Opinion ID: 2150379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Affirmative proof of compelling need.

Text: Appellant contends that even if the constitution does not provide an absolute right to journalists to refuse to divulge confidential sources of information, nevertheless, the state must affirmatively demonstrate in each case: (1) The substantiality of the state interest to be served by compelling the testimony, and (2) the lack of an alternative method, less restrictive of first amedment rights, by which such objective could be served. We think the solution of the crime involved here and the prevention of repetition of such crimes constitutes a compelling need. The administration of criminal justice itself is a sufficient substantial interest of the state. Next, appellant contends that the state must show that there are no alternative methods by which it may secure the desired information. We think that if there are alternative methods of gaining this information, appellant should point them out. He asks too much when he asks the court to presume that state officers could gain this information elsewhere but have chosen to wait and see if Mr. Knops will supply it. The mere fact that the culprits are still at large is nearly conclusive proof that the state does not know who they are. In view of these considerations, it would unnecessarily impede the solving of this case to require the state to go through the empty ritual of proving that which is already obvious, namely, that the identity of the culprits is unknown. We conclude that the appellant has a constitutional right to the privilege not to disclose his sources of information received in confidential relationship. However, when such confidence is in conflict with the public's overriding need to know, it must yield to the interest of justice. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, we think the public's right to know outweighs the appellant's right of privilege. By the Court. Judgment affirmed. HEFFERNAN, J. ( concurring in part; dissenting in part ). I agree with the major premise of the majority opinion. It sets forth what is now the law of this state that a journalist may assert a constitutional privilege to protect the confidentiality of his news sources. As a clarification of a significant and fundamental first amendment right of the freedom of press, the opinion will stand as a landmark in legal history. As the writer of this opinion understands the majority position, we hold that a journalist (including without distinction one of the underground press) shall not be compelled to reveal the confidential associations or confidential information upon which published news stories are based. Such right, however, is made subject to the right of the state to compel testimony in the event that the journalist's testimony is required in the furtherance of a compelling and overriding interest that cannot be served by any alternate means. We also hold, following Caldwell, as I understand the majority opinion, that the compelling and overriding interest of the state must be demonstrated to the court as a prerequisite for the issuance of a subpoena that would compel the production of either testimonial or documentary evidence. While the majority holds that the privilege exists subject only to the compelling state interest test, it finds that compelling state interest by the process of judicial notice. It takes notice of disorders that have wracked our society in recent months and the compelling state interest in assuring order and the safety of our citizens. [1] From this, it properly concludes that the information concerning the arson of a state university building and the bombing of Sterling Hall and the United States Mathematics Research Center on the University of Wisconsin campus are acts fraught with such grave implications to our society that the privilege must fall. [2] Up to this point, I am in substantial agreement with the majority opinion, but I believe it fails to properly apply its own test of whether the state's compelling interest could be served by alternative means not requiring an impingement upon constitutional rights. The majority assumes that no alternative method of getting any of this information is available because, The mere fact that the culprits are still at large is nearly conclusive proof that the state does not know who they are. This writer takes judicial notice of the official records of both the State and the United States that show that officers of both the State and the United States Department of Justice under oath have stated that they now know who bombed Sterling Hall. Federal warrants have been issued for the arrest of the suspects. We cannot conclude, merely because these suspects have not yet been arrested, that the state requires further information as to the identity of the Sterling Hall bombers. The writer of this opinion takes judicial notice of the statement of United States Attorney John Olson declaring that the United States has full information in regard to the identity of the Sterling Hall bombers and that Mark Knops' testimony in that respect is now superfluous. It thus seems clear that in respect to the testimony sought in regard to the Sterling Hall bombing, the information has already been attained by alternate means. The State of Wisconsin no longer has a compelling state interest in having Knops testify to what is already known. It continues to have a compelling state interest in the arson of Old Main Hall on the Whitewater campus. Accordingly, I would agree with the majority's determination to affirm the finding of contempt. However, since the question of Knops' purging himself in regard to the Sterling Hall questions is now moot, I would return the cause to the trial court for resentencing, bearing in mind that, under the test laid down by the majority of this court, no compelling interest exists for Knops' testimony in regard to the source of his information about the University of Wisconsin Sterling Hall bombing. I concur in the affirmance of the finding of contempt, but would remand for resentencing. Milwaukee v. Pontell, 49 Wis. 2d 662.