Opinion ID: 205620
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Beann Defendants

Text: The answer to the issue of general jurisdiction over the Beann defendants, insofar as it concerns operation of the Wave59 forum where the offending email was posted, is fairly straightforward, particularly on the sparse facts alleged by Mr. Shrader. The forum was simply a vehicle by which members could exchange information, and there is no indication that the Beann defendants interfered with its operation so as to alter its basic passive character (Mr. Shrader's primary complaint is that they did not interfere and remove the posting). Taking guidance from the case law noted above dealing with passive web sites, we conclude that Mr. Shrader failed to demonstrate general jurisdiction over the Beann defendants based on operation of the Wave59 forum. [5] As for specific jurisdiction, the Beann defendants might be subject to suit in Oklahoma based on the allegedly defamatory email posted on the Wave59 forum if they had intentionally directed the forum at Oklahoma. But there is no indication the forum targeted an Oklahoma audience or the work of Oklahoma writers, much less Mr. Shrader personally. Nor are there any facts suggesting the forum had some other connection to Oklahoma. On the contrary, Mr. Shrader's pleadings stressed the forum's non -local nature, repeatedly referring to the fact that it drew an audience from all over the world. Mr. Shrader attempted to tie the Beann defendants to the acts of the other defendants by alleging, in conclusory and speculative fashion, a civil conspiracy to interfere with his business. These are just the sorts of allegations Dudnikov directs us not to consider, as it pointedly limits the facts that must be accepted for purposes of the jurisdictional analysis to those well-pled (that is, plausible, non-conclusory, and non-speculative) facts alleged in plaintiff['s] complaint, 514 F.3d at 1070 (citation omitted). As we have held elsewhere, [i]n order for personal jurisdiction based on a conspiracy theory to exist, the plaintiff must offer more than `bare allegations' that a conspiracy existed, and must allege facts that would support a prima facie showing of a conspiracy. Melea, Ltd. v. Jawer SA, 511 F.3d 1060, 1069 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Lolavar v. de Santibanes, 430 F.3d 221, 229 (4th Cir.2005)). See generally Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (holding conclusory allegation of conspiracy is insufficient, even when coupled with parallel conduct by defendants). Mr. Shrader has not done that.
The question of general jurisdiction here is potentially more complicated when the Wave59 web site's commercial activities are considered. These do not affect the analysis of specific jurisdiction, since only the contacts out of which Mr. Shrader's tort claims arise are relevant in that respect. As the Fifth Circuit explained in analogous circumstances: For specific jurisdiction we look only to the contact out of which the cause of action arisesin this case the maintenance of the internet bulletin board. Since this defamation action does not arise out of the solicitation of [business]..., those [commercial] portions of the website need not be considered. Revell, 317 F.3d at 472 (footnote omitted). But the case for general jurisdiction, which is based on all of a defendant's contacts with the forum state, can sweep much broader to include the sales side of the site. It should be emphasized that, as we are dealing with general jurisdiction, the commercial contacts here must be of a sort that approximate physical presence in the stateand engaging in commerce with residents of the forum state is not in and of itself the kind of activity that approximates physical presence within the state's borders. Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l, Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.2000); see Revell, 317 F.3d at 471 & n. 19; Bird v. Parsons, 289 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir.2002). Nevertheless, most courts would agree that operating a web site selling products to residents of a state can subject the seller to general jurisdiction in that state, depending on the nature and degree of commercial activity with the forum state. See, e.g., Lakin v. Prudential Sec. Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 712-13 (8th Cir.2003) (noting determination of general jurisdiction over commercial web site would require development of facts regarding quantity of transactions with forum residents); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C.Cir. 2002) (same). The case law sets the bar quite high, however, denying general jurisdiction absent substantial sales. Compare Campbell Pet Co. v. Miale, 542 F.3d 879, 884 (Fed. Cir.2008) (holding twelve internet sales for $14,000 over eight years insufficient for general jurisdiction); Revell, 317 F.3d at 471 (holding sales of thirty-five subscriptions in two years insufficient for general jurisdiction); Bird, 289 F.3d at 873-74 (holding 4,666 internet domain-name registrations, specifically analogized to sales, insufficient for general jurisdiction); ESAB Group, Inc. v. Centricut, Inc., 126 F.3d 617, 623-24 (4th Cir.1997) (holding twenty-six mail order customers in forum state insufficient for general jurisdiction) with Gator.Com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir.2003) (finding general jurisdiction based in part on millions of dollars in sales, driven by an extensive, ongoing, and sophisticated sales effort involving large numbers of direct email solicitations and millions of catalog sales), vacated as moot on reh'g en banc on basis of settlement, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir.2005). In sum, the best general formulation for this niche of the law may have been provided by the district court in Oklahoma: A web site will subject a defendant to general personal jurisdiction only when the defendant has actually and deliberately used its website to conduct commercial transactions on a sustained basis with a substantial number of residents of the forum. Smith v. Basin Park Hotel, Inc., 178 F.Supp.2d 1225, 1235 (N.D.Okla.2001) (emphasis added). Turning back to our case, Mr. Shrader has not emphasized this aspect of the jurisdictional issue, but he has not completely ignored it. He submitted, and the district court admitted, several exhibits relating to commercial activity on the Wave59 site, which show that (1) he purchased books, courses, and a data feed from Wave59; (2) another person from Tulsa purchased a book from Wave59; and (3) Wave59 advertized in a magazine called TradersWorld, which was available for purchase at a Tulsa bookstore. [6] This showing is clearly insufficient to warrant the exercise of general personal jurisdiction over the Beann defendants.