Opinion ID: 852934
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion to Correct Sentence

Text: The defendant's motion to correct sentence derives from Indiana Code § 35-38-1-15 which provides: If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence. The purpose of the statute is to provide prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence. Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 (Ind.1991). In Thompson v. State , we declined to limit a defendant to the remedy provided by the Indiana Post-Conviction Rules and stated: By allowing a defendant either avenue in forwarding his sentencing error, judicial time and effort may be conserved while justice is speedily and efficiently afforded those convicted of crime. When a defendant wishes to question only the propriety of his sentence, he may utilize the vehicle of [now Indiana Code § 35-38-1-15]. This vehicle is available to a defendant whether or not a guilty plea has been filed. Of course, the defendant may also file, within sixty days of sentencing, a motion to correct errors and designate an erroneous sentence as the complained of error. But, there is nothing in the statute which should preclude a defendant from raising the issue of an erroneous sentence at a time after sixty days have elapsed. 270 Ind. 677, 679, 389 N.E.2d 274, 276 (1979). [1] We held that a motion to correct sentence would not preclude the defendant from filing a later petition for post-conviction relief where warranted. Id. When an error related to sentencing occurs, it is in the best interests of all concerned that it be immediately discovered and corrected. Other than an immediate motion to correct sentence, such errors are best presented to the trial court by the optional motion to correct error under Indiana Trial Rule 59, or upon a direct appeal from the final judgment of the trial court pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 9(A). [2] See Thompson v. State, 270 Ind. 677, 679-80, 389 N.E.2d 274, 276-77 (1979). Thereafter, for claims not waived for failure to raise them by direct appeal, a defendant may seek recourse under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1, § 1(a)(3) by claiming that the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise erroneous. As noted above, however, we have recognized the statutory motion to correct sentence as an alternate remedy. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1243 (Ind.2000); Reffett v. State, 571 N.E.2d 1227, 1228-29 (Ind.1991); Jones v. State, 544 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind. 1989); Gee v. State, 508 N.E.2d 787, 788 (Ind.1987); Thompson, 270 Ind. at 679-80, 389 N.E.2d at 276. A trial court's ruling on a motion to correct sentence is subject to appeal by normal appellate procedures. Thompson, 270 Ind. at 680, 389 N.E.2d at 276-77. While the motion to correct sentence is available as an alternate remedy, we have repeatedly cautioned that it is appropriate only when the sentence is erroneous on its face. Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1243; Reffett, 571 N.E.2d at 1229; Jones, 544 N.E.2d at 496. We acknowledge that some of our decisions may not have rigorously applied the erroneous on its face standard. In Jones, we stated that the motion to correct sentence could be used to correct errors such as illegal sentences in violation of express statutory authority or an erroneous interpretation of a penalty provision of a statute, but would not be available for claims raising constitutional issues or issues concerning how the trial court weighed factors in imposing sentence. Jones, 544 N.E.2d at 496. In apparent contradiction to the facial invalidity limitation, however, this Court in Jones then proceeded to address the merits of a claim that the trial court imposed a maximum sentence in partial reliance upon invalid aggravating factorsa claim that required this Court to go beyond the face of the sentencing judgment and the applicable penalty statute. In Reffett, we permitted a motion to correct sentence, summarily reasoning that [i]f a sentence that violates express statutory authority is facially erroneous, a sentence that violates the express terms of a plea agreement is also facially erroneous. 571 N.E.2d at 1229. And in Mitchell we addressed a double jeopardy claim presented by a motion to correct sentence, likewise summarily concluding that [i]f a sentence violating express statutory authority is facially erroneous, a sentence violating double jeopardy is also facially erroneous. 726 N.E.2d at 1243. When claims of sentencing errors require consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment, they are best addressed promptly on direct appeal and thereafter via post-conviction relief proceedings where applicable. Use of the statutory motion to correct sentence should thus be narrowly confined to claims apparent from the face of the sentencing judgment, and the facially erroneous prerequisite should henceforth be strictly applied, notwithstanding Jones, Reffett, and Mitchell. We therefore hold that a motion to correct sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory authority. Claims that require consideration of the proceedings before, during, or after trial may not be presented by way of a motion to correct sentence. [3] In addition to limiting a motion to correct sentence to errors apparent on the face of the judgment, Indiana case law has long emphasized that the preferred procedure is by way of a petition for post-conviction relief. Jones, 544 N.E.2d at 496. See, e.g., Reffett, 571 N.E.2d at 1228; Gee, 508 N.E.2d at 788; Hatchett v. State, 794 N.E.2d 544, 546 (Ind.Ct.App.2003); White v. State, 793 N.E.2d 1127, 1129 (Ind. Ct.App.2003); Funk v. State, 714 N.E.2d 746, 748-49 (Ind.Ct.App.1999); Poore v. State, 613 N.E.2d 478, 480 (Ind.Ct.App. 1993); Browning v. State, 576 N.E.2d 1315, 1317 (Ind.Ct.App.1991); Powell v. State, 574 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ind.Ct.App. 1991). This emphasis that post-conviction proceedings are preferred for raising sentencing error should not be understood to imply that the statutory motion to correct sentence is nevertheless permissible to raise claims that are not facially evident on the judgment. It is not. This Court tries to encourage conservation of judicial time and energy while at the same time affording speedy and efficient justice to those convicted of a crime. Reffett, 571 N.E.2d at 1229. As to sentencing claims not facially apparent, the motion to correct sentence is an improper remedy. Such claims may be raised only on direct appeal and, where appropriate, by post-conviction proceedings. When a motion to correct sentence presents a claim that may be resolved by considering only the face of the judgment and the applicable statutory authority without reference to other matters in or extrinsic to the record, such a motion may be expeditiously considered and corrections made without invoking post-conviction proceedings. The preferred procedure language does not require that such claims of facial error be presented by petition for post-conviction relief. This may appear contrary to Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(b), which declares that the post-conviction relief procedure takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction or sentence and it shall be used exclusively in place of them. (emphasis added.) Because this rule already existed when Indiana Code § 35-38-1-15 was enacted in 1983, the motion to correct sentence remedy was not heretofore available as provided in the rule. Compare Ind. P-C.R. 1(1)(b) (West 1982) with Acts 1983, Public Law 311, Section 3. Furthermore, our cases have clearly permitted a defendant to use the statutory motion to correct sentence notwithstanding the potential availability of post-conviction relief. See Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1243; Reffett, 571 N.E.2d at 1229; Jones, 544 N.E.2d at 496; Gee, 508 N.E.2d at 788; Thompson, 270 Ind. at 679, 389 N.E.2d at 276. Because such motions to correct sentence based on clear facial error are not in the nature of post-conviction petitions, we conclude that they may also be filed after a post-conviction proceeding without seeking the prior authorization necessary for successive petitions for post-conviction relief under Indiana Post-Conviction Rule 1(12). This holding overrules those cases that have held to the contrary, primarily in the interest of finality. See, e.g., White, 793 N.E.2d at 1132; Waters v. State, 703 N.E.2d 688, 689 (Ind.Ct.App.1998). In the present case, the defendant challenged his sentencing by a motion to correct sentence claiming that the trial court failed to comply with Indiana Code § 35-38-3-2(a) which provides in relevant part that [w]hen a convicted person is sentenced to imprisonment, the court shall, without delay, certify, under the seal of the court, copies of the judgment of conviction and sentence to the receiving authority, and further specifies in subsection 2(b) that [t]he judgment must include, among other things, the amount of credit, including credit time earned, for time spent in confinement before sentencing. The defendant contends that the trial court's sentence reported only the actual time served before sentencing and did not comply with the statutory requirement that it also include a separate statement of credit time earned for time spent in confinement before sentencing. He does not allege a calculation error that would require consideration of matters outside the face of the sentencing judgment. His assertion is that required information is omitted. This claim is the type of claim that may be asserted by a motion to correct sentence.