Opinion ID: 1940064
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Parts of Section 376.313(3) Evidencing an Intent to Create a Cause of Action

Text: Other aspects of the statute further evidence the legislature's intent to create a cause of action rather than modify existing ones. The title of section 376.313, Nonexclusiveness of remedies and individual cause of action for damages under ss. 376.30-376.319, implies the creation of a new cause of action. We have previously stated that in determining legislative intent, we must give due weight and effect to the title of the section. State v. Webb, 398 So.2d 820, 824-25 (Fla.1981). The title is more than an index to what the section is about or has reference to; it is a direct statement by the legislature of its intent. Id. Another subsection further illuminates the Legislature's intent. Section 376.313(1) provides that [t]he remedies in ss. 376.30-376.319 shall be deemed to be cumulative and not exclusive. This language evidences an intent in section 376.313(3) to create an entirely new cause of action cumulative to the common law. See St. Angelo v. Healthcare & Ret. Corp. of America, 824 So.2d 997, 999 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (A `cumulative remedies' clause in a statute usually does not supersede other common law remedies.); cf. Flo-Sun, Inc. v. Kirk, 783 So.2d 1029, 1036 (Fla.2001) (concluding that interpreting a cumulative remedies clause in section 403.191, Florida Statutes (1995), to foreclose other remedies would be less than intellectually credible). Finally, we find it probative that the statute contains an attorney's fees provision allowing a plaintiff to recover reasonable attorney's and expert witness fees. See § 376.313(6), Fla. Stat. (2002). Because attorneys' fees are not available in actions under the common law, the Legislature's provision for attorneys' fees is evidence that it was creating a new cause of action. All these factors  the statute's provision of a damages remedy for the non-negligent discharge of pollution; the defenses provided in the statute, including the inclusion of lack of causation as an affirmative defense; and other aspects of the statute such as its title, the cumulative remedies clause and the attorney's fees provision  when combined with the statutory directive that section 376.313(3) should be liberally construed lead to the inevitable conclusion that the statute creates a cause of action for strict liability regardless of causation. See Gary K. Hunter, Statutory Strict Liability for Environmental Contamination: A Private Cause of Action to Remedy Pollution or Mere Legislative Jargon?, Fla. Bar J., Jan. 1998, at 50, 51 (proposing that given the title of section 376.313(3) and the phrase not prohibiting a cause of action, [c]oupled with the further direction in the statute that such a suit would not require the plaintiff `to plead or prove negligence in any form or manner'; the specification of the limited defenses to such an action; and the inclusion of a cost and attorneys' fee award to the injured party, it is challenging to perceive any intent other than the creation of a private right of action for strict liability).