Opinion ID: 2171199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: did the trial court have the authority to modify the defendant's probation from institutionalization to incarceration?

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court did not have the authority to modify or set aside the defendant's probation in such a manner as to change the terms from institutionalization to incarceration. As support, the defendant directs our attention to sec. 973.09(1) (a) and (3)(a) and sec. 973.10(2), Stats. The relevant portions of those statutes read as follows: 973.09 Probation. (1)(a) Except as provided in par. (c) or if probation is prohibited for a particular offense by statute, if a person is convicted of a crime, the court, by order, may withhold sentence or impose sentence under s. 973.15 and stay its execution, and in either case place the person on probation to the department for a stated period, stating in the order the reasons therefor. The court may impose any conditions which appear to be reasonable and appropriate. The period of probation may be made consecutive to a sentence on a different charge, whether imposed at the same time or previously. . . . (3)(a) Prior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions thereof. 973.10 Control and supervision of probationers.... (2) If a probationer violates the conditions of probation, the department may: (a) If the probationer has not already been sentenced, order the probationer brought before the court for sentence which shall then be imposed without further stay under s. 973.15; or (b) If the probationer has already been sentenced, order the probationer to prison, and the term of the sentence shall begin on the date the probationer enters the prison. Therefore, the defendant maintains that once the trial court imposes probation and transfers custody of the defendant to the department, it retains only the authority to modify the defendant's probation, while the department of health and social services must be the party to revoke the defendant's probation. The defendant argues that the judge's modification to include incarceration essentially amounted to a revocation, which exceeds the court's authority under sec. 973.09. The court of appeals accepted this argument, utilizing the following language in its opinion: Modification of probation conditions must be addressed through the proper administrative processes and not in the manner here attempted by the state. We begin our discussion with the observation that the court's sentencing power is derived solely from the statutes and that the courts must adhere to statutory limits when fashioning sentences. [3] The defendant has not argued that the original condition of probation, namely, institutionalization at Mendota, was unreasonable. Rather, he has argued that when he was unable to gain admission to Mendota, the trial court did not have the authority to incarcerate him. In Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978), this court discussed the probation statute, particularly sec. 973.09(3)(a) addressing the court's power to extend probation or to modify its terms. Huggett involved the trial court's extension of the defendant's probation for failure to make the court-ordered restitution. The court initially noted that, The dual goals of probation are `the rehabilitation of those convicted of crime and the protection of the state and community interest.' State v. Tarrell, 74 Wis. 2d 647, 653, 247 N.W.2d 696 (1976). Id. at 798. Concerning the court's extension of the defendant's probation, the court stated, Failure to make restitution within the original probation period might constitute cause for extending probation and continuing restitution if there is a basis for believing that additional restitution would effectuate the objectives of probation.... Id. at 803 (Emphasis added.) This court recognized in Huggett that inherent within the probation statute is the court's continued power to effectuate the dual purposes of probation, namely, rehabilitating the defendant and protecting society, through the court's authority to modify or extend probationary terms. In the instant case, Judge Raskin utilized the following language when he placed the defendant on probation: The Court will stay that sentence and place the defendant on probation for a period of three years with certain conditions. With respect to those conditions, the Court adopts the recommendations made by the probation officer in his report ... which means that the defendant shall voluntarily admit himself to the Mendota Institution for the intensive care and treatment that the Court feels that he must have in order to live a peaceful and nonviolative life in this community. (Emphasis added.) The court's language obviously indicates that the judge had determined that confinement in a structured setting was necessary for the rehabilitation of the defendant, as well as for the protection of society. It is equally obvious that the court specifically rejected outpatient therapy for the defendant, as had been recommended by the defendant's psychologist. The structured setting that was chosen by the court was the Mendota institute. This is an appropriate condition under sec. 3.2 of the American Bar Association's Standards Relating to Probation (Approved Draft 1970), as adopted by this court. [4] We believe that what occurred in the instant case, through the defendant's inability to gain admission to Mendota, completely circumvented the intent behind the judge's grant of probation. In essence, a failure of a primary condition, namely, confinement, became impossible because of the nature of the defendant's mental condition which was unknown to the judge at the time of sentencing. As we noted above, the judge's grant of probation was based upon the primary condition of complete confinement and specifically rejected outpatient therapy. This grant was fashioned with the purpose of rehabilitating the defendant, yet protecting society by isolating the defendant during the rehabilitation process. We noted above that inherent within the probation statute is the judge's authority to effectuate the purposes behind probation. Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d at 803. In this case, because of the fact that the grant of probation was premised upon confinement, we hold that the trial judge possessed the authority to modify probation to include incarceration when this primary condition becomes unachievable, thereby circumventing the intent behind the grant of probation. [5] We hold that this modification is not a revocation. It is instead a very limited extension of the power to modify the terms of probation and should only be utilized by the courts in cases such as the instant one, where the judge's intent behind the grant of probation is completely frustrated due to the failure of a primary condition. An analogy to the court's authority to exercise this power to modify may be found in the Wisconsin cases addressing resentencing following a new trial or postconviction remedy due to the judge's knowledge of a new factor. For example, in State v. Leonard, 39 Wis. 2d 461, 159 N.W.2d 577 (1968), the defendant successfully vacated a sentence imposed by the court following revocation of probation because the defendant had not been afforded his constitutional right to counsel at the sentencing. Id. at 464. Upon resentencing, the court increased the vacated sentence by three years. Although this court remanded the case for resentencing in accordance with the standard adopted in the opinion, the opinion set forth the following standard: Hereafter, on resentencing following a second conviction after retrial, or mere resentencing, the trial court shall be barred from imposing an increased sentence unless (1) events occur or come to the sentencing court's attention subsequent to the first imposition of sentence which warrant an increased penalty; and (2) the court affirmatively states its grounds in the record for increasing the sentence. Id. at 473. Subsequently, in Denny v. State, 47 Wis. 2d 541, 178 N.W.2d 38 (1970), this court reiterated the Leonard standard. The Denny opinion also noted that the United States Supreme Court had reached a decision similar to Leonard in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, and this court quoted the following language from Pearce in its discussion of new factors: `A trial judge is not constitutionally precluded, in other words, from imposing a new sentence, whether greater or less than the original sentence, in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may have thrown new light upon the defendant's life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 245.' Denny v. State, 47 Wis. 2d at 545, citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 723. Although the Denny opinion acknowledged that new factors may involve more generalized factors than those found in the definition set out in Pearce, such as any objective, identifiable factual data not known to the trial judge at the time of the original sentencing proceeding, [6] we find that events which transpired in the instant case fit squarely within the above rationale. Events following the grant of probation, namely, the defendant's denial of admission to Mendota, shed light upon the defendant's life, health, habits, conduct, and mental and moral propensities. In particular, the testimony of Dr. Thiel from Mendota revealed to Judge Raskin that the defendant suffered from a personality disorder which was, for all practical purposes, untreatable. This untreatable personality disorder is comparable to the new factor or objective, identifiable factual data unknown to the trial judge at the time of the defendant's original sentencing. Stated another way, the nature of the defendant's disorder constituted, `a fact or set of facts highly relevant to the imposition of sentence, but not known to the trial judge at the time of original sentencing, either because it was not then in existence or because, even though it was then in existence, it was unknowingly overlooked by all of the parties.' State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d 544, 546, 335 N.W.2d 399 (1983) (emphasis added), citing Rosado v. State, 70 Wis. 2d at 288. As we noted earlier in our analysis, the trial judge apparently strove to fashion a disposition which would rehabilitate the defendant through treatment, yet protect society from any further actions by the defendant. This was based partially upon Dr. Fogle's testimony that the defendant had cooperated in his treatment, had admitted to having sexual problems, and appeared to be benefiting from the therapy. However, at the February 11, 1982, hearing, Dr. Thiel testified that the defendant denied any responsibility for the offenses for which he had been convicted. The doctor's testimony indicates that the defendant boasted of his sexual prowess and, when asked about the concept of controlling his own sexual impulses, he made remarks that the doctor considered to show bravado. We further observe that the doctor testified that the defendant suffered from a personality disorder or characterological defect, which he described as follows: That is a characterological defect, where a person does not have internal control upon his beliefs and actions and feels not responsible for negative kinds of things that should happen to him. Dr. Thiel further testified that he has attempted to treat patients with personality disorders in the past and has had no success with such treatment. As we noted above, the doctor stated that such disorders are of a type which psychotherapy has little, if any, success in treating. He attributed this failure to psychotherapy to the dynamics of the disorder. The individual does not except [sic] responsibility for his or her position enough to have success in dealing within the realm of psychiatry and psychotherapy with a person, the person needs to be a participant in the process, has to recognize that he or she has difficulty. The doctor testified that neither inpatient nor outpatient therapy offers much benefit in treating such disorders. When asked to make an assumption regarding the treatment available at institutions other than Mendota, the doctor testified that he could not make the assumption that a person suffering from such a disorder is treatable. Upon further questioning regarding the effects of working with the defendant in a nonsecure setting, Dr. Thiel stated the following: It is impossible for me to predict people's behaviors. Given the past history of this particular individual and given that the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior, there is an increased chance that this individual's future behavior would be similar to his past behavior should there not be some constraints placed upon him. The untreatable nature of the defendant's personality disorder is clearly similar to a new factor in resentencing and justifies the inclusion of incarceration in the court's power to modify the terms of probation under sec. 973.09(3) (a), Stats. This new factor entirely frustrated the judge's intent and circumvented the dual purposes of probationto rehabilitate the defendant, yet protect society. It is obvious that the trial court fashioned its disposition based upon Dr. Fogle's testimony that the defendant was cooperating in his therapy sessions and accepting responsibility for his actions, particularly those involving the August 20, 1981, incident. A judge is not a psychologist or psychiatrist and necessarily may rely upon the opinions of such experts concerning what disposition would be most beneficial to the particular defendant. However, in this case the court's subsequent knowledge or realization of the untreatable nature of the defendant's disorder, coupled with the defendant's attitude indicating bravado for his own sexual prowess and impulsiveness, together with the increased chance that his future behavior would repeat past behavior, clearly represents a new factor. We find that this new factor justified the court's modification of the terms of probation to include incarceration of the defendant. This court has stated that whether a new factor warrants modification of a sentence is a question of discretion. State v. Hegwood, 113 Wis. 2d at 546. Discretion is not synonymous with decision-making. Rather, the term contemplates a process of reasoning. This process must depend on facts that are of record or that are reasonably derived by inference from the record and a conclusion based on a logical rationale founded upon proper legal standards. McCleary v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 263, 277, 182 N.W.2d 512 (1971). Keeping the above concerns in mind, we believe that the same argument may be applied to the instant case concerning the modification of probation. The record indicates that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion by choosing to modify the terms of probation to include incarceration. The trial court gave his reasons as follows: At the time that the Court imposed sentence of the conditional probation, neither the prosecution nor the defense nor the Court were [sic] apprised of the possibility that the defendant would not be accepted as a patient at Mendota. It did not cross the mind of any the parties, least of all the Court that the defendant, by his attitude that he'd ever need such treatment or was guilty of any wrong doing, could impede his acceptance as a patient and thereby frustrate the entire process of probation. Based upon the fact that the defendant had proved to be untreatable, a structured prison setting offered the only viable alternative available to the judge to ensure the protection of society by providing the necessary constraints upon the defendant's impulses. Because we have concluded that the judge exercised the proper discretion and authority by modifying the grant of probation to include incarceration, we must now address the issue of whether or not this action violates the double jeopardy provisions of the Wisconsin and Federal Constitutions.