Opinion ID: 200773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: the bolstering claim

Text: 34 The appellant maintains that the prosecution improperly bolstered Irizarry's credibility when Ivan Lugo, an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), testified as to both Irizarry's confirmed reliability as an informant in an unrelated investigation (involving the Tibes housing project gang) and the methods that he (Lugo) employed to corroborate Irizarry's out-of-court statements regarding the murder of Saul Perez. Because the parties disagree as to the appropriate standard of review, we start there. 35 To preserve a claim of error in the admission of testimony, a party ordinarily must interpose a contemporaneous objection to the question posed. See Fed.R.Evid. 103(a). But lawyers are not required to be prescient. Consequently, they are not required to object to proper questions in anticipation of unresponsive or otherwise inappropriate answers. 21 Charles A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 5037, at 187 (1st ed. 1977 & Supp.2003) (collecting cases). When a proper question elicits an untoward reply, the failure to object to the question is excused so long as the aggrieved party promptly moves to strike the offending answer. See id. at 188-90. 36 On direct examination, Lugo testified that he had attempted to corroborate most of the information provided by Irizarry about the Tibes gang. Immediately after Lugo made this statement, defense counsel lodged a bolstering objection. The court correctly overruled the belated objection — both the question (I ask you, after learning that information [about the existence of several gangs], what, if anything, did you do?) and Lugo's carefully circumscribed answer were proper. 37 Lugo's subsequent testimony was considerably more problematic. Among other things, he professed his belief in the accuracy of Irizarry's statements about the Tibes gang and vouchsafed that there were several other witnesses, several other cooperating sources who could corroborate Irizarry's testimony linking the appellant to La Cabra's organization. But the appellant neither interposed any further objection nor moved to strike these answers. Hence, our review is for plain error. 38 The impropriety of the last-mentioned testimony is readily apparent. It is black-letter law that prosecutors may not place the prestige of the United States behind a witness by making personal assurances about the credibility of a witness or by indicating that facts not before the jury support the witness's testimony. United States v. Rosario-Diaz, 202 F.3d 54, 65 (1st Cir.2000) (citing United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1207-08 (1st Cir.1994)). It follows inexorably that the prosecution cannot prop up a dubious witness by having a government agent place the stature of his office behind the witness. Id. Although the prosecution's success often depends on its ability to convince the jury of a particular witness's credibility, it cannot entice the jury to find guilt on the basis of a DEA agent's opinion of the witness's veracity. 39 Lugo's testimony constitutes a flagrant breach of these standards. It invited the jury to give weight to his belief that Irizarry had told the truth during the investigation of the Tibes gang. Equally as improper was Lugo's ipse dixit that several other witnesses — none of whom were identified — had purportedly corroborated Irizarry's testimony about the appellant's involvement in Saul Perez's murder. In these ways, Lugo placed the prestige of his lengthy government service behind Irizarry's statements. Furthermore, the reliance on evidence not before the jury constituted an independent (and even more serious) lapse. See Balsam, 203 F.3d at 88 (condemning a prosecutor's reliance on facts outside the record to support a prosecution witness). The challenged testimony was improper and never should have seen the light of day. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 253 F.3d 251, 253-54 (6th Cir.2001); Rosario-Diaz, 202 F.3d at 65-66. To make a bad situation worse, this hardly seems to be an innocent lapse. Lugo was a veteran DEA agent and had an obvious interest in bolstering Irizarry's credibility. 40 Having found improper bolstering, we apply the test for plain error. See Duarte, 246 F.3d at 60-62. The first two requirements are easily satisfied: it was error of the most glaring sort to place the challenged testimony before the jurors. We proceed, then, to the third and fourth steps of the plain error pavane. 41 The appellant emphasizes that Irizarry's credibility was very important to the case against him and claims, on that basis, that Lugo's ill-conceived testimony affected his substantial rights. This claim fails for two principal reasons. 42 First, Irizarry's testimony was scarcely the sine qua non of the government's case. The jury may well have based its verdict on Officer Nazario's testimony. Nazario stated that he observed the appellant exchanging money with people on the street and consorting with both Paquito — a confirmed member of the La Cabra conspiracy — and Irizarry. Moreover, Nazario testified that he had learned first-hand of the appellant's leadership position in the drug conspiracy when the appellant apologized on behalf of an underling who had left a used syringe in Nazario's backyard. This testimony, in combination with other evidence, was potent enough to prove the government's case. 43 Second, and perhaps more critical to our analysis, Lugo's improper bolstering appears to have played a very modest role in the unfolding drama of the trial. The prosecutor wisely refrained from referring to that testimony during closing arguments and reminded the jurors several times that it was their responsibility to assess the credibility of the witnesses. The district court's instructions sounded a similar theme. Viewed in this light, we conclude that Lugo's bolstering, while deserving of reproof, did not affect the appellant's substantial rights. Consequently, the incident does not require vacation of the conviction.