Opinion ID: 2443365
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Superior Court Has Personal Jurisdiction Over Appellee

Text: A District of Columbia court may assert personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if jurisdiction is authorized by statute and the exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with the due process clause. See, e.g., Holder v. Haarmann & Reimer Corp., 779 A.2d 264, 269-71 (D.C.2001). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the court may establish personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Harris v. Omelon, 985 A.2d 1103, 1105 (D.C.2009). The District of Columbia's long-arm statute sets forth two requirements for personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant: (1) the defendant must have engaged in one of the acts listed in section 13-423(a); and (2) the claim for relief [must] aris[e] from acts enumerated in the statute, per section 13-423(b). Etchebarne-Bourdin v. Radice, 982 A.2d 752, 757 (D.C.2009) (quotations omitted). [6] Here, appellant, a District of Columbia resident, claims injury resulting from appellee's alleged fraud and his conversion of appellant's real and personal property located in Maryland. The evidence of record is that appellee is a Maryland resident, does not own any D.C. property, and works for a Maryland corporation that he owns. While appellee admits in his affidavit that his Maryland company does projects from time to time in Washington, D.C., he asserts that his business activities in the District have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with the plaintiff in [this] action, or his alleged personal property, or any alleged taking. Appellant has not disputed appellee's factual assertions.
Appellee's admission that he does occasional business projects in the District does not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction under subsections (a)(1) or (a)(2) of the District's long-arm statute because subsection (b) of the statute requires that appellant's claim for relief aris[e] from these jurisdictional activities. See Shoppers Food Warehouse v. Moreno, 746 A.2d 320, 335 (D.C.2000) ([F]or the Superior Court to have jurisdiction over [a plaintiff's] claim, the claim ha[s] to be related to or substantially connected with [the defendant's] activity in the District.). Appellant does not allege that his claims arise from or are related to appellee's business activities in the District. Nor has appellant contested appellee's assertion that his business activities in the District have absolutely nothing whatsoever to do with [appellant]. Therefore, the facts of record do not justify the exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellee under either subsection (a)(1) or (a)(2) of the District's long-arm statute.
Similarly, appellant's allegation that appellee fraudulently acquired his real property and converted his personal property  all located in Maryland  does not meet the requirements of subsection (a)(3), which allows the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant who causes injury to a plaintiff in the District by an act or omission in the District. See D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(3) (2001).
Subsection (a)(4) of the District's long-arm statute allows a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant who committed an act outside the District of Columbia that caused a tortious injury in the District if the defendant regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed, or services rendered in the District. D.C.Code § 13-423(a)(4) (2001); see Etchebarne-Bourdin, 982 A.2d at 762-63 (holding that where plaintiff suffers injury in the District as a result of tortious conduct outside the forum, the required nexus is met and the in-forum conduct in the District required by statute is considered a plus factor and need not be related to the claim). Appellant's complaint alleges that appellee committed a tortious act outside of the District and the assertion in appellee's affidavit that his Maryland company undertakes projects in the District from time to time could be understood as do[ing] business in the District; we will assume so for present purposes. However, appellant's submissions do not contend that (much less explain how) the alleged conversion of his personal property and fraudulent taking of his real property in Maryland caused an injury in the District of Columbia. Appellant's bare assertion that he is a D.C. resident is not sufficient to establish that he suffered tortious injury in the District as a result of an alleged fraud or conversion that took place in Maryland. Without injury in the District, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over appellee under subsection (a)(4). See Helmer v. Doletskaya, 364 U.S.App.D.C. 178, 186, 393 F.3d 201, 209 (2004) (finding no personal jurisdiction where the original events that caused the alleged injury to [the plaintiff] ... occurr[ed] outside the District of Columbia, but the plaintiff, a D.C. resident, failed to show that the resulting fraud also caused injury to him in the District of Columbia). [7] Because appellant has failed either to assert necessary facts or to show that there is a disputed material fact relevant to personal jurisdiction under the District's long-arm statute, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted. [8]
Appellant repeatedly requested discovery that might allow him to demonstrate that District of Columbia courts can exercise personal jurisdiction over appellee, and he appears to allege on appeal that the trial judge erred by not ordering such discovery. While this court has permitted reasonable discovery at the request of pro se plaintiffs whose claims face dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, at a minimum the plaintiff must allege some facts that would justify the exercise of jurisdiction. See Wilson v. Wilson, 785 A.2d 647, 650 (D.C.2001) (granting relief where plaintiff's allegations demonstrate[d] a sufficient nexus between [the defendant] and the District of Columbia to justify discovery on whether personal jurisdiction over [the defendant] would comport with basic fairness). Here, other than saying he is a D.C. resident, appellant has not alleged a necessary fact  injury suffered in the District of Columbia  that is a prerequisite for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over appellee. Even though he asked for discovery, he did not in fact file interrogatories or request documents. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive why appellant would need discovery from appellee in order to put forth a prima facie case that appellant suffered injury in the District. We therefore find that the trial judge's failure to order discovery was not an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Clampitt v. Am. Univ., 957 A.2d 23, 28 (D.C.2008).