Opinion ID: 1447258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: failure to establish contract

Text: The alleged error most emphasized by defendant is plaintiff's failure to establish a contract, a matter which was centric in the former appeal and which we discussed at length in that decision. The evidence in the first and second trials being substantially the same, we view our former analysis as relevant in the consideration of this feature. Defendant's argument calls attention to our recognition in the original case that the evidence offered in proof of an oral contract to make a will should be clear and convincing, and that while this does not connote proof beyond all reasonable doubt, the rule requires something more than a mere preponderance. Pangarova v. Nichols, supra, 419 P.2d at 695. Primarily defendant argues that the alleged letters which were admitted into evidence should have been received for no purpose other than the mere writing of the decedent, noting that the only foundation existing at the time of their admission was that the documents contained the handwriting of the decedent and that the translations were substantially correct. She says there was no evidence of their being mailed or received and quotes from Harper v. Wilson, 10 Cir., 46 F.2d 785, 787: The letters bear dates extending from November 8, 1916, to July 12, 1924. They show that Harper was advising and assisting Wilson in obtaining the placer locations and the leasing permits, and they contain offers to divide the avails, but there was no competent testimony that Wilson mailed them or that Harper received them.       There was no competent testimony that Wilson mailed or parted with the letters. No letters from Harper were introduced. The letters of Wilson, standing alone, fell short of establishing a joint adventure, whereby Harper was to share in the royalties from the lands on which the permits here involved were issued. And the whole of the evidence was insufficient for that purpose. The bill was properly dismissed as to the administratrix. We find that holding to be inapplicable to the present situation. It is true that there was no competent testimony that the deceased Nichols had mailed the letters or that plaintiff (or plaintiff's father) had received them, although apparently if objection had not been made to a particular answer of Maren Pangarov in his deposition, it would have been adduced that he had sent all the letters to America which he had received from decedent regarding his efforts to secure passage of plaintiff. Nevertheless, when these exhibits were received in evidence, Ruby Drazick was on the stand. She had testified as to her first meeting the deceased in about 1937 when she worked in Senator Schwartz' office. At that time she had been told he had a niece in Bulgaria whom he was thinking of bringing over, wanting to adopt her as his daughter. Between 1937 and 1946 she saw Mr. Nichols two or three times a month and in their conversations his niece Tsetsy was often referred to. In about 1947 she began writing letters for him to the niece because he did not write in the English language. Miss Drazick, of course, was able to identify the letters she had typed for deceased, some of which she had mailed to plaintiff, but as to those in his handwriting, to which objection was made, she was able only to identify them as his handwritten letters addressed to his niece or brother. Under such circumstances, the holding of the Harper case is inapposite and the identified letters were properly admitted for all purposes. Defendant further argues various ramifications of this general phase, e.g., that plaintiff did not establish an offer with the required degree of certainty; that ordinarily the act which constitutes the consideration (sufficient to support a contract) must be at the instance of the promisor, and must be regarded by the parties as consideration; that under the letters any obligations required of the plaintiff were so indefinite that it would be impossible to adequately determine for the formation of a contract; and that where, as here, there is a failure to perform it has been held that such failure terminates an agreement to will property and relieves decedent from his obligations. Defendant further argues that plaintiff did not show legal excuse for her nonperformance nor that the decedent prevented her from performing. Such argument although casually alluding to general legal principles relates inherently to factual aspects which could well have appealed to the jury, but it cannot affect the matter here unless we are willing to hold that such questions were questions of law and as such could not properly be submitted to the jury. This we are unwilling to do. Basically the evidence adduced in the case before us was the same as that in the first trial. On appeal this court said that the question of whether plaintiff by way of conduct and performance had accepted the offer of decedent was primarily a question of fact, and that the actions and conduct of the defendant and decedent's failure to obtain her co-operation, as represented, did not constitute an excuse for decedent's failure to meet his obligations. We perceive no reason for the application of a different rationale now. Defendant lists certain testimony not presented at the first trial to the effect that trouble started between plaintiff and defendant immediately following plaintiff's arrival when plaintiff commenced quarreling and arguing about the fact that decedent had married before she arrived, later urging deceased to divorce his wife, whom she referred to as a dirty Greek, and physically assaulted decedent. However, such testimony was contradicted by plaintiff, who testified that on the evening of her arrival while she was showering she heard the loud voices of her aunt and uncle, her uncle repeatedly calling defendant S.O.B.; that he was disturbed from defendant's fighting with him every day and night; that he did not have regular sleep because of too much trouble giving his wife to him; that decedent said to plaintiff he had made `the biggest mistake in my life to marry this dirty Greek,' that `She marry me to get my money. She is Greek and she try to get all Bulgarian money to her Greek relatives.    all the property on my name and the will she knows before she got married to me, the will is yours.   '    he mention that she has been all the time bother him, insist that he to change the will and have mutual agreement of the money of the estate or property after they got married; that her uncle was very unhappy she was leaving his home; that it was defendant's decision that she should leave; and that defendant told her to go, threatening to kill her. It should perhaps also be observed that defendant in arguing the effect of decedent's marriage subsequent to any understanding between him and plaintiff asserts that defendant knew of no prior dealings between the decedent and his niece but plaintiff also disputes this. It is axiomatic from frequent statements in our jurisdiction that where testimony is conflicting the reviewing court will give consideration only to that of the prevailing party. To bolster her contention that the completion of the contract was impossible, defendant quotes only from an irrelevant portion of the previous opinion in the case and adds a statement from 1 Bowe-Parker: Page, Wills, p. 461 (1960): If one of the provisions of an entire and indivisible contract is illegal, none of the other covenants can be enforced. We are not required to notice claimed error unsupported by available precedent or cogent argument. Stolldorf v. Stolldorf, Wyo., 384 P.2d 969, 973.