Opinion ID: 1256088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Governing Project-Specific Regulation

Text: The circuit court held that the Small Islands Regulation, not the Transportation Regulation, was the governing project-specific regulation. We disagree. As a creature of statute, OCRM has only those powers expressly conferred or necessarily implied for it to effectively fulfill the duties with which it is charged. Captain's Quarters Motor Inn, Inc. v. S.C. Coastal Council, 306 S.C. 488, 490, 413 S.E.2d 13, 14 (1991). OCRM has the duty to approve or deny permit applications. S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-50(G) (Supp.2003). To fulfill this duty, OCRM must promulgate rules and regulations. S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-130(B) (Supp.2003). Whether an island is small is the threshold issue in determining whether the Transportation Regulation or the Small Islands Regulation is the governing project-specific regulation. No statute or regulation defines small island. The circuit court held that the ALJ and Panel's test for determining whether an island is small  comparing Park Island only to other islands within the same watershed  was invalid because it was not promulgated by regulation. We agree. The circuit court also held that Park Island was a small island, using no test but rather deferring to OCRM staff. OCRM and Respondents assert that small is a term of common understanding, so no particular test is necessary. We disagree. Small is a term of subjective relativity, and the regulations provide no benchmark for comparative size. Smallness arguably could be determined per watershed, with respect to all of South Carolina's islands, or on an absolute scale. The problem is that there is nothing to interpret or apply. [10] Allowing OCRM to exercise unrestrained discretion is inconsistent with the statute requiring the agency to evaluate permit applications pursuant to regulation. [11] See Captain's Quarters Motor Inn, Inc., 306 S.C. at 490-91, 413 S.E.2d at 14 (invalidating a test used by OCRM's predecessor in evaluating permit applications because it was not promulgated by regulation); see also Edisto Aquaculture Corp. v. S.C. Wildlife and Marine Res. Dep't, 311 S.C. 37, 40, 426 S.E.2d 753, 755 (1993) (distinguishing mandatory agency enabling statutes from permissive ones). That there is no promulgated test means that the Small Islands Regulation fails for vagueness. [12] Any test to determine whether an island is small is invalid as not promulgated by regulation. In light of the Small Islands Regulation's invalidity, the circuit court should have deferred to the Panel's decision that the permit was governed by the Transportation Regulation. Courts defer to the relevant administrative agency's decisions with respect to its own regulations unless there is a compelling reason to differ. Brown, 348 S.C. at 515, 560 S.E.2d at 414; Byerly Hosp. v. Health and Human Serv. Fin. Comm'n, 319 S.C. 225, 229, 460 S.E.2d 383, 386 (1995). The Panel, not OCRM staff, is entitled to deference from the courts. See S.C.Code Ann. § 1-23-610(A) (Supp.2003); S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-40(A) (Supp.2003); S.C.Code Ann. § 48-39-150(D) (Supp.2003); see also Dorman v. Dep't of Health and Envtl. Control, 350 S.C. 159, 167, 565 S.E.2d 119, 123-24 (Ct.App.2002). There was no compelling reason to overrule the Panel's decision that the Transportation Regulation governed. Despite its adoption of the invalid ALJ test to determine whether an island is small, [13] the Panel's conclusion that the Transportation Regulation controlled was correct. As OCRM Director of Permitting and Certification Richard Chinnis testified, the Transportation Regulation is the default bridge regulation. OCRM staff would have applied it had the staff recognized that the Small Islands Regulation was invalid. Consequently, we reverse the circuit court's decision and hold that the Transportation Regulation was the governing project-specific regulation.