Opinion ID: 2633459
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficient evidence of alternative means

Text: In this case, the jury was instructed that it could find Defendant guilty based on the absence of consent or any of the four grounds of ineffective consent, essentially giving the jury five alternative means of establishing that Complainant did not legally consent to the conduct. The ICA concluded that the consent instruction amounted to plain error based in part on the possibility that jurors may have found that Complainant consented to the conduct but that such consent was ineffective, where the prosecution did not present legally sufficient evidence of ineffective consent. In its application for a writ of certiorari, the prosecution contends that, although the ineffective consent instruction was erroneously given, it was so inapplicable that it could not have contributed to the verdict. It is undisputed that there was legally sufficient evidence to support a jury finding of absence of consent. The prosecution also conceded that, although there was some evidence to support a finding of ineffective consent based on two of the four statutory grounds, [20] the evidence adduced in support of those grounds was legally insufficient. Thus, the issue before this court is whether the ineffective consent instruction constituted reversible error where it is possible that the jury found Defendant guilty based upon one of the grounds of ineffective consent, despite the prosecution's failure to meet its burden of proof as to that ground. In other words, in an alternative means case where it is impossible to tell which alternative the jury's verdict is based upon, does due process require that each of the alternative means presented to the jury be supported by legally sufficient evidence? In Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 112 S.Ct. 466, 116 L.Ed.2d 371 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed whether, in an alternative means case where the jury was not instructed to reach unanimity on one of the alternatives, legally sufficient evidence of each alternative submitted to the jury is required to comply with due process. In Griffin, the defendant was charged with a single count of conspiring to defraud an agency of the federal government, [21] and the conspiracy was alleged to have had two objects: (1) impairing the efforts of the Internal Revenue Service to ascertain income tax liability; and (2) impairing the efforts of the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) to identify forfeitable assets. Id. at 47, 112 S.Ct. 466. The two objects were treated as alternative means of establishing the offense. [22] At trial, the government failed to produce any evidence to prove interference with the DEA. Id. at 48, 112 S.Ct. 466. The jury returned a general verdict of guilt against Griffin and her two codefendants. Id. The Court held that the due process clause of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution does not require that a general guilty verdict in a multiple object conspiracy case be set aside where the verdict left in doubt whether the jury had convicted the defendant of the first or second object, regardless whether the evidence is insufficient to support a conviction as to one of the objects. See id. at 56-60, 112 S.Ct. 466. In affirming the defendant's conviction, the Court relied primarily on its holding in Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 90 S.Ct. 642, 24 L.Ed.2d 610 (1970). See Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466. As discussed by the Court in Griffin, Turner involved a claim that the evidence was insufficient to support a general guilty verdict under a one-count indictment charging the defendant with knowingly purchasing, possessing, dispensing, and distributing heroin not in or from the original stamped package, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 4704(a)(1964 ed.). [The Court in Turner ] held that the conviction would have to be sustained if there was sufficient evidence of distribution alone. [ Turner ] set forth as the prevailing rule: [W]hen a jury returns a guilty verdict on an indictment charging several acts in the conjunctive, as Turner's indictment did, the verdict stands if the evidence is sufficient with respect to any one of the acts charged. [ Turner, 396 U.S.] at 420, [90 S.Ct. 642][.] Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466 (emphasis in original). The Court in Griffin concluded that, where one of the possible bases of conviction was neither unconstitutional [23] nor illegal, [24] but merely unsupported by sufficient evidence, there was no violation of the due process clause. Id. at 59-60, 112 S.Ct. 466. The Court made a distinction between a jury instruction that misstates the law and one that presents a theory of conviction not supported by the evidence, reasoning that, although jurors are generally not equipped to discern a mistake in the law as charged to them, the Court may be more confident that the jury would reject a legal theory not supported by the facts. Id. at 59, 112 S.Ct. 466. The petitioner in Griffin sought to distinguish Turner on the basis that it applies only where one can be sure that the jury did not use the inadequately supported ground as the basis of the conviction. That assurance exists, petitioner claim[ed], when the prosecution presents no evidence whatever to support the insufficient theory; if the prosecution offers some, but insufficient, evidence on the point, as it did in [ Griffin ], then the verdict must be set aside because it is impossible to determine the theory upon which the jury relied. Id. at 58, 112 S.Ct. 466 (emphases in original). The Court rejected a rule, advanced by the petitioner, that distinguished situations where there was absolutely no evidence in support of a theory from situations where there was some evidence, although insufficient. Id. The Court reasoned that such a rule would reward the greater failure of proof, was full of practical difficulty, and was not supported by Turner. Id. The Court recognized, however, that it would generally be preferable for the trial court to remove unsupported theories from the jury's consideration. Id. at 60, 112 S.Ct. 466. [25] Although Griffin established that, under federal law, sufficient evidence was required for only one of the alternative means supporting a conviction, a number of state courts have rejected such analysis on state law grounds, holding that there must be sufficient evidence to support each alternative theory submitted to the jury to uphold a general verdict of guilty. See e.g., Commonwealth v. Plunkett, 422 Mass. 634, 664 N.E.2d 833, 837 (1996) (rejecting Griffin on state law grounds); Ortega-Martinez, 881 P.2d at 234-35 (rejecting Griffin on state law grounds); People v. Rodriguez, 914 P.2d 230, 273 (Colo.1996) (citing James v. People, 727 P.2d 850 (Colo.1986) (rejecting Turner on state law grounds)); see also Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812 (Wyo.1996) (upholding general verdict in alternative means case based on state law that requires legally sufficient evidence of each alternative ground for conviction); Timley, 875 P.2d at 246 (citing Kitchen, 756 P.2d at 109, for the proposition that unanimity is not required in an alternative means case provided that substantial evidence supports each alternative means); cf. Ice, 997 P.2d at 741 (distinguishing Griffin, where there was strong evidence supporting one theory and none on another, from case where evidence of alternative theory was legally insufficient despite significant testimony and prosecutorial effort). But see, e.g., Atwater v. State, 626 So.2d 1325, 1327-28 n. 1 (Fla.1993) (adopting Griffin with approval), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1046, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994); Guiton, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d at 53 (harmonizing Griffin rule with state law, holding that, on appeal of a conviction by a jury that was presented with alternate legal theories of conviction, one of which is factually inadequate, the appellate court should affirm the judgment unless a review of the entire record affirmatively demonstrates a reasonable probability that the jury in fact found the defendant guilty solely on the unsupported theory); State v. Enyeart, 123 Idaho 452, 849 P.2d 125, 128-29 (1993) (citing Griffin for the proposition that a general verdict stands even if one of the alternative bases for conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence). In Plunkett, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court held that a new trial on the charge of murder was required where the jury was presented with two alternative theories of first degree murder, there was insufficient evidence as to one of the theories, and it was impossible to tell upon which theory the jury relied. Rejecting the United States Supreme Court's analysis in Griffin, the Massachusetts court stated: We do not accept the Supreme Court's premise that, in such a situation, the jurors will have obviously rejected the theory for which there was no evidentiary support. If the judge tells a jury that they may find the defendant guilty on a theory that is factually unsupported (in effect committing an error of law), the jurors understandably might believe that there must be some evidence to support that theory. The law of homicide is not uncomplicated in this Commonwealth. If judges at all levels have difficulty with it from time to time, it is obvious that lay jurors can easily be confused. The premise of the Supreme Court's position, that obviously the jury did the right thing, is not so well founded as to attract our acceptance of it. See People v. Guiton, 4 Cal.4th 1116, 1132-33, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 365, 847 P.2d 45 (1993) (Mosk, J., concurring) (the premise of jury `infallibility' is unsupported). If the premise of the Supreme Court's position were correct, a jury would never return a guilty verdict when the evidence was insufficient to warrant that verdict, and we know that is not so. If a person is to be incarcerated, . . . in fairness there must be evidentiary support for each theory of guilt on which the judge tells the jury they may find the defendant guilty. Plunkett, 664 N.E.2d at 837 (emphasis added). [26] Indeed, there are numerous examples of cases in Hawai`i where this court has reversed a defendant's conviction because the jury's verdict was not supported by legally sufficient evidence as a matter of law. See, e.g., State v. Balanza, 93 Hawai`i 279, 288, 1 P.3d 281, 290 (2000); State v. Bautista, 86 Hawai`i 207, 214, 948 P.2d 1048, 1055 (1997); State v. Malufau, 80 Hawai`i 126, 133, 906 P.2d 612, 619, vacated in part on other grounds, 80 Hawai`i 126, 906 P.2d 612 (1995); State v. Lucks, 56 Haw. 129, 132, 531 P.2d 855, 858 (1975). In Ice, the Kansas Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's rape conviction where one of the alternative theories of guilt presented to the jury was not supported by sufficient evidence. 997 P.2d at 741. The jury was presented with alternative theories of establishing that sexual intercourse was committed without the consent of the complainant, including: (1) that she was overcome by force or fear; or (2) that she was incapable of giving valid consent. Id. at 739. The court held that there was legally insufficient evidence of incapacity and that there was a real possibility that one or more of the jurors convicted the defendant based on that theory. Id. at 741. In reversing the defendant's conviction, the court in Ice distinguished Griffin as a case where one can reasonably assume the jury did not behave capriciously and convict on a theory in which there was no evidence, when there was strong evidence supporting another theory. Id. The court in Ice reasoned that, [w]ith so much testimony and prosecutorial effort invested into the `no capacity' theory, we cannot say there is no real possibility that the verdict here was based only on the force [or] fear theory. Id. Thus, the Kansas court adopted a rule, rejected by Griffin, recognizing that courts could reasonably assume that a jury would reject a theory where there was no evidence or argument, but that courts could not reasonably assume that a jury would not convict on a theory supported by argument and some evidence, although legally insufficient. A defendant's rights are clearly prejudiced where the jury is instructed that it may find him guilty based upon a theory of guilt that is not supported by sufficient evidence as a matter of law. The source of a defendant's right to the establishment of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case is found in the due process clause of article I, section 5 of the Hawai`i State Constitution, independent of the United States Constitution. State v. Perez, 90 Hawai`i 113, 129, 976 P.2d 427, 443 (App.1998), rev'd in part on other grounds, 90 Hawai`i 65, 976 P.2d 379 (1999). In Turner and Griffin, the Court held that, where a jury is presented with alternative means of establishing a crime and only one is supported by sufficient evidence, the federal constitution does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each alternative theory. Turner, 396 U.S. at 420, 90 S.Ct. 642; Griffin, 502 U.S. at 56-57, 112 S.Ct. 466. However, this court has recognized that the due process protection under the Hawai`i constitution is not necessarily limited to that provided by the United States Constitution. State v. Bernades, 71 Haw. 485, 487, 795 P.2d 842, 843 (1990) (citing State v. Santiago, 53 Haw. 254, 492 P.2d 657 (1971)). We are not convinced by the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Griffin that the jury will necessarily reject a theory unsupported by legally sufficient evidence, particularly where there is some evidence adduced and considerable argument presented to the jury. However, we recognize, as did the Kansas Court of Appeals, that, where there is no real possibility that the jury convicted based on an unsupported theory, e.g., where there is overwhelming evidence of one theory and absolutely no argument or evidence presented on another, there may be no reversible error. See Ice, 997 P.2d at 741; see also State v. Chapman, 229 Conn. 529, 643 A.2d 1213, 1221-22 (1994) (in an alternative means case, the court held that, although the trial court erroneously instructed jury on an alternative for which there was no evidence, the instruction was harmless error). Thus, based on our analysis of Defendant's rights to a unanimous verdict and to due process under article I of the Hawai`i Constitution, we hold that unanimity is not required where alternative means of establishing an element of an offense are submitted to the jury, provided that there is no reasonable possibility that the jury's verdict was based on an alternative unsupported by sufficient evidence. We further hold that: (1) separate and distinct culpable acts may not be treated as alternative means of proving the conduct element of an offense, see section III.B.1.; and (2) whether the alternative theories may be treated as alternative means or constitute separate crimes is an initial determination to be made on a case-by-case basis. See Section III.B.2.a. Having determined that the absence of consent and ineffective consent may be treated as alternative means of proving the lack of legal consent, we now examine whether there was legally sufficient evidence of each alternative submitted to the jury in this case.