Opinion ID: 797035
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applying the Class-of-One Theory to Public Employment

Text: 23 Whether to apply the class-of-one theory to decisions of public employers presents a significantly different question than whether to apply it to legislative or regulatory acts of government. In general, there is a distinction between the government acting `as a proprietor' that was managing `its own internal affairs' rather than as a `lawmaker' that was attempting `to regulate or license.' Singleton v. Cecil, 176 F.3d 419, 425 (8th Cir.1999) (en banc) (quoting Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896, 81 S.Ct. 1743, 6 L.Ed.2d 1230 (1961) (alterations omitted)). The Supreme Court has always assumed that the government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does the government as sovereign. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) (discussing difference in government ability to restrict speech). 24 Because the government as employer has broader powers than the government as regulator, the scope of judicial review is correspondingly restricted. Accordingly, the Supreme Court has warned that [t]he federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies, and therefore the Constitution cannot be interpreted to require judicial review of every such decision. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 349-50, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976) (rejecting due process claim where the plaintiff is fired from public employment for reasons either false or mistaken). 25 In other areas of constitutional law, the Court has limited the rights of public employees as compared to ordinary citizens. For instance, in the First Amendment context, courts review restrictions on employees' speech with greater deference in order to balance the government employer's legitimate interests in its mission. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, ___ U.S. ____, ____, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 1960, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006) (holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline); City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80-82, 125 S.Ct. 521, 160 L.Ed.2d 410 (2004) (per curiam) (applying balancing test drawn from Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968)). Similarly, in the Fourth Amendment context, the government, as employer, need not obtain a warrant to search an employee's property because imposing such a requirement unduly burdens government business and improperly transforms everyday business incidents into constitutional matters. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 721-22, 107 S.Ct. 1492, 94 L.Ed.2d 714 (1987) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). 26 The class-of-one theory of equal protection is another constitutional area where the rights of public employees should not be as expansive as the rights of ordinary citizens. The paradigmatic class-of-one case should be one in which a public official, for some improper motive, comes down hard on a hapless private citizen. Lauth, 424 F.3d at 633. This was the type of case decided in Olech and Squaw Valley. In contrast, when a public employee is subjected to unequal treatment at work for arbitrary reasons, the need for federal judicial review under equal protection is especially thin given the number of other legal protections that public employees enjoy. See id. 27 A judicially-imposed constitutional proscription of arbitrary public employer actions would also upset long-standing personnel practices. Although arbitrary government acts are unreasonable in the legislative or regulatory context, employers have traditionally possessed broad discretionary authority in the employment context. The power of employers to discharge employees for reasons that may appear arbitrary, unless constrained by contract or statute, is well-established under the common law of at-will employment. See NLRB v. J. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 273-74, 95 S.Ct. 959, 43 L.Ed.2d 171 (1975) (describing common law); Andrews v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 406 U.S. 320, 324, 92 S.Ct. 1562, 32 L.Ed.2d 95 (1972) (same). Applying equal protection to forbid arbitrary or malicious firings of public employees would completely invalidate the practice of public at-will employment. See Singleton, 176 F.3d at 428. We decline to effect such a significant change in employment law under the general provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Waters, 511 U.S. at 679, 114 S.Ct. 1878 ([A]n at-will government employee . . . generally has no claim based on the Constitution at all.). 3 28 In addition to significantly altering traditional personnel practices, applying the class-of-one theory to public employment would also generate a flood of new cases, requiring the federal courts to decide whether any public employee was fired for an arbitrary reason or a rational one. See Jennings, 383 F.3d at 1211. The theory would apply not only to discharges, but also to other employment actions, such as promotions, disciplinary actions, and decisions about pay, benefits and transfers. Contrary to the Supreme Court's admonition, federal courts would be required to review the multitude of personnel decisions that are made daily by public agencies. Bishop, 426 U.S. at 349, 96 S.Ct. 2074. 29 Finally, we believe that Olech is too slender a reed on which to base such a transformation of public employment law. It seems unlikely that the Supreme Court intended such a dramatic result in its per curiam opinion in Olech.  Campagna v. Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 206 F.Supp.2d 120, 127 (D.Mass.2002), aff'd, 334 F.3d 150 (1st Cir.2003). Accordingly, we hold that the class-of-one theory of equal protection is inapplicable to decisions made by public employers with regard to their employees. We therefore reverse the judgment in favor of Engquist on her equal protection claim. 4