Opinion ID: 844172
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spontaneous statements

Text: ―A statement may be admitted, though hearsay, if it describes an act witnessed by the declarant and ‗[w]as made spontaneously while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by‘ witnessing the event. (Evid. Code, 98 § 1240.) ‗ ―To render [statements] admissible [under the spontaneous declaration exception] it is required that (1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the utterance must have been [made] before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e., while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the occurrence preceding it.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 809-810, quoting People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 318.) Defendant contends Pat‘s statements to Rosemary do not qualify as spontaneous statements because minutes had elapsed between his telephone call and his statement to her, and because he made statements only in response to her questioning. Neither the passage of time nor Rosemary‘s questioning precluded the trial court from finding that Pat was still under the stress of the excitement. The evidence clearly showed that Pat had difficulty talking when speaking to Rosemary. Thus, Rosemary‘s description of his demeanor provided substantial evidence establishing the preliminary fact that Pat was still under the stress of learning that his son had killed two girls. (See People v. Brown, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 541 [statement made two and one-half hours after the stressful event was still spontaneous].) Moreover, Rosemary‘s question merely asked why Pat was crying, was simple and nonsuggestive, and could not have deprived Pat‘s statements of their spontaneity. (People v. Poggi, supra, 45 Cal.3d 306, 319-320.) Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded Pat‘s statement came within the hearsay exception for a spontaneous statement. 99 3. Trustworthiness and reliability under the Sixth Amendment We reject defendant‘s claim that the statements were ―testimonial‖ within the meaning of Crawford. Pat‘s statements were made to his wife and not to any government officers under formalized circumstances that were ―testimonial.‖ (Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 51.)36 In addition, defendant‘s challenge to the reliability and trustworthiness of these statements is inapt because his challenge is directed against Rosemary‘s credibility. Thus, defendant again makes the mistake of questioning the reliability of the witness who testifies about the hearsay statement instead of examining the circumstances surrounding the declarant‘s making of the statements. (People v. Spencer, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 946.) In any event, defendant had ample opportunity to confront Rosemary‘s truthfulness, and the jury could properly make its own determination of her credibility. Here, there were no circumstances that would raise any doubt concerning Pat‘s statements. As defendant admitted at trial, he was close to his father; thus, it was not inconceivable that defendant would confide in Pat. The fact that Pat thereafter helped store and sell items that defendant had abandoned in California tended to show that he was aware his son was a suspect in the crimes at issue in their case. Finally, it was not inconceivable that Pat would share his shock with 36 We also reject defendant‘s contentions, made before the high court decided Crawford, that admissions and spontaneous statements are not firmly rooted hearsay exceptions, which carry sufficient indicia of reliability to satisfy the Sixth Amendment‘s confrontation clause. (People v. Silva (1988) 45 Ca1.3d 604, 624 [admissions are a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule]; People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 529 [spontaneous statements are a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule].) 100 his wife, especially immediately after listening to his son admit to killing ―two girls.‖ Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the statements bore sufficient indicia of reliability and trustworthiness. (See People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 745.) The court properly admitted defendant‘s admissions and Pat‘s spontaneous statements. E. The Effect of the O.J. Simpson Media Coverage Defendant claims the media coverage of the homicides involved in the O.J. Simpson case affected his right to a fair trial and due process, because his trial began just after Simpson was arrested for the killings in that case, and the circumstances of those homicides were allegedly similar to the allegations against him. He asserts his jury was affected by this media coverage, and that the jurors impressions of that case ―would be carried over unconsciously and used in [the jurors‘] evaluation of the evidence against‖ defendant. Accordingly, defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his repeated requests, before and during trial, to continue the trial until media coverage of the Simpson case waned. A trial court is vested with broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for a continuance, and we review any denial for abuse of discretion. (People v. Sakarias, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 646-647.) ―Denial of what is essentially a motion for a continuance, when no good cause is demonstrated, is not an abuse of discretion.‖ (People v. Davenport (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1171, 1196; § 1050.) Here, defendant‘s showing of good cause rested completely on speculation. (People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 451 [vague and speculative reasons do not constitute a showing of good cause].) Defendant argued before the trial court that press coverage of the O.J. Simpson case caused the community to be ―worked up into a frenzy‖ and set into a ―lynch mob mentality,‖ and 101 engendered the prospect of ―trial by newspaper.‖ But at no point did defendant provide the trial court with evidence showing that any juror was actually biased against him or considered evidence presented outside of trial as a result of the publicity concerning the O.J. Simpson case. Moreover, defendant fails to show a substantial likelihood of prejudice flowing from the denial of the requests for continuance. None of the publicity in the O.J. Simpson case mentioned defendant‘s case or otherwise related to his own guilt or innocence. The newspaper articles defendant submitted with his motion for continuance merely convey the circumstances of the killings, Simpson‘s celebrity status, his attendance at his ex-wife‘s funeral, suspicions of his involvement in the killings, his attempt to flee in a slow-speed vehicle chase, his threats to commit suicide, and his subsequent arrest. The articles contain no allegations that Simpson stalked his ex-wife, and only one article briefly discussed their prior marital discord. Thus, the two cases were only superficially similar. The infamy surrounding the O.J. Simpson case largely centered around the allegation that a former professional athlete, actor, and television personality had killed his ex-wife and her friend. None of these circumstances were present here. Moreover, unlike Simpson, defendant was not a celebrity, did not have a long history of physically assaulting Connie, had a three-month pattern of stalking Connie, and fled under completely different circumstances. Therefore, assuming the jurors were following the media coverage of the O.J. Simpson case, this publicity would not have been an improper influence. In addition to the newspaper articles, defendant submitted to the trial court eight declarations from three local criminal defense attorneys expressing their concern about the fairness of defendant‘s trial in light of the O.J. Simpson media coverage. These declarations engage in the same speculation defendant repeats on 102 appeal. More importantly, defendant had ample opportunity during voir dire to question jurors about the effect of their exposure to the O.J. Simpson press coverage, but he did not do so. Instead, defendant would have us divine prejudice when he failed to develop a record to support his claim. Assuming any of the jurors were exposed to the publicity surrounding the O.J. Simpson case during this trial, there was no substantial likelihood that they were actually biased against defendant by that media coverage or that they could not decide a verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial. (See People v. Cruz (2008) 44 Cal.4th 636, 686-688.) The trial court properly denied defendant‘s motions for a continuance. F. Cumulative Error Defendant argues that reversal of his conviction is necessary because of the cumulative effect of errors in the guilt phase of his trial. At the guilt phase, the errors we have identified are the admission of the entire audio-recorded police interview of Marilyn Young, the admission of Connie‘s letter about defendant‘s abandoned childhood and his inability to make changes, and the failure of the trial court to give a limiting instruction concerning the nonhearsay purpose of Connie‘s various statements. We concluded that these statements either duplicated other admissible evidence or could not have been prejudicial in light of the overwhelming evidence of defendant‘s guilt. Considered cumulatively, the errors described above could not have prejudiced defendant at the guilt phase.