Opinion ID: 1140801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Tortious-Interference-with-Contract Claim Against Systrends

Text: Systrends argues that it was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law on Group 8760's claim that it tortiously interfered with Brooks's employment agreement, because, it argues, that agreement was not enforceable. In that regard, Systrends adopts by reference the argument Brooks makes in his brief that the contract was void under Ala.Code 1975, § 8-1-1, because the geographic limitation of the noncompetition provision was not reasonable. We do not find that argument well taken, for the reasons already discussed. Systrends separately argues that because the restrictive covenant in Brooks's employment agreement appeared to Systrends to be void, it could not have intended to violate a valid contract. (Systrends' principal brief, pp. 52-53.) Systrends cites no authority in support of this argument and [w]hen an appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument on a particular issue, this Court may affirm the judgment as to that issue, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform an appellant's legal research. City of Birmingham v. Business Realty Inv. Co., 722 So.2d 747, 752 (Ala.1998). Systrends' further argument that Group 8760 failed to prove that Systrends intended to interfere with the contract because the evidence actually showed that Systrends went to significant links to insure that it did not interfere with the restrictive covenant (Systrends' principal brief, p. 54), is not sustained, given the reasonable inferences the jury was entitled to draw from the totality of the evidence, as already analyzed. That analysis also adequately established that Systrends' employment of Brooks in activities competitive to those of Group 8760 was detrimental to Group 8760. Accordingly, Systrends was not entitled to a judgment as a matter of law as to the tortious-interference-with-contract claim. We do agree with Systrends, however, that there was no evidence from which the jury reasonably could have based a determination of the share of the total damages that should be assigned to this particular claim. No witness, and no exhibit, shed any light on what portion, percentage, or quantity of the $9 million lump-sum damages figure could be attributed to Systrends' interference with Brooks's employment agreement. Therefore, Systrends was entitled to a new trial on that basis, and the trial court erred in denying its motion in that regard. As explained earlier, elimination of the compensatory-damages award necessitates elimination of the punitive-damages award also. Because of this disposition, we pretermit discussion of Systrends' several other arguments as to why it was entitled to a new trial.