Opinion ID: 187060
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Implementation after impasse

Text: Section 8 of the Act requires an employer to bargain with the union representing its employees with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a), (d). When a CBA expires without a new agreement having been reached, the employer must continue to bargain in good faith for a new agreement and maintain the status quo during negotiations. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 743, 746, 82 S.Ct. 1107, 8 L.Ed.2d 20 (1962). The duty to bargain does not, however, compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d). The Act does not contemplate that unions will always be secure and able to achieve agreement even when their economic position is weak. H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 397 U.S. 99, 109, 90 S.Ct. 821, 25 L.Ed.2d 146 (1970). The Board is charged only with ensuring the parties satisfy their duty to bargain; it may not act at large in equalizing disparities of bargaining power between employer and union. NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Ina Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490, 80 S.Ct. 419, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960). Nor may the Board impose a substantive provision upon the parties. [A]greement may in some cases be impossible, and it was never intended that the Government would in such cases step in, become a party to the negotiations and impose its own views of a desirable settlement. H.K. Porter, 397 U.S. at 103-04, 90 S.Ct. 821. Either party to collective bargaining may lawfully insist to the point of impasse upon any provision related to a mandatory subject of bargaining, which is to say wages, hours, [or] other terms and conditions of employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d); NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349, 78 S.Ct. 718, 2 L.Ed.2d 823 (1958). An employer may even insist upon a provision granting it discretion unilaterally to change certain conditions of employment during the term of the CBA. NLRB v. Am. Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 409, 72 S.Ct. 824, 96 L.Ed. 1027 (1952) (Whether a contract should contain a clause fixing standards for such matters as work scheduling or should provide for more flexible treatment is an issue for determination across the bargaining table, not by the Board). When an employer and a union reach an impasse over a mandatory subject of bargaining, either side may resort to economic warfarea strike, a lockout, etc.and the employer's statutory duty to maintain the status quo during post-contract negotiations . . . end[s]. Laborers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Advanced Lightweight Concrete Co., Inc., 484 U.S. 539, 543 n. 5, 108 S.Ct. 830, 98 L.Ed.2d 936 (1988). The employer then may mak[e] unilateral changes that are reasonably comprehended within his preimpasse proposals. Am. Fed'n of Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622, 624 (D.C.Cir.1968) (internal quotation mark omitted), The rationale for this rule is that the employer's unilateral imposition of the final offer breaks the impasse and therefore encourages future collective bargaining. McClatchy Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 131 F.3d 1026, 1032 (D.C.Cir.1997). It moves the process forward by giving one party, the employer, economic leverage. Id. An employer's right to deploy its economic weapons following an impasse is not absolute: The Supreme Court has held the Board, in order to facilitate the process of collective bargaining, may place certain restrictions upon what an employer may do after impasse. In Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 720, 70 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982), for example, the Court upheld a Board order barring an employer from withdrawing from a multi-employer unit after bargaining had reached an impasse. Id. at 412, 102 S.Ct. 720. The Court stated more generally that the Board may deny an employer a particular economic weapon . . . in the interest of the proper and preeminent goal, maintaining the stability of the multiemployer bargaining unit. Id. at 419, 102 S.Ct. 720; see also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32, 87 S.Ct. 1792, 18 L.Ed.2d 1027 (1967) (upholding Board decision prohibiting employer from granting benefits to strike-breakers but not strikers because of discouraging effect on . . . future concerted activity); NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 231, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963) (upholding Board decision prohibiting employer from granting super-seniority to strike-breakers because [s]uper-seniority renders future bargaining difficult, if not impossible); cf. Am. Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 309, 85 S.Ct. 955, 13 L.Ed.2d 855 (1965) (holding lockout was not unfair labor practice because the employer's intention was [not] to destroy or frustrate the process of collective bargaining).