Opinion ID: 4566484
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: interstate compact on the placement of

Text: CHILDREN ¶51 We now address Father’s argument that the court of appeals erred in remanding the case to the district court for supplemental factfinding regarding compliance with the ICPC. The court of appeals concluded that Mother’s ICPC request form was defective because she listed D.G. instead of Father as the child’s father. In re Adoption of B.H., 2019 UT App 103, ¶ 28, 447 P.3d 110. But the court held that this defect did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction or otherwise require dismissal of the adoption petition. Id. However, because the district court did not include a conclusion that the ICPC “ha[d] been complied with” in the adoption decree—as required by the Adoption Act, UTAH CODE § 78B-6-107(1)(a)—the court of appeals set aside the decree. In re Adoption of B.H., 2019 UT App 103, ¶ 30. It then remanded to the district court for additional factfinding, and if necessary to give Adoptive Parents an opportunity to cure the ICPC deficiency before moving for reinstatement of the decree. Id. ¶ 27 n.7. Neither party has contested the court of appeals’ determination that the ICPC request was materially defective, so that issue is not before us. ¶52 Father contends it was error for the court of appeals to remand to the district court for additional factfinding and to permit the Adoptive Parents to cure the ICPC deficiency if necessary. He asserts that the ICPC must be complied with before filing an adoption petition and that the failure to do so constitutes an irreparable jurisdictional defect. He contends that because the ICPC notice was defective, Mother’s attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of Utah courts is invalid and the deficiency can no longer be cured.13 Father asserts that this means Montana has __________________________________________________________ 13 The court of appeals also observed that Mother might have complied with the ICPC through a cover letter that identified Father as her husband, but this document was not submitted in the district court. So Father argues that the court of appeals should not have remarked upon this letter. We do not consider this letter in our analysis. 15 IN RE B.H. Opinion of the Court jurisdiction over the child and that any new ICPC request must be filed in Montana. ¶53 We agree with the court of appeals that the deficient ICPC request form does not deprive the Utah court of jurisdiction. A reading of the ICPC reveals that it does not purport to govern jurisdiction among party states or strip jurisdiction from a receiving state as a remedy for a violation of its terms. ¶54 The ICPC “provides a uniform legal framework for the placement of children across State lines in foster homes and[] adoptive homes.” CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL32070, INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: ICPC, 1 (2003). It is a compact among party states14 “to cooperate with each other in the interstate placement of children” to ensure that (1) children requiring placement “receive the maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment”; (2) the receiving state “may have full opportunity to ascertain the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for the protection of the child”; (3) the sending state “may obtain the most complete information on the basis of which to evaluate a projected placement before it is made”; and (4) “[a]ppropriate jurisdictional arrangements for the care of the children will be promoted.” UTAH CODE § 62A-4a-701 art. I(1)–(4). Its “chief function . . . is to protect the interests of children and of the States by requiring that certain procedures be followed in the making and the maintenance of interstate child placements.” CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, RL32070, INTERSTATE COMPACT ON THE PLACEMENT OF CHILDREN: ICPC, 1 (2003). ¶55 To this end, the ICPC requires that a “sending agency” comply with its terms and with any applicable laws of the __________________________________________________________ 14 The ICPC “is a statutory agreement between all [fifty] states, the District of Columbia and the US Virgin Islands.” Am. Pub. Hum. Servs. Ass’n, ICPC FAQ’S, https://aphsa.org/AAICPC/AAICPC/icpc_faq_2.aspx#:~:text=T he%20Interstate%20Compact%20on%20the%20Placement%20of% 20Children%20(ICPC)%20is,and%20the%20US%20Virgin%20Islan ds.&text=It%20sets%20forth%20the%20requirements,be%20place d%20out%20of%20state (last visited July 23, 2020). 16 Cite as: 2020 UT 64 Opinion of the Court receiving state that govern the placement of children in that state. UTAH CODE § 62A-4a-701 art. III(1). A “sending agency” is: [A] party state, officer, or employee thereof; a subdivision of a party state, or officer or employee thereof; a court of a party state; a person, corporation, association, Indian tribe, charitable agency, or other entity which sends, brings, or causes to be sent or brought any child to another party state. Id. § 62A-4a-701 art. II(2). Here, Mother is the “sending agency” because she is the “person” who caused the child to be sent to Utah with Adoptive Parents. ¶56 Father is correct that Mother was required to comply with the ICPC before sending the child to Utah with Adoptive Parents. See id. § 62A-4a-701 art. III(2) (requiring compliance “[p]rior to sending, bringing, or causing any child to be sent or brought into a receiving state for placement”). ¶57 However, it does not follow that her deficient attempt to do so constitutes an irreparable jurisdictional defect. The ICPC addresses the consequences of a failure to comply with its terms, and none of them involve transferring jurisdiction over the child from the receiving state to the sending state or reversing a child placement. The ICPC provides that a violation of its provisions constitutes a violation of “the laws respecting the placement of children” of both the sending state and the receiving state. Id. § 62A-4a-701 art. IV. And such a violation “may be punished or subjected to penalty in either jurisdiction in accordance with its laws.” Id. Father does not identify a law in either state that would require a reversal of the placement or a loss of jurisdiction in Utah under the circumstances here. ¶58 Additionally, the ICPC provides that in the case of a violation by a sending agency, “any violation shall constitute full and sufficient grounds for the suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency which empowers or allows it to place, or care for children.” Id. Notably, this provision focuses on penalties and punishments directed at the noncompliant entity. It does not provide for reversing the placement that resulted from the violative behavior or the loss of jurisdiction over the child in the receiving state. We agree with the court of appeals that the penalties for noncompliance contemplated in the ICPC do not 17 IN RE B.H. Opinion of the Court “divest the district court of jurisdiction.” In re Adoption of B.H., 2019 UT App 103, ¶ 28. ¶59 Father also asserts that because Mother’s attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of Utah courts was lacking, the sending jurisdiction retains jurisdiction. But that is incorrect. One provision of the ICPC speaks to “retention of jurisdiction.” See UTAH CODE § 62A-4a-701 art. V. It states, The sending agency shall retain jurisdiction over the child sufficient to determine all matters in relation to the custody, supervision, care, treatment, and disposition of the child which it would have had if the child had remained in the sending agency’s state, until the child is adopted, reaches majority, becomes self-supporting, or is discharged with the concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state. Id. § 62A-4a-701 art. V(1) (emphasis added). This preserves the sending agency’s jurisdiction over the child, not the sending state’s jurisdiction over the child.15 Here, that is Mother; not Montana.16 __________________________________________________________ 15 This provision is concerned with the child’s care, not jurisdiction between member states. It preserves the sending agency’s jurisdiction over and financial responsibility for the child until another individual or entity, including the child, assumes responsibility for the child or the child “is discharged with the concurrence of the appropriate authority in the receiving state.” UTAH CODE § 62A-4a-701 art. V(1). 16 Father relies on In re Adoption of T. M. M. for support. 608 P.2d 130 (Mont. 1980). In that case, the prospective adoptive parents did not comply with the ICPC at all. Id. at 133. The biological mother, who had relinquished her parental rights, challenged the adoption and sought to revoke her own relinquishment. Id. at 132. The Montana Supreme Court held that “the failure of the prospective adoptive parents to comply with the terms and procedures of the [ICPC] constitute[d] full and sufficient grounds for the revocation of the parent’s consent.” Id. at 134 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Montana Supreme Court appears to have equated the revocation of the mother’s consent with the “suspension or revocation of any license, permit, or other legal authorization held by the sending agency.” Id. (Continued . . .) 18 Cite as: 2020 UT 64 Opinion of the Court ¶60 Father also argues that because the Adoption Act requires compliance with the ICPC, the adoption is invalid because of the defective ICPC request. Father is correct that the Adoption Act requires compliance with the ICPC. See id. § 78B-6-107(1)(a) (stating “in any adoption proceeding . . . the court’s final decree of adoption shall state that the requirements of [the ICPC] have been complied with”). However, the Adoption Act does not provide for a dismissal of the adoption petition or a loss of jurisdiction as a result of noncompliance. ¶61 The provision of the Adoption Act that most closely addresses the circumstances here functions similarly to the ICPC—it provides for remedies against the alleged wrongdoer. Utah Code section 78B-6-106(2) states, Any person injured by fraudulent representations or actions in connection with an adoption is entitled to pursue civil or criminal penalties in accordance with existing law. A fraudulent representation is not a defense to strict compliance with the requirements of this chapter and is not a basis for dismissal of a petition for adoption, vacation of an adoption decree, or an automatic grant of custody to the offended party. Custody determinations shall be based on the best interests of the child, in accordance with the provisions of Section 78B-6-133. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, even assuming Mother knowingly made a fraudulent misrepresentation on the ICPC request form, the Adoption Act explicitly rejects dismissal of the petition or transfer of custody to Father as a consequence. ¶62 We agree with the court of appeals that the ICPC deficiency in this case is not a jurisdictional defect. Neither the ICPC nor the Adoption Act provides for a loss of jurisdiction in the Utah district court or a dismissal of the adoption petition under these circumstances. ¶63 Even so, we also agree with the court of appeals that it is necessary to set aside the adoption decree in its current form and remand to the district court for further proceedings. The Adoption Act requires that the district court state in the adoption decree (citation omitted). We are not inclined to adopt this interpretation of the language of the ICPC. 19 IN RE B.H. Opinion of the Court that the ICPC was complied with. And although the district court concluded that the requirements of the Adoption Act had been met, the court did not support this conclusion with the necessary determination of ICPC compliance. ¶64 As we have explained, this deficiency is not a jurisdictional defect. Neither the ICPC nor the Adoption Act requires dismissal of the petition or a loss of jurisdiction in the district court. But the fact remains that the district court’s conclusions of law in support of the adoption decree are insufficient. Accordingly, we set aside the decree and remand to the district court for further proceedings. We leave the form and scope of those proceedings to the district court’s discretion.