Opinion ID: 1817269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: did the state's closing argument render the penalty phase fundamentally unfair?

Text: In addressing this issue we have held considerable latitude must be given counsel in the argument of cases. Craft v. State, 271 So.2d 735, 737 (Miss. 1973). However, there are limits to this latitude. Specifically in death penalty cases, the state is prohibited from arguing elements such as the possibility of parole, Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 at 812-14 (Miss. 1984), or of reversal through appellate review, Wiley v. State, 449 So.2d 756, 761-63 (Miss. 1984). Obviously there are other unmentioned restrictions, such as arguing facts not in evidence, which to avoid prolixity we do not dwell upon. Having reviewed the prosecutor's closing argument in the context of the evidence, we conclude the state took great liberty but did not exceed its limits. As we stated in Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 762 (Miss. 1984), The defendant is entitled to broad latitude in framing his final argument to the jury ... (citations omitted) Likewise the prosecuting attorney is entitled to a comparable latitude, so long as he or she does not argue some impermissible factor. No impermissible factor was argued here, in our opinion. Observing additionally that defense counsel did not bring the alleged errors to the attention of the court, we hold this proposition meritless.