Opinion ID: 779125
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 77 This Circuit examines four factors to determine when procedural default of a state rule will prevent a federal court's review on habeas: (1) there must be a state procedural rule applicable to the petitioner's claim that he did not comply with; (2) the state courts must have actually enforced the state procedural rule against petitioner's claim; (3) the state procedural forfeiture must be an adequate and independent state ground upon which the state can rely to foreclose review of a federal constitutional claim; and (4) if the above three factors are met, the court may still excuse the default if the petitioner can demonstrate that there was cause for him to not follow the procedural rule and that he was actually prejudiced by the alleged constitutional error. Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir.1986); see also Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 576 (6th Cir.2002). 78 Tennessee state law provides that petitioners must file a petition for postconviction relief within one year from the date of the final action of the state's highest court on direct appeal. T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a). Petitioners may file only one petition attacking a single judgment; any subsequent petition is to be summarily dismissed. T.C.A. 40-30-202. 3 Hutchison does not dispute that his second petition was untimely under the statute of limitations or that his second petition was technically barred under the one-petition rule. 4 Instead, he alleges that the one year statute of limitations and the one petition rule do not constitute adequate and independent state grounds to uphold the conviction. Specifically, he charges that the Tennessee courts make a case-by-case due process exception to these provisions for those prisoners who present a legal or factual predicate that arises after the expiration of the limitations period. 79
80 This Court reviews de novo the question of whether a state procedural rule is an adequate and independent state ground. Luberda v. Trippett, 211 F.3d 1004, 1006 (6th Cir.2000). 81 To be adequate, a state procedural rule must be `firmly established and regularly followed' by the time as of which it is to be applied. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424, 111 S.Ct. 850, 112 L.Ed.2d 935 (1991). To determine whether the rule is firmly established, the court should look to whether, at the time of the petitioner's actions giving rise to the default, the petitioner could not be deemed to have been apprised of [the rule's] existence. Id. at 423, 111 S.Ct. 850 (quotation and citation omitted). A petitioner must show more than [a]n occasional act of grace by a state court in excusing or disregarding a state procedural rule in order for a federal court to conclude that the state procedural rule is inadequate because inconsistently applied. Coleman, 268 F.3d at 429 (quotation and citation omitted); see also Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 410 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 103 L.Ed.2d 435 (1989). 82
83 Hutchison argues that the Tennessee procedural rules are not adequate or independent because Tennessee courts apply a due process exception, first articulated in Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn.1992), to later-arising constitutional claims. Burford held that the state's previous three-year statute of limitations for postconviction petitions was facially constitutional, but recognized that there may be cases where the strict application of the limitations period would deprive prisoners of a meaningful opportunity to present their claims. In those cases, tolling of the statute of limitations is required to ensure that the statute is applied in a manner consistent with state and federal constitutional due process guarantees. See id. at 208. 84 Following Burford, Tennessee courts have employed a due process balancing test to determine whether to apply a statute of limitations bar where the grounds for relief actually arose after the limitations period would normally have commenced. Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 301 (Tenn.1995). Under this rule, [t]o determine whether a petitioner was denied a reasonable opportunity to present a claim, a court must balance the liberty interest in collaterally attacking the constitutional violations ... against the State's legitimate interest in preventing the litigation of stale and fraudulent claims. Wright v. State, 987 S.W.2d 26, 28 (Tenn. 1999). This exception for later-arising claims has been applied to permit consideration of procedurally barred Brady claims in circumstances involving both successive petitions and statute of limitations problems. Id. at 26; see also Sample v. State, Nos. 02C01-9505-CR-000131, 02C01-9505-CR-00139, 1996 WL 551754, at -7 (Tenn.Crim.App. Sept.30, 1996) (holding that trial court erred in dismissing successive postconviction petition without a hearing on waiver and statute of limitations grounds where facts alleged in petition showed that exculpatory evidence was suppressed until after limitations period had expired and after first petition was dismissed). In applying the Burford exception, Tennessee courts have established no formal constraints on the amount of time that the statute may be tolled. Williams v. State, 44 S.W.3d 464, 471 (Tenn.2001). In addition, as Burford made clear, Tennessee courts will sometimes toll the statute of limitations in cases where, as here, the grounds for relief became known after the statute of limitations began to run but before the limitations period completely expired. 845 S.W.2d at 209 (holding that an untimely claim should be allowed on due process grounds notwithstanding the fact that grounds for relief became known ten months before expiration of the statute). 85 Hutchison argues that Tennessee courts' willingness to excuse procedural default pursuant to Burford demonstrates that state procedural rules are not regularly followed in the context of later-arising claims. The district court rejected this argument. The court noted that Burford applied only to a narrow category of later-arising claims, which were not presented in the instant case. The court also suggested that the 1995 amendments to the statute of limitations may have vitiated Burford, and limited the exceptions to the statute of limitations to the narrow grounds laid out in the statute. Dist. Ct. Op. at 21-22. This reasoning is unpersuasive. The district court's first point begs the question. Hutchison has asserted that his claim is later-arising because he did not possess the factual predicate — i.e., the Brady materials — until it was too late to include them in his first postconviction petition. As noted above, Burford tolling may be applied in cases where the reason for delay in bringing the claim was suppression of evidence by the prosecution. See Sample, 1996 WL 551754, at -7. The district court's second point is legally incorrect, insofar as the Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that the Burford exception continues to apply after the 1995 amendments. Williams, 44 S.W.3d at 467 (remanding for further proceedings to determine whether counsel's misrepresentations to petitioner justified application of Burford exception to one-year statute of limitations under 1995 Act). 86 Nevertheless, we agree that Tennessee's due process exception does not render this provision inadequate. Tennessee's due process exception does not grant unfettered discretion to state courts in applying procedural default rules. Although Tennessee courts will often permit the hearing of an untimely claim, the decision is confined by the due process standards delineated in Burford and its progeny. The Tennessee courts consistently enforce a procedural scheme that encompasses both the one-year limitations period and a court-recognized procedure for tolling that statute when specific due process grounds are presented. Indeed, the postconviction court purported to follow this procedure in Hutchison's case, insofar as it considered his claim that he did not have a meaningful opportunity to present his claims earlier. Nevertheless, it found he had not made the showing required to warrant tolling. See Hutchison, 1997 WL 776342, at . 87 We have suggested in similar contexts that the state procedural rules at issue in the instant case are sufficiently firmly established to provide an adequate and independent state grounds for decision. This Court has previously determined that Tennessee's waiver rule, T.C.A. § 40-30-206(g), which provides that claims not raised in a prior proceeding are barred, constitutes an adequate and independent state-law rule precluding habeas relief. See Cone v. Bell, 243 F.3d 961, 969 (6th Cir.2001) (finding Brady claim procedurally barred by predecessor to T.C.A. § 40-30-206(g)), rev'd on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 331 (6th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 842, 120 S.Ct. 110, 145 L.Ed.2d 93 (1999). In Hannah v. Conley, 49 F.3d 1193 (6th Cir.1995) (per curiam), this Court found that the then-applicable three-year statute of limitations for postconviction petitions in Tennessee was regularly applied and would bar presentation of an unexhausted claim. Id. at 1197. The Hannah court noted that the language of the statute was mandatory in that it provided that a claimant must petition within three years or his claim shall be barred. Id. at 1196. The current one-year statute of limitations contains the same mandatory language. See T.C.A. § 40-30-202(a). 88 Although the previous cases did not present a Burford -type later arising claim, we do not find that the state's Burford tolling rules command a different result. In Paprocki v. Foltz, 869 F.2d 281 (6th Cir.1989), we considered whether the Michigan state court had waived its right to enforce its procedural rule by briefly considering whether manifest injustice would result from a default. Id. at 285. This Court concluded that [w]e would be loath to adopt an exception to the `cause and prejudice' rule that would discourage state appellate courts from undertaking the sort of inquiry conducted by the Michigan court. Id. Similarly, in the instant case, to find that the repeated application of Burford -style tolling renders the Tennessee statute of limitations an inadequate basis to deny postconviction relief would have the unfortunate effect of discouraging a practice that provides states the opportunity to remedy unconstitutional convictions in cases involving later-arising claims. 89 Given that tolling under Burford is not discretionary and given this Circuit's reluctance to discourage state courts from exhibiting caution before applying procedural default rules in capital cases, we conclude that the Burford exception does not render Tennessee's procedural rules inadequate. 5 90
91 Hutchison also argues that the state postconviction court's determination that his claims were procedurally barred was intertwined with federal law, and therefore was not an independent state-law ground for denial of his petition. Hutchison bases this argument on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). In Ake, the Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to review the merits of the defendant's constitutional due process claim on direct review from the Oklahoma Supreme Court, despite the Oklahoma Supreme Court's conclusion that the argument was waived under a state procedural rule. Id. at 74, 105 S.Ct. 1087. The Ake Court reasoned that because the state-law waiver rule did not apply to constitutional errors, [b]efore applying the waiver doctrine to a constitutional question, the state court must rule, either explicitly or implicitly, on the merits of the constitutional question. Id. at 75, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Thus, the Court could review the state supreme court's decision insofar as that decision was premised upon a determination of the merits of the defendant's federal-law claim. The Court explained that when resolution of the state procedural law question depends on a federal constitutional ruling, the state-law prong of the court's holding is not independent of federal law, and our jurisdiction is not precluded. Id. 92 Hutchison argues that the Tennessee criminal appeals court's conclusion that his Brady claims were barred is similarly intertwined with federal law. In order to reach the conclusion that his claims had been waived, Hutchison argues, the court had to consider whether, under Burford, Hutchison was afforded a fair opportunity to present his claims. Hutchison argues that the exception recognized in Burford is based upon U.S. Supreme Court precedent and the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 207-08 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 437, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982)); Seals v. State, 23 S.W.3d 272, 277 (Tenn.2000). Therefore, Hutchison asserts that the state court's determination of the waiver issue was necessarily based upon the application of federal constitutional law. 93 The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Coleman, 501 U.S. at 741-42, 111 S.Ct. 2546. In Coleman, a habeas petitioner argued, relying on Ake, that the Virginia Supreme Court's decision that his appeal was barred by the statute of limitations was not independent of federal law because state law required tolling of the limitations period if denial of an extension of time would abridge a constitutional right. Id. at 741, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Court, after expressing some doubt as to whether Ake applied in the habeas context, concluded that even if Ake applies here, it does [petitioner] no good because the Virginia Supreme Court relied on an independent state procedural rule. Id. The Court explained that the Virginia Supreme Court's tolling doctrine did not require state courts to examine the merits of the petitioner's federal constitutional claims before applying the bar. Instead, the Court concluded, [a] more natural reading is that the Virginia Supreme Court will only grant an extension of time if the denial itself would abridge a constitutional right. That is, the Virginia Supreme Court will extend its time requirement only in those cases in which the petitioner has a constitutional right to have the appeal heard. Id. at 741-42, 111 S.Ct. 2546. The Court then explained that the tolling rule was of no help to the petitioner's jurisdictional argument, because he did not contend that the failure of the Virginia Supreme Court to hear his untimely state habeas appeal violated one of his constitutional rights. Id. 94 Coleman controls in the instant case. The Burford exception applies when the strict application of the statute of limitations would constitute a denial of federal and state due process rights by depriving the petitioner of a meaningful opportunity to present his claims. Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. Thus, as with the Virginia rule, Burford provides an exception to the statute of limitations when the denial of the hearing itself would violate the petitioner's constitutional due process rights. Unlike Ake, the decision to apply the Burford exception does not depend upon the state court's determination of the merits of the petitioner's constitutional challenges to his conviction or sentence. 6 Indeed, the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals expressly stated that it was not reviewing the merits of Hutchison's Brady claim. Hutchison, 1997 WL 776342, at  ([W]e determine[ ] that the petition was properly dismissed because it had been filed after expiration of the statute of limitations and a prior post-conviction petition had been filed and heard on the merits....). Because Hutchison, like the petitioner in Coleman, does not assert that the state's denial of a second postconviction hearing was itself a constitutional violation, the state court's decision not to apply the Burford exception is not reviewable by this Court. Accord Scott v. Mitchell, 209 F.3d 854, 868 (6th Cir.2000) (The Supreme Court ... does not find the mere reservation of discretion to review for plain error in exceptional circumstances sufficient to constitute an application of federal law.). 95
96 Hutchison's default may nonetheless be excused if he can show cause for his failure to timely raise his Brady claims and prejudice resulting from his default. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977). In the context of this Brady claim, the requirements for showing cause and prejudice parallel the elements of the underlying Brady violation. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936. Suppression of exculpatory or favorable impeaching evidence by the state that results in an inability to raise claims relating to that evidence in state court establishes cause for the ensuing default. Id. The petitioner need not show that the prosecutor acted in bad faith or that defense counsel made a specific request for evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985). However, unless the alleged Brady evidence is material for the purposes of the Brady rule, its suppression d[oes] not give rise to sufficient prejudice to overcome the procedural default. Strickler, 527 U.S. at 282, 119 S.Ct. 1936. 97
98
99 The Tennessee appeals court found that Hutchison had received the alleged Brady materials prior to his first postconviction hearing. See Hutchison, 1997 WL 776342, at . As it explained: 100 Petitioner candidly admits that he had access to the alleged  Brady  material prior to the hearing on the first petition for postconviction relief. There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Petitioner was not provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner as required by Burford, 845 S.W.2d at 208. 101 Id. Giving deference to this factual finding, as required by AEDPA, the district court concluded that Hutchison had access to the Brady material prior to his first postconviction hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). Because Hutchison could not show that his failure to present these claims was due to suppression rather than his own neglect, the district court concluded that Hutchison could not show cause for the default. 102 We agree with the district court. Hutchison has not presented clear and convincing evidence that he did not possess the first group of Brady materials prior to his first hearing. There is no affidavit or testimony from Hutchison's postconviction counsel regarding the timing of the prosecution's disclosures. Nor is there any documentary evidence addressing this question. The only item in the record cited by Hutchison to support his claim is the state's reply to his traverse in opposition to summary judgment filed before the district court. In replying to Hutchison's contention that a factual dispute existed over whether the files were provided prior to or at the first postconviction hearing, the state responded that the dispute could be eliminated by amending the phrase to read `immediately prior to' the hearing. Respondent is not asserting that the records were provided days or weeks before the hearing. J.A. at 369-70. 103 The record also supports the district court's conclusion that the materials were not suppressed prior to the first postconviction hearing. Hutchison's brief to the state criminal appeals court said of the Brady materials presented in Hutchison's second postconviction petition that [t]hese items were part of a large volume of documents that the appellant was allowed to examine before the hearing on the original post conviction petition; however, the appellant and his counsel were not given adequate time to examine and utilize the same in order to make the same part of the original hearing. J.A. at 137 (emphasis added). Moreover, in an appearance before the postconviction court prior to Hutchison's first postconviction hearing, counsel for Hutchison requested a continuance, explaining that [t]here are records of various law enforcement agencies, including the District Attorney's office, that I have not had an opportunity to review. J.A. at 857. The district court interpreted this statement to imply that Hutchison had received the district attorney's file by September 8, 1995, seventeen days before Hutchison's initial postconviction hearing. Dist. Ct. Op. at 54. In addition, during oral argument on Hutchison's second state postconviction petition, Hutchison's counsel stated that the materials that make up the basis for the Petition were not materials that were furnished by the State in discovery in the original trial. These were materials that were obtained by myself in the process of preparing for the second, or the Petition for Post Conviction Relief for hearing. J.A. at 879. Although syntactically confusing, this statement suggests that the materials were disclosed during the preparation of the first postconviction petition. 104 Even if Hutchison did not receive the district attorney's file in time to raise the Brady claims in his first postconviction petition, he cannot show cause to excuse his failure to file his second petition within the one-year statute of limitations. Hutchison, 1997 WL 776342, at . Under the Post-Conviction Procedure Act of 1995, Hutchison had until May 10, 1996, to bring a timely petition for postconviction relief. See Carter, 952 S.W.2d at 419. Under any account of the facts, Hutchison received the first group of alleged Brady materials no later than September 27, 1995. He filed his second state postconviction petition on August 1, 1996. Hutchison has provided no credible explanation for his failure to raise these claims before the statute of limitations expired on May 10, 1996. We therefore find Hutchison has not demonstrated sufficient material facts to show cause for his procedural default. 105
106 Even if Hutchison could show cause for his default as to the first group of Brady claims, the allegedly suppressed evidence is not material for Brady purposes. Therefore, Hutchison cannot show prejudice resulting from any default. 107 The Supreme Court has explained that the touchstone of materiality is a `reasonable probability' of a different result .... The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Moreover, materiality is not a sufficiency of evidence test. A defendant need not demonstrate that after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been enough left to convict. Id. at 434-35, 115 S.Ct. 1555. Materiality is to be evaluated in light of the cumulative effect of the undisclosed evidence. Id. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555. [I]nformation withheld by the prosecution is not material unless the information consists of, or would lead directly to, evidence admissible at trial for either substantive or impeachment purposes. United States v. Phillip, 948 F.2d 241, 249 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 930, 112 S.Ct. 1994, 118 L.Ed.2d 590 (1992). 108 The chief piece of exculpatory and impeaching evidence advanced by Hutchison is the statement by Davis reporting Miller's statement that he (Miller) and Gaylor had set up the whole thing involving Hugh's death and had devised the plan to use two boats. J.A. at 581. Hutchison contends that this evidence was exculpatory insofar as it established that Gaylor and Miller acted alone in planning Huddleston's murder. Hutchison argues that the statement could have been used to impeach Miller because it was inconsistent with his testimony implicating Hutchison. Hutchison also contends that disclosure of this statement would have altered his trial strategy and supported his motion for severance. 109 Miller's statement to Davis is hearsay and could not be used to prove the truth of what was said — i.e., that Miller and Gaylor acted alone. The fact that any use of the evidence would be limited to impeachment mitigates the potential exculpatory impact of the evidence. See United States v. Perez, 280 F.3d 318, 349 (3d Cir.2002) (finding that exculpatory out-of-court statement by witness would not have made a difference in the trial because, while it may come in to impeach..., it could not come in for substantive consideration by the jury because it was inadmissible hearsay). In addition, Hutchison has offered no basis for concluding that disclosure of this item would have led to the discovery of other admissible evidence that could have been used to prove the substance of the statement — i.e., that Gaylor and Miller planned the murder alone. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6, 116 S.Ct. 7, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (finding no Brady violation where suppressed evidence was inadmissible and petitioner could offer only speculation that disclosure would have led to admissible evidence). 110 Moreover, although Hutchison's counsel could have asked Miller about the statement described in the insurance report on cross-examination, the insurance report itself would not have been admissible as extrinsic evidence of Miller's prior inconsistent statement. The account of Miller's statement in the insurance report contains multiple levels of hearsay: the report itself is an out-of-court statement that summarizes an out-of-court statement by Tony Goings, which in turn recounts an out-of-court statement by David Davis reporting the out-of-court statement of Miller. Although the out-of-court statement of Miller is admissible for impeachment purposes, the Tennessee Rules of Evidence, like the Federal Rules, permit introduction of multiple hearsay evidence only if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule. Tenn. R. Evid. 805. Because there is no exception covering the intermediate levels of hearsay in the insurance report, the report would not be admissible to impeach Miller. See Paradis v. Arave, 240 F.3d 1169, 1179 (9th Cir.2001) ([I]f Haws' notes record Elliott's hearsay reports of Dr. Brady's hearsay statements, then the notes themselves would not be admissible, even to impeach Dr. Brady.). 111 Finally, Hutchison's claim that nondisclosure of Miller's statement prejudiced his trial strategy is insufficient to establish materiality. This Circuit has implied that it may consider whether suppression of Brady materials affected trial strategy in determining prejudice. See Schledwitz v. United States, 169 F.3d 1003, 1016 (6th Cir.1999). But see Phillip, 948 F.2d at 249 (Significantly, the issue of materiality for Brady purposes pertains only to the question of a defendant's guilt or innocence, not to the issue of a defendant's ability or inability to prepare for trial.). In Schledwitz, however, the petitioner provided affidavits from counsel stating specifically what witnesses would have been called had the evidence been disclosed, thus giving the court a basis to evaluate how the disclosure would have affected the trial. 169 F.3d at 1016. As noted above, the insurance report could not be used to prove the truth of Miller's statement that he and Gaylor acted alone. The primary items of evidence cited by Hutchison as supporting this defense strategy are statements relating to the possibility of a homosexual relationship between Gaylor and Huddleston and evidence that Gaylor and Miller had abused Huddleston on previous occasions. Such evidence, however, does not exculpate Hutchison; it merely inculpates a coconspirator who has already been found guilty of participating in the murder. This evidence is not inconsistent with the state's evidence or theory of guilt. In fact, Miller testified that Gaylor suggested that he knew of the right victim for the life insurance scheme. J.A. at 806. Even if the evidence established that Miller had concocted the murder plan, Hutchison would still be death-penalty eligible for his participation as a conspirator in a murder-for-hire scheme. See generally State v. Porterfield, 746 S.W.2d 441 (Tenn.1988); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 293, 119 S.Ct. 1936 (finding no prejudice where petitioner's guilt of capital murder did not depend on proof that he was the dominant partner). 112 The remaining items included in Hutchison's first group of Brady claims are two statements in the insurance claims investigation indicating that Miller and Gaylor physically abused Huddleston in the past. As noted above, this evidence is not significantly exculpatory as to Hutchison. The evidence may have some value in impeaching Miller, who testified that he had never seen any physical confrontations between Gaylor and Huddleston. J.A. at 804. Miller was the chief prosecution witness, Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d at 165, so any impeaching evidence would have been valuable to Hutchison at trial. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 445-46, 115 S.Ct. 1555 (indicating that denial of opportunity to use impeaching evidence against essential witness weighs heavily in due process analysis); Schledwitz, 169 F.3d at 1016 (withholding evidence of purportedly neutral witness in investigation of defendant was all the more egregious because Horne, as found by the district court, was the `key' witness). However, at trial, defense counsel did ask Miller about previous incidents of physical abuse of Huddleston. J.A. at 811 (And do you admit or deny that you and David Davis went outside and in fact bent [Huddleston's] arm behind his back and put him to the ground?). Miller denied these incidents; but the fact that defense counsel pursued this line of questioning suggests that he was aware of facts regarding physical abuse of Huddleston and was able to bring at least one of these alleged incidents to the jury's attention for the purpose of impeaching Miller. 113 Finally, any impeachment value of the evidence is undermined by other evidence in the record, including: Rollyson's corroboration of Miller's testimony, the existence of the life insurance policy naming Hutchison, the testimony of Hutchison's cellmate, and the letters written by Hutchison himself while in prison. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d at 166. 114 In sum, the evidence cited by Hutchison in his first group of Brady claims does not satisfy the materiality test. Therefore, Hutchison cannot show prejudice stemming from its suppression. 115
116 The district court determined that Hutchison had likewise failed to show cause for his failure to raise claims relating to the second group of Brady materials — the materials that were allegedly disclosed only after the filing of Hutchison's federal habeas appeal — in state court or prejudice resulting from his default. The district court explained that it is not clear to the Court how petitioner could determine that the material contained in [the second group of claims] was not included in the previous records disclosed to and reviewed by petitioner's post-conviction counsel. Dist. Ct. Op. at 57. The district court also noted that petitioner could not show a reasonable probability of a different result if the materials in this second group had been timely disclosed. 117 We agree with the district court. The burden of production is on Hutchison to demonstrate a material fact as to the cause of his default. Hutchison has produced no admissible evidence to show that the materials available to him during his habeas petition were not available before his first postconviction proceeding. Moreover, the insurance report materials listed in Hutchison's second group of Brady claims have little or no impeachment or exculpatory value. The fact that Curnutt delivered premium payments to the insurance company is not exculpatory, or otherwise inconsistent with the prosecution's case, since Curnutt was alleged to be a member of the conspiracy himself and was convicted for his involvement in a separate trial. J.A. at 820 (discussing Curnutt's involvement in the conspiracy); see also Strickler, 527 U.S. at 293, 119 S.Ct. 1936. The fact that Huddleston talked with the nurse and rescheduled his physical examination does not refute Hutchison's involvement in arranging the insurance policy. The statement by Harmon indicating that Miller was nervous at Huddleston's funeral would add little to the defense, since Miller acknowledged at trial that he was at least complicit in the murder. Finally, the petitioner has not given any reason why the fact that the manager of the marina remembered Huddleston renting the boat would be exculpatory or impeach another witness. 118 The remaining materials in the second group appear to be documents from the TBI files. Petitioner cannot establish cause for his failure to present his claims relating to these materials in the state court. Hutchison's discovery motion to the district court reveals that he did not request the TBI records until December 14, 1998. J.A. at 65. This was long after the expiration of the Tennessee statute of limitations. Hutchison admits, however, that these materials could have been requested at the time that postconviction counsel was appointed prior to his first postconviction hearing in 1995. Appellant's Br. at 80. Given the difficulty Hutchison experienced in obtaining the TBI file once it was requested, it is possible that Hutchison would not have received the files in time to file a claim prior to the expiration of the limitations period. Nonetheless, had he attempted to present the TBI materials to the state court, any difficulty he experienced in obtaining the TBI files could have formed the basis of an argument for Burford tolling, which would have afforded the state court an opportunity to consider the claims. The fact that the TBI materials appear to have gone unrequested until after Hutchison had defaulted his state remedies means that he cannot establish cause for his default of these claims. 119 Even if Hutchison could establish cause, the items in the second group of Brady claims are not material for Brady purposes, and therefore are not sufficient to demonstrate prejudice resulting from Hutchison's default. Several of these materials, including the McCart statement, and the Huddleston letter, could be used to show that there was a sexual relationship between Huddleston and Gaylor, which might supply additional evidence of motive for Gaylor. However, it is not clear how this evidence would exculpate Hutchison. The prosecution's theory already posited that Gaylor was involved in the murder, so evidence inculpating Gaylor would not tend to show Hutchison's innocence. In addition, there was already abundant evidence indicating that Gaylor had a financial motive to murder Huddleston, insofar as Gaylor was the sole beneficiary under the will and another insurance policy. Therefore, it is unclear why evidence of another motive would have changed the jury's impression of Hutchison's guilt or made Hutchison more likely to pursue a theory of defense asserting that Gaylor acted to kill Huddleston without Hutchison's involvement. 120 Hutchison argues that McCart's statement has exculpatory value because she states that Gaylor talked about killing Huddleston with a group of people that did not include Hutchison. At best, however, this establishes that some discussion of killing Huddleston occurred when Hutchison was not present, but it does not exclude Hutchison from the conspiracy. 121 The report of the polygraph examination of Rollyson would have had little value for the defense. Rollyson testified that he was on the boat when Huddleston drowned. The polygraph report suggested that he answered deceptively to questions about whether he touched Huddleston while he was in the water. Although the polygraph report contradicts Rollyson's testimony at trial that he did not touch Huddleston and did not see him fall into the water, it shows only inconsistency in Rollyson's statements about his own involvement in the crime. It does not exculpate Hutchison. Moreover, the defense was able to impeach Rollyson with a prior statement given to the police that he did touch Huddleston while Huddleston was in the water. The report, therefore, would have added little to the defense. 122 Finally, Hutchison points to the statement from John Davidson, who claims to have known Hutchison for seven years, indicating that Davidson was unaware of any drug activity on Hutchison's part. This evidence may have some exculpatory value insofar as it rebuts the prosecution's theory that the crime was motivated by Hutchison's desire to expand his drug business. However, [t]he Brady rule does not assist a defendant who is aware of the essential facts that would allow him to take advantage of the exculpatory evidence at issue. Coleman, 268 F.3d at 438. Presumably, if Davidson and Hutchison knew each other as well as Davidson claims, Hutchison would have known about any potential testimony from Davidson. Therefore, Hutchison was aware of the essential facts necessary for him to take advantage of this testimony. Moreover, Davidson's statement is not particularly strong evidence; the mere fact that one of Hutchison's longtime friends was unaware of drug activity does not rule out the possibility that drug activity occurred without his knowledge. 123 Taken together, these items do not so undermine confidence in the jury's verdict that they could be considered material for Brady purposes. Therefore, even if Hutchison could show cause for his failure to raise his claims relating to the TBI materials, he cannot demonstrate prejudice sufficient to excuse the default.