Opinion ID: 3003404
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Heading: a nalysis of d ustin d ecker’s a ppeal

Text: Dustin Decker was a methamphetamine dealer in Indianapolis who purchased some of the drugs that Baltista and Eden Soto obtained from Lupillo. Decker pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute, and possession with intent to distribute, in excess of 500 grams of a 6 Alvarez also claimed in her opening brief that no evidence demonstrated she knew the conspiracy was trafficking in methamphetamine rather than a less serious drug, and that sentencing her accordingly violated her right to due process. But a defendant may be convicted for conspiracy without knowing the precise type of drug involved, see Carrera, 259 F.3d at 830, and inherent in a conviction is that a defendant will also be sentenced. The jury found Alvarez guilty of conspiring to distribute methamphetamine—there was no evidence of any other drug—and the court did not err in its sentence. Nos. 07-3964, 07-4060 & 08-1141 23 mixture or substance containing a detectible amount of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. At Decker’s plea hearing, a federal agent testified that authorities recovered two sizeable stashes of methamphetamine from Decker’s home. The agent also stated that from approximately October 1, 2006, through January 22, 2007, Decker received weekly deliveries of around five pounds of methamphetamine, which he intended to resell for profit. Decker agreed with the factual basis for his plea, except for the weekly drug quantity. He claimed that he only received seven to eight pounds of methamphetamine during the entire conspiracy. The probation office prepared a PSR, which adopted the government’s factual basis for Decker’s plea. The PSR noted but dismissed Decker’s claim that he had only distributed seven to eight pounds of methamphetamine and fixed his base offense level at thirty-eight. Decker accepted this base offense level in his Sentencing Memorandum, but he requested that the court grant a re- duction based on his minor role. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b). At his sentencing hearing, the district court adopted the PSR’s suggested base offense level of thirty-eight. Decker’s counsel did not object to the recommended drug quantity. The only argument Decker presented was that he should receive a reduction for his minor role in the conspiracy. In making this argument to the court, Decker’s counsel stated: We aren’t arguing—and we understand well the law in the area with regard to conspiracies and that is that he could be tied to the total amount of the 24 Nos. 07-3964, 07-4060 & 08-1141 conspiracy. That’s not our argument. Actually, we’re using that as part of our argument as a minor participant. After imposing a two-level increase for possession of a firearm and granting a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the district court set Decker’s final offense level at thirty-seven. His criminal history category was II, resulting in a Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months’ imprisonment. The district court sentenced Decker to 235 months in prison, and Decker appealed. Decker claims that the district court miscalculated his base offense level by holding him responsible for too much methamphetamine. Before we may reach the merits of Decker’s argument, we must consider whether he waived or merely forfeited his challenge, a distinction carrying great weight. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right, and it precludes appellate review altogether. United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing Olano, 507 U.S. at 733). Forfeiture, on the other hand, is the failure to timely assert a right, and we review a forfeited challenge for plain error. Id. The line between waiver and forfeiture is often blurry. We have noted that “[t]he touchstone of waiver is a knowing and intentional decision” not to assert a right, id. at 848, whereas forfeiture typically results from “an accidental or negligent omission,” United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th Cir. 2001). The distinction is not always easy to make, and the important concern is Nos. 07-3964, 07-4060 & 08-1141 25 whether a defendant chose, as a matter of strategy, not to present an argument. See Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848; see also United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008). Decker argues that his counsel’s above-quoted comments did not waive his challenge, relying heavily on our remark in Jaimes-Jaimes that “a lawyer’s statement at sentencing that the defendant does not object to anything in the presentence report does not inevitably constitute a waiver.” 406 F.3d at 848. He also claims that JaimesJaimes requires that a defendant’s intent to relinquish a challenge appear unambiguously in the record. We do not read Jaimes-Jaimes as broadly as Decker suggests. In that case, the court could discern no strategic reason for the defendant’s failure to object to a sixteenlevel sentencing adjustment. Id. In fact, we noted that “the only plausible possibility” was that the defendant’s attorney was deficient in failing to object, and therefore it was “accidental rather than deliberate.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotations omitted). Given the magnitude of the adjustment and the absence of a strategic reason for failing to object, we held that the defendant merely forfeited his challenge, even though counsel affirmatively stated that he accepted the Guidelines calculation. Id. at 848-49. Although a lawyer’s statement that a defendant has no objection to the PSR does not automatically constitute a waiver, it certainly might. See, e.g., United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Redding, 104 F.3d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1996). We must 26 Nos. 07-3964, 07-4060 & 08-1141 consider the lawyer’s statement in light of the surrounding circumstances and determine whether counsel made a knowing and intentional decision. We do not require the defendant to expressly state on the record his intent to waive a challenge before we will consider it waived—defendants often fail to object to a PSR, and such an express statement is rare. Rather, our task is to use conjecture as to whether the defendant’s failure to object was accidental or deliberate, and to do so, we evaluate the record as a whole. In Decker’s case, we find that he waived his objection to the court’s drug quantity calculation. His counsel’s statement did not merely indicate that he had no objections to the PSR—it affirmatively stated that he knew that Decker could be sentenced for drugs trafficked by the whole conspiracy and that he was not challenging the drug quantity for a strategic reason. This is precisely what the waiver doctrine contemplates. Moreover, the record, even without reference to counsel’s statement, indicates that Decker made a deliberate choice not to challenge the drug quantity calculation. Decker had access to the PSR, knew of his right to object, considered objecting to portions of the PSR other than the one he now challenges, and stated on the record that he did not have any further objections when asked by the district court. We have previously found waiver in similar circumstances. See, e.g., United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. MartinezJimenez, 294 F.3d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 2002); Staples, 202 F.3d at 995; Redding, 104 F.3d at 99. Nos. 07-3964, 07-4060 & 08-1141 27 Decker instead focused on his allegedly minor role in the conspiracy, arguing that the amount of methamphetamine that he handled paled in comparison to the quantity attributed to the entire conspiracy. “ ‘There may be sound strategic reasons why a criminal defendant will elect to pursue one sentencing argument while also choosing to forego another, and when the defendant selects as a matter of strategy, he also waives those arguments he decided not to present.’ ” United States v. Kindle, 453 F.3d 438, 442 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848). Our duty when considering waiver is to divine from the record an intent to forego an argument, and counsel’s statement, in light of the other circumstances in this case, provides more than a sufficient basis for doing so. We find that Decker waived his challenge to the district court’s drug quantity calculation.