Opinion ID: 5241
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equitable and Promissory Estoppel

Text: 9 Having decided that neither the manuals nor the letters give rise to the existence of an enforceable contract between the parties, we now consider whether an enforceable contract may be found on grounds of estoppel. Equitable estoppel is a wellestablished exception to the statute of frauds. PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy, 449 So.2d 201 (Miss. 1984). A party asserting equitable estoppel must show (1) that she has changed her position in reliance upon the conduct of another; and (2) that she has suffered detriment caused by this change in position in reliance upon that conduct. Id. at 206. Promissory estoppel requires (1) a promise; (2) that induces action of a definite or substantial character on the part of the promisee; and (3) that the promisor reasonably should have expected the promisee's action. See Sanders v. Dantzler, 375 So.2d 774, 776-77 (Miss. 1979). If these elements are present, the promise is binding if injustice can be avoided only by the enforcement of the promise. Id. at 776. Additionally, each of these doctrines requires reasonableness. See PMZ Oil, 449 So.2d at 206; Sanders, 375 So.2d at 776. The law, however, does not regard estoppels with favor, nor extend them beyond the requirements of the transactions in which they originate. PMZ Oil, 449 So.2d at 206 (quoting McLearn v. Hill, 176 N.E. 617, 619 (Mass. 1931)). In the case at bar, Solomon has wholly failed to set forth a genuine issue of material fact as to whether a promise was made by Walgreens. The record is devoid of evidence to support Solomon’s allegation that Walgreens promised her guaranteed employment upon 10 her arrival in Mississippi. Therefore, we conclude that no reasonable trier of fact could find that Walgreens, through the letters of its district managers, somehow made a promise to Solomon expecting to induce action on her part to her detriment.4 Furthermore, even if Walgreens hypothetically promised Solomon a job, we are unable to find any evidence that she relied on such a hypothetical promise to her detriment. Solomon’s decision to leave Illinois and move to Mississippi was admittedly motivated by her divorce rather than by the promise of a job with Walgreens. Even if Solomon’s move had been induced by a promise of a job, the Mississippi Supreme Court has followed the case law of New York, which has held consistently that a change of job or residence, by itself, is insufficient to trigger invocation of the promissory estoppel doctrine. Bowers Window & Door Co. v. Dearman, 549 So.2d 1309, 1315 (1989) (quoting Cunnison v. Richardson Greenshields Securities, Inc., 107 A.D.2d 50, 53 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985)) (move from Toronto to New York equally consistent with employment at will). The choice to forgo current employment because of rosy promises does not put the stigma of unconscionability upon the defendant . . . . Id. (quoting Ginsberg v. Fairchild-Noble Corp., 81 A.D.2d 318, 321 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981)). Solomon, therefore, cannot, on the basis of her move to Mississippi, invoke the doctrine of promissory estoppel. See Cunnison, 107 A.D.2d at 53. 0. To the contrary, Solomon received express notice in her 1985 employment application that district managers do not have the authority to make such promises. 11 Other factors recited by Solomon also weigh against detrimental reliance: she knew that her rate of pay in Mississippi would be less than in Illinois; Walgreens never represented that it would assume Solomon’s moving expenses; she alone made the initial decision to relocate to Mississippi for personal reasons following her divorce; at no time did Walgreens attempt to induce her to move based on any sort of promise.5 In short, Walgreens had nothing to gain by Solomon’s relocation to Mississippi. In order to recover under a breach of contract claim on a theory of equitable estoppel, a plaintiff must demonstrate a changed position and detrimental reliance. PMZ Oil, 449 So.2d at 1315. We cannot conclude that Solomon changed her position in reliance on the alleged promise of employment to her detriment. The only detriment which Solomon may legitimately claim is the loss of a Walgreens job in Illinois based on the hope of a Walgreens job in her newly chosen residential locale. It is the majority rule, and the rule in Mississippi, that the termination of existing employment, even in reliance on an oral contract of employment, is insufficient proof of detriment and a necessary incident of being in the labor market or workforce; it is not such an injury as to estop a defendant from asserting the statute of frauds as a 0. Solomon also attempts to argue that the letters by Grauer and Earnest, prepared at her request, guaranteed her a definite term of employment for 30 to 40 hours in the Tupelo store. This even further undermines her estoppel argument. We find it manifestly unreasonable to assert, and nearly impossible to believe, that a person would relocate her entire family to Mississippi based solely on the promise of a mere 30 to 40 hours of employment. 12 defense. Bowers, 549 So.2d at 1315. Based upon the current state of Mississippi law, Solomon, as an at-will employee, has failed to present any evidence of detriment sufficient to invoke the doctrine of estoppel. Id. Accordingly, we find that Solomon has failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact regarding both the existence of a promise and her detrimental reliance.6