Opinion ID: 2465631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Guillory

Text: Three years later, however, this court denied another 60-1507 movant the right to file an untimely appeal. In Guillory, 285 Kan. 223, 170 P.3d 403, which is the decision relied on by the Court of Appeals in dismissing Albright's appeal, the court ruled that the Ortiz exceptions did not save Guillory's out-of-time appeal. Relying on this holding, the Court of Appeals in this case issued an order to show cause why Albright's appeal should not be dismissed. In the order, the Court of Appeals stated: The court notes the April 29, 2009, order in which the parties agreed to accept the untimely notice of appeal as timely filed, on the theory that Appellant's counsel failed to perfect his appeal. However, where a defendant files an untimely appeal from the denial of a K.S.A. 60-1507 motion, the exceptions of State v. Ortiz are inapplicable and the appeal must be dismissed. Guillory v. State, 285 Kan. 223, Syl. ¶ 3, 170 P.3d 403 (2007). Albright argues that this statement of the Guillory holding is overly broad because it ignores the facts of Guillory, specifically that Guillory was not represented by appointed counsel. The State agrees. Albright further argues the facts of this case and of Brown are distinguishable from Guillory because a district court appointed counsel to represent Brown and Albright. As Albright notes, Guillory presented a different situation from Brown because Guillory acted as a pro se petitioner throughout the district court proceeding and did not have counsel to file an appeal when the district court entered a summary denial of Guillory's 60-1507 motion, i.e., a denial that occurred without the appointment of counsel or a hearing. Nevertheless, Guillory, like Brown, contended that his case fell within the first Ortiz exception (failure to be informed of his right to appeal). He asserted that the principles of fundamental fairness require that a 60-1507 movant who has not been provided with appointed counsel should either be informed of the right to appeal by the court or be permitted to appeal the denial out of time. Albright makes the same argument. The Guillory court clearly rejected the notion that a 60-1507 movant can rely on the first Ortiz exception in order to file an untimely appeal. Guillory, 285 Kan. 223, Syl. ¶ 3, 170 P.3d 403. The Guillory court explained: A fatal flaw in Guillory's argument is that the first Ortiz exception, excusing an untimely notice of appeal where the defendant was not informed of the right to appeal, was based on the fact that a criminal defendant has a statutory right to be advised of his or her right to a direct appeal. K.S.A. 22-3424(f) requires the sentencing court to inform criminal defendants of the right to appeal. See Phinney, 280 Kan. at 402, 122 P.3d 356 (discussing K.S.A. 22-3424[f], which requires trial court to advise defendant in a criminal case of right to appeal, and noting State v. Willingham, 266 Kan. 98, 100-01, 967 P.2d 1079 [1998], and Ortiz indicate fundamental fairness requires that criminal defendant be advised of rights to direct appeal). In contrast, there is no statutory requirement that the district court advise a K.S.A. 60-1507 petitioner of the right to appeal the decision on his or her petition. Guillory, 285 Kan. at 228, 170 P.3d 403. Consequently, if Albright's argument is founded on the first Ortiz exception only, the Court of Appeals was correct in dismissing this appeal. But it is not. Before us, Albright's counsel clarified that, although reasserting his request that this court recognize that a district court has a duty to inform a 60-1507 movant of the right to appeal, Albright also relies on the third Ortiz exception (counsel failed to perfect and complete an appeal). According to Albright, he had presented this issue to the Court of Appeals through (1) his focus on ineffective assistance of appointed counsel in his February 2009 pro se motion and (2) his contention there is prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of appointed counsel. He further argues that Guillory did not address the third Ortiz exception. Rather, the Guillory court drew no conclusion regarding the rights of a 60-1507 movant who has appointed counsel. In that regard, he argues, the Guillory court did not overrule Brown's conclusion that a 60-1507 movant who had appointed counsel had the right to file an out-of-time appeal as a remedy for appointed counsel's deficient conduct. We agree with these arguments. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' conclusion in this case, the Guillory court did not reject the potential application of the third Ortiz exception in cases where the district court had determined that the 60-1507 movant had met the threshold to have counsel appointed. In fact, the Guillory court went out of its way to distinguish Brown by noting that at the heart of the Brown court's reasoning was the notion that, under statutory mandate, appointed counsel must provide at least minimally competent assistance. Guillory, 285 Kan. at 228, 170 P.3d 403. The Guillory court reasoned the same consideration could not apply to a pro se 60-1507 movant, such as in Guillory's case. The Guillory court reiterated that there is no statutory right to counsel at the district court level for indigent 60-1507 movants until they meet the threshold showing of substantial legal issues or triable issues of fact. Guillory, 285 Kan. at 228, 170 P.3d 403. A pro se 60-1507 movant who fails to meet this threshold does have a right to appointment of counsel on appeal but not until after a notice of appeal has been filed. Guillory, 285 Kan. at 228-29, 170 P.3d 403; see Supreme Court Rule 183(m). Thus, the court indirectly confirmed that the second Ortiz exception could not applythere is no obligation to appoint appellate 60-1507 counsel unless counsel had been appointed for purposes of the proceedings in the district court or until after the notice of appeal has been filed. As far as the filing of a timely notice of appeal is concerned, a pro se 60-1507 movant is in the same position as all other pro se civil litigants and is required to be aware of and follow the rules of procedure that apply to all civil litigants, pro se or represented by counsel. Guillory, 285 Kan. at 229, 170 P.3d 403. Consequently, this court concluded it had no jurisdiction to consider Guillory's untimely appeal from the district court's summary denial of the 60-1507 motion. The appeal was dismissed. Guillory, 285 Kan. at 229, 170 P.3d 403. Although the Guillory court did not specifically say its decision had no impact on the application of the third Ortiz exception or the portion of the Brown decision that discussed the impact of counsel's deficient performance in not filing an appeal, the court's efforts to distinguish Brown suggest that its holding regarding the third Ortiz exception has no application to cases where counsel was appointed. Rather, after the Guillory decision, Brown continues to be potentially applicable to the third Ortiz exception. Albright met the threshold for having and did have appointed counsel, so Guillory does not foreclose the possibility that he has a remedy under the third Ortiz exception.