Opinion ID: 1604539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ineffective assistance during penalty phase

Text: In Sweet's second claim, he asserts that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present readily available mitigating evidence during the penalty phase. Sweet actually raises several separate but related claims. First, Sweet contends that trial counsel was ineffective in presenting the testimony of his sister, Deonne Sweet, during the penalty phase. Second, Sweet argues that Adams was ineffective in failing to present Sweet's mother, Bertha Sweet, and Sweet's foster mother, Emily Shealey, during the penalty phase. Finally, Sweet maintains that Adams was ineffective in failing to present available mental mitigation during the penalty phase. We address each claim individually, but also evaluate the cumulative effect of the additional mitigation in order to determine whether Sweet has demonstrated prejudice. At the penalty phase, Adams relied solely on Deonne Sweet to provide mitigation testimony. Adams explained at the evidentiary hearing that he had several meetings with Deonne where he discussed the types of things he would ask during the penalty phase. He asked Deonne if she had the names of any family members he could speak to, and he stated that she did not give him any information. [7] Deonne testified to the following at trial. She and Sweet grew up without a father. Growing up with her mother was normal. However, she also testified that their mother was an alcoholic on and off. Deonne stated that she did not know if their mother's alcoholism affected Sweet, but that it did not affect her. Deonne explained that she raised Sweet for a period of time, and that Sweet was a good uncle to Deonne's daughter. Deonne testified that Sweet never caused any problems for her when she was raising him. Finally, Deonne stated that she and Sweet were in a foster home because of their mother's neglect and alcoholism, and that Sweet was in a foster home for approximately two years. At the evidentiary hearing, Deonne elaborated on her prior trial testimony. The new portions of her testimony included the fact that Sweet never knew his father, and that his father never acknowledged Sweet as his son. Sweet sometimes witnessed their mother fighting with her boyfriends and their mother would sometimes hide from them. Sweet had behavioral problems in school and could not sit down and pay attention. Furthermore, Sweet had a stuttering problem for which he went to speech therapy. Sweet was sent to a juvenile facility in Marianna. Sweet was never physically abused. Sweet contends that defense counsels' lack of preparation in presenting Deonne's testimony constituted deficient performance. However, we need not decide this issue, as we conclude that, based solely on Deonne's testimony at the evidentiary hearing, Sweet has failed to establish prejudice. See Waterhouse, 792 So.2d at 1182 (where defendant fails to make showing as to one prong of Strickland, it is unnecessary to analyze the other prong). We conclude that although Deonne elaborated on her trial testimony during the evidentiary hearing, this additional testimony was essentially cumulative. As to Sweet's claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to have his mother and foster parent testify, the trial court found that Adams did speak to various potential witnesses concerning mitigation, including Sweet's mother, his girlfriend, his girlfriend's mother, and his foster parents. Furthermore, we note with regard to this mitigation, that this is not a case where Adams failed to investigate any available mitigating witnesses. See, e.g., Rose, 675 So.2d at 572; Heiney v. State, 620 So.2d 171, 173 (Fla.1993). We do not, however, reach the issue of whether Adams was deficient in failing to have additional penalty phase witnesses testify, because, having reviewed the testimony of the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing, we agree with the trial court that Sweet did not establish prejudice under this claim. Although Bertha Sweet's testimony at the evidentiary hearing did present some new facts concerning Sweet's childhood, the majority of the testimony was cumulative to Deonne's trial testimony. Not only was the testimony cumulative to Deonne's testimony that was actually presented at trial, but presenting Bertha as a witness would have opened the door to cross-examination about Sweet's juvenile record. For example, Bertha stated that Sweet got into trouble a number of times as a juvenile and was sent away to the Dozier School for Boys in Marianna. Sweet was suspended from school for misconduct and he would get into fights at school. Bertha testified that Sweet was arrested for battery in 1981 for hitting another child and that he was taken into custody for being ungovernable. Moreover, Sweet began stealing things at a very young age and this continued into his teenage years. Bertha also testified that Sweet was once arrested for stealing a bicycle. Thus, to the extent that the jury may have benefitted from this additional testimony, the jury also would have heard potentially damaging information regarding Sweet's juvenile record and prior violent behavior. Moreover, none of Bertha's testimony established any statutory mitigation or refuted any statutory aggravation. We also reject Sweet's ineffective assistance claim with regard to the failure to call Sweet's foster mother, Emily Shealey, as a witness during the penalty phase. Adams spoke with Shealey before trial. At the evidentiary hearing, he stated that he did not present her as a witness because of something she said, although he could not remember what specific thing she said that caused him concern. At the evidentiary hearing, Shealey testified that when Sweet arrived at her house, Sweet told her that his mother was not taking care of him and was drinking a lot. Shealey also stated that Sweet did not do well in school at first, but Shealey straightened him out and placed him on Ritalin. Moreover, Sweet behaved well in Shealey's home, and got along with Shealey's son. However, she also acknowledged that Sweet stole from a store at least three times and misbehaved a lot in class. Salmon conceded at the evidentiary hearing that by placing Shealey (as well as Bertha Sweet) on the stand, the State would have been able to elicit Sweet's juvenile criminal history through cross-examination. Similar to Bertha Sweet's testimony, we conclude that Shealey's testimony was cumulative to that of Deonne's. In fact, Shealey's testimony probably would have been damaging, in that Sweet's juvenile criminal history would likely have been disclosed to the jury. Moreover, none of Shealey's testimony established any statutory mitigation or refuted any statutory aggravation in this case. Sweet's final contention of penalty phase ineffectiveness is that Adams rendered ineffective assistance in failing to request the appointment of a mental health expert to evaluate Sweet. At the evidentiary hearing, Sweet presented the testimony of Drs. Ernest Miller and Jethro Toomer. Dr. Miller, a retired professor of psychiatry, was appointed by the trial court to evaluate Sweet for competency. Dr. Miller rendered a report in which he found Sweet competent to stand trial. However, Adams never submitted the competency report into evidence or pursued with Dr. Miller the potential for further examination of Sweet in order to establish mental mitigation. As we stated in Rutherford, 727 So.2d at 223: In evaluating the Strickland prongs of deficiency and prejudice, it is important to focus on the nature of the mental mitigation Rutherford now claims should have been presented. This focus is of assistance when determining whether trial counsel's choice was a reasonable and informed strategic decision, as well as whether the failure to present such testimony (assuming that the failure amounted to a deficiency in performance) deprived the defendant of a reliable penalty phase proceeding. Dr. Toomer, a clinical and forensic psychologist, evaluated Sweet for the purposes of the evidentiary hearing. Dr. Miller's testimony contradicted Dr. Toomer's testimony. Dr. Toomer testified that he did not administer the Minnesota Multiphastic Personality Inventory (MMPI) because there is nothing suggesting the existence of any severe form of mental illness or major mental illness with regard to Sweet. Dr. Toomer testified about Sweet's family background and also stated that Sweet had an IQ of 88, which fell in the low-average range. Dr. Toomer stated that he did not test Sweet for organic impairment, but that Sweet did fall within the range of psychological problems. Dr. Toomer explained that, based on Sweet's background, there were a number of red flags concerning overall functioning. Dr. Toomer stated that Sweet was suffering from a personality disorder, in that he was dependent upon others, but did not suffer from an antisocial personality disorder. Dr. Toomer explained that he found no sign of organic brain damage and that Sweet did not fall into the mentally deficient category. Further, Dr. Toomer testified that Sweet could not have committed the crime in a cold and calculated manner because, based upon Sweet's background, he did not act in a logical, premeditated manner. Moreover, Dr. Toomer stated that Sweet was unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law, based upon his impulsivity, and therefore, Sweet should have been able to establish a statutory mental mitigator. On cross-examination, Dr. Toomer conceded that Sweet had been able to conform his conduct to the requirements of law while in jail, but explained that this was due to the fact that he was in a structured environment. Moreover, Dr. Toomer stated on cross-examination that Sweet knew the difference between right and wrong at the time he committed the murder. Dr. Toomer also explained that Sweet was under the influence of an emotional disturbance at the time of the murder based upon his borderline personality disorder, and thus Sweet would have been able to establish another statutory mitigator. In contrast to Dr. Toomer, Dr. Miller testified that Sweet suffered from an antisocial personality disorder. However, Dr. Miller explained that people who suffer from antisocial personality disorders may be capable of engaging in planning. Moreover, Dr. Miller stated that Sweet would sometimes have the capacity to satisfy the CCP aggravator, and that at other times Sweet would act out impulsively. Dr. Miller stated that Sweet was capable of engaging in long-range planning and forming the design to kill someone after deliberation. Yet Dr. Miller also testified that the defense might have been able to argue against CCP because of Sweet's impulsive behavior. Moreover, Dr. Miller stated that Sweet could appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Dr. Miller testified that he saw no evidence of brain damage or mental illness. Dr. Miller concluded that it was difficult to find anything directly and openly mitigating in this case and that the facts of this case suggest premeditation and planning. In rejecting the testimony that Sweet could not have formed the premeditation sufficient to establish the CCP aggravator and that Sweet was under an extreme emotional disturbance at the time of the murder, the trial court evaluated not only the testimony of the expert witnesses, but the other evidence at trial regarding the heightened premeditation that surrounded the planning and execution of this murder: However, this Court finds that the evidence in this case contradicts Dr. Toomer's opinions. The evidence at trial overwhelmingly showed the defendant's motive and intent to eliminate the victim/witness to his prior robbery of that victim, and the defendant's own inculpatory statements to Manuela Roberts and Solomon Hansbury provide the icing on the cake. We conclude that it is not reasonably probable, given the nature of all the additional mitigation, that this altered picture would have led to the imposition of a life sentence, outweighing the multiple substantial aggravators at issue in this case. Rutherford, 727 So.2d at 226. We have carefully reviewed the evidentiary hearing testimony of Dr. Miller and Dr. Toomer and agree with the trial court that, given the nature of the mental health mitigation presented by these experts at the evidentiary hearing, Sweet has failed to demonstrate that he was deprived of a reliable penalty phase hearing. Moreover, we cannot conclude that the presentation of the testimony would have led to the imposition of a sentence other than death, given the four strong aggravators and the nature and extent of the additional mitigation evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. We find this case similar to Rutherford: Even if the additional mitigation evidence Rutherford presented at the 3.850 hearing had been heard and considered by the jury and original judge, it is not reasonably probable, given the nature of the mitigation offered, that this altered picture would have led to the imposition of a life sentence, outweighing the multiple substantial aggravators at issue in this case (HAC, CCP, and robbery/ pecuniary gain). Rutherford was not deprived of a reliable penalty proceeding. 727 So.2d at 225-26; see also Haliburton v. Singletary, 691 So.2d 466, 471 (Fla.1997) (In light of the substantial, compelling aggravation found by the trial court [i.e., under sentence of imprisonment, prior violent felonies, committed during a burglary, and CCP] there is no reasonable probability that had the mental health expert testified, the outcome would have been different.). As to the additional mitigation evidence presented through Deonne Sweet, Bertha Sweet and Emily Shealey, we conclude that the testimony is both cumulative and potentially harmful, as the testimony might have opened the door for the State to present negative information concerning Sweet's background. See Rutherford, 727 So.2d at 224-25 (explaining that essentially cumulative testimony presented during 3.850 evidentiary hearing was insufficient to establish prejudice in failing to present additional mitigation); see also Ventura v. State, 794 So.2d 553, 570 (Fla.2001) (holding that defendant could not establish prejudice where the mitigation presented at evidentiary hearing was cumulative of evidence presented at trial); Breedlove v. State, 692 So.2d 874, 878 (Fla.1997) (affirming denial of 3.850 relief where the three aggravating factors we have previously affirmed [prior violent felony, during course of burglary, and HAC] overwhelm whatever mitigation the [3.850] testimony of [the defendant's] friends and family members could provide). Accordingly, we reject Sweet's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the penalty phase.