Opinion ID: 2974181
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction of Firearms Evidence

Text: Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude introduction of evidence relating to a “gun that was recovered from a vehicle subsequent to the arrest of the Defendant.” According to defendant’s motion, introduction of the firearm would be used primarily to call his character into question in contravention of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). It also noted that defendant had not been charged with possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). At the pretrial conference, the district court made the following observations: And the other [motion] about guns, this objection is . . . based on [Rule of Evidence] 404, and other than the guns are generally admissible in drug trials, [the AUSA] says that the defendant’s knowledge that the informant possessed multiple firearms supports his knowledge that the informant was a drug dealer which is relevant to the money laundering charge, which makes sense to me. And then the fact that he was -8- No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez soliciting the informant who he knew to be an armed drug dealer to have a potential witness killed also helps demonstrate the seriousness of his intent. So that all makes a lot of sense to me. What do you have to say about his response? DEFENSE COUNSEL: That does make a lot of sense. And if that’s . . . how the proof in this case goes, then there may be a reason for that to come in. Although the motion in limine sought exclusion only of the firearm seized from defendant’s pick-up truck on the night of his arrest, at trial defense counsel also objected to the introduction of evidence during Officer Burchwell’s testimony of a MAC-11 seized at the Cedar Valley Drive address. The district court denied the objection but told counsel, “I’m just going to instruct the jury at this time we are hearing about searches but there’s no connection at this time to this defendant.” In a similar vein, defense counsel objected when Richardson mentioned the MAC-11 and a .40 caliber Glock left at the Cedar Valley address. According to Richardson, “I would leave [defendant] with the guns basically. He would want the gun there for protection use.” As part of its instructions, the district court told the jury: “You have heard testimony that the defendant committed some acts other than the ones charged in the indictment. You cannot consider this testimony as evidence that the defendant committed the crimes that he’s on trial for now.” This court recently reiterated the manner in which we review admission of evidence pursuant to Rule 404(b): First, we review for clear error the district court’s factual determination that sufficient evidence exists that the other acts occurred. Second, we review de novo whether the district court correctly determined that the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose. Third, we review for abuse of discretion the district court’s determination that the “other acts” evidence is more probative than prejudicial under Rule 403. -9- No. 05-5257 United States v. Gomez United States v. Matthews, 440 F.3d 818, 828 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Comer, 93 F.3d 1271, 1277 (6th Cir. 1996)). Turning to the issue before us, we note that each of the three charged counts requires proof of some element of intent. Second, firearms are considered “tools of the drug trade” and, as such, are admissible in drug trafficking trials even if no firearms charge has been alleged. See United States v. Ware, 161 F.3d 414, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1998). Third, Richardson testified that he, not defendant, owned the guns in question, lessening the danger of unfair prejudice. And, fourth, the limiting instructions mentioned above properly guided the jury in the manner in which it weighed this evidence. Given these considerations, we affirm the decision of the district court to permit the introduction of evidence of the firearms at trial.