Opinion ID: 2738874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Proper Application of Section 2

Text: Properly applying the law to the facts, even as the district court portrayed them, shows that Plaintiffs are, in fact, likely to succeed on the merits of their Section 2 claims regarding the elimination of same-day registration and out-ofprecinct voting, contrary to the district court’s determination. In the first step of our Section 2 analysis, we must determine whether House Bill 589’s elimination of same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting imposes a discriminatory burden on members of a protected class, meaning that members of the protected class “have less opportunity than other members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives of their choice.” 52 U.S.C. 10301. See also Husted, 2014 WL 4724703, at  (identifying the two steps of the Section 2 vote-denial inquiry). There can be no doubt that certain challenged measures in House Bill 589 disproportionately impact minority voters. The district court found that Plaintiffs “presented unrebutted testimony that [African American] North Carolinians have used [same-day registration] at a higher rate than whites in the three federal elections during which [same-day registration] was offered” and recognized that the elimination of same-day registration would “bear more heavily on African-Americans than whites.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 348-49. The district 46 court also “accept[ed] the determinations of Plaintiffs’ experts that” African American voters disproportionately voted out of precinct and that “the prohibition on counting out-of-precinct provisional ballots will disproportionally affect [African American] voters.” Id. at 366. Second, we must determine whether this impact was in part “caused by or linked to ‘social and historical conditions’ that have or currently produce discrimination against members of the protected class.” Husted, 2014 WL 4724703, at  (quoting Gingles, 478 U.S. at 47). Here, when we apply the proper legal standard to the district court’s findings, the disproportionate impacts of eliminating same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting are clearly linked to relevant social and historical conditions. In making this determination, we are aided by consideration of the “typical” factors that Congress noted in Section 2’s legislative history. However we recognize that “there is no requirement that any particular number of factors be proved, or that a majority of them point one way or the other.” Gingles, 478 U.S. at 45 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Regarding the history of voting-related discrimination in the pertinent State, the district court found that “North Carolina . . . has an unfortunate history of official discrimination in voting and other areas that dates back to the 47 Nation’s founding. This experience affects the perceptions and realities of [African American] North Carolinians to this day.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 349. One of Plaintiffs’ witnesses testified, for example, that at around age 19—in the 1940s—she was required to recite the Preamble to the Constitution from memory in order to register to vote. Id. at 349 n.29. As of 1965, 39 counties in North Carolina were considered covered jurisdictions under the Voting Rights Act, having “maintained a test or device as a prerequisite to voting as of November 1, 1964, and [having] had less than 50 percent voter registration or turnout in the 1964 Presidential election.” Shelby Cnty., 133 S. Ct. at 2620. And in 1975, when the Voting Rights Act’s preclearance formula was extended to cover jurisdictions that provided “English-only voting materials in places where over five percent of voting-age citizens spoke a single language other than English,” several additional North Carolina counties became covered jurisdictions. Id. The district court recognized that the legacy of overtly discriminatory practices such as these and the concurrent “struggle for African-Americans’ voting rights” justifies North Carolinians’ skepticism of changes to voting laws. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 349. The fact that the Supreme Court struck down the Voting Rights Act’s “covered jurisdictions” formula in 48 Shelby County does not allow us to simply ignore Congress’s directive to view current changes to North Carolina’s voting laws against the mire of its past. Regarding effects of past discrimination that hinder minorities’ ability to participate effectively in the political process, the district court pronounced that “Plaintiffs’ expert testimony demonstrates that [African American] citizens of North Carolina currently lag behind whites in several key socioeconomic indicators, including education, employment, income, access to transportation, and residential stability.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 348. To this end, Plaintiffs presented the following unchallenged statistics: (1) as of 201112, 34% of African American North Carolinians live below the federal poverty level, compared to 13% of whites; (2) as of the fourth quarter of 2012, unemployment rates in North Carolina were 17.3% for African Americans and 6.7% for whites; (3) 15.7% of African American North Carolinians over age 24 lack a high school degree, as compared to 10.1% of whites; (4) 27% of poor African American North Carolinians do not have access to a vehicle, compared to 8.8% of poor whites; and (5) 75.1% of African Americans in North Carolina live in owned homes as compared to 49.8% of whites. Id. at n.27. Finally, as to the tenuousness of the reasons given for the restrictions, North Carolina asserts goals of electoral 49 integrity and fraud prevention. But nothing in the district court’s portrayal of the facts suggests that those are anything other than merely imaginable. And “states cannot burden the right to vote in order to address dangers that are remote and only ‘theoretically imaginable.’” Frank, 2014 WL 1775432, at  (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 33 (1968)). Indeed, the best fact for North Carolina in the district court’s opinion—the only specific problem cited, beyond naked statements of bureaucratic difficulty attributable at least as much to under-resourcing of boards of elections—is that a thousand votes that had not yet been properly verified had been counted in an election. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 353. But nothing in the district court’s opinion suggests that any of those were fraudulently or otherwise improperly cast. Thus, even the best fact the State could muster is tenuous indeed. At the end of the day, we cannot escape the district court’s repeated findings that Plaintiffs presented undisputed evidence showing that same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting were enacted to increase voter participation, that African American voters disproportionately used those electoral mechanisms, and that House Bill 589 restricted those mechanisms and thus disproportionately impacts African American voters. To us, when viewed in the context of relevant “social and historical conditions” in North Carolina, Gingles, 478 U.S. at 50 47, this looks precisely like the textbook example of Section 2 vote denial Justice Scalia provided: If, for example, a county permitted voter registration for only three hours one day a week, and that made it more difficult for blacks to register than whites, blacks would have less opportunity “to participate in the political process” than whites, and [Section] 2 would therefore be violated . . . . Chisom, 501 U.S. at 408. Further, even if we were to accept North Carolina’s purported non-discriminatory basis for keeping the full bill a secret until the federal preclearance regime had been thrown over in Shelby County, we cannot ignore the discriminatory results that several measures in House Bill 589 effectuate. Section 2’s “‘results’ criterion provides a powerful, albeit sometimes blunt, weapon with which to attack even the most subtle forms of discrimination.” Chisom, 501 U.S. at 406 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Neither North Carolina nor any other jurisdiction can escape the powerful protections Section 2 affords minority voters by simply “espous[ing]” rationalizations for a discriminatory law. McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 357. While plaintiffs seeking preliminary injunctions must demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits, they “need not show a certainty of success.” Pashby, 709 F.3d at 321. For the reasons set out above, Plaintiffs here have shown that with respect to the challenged provisions of House Bill 589 51 affecting same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting, they are likely to succeed with their Section 2 claims. In deciding otherwise, the district court abused its discretion. B. Irreparable Harm, the Public Interest, and the Balance of Hardships Having concluded that Plaintiffs have met the first test for a preliminary injunction, likelihood of success on the merits, as to their same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting challenges, we must consider whether the other elements have similarly been met. In other words, we must analyze whether Plaintiffs are likely to suffer irreparable harm; the balance of the hardships; and whether the injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Courts routinely deem restrictions on fundamental voting rights irreparable injury. See, e.g., Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 436 (6th Cir. 2012); Williams v. Salerno, 792 F.2d 323, 326 (2d Cir. 1986); cf. Alternative Political Parties v. Hooks, 121 F.3d 876 (3d Cir. 1997). And discriminatory voting procedures in particular are “the kind of serious violation of the Constitution and the Voting Rights Act for which courts have granted immediate relief.” United States v. City of Cambridge, 799 F.2d 137, 140 (4th Cir. 1986). This makes sense generally and here specifically because whether the number is thirty or thirty-thousand, surely some North Carolina minority voters will 52 be disproportionately adversely affected in the upcoming election. And once the election occurs, there can be no do-over and no redress. The injury to these voters is real and completely irreparable if nothing is done to enjoin this law. 5 By definition, “[t]he public interest . . . favors permitting as many qualified voters to vote as possible.” Husted, 697 F.3d at 437. See also Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (The public has a “strong interest in exercising the fundamental political right to vote.” (citations omitted)). And “upholding constitutional rights serves the public interest.” Newsome v. Albermarle Cnty. Sch. Bd., 354 F.3d 249, 261 (4th Cir. 2003). The election laws in North Carolina prior to House Bill 589’s enactment encouraged participation by qualified voters. But the challenged House Bill 589 provisions stripped them away. The public interest thus weighs heavily in Plaintiffs’ favor. 5 The district court seemingly failed to understand this point. For instance, in ruling that reduction in early voting was unlikely to cause irreparable harm to African American voters, the district court noted that during the 2010 midterm election, “the racial disparity in early-voting usage that was observed in 2008 and 2012 all but disappeared.” McCrory, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 372. In fact, the disparity was reduced from twenty percent to three percent. Thus, the district court seemed to believe that the injury to a smaller margin of African American voters that would occur during a midterm election year would be somehow less “irreparable.” That conclusion misapprehends the irreparable harm standard and constituted an abuse of discretion. 53 By contrast, balancing the hardships is not wholly unproblematic for Plaintiffs. North Carolina will have little time to implement the relief we grant. But for some of the challenged changes, such as the elimination of same-day registration, systems have existed, do exist, and simply need to be resurrected. Similarly, counting out-of-precinct ballots merely requires the revival of previous practices or, however accomplished, the counting of a relatively small number of ballots. 6 In conclusion, Plaintiffs have satisfied every element required for a preliminary injunction as to their Section 2 claims relating to same-day registration and out-of-precinct voting. 7 Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion 6 In Purcell, 549 U.S. 1, on which the dissenting opinion relies, the Supreme Court seemed troubled by the fact that a two-judge motions panel of the Ninth Circuit entered a factless, groundless “bare order” enjoining a new voter identification provision in an impending election. At the time of the “bare order,” the appellate court also lacked findings by the district court. By contrast, neither district court nor appellate court reasoning, nor lengthy opinions explaining that reasoning, would be lacking in this case. 7 By not addressing Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims, we do not mean to suggest that we agree with the district court’s analysis. But because we find that Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits under the Voting Rights Act, we need not, and therefore do not, reach the constitutional issues. 54 in refusing to grant the requested injunctive relief as to those provisions. 8