Opinion ID: 855512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: McDonnell Douglas/Burdine Framework

Text: Under the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, a plaintiff has the initial burden to establish a prima facie case of retaliation. The prima facie case consists of four elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in activity protected under Title VII; (2) plaintiff’s exercise of her protected rights was known to defendant; (3) an adverse employment action was subsequently taken against the employee or the employee was No. 11-2288 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist. Page 9 subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action or harassment. Garner v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Juvenile Court, 554 F.3d 624, 639 (6th Cir. 2009). Should the plaintiff establish a prima facie case, a presumption of unlawful retaliation arises and the burden of production shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption by “articulat[ing] some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action.” Spengler, 615 F.3d at 492 (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). If a defendant successfully produces such a legitimate reason, then the burden of production returns to the plaintiff to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the proffered reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. Abbott, 348 F.3d at 542. While the burden of production shifts throughout the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework, the burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff. Id. The parties do not dispute that the first two prongs of Fuhr’s prima facie case have been met: Fuhr’s 1999 discrimination suit was protected activity under Title VII and Defendant knew that Fuhr engaged in this protected activity. Therefore, the crux of this case rests on whether Fuhr can establish: (1) that a causal connection exists between her suit and the retaliatory acts and (2) that the retaliatory acts constitute an adverse employment action. B. Causal Connection Between the Protected Activity and Retaliatory Acts Fuhr argues that the district court erred in its analysis of whether there was a causal connection between the district court’s judgment in 2001 and her removal as girls varsity coach in 2006. She claims that the relevant timeline is between her installation as boys varsity coach and various retaliatory actions taken against her prior to her 2006 removal as the varsity girls coach. Yet even with this shortened timeline, Fuhr is unable to establish that there was a causal connection between her instatement as varsity boys coach and the actions taken prior to her removal as varsity girls coach. No. 11-2288 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist. Page 10 A causal connection is established when a plaintiff proffers “evidence sufficient to raise the inference that her protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse action.” Upshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 576 F.3d 576, 588 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting EEOC v. Avery Dennison Corp., 104 F.3d 858, 861 (6th Cir. 1997)). Temporal proximity alone cannot establish a causal connection. Spengler, 615 F.3d at 494. However, temporal proximity always plays a role in establishing a causal connection; its significance depends on the context. Where an adverse employment action occurs very close in time after an employer learns of a protected activity, such temporal proximity between the events is significant enough to constitute evidence of a causal connection for the purposes of satisfying a prima facie case of retaliation. But where some time elapses between when the employer learns of a protected activity and the subsequent adverse employment action, the employee must couple temporal proximity with other evidence of retaliatory conduct to establish causality. Mickey v. Zeidler Tool & Die Co., 516 F.3d 516, 525 (6th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). Fuhr brought her discrimination case in 1999. It was not until 2001, however, that the district court ordered Defendant to make Plaintiff the varsity boys coach; and it was March 2004 by the time the district court’s 2001 judgment was affirmed on appeal. See Fuhr I, 364 F.3d 753 (6th Cir. 2004). The earliest date on which Fuhr asserts a retaliatory act took place is April 27, 2006. Even when taking March 2004 as the date in which Fuhr engaged in protected activity [i.e. fully litigating the discriminatory denial of the boys varsity coach position] and April 2006 as the date of the earliest act of retaliation, this leaves a gap of two years between her protected activity and the first reported retaliatory act. This multi-year gap proves fatal to Fuhr’s assertion that there is a causal connection. Our review of the law shows that multiyear gaps between the protected conduct and the first retaliatory act have been insufficient to establish the requisite causal connection. See Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273–74 (2001) (holding that an adverse “[a]ction taken (as here) 20 months later suggests, by itself, no causality at all”); Dixon v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 324, 334 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting that the No. 11-2288 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist. Page 11 plaintiff was unable to “point to any authority holding that a causal connection exists where there has been a gap of multiple years . . . between the protected activity and the adverse employment action”). Therefore, while temporal proximity alone cannot establish a causal connection, a lack of temporal proximity alone can be fatal to an attempt to establish a causal connection under circumstances such as these. Because the prima facie case for retaliation requires that all four elements be satisfied, the failure to find one element all but resolves this case. Nevertheless, even if Fuhr could establish a causal connection, she would be unable to establish that Defendant took an adverse employment action against her. C. Adverse Employment Action Fuhr argues that the district court was incomplete in its analysis of her prima facie case. One element of the prima facie case can be met by establishing that either: (1) an adverse employment action was taken against the employee subsequent to engaging in protected activity or (2) the employee was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by a supervisor. Garner, 554 F.3d at 639. Fuhr claims that the district court only analyzed whether she was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment and failed to address whether Defendant took an adverse employment action against her. Indeed, the district court only addressed whether Fuhr was subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment by her supervisor, Hazel Park High’s athletic director, Tom Pratt. The district court did this because, even though Fuhr correctly identified both ways of establishing the element, she only argued that she was subjected to severe and pervasive retaliatory harassment. Fuhr argued that “Defendants created a hostile work environment” through retaliatory acts and that “her supervisor, Tom Pratt, did engage in pervasive retaliatory harassment”; she concluded “that the retaliation was severe and pervasive and at the hands of her superiors.” R. 98 at 34–35. Because Fuhr failed to argue to the district court that Defendant took an adverse employment action against her, she is precluded from raising such an argument on appeal. “This court will not decide issues or claims not litigated before the district court. . . . ‘[W]e review the No. 11-2288 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist. Page 12 case presented to the district court rather than a better case fashioned after the district court’s order.’” White v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 899 F.2d 555, 559 (6th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted).3 D. Defendant’s Legitimate Nondiscriminatory Explanation of Actions Even if we were to assume that Fuhr met her initial burden of establishing her prima facie case so that unlawful retaliation would be presumed, Defendant would successfully rebut the presumption of unlawful retaliation. Defendant has articulated legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the actions that Fuhr alleges collectively constituted an adverse employment action. A sampling of these actions, and Defendant’s reasons for them, are as follows: Defendant submits that Fuhr’s removal as varsity girls basketball coach in June 2006 was in response to the ongoing litigation in the MHSAA case. Defendant sought to proactively make sure coaches were in place should the seasons need to be realigned. Fuhr argues that because the judgment in MHSAA did not become final until the Supreme Court’s final denial of certiorari in 2007, Defendant had no legitimate reason to remove her as coach of both teams in 2006. Defendant’s action was legitimate, however, because it would have been impractical for one coach to head both teams simultaneously if both the girls and boys seasons would indeed be played in the winter. Fuhr’s complaints regarding the placement of the ice machine in the football coach’s office and the denial of permission to allow the varsity boys basketball team access to the football locker room are complaints about decisions that affected all nonfootball sports teams equally. Fuhr’s complaints that Defendant refused to pay for an athletic trainer to attend basketball practice and the denial of access to the gym at a specific time are acts that affected all of Hazel Park High’s sports teams equally—Defendant provides trainers only 3 We also note that on appeal Fuhr has not briefed the district court’s finding that she was not subjected to severe or pervasive retaliatory harassment. We therefore conclude that she does not appeal this finding. No. 11-2288 Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist. Page 13 at games for budgetary reasons and all teams were denied access to the gym at Plaintiff’s desired time because the City Recreation Center had already reserved the gym for that time. Fuhr asserts Defendant inappropriately disciplined her best players. However, Defendant submitted evidence supporting the reasons behind the disciplinary actions. Tom Pratt’s lackadaisical completion of his duties—the untimely submission of the the order for the varsity boys basketball uniforms and irregular job evaluations—has affected all of Hazel Park High’s teams and coaches. Defendant submits that Pratt has ordered uniforms late for other teams as well, such as the wrestling team. Defendant also concedes that although Pratt is supposed to evaluate all coaches under his supervision annually, he has been sporadic in his evaluation of all coaches, not just Fuhr. Therefore, these problems are not unique to Fuhr. Finally, Fuhr grieves that Clint Adkins, the school board president, set up a room for community members to complain about her at the city’s community center and that Tom Pratt did not inform her about a petition circulated by parents which called for her removal as varsity boys basketball coach. These complaints are meritless because Defendant could not suppress community members’ free speech without raising First Amendment concerns with respect to impermissible viewpoint discrimination.