Opinion ID: 42366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Silva’s Due Process Claim

Text: On appeal, Silva first argues that the BIA violated his due process rights by failing to correct the IJ’s misstatement of law regarding exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify filing a late asylum application. In particular, he challenges the IJ’s determination that, in order to show extraordinary circumstances, Silva had to 15 show ineffective assistance of counsel. He further argues that the IJ’s error prejudiced Silva’s case because the IJ assumed early in the proceedings that Silva’s asylum application would be denied. Next, Silva argues that his due process rights were violated because the BIA’s opinion was not reasoned and amounted to a single-member “rubber stamp” of the IJ’s decision. He also argues that his appeal should have been assigned to a three-judge panel of the BIA. We conclude that Silva’s due process argument is without merit. We review constitutional challenges de novo. Lonyem v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 352 F.3d 1338, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). “To establish due process violations in removal proceedings, aliens must show that they were deprived of liberty without due process of law, and that the asserted errors caused them substantial prejudice.” Id. at 1341-42. With respect to Silva’s first argument, the gravamen of his complaint is that the BIA’s opinion was unreasoned and amounted to affirmance without an opinion in violation of his due process rights. First, Silva mischaracterizes the BIA’s opinion, which was not an affirmance without opinion. See 8 C.F.R. 1003.1(e)(4)(ii) (describing the procedure for issuing an affirmance without opinion). Second, for the reasons discussed more fully in part II of this opinion, even if Silva had proven a due process violation, we conclude that he cannot show substantial prejudice because, as both the BIA and the IJ found, even if Silva’s application had been timely filed, he still could not meet his burden of proving he 16 qualified for asylum. Lastly, to the extent that Silva argues that the BIA merely “rubber-stamped” the IJ’s decision and that the case was improper for a single BIA member to affirm, the argument is without merit. Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5), if a “Board member to whom an appeal is assigned determines, upon consideration of the merits, that the decision is not appropriate for affirmance without opinion, the Board member shall issue a brief order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision . . . unless the Board member designates the case for decision by a threemember panel.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). A case may only be assigned to a threemember panel if the case presents one of the circumstances listed in 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(e)(6)(i)-(vi). Silva purports to rely on §§ 1003.1(e)(6)(iv)-(v), which permits a three-member panel to review cases raising issues of either national import or the need to review a clearly erroneous factual determination by an immigration judge. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(e)(6)(iv), (v). However, for the reasons set forth below, in part II, the IJ’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous, and Silva fails to demonstrate the national importance of his case. II. Whether Substantial Evidence Supported Silva’s Asylum Claim Silva argues that he provided evidence of both past persecution and a wellfounded fear of future persecution and his application for asylum and withholding 17 of removal should have been granted.4 To the extent that the IJ’s decision was based on a legal determination, review is de novo. Mohammed v. Ashcroft, 261 F.3d 1244, 1247-48 (11th Cir. 2001). The IJ’s factual determinations are reviewed under the substantial evidence test, and we “must affirm the [IJ’s] decision if it is ‘supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.’” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1283-84 (citation omitted). Thus, factual determinations “may be reversed by this court only when the record compels a reversal; the mere fact that the record may support a contrary conclusion is not enough to justify a reversal of the administrative findings.” Adefemi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1022, 1026 (11th Cir. 2004). An alien who arrives in or is present in the United States may apply for asylum. See INA § 208(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum if the alien meets the INA’s definition of a “refugee.” See INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1).5 A “refugee” is: 4 Silva does not raise any challenge in his brief to the denial of relief under the CAT and, thus, that issue is deemed abandoned. Sepulveda v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1228, n.2 (11th Cir. 2005). 5 Pursuant to the REAL ID Act of 2005, INA § 208(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), was amended to add “The Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General” as if enacted on March 1, 2003. See Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat 231 (May 11, 2005), Division B, Sec. 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1) and note (1). 18 [A]ny person who is outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. . . . 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The asylum applicant carries the burden of proving statutory “refugee” status. See Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1284. To establish asylum eligibility, the alien must, with specific and credible evidence, establish (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the statutorily listed factor, in this case group membership, will cause such future persecution. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b); Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1287. The INA does not expressly define “persecution” for purposes of qualifying as a “refugee.” See INA § 101(a)(42), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42). However, we have discussed other circuits’ holdings that “persecution” is an “extreme concept,” requiring more than “a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation,” or “[m]ere harassment.” Sepulveda v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 401 F.3d 1226, 1231 (11th Cir. 2005). “[A]n applicant must demonstrate that his or her fear of persecution is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.” Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. A showing of past persecution creates a presumption of a “well-founded 19 fear,” subject to rebuttal by the INS. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1). A “well-founded fear” of persecution may also be established by showing a reasonable possibility of personal persecution that cannot be avoided by relocating within the subject country. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i) & (ii). It is “well-established” that the wellfounded fear inquiry contains both an objective and subjective component, i.e., the petitioner must be genuinely afraid and that fear must be objectively reasonable. Al Najjar, 257 F.3d at 1289. Furthermore, it is the petitioner’s burden to present “specific, detailed facts showing a good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution.” Id. at 1287 (quotation and citation omitted). We have further stated that “where the alleged persecutors are not affiliated with the government, it is not unreasonable to require a refugee who has an internal resettlement alternative in his own country to pursue that option before seeking permanent resettlement in the United States, or at least to establish that such an option is unavailable.” Mazariegos v. Office of U.S. Attorney General, 241 F.3d 1320, 1327 (11th Cir. 2001). First, to the extent that Silva is arguing that his application for asylum was filed within the one-year deadline or subject to an exception found in 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)-(5), we lack jurisdiction to review that determination. See Fahim v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 278 F.3d 1216, 1217 (11th Cir. 2002) (holding that federal courts are without jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s decision as to 20 timeliness of an asylum request); see also Vasile v. Gonzalez, No. 03-3337 (7th Cir. Aug. 9, 2005) (persuasively holding that, even in light of the REAL ID Act’s jurisdictional review provisions, the decision whether to extend the deadline for filing asylum claims is discretionary and, therefore, not subject to review). However, as the BIA and the IJ found, even were Silva’s application timely, he could not meet his burden of proving he qualified for either asylum or withholding of removal. Their decisions are supported by substantial evidence. Silva’s own testimony indicated that he had never had any direct contact with any guerillas. The only threats he received were phone calls to his father’s home in Bucamaranga, and at no point was he ever visited or called in Bogota. A handful of phone calls threatening Silva without more does not rise to the “extreme concept” required to demonstrate past persecution. Persuasive authority from other circuits indicates that “[t]hreats alone generally do not constitute actual persecution; only rarely, when they are so immediate and menacing as to cause significant suffering or harm in themselves, do threats per se qualify as persecution.” Vatulev v. Ashcroft, 354 F.3d 1207, 1210 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Mendez-Gutierrez v. Ashcroft, 340 F.3d 865, 869 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003); Boykov v. I.N.S., 109 F.3d 413, 416 (7th Cir. 1997). Silva was never harmed, nor was he ever personally confronted by anyone claiming to be a FARC member. We, therefore, conclude that the record supports the BIA’s and IJ’s determination that 21 Silva failed to prove that he suffered past persecution. As to a well-founded fear of future persecution, Silva’s testimony failed to establish that his fear was objectively reasonable. Even when he was participating in political activities, his activity was limited to low-profile activity such as distributing papers with a candidate’s name on them. He had never been personally confronted by the guerillas and, notably, there was no testimony suggesting that the leader of the movement to which Silva was a member had been threatened or otherwise harmed by anyone claiming to be a guerilla. Moreover, Silva stopped participating in politics and, therefore, it would seem anomalous for anyone to want to persecute him on the basis of his political activity once that activity ceased. To the extent he relies on the deaths of his uncles, even if Silva had properly proved that the deaths were the result of assassinations by guerillas, Silva failed to demonstrate any connection between the political beliefs and activities of those uncles and the activities of his own. Silva admitted not having associated with the uncles in their political activities and, therefore, Silva lacked any detailed, specific evidence to show he would be singled out for persecution because his uncles were. Where the applicant’s testimony is weak, there is a greater need for corroborative evidence. See Yang v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 0316068, manuscript op. at 6 (11th Cir. July 29, 2005), citing In re Y-B-, 21 I&N Dec., 1136, 1139 (BIA 1998). 22 Finally, Silva failed to demonstrate that internal relocation was not an available option. His own testimony established that he was never contacted in Bogota, and that all of the threats occurred in Bucamaranga at his father’s home. Thus, we conclude that the BIA’s and IJ’s conclusion, that Silva’s low-profile political activity coupled with the localized nature of the threats made internal relocation a reasonable option, is supported by substantial evidence in the record. Lastly, an alien seeking withholding of removal under the INA must show that his life or freedom would “more likely than not” be threatened upon return to his country because of, among other things, his political opinion or membership in a particular social group. See Mendoza v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 327 F.3d 1283,1287 (11th Cir. 2003); INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). This standard is more stringent than the “well-founded fear” standard for asylum; thus, because Silva was unable to meet the well-founded fear standard for asylum, he is unable to qualify for withholding of removal. In sum, we conclude that the BIA and IJ’s opinions finding that Silva was unable to meet his burden of proof for asylum or withholding of removal are supported by substantial evidence. We further conclude that Silva, to the extent he even raised a due process claim, cannot show substantial prejudice and, therefore his due process claim is meritless. Accordingly, we deny the petition. PETITION DENIED. 23