Opinion ID: 812801
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of the Government’s Suit

Text: Balice‟s argument that the Government‟s suit is untimely as to the 1992 and 1993 tax years is without merit. If a taxpayer requests a CDP hearing, “the running of any period of limitations under section 6502 (relating to collection after assessment) . . . shall Court‟s May 31, 2011 order denying the Government‟s motion to dismiss. 5 be suspended for the period during which such hearing, and appeals therein, are pending. In no event shall any such period expire before the 90th day after the day on which there is a final determination in such hearing.” 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e)(1); see also 26 C.F.R. § 301.6330-1(g)(1) (noting that the limitations period for collections will be suspended from the date a taxpayer requests a CDP hearing until the taxpayer withdraws the request or the date the determination resulting from the hearing becomes final because of the expiration of the time for seeking judicial review). Here, Balice timely mailed her CDP request on August 26, 2002, and on January 29, 2004, the IRS Appeals Office issued a notice of determination in which it sustained the IRS‟s proposed collection action for the 1992 and 1993 tax years. The statute of limitations with regards to these tax years was suspended pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 6330(e) for 551 days—from August 26, 2002 to February 28, 2004, the date when Balice‟s right to judicial review expired. After adding these 551 days to the 1,938-day suspension of the limitations period conceded by Balice,3 the statute of limitations for tax years 1992 and 1993 had been extended for a total of 2,489 days to June 12, 2011 and June 19, 2011. The Government filed its suit on January 7, 2011; therefore, it was timely filed. 3 As noted above, Balice filed an installment agreement request on October 30, 1998. Pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6331(k) & 6331(i)(5), the limitations period was suspended for 385 days—from October 30, 1998 until November 19, 1999, thirty days after the IRS rejected the request on October 20, 1999. Furthermore, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6503(b) & 6503(h), the limitations period was suspended from the date of each of Balice‟s bankruptcy filings until their dismissals, plus six months. Accordingly, her two bankruptcy filings suspended the limitations period for 1,553 days. 6 B. Balice’s Challenges to the CDP Request and Documentary Evidence For the first time on appeal, Balice challenges the legitimacy of her CDP request and the admissibility of the copy of the request submitted by the Government in support of its motion for summary judgment. If the nonmoving party fails to identify evidence in the record that creates a genuine issue of material fact, that party cannot later argue on appeal that evidence in the record creates a genuine issue of material fact if the district court‟s attention was not directed to that evidence during summary judgment proceedings. See Childers v. Joseph, 842 F.2d 689, 694-95 (3d Cir. 1988). Balice failed to challenge the exhibits relied upon by the Government. She also failed to submit an affidavit or any evidence raising a factual dispute regarding the validity of her CDP request as required. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e) (adverse party to motion for summary judgment cannot rest upon allegations or denials of moving party‟s pleading but instead must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue of fact through affidavits or otherwise); see also Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007). Therefore, because Balice failed to challenge the legitimacy of her CDP request in the District Court, she cannot now do so here on appeal. See Childers, 842 F.2d at 694-95. Furthermore, because Balice did not object to the admissibility of the copy of her CDP request submitted by the Government, we review her objections for plain error only. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(e). First, Balice asserts that this evidence does not meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 901, which provides that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must 7 produce evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is.” Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). The burden of proof under Rule 901 is “slight,” requiring only “a foundation from which the fact-finder could legitimately infer that the evidence is what the proponent claims it to be.” Link v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 788 F.2d 918, 927 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, “„[a]ny combination of items of evidence illustrated by Rule 901(b) . . . will suffice so long as Rule 901(a) is satisfied.‟” United States v. Reilly, 33 F.3d 1396, 1405 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting 5 Weinstein‟s Evidence ¶ 901(b)(1)[01] at 901-32). The Government attached the declaration of IRS Agent Michael MacGillivray to its reply to Balice‟s opposition to its motion for summary judgment, and in this declaration, Agent MacGillivray attested to personal knowledge of Balice‟s CDP request. Accordingly, the Government satisfied its burden under the requirements of Rule 901. Second, Balice argues that the copy of the CDP request does not satisfy the requirements of the “best evidence” rule under Federal Rule of Evidence 1003, which states that “[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the original unless a genuine question is raised about the original‟s authenticity or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.” As discussed above, Balice has not demonstrated that there is a genuine question regarding the authenticity of the CDP request. Furthermore, she has not alleged that the circumstances rendered it unfair for the Government to submit a duplicate of her CDP request. Accordingly, there is no reason for us to question that the exhibits are not identical to the originals. 8