Opinion ID: 2590700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretrial Issue โ Excusal of a Juror

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court improperly excused one prospective juror, Rachel F., because of her views on the death penalty. In determining whether to excuse a juror based on her views regarding the death penalty, a trial court must determine whether the juror's views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 558, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) Substantial evidence is the standard of review applicable to a finding on the potential effect of a prospective juror's views related to capital punishment. [Citations.] ( People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 558, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344.) The same standard applies for determining the nature of such views. ( Ibid. ) We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that the prospective juror's views against the death penalty prevented or substantially impaired her ability to perform her duties. During voir dire, the trial court excused Rachel F. for cause. On her juror questionnaire, Rachel F. originally answered no, but changed her answer to yes, to the question whether she would always vote against death, no matter what evidence might be presented or argument made during a penalty trial. When the trial court questioned her about her changed response, it asked whether she had a conscientious objection to the death penalty such that she would automatically and absolutely refuse to consider or vote for a verdict of death in a case involving these charges and special circumstance. Rachel F. answered, I would not be able to consider the death penalty. When defense counsel also asked her, Can you conjure up a set of facts in your mind that you can consider that [death] would be an appropriate penalty, Rachel F. responded, No, I can't conjure that up. The court also asked, And so under no circumstances would you ever consider voting for the death penalty? She replied, I don't think I could send somebody to his death. Ever. Contrary to defendant's contention, the fact that Rachel F. qualified her answers with I think, does not undercut the trial court's finding that she was substantially impaired from performing her duties. ( People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1062, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277.) Also, the trial court was not required to determine whether the prospective juror might be able to consider the death penalty under different circumstances. The impact the juror's views might have in actual or hypothetical cases that are not before the juror [is] irrelevant to the determination whether the juror's ability to return the death penalty was impaired. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 45, fn. 16, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388.)