Opinion ID: 6982210
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendants’ Absence During Voir Dire and Peremptory Challenges

Text: Defendants next argue that the district court violated their constitutional rights by conducting part of the voir dire, and by holding a conference to exercise peremptory challenges, outside of the presence of the defendants. See Br. of Def. Curtis at 19-31 (other defendants adopting this argument by reference). The district court conducted part of the voir dire of the jury venire in the courtroom with all of the defendants present. Afterwards, ten prospective jurors were asked to remain due to the fact that they had responded in the affirmative when asked if they had heard or read any publicity about the case or apparently if they had any connection to illegal drugs. See J.A. at 391-92 (Tr. at 149-50). These jurors were then questioned one-by-one in a separate conference room while the others waited in the courtroom with the defendants. See J.A. at 392 (Tr. at 150). An attorney for one of the defendants objected to the absence of the defendants, but the district court overruled the objection, analogizing the situation to an extension of the sidebar conferences held with prospective jurors in the courtroom, which were held outside of the range of hearing of the defendants. See J.A. at 392-93 (Tr. at 150-51). The district court also instructed counsel for defendants that the conference on peremptory challenges would be held in the jury room, and the defendants would not be present unless counsel insisted, but the attorneys could go out and discuss matters with their clients if they wished. See J.A. at 387-88 (Tr. at 13-14). None of the defendants’ counsel objected to this statement by the district court, and none of the defendants’ counsel objected to the. defendants’ absence during the peremptory challenges. See J.A. at 448-72 (Tr. at 295-320). Defendants have a constitutional right to be present at all stages of their trial. This right “is rooted to a large extent in the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, but [the Supreme Court has] recognized that this right is protected by the Due Process Clause in some situations where the defendant is not actually confronting witnesses or evidence against him.” United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (citations omitted). The defendants’ constitutional claim here is therefore properly brought under the Fifth Amendment, not the Sixth Amendment, because the challenged events occurred before any witnesses or evidence were brought against the defendants. Under the Fifth Amendment, a defendant “has a [constitutional] right to be present at all stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819 n. 15, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). Furthermore, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(a) mandates that “[t]he defendant shall be present ... at every stage of the trial including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the verdict.” Although stemming from the Constitution, this rule includes common-law rights and is broader than the protection provided in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. See United States v. Brown, 571 F.2d 980, 986 (6th Cir.1978). Rule 43(b) and (c) lists exceptions to the presence-of-the-defendant rule. The two incidents in this case do not fall within these exceptions. In fact, temporary exclusions of defendants during aspects of the impaneling of the jury have been held to constitute error. See Brown, 571 F.2d at 986 (holding that a conference discussing the dismissal of a juror outside of the presence of the defendant violated Rule 43(a), but was not a constitutional violation); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 872-73 (4th Cir.1996) (recognizing the Rule 43 right to presence for all portions of the voir dire), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414, 138 L.Ed.2d 179 (1997); United States v. Alessandretto, 637 F.2d 131, 138 (3d Cir.1980) (holding that absence of defendants from part of voir dire discussing trial publicity with prospective jurors was error under Rule 43), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949, 101 S.Ct. 2031, 68 L.Ed.2d 334 (1981). Although under Rule 43(b), the right to presence can be waived, the government here does not argue waiver but concedes that the district court violated Rule 43(a). The government argues instead that the defendants fail to show prejudice under the harmless error test with respect to the voir dire conference and under the plain error test with respect to the peremptory challenges conference. Defendants point out that the harmless error standard does not apply to impairments of the right to exercise peremptory challenges. See United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir.1998). We do not hold, however, that the defendants’ right to exercise peremptory challenges was impaired. The issue of the defendants’ absence during a portion of the exercise of peremptory challenges is a separate question. There is no dispute that the harmless error and plain error standards of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 apply to violations of Rule 43. See Tipton, 90 F.3d at 874-76 (applying plain error); United States v. Alikpo, 944 F.2d 206, 209-11 (5th Cir.1991) (applying harmless error); Brown, 571 F.2d at 987 (applying harmless error). These courts refused to hold that the absence of the defendants from isolated portions of the impaneling of the jury rose to the level of a constitutional violation. We therefore apply the harmless error and plain error tests of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52 to the defendants’ claims here. The harmless error test applies to the exclusion of the defendants from the portion of the voir dire when the district court questioned certain prospective jurors about publicity and illegal drugs, because Needum’s attorney objected to the exclusion of the defendants from the conference room. See J.A. at 392-93 (Tr. at 150-51). No objection was registered with respect to the exercise of peremptory challenges in the jury room in the absence of the defendants, however, and we therefore review this issue for plain error. Although the government concedes error under Rule 43(a) for both portions of the impaneling of the jury at issue, both the harmless error and plain error tests require reversal only if the defendants were prejudiced by the error. With respect to the voir dire, under the harmless error test, the government has the burden of showing that the defendants were not prejudiced by the error. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Here, the defendants were excluded from only a small portion of the voir dire where a number of prospective jurors were interviewed, and in some cases, excused for cause based on their exposure to drug use or pretrial publicity. Furthermore, counsel for all the defendants were present, and the district court specifically informed them that they were free to confer with their clients at any time during this portion of the voir dire. Defendants’ chief concern is that one prospective juror was exposed to antics of the defendants that occurred in the courtroom while she was waiting to be interviewed in the conference room by the judge and counsel. When asked about the incident, the prospective juror said she “just saw them talking” and she was “too far away from them to hear what they were talking about.” J.A. at 419, 423 (Tr. at 177, 181). She then said “[t]hey were just talking and joking,” J.A. 425 (Tr. at 183), and that this gave her the impression “[t]hat they were friends, that they knew each other.” J.A. at 425 (Tr. at 183). The district court refused to dismiss her for cause. See J.A. at 425. Defendants’ counsel later were unable to agree to a peremptory challenge of this prospective juror, see J.A. at 463-64, and she was eventually impaneled. See J.A. at 465. The defendants’ argument is essentially that they were prejudiced not because they were excluded from the voir dire conference, but because they were left in the courtroom with the prospective jurors waiting to be interviewed, and that the one prospective juror from this group who was eventually impaneled may have developed a bias against them. We reject this prejudice argument. The district court and counsel for defendants questioned the prospective juror about this incident, see J.A. at 419, 423-25, and the district court was satisfied that she could be impartial. See J.A. at 425 (“It would appear to me that she didn’t pay any attention to that and was not affected by that and [is] someone who would make every effort to be fair and objective.”). We have no reason to disagree with the district court’s conclusion. We conclude that the government has met its burden of showing that this error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The absence of the defendants from the peremptory challenge conference may sometimes constitute reversible error because courts have recognized that defendants can often be helpful in noticing or pointing out things about certain jurors that their lawyers might not or could not see. See United States v. Camacho, 955 F.2d 950, 953 (4th Cir.1992); United States v. Gordon, 829 F.2d 119, 124 (D.C.Cir.1987). This process is important to ensuring an impartial jury. However, under the plain error standard, the defendants must make a specific showing of prejudice to warrant reversal of a conviction. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 735, 113 S.Ct. 1770. Here, although the defendants were not present when the peremptory challenges were actually made, they were present during most of the voir dire, and they had the opportunity to speak with their attorneys with respect to the section of the voir dire they did not attend. Therefore, each defendant had the opportunity to discuss with counsel and to inform the district judge concerning any prospective juror, and counsel met with the judge to exercise the challenges. We hold that the defendants have failed to make a specific showing of prejudice resulting from this error. J. Race-Based Peremptory Challenges Defendants’ next claim, presented by Chad Gibbs, see Br. of Def. Chad Gibbs at 10-12, is that the prosecution impermissi-bly used five of its eight peremptory challenges against African-American jurors in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The government struck three African-Americans with its six initial peremptory challenges. The government then used both of its peremptory challenges for the alternate jury pool to strike African-Americans. Chad Gibbs’s attorney objected to each challenge of an African-American juror, and the district court overruled each objection. In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids race-based peremptory challenges. To establish a violation of equal protection under Batson, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges based on race. Id. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the prosecution to articulate race-neutral reasons for the strikes. Id. The prosecutor must convey a reason that is “clear and reasonably specific.” Id. at 98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. If, as here, the district court rules on the prosecutor’s explanation, the requirement that the defendant make a prima facie showing of race-based peremptory challenges becomes moot. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 358-59, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (plurality opinion); United States v. Tucker, 90 F.3d 1135, 1142 (6th Cir.1996). When the district court rules on a prosecutor's explanation for a peremptory challenge after an objection to the challenge, the question ... boils down to whether the appellants established by a preponderance of the evidence that the peremptory strikes were intentionally dis-crinilnatory. Tucker, 90 F.3d at 1142. We review for clear error all factual findings by the distri~t court on this issue. See United States v. Hill, 146 F.3d 337, 341 (6th Cir.1998); Tucker, 90 F.3d at 1142. The prosecutor's reason for the strike need not be sufficient to challenge for cause, but the prosecutor may not rely on his assurances of good faith. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The prosecution struck an African-American woman with its first peremptory challenge. See J.A. at 449. Gibbs's lawyer objected. See J.A. at 449-50. After arguing that defense counsel had not established a prima facie case, the prosecutor explained that the juror stated in her questionnaire that she knew Derrick Russell, one of the original defendants named in the indictment, and that she knew two of the cooperating witnesses' attorneys. See J.A. at 450-51. The district court then overruled Gibbs's objection. See J.A. at 451. The prosecution used its second peremptory challenge to strike an African-American man. See J.A. at 451. Gibbs's attorney objected. See J.A. at 451. When asked for his reasons, the prosecutor explained that he knew the juror because the juror worked in the prosecutor's office building, but the juror had not responded when asked if he knew any of the counsel in the room. The prosecutor was also concerned that the juror was too familiar with the case because he had worked in the building during the indictment stage, and finally the prosecutor was concerned that the juror was an older man who had been living with his parents for eleven years. See J.A. at 452-54. The district court held its ruling in abeyance. See J.A. at 454. The prosecutor also used his fourth peremptory challenge to strike an African-American man/ See J.A. at 456. Gibbs’s attorney objected. See J.A. at 456. The prosecutor explained that the juror wrote in his questionnaire that he knew a number of defendants named in the initial indictment, including Needum. The juror worked and became acquainted with certain of the defendants at a detention center. See J.A. at 456. The district court found this to be a permissible ground for a peremptory challenge. See J.A. at 456-57. The district court reconsidered these three strikes and confirmed his decision to overrule the objections, including the one previously held in abeyance, holding that they were not race-based. See J.A. at 458-59. The prosecutor offered specific, race-neutral reasons for each of these three peremptory challenges, ■ and there is nothing in the record to suggest that the district court’s decision to overrule the defendants’ objections was clearly erroneous. The pro~ecutor exercised both of his peremptory challenges of alternate jurors against African-Americans. See J.A. at 465-70. Gibbs's attorney objected to both. See J.A. at 466, 470. Apparently relying solely on the juror-prepared questionnaires and unaware that they were African-Americans, the prosecutor claimed that his decision was strategically based on the fact that he sought to have two jurors lower on the list seated, and did not have anything per se against the two he was striking. See J.A. at 467-68, 470. The prosecutor was also concerned that one of the two jurors had no feelings one way or the other about drugs. See J.A. at 470. The district court found that the prosecutor's choices were non-racial and neutral. See J.A. at 468-70. Simply claiming good faith is not an acceptable explanation for striking an African-American juror when the defendants have made a prima facie showing. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98, 106 S.Ct. 1712. Furthermore, a tactical explanation that two jurors lower on the list were preferable is inadequate to sustain a challenge. The prosecutor could prefer the other jurors precisely because they were not African-American. It would therefore have been appropriate for the district court to elicit more detail with respect to the prosecutor’s alleged tactical decision. However, given that it is not clear that the defendants made a prima facie showing of race-based challenges in light of the fact that the prosecutor was not aware that the two jurors he sought to strike were African-Americans, and given that the prosecutor appears to have made his tactical decision without being aware of the two jurors’ race, we hold that the district court’s determination was not clearly erroneous. K. Sentencing- Issues
Anthony Gibbs, Chad Gibbs, Woods, Needum, Curtis, and Berry challenge the district court’s calculation of drug quantities to determine their base offense levels under U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.l(a)(3). With the exception of Curtis, each of the defendants was sentenced based only on the drugs directly attributable to him, and was not held accountable for the drug quantities of his co-conspirators. We note a number of problems that the district court must address at the resentencing hearings of each of the defendants. We are particularly troubled by the extent to which the district court relied on the testimony of probation officers who had obtained their information from Aidrew Jackson. As is discussed below, a number of the defendants point out that drug calculations attributed to Jackson often were irreconcilable with other statements he had made or were otherwise unreliable. In calculating the base offense level for purposes of sentencing, this court considers the quantities of drugs that were “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan.” See United States v. Milledge, 109 F.3d 312, 316 (6th Cir.1997) (quoting U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(2)). “The government bears the burden of proving the quantity of drugs chargeable to a defendant for sentencing purposes by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Gessa, 57 F.3d 493, 496 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1098, 116 S.Ct. 827, 133 L.Ed.2d 769 (1996). This court reviews for clear error a district court’s drug quantity determinations. See United States v. Berry, 90 F.3d 148, 152 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 999, 117 S.Ct. 497, 136 L.Ed.2d 389 (1996); Gessa, 57 F.3d at 496; United States v. Ward, 68 F.3d 146, 149 (6th Cir.1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1151, 116 S.Ct. 1028, 134 L.Ed.2d 106 (1996). The district court’s findings must have “some minimum indicium of reliability beyond mere allegation.” Ward, 68 F.3d at 149 (quoting United States v. Smith, 887 F.2d 104, 108 (6th Cir.1989) (citation omitted)). Anthony Gibbs argues that 625 of the 682 grams of crack for which the district court held him accountable were improperly included in the district court’s calculation. The 625-gram calculation was based solely on statements made at a post-trial private interview between the probation officer who prepared the presentence investigation report and Andrew Jackson, one of the corroborating witnesses. See J.A. at 2031 (Sentencing Hr’g at 10). While recognizing the “wide discretion allowed a trial judge in considering the evidence submitted at sentencing,” United States v. Silverman, 976 F.2d 1502, 1508 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 990, 113 S.Ct. 1595, 123 L.Ed.2d 159 (1993), Gibbs argues that the district court’s determination was clearly erroneous because Jackson’s testimony at the jury trial directly contradicted the probation officer’s claim. We do not agree that Jackson’s trial testimony contradicted the probation officer’s statements. When asked: “Did you ever see [Anthony Gibbs] involved in any other type of activity during the month of July of 1993?” Jackson replied: “Just out there selling, just out there like everybody else.” J.A. at 783-84. When asked: “[D]o you recall ever seeing him with a particular amount of crack cocaine in July of 1993?” Jackson mentioned one specific incident where Gibbs was holding a bag of about one-half ounce. See J.A. at 783-84. This testimony is not in total contradiction to Jackson’s later discussion with the probation officer. Instead, it could be a result of the lack of thoroughness in the government’s examination of the witness. The government only needed to prove at trial that Gibbs possessed with intent to distribute five grams of crack to sustain the conspiracy charge. We are troubled, however, by other statements of the probation officer. The probation officer indicated that she spoke with Jackson the day before the sentencing hearing, see J.A. at 2028 (Sentencing Hr’g at 7), which was held on March 7, 1996. The presentence investigation report, however, prepared months before, already included the 625 grams of crack sales in July of 1993. See J.A. at 2128 (Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) at ¶ 82). This inclusion is apparently attributable to information provided to the testifying probation officer by other probation officers. See J.A. at 2027. The probation officer’s meeting with Jackson was ostensibly meant simply to confirm these figures. Without more evidence at the sentencing hearing, it is questionable whether the district court has shown a minimum indicium of reliability. The district court ruled that “this calculation of relevant conduct has been proved by the testimony beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial and with, at least, the probation officer here today further supporting the amounts in the report.” J.A. at 2035. Anthony Gibbs points out, however, that the jury convicted him of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), which requires a showing of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt for possession with intent to distribute more than five grams of cocaine base. The only evidence with respect to the 625 grams of crack at issue is the testifying probation officer’s discussion with Jackson who testified directly at trial only with respect to one-half ounce (approximately fourteen grams) of crack. The probation officer does not appear to discuss at the sentencing hearing how Jackson came up with the figure of 125 grams of crack per week in July of 1993, nor does the presentence investigation report provide any further basis. See J.A. at 2128 (PSR at ¶ 82). See also United States v. Frazier, 89 F.3d 1501, 1506 (11th Cir.1996) (holding that extrapolation of drug quantities from general evidence of selling quantities and periods of time is insufficient for sentencing without more specific evidence of the number of transactions and quantities of drug involved), cert. denied sub nom. Hutchinson, 520 U.S. 1222, 117 S.Ct. 1719, 137 L.Ed.2d 842 (1997). The district judge simply found the probation officer credible and presumably accepted the probation officer’s determination that Jackson was credible. Although “[t]he sentencing court’s use of hearsay information has traditionally been almost unlimited,” Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1509, there must be some evidence of reliability. Gibbs does not have a constitutional right to confront Jackson at the sentencing hearing, see Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1511, but we conclude that the district court should have elicited more information from the probation officer regarding her discussion with Jackson and other probation officers. Cf. United States v. Roberts, 14 F.3d 502, 520-21 (10th Cir.1993) (expressing concern about the attribution of large drug quantities to defendants at sentencing without satisfactory corroborating evidence). Although the probation officer testified that she confirmed the drug quantities in the presentence investigation report 'with Jackson, there is insufficient information regarding the unnamed probation officer’s or officers’ original discussion with Jackson from which the drug calculations in the presentence investigation report originated. At Gibbs’s resentencing hearing, the district court must elicit more information with respect to Jackson’s original statements and the source of Jackson’s knowledge to determine by a preponderance of the evidence the quantity of drugs for which Gibbs should be held responsible. Anthony Gibbs also argues that because in July 1993 he was only seventeen years old, and the bulk of the relevant conduct with which he is charged occurred at that time, his juvenile status precludes such a sentence and conviction. Although we vacate Gibbs’s conspiracy conviction, we hold that the district court on remand may take into account quantities of crack cocaine Gibbs sold before he reached age eighteen as relevant conduct to Gibbs’s independent drug trafficking convictions. Under the Sentencing Guidelines, the district court may include, as relevant conduct for sentencing, quantities of drugs “that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(2). As long as the government successfully prosecutes a defendant for a crime that occurred after the defendant reached the age of majority, the district court may consider relevant conduct that occurred before the defendant reached the requisite age as long as such conduct falls within the limitations set forth in § lB1.3(a)(2). We note however, that because we have vacated Gibbs’s conspiracy conviction, the district court may not include as relevant conduct Gibbs’s sales of crack in July 1993 as acts committed during the commission of the offense of conspiracy under U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(A). To be “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan” as Gibbs’s convictions on Counts 132 and 182 for possession with intent to sell crack after Gibbs reached the age of majority, the sales in July 1993 must have “at least one common factor” or be “sufficiently connected or related to each other as to warrant the conclusion that they are part of a single episode, spree, or ongoing series of offenses.” See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 commentary, applic. note 9. Anthony Gibbs’s argument is that most of the crack that was attributed to him was for sales that occurred in July 1993, when he was only seventeen years old. We note that Gibbs’s 21 U.S.C. § 841 conviction on Count 55 was for possession with the intent to sell crack in July 1993. Gibbs does not challenge his conviction on Count 55 itself, only the use of this crack as relevant conduct for sentencing. While it is not clear why Gibbs fails to challenge his conviction on Count 55, we point out that under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act (“FJDA”), because Gibbs was previously found guilty of possession of fifty unit doses of cocaine as a juvenile, see J.A. at 2130(PSR), the Count 55 charge against him would be mandatorily transferred to a federal district court for criminal prosecution upon motion of the government. See 18 U.S.C. § 5032; United States v. Welch, 15 F.3d 1202, 1208 n. 7 (1st Cir.1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1076, 114 S.Ct. 1661, 128 L.Ed.2d 377 (1994), and cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1096, 114 S.Ct. 1863, 128 L.Ed.2d 485 (1994). The FJDA would appear to apply to Gibbs’s indictment on Count 55 because he was less than twenty-one years of age. See 18 U.S.C. § 5031. Therefore, because Gibbs’s conviction on Count 55 appears to be valid, certainly the district court may consider possession and sales of crack cocaine attributable to Gibbs in July 1993 to calculate his sentence. Chad Gibbs argues that 1,599.25 grams of the 1,602.55 grams of crack for which the district court held him accountable were improperly included in the district court’s calculation. As with Anthony Gibbs, this amount of crack was based on a probation officer’s private discussions with witnesses who had testified at trial. Chad Gibbs argues, like his brother, that the information from the witnesses, Thomas Terry and Andrew Jackson, was inconsistent with their testimony at trial. The probation officer testified that Thomas Terry told him that he met Chad Gibbs in 1990 through Anthony Graves and that he knew that Gibbs was selling crack, at the rate of five ounces per week in June and July 1990. See J.A. at 2076-77. At trial, Terry testified that he knew Anthony Graves from their old neighborhood before Terry moved to the Short North, and that he met Chad Gibbs at the same time he met Anthony Graves. See J.A. at 1217, 1222 (Test, of Terry). Terry then moved to the Short North in November 1990 and began selling drugs. See J.A. at 1217-18. Gibbs argues on appeal that Terry testified at trial that he met Graves and Gibbs in November 1990 and therefore could not have met Gibbs in June 1990. Gibbs is misreading the testimony of the probation officer and Terry. The probation officer did not say that Terry told him he met Gibbs in November 1990. See J.A. at 2076. Also, Terry specifically stated at trial that he met Graves before he moved to the Short North in November 1990. See J.A. at 1217. The district court found that this evidence met the preponderance of the evidence standard. See J.A. at 2085. Although it is possible, therefore, that Terry met Chad Gibbs before he moved to the Short North, Terry’s testimony at trial strongly indicates that he was not exposed to drug sales and was not aware of drug sales in the Short North until he moved there in the fall of 1990. See J.A. at 1217-18. Upon resentencing, the district court must elicit more specific evidence as to Terry’s witnessing of Gibbs’s sales of crack in June and July 1990 to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. Chad Gibbs also argues that evidence taken by the probation officer from private meetings with Andrew Jackson was unreliable. The first argument is that Jackson’s statements to the probation officer that Gibbs was selling three-and-a-half to four ounces of crack per week in December 1992 were unreliable. He then says Jackson’s statement to the probation officer that Gibbs sold one ounce of crack in July 1993 is unreliable because Jackson stated at trial that Gibbs only possessed one-half ounce of crack. See J.A. at 775 (Test, of Jackson). Gibbs also points out that Jackson agreed that he was “taking a guess” with respect to his drug calculations, see J.A. at 822, and that the oath he took at trial “didn’t mean much to [him].” J.A. at 825. Jackson also claimed that he did not know how much crack he himself was selling in 1993. See J.A. at 827. Again, Jackson’s testimony is troubling, at times arguably contradictory, and the specific drug amounts were related to the court solely through probation officers. It is doubtful that the prosecution has met the preponderance of the evidence standard. Although the government repeatedly argues that the drug calculations were reasonable and the drug quantities could often have been greater, this does not reduce the burden of proof with respect to the drug quantities in the drug transactions relied upon by the government. Here again, upon resentencing, more specific evidence regarding the source and reliability of Jackson’s testimony must appear on the record to support the drug quantity calculations by a preponderance of the evidence. Chad Gibbs also argues that he should not be held responsible for crack sold before he turned eighteen. Again, although we vacate Gibbs’s conviction on the conspiracy count, the district court is free to consider relevant conduct related to Gibbs’s independent drug trafficking convictions. The district court is, however, limited to conduct that satisfies the requirements of U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(2). Woods argues that 2,412.65 of the 2,452.35 grams of crack for which the district court held him accountable were improperly included in the district court’s calculation. His first claim is that Robert Dotson, whose testimony was accepted by the probation officer to attribute 1,269.15 grams of crack to Woods, see J.Á. at 2329(PSR), was unreliable. The officer did not personally meet with Dotson, J.A. at 2094, but relayed information from his supervisor who did meet with Dotson. See J.A. at 2094. The probation officer also repeatedly stated that he calculated the presentence report quantities conservatively based on Dotson’s testimony. Woods points out that Dotson was arguably not always honest during his testimony, see J.A. at 626-29 (saying he did not use drugs during probation but then remembering that he did), that he could not calculate weight of drugs by looking at them, J.A. at 621-22, and that he was not sure how much a kilogram is. See J.A. at 546. Cf. United States v. Robison, 904 F.2d 365, 371-72 (6th Cir.) (holding that a drug user’s testimony when she admitted to guessing and felt pressured into guessing was not sufficiently rehable for calculating drug quantities), cert. denied sub nom. Smoot v. United States, 498 U.S. 946, 111 S.Ct. 360, 112 L.Ed.2d 323 (1990). Upon resentencing the district court must evaluate the government’s evidence more closely to ensure that the drug quantities allocated to Woods can be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Woods also challenges the probation officer’s determination that Woods sold one ounce of crack per week for forty weeks between November 1992 and September 1993. The probation officer calculated this amount based on a conservative estimate of the amount of drugs Andrew Jackson told the officer Woods was dealing during this period of time. See J.A. at 2097-98. Woods points out that Jackson testified at trial that he moved to the Short North in December 1992 and moved out in August 1993. See J.A. at 737, 743, 835. These dates are shorter than the time period the probation officer claims Jackson told him he saw Woods selling crack. The district court, however, stated simply “the Court has previously found and continues to find that Mr. Jackson is a reliable source of information as to dealings of the Short North Posse.” J.A. at 2107. Once again, a defendant has raised doubt about Jackson’s testimony regarding drug quantity, which the district court must consider at its resentencing of Woods. Needum argues that 134 of the 288.2 grams of crack for which the district court held him accountable were improperly included in the district court’s calculation. He argues that the government’s reliance on the probation officer’s discussions with Terry and Jackson was insufficient for sentencing purposes. As set out above, such hearsay testimony is admissible if it carries minimal indicia of reliability. See Silverman, 976 F.2d at 1510-11. Needum cites trial testimony to indicate that the total amount of drugs Jackson and Terry attributed to him was in the area of 126-154 grams. See J.A. at 1360-63, 751, 776 (Tr. at 2326-27, 2356-57, 1028, 1053). At Needum’s sentencing hearing, Needum’s lawyer pointed out this discrepancy. See Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 4. The district court simply asked the probation officer if the calculations were accurate, without evoking any detail about the probation officer’s meeting with Jackson or Terry. Due to the fact that Needum’s case must be remanded for resentencing with respect to his erroneous firearm convictions, and because we have been consistently troubled by the reliability of Jackson as a source for drug quantities, we instruct the district court on remand to explore further the source and reliability of Jackson’s and Terry’s knowledge of Needum’s relevant conduct. Robert Curtis argues that 71.66 of the 76.96 grams of crack for which the district court held him accountable were improperly included in the district court’s calculation. Again these calculations were based on testimony of Jackson and Terry, and also from testimony of Quinton Clausell. Terry testified that he sold drugs to Needum, see J.A. at 1243-45, ostensibly for Needum’s cousins, who are Robert and Michael Curtis. See J.A. at 1244-45. Terry then said he just remembered the drugs being for Michael. See J.A. at 1245. There is no evidence that Curtis ever received these drugs or that they were intended for him. The probation officer testified that Terry specifically told him that two baggies of one-quarter ounce each were for Michael and Robert. See J.A. at 2047-48. Without any evidence that Robert Curtis ever received these drugs, Terry’s information fails to meet the minimal indicia of reliability test. Robert Curtis then challenges a one-quarter ounce amount of crack that Jackson allegedly saw in Curtis’s possession. Jackson testified at trial that he did not know for certain the amount because he was a distance from Curtis. See J.A. at 733. The probation officer' testified that Jackson was certain of the amount. See J.A. at 2053-54. Again upon resentencing the district court should review cautiously the reliability of Jackson’s information. Curtis challenges a one-quarter ounce quantity of crack he allegedly possessed in 1994. This was based on testimony of Clausell. Curtis further argues that because Clausell testified to being a heavy marijuana user, see J.A. at 719, his testimony was not reliable. We cannot conclude that Clausell’s marijuana use alone rendered it clearly erroneous for the district court to hold that this amount was supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Curtis also objects to a .8 gram sale of crack that Needum sold to Agent Russell that was attributed to Curtis because Needum entered Curtis’s apartment during a drug transaction and then provided the drugs. Although there was no evidence that Curtis was home, the district court could find, under the preponderance of evidence standard, that it is more likely than not that Needum obtained the drugs from Curtis’s apartment and that Curtis had constructive possession over the crack, whether or not he was at home during this transaction. Berry argues that 7 of the 37.675 grams of crack for which the district court held him accountable were improperly included in the district court’s calculation. One of the alleged co-conspirators, James Brown, testified at the sentencing hearing that he used to sell crack cocaine with Berry and directly saw him selling one-eighth ounce quantities of crack on a number of occasions. See J.A. at 2004-06. Berry argues that the government should not have been able to introduce Brown’s testimony because the government only introduced it after realizing that all of the earlier testimony related to drug sales before Berry’s eighteenth birthday. See Br. of Def. Berry at 10. There is nothing in the sentencing hearing to indicate that the government introduced this evidence for improper reasons, and the district court found that Brown’s testimony was credible. See J.A. at 2019.
Three defendants, Anthony Gibbs, Nee-dum, and Curtis, argue that the district court erred by not granting them a mitigating-role reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2 for being minor participants in the offense. Due to the fact that we vacate the conspiracy convictions of each of these defendants, this issue is no longer relevant.
Woods argues that the district court erred by including five points in his criminal history score. The government, citing United States v. Organek, 65 F.3d 60, 62 (6th Cir.1995), and United States v. French, 974 F.2d 687, 697 (6th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1066, 113 S.Ct. 1012, 122 L.Ed.2d 160 (1993), argues that Woods waived this argument because he did not object before the district court. Although Woods appears to concede this, see Reply Br. of Def. Woods.at 16-17, he argues that this inclusion of criminal history points was clearly erroneous and upon remand for resentencing, the district court should reconsider his criminal history score. The government appears to rely on 21 U.S.C. § 851(b), which states that any failure to challenge a prior conviction before the sentence is imposed constitutes waiver of the issue. See Organek, 65 F.3d at 62. Woods, however, does not challenge the prior convictions; instead he contests the district court’s calculation of the date he joined the conspiracy. We therefore review this issue for plain error. The probation officer assessed three criminal history points to Woods for juvenile petit theft convictions when he was ten to eleven years old under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)(2)(B), see J.A. at 2331-32 (PSR at ¶¶ 94, 95, 97), and two points under § 4Al.l(e) because Woods allegedly joined the conspiracy within two years of release from confinement. See J.A. at 2337 (PSR at ¶ 111). Dotson and Crockett testified that they first saw Woods selling crack in 1991, see J.A. at 490-92 (Test, of Dotson); J.A. at 1600-02, 1604-07 (Test, of Crockett), but that the conspiracy began in 1989. See J.A. at 483-89 (Test, of Dotson); J.A. at 1597-98 (Test, of Crockett). The probation officer concluded that Woods joined the conspiracy in 1990, when he was arrested for possession of crack and carrying a concealed weapon. See J.A. at 2337 (PSR at 21 ¶ 111). Woods argues that he cannot be found to have joined the conspiracy until 1991, because the founders of the SNP did not even see him selling before then. Woods’s theory would render erroneous the sentence enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 4Al.l(e) and 4A1.2(d)(2)(Bj. The district court, however, found that the 1990 arrest constituted a “reasonable determination of when the defendant first became involved with the Posse.” Sentencing Hr’g Tr. at 4. The district court may consider any relevant conduct in determining the “commencement of the instant offense” for purposes of computing enhancements for criminal history. See U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 commentary, applic. note 8. For the 1990 arrest to constitute relevant conduct, it must either be found to be an act “during the commission of the offense of conviction” under U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l)(A) or, because each of the three Counts on which Woods was convicted was for an offense that requires grouping of counts under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(d), an act that was “part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction” under U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(2). The 1990 sale is included as relevant conduct under U.S.S.G. § lB1.3(a)(l) in the presentence investigation report. See J.A. at 2329-30 (PSR at ¶¶ 83, 85). The 1990 sale did not occur “during the commission of the offense of conviction” on Counts 125 or 146, both of which were based on drug transactions in 1994. The probation officer must, therefore, have considered the 1990 sale to have occurred during the commission of the conspiracy offense. The fact that Woods possessed crack in the Short North in 1990, however, does not alone render the 1990 possession during the commission of the conspiracy offense, as the district court appears to have concluded. If, at resentencing, the government maintains this position, the government must show by a preponderance of the evidence that Woods was a member of the conspiracy at the time he was arrested in 1990 for possession of crack cocaine and a firearm.