Opinion ID: 2301718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Assessing Prejudice

Text: Normally, in evaluating a Napue claim, we would consider whether there was `any reasonable likelihood' that false testimony could `have affected the judgment of the jury.' [11] Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A.2d 580, 589-90 (D.C.1986) (quoting Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), which in turn was quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271, 79 S.Ct. 1173). In this case, however, the false testimony was corrected in front of the fact-finder, and thus the usual test does not fit the circumstances. Appellant does not claim that the jury was misled, but rather that his opportunity to make decisions about trial strategy was unfairly limited. This is, of course, a claim to be taken seriously. But we are not obliged to accept uncritically appellant's assertion that his trial strategy would have been different. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 846 A.2d 302, 307-08 (D.C.2004) (rejecting appellant's claim that the withholding of Perry's prior statement adversely influenced his trial preparation, opening statement, and choice of trial strategy); Edelen v. United States, 627 A.2d 968, 971 (D.C.1993) (court was unpersuaded by appellant's claim that his pretrial preparation would have been different if he had known of statements earlier). We frequently consider claims that a delay in disclosure has interfered with trial strategy. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 968 A.2d 39, 66 (D.C.2009) (noting that timely disclosure is required under Brady, in part, so that the defendant can craft an appropriate defense). Nonetheless, a finding that the prosecution improperly delayed disclosure, even until the middle of trial, does not result in automatic reversal. See id. (appellants did not demonstrate[ ] any prejudice by the delay in receiving the statement) (internal editing omitted). We will reverse only if the defendant's rights were substantial[ly] prejudice[d]. [12] Miller, 14 A.3d at 1115. [13] Moreover, we give careful consideration to the trial court's assessment of the need for a mistrial. Edelen, 627 A.2d at 972 (noting that the trial judge is in a far better position than we are to assess the atmospherics of the case and to determine whether, given all that had occurred, [the] defense was appreciably prejudiced by any delay in the disclosure to counsel). A mistrial is a severe remedy  a step to be avoided whenever possible, and one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor. Najafi v. United States, 886 A.2d 103, 107 (D.C.2005) (quoting Salmon v. United States, 719 A.2d 949, 956 (D.C.1997)). For this reason, a decision to grant a motion for a mistrial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and we will reverse that decision only where it `appears irrational, unreasonable, or so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice.' Evans v. United States, 12 A.3d 1, 7 (D.C.2011) (quoting Coleman v. United States, 779 A.2d 297, 302 (D.C.2001)). Here, appellant has not demonstrated that degree of prejudice. First, appellant exaggerates the harm done by Sergeant Evans' testimony. By the end of his testimony, the jury knew Sergeant Evans had previously testified under oath that Officer Nagurka had said appellant slid the gun under the fence. Although Sergeant Evans attempted to explain the change in his testimony, the trial court noted that his explanation was not very convincing. Far from making defense counsel appear ignorant before the jury, as appellant asserts, Sergeant Evans' reversal under oath made the sergeant appear careless and unreliable. [14] Second, as the trial court observed, defense counsel immediately and effectively responded to the changed testimony by impeaching Sergeant Evans. She also forcefully argued in closing that Sergeant Evans' testimony by itself created reasonable doubt. Although he had sworn to tell the truth at the prior proceeding, nine months later he somehow just miraculously recalled that he had confused the facts of this case with those of another. Counsel compared Sergeant Evans to a doctor who was treating a juror's child. [W]ill you pause or hesitate to allow him to go forward, when he's going to come in and say, `Oh, well, I got him mixed up with a patient I saw two days ago and I prescribed the wrong medication?' Moreover, because Sergeant Evans' testimony at the preliminary hearing was given under oath, that prior testimony came in as substantive evidence to impeach Officer Nagurka. See D.C.Code § 14-102(b) (2001) (prior inconsistent statement given under oath is admissible as substantive evidence if the declarant testifies at trial and is subject to cross-examination). If appellant had not called Sergeant Evans, appellant would have been left with the unimpeached eyewitness testimony of Officer Nagurka that appellant made a sharp right turn towards this alley to avoid the police unit, and then toss[ed] a ... silver object into the front yard of a nearby house where a gun was found immediately thereafter. For this reason, appellant was arguably better off having called and impeached Sergeant Evans than he would have been without this testimony. Finally, appellant claims that if he had known the truth about Evans' pretrial testimony, [he] would not have called Evans, and would have just focus[ed] on the[ ] weaknesses in the United States's case. But appellant raised all of these weaknesses at trial, and he overestimates their potential to create a reasonable doubt on the facts of this case. Appellant's defense  that he was arrested for a gun that someone else had stashed in plain view in the front yard  simply does not stand up to reason and would certainly not have been any stronger in the absence of Sergeant Evans' testimony. On this record, appellant was not substantially prejudiced by any impropriety in the timing of the government's disclosure, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motion for a mistrial. The judgment of the Superior Court is therefore Affirmed.