Opinion ID: 6497670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶14 Whitaker argues that the circuit court relied on an improper sentencing factor——thereby violating his constitutional rights——when it: (1) repeatedly referenced Whitaker's childhood Amish community; and (2) stated its intent to deter others within that community from failing to report or stop ongoing sexual assaults. Whitaker's exact constitutional claims are somewhat nebulous, but they appear to boil down to freedom of association and the free exercise of religion. As to the former, Whitaker argues that when the circuit court said it hoped the sentence would send a message to members of the Amish community, the court improperly based the sentence on his protected association with that community. As for the latter, Whitaker argues that when the court encouraged his childhood Amish community to report sexual assaults to the secular authorities, contrary to the community's practice of avoiding outside societal influence, the circuit court violated his right to free religious exercise. Because this case can be decided on Thus, depending on how a court looks at it, a reasonable nexus to a proper and relevant sentencing factor either: (1) renders the challenged factor proper because it is inextricably intertwined with a relevant and proper factor; or (2) indicates that the court was actually relying on the related relevant and proper factor and not solely relying on the challenged factor. Either way, the analysis is equivalent. An appellate court affirms the sentence if the challenged factor is relevant to proper sentencing considerations rather than a stand-alone factor untethered to the underlying criminal conduct. In this case, we continue to follow this court's more recent guidance and apply the reasonable nexus test under the actual-reliance prong. 10 No. 2020AP29-CR narrower grounds, as a prudential matter we assume without deciding that any consideration of Whitaker's childhood Amish community was improper.7 That said, we hold that Whitaker fails to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the assumed improper factor was the sole cause of a harsher sentence because it bears a reasonable nexus to relevant and proper sentencing factors. ¶15 We begin with the context in which the circuit court made the challenged comments. Whitaker pled to only one count of sexual assault of a minor despite confessing to hundreds more and received two years of initial confinement.8 In addressing the egregious facts of this case, and at the behest of the defendant,9 the circuit court repeatedly considered the enabling behavior of the elder members of Whitaker's childhood community. The sentencing court stated that the relevant Galleon [sic] factors are punishment, and also deterrence of others, hopefully 7See Md. Arms Ltd. P'ship v. Connell, 2010 WI 64, ¶48, 326 Wis. 2d 300, 786 N.W.2d 15 (Typically, an appellate court should decide cases on the narrowest possible grounds.). 8Under Wis. Stat. § 973.01(2)(b)1. and (2)(d)1., a Class B felony carries a maximum sentence of 40 years initial confinement and 20 years of extended supervision. 9Whitaker asked the circuit court to consider how his upbringing affected his socialization as a mitigating factor. Specifically, Whitaker blamed his upbringing for limiting his sexual education, isolating him from resources, and contributing to a skewed view of adolescent development. He also said that it was important to note that there were adults who were aware of this conduct when it was happening . . . and it was recommended that the allegations remain within the community. 11 No. 2020AP29-CR deterrence of others in the Amish community. It repeated, I'm hoping that this sentence deters, as I said, the community, and continued, a prison sentence is the only way to send the message to Mr. Whitaker and to the community that this is totally unacceptable behavior. . . . And I hope that the elders in the community pay attention to this. ¶16 Whitaker argues that these references to his childhood Amish community lack congruity to his offense and therefore lack a sufficient nexus to relevant and proper sentencing objectives. We disagree. Read in context, the circuit court's efforts to encourage Whitaker's childhood community to report child sexual assaults wholly relate to relevant criminal conduct, both generally and specifically. The circuit court was not addressing a failure to report a one-off crime after the fact; the community elders knew the assaults were ongoing. Their failure to meaningfully intervene directly enabled Whitaker to commit hundreds of additional assaults on his sisters and greatly compounded their harm. As the circuit court stated, it is insufficient to address these crimes internally in the community when it is not a one-time thing and . . . the women, the daughters, the wives in the Amish community are not empowered to come forward. ¶17 This reasoning touches on valid considerations of general deterrence and protection of the public. We have long accepted that general deterrence is an appropriate sentencing consideration. See Gallion, 270 Wis. 2d 535, ¶61. Here, the sentencing court expressed its desire to generally deter others, 12 No. 2020AP29-CR specifically others in Whitaker's childhood community, from both committing sexual assaults and refusing to protect victims in the community from sexual violence. This sentiment was directed at the community members to encourage them to meaningfully intervene by reporting sexual abuse and holding abusers accountable rather than continuing to ignore or conceal the abuse. Should the community protect victims and hold abusers to account, future potential abusers are likely to be deterred from engaging in this type of abusive conduct. In other words, the community's meaningful intervention directly relates to the sentencing goal of deterring similar crimes. ¶18 Here, general deterrence logically ties in with a second sentencing goal: public protection. Much like the goal of deterrence, public protection can be applied both to the individual defendant specifically and to the larger community generally. This means the court may consider: (1) the need to protect the public from the individual defendant; (2) the need to protect the public from those like the defendant; or (3) both. See Id., ¶61 (the court properly took into account the need to protect the public from Gallion and others like him). As with deterrence, the circuit court in this case was focused on public protection in the general sense. As noted above, deterring sexual assault through effective community intervention protects victims. As this case exemplifies, victims of sexual abuse are often powerless to protect themselves. And in this case the victims' powerlessness was compounded when the family and community elders did little to 13 No. 2020AP29-CR protect A.B., C.D., and E.F. from Whitaker's unrelenting abuse even after learning of the ongoing assaults. The three victims were left completely defenseless. The circuit court recognized that the victims' protection was dependent on help from the community and encouraged community members to hold offenders like Whitaker to account. In doing so, the circuit court sought to protect victims from further trauma and abuse. The circuit court acted within its discretion to address this failure of protection in hopes of both preventing others from engaging in similar abuse and protecting potential victims in that community from similar conduct.10 ¶19 For the sake of completeness, we understand the remainder of the court's discussion to be addressing the offenses' seriousness, the effects on the victims, and the need for punishment. The circuit court repeatedly referenced these valid considerations, stating that the relevant Galleon [sic] factors are punishment, and also deterrence of others, that punishing Mr. Whitaker for his behavior was critical, that no confinement would depreciate the seriousness of this offense, and that a prison sentence is the only way to send the message 10The sentencing court made other limited references to Whitaker's childhood community unrelated to general deterrence or protection of the public. However, Whitaker does not allege that these limited comments served as anything other than a basis for leniency. For example, the circuit court exempted Whitaker from the sex offender registration requirement, in part because it shifted the blame from Whitaker onto a community and a family that wasn't protecting the daughters. It also stated that [Whitaker] was in an Amish community. And so . . . I don't believe he poses a risk. 14 No. 2020AP29-CR to Mr. Whitaker . . . that this is totally unacceptable behavior. The circuit court sought to address the sheer number of crimes Whitaker committed, emphasizing that [i]t was a thousand. It was years of abuse. The circuit court also focused on the victims, calling the facts of their abuse abhorrent, saying A.B. was destroyed by her brother's actions, and stating its hope that Whitaker's sentence may help the family heal. ¶20 Having reviewed the entire sentencing transcript, we conclude that the circuit court's challenged statements bore a reasonable nexus to the relevant and proper sentencing factors of general deterrence and protection of the public. Nothing in the transcript suggests the circuit court increased Whitaker's sentence solely because of his religious beliefs or his association with the Amish community. See Williams, 381 Wis. 2d 331, ¶53. Therefore, we will not disturb the circuit court's wide sentencing discretion. Id., ¶45.