Opinion ID: 1191630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Condition

Text: Proximate cause is not the end of the inquiry. As the court of appeals correctly explained in St. Paul, the condition of the insured property also is relevant to the definition of windstorm. The important question is not, however, whether the property was in objectively reasonable condition at the time of loss. The question is whether the insured property was in reasonable condition in comparison to its condition at the time it was insured. This inquiry is necessary to uphold the expectations of both  the insurer and the insured. St. Paul, 22 Ariz. App. at 560, 529 P.2d at 714 (emphasis in original). When an insurer agrees to insure a building against windstorm damage, the insured may assume it intended to insure the building in its current condition, even if the building is in objectively unreasonable condition. Thus, in St. Paul an eight to twelve mile-per-hour wind was a windstorm because the parties had intended to insure a partially constructed building which was structurally unstable and was therefore vulnerable to damage from the force of the wind. Id. If, however, we were dealing with a building that was structurally stable when it was insured, but was subsequently weakened by fire or termites, a ten to twelve mile-per-hour breeze might not be a windstorm, even though it damaged the building. There is some support in St. Paul and the cases it cites for limiting the definition of windstorm to wind that damages buildings in objectively reasonable condition. Given St. Paul 's holding, however, any language that arguably supports such a reasonable condition requirement is overly broad. We reject the proposition that windstorm coverage extends only to buildings in objectively reasonable condition. Insurers are free to expressly limit coverage to buildings meeting certain structural qualifications or to inspect buildings before issuing windstorm coverage. Absent such limitations, however, a windstorm is a wind of sufficient force to proximately cause damage to the ordinary condition of the things insured.... Fidelity-Phenix Fire Insurance Co. v. Board of Education, 201 Okl. 250, 252, 204 P.2d 982, 985 (1948); accord Great American Insurance Co. v. Railroad Furniture Salvage of Mobile, Inc., 276 Ala. 394, 399-400, 162 So.2d 488, 493 (1964); Stephens v. New Hampshire Insurance Co., 92 Idaho 537, 539-40, 447 P.2d 14, 16-17 (1968).