Opinion ID: 1272723
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compelled Motion for Departure

Text: Section 3553(e) states that [u]pon motion of the Government, the court shall have the authority to impose a sentence below a level established by statute as a minimum sentence so as to reflect a defendant's substantial assistance in the investigation or prosecution of another person who has committed an offense. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e); see United States v. Williams, 474 F.3d 1130, 1130-31 (8th Cir. 2007) (Where a court has authority to sentence below a statutory minimum only by virtue of a government motion under § 3553(e), the reduction below the statutory minimum must be based exclusively on assistance-related considerations.). In the absence of a government motion, a district court is without authority to impose a sentence below a statutory minimum. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185, 112 S.Ct. 1840, 118 L.Ed.2d 524 (1992); United States v. Holbdy, 489 F.3d 910, 912 (8th Cir.2007). The government has the power, not a duty to make a § 3553(e) motion. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185, 112 S.Ct. 1840. A defendant's assistance is the only permissible basis for the government to exercise or refuse to exercise its power under § 3553(e). United States v. Stockdall, 45 F.3d 1257, 1260-61 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that, for the right reasons, the government may refuse to make a motion on each offense). If the government states that because of other non-assistance and assistance departures, the § 3553(e) motion is not warranted or not appropriate, the government makes a permissible policy choice, and the district court commits no error in declining to compel the motion. United States v. Mills, 491 F.3d 738, 742 (8th Cir.2007) (internal quotations omitted). The district court may review the government's refusal to make a motion in limited circumstances. First, the district court may review the government's decision for an unconstitutional motive. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86, 112 S.Ct. 1840. It is clear that a substantive due process violation involving the government's abuse of power that shocks the conscience provides a basis for the district court to compel the government's motion. United States v. Moeller, 383 F.3d 710, 712 (8th Cir.2004) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, an equal protection violation involving unlawful, purposeful discrimination provides a basis far the district court to compel the government's motion. Id. (internal quotations omitted). The district court may grant a remedy if the refusal was based on an unconstitutional motive, e.g., if the refusal was based on the defendant's race or religion or was simply irrational. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185-86, 112 S.Ct. 1840. However, the defendant is not entitled to discovery, a remedy, or an evidentiary hearing if the defendant can offer only generalized allegations of improper motive. Id. at 186, 112 S.Ct. 1840. The defendant must make a substantial threshold showing before the court may review the government's decision because the decision may have been based not on a failure to acknowledge or appreciate [the defendant's] help, but simply on [the government's] rational assessment of the cost and benefit that would flow from moving. Id. at 186, 112 S.Ct. 1840 (internal quotations omitted). Second, a district court can compel a § 3553(e) motion if the government acknowledges the defendant provided substantial assistance, but refuses to make a motion expressly because the defendant engaged in unrelated misconducta reason unrelated to the quality of the defendant's assistance. United States v. Anzalone, 148 F.3d 940, 941 (8th Cir.1998); see Moeller, 383 F.3d at 712 (stating that the holding in Anzalone was predicated on government concessions that established a statutory duty to file the substantial assistance motion). Third, the district court may be able to compel a motion if the government acted in bad faith by refusing to make a motion. The Supreme Court has mentioned unconstitutional motives as providing a basis for compelling the government to move, but has not discussed bad faith. Wade, 504 U.S. at 185, 112 S.Ct. 1840. This court' has an intra-circuit split on whether bad faith provides a basis to compel a motion. Holbdy, 489 F.3d at 913 n. 2 (comparing cases). The Moeller court states that bad faith is insufficient because it is not a constitutional standard. Moeller, 383 F.3d at 712; see United States v. Hodge, 469 F.3d 749, 754 (8th Cir.2006) (noting its agreement with Moeller, but declining to enter the intra-circuit debate). Other cases state that the government's bad faith in refusing to make a § 3553(e) motion would give the district court the power to compel the motion, but no case found such bad faith. United States v. Wolf; 270 F.3d 1188, 1191 (8th Cir.2001) (referring to bad faith, particularly in light of representations made to a defendant'  (quoting United States v. Rounsavall, 128 F.3d 665, 669 (8th Cir.1997))); Anzalone, 148 F.3d at 941; United States v. Kelly, 18 F.3d 612, 617-18 (8th Cir. 1994). In the present case, the government refused to make a §. 3553(e) motion on the gun count, but the district court granted Freemont's oral motion to compel a § 3553(e) motion. These facts are similar to those presented in Moeller. In Moeller, the defendant pled guilty to a drug count with a statutory minimum sentence of 5 years in prison. 383 F.3d at 711. The defendant's guidelines range was 78-97 months in prison. The government made a § 5K1.1 motion based on the defendant's substantial assistance to reduce the sentence, but did not make a § 3553(e) motion that would enable the district court to depart below the statutory minimum sentence. At sentencing, the district court encouraged defense counsel to make a motion to compel, granted it, and stated that the government acted in bad faith by refusing to make the § 3553(e) motion because the only reason for the refusal was to limit the district court's discretion. The district court sentenced the defendant to 10 months below the statutory minimum. This court reversed, remanded for resentencing, and stated that it is not the sentencing court's function to look behind the prosecutor's substantial assistance decision-making in this fashion. The prosecutor's evaluation of the quantity and quality of a defendant's assistance . . . `is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.' Moeller, 383 F.3d at 713 (citation omitted). But the court noted that § 3553(e) `was not intended to grant prosecutors a general power to control the length of sentences.' Id. at 712 (quoting Stockdall, 45 F.3d at 1261). The court concluded that while the government's refusal to move has the effect of limiting the district court's discretion, the district court cannot review the refusal unless it involved an unconstitutional motive. Id. at 713. In the present case, the government's reason for not making the motion on the gun count fits within the permissible bounds of prosecutorial discretion and was a rational assessment of the cost and benefit that would flow from moving because the decision was based on Freemont's overall assistance. Wade, 504 U.S. at 187, 112 S.Ct. 1840. The government had already acknowledged her substantial assistance through the § 3553(e) motion on the drug counts. Freemont also produced no evidence that the government acted in bad faith by refusing to make a § 3553(e) motion on the gun count, and thus this court does not need to address our intra-circuit split on the circumstances in which the district court may compel the government to make a § 3553(e) motion. Consequently, the district court erred in compelling the government to make a § 3553(e) motion.