Opinion ID: 2083453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Defendant's Mental Retardation

Text: Defendant next contends that his death sentence is unconstitutional because he is mentally retarded. In support of this contention, defendant cites his IQ of 71 and Dr. Gelbort's diagnosis that defendant suffered from mild mental retardation. Defendant acknowledges that the United States Supreme Court has previously determined that the eighth amendment does not preclude the execution of a mentally retarded defendant convicted of a capital crime (see Penry, 492 U.S. at 340, 109 S.Ct. at 2958, 106 L.Ed.2d at 292). Despite that decision, defendant argues that the standards of international morality have now evolved to such a point that the execution of the mentally retarded should now be constitutionally proscribed. The State argues that defendant has failed to sufficiently establish that he is mentally retarded, observing that even defendant's lowest measured IQ is higher than the upper limit of 70 set for classifying individuals as mentally retarded. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 308 n. 1, 109 S.Ct. at 2941 n. 1, 106 L.Ed.2d at 271 n. 1. Nevertheless, we need not address the State's argument in order to reject defendant's claim. The Penry Court, in 1989, determined that it is not unconstitutional to execute a mentally retarded person who is convicted of a capital crime. In coming to this conclusion, the Court rejected the defendant's claim that a there was a national consensus against executing the mentally retarded, finding insufficient objective evidence of such a consensus. Penry, 492 U.S. at 333-35, 109 S.Ct. at 2955, 106 L.Ed.2d at 288-89. The defendant here cites no significant objective evidence beyond that which was found insufficient in Penry. Therefore, we do not depart from that decision.