Opinion ID: 672341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Relationship of relief to prior discrimination

Text: 44 In assessing whether a race-conscious measure is narrowly tailored, the second inquiry undertaken ensures that the degree of remedial preference is tied to the effects of past disadvantages or discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507-508, 109 S.Ct. at 729-30; Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 463-67, 100 S.Ct. at 2767-69; 100 S.Ct. at 2791-93 (Powell, J., concurring). This inquiry analyzes the flexibility and duration of the remedy as well as the relationship of the numerical goals to the relevant labor market. United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. at 171, 107 S.Ct. at 1066. 45 In considering whether a race-conscious remedy meets this requirement, courts should emphasize that the government entity should adopt a program for a limited duration to facilitate its periodic reevaluation. See, e.g., Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 513, 100 S.Ct. at 2792 (Powell, J., concurring) ([t]he temporary nature of this remedy ensures that a race-conscious program will not last longer than the discriminatory effects it is designed to eliminate). Limiting the duration of relief also ensures that courts will not uphold remedies that are ageless in their reach into the past, and timeless in their ability to affect the future. See Wygant, 476 U.S. at 276, 106 S.Ct. at 1848 (plurality opinion). Race-conscious relief must be particularly circumscribed to avoid reinforcement of a manner of thinking by race that was the source of the injustice and that will, if it endures within our society, be the source of more injustice still. Croson, 488 U.S. at 527-28, 109 S.Ct. at 740 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Flexibility forbids mechanistic application of fixed quotas. Unyielding quotas operate under the unrealistic premise that minorities will choose a particular trade in lockstep proportion to their representation in the local population. Croson, 488 U.S. at 507, 109 S.Ct. at 729. By contrast, case-by-case utilization goals, including percentage preferences, eschew making the color of an applicant's skin the sole relevant consideration and thus are less problematic from an equal protection standpoint. Coral Construction Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 924 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 875, 116 L.Ed.2d 780 (1992). 46 Turning first to the duration of the Fire Department's program, the district court found that the Plan was of limited duration because it contains a provision ensuring that the program will end when it achieves its 70% hiring goal. According to the testimony of Jacquelyn Rowe, former director of the Affirmative Action Office, [t]he plan is reviewed annually ... [T]he plan is remedial in nature, and it addresses problems of under-utilization. If they don't exist, then there is no need to set a goal. Significantly, the goals in the instant case were reviewed before each hiring year, and a new goal established, based upon the extent of underrepresentation remaining, the probable number of qualified minority applicants, and the anticipated number of openings. These findings of the district court support the court's conclusion that the Plan is narrowly tailored. 47 Peightal next argues that the Plan created a de facto quota instead of a goal. Peightal urges that because the Fire Department grouped applicants into six categories of racial and ethnic classifications, with applicants compared only against members of their respective group, this effectively isolated each group's members from overall competition, thus creating a quota. We decline appellant's invitation to revisit this issue, given our adoption of the district court's fact-finding prior to remand that the Plan utilized a goal as opposed to a quota. Peightal, 940 F.2d at 1396-97 and n. 10, 1410. 21 48 Peightal contends that the Plan is nevertheless constitutionally flawed because of its definition of Hispanic. 22 Peightal contends that the amorphousness of the definition, coupled with the self-identification procedure utilized on the application form, creates an improper classification for remedial purposes. The crux of Peightal's argument is that the Plan is both over-and-under-inclusive in its preferential treatment of Hispanics. Peightal argues that the Plan is over-inclusive because it encompasses the same variety of ethnic and racial characteristics as are found in the generalized classification of all English speaking nations; for example, it includes persons who can trace their ancestry to Spain, irrespective of language or culture. 49 The EEOC definition of Hispanic, as applied by Metro Dade, includes: All persons of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, Central or South American, or other Spanish culture or origin, regardless of race. The EEOC guidelines also require that a person's claim of identification with a certain racial or ethnic group should accompany strong visible indication that the person culturally and linguistically identifies with the group he or she claims. (emphasis in original). The district court found that Metro Dade, in applying the definition of Hispanic articulated by the EEOC, also applied this limiting guideline. The district court, thus, specifically rejected Peightal's effort to cast the classification procedure utilized by the Department solely as self-identifying. The investigatory procedures utilized by the affirmative action office operated as a check to the self-identification procedure and also operated to narrow the definition of the protected group to those with strong visible indications of cultural and linguistic identification with the group, thus ensuring that non-minorities would not erroneously receive race-conscious relief. 50 The Supreme Court in Croson cautioned that a plan's gross over-inclusiveness of racial groups that have never suffered from prior discrimination may indicate that race-conscious relief is not narrowly tailored. Croson, 488 U.S. at 505, 109 S.Ct. at 728 (quoting Wygant, 476 U.S. at 284 n. 13, 106 S.Ct. at 1852 n. 13 (haphazard inclusion of racial groups 'further illustrates the undifferentiated nature of the plan' )). Whereas the program invalidated in Croson included groups for which there was no evidence of prior discrimination, Metro Dade adduced ample evidence of prior discrimination for the group of Hispanics identified by its Plan. Contained within Peightal's assertion concerning the impropriety of this classification is the implication that certain sub-groups should not have been included within the group of Hispanics. Nevertheless, the district court implicitly found that application of the definition in conjunction with the EEOC guidelines operated effectively to narrow the defined class to exclude those persons having no cultural or linguistic identification with the Hispanic group. The affirmative action office interviewed applicants or employees whose minority status was challenged, applying the EEOC guidelines to the person's self-identification. Significantly, Peightal failed to adduce one instance in which application of the definition and guidelines produced an over-inclusive result, whereby a non-minority received race-conscious relief. 51 Although a number of affirmative action programs have tried to develop a narrower substitute for the term Hispanic, Peightal has conceded that no case has invalidated the EEOC definition applied by Metro Dade. See, e.g., Mackin v. City of Boston, 969 F.2d at 1274 n. 2, cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1043, 122 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993) (Spanish-surnamed); Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 464, 100 S.Ct. at 2767 (Spanish-Americans); and Croson, 488 U.S. at 478, 109 S.Ct. at 713 (Spanish speaking). Further, these alternative definitions may similarly suffer from the infirmity of over-inclusiveness under the analysis employed by Peightal. For example, Spanish-surnamed individuals could include those individuals who have married someone of Spanish ancestry but who themselves lack Spanish heritage. Similarly, the group of Spanish-speaking individuals could include persons of Caucasian ancestry who have simply chosen to learn a second language. Peightal has offered no alternative definition to that created by the EEOC and has offered no case containing a definition that could not produce the over-inclusiveness of which he complains. 23 From the foregoing, we conclude that the Plan is not over-inclusive. 52 Peightal also attacks the Plan as under-inclusive, arguing that it benefits those of Spanish descent, while excluding, and therefore discriminating against, persons of other European national origin. Peightal claims that Brazilians of Portuguese descent, Greeks, Jews, Italians, and Iranians are culturally and linguistically discernable, and may have suffered similar discrimination, but have been denied benign preference in hiring by Metro Dade's Plan. 24 Peightal also asserts that it is logically inconsistent to deny Brazilians of Portuguese origin hiring preference while according such a preference to Brazilians of Spanish origin. Peightal has not offered evidence or pointed to evidence submitted by Metro Dade to support an assertion that prior discrimination exists against the groups he has identified. Absent such evidence, implementation of race-conscious relief in favor of such groups would have violated the teachings of Croson, 488 U.S. at 506, 109 S.Ct. at 728. Indeed, Peightal has not proffered any evidence in support of his illustrations of underinclusiveness. 25 Accordingly, we hold that the Plan is not under-inclusive. 53