Opinion ID: 2609751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the penalty provisions of as 46.03.760 and as 46.03.790

Text: Finally, Stock argues that the penalty provisions of AS 46.03.760 and AS 46.03.790 violate the equal protection and due process clauses of the United States and Alaska constitutions. AS 46.03.760 specifies: (a) A person who violates §§ 710, 730, 740, or 750 of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $25,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both. Each unlawful act constitutes a separate offense... . AS 46.03.790 provides for punishment for wilful violation of the provisions of the Environmental Conservation Act, or a regulation, written order or directive of a court made under it, by fine of not more than $1,000 and costs of prosecution, or by imprisonment for one year or both. Each day upon which a wilful violation occurs may be considered a separate and additional violation. Stock argues that the sections constitute an unreasonable classification whereby negligent violators may be punished by a $25,000 fine while wilful violators may receive a $1,000 fine only. First, this argument ignores the fact that each day of the wilful violation may be regarded as a separate and additional violation. Wilful pollution of 60 days duration would thus be subject to a $60,000 fine. As applied to Stock's case, it is apparent that the contamination occurred over a considerable period of time. If, then, he had been charged under AS 46.03.790, the maximum penalty could have been substantially higher than under the non-wilful provision, AS 46.03.760, which provides that each unlawful act constitutes a separate offense. For like reasons, Stock's argument that the provisions violate the due process clause must fail. He contends that to minimize a sentence there is strong inducement to plead to a charge of being a wilful rather than negligent violator. If the sentence for wilful violation is more severe as a continuing offense, there would, of course, be no such inducement. Moreover, he assumes that he was confronted with such an option. The wilfulness offense cannot be regarded as a lesser included crime within the charge of a non-wilful pollution. There could be no pressure to plead guilty to sec. 790 when it was neither charged nor available as a lesser included offense. Stock analogizes the pressure he was under to plead guilty to the offense with a lesser penalty to the pressure the murder defendant was placed under to waive trial by jury in order to avoid the possible imposition of the death sentence in United States v. Jackson. [40] In Jackson, the statute provided that the death penalty could be imposed only by a jury. The defendant could avoid the death penalty by obtaining a non-jury trial, or if the government demanded a jury trial, by pleading guilty. The statute thus put extreme pressure upon the defendant to waive his fifth amendment right not to plead guilty and his sixth amendment right to a jury trial. Extending the concept that due process prohibits conviction based upon a coerced guilty plea, the United States Supreme Court held that death penalty statutes may not be so drawn as to chill the exercise of basic constitutional rights. [41] By comparison, Stock argues that he was pressured to plead guilty to a specific intent crime in order to avoid going to trial on a charge not involving wilfulness. No jury waiver question is involved. Nor does this case have the aspect of grisly choice identified with waivers to avoid potential imposition of a death penalty. [42] Stock simply argues that the existence of one offense with lesser punishment encourages him to plead guilty rather than go to trial on the offense with greater punishment. The only fact which distinguishes his case from one in which there is a lesser included offense is that the supposed lesser offense by way of punishment involves conduct traditionally thought to carry greater criminality  specific intent. That the offense generally considered to be the more serious receives a lighter sentence was a similar contention confronted in Green v. State. [43] There it was maintained that the Alaska minimum sentence of 15 years imprisonment for second degree murder while the minimum for first degree murder was one year at hard labor constituted a violation of constitutional due process rights. We disposed of the argument as to the disparity in sentences by stating: There are a number of states in which the courts have held that punishment for crime must be proportioned to the offense. Such holdings have usually been based upon the enunciation of the restriction in the respective state constitutions that penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense. The Alaska Constitution, though of recent origin, contains no such restriction, nor does one appear in the federal constitution. We conclude, therefore, that in this jurisdiction punishment for crime need not be strictly proportioned to the offense. Only those punishments which are cruel and unusual in the sense that they are inhuman and barbarous, or so disproportionate to the offense committed as to be completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice may be stricken as violating the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Such punishments would also be void under article I, section 12 of the Alaska Constitution which declares that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. [44] The penalty provisions here involved do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment nor are they so completely arbitrary and shocking to the sense of justice that they must be stricken. Affirmed.