Opinion ID: 1319180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cross-appeal by defendants (journal).

Text: In its brief, the Journal presents several issues on appeal, urging that the trial court erred in denying its motion to dismiss Marchiondo's complaint based upon the article on organized crime. The issues presented include the law of libel before and after Gertz ; damages; and constitutionally privileged publications and limitations on libel actions. For years, federal and state courts, including those in New Mexico, have been confronted with the problem of achieving a proper balance between the laws of defamation and the laws of constitutionally protected freedom of speech and of the press. The problem again presents itself in this case. A. LAW OF LIBEL BEFORE AND AFTER GERTZ; DAMAGES. The applicable law of libel must be reviewed in light of the changes in the law of defamation as articulated by the United States Supreme Court and by this Court. Herbert v. Lando, supra ; Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra ; Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 91 S.Ct. 1811, 29 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964); Reed v. Melnick, 81 N.M. 608, 471 P.2d 178 (1970); Del Rico Co. v. New Mexican, 56 N.M. 538, 246 P.2d 206 (1952); Mauck, Stastny & Rassam, P.A. v. Bicknell, 95 N.M. 702, 625 P.2d 1219 (Ct. App. 1980). In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra , the United States Supreme Court was faced with the problem inherent in the conflict between the First Amendment and the laws of defamation in the various states. United States Supreme Court cases prior to Gertz held that where a defamation plaintiff was either a public official or a public figure, or where an allegedly defamatory statement involved a matter of public concern, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove that the defendant acted with actual malice (with knowledge of falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth). Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, supra ; Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, supra ; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra . This is still the applicable rule. However, where the defamation plaintiff is neither a public official nor a public figure, but rather, a private defamation plaintiff, Gertz set forth requirements which profoundly affected the traditional law of defamation. In the primary holding in Gertz, Justice Powell stated: We hold that, so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual. [Footnote omitted; emphasis added.] Id. at 347, 94 S.Ct. at 3010. The Gertz Court, therefore, did not require proof of actual malice in cases involving non-public defamation plaintiffs, and left it to the states to impose either an actual malice standard or a lesser standard of fault for non-public defamation plaintiffs, so long as the states did not apply strict liability. In accord with Gertz, we adopt the ordinary negligence standard as a measure of proof necessary to establish liability for compensation for actual injury. The Court in Gertz, supra, at 349-50, 94 S.Ct. at 3011-12, said: We need not define actual injury, as trial courts have wide experience in framing appropriate jury instructions in tort actions. Suffice it to say that actual injury is not limited to out-of-pocket loss. Indeed, the more customary types of actual harm inflicted by defamatory falsehood include impairment of reputation and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering. Of course, juries must be limited by appropriate instructions, and all awards must be supported by competent evidence concerning the injury, although there need be no evidence which assigns an actual dollar value to the injury. [Emphasis added.] In Gertz, supra, the Court also held that a non-public defamation plaintiff could seek punitive damages, but to recover he must prove actual malice: Our accommodation of the competing values at stake in defamation suits by private individuals allows the States to impose liability on the publisher or broadcaster of defamatory falsehood on a less demanding showing than that required by New York Times [actual malice]. This conclusion is not based on a belief that the considerations which prompted the adoption of the New York Times privilege for defamation of public officials and its extension to public figures are wholly inapplicable to the context of private individuals. Rather, we endorse this approach in recognition of the strong and legitimate state interest in compensating private individuals for injury to reputation. But this countervailing state interest extends no further than compensation for actual injury. For the reasons stated below, we hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. [Emphasis added.] Id. at 348-49, 94 S.Ct. at 3011. We adopt the Gertz standard of proof for recovery of punitive damages. In summary, we hold that as to the law of defamation: (1) The standard of strict liability no longer applies; (2) The ordinary common law negligence standard of proof shall apply to private defamation plaintiffs to establish liability, and liability is limited to recovery of actual damages; (3) A private defamation plaintiff must plead and prove special damages in order to recover them; (4) A private defamation plaintiff who seeks punitive damages must prove actual malice. We note that our recent Uniform Jury Instructions applicable to libel and slander, Chapter 10, UJI Civil, may not correctly state the law now articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Gertz, supra, and by this Court in this opinion. We further note particularly that N.M.U.J.I.Civ. 10.4, subparagraph 3 (Libel Per Quod), N.M.S.A. 1978 (Repl.Pamp. 1980), does not include general or actual damages, but mentions only recovery of special damages. This is no longer the law, and recovery for actual or general damages is to be included in the instruction. The following appears in the Committee Comment to N.M.U.J.I.Civ. 10.4: Punitive damages are not recoverable. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra . This statement is not correct. Punitive damages are recoverable if there is proof that the publication was made with actual malice (knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth). Gertz, supra . The trial courts should fashion appropriate instructions based upon the facts in each case, at least until we have approved specific uniform jury instructions to substitute for the instructions which are now in existence but which are erroneous.           B. CONSTITUTIONALLY PRIVILEGED PUBLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS ON LIBEL ACTIONS. We now proceed to consider further the Journal's contention that the headline, photograph and article on organized crime are constitutionally protected opinion or privileged under the fair comment doctrine. We have previously, in this opinion under Point III, held that the Skeen article is a constitutionally protected opinion. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, supra , the United States Supreme Court applied the common law doctrine of fair comment to the requirements of the First Amendment. The Court in Rosenbloom held that a defamation plaintiff must prove actual malice where the alleged defamation involved matters of public interest. Fair comment was also the basis of the post- Gertz New Mexico decision in Mauck, Stastny & Russam, P.A., v. Bicknell, supra, which recognized a qualified privilege for a non-public figure who makes a statement regarding a matter of public interest. In Gertz, however, the United States Supreme Court clearly retreated from, though it did not expressly overrule, its prior position in Rosenbloom. In criticizing Rosenbloom for going too far in protecting constitutional rights without adequately considering the role of the states in protecting the reputations of private individuals through the law of defamation, Justice Powell stated: [W]e conclude that the States should retain substantial latitude in their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a private individual. The extension of the New York Times test [of actual malice] proposed by the Rosenbloom plurality would abridge this legitimate state interest to a degree that we find unacceptable. And it would occasion the additional difficulty of forcing state and federal judges to decide on an ad hoc basis which publications address issues of general or public interest... . The public or general interest test for determining the applicability of the New York Times standard to private defamation actions inadequately serves both of the competing values at stake [the First Amendment and the law of defamation]. On the one hand, a private individual whose reputation is injured by defamatory falsehood that does concern an issue of public or general interest has no recourse unless he can meet the rigorous requirements of New York Times. ... On the other hand, a publisher or broadcaster of a defamatory error which a court deems unrelated to an issue of public or general interest may be held liable in damages even if it took every reasonable precaution to ensure the accuracy of its assertions. Gertz, supra, at 345-46, 94 S.Ct. at 3009-10. The Gertz Court said that under certain conditions, opinions are protected by the First Amendment. This statement in Gertz, as well as the statement above criticizing Rosenbloom, supra, indicates that the public interest privilege has been altered. Opinions are protected but defamatory falsehood is not. The problem which arises under the new standard is distinguishing between an opinion and a mere statement of fact. In Kutz v. Independent Pub. Co., Inc., 97 N.M. 243, 638 P.2d 1088 (Ct.App. 1981), the court set out the criteria for determining as a matter of law, when a statement may be said to be opinion or fact. [I]f the material as a whole contains full disclosure of the facts upon which the publisher's opinion is based and which permits the reader to reach his own opinion, the court in most instances will be required to hold that it is a statement of opinion, and absolutely privileged. Id. at 245, 638 P.2d at 1090 (citation omitted). Conversely, where there are implications in the statement that the writer has private, underlying knowledge to substantiate his comments about plaintiff, and such knowledge implies the existence of defamatory facts, the statement is deemed to be factual and not privileged. Id. at 246, 638 P.2d at 1091. See also Marchiondo v. Tribune, supra . A good statement setting forth guidelines to be followed by trial courts in an initial determination of whether a publication constitutes opinion or fact is found in Mashburn v. Collin, 355 So.2d 879, 885 (La. 1977): [T]he crucial difference between statement of fact and opinion depends upon whether ordinary persons hearing or reading the matter complained of would be likely to understand it as an expression of the speaker's or writer's opinion, or as a statement of existing fact. [Footnote omitted.] We also adopt the language contained in Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App.3d 61, 77-78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 984, 100 S.Ct. 490, 62 L.Ed.2d 412 (1979): Where the statements are unambiguously fact or opinion, ... the court determines as a matter of law whether the statements are fact or opinion. However, where the alleged defamatory remarks could be determined either as fact or opinion, and the court cannot say as a matter of law that the statements were not understood as fact, there is a triable issue of fact for the jury. [Citations and footnote omitted.] To the extent that Reed v. Melnick, supra ; Del Rico v. New Mexican, supra ; Marchiondo v. Tribune, supra , and all other opinions of this Court and the Court of Appeals are inconsistent with this opinion, such cases are hereby expressly overruled. The cause is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent and in accord with this opinion. IT IS SO ORDERED. EASLEY, C.J., SOSA, Senior Justice, and PAYNE and RIORDAN, JJ., concur.