Opinion ID: 789130
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of a procedural right designed to protect plaintiffs' interests

Text: 19 Appellants fail to show that a procedural right sufficient for standing has been violated. Not all procedural-rights violations are sufficient for standing; a plaintiff must show that the procedures in question are designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. at 2143 n. 8 (emphases added). 20 With respect to the organizational plaintiffs, the procedural rights at issue are clearly insufficient for standing, as the procedures at issue were not designed to protect some threatened concrete interest of the organizations. The No Child Left Behind Act required the Secretary to select individuals to participate in such process from among individuals or groups that provided advice and recommendations, including representation from all geographic regions of the United States, in such numbers as will provide an equitable balance between representatives of parents and students and representatives of educators and educational officials. 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(3)(B). Nowhere does the Act make mention of advocacy organizations' interests. The only interests arguably enjoying implicit protection here are those of parents, students, educators and education officials; although the advocacy groups may be representatives of parents and students, the interests to be protected are those of the parents and students, not of the organizations. 21 Even in the case of the individual plaintiff, Lindsey, it is not at all clear that the Act's procedures regarding the negotiated rulemaking process were designed to protect the interests of parents and students. The structure of § 6571 as a whole shows that Congress manifestly did not endorse protective litigation regarding the formation of the committee amidst the time-limited rulemaking process. The Act specifically mandated that [s]uch [rulemaking] process shall be conducted in a timely manner to ensure that final regulations are issued by the Secretary not later than 1 year after January 8, 2002[.] 20 U.S.C. § 6571(b)(4)(A). And, as noted above, the Act created a complex process for crafting federal and state regulations that would affect parents' and students' interests, including the Act's provision for the selection of an equitable balance of committee members. These provisions do not offer any promise of purposeful protection of the concrete interests of students and parents. Appellants cite the Conference Report for evidence that Congress sought to `ensu[re] that the views of both program beneficiaries and program providers are fairly heard and considered.' Brief for Appellants at 9 (quoting H.R. CONF. REP. 107-334, at 809, reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1230, 1352). This is not persuasive evidence of protective design. To the extent that the legislative history is relevant to the question before us, we note that the language of the report does not support Appellants' position; if anything, it weighs against it: The Conferees do not intend this language to require strict numerical equality or comparability among these representatives. Rather, the Conferees intend the Secretary to have flexibility in selecting the [committee members.] H.R. CONF. REP. 107-334 at 809, reprinted in 2001 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1230, 1352. 22 With respect to the organizational plaintiffs, the NCLBA clearly did not create procedural rights designed to protect their concrete interests. With respect to Lindsey, the NCLBA did not clearly create such a right; but as the next section of this standing analysis makes clear, even if NCLBA did create such a right, she has not suffered injury sufficient to establish standing. 23