Opinion ID: 2066513
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Heading: The History and Significance of the Political Power Factor

Text: Some history is necessary in order to understand the significance of the political power factor in equal protection jurisprudence. One of the principal purposes of the four factor test for heightened scrutiny, based on its history, is to provide for the extraordinary remedy of judicial intervention into legislative classification in those instances in which, because of the status of the group affected by the classification, the group has no likely effective means of redressing any discrimination effected by means of the classification through the normal political process. The starting point for evaluating the constitutionality of a legislative classification under equal protection principles has long been the rational basis test, which applies to economic and social regulation. See Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580, 583, 55 S.Ct. 538, 79 L.Ed. 1070 (1935). This test is rooted in the notion that the principal function of the legislature is to draw linesin effect, to make classifications, so that it is not necessary for all legislation to apply to everyone in the first instanceand that, when the legislature does so, the [c]onstitution presumes that even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by the democratic process. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). As the United States Supreme Court has recognized: Classification is the essence of all legislation, and only those classifications which are invidious, arbitrary, or irrational offend the [e]qual [p]rotection [c]lause of the [c]onstitution. Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 967, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982). Thus, the rational basis test is based on judicial respect for the separation of powers. In 1938, in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938), the United States Supreme Court upheld a legislative classification created by the federal Filled Milk Act as having a rational basis. In what has now been recognized as its seminal footnote 4; id., at 152-53 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778; however, the court for the first time suggested the rationale for a more searching level of judicial inquiry for certain cases. One category of such cases was those in which those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation were, by the nature of the legislation itself, restrictive of those processes, such as legislation restricting the right to vote, restraining the dissemination of information and interfering with political organizations. Id. The court then broadened its suggestion of the possibility of a more searching level of judicial inquiry to another category of cases. The court stated: Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes directed at particular religious ... or national ... or racial minorities ... [or] whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.  (Citations omitted; emphasis added.) Id., at 153 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778. Footnote 4 has had such great impact on constitutional law that it is often referred to as the most famous and most celebrated footnote in the Supreme Court's history. See, e.g., D. Hutchinson, Symposium, Discrimination and Inequality: Emerging Issues, `Gay Rights' for `Gay Whites'?: Race, Sexual Identity, and Equal Protection Discourse, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 1358, 1379 n. 107 (2000) (`most famous footnote'); P. Linzer, The Carolene Products Footnote and the Preferred Position of Individual Rights: Louis Lusky and John Hart Ely vs. Harlan Fiske Stone, 12 Const. Commentary 277 (1995) (same); A. Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 Yale L.J. 1193, 1195 (1992) (same); S. Delchin, comment,  United States v. Virginia and Our Evolving `Constitution': Playing Peek-a-boo with the Standard of Scrutiny for Sex-Based Classifications, 47 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 1121, 1154 n. 206 (1997) (`most celebrated footnote'); L. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. Rev. 1, 92 (same); L. Powell,  Carolene Products Revisited, 82 Colum. L. Rev. 1087 (1982) (first description as most celebrated footnote). Justice Powell, delivering the Harlan Fiske Stone Lecture at Columbia University in New York, observed that Carolene Products Co. was an unremarkable case. L. Powell, supra, 82 Colum. L.Rev. at 1087. Justice Powell explained that footnote 4, which, ironically, was not only relegated to a footnote, but also was dicta, is the sole reason for the continuing fascination with the case. Indeed, Justice Powell noted that the footnote now is recognized as a primary source of strict scrutiny judicial review, which many scholars think... actually commenced a new era in constitutional law. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 1088. Justice Powell's explanation of the theory underlying footnote 4 is significant. The fundamental character of our government is democratic. Our constitution assumes that majorities should rule and that the government should be able to govern. Therefore, for the most part, Congress and the state legislatures should be allowed to do as they choose. But there are certain groups that cannot participate effectively in the political process. And the political process therefore cannot be trusted to protect these groups in the way it protects most of us. Consistent with these premises, the theory continues, the Supreme Court has two special missions in our scheme of government: First, to clear away impediments to participation, and ensure that all groups can engage equally in the political process; and Second, to review with heightened scrutiny legislation inimical to discrete and insular minorities who are unable to protect themselves in the legislative process.  (Emphasis added.) Id., at 1088-89. Thus, a principal purpose underlying heightened scrutiny judicial intervention into the realm of legislative judgment into its essential process of classification is directly related to the political power factor. Heightened scrutiny analysis is designed as an extraordinary form of judicial intervention on behalf of those insular minority classes who presumably are unlikely to be able to rectify burdensome or exclusive legislation through the political process. The United States Supreme Court's equal protection case law reflects the importance of footnote 4 of Carolene Products Co., and the close tie between heightened scrutiny analysis and the relative political power of the group being considered for protected class status. See, e.g., San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 105, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (The reasons why such classifications [of race, nationality and alienage] call for close judicial scrutiny are manifold. Certain racial and ethnic groups have frequently been recognized as `discrete and insular minorities' who are relatively powerless to protect their interests in the political process. See Graham v. Richardson, [403 U.S. 365, 372, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971)]; cf. United States v. Carolene Products Co., [supra, 304 U.S. at 152-53] n. 4[, 58 S.Ct. 778].); Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976) ([b]ut even old age does not define a `discrete and insular' group, United States v. Carolene Products Co., [supra, at 152-53 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778], in need of `extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process'); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 217 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 72 L.Ed.2d 786 (1982) ([C]ertain groups ... have historically been `relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process.' ... [S]ee United States v. Carolene Products Co., [supra, at 152-53 n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 778]. [Citations omitted.]). Although the United States Supreme Court has not always cited the Carolene Products Co. footnote in its formulation of the test for heightened scrutiny, it has applied the political power factor in determining whether legislation affecting a particular class is to be made subject to that scrutiny, and its reasoning and language clearly have echoed the purpose of that factor as explained by Justice Powell. In Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., supra, 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249, the court, in determining that the mentally retarded were not a quasi-suspect class, used language and reasoning that established clearly that the political power factor is integral to the determination of whether a class is entitled to suspect or quasi-suspect class status, and, therefore, whether legislation affecting that class should be subjected to heightened or merely rational basis scrutiny. First, in contrasting the rational basis test with the strict scrutiny test, the court noted that statutes that classify on the basis of race, alienage or national origin are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathya view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving as others. For these reasons and because such discrimination is unlikely to be soon rectified by legislative means, these laws are subjected to strict scrutiny.... (Emphasis added.) Id. In summarizing the rational basis test, the court referred to the fact that, where the group involved has characteristics relevant to state interests, courts have been very reluctant, as they should be in our federal system and with our respect for the separation of powers, to closely scrutinize legislative choices.... (Emphasis added.) Id., at 441, 105 S.Ct. 3249. The court then turned to its explanation of why it rejected quasi-suspect classification for the mentally retarded, stating: [T]he distinctive legislative response, both national and state, to the plight of those who are mentally retarded demonstrates not only that they have unique problems, but also that lawmakers have been addressing their difficulties in a manner that belies a continuing antipathy or prejudice and a corresponding need for more intrusive oversight by the judiciary.  (Emphasis added.) Id., at 443, 105 S.Ct. 3249. After cataloguing the federal and state legislation demonstrating those legislative responses, the court stated: [T]he legislative response, which could hardly have occurred and survived without public support, negates any claim that the mentally retarded are politically powerless in the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the lawmakers.  (Emphasis added.) Id., at 445, 105 S.Ct. 3249. One cannot reasonably read these passages without hearing and seeing the important relevance of the political power factor to the three tier analysis; it is integral to the determination of whether a particular class should be elevated to protected status. Contrary to the majority, therefore, I conclude that the political power of the group that seeks heightened scrutiny is a highly relevant consideration in the formulation and application of the four part test to determine whether the legislation at issue is to be subject to that degree of scrutiny. I would, therefore, as a matter of our own state constitutional law, retain the political power factor as an equal consideration in the equal protection calculus because it constitutes one of the fundamental purposes of the entire heightened scrutiny analysis. Finally, as I explain in part I C of this opinion, I agree with the majority's formulation of how to define that factor and, in applying it to this case, I conclude that, under that definition, the plaintiffs are not entitled to heightened scrutiny. I turn now to the application of that factor in the present case.