Opinion ID: 1826657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the trial judge erred in refusing to permanently recuse himself.

Text: Finally, Cottrell and Williams contend that this Court must order Judge Thomas S. Wilson, the trial judge who presided over his trial, to permanently recuse himself from this case. The record contains a letter from Judge Wilson to the Presiding Judge of the Tuscaloosa Circuit, dated August 7, 2006, stating: This letter is to put in writing our conversation of last week regarding the [Cottrell v. NCAA and Culpepper] case. As I informed you there has been a motion to supplement the record on appeal. There is also currently pending in the Supreme Court a motion to have the Supreme Court order me to recuse myself from further proceedings in the Cottrell case. There is also pending before the Judicial Inquiry Commission a motion by [Cottrell and Williams's counsel] to have them reconsider their order dismissing [Cottrell's and Williams's counsel's] complaint against me. Finally, there is pending before the Montgomery Bar Association Disciplinary Committee, a complaint filed by me against [Cottrell's and Williams's counsel]. Based on all these matters I feel that it is best that I temporarily recuse myself from hearing any matters in the case till the above matters are resolved. Depending on the final disposition of the above matters, I may have to permanently recuse myself. However, for the time being, I am asking you to reassign the case to another judge to handle any matters that might arise till further notice. The presiding judge reassigned the case. Cottrell and Williams argue that the trial judge exceeded the scope of his discretion by not permanently recusing himself from the case. Specifically, Cottrell and Williams argue: Judge Wilson's reasoning, however, is faulty, because the resolution of those matters, no matter how decided, cannot undo the appearance of bias nor erase the question of whether he can be impartial that was created by his bar complaint against [plaintiffs' counsel]. In Ex parte George, 962 So.2d 789 (Ala. 2006), this Court stated: A trial judge's ruling on a motion to recuse is reviewed to determine whether the judge exceeded his or her discretion. See Borders v. City of Huntsville, 875 So.2d 1168, 1176 (Ala.2003). The necessity for recusal is evaluated by the `totality of the facts' and circumstances in each case. [Ex parte City of] Dothan Pers. Bd., 831 So.2d [1] at 2 [(Ala. 2002)]. The test is whether `facts are shown which make it reasonable for members of the public or a party, or counsel opposed to question the impartiality of the judge.' In re Sheffield 465 So.2d 350, 355-56 (Ala.1984)(quoting Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala.1982)). 962 So.2d at 791. The documents properly before this Court establish that Judge Wilson temporarily recused himself from this case and that he will consider permanent recusal, if circumstances require. Therefore, we cannot conclude based on the record before us that Judge Wilson exceeded the scope of his discretion. We recognize that Cottrell and Williams have attached exhibits to their briefs appearing to support their contention. However, an exhibit attached to a brief is not proper evidence for this Court's consideration. See Green v. Standard Fire Ins. Co. of Alabama, 398 So.2d 671, 673 (Ala.1981) (the record on appeal cannot be changed or altered by statements made in appellate briefs or evidence not appearing in the record). To the extent that Cottrell and Williams contend that this Court errs in refusing to consider the issue of Judge Wilson's recusal as a request for mandamus relief, we conclude that they have not established a clear legal right to the relief they request. Mandamus is `proper to compel a court to perform ministerial duties and to entertain jurisdiction,' State v. Cannon, 369 So.2d 32, 33 (Ala.1979); it is also the proper method by which to review whether recusal is required. Ex parte Melof, 553 So.2d 554 (Ala.1989). We have often stated the standard for issuing a writ of mandamus: `A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy, and it will be issued only when there is: 1) a clear legal right in the petitioner to the order sought; 2) an imperative duty upon the respondent to perform, accompanied by a refusal to do so; 3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and 4) properly invoked jurisdiction of the court. Ex parte United Serv. Stations, Inc., 628 So.2d 501, 503 (Ala. 1993).'  Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173, 176 (Ala. 2000). Ex parte Little, 837 So.2d 822, 824 (Ala. 2002). The information before us indicates that Judge Wilson has recused himself from this case; therefore, Cottrell and Williams have not established that Judge Wilson has refused to recuse himself and that they have been denied a clear legal right to the relief requested. Mandamus relief based on the information before us is not proper.