Opinion ID: 1717677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: comparative fault of latonya lester

Text: Defendants next raise two interrelated allegations of prejudicial error: 1) the refusal of the trial court to allow defendants to amend their pleadings to allege Latonya Lester's comparative fault and 2) the refusal of the court to submit an instruction that would allow the jury to assess fault against Latonya. Procedurally, the defendants sought leave to file amended answers on the day of trial in order to include the comparative fault of Latonya Lester as a defense. Later, during the instruction conference, defendants sought to have the jury instructed on this same issue. The trial court ruled against defendants in both instances. These claims of error cannot be addressed until we resolve the underlying issuewhether the fault of Latonya Lester is a question of fact for the jury, or whether Latonya, a child of tender years, is incapable of fault as a matter of law. Only if we resolve this issue in favor of defendants and against Latonya, do we address the particular points raised by defendants. Furthermore, defendants' allegations have been perfected only as they pertain to the claims of Latonya Lester. The point of error on these issues does refer to the amendments and instructions proposed by defendants, however, in violation of Rule 84.04(d), defendants fail to state why the action of the trial court was erroneous as to Wanda Thompson's claims, and fail to offer citations of authority on the matter. The assessment and application of Latonya's comparative fault to reduce the recovery of co-plaintiff, Wanda Thompson, is an issue that is not only problematic but also separate and distinct from the focus of the point of errorwhether fault can be assessed against a child of tender years. Defendants have neither identified nor briefed this separate issue. Under these circumstances, we decline to review the point of error as it purports to apply to Wanda's claim.
Various courses have been charted on the issue of contributory negligence, and now, the issue of comparative fault, [2] and their application to children of tender years. In this area, courts must necessarily balance an appropriate concern that children cannot be expected to conform their conduct to adult standards with a countervailing concern that the general public should not shoulder all liability created by the avoidable carelessness of children. A large number of states resolve this difficulty under the tender years doctrine, which calls for the establishment of a fixed age below which a child will be conclusively presumed incapable of negligence (or fault). See, e.g., Yarborough v. Berner, 467 S.W.2d 188, 190 (Tex.1971) (below age five); Swindell v. Hellkamp, 242 So.2d 708, 710 (Fla.1970) (below age six). [3] The most severe line drawing, however, occurs under the so-called Illinois Rule, recognized in several states. See, e.g., Mort v. Walter, 98 Ill.2d 391, 75 Ill.Dec. 228, 457 N.E.2d 18 (1983); Pino v. Szuch, 185 W.Va. 476, 408 S.E.2d 55, 57 (1991). Derived from biblical and criminal common law antecedents, this rule places an almost mystical importance on the age seven and multiples thereof. [4] It is applied so that a child under seven is incapable of negligence as a matter of law. Children between seven and fourteen are presumed incapable of negligence. Only at age fourteen is a child presumed to possess sufficient mental capability to comprehend and avoid danger. Pino, 408 S.E.2d at 58. In stark contrast to the Illinois Rule is the modern trend which rejects fixed and arbitrarily drawn age limits. See, e.g., Honeycutt by and through Phillips v. City of Wichita, 247 Kan. 250, 796 P.2d 549, 552 (1990); Peterson v. Taylor, 316 N.W.2d 869 (Ia.1982); Toetschinger v. Ihnot, 312 Minn. 59, 250 N.W.2d 204 (1977). [5] These jurisdictions hold that the question of contributory negligence of young children is ordinarily a question of fact for the jury to decide. Honeycutt, 796 P.2d at 552. A minor's incapacity for negligence may be determined as a matter of law only if the child is so young, or the evidence of incapacity so overwhelming, that reasonable minds could not differ on the matter. Id. at 551, citing Quillian v. Mathews, 86 Nev. 200, 467 P.2d 111-13 (1970). Although this approach is not without its critics, [6] it has been cited with favor in Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts: Most courts have attempted to fix a minimum age, below which the child is held to be incapable of all negligence.... Other courts have rejected any such fixed and arbitrary rules of delimitation, and have held that children well under the age of seven can be capable of some negligent conduct. Undoubtedly there is an irreducible minimum, probably in the neighborhood of four years of age, but it arguably ought not to be fixed by rules laid down in advance without regard to the particular case. As the age decreases, there are simply fewer possibilities of negligence, until finally, at some indeterminate point, there is none at all. Prosser and Keeton at 180. In a series of cases near the turn of the century, this Court adopted in essence what we have described here as the modern trend. Holmes v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 190 Mo. 98, 88 S.W. 623 (banc 1905); Spillane v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 135 Mo. 414, 37 S.W. 198 (1896); Burger v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 112 Mo. 238, 20 S.W. 439 (1892); accord Berry v. St. Louis M. & S.E.R. Co., 214 Mo. 593, 114 S.W. 27 (1908). In Holmes , the Court stated that the question of whether a child is old enough to be held responsible for his conduct, as for contributory negligence, is always a question of fact.... Holmes, 88 S.W. at 624-25 (citations omitted). [7] The only exception to this rule is where a child is exceedingly young or where there is otherwise no doubt as to the child's capacity, in which case the trial court will decide the issue as a matter of law. Id. When evaluating responsibility for conduct, no higher degree of care will be expected of [a child] than is usually exercised by persons of similar age, judgment, and experience. Id. Subsequent appellate decisions, however, began to erode the holdings of the Holmes era cases. For example, in Quirk v. Metropolitan Street Ry. Co., 200 Mo.App. 585, 210 S.W. 103 (1919), it was held that a seven-year-old child who had jumped from a streetcar could not be contributorily negligent, in part, because of his tender years. Quirk, 210 S.W. at 105-06. In Volz v. City of St. Louis, 326 Mo. 362, 32 S.W.2d 72 (1930), this Court stated in dicta that we deem it advisable to say that it is the general rule that a boy six years of age cannot be guilty of contributory negligence. Id. 32 S.W.2d at 74. Similarly, this Court noted, again through dicta, in Schmidt v. Allen, 303 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Mo. 1957), that a four-year-old child, struck by a car while attempting to cross a major thoroughfare in St. Louis, could not be contributorily negligent. Because of these and other similar cases, the viability and validity of Holmes is called into question. [8] We believe, however, that the modern trend, espoused in Holmes and adopted early on by this Court, is more sound and more likely to ensure just results. Although jurisdictions which have adopted either the Illinois Rule or other arbitrary age distinctions have the advantage of consistency and ease of application, that is also the principal shortcoming of their approach. Positing a predetermined age at which negligence or fault can occur has little basis in reason or logic; one day's difference in age should not serve as the dividing line as to whether or not a child is capable of negligence or fault. See Toetschinger, 250 N.W.2d at 211. We prefer a rule that allows for a degree of flexibility in the handling of each case so that a child's negligence or fault is determined in relation to the expectations held for other children in same or similar circumstances. To summarize, we reaffirm the holding of Holmes . The fault of a child should be determined by the fact-finder in each case, based upon that degree of care exercised by children of the same or similar age, judgment, and experience. Only if the child is so young or the evidence of incapacity so overwhelming that reasonable minds could not differ on the issue, should trial courts rule as a matter of law, usually pursuant to a motion for directed verdict, that the child cannot be capable of fault.
Having concluded that comparative fault may be assessed against a child of tender years, we must next determine if comparative fault is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded before evidence and instructions may be submitted on the issue. Defendants contend that comparative fault is not an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and that the jury must be given a comparative fault instruction, if supported by the evidence, regardless of the pleadings. We disagree. In the seminal case of Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. banc 1983), this Court abolished contributory negligence as a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery in negligence cases and appended the Uniform Comparative Fault Act (UCFA) to the opinion with directions that the doctrine of comparative fault as set out in the UCFA be applied to all future cases, insofar as possible. Id. at 15. Section 2(a) of the Act provides: In all actions involving fault of more than one party to the action ... the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the jury to answer special interrogatories [comparative fault instructions] ... indicating ... (2) [T]he percentage of the total fault of all of the parties to each claim.... As we understand defendants' position, the words shall instruct the jury mandate a comparative fault instruction if the evidence in a case shows that fault may be attributed to more than one party to the action. Generally, we agree with that interpretation. However, defendants also read into this language an implication that the comparative fault instruction must be given regardless of whether comparative fault was actually pled. In our view, there is no such implication, and the UCFA does not in any way speak to that question. Defendants also cite Earll v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 714 S.W.2d 932 (Mo. App.1986), in which the court of appeals stated: [W]e believe that, in a negligence case, where there is evidence from which a jury could find that plaintiff's conduct was a contributing cause of his damages, unless the parties agree otherwise, the case should be submitted to the jury under the instructions and verdict forms approved by the Supreme Court for use in comparative fault cases regardless of whether the defendant submits an affirmative defense instruction or not. Id. at 937. (emphasis added). The defendants in Earll , however, had, indeed, pleaded comparative fault as an affirmative defense. Moreover, the case was tried and evidence was introduced under the assumption that comparative fault was applicable. At the close of the evidence, though, defendant chose not to tender a comparative fault instruction. The plaintiffs responded by proffering a comparative fault instruction of their own which was refused. The court of appeals held that the trial court's refusal to give the instruction was error; once the issue of comparative fault was in the case, neither party should be allowed to unilaterally deprive the other party of the opportunity to give a comparative fault instruction. [9] When the cited quotation is considered in its full context, it has no relation to the question at handwhether comparative fault must be pled as an affirmative defense. We hold that comparative fault instructions may be given only where comparative fault has been raised in the pleadings as an affirmative defense. In arriving at this conclusion, we rely on Rule 55.08 which provides in pertinent part: in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... contributory negligence ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. The key phrase any other matter indicates that the list of affirmative defenses is not exhaustive or exclusive. Under an almost identical federal rule, [10] this language has been interpreted to include a duty to plead comparative fault. Marino v. Otis Engineering Corp., 839 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.1988). A number of state jurisdictions have also followed suit. [11] In our view, a plaintiff's comparative fault is a defense to defendant's liability just as contributory negligence, prior to Gustafson , was a defense to defendant's liability. The commonality is that both concepts recognize that the liability of the defendant can be negated by the fault of the plaintiff. Although we acknowledge that comparative fault was designed to apportion fault rather than to operate as a complete defense, the obligation to plead affirmative defenses ought not be limited to complete defenses. See C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 1273, at 453 (5th Ed.1990). In this ruling, we also note that the recently published proposed changes to the Rules of Civil Procedure include an amendment to Rule 55.08 so that it states expressly that comparative fault is an affirmative defense. One exception to the rule that comparative fault must be pled as an affirmative defense is where, under Rule 55.33(b), issues such as comparative fault are tried by express or implied consent of the parties. In these cases, the issues of comparative fault shall be treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. In this case, however, it is clear that there was no express or implied consent, even though evidence was presented to the effect that Latonya was admonished many times by her mother to be very cautious and careful when crossing the street. This evidence was admitted solely on the issue of the mother's comparative fault in her separate claim against plaintiffs. It is well settled that evidence will give rise to an amendment of pleadings by implied consent only when it bears solely on the proposed new issue and is not relevant to some other issue already in the case. Associate Engineering Co. v. Webbe, 795 S.W.2d 606, 610 (Mo.App.1990); Racine v. Glendale Shooting Club, Inc., 755 S.W.2d 369, 373 (Mo.App.1988).
Having determined that comparative fault must be pled as an affirmative defense, we come to the exact points raised by defendants: whether the trial court erred by denying defendants' request for leave to amend their answer to plead Latonya's fault, and whether the court erred in refusing an instruction to allow the jury to assess that fault. No record was made of the proceedings in which defendants' motion for leave to amend was presented. The legal file discloses only that defendants' written motion was filed with the court on the first day of trial (we assume in pretrial conference) and was subsequently denied by the trial court. There is no indication that plaintiffs specified any grounds for an objection to the proposed amendment, or that they registered any objection at all; nor is there any statement of the trial court's reasons for denying the motion. In all likelihood, the trial court, not having the benefit of our decision rejecting the tender years doctrine, refused to allow the amendment because of a belief that Latonya, age four years and nine months, could not, as a matter of law, be found to be at fault. The denial of the motion on this sole ground was error. It is conceivable, however, that the proposed amendment was rejected for the separate reason that it was untimely filed. Day-of-trial amendments are permitted only by leave of court, but leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. Rule 55.33(a). Under this rule, the decision to allow or disallow amendments to pleadings is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Hospital Development Corp. v. Park Lane Land Co., 813 S.W.2d 904, 907 (Mo.App.1991); Baker v. City of Kansas City, 671 S.W.2d 325, 329 (Mo.App. 1984). Factors to consider in the exercise of that discretion include: (1) the hardship to the moving party if leave to amend is denied; (2) the reasons for the moving party's failure to include the matter in the original pleadings; and (3) the injustice to the nonmoving party should leave to amend be granted. Hospital Development Corp. 813 S.W.2d at 907. Plaintiffs do not challenge defendants' showing on the first two factors. Denial of leave to amend caused obvious hardship to defendants because they were not able to avail themselves of the defense of comparative fault and secure an instruction on that point of law. Furthermore, defendants' tenable position that no comparative fault pleading was required tends to excuse the failure to file an earlier amendment. Plaintiffs focus, instead, on the last factor of injustice to the non-moving party, which is essentially a rule of prejudice. However, plaintiffs point to no specific injustice and argue nothing more than that they would have been sandbagged had the new defense been allowed. Defendants' amendment, offered solely to establish a new legal theory of defense, did not submit any allegations of fact that had not already been fully explored through the parties' extensive discovery efforts. Even though Latonya's contributory fault would not have been relevant under the tender years doctrine, it is inconceivable that plaintiffs would not have evaluated her causal participation in the accident. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what additional discovery or other preparation plaintiffs might have undertaken to fend off the proposed defense. In this situation, plaintiffs could not have been prejudiced. In the improbable event that the trial judge denied the motion for leave to amend because it was untimely filed, there was an abuse of discretion. We hold that the amendment should have been allowed and the instruction should have been given.