Opinion ID: 1632443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Weekday Visits

Text: The trial court characterized Mrs. Cochran's decision to terminate the weekday visits as evidence of an attempt to undermine Mr. Cochran's authority with the children. In that connection, the trial court stated: [Mrs. Cochran's] testimony confirmed that she believes that it is within her purview, as the physical custodian for the children, to determine whether or not the children should exercise visitation with their father. Mrs. Cochran arguesand we agreethat her pro-active stance in allowing Tuesday-Thursday and other additional visitation was [improperly] used as a weapon against her. Mrs. Cochran's brief, at 56. Mrs. Cochran was not legally obligated to continue the weekday visits, which merely supplemented, by mutual agreement, the visitation schedule set out in the divorce judgment. It is the policy of the courts to encourage amicable agreements between the parties in custody matters, because such agreements benefit all the parties, and the children in particular. Ex parte Couch, 521 So.2d 987, 990 (Ala. 1988). That policy would be frustrated if agreed-upon changes to a custody arrangement [could] be considered to be relinquishment of a part[y's] rights under the previous custody judgment. Watters v. Watters, 918 So.2d 913, 917 (Ala.Civ. App.2005). At any rate, modification of custody is not the proper remedy for a visitation dispute. Foster v. Carden, 515 So.2d 1258, 1260 (Ala.Civ.App.1987); Smith v. Smith, 464 So.2d 97, 100 (Ala.Civ.App. 1984). Rather, the appropriate remedy in such a situation is to punish the custodial parent for contempt, not to uproot the children. Lami v. Lami, 564 So.2d 969, 970 (Ala.Civ.App.1989). Mr. Cochran relies on Fricks v. Wood, 807 So.2d 561 (Ala.Civ.App.2001), in which the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed a judgment modifying custody in favor of the non-custodial parent on the ground that the mother had deliberately obstructed the father's relationship with the child. 807 So.2d at 564. Mrs. Cochran contends that Fricks is easily distinguishable from this case, and we agree. In Fricks, the following factors were determinative: The mother admitted that on numerous occasions, she had denied the father his scheduled visitation because she was confused or had made a mistake in interpreting the parties' divorce judgment; that she had prevented the father from picking the child up from his preschool program .... She admitted that she had purposely omitted the father's name and his contact information from all of the child's school enrollment forms, and that she had listed her new husband as the child's father. 807 So.2d at 563-64 (emphasis added). Additionally, she did not even list the father as a person approved to pick up the child from school. Id. at 562-63. In this case, there are no allegations that Mrs. Cochran has violated the visitation schedule set out in the divorce judgment so that she would be subject to contempt proceedings. There is no authority in the settlement agreementor anywhere else of which this Court is awarefor the proposition that a parent who has primary physical custody may not engage the services of someone other than the former spouse as an occasional babysitter. Mr. Cochran concedes that he has always had complete access to the children's school and medical records. Unlike the mother in Fricks, Mrs. Cochran made no attempt to hide the identity of the children's father or to isolate Mr. Cochran from the personnel at the children's school or from the school itself. Also, according to Mr. Cochran, he had a lot of access to the boys along with the structured two-hour visits on Tuesdays and Thursdays. (Emphasis added.) Mr. Cochran coaches a number of sports activities in which his children regularly participate. In that connection, he often drives the children to and from the sports events. At trial, he stated: I have still a lot of access to the boys. It's access during their sporting events. ... They are practicing football or practicing basketball during the time that I am with them. (Emphasis added.) Fricks does not aid Mr. Cochran. An issue involved in the termination of the weekday visits was homework. However, it was Mrs. Cochran's position that the weekday visits were interfering with the children's ability to complete their homework within, in the words of Dr. Kirkland, the rigorous homework and structured schedule requirements associated with private school in Montgomery. [3] There was never any allegation, as the trial court suggested, that Mr. Cochran was incapable of doing elementary-school homework. There was no evidence to support Mr. Cochran's contention, or the trial court's conclusion, that in terminating the weekday visits Mrs. Cochran was attempting to undermine his relationship with the children. Finally, the mere passage of time is not a basis for a modification of custody. Nichols v. Nichols, 516 P.2d 732, 734 n. 3 (Alaska 1973). `The fact that the children have grown older in and of itself is no sufficient change of condition to warrant a change in custody.' Engler v. Engler, 455 S.W.2d 36, 41 (Mo.Ct.App. 1970) (quoting Fordyce v. Fordyce, 242 S.W.2d 307, 314 (Mo.Ct.App.1951)). The natural aging process is a contingency to be normally expected and ... is one which it is to be presumed the trial court took into consideration in making the original decree in the infancy of the children. Fordyce, 242 S.W.2d at 314. Moreover, it is disingenuous to suggest that any alleged belligeren[ce] of the children toward Mrs. Cochran constitutes a ground for modifying the custody arrangement in favor of Mr. Cochran. See Pullum v. Webb, 669 So.2d 925, 927 (Ala.Civ.App.1995) (erosion of the relationship between the [custodial parent] and the children is insufficient to support a change in custody). For these reasons, we conclude that Mr. Cochran has not met his burden of showing that a material change in circumstances has occurred since the previous judgment. Dean, 998 So.2d at 1065. Because as to custody the modification order is without legal and factual support, it cannot be sustained. As to the custody issue, it is, therefore, reversed. Likewise, the co-parenting order, which is a product of the erroneous modification order, is also reversed.
Mrs. Cochran next contends that the trial court misconstrued paragraph 8(d) of the settlement agreement by erroneously concluding that the $500 child-care provision terminated in September 2004, the month after S.S. began first grade, and she argued that the trial court lacked the power to void the arrearage judgments of 2002 and 2003. Because we agree that the trial court was without jurisdiction to void the arrearage judgments, we do not decide whether it correctly identified the terminus ad quem of the child-care provision. It is well settled that child support payments become final judgments on the day they are due and may be collected as any other judgment is collected; and that payments that mature or become due before the filing of a petition to modify are not modifiable. See State ex rel. Howard v. Howard, 671 So.2d 83 (Ala.Civ.App.1995); Cunningham v. Cunningham, 641 So.2d 807 (Ala.Civ. App.1994); Glenn v. Glenn, 626 So.2d 638 (Ala.Civ.App.1993); Frasemer v. Frasemer, 578 So.2d 1346 (Ala.Civ.App. 1991); Barnes v. State ex rel. State of Virginia, 558 So.2d 948 (Ala.Civ.App. 1990); Endress v. Jones, 534 So.2d 307 (Ala.Civ.App.1988). Furthermore, it is well settled that a trial court has no power to forgive an accrued arrearage. See, State ex rel. McDaniel v. Miller, 659 So.2d 640 (Ala.Civ.App.1995); Hardy v. Hardy, 600 So.2d 1013 (Ala.Civ. App.1992), cert. denied, Ex parte Hardy, 600 So.2d 1016 (Ala.1992). Although the trial court has the discretion to give the obligated parent credit for money and gifts given to the child or for amounts expended while the child lived with the obligated parent or a third party, it may not discharge child support payments once they have matured and come due under the divorce judgment.  Ex parte State ex rel. Lamon, 702 So.2d 449, 450-51 (Ala.1997) (emphasis added). See also McIlwain v. Atchison, 571 So.2d 1181, 1182 (Ala.Civ.App.1990) (distinguishing Keller v. Keller, 370 So.2d 306 (Ala.Civ. App.1979), and holding that the trial court... lacked the authority to allow the father credit against a [1986] arrearage judgment for sums paid by the father to support and maintain the child for periods of time [from 1986 to 1989] when the child did not reside with the mother). Thus, to the extent that the modification order deemed the arrearage judgments fully satisfied and void, the order is reversed. [4]