Opinion ID: 1475135
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the plaintiff's takings claim

Text: We next turn to the plaintiff's contention that the trial court improperly granted the state's motion to dismiss because sovereign immunity does not bar its claim that the state's failure to pay the full amount of rent allegedly due under the lease is an unconstitutional taking of the plaintiff's property for public use without just compensation. The plaintiff's takings claim is similarly unavailing because the state's failure to pay the full amount of rent allegedly due is not, as a matter of law, a taking. The plaintiff correctly notes that [t]he doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available to the state as a defense to claims for just compensation arising under article first, § 11, of the Connecticut constitution.... When possession has been taken from the owner, he is constitutionally entitled to any damages which he may have suffered.... [18] (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Tamm v. Burns, 222 Conn. 280, 283, 610 A.2d 590 (1992). To survive a motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity, [however] a complaint `must allege sufficient facts to support a finding of a taking of land in a constitutional sense.' Id., at 284, 610 A.2d 590. We conclude that the plaintiff has failed to meet this burden. It is axiomatic that government action cannot constitute a taking when the aggrieved party does not have a property right in the affected property. Whether one's interest or entitlement rises to the level of a protected property right depends upon the extent to which one has been made secure by [s]tate or [f]ederal law in its enjoyment. Wilmarth v. Georgetown, 28 Mass.App. 697, 701, 555 N.E.2d 597 (1990). In the present case, the trial court properly concluded that the tax escalation clause was an invalid lease term because it had not been approved by the review board pursuant to § 4b-23 (e). See footnote 5 of this opinion. The facts in the complaint, even when construed broadly in a manner most favorable to the plaintiff, simply fail to support a finding that the tax escalation clause was valid as a matter of law. [19] The complaint mentions nothing about review board approval, which is a necessary component of a valid contract at law pursuant to § 4b-23 (e). See footnote 5 of this opinion. The plaintiff, therefore, does not have an enforceable property interest in the income that would be generated by the tax escalation clause. [20] Accordingly, the claim was properly dismissed by the trial court. [21] The judgment is affirmed.