Opinion ID: 2285388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: and (b) RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Text: The appellants, in support of their contention that their Motion for Summary Judgment was improperly denied and the Board's Motion erroneously granted, contend that no allegations of facts were made by the Board attempting to controvert the allegations set forth in their petition; that the regulations and practice of the Board should have been given weight in view of the reliance [thereon] by the beauty school industry for a period of twenty-eight years; and that the Board had failed to controvert the appellants' allegations that they had expanded their facilities, made improvements and established new schools in reliance upon the practice authorized by the Board, nor was their allegation controverted that in the event they were limited to charging the cost of materials, then tuition would have to be increased. The Board, by its Answer, admitted the majority of the allegations made by the appellants, but denied that it by its rules and regulations had allowed the schools to reflect in their charges the cost of administration and the cost of materials. It was further denied that the provisions of Art. 43, § 537, were not a valid exercise of the police power and denied that the appellants would suffer irreparable injury. As to the remainder of the appellants' allegations, the Board pleaded that it was without knowledge  amounting to a denial, under Maryland Rule 372 a 2. [6a] The appellants earnestly argue that the Answer filed by the Board established a genuine dispute as to material facts and it was thus error to grant the Board's Motion; by the same logic  though they allege the pleadings establish a genuine dispute as to material facts  they contend that they were entitled to summary relief. The function of the summary judgment procedure is not to try the case or decide the issues of fact raised; it is merely to determine whether or not an issue of fact is to be tried and if there is none, to cause judgment to be rendered accordingly. Greenwell v. American Guaranty Corp., 262 Md. 102, 277 A.2d 70 (1971); Trustees of Broadfording Church of the Brethren v. Western Maryland Railway Co., 262 Md. 84, 277 A.2d 276 (1971). The purpose of the hearing on the motion, at the trial level, is to decide if a real dispute as to material facts does exist and if the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affidavits (if any) show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, summary judgment should be granted. Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, Inc., 260 Md. 251, 272 A.2d 42 (1971). A bare allegation in a general way that there is a dispute as to material facts is never sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Melbourne v. Griffith, 263 Md. 486, 283 A.2d 363 (1971); nor is the mere filing of an Answer to a bill of complaint necessarily fatal to a motion for summary judgment, particularly where the Answer does not warrant a finding that there is a genuine dispute as to material facts between the parties. Burrell v. Frisby, 212 Md. 181, 129 A.2d 75 (1957). Even where it is shown that there is a dispute as to a fact, when the resolution of that factual dispute is not material to the controversy, such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment. Shaffer v. Lohr, 264 Md. 397, 287 A.2d 42 (1972); S.L. Hammerman Organization, Inc. v. Community Health Facilities, Inc., 264 Md. 37, 50, 284 A.2d 599, 605 (1971); Meola v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 246 Md. 226, 239-40, 228 A.2d 254, 262 (1967); a dispute as to facts relating to grounds upon which the decision is not rested is not a dispute with respect to a material fact and such dispute does not prevent the entry of summary judgment. Daniel v. Kensington Homes, Inc., 232 Md. 1, 13, 192 A.2d 114 (1963); Parklawn v. Nee, 243 Md. 249, 254, 220 A.2d 563 (1966); Rooney v. Statewide Plumbing, 265 Md. 559, 564, 290 A.2d 496 (1972). As aptly stated by Judge Powers, for the Court of Special Appeals, in Knisley v. Keller, 11 Md. App. 269, 272-3, 273 A.2d 624 (1971), ... The function of the trial judge [in connection with a motion for summary judgment] is much the same as that he performs at the close of all the evidence in a jury trial when motions for directed verdict or requests for peremptory instructions require him to decide whether an issue requires resolution by a jury, or is to be decided by the court as a matter of law. See also Rooney v. Statewide Plumbing, supra . In reviewing the propriety of the granting of a summary judgment our concern is primarily with deciding whether a factual issue does exist which is material to the resolution of the controversy. See Brown v. Suburban Cadillac, supra ; Rooney v. Statewide Plumbing, supra . Where the record shows that there is no such genuine dispute as to any material fact necessary to resolve the controversy as a matter of law, and that the movant is entitled to judgment, the entry of summary judgment is proper. S.L. Hammerman Organization, Inc. v. Community Health Facilities, Inc., supra . As a general rule constitutional questions are not to be dealt with abstractly and this court will not decide constitutional questions except when concrete and specific issues are raised by actual ones. See Hammond v. Lancaster, 194 Md. 462, 471, 71 A.2d 474, 479 (1950) (Motion to Stay denied, 339 U.S. 908); Tanner v. McKeldin, 202 Md. 569, 580, 97 A.2d 449, 454 (1953); Givner v. Cohen, 208 Md. 23, 37, 116 A.2d 357, 363 (1955); State v. Cherry, 224 Md. 144, 167 A.2d 328 (1961); Board of Public Welfare v. Myers, 224 Md. 246, 252, 167 A.2d 765, 768 (1961). The provisions of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (Art. 31A) have been invoked to obtain a declaration whether or not a statute is constitutional, when the complainant alleges that he will be directly damaged, in person or in property, if the statute is enforced; that such enforcement will result in infringement of his constitutional rights and that the defendant, who is charged with the duty of enforcing the statute, is enforcing it, or is about to enforce it. Davis v. State, 183 Md. 385, 37 A.2d 880 (1944); Tanner v. McKeldin, supra ; Liberto v. State's Attorney, 223 Md. 356, 164 A.2d 719 (1960); Bruce v. Director, Dept. of Chesapeake Bay Affairs, 261 Md. 585, 276 A.2d 200 (1971). In State's Attorney v. Triplett, 255 Md. 270, 257 A.2d 748 (1969), and in Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 237 A.2d 35 (1968), the summary judgment procedure was used in actions brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act to pass upon the constitutionality of statutes. In Triplett, supra, Judge Barnes, for the Court, after pointing out that ... every presumption favors the validity of the statute and it will not be held to be unconstitutional and void unless it plainly contravenes a constitutional provision, stated: In our opinion, the Chancellor should not have granted a summary judgment declaring the Act unconstitutional as denying due process of law and the equal protection of the law. There may be cases involving statutes where the denial of due process of law and of equal protection of the law are clear on the face of the statutes or upon consideration of quite limited evidence, but, in our opinion, the statute involved in the present case is not of this type, especially in view of the issues arising in regard to the possible restrictive effect of the provisions of the title of the Act upon the construction of the language in the body of the Act. (Emphasis supplied) [255 Md. at 285-6, 257 A.2d at 755.] In Hunt v. Montgomery County, supra , a bill for declaratory relief was heard on demurrer, by agreement of the parties; a declaratory decree was entered declaring the rights of the parties and entering judgment for the defendants without the demurrer having been ruled upon. We noted there that since there was no genuine dispute of fact, and as the answer to the contentions turned solely on questions of law, the declaration entered by the court could be treated as a summary judgment. Chief Judge Hammond, after citing Borchard, Declaratory Judgments, 369-70 (2d Ed. 1941), stated: Borchard, op. cit. p. 432, says further: A question has been raised by a series of cases in New York, whether a motion to dismiss a complaint or a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be entertained and granted in an action for a declaratory judgment, or whether, as in Neubeck v. McDonald [220 N.Y.S. 761], the trial court, in the exercise of its discretion, should refrain from entertaining such a motion until the trial shall have clarified the facts and enabled the court to determine whether the complaint has any basis in fact or law. Since such motions are entertained in actions for coercive relief, there is no reason whatever why they should be rejected in declaratory actions. Where motions are granted it indicates that the court either finds no `cause of action' or lacks jurisdiction or can decide on the face of the pleadings, without the taking of evidence, that either plaintiff or defendant is right, a decision which is appealable. On the other hand, where the court refuses to entertain or grant the motion, it is apparent that the court is unable to determine the issue presented by the motion on the complaint or the pleadings and wishes to hear evidence from both sides before making up its mind. There is no basis, therefore, for the suggestion that the declaratory action in this respect differs from any other proceedings.  In the case before us we think Judge Clapp permissibly found that there was no genuine dispute of fact and that the answer to the contentions of the parties turned solely on questions of law which the parties had agreed to submit to the court. This being so, there was every reason to declare how the controlling law governed the essentially undisputed facts. American Auto Ins. Co. v. Indemnity Co. (E.D. Pa.), 108 F. Supp. 221, aff'd 228 F.2d 622. The appellant's present claim that there existed a genuine factual dispute is inaccurate. There is no dispute as to the operative facts which led to the filing of the petition and which are therein alleged. The claimed dispute is as to legislative and administrative history, and the only facts as to these proffered are not challenged by the appellees and, as we indicated earlier, lend as much support to the appellees' interpretation of the statutes as they do to that of the appellants. [248 Md. at 413-414, 237 A.2d at 40.] Although the appellants alleged in their petition that since 1935, by its rules and regulations, the Board has allowed the schools to reflect in their clinic charges the cost of administration, including the cost of materials, and alleged in their Motion for Summary Judgment that such charges were approved by regulation and practice of the Board, no copies of any such purported rules or regulations were filed as exhibits accompanying their petition or Motion. Indeed, we take judicial notice, as we did in Wrenn v. Vincent et Vincent of Langley, Inc., 235 Md. 466, 201 A.2d 768 (1964) (involving an identical contention), that no such rules or regulations have as yet been filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals pursuant to the provisions of Art. 41, § 9 and § 246 of the Annotated Code. In Wrenn, supra, we stated: ... We may note that Code, 1963 Supp. Art. 43, § 548, empowers the State Board of Cosmetologists to `prescribe such sanitary and safety rules as it may deem necessary, with particular reference to the precautions necessary to be employed to prevent the creating and spreading of infectious and contagious diseases,' and that Code 1957, Art. 43, § 544, gives the Board power to `prescribe reasonable rules    generally for the conduct of persons    affected by this subtitle.' We may take judicial notice that no rules under this provision (or its statutory precursors) have been filed with the Clerk of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Code, 1957, Art. 41, §§ 9 and 246. [235 Md. at 470, n. 2, 201 A.2d at 770.] The appellants' reliance upon the alleged existence of rules and regulations of the Board, to say the least, is misplaced. It must additionally be pointed out that the parties in their Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment each represented to the court that there was no genuine dispute as to any material facts in this matter. [7] The Chancellor, in his memorandum, stated: All parties having assured the court, both in their oral arguments and Memoranda, that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact, disposition is forthwith made upon those Motions. [8] The actions of an attorney within the scope of his employment are binding upon his client under the ordinary principles of agency. McGinnis v. Chance, 247 Md. 393, 399-400, 231 A.2d 63, 67 (1967); Bob Holding Corp. v. Normal Corp., 223 Md. 260, 164 A.2d 457 (1960); 7 C.J.S., Attorney and Client, § 79 (1937); and 7 Am.Jur.2d, Attorneys-at-Law, § 100 (1963). This is particularly true concerning the stipulation of counsel in open court. See Posko v. Climatic Control Corp., 198 Md. 578, 84 A.2d 906 (1951); citing Bloom v. Graff, 191 Md. 733, 737, 63 A.2d 313, 315 (1949); 9 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), § 2594; 2 Jones, Evidence (2nd ed.), pp. 1759, 1761. The affirmative representation by appellants' counsel in the trial court that there was no dispute as to any material facts and the concessum thereon is determinative of this contention. [9] Notwithstanding the lack of evidence of the promulgation of such alleged rules and regulations relied on by the appellants, and notwithstanding the concessum that there was no genuine dispute as to any material facts, our independent appraisal of the record convinces us that the resolution of whatever factual dispute may have been raised by the pleadings was not material to the legal issue, as to whether or not Art. 43, § 537 on its face was a valid exercise of the police power of the State. The pleadings and the Motions presented the lower court with a concrete and specific issue. It was not error for the trial court, without the taking of testimony concerning the allegations made by the appellants to render summary judgment on the limited issue of the constitutionality of the Section on its face.