Opinion ID: 395320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: lunch policy

Text: 28 As previously mentioned, the lunch practices of the plant's employees have been the subject of collective bargaining between Ball Corporation and the Union. The lunch provision in the 1966 contract explicitly treated male and female employees in a different fashion. 15 In 1972, the employment agreement was revised to incorporate the following facially neutral terms: 29 When a department or a portion thereof is scheduled for three (3) shifts, the normal work day for finishers shall be eight (8) hours including a thirty (30) minute unpaid lunch period. All other production workers will work eight (8) hours and eat their lunch at a time when the work load permits without unduly interfering with the efficient operation of their duties. 30 Since the above provision is facially neutral, the district court properly focused on the effect of the provision. Thus, the Griggs v. Duke Power Co. or disparate impact line of cases, rather than the disparate treatment line, provides the proper mode of analysis here. See Teamsters v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 335-36 n.15, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-1855 n.15; Grano v. Department of Development, 637 F.2d 1073, 1081 (6th Cir. 1980). 16 31 It is uncontested that the lunch provision has a disparate impact against women. Since women fill the vast number of finisher positions at the plant, the above provision operates to preclude more women than men from working a full eight-hour day. Thus, the inquiry below focused upon whether Ball Corporation demonstrated that the disproportionate effect on women resulting from the operation of the lunch provision, was justified by business necessity. Upon a review of the record, we believe that the district court correctly found that the lunch policy is justified by business necessity. 32 The concept of business necessity in the Title VII area has been a much discussed issue. In this circuit, there has been recent controversy over what constitutes the proper standard for maintaining the defense. See Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, Inc., 645 F.2d 1251 (6th Cir. 1981). However, the district court in this case applied the proper standard. The evidence showed an extremely high correlation between the lunch policy and the performance requirements of production workers and finishers. It is undisputed that McNeil press operators, 17 cannot eat lunch on the run and efficiently operate their machines at the same time. 18 It is also uncontested that operators of conventional presses can eat lunch on the run while simultaneously running their machines. 19 Ball Corporation demonstrated that if McNeil press operators were allowed to eat on the run, their presses simply would not function effectively during the thirty minute lunch period. This showing meets the high standard required to establish business necessity or manifest job relationship under Griggs v. Duke Power Co. See Horace v. City of Pontiac, 624 F.2d 765 (6th Cir. 1980); Kirby v. Colony Furniture Co., 613 F.2d 696 (8th Cir. 1980); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 928, 100 S.Ct. 1865, 64 L.Ed.2d 281 (1980); Mitchell v. Mid-Continent Spring Co. of Kentucky, 583 F.2d 275 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 922, 99 S.Ct. 2030, 60 L.Ed.2d 396 (1979); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. New York Times Broadcasting Service, Inc., 542 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1976); Parson v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp., 575 F.2d 1374 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied sub nom., United Steel Workers of America v. Parson, 441 U.S. 968, 99 S.Ct. 2417, 60 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1979); United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Co., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972) (en banc), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116, 93 S.Ct. 913, 34 L.Ed.2d 700 (1973); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 879 (6th Cir. 1973); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 662 (2d Cir. 1971); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006, 92 S.Ct. 573, 30 L.Ed.2d 655 (1971). 20 33 The EEOC, citing Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., supra, at 879, argues that Ball did not establish business necessity here because it did not show that there was no available acceptable alternative policy. However, this contention is based on a misreading of our opinion in that case. In Head, the issue of which party properly has the burden of proving less discriminatory alternatives was not before the court. Thus, the decision provides no precedent on that issue. See Chrisner v. Complete Auto Transit, supra at 1266-67 n.6 (Keith, J., concurring and dissenting). Subsequent decisions have made clear that in Title VII disparate impact cases, the plaintiff has the burden of showing less discriminatory alternative policies. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2375, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975). See also Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for Adequate Standards, 15 Ga.L.Rev. 376, 398-9 (1981). 34 Thus, the EEOC had the burden of showing the availability of a less discriminatory lunch policy in order to rebut Ball Corporation's showing of business necessity. The EEOC presented no evidence showing the availability of such a policy; therefore, the district court's ruling as to this issue is affirmed.