Opinion ID: 2639478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: federal law preempts pearl's theories of negligence premised upon inadequate warning devices, excessive train speed and local hazard conditions

Text: Background on the Federal Law Relating to Railroad Safety ¶ 16 The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-447 (now codified at 49 U.S.C. § 20101 (2000), et seq. ) was enacted for the express purpose of promot[ing] safety in every area of railroad operations and reduc[ing] railroad-related accidents and incidents. 45 U.S.C. § 421 (49 U.S.C. § 20101). Additionally, the FRSA directed the Secretary of Transportation to address safety problems at grade crossings and was given broad powers to prescribe regulations and issue orders for every area of railroad safety. 45 U.S.C. § 431(a) (49 U.S.C. § 20103(a)). This legislation expressly provides for the federal preemption of State law as follows: Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation or order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement. 45 U.S.C. § 434 (49 U.S.C. § 20106). This Act also contains an express savings clause, which provides as follows: A State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or order (1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard; (2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States government; and (3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Id. (emphasis added). Pursuant to the FRSA, in 1971, The Secretary of Transportation issued regulations, which set maximum allowable train speeds corresponding to track classification. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (2002). [12] ¶ 17 In 1973, the Highway Safety Act was enacted, which created the Federal Railway-Highway Crossings Program (The Crossings Program). 23 U.S.C. § 130 (2000). The Crossings Program makes federal funds available to the States for improvement and elimination of hazards at grade crossings on the condition of States' maint[enance of] a survey of all highways to identify those railroad crossings which may require separation, relocation, or protective devices, and establish and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose. 23 U.S.C. § 130(d). [13] The Secretary, through the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA), issued several regulations pursuant to the FRSA and the Highway Safety Act in implementation of the Crossings Program including the federal regulation requiring that the warning devices at crossings must comply with standards set forth in the FHWA's Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways (MUTCD). 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(1), 655.603. [14] Additionally, federal regulations implementing the Crossings Program specifically addressed the design of grade crossing improvements. See 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b). When the conditions contained in these regulations are applied, they establish the requisite adequate warning devices to be installed where [f]ederal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4). [15]
¶ 18 Two of Pearl's four negligence theories are based upon the premise that the train in question was traveling at an excessive speed at the time of the accident. Pearl specifically claims that the train was exceeding the federally mandated speed limit at the crossing (hereinafter the excessive speed claim) and the Railroad was exceeding a safe speed in light of the specific, individualized hazard the Railroad had created at the crossing. ¶ 19 It is undisputed that the train at issue in this case was traveling 40 miles per hour at the time of the accident. Further, the record reflects that at the time of the accident, the track was classified pursuant to federal regulation as a Class 3 track, which has a maximum allowable speed of 40 miles per hour. [16] ¶ 20 Since the train was traveling within the speed limit established in the federal regulations, Pearl's common law negligence claims premised upon excessive train speed are therefore preempted by federal law. The Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA), 45 U.S.C. §§ 421-447 expressly preempts all Pearl's claims based upon excessive train speed. Further, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the maximum allowable speeds codified at 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) cover[ ] the subject matter of train speed with respect to track conditions, including conditions posed by grade crossings, and therefore, preempt common law tort claims asserting the train traveled at an excessive rate of speed. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993). Thus, pursuant to the FRSA and the rule in Easterwood, all Pearl's excessive train speed claims are preempted. ¶ 21 Pearl has sought to circumvent federal preemption by arguing that the track should have been classified at a lower classification and therefore, a lower speed limit should have been applicable at the time of the accident. Pearl argued that the jury was entitled to determine the class of track and its corresponding speed limit. The trial court agreed and instructed the jury on this issue. The COCA held the trial court erred in giving this instruction and this Court agrees. The federal regulations explicitly place the responsibility of the determination whether to lower a track's classification (and the track's corresponding speed limit) upon either a Federal Railroad Administration Track Inspector or a State Track Inspector. 49 C.F.R. § 216.15(a). That regulation provides in pertinent part as follows: When an FRA Track Inspector or State Track Inspector determines that track does not comply with the requirements for the class at which the track is being operated... he notifies the railroad in writing that the track is being lowered in class and that operations over that track must comply with the speed limitations prescribed in part 213 of this chapter. 49 C.F.R. § 216.15(a). Pursuant to this federal authority, the determination of whether to lower the track classification and its corresponding speed limit is clearly for the FRA track inspector and/or State Track Inspector rather than a question of fact for the jury. Federal law provides ... the decision to downgrade a track belongs to the FRA track inspector. Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 110 F.Supp.2d 1086, 1092 (E.D.Ark. 2000). ¶ 22 In Stevenson, the plaintiffs argued that a track should have been downgraded and a corresponding lower speed limit should have been implemented prior to the motor vehicle-train accident at issue in that case due to a number of track conditions found in the area including the specific local hazard. Id. at 1091. The Stevenson court rejected this argument, reasoning that Plaintiffs are attempting to reclassify the track after the fact. This is an impermissible collateral attack on the regulatory process. Id. In this case, the record is absent any evidence of either a FRA Track Inspector and/or State Track Inspector's determination that the track in question did not meet the requirements of a class 3 track. Further, there is no evidence of any written notification to the Railroad of any federal or state inspector's determination in this case that a lowering in track classification was warranted. In fact, The Federal Railroad Administration inspection report of January 22, 1997 [17] indicates the FRA Inspector inspected the track in Mena, Arkansas at that time, noted the presence of defects, but expressly indicated there were no violations, and no reduction in track classification at that time. Just as the plaintiff's attempt in Stevenson failed, Pearl's attempt to re-classify the track after the fact in this case likewise fails as an impermissible collateral attack on the regulatory process.
¶ 23 Pearl additionally argues that the crossing presented a specific, individualized hazard that required the train's speed to be reduced as it approached the crossing. As noted above, federal preemption under § 20106 of excessive train speed claims is not absolute, as the statute contains an express savings clause. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that common law speed restrictions are not preserved by the savings clause within the federal statute, the terms of which allows States to adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law ... related to railroad safety when the law ... is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard. CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 675, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993); [18] 49 U.S.C. § 20106. [19] The Easterwood Court specifically refrained from ruling on the question of federal preemption of a suit for breach of related tort law duties, such as the duty to slow or stop a train to avoid a specific, individual hazard. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675, n. 15, 113 S.Ct. 1732. Courts construing Easterwood have interpreted this pronouncement as the specific, individual hazard exception to federal preemption. Thus, where it is determined that a specific, individual hazard exists, a state tort law action survives for breach of the duty to slow or stop the train to avoid such a hazard. While the Easterwood footnote distinguished the specific, individual hazard from the essentially local safety hazard savings clause of the federal statute, the U.S. Supreme Court refrained from further defining the hazard or hazards that would constitute the specific, individual hazard such that would qualify for exception to federal preemption. [20] Subsequently, other courts including this one in Myers v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 2002 OK 60, ¶ 27, 52 P.3d 1014, have addressed what hazards and/or conditions constitute a specific, individual hazard, [21] and likewise have determined which conditions at crossings do not constitute a specific, individual hazard. [22] ¶ 24 Pursuant to Easterwood and upon consideration of the various views espoused in its progeny, this Court in Myers held that a specific, individual hazard is a person, vehicle, obstruction, object, or event which is not a fixed condition or feature of the crossing and which is not capable of being taken into account by the Secretary of Transportation in the promulgation of uniform, national speed regulations. Myers, 2002 OK 60, ¶ 27, 52 P.3d at 1027. A specific, individual hazard refers to a unique occurrence which could lead to a specific and imminent collision and not to allegedly dangerous conditions at a particular crossing.  Id. at 1028 (emphasis added). Additionally, Myers identified certain hazards and factors that would not constitute a specific, individual hazard as follows: Hazards posed by track conditions, including those existing at grade crossings, are capable of being taken into account by the Secretary and are covered by the federal speed regulations. Factors such as general knowledge that a crossing is dangerous, traffic conditions, a crossing's accident history, sight distances, multiple crossings in close proximity, sun glare, a railroad's internal policies regarding speed, and inadequate signal maintenance are not specific, individual hazards. Id. (emphasis added). ¶ 25 In this case, Pearl argues the Railroad's alleged failure to keep a promise regarding its increase of train speeds and corresponding adjustment of warnings it would provide motorists driving over crossings in Mena, Arkansas amounts to a specific, individualized hazard. [23] Pearl argues the Railroad made false representations that it would increase train speed incrementally and it would implement certain protective measures to ensure local citizens had the same advance warning times that they had under the lower speeds. Warning devices were never altered in accordance with the alleged promises, and Pearl asserts that such promises had prevented local government from implementing their own safety measures. Thus, Pearl asserts these false representations created a specific, individualized hazard at the Pickering Street Crossing. ¶ 26 The record reveals that Pearl's specific, individual hazard theory is based entirely on the Railroad's internal speed regulations, which set a lower speed limit than the maximum allowable speed limit mandated by federal law, as referenced in a letter the Railroad's General Superintendent sent to the Mayor of Mena, Arkansas on November 11, 1997 regarding the Railroad's internal policies. [24] While the record suggests that the Railroad may have violated its own internal speed limit in traveling at 40 miles per hour at the time of this collision, this speed was clearly within the maximum speed limit established by federal law for a Class 3 track. Internal speed limits set by the Railroad are not a person, vehicle, obstruction, object, or event which is not a fixed condition or feature of the crossing incapable of being taken into account by the Secretary of Transportation. Id. at 1027. Clearly, train speed limits are capable of being taken into account by the Secretary of Transportation in the promulgation of uniform, national speed regulations, since this is exactly what the Secretary has done in establishing classifications of tracks and corresponding maximum speed limits. Such internal speed limits are not a unique occurrence which could lead to a specific and imminent collision and have nothing to do with the avoidance of a specific collision such that would fall within the definition of specific, individual hazard, as defined in Myers. Id. at 1028. Further, this Court expressly provided that a railroad's internal policies regarding speed do not constitute a specific, individual hazard. Id.; See also St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Pierce, 68 F.3d 276 (8th Cir.1995) (holding that despite railroad's violation of its self-imposed speed limit, which was lower than federal law, the fact that the train was traveling within the maximum speed limit allowed by federal law thus triggers preemption of any negligence action against railroad based upon alleged excessive train speed). In accordance with these authorities, we find that Pearl's specific, individual hazard or local hazard claim is merely a cloak for his excessive train speed theory of negligence, which federal law clearly preempts.
¶ 27 Pearl's fourth negligence theory is premised upon the Railroad's alleged failure to provide an adequate warning to motorists of the presence of an approaching train in light of the abnormally dangerous nature of the crossing (hereinafter the inadequate warning claim). As discussed supra in introduction to Part III of this opinion, federal regulations implementing the Crossings Program addressed the design of grade crossing improvements. 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b). These regulations specify what constitutes adequate warning devices, which must be installed at crossings where Federal-aid funds participate in the installation of the devices. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that when federal funds participate in the crossing improvement project, these regulations establish a standard of adequacy that `determines the devices to be installed.' Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344, 354, 120 S.Ct. 1467, 146 L.Ed.2d 374 (2000) (quoting CSX Transp., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 671, 113 S.Ct. 1732, 123 L.Ed.2d 387 (1993)). Both Easterwood and Shanklin held that where §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4) are applicable, state tort law is preempted. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670, 113 S.Ct. 1732; Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 352, 120 S.Ct. 1467. ¶ 28 In Easterwood, the U.S. Supreme Court determined that the federal regulations were inapplicable in that case because although federal funds had been obtained for placement of warning devices at the crossing in question, those warning devices were never actually installed. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 671-73, 113 S.Ct. 1732. In light of Easterwood, the Shanklin Court held that these federal regulations are applicable to all warning devices actually installed with federal funds and that the applicability of these regulations does not depend on any individualized determination of adequacy by a diagnostic team or an FHWA official. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 356, 120 S.Ct. 1467. ¶ 29 The record reflects that pursuant to an Arkansas Crossings Improvement Program in 1980, federal funds were used to install the crossbucks warning signs at the Pickering Street Crossing and that such warning signs remained present at the crossing at the time of the collision in the instant case. The record also reflects that this use of federal rail-highway monies for this project was approved by the Federal Highway Administration, thus satisfying the conditions of § 646.214(b)(4). [25] Since federal funds were used in the installation of warning devices actually installed at the Pickering Street Crossing, the conditions to applicability of §§ 646.214(b) were met in this case, thus triggering federal preemption pursuant to Shanklin and Easterwood. Because the federal regulations apply in this case with respect to the crossbucks at the crossing, this warning device meets the federal standard of adequacy, and such federal standard thereby displaces state and private decisionmaking authority. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670, 113 S.Ct. 1732 Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 354, 120 S.Ct. 1467. Any state law or rule that more or different crossing devices were necessary at [this] federally funded crossing is therefore preempted. Shanklin, 529 U.S. at 355, 120 S.Ct. 1467. Pursuant to these authorities, the warning devices present at the Pickering Street Crossing are deemed adequate as a matter of federal law and Pearl's negligence theory premised upon the Railroad's failure to provide an adequate warning is thereby preempted.