Opinion ID: 2615951
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Heading: Whether M'Naghten violates defendant's rights under the Fourteenth Amendment

Text: Defendant next questions the application of the M'Naghten rule to defendant as being in violation of his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment: the Privileges and Immunities Clause; the Due Process Clause; and the Equal Protection Clause. As to the Privilege and Immunities Clause, the argument is that because Arizona applies the harsher rule in the M'Naghten test, people are discouraged from entering the state and their constitutional right to free travel among the states has been impinged. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970). We do not agree. The right to travel does not include crossing state lines in order to commit a crime. There is no violation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in having different jurisdictions apply different rules to determine criminal responsibility. Steelman bases his due process argument on the existence of a variety of tests applied in different state and federal jurisdictions around the country. Whenever a particular procedural protection is brought within the ambit of the Due Process Clause by the United States Supreme Court, it then becomes a uniform procedural rule to be followed in courts across the country. The United States Supreme Court has not held, however, that due process requires one rule of criminal responsibility. In Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302 (1952), the United States Supreme Court stated that it was not convinced that the state of medical art was such that a single rule of criminal responsibility was required for every state and federal court. Although the question of a due process standard for the sanity defense has been discussed by numerous state and federal courts and many of them have abandoned M'Naghten for what they have perceived to be a better rule, this court has decided to remain with the M'Naghten rule. State v. Sisk, 112 Ariz. 484, 543 P.2d 1113 (1975). We find no due process violation. But Steelman contends further that the application of the M'Naghten rule to him is a violation of the equal protection of the laws. The basic rule of equal protection in criminal cases is that no person should be subject to a greater or different punishment than another in similar circumstances. See Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 1 S.Ct. 637, 27 L.Ed. 207 (1883). Steelman claims that all of those who have been diagnosed as mentally ill are similarly situated and therefore a rule which distinguishes among different forms of mental illness to determine criminal responsibility violates equal protection because some are punished and some are acquitted by reason of insanity. We do not agree. The M'Naghten rule is not an attempt to define insanity or mental illness or to distinguish and discriminate among them. The M'Naghten rule is used to determine who should be held responsible for criminal conduct regardless of the nature of their mental illness. According to the M'Naghten rule, those who do not understand the nature and quality of their actions or do not know that what they do is wrong, are incapable of forming criminal intent. Any one of a variety of mental illnesses can result in an accused being unable to form a criminal intent under the M'Naghten rule. The question of the ability to form a criminal intent is the guiding principle and the rule covers all of those who fit that category regardless of the type or degree of mental illness. The rule, therefore, does not create a classification among different mental illnesses. We find no error. Steelman further contends, however, that his right to equal protection of the laws is violated by A.R.S. § 13-132: No act committed by a person while in a state of voluntary intoxication is less criminal by reason of his having been in such condition, but when the actual existence of any particular purpose, motive or intent is a necessary element to constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time in determining the purpose, motive or intent with which he committed the act. Steelman argues that this statute creates an impermissible classification in that it permits a person who has voluntarily intoxicated himself to present evidence of diminished capacity while a person suffering from a mental disorder with the same impact is not permitted to present evidence of the effect of his disorder on his ability to form specific intent. Again we do not agree. Voluntary intoxication is not a defense to a crime, but may be shown only to negate specific intent. State v. Cooper, 111 Ariz. 332, 529 P.2d 231 (1974). Insanity, however, is a defense to the crime itself and the M'Naghten rule is our test for such insanity. The statute, A.R.S. § 13-132, is directed to those people who have voluntarily intoxicated themselves to the point where they are incapable of forming a specific intent. We do not believe this is an impermissible classification. There is no violation of defendant's equal protection rights of the Fourteenth Amendment. Finally, Steelman claims that all of his arguments about the validity of the M'Naghten rule should be considered in the context of this as a capital case. We do not agree. M'Naghten deals with the question of which individuals are capable of forming general criminal intent and should be punished. The death penalty raises the question of the kind of punishment which may be imposed and must be considered separately under the Eighth Amendment. See Leland v. Oregon, supra; Jackson v. Dickson, 325 F.2d 573 (9th Cir.1963), cert. den. 377 U.S. 957, 84 S.Ct. 1637, 12 L.Ed.2d 501 (1964). We find no error. MOTION UNDER RULE 11 Within a month of Steelman's return to Arizona, his counsel moved for an examination and hearing pursuant to Rule 11, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S., in order to determine his competency to stand trial and his mental condition at the time of the offense charged. The motion was granted and three doctors, Dr. Jacob Hoogerbeets (requested by the defense), Dr. Allan Beigel (requested by the State), and Dr. Marshall Jones were appointed to examine Steelman. On 7 February 1975, the hearing was held and Steelman was found to be competent to stand trial on the basis of the reports submitted by the three doctors. The question of Steelman's competency to understand and participate in the proceedings was again raised during the trial. On the morning of 14 July, defense counsel requested a hearing in chambers. Counsel reported that Steelman had requested that he be handcuffed during the proceedings because he felt that he would be unable to control himself. Steelman was brought in and asked about his condition. He told the trial court that he had been hallucinating through the night and into the morning and that this produced violent reactions which could cause him to injure himself or someone else. He claimed to have already injured himself by throwing his arm against the wall of his cell. Steelman requested either handcuffs or the drugs Quaalude, morphine or Demerol. The court held a discussion with Steelman off the record with counsel present and consulted by telephone with Dr. Hoogerbeets in Tucson. The court stated that Dr. Hoogerbeets told him that there was no reason to be concerned about Steelman's mental condition; that this happened about every three weeks and that the defendant would use the situation to request Quaalude, a barbiturate, or some other street drug. According to Dr. Hoogerbeets, Thorazine or Stelazine would be adequate. Defense counsel then moved for a Rule 11 hearing. With the motion pending, the court recessed and had Steelman taken to nearby Springerville where he was examined by Dr. Heynekamp, a medical doctor who was not a psychiatrist. Dr. Heynekamp found that Steelman was able to assist counsel; he was rational and normal. One of the drugs recommended by Dr. Hoogerbeets was prescribed to calm his nerves but the defendant refused to take it claiming that it would make him hyper and cause hallucinations. The court denied the Rule 11 motion, but indicated that it was leaving open the possibility that the ruling could be changed depending on his observation of Steelman as the trial progressed. An arrangement was made permitting Steelman to sit in the courtroom without handcuffs by placing deputies on either side of him. On appeal, Steelman contends that the trial court improperly found him competent to stand trial. We do not agree. The court had before it a motion requesting an examination and hearing under Rule 11. Rule 11.2 reads as follows: At any time after an information is filed or indictment returned, any party may move for an examination to determine whether a defendant is competent to stand trial, or to investigate his mental condition at the time of the offense, or both. Such examination and hearing must be held if there are reasonable grounds to support such an examination and hearing. Rule 11.3, Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17 A.R.S.; State v. Messier, 114 Ariz. 522, 562 P.2d 402 (1977); State v. De Vote, 87 Ariz. 179, 349 P.2d 189 (1960); State v. Reid, 87 Ariz. 123, 348 P.2d 731 (1960). Reasonable grounds exist if there is sufficient evidence to believe that the defendant is not able to understand the nature of the proceedings against him and to assist in his defense. State v. Bradley, 102 Ariz. 482, 433 P.2d 273 (1967); State v. Messier, supra. We believe that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in finding that a Rule 11 examination was unnecessary. The question of Steelman's competency to stand trial had been ruled upon prior to trial, and although this previous determination was not binding upon the trial court, at the time the motion was again made it certainly could be considered by the court in ruling upon the motion during trial. This previous determination, based upon extensive examination and testimony, plus the court's own observations as well as the conclusion of a local medical doctor, were sufficient to support the trial court's ruling. We find no error. Compare State v. McClendon, 101 Ariz. 285, 419 P.2d 69 (1966), appeal after remand 103 Ariz. 105, 437 P.2d 421 (1968). But defendant challenges this finding on the ground that Dr. Patricia White, a psychiatrist who had examined and treated defendant while he was in California, examined him during the trial and found him to be insane. Insanity is not the same thing as competency. Competency focuses on an extremely narrow issue: whether whatever is afflicting the defendant has so affected his present capacity that he is unable to appreciate the nature of the proceedings or to assist his counsel in conducting his defense. United States v. McEachern, 465 F.2d 833 (5th Cir.1972), cert. den. 409 U.S. 1043, 93 S.Ct. 539, 34 L.Ed.2d 494 (1972). Dr. White's medical diagnosis, while it may have been relevant to defendant's sanity defense, did not determine defendant's competency to stand trial.