Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Reference to the Absence of a Defense to the Lactawen Murder

Text: During his penalty phase argument, the prosecutor stated, with regard to the section 190.3, factor (b) evidence, And we all know, you didn't see any defense to any of these crimes. We didn't see anything presented to rebut testimony about Ms. Lactawen's murder. When defendant objected to this statement as Griffin error (see Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106) the trial court reminded the jury that the burden to prove the factor (b) evidence rested upon the prosecution and that defendant bore no burden. Defendant contends on appeal that the prosecutor's comment violated defendant's constitutional right to choose not to testify, and that the trial court's admonition was insufficient to cure the alleged error. He is mistaken. The People assert the prosecutor's comments properly emphasized the absence of evidence controverting the prosecution's evidence. (See People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1051, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277.) Even if we were to assume otherwise, as urged by defendant that the prosecutor's comment violated defendant's constitutional right to refrain from testifying, under Griffin, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (see People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1229, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1 ( Johnson )), because only his own testimony could have rebutted the evidence against himwe would conclude that any misconduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor's statement was, at most, an indirect, brief and mild reference to defendant's failure to testify as a witness. ( People v. Mincey, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 446, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388.) The prosecutor did not suggest that the jury should draw any additional inference of guilt from defendant's failure to testify beyond the inference of guilt established by the evidence that had been presented. Such references have uniformly been held to be harmless error. ( Id. at p. 447, 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388; People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 572, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776.) Moreover, the overwhelming proof that defendant committed the Lactawen murder, and the trial court's timely admonition to the jury regarding the burden of proof and its instruction that the jury could not draw any adverse inference from defendant's decision not to testify at the penalty phase, further ameliorated any possibility of harm. ( People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1267, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544.) Accordingly, any misconduct would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also contends the prosecutor's statement took unfair advantage of the denial of defendant's in limine motion to exclude the Lactawen murder evidence, because the prosecutor place[d] appellant in an untenable position and subsequently argue[d] that the choice appellant was forced to make supported sentencing him to death. Even if defendant had not forfeited this claim by failing to raise it below, we would conclude that it fails because, as discussed above, any possible misconduct would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.