Opinion ID: 77806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Arthur's motion to alter or amend the judgment

Text: After the district court had dismissed his complaint and Arthur had appealed that dismissal, Arthur timely filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) in the district court. In this motion, he argued, inter alia, that a new affidavit from Ray Melson provided evidence of Arthur's innocence. In support of this motion, he submitted three affidavits from Melson and an affidavit from Stephen Gustat. The affidavits from Melson provide Arthur with an alibi, recant that alibi, and repudiate the recantation. The district court discredited Melson's third affidavit because it was unsworn, created more questions than it answered regarding Melson's credibility, actually diminishe[d] the value of anything Melson may have [had] to say to the point of no credibility at all, and was filed only as a last-minute effort because it was not filed earlier. [6] Arthur XXI, 2007 WL 2539962 at . It concluded that Arthur's argument that he was not afforded significant procedural safeguards was considered on habeas, that he failed to raise his ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his initial § 1983 complaint, and that the court had properly considered Arthur's delay in dismissing his complaint. Id. 2007 WL 2539962 at -3. We review the denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of discretion. Drago v. Jenne, 453 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2006). The only grounds for granting [a Rule 59] motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir.1999). [A] Rule 59(e) motion [cannot be used] to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment. Michael Linet, Inc. v. Village of Wellington, Fla., 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir.2005). Arthur cannot show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. Because Melson's affidavit was unsworn, it was not properly considered by the district court. See Holloman v. Jacksonville Housing Auth., No. 06-10108, 2007 WL 245555 at , ___ Fed.Appx. ___ (per curiam) (unsworn statements, even from pro se parties, should not be `consider[ed] in determining the propriety of summary judgment') (quoting Gordon v. Watson, 622 F.2d 120, 123 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam)). To the extent that it was considered, however, it was not newly discovered. It could have been discovered during the five years after Melson had repudiated his first affidavit, and filed with the complaint. As the district court held, by repudiating a repudiation of his initial affidavit, Melson's third affidavit raised more questions, at least regarding his credibility, than it answered.