Opinion ID: 2600503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The trooper properly informed Higgins about the recording

Text: ¶ 44 Higgins argues that he did not receive a proper warning because the trooper only informed Higgins that he was being recorded and did not specify that he was making a sound recording. RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) requires that an officer inform any person being recorded by sound under this subsection (1)(c) that a sound recording is being made and that the statement so informing the person shall be included in the sound recording. RCW 9.73.090(1)(c). However, the statute further specifies that the law enforcement officer is not required to inform a person being recorded by video that the person is being recorded by video. Id. ¶ 45 The State argues that RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) specifies that officers must warn about sound recording because the statute does not regulate video recordings. Legislative history supports the interpretation that the word sound is present in the statute only to distinguish sound recordings from video recordings. This court may consider sequential drafts of a bill in order to help determine the legislature's intent. State v. Martin, 94 Wash.2d 1, 19, 614 P.2d 164 (1980). The original version of Substitute H.B. 2903, which added RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) to the privacy act, did not include the requirement that officers inform traffic stop detainees about the recordings. SUBSTITUTE H.B. 2903, 56th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.2000). The House subsequently adopted an amendment to the bill that provided that officers must warn any individuals being recorded that a recording was being made, but did not specifically refer to sound recordings. Id. The final version of the bill added the language that officers need not warn individuals about video recordings and rewrote the warning provision to apply only to sound recordings. Id. This history indicates that the legislature added the word sound to the statute in order to distinguish sound recordings, which require a warning, from video recordings, which do not require a warning. ¶ 46 This interpretation is consistent with the plain language of the statute. RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) does not mandate that an officer must use specific language when informing a traffic stop detainee that the officer is recording their conversation. If the legislature had intended that officers use specific words when informing drivers of recordings, it could have specified the words to use. Moreover, Higgins never argued that he did not receive proper notice that the trooper was making a sound recording of their conversation. He merely argues that the recording is inadmissible based on a technicalitya technicality that is not specifically required by the statute. ¶ 47 We agree with the Court of Appeals that the trooper's statement that he was recording his conversation with Higgins adequately informed Higgins that the trooper was making a sound recording. Thus, we hold that Trooper Cheek complied with the requirements of RCW 9.73.090(1)(c) and properly informed Higgins that he was recording their conversation. As a result, we remand Higgins' case for a hearing, which may include the admissible recording of his traffic stop.