Opinion ID: 429185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 21 Group bargaining has long been an accepted form of bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act. See, e.g., NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 77 S.Ct. 643, 1 L.Ed.2d 676 (1957). Although most of the cases that address group bargaining involve multi-employer bargaining associations, the principles underlying those cases also apply to group bargaining by unions. Those principles involve the right of employees and of employers to choose their own representatives in formal labor negotiations, a right that is fundamental to the statutory scheme. General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 512, 516 (2nd Cir.1969). Both multiunion and multiemployer bargaining ... [have] been widely recognized as an effective way to create stability in collective-bargaining relationships and 'a vital factor in the effectuation of the national policy of promoting labor peace through strengthened collective bargaining.'  Brotherhood of Teamsters Local No. 70, 214 NLRB 902, 905 (1974) (quoting NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 449, 353 U.S. 87, 95, 77 S.Ct. 643, 647, 1 L.Ed.2d 676 (1957)). 22 Group bargaining can take many forms. The term joint bargaining is commonly used to describe a bargaining arrangement that binds all of the participants. See, e.g., General Electric, 412 F.2d at 522. Allied, for instance, is an association of numerous employers, each of which is bound by the contracts negotiated by Allied on its behalf. This arrangement constitutes a form of joint bargaining. On the union side, an agreement to be bound by group action may take several forms, two of which are discussed in this opinion: pooled voting and what the Board has labelled majority ratification. Under a pooled voting agreement, a contract approved by a predetermined majority of affected employees--regardless of their affiliation with a particular local or bargaining unit--will bind all of the employees. The Warehouse Locals, which make up one of the three bargaining units in this case, ratify contracts pursuant to a pooled voting arrangement. Similarly, Local 174 ratified the 1977 soft drink contract pursuant to a pooled voting agreement with the other unions, despite the fact that Local 174's members had voted to reject the contract. Under a majority ratification arrangement, the unions are bound by any agreement ratified by a majority of the affected bargaining units, regardless of the size of those units. In this case, the Board argues that Local 174 agreed to be bound by any contract ratified by the other two bargaining units, not by the results of pooled voting. 23 The test for determining whether a party is bound by the results of group bargaining is well settled. The party must have demonstrated an unequivocal intention to be bound by group action. This court has stated the test in two-part fashion: 24 [The test is] whether the members of the group have indicated from the outset an unequivocal intention to be bound in collective bargaining by group rather than individual action, and whether the [association] representing [ ]the employe[rs] has been notified of the formation of the group and the delegation of bargaining authority to it, and has assented and entered into negotiations with the group's representative. 25 Western States Regional Council No. 3, International Woodworkers of America v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 770, 773 (D.C.Cir.1968) (citations omitted). An unequivocal intention to be bound by group action need not be expressed in a written agreement. We have recognized that group activity can and does range over a wide spectrum of habits, practices, and understandings, explicit and implicit, which makes generalization more hazardous than usual. Retail Clerks Union No. 1550 v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 210, 216 (D.C.Cir.1964). Thus a party may rely on apparent, as well as express, delegation of authority in consenting to engage in joint bargaining. NLRB v. Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190, 194 (5th Cir.1977); see also NLRB v. Dover Tavern Owners' Association, 412 F.2d 725, 727 (3rd Cir.1969). Moreover, the unequivocal intention can be inferred, in part, from a course of conduct. See Joseph McDaniel, 226 NLRB 851, 853 (An employer who, through a course of conduct or otherwise, signifies that it has authorized the group to act in its behalf will be bound by that apparent creation of authority.) (footnote omitted), enforced sub nom. NLRB v. Beckham, Inc., 564 F.2d 190 (5th Cir.1977). It is therefore appropriate for the Board to look at the particular facts of each case to determine whether the parties intended to be bound by group action. 26 Although the Board has considerable discretion in making this case-by-case determination, the legal standard which the Board must apply is stringent. The intention to be bound must be unequivocal--it cannot be ambiguous or susceptible to numerous interpretations by the party who consents to engage in group bargaining. 27 The problem with the Board's holding in this case is that the Board stretched the meaning of unequivocal beyond recognition. The factual support for the Board's theory consists of a fragile collection of inferences built upon inferences. Its conclusion simply is not supported by substantial evidence. 28 The Board explained its finding of an unequivocal intention to be bound as follows: 29 [I]t is clear ... that the parties' coordinated bargaining format in 1977, and again in 1980, contemplated a binding contract upon ratification by a majority of the unions, and that [Local 174] tacitly concurred therein based on its acquiescent participation in the negotiations, its execution of a prior contract over its members' rejection, and its failure to notify the association at any time of its rejection of the majority ratification principle. 30 265 NLRB No. 59, slip op. at 4. The central assertion, upon which the Board's entire judgment rests, is that the parties contemplated a binding contract upon ratification by a majority of the unions. If the Board is incorrect about that inference, then the entire house of cards collapses. Petitioner's acquiescent participation in coordinated bargaining in 1980 and its failure to notify the association ... of its rejection of the majority ratification principle have no meaning unless that principle was adopted by the unions. 31 The Board relies on the total context of the negotiations and the course of conduct of petitioner to demonstrate the existence of the requisite intent. In particular, the Board emphasizes several factors: the background of the 1977 coordinated bargaining proposal; the one big strike or one big settlement statement at the outset of the 1977 grocery negotiations; petitioner's execution of the 1977 soft drink contract despite rejection of the contract by its membership; and the statement that, if one local failed to ratify the contracts, that would be an internal union matter. An analysis of these factors, especially in light of the other evidence on the record, demonstrates the weakness of the Board's position. See Universal Camera, 340 U.S. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 464 (The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight.). 32 As a preliminary matter, we note that no union representative stated that the unions intended to be bound by majority ratification. Moreover, although the parties agreed to negotiate through one primary spokesman, they still voted on three separate contracts. The final agreement reflected an economic settlement that was identical for all three contracts, but contained individual issues for each union which were worked out at the bargaining table. Although we recognize that [t]he signing of individual contracts does not negate the existence of a multi-[union] unit, Dover Tavern, 412 F.2d at 727 n. 4, there must be other evidence supporting the existence of such a unit. 33 The Board argues that the background of the 1977 grocery negotiations supports an inference that the unions intended to be bound by majority ratification. It is clear that the unions' purposes in using coordinated bargaining were to avoid another breakdown in negotiations like the one that had occurred in 1974 and to obtain similar economic settlements. But these factors support an inference that the unions intended to sit at the same table for negotiation purposes, not that they unequivocally intended to be bound by majority agreement. In fact, the background of the 1977 grocery negotiations suggests that the unions did not intend to be bound by majority ratification. 34 The union representatives used the term coordinated bargaining to describe the group bargaining arrangement to Allied. They did not refer to joint bargaining--a term commonly used to describe a binding group bargaining arrangement. Moreover, the union attorney cited the General Electric case to explain the proposal to Richard King and the other Allied representatives. In General Electric, the court rejected the employer's contention that the united bargaining front presented by the unions amounted to an imposition of joint bargaining to which the employer did not want to assent. 412 F.2d at 522-23. The court upheld the legality of a coordinated bargaining format and ordered the company to bargain with the union despite the presence of representatives of other bargaining units at the table. Considered as a whole, the background of the 1977 grocery negotiations does not support the Board's conclusion. 35 The Board also places considerable emphasis on petitioner's signing of the 1977 soft drink contract to support the inference that it unequivocally intended to be bound by majority ratification. Although Allied was not informed of any agreement between the unions at the time the soft drink contracts were executed in 1977, it did know that petitioner's membership had voted to reject the contract. In light of this information, the Board concludes that it was reasonable for Allied to infer from petitioner's acceptance of the contract, that petitioner was bound by any agreement ratified by a majority of the unions. The irony of this position is that petitioner in fact signed the contract pursuant to an agreement to pool its votes with the other locals. Yet the Board has not taken the position that there was such a pooled vote agreement in the 1980 grocery negotiations. Thus the analogy to the 1977 soft drink negotiations is flawed. Even assuming arguendo that there was a pooled vote agreement in both sets of negotiations, it is not clear from the record that a majority of individual employees voted to ratify the 1980 grocery agreement, but only that two out of the three bargaining units had enough votes to ratify. 36 The central weakness in the Board's reliance on the 1977 soft drink agreement is that petitioner occupies very different bargaining positions in the soft drink and grocery industries. Petitioner is one of the dominant locals in the grocery industry and traditionally led the grocery negotiations by bargaining to settlement before the other unions met with Allied. In contrast, Local 174 was never the leader in the soft drink negotiations and represented only 65 of the 1200 workers covered by those agreements. The union's bargaining positions in the two sets of negotiations varied considerably. It is unreasonable to infer that Local 174's behavior in the soft drink negotiations, where it was a minor player, would be repeated in negotiations where it was a dominant union. 37 Given that the background of the 1977 grocery negotiations and petitioner's signing of the 1977 soft drink agreement provide little support for the Board's conclusion, the Board relies heavily on the two statements made at the outset of the 1977 and 1980 grocery negotiations: that there would be one big strike or one big settlement and that the failure of a union to ratify the agreement would constitute an internal union matter. Neither statement indicates that the unions were binding themselves to a majority ratification principle. These statements do not indicate an unequivocal intention to adhere to any settlement ratified by two out of the three bargaining units. In light of the agreement to continue with three separate contracts, which contained some distinct provisions for each union, the one big strike or one big settlement statement in 1977 is ambiguous. Robert Cooper could not recall the statement, but testified that it might have been said as a bargaining tool to present a united front to Allied. Nor was the ambiguity of the 1977 statement clarified by the repeated statement in 1980 that rejection of the agreement by one bargaining unit would constitute an internal union matter. The events that transpired following petitioner's rejection of the contract demonstrate that the phrase internal union matter is susceptible to more than one interpretation. After it rejected the agreement, Local 174 failed to receive strike sanction from its Joint Council. Robert Cooper testified that he always thought internal union matter referred to whether the rejecting local would be able to go on strike. 38 The evidence relied upon by the Board--the background of the 1977 grocery negotiations, petitioner's signing of the 1977 soft drink agreement, and the two statements made by union representatives--does not support its conclusion that Local 174 manifested an unequivocal intention to be bound by an agreement ratified by a majority of the unions. Because there was no apparent agreement among the unions to be bound by majority ratification, the fact that Cooper acquiesced in the 1980 agreement to engage in coordinated bargaining, like the last time adds nothing to the Board's argument. Similarly, the Board's contention that Cooper tacitly concurred in the majority ratification principle by remaining silent when the internal union matter statement was made in 1980 is also incorrect because no such principle can be inferred from the evidence. Compare McAx Sign Company, Inc. v. NLRB, 576 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1116, 99 S.Ct. 1021, 59 L.Ed.2d 75 (1979) (where an employer's failure to reserve the right to dissent to a wage increase that had been agreed to in group bargaining and which the employer had in his possession for nearly a month, supported an inference that the employer intended to be bound by group action). The Board's reliance on Cooper's acquiescence and tacit concurrence in the 1980 bargaining format tends to confuse two distinct legal issues: whether petitioner bound itself to the results of group bargaining and whether, once having done so, petitioner met the stringent requirements for withdrawing from such a bargaining arrangement. See Charles D. Bonanno Linen Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 454 U.S. 404, 102 S.Ct. 720, 70 L.Ed.2d 656 (1982) (describing the circumstances under which a party may withdraw from joint bargaining). Cooper's silence during the 1980 negotiations does not affect our conclusion that there is insufficient evidence to support the Board's finding that Local 174 manifested an unequivocal intention to be bound by group action.