Opinion ID: 3000449
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McIntosh

Text: McIntosh also filed a notice of appeal, but his appointed counsel now seeks to withdraw under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), because she is unable to discern a nonfrivolous issue to pursue. Counsel’s supporting brief is facially adequate, and McIntosh has responded to our invitation under Circuit Rule 51(b) to comment on counsel’s submission. We limit our review to the potential issues Nos. 06-1803 & 06-1817 Page 4 identified in counsel’s brief and McIntosh’s response. See United States v. Schuh, 289 F.3d 968, 973-74 (7th Cir. 2002). Counsel first considers whether McIntosh could argue that the evidence adduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s findings of guilt on the conspiracy and possession counts. McIntosh never moved for a judgment of acquittal, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, so we would review such a claim for plain error, reversing only if “the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt” and allowing the conviction to stand would result in a “manifest miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 777 (7th Cir. 2006). First, the evidence in the record is sufficient on the conspiracy count if it shows that McIntosh was aware that the goal of the conspiracy was to distribute marijuana and he acted to further that goal, see United States v. Medina, 430 F.3d 869, 882 (7th Cir. 2005), even if the evidence is entirely circumstantial, see United States v. Brisk, 171 F.3d 514, 526 (7th Cir. 1999). Here, the evidence showed that McIntosh called Black four times between 12:23 a.m. and 12:35 a.m., which was about twenty-five minutes before the three men attempted to pick up the marijuana. The jury could reasonably infer that McIntosh made these phone calls in order to recruit Black to use his pick-up truck to retrieve the marijuana. McIntosh then rode with Black and Posada to the location and proceeded to help load the boxes—some of which broke open prior to being loaded and all of which had a “strong marijuana odor”—suggesting that McIntosh knew that the boxes contained marijuana. This inference is further supported by the fact that McIntosh jumped out of the fleeing pick-up truck as it was still moving, evaded the police, and hid underneath a car that was parked nearby. It would, therefore, be frivolous for McIntosh to argue that the record is devoid of evidence that he knew that there was a conspiracy to distribute marijuana and that he acted to further that goal by recruiting a driver and loading the truck. Second, the evidence is sufficient on the possession count if it shows that McIntosh possessed the marijuana with the intent to distribute it while knowing that it was a controlled substance. See United States v. Orozco-Vasquez, 469 F.3d 1101, 1106 (7th Cir. 2006). It would be frivolous to argue in the face of the evidence described above that McIntosh was unaware that the boxes contained marijuana or that he did not possess it. Moreover, the jury heard that the shipment weighed more than 1000 pounds and was worth between $700,000 and $1 million. The quantity and cost of the drugs amply support an inference that McIntosh’s possession was with intent to distribute. McIntosh, in his Rule 51(b) response, argues that the evidence described above established nothing more than his “mere presence” during the offense. The Nos. 06-1803 & 06-1817 Page 5 mere presence doctrine forbids the government from asking ask a jury “to convict a defendant just because he was found in proximity to illegal activity,” United States v. Garcia, 439 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2006), but the doctrine applies only to a defendant who is present “and nothing more,” United States v. Starks, 309 F.3d 1017, 1026 (7th Cir. 2002). Here, the evidence showed that McIntosh was an active participant—he recruited Black and loaded some of the boxes onto the truck—and thus it would be frivolous for McIntosh to try to argue that he was merely present during the offense. McIntosh also challenges his conviction on two additional grounds, both of which are frivolous. First, he proposes to argue that the district court erroneously admitted hearsay testimony from Agents Hagelsieb and Lievers, both of whom testified regarding statements Posada made to them. McIntosh forfeited this issue when his counsel failed to object to the admission of this testimony at trial; therefore, we review for plain error. See United States v. Taylor, 471 F.3d 832, 841 (7th Cir. 2006). Thus McIntosh would have to show (among other things) that the admission of the testimony affected his substantial rights, see id., and this he cannot do because none of the testimony to which he objects has anything to do with his involvement in the offense. Moreover, Posada is a coconspirator, and the statements he made to Hagelsieb while arranging delivery of the marijuana were made “during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy”; such statements are not hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Second, McIntosh raises a virtually unintelligible argument concerning a “flight instruction.” Indeed, we disfavor flight instructions, which authorize the jury to draw an inference of guilt from the fact that a suspect fled from authorities, see United States v. Rodriguez, 53 F.3d 1439, 1451 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Williams, 33 F.3d 876, 879 (7th Cir. 1994), but exactly what McIntosh proposes to argue here is unclear. Neither party requested a flight instruction, and the district court did not deliver one. Any argument on this point would be frivolous. Finally, counsel considers whether McIntosh could argue that his guidelinesrange sentence of 360 months (almost triple what the advisory sentence would have been were he not a career offender, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1) is “greater than necessary” to serve the purposes of sentencing described in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Counsel notes that the sentence is presumed reasonable. See United States v. Mykytiuk, 415 F.3d 606, 608 (7th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court recently granted a writ of certiorari to consider whether according a presumption of reasonableness to a sentence within the guidelines range is consistent with United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), see United States v. Rita, No. 05-4674, 2006 WL 1144508 (4th Cir. May 1, 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 551 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2006) (No. 06-5754), but regardless of how Nos. 06-1803 & 06-1817 Page 6 that question is ultimately answered, it would be frivolous for McIntosh to challenge the reasonableness of his sentence. At sentencing, McIntosh admitted that he was a career offender, but he argued for leniency because coconspirators Posada and Black had received much lower sentences. The district court rejected this argument, commenting on McIntosh’s extensive criminal history and noting that McIntosh was on supervised release after serving a long sentence for federal drug offenses when he committed the instant offense. See United States v. McIntosh, No. 96-CR-0130-02 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 9, 1997). The district court said that this criminal history accounted for any “disparity” between McIntosh’s sentence and his coconspirators’ sentences and then selected the lowest possible sentence within the guidelines’ range. The district court considered the § 3553(a) factors and articulated its reasons for the sentence chosen; it would be frivolous to argue that the sentence it chose was unreasonable. See United States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005).