Opinion ID: 2513946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Necessary Showing for a Prima Facie Case

Text: Wheeler used both the terms strong likelihood and reasonable inference in describing the standard for a prima facie case. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280, 281, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) We believe it obvious that we considered the two terms to be different phrasing of the same standard. Language in a 1994 Court of Appeal decision, People v. Bernard (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 458, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 486, however, created some uncertainty. That case seemed to read the two terms as stating different standards, with reasonable inference being a lower standard than strong likelihood. ( Id. at p. 465, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 486.) In Wade v. Terhune (9th Cir.2000) 202 F.3d 1190, the court found that, at least after People v. Bernard, supra, 27 Cal. App.4th 458, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 486, California state courts have applied a lower standard of scrutiny to peremptory strikes than the federal Constitution permits. ( Wade v. Terhune, supra, at pp. 1196-1197.) The court noted also that, in recent years, this court has generally cited the strong likelihood language rather than the reasonable inference language. ( Id. at p. 1197.) It believed that California courts give criminal defendants less protection than the United States Constitution requires when they follow the Wheeler `strong likelihood' test in determining whether a prima facie case has been established. ( Wade v. Terhune, supra, at p. 1197.) In the court's view, the Wheeler `strong likelihood' test for a successful prima facie showing of bias is impermissibly stringent in comparison to the more generous Batson `inference' test. ( Ibid. ) The court therefore conclude[d] that California courts in following the `strong likelihood' language of Wheeler are not applying the correct legal standard for a prima facie case under Batson. (Ibid. ) Shortly after Wade v. Terhune, supra, 202 F.3d 1190, and in response to it, we reiterated that in California, a `strong likelihood' means a `reasonable inference,'  and disapproved People v. Bernard, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 458, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 486, to the extent it is inconsistent with People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pages 280-281, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748. ( People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1188, fn. 7, 99 Cal.Rptr .2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that this action did not cure the problem it perceived, at least for cases tried after Bernard and before Box in which trial courts were following Bernard's take on Wheeler. (Cooperwood v. Cambra (9th Cir.2001) 245 F.3d 1042, 1047.) It said that regardless of our action in People v. Box, supra, at page 1188, footnote 7, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130, whenever state courts use the `strong likelihood' standard, ... these courts are applying a lower standard of scrutiny to peremptory strikes than the federal Constitution permits. ( Cooperwood v. Cambra, supra, at p. 1047.) The majority below agreed and, accordingly, found that the trial court used an impermissible standard in determining whether defendant had established a prima facie case. We reiterate what we implied in Wheeler and stated in Box: Wheeler's terms strong likelihood and reasonable inference state the same standard. ( People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1188, fn. 7, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) This has always been true, although we recognize that People v. Bernard, supra, 27 Cal.App.4th 458, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 486, may have created some uncertainty for a few years. But the important question for current purposes is not whether California courts have always viewed these terms as the same, but whether California's strong likelihood standard violates Batson. The Wade v. Terhune court and the majority below assumed that Batson's inference test is more generous than Wheeler's strong likelihood test without examining what the United State Supreme Court itself has said on the matter. ( Wade v. Terhune, supra, 202 F.3d at p. 1197.) But to address this question, it is necessary to delineate exactly what the high court meant when it equated the necessary prima facie case with an inference of discriminatory purpose. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) We believe the court has made its meaning clear. The high court appears to have given other courts some flexibility in establishing the exact procedures to follow. We decline, however, to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 99, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) Thus, to some extent at least, Batson seems to have left to lower courts the task of determining the type and quantum of proof necessary for a defendant to establish a prima facie case. ( State v. Duncan (La.2001) 802 So.2d 533, 545; see also Note, Batson v. Kentucky and the Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenge: Arbitrary and Capricious Equal Protection? (1988) 74 Va. L.Rev. 811, 817 [The Supreme Court has left the lower courts to grapple with the proper implementation of the Batson test. They must determine not only the quantum of proof necessary for a defendant to establish a prima facie case but also the types of explanations sufficient to rebut the defendant's claim].) But whatever flexibility the high court has left state courts, the California standard is not less generous than the test the Batson court itself applies to establish a prima facie case. In Batson, the court stated that its decisions under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 explained the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94, fn. 18, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) The court has since repeatedly cited title VII cases as authoritative in the Batson context. ( Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003) 537 U.S. 322, 338, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 1041, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 ( Miller-El); Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769,131 L.Ed.2d 834; Hernandez v. New York (1991) 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (plur.opn.).) One of the decisions the court cited in Batson, McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973) 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668, made clear that the plaintiff carried the initial burden of showing actions from which one can infer, if such actions remain unexplained, that it is more likely than not that such actions were `based on a discriminatory criterion illegal under the Act.' ( Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters (1978) 438 U.S. 567, 576, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957, italics added.) Another of the decisions that Batson cited explained that the burden is not onerous, but the party nevertheless had to prove by the preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of discrimination. ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine (1981) 450 U.S. 248, 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, italics added.) It stated that the prima facie case `raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. ( Id. at p. 254, 101 S.Ct. 1089, italics added.) In one of the cases Batson cited, the high court recognized that the term prima facie case is, by itself, ambiguous, so it specifically stated what it meant in this context. The phrase `prima facie case' not only may denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presumption, but also may be used by courts to describe the plaintiffs burden of producing enough evidence to permit the trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2494 (3d ed.1940). McDonnell Douglas should have made it apparent that in the Title VII context we use `prima facie case' in the former sense. ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 254, fn. 7, 101 S.Ct. 1089.) Thus, when it refers to the objector establishing an inference of discriminatory purpose ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 94, 106 S.Ct. 1712), the high court means establishing a legally mandatory rebuttable presumption, and not merely presenting enough evidence to permit the inference. Wigmore, in turn, goes into greater detail. He explains that the term `prima facie case' is used in two senses.... (9 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourne rev. ed.1981) § 2494, p. 378.) [2] The sense the high court does not mean in this context created the lower of the two burdens merely the duty of producing some evidence  sufficient to allow a matter to go to the jury. (Wigmore, at p. 379, italics added.) Wigmore also describes the sense in which the high court uses the term. [T]he term `prima facie' is sometimes used as equivalent to the notion of a presumption, even in the strict sense of a ruling of the judge putting upon the opponent the duty of producing evidence. ( Ibid. ) Thus, it applies where the proponent, having the burden of proving the issue (i.e., the risk of nonpersuasion of the jury), has not only removed by sufficient evidence the duty of producing evidence to get past the judge or the jury, but has gone further, and, either by means of a presumption or by a general mass of strong evidence, has entitled himself to a ruling that the opponent should fail if he does nothing more in the way of producing evidence. ( Ibid., italics added.) Thus, Batson permits a court to require the objector to present, not merely some evidence permitting the inference, but strong evidence that makes discriminatory intent more likely than not if the challenges are not explained. Nothing suggests the high court has since modified Batson's approach. Indeed, in its most recent decision on this subject, it said it was considering the three-step framework mandated by Batson and reaffirmed in our later precedents and, in describing the prima facie case requirement, echoed Batson's inference language. ( Miller-El, supra, 537 U.S. at pp. 338, 347, 123 S.Ct. at pp. 1040, 1045 [the inference of discrimination to support a prima facie case].) Other states, although not all, [3] have reached similar conclusions regarding Batson's meaning. Citing Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at pages 252-253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, the Connecticut Supreme Court has said that under the first stage of the Batson inquiry, the defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. ( State v. Gonzalez (1988) 206 Conn. 391, 538 A.2d 210, 213.) The Maryland Court of Appeals recognized that Batson cited title VII cases for an explanation of the operation of prima facie burden of proof rules. ( Stanley v. State (1988) 313 Md. 50, 542 A.2d 1267, 1271.) The Maryland Court of Appeals also concluded that to make the prima facie showing Batson requires, the moving party must `prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the peremptory challenges were exercised in a way that shifts the burden of production to the State and requires it to respond to the rebuttable presumption of purposeful discrimination that arises under certain circumstances.'  ( Mejia v. State (1992) 328 Md. 522, 616 A.2d 356, 361, quoting Stanley v. State, supra, at p. 1277.) Wheeler's term strong likelihood signals that it meant prima facie case in a similar sense. [4] This burden is not onerous ( Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, supra, 450 U.S. at p. 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089), but it is substantial. It is also appropriate to compel the objecting party to meet this burden before it can force the other party to explain the reasons for its peremptory challenges. The burden is one which a party may reasonably be expected to sustain in meritorious cases, but which he cannot abuse to the detriment of the peremptory challenge system. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 278, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) The high court itself has noted that the Batson analysis permits prompt rulings on objections to peremptory challenges without substantial disruption of the jury selection process. ( Hernandez v. New York, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 358, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (plur.opn.); see also id. at p. 374, 111 S.Ct. 1859 (cone. opn. of O'Connor, J.) [warning against unacceptable delays in the trial process that would be antithetical to the nature and purpose of the peremptory challenge].) The term strong likelihood has never set a higher standard than Batson permits. Wheeler define[d] a burden of proof. . . . ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 278, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) Except as otherwise provided by law, the default burden of proof in California is proof by a preponderance of the evidence. (Evid. Code, § 115; see Conservatorship of Wendland (2001) 26 Cal.4th 519, 546, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 28 P.3d 151.) Here, no other law has provided for a different standard. This court has never suggested that Wheeler imposed the burden of either clear and convincing proof or proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the two higher burdens of proof that exist in this state. (Evid.Code, § 115.) Moreover, the unqualified word likelihood would have been insufficient to signal the correct standard. That word, or the equivalent likely, has a range of meanings, including some lower than more likely than not. (See People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti ) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 917, 922, 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 44 P.3d 949 [interpreting a statute using the word likely as not requiring a showing of a better than even chance].) Thus, qualifying likelihood with strong is appropriate and consistent with Batson. Although not dispositive, the Batson court itself considered Wheeler's procedures comparable to its own. It did not specifically cite Wheeler's strong likelihood language, but it referred to this court's procedures implementing its version of [Batson's evidentiary] standard without suggesting there was anything wrong with those procedures. ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 99, fn. 23, 106 S.Ct. 1712.) We disagree that the strong likelihood standard became too high in the interval between People v. Bernard, supra, 27 Cal. App.4th 458, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 486, and People Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130. Bernard did not somehow transform strong likelihood from a correct to an incorrect standard. Like the court in Wade v. Terhune, supra, 202 F.3d 1190, and the majority below, the Bernard court did not examine what Wheeler or the high court meant by the word inference in this context. It misunderstood that meaning. The Bernard court said the presumption that peremptory challenges are being used properly should be rebuttable only by a strong showing, not a mere inference, because a different standard might easily transform removal of each and every prospective juror belonging to a cognizable group into a Wheeler hearing. ( People v. Bernard, supra, at p. 465, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 486.) It also referred to a reduction of the prima facie standard to a `reasonable inference' test. ( Ibid. ) This use of the word inference was akin to Wigmore's lower sense of evidence merely permitting one to draw an inference, not the higher sense of Batson and Wheeler. Thus, to the extent Bernard erred, it was in assuming inference was lower than it really is in this context, not in raising strong likelihood to an impermissibly high standard. Accordingly, Wheeler's standard for establishing a prima facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges is, and always has been, compatible with Batson. It merely means that to state a prima facie case, the objector must show that it is more likely than not the other party's peremptory challenges, if unexplained, were based on impermissible group bias. The trial court here properly cited the Wheeler standard in determining whether defendant had established a prima facie case.