Opinion ID: 4374878
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Emergency Grievances

Text: Rachel contends that he exhausted all his claims by submitting two grievances labeled as emergency grievances to Grogan, JCCC 14-193 and JCCC 14-221. Rachel complained of stomach and chest pain and sought immediate medical care. He asserted that his situation was an emergency and he couldn’t wait for a reply to an RTS. Grogan returned each of these grievances unanswered, noting, “Complaint is not of a sensitive and/or emergency nature as described in [the grievance policy]; consequently, the standard grievance process outlined in [the policy] must be followed.” R., Vol. I at 126, 141. Rachel appealed to McCoy, who returned both appeals unanswered. McCoy told Rachel it was his “responsibility to submit [his] grievance correspondence properly.” Id. at 129, 144. And she advised him to submit a Request for Health Services via the sick call process at JCCC. Rachel didn’t re-submit either grievance through the standard, non-emergency grievance process. 4 The district court held that Rachel failed to exhaust any claim via his first emergency grievance, JCCC 14-193, because he didn’t complete the grievance process. See Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding an inmate who starts the grievance process but doesn’t complete it hasn’t properly exhausted his administrative remedies). The same reasoning applies to Rachel’s second emergency grievance, JCCC 14-221.2 Rachel argues that his emergency grievances were sufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies because he believed that his situation was an emergency and he therefore met the requirements for filing emergency grievances. But Grogan determined, pursuant to the ODOC grievance policy, that JCCC 14-193 and JCCC 14-221 didn’t qualify as emergencies. And the policy gives Grogan, JCCC’s HSA, the authority to determine whether a grievance labeled as an “emergency” by an inmate is, in fact, an emergency. R., Vol. I at 104 (designating the HSA as the Reviewing Authority), 117 (authorizing the Reviewing Authority to determine if a grievance is an emergency). Rachel can’t rely on his own interpretation of the grievance process as permitting him, rather than ODOC, to decide what qualifies as an emergency grievance. See Thomas v. Parker, 609 F.3d 1114, 1119 (10th Cir. 2010) (“Plaintiff’s disagreement with prison officials as to the appropriateness of a 2 Although the district court didn’t reach the same holding as to JCCC 14-221, defendants argued it was procedurally defective in their summary judgment brief and they repeat that contention on appeal. See Schanzenbach v. Town of Opal, 706 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2013) (“We can affirm on any ground supported by the record, so long as the appellant has had a fair opportunity to address that ground.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 5 particular procedure under the circumstances, or his belief that he should not have to correct a procedural deficiency does not excuse his obligation to comply with the available process.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rachel’s argument that the defendants nonetheless received adequate notice of his claims through his improper emergency grievances also lacks merit. See Jernigan, 304 F.3d at 1032 (rejecting inmate’s contention that he exhausted his claims because he gave notice to defendants by means other than the grievance process). After determining that Rachel’s grievances didn’t qualify as emergencies, Grogan directed him to use the standard grievance process. He failed to do so. Thus, his two emergency grievances, JCCC 14-193 and JCCC 14-221, weren’t sufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies as to any claim against any defendant.