Opinion ID: 2975466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Uncounseled Juvenile Offenses

Text: Petitioner was fourteen years old at the time of the first offense, and fifteen years old at the time of the second offense. The presentence report indicates that Petitioner “waived representation by an attorney” with respect to both of these offenses, but there is simply no evidence of a valid waiver of the right to counsel. (J.A. 184) The record contains a single state court document which summarily states that Petitioner “waived an attorney” in connection with the first juvenile offense. (J.A. 151) Records concerning the second juvenile offense are entirely absent from the record.1 The majority ignores the sheer dearth of records and appears to defer to the cursory state court document. This deference is completely unfounded. The document cannot be given great weight because it does not contain any meaningful elaboration and fails to set forth the circumstances surrounding the waiver of the right to counsel. Rather than deferring to a cursory and inconclusive state court document, this Court is charged with “ensur[ing] that a defendant’s waiver is made with eyes wide open” and “must thoroughly investigate the circumstances under which the waiver is made.” Fowler, 253 F.3d 244, 249 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). This Court “must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of an individual’s fundamental constitutional rights,” id. at 249 (citation omitted), and 1 Since the only state court document in the record was prepared exclusively in connection with the first juvenile offense, the document cannot serve as a basis for inferring that Petitioner waived counsel for the second juvenile offense. 16 “looks at all of the circumstances surrounding waiver of counsel to ensure that such waiver was knowing and intelligent,” James v. Brigano, 470 F.3d 636, 643 (6th Cir. 2006). In this case, there is no record of a colloquy between the trial judge and Petitioner concerning the implications of waiving the right to counsel. There is simply no information on the record to determine whether the waiver of the right to counsel was made orally or in writing; whether Petitioner’s parents were notified of Petitioner’s right to counsel; whether Petitioner or his parents waived the right to counsel; or whether Petitioner’s parents consented to the waiver.2 Since we have no colloquy or meaningful records to review, this Court simply cannot test whether Petitioner’s constitutional rights have been violated. Despite the complete absence of evidence and information, the majority affirms the district court’s conclusion that Petitioner “either knowingly waived counsel or was appointed counsel in his state juvenile cases.” (J.A. 147) (emphasis added). An affirmance of the district court decision is simply unfounded because the record is inconclusive and does not indicate whether Petitioner waived counsel under the appropriate procedural mechanisms. More specifically, the district court failed to properly inquire whether Petitioner’s knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. See, e.g., King v. Bobby, 433 F.3d 483, 490 (6th Cir. 2006); Fowler v. Collins, 253 2 Although Petitioner’s mother appears to have been present in one of the state court proceedings, there is no information concerning the role Petitioner’s mother played in the proceeding. See J.A. 151. In Application of Gault, the Supreme Court expressly held that: [t]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that . . . the child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (emphasis added). The mere presence of Petitioner’s mother cannot be given great weight because the record simply does not show that Petitioner’s mother was apprised of any constitutional rights. 17 F.3d 244, 249 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that for a defendant’s waiver to be valid, the “waiver of his right to counsel must be made on the record knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily”); United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 377 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding that a conviction does not constitute an uncounseled conviction if “[t]he record reflects that [petitioner] knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel in connection with the . . . conviction”). In this case, “it is unclear from the record whether [petitioner] was afforded [the] right to counsel during the [juvenile] delinquency proceedings.” United States v. Robertson, 40 F. App’x 933, 940 (6th Cir. 2002) (unpublished case). Given the scant record, rather than affirming the district court’s unfounded conclusion, I would “vacate the sentence and remand th[e] case with instructions to the district court to determine whether [petitioner] was afforded this element of due process during the delinquency adjudication.” Id. Since there is no record of the alleged waiver of the right to counsel, I would find that a determination on the validity of Petitioner’s waiver is simply not possible on this record and that the district court erred in concluding that Petitioner knowingly waived counsel in the juvenile cases.