Opinion ID: 1367509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: historical pathway to the present in wyoming

Text: The pathway from Casey, 276 U.S. at 421, 48 S.Ct. at 375 and Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 471, 48 S.Ct. at 570, Brandeis, J., dissenting, through the course of federal cases leading to Jacobson, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1535, is too long to detail in this dissent and too well considered in carefully written reviews. [11] Wyoming case law fails to provide great illumination in either the present majority or previous cases since little consideration was given to philosophical principles, ethical governmental morality, or constitutional concepts involved in entrapment activities by the government. The exception comes in the brief evaluation provided, in a non-definitive decision, by Justice A.G. McClintock in Lafleur v. State, 533 P.2d 309, 314 (1975) (emphasis added): Without anticipation of what our view might be should a case ever arise wherein the activity of the government has been to manufacture the crime, and conceding that the initial suggestion for the crime did not come from defendant, there is ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that it came from defendant's associate and that defendant himself was at all times an active participant in the investigation, planning (such as it was), and execution of the offense. By its verdict the jury has rejected any claim that this crime was the creation of the State. We therefore hold that whether viewed subjectively from the standpoint of the defendant's conduct and intention or objectively as to the degree of participation of the State, the defense of entrapment was not established as a matter of law. In Higby v. State, 485 P.2d 380 (Wyo. 1971), an appropriately thoughtful concept was advanced; but, overtly, the concept has not been followed to the present majority opinion. Entrapment does not arise where one is ready to commit the offense, given but the opportunity, and suspected persons can be tested by being offered an opportunity to transgress the law although they may not be put under any extraordinary temptation or inducement. Id. at 384. That concept requires review of the activity of law enforcement and recognizes that an initial suspicion is required before the entrapping process becomes justified. The test advanced in Montez v. State, 527 P.2d 1330, 1332 (Wyo.1974) of government's deception actually implants the criminal design in the mind of the defendant, is a more complex statement for the continued concept of creative activity . In Higby, the entrapment defense had been raised, considered at a pre-trial hearing where denied, and then withdrawn before trial. Dycus v. State, 529 P.2d 979 (Wyo.1974) followed the same concept by finding lack of evidence of any creative activity of the police authority while citing Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372, 78 S.Ct. at 821. The Wyoming court then said that if a dispute existed, the dispute would be referred to the jury for a decision as a matter of fact. Dycus, 529 P.2d at 981. The principal case for Wyoming law was Janski, 538 P.2d 271, which resulted from a fractious final rehearing split decision with two justices forming the plurality with one concurrence and two justices dissenting. The court adopted the subjective test without differentiation of the prior cases, evaluation of the objective approach, or examination of the structural invalidity in the subjective approach which was then well known. Justice Robert A. Rose, however, in a strongly addressed dissent, recognized that the creative activity test of Higby and Dycus was being abandoned. Janski was bottomed on an esoteric concept of ready complaisance to prove predisposition. In Lafleur, 533 P.2d 309, the court quoted in part Saunders, 38 Mich. 218, which had reapplied the creative activity test. Wright v. State, 670 P.2d 1090 (Wyo. 1983) involved excessive sentencing questions, see, Wright v. State, 707 P.2d 153 (Wyo.1985), but casually left for the jury's decision questions of initial predisposition and, for that matter, apparently ignored creative activity conceptualization. Neither the initial nor the later Wright case really clarified appropriate issues of entrapment, since seemingly not contested among the jurists writing in either opinion. [12] This court's last experience with entrapment, before today, came in Noetzelmann v. State, 721 P.2d 579 (Wyo.1986), which was a typical suspicion situation, confirmed by result, where the entrapment instruction was denied by the trial court. Those facts hardly determined inapplicability of an objective standard or, perchance, adoption of the clear subjective approach since predisposition was not an issue. In the present case, the evidence when viewed in a light favorable to appellant discloses that the agents went to the Corner Pocket for the express purpose of meeting and attempting to purchase drugs from appellant. A surveillance crew was already in position outside the bar. Upon being introduced to appellant by their informant, the agents asked appellant if he could get them some marijuana. Appellant left the bar and returned 30 minutes later with two baggies of marijuana. Even when viewed in this light, the evidence is not sufficient to support the theory of entrapment. Entrapment occurs only when the criminal conduct was the product of the creative activity of law enforcement officials.    It does not arise if one is ready to commit the offense, given but the opportunity.    The decisions in cases involving the illegal sale of drugs are practically unanimous in holding that the offense of entrapment is not available where the only solicitation is an offer to buy.    Suspected persons can be tested by being offered an opportunity to transgress the law, although they may not be put under an extraordinary temptation or inducement. Id. at 581 (emphasis added). See, e.g., People v. Kulwin, 229 Ill.App.3d 36, 170 Ill. Dec. 828, 593 N.E.2d 717 (1992), where inducement is the test as synonymous with creative activity which was previously used in Wyoming. It is valuable to recognize, although postured more upon an objective analysis, the historical Wyoming tenet of creative activity, Dycus, 529 P.2d 979; Higby, 485 P.2d 380; cf. Lafleur, 533 P.2d 309, adopted neither objective nor subjective approaches. In essence, I recognize the creative activity concept to be closely identified with reasonable suspicion.