Opinion ID: 1658861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Merits of Defendants' Contention as to Directed Verdict

Text: Both MIC and Cooper Chevrolet argue that the trial court erred in not directing a verdict for them on the issue of fraud. The standard of review for testing a motion for a directed verdict or a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict is whether there is a scintilla of evidence to go to the jury. Gulf States Paper Corp. v. Hawkins, 444 So.2d 381 (Ala.1983). This case was submitted to the jury under Ala. Code (1975), § 6-5-101 and § 6-5-102. Section 6-5-101 provides: Misrepresentations of a material fact made willfully to deceive, or recklessly without knowledge, and acted on by the opposite party, or if made by mistake and innocently and acted on by the opposite party, constitute legal fraud. The essential elements of this cause of action are: (1) a false representation; (2) concerning a material fact; (3) reliance upon the false representation, and; (4) damage as a proximate result. International Resorts, Inc. v. Lambert, 350 So.2d 391 (Ala.1977); Nobility Homes, Inc. v. Ballentine, 386 So.2d 727 (Ala. 1980); Burroughs Corp. v. Hall Affiliates, Inc., 423 So.2d 1348 (Ala. 1982). The evidence supports the trial court's submission of this case to the jury. There was evidence that Whaley and Harmon were told that it did not make any difference whether Harmon had a driver's license, since the insurance was in Whaley's name and the insurance was on a car and not an individual person. The representation that insurance could be issued concerned a fact material to the transaction, because Whaley testified that if he had known Harmon could not receive insurance he would not have purchased the car. The evidence suggests that Harmon and Whaley believed they could receive effective insurance if it was obtained in Whaley's name and agreed to purchase the car based upon the Cooper Chevrolet salesman's statements. The damages included loss of the car, loss of Harmon's job because of lack of transportation, and the expense of defending a law suit which was brought against both Harmon and Whaley for the indebtedness incurred in the purchase of the car, which both were unable to pay. Based upon the foregoing, the trial court was correct in not entering a directed verdict for MIC and Cooper Chevrolet. MIC and Cooper Chevrolet also argue that if there was fraud the plaintiffs willingly participated in it, and, thus, that they cannot recover. The law is well settled that the question of whether a person so participated in a fraud as to preclude him from recovery is a jury question. National Life & Accident Insurance Co. v. Allen, 285 Ala. 551, 234 So.2d 567 (1970). This issue was properly presented to the jury, and the jury found that Harmon and Whaley did not participate in the fraud.