Opinion ID: 1189246
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Questioning Witness Credibility

Text: The second issue appealed by Carter concerns the Government's line of questioning during his cross-examination, where he was asked whether each of the witnesses called by the Government was lying. The parties dispute the proper standard of review to be applied, with Carter claiming that this Court should review the district court's decision to allow this line of questioning for an abuse of discretion, while the Government claims Defense counsel failed to issue a timely objection, thus subjecting the matter to plain error review. United States v. Thomas, 453 F.3d 838, 844-45 (7th Cir.2006). It is unnecessary, however, for this Court to determine whether the objection raised towards the end of this line of questioning was timely, because even under an abuse of discretion standard, any error committed was harmless. See United States v. Owens, 424 F.3d 649, 653 (7th Cir.2005) (harmless error analysis applies to review for an abuse of discretion); United States v. Mansoori, 480 F.3d 514, 523 (7th Cir. 2007) (The key distinction between the harmless error and plain error analyses lies in the assignment of the burden of persuasionin plain error cases, it is the defendant's burden to prove that the error was prejudicial, whereas in harmless error cases it is the government's burden to prove that the error was not prejudicial.) (emphasis in original). For the same reason, it is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether, as the Government argues, Carter's earlier responses to questions invited this error, see United States v. Johnson, 26 F.3d 669, 677 (7th Cir.1994) (A party may not `invite' error and then argue on appeal that the error for which he was responsible entitles him to relief.); but see United States v. Napue, 834 F.2d 1311, 1324 (7th Cir.1987) (if defense counsel exceeds proper bounds in eliciting evidence, the prosecutor can object and can even ask that defense counsel be held in contempt; the prosecutor may not, however, fight fire with fire), thus excusing the Government from the general proposition that it is improper to ask one witness to comment on the veracity of the testimony of another witness. Thomas, 453 F.3d at 846 (quoting United States v. McKee, 389 F.3d 697, 699 (7th Cir.2004)). This Court will only find that an error was not harmless if the error had a substantial influence over the jury, and the result reached was inconsistent with substantial justice. Owens, 424 F.3d at 653 (quoting United States v. Hernandez, 330 F.3d 964, 969 (7th Cir.2003)). We note at the outset that this Court, in reviewing similar improper questioning on the credibility of other witnesses for plain error, has placed considerable weight on the curative effect of jury instructions. See McKee, 389 F.3d at 699; Thomas, 453 F.3d at 846. Here, the district court instructed the jury that, You are to decide whether the testimony of each of the witnesses is truthful and accurate in part, in whole, or not at all, as well as what weight, if any, you give to the testimony of each witness, thus mitigating any potential prejudice to Carter stemming from the Government's line of questioning. Furthermore, by Carter's own admission, many of the other factors relied upon by this Court in making a harmless error determination cut in the Government's favor. This Court has stated that in evaluating whether an error was harmless, it looks to the following factors: (1) the importance of the witnesses's testimony in the prosecution's case; (2) whether the testimony was cumulative; (3) whether other evidence corroborated or contradicted the witness's material testimony; and (4) the overall strength of the prosecution's case. United States v. Ochoa, 229 F.3d 631, 640 (7th Cir.2000). Carter, however, apparently misconstruing in whose favor these factors are to be read, argues with respect to the first factor that Carter's statements as to the other witnesses' credibility were not important for the Government's case, and similarly for the second factor, argues that the testimony was cumulative given the other testimony provided by the Government's own witnesses. While Carter apparently believed that these factors cut in his favor, a review of this Court's discussion of these factors in Ochoa makes clear that the less important the evidence was to the Government, and the greater the degree to which the evidence was cumulative in nature, the stronger the argument that the error was harmless. Id.; see also United States v. Hernandez-Rivas, 348 F.3d 595, 600 (7th Cir.2003). Given these concessions, particularly when coupled with the district court's curative instructions and the amount of video evidence against Carter, we find that the jury would have convicted Carter beyond a reasonable doubt even in the absence of his testimony regarding other witnesses' credibility, and thus the error was harmless.