Opinion ID: 1728247
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the alibi jury instruction erroneously rejected?

Text: Alibi was Sanford's sole defense, other than objecting to the confession. His testimony and that of his mother and sister we have previously summarized, supra. Pursuant to his alibi defense, Sanford requested Instruction D-7, the language of which and accompanying colloquy follow: The Court instructs the jury that if you believe from the evidence that on June 12, 1976 that Bobby Sanford was at home in the presence of his mother and sister, then you must return a verdict of Not Guilty. The district attorney objected, stating: I object to D-7 because it's misleading to the Jury. The instruction says if they believe that he was at home at any time on June 12, 1976, he should be found not guilty, and the State has proved that this alleged act occurred at night time, so it's misleading to the Jury. He could have been home any time that day and still committed the crime. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT (Mr. Kelly): I'll put in the time, Your Honor. THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY (Mr. Chatham): I believe this instruction is for an alibi defense. COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT (Mr. Kelly): Your Honor, for the record, Defendant moved [sic] the Court to permit him to amend Instruction D-7 to include the times of from 9:30 p.m. on June 12, 1976 until 2:15 a.m. on June 13, 1976. THE COURT: And there's not one scintilla of proof in that regard. The only thing we have in this record is that Mama went to bed at 10:30, a [sic] minutes after 10:35, right after the news. One sister went at 11:30  he went to bed about 11:30, and one sister, I believe she said she was still up at that time. There is no proof as to any other time he was there or anything else. And the Court will refuse that instruction. Alibi as a defense is well established in our criminal jurisprudence. We have held many times that alibi testimony, if believed by the jury when considered along with all the other evidence, requires acquittal. Without question, one who interposes an alibi as the theory of his defense, and presents testimony in support of such a plea, is entitled to a jury instruction focusing upon such a theory. Here there is no indication that Sanford's counsel was not permitted to orally argue the alibi during the course of his jury argument made after all the testimony concluded. Although such an argument may have been made, we cannot be certain inasmuch as the record contains no transcript of closing jury arguments. We think it appropriate to state here that in trials of criminal cases (more especially for felonies) presiding judges may (and must if requested) require that jury arguments be made part of the record. Then on appeal, either side in the interest of justice may designate placing a transcription of the jury arguments in the record to be presented to us. Instruction D-7, as initially requested was improper for several reasons. Not only is it (as originally worded) peremptory in form, requiring acquittal in the event the jury should believe that the appellant Sanford was at home any instant of the day-light or dark hours of June 12, 1976, but it was also clearly improper for failing to limit (to any particular time frame or to day-light or dark hours of June 12, 1976) the appellant's being at home. Further, the instruction is improper in that it should have directed the jury to base its finding not only upon that portion of the evidence dealing with appellant's alibi, but it should have told the jury to consider his alibi evidence along with all the other evidence in the case. 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1204 (1961) at 527-529. The rule is as stated in 1 Wharton's Criminal Law Evidence § 23, pages 42-43 [13th Ed., Torcia, (1972)]: All the evidence in the case is to be considered together. The converse rule is stated under the same section of Wharton's work to be that: [T]he fact finder cannot acquit the defendant on the ground that the alibi evidence considered by itself raises a reasonable doubt. When the trial court announced that it would not grant the requested instruction, defense counsel moved the court to permit him to amend Instruction D-7 to include the times of from 9:30 p.m. on June 12, 1976 until 2:15 a.m. on June 13, 1976. Consideration of the proposed amendment to D-7 must be done in the light of testimony which pertained to Sanford's alibi defense. According to him, he retired between 10:30 and 10:35 on the evening of the crime. His mother testified that she watched the news and went to bed at about 10:30 p.m., not knowing when her son went to bed. Sanford's sister testified that she was still up when he went to bed a little before 11:00 or 11:30 of the evening of the offense. Nowhere in the record do we find any testimony that Sanford was in the presence of or in the same room with his mother and sister at any time whatever after he went to bed on the night of the offense. Three people in three separate rooms of a certain residence could hardly be said to be in the presence of each other, and hardly could there be drawn any conclusion or inference that none of the three exited the house unknown to the others. [2] Both in its original form and with the proposed amendment, D-7 contains language not only that the appellant was at home but that he was at home in the presence of his mother and sister.  The court's rejection of the proposed instruction as originally submitted in handwriting (obviously, it was hastily drawn rather than prepared in advance of the trial), and then its rejection of the proposed amendment which was sought by an oral motion made at the time the court was considering all of the requested instructions, does not require reversal. Clearly there was no evidence that Sanford throughout all the night was in the presence of his mother and sister, thus the instruction lacks evidentiary support. Further, as we pointed out above, the instruction seems to focus and comment upon only the alibi testimony in isolation from the rest of the evidence, rather than being considered together with all the [rest of the] evidence. Additionally, we note that there was testimony indicating that the offense may not have occurred within the time frame between 9:30 p.m... . until 2:15 a.m. but prior to 9:30. Indeed, witness David Thorpe's testimony may be construed to fix the time as prior to 9:30 p.m. on June 12, 1976. The trial judge's statement in the record (made when defense counsel sought permission to amend Instruction D-7) that there's not one scintilla of proof in that regard is not entirely accurate, because the defense had presented testimony at least raising some suggestion (though not with certainty) that Sanford was at home while his mother and sister were also there. However, the judge was not entirely in error as to his recollection of the evidence, because he referred to evidence that Mama went to bed at 10:30 and sister went at 11:30. In our view, neither affirmance nor reversal may logically rest upon whether or not a trial judge possesses an infallible memory as to all the evidentiary minutiae presented during a trial. Here the critical issue is: Must the conviction be reversed because the trial judge rejected Instruction D-7 in both its original form and in the form as counsel sought to amend it? The answer is negative because, as initially requested and even after the proposed amendment, the instruction contained the erroneous language (unsupported by testimony) that Sanford was at home in the presence of his mother and sister ... The evidence presented by the defense, even if construed in his favor, shows only that the three (Sanford, his mother, and sister) retired for the night. No testimony indicated that they subsequently remained in the presence of each other. [3] We conclude that Sanford was given a fair trial, and the verdict is well supported by competent evidence. Accordingly, reversal is not warranted. AFFIRMED. SMITH, ROBERTSON, P. JJ., and SUGG, WALKER and LEE, JJ., concur. PATTERSON, C.J., and BOWLING, J., dissent. COFER, J., takes no part.