Opinion ID: 2517385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Impermissibly Amended the Verdict

Text: The School District and Security Life both agreed to the unusual manner in which the case was tried, as well as to the jury instructions and verdict form. Using a stock verdict form and instructions they attempted, unsuccessfully, to adapt them to the two alternative scenarios: (1) taking Parcel A and not taking Parcel B but damaging it, or (2) taking the entire property. The verdict form to which the parties agreed irreconcilably confused the jury by introducing the concept of interim damaged property based on the dates of possession of Parcel A and Parcel B, a concept that does not exist under Colorado law. The verdict form the jury completed reads as follows: We, the jury, ascertain and assess: (1) Parcel A is described on Exhibit A attached hereto. (2) The value of Parcel A, which is actually taken, on February 19, 2004, was $5,619,240.00. (3) The damages to the residue of such property, or Parcel B, if not actually taken, are $2,000,000.00. (4) Parcel B is described on Exhibit B attached hereto. (5) The value of Parcel B on February 7, 2005, if actually taken is $1,655,280.00. The verdict's inconsistency is facially apparent because the jury awarded more money for damaging Parcel B than it did for condemning Parcel B outright. To rectify the jury's inconsistent verdict, the trial court made a calculation that the verdict form does not call for. It impermissibly added together the monetary amounts the jury inserted into the second and third blank lines of the verdict form to reach the value of Parcel B if the School District chose to take the entire property. However, the verdict form specifically requires the jury to state the value of Parcel B in the third blank line of the verdict form. The trial court's impermissible intervention in amending the jury's completed verdict form highlights the confusion the jury instructions and verdict form engendered. To avoid this confusion, something comparable to the following language should have been included on the verdict form following the third blank: (THE AMOUNT OF MONEY TO BE INSERTED INTO THIS BLANK LINE IS THE ACTUAL VALUE YOU DETERMINE FOR PARCEL B AS OF FEBRUARY 7, 2005 WITHOUT ANY CONSIDERATION OF DAMAGES, BECAUSE NO DAMAGES WILL HAVE OCCURRED IF THE SCHOOL DISTRICT TAKES BOTH PARCELS A AND B) In the absence of such an explanation, the jury instructions together with the verdict form confused and misled the jury. Jury Instruction No. 11 stated, [The School District] may decide to acquire Parcel B, in which case, there will be no residue and you are to determine the amount of compensable damages, if any, to Parcel B, in the event Parcel B is not acquired by [the School District]. The obvious error with this jury instruction, as well as with the other instructions, is that they do not clarify, in light of the alternative scenarios, that no damages occur if the School District chooses to also acquire Parcel B. In its statement of different possession dates for Parcels A and B, Jury Instruction No. 2 also added to jury confusion by implanting the concept of interim damaged property, a legal concept that does not exist in Colorado condemnation law. The unusual manner in which the parties agreed to try the caseincluding the verdict form and jury instructions as written and agreed to prompted the trial court to alter the jury's verdict in a substantive way and implicitly accepted the nonexistent legal concept of interim damaged property. The trial court stated: The only fair and logical reading of the verdict is that the jury found that, as of the taking on February 19, 2004, the value of the property taken (A) was $5,619,240 and the damages to the remainder (B) was $2,000,000. Subsequently, as of February 7, 2005, and after the $2,000,000 had been paid, if the School District wished to purchase parcel B, the value of that would be an additional $1,655,280, for a total of $9,274,520. (Emphasis added). In addition, the court of appeals was so confounded when examining the verdict form and jury instructions that it explicitly recognized the nonexistent legal concept of interim damages. However, both parties conceded in their briefs and at oral argument before us that no such concept exists in Colorado condemnation law. In my view, the trial court amended the jury's verdict improperly. It did so because it recognized that the jury should have stated in one figureon the third blank linethe total value of Parcel B in the scenario of the School District taking the entire property. However, because the jury inserted a relatively low monetary figure as the value of Parcel B, $1,655,280, the trial court conjectured that the jury had broken the total value of Parcel B into two figures. It then made a calculation that the jury did not make, adding $2,000,000 to the amount the jury had stated as being the value of Parcel B. In making a calculation the jury did not make, the trial court engaged in speculation about the jury's intent and made an impermissible change in substance to the jury's verdict. When there are misleading instructions, confusing verdict forms, or conflicting answers in the jury's completed verdict form, neither a trial court nor an appellate court should attempt to correct the jury verdict. See Boulder Valley Sch. Dist. R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085, 1093-94, (Colo.1991), rev'd on other grounds by Cmty. Hosp. v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 670 (Colo.1998).