Opinion ID: 167166
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: federal wiretap act

Text: 5 The Federal Wiretap Act generally forbids the intentional interception of wire communications, such as telephone calls, when done without court-ordered authorization. United States v. Workman, 80 F.3d 688, 692 (2d Cir.1996). It protects an individual from all forms of wiretapping except when the statute specifically provides otherwise. United States v. Hammond, 286 F.3d 189, 192 (4th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 6 When information is obtained in violation of the Act, no part of the contents of such communication and no evidence derived therefrom may be received in evidence in any trial. 18 U.S.C. § 2515. But only an aggrieved person. . . may move to suppress a communication that was unlawfully intercepted. Id. § 2518(10)(a); see Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 175 & n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) (Congress could have excluded such evidence against anyone for any purpose but has not done so. . . . Congress has provided only that an `aggrieved person' may move to suppress. . . a . . . communication intercepted in violation of the Act.). An aggrieved person is defined by the Act as a person who was a party to any intercepted wire, oral, or electronic communication or a person against whom the interception was directed. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(11). This standing requirement should be construed in accordance with existent standing rules. Alderman, 394 U.S. at 176 n. 9, 89 S.Ct. 961. Generally, to establish standing the movant must show that (1) he was a party to the communication, (2) the wiretap efforts were directed at him, or (3) the interception took place on his premises. See United States v. Apple, 915 F.2d 899, 905 (4th Cir.1990). Of the five intercepted communications that were admitted at trial, Mr. Faulkner was a party to two and Mr. Rodgers was a party to another. On the record before us it does not appear that either has standing to challenge admission of any of the intercepted communications they were not parties to. Nevertheless, the government has not raised the issue, so we need not address it. See United States v. Dewitt, 946 F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir.1991) (standing issue waived when not raised by government). 7 The government does not dispute that the Act applies to prisons. See Hammond, 286 F.3d at 192; United States v. Feekes, 879 F.2d 1562, 1565 (7th Cir.1989); United States v. Amen, 831 F.2d 373, 378 (2d Cir.1987). To justify the challenged interceptions, the government relies on the law enforcement exception, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(5)(a)(ii) (definition of interception excludes recording made by any telephone. . . instrument, equipment or facility. . . being used by . . . an investigative or law enforcement officer in the ordinary course of his duties), and the consent exception, id. § 2511(2)(d). The district court rejected the law-enforcement exception because there was no evidence that CCA officials had been granted law-enforcement authority by the Marshals Service. See id. § 2510(7) (defining investigative or law enforcement officer as one who is empowered by law to conduct investigations of or to make arrests for violations of Chapter 18 of the United States Code). But it ruled that the consent exception applied. Because we hold that the recordings were properly admitted under the consent exception, we need not resolve whether they might also have been admissible under the law-enforcement exception. The consent exception provides: 8 It shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication where such person is a party to the communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State. 9 Id. § 2511(2)(d). (Section 2511(2)(c) provides the same exception for persons acting under color of law except that the unless clause is omitted.) It is generally accepted that a prisoner who places a call from an institutional phone with knowledge that the call is subject to being recorded has impliedly consented to the recording. See United States v. Footman, 215 F.3d 145, 154 (1st Cir.2000); Amen, 831 F.2d at 378-79 (2d Cir.); Hammond, 286 F.3d at 192 (4th Cir.); United States v. Horr, 963 F.2d 1124, 1126 (8th Cir.1992); United States v. Van Poyck, 77 F.3d 285, 292 (9th Cir.1996). The only circuit opinion to question this application of the consent exception is Feekes, 879 F.2d 1562. In that opinion the Seventh Circuit upheld the recording of prisoners' conversations under the law-enforcement exception to the Wiretap Act but added the following dictum in response to the contention that the consent exception applied because the prisoners had been notified that their calls would be monitored: 10 To take a risk is not the same thing as to consent. The implication of the argument is that since wiretapping is known to be a widely employed investigative tool, anyone suspected of criminal (particularly drug) activity who uses a phone consents to have his phone tapped — particularly if he speaks in code, thereby manifesting an awareness of the risk. 11 Id. at 1565. 12 We are not persuaded to depart from the unanimous view of the holdings by our fellow circuit courts. The issue is solely one of statutory interpretation. The Second Circuit observed that [t]he legislative history shows that Congress intended the consent requirement [exception?] to be construed broadly, Amen, 831 F.2d at 378, noting in support that the Senate Report on the Wiretap Act said of the consent exception: `Consent may be expressed or implied. Surveillance devices in banks or apartment houses for institutional or personal protection would be impliedly consented to.' Id. (quoting S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 2112, 2182). Of course, there is a difference between broad and unlimited. We agree with Feekes that engaging in drug trafficking does not in itself imply consent to a wiretap. But that is not this case. We are dealing here with incarcerated persons who receive very specific warnings about particular phones. To be sure, the prisoners at CCA did not have the opportunity to choose another, unmonitored telephone. But loss of some choice is a necessary consequence of being confined, and [p]rison inmates have few expectations of privacy in their communications. Footman, 215 F.3d at 155. Rarely are choices in life totally free from opportunity costs; something must be foregone whenever one comes to a fork in the road. The real issue is whether imposition of a condition is acceptable, so that a choice subject to that condition is considered a voluntary, consensual one. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749-52, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970) (guilty plea was voluntary even though entered to avoid threat of death penalty). Because of the undeniable need to control prisoner communications to the outside world, we have no hesitation in concluding that a prisoner's knowing choice to use a monitored phone is a legitimate consent under the Wiretap Act. 13 In this case Hargrove impliedly consented to recording of the conversations. As previously noted, detainees at CCA receive numerous warnings that their calls may be recorded. Hargrove was undoubtedly well aware of these warnings; during a conversation with Mr. Rodgers he said, I can't hardly talk on this phone, cause you know they got it screened. . . . [They] got this phone tapped so I gotta be careful. R. Vol. Four, Gov. Ex. 13 at 14. (The coded language used by Appellants indicates that they too were aware that the calls were being monitored.) 14 Appellants complain that they were not the ones who answered the calls placed by Hargrove and they did not hear the recorded voice. But this is irrelevant because the consent of one party is enough, Footman, 215 F.3d at 154 (It is settled law that only one party need consent to the interception of the calls.), and Hargrove consented. The district court therefore properly held that the consent exception applied and the conversations were not excludable under the Wiretap Act.