Opinion ID: 1389692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order of Immediate Occupancy

Text: We turn first to the issue of the legal effect of the order of immediate occupancy. In a condemnation proceeding, the State has the burden of coming forward with the evidence of, and the burden of persuasion to establish, its right to condemn. The State must prove that the taking of the property is necessary and that the property will be dedicated to a public use. Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 Utah 105, 118, 121 P. 584, 589 (1911), aff'd, 239 U.S. 323, 36 S.Ct. 101, 60 L.Ed. 307 (1915). See Williams v. Hyrum Gibbons & Sons Co., Utah, 602 P.2d 684, 688 (1979); Monetaire Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co., 53 Utah 413, 426, 174 P. 172, 177 (1918). Cf. Salt Lake County v. Ramoselli, Utah, 567 P.2d 182, 184 (1977). Only after the State has established the elements of the cause of action, must the property owner prove the amount of compensation to which he is entitled. State ex rel. Road Commission v. Taggart, 19 Utah 2d 247, 430 P.2d 167 (1967); Utah Road Commission v. Hansen, 14 Utah 2d 305, 383 P.2d 917 (1963); Tanner v. Provo Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., supra . The State argues that because the Fribergs challenged the State's authority to condemn at the hearing on the motion for immediate occupancy, the doctrine of res judicata bars the Fribergs from again adjudicating the State's power to condemn. On that premise, the State concludes that its right to condemn was fixed when the order of immediate occupancy was entered and that valuation as of the date of service of process was fair and reasonable because there had been no undue delay between the time of service and the time the order of immediate occupancy was entered. The argument is based on language in Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 437, 255 P. 672, 677 (1926): Under [the predecessor to § 78-34-9] it is apparent that the power of the court to grant or refuse an application to occupy premises sought to be condemned, pending the action, is, to a large extent, discretionary, depending upon the showing of necessity for a speedy occupation. To wisely exercise the discretion the court might well require the plaintiff to make a showing, not only as to the necessity for a speedy occupation, but also a prima facie showing as to his right to condemn, if that right be controverted. [Emphasis added.] The State misconstrues both the language of Utah Copper and the nature of a proceeding for immediate occupancy. The above-quoted language only states that if the condemnor's authority to condemn is challenged, a prima facie showing of the right to condemn must be made to support an order of immediate occupancy. However, a prima facie showing of authority is not a final determination of authority. Such a showing simply requires the State to adduce some evidence to prove that it has fulfilled the necessary preconditions to the exercise of the power of eminent domain, a procedure similar to the entry of a preliminary injunction. The law could hardly allow the State to expel a landowner from his land before a final judgment is entered without at least some proof of its power to do so. An order of immediate occupancy is entered pendente lite and only authorizes the State to take immediate possession until a final adjudication of the merits. [A]n order of immediate occupancy is nothing more than an interlocutory order. State ex rel. Road Commission v. Danielson, 122 Utah 220, 222, 247 P.2d 900, 901 (1952); Utah Copper Co. v. Montana-Bingham Consolidated Mining Co., 69 Utah 423, 436, 255 P. 672, 676 (1926). See also § 78-34-9 (which assumes that an order of immediate occupancy is an interlocutory order only). In the instant case, the order of immediate occupancy, on its face, did not decide the jurisdictional conditions precedent to a final judgment and decree. The order states: It is further ordered and adjudged that pending further hearing and trial on the issues that may be presented in this action, and subject to the conditions herein set forth the Fribergs may not interfere with the State's possession of the premises (emphasis added). The trial court made no findings as to the State's authority to condemn. The order clearly contemplated that the issues relating to the State's authority to condemn were to be decided in a further hearing. The State's right to condemn, if challenged, can finally be determined only after a trial on the merits, not at a hearing on the motion for immediate occupancy. State v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad Co., 8 Utah 2d 236, 238, 332 P.2d 926, 927 (1958). [10] Since an order of immediate occupancy only requires prima facie proof of the right to condemn, that order is not a final adjudication on the merits. Res judicata has no application in the absence of a final adjudication. Cf. Pegues v. Morehouse Parrish School Board, 706 F.2d 735 (5th Cir.1983); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Haydu, 637 F.2d 391 (5th Cir.1981). See generally 1B J. Moore, J. Lucas, & T. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice § 0.409[1] (2d ed. 1983). The Fribergs' express reservation of their right to contest the power to condemn in plenary proceedings is not prohibited by the rules of res judicata. In fact, as late as December 12, 1979, the Fribergs and the State stipulated that the Fribergs would convey title and that only two issues would be reserved for an evidentiary trial: the amount of damages and the date of valuation.