Opinion ID: 2624540
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Misrepresenting the Burden of Proof in Closing Argument

Text: In closing argument, the prosecutor repeatedly utilized the phrase, sometimes you just know. For example, the prosecutor said: I was trying my first jury case and I was all alone, because the partner that I was working with had to do a trial himself and so he tried to come up and check on me and I was sitting over lunch scribbling out the closing argument and he said, `Are you ready?' And I said, `Well, I'm trying to be.' And I kept scribbling. He said, `Brent, closing arguments come from here.' And what I want you people to know that as 12 of you sit there sometimes you just know. Sometimes you just know. Subsequently, in wrapping up, the prosecutor argued: But I submit to you that as you evaluate the testimony of [A.C.] it fits with the totality of what you heard in this case. It fits and sometimes, ladies and gentlemen, you do just know and we ask you to find a guilty verdict against the defendant. Brinklow argues that the prosecutor's repeated use of the phrase, sometimes you just know, urged the jury to decide the case based upon what must have happened, rather than on what the evidence proved. He contends that by using the phrase the State intentionally diluted its burden of proving the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Brinklow relies on State v. Mitchell, 269 Kan. 349, 360-61, 7 P.3d 1135 (2000), where the prosecutor argued in closing that `the State's burden of proof in this type of criminal case and in any criminal case is a common sense burden.' This court found that remark was a misstatement of the law and misleading to the jury because it led the jury to believe that it could convict Mitchell by using a burden of proof less than `reasonable doubt.' 269 Kan. at 361, 7 P.3d 1135. The State counters by pointing to State v. Wilson, 281 Kan. 277, 286, 130 P.3d 48 (2006), where the prosecutor stated in closing argument: `I want you to look at the evidence, remember all the testimony that you heard, and go back to that definition of reasonable doubt that, unfortunately, no one can say in precise words what it is. `You just have to intuitively know when you see it.' This court rejected the defendant's argument that the prosecutor committed misconduct by equating reasonable doubt with intuition. We interpreted that remark as suggesting that, although reasonable doubt does not have a precise definition, jurors will instinctively know it when they see it. 281 Kan. at 286, 130 P.3d 48. The Court of Appeals found the statements in this case to be more akin to the permissible remarks in Wilson. We disagree. In Wilson, the prosecutor was clearly referring to the definition of reasonable doubt, i.e., a juror has to intuit when the level of evidence has eliminated that juror's reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt. Here, the prosecutor was suggesting that sometimes a juror will just know that the defendant is guilty, i.e., a gut-level intuition that the defendant committed the alleged acts is sufficient to convict. Recently, in State v. Sappington, 285 Kan. 176, 169 P.3d 1107 (2007), the prosecutor characterized the test as being whether it was reasonable given the evidence that the defendant did the criminal act. We found that statement to be more egregious than the statement in Wilson and opined that the statement had diluted the State's burden of proof. 285 Kan. at 185-86, 169 P.3d 1107. If a jury cannot convict because common sense tells it the defendant is guilty and cannot convict because it is simply reasonable to believe the defendant did it, then it is likewise improper to convict because the jury just knows that the defendant did it. Such a suggestion is contrary to the concept of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and approaches, if not reaches, the level of gross and flagrant argument. Further, the prosecutor's repeated use of the phrase, sometimes you just know, indicates an intentional theme which would not rule out the ill-will factor. Moreover, given the absence of forensic evidence and the victim's initial recantation of the allegations, one cannot unequivocally declare the evidence overwhelming and unaffected by the impropriety in the closing argument.