Opinion ID: 408034
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tunney Act

Text: 40 Essential to IBM's argument that Judge Edelstein has abused his jurisdiction is a firm conviction that the Tunney Act does not apply to the January 8 stipulation of dismissal. Our inquiry must therefore commence with an analysis of the Act itself. 41 The Tunney Act was enacted in 1974 in response to the growing number of settlements by consent decree in actions filed by the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 7 Recognizing that (t)he entry of a consent decree is a judicial act which requires the approval of a United States district court, S.Rep.No.93-298, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), and fearing that courts were engaging in judicial rubber stamping of proposals submitted by the Justice Department, H.R.Rep.No.93-1463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974), reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6535, 6538, Congress determined that judicial approval should be based upon specific criteria to ensure that the settlement terms would serve the public interest. 8 Congress also recognized that antitrust violators wield great influence and economic power, S.Rep.No.93-298, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1973), and felt that additional comment and response from the public would alleviate much of the significant pressure violators could often bring ... to bear on government, and even on the courts, in connection with handling of consent decrees, id. Prior to the Act, the public was advised of the entry of a consent decree in an antitrust action only on the actual date of filing by means of a press release. The release invited public comments to the court and to the Department of Justice before the decree was entered as a judgment of the court thirty days later. This procedure, however, was followed only as a matter of internal policy of the Department of Justice. The Act strives to elicit greater public input by requiring advance publication in the Federal Register of the terms of the Department's proposed consent decree and a competitive impact statement summarizing the likely effects of the decree, and by expanding the thirty-day public comment period to sixty days. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b). 42 In addressing the contention that the Act's strictures also apply to stipulations of dismissal entered pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1), we must of course begin with the language of the statute itself. Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). The Act by its express terms applies only to (a)ny proposal for a consent judgment submitted by the United States for entry in any civil proceeding brought by or on behalf of the United States under the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (emphasis added). 43 Nowhere does the Act indicate that its provisions also apply to stipulations of dismissal. The absence of such an indication is highlighted by the observation that Rule 41 had existed in its present form for almost thirty years prior to the Tunney Act's enactment. Congress was surely aware of Rule 41(a)(1)'s clear statement that a voluntary stipulation of dismissal requires no order of court. We are particularly skeptical of the possibility that Congress provided sub silentio for the Act to apply to Rule 41(a)(1) stipulations of dismissal because the Act establishes an exception to the general rule that district courts need not subject consent decrees to a public interest litmus test. We are reluctant to broaden such a narrow exception to a long-standing rule without a clear indication of legislative intent. Amici argue that such an indication can be found in the Act's legislative history. That history totally contradicts the claim. An earlier bill introduced by Senator Bayh would have adopted a more expansive scope than the Tunney Act by subjecting any proposed consent judgment or decree or other settlement  to judicial approval. S.1088, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 Cong.Rec. 6446 (1973) (emphasis added). Congress' ultimate decision to reject this broader language strongly militates against a judgment that Congress intended a result that it expressly declined to enact. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 200, 95 S.Ct. 392, 401, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974). 44 Moreover, neither the House nor Senate report contains a single reference to Rule 41 or to stipulations of dismissal. That the Act is addressed expressly and exclusively to consent decrees is made clear by the House Report's unequivocal statement of purpose: 45 Given the high rate of settlement in public antitrust cases, it is imperative that the integrity of and public confidence in procedures relating to settlements via consent decree procedures be assured. The bill seeks precisely to accomplish this objective and focuses on the various stages of consent decree procedures, including that process by which proposed settlements are entered as a court decree by judicial action. 46 H.R.Rep.No.93-1463, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1974), reprinted in (1974) U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 6535, 6536 (emphasis added). 47 The language of the Act and the Congressional reports are alone sufficient to dispel any notion that the Act applies to Rule 41(a)(1) dismissals. Yet, in addition, the Committee Hearings and Congressional debates compel the identical conclusion. The Act's sponsor, Senator Tunney, emphatically indicated in his opening remarks at the Senate Hearings that the Act's sole focus is on consent decrees: 48 Specifically, our legislation will bring the consent decree process into the full light of day and will increase penalties for offenders. It will make our courts an independent force rather than a rubber stamp in reviewing consent decrees, and it will assure that the courtroom rather than the backroom becomes the final arbiter in antitrust enforcement. 49 ... (The Act) focuses on the process by which antitrust suits are settled and consent judgments entered by providing specific standards and procedures to assure that the decision to settle and the settlement itself are in fact in the public interest. 50 The Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act: Hearings on S. 782 and S. 1088 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) (Senate Hearings ) (emphasis added). In the three days of Senate Hearings in which thirteen witnesses testified, not once was the possibility mentioned that the Act might also apply to Rule 41(a)(1) dismissals. Senator Tunney's comments at the House hearings are even more pointed that voluntary dismissals are not within the Act's scope: 51 Mr. Hutchinson. Well, all right. 52 .... 53 I have only one other question, Senator, that I want to put to you. 54 Suppose that a court should determine that the consent judgment proposed by the United States isn't in the public interest, and they refuse to enter that decree. Then what alternative is left to the parties in the case? Is it necessary to try the case? 55 Mr. Tunney. Well, I would say there are two alternatives. They could try to work out a new agreement which would meet with the judge's approval or proceed with the litigation. 56 Mr. Hutchinson. Well, in other words, they could start anew and try to work out something else? 57 Mr. Tunney. Yes, absolutely. 58 Mr. Hutchinson. Would any kind of a consent decree need to have the court's approval? 59 Mr. Tunney. Right. 60 Mr. Hutchinson. Would any kind of agreement made outside the court privately stand? 61 Mr. Tunney. Well, I certainly do not think so. I suppose the Justice Department could drop the suit. That would be a third alternative. Otherwise the Justice Department could proceed with the litigation or come in with a new consent (decree) and attempt to get the judge's approval of that decree. There could not be, as I understand the law, and as I understand this litigation, a private agreement that would not involve a ratification by the court. 62 Consent Decree Bills: Hearings on H.R.9203, H.R.9947 and S.782 Before the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the Committee on the Judiciary, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 43 (1973) (House Hearings ) (emphasis supplied). The unmistakable import of Senator Tunney's remarks is that the Justice Department's decision to dismiss a suit is an alternative to proceeding with litigation or entering a consent decree. As such, it is not within the Act's scope. Remarks by other witnesses are to the same effect. See, e.g., Senate Hearings at 76 (Statement of James C. Campbell) (The third possible outcome of judicial disapproval of the decree is that the defendant refuses to re-enter consent negotiations and the government declines to prosecute further.); House Hearings at 176 (Statement of George D. Reycraft) (The only way I know of to get rid of (antitrust cases) is that you try them, settle them by consent decree, or you dismiss them.). 63 In addition to the clear and indisputable legislative history, which compels the conclusion that the Act was not intended to apply to stipulations of dismissal, we perceive possible constitutional issues arising from the position amici endorse. The district court's involvement in the executive branch's decision to abandon litigation might impinge upon the doctrine of separation of powers. Judicial approval of consent decrees under the Act is, analytically, an entirely distinct proposition because the decree is entered as the court's judgment. We see no need to resolve these and other issues of constitutional dimension 9 because we construe the statute simply on the basis of its language and legislative history to exclude from its scope Rule 41(a)(1) dismissals. 64 Finally, amicus Public Citizen points to several antitrust actions in which it asserts that district courts have found the Act applicable to Rule 41(a) dismissals. See United States v. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, No. C.V. 69-075-JWC (C.D.Cal. filed Nov. 24, 1969); United States v. American Telephone and Telegraph Co., No. 74-1698 (D.D.C. Jan. 12, 1982). We express no opinion on the actions taken by these courts other than to observe that both cases involved settlements of antitrust actions and, at least to some extent, entry of consent decrees. They are therefore each distinguishable from the present case. In a third case cited by Public Citizen, United States v. Mercedes-Benz of North America, No. C-79-2144 MHP (N.D.Cal. filed Aug. 15, 1979), the court apparently ordered the parties, sua sponte, to brief the issue of whether the Act applies to Rule 41(a)(1)(ii) dismissals. That court has yet to render its decision. We can only state that should the court conclude that the Act does apply, we would emphatically disagree. 65 In conclusion, we interpret the essence of amici's position to be that despite the compelling evidence that Congress did not provide for the Act to encompass stipulations of dismissal, the Act should be so applied. Amici as well as Judge Edelstein refer to the Act's remedial nature, and argue that many of the considerations which prompted Congress to legislate in the area of consent decrees are also present where dismissals are involved. While this may be true, we are powerless to amend an Act of Congress to provide what litigants desire; we may only order enforced what an Act lawfully provides. And absent some indication that Congress intended the Tunney Act to apply to dismissals, we must conclude that it does not apply.