Opinion ID: 380335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Order of Review

Text: 23 Review of this patronage case can be divided into three steps. The logical first step would be to determine, assuming that plaintiffs' allegations are true, whether the defendant's conduct was an impermissible infringement of first amendment freedoms. Precepts of judicial decisionmaking, however, require consideration first of the nonconstitutional grounds raised by appellant. See New York Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 582-83 n.22, 99 S.Ct. 1355, 1363-1364, 59 L.Ed.2d 587 (1979); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568-69, 67 S.Ct. 1409, 1419, 91 L.Ed. 1666 (1947) quoting Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). We will therefore begin by assuming that plaintiffs' allegations would support a finding of a first amendment violation, and turn to the second question: whether the plaintiffs have met their burden of showing a constitutional deprivation. The final inquiry is whether defendant rebutted this showing with sufficient evidence that the same employment decision would have been reached regardless of the constitutionally protected conduct.