Opinion ID: 365456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: 13 On February 14, 1978, after two weeks of the first trial, Judge Sifton gave his initial charge to the jury. Because the indictment included a four-man conspiracy count and 24 substantive counts divided into 7 separate groups, the charge was long and complex. The jury retired for deliberation before lunch on Tuesday, February 14, 1978. Later in the day the jury sent out two notes requesting certain testimony and exhibits, and asking questions about the conspiracy count. Their first question was whether they could convict just one defendant of conspiracy and find the other defendants not guilty, to which the judge answered, In the circumstances of this case, no, you may not. Judge Sifton told the jury, in response to their second question, that they could not consider the government agents as part of the conspiracy, and that, 14 The same element also has a bearing on the first question since more than one defendant must agree to the illegal objectives of the conspiracy. You cannot convict a single defendant because of the absence of an agreement among two defendants, at least two defendants to the illegal objectives of the conspiracy. 15 The jury then retired and sent out an additional note describing more specifically the testimony they wished to hear from the tape recordings. At 5:56 p. m. the jury returned to the courtroom, heard portions of the tapes as well as certain other testimony they had requested, and were then excused for the evening and directed to return for further deliberations at 9:30 a. m. the next day, Wednesday. 16 On Wednesday, Judge Sifton gave additional instructions with respect to conspiracy and entrapment. After more deliberations the jury inquired on the conspiracy count. Must all four defendants be considered as one unit    ?  Judge Sifton responded, 17 (N)ot only are you not required to consider all defendants as a unit, but you should not consider all defendants as a unit.    (E)ach defendant's guilt or innocence of any count in the indictment is to be considered individually, and the fact that you have one defendant guilty or innocent with regard to Count 1, or any other count, should not influence in any way your determination with regard to any other defendant. 18 He further instructed them that they had an obligation to consider, each count separately and in considering each count to consider the guilt or innocence of each defendant separately   , that, (a)t the same time you should consider the guilt or innocence of each defendant separately   , and that, 19 You are    required to consider each defendant individually to determine whether each element of the charge is a fact beyond a reasonable doubt with regard to each defendant; and the fact that you may find one defendant guilty or innocent with regard to any count of the indictment does not require you, and should not be considered by you as requiring you to find any other defendant guilty or innocent of that same count. 20 Later, when the jury reported it had reached a verdict on all counts except 1, 15 and 20, Judge Sifton rejected the government's request for an Allen charge and instructed the jury by note that they had not yet deliberated long enough, and that they should continue their deliberations on the counts on which they had not yet reached a verdict. Some time later the jury indicated that they had reached agreement on all but count 1, on which they asked for further clarification. After hearing all counsel, the court gave further instructions with respect to the conspiracy count and, after still more jury deliberations, the court received the jury's verdict with respect to counts 2 through 25, 2 after which the jury was excused with instructions to return the next morning, Thursday, at 9:30 a. m. 21 On their way to the subway that evening, two female jurors were attacked by four youths and suffered minor injuries and the loss of a pocketbook. When the jury reconvened the next morning, Judge Sifton made careful inquiry of the two women jurors and then of the entire panel, one of whom acknowledged being deeply moved by what had happened. MacQueen's attorney moved for a mistrial. Siniscalchi's attorney stated, I do not join in that application. Neither did counsel for Zimmerman and Armello join MacQueen's application. In order to give the jurors a period of recuperation from a draining incident, the trial judge excused the jurors until the following day, Friday, at 9:30 a. m. so that they could then continue their deliberations on the conspiracy count. 22 After some cautionary instructions the next morning, the jury resumed its deliberations. At approximately 11:15 a. m., responding to a further jury note, the court repeated its instructions on entrapment. At approximately 12:05 p. m. the jury indicated by note that it could not reach agreement on the conspiracy count. The government's suggestion of an Allen charge was opposed by Siniscalchi's counsel who said, I am not asking for a mistrial at this point. He also asked the court to inquire of the jury as to whether they have reached a verdict as to anyone or any defendant. I think that's a possibility that they don't know that they could reach a verdict on one. The court responded, I think they're very well aware of that from the nature of the questions they have asked. Judge Sifton suggested a modified Allen charge which was agreed to by all counsel. 23 A further jury note at approximately 3:30 p. m. again indicated inability to agree on the conspiracy count. The following colloquy then occurred: 24 Mr. Gotkin (counsel for defendant MacQueen): Your Honor, assuming the jury's discharged, there's nothing improper about us talking with the jury, I mean, under the circumstances. 25 The Court: I certainly don't encourage it. I really don't encourage it at all. In fact, I discourage it. I think we've been through quite an experience, that I really don't see the point of it. I think under the circumstances, that at this point it is appropriate to discharge the jury. 26 Mr. O'Brien (counsel for defendant Siniscalchi): Your Honor, I would agree. Again, it just lingers in my mind that's possible that they could have reached a verdict with one or more defendants, and I would just again, before you discharge the jury, say am I correct that you cannot reach a verdict as to any defendant. 27 Mr. Gotkin: I object to that. 28 The Court: No, I'm not going to ask them that question for the reason I've indicated earlier, is that their questions have indicated quite a bit of sensitivity to that particular point. All right, bring in the jury, please. 29 The court then discharged the jury at 3:40 p. m. 30 Later in the afternoon, the following incident occurred: 31 Mr. O'Brien: Your Honor, I just spoke with the jury. 32 Mr. Gotkin: I'm sorry? 33 Mr. O'Brien: I said I just spoke with the jury. They told me that Lenny Siniscalchi had been found not guilty since Tuesday, and they did not know they can bring in a verdict on just one, and that the verdict was nine to three for conviction on the other two, and the issue that had held them up was entrapment. 34 Mr. Gotkin: Nine three for conviction on the other three defendants? 35 Mr. O'Brien: Yes. And the issue was held up. 36 The Court: Well, I cautioned you against making that sort of inquiry. You've made that sort of inquiry. You can't use it to impeach the results. We can only go on the objective appearance of things. I find no reason on the basis of what we have seen that they were confused on that score, and the information which was, may instruct us in future situations, but I don't think it has any bearing on the situation here. 37 Four days later Siniscalchi's attorney moved under F.R.Cr.P. 29(c) for a judgment of acquittal on the ground there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction and that a reasonable doubt existed in the minds of all the jurors. In his supporting affidavit Siniscalchi's counsel stated that after the jurors had been dismissed he had spoken to four or five of them, one of whom volunteered that the jury had unanimously found Siniscalchi not guilty on the conspiracy count. When asked why they had not returned such a verdict, all of those present said they believed they had to reach a unanimous verdict as to all defendants before rendering a verdict. From this, Siniscalchi's counsel argued that Siniscalchi had in effect been found not guilty, that the court at least should make inquiry of the jurors to determine whether they had found Siniscalchi not guilty, and that a judgment of acquittal was necessary to prevent a miscarriage of justice, since if the court had made the inquiry requested by Siniscalchi's counsel prior to discharging the jury, Siniscalchi would have been acquitted. 38 On April 3, 1978, just prior to commencement of the retrial, Judge Sifton rendered an oral decision on Siniscalchi's motion for judgment of acquittal. He rejected the argument directed at the sufficiency of the evidence, taken by itself or in combination with the additional information about the jury's asserted but unreported agreement with respect to Siniscalchi. 39