Opinion ID: 177878
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Blake - Comparable Ground of Inadmissibility

Text: In Blake, we clarified that, to determine whether an aggravated felony that is a ground for deportability also constitutes a comparable ground for denying admissibility, the BIA must look to the substance of the particular 2 criminal conviction, not merely the language of the statutes. 489 F.3d at 103. That is, an aggravated felony can be a comparable basis for excludability as a crime involving moral turpitude if the substance of the aggravated felony offense would constitute a crime of moral turpitude under INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), thus making an alien inadmissable on the basis of the conviction. Blake, 489 F.3d at 102-04. Under Blake, the BIA was required to consider whether Mignano’s conviction for firearms trafficking could constitute a crime involving moral turpitude. See id. at 103. In finding that Mignano’s ground of deportability based on his firearms conviction would not constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, the BIA failed to analyze whether the particular crime for which Mignano was convicted – firearms trafficking – could constitute a ground of inadmissibility. Instead, the BIA stated generically that “firearms offenses” could not constitute a ground of inadmissibility, and cited as support: (1) Blake, 489 F.3d at 95-96; (2) In re Montenegro, 20 I. & N. Dec. 603, 605 (BIA 1992); and (3) In re Azurin, 23 I.& N. Dec. 695, 699 n.2 (BIA 2005). None of the cited cases, however, addresses whether firearms trafficking constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude, which would thus be a ground for inadmissibility. Because the BIA erred in failing to consider whether Mignano’s particular conviction for firearms trafficking might constitute a ground of inadmissibility, remand is appropriate for the BIA to consider this issue in the first instance. See Blake, 489 F.3d at 103; INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002). On remand, the BIA is directed to address whether Mignano’s conviction for firearms trafficking is a crime involving moral turpitude and, for that reason, would constitute a ground of inadmissibility, see INA § 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and consequently, whether Mignano is eligible for relief under § 212(c)). II. Whether Mignano was Improperly Charged as Deportable Mignano also argues that because he was charged with being deportable at the time he was re-entering the country on his return from a visit to Italy, he should have been charged with being inadmissible rather than deportable. As the Government argues, however, this issue is not before us for review because Mignano failed to raise the issue in his 2007 motion to reopen. Accordingly, we decline to address this issue. See Ke Zhen Zhao v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 265 3 F.3d 83, 89-90 (2d Cir. 2001) (holding that where the alien files a timely petition from the denial of a motion, but not from the underlying affirmance of the removal order, the Court may review only the denial of the motion); see also Stone v. INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405-06 (1995). For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule 34.1(b). FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 4