Opinion ID: 781964
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Work-Related Misconduct

Text: 20 The Ortega Court also limited its holding to searches undertaken (1) for noninvestigatory work-related purposes or (2) to investigate work-related misconduct. Id. at 725-26, 107 S.Ct. 1492. The Court distinguished these sorts of searches from those searches seeking to find evidence of criminal misconduct, id. at 721, 107 S.Ct. 1492, reasoning that public employers are hardly in the business of investigating the violation of criminal laws. Id. at 722, 107 S.Ct. 1492. The Court expressly declined to address the appropriate Fourth Amendment standard when an employee is being investigated for criminal misconduct or breaches of other nonwork-related statutory or regulatory standards. Id. at 729 n. , 107 S.Ct. 1492 (emphasis added); see also Cerrone v. Brown, 246 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir.2001) ([ Ortega ] did not disturb the well-settled rule that probable cause is required for criminal investigations.). 21 Wiley argues that, in contrast to the search in Ortega, the search conducted by the Warden in this case was not an investigation simply to unearth evidence of work-related misconduct, but one with possible criminal implications requiring the existence of probable cause to sustain the search's legality. Wiley alleges that the correctional officers who conducted the search could have arrested him. However, in looking to ascertain whether the investigation is criminal in nature, the proper focus is not on the positions or capabilities of the persons conducting the search, but rather the reason for the search itself. See United States v. Fernandes, 272 F.3d 938, 943 n. 3 (7th Cir.2001) (analyzing the case pursuant to Ortega because, while the prosecutor ordering the search of Fernandes's office was in the business of investigating the violation of ... criminal laws, the search itself was not a criminal investigation, but rather undertaken to ensure that the work of the agency [was] conducted in a proper and efficient manner (quoting Ortega, 480 U.S. at 723, 724, 107 S.Ct. 1492)). Wiley argues that he could have been arrested pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1791, which provides for fines or imprisonment for providing or attempting to provide prohibited objects, including firearms, to a prison inmate. However, Wiley does not provide any evidence to indicate that the Warden ordered the search in view of § 1791. 22 Rather, the facts of this case indicate that the search of Wiley's car was an internal investigation for purposes of maintaining security and order in the Institution. The Bureau of Prison's Standards of Employee Conduct, Program Statement 3420.08, prohibits employees at the Institution from introducing contraband into or upon the grounds of any federal penal or correctional institution, or taking or attempting to take therefrom, anything whatsoever without the Warden's knowledge and consent.... The initial impetus for the search was the OIA memorandum, which requested that the Warden investigate the matter locally and forward a report of his findings to the OIA in Denver. The memorandum also informed the Warden that upon receipt of his report, the matter would be considered closed unless the Warden was requested to provide additional information. The memorandum thus signals that the purpose of the search of Wiley's car was not to ferret out possible criminal activity but to uncover workrelated misconduct in an internal investigation by the agency. 23 In conclusion, because the search of Wiley's car was a workplace search undertaken to investigate possible work-related misconduct, we agree with the Board that the search should be analyzed pursuant to the reasonable suspicion standard articulated in the Ortega decision.