Opinion ID: 1715822
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Other Specifications of Negligence.

Text: In paragraphs 11(c) and 11(d) of her petition, Giese alleges that Clarkson was negligent in failing to timely provide quality medical care or consultation and failing to consult with other medical personnel with respect to her condition. These allegations, which are unrelated to the issue of informed consent, were not addressed by the district court in its order sustaining Clarkson's demurrer. That order refers to a statement by Giese's counsel that `[t]he cause of action is really based on informed consent.' However, Giese's counsel represented during oral argument on appeal that the allegations in paragraphs 11(c) and 11(d) pertain to theories of recovery other than informed consent, which were never abandoned. Since there is nothing in the record establishing that these allegations were ever stricken or withdrawn, we must consider them in determining whether the petition is sufficient to withstand Clarkson's demurrer. Clarkson contends in its brief that these allegations are vague and relate to obligations owed by a physician, not a hospital. Brief for appellee at 24. While the allegations are vague and general in nature, it has long been the law of Nebraska that even a general allegation of negligence is good against a demurrer. Crawford v. Ham, 209 Neb. 802, 311 N.W.2d 896 (1981). We have held that [a]s a general rule, hospital staff members lack authority to alter or depart from an attending physician's order for a hospital patient and lack authority to determine what is a proper course of medical treatment for a hospitalized patient. Jensen v. Archbishop Bergan Mercy Hosp., 236 Neb. 1, 8, 459 N.W.2d 178, 183 (1990). However, we have recognized that under some circumstances, hospital personnel have a duty to communicate with an attending physician concerning a hospitalized patient. Critchfield v. McNamara, 248 Neb. 39, 532 N.W.2d 287 (1995) (holding that hospital employees had duty to report change in patient's condition to appropriate medical personnel). Applying these authorities and the required liberal construction to paragraphs 11(c) and 11(d) of the petition, we conclude that no cause of action is stated against Clarkson by paragraph 11(c) because Giese alleges no facts upon which Clarkson would have a duty to provide medical care or consultation to her. See Jensen, supra . However, the allegation in paragraph 11(d) that Clarkson failed to consult with other medical personnel with respect to [Giese's] condition and the allegations of proximately caused injury and damages contained in paragraphs 12 and 13 of the petition are sufficient to state a cause of action against Clarkson. See Critchfield, supra . Because one of the four specifications of negligence directed at Clarkson was legally sufficient, the petition stated a cause of action unless barred by the statute of limitations.