Opinion ID: 2169632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Fifth Amendment: Alleged Custodial Interrogation

Text: We first address Burdette's assertion that the statements were obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment and that the district court erred when it concluded that Burdette was not in custody at the time he made the statements to Pankonin. The U.S. Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), that in order to safeguard the uncounseled individual's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, suspects interrogated while in police custody must be told that they have the right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them in court, and that they are entitled to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed, at the interrogation. The Miranda Court defined custodial interrogation as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The U.S. Supreme Court set forth the standards governing a state court's determination of when an individual is in custody in Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116 S.Ct. 457, 133 L.Ed.2d 383 (1995). Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination: (1) an assessment of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation and (2) whether a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was or was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave. The first inquiry is distinctly factual, while the second calls for application of the controlling legal standard to the historical facts. Id. See, also, State v. Veiman, 249 Neb. 875, 546 N.W.2d 785 (1996). Police officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question, or simply because the questioning takes place in a police station, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect. Rather, Miranda warnings are required only where there has been such a restriction on one's freedom as to render one in custody. One is in custody for Miranda purposes when there is a formal arrest or a restraint on one's freedom of movement of the degree associated with such an arrest. State v. Cody, 248 Neb. 683, 539 N.W.2d 18 (1995). See, also, Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977). What is dispositive in determining whether Miranda warnings should have been issued is whether a reasonable person would have felt free to leave under the circumstances. State v. Veiman, supra . The district court in the instant case found the circumstances surrounding Burdette's questioning on October 27, 1998, to be as follows: [W]hen law enforcement officers requested that [Burdette] update the form, [Burdette] voluntarily accompanied the officers to the police station to complete the form, riding with the officers in their car to the station. The officers testified that [Burdette] was cooperative, that no threats were made, and that handcuffs were not used.... [T]he only questions asked of [Burdette] were the standard questions on the Sexual Offender Registration Form. The officers testified that if [Burdette] had refused to update the form at the time he was stopped, they would have allowed him to leave. The record of the suppression hearing supports the district court's factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding the questioning. We have reviewed the district court's factual findings for clear error and find none. Burdette presented no evidence that would contradict the district court's finding that he voluntarily accompanied Jackson and Pankonin to the sheriff's headquarters and that his statements to Pankonin were given voluntarily. Jackson and Pankonin testified that Burdette willingly accompanied them in their vehicle and did not ask to drive himself to the sheriff's headquarters. Neither did he at any time ask to end the interview or to be allowed to leave. Burdette put on no evidence to refute this testimony. We have reviewed the record and, upon our de novo review of the district court's conclusion, agree with the district court that as to the second inquiry under Thompson and under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt that he or she was at liberty to end the questioning and leave. Burdette went to the sheriff's headquarters voluntarily, and there was no evidence to indicate that Burdette attempted to end the questioning and was prevented from doing so. For purposes of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), Burdette was not in custody when he made the statements on October 27, 1998, and therefore the statements were not obtained in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights.