Opinion ID: 1897769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Expert Witness's Opinion as a Vouch for the Credibility of Plaintiff's Testimony

Text: In her final claim of error, [12] Appellant requests us to consider whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion by disallowing testimony from plaintiff's expert witness as to the cause of plaintiff's medical condition at the age of thirty-one months on the basis that such testimony would improperly vouch for the credibility of the plaintiff's anticipated testimony, disputed by the defense, that she was being sexually abused during that period of her life. Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion in excluding expert opinion testimony by Dr. Abramson that the cause of Appellant's medical complaints to Appellees prior to ages five or six was sexual abuse, the possibility of which the defendant doctors were negligent in not recognizing and reporting. We hold, however, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. In the trial below, the court precluded Dr. Abramson's proposed testimony that, in his opinion, the cause of Appellant's symptoms between 1978 and 1980, as reported to and treated by Appellees during her first seven visits to their offices, was sexual abuse. The judge reasoned that such testimony would improperly vouch for the credibility of Appellant's anticipated testimony, disputed by the defense, that she was sexually abused prior to 1981, or prior to the ages of five or six. In Bohnert v. State, 312 Md. 266, 539 A.2d 657 (1988), we considered the trial court's admission of expert opinion testimony adduced by the State that the complainant in a criminal trial was, in fact, a victim of sexual abuse. Id. at 271, 539 A.2d at 659. We held not only that under the circumstances of that case was admitting the opinion in evidence an abuse of the trial court's discretion because of insufficient foundation, but also that such testimony was inadmissible as a matter of law because of its improper impact upon the jury's assessment of the credibility of both the complainant and the defendant. Id. at 277, 539 A.2d at 662. Appellant's proposed expert opinion testimony in the present case would suffer from the same legal flaws as the evidence erroneously admitted in Bohnert. Just as in Bohnert, the proffered expert opinion in the present case could not be admitted as a matter of judicial discretion given that the underlying, non-testimonial evidence could not support the conclusion sought by Appellant's counsel, nor could the opinion be admitted as a matter of law to the extent that any reliance by Dr. Abramson upon Ms. Bentley's recollection of events of abuse prior to 1981 would necessarily vouch for the credibility of her testimony. The record in Bohnert led to no other conclusion than that [the expert]'s opinion was founded only upon what [the complainant] said had occurred. Id. at 276, 539 A.2d at 662. As we explained, The opinion of [the expert] was not based on facts sufficient to form a basis for her opinion. There were no facts to show that [the complainant]'s allegations were true, so that a reasonably accurate conclusion that the child had been sexually abused could be made. The conclusion that she had in fact been abused was no more than mere conjecture or guess. The short of it is that the very groundwork for [the expert]'s opinion was inadequately supported. Id., 539 A.2d at 662. The same reasoning holds equal sway in the present case. Despite Appellant counsel's concerted attempts before both the trial court and this Court to make the underpinnings of Dr. Abramson's proffered opinion testimony distinguishable from the circumstances attendant in Bohnert, those efforts were, and remain, ultimately unsuccessful. Appellant's counsel had repeatedly assured the trial judge that Dr. Abramson's opinion would be founded solely upon his review of medical and other records, already admitted into evidence on stipulation of all the parties, as well as the uncontested evidence that Appellant was sexually abused by different persons in her household between 1981 and 1989, when she was between the ages of six and thirteen. Indeed, in framing his question to Dr. Abramson, plaintiff's counsel specifically warned the doctor not to consider Appellant's account of the sexual abuse she allegedly suffered from ages two to five: Now, I would like to ask you to exclude from your consideration any sworn testimony.... [13] Nonetheless, these maneuvers could not cure the expert opinion of its legal infirmities. We reiterated in Bohnert that no matter how highly qualified the expert may be in his field, his opinion has no probative force unless a sufficient factual basis to support a rational conclusion is shown. The opinion of an expert, therefore, must be based on facts, proved or assumed, sufficient to form a basis for an opinion, and cannot be invoked to supply the substantial facts necessary to support such conclusion. The facts upon which an expert bases his opinion must permit reasonably accurate conclusions as distinguished from mere conjecture or guess. Id. at 274-75, 539 A.2d at 661 (quoting State Health Dep't v. Walker, 238 Md. 512, 520, 209 A.2d 555, 559-60 (1965) (citations omitted)). See also Worthington Constr. v. Moore, 266 Md. 19, 29, 291 A.2d 466, 470-71 (1972) (An expert's judgment has no probative force unless there is a sufficient basis upon which to support his conclusions. (citations omitted)); Maryland Rule 5-702 (requiring a sufficient factual basis for the admission of expert testimony). In pronouncing his opinion while disregarding Appellant's sworn testimony, and thus not incorporating her accounts of abuse prior to 1981 into his calculus, Dr. Abramson would have had to rely upon facts that were insufficient to support his purported conclusion, and therefore the opinion was inadmissible. Dr. Abramson's reasoning was essentially that, in his expert opinion, because Appellant undeniably suffered sexual abuse after 1981, the medical problems she endured prior to 1981, as documented and treated by Appellees, were caused by sexual abuse, even though all of the symptoms exhibited by Appellant could, by the expert's own testimony, be attributed to a myriad of causes wholly unrelated to sexual abuse. Appellees are correct in their assertion that the necessary link between the basis for Dr. Abramson's opinion and his conclusion is absent: the subsequent undisputed history of sexual abuse in combination with earlier medical symptoms attributable to a wide variety of causes cannot be opined to a reasonable degree of medical certainty to establish sexual abuse as the cause of those earlier symptoms. Our primary reasoning in Bohnert, 312 Md. at 276, 539 A.2d at 662, concluding the expert's opinion to have been inadequately supported, would be equally germane here. Because Dr. Abramson's proposed testimony, couched as expert opinion, amounted to no more than mere speculation and conjecture, it was incompetent evidence. Conversely, because the non-testimonial materials to be considered by Dr. Abramson were insufficient to render an opinion, by necessity he would have had to ignore the limitations urged upon him by counsel in order to pronounce a factually supportable conclusion, i.e., one reliant upon Appellant's accounts of early abuse. The doctor's opinion would then have been vouching for the credibility of those accounts, impermissibly so according to our alternate reasoning in Bohnert: The opinion of [Dr. Abramson] that [Appellant] in fact was sexually abused was tantamount to a declaration by [him] that [Appellant] was telling the truth.... In the circumstances here, the opinion could only be reached if [Appellant]'s testimony were believed.... The import of the opinion was clear[Appellant] was credible.... Id. at 278-79, 539 A.2d at 663. In light of the discretion and wide latitude afforded to the trial court in ruling on the admission of expert opinion testimony, see Hartless v. State, 327 Md. 558, 576, 611 A.2d 581, 590 (1992), we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence proffered by Appellant. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR FREDERICK COUNTY REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT FOR A NEW TRIAL CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEES.