Opinion ID: 618647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against the City of Santa Maria Defendants

Text: Just as the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches generally, so too does it prohibit a search conducted pursuant to an ill-begotten or otherwise invalid warrant. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; Millender v. Cnty. of L.A., 620 F.3d 1016, 1024 (9th Cir.2010) (en banc) (Even when only a portion of a search warrant is invalid, the subject of the search suffers a constitutional violation.). The Bravos argue that the search warrant for their home was invalid because it was obtained through the intentional or reckless omission of facts required to prevent technically true statements in the affidavit from being misleading. Liston v. Cnty. of Riverside, 120 F.3d 965, 973 (9th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Stanert, 762 F.2d 775, 781, as amended, 769 F.2d 1410 (9th Cir.1985)). To survive summary judgment on a claim of judicial deception, a § 1983 plaintiff need not establish specific intent to deceive the issuing court. See Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1124 (9th Cir.1997). Rather, the plaintiff must (1) establish that the warrant affidavit contained misrepresentations or omissions material to the finding of probable cause, and (2) make a substantial showing that the misrepresentations or omissions were made intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth. See Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1223-24 (9th Cir. 2009); accord Butler v. Elle, 281 F.3d 1014, 1024 (9th Cir.2002); Liston, 120 F.3d at 973-74. If these two requirements are met, the matter must go to trial. Liston, 120 F.3d at 973. The district court concluded that the omission of Javier Jr.'s custody status was not material and that in any event the Bravos presented no evidence to support an inference of intentional or reckless conduct on Tanore's part. We disagree on both counts.
We review de novo the district court's conclusion that Tanore's omission of Javier Jr.'s custody status was not material to a finding of probable cause. See id.; Butler, 281 F.3d at 1024 (Materiality is for the court. . . . (citing Hervey v. Estes, 65 F.3d 784, 789 (9th Cir.1995))). To determine the materiality of omitted facts, we consider whether the affidavit, once corrected and supplemented, establishes probable cause. Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1224; accord Liston, 120 F.3d at 973. If probable cause remains after amendment, then no constitutional error has occurred. See Ewing, 588 F.3d at 1224; Liston, 120 F.3d at 973-74. Here, the affidavit on its face easily established a fair probability that the evidence sought would be found, had Javier Jr. actually resided at the Bravo residence. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). Tanore verified that the Bravo home was Javier Jr.'s last-known residence based on DMV records, prior search warrants, SBSO records, and the confidential informants' personal knowledge. See Liston, 120 F.3d at 973 (finding that the utility records, officer surveillance, and DMV records included in a warrant application ordinarily would have provided a sufficient basis for establishing probable cause). Furthermore, Tanore permissibly relied on the witnesses' confidential information regarding the Tangas' practice of storing weapons for one another, which was consistent with his own expertise and knowledge of the gang's operations. Finally, Tanore had probable cause to believe Javier Jr. was affiliated with the Tangas based not only on the confidential informants' tips, but also on SBSO records verifying Javier Jr.'s criminal history in connection with other Tangas gang members. The district court therefore properly rejected the Bravos' alternative argument that, even absent judicial deception, the warrant lacks sufficient indicia of reliability and is facially invalid due to lack of particularity. Nonetheless, we must ask whether probable cause remains once the affidavit is supplemented with the challenged omission  here, Javier Jr.'s two-year sentence imposed over six months prior to the incident occasioning the search warrant, and his consequent incarceration in state prison at the time of the drive-by shooting and of the warrant's execution. We conclude that the corrected affidavit could not establish probable cause for the search and especially does not meet the heightened standard of justification required for nighttime SWAT service. [4] The district court reasoned that Javier Jr.'s presence was immaterial because the warrant was not for his arrest but only to search for evidence related to the April 21 shooting. This fact, however, was highly material to the search, which authorized the seizure of evidence relating to the April 21 shooting. Javier Jr.'s custody status meant not only that he would not be present in the Bravo residence at the time of the search, but that he could not have been involved in the shooting or in concealing the evidence. Tanore had no evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Bravo or E.B. were involved in the April 21 shooting or that during a period in which Javier Jr. was not residing in their home they would have assisted Tangas gang members in concealing evidence, and specifically in concealing evidence from the shooting. The generalized statements in the affidavit that it is common for families of gang members to assist other members of the gang are insufficient to support probable cause to search the Bravos' home. See United States v. Rodgers, 656 F.3d 1023, 1030-31 (9th Cir.2011) (stating that an assumption that most sixteen-year-old passengers have identification does not lead to probable cause to search every car carrying a teenager absent some individualized suspicion regarding the teenager, the vehicle in question, and the crime at issue); United States v. McCarty, 648 F.3d 820, 830 (9th Cir.2011) (Searches and seizures are ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, and the circumstances under which a warrantless search not supported by probable cause may be considered reasonable under the Fourth Amendment are very limited.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Moreover, the warrant also authorized the search of any and all firearms, ammunition, casings, cartridges, cleaning equipment, or scabbard of any type of firearm found on the premises during the warrant's execution, and any indicia of gang membership or affiliation with any gang, including writings, photographs, news clippings, or videos depicting persons, vehicles, weapons, clothing, handsigns, or locations appearing relevant to gang membership. Defendants' only basis for seizing indicia of gang association and weapons other than the caliber handguns suspected of use in the drive-by shooting was to gather evidence of Javier Jr.'s suspected violation of California Penal Code § 186.22(a) (Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act). That statutory provision makes guilty of a felony any person who actively participates in any criminal street gang with knowledge that its members engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity, and who willfully promotes, furthers, or assists in any felonious criminal conduct by members of that gang, as defined in § 186.22(f). Cal.Penal Code § 186.22(a). Probable cause must support the search for and seizure of all items described in the warrant. See Millender, 620 F.3d at 1024. Tanore had no evidence that Mr. and Mrs. Bravo or E.B. were gang members of any kind. Probable cause to search broadly for any and all guns, ammunition, and indicia of gang affiliation therefore was predicated entirely on Javier Jr.'s own suspected involvement in hiding weapons for other gang members. Furthermore, once the affidavit was corrected and supplemented with the missing information about Javier Jr.'s custody status, even if we were to conclude that cause existed for a search, there would still be no basis for authorizing nighttime service. A nighttime incursion by a SWAT force is a far more serious occurrence than an ordinary daytime intrusion pursuant to a regular warrant and therefore requires higher justification beyond mere probable cause to search. See United States v. Colonna, 360 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir.2004) ([T]he mere likelihood that drugs or weapons will be found at a particular premises does not justify a no-knock or nighttime execution of a search warrant.). Were this not the case, then any showing of probable cause to search would justify nighttime intrusion by a team of SWAT officers. The Supreme Court has held clearly that a no-knock entry is justified only by exigent circumstances, which include when officers have a reasonable suspicion that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 394, 117 S.Ct. 1416, 137 L.Ed.2d 615 (1997). We see no reason not to apply the same standard to SWAT officers' nighttime searches, which both constitute much greater intrusions on one's privacy than ordinary daytime searches and carry a much higher risk of injury to persons and property. See Alexander v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355, 1367 (9th Cir.1994) (explaining that a jury might conclude that deployment of a SWAT team for the purpose of inspecting property was excessive); Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 430 F.3d 140, 149 (3d Cir.2005) ([A] decision to employ a SWAT-type team can constitute excessive force if it is not objectively reasonable to do so in light of the totality of the circumstances. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1190 (10th Cir.2001) ([T]he decision to deploy a SWAT team to execute a warrant must be `reasonable' because it largely determines how the seizure is carried out, thereby determining the extent of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests.); Rush v. Mansfield, 771 F.Supp.2d 827, 858-59 (N.D.Ohio 2011); Solis v. City of Columbus, 319 F.Supp.2d 797, 808-09 (S.D.Ohio 2004). Had Javier Jr.'s incarceration been disclosed and probable cause for a search still existed, no reasonable cause for nighttime service would have remained under the totality of the circumstances. Defendants argue that disclosing Javier Jr.'s two-year sentence would not be dispositive of his custody status because presentence credits and good time or work credits might have resulted in an earlier release date. But the appropriate inquiry is not whether Javier Jr.'s two-year sentence dispositively established he was still in custody, but rather whether that fact would have prompted the issuing judge to requir[e] additional information or impos[e] specific restrictions on [the warrant's] execution. Liston, 120 F.3d at 974. In Liston, the Court found that an officer's failure to disclose in a search warrant application the presence of For Sale and Sold signs on the target property constituted a material omission. Although the signs on their own may not have established dispositively that the house belonged to new owners, they would have put a reasonable magistrate on notice that a change in occupancy would be occurring in the near future. Id. Similarly here, disclosure of Javier Jr.'s two-year sentence would have put the issuing judge on notice that Javier Jr. could still be in custody. Had the omitted facts of Javier Jr.'s two-year sentence and custody status been included, it is extremely doubtful that an issuing judge would simply have issued the warrant or authorized nighttime service without more information. See id. Finally, the defendants' reliance on Motley v. Parks, 432 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc), is misplaced. Motley did not hold that custody status is immaterial to whether officers have probable cause to search a person's residence; indeed, probable cause to search was not at issue in that case. Motley held only that where a parolee has consented to warrantless searches of his residence and property at any time as a condition of his parole, law enforcement has a constitutional obligation to ensure they have probable cause to believe they are at the right house. Id. at 1079-80. Javier Jr. was not a parolee, and no resident of the Bravo home consented to a warrantless search. Motley therefore does not absolve defendants of their constitutional obligation to establish probable cause to search for all items described in the search warrant.
We next consider whether the Bravos have made a substantial showing that Tanore deliberately or recklessly omitted Javier Jr.'s custody status. Viewing the evidence and drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the Bravos, as we must, we conclude that the district court erred in finding Tanore negligent at most. To survive summary judgment, the Bravos need only make a substantial showing of a deliberate or reckless omission, not provide clear proof. Liston, 120 F.3d at 974 (internal quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is improper where there is a genuine dispute as to the facts and circumstances within an officer's knowledge or what the officer and claimant did or failed to do. Hopkins v. Bonvicino, 573 F.3d 752, 763 (9th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Butler, 281 F.3d at 1024 ([S]tate of mind is for the jury. (citing Hervey, 65 F.3d at 789)). The Bravos have made the required substantial showing that Tanore may have intentionally or recklessly omitted Javier Jr.'s two-year sentence from his affidavit. Tanore stated in his deposition testimony that he reviewed Javier Jr.'s rap sheet in preparing the affidavit, and though he could not recall with certainty whether he had observed Javier Jr.'s two-year sentence, imposed on September 9, 2005, he acknowledged that he may have. The two-year sentence appears on the rap sheet a mere two lines below the convicted disposition for the predicate offense of receiving stolen property in violation of California Penal Code § 496(A)a fact Tanore thought important enough to include in his affidavit. For summary judgment review purposes, the Bravos are entitled to the reasonable inference that Tanore in fact observed the two-year sentence on the rap sheet and either deliberately or recklessly failed to disclose it in his affidavit. Tanore's testimony that, even if he had observed the state prison sentence on Javier Jr.'s rap sheet, it ordinarily wouldn't be something [he] would check into, underscores his apparent disregard for the importance of full disclosure of information to the issuing magistrate. Finally, although he claims that, in this instance, he actually did look into the warrant targets' custody status by having Detective Lara call the SBSO substation and ask the custody officer to run the names of the targets, the Bravos submitted evidence contradicting such claims: no custody officer who was working during the relevant time period recalls receiving a call from Lara. And SBSO custody officers declared that, even if they had received such a request, their standard database search would reveal only whether the subject was currently in county jail, not whether that person had been transferred to state prison. Based on this record, a reasonable jury could conclude that Tanore intentionally or recklessly omitted the two-year-sentence information from the affidavit, and the Bravos presented ample evidence to support that inference. In opposing summary judgment, the Bravos submitted deposition testimony by Lieutenant Ralston, who stated that a reasonably competent police officer, had he seen [the two-year sentence on Javier Jr.'s rap sheet], would have done additional follow-up. Ralston further testified that he told Tanore and Lara he was disappointed that they didn't pay attention to [the two-year sentence] or didn't see it because he thought it was pertinent to the investigation, was something that should have been observed, and was important to know. . . . Important enough to tell the judge when you were seeking the warrant. Similarly, the SBSO Sheriff's Commander testified that if the reason for the gang association warrant was because [Javier Jr.] was associated with that residence and I knew that he was not, in fact, there, that he was in prison, I'd ask a lot more questions about the warrant and the people who lived there and do some more background checks and find out why, in fact, that residence had been identified as a possible search warrant. All this and other evidence in the record suggests that Tanore's omission of this material fact was more than mere negligence. Given the importance of the custody status to the finding of probable cause for the search and to the justification for nighttime service, a reasonable jury could conclude that Tanore's failure to mention Javier Jr.'s two-year sentence or to follow up and inquire about Javier Jr.'s custody status amounted to at least reckless disregard for the truth. Summary judgment was therefore improperly granted.
The Bravos also seek to hold the Santa Maria Defendants liable for the unreasonable manner in which the SBPD SWAT team served the warrant, arguing that the manner of execution was a natural consequence[] of SMPD's decisions to employ nighttime SWAT service. Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir.2004) (holding a police officer responsible for plaintiff's unlawful arrest even though he passed the warrant on to another officer); see also Liston, 120 F.3d at 981 n. 13 (noting that an officer's liability for the unlawful acts of those who execute a warrant he obtained by judicial deception is governed by traditional tort law principles (citing Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir.1996))). The Santa Maria Defendants vigorously contest this claim, insisting they had no control or direction over the manner in which SBPD served the warrant on the Bravo residence. Because the district court determined that the search warrant was valid, it had no occasion to consider this question. Rather than address it now, we remand for the district court to consider in the first instance the extent to which the Santa Maria Defendants might be liable for the warrant's unlawful manner of execution, even though service was made by a different law enforcement agency acting in concert with the SMPD. We recognize that [t]ypically, of course, only one or a few officers plan and lead a search, but more perhaps many morehelp execute it. Motley, 432 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, while the officers tasked with executing a warrant are generally entitled to rely on information obtained from fellow law enforcement officers so long as such reliance is objectively reasonable, id., [t]he officers who lead the team that executes a warrant are responsible for ensuring that they have lawful authority for their actions and cannot evade liability simply by delegating responsibility to others, id. The district court did consider and reject the Bravos' claim that the SMPD officers unlawfully detained them while continuing to search their home, even after learning that Javier Jr. was in custody, concluding that the temporary detention of the Bravos, while undoubtedly frightening and humiliating to them, was a routine detention of residents in a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant. To the extent the district court's holding regarding the lawfulness of the search rests on the premise that SMPD officers were acting pursuant to a valid warrant, it is remanded for further consideration in light of this Opinion. If a jury finds that Tanore intentionally or recklessly withheld information about Javier Jr.'s custody status from the issuing magistrate, the district court should apply traditional tort law principles to determine the extent to which the Santa Maria Defendants are liable for any constitutional injuries the Bravos may have suffered as a natural consequence[] of the judicial deception. Lee, 363 F.3d at 935 n. 3; see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (rejecting an argument that the judge's decision to issue the warrant breaks the causal chain between the application for the warrant and the improvident arrest because the common law recognized the causal link between the submission of a complaint and an ensuing arrest); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (Section [1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir.1991) (observing that [t]he Supreme Court has sanctioned the resort to tort analogies in establishing the elements of a section 1983 cause of action); Liston, 120 F.3d at 981 n. 13; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A cmt. b (1965) (If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.).
The Bravos sued Tanore, Ralston, and Macagni in their individual capacities and the City of Santa Maria under several municipal liability theories. Because the district court did not have occasion to reach these issues, we do not address them here. See Golden Gate Hotel Ass'n v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 18 F.3d 1482, 1487 (9th Cir.1994) (As a general rule, `a federal court does not consider an issue not passed upon below.') (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 120, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976)).