Opinion ID: 1061025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: consideration of post judgment facts

Text: We take judicial notice that following the issuance of our orders in these cases something approaching legal chaos ensued. Appellant Hooker sued this Court in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee. Justice White joined other appellate judges in seeking and obtaining a ruling from Judge Bernice Donald, United States Judge for the Western District of Tennessee, that required that the judges be placed on the ballot for retention election. The retention election was held on August 1, 1996, and Justice White was voted out of office. On September 9, 1996, the Attorney General's Office issued its Opinion No. 96-117 holding that the vacancy in the unexpired term of Justice O'Brien could be filled by a resident of either the Eastern or Western Grand Division of the state. In that Opinion, the Attorney General distinguished the post-election situation from the issue which this Special Supreme Court dealt with by asserting, ipsi dixit, that the vacancy on the Supreme Court bench was not created by Justice O'Brien's resignation, but by Justice White's failure to receive a majority of votes for retention in the August 1, 1996 election. Rule 14, Tennessee Rules of Appellate Procedure, grants power to the appellate courts to consider post-judgment facts capable of ready demonstration, affecting the positions of the parties or the subject matter of the action such as . . . other judgments or proceedings. . . . An appellate court may act on its own motion. We believe that the Attorney General Opinion No. 96-117 affects the subject matter of this action and that its validity should be considered by this Court. As noted previously, the Tennessee Constitutional mandate for filling vacancies for unexpired terms on the Supreme Court is the last sentence of Article VII, Section 5, of the Constitution of Tennessee which provides as follows: No special election shall be held to fill a vacancy in the office of Judge or District Attorney, but at the time herein fixed for the biennial election of civil officers; and such vacancy shall be filled at the next Biennial [sic] election recurring more than thirty days after the vacancy occurs. This mandate that Supreme Court vacancies be filled at the biennial election recurring more than thirty days after the vacancy occurs, requires a two-step process to fill a vacancy: (1) the vacancy is first filled until the biennial election; (2) a judge is elected at the biennial election to fulfill the unexpired term. The Legislature implemented Article VII, Section 5, by enacting T.C.A. § 17-1-301, providing, in part, that the Governor appoint a qualified person, until such election can be held. That appointment expires on August 31 of the biennial election year and the vacancy is filled by the biennial election for the period from September 1 of the biennial election year to the end of the full eight-year term of the justice who has created the vacancy. Compare, State ex rel. Higgins v. Dunn, supra, at 491. The vacancy that was on the ballot to be filled in the August 1, 1996 biennial election was the unexpired term of Justice O'Brien. The premise of the Attorney General's Opinion that the vacancy to be filled now is that of Justice White is that a new vacancy was created by the rejection of a justice who had no unexpired term to be filled. That position ignores Article VII, Section 5, of the Tennessee Constitution and is facially untenable. Nothing in the Tennessee Plan indicates that it was intended to override T.C.A. § 17-1-301(b). Therefore, we hold that Attorney General Opinion No. 96-117 is erroneous; the requirements of T.C.A. § 17-1-301(b) and T.C.A. § 8-48-109 must be followed; and the at large vacancy created by the resignation of Justice O'Brien must be filled by a resident of the Eastern Grand Division, the grand division in which the vacancy originally occurred. All motions and petitions filed since July 5, 1996, not heretofore or herein ruled upon, have been considered by the Court, found to be without merit or not within the scope of this special courts commission, and are denied. Costs are adjudged as follows: John King and each intervenor shall pay the costs resulting from their respective filings. The remaining costs shall be assessed one-fourth to Appellant Hooker, one-fourth to Appellant Laska and one-half to the state defendants.