Opinion ID: 2572707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The UCCJA is jurisdictional legislation that was developed by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) in 1968, and was adopted in Colorado in 1973, nearly verbatim. L.G v. People, 890 P.2d 647, 655 (Colo.1995). The UCCJA applies to custody determinations made in custody proceedings. See § 14-13-103(2) and (3), 6B C.R.S. (1999); L.G., 890 P.2d at 657. Although the term adoption does not appear in the UCCJA's definition of child-custody determinations or child-custody proceedings, courts of this state construed the UCCJA to include adoption proceedings. See In re Custody of K.R., 897 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Colo.App.1995) (Adoption proceedings are custody proceedings within the meaning of the UCCJA, and therefore its jurisdictional prerequisites apply to custody determinations following a failed adoption.). [12] Missouri appears to be among the states that would similarly apply the UCCJA to adoption proceedings. See In re T.C.M., 651 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Mo.Ct.App.1983) (Assuming the UCCJA applied to adoptions, Missouri, as the home state of the child, could take jurisdiction over a proceeding in which the prospective adoptive parents resided in Missouri, although the contested adoption proceeding had occurred in North Carolina.). [13] Under the UCCJA, courts of this state employed a two-part test to determine whether jurisdiction in a custody matter is proper. L.G., 890 P.2d at 656 (citing Barden v. Blau, 712 P.2d 481, 484 (Colo.1986)). First, a court was required to determine whether, as a threshold matter, it could properly exercise jurisdiction over a case pursuant to section 14-13-104 of the UCCJA. L.G., 890 P.2d at 656. If the statute conferred jurisdiction, the court was nevertheless required to determine whether, under other provisions of the UCCJA, the court ought to exercise that jurisdiction. Id. Section 14-13-104(1)(a) (c), 5 C.R.S. (2003) of the UCCJA provided three general bases for an assertion of jurisdiction over custody proceedings: (1) if the state was the child's home state, [14] and one parent or person acting as a parent continued to live in the state even though the child did not; (2) if the child had significant connections with the state so that it was in the child's best interests for that state to assume jurisdiction; and (3) if there was an emergent situation requiring the protection of the child and the child was physically present in the state. L.G., 890 P.2d at 658. Section 14-13-104(1)(d) provided one final avenue for a court to assume jurisdiction. Under that provision, Colorado could assume jurisdiction over the custody proceedings if it appeared that no other state would have jurisdiction under any of the other provisions contained in section 14-13-104. Id. Although the UCCJA identified several different bases for jurisdiction, it provided no clear means of assigning priority among them. Rather, it allowed courts to exercise jurisdiction if any of the jurisdictional requirements within the UCCJA were met. This resulted in the possibility, and indeed the likelihood, that more than one state could assert jurisdiction. See Kathleen A. Hogan, Custody Jurisdiction, 26 WTR Fam. Advoc. 22, 23 (2004). For precisely this reason, after a court determined it had jurisdiction, it was required to take the additional step of determining whether it ought to exercise that jurisdiction in light of other provisions of the UCCJA. Most importantly, if a court in this state wanted to modify another state's initial custody decree, it was required to satisfy section 14-13-115, 5 C.R.S. (1999), of the UCCJA. That provision provided that [i]f a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this state shall not modify that decree unless it appears to the court of this state that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction ... or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and the court of this state has jurisdiction. Thus, once an initial custody decree was entered in another state, the courts of this state could only exercise jurisdiction if the other court lacked jurisdiction when the decree was entered or somehow declined to exercise jurisdiction. In this case, were we to apply the UCCJA, Colorado would clearly have jurisdiction to entertain the Petitioners' Verified Petition for Allocation of Parental Responsibilities. At the point at which the Petition was filed, A.J.C. had lived in Colorado for at least six consecutive months. Therefore, Colorado is the home state of A.J.C. under the UCCJA. Additionally, the Petitioners fall within the statutory definition of persons acting as a parent because they have had physical custody of A.J.C. since his birth and have exercised all parental rights and responsibilities. However, our conclusion that Colorado is the home state of A.J.C., by itself, would be insufficient to confer jurisdiction upon Colorado under the UCCJA. Rather, we would also be required to consider whether Colorado, in light of other provisions of the UCCJA, should exercise jurisdiction in this case. Viewing Missouri's order as akin to an initial custody decree, we would be bound under the UCCJA to examine the provisions of section 14-13-115 to determine whether we had jurisdiction to modify that decree. The relevant inquiry for purposes of this case would be whether Missouri had declined to exercise its jurisdiction by virtue of having failed to determine custody of A.J.C. according to his best interests. Other jurisdictions relying upon the UCCJA have examined that precise dilemma. Some courts have recognized the need to accord full faith and credit to custody decrees of other states. Others have concluded that the failure to make custody determinations according to the best interests of the child may be construed as a declination of jurisdiction, thereby enabling the state where the child resides to exercise jurisdiction. The two lead cases around the country on opposing sides of this issue are a New Jersey Supreme Court case and a Michigan Supreme Court case. In E.E.B. v. D.A., 89 N.J. 595, 446 A.2d 871 (1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1210, 103 S.Ct. 1203, 75 L.Ed.2d 445 (1983), the New Jersey Supreme Court held that New Jersey was not obligated under either the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA), § 28 U.S.C. 1738A (2004), or the UCCJA to enforce a custody determination made by another state following a failed adoption where the other state did not consider the best interests of the child. In E.E.B., both the adoptive parents and the natural mother resided in Ohio at the time mother surrendered the child to the state and adoption had been effectuated by the Ohio courts. 446 A.2d at 873. Shortly after the adoption, the mother revoked her consent. Id. To regain custody of the child, she initiated a habeas corpus action in the Ohio courts, ultimately appealing to the Ohio Supreme Court. Id. at 874. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the natural mother had effectively revoked her consent and it determined that the right to custody belonged with the natural mother and, without conducting a best interests hearing, ordered the return of the child to her. Id. at 873-74. During the appeals process, however, the adoptive parents had moved with the child to New Jersey. Id. at 874. The parents then instituted an action for custody in the courts of New Jersey. Id. at 874. In approving a New Jersey court's exercise of jurisdiction over the case despite the prior custody determination made in Ohio, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that: Ohio's failure to conduct a best interest hearing constitutes a refusal to exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f)(2). Under PKPA, therefore, New Jersey is free to modify the Ohio decree. This result comports with the congressional intent that child custody decisions be made in the state best able to determine the best interest of the child. See Pub.L.No. 96-611, section 7, 94 State. 3568. Id. at 877. Ultimately, the court held that by declining to determine the best interests of the child, Ohio enabled the New Jersey courts to modify the initial custody determination from Ohio without violating the full faith and credit clause or federal and state statutes, including the UCCJA. Id. at 880. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia reached a similar result in Lemley v. Barr, 176 W.Va. 378, 343 S.E.2d 101 (1986). In that case, adoption proceedings that were initiated in Ohio were invalidated. The natural mother then brought a habeas corpus action in West Virginia to secure custody of the child from the prospective adoptive parents living with the child in West Virginia. The West Virginia court held that the judgment from Ohio setting aside the adoption was entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 105. Nevertheless, the court held that West Virginia retained jurisdiction to determine custody in light of the child's best interests. Id.; see also In re Baby Girl L., 51 P.3d 544 (Okla.2002) (rejecting due process claim of out-of-state prospective adoptive parents seeking custody of child but ultimately holding that Oklahoma statutes required court to determine best interests of child after a failed adoption). The Supreme Court of Michigan held otherwise when confronted with this issue. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 442 Mich. 648, 502 N.W.2d 649 (1993); but see id. at 668 (Levin, J., dissenting). [15] In that case, the court rejected the argument that the judgment of an Iowa court should not be enforced based on the fact that it did not conduct a hearing concerning the best interests of the child in making a custody determination after a failed adoption. Id. at 660. The court determined that the UCCJA does not require, as a substantive test, that each jurisdiction apply a best interests of the child standard when making custody determinations. Id. at 661. Rather, the court concluded that [e]ach state, through legislation and interpretive decisions of its courts, is free to fashion its own substantive law of family relationships within constitutional limitations. Id. As we stated earlier, the UCCJA embodies the notion that custody decrees entered in one state are entitled to full faith and credit in Colorado. However, because the circuit court failed to determine the best interests of A.J.C., we conclude that Colorado would not be obligated under the UCCJA to give full faith and credit to the circuit court's order granting custody to Mother. In Department of Social Services v. District Court, 742 P.2d 339 (Colo.1987), this court concluded that two children who had been found dependent and neglected in Ohio and who were in Colorado in a social services placement had to be returned to Ohio upon the request of the Ohio Department of Social Services, the sending agency. The majority focused on the authority of the sending agency to require return of the children, and did not address a best interests analysis. However, Justices Mullarkey and Rovira specially concurred; citing to E.E.B., they would have permitted Colorado to retain jurisdiction under the UCCJA for purposes of conducting a best interests hearing. 742 P.2d at 342-43. Thus, under the UCCJAthe prevailing law in Missouriwe conclude that Colorado could properly exercise jurisdiction over the Petitioners' Verified Petition for Allocation of Parental Responsibilities.