Opinion ID: 687673
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: decision of the bia

Text: 28 We also conclude the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Khalaj's application for stay of deportation pending disposition of her motion to reopen and reconsider. 29 There is no statutory provision for the reopening of a deportation proceeding. The authority for motions to reopen derives solely from regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 446, 105 S.Ct. 2098, 2100, 85 L.Ed.2d 452 (1985) (Rios-Pineda ). Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be granted unless it appears to the [BIA] that evidence sought to be offered is material and was not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former hearing.... 8 C.F.R. Sec. 3.2. The regulation does not specify the conditions under which a motion to reopen must be granted. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 321-23, 112 S.Ct. 719, 724, 116 L.Ed.2d 823 (1992) (Doherty). 30 The granting of a motion to reopen is discretionary, and the Attorney General has broad discretion to grant or deny such motions. Id. (citing Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. at 449, 105 S.Ct. at 2101-02); White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312, 1315 (8th Cir.1993) (White). Motions for reopening of immigration proceedings are disfavored, especially those in a deportation proceeding. Doherty, 502 U.S. at 321-23, 112 S.Ct. at 724; White, 6 F.3d at 1315. There are at least three independent grounds on which the BIA may deny a motion to reopen: failure to establish a prima facie case for the relief sought, failure to introduce previously unavailable, material evidence, and a determination that even if these requirements were satisfied, the movant would not be entitled to the discretionary grant of relief sought. INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05, 108 S.Ct. 904, 911-12, 99 L.Ed.2d 90 (1988). 31 Here, the BIA found there was little likelihood the motion to reopen and reconsider would be granted. The previous IJ and BIA decisions denying Khalaj political asylum found no past persecution and no objectively reasonable fear of persecution for political opinion or for membership in a particular social group. As the district court found, Khalaj presented no new evidence of any substance with her motion to reopen and reconsider. The only new evidence presented was the fact that Germany granted political asylum to Khalaj's sister, evidence which was neither previously unavailable to Khalaj nor material to the motion to reopen, for the reasons discussed above. 32 The fact that the BIA did not give more specific reasons for its denial of Khalaj's application for a stay does not render the denial without a rational basis. The applicable regulations do not require the BIA to explain its denial of a stay pending a decision to reopen or reconsider. The BIA may, in its discretion, stay deportation. 8 C.F.R. Sec. 3.6. No notice to the petitioner of the reasons for the discretionary decision is required, in contrast to the regulations governing stays by the district director, which require written notice of specific reasons for denial. See 8 C.F.R. Sec. 243.4. 33 Here, Khalaj has failed to establish a prima facie case for relief. The IJ and BIA found her ineligible for asylum, based on her failure to establish that she was subject to persecution in the past or had a reasonably objective fear of persecution in the future. Moreover, Khalaj has failed to present new evidence which would warrant reopening of her case. Thus, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying her motion to stay on the basis there was little likelihood the motion to reopen or reconsider would be granted. 34 Khalaj next argues that the INS has not ascertained whether Iran will accept her upon deportation, as required by 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227(a)(2)(D). 4 As Khalaj legally gained admission to the United States, her deportation is governed by the expulsion provisions of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1253 rather than the exclusion provisions of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1227. See, e.g., Amanullah and Wahidullah v. Cobb, 862 F.2d 362, 369 (1st Cir.1988) (Aldrich, J., concurring) (quoting United States ex rel. Tom We Shung v. Murff, 176 F.Supp. 253, 256 (S.D.N.Y.1959), aff'd on opinion below, 274 F.2d 667 (2d Cir.1960)). Khalaj does not indicate whether she has designated the country to which she wishes to be deported, as provided by Sec. 1253(a). While the Attorney General is obligated to follow her regulations in deporting Khalaj, we conclude Khalaj's unsupported allegation does not establish that the challenged decisions of the district director and BIA were an abuse of discretion. Rather, Khalaj merely asserts that a subsequent administrative requirement has not been followed. 35 Khalaj next argues the BIA's denial of her application to stay deportation deprives her of due process. Khalaj contends that because departure or deportation is considered a withdrawal of a motion to reopen or reconsider under 8 C.F.R. Sec. 3.2, her deportation would extinguish judicial review and result in a violation of her due process rights. After a review of the record, we conclude Khalaj received a full and fair deportation hearing before the immigration judge in December 1990, and full review of the immigration judge's decision by the BIA in 1992. Khalaj's view of due process would prohibit the INS from ever attempting to deport an alien pursuant to a valid deportation order if any further administrative relief, such as motions to reopen, were available. Bothyo, 772 F.2d at 358. Khalaj has had a full and fair opportunity to present her case to the INS and BIA, and we conclude she has not been denied her right to constitutional due process. See id.; Rahim v. McNary, 24 F.3d 440, 443 (2d Cir.1994); Villegas v. O'Neill, 626 F.Supp. 1241, 1246 (S.D.Tex.1986). 36 Khalaj's final argument, that the BIA's summary denial of her application for a stay of deportation without a reasoned opinion is a denial of due process, is rejected for the reasons discussed above.