Opinion ID: 6320556
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: request for expert witness

Text: Defendant alleges a violation of his due-process rights, which is an issue of constitutional law that this Court reviews de novo. People v Smith, 498 Mich 466, 475; 870 NW2d 299 (2015). 3
In People v Kennedy, 502 Mich 206, 211-212; 917 NW2d 355 (2018), the defendant’s request for a DNA expert had been denied for failure to show that expert testimony would benefit his defense as purportedly required by MCL 775.15. In Kennedy, we clarified that MCL 775.15 was inapplicable to such requests and that the due-process analysis laid out in Ake v Oklahoma, 470 US 68; 105 S Ct 1087; 84 L Ed 2d 53 (1985), instead controlled. Kennedy, 502 Mich at 219-220. Ake itself involved a defendant’s claim of insanity and his request for a psychiatric expert; we held that the Ake due-process analysis applied beyond that context and more broadly governed requests by indigent criminal defendants for the appointment of an expert at government expense. Id. at 219220, 225. 3 In determining the standard for courts to review such requests, this Court adopted the reasonable-probability standard articulated in Moore v Kemp, 809 F2d 702 (CA 11, 1987). Specifically, this Court held that “ ‘a defendant must show the trial court that there exists a reasonable probability both that an expert would be of assistance to the defense and that denial of expert assistance would result in a fundamentally unfair trial.’ ” Kennedy, 502 Mich at 227, quoting Moore, 809 F2d at 712. Generally, when requesting an expert “ ‘to assist . . . in confronting the prosecution’s proof,’ ” a defendant “ ‘must inform the court of the nature of the prosecution’s case and how the requested expert would 3 To the extent that Kennedy only concerned indigent criminal defendants, we reiterate the Court of Appeals’ note that “[d]efendant was originally appointed counsel on the basis of his indigence, and although he later retained counsel, there is no evidence that defendant’s financial circumstances changed during the pendency of the case.” Propp, 330 Mich App at 160 n 2. 4 be useful.’ ” Kennedy, 502 Mich at 227, quoting Moore, 809 F2d at 712. At a minimum, this requires a defendant to inform the trial court about the nature of the crime and the evidence linking him to the crime. Kennedy, 502 Mich at 227. However, when a defendant requests an expert to present an affirmative defense, a defendant must make the additional showing of a substantial basis for the defense. Id. In this case, the Court of Appeals held that “defendant sought appointment of an expert in order to assert the affirmative defense that the victim died accidentally while she and defendant engaged in erotic asphyxiation. Accordingly, defendant was required to demonstrate a ‘substantial basis for the defense.’ ” Propp, 330 Mich App at 163, quoting Moore, 809 F2d at 712. The Court of Appeals did not explain why it characterized the defense at issue here as an affirmative defense. “An affirmative defense admits the crime but seeks to excuse or justify its commission. It does not negate specific elements of the crime.” People v Dupree, 486 Mich 693, 704 n 11; 788 NW2d 399 (2010). Black’s Law Dictionary similarly defines “affirmative defense” as follows: A defendant’s assertion of facts and arguments that, if true, will defeat the plaintiff’s or prosecution’s claim, even if all the allegations in the complaint are true. The defendant bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense. Examples of affirmative defenses are duress (in a civil case) and insanity and self-defense (in a criminal case). [Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed), p 528 (emphasis added).] Recall two things: Defendant requested an expert here to pursue his theory that the killing was accidental, and defendant was convicted of first-degree premeditated murder. One of the elements of first-degree premediated murder is the intent to kill; moreover, that intent to kill must be both deliberate and premeditated. People v Dykhouse, 418 Mich 488, 495; 5 345 NW2d 150 (1984). See also People v Oros, 502 Mich 229, 240; 917 NW2d 559 (2018). Unlike insanity, which was the defense at issue in Ake, a defendant who advances a defense of accident does not bear the burden of proving a lack of intent for a crime that includes intent as an element. In other words, because intent to kill is an element of firstdegree premeditated murder, it was the prosecution’s burden to prove intent beyond a reasonable doubt in order to secure the conviction. The defense of accident was not an affirmative defense because defendant did not bear the burden of negating intent. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred by applying the standard for affirmative defenses to defendant’s request for expert assistance. Because the Court of Appeals failed to apply the correct standard, we vacate the Court of Appeals’ analysis on this issue and remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the correct standard under Kennedy— namely, whether there was a reasonable probability that the expert would have been helpful to the defense and whether the denial of expert assistance rendered the trial fundamentally unfair.