Opinion ID: 1650436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Incorrect testimony.

Text: At trial, when describing the time and the circumstances of the sale of the drugs, Bridges testified:  Q. You've discussed this place [case] with Officer Bowers, I mean Officer Rodgers several times since the incident occurred; is that right? A. No.  Q. Never have? A. He never have discussed the case with me, no.  Q. Did Officer Randa? A. No.  Q. You didn't discuss it or, or talk with the district attorney either; is that right? A. No. At the hearing on the motion for a new trial the assistant district attorney testified that he had talked to Bridges prior to the time he testified. It is now claimed that under the rule of Napue v. Illinois [1] the prosecutor was obliged to correct the testimony of Bridges at trial and to correct the impression left that Bridges had not talked to the prosecutor prior to his testimony. True, in Napue the Supreme Court of the United States reversed a criminal conviction in which the state's primary witness had lied when he said that the state had granted him no consideration in exchange for his testimony. In fact, the prosecutor had promised the witness a reduction of his sentence, and the prosecutor knowingly allowed the witness to give false testimony. But there are two important distinctions between Napue and the present case. First, the present action was a trial to the court, there was no jury. Second, the allegedly false testimony here does not go to showing a reason or a motivation for the witness to withhold the truth. In Napue the United States Supreme Court considered whether the witness' credibility would have been affected had the jury been aware of the deal. Here there is no evidence to support the assertion of a deal between the state and the witness, although defendant attempts to draw that inference. In the instant case, the trier of fact was an experienced judge who is certainly aware of the custom of attorneys to discuss the witness' testimony with him prior to his giving that testimony. Thus, we question whether the rationale of Napue applies to the present case. As a more basic response to defendant's argument, it is clear that this alleged false testimony could not in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the fact finder. Napue does not require reversal or a new trial unless the judgment of the fact finder could likely have been affected. [2] It must also be noted that this statement by Bridges does not go to an element of the crime. [3] The testimony given by Bridges was not such as to demonstrate a desire to keep something from the court which would go to his credibility. In Napue the fact that the witness had been granted a deal would go to his credibility as a witness for the state, while here the fact that he had talked briefly with the prosecutor prior to his testimony would raise no such inference.