Opinion ID: 1863564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: potential to mislead

Text: ¶ 31. A more serious criticism of Wis JICivil 200 is that it is misleading as written, that it confuses the jury as to the plaintiff's burden of proof. This criticism is best summarized by Judge Brown when he writes that using the term `reasonable certainty' in the instruction creates too high of a risk that jurors will hold a plaintiff to a higher burden of proof than intended. Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶ 25 (Brown, P.J., concurring). ¶ 32. Both Judge Brown and Attorney Gesler turn to dictionary definitions of certainty. Gesler cites Black's Law Dictionary 205 (5th ed. 1979) for the definition that certainty means absence of doubt. Gesler, supra, at 12. Judge Brown quotes The Random House Dictionary of the English Language, Unabridged 339 (2d ed. 1987) that certainty means an assured fact and without a doubt. Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶ 27 (Brown, P.J., concurring). They support their premise with a statistical study from The New England Journal of Medicine. Augustine Kong et al., How Medical Professionals Evaluate Expressions of Probability, 315 New Eng. J. Med. 740, 740-44 (1986). Citing this study, Gesler writes that [u]se of the word certainty produces in the hearer an expectation of probability of over 90%. Gesler, supra, at 12. Judge Brown writes of the study: The word certain had a probability rating of 99%. When the adverb almost was added to the adjective certain, the median moved from 99% to 94%. The data thus points to the unescapable conclusion that words matter and a person being asked to find something to a certainty thinks of the task as being asked to find something to a 99% degree of probability or higher. Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶ 29 (Brown, P.J., concurring) (citations omitted). ¶ 33. Nommensen contends that the term reasonable certainty means without a doubt. He argues that the instruction makes no attempt to explain how jurors are to deal with two different, separate pieces of information presented to them: 1) that the jurors must be convinced in their own mind and 2) that they must be convinced that one side's evidence is probably more true than the other side's. There is no explanation in the jury instruction as to how to weigh the evidence. This absence of explanation creates the very real danger that a juror will use the reasonable certainty language as a method by which to analyze the two pieces of information. Presently, a jury can easily understand the instruction to say that unless the plaintiff's evidence is true to a reasonable certainty he may not be considered right enough for the plaintiff to win. The use of the term reasonable certainty creates too high a danger that jurors will hold the plaintiff to a higher proof standard than intended and that they may believe they need to be satisfied to a greater than required degree of precision. ¶ 34. Judge Brown comes to the same conclusion. He writes: I am convinced that a reasonable juror could understand the instruction to say as follows: Plaintiff's evidence is weighed against the defendant's and the job of deciding whose evidence has more weight is yours. But before you may find that the plaintiff's evidence has more weight, you must first be satisfied that the plaintiff has provided you with evidence that is absolutely true or nearly absolutely true. Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶ 45 (Brown, P.J., concurring). ¶ 35. Nommensen's solution to all this is to substitute the word probability for the word certainty in the instruction. He also picks up an idea from the Gesler article that perhaps the mental element should be dropped from the instruction altogether. [3] He urges the court to rewrite the instruction. [2-4] ¶ 36. The purpose of a jury instruction is to fully and fairly inform the jury of a rule or principle of law applicable to a particular case. Grube v. Daun, 213 Wis. 2d 533, 549, 570 N.W.2d 851 (1997); Nowatske v. Osterloh, 198 Wis. 2d 419, 428, 543 N.W.2d 265 (1996). We agree with Judge Brown that the job of an instruction is not only to state the law accurately but also to  explain what the law means to persons who usually do not possess law degrees. Nommensen, 239 Wis. 2d 129, ¶ 45. Thus, a jury instruction should be as clear and simple as reasonably possible to aid the jury in understanding the law. [5] ¶ 37. The jury instruction committees play a vital role in Wisconsin's system of justice. Kim v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 176 Wis. 2d 890, 896-97, 501 N.W.2d 24 (1993). Their often unheralded work is indispensable to the successful operation of the courts. The desirability of uniform instructions for most cases is not open to debate because uniformity, supported by scholarship and attention to detail, tends to assure that litigants will be treated fairly and equally in the court system. ¶ 38. Crafting jury instructions is demanding and meticulous work. It invites constructive comment and suggestion so as better to appreciate the clarity and workability of each instruction. ¶ 39. We are impressed with an observation in Grotjan v. Rice, 124 Wis. at 258: Efforts to state elementary principles in ways not found in the books are quite liable to work harm. The better way is not to depart from those definitions which have received judicial approval. We do not mean by this to suggest that the formulations of existing jury instructions cannot be improved. We do mean to say that revising jury instructions on fundamental principles requires caution. [6] ¶ 40. It is not the role of the supreme court to draft jury instructions, particularly instructions that have the potential of affecting every civil trial in Wisconsin. We have often referred difficult instruction issues to the jury instruction committees. State v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 199, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996); Nowatske, 198 Wis. 2d at 449; State v. Garcia, 192 Wis. 2d 845, 860 n.6, 532 N.W.2d 111 (1995); Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis. 2d 475, 495, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983). ¶ 41. In this instance, the change petitioner seeks in instruction 200 would require adjustments in many other civil jury instructions. Neither the petitioner nor the respondents have discussed the effect of the proposed change in instruction 200 on other jury instructions. ¶ 42. According to our computer search of the instructions, the words reasonable certainty appear in about 60 jury instructions, in addition to Wis JICivil 200. Most of these instructions read as instruction 200 does: to a reasonable certainty by [or from] the [or a] greater weight of the credible evidence. Wis JICivil 107 (Submission on Ultimate Fact Verdict); 108 (Submission on Ultimate Fact Verdict When Court Finds One or More Parties at Fault); 350 (Presumptions: Conflict as to Existence of Basic Fact; Evidence Introduced from Which Nonexistence of Presumed Fact May be Inferred); 352 (Presumptions: Existence of Basic Fact Uncontradicted; Evidence Introduced from Which Nonexistence of Presumed Fact May be Inferred); 353 (Presumptions: Deceased Person was not Negligent); 1001 (Negligence: Fault: Ultimate Fact Verdict); 1023 (Medical Negligence); 1023.8 (Professional Negligence: Chiropractor Treatment); 1023.10 (Professional Negligence: Dental); 1026 (Bailment: Negligence of Bailee May be Inferred); 1114 (Duty of Preceding Driver to Following Driver: Lookout); 1580 (Comparative Negligence: Plaintiff Driver and One or More Defendant Drivers); 1585 (Comparative Negligence: Plaintiff-Guest and Host-Defendant Negligent); 1590 (Comparative Negligence: Plaintiff-Guest Passively Negligent; Host (or Other Driver) Negligent); 1591 (Comparative Negligence: Guest Passively Negligent; Claims Against and Among Drivers; Apportionment from One Comparative Negligence Question); 1592 (Comparative Negligence: Guest Passively Negligent; Claims Against and Among Drivers; Apportionment of Comparative Negligence from Two Questions); 1600 (Servant: Driver of Automobile (Presumption from Ownership of Vehicle)); 1723 (Enhanced Injuries); 1730 (Damages: Duty to Mitigate; Physical Injuries); 1731 (Damages: Duty to Mitigate); 2501 (Defamation: Private Individual Versus Private Individual, No Privilege); 2507 (Defamation: Private Individual Versus Private Individual with Conditional Privilege); 2509 (Defamation: Private Individual Versus Media Defendant (Negligence Standard)); 2552 (Invasion of Privacy: Publication of a Private Matter: Conditional Privilege); 2760 (Bad Faith by Insurance Company (Excess Verdict Case)); 2780 (Intentional Interference with Contractual Relationship); 3725 (Damages: Future Profits); 5001 (Paternity: Child of Unmarried Woman) (recommending burden of proof instruction [i]f the statistical probability of paternity is 99.0% or higher); 8060 (Adverse Possession Not Found on Written Instrument (Wis. Stat. § 893.25)). ¶ 43. Other instructions reverse the order of the element of certitude and the necessary quantum of evidence. These instructions read: by the greater weight of the credible evidence to a reasonable certainty. Wis JICivil 1001 (Negligence: Fault: Ultimate Fact Verdict) (also contains an inverted version of the phrase); 1381 (Negligence: Teacher: Duty to Supervise Students); 2006 (Battery: Self-Defense); 2006.5 (Battery: Defense of Property); 2770 (Termination of Dealership (Dealer/PlaintiffGrantor/Defendant)); 3260 (Strict Liability: Duty of Manufacturer to Ultimate User). ¶ 44. Eliminating the phrase reasonable certainty in instruction 200 would affect other instructions in an assortment of ways. Wis JICivil 50 (Preliminary Instructions Before Trial) (explaining that burden of proof cannot be met absent reasonable certainty); 1026.5 (Bailment: Negligence of Carrier Presumed) (to a reasonable certainty by a fair preponderance of the evidence that it is more probable); 1054 (Equipment and Maintenance of Vehicles: Brakes) (from all of the credible evidence, you are satisfied to a reasonable certainty); 2610 (Malicious Prosecution: Advice of Counsel as Defense) (The burden is upon (defendant) to satisfy you to a reasonable certainty....); 3725 (Damages: Future Profits) (using reasonable certainty in numerous ways). ¶ 45. Finally, some comments to existing instructions contain references to the phrase reasonable certainty in the context of discussing the applicable burden of proof. E.g., Wis JICivil 200 (Burden of Proof: Ordinary); 1006 (Gross Negligence: Defined) (alternative instruction); 2100 (False Imprisonment: Definition); 4000 (Agency: Definition) (recommending burden of proof instruction in certain circumstances). [4] ¶ 46. If we were to rewrite instruction 200, as Nommensen suggests, by substituting the word probability for the word certainty, we would in effect be deciding to substitute that word in many other instructions. This would require an impact analysis that we are ill equipped to undertake. It would be far better for an expert committee of circuit judges and scholars, working without an artificial deadline, to decide how to accomplish such wide-sweeping changes, if there were a consensus that such changes were warranted. [7] ¶ 47. It is important to keep in mind that Nommensen's proposal to substitute the word probability for the word certainty in Wis JICivil 200 has been rejected by the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee in the past. Wis JICivil 200 cmt. (Suggestions have...been made to the Committee and to trial judges during instruction conferences that the certainty element (`to a reasonable certainty') should be replaced with the term `reasonable probability.'...The Committee believes that the term `reasonable certainty' has been firmly established in our case law and accurately reflects the degree of certitude jurors must reach in answering verdict questions.). While the decisions of the civil instructions committee are not binding upon this court, we generally find the committee's work insightful and persuasive. [8] ¶ 48. Another of Nommensen's proposalsto eliminate discussion of the degree of certitude altogether runs contrary to well-established case law. Even if we were to accept this proposal, the work of rewriting the instructions would be a daunting task. The degree of certitude appears in so many instructions, and is written in so many different ways, that to follow Nommensen's suggestion would require that we effectuate deep and fundamental revisions in many instructions, as well as minor deletions in others. This is not our institutional role. In addition, this idea of Nommensen's does not square with this state's longstanding two-element approach to the burden of proof. The Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee also has expressly rejected this proposal. [5] Accordingly, we decline to rewrite instruction 200 in the manner proposed by Nommensen.