Opinion ID: 1864077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application to the mother lode

Text: In the instant case, the trial court ordered the forfeiture of the claimant's store, finding that the prosecutor had established by a preponderance of the evidence that the Mother Lode had been used to facilitate the unlawful sale of drugs. Findings of a trial court sitting without a jury will not be set aside on appeal unless they are determined to be clearly erroneous. Smith v State Accident Fund, 403 Mich 201, 204; 267 NW2d 909 (1978); Tuttle v Dep't of State Hwys, 397 Mich 44, 46; 243 NW2d 244 (1976). `[A] finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' Smith, supra at 204 (citations omitted). In light of this standard of review, we turn to the order of forfeiture issued by the trial court in the instant case. In determining the propriety of an order of forfeiture, courts must be guided by a rule of reasonableness. For example, we agree with the Legislature that it would be unfair to order the forfeiture of a home or business if the owner had been unaware that a member of the household or business was trafficking controlled substances. In response to this concern, the Legislature, in § 7521(1)(f), expressly prohibited the confiscation of an unwitting owner's property: To the extent of the interest of an owner, a thing of value is not subject to forfeiture under this subdivision by reason of any act or omission that is established by the owner of the item to have been committed or omitted without the owner's knowledge or consent. [Emphasis added.][ [14] ] It is equally unreasonable, in our view, for a court to order the forfeiture of property which has only an incidental or fortuitous connection to the unlawful activity. We have yet to determine what sort of relationship will satisfy the facilitation language of § 7521(1)(f). However, in interpreting similar language in 21 USC 881, the federal courts have held that in order for property to be forfeited under the used to facilitate language, there must be a substantial connection between the property and the underlying criminal activity. [15] Other federal circuits have expressly rejected any requirement of a substantial connection, holding instead that use of property in any manner in connection with an unlawful drug transaction is sufficient to justify forfeiture. [16] Having examined the split of authority in the federal courts, we are persuaded by the faction adhering to the substantial connection test. We explicitly reject the in any manner test for Michigan. The substantial connection test, in our view, strikes the proper balance between the rights of the individual property owners and the state's need to use the weapon of forfeiture in its war on wholesale drug dealing. For these reasons, we hold that real property which has allegedly been used to facilitate a violation of the controlled substances act may only be forfeited if the party seeking forfeiture establishes that there was a substantial connection between the realty and the underlying illegal transaction. Having reviewed the record in the instant case, we hold that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that the claimant's store was used to facilitate the unlawful sale of narcotics. In United States v Certain Lots in Virginia Beach, Virginia, 657 F Supp 1062 (ED Va, 1987), the court, applying the substantial connection test, refused to permit the forfeiture of the claimant's home upon the basis of one drug transaction. Despite the presence of drug-related items at the time of arrest, there was no evidence that the claimant routinely used the house to store, hide, or distribute drugs. Thus, according to the court, the brief use of the claimant's house was merely incidental to the transaction. Similarly, in United States v Twelve Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Five Dollars, 669 F Supp 939 (D Minn, 1987), another court declined to allow the forfeiture of a home which was the site of a single cocaine transaction. The claimant in Twelve Thousand Dollars had not used his home or telephone for any other drug sales, although he admitted to personal drug use. Furthermore, there was no evidence whatsoever suggesting that the claimant had used his home to store or distribute narcotics. Accordingly, the court concluded that there was no substantial connection between the claimant's residence and his drug activities. In United States v 26.075 Acres Located in Swift Creek Twp, Wake Co, North Carolina, 687 F Supp 1005 (ED NC, 1988), the court upheld the forfeiture of a personal residence and a wooded tract of vacant land, finding that there was a substantial connection between the property and certain unlawful cocaine transactions. In reaching this result, the court noted that utilizing or intending to utilize one's real property as the site for a drug transaction or intended drug transaction will render it subject to forfeiture. Id. at 1016. The court highlighted the fact that the claimant had, on two separate occasions, indicated to an undercover officer a willingness to secure the intended cocaine transaction by offering her deed to the farm as collateral. In the opinion of the Swift Creek court, this fact result[ed] as a matter of law in the use or intended use of all of claimant's property described therein to facilitate a violation of Title 21, United States Code. Id. at 1017. In the instant case, it is uncontroverted that the informant and Detective Trombley initially contacted the claimant at the Mother Lode for the specific purpose of buying cocaine and that each contact thereafter was in some way connected to the store. Unlike the isolated transactions involved in Certain Lots In Virginia Beach and Twelve Thousand Dollars, the instant case involves two separate drug trades, each originating out of the Mother Lode. The undercover officer was encouraged to call and visit the claimant at his business in order to keep abreast of the status of their deals. Furthermore, unlike the claimant in Twelve Thousand Dollars, the claimant here repeatedly used the business phone to contact his supplier and to arrange meetings with his prospective buyer, Officer Trombley. It is also uncontroverted that claimant Lewandowski, during the first cocaine transaction, offered the detective a Mother Lode receipt in exchange for cash up-front. In our view, this action is analogous to that of the claimant in Swift Creek who offered an undercover officer a deed to her farm as collateral in a drug deal. In light of Lewandowski's willingness to furnish Trombley with a Mother Lode receipt, it becomes clear that the claimant's business was an integral part of a continuing drug operation. Further support for this conclusion can be found in the fact that the second transaction, involving eight ounces of cocaine and $15,000, actually took place in the back room of the store. At the conclusion of this particular trade, the claimant was seen commingling the proceeds with legitimate business funds in the cash drawer behind the front counter. In light of the uncontroverted evidence in this case, we conclude that the claimant's store was substantially connected to his unlawful cocaine business.