Opinion ID: 2797368
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unlawful Impression of Surveillance

Text: Woodcrest was found to have violated § 8(a)(1) of the NLRA by creating an unlawful impression of surveillance. “Conduct which gives the impression of surveillance violates section 8(a)(1) if the conduct reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.” Hanlon & Wilson Co. v. NLRB, 738 F.2d 606, 613 (3d Cir. 1984).
Here, the surveillance claim relates to two interactions between Jimenez and Assistant Director of Recreation Vladamir Guerrero that occurred after the election. In the first interaction, Guerrero told Jimenez, “I heard your name; your name has been popping out a lot.” (J.A. 18.) In the second interaction, which occurred approximately a month later, Guerrero saw Jimenez in the lunch room and said, “Oh it’s the famous boy.” (Id.) Jimenez followed Guerrero into the latter’s office. Guerrero said that the Director of Nursing had distributed a memorandum about a newspaper article containing pro-Union statements by Jimenez and had mentioned his name several times at a management meeting. Crucially, Guerrero then told Jimenez, “they’re pretty pissed” about the article, so “watch [your] back, be careful, careful about what you say, you know, do what you have to do, come to work early, and then just, you know, do your job and go home.” (J.A. 380.) He said Jimenez should “tone it down a interrogations that are not coercive, we clarify that the cease and desist order applies only to coercive interrogations. 27 little bit” and keep his pro-Union views “under wraps.” (J.A. 18.) The ALJ explained that the Board’s test for unlawfulimpression-of-surveillance claims is “whether an employee would reasonably assume from the statement(s) in question [that] his or her union activities have been placed under surveillance.” (J.A. 381.) The ALJ rejected the claim of unlawful impression of surveillance because Jimenez was a “very visible and vocal supporter of the Union” and Guerrero’s statements do not establish that Woodcrest “was observing or monitoring him or his activities more closely.” (Id.) On appeal, the Board reversed under a totality of the circumstances test. The Board faulted the ALJ for “not address[ing]” Jimenez’s “uncontradicted testimony that Guerrero warned him to ‘watch [his] back, be careful, careful about what you say . . . do what you have to do, come to work early, and then just . . . do your job and go home,’ or Guerrero’s testimony that he advised Jimenez to ‘tone it down a little bit,’ and to keep his views about the Union ‘under wraps.’” (J.A. 19 (alterations in original).) These comments “would reasonably be understood by Jimenez as a warning that [Woodcrest] was moving from routine observation to closely monitoring the degree and extent of his union activity, open or not, and if he continued to engage in such activity, he could face reprisals.” (Id.) The Board’s remedy for this violation was for Woodcrest to cease and desist from “creating the impression that employees’ union and other protected concerted activities were under surveillance.” (J.A. 20.) The Board also 28 amended the required notice to employees so that it reads: Woodcrest “WILL NOT create the impression that your union and other protected concerted activities are under surveillance.” (Id.)
Section 8(a)(1) prohibits employers from giving the “impression of surveillance” if doing so “reasonably tends to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights.” Hanlon & Wilson, 738 F.2d at 613. “There need not be actual interference or coercion to have a section 8(a)(1) violation.” Id. “‘The significant fact . . . is whether [the supervisor’s] statement had a reasonable tendency to discourage the employees in exercising their statutory rights by creating the impression that he had sources of information about their union activity.’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Overnite Transp. Co., 254 N.L.R.B. 132, 133 (1981)). We have had several opportunities to consider unlawful impression of surveillance claims. In Hanlon & Wilson, we found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that the employer had created an unlawful impression of surveillance in violation of § 8(a)(1) where an employee was told that “[w]e hear you are trying to get the steel workers in here.” Id. In Frito-Lay, we found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that the employer had created an unlawful impression of surveillance by telling an employee that “he ‘understood’ from ‘an individual’ and that he had ‘heard . . . rumors’ that Hunter was starting a union.” 585 F.2d at 66 (alteration in original). In Landis Tool Co., Division of Litton Industries v. 29 NLRB, we found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s determination that the employer had created an unlawful impression of surveillance because, inter alia, a foreman told two employees “that he knew they had signed union cards and that employee Miller was a union instigator.” 460 F.2d 23, 25 (3d Cir. 1972). Here, the Board emphasized Guerrero’s warning to Jimenez to “watch [your] back, be careful, careful about what you say . . . do what you have to do, come to work early, and then just . . . do your job and go home,” and to “tone it down a little bit” and to keep your views about the Union “under wraps.”8 (J.A. 19 (second and third alterations in original).) The Board also emphasized Guerrero’s comments to Jimenez that “I heard your name; your name has been popping out a lot” and that he is “the famous boy” whom management had named “several times at a management meeting.” (J.A. 18.) Together, these comments suffice to establish that this part of the Order is supported by substantial evidence. The Guerrero-Jimenez interaction is, if anything, more indicative of an unlawful impression of surveillance than were the conversations in Hanlon & Wilson, Frito-Lay, and Landis Tool. In those three cases, a supervisor had told an employee that the company was aware of the employee’s union activities. Here, not only did Guerrero indicate that Woodcrest was aware of Jimenez’s activities, but he actually told him to watch his back and keep his pro-Union views 8 The fact that the Board disagreed with the ALJ on this issue does not make the Board’s conclusion any more suspect; it does not alter our standard of review. See Hunter Douglas, Inc. v. NLRB, 804 F.2d 808, 812-13 (3d Cir. 1986). 30 under wraps. These statements had a reasonable tendency to discourage Jimenez in exercising his statutory rights by creating the impression that Woodcrest had sources of information about his union activity. See Hanlon & Wilson, 738 F.2d at 613. Woodcrest argues that Guerrero’s “tone it down a little bit” and “watch [your] back” comments did not convey an unlawful impression of surveillance, but rather conveyed an unlawful threat, which would not support an unlawful impression of surveillance charge. However, it is an eminently reasonable inference that these comments conveyed an unlawful impression of surveillance. “Watch your back” implies that someone else is watching. Guerrero was not merely reporting information that Jimenez had voluntarily provided. Guerrero affirmatively told Jimenez that he should watch his back and be “careful about what you say.” (J.A. 19.) Moreover, he urged him to avoid being where he could be observed engaging in pro-Union activity— “just . . . do your job and go home.” (J.A. 18 (alteration in original).) These comments would cause a reasonable person to suspect that his actions are under surveillance and were specifically meant to encourage Jimenez to “tone . . . down” his activities in support of the Union. (J.A. 19.) This is the sort of coercion prohibited by § 8(a)(1), and the Board’s decision is therefore supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we will affirm and enforce this part of the Order.