Opinion ID: 6357541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Instruction on Concurrent Causation

Text: [¶ 46] Hopkins argues that the court erred by giving a concurrent causation instruction that confused the jurors. We review jury instructions as a whole for prejudicial error to ensure that they accurately and fairly informed the jury of the law and to determine the potential for a juror misunderstanding as a result of the instructions. See State v. Okie , 2010 ME 6 , ¶ 8, 987 A.2d 495 . We will not vacate a  judgment based on the denial of a proposed jury instruction unless the appealing party can demonstrate that the instruction (1) stated the law correctly; (2) was generated by the evidence in the case; (3) was not misleading or confusing; and (4) was not sufficiently covered in the instructions the court gave. State v. Hanaman , 2012 ME 40 , ¶ 16, 38 A.3d 1278 . A trial court has wide discretion in formulating its instructions to the jury so long as it accurately and coherently reflects the applicable law. State v. Martin , 2007 ME 23 , ¶ 6, 916 A.2d 961 . When jury instructions closely parallel the provisions of the Maine Criminal Code, they are adequate to provide the jury with the necessary information. State v. Mann , 2005 ME 25 , ¶ 13, 868 A.2d 183 . [¶ 47] Title 17-A M.R.S. § 33 provides that [u]nless otherwise provided, when causing a result is an element of a crime, causation may be found where the result would not have occurred but for the conduct of the defendant operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the defendant was clearly insufficient. [¶ 48] Reviewing the instructions as a whole, the court informed the jury correctly and fairly of all necessary elements of the governing law on concurrent causation. Although Hopkins's requested instruction stated the law correctly, was generated by the evidence, and was not misleading or confusing, the trial court's slightly different instruction mirrors the clearly insufficient statutory language, and was adequate to provide the jury the necessary information about the elements of concurrent causation. See 17-A M.R.S. § 33 ; Mann , 2005 ME 25 , ¶ 13, 868 A.2d 183 . [¶ 49] Additionally, upon receiving a note from the jury asking for clarification on causation, the court responded by giving a clarifying instruction that used language similar to the language that Hopkins originally requested. The court did not err in instructing the jury on concurrent causation.