Opinion ID: 1979632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Use of a Handgun vs. Possession of a Handgun

Text: Consistent with the case law of this State, an individual must possess a handgun before he or she can use that handgun. For example, in Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 156-57, 626 A.2d 946, 956 (1993), in evaluating two different statutes, this Court stated that use requires conduct different from possessionan active, rather than passive, employment of a handgun and further, that `use' requires that the defendant `carry out a purpose or action' or `make instrumental to an end or process' or `apply to advantage' the firearm (quoting Wynn v. State, 313 Md. 533, 543, 546 A.2d 465, 470 (1988)). [11] Furthermore, in Wynn, we analyzed the language of Md. Ann.Code., Art. 27 § 36B (1957, Repl.Vol.1982, Cum.Supp.1986) [12] to determine whether the Legislature distinguished between the possession of a handgun and use of a handgun, when it enacted that provision. In that case, we examined whether mere possession of a handgun is equivalent to the use of a handgun under those provisions. In examining the preamble to Art. 27 § 36B, now codified as Md.Code (2002), § 4-202 of the Criminal Law Article (Legislative findings), we noted that the [L]egislature specifically distinguished between the wearing, carrying and transporting of handguns and the use of handguns in criminal activity . . . [which] [] clearly indicates that the [L]egislature considered the use of a handgun to be something more than mere illegal possession of a handgun and that the [L]egislature contemplated use of a handgun in an active as opposed to a passive manner. Wynn, 313 Md. at 541, 546 A.2d at 469. We stated further that, the term `use' connotes something more than bare possession of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and concluded that, therefore, the Legislature did not equate carrying of a handgun with use of a handgun. [13] Although there exists a clear distinction between possession and use, possession is a necessary component of the term use. In accordance with these definitions and case law, we agree with Williams and the Court of Special Appeals, and conclude that Williams must have possessed the handgun before he could have used it. Because Williams embraced the entire criminal enterprise, it was inconsistent for the trial judge to conclude that Williams used the handgun, but did not actually or constructively possess that gun. The trial judge failed to adequately explain how Williams was not in possession of the handgun while traveling to the Citgo station with Henderson and Gaines, but, nonetheless, embraced all of the other crimes committed in furtherance of the attempted armed robbery. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED. BALTIMORE COUNTY TO PAY THE COSTS IN THIS COURT AND THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS.