Opinion ID: 2982819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Separate Injury

Text: Henry first argues that his claim is not time-barred because, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to him, there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he sustained a new and distinct injury on March 11, 2011. He cites several non-binding cases from other courts and one from our circuit, Fonseca, 246 F.3d at 591, for the proposition that FELA’s statute of limitations does not begin to run until temporary or de minimus symptoms of a condition become so continuous or serious that the condition’s “accumulated effects” are realized. In Fonseca, a railroad laborer filed a FELA action seeking damages for his carpal tunnel syndrome (CTS). Fonseca had experienced temporary, intermittent CTS symptoms in his hands for decades but only experienced continuous CTS symptoms within three years of filing suit. The district court granted the railroad’s motion for summary judgment, holding that Fonseca’s claim was time-barred under 45 U.S.C. § 56. We reversed, holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Fonseca had experienced the “accumulated effects” of his 1 The court made a final ruling that rejected Henry’s claim that his assignment to Haverhill in 2010 somehow restarted the statute of limitations on his injury. Henry does not challenge this ruling on appeal except to argue that the 2011 event was a new injury. 5 No. 14-3821, Henry v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. CTS within the three-year period. Id. at 591. Central to our holding was our conclusion that Fonseca’s claim could have lacked evidentiary support if he filed it within three years of his first transient ache and pain. Id. at 592. Unlike Fonseca, Henry’s injury was cognizable when the 2005 and 2009 MRIs revealed that he had experienced degenerative changes to his intervertebral discs. Such changes, by their very nature, are permanent. Henry never argues otherwise. Although Henry’s pain may have subsided following the 2005 and 2009 events, there is no evidence that his degenerative condition improved. As a result, Henry experienced the “accumulated effects” of his degenerative back condition in October 2009, at the latest, when his condition was diagnosed. Henry also argues that the 2011 event was a separate and distinct injury because he was unable to return to work and the pain was more severe than previous episodes. He cites several cases where other courts have held that employees experienced new, distinct injuries rather than aggravations of existing injuries, for statute of limitations purposes. See Campbell v. CSX Transp., Inc., No. 1:07CV841, 2009 WL 2709280, at  (S.D. Ohio Aug. 25, 2009) (holding that there was a genuine issue as to whether an employee had a new back injury when the pain originated from a different location in his back and it was more severe than previous pain); see also Green v. CSX Transp., Inc., 414 F.3d 758, 765 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that there was a genuine issue as to whether the plaintiff had sustained a new injury to her shoulder when the pain was more severe than she had previously experienced and resulted in a new diagnosis). If anything, these cases are in accord with our conclusion that the 2011 event was merely an aggravation of Henry’s pre-existing injury. As the district court noted, Henry’s medical diagnoses from 2005, 2009, and 2011 are virtually identical, Henry described the pain he experienced during those episodes the same way (acute, constant, and moderately severe lower 6 No. 14-3821, Henry v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. back pain), the episodes were brought on from similarly benign activity (bending over to pick up paper or getting out of a chair), and both the 2009 and 2011 episodes resulted in missed work (six months in the case of the 2009 event). Even if Henry’s symptoms were more severe following the March 2011 event, that is not a basis to treat it as a separate injury for purposes of FELA’s statute of limitations. See Aparicio, 84 F.3d at 815 (quoted above); see also Mounts v. Grand Trunk W. R.R., 198 F.3d 578 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that an employee’s FELA claim for hearing loss was time-barred when the hearing loss was diagnosed five years before the lawsuit was filed even though it had worsened considerably since the original diagnosis). Finally, Henry argues that the affidavit of Dr. Robert Zaas, which Henry offered in response to Norfolk’s motion for summary judgment, created a question of fact as to whether his exposure to the Haverhill ground conditions in 2010 and 2011 caused a separate injury to his back. In that affidavit, Dr. Zaas, a board certified orthopedic surgeon, opined that Henry’s work at the Haverhill plant “was a significant contributory factor in causing the symptomatic activation of Mr. Henry’s degenerative disc disease and permanent disability from his railroad occupation.” (Emphasis added); see also id. at 323 (calling the injury a “preexisting” one). The district court rejected Henry’s argument, reasoning that based on Dr. Zaas’s affidavit, reasonable jurors could not disagree that the 2011 episode was a “manifestation of the same degenerative back condition about which [Henry] was informed in 2005 and 2009.” The court explained that: On its face, Dr. Zaas’ statement suggests that Plaintiff suffered from a degenerative back condition (diagnosed in 2005), a symptom of which manifested itself in 2011. Symptoms, however, of a previously-diagnosed condition are not considered a new injury for purposes of FELA’s statute of limitations. See, e.g., Mounts, 198 F.3d at 580-82 (finding no separate injury when a plaintiff experienced worsened symptoms of a previously-diagnosed hearing condition). Dr. Zaas’ affidavit does not affect the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s 7 No. 14-3821, Henry v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. degenerative back condition became legally cognizable in October 2009 at the latest. We agree. If anything, Dr. Zaas’s affidavit confirms that the 2011 event was a symptom of Henry’s previously diagnosed degenerative back condition.