Opinion ID: 1454463
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Recall and resentencing authority under section 1170(d).

Text: Section 1170(d) was enacted in 1976 as part of the Determinate Sentencing Act. As noted (see fn. 3, ante ), the subdivision allows a sentencing court to recall its sentence within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the recommendation of the Director of Corrections or the Board of Prison Terms.... After recall, the court may resentence the defendant in the same manner as if he or she had not previously been sentenced, provided any new sentence does not exceed the original sentence, grants credit for time served, and appl[ies] the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing.... (6) Section 1170(d) is an exception to the common law rule that the court loses resentencing jurisdiction once execution of sentence has begun. (E.g., Holder v. Superior Court (1970) 1 Cal.3d 779, 783 [83 Cal. Rptr. 353, 463 P.2d 705]; People v. Delson (1984) 161 Cal. App.3d 56, 62 [207 Cal. Rptr. 244]; People v. Calhoun (1977) 72 Cal. App.3d 494, 497 [140 Cal. Rptr. 225].) Where the statute applies, and if such a sentencing option would otherwise be available, section 1170(d) allows the court, among other things, to grant probation with or without conditions such as service of time in county jail. (See §§ 1168, subd. (a), 1170, subd. (a)(2), 1203.) (7a) Petitioner argues that section 1170(d) allows resentencing after commitment only to eliminate disparity and promote uniformity, based solely on circumstances existing at the time the initial sentence was imposed. Petitioner implies that these limitations thus also extend to recall of the original sentence, since recall is merely the necessary preliminary to resentencing. Hence, petitioner reasons, even though Bradley's resentencing has not yet taken place, the trial court's June 1988 recall order was itself in excess of jurisdiction, and the original sentence must be reinstated forthwith. The Court of Appeal majority agreed. Real parties contend, on the other hand, that recall and resentencing are distinct steps, and that only the resentencing step  which has not yet occurred in this case  is subject to the disparity and uniformity provisions of the statute. Regardless of what prompted the recall, real parties suggest, the court violates section 1170(d) only if the resentence ultimately imposed fails to meet the statutory requirements. Moreover, real parties assert, nothing in section 1170(d) limits resentencing discretion as petitioner suggests. We agree with real parties that within the 120-day period, the court may recall a sentence on its own motion for any reason rationally related to lawful sentencing. The court may then impose any otherwise lawful resentence suggested by the facts available at the time of resentencing. By its terms, section 1170(d) empowers a trial court to recall and vacate a prison sentence after commitment, with but two stated limitations. First, the power may be exercised only upon the court's own motion, or upon recommendation of the Director of Corrections (Director) or the Board of Prison Terms (Board). Second, in order to recall a sentence on its own initiative, the court must act within 120 days after it committed the defendant to prison. Once the sentence and commitment have validly been recalled, section 1170(d) authorizes the court to resentence ... in the same manner as if [ the defendant ] had not previously been sentenced. ... (Italics added.) Insofar as it is not limited by other phrases in the subdivision, the as if language indicates that the resentencing authority conferred by section 1170(d) is as broad as that possessed by the court when the original sentence was pronounced. The statute makes resentencing power narrower than original sentencing power in only two ways. First, the resentence may not exceed the original sentence. Second, the court must award credit for time served on the original sentence. Petitioner and the Court of Appeal majority perceive a third limitation based on the statutory proviso that the resentence must apply Judicial Council sentencing rules so as to eliminate disparity ... and to promote uniformity.... However, this phrase cannot plausibly be interpreted as limiting the court to correction of a disparate sentence. In the first place, section 1170(d) does not state that recall and resentencing are authorized only for the purpose of eliminat[ing] disparity and promot[ing] uniformity. The statutory language does not link recall with disparity at all, and declares only that any resentence ultimately imposed shall apply the Judicial Council's sentencing criteria so as to minimize disparity. Nor, in context, does section 1170(d)'s reference to the antidisparity rules imply that the statute permits recall and resentencing only to correct a disparate sentence. The entire Determinate Sentencing Act (§ 1170 et seq.) was expressly intended to achieve the elimination of disparity and the provision of uniformity in punishment by introducing a scheme of fixed prison terms in proportion to the seriousness of the offense as determined by the Legislature to be imposed by the court with specified discretion. (§ 1170, subd. (a)(1); see People v. Martin (1986) 42 Cal.3d 437, 442-443 [229 Cal. Rptr. 131, 722 P.2d 905].) Section 1170.3, subdivision (a), directs the Judicial Council to seek to promote uniformity in sentencing under [s]ection 1170 by adopting formal guidelines for exercise of the trial courts' determinate sentencing discretion. The rules promulgated by the Judicial Council under section 1170.3 explicitly extend to all determinate sentencing, not just to resentencing under section 1170(d). (§ 1170, subds. (a)(2), (d), (f)(1), (2); Cal. Rules of Court, rules 401, 403). Section 1170(d)'s reference to the rules thus suggests no limitation under that subdivision which does not apply to determinate sentencing in general. [9] Section 1170(d) is the direct statutory descendant of a provision in the superseded Indeterminate Sentencing Law that had nothing to do with enforcing comparative uniformity of sentences. (See People v. Roe (1983) 148 Cal. App.3d 112, 116 [195 Cal. Rptr. 802]; People v. Gainer (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d 636, 639-640, fn. 3 [184 Cal. Rptr. 120].) Prior to 1976, section 1168 contained a parallel provision authorizing courts to recall and resentence on their own motion, or upon recommendation of the Director, if [such action] is deemed warranted by the [Director's] diagnostic study and recommendations approved pursuant to [s]ection 5079.... [10] Then, as now, the postcommitment diagnostic study and recommendations prepared and approved under section 5079 focused on the prisoner's individual circumstances and characteristics. [11] Section 1168 was understood as granting broad power to reconsider a sentence mistakenly imposed in the individual case. (See, e.g., Holder v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 782.) Beginning in 1976, the recall provision of section 1168 was transferred in substance to new section 1170(d). Several changes were made, but none suggest a new and exclusive focus on sentence uniformity and disparity. Section 1170(d) omitted the limiting reference to the Director's diagnostic study; named the Board as an additional entity authorized to recommend recall at any time; prohibited a more severe resentence; required credit for time served; and subjected any resentence (like all determinate sentences) to the Judicial Council's antidisparity rules. (8) It thus seems clear that by enacting section 1170(d), the Legislature intended to retain, within the limits of determinate sentencing, the preexisting judicial power to recall and reconsider a sentence on individual grounds. The cases have so assumed. (See, e.g., People v. Keele (1986) 178 Cal. App.3d 701, 705, fn. 3 [224 Cal. Rptr. 32]; People v. Laue (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 1055, 1060 [182 Cal. Rptr. 99]; People v. Colley (1980) 113 Cal. App.3d 870, 871-872 [170 Cal. Rptr. 339].) The statutory procedure for correction of disparate sentences is contained elsewhere in section 1170. Subdivision (f)(1) of section 1170 requires the Board, within one year after a prison term commences, to review the sentence for comparative disparity. If the Board finds the sentence disparate, it must notify the sentencing court, the attorneys, and the Judicial Council, stating the reasons for its determination. Within 120 days after such notification, the trial court  shall schedule a hearing and [after considering the Board's information] may recall the sentence and commitment ... and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant had not been sentenced previously.... (Italics added.) As in cases under section 1170(d), any resentence may not exceed the original sentence, and the court must apply the Judicial Council's rules so as to eliminate disparity ... and to promote uniformity of sentencing. (§ 1170, subd. (f)(2).) If section 1170 were interpreted as petitioner and the Court of Appeal majority suggest, the statute would contain two separate, inconsistent, and confusing mechanisms for the sole purpose of correcting disparate sentences. Section 1170, subdivision (f) directs the Board to conduct a disparity review of every sentence within one year after its commencement. (9) (See fn. 12.) If within this period the Board finds a sentence disparate, the trial court must schedule a hearing and consider whether the Board's finding warrants recall and resentencing. [12] By contrast, section 1170(d) makes no reference to administrative review or findings, nonetheless allows either the Board or the Director to recommend recall of a sentence at any time, but apparently does not require the court to respond to the recommendation. [13] Moreover, under section 1170(d), the court may recall and resentence on its own initiative, but need not do so, and cannot do so more than 120 days after commitment. As Justice Poche's dissent in the Court of Appeal points out, [i]t is ... difficult to fathom why the Legislature would treat the single problem of aberrant sentences in such Byzantine fashion, and in such strained and ambiguous language. (7b) In fact, because subdivision (f) of section 1170 assures careful and orderly disparity review of every determinate prison sentence, there is little reason for a separate, discretionary procedure under section 1170(d) which also focuses exclusively on correction of disparity. (10) Where reasonably possible, we avoid statutory constructions that render particular provisions superfluous or unnecessary. (E.g., People v. Olsen (1984) 36 Cal.3d 638, 647 [205 Cal. Rptr. 492, 685 P.2d 52]; Bowland v. Municipal Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 479, 489 [134 Cal. Rptr. 630, 556 P.2d 1081].) (7c) Far more reasonable is the assumption that while section 1170, subdivision (f) was intended to deal specifically with correction of disparity, section 1170(d) confers a broader power to recall and resentence for any otherwise lawful reason, so long as the court takes the Judicial Council standards into account when imposing a new sentence. This construction is confirmed in guidelines published by the Department of Corrections (CDC), whose Director is authorized under section 1170(d) to recommend recall of a prison sentence at any time after its commencement. CDC's 1985 classification manual notes that the superior court retains absolute discretion to recall a sentence within the first 120 days of sentencing. The classification manual also states that the Director may recommend recall at any time, independent of the Board's disparity review, based on changes in the inmate's situation or significant new information that was not considered by the court in pronouncing sentence. (Classification Manual, Cal. Dept. of Corrections (1985) § 602, p. 600-1.1; see also id., §§ 603(a), at p. 600-1.1, & 604(b), at p. 600-1.2 [if conditions have changed to the extent that the inmate's continued incarceration in the Department is not in the interest of justice].) In early 1990, the classification manual was superseded by a department operations manual, which contains similar interpretations of section 1170(d). (See Dept. Operations Manual, Cal. Dept. of Corrections (1990) §§ 62020.3, 62020.6.) (11) Unless unreasonable or clearly contrary to the statutory language or purpose, the consistent construction of a statute by an agency charged with responsibility for its implementation is entitled to great deference. (E.g., Nipper v. California Auto. Assigned Risk Plan (1977) 19 Cal.3d 35, 45 [136 Cal. Rptr. 854, 560 P.2d 743].) (7d) Accordingly, we conclude that section 1170(d) permits recall and resentencing for any otherwise lawful reason, not simply to correct a disparate sentence. The Humboldt County Superior Court did not exceed its powers under section 1170(d) by recalling Bradley's sentence within 120 days for reasons unrelated to disparity. Nor can we accept the premise that section 1170(d) precludes consideration of circumstances which arose after the original sentencing. Section 1170(d) imposes no such express limitation on the court's powers. On the contrary, the statute simply provides that the court may recall its original sentence within 120 days, or upon recommendation of the Board or the Director, and may resentence  as if [ the defendant ] had not previously been sentenced. ... (Italics added.) The inference arises that the factors the court may consider are no more limited than if the resentencing were the original sentencing. This view comports with principles generally applicable to resentencing law. (12) For example, it is well settled that when a case is remanded for resentencing after an appeal, the defendant is entitled to all the normal rights and procedures available at his original sentencing ( People v. Foley (1985) 170 Cal. App.3d 1039, 1047 [216 Cal. Rptr. 865]; see also, e.g., Van Velzer v. Superior Court (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 742, 744 [199 Cal. Rptr. 695]), including consideration of any pertinent circumstances which have arisen since the prior sentence was imposed (e.g., People v. Flores (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 1156, 1160-1162 [244 Cal. Rptr. 322]). For its narrower interpretation of section 1170(d), the Court of Appeal majority relied heavily on our construction of the recall/resentence language formerly contained in section 1168. (See discussion, ante. ) In Holder v. Superior Court, supra, 1 Cal.3d 779 (hereafter Holder ), we ruled that section 1168, as then in force, empowered a court only to reconsider whether its original sentencing decision was correct when made, and did not permit consideration of postsentence developments such as rehabilitation in prison. (1 Cal.3d at p. 782.) Our conclusion flowed from two premises. First, we noted that section 1168 authorized recall and resentencing if such action was deemed warranted by the postsentence diagnostic study and recommendations approved by the Director pursuant to section 5079. ( Holder, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 782.) Thus, we suggested, the statute merely provided a convenient alternative to section 1203.03, which allows the court to place the defendant in a diagnostic facility prior to sentencing for purposes of obtaining a report and recommendation. (1 Cal.3d at p. 782, fn. 3.) Second, we perceived that if a court could recall and resentence based on postsentencing events, an anomalous duplication of authority would arise under the indeterminate sentencing scheme then in effect. Under that system, we noted, the Legislature had given the Adult Authority (the Board's predecessor) power to determine the duration of imprisonment within statutory limits and the matter of parole.... We reasoned that if the court could recall a sentence and grant probation based on rehabilitation after entering prison, there manifestly would be two bodies (one judicial and one administrative) determining the matter of rehabilitation, and it is unreasonable to believe the Legislature intended such a result. ( Holder, supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 782, fn. 3.) For the most part, these premises are inapplicable to current section 1170(d). When the Legislature moved the substance of the recall/resentence provision from section 1168 to section 1170(d), it did so with an explicit difference. Missing from the new statute was the prior language limiting the recall/resentence power to those cases in which such action was deemed warranted by the CDC's diagnostic report and recommendations. Section 1170(d), unlike the pre-1976 version of section 1168, contains no express limitation on the factors which can motivate a recall and resentence. (13) We presume the Legislature intends to change the meaning of a law when it alters the statutory language ( Eu v. Chacon (1976) 16 Cal.3d 465, 470 [128 Cal. Rptr. 1, 546 P.2d 289]), as for example when it deletes express provisions of the prior version ( People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 142 [169 P.2d 1]). Because the Legislature is presumed aware of prior judicial constructions of a statute, the inference of altered intent is particularly compelling when, as in this case, the omitted word or phrase was significant to such a construction. ( Clements v. T.R. Bechtel Co. (1954) 43 Cal.2d 227, 231-232 [273 P.2d 5].) (7e) Omission from section 1170(d) of the diagnostic-report limitation previously contained in section 1168 is strong evidence that the Legislature no longer intended to limit the circumstances under which the court could invoke its recall and resentencing power. Moreover, the policy concern which prompted Holder's construction of section 1168 was largely eliminated by the Legislature at the time it adopted section 1170(d). Section 1170 was enacted as part of the 1976 statute which repealed most indeterminate prison sentences and substituted a system of determinate prison terms for most offenses punishable by prison. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1139, § 273, p. 5140.) In determinate sentencing, the actual period of prison incarceration is primarily determined by the court's choice of term, rather than by the Adult Authority's discretionary parole decisions. (See §§ 1170 et seq., 2931 et seq., 3040 et seq.) By transferring control over length of incarceration from the Adult Authority to the courts, the determinate sentencing system thus eliminates the danger that judicial recall and resentencing powers would interfere with primary administrative discretion to decide when a person initially sentenced to prison should be released. [14] We assume that when the Legislature adopted section 1170(d), it was aware not only of our result in Holder, supra, 1 Cal.3d 779, but of the reasoning which underlay our holding in that case. By enacting section 1170(d) in the context of a determinate sentencing scheme, and by omitting a limiting phrase on which Holder had directly relied, the Legislature consciously undermined all grounds for Holder's narrow construction of the pre-1976 recall/resentence provision. Under these circumstances, we infer no legislative intent that the Holder ruling be imported into the new statute. The Court of Appeal majority found it significant that under current law, the Director may reduce a determinate prison sentence only by the amount of statutory good time and worktime credits the prisoner has earned (see §§ 2931, 2933), or for the prisoner's heroic act[ion] in a life-threatening situation or exceptional assistance in maintaining prison security. (§ 2935; see also Cal. Code Regs., tit. 15 (hereafter Regulations), § 3043, subd. (g).) As in Holder, supra, 1 Cal.3d 779, the majority reasoned, it would be anomalous if judicial recall and resentencing were available for postcommitment reasons  such as an agreement to testify in a non-prison-related criminal case [15]  which could not result in an administrative reduction of sentence. We disagree. That the Determinate Sentencing Act has left the Director with narrow, carefully defined authority to award credits against a prison sentence does not undermine the principle that the court, the primary determinate sentencing authority, has much broader statutory jurisdiction to reconsider its original sentence, even on the basis of subsequent events. In sum, we see no reason to conclude that section 1170(d), contrary to its terms, limits the reasons why a trial court may exercise its statutory authority to recall and resentence. We hold that section 1170(d) permits the sentencing court to recall a sentence for any reason which could influence sentencing generally, even if the reason arose after the original commitment. The court may thereafter consider any such reason in deciding upon a new sentence. After affording the victim the right to attend sentencing proceedings and express his or her views (§ 1191.1), the court may then impose any new sentence that would be permissible under the Determinate Sentencing Act if the resentence were the original sentence. [16] Accordingly, even if the recall of Bradley's prison sentence was prompted by Bradley's postcommitment offer of testimony in another case, the court's action did not exceed its jurisdiction under section 1170(d). Nor is the court precluded by section 1170(d) from taking Bradley's cooperation into account when imposing any new sentence. (14) Petitioner argues that even if the court could recall and resentence in light of Bradley's cooperation in the Kellotat case, the court lost jurisdiction to impose a new sentence when it failed to resentence within the 120-day period of section 1170(d). Hence, he reasons, the Court of Appeal correctly concluded that Bradley's original sentence must be reinstated. We disagree. Cases under both section 1170(d) and the predecessor version of section 1168 have held that the court loses own-motion jurisdiction if it fails to recall a sentence within 120 days of the original commitment. (See People v. Roe, supra, 148 Cal. App.3d at p. 117; People v. Calhoun, supra, 72 Cal. App.3d at p. 497.) However, no decision has directly held that both recall and resentencing must occur within the statutory limit. [17] Section 1170(d) could grammatically be read to mean that if the court acts on its own motion, it must both recall and resentence within 120 days after commitment. However, the statutory language is more susceptible to the understanding that the court preserves its jurisdiction by recalling the sentence within 120 days, and then may resentence in the same manner as if [the defendant] had not previously been sentenced.... Such phraseology implies there are no jurisdictional time limits on resentencing that would not apply on initial sentencing. This flexible view is supported by a reading of section 1170(d) in its entirety. When recall stems from a recommendation by the Board or the Director, the statute imposes no jurisdictional requirement of immediate resentencing. No reason appears why the Legislature would wish a more rigid resentencing rule after a timely recall on the court's own motion. As a general rule, time limits on the pronouncement of sentence are not jurisdictional, but are waivable by the parties. (E.g., People v. Ford (1966) 65 Cal.2d 41, 47 [52 Cal. Rptr. 228, 416 P.2d 132]; People v. Williams (1944) 24 Cal.2d 848, 850 [151 P.2d 244]; People v. Jackson (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 953, 955-957 [181 Cal. Rptr. 429]; People v. Cheffen (1969) 2 Cal. App.3d 638, 642 [82 Cal. Rptr. 658].) The Legislature has not indicated otherwise here. We conclude the trial court has not lost resentencing jurisdiction, nor has it otherwise erred, by delaying resentencing with the consent of both Bradley and the People. In sum, the trial court did not err under section 1170(d) by recalling Bradley's sentence for reasons unrelated to disparity. (15, 16, 17) (See fn. 18.) Moreover, the court retains jurisdiction to impose any otherwise permissible new sentence, which may include consideration of facts that arose after Bradley was committed to serve the original sentence. [18]