Opinion ID: 2998862
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Foreclosure and Sale

Text: We were also concerned about finality because Mr. Byrne’s intervention seeking back taxes was, in a sense, an attempt to renegotiate the sale price-- perhaps undoing the sale’s finality. If so, then the scope of the appeal might also include the confirmation of sale itself. Cf. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., 390 F.3d at 523–24 (emphasis added) (holding that a foreclosure action becomes final only when the order confirming sale establishes “who gets the property, at what price, and what deficiency judgment (if any) will be entered against the [mortgagor]”). Such a situation raises, in turn, the possibility that the foreclosure action became final only when the district court ordered a disbursement of surplus to Mr. Byrne for back taxes, because it was only at that point that the court set the final sale price. The limited remand resolved these concerns. First, although the payment for back taxes could be seen as a refund, Mr. Byrne did not seek to undo the sale. Payment to him therefore would not reverse the transfer of the property that resulted in a risk of irreparable harm, justifying immediate appeal. See Sage, 96 U.S. at 714; Davenport, 106 F.3d at 1334-35. Second, to the extent that Mr. Byrne’s intervention reset the sale price, it did not affect the amount paid to Contimortage because, even after the refund, the sale price exceeded the debt. Since the whole purpose of the foreclosure action is to secure that debt for the mortgagee, the language in Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, 390 F.3d at 523-24, regarding the sale price should not be taken to undermine the finality of the underlying dispute between Contimortgage and Mr. Anglezis. Third, as we are about to explain, the district court had no subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Byrne’s claims, so as a matter of common sense, his intervention was void and should not undo the finality of the underlying foreclosure. 3 Because Mr. Biasiello simultaneously withdrew, there was no chance that he would accrue any other fees, and the order to pay him cannot be seen as interim or inherently nonfinal. See Estate of Drayton v. Nelson, 53 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1994). Nos. 03-3471 & 03-4192 Page 8