Opinion ID: 2594892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Alleged Interference With Jury Deliberations

Text: During its guilt deliberations, the jury asked the court questions regarding the verdict forms. Defendants contend the court's responses and other actions improperly interfered with the jury's deliberations. We disagree. The court merely clarified some points of confusion and then permitted the jury to continue its deliberations.
In June 1990, a few months before the crimes in this case, the voters approved Proposition 115, which made substantive changes in felony-murder special-circumstances provisions, including amending subdivision (b) and adding subdivisions (c) and (d) to section 190.2. ( Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 981, 986-987, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 102, 831 P.2d 327.) [8] Before these amendments, for a felony-murder special circumstance to apply, the defendant had to either be the actual killer or intend to kill. ( People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1147, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306.) Under Proposition 115, a person other than the actual killer is subject to the death penalty or life without parole if that person was a major participant in the underlying felony (here robbery) and either intended to kill or acted with reckless indifference to human life. (See People v. Estrada (1995) 11 Cal.4th 568, 572, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 586, 904 P.2d 1197.) At the time of trial, these provisions  including the reckless indifference to human life provision  were fairly new, and the court and parties had to devise a verdict form for this new version of the robbery-murder special circumstance. The verdict form that the court originally gave the jury included three questions to which the jury was to answer true or not true. The first question was whether the murder was committed under the robbery-murder special circumstance. The second was whether the defendant was the actual killer. The third was whether the defendant was either the actual killer or an aider and abettor who either intended to kill a human being or aid another in the killing of a human being or with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant aided and abetted the commission of the crime of robbery which resulted in the death of a human being. The court instructed the jury, If you find that a defendant was not the actual killer of a human being or if you are unable to decide whether the defendant was the actual killer, you cannot find the special circumstance true as to that defendant unless it found true the third question on the verdict form. (Italics added.) But the original verdict form itself did not state what the jury should do it if could not decide the second question unanimously. During the guilt deliberations, the jury sent the court a note asking, Is a unanimous decision required for all parts of special circumstance verdict. After discussion with the parties, the court answered the question, Yes. The foreperson of the jury indicated there was some confusion between the instructions and the verdict form. The court told the jury that if it was still confused, it should go back into the jury room and submit a new question. The jury resumed its deliberations. Thereafter, out of the jury's presence, the court and parties discussed the jury's concern further. The district attorney suggested the jury might have been confused as to what it should do if it could not answer the second question unanimously. The district attorney suggested, and the court agreed, that the jury should be told that if it found the defendant was not the actual killer or was unable to decide the question unanimously, it should proceed to the third question. The court stated, It seems clear to me now that I reviewed that verdict form that that should have been included initially. But the court took no further action pending further questions from the jury. The next day, November 7, 1991, the district attorney expressed concerns out of the jury's presence about a then recent Court of Appeal decision that had held that Proposition 115's amendments to section 190.2 were ineffective. At that time, this court had granted review in the case but had not yet decided it. (See Yoshisato v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th 978, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 102, 831 P.2d 327.) The district attorney was concerned that if the Court of Appeal's view prevailed, the verdict might later be invalidated. She suggested the verdict form be changed to require the jury to find an intent to kill before it found true the felony-murder special circumstance. The court told the jury to suspend deliberations while it considered the matter. It reviewed the Court of Appeal opinion, noted that it was not binding because this court had granted review, and disagreed with it. It anticipated (correctly, see Yoshisato v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th 978, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 102, 831 P.2d 327) that we would overturn the Court of Appeal's judgment and hold that Proposition 115's amendments to section 190.2 were effective. Accordingly, it took no action on the district attorney's request and permitted the jury to resume deliberating. The jury then asked the court another question: When rendering a decision for `verdict special circumstance' which provides for three findings (true or not true), and assuming a unanimous decision was rendered for the first finding, would it be acceptable to leave the second and third finding blank without negating the first finding and, therefore, the overall verdict? The court and parties conferred on how to respond. With the agreement of everyone, including defendants, the court instructed the jury that if it was unable to agree on the second question, it should leave it blank and go on to the third question. The foreperson asked another question. The court did not want to answer a new question at that point without carefully considering it. It told the jury to resume deliberations and to ask further questions in writing if it had any. The jury then resumed deliberations. Later, the court told the parties it intended to call the jury back and ask if it had further questions. Counsel for Cleveland objected that doing so in the absence of further questions from the jury would be invading the province of the jury. The other two defense attorneys submitted the matter without comment. The court called in the jury and asked if it had another question. The foreperson said the jury might have one. The court then excused the jury for the day, six minutes earlier than the normal time the jury stopped deliberating. The court suggested that if the district attorney wished to have a new, clearer verdict form, she should prepare one for the next day. The next morning, the jury did not resume deliberations immediately. The court and parties conferred to discuss possible new verdict forms. At the district attorney's request, and over defendants' objections, the court decided to give the jury the new forms. The court ascertained from the foreperson that the jury had a problem with the verdict form as presented in reference to the special circumstances concerning murder in the commission of robbery. Because of that concern, and because it found that the original verdict form was inartfully drafted, it told the jury it would substitute a new verdict form. It instructed the jury that the fact that I am giving you a new verdict does not mean on my part that any of the verdict forms necessarily apply to any of the defendants, that's for the jury to determine. It gave the jury the new forms and told it to resume deliberating. The new form stated, If you are unable to unanimously agree that the defendant was the actual killer, you may leave the answer to the question in paragraph 2 blank; and If you have answered the question in paragraph 2 `not true' or you left it blank, then proceed to the question in paragraph 3. The jury resumed deliberating at 9:48 a.m. that morning. After the jury resumed deliberations, Cleveland moved for a mistrial based on these events. The court denied the motion. The jury reached its verdict later that day. It found not true that Veasley or Charan was the actual killer and left the question blank as to Cleveland. It found the third question true as to all three defendants.
Defendants contend the court improperly and prejudicially interfered with the jury's deliberations. As to Veasley, except for the contention that the court should not have supplied a new verdict form, the issue is not cognizable on appeal. Veasley did not otherwise object to the court's actions. ( People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 730, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332.) Veasley contends his attorney was ineffective for not objecting. However, competent counsel may reasonably decline to object to the court's responding to questions from the jury and suspending deliberations while it considered what to do with an appellate court decision that had invalidated part of the legal basis on which the prosecution against his client was proceeding. In any event, we see no error. Section 1138 provides that when, after they have begun deliberating, the jury desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case, ... the information required must be given.... (See People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d 68, 97, 279 Cal.Rptr. 276, 806 P.2d 1311.) This provision imposes on the court the primary duty to help the jury understand the legal principles it is asked to apply. ( Ibid. ) The court fulfilled this duty. The jury sought the court's advice on a matter about which it was confused. It was clearly having difficulty deciding whether any of the defendants was the actual shooter, which was understandable given the absence of evidence on the point. It was uncertain whether it had to decide that question unanimously and how it should proceed if it could not do so. The court clarified the point in a way everyone, including defendants, agreed on. It instructed that if the jury could not decide whether a defendant was the actual killer it should leave the second question blank and move on to the third question. This instruction was correct, as the jury could validly find true the robbery murder special circumstance without determining whether any particular defendant had been the actual killer. Eventually, to make matters as clear for the jury as possible, the court substituted new verdict forms that explained the correct procedure precisely. Contrary to defendants' argument, the court did not coerce the jury in the slightest. Indeed, when it supplied the new verdict form, it carefully reiterated that whether any of the forms applied to any defendant was solely for the jury to determine. Thus, the court did not interfere with the jury's deliberations; it provided guidance when the jury requested it. Cleveland argues that the special questions on the verdict form were not required, and they prejudiced him because the jury eventually found not true that Veasley or Charan was the actual killer but did not decide the question as to him. But whether the questions were required, merely asking them was not error. (See People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 511-512, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119.) Indeed, all the parties agreed to them at trial. We also see no prejudice regarding either the guilt or penalty determination. At most, the verdict showed uncertainty at the guilt phase whether Cleveland was the actual killer. But the evidence, not the verdict form, created the uncertainty. Moreover, who the actual killer was was irrelevant to the guilt verdict. At the penalty phase, Cleveland was permitted to present additional evidence (not admissible earlier) that suggested he was not the actual killer. Defendants also argue that the court's suspending deliberations was itself coercive and prejudicial. It was neither. The court acted cautiously in deciding how to respond to the jury's questions and what to do about the appellate court decision, and properly so. In a capital trial especially, the court should proceed cautiously. It properly suspended the deliberations briefly to consider important legal issues and make sure the jury was correctly instructed, and then permitted the jury to resume deliberations. Ultimately, a correctly instructed jury rendered an uncoerced verdict finding true as to each defendant both the robbery-murder special circumstance and all of its necessary predicate facts. The court did not err during deliberations. [9]