Opinion ID: 2167424
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: the judgment for the district of columbia

Text: The Varners claim that the District of Columbia, and specifically Detective Kyle Cimiotti, were negligent in their investigation of the Plunkett murder. They contend that if the police had exercised reasonable care in investigating that murder, Mesa would have been swiftly apprehended, and he would therefore have had no opportunity to kill Benjamin Varner. Retired Detective Jeffery Greene, formerly of the homicide squad of the MPD, stated in an affidavit which was filed by the Varners in opposition to the District's motion for summary judgment: It is ... my opinion that had reasonable and professional techniques been employed in the Plunkett homicide investigation, that the MPD homicide detectives would have learned that Mr. Plunkett's credit cards and ATM cards were missing, that Mr. Mesa had used Mr. Plunkett's credit cards and ATM cards after Mr. Plunkett's death, and that had said practice been employed, that within a reasonable degree of certainty the MPD homicide detectives would have learned that Joseph Mesa, Jr. had used Mr. Plunkett's computer and Internet account and credit card to order bikes and have it [sic] delivered to his mailing address and also made other purchases. Detective Greene further stated that, in his opinion, the way that Defendant District of Columbia employees handled the Plunkett murder was grossly below the required, necessary, and acceptable standard of care and showed disregard for the safety of the students at Gallaudet .... It was Greene's opinion that had the homicide investigation followed standard procedures, [then] within a reasonable degree of investigative certainty, the murder of Benjamin Varner would not have taken place. The District filed a motion for summary judgment, relying in part on the public duty doctrine. The District argued that plaintiffs are seeking to hold the government liable for the criminal conduct [of] Mr. Mesa. However, under the well established common law of the District of Columbia, if the District owed no duty of care to the decedent beyond the general duty owed to the public at large, judgment must be entered for the District defendants. Under the public duty doctrine, [the District of Columbia] and its agents owe no duty to provide public services to particular citizens as individuals. Instead, absent some special relationship between the government and the individual, the District's duty is to provide public services to the public at large. Powell v. District of Columbia, 602 A.2d 1123, 1125 (D.C.1992) (citations omitted). The public duty doctrine shields the municipality and its agencies from suits attacking the manner in which the District of Columbia deploys its manpower and undertakes to discharge its obligation to the general public. Hines v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 133 (D.C. 1990); see also Platt v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 149 (D.C.1983). It is well-settled in the District of Columbia that a government and its agents are under no general duty to provide public services ... to any particular citizen. Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1, 4 (D.C.1981) ( en banc ); see also Johnson v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 140 (D.C.1990); Hines, supra; Wanzer v. District of Columbia, 580 A.2d 127 (D.C.1990). With respect to such public services, such as police protection, the duty is to the public, and absent a special relationship, the District of Columbia cannot be held liable. Platt, supra (plaintiff's claims dismissed because the District of Columbia's frequent fire inspections and the issuance of certificate of occupancy did not create a special relationship with the District and the theatre patrons). Adopting language from our opinion in Powell, the District contended that a duty owing to everybody can never become the foundation of an action until some individual is placed in [a] position which gives him particular occasion to insist upon its performance; it then becomes a duty to him personally. 602 A.2d at 1127 (quoting Orzechowski v. State, 485 A.2d 545, 549 n. 3 (R.I.1984)) (quoting 3 COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS § 478, at 366 (4th ed.1932)). The trial judge granted the District's motion, essentially endorsing the District's position. The judge wrote that under the public duty doctrine, public officials such as police officers cannot be held liable for harm caused by criminals unless there was a special relationship between the victim and the official. See, e.g., Platt v. District of Columbia, 467 A.2d 149 (D.C.1983). In order to find that a special relationship had been created, a two-prong test applies: there must be either [sic] a direct or continuing contact between the victim and the police department, and there must be a justifiable reliance on that contact by the victim. See id. In the present case, neither prong of the test is met. Plaintiffs argue that a special relationship had been created by the prior murder of a Gallaudet student, and because the MPD had a presence on the Gallaudet campus. [Citation to record omitted.] Plaintiffs present no argument or evidence, however, to show that Benjamin Varner himself had any direct or continuing contact with the MPD. Merely because the police are present in an area does not create a special relationship with the people in that area. To the contrary, finding that a special relationship exists in such a situation would obviate the public duty doctrine, as a special relationship would be created between the police and the people in any area in which the police are doing their job. Thus, absent any information or argument by plaintiffs that a special relationship had been created between Detective Cimiotti and Benjamin Varner himself, as opposed to the entire Gallaudet student body, the public duty doctrine applies to this case. We substantially agree with the District's argument and with the trial judge's analysis. On appeal, the Varners contend, as they did in the trial court, that the police had created a special relationship with Benjamin Varner and with other students at Gallaudet, that Benjamin had relied on this special relationship and on promises of protection, and that the public duty doctrine therefore had no application. The Varners cite, inter alia, the affidavit of Benjamin's friend and fellow student, Casey Przygoda. In that affidavit, Ms. Przygoda stated in pertinent part: After Eric Plunkett was killed, I, and other students at Gallaudet University, were assured by the District of Columbia Police (DC Police) that they were going to give us special protection in addition to what the rest of the community was given because as students we were all frightened and upset with what had happened.        I remember a meeting where the DC Police told us that they were there specifically to protect us and provide for our safety so that there would not be another murder. The DC Police also assured us they were working even harder to solve this murder because it has happened right on campus. I, and other students at Gallaudet University, relied upon the police to provide us the necessary protection from the person who had committed the murders. (Emphasis added.) In addition, plaintiffs Willie and Diane Varner, Benjamin Varner's parents, filed a joint affidavit in which they stated, in effect, that according to Benjamin, he personally was relying on assurances from the police that he and other students would be protected. [14] In our view, these affidavits, and the arguments which the Varners have made on the basis of their factual representations, are insufficient to take the case out of the reach of the public duty doctrine. As the italicized language in Ms. Przygoda's affidavit itself reveals, any assurances of protection made by the police were directed to the Gallaudet students collectively, not to Benjamin Varner or to any other student individually. Gallaudet has approximately 2000 undergraduates and graduate students, as well as many faculty members and administrators. The presence of police officers on the campus, and their promises of protection, cannot reasonably be viewed as having created more than 2000 special relationships. If, at Gallaudet, all 2000 students were entitled to avail themselves of the special relationship exception to the public duty doctrine, then that exception would emasculate and nullify the doctrine itself. Indeed, although the police owe a duty to the public, any crime will primarily involve a segment of the public, often residents of a particular neighborhood, or, as in this case, students and faculty members at a particular institution. If, in such cases, all of the residents, students, or others who receive reassurance from the police, have a right of action against the District for any alleged negligence in solving one crime or in preventing a second, then the public duty doctrine effectively becomes a nullity. [15] A caveat may be in order. There is perhaps no doctrine more firmly established than the principle that liability follows tortious wrongdoing; that where negligence is the proximate cause of injury, the rule is liability and immunity is the exception. Miller, 841 A.2d at 1249 (concurring opinion) (quoting Stone v. Ariz. Highway Comm'n, 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107, 112 (1963)). The public duty line of cases represents a major exception to this generally salutary principle. In this case, if Detective Greene, formerly of the MPD's homicide squad, is correct in his assessment of the quality of the police investigation of the Plunkett homicide, then negligence on the part of the police proximately resulted in the untimely death of the plaintiffs' son at the hands of a murderer who should have been apprehended long before he could harm Benjamin Varner. [16] Nevertheless, the public duty doctrine is well-established in this jurisdiction, and we entertain no doubt that it bars the Varners' suit against the District. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial judge properly granted the District's motion for summary judgment.