Opinion ID: 1722795
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: contribution statute

Text: The computation issue presented by these cases concerns the appropriate application of the setoff provision incorporated within the statutory scheme embodied in the contribution statutes, MCL 600.2925a-600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(1)-27A.2925(4). The contribution-release section here in question, MCL 600.2925d; MSA 27A.2925(4), states in relevant part: When a release ... is given in good faith to 1 of 2 or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful death: (a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or wrongful death unless its terms so provide. (b) It reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release ... or to the extent of the amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever amount is the greater. (c) It discharges the tort-feasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to any other tort-feasor. [Emphasis added.] This statute allows a plaintiff to settle with less than all of the alleged tortfeasors, without discharging his claim against the remaining tortfeasors. It also allows the settling tortfeasor to escape liability for contribution, whatever the settlement amount or degree of fault. [7] The plaintiff's claim against the [remaining] tort-feasors, however, is reduced by the amount of the settlement. The approach approved by the majority construes the plaintiff's claim against the nonsettling defendants as including the percentage of the damages attributable to the plaintiff's own negligence. This construction is inconsistent with the general comparative negligence principles adopted in Placek, supra, and by legislative act applicable in all products liability actions, MCL 600.2949(1); MSA 27A.2949(1). [8] The flaw in this characterization of the plaintiff's claim is that it does not distinguish the plaintiff's negligence in causing his own injury from the negligence of the defendant-tortfeasors. A plaintiff's negligence in this regard relates to a failure to use due care for his own protection. Unlike the defendant's negligence which relates to the lack of due care for the safety of others, the plaintiff's negligence is not tortious. A plaintiff found to have been contributorily negligent in causing his own injury, therefore, cannot be characterized as a tort-feasor with regard to his own injury. Recognizing this distinction in American Motorcycle Ass'n v Superior Court, 20 Cal 3d 578, 589-590; 146 Cal Rptr 182; 578 P2d 899 (1978), the California Supreme Court noted: Moreover, even when a plaintiff is partially at fault for his own injury, a plaintiff's culpability is not equivalent to that of a defendant. In this setting, a plaintiff's negligence relates only to a failure to use due care for his own protection, while a defendant's negligence relates to a lack of due care for the safety of others. Although we recognized in Li [ v Yellow Cab Co of California, 13 Cal 3d 804; 119 Cal Rptr 858; 532 P2d 1226 (1975)] that a plaintiff's self-directed negligence would justify reducing his recovery in proportion to his degree of fault for the accident, the fact remains that insofar as the plaintiff's conduct creates only a risk of self-injury, such conduct, unlike that of a negligent defendant, is not tortious. (See Prosser, Law of Torts [4th ed]  65, p 418.) [Cited in Lemos v Eichel, 83 Cal App 3d 110, 117; 147 Cal Rptr 603 (1978).] The conclusion that the proportion of damages attributable to the plaintiff's own negligence is to be included as part of the plaintiff's claim against the nonsettling defendants is inapposite. The determination concerning whether and to what extent a plaintiff's own negligence contributed to his injury is necessary, specifically, to determine whether and to what extent a claim exists. The language of the statutory setoff provision here in question does not lend itself to the majority's characterization of the plaintiff's claim. That the Legislature intended to confer a substantive right upon plaintiffs to deduct settlement amounts from the proportion of the plaintiff's damages found to have been self-inflicted is questionable. To quote Judge MARUTIAK'S dissenting opinion in Jackson v Barton Malow Co, 131 Mich App 719, 727; 346 NW2d 591 (1984): The statute clearly anticipates that plaintiff's negligence will be factored against the gross assessment of damages before the settlement amount is to be subtracted. Unless  2925d is constitutionally invalid, it governs and must be applied. Notwithstanding the majority's attempt to reconcile its decision with the language of this statutory provision, the only possible construction that is consistent with its decision is that the claim against the other tortfeasors is the total amount of damages before application of the plaintiff's contributory fault percentage. This construction was expressly given to  2925d by the Court of Appeals in Gagnon v Dresser Industries, 130 Mich App 452, 458; 344 NW2d 582 (1983). See ante, p 185.