Opinion ID: 2622669
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Dr. Jensen's Application for Award of All Claimed Costs

Text: ¶135 Dr. Jensen also argues that all of his claimed costs should have been awarded because Ms. Sawyers failed to comply with rule 54(d)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 54(d)(2) states: The party who claims his costs must within five days after the entry of the judgment serve upon the adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs and necessary disbursements in the action, and file with the court a like memorandum thereof duly verified stating that to affiant's knowledge the items are correct, and that the disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied with the costs claimed may, within seven days after service of the memorandum of costs, file a motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the court. A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing of the finding of fact and conclusions of law, but before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be considered as served and filed on the date judgment is entered. Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2). ¶136 The sum total of Dr. Jensen's argument is that his timely filed motion of dissatisfaction with the court seeking costs in the amount of $122,952.66 should have been granted because Ms. Sawyers filed an objection, rather than a motion, opposing those costs. He cites no authority for support. ¶137 Ms. Sawyers contends that the words motion and objection are interchangeable and therefore she properly complied with rule 54(d)(2). For support, she cites two rule 54(d)(2) cases, Graco Fishing & Rental Tools v. Ironwood Exploration, Inc., 766 P.2d 1074, 1080 (Utah 1987), and Suniland Corp. v. Radcliffe, 576 P.2d 847, 849 (Utah 1978), which specifically identify the filing of an objection rather than a motion to convey the dissatisfaction with the proposed distribution of cost awards. ¶138 We agree with Ms. Sawyers that motion and objection are interchangeable in this case. Black's Law Dictionary defines a motion as a written or oral application requesting a court to make a specified ruling or order. 1031 (7th ed. 1999). An objection is defined as a formal statement opposing something that has occurred or is about to occur, in court. Graco Fishing, 766 P.2d at 1101. In this case, having reviewed Ms. Sawyers' objection to the memorandum of verified costs which follows the same framework as a motion, we conclude that the distinction Dr. Jensen asks us to make is too narrow and violates the intent and spirit of rule 54(d)(2). We affirm the trial court's finding that Ms. Sawyers complied sufficiently with rule 54(d)(2).
¶139 Dr. Jensen appeals the trial court's denial of his application for costs for necessary disbursements authorized under rule 54(d)(2) and associated with his claim for transcript costs, expert witness fees, court equipment expenses, and other out-of-pocket costs. Dr. Jensen claims that the trial court erred by too strictly applying the rule we set out in Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah 1980). The trial court supported its position by writing that the Utah Supreme Court has stated that `there is a distinction to be understood' between legitimate and taxable costs and other expenses of litigation which may ever be so necessary, but are not taxable as costs (citing Frampton, 605 P.2d at 774). Dr. Jensen argues that we should reverse or modify the Frampton rule because rule 54(d)(2) does not distinguish between taxable costs and litigation expenses and because the Frampton rule omits the necessary disbursements language in rule 54(d)(2). We disagree. ¶140 We again reference the appropriate standard of review for costs under rule 54(d)(2). A trial court's decision to award the prevailing party its costs will be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Young v. State, 2000 UT 91, ¶ 4, 16 P.3d 549. Moreover, in Frampton we instructed that the trial court has a duty to guard against excesses or abuses in awarding costs. 605 P.2d at 773. ¶141 The trial court's order on this issue carefully reviewed this court's body of law on necessary disbursements and costs. The court makes clear that many of Dr. Jensen's proposed costs violate the Frampton rule against unnecessary costs. Specifically, the court found that some of the deposition costs were not essential or Dr. Jensen could not demonstrate that a less expensive means of obtaining the transcripts would not have been practical. [14] The court reminded the parties that [c]osts were not recoverable at common law; and are therefore generally allowable only in the amounts and in the manner provided by statute. Frampton, 605 P.2d at 773. As a result, a number of items were held unrecoverable by statutethose included a video consultant and court equipment expenses. ¶142 Dr. Jensen tries to make a case for rejecting Frampton, arguing that the question of necessary costs should not be left entirely to the discretion of the legislature and because it may violate the open courts clause in the Utah Constitution by limiting recoverable costs to those conservatively specified by the legislature. We disagree. For twenty-five years, Frampton has remained our guiding principle for allocation of recoverable costs. The trial court properly applied Frampton to the issue of recoverable costs. Dr. Jensen has failed to persuade us with sufficient authority or evidence that we should overrule Frampton and reject the guidelines established by the legislature for appropriate recoverable costs. We therefore affirm.