Opinion ID: 585811
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Substitution Without Prejudice

Text: 34 In Cohen, the Supreme Court observed that 28 U.S.C. § 1291 should be given a practical rather than technical construction. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1226; accord, Shapiro v. UJB Financial Corp., 964 F.2d 272, 278 (3d Cir.1992). As we have indicated, under the collateral order doctrine an order denying immunity may constitute a final order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and thus be immediately appealable. Because entitlement to immunity is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability ..., it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (emphasis in original). The various forms of immunity, including executive, legislative, judicial, and prosecutorial, reflect a policy that the public is better served if certain public officials exercise their discretionary duties with independence and without fear of the burdens of a civil suit for damages. See generally id. at 525-26, 105 S.Ct. at 2815; Nixon, 457 U.S. at 744-46, 102 S.Ct. at 2698-99; Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 806-08, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2732-33, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). [E]ven such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible, as '[i]nquiries of this kind can be peculiarly disruptive of effective government.'  Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817, 102 S.Ct. at 2737-38). 35 While an order setting aside the Attorney General's certification may be immediately appealable under these principles, see, e.g., Wood v. United States, 956 F.2d at 10, the issue in this case is whether an immediate appeal similarly lies for an order denying a motion to substitute without prejudice, i.e., in anticipation of further discovery. We must thus determine whether such an order satisfies the first prong of the Cohen test: does it conclusively determine the disputed question? The appellants conspicuously skirt the issue with the following conclusory statement in their reply brief: The first prong of the Cohen test ... ensures that the matter is ripe for appeal. This prong is easily met here, for the district court denied the government's motion for substitution under the Reform Act. But the court did so without prejudice. 36 In discussing the conclusiveness prong of Cohen in the context of qualified immunity, the Supreme Court has held that a denial of qualified immunity may be considered 37 'conclusive' in either of two respects. In some cases, it may represent the trial court's conclusion that even if the facts are as asserted by the defendant, the defendant's actions ... are ... not within the scope of qualified immunity. In such a case, there will be nothing in the subsequent course of proceedings in the district court that can alter the court's conclusion that the defendant is not immune. Alternatively, the trial judge may rule only that if the facts are as asserted by the plaintiff, the defendant is not immune. At trial, the plaintiff may not succeed in proving his version of the facts, and the defendant may thus escape liability. Even so, the court's denial of summary judgment finally and conclusively determines the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial on the plaintiff's allegations, and because '[t]here are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred,' it is apparent that 'Cohen's threshold requirement of a fully consummated decision is satisfied' in such a case. 38 Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (emphasis in original) (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 659, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977)). 39 Clearly, the district court's order in this case was not conclusive in the sense that there will be nothing in the subsequent course of proceedings in the district court that can alter the court's conclusion that the defendant[s] [were not acting within the scope of employment and thus are] not immune. The district court made clear both at oral argument and in its subsequent order, that its ruling denying the motion to substitute was tentative, and that it would subsequently conduct a hearing on a more fully developed record to determine conclusively the scope of employment issue. Cf. Praxis Properties Inc. v. Colonial Savings Bank, 947 F.2d 49, 56 (3d Cir.1991) (We can perceive of no circumstances under which the district court would revisit the legal question that [the appellant] now appeals to this court.) 40 Moreover, the district court's ruling does not conclusively determine[ ] the defendant's claim of right not to stand trial on the plaintiff's allegations, Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527, 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (emphasis in original), for we cannot conclude that  '[t]here are simply no further steps that can be taken in the District Court to avoid the trial the defendant maintains is barred....'  Id. (quoting Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. at 659, 97 S.Ct. at 2040). The district court has not mandated that the appellants stand trial on the claims for which substitution has been sought. Rather, it ordered the appellants to comply with pretrial discovery so that the court can conduct a hearing--also pretrial--in order to determine whether the United States should be substituted, and therefore whether the appellants must ultimately stand trial. 41 To be sure, the policy underlying the grant of immunity extends to pretrial matters as well and, as the Court noted in Mitchell, such pretrial matters as discovery are to be avoided if possible.... Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. at 2815 (emphasis added). However, the finality aspect of the collateral order doctrine is not satisfied by the conclusion that the district court's ruling conclusively determined the immunity issue to the extent that it requires the appellants to engage in such limited discovery proceedings. We can hardly hold otherwise, for a contrary conclusion would create a basis for immediate appeal from a denial of substitution pending even minimal discovery. As we have discussed above, even a federal employee entitled to immunity as a result of substitution under the Reform Act must submit to limited discovery where it is necessary for the district court to establish whether the employee acted within the scope of employment. 42 Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that some discovery might be necessary to resolve a claim of immunity, although again in the context of qualified rather than absolute immunity. In Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987), the Court confronted the conflict between the need for discovery in order to resolve the immunity issue, and the adverse consequences of subjecting public officials to broad-ranging discovery--the avoidance of which is the very reason immunity was granted in the first place. Id. at 646 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. at 3042-43 n. 6. The Court emphasized that qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the litigation. Id. Accordingly, the Court instructed that the district court should first determine whether the plaintiff alleged that the defendant took actions that a reasonable officer could have believed lawful. 14 If so, the defendant is entitled to immunity prior to discovery. On the other hand, if the plaintiff's allegations are sufficient as a matter of law to avoid an immunity defense, but the defendant denies engaging in the alleged conduct, then discovery may be necessary before [the defendant's] motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds can be resolved. Id. 15 Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has held, [w]here the applicability of the immunity cannot be decided from the face of the pleadings but requires some discovery, the denial of a motion to dismiss on the immunity ground is not appealable prior to discovery. United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 893 F.2d 498, 503 (2d Cir.1990) (Eleventh Amendment immunity). 43 Similarly, in Mitchell, the Court held that a denial of a claim of qualified immunity is appealable to the extent that it turns on an issue of law. 472 U.S. at 530, 105 S.Ct. at 2817. Thus, the courts of appeals have held that a district court's order denying summary judgment on the ground of qualified immunity is immediately appealable only where the district court's decision is premised upon purely legal, rather than factual, issues. See Henry v. Perry, 866 F.2d 657, 659 (3d Cir.1989) (Sloviter, J., concurring); Chinchello v. Fenton, 805 F.2d 126, 130-31 (3d Cir.1986) (dictum). See also Cartier v. Lussier, 955 F.2d 841, 844 (2d Cir.1992); DiMarco v. Rome Hosp., 952 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir.1992); P.C. v. McLaughlin, 913 F.2d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir.1990); Peppers v. Coates, 887 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th Cir.1989); Feagley v. Waddill, 868 F.2d 1437, 1439 (5th Cir.1989); Velasquez v. Senko, 813 F.2d 1509, 1511 (9th Cir.1987). But see Craft v. Wipf, 810 F.2d 170, 171-73 (8th Cir.1987). 44 Other courts have applied this reasoning to denials of absolute immunity, and have similarly held that, where the availability of [absolute] immunity cannot ... be determined as a matter of law, [the court of appeals] lack[s] jurisdiction over th[e] interlocutory appeal and [is] obliged to dismiss so that the matter may proceed in the trial court. White v. Frank, 855 F.2d 956, 962 (2d Cir.1988); accord Stem v. Ahearn, 908 F.2d 1, 3 (5th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 788, 112 L.Ed.2d 850 (1991); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 893 F.2d at 502; Compania Mexicana De Aviacion v. United States Dist. Court, 859 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir.1988); Group Health Inc. v. Blue Cross Ass'n, 793 F.2d 491, 497 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 930, 107 S.Ct. 1566, 94 L.Ed.2d 758 (1987); Evans v. Dillahunty, 711 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir.1983). Consequently, if an order denying a motion to dismiss based on the ground of absolute or qualified immunity is not immediately appealable when the denial is predicated on the existence of unresolved issues of fact, then a motion to substitute (which is akin to a motion to dismiss) denied without prejudice because of unresolved issues of fact cannot be immediately appealable. Cf. Borelli v. Reading, 532 F.2d 950 (3d Cir.1976) (order dismissing complaint without prejudice usually not appealable).