Opinion ID: 3031993
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Illusory Efficiencies

Text: The obvious attractiveness of the Crosby approach inheres in its purported efficiencies. As a reviewing court, however, our obligations under the Constitution are not always measured against a metric of efficiency or administrative convenience. See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 2543 (2004) (“[O]ur decision cannot turn on whether or to what degree trial by jury impairs the efficiency . . . of criminal justice.”); Universal Camera Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951) (“Reviewing courts must be influenced by a feeling that they are not to abdicate the conventional judicial function.”). As the Supreme Court cautioned in Booker itself, “ ‘delays, and little inconveniences in the forms of justice, are UNITED STATES v. AMELINE 6391 the price that all free nations must pay for their liberty in more substantial matters.’ ” Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756 (quoting 4 Commentaries on the Laws of England 343-44 (1769)). In light of the important constitutional rights at issue, the minimal burdens that accompany individualized review of unpreserved claims of Booker error are worth bearing. Moreover, any efficiency that the majority’s approach may seemingly promise is likely to prove illusory. If a district judge chooses on remand not to resentence a defendant, we may be required to review the standing sentence for reasonableness. Review for “reasonableness” is not limited to consideration of the length of the sentence. Instead, the Booker Court instructed appellate courts, in determining reasonableness, to consider not only the length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court. See Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765-66; see also United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2005) (after Booker appellate courts should “consider not only the length of the sentence but also the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the district court in reaching its sentencing determination”). Ultimately, we may conclude that a sentence is unreasonable when the sentencing judge fails to explicitly consider the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), or neglects to consult the applicable Guidelines range, and instead selects what he deems an appropriate sentence without such required consideration. In cases where a district judge elects not to hold a hearing before deciding not to resentence,5 however, it 5 Decisions in the aftermath of the Second Circuit’s Crosby decision prove that district courts will elect not to hold hearings before deciding not to resentence. In one case, for example, a district judge for the Southern District of New York denied a defendant’s request for a hearing, stating: Crosby provides specific guidance to the District Courts of this Circuit concerning cases remanded for possible re-sentencing. In deciding whether a defendant should be re-sentenced, the District Court should obtain the views of counsel, at least in writing, but need not require the presence of the Defendant. Moreover, the 6392 UNITED STATES v. AMELINE will be impossible for us to conduct a reasonableness review, for the judge’s “appropriate explanation” for his decision not to resentence cannot replace the insight into the factors evaluated and the procedures employed by the judge that a tran- script of a sentencing hearing would provide. This is especially true in light of the majority’s failure to discuss what would be an “appropriate explanation.” See Paladino, 401 F.3d at 488 (Kanne, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc) (“The record in the case in which there was no resentencing (or hearing on the issue) will be impossible for us to review for reasonableness, if reasonableness is to be determined with regard to all of . . . ‘the numerous factors that guide sentencing.’ ” (quoting Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 765-66)). In addition to hindering our ability to review reimposed sentences for “reasonableness,” the majority opens our docket to countless arguments that would be precluded if we had performed an individualized analysis. If we were to determine under an individualized analysis that a particular defendant did not meet his burden under the plain error standard, the case would not be remanded to the district court and there would be no second appeal. If we were to determine otherwise, the defendant’s sentence would be vacated and his case remanded for a full resentencing. However, because the defendant would be entitled to all the procedures that accompany a full resentencing, such as the opportunity to “present all available accurate information bearing on mitigation of punishment,” see United States v. Mack, 200 F.3d 653, 658 (9th Cir. 2000), the only issue on appeal likely would be the question of whether to re-sentence may be resolved with or without a hearing. Accordingly, defense counsel’s current request for a conference is DENIED. The parties are directed to file any written submissions concerning the possible re-sentencing of defendant by May 15, 2005. United States v. Jasper, 2005 WL 774519 (S.D.N.Y. April 6, 2005) (citations and quotations omitted). UNITED STATES v. AMELINE 6393 “reasonableness” of the defendant’s new sentence. By contrast, under the majority’s approach, if a district court elects not to hold a hearing before deciding to reimpose the preBooker sentence, the defendant could raise a host of claims in addition to the reasonableness of his sentence, such as the district court’s failure to consider the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and its violation of his right to allocution. Therefore, while at first blush it may be enticing to an overworked and overscrutinized bench to rid ourselves of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of appeals, we may create much more work for ourselves down the road than if we had simply done it right in the first place. The Eleventh Circuit accurately describes Crosby as “requiring resentencing in order to determine whether resentencing is required.”6 Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1305. It correctly observes that the Crosby procedure “undermines the Supreme Court’s teaching that one of the principal purposes of the plain error rule is to avoid needless reversals and remands.” Id. By adopting Crosby, the majority creates “the real possibility of another appeal and another remand on top of that.” Id. One of the reasons for plain error review is to reduce the burden on the judicial system. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468 (1997). The majority’s approach will necessarily increase the workload of courts, first, at the district court level, and then, inevitably, at the appellate level. The better approach is to review these appeals as the Supreme Court instructed and as our appellate duty requires. 6 The Second Circuit has responded to this criticism by stating that “[t]he remand is for a determination of whether the original sentence would have been materially different, and only in that event does the remand lead to resentencing.” United States v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 461 (2d Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original). This response misses the point, for the inquiry into whether the original sentence would have been “materially different” necessarily involves consideration of what sentence the district court would apply if it were to resentence under the advisory Guidelines. 6394 UNITED STATES v. AMELINE