Opinion ID: 1890795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal to allow cross-examination of witness about pending criminal cases

Text: During cross-examination of Geraldine Litton, defense counsel attempted to show that she was currently facing several charges in Martin County. The trial court sustained the Commonwealth's objection, and, as a result, Appellant maintains that he was unable to fully and effectively cross-examine Ms. Litton. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). However, this right to confrontation is not limitless. [T]he Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish. Id. at 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that trial judges retain wide latitude ... to impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about ... harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Id. This Court has long recognized the principle that a defendant has a right to expose the fact that a testifying witness who has criminal charges pending thereby [may possess] a motive to lie in order to curry favorable treatment from the prosecution. Williams v. Commonwealth, 569 S.W.2d 139, 145 (Ky.1978). Such a showing of bias can be important because, unlike evidence of prior inconsistent statementswhich might indicate that the witness is lyingevidence of bias suggests why the witness might be lying. Stephens v. Hall, 294 F.3d 210, 224 (1st Cir.2002) (emphasis in original). Accordingly, in the instant case, we believe it was error for the trial court to sustain the Commonwealth's objection to the introduction of pending charges against Ms. Litton. Even so, however, the [c]onstitutionally improper denial of a defendant's opportunity to impeach a witness for bias, like other Confrontation Clause errors, is subject to ... harmless-error analysis. The correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431. Given the testimony offered by Ms. Litton, we believe the exclusion of the criminal charges was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The seminal issue in this case was whether or not Appellant was criminally responsible for the crimes charged. Ms. Litton's testimony, on the other hand, focused primarily on retelling the uncontroverted facts that occurred on September 18, 2006. This testimony was corroborated by virtually every witness the Commonwealth called, as well as Appellant's own testimony. Because this testimony did not concern Appellant's mental state at the time of the crime, we cannot see how the lack of evidence regarding the pending Martin County charges was prejudicial. Even assuming the the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, there was more than ample evidence, including Appellant's own admissions, that he committed the crimes charged. Therefore, we believe that the trial court's denial of the introduction of evidence concerning pending charges against Ms. Litton was in error, but was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.