Opinion ID: 786890
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of the Outside of Burnette's Mail at the CMRAs

Text: 14 On appeal, Burnette does not challenge the district court's conclusion that suppression was not an available remedy for a violation of postal regulations governing the use of mail covers, nor does she argue that such a violation in fact occurred. Instead, she claims that EPA agents conducted an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment when they examined the outside of her mail that was contained inside a private mailbox situated in the private mailroom of a CMRA from which she rented postal services. Burnette claims, without explanation, that almost all of the evidence at trial derived from the search of her mail and, thus, that her conviction should be vacated and the case remanded for retrial. 15 Burnette acknowledges that she did not raise her Fourth Amendment claim below but argues that it was preserved for appeal because the district court examined whether Appellant had a privacy interest in the content of her mailbox and the business address and concluded that no Fourth Amendment violation occurred. This characterization is not entirely accurate. In rejecting Burnette's motion to suppress based on a regulatory violation, the district court noted that [c]ourts have established that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the information conveyed on the outside of her mail. Where there is no such expectation, the court explained, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. See, e.g., United States v. Choate, 576 F.2d 165, 177 (9th Cir.1978) (holding that the use of mail covers to obtain information from the exterior of an individual's mail does not violate the Fourth Amendment given that the information would foreseeably be available to postal employees); accord, e.g., United States v. Hinton, 222 F.3d 664, 675 (9th Cir.2000) (There is no expectation of privacy in the addresses on a package, regardless of its class.); United States v. Osunegbu, 822 F.2d 472, 480 n. 23 (5th Cir.1987) ([A]n addressee or addressor generally has no expectation of privacy as to the outside of mail.). 16 As defense counsel acknowledged at oral argument, Burnette does not claim to have a protectible privacy interest in the exterior of her mail irrespective of its location. Burnette never raised, and the district court never considered, her present claim that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in information conveyed on the outside of mail that was enclosed inside a private mailbox in the private mailroom of a CMRA from which she rented postal services. Therefore, we review that claim only for plain error. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993); see Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). To establish plain error, Burnette must show (1) that an error occurred (2) which was clear or obvious and which not only (3) affected [her] substantial rights, but also (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Duarte, 246 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir.2001). 17 Governmental intrusions do not implicate the Fourth Amendment unless they infringe upon an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy. Vega-Rodriguez v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 110 F.3d 174, 178 (1st Cir.1997). For Fourth Amendment purposes, a privacy expectation must meet both subjective and objective criteria: the complainant must have an actual expectation of privacy, and that expectation must be one which society recognizes as reasonable. Id. The Supreme Court has not developed a fixed standard by which to evaluate the objective reasonableness of an asserted expectation of privacy; rather, it has considered such diverse factors as the Framers' intent, the uses to which an individual has put a location, and society's understanding that certain areas warrant protection from governmental intrusions. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177, 104 S.Ct. 1735, 80 L.Ed.2d 214 (1984). As with other areas of Fourth Amendment analysis, the question of whether a party has a reasonable expectation of privacy is context-specific, and each case therefore must be judged according to its own scenario. Vega-Rodriguez, 110 F.3d at 178. 18 Burnette argues that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the three CMRAs from which she rented mail receiving and forwarding services. She suggests that each CMRA was the equivalent of a shared office, the occupants of which have a reasonable expectation that the contents of the office will not be disturbed except by personal or business invitees. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968). Even if a CMRA is the Fourth Amendment equivalent of a shared office, however, Burnette would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in every area inside the postal facility. We have held that a tenant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building. United States v. Hawkins, 139 F.3d 29, 32 (1st Cir.1998). Such areas are exposed both to those who have access to that area and those, including law enforcement officers, who may be given permission to enter that area. Osunegbu, 822 F.2d at 479 (citing United States v. Novello, 519 F.2d 1078, 1078 (5th Cir.1975), for the proposition that a party has no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the exterior of items stored in a common area of a public warehouse). Likewise, Burnette has no reasonable expectation of privacy in the outside of mail that is sorted or stored in the open, common office area of a CMRA. See id. (noting that an individual has no privacy interest as to the outside of mail addressed to a private mailbox in a private mail facility before the mail is placed in the box). 19 Burnette maintains, however, that her mail was stored in her private mailbox in a private mailroom that was guarded by an attendant at all times. That arrangement, she suggests, assured that other occupants of the business address did not have free access to the contents of [her] mailbox. Consequently, the owner of the office service business did not share joint access and control over the contents of [her] mailbox and was not authorized to allow others' entrance to [the] mailbox. This scenario presents a more colorable claim that the government agents infringed upon Burnette's reasonable expectation of privacy when they examined the outside of her mail. On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit has rejected a similar claim that the examination by government agents of the contents of a rented mailbox within a private postal facility violated a defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy. Osunegbu, 822 F.2d at 480. Ultimately, the reasonableness of Burnette's asserted expectation of privacy may depend upon facts such as the layout of the mailroom and mailboxes, the CMRAs' procedures for mail delivery and storage, and the agreement between the CMRAs and their clients as to access by CMRA managers and third parties to mail inside the mailboxes. 20 In this case, however, the record does not provide any such details nor does it support Burnette's factual claim that EPA agents examined her mail that was in a private mailbox in a private mailroom. Burnette's motion to suppress was based solely on the claim that government agents violated postal regulations when they obtained information that appeared on the outside of mail that was addressed to her and held at the CMRAs without first obtaining a mail cover. The parties did not present and the district court did not consider evidence regarding the location within the CMRA where Burnette's mail was observed or the procedures employed by CMRA employees in sorting, delivering, and storing their customers' mail. 6 The district court could hardly have been expected to conclude that the government unconstitutionally infringed upon Burnette's reasonable expectation of privacy by examining the contents of her private mailbox when Burnette did not raise, let alone develop, the factual basis to support a claim that her mail was enclosed in a private mailbox over which she had exclusive control or that federal agents examined the contents of such a mailbox. 7 Therefore, the district court did not err, let alone commit plain error, by denying Burnette's motion to suppress the evidence derived from the search of the exterior of her mail at the CMRAs.