Opinion ID: 705109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Lindley's Appeal

Text: 22 Lindley submits that the OAA does not create rights privately enforceable under Sec. 1983. She contends specifically that the statutory command that funding formulae take factors into account is too ambiguous to be judicially enforceable. She also maintains that the amendment to the OAA that required federal approval of each state's funding formula makes clear that Congress did not intend that the OAA be enforced by private citizens. Alternatively, Lindley argues that her formula adequately accounts for the State's disabled and linguistically isolated. She submits that her existing formula, through its 75+ and minority factors, directs funds toward PSAs on the basis of their number of disabled and linguistically isolated individuals and thus takes account of them. She also contends that the phrase best available data does not require use of exclusive factors for language barriers and disabilities and argues that nothing in that requirement prohibits her from eliminating characteristics affecting too small a portion of the population to be useful measuring criteria. 23 The City responds that the OAA creates a private right of action under Sec. 1983. The statutory language, the City submits, unambiguously requires Lindley to develop a formula that takes into account the distribution of older individuals hindered by disability or language barriers. Congress' requirement of federal approval of state funding formulae, the City contends, was not intended to foreclose a private right of action. Finally, the City argues that Lindley's formula violates the OAA because it fails to use the best available data to take account of disability and language barriers.
24 We turn first to whether the requirements of the OAA may be enforced under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. In Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 6-8, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 2505-06, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980), the Supreme Court recognized that parties may rely upon Sec. 1983 to challenge violations of federal statutes. 6 However, not all violations of a federal statute give rise to Sec. 1983 actions. Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 355-56, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 1366, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992); Clifton v. Schafer, 969 F.2d 278, 283 (7th Cir.1992). Because Sec. 1983 speaks in terms of 'rights, privileges, or immunities,' not violations of federal law, Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 106, 110 S.Ct. 444, 448, 107 L.Ed.2d 420 (1989), the particular federal statute at issue must itself create rights that are enforceable under Sec. 1983. Miller v. Whitburn, 10 F.3d 1315, 1319 (7th Cir.1993) (citing Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423, 107 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987)); Clifton, 969 F.2d at 283. Absent such enforceable rights, a cause of action under Sec. 1983 is unavailable. Suter, 503 U.S. at 356, 112 S.Ct. at 1366. In addition, even if a statute creates such rights, a cause of action under Sec. 1983 may be unavailable if Congress  'foreclose[s] such enforcement ... in the enactment itself.'  Id. at 355-56, 112 S.Ct. at 1366 (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 770); see also Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508, 110 S.Ct. 2510, 2517, 110 L.Ed.2d 455 (1990) (A plaintiff alleging a violation of a federal statute will be permitted to sue under Sec. 1983 unless (1) 'the statute [does] not create enforceable rights, privileges, or immunities within the meaning of Sec. 1983,' or (2) 'Congress has foreclosed such enforcement of the statute in the enactment itself.' ) (quoting Wright, 479 U.S. at 423, 107 S.Ct. at 770). In Miller, we noted that a statute creates a right enforceable under Sec. 1983 if 25
26 (2) it imposes a binding obligation on the governmental unit rather than merely expressing a congressional preference for a certain kind of conduct, and 27 (3) the interest asserted by the plaintiff is not so vague or amorphous that it is beyond the competence of the judiciary to enforce. 28 10 F.3d at 1319; see also Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. 7
29 We now apply these principles to the relevant portions of the OAA. As we have outlined above, the OAA requires each state agency on aging to use the best available data to develop a distribution formula that takes into account the geographical distribution of older individuals within the state, as well as the distribution of those individuals in greatest economic and social need, with particular attention to low-income minority older individuals. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C). In evaluating whether this language creates rights enforceable under Sec. 1983, we are guided by the Supreme Court's recent analyses in Wilder and Suter. 30
31 In Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Ass'n, the Court considered whether the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act created rights enforceable under Sec. 1983. In relevant part, the amendment required that health care providers be reimbursed at rates 32 which the State finds, and makes assurances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and adequate to meet the costs which must be incurred by efficiently and economically operated facilities[.] 33 496 U.S. at 503, 110 S.Ct. at 2514 (citing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1396a(a)(13)(A)). The Court determined that this provision created rights enforceable under Sec. 1983. First, the Court set forth the three-part test outlined above. See id. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. Applying this test to the pertinent statute, the Court noted that there was little doubt that health care providers were the intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment. Id. at 510, 110 S.Ct. at 2517. Focusing upon the statutory language, the Court commented that the Boren Amendment is cast in mandatory rather than precatory terms: the state plan 'must' 'provide for payment ... of hospitals' according to rates the State finds are reasonable and adequate. Id. at 512, 110 S.Ct. at 2518. The Court rejected the argument that the requirement that rates be reasonable and adequate was too amorphous to be judicially enforceable. It reasoned that, although the amendment afforded the States wide discretion, it was not beyond judicial competence to determine, on the basis of a record made by the parties, whether the rates were reasonable. Id. at 520, 110 S.Ct. at 2523. Finally, the Court determined that Congress had not foreclosed enforcement under Sec. 1983 by providing for review of state rates by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. The Court noted that it had held remedial schemes established by Congress sufficient to foreclose a Sec. 1983 remedy on only two occasions. Id. at 521, 110 S.Ct. at 2523 (citing Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 104 S.Ct. 3457, 82 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 2615, 69 L.Ed.2d 435 (1981)). In each instance, Congress had established comprehensive enforcement schemes in the text of the relevant statutes. 8 The Court determined that, although it authorized the Secretary to withhold approval of plans or to curtail the flow of federal funds to states whose plans did not comply with the Medicare Act, the administrative scheme established by the Boren Amendment was not sufficiently comprehensive to demonstrate a congressional intent to withdraw the private remedy of Sec. 1983. 496 U.S. at 522, 110 S.Ct. at 2524. The Court noted that this conclusion was particularly appropriate in the case of the Medicare Act because the Boren Amendment to the statute evidenced an intent to reduce the role of the Secretary in determining methods for calculating payment rates. Id. 34 Two years after Wilder, the Court decided Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 112 S.Ct. 1360, 118 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). The federal statute at issue in Suter, the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 620-628, 670-679a (Adoption Act), provided for federal reimbursement of a portion of the expenses states incurred in administering foster care and adoption programs. To obtain federal reimbursement, the states had to submit a plan to the Secretary of Health and Human Services for approval. Id. at 351, 112 S.Ct. at 1363-64. The statute delineated sixteen requirements that each state plan had to satisfy. Among these was a requirement that the state plan provide 35 that, in each case, reasonable efforts will be made (A) prior to the placement of a child in foster care, to prevent or eliminate the need for removal of the child from his home, and (B) to make it possible for the child to return to his home[.] 36 Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. Sec. 671(a)(15)). The Court determined that this provision did not create rights enforceable under Sec. 1983. Initially, it stated that, although the Act was mandatory in its terms, whether it created rights enforceable under Sec. 1983 required analysis of exactly what is required of States by the Act. Id. at 358, 112 S.Ct. at 1367. Examining the statute, the Court noted that the requirement placed on the states went only so far as to ensure that the State have a plan approved by the Secretary which contains the 16 listed features. Id. The Court recognized the similarities between the Adoption Act at issue in Suter and the statutory language it had considered in Wilder, but distinguished Wilder on the ground that the Boren Amendment had set forth in some detail the factors to be considered in determining the methods for calculating rates. 503 U.S. at 359, 112 S.Ct. at 1368. In contrast, the Court reasoned, the Adoption Act provided no further guidance as to how 'reasonable efforts' are to be measured. Id. at 360, 112 S.Ct. at 1368. The Court found additional support for its determination that no Sec. 1983 remedy was available in the provisions of the Adoption Act which provided enforcement mechanisms for the reasonable efforts clause. The statute afforded the Secretary authority to reduce or to eliminate payments to states whose plans did not comply with the statutory requirements. Also, in cases involving children who had been removed involuntarily from their homes, the statute required a judicial determination that continued habitation would be contrary to the child's welfare before states could receive federal reimbursement. See id. The Court commented that, although these statutory provisions might not constitute a comprehensive enforcement mechanism evidencing Congress' intent to foreclose remedies under Sec. 1983, they did demonstrate that the absence of a remedy to private plaintiffs under Sec. 1983 [did] not make the reasonable efforts clause a dead letter. Id. at 360-61, 112 S.Ct. at 1368-69. Finally, the Court considered the regulations promulgated by the Secretary to enforce the Act. It noted that they were not specific and did not provide notice to the States that failure to do anything other than submit a plan with the requisite features, to be approved by the Secretary, is a further condition on the receipt of funds from the Federal Government. Id. at 362, 112 S.Ct. at 1369. 37
38 Suter teaches that each statute must be interpreted by its own terms. 503 U.S. at 358 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 1367 n. 8. Mindful of this command, our focus must be on the statutory scheme at issue in this case, taken in its totality. After analyzing the OAA on this basis, we conclude that 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C) does not create rights enforceable under Sec. 1983 because its standards are too amorphous to be judicially enforceable. See Wilder, 496 U.S. at 509, 110 S.Ct. at 2516; Miller, 10 F.3d at 1319. Although the OAA is mandatory in its terms, we must, consistent with Suter, consider exactly what is required of States by the Act. Suter, 503 U.S. at 358, 112 S.Ct. at 1367. The OAA requires that states develop formulae for distributing OAA funds which use the best available data that takes into account older individuals with greatest economic and social need, paying particular attention to low-income minority individuals. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C). However, the statute provides no additional guidance as to how the formulae are to take into account these individuals. Cf. Suter, 503 U.S. at 360, 112 S.Ct. at 1368. Section 3025(a)(2)(E) does require states to provide assurances that preference will be given to the groups mentioned in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C); however, this provision simply recasts the language in section 3025(a)(2)(C) without further explicating it. Thus, courts are left with an amorphous provision. The statute gives no explicit guidance as to whether a state formula must include a factor for each and every subclass of older individuals. Nor does it address whether a formula will be considered to have taken account of a factor if, as in the case of Director Lindley's formula, it excludes the factor because few people in the state fall into the category the factor represents. It gives no guidance about a formula that, as the district court found with respect to Lindley's, distributes increased funds with respect to particular categories of individuals, even though it does not contain a factor corresponding to those particular categories. In sum, the OAA does not mandate explicitly that state formulae include specific numbers or types of funding factors. Cf. Miller, 10 F.3d at 1319 ([A] Sec. 1983 action is unavailable if the federal statute at issue merely condition[s] a state's receipt of federal funds on the adoption of a plan satisfying certain criteria.). 39 Moreover, the relevant version of the OAA, like the statute at issue in Suter, requires that state funding formulae be submitted to the federal Administration on Aging for approval. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(D). Further, the OAA provides that each state funding formula should be developed in consultation with area agencies. Id. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C). These provisions, while not necessarily indicating that Congress intended to foreclose a Sec. 1983 remedy in the OAA itself, make clear that the absence of such a remedy does not make the ['takes into account'] clause a dead letter. Suter, 503 U.S. at 360-61, 112 S.Ct. at 1368-69; see also Martinez v. Wilson, 32 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir.1994) (The 1992 amendments to [the OAA] plainly give the Secretary, not the courts, primary responsibility for assuring that state [intrastate funding formulae] conform to the Act's requirements as a condition of receiving federal funds.). Finally, as in Suter, the implementing regulations provide no additional guidance. The relevant regulation merely requires that each state's funding formula reflect the proportion among the planning and service areas of persons age 60 and over in greatest economic or social need with particular attention to low-income minority individuals. 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1321.37(a). This provision tracks the amorphous statutory language set forth in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C). Cf. Martinez, 32 F.3d at 1421 n. 4 (The implementing regulations are no clearer [than the OAA.]); Appalachian Agency for Senior Citizens v. Bland, 775 F.Supp. 191, 196 (W.D.Va.1991) (quoting section 1321.37(a) and noting, [n]o further direction is given to the states for developing formulas). Accordingly, we hold that the City does not have a right, enforceable under Sec. 1983, to challenge the particular factors that are included in or excluded from Lindley's funding formula. The OAA's requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. Sec. 3025(a)(2)(C) are too amorphous to create rights enforceable under Sec. 1983. 40 Our conclusion is bolstered by the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Martinez v. Wilson, 32 F.3d 1415, 1420 (9th Cir.1994). In Martinez, the court considered whether there was a private cause of action under Sec. 1983 for a group of cities that, as area agencies on aging, wanted to challenge the weights assigned to various factors included in the State of California's OAA funding formula. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no private remedy enforceable under Sec. 1983 existed. After reviewing the OAA, the court reasoned that [b]eyond the vague requirements that the [formula] 'take into account' or pay 'particular attention' to certain categories of older individuals, the Act provides no guidance as to how these phrases should be translated into specific percentages in any [formula]. There are no judicially manageable standards here. 32 F.3d at 1421. Although our case involves a challenge to the particular factors included in the formula, rather than the weights assigned to these factors, we agree that the vague requirements of the statute fail to provide sufficient guidance to render the Act judicially enforceable. 9