Opinion ID: 1248800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Basis For Termination of Parental Rights

Text: The court of appeals found the only ground upon which the juvenile court based its decision to terminate parental rights was the father's refusal to admit he sexually abused his stepdaughter. The court found this was impermissible as the father has a constitutional right against self-incrimination. We disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the juvenile court terminated Douglas' parental rights solely because of his failure to admit guilt. The Fifth Amendment provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const. amend. V. The privilege applies equally to allow a person not to answer official questions put to him in any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.' Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1141, 79 L.Ed.2d 409, 418 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77, 94 S.Ct. 316, 322, 38 L.Ed.2d 274, 281 (1973)). When the State `compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment.' In re E.H. III, 578 N.W.2d 243, 249 (Iowa 1998) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 2135, 53 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (1977)). The privilege against self-incrimination applies also within the context of court-ordered therapy requiring an admission of criminal conduct. In re E.H. III, 578 N.W.2d at 249 (citations omitted). In this case, Douglas' would-be statements that he abused his stepdaughter were not compelled by the State to prevent the potential sanction of losing his daughter. The court may not compel Douglas to admit his guilt in order to be eligible to regain custody of his daughter. The court may, however, require Douglas to comply with the case permanency plan which includes treatment. Failure to do so may result in termination of his parental rights. The case permanency plan required Douglas to accomplish several things. Douglas had to undergo a substance abuse evaluation and follow the recommendations of the evaluation. In connection with this, Douglas was specifically ordered not to use alcohol. The plan required Douglas to complete sexual offender treatment and learn to control inappropriate sexual behavior. Finally, because the parents have difficulty setting rules, controlling Cecilia's behavior, and appropriately disciplining and maintaining reasonable boundaries, Douglas had to participate in family-centered services and attend all sessions. The case permanency plan also required Douglas to maintain both a stable residence and employment. Overall, Douglas was required to provide for Cecilia's emotional, physical, and educational needs. Douglas failed every requirement of the case permanency plan. In order for Douglas to work toward family reunification it was crucial that he undergo substance abuse treatment. All three girls stated Douglas drinks heavily. Both Cecilia and Diana stated that when the abuse occurred in the house, Douglas had frequently been drinking. Douglas underwent a substance abuse evaluation that ultimately recommended he participate in the extended outpatient treatment program. Despite the recommendation, Douglas did not comply because he said he was no longer drinking and did not need the treatment. Douglas' protestations of sobriety were unfounded as proven by his third conviction for operating while intoxicated. Douglas' social worker also received periodic reports that Douglas was still drinking, in addition to his conviction. The case permanency plan also provided Douglas had to participate in parenting skills services. As to rectifying parental deficiencies, Douglas attended a few sessions designed to improve his parenting skills but was uncooperative and did not complete assignments. In January 2001, one month prior to the termination, he completely stopped attending these services. It cannot be said Douglas participated in any meaningful way in learning better parenting skills. Douglas was required to maintain a stable residence and employment. During the two years the girls were in foster care, Douglas did not comply with these requirements. Douglas and Sandra sold their home and purchased a mobile home in which they moved around from one camping sight to the next for approximately one year. During the same time, Douglas did not maintain a stable job. In general, Douglas' social worker stated Douglas has shown little interest in visitation or reunification with Cecilia. Douglas was unsuccessful in sexual offender treatment. The case permanency plan only required Douglas to complete treatment. Under the case plan, successful completion of treatment did not include a requirement of admission of guilt. Douglas first sought treatment with Dan Fullerton, but quickly ceased his visits because he was unwilling to admit he abused Diana. Dr. David McEchron, a clinical psychologist, also attempted to treat Douglas. The fact Douglas failed to address the sexual abuse issues was not the only reason he failed his second attempt at treatment. Dr. McEchron was concerned with his findings of Douglas' depression and lack of self-esteem. Douglas denied any need for psychological treatment whether it would be for depression, self-esteem issues, or sexual abuse problems. Dr. McEchron did not terminate treatment solely because of Douglas' unwillingness to admit responsibility for the abuse. Though Douglas stated he is depressed, psychological tests revealed the extent of Douglas' depression to be much worse than he admitted. Dr. McEchron believed Douglas needed treatment for more than just the sexual abuse issues. Because of Douglas' unwillingness to participate in any meaningful form of treatment, Dr. McEchron terminated treatment. The State may not penalize Douglas for noncompliance with a court order impinging on his right against self-incrimination. See In re J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. 1987) (citing Turley, 414 U.S. at 77, 94 S.Ct. at 322, 38 L.Ed.2d at 281 and Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 804-05, 97 S.Ct. at 2135, 53 L.Ed.2d at 6). But this is as far as the Fifth Amendment privilege extends. The State may require parents to otherwise undergo treatment, but it may not specifically require an admission of guilt as part of the treatment. Contrary to Douglas' assertions, a person's exercise of a constitutional right may indeed have consequences. One such consequence may be a person's failure to obtain treatment for his or her problems. Here, there is no evidence the State required Douglas to complete any particular sexual offender treatment program. There is also no evidence that the State disapproved of Douglas' participation in a treatment program that would not require an admission of guilt. In fact, there was no evidence showing there was alternative treatment available to him that would satisfy his concerns. The permanency plan merely required treatment. Douglas' failure to complete treatment because of one reason  his exercising his Fifth Amendment rights  does not lessen his failure. Under such facts, we find Douglas failed to prove the State's case permanency plan effectively constituted a requirement that Douglas must incriminate himself. See, e.g., In re E.H. III, 578 N.W.2d at 250; State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't v. Black, 101 Or.App. 626, 792 P.2d 1225, 1228 (1990). We note that sexual offender treatment where the offender refuses to take responsibility for the abuse may constitute ineffective therapy. In re H.R.K., 433 N.W.2d 46, 50 (Iowa Ct.App.1988) (requirement that the parents acknowledge and recognize the abuse before any meaningful change can occur is essential in meeting the child's needs). A parent's failure to address his or her role in the abuse may hurt the parents' chances of regaining custody and care of their children. However, these consequences lie outside the protective ambit of the Fifth Amendment. In re J.W., 415 N.W.2d at 883. We acknowledge the fact that Douglas is faced with a dilemma, but we find it is not a dilemma that triggers constitutional protection. Id. at 884. Douglas was well aware of what was required of him under the case permanency plan. The State made continuous attempts to see that Douglas was able to satisfy the plan's requirements. DHS provided Douglas with treatment and other services to overcome his problems. The department gave him generous time to develop needed parenting skills and comply with all of the requirements of the case permanency plan. Yet he has failed to show little, if any, improvement. Given Douglas' past performance, we are not convinced additional time or alternative services will change his conduct. Douglas' resolute denial of these allegations neither lessens the juvenile court's finding nor shakes the court's goal to do what is best for the child. The best interests of Cecilia are our paramount concern. In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 1990). Douglas' failure to comply with the requirements of the case permanency plan shows his lack of commitment to [Cecilia], and [his] persistence in putting [his] own needs before those of [his] child. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App.1997). As a result of Douglas' failure to complete any form of treatment, we cannot conclude Douglas has fixed his problems and is now fit as a parent. See In re Guardianship of D.J.M., 325 N.J.Super. 150, 737 A.2d 1179, 1184 (1999). Douglas has given us no reason to believe that he is now able to be a parent to Cecilia or that he will not continue his abusive patterns. The crucial days of childhood cannot be suspended while parents experiment with ways to face up to their own problems. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d at 781 (quoting In re D.A., 506 N.W.2d 478, 479 (Iowa Ct.App.1993)); In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d at 495. Children simply cannot wait for responsible parenting. Id. (quoting In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d at 495). In looking to her long-range as well as immediate interests, we conclude termination of Douglas' parental rights is in Cecilia's best interests. See In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d at 781; In re L.L., 459 N.W.2d at 493. All of these factors were within the juvenile court's consideration when it determined whether Douglas' parental rights should be terminated. Foremost in the court's deliberations was the fact that the juvenile court found Douglas did sexually abuse his stepdaughter and the abuse was ongoing. Douglas never appealed this finding by the juvenile court. Based on the facts in the record, we conclude Douglas' failure to admit guilt was not the reason Cecilia could not or should not be returned to her father. There is substantial competent and credible evidence to support the juvenile court's termination decree. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED IN PART; DECREE OF JUVENILE COURT AFFIRMED.