Opinion ID: 2128049
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: defendants' standing to raise constitutional claim

Text: The doctrine of standing is intended to assure that issues are raised only by those parties with a real interest in the outcome of the controversy. [Citation.] To have standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute, one must have sustained or be in immediate danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of enforcement of the challenged statute. [Citation.] The claimed injury must be (1) distinct and palpable; (2) fairly traceable to defendant's actions; and (3) substantially likely to be prevented or redressed by the grant of the requested relief. [Citations.] Chicago Teachers Union, Local 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 189 Ill.2d 200, 206-07, 244 Ill.Dec. 26, 724 N.E.2d 914 (2000). The Village asserts that because the property owners had ample opportunity to repair the structure prior to the entry of the demolition order, they have not been harmed by the alleged defect in the statute, and, therefore, they lack standing to attack the constitutionality of section 11-31-1. The property owners claim that they were not obliged to repair or demolish the structure until after the matter was adjudicated and the structure found to be dangerous and unsafe. Thus, they argue, they were entitled to a reasonable amount of time after the Village's allegations were proven in which to determine whether they were willing to invest the amount of money that would be required and, in addition, a reasonable amount of time to make the repairs if they chose to do so. Because the statute does not provide for such an opportunity to repair after the entry of the demolition order, they contend the statute denies them due process. We conclude that the property owners do have standing to raise the claim that a property owner is constitutionally entitled to the opportunity to decide whether to make repairs and to a reasonable amount of time to do so after an adjudication that the structure is dangerous and unsafe. Indeed, such a claim could be made only by a property owner who has resisted initiating repairs until after the circuit court has ruled on the merits and who, as a result, is in immediate danger of having his building demolished. The property owners have demonstrated they are in immediate danger of sustaining a palpable injury, fairly traceable to the Village's actions, which will be remedied if this court grants the relief sought. See Chicago Teachers Union, 189 Ill.2d at 206-07, 244 Ill.Dec. 26, 724 N.E.2d 914. The Village makes a separate, but related, argument that the property owners have waived any challenge to the constitutionality of the statute because they did not ask [the circuit court] for the relief they now say they were denied. Not only did they fail to undertake repairs after they first received notice from the Village of the need to do so, they neither undertook repairs during the pendency of the litigation, nor sought a stay either before or after the circuit court entered the order of demolition. Thus, the Village argues, they may not argue on appeal that they were denied the opportunity, after the building was ruled dangerous and unsafe, to decide whether they were willing to spend whatever it would take to save the structure from demolition. The Village cites Western Casualty & Surety Co. v. Brochu, 105 Ill.2d 486, 500, 86 Ill.Dec. 493, 475 N.E.2d 872 (1985), in which this court stated that it is axiomatic that questions not raised in the trial court are deemed waived and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Even if the property owners' failure to request the opportunity to which they claim they are constitutionally entitled constitutes waiver of this claim, the rule of waiver serves as a limitation on the parties and not on the court. This court is not precluded from considering issues not properly preserved by the parties, and indeed has `the responsibility    for a just result and for the maintenance of a sound and uniform body of precedent [that] may sometimes override the considerations of waiver that stem from the adversary character of our system.' Jackson Jordan, Inc. v. Leydig, Voit & Mayer, 158 Ill.2d 240, 251, 198 Ill.Dec. 786, 633 N.E.2d 627 (1994), quoting Hux v. Raben, 38 Ill.2d 223, 225, 230 N.E.2d 831 (1967). Because the appellate court addressed the constitutional question pursuant to a supervisory order of this court directing it to do so, we choose to address the issue on its merits.