Opinion ID: 2603734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: A Reexamination of Our Prior Decisions

Text: Pointing to the language of the Act and its repeated references to specific discriminatory classifications such as race, color, religion, etc., defendants contend that judicial expansion of these classifications to include whatever the courts might label arbitrary discrimination cannot be justified. There is substantial support for defendants' contention in both the language and history of the Unruh Act. When the Act was adopted in 1959, the Legislature extensively revised the prior law. Among other changes, it deleted the good cause language that we had construed broadly in Stoumen v. Reilly, supra (37 Cal.2d at p. 716), to prohibit exclusions of bar and restaurant patrons (including homosexuals). (See Horowitz, The 1959 California Equal Rights in Business Establishments Statute  A Problem in Statutory Interpretation (1960) 33 So.Cal.L.Rev. 260, 269.) It also gave special emphasis to the list of categories of prohibited discrimination by repeating it three times  twice in section 51 and then again in section 52, where it provided a remedy only for discrimination on account of color, race, religion, ancestry, or national origin. These changes in the language of the statute are evidence of an intent to clarify and narrow its scope. From his comprehensive analysis of the statutory language, including changes made in the legislative process, Professor Horowitz concluded: The new Sections 51 and 52 seemingly prohibit only discrimination on grounds of race, color, religion, ancestry, or national origin.... The old sections prohibited all discrimination except that specifically permitted; the new sections prohibit only specific types of discrimination. (33 So.Cal.L.Rev. at p. 302; see also id. at p. 271.) There is further evidence that the Legislature intended to confine the scope of the Act to the specified types of discrimination in the second sentence of section 51. That sentence states: [t]his section shall not be construed to confer any right or privilege on a person which is conditioned or limited by law or which is applicable alike to persons of every sex, color, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, or blindness or other physical disability. Without substantial discussion, we stated in Marina Point that the meaning of this sentence was obscure and declined to infer from it any intent to restrict our statements in Cox ( supra, 3 Cal.3d 205) that the Act applies to all arbitrary forms of distinction or classification in public accommodations. ( Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 733-735.) On reexamination, we do not find the quoted sentence to be so devoid of meaning. (2) Its plain language suggests that the Act was not intended to create rights of access to public accommodations when: (1) other legislation specifically limited or disclaimed those rights; or (2) those rights were already extended to all persons regardless of sex, color, race, or the other listed categories. (See Orloff v. Hollywood Turf Club, supra, 110 Cal. App.2d 340, 342-343 [predecessor to quoted sentence allows business establishment to impose admission charge equally and without discrimination ... on all citizens].) Applied to this case, the second sentence of section 51 indicates the Act was not intended to create a right of access to rental housing notwithstanding a landlord's policy of selection based on financial criteria, so long as the policy is applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, color, sex, religion, etc. Although defendants' argument against Cox, Marina Point, and related cases is not without foundation, it does not afford a sufficiently compelling reason to overrule the holdings of Cox and its progeny. Beginning with Cox in 1970, the Unruh Act has been construed to apply to several classifications not expressed in the statute. (E.g., Cox, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 217-218 [unconventional dress or physical appearance]; Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 736-741 [families with children]; O'Connor, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 794 [persons under 18]; see also Rolon v. Kulwitzky (1984) 153 Cal. App.3d 289, 292 [200 Cal. Rptr. 217] [homosexuality]; Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts (1983) 147 Cal. App.3d 712 [195 Cal. Rptr. 325, 38 A.L.R.4th 607] [same]; and Hubert v. Williams (1982) 133 Cal. App.3d Supp. 1, 5 [184 Cal. Rptr. 161] [same].) (3) We generally presume the Legislature is aware of appellate court decisions. ( Viking Pools, Inc. v. Maloney (1989) 48 Cal.3d 602, 609 [257 Cal. Rptr. 320, 770 P.2d 732]; Estate of McDill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 831, 839 [537 P.2d 874].) It has not taken specific action to overrule these cases. Moreover, the Legislature has amended the Act several times in the 20-year period since Cox ( supra, 3 Cal.3d 205) was decided. [W]hen the Legislature amends a statute without altering portions of the provision that have previously been judicially construed, the Legislature is presumed to have been aware of and to have acquiesced in the previous judicial construction. Accordingly, reenacted portions of the statute are given the same construction they received before the amendment. ( Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 734.) Thus, defendants' suggestion that the holdings of Cox, Marina Point, O'Connor, and similar appellate decisions extending the Unruh Act beyond its specified categories of discrimination have somehow been repudiated by the Legislature is untenable; the absence of any specific legislative action designed to alter those holdings belies any such inference. However, our rejection of defendants' suggestion does not necessarily imply acceptance of plaintiffs' contrary argument that all economic distinctions must therefore be scrutinized for alleged arbitrariness because the Legislature has effectively endorsed the broad language used in those cases. (4) The presumption of legislative acquiescence in prior judicial decisions is not conclusive in determining legislative intent. As we have also stated: `Legislative silence after a court has construed a statute gives rise at most to an arguable inference of acquiescence or passive approval.... But something more than mere silence is required before that acquiescence is elevated into a species of implied legislation....' ( Cianci v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 903, 923 [221 Cal. Rptr. 575, 710 P.2d 375], quoting People v. Daniels (1969) 71 Cal.2d 1119, 1127-1128 [80 Cal. Rptr. 897, 459 P.2d 225, 43 A.L.R.3d 677].) In the area of statutory construction, an examination of what the Legislature has done (as opposed to what it has left undone) is generally the more fruitful inquiry. [L]egislative inaction is `a weak reed upon which to lean'.... ( Troy Gold Industries, Ltd. v. Occupational Safety & Health Appeals Bd. (1986) 187 Cal. App.3d 379, 391, fn. 6 [231 Cal. Rptr. 861].) (1b) In this case, any presumption in favor of legislative acquiescence in the broad concept of arbitrary discrimination is weakened by two factors: (1) the specific facts of our prior cases which, unlike their broad language, are confined to discrimination based on personal characteristics similar to the statutory classifications of race, sex, religion, etc.; and (2) evidence of subsequent legislative action emphasizing the continued importance of those classifications. To acknowledge that the Legislature has not altered the holdings in specific prior cases does not imply that it has approved the broad language in those decisions to the effect that any classification that might be judicially viewed as arbitrary or unreasonable or stereotyped is therefore subject to judicial scrutiny by virtue of the Act. (5) It is a foundational principle that: `[T]he language of an opinion must be construed with reference to the facts presented by the case, and the positive authority of a decision is coextensive only with such facts.' ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 711, 734-735 [257 Cal. Rptr. 708, 771 P.2d 406]; see also 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 783, p. 753.) A litigant cannot find shelter under a rule announced in a decision that is inapplicable to a different factual situation in his own case, nor may a decision of a court be rested on quotations from previous opinions that are not pertinent by reason of dissimilarity of facts in the cited cases and in those in the case under consideration. ( Southern Cal. Enterprises v. Walter & Co. (1947) 78 Cal. App.2d 750, 757 [178 P.2d 785], quoted in 9 Witkin, supra, at pp. 754-755.) The fundamental distinction between holdings and mere descriptive language applies no less to our perceptions that the Legislature has acquiesced in prior judicial decisions. (See 16 Cal.Jur.3d (rev.) Courts, § 192, p. 628 [The general rule that prior decisions are controlling only as to cases presenting the same factual situation is of course a limitation on the application of stare decisis to statutory construction.].) The Legislature is a pragmatic political body; its primary concern is not to study and refine the language used in judicial decisions, but to accomplish practical results. (6) (See fn. 6.) As such, it is unlikely to analyze and rewrite broad judicial language as an abstract exercise; it is far more likely to revise the bottom line results of decisions, particularly those that adversely affect established interest groups. [6] In light of these principles, the Unruh Act is best understood by considering what the Legislature has actually done in response to our decisions. (1c) Notwithstanding our language about arbitrary discrimination and stereotypes, the Legislature has continued to pay close attention to the specified categories of discrimination in the Unruh Act. As observed above, it expanded the scope of the Act after Cox by adding sex in 1974 and blindness and physical disability in 1987 as additional prohibited classifications. Following our decisions in Marina Point, supra, and O'Connor, supra, the Legislature quickly enacted legislation to confirm and codify our holdings as applied to housing discrimination against families with children, but also to clarify those holdings insofar as they applied to senior citizens' housing. (§§ 51.2, 51.3; Stats. 1984, ch. 787, § 1, p. 2781; Stats. 1984, ch. 1333, § 1, pp. 4681-4682; see also Civ. Code, § 51.4; Stats. 1989, ch. 501, § 2, No. 4 Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, pp. 1555-1556 [enacting time-limited exception to design requirements for senior housing in light of federal law and Marina Point ].) Finally, although the Legislature made no change in the Act in direct response to our broad language concerning arbitrary distinctions, it did not alter or repeal the second sentence of section 51 (which states that the statute confers no right or privilege applicable alike to all persons regardless of race, sex, religion, etc.) in response to our conclusion that it was obscure in its meaning. ( Marina Point, supra, 30 Cal.3d at p. 733.) Instead, it has continued to add the additional prohibited categories of discrimination to that sentence. Thus, the Legislature's continued emphasis on the specified categories of discrimination in the Act (without adding the words arbitrary, unreasonable, or similar language to its provisions) reflects the continued importance of those categories in its proper interpretation. (7) As in any case of statutory interpretation, our task is to determine afresh the intent of the Legislature by construing in context the language of the statute. ( Brown v. Kelly Broadcasting Co., supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 724; People v. Woodhead (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1002, 1010 [239 Cal. Rptr. 656, 741 P.2d 154].) Therefore, we will now consider the problem before us in light of both the language and history of the Act and the probable impact on its enforcement of the competing interpretations urged on us by the parties.