Opinion ID: 2151713
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Heading: Does the PKPA Apply in This Case?

Text: We must determine whether the PKPA applies in this case. If we conclude the PKPA does not apply, Iowa is not required under the PKPA to give New York's custody order full faith and credit. As mentioned, the PKPA provides that [t]he appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and shall not modify except as provided in subsection (f) of this section, any child custody determination made consistently with the provisions of this section by a court of another State. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a) (emphasis added). A. Whether the dispute involves an initial decree or modification of an existing decree. The italicized language makes clear that the application of the PKPA hinges on two questions. First, does the dispute involve an initial custody order or modification of an existing custody order? As mentioned, the PKPA only governs the enforceability of one state's custody order in another state and the other state's power to modify that order. The Act does not purport to control jurisdiction to issue an initial order. Columb, 633 A.2d at 692; see also J.D.S., 893 P.2d at 739 (A state need not comply with the PKPA to exercise initial jurisdiction.); Holm, 615 N.E.2d at 1053 (holding that PKPA is controlling only when there is a conflict between states); In re Marriage of Murphy, 90 Wash.App. 488, 495, 952 P.2d 624, 628 (1998) (If a custody decree does not already exist ... the [PKPA] has no application.); In re Marriage of Davidson, 169 Wis.2d 546, 555, 485 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Wis.Ct.App.1992) (holding that compliance with the PKPA will not become an issue in a Wisconsin court unless a child custody determination by a court of another state is attacked or sought to be modified in a Wisconsin court; court concluded that, because proceeding was an initial custody proceeding rather than a modification proceeding, state law, not the PKPA, was controlling). The present dispute satisfies the first question because the dispute involves the modification of an existing order, not the issuance of an initial custody order. B. Whether the New York custody order was made consistently with the provisions of the PKPA. The second question is whether the existing New York custody order was made consistently with the provisions of the PKPA. This determination is necessary because whether a state's child custody determination is consistent with the provisions of the PKPA is a precondition to [the] Act's direction that the determination not be modified by any other state. In re Marriage of Michalik, 164 Wis.2d 544, 551, 476 N.W.2d 586, 589-90 (Wis.Ct.App.1991); see also Glanzner v. State, 835 S.W.2d 386, 391 (Mo.Ct.App.1992) (Under the PKPA, California would be required to give full faith and credit to the Missouri decree because the Missouri proceedings comply with the PKPA.). Therefore, if a custody order was not entered consistently with the PKPA, such order would not under the PKPA be entitled to full faith and credit in another state. See Atkins v. Atkins, 308 Ark. 1, 3, 823 S.W.2d 816, 819 (1992) ([I]f a custody decree fails to conform to the requirements of the PKPA, it will not be entitled to full faith and credit in another state.). Was the New York custody order entered consistently with the terms of the PKPA? A child custody determination made by a court of a state is consistent with the provisions of the PKPA only if (1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and (2) one of the following conditions is met: (A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within six months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child is absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State; (B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interests of the child that a court of such State assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than mere physical presence in such State, and (II) there is available in such State substantial evidence concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal relationships; (C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse; (D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to determine the custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction; or (E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this section. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c); see Matthews, 649 A.2d at 235 (Under subsection (c) of the Act, a custody determination is consistent with the PKPA if two requirements are fulfilled. First, the issuing court must have jurisdiction under state law.... Second, one of the five conditions listed in PKPA subsection (c)(2) must be met.). For purposes of our analysis, we will assume that when Maurice filed for divorce in November 1993, the New York Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction under its own laws to enter the custody order. (Later in this opinion, we find such jurisdiction was lacking.) However, for reasons that follow, we find that, when Maurice filed for divorce in November 1993, none of the five conditions listed in PKPA subsection (c)(2) were met. The PKPA defines home State to mean the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six consecutive months.... Periods of temporary absence of any of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4). As mentioned, in January 1993, following a period of marital difficulty, Karna and Isaiah moved to Iowa. Except for two visits to Maurice from May 4, 1993, to June 6, 1993, and from August 15, 1993, to September 24, 1993, Isaiah remained in Iowa with Karna until June 1994. Additionally, the stipulation that the parties executed on May 8, 1994, states that Karna was residing at 2555-53rd Ct., Des Moines, Iowa. Therefore, Isaiah resided in Iowa approximately ten months before Maurice filed for divorce in New York in November 1993. We find that Iowa, not New York, was Isaiah's home state at the time Maurice filed for divorce in November 1993. Further support for our finding is the Family Court's decision filed a week after the divorce decree was entered. The Family Court found that Iowa, not New York, was the child's home state when Maurice filed a petition for custody in September 1993. Nothing occurred between September 1993 and November 1993, when Maurice filed for divorce, to change that status. For these reasons, we conclude the New York custody order does not satisfy the home state condition of subsection (c)(2)(A) because New York was not Isaiah's home state at the commencement of the proceeding. Nor does (c)(2)(B) apply. This subsection essentially provides that a custody order is consistent with the PKPA if, in entering the decree, the best interests of the child demanded that the decretal state assume jurisdiction because, among other things, the child and a contestant had significant connection with the decretal state. However, subsection (c)(2)(B) applies only when it appears that no other state would have jurisdiction under [subsection (c)(2)(A).]the home state requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B)(i). As mentioned, Iowa, not New York, was Isaiah's home state when Maurice filed for divorce in November 1993. Nor is the condition in subsection (c)(2)(C) satisfied. There is nothing in the record to suggest that Isaiah had been abandoned or that he had been subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse. We are left with subsections (c)(2)(D) and (E). According to subsection (c)(2)(D), a child custody determination by a court of a State is consistent with the PKPA if (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to determine custody of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that such court assume jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2)(B). This subsection does not apply because a state other than New York, i.e., Iowa, was Isaiah's home state. Nor had a state declined jurisdiction on the ground that New York was the more appropriate forum to determine custody of Isaiah. Obviously, subsection (c)(2)(E) does not apply because this provision only applies in situations in which a court has already entered a custody order and a party seeks to modify that custody order in another state. The New York custody order was an initial custody order. Because none of the conditions in 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(c)(2) has been met, we conclude the New York decree was not a child custody determination made consistent with the provisions of the PKPA. For that reason, the provisions of the PKPA, which require Iowa to give full faith and credit to the New York custody order, do not apply. Therefore, the Iowa district court here was not required by the PKPA to give the New York custody order full faith and credit.