Opinion ID: 1795142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Submit a Manslaughter Instruction

Text: In 1931, in State v. Clough, 327 Mo. 700, 705, 38 S.W.2d 36, 38 (1931), Division No. 2 of this Court said: The authorities are fairly harmonious in holding that, in order for a homicide to be reduced from murder to manslaughter, there must be a sudden unexpected assault, encounter, or provocation tending to excite the passion beyond control. It is not the assault or the provocation alone that reduces the grade of the crime, but it is the sudden happening or occurrence of the provocation so as to render the mind incapable of reflection and obscure the reason so that the elements of malice and deliberation necessary to constitute murder are absent, and therefore the crime is not murder, but manslaughter. . . . In the case now before us, there is abundant testimony by disinterested witnesses to the effect that deceased made numerous threats against the life of the defendant. These threats were communicated to defendant. In addition, defendant testified that deceased followed defendant on two occasions within a few days prior to the homicide and threatened to assault him. Defendant testified he armed himself with a deadly weapon for the purpose of protecting himself against the threatened assaults of deceased; that at the time of the shooting deceased advanced toward him, stating `I will get you now,' etc., and threw two rocks at defendant, and when deceased reached a point of about six feet from defendant, defendant shot to protect himself. After the shooting, defendant calmly walked by the body of the deceased and telephoned the sheriff that he had killed the deceased. Under this testimony there is no room for manslaughter. The killing of the deceased was not the result of a sudden provocation, calculated to excite the passion of defendant beyond control. If defendant is to be believed, he should be acquitted on the ground of self-defense. If defendant is not to be believed, then he is guilty of murder. . . . The court did not err in failing to instruct on manslaughter. In 1969, in State v. Smith, 445 S.W.2d 326, 331 (Mo.1969), Division No. 1 of this Court cited the Clough language and held that, on the facts in the case, the trial court likewise did not err in failing to instruct on the issue of manslaughter. In 1971, in State v. Ayers, 470 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Mo. banc 1971), this Court en banc held that unless we can declare as a matter of law that there is `an entire absence of evidence upon which to rest a verdict of guilty of manslaughter,' it is the duty of the trial court to give an instruction on manslaughter. In 1972, in State v. Hubbard, 484 S.W.2d 224, 226 (Mo.1972), Division No. 1 of this Court cited the Clough language and held that the trial court did not err in refusing to give the manslaughter instruction. In 1972, in State v. Patterson, 484 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Mo.1972), Division No. 2 of this Court cited the Clough language and said: On this record, we hold that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on manslaughter because we cannot declare as a matter of law that the killing of Robert Russell was not the result of a `sudden unexpected assault, encounter, or provocation tending to excite the passion beyond control.' State v. Clough, supra; State v. Ayers, supra; and Stevenson v. United States, 162 U.S. 313, 16 S.Ct. 839, 40 L.Ed. 980, wherein the United States Supreme Court said: `A judge may be entirely satisfied, from the whole evidence in the case, that the person doing the killing was actuated by malice; that he was not in any such passion as to lower the grade of the crime from murder to manslaughter by reason of any absence of malice; and yet, if there be any evidence fairly tending to bear upon the issue of manslaughter, it is the province of the jury to determine from all the evidence what the condition of mind was, and to say whether the crime was murder or manslaughter. In 1973, in State v. Jackson, 496 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Mo. banc 1973), this Court en banc cited the Clough language and held, on the record in that case, that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on manslaughter because there is no evidence which would support a reduction of the homicide from murder to manslaughter. In 1975, in State v. Stapleton, 518 S.W.2d 292, 299, 300 (Mo. banc 1975), this Court en banc referred to Ayers, in part, as follows: . . . Affirmatively put, Ayers holds that when there is evidence sufficient to submit second degree murder, there is automatically evidence sufficient to submit manslaughter and that it is the function of the jury to decide whether the defendant acted with premeditation and malice. ..... In short, the significance of State v. Ayers, supra , is the holding that the trial court is required to submit manslaughter in murder second degree cases on the basis of the evidence which supports the second degree murder instruction even though there is no evidence of lack of malice or premeditationno evidence of provocation. The writers of the principal, concurring and dissenting opinions in the Kansas City District of the Court of Appeals would seem to have agreed that, by use of the above language, Stapleton construed Ayers to require that, where conventional murder instructions are supported by the pleadings and evidence and are given, there must be an automatic submission of manslaughter. This requirement has been in effect since March 1, 1975 (See MAI-CR 6.02, Caveats). This requirement was not instituted by Ayers . Any contrary implication from the language appearing in Stapleton is unfortunate if automatic submissions were made prior to March 1, 1975. As demonstrated above, in Smith , Hubbard , Patterson and Jackson , the Clough language has controlled. The significance of Ayers lies only in its emphasis on the relative functions of judge and jury in a felonious homicide case, and in its holding that it is the duty of the judge to instruct on lesser grades of homicide unless he can declare, as a matter of law, that there is no evidence to support such submission. Accordingly, we apply the Clough language to the facts of this case. The evidence at trial showed that George Chase, the deceased, came to the rescue of Kay Mohatt after her call for help. Chase grabbed appellant around the neck and was attempting to pull him away from Kay Mohatt and appellant called get him off. Appellant's fellow escapee, Williams, then killed Chase with a mop bucket handle. On this record, we declare, as a matter of law, that there is no evidence to support a submission of manslaughter under Clough .