Opinion ID: 746887
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reliability: The expert's opinion or inference must be

Text: 27 grounded in the methodology of his discipline. 28 The Daubert court read Rule 702 to provide that  '[i]f scientific technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue'  an expert  'may testify thereto.'  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589, 113 S.Ct. at 2794 (emphasis by Court deleted). Knowledge in this context  'applies to any body of known facts or to any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good grounds.'  Id. at 590, 113 S.Ct. at 2795(quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1252 (1986)). 29 In Daubert, the Court indicated that, (1) scientific knowledge within Rule 702 means principles, theories, techniques or inferences derived by the scientific method or by a body of sound scientific methods; and (2) that the proffered expert's opinion, inference, or testimony based on scientific knowledge, in order to have evidentiary reliability or trustworthiness, must be derived or inferred by the same methods. Id. at 590 n. 9, 113 S.Ct. at 2795; See also the court's general observations on principal scientific methods. Id. at 593-594, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-2797. 30 By the same token, we conclude that, under Rule 702, an opinion based on other technical or specialized knowledge, must be grounded in the principles, methods and procedures of the particular field of knowledge involved. Every discipline employs a body of methods, rules, and postulates, i.e., methodology, both in its ordinary functions and in developing and adopting new concepts, techniques, and analogues. Therefore, the knowledge of each discipline, under Rule 702, is both its principles and methodology and the theories, techniques or inferences produced through its methodology. Thus, the proffered opinion of any expert in a field of knowledge, in order to be evidentiarily reliable, must either be based soundly on the current knowledge, principles and methodology of the expert's discipline or be soundly inferred or derived therefrom. 31 As the American College of Trial Lawyers' report concludes, [W]hether the testimony concerns economic principles, accounting standards, property valuation or other non-scientific subjects, it should be evaluated by reference to the 'knowledge and experience' of that particular field. To that extent, Daubert ought to be regarded as universally applicable to expert evidence. American College of Trial Lawyers, Standards and Procedures for Determining the Admissibility of Expert Evidence after Daubert, 157 F.R.D. 571, 579 (1994). 32 For the same reasons, this court recently held in Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984 (5th Cir.1997) that the application of Daubert in determining the admissibility of expert testimony is not limited to scientific knowledge or novel scientific evidence. Id. at 989-991. Moreover, in Watkins, this court concluded that: 33 [W]hether an expert's testimony is based on scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, Daubert and Rule 702 demand that the district court evaluate the methods, analysis, and principles relied upon in reaching the opinion. The court should ensure that the opinion comports with applicable professional standards outside the courtroom and that it will have a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the] discipline. 34 Id. at 991(quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796.) (also citing and quoting Cummins v. Lyle Indus., 93 F.3d 362, 366-371 (7th Cir.1996)(Rule 702 demands that experts adhere to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in their professional work. Id. at 369)(citing Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir.1996))); See also Tyus v. Urban Search Management, 102 F.3d 256, 263 (7th Cir.1996)(Social science testimony ... must be tested to be sure that the person possesses genuine expertise in a field and that her court testimony 'adheres to the same standards of intellectual rigor that are demanded in [her] professional work.' ) (quoting Braun v. Lorillard Inc., 84 F.3d 230, 234 (7th Cir.1996)). 35