Opinion ID: 1448782
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of Petition for Rehearing

Text: In their initial briefings before us, neither party addressed the intent clause with any amount of specificity. Indeed, the Government's only mention of the intent clause suggested that it believed, as did the panel originally, that the intent clause referred to the intent of the toucher, in this case B.H.: In the context of this case, the term sexual contact includes the intentional touching of B.H.'s genitalia by B.H., with an intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person. The sexual desires could be B.H.'s or, to the extent that they were aroused by watching, the sexual desires could be Defendant Shafer and Defendant Amundson's. Gov't Br. at 17 (emphasis added). At oral argument, the panel extensively questioned the Government on the intent clause. The Government initially asserted that the intent clause referred to B.H.'s intent and that the requisite intent could be gleaned from the fact that B.H. was self-masturbating. The Government then briefly contended that, although the statute requires that the person doing the touching perform that act intentionally, the intent clause of the statute refers to the defendant's intent. Upon further questioning, however, the Government quickly abandoned this argument in favor of its earlier positionthat B.H.'s intent was the pertinent inquiry and that such intent could be inferred from the act of self-masturbation. Even though the parties had not briefed the issue of the intent clause and the panel made abundantly clear during oral argument that intent was an important issue in this case, neither party sought to submit subsequent letter briefs. Furthermore, the Government made no real attempt to dissuade the panel from an interpretation of the intent clause requiring a court to look at the intent of the individual doing the touching to determine if sexual contact occurred, and this was the reading of the intent clause that we adopted in our initial opinion. Applying that reading of the statute, we concluded that there was no evidence that B.H. self-masturbated with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of himself or any onlooker. We vacated Shafer's sentence and remanded, noting that our holding does not preclude the district court from making the necessary finding of intent on remand. United States v. Shafer, 557 F.3d 440, 446 (6th Cir.2009). Having lost on this issue, the Government, in its petition for rehearing, asserts for the first time that our approach to the intent clause is flawed when read in light of the legislative history surrounding the Act, and that the intent clause of § 2246(3) refers to the defendant's intent, regardless of whether the victim or the defendant is the person doing the touching of the genitalia. [7] Shafer counters that our initial interpretation of the intent clause, requiring that the person who is doing the touching, in this case B.H., must have the specific intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, is proper. We typically do not consider arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. Costo v. United States, 922 F.2d 302, 302-03 (6th Cir.1990) (Generally, an argument not raised in an appellate brief or at oral argument may not be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.); Gen. Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corp. v. Smith & Oby Co., 274 F.2d 819, 819 (6th Cir.1960) (noting that, on rehearing, a panel may disregard a theory of counsel that was not discussed in the original brief); see also Easley v. Reuss, 532 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir.2008) (Panel rehearing is not a vehicle for presenting new arguments, and, absent extraordinary circumstances, we shall not entertain arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing.). This rule reflects the dictate of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(2), which requires that a party's petition for rehearing state with particularity each point of law or fact that the petitioner believes the court has overlooked or misapprehended and ... argue in support of the petition. Fed. R.App.P. 40(a)(2). As the Seventh Circuit explained, [i]t goes without saying that the panel cannot have `overlooked or misapprehended' an issue that was not presented to it. Easley, 532 F.3d at 593. Thus, Rule 40(a)(2) prevents us from considering arguments raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing under most circumstances. This rule is not, however, absolute. As the Easley panel noted, a panel may choose to entertain a new argument on rehearing if extraordinary circumstances are present. Id. at 594; accord United States v. Patzer, 284 F.3d 1043, 1045 (9th Cir.2002) (A case must involve extraordinary circumstances [to] justify our considering on petition for rehearing[] issues which were not previously presented. (internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original)). We find that this case presents such circumstances. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in Escobar Ruiz v. INS, 813 F.2d 283 (9th Cir.1987), is instructive. In Escobar Ruiz, the panel initially held that the former Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 504 (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1982), applie[d] to immigration proceedings before the immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Id. at 284. For the first time in its petition for rehearing, the government claim[ed] that deportation proceedings are not adversary adjudications within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 504 of the EAJA, and referred the panel to a subsection of § 504 that supported such an argument. Id. at 285. The panel noted that it ordinarily [would] not consider for the first time on rehearing issues not presented by the parties in their briefs on appeal, but that this case met the extraordinary circumstances exception to that rule: Our initial decision that Escobar Ruiz may be entitled to attorney's fees is the first by any court to consider the question whether the EAJA applies to immigration proceedings, and it is likely that numerous claims will be made in reliance on the opinion we issued. The new legal issue raised by the government goes to the heart of our decision. If the government's argument regarding the term adversary adjudication in section 504 is correct, then the EAJA does not apply to immigration proceedings and all attorney's fees claims arising out of such proceedings should be dismissed. Under these circumstances, permitting an improper interpretation of the EAJA to stand as the controlling precedent in our circuit would constitute a disservice to all parties concerned. Id. at 285-86. The panel further noted that it was convinced that the government's failure to present the issue at the proper time was inadvertent or negligent rather than willful, and that, [a]ll in all, ... [it] ha[d] before [it] one of those special situations [in which] a belatedly raised issue may be considered. Id. at 286 (internal quotation marks omitted) (sixth alteration in original). The circumstances of Escobar Ruiz are identical to the circumstances of the instant case. Specifically, as noted above, we are the first panel to interpret § 2246(3) in regard to self-masturbation. Thus, our decision in this case will likely act as a guide to other panels across the country that are presented with this issue in the future. Moreover, our decision is binding precedent in this circuit. See Bonner v. Perry, 564 F.3d 424, 430 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that [a] panel of this Court cannot overrule the [published] decision of another panel (internal quotation marks omitted) (first alteration in original)). As in Escobar Ruiz, the Government's new argument goes to the heart of our initial holding and, if we were incorrect in that holding, allowing that holding to stand would constitute a disservice to all parties concerned. Escobar Ruiz, 813 F.2d at 286. Additionally, we do not believe that the Government's failure to raise this argument previously was at all willful; rather, we believe that the Government's error was likely due to oversight or negligence. Therefore, we conclude that this case presents extraordinary circumstances sufficient to allow us to consider the Government's new argument.