Opinion ID: 2156002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Assertion of the Fifth Amendment Privilege

Text: The fifth amendment provides, in part: No person    shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself   . (U.S. Const., amend. V; see also Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 10.) The privilege, which is available in any proceeding, guards against the compulsory disclosure of facts tending to establish criminal liability. ( People ex rel. Keith v. Keith (1967), 38 Ill.2d 405, 410.) A witness in a criminal case has the privilege to refuse to answer questions which tend to incriminate him. The protection secured by the fifth amendment is confined, however, to those instances where the witness has reasonable cause to believe he might subject himself to prosecution if he answers. Mason v. United States (1917), 244 U.S. 362, 61 L.Ed. 1198, 37 S.Ct. 621; People v. Baker (1988), 123 Ill.2d 233, 243-44; People v. Katsigiannis (1988), 171 Ill. App.3d 1090, 1101; People v. Thornton (1983), 120 Ill. App.3d 983, 986; People v. McLaren (1979), 77 Ill. App.3d 368, 373. The privilege against self-incrimination does not exist where there are no reasonable grounds to fear self-incrimination. ( In re Zisook (1981), 88 Ill.2d 321, 331.) Neither an unreasonable fear of self-incrimination nor a mere reluctance to testify is a ground for claiming the privilege. ( Zisook, 88 Ill.2d at 331.) Furthermore, the mere say-so of a witness does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. ( Hoffman v. United States (1951), 341 U.S. 479, 486, 95 L.Ed. 1118, 1124, 71 S.Ct. 814, 818.) Once a witness asserts his fifth amendment privilege not to incriminate himself, then it is for the circuit court to determine if under the particular facts there is a real danger of incrimination. Baker, 123 Ill.2d at 244; Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486, 95 L.Ed. at 1124, 71 S.Ct. at 818; Rogers v. United States (1951), 340 U.S. 367, 95 L.Ed. 344, 71 S.Ct. 438; Zisook, 88 Ill.2d at 332; People v. Prater (1987), 158 Ill. App.3d 330, 337; Thornton, 120 Ill. App.3d at 986. The witness is not required to prove that the answer to a particular question would necessarily subject him to prosecution. As the Supreme Court stated in Hoffman: [I]f the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim `must be governed as much by his personal perception of the peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.' ( Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486-87, 95 L.Ed. at 1124, 71 S.Ct. at 818.) This court in People v. Schultz (1942), 380 Ill. 539, 544, stated: [I]t must appear from the circumstances of the case and the nature of the evidence which the witness is called to give, that there is a reasonable ground to apprehend danger to the witness from his being compelled to answer. Schultz, 380 Ill. at 544. There is nothing in the record before this court to indicate the circuit court determined that Mr. Bea had reasonable grounds to fear incriminating himself if he were to answer the questions put to him by the State or defendant. The State informs this court that the circuit court, in an off-the-record discussion, attempted to ascertain the basis of Mr. Bea's assertion of the privilege. According to the State, Mr. Bea was fully aware of his grand jury testimony and asserted his fifth amendment privilege solely in order not to implicate defendant. The State asserts that this was obviously considered by the trial court in its off-the-record attempt to ascertain the basis of Mr. Bea's assertion of the privilege. Initially, we note that if the circuit court had actually made a determination on the record that Mr. Bea was asserting the fifth amendment privilege solely in order not to implicate defendant, then allowing Mr. Bea to refuse to answer questions based on his fifth amendment privilege would have been an abuse of discretion. As has been explained, the assertion of the privilege may not be based solely on the say-so of the witness and mere reluctance to testify is not a basis for the successful assertion of the privilege. ( Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486, 95 L.Ed. at 1124, 71 S.Ct. at 818; Zisook, 88 Ill.2d at 331.) It is for the circuit court, and not the witness, to determine if under the particular facts there is a real danger of incrimination. Baker, 123 Ill.2d at 244; Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486, 95 L.Ed. at 1124, 71 S.Ct. at 818; Zisook, 88 Ill.2d at 332. It is not possible for this court to review an alleged off-the-record attempt by the circuit court to ascertain the basis of Mr. Bea's assertion of his constitutional privilege not to incriminate himself. Both defendant and the State provide this court with alternative speculations as to why Mr. Bea might have asserted his fifth amendment privilege. Regardless of whether any of these speculations are correct, the fact is that Mr. Bea was allowed to assert his fifth amendment privilege not to incriminate himself. It appears from the fact Mr. Bea was permitted to refuse to testify based on the privilege that the circuit court determined reasonable grounds did exist for Mr. Bea to fear incriminating himself. From this conclusion, the circuit court then made the determination that refusal to testify on the ground that Mr. Bea had reasonable grounds to fear incriminating himself was inconsistent with his prior testimony before the grand jury. We conclude it was error for the circuit court to construe Mr. Bea's assertion of the privilege as being inconsistent with his out-of-court statements to the grand jury. We also conclude Mr. Bea was not subject to effective cross-examination when he refused to answer any questions put to him by either the prosecution or the defense.