Opinion ID: 831274
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: BUSH v. SHABAHANG

Text: In its application of MCL 600.2301, the plurality purports to extend Bush v. Shabahang, 484 Mich. 156, 772 N.W.2d 272 (2009), another decision according little consideration to the actual language of relevant statutes, to a notice of intent mailed to the wrong address. [11] Bush formulated a test to determine whether MCL 600.2301 is applicable when the substantive content of the notice of intent is defective, id. at 177, 772 N.W.2d 272, and held that when [a notice of intent] is timely, the statute of limitations is tolled despite defects contained therein, id. at 185, 772 N.W.2d 272 (emphasis added). Here, the plurality would sustain even an untimely notice of intent. To determine whether MCL 600.2301 should be applied to a defective notice of intent, the majority established a two-pronged test in Bush: [F]irst, whether a substantial right of a party is implicated and, second, whether a cure is in the furtherance of justice. If both of these prongs are satisfied, a cure will be allowed on such terms as are just. ... Defendants who receive these notices are sophisticated health professionals with extensive medical background and training.... Accordingly, we conclude that no substantial right of a health care provider is implicated. Further, we hold that the second prong of the test, which requires that the cure be in the furtherance of justice, is satisfied when a party makes a good-faith attempt to comply with the content requirements of [MCL 600.2912b]. Thus, only when a plaintiff has not made a good-faith attempt to comply with [MCL 600.2912b(4)] should a trial court consider dismissal of an action without prejudice. [ Bush, 484 Mich. at 177-178, 772 N.W.2d 272.] In my dissent in Bush, I observed that the majority had provided no guidance for the application of its new test, id. at 199 n. 10, 772 N.W.2d 272, and such guidance has still not been provided. Concerning the first prong, the plurality simply declares that even though plaintiff failed to comply with MCL 600.2912b(2), and even though defendants did not receive the notices of intent until after the limitations period expired, defendants' substantial rights have not been affected and the notices were timely because defendants received actual notice. According to the plurality, because the purpose of MCL 600.2912b is to promote settlements of medical malpractice claims, it is in the furtherance of justice to disregard the defect here. The plurality also disregards the second prong of the Bush test, namely, that plaintiff has made a good-faith attempt to comply with the law. Id. at 178, 772 N.W.2d 272. In defining its own test, it is clear that nothing really matters except that the plurality dislikes medical malpractice reforms and that it will not permit such reforms, or any other contrary determinations of the Legislature, to impede the progress of this lawsuit. Applying the test in Bush, MCL 600.2301 is inapplicable to the instant case. First, defendants' substantial rights, in particular, the right not to be sued beyond the expiration of the limitations period, are affected. In Bigelow v. Walraven, 392 Mich. 566, 576, 221 N.W.2d 328 (1974), this Court explained the purpose behind the statutes of limitations: Statutes of limitations are intended to compel the exercise of a right of action within a reasonable time so that the opposing party has a fair opportunity to defend; to relieve a court system from dealing with `stale' claims, where the facts in dispute occurred so long ago that evidence was either forgotten or manufactured; and to protect potential defendants from protracted fear of litigation. [Citation omitted; emphasis added.][ [12] ] Statutes of limitations have multiple purposes, among which are the maintenance of the psychological well-being of potential defendants by setting forth time limits on their exposure to litigation and the protection of defendants' practical interests in being able to effectively defend themselves against lawsuits that are not excessively stale and in which evidence has not been lost over time. While a plaintiff has a right to sue a defendant before the limitations period expires, a defendant has an equivalent right not to be sued after the limitations period expires. So the question here is whether this right constitutes a substantial right. Bush, 484 Mich. at 177, 772 N.W.2d 272. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.), p. 1349, defines substantial right as [a]n essential right that potentially affects the outcome of a lawsuit and is capable of legal enforcement and protection, as distinguished from a mere technical or procedural right. In People v. Carines, 460 Mich. 750, 763, 597 N.W.2d 130 (1999), we explained that to demonstrate that substantial rights are affected generally requires a showing of prejudice.... [13] Statutes of limitations are not procedural; rather, they are substantive in nature. Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc., 468 Mich. 594, 600, 664 N.W.2d 705 (2003). A defendant's right to not be sued after the limitations period has expired is not a mere procedural right. Rather, this right pertains to matters that are dispositive and outcome-determinative. If the limitations period has expired, then a plaintiff is barred from pursuing an action, regardless of its merits. Defendants' entirely substantial rights were affected because the limitations period expired before plaintiff properly mailed the notices of intent to defendants. Absent authority, a majority of justices have revived a lawsuit that became null and void the moment the period of limitations expired without the statutorily required notice of intent having been properly sent by plaintiff. Second, even if defendants' substantial rights had not been affected under the first prong of Bush, plaintiff clearly did not make a good-faith attempt to comply with the statute as required by Bush's second prong. Specifically, plaintiff did not make a good-faith attempt to comply with MCL 600.2912b(2). As already discussed, plaintiff was well aware that defendants' last known professional business address was 50 W. Carleton Road because all office visits related to the alleged malpractice had occurred at this address. Plaintiff asserts that she was not aware that defendants only had one place of business; that is, she asserts that she believed that defendants conducted business at 46 S. Howell Street and 50 W. Carleton Road. However, the facts here indicate that plaintiff also mailed the notice of intent to Hillsdale Community Health Center at 50 W. Carleton. The hospital's address is 168 S. Howell Street, and it has never been located at 50 W. Carleton. [14] This fact tends to disprove plaintiff's claim that she engaged in a good-faith effort to determine defendants' address, or that she believed defendants had more than one address. Plaintiff not only mailed the notices of intent for defendants to the wrong address, but she also mailed the notice for the hospital to the wrong address. Moreover, it is clear that plaintiff was aware of defendants' new address because she mailed the hospital's notice to that address. Thus, plaintiff neither made a reasonable effort to ascertain defendants' address, as required by MCL 600.2912b(2), nor a good-faith effort to reasonably ascertain defendants' address, as required under the rule in Bush. Plaintiff was not earnest or conscientious in any way in her effort to locate defendants' address in the small community of Hillsdale, Michigan; she was simply careless and this carelessness is legally relevant under the statute. The plurality concludes that when a defendant receives notice is irrelevant under MCL 600.2912b(2) because this provision does not require that a defendant actually receive notice before the limitations period has expired. Rather, the plurality appears to believe it is the law of this state that as long as a plaintiff mailed the notice of intent before the limitations period expired, such notice is timelywithout regard to whether the plaintiff took steps to reasonably ascertain the defendant's last known professional business address, without regard to whether the defendant's substantial rights were affected, and without regard to whether the plaintiff made a good-faith effort to comply with MCL 600.2912b(2). In the end, the plurality would rewrite MCL 600.2912b(2) in a way that not only disregards this Court's prior decisions, but also frustrates the express intentions of the Legislature.