Opinion ID: 754158
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Parental Rights Appeal

Text: 65 The remaining issue concerns the fees related to the parental rights appeal and petition for certiorari. This appeal originated when plaintiffs filed a motion for injunctive relief to compel compliance with the District Court's orders regarding court access. Glover v. Johnson, 850 F.Supp. 592 (E.D.Mich.1994). Plaintiffs were prompted by defendants' notice of decision to reduce funding for Prison Legal Services (PLS), the agency which provides legal assistance to female inmates, and to wholly eliminate PLS' provision of legal assistance on parental rights matters. The District Court interpreted its earlier orders on court access as having ordered the indefinite continuation of defendants' contract with PLS, which since 1978 had required PLS to provide assistance in the area of parental rights, and held defendants in contempt of those earlier orders. Id. at 594. The District Court also concluded that the elimination of legal assistance in the area of parental rights would violate plaintiffs' newly-enunciated constitutional right to legal assistance in parental rights matters. Id. at 595-601. 66 The district court proceedings were broader than those on appeal. What is relevant for our purposes here is not what happened below, but instead the issues litigated on appeal. Appeal no. 96-1617 was limited to whether defendants were required by court order or by the Constitution to provide plaintiff inmates with legal assistance in parental rights matters. Plaintiffs lost on both issues. Glover IV, supra, 75 F.3d 264. 67 In reversing, we first held that the court had abused its discretion in holding defendants in contempt because we found no order requiring the funding of legal assistance in any particular area of law. In the absence of a violated order, the contempt finding could not be sustained. Id. at 267. Next, we held that defendants are not constitutionally required to provide plaintiffs legal assistance in parental rights matters. Id. at 269. The Supreme Court denied plaintiffs' petition for certiorari. --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 67, 136 L.Ed.2d 28 (1996). 68 In awarding fees for appellate work on this matter, the District Court acknowledged this Court's conclusion that defendants had provided legal services for parental rights matters without the support of a direct order but nevertheless concluded that the work done by plaintiff contesting the termination of services was a post-judgment monitoring activity and is therefore compensable. We disagree with this conclusion. Given the lack of any remedial order, plaintiffs' counsel's efforts might best be characterized as a failed offensive attempt to expand the remedy. In such circumstances courts are less inclined to award fees. See, e.g., Ustrak v. Fairman, 851 F.2d 983, 990 (7th Cir.1988). Plaintiffs' attorneys' efforts do not qualify as post-judgment compliance monitoring and plaintiffs cannot rely upon their status as prevailing parties in the underlying litigation. We therefore reverse this portion of the challenged awards given plaintiffs' lack of success in appeal no. 96-1617 and in the petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court.