Opinion ID: 518096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Brooks Davis.

Text: 21
22 Brooks Davis contends that the district court erred in ruling Harper's testimony admissible, that the disqualification of Simels thus was unnecessary, and consequently that the declaration of a mistrial was not a manifest necessity. The government intended to call Harper to testify about his involvement in drug transactions and the Diggins shooting, as well as the threat allegedly made by Simels at the MCC. Evidence of the threat was offered to show consciousness of guilt and the existence of the conspiracy. In the district court, and on this appeal, Brooks Davis' main objection to Harper's testimony is not based on conventional evidentiary grounds. Rather, he contends that error lies in the failure of the district court to adhere to procedures which he claims were established by this Court to govern the admissibility of evidence that tends to implicate counsel. 23 Specifically, Brooks Davis contends that our holdings in United States v. Valencia, 826 F.2d 169 (2d Cir.1987); United States v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d Cir.1984); and United States v. Cunningham, 672 F.2d 1064 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 951, 104 S.Ct. 2154, 80 L.Ed.2d 540 (1984), require that before an attorney's statement may be used against his client in a criminal trial, the government must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence at a special hearing, that the statement was clearly made, that an innocent explanation does not exist, and that the statement is the equivalent of a testimonial statement of the defendant. Furthermore, defendant argues that the district court then must balance the government's need to introduce the evidence against the defendant's interest in retaining his attorney. We, however, agree with the district court's holding that the cited cases in no way support any argument for holding a special hearing or excluding Harper's testimony. 24 Of the cases relied on by Brooks Davis, Cunningham is most closely analogous to the instant case in that it concerned the admissibility of evidence tending to implicate defense counsel in a scheme to conceal evidence. At issue in Cunningham was the location of certain envelopes. 672 F.2d at 1067-68. The government sought to introduce the testimony of a witness who claimed that defendant's counsel had told her that he, counsel, was responsible for the envelopes and the envelopes were safe. Id. at 1068. On the premise that [this] testimony might be admissible at trial, and that if it were, [counsel] ought to be a witness, the district court disqualified counsel pursuant to Rule 5-102(A) of the Disciplinary Rules of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility (Disciplinary Rules). Id. at 1070. On appeal, we noted that the question of admissibility ha[d] not definitely been decided, and under that circumstance, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to be represented by counsel of his own choice is too important to be denied on the basis of a mere, though substantial, possibility. Id. at 1075. Consequently, we vacated the disqualification order, and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of whether the evidence implicating counsel was admissible. 25 Contrary to Brooks Davis' interpretation, we did not instruct the Cunningham district court to determine the admissibility of the disputed testimony by any mode of analysis other than application of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The balancing task that we referred to in Cunningham is not, as defendant contends, part of the determination of admissibility. Rather, once it has been determined that evidence implicating counsel is admissible, a court must then balance the defendant's constitutional right [to retain counsel of choice] against the need to preserve the highest ethical standards of professional responsibility. Id. at 1070. The error in Cunningham was that we were asked to engage in this balancing at a time when it had yet to be determined that the evidence which made the balancing necessary was admissible. 26 In McKeon, we considered the evidentiary use against a criminal defendant of his counsel's argument to a jury in an earlier proceeding. We began by observing the general proposition that  '[s]tatements made by an attorney concerning a matter within his employment may be admissible against the party retaining the attorney.'  McKeon, 738 F.2d at 30 (quoting United States v. Margiotta, 662 F.2d 131, 142 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 913, 103 S.Ct. 1891, 77 L.Ed.2d 282 (1983)). We recognized, however, that when the proffered statements consist of prior jury argument, policy considerations dictate that the statements not be subjected to the more expansive practices sometimes permitted under the rule allowing use of admissions by a party-opponent. Id. at 31. Thus, in order to avoid trenching upon those policies, see id. at 32-33, we established procedures to circumscribe the use of prior jury argument. See id. at 33. Contrary to defendant's assertion that these procedures apply to the use of all statements by defense counsel, we clearly stated in McKeon that we were circumscrib[ing] the evidentiary use of prior jury argument. Id. (emphasis added); see id. at 32. 27 Finally, in Valencia, we affirmed the district court's refusal to admit, under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D), statements made to the prosecuting attorney by defense counsel. In reaching this result, we noted that the trial judge must be accorded considerable discretion in determining the application of Rule 801(d)(2) to statements of an attorney offered by the prosecutor against a criminal defendant. Valencia, 826 F.2d at 173. While we cautioned against the routine use of attorney statements against a criminal defendant, id. at 172, we analyzed the disputed statements under Rule 801(d)(2), and not under special procedures that the defendant contends were established by Cunningham and McKeon. 28 Accordingly, we find no support for Brooks Davis' contention that there are special procedures to be followed, or balancings to be performed as a prerequisite to the evidentiary use of a defendant's counsel's out-of-court statements. We further find no reason for adopting such measures now. Defendant predicts that there will be virtually automatic disqualification [of counsel] ... any time a person is willing to testify that defense counsel threatened him, and thus, vigorous and legitimate representation of clients will be deterred. This problem, however, does not appear to have materialized in the almost seven years since Cunningham was decided. Safeguards already exist in that trial courts are equipped to exclude the irrelevant and prejudicial, and are accorded considerable discretion in the application of Rule 801(d)(2) to attorney's statements. Valencia, 826 F.2d at 173. Moreover, conditioning the admissibility of a statement by counsel on the defendant's interest in retaining counsel would produce the anomalous result of admitting statements made by a co-conspirator who had recently become defendant's counsel, but not admitting the statements if the co-conspirator had long been defendant's counsel. Cf. Cunningham, 672 F.2d at 1070-71 (interest in retaining counsel is particularly strong where counsel represented defendant for over six years and in numerous proceedings). 29 Turning to the facts of the case before us, we note that this is not a routine case. Harper's disputed testimony implicating Simels in a scheme to keep witnesses from testifying was offered after two government witnesses had already recanted, and a third had been shot. Simels went to see Harper alone at the MCC. Although the affidavit he procured contains Harper's disavowal of knowledge of or involvement with any criminal activity of the defendants, Harper pleaded guilty to participating in the defendants' narcotics conspiracy and to conspiring to commit murder in aid of racketeering--charges carrying possible maximum sentences of twenty and ten years respectively. The district court found Harper to be quite a credible witness. Judge Griesa carefully considered the nature of Harper's proposed testimony, and all that would occur as a result of its admission. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that it was an abuse of discretion to rule Harper's testimony fully admissible against Brooks Davis. 30
31 Once the decision was made to admit Harper's testimony, it was inevitable that Simels would become a witness--either sworn or unsworn--in the proceedings, thus requiring the disqualification of Simels as Brooks Davis' counsel under Disciplinary Rule 5-102(A). Brooks Davis contends, however, that the disqualification of Simels, and consequently the declaration of a mistrial, could have been avoided by a series of proposed waivers. Specifically, defendant argues that he has the right, under the sixth amendment, to retain Simels as counsel and to waive any direct challenge to Harper's testimony in order to prevent Simels from becoming a witness. Defendant further argues that the district court abused its discretion in declining to honor his waiver of conflict-free counsel. We find these contentions to be without merit. 32 We have recognized that the right to retain counsel of choice is a right of constitutional dimension. United States v. Wisniewski, 478 F.2d 274, 285 (2d Cir.1973). The right, however, is not absolute. As the Supreme Court has recently stated, the essential aim of the [Sixth] Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be represented by the lawyer whom he prefers. Wheat v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 1697, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988). 33 Relying on Cunningham and United States v. Curcio, 680 F.2d 881 (2d Cir.1982), defendant asserts that he is entitled to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to be represented by conflict-free counsel, and thus retain Simels as counsel. Defendant's argument, however, evinces little appreciation for the nature of the conflict enveloping Simels. The conflict here is not the more usual one of multiple representation. United States v. Cancilla, 725 F.2d 867, 870 (2d Cir.1984). Rather, counsel has been placed in the position of having to worry about allegations of his own misconduct. As we noted in Cancilla, [w]hat could be more of a conflict than a concern over getting oneself into trouble with criminal law enforcement authorities? Id. 34 In the district court's view, 35 Mr. Simels ... has exposed himself to charges of the greatest misconduct. He has a personal stake in the matter. Whether he is ever indicted for a criminal violation, I don't know. But he certainly has a problem which will eventually go before the grievance committee of this court as to whether he is to be disciplined in this court. And in any event, he is and he knows it and it has been stated by the court, he is now accused of very serious misconduct, potentially criminal in nature. 36 Thus, if the court had accepted Brooks Davis' proffered waiver of conflict-free counsel, he would have been represented by counsel encumbered with a strong incentive to conduct the trial in a manner that would minimize counsel's own exposure. This conflict would continue to exist even if all references to Simels were redacted from Harper's testimony, or if Brooks Davis waived the presentation of any direct rebuttal to Harper's testimony. 37 The extent to which a district court may override a defendant's waiver of his attorney's conflict of interest has recently been explored by the Supreme Court. In Wheat, the Court recognized that [f]ederal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe them. 108 S.Ct. at 1697. To this end, a district court should not be required to tolerate an inadequate representation of a defendant. Id. at 1698 (quoting United States v. Dolan, 570 F.2d 1177, 1184 (3d Cir.1978)). Consequently, where a court justifiably finds an actual conflict of interest, there can be no doubt that it may decline a proffer of waiver. Id. 38 The testimony of Harper was very powerful evidence against Brooks Davis. As the district court explained, by waiving the right to call Simels, Brooks Davis would be foregoing the presentation of the most relevant evidence on the point, evidence that would be of great assistance to Brooks Davis if it were true. Furthermore, this waiver was offered by Brooks Davis in order to retain the representation of an attorney saddled with a serious conflict of interest. While the prospect of allowing someone to defend himself with one hand tied behind his back may present an interesting spectacle in a wrestling ring, the court's institutional interest in the rendition of just verdicts in criminal cases, id., and the proper administration of justice require that a criminal defendant not be so encumbered. 39 Since we agree with the district court's decision declining Brooks Davis' proffered waiver, we find the disqualification of Simels to have been proper, and thus the declaration of a mistrial as to Brooks Davis to have been a manifest necessity. 40