Opinion ID: 2122030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pretrial Suppression Hearing

Text: Defendant has not pursued his pretrial contention that his inculpatory statements should have been suppressed as involuntarily made. He continues to maintain, however, that his statements should have been suppressed because they were the fruit of an unlawful warrantless arrest inside his home. Hearings were conducted on defendant's motions to quash his arrest and to suppress his statements. Several police officers, including Detectives Kaminski, Mannion, Richter, Gildea and Jin testified regarding defendant's arrest both at the hearings and at trial. Theresa Williams, who owned the house where defendant was staying, and Evelyn Miller, defendant's girlfriend, also testified concerning defendant's arrest at the pretrial hearing and at trial. A composite of those witnesses' testimony is as follows. After obtaining a description of the offender from witnesses on the scene and questioning Smith, police officers took Golden into custody. Confronted with her failure of a polygraph examination, Golden made a statement implicating herself and defendant in Valerie's murder. According to Detective Kaminski, Golden related that Smith was angry that Louia had decided to end their relationship. In conversations on June 21, and June 23, 1987, Smith told Golden that she wished Valerie were dead and asked Golden if she knew anybody who could do it. Golden responded that she did, but that it would cost $500, which Smith agreed to pay. Smith and Golden drove to a lounge near 59th and Honore Streets. Golden approached a man whom she knew only as Eddie and told him that the woman in the car (Smith) wanted somebody hit and was willing to pay $500. Eddie accepted the offer and agreed to give Golden $100 from Smith's payment to him. Smith, Golden and Eddie drove to the home of Golden's cousin Tippy, where Golden obtained a gun. After taking Smith home, Golden and Eddie drove to the apartment building where Valerie McDonald and her family lived. They left when they saw that Louia's car was not there. They returned the gun to Tippy and agreed to meet again the next day. The following evening they picked up the gun, drove past the McDonalds' residence and then parked the car a short distance away. Golden pointed out the McDonalds' car as it passed. Eddie then exited the car. Sometime later he ran back and, in response to Golden's inquiry, said I shot her in the head. I think she's dead. They then drove to Smith's house, where Eddie was paid $500, from which he gave Golden $100. Detective Kaminski testified that Golden told him that she did not know the address of the house where Eddie was staying, but that she would be able to direct the detectives to it. Shortly after midnight on June 25, she and seven detectives drove, in three cars, from Area 6 on the north side of Chicago to a house on South Wolcott Avenue. A middle-aged man and woman, who stated that they were Eddie's aunt and uncle, advised the police that Eddie was not there. Detectives Mannion and Jin remained there while the other detectives and Golden proceeded to a house a few blocks away on South Honore Avenue. Detectives Richter, Gildea and Johnson approached the front door; Kaminski went to the rear of the house. All the officers had their weapons drawn; Richter was armed with a shotgun. Richter's knock on the front door was answered by a woman named Theresa. When Richter asked if Eddie was there, Theresa opened the door, allowed the officers to enter the foyer, and told them that Eddie was downstairs with his girlfriend. Theresa led them through the house to a rear door leading down to the basement. Theresa pointed to a room with a partially open door at the front of the basement from which some light was emanating. The officers did not notice any furnishings as they walked through the basement. Richter looked in the room and saw that the man in the bed fit the description of the offender. When Richter asked, Are you Eddie? the man responded that he was. Richter ordered defendant out of bed and advised him that he was under arrest. Defendant, wearing only undershorts, was ordered to his knees and handcuffed. The woman in the room with defendant (Evelyn Miller) handed one of the detectives some clothing before defendant was taken out of the house. Defendant was placed in a squad car and driven away from the house, where bystanders had gathered. The police stopped the car a few blocks away and allowed defendant to put on his clothing. Theresa Williams (not related to defendant) testified that at approximately 1 a.m., her brother Ronald woke her and her boyfriend, Dwight, by calling out and knocking on their bedroom door. When she came out, police officers were standing on each side of the door with their guns pointed toward her. She did not know how the police gained entry into the house. When Dwight came out of the bedroom, an officer said, He's not the guy. Williams asked who they were looking for and told them she had a basement tenant who had a boyfriend staying with her. The officers instructed her to take them downstairs. She had to unlock the bottom basement door to enter the basement; as she did, the police pushed her inside. Williams called out for Miller, but Miller did not answer. Williams knocked on the bedroom door and announced that the police were there to see Eddie. When the light went on the police again pushed her through the door first. They followed her into the room with their guns drawn and said, Get up right now Eddie Williams. An officer took a photograph from Miller's mirror and searched under the mattress while defendant was being handcuffed. Defendant was then taken out the back door in his undershorts. On cross-examination, Theresa Williams stated that the police asked if they could go downstairs to see Miller's boyfriend, and that she gave her permission. Williams also stated that the basement contained several pieces of Miller's furniture, including bunk beds where Miller's two children were sleeping. The children awoke when Miller began screaming at the police officers. Evelyn Miller testified that she and defendant were asleep when Theresa Williams knocked on the door and said that some police officers wanted to see Eddie. As soon as she reached up and turned on the light, two police officers came in with their guns drawn. They asked defendant if he was Eddie Williams; defendant said that he was. The officers ordered defendant out of bed and onto his knees. Miller was not allowed to get out of bed. The officers searched under her mattress, asking, Where's the gun? They also took a photograph of defendant from her mirror. As the officers were leaving, Miller asked where they were taking defendant so that she could bring him some clothes. She later went to Area 6 and gave an officer there some clothes for defendant. Theresa Williams had given defendant permission to move in with Miller, and he had contributed some money for the rent. The remainder of Miller's cross-examination is the subject of a separate issue and will be discussed later in this opinion. Although defendant did not testify at the suppression hearings, his testimony at trial included an account of his arrest. Defendant testified that when Miller turned on the light in their room, he awoke and saw several police officers with their guns drawn. They ordered him to get out of bed. He repeatedly asked them what he had done. They responded that he knew what he had done and to just shut up. The officers ordered him onto his knees, pushed his face on the floor and, while pointing a gun to the back of his head, handcuffed him. He requested but was not permitted to put on his clothes. He was led out to a squad car and transported to the police station, where he was handcuffed in an interview room. Many hours later, as a result of some smacks and threats by Mannion and a lack of sleep, defendant began agreeing to the version of events recounted to him by Detective Mannion and Assistant State's Attorney DeGrazia. Eventually he signed the statement that DeGrazia had composed in advance and brought into the interview room with him. The trial court denied defendant's motion to quash his warrantless arrest. In its ruling, the court found that the police acted reasonably, that they had probable cause to arrest defendant, that exigent circumstances were present, and that there was no forced entry. The court also denied defendant's motion to suppress his statements as having been illegally procured and involuntarily given. Defendant argues that his arrest at 1 a.m. by three heavily armed officers who confronted the owner of the house with their weapons drawn, ordered her to unlock the basement apartment door, burst their way into his bedroom while he was asleep, ordered him to his knees, handcuffed him and forced him to leave his house clad only in his undershorts constituted a flagrant violation of the constitutional protections against warrantless arrests inside a suspect's home. Defendant asserts that there was no exigency sufficient to countenance the officers' failure to obtain a warrant for his arrest. He maintains that the police had ample time and opportunity after obtaining information from Golden to procure an arrest warrant, and that there was no reason for the police to believe he might flee. He also argues that the number of officers involved made it possible that one officer could have obtained a warrant while the others secured the location from the outside, and that their armed entry into both the house and the basement apartment, which awakened and frightened all of the residents including two young children, was neither consensual nor peaceful. In the absence of consent or exigent circumstances, the police are prohibited from making a warrantless entry into a private residence to effectuate a routine felony arrest. ( Payton v. New York (1980), 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639; People v. Abney (1980), 81 Ill.2d 159, 163-74, 41 Ill.Dec. 45, 407 N.E.2d 543.) Factors which have been considered relevant to a determination of exigency include whether: (1) the crime under investigation was recently committed; (2) there was any deliberate or unjustified delay by the police during which time a warrant could have been obtained; (3) a grave offense was involved, particularly a crime of violence; (4) there was reasonable belief that the suspect was armed; (5) the police officers were acting on a clear showing of probable cause; (6) there was a likelihood that the suspect would escape if he was not swiftly apprehended; (7) there was strong reason to believe the suspect was in the premises; and (8) the police entry was made peaceably, albeit nonconsensually. People v. Foskey (1990), 136 Ill.2d 66, 75, 143 Ill.Dec. 257, 554 N.E.2d 192; People v. White (1987), 117 Ill.2d 194, 216-17, 111 Ill.Dec. 288, 512 N.E.2d 677; People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill.2d 502, 515, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369; Abney, 81 Ill.2d at 169-74, 41 Ill.Dec. 45, 407 N.E.2d 543. This list is not exhaustive of the factors which may constitute exigent circumstances. The fundamental guiding principle is reasonableness, in accord with constitutional provisions governing searches and seizures. ( Foskey, 136 Ill.2d at 75-76, People v. Cobb (1983), 97 Ill.2d 465, 484, 74 Ill.Dec. 1, 455 N.E.2d 31.) In determining whether the police acted reasonably, the court must look to the totality of the circumstances confronting the officers at the time the entry was made. ( Yates, 98 Ill.2d at 515, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369.) The decision of the trial court on a motion to quash and suppress will not be disturbed by a reviewing court unless that decision is determined to be clearly erroneous. White, 117 Ill.2d at 213, 111 Ill.Dec. 288, 512 N.E.2d 677. As a preliminary matter, we take note of the parties' arguments regarding whether the police had consent to enter the residence. The State argues that Williams gave her consent, and that defendant has not challenged on appeal the trial court's implicit finding of a reasonable belief by the officers that consent was granted. In reply, defendant asserts that the entry was nonconsensual and that he has not conceded otherwise, but he has not raised the issue directly because the State did not argue against his motion to quash on the lack-of-consent basis in the trial court. This court has held that the rule of waiver, that an issue not raised in the trial court generally will not be considered on appeal, is a limitation on the parties, not on the courts, and that waiver may be disregarded by a reviewing court in order to achieve a just result. ( People v. Hoskins (1984), 101 Ill.2d 209, 219, 78 Ill.Dec. 107, 461 N.E.2d 941.) However, in the present case, we do not reach the parties' assertions of waiver on the issue of consent for two reasons. First, by denying the motion to quash on the ground that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless arrest, the trial court impliedly ruled that the entry was nonconsensual, since consent to enter a residence by the suspect or by a third party with control over the premises validates a warrantless arrest and renders unnecessary a showing of exigent circumstances. ( People v. Henderson (1990), 142 Ill.2d 258, 297-98, 154 Ill.Dec. 785, 568 N.E.2d 1234.) Second, even absent a clear ruling on the issue of consent, we conclude that the trial court's finding of exigent circumstances is supported by the evidence. The crime involved was of the most serious nature, involving unprovoked, deadly violence against the victim. From the time of the murder until defendant's arrest only 27 hours later, the police conducted an around-the-clock investigation, acting on every lead they received without delay. (See People v. Jones (1989), 184 Ill.App.3d 412, 133 Ill.Dec. 295, 541 N.E.2d 132.) During the course of their investigation, the police learned that the car used in the offense belonged to Smith, who led them to Golden. Golden provided the police with a detailed statement regarding the conspiracy and the shooting. Her statement was corroborated by several facts which were already known to the police, e.g., the relationship between Smith and Louia, that Valerie had been shot in the head, that the getaway car was parked in a supermarket lot, and that after the shooter jumped into the car it sped away. Golden confessed to her own involvement in the crimes and implicated defendant as the gunman. Her confession, coupled with specific, independently corroborated details concerning the crimes and the gunman, constituted sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the police with probable cause to arrest defendant. See People v. James (1987), 118 Ill.2d 214, 222, 113 Ill.Dec. 86, 514 N.E.2d 998. Defendant's argument that, given the time lapse between Golden's statement and his arrest, the police could have obtained an arrest warrant is unpersuasive. The evidence established that Golden completed her statement at approximately 10 p.m., and that the team of officers which was thereafter assembled left Area 6 headquarters shortly after midnight. The officers clearly acted without delay in initiating efforts to apprehend defendant following receipt of information from Golden concerning defendant and his possible whereabouts. (See Jones, 184 Ill.App.3d at 422, 133 Ill.Dec. 295, 541 N.E.2d 132 (no unjustified delay by police where arrest was made 27 hours after crime and four hours after police learned of defendant's involvement).) Additionally, Smith had been released from custody after being questioned the previous afternoon. Thus, there existed a reasonable possibility that she knew defendant's whereabouts and might alert him that Golden had been taken into custody for interrogation. (See Cobb, 97 Ill.2d 465, 74 Ill.Dec. 1, 455 N.E.2d 31.) It was not unreasonable for the police to believe that swift action to apprehend defendant was necessary. Further, the police were not in possession of defendant's surname or address because Golden claimed she did not have that information. They had only Golden's statement that the person they were seeking was named Eddie, and that she could show them where he was staying. Thus, the officers lacked sufficient information to obtain a warrant naming defendant and authorizing an arrest at his home. And, in fact, Golden's initial identification of the house on Wolcott Avenue as defendant's residence proved to be incorrect. It was only after the police arrived at the Wolcott location that they received additional information which led them to an address on Honore Avenue. Two detectives remained at the Wolcott residence while four others immediately proceeded to Williams' house on Honore Avenue, two blocks away. Given these circumstances, the police were justified in taking immediate action to apprehend defendant and were not required to risk defendant's flight and disappearance in the time needed to obtain a warrant. Finally, irrespective of whether there was actual or apparent consent given for the police to enter the house, the entry was not forcible; there was no damage to any part of the building or injury to any of the occupants. That the officers entered with their guns drawn is not unreasonable since the crime was a violent, calculated murder for money, committed with a gun they had not yet recovered. The officers were justified in believing defendant was dangerous and, possibly, armed. In sum, upon a review of the totality of the evidence, we agree with the trial court that the police had probable cause to arrest defendant and that exigent circumstances were present to justify making the arrest without a warrant. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motions to quash his arrest and suppress his subsequent custodial statements.