Opinion ID: 4673687
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reliance on the Residual Clause

Text: Notably, Rodella’s arguments on appeal extend beyond the issue on which the district court granted a COA. Indeed, the bulk of his arguments concern the constitutional question of whether his § 924(c) sentence was based on that statute’s invalidated residual clause. Yet, he does not expressly ask for an additional grant of a COA. The government, however, does not object to his arguments on the ground that they exceed the bounds of the granted COA; instead, it fully engages with them. At least under these circumstances, we exercise our discretion to construe Rodella’s notice of appeal and opening brief as a request for a COA on the constitutional issue. See United States v. Hong, 671 F.3d 1147, 1148 (10th Cir. 2011). Doing so, we deny Rodella’s request for a COA and dismiss that portion of this matter for the reasons that follow. Where, as here, the record is silent as to whether a sentencing court relied on an invalidated residual clause, a court must examine “the relevant background legal environment at the time of sentencing to determine whether the district court would have needed to rely on the residual clause,” given the option of the elements clause. United States v. Copeland, 921 F.3d 1233, 1242 (10th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “[O]ur analysis never progresses beyond th[is] initial, historical evaluation of the sentencing court’s decision,” United States v. Lewis, 904 F.3d 867, 873 (10th Cir. 2018), unless the movant shows that the sentencing “court would have needed to rely on 7 the residual clause,” United States v. Lozado, 968 F.3d 1145, 1149 (10th Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted).3 When Rodella was sentenced in February 2015, a court would have applied the “categorical approach” to determine whether 18 U.S.C. § 242 qualified as a violent crime under the elements clause. See United States v. Trent, 767 F.3d 1046, 1051-52 (10th Cir. 2014), abrogated by Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2251 n.1 (2016). Under that approach, “a conviction qualifies only if all violations of the statute would qualify, regardless of how the specific offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.” Id. at 1052 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). But if the statute of conviction was divisible, meaning that “it set[ ] out one or more elements of the offense in the alternative,” then the court would have engaged in the modified categorical approach, “examin[ing] certain definitive underlying documents to determine which alternative the defendant’s conviction satisfied.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).4 3 But “if we determine the district court relied on the now-invalidated residual clause, then we engage in a harmless-error analysis in which we ask whether the [sentencing enhancement] is correct under current law.” Lozado, 968 F.3d at 1149 (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 When Rodella was sentenced, we were not concerned with whether the statute’s alternative “terms described different means of committing a single crime or different elements delineating separate crimes.” United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2017) (emphases added). That changed in 2016, when “the Supreme Court held in Mathis that the distinction between means and elements is important and that the modified categorical approach is available only when a statute lists alternative elements.” Id. at 1262-63. 8 Relying on Trent, the district court here found that § 242 is divisible because it “has three separate clauses carrying three separate offenses that can be further parsed into alternative terms.”5 Aplt. App. at 73. The district court then consulted the verdict forms and jury instructions, determining that Rodella was subject to § 242’s dangerous-weapon provision, which prescribes a sentence up to ten years if the “acts [committed to deprive a person of a right] include the use . . . or threatened use of a dangerous weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Second Clause).6 In comparison, the Elements Clause provides that a 5 The three clauses of § 242, broken apart for clarity, are as follows: [First Clause] Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, willfully subjects any person in any State, Territory, Commonwealth, Possession, or District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or to different punishments, pains, or penalties, on account of such person being an alien, or by reason of his color, or race, than are prescribed for the punishment of citizens, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both; [Second Clause] and if bodily injury results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include the use, attempted use, or threatened use of a dangerous weapon, explosives, or fire, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; [Third Clause] and if death results from the acts committed in violation of this section or if such acts include kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap, aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to commit aggravated sexual abuse, or an attempt to kill, shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or for life, or both, or may be sentenced to death. 18 U.S.C. § 242. 6 The district court observed that Rodella was also charged under the “bodily injury” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 242 (Second Clause). The jury did not, however, rely on that alternative, agreeing instead beyond a reasonable doubt that Rodella had “used or threatened to use a dangerous weapon.” Aplt. App. at 27. 9 conviction is a “crime of violence” if it “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A), which means “violent force,” see Curtis Johnson v. United States, 559 U.S. 133, 140 (2010). To ascertain whether § 242’s dangerous-weapon provision “swe[pt] more broadly” than § 924(c)(3)’s Elements Clause, thus not “count[ing] as a[ ] . . . predicate” offense, or whether it either matched that clause or “define[d] the crime more narrowly,” thereby qualifying as a predicate offense, Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254, 261 (2013), the district court relied on United States v. Ramon Silva, 608 F.3d 663 (10th Cir. 2010), abrogated in part by Mathis, 136 S. Ct. at 2253-54. Rodella’s disagreement with the district court’s analysis begins here. In Ramon Silva, we held that “[t]hreatening or engaging in menacing conduct toward a victim, with a weapon capable of producing death or great bodily harm, threatens the use of violent force” under the Elements Clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). 608 F.3d at 670 (internal quotation marks omitted). We noted that this type of conduct threatens the use of violent force in two different ways: (1) “[t]he conduct could always lead to substantial and violent contact, and thus it would always include as an element the threatened use of violent force”; and (2) “the conduct could at least put the victim on notice of the possibility that the weapon will be used more harshly in the future, thereby constituting a threatened use of force.” Id. at 672 (ellipsis and internal quotation mark omitted). The district court found Ramon Silva instructive, so it determined that because “any use of a dangerous weapon under 18 U.S.C. § 242 also threatens the use of violent 10 force,” a conviction under § 242’s dangerous-weapon provision is a § 924(c)(3) Elements Clause predicate offense. Aplt. App. at 75. Rodella argues that Ramon Silva was not controlling law because it “focused on the element of touching the victim and required more than the display of dexterity handling a weapon,” whereas § 242 does not require touching the victim. Aplt. Opening Br. at 17 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s reliance on Ramon Silva. First, Rodella mischaracterizes Ramon Silva. In that case, we considered whether a conviction under an “‘apprehension-causing’ aggravated assault” statute qualified as a violent felony, and we took guidance from cases that “analyzed aggravated battery statutes that criminalized intentional physical contact with a deadly weapon.” 608 F.3d at 672. We found those cases persuasive despite the differences in physical contact. Id. We explained that apprehension-causing assault “creates a commensurate threat of physical force” that could either “always lead to substantial and violent contact” or “at least put the victim on notice of the possibility that the weapon will be used more harshly in the future.” Id. (ellipsis and internal quotation marks omitted). And although we said that there must be “more than the display of dexterity in handling a weapon,” we noted that a purposeful threat or menacing conduct “toward a victim” would suffice. Id. at 674 (emphasis in original). In short, we agree with the district court that Ramon Silva is instructive, given that § 242, as relevant here, involves a willful deprivation of rights that includes the use or threatened use of a dangerous weapon against a victim. 11 Nevertheless, Rodella contends that the word “use” in § 242 somehow indicates that the offense can be committed merely by possessing a weapon, without any threat of violent force. The district court rejected this argument, finding that “use” connotes active employment of a firearm. Indeed, the common definition of “use” is “[t]o employ for the accomplishment of a purpose.” Use, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Further, the § 924(c) jury instructions in this case explained that a defendant “‘uses’ a firearm when it (1) is readily accessible and (2) is actively employed during and in relation to the underlying crime.” Aplee. Supp. App. at 26 (emphasis added). And § 242’s plain terms require, as relevant here, that the “acts” involving the deprivation of rights “include the use . . . or threatened use of a dangerous weapon.” 18 U.S.C. § 242. Mere possession of a dangerous weapon is not consistent with the common definition of “use,” the jury instructions in this case, or § 242’s language. Moreover, in an effort to advance his cause, Rodella relies on two unpublished Tenth Circuit decisions. We put aside the obvious fact that these decisions would not have been binding on the district court at the time of Rodella’s sentencing. Instead, it suffices for us to note that Rodella fails to demonstrate that the district court would have found either decision to be a persuasive guidepost at the time of his sentencing. First, Rodella argues that the district court should not have relied on Ramon Silva because there was a more relevant case, United States v. Verbickas, 75 F. App’x 705 (10th Cir. 2003) (per curiam). There, correctional officers were convicted of violating § 242 by depriving inmates of their constitutional rights in a manner that resulted in bodily injury. This court concluded that a § 242 bodily-injury conviction qualified as a “crime of violence” under 12 the Mandatory Detention Act’s Residual Clause because there was “‘a substantial risk that physical force . . . [was] used in the course of committing the offense.’” Id. at 707 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3156(a)(4)(B)). Rodella fails to explain, though, how Verbickas has any bearing on whether his § 242 use-or-threatened-use-of-a-dangerous-weapon conviction could have served as a § 924(c) Elements Clause predicate. Verbickas involved a different predicate offense than the one involved here and would not have prevented the district court from sentencing Rodella under the Elements Clause. And, second, Rodella contends that the government should be barred from claiming that his § 242 conviction could have served as a § 924(c) Elements Clause predicate. He points out that the government conceded in United States v. Ryle, 778 F. App’x 598, 600 (10th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), that Ryle’s § 242 conviction was used as a § 924(c)(3) Residual Clause predicate. Ryle’s conviction was based on the “kidnapping or an attempt to kidnap” provision in § 242’s third clause, see supra note 5, and the government regularly concedes that kidnapping does not have a physical-force component. See Aplt. App. at 47. The district court rejected Rodella’s assertion of a bar, explaining that because “§ 242 is a divisible statute, the United States can take a position that one offense under the statute is a crime of violence under the elements clause and another offense is a crime of violence under the residual clause.” Aplt. App. at 80. We conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s ruling. Although Rodella maintains that “[t]he only difference between the cases is the means in which ‘deprivation of rights’ was violated,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 19 (emphasis added), we reiterate that at the time of Rodella’s sentencing, a statute containing alternative terms 13 was considered divisible “regardless of whether those terms described different means of committing a single crime or different elements delineating separate crimes,” United States v. Titties, 852 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2017) (describing the law in this Circuit before 2016). We conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate whether the district court more likely than not relied on the residual clause in classifying his § 242 offense as a § 924(c) crime of violence.