Opinion ID: 1657126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence about Prior Accident

Text: The Railroad complains about limitations on its redirect examination of a witness about knowledge of a prior accident at this intersection. Three weeks before the collision in this case, the Railroad was involved in another accident at the same intersection. Both parties called the Railroad's agent who investigated both incidents. During direct examination in plaintiff's case, Barlett's attorney established that the witness did not go to Joplin to investigate the first collision until after Barlett's accident. The Railroad alleges that Barlett's later cross-examination (during the Railroad's case) raised an inference that this prior accident was caused by the vegetation. If this inference were raised, it comes from two questions probing whether any order to cut the vegetation was given between the two accidents. The witness responded to these questions that he had no knowledge before Barlett's collision that vegetation was a problem at this intersection. Pursuing these questions, the Railroad sought to offer evidence that this prior collision did not involve vegetation. The trial judge excluded this evidence, raising two issues: 1) was the evidence admissible as a result of Barlett's opening the door; and 2) did the trial court have discretion to exclude this evidence. Generally, evidence otherwise inadmissible may be admitted to rebut a negative inference raised by incomplete evidence of a transaction. Wilson v. Shanks, 785 S.W.2d 282, 285-86 (Mo. banc 1990). It is arguable whether the evidence in this case created a negative inference. None of the questions explicitly indicated that the earlier accident involved vegetation, and the witness's testimony was that he had received no information that vegetation was a problem. In any case, a trial court has discretion in admitting curative evidence. Gevermuehle v. Geimer, 619 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Mo.App. 1981). The Railroad sought to introduce hearsay evidence of the circumstances of the prior accident. The trial court, within its discretion, foreclosed what could have been a substantial detour into a collateral issue. See Jones v. Terminal Railroad Association, 242 S.W.2d 473, 477 (Mo. 1951). If the Railroad had limited itself to clarifying, by one or two pointed questions, that the first accident did not involve the issue of vegetation, the trial court might have ruled differently. The extensive offer of proof, however, indicated a desire to explore the details of that collision. Finally, even if the trial court had abused its discretion, no prejudice resulted. The evidence on the extent of vegetation was clear, solid, and overwhelming. This claim of error is without merit.