Opinion ID: 1170931
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions on Sympathy and General Character and Background Evidence.

Text: (33) Defendant and amicus curiae argue that the jury was misinstructed on the proper role of sympathy and general character and background evidence in the penalty phase. In reviewing such claim, we examine the instructions and arguments as a whole to determine whether the jury was adequately informed of the proper scope of mitigating evidence for its consideration. ( California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 546 (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.) [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 943, 107 S.Ct. 837]; see Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104, 113-115 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 10-11, 102 S.Ct. 869]; People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-537, 544, fn. 17 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440]; People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 878, & fn. 10 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813].) We have undertaken such a review here and conclude that the jury was not misled regarding its responsibilty to consider all of the mitigating evidence in the case. First, the jury was not instructed at the penalty phase with the nosympathy language embodied in CALJIC No. 1.00. (Compare People v. Brown, supra, 40 Cal.3d at pp. 536-537, vacated sub nom. California v. Brown, supra, 479 U.S. 538 [wherein the high court held that the giving of the California standard anti-sympathy instruction (CALJIC No. 1.00) at the penalty phase is not unconstitutional per se].) The jury was specifically instructed that: [Y]ou were previously instructed you must not be influenced by pity for the defendant or swayed by sympathy for him. I instruct you that in this phase of the case, the penalty phase, pity and sympathy for the defendant would be proper considerations for you should you find them to be warranted in the circumstances. Next, although the jury did receive an instruction in the literal terms of factor (k) in this pre- Easley case ( People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d 858), our review of the arguments as a whole reinforces our conclusion that, as instructed, the jury must have understood its obligation to consider and weigh all of defendant's mitigating evidence. After arguing to the jury that the law is neutral on what happens at the penalty phase, the prosecutor distinguished the penalty from the guilt phase of trial thusly: There's a difference, and that difference is that you previously have been told that pity or passion for a defendant, sympathy, that sort of thing, cannot enter into your deliberations.... This [the penalty phase] is the exception.... You still cannot look at sympathy or passion or prejudice for the victims in terms of how it would change facts. You can't do that, but you can consider passion or prejudice towards the defendant. [¶] [T]he instruction will say that ... in this  the penalty phase, pity and sympathy for the defendant would be proper considerations if you should find them to be warranted in the circumstances. If the defense raises anything in this case, which you may or may not have heard, any real evidence of so far, that there is a reason for sympathy towards this particular defendant, then of course that's something for you to weigh and something that you use in looking at the instructions on the case.  (Italics added.) Defense counsel told the jury they could consider Marvin's family as well. They have indicated to you that they have loved Marvin. They wish him to live, albeit in confinement, life imprisonment without possibility of parole. They have indicated to you that Marvin has done some worthwhile acts while he has been on this earth. That he is a human being, that he has done things to help others, that he has been worthwhile in his activities, that he is a person of worth. Defense counsel explained: The prosecutor indicated that the instruction provides as they do that you can consider passion and pity for the defendant if you find that to be appropriate. Finally, in his closing argument, the prosecutor again argued that defendant's proffered general character and background evidence was worthy of minimal mitigating weight: Marvin's family felt that he should live. You heard the testimony ... I would expect a family to say that. The evidence you heard the other day from the defense on Mr. Walker and his good deeds, the thing that stands out that mostly I think about is that there was almost nothing to say.... [¶] You're going to have instructions. You'll see how much value that is. Defendant directs us to the prosecutor's closing remarks in which he stated:  The mitigating factors are a possibility of two. And the aggravating factors are all the rest. (Italics added.) However, read in context, we believe the prosecutor was simply arguing his view of the state of the evidence; namely, that defendant's relative youth and his lack of prior convictions were the only two factors worthy of assignment of any mitigating weight. Nor do we view the prosecutor's argument under factor (k) as improperly suggesting to the jury that evidence thereunder related solely to the crimes  or that factor (k) evidence could be aggravating. (See People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) In his closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the testimony of defendant's family members and friends; including testimony that he had done some favors, loaned them money, done odd jobs for some, and given others rides to work. He never suggested that any evidence, or lack of evidence, regarding defendant's general background and character, was aggravating. Rather, he simply urged the jury to accord little mitigating weight to such evidence: if that's all you can say about somebody, that is very, very thin. Viewing the instructions and arguments as a whole, we conclude the jury here was adequately informed of the full nature of its responsibility to consider defendant's mitigating general character and background evidence.