Opinion ID: 782233
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standing and sovereignty

Text: 41 Alvarez claims that his arrest violated Mexico's sovereign rights because Mexico had not granted the United States permission to exercise police power on its soil. Because such an encroachment on Mexico's sovereignty violates the law of nations within the meaning of the ATCA, Alvarez reasons, he is entitled to relief under that statute. The district court agreed and rejected Sosa's objection that Alvarez lacks standing to invoke Mexico's sovereignty rights. 42 We have little trouble accepting the premise from which Alvarez begins. Few principles in international law are as deeply rooted as the general norm prohibiting acts of sovereignty that offend the territorial integrity of another state. See generally 1 L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim's International Law § 119 (Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1992); see also F.A. Mann, Reflections on the Prosecution of Persons Abducted in Breach of International Law, in International Law at a Time of Perplexity 407 & n. 2 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds. 1989) (referring to this incontrovertible rule as elementary). This tenet, as Alvarez points out, can be traced to the earliest decisions of the Supreme Court. Most notably, in 1812, when faced with the question whether an American citizen could assert title to an armed French vessel found in the territorial waters of the United States, Justice Marshall began his landmark decision by emphasizing the exclusive and absolute nature of territorial jurisdiction, exceptions to which must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself. Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812). 43 Twelve years later, Justice Story voiced similar sentiments. Analyzing an American seizure of a foreign ship that had sailed into Spanish waters, he observed that [i]t would be monstrous to suppose that our ... officers were authorized to enter into foreign ports and territories, for the purpose of seizing vessels which had offended against our laws. It cannot be presumed that Congress would voluntarily justify such a clear violation of the laws of nations. The Apollon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 371, 6 L.Ed. 111 (1824). 44 Alvarez seeks to invoke a principle, concomitant with this precept of territorial sovereignty, that prohibits a state's law enforcement agents from exercising their functions in the territory of another state without the latter's consent. The Supreme Court clearly recognized this proscription in The Appollon. In addition, several notable authorities are in accord. See Restatement on Foreign Relations § 432(2) (A state's law enforcement officers may exercise their functions in the territory of another state only with the consent of the other state, given by duly authorized officials of that state.); 1 Oppenheim, supra, § 119, at 387-88 (It is ... a breach of international law for a state without permission to send its agents into the territory of another state to apprehend persons accused of having committed a crime.); see also M. Cherif Bassiouni, International Extradition: United States Law and Practice 255 (4th ed. 2002) (recognizing the rule and noting that it is grounded in the notion that international law is designed to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states by restricting impermissible state conduct). But whatever the modern contours of this principle or its corollaries, they are inapplicable here and need not be explored because Alvarez cannot establish, as a threshold matter, that he has standing to assert Mexico's interests in its territorial sovereignty. 8 45 The Supreme Court has instructed that to meet the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing under Article III, plaintiffs must [f]irst and foremost show the existence of an injury in fact. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102-03, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Related to this constitutional prerequisite is a separate prudential requirement of standing: plaintiffs must demonstrate they are proper proponents of the particular legal rights on which they base their suit. Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976). This requirement applies even when the very same allegedly illegal act that affects the litigant also affects a third party. United States Dep't of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 720, 110 S.Ct. 1428, 108 L.Ed.2d 701 (1990). Although Alvarez may have properly alleged that Mexico's sovereignty was infringed during his abduction — an issue we need not resolve here — he has not demonstrated that he is a proper party to vindicate Mexico's national interests. 46 Alvarez argues that he meets the standing requirements because courts may review ATCA claims whenever an alien is injured tortiously in the course of the defendant's violation of international law. But the ATCA creates a remedy for a tort ... committed in violation of the law of nations, not in the course of any recognized international law violation. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The legal rights on which Alvarez bases his claim, and which the ATCA recognizes, are those that protect the individual from tortious conduct. By its terms, the ATCA provides only for suits by individual aliens; it does not allow for an individual to vindicate the rights of a foreign government. 47 To allow state-on-state injuries like the one Alvarez alleges here to be vindicated by a third party not only would read too much into the ATCA, but would lead to the judiciary's intrusion into matters that are appropriately reserved for the Executive branch. Although international human rights litigation under the ATCA inevitably raises issues implicating foreign relations, sovereigns' prerogatives are ordinarily and traditionally handled through diplomatic channels. 9 The right of a nation to invoke its territorial integrity does not translate into the right of an individual to invoke such interests in the name of the law of nations. 48 Alvarez seeks refuge in Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886), the case that previously doomed his attempt to secure dismissal of his criminal indictment. See Alvarez-Machain II, 504 U.S. at 662, 112 S.Ct. 2188. Like Alvarez, Ker claimed forcible abduction from a foreign country, in his case Peru. Although the Supreme Court refused to dismiss Ker's indictment, it observed that Ker was probably not ... without redress, for he could sue [his abductor] in an action of trespass and false imprisonment. Ker, 119 U.S. at 444, 7 S.Ct. 225. The Court made no guarantees, however, regarding a claim under the ATCA or any other federal statute; nor did it intimate that Ker could sue to avenge Peru's sovereignty rights. Rather, the Court noted that Peru could pursue a separate remedy — the kidnapper's extradition. Id. Ker thus implicitly drew the distinction between vindication of individual rights and a sovereign's vindication of its rights. Ker does not bridge the gap in Alvarez's claim. 49