Opinion ID: 1126936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Charge of Discrimination Resulting in Denial of Equal Protection

Text: Before closing the phase of the appeal relating to the presentation of evidence, we turn our attention to the challenge raising the question of discriminatory action on the part of the Milwaukie Council. If discrimination is present then it is violation of that part of the Fourteenth Amendment reading, No State shall make or enforce any law which shall    deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. Although not expressed in precisely the same language, discrimination would be equally offensive to its near counterpart in the Oregon Constitution, Section 20 of Article I, reading: No law shall be passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or immunities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all citizens. The tests are substantially the same. State v. Savage, 96 Or 53, 59, 184 P 567. Success in behalf of the proposition depends entirely upon what appellant claims was evidence developed during the trial. Appellant's charge here is predicated on the proposition that when there are two other churches in the area, a denial of appellant's application constitutes unlawful discrimination against it and there is, therefore, deprivation of the equal protection accorded by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Oregon. 13. It is well settled that when there is an actual discrimination, it is a violation of the equal protection accorded by the Fourteenth Amendment. Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 US 67, 97 L Ed 828, 73 S Ct 526 (1953); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 86 L Ed 1655, 62 S Ct 1110 (1942). It must, however, be supported by evidence. 14. Here, the discrimination asserted rests entirely upon the assumption of the existence of a certain state of facts. In making the charge, the appellant is confronted with the presumption that in the administration of a statute or ordinance, it will be so administered by the body charged with its enforcement as to render its application valid. It will not be assumed that the Council will enforce the law in such a manner as to produce inequity or denial of due process or that the power conferred will be abused or improvidently exercised. 16 CJS 468, Constitutional Law § 100; American Power Co. v. S.E.C., 329 US 90, 112, 91 LEd 103, 67 S Ct 133; Yakus v. U.S., 321 US 414, 434, 88 LEd 834, 64 S Ct 660; and cases previously cited. We observe that at the threshold of our consideration of the charge of discrimination, we are confronted with an anomalous situation produced by the appellant. We recall that during the course of the oral argument, counsel for appellant complained because the trial court denied it an opportunity to produce evidence of discrimination. Our examination of the record reveals no basis for such representation. To the contrary, appellant was given that opportunity but failed to embrace it. Notwithstanding the representation made orally, its brief on the subject rests upon the assumption that evidence of discrimination is before the court. The statement made by appellant's counsel in this court may have been an inadvertence, due in part to the fact that he was not the trial counsel in the lower court. We would be inclined to ignore and excuse it were it not for certain misstatements of fact which appear in appellant's brief and to which we will presently make reference. The only evidence which can be relied upon to demonstrate discriminatory action upon the part of the Council, if any, and the only record remotely referring to the presence of two other churches in the city of Milwaukie, or wherever they are located in that city, is entirely encompassed in the replies of appellant's two witnesses, Mr. Hughart and Mr. Klein. The former, when asked whether there were other churches located in the vicinity of your property in Milwaukie, answered, definitely, naming two as very close and maybe others. The only question addressed to Mr. Klein on the subject was the one wherein he was asked if since this permit [appellant's] was denied the Council had not granted permission to other churches to construct buildings in the City of Milwaukie. He answered that he was not aware that the Council had or had not issued any permits to other churches since the denial of the Witnesses' application. Whereupon, counsel terminated his examination. He made no further attempt during the trial to introduce any records or other testimony bearing on the issuance of permits, if any, to other churches before or after the time of the denial of appellant's application, notwithstanding the door of opportunity had been opened by the court's ruling on the question asked of and answered by Mr. Klein. If the record in the lower court is as incomplete as appellant represented during the time of oral argument here, it was the result of a want of diligence on the part of trial counsel to have made it otherwise. The record here tells us nothing more concerning the existence of the two other churches than is comprehended in the two short answers of the witnesses mentioned. We do not know that either of such churches are in the same zone where appellant's property is located or whether in an unzoned portion of the city, even though in the vicinity of appellant's lots, or very close, as stated by the witness Hughart. We do not know when either of the other churches was built in Milwaukie, that is, before June 24, 1946 (the effective date of the zoning ordinance), or after that date. On the other hand, from a reading of the ordinance, we do know that if other churches were built before that date and in the same, but later-zoned area, then such churches are classified as non-conforming property, untouched by the operation of the ordinance (Ordinance No. 481, § 23). If, however, the other churches were granted building permits after June 24, 1946, we know not when or where, nor whether the same conditions of traffic congestion and hazard which militated against the appellant were existent at the time of the construction of the other churches or to the same degree. The time of the building of the other churches, their location, and when permits, if any, for their erection were issued, are matters of proof which should have been within easy reach of the appellant. We have not even been supplied with the boundaries of the various zones established by Ordinance No. 481. But, notwithstanding the paucity and vague character of the testimony concerning the other churches, and the record's silence concerning particulars which might, if relevant, be helpful in determining whether the appellant was the victim of discriminatory action, appellant's brief is replete with statements which, contrary to the record, assume a state of nonexistent facts. It is upon these erroneous representations of the evidence that the appellant predicates its entire argument as being a victim of discrimination. The following are phrases exemplifying these palpably incorrect assertions: It has been demonstrated from the statement of the evidence    that no other church has been required to show no traffic congestion or denied an application for a permit. This is discrimination   . Again, on the same page: It also has been shown that there are churches in the very same neighborhood that have been permitted to operate without objection on account of traffic congestion. And at page 36 of appellant's brief, is this further statement: Permitting other churches to be operated in the same neighborhood while denying plaintiff the right to build and use the building in question as a church constitutes discrimination   . (Emphasis ours.) Resting upon the foregoing false hypothesis, the appellant then makes the following extravagant statement: The only objection that the defendants have urged or can urge is that the defendants do not like the religious practices of Jehovah's Witnesses and their attending the plaintiff's church   . (Emphasis ours.) We cannot pass such an unwarranted and unjust conclusion without comment. It is unfair to the Council. It is unfair to those representing the Council in this matter. Not only does the brief of respondents fail to disclose one iota of hostility toward appellants, but there is not one word in the record from whence an inference of such intolerance or prejudice on the part of the Council can be derived. We find nothing resulting from the action of the Council which would warrant us in concluding that discrimination was a resulting incident of the Council's denial. If there was evidence of discrimination, we would give it careful consideration and likewise to the various authorities offered by the appellant in support. But finding no evidence of discriminatory action, we conclude that appellant's claim in this respect is wanting in merit. 15. At the trial the Witnesses had the burden of proof but not only failed utterly to prove discrimination but also failed to establish that the Council in its consideration of the application acted arbitrarily and capriciously as previously defined. There was no evidence to overcome the presumption of reasonableness and validity which the law accords to such administrative decisions in zone matters.