Opinion ID: 2494143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of the Tax-Sale and Redemption Statutes

Text: During the trial, Ross attempted to read to the jury, or otherwise to place in evidence, portions of the redemption and tax-sale statutes, which, he alleged, gave him the right to place tenants on the property after, and despite, the issuance of the certificate of redemption. After an objection by the Rosen-Ragers' counsel, Ross's counsel stated to the circuit court: If we can read certain aspects of the statute.... That gives us an opportunity to show our primary defense of justification. If we are not able to discuss the specific statute and what it states and his understanding of it at all, then I think that entirely eliminates our ... defense. .... ... If there is no degree that Mr. Ross would have any justification, then, obviously, the [punitive] damages could be higher. If there is complete justification for the actions that he has done, even though you determined they're wrong previously, there would be no damages, conceivably. (Emphasis added.) The circuit court disallowed Ross's proffer. Ultimately, it charged the jury solely on wantonness as a basis for punitive damages. Ross objected to the charge on the ground that it did not contain an instruction on reliance on the statutes as justification. That objection was overruled. Ross now argues that the judgment entered on the jury's verdict must be reversed, because, he says, [e]xcluding the statutes deprived the jury of information vital to assessing [his] conduct and determining whether and what punishment was appropriate. Ross's brief, at 57. We disagree with this argument. The partial summary judgment finding Ross liable for wantonness being proper as discussed above, Ross's alleged understanding of the statutes was irrelevant. The admission of the statutes into evidence would merely have invited the jury to nullify the partial summary judgment, which had correctly resolved in the Rosen-Ragers' favor the issue whether, as a matter of law, Ross was justified to any degree. Consequently, the circuit court did not exceed its discretion in shielding the jury from the text of the statutes.