Opinion ID: 1058630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: analysis

Text: The very narrow issue preserved in the trial court and presented by McDonald for our review is quite simple. McDonald maintains that our decision in Martin governs this case, because, he alleges, the victims were of the age of consent and not excepted from the scope of our opinion. The Martin case involved two unmarried adults in a sexually active relationship. 269 Va. at 38, 607 S.E.2d at 368. Martin became infected with the herpes virus allegedly because of sexual contact with Ziherl. Id. After their relationship ended, Martin sued Ziherl in tort alleging that he knew he was infected with the sexually transmitted herpes virus when they engaged in unprotected sexual conduct, knew that the virus was contagious, and failed to inform her of his condition. Id. Ziherl filed a demurrer asserting that Martin's injuries were caused by her participation in an illegal act under Virginia law and therefore, under Zysk v. Zysk, 239 Va. 32, 404 S.E.2d 721 (1990), the motion for judgment did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id. The trial court sustained Ziherl's demurrer. Id. On appeal we considered the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003), upon our prior decision in Zysk and further considered whether Code § 18.2-344, the fornication statute, (Any person, not being married, who voluntarily shall have sexual intercourse with any other person, shall be guilty of fornication, punishable as a Class 4 misdemeanor.), could continue to provide a public policy basis for not permitting civil recovery for the conduct presented in both Zysk and Martin. Lawrence had been convicted of violating a Texas statute that made it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct described as the act of sodomy. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.06(a)(2003). The Court of Appeals for the Texas Fourteenth District rejected Lawrence's constitutional challenge to the statute relying on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 189, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (1986). The Supreme Court in Bowers had previously held that a Georgia statute making it a crime to engage in homosexual sodomy, was constitutional. Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 360-62 (Tex.App.2001). Reversing its prior decision in Bowers, the Court in Lawrence held that the Texas sodomy statute was unconstitutional because it furthered no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472. The Court in Lawrence noted that: The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter. Id. Upon consideration of the decision in Lawrence, we observed in Martin that: We find no relevant distinction between the circumstances in Lawrence and the circumstances in the present case. . . . We find no principled way to conclude that the specific act of intercourse is not an element of a personal relationship between two unmarried persons or that the Virginia statute criminalizing intercourse between unmarried persons does not improperly abridge a personal relationship that is within the liberty interest of persons to choose. Because Code § 18.2-344, like the Texas statute at issue in Lawrence, is an attempt by the state to control the liberty interest which is exercised in making these personal decisions, it violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 269 Va. at 41-42, 607 S.E.2d at 370. First, it is necessary to state that our holding in Martin was that, under the circumstances presented, the statute at issue, Code § 18.2-344, was unconstitutional. See Id. at 42, 607 S.E.2d at 371. We further stated that: It is important to note that this case does not involve minors, non-consensual activity, prostitution, or public activity. The Lawrence court indicated that state regulation of that type of activity might support a different result. Our holding, like that of the Supreme Court in Lawrence, addresses only private, consensual conduct between adults and the respective statutes' impact on such conduct. Our holding does not affect the Commonwealth's police power regarding regulation of public fornication, prostitution, or other such crimes. Id. at 42-43, 607 S.E.2d at 371. Clearly, the declaration that the holding did not affect the Commonwealth's police power regarding other crimes is the essence of an as-applied analysis of constitutionality of the statute. After Martin, Code § 18.2-344 still has efficacy as noted; consequently, it was not facially invalidated by our opinion. McDonald's as-applied constitutional challenge to Code § 18.2-361, the sodomy statute, involves McDonald's proposed construction of several statutes. Except for certain conduct between specified related persons, the sodomy statute does not contain age restrictions. See Code § 18.2-361. McDonald seeks to borrow age restrictions from the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute, Code § 18.2-371 and the carnal knowledge statute, Code § 18.2-63. In pertinent part, the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute states: Any person 18 years of age or older, including the parent of any child, who . . . (ii) engages in consensual sexual intercourse with a child 15 or older not his spouse, child, or grandchild, shall be guilty of a Class 1 misdemeanor. Code § 18.2-371. In pertinent part, the carnal knowledge statute states: If any person carnally knows, without the use of force, a child thirteen years of age or older but under fifteen years of age, such person shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony. . . . . For the purposes of this section, (i) a child under the age of thirteen years shall not be considered a consenting child and (ii)  carnal knowledge includes the acts of sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anallingus, anal intercourse, and animate and inanimate object sexual penetration. Code § 18.2-63. McDonald contends that the contributing to the delinquency of a minor statute refers only to sexual intercourse and penalizes such acts as a misdemeanor for an adult to commit such acts upon children aged fifteen, sixteen, or seventeen. Because the statute does not mention sodomy, McDonald argues that the contributing statute does not apply to acts of sodomy. He further infers from the carnal knowledge statute that because prosecution under its provisions includes both sexual intercourse and specified forms of sodomy, that this puts the age of consent for sexual activity in Virginia at 15 years old. McDonald is incorrect for two reasons: (1) the sodomy statute stands alone and without age restrictions concerning consent in this case, and (2) the real issue in this case is the victims' legal status as minors. First, the fact that separate statutes may overlap in their proscription of specific conduct does not detract from their independent enforcement except when double jeopardy concerns are implicated. [W]hen an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants. United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123-24, 99 S.Ct. 2198, 60 L.Ed.2d 755 (1979); see also Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 451, 501-02, 619 S.E.2d 16, 45 (2005). Whether to prosecute and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury are decisions that generally rest in the prosecutor's discretion. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 124, 99 S.Ct. 2198. McDonald raises no double jeopardy issues. Furthermore, there is no basis for engrafting provisions or perceived implications from the carnal knowledge statute and the laws governing the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor into the sodomy statute. Such matters are for legislative consideration, and here the provisions are simply different. Second, the real issue is the legal status of the victims as minors. Determining the age of majority is the province of the General Assembly. Mack v. Mack, 217 Va. 534, 537, 229 S.E.2d 895, 897 (1976) (holding minority is a legal status subject to change by the legislature). The Code is quite specific concerning the dividing line between minors and adults. Code § 1-203 (` Adult ' means a person 18 years of age or more.), Code § 1-204 (For the purposes of all laws of the Commonwealth including common law, case law, and the acts of the General Assembly, unless an exception is specifically provided in this Code, a person shall be an adult, shall be of full age, and shall reach the age of majority when he becomes 18 years of age.), Code § 1-207 (` Child,' `juvenile,' `minor,' `infant,' or any combination thereof means a person less than 18 years of age.). The sodomy statute has no express age of consent; however, it must be applied in a constitutional manner in conformity with Lawrence and Martin. The Court in Lawrence was explicit in its declaration of the scope of its opinion: The present case does not involve minors. 539 U.S. at 578, 123 S.Ct. 2472. We were equally explicit in our opinion in Martin: It is important to note that this case does not involve minors, nonconsensual activity, prostitution, or public activity. . . . Our holding, like that of the Supreme Court in Lawrence, addresses only private, consensual conduct between adults and the respective statutes' impact on such conduct. 269 Va. at 42-43, 607 S.E.2d at 371. As we have previously held, we construe the plain language of a statute to have limited application if such a construction will tailor the statute to a constitutional fit. Virginia Society for Human Life v. Caldwell, 256 Va. 151, 157 n. 3, 500 S.E.2d 814, 817 n. 3 (1998). Therefore, when there is an as-applied challenge to a statute, we must interpret the statute in such a manner as to remove constitutional infirmities. The only issue preserved at the trial court and presented to this Court is an as-applied constitutional challenge to the sodomy statute. McDonald's statutory construction argument is faulty and furthermore, it misses the real issue. The victims in this case were minors, defined by the Code of Virginia as persons under the age of eighteen. See Code § 1-207. Nothing in Lawrence or Martin prohibits the application of the sodomy statute to conduct between adults and minors.