Opinion ID: 4337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Dismissal of Juror Three

Text: Russell argues that the District Court erred by dismissing Juror Three after Juror Three told the Court that she recognized “Cheddar,” a member of the Folk Nation gang, as a man who participated in an online chat group of which Juror Three was a member. We review a district court’s decision to dismiss a juror before jury deliberations for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 342 F.3d 168, 182-83 (2d Cir. 2003). A district court has abused its discretion if it has (1) “based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law,” (2) made a “clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence,” or (3) “rendered a decision that cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Sims v. Blot, 534 F.3d 117, 132 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The threat of jury tampering loomed over this trial, so much so that the District Court granted the government’s request, over defendants’ objection, to empanel an anonymous jury.2 Jurors reported feeling intimidated by spectators in the gallery, and there was an attempt on the part of one of defendants’ associates to intimidate a witness. When the District Court learned that Juror Three had some contact with a member of defendants’ gang, it was well within the District Court’s discretion to conclude that Juror Three’s anonymity was threatened and that there was “reasonable cause” to dismiss her. United States v. Purdy, 144 F.3d 241, 247 (2d Cir. 1998). In any event, the District Court’s decision did not cause “‘bias or prejudice to the defendant.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Gambino, 951 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir. 1991)). The dismissal of Juror Three was not, therefore, an error meriting vacatur of the judgment. III. The Admission of the Telephone Call Between McTier and Lewin McTier argues that the District Court erred by admitting into evidence a taped telephone call between McTier and Lewin, an associate of the Folk Nation gang. McTier argues that the telephone call was irrelevant and improperly “bolstered” the credibility of Lewin, who was a cooperating witness for the government. We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mercado, 573 F.3d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 2009); cf. Sims, 534 F.3d at 132. 2 On appeal, defendants do not challenge the District Court’s decision to empanel an anonymous jury. 4 The admission of the recording of the telephone call was not an abuse of discretion. The recording was relevant because it provided evidence of McTier’s relationship with Lewin and contained arguably incriminating statements by McTier. The claim of improper “bolstering” is unfounded, and the statements were not hearsay because they were either not admitted for the truth of the matter asserted or were non-hearsay admissions under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2).