Opinion ID: 2648680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Warrants and Previous Threats

Text: Prior to trial, Lard moved in limine to prohibit the State from offering testimony that warrants for his arrest existed at the time of the incident. He also urged the circuit court to exclude testimony that he had threatened to harm police officers prior to the shooting. Based on the State’s arguments, the circuit court denied Lard’s motion in limine, ruling that the proposed testimony on these subjects was admissible to show motive, intent, plan, and Lard’s state of mind when the shooting occurred. However, the court also ruled that the State could not reveal the charges for which the warrants had been issued. Pursuant to the circuit court’s decision, the State elicited testimony from Elumbaugh that Lard knew about a warrant for his arrest. Elumbaugh further testified that Lard referred to his gun as a “p-shooter,” meaning “police shooter,” and said that Lard had stated that “if they ever try to come after me, there’s gonna be a war,” and that Lard had warned him “if you ever get pulled over and I’m with you, you better try to get away because I’m gonna be shootin’.” He added that Lard made these statements within several months of the incident. In addition, Swanner testified that she had been told that Lard had an outstanding arrest warrant regarding child support.4 She also testified that Lard advised her that, if he were to be stopped by the police, he “would take half of ‘em with him.” 4 Lard did not object when Swanner mentioned that the warrant involved child support. He also does not claim error for the violation of the circuit court’s ruling prohibiting testimony about the nature of the offense underlying the warrant. We also note that Dr. Raymond Molden, a State rebuttal witness, testified that Lard owed $42,000 in back child support. Lard raised no objection to Molden’s testimony, but Dr. Molden did not testify that there was a warrant for Lard’s arrest for the nonpayment of child support. 8 Cite as 2014 Ark. 1 When the purpose of evidence is to show motive, anything and everything that might have influenced the commission of the act may, as a rule, be shown. Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 461, 385 S.W.3d 214. Evidence may be independently relevant if it shows motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake. Smith v. State, 2010 Ark. 75, 364 S.W.3d 443. Additionally, any evidence that is relevant to explain the act, show a motive, or illustrate the accused’s state of mind, may be independently relevant and admissible. Brunson v. State, 368 Ark. 313, 245 S.W.3d 132 (2006); Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000). The State’s theory in this case was that Lard began shooting at the officers in order to avoid arrest. The evidence produced at trial showed that Officer Schmidt had arrested Elumbaugh based on an outstanding warrant and that he was running checks on the other occupants of the vehicle, including Lard, to determine whether they were wanted as well. Therefore, evidence revealing that Lard had warrants for his arrest and that Lard had knowledge of this fact was independently relevant to establish a motive for his actions. As for Lard’s threats, in order to prove capital murder and attempted capital murder, the State was required to show that Lard acted with premeditation and deliberation. See Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-101(a)(3) (Supp. 2011). Lard’s previous threats to shoot police officers if confronted were thus independently relevant as proof of his intent, plan, and state of mind. We conclude that the testimony concerning warrants and threats was highly probative, not unfairly prejudicial, and was admitted for appropriate purposes under Rule 404(b). Therefore, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the introduction of this 9 Cite as 2014 Ark. 1 testimony.