Opinion ID: 1127452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Trial Rights: Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution

Text: Next, plaintiff argues that the application of ORS 18.560(1) to this wrongful death action violates her right to a jury trial as provided in Article I, section 17, and Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. Plaintiff argues that the right to a jury trial means that the jury decides the facts (including the amount of damages to be awarded) and that the jury's unmodified determination of damages is given effect: Reducing a verdict after a jury has determined that the evidence supports an award in a specified amount is an invasion of the jury's sole responsibility and is prohibited by [Article I, section 17, of] the constitution. Moreover, according to plaintiff, Article VII (Amended), section 3, makes it explicit that overriding the jury's damage award if it is supported by the evidence is also impermissible. Article I, section 17, guarantees a jury trial in civil actions. Article I, section 17, was part of the Bill of Rights of the Oregon Constitution, which was adopted in 1857. Article VII (Amended), section 3, guarantees that, after a jury trial, no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict. Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, was adopted by the voters of Oregon by initiative petition in 1910.
The right to trial by jury in Article I, section 17, does not give plaintiff a right to a jury trial in all civil matters.    [A] jury trial is guaranteed only in those classes of cases in which the right was customary at the time the constitution was adopted or in cases of like nature. We must, therefore, decide whether plaintiff had a well-established right to have a jury determine the amount of damages in an action [for wrongful death] when our constitution was adopted. Molodyh v. Truck Insurance Exchange, 304 Or. 290, 295-96, 744 P.2d 992 (1987) (emphasis in original; citations omitted; footnote omitted). [8] See also Deane v. Willamette Bridge Co., 22 Or. 167, 169-77, 29 P. 440 (1892) (the plaintiff had no right under Article I, section 17, to a jury determination of damages in a default proceeding, because common law did not afford a right to jury trial in a default proceeding). In Oregon, as plaintiff acknowledges, the right of action for wrongful death is statutory. [A]t common law no remedy by way of a civil action for wrongful death existed. Richard v. Slate, 239 Or. 164, 167, 396 P.2d 900 (1964). In Goheen v. General Motors Corp., 263 Or. 145, 153-54, 502 P.2d 223 (1972), this court traced the history and development of wrongful death actions in Oregon and stated: The original Oregon Wrongful Death Act was included in the original Deady Code in 1862.    [It] did not specifically limit awards of damages to any named dependents. Neither did it specifically limit damages to pecuniary loss, although total recovery was limited to $5,000. This limitation on the amount of recovery was increased from time to time, and was finally removed [by Oregon Laws 1967, chapter 554, section 1]. (Footnotes omitted.) There was no wrongful death statute in Oregon before the 1862 Deady Code. Ibid. Therefore, at the time Article I, section 17, was adopted, no right existed for a trial by jury for a wrongful death action. Because wrongful death actions are purely statutory, they exist only in the form and with the limitations chosen by the legislature. Hughes v. White, 289 Or. 13, 18, 609 P.2d 365 (1980). Plaintiff argues, however, that the right to a jury trial is not strictly limited to cases in which it existed in 1859, when [Article I, section 17,] became effective, because the right extends to cases `of like nature' to those that existed at common law at the time the constitution was adopted. Plaintiff argues that, in 1857, a right to jury trial existed for personal injury actions; that a wrongful death action is of like nature to a personal injury action; and, thus, that the right to a jury trial attaches here. Even accepting the premise that a wrongful death action is of like nature to a personal injury action, plaintiff's argument would not prevail. When Article I, section 17, and the constitution were adopted, a jury's determination of the amount of damages to be awarded in tort actions was not protected from judicial alteration. Before the adoption of Article VII (Amended), section 3, in 1910, Oregon trial courts were empowered to exercise their discretion and set aside jury verdicts and grant a new trials for excessive damages found by a jury, or to order a remittitur of the excess as a condition to denying a motion for a new trial. See, e.g., General Laws of Oregon, ch. 2, § 232(5), p. 197 (Deady 1845-1864) (court could set aside jury's verdict because of [e]xcessive damages    given under the influence of passion or prejudice); Adcock v. Oregon Railroad Co., 45 Or. 173, 181, 77 P. 78 (1904) (Where the damages assessed are excessive, in the opinion of the trial court, or not justified by the evidence, the error may in many cases be obviated by remitting the excess.); Sorenson v. Oregon Power Co., 47 Or. 24, 33, 82 P. 10 (1905) (approving trial court's exercise of remittitur). See also Hall S. Lusk, Forty-Five Years of Article VII, Section 3, Constitution of Oregon, 35 Or.L.Rev. 1, 4 (1955) (stating that, before adoption of Article VII (Amended), section 3, trial courts were empowered to set aside verdicts that they believed to be excessive). Article VII (Amended), section 3, and subsequent decisions by this court, did away with that practice. In order to inhibit such practice and to uphold verdicts, the Constitution was amended so as to preclude a court from re-examining any fact that had been tried by a jury, when the verdict returned was based on any legal evidence. Buchanan v. Lewis A. Hicks Co., 66 Or. 503, 510, 133 P. 780, 134 P. 1191 (1913). Until the adoption of Article VII (Amended), section 3, in 1910, trial courts were empowered to reduce jury awards of damages when the courts believed that those awards were excessive. That fact, in itself, disposes of plaintiff's argument that there existed at common law, at the time Article I, section 17, was adopted in 1857, a right to have a judge enter judgment on a jury's award of damages without judicial alterationin a personal injury action. Plaintiff's Article I, section 17, argument is not well taken.
As noted above, the right of action for wrongful death in Oregon is wholly statutory, and the legislature is entitled to impose boundaries on statutory actions. 322 Or. at 292, 906 P.2d at 795-796. Indeed, for most of its existence, the statutory right of action for wrongful death has contained a limitation on the amount that a plaintiff could recover. In it original form, the Oregon Wrongful Death Act limited a plaintiff's total recovery to $5,000. The legislature increased that limitation on the amount of recovery from time to time; in 1961, the legislature raised the limit for the fifth time, to $25,000. See Goheen, 263 Or. at 154 nn. 15-17, 502 P.2d 223 (tracing statutory changes). In 1967, the legislature removed any limitation. Or.Laws 1967, ch. 544, § 1. As pertinent here, by enacting ORS 18.560(1) in 1987, [9] the legislature in essence ended a 20-year hiatus in limitations on the amount of recovery in wrongful death actions. With respect to a wrongful death action, ORS 18.560(1) has the effect of reinstating a ceiling on that legislatively created remedy. The dispositive question is whether Article VII (Amended), section 3, prevented the legislature from so defining wrongful death claims. We interpret a provision of the Oregon Constitution by examining [i]ts specific wording, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its creation. Priest v. Pearce, 314 Or. 411, 415-16, 840 P.2d 65 (1992). Nothing in the wording of Article VII (Amended), section 3, quoted above at note 6, restricts the legislature's authority to set a substantive limitation on a purely statutory remedy. The wording of Article VII (Amended), section 3, addresses only the power of courts to re-examine[ ] facts tried by a jury. The case law surrounding Article VII (Amended), section 3, leads to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Buchannan, 66 Or. at 510, 133 P. 780, 134 P. 1191 (describing effect of that amendment). Finally, there is no suggestion in the circumstances that led to the creation of Article VII (Amended), section 3, that that provision was intended to restrict the legislature's authority to set a substantive limitation on a purely statutory remedy. Rather, the purpose of Article VII (Amended), section 3, was to bring about an improved administration of justice by reducing retrials to a minimum and so eliminating delay and expense. Lusk, 35 Or.L.Rev. at 3. See also Thomas H. Tongue, In Defense of Juries As Exclusive Judges of the Facts, 35 Or.L.Rev. 143 (1956) (agreeing with Justice Lusk's assessment of the purpose of Article VII (Amended), section 3); Pamphlet Containing Measures to be Submitted to Voters of Oregon, November 8, 1910, at 176-77 (The purpose of this amendment is to    remove the pretext for new trials in those cases in which substantial justice is done by the verdict and judgment, but in which the trial court may have made a technical mistake.). The right of action for wrongful death was created by the legislature in 1862, and it was created with a limitation on the amount recoverable. When the voters adopted Article VII (Amended), section 3, in 1910, the maximum amount recoverable in a statutory wrongful death action was $7,500. Lord's Oregon Laws, ch. VI, § 380, p. 326 (1910). Although voters told the courts not to re-examine facts tried by a jury, Art. VII (Amended), § 3, there is no indication in wording, case law, or history that the voters meant to undo the extant dollar limit on wrongful death actions. The removal, in 1967, of any limitation on the amount recoverable in a wrongful death action did not place the issue of dollar limits beyond the legislature's power to act, nor clothe the legislature's creation with constitutional guarantees not present at its inception. In summary, after examining the wording of Article VII (Amended), section 3, the case law surrounding it, and the historical circumstances that led to its creation, we have found no suggestion that Article VII (Amended), section 3, restricts the legislature's authority to set a maximum recovery in statutory wrongful death actions. Its authority in that regard is not diminished by the fact that the maximum recovery is set in a general statute that applies to wrongful death actions, rather than in the wrongful death statute itself. The Court of Appeals erred when it held that application of ORS 18.560(1) to plaintiff's wrongful death action violated Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution. The trial court correctly held that ORS 18.560(1) does not violate the Oregon Constitution as applied in this case.