Opinion ID: 1330625
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Self-Serving Statement

Text: The trial court ruled Cabrera-Pena's self-serving statement made to Officer Membreno was not a proper subject for cross-examination. The Court of Appeals agreed, finding Cabrera-Pena's statements to Membreno were not admissible under either Rule 106, SCRE, or under this Court's opinions in State v. Jackson, 265 S.C. 278, 217 S.E.2d 794 (1975) or State v. Terry, 339 S.C. 352, 529 S.E.2d 274, cert. denied, 531 U.S. 882, 121 S.Ct. 197, 148 L.Ed.2d 137 (2000). Initially, we note that, at oral argument before this Court, counsel for Cabrera-Pena indicated that this Court's opinion in State v. Terry is being read as requiring exclusion of the exculpatory portions of a defendant's statement under any and all circumstances. Such a reading misconstrues the holding in Terry. Terry involves the issue of whether a statement against penal interest may be admitted by a non-testifying defendant pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3), SCRE. There, we held that Terry, who had elected not to testify, could not thereafter admit the self-serving statement he made to the police. The rationale for this holding, however, was that a defendant may not claim unavailability as a witness by virtue of exercising his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Terry stands only for the proposition that such an exculpatory statement may not be admitted by a non-testifying defendant pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3). However, this does not mean that the exculpatory statement of a non-testifying defendant is inadmissible under any and all circumstances. Indeed, we find the statement in the present case was admissible pursuant to State v. Jackson, 265 S.C. 278, 284, 217 S.E.2d 794, 797 (1975). In State v. Jackson , it was held: When part of a conversation is put into evidence, an adverse party is entitled to prove the remainder of the conversation, so long as it is relevant, particularly when it explains or gives new meaning to the part initially recited. All statements made in a conversation, in relation to the same subject or matter, are to be supposed to have been intended to explain or qualify each other, and therefore the plainest principles of justice requires that if one of the statements is to be used against the party, all of the other statements tending to explain it or to qualify this use should be shown and considered in connection with it. 265 S.C. at 284, 217 S.E.2d at 797 (emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted). Here, Cabrera-Pena was interviewed during a one-hour period at 4:00 a.m. During this interview, he made oral statements to Officer Membreno and gave a written statement. At trial, the state elected, notwithstanding an abundance of eyewitness testimony, to call Officer Membreno to the stand and question him concerning the statements made to him by Cabrera-Pena. The trial court then prohibited Cabrera-Pena from cross-examining Membreno as to the remaining self-serving statements made to Membreno. This was error. Officer Membreno testified as to his conversation with Cabrera-Pena, referring to his notes from the interview. Membreno testified that Cabrera-Pena blurted out that he was guilty and went on to give him the details of the evening. Thereafter, when Cabrera-Pena attempted to cross-examine Membreno concerning the contents of his report of their conversation, he was prohibited from doing so. [2] Under Jackson, once the state elected to utilize Officer Membreno's testimony to elicit incriminating statements made by Cabrera-Pena, justice required that his remaining statements tending to explain or qualify those statements should have been considered in connection therewith. Accordingly, we find Cabrera-Pena's cross-examination of Membreno was improperly limited. We find the state's assertion of a distinction between the written and oral conversations in this case to be one without a difference. As noted previously, Officer Membreno testified on direct examination from his notes concerning the substance of his conversation with Cabrera-Pena. Cabrera-Pena then attempted to cross-examine Membreno regarding the contents of the report of that conversation. This is not a case in which the defendant gave numerous written and oral statements to police over several hours, days or weeks. To the contrary, this was a one-hour conversation with police wherein Cabrera-Pena gave a statement  a written statement and vocal statements. We find that fundamental fairness requires that Cabrera-Pena be permitted to cross-examine Officer Membreno concerning the entirety of their conversation. Jackson, supra . Accordingly, we hold the Court of Appeals erred in holding Cabrera-Pena was not entitled to cross-examine Membreno. Further, we take this opportunity to clarify for the bench and bar the application of Rule 106, SCRE. Rule 106 provides: When a writing, or recorded statement, or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it. The Court of Appeals held that Rule 106, by its terms, applies only to written or recorded statements. As we noted in State v. Taylor, 333 S.C. 159, 170, 508 S.E.2d 870, 876 (1998), Rule 106 is based on the rule of completeness and seeks to avoid the unfairness inherent in the misleading impression created by taking matters out of context. We stated: Rule 106 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence] is a procedural device governing the timing of completion evidence; the Rule is `primarily designed to affect the order of proof'. It means that the adverse party need not wait until cross-examination or rebuttal. As such, the Rule reduces the risk that a writing or recording will be taken out of context and that an initial misleading impression will take hold in the mind of the jury. Id. (citing S. Saltzburg, M. Martin & D. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, 98-99 (1998)). The Historical Notes to Rule 106 recognize, however, that adoption of the rule does not change the order of proof as to the remainder of an unrecorded conversation; the party seeking to bring out the remainder must do so during cross-examination or during that party's case. (Emphasis supplied). Accordingly, Rule 106 merely requires that an oral or unrecorded conversation be brought out upon cross-examination, rather than on direct examination; the rule does not, however, prohibit introduction of oral statements or otherwise vitiate the rule of completeness as it applies to such statements. We find the common law of this state extends the rule of completeness to oral communications. Jackson, supra . Accord State v. Eugenio, 219 Wis.2d 391, 579 N.W.2d 642 (1998) (notwithstanding provision identical to Rule 106 referring only to written or recorded statements, common law rule of completeness continues to exist for oral statements); State v. Cruz-Meza, 76 P.3d 1165 (Utah 2003) (recognizing rule of completeness may be applied to oral statements through Rule 611); [3] State v. Johnson, 479 A.2d 1284 (Maine 1984). See also United States v. Haddad, 10 F.3d 1252 (7th Cir.1993) (citing 1 Weinstein & Berger, Weinstein's Evidence, § 106-4 (1992)). Accordingly, where, as here, the state elects to use a witness to elicit portions of a conversation (and incriminating statements therein) made by a defendant, the rule of completeness requires the defendant be permitted to inquire into the full substance of that conversation.