Opinion ID: 2971450
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Undisputed IEPs

Text: The school district argues that the ALJ’s decision was based solely on the appropriateness of the 1999-2000 IEP; therefore, the district court should not have considered other IEPs in evaluating the ALJ’s decision. The school district also contends that the district court’s consideration of the additional evidence improperly changed the character of the hearing “from one of review to a trial de novo.” Cook, 11 915 F.2d at 235. Finally, the school district asserts that it presented the only evidence at the due process hearing regarding the appropriateness of the disputed IEP. The Bellamys point out that the ALJ considered several evaluations of Pacoda conducted prior to the 1999-2000 school year. Citing the school district’s evaluations of Pacoda in 1993, 1995, and 1999, and noting that Pacoda throughout this period had scored below average on the Wechsler test and Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales, the ALJ observed the her “performance measured by these standardized tests falls within a narrow range at the lowest percentiles; therefore, even changes in the Student’s measured performance that might have statistical significance are, as a practical matter, inconsequential.” J.A. at 20. Thus, prior IEPs were part of the record before the ALJ. That the ALJ looked to the earlier IEPs to assess Pacoda’s needs is apparent from his order to the district that it provide Pacoda with four years of compensatory education. This remedy was, at least in part, based on the pre-1999-2000 school year evaluations. As noted above, a district court may admit additional evidence provided it does not use that evidence to rule on issues not before the ALJ. Guest, 193 F.3d at 463. In this case the district court’s memorandum cited Pacoda’s previous IEPs to demonstrate the course of the diagnoses of her condition during her enrollment in the defendant’s schools. The district court also noted that Pacoda’s IEP for the 1999-2000 school year took into account her intelligence scores from previously-administered evaluations – the same evaluations the ALJ discussed. Although the district court must “be careful to avoid imposing [its] view of preferable educational methods upon the States,” Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, the scope of the district court’s analysis remained confined to the question of whether the IEP for the 1999-2000 school year was adequate to meet Pacoda’s needs. This was the issue before the ALJ. While the district court may have accorded greater 12 weight to some of the evidence, or examined it in greater detail than did the ALJ, it did not exceed the proper scope of its review, or otherwise err when it took cognizance of Pacoda’s earlier IEPs. 3. Evidence of the District’s Procedural Violation The Bellamys requested an IEP team meeting on February 3, 2000. The rules of the Tennessee State Board of Education require that such meeting be convened within ten school days of such request. Tenn. Dep’t of Educ., State Bd. of Educ., Rules, Regulations, and Minimum Standards for the Operation of the Public School System 0520-1-9-.10(3)(a), available at http://www.state.tn.us/sos/rules/0520/0520-01/0520-01.htm (“Upon the written request of any member, the IEP team shall be convened within ten (10) schooldays to review or revise the IEP or consider the child’s placement.”). According to the record, such a meeting was not convened – the February 23, 2000, meeting did not occur within ten days, nor did the entire IEP team attend. The full IEP team finally met on March 31, 2000, long after the ten-day period had expired. This was, according to the Bellamys, a procedural violation.4 The school district asserts that the ALJ made no finding of procedural violations by the school district; thus, the school district argues, the district court’s decision to admit evidence of such a violation was improper. 4 School districts have an obligation to “establish and maintain” procedural safeguards under 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a) In Rowley, the Supreme Court explained: It seems to us no exaggeration to say that Congress placed every bit as much emphasis upon compliance with procedures giving parents and guardians a large measure of participation at every stage of the administrative process, see, e.g., §§ 1415(a)-(d), as it did upon the measurement of the resulting IEP against a substantive standard. 458 U.S. at 205-06. 13 The Bellamys assert that the ALJ properly admitted evidence of the procedural violation at the due process hearing, even though he did not mention the procedural violation in his order or memorandum. The Bellamys also argue that, even if the district court erred in admitting evidence of the procedural violation, the district court’s opinion should be affirmed because the court did not rely on that procedural violation in reaching its decision. The school district is correct that the ALJ did not make a finding that the failure timely to convene the IEP meeting constituted a procedural violation. The Bellamys, on the other hand, correctly contend that the ALJ admitted evidence of their request for such meeting and the school district’s failure to respond to that request. Nothing in the Sixth Circuit’s case law suggests that the district court is precluded from making a finding that a procedural violation occurred just because the ALJ did not make such a finding. The district court applies a “modified” de novo standard of review to the findings of the ALJ. Tucker, 136 F.3d at 503. The district court is required “to make its findings of fact based on a preponderance of the evidence contained in the record (including evidence contained in both the administrative record and in the record of deposition testimony made before the district court), while giving deference to the fact findings of the administrative proceedings . . . .” Id. In the instant case, the ALJ admitted the evidence on which the district court made its finding that the Bellamys’ request for an IEP team meeting triggered the school district’s duty to convene such a meeting. J.A. at 58. Thus, the finding of the procedural violation by the district court was based on evidence admitted previously by the ALJ.