Opinion ID: 1906837
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Majority's Application of Faulkner to the Facts

Text: Finally, I take issue with several of the Majority's observations regarding the application of the Faulkner test to the facts of this case. The Majority observes that the trial court could have found that the first and third factual findings had special relevance, but that any special relevancy of the second factual findingthat Streater broke into the house and took her moneyis doubtful. Maj. op. at 817, 724 A.2d at 119. The Majority next states that it is unclear whether the protective order was issued with Streater's consent, or whether the court found independently that the conduct occurred by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 818, 724 A.2d at 120. Thus, the Majority appears to conclude that the trial court admitted the evidence without first finding that the conduct occurred by clear and convincing evidence. Id. Finally, the Majority concludes that the trial court erred in failing to determine, on the record, whether the probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect, and insinuates that several of the prior acts at issue may not satisfy this test on remand. Id. at 819-21, 724 A.2d at 120-21. As to the Majority's first observation, I do not share the Majority's doubts as to whether the factual findings contained in the protective order had special relevance in proving the harassment charge and the stalking charge. Stalking and harassment each require the State to prove a continuing course of conduct ___ a series of events___and not simply one discrete act. Given the nature of these crimes, all three prior acts by the accused against the victim were specially relevant as tending to show that the accused engaged in a continuous course of conduct against the victim. See, e.g., Todd v. State, 230 Ga.App. 849, 498 S.E.2d 142, 145 (1998) (in prosecution for terroristic threats and stalking, evidence of prior acts by accused against victim admissible to show course of conduct of harassment and intimidation); Hayes v. State, 717 So.2d 30, 37 (Ala.Crim.App.1997) (an accused's prior acts of harassing are admissible to demonstrate a course of conduct); Commonwealth v. Urrutia, 439 Pa.Super. 227, 653 A.2d 706, 710 (1995) (course of conduct by its very nature requires showing of repetitive pattern of behavior and, therefore, where evidence of prior bad acts is necessary to establish the pattern, the evidence is admissible). While conceding the special relevance of the first and third factual findings, the Majority suggests that any special relevancy of the second factual findingthe handwritten note in the protective order declaring that Mr. Streater `broke into the house and took her money' ... is doubtful without further evidence as to the nature of the conduct or its impact on Ms. Streater. Maj. op. at 817, 724 A.2d at 119. The Majority reasons: [T]here is no indication that the bad acts referenced by this statement occurred in the victim's presence. A house may be broken into and money taken outside of the owner's presence. Breaking in and taking money may have no special relevance relating to any contested issue concerning Mr. Streater's intent to violate the telephone use, harassment, or stalking statutes. At best, it could be argued that the breaking and taking help to prove a `course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person.' Even that argument may fail, however, because there was no indication that prior to the time the protective order was issued Mr. Streater had been given notice to stay away from Ms. Streater. Id. I do not believe that it is a stretch to include breaking into a home and stealing money as part of a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person. I think such evidence falls well outside the proscriptions of Rule 404(b). The State is not using the prior acts to demonstrate the defendant's general propensity toward crime, but rather to show a specific, repetitive pattern of behavior toward the victim, a pattern the State is required to prove to convict the defendant of harassment. The Majority also suggests that because there is no evidence that the defendant was told to stay away from Ms. Streater before the defendant committed these acts, the argument to admit this evidence may fail. [4] Maj. op. at 817, 724 A.2d at 119. Interestingly, the Majority had no such difficulty in concluding that the threat, assault and/or battery were specially relevant as part of a continuing course of conduct, notwithstanding the lack of evidence that Mr. Streater had been warned before he committed those acts. The Majority states that coupled with the testimony concerning the events that led to Mr. Streater being prosecuted, which occurred after the protective order became effective, the threat and battery and/or assault could help to establish the `course of conduct' and `continuity of purpose' necessary to establish the offenses of harassment and stalking. Id. at 817, 724 A.2d at 119. The Majority correctly observes that it is these prior acts, coupled with the events leading to the prosecution, that establish the course of conduct. The same rationale holds true for the breaking and taking conductwhen coupled with the testimony concerning the events that led to Mr. Streater being prosecuted, which occurred after the protective order became effective,the acts of breaking into the house and taking the money are relevant to establish the `course of conduct' and `continuity of purpose' necessary to establish the offense of harassment. The absence of any prior warning does not alter this analysis. Even assuming the evidence is not admissible as part of a continuing course of conduct, the evidence should be admissible on other grounds, e.g., to prove Mr. Streater's intent, and as to the harassment charge, to show that Ms. Streater was alarmed and/or seriously annoyed by Mr. Streater's subsequent conduct. First, the evidence that Mr. Streater previously broke into the victim's home and took her money is relevant to his intent to stalk and harass the victim, particularly in light of the defendant's theory of the case, i.e. that any interaction he had with his wife was intended only to address legitimate property concerns and her horrendous behavior. As the Majority points out, defense counsel argues that my client acted ... simply to address some legitimate issues and states that there was no intent to place Ms. [Streater] at fear ... [or] to annoy ... [or] harass ... his estranged wife. Maj. op. at 3. Surely, when defense counsel argues in opening statement that Mr. Streater's intent in showing up at her work and home and calling her repeatedly was completely innocent, his prior actions in breaking into the home and taking her money should be admissible as tending to show that his subsequent actions were not perpetrated with innocent intent, but with criminal intent. [5] In addition, Streater's prior breaking into the house and theft also tends to show the impact of Streater's subsequent conduct on Ms. Streaterspecifically, that Ms. Streater was alarmed and/or seriously annoyed by the defendant's subsequent conduct. This is a required element of the harassment statute. See Maryland Code (1957, 1996 Repl.Vol.) Article 27, § 121A (providing that [a] person may not follow another person in or about a public place or maliciously engage in a course of conduct that alarms or seriously annoys another person. ) As the court stated in People v. McCray, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 872, 881, 58 Cal.App.4th 159, 172 (1997), when faced with a similar situation, The offenses with which appellant was charged also required the prosecution to prove that [the victim] was reasonably caused to be in fear for her safety by appellant's threats or that the threats would cause a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress. The evidence of past domestic abuse was highly relevant and probative on these issues; indeed, it is difficult to imagine how the jury could have properly assessed [the victim's] response to appellant's conduct without knowledge of these past incidents. `Appellant was not entitled to have the jury determine his guilt or innocence on a false presentation that his and the victim's relationship ... [was] peaceful and friendly.' (Citations omitted). In sum, the defendant's prior acts of breaking into the defendant's home and taking her money were specially relevant as tending to show a course of conduct, the defendant's intent, and the fact that the victim was alarmed and/or seriously annoyed by his subsequent conduct.