Opinion ID: 846038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The City's Constitutional Authority

Text: Article 7 of the Constitution of 1963 enumerates the general authority and limits on the authority of local governments, such as counties, townships, cities, and villages. [7] Subject to authority specifically granted in the Constitution, local governments derive their authority from the Legislature. [8] We have held that [local governments] have no inherent jurisdiction to make laws or adopt regulations of government; they are governments of enumerated powers, acting by a delegated authority; so that while the State legislature may exercise such powers of government coming within a proper designation of legislative power as are not expressly or impliedly prohibited, the local authorities can exercise those only which are expressly or impliedly conferred, and subject to such regulations or restrictions as are annexed to the grant. [9] Notwithstanding that local governments obtain their authority from the Legislature, the Constitution reserves to local governments certain authorities. In this case, plaintiff relies on the authority to exercise reasonable control over its streets, which is specifically reserved in art. 7, § 29, which states: No person, partnership, association or corporation, public or private, operating a public utility shall have the right to the use of the highways, streets, alleys or other public places of any county, township, city or village for wires, poles, pipes, tracks, conduits or other utility facilities, without the consent of the duly constituted authority of the county, township, city or village; or to transact local business therein without first obtaining a franchise from the township, city or village. Except as otherwise provided in this constitution the right of all counties, townships, cities and villages to the reasonable control of their highways, streets, alleys and public places is hereby reserved to such local units of government. [10] Thus, the authority reserved to local units of government to exercise reasonable control over the enumerated subject areas is explicitly made subject to the other provisions of the Constitution. One such provision is art. 7, § 22, which empowers cities and villages to adopt resolutions and ordinances relating to its municipal concerns, property and government, subject to the constitution and law.  [11] In People v. McGraw, [12] this Court interpreted the similarly worded reasonable control predecessor of art. 7, § 29 found in the 1908 Constitution, [13] along with the predecessor of art. 7, § 22, the provision regarding municipal powers. [14] McGraw involved traffic ordinances enacted by the City of Detroit that conflicted with the general state traffic laws. This Court held that [t]aking the [constitutional] sections together, they should be so construed as to give the power to municipalities to pass such ordinances and regulations with reference to their highways and bridges as are not inconsistent with the general State law. [15] Thus, McGraw permits a city to exercise reasonable control to regulate matters of local concern, but only in a manner and to the degree that the regulation does not conflict with state law. In 1939, the Legislature created the MPSC, giving it broad regulatory authority over public utilities. Under its enabling statute, [t]he public service commission is vested with complete power and jurisdiction to regulate all public utilities in the state except . . . as otherwise restricted by law. The public service commission is vested with the power and jurisdiction to regulate all rates, fares, fees, charges, services, rules, conditions of service, and all other matters pertaining to the formation, operation, or direction of public utilities. The public service commission is further granted the power and jurisdiction to hear and pass upon all matter pertaining to, necessary, or incident to the regulation of public utilities . . . . [16] In 1970, the MPSC promulgated rules governing the underground placement of new and existing utility wires. [17] Specifically, the MPSC promulgated Rule 460.516, governing the [r]eplacement of existing overhead lines, and Rule 460.517, concerning [u]nderground facilities for convenience of utilities or where required by ordinances. [18] These rules appear to cover the same subject matter as Taylor Ordinance 00-344, and in a manner that possibly creates a conflict between the MPSC's rules and the plaintiff's ordinance. Because the MPSC has not construed how its rules governing the allocation of costs for the underground relocation of utility wires apply in this circumstance, and because provisions of the ordinance appear to fall within the MPSC's regulatory purview, the MPSC, rather than a court, should assess whether there is an actual conflict. As discussed later in this opinion, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires us to defer to the judgment of the MPSC on this question. If the ordinance conflicts with MPSC rules, then under art. 7, §§ 22 and 29, and McGraw, Taylor Ordinance 00-344 must yield. The cases from this Court relied on by the Court of Appeals and plaintiff are readily distinguishable from the present case. As an initial matter, all the cases from this Court holding that a municipality has the power to force a utility to relocate its facilities at its own expense were decided before the MPSC's promulgation of rules regarding the underground relocation of wires. [19] Thus, there was no state law for the municipal action to conflict with. To the extent these cases conflict with the MPSC's interpretation of its rules, however, they are abrogated. Moreover, no case cited is factually analogous. For example, the Court of Appeals cited this Court's opinion in Detroit Edison Co v. Detroit [20] for the proposition that this Court ruled that the city of Detroit could order the utility to move its poles at its own expense under the municipality's constitutional right to control public places. [21] In Detroit Edison, the utility erected poles on an easement granted to the city for public utilities. The utility claimed exclusive control over the easement because the grantor dedicated it for utilities rather than public use. This Court held that the utility easement fell under the public places language of article 8, § 28 of the 1908 Constitution. However, the Court did not rely on that constitutional provision in holding that the city could require the utility to pay to move the poles. Rather, the Court relied on the utility's concession that it would be liable if the easement was determined to be a public place. [22] Therefore, Detroit Edison does not support plaintiff's argument or the holding of the Court of Appeals. [23] As noted, the precedent that governs the resolution of this case is McGraw. Because Taylor Ordinance 00-344 may conflict with MPSC rules, it may not be a valid exercise of plaintiff's reasonable control over its streets. Therefore, if the portion of the ordinance that requires the utility to bear the entire cost of relocation conflicts with the MPSC rules on the subject, that portion of the ordinance is invalid. We reverse the Court of Appeals judgment that held to the contrary.