Opinion ID: 1427529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: The proper test to determine a claim of insufficient evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a rational trier of fact could find appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Barnes (1986) 42 Cal.3d 284, 303 [228 Cal. Rptr. 228, 721 P.2d 110]; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 576-578 [162 Cal. Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, 16 A.L.R.4th 1255].) As explained above, true jury unanimity is impossible when generic evidence is the sole basis of a conviction for committing specific criminal acts. But to say as a matter of law that 12 jurors could not achieve agreement beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented is tantamount to declaring the evidence insufficient. Lack of jury unanimity plainly violates due process; likewise evidence that does not allow jury unanimity is insufficient. The majority opinion, in addition to its lengthy though largely irrelevant discussion of the child/witness's credibility, argues that generic testimony is not insufficient because [a]s many of the cases make clear, the particular details surrounding a child molestation charge are not elements of the offense and are unnecessary to sustain a conviction. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 315.) But this formulation misconstrues the dilemma of generic testimony. The need to prove that specific acts of lewd or lascivious conduct were committed is axiomatic, arising from the statute itself; the only question is whether the courts should accept nonspecific testimony to prove these acts. As explained above, such proof is insufficient as a matter of law because jurors are unable to achieve true unanimity to convict a defendant of specific criminal acts.