Opinion ID: 69626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Morley

Text: Morley argues that the evidence did not support a finding that he “willfully” joined the conspiracies or acted as a lookout during the offloading of the marijuana. He asserts that although both Cash and Saunders testified that it was their understanding that Morley was to act as the lookout, Morley himself never directly told either of them that he was the lookout. He further contends that the cell phone records established at most that he arrived within a two and a half to three mile radius of Royal Road at some point around the time the offloading apparently took place and that there were no eye witnesses who could affirmatively place him at the scene. “We review the sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and drawing all reasonable inferences and credibility choices in favor of the jury’s verdict.” United States v. Taylor, 480 F.3d 1025, 1026 (11th Cir. 2007). In conducting our review, “our task is not to chose between competing interpretations of the evidence,” but, rather, to determine only whether a reasonable jury could have found the defendant 17 guilty based on the evidence before it. United States v. Jordan, 582 F.3d 1239, 1247 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Accordingly, “[t]he evidence does not need to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be wholly inconsistent with every conclusion except that of guilt, provided that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). a. Counts One and Three – Conspiracy to Import Marijuana; Conspiracy to Possess with Intent to Distribute Marijuana To sustain a conviction for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. §§ 952(a), 963 (conspiracy to import) or 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 846 (conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute), “the government must demonstrate that an agreement existed between two or more people to commit a crime, that the accused had knowledge of at least the essential objectives of that agreement, and that armed with that knowledge, he voluntarily joined or participated in the illegal venture.” United States v. Battle, 892 F.2d 992, 999 (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). A defendant’s knowing participation in a conspiracy may “be inferred from evidence that the defendant took action that furthered the conspiracy.” United States v. Cooper, 873 F.2d 269, 272 (11th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). “Culpable participation need not be great. Guilt may exist even when the defendant plays only a minor role and does not know all the details of the conspiracy.” United States v. Lyons, 53 F.3d 1198, 18 1201 (11th Cir. 1995). “Although mere presence is inadequate to establish guilt, . . . it is material, highly probative, and not to be discounted.” United States v. Gamboa, 166 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Lyons, 53 F.3d at 1201 (“Presence . . . raises a permissible inference of participation in the conspiracy.”). Morley does not dispute the existence of the conspiracies, but contends that he did not knowingly participate in them. Morley’s argument is without merit. Cash testified at trial that Morley was present when Cash first met with Taylor and Derrick to discuss the offloading plan and that Morley told him “they needed [his] help to go pick up something.” Morley’s cell phone records also showed that he was in near-constant contact with Cash, King, and Derrick, leading up to and during the offloading operation. This evidence was sufficient to prove that Morley knew about the illegal scheme to import marijuana. The evidence was likewise sufficient to show that Morley was not merely present at or near the scene of the offloading operation, but acted in furtherance of the conspiracies by serving as the lookout. Cash testified that after Derrick spoke with Taylor and Morley at King’s cousin’s house, Derrick told Cash that the plan was for Morley to “be on top and be the lookout” when they offloaded the marijuana. Saunders also was told, upon arriving in the boat at the offload site, 19 that Morley was “up top.” Cash further testified that after spotting a vehicle in the offload area, he called Morley to make sure Morley was “still on top looking out,” and Morley told him “yes, everything looked good, don’t worry about nothing.” Morley’s cell phone records confirm that Morley was present in the immediate vicinity of the offload site and spoke to Cash numerous times during the execution of the illegal importation scheme. Cash’s and Saunders’ testimonies, which the jury was entitled to credit, were sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that Morley knowingly and voluntarily participated in the conspiracies charged. See United States v. Ndiaye, 434 F.3d 1270, 1296 (11th Cir. 2006).4 b. Count Two – Importation of Marijuana into the United States We have held that where the evidence is sufficient to establish that the defendant, charged with both conspiracy to import and importation, knowingly participated in the conspiracy, the government need not present additional evidence in order to obtain a conviction on the substantive count, “for it charges [him] with an event which occurred while [he] actively participated in the alleged conspiracy.” Battle, 892 F.2d at 999. Because the evidence in this case was sufficient to establish that Morley knowingly joined the conspiracy to import marijuana, it is 4 The fact that Cash misidentified Morley at trial and that it was Derrick and not Morley who assisted in the offloading of the marijuana is of no consequence, as the evidence nevertheless established that Morley participated in the entire criminal scheme by serving as the “lookout.” 20 likewise sufficient to establish Morley’s guilt as to the substantive offense of importation. See id.; see also United States v. Johnson, 575 F.2d 1347, 1366-67 (5th Cir. 1978) (where there was sufficient evidence to prove defendant was active, knowing participant in conspiracy to import marijuana, no additional evidence was necessary to convict on substantive importation count that “charge[d] [defendant] with an event which occurred while he was active as a member of the conspiracy.”). c. Count Four – Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana To sustain a conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), the government must prove that the defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance with the intent to distribute it. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); United States v. Hernandez, 433 F.3d 1328, 1333 (11th Cir. 2005). Possession may be actual or constructive, and the “[i]ntent to distribute may be inferred from the amount of the drug involved.” Id. (quotation marks, alteration, and citation omitted). A defendant who aids or abets others in their possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance may be convicted under § 841(a) as a principal, even if he himself never actually or constructively possessed the controlled substance. See 18 U.S.C. § 2; Cooper, 873 F.2d at 272-73. “To prove guilt under a theory of aiding and abetting, the Government must prove: (1) the substantive offense was committed by someone; 21 (2) the defendant committed an act which contributed to and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid in its commission.” Hernandez, 433 F.3d at 1333 (quotation marks and citation omitted). First, there is no question in this case that Morley’s co-conspirators possessed the marijuana and, based on the amount of marijuana found in the van, that they intended to distribute it. See id. Second, as we previously discussed, the trial testimony established that Morley knowingly and intentionally furthered the commission of the offense by acting as a lookout while the others offloaded the marijuana from the boat and placed it in King’s van. Inasmuch as the evidence was sufficient to show that Morley aided and abetted the others in their possession with intent to distribute the marijuana, it was sufficient to convict Morley as a principal under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B).
Morley argues that the district court should have severed his trial from that of Russell because Nameroff’s behavior and the tactics he employed during trial prejudiced his defense. Specifically, Morley notes that (1) the district court had to admonish Nameroff on several occasions; (2) Nameroff asked improper questions about events that never took place; (3) Nameroff called Morley’s attorney a “f’ing prick”; (4) Nameroff started crying during closing arguments making some of the 22 jurors laugh; and (5) Nameroff told the jury during opening statements that Russell had an alibi defense but then never presented one. “[W]e will not reverse the denial of a severance motion absent a clear abuse of discretion resulting in compelling prejudice against which the district court offered no protection.” United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1352 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Compelling prejudice exists if “the jury [i]s unable to sift through the evidence and make an individualized determination as to each defendant.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). We presume that a jury follows the instructions given to it by the district court and are “reluctant to reverse a district court’s denial of severance, particularly in conspiracy cases, as generally persons who are charged together should also be tried together.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Morley presents no evidence that the jury failed to follow the district court’s instruction that it treat the defendants and the evidence against them on each charge separately and independently. He thus failed to show that Nameroff’s defense of Russell had a compelling prejudicial effect on his case. See id. Further, the trial transcript reflects that Nameroff called Morley’s attorney a “f-ing prick” outside the presence of the jury. We thus fail to see how this comment, while wholly inappropriate, could have prejudiced Morley’s defense. The district court 23 did not abuse its discretion in denying Morley’s severance motion.