Opinion ID: 2353935
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claim of Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus

Text: Appellant directs a broadbased attack on the constitutionality of the recently enacted Post Conviction Hearing Act, Act of January 25, 1966, P.L. (1965) 1580, 19 P.S. § 1180-1 et seq. (Supp. 1966), contending that the lower court's dismissal of his petition on the basis of § 4 worked a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Section 4(b) of this act provides: (b) For the purpose of this act, an issue is waived if: (1) The petitioner knowingly and understandingly failed to raise it and it could have been raised before the trial, at the trial, on appeal, in a habeas corpus proceeding or any other proceeding actually conducted, or in a prior proceeding actually initiated under this act; and (2) The petitioner is unable to prove the existence of extraordinary circumstances to justify his failure to raise the issue. Such a dismissal is not a suspension of the writ for, prior to the adoption of the Post Conviction Hearing Act, we consistently held that trial counsel's failure to object waived any claim for coerced confession. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Storch v. Maroney, 416 Pa. 55, 204 A. 2d 263 (1964). In fact, § 4(b) represents an expansion of the waiver concept for we must now examine whether counsel's decision can be imputed to his client such that the petitioner can be deemed to have knowingly and understandingly failed to raise [21] the issue. However, as earlier discussed, counsel's decision not to attack the validity of appellant's confessions should be equated in the instant case to a knowing and understanding failure by appellant to raise this issue at the appropriate time. We therefore hold that § 4(b) precludes any claim for relief based upon the alleged coercive nature of appellant's confessions. [22] Snyder's second allegation of a suspension of the writ is directed to the failure of the court below to hold a hearing pursuant to § 9 of the act on his claims of the use of perjured testimony and an obstruction of the right to appeal. Section 9 requires a hearing only where the facts alleged would entitle petitioner to relief. Although the appellant's legal conclusions, i.e., perjury and obstructed appeal, form a sufficient basis for relief, there are no facts alleged which in legal contemplation support these conclusions. A hearing was therefore not necessary. Denial of a hearing did not work a suspension of the writ for § 9 is certainly as charitable to petitioners as was Pennsylvania practice prior to the Post Conviction Hearing Act. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Rogozinski v. Russell, 422 Pa. 536, 222 A. 2d 734 (1966); Commonwealth ex rel. Green v. Rundle, 413 Pa. 401, 196 A. 2d 861 (1964).