Opinion ID: 852183
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Did Trial Counsel Fail to Ensure Proper Instructions?

Text: We will reverse a post-conviction court's decision regarding ineffective assistance for failure to object to instructions only if Baer can show that the trial court was compelled as a matter of law to sustain his objections. Lambert v. State, 743 N.E.2d 719 (Ind.2001). Similarly, for claims that different instructions should have been tendered by trial counsel, we will not reverse if the trial court could have properly refused the instruction under applicable law, meaning, that we will not reverse the post-conviction court unless the trial court would have been compelled by law to give the instruction. Id. at 738-39. Indiana Code § 35-50-2-9(c)(6) allows the jury to consider in mitigation [t]he defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication. Jury instruction number eleven parroted this statute, but did not include the last three words. (Direct Appeal App. at 1324.) Baer argues that instruction eleven should have ended with the words of intoxication. An instruction tendered by Baer with the intoxication language could have been rejected by the trial court because the evidence showed that Baer was not intoxicated at the time of the offense. (Trial Tr. at 1257-63, 1627-47, 2404-05.) Another challenge relates to an instruction telling the jury that voluntary intoxication was not a defense and could not be taken into account when determining the mental state required for conviction. (Direct Appeal App. at 1333-34.) Baer argues that this instruction prevented the jury from considering intoxication as a mitigating factor. (Appellant's Br. at 66-67.) This instruction was a correct statement of the law and was relevant in determining whether Baer committed his crimes intentionally. As to mitigation, the court told jurors they could consider [a]ny ... circumstances (Direct Appeal App. at 1324) in mitigation and that there are no limits on what factors an individual juror may find as mitigating. (Direct Appeal App. at 1325.) An objection to the instruction on voluntary intoxication as a defense to the crime would have been overruled at trial. Baer also argues that counsel should have objected to an instruction that the jury has the right to accept or reject any or all of the testimony of witnesses, whether expert or lay witnesses on the questions of insanity or mental illness. (Direct Appeal App. at 1336.) We think it unlikely that most counsel would have worried much about this mention of insanity. The court properly instructed the jury on issues of GBMI and insanity. Baer's trial counsel told the jury repeatedly that they were not arguing that Baer was insane. The jury would not have inferred that Baer was claiming he was legally insane. Lastly, Baer claims that counsel was ineffective for not offering an instruction stating that life without parole means life without parole. (Appellant's Br. at 68.) The term life without parole consists of ordinary words that can easily be understood by the average person. See Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739, 756 (Ind.2002).