Opinion ID: 1593307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Exclusion of Mitigating Evidence and Failure to Consider Evidence of Security Lapses and Supervision Failures as Mitigating

Text: We next turn to Eaglin's claims of penalty phase error. His first claim relates to an asserted error in the trial court's exclusion of a videotape interview of a former guard trainee from the Charlotte Correctional Institution. We combine our discussion of the alleged error in the exclusion of this interview with Eaglin's claim that the trial court erred in rejecting evidence of security lapses and supervision and systems failures at the prison as mitigation. Regarding the particular interview excluded, the interview recounted how a guard trainee resigned from her position after she was requested to conduct a head count by herself of sixty-five inmates. Eaglin claims that this videotape was relevant mitigating evidence as to the ongoing problems with the management at the prison. Although the trial court allowed other evidence of the asserted mismanagement, the court excluded this particular videotape, finding that the subjective feelings of the guard trainee were not relevant. We recognize the requirement of the United States Supreme Court to liberally permit any conceivable mitigation. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (plurality opinion) ([T]he sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, [shall] not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.). However, the mitigating evidence must be  relevant to the defendant's character, his prior record, and the circumstances of the offense in issue. Hess v. State, 794 So.2d 1249, 1269 (Fla.2001) (emphasis added) (quoting Herring v. State, 446 So.2d 1049, 1056 (Fla.1984)); see also Farina v. State, 937 So.2d 612, 619 (Fla.2006) ([M]itigating evidence must meet a threshold of relevance.). We affirm the trial court's ruling in excluding the videotape because this type of evidence would not properly be considered mitigating. Further, this particular interview would not be admissible because it contains nothing more than the subjective views of the person being interviewed, who worked as a guard trainee during an unrelated incident. The unidentified witness's statements had nothing to do with the facts or circumstances of this crime, nor could they by any stretch of the imagination be considered admissible mitigating evidence going to Eaglin's background, character, prior record, or the circumstances of this offense. Thus, we find that the trial court did not err in excluding the videotape evidence. Moreover, the similar testimonial evidence of security lapses, systems failures, and supervision failures at the Charlotte Correctional Institution was properly rejected as mitigation by the trial court. In rejecting this mitigation, [4] the trial court relied on this Court's decision in Howell v. State, 877 So.2d 697 (Fla.2004), which stated that [e]vidence is mitigating if, in fairness or in the totality of the defendant's life or character, it may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability for the crime committed. Id. at 704 (quoting Merck v. State, 763 So.2d 295, 298 (Fla.2000)). The trial court was correct in its reliance on Howell. Here, any negligence on the part of the prison does not reduce the moral culpability of Eaglin for the murders of Lathrem and Fuston. Eaglin has presented no case law recognizing third-party negligence as a factor in lessening the fault of a defendant. Thus, we conclude that the trial court did not err in rejecting the various security, systems, and supervision failures at the prison as nonstatutory mitigation.