Opinion ID: 2329158
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Brown's Defense

Text: Brown proceeded to trial on the theory that Detectives Kapetanakos and White had mistakenly arrested him after observing a different man selling drugs on the morning of October 5, 1999. Brown's defense relied primarily on a police photograph that had been taken shortly after his arrest, in which he was not wearing the black and white FUBU hat that Detective Kapetanakos had consistently described the seller as wearing during the drug transactions. Instead, the photograph showed Mr. Brown with a full beard and mustache, a black-and-white striped shirt, and a hat with a Dale Earnhardt logo on it. The defense sought to discredit Detective Kapetanakos' identification by pointing out the discrepancies between his description of the seller's appearance (green jacket, blue jeans, and black-and-white FUBU hat) and the photograph of Brown (facial hair, black-and-white striped shirt, Dale Earnhardt hat). Brown's attorney also sought to weaken the prosecution's case by pointing out that the detectives had not obtained any corroborative evidence to support their eyewitness account of the crime. For example, while cross-examining Detective White, Brown's attorney elicited testimony that although the Park Police had the option of recording the communications made during the observation post operation, they chose to communicate using an unrecorded channel. [7] Detective White's testimony on cross-examination also revealed that he had not taken any photographs during the illicit transactions or following the arrests. During closing arguments, Brown's attorney twice mentioned the government's failure to collect corroborative evidence. [8] Specifically, counsel argued that the jury could find a reasonable doubt because the government had not taken any fingerprints, photographs, recorded communications, or videotape recordings documenting Brown's alleged participation in the crime. In anticipation of Brown's closing argument regarding the government's failure to produce corroborative evidence linking Brown to the crime, the prosecution requested a jury instruction stating that the government was under no obligation to put forth that type of evidence. The prosecution referred the court to dictum in Greer v. United States, 697 A.2d 1207, 1211 (D.C.1997), in which this court suggested that, under certain circumstances, the government probably could [ ] obtain[ ] an instruction, that it was under no legal obligation to create corroborative evidence. Id. Although the trial court refused to rule on the request until after it had heard the defense's closing arguments, it put Brown on notice ... that if you argue, ladies and gentlemen, you don't have a photograph, you don't have a videotape of this transaction, I think you can expect that the Government will request and the Court will grant the request for a Greer -type instruction. The following day, Brown's attorney objected on the ground that the prosecution had not laid an adequate foundation to support a Greer -type instruction. Your Honor, I just would object for the record, I've asked Detective White whether he took any fingerprints and photographs, there's been no evidence that they aren't required to do so and I think an instruction from the Court or even argument from the Government that they aren't required to do so really would be prejudicial, given the fact that there's no evidence, frankly as I stand here today, I don't know whether they're required to do that, and I can't may be its true with the Metropolitan Police Department but I don't know if that's true with the U.S. Park Police. I think Greer allows us to argue, as the Court knows, that there aren'tthis is not corroborative, Greer says that the Government's probably entitled to an instruction, and that's an MPD case. I just would ask the Court not instruct, the Government not be allowed to argue, [the prosecutor] could have asked any number of his witnesses whether they were required to do that and he did not, so I would certainly ask that that be the status of the instruction and argument. That's all. In response, the trial court indicated that it still planned to instruct the jury that the park police are under no obligation to videotape, fingerprint, photograph or otherwise. In addition, the court refused to allow Brown's attorney to tell the jury during her closing argument, there's been no evidence that [the Park Police are] not required to do so.