Opinion ID: 1934004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the denial of bowen's motion for directed verdict

Text: At the conclusion of plaintiff's case, Bowen's moved for a directed verdict on the ground that the statute did not provide for recovery on the part of one who ingested alcohol but only in regard to innocent third parties and on the further ground that no common-law right of action existed in favor of such a person in this jurisdiction. The trial justice denied the motion. At the conclusion of all the evidence in the case, this motion was not renewed. It is well settled that the failure to renew a motion for directed verdict at the close of all the evidence forecloses appellate review of the denial of the motion. See, e.g., Simpson v. Dailey, 496 A.2d 126, 129-30 (R.I.1985); Hamrick v. Yellow Cab Co. of Providence, 111 R.I. 515, 304 A.2d 666 (1973); Young v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 109 R.I. 458, 287 A.2d 345 (1972); 1 Kent, R.I.Civ.Prac. § 50.1 (1969). Consequently we need not address the substantive issues concerning the existence or nonexistence of a common-law right of action in light of a dram-shop statute that only provides a remedy for third parties injured by the person who imbibes the alcoholic beverage. We shall leave that question to a case in which it is properly presented to us for appellate review. For the reasons stated, the defendant's appeal from the judgment and the plaintiff's appeal from the judgment based upon a directed verdict in favor of Kilroy are denied and dismissed. The judgment entered in the Superior Court is affirmed. The papers in the case may be remanded to the Superior Court.