Opinion ID: 71483
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Modifying Miller's Restitution Obligation

Text: In his second petition for a writ of audita querela and in his appellate briefs before this court, Miller's argument omits any discussion of a possible ineffective assistance of counsel issue, as well as any hint that he might have returned the $170,405.00 at issue in this appeal before his sentence. Instead, he states that he was the registered owner of the subordinated investment note and had dominion over it until its maturity in April 2004. Accordingly, he contends that the district court's restitution order was correct at the time it was issued. The error he seeks to have corrected is the Government's failure to credit this obligation by the amount MSM announced it had recovered in May 2004. In other words, under Miller's current characterization of the facts, the issue presented is the same as would have occurred if in May 2004 he had tendered payment of $170,405.00 towards his restitution obligation and the Government had accepted it but refused to acknowledge its receipt. We do not think that such a situation renders the district court's restitution order infirm. Under Miller's current characterization of the facts, all parties agree that the district court's restitution order correctly reflects the amount that Miller embezzled. The only disagreement is over whether or not Miller is entitled to a credit for the money recovered in May 2004. We do not think that a subsequent disputed payment renders the amount of the original restitution order infirm. Although 18 U.S.C. § 3663A provides that, when a criminal restitution order is issued, it must be offset by the value ... of any part of the property that is returned, we do not think that this language should be read to require district courts to formally modify restitution orders every time a defendant subsequent to the order makes a payment on his obligation. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663A(b)(1)(B) (West 2000). Indeed, such a burden would be intolerable, given the number of impoverished defendants who are ordered to make modest restitution payments on a periodic basis. Similarly, where property that was accounted for in fixing the amount of a restitution order is returned after that order has already been issued, we do not think that modification of the order itself is required. This type of recovery is no different from a payment, and it should be accounted for in the same way. If it still exists, the writ of audita querela can only be applied to rectify a judgment which, though correct when rendered, has since become infirm. Because all parties to this case agree that the district court's restitution order was initially correct, and because the statute does not require the order to be modified every time a subsequent payment is made on a restitution obligation, there is no infirmity in Miller's judgment for a writ of audita querela to rectify. [3] Therefore, the district court did not err by dismissing his petition.