Opinion ID: 1561252
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reinstruction of the jury

Text: Once again, this court is asked to revisit the law governing the reinstruction of the jury. Coreas contends that the trial court erred when, in response to a note from the jury asking to be reinstructed on second degree murder and voluntary manslaughter, the trial court refused to reinstruct on self-defense. Decisions regarding whether and how to reinstruct the jury are committed to the broad discretion of the trial court. Davis v. United States, 510 A.2d 1051, 1052-53 (D.C.1986) (per curiam) (citing Tyler v. United States, 495 A.2d 1180, 1183 (D.C. 1985); Bedney v. United States, 471 A.2d 1022, 1024 (D.C.1984); Shreeves v. United States, 395 A.2d 774, 787 (D.C.1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943, 99 S.Ct. 2161, 60 L.Ed.2d 1045 (1979); Murray v. District of Columbia, 358 A.2d 651, 653 (D.C.1976)); Potter v. United States, 534 A.2d 943, 946 (D.C.1987) (per curiam); see also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-4.3 (Trial by Jury) (1980); E. DEVITT & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 5.21 (3d ed. 1977). In this case the trial court erred by applying the wrong standard to its exercise of discretion. Initially, the trial court decided to give the reinstruction on self-defense. The government objected and opined, without citation, that [w]hen the jury asks for a specific instruction the court should not vary from that instruction but should give it as is. That is the government's position. The jury was then reinstructed. In an apparent about-face, the trial judge decided not to reinstruct on self-defense based on the mistaken impression that there existed a case which would indicate that the instruction should not be modified. [7] Since we reverse on other grounds, we do not decide whether this erroneous exercise of discretion constitutes an abuse of discretion. See Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 363 (D.C.1979). We reemphasize, however, that when the trial court gives supplemental jury instructions it should seek not only to respond to the jury's request as the court in its discretion sees fit, but it should do so in a manner that does not unduly emphasize one aspect of the case. When the reinstructions refer only to the elements that compose the offense or offenses charged, the jury may be unduly persuaded by what it has heard the trial judge instruct upon last. Davis, supra, 510 A.2d at 1053; see, e.g., Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946) (the judge's last word is apt to be the decisive word.); Tart v. McGann, 697 F.2d 75, 77 (2d Cir.1982) (trial court `must exercise special care to see that inaccuracy or imbalance in supplemental instructions do not poison an otherwise healthy trial.') (quoting United States v. Carter, 491 F.2d 625, 633 (5th Cir.1974)); Perez v. United States, 297 F.2d 12, 16 (5th Cir.1961) (when reinstructing jurors, the underlying search in determining which instruction to give is whether the charge taken as a whole was such as to confuse or leave an erroneous impression in the minds of the jurors.). At a minimum, the trial judge should strive during reinstruction to achieve the ideal of a neutral, balanced instruction. Davis, supra, 510 A.2d at 1053. The mere insertion in the standardized instruction of the phrase `such as when he [or she] acts in self-defense' . . . would obviate any concern that the jury might not understand or recall that, once raised, self-defense is an element of homicide [or second degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, as in this case] that must be disproved by the government beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (citations omitted).