Opinion ID: 2587723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Exclusion of Prior Conviction During Witness Cross-Examination

Text: Engelhardt next contends the district court erred by prohibiting the defense from impeaching Dorothy Smith by introducing evidence of Brian's prior aggravated battery conviction. Our standard of review on this evidentiary ruling is the same as previously stated. Generally a district judge has discretion to determine the propriety and scope of cross-examination. State v. Hutchinson, 222 Kan. 365, 367, 564 P.2d 545 (1977). However, Engelhardt asserts this issue has constitutional implications, arguing the district court's limitation of his cross-examination of Dorothy denied him his right to present a defense and effectively cross-examine. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 39 L. Ed. 2d 347, 94 S. Ct. 1105 (1974); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 35 L. Ed. 2d 297, 93 S. Ct. 1038 (1973). Constitutional claims raise issues of law subject to de novo appellate review. State v. Rivera, 277 Kan. 109, 113, 83 P.3d 169 (2004). During the State's direct examination of Dorothy regarding her relationship with her husband Brian, she testified that there had been stress and tension between them and Engelhardt. Over defense counsel's objection, the district court allowed the prosecutor to question Dorothy about the reason for the tension relevant to the issue of control. Dorothy testified that Brian was an alcoholic and that Engelhardt would bring him alcohol, get Brian very, very drunk, and try to turn Brian against her. Dorothy further testified that Engelhardt did not like her to be around because then he could not manipulate Brian all the time. The court sustained defense counsel's objection to this particular statement as speculative. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Dorothy whether Brian gets violent when he drinks. She admitted that Brian was an alcoholic but wouldn't say [he was] violent. When questioned further, Dorothy admitted Brian had broken a few dishes here and there. When asked whether Brian had broken windows out of cars, Dorothy answered, What I was told was that that [ sic ] wasn't him. I did not directly witness that. She further testified she could not remember whether Brian had threatened to kill her and Drake, but she admitted she must have said as much if an investigator's report said she did. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel then requested permission to introduce evidence of Brian's prior violent conduct, such as aggravated battery, as part of this cross-examination. The defense argued that the State had attempted, through Dorothy's testimony, to portray Brian as a decent guy unless [Engelhardt was] there feeding him alcohol, getting him drunk. Defense counsel wanted to prove Brian was capable of committing violent acts without the influence of Engelhardt. The district judge denied defense counsel's request to introduce evidence of Brian's prior violent conduct, finding the State did not open the door to such evidence. Engelhardt cites the following two cases to support his contention that evidence of Brian's prior violent conduct should have been admitted to discredit Dorothy generally and to specifically undercut her testimony regarding Brian's good character. In State v. Mays, 254 Kan. 479, 866 P.2d 1037 (1994), the victim claimed that Mays raped and robbed her. Mays did not deny the victim was raped. Instead, he claimed the victim named him as the offender at the urging of her boyfriend because of a feud over money belonging to the boyfriend that Mays had lost gambling. The excluded evidence in Mays included testimony about the victim's financial dependence on her boyfriend and her boyfriend's threat to get even with the defendant. See 254 Kan. at 482-86. This court concluded the exclusion of relevant, admissible, noncumulative evidence bearing upon the credibility of a critical prosecution witness unfairly prejudiced the defendant and violated Mays' right to a fair trial. 254 Kan. at 487. In State v. Davis, 237 Kan. 155, 160, 697 P.2d 1321 (1985), during redirect examination of accomplice Donald Coty, defense counsel elicited comments from the witness that `[robbing] ain't my lifestyle.' Coty further stated that he had never robbed people. Following his testimony, the defense sought to present testimony from Coty's mother that Coty made a living committing robbery. This court noted that K.S.A. 60-420 permitted any party, even the party calling a witness, to introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any conduct by [the witness] or any other matter relevant for the purpose of attacking the witness' credibility. However, evidence of traits of a witness' character other than honesty or veracity or their opposites, as well as evidence of specific instances of conduct relevant only to prove such traits of character, are inadmissible as affecting credibility. 237 Kan. at 160 (citing K.S.A. 60-422[c], [d]; State v. Nixon, 223 Kan. 788, 576 P.2d 691 [1978]). The Davis court concluded that the exclusion of the evidence attacking Coty's credibility was prejudicial to the defendant. 237 Kan. at 160-61. Davis and Mays are distinguishable from the present case. Unlike the situation in Davis, one reason the defense wanted to introduce evidence of Brian's prior aggravated battery conviction in this case was to show that Dorothy knew of this prior bad conduct and was concealing it. This would have been an improper use of such evidence. See Davis, 237 Kan. at 160. Mays is distinguishable because Dorothy was not a critical prosecution witness. This was not a he said-she said rape case. Numerous other witnesses testified to the events leading up to the murder and the activities to avoid detection after it occurred. Even if Dorothy's credibility had been destroyed, Engelhardt faced other highly effective and incriminating accusers. We see no abuse of discretion and no violation of the defendant's constitutional rights in the district judge's ruling on the scope of Dorothy's cross-examination.