Opinion ID: 561364
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Bad Memory Instruction

Text: 8 Chen contends that the district court erred in refusing to give his proposed jury instruction regarding failure to remember in connection with the knowing falsity element of perjury. Specifically, Chen requested the following instruction: 9 The requirement that you find the defendant acted knowingly means that you may not find the defendant guilty of making a false declaration simply because the defendant gave testimony which is factually incorrect. The defendant may have given incorrect testimony because of an honest mistake of facts, confusion, haste, oversight, or carelessness. If the defendant made an erroneous and incorrect statement due to a slip of the tongue or bad memory or through misunderstanding, the defendant would not be guilty of making the false statement knowingly. 10 The district court declined to give this instruction and instead gave the following general instruction on the element of knowledge: 11 If you decide the answer the defendant gave was false, you must then decide whether the defendant gave that answer knowingly, that is, at the time the answer was given, did the defendant know and believe that the answer was false. Unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his answer was false, you may not find the defendant guilty. 12 It is well-established that a criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury instruction on any legal defense to the charge against him which has some foundation in the evidence. United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Lopez, 885 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 748, 107 L.Ed.2d 765 (1990); United States v. Yarbrough, 852 F.2d 1522, 1541-42 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 866, 109 S.Ct. 171, 102 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). 13 Here, Chen's defense theory was that he could not be convicted of giving false testimony to the grand jury because he did not knowingly make any false statement. He argues the lapse of eight years between the questioned events back in 1981 and his testimony before the grand jury supports his request for the bad memory instruction. 14 We may assume Chen is correct in arguing that there is some evidence to support his request for a bad memory instruction. We may also assume, for purposes of this discussion only, that his requested instruction was a correct statement of the law. Nevertheless, if the instructions given by the court in their entirety adequately covered Chen's defense theory of the case, the district court did not err in refusing to give Chen's instruction. Mason, 902 F.2d at 1438; Lopez, 885 F.2d at 1439. 15 So long as the instructions fairly and adequately cover the issues presented, the judge's formulation of those instructions or choice of language is a matter of discretion. United States v. Echeverry, 759 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir.1985) (citing United States v. Abushi, 682 F.2d 1289, 1299 (9th Cir.1982)); United States v. James, 576 F.2d 223, 226 (9th Cir.1978) (district court given substantial latitude in tailoring instructions so long as they fairly and adequately cover the issues presented). [I]n reviewing the instructions as a whole, we must consider how they will reasonably be understood by the jury in the context of the whole trial. Mason, 902 F.2d at 1441 (citing Stoker v. United States, 587 F.2d 438, 440 (9th Cir.1978)). 16 Viewing the instructions as a whole, it is apparent that the defense theory was adequately covered by the instructions given. Although the district court did not define the term knowingly as requested by Chen, the jury nevertheless was instructed that the government had to prove that Chen answer[ed] knowingly, that is, at the time the answer was given ... [he knew] and believed the answer was false. 17 The instructions as given did not explicitly use the term bad memory or the word forgot, but this is not determinative. [N]either party, including a criminal defendant, may insist upon any particular [instructional] language. James, 576 F.2d at 226 (citing United States v. Pallan, 571 F.2d 497 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 911, 98 S.Ct. 2249, 56 L.Ed.2d 411 (1978)). It is enough that the charge given by the district court, if followed by the jury, was sufficient to preclude a conviction if the jury believed that Chen had forgotten about the kickbacks. Cf. United States v. Dorotich, 900 F.2d 192, 194 (9th Cir.1990) (defendant not entitled to separate good faith instruction when trial court gives adequate instruction on specific intent); United States v. Solomon, 825 F.2d 1292, 1297 (9th Cir.1987) (same), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1046, 108 S.Ct. 782, 98 L.Ed.2d 868 (1988)). 18