Opinion ID: 2640593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: direct or proximate cause.

Text: ¶ 37 As to their challenge relating to causation, insurers argue, in effect, no causation could be found unless Smith herself testified she could and would have settled her claim or that she authorized someone else who would have done so, said authorization being made at a time Smith unequivocally had the capacity to so authorize. We do not believe the failure of Smith to testify at trial provides insurers with an absolute shield on the proximate or direct cause element of insured's claim. Initially, we begin our analysis with the recognition that, unless there is no competent evidence from which a jury could reasonably find a causal nexus between the act(s) or omission(s) deemed tortious and the injury, the question of proximate cause is for the jury. Gillham v. Lake Country Raceway, 2001 OK 41, ¶ 7, 24 P.3d 858, 860. ¶ 38 Insurers' argument(s) as to causation, capacity and authorization seek to take advantage of Smith's purported incapacity (as a result of her injuries from the accident and treatment received) from the date of the accident to, at the latest, April 17, 2000, when suit was filed against insured by Young on Smith's behalf. Although we agree it is the client that must decide whether to settle a case, or afford someone else the authority to do so on her behalf, and the general rule is that an attorney has no power or authority to compromise or settle a case without appropriate authority from the client [ See Walker v. Gulf Pipe Line Co., 1924 OK 515, 226 P. 1046 (First Syllabus by the Court)], we believe the instant trial record contains sufficient evidence to support a rational finding it was the unreasonable acts and/or omissions of insurers in breach of their duty of good faith and fair dealing toward insured that caused a lost opportunity to settle the matter within the $10,000.00 policy limits. This is so, even though Smith did not testify at the trial of this matter. ¶ 39 In effect, one or more of the attorneys for Smith testified they would have recommended settlement within the policy limits had a statement been given and they were convinced insured had no other assets, or limited assets (other than the insurance policy), to satisfy the large claim existent, and no other insurance or tortfeasor was available. To us, the jury was allowed to consider this testimony, reasonable inferences from other evidence submitted at trial and to use common sense to reach a reasoned decision that it was more probable than not the matter would have settled for the $10,000.00 policy limits were it not for unreasonable acts and/or omissions of insurers in violation of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. [8] ¶ 40 It has also been recognized the basic purpose of the rule that a contract (a settlement agreement is one type of contract) may be avoided by virtue of the incapacity of one of the makers thereof is for protection of the incompetent. Davidson v. National Aid Life Ass'n, 1935 OK 922, 50 P.2d 173, 175. It is also quite plain that a client may later ratify a settlement agreement reached by his/her attorney under appropriate circumstances. Yahola Sand & Gravel Co. v. Marx, 1960 OK 206, 358 P.2d 366. Any settlement reached by Young on Smith's behalf by virtue of the former's authorization under the power of attorney, could further have been made subject to court approval had insurers been concerned about the capacity of Smith during the relevant time period. Very simply, in our view, the absence of testimony from Smith did not mandate a directed verdict in favor of insurers because of a lack of proof on the causation element. [9] Thus, the question of whether insurers caused a lost opportunity to settle Smith's claim within the $10,000.00 policy limits was an issue properly left for the jury to decide. ¶ 41 In sum, sufficient evidence was presented from which the jury could properly conclude insurers engaged in unreasonable conduct, breached the duty of good faith and fair dealing owed to insured and directly/proximately caused insured recoverable damages. The trial court did not err in submitting insured's claim against insurers for actual damages to the jury.