Opinion ID: 203421
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Administrative Tolling Theory

Text: Morán Vega also claims that the district court erred by concluding that the filing of an administrative appeal on December 8, 2001 did not toll the statute of limitations. The argument is that the August 2003 complaint was timely because a final decision on the appeal did not issue until November 2005. [3] Because Section 1983 borrows from state law to determine the length of its limitations period, we look to state law for tolling principles. Rodriguez Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 41-42 (1st Cir. 1990). The applicable statute in Puerto Rico is Article 1873 of the Civil Code, which provides that [p]rescription of actions is interrupted by their institution before the courts, by extrajudicial claim of the creditor, and by any act of acknowledgment of the debt by the debtor. P.R. Laws. Ann. tit. 31, § 5303. An extrajudicial claim, such as an administrative appeal, must meet three requirements to toll the limitations period: The claim must be made by the holder of the substantive right (or his legal representative), ... it must be addressed to the debtor or passive subject of the right, not to a third party, ... and it must require or demand the same conduct or relief ultimately sought in the subsequent lawsuit. Rodriguez Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 44 (internal citations omitted); see also generally Rodríguez-García v. Municipality of Caguas, 354 F.3d 91, 97-99 (1st Cir.2004); Cintron v. E.L.A., 127 P.R. Dec. 582 (1990) (holding that an administrative claim will toll the statute of limitations only if there is an identity between the action instituted and the action tolled). Consequently, an administrative claim will toll the limitations period only if it puts forth an identical cause[] of action, Benitez-Pons v. Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 59 (1st Cir.1998) (quoting Rodriguez Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted)), and only if [t]he relief sought in the extrajudicial claim [is] the same as that later sought in court. Valentín-Almeyda, 447 F.3d at 101; see also Rodriguez Narvaez, 895 F.2d at 46. Morán Vega's administrative claim does not meet these requirements. The relief Morán Vega sought in his December 8, 2001 administrative filing was reinstatement, not the compensatory or punitive damages which were sought in the August 2003 federal court complaint. Moreover, Morán Vega has not shown that the claims raised in the administrative complaint match the claims, particularly the federal civil rights claims, put forth in the August 2003 complaint. Compare Valentín-Almeyda, 447 F.3d at 101-02 (finding the limitations period tolled in a Title VII case where a plaintiff brought identical claims against identical defendants). Finally, as the district court noted, even if the December 8 filing succeeded in tolling the limitations period, it would only start a new one-year period on the date of the filing, not the date of the resolution of the claim. See Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co., Ltd. v. Perez & Cia., P.R., 142 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1998) (The prescriptive term is interrupted on the date on which the defendant receives the extrajudicial claim.) (emphasis added). Consequently, the December 8, 2001 filing would only extend the limitations period one year, leaving any claim filed after December 8, 2002 untimely. The district court correctly rejected Morán Vega's administrative tolling argument. The judgment of dismissal is affirmed.