Opinion ID: 771716
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Methodology

Text: 69 A&H argues in the alternative that inasmuch as the District Court used a multi-factored test, it should have considered all of the Lapp factors, and that the missing factors would have favored A&H. It therefore contends that the court erred as a matter of law in fashioning its own test. However, the test used by the District Court is functionally the same as the Lapp test. A comparison of these factor lists reveals that the ostensibly missing Lapp factors appear to be incorporated into the District Court's test. Lapp factor (9), the relationship of the goods in the minds of the consumers because of the similarity of function, and Lapp factor (8), the extent to which the targets of the parties' sales efforts are the same, are subsumed in the court's factor (3), which considers the similarity of the products and the degree to which they directly compete with each other. Lapp factor (4), the length of time the defendant has used the mark without evidence of actual confusion is subsumed along with factor (6), evidence of actual confusion, within the District Court's factor (7), incidents of actual confusion. Lapp factor (10), other facts suggesting that the consuming public might expect the prior owner to manufacture both products, or expect the prior owner to manufacture a product in the defendant's market, or expect that the prior owner is likely to expand into the defendant's market, is unmentioned, but also unnecessary, because the similarity of the goods and their competitive relationship was accounted for in the court's factor (3). 70 A&H essentially argues that, had the Lapp test been applied as written, a greater absolute number of factors would have been decided in its favor, thus leading to a different outcome; for instance, the court's factor (3), rather than counting in its favor a single time, would have been divided into at least two factors, each of which would have weighed in its favor. However, we have repeatedly insisted that the Lapp factors are not to be mechanically tallied, but rather that they are tools to guide a qualitative decision. See Fisons, 30 F.3d at 476 n.11 (The weight given to each factor in the overall picture, as well as its weighing for plaintiff or defendant, must be done on an individual fact- specific basis.). 71 The District Court did not engage in a simplistic quantitative comparison, but accurately understood the role of the factors: 72 No single factor is dispositive, and a finding of a likelihood of confusion does not require a positive finding on a majority of these factors. Instead, they are simply a guide to help determine whether confusion would be likely between the use of two contested trademarks on competing products. In addition to the listed factors, a court is free to consider other relevant factors in determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists. 73 A&H IV, 57 F. Supp. 2d at 164 (citations omitted). Although it might promote clarity always to use the same factors in the same order, the District Court covered all the ground covered by the Lapp factors and did so with care. Therefore, we conclude, the court did not err in its use of the factors.