Opinion ID: 2980713
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Closing Argument Claim

Text: The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the trial court erred when it prevented defense counsel from commenting on matters in evidence during its closing argument. In consideration of the fact that the State’s own admission apprised the jury of the very information defense counsel 11 No. 10-1903 Batey v. Scutt sought to discuss, however, it found the error harmless. Under AEDPA, we reverse this finding only if we conclude that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision was contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law, as defined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has held that the right of a criminal defendant to present closing argument is derivative of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and the right to present a defense, and “is a basic element of the adversary factfinding process in a criminal trial.” Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 858 (1975). To this end, while the trial court has discretion to “ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark, or otherwise impede the fair and orderly conduct of the trial,” id. at 862, it may not fully curtail the defendant’s right “to be heard in summation of the evidence from the point of view most favorable to him.” Id. at 864. The State does not dispute that the trial court’s closing argument ruling was error but urges us to conclude, like the Michigan Court of Appeals, that the error was harmless. An ordinary trial error is harmless if the reviewing court finds that it did not have “substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 638 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). We agree that any error in this case was harmless under Brecht. By virtue of the prosecutor’s earlier admissions, the jury had access to evidence that Jason had sexually abused Matthew in the past. Furthermore, defense counsel was able to read aloud the most damaging portions of this evidence before the prosecutor objected. In fact, defense counsel was able to fully argue that Dr. Zollar’s testimony merely established that Matthew had been a victim of sexual molestation and that the jury could ultimately infer that Jason, not Petitioner, was the perpetrator of that abuse. Although 12 No. 10-1903 Batey v. Scutt the trial court sustained the prosecutor’s objection, it never instructed the jury to disregard defense counsel’s comments. Finally, defense counsel was able to conclude his closing argument remarks on the subject, without objection, by encouraging the jury to reference Matthew’s letter for itself. We are confident that this directive, coupled with the aforementioned factors, ameliorated any prejudice caused by the trial court’s ruling.3 As the Michigan Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion, we find that its decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The district court relied on Conde v. Henry, 198 F.3d 734 (9th Cir. 1999) to support its conclusion that the Michigan Court of Appeals’ decision failed under AEDPA. The district court’s reliance on Conde was misplaced for two reasons. First, Conde is a Ninth Circuit case and is thus not “clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Second, Conde is factually distinguishable. In that case, the Ninth Circuit found habeas relief appropriate for the trial court’s structural error of preventing defense counsel from arguing to the jury that the defendant, on trial for kidnaping for the purposes of robbery, had no intent to commit robbery. Conde, 198 F.3d at 739. Thus, the trial court’s ruling in Conde effectively prevented the defendant from contesting an element of the crime with which he was charged. Id. This is not the case here, where the maximum effect of the trial court’s ruling was to merely 3 We are also persuaded by the State’s argument that additional elaboration on Jason’s alleged abuse may not have been as exculpatory as expected. Indeed, the unusual nature of biological brothers engaging in sexual acts with one another may have corroborated, rather than undermined, Matthew’s testimony that Petitioner told him that sexual activity between family members was normal. 13 No. 10-1903 Batey v. Scutt abbreviate one of many of Petitioner’s arguments supporting his complete innocence.