Opinion ID: 2629719
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Application of Jumila

Text: Notwithstanding our decision to overrule Jumila, we review Brantley's arguments to ensure that he was not prejudiced by the circuit court's decision. Brantley argues that the circuit court erred in denying his motion because there is no question that Jumila should have been applied retroactively to him based upon the fact that the appellant in Jumila, like Brantley, also sought retroactive relief via a HRPP Rule 35 petition. Brantley further contends that the circuit court should not have considered the effect of the 1999 legislation on his case, nor delayed ruling on his motion to do so. Finally, Brantley contends that another section of the 1999 amendment to HRS § 134-6(a) expressly prohibits his conviction of both offenses. In light of our holding today, we need not address the circuit court's retroactivity analysis because we affirm its order on other grounds. See Taylor-Rice v. State, 91 Hawai`i 60, 73, 979 P.2d 1086, 1099 (1999) ([T]his court may affirm a judgment of the trial court on any ground in the record which supports affirmance.); State v. Taniguchi, 72 Haw. 235, 240, 815 P.2d 24, 26 (1991) ([W]here the decision below is correct[,] it must be affirmed by the appellate court[.]). Moreover, our decision today effectively precludes retroactive application of Jumila in collateral proceedings because our decision is binding on this and all other collateral petitions addressing this issue that are currently pending or on direct review. See State v. Jackson, 81 Hawai`i 39, 51, 912 P.2d 71, 83 (1996) (Where a new rule of law is applied to the appellant in the case, rather than limiting its application to future appeals, `persuasive federal authority would suggest that we would be obligated to apply the same rule to all other criminal proceedings currently pending in the court system.') (citing State v. Kekona, 77 Hawai`i 403, 411 n. 3, 886 P.2d 740, 748 n. 3 (1994) (Levinson, J., concurring and dissenting) (citing Powell v. Nevada, 511 U.S. 79, 84, 114 S.Ct. 1280, 128 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994))). Finally, we reject Brantley's contention that section 2 of the 1999 amendment to HRS § 134-6(a) mandates that his conviction be reversed. As discussed previously, section 1 of the 1999 amendment to HRS § 134-6(a) expressly stated that dual convictions are permitted. Section 2 of the 1999 amendment states that [t]his Act does not affect rights and duties that matured, penalties that were incurred, and proceedings that were begun, before its effective date. 1999 Haw. Sess. L. Act 12, § 2 at 12. Brantley argues that this language indicates that the legislature expressly intended that the 1999 amendment to the law not be applied retroactively. We agree. However, the 1999 amendment is inapposite to Brantley's case because he was convicted under the 1993 version of the law and sought relief pursuant to Jumila; he was not convicted under the law as it stood after the 1999 amendment. Because we overrule Jumila, the relief Brantley seeks is not available. Given our conclusion today that the legislature intended all along to permit dual convictions and amended the law in 1999 in order to address our contrary decision in Jumila, we do not believe, as Brantley urges, that by enacting section 2, the legislature intended to expressly disallow all dual convictions for the time period prior to the 1999 amendment, and then to allow the contrary practice of permitting dual convictions after the amendment. Rather, we think that section 2 was merely a statement that the newly-enacted 1999 amendment to HRS § 134-6(a) should not be applied retroactively.