Opinion ID: 548955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 8 In order to sustain a conviction for the crime of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, the Government must prove three elements: (1) knowing (2) possession of marijuana (3) with intent to distribute it. United States v. Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d 496, 500 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Vergara, 687 F.2d 57, 61 (5th Cir.1982). A conviction for the crime of importation of marijuana requires proof that the defendant knowingly played a role in bringing marijuana from a foreign country into the United States. Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d at 500. In either event, the Government must adduce sufficient evidence of guilty knowledge, a requirement Diaz-Carreon contends was not satisfied in the instant case. 9 In considering Diaz-Carreon's allegations, this Court must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence in a light most favorable to the government. United States v. Prieto-Tejas, 779 F.2d 1098, 1101 (5th Cir.1986). To support a conviction, the evidence need not exclude every hypothesis of innocence, so long as a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc), aff'd, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983). A jury is free to choose among reasonable constructions of the evidence. Id. 10 In the instant case, the Government had the difficult task to prove that Diaz-Carreon knowingly possessed and imported marijuana. The Government could have, and did in fact, offer evidence that Diaz-Carreon was the driver of a vehicle which contained contraband. Knowledge of the presence of a controlled substance often may be inferred from the exercise of control over a vehicle in which the illegal substance is concealed. United States v. Richardson, 848 F.2d 509, 513 (5th Cir.1988); Vergara, 687 F.2d at 62. Here, however, evidence that Diaz-Carreon was the driver of the pickup truck would have been insufficient in itself to support a finding of guilty knowledge. The marijuana in this case was smuggled in hidden compartments which were not clearly visible or readily accessible to the defendant. Under these circumstances, control of the vehicle in which the contraband is cleverly hidden does not support an inference of guilty knowledge; it is at least a fair assumption that a third party might have concealed the controlled substances in the vehicle with the intent to use the unwitting defendant as the carrier in a smuggling enterprise. 4 Thus, in hidden compartment cases, this Court has repeatedly required additional evidence indicating knowledge--circumstances evidencing a consciousness of guilt on the part of the defendant. United States v. Olivier-Becerril, 861 F.2d 424, 426-27 (5th Cir.1988); Richardson, 848 F.2d at 513; United States v. Del Aguila-Reyes, 722 F.2d 155, 157 (5th Cir.1983). 11 While Diaz-Carreon's control of the pickup truck does not in itself constitute sufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed and imported marijuana, the Government in the instant case produced significant additional evidence that tends to establish Diaz-Carreon's guilty knowledge. Specifically, the Government asserts that the following circumstances adequately evidence the defendant's consciousness of guilt: (1) Diaz-Carreon's nervousness; (2) Diaz-Carreon's conflicting statements to customs officials; and (3) Diaz-Carreon's implausible story. 12 Nervousness. Nervous behavior at an inspection station frequently constitutes persuasive evidence of guilty knowledge. See Richardson, 848 F.2d at 513; Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d at 500-01; United States v. Moreno, 579 F.2d 371, 372 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 908, 99 S.Ct. 1217, 59 L.Ed.2d 456 (1979). Nervousness, however, is a normal reaction to circumstances which one does not understand. Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d at 501. In the absence of facts which suggest that the defendant's nervousness or anxiety derives from an underlying consciousness of criminal behavior, evidence of nervousness is insufficient to support a finding of guilty knowledge. Ample facts nonetheless exist in the instant case which suggest that Diaz-Carreon's nervousness derived from an underlying consciousness of criminal behavior. For example, before being told that agents had discovered marijuana in the pickup truck, Diaz-Carreon volunteered, If the truck is loaded, I didn't know about it. The jury could reasonably infer that this simple statement, delivered in a rush of anxiety, indicated that Diaz-Carreon knew of the existence of the marijuana in the truck and hoped to divert suspicion from himself. 13 Inconsistent statements to customs officials. Perhaps the strongest evidence of a criminal defendant's guilty knowledge is inconsistent statements to federal officials. See, e.g., Richardson, 848 F.2d at 513 (inconsistent statements to Drug Enforcement Agency and Border Patrol agents); Williams-Hendricks, 805 F.2d at 501 (inconsistent statements to customs inspectors). Inconsistent statements are inherently suspicious; a factfinder could reasonably conclude that they mask an underlying consciousness of guilt. In the present case, Diaz-Carreon first told customs officials that he was traveling to Canutillo, Texas, and later told customs officials that he was traveling to Anthony, New Mexico. He initially informed customs officials that he was a resident of Anthony, but later he admitted that he was a resident of Puerta de Anapra, Mexico. Diaz-Carreon's inconsistent account of these details casts considerable doubt on the veracity of his claim that he was unaware of the presence of the marijuana. 14 Implausible story. This Court has acknowledged that a less-than-credible explanation for a defendant's actions is part of the overall circumstantial evidence from which possession and knowledge may be inferred. United States v. Phillips, 496 F.2d 1395, 1398 n. 6 (5th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1056, 95 S.Ct. 2680, 45 L.Ed.2d 709 (1975). During an interview with a special agent of the customs service, Diaz-Carreon asserted that a man named Ruben, whom Diaz-Carreon had known only for a couple of days, had loaned him the pickup truck so that he could find employment. Diaz-Carreon maintained that Ruben neither informed him nor even hinted that the vehicle concealed controlled substances. However, Diaz-Carreon could not reveal--or refused to reveal--either the place where the mysterious Ruben lived or the place where Ruben was to retrieve the truck. The omission of these details seriously weakened the plausibility of Diaz-Carreon's portrayal. An implausible account of exculpatory events suggests that the defendant desires to obscure his criminal responsibility. A factfinder need not ignore such an implausible account; under appropriate conditions, the implausible account provides persuasive circumstantial evidence of the defendant's consciousness of guilt. 5 15 Considered together, these circumstances presented sufficient evidence of Diaz-Carreon's consciousness of guilt. The jury certainly was not obligated on these facts to find that Diaz-Carreon possessed guilty knowledge; it could well have rejected inferences which are reasonable to draw from these facts. Del Aguila-Reyes, 722 F.2d at 158. The jury in this case, however, determined that the evidence demonstrated Diaz-Carreon's guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. This Court is not inclined to disturb the jury verdict. On the totality of the circumstances, this Court concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury finding that Diaz-Carreon knowingly imported and possessed marijuana with the intent to distribute.