Opinion ID: 3061709
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Step Jury Instruction

Text: In United States v. Yost, we addressed whether the defendant’s conduct constituted a substantial step towards violating § 2422(b). 479 F.3d 815, 819-20 (11th Cir. 2007). The defendant in Yost made sexually explicit comments to an undercover agent posing as a child, posted a picture of his genitalia, called her on the telephone, and made arrangements to meet her so they could engage in sexual 3 We review a district court’s rejection of a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moore, 525 F.3d 1033, 1046 (11th Cir. 2008). However, we review the legal correctness of a jury instruction de novo. United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000). 4 activity. Id. at 820. We found that the totality of these acts constituted a substantial step in an attempt to knowingly persuade, induce, entice, or coerce a minor to engage in criminal sexual activity. Furthermore, we specifically rejected the defendant’s argument that his failure to arrive at the meeting place precluded a finding of a substantial step, holding that neither travel nor an actual meeting is necessary to find that a defendant committed a substantial step in these circumstances. Id. We conclude the district court’s instruction is consistent with our precedent in Yost. The district court noted that the jury may consider the nature and the context of Abarca’s internet, e-mail, and telephone conversations with the undercover agent and whether he made arrangements for any meeting. Further, the court noted that an actual meeting was not necessary for a defendant’s conduct to constitute a substantial step. Thus, the district court did not err in its substantial step instruction to the jury.