Opinion ID: 2011019
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: deprivation of constitutional rights

Text: The plaintiff also asserts that the trial court improperly dismissed its claim that it was deprived of its constitutional rights. Specifically, the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly concluded that it failed to allege sufficient facts to support its claim that the defendants violated its state and federal constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the laws. [6] In response, the defendants assert that the trial court properly determined that the plaintiff had failed to allege sufficiently a deprivation of an actual constitutional right, and, accordingly, its claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. We agree with the defendants. The following additional facts are necessary to our resolution of this claim. In its complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the proposal it submitted to the defendants, called for the construction of an aviation related facility at the airport consisting primarily of a 20,000 square foot hangar, two ramps, a taxiway, and a parking garage in return for a ground lease for the operation and maintenance of that facility. At the end of the term of the lease, the facility would revert to the possession and ownership of the state. In the sixth count of its amended complaint, the plaintiff alleges that the defendants deprived it of its constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of the law by arbitrarily and capriciously terminating the alleged contract between the parties and by engaging in covert, collusive, and/or conspiratorial contacts with another provider of aviation services at the airport that was a competitor of the plaintiff (competitor). Specifically, the plaintiff asserts that the defendants treated the competitor more favorably by awarding the competitor multiple contracts to develop parcels of land at the airport. The plaintiff further alleges that the defendants did not require the competitor to follow the required bidding practices or to comply with applicable standards in the development of these parcels, and that the defendants acted in collusion with the competitor to develop these parcels. The plaintiff's final allegation is that the defendants' improper actions allowed its competitor to gain an unfair competitive advantage. The plaintiff's claim that the defendants deprived it of its constitutional rights implicates only the second exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. As we previously have set forth herein, the second exception permits a plaintiff to bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief based on a substantial claim that the state or one of its officers has violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Doe v. Heintz, supra, 204 Conn. at 31, 526 A.2d 1318. In order to sufficiently raise such a claim, the allegations of the complaint and the facts in issue must clearly demonstrate an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests. Barde v. Board of Trustees, supra, 207 Conn. at 64, 539 A.2d 1000.
We begin with the plaintiff's claim that the defendants deprived it of its constitutional right to procedural due process by breaching the alleged contract with the plaintiff. [7] Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive individuals of liberty or property interests within the meaning of the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause of the ... [f]ourteenth [a]mendment. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Greater New Haven Property Owners Assn. v. New Haven, 288 Conn. 181, 198, 951 A.2d 551(2008), quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). In order for a person to have a property interest in a benefit such as the right to payment under a contract, [h]e must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.... When determining whether a plaintiff has a claim of entitlement, we focus on the applicable statute, contract or regulation that purports to establish the benefit.... We note that although a public contract can confer a protectible benefit, not every contract does so ... and the type of interest a person has in the enforcement of an ordinary commercial contract often is qualitatively different from the interests the [United States] Supreme Court has thus far viewed as property entitled to procedural due process protection.... (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Martz v. Valley Stream, 22 F.3d 26, 29-30 (2d Cir.1994). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a claim by a governmental contractor similar to the one in the present case in S & D Maintenance Co. v. Goldin, 844 F.2d 962, 966 (2d Cir.1988). In Goldin, a company that had contracted with the city of New York for the maintenance of its parking meters brought an action against the city alleging that it had violated the company's right to due process when the city terminated the contract between the parties. Id., at 963. The Second Circuit reasoned as follows: In one sense, of course, every enforceable contract right can be said to be an entitlement. As long as a state provides judicial remedies for the enforcement of contracts, either specific performance or damages for breach, every person holds a legitimate expectation that his contractually conferred rights are secure. And whenever a person contracts with a state, breach by the state can be considered a denial of his entitlement to performance of the contract. If the concept of entitlement were this expansive, federal courts could be asked to examine the procedural fairness of every action by a state alleged to be in breach of its contracts.... We must bear in mind that the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment [to the United States constitution] was not intended to shift the whole of the public law of the states into the federal courts. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 966. [8] The Second Circuit further explained that the United States Supreme Court has accorded procedural due process protection to interests that extend well beyond actual ownership of real estate, chattels, or money.... (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. The Second Circuit explained, however, that [i]n these contexts, the [d]ue [p]rocess [c]lause is invoked to protect something more than an ordinary contractual right. Rather, procedural protection is sought in connection with a state's revocation of a status, an estate within the public sphere characterized by a quality of either extreme dependence in the case of welfare benefits, or permanence in the case of tenure, or sometimes both, as frequently occurs in the case of social security benefits. Id. The court rejected the plaintiff's claim, refusing to extend due process protection to the company's temporary contractual interest. The court explained that we hesitate to extend the doctrine further to constitutionalize contractual interests that are not associated with any cognizable status of the claimant beyond its temporary role as a governmental contractor. Id., at 967. We conclude that, like the property interest involved in Goldin, in the present case, the plaintiff's limited property interest in a contract with the defendants is not an entitlement to which due process protections apply. Even if we were to assume for the purposes of this claim that the defendants did enter into a contract with the plaintiff to develop and lease the parcel, such a contract lacks both the permanence and dependence necessary to afford it procedural due process protection. First, the alleged contract was temporary in nature in that it was a leasehold interest for the right to operate and maintain the parcel. At the expiration of its leasehold, the plaintiff would have no continued right to the facility and the state would retain all ownership rights. See, e.g., id., at 967-68 (refusing to recognize property interest in two year contract between contractor and government for maintaining parking meters); Malapanis v. Regan, 340 F. Sup.2d 184, 190-92 (D.Conn.2004) (refusing to recognize constitutional property interest in three year contract with option to renew yearly for up to ten years); Hotel Syracuse, Inc. v. Young, 805 F.Supp. 1073,-1084-85 (N.D.N.Y.1992) (denying due process protection for company's contractual interest in ownership and operation of hotels through contract and financing agreement with city). Second, the plaintiff cannot demonstrate an extreme dependence upon the contract such that it is entitled to due process protection. The plaintiff is a sophisticated business entity that operates at least one other facility at the airport. Nothing in the record demonstrates that the plaintiff is wholly dependent upon the contract at issue here for its immediate well-being or survival. The plaintiff has not clearly demonstrate[d] an incursion upon constitutionally protected interests. Barde v. Board of Trustees, supra, 207 Conn. at 64, 539 A.2d 1000. Like the contractor in Goldin, therefore, the plaintiff is a temporary government contractor that is not afforded the protection of procedural due process under the federal constitution. See id., at 64-65, 539 A.2d 1000. Accordingly, we conclude that the plaintiff's claim that the defendants deprived it of its constitutional right to due process fails to meet the requirements for the second exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
The plaintiff also alleges in its amended complaint that the defendants deprived it of its constitutional right to equal protection of the laws because it treated the competitor differently than the plaintiff. The [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause of the [f]ourteenth [a]mendment to the United States [c]onstitution is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike. [ Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985)] (citing Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216, [102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982))].... Zahra v. Southold, 48 F.3d 674, 683 (2d Cir.1995). A violation of equal protection by selective [treatment] arises if: (1) the person, compared with others similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) ... such selective treatment was based on impermissible considerations such as race, religion, intent to inhibit or punish the exercise of constitutional rights, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a person. LaTrieste Restaurant & Cabaret, Inc. v. [Port Chester], 40 F.3d 587, 590 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting LeClair v. Saunders, 627 F.2d 606, 609-10 (2d Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959, 101 S.Ct. 1418, 67 L.Ed.2d 383 [1981]).... Thomas v. West Haven, 249 Conn. 385, 392-93, 734 A.2d 535 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1187, 120 S.Ct. 1239, 146 L.Ed.2d 99 (2000). Cadlerock Properties Joint Venture, L.P. v. Commissioner of Environmental Protection, 253 Conn. 661, 670-71, 757 A.2d 1 (2000). In the present case, although the plaintiff alleges that the defendants treated the competitor differently, it does not allege that the differential treatment was based on any impermissible consideration. It simply alleges that the defendants treated its competitor more favorably by awarding the competitor multiple contracts to develop parcels of land at the airport and that the defendants did not require the competitor to follow the required bidding practices or to comply with applicable standards in the development of these parcels. The plaintiff asserts that the defendants acted in collusion with the competitor to develop these parcels and that the defendants' improper actions allowed the plaintiff's competitor to gain an unfair competitive advantage. In the absence of any allegation as to an impermissible basis for the alleged differing treatment, we must conclude that the plaintiff's claim that the defendants deprived it of its constitutional right to equal protection of the laws fails to meet the requirements for the second exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The judgment is affirmed.