Opinion ID: 2593819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: NRS 193.161(2), the on-school-property alternative, is constitutional

Text: In essence, NRS 193.161(2), the statute Villanueva challenges, allows the district court to impose an alternative sentence for felonies committed on school property that cause death or substantial bodily harm: 2. Unless a greater penalty is provided by specific statute ... in lieu of an additional term of imprisonment as provided pursuant to subsection 1, if a felony that resulted in death or substantial bodily harm to the victim was committed on the property of a public or private school when pupils or employees of the school were present or may have been present, ... and the person who committed the felony intended to create a great risk of death or substantial bodily harm to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person, the felony may be deemed a category A felony and the person who committed the felony may be punished by imprisonment in the state prison: (a) For life without the possibility of parole; (b) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served; or (c) For a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served. (Emphasis added.) It should first be noted that NRS 193.161(2) is a sentencing alternative, not a sentencing enhancement. When an enhancement is applied, it increases the penalty for the underlying offense. In contrast, the on-school-property alternative does not augment the penalty for the underlying offense, but replaces it. [1] In his void-for-vagueness argument, Villanueva challenges the sentencing provisions of NRS 193.161(2), arguing that the statutory language may is unconstitutionally vague and ambiguous because in using the word may, the legislature failed to give any direction to the fact finder or the court as to how to interpret and apply the sentencing provisions. Addressing Villanueva's concern, we first note that there is nothing inherently ambiguous about the word may. The permissive term simply gives the sentencing court discretion in applying NRS 193.161(2) and in choosing from the various sentences stated therein. In order to survive a void-for-vagueness challenge, sentencing provisions need only state with sufficient clarity the consequences of violating a given criminal statute. [2] The consequences for committing a felony on school property, although various alternatives are given, are clearly stated in NRS 193.161(2)(a)-(c). Thus, we conclude that NRS 193.161(2) is not unconstitutionally vague. [3] In his constitutional challenge, Villanueva also contends that the legislature has impermissibly delegated its authority to define crimes and affix penalties to the judiciary by allowing the sentencing court broad discretion without providing guidelines for choosing from the various sentencing alternatives. Primarily in two contexts, we have stated the principle that the legislature holds the power to define crimes and affix penalties and that it may not delegate its power: (1) challenges to sentences as cruel and unusual punishments; and (2) challenges to the authority delegated to administrative agencies. Regarding the first, we have generally upheld sentences against constitutional challenges so long as the sentence imposed is within the limits of a valid statute. [4] In so doing, we have reminded appellants that it is the legislature's function to set penalties, a function we will not invade absent constitutional problems. [5] In other cases, we have cited the principle as a limit on the authority of administrative agencies. [6] We have held that the legislature may delegate the power to determine the facts or state of things upon which the law makes its own operations depend, but the legislature may not delegate its power to legislate. [7] At no time, however, have we construed this principle as limiting the quantum of discretionary authority that the legislature can delegate to the judiciary for sentencing. Here, Villanueva does not contend that his sentence is cruel and unusual, nor does he challenge the decision of an administrative agency. Quite to the contrary, he challenges the legislature's grant of discretionary authority to the courts. We reject this challenge. First, the judiciary has long enjoyed discretion in sentencing within a wide range of possible sentences fixed by the legislature. [8] This is because a court is well suited to administer justice in sentencing by virtue of its role as an interpreter of laws and as a fact finder intimately familiar with the particular nuances of the case before it. [9] Furthermore, constitutional checks such as the guarantees of due process and equal protection, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment provide adequate parameters to the district courts' exercise of discretion. For these reasons, this court generally defers to the sentence imposed by the district court. [10] Finally, we note that the United States Supreme Court has acknowledged the validity of legislatures creating a single statute authorizing various alternative punishments. [11]