Opinion ID: 181770
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: BMG's Protective Cross-Appeal

Text: BMG also raised the issue of waiver in what it calls a protective cross-appeal. Specifically, BMG cross-appealed to preserve, as an additional or alternative basis for affirming that portion of the District Court's order of August 6, 2008[,] finding that Appellants could not invoke tribal sovereign immunity, the issue that Appellants also waived any claim of tribal sovereign immunity by executing the two license agreements with Breakthrough Management. Aplee./Cross-Aplt. Mem. Br. Jurisdiction, Attach. BMG0093 (Notice of Protective Cross-Appeal, filed Sept. 3, 2008). BMG argues that this court should exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over its cross-appeal because the issue of waiver is inextricably intertwined with the Appellants's interlocutory appeals. Aplee./Cross-Aplt. Mem. Br. Jurisdiction at 18-19. BMG contends that there is a single issue at stake: whether Appellants are entitled to assert tribal sovereign immunity as a defense. Id. at 18. BMG states in the alternative that [e]ven if the claims . . . were not `inextricably intertwined,' pendent jurisdiction still would be appropriate here, because review of the cross-appeal is necessary to ensure meaningful review of Appellants' claims of tribal sovereign immunity. Id. at 19. BMG maintains that if its argument regarding waiver is later found to be correct on subsequent appeal, that would render this court's review of the instant appeal meaningless. Id. BMG also contends that the only way it could raise the issue of waiver is through a cross-appeal because it asks the Court to affirm on grounds that might enlarge the rights afforded the prevailing party (i.e., the Tribe may be affected by this court's ruling that the parties to this appeal had waived any sovereign immunity they possessed). Id. at 13, 16. We are unpersuaded. We conclude that it would be improper for us to exercise pendent jurisdiction over BMG's cross-appeal. We have recognized that the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction `is generally disfavored.' Timpanogos Tribe v. Conway, 286 F.3d 1195, 1200 (10th Cir.2002) (quoting Armijo ex rel. Chavez v. Wagon Mound Pub. Schs., 159 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.1998)). This court has stated it will take pendant [sic] jurisdiction over an interlocutory appeal only where the otherwise nonappealable decision is inextricably intertwined with the appealable decision, or where review of the nonappealable decision is necessary to ensure meaningful review of the appealable one. Tarrant Reg'l Water Dist. v. Sevenoaks, 545 F.3d 906, 915 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Timpanogos Tribe, 286 F.3d at 1200) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United Transp. Union Local 1745 v. City of Albuquerque, 178 F.3d 1109, 1114 (10th Cir.1999) (noting that the exercise of pendent jurisdiction is discretionary and should be used sparingly); Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1264 (same). Issues are inextricably intertwined if the pendent claim is coterminous with, or subsumed in, the claim before the court on interlocutory appeal that is, when the appellate resolution of the collateral appeal necessarily resolves the pendent claim as well. Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 930 (10th Cir.1995); see Malik v. Arapahoe Cnty. Dept. of Social Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1317 (10th Cir.1999) (Accordingly, our application of the `inextricably intertwined' standard for exercising pendent jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals must be narrowly focused on those claims the review of which would not require the consideration of legal or factual matters distinct from those raised by the claims over which we unquestionably have jurisdiction. (emphasis added)). As clearly evident from our decision to remand the issue of waiver to the district court, supra, we do not view the waiver issue as being inextricably intertwined with the question of whether the Authority and the Casino share in the Tribe's sovereign immunity. Our decision concerning the latter issue does not necessarily resolve[] the pendent [waiver] claim as well. Moore, 57 F.3d at 930. The immunity and waiver issues are distinct. See Sac & Fox Nation v. Hanson, 47 F.3d 1061, 1064 (10th Cir.1995) ([I]f the Nation was entitled to sovereign immunity, it did not waive its immunity from suit. We must therefore address the predicate question of whether the Nation had sovereign immunity in the first instance.); see also Gonzalez v. 7th St. Casino, No. 09-2674-CM, 2010 WL 1875734, at  (D.Kan. May 5, 2010) (Whether an entity is entitled to tribal sovereign immunity to begin with is a separate issue from whether immunity has been waived.); Bales v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., 606 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1305-06 (D.N.M.2009) (as to that case, noting that waiver is not an issue but rather the issue is whether there is tribal sovereign immunity to begin with). Our resolution of the former issue (i.e., the availability of tribal sovereign immunity) involves consideration of the relationship between the Tribe and the Authority and the Casino, whereas our resolution of the latter (i.e., waiver of any tribal sovereign immunity) calls for consideration of the effect of the forum-selection clauses of the license agreements. See Aplts./Cross-Aplees. Mem. Br. Jurisdiction at 10 ([T]he appeal only requires the Court to examine the relationship between Appellants and the Tribe. The effect, if any, of BMG's license agreement is a separate claim under a separate legal theory.). Furthermore, our decision concerning sovereign immunity will stand as meaningful precedent involving complicated Indian-law issues, irrespective of the ultimate conclusion concerning waiver before the district court or in any subsequent appeal. BMG is free to litigate the waiver issue before the district court and to appeal from an adverse ruling on this issue. BMG's suggestion that it must raise this issue on cross-appeal because of the possible impact of a waiver ruling on the Tribe's claim of immunity is misguided. [18] A cross-appeal ordinarily would be appropriate where a litigant seeks to enlarge his rights conferred by the original judgment or to lessen the rights of his adversary under that judgment. United States v. Am. Ry. Exp. Co., 265 U.S. 425, 435, 44 S.Ct. 560, 68 L.Ed. 1087 (1924) ([T]he appellee may not attack the decree with a view either to enlarging his own rights thereunder or of lessening the rights of his adversary, whether what he seeks is to correct an error or to supplement the decree with respect to a matter not dealt with below.); see June v. Union Carbide Corp., 577 F.3d 1234, 1248 n. 8 (10th Cir.2009) (Under the cross-appeal rule, `an appellate court may not alter a judgment to benefit a nonappealing party.' (quoting Greenlaw v. United States, 554 U.S. 237, 244, 128 S.Ct. 2559, 171 L.Ed.2d 399 (2008)). In the context of an interlocutory appeal, the functional equivalent of the original judgment is the interlocutory order appealed from viz., in this instance, the district court's order denying sovereign immunity to the Authority and the Casino. See Behrens v. Pelletier, 516 U.S. 299, 307, 116 S.Ct. 834, 133 L.Ed.2d 773 (1996) ([A]n order rejecting the defense of qualified immunity at either the dismissal stage or the summary judgment stage is a `final' judgment subject to immediate appeal.); Roska ex rel. Roska v. Sneddon, 437 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir.2006) (Although we have jurisdiction over Defendants' appeal from the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity, we decline to assert pendent appellate jurisdiction over Defendants' claim that the district court failed to apply a local rule.); see also 15A Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3904, at 221 (Supp. 2010) (Interlocutory appeals may present special challenges in cross-appeal practice. . . . [T]he appeal may properly be confined to matters that relate closely to the order that supports the appeal.  (emphasis added)). As the Authority and the Casino correctly note, BMG's `right' conferred by that [interlocutory immunity] order is the right to maintain its lawsuit against these two defendants.  Aplts./Cross-Aplees. Mem. Br. Jurisdiction at 12 (emphasis added). If BMG were successful on its waiver argument, that right would not be enlarged. Accordingly, we decline to assert pendent jurisdiction over BMG's waiver-based cross-appeal, and, accordingly, dismiss it.