Opinion ID: 1376308
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mistake Concerning the Identity of the Proper Party

Text: The third requirement under Rule 15(c)(3) requires an examination of whether the newly-named appellees knew or should have known that the appellant would have named them in the original complaint, but for a mistake in identity. This requirement has been the focus of much debate by the parties, in their briefs and at oral argument, and the interpretation of this requirement formed the basis of the circuit court's decision to dismiss the appellant's amended complaint. The appellees repeatedly argued, before this Court and before the circuit court, that a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party in Rule 15(c)(3) means a mistake of fact, a misnomer, a misidentificationand not a mistake of law. The appellees contend that the appellant knew the identities of the appellees, but because of a mistaken interpretation of the Act, made a conscious choice not to name the appellees until after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The appellees assert that the appellant did not make a slip of the pen when she chose not to name the individual appellees in her original complaint, but rather made a strategic decision ... to doggedly pursue her claim solely against the City even though her action against the City was barred by law. The appellees are partly correct in their arguments, because our cases have held that Rule 15 permits a party to correct misnomers. See, e.g., Higgins v. Community Health Assoc., 189 W.Va. 555, 433 S.E.2d 266 (1993) ( per curiam ) (plaintiff sued hospital under registered, assumed name Jackson General Hospital; amendment of complaint allowed to relate back under Rule 15 to assert action against the hospital's owner, Community Health Association, d/b/a Jackson General Hospital). Our cases have also allowed plaintiffs to use Rule 15 to correct the status of a party being sued. See, e.g., Marks Construction, Inc. v. Board of Educ. of County of Wood, 185 W.Va. 500, 408 S.E.2d 79 (1991) ( per curiam ) (plaintiff mistakenly sued defendant-partnership as a corporation; amended complaint suing defendant as a partnership held to relate back); Lawson v. Hash and Benford, 209 W.Va. 230, 545 S.E.2d 290 (2001) ( per curiam ) (plaintiff mistakenly sued defendant partnership; amended complaint suing individual partners held to relate back). We also agree with the appellees' proposition that Rule 15 allows a plaintiff to only correct a mistake, not to correct a deliberate tactical omission of a party or claim. See Brown v. Community Moving & Storage, Inc., 193 W.Va. 176, 179, 455 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1995) ( per curiam ) (We recognize the plaintiff's reluctance to bring the fraud action ... because to do so effectively would block recovery of the valuable insurance proceeds. However, we do not find this fact to be persuasive. It is not a rare situation in which a plaintiff must choose to add a party he would rather not bring into the suit or plead alternative theories to the circuit court.) However, our reading of the authorities cited by the appellees, particularly Moore's Federal Practice 3d, leads us to language which is not cited by the appelleeswhich plainly states (with emphasis added): A court should not limit its findings of mistake merely to cases of misnomer. Rather, [a court] should focus on the new party's appreciation of the fact that the failure to include it in the original complaint was an error and not a deliberate strategy. A court should allow an amendment to relate back to add a defendant that was not named at the outset, but was added later when plaintiff realized that the defendant should have been named, and also to allow an amendment to the original complaint that named the defendant, but in the wrong capacity. 3 Moore's Federal Practice 3d, § 15.19[3][d] at 15-90-91. The treatise also makes a statement contrary to the position repeatedly asserted by the appellees, that mistake as used in Rule 15 means only a mistake of fact, stating: Mistake may also include a mistake in law. The inquiry is whether the defendants should have known that they would be sued but for a mistake by the lawyer to name them, rather than whether the defendant actually knew that the law required it to be named.... 3 Moore's Federal Practice 3d, § 15.19[3][d] at 15-92.1. The mistake language contained in both the federal and West Virginia versions of Rule 15 was prompted by several cases in which plaintiffs, unaware of the technical requirements of the law, mistakenly named institutional instead of individual defendants. Soto v. Brooklyn Correctional Facility, 80 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir.1996). Rule 15(c)(3)(B) was expressly intended to preserve legitimate suits despite ... mistakes of law at the pleading stage. 80 F.3d at 36. Other courts, interpreting language similar to our Rule 15(c)(3), have held that a plaintiff's or lawyer's misinterpretation of the law and failure to sue the correct defendants in the original complaint is a legal mistake correctable by an amendment, and the amendment relates back to avoid the effects of the statute of limitation. For example, in Woods v. Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, 996 F.2d 880 (7th Cir.1993), a plaintiff sued a university for an unlawful search of his home by the university's police department. The district court later dismissed the university, finding it was constitutionally immune. The plaintiff then filed an amended complaint against the proper defendants, the individual university employees whom he alleged conducted the unlawful search; the district court dismissed the amended complaint as time-barred. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed and allowed the plaintiff to amend the complaint, stating that `mistake' as used in Rule 15(c) applies to mistakes of law as well as fact, and finding it clear that the plaintiff made a `mistake' as to the identity of the proper party and no question that the plaintiff would have sued the proper party but for that mistake. 996 F.2d at 886-87. What it comes down to purely and simply is ... that it was the legal blunder of Woods' counsel his `mistake'that caused his continued (and fruitless) pursuit of state agencies rather than individual state actors as defendants in the case[.] 996 F.2d at 887. Similarly, in Donald v. Cook County Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d 548 (7th Cir.1996), a pro se prison inmate brought an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a sheriff's department, alleging he suffered a heart attack when jail officials took away his heart medication. After the expiration of the statute of limitation, the district court dismissed the inmate's complaint against the sheriff's department because it failed to name the individual jail officials employed by the sheriff's department as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and refused to allow the inmate to amend his complaint to name the individual employees. The court of appeals reversed the district court and allowed the inmate to amend his complaint to name the individual employees and relate back to the date the original complaint was filed. The court of appeals concluded that [a] legal mistake concerning whether to sue an institutional or individual defendant brings the amendment within the purview of Rule 15(c)(3)(B), and found that the inmate's failure to identify and serve these defendants ... was not due to any lack of diligence on his part ... [because] he apparently believed that, by suing the Sheriff's Department, he effectively sued everyone involved in precipitating his injuries. 95 F.3d at 557. See also, Blaskiewicz v. County of Suffolk, 29 F.Supp.2d 134 (E.D.N.Y.1998) ( pro se inmate's amended complaint naming individual correctional officers related back to original complaint against county); Soto v. Brooklyn Correctional Facility, 80 F.3d 34 (2d Cir.1996) (inmate's failure to name individual defendants within the limitation period was a mistake of law concerning identity of the proper party, which supported relation back of amendment to complaint against institutional defendant); State ex rel. Eccleston v. Montana Third Jud. Dist. Ct., 240 Mont. 44, 50, 783 P.2d 363, 367 (1989) (plaintiffs sued school district, and upon discovering school district was immune under state law, plaintiffs amended complaint to add school principal and janitors; district court properly allowed the amendment to relate back because while there was no mistake as to the identity of the District employees who were involved in the circumstances that led to the filing of this lawsuit ... there was a mistake as to the identity of the proper parties to this lawsuit[.]); Brown v. Georgia Dept. of Revenue, 881 F.2d 1018, 1022-23 (11th Cir.1989) (plaintiff sued state personnel board; later amendment after expiration of statute of limitation to add individual members of board in their official capacities to comply with 11th Amendment was proper way to correct a pleading mistake). We further note that the appellees' mistake-of-fact argument is simply not supported by the language of Rule 15(c)(3). The rule applies to amendments that both changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted. Mistake must therefore mean more than a mere misnomer or mislabeling of the proper party, because the notice and knowledge requirements contained in Rule 15(c)(3)(A) and (B) clearly apply only to newly added partiesnot mislabeled parties who are already before the court under an incorrect name. A misnomer is involved when the correct party was served so that the party before the court is the one plaintiff intended to sue, but the name or description of the party in the complaint is deficient in some respect. Under those circumstances, an amendment merely correcting that description does not entail the actual changing of the parties.... An amendment by which plaintiff seeks to change the capacity in which defendant is being sued also does not change the parties before the court and will relate back. In this situation defendant has had notice from the outset that an action has been brought against him and may not properly claim prejudice or surprise to defeat the amendment. 6A Federal Practice & Procedure § 1498 at 130-134. We therefore conclude that under Rule 15(c)(3)(B), a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party can include a mistake by a plaintiff of either law or fact, so long as the plaintiff's mistake resulted in a failure to identify, and assert a claim against, the proper defendant. A court considering whether a mistake has occurred should focus on whether the failure to include the proper defendant was an error and not a deliberate strategy. In the instant case, the appellant knew of the identity of the appellees, but due to a mistaken interpretation of law by appellant's counsel did not comprehend until this Court's opinion was issued in Brooks I on May 18, 1998, that the appellees were proper parties to be sued. The appellant did not make a conscious, deliberate strategic reason to not name the appellees, but did so based upon a reasonable reading of several statutes. It is clear, then, that the appellant made a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party as set forth in Rule 15(c)(3)(B). Before a complaint can be amended to add a new defendant, Rule 15(c)(3)(B) also requires that a circuit court find that the newly-named defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the plaintiff would have sued it in the original complaint, but for the mistake. We therefore examine the record to determine if the appellees knew or should have known, when the appellant filed her original complaint, that the appellant's attorney had made a mistake of law in failing to identify the appellees as defendants. The appellant's original complaint in the instant case alleged that the City, through various listed acts and omissions by the appellees, acted recklessly and in disregard of the safety of the decedent. The appellant clearly was stating a cause of action against the appellees, who could be held liable under W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(b)(2) for acts or omissions ... in a wanton or reckless manner. The statute states that only an employee of a political subdivision can be liable for wanton or reckless conductyet the original complaint mistakenly named only the City. Before the appellant's original complaint was filed, this Court had repeatedly recognized that the Act permits the naming of both political subdivisions and employees of political subdivisions as defendants in a civil action, under certain defined circumstances. Brooks I, 202 W.Va. at 253, 503 S.E.2d at 821 (citing numerous prior cases where actions against political subdivision employees had been allowed). We therefore conclude that the appellees should have known, when the original complaint was filed, that the appellant would have named the appellees in her complaint but for a mistake in identifying the proper party. D.