Opinion ID: 2602244
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Heading: Transferred Intent Applies When the Intended Target Is Killed

Text: In People v. Birreuta (1984) 162 Cal. App.3d 454, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635 (Birreuta) , the defendant was convicted of two first degree murders. He denied intending to kill one of the victims. The court instructed the jury on transferred intent. The Court of Appeal found the instruction erroneous, reasoning that transferred intent does not apply when the intended target is killed. The function of the transferred intent doctrine is to insure the adequate punishment of those who accidentally kill innocent bystanders, while failing to kill their intended victims. But for the transferred intent doctrine, such people could escape punishment for murder, even though they deliberately and premeditatedly killedbecause of their `lucky' mistake .... [¶] When the intended victim is killed, however, there is no need for such an artificial doctrine. The defendant's premeditation, deliberation, intent to kill and malice aforethought are all directly employable in the prosecution for murdering his intended victim. The accidental killing may thus be prosecuted as a manslaughter or second degree murder without ignoring the most culpable mental elements of the situation.... [¶] We conclude that the interests of justice are best served by differentiating between killers who premeditatedly and deliberately kill two people, and killers who only intend to kill one person, and accidentally kill another. Both types should be punished for both killings, but the former type is clearly more culpable. In the first situation, the killer has committed two intended first degree murders. In the second situation ... the killer has committed one first degree murder and one second degree murder or manslaughter. If the transferred intent doctrine is applicable when the intended victim is killed, this difference disappears. Accordingly, we hold that the transferred intent doctrine does not apply in this case because ... the intended victim ... was killed. (Id. at pp. 460-461, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635.) The Birreuta court cited but found unpersuasive contrary dicta in an earlier case. ( Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d at pp. 458-459, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635, citing People v. Carlson (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 349, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321.) In Carlson, the defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter of his wife and murder of the fetus she was carrying. The court applied transferred intent. If, under the evidence, defendant intended to kill his wife but by accident or inadvertence he killed the unborn child, the proper principle to be applied is that which operates under the doctrine of `transferred intent.' ( People v. Carlson, supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 356, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321.) The court had no doubt that the doctrine of `transferred intent' applies even though the original object of the assault is killed as well as the person whose death was the accidental or the unintended result of the intent to kill the former. (Id. at p. 357, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321.) This language was, as Birreuta noted, dicta because the Carlson court ultimately reversed the murder conviction on unrelated grounds. (Id. at pp. 357-358, 112 Cal.Rptr. 321.) There is some force to Birreuta 's argument that a person who intends to kill two persons and does so is more culpable than a person who only intends to kill one but kills two. But we find no legally cognizable difference between the two persons. Because the facts in Scott did not present the Birreuta question, we decline[d] to express a view on that decision. ( Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 552, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288.) But Scott is instructive. There we affirmed convictions of two crimes against separate victims based on an intent to killattempted murder and, on a transferred intent theory, murder even though the defendant may have intended to kill only one person. We rejected the defendant's argument that he was improperly being prosecuted as if he intended to kill two people rather than one. (Id. at p. 551, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288.) Contrary to what its name implies, the transferred intent doctrine does not refer to any actual intent that is capable of being `used up' once it is employed to convict a defendant of a specific intent crime against the intended victim. (Id. at p. 550, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288.) Similarly, a person's intent to kill the intended target is not used up once it is employed to convict the person of murdering that target. It can also be used to convict of the murder of others the person also killed. When one intends to kill and does so, the killing is hardly an accident, even if the specific victim or victims are unintended. (Cf. Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal. App.3d at p. 460, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635 [referring to accidentally kill[ing] innocent bystanders].) The Birreuta court believed there is no need to transfer intent when the intended target is killed because the defendant can be convicted of murder of the intended victim. (Ibid.) But this point is not dispositive. It may not be necessary to find that intent to kill extends to all persons actually killed, but we believe it is appropriate to do so. The Birreuta rule presents conceptual difficulties under other facts. Birreuta says that a person who, premeditatedly intending to kill one person, kills the target and an unintended victim is guilty of one first degree murder and one second degree murder or perhaps manslaughter. But what if, instead of killing the target, the same person with the same intent kills two unintended targets? Is that person guilty of two first degree murders or, like the person who kills two including the target, only of one first degree murder and one lesser crime? Birreuta would seem to permit only one conviction of first degree murder. But if so, how? Is the transferred intent used up once it is transferred to one victim? How can that be reconciled with Scott? Moreover, if it is used up, on which of the two unintended victims is it used? Which of the unintended victims, who are equally dead and to whom the person had the same mental state, was the victim of a first degree murder and which of a lesser crime? How can a court make this sensible to a jury? Justice Mosk's concurring opinion in Scott, which reached the same result as the majority but by a different, and broader, route, supports the conclusion that Birreuta was incorrect. He rejected the assumption that malice aforethought exists in the perpetrator only in relation to an intended victim. ( Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 555, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.).) Instead, he argued, malice, either express or implied, does not exist in the perpetrator only in relation to an intended victim. True, an unlawful intent to kill almost always happens to be directed at an intended victim .... But there is no requirement of an unlawful intent to kill an intended victim. The law speaks in terms of an unlawful intent to kill a person, not the person intended to be killed. (See Pen.Code, § 188 [providing that malice aforethought is `express when there is manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature']....) (Id. at pp. 555-556, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288.) Whether one conceptualizes the matter by saying that the intent to kill the intended target transfers to others also killed, or by saying that intent to kill need not be directed at a specific person, the result is the same: assuming legal causation, a person maliciously intending to kill is guilty of the murder of all persons actually killed. If the intent is premeditated, the murder or murders are first degree. [2] Cases from other jurisdictions have not treated Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 454, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635, kindly. Several have expressly disagreed with it. ( State v. Hinton (1993) 227 Conn. 301, 630 A.2d 593, 598-599; Ochoa v. State (1999) 115 Nev. 194, 981 P.2d 1201, 1204-1205; State v. Worlock (1990) 117 N.J. 596, 569 A.2d 1314, 1325; State v. Fennell (2000) 340 S.C. 266, 531 S.E.2d 512, 515-518 [but citing Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th 544, 59 Cal. Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288, with approval].) The three later opinions each quote with approval the New Jersey Supreme Court: When a defendant contemplates or designs the death of another, the purpose of deterrence is better served by holding that defendant responsible for the knowing or purposeful murder of the unintended as well as the intended victim. Hence, we reject defendant's argument that the successful killing of the intended victim prevents the `transfer' of that intent to an unintended victim. ( State v. Worlock, supra, 569 A.2d at p. 1325.) The Connecticut Supreme Court added that the law does not give the defendant a discount on the second and subsequent victims of his intentional conduct. ( State v. Hinton, supra, 630 A.2d at p. 598.) Other cases predated Birreuta but reached the opposite conclusion. ( United States v. Sampol (D.C.Cir.1980) 636 F.2d 621, 674 [There are even stronger grounds for applying the principle [transferred intent] where the intended victim is killed by the same act that kills the unintended victim]; United States v. Weddell (8th Cir.1977) 567 F.2d 767, 769-770.) [3] The court in Harvey v. State (1996) 111 Md.App. 401, 681 A.2d 628 considered this question in detail. It first discussed the conceptual difficulties it presents. Some of the early, and simplistic, explanations of the transferred intent doctrine gave rise to some troubling conceptual problems. The classic formulation envisioned a single actus reus the death of the unintended victim. If the single mens rea the specific intent to kill the intended victim, e.g. could then be `transferred' to the unintended victim, the unitary mens rea could combine with the unitary actus reus to produce one unitary and doctrinally tidy crime.... [¶] The simple arithmetic explanation proved inadequate, however, when there was more than one actus reus. Suppose, in addition to the death of the unintended victim, the intended victim had also been killed or, at least, wounded by the bullet in its flight. If the mens rea had to be used to prove the crime against the intended victim, what was then left to be `transferred' to the case involving the unintended victim? The conceptual problem also arose even where the deadly force missed the intended victim completely but the State nonetheless sought to charge the assailant with the inchoate crime of intent to murder or assault with intent to murder. If the mens rea were in limited supply, to which of two crimes should it be allocated? How could a single mens rea be made to do double duty? (Id. at pp. 636-637.) The court then supplied the answer. As we did in Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th 544, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288, it rejected the notion that transferring the intent uses it up. By thinking of the mens rea in such finite termsas some discrete unit that must be either here or therewe have created a linguistic problem for ourselves where no real-life problem existed. Criminal acts, consummated or inchoate, are discrete events that can be both pinpointed and counted. A mens rea, by contrast, is an elastic thing of unlimited supply. It neither follows nor fails to follow the bullet. It does not go anywhere. It remains in the brain of the criminal actor and never moves. It may combine with a single actus reus to make a single crime. It may as readily combine with a hundred acti rei, intended and unintended, to make a hundred crimes, consummated and inchoate. Unforeseen circumstances may multiply the criminal acts for which the criminal agent is responsible. A single state of mind, however, will control the fact of guilt and the level of guilt of them all. ( Harvey v. State, supra, 681 A.2d at p. 637.) Relying heavily on Poe v. State, supra, 341 Md. 523, 671 A.2d 501Maryland's equivalent of Scott, supra, 14 Cal.4th 544, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 178, 927 P.2d 288the court concluded that the guilt of the assailant (or his accomplice) vis-a-vis the unintended victim was unaffected by the fate of the intended victim. As far as the case with respect to the unintended victim was concerned, it made no difference whether the intended victim had been 1) aimed at and missed, 2) hit but only wounded, or 3) hit and killed. It similarly made no difference whether the assailant (and/or accomplice) had been charged with a crime against the intended victim or not. There was no danger of depleting the mens rea. [¶] The `transferred' mens rea vis-a-vis the unintended victim or victims will not be affected in any way, therefore, by what happens to the intended victim. ( Harvey v. State, supra, 681 A.2d at p. 637.) We conclude that Birreuta, supra, 162 Cal.App.3d 454, 208 Cal.Rptr. 635, was incorrect and disapprove it to the extent it is inconsistent with our opinion. Intent to kill transfers to an unintended homicide victim even if the intended target is killed. [4]