Opinion ID: 2982165
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission by Silence

Text: Watson next argues that he was denied a fair trial where the Government was able to elicit testimony from LaTonya Smith as an “admission by silence” on Watson’s part, and referred to Watson’s silence as an admission during closing arguments. The disputed testimony came just after Smith testified that she was at Duncan’s house in December 2001when she first learned of the robbery: Q: So you were at the house. A: Yes, I was at the house and I was sitting at the table and Norman [Duncan] and O’Reilly and Mr. Watson, they was all at the door in front of the door and I overheard Norman say that did you see my cousin shoot him or to that sort. Q: And was Watson standing there when Duncan said that? A: Yes. Q: Did Watson hear Duncan say that? A: He was standing right there. -8- Case No. 12-2218 United States v. Watson Q: Did he deny that he--- A: He didn’t say anything. Q: How soon after the robbery did this occur? A: Two or three days I think, three days. Watson had moved to exclude Smith’s testimony about Duncan’s question as hearsay. The Government argued that Watson’s silence in the face of the question rendered it an adoptive admission and the district court agreed. “We review a district court’s decision to admit evidence over a hearsay objection de novo.” United States v. Jinadu, 98 F.3d 239, 244 (6th Cir. 1996). A statement that would otherwise be inadmissible hearsay is admissible against a party if it is a statement “the party manifested that it adopted or believed to be true.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B). A party may manifest an adoption of a statement through language, conduct, or silence. Jinadu, 98 F.3d at 244. To determine whether silence indicates adoption of a statement, “the primary inquiry is whether the statement was such that, under the circumstances, an innocent defendant would normally be induced to respond, and whether there are sufficient foundational facts from which the jury could infer that the defendant heard, understood, and acquiesced in the statement.” Id. The district court did not err by admitting Smith’s testimony. First, there were sufficient facts for a jury to infer that Watson heard and understood when Duncan asked O’Reilly if he saw his “cousin” shoot the guard. Broom had testified earlier that Duncan used the term “cousin” to refer to Watson, and Smith testified on cross-examination that Duncan did not use that term for anyone else. Smith testified that Watson was “standing right there” when Duncan posed the question. Although she also testified in cross-examination that Watson was only in the room for -9- Case No. 12-2218 United States v. Watson “a couple of minutes,” she did not contradict her testimony that Watson was in the room when Duncan posed the question. Second, an innocent person “would . . . be induced to respond” if, as happened here, someone stated in his presence that he shot the victim of an unsolved murder committed a few days prior. Jinadu, 98 F. 3d at 244. Watson argues, citing United States v. Williams, 445 F.3d 724, 735 (4th Cir. 2006), that Duncan’s question to O’Reilly was not sufficiently accusatory for Watson’s silence to be an admission. See id. (finding the question “did you kill somebody?” insufficiently accusatory to render the defendant’s silence an adoptive admission). But Duncan’s question to O’Reilly is distinguishable from the question in Williams; it included as its premise that Watson killed the guard and only asked whether O’Reilly saw it. See id. (finding distinguishable questions in which there is an “accusatory statement implicit in the question,” e.g., asking why, not whether, the defendant killed someone). Watson also argues that it was error to construe Duncan’s question as an adoptive admission because the question was not directed at Watson. But a statement or question need not be directed at the defendant for it to be admissible as the defendant’s admission. See, e.g., United States v. Grunsfeld, 558 F.2d 1231, 1237 (6th Cir. 1977) (defendant’s silence when introduced to third party as his codefendant’s “business partner” was an adoptive admission); United States v. Hoosier, 542 F.2d 687, 688 (6th Cir. 1976) (defendant’s silence in face of girlfriend’s statement to third party regarding “sacks of money” in their hotel room was an adoptive admission). Watson further argues that he “is fully entitled to be free from compelled selfincrimination under the Fifth Amendment,” and that applying the adoptive admission concept in this context infringes on that right. But there is no blanket prohibition against finding an - 10 - Case No. 12-2218 United States v. Watson admission by silence in the criminal context. See Advisory Committee’s Notes on Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(B) (noting that Supreme Court decisions “relating to custodial interrogation and the right to counsel appear to resolve [Fifth Amendment] difficulties. Hence the rule contains no special provisions concerning failure to deny in criminal cases.”). And Watson does not identify any authority for the contention that a defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights are implicated when evidence of his silence during a conversation unconnected to any police investigation, custody, or interrogation is introduced against him at trial. Cf. Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 283 (6th Cir. 2000) (the Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-incrimination extends “to persons in custody or charged with a crime[,]” and suspects “questioned during the investigation of a crime”). Further, were we to find Smith’s testimony inadmissible, we would find the error harmless because the jury heard substantial other evidence that Watson shot the guard. Crutcher testified that he heard Watson state affirmatively that he “had to lay a guard down” during a robbery. O’Reilly described the shooting and Watson’s role in it in detail during the recorded conversation. Wilson testified that when the conspirators discussed the shooting as they drove away from the scene, Watson stated that “the guy went for his gun.” In addition, Derrick Smith testified that he heard Watson threatening to kill the coconspirator who Watson suspected had snitched. In light of these more explicit admissions, we find it unlikely that Latonya Smith’s testimony affected the outcome of Watson’s trial. See McCombs v. Meijer, Inc., 395 F.3d 346, 358 (6th Cir. 2005) (the harmless-error standard requires reversal when the appellate court “lacks a fair assurance” that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial) (internal quotation marks omitted). - 11 - Case No. 12-2218 United States v. Watson