Opinion ID: 2464796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Continuance/DiscoverySummary Judgment

Text: [¶ 26] In two related issues, Ms. Magin challenges the district court's refusal to grant her motion to continue the summary judgment hearing and her motion for additional time to conduct discovery. The district court has broad discretion to grant or deny a motion for continuance and absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will not disturb its ruling. Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, ¶ 16, 101 P.3d 446, 454 (Wyo.2004). To find an abuse of discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to deny appellant due process, and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual prejudice and a violation of his rights. Upon review we look at the peculiar circumstances of the case and the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time of the request. Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 671, ¶ 7 (Wyo.2003). Id. See also, Jacobson v. Cobbs, 2007 WY 99, ¶ 10, 160 P.3d 654, 657 (Wyo.2007). [¶ 27] Solitude filed its motion for summary judgment in August 2009. Ms. Magin filed motions for extension of time to respond to the summary judgment motion in August and September 2009, citing Solitude's failure to comply with her discovery requests. At the hearing on September 29, 2009, the district court ordered Solitude to produce the documents requested by Ms. Magin and make its board members and experts available for depositions. Solitude produced documents to Ms. Magin in October 2009. [¶ 28] The record contains no evidence that Ms. Magin made any effort to depose the Solitude board members and experts following the district court's ruling that she was entitled to do so. If she did and was refused by Solitude, Ms. Magin filed no motion to compel. Additionally, after Solitude produced the documents in October 2009, the record contains no evidence that Ms. Magin requested additional information or used the documents produced to prepare a response to Solitude's motion for summary judgment. [¶ 29] On February 22, 2010, the district court sua sponte set a hearing on all pending motions for April 1, 2010. Ms Magin still took no action to prepare a response to the summary judgment motion and on March 26, 2010, filed a motion to continue the hearing on Solitude's summary judgment motion. The district court denied the motion to continue on March 30, 2010. On the day of the hearing, Ms. Magin filed a memorandum requesting additional time to respond to Solitude's summary judgment motion under W.R.C.P. 56(f), citing among other reasons, the need to depose several witnesses. The district court denied the request and granted summary judgment on the merits in favor of Solitude. [¶ 30] Ms. Magin claims the district court should have continued the hearing and allowed her additional time to conduct discovery because it had not ruled on her motion for reconsideration of the disqualification motion and had not established discovery deadlines after ordering Solitude to comply with her discovery requests at the September 29, 2009, hearing. Although a district court has the power to reconsider its pre-judgment rulings, see, e.g., Steranko v. Dunks, 2009 WY 9, ¶ 6, 199 P.3d 1096, 1096-97 (Wyo.2009) (order granting petition for writ of review), Ms. Magin provides no authority that a motion for reconsideration of a pre-judgment ruling relieves litigants of their responsibility to respond timely to a summary judgment motion. [¶ 31] In addition, the fact that a district court has not set deadlines for discovery or filing responses to dispositive motions does not mean the parties can allow a matter to languish. Wyoming Rule of Civil Procedure 6(b) and (c) set forth the time for responding to motions when the district court has not set other deadlines and a means for seeking an order from the district court establishing different deadlines. Rule 6(c)(1) states: Unless these rules or an order of the court establish time limitations other than those contained herein, all motions, . . . together with supporting affidavits, if any, shall be served at least 10 days before the hearing on the motion. . . . [U]nless the court by order permits service at some other time, a party affected by the motion may serve a response, together with affidavits, if any, at least three days prior to the hearing on the motion or within 20 days after service of the motion, whichever is earlier. Unless the court by order permits service at some other time, the moving party may serve a reply, if any, at least one day prior to the hearing on the motion or within 15 days after service of the response, whichever is earlier. Unless the court otherwise orders, any party may serve supplemental memoranda or rebuttal affidavits at least one day prior to the hearing on the motion. See also, Kruckenberg v. Ding Masters, Inc., 2008 WY 40, ¶ 15, 180 P.3d 895, 900 (Wyo. 2008). Ms. Magin's claim that the summary judgment hearing should have been continued because the district court had not set specific deadlines ignores the requirements of the rules of civil procedure. If Ms. Magin wanted different deadlines set, she should have filed a motion asking for them. [3] In addition, nearly six weeks passed between the February 22, 2010, order setting the summary judgment hearing and the actual hearing on April 1, 2010, during which Ms. Magin could have prepared a response to Solitude's summary judgment motion. [¶ 32] Ms. Magin also claimed she was entitled to additional time to conduct discovery under W.R.C.P. 56(f): Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. In Jacobson, ¶¶ 11-15, 160 P.3d at 657-58, we agreed with the district court that a litigant cannot use Rule 56(f) to excuse his failure to move forward with discovery, etc. and forestall summary judgment when he has had ample time to conduct discovery and respond to a summary judgment motion. Ruling that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Jacobson's motion for enlargement of time to respond to Cobb's summary judgment motion, we distinguished Abraham. In that case, we held that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to continue the summary judgment hearing when the discovery deadline had not expired and the defendant had not been given adequate time to respond to the summary judgment motion. Id., ¶ 19, 101 P.3d at 455. [¶ 33] The present case is more similar to Jacobson than to Abraham. Ms. Magin did not establish that she had insufficient time to obtain the necessary discovery or that she had a valid reason for being unable to present facts essential to her position. She had over six months from the time the district court granted her discovery requests until the summary judgment hearing was held. Even after the denial of her motion for disqualification, she had four months to prepare. Ms. Magin simply ignored her obligations to move forward with discovery and present a response to Solitude's summary judgment motion. [¶ 34] In denying Ms. Magin's request for a continuance and granting Solitude's motion for summary judgment, the district court specifically stated that it was relying on the principles set forth in W.R.C.P. 1: These rules govern procedure in all courts of record in the State of Wyoming, in all actions, suits or proceedings of a civil nature and in all special statutory proceedings except as provided in Rule 81. They shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action. (Emphasis added.) The district court acted well within its discretion and consistent with the letter and spirit of the rules. Considering the extended procedural history in this case, we conclude the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for a continuance or refusing Ms. Magin additional time to respond to the summary judgment motion under Rule 56(f).