Opinion ID: 614136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Cumulative Recovery under the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act

Text: Arrow argues, in the alternative, that plaintiffs are precluded from recovering statutory damages under both the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act. Its argument contravenes the plain language of both acts, and ignores the many courts that have permitted simultaneous recovery under both acts. [11] Federal law preempts state law in three circumstances: Congress can define explicitly the extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law. . . . Second, in the absence of explicit statutory language, state law is preempted where it regulates conduct in a field that Congress intended the Federal Government to occupy exclusively. . . . Finally, state law is preempted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law. English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79-80, 110 S.Ct. 2270, 110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990) (citations omitted). The FDCPA states explicitly: This subchapter does not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject to the provisions of this subchapter from complying with the laws of any State with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of this subchapter, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency. For purposes of this section, a State law is not inconsistent with this subchapter if the protection such law affords any consumer is greater than the protection provided by this subchapter. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n. This language, coupled with the FDCPA's express purpose to promote consistent State action, 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e), establishes that Congress did not intend the FDCPA to preempt consistent state consumer protection laws. [12] Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485, 116 S.Ct. 2240, 135 L.Ed.2d 700 (1996) (the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone in every preemption case) (internal quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). Statutory damages under the FDCPA are intended to deter violations by imposing a cost on the defendant even if his misconduct imposed no cost on the plaintiff. Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir.2001). State laws permitting plaintiffs to recover additional statutory damages increase deterrence, thus affording greater protections to consumers and operating consistently with the FDCPA. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692n. Accordingly, we presume that the FDCPA permits plaintiffs to recover additional damages under state law. Similarly, the Rosenthal Act does not limit recovery simply because it is also available under federal law. The Rosenthal Act specifically provides that its remedies are intended to be cumulative and. . . in addition to any other. . . remedies under any other provision of law. [13] CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.32. [14] In an analogous case, the Eleventh Circuit held that a Florida consumer protection statute, which stated that its remedies were cumulative, contemplated dual enforcementthat an out of state debt collector could quite possibly be subject to the sanctions and enforcement provisions of both of the various states or the FDCPA. LeBlanc, 601 F.3d at 1192 (internal quotation marks omitted). Arrow argues that, notwithstanding the language of the FDCPA and the Rosenthal Act, permitting plaintiffs to recover under both statutes would (1) run afoul of the general proposition that a plaintiff may not receive multiple awards for the same item of damage and (2) contravene the FDCPA's implied limit on double recovery. We readily dispense of the first argument, because the authority cited by Arrow for the proposition that as a general rule, a plaintiff may not receive multiple awards for the same item of damage is distinguishable. The general rule is that plaintiffs may not recover for the same loss in both contract and in tort. See, e.g., Ambassador Hotel Co. v. Wei-Chuan Invest., 189 F.3d 1017, 1032 (9th Cir.1999). These common law principles are wholly inapplicable to the statutory damage provisions of the FDCPA and Rosenthal Act. Statutory damages under both provisions are not tied in any way to actual losses suffered by the plaintiff. See 15 U.S.C. 1692k(b); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1788.17. Moreover, we cannot reject the statutory text in order to imply common law limitations, particularly where, as here, the statute's language is plain, [and] the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms. Sayyed v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 485 F.3d 226, 229-30 (4th Cir.2007) (rejecting the district court's attempt to graft principles of common law witness immunity onto attorney communications under the FDCPA) (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989)). We also reject Arrow's argument that recovery under state and federal law contravenes the FDCPA's implied ban on cumulative recovery. Simply put, there is nothing in the FDCPA from which to imply a per se prohibition on class recovery under both state and federal law. The only limit on class recovery under the FDCPA is that statutory damages for the class cannot exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1 per centum of the net worth of the debt collector. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. This limit is intended to ensure that punishment [is] meted out according to a business's ability to absorb the penalty. Sanders v. Jackson, 209 F.3d 998, 1002 (7th Cir.2000). [15] Those concerns are not at issue in this case. Here, the total damages awarded were $225,500: significantly less than the statutory limit. In this case, permitting recovery under the Rosenthal Act and the FDCPA is not inconsistent with section 1692k of the FDCPA. [16]