Opinion ID: 158597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Firmly rooted hearsay exception

Text: 27 First, we consider the government's contention that the statements at issue fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception as statements against penal interest, admissible under Fed. R. Evid. 804(b)(3). The Supreme Court has previously observed that this hearsay exception defines too large a class for meaningful Confrontation Clause analysis. Lee, 476 U.S. at 544 n.5. But the government contends that the Supreme Court addressed these concerns in Williamson, 512 U.S. 594, by defining the class of statements against penal interest very narrowly to include only those parts of statements that are truly self-inculpatory. It argues the Williamson Court implied that as long as a statement fits within this narrower rule, it satisfies Confrontation Clause analysis. 28 Following the most recent guidance of the Supreme Court, however, we decline to adopt that conclusion with respect to these statements. In Lilly, 119 S. Ct. 1887, an opinion issued during the pendancy of this appeal, the Supreme Court explicitly considered the use of statements against penal interest offered by the prosecution in the absence of the declarant to incriminate a criminal codefendant. Five members of the Court held that such statements do not categorically satisfy Confrontation Clause concerns. See id. at 1899, 1903. 29 Justice Scalia, concurring separately, took the most resolute stance against the use of such statements, calling it a paradigmatic Confrontation Clause violation. Id. at 1903. The four-member plurality took a more nuanced approach. It divided the category of statements against penal interest into three subcategories: (1) those used as voluntary admissions against the declarant; (2) those used as exculpatory evidence offered by a defendant who claims that the declarant committed, or was involved in, the offense; and (3) those used as evidence offered by the prosecution to establish the guilt of an alleged accomplice of the declarant. Id. at 1895-97. The plurality recognized that statements in this last category -- like those at issue here -- do not fall into a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 1899. 30 In so doing, the plurality observed that the Court had over the years 'spoken with one voice in declaring presumptively unreliable accomplices' confessions that incriminate defendants.' Id. at 1897 (quoting Lee, 476 U.S. at 541). It reaffirmed the Court's prior recognition that: 31 th[e] truthfinding function of the Confrontation Clause is uniquely threatened when an accomplice's confession is sought to be introduced against a criminal defendant without the benefit of cross-examination . . . . Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements about what the defendant said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence. 32 Id. at 1898. 33 Three concurring justices refused such a broad holding, reserving the possibility that a genuinely self-inculpatory statement that also inculpates a codefendant might nevertheless satisfy a firmly rooted hearsay exception. Id. at 1904. But, they also appeared to distinguish between genuinely self-inculpatory statement[s] and statements given as part of a custodial confession of the sort that this Court has viewed with 'special suspicion' given a codefendant's 'strong motivation to implicate the defendant and to exonerate himself.' Id. at 1904. The statements at issue here given while the codefendants were detained at the police station fall into this latter category. Hence, declining to venture forth where the Supreme Court itself has thus far refused to tread, we hold these statements do not fall within a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 34 We note the government's argument that Ms. Rubio's statement should not even be subject to Lee scrutiny because it does not mention Ms. Gomez by name. We reject that argument. Ms. Rubio's entire statement is phrased in terms of we, which, in conjunction with the other evidence presented at trial, would have been clearly understood to include Ms. Gomez. Thus, we proceed to consider whether the contested statements nevertheless meet the second Roberts exception.