Opinion ID: 4469561
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The stop of Small’s car was valid

Text: The Fourth Amendment lets “an officer . . . conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). The reasonable-suspicion standard applies whether the suspect is traveling on foot or by car. United States v. Delfin-Colina, 464 F.3d 392, 397 (3d Cir. 2006). 5 Reasonable suspicion “is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. The officer need articulate only a “ ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981)). To decide whether an officer could have reasonably suspected wrongdoing, we look at the totality of the circumstances. Id. The government argues that the officers reasonably suspected a traffic violation because they saw a crack in Small’s windshield. The District Court agreed. 2018 WL 2049821, at . On appeal, Small marshals considerable evidence to the contrary. He shows that the officers’ reported sighting of a “large” and “clearly visible” crack in Small’s “[s]everely damaged” windshield that “obstructed [Small’s] vision” does not square with the photographs taken of his windshield later that day. Compare JA 67, 132, 134 (officers’ testimony), with JA 143–45 (photographs of Small’s car). Nor was the crack visible in the video footage of the traffic stop. But we need not question the District Court’s credibility finding because “[w]e may affirm on any ground supported by the record.” United States v. Agnew, 407 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir. 2005). Here, the officers had an alternative basis for the stop: reasonable suspicion that Small was using his car to traffic drugs. When the officers saw Small driving by them, they had an articulable basis to suspect that he had ecstasy in the car. Based on tips from a reliable informant, they knew that he used his black Lincoln Town Car to transport ecstasy. This tip alone could arguably support reasonable suspicion. See Gatlin, 613 F.3d at 378. 6 Plus, the officers’ personal observations partially corroborated the tip. At the September 2016 curfew check, Officer Porter saw a black Lincoln Town Car parked in Small’s driveway. Afterwards, he ran the car’s registration and found that it was Small’s. On top of this, the officers knew that Small had been behaving suspiciously for months: he had failed two curfew checks, one of which had led to a hot pursuit of a man who had just come out of Small’s home. These particularized facts, coupled with Small’s prior drug conviction, could lead the officers to reasonably suspect that Small used his car to transport drugs. See United States v. Green, 897 F.3d 173, 187 (3d Cir. 2018) (“Though a criminal record . . . is not sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion, it is a valid factor.”). So as soon as the officers saw the black Lincoln Town Car pass them with Small at the wheel, they had reason to suspect a crime. Small argues that because the informant’s tips date to September 2016, they had gone stale by the March 2017 stop. But Officers Boesenberg and Porter had spoken to the informant four or five more times in the intervening six months. The last of these was only one-and-a-half to two weeks before the stop. In any event, the passage of time “loses significance” when tips relate to ongoing crimes. Henley, 941 F.3d at 653 (quoting United States v. Urban, 404 F.3d 754, 774 (3d Cir. 2005)). So the tips were not stale. The officers still had reasonable suspicion and could make the stop. 7 B. The searches of Small’s car and home were also valid After stopping Small’s car, the officers searched it. They also later searched his home. We hold that these searches were valid for three reasons. First, the same reasonable suspicion that justified the traffic stop likewise justified the search of the car. Ordinarily, the automobile exception to the warrant requirement lets officers search a car without a warrant if there is probable cause to believe that the car holds evidence of a crime. United States v. Donahue, 764 F.3d 293, 299–300 (3d Cir. 2014). But because of the “special needs” of the probation system, searches of probationers’ property require not probable cause, but only reasonable suspicion. Hill, 967 F.2d at 907–09 (citing Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875–76 (1987)). As discussed, the officers reasonably suspected that Small was transporting drugs in his car. So they could search the car without a warrant. Second, after the lawful stop began, the officers gathered more evidence that corroborated and heightened their suspicion. After stopping Small’s car, Officer Boesenberg approached the car and smelled marijuana coming from it. Then Officer Porter questioned the passenger, who admitted that she had been smoking marijuana before the stop. She also said that once the stop began, Small gave her a bag of pills to hide. Only after these admissions did the officers search the vehicle. By that point, the officers had “not merely reasonable suspicion, but probable cause” to search the car for drugs. United States v. Ramos, 443 F.3d 304, 308 (3d Cir. 2006). Finally, the officers’ reasonable suspicion that Small was dealing ecstasy also justified the probationer search of his house. Small argues that the administrative search warrant 8 rested on the evidence gathered from the allegedly illegal search of his car. But the stop and search of his car were both lawful. In any case, the officers had reason to suspect Small of drug dealing before they pulled him over in March 2017. Because Small is a probationer, this reasonable suspicion was all the officers needed to search his house. Henley, 941 F.3d at 651; Hill, 967 F.2d at 909. The evidence gathered from the car search only bolstered the officers’ grounds for searching his house. Thus, that search was also valid under the Fourth Amendment.