Opinion ID: 3015609
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Government’s Use of Georgacarakos’ Silence

Text: Georgacarkos’ strongest argument, at least at first blush, is that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when the prosecutor allegedly commented on his postMiranda silence during an extensive cross-examination of him. Two questions are challenged: “[W]hat did you share with the FBI in terms of information that night about your presence in Mr. Anderson’s cell?” and “Was this part of the trick, not to tell the FBI that you were involved in a self-defense situation?” 744a; see Appellant’s Br. at 32. Georgacarkos responded that he told the FBI agents “nothing” other than details about his religion and admitting the “obvious” about being found in cell B-206 on the night of the 2 The remaining seven issues do not warrant discussion: (1) the extensive preindictment delay violated his due process rights; (2) because Kowaalski pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter under a defense of heat of passion, Georgacarakos was also only guilty of voluntary manslaughter, for “heat of passion for one is heat of passion for both”; (3) disclosure of a multi-page document violated the co-defendants’ oral joint defense agreement; (4) Kowaalski’s attorney should have turned over copies of his investigator’s interviews because they were paid for with joint defense funds; (5) the District Court erroneously denied his Rule 29 motion at the conclusion of the government’s case; (6) the “abnormality of the verdict form” warranted a new trial; and (7) the District Court erred in refusing to impose the death penalty. 3 murder. Georgacarakos also challenges the prosecutor’s comment during closing argument that Georgacarakos “told the FBI very little, and only what was convenient.” (881a). No objection was made either to the two questions on cross-examination or to the one comment on closing argument. Thus, as Georgacarkos concedes, plain error applies. Although the Supreme Court has held that a prosecutor may use a defendant’s post-Miranda statements for impeachment purposes, see Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408 (1980), it has also held that a prosecutor may not cross-examine a defendant about his post-Miranda silence. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976). Georgacarakos claims there was a Doyle violation, while the government relies on the Anderson line of cases to argue that the prosecutor’s questions and his comment were permissible. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Agee, 597 F.2d 350, 354 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc) (it was the defendant’s attempted deception, not his silence, that the prosecutor used to impeach the defendant). As we emphasized in Johnson, “[I]t is important to evaluate the prosecutor’s question in context.” 302 F.3d at 144. The context here is this. When Georgacarakos encountered the FBI following the murder, he answered questions about his religion and the “obvious” fact of where he was found; he was not “silent.” So, when asked on crossexamination what he shared with the FBI about his presence in the cell, he admitted what he had said, but also said that he had told the FBI nothing about self-defense. 774a, 778a. The prosecutor then asked if it was part of the “trick” not to tell the FBI that he was 4 “involved in a self-defense situation.” 774a. This question was in direct response to Georgacarakos’ repeated statements on direct examination – “we decided to try to trick the government by not letting on that that was what we were going to do,” namely, that he and Kowaalski were not going to raise self-defense at the outset, 726a; “the trick was that we were gong to pretend . . . it wasn’t us . . . you can’t prove it was us. And that was the trick of it,” 729a; [i]t was going to be a trick on the prosecutor, 730a; “[i]t was my trick, my idea,” 732a. To ask whether it was “part of the trick, not to tell the FBI that [he was] involved in a self-defense situation” was perfectly appropriate. So, too, was the lone comment on summation. But even if we assume some sort of Doyle violation, before an appellate court can correct an error not objected to at trial, the defendant has the burden of proving that the (1) error (2) was plain and (3) affected substantial rights. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002). If the first three conditions are satisfied, we may notice the forfeited error in the rare case where the error “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). Georgacarakos has not produced any evidence to suggest that the government’s improper use of his “silence” affected his substantial rights, i.e., altered the outcome of the trial. Accordingly, this argument is unavailing.