Opinion ID: 1560524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We first consider whether we have jurisdiction to decide this case. Because this is an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a plea to the jurisdiction and there was no dissent in the court of appeals, we have jurisdiction only if we determine that the court of appeals held differently from a prior decision of another court of appeals or of this Court on a question of law material to the decision of the case. See TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 22.001(a)(2), 22.225(c); Coastal Corp. v. Garza, 979 S.W.2d 318, 319 (Tex.1998). Such conflicts jurisdiction exists when one case `would operate to overrule the other in case they were both rendered by the same court.' Coastal Corp., 979 S.W.2d at 319-20 (quoting Christy v. Williams, 156 Tex. 555, 298 S.W.2d 565, 568-69 (1957)). In other words, it must appear that the decisions in the two cases are  so far upon the same state of facts that they would control one another. Id. at 320 (emphasis in original). The TNRCC argues that we have conflicts jurisdiction because the court of appeals' opinion conflicts with the Fourth Court of Appeals' opinion in Schaefer v. City of San Antonio, 838 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ). In Schaefer, the court of appeals held that a stationary electric motor-driven pump was not motor-driven equipment under the Tort Claims Act. Id. at 693. White counters that no conflict exists because the court of appeals' conclusion that such a pump was not motor-driven equipment is not a holding but merely dicta. Noting that the scope of motor-driven equipment must be understood to be fairly broad, the court of appeals in this case concluded that, in alleging injury caused by a stationary electric motor-driven pump, White ... alleged sufficient facts to establish that TNRCC's pump was `motor-driven equipment' as that term is used in the act. 13 S.W.3d. at 825-26. [1] By contrast, Schaefer holds: Because the status of stationary electric motor-driven pumps as `motor-driven equipment' is questionable at best, we conclude that the City Water Board's sovereign immunity has not been clearly and explicitly waived. Therefore, we conclude that the water pump in question is not `motor-driven equipment' for purposes of the Act. Schaefer, 838 S.W.2d at 693. Despite White's argument otherwise, this language is part of Schaefer's holding, not dicta. Schaefer sued the San Antonio Waterworks Board for property damage from a broken water line near his property. Id. at 689. He argued that the City had waived sovereign immunity under section 101.021(1)(A), the provision at issue in this case. Among other claims, he asserted that the City's use of motor-driven pumps to drive water through its water lines caused the water to shoot out of the broken line and onto his property. The Schaefer court made two holdings: (1) the city was not operating or using the water pump and (2) the pump was not motor-driven equipment. Id. at 693. Certainly, the court could have relied on either determination to reach its ultimate conclusion that sovereign immunity had not been waived. But it relied on both. Because of the factual similarities between Schaefer and this case, and the divergence between the two cases' holdings, we conclude that one decision would operate to overrule the other. Coastal Corp., 979 S.W.2d at 319-20. We therefore have jurisdiction, and we now address the merits of this case.