Opinion ID: 1267773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Disqualification of Expert

Text: The appellants assert next that the trial court erred in refusing to qualify one of their first witnesses, Judy Koelpin, as an expert in the field of blood spatter patterns and their interpretation. We agree. The record reveals that Mrs. Koelpin had been a forensic science investigator for eight years. She had attended approximately one hundred forensic crime scenes and assisted with one thousand or more autopsies. It was Ms. Koelpin's responsibility to assist the pathologist and collect evidence directly related to the body. In 1985, Ms. Koelpin attended a one week seminar on the characteristics of blood stain evidence taught by one Professor Herbert McDonald, who, according to Ms. Koelpin, had done extensive investigations into this and written a booklet on the subject. Ms. Koelpin admitted that she had never testified in court before on blood pattern interpretations. Based on the above, the trial judge ruled that Ms. Koelpin was not qualified as an expert. The qualification of a witness as an expert falls largely within the discretion of the trial judge. State v. Caldwell , 283 S.C. 350, 322 S.E. (2d) 662 (1984). It is incumbent upon the party offering the expert to show that his witness possesses the necessary learning, skill, or practical experience to enable him to give opinion testimony. State v. Moorer , 241 S.C. 487, 129 S.E. (2d) 330 (1963). However, we have made it clear that, generally, defects in the amount and quality of education or experience go to the weight to be accorded the exert's testimony and not its admissibility. Id. Although neither party made reference to it, we note that authority exists to guide us on this precise question. In Fox v. State , 506 N.E. (2d) 1090, 1094 (Ind. 1987), the Indiana Supreme Court held that a detective was qualified as an expert in the field of blood spatter interpretation where he had attended a school for approximately one to two weeks for the study of bloodstains and interpretations of blood spatterings, and where he had never testified in a trial on the flight characteristics of blood or blood spattering. The court there stated, (w)e recognize that Detective Weeks' expertise in this area was limited; however, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling that his limited experience goes to the weight of his testimony rather than its admissibility. Id. We take the identical view in the instant case. Therefore, in the particular facts and circumstances of this case, we hold that it was error for the trial judge to refuse to qualify Ms. Koelpin as an expert. We hold that the trial judge here applied the rules concerning the qualifying of an expert too stringently, and that his ruling impacted on the fairness of the Myers' trial. See California v. Trombetta , 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed. (2d) 413 (1984) (the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense). The State's counsel at oral argument conceded that the interpretation of blood stains and spatters is a matter for expert opinion; a matter outside the knowledge of ordinary jurors. Thus, expert testimony was warranted. Despite this, the question of blood spatters and their interpretation was discussed thoroughly by the Solicitor in his closing argument: Now I want to show you a picture and you draw your own conclusions, but I'm gonna submit to you that Mr. Myers was flat on his back on the floor when he was repeatedly bashed about the face.... I want you to particularly take note, Mr. Myers is lying flat on his back, just like they described they found him, his arm is in this position, but yet when they show you this blood, the officer testified that it was about five inches down in this area at the bottom of the wall on which there was no blood. The blood was from about five inches, if I recall his testimony, but you look at it. Tell me if you see any blood in this area. The blood is up at the top of the picture. You see lots of blood on his arm. I submit to you that that man was lying there and was hit and that blood spurting from his head, that arm caught the low blood and it didn't go over on the floor. There's absolutely none that you see in this area here, and I think Lt. Knight it was, testified there might have been a few drops in there, but none to speak of. If he was hit in any other condition than that, why wouldn't there be blood all around his head? Why wouldn't there be blood between him and the wall? Why wouldn't there be blood on the bottom of the wall? Do you think that that man was ever hit standing up with any type of instrument? Do you think that that man was hit entirely as he leaned over somebody and was choking them. Look at his tee shirt. Where is the blood that would have fallen down if he had been standing up? Where is the blood on that tee shirt that would have been on there if he had been in any upright position, or a semi-upright position? (Tr. 465, 11. 21-24; 466, 11. 3-22; 467, 11. 1-7). The jury was Therefore presented only with the Solicitor's interpretation of the blood spatters, despite the State's concession that this blood spatter evidence is a matter for expert opinion. The State argues that the appellants made no proffer regarding the substance of Ms. Koelpin's testimony, and for that reason, there was no error preserved for our review. We cannot agree. It is clear from the transcript that at least Ms. Koelpin was going to enlighten the jury, through her expertise, on general principles of blood spatter interpretation. The following testimony demonstrates this: Q. What did you learn that week regarding blood? A. Primarily what the characteristics of blood, if blood travels a certain distance and strikes a certain object, it would show differently than blood that would travel in another path. The path of the blood is very important. It will leave certain patterns. That's the easiest way really to explain it. You have splashed blood and it will look different that blood that has  (Tr. 123, 11. 1-8). At this point, the trial court interrupted Ms. Koelpin and made the determination that she was not qualified as an expert. Although we have no way of knowing whether Ms. Koelpin would have opined that the blood spatters indicated self-defense by Lucille and David, we can divine that at least Ms. Koelpin would have informed the jury of the principles of blood spatter evidence so that the jurors could make an intelligent decision interpreting the blood spatters. The jury was deprived of this expert information and was instead bombarded with the solicitor's nonexpert views and interpretations of the blood spatters. We hold that this was sufficiently prejudicial to make the trial court's ruling reversible. [1]