Opinion ID: 1388285
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Property Damage Claims

Text: Plaintiffs challenge, on the merits, entry of partial summary judgment on their claims for property damage. Trial court granted Nassau's motions on the ground that Plaintiffs presented no evidence that any alleged property damage was proximately caused by the operation of the Nassau facility. In reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, we apply the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), S.C.R.C.P.: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See 10 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2716, p. 643 (1983); SSI Medical Services, Inc. v. Cox , ___ S.C. ___, 392 S.E. (2d) 789 (1990); Irby v. Richardson , 278 S.C. 484, 298 S.E. (2d) 452 (1982). This standard mirrors the standard for a directed verdict under Rule 50(a), S.C.R.C.P. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L. Ed. (2d) 202, 213 (1986); see also Main v. Corley , 281 S.C. 525, 316 S.E. (2d) 406 (1984). Under Rule 56(c), the party seeking summary judgment has the initial responsibility of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed. (2d) 265 (1986); see also Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Marine Contracting & Towing Co. , ___ S.C. ___, 392 S.E. (2d) 460 (1990). With respect to an issue upon which the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof, this initial responsibility may be discharged by `showing'  that is, pointing out to the [trial] court  that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed. (2d) at 275. The moving party need not support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. at 2553, 91 L.Ed. (2d) at 274. (Emphasis in original.) Once moving party carries its initial burden, opposing party must, under Rule 56(e), do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts but must come forward with `specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.' Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 586-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed. (2d) 538, 552 (1986) (emphasis in original). Indeed, Rule 56(e) specifically prohibits the nonmoving party from resting upon the mere allegations or denials of its pleadings. See SSI Medical Services, supra ; Moody v. McLellan , 295 S.C. 157, 367 S.E. (2d) 449 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the evidence and its reasonable inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. SSI Medical Services, supra ; Standard Fire, supra . The court then applies the standard set out in Rule 56(c): [T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to the party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be `no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is `entitled to a judgment as a matter of law' because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof. Celotex 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552, 91 L.Ed. (2d) at 273. Plaintiffs do not take issue with the trial court's conclusion that Nassau met its burden under Rule 56(c). Rather, they contend that evidence contained in answers to interrogatories and depositions was sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact concerning property damage. We disagree. In Gray v. Southern Facilities, Inc. , 256 S.C. 558, 183 S.E. (2d) 438 (1971), this Court upheld the granting of an involuntary nonsuit at the close of plaintiff's case [7] where plaintiff had failed to present evidence of any physical damage to his property. We stated: While proof, with mathematical certainty, of the amount of loss or damage is not required, in order for damages to be recoverable the evidence should be such as to enable the court or jury to determine the amount thereof with reasonable certainty or accuracy. Neither the existence, causation nor amount of damages can be left to conjecture, guess or speculation. See Piggy Park Enterprises, Inc. v. Schofield , 251 S.C. 385, 162 S.E. (2d) 705, [(1968)] and cases therein cited. The evidence as to the diminution of market value is, in our view, speculative, not only as to the amount but speculative as to the portion thereof proximately and directly resulting from the one delict on the part of the respondents complained of and proved. Accordingly, such evidence was of no real probative value in ascertaining the amount of any actual damage to the market value of appellant's property resulting from respondent's single wrongful act. Id. 256 S.C. at 570-71, 183 S.E. (2d) at 444. Plaintiffs' case suffers from a similar deficiency. Although many individual plaintiffs asserted in their answers to interrogatories and depositions that pollution from Nassau's plant had caused a diminution in the value of their property, these bald allegations are insufficient to create a genuine issue of fact. See Stevens v. Barnard , 512 F. (2d) 876, 879 (10th Cir.1975). There is a total absence of any competent evidence showing either the existence or the amount of damage to property, or that any such damage was proximately caused by the acts of Nassau. Accordingly, we affirm trial court's grant of partial summary judgment on Plaintiffs' claims for property damage.