Opinion ID: 783458
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the Chicago Zoning Ordinance

Text: 22 Under the Free Exercise Clause of First Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to state and local governments by the Fourteenth Amendment, no law may prohibit the free exercise of religion. Prior to RLUIPA's enactment, two Supreme Court decisions held that no Free Exercise Clause violation results where a burden on religious exercise is the incidental effect of a neutral, generally applicable, and otherwise valid regulation, in which case such regulation need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest. Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). Appellants cite Smith and Hialeah as additional authority for application of the compelling governmental interest and least restrictive means tests to the CZO, not unlike those urged under RLUIPA. 23 Appellants first argue that the CZO lacks facial neutrality because, like the law at issue in Hialeah, the CZO refers to a religious practice — use of property as a church — without a secular meaning discernable from the language or context. 508 U.S. at 530, 113 S.Ct. 2217. In that case, the City of Hialeah reacted to the intention of practitioners of the Santería religion to establish a church within city limits by passing ordinances banning public ritual sacrifice, a distinguishing element of the Santería religious tradition. The Court explained that a law is not neutral if its object is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, and then found that the Hialeah ordinances' use of the words sacrifice and ritual, which have strong religious connotations, was evidence of their purposeful targeting of Santería practices. Appellants assert by analogy that the CZO's explicit inclusion of church among the various land uses it regulates indicates that it discriminates against churches on its face. Unlike the Hialeah ordinances, however, the text of the CZO includes church as just one among many and varied religious and nonreligious regulated uses. 7 More importantly, nothing in the record suggests, nor do Appellants articulate in anything but conclusory terms, that the object and purpose of the CZO are anything other than those expressly stated therein. See 17 MUN. CODE CHI. § 2. 24 In addition to their facial challenge under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Hialeah, Appellants allege that the CZO was not neutrally applied to His Word during the course of Alderman Huels' successful efforts to initiate the rezoning of 1616 West Pershing Road. 8 While they concede that Alderman Huels may not be held personally liable for his actions based on our decision in Biblia Abierta, 129 F.3d at 901-02, Appellants argue that his actions were legislative acts which improperly targeted His Word. However, 25 [m]unicipal liability attaches only where the decisionmaker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered. The fact that a particular official — even a policy-making official — has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. 26 Pembaur v. Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 481-82, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986). Here, the possibility that Alderman Huels' motives for wanting to have the property rezoned were illicit in no way demonstrates that the City Council and the Mayor, who have final authority under state law to enact city ordinances, see 65 I.L.C.S. §§ 5/1-2-1(2), endorsed any such motives. Absent some evidence that the policy-making body, in this case the City Council, approved both the rezoning and the illicit motivation therefor — and Appellants offer none — Chicago cannot be held liable for Alderman Huels' actions. See, e.g., City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 128-30, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988) (plurality opinion); id. at 140-42, 108 S.Ct. 915 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment). 27 Appellants also contend that the CZO is not generally applicable, in that the Special Use, Map Amendment, and Planned Development processes create discretionary, individualized exemptions to the CZO which are then impermissibly withheld from churches. As support for this proposition, they cite the Supreme Court's pronouncement that [i]n circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a general requirement are available, the government `may not refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without compelling reason.' Hialeah, 508 U.S. at 537, 113 S.Ct. 2217 ( quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (citation omitted)). Even assuming, arguendo, that the burdens incidental to churches seeking Special Use, Map Amendment, or Planned Development approval amount to religious hardship within the meaning of the Court's decision in Hialeah, Appellants appear to confuse exemption from a particular zoning provision (in the form of Special Use, Map Amendment, or Planned Development approval) with exemption from the procedural system by which such approval may be sought. Under the CZO, these alternate avenues of zoning approval are not merely available to any would-be applicant, as Hialeah requires. They are mandatory. In short, no person, nor any nonconforming land use, is exempt from the procedural system in place for Special Use, Map Amendment, or Planned Development approval specifically, or the CZO generally. Furthermore, the experiences of plaintiff churches Christ Center and Christian Bible, each of which was initially denied — and subsequently granted — Special Use approval, demonstrates that Chicago has extended Special Use exemptions to churches. It is clear to this Court that it is neither the policy nor the practice of Chicago to refuse to extend to churches its system of individualized exemptions and, thus, that the CZO is a generally applicable system of land-use regulation. 28 In Smith, the Supreme Court noted that, in cases implicating the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and freedom of association, the First Amendment may subject the application to religiously motivated action of a neutral, generally applicable law to a heightened level of scrutiny. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881-82, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Seizing upon this principle, Appellants maintain that their Free Exercise claim involves hybrid rights of free exercise, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and equal protection, such that Chicago must justify the CZO's incidental burdens on church location with a compelling state interest. Based on the analyses of Appellants' speech, assembly, and equal protection claims that follow, however, we find them individually lacking the merit necessary to withstand summary judgment. We agree with the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that a plaintiff does not allege a hybrid rights claim entitled to strict scrutiny analysis merely by combining a free exercise claim with an utterly meritless claim of the violation of another alleged fundamental right. Miller v. Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1207-08 (9th Cir.1999). Accord, e.g., Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District, 135 F.3d 694, 700 (10th Cir.1998); Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir.1995); Kissinger v. Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177, 180 (6th Cir.1993). Appellants have identified no constitutionally protected interest upon which the CZO infringes, as they must in order to establish a hybrid rights claim requiring heightened scrutiny. 29 Of Appellants' remaining constitutional claims, the first alleges that the CZO violates Appellants' First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and freedom of assembly because the CZO is neither (i) content neutral nor (ii) narrowly tailored to serve a legitimate governmental objective and (iii) does not leave open ample channels of alternative communication. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) (articulating these three criteria for valid time, place, and manner restrictions on speech and assembly). Appellants state in conclusory terms that the CZO discriminates against religious uses, is irrational and arbitrary, restricts churches to R zones, and is not narrowly tailored. They also state that the CZO's requirement that churches occupying more than two acres obtain Planned Development approval creates a practical ban on large churches. As discussed previously, the CZO is neutral and generally applicable and places churches on a footing equal with, if not superior to, that of nonreligious assembly uses. Similarly, to the extent that the CZO incidentally regulates speech or assembly within churches, such regulation is motivated not by any disagreement that Chicago might have with the message conveyed by church speech or assembly, but rather by such legitimate, practical considerations as the promotion of harmonious and efficient land use. In this respect it is content neutral. In order to satisfy the requirement that it is narrowly tailored, a regulation need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means. Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746. It need only further a substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Id. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746. There is no question that Chicago — like any population center — has a substantial interest in regulating the use of its land and that the CZO promotes that interest. We are also unpersuaded by Appellants' implicit suggestion that the restriction of church use as of right to R zones leaves churches with insufficient channels of communication. Not only may churches freely disseminate religious speech in a majority of Chicago land zoned for development, but they may also disseminate — and, in the cases of plaintiffs Christ Center and Christian Bible, have in fact disseminated — religious speech in B and various C districts with Special Use approval. Similarly, the Planned Development approval process provides larger churches with ample opportunity to locate within Chicago in a manner consistent with the CZO's legitimate, stated purposes. For these reasons, Appellants' First Amendment freedom of speech and freedom of assembly claims are without merit. 30 Appellants further argue that the CZO violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment — which provides that no state shall deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws — by treating churches in a manner less favorable than that of nonreligious assembly uses. It is the well established law of this Circuit that, [a]bsent a fundamental right or a suspect class, to demonstrate a viable equal protection claim in the land use context, a plaintiff must demonstrate governmental action wholly impossible to relate to legitimate governmental objectives. Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 370-71 (7th Cir.2000); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (unless a statute classifies by race, alienage, or national origin or impinges on fundamental constitutional rights, [t]he general rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest). Appellants urge us to elevate the level of scrutiny under which we review their equal protection claim against the CZO because the regulation of a church's use of land necessarily implicates the fundamental right of freedom of religious exercise. As a preliminary matter, we are quick to reiterate our earlier determination that any burdens on religious exercise imposed by the CZO are both incidental and insubstantial. Furthermore, this court has held that the fundamental rights theory of heightened equal protection scrutiny applies only to laws that effect grave interference with important religious tenets or . . . affirmatively compel [congregants] to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs. Griffin High School v. Illinois High School Athletic Assoc., 822 F.2d 671, 674 (7th Cir. 1987). Whatever the obstacles that the CZO might present to a church's ability to locate on a specific plot of Chicago land, they in no way regulate the right, let alone interfere with the ability, of an individual to adhere to the central tenets of his religious beliefs. As the district court adroitly noted, the CZO's limitations on church location are not the regulation of belief, any more than regulating the location of the Chicago Tribune building is the regulation of the newspaper's [F]irst [A]mendment-protected product. Civil Liberties for Urban Believers, 157 F.Supp.2d at 908. 31 Viewed through the lens of the Cleburne and Forseth rational basis analyses, Chicago's system of land-use regulation satisfies the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. In general, a zoning ordinance imposing restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban communities such as the segregation of residential, business, and industrial buildings satisfies the rational basis test as a valid exercise of authority. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Company, 272 U.S. 365, 386-87, 394, 397, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926). Here, Chicago permits churches to locate in R districts as of right, while requiring Special Use approval in B and most C districts, not only to promote the general public welfare and to protect the character, stability, order, and efficient development of Chicago's varied areas, but also to prevent overcrowding, to limit street congestion, and to conserve the taxable value of city land. 17 MUN. CODE CHI. § 2. Moreover, the CZO makes available avenues by which exceptions for nonconforming uses may be sought (and has made such exceptions in the cases of two plaintiff churches who applied for Special Use approval). Though the end result of this zoning scheme may be to afford churches better opportunities for location in R districts than B, C, or M districts, under the amended CZO churches still fare better than many other nonreligious assembly uses that are treated equally in B, C, and M districts but excluded from R districts. To the extent that the CZO treats churches any differently from nonreligious assembly uses, it does not disfavor churches. More importantly, any such difference is rationally related to Chicago's legitimate interest in regulating land use within its city limits. The CZO thus complies with the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause. 32 Finally, Appellants challenge the district court's analysis of their Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim. 9 Specifically, Appellants suggest that the district court's characterization of their claim against the Special Use approval procedures as one involving property rights, rather than any particular use or fundamental activity, is at odds with an earlier district court finding that Appellants' due process claim asserted a fundamental liberty interest in their free exercise of religion, freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. See Civil Liberties for Urban Believers v. Chicago, 1997 WL 94731, No. 94 C 6151 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 28, 1997) (memorandum opinion and order denying Chicago's motion to dismiss multiple claims). Appellants disregard the fact that this language comes from an order denying Chicago's motion to dismiss Appellants' due process claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the FRCP. At the summary judgment stage, the district court's finding that a claim is properly stated for Rule 12(b)(6) purposes has no effect on its determination of the merits of that claim. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to Appellants, the district court properly determined that, because Appellants challenged the alleged vagueness of the zoning procedures and standards in a manner that any property owner might so do irrespective of a particular property use or fundamental liberty, the claim focused on property rights rather than Appellants' right to worship. The district court then relied upon River Park v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164 (7th Cir.1994), to determine that any facial due process attack on the CZO must be made in state court. As we stated in that case, in which a plaintiff corporation alleged that Highland Park's politically motivated refusal to act on its zoning application bankrupted the corporation and deprived it of procedural due process, 33 Federal courts are not boards of zoning appeals [and] the procedures due in zoning cases are minimal. Cities may elect to make zoning decisions through the political process.... Highland Park made a political decision in a political fashion, employing procedural maneuvers that prevented the question from reaching the floor for a vote.... [Plaintiff] may not have received the process Illinois directs its municipalities to provide, but the Constitution does not require state and local governments to adhere to their procedural promises. Failure to implement state law violates that state law, not the Constitution; the remedy lies in state court. 34 River Park, 23 F.3d at 165-67 (citations omitted). Here, too, the CZO and its special approval procedures provide Appellants with all the legislative process that is due. Moreover, as the district court noted, the CZO expressly provides for the review of zoning decisions by the Illinois Circuit Courts. See 17 MUN. CODE CHI. § 11.3-4; 65 I.L.C.S. § 5/11-13; 735 I.L.C.S. 5/3-104. As such, Appellants cannot prevail on their due process claim.