Opinion ID: 719818
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Grant a Mistrial Based on Jury Taint

Text: 39 Lacey argues that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial after a potential juror made certain allegedly prejudicial remarks in the presence of the other venirepersons. A ruling on a motion for mistrial is within the sound discretion of the district court and will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. United States v. Wacker, 72 F.3d 1453, 1466 (10th Cir.1995) (citing United States v. Berryhill, 880 F.2d 275, 278 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1049, 110 S.Ct. 853, 107 L.Ed.2d 846 (1990)). 40 In response to questioning from the court during voir dire, one potential juror indicated that his opinion of the defendant's guilt would be affected if the defendant did not take the stand and proclaim his innocence. When asked if this belief would affect his ability to render an impartial verdict, the juror replied that it would. 10 The district court promptly dismissed the juror for cause, yet two other jurors questioned immediately thereafter expressed similar opinions regarding the defendant's decision not to testify. One of these two jurors was excused for cause and the other was excused by way of defendant's peremptory challenge. At this point in the proceedings, Lacey moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion and instructed the jury as follows: 41 The fact that a defendant did not take the stand and testify in his own behalf does not create any presumption against him. You are charged that you must not permit that fact to weigh in the slightest degree against him nor should it enter into your discussions or deliberations in any manner. 42 (R.O.A. Vol. X, p. 321.) The court then inquired whether any of the jurors would have difficulty following this instruction. None of the jurors responded affirmatively. Because Lacey did not testify at trial, the court issued the instruction again at the close of the case. 43 When improper or prejudicial remarks are made by one venireperson and heard by other venirepersons during the jury selection process, we have held that the test of juror impartiality is whether 'the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.'  Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1467 (quoting Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642-43, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961)). While it is true that the three excused jurors demonstrated some degree of bias against a defendant who would not testify, the partiality of the petit jury is evaluated in light of those persons ultimately empaneled and sworn, not those who are excused from service. United States v. McIntyre, 997 F.2d 687, 698 n. 7 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 736, 126 L.Ed.2d 699 (1994). The trial judge believed that the cautionary instruction given to the remaining venirepersons was sufficient to cure any possible prejudice against the defendant. The court also took the additional step of questioning the potential jurors in order to be certain that its instructions were heeded. Because the district court is in the best position to judge the effect of improper statements on a jury and the sincerity of the jurors' pledge to abide by the court's instructions, its assessment is entitled to great weight. Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1467-68 (citing United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320, 1330-31 (10th Cir.1979); United States v. Tegzes, 715 F.2d 505, 508-09 (11th Cir.1983)). After reviewing the record, we do not believe that the district court abused its discretion by denying Lacey's request for a mistrial.