Opinion ID: 795215
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 17 As to the sufficiency of the evidence, Winston contends that: (1) no evidence exists that he knew Tatum's backpack contained crack cocaine or that he knew Tatum was trying to sell crack cocaine prior to Tatum's conversation with Howell; (2) Howell and Tatum never reached an agreement to sell crack cocaine, and he never participated in the conversation or discussed the possession or distribution of crack cocaine with Howell or Tatum; (3) no evidence in the record identified the substance Howell saw Winston flushing down the toilet or its origin; (4) no evidence exists that he had an agreement with anyone, including Tatum, to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine; and (5) evidence of his mere association with Tatum and his mere presence during the conversation between Howell and Tatum is insufficient to show an agreement, his knowledge of an agreement, or his knowing joinder and participation in an agreement to possess with intent to distribute crack cocaine. 18 We review de novo a district court's denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal. United States v. Howard, 413 F.3d 861, 863 (8th Cir.2005). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, resolving evidentiary conflicts in favor of the government, and accepting all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury's verdict. United States v. Littrell, 439 F.3d 875, 880 (8th Cir.2006) (citation omitted). This is an extremely strict standard of review. United States v. Alexander, 408 F.3d 1003, 1008 (8th Cir.2005). 19 To convict [a defendant] of conspiracy, the government need[s] to prove [the defendant] (1) had an agreement to achieve an illegal purpose, (2) knew of the agreement, and (3) knowingly became part of the agreement. United States v. Johnson, 439 F.3d 947, 954 (8th Cir.2006). Direct evidence of an explicit agreement is not necessary to prove a conspiracy; instead, a `tacit understanding' among co-conspirators may be, and often will be, inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. In many conspiracy cases there is no confession by the defendant or other direct proof that he agreed to the illegal act. However, the jury is free to consider all the evidence — direct and indirect — presented of the defendant's statements and actions. United States v. Wilson, 103 F.3d 1402, 1406 (8th Cir.1997). In addition, the jury may draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented about what the defendant's state of mind was when he did or said the things presented in the evidence. Id. at 1407. 20 We recently clarif[ied] the proper standard of review for challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence in conspiracy cases. United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir.2006) (en banc). While acknowledging our previous statements that slight evidence is sufficient to connect a defendant to a conspiracy, in Lopez, we clarified that while a defendant's role in a conspiracy may be minor, the government must offer enough evidence to prove a defendant's connection to a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt before the conspiracy conviction can be upheld. Id. 21 In a conspiracy case, evidence of association or acquaintance is a relevant factor but alone is insufficient to establish a conspiracy. Alexander, 408 F.3d at 1008. Likewise, a defendant's mere presence, coupled with knowledge that someone else who is present intends to sell drugs, is insufficient to establish membership in a conspiracy. United States v. Shoffner, 71 F.3d 1429, 1434 (8th Cir.1995). 22 As to conspiracy, the first question we must address is whether Winston had an agreement to achieve an illegal purpose, i.e., to possess crack cocaine with an intent to distribute it. Because the facts do not show Howell and Tatum entered an explicit agreement to sell crack cocaine, we must determine whether circumstantial evidence establishes that Winston and Tatum made a tacit agreement to do so. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we hold that a jury could reasonably find that such an agreement existed. 23 The jury in this case heard evidence that sufficiently linked Tatum and Winston's association to drugs. First, the government presented evidence that they were both fugitives from justice, eluding arrest from charges out of the State of Kansas. Second, the jury heard evidence that Winston initiated contact with Howell, calling him and asking him if he could purchase marijuana from Howell. Third, Howell testified that Winston came to his house with Tatum, someone he did not know very well, who was carrying a child's backpack, which the jury later learned contained crack cocaine and a handgun. The jury could have reasonably inferred that because Howell was not expecting Tatum and was not well-acquainted with him, Winston agreed to drive Tatum to Howell's residence, knowing that Tatum wanted to speak with Howell about selling drugs. See United States v. Sparks, 949 F.2d 1023 (8th Cir.1991) (noting evidence that co-defendants arrived at a house in the same car and conferred before approaching the house indicated that they cooperated in their journey to the house and helped support their conspiracy convictions). Fourth, after Winston brought Tatum to Howell's residence, he was present during the conversation in which Tatum proposed that Howell sell the crack cocaine for him. The jury could reasonably have linked Winston's presence during the conversation with his prior conduct of driving Tatum to Howell's house, inferring that Winston knew what was in Tatum's backpack. Fifth, Winston was not merely present during the attempted drug transaction between Tatum and Howell. Howell saw Winston dumping a white powdery substance into the toilet. The jury later learned that crack cocaine was found in this toilet, along with a gun containing Winston's fingerprints. 24 The second and third inquiries in the conspiracy analysis are whether Winston knew of the agreement and whether he knowingly became a part of the agreement. To establish these elements, the government presented evidence that Winston dumped a white powdery substance, later discovered to be crack cocaine, down the toilet when the police arrived. The jury could reasonably infer from Winston's actions that Winston would not have taken possession of the crack cocaine and disposed of it if he had no knowledge of its whereabouts in the child's backpack and had no interest in it. The jury could reasonably find based on his actions that he was part of the agreement. 25 Therefore, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and accepting all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that support the jury's verdict we hold that the district court did not err in denying Winston's motion for judgment of acquittal.