Opinion ID: 1175478
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: effect of erroneous special-circumstance finding

Text: (17) As heretofore explained, the finding of the special circumstance that defendant killed Ms. Neidig to avoid or prevent lawful arrest (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(5)) is unsupported by substantial evidence and must be set aside in light of People v. Bigelow, supra, 37 Cal.3d 738, 752. On the other hand, there was no error in the findings of the special circumstances that the killing was perpetrated in the commission of a robbery (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(i)) and a burglary (ง 190.2, subd. (a)(17)(vii)). The jury was properly instructed at the penalty phase to consider the existence of any special circumstances found to be true (ง 190.3, factor (a)). Defendant contends that this instruction prejudiced him by authorizing the jury to take into account the erroneously found special circumstance. In People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115], the jury was allowed to consider, as aggravating factors, 11 special circumstances of which only 3 had been properly found. Moreover, the prosecutor's closing argument contained repeated references to 11, rather than 3, special circumstances. His major emphasis, however, was on other aggravating factors, i.e., present and former convictions and uncharged crimes, all supported by overwhelming evidence. Under those circumstances, a majority of the court concluded there had been no prejudicial error at the penalty phase. ( Id. at pp. 1281-1283 (plur. opn.), p. 1288 (conc. opn. of Panelli, J.).) Here, the prosecutor opened his penalty phase argument by referring to the fact that the jury had already found that defendant committed first degree murder under special circumstances, to prevent an arrest and during the course of a burglary and a robbery, and went on to itemize the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors, including the existence of special circumstances that were found true. The balance of the argument, however, contained only one other reference, indirect in nature, to the improperly found special circumstance: [L]ook what happened on May 13th after the killing of Mrs. Neidig; the two possible witnesses were both assaulted and nearly killed, and the only reason that I feel for that conduct was to prevent not only an arrest but also to prevent anyone from testifying against him later if he happened to be caught. And the only reason he was caught is because Mr. Giannavola was out there. The argument generally reviewed the evidence and contended that defendant's present and past crimes were committed with cold deliberation and should not be excused by any psychological disorder or childhood deprivation. The jury instruction to consider the special circumstances found true at the guilt phase did not permit consideration of any evidence that was not otherwise admissible and relevant to the penalty decision ( Allen, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 1281). Accordingly, defendant was not prejudiced by the erroneous finding of a special circumstance of killing to avoid or prevent arrest since there is no reasonable possibility that elimination of that finding would have affected the verdict.