Opinion ID: 2675341
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The African-American Prospective Jurors

Text: Defense counsel made a Batson/Wheeler motion regarding the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror K.P., who was African-American. The trial court denied the motion, finding no prima facie case had been made. The next day, defense counsel made a second Batson/Wheeler motion following the prosecutor’s peremptory challenges against four African-American jurors: D.M., W.J., I.T., and L.W. The court found a prima facie case had been established and extended its finding to include Prospective Juror K.P. After hearing the prosecutor state his reasons for excluding these jurors, the trial court remarked, “In evaluating those reasons, it’s completely understandable why he would have asked each of these jurors to be excused by using his peremptory challenges.” The trial court found that there were “honest race-neutral reasons for excusing each of these jurors,” and denied the Batson/Wheeler motion. Later that day, defense counsel brought a Batson/Wheeler motion regarding the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror P.K., another African-American. The trial court assumed a prima facie case existed for P.K. as well. After hearing the prosecutor’s reasons for excluding P.K., the trial court found that the prosecutor was “candid and honest” in stating a race-neutral reason, and denied the motions. Before addressing the individual prospective jurors at issue, we observe that at the time the jury was empanelled, three African-Americans were seated on the jury. The presence of these jurors on the panel is one indication of the prosecutor’s good faith in exercising his peremptory challenges to exclude the African-American prospective jurors in question. (People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.4th p. 480.) 42 Prospective Juror K.P. The prosecutor explained his peremptory challenge of K.P. as follows: “[B]oth she and her husband had been through the justice system and had been convicted of crimes. Her husband is involved in narcotics and spousal abuse. I believe she indicates that he is currently addicted to drugs and alcohol.” Defendant does not dispute the prosecutor’s stated reasons are supported by answers in K.P.’s questionnaire. Instead, he contends a comparative juror analysis undermines the genuineness of those grounds because K.P. was not the only member of the venire to report problems with law enforcement. Defendant describes the following background information for the non-African-American sitting jurors.21 Three had a husband, father, or brother who had been convicted of driving under the influence. One had used drugs in her youth, her sister had a drug problem, and her husband had a drinking problem although he had been sober for two years. One had a stepson with drug problems that had resulted in juvenile court intervention and a drug program. One juror had been arrested and charged with domestic violence, although the charges later were dropped. K.P.’s background is distinguishable from the jurors with whom she is compared because of her conviction for the crime of theft and by the apparent severity and ongoing nature of her husband’s drug addiction. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of the motion as to K.P. 21 Defendant acknowledges the juror questionnaires do not contain information about the race or ethnicity of prospective jurors. He bases his inference that various seated jurors were not African-American on defense counsel’s statement that, at the time the prosecutor accepted the panel, he had excused five out of seven African American jurors who were in the jury box. Based on defendant’s identification of the remaining two jurors as African American, he concludes the remaining seated jurors were not African-American. 43 Prospective Juror D.M. The prosecutor explained he excused D.M. because “he is against the death penalty,” and had written in his questionnaire that he always had been against the death penalty “because rich people very seldom are ever put to death. However, some cases are so heinous, it needs to be imposed.” The prosecutor noted D.M. had added that he opposed the death penalty because “it is unfairly applied.” The prosecutor said he was concerned about D.M.’s views because he knew what the evidence would show about defendant’s background. Defendant contends the prosecutor’s explanation was pretextual because some non-African-American jurors whom he did not challenge voiced less support for capital punishment than D.M. D.M. rated himself 6 on the 10-point scale. Defendant notes three non-African-American prospective jurors rated themselves 5 on the 10-point scale, and he contends one could interpret the remarks of at least one of them as reflecting more ambivalence about the death penalty than D.M. had voiced. Defendant does not dispute that, unlike D.M., none of the jurors to whom he compares D.M. expressed their ambivalence in the terms of a specific concern that the death penalty was seldom used against the wealthy. Instead, he contends the prosecutor had no reason to be concerned about D.M.’s specific views on the death penalty because there was no evidence of poverty or deprivation in defendant’s family background. We disagree. However one might characterize defendant’s background, it was not one of wealth. The prosecutor’s concern about D.M.’s specific view on the application of the death penalty distinguishes D.M. from those other jurors. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of the motion as to D.M. 44 Prospective Juror W.J. The prosecutor explained he had challenged W.J. primarily because he did not appear to be adequately educated to comprehend the complicated jury instructions that would be used in the case. He noted W.J. had misspelled many words in his questionnaire, including “honest,” “offense,” and “misdemeanor,” and that W.J. had been convicted of a misdemeanor for possession of stolen property. The prosecutor expressed concern that W.J. would not fairly and effectively evaluate the evidence. The trial court concurred in the prosecutor’s assessment, stating that W.J. had not seemed to comprehend fairly simple questions during voir dire by Hawkins’s trial counsel. Defendant contends W.J.’s educational level was comparable to other jurors the prosecutor accepted. W.J. had completed high school and taken some college classes, whereas one prospective juror had no college experience and two others had taken college classes but received no degrees. Defendant notes the prospective juror who lacked college experience also made numerous spelling errors in his questionnaire. But defendant fails to show that these other jurors also showed difficulty comprehending voir dire questions or had been convicted of a misdemeanor. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of the motion as to W.J. Prospective Juror I.T. I.T. had a brother incarcerated at San Quentin for murder, but she said his experience would not influence her decision-making. She rated herself a 2 on the scale of 1 to 10. She believed her Christian faith did not favor capital punishment, but stated she would follow the law rather than her personal agenda, and that she could impose the death penalty for a single special circumstance murder. The prosecutor explained he had challenged I.T. because, although she indicated she would consider the death penalty, he did not believe she could do so. 45 He pointed to her statements in her questionnaire that “God gave life, and only God should take it away,” and “I am a Christian and study the Bible, and I don’t remember reading that God gave another human being the authority to make a decision to kill another.” The reluctance of a juror to impose the death penalty based on religious belief is a permissible ground for the exercise of a peremptory challenge. (People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 118-119.) Defendant acknowledges that “standing alone, the prosecutor’s challenge to I.T. might not be remarkable.” We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of the motion as to I.T. Prospective Juror L.W. The prosecutor explained he had challenged L.W. because his questionnaire indicated he was widowed and had retired from the military in 1974, but there was “a complete void as to what he’s been doing since 1974.” The prosecutor was concerned L.W. wrote he had no opinion on the death penalty, but also wrote that it served no purpose. The prosecutor questioned whether a juror who thought the death penalty served no purpose would seriously consider the People’s arguments in its favor. He was also concerned L.W. believed O.J. Simpson properly was acquitted because officers in that case “took the Fifth Amendment.” Claiming the prosecutor’s stated reasons were pretextual, defendant points to the fact L.W. rated himself as 5 on the 10-point scale. Defendant incorporates the same comparative argument he made in regard to D.M., namely, that other prospective jurors not challenged by the prosecutor gave themselves the same neutral rating. Defendant presents his comparative juror arguments at a high level of generality, ignoring the prosecutor’s stated concern that L.M believed that the death penalty served no purpose. Such a belief could a cause a prosecutor concern despite L.M.’s self-rating as neutral on the death penalty. The prosecutor’s additional concern that he did not have a good sense of who L.W. was finds 46 support in the record in light of L.M.’s failure to provide any information after 1974. Defendant’s argument to the contrary, the fact that the prosecutor could have asked more questions to illuminate L.W.’s background does not cause us to regard the prosecutor’s stated reasons as pretextual. Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of the motion as to L.W. Prospective Juror P.K. The prosecutor explained he had challenged P.K. because of his opposition to the death penalty, noting that in his questionnaire P.K. had written he was opposed to the death penalty due to its application and history in the United States, and had rated himself a 2 on the 10-point scale. Opposition to the death penalty is a permissible, race-neutral reason for a peremptory challenge. (People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 970-971.) In asserting the prosecutor’s stated reason for P.K.’s excusal was pretextual, defendant simply refers to his earlier argument concerning Prospective Juror I.T, and he again acknowledges the challenge standing alone would be unremarkable. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s denial of the motion as to P.K.