Opinion ID: 3063773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indictment surplusage

Text: We review the district court’s ruling on whether to strike surplusage from an indictment for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Bullock, 451 F.2d 884, 888 (5th Cir. 1971). Because, however, Brye did not request the court to strike the language in the indictment based on the requirements of § 924(e) or for sentencing purposes, review of that issue is also for plain error. See Gresham, 325 F.3d at 1265. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) provides that, “[u]pon the 3 defendant’s motion, the court may strike surplusage from the indictment or information.” Fed.R.Crim.P. 7(d) The application notes to this rule explain that the authority of the court to strike such surplusage is to be limited to doing so on a defendant’s motion. Fed.R.Crim.P. 7 (n.3). A motion to strike surplusage from an indictment should not be granted “unless it is clear that the allegations are not relevant to the charge and are inflammatory and prejudicial. This is a most exacting standard.” United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1426 (11th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations and citation omitted). We have found that a defendant was not unduly prejudiced by language that was not stricken from an indictment where the court provided the jury with only a summary of the indictment that did not include references to the disputed language. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Brye’s motion to strike surplusage from the indictment because his five prior felonies were relevant to the charge, and the court took measures to ensure that Brye was not unduly prejudiced.