Opinion ID: 1808114
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Credibility of Daniel Speer

Text: The referee concluded that [t]here is no question but that Daniel Speer, the principal witness against Mr. Rhodes, falsified parts of his testimony and that he was impeached numerous times on cross examination by Mr. Rhodes' counsel and by the witnesses called for the purposes of impeachment. Thomas Zimmer, a conservation officer with the Game and Parks Commission, testified that he checked Daniel Speer for a hunting license in the fall of 1984. At that time, the law required that anyone 16 years of age or older had to have a hunting license. Speer lied to Zimmer about his age, indicating that he was only 16, but then produced a driver's license that confirmed he was 21. Speer denied lying to Zimmer. Michele Taylor, who was 18 years old, testified that on May 23, 1989, she was sunbathing on the riverbank in Pressley Park with her friend, Cathy Russell. Taylor and Russell saw Speer standing on the other side of the river. The two women then saw Speer drop his swimming suit or underwear and begin fondling himself. Taylor testified that she did not report the incident to law enforcement because she did not want to go to court and didn't want all the problems it would cause. Taylor further stated that she was afraid of Speer and did not want to testify against him. Speer's testimony on cross-examination suggests the possibility that Speer is homophobic and that he was not truthful in his testimony regarding his purchases of a gun and ammunition at Gibson's, the 1984 hunting incident, the Jerod Beck assault, and the incident in Pressley Park. Speer quit his job at the Tumbleweed Cafe after assaulting another employee. He was fired from a job at Becton-Dickinson in Broken Bow for lying on a timecard. The referee found that Speer's testimony relating to the material parts of the case was corroborated by the circumstantial evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn from the known facts and the admissions of the respondent, Rhodes. The record supports this finding. In summary, the evidence shows that sometime during late 1985 and early 1986, Rhodes started to develop a relationship with Daniel Speer. It began by Rhodes' presenting Speer with expensive gifts, contributing $4,700 to Carl Speer's campaign, offering to pay at lest an equivalent amount for Daniel Speer's college expenses following the campaign, and offering to make Daniel Speer's car payments while he was in college. Rhodes also took Speer on trips to Omaha, Lincoln, and Vancouver, all of which Rhodes paid for. Rhodes also discussed with Speer the possibility of trips to Missouri and the Bahamas. All of the essential facts are admitted by Rhodes, although he attempted to explain them away as acts of charity. The expenditures Rhodes made during a relatively short period of time demonstrate a consistent and aggressive effort on the part of Rhodes to develop his relationship with Speer. While Rhodes was fostering his relationship with Speer, Rhodes was also prosecuting Speer and had filed a misdemeanor criminal mischief charge against Speer in the county court for Custer County. During the various trips they took together, Rhodes discussed cases with Speer involving sexual matters involving not only Speer but also other individuals who were involved with girls in Broken Bow who were under the age of consent. The relationship between Speer and Rhodes was not the type of relationship between a prosecutor and defendant that can be tolerated in a criminal case. Rhodes manipulated the criminal justice system against Speer, in violation of DR 7-102, while providing gifts in an effort to establish a relationship with Speer. The effort went from attempting to ingratiate himself with Speer by dismissing relatively minor charges to attempting to coerce and intimidate Speer by filing more serious charges. The conduct of the respondent after the Vancouver trip was erratic at best. Rhodes started writing notes and letters to Speer in an effort to get Speer to talk to him, when it was clear that Speer wanted nothing to do with Rhodes. Rhodes' testimony that his motive toward Speer was charitable because Rhodes was in the habit of helping people is not convincing in view of the record and the lack of substantial evidence of any real effort by Rhodes to help anyone, except Daniel Speer and his brother Carl. Rhodes' testimony that he was afraid of Speer did not justify Rhodes' conduct. Speer's threats may have been related to what occurred in Vancouver, rather than originating from any prosecutorial action against Speer. There is no adequate explanation why respondent did not prosecute Speer for any of the alleged threats that he made against Rhodes or for the failure to prosecute Speer for other offenses by Speer which Rhodes knew about. Rhodes' conduct toward the special prosecutor, Roth, and Rhodes' conduct during the deposition was erratic and bizarre. The problems between Roth and Rhodes started only after Roth became active in the Speer prosecutions. Instead of completely withdrawing from those cases, Rhodes attempted to exert some influence upon Roth. The evidence shows clearly and convincingly that Rhodes was guilty of misconduct and that he violated the provisions of DR 1-102, DR 2-110, DR 5-101, and DR 7-102. Rhodes argues that a prosecutor is disqualified only when he is the victim in a case which he prosecutes. This argument lacks merit, and, as the relator points out, such a rule would permit prosecutors to prosecute their close friends and relatives. In Kennedy v. L.D., 430 N.W.2d 833, 837 (Minn.1988), the Supreme Court of Minnesota stated, It is improper for prosecutors to participate in cases which involve personal friends or relatives.... See, also, State v. Bell, 84 Idaho 153, 370 P.2d 508 (1962), in which the court held that an affidavit of the prosecuting attorney alleging that the defendant and prosecuting attorney and their families had been close personal friends, that the defendant and prosecuting attorney had had business and political relations in the past, and that it would be difficult for the prosecuting attorney to conduct a trial was a sufficient showing to warrant appointment of a special prosecuting attorney. In People v. Doyle, 159 Mich.App. 632, 636, 638, 641-44, 646, 406 N.W.2d 893, 895-99 (1987), the court said: The basis of defendants Doyle's, Kardos' and Reynolds' motion for disqualification of the prosecutor for conflict of interest is the personal relationship between Doyle and Dennis Lazar, Chief Assistant Genessee County Prosecutor. Doyle and Lazar are brothers-in-law; their wives are sisters. The Flushing drug investigation, supervised by the prosecutor's office, began in August, 1984, and implicated Doyle in September, 1984. Doyle married Lazar's sister-in-law around Christmas, 1984. .... The basis for defendants Walter Johnson's, Scott Johnson's and Timothy Donaldson's claim for disqualification is that the complaining witness and victim, Danny Lazar, is the brother of Dennis Lazar, Chief Assistant Prosecutor. .... The instant cases fall into the second category, which includes situations where the prosecuting attorney has a personal interest (financial or emotional) in the litigation, or has some personal relationship (kinship, friendship or animosity) with the accused. In Michigan, the recusal of a prosecuting attorney who has a personal interest in the case is required by the Code of Professional Responsibility. Canon 9 provides that a lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety. DR 5-101 is arguably applicable: DR 5-101. Refusing Employment When the Interests of the Lawyer May Impair His Independent Professional Judgment. (A) Except with the consent of his client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of his professional judgment on behalf of his client will be or reasonably may be affected by his own financial, business, property, or personal interests. .... Courts around the country recognize two policy considerations underlying the disqualification of prosecuting attorneys for a conflict of interest. The first policy served by the rule is fairness to the accused. It is universally recognized that a prosecutor's duty is to obtain justice, not merely to convict.... The second policy served by disqualification of a prosecuting attorney for conflict of interest is the preservation of public confidence in the impartiality and integrity of the criminal justice system. [ People v. ] Greer, supra, p. 268 [19 Cal.3d 255, 561 P.2d 1164, 137 Cal.Rptr. 476 (1977)]; [ People v. ] Conner, supra, p. 146 [34 Cal.3d 141, 666 P.2d 5, 193 Cal.Rptr. 148 (1983)]; 31 ALR3d 953. American courts have consistently held that the appearance of impropriety is sufficient to justify disqualification of a prosecuting attorney.... .... ... The fact that Lazar is the Chief Assistant Prosecutor and Doyle's brother-in-law creates for Lazar a conflict of interest. There is an appearance of impropriety when Lazar acts in matters concerning Doyle. His family relationship with defendant Doyle is sufficiently incompatible with the interest of the defendant, of the state and of the administration of justice generally so as to require Lazar to withdraw from Doyle's case.