Opinion ID: 779824
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Wage and Penalty Claims

Text: 21 Olympic also is not liable in personam either for pre-February 17, 2000, wages due Appellants, or for wrongful termination penalty wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313(c). 17 Appellants contend that the district court erred in finding that Olympic had sufficient cause to withhold payment of IMAR-period wages, thereby erroneously exonerating Olympic from in personam liability for IMAR-period penalty wages. Appellants contend that Olympic, as the Fierce Packer's owner, had no cause to deny its liability for these wages on account of the lien against the vessel for unpaid IMAR charter period wages. This contention, however, ignores that a valid bareboat charter agreement existed between Olympic and IMAR through February 17, 2000. Under this charter, IMAR became the Fierce Packer's de facto owner and, as such, only IMAR is liable in personam for these seamen's wage claims. See Everett v. United States, 284 F. 203, 205 (9th Cir.1922). Ownership of the Fierce Packer reverted back to Olympic after IMAR's bankruptcy, but, given IMAR's ownership of the Fierce Packer during its charter period, it was reasonable for Olympic to conclude that it was not liable in personam for IMAR's wrongful discharge of Appellants and that IMAR was ultimately responsible for the crew's pre-February 17, 2000, wage claims. While the crew could (and did) pursue their in rem claims against the Fierce Packer, which ultimately required Olympic to pay the crew's IMAR-period wages to get its vessel released from arrest, Olympic justifiably denied in personam liability. See Mateo v. M/S KISO, 41 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir.1994) (explaining that the phrase without sufficient cause in § 10313(g) means arbitrary, unwarranted, unjust, and unreasonable conduct). 22 Further, the Fierce Packer is not liable in rem for statutory penalty wages stemming from the late payment of IMAR-period wages. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(g) imposes liability only on the vessel's master or owner. 18 While courts have permitted in rem maritime liens against vessels to satisfy penalty wage debts, see Governor & Co. of the Bank of Scotland v. Sabay, 211 F.3d 261, 271 (5th Cir.2000), such in rem liens must stem from wage payment delays exacted by the vessel's owner or master. See id. at 272. Given that Olympic was not the Fierce Packer's owner during the IMAR charter period, the Fierce Packer is not liable in rem for penalty wages which accrued during the IMAR charter period. 23 Olympic also is not liable for statutory wage penalties stemming from the post-IMAR charter period. 46 U.S.C. § 10313(f) provides statutory wage penalties when seamen are not promptly paid [a]t the end of a voyage. 19 There was, however, no discrete, specific, or imminent voyage planned in the post-IMAR charter period. While post-IMAR voyages to Christmas Island, Fanning Island, or Seattle were considered, such voyages were mere possibilities discussed among Hansen, Schultz, and the crew, nothing more. We have previously held that the voyage requirement of § 10313(f) should be given meaning. Su v. M/V. Southern Aster, 978 F.2d 462, 469-70 (9th Cir.1992). The complete absence of a post-IMAR voyage by the Fierce Packer (or definitive plans for such a voyage) renders Appellants ineligible to recover statutory wage penalties under § 10313(f). 24 Further, Skagvik is statutorily ineligible for penalty wages under 46 U.S.C. § 10313. Masters typically are not eligible for § 10313's penalty wage remedies. George v. Kramo Ltd., 796 F.Supp. 1541, 1548 (E.D.La.1992). While courts occasionally have held that masters are eligible for relief under § 10313, such eligibility has been found only when the master in fact performs the tasks of a regular seaman. See Barber v. M/V Blue Cat, 372 F.2d 626, 628 (5th Cir.1967). The record here does not support such a finding. According to Skagvik, he stopped performing master's work once Schultz arrived in Hawaii. However, while Skagvik did perform many of the same tasks performed by the crew in the post IMAR charter period, such a functional overlap does not necessarily relieve Skagvik of his status as ship master. See Kennerson v. Jane R., Inc., 274 F.Supp. 28, 30 (S.D.Tex.1967). This is not a case where the master has formally relinquished authority, or where the master in fact never truly possessed authority as the vessel's captain. Skagvik was the Fierce Packer's master during the entire IMAR charter period, navigating the ship from Seattle to Honolulu, and from Honolulu to neighboring islands. There also is evidence that Skagvik continued to receive a master's salary throughout the post-IMAR period. Thus, the district court did not clearly err in finding Skagvik statutorily ineligible for penalty wage relief under § 10313.