Opinion ID: 2287329
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: use of appellant's low intelligence quotient as a factor in sentencing

Text: Finally, appellant challenges the sentencing court's reliance on appellant's limited intelligence in imposing a lengthy term of imprisonment. We find that the trial court erred in considering appellant's low level intelligence as an aggravating factor for sentencing purposes. This is a challenge to the discretionary aspect of appellant's sentence, and as such, must be considered a petition for permission to appeal, as the right to appeal from the discretionary aspect of sentencing is not absolute. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b); Commonwealth v. Tuladziecki, 513 Pa. 508, 511, 522 A.2d 17, 18 (1987); Commonwealth v. Williams, 386 Pa.Super. 322, 562 A.2d 1385, 1386-87 (1989) (en banc). Before we can address the merits of the issue raised on appeal, appellant must demonstrate in his statement of reasons for allowance of appeal that there exists a substantial question as to whether the sentence imposed is appropriate under the Sentencing Code. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b). Commonwealth v. Anderson, 381 Pa.Super. 1, 16, 552 A.2d 1064, 1072 (1988). Appellant's statement of reasons for allowance of appeal alleges, in part, that the propriety of the sentence as a whole is in question because the trial judge used defendant's pronounced and acknowledged mental retardation as an important factor in setting a lengthy period of imprisonment. Supplemental Brief for Appellant at 6. Further, appellant's statement of reasons states that the issue of whether a person's low I.Q. is an appropriate basis upon which to impose a lengthy sentence is an issue of first impression in Pennsylvania. We find that appellant has raised a substantial question to warrant review of his sentence, because the statement of reasons claims that the trial court relied on an impermissible factor in sentencing appellant. We grant appellant's petition for permission to appeal from the discretionary aspects of his sentence. In deciding whether a trial judge considered only permissible factors in sentencing a defendant, an appellate court must, of necessity, review all of the judge's comments. Moreover, in making this determination it is not necessary that an appellate court be convinced that the trial judge in fact relied upon an erroneous consideration; it is sufficient to render a sentence invalid if it reasonably appears from the record that the trial court relied in whole or in part upon such a factor. Commonwealth v. Bethea, 474 Pa. 571, 379 A.2d 102 (1977). Upon review of the sentencing judge's comments made at the sentencing hearings, we find that it reasonably appears from the record that the judge relied in part upon appellant's low intelligence in fashioning the sentence. At the hearing, trial counsel urged the court to view appellant's intelligence quotient as a mitigating factor in sentencing. The following colloquy took place during the sentencing hearing: MR. QUINN: . . . and I would also ask your honor to keep in mind the report about his intelligence. He's reported to have an I.Q. of 74 which the report characterizes as border line mentally retarded. THE COURT: Yes, but that doesn't prevent a man from being an honest person, the fact that he had a low mentality. As a matter of fact, it seems, helps [sic] that kind of simplicity, mental simplicity does help keep one honest and trite. This man has not that. He may have that plus, the plus factors are the factors that concern us because they pose a danger, not only to himself but to society . . .       MR. QUINN: Well, in any case, with his, considering his youth and the circumstances of this case, considering the fact that he was under the influence of another person, and considering the fact that he was of marginal intelligence are  THE COURT: The marginal intelligence gives me a great deal of concern. I mean, he has the ability to do what he did, his intelligence is low, which means that his judgment might be poor which means that he would pose a danger under similar circumstances that would not only fuel the wrong but compound it because he doesn't have the ability, the natural intelligence to control himself. You tell me what do I do? He's more explosive than if he had the intelligence. He needs some real extensive type of training to  MR. QUINN: I agree. THE COURT: To get those traits out of him and improve his intelligence quotient. How do we do that? We can't keep him out, he needs a lot of time to do that, so the strictures are that he has to be put into a structured environment, and there maybe rectify his conduct. That's why we call it correctional institution. They correct the conduct, but he has a long road to hoe with the inability to comprehend his wrong . . . N.T. December 28, 1988 at 9, 14-15. At the hearing on appellant's motion for reconsideration of sentence, counsel again urged the court to consider appellant's youth and low intelligence as mitigating factors: MR. QUINN: . . . I would respectfully submit that in the course of the sentencing proceedings, matters that were in fact matters which mitigated my client's actions were cited by the court as reason to give him a severe sentence; specifically his youth, his border line mental retardation were characterized by this court as something that caused the court concern and would warrant a stiffer sentence rather than factors to be considered in mitigation as a youth and border line mental retardation should be. . . . THE COURT: How old is he? MR. QUINN: He's twenty now. Nineteen now. THE COURT: Nineteen. MR. QUINN: Right. THE COURT: So he hasn't been an adult long enough to establish a criminal record. He only has a criminal record as a juvenile so he's coming from his juvenile to adulthood with the retardation that you're talking about. He hasn't reached there yet but he's [sic] a potential for causing great serious injuries. He has that potential. Because of his retardation and because of his youth, he doesn't fully have a comprehension that using a gun in a guy's stomach is murderous. MR. QUINN: And I submit that the court's statement today, and the court's statement at an earlier date constitutes an inadequate reason and in fact an erroneous reason upon which to base a statutory maximum sentence in view of the failure to have any prior record score. THE COURT: I find from that reasoning that he is a potentially dangerous person. I've given you the basis for my thinking, so I think I'm entitled to make that determination. N.T. February 1, 1989 at 3, 5-6. From these remarks we can reasonably conclude that the court viewed appellant's low level intelligence as a factor which warranted imposing a more severe sentence. In imposing a sentence, a sentencing court must consider the individual characteristics and circumstances of a defendant, Commonwealth v. Martin, 466 Pa. 118, 351 A.2d 650 (1976), and, in particular, the rehabilitative needs of the defendant. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). Appellant does not argue that the sentencing court erred in considering his low level I.Q., but rather argues that the court erred in treating his low intelligence as an aggravating factor in setting the sentence. A review of Pennsylvania caselaw on this topic reveals that limited intelligence of a defendant has been considered as a potentially mitigating factor, not an aggravating factor, in imposing a sentence. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 518 Pa. 15, 540 A.2d 246, 261-62 (1988) (evidence of appellant's low I.Q. of 76 was placed before the jury as a possible mitigating factor); Commonwealth v. Sheridan, 348 Pa.Super. 574, 502 A.2d 694 (1985) (upholding sentence which fell below the sentence recommended in the Sentencing Guidelines where the sentencing court had relied, in part, upon the fact that the defendant had restricted intelligence with an extremely weak ego structure); Commonwealth v. Anderson, supra . Although our research reveals no cases dealing with whether it is permissible to consider a defendant's low I.Q. as an aggravating factor in determining an appropriate sentence, we note that the Pennsylvania statute which sets forth the sentencing procedure for first degree murder delineates aggravating factors and mitigating factors to be considered in sentencing. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9711(d) and (e). A review of these factors shows that aggravating circumstances may generally be categorized as factors which result from some conduct or condition imposed by the defendant which make the crime more shocking or egregious. Thus, where the defendant behaves in such a way as to make the offense more reprehensible, such as where the defendant kills with the expectation of monetary reward, or the defendant kills by way of torture or while committing a felony or hijacking an aircraft, the jury may view the conduct as warranting the more serious penalty of death. In contrast, the mitigating factors set forth in the sentencing provision account for individual characteristics of the defendant which may affect the defendant's emotional or mental well-being at the time of the offense and which thus may impair the defendant's ability to appreciate the seriousness of his or her behavior. We note that the mitigating factors are generally circumstances over which the defendant has little or no control, as opposed to the aggravating circumstances which are created due to some bad act on the part of the defendant. We hold that it is impermissible to use a defendant's low I.Q. as an aggravating factor in sentencing. We find that a defendant's intelligence level, an immutable characteristic over which an individual has no control, may not be considered as an aggravating factor in sentencing. We fail to see a connection between a person's intelligence, or I.Q., and his or her propensity to commit crimes or need for rehabilitation. Moreover, we disagree with the views of the trial court that appellant's low degree of intelligence makes appellant more likely to perform an illegal act, or that a longer period of incarceration would somehow improve appellant's intelligence. The trial court abused its discretion in relying upon appellant's low I.Q. to impose a more severe penalty. [2] We vacate the judgment of sentence and remand the case for resentencing in accordance with this Opinion. Jurisdiction is relinquished. POPOVICH, J. files a dissenting statement. POPOVICH, Judge, dissenting: I dissent from that portion of the Opinion wherein the Majority rules that the sentencing court abused its discretion in relying upon appellant's low intelligence quotient in imposing sentence. In my view, the lower court did not abuse its discretion; rather it is the Majority which has installed blinders on the court's view of reality. Of necessity the sentencing court must consider, among other factors, the intellectual capacity of the offender. The Majority cannot, it writes, find any cases pertinent to the issue as though this were an issue of first impression. There are no cases because it has always been the law, beyond cavil, that the sentencing court take into account an offender's mental background and his propensity to commit crime, his responsibility to society and his ability to control his actions, how best to improve his intelligence quotient and what his rehabilitative needs are. All of these factors were considered by the sentencing court in a colloquy that covered almost 40 pages of transcript. Although, admittedly, the sentence could be considered harsh, that does not mean that the sentence was ill-considered. And we must not, either, lose sight of the fact that this young man shot, at close range, another human being with the intent to kill. It was a senseless, primitive act, an act not surprisingly perpetrated by one of low intelligence. As the sentencing court stated, THE COURT: The marginal intelligence gives me a great deal of concern. I mean, he has the ability to do what he did, his intelligence is low, which means that his judgment might be poor which means that he would pose a danger under similar circumstances that would not only fuel the wrong but compound it because he doesn't have the ability, the natural intelligence to control himself. You tell me what do I do? He's more explosive than if he had the intelligence. He needs some real extensive type of training to        THE COURT: To get those traits out of him and to improve his intelligence quotient. How do we do that? We can't keep him out, he needs a lot of time to do that, so the strictures are that he has to be put into a structured environment, and there maybe we can rectify his conduct. That's why we call it correctional institution. They correct the conduct, but he has a long road to hoe with the inability to comprehend his wrong, and his wrong was grave because it almost took somebody's life, loss of property and life. Sentencing Transcript, p. 14. Perhaps the Majority, had it comprised the sentencing court, would have imposed a less severe sanction, but for it to say that the sentencing court abused its discretion is to turn upside down and inside out the sentencing scheme of this Commonwealth.