Opinion ID: 681588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Wiretap Issue

Text: 5 The drug conspiracy for which the appellants here were convicted was uncovered in large part through the use of wiretaps on various conventional and cellular phones. All the appellants seek reversal of their convictions on the grounds that the evidence derived from these wiretaps should have been suppressed because of alleged violations by the government of the wiretap statute. 6 The wiretap statute (Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968) provides that: 7 The Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, Associate Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General, any acting Assistant Attorney General or any Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Criminal Division specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge ... for ... an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications.... 8 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516 (1988) (emphasis added). Once an authorized application for a wiretap has been granted, the statute requires that 9 [e]very order and extension thereof shall contain a provision that the authorization to intercept ... shall be conducted in such a way as to minimize the interception of communications not otherwise subject to interception under this chapter.... In the event the intercepted communication is in a code or foreign language, and an expert in that foreign language or code is not reasonably available during the interception period, minimization may be accomplished as soon as practicable after such interception. 10 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(5) (1988). Finally, section 2518(10)(a) provides for the suppression of all evidence, either contained in, or derived from, a wiretap, if the communication was unlawfully intercepted, or the order of authorization or approval under which it was intercepted was insufficient on its face, or the interception was not made in conformity with the order of authorization or approval. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2518(10)(a) (1988). 5 11 On December 12, 1986, then-Attorney General Meese signed an order authorizing three Deputy Assistant Attorneys General (John C. Keeney, Stephen A. Saltzburg, and Mark M. Richard, referred to as DAAGs) to authorize applications for wiretaps. On August 12, 1988, Attorney General Meese resigned and Thornburgh took his place. Between September 20, 1988 and March 15, 1989, that is between one and seven months after Meese left office, nine wiretaps were issued pursuant to requests authorized by the three DAAGs. The authorization memoranda in question here were each addressed to Franklin Hess, Head of Enforcement, Criminal Division, and each purported to be from Edward Dennis, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division. The memoranda bore a line for Dennis' signature, over which a signature of one of the three DAAGs was found. On May 24, 1989, Attorney General Thornburgh redesignated these same DAAGs as authorized to approve wiretap applications. 12 Three violations of the wiretap statute are alleged to have occurred here. First, the appellants contend that the authorization memoranda prepared by the Justice Department were not in fact signed by their author. Second, the appellants contend that the authorizations designating certain officials to authorize wiretaps expired when they were not re-approved by the Attorney General who had replaced the designating Attorney General. Third, the appellants argue that the minimization requirement of the wiretap statute was violated. We reject each of these challenges.
13 The appellants first argue that the purposes of the wiretap statute--to assure that an accountable and identifiable person actually reviews wiretap requests, see United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 515-16, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1826-27, 40 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974) (statute requires mature judgment of a particular, responsible Department of Justice official)--were thwarted because the person who signed the memoranda did not actually write them (i.e. the memos purported to be from Dennis but were signed by other people), and because there was no clear evidence as to who actually authorized the applications. 6 This argument is insubstantial. Assuming that the relevant DAAGs were properly authorized to approve applications, the fact that the memos they signed purported to be from Dennis is irrelevant to the purposes of the statute because those individuals who did sign the applications were identifiable. See United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 575, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 1856, 40 L.Ed.2d 380 (1974) (the misidentification of the officer authorizing the wiretap application did not affect the fulfillment of any of the reviewing or approval functions required by Congress). We have refused to suppress evidence in similar circumstances. United States v. James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1017 (D.C.Cir.) (agreeing with the district court that it was immaterial that a memorandum was initialed by Assistant Attorney General Wilson when the decision was in fact made by Attorney General Mitchell), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1020, 95 S.Ct. 495, 42 L.Ed.2d 294 (1974). And the First Circuit approved of wiretaps under precisely the facts of this case. United States v. Citro, 938 F.2d 1431, 1435 (1st Cir.1991) (memo from Dennis signed for by Keeney), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 902, 116 L.Ed.2d 804 (1992).
14 The appellants next argue that the three DAAGs in question were not authorized to approve wiretap applications when those applications were made up to seven months after the designating Attorney General had left office. In other words, the appellants assert that the designations expired automatically upon a change of Attorneys General, or at least soon thereafter. This identical argument has been rejected by every circuit to have considered the issue, with the First, Second, Fourth, Sixth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits holding that under principles of administrative continuity a designation of officials by one Attorney General continues in effect through a change in Attorneys General so long as the people designated continue to hold their offices. A typical case is United States v. Kerr, 711 F.2d 149 (10th Cir.1983). There, the Tenth Circuit upheld a wiretap where the application was authorized by an official almost two and one half years after the designating Attorney General had left office. The court reasoned: 15 The wiretaps are obviously different in some respects from the other functions and the continuing activities of the Attorney General's staff through changes in administration. Nevertheless, in our opinion, when the authority to authorize applications for wiretaps has been validly delegated to a person in a particular position, as we are concerned with here, it continues so long as that person remains qualified. There was no limitation in the delegation of authority, and the statute contains no express limitations nor language from which one could be implied. 16 Id. at 150-51. To similar effect are United States v. Lawson, 780 F.2d 535, 539 (6th Cir.1985) (following Kerr ); United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 311 (2d Cir.) (Administrative continuity requires that the designation by an outgoing Attorney General of Assistants to authorize electronic surveillance remain valid at least for a reasonable time after the Attorney General leaves office, even without an express redesignation by his successor.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 931, 103 S.Ct. 2095, 77 L.Ed.2d 304 (1983); United States v. Messersmith, 692 F.2d 1315, 1317 (11th Cir.1982) (quoting Wyder, infra ); United States v. Wyder, 674 F.2d 224, 227 (4th Cir.) (We can see no basis for holding that Sec. 2516(1) represents a deviation from the usual rule that administrative orders ordinarily remain in effect beyond the tenure of the individual who issued them.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1125, 102 S.Ct. 2944, 73 L.Ed.2d 1340 (1982). The First Circuit has gone even further and held that an Attorney General's designation of an individual by job title is all that is required. Under that approach, a designation by one Attorney General of the chief deputy assistant in the criminal division would continue in force indefinitely through a change in both Attorneys General and deputy assistants, unless revoked. See United States v. O'Malley, 764 F.2d 38, 42 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Bynum, 763 F.2d 474, 475 (1st Cir.1985). Under either approach, the designations here suffice. 17 This issue, however, is somewhat complicated by our prior decision in United States v. Robinson, 698 F.2d 448, 452 (D.C.Cir.1983). Robinson involved a challenge to the adequacy of authorization memoranda approved by an Assistant Attorney General who had been designated by a former Attorney General but not (until eight days after approval of the wiretap application) by the new Attorney General. In the course of concluding that the authorization by Assistant Attorney General Litvack adequately satisfies the purposes of the statutory provision because Litvack had been specially designated by [the former Attorney General] within the literal meaning of Section 2516(1), 698 F.2d at 452, we rejected the administrative continuity approach. Our reasoning in so doing, however, is no longer applicable. We stated: 18 [A]rguments about the need for administrative continuity miss the mark in this case. The power to authorize electronic surveillance applications is uniquely circumscribed by statute. Congress has identified a very limited category of officials who may legally wield this power. Section 2516's restrictions thereby ensure that decision-making is centralize[d] in a publicly responsible official subject to the political process. S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 97 (1968). 19 698 F.2d at 452 (emphasis added). In other words, our rejection of administrative continuity was premised on the notion that Congress intended only politically accountable officials (presidentially appointed and confirmed by the Senate) to authorize wiretap applications. On that premise, it was feasible to read the statute to require that upon a change in political administrations the newly appointed officials re-evaluate all outstanding designations to ensure full political accountability. That rationale was rejected by Congress, however, when it amended the statute to permit Deputy Assistant Attorneys General--nonpolitical appointees who are not publicly responsible ... to the political process--to authorize wiretap applications. The administrative continuity approach followed by our sister circuits is surely now more appropriate. Nothing in the statute as amended suggests that, unlike other governmental authorizations, officials must be redesignated every time an Attorney General is replaced by a new official. 20 The appellants fix upon the following language in Robinson: [S]ince the delay in revalidation was relatively brief and since the purposes of the statutory requirements were adequately served, we will not overturn the District Court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress. 698 F.2d at 452. Because the delay here--approximately seven months--was considerably greater than the one month delay in Robinson, the appellants would have us conclude that the delay here was unreasonable and reverse. But, having concluded that the purposes of the statutory requirements were adequately served, and that the designation fell within the literal meaning of Section 2516(1), our statements about the brevity of the delay in redesignating Litvack were only dicta. And, of course, our concern about delays in redesignation must be understood in light of the statute that we were interpreting at the time. Because our rejection of the administrative continuity approach was premised on Congress' then-expressed intention to limit designations to politically accountable persons, and because that rejection was the basis of our concern about the delay in redesignation, Robinson's statements about the length of any such delay--even if they had been the holding of the case--would not be binding on us after Congress' amendment of the statute. 21 We choose to join the majority of our sister circuits in holding that a designation continues in force through a change in attorneys general, so long as the designated Deputy Assistant remains in office. We leave for another day the question of whether the First Circuit's position, allowing designations by office rather than person, represents an acceptable application of the statutory command that Deputy Assistants be specially designated. 7
22 The appellants next argue that the government violated another requirement of the statute by failing to reasonably minimize the number of intercepted calls that were not otherwise subject to interception. The appellants' argument below was apparently based on a statistical examination of certain logs which allegedly showed that only ten percent of the calls were minimized (i.e. were not monitored to the end of the conversation). The appellants never submitted, however, a formal statistical analysis which could have been entered into evidence. The government responds by pointing out that many of the conversations were too short in duration to minimize (i.e. to hang up in time) and that many others were in code or a foreign language (Spanish). The district court reviewed the evidence and concluded that it amply demonstrated the government's compliance, especially in these circumstances. 23 The Supreme Court has indicated that the minimization requirement is not an absolute prohibition on the interception of nonrelevant conversations, and has approved of government conduct where only 40% of the intercepted calls were conspiracy-related. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 135, 140, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 1722, 1724, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978). We have held that the standard is one of reasonableness. United States v. Wilson, 835 F.2d 1440, 1445 (D.C.Cir.1987). Even if the minimization requirement was violated, moreover, we have indicated that suppression might not be an appropriate remedy, United States v. Scott, 516 F.2d 751, 760 n. 19 (D.C.Cir.1975), aff'd by Scott, 436 U.S. at 140, 98 S.Ct. at 1724, and have suggested, although in dicta, that the only remedy might be the suppression of the nonrelevant calls, leaving the aggrieved individuals with a civil suit for damages under the statute. See Scott, 516 F.2d at 760 n. 19. 24 As the government emphasizes, the appellants make no effort to point to specific conversations that should not have been intercepted, or even to a pattern of such conversations. That only ten percent of calls were not monitored until the end proves nothing--even if true--because it may well have been that the remaining calls all related to the conspiracy or could not have reasonably been minimized. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in Scott, and without more concrete indications that the government failed to meet its obligations to minimize intercepted communications, there was no error below. 25 Thus, the district court's refusal to suppress evidence derived from the wiretaps was proper, and we affirm its disposition of this issue.