Opinion ID: 2446551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the urlta as limited to the counties containing cities of the first class and urban-county government constitutes local or special legislation in violation of sections 59 and 60 of the kentucky constitution.

Text: URLTA is an adoption of our General Assembly of the Model Residential Landlord-Tenant Code. [1] The Kentucky Legislature adopted the Act, recognizing what progress had been made in other legislatures in the tenant-landlord area. [2] It realized that Anglo-Saxon agrarian common laws, which had been the foundation of tenant-landlord relationships, provided scant relevance to such current matters, particularly in urban areas. McCabe. As noted by McCabe in his comments on URLTA: But the 250 practicing lawyers, judges and law professors who drafted the act agreed the basic reform of the landlord-tenant laws could prevent marginal housing from sliding into the area of uninhabitable housing  and then, inevitably, into abandonment. Present laws in most states encourage landlords to defer maintenance to net high short-terms profits and tax benefits. In this way apartment buildings die by degree as plumbing, electrical and other systems decay and eventually stop functioning entirely. At the same time, trash and garbage piles up, yards or common areas are unusable, and the property becomes a neighborhood eyesore eventually, fit only as housing for rats. Whenever a building reaches that point where taxes, mortgage rates and other fixed expenses eat up all the rent collected from tenants who have a decreasing ability to pay it, the property is unsalvageable. That's why the Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act is aimed at keeping decent housing clean and safe. Our legislature, by placing duties to care for the property on both the landlord and tenant (see KRS 383.595 and KRS 383.605, respectively), has attempted to keep the property on the market, provide a fair return for the landlord, and provide the tenant with a habitable place to live. URLTA was enacted by the Legislature with the specific purposes and policies of encouraging landlords and tenants to maintain and improve the quality of housing and to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of URLTA among those states which enact it. KRS 383.505(2)(a) and (b). Section 383.530 Territorial Application provides that the URLTA shall apply to, regulate, and determine rights, obligations and remedies under a rental agreement, wherever made, for a dwelling unit located within this state. In limitation of general scope and purpose of the URLTA, and in conflict with the provisions set forth in KRS 383.505(2)(a) and (b) and KRS 383.530, the Legislature limited the applicability of the URLTA to counties containing cities of the first class and urban-county governments. KRS 383.715. At the time URLTA was enacted and presently URLTA is limited by its terms to only two of the 120 counties in Kentucky, namely Jefferson and Fayette Counties. Section 59 of the Constitution of Kentucky, provides that the General Assembly shall not pass local or special acts in any case where a general law can be made applicable. Section 60 of the Constitution of Kentucky provides that the General Assembly shall not indirectly enact any special or local act by exempting from the operations of a general act any city, town, district or county. Special or local legislation as defined in Board of Education of Jefferson County v. Board of Education of Louisville, Ky., 472 S.W.2d 496 (1971) at 498 is as follows: A local act is one confined to territorial limits, other than that of the whole state or is applicable to some political subdivision and not to others. A special law is legislation which arbitrarily or beyond reasonable justification discriminates against some persons or objects and favors others. (Emphasis provided.) The definition of local or special legislation provided by the Kentucky courts is similar to that definition used by the United States Supreme Court. In Gray v. Taylor, 227 U.S. 51, 33 S.Ct. 199, 57 L.Ed. 413 (1913), Justice Holmes, for a unanimous court, defined local law as: . . . a law that in fact, if not in form, is directed only to a specific spot. . . . Although classifications according to population are allowable, where the subject is one of general application throughout the state and has been so treated in the general scheme of legislation, distinctions favorable or unfavorable to particular localities resting alone upon numbers and density of population would be violative of Section 59 and Section 60 of the Constitution of Kentucky. James v. Barry, 138 Ky. 656, 128 S.W. 1070 (1910). Stated another way, an Act based upon a classification merely according to classes of cities cannot be upheld unless it pertains to the organizations or government of the classified cities or unless the classification has a reasonable relation to the purpose of the Act. Mannini v. McFarland, 294 Ky. 837, 172 S.W.2d 631 (1943); Hall v. Miller, Ky.App., 584 S.W.2d 51 (1979); United Dry Forces, et al. v. Lewis, et al., Ky., 619 S.W.2d 489 (1981). It is clear that the stated purpose and policy of the URLTA does not pertain to the organization or government of the Counties of Jefferson or Fayette. The issue then becomes whether the application of the URLTA to only counties containing cities of the first class and urban county governments has a reasonable relation to the purpose of the Act. As quoted in Chandler v. City of Louisville, 277 Ky. 79, 125 S.W.2d 1026 (1939): It is a mistaken idea that because classification on the basis of population is sustainable in respect of legislation on certain subjects, it may be appropriate for all purposes of classification in legislative enactments. Such a basis for classification must have a reasonable relation to the purposes and objects of the legislation and must be based upon a rational difference in the necessities or conditions found in the groups subjected to different laws. If no such relation and difference exists, the classification is invalid. The appellant Miles asserts that the rational basis for limiting the URLTA to counties containing cities of the first class and urban-county governments is (1) the number and density of tenants in such counties, (2) the closeness of the dwellings in these urban areas and the corresponding health problems, (3) the amount of substandard housing and prevention of economic waste, and (4) its current non-application. Although it may be conceded that Jefferson and Fayette Counties have the first and fourth, respectively, largest number of tenants occupying substandard housing of the one hundred and twenty (120) counties in the Commonwealth, the mere acuteness of the problem with respect to these two counties does not serve as a rational basis for eliminating or refusing to deal with similar situations, involving the other 118 counties in the Commonwealth. The problems of public health, economic waste and substandard dwelling dealt with by the act are no less important in the other 118 counties in the Commonwealth. As stated by the Court of Appeals, There is no indication that the problem of substandard rental housing and crowded rental quarters is any more acute in proportion to the population in Jefferson County and Fayette County than it is in other areas of the state. Even when absolute numbers (rather than percentages) are used, it is apparent that Jefferson and Fayette counties are not the two counties with the largest number of substandard renter-occupied units. Pike and Hardin Counties occupy the second and third positions on the chart, with Fayette County coming in fourth. It is the opinion of this Court that the Jefferson Circuit Court and Court of Appeals decisions holding that the URLTA is special legislation within the prohibition of the Kentucky Constitution and therefore invalid is correct, and the decisions are affirmed. As to the issue of whether the Appellee, Kenneth Shauntee, a Jefferson County landlord, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the URLTA it is apparent that as a property owner and landlord in Jefferson County he is directly affected by the statute in question. It goes without saying that a person who is injured or prejudiced by an unconstitutional law can complain of it. Akers v. Floyd County Fiscal Court, Ky., 556 S.W.2d 146 (1977), at page 149, citing Kohler v. Benckart, Ky., 252 S.W.2d 854 (1952); Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, Ky., 445 S.W.2d 709 (1969).