Opinion ID: 774017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Habeas Proceeding

Text: 38 On April 21, 1997, Leka filed pro se a timely petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of New York. 2 Leka subsequently obtained counsel. In his petition, Leka alleged: 1) that the police identification procedures were impermissibly suggestive; 2) that his counsel did not provide effective assistance; and 3) that the prosecution suppressed material evidence in violation of Brady. The district court denied Leka's petition. See Leka v. Portuondo, 76 F. Supp. 2d 258 (E.D.N.Y. 1999). 39 1) Leka's claim that the identification procedures employed by the police were impermissibly suggestive was adjudicated on the merits in state court and rejected. The district court reviewed the state court opinions and concluded that Leka's showing did not overcome the deference owed under AEDPA. In particular, the district court weighed the post-trial recantations by Torres and Modica against their statements to the police, their testimony at the Wade hearing and their testimony at trial, and concluded that Leka [did] not provide clear and convincing evidence rebutting... the state trial court's reasonable determination that [the] allegations of coercive or improper police tactics are false. Id. at 279. 40 2) Leka raised two challenges to the effectiveness of his trial counsel: he claimed Zeni Cira's funding of Leka's defense created a conflict of interest; and he claimed (in the alternative to his Brady claim) that his counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate Chiusano, Gonzalez, and Garcia and present their testimony at trial. 41 As to Leka's conflict of interest claim, the district court deferred to the state trial court's finding that [trial counsel] tried the case most diligently and vehemently. Id. at 291. Accordingly, the district court held that Leka had not demonstrated any lapse in representation attributable to the alleged conflict. Id. at 291-92 (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349 (1980)). 42 As to Leka's actual ineffectiveness claim, the district court held that trial counsel's failure to capitalize upon the opportunities provided to investigate the observations made by Chiusano, Gonzalez, and Garcia did not fall outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Leka, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 293 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). 43 3) The district court concluded that the testimony cited by Leka as Brady material was not suppressed. The court began by noting that (as discussed above) in response to Leka's §440.10 motion, the state courts found that Leka made no showing that the testimony of Chiusano, Gonzalez, and Garcia could not have been obtained for use at trial. The district court held that [t]he state courts' determination on this question of fact was reasonable in light of the evidence before them and thus binding on habeas review. Leka, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 283. 44 The district court based that holding on its finding that there was sufficient time between the disclosure of Chiusano, Gonzalez, and Garcia as witnesses (February 19, 22, and 21 respectively) and opening arguments (March 2) to afford the defense an opportunity to use their testimony at trial. See Leka, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 282-86. Although Chiusano's name was mis-spelled in the prosecution's disclosure, the district court found that the defense (after finding no Cansano) could have tracked down Chiusano through the bus company, which would know which driver was on the particular route at that particular time (if the bus was on schedule). See id. at 283. Although Gonzalez had moved to Florida, the district court found that (as of four days before opening arguments, i.e., on the first day of trial) the defense knew the Florida town in which he lived, and that, notwithstanding that opportunity, the defense indicated later at trial it would not seek Gonzalez's testimony. See id. 45 As to Garcia, the district court noted the state trial court's finding that Garcia was known to the defense. Id. at 282 (quoting Section 440.10 Opinion, at 6 n.2). The finding that Garcia was known to the defense is true enough as far as it goes. But the record support for this finding is the prosecution's disclosure of Garcia's identity at the Wade hearing on Wednesday, February 21, three business days before trial. After a searching review of the record, the district court (i) credited the prosecution's account of the defense's botched effort to contact Garcia; (ii) accepted the trial court's post-trial finding that defense counsel was aware that if the prosecutor did not call Garcia, the protective order would be reconsidered, Section 440.10 Opinion, at 6 n.2; and (iii) found it difficult to accept Leka's contention that Garcia was originally a willing defense witness discouraged from cooperating by the prosecution, Leka, 76 F. Supp. 2d at 284, 285 n.41. Having made or deferred to these findings, the district court (i) treated the protective order as a reasonable measure for the prosecution to seek; (ii) pointed out that defense counsel sought no reconsideration of the protective order after the close of the prosecution's case; and (iii) treated that fact as an election on the part of the defense. 46 The district court also held that the testimony of Chiusano, Gonzalez, and Garcia was not material. The court found that Leka had more than ample ammunition with which to impeach Modica and Torres' testimony. Id. at 288. Although Garcia's testimony might have reinforced the defense argument that the man Torres saw shooting in the street (and identified as Leka) was instead the victim, the court noted that the jury might have credited that defense argument but have concluded nonetheless that Leka shot Ferati while remaining in the car. The district court undertook a detailed analysis--correlating the estimated speed of the bus, the walking pace of Torres and Modica, and length of the block and concluded that [i]t is possible... to construct a sequence of events that would be consistent with all the salient features of both Modica's testimony and Chiusano's statement to the police. Id. at 289 n.49 (emphasis in original). Finally, the district court noted that the observations of Chiusano, Gonzalez, and Garcia would have undermined the alternate theory of the crime offered by Leka at trial (that Ferati was shot by Luftim Cira, the father of the children in the custody dispute, or by his brother Zeni Cira), because the testimony supporting that scenario suggests that the car stopped for some seconds before the shooting began. 47 We reverse solely on the basis of Leka's Brady claim, and only with respect to the non-disclosure of information concerning Officer Garcia. We hold that this evidence was favorable to the defense, that the prosecution suppressed it, and that it was material. Our evaluation of materiality considers the weight of the evidence at trial, the vulnerability of the eyewitness trial testimony, the recantations made by those eyewitnesses, and the accounts of Chiusano and Gonzalez; those observations do not and are not intended to imply that the district court's rulings were erroneous in any other respect.