Opinion ID: 2640614
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Competency of Victim to Testify

Text: [¶31] Mr. Sisneros filed a motion requesting a competency/taint hearing. At the hearing, he withdrew his claim of taint and the district court proceeded to determine whether KF was competent to testify. Mr. Sisneros claims the district court erred by ruling KF was competent to testify at trial against him. [¶32] Pursuant to W.R.E. 601, any person is competent to be a witness unless he is otherwise disqualified from testifying. Our precedent discusses the specific requirements for competency: A person is generally competent to testify if he can understand, receive, remember and narrate impressions and is sensible to the obligations of the oath taken before testifying. Watters v. State, 2004 WY 155, ¶ 14, 101 P.3d 908, 914 (Wyo. 2004) (some citations omitted). The district court has broad discretion in determining whether a witness is competent to testify. Id. See also, Larsen v. State, 686 P.2d 583, 585 (Wyo. 1984). [¶33] With regard to children, [i]ntelligence, not age, is the proper criteria in determining the competency of a witness. Larsen, 686 P.2d at 585. The difficulty with cases involving the allegations of sexual improprieties with young children is evident. As we stated in Larsen : . . . On the one hand, in accepting the testimony of a child there is the danger that she may not be telling the truth, in which event an innocent man may be convicted of crime and suffer the consequences thereof. On the other, if the child's testimony is not accepted, a man guilty of crime, and possibly with the potential for more such, will go free. In this connection, it must be borne in mind that when such an offense [assaulting and taking indecent liberties upon a child] is committed, it is done with the greatest possible stealth and secrecy, so that most often the testimony of the victim, coupled with the type of corroboration we have here, is the only evidence available upon which to determine guilt or innocence. The fact that there are difficulties involved should not prevent the processes of justice from functioning. Larsen, 686 P.2d at 585-86, quoting State v. Smith, 401 P.2d 445, 447 (Utah 1965). Recognizing these concerns, once the child's competency is called into question by either party, it is the duty of the court to make an independent examination of the child to determine competency, and that determination will not be disturbed unless shown to be clearly erroneous. Watters, ¶ 14. A five-part test is utilized to determine the competency of child witnesses: (1) an understanding of the obligation to speak the truth on the witness stand; (2) the mental capacity at the time of the occurrence concerning which he is to testify, to receive an accurate impression of it; (3) a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of the occurrence; (4) the capacity to express in words his memory of the occurrence; and (5) the capacity to understand simple questions about it. Id., quoting Larsen, 686 P.2d at 585. [¶34] Mr. Sisneros' argument focuses on a few select statements made by the victim during the competency hearing which indicated a lack of understanding of the questions posed to her. A representative sample of the statements relied upon by Mr. Sisneros follows: Q. Is it better to tell the truth or to say I don't remember? A. Yes. Q. Is it better  I will ask you the question again. Is it better to tell the truth when it is hard to tell the truth, or can you just say I don't remember instead of telling the truth? A. I don't remember. We agree that, when some of KF's statements are taken in isolation, they are troubling. Nevertheless, the district court was charged with determining whether or not KF was competent to testify based upon the entirety of her testimony. [¶35] KF was eight years old at the time of the trial and six years old when the assaults took place. At the competency hearing, in response to questions about her obligation to tell the truth while in court, she indicated she understood that responsibility and repeated numerous times that lying was bad. She knew her age, birthday, school, grade level, and her teacher's name. KF was able to recall the names and ages of friends who lived near her when the assaults took place and identified the different people and pets who lived with her at that location. After KF faltered on a few questions, the State called a social worker who was employed by the Department of Family Services to testify at the competency hearing. The social worker testified that KF has a language disability which affects some aspects of communication. Describing the effect of this condition upon KF's ability to testify, the social worker testified: One aspect of the disability is her ability to translate what she's hearing and answering, so she needs time. You ask her a question, she needs time to process it because if you interrupt that train of thought with another question, she's lost that part of the question and moves on to the next one. So you need to [s]pace out your questions so she can have time to process it. When questioned about the effect of her language disability on her memory, the social worker testified: She has the memory. She needs time to process the question so she can access the memory then say it. [¶36] In rendering its ruling on KF's competency to testify, the district court recognized her testimony was not perfect. The district judge explained, however, on the whole, he believed KF understood her obligation to tell the truth. The court also concluded that, although she may not be a particularly effective witness because she occasionally did not follow the line of questioning, KF did have the mental capacity to receive an accurate impression of the charged events and a memory sufficient to retain an independent recollection of those events. The district court judge also stated that, despite some difficulty expressing herself, KF had the capacity to describe her memory of the occurrences and to understand simple questions about them. [¶37] Mr. Sisneros focuses on the fact that KF's testimony at the competency hearing about the charged events was not consistent with her previous statements. This argument does not speak so much to KF's competency, as to her credibility. The weight to be accorded her testimony would have, of course, been left to the finder of fact if the case had gone to trial. See Watters, ¶ 18 (discussing the distinction between competence and credibility). By pleading guilty, Mr. Sisneros forewent his opportunity to argue the inconsistencies in her testimony to the finder of fact. [¶38] On this record, we must defer to the district court's finding that KF was competent to testify. The district judge is in the best position to make that determination as he is the one who sees the proposed witness, notices [the witness'] manner, . . . apparent possession or lack of intelligence and may resort to any examination which will tend to disclose [the witness'] capacity and intelligence, as well as his [or her] understanding of the obligations of an oath. As many of these matters cannot be photographed into the record, the decision of the trial judge will not be disturbed on review, unless from that which is preserved it is clear that it was erroneous. Larsen, 686 P.2d at 585 (citations omitted). We agree with the district court's analysis and certainly cannot conclude its finding was clearly erroneous. [¶39] Affirmed.