Opinion ID: 70996
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Colored Headband

Text: To establish that the TDCJ’s prohibition against colored headbands violates RLUIPA, Thunderhorse must first show that the prohibition substantially burdens his religious exercise. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)- 2 Defendants introduced similar evidence in this case. Furthermore, the Regional Director of the TDCJ explained that, because altercations between inmates occur with some frequency, the policy prevents inmates from “grab[bing] that handful of hair, [which] becomes a heck of a leverage issue . . . .” 3 Thunderhorse argues that the policy cannot be the least restrictive way to maintain prison security because the TDCJ enforces it in an arbitrary manner and other prison systems, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons, permit long hair. He cites examples of how the TDCJ had previously permitted him and other inmates to have long hair. These contentions find support in Warsoldier v. Woodford, in which the Ninth Circuit issued a preliminary injunction, pursuant to RLUIPA, that prevented the California Department of Corrections from enforcing its hair-length restriction against a Native American inmate. See 418 F.3d 989, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 2005). The Ninth Circuit found that the restriction was not the least restrictive means to maintain prison security, in part, because the prisons run by the federal government, Oregon, Colorado, and Nevada all permit long hair or provide religious exemptions to their hair-length restrictions. See id. at 999 (citations omitted). This court, however, is bound by Diaz and Longoria. 7 Case: 08-40821 Document: 00511023468 Page: 8 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 08-40821 2000cc-2(b). The magistrate judge found that Thunderhorse failed to establish that wearing a white cloth headband, which the TDCJ allows, as opposed to a colored headband, which the TDCJ prohibits, substantially burdens his religious exercise. We agree. Thunderhorse’s sole complaint on appeal is that he is unable to purchase the white headbands through the approved vendors or at the TDCJ’s commissaries. He contends that this inability to purchase the white headbands, rather than the policy itself, is the substantial burden. At trial, he admitted that he cannot purchase the white headbands because the only remaining approved vendor mishandles his orders. In response, the Regional Director of the TDCJ promised to attempt to secure more vendors. Based on this evidence, the only fault that the magistrate judge could have attributed to the TDCJ is that it should have selected more competent vendors—an oversight that does not rise to the level of a RLUIPA violation. In sum, Thunderhorse has not shown that the TDCJ’s headband policy substantially burdens his rights under RLUIPA.4 4. Performing Personal Pipe Ceremonies in His Cell The TDCJ’s ban on pipe use within the cell does not violate RLUIPA. Thunderhorse seeks to perform personal pipe ceremonies inside of his cell.5 According to Thunderhorse, Native American Shamans use the pipe to pray. It 4 Thunderhorse does dispute the TDCJ’s justification for the restriction against colored headbands, which the magistrate judge credited. According to the TDCJ, the restriction is the least restrictive way to prevent inmates from using colored accessories to promote gang affiliations. Thunderhorse, however, is in administrative segregation where he spends most of his time alone and in his cell. Neither the magistrate judge nor the TDCJ has explained how allowing him to wear a colored headband while he is alone and in his cell could promote gang violence. But we do not reach this question because Thunderhorse has failed to satisfy his threshold burden of establishing that the white-headband-only policy substantially burdens his religious exercise. 5 The TDCJ allows those in the general population (but not those in administrative segregation such as Thunderhorse) to participate in group pipe ceremonies outdoors. At trial, Thunderhorse made clear that he did not seek to attend those ceremonies. Instead, he only sought to perform personal pipe ceremonies inside of his cell. 8 Case: 08-40821 Document: 00511023468 Page: 9 Date Filed: 02/09/2010 No. 08-40821 is undisputed that the pipe ceremony is a religious exercise and that the prohibition on it is a substantial burden. Therefore, the issue is whether Defendants have shown that the prohibition on personal pipe use within the cell is the least restrictive method to achieve a compelling interest. Defendants argue that the compelling interest here is prison security: no inmate may have materials inside of his cell that could be used to start a fire or create an explosive. The magistrate judge properly ruled for Defendants on this basis, stating that “[b]ecause Thunderhorse is in administrative segregation, he does not have access to pipe ceremonies for security reasons, which reasons represent compelling governmental interests.” Maintaining prison security is a compelling interest. Sossamon v. Lone Star State of Texas, 560 F.3d 316, 334 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Texas obviously has compelling governmental interests in the security . . . of its prisons . . . .”). We find no reason to question the TDCJ’s position that the prohibition on incendiary items within the cell is the least restrictive way to prevent inmates from starting fires in their cells. Hence, the TDCJ’s prohibition on pipe use within the cell does not violate RLUIPA.