Opinion ID: 167719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tal's Individual Claims

Text: 13 The district court dismissed Tal's individual antitrust and RICO claims in the First Amended Complaint for lack of standing. Tal challenges this ruling as well as the district court's order denying him the ability to represent Tal, Inc. and Bricktown, Inc. pro se. A. Standing to file antitrust and RICO claims 14 In order to have standing under Article III of the Constitution, a plaintiff must allege an injury-in-fact. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). However, the standing requirements in the antitrust context are more rigorous than that of the Constitution. Thus, [h]arm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact, but the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiff is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action. Assoc. Gen. Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n. 31, 103 S.Ct. 897, 74 L.Ed.2d 723 (1983). This additional determination stems from section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15, which states [a]ny person . . . injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue. . . and shall recover threefold the damages. . . sustained, and . . . a reasonable attorney's fee. 6 Thus, antitrust standing requires a private plaintiff to show (1) an `antitrust injury'; and (2) a direct causal connection between that injury and a defendant's violation of the antitrust laws. Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc., 315 F.3d 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 2003); see Sports Racing Services, Inc. v. Sports Car Club of America, Inc., 131 F.3d 874, 882 (10th Cir.1997); City of Chanute, Kan. v. Williams Natural Gas Co., 955 F.2d 641, 652 (10th Cir.1992). 7 An antitrust injury is defined as an injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489, 97 S.Ct. 690, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). 15 Section 4 of the Clayton Act has been held to exclude personal injuries, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979), as well as derivative injuries such as loss of stock value or employment opportunities. Sharp v. United Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 404, 407-08 (10th Cir.1992); Curtis v. Campbell-Taggart, Inc., 687 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir.1982). It is settled law that shareholders and employees do not have standing to sue for antitrust violations that injure a corporation. Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394, 397 (10th Cir.1979). This prohibition also includes corporate officers. Nat'l Indep. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748 F.2d 602, 608 (11th Cir.1984) (Neither an officer nor an employee of a corporation has standing to bring an action in his own right for an antitrust violation causing injury to the corporation and its business.). 16 Similarly, RICO allows [a]ny person injured in his business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter [to] sue therefor in any appropriate United States district court and . . . recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. . . . 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Congress modeled § 1964(c) on the civil-action provision of the federal antitrust laws, § 4 of the Clayton Act. . . . Holmes v. Secs. Investor Protection Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 267, 112 S.Ct. 1311, 117 L.Ed.2d 532 (1992). Thus, like the Sherman Act, standing for private individuals under RICO requires a plaintiff to have been injured in his business or property by the conduct constituting the violation. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496, 105 S.Ct. 3275, 87 L.Ed.2d 346 (1985). Similarly, corporate presidents ordinarily do not have standing to assert an individual RICO claim for conduct which harmed the corporation, because such injuries are derivative. Manson v. Stacescu, 11 F.3d 1127, 1132-33 (2d Cir.1993). 17 As the district court held, Tal does not have standing to assert his individual RICO and antitrust claims because he has not shown that he suffered an antitrust injury as a result of the Appellees' actions. At best, Tal, Inc., as owner of the condemned property, suffered from the alleged fraudulent condemnation, and Bricktown, Inc., which submitted the redevelopment bid, suffered from the alleged Sherman Act and RICO violations as they relate to the award of development contracts. However, all of Tal's claims derive from his role as the president of Tal, Inc. and Bricktown, Inc. These injuries are the companies' and the companies have the right to vindicate them. Tal cannot assert personal injury based on the condemnation of property he did not own, nor may he claim lost profits and business opportunities from the Appellees' alleged bid-rigging. Additionally, injury to his reputation, dignity and emotional damages are not the type of injuries redressable by the antitrust laws or RICO which are expressly limited to injuries to business or property. 15 U.S.C. § 15; 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); see Reiter, 442 U.S. at 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326; Manson, 11 F.3d at 1132. 18 B. Right to represent the corporations pro se 19 It has been our long-standing rule that a corporation must be represented by an attorney to appear in federal court. 8 Consistent with that rule, Local Rule 17.1 of the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma provides: [p]arties who are not natural persons may not appear pro se.  Thus, the district court did not err in denying Tal the right to represent Tal, Inc. and Bricktown, Inc. pro se and requiring the corporations to secure counsel. 20 Tal tries to avoid this result by arguing: (1) Oklahoma statutes give directors the right to sue on behalf of the corporation; (2) allowing a shareholder to be held liable for a company's shortcomings but not allowing a shareholder to appear pro se for the company creates a double standard; (3) small companies may not be able to afford to hire an attorney; and (4) a company has a constitutional right to allow its directors to represent it pro se. 21 Tal's arguments are without merit. First, no Oklahoma statute confers on directors the right to appear pro se, only the right to institute suits on behalf of a corporation. See 18 OKLA. STAT. TIT. § 1016(2). Moreover, such a right must be exercised in conformity with court rules that require corporations to be represented by counsel. See Massongill v. McDevitt, 828 P.2d 438, 439-40 (Okla.Ct.App.1989). Tal's double standard argument ignores the benefits of corporate status. Shareholders, including Tal, enjoy limited liability, unless the corporate veil is pierced because the company is an instrumentality or alter ego of its shareholders. See Key v. Liquid Energy Corp., 906 F.2d 500, 503-04 (10th Cir.1990) (discussing piercing of corporate veil). Moreover, Tal's argument ignores his power as a director to institute a suit, through counsel, on behalf of Tal, Inc. and Bricktown, Inc. There is little reason to believe that a company director will be hindered in advancing the interests of the company by requiring the company to be represented by an attorney. 22 Finally, Tal seeks to stretch the Constitution beyond elastic limits by arguing, [i]f . . . a criminal defendant has the right to proceed Pro Se, the right should [] apply with even greater force in a civil context. While criminal defendants are entitled to representation by counsel at no charge, . . . no comparable right exists for civil litigants. (Tal's Br. at 30.) Tal's comparison with a criminal defendant's right to an attorney or to appear pro se fails for the obvious reason that the Constitution only guarantees a right of representation to criminal defendants. Tal may proceed pro se, but Tal, Inc. and Bricktown, Inc. may not. Corporations bear the costs associated with filing suit until their claims are vindicated. 23