Opinion ID: 2746598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Johnson's Lawyers

Text: Defendant next argues the district court abused its discretion by not allowing Johnson's attorneys to testify about her statements claiming responsibility for the drugs. This evidence, he contends, should have been admitted under either Rule 804(b)(3) or Rule 807 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mojica-Baez, 229 F.3d 292, 300 (1st Cir. 2000).
Hearsay is a declarant's out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed. R. Evid. 801. With certain exceptions, hearsay is not admissible in federal court. Fed. R. Evid. 802. One exception is Rule 804(b)(3), under -20- which hearsay is admissible if the declarant is unavailable to testify, and the statement--when made--would have tended to expose the declarant to criminal liability (among other requirements not in dispute). We look at all surrounding circumstances to determine whether a statement was against a declarant's criminal interest. See United States v. Pelletier, 666 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2011). The district court found Johnson's statements to her attorneys could not come in under Rule 804(b)(3) because they would not have exposed her to criminal liability. We agree. The limited case law on point counsels for exclusion, and logically so. See, e.g., Revels v. Diguglielmo, No. Civ.A. 03-5412, 2005 WL 1677951, at  (E.D. Penn. July 18, 2005) (unpublished) (state court correctly held that . . . Mr. Perrin's communications with his lawyer . . . were protected by attorney-client privilege and therefore not against his penal interest); People v. Johnson, 482 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) ([A] statement made to an attorney is confidential and, therefore, not adverse to one's penal interest . . . .). Indeed, the primary case relied upon by Defendant, Morales v. Portuondo, 154 F. Supp. 2d 706 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), actually counsels against his position on Rule 804(b)(3). In Morales a man named Fornes confessed guilt to an attorney named Servino, and the court found this confession was against Fornes' penal interest. Id. at 712, 725—26. But Servino was not Fornes' attorney; rather, he represented Morales, who was charged with the -21- crime to which Fornes confessed. Id. at 712. In short, no confidentiality or privilege was in play because Fornes believed [Servino] would take the information to the prosecuting authorities. Id. at 726. Furthermore, Fornes confessed to another attorney (named Cohen) and the court found this confession was not against Fornes' criminal interest because Fornes had sought Cohen out for legal advice and thus fully expected that Cohen would keep his conversations . . . confidential. Id. at 713–14, 726. Again, on Rule 804(b)(3), Morales in no way favors Defendant. Nevertheless, Defendant puts forth several additional arguments for why Johnson's statements to her attorneys were against her criminal interest. None of them hold water. First, he contends we must take context into account, see Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 603 (1994) ([W]hether a statement is self-inculpatory or not can only be determined by viewing it in context.), the pertinent context (according to Defendant) being that Johnson made identical statements to other people that were against her criminal interest. Defendant essentially asks us to adopt a sort of legal osmosis: Johnson made several statements against her criminal interest, so any statement containing the same information was against her criminal interest as well. This is nonsensical, as it would require us to do the very thing Defendant urges us not to do--ignore context. Although Johnson made a number -22- of similar statements, those made in the context of the attorneyclient privilege were simply not against her criminal interest. Defendant tries a different twist along the same lines. Even if Johnson's statements to her attorneys were confidential, he asserts, her later statements to third parties waived the attorneyclient privilege, subjecting her to criminal liability. See In re Keeper of the Records (Grand Jury Subpoena Addressed to XYZ Corp.), 348 F.3d 16, 22 (1st Cir. 2003) ([T]he attorney-client privilege may be waived . . . . When otherwise privileged communications are disclosed to a third party, the disclosure destroys the confidentiality upon which the privilege is premised.). Defendant did not contend there was a privilege waiver before the district court, however, meaning this argument is, ironically, waived. See Vázquez-Rivera v. Figueroa, 759 F.3d 44, 49 (1st Cir. 2014). We decline to evade logic and case law. Johnson's statements to her attorneys were not against her criminal interest because, when made, they were confidential and protected by the attorney-client privilege. Thus, the district court correctly found her attorneys' proffered testimony about those statements to be inadmissible under Rule 804(b)(3).
Another exception to hearsay exclusion is the Residual Exception, by which hearsay is admissible if: (1) the statement has equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness; (2) it -23- is offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) it is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence that the proponent can obtain through reasonable efforts; and (4) admitting it will best serve the purposes of these rules and the interests of justice. Fed. R. Evid. 807(a). In general, Congress intended the residual hearsay exception to be used very rarely, and only in exceptional circumstances. United States v. Trenkler, 61 F.3d 45, 59 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court excluded the testimony of Johnson's attorneys under Rule 807(a)'s third element. The attorneys' testimony would have been cumulative rather than more probative, the court found, because it was duplicative of Johnson's own notarized statements. Awer, 502 F. Supp. 2d at 276. Defendant again relies on Morales to argue for admission. There, after ruling out Rule 804(b)(3), the court admitted Fornes' statements to attorney Cohen under Rule 807, in part because Cohen's testimony was vital to Morales' case. Morales, 154 F. Supp. 2d at 726. In line with this, Defendant argues the lawyers' testimony here was vital--i.e., more probative than Johnson's statements. He gives scattered reasons for this purported vitality, which we put into three broad categories: identity, context, and drama. First, identity: Defendant asserts the testimony is more probative because it comes from seasoned lawyers. -24- Second, context: Defendant contends the attorneys would have testified Johnson: (a) spoke confidentially, bolstering her credibility; (b) told the attorney on the day of her arrest the cocaine was hers, making it unlikely she concocted the story later; (c) talked to both attorneys outside Defendant's presence, decreasing the possibility of coercion; (d) was very emotional and distressed that Defendant was being accused, bolstering her credibility, and (e) told them specifics of how she put the drugs in Defendant's bag without him knowing. Third, drama: Defendant argues the jury would have been more persuaded by live testimony than by a piece of paper. Defendant makes a reasonable--albeit flawed--argument.7 Problem is, a reasonable argument can also be made that a jury would find a detailed handwritten confession far more compelling than a lawyer's third-party account, no matter how much context the lawyer can provide.8 Likewise, a written account from soon after the incident removes all need to rely on a witness's memory of events long past. Because reasonable minds can disagree on whether 7 To give just one example of a flaw, Defendant's context and drama arguments are undercut by the fact that Johnson's cellmate testified in person, labeled Johnson honest, and detailed Johnson's distressed emotional state. 8 The public view of lawyers, after all, is verifiably dismal. See Public Esteem for Military Still High, Pew Research Center (July 11, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/2013/07/11/ public-esteem-for-military-still-high/ (Among the 10 occupations the survey asked respondents to rate [for contribution to society], lawyers are at the bottom of the list. (emphasis added)). -25- the attorneys' testimony was vital, the district court's position-- that the testimony was not more probative than Johnson's written statements--cannot be an abuse of discretion, especially when Rule 807 is to be used very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances. See United States v. Hughes, 535 F.3d 880, 882–83 (8th Cir. 2008) (district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to admit testimony under Rule 807 in part because the excluded testimony was cumulative of Hughes's own testimony).