Opinion ID: 4285181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [3] Because postconviction proceedings are civil in nature,8 some principles of jurisdiction derived from civil cases may be applicable to proceedings under the Nebraska Postconviction Act.9 We turn to the State’s jurisdictional argument. The State argues that granting Henk’s motion for leave to file an amended motion for postconviction relief and holding a hearing on the additional claim were outside the scope of the mandate from this court and, thus, outside the district court’s authority. We agree. But for reasons discussed below, we also conclude that holding a hearing on the claim of prosecutorial misconduct was outside the scope of our mandate. [4-7] A district court has an unqualified duty to follow the mandate issued by an appellate court and must enter judgment in conformity with the opinion and judgment of the appellate court.10 A lower court may not modify a judgment directed by an appellate court; nor may it engraft any provision on it or take any provision from it.11 No judgment or order different from, or in addition to, the appellate mandate can have any effect.12 Because a trial court is without power to affect rights and duties outside the scope of the remand from an appellate court, any order attempting to do so is entered without jurisdiction and is void.13 7 Id. 8 See State v. Reeves, 258 Neb. 511, 604 N.W.2d 151 (2000). 9 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-3001 to 29-3004 (Reissue 2016). 10 State v. Payne, supra note 4. 11 Id. 12 Id. 13 Id. - 592 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HENK Cite as 299 Neb. 586 [8] In Henk’s original appeal from postconviction proceedings, we remanded the cause for an evidentiary hearing “to determine whether a constitutional violation occurred and, if so, whether Henk was prejudiced by such violation.”14 Our mandate directed the district court “to enter judgment in conformity with the judgment and opinion of this court.” When an appellate court’s mandate makes its opinion a part thereof by reference, the lower court should examine the opinion with the mandate to determine the judgment to be entered or the action to be taken thereon.15 In our previous opinion, this court passed on only one issue—whether Henk was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim that his due process rights were violated when Kofoed planted evidence and falsified official reports. Though Henk had initially also asserted a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, he affirmatively abandoned it on appeal and assigned error only to the court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on his first claim. Relying on this sole assignment of error, we did not consider whether Henk was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the prosecutorial misconduct claim. [9,10] Since only one issue was passed upon by this court and referenced in our opinion, our mandate was limited to require an evidentiary hearing on that claim alone. Issues that an appellant waives on appeal are not part of an appellate court’s mandate on remand.16 And in order to protect the integrity of the judicial process, a defendant cannot be allowed to assert new claims on remand even when he or she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on other claims.17 Because the district court did not have the authority to affect rights and duties 14 State v. Henk, supra note 1. 15 County of Sarpy v. City of Gretna, 276 Neb. 520, 755 N.W.2d 376 (2008). 16 Pennfield Oil Co. v. Winstrom, 276 Neb. 123, 752 N.W.2d 588 (2008). 17 See, e.g., State v. Payne, supra note 4; State v. Edwards, 294 Neb. 1, 880 N.W.2d 642 (2016) (Stacy, J., concurring; Cassel, J., joins). - 593 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HENK Cite as 299 Neb. 586 outside the scope of the remand, we vacate and set aside the order granting leave to file an amended motion for postconviction relief and that portion of the district court’s order addressing the second and third claims. We express no opinion as to whether there is a procedural bar on Henk’s third claim, because the record on appeal is insufficient to determine whether the claim for ineffective assistance of counsel could have been asserted at the time that he filed the prior motion.18 Assuming without deciding that he was not procedurally or time barred from doing so, we note that Henk could have filed a second motion for postconviction relief alleging this claim at the time of filing his request for leave to amend his first motion.19 However, Henk is judicially estopped from reasserting his second claim, because he affirm­atively abandoned it in his first appeal.20 Having determined that only one issue is properly before us on appeal, we turn to consider the merits of that claim. Merits Henk argues that but for the fabricated evidence, he would not have agreed to the plea bargain. He suggests that “[h]ad the fraudulent conduct of the government official been revealed and disclosed it would have tainted the entire process.”21 However, the wrongness of Kofoed’s conduct is not the issue in this case. That matter has been settled, and Kofoed has been sentenced in consideration of his crimes.22 Here, Henk had the 18 See State v. Jackson, 296 Neb. 31, 892 N.W.2d 67 (2017). 19 See, e.g., State v. Edwards, supra note 17. 20 See O’Connor v. Kearny Junction, 295 Neb. 981, 987, 893 N.W.2d 684, 690 (2017) (“[w]hen a party has unequivocally asserted a position in a proceeding and a court accepts that position, judicial estoppel can bar that party’s inconsistent claim against the same or a different party in a later proceeding”). 21 Brief for appellant at 34. 22 See State v. Kofoed, 283 Neb. 767, 817 N.W.2d 225 (2012). - 594 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HENK Cite as 299 Neb. 586 burden to prove that there was a constitutional violation and that he was prejudiced by the constitutional violation. [11] Normally, a voluntary guilty plea waives all defenses to a criminal charge, but a court will consider an allegation that the plea was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel.23 Though this claim was not framed as ineffective assistance of counsel in the first appeal, we nonetheless remanded for an evidentiary hearing. The sufficiency of this allegation thus became the law of the case, and, as neither party addresses it on this appeal, we assume without deciding that a constitutional violation occurred. To establish prejudice in this context, Henk had to show that but for the fabricated evidence, he would not have accepted the plea bargain.24 Henk did not meet this burden of proof. The record demonstrates that Henk’s main concern in pleading guilty was preventing the media from disclosing the evidence and his statements detailing the killing to law enforcement. In Henk’s own words, he said, “I was very interested in getting the statements that I made and confessions that I made not given to the public. So that was a major consideration.” During his interviews with law enforcement, he had gone into detail about killing Brendan and he had made clear even before he was charged that he intended to plead guilty. He also admitted to the killing at the hearing on his plea. And as the district court noted, Henk offered his own deposition into evidence, but it did not state that he would not have pled guilty were it not for the dumpster evidence. With this record, the district court was not clearly wrong in finding that there was ample evidence that Henk would have accepted the plea offer, regardless of the blood evidence from the dumpster. 23 See State v. Lee, supra note 3. 24 See id. - 595 - Nebraska Supreme Court A dvance Sheets 299 Nebraska R eports STATE v. HENK Cite as 299 Neb. 586 Because Henk did not show that but for the fabricated evidence, he would not have accepted the plea bargain, he failed to establish that he was entitled to postconviction relief. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying his motion.