Opinion ID: 1230281
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Right of the Client to Discharge the Attorney

Text: (13a) Finally, we must address a point not raised explicitly by the County, but one nonetheless before us because of the nature of the relief requested: [11] whether the client has the right to discharge an attorney in whom it purportedly has lost faith. This question is analytically distinct from the question of attorney loyalty to the client; it considers whether, despite an attorney's actual loyalty, job performance, or observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct, a public employer should nonetheless have the right to discharge the attorney because it no longer has complete confidence in the attorney's capacity to serve loyally. (14) Code of Civil Procedure section 284 provides in part that an attorney in an action or special proceeding may be changed at any time before or after judgment or final determination as follows: ... (2) Upon the order of the court, upon the application of either client or attorney, after notice from one to the other. We have construed this code section to confer upon clients, beyond the context of litigation, the [absolute] power to discharge an attorney, with or without cause.... ( Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, 790 [100 Cal. Rptr. 385, 494 P.2d 9].) That statute embodies the recognition that `the interest of the client in the successful prosecution or defense of the action is superior to that of the attorney, and he has the right to employ such attorney as will in his opinion best subserve his interest.' ( Ibid., quoting Gage v. Atwater (1902) 136 Cal. 170, 172 [68 P. 581].) (15) There is no question that the MMBA prohibits employers from discharging employees who exercise lawful employee rights of representation. Government Code section 3506 states that [p]ublic agencies ... shall not interfere with, intimidate, restrain, coerce or discriminate against public employees because of their exercise of their rights under Section 3502 [the public employees' right to `form, join, and participate in the activities of employee organizations of their own choosing']. The MMBA ensures a public employee the right to engage in a wide range of union-related activities without fear of sanction.... ( Social Workers' Union, Local 535 v. Alameda County Welfare Dept. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 382, 388 [113 Cal. Rptr. 461, 521 P.2d 453].) Public employers may not discriminate against their employees on the basis of membership or participation in union activities. (See Campbell Municipal Employees Assn. v. City of Campbell (1982) 131 Cal. App.3d 416 [182 Cal. Rptr. 461]; Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors (1985) 167 Cal. App.3d 797, 806. 807 [213 Cal. Rptr. 491].) This freedom from sanction obviously includes the right not to be discharged for lawful union activity. The right to participate in employee self-organization and collective bargaining would be meaningless if an employee could be discharged simply for engaging in such lawful activity. (See Portland Williamette Co. v. N.L.R.B. (9th Cir.1976) 534 F.2d 1331, 1334 [discharge of employee engaged in union activity inherently destructive of union activity and therefore presumed to be discriminatory].) And as we have already concluded, in part II.A.2. of this opinion, ante, a suit by an employee association to enforce its rights under the MMBA is a form of lawful, protected activity. Under normal circumstances, therefore, the filing of such a suit may not lead to the discriminatory discharge or discipline of an employee. (13b) The question before us, then, is how that right to be free from discriminatory discharge for lawfully participating in activities sanctioned by the MMBA may be reconciled with the rule of Code of Civil Procedure section 284 that an attorney may be discharged by a client for any reason and for no reason. In determining the manner in which partially conflicting statutes are to be construed, we look first to the intent of the Legislature. ( Woods v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 323 [279 Cal. Rptr. 613, 807 P.2d 455].) As a rule, a later, more specific, statute will prevail over an earlier, more general one. ( Id. at p. 324.) In this case, the general rule permitting a client to discharge her attorney has been modified by the subsequent explicit inclusion of certain attorneys within the scope of a statutory labor relations scheme which inherently limits the right of public employers to terminate their employees at will. We do not believe the Legislature intended to explicitly confer these rights to organize and bargain collectively on attorneys employed by cities and counties, without also intending that these attorneys be protected from discharge for pursuit of these rights. Moreover, even if the rule of a client's right to discharge an attorney is one that predates, and has validity independent of, its enactment into statute, the legislative modification of the rule does not raise constitutional separation of powers issues. [12] The Legislature could legitimately decide that this rule  based on the principle that the client's interest in receiving satisfactory representation is superior to the attorney's interest in continued employment  should be altered in those limited class of cases in which the attorney is the client's employee and is discharged primarily not for providing inadequate representation as an attorney, but for the assertion of his statutory rights as an employee. The obligation of attorneys to follow the Rules of Professional Conduct and State Bar Act, as well as the client's ability to discharge an attorney for reasons other than participation in activity sanctioned by the MMBA, provides sufficient safeguards to protect the integrity of the attorney-client relationship. We therefore hold that the MMBA creates an exception to the general rule found in Code of Civil Procedure section 284 and case law, that a client may discharge an attorney at will. That exception is a prohibition on terminating an attorney solely or chiefly because he or she has engaged in protected activity under the MMBA. As discussed in part II.A.2. of this opinion, ante, a suit by an employee organization to enforce such collective bargaining rights is an example of such protected activity, and may not be punished by the attorney's discipline or discharge. Attorneys who believe they have been discriminated against for protected activity may bring an antidiscrimination action in the manner available to other employees. (See Public Employees Assn. v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 167 Cal. App.3d 797, 807; Fun Striders, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (9th Cir.1981) 686 F.2d 659, 661-662.) (16) In so holding, we note here that the trial court, though deciding that an attorney cannot be discharged or disciplined for participating in the filing of this petition, declined to grant the Association's request to reinstate the Attorneys to their full employment responsibilities, e.g., to entitle them to attend confidential meetings from which they were excluded by the County Counsel once they announced their intention to sue. The trial court decided this matter correctly. Although the County may not punish the Attorneys for suit over an MMBA matter, there is no reason why the County should not be accorded great flexibility in reorganizing the County Counsel's office to respond to the lawsuit. This may include, as the trial court below suggested, the reassignment of Association members to matters of representation outside the field of labor relations. Nothing in the MMBA prohibits the Board and its members from asserting their rights, as clients, to refuse representation from the Association attorneys on any given matter, and to make use of non-Association attorneys or outside counsel in sensitive matters, so long as such reassignment is done nonpunitively. By allowing the County this flexibility, the trial court properly balanced the County's need for obtaining representation in which it has full confidence with the Attorneys' statutory employment rights.