Opinion ID: 1915578
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Barry Guerke, Parkowski, Guerke & Swayze, P.A., Dover, Delaware, for appellants.

Text: Brian Thomas McNelis, Young & McNelis, Dover, Delaware, for appellee. Before STEELE, Chief Justice, HOLLAND, BERGER, JACOBS, Justices and NOBLE, Vice Chancellor [] constituting the court en banc. STEELE, Chief Justice for the Majority. Plaintiff-appellant Megan Berns' automobile collided with defendant-appellee Debra Doan's automobile on Doan's driveway. Upon finding the public highway blocked by a fallen tree, Berns attempted to use Doan's driveway to turn around. At the very time Berns pulled into the driveway, Doan was backing out of her driveway. The two vehicles collided and allegedly Berns and her daughter, Kylee were injured. Berns brought suit in Superior Court to recover for those alleged injuries. The trial judge granted Doan summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact in dispute because Berns trespassed on Doan's real property at the time of the accident, and because the premises guest statute, 25 Del. C. § 1501 bars trespassers' actions against private landowners for injuries or damages based on simple negligence. In Berns' first appeal, we held that Berns trespassed upon Doan's land and the premises guest statute barred her from recovering for any injuries caused by Doan's alleged ordinary negligence. [1] Berns moved for reargument and we granted her motion to consider whether the common law principles in Campbell v. Race [2] compelled a conclusion that Berns was a public invitee on Doan's land, rather than a trespasser, and, therefore, the premises guest statute would not apply. [3] We conclude that, because it was not inevitably necessary for Berns to enter Doan's real property, Berns and Kylee were trespassers whose claims the premises guest statute bars. Accordingly, we affirm the Superior Court's grant of summary judgment to the defendant.