Opinion ID: 160439
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Elections Clause

Text: 12 The State contends that 1-4-802(1)(g) is not an additional qualification but rather an enhancement to the State's authority to regulate its ballot under the Elections Clause of the United States Constitution. The Elections Clause provides that the Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof. U.S. Const. art. I, 4, cl.1. That the States maintain a discretionary power over elections, a power restricted to the procedural regulation of the times, places and manner of elections, is not in dispute. The Federalist No. 59; see also The Federalist No. 60 (examining the potential danger of confiding the ultimate right of regulating its own elections to the Union itself). See, e.g., Libertarian Party of Illinois v. Rednour, 108 F.3d 768, 777 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Illinois ballot access petitioning requirements were entirely procedural). 13 The Supreme Court has recognized that States have a legitimate interest in regulating the number of candidates on the ballot. Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184-85 (1979). The Elections Clause gives States authority to enact the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right involved, without the abridgment of fundamental rights. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 834 (1995) (striking down Arkansas term limits for election to Congress) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 14 The State suggests that the district court should have applied a more flexible approach, weighing the 'character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments . . .' against 'the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule.' Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992) (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983)). Under Burdick, because Mr. Campbell does not allege that 1-4-802(1)(g) is discriminatory, the State need only show an important regulatory interest. See id. The State purports that regulation of the ballot satisfies this interest. 15
16 In support of its regulatory interest, the State relies heavily on Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), in which the Supreme Court upheld California's sore loser ballot restriction. That provision limited independent candidate access to those candidates who were not affiliated at any time in the preceding one year with a qualified political party, thus prohibiting a candidate from losing a party primary and running as an independent. The Court stated that the non-affiliation requirement no more establishes an additional requirement for the office of Representative than the requirement that the candidate win the primary to secure a place on the general ballot or otherwise demonstrate substantial community support. Id. at 746 n.16. The State contends that Storer's disaffiliation requirement is analogous to Colorado's requirement of registration as a disaffiliated candidate and should therefore be upheld. Mr. Campbell distinguishes Storer's non-affiliation requirement as a general state policy aimed at maintaining the integrity of the various routes to the ballot. Id. at 733. 17 Applying the flexible standard of Burdickweighing the character and magnitude of the asserted injury against the State's proffered regulatory interestswe agree that the regulation involved in Storer is distinguishable from the registration requirement in the case at hand. In Storer, the Court recognized that the non-affiliation requirement served to prevent a losing candidate from continuing the struggle and to limit the names on the ballot to those who have won the primaries and those independents who have properly qualified. Id. at 735. It required the candidate to demonstrate a significant amount of public support before she gained access to the ballot, thereby winnow[ing] out and finally reject[ing] all but the chosen candidates. Id. It also further[ed] the State's interests in the stability of its political system, id. at 736, without discriminating against independents. See id. at 733. The sore loser disaffiliation requirement was therefore a valid exercise of California's power under Article 1, 4. See id. at 736. 18 In contrast, here, Colorado's registration requirement does little to winnow out chosen candidates, but rather completely excludes those who have not registered. In Storer, disaffiliation did not require a candidate to register, but only to be clear of political party affiliations for a year before the primary. Id. at 733. In fact, the [independent] party candidate must not have been registered with another party for a year before he files his declaration. Id. at 733-34 (emphasis supplied). The Colorado registration requirement does not advance ballot housekeeping by limiting access to the ballot based on electoral support; instead, it limits access based on other exclusionary measures. The State's reliance upon the Elections Clause is misplaced. See Thornton, 514 U.S. at 822 (stating that [p]ermitting individual States to formulate diverse qualification for their representatives far exceeds the national character that the Framers envisioned and sought to ensure) (emphasis supplied); see also The Federalist No. 57 (No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the inclination of the people.). We do not see the State's important regulatory interest in this provision.