Opinion ID: 1577033
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: prejudicial effect of counsel's ineffectiveness

Text: In considering the prejudicial effect of movant's lawyer's ineffectiveness, counsel's actions should be judged by her overall performance, the right to effective assistance of counsel may in a particular case be violated by even an isolated error of counsel if that error is sufficiently egregious and prejudicial. Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 429 (internal quotations omitted). The State argues that in order to prove prejudice, Mr. Black was required to have called each of the witnesses in question at his post-conviction motion hearing so that he could show what they would have stated had his counsel attempted to impeach them with their prior inconsistent statements. The court noted in rejecting a similar argument in Clay v. State, however, [t]he 29.15 hearing is not a trial of the charges. Its purpose is to receive evidence touching on the adequacy of counsel's performance. The [witnesses'] testimony shows that important evidence was available if only counsel had looked for it. 954 S.W.2d 344, 348 (Mo.App. E.D.1997) (Blackmar, J.). In other words, a movant is not required to reenact how a hypothetical trial would have proceeded had particular evidence been utilized, but to show that counsel knew of the evidence and was ineffective in failing to use it, to movant's prejudice. Here, counsel's failures went to the key issue of deliberation. The record in this case shows that the jury was focused on that issue. The jurors circled the words cool reflection in the first-degree murder verdict director and sent the verdict director to the judge with a note stating, Judge, please define this phrase. The judge refused to do so, and directed the jury to be guided by the instructions. It returned a verdict of guilty. A similar situation occurred in Deck , in which this Court had to determine whether error by counsel in failing to object to instructions to the jury regarding whether or not to impose the death penalty was so prejudicial as to require a new trial. In determining that a new trial was required, this Court considered how this missing instruction might have impacted the jury and concluded: Most tellingly, the jurors ... sent the judge a note stating they were confused about what mitigation meant in Instruction 8 and asking for a legal definition of the term ... While the court's denial of their requests was proper, the requests show that the jury was focusing on the issue of mitigation and may have been confused by what it meant as used in the instructions. 68 S.W.3d at 431. Deck concluded that the failure was prejudicial. As in Deck , when the jury here sent a note to the judge indicating confusion by circling the words cool reflection in the first-degree murder verdict director, the court did not err in refusing to define the term. Here also, the request shows that the jury was focusing on this issue and was confused by the evidence concerning deliberation. That evidence was not overwhelming, consisting principally of testimony of State's witnesses who said Mr. Black reached into the truck and stabbed the victim. On direct appeal, the Court found that this evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. Had that testimony been impeached, little would have remained to support the finding of deliberation. [2] As noted in Clay : The relative strength or weakness of the prosecution's case is significant in determining whether any deficiencies in trial counsel's performance were prejudicial, because the question which must be answered is whether, but for the deficiencies, the result of the trial might have been different. 954 S.W.2d at 346-47. The unoffered evidence, admissible both for impeachment and as substantive evidence, went to a central, controverted issue on which the jury focused during deliberations. If believed by the jury, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, this Court determines that counsel's ineffectiveness was so prejudicial as to undermine this Court's confidence in the outcome of the trial. The motion court therefore erred in overruling the motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15. The judgment is reversed. Pursuant to Rule 84.14, a new trial is ordered on all issues. The case is remanded. WHITE, C.J., WOLFF, PRICE, TEITELMAN and LIMBAUGH, JJ., and BLACKMAR, Sr.J., concur. RUSSELL, J. not participating.