Opinion ID: 1637248
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Preservation of Grillot's right against double jeopardy requires that we consider his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence before we consider alleged trial error even though the issue was not presented as the first issue on appeal. Davis v. State, 350 Ark. 22, 86 S.W.3d 872 (2002). In order to contest the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction on appeal, the defendant must move for a directed verdict at the close of the prosecution and again at the close of all the evidence. Ark. R.Crim. P. 33.1(a) (2002); Doss v. State, 351 Ark. 667, 97 S.W.3d 413 (2003). Moreover, we have made it clear that a defendant, in making his motions for directed verdict, must anticipate an instruction on lesser-included offenses and specifically address the elements of that lesser-included offense on which he wishes to challenge the State's proof in his motion. Brown v. State, 347 Ark. 308, 65 S.W.3d 394 (2001). At the close of the State's case-in-chief, Grillot made the following argument: [D]efense moves for a directed verdict as to Count 1, Capital Murder. On that basis, Judge, the evidence is clear that there is no underlying felony that has been proven in this case.... Jeremy Phillips [testified] he did it for premeditation, that he basically did it for hire.... [T]he State would have to show that Eric Grillot is an accomplice. There is no testimony whatsoever that shows Eric Grillot is an accomplice to Jeremy Phillips in that when he committed those murders. The statements and testimony is that basically Jeremy Phillips did this on his own, that anything Eric Grillot did was basically to cover up the murder, not to aid, abet or assist in the murder which was under the accomplice theory. So, we would ask for a directed verdict on the capital murder charge. Then, at the conclusion of all the evidence, Grillot moved for a directed verdict stating: [A]s to count 1, capital murder[,] ... [t]he evidence is clear that Jeremy Phillips was the person who pulled the trigger and the person who shot Will Jackson. That fact is uncontroverted. The only way that Mr. Grillot can be guilty of capital murder would be if he is found to be an accomplice; that he aided and abetted in the planning and the only evidence that indicates that that may have been true is Jeremy Phillips' statement.... Which is uncorroborated. The law is that his statement has to be corroborated with some evidence, independent evidence, to indicate the charges will be true. As the court said... at the end of the State's case[,] the only evidence the Court could find would be circumstantial evidence but felt circumstantial evidence was sufficient to go to the jury. Circumstantial evidence is not sufficient uncorroborated to make a finding that Eric Grillot was an accomplice.... [M]y understanding is that the State is amending the charge to add murder for hire. Well, the testimony is that the murder for hire was ___ was an act with Jeremy Phillips the shooter, testified that he was hired to do that. His testimony was that Eric did not plan. Again, that is accomplice testimony. It is uncorroborated. The only evidence we have of that is what Jeremy Phillips says. So as to the capital murder charge I move for a directed verdict on that charge. As a threshold matter, the State contends that the motion for directed verdict quoted above is insufficient to preserve a sufficiency challenge to his first-degree murder conviction because the directed-verdict motion addressed only the capital murder charge and not the lesser-included offenses. We agree. This court has held that, in order to preserve challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting convictions for lesser-included offenses, defendants must address the lesser-included offenses either by name or by apprising the trial court of the elements of the lesser-included offenses questioned by their motions for directed verdict. Haynes v. State, 346 Ark. 388, 58 S.W.3d 336 (2001) (concluding that challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a first-degree murder conviction was procedurally barred when the defendant was charged with capital murder and failed to move specifically for directed verdict on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder); see also Ramaker v. State, 345 Ark. 225, 46 S.W.3d 519 (2001). In the instant case, Grillot failed to move for a directed verdict on the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder. Not only did he fail to address the lesser-included offense of first-degree murder by name; but, he also failed to address the elements of the lesser-included offense as distinguished from the elements of the capital-murder charge. Contrary to the dissent's assertion that there was no distinction between capital murder and first-degree murder for this court to consider, the elements that the State had to prove in order to obtain a conviction on either offense were different. The instructions given to the jury demonstrate that the elements at issue in this case were not identical. The capital-murder instruction and the first-degree-murder instruction given at trial read, in relevant part, as follows: Eric Grillot is charged [as an] accomplice in the offense of capital murder. To sustain ... this charge, the State must prove the following things beyond a reasonable doubt. First, that Eric Grillot or an accomplice entered into an agreement that they would cause the death of another person in return for anything of value. And second, that pursuant to that agreement, they caused the death of William Jackson. Or ... that with premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of any person, Eric Grillot or an accomplice caused the death of William Jackson.     If you have a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt of capital murder, then you will consider the charge of first degree murder. To sustain this charge, the State must prove the following things beyond a reasonable doubt. That with the purpose of causing the death of William Jackson, Eric Grillot or an accomplice caused the death of William Jackson. Thus, in making his directed-verdict motion, Grillot was required to set forth the differing elements. [1] See Jenkins v. State, 350 Ark. 219, 85 S.W.3d 878 (2002); Brown v. State, supra ; Walker v. State, 318 Ark. 107, 883 S.W.2d 831 (1994). [2] Nonetheless, Grillot asserts that because he denied any and all liability for capital murder, he did not believe a lesser-included instruction would be warranted. On that basis, he contends there was no need to address the lesser-included offenses in his directed-verdict motions. This argument is without merit for the reasons stated later in this opinion when we address Grillot's asserted point of error regarding jury instructions. As noted by this court in Brown v. State, supra , a defendant, in making his motion for directed verdict, must anticipate an instruction on lesser-included offenses. 347 Ark. 308, 65 S.W.3d 394. In any event, the rules of criminal procedure and our case law are clear. As already stated, in order to preserve an argument based on the sufficiency of the evidence, a defendant must move for a directed verdict with specificity at the close of the State's case-in-chief and again at the close of all the evidence. Ark. R.Crim. P. 33.1(a); Haynes v. State, supra . Additionally, we have consistently held that first-degree murder is a lesser-included offense to premeditated capital murder. McFarland v. State, 337 Ark. 386, 989 S.W.2d 899 (1999); Allen v. State, 310 Ark. 384, 838 S.W.2d 346 (1992); Bell v. State, 296 Ark. 458, 757 S.W.2d 937 (1988). A mere belief that a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense should not be submitted does not obviate the defendant's duty to move for a directed verdict with specificity. Grillot also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for aggravated robbery and theft of property, contending that there was no evidence he intended to deprive the owner of any property. A person commits aggravated robbery if he commits robbery and he is armed with a deadly weapon or represents by word or conduct that he is so armed, or he inflicts or attempts to inflict death or serious physical injury upon another person. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-12-103 (Repl. 1997). A person commits robbery if, with the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor theft or resisting apprehension immediately thereafter, he employs or threatens to immediately employ physical force upon another. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-12-102 (Repl.1997). A person commits theft of property if he [k]nowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another person with purpose of depriving the owner thereof. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(a)(1) (Repl.1997). Deprivation of property requires the disposal under circumstances that make its restoration unlikely. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-36-101(4)(C) (Repl.1997). In this case, Phillips took money from Jackson after killing him. In addition, Grillot took Jackson's truck and abandoned it in another state. Then, he threw the keys to the truck and Jackson's wallet in the Gulf of Mexico. All these acts stemmed from an event where a deadly weapon was used. From these facts, a jury could reasonably infer that neither the truck nor the wallet were likely to be restored to Jackson, or his estate. Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support the aggravated robbery and theft-of-property convictions.