Opinion ID: 726760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DEA Agents Qualified Immunity

Text: 22 Pre-trial detainees possess a clearly established right to be free from punishment. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 534-37, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1871-73, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). This right is located in the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, but we borrow from Eighth Amendment principles in determining the care to be afforded pre-trial detainees. Jones v. Johnson, 781 F.2d 769, 771 (9th Cir.1986). The Eighth Amendment proscribes ... sanctions that are 'so totally without penological justification that it results in the gratuitous infliction of suffering.'  Hoptowit v. Ray, 682 F.2d 1237, 1246 (9th Cir.1982) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2929, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). Convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees are also entitled to adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety. Id. 23 The complaint here reveals that the DEA agent defendants threatened Alvarez-Machain during an interrogation session in El Paso on April 3, 1990; withheld food throughout the interrogation; incarcerated him under a false name, making it impossible for the United States government to respond to inquiries about his whereabouts from his family or the Mexican government; and denied him adequate medical attention. Each of these allegations, if proven, served to create an atmosphere of fear and isolation, imposing gratuitous suffering in violation of Hoptowit. Further, the deprivation of food and medical attention alone could serve to sustain a claim under the due process clause. Id. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying defendants' motion to dismiss these claims. 24