Opinion ID: 1974381
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Text: In reviewing the court's dismissal of Wright's complaint pursuant to M.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), we must determine whether the complaint alleges the elements of a cause of action or facts entitling the plaintiff to relief on some legal theory. Robinson v. Washington County, 529 A.2d 1357, 1359 (Me.1987). We must, therefore, make a preliminary determination that the Freedom of Access Act, upon which Wright bases his complaint, applies to proceedings conducted by an Air National Guard administrative separation board. In resolving this question, we must focus on the precise language used in the Act. The Freedom of Access Act applies to public proceedings. As used in the Act, public proceedings ... means the transactions of any functions affecting any or all citizens of the State by any of the following: ... Any board or commission of any state agency or authority. ... 1 M.R.S.A. § 402(2)(B) (Supp.1992) (emphasis added). Because we conclude that an Air National Guard administrative separation board is not a board within the meaning of the Act, we affirm the trial court's dismissal for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The National Guard is a unique military force in that each unit within the Guard is responsible to two governments, one local (here, [the State of Maine]), and the other federal, i.e., that of the United States. Penagaricano v. Llenza, 747 F.2d 55, 56 (5th Cir.1984). As a result, it does not fit neatly within the scope of either state or national concerns; historically the Guard has been, and today remains, something of a hybrid. New Jersey Air Nat'l Guard v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 677 F.2d 276, 278-79 (3d Cir.1982). Under the National Guard's dual enlistment system, all persons enlisting in a State National Guard simultaneously enlist in the National Guard of the United States. See Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 334, 345, 110 S.Ct. 2418, 2425, 110 L.Ed.2d 312 (1990). Pursuant to 32 U.S.C. § 101(6), all persons appointed to the Guard must meet prescribed federal standards for their particular service grade through a process known as federal recognition. See Penagaricano, 747 F.2d at 56. As a consequence of federal recognition, all Air National Guard members concurrently hold membership in a distinct federal military organization, the Air National Guard of the United States (`ANGUS'). Id. (citing 10 U.S.C. § 8351(a)). Moreover, [t]he federal government provides virtually all of the funding, the material, and the leadership of the State Guard units. Perpich, 496 U.S. at 351, 110 S.Ct. at 2428. It is because of this unique hybrid structure, with its strong federal underpinnings, that we conclude that an administrative separation board of the Air National Guard is not a board of any state agency or authority within the meaning of the Act. Our conclusion is supported by the Legislature's further inclusion, in section 402(2)(B) of the Act, of the following organizations: the Board of Trustees of the University of Maine System, the Board of Trustees of the Maine Maritime Academy, and the Board of Trustees of the Maine Technical College System. By expressly including these organizations within the Act's reach, the Legislature has demonstrated its ability to incorporate in the Act other institutions that are hybrid agencies. The failure to include an Air National Guard administrative separation board reflects the Legislature's intention that such a board not be governed by the Act's provisions. Rather, the Legislature desires that administrative separation proceedings be governed by the comprehensive and detailed Air National Guard regulatory scheme. See 37-B M.R.S.A. § 142 (1989) (the procedures for ... discharging ... personnel of the state military force shall be consistent with federal laws and regulations prescribed for the National Guard). Thus, in the absence of an express statutory inclusion of an administrative separation board of the Air National Guard within the terms of the Freedom of Access Act, we conclude that the Act has no application to Wright's discharge proceedings. Accordingly, the court's dismissal on Rule 12(b)(6) grounds was appropriate. The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.