Opinion ID: 901602
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Landlord duties under common law

Text: [¶9.] The general rule under the common law is that the owner of a building who has leased that building to another, without any agreement to repair, is not liable to a tenant or to his invitees for injuries sustained by reason of its unsafe condition. Boe v. Healy, 84 SD 155, 168 NW2d 710 (1969). [1] Similarly, once a landlord has parted with full possession of the premises to the tenant, the general rule is that the landlord is not liable for injury to third persons caused by the tenant's negligence. Clauson v. Kempffer, 477 NW2d 257 (SD 1991). When setting forth that general rule in Clauson, this Court quoted approvingly from the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 355. This Court then discussed the various exceptions to that general rule that are itemized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 357-362. This Court has also applied other common law general rules and exceptions outlined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. See Walther v. KPKA Meadowlands, Ltd., 1998 SD 78, 581 NW2d 527; Smith v. Lagow Construction & Developing Co., 2002 SD 37, 642 NW2d 187 (both cases dealing with landlords' duties to protect against unlawful acts of third parties). [¶10.] This Court has not specifically utilized the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 356 (1965) in any prior decisions. Section 356 explains that a lessor of land is not liable to his lessee . . . for physical harm caused by any dangerous condition, whether natural or artificial, which existed when the lessee took possession. After reviewing the case law, the circuit court correctly concluded that this Court would utilize § 356 in an appropriate case. [¶11.] It was undisputed that the stairwell did not contain a handrail at the time Hendrix took possession, and that it was in the same condition when Hendrix fell. Under the analysis of the general rule in § 356, Schulte is not liable for a dangerous condition that existed when Hendrix took possession. However, the necessary analysis does not end with § 356. The harshness of that general rule is moderated in certain specific circumstances that are outlined in the exception sections, §§ 357-362. [¶12.] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 357 (1965) provides one such exception. It reads: A lessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his sublessee by a condition of disrepair existing before or arising after the lessee has taken possession if: a. the lessor, as such, has contracted by a covenant in the lease or otherwise to keep the land in repair, and b. the disrepair creates an unreasonable risk to persons upon the land which the performance of the lessor's agreement would have prevented, and c. the lessor fails to exercise reasonable care to perform his contract. [¶13.] The lease between Schulte and Hendrix provided: Owner shall respond in a reasonable time to calls by the Family for services consistent with the obligations under the Lease and maintain the dwelling unit, equipment, common areas, and facilities provided for the use and benefit of the Family in compliance with applicable Housing Quality Standards. [¶14.] Section 357 contains a narrow exception to the general rule of non-liability. As such, it should be applied precisely. It does not impose a sweeping obligation upon a landlord to eliminate all potential dangers. Such an obligation would have the exception swallow the rule. Instead, it imposes liability only when there is a condition of disrepair. The circuit court's decision correctly focused on this narrow language. [¶15.] It was undisputed that no handrail had ever been installed in the stairway in question. Thus, there was no disrepair. This was not a situation where a handrail was damaged and not repaired. This was a situation where a handrail was never installed. To require a landlord to install a handrail that never existed would take the exception beyond its limited scope. [¶16.] Hendrix asks this Court to abandon the common law as outlined in its prior case law and the Restatement. Hendrix contends that this is necessary because public policy requires the Court to protect the interests of tenants who are in an unequal bargaining position with landlords. However, those concerns were the very purpose for the exceptions in §§ 357-362 as explained in the official comments to those sections. [¶17.] Hendrix asks this Court to require all landlords to maintain all rental property in a reasonably safe condition regardless of possession. The public policy concerns raised by Hendrix are already addressed by the exceptions set forth in the Restatement. We decline the invitation to abandon the common law formulations.