Opinion ID: 2460645
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Scheme Violates KRS 500.070(1) and the Due Process Guarantees of United States and Kentucky Constitutions.

Text: In addition to the problems I have already outlined, there is a final, fatal flaw in the statutory scheme enacted by the General Assembly: it violates the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions by reducing the burden of proof required of the Commonwealth in a criminal proceeding. KRS 500.070(1) requires the Commonwealth to prove every element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt, including the mental state of the crime. KRS 121.120(5), 121.140(5) and 121.990 set forth knowing as the mental state requisite for felony violations of the campaign finance law. These statutes empower the Registry to make the finding of whether a knowing violation has occurred. Thus, this statutory scheme makes it easier for the Commonwealth to meet its burden of proving mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt: it authorizes an administrative agency-the Registry-to make that finding based on a preponderance of the evidence. See 9 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (Chadbourne rev. 1981) & Supp.1996 (Best rev.) (stating The traditional standard of proof in a civil or administrative proceeding is the preponderance standard.) [T]he mens rea requirement under a criminal statute, however, is a question of law, to be determined by the court. Staples v. U.S., 511 U.S. 600, 612 n. 6, 114 S.Ct. 1793, 1800, 128 L.Ed.2d 608, 621 (1994). It cannot be adjudicated by an administrative agency. By empowering the Registry to determine whether a violation is knowing, KRS 121.120(5), 121.140(5) and 121.990 not only violate the procedural protections of KRS 500.070(1), but the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Ky. Const. § 2. These statutes allow an accused to be convicted without the Commonwealth proving beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime charged and thus should be stricken as unconstitutional. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-64, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1071-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 373-75 (1970). III. CONCURRENT OR NON-EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION IS ALSO UNCONSTITUTIONAL Even if the majority's interpretation were correct, it still leaves in place a statutory enforcement scheme that confers a power which is solely judicial in nature on an executive agency. The analysis set forth in the introduction and section II(B) of this dissent applies with equal force: the probable cause determination made by the Registry is not the common administrative-type determination of probable cause reflecting an agency's reasonable belief that its statutes or regulations have been violated. In fact, just the opposite is true: this administrative finding is a judicial-type determination comparable to an information. See RCr 6.04, 6.10. It sets forth the facts comprising each felony offense, then refers the matter for prosecution. See KRS 121.140(5) and 32 Ky. Admin. Regs 2:030 § 4, 2:040 §§ 8-9. But prosecution of a felony crime may not be commenced by information; instead, a grand jury indictment is constitutionally required. Ky. Const. § 12. Therefore, under the majority's construction, KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) effectively make the grand jury unnecessary, which the Constitution does not permit. Furthermore, as stated above, the decision of the Registry is not reviewable by any court. KRS 121.140(7). It logically follows that if no court can overturn the Registry's decision, neither can the grand jury. The end result of this dilemma is that the grand jury could be totally dispossessed of its constitutional power to indict for felony crimes committed. Therefore, even under the majority's interpretation, KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) cannot stand. IV. SEVERABILITY Finally, we must determine what portions of the statutes in question are severable so that the valid portions may be saved and the invalid portions stricken. It is a fundamental principle that a statute may be valid in one part and invalid in another part, and if the invalid part is severable from the rest, the part which is valid may be sustained. Burns v. Shepherd, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 685 (1953) ( citing State Bd. of Election Commissioners v. Coleman, 235 Ky. 24, 29 S.W.2d 619 (1930)). KRS 446.090 provides in part that if any of the statute be held unconstitutional the remaining parts shall remain in force, unless the statute provides otherwise, or the remaining parts are so essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon the unconstitutional part that it is apparent that the General Assembly would not have enacted the remaining parts without the unconstitutional part.... Thus, the question to be addressed is whether the criminal penalties of this statutory enforcement scheme can be severed and stand alone. The structure of the statutory enforcement scheme does not lend itself to severability. Because the Registry has exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether a knowing campaign violation has occurred, the grand jury may not indict absent such a determination. The language of the statutory scheme makes an administrative finding by a politically appointed executive branch commission a prerequisite to indictment by the grand jury operating under the direction of the Court of Justice. Thus, the prosecution of knowing campaign finance violations is essentially and inseparably connected with and dependent upon the Registry's prior probable cause determination of a knowing violation. Bailey v. Runyon, Ky., 293 S.W.2d 631, 633 (1956). If, under this scheme, the Registry decides a violation is not knowing, no further action may be taken. This is an illegal and unacceptable result. Even if it is true that the statutes in question grant non-exclusive jurisdiction to the Registry, to sever KRS 121.140(5) from the rest of the statutory scheme destroys the regulatory process created by the General Assembly as it removes the Registry from enforcement of knowing violations of the statutes. For example, if the Registry were to find that no knowing violation had occurred, yet a grand jury decided to indict anyway, the grand jury would effectively be acting in contravention of KRS 121.140(7) which prohibits appeals of the Registry's probable cause determinations. This renders KRS 121.140(7) meaningless in contravention of the principle that all of the language of a statute is to be given effect. Combs v. Hubb Coal Corp., Ky., 934 S.W.2d 250, 252 (1996). Moreover, even if KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5) could be severed, the remainder of the campaign finance laws are not enforceable because the criminal penalties cannot stay in place. To be enforceable, what is left after severance would have to be fully operable as law. Tri-City Turf Club, Inc. v. Public Protec. & Reg. Cabinet, Ky.App., 806 S.W.2d 394, 397 (1991), dis. rev. denied. I find that what is left after the severance is not fully operable. Only knowing violations of the campaign finance laws may be criminally prosecuted. KRS 121.140(5) and 121.990. Thus, whether one views the jurisdictional issue as exclusive or non-exclusive, under the terms of these statutes a crime is not created unless the Registry makes a determination that a knowing violation occurred. According to KRS 121.140, the General Assembly set forth the three-step investigatory process to be used by the Registry culminating in referral for prosecution of knowing violations after the Registry makes the appropriate finding. The penalties of KRS 121.990 for knowing violations are predicated upon the Registry's finding that a knowing violation occurred. If, then, the Registry is removed from the process, the felony and misdemeanor punishments for knowing violations, as defined in these statutes, would be removed from the penalties of KRS 121.990. The remaining statutes would create a some sort of crime for their violation, but the crime would have no penalty. Nor could this Court impose a penalty to bridge the gap. Courts cannot impose common law punishments, but are restricted to imposing only the penalties prescribed by the statute. See Huyser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 116 Ky. 410, 76 S.W. 174, 176 (1903). A court may not graft a penalty onto a statute that has no penalty. Cf. Commonwealth v. McClure, Ky.App., 593 S.W.2d 92, 96 (1979), dis. rev. denied (1980). Given these facts, I believe that there can be no question that the General Assembly would not have permitted the criminal penalties of this statute to stand alone. The General Assembly enacted a clearly unconstitutional statute and created a crime which can only be prosecuted by means of that statute; these statutes are inexorably intertwined. Accordingly, since the criminal penalties are essentially and inseparably connected and dependent upon the enforcement scheme set forth in KRS 121.120(5) and 121.140(5), I would strike as unconstitutional KRS 121.120(5), KRS 121.140(5) and KRS 121.990, except KRS 121.990(5) (injunctive relief) and KRS 121.990(13) (civil penalties). See Commonwealth v. Cullum, Ky., 494 S.W.2d 521, 521 (1973); Engle v. Bonnie, 305 Ky. 850, 854, 204 S.W.2d 963, 965 (1947). V. CONCLUSION To summarize, I would hold that this statutory scheme is unconstitutional on several bases. First, the separation of powers doctrine is violated by the granting of a uniquely judicial power, the finding of probable cause to prosecute, to the executive. Second, the inherent rulemaking power of this Court is usurped by the General Assembly in modifying our established procedures with regard to both findings of probable cause and the operation of grand juries. Third, the statutory scheme impermissibly dispossesses the grand jury of its constitutionally awarded powers. Fourth, it violates the due process guarantees of the United States and Kentucky Constitutions. Since I believe that the General Assembly would not have enacted the criminal penalties without the limitation on their use, I would hold them non-severable. For these reasons I would strike as unconstitutional KRS 121.120(5), KRS 121.140(5) and KRS 121.990, except KRS 121.990(5) (injunctive relief) and KRS 121.990(13) (civil penalties). I would grant the petitions for writ of prohibition regarding any action of the grand jury based on alleged violations of the campaign finance laws. It is the function of the judiciary to declare the law, not to make it. While it is unfortunate that the unconstitutionality of this statutory scheme renders it unenforceable, only the General Assembly can correct the problem, not this Court.