Opinion ID: 800059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The California State Court's Decision

Text: Having identified the clearly established federal law that governs Rodgers' Sixth Amendment claim, we review the state court's decision to determine whether it was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, that law. Rodgers informed the trial court he wished to file a motion for new trial immediately following the guilty verdict. At that time, Rodgers requested the reappointment of counsel, but the trial court denied Rodgers' request, holding: We aren't doing anything like that right now, Mr. Rodgers. If you have some request that you want to make a motion for something, I expect that you will do that and you will serve it, and you will file it, we will take it up at that time. A month later, Rodgers again requested counsel for perfecting a new trial motion, this time in a written motion. The trial court once more denied Rodgers' request, and the following exchange occurred: RODGERS: Your Honor, also, if you are going to deny counsel COURT: You are not going to get counsel, Mr. Rodgers. You made this election to represent yourself. Everybody tried to talk you out of it at the time. You insisted you wanted to do it. You are doing it. We aren't going to substitute in an attorney at this time. In addressing the trial judge's denial of Rodgers' request for counsel, the California appellate court reasoned: When, as here, a defendant has exercised his right to represent himself at trial and later seeks to have counsel appointed, the court's decision to deny counsel is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. In determining whether the court abused its discretion, we consider the totality of the facts and circumstances. (internal citations omitted). The court then focused on the fact Rodgers switched between representation and self-representation at various times throughout the case, and noted Rodgers' motion did not include facts or reasons in support. The court also held Rodgers exhibited considerable knowledge of both trial tactics and trial procedure, and ultimately concluded the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in declining to appoint counsel for a new trial motion. The California appellate court's decision is indistinguishable from the state court decision we held to be contrary to clearly established federal law in Ignacio. There, as here, the state court incorrectly applied an abuse of discretion standard in determining the trial court did not violate the petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. As we explained in Ignacio, and as holds equally true here, this standard permitted the state court to affirm the denial of the defendant's timely request for representation without any basis other than the discredited idea that once waived, the right to counsel cannot be reasserted at sentencing. Ignacio, 360 F.3d at 1061. It is clearly established federal law that the post-trial motion for new trial is a critical stage that implicates the right to counsel, as is a defendant's right to re-assert the right to counsel during post-trial proceedings. For that reason, trial courts cannot deny a defendant's timely request for representation without a sufficient reason. Here, the state trial court had no such reason, and to the extent the California appellate court found such reason, its decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). While Rodgers did not give any reasons for his request for counsel, it is clear the trial judge rejected his request based primarily on the discredited idea that once waived, the right to counsel cannot be reasserted.... Ignacio, 360 F.3d at 1061. Regardless, denying Rogers' request because he failed to articulate a reason is tantamount to denying his request because of his prior Faretta waiver. Indeed, the obvious reason Rodgers wanted counsel even if he did not explicitly state itwas his belief that trained counsel would be better able to prepare his new trial motion. Because the trial court's focus on Rodgers' waiver of counsel at trial was inappropriate, we conclude its denial of Rodgers' request violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Therefore, the California appellate court's decision, which upheld the trial judge's denial of Rodgers' request, was contrary to ... clearly established federal law.