Opinion ID: 777915
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Kim Was In Custody

Text: 19 An officer's obligation to give a suspect Miranda warnings before interrogation extends only to those instances where the individual is in custody. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) (per curiam). To determine whether an individual was in custody, a court must, after examining all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation, decide whether there [was] a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The inquiry focuses on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not the subjective views of the officers or the individual being questioned. Id. at 323, 114 S.Ct. 1526. That is, we must determine whether the officers established a setting from which a reasonable person would believe that he or she was not free to leave. United States v. Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir.), modified by 830 F.2d 127 (9th Cir.1987); see also Hayden, 260 F.3d at 1066. The following factors are among those likely to be relevant to deciding that question: (1) the language used to summon the individual; (2) the extent to which the defendant is confronted with evidence of guilt; (3) the physical surroundings of the interrogation; (4) the duration of the detention; and (5) the degree of pressure applied to detain the individual. Hayden, 260 F.3d at 1066 (citing Beraun-Panez, 812 F.2d at 580). Other factors may also be pertinent to, and even dispositive of, the ultimate determination whether a reasonable person would have believed he could freely walk away from the interrogators; the Beraun-Panez/Hayden factors are simply ones that recur frequently. 20 The district court's factual findings are not clearly erroneous, as they are supported by testimony in the record that the judge determined was credible. After reviewing the factual findings under all of the circumstances, including both the above factors and others, we conclude that Kim was in custody for Miranda purposes because a reasonable person in Kim's circumstances would not have felt free to leave. See id. 21 The police did not summon Kim to the store, or require her to enter the store once she arrived in the parking lot. Rather, she came to the store voluntarily because she was alarmed that her son did not answer the store's phone when she called to check on him. When she arrived to find the door locked, she knocked and asked that the police allow her and her husband inside because they were the store's owners. 22 In determining whether suspects were in custody for Miranda purposes, the Supreme Court has considered whether they voluntarily approached or accompanied law officers understanding that questioning would ensue. See California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517, 77 L.Ed.2d 1275 (1982) (per curiam) (holding that defendant was not in custody when he agreed to accompany police to the station to answer questions and was allowed to leave immediately afterward); Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711 (holding that defendant was not in custody when he came to the station voluntarily and left without hindrance after 30 minutes of questioning). We, too, have found that suspects were not in custody where the circumstances included volunteering to answer law officers' questions. See, e.g., Hayden, 260 F.3d at 1066-67; United States v. Hudgens, 798 F.2d 1234, 1236-37 (9th Cir.1986). 23 There is a critical distinction, however, between voluntarily entering one's own place of business without any intention to present oneself for a police interview, and voluntarily accompanying the police to their station upon request for the very purpose, known in advance, of answering their questions. Here, Kim did not willingly agree to submit to an encounter with the police. Rather, she went to her store because an officer's visit to her home caused her to worry about her son when he did not answer the store's phone. Arriving at the store to find the place surrounded by police cars did not alleviate her concerns, so she sought to enter the store to check on her son's situation. Although Kim did arrive at the store voluntarily, she did not do so to speak to the police. That the police did not summon her to the store in the first place, imperatively or otherwise, is therefore entirely uninformative in determining the dispositive question — whether Kim would have felt free to leave once the questioning started. 24 If the police ask — not order — someone to speak to them and that person comes to the police station, voluntarily, precisely to do so, the individual is likely to expect that he can end the encounter. By contrast, someone who comes to her own store with no intention of submitting to questioning is not likely to harbor the same understanding once police interrogation nonetheless begins — especially if, as here, she is ordered to shut up, seated in isolation away from two other family members, and then questioned. 25 Voluntary initiation of contact with the police cannot be, under any circumstances, the end of the inquiry into whether a defendant was in custody during the encounter. If an individual voluntarily comes to the police station or another location and, once there, the circumstances become such that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave, the interrogation can become custodial. The Supreme Court cases relying on the voluntary initiation of the police encounter or on the location of the interrogation so indicate, as none rely solely on either factor. See, e.g., Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711 (finding no indication that the questioning took place in a context where [defendant's] freedom to depart was restricted in any way); Beheler, 463 U.S. at 1125, 103 S.Ct. 3517 (finding that defendant's freedom was not restricted in any way whatsoever and that the prior identification of the defendant as a suspect and the fact that the interview was in a police station were not alone enough to create a custodial situation). 26 Our similar cases rely on the fact that the initial encounter with the police was voluntary only in the absence of other circumstances indicating that the interview later became coercive. See Hayden, 260 F.3d at 1066 (the defendant was told explicitly that she was free to leave at anytime, her ability to leave was [not] in any other way restrained, and the duration of the interviews was [not] excessive[and] undue pressure was [not] exerted); United States v. Gregory, 891 F.2d 732, 735 (9th Cir.1989) (the defendant consented to be interviewed in his house, he was interviewed in the presence of his wife, the interview lasted only a brief time, and no coercion or force was used); Hudgens, 798 F.2d 1234 (the defendant voluntarily entered a police car to talk to the police, the agents did not use intimidating or coercive language during the interview, and the defendant testified that he did not feel coerced by the agents). 27 The one case we have found that is on the surface factually close to this one is United States v. Crawford, 52 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir.1995), in which the district court had concluded that the defendants were not in custody after they voluntarily entered their own electronics store during a search. Reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress under a deferential standard, the Fifth Circuit concluded that it cannot be said that the trial court's findings are not plausible. Id. at 1309. 28 There are significant factual differences between this case and Crawford. 2 More importantly, however, the deferential standard of review of the district court's denial of the motions to suppress weighed much more heavily in favor of a finding on appeal that the defendants were not in custody. Because we are reviewing the in custody determination de novo, Crawford is not particularly informative. Fernandez v. Roe, 286 F.3d 1073, (9th Cir.2002) (distinguishing precedent that review[ed] for `clear error,' unlike the de novo review applied here). 3 29 To support its argument that Kim was not in custody for Miranda purposes during the search, the government relies on Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 701-02, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981). Summers held the police's detention of an individual at his home during the execution of a search warrant did not constitute a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. The government contends that, although Summers did not address the issue of custodial interrogation, its principles support the conclusion that police officers executing a search warrant need not give Miranda warnings to an individual detained and questioned during a search. We disagree. 30 In the Fourth Amendment context, locking doors and restricting the occupants' movement are often reasonable police procedures to control access to a scene during the execution of a search warrant. See id. at 702-03, 101 S.Ct. 2587 (The risk of harm to both the police and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned command of the situation.). But whether an individual detained during the execution of a search warrant has been unreasonably seized for Fourth Amendment purposes and whether that individual is in custody for Miranda purposes are two different issues. 31 In Summers, the Supreme Court found that the defendant was not free to leave the premises while the officers were searching his home, and that his detention constituted a seizure, albeit a reasonable one under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 696, 101 S.Ct. 2587. The police did not interrogate Summers during the detention. If they had asked questions going beyond a brief Terry -type inquiry, see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (permitting a brief stop and inquiry that are reasonably related in scope to the justification for their initiation), Summers would, it appears, have been entitled to Miranda warnings. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 439-40, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (When there is a brief Terry detention, officers may, without giving Miranda warnings, ask only a moderate number of questions to determine [a person's] identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions.). Thus, while the reasonable and necessary steps that the officers took to secure Kim's store during the search may preclude a conclusion that she was unconstitutionally seized, the locked doors and restriction of Kim's movement are still relevant to whether she was entitled to Miranda warnings before the police questioned her. See Booth, 669 F.2d at 1236 (upholding the district court's determination that defendant who had been handcuffed and frisked was in custody, while noting that [s]trong but reasonable measures to insure the safety of the officers or the public can be taken without necessarily compelling a finding that the suspect was in custody.). 32 Further, isolating the defendant from the outside world — here from her husband who had tried to join her in the shop — largely neutralizes the familiarity of the location as a factor affirmatively undermining a finding of coercion. We so recognized in Beraun-Panez, 830 F.2d 127. In Beraun-Panez, the officers interrogated the defendant at the side of the road in familiar surroundings but intercepted one of Beraun-Panez's co-workers who tried to approach him. We found that by keeping [defendant] isolated from other people, the officers contributed to the custodial nature of the interrogation, 830 F.2d at 127, noting that the coercive impact of enforced isolation is particularly strong where the defendant may have had some difficulty in understanding English, 812 F.2d at 581. 33 Our point is not that the situation here was decidedly coercive simply by virtue of the fact that the police officer is part of a law enforcement system which may ultimately cause the suspect to be charged with a crime. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. 711. Rather, the police in this case temporarily took over complete control of Kim's store, creating a police-dominated atmosphere, in which the police kept Kim physically isolated from two family members who could have provided both moral support and, given her limited English, a more complete understanding of the overall situation. See Beraun-Panez, 830 F.2d at 127 (The Supreme Court in Miranda noted that separating a subject from others, who might lend moral support to a person questioned and thereby prevent inculpatory statements, was a technique of psychological coercion.). 34 Additionally, this was a full-fledged interrogation, not a brief inquiry. The district court found that Kim was detained for some time before questioning began. Then, she was questioned for at least 30 minutes before an interpreter arrived and another 20 minutes once the interpreter joined the interrogation. The police had in an earlier encounter warned Kim of the possible criminal aspects of pseudoephedrine sales; they were in the process of searching her store; and they had earlier in the day come to her home looking for an employee. Given all those circumstances, Kim could well have assumed — especially given her limited English — that she was a criminal suspect. That the questions to Kim covered in detail her pseudoephedrine sale activities — including her sources, her customers, and where she kept the proceeds — could only have reinforced that impression. Under these circumstances, we find the overall length and manner of questioning, both before and after the interpreter arrived, to support the conclusion that Kim was in custody. 35 In sum, Kim's voluntary entrance into the store and the fact that she was familiar with the location of the interview, considered in isolation, might weigh in favor of concluding that she was not in custody during the questioning. Nevertheless, under all the circumstances here, we conclude that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave and therefore that Kim was sufficiently restrained so as to be considered in custody. Whether or not they intended to surround Kim to make her feel that she could not leave the store, the position of the officers, the fact that they locked Kim's husband out of their store, their restriction of her communication with her son, and their orders as to what language she should speak and when and where she could sit, combined with the length and nature of the questioning, would have made a reasonable person believe that she could not have just walked away. Under these circumstances, Kim would have reasonably felt compelled to stay in the store and answer the officers' inquiries for as long as they continued to question her — which is precisely what she did.