Opinion ID: 218764
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: violation of a clearly established constitutional right

Text: After an initial inquiry as to whether the defendant was acting in his discretionary authority when the alleged acts occurred, we consider: (1) [i]f the facts, construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, show that a constitutional right has been violated; and (2) whether the right violated was `clearly established.' Grider v. City of Auburn, 618 F.3d 1240, 1254 & n. 19 (11th Cir.2010). Both elements of this test must be satisfied for an official to lose qualified immunity, and this two-pronged analysis may be done in whatever order is deemed appropriate for the case. Id.; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 129 S.Ct. 808, 815-16, 172 L.Ed.2d 565. In determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established at the time of violation, the relevant, dispositive inquiry is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Grider, 618 F.3d at 1266-67 (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted); see also Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 2516, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002). We must undertake this inquiry in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad general proposition. Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198, 125 S.Ct. 596, 599, 160 L.Ed.2d 583 (2004) (quotation marks omitted). The Fourth Amendment protects people from unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. For Fourth Amendment purposes, a seizure occurs when an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.... Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 n. 16, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). An encounter between a police officer and a citizen becomes a seizure when a reasonable person would not feel free to terminate the encounter. United States v. Jordan, 635 F.3d 1181, 1186 (11th Cir.2011) (quotation marks omitted). When an officer stops an individual to ascertain that person's mental state (rather than to investigate suspected criminal activity), the Fourth Amendment requires the officer to have probable cause to believe the person is dangerous either to himself or to others. See, e.g., Cloaninger ex rel. Cloaninger v. McDevitt, 555 F.3d 324, 334 (4th Cir.2009) (involving officer's welfare check at residence after doctor's 911 call reported possible suicide attempt); Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1102 (6th Cir.1997) (involving officer dispatched to residence after mental health worker reported a suicide attempt). The Fourth Amendment also prohibits warrantless searches of a person's home. United States v. Holloway, 290 F.3d 1331, 1334 (11th Cir.2002). This prohibition is not absolute, however. Id. One exception to the warrant requirement is that the police may enter a private premises and conduct a search if `exigent circumstances' mandate immediate action. Id. [E]mergency situations involving endangerment to life fall squarely within the exigent circumstances exception. Id. at 1337; id. at 1335 (The most urgent emergency situation excusing police compliance with the warrant requirement is, of course, the need to protect or preserve life.); see also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). For this exception to apply, the officer must have both exigent circumstances and probable cause. Holloway, 290 F.3d at 1337. When officers respond to an emergency, the probable cause element may be satisfied where officers reasonably believe a person is in danger. Id. at 1338. The officer's conduct is evaluated by reference to the circumstances then confronting the officer, including the need for a prompt assessment of sometimes ambiguous information concerning potentially serious consequences. Id. at 1339 (quotation marks omitted). In addition, the officer's warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation.... Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413 (quotation marks omitted). Roberts appears to argue that once Deputy Spielman saw that she was alive, there was no longer any exigency sufficient to justify his continued presence on her property or his seizure of her person. However, under the circumstances Deputy Spielman confronted, it was objectively reasonable for him to believe that Roberts might still be in need of immediate aid even though she was alive. See Monday, 118 F.3d at 1102 (stating that a showing of probable cause in the mental health seizure context requires only a probability or substantial chance of dangerous behavior, not an actual showing of such behavior. (quotation marks omitted)). Deputy Spielman was dispatched in response to a 911 call for a possible suicide attempt. At the residence, Huckabee, the relative who had placed the 911 call, told Deputy Spielman that Roberts's truck was in the driveway and her television was on, but Huckabee had been unable to get a response from Roberts for an hour. Huckabee also explained that Roberts suffered from bipolar disorder and had a history of suicide attempts. There is nothing in the record to suggest Deputy Spielman should have doubted the information Huckabee gave him. Although Deputy Spielman knocked repeatedly and loudly at several doors and windows of the residence, Roberts did not respond, prompting Deputy Spielman to open the door a crack, call out to Roberts and look around. Given Roberts's belligerent behavior when Deputy Spielman opened the door and identified himself, and in light of what Huckabee had told him, Deputy Spielman could reasonably have believed that Roberts posed a danger to herself that justified his remaining inside the doorway of her home for about five minutes and then, for safety reasons, briefly removing her from the home while he tried to calm her down and determine her mental state. We stress the limited scope of Deputy Spielman's entry into the home and encounter with Roberts. Deputy Spielman opened the door and then stood in the doorway of Roberts' home for about five minutes while he spoke with her. Deputy Spielman then escorted Roberts outside to the back steps of her garage, but only after she continued yelling and made her ambiguous or I willstatement that a reasonable officer could have interpreted as a threat or at least as further cause for concern about Roberts's mental state. Although the record is silent as to precisely how long Deputy Spielman spoke with Roberts as she sat on the steps, it does not appear to have been a very long time. When Deputy Spielman determined that Roberts was not threatening suicide, he determined that there was no longer an exigency justifying further action, and he left the property. We conclude that, under the particular factual circumstances of this case, Deputy Spielman's conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and he is therefore entitled to qualified immunity. Furthermore, even assuming arguendo a constitutional violation, a reasonable officer in Deputy Spielman's shoes would not have known that his conduct was unlawful. Roberts has cited no binding precedent that clearly established that probable cause and exigent circumstances immediately evaporate once an officer performing a welfare check for a possibly suicidal person sees that the person is merely alive. For these reasons, we REVERSE the district court's order denying Deputy Spielman's motion for summary judgment on Roberts's § 1983 claim, and we REMAND this case to the district court for entry of judgment in favor of Jason Spielman on Roberts's § 1983 claim and for further proceedings. [4] REVERSED.