Opinion ID: 2636899
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of defendant during closing arguments.

Text: A criminal defendant charged with a felony has a due process right under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as a right to confrontation under the Sixth Amendment, to be present at all critical stages of the trial. ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1010, 77 Cal. Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) A competent defendant may waive that right, however. ( Ibid. ) Neither the constitutional right to confrontation nor the right to due process precludes waiver of a defendant's right to be present at a critical stage of a capital trial. ( People v. Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 325, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) Section 977 permits a felony defendant, with leave of court, to waive his or her presence at all stages of the trial other than arraignment, plea, presentation of evidence, and sentencing. Section 977 requires, however, that the defendant personally execute, in open court, a written waiver of the right to be present. Prior to closing arguments at the penalty phase of the trial, defense counsel advised the court that appellant was very agitated and chose not to be present for the prosecutor's closing argument. After advising that this would be to appellant's detriment, the judge permitted counsel and appellant to confer in the court's chambers. After that conference counsel advised the court that appellant said that mentally he could not sit and listen to the prosecutor. Counsel invited the court to attempt to dissuade appellant, and the court addressed appellant directly about appellant's past exemplary behavior, that his absence could suggest to the jury that appellant concurred in what the prosecutor was saying, the anticipated nature of the argument, and that appellant would have to determine if he could listen to that argument without losing control. The court also suggested that it might be detrimental if appellant were absent only during the prosecution argument. Appellant and his counsel again conferred, after which defense counsel advised that, while appellant acknowledged responsibility for the crimes, appellant had been upset by what he perceived to be the prosecutor's mischaracterization of his life during the three months of trial. Counsel had advised appellant that he should remain, but also acknowledged to him that it was his trial. Counsel then stated that it was appellant's preference to be absent during both arguments. Immediately thereafter, before appellant left the courtroom, the parties discussed stipulations, the court asked if appellant wanted to be present, to which appellant replied sure. The trial court advised the jury that appellant had asked that he not be present during the argument of counsel and the court had honored that request. Closing argument is not a proceeding at which the personal presence of a felony defendant is required by section 977. However, appellant did not himself express a preference to be absent during closing argument and he did not execute a written waiver. Appellant now claims that a personal waiver was necessary to ascertain that he had knowingly and voluntarily surrendered his federal and state constitutional right to be present at trial, and complains that his attorneys contributed to the error. Assuming, but not deciding, that closing argument is subject to the statutory written-waiver requirement (see People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1357, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259 [written waiver required only if proceeding affects opportunity to defend]), nothing in this record suggests that appellant suffered any prejudice as a result of his absence during the argument of counsel.