Opinion ID: 2514968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arguments and Stipulations in the Sentencing Motion

Text: On October 31, 2005, the state filed a Motion to Impose Mandatory Term of Imprisonment, Pursuant to [HRS § 706-606.5], as Amended, requesting that Heggland be subject to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of one year and eight months, as required by HRS § 706-606.5(1)(a)(iv) for applicable PDD charges. The prosecution contended that the proviso in HRS § 706-606.5(2)(f), which only allows mandatory minimum sentencing for offenses committed within the maximum term of imprisonment possible after a prior felony conviction of another jurisdiction, did not preclude imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence in this case, based on the following two grounds (nos. 3 and 4 of 7 asserted grounds): 3. At the time the Defendant committed the offenses in the instant case, he had prior felony conviction in Colorado (Department of Corrections No. 110596) for Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Robbery; 4. The maximum term of imprisonment for this prior felony conviction in Colorado was November 21, 2004. A sentencing hearing was held on November 2, 2005, but was continued until December 7, 2005 at the request of defense counsel. [3] On December 5, 2005, the prosecution filed a sentencing memorandum containing six stipulations made by Heggland in the November hearing. The following stipulations are relevant to this appeal: 3. At the time the Defendant committed the offenses in the instant case, he had prior [sic] felony conviction in Colorado (Department of Corrections No. 110596) for Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Robbery; .... 5. At the time of the present offense he was on parole for a prior felony conviction in Colorado for Conspiracy to Commit Aggravated Robbery until November 21, 2004. 6. Up until November 21, 2004, his parole could have been revoked. In addition to reducing these stipulations to writing, the prosecution: (1) asked the court to take judicial notice of (a) the date on which the PDD offense occurred (August 28, 2003), and (b) the fact that the Colorado offense for which Heggland had been convicted was a class 4 felony with a maximum sentence of six years with a mandatory minimum period of parole of three years, under Colorado Statute section 18-1.3-401(1)(a)(V); and (2) notified the court that it intended to call Heggland's parole officer Reggie Une to testify to (a) the date of conviction for Heggland's Colorado crime and (b) the fact that Heggland could have been retaken and sent back to prison until November 21, 2004, which it called the `control and discharge' date for the conviction. The prosecution also argued that HRS § 706-606.5 applies to Heggland, because his prior conviction fell within the proviso of HRS § 706-606.5(2)(f). Specifically, the prosecution stated that The Defendant is subject to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of one year and eight months for [PPD] because under HRS Section 706-606.5(2)(f), it was committed on August 28, 2003, within the maximum term of imprisonment possible after his prior felony conviction from Colorado (before November 21, 2004). Even if the Court, uses the maximum term of imprisonment (six years from Defendant's sentence on November 14, 1997 = November 13, 2003) and ignores the mandatory period of parole Defendant still committed the crimes in this case, Defendant committed this crime on August 28, 2003 (before November 13, 2003).