Opinion ID: 2304206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alibi Instruction Required

Text: In Jackson v. State , this Court held that where there was sufficient evidence to justify a charge on alibi, [it] was prejudicial error to deny the substance of that request and reversal was required. [6] Two years later, in Gardner v. State , we again held that an alibi instruction should be given if there is some credible evidence showing that the defendant was elsewhere when the crime occurred ... [and] if a defendant requests an instruction on alibi. [7] In Gardner, we also held that where the defendant makes no specific request for an alibi instruction, a duty to [ sua sponte ] instruct the jury upon alibi may arise [in certain circumstances], so that the failure to do so would amount to a manifest defect affecting the defendant's substantial rights and thus constitute plain error. [8] This Court has defined the alibi defense as `a denial of any connection with the crime,' and is based upon evidence that the defendant `was somewhere other than at the place the crime is alleged to have been committed when it is alleged to have been committed.' [9] It is well settled that our holding in Jackson requires the trial judge to instruct the jury on the alibi if the defendant requests the instruction and presents some credible evidence of the alibi. [10] This Court has defined some credible evidence as evidence that is capable of being believed. [11] Sworn testimony constitutes some credible evidence since the jury must assess the credibility and decide whether to believe any sworn testimony presented at trial. The State argues that the Superior Court's general instructions on burden of proof eliminated any prejudice. That argument was rejected by this Court in Jackson. By requiring a specific instruction on an alibi defense that explains the context within which evidence of alibi must be evaluated, the trial court prevents the jury from assuming that the jury could assume that the defendant bears the burden of proving alibi. [12] In fact, because the defense of alibi is not an affirmative defense, the defendant does not have the burden of proving his alibi. [13] Instead, a proper alibi instruction informs the jury that, if the proof adduced raises a reasonable doubt of [the] defendant's guilt, either by itself or in conjunction with all other facts in the case, the defendant must be acquitted. [14] Here, the general instructions given by the Superior Court informed the jury that [t]he burden of proof is upon the State to prove all of the facts necessary to establish each and every element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt and that a defendant is not required to present any evidence on his own behalf. Although the general instructions accurately addressed each party's burden of proof, or lack thereof, a specific instruction on alibi was required under this Court's holding in Jackson. [15] The jury should have been instructed that they must acquit the defendant[s] if they find that the evidence [of each defendant's alibi] raises a reasonable doubt as to [each] defendant's guilt. [16] Unlike the defenses contained within the Delaware Code, the alibi defense is not an affirmative defense and is not required to be proven to the jury's satisfaction. [17] Without an alibi instruction in this case, the jury was erroneously left free to assume that the defendant b[ore] the burden of proving alibi. [18] An alibi instruction is required so that a jury does not make a determination of guilt based on the failure of the defense rather than because the evidence introduced by the [state] ha[d] satisfied the jury of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [19] Thirty years ago, our holding in Jackson established that a trial judge must give the jury an alibi instruction where sufficient credible evidence is presented and a timely request is made. Relying on Jackson, Dillard and Brown argue that the trial judge was obligated to give the requested alibi instruction and that the failure to do so was prejudicial error requiring reversal. We agree. The sworn testimony of the alibi witnesses presented by Dillard and Brown, along with the defendants' requests for the alibi instruction, required the trial judge to provide the alibi instruction. [20] We hold that the Superior Court committed reversible error by not providing the jury with an alibi instruction.