Opinion ID: 3164522
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Solicits the other person to commit it; [or]

Text: 26  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  (b) Aids or agrees or attempts to aid the other person in planning or committing it . . . . Thus, the requisite intent of an accomplice to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense is premised on the accomplice’s objective to bring about the conduct that forms the basis for the charge, that is, the principal’s conduct. See State v. Basham, 132 Hawai#i 97, 109, 319 P.3d 1105, 1117 (2014) (discussing the meaning of “intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense”); State v. Mikasa, 111 Hawai#i 1, 6, 135 P.3d 1044, 1049 (2006) (“A principal is the person that commits the crime.”). Thus, HRS § 702-222 requires proof of conduct establishing complicity--solicitation, aiding, agreeing to aid, or attempting to aid--“[w]ith the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense.” The circuit court’s modification to the State’s proposed jury instruction in this case reflects a critical misunderstanding of accomplice liability. The circuit court instructed the jury that Toma could be found guilty if Toma was an accomplice of the principal or if the principal was an accomplice of Toma: Before you find Defendant Faalaga Toma guilty of any offense, you must unanimously agree that the offense was committed by the Defendant’s own conduct or by the conduct of another person who you unanimously determine to be an accomplice of the Defendant or to whom the Defendant was an accomplice and that the prosecution has proved the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 27  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  (Emphasis added). Consequently, the court submitted a theory of criminal liability to the jury that Toma could be found guilty based on another person being both the principal and the accomplice for the offense. The court did so unprompted by the State and over the objection of defense counsel. The circuit court’s accomplice liability theory, allowing for conviction based on the principal being an accomplice, is directly contrary to HRS § 702-222--which provides that a person is an accomplice based on his or her own intent and conduct demonstrating complicity. The commentary to HRS § 702222 states, “The Code avoids the vague concept of conspiracy in basing penal liability on the conduct of another, and focuses instead on the conduct of the accused which is sufficient to establish the accused’s complicity.” See HRS § 702-222 cmt. The commentary to Model Penal Code § 2.06 (Proposed Official Draft 1962)--from which accomplice liability under HRS §§ 702-221 and 702-222 is derived11--makes the same observation. See Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. 4.(a) (providing that the most important point of divergence from the common law with regard to accomplice liability is that “it does not make ‘conspiracy’ as such a basis of complicity in substantive offenses committed in furtherance of its aims”). In rejecting the conspiracy model, the HRS and Model 11 See HRS vol. 7A app. 3 (1976) (table of derivation). 28  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  Penal Code formulation of accomplice liability “asks, instead, more specific questions about the behavior charged to constitute complicity, such as whether the defendant solicited the commission of the particular offense or whether he aided, or agreed or attempted to aid, in its commission.” Id. “The reason for this treatment is that there appears to be no better way to confine within reasonable limits the scope of liability to which conspiracy may theoretically give rise.” Id. Therefore, it would be contrary to HRS § 702-222 to find Toma guilty of an offense because another person was his accomplice. Such a result would allow the jury to convict Toma based on another person’s intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense and the other person’s conduct demonstrating complicity. Under our law, Toma can only be legally responsible for the assault as an accomplice if the State demonstrates that Toma solicited, aided, agreed to aid, or attempted to aid another person with the intention of promoting or facilitating the commission of the offense. HRS § 702-222. The circuit court’s theory that accomplice liability may be premised on the principal being an accomplice of the defendant is an expansion of accomplice liability neither prescribed nor authorized under HRS § 702-222. 29  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  2. Hawai#i Law Precludes Judicial Establishment of a Theory of Criminal Liability. As discussed, the circuit court’s theory of accomplice liability in this case is not recognized by Hawai#i law. This unfounded expansion of accomplice liability amounts to judicial establishment of a theory of criminal liability. Such judicial expansion of the law is directly contrary to Hawaii’s comprehensive criminal statutory scheme, which precludes commonlaw offenses and theories of criminal liability. It has long been “observed that there are no common-law offenses in Hawai#i.” Territory v. Rogers, 37 Haw. 566, 567 (Haw. Terr. 1947). In 1972, this basic principle was enacted into law; HRS § 701-102(1) (1993) provides, “No behavior constitutes an offense unless it is a crime or violation under this Code or another statute of this State.” The commentary to HRS § 701-102 notes that despite the clear rule against commonlaw offenses, “it appears wise to enact specifically that no behavior is penal unless it is made so by this Code or by another statute.” HRS § 701-102 cmt12 (Emphasis added). In State v. Yamamoto, 98 Hawai#i 208, 46 P.3d 1092 12 HRS § 701-102 was derived from Model Penal Code § 1.05. See HRS vol. 7A app. 3 (1976) (table of derivation). The commentary to Model Penal Code § 1.05 is in accordance with the commentary to HRS § 701-102(1). The Model Penal Code commentary explains that “[t]here can be no justification for preserving common law offenses once a comprehensive penal code is enacted.” Model Penal Code § 1.05 cmt. 2. 30  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  (App. 2002), the trial court erroneously instructed the jury with regard to one of the elements of kidnapping by stating, “Terrorize means the risk of causing another person serious alarm for his or her personal safety.” 98 Hawai#i at 217, 46 P.3d at 1101. The inclusion of the word “risk” was error because the kidnapping statute required the intent to “[t]errorize that person or a third person,” not the intention of the “mere risk of causing another person serious alarm.” Id. The Yamamoto court cited to HRS § 701-102(1) in support of its conclusion that a conviction based on the defendant’s “mere risk” of terrorizing the victim was “not the statutory crime, and hence, no crime at all.” Id. at 219, 46 P.3d at 1103; cf. State v. Kaakimaka, 84 Hawai#i 280, 295, 933 P.2d 617, 632 (1997).13 The instruction in this case, like the erroneous instruction in Yamamoto, instructed the jury in a manner that is unfounded in statutory law. The circuit court’s theory of accomplice liability is not a statutory theory of liability as it 13 In Kaakimaka, the prosecution attempted to extend the three year statute of limitations for conspiracy to commit second degree murder based on “concealment of the murder” as being an “original objective of the murder.” Id. at 292, 933 P.2d at 629. However, the court concluded that “the conspiratorial objective must constitute an offense enumerated within the Code,” and the prosecution did not cite to any section of the code in its indictment prohibiting “concealment.” Id. at 293, 933 P.2d at 630. The court found that “[b]ecause the ‘concealment’ objective is not an enumerated offense within the Code, the defendants have not been notified, as due process requires, of any cognizable objective of the conspiracy that could extend the limitations period.” Id. at 295, 933 P.2d at 632. 31  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  is not premised on the definition of accomplice liability found in HRS § 702-222, and, thus, it is “no crime at all.” Id. at 219, 46 P.3d at 1103. The circuit court instructed the jury that it could find Toma guilty of the charged offense if another person was an accomplice of him, even though HRS § 702-222 requires Toma to have the requisite intent to promote or facilitate the commission of the offense and to engage in conduct demonstrating complicity. A jury instruction that violates the prohibition in HRS § 701-102, by submitting to the jury a common law theory of criminal liability, also raises significant due process concerns, for a criminal justice system that requires criminal liability to be statutorily defined is “a dictate of fundamental fairness.” See HRS § 701-102 cmt.14 3. Unforeseeable Judicial Enlargement of a Theory of Criminal Liability Violates Fundamental Constitutional Rights. Because the flawed jury instruction in this case went far beyond the definition of “accomplice liability,” it expanded the scope of Toma’s criminal liability in a way that Toma could not have anticipated. Such an “unforeseeable and retroactive judicial expansion of narrow and precise statutory language” 14 The Model Penal Code commentary also points to “vagueness of the common law offenses” as another point of concern and criticism of common law offenses. Model Penal Code § 1.05 cmt. 2. 32  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  deprives a defendant of the right to fair notice under the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution and article 1, section 5 of the Hawai#i Constitution. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 352 (1964); Garcia v. State, 125 Hawai#i 429, 437-38, 263 P.3d 709, 717-18 (2010) (noting unexpected judicial reformation of the law violates the principle of fair warning); State v. Jess, 117 Hawai#i 381, 408, 184 P.3d 133, 160 (2008) (same). Additionally, the circuit court’s expansion of criminal liability by its jury instructions on the law deprived Toma of an adequate opportunity to defend against the uncharged accusation and derogated his right to a fair trial.15 Of further gravity, “judicial enlargement of a criminal act by interpretation is at war with a fundamental concept of the common law that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness.” Bouie, 378 U.S. at 352; see State v. Alangcas, No. SCWC-30109, 2015 WL 518274, at  (Haw. Feb. 9, 2015, Feb. 20, 2015); State v. Beltran, 116 Hawai#i 146, 151, 172 P.3d 458, 463 (2007). The United States Supreme Court has stated that 15 “The due process guarantee of the . . . Hawaii constitution[] serves to protect the right of an accused in a criminal case to a fundamentally fair trial. Central to the protections of due process is the right to be accorded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” State v. Kaulia, 128 Hawai#i 479, 487, 291 P.3d 377, 385 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Matafeo, 71 Haw. 183, 185, 787 P.2d 671, 672 (1990)) (internal quotation marks omitted); Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (“[T]he Constitution guarantees criminal defendants “a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.”). 33  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  “unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute, applied retroactively, operates precisely like an ex post facto law,” and the Court reasoned that “[i]f a state legislature is barred by the Ex Post Facto Clause from passing such a law, it must follow that a State Supreme Court is barred by the Due Process Clause from achieving precisely the same result by judicial construction.” Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353-54. By instructing the jury in a manner that judicially expanded accomplice liability, the circuit court enlarged HRS § 207-722 in a manner completely unforeseeable to Toma and retroactively charged an unfounded theory of accomplice liability to Toma’s previous conduct. “Our system of laws assumes that a person must choose between lawful and unlawful conduct, so we require that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he or she may act accordingly.” State v. Kaneakua, 61 Haw. 136, 138, 597 P.2d 590, 592 (1979). This “fundamental principle that ‘the required criminal law must have existed when the conduct in issue occurred,’” applies “to bar retroactive criminal prohibitions emanating from courts.” Bouie, 378 U.S. at 353 (quoting Hall, General Principles of Criminal Law 58—59 (2d ed. 1960)). Because HRS § 702-222 and our case law applying accomplice liability could not 34  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  possibly have put Toma on notice with regard to the circuit court’s erroneous theory of accomplice liability, the jury instruction violated Toma’s federal and state due process rights and deprived Toma of a fair trial and his right to prepare and present a defense. This denial of Toma’s due process and fair trial rights affected his substantial rights.16 4. Flawed Accomplice Instruction Failed to Require Proof of a Culpable State of Mind or Conduct. The circuit court’s misstatement of accomplice liability in its instruction to the jury also implicates the most basic statutory requirements for proof of accomplice liability. Under Hawai#i law, a person may not be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense and the state of mind required to establish each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. HRS § 701-114 (1993). In State v. Aganon, 97 Hawai#i 299, 36 P.3d 1269 (2001), this court found that a jury instruction, which instructed a jury that it only needed to find the requisite state of mind as to one of three elements, constituted plain error. The defendant in Aganon was charged with the offense of murder in 16 See State v. Miller, 122 Hawai#i 92, 101, 223 P.3d 157, 166 (2010) (recognizing appellate review under the plain error standard is appropriate where trial court error “implicates” “due process” (quoting State v. Adams, 76 Hawai#i 408, 414, 879 P.2d 513, 519 (1994)). 35  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  the second degree under HRS § 702-205 (1993), which required proof that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly with respect to each of the three elements of the offense. 97 Hawai#i 302, 36 P.3d at 1273. The court instructed the jury that the three elements must have been committed by the defendant “intentionally or knowingly,” and the court proceeded to define what “intentionally” and “knowingly” meant respectively in the context of each element of the offense. Id. at 301-02; 36 P.3d at 1272-73. In response to a communication sent by the jury in deliberation, the court erroneously instructed the jury that it was sufficient if the jury unanimously agreed that the defendant had the requisite state of mind for one of the three elements. Id. at 302; 36 P.3d at 1273. This court held that the error adversely affected the defendant’s substantial rights and constituted plain error because the jury could have found the defendant guilty without finding the requisite state of mind for each element of the offense. Id. at 303; 36 P.3d at 1273. In this case, the circuit court crafted an instruction that advised the jury that it could find Toma guilty if he was an accomplice of the principal or if the principal was an accomplice of him, even though HRS § 702-222 requires proof that the defendant had the prescribed intent and engaged in the requisite conduct to establish complicity as an accomplice. This 36  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  instruction may have led to the absurd result that the jury found Toma guilty of the offense entirely based on a finding of another person’s conduct and intent to be an accomplice of Toma. Thus, the instruction in this case goes much farther than the erroneous jury instruction in Aganon--which erred by not requiring the requisite mental state of the defendant be proven for each element--by not requiring any proof that Toma had the requisite mental state or that he exhibited conduct demonstrating his complicity. The instruction in this case made it possible that the jury’s finding of guilty was premised entirely on the intent and conduct of another person. Accordingly, the circuit court’s theory of accomplice liability was in direct contravention of HRS § 701-114’s requirement that the State prove the requisite state of mind as defined in HRS § 702-222. 5. The Erroneous Jury Instructions Adversely Affected Toma’s Substantial Rights Necessitating Exercise of this Court’s Authority to Recognize Plain Error. As stated, the circuit court’s unfounded theory of accomplice liability deprived Toma of due process under the United States Constitution and the Hawai#i Constitution, and it also violated basic principles of our criminal law requiring criminal theories of liability to be statutorily defined and proven. The jury instructions with regard to accomplice 37  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  liability were not only wrong but they were also confusing and inconsistent. We know, based on the jury’s answers to the questions on the verdict form, that the jury found Toma guilty of the offense based on an accomplice theory of liability. By virtue of the circuit court’s jury instruction, the jury could have found Toma guilty based on “another person, who [the jury] unanimously determine[d] to be an accomplice of [Toma].” The confusion created by the jury’s misstatement of accomplice liability was particularly problematic in this case because of the conflicting testimony presented at trial and the numerous people involved in the fight. Given the nature of the circumstances of this case, the jury could have convicted Toma based on the conduct of one of the other employees of the nightclub, one of the mall security guards, or one of the people from the crowd surrounding the fight. Under the court’s erroneous theory of accomplice liability, even if the jury believed Toma’s testimony that he merely restrained the complaining witness and asked him to leave, the jury could still have found him guilty based on another person who committed the offense and was found to be “an accomplice of” Toma. The defense, in objecting to the accomplice instruction, predicted that it would cause “utter confusion on the part of the jury.” The record indicates that the jury was in 38  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  fact confused with regard to the accomplice instruction; the jury’s only question for the court during its deliberations asked the court to “explain the accomplice policy.” The circuit court responded by referring the jury back to its written instructions, including its misstatement of accomplice liability. Although the jury instructions also defined accomplice correctly, no curative instruction relating to the misstatement of the law on accomplice liability was given. See State v. Espiritu, 117 Hawai#i 127, 143, 176 P.3d 885, 901 (2008) (holding that instructions given by the court correctly stating the law did not redress a prosecutor’s misstatements of the law absent a specific curative instruction relating to the misstatements); see also Basham, 132 Hawai#i at 111, 319 P.3d at 1119 (“[W]hile the court properly instructed the jury on accomplice liability, that instruction did not cure the prosecutor’s misstatements of the law, where no specific curative instruction relating to the misstatements was given.”). Further, the court’s error was repeated in both the written jury instructions and the jury verdict form.17 As completed by the jury, the jury verdict form rejected a finding that Toma was a principal that committed the offense, and the 17 The jury verdict form did not include the correct accomplice definition. 39  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  jury found Toma guilty under a theory of accomplice liability. It is uncertain whether the verdict was based on the correct theory of accomplice liability under HRS § 702-222 or on the court’s unfounded, reverse-accomplice theory. In light of the circuit court’s uncorrected misstatement of the law and the jury verdict form indicating that the jury reached its guilty verdict on the accomplice liability instruction presented by the court, there is more than a reasonable possibility that the jury found Toma guilty under the circuit court’s erroneous theory of accomplice liability. This is particularly true given the state of the evidence in this case, including the involvement of multiple actors. Accordingly, the circuit court’s instruction misstating accomplice liability adversely affected Toma’s substantial rights and constituted plain error.18 See Aganon, 97 Hawai#i at 303, 36 18 Although Toma specifically objected to the court’s flawed accomplice instruction at the circuit court because the instruction would create “utter confusion on the part of the jury” given that the complaining witness claimed he was assaulted at various locations by multiple unidentified people, his position before the ICA and this court was that no accomplice instruction should have been given at all. Thus, even though he objected to the jury instruction as confusing at trial, he did not assert on appeal that the instruction was flawed because it allowed the jury to convict him of the assault charge if the person who committed the assault was an accomplice of Toma. However, assuming arguendo that Toma did not preserve his objection for appeal to the giving of the flawed accomplice instruction by the court, its submission to the jury and its integration into the verdict form unquestionably demonstrates that the instructions were not correctly stated, and “the rule is that such erroneous instructions are presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error was not prejudicial.” State v. Eberly, 107 Hawai#i (continued...) 40  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  P.3d at 1273 (finding plain error because “the jury could have found [defendant] guilty . . . even though it did not find the requisite state of mind” for each element of the offense based on the court’s erroneous response to the jury); cf. Yamamoto, 98 Hawai#i at 219, 46 P.3d at 1103 (finding jury instructions were not harmless where the instruction deprived defendant of a possible defense and a reasonable possibility existed that the jury convicted defendant of something that did not even constitute a crime). The error in this case arose from the circuit court’s erroneous modification to the State’s proposed instruction over the objection of the defense. This court confirmed that “[i]n our judicial system, the trial courts, not the parties, have the duty and ultimate responsibility to insure that juries are properly instructed on issues of criminal liability. Basham, 132 Hawai#i at 110, 319 P.3d at 1118 (quoting State v. Haanio, 94 Hawai#i 405, 415, 16 P.3d 246, 256 (2001)); State v. Kikuta, 125 Hawai#i 78, 90, 253 P.3d 639, 651 (2011) (“[I]t is the duty of the trial court to ensure that the jury is properly 18 (...continued) 239, 250, 112 P.3d 725, 736 (2005); see State v. Pinero, 75 Haw. 282, 291, 859 P.2d 1369, 1374 (1993) (“An appellate court presume that an instruction correctly stated the law if no objection to the allegedly erroneous instruction was made at trial.” (emphasis added)). 41  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  instructed.”); State v. Flores, 131 Hawai#i 43, 56, 314 P.3d 120, 133 (2013) (“[T]he trial courts, not the parties, have the duty and ultimate responsibility to insure that juries are properly instructed on issues of criminal liability.”) Consequently, in reviewing a flawed jury instruction, “we will vacate, without regard to whether timely objection was made, if there is a reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the defendant’s conviction, i.e., that the erroneous jury instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. DeLeon, 131 Hawai#i 463, 480, 319 P.3d 382, 399 (2014) (quoting State v. Nichols, 111 Hawai#i 327, 141 P.3d 974 (2006).19 As discussed, the jury instruction in this case misstated accomplice liability so that Toma could have been found guilty based on a theory of accomplice liability not recognized 19 The plain error standard is also applied when the issue has not been raised to this court on appeal but the error affects substantial rights of the defendant. State v. Getz, 131 Hawai#i 19, 27, 313 P.3d 708, 716 (2013) (vacating and remanding for a new trial based on the circuit court’s failure to give a specific unanimity decision although the defendant did not raise the lack of a specific unanimity instruction as a point of error on appeal); State v. Salas, SCWC-10-123 (Haw. Feb. 12, 2014) (mem.) (invoking plain error and vacating conviction and remanding for further proceedings where defense counsel failed to raise a lack of a specific unanimity instruction on appeal); see also State v. Staley, 91 Hawai#i 275, 286, 982 P.2d 904, 915 (1999) (addressing the violation of the defendant’s right to testify as plain error although not raised by defense counsel on appeal); In Interest of Doe, 77 Hawai#i 46, 50, 881 P.2d 533, 537 (1994) (“Although Doe has not raised the family court’s failure to explain the nature of assault as error with regard to her waiver of counsel, we may sua sponte notice plain error where it affects Doe’s substantial rights.”); State v. Fox, 70 Haw. 46, 55, 760 P.2d 670, 675 (1988) (“And we may notice ‘plain error’ even when ‘not presented’ by the appellant.”). 42  NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST’S HAWAI#I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER  by our law. Given the fact that the jury specifically indicated on the verdict form that Toma was found guilty based on a theory of accomplice liability there is a reasonable possibility that the erroneous accomplice instruction contributed to Toma’s conviction. Thus, the flawed instruction was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In conclusion, the circuit court in this case modified the proposed jury instructions in a manner that misinformed the jury regarding the applicable criminal law and allowed the jury to convict him of a felony offense based upon conduct that is not a crime. The erroneous instruction therefore affected Toma’s substantial rights and denied him a fair trial.20 Accordingly, the circuit court’s December 18, 2012 Judgment of Conviction of Probation Sentence is vacated, and this case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. DATED: Honolulu, Hawai#i, December 21, 2015. Taryn R. Tomasa /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald for defendant-appellant /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna Brian R. Vincent for plaintiff-appellee /s/ Richard W. Pollack 20 This court has repeatedly stated that it “will apply the plain error standard error of review to correct errors which seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings, to serve the ends of justice, and to prevent the denial of fundamental rights.” See, e.g., Nichols, 111 Hawai#i at 334, 141 P.3d at 981; see also DeLeon, 131 Hawai#i at 480, 319 P.3d at 399 (same); State v. Taylor, 130 Hawai#i 196, 205, 307 P.3d 1142, 1151 (2013) (same); State v. Walsh, 125 Hawai#i 271, 284, 260 P.3d 350, 363 (2011) (same); Kikuta, 125 Hawai#i at 95, 253 P.3d at 656 (same); State v. Sawyer, 88 Hawai#i 325, 330, 966 P.2d 637, 642 (1998) (same). 43