Opinion ID: 4374721
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Napue Due Process Violation

Text: Appellant claims he is entitled to a new trial based on what is commonly referred to as a Napue violation of his right to due process. A Napue violation occurs when the government presents or fails to correct testimony it knows to be, or should know to be, false or misleading.30 The government has waived its procedural objections to appellant’s Napue claim; it concedes that it presented false or misleading expert testimony at appellant’s trial; it acknowledges that knowledge of the falsity of that testimony must be imputed to it notwithstanding the good faith of the prosecutor; 31 and it agrees that the sole issue with respect to the Napue claim is whether there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the verdict. 30 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); see also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972); Longus v. United States, 52 A.3d 836, 844-45 (D.C. 2012) (“A bedrock principle of due process in a criminal trial is that the government may neither adduce or use false testimony nor allow testimony known to be false to stand uncorrected.”). 31 “‘[T]he touchstone of due process’ in cases such as this ‘is the fairness of the trial, not the culpability of the prosecutor.’” Woodall v. United States, 842 A.2d 690, 697 (D.C. 2004) (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 219 (1982)). 26 When a Napue violation is shown to have occurred, “it entails a veritable hair trigger for setting aside the conviction.” 32 As the Supreme Court stated in Giglio, “[a] new trial is required if ‘the false testimony could . . . in any reasonable likelihood have affected the judgment of the jury.’” 33 Like other courts, we have understood this as substantively equivalent to requiring reversal unless there is “no reasonable possibility that the falsehood affected the jury’s verdict” 34 or unless the false testimony was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”35 As the government notes, however, these formulations of the standard for the materiality of false testimony warranting reversal do differ in what they imply regarding which party bears the burden of persuasion. The first formulation implies it is the “appellant [who] must demonstrate . . . that there is a reasonable 32 United States v. Gale, 314 F.3d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 33 Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154 (quoting Napue, 360 U.S. at 271). See also, e.g., O’Brien v. United States, 962 A.2d 282, 314 (D.C. 2008); Hawthorne v. United States, 504 A.2d 580, 589-90 (D.C. 1986). 34 Woodall, 842 A.2d at 696 & n.6 (“[T]here is no substantive difference in these formulations.” (citing United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 678-79 & n.9 (1985)). 35 See (Keith) Mitchell v. United States, 101 A.3d 1004, 1008 & n.4 (D.C. 2014) (stating that “harmlessness must be proven by the constitutional standard of beyond a reasonable doubt” and that this standard is “equivalent” to the “any ‘reasonable likelihood’” standard). See also Longus, 52 A.3d at 845. 27 likelihood that the [false or misleading] testimony could have affected the verdict,” which is what this court said in O’Brien. 36 In contrast, the other two formulations imply that “the burden of showing harmlessness is on the government rather than the appellant[],” as this court said in Mitchell.37 The parties before us disagree as to whom the burden of persuasion with respect to materiality properly belongs. The government argues that when, as here, we are faced with inconsistent holdings, “we are required to follow the earlier decision[s] rather than the later one[s],” 38 i.e., the rule as stated in O’Brien rather than as stated in Mitchell. Appellant disagrees, arguing that the burden-of-persuasion issue was not briefed or 36 962 A.2d at 315. See also Powell v. United States, 880 A.2d 248, 257 (D.C. 2005) (“[T]he burden is on the appellant to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief[.]”). 37 101 A.3d at 1008. See also Longus, 52 A.3d at 845 (stating that defendant is entitled to a new trial if “the government cannot show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the false testimony was harmless in the context of appellant’s trial”). 38 Thomas v. United States, 731 A.2d 415, 421 n.6 (D.C. 1999). See also M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971) (“[N]o division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court. . . . [S]uch [a] result can only be accomplished by this court en banc.”). Moreover, the government asserts, the overwhelming weight of authority from other courts, federal and state, supports placing the burden of persuasion on the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Burch, 156 F.3d 1315, 1328-29 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“Even if appellant could establish that the prosecution either sponsored or failed to correct false testimony, he cannot satisfy the materiality test for prosecutorial misconduct articulated in Napue and reiterated in Giglio . . . .” (footnote omitted)). 28 analyzed in, or material to the outcome of, the earlier decisions, as he claims it was for the first time in this jurisdiction in Longus and Mitchell.39 We consider it unnecessary to decide which party in this case bears the burden of persuasion with respect to the materiality of the Napue violation. Practically speaking, whether we follow O’Brien or Mitchell, there is “little, if any difference between a rule formulated, as in Napue, in terms of ‘whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the conviction,’ and a rule ‘requiring the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’” 40 Either way, our determination of materiality is de novo based on our “own independent examination of the record,” including the 39 See Hobson v. District of Columbia, 686 A.2d 194, 198 (D.C. 1996) (“We have recently reiterated that ‘a point of law merely assumed in an opinion, not discussed, is not authoritative,’ . . . and that principles of stare decisis do not apply ‘unless in the decision put forward as precedent the judicial mind has been applied to and passed upon the precise question.’” (quoting District of Columbia v. Sierra Club, 670 A.2d 354, 360 (D.C. 1996)). For similar reasons, appellant also discounts the significance of other courts’ decisions cited by the government. 40 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 680 n.9 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)) (internal quotations omitted). 29 “evidentiary basis” of the lower court’s ruling.41 For present purposes, we assume, without deciding, that it is the defendant’s burden to establish the materiality of false testimony to support a Napue claim. We shall assess whether appellant has shown any reasonable likelihood – in other words, a reasonable possibility – that Agent Fram’s false and misleading testimony could have affected the verdict. In the proceedings below on appellant’s Napue claim, the court did not apply this test and did not determine whether there existed a reasonable possibility that Fram’s testimony affected the verdict. Instead, the court proceeded on the premise that “for due process purposes it must be reasonably probable (and not merely possible)” (emphasis added) that the challenged testimony caused the jury to find appellant guilty. Having drawn that distinction, the court found only that there existed “no reasonable probability” that the expert testimony caused the jury to find appellant guilty. In this respect, the court erred. The “reasonable probability” standard of materiality does not apply to Napue claims. 42 The effect of the court’s error was to impose too demanding a 41 Napue, 360 U.S. at 271-72. See, e.g., (Keith) Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1008. 42 The “reasonable probability” standard of materiality applies to Brady violations (involving the suppression of evidence favorable to the defense), see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999), and in some other contexts, but the Supreme Court has explained that it has applied a “strict[er] standard of (continued…) 30 burden of proof on appellant. The difference is significant. As this court has explained, When a defendant is required to show a “reasonable probability” of prejudice in order to obtain postconviction relief for a violation of his constitutional rights, the harm of which he complains . . . must be significant enough that it “undermines confidence” in the trial’s outcome. This means more than a mere possibility of prejudice.[43] For several reasons, we conclude there is a reasonable possibility that Agent Fram’s false or misleading hair comparison testimony swayed the jury to convict appellant. To begin with, the testimony was far from merely cumulative evidence of appellant’s guilt. Fram’s unrefuted hair comparison, replete with photographic exhibits to enhance its credibility and impact, constituted powerful, independent, (continued…) materiality” to convictions obtained by the knowing use of false testimony “not just because they involve prosecutorial misconduct, but more importantly because they involve a corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.” United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In its order in this case, the court cited Heath v. United States, 26 A.3d 266, 280 (2011), as requiring a showing of “reasonable probability” rather than “reasonable possibility.” Heath, however, did not involve a Napue claim and did not suggest that a “reasonable probability” standard governed such claims. 43 Hood v. United States, 28 A.3d 553, 564 (D.C. 2011) (footnotes omitted). 31 “scientific” proof positively identifying appellant as the robber to a high degree of certainty – a degree of certainty that the prosecutor emphasized to the jury in both his initial and rebuttal arguments and that defense counsel had no means to rebut. There is every reason to suppose the lay jury found Fram’s testimony highly persuasive. 44 His acknowledgements that microscopic hair comparisons were “not like a fingerprint” and “not a basis for absolute personal identification” did little to detract from his seemingly impressive real life forensic experience in thousands of cases showing how “very rare” it was to find matching hairs from two different people (and how skillful he personally claimed to be in distinguishing hairs from different sources). The jury did not have to find Fram’s hair comparison “conclusive” to find it very reliable indeed. The prosecutor knew what he was doing when, in rebuttal, he urged the jurors to credit the eyewitness identifications because it would have been so “remarkable” for Fram’s finding of a match to be wrong. There is good reason to conclude that, “[g]iven the prosecutor’s own forceful reliance on [it, Fram’s hair comparison testimony] cannot be said – as a 44 See United States. v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1263 (11th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (“Simply put, expert testimony may be assigned talismanic significance in the eyes of lay jurors . . . .”); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 352 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The tendency of testimony on scientific techniques to mislead the jury relates to the fact that, because of the apparent objectivity of opinions with a scientific basis, the jury may cloak such evidence in an aura of mystic infallibility.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 32 matter of reasonable possibility – to have had no effect on the jury’s conclusion[.]” 45 The remainder of the prosecution’s case rested on the eyewitness identifications of Woldeab and Zinabu. Identifications of “long-time acquaintance[s]” often are thought to “contain[] strong elements of reliability.” 46 Even so, anyone who has ever mistaken a stranger for a friend knows that such identifications come with no guarantee of infallibility. This court has seen cases in which errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence could not be deemed harmless despite eyewitness identifications by persons who thought they already knew the culprit. 47 We have disavowed the notion that, “as a matter of law, identifications of known acquaintances are inherently stronger than identifications of strangers without looking at the other evidence in the particular case.”48 45 Morten v. United States, 856 A.2d 595, 602 (D.C. 2004). This court often has recognized that the prosecutor’s “own estimate of his case, and of its reception by the jury at the time, is . . . a highly relevant measure now of the likelihood of prejudice.” Id. (quoting Allen v. United States, 837 A.2d 917, 923 (D.C. 2003)). 46 Redmond v. United States, 829 A.2d 229, 234 (D.C. 2003). See also Snowden v. United States, 52 A.3d 858, 871 (D.C. 2012). 47 See, e.g., Haney v. United States, 120 A.3d 608, 613-14 (D.C. 2015); (Keith) Mitchell, 101 A.3d at 1006, 1009. 48 Heath, 26 A.3d at 282 n.53. 33 Subtracting the hair comparison testimony, the evidence in this case provided a number of reasons (many of them explicitly urged on the jury by defense counsel) why the jury might have doubted the reliability of the identifications of appellant as the robber. First, as defense counsel argued, the witnesses’ identifications were based on brief exposures to the robber’s face under violent, stressful, and traumatic circumstances that militated against their making a reliable identification. Zinabu was virtually paralyzed with fear and shock and his view was obscured when he momentarily glimpsed the robber’s face through a narrow crack in the bathroom door. Woldeab was injured, in pain and in shock, and bleeding profusely when she saw the robber’s face for only “a few seconds” after being pistol-whipped on the back of her head. Moreover, upon seeing the robber’s face, Woldeab asked, “Michael, is that you . . .?”– a question the jury could have understood as evincing her actual uncertainty in the moment about his identity. Second, as defense counsel also pointed out, the identification testimony of the two witnesses appeared to be in conflict: Zinabu claimed the robber’s mask came off and revealed his face while Woldeab still was grappling with him, yet she herself did not see his face during their struggle even though she likely was 34 looking straight at him. Arguably, this inconsistency provided additional reason to doubt the identification testimony. Third, defense counsel urged the jury to consider that each identification may have been influenced by bias and suggestivity. In Woldeab’s case, counsel proposed that this could have been triggered by her verbal altercation just minutes before the robbery with someone she associated with appellant, combined with her recent history of similar angry arguments with appellant himself. As for Zinabu, he arguably had every reason to agree with Woldeab’s identification (which he heard her declare before he told anyone he could identify the robber himself) in order to mollify her anger at him for failing to come to her aid and to deflect any suspicion that he was complicit in the robbery – especially after Woldeab questioned him about how the robber could have gotten through the locked door. Fourth, the strength of the prosecution’s case apart from the hair analysis was diminished by the absence of any incriminating physical evidence. 49 Of 49 We do not consider the hat to be incriminating merely because Woldeab testified that it looked like one she had seen appellant wearing. As defense counsel argued (without any counterargument by the prosecutor), there was nothing unique or unusual about the hat – nothing “to distinguish it from thousands of other hats that you might see on any vending stand on your way between here and the edge of (continued…) 35 particular note, the police search of appellant and his residence when he was arrested turned up no evidence of any kind linking him to the robbery – no key to the cash register room, no mask or other clothing, no gun, and no apparent proceeds.50 The absence of such evidence can be explained away, of course; but we have appreciated that it also “may provide the reasonable doubt that moves a jury to acquit.”51 Fifth, the evidence indicated that the robber possessed a key to the cash register room, that he knew to look for money in a particular drawer in that room, and that he was familiar with the layout of the back of the store and knew there was an employee bathroom located there. There was no evidence that appellant, (continued…) town.” It was only Fram’s testimony about the hair found in the hat that made it a significant piece of evidence. 50 See Miller v. United States, 444 A.2d 13, 16 (D.C. 1982) (finding that the government’s case was not overwhelming where there was an eyewitness identification of the defendant, but he “was not found with the fruits of the crime or the implements of the crime in his possession.”). 51 Greer v. United States, 697 A.2d 1207, 1210 (D.C. 1997) (“‘Indeed, it is the absence of evidence upon [material] matters that may provide the reasonable doubt that moves a jury to acquit.’ Thus, in assessing whether the government has met its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury may properly consider not only the evidence presented but also the lack of any evidence that the government, in the particular circumstances of the case, might reasonably be expected to present.”) (quoting United States v. Poindexter, 942 F.2d 354, 360 (6th Cir. 1991)). 36 who was only a customer of the store, albeit a frequent one, could have obtained the closely held key or the kind of knowledge the robber seemed to possess. This provided a reason to doubt that appellant was the perpetrator; it suggested that the robber was not appellant, but someone like a (present or former) store employee. Sixth, the evidence (which the prosecutor himself elicited and appeared to credit in his closing argument) that appellant returned to the store shortly after it reopened also tended to cast doubt on his identification as the robber – for if he had been the robber, he presumably would have stayed away since he knew the store’s owner had recognized him and could expect her to call the police on sight of him. Taking all these considerations into account, we come to the conclusion that appellant has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that Agent Fram’s false or misleading testimony could have affected the jury’s verdict. Without that powerful testimony, the evidence of appellant’s guilt was still strong, but it was not overwhelming, and we find it plausible that the jury could have entertained a reasonable doubt and acquitted him. Appellant therefore is entitled to have his convictions set aside; the government may seek to retry him if it so chooses. 37