Opinion ID: 3006955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chief McClelland

Text: Next, we consider LaFleur’s claims against Chief McClelland. LaFleur seems to assert constitutional liability based on an official policy or governmental custom to conduct reverse-sting operations, and/or, alternatively, based on the failure of the municipality adequately to train or supervise such operations. By either route, Monell controls, and LaFleur’s claim fails. Under Monell, a municipality and/or its policymakers may be held liable under § 1983 “when execution of a government’s policy or custom . . . by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury. . . .” Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; see also Peterson v. City of Fort Worth, 588 F.3d 838, 847 (5th Cir. 2009) (requiring plaintiffs to show “(1) an official policy (2) promulgated by the municipal policymaker (3) [that was also] the moving force behind the violation of a constitutional right”). LaFleur’s complaints only focus on his generalized grievances that relate to the concept of undercover reverse-sting operations generally and their use as a tool of law enforcement by the Houston Police Department. This lack of specificity alone undermines any such Monell claim. In any event, he must show the violation of some specific constitutional right that resulted from the alleged illegal policy and, as we have noted, he has shown none. Monell liability simply does not apply. Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to all claims against Chief McClelland.