Opinion ID: 2271619
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Felony Murder While Armed (Burglary)

Text: Castillo challenges his conviction for the armed felony murder of STC member Ávila based on the predicate crime of first-degree burglary with the intent to commit assault. He argues that the government failed to prove that the burglary (of the apartment where Ávila was staying with the mother of Castillo's children) was undertaken with the specific intent to commit an assault, and likewise failed to prove that Ávila's death occurred during the course of the burglary. We disagree. Government witnesses Vigil and Juan Carlos Morales testified that a group of VL members, including themselves and Castillo, decided to go to the apartment on Hawaii Avenue after looking in vain for STC members in the STC territory around 14th and Peabody Streets, and after Castillo said that he wanted to go to the apartment to see his children. Vigil also testified that along the way, he stopped to get his bat, and Juan Carlos Morales testified that Castillo had a gun in his waistband. The VL members went into the apartment carrying these weapons and Castillo pointed his gun at Ávila. This evidence allowed the jury to conclude that Castillo and his cohorts entered the apartment with the intent to commit an assault. As the basis for his argument that there was no evidence that the murder occurred during the course of the burglary, Castillo points out that the government's witnesses testified that the burglars forced Ávila to go outside at gunpoint and that, once outside, Ávila broke free and ran, and Castillo ran after him and shot him. Castillo argues that this evidence shows that the burglary had already come to an end when, according to the government's evidence, the fatal shooting occurred. He urges that the mere coincidence in time of [the predicate crime] and a murder is insufficient to support a felony murder conviction. Head v. United States, 451 A.2d 615, 625 (D.C. 1982) (citations omitted). The essential elements of felony murder while armed are that the defendant, while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a specified felony while armed, inflicted an injury on the victim from which he died. Id. (citations omitted). Thus, [t]here must be evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that the murder took place during the course of the predicate crime of burglary. Id. (citations omitted). The government argues that this test was met because the burglary and the homicide were part of a continuous transaction and the evidence showed an `unbroken chain of facts and circumstances which link[ed]' the burglary . . . and the homicide. Marshall v. United States, 623 A.2d 551, 558 (D.C.1992) (citation omitted). We agree with the government that the evidence permitted the jury to infer that the burglary was undertaken to enable the kidnaping, and that, in that sense, appellant was still [attempting to] carry[] away the fruits of the burglary when the shooting occurred. Coleman, 295 F.2d at 560; cf. Carter v. United States, 223 F.2d 332, 334 (D.C.Cir.1955) (so long as the essential ingredient of asportation continues, the crime of robbery is still in progress . . . with the result that the robber is guilty of first degree murder if in those circumstances he kills a pursuer). The facts of this case are somewhat on par with those of Carter, in which the court upheld a conviction of felony murder (robbery) even though the evidence showed that the homicide occurred after Carter had completely finished robbing the victim and had left the immediate vicinity without being pursued. Id. Although there was a slight interval between the time when Carter stole the money and the time when [the police officer whom Carter shot] began pursuing him, id., appellant had not secured to himself the fruits of the robbery, but was still feloniously carrying away the stolen money when [the police officer] began the chase. Id. Here, as in Carter, it was for [the jury] to say whether [the predicate] crime was still in progress when the shooting occurred, id. at 335, and the the chain of circumstances may well have seemed to the jury unbroken and continuous. . . . Coleman, 295 F.2d at 558.