Opinion ID: 2368128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether to Impose a Fitness Requirement

Text: The remaining issue is whether, as Bar Counsel urges, we should require respondent to prove his fitness to practice as a condition of reinstatement following his eighteen-month suspension. In declining to recommend a fitness requirement, the Board explained that the record in this case is relatively undeveloped in substantial measure because Maryland's per se disbarment rule relieved its Bar Counsel of the need to establish the predicates for a fitness requirement. Report at 15. The Board also found no evidence that Respondent acted out of self-interest or intended to injure his client, and nothing that leads us to predict future misconduct. Id. at 15-16. [W]hile the decision to suspend an attorney for misconduct turns largely on the determination of historical facts, the decision to impose a fitness requirement turns on a partly subjective, predictive evaluation of the attorney's character and ability. Cater, supra, 887 A.2d at 22. Accordingly, as we recognized in Cater, while the evidence that establishes the predicate violation of professional norms is usually much the same evidence that evokes doubts about the respondent's future fitness to adhere to those norms, nevertheless, proof of a violation of the Rules that merits even a substantial period of suspension is not necessarily sufficient to justify a fitness requirement. Id. What may tip[] the balance in favor of a fitness requirement is evidence of circumstances surrounding and contributing to the misconduct. Id. One such circumstance is an attorney's lack of remorse, failure to cooperate during the disciplinary process, or other evidence of questionable conduct in the course of disciplinary proceedings. [16] Another circumstance that warrants imposing a condition on the resumption or continuation of practice is repeated neglect of client matters or a repeat of misconduct of the type for which a respondent was previously disciplined. [17] In addition, as our cases explain, where there is evidence that a respondent's misconduct is attributable to unresolved personal problems, we are more likely to conclude that a fitness requirement is warranted. [18] By contrast, where the misconduct involved a response to the pressure of the moment [19] or a situation unlikely to be repeated, [20] we are less likely to impose a condition on the respondent's resumption of practice. The Board termed respondent's conduct in issue here bizarre, but concluded that the record does not shed any light on Respondent's thought process or motivation. Report at 14. What the Maryland hearing court transcript does reveal is the following explanation by respondent: I told [the client] that what my instructions were that we would not take the appeal on any type of contingency matter. We would only do it as a strictly hourly billing. He said [that] to him that was an indication that we didn't really have a lot of confidence that we could prevail on appeal, so he wasn't inclined to authorize an appeal. And in addition, he had recently begun working for a new outfit ... And so he had kind of already made the decision himself, that he had moved on. He got, you know, all the money that he had lost through the insurance and he had moved on and he told me that he wasn't interested in any appeal. ... Mr. Cooper told me to call him back and tell him we'll do it on contingency. Tell him we'll do it on contingency, you know, and that's that. We're going to take the case to, you know, we're going to appeal. ... [H]e's not one to take a client's word as a final matter on something.... [W]orking under Mr. Cooper for four years, I know that he doesn't take no as easily as other people will. And in-you know, being felt cornered I suppose or in a fit of stupidity I told him that we did file the appeal. I think, at the time, I felt that that was a way to get him off my back and not have to suffer any wrath or further rebukes from him, and we can proceed. Transcript of hearing before the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland in Petition No. 19617M, October 24, 2005, at 10, 11, 16. Bar Counsel refers to respondent's explanation (and to respondent's statement in his submission to the Board that Mr. Cooper is no longer with the law firm) as respondent's false exculpatory view of his own misconduct. Because the Maryland Court made no such finding (and, indeed, neither characterized nor even specifically mentioned respondent's explanation quoted above), we decline to draw that conclusion. However, we regard respondent's proffered explanation as consistent with the impression that we take from the record as a whole, which is that the conduct began with what respondent acknowledges was a foolish and imprudent response to a particular pressure, and developed into misconduct that snowballed as respondent made effort after effort to conceal his initial lie to his supervisor about having filed an appeal on behalf of the client. At all stages, the misconduct was serious, and, concededly, we cannot be certain that respondent will not engage in similar dishonest conduct upon a return to practice, but nothing in the record give us reason to think that misconduct of the type involved here will be repeated. Bar Counsel takes a contrary view, arguing that the fact that Respondent was willing to engage in such an elaborate and long-lasting scam ... for no reason that makes any sense increases, rather than decreases the danger he presents to the consumers of legal services, the court, and the integrity of the Bar. One can only wonder at the extent of the dishonest actions Respondent would be willing to undertake to extricate himself from a truly difficult situation. Bar Counsel's brief contends in addition that [w]ithout an understanding as to what caused respondent, for no reason that makes any sense, to engage in such a prolonged and serious course of misconduct, ... the Court can have no confidence that Respondent will not engage in similar conduct in the future. But this argument comes uncomfortably close to placing on respondent the burden to show that his behavior does not necessitate a fitness requirement, contrary to our cases. As we explained in Cater, [w]e are `reluctant' to impose [a fitness requirement] if the need is not amply demonstrated.... 887 A.2d at 23 (citation omitted). In order for us to require proof of fitness as a condition of reinstatement after suspension, the record in the disciplinary proceeding must contain clear and convincing evidence that casts a serious doubt upon the attorney's continuing fitness to practice law. DeMaio, 893 A.2d at 589 (quoting Cater, 887 A.2d at 24 (explaining also that the burden of proof is on the proponent of the fitness requirement to show by clear and convincing evidence contained in the record of the disciplinary proceeding that serious doubt exists as to the attorney's continuing fitness to practice law)). Serious doubt, we said in Cater, is real skepticism, not just a lack of certainty. 887 A.2d at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the serious doubt that Cater requires for imposition of a fitness requirement must involve more than no confidence that [a] Respondent will not engage in similar conduct in the future. We agree with the Board that nothing in the record provides clear and convincing evidence that casts substantial [or serious] doubt on Respondent's continuing fitness to practice law. Report at 16. Although acknowledging that in DeMaio this court assumed ... without specifically addressing the issue that the standard for the imposition of a fitness requirement set forth in Cater is applicable to reciprocal cases in which the Court decides pursuant to D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11(c)(4), to impose a lesser sanction, Bar Counsel urges us to hold that the Cater standard does not apply in such reciprocal proceedings. Rather, Bar Counsel urges, the Court should be loath to impose a non-identical sanction not involving a fitness requirement unless the record clearly establishes that a fitness requirement is unwarranted and the burden ought to be on the attorney to establish that a fitness requirement is not warranted. However, having determined not to impose reciprocal discipline identical to that ordered by Maryland, we discern no reason why we should employ a presumption in favor of a fitness requirement such as is entailed in disbarment. [21] Rather, we confirm, the Cater standard does apply in reciprocal discipline cases. We observed in Cater that the length of a suspension is fixed, in part, with the aim of individual correction, such that [t]he more unlikely it is that the attorney will be rehabilitated by the end of the predetermined suspension term, the more the need for additional protection in the form of a fitness requirement. 887 A.2d at 23. Here, respondent has already been suspended since October 3, 2006, i.e., for thirty-four months, almost twice the period of suspension recommended by the Board. This, too, weighs against the imposition of a fitness requirement, [22] which operates as an enhanced sanction. [23] Accordingly, for all the foregoing reasons, we adopt the Board's recommendation that we not impose a fitness requirement. However, while we have determined not to impose a fitness requirement, we also conclude that this is a case in which it is appropriate to exercise our authority, pursuant to D.C. Rule XI, § 3(b), to impose any other reasonable condition of reinstatement. Although Bar Counsel has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that a substantial question exists as to respondent's fitness to practice law, we do agree with Bar Counsel, largely for the reason discussed in note 11 supra, that there is some evidence that respondent may not yet fully appreciate the scope of his obligation to keep a client informed about the status of a matter and to explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation. Rules of Professional Conduct, R. 1.4(a), (b). We are persuaded that respondent, and the clients he may serve upon reinstatement, will benefit from his attendance at a course on professional responsibility designed to bridge the gap between knowledge of the Rules of Professional Conduct and their application in practice. Accordingly, we shall require respondent to enroll in and complete a course in professional responsibility for attorneys, approved by Bar Counsel, within six months after resuming law practice in this jurisdiction. Respondent must provide proof of attendance to Bar Counsel and must certify to Bar Counsel that he has complied with the time limit we have established. Respondent's failure to do so may provide grounds for additional discipline.