Opinion ID: 2277546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Same Claim

Text: In order for res judicata to be applicable, Dr. deLeon must be attempting to relitigate the same claim or cause of action in the second action as in the first. In determining whether claims are the same for purposes of res judicata, we have in the past sometimes utilized a same evidence test. See MPC, Inc. v. Kenny, supra, 279 Md. at 33, 367 A.2d at 489. We have indicated, however, that the concept of a claim is broad. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Lupton, 253 Md. 93, 252 A.2d 71 (1969) (defining a claim as a group or aggregate of operative facts giving ground or occasion for judicial action, as distinguished from the narrow concept of a `cause of action'). Recently, in Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, 309 Md. 487, 525 A.2d 232 (1987), we adopted the transaction test, as set forth in § 24 of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, as the basic test for determining when two claims or causes of action are the same for purposes of res judicata. See also Rowland v. Harrison, supra, 320 Md. at 230 n. 2, 577 A.2d at 54 n. 2; Shum v. Gaudreau, supra, 317 Md. at 54-55, 562 A.2d at 710. In Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, supra, 309 Md. at 497-498, 525 A.2d at 237-238, Judge Rodowsky for the Court explained as follows (footnote omitted): Restatement (Second) of Judgments describes the current approach of courts to answering the same claim  separate claim conundrum in § 24, comment a, at 197: The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of relief flowing from those theories, that may be available to the plaintiff; regardless of the number of primary rights that may have been invaded; and regardless of the variations in the evidence needed to support the theories or rights. The transaction is the basis of the litigative unit or entity which may not be split. Consequently, the American Law Institute in § 24 of Restatement (Second) of Judgments has adopted the following standards for determining the `Dimensions of Claim for Purposes of Merger or Bar  General Rule Concerning Splitting': (1) When a valid and final judgment rendered in an action extinguishes the plaintiff's claim pursuant to the rules of merger or bar (see §§ 18, 19) the claim extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. (2) What factual grouping constitutes a `transaction', and what groupings constitute a `series', are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage. [6] In light of these principles, the Court in Bilbrough, 309 Md. at 500, 525 A.2d at 238-239, held that the claims there were separate because two separate transactions were involved. In reaching this conclusion, the Court pointed out that the two actions concerned different matters, that the core of the activities complained of by the respondent in the two actions occurred at different times, and that the activities occurred at different places. Applying the factors set forth in Bilbrough and in § 24 of the Restatement to the instant case, however, compels the conclusion that the earlier suit against the hospital and the present suit involve the same transaction or the same series of transactions. With respect to whether the facts of each case are related in time, space, origin or motivation (§ 24(2)), both the alleged defamatory statements in the federal case and the alleged defamatory statements in the present case occurred over the same period of time, in the same place, and had essentially the same origin and motivation. In fact, to a great extent, the two lawsuits are based on the same alleged defamatory statements. As earlier discussed, Dr. deLeon's federal court complaint broadly charged that he was defamed by many statements, written and oral by hospital personnel, during both the period of his residency training and the period of his house staff appointment, to the effect that his judgment and clinical skills were unsatisfactory and that he had been incompetent. The federal court complaint encompassed both the allegedly false conclusory opinions and determinations to this effect, as well as the fals[e] ... underlying medical and other information upon which such opinions and publications were based. The federal complaint expressly included the information offered in support of [the hospital's] conclusions which was procured by Dr. Macon and was allegedly false, unsubstantiated and distorted. The federal complaint, therefore, was in part based on the very same allegedly defamatory statements, given to Dr. Macon by Nurses Slear and Broussard, which are the subject of the present case. The alleged defamatory statements in this case not only were made at the same time, at the same place, and with the same origin or motivation, but they are the same as many of the statements on which the federal litigation was based. Dr. deLeon, in his brief in this Court, argues that his focus in the federal case was upon the hospital's denial of privileges and upon the statements made by Dr. Macon. Dr. deLeon argues that the issues in the federal litigation were whether Dr. Macon acted with malice or in bad faith, whether Dr. Macon was guilty of egregious conduct, and whether Dr. Macon's statements were constitutionally protected or privileged. Dr. deLeon continues (brief, at 17): Here, by contrast, the essential and material facts are statements made by Slear and Broussard and their knowledge that their statements were false or made with a reckless disregard of the truth. The Defendants' alleged statements and publications in this case are different from those made by Dr. Macon, although Dr. Macon may have republished the statements of the defendants. That Dr. deLeon in the federal case may have focussed on the hospital's final action and on Dr. Macon's statements, which is understandable as Dr. Macon was the only individual defendant named in that case, does not change the nature of the claims set out in the federal complaint. The defamation count against the hospital in the federal action was not limited to the hospital's ultimate decision or the statements by Dr. Macon; in fact, the count against the hospital did not even mention Dr. Macon. The federal complaint generally referred to numerous written and oral defamatory statements on behalf of the hospital, as well as the underlying information on which the statements were based. To reiterate, the complaint filed in the United States District Court clearly embraced the statements by Nurses Slear and Broussard which are the subject of this state court suit. Moreover, as previously noted, supra n. 4, after filing the complaint, the plaintiff in the federal case did not limit himself to the hospital's final decision or to the statements by Dr. Macon. As Chief Judge Harvey indicated for the federal district court, Dr. deLeon deposed a multitude of persons, including Nurses Slear and Broussard, in a desperate effort to uncover evidence which might support his claims, but Dr. deLeon was completely unsuccessful. In ruling on the defendants' motion for summary judgment, Chief Judge Harvey in his memorandum opinion considered inter alia the deposition testimony of the many ... nurses who had contact with Dr. deLeon. Both Chief Judge Harvey's opinion and the Fourth Circuit's opinion ( e.g., 871 F.2d at 1235-1236) discussed some of the very incidents recounted by Nurses Slear and Broussard and which furnish the grounds for the present state court action. Chief Judge Harvey also pointed out that the [p]laintiff has sought to relitigate in this Court each and every controverted incident discussed before the various hospital bodies that considered his application. It is obvious that the alleged defamation in the present case, i.e., the statements during 1983-1985 by Nurses Slear and Broussard to Dr. Macon, about incidents involving Dr. deLeon and relating to Dr. deLeon's professional fitness and competency, constituted an integral part of the claims in the earlier federal litigation. The incidents recounted by the two nurses were largely the foundation for the actions taken by Dr. Macon and the hospital; they were the core of the federal suit. In addition, the principal damage allegedly resulting from the defamation in the present case was Dr. deLeon's being denied privileges at St. Joseph's Hospital and the harm to his career and reputation resulting therefrom. This was identical to the principal damage claimed in the federal case. Cf. Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, supra, 309 Md. at 501, 504, 525 A.2d at 239-241. Furthermore, the federal courts' rulings on certain specific issues, such as the effect of the release signed by Dr. deLeon and conditional privilege under Maryland law, would appear to be dispositive in the present case. Under the principles set forth by this Court in Kent County Bd. of Educ. v. Bilbrough, supra , the earlier federal suit and the present action both arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions. Consequently, they involved the same claim or claims. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City, therefore, correctly held that the principle of res judicata bars Dr. deLeon and his wife from relitigating the same claim or claims. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED TO THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENTS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE PLAINTIFFS.