Opinion ID: 835779
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial Court's Grant of State's Motion to Supplement the Record

Text: In another assignment of error, defendant contends that the trial court erred by granting the state's motion to supplement the record after the trial court reporter inadvertently erased approximately 90 minutes of the audio recording of defendant's penalty trial. Before turning to our discussion of defendant's arguments, we first provide the relevant factual background. As noted previously, 338 Or. at 310, 108 P.3d at 1144-45, after the jury made the requisite findings under ORS 163.150(1)(b), the trial court entered the judgment of conviction and sentenced defendant to death on October 27, 1997. On November 13, 1997, the trial court's electronic reporter was duplicating the audiotapes of defendant's penalty trial at the request of the district attorney's office in Tulare County, California, for the preparation of that state's case against defendant for the murder of George. In the process of duplicating the tapes, the trial court reporter inadvertently reversed the original tape and the blank tape on the duplicator, and 90 minutes of the audio recording of defendant's penalty trial on October 10, 1997, were erased. On November 26, 1997, the trial court clerk submitted to this court the death-penalty review packet relating to defendant's case. See ORAP 12.10(3), (4) (immediately after entry of judgment of conviction and sentence of death, trial court clerk shall prepare death-penalty review packet and send original copy to State Court Administrator). On December 30, 1997, after learning about the erased audiotape, the prosecutor filed a motion with the trial court to supplement the record or, alternatively, to submit an agreed narrative statement. [22] The prosecutor supported his motion with an affidavit from the trial court reporter describing how the audiotape inadvertently had been erased, along with the trial court reporter's log of the trial events that the erased tape had recorded. The trial court reporter's log showed that the erased tape had included the entire testimony of seven state witnesses and the beginning of the testimony of an eighth state witness. In addition to those materials, the prosecutor also supported his motion with his own affidavit attesting to the trial events that the erased audiotape had recorded. In that affidavit, the prosecutor attested that the following trial events had occurred before the trial court: (1) defense counsel submitted a motion in limine to exclude victim-impact testimony relating to the murder of George, which the trial court granted; (2) defense counsel renewed his previously denied motion to exclude evidence of George's body, which the trial court declined to revisit; and (3) the state submitted a proposed written order relating to the trial court's previous ruling on defendant's constitutional challenges to the composition of the jury pool, which the trial court declined to sign to allow defense counsel the opportunity to respond. In addition to those events, the prosecutor also averred that the following trial events had occurred before the jury: (1) Deputy Mark Moore, Department of Corrections, testified on behalf of the state about a rope made of bed sheets that he found in defendant's cell; (2) Shawn Harper, defendant's former cellmate, testified on behalf of the state about witnessing defendant practicing a stabbing motion with a pencil; (3) Kevin Louis Clark, Deputy Coroner for Calaveres County, California, testified on behalf of the state about picking up George's body from Kenneth Sr.'s ranch, and he identified state exhibit 98 as a photograph of George's body wrapped in a body bag; (4) Thomas Crabtree, Deputy Coroner for Tulare County, California, testified on behalf of the state about taking x-rays of George's body while it was still in the body bag, and he identified state exhibit 98 as a photograph of George's body wrapped in a body bag; (5) Dr. John Miller testified on behalf of the state about having been George's dentist, and he identified state exhibits 101 and 102 as x-rays that Miller had taken of George's jaw on July 31, 1991; (6) Dr. Peter Raventos, forensic odontologist for Tulare County, California, testified on behalf of the state about removing the upper and lower jaws from George's body, about making a positive identification of George's body from his dental records, and identified state exhibits 103 and 104 as the x-rays that he had taken of George's jaws; and (7) Timothy Sola, a crime technician with the Visalia Police Department in California, testified on behalf of the state about George's body having been wrapped in several layers of plastic and duct tape, about attending George's autopsy, about physical evidence removed from George's body during the autopsy, and he identified state exhibit 4 as a photograph of George's body on the autopsy table. Following that testimony, the prosecutor further attested that the defense counsel had objected outside the presence of the jury to the introduction of state exhibit 108, a color photograph of the bullet wounds to George's head. The prosecutor attested that the trial court had overruled defendant's objection and also had denied defendant's subsequent request that a black-and-white photograph be substituted for that color photograph. Finally, the prosecutor averred that the state had called Dr. Gary Walter, whose erased testimony concerned his qualifications as a forensic pathologist licensed to practice in California. In his response to the state's motion, defendant agreed with the state that the erasure of the audiotape had been inadvertent. Defendant argued, however, that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule upon the state's motion because the death-penalty review packet for defendant's case already had been filed with this court. See also ORAP 12.10(1), (3) (providing that no notice of appeal is required and describing requirements for death-penalty review packet). Defendant also rejected the state's offer to stipulate to an agreed narrative statement and asserted that neither defense counsel nor defendant had sufficient memory of the trial events to advise the trial court as to how the missing record can be adequately reconstructed. At the hearing on the state's motion on January 27, 1998, the trial court rejected defendant's argument that it lacked jurisdiction to supplement the record. The trial court also allowed the state's motion to supplement the record, stating specifically: [The prosecutor's affidavit] corresponds to my recollection of the testimony, the issues raised, and the rulings of the Court. I cannot supplement that Affidavit with specificity regarding the State and Federal Constitutional grounds that the defense raised  just as [the prosecutor] has indicated in his cross-examination that he cannot  other than to say that every state and federal  and [defense counsel's] consistency and thoroughness and professionalism in  professionalism  in citing both the State and Federal grounds on each of [defense counsel's] objections was routine during the trial and occurred, and I believe occurred on these rulings also. As far as the victim impact statements or the victim impact issue regarding what was admissible in relation to the Scott George murder, his death, he was not a victim in these proceedings. [Defense counsel] moved against that. The State conceded that, and I ruled that that would not come in; it didn't come in. As far as the Motion to Suppress, my clear recollection, as far as the father's statements, whether or not the father was an agent of the police and needed to Mirandize, that no new legal grounds or factual grounds were discovered during the trial portion that had not been fully articulated in the Motion to Suppress itself. I'm going through the Affidavit, which is the pause. Regarding Deputy Mark Moore from the Oregon intake center, this was the law enforcement person that testified about the two feet of rope made from strips of sheeting, bed sheets, I agree with [the prosecutor's] Affidavit that there was one objection made, and it was sustained. And it was made by the defense, and it was sustained as to whether or not prisoners sometimes use ropes as weapons, and I sustained that objection. At that point I wasn't concerned what other inmates did. I have nothing to add in relation to the testimony of Shawn Harper beyond the Affidavit. Again, I find it is accurate. I find the whole thing, the whole Affidavit, is accurate. As far as the pictures were concerned, I ruled on several pictures in this case, and I ruled that the amount of pictures were not excessive; that they were not unduly inflammatory, and once I ruled that way on the color photos, there was no reason for me, then, to want to insert or think that it was appropriate, in their place, to put a black and white photo. The black and white photo, had it been available  I don't know if it was available or not  I ruled that I would not order a substitution of that. Clearly a black and white photo is less vivid and, perhaps, less demonstrative than a color photo. I admitted the color photos because I did not believe that they were unduly gruesome, inflammatory, would not counter the balance of fairness that the law requires in this case. And they were not unduly numerous in number, the photos that were received, and that's the same ruling I made on all the photos. I did not tie that ruling to any particular statutory, Constitutional, or evidentiary rule basis. It was just a fact decision that I made. I recall that the testimony of Dr. Gary Walter was the testimony that  which is on the record except for, I believe, the first part of his describing his credentials and the  and I do not believe that his credentials were challenged, and I firmly know that, had they been, I would have recognized him as an expert because I believe that it was clear that he was an expert; that the balance of his testimony which is on the record is the culmination of all the testimony regarding the body, photographs, and all that stuff that led up, and that is with us. That concludes what I'm going to say about that. Once again, I rule that I have jurisdiction to do this. I have it as Judge in this court; that the Affidavit attached to the Motion to Supplement the Record by [the prosecutor] is accurate; and that I will supplement the record with that Affidavit and the comments that I have just made. After the trial court granted the state's motion to supplement the record, the transcript settled without further objection. Defendant then filed a motion with this court titled Objection To Settling Transcript/Motion to Vacate Trial Court Order Supplementing Transcript. The state opposed that motion, and this court denied it. [23] On review, defendant repeats his argument that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to supplement the record after the trial court clerk filed the death-penalty review packet relating to defendant's case with this court. Defendant also argues that, in any event, this court should grant defendant a new penalty trial under ORS 19.420(3) because the appellate record is insufficient for the prosecution of an appeal of defendant's death sentences. For the reasons stated below, we reject both defendant's arguments.
We first address defendant's argument that the trial court lacked authority to grant the state's motion to supplement the record. Former ORS 163.150(1)(g) (1997) provided that, when a defendant is sentenced to death, [t]he judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic and direct review by this court. [24] ORAP 12.10 does not require a defendant sentenced to death to file a notice of appeal, and, instead, charges the trial court clerk with filing a packet with the State Court Administrator that includes a copy of the judgment of conviction and sentence of death, along with a certificate and cover sheet providing information about the underlying trial court proceeding. Defendant is correct in asserting that those provisions vest this court with jurisdiction immediately upon entry of the judgment of conviction and sentence of death. Contrary to defendant's arguments, however, that conclusion does not mean that the trial court lacked authority to consider the state's motion to supplement the transcript. ORAP 12.10(5) [25] prescribes the manner and the timing for the preparation of a transcript of a trial court proceeding resulting in the imposition of a death sentence. That rule provides that, as in other criminal appeals, the trial court settles the transcript pursuant to ORS 138.185 and ORS 19.370. See also Fry v. Ashley, 228 Or. 61, 71, 363 P.2d 555 (1961) (It is elementary that it is the circuit court, not this court, which determines the correctness of the transcript which comes to this court on an appeal.). In this case, the prosecutor filed the motion to supplement the transcript pursuant to former ORS 19.370(3) (1997). [26] That statute provided, in part: Within 15 days after the transcript is filed, any party may move the trial court for an order to correct any errors appearing in the transcript or, where the interests of justice require, to have additional parts of the proceedings included in the transcript. A copy of any such motion shall be filed with the court to which the appeal is made. The trial court shall direct the making of such corrections and the adding of such matter as may be appropriate and shall fix the time within which such corrections or additions shall be made. (Emphasis added.). As the state correctly notes, this court previously has construed the wording in former ORS 19.370(3) to authorize the trial court to supplement the record when the court reporter has failed to record a trial court event. See Fry, 228 Or. at 73, 363 P.2d 555 (If the stipulation referred to was entered into during the trial, but not taken down by the reporter, and the appellant wished to rely upon it here, he could and should have moved the trial court to have it `included in the transcript' as `additional parts of the proceedings[.]' (construing former ORS 19.078(3), renumbered as ORS 19.370(3)). Thus, consistently with former ORS 19.370(3) (1997), the trial court had authority to include in the transcript as additional parts of the proceedings the hearing on the state's motion in which the trial court supplemented the record with the prosecutor's affidavit and with the trial court's own statements describing the trial court events that the erased audiotape had recorded.
Having concluded that the trial court had authority to supplement the record in the manner that it did, we now consider defendant's argument that this court nevertheless should grant defendant a new penalty trial under ORS 19.420(3). That statute provides: Whenever it appears that an appeal cannot be prosecuted, by reason of the loss or destruction, through no fault of the appellant, of the reporter's notes or audio records, or of the exhibits or other matter necessary to the prosecution of the appeal, the judgment appealed from may be reversed and a new trial ordered as justice may require. In Smith v. Custom Micro, Inc., 311 Or. 375, 811 P.2d 1371 (1991), this court construed that same statute, then numbered as former ORS 19.130(3), [27] to determine the circumstances under which an appellate court should exercise its discretion to grant an appellant a new trial under that provision. As an initial matter, the court observed that the statute provides an appellate court with discretionary authority to grant a new trial only when a record or exhibit necessary to the prosecution of an appeal is destroyed and that destruction occurred through no fault of the appellant. Id. at 378, 811 P.2d 1371. In this case, there is no dispute that both those statutory prerequisites are met. The question, instead, is whether this court should exercise its discretion to grant defendant a new penalty trial in light of the 90 minutes erased from the audio record of defendant's penalty trial. In Smith, this court identified the considerations that guide an appellate court's discretion in deciding whether to grant a new trial under ORS 19.420(3). Specifically, this court instructed that, to be entitled to a new trial under ORS 19.420(3), [t]he appellant (1) must show due diligence in attempting to find and supply a record for the purposes of appeal; and (2) must make `at least a prima facie showing of error, or unfairness in the trial, or that there had been a miscarriage of justice.' Id. at 379, 811 P.2d 1371 (quoting Ethyl Corp. v. Jalbert, 270 Or. 651, 655, 529 P.2d 368 (1974)). In this case, defendant contends that he has satisfied both those criteria. He first argues that defense counsel attempted to reconstruct the record for purposes of appeal, but lacked sufficient recall of the erased trial events to do so. Defendant also points to inconsistencies between the prosecutor's affidavit and the trial court reporter's log of trial events, and asserts that, as a result of the missing 90 minutes, appellate counsel and this court are precluded from identifying possible errors that occurred during defendant's penalty trial, including instances of prosecutorial misconduct, instances of inadequate assistance of counsel, and instances of trial court error. After considering defendant's arguments, we are unpersuaded that this is an instance in which we should exercise our discretion under ORS 19.420(3) to grant a new trial. The 90 minutes of erased audiotapes represented only a very short part of defendant's penalty trial, and the trial court was able to reconstruct a record of the lost trial events with considerable detail. Other than pointing to inconsistencies between the prosecutor's affidavit and the trial court reporter's log, defendant does not allege that the supplemental record that the trial court added is not an accurate representation of the trial events that the erased tape had recorded. In addition, despite his many suggestions of possible error, defendant fails to make a persuasive argument that the missing transcript will prevent review by this court of any error or miscarriage of justice that actually occurred. In sum, even assuming that defendant showed due diligence in attempting to supply a record for purposes of appeal, defendant is not entitled to a new penalty trial because he has failed to make a prima facie showing of error, or unfairness in the trial, or that there had been a miscarriage of justice. Smith, 311 Or. at 379, 811 P.2d 1371 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).