Opinion ID: 1194810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: legal framework applicable to a qualification standard claim under the ada

Text: The hearing standard at issue here is a facially discriminatory qualification standard because it focuses directly on an individual's disabling or potentially disabling condition. See, e.g., McGregor v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 187 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that a policy requiring employees to be 100% healed or fully healed after an injury is facially discriminatory and constitutes a per se violation of the ADA). Instead of recognizing this posture, the district court analyzed the claim as a pattern-or-practice disparate treatment claim, applying the burden-shifting protocol set out in Teamsters. See 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. 1843. A burden-shifting protocol is, however, unnecessary in this circumstance. The fact to be uncovered by such a protocol  whether the employer made an employment decision on a proscribed basis (here, disability in the form of hearing impairment)  is not in dispute. See Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1182-83 (6th Cir.1996) (noting that when a defendant admits to taking account of disability status, the burden-shifting framework sometimes applicable to disparate treatment claims is unnecessary). In addition, whether Bates established a prima facie case of employment discrimination in the summary judgment burden-shifting sense is moot after trial. The relevant inquiry now is simply whether the evidence presented at trial supports a finding of liability. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983); Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 855-56 (9th Cir.2002) (en banc), aff'd, 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003).
The enforcement provision of Title I of the ADA, under which Bates brought suit, provides: No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Thus, under the ADA, an employee bears the ultimate burden of proving that he is (1) disabled under the Act, (2) a qualified individual with a disability, and (3) discriminated against because of the disability. Nunes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.1999). There is no dispute that the class members, who are hearing impaired, are disabled. Instead, we focus on the two other key terms in the statute: qualified individual and discriminate. To unpack the meaning of these terms, we look to the statute. A qualified individual is an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). Essential functions are fundamental job duties of the employment position . . . not includ[ing] the marginal functions of the position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see Cripe v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 887 (9th Cir.2001). If a disabled person cannot perform a job's `essential functions' (even with a reasonable accommodation), then the ADA's employment protections do not apply. Cripe, 261 F.3d at 884-85. If, on the other hand, a person can perform a job's essential functions, and therefore is a qualified individual, then the ADA prohibits discrimination with respect to the employment actions outlined in 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Id. Discrimination under the ADA includes the use of qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities unless the standard, test or other selection criteria, as used by the covered entity, is shown to be job-related for the position in question and is consistent with business necessity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (emphasis added). [5] The EEOC regulations define qualifications standards as the personal and professional attributes including the skill, experience, education, physical, medical, safety and other requirements established by a covered entity as requirements which an individual must meet in order to be eligible for the position held or desired. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(q). In a case involving the use of a qualification standard, the ADA provides employers with a business necessity defense: It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (emphasis added). Where an across-the-board safety qualification standard is invoked, the question then becomes what proof is required with respect to being a qualified individual, that is, one who can perform the job's essential functions. Before an employee can challenge an employer's qualification standard, however, an employee must first prove that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA, that is, one who can perform the job's essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation. Bates argues that he meets all of the essential functions of the package-car driver position, including being a safe driver. Although Bates acknowledges that class members do not meet the DOT hearing standard, he contends that hearing is not an essential function, and thus there are qualified individuals who meet UPS's other job requirements. UPS, on the other hand, urges that class members are not qualified individuals because they cannot meet UPS's requirement that all drivers pass the DOT hearing standard, and thus cannot meet an essential function of the job  DOT certification to drive all commercial vehicles. UPS also argues that each class member is required to show not only that he is a safe driver in the sense that he has a clean driving record, but also that he is a safe driver despite being hearing impaired. We turn first to the qualified individual inquiry and then to the question of discrimination.
As the plaintiff, Bates bears the burden to prove that he is qualified. See Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1246; Kennedy v. Applause, Inc., 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 1996). Qualification for a position is a two-step inquiry. The court first examines whether the individual satisfies the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the position. The court then considers whether the individual can perform the essential functions of such position with or without a reasonable accommodation. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see Humphrey v. Memorial Hospitals Ass'n, 239 F.3d 1128, 1135 (9th Cir.2001); see also EEOC v. Convergys Customer Management Group, Inc., 491 F.3d 790, 794-95 (8th Cir.2007); Branham v. Snow, 392 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir.2004).
The package-car driver job requires an applicant to meet UPS's threshold seniority requirements for the package-car driver position, complete an application, be at least twenty-one years of age, possess a valid driver's license, and have a clean driving record by UPS's local standards. The district court's finding that named plaintiff Oloyede and class member Elias Habib meet these prerequisites is not clearly erroneous.
To prove that he is qualified, the applicant also must show that he can perform the essential functions of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). See Nunes, 164 F.3d at 1246; Kennedy, 90 F.3d at 1481. As noted earlier, a job's essential functions are fundamental job duties of the employment position . . . not includ[ing] the marginal functions of the position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1); see also id. § 1630.2(n)(2)(3) (elaborating on reasons and evidence relevant to an essential function showing). Essential functions are not to be confused with qualification standards, which an employer may establish for a certain position. Whereas essential functions are basic duties, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(1), qualification standards are personal and professional attributes that may include physical, medical [and] safety requirements. Id. § 1630.2(q). The difference is crucial. The statute does not require that a person meet each of an employer's established qualification standards, however, to show that he is qualified. And, indeed, it would make little sense to require an ADA plaintiff to show that he meets a qualification standard that he undisputedly cannot meet because of his disability and that forms the very basis of his discrimination challenge. [6] Although the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of persuading the fact finder that he can perform the job's essential functions, we agree with the Eighth Circuit's approach that an employer who disputes the plaintiff's claim that he can perform the essential functions must put forth evidence establishing those functions. EEOC v. Wal-Mart, 477 F.3d 561, 568 (8th Cir.2007). The genesis of this rule is the recognition that much of the information which determines those essential functions lies uniquely with the employer. Benson v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 1108, 1113 (8th Cir.1995). In addition, the ADA and implementing regulations direct fact finders to consider, among other things, the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants, id. ; [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iii); [t]he consequences of not requiring the [applicant or employee] to perform the function, id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(iv); and the work experience of current and former employees. Id. § 1630.2(n)(3)(vi), (vii). Thus, to the extent that an employer challenges an ADA plaintiff's claim that he can perform the job's essential functions, we think it appropriate to place a burden of production on the employer to come forward with evidence of those essential functions. See Wal-Mart, 477 F.3d at 568; Benson, 62 F.3d at 1113. At trial the parties agreed that two of the essential functions of the package-car driver position are (1) the ability to communicate effectively and (2) the ability to drive safely. UPS urged that the ability to drive DOT-regulated vehicles was another essential function. The district court rejected that contention, finding that UPS permits other drivers who cannot drive all DOT-regulated vehicles to drive package cars. [7] For example, UPS has protocols in place for driver applicants who cannot pass certain DOT certification requirements because of their vision impairments or insulin-dependent diabetes, but who can pass less stringent physical requirements. UPS has not shown that the district court's determination that DOT certification is not an essential job function was clearly erroneous. See, e.g., Taylor v. Rice, 451 F.3d 898, 907 (D.C.Cir.2006) (concluding that issues of fact regarding job's essential functions precluded summary judgment for employer because record showed that, in practice, employer did not require all other employees to abide by claimed essential function); Davidson v. Am. Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th Cir.2003) (The question of whether a job requirement is a necessary requisite to employment initially focuses on whether an employer actually requires all employees in the particular position to satisfy the alleged job-related requirement.). Only the second essential function, safe driving, is at issue in this appeal. UPS argues that hearing at a level sufficient to pass the DOT hearing standard is either a stand-alone essential job function or part and parcel of being a safe driver. This point illustrates the critical difference between a job's essential functions  effective communication or safe driving  versus a qualification standard based on personal or professional attributes, such as hearing at a certain level. The question, then, is whether plaintiffs established that they meet the essential function of safe driving. The district court found that Oloyede met UPS's threshold requirements of having no accidents or moving violations within the last year, no DUI within the last three years, and no more than three moving violations in the last three years. Habib also met the prerequisites to apply for the position: a valid driver's license, twenty-seven years of driving experience, and no evidence of even a minor traffic accident. [8] UPS urges that Oloyede and Habib are required to show not only that they are safe drivers in the sense that they have a clean driving record, but also that they are safe drivers even though they are hearing impaired. The district court rejected that argument, stating that imposing this burden would require plaintiffs to disprove the employer's business necessity affirmative defense, i.e., that the employer is justified in imposing a qualification standard that facially screens out individuals with a specific disability. Because UPS has linked hearing with safe driving, UPS bears the burden to prove that nexus as part of its defense to use of the hearing qualification standard. The employees, however, bear the ultimate burden to show that they are qualified to perform the essential function of safely driving a package car. In so doing, Oloyede and Habib need not disprove the validity of the hearing standard, but must demonstrate their safe driving ability vis-a-vis package cars. The inquiry is not whether Oloyede and Habib are capable of safely driving their personal cars, but rather whether they can drive the package cars at issue in this litigation. The district court did not make a finding with respect to plaintiffs' ability to drive package cars safely. Merely finding an absence of evidence with respect to driving a package car is insufficient. In short, Oloyede and Habib bear the burden of proving that they are qualified individuals with disabilities. They must show that they can perform the essential job function of safely driving package cars. Only if they meet this burden does the question become whether the qualification standard used by the employer satisfies the business necessity defense. By requiring UPS to justify the hearing test under the business necessity defense, but also requiring plaintiffs to show that they can perform the essential functions of the job, we are not saying, nor does the ADA require, that employers must hire employees who cannot safely perform the job, particularly where safety itself is an essential function. Nor are we saying that an employer can never impose a safety standard that exceeds minimum requirements imposed by law. However, when an employer asserts a blanket safety-based qualification standard  beyond the essential job function  that is not mandated by law and that qualification standard screens out or tends to screen out an individual with a disability, the employer  not the employee  bears the burden of showing that the higher qualification standard is job-related and consistent with business necessity, and that performance cannot be achieved through reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). This approach is parallel to the one adopted in a direct threat case under the ADA. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (The term `qualification standards' may include a requirement that an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace.). Although the specifics of proof in direct threat and business necessity cases may vary, the frameworks are parallel. We emphasize that UPS is not required to meet the requirements of the direct threat defense, but rather that cases under that section of the ADA illuminate our analysis. In Branham, the Seventh Circuit considered a qualification standard that disqualified an individual from being an IRS criminal investigator if the applicant had [a]ny condition that would hinder full, efficient performance of the duties of the[] position[] or that would cause the individual to be a hazard to himself/herself or to others. . . . 392 F.3d at 900 (quoting IRS qualification standard). Safety was an issue in Branham, as it is here. The parties did not dispute that an essential job requirement was the ability to function safely under the working conditions imposed on such employees. Id. The IRS claimed that the applicant's diabetes placed him at risk of subtle and/or sudden incapacitation, which would place the applicant and others . . . at an extreme risk of safety that would be unacceptable. Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). The IRS also argued that the applicant bore the burden of establishing as part of his prima facie case that he did not pose a direct threat to himself or others. Id. at 906. In rejecting the IRS's position, the Seventh Circuit concluded that the applicant need only establish that he was otherwise qualified for the criminal investigator job by meeting the job's essential functions. Id. at 904-05. And, because the IRS's safety qualification standard regarding the medical condition incorporated the direct threat defense under the ADA, the employer bore the burden of proving that the employee was a direct threat. Id. at 906-07. The employee did not have to disprove the claim that he was a direct threat as part of his prima facie case of discrimination. Id. at 906-07. The Branham approach works equally well in framing our analysis of UPS's hearing qualification standard. The employee does not bear the burden to invalidate the employer's safety-based qualification standard. Nor is the employee required to disprove UPS's contention that, in order to be safe, the driver must pass the DOT hearing standardthe very qualification standard disputed in this case. See, e.g., Cripe, 261 F.3d at 889-90 (holding that a service requirement that rendered only disabled officers ineligible for specialized assignments could not be applied to them unless it was shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and performance could not be achieved through reasonable accommodation); McGregor, 187 F.3d at 1116 (explaining that the ADA generally requires individualized assessment of whether a qualified individual is able to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation, rather than use of blanket qualification standards, like a 100% healed or fully healed policy, as substitute for such individualized determination). Similar to the court in Branham, we conclude that an employee who shows that he meets the basic qualifications for the package-car driver position (seniority, twenty-one years of age, and holding a valid driver's license) and can drive a package car safely, including having a clean driving record and passing the driving test, is an otherwise qualified individual. The last step of the qualified individual inquiry requires a plaintiff to show that he is qualified with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). If the plaintiff proves that he can perform the job's essential functions either without a reasonable accommodation or with such an accommodation, then he has met his burden to show he is qualified. See McGregor, 187 F.3d at 1115; Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir.1998) (en banc). Here, the district court did not explicitly discuss reasonable accommodation, although in finding that Oloyede and Habib met the job requisites and could perform the essential function of safe driving, it implicitly found that no accommodation was necessary to meet those baseline requirements for UPS package-car driver applicants. [9] Because the district court did not analyze whether Oloyede and Habib are qualified individuals capable of performing the essential function of safely driving a package car in the framework discussed above, nor did it directly undertake the qualified individual inquiry, we remand to the district court for the employees to prove that they are so qualified and for an analysis of reasonable accommodation. Thus, we vacate the district court's order denying UPS's motion for judgment on partial findings under Rule 52(c), and in the alternative to decertify the nationwide class under Rule 23(c)(1) and (d).
An employee bears the burden of proving that he was discriminated against because of a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). See Costa, 299 F.3d at 857 (The employee's ultimate burden of proof in all cases remains the same: to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged employment decision was `because of' discrimination.). The qualification standard at issuethe DOT hearing standardis facially discriminatory and falls squarely within the ADA's definition of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (discrimination includes using qualification standards, employment tests or other selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out an individual with a disability or a class of individuals with disabilities). The district court found, and UPS does not contest, that UPS applies a qualification standard that has the effect of discriminating on the basis of disability and/or screens out the class of employees who cannot pass the DOT hearing standard. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6). Such discrimination violates the ADA unless UPS can prove a valid defense to its use of the DOT hearing standard. We therefore turn to UPS's defense that its reliance on the DOT hearing standard is justified under the business necessity defense.
Under the ADA, an employer may assert an affirmative defense to a claim that application of a qualification standard, test or selection criteria discriminates on the basis of disability. See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a); Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 568, 119 S.Ct. 2162. Although the shorthand reference is the business necessity defense, the defense also incorporates requirements of job-relatedness and reasonable accommodation. We most recently addressed the ADA's business necessity defense in Morton, 272 F.3d 1249. There, we held that the ADA's version of the business necessity defense incorporates concepts from both the traditional Title VII business necessity defense to disparate impact claims and the BFOQ defense in Title VII and Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) disparate treatment challenges to a proscribed classification. Id. at 1260-63. Today, we revisit our conception of the business necessity defense under the ADA and overrule Morton to the extent that it conflicts with this opinion. [10] Specifically, we reject Morton 's adaptation of the Title VII and ADEA BFOQ safety standard requirement in the ADA context. We look first and foremost to the text of the ADA: It may be a defense to a charge of discrimination under this chapter that an alleged application of qualification standards, tests, or selection criteria that screen out or tend to screen out or otherwise deny a job or benefit to an individual with a disability has been shown to be job-related and consistent with business necessity, and such performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, as required under this subchapter. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a) (emphasis added). To successfully assert the business necessity defense to an allegedly discriminatory application of a qualification standard, test or selection criteria, an employer bears the burden of showing that the qualification standard is (1) job-related, (2) consistent with business necessity, and (3) that performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation. Id. ; see Cripe, 261 F.3d at 890 (holding that the employer bears the burden of proving affirmative defense of business necessity). Rather than analyzing each of these statutory components of the business necessity defense, Morton looked to other provisions of the ADA (the qualified individual requirement, the undue hardship defense, and the reasonable accommodation provision of the business necessity defense), and concluded that these provisions suggest that Congress must have intended to permit across-the-board exclusion of employees based upon disability-related safety criterion only on a showing somewhat similar to the one used for safety qualifications under the Title VII and ADEA [BFOQ] standard. Morton, 272 F.3d at 1261-62. We mistakenly concluded that [i]f a transportation employer can demonstrate neither that all persons who fail to meet a disability-related safety criterion present an unacceptable risk of danger nor that it is highly impractical more discretely to determine which disabled employees present such an unacceptable riskthe Title VII/ ADEA [BFOQ] safety standard requirementswe would not think that the safety criterion would provide an accurate measure of actual ability. Id. at 1263. However, as Morton recognized, there is no [BFOQ] defense as such in the ADA. Id. at 1261. UPS argues, and we agree, that it is improper to import the BFOQ standard into the ADA business necessity defense. Instead, we return to the statutory provisions Congress set out for the ADA's version of the business necessity defense. To show job-relatedness, an employer must demonstrate that the qualification standard fairly and accurately measures the individual's actual ability to perform the essential functions of the job. See Cripe, 261 F.3d at 890; H.R.Rep. No. 101-485(III), at 32 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 454-55; [11] see also Belk v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 194 F.3d 946 (8th Cir.1999); [12] Hendricks-Robinson v. Excel Corp., 154 F.3d 685, 699 (7th Cir.1998). When every person excluded by the qualification standard is a member of a protected class  that is, disabled persons  an employer must demonstrate a predictive or significant correlation between the qualification and performance of the job's essential functions. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Cf. Clady v. County of Los Angeles, 770 F.2d 1421, 1432 (9th Cir. 1985) (As a general principle, the greater the test's adverse impact, the higher the correlation which will be required.) (analyzing business necessity defense to Title VII disparate impact claim). To show that the disputed qualification standard is consistent with business necessity, the employer must show that it substantially promote[s] the business's needs. Cripe, 261 F.3d at 890 (quoting Bentivegna v. U.S. Dep't of Labor, 694 F.2d 619, 621-22 (9th Cir.1982) (interpreting the term business necessity for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973)). As we observed in Cripe: The `business necessity' standard is quite high, and is not to be confused with mere expediency. Cripe, 261 F.3d at 890 (citation, quotation marks and alteration omitted). For a safety-based qualification standard, [i]n evaluating whether the risks addressed by . . . [the] qualification standard constitute a business necessity, the court should take into account the magnitude of possible harm as well as the probability of occurrence. EEOC v. Exxon Corp., 203 F.3d 871, 875 (5th Cir.2000) (noting that [t]he acceptable probability of an incident will vary with the potential hazard posed by the particular position: a probability that might be tolerable in an ordinary job might be intolerable for a position involving atomic reactors, for example). Finally, to show that performance cannot be accomplished by reasonable accommodation, the employer must demonstrate either that no reasonable accommodation currently available would cure the performance deficiency or that such reasonable accommodation poses an undue hardship on the employer. [13] See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12113(a), 12111(10) (defining undue hardship). See McGregor, 187 F.3d at 1116; see also Hendricks-Robinson, 154 F.3d at 699 (Even when `physical fitness' is a selection criterion that is related to an essential function of the job . . . it `may not be used to exclude an individual with a disability if that individual could satisfy the criterion with the provision of a reasonable accommodation.') (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. § 1630.10) (quotation marks and alterations omitted). The ADA does not provide a comprehensive recitation of what is encompassed by a reasonable accommodation, but gives some examples of what the term may include. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(2); see also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(o)(1) (defining reasonable accommodation to include [m]odifications or adjustments to application processes, work environment, and access to benefits and privileges of employment). Among the examples are accommodations such as: (A) making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities; and (B) job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). Making a showing as to reasonable accommodation may entail adopting an alternative, less discriminatory criterion. H.R. Rep. 101-485(II), 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 354 (1990); accord S.Rep. No. 101-116. In rejecting UPS's business necessity defense to application of the DOT hearing standard to all package-car driving positions, the district court concluded that UPS has demonstrated neither that all or substantially all deaf drivers pose a higher risk of accidents than non-deaf drivers nor that there are no practical criteria for determining which deaf drivers pose a heightened risk and which do not. Additionally, UPS has not demonstrated that it would be impossible to develop empirical evidence that would be sufficient to make either showing. This finding does not track the statutory elements of the business necessity defense. Because the district court understandably based its rationale on the then-extant Morton framework, we vacate the finding that UPS violated Bates's rights under the ADA, vacate the injunction, and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. We leave to the district court the determination whether additional evidence is appropriate in light of the significant change in the legal landscape of this case. [14] One further aspect of Morton bears noting here. As part of its business necessity analysis under Morton, the district court also rejected UPS's reliance on the DOT's hearing standard. The district court pointed to Morton 's statement that the existence of theby its own terms inapplicableDOT standard cannot shoulder UPS's statutory burden to show business necessity. Morton, 272 F.3d at 1264-65 (holding that the mere existence of government safety standard did not demonstrate UPS's business necessity defense and fact issues precluded summary judgment). Here, UPS offered up the DOT standard as evidence that, for safety purposes, a certain level of hearing is necessary to drive non-DOT-regulated vehicles. According to UPS, there is complete congruity between the positions of driving a DOT-regulated package car (more than 10,000 pounds) and driving a vehicle that weighs a little less. UPS argued that package cars weighing almost five tons do not have operating characteristics similar to passenger cars and pose greater risks than do passenger cars. To be sure, DOT's regulation does not apply to the category of vehicles at issue in this case. However, that circumstance does not mean that the standard has no relevance to the employer's safety argument. UPS is entitled to use as some evidence of its business necessity defense the fact that it relied on a government safety standard, even where the standard is not applicable to the category of conduct at issue. To the extent Morton suggests or is interpreted to the contrary, it is overruled. Cf. Albertson's, 527 U.S. at 577, 119 S.Ct. 2162 (holding that an employer is not required to justify its decision to require that employees meet an applicable government safety regulation, even if the government permits waiver of the applicable requirements under an experimental policy). The parallel consideration applies to an employee; that is, an employee may offer as evidence challenging the validity or applicability of a safety standard the government's refusal to adopt such standard to govern the conduct at issue. See, e.g., 53 Fed.Reg. 18042, 18044 (discussing DOT's rejection of UPS's attempt to apply DOT's physical requirements to trucks under 10,000 pounds because (1) smaller trucks and vans have operating characteristics more comparable to cars; and (2) smaller trucks and vans pose a lesser safety risk than large trucks). Thus, while certainly not dispositive of UPS's showing of job-relatedness, business necessity or the reasonableness of potential accommodations, UPS's reliance on the government safety standard with respect to other vehicles in its fleet should be entitled to some consideration as a safety benchmark. Whether, as UPS puts it, non-DOT package cars in the UPS fleet share significant risk characteristics with their slightly larger cousins is a factual question of the congruity between vehicles and drivers in UPS's non-DOT fleet and those regulated by DOT. See Johnson v. Mayor & City Council, 472 U.S. 353, 371, 105 S.Ct. 2717, 86 L.Ed.2d 286 (1985) (federal rules on mandatory retirement age for firefighters may be relevant to nonfederal firefighters, depending on congruity of the occupations). We leave it to the fact finder to determine how much weight to give such evidence.