Opinion ID: 25
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Adequacy of the Court's Response

Text: When a defendant has timely objected to the district court's handling of a claim of premature deliberation, we review the court's response for abuse of discretion. United States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir.2004). Because trial judges enjoy broad discretion in addressing potential juror misconduct, we normally. . . will not reverse unless the judge's choice among the various avenues available was patently unreasonable. United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 591 (1st Cir.2002). Indeed, we have held that the court's discretion is at its broadest when it responds to an allegation of premature jury deliberations. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d at 74; see also United States v. Dominguez, 226 F.3d 1235, 1246 (11th Cir.2000) (noting broadest discretion when the allegation involves internal misconduct such as premature deliberations). The government argues that an even higher hurdleplain error reviewapplies to this case because Diaz did not object to the court's original response to the note or to its instruction the next day. The government also contends that, because Diaz never moved for a mistrial based on the jury's conduct, he may not now claim entitlement to a new trial. In response, Diaz asserts that his claim was fully preserved by his request on the second day of trial that the district court probe the possibility of improper jury deliberations. He argues that his delayed objection did not impair the court's ability to craft a solution, noting that the court could have at that point excused any jurors who had formed an opinion about guilt or innocence. He further emphasizes that the court expressly rejected the possibility of a mistrial, making it futile for him to move for a mistrial or to object to the second jury instruction. We need not rule on the timeliness of Diaz's objection because, even under the more favorable abuse of discretion standard, his claim of reversible error is unavailing. With respect to timing, we note only that, while Diaz's counsel was slow to register an objection to the district court's original approach, the court acknowledged that some remedy was still appropriate and useful when the issue was raised on the second morning of the trial. See United States v. Carpenter, 494 F.3d 13, 21 (1st Cir.2007) (noting that [t]he preservation requirement is designed to alert the trial judge to a party's objection to a ruling, with adequate explanation, so the judge can decide what course of action to take to assure, so far as possible, the legal correctness of the trial proceedings). For present purposes, we can assume for convenience that the abuse of discretion standard applies.
Trial courts employ a multi-step framework in assessing claims of juror misconduct, including premature deliberations. See, e.g., United States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir.2007); Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d at 74. The court first must ascertain whether the allegation is colorable. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d at 74. If it is, the court must investigate to assess[] the magnitude and extent of any prejudice caused and, where necessary, it must consider prophylactic measures to alleviate the prejudice. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52. If no curative measures appear adequate, the court may grant a timely motion for mistrial. Id. The district court in this case rejected the defendant's claim at the threshold, refusing to probe the possibility that the jurors had engaged in premature deliberations, and instead relied on its firm instruction reminding the jurors of its earlier admonition against discussing the case before all of the evidence was presented. We cannot fault the court for that measured course of action. Just the day before the note was received, after the jurors were sworn, they had been told not to discuss the case until after they heard all of the testimony. [6] The note barely intimated that the jurors had violated that prohibition at all, let alone engaged in inappropriate deliberation. Although the use of the pronoun our suggested a conversation among at least two jurors, the note requested clarification only of a legal principle and gave no indication that the jurors had discussed the merits of the case against the defendant. In addition to the content of the note itself, the fact that the trial had been underway for less than ninety minutes diminishes the likelihood that the conversation that apparently took place constituted inappropriate deliberations about the facts of the case as then presented, or the defendant's guilt or innocence. Conversations between jurors concerning the case they are hearing do not always amount to premature deliberations. See United States v. Peterson, 385 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir.2004) (Not every comment a juror may make to another juror about the case is a discussion about a defendant's guilt or innocence that comes within a common sense definition of deliberation.); Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d at 75 (finding no duty to investigate where juror expressed doubt about her ability to determine guilt because that conversation was a far cry from a conversation in which the jurors discussed the merits of the parties' positions). Indeed, the district court observed that, [t]ruthfully, the way [the jurors] phrased [their question] and the way the law is going to go, their focusing on that is exactly the right issue. Diaz's counsel responded that she was not necessarily disagreeing with the court's assessment, but pointed out that, if asked, the jurors might say they were actually reaching some factual conclusions. The court deemed this hypothetical possibility of juror misconduct an insufficient basis to justify further inquiry, but it did not simply dismiss the defendant's concerns. Rather, the court provided a remedy in the form of an emphatic reminder that the jurors should not talk about the case. Particularly given the ambiguous content of the note, the court's handling of the situation was sensible and appropriate, and well within the bounds of its broad discretion. [7]