Opinion ID: 863638
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of review

Text: ¶6. This Court has held that the standard of review applicable on a motion to dismiss under Miss. R. Civ. P. 41(b) is different than that applicable on a motion for directed verdict. Stewart v. Merchants Nat'l Bank, 700 So. 2d 255, 258 (Miss. 1997). In considering a motion to dismiss, the judge should consider the evidence fairly, as distinguished from in the light most favorable to the Plaintiff, and the judge should dismiss the case if it would find for the defendant. The court must deny a motion to dismiss only if the judge would be obliged to find for the plaintiff if the plaintiff's evidence were all the evidence offered in the case. This Court applies the substantial evidence/manifest error standards to an appeal of a grant or denial of a motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R.C.P. 41 (b). Id. at 259 (interior citations omitted). B. ¶7. The Browns contend that the Court of Appeals applied an incorrect standard in reviewing the trial court's decision. The Browns assert that the Court of Appeals applied the standard of review applicable to a directed verdict in a jury case, rather than the standard of review applicable to a case before a trial judge sitting as the trier of fact. ¶8. The record reveals that at the close of the Alexanders' case-in-chief the Browns moved to dismiss the case based upon the Alexanders' failure to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the Browns committed any trespass either directly or indirectly through McGowan. The chancellor on the record stated I have come to the inescapable conclusion that the Alexanders failed to make a prima facie case, and I am therefore granting the Motion to Dismiss with Prejudice. ¶9. It is clear from its recitation of the facts that the Court of Appeals realized that the trial judge had granted a motion to dismiss rather than a directed verdict. However, the Court of Appeals erroneously applied the standard of review of abuse of discretion, which is applicable to directed verdict. In utilizing this erroneous standard, the Court of Appeals stated that [b]ecause there was no proof, nor any attempt at proof, of an independent contractor relationship, this Court finds that the chancellor abused his discretion. ¶10. Clearly, the Court of Appeals' application of an erroneous standard of review in its analysis rendered its decision in conflict with prior cases of this Court providing the applicable standard of review for motions to dismiss under Rule 41(b). C. ¶11. We now turn to the issue of whether, utilizing the proper standard of review, the motion to dismiss was properly granted. In deciding to reverse the chancellor's decision, the Court of Appeals majority states: There are two basic flaws in the chancellor's decision. They are his findings (1) there was nothing to connect Mr. McGowan to the damage done on Friday, and (2) Mr. McGowan was an independent contractor. Kelly Kersh testified to seeing the bulldozer digging on the Alexanders' property on that Friday. This testimony is found in the trial transcript at page 30. Mr. Alexander testified to confronting Mr. McGowan on his property on Friday. His testimony is found in the record on pages 92-94. The testimony of these two witnesses is sufficient to connect Mr. McGowan to the Friday damage. The chancellor found that Mr. McGowan was an independent contractor and that therefore the Browns were not responsible for his actions. An employer is not generally liable for the torts of an independent contractor. Hester v. Bandy, 627 So. 2d 833,841 (Miss. 1993). However, the trial court cannot assume that an independent contractor relationship exists. There must be some proof of that relationship. The record is absolutely devoid of any evidence to establish that Mr. McGowan was an independent contractor. In the absence of such evidence, the chancellor committed reversible error in holding that McGowan was an independent contractor for whom the Browns had no responsibility. ¶12. The Court of Appeals was correct in noting that there was testimony linking McGowan to the damage done on Friday. However, the issue was not whether McGowan had committed trespass, but instead whether the Browns had committed trespass, either directly or indirectly through McGowan. As noted by Chancellor Lutz, and the Court of Appeals' dissent, the Alexanders failed to prove that McGowan was an employee of the Browns. This was an element on which proof was necessary in order for the Alexanders to make a prima facie case of trespass. McGowan was not called to testify though he would have in all likelihood provided the link necessary to hold the Browns liable for trespass. The failure to establish employment was fatal to the Alexanders' case. ¶13. The Court of Appeals majority, however, turns the chancellor's view around, and holds that absent proof that McGowan was not the Browns' employee, the case should have been permitted to proceed. We disagree. McGowan's status as an independent contractor was not an affirmative defense. To the contrary, the burden of proving that McGowan was an agent or employee of the Browns' was on the Alexanders'. When the Alexanders rested their case, McGowan's status should have already been proven. If McGowan's status as an employee or independent contractor was an affirmative defense, the Browns would have accepted as true all the assertions of the complaint, and then would have raised McGowan's status as a basis for avoidance of liability. Hertz Commercial Leasing Div. v. Morrison, 567 So.2d 832, 834-35 (Miss.1990). However, in order to make out a prima facie case against the Browns for trespass, the Alexanders needed to prove that the Browns were liable for McGowan's actions because he was their employee. This they failed to do. The Browns' position that McGowan was an independent contractor was not an acceptance of the Alexanders' assertions. It was a denial. ¶14. While others testified, only two witnesses' testimony bears substantially on the present issue: Kelly Kersh and Willie Alexander. Kelly Kersh, owner and resident of Lot 7, testified that she could observe both the Alexander and the Brown lots from her kitchen window. In a fashion reminiscent of Gladys Kravitz on the television series Bewitched, Mrs. Kersh watched the activity on the Brown and Alexander lots with keen interest. In keeping with her Gladys Kravitz persona, Mrs. Kersh promptly reported her observations to anyone who would listen. She phoned Entergy and complained that the Browns were about to hook up to her electrical power box without her consent. She phoned the water treatment plant to find out where the ground water on the property was going to drain. She also phoned the building inspector because she was concerned about the slab being poured on the Brown lot, believing it to be too thin. She also kept the Alexanders updated regarding the activities occurring on the Brown property. All in all, she recalled having at least ten conversations with the Alexanders regarding the activities on the Brown property. ¶15. Willie Alexander also complained that workers on the Brown property crossed his vacant lot to get to an adjoining neighbor's outdoor bathroom and that they used his property to park their vehicles. He admitted, however, that none of the workers told him that the Browns directed them to use his property in such a manner. In fact, Mr. Brown had a notice stating that no contractor was to go onto Lot 5 posted on the job site. Clearly, these acts were taken despite the Browns' directions otherwise. These acts constitute lone adventures, not joint ventures. ¶16. Mr. Alexander further admitted that he hired McGowan to do work on his own lot. He testified that he spotted McGowan bulldozing on his property. Mr. Alexander stopped McGowan and told him to get off his property and stay off. McGowan explained that he had seen a snake in the brush nearby and was trying to clear it out. Mr. Alexander, apparently no Crocodile Dundee, and fearing snakes, said by all means, clear that out, but keep your bulldozer off my property. Four days later, he hired McGowan to do additional work on his own driveway. Perhaps this proof explains the Alexanders' recalcitrance to call Mr. McGowan to testify. ¶17. Mr. Alexander also testified that he spoke with Sammy Winder, a dirt contractor, on the Brown property. He had previously contracted with Winder to deliver a dump truck load of dirt. He himself went onto the Brown property to pay Winder. ¶18. A review of the testimony reveals that there was a good bit of invading of neighboring lots done by the lone adventurers in their mixed roles. Add this to the side dealings and it is difficult to know what exactly the lone adventurers were doing at any given time. Also, it is impossible to tell at whose direction, if anyone's at all, they were acting. ¶19. The case presented by the Alexanders was that the Browns committed a trespass solely through McGowan, who was not a defendant in the case, and who was not called to testify. The Court of Appeals cites authority that a person can be liable for trespass by causing someone else to commit the tortious act. W. Page Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §13, at 73 (5th ed. 1984). We do not disagree with the law. The point, however, is that no evidence was presented that the Browns caused McGowan to commit the trespass. The case fails on the facts. The only evidence linking the Browns to McGowan was that the Browns retained McGowan's services. This fact alone does not render them liable for his torts. If it did, then the Alexanders have an additional problem, since they retained his services too. As Dean Keeton further states in section 13, the intent necessary for a trespass is for one to be at the place on the land where the trespass allegedly occurred. Id. It was the absence of any proof that the Browns had this intent that the chancellor relied upon to reject liability. ¶20. One who retains the services of an independent contractor is not generally liable for the torts that he commits: It is well settled that one who contracts with an independent contractor to perform certain work or service which is not illegal, dangerous or harmful, is not liable for torts committed by him. Where, however, the work or service to be performed in itself entails the commission of some illegal, dangerous or tortious act, the rule obviously cannot apply, because in such instance the principal and the independent contractor both play an integral part, are both proximate causes, of whatever harm ensues. Hester v. Bandy, 627 So.2d 833, 841 (Miss. 1993) (citation omitted). This general rule is applicable to the instant case, as there was nothing illegal, dangerous, or harmful about having this lot cleared so the Browns could build their home. ¶21. Relying on Long v. Magnolia Hotel Co., 227 Miss. 625, 86 So. 2d 493 (1956), the Alexanders, as well as the dissent in this case, assert that the Court of Appeals properly reversed and remanded the case. In Long, after the close of all of the evidence, the trial court granted a peremptory instruction and entered judgment for the defendants, the adjoining landowner and contractor. The basis for the peremptory instruction was that at least some of the damage was caused by a tornado. This Court reversed the trial court and found that the question of negligence of the contractor and the adjoining landowner should have been presented to the jury. ¶22. The facts of the instant case are clearly not analogous to Long, and the law used to decide Long does not control in this case. Based upon a fair reading of the record presented before the chancellor, we find that the evidence supports the chancellor's finding that the Alexanders failed to make a prima facie case of trespass against the Browns. Consequently, we also find that the motion to dismiss was properly granted.