Opinion ID: 537614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: solving the puzzle

Text: 15 Prior to October 1986, section 841(b)(1)(B) mandated the imposition of a special parole term in a case like this one. The ADAA, as we have shown, modified the statute's penalty provision to abolish special parole and substitute supervised release. Yet, the concept of supervised release, as Ferryman accurately pointed out in his initial motion to correct his sentence, did not take final shape until November 1, 1987 (when 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583 became law). Appellant argues, in effect, that for offenses committed during the hiatus period, which would have been within section 841(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1984) prior to October 27, 1986, neither special parole nor supervised release was imposable. We are unpersuaded. 16 In the first place, there is nothing to commend reading both special parole and supervised release out of the statutory scheme. It seems perfectly clear that Congress, notwithstanding its somewhat inartful scrivening, intended that those who violated section 841(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1984) remain subject throughout to some form of post-confinement monitoring. Appellant has been unable to suggest any good reason for implying the existence of a monitoring gap during the hiatus period--and we are aware of none. The real question in the section 841(b)(1)(B) milieu is not whether Congress opted for post-confinement monitoring during the hiatus period, but what modality it intended the courts to employ to accomplish such monitoring. 17 Because ADAA section 1002 contained no specified effective date, the amendments embodied therein have, in general, been held effective from and after the date of enactment (October 27, 1986). See, e.g., United States v. Padilla, 869 F.2d 372, 381-82 (8th Cir.) (increased penalties applicable to offense committed in March 1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 3223, 106 L.Ed.2d 572 (1989); United States v. Posner, 865 F.2d 654, 660 (5th Cir.1989) (no parole provision of ADAA applies to February 1987 offense); see also United States v. Levario, 877 F.2d 1483, 1487 (10th Cir.1989); United States v. Meyers, 847 F.2d 1408, 1414-16 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Smith, 840 F.2d 886, 889-90 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 154, 102 L.Ed.2d 125 (1988). This is in accord with the presumption that statutes become effective at the moment they are signed into law. See, e.g., United States v. Robles-Pantoja, 887 F.2d 1250, 1257 (5th Cir.1989); Levario, 877 F.2d at 1487; Meyers, 847 F.2d at 1415. But, that rule of thumb is merely an aid to ascertaining legislative intent. Ultimately, absent a clear manifestation of contrary intent, a newly-enacted or revised statute is presumed to be harmonious with existing law and its judicial construction. Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270, 277 (8th Cir.1983). The effective forthwith principle does not displace general statutory construction rules, which remain applicable to questions surrounding the time when a statute is to go into effect. See, e.g., United States v. Shaffer, 789 F.2d 682, 686 (9th Cir.1986) (where no date is prescribed for implementation of statute, issue must be resolved under usual tenets of statutory construction); see also United States v. Affleck, 765 F.2d 944, 948 (10th Cir.1985) (in absence of congressional intent to the contrary, law takes effect on date of enactment). One such tenet, of course, is that statutes must always be interpreted with a view toward avoiding absurd results and resolving internal inconsistencies. See United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); Hernandez-Colon v. Secretary of Labor, 835 F.2d 958, 960 (1st Cir.1988); see also Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121, 128 (1st Cir.1979) (when plain meaning of statute produces a result at variance with the policy of the legislation as a whole and an aid to the construction of the meaning is available, there is no rule of law which forbids its use, however clear the words may appear on superficial examination). 18 In an instance where, as here, section 1004 (which expressly delays the interchange of supervised release for special parole) is in apparent conflict with the effective forthwith presumption that animates other aspects of section 1002, the usual canons of construction also require that we prefer the specific over the general, what is express over what might otherwise be implied. See Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 1752-53, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550-51, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 2482-83, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974); United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1132 (1st Cir.1981). Given the close similarity between the two types of post-confinement monitoring, see infra, and the fact that standards for the imposition of supervised release were not solidly in place until November 1, 1987 (when 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583 became effective), we believe it best effectuates Congress' discernible intent, where supervised release is not an innovation but merely a replacement for special parole, to read the statutory interplay as implementing a simultaneous one-time swap of one for the other. In such a circumstance, we agree with the Fifth Circuit that tying the effective date of the change to the effective date of the implementing statute would seem the more logical arrangement. United States v. Byrd, 837 F.2d 179, 181 n. 8 (5th Cir.1988). 19 We hold that, with respect to cocaine distribution offenses committed during the hiatus period and falling within the ambit of the 1984 version of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(b)(1)(B), ADAA Sec. 1004 sufficed to delay the effective date of supervised release and thereby preserved the preexisting special parole requirements. 4 Accord United States v. Robles-Pantoja, 887 F.2d at 1257-61; United States v. Posner, 865 F.2d at 657-60; United States v. Smith, 840 F.2d at 889-90; United States v. Brundage, 709 F.Supp. 10, 12 (D.D.C.1989); United States v. Robinson, 697 F.Supp. 1506, 1507 (D.Minn.1988); but see United States v. Chica, 707 F.Supp. 84, 85-86 (D.R.I.1989) (imposing, and adhering to, term of supervised release for section 841(b)(1)(B) offense committed during hiatus period). A special parole term was, therefore, not only imposable, but obligatory, for the offense of conviction.