Opinion ID: 222706
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: back pay calculations

Text: Lufkin argues on cross-appeal that the district court erred in its calculation of back pay. Following the instructions of the McClain II panel, the district court awarded plaintiffs $3.3 million in back pay damages and $2.2 million in pre-judgment interest to reflect a total of 136 lost promotions. We omit discussion of the finer details of the back pay award except to note that damages commence on March 6, 1994, or 300 days before McClain filed his EEOC claim. Title VII provides that, except for continuing violations like harassment, damages may only be awarded for violations that occurred 300 days before an EEOC charge is filed. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). Lufkin now contends that the district court should have awarded damages commencing no earlier than April 2, 1996, or 300 days before Thomas filed his EEOC claim. Lufkin reasons that because McClain II held that only Thomas's EEOC claim sufficiently exhausted administrative remedies, only that claim may provide the benchmark for the 300-day calculation. Starting damages two years later, Lufkin argues, produces two results: the $593,208 in damages assessed for 1994-95 should be vacated; and the entire back pay award for the post-1996 period should be vacated because there is no statistically significant indication of racial discrimination using post-1996 data. Lufkin does not appear to dispute that the district court correctly followed the instructions of McClain II. Therefore, Lufkin's attack on the district court's order is really an attack on the holding of McClain II. This court's rule of orderliness prevents one panel from overruling the decision of a prior panel. Teague v. City of Flower Mound, 179 F.3d 377, 383 (5th Cir.1999). In addition, under the law-of-the-case doctrine, an issue of law or fact decided on appeal may not be reexamined either by the district court on remand or by the appellate court on a subsequent appeal. Fuhrman v. Dretke, 442 F.3d 893, 896 (5th Cir.2006) (citations and quotations omitted). Nevertheless, Lufkin argues that we may in effect overrule the previous panel because (1) an intervening 2010 Supreme Court opinion clarifies the 300-day time bar; (2) the law of the case does not apply because the McClain II implicit decision on limitations was not squarely considered by the prior panel and was clearly wrong; and (3) McClain II may be set aside in order to prevent manifest injustice. On this record, we must reject these contentions. First, the intervening Supreme Court decision on which Lufkin relies adds nothing. In Lewis v. City of Chicago, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2191, 176 L.Ed.2d 967 (2010), the Court rejected class certification for a sub-class of plaintiffs who alleged injury prior to the Title VII 300-day bar. Lewis neither forged new law nor elaborated on the 300-day period. Indeed, the 300-day statutory bar was clear well before Lewis. See, e.g., United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977) (A discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which occurred before the statute was passed.... [It] has no present legal consequences.). Second, Lufkin claims that McClain II overlooked the question of the proper date on which to commence damages for the lost promotion claim, and therefore, the law-of-the-case doctrine does not apply. McClain II noted, however, that Lufkin did not contest Thomas's 1997 EEOC claim at trial: Although McClain's EEOC complaint and the OFCCP investigation failed to exhaust the employees' class claims, Buford Thomas's EEOC complaint carries part of the requisite burden.... We conclude, however, that exhaustion was sufficient. Significantly, Lufkin did not contend otherwise in the trial court  (emphasis added). See 519 F.3d at 275. According to Lufkin, the McClain II panel erred by not following the logic of its argument to the conclusion that any damages owed to the class for lost promotions must therefore be limited to the 300-day period preceding Thomas's claim. That McClain II did not go this extra mile is clear. That a proper application of the Title VII statute of limitations would have required this result is also clear. The question before this court, then, is whether the law of the case doctrine should not apply either because McClain II overlooked this point or because manifest injustice ensues from a failure to vacate and remand the damage award. Lufkin, we believe, does not merit our exercise of discretion to correct McClain II for two reasons. First, Lufkin waived its right to complain about the correct application of the time bar. Lufkin acknowledges in this appeal that it did not question at trial the sufficiency of Thomas's EEOC claim to exhaust administrative remedies for the class. Lufkin also admits that, as a consequence, it made no argument in the trial court or to this court on appeal concerning the proper time bar if Thomas's exhausted claim became the linchpin for the class's claims. Yet Lufkin strenuously challenged, and we ultimately upheld its challenge, of the sufficiency of McClain's EEOC charge to exhaust remedies for the class. Why Lufkin chose not to question, as a fallback, the ramifications of Thomas's EEOC claim is unstated. Lufkin added Thomas's EEOC charge to the trial court record. Lufkin now asserts that no one at the trial court level sought relief on that charge. But it is part of the record and Lufkin does not deny that it has operative effect. That this court overlooked how the 300-day statute of limitation would apply to claims founded on Thomas's EEOC charge is in large measure a product of Lufkin's oversight. Second, despite the large sum of damages alleged to turn on this issue, we do not find manifest injustice that necessitates correction. This case has been in litigation nearly fifteen years and has spawned five appeals. Vacating the damage award and remanding for further proceedings would be a costly and complex undertaking. It is likely that whatever amount Lufkin successfully shaved off the damage award would be offset by the attorneys' fees plaintiffs would accrue on remand. Given this economic reality and the background circumstances, justice is better served by finality. We therefore affirm the district court's back pay calculation. [8]