Opinion ID: 464953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wright's Ability to Waive Constitutional Rights

Text: 18 Wright also argues on appeal that the trial court failed to undertake a sufficiently searching judicial inquiry before permitting Wright to testify in his own defense and to agree to certain stipulations. Wright's counsel concedes, as indeed he must, that the district court's personal examination of Wright concerning his decision to testify would have been adequate had Wright not been asserting an insanity defense. 3 Counsel argues, however, that the trial judge had a duty to undertake a more rigorous inquiry because Wright's sanity was at issue and suggests that the court should have sua sponte ordered a psychiatric examination to determine Wright's ability to make a knowing and voluntary waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. 19 A criminal defendant's waiver of any constitutional right must be knowing and intelligent. E.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938). Thus, the district court properly questioned Wright about his decision to take the stand. Nothing in that colloquy--and nothing in the testimony of any of the psychiatrists at trial--suggests that Wright was unable knowingly and intelligently to choose to take the stand. Where a trial judge has personally interviewed a defendant, where nothing in any surrounding circumstances indicates that the defendant's mental condition has interfered with the waiver of constitutional rights, and where the defendant's own counsel does not request a psychiatric examination prior to the waiver, we will not reverse the district court's finding that the waiver was knowing and intelligent. We note here that Wright had a very high level of intelligence, cf. United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721 (D.C.Cir.1976), and nothing in the record indicates that he might be incapable of making a reasoned choice to take the stand. Absent either the failure of a district court to examine the defendant or some evidence that a defendant's thought process was impaired, we cannot find that the district court erred in not ordering a psychiatric examination of Wright. 20 Wright relies on United States v. Brown, 428 F.2d 1100 (D.C.Cir.1970), to support his argument that the district court's acceptance of his stipulations was in error. In Brown, the district court accepted a defendant's stipulation that he had committed all acts charged in an indictment even though psychiatrists called by both the defendant and the government agreed that the defendant suffered from a mental disorder. This court reversed, holding that the trial judge was obliged to address the defendant personally to determine whether the defendant waived his rights voluntarily and with an understanding of the consequences of his action. 4 21 Two separate considerations underlay our holding in Brown, neither of which is implicated in this case. Our first concern in Brown was the analogy between the stipulations and a guilty plea. We have in later cases generally limited Brown 's requirement to hold an inquiry of the type required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to situations in which the stipulations entered are equivalent to a guilty plea. See United States v. Lawson, 682 F.2d 1012 (D.C.Cir.1982). No such inquiry is required where a defendant has not admitted his guilt and thereby waived trial on all issues. See United States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397, 404 (D.C.Cir.1978). The stipulations agreed to by Wright do not even approximate an admission of the acts charged in the indictment and hence do not raise Brown 's concern that a defendant understand the consequences of a stipulated trial. Cf. United States v. Strother, 578 F.2d 397. 22 The second consideration in Brown was the obvious concern that the defendant's mental disorder might preclude him from making a voluntary and knowing waiver of his rights. We have reiterated Brown 's concern for mentally disturbed defendants in later cases. See United States v. Dorsey, 449 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (D.C.Cir.1971). The present case poses a somewhat different question than that addressed in Brown, since Wright's stipulations are not analogous to a guilty plea. His stipulations did not waive his right to a jury trial and implicated only peripherally his privilege against compelled self-incrimination or his right to confront witnesses testifying against him. While the district court has a duty to ensure that the waiver of constitutional rights by a purportedly insane defendant is an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1023, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938), we find that the trial judge adequately fulfilled this duty in the present case. Any implicit waiver of constitutional rights in the stipulations was so attenuated as to be analogous to the tactical decisions we permit defense counsel to make daily for any defendant. As Wright raises no claim of ineffective assistance of counsel and as Wright was found competent to stand trial, we uphold the district court's acceptance of the stipulations.