Opinion ID: 4025929
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: What Speech Matters?

Text: Although the termination letter Holbrook received cites three speech-based grounds for the decision—i.e., the July 26 e-mail, the Facebook post, and Holbrook’s conversation with the assistant chief of a neighboring fire department—the district court’s ruling and the parties’ briefing below and on appeal have focused primarily on Holbrook’s July 26 e-mail to fire department employees. It was this correspondence that evidently triggered Dumas’s ire—written in “all caps” with multiple exclamation points, informing employees that “we could potentially be out of a job” because closure of the fire department could be imminent, urging employees to attend the next Village Council meeting, and accompanied by the notice of insurance cancellation . . . even before Village leaders discussed the significance of the notice at the July 28 Village Council meeting. Of the three speech-based grounds included in the termination letter, Dumas ostensibly knew only about the July 26 e-mail correspondence when, on August 5, Dumas told Holbrook she would be asking for his resignation after he admitted communicating the potential loss of jobs to employees. R. 22-8, Holbrook Aff. at ¶ 7, Page ID 236. It was this correspondence that Dumas has characterized in her briefing as sensationalized and alarmist, inciting panic among employees, hurting morale, and inducing some to leave the department. It was this correspondence, more than the others, that fits the termination letter description of Holbrook’s “violation” as “disruptive activity in the workplace,” and “insubordination and other disrespectful conduct,” and “unauthorized disclosure of confidential information” and “unsatisfactory performance or conduct.” R. 19-1 Ex. F, Termination Letter, Page ID 152. In his appellate briefing, however, Holbrook has taken a somewhat different tack. He has attempted to blur the focus by relying more heavily on the later communications as speech-based -8- Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas grounds for his termination. He argues that Dumas’s reference to these communications in the termination letter—i.e., communications directed to non-employees—indicates he was disciplined in part due to speech that was not strictly intra-departmental, speech that was not pursuant to his official duties, speech that was “as a citizen.” The district court did not address this argument—and for good reason. Review of the briefing on both motions for summary judgment reveals that the argument was not addressed to the district court. That is, the summary judgment briefing reflects the parties’ mutual understanding that the principal speech-based reason for termination was the July 26 e-mail. Holbrook’s attempt to now attack the district court ruling based on arguments not presented below is improper and entitled to no consideration on appeal. See Hayward v. Cleveland Clinic Foundation, 759 F.3d 601, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2014) (argument not raised below deemed waived unless plain miscarriage of justice would result). Moreover, as detailed below, careful review of the totality of the circumstances reveals why the July 26 e-mail was the focus below and why we need not address the newly asserted role of the later communications to avoid a miscarriage of justice. Yes, the termination letter mentions the Facebook message—addressed to current and past employees and those who support the fire department—and Holbrook’s assistant chief conversation. By the time Holbrook had disclosed the Facebook post and the assistant chief conversation in his August 8 answers to Dumas, however, the notice of insurance cancellation had already been made public, by Dumas herself, at the July 28 Village Council meeting. 4 The subsequent communications can hardly have provoked Dumas, as they disclosed nothing more than she had already disclosed herself. The impact of Holbrook’s later communications thus 4 In fact, according to Holbrook’s Facebook posting, the Village made a video recording of the Village Council meeting available on-line. -9- Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas appears to have been redundant of the impact of the July 26 e-mail, which is clearly what provoked Dumas. And apart from their nominal inclusion in the termination letter, the record is devoid of evidence—from either side—supporting the notion that either of these communications played a motivating role in the termination decision. Instead, the record evidence is decidedly to the contrary. As indicated above, Holbrook’s affidavit avers that Dumas said she would ask for his resignation on August 5, immediately after he admitted sending the July 26 e-mail to employees, ostensibly before she knew anything about the later communications. Within days, Holbrook sent a letter of formal complaint to Village Mayor LaVerne Mitchell, objecting to the unfairness of Dumas’s anticipated request for his resignation. R. 19-1 Ex. C, Letter to Mayor, Page ID 139. In his protestations to the Mayor, Holbrook complained that he was being punished for telling the employees about the insurance letter and the consequent threat to their employment, information he thought they had a right to know about, and information he thought he, as “Chief,” had a duty to communicate to his employees. Further, Holbrook’s deposition testimony, given eight months later, demonstrates that he continued to believe, unequivocally, that this was the reason for his termination. That is, he believed, “absolutely,” that he was retaliated against because he told employees about the insurance problem. R.19-1, Holbrook Dep. at 63, 66, Page ID 129–30. This “violation” was accomplished by the July 26 e-mail. Given the extant record, the conclusion is practically inescapable that Dumas included the later two communications in the termination letter, communications addressed to nonemployees, simply to buttress the real reason for her decision, her disapproval of the July 26 e- mail. It was clearly the alarmist July 26 e-mail to the firefighters personally that could be reasonably perceived by Dumas as an “unauthorized disclosure,” as “insubordinate and - 10 - Case No. 15-4334, Holbrook v. Dumas disrespectful,” and as “disruptive in the work place.” This was almost certainly the predominant trigger of Dumas’s strong reaction. Indeed, Holbrook readily admitted in deposition that employees’ knowledge of the insurance problem and the threat to their jobs affected morale and contributed to attrition in the fire department. R. 19-1, Holbrook Dep. at 40, Page ID 123. Thus, even if Holbrook’s new reliance on the Facebook post and assistant chief conversation were considered, the conclusion that Holbrook was fired for sending the July 26 e-mail, as Fire Chief, to his employees, enjoys far more support in the record than any other conclusion. The inclusion of the later communications in the termination letter amounts to no more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the newly asserted notion that Holbrook’s communications with nonemployees actually precipitated his firing. Any mischief perceived to have been done by the later communications would appear to have been redundant of, and wholly incidental to, the actual moving cause of Dumas’s decision.5 Hence, the threshold question whether Holbrook engaged in speech as a citizen on a matter of public concern is rightly focused on the July 26 e-mail communication.