Opinion ID: 437447
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Class-Based Discriminatory Animus

Text: 76 FBI defendants also contend that plaintiffs failed to establish the existence of the racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus 54 requisite to recovery under section 1985(3). Their challenge is not directed at the trial judge's instructions on the matter, which were not challenged below, 55 but at the sufficiency of the evidence on this element of plaintiffs' case. We hold that there was sufficient evidence to permit a jury to find that the FBI defendants acted with the requisite animus, and that the claim must therefore fail. 77 We note at the outset the existence of some debate over the kinds of class-based discriminatory animus that section 1985(3) requires. Scott sought to break down the potential scope of the provision into three categories of animus--economic and commercial, purely political (meaning wholly non-racial), and racial (including the traditional supporters of civil rights)--and held that the first category was not within the reach of the section. Griffin, on the other hand, had squarely placed the third category (i.e., racial) within the section's reach. Both cases left unanswered whether political activity simpliciter defines a class of people covered by section 1985(3). At the same time, several circuits have ruled that politics and religion define such a class. See, e.g., Keating v. Carey, 706 F.2d 377, 386-88 (2d Cir.1983) (discrimination on basis of political affiliation constitutes class-based discriminatory animus); Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45, 47-48 (4th Cir.1981) (discrimination against members of Unification Church), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 907, 102 S.Ct. 1253, 71 L.Ed.2d 445 (1982); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 623 & n. 22 (7th Cir.1979) (discrimination based on political affiliation with racial overtones), modified on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754, 100 S.Ct. 1987, 64 L.Ed.2d 670 (1980); Means v. Wilson, 522 F.2d 833, 839-40 (8th Cir.1975) (discrimination against supporters of insurgent candidate for tribal council presidency), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 958, 96 S.Ct. 1436, 47 L.Ed.2d 364 (1976); Glasson v. City of Louisville, 518 F.2d 899, 911-12 (6th Cir.) (discrimination against critics of the President), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 930, 96 S.Ct. 280, 46 L.Ed.2d 258 (1975); Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057, 1064-65 (6th Cir.1973) (discrimination against Jews); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1232 (8th Cir.1971) (en banc) (worshippers at predominantly White parish disrupted by Black civil rights workers); see also Comment, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights, 90 HARV.L.REV. 1721, 1728 (1977) ([T]he legislative history behind section 1985(3) points unmistakably to the conclusion that discrimination [on the basis of political affiliations or beliefs] was intended to be actionable.); cf. Wilhelm v. Continental Title Co., 720 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.1983) (handicapped persons not a class within meaning of section 1985(3)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1601, 80 L.Ed.2d 131 (1984); DeSantis v. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co., 608 F.2d 327, 333 (9th Cir.1979) (homosexuals not a protected class). 78 Given the facts of this case, it is unnecessary to decide whether purely political or other activity without any racial overtones falls within section 1985(3). The FBI conspiracy allegedly targeted plaintiffs in significant part because of their involvement in and support of civil rights. At a minimum, according to Griffin, section 1985(3) reaches conspiracies motivated by animus against Blacks and those who support them. As the Court in Scott explained, 79 The central theme of the bill's proponents was that the [Ku Klux] Klan and others were forcibly resisting efforts to emancipate Negroes and give them equal access to political power. The predominate purpose of Sec. 1985(3) was to combat the prevalent animus against Negroes and their supporters. The latter included Republicans generally, as well as others, such as Northerners who came South with sympathetic views towards the Negro. 56 80 Thus, in Griffin, the Court found an alleged conspiracy against Blacks (and against a non-party who was mistaken to be a civil rights worker), designed to prevent them from seeking equal rights under the laws, to satisfy the requisite animus requirement. Similarly, we find that the uncontroverted evidence plaintiffs offered to prove the requisite animus discloses that defendants' actions were undoubtedly aimed at plaintiffs at least in part on account of their racial politics --that is, their participation in and support of civil rights protest, so as to take the conspiracy out of the purely political, wholly non-racial category. The evidence strongly supports the conclusion that the COINTELPRO conspiracy was impelled by a commingling of racial and political motives, 57 and is far removed from the kind of purely political disputes that seemingly have troubled the Supreme Court in its reading of section 1985(3). 58 The blatant racial overtone of the FBI program, coupled with plaintiffs' various organizational efforts, make clear the entanglement of race and politics that characterized the implementation of the COINTELPRO conspiracy. 81 First, the plaintiffs clearly constitute a class of Black and White civil rights workers and White supporters of their efforts and, thus, fall at the core of section 1985(3)'s concern. Plaintiffs Abbott and Booker were prominent in the Emergency Committee on the Transportation Crisis, a coalition of Black and White neighborhood groups opposed to construction of superhighways through the District's residential areas, because of the consequent displacement of many poor Blacks; plaintiffs Booker and Eaton were involved in organization of the Black United Front, a civil rights group. Plaintiff Hobson, an active member of the peace movement, also worked for and supported the civil rights efforts of her husband, Julius Hobson. Many of these plaintiffs also participated in protests against the Vietnam War, in part to heighten the awareness of the public on particularly the racial miseries of the war ... [meaning] that minority youths were disproportionately being drafted and fighting for the war. 59 At the same time, the plaintiffs who were primarily involved with antiwar groups, such as the Washington Mobilization Committee and the New Mobilization Committee, worked with Black civil rights groups on peace marches 60 and otherwise, both to support civil rights generally and to increase Black awareness of the high casualty figures among Black soldiers and the perceived need, as a result, to participate in antiwar protest. Given the undisputed evidence that the antiwar plaintiffs and civil rights plaintiffs joined together to seek common goals of concern to each, we find they represent, at a minimum, a class of civil rights workers and their supporters at the core of section 1985(3)'s concerns. 82 It is equally clear that the FBI defendants' conspiracy was directed against plaintiffs because of their participation in these very activities. Considerable testimony described efforts by the FBI to drive a wedge into this alliance between civil rights groups and peace groups. 83 The FBI's COINTELPRO program sought not only to neutralize and disrupt Black groups and antiwar groups separately, but also to exploit any dissention between them in an effort to deter formation of an alliance. One of the most shocking examples of this effort is found in an FBI document, written in August 1969, relating to the BUF head tax demand on the New Mobilization Committee. It discloses that an aim of COINTELPRO-New Left, to which it is referenced, was to split the antiwar and civil rights groups: 84 The Washington Field Office has recommended and the Bureau concurs in that recommendation that this is an ideal situation to exploit through the Counterintelligence Program. 85 Recipient offices are to furnish recommendations for such action to the Bureau by 8/29/69 without fail. Consideration is to be given to utilizing informants in both racial and nonracial protest groups in this matter. It is noted that the nonracial protest groups, particularly the NMC, can be accused of racism in refusing to go along with this demand. At the same time, such groups could be split further by some individuals calling the Front's demands extortion while other individuals in the group support the demands. 86 .... 87 The NMC has called for a massive demonstration at Washington, D.C., on 11/15/69. This demonstration may result in confrontation with authorities. The BUF is demanding that it be paid to let this demonstration go on in Washington, D.C. Committee members are upset over these demands and this situation offers an opportunity to divide and to embarrass them. This airtel requests recommendations from the field. 61 88 An October 1969 memorandum from the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) in New York to the FBI Director, also referenced to COINTELPRO-New Left, followed: 89 Enclosed are two copies of a suggested leaflet entitled Give Them Bananas!, designed to widen the rift between the New Mobilization Committee To End The War in Vietnam (NMC) and the Black United Front (BUF) over the BUF demand that the NMC pay for their planned March on Washington 11/15/69. 90 Enclosed leaflet has been written in the jargon of the New Left, necessitating the use of a certain amount of profanity. 91 It is realized this material is racial in tone but it is believed this is the one point of vulnerability in the NMC-BUF combination. 92 Bureau authority is requested to prepare and mail anonymously the enclosed leaflet to selected individuals active in the NMC and BUF both in the New York and Washington areas. 62 93 Subsequent documents reveal that Bureau authority was granted, with the caution, Take all necessary steps to protect the identity of the Bureau as the source of these leaflets, 63 and that copies of the leaflet were forwarded to WFO fordistribution. 64 Rev. Moore, purported author of the BUF head tax demand, testified that he in fact received the FBI's leaflet. 65 As distributed, it was titled, Give Them Bananas!, was decorated with a drawing of a monkey, and contained a string of profane, racist and degrading remarks that our senses of propriety and revulsion prevent us from reprinting in full. 66 94 We believe the foregoing amply discloses that the FBI actions were sufficiently related to matters of race to place the FBI conspiracy solidly within even the narrowest reading of section 1985(3). 67 Section 1985(3) was intended, perhaps more than anything else, to provide redress for victims of conspiracies impelled by a commingling of racial and political motives. 68 We would be hard pressed to imagine a case with evidence stronger than we find here of precisely such commingled motives. Accordingly, we reject the FBI defendants' contention that plaintiffs' evidence on this element of their claim did not support the verdict. 95