Opinion ID: 215095
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bibbins's Necessity Defense

Text: We must also address Bibbins's argument that he is entitled to the necessity defense. During closing argument, Bibbins's attorney argued to the magistrate judge that if Bibbins had intentionally resisted the rangers, he had done so out of necessity. The magistrate judge, however, did not mention the necessity defense in his written Findings and Decision. Bibbins renewed his necessity defense argument in his appeal to the district judge, but the district judge similarly did not address the defense in his order. Because Bibbins's attorney did not request special findings under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 23(c), we review the district court's denial of Bibbins's necessity defense for substantial evidence. As explained above, there is substantial evidence to support the magistrate judge's rejection of the necessity defense if after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have rejected the defense. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 (emphasis in original). In other words, to prevail, Bibbins must demonstrate that no rational factfinder, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, would reject his necessity defense. Bibbins has not made such a showing. To succeed on his necessity defense, Bibbins must show: (1) that he was faced with a choice of evils and chose the lesser evil; (2) that he acted to prevent imminent harm; (3) that he reasonably anticipated a causal relation between his conduct and the harm to be avoided; and (4) that there were no other legal alternatives to violating the law. United States v. Arellano-Rivera, 244 F.3d 1119, 1125-26 (9th Cir.2001). We agree with the district court's rejection of Bibbins's necessity defense because there is substantial evidence to support a finding that Bibbins was not forced to choose between two evils. The first prong of the necessity defense requires a showing that Bibbins was faced with a choice between two evils and chose the lesser one. See id. at 1126. This prong reflects the underlying utilitarian principle of the necessity defense. United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir.1992). We have explained that the necessity defense justifies criminal acts taken to avert a greater harm, maximizing social welfare by allowing a crime to be committed where the social benefits of the crime outweigh the social costs of failing to commit the crime. Id. at 196. Bibbins argues that he was forced to choose between two evils: protecting his leg or resisting the officers. We disagree. Even if we assume without deciding that sustaining leg pain is the kind of evil that the necessity defense is designed to prevent, we think a reasonable factfinder, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, could find that Bibbins could have protected his leg without resisting the officers. Specifically, Bibbins could have more articulately vocalized his need for medical help or proposed an alternative way to comply with the rangers' instructions. We therefore cannot say that no reasonable factfinder would reject Bibbins's necessity defense. Accordingly, we hold that the district court's rejection of Bibbins's necessity defense was supported by substantial evidence, and we affirm his conviction of violating 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(1).