Opinion ID: 187177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ndaa 2008

Text: On December 14, 2007 the Congress passed the first version of the NDAA, § 1083 of which would have amended the terrorism exception to foreign sovereign immunity by striking 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7), the exception upon which the plaintiffs relied, and enacting a new exception, to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1605A. President Bush sought to pocket veto the bill because he believed § 1083 would threaten the reconstruction of Iraq: [S]ection 1083 would risk the freezing of substantial Iraqi assets in the United States.... Section 1083 also would expose Iraq to new liability of at least several billion dollars by undoing judgments favorable to Iraq, by foreclosing available defenses on which Iraq is relying in pending litigation, and by creating a new Federal cause of action backed by the prospect of punitive damages to support claims that may previously have been foreclosed. Memorandum of Disapproval, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1641, 1641 (Dec. 28, 2007). The Congress subsequently passed a revised version of the NDAA, which included a new provision (§ 1083(d)) that authorized the President, upon making certain findings, to waive any provision of [§ 1083 of the NDAA] with respect to Iraq. The President signed that bill into law and promptly exercised his authority under § 1083(d)(1) to waive all provisions of section 1083 with respect to Iraq, and all agencies and instrumentalities thereof. Presidential Determination No.2008-9, 73 Fed.Reg. 6571 (Jan. 28, 2008). [] Iraq contends the enactment of the NDAA and the President's waiver of § 1083 with respect to Iraq stripped the federal courts of jurisdiction over these cases; the plaintiffs disagree, of course. Section 1083(a) of the NDAA, which amended the FSIA by creating new § 1605A of Title 28, contains an exception to the grant of sovereign immunity similar to that in former § 1605(a)(7) but more advantageous to plaintiffs in several respects. For instance, it precludes a foreign state from filing an interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine, § 1605A(f), and permits a plaintiff to attach property in advance of judgment, § 1605A(g). In addition, § 1605A(c) abrogates Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d 1024 (D.C.Cir.2004), by creating a federal right of action against foreign states, for which punitive damages may be awarded. Iraq argues that because § 1083(b)(1) of the NDAA repeals § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA, upon which the present cases were founded, we must dismiss these cases for want of jurisdiction. see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330(a), 1604 (jurisdiction over case against foreign sovereign depends upon exception to immunity). Further, according to Iraq, the President's waiver of § 1083 of the NDAA prevents the plaintiffs from refiling their cases under the jurisdiction conferred by new § 1605A. A statute removing federal jurisdiction presumptively applies to pending cases because such a statute usually `takes away no substantive right but simply changes the tribunal that is to hear the case.' Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 2765, 165 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006) (quoting Hallowell v. Commons, 239 U.S. 506, 508, 36 S.Ct. 202, 60 L.Ed. 409 (1916)); see also Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 951, 117 S.Ct. 1871, 138 L.Ed.2d 135 (1997). In contrast, a statute that retroactively alters the consequences of primary conductas by impair[ing] rights a party possessed when he acted, increas[ing] a party's liability for past conduct, or impos[ing] new duties with respect to transactions already completed, Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994)is presumptively non-retroactive; such a statute applies to a pending case only if the Congress clearly so provides. The FSIA speaks to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, but it also governs the immunity of foreign states in any U.S. forum. see 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (a foreign state shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter); cf. Hughes Aircraft Co., 520 U.S. at 951, 117 S.Ct. 1871 (statutes affect[ing] ... whether [a suit] may be brought at all ... speak[] not just to the power of a particular court but to the substantive rights of the parties as well and are therefore subject to [the] presumption against retroactivity). Accordingly, it is not clear which presumption might apply, if any is needed. In this case, however, it is unnecessary to invoke either presumption because § 1083 makes several references to pending cases and we need not look beyond the text and structure of the NDAA to ascertain its effect upon cases brought under § 1605(a)(7). Accord Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2762-69 (holding, based upon [o]rdinary principles of statutory construction, the provision of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109-148, Title X, 119 Stat. 2680, 2739-44, that deprived the courts of jurisdiction over habeas petitions filed by persons detained at Guantaacute;namo Bay did not apply to habeas cases pending when it was enacted). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the courts retained jurisdiction over cases pending pursuant to former § 1605(a)(7) when the Congress enacted the NDAA. Cf. Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 697-700, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004) (applying ordinary principles of construction to decide whether FSIA, which codified immunity of foreign sovereigns, applies to conduct predating statute). We note first that the new terrorism exception in § 1605A by its terms does not provide a substitute basis for jurisdiction over all cases pending under § 1605(a)(7) when § 1605A replaced it. The new provision deprives a foreign sovereign of immunity to suit only if (I) the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism at the time the act [giving rise to the suit] occurred, or was so designated as a result of such act, and, subject to subclause (II), either remains so designated when the claim is filed under this section or was so designated within the 6-month period before the claim is filed under this section; or (II) in the case of an action that is refiled under this section by reason of section 1083(c)(2)(A) of the [NDAA for] 2008 or is filed under this section by reason of section 1083(c)(3) of that Act, the foreign state was designated as a state sponsor of terrorism when the original action or the related action under section 1605(a)(7) (as in effect before the enactment of this section) ... was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i). Inasmuch as this provision expressly distinguishes between cases filed under this section i.e., § 1605Aand cases filed under section 1605(a)(7) of the pre-amendment Act, a pending case obviously cannot be said to have been filed under the new provision. Therefore, the plaintiff in a case pending under § 1605(a)(7) may not maintain that action based upon the jurisdiction conferred by § 1605A; in order to claim the benefits of § 1605A, the plaintiff must file a new action under that new provision. Because the courts have no jurisdiction of a case against a foreign sovereign absent an exception to the grant of immunity in the FSIA, and because § 1605A does not provide that exception for pending cases, Iraq contends the NDAA requires the dismissal of these cases. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, argue that § 1605(a)(7) remains a viable exception to immunity for cases, such as these, filed when it was the source of our jurisdiction. Based upon the following analysis of NDAA §§ 1083(c) (Application to Pending Cases) and 1083(d) (Applicability to Iraq), we hold the courts retain jurisdiction pursuant to § 1605(a)(7) over cases that were pending under that section when the Congress enacted the NDAA. Section 1083(c)(1). The first subsection of § 1083(c) provides: The amendments made by this section [1083] shall apply to any claim arising under section 1605A. Because, as we have said, a claim pending under former § 1605(a)(7) when the NDAA became law did not aris[e] under section 1605A, cf. Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260, 36 S.Ct. 585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916) (A suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action), it is apparent that the 2008 amendments, including the conforming amendments that strike former § 1605(a)(7), see NDAA § 1083(b), do not apply to any claim then pending under that provision. Moreover, reading the Act to extinguish jurisdiction over cases pending under § 1605(a)(7) when the NDAA became law would render § 1083(c)(1) nugatory: There would be no need to specify the amendments ... apply to any claim arising under section 1605A for the amendments obviously would apply to any such claim and could apply to no other claim; as we interpret it, however, § 1083(c)(1) makes clear the amendments apply to any claim under § 1605A, but to no pending claims. [] Sections 1083(c)(2) and (c)(3). Plaintiffs with pending cases may invoke new § 1605A in certain circumstances. Pursuant to § 1083(c)(2) (Prior Actions), a plaintiff who detrimentally relied upon former § 1605(a)(7) of the FSIA as creating a cause of action and whose action was pending before the courts in any form when the NDAA became law was given 60 days within which to refile his suit based upon the new cause of action created by § 1605A(c). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (providing exception to immunity for original action that is refiled ... by reason of section 1083(c)(2)(A)). Section 1083(c)(3) of the NDAA (Related Actions) authorizes a plaintiff who had timely commenced a related action under § 1605(a)(7) to bring any other action arising out of the same act or incident, provided the [new] action is commenced within 60 days from the later of (A) the date of the entry of judgment in the original action or (B) the date of the enactment of [the NDAA]. These transition rules, as Iraq calls them, cannot be squared with Iraq's position that the NDAA requires the dismissal of pending cases. The 60-day limit in § 1083(c)(3) implies a court could, after enactment of the NDAA, still enter judgment in an action filed under § 1605(a)(7). Iraq argues that in this context entry of judgment means only dismissal for want of jurisdiction rather than the entry of a judgment on the merits, but nothing in the text of § 1083 suggests the phrase has such a narrow meaning, cf. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed.2004) (defining judgment to mean judgment on the merits), and the structure of the NDAA indicates precisely the opposite. New § 1605A(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the FSIA refers to a pending original action being refiled... by reason of section 1083(c)(2)(A) of the NDAA while referring to a new action being filed ... by reason of section 1083(c)(3) if a pending related action had been timely commenced, see 28 U.S.C. § 1605A(b), which implies the Congress understood that the courts would retain jurisdiction over the original related action described in § 1083(c)(3). That explains why the 60-day period for invoking § 1083(c)(2) began with the enactment of the NDAA, see § 1083(c)(2)(C)(ii), whereas the 60-day period in § 1083(c)(3) may run from the date of the entry of judgment in the related action, which could be well after the enactment of the NDAA. There would be no reason for the Congress to have tied the 60-day period in § 1083(c)(3) to the date of entry of judgment in a case pending under § 1605(a)(7) when the NDAA became law if, as Iraq argues, the quoted words mean only a dismissal for want of jurisdiction and the Act requires the dismissal of all pending cases. The text and structure of the NDAA thus compel the conclusion that, notwithstanding the enactment of the NDAA, a court still may enter a judgment on the merits in such a case, which it could not do if it did not have jurisdiction over the case. See, e.g., Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868) (Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause). Because new § 1605A is inapplicable, that jurisdiction over pending cases can be founded only upon former § 1605(a)(7). [] Section 1083(c)(4). The final provision of § 1083(c) also is instructive. In 2003 the President acted under the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2003 (EWSAA), Pub.L. No. 108-11, § 1503, 117 Stat. 559, 579, to make inapplicable with respect to Iraq ... any ... provision of law that applies to countries that have supported terrorism. Presidential Determination No.2003-23, 68 Fed. Reg. 26,459 (May 7, 2003). In Acree v. Republic of Iraq, 370 F.3d 41 (2004), however, we held that the EWSAA did not authorize the President to suspend former § 1605(a)(7) with respect to Iraq. Paragraph (4) (Preserving the Jurisdiction of the Courts) of subsection 1083(c) (Application to Pending Cases) ratifies that holding: Nothing in section 1503 of the [EWSAA] ... has ever authorized the President to mak[e] inapplicable ... any provision of [the FSIA or to] remov[e] ... the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Thus both the text and the context of this provision make clear the Congress was intent upon preserving the courts' jurisdiction over pending cases, which could only mean cases filed under former § 1605(a)(7). Section 1083(d)(1). This section authorizes the President to waive any provision of ... section [1083 of the NDAA] with respect to Iraq. If a suit against Iraq for terrorist acts could proceed only under § 1605A, as Iraq maintains, then the President could use § 1083(d)(1) to deprive the courts of jurisdiction and would have no reason ever to invoke the EWSAA; § 1083(c)(4) would be surplusage. Cf. Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 174, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (we must give effect ... to every clause and word of [the] statute). [] Moreover, § 1083(d)(2)(C), which provides that the President's waiver authority applies regardless of whether ... that authority affects any action filed before ... enactment of the [NDAA], would be unnecessary if the Act deprived the courts of jurisdiction over pending cases. Reading the NDAA, as we do, to leave intact jurisdiction over cases pending under former § 1605(a)(7) gives meaning both to § 1083(c)(4) and to § 1083(d) and makes sense of the relation between them. Section 1083(c)(4) clarifies that the President has no authority under the EWSAA to limit the jurisdiction of the courts over cases against Iraq. Section 1083(d)(1) then grants the President the authority to render inapplicable those provisions of the NDAA to which President Bush had objected when he vetoed the first version of the NDAA. []