Opinion ID: 2593105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Helfrich's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

Text: Helfrich asks us to reverse the superior court's denial of his motion for partial summary judgment. He argues that the letter Lee posted on Helfrich's door on June 1, 2005 failed to satisfy the minimum provisions of URLTA [9] and the forcible entry and detainer (FED) statutes regarding notices to quit. Helfrich implicitly contends that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the notice was a notice to quit governed by URLTA and the FED statutes, that it failed to satisfy the requirements of those statutes as a matter of law, and that he therefore was entitled to prevail as a matter of law on those claims. He asks that we remand to the superior court for determination of actual damages and award of costs and attorney's fees. URLTA was adopted in Alaska to govern landlord-tenant disputes. [10] We have held that URLTA should be harmonized with the FED statutes, which govern evictions. [11] Generally, a landlord may not evict a tenant under the FED statutes unless the landlord first gives the tenant a notice to quit, [12] otherwise known as an eviction notice. A notice to quit is a written demand for the tenant to vacate and surrender the property, thereby terminating the tenancy. [13] The notice to quit must meet certain requirements. It must be in writing and must be delivered to the tenant, left at the premises, or sent by registered or certified mail. [14] The notice must tell the tenant why the landlord is terminating the tenancy, what the tenant may do to avoid termination if the breach or violation may be corrected, and the date and time of termination under the lease or rental agreement. [15] The notice must direct the tenant to quit no later than the termination date under the lease or rental agreement. [16] And the notice must notify the tenant that if the tenant remains in occupation after termination the landlord may commence a civil action to remove the tenant ... and recover possession. [17] URLTA also requires the landlord to give written notice of intent to terminate a tenancy. [18] A landlord may terminate any tenancy if rent is unpaid when due and remains unpaid for seven days after the landlord provides the tenant with written notice that rent is due and that the landlord intends to terminate if the rent is not paid within that time. [19] A landlord or tenant may also terminate a month to month tenancy by a written notice given to the other at least 30 days before the rental due date specified in the notice. [20] The parties disagreed in the superior court whether there was a genuine dispute of material fact about whether the letter Lee posted on Helfrich's door was an eviction notice, and, accordingly, disagreed whether the letter had to satisfy the FED and URLTA notice requirements. Valdez Motel appeared to concede that, if the letter was found to be an eviction notice, it would be defective under URLTA as a matter of law. Helfrich argued that there was no dispute that the letter was an eviction notice because it demanded that he move out as fast as you can, and because Lee desired that Helfrich comply with that demand. [21] Valdez Motel responded that the letter was not an eviction notice, but an expression of Lee's thought or opinion that it would be best, given the existing animosity between the parties, for Helfrich to move out. It argued that Helfrich took the statement move out as fast as you can out of context in characterizing it as an unequivocal demand. In support of its arguments, Valdez Motel noted that the sentence read in full: I think at this point, Steve, it is best you move out as fast as you can. The superior court denied Helfrich's motion for partial summary judgment and his motion for reconsideration. In denying Helfrich's motion for reconsideration, the superior court stated that there was a factual dispute as to the nature of the purported June 1, 2005 eviction notice, such that entry of judgment as a matter of law was not appropriate. We agree with the superior court's assessment and affirm the denial of summary judgment. Although a trier of fact might have concluded that the letter was an eviction notice, the letter's words and Lee's relevant deposition testimony [22] create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the letter was an eviction notice that fell within the ambit of URLTA and the FED statutes. The trial court therefore properly denied summary judgment to Helfrich on this issue. [23]