Opinion ID: 222920
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scott Johnson's Appeal

Text: Johnson first argues that the search warrants executed on the day of his arrest were fatally flawed and that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence. When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we give deference to the issuing judge's finding of probable cause, but review de novo the district court's legal conclusion that the warrant was supported by probable cause. United States v. Bell, 585 F.3d 1045, 1049 (7th Cir.2009). As an initial matter, we note that while Johnson's appeal attacks the bases for any and all of the search warrants issued in this case, his pretrial motion to suppress specifically addressed only the warrant for the search of the Westmoreland residence. When a defendant fails to move to suppress evidence before trial, he waives his objection to the evidence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(e); such waived arguments are not subject to appellate review unless the district court first grants relief from the waiver for good cause. United States v. Acox, 595 F.3d 729, 730 (7th Cir.2010). Therefore, we entertain only Johnson's challenge to the search warrant for the Westmoreland residence. Johnson argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the magistrate judge's finding of probable cause because the affidavit accompanying the warrant application relied on insufficiently corroborated informants. Where, as here, the issuing judge considered only the supporting affidavit when deciding whether to issue a search warrant, the warrant must stand or fall solely on the contents of the affidavit. United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 866 (7th Cir.2002). And when an affidavit relies on information supplied by an informant, the issuing judge must consider whether the information is reliable. The judge must look at a variety of factors, including the degree to which police have corroborated the information, whether and to what extent the information is based on the informant's own observations, how much detail the informant provides, how much time elapsed between the events reported and the warrant application, and whether the informant personally appeared before the warrant-issuing judge. United States v. Dismuke, 593 F.3d 582, 586-87 (7th Cir.2010). We take into account these and any other pertinent factors as a whole, and no one factor necessarily dooms a search warrant. Bell, 585 F.3d at 1049. The affidavit accompanying the warrant application contained information from four confidential informants tying Johnson to cocaine dealing at various locations over the course of two years. While that might be enough for an arrest warrant, a search warrant for the Westmoreland residence, however, required more than general evidence of Johnson's cocaine dealing: the affidavit needed to allow the issuing judge to determine that there was probable cause that evidence of that cocaine dealing would be found at the Westmoreland residence. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). We agree with the district court that the information from the fourth confidential informant alone was sufficient to support probable cause for the search warrant. Specifically, this informant told the government that he had purchased multi-ounce quantities of cocaine from Johnson four times in the preceding week, all from the Westmoreland residence, and made a controlled purchase on the same day as the warrant application. And this informant was previously known to the government and had provided reliable information in the past. See United States v. Sidwell, 440 F.3d 865, 869 (7th Cir.2006) (citing as persuasive the fact that the informant had completed numerous other controlled buys in the past and provided, on those occasions, accurate and reliable information). Moreover, his own observations were corroborated by direct surveillance by federal agents. See Dismuke, 593 F.3d at 587. Finally, the strongest bit of evidence supporting the warrant  the informant's supervised, controlled purchase from Johnson, at the residence  took place mere hours before the warrant was requested and issued. See id. All of this was enough for the issuing judge to conclude that the fourth informant's statements were reliable. See id. And those statements were more than adequate to provide the magistrate judge with sufficient evidence to induce a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search [would] uncover evidence of a crime. United States v. Lowe, 516 F.3d 580, 585 (7th Cir.2008). Thus, the district court properly denied Johnson's motion to suppress the evidence recovered from the Westmoreland residence.
Johnson next argues that the district court erred by failing to instruct the jury that two of the witnesses against Johnson had received benefits from the government because they had not been charged with possession of cocaine in exchange for their testimony and were hoping that by testifying they would not be charged. The district court is in the best position to assess the risk of unreliable testimony, and therefore we leave the decision regarding credibility instructions to the district court's discretion. United States v. Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 904 (7th Cir.2010). It is well established in this circuit that general credibility instructions highlighting the possibility of bias are generally adequate, and thus that special credibility instructions are not required as a matter of course. United States v. Cook, 102 F.3d 249, 251-52 (7th Cir.1996). While we have never ruled out the possibility that some circumstances may demand special credibility instructions, we addressed, and rejected, arguments very similar to Johnson's in United States v. Jordan, 223 F.3d 676, 692 (7th Cir.2000), and Cook, 102 F.3d at 251-52. Absent any special factors distinguishing this case, we have no reason to revisit the issue here.
Johnson's final argument is that in its opening statement, the prosecutor erroneously claimed that over five kilograms of cocaine were recovered from searches of Johnson's property when in fact the amount was less than one half-kilogram. Johnson claims that this planted a false impression in the jurors' minds that persisted throughout the trial to Johnson's prejudice. Therefore, Johnson argues, the district court erred in denying his timely motion for a mistrial. We review the denial of a motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion, because the district court is in a superior position to judge the seriousness of the incident in question, particularly as it relates to what has transpired in the course of the trial. United States v. Lauderdale, 571 F.3d 657, 660 (7th Cir.2009). To win a new trial based on a prosecutor's improper comments, a defendant must establish that the prosecutorial misconduct deprived him of his right to a fair trial. United States v. Myers, 569 F.3d 794, 798 (7th Cir.2009). This means that Johnson must establish both that the prosecutor's misstatement was improper and that it prejudiced him by so infect[ing] the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986). The district court, which was in the best position to judge, found that the overstatement was a mistake and a minor issue. Leaving aside whether such an isolated, accidental comment as this can ever satisfy the first prong, [2] Johnson cannot establish the requisite prejudice. The misstatement was made only once during opening statement, and the prosecutor immediately corrected the statement in his next breath and made no further reference to the five kilograms. Johnson's counsel had ample opportunity to address the misstatement in his own opening or closing presentations. And whatever impression the misstatement left on the jury, the government never put forward any evidence that five kilograms had been discovered during searches. We do not assume that such a discrepancy prejudices a defendant  it could just as easily harm the government's case. See United States v. Akin, 562 F.2d 459, 466 (7th Cir.1977) (reasoning that when opening statement is not substantiated at trial the Government rather than defendant was hurt by [the] failure of proof). In light of the overall insignificance of the prosecutor's comments in its opening statement, as well as the substantial evidence against Johnson  including his own confession that he had received and sold more than five kilograms the night before  we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.