Opinion ID: 2343208
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: reviewability of claims

Text: Both Jones and the Commonwealth appealed the decision of the PCRA court. Jones presents the following seventeen claims: (1) The jury instructions violated Due Process of Law because they reduced the prosecutor's burden of proof; (2) The admission at trial of the hearsay identification of Nassia Ford violated various of the rights of Jones; (3) Prosecutorial misconduct pervaded the trial; (4) The Commonwealth discriminated against African-American venirepersons in its exercise of preemptory jury challenges; (5) The failure to provide Jones with trial transcripts denied him rights under the state and federal constitutions; (6) Jones' rights were violated by the prosecution's concealment of an agreement made with Sylvester Williams and the trial court's subsequent failure to strike his testimony. (7) The trial court's instructions to the jury were improper; (8) Jones' constitutional rights were violated by the trial court's constant criticisms of co-defense counsel; (9) Jones' rights to a fair capital trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments and his rights under the confrontation clause were abridged when the trial court admitted a newscast from the evening of the murder; (10) The reasonable doubt instruction violated due process; (11) The trial court failed to instruct the jury properly on all of the elements of first-degree murder and aggravated assault in violation of In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); (12) The trial court's instructions on aggravated assault violated Commonwealth v. Nichols, 692 A.2d 181 (Pa.Super.1997); (13) Jones' conviction violated Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980); (14) Jones is entitled to relief from his conviction and death sentence because the information and jury instruction omitted essential elements of the offense, namely a specific intent; (15) Cumulatively, the myriad errors in Jones' trial violated his rights under the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions; (16) Jones is entitled to an evidentiary hearing; and (17) Discovery. (Brief of Jones at iii-v). The Commonwealth, in its cross-appeal, raises two issues: (1) Did the PCRA court abuse its discretion when it granted an evidentiary hearing and did the PCRA court err when it granted Jones a new penalty hearing? (2) Did the PCRA court properly dismiss Jones' claims that were not cognizable under the Post Conviction Relief Act? (Brief of Commonwealth at 3). Our standard of review of the grant or denial of post-conviction relief is limited to examining whether the lower court's determination is supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 541 Pa. 108, 661 A.2d 352, 356 n. 4 (1995). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a defendant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2). [9] Further, these issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3). A claim is previously litigated under the PCRA if the highest appellate court in which the petitioner could have had review as a matter of right has ruled on the merits of the issue. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(a)(2). On review of Jones's conviction and Judgment of Sentence, we denied relief on the underlying claims that he now raises in issues 6, 7, and 9 and in portions of issue 3. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 530 Pa. 591, 610 A.2d 931, 939-40 (1992) (issue 6); id. at 944 (issue 7); id. at 942 (issue 9); id. at 939, 940-42, 942-44 (portions of issue 3). As we recently held in Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005), an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel is not previously litigated within the meaning of the PCRA merely because its underlying claim was raised on direct appeal. Nevertheless, the above issues are not cognizable notwithstanding Collins because Jones fails to argue that this Court erred in denying relief with respect to any of the underlying claims upon which the issues are premised. [10] An allegation is waived if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state post-conviction proceeding. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b). In the instant matter, Jones brings several such claims. [11] Jones concedes that most of the issues he raises are waived. He contends, however, that this Court should review these claims as they are brought under the rubric of ineffective assistance of counsel and are thus reviewable in the current context. The Commonwealth avers that the versions of all of Jones' claims sounding in trial court error, prosecutorial error, and trial counsel ineffectiveness were available to him on direct appeal, where he was represented by counsel other than trial counsel. Since these claims could have been raised on appeal, the Commonwealth argues that these claims are now waived pursuant to the PCRA. In his brief to this Court, Jones includes a section asserting the overall ineffective assistance of prior counsel, and a brief paragraph, at the most, at the conclusion of each substantive argument averring that counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issues discussed in the claim. In none of these claims, however, does Jones offer more than a conclusory assertion of errorfailing to mention or discuss any lack of a reasonable basis for the actions taken by prior counsel or any resultant prejudice. At the time that Jones filed his consolidated Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, the jurisprudence of this Court was not clear regarding whether claims, otherwise waived for failure of the defendant to raise them, were reviewable where boilerplate language was used to re-frame them as ones of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Commonwealth v. McGill, 574 Pa. 574, 832 A.2d 1014, 1022 (2003) (The manner by which a petitioner preserves, through pleading and presentation in his briefs, and proves a claim of layered ineffectiveness sufficient to warrant relief in a meritorious case . . . has been a source of disagreement and confusion.). Consistent with the approach we took in our decisions during the time period when Jones filed his consolidated PCRA Petition, in the instant case we will review his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, despite the cursory language utilized in his brief to overcome waiver. [12] We assume that Jones intended the portion of his brief entitled Appellant's Statement Regarding Cognizability (Brief of Jones at ii) to apply to all of his succeeding arguments. As such, claims 1, 2, 5, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, and portions of issue 3 are not deemed unreviewable because of the manner in which Jones presented them. Further, an issue is waived where it was not presented in the original or amended PCRA petition below. See Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 706 (1998) (noting that a claim for post-conviction relief cannot be raised for the first time on appeal to this Court); Commonwealth v. Laird, 555 Pa. 629, 726 A.2d 346, 354 (1999). With this in mind, we now dismiss claims 12 and 13, and a portion of claim 3, deeming them waived as they were not raised below. In summary, we conclude that the following claims of Jones are properly reviewable by this Court: 1, 2, portions of issue 3, 5, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, and 17.