Opinion ID: 1293270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Other State Interests

Text: The state, citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed.2d 600 (1969), argues that it has an interest in allowing every citizen the right to reside at the place of his or her choosing. While disclaiming any intent to challenge the constitutionality of the municipal residency requirements, the state argues that because courts have recognized a right to reside where one wishes and because municipal residency requirements burden that right, the General Assembly may act to protect such right by forbidding municipal residency requirements. First, we agree that Denver's residency requirement is constitutional under the federal constitution. [8] In McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Service Commission, 424 U.S. 645, 96 S.Ct. 1154, 47 L.Ed.2d 366 (1976), the Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion upheld a requirement that employees of the city of Philadelphia reside within the city limits. The court distinguished Shapiro which required prior residency as a condition of eligibility to vote. McCarthy, 424 U.S. at 646, 96 S.Ct. at 1155. The Philadelphia provision was a bona fide continuing residence requirement, the court held. Id. at 647, 96 S.Ct. at 1155. Thus, because residency requirements such as those present in this case do not impermissibly infringe on the constitutional right to travel, we cannot accept the state's argument that section 8-2-120, by forbidding such requirements, serves to protect this important right. The question is not whether a person is free to live where he or she wishes but rather whether one may live where one wishes and at the same time insist upon employment by government. Ector v. City of Torrance, 10 Cal.3d 129, 137, 109 Cal.Rptr. 849, 853, 514 P.2d 433, 437 (1973), citing Kennedy v. City of Newark, 29 N.J. 178, 148 A.2d 473 (1959). We find no constitutional difficulty with the municipal residency requirements in this case. Second, we note that the Colorado Constitution itself recognizes the value of residency provisions, requiring residence as a condition of employment in the state government. Colo. Const., Art. XII, § 13(6). Thus, to the extent that the state denies the legitimacy of the appellees' proferred policy reasons in support of their residency requirements, the state's position is inconsistent with the very policy advanced by our constitution. [9]