Opinion ID: 2621936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Oklahoma statutory and jurisprudential standards.

Text: ¶ 11 The clear, explicit, unmistakable and mandatory [14] language of 43 O.S. 2001 § 134(B) [15] directs trial courts to provide in divorce decrees that, upon death or remarriage of the recipient, unaccrued alimony payments shall cease. Recipients may avoid termination of alimony payments if, within 90 days of the date of the wedding, they commence an action to demonstrate that the alimony is still needed and that the circumstances have not rendered payment inequitable. ¶ 12 The wife relies on Stuart v. Stuart, 1976 OK 107, 555 P.2d 611, for the proposition that if a decree contains no indication that the parties intend that support terminate on death or remarriage of the wife, the same remains payable. Because Stuart is distinguishable on its facts, the reliance is misplaced. ¶ 13 The Stuart Court held that the evidence supported a finding that the decree was a consent decree which could not be modified and should not result in termination of support on death or remarriage. Nevertheless, in Stuart, the property settlement agreement did not designate whether the alimony payment, or any portion thereof, was support alimony or alimony in lieu of property division. Here, there is no such ambiguity. The agreement clearly designates the alimony as such and contains a separate provision encompassing the division of property. [16] ¶ 14 The duty of the husband to make continuing support payments is not required under Oklahoma law for multiple reasons. First, the wife did not commence any action in an attempt to demonstrate her continued need or the husband's ability to pay the awarded monthly support. We considered almost identical statutory language [17] in Kildoo v. Kildoo, 1989 OK 6, 767 P.2d 884. In so doing, we determined that the ninety day period would not be extended either because the recipient misconstrued the divorce decree or misunderstood the legal consequences of failing to commence such an action. Here, the wife did not commence an action in an attempt to require continuation of the support payments. Rather, she merely defended the husband's suit to terminate payment, which was filed well outside the ninety day period of the statutory provision. ¶ 15 Second, the language of the decree, considered in light of Oklahoma jurisprudence, is insufficient in and of itself to support continued payments following the wife's remarriage. Although we have upheld the continued payment of alimony where the statutory protections are clearly waived by agreement of parties or otherwise, [18] we have refused to require continued support payments following remarriage where: 1) the divorce decree was silent as to the parties intent vis a vis the requirement for payments to continue following the recipient's remarriage; [19] and 2) the consent decree incorporating language denominating payment as support did not contain clear language indicating that payments would not terminate upon remarriage and the recipient did not commence an action for continued payment within ninety days of the remarriage. ¶ 16 In the instant cause, the decree requires the husband to make support alimony payments until the wife's death. It contains no language relating to the wife's remarriage or indicating that the statutorily based termination conditions of 43 O.S. 2001 § 134(B) [20] are waived. Therefore, we hold that neither the statute nor our jurisprudence support continued alimony payments to the wife following her remarriage.