Opinion ID: 686425
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Post-Verdict Hearings and the Standard of Decision

Text: 191 The Arsenal appellants challenge the judgment entered against them on the ground that they were denied a jury trial on damages in violation of the Seventh Amendment guarantee of the right to a jury trial upon a timely demand. Fed.R.Civ.P. 38. Appellants demanded a jury trial and agreed to a bifurcation of liability issues and damages. Following the jury trial and jury verdict on the issues of liability, the district court properly determined that no genuine disputes of material fact remained with respect to damages. 192 The appellants' challenge fails because, after the jury verdict, damages could be determined purely as a matter of law, in the sense that reasonable factfinders applying the correct legal standard could come to but one determination as to the amount of damages to be awarded under the jury's findings on liability. 193 Precedents regarding summary judgment provide useful guidance on issues arising after jury verdict in the first phase of a phased trial such as occurred in this case. 194 In the pretrial context, regardless of any jury demand made by the parties, summary judgment is warranted when no triable fact issues have been identified. 195 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (summary judgment is appropriate when there are no disputed issues of material fact); 196 see also Plaisance v. Phelps, 845 F.2d 107 (5th Cir.1988) (plaintiff did not have an absolute right to a jury trial where there was no genuine issue of material fact, since the function of a jury is to try disputed material facts); 197 Bloomgarden v. Coyer, 479 F.2d 201, 206 (D.C.Cir.1973) (The summary judgment procedure is properly and wholesomely invoked when it eliminates a useless trial....). 198 In addition, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16, the court may take action to formulate and simplify the issues including the elimination of frivolous claims or defenses. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16. Rule 16 also authorizes courts to take action with respect to the appropriateness and timing of summary adjudication under Rule 56. Id. Moreover, Rule 16 was intended to confirm the power of the court to identify [ ] litigable issues without awaiting a formal motion for summary judgment. Advisory Committee Notes, 1983 Amendment. 199 In this case, the trial judge's determination regarding the damages to be awarded was made after the jury trial on liability. At the conference on damages held after trial, the court stated its intention to enter a judgment without another trial if no genuine dispute of fact material to the damages determination remained. In a conference with counsel, the court stated, [u]nder Rule 16, I have the power to narrow the issues for trial ... I can in effect talk through a proceeding akin to a motion for summary judgment. 200 This court has held that a district court may grant summary judgment sua sponte as long as two requirements are met. Stella v. Town of Tewksbury, 4 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir.1993). First the discovery phase must be sufficiently advanced that the court can make an accurate determination of whether a genuine issue of material fact [exists]. Id. (citation omitted). Second, the target must have been on notice to bring forth all of its evidence. Id.  'Notice' in this context means that the losing party ... received a fair opportunity to put its best foot forward. Jardines Bacata, Ltd. v. Diaz-Marquez, 878 F.2d 1555, 1560 (1st Cir.1989). 201 These two requirements were met. The discovery phase was not merely sufficiently advanced. It was complete. And a trial on the liability issues had been completed. The appellants received notice and an opportunity to be heard. The district judge, before entering judgment, allowed the parties an opportunity to file written submissions on the issues that were raised at the conference. 202 In their post-trial memorandum, the appellants made substantially the same argument as they make before this court (discussed below), and in both instances without any proffer that they would be able to offer at a damages-phase trial any evidence that would raise a genuine dispute of fact that might be resolved by a factfinder in their favor.