Opinion ID: 1133683
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in allowing testimony concerning alleged prior bad acts.

Text: ś 49. Rubenstein argues the trial court committed reversible error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of alleged prior bad acts, and he requests a new trial based upon this error. We find that of the sixteen statements pointed to by Rubenstein, many were without objection or the objections were properly sustained. The contemporaneous objection rule applies in death penalty cases. Scott v. State, 878 So.2d 933, 988 (Miss.2004); Williams v. State, 684 So.2d 1179, 1203 (Miss.1996). Therefore, any issue to which Rubenstein failed to object is procedurally barred. Howard v. State, 507 So.2d 58, 63 (Miss. 1987). Statement 1 ś 50. Officer Applewhite testified, [f]rom the information that we had received, after talking with [David Perry], we knew that Mr. Rubenstein had come to Mississippi on [November 16]. We also had information of insurance scams that had been done. The trial court sustained the defense's objection. However, before the trial court could instruct the jury to disregard the statement, defense counsel said, I'll pass over it, Judge. That's fine. Therefore, the trial court did not err, and Rubenstein's complaint is without merit. Statement 2 ś 51. The State asked Officer Applewhite, [a]re you aware of any other life insurance policies, that Mr. Rubenstein had, on anyone who was not his grandchildren? The officer replied affirmatively. Rubenstein made no objection, so his complaint about this statement is procedurally barred. Foster, 639 So.2d at 1270 (failure to object waives error). Statement 3 ś 52. Defense counsel questioned Officer Applewhite as to what David Perry told him when he visited David in the hospital. Officer Applewhite testified that David discussed Rubenstein's knowledge of and involvement in insurance fraud schemes. ś 53. Rubenstein asked the questions that elicited this answer. Indeed, prior to the officer answering, the State tried to intercede, but the defense insisted he be allowed to speak. The defense then objected, although he articulated no reason for the objection, only the words, No, Judge stop him. A defendant cannot complain on appeal about errors he invited. Caston v. State, 823 So.2d 473, 502 (Miss.2002) (citing Singleton v. State, 518 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss.1988)). Rubenstein opened the door, and he cannot now claim error. Statement 4 ś 54. When testimony continued, Rubenstein questioned whether the officer's information came from notes taken during his interview with David. He testified, [f]rom the notes, that they have a copy of, David told us about the night of the 16th or 17th that Mr. Rubenstein was aggravated when he left. Mikeâ told Mike to tell Darrell thatâ , at which point the trial court stopped the testimony and excused the jury. ś 55. Rubenstein objected to Officer Applewhite's discussion of insurance and asked for a mistrial. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion. However, the trial court made an extensive on-the-record finding on this issue. ś 56. The trial court stated the insurance issue was extensively testified to in front of the jury at the last trial, and the defendant had been furnished a copy of the report from Officer Applewhite's interview with David Perry. Although the witness was reluctant to answer questions which would bring up the insurance issue, defense counsel forcefully directed Officer Applewhite to respond. Given Rubenstein's notice of the content of the answers as well as his demand for them, the trial court determined Officer Applewhite could respond, adding, [t]he door has been, not just cracked, but it has been thrown wide open to this answer. The trial court concluded, [i]f you ask a question and it calls for a hearsay answer, and there is no objection, yes, sir, the witness can answer it. ś 57. The trial court did all that was necessary for this statement by making a proper on-the-record ruling. Accordingly, Rubenstein's complaint about this statement is without merit. Statement 5 ś 58. Rubenstein argues Officer Applewhite continued to reference Rubenstein's involvement in insurance scams while on cross-examination. After the trial court made its on-the-record finding discussed in Statement 4, Rubenstein objected to Officer Applewhite's testimony coming before the jury pursuant to M.R.E. 403. The trial court then limited the testimony to automobile insurance scams. ś 59. Once testimony resumed before the jury, Officer Applewhite stated Rubenstein was involved in automobile insurance scams in Texas and Louisiana with other family members. Officer Applewhite later referred to information concerning previous insurance scams that was done [sic] with Mr. Rubenstein and other members of the Perry family, including scams involving car insurance. ś 60. Again, this information was elicited during cross-examination by the defense. After Officer Applewhite was allowed to finish his answer to the original question, Rubenstein continued to ask more questions concerning the alleged insurance scams. Rubenstein did not object to these statements, so any error is barred from review for failure to object. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988. In addition, Rubenstein opened the door by asking about the scams and continuing along the line of questioning. Caston, 823 So.2d at 502. We find Rubenstein's complaints about these statements are without merit. Statement 6 ś 61. Officer Applewhite testified on cross-examination about other life insurance policies in the 1970's and how other life insurance policies were considered that changed the focus of the investigation on January the 12th, from knowledgeâ information. ś 62. Rubenstein did not object to the officer's first statement that we were informed of another life insurance policy that happened in 1970. Rubenstein continued to question Officer Applewhite as to why he focused on Rubenstein on January 12, implying that knowledge of an insurance policy on Krystal was the key factor. When the officer began to answer that he investigated two policies, the trial court interrupted him and excused the jury. ś 63. The officer was trying to explain that authorities relied upon more than just Krystal's policy for suspecting Rubenstein. After the jury was excused, the trial court cautioned Rubenstein that his questioning could open the door to unfavorable testimony. Prior to the jury's return, the trial court warned the officer that before he said anything about the 1979 insurance policy, he was to stop and make sure it understood where his answer was going. ś 64. Rubenstein claims the trial court did not caution the officer about references to another policy, but clearly the record reflects the trial court warned the officer to stop before stating anything about the 1979 policy. Thus, Rubenstein's complaint is without merit. As for the officer's statement that the investigation shifted to Rubenstein because of other insurance policies, Rubenstein made no objection. Therefore, the issue is waived and procedurally barred. Howard, 507 So.2d at 63 (failure to object waives error). Statement 7 ś 65. Officer Applewhite testified on cross-examination, Sir, if you are asking me if the investigation was not completed, there are a lot of things that this jury doesn't know about the investigation. He gave this answer in response to Rubenstein's question of whether he thought the identity of the owner of the hairs found near Krystal's body was irrelevant. Rubenstein claims Officer Applewhite's response was yet another reminder of the prior life insurance policy. Rubenstein never objected to this statement; therefore, the asserted error is procedurally barred. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988. ś 66. Procedural bar notwithstanding, Rubenstein disingenuously claims the response was a reminder of the life insurance policy. The officer gave a vague answer to a question wholly unrelated to the issue of insurance. Further, the preceding testimony concerned physical evidence of blood on Darrell's shoes and hairs found near Krystal's body. There had been no discussion of insurance policies for several pages of transcript prior to this response. We find there is no error. Statement 8 ś 67. Officer Applewhite responded to defense questions on cross-examination concerning life insurance policies for Rubenstein's wife and granddaughters. The State intended to ask about insurance because, it argued, Rubenstein opened the door to this type of redirect examination question. The State proffered Officer Applewhite's testimony, out of the jury's presence, in which he stated authorities considered life insurance policies other than those of Rubenstein's wife and granddaughters, and said Rubenstein had attempted to collect on a business insurance policy on a former partner, Harold J. Conner. ś 68. Prior to a ruling on whether this testimony could go before the jury, the defense suggested, and the parties agreed to, a stipulation about Rubenstein's knowledge of the workings of insurance. [10] The trial court also conducted a M.R.E. 403 balancing test and determined the officer's testimony was probative to rebut the claim that Rubenstein purchased policies on his wife and grandchildren for philanthropic purposes. Additionally, the trial court stated the omission of references to other policies would imply the life insurance policies were the only ones relied on by authorities. Finally, the trial court found the defense had opened the door to this testimony. The trial court did prohibit testimony alleging Rubenstein was involved in Conner's death. ś 69. After the jury returned, the State only asked Officer Applewhite (1) whether he was aware Rubenstein had life insurance policies on non-family members, and (2) whether he could confirm the alleged automobile scams described by David. ś 70. Rubenstein now suggests he was forced into the stipulation by the trial court's ruling that the State could conduct a redirect examination of Officer Applewhite concerning Rubenstein's alleged prior bad acts involving life insurance. ś 71. First, Rubenstein made no formal objection to this issue. Moawad, 531 So.2d at 634 (failure to object waives error). Second, the trial court determined Rubenstein opened the door to questions involving insurance policies, especially when he implied the policies on the girls were for their education. Singleton, 518 So.2d at 655. Further, Rubenstein suggested and negotiated a stipulation to be read to the jury. The State only asked for a yes or no answer to its two questions on redirect. Rubenstein's complaint is without merit. Statement 9 ś 72. Rubenstein argues the trial court erred by allowing the State to ask Officer Applewhite whether the authorities were able to confirm David's statements. Rubenstein made no contemporaneous objection, so he has waived appellate review of this issue. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988. ś 73. Rubenstein argues that Mr. Shields objected to no avail and went forward with the stipulation. The record reflects the defense failed to lodge an objection. To the extent that Rubenstein's argument is intended to relate back to the trial court's denial of his request to reconsider in Statement 8, the complaint is still without merit for the reasons given above. Statement 10 ś 74. The State asked Sheriff Glynnis, and what, if anything, did [Rubenstein] tell you concerning an insurance scam, or anything of that nature? Rubenstein claims the State knew he said nothing to the sheriff about any scam, and even though the objection was sustained, the prejudicial information went before the jury. Rubenstein did not object to this question at trial on the ground that it was prejudicial; rather, defense counsel claimed it was leading. The trial court did not believe the inquiry was leading, but it sustained the objection nonetheless. Sheriff Glynnis never answered the question. ś 75. Because Rubenstein did not object to the question on the ground of prejudice, he has waived appellate review of this error. Carter v. State, 722 So.2d 1258, 1261 (Miss.1998) (Objection on one ground at trial waives all other grounds for objection on appeal.). In any event, the trial court sustained his objection, so Rubenstein's complaint is without merit. Statement 11 ś 76. Rubenstein argues the State elicited inflammatory and irrelevant testimony about insurance scams from Page. When questioned by the State why Annie went to Mississippi, Page testified she went to do something for Mr. Mike, and he just figured it was another scam, you know, insurance scam for pills or something like that. The record reflects that Rubenstein did not object. Therefore, this issue is waived. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988. Statement 12 ś 77. On cross-examination, Page stated he heard from Annie, Darrell, and David that they had committed scams involving car accidents and pills for Rubenstein. The record reveals Rubenstein failed to object to these statements; therefore, the issue is waived. Williams, 684 So.2d at 1203 (failure to object waives error). ś 78. Furthermore, the trial court ruled the defense opened the door for Page's testimony, and his statements were trustworthy because of his significant relationship with Annie. See M.R.E. 804(b)(5). The trial court acknowledged that while the testimony was hearsay, the question was asked why, and I think this witness should be allowed to answer the question. He had an opinion. And he was asked why. And he'll be allowed to give it. ś 79. Rubenstein opened the door to Page's statements, and the trial court made thorough, on-the-record findings as to this issue. Following this ruling, the defense did not object to Page's continued testimony that Annie, Darrell, and David told him of insurance scams. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988 (failure to object waives error). This complaint is meritless. Statement 13 ś 80. Darrell's brother, Michael Perry, was asked what he knew about insurance scams involving Rubenstein. Michael began to testify that he was involved in scams, but defense counsel interrupted and insisted Michael only testify to his personal knowledge. The State and trial court agreed with the defense, so Michael only testified about his participation in insurance scams in 1981 and 1983. Michael's answers conformed with the defense's request. Accordingly, we find no error as to these statements. ś 81. Rubenstein also claims he objected to the relevance of testimony concerning the purpose of airline tickets involved in the 1983 airport scam. The State argued the testimony concerned the modus operandi and the complexity of the scams, and the trial court overruled the objection. Rubenstein argues the trial court failed to perform a M.R.E. 403 analysis, but we find both sides presented arguments from which the trial court made a ruling. Rubenstein did not ask the trial court to make a probative versus prejudicial finding, but merely objected to the tickets' relevance. Rubenstein's complaints about these statements are without merit. Statement 14 ś 82. Denham testified on direct examination by the State that Annie said she was going to do an insurance scam. Rubenstein objected, arguing the case was not an insurance fraud case, and stated, [t]his has no place in this trial. Under 403 and 404, 402, under any imagination. The trial court made an extensive on-the-record finding pursuant to M.R.E. 404 and M.R.E. 403, and it determined the questioning to be admissible. [11] ś 83. The trial court did not err by admitting this testimony. The State's theory of the case was that Rubenstein used the prospect of an insurance scam to lure Annie and Darrell to the Mississippi cabin. The trial court made a Rule 404(b) analysis, performed a Rule 403 balancing, and found the testimony admissible to assist the jury in comprehending the case. Rubenstein's complaint is without merit. Statement 15 ś 84. Sue Bellow testified Annie told her they were going to Mississippi and have a car accident for Mike to collect some money so they could get their own place and get away from her mom's. Rubenstein failed to object, so the issue is procedurally barred. Moawad, 531 So.2d at 634 (failure to object waives error). Statement 16 ś 85. Rubenstein called one of his fellow inmates, Donald Landrew, to testify. Rubenstein claims that during Landrew's cross-examination, the State elicited more testimony about insurance scams as well as testimony about Rubenstein's attempted escape. The defense failed to object, so the error is procedurally barred. Scott, 878 So.2d at 988.