Opinion ID: 447624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the tortious interference award

Text: 14 The Catholic Bishop contends that it was legally impossible for it to tortiously interfere with F.E.L.'s business relationship with the Chicago parishes because the Catholic Bishop and the parishes are the same entity, and that therefore it was error for the trial judge to allow the jury to consider the Catholic Bishop's conduct toward the Chicago parishes in reaching its verdict on F.E.L.'s tortious interference claim. The Catholic Bishop also contends that F.E.L. presented insufficient evidence to allow recovery for tortious interference with F.E.L.'s business outside the Chicago Archdiocese. We agree that it was improper for the jury to base any part of its award on the Catholic Bishop's conduct toward the Chicago parishes, but disagree that the evidence was insufficient to allow recovery for tortious interference with F.E.L.'s business outside Chicago. 15 In order to maintain an action for tortious interference with a business relationship, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a separate and independent business relationship with a third party. See Hannigan v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 410 F.2d 285 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 902, 90 S.Ct. 214, 24 L.Ed.2d 17 (1969); Republic Gear Co. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 406 F.2d 57 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1000, 89 S.Ct. 1596, 22 L.Ed.2d 777 (1969). Generally, a party cannot be liable in tort for interfering with its own contract, or even for breaching its own contract. See Fuller v. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine, 719 F.2d 1326, 1334 (7th Cir.1983); DP Service, Inc. v. AM Internat'l, 508 F.Supp. 162, 167-68 (N.D.Ill.1981). Thus, the Catholic Bishop and the Chicago parishes would have to be separate and independent entities for F.E.L. to recover for tortious interference within the Chicago Archdiocese. 16 Pursuant to special legislation enacted by the Illinois General Assembly in 1861, the Catholic Bishop is organized as a corporation sole under Illinois law. See Private Laws of Illinois, 22nd General Assembly, at 78 (1861); Galich v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 75 Ill.App.3d 538, 546, 31 Ill.Dec. 370, 394 N.E.2d 572 (1st Dist.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 916, 100 S.Ct. 1277, 63 L.Ed.2d 600 (1980). As a corporation sole, the Catholic Bishop owns all the real and personal property in the Chicago Archdiocese. The parishes themselves have no individual capacity to sue or be sued. See, e.g., Haymes v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 41 Ill.2d 336, 337, 243 N.E.2d 203 (1968); Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. Village of Palos Park, 286 Ill. 400, 401, 121 N.E. 561 (1919). In short, the parishes within the Archdiocese are not legal entities separate and independent from the Catholic Bishop, but are subsumed under the Catholic Bishop. See Galich, 75 Ill.App.3d at 546-47, 31 Ill.Dec. 370, 394 N.E.2d 572. 17 The evidence presented at trial reflects this unity. Individual priests had limited, authorized power to purchase a license for F.E.L. material, but the licenses purchased were paid for and owned by the Catholic Bishop. F.E.L. does not dispute that its hymnals and songsheets, although purchased by the parishes, were actually owned by the Catholic Bishop. Nor does F.E.L. dispute that the Catholic Bishop and the Chicago parishes are the same entity; to the contrary, the basis of F.E.L.'s copyright infringement claim is that the Catholic Bishop is liable for all the unauthorized copying of F.E.L.'s material by the Chicago parishes. This position cannot be reconciled with F.E.L.'s contention that the parishes are separate and independent from the Catholic Bishop for the purposes of its tortious interference claim. It was therefore improper for the jury to consider the Catholic Bishop's conduct toward its own parishes in determining the merit of F.E.L.'s tortious interference claim or award any damages to F.E.L. because of that conduct. 18 F.E.L. contends that, even accepting that they are the same entity, the Catholic Bishop was nonetheless capable of tortiously interfering with its parishes. In support of this contention, F.E.L. cites several cases which hold corporate officers liable in tort for wrongfully inducing the breach of their corporation's contracts. See Fuller v. Chicago College of Osteopathic Medicine, 719 F.2d 1326, 1334 (7th Cir.1983); Swager v. Couri, 77 Ill.2d 173, 32 Ill.Dec. 540, 395 N.E.2d 921 (Dist.1979); Worrick v. Flora, 133 Ill.App.2d 755, 758, 272 N.E.2d 708 (3d Dist.1971). No breach of contract has occurred in this case. The purchase of an F.E.L. license did not require the purchasing parish to actually use F.E.L.'s music. Nor was a parish required to renew the license after its expiration. Therefore, the cases cited by F.E.L. do not apply to this case. 2 19 F.E.L. also based its tortious interference claim on the Catholic Bishop's conduct involving other Catholic dioceses throughout the nation, and F.E.L. presented evidence that these actions damaged its business relationships with these dioceses. The various Roman Catholic dioceses in the United States function as independent entities. Therefore, this part of F.E.L.'s tortious interference claim is not infirm. We are unable to determine from the record before us, however, what amount of the jury's tortious interference award was impermissibly based on the Catholic Bishop's conduct toward its own parishes and what amount, if any, was based on its actions involving dioceses outside Chicago. We therefore vacate the jury's award for tortious interference with F.E.L.'s business and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.