Opinion ID: 797185
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court Has Discretion to Calculate or Consider Defendant's Tax Loss

Text: 18 In the instant case, the applicable sentencing guideline is set forth in United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) § 2T1.9(a)(1). Section 2T4.1 of the sentencing guidelines sets forth offense levels based on tax loss amounts. The express language of the relevant statutes indicates that offense levels are either calculated under § 2T4.1, based on the tax loss amount, or set at ten. U.S.S.G. § 2T1.9. A review of the relevant statues reveals that the amount of tax loss is not an element of Defendant's offense, but rather is relevant to Defendant's sentence under the guidelines. See 18 U.S.C. § 371; 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3) and 5324(d)(1). 19 Admittedly, it may have been appropriate for a district court to calculate the amount of tax loss and to use it in sentencing before Booker. See, e.g., United States v. Nash, 175 F.3d 429, 439-440 (6th Cir.1999) (finding that the district court properly calculated defendant's tax liability); see also United States v. Ghali, 47 Fed.Appx. 281, 283 (6th Cir.2002) (unpublished case). However, in light of Booker, the overwhelming case law authority indicates that resentencing is appropriate if a defendant is sentenced under a mandatory sentencing guideline regime and if the district court enhances the defendant's sentence based on factors not proven to a jury or admitted by the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 399 F.3d 640, 648-49 (6th Cir.2005) ([T]he Sixth Amendment is violated where, under a mandatory sentencing scheme, judicial fact-finding, as opposed to facts found by a jury, increases the sentence beyond the statutory maximum sentence which may be imposed solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Paz, 405 F.3d 946, 948 (11th Cir.2005) ([U]nder Booker, the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury is violated where under a mandatory guidelines system a sentence is increased because of enhancement based on facts found by the judge that were neither admitted by the defendant nor found by the jury.) (emphasis in original). The district court's reliance on judge-found facts to increase [a] defendant's sentence under mandatory guideline[s] violate[s] the Sixth Amendment. United States v. Stephens, 148 Fed.Appx. 385, 388 (6th Cir.2005) (unpublished case) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Pree, 408 F.3d 855, 874-75 (7th Cir.2005) (The Government concedes that the district court committed error that was plain in treating the guidelines as mandatory and enhancing [defendant's] sentencing range based on the court's findings of fact.) (emphasis added); United States v. Harpole, 168 Fed.Appx. 182, 185 (9th Cir.2006) (unpublished case) (Because [defendant] was sentenced under mandatory Sentencing Guidelines, this judge-made finding of fact violated [defendant's] Sixth Amendment rights.) (emphasis added). 20 Thus, in enhancing defendant's sentence based on factors not proven to a jury or admitted by a defendant, [t]he district court [does] not violate Booker [if] it considered the guidelines to be advisory and not mandatory. United States v. Redmond, 188 Fed.Appx. 377, 381 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished case); see also United States v. Anderson, 187 Fed.Appx. 517, 521 (6th Cir.2006) (unpublished case). Post- Booker, under the advisory sentencing guideline regime, a sentencing enhancement is constitutional as long as it is based on reliable information and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Redmond, 188 Fed.Appx. at 381. 21 This is not the first time this Court is asked to make a determination with respect to Defendant's sentence. See Kosinski, 127 Fed.Appx. at 751. This Court previously found that the district court's original sentence violated Booker because Defendant was sentenced based on the amount of tax loss determined by the district court, rather than an amount found by the jury. Id. It is important to note that Defendant was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing guidelines regime. Thus, by making factual determinations, the district court did exactly what the Supreme Court found to be a violation of the Sixth Amendment in Booker. the district court engaged in independent fact-finding which enhanced Defendant's sentence beyond the facts established by the jury verdict or admitted by Defendant. United States v. Davis, 397 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir.2005). In pertinent part, this Court found that: 22 [t]his case is factually indistinguishable from Booker itself and thus resentencing is required. Booker was convicted by a jury of possessing at least 50 grams of cocaine. At sentencing, the district court determined that Booker possessed at least 616 grams of cocaine and sentenced him accordingly. Had Booker been sentenced on the jury's finding alone, the Guideline range would have been 210 to 262 months. Instead, based on the district court's finding that Booker possessed more cocaine, Booker received a sentence of 360 months. The Supreme Court concluded that because only 50 grams was argued to the jury, the sentence exceeded that authorized by the jury verdict and thus violated the Sixth Amendment. In this case, Kosinski was sentenced based on the amount of tax loss determined by the district court. The jury was never asked to determine tax loss. Without the district court's factual determination of tax loss, the offense level would be 10, corresponding to a sentence of 6 to 12 month. U.S.S.G. § 2T1.9. Applying the reasoning of Booker, the 30-month sentence Kosinski received plainly went beyond that authorized by the jury. We therefore conclude that Kosinski was sentenced in violation of the Sixth Amendment. 23 Kosinski, 127 Fed.Appx. at 751 (citations omitted). Since Defendant was sentenced under a mandatory sentencing guidelines regime and the district court enhanced the sentence based on factors not proven to a jury or admitted by Defendant, this Court vacated Defendant's original sentence and remanded for resentencing. 24 At the resentencing hearing, the government asked the district court to 1) calculate Defendant's tax loss amount as a factual finding by a preponderance of the evidence, and 2) sentence Defendant at offense level eighteen. In turn, the district court asked the government what the offense level would be if the Court were limited to what was charged and the jury found. (J.A. 104) In its response, the government conceded that, under U.S. S.G. § 2T1.9, the offense level would be ten, but argued that after Booker . . . [the sentencing court] can still go ahead and calculate a guideline range and guideline sentence, but its only advisory. (J.A. 105) The district court found that it could not consider the previously calculated tax loss to determine Defendant's sentencing guideline range because the tax loss amount was not charged in the indictment and was not found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt: 25 [U]nder Booker [the district court] couldn't consider [the amount of tax loss it had originally determined under the sentencing guidelines] because that's more than the jury was asked to find; or, more accurately, they weren't asked to find that specific amount. 26 (J.A. 122) Since the district court concluded that it could not calculate or consider the tax loss amount, it took offense level ten, as set forth in U.S. S.G. § 2T1.9, as [a] starting point and [found] that anything within [the sentencing guideline range of] six to 12 months would be reasonable. (J.A. 123) The district court sentenced Defendant to three years of probation supervision, with the condition that the first six months be served in a halfway house and that the second six months be served under home confinement. The government objected at the resentencing hearing, arguing that the sentence was unreasonable. We find that the district court erred in concluding that it could not calculate or consider Defendant's tax loss amount. 27  Booker did not eliminate judicial fact-finding. United States v. Coffee, 434 F.3d 887, 898 (6th Cir.2006). It is clear under the law of this Circuit that a district court may make its own factual findings regarding relevant sentencing factors, and consider those factors in determining a defendant's sentence[.] United States v. Gardiner, 463 F.3d 445, 461 (6th Cir.2006). In the instant case, the district court erred in believing that considering Defendant's tax loss amount would violate the Sixth Amendment. [W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a defined range, the defendant has no right to a jury determination of the facts that the judge deems relevant. Booker, 543 U.S. at 233, 125 S.Ct. 738. Thus, Booker does not bar the district court from calculating and considering the tax loss amount provided that the sentencing guidelines are used as advisory and not mandatory. More specifically, post- Booker, a district court may enhance a defendant's sentence based upon facts not found by a jury, provided they do not consider themselves required to do so. Davis, 397 F.3d at 352 (Cook, J., concurring); see also Anderson, 187 Fed.Appx. at 521. Defendant's sentence is, therefore, erroneous insofar as the district court calculated Defendant's sentence while harboring the misapprehension that, under Booker, [it] could not enhance [Defendant's] sentence based upon factors that were not determined by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. Gardiner, 463 F.3d at 461. 28 Therefore, the district court has discretion to calculate and consider the tax loss amount for sentencing purposes provided that 1) the district court does not consider itself required to do so, and 2) as long as the calculation is based on reliable information and supported by a preponderance of the evidence. See United States v. Yagar, 404 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir.2005). Since the district court may — but is not required to — calculate or consider Defendant's tax loss amount, this Court takes no position as to the propriety of doing so in the instant case. Reversal here is required, not because the district court failed to calculate or consider the tax loss amount, but because the district court was under the misapprehension that it simply could not do so. In light of the district court's discretion, nothing in this opinion should be construed as an endorsement of tax loss calculation or consideration. At resentencing, the district court should recognize and exercise its discretion to consider — or to not consider — Defendant's tax loss. 29