Opinion ID: 565995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Regulation's Consistency with Other Provisions of the Act

Text: 24 Appellees argue that even if LSC has the rulemaking powers outlined above, the redistricting regulation conflicts with certain other provisions contained in the Act. We consider each of these provisions in turn. 25 a. Section 1007(a)(2)(C). The first provision cited by appellees, and the provision chiefly relied upon by the district court in its decision, states that LSC shall insure that ... recipients, consistent with goals established by the Corporation, adopt procedures for determining and implementing priorities for the provision of [legal] assistance.... LSCA Sec. 1007(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996f(a)(2)(C). The district court held that this provision authorizes LSC to set goals relating to the procedures by which LSC recipients set priorities, not to itself determine substantive case priorities. Texas Rural Legal Aid, 740 F.Supp. at 886. The district court buttressed its interpretation by contrasting the current version of this provision with the language originally enacted in 1974 and by consulting the legislative history of the 1977 amendments to the Act, which changed the provision to its present form. See id. at 883-84. 26 Although we do not agree with LSC's contrary position that section 1007(a)(2)(C) actually provides clear support for its authority to set substantive priorities, we do believe that the provision is ambiguous and that we should defer to LSC's interpretation. First, the language of the provision simply does not clearly support either appellees' or LSC's interpretation. Although section 1007(a)(2)(C) states that the procedures adopted by program recipients for setting priorities must be consistent with goals established by LSC, the placement of the latter phrase does not necessarily imply that only the procedures--and not also the priorities set by those procedures--must be consistent with LSC regulations. Section 1007(a)(2)(C) can just as easily be read as subordinating both the procedures and priorities adopted by local programs to the national goals established by LSC, or as simply not addressing LSC's authority concerning priorities at all. In the latter instance, the provision would do nothing to constrain LSC's general rulemaking powers; in the former, it would supplement and support those powers. 27 Second, the changes effected in section 1007(a)(2)(C) by the 1977 amendments to the Act do not compel the conclusion that Congress intended to place exclusive authority over caseload priorities in the hands of the local programs. As originally enacted, section 1007(a)(2)(C) directed LSC to establish priorities to insure that persons least able to afford legal assistance are given preference in the furnishing of such assistance. The House report accompanying the 1977 amendments indicates that the new version of section 1007(a)(2)(C) reflected Congress's determination that establishing poverty as the sole criterion for allocating program resources risked leaving unaddressed certain legal problems of importance to the poor. See H.R.REP. No. 310, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.NEWS 4503, 4512. The House report then stated: 28 Reference to goals that may be established by the Corporation permits the Corporation to set as goals the provision of legal assistance in the most effective manner, or so as to have the greatest effect on problems of poor people, or other similar goals. The reference is not intended to detract from the rightful role of local programs, in consultation with local client communities, to set priorities concerning the substantive law matters to which scarce program resources are to be allocated. This does not require the Corporation to establish goals, but authorizes the Corporation to do so if it finds appropriate. 29 Id. at 4513; cf. S.REP. NO. 172, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1977). Although this passage clearly contemplates that local programs will have a major, and perhaps even preeminent, role in setting program priorities, it does not necessarily imply that LSC should exercise no control at all over those priorities. The reference to the rightful role of local programs in setting priorities, in conjunction with the statement that LSC may set goals so as to have the greatest effect on problems of poor people, arguably implies that LSC and local programs are both to play roles in establishing priorities. LSC interprets the rightful role of local programs to be the assessment of the peculiar local needs of client populations, while LSC's own role is to provide caseload guidance based on considerations that it deems are not dependent on local conditions. In the instant case, LSC determined that redistricting activities raised concerns of general import analogous to those that motivated Congress to prohibit certain other categories of litigation, and it therefore acted to prohibit local programs from engaging in those activities. We believe that a reasonable construction of section 1007(a)(2)(C) and its legislative history supports LSC's authority to make such assessments. Under this interpretation of the Act, the roles of the local programs and LSC are complementary, with each exercising authority within the realm of its special expertise. There is thus no cause for asserting, as the district court did, that LSC's position would make the local boards mere puppets of LSC. See Texas Rural Legal Aid, 740 F.Supp. at 884. 30 b. Statutory Prohibitions on Litigation. Appellees argue next that the redistricting regulation is inconsistent with the specific substantive prohibitions included in the Act by Congress (e.g., the bans on school desegregation and abortion litigation) because Congress intended those prohibitions to be exclusive. The only support appellees provide for this assertion, however, is the general evidence they adduce that Congress meant to deprive LSC of any authority to control the caseload priorities established by basic field programs. Having rejected appellees' argument on that point, we reject their argument on this one as well. 31 Although they do not explicitly cite it, appellees appear to rely on the canon of statutory interpretation, expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of one is the exclusion of others). Whatever its usefulness in other circumstances, however, this canon has little force in the administrative setting. See, e.g., Cheney Railroad Co. v. ICC, 902 F.2d 66, 68-69 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 519, 112 L.Ed.2d 530 (1990); Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Federal Mine Safety & Health Comm'n, 895 F.2d 773, 779 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 137, 112 L.Ed.2d 104 (1990). Under Chevron, we normally withhold deference from an agency's interpretation of a statute only when Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at 2781, and the expressio canon is simply too thin a reed to support the conclusion that Congress has clearly resolved this issue. See Cheney Railroad Co., 902 F.2d at 69. Having decided that, we must defer to LSC's refusal to read the Act in the manner suggested by the expressio canon if its interpretation is otherwise reasonable. See id.; Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Thornburgh, 868 F.2d 1285, 1292 (D.C.Cir.) (Chevron implicitly precludes courts picking and choosing among various canons of statutory construction to reject reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes) (emphasis deleted), aff'd without opinion by an equally divided Court, 493 U.S. 38, 110 S.Ct. 398, 107 L.Ed.2d 277 (1989). 32 In any event, an equally pertinent canon of interpretation states that a congressional decision to prohibit certain activities does not imply an intent to disable the relevant administrative body from taking similar action with respect to activities that pose a similar danger. See, e.g., Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 372-73, 93 S.Ct. 1652, 1662-63, 36 L.Ed.2d 318 (1973); Bailey v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank, 788 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 915, 107 S.Ct. 317, 93 L.Ed.2d 290 (1986). The expressio maxim is inappropriate in the administrative context, these cases suggest, because its application would undermine the flexibility sought in vesting broad rulemaking authority in an administrative agency. Mourning, 411 U.S. at 372, 93 S.Ct. at 1662. Indeed, a congressional prohibition of particular conduct may actually support the view that the administrative entity can exercise its authority to eliminate a similar danger. Id. at 372-73, 93 S.Ct. at 1662-63. Here, LSC determined that the dangers of entanglement in controversial local issues such as school desegregation and abortion were presented as well by redistricting litigation and, accordingly, justified imposing a similar ban on program recipients. Particularly in light of the Act's mandate to LSC to ensure that the legal services program remain free from partisan political involvement, we cannot conclude that LSC's position is based on an unreasonable interpretation of the Act. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 387, 103 S.Ct. 683, 689-90, 74 L.Ed.2d 548 (1983) (expressio maxim and other canons of interpretation  'long have been subordinated to the doctrine that courts will construe the details of an act in conformity with its dominating general purpose' ) (quoting SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 350-51, 64 S.Ct. 120, 123, 88 L.Ed. 88 (1943)). 33 c. Section 1010(c). Appellees' next argument is more narrowly drawn but also relies implicitly on the expressio maxim. They claim that the redistricting regulation's prohibition on the use of private funds by program recipients for redistricting activities conflicts with section 1010(c) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996i(c), which provides that private funds received for the provision of legal assistance shall not be expended by recipients for any purpose prohibited by this subchapter.... This provision was intended to prevent local programs from contraven[ing] the other restrictions in the act by attributing them to the non-Federal share of funds contributed to such programs. 120 CONG.REC. 24,026 (1974) (summary of Act by Senator Nelson). Appellees read into section 1010(c) a congressional intent to bar use of private funds only for purposes prohibited by the Act itself (as they try to read a similar exclusivity into Congress's enactment of those prohibitions), but the only support they provide for this assertion, other than the language of the provision and similar language in the legislative history, is the fact that Congress has on several occasions overridden by statute other LSC regulations that limited the use of private funds by program recipients. See, e.g., Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub.L. No. 101-515, Sec. 607, 104 Stat. 2101, 2152 (1990) (use of private funds for legislative representation); id., 104 Stat. at 2153 (use of private funds for financially ineligible clients). 34 Reliance on subsequent legislative history of this sort, however, is notoriously suspect and  'form[s] a hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier [Congress].'  Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories, 460 U.S. 150, 165 n. 27, 103 S.Ct. 1011, 1021 n. 27, 74 L.Ed.2d 882 (1983) (quoting United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313, 80 S.Ct. 326, 331-32, 4 L.Ed.2d 334 (1960)). In any event, consulting these later actions by Congress does not persuade us that they support appellees' position. Notably, Congress did not respond to LSC's prior regulations on the use of private funds by enacting a general provision barring LSC from imposing limitations in excess of those provided by the Act, nor has Congress taken any action with respect to the specific limitation contained in the redistricting regulation. Appellees direct our attention to a statement by Senator Rudman that expresses general dissatisfaction with LSC's misguided view of its authority to extend the coverage of regulations it promulgates to private funds. 135 CONG.REC. S7233 (daily ed. June 23, 1989). Yet Senator Rudman also seemed to recognize that LSC does have some authority to regulate the use of private funds by program recipients, stating only that LSC had overextend[ed] that authority. Id. The kind of regulation at issue here, which is more closely akin to the prohibitions specifically enumerated by Congress itself in the Act than were the regulations overridden by Congress, would seem to further rather than impede the purposes underlying the Act and to justify the exercise of LSC's authority to limit the use of private funds. At the very least, we cannot say that LSC's interpretation of its authority in this respect is an impermissible construction of the Act. If Congress disagrees with LSC's action, it remains free to override this part of the redistricting regulation, as it has done in other situations. 35 d. Section 1007(a)(5). Appellees also challenge the redistricting regulation's prohibition of legislative representation in connection with redistricting matters. See 45 C.F.R. Sec. 1632.2 (prohibiting any effort, whether by request or otherwise, even if of a neutral nature, to revise a legislative, judicial, or elective district at any level of government). This provision, they argue, conflicts with section 1007(a)(5) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996f(a)(5), which prohibits program recipients from using federal funds to engage in legislative representation of clients except (1) when necessary to the provision of legal advice and representation with respect to such client's legal rights and responsibilities, or (2) when a legislative body or agency either requests the recipient to testify, draft, or review measures or to make representations to the body or agency or is considering a measure directly affecting the activities of the local program or LSC. Because the redistricting regulation's ban on legislative representation sweeps more broadly than the provisions contained in section 1007(a)(5), appellees conclude that LSC lacked authority to impose it. 36 Once again, however, appellees fail to explain why the Act's failure to prohibit certain activities on a general basis prevents LSC from imposing such a restriction in specific situations where it deems it necessary or prudent. Furthermore, it is not clear to us that the exceptions to the lobbying limitation in the Act necessarily apply in situations where (as with school desegregation and abortion) the Act bars program recipients from engaging in certain types of substantive legal activities. In any event, program recipients presumably would have few, if any, occasions to lobby on behalf of [a] client's legal rights and responsibilities with respect to prohibited activities, precisely because they generally are barred from representing clients on those matters. 37 e. Section 1006(b)(3). Finally, appellees argue that the absence of a grandfather clause exempting redistricting activities currently being conducted by local program recipients violates section 1006(b)(3) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2996e(b)(3), which requires LSC to ensure that activities under this subchapter are carried out in a manner consistent with attorneys' professional responsibilities. Because the regulation would require immediate withdrawal of local program attorneys from redistricting cases, appellees conclude that it would force these attorneys to violate their ethical obligations to their clients. 38 Appellees acknowledge, however, that the Ethics Committee of the American Bar Association has upheld withdrawal by an attorney in the face of a loss of LSC funding, provided that the attorney has given notice to the client and has made efforts to find other funding or substitute counsel. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 347 (1981). Appellees provide no reason for assuming that a different standard would be applied to attorneys forced to withdraw from pending redistricting cases because of the regulation at issue here. Furthermore, LSC has granted partial or temporary waivers for several pending cases brought by attorneys for two of the organizations involved in this litigation, indicating that LSC will administer the regulation flexibly. Should withdrawal of funding confront any local program attorneys with the risk of violating their ethical responsibilities, we trust that LSC will show similar flexibility, in conformity with its statutory duty to prevent such violations. 39 For all of the foregoing reasons, we hold that LSC's interpretations of the contested statutory provisions are permissible constructions of the Act. We therefore reject appellees' assertion that the regulation is inconsistent with those provisions. 40