Opinion ID: 1954405
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Continuing TortSuccessor Business Liability

Text: The more subtle and demanding question is when the statute of limitations begins to run on a hostile-work-environment sexual harassment claim in the context of successor-business enterprises, each of which has contributed to the creation of a hostile environment. [2] K-Mart contends that any claim for sexual harassment against it must have been brought within two years of the change in ownership that occurred on January 10, 1994. When an individual is subject to a continual, cumulative pattern of tortious conduct, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the wrongful action ceases. See, e.g., Cyrus v. Nero, 546 N.E. 2d 328, 331 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (discussing continuing tort doctrine). Although some jurisdictions have asserted that the continuing tort doctrine should be applied broadly as a rule of equitable tolling, no consensus exists regarding whether the rule is one of accrual or of tolling. James R. MacAyeal, The Discovery Rule and the Continuing Violation Doctrine as Exceptions to the Statute of Limitations for Civil Environmental Penalty Claims, 15 Va. Envtl. L.J. 589, 623-24 (1996). In Smith v. Tandy Corp., the court refused to expand the doctrine to harassment claims because the plaintiff was fully aware of the tortious acts ..., and she certainly could have filed the suit within the two-year limitations period. 738 F.Supp. 521, 523 (S.D.Ga.1990). On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Louisiana recognizes that it is the cumulation of acts and conduct, and the resulting cumulation of damages, that transforms the individual incidents of harassment into an actionable tort. Bustamento v. Tucker, 607 So. 2d 532, 540 (La.1992). The court noted that hostile environment claims are often based on continuing violations because [i]n a hostile environment, an individual feels constantly threatened even in the absence of constant harassment. ... A logical corollary is that once a pattern of harassment has created a psychologically offensive work environment, the status quo of such continuous wrongful conduct can be based on the harasser's mere presence. [ Id. at 541 (internal citations omitted).] Consequently, the court held that in an emotional distress claim stemming from sexual harassment, when the acts or conduct are continuous on an almost daily basis, by the same actor, of the same nature, and the conduct becomes tortious and actionable because of its continuous, cumulative, synergistic nature, the statute of limitations period does not commence until the final act has occurred or the conduct has ceased. Id. at 542; see also Paine v. Department of Mental Health Servs., No. C-92-2953-SC, 1995 WL 56588 at  (N.D.Cal. Feb.7, 1995) (noting that sexual harassment can involve a series of acts which only cumulatively alert one to a legitimate claim for sexual harassment.); Hubbard v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 330 N.W. 2d 428, 440 n. 11 (Minn.1983) (finding continuing violation when the discriminatory acts of an employer over a period of time indicate a systematic repetition of the same policy and constitute a sufficiently integrated pattern to form, in effect, a single discriminatory act.); Cyrus, supra, 546 N.E. 2d at 331 (observing that when wrong is continual, statute of limitations is tolled so that it does not commence running until the wrongful act ceases.); Collins v. Willcox, Inc., 158 Misc. 2d 54, 600 N.Y.S. 2d 884, 886 (Sup.Ct.1992) (recognizing that continuing sexual harassment claim's aggregate effect can give rise to a claim of emotional distress). Thus, a significant number of courts recognize that the cumulative effect of a series of discriminatory or harassing events represents a single cause of action for tolling purposes and that the statute of limitations period does not commence until the date of the final act of harassment. Our Appellate Division has reached a similar conclusion. See Terry v. Mercer County Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 173 N.J.Super. 249, 253, 414 A. 2d 30 (App.Div. 1980) (relaxing filing requirement under N.J.S.A. 10:5-18 of LAD, which requires that complaint be filed in DCR within 180 days of alleged tortious conduct, [i]f the discriminatory conduct can be said to constitute a continuing violation ....) (citations omitted), modified by, 86 N.J. 141, 430 A. 2d 194 (1981). In this case, the relevant final date of harassment is March 4, 1994, the day when Wal-Mart terminated Wilson. If plaintiff can demonstrate that Gallo's discriminatory conduct represents a continuum of harassment that began prior to January 10, 1994, while both were employed by K-mart, and continued through March 4, 1994, when Wal-Mart/Gallo terminated plaintiff, her claim against K-Mart may not be extinguished. Her complaint filed on March 4, 1996 may have been timely because it was filed within two years of the last act of continuous harassment. Obviously, that conclusion raises difficulties. Because the claim of sexual harassment (if viewed as a continuing tort) is indivisible, it would be unfair to require Wal-Mart or K-Mart to pay all of the damages. An allocation of damages would be required. Although difficult, the allocation issues are not unmanageable. See Olah v. Slobodian, 119 N.J. 119, 131-34, 574 A. 2d 411 (1990) (discussing allocation of damages between pre-existing and new causes of harm). In some circumstances, a successor will be held liable as a matter of law for the employment discrimination of a predecessor. See Musikiwamba v. ESSI, Inc., 760 F. 2d 740, 750 (7th Cir.1985) (describing nine factors for determining whether successor corporation is liable for civil rights violation of predecessor); but see Forde v. Kee Lox Mfg. Co., 584 F. 2d 4, 5-6 (2d Cir.1978) (finding no substantial continuity of identity before and after change); cf. Akef v. BASF Corp., 140 N.J. 408, 415-16, 658 A. 2d 1252 (1995) (holding that to apportion liability to prior employer in context of workers' compensation, plaintiff must demonstrate that underlying condition was discoverable and measurable). In other contexts, we have considered significant the allocation that the parties themselves have made for successor and predecessor liabilities. See Mettinger v. Globe Slicing Mach. Co., 153 N.J. 371, 386, 390-91, 709 A. 2d 779 (1998) (holding it is not unfair for distributor of defective product to maintain action for indemnification against successor to product-line manufacturer). If the parties have provided for predecessor/successor liability for employment discrimination claims, the trial court should give effect to such provisions and simply explain to the jury that the parties have agreed on the issues of allocation and that it should return a single sum of damages for the injury for any period of sexual harassment that it finds compensable. [3] If the parties have not made provision for such allocation of liabilities, the factfinder may be requested to apportion the single sum of damages between the wrongdoers on each of the theories of liability claimed. Obviously, there can be no double counting.