Opinion ID: 1249250
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: injury to children, whether trespasser, licensee or business visitor

Text: Before the plaintiff can recover against the defendant ... the plaintiff must prove, by the greater weight of the evidence, each and all of the following: 1. That there was (a, an artificial) condition on defendant's (premises), at a place where the defendant knew, or had reason to know, children were likely to be; 2. That the defendant knew, or had reason to know, of the existence of this condition; 3. That the defendant knew, or had reason to know, that the condition involved an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to children likely to be there. The question is whether there was any evidence from which to infer that Lois knew or should have known that a dangerous condition existed. Lois stated that she knew Eugene had used a carpet knife in the storage room the night before the accident but that she did not have any reason to believe that the carpet knife had not been put away. Lois testified that she knew Eugene kept tools for his carpet business in a toolbox in the storage room. Eugene had not previously left knives lying around and had always put away the knives. Lois had never before seen a knife within Braxton's reach. Giving all reasonable inferences to the plaintiffs, we cannot say that Lois knew or had reason to know of this dangerous condition. The trial court did not err in refusing to give the instruction to the jury regarding premises liability as to Lois or in granting a partial directed verdict on this issue. The plaintiffs next assert that the trial court erred in denying their motion to amend the petition. Permission to amend a pleading is addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Thrift Mart v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 251 Neb. 448, 558 N.W.2d 531 (1997), overruled on other grounds, Hornig v. Martel Lift Systems, 258 Neb. 764, 606 N.W.2d 764 (2000). Amendment of a petition is not a matter of right. Darrah v. Bryan Memorial Hosp., 253 Neb. 710, 571 N.W.2d 783 (1998). At the close of the evidence, the plaintiffs moved to amend their petition to insert a business invitee allegation. The trial court sustained the defendants' objection because the amendment restructured the petition and contained a theory of recovery involving Lois on both supervision and premises liability. The court stated that all theories of recovery would be appropriately charged to the jury but later decided not to submit to the jury the plaintiffs' theory that Braxton had the status of a business invitee. The plaintiffs argue that based on the evidence adduced at trial, Braxton was a business invitee because consideration had been paid or furnished by Michael for the babysitting services which the defendants had provided to Braxton. The defendants testified that Lois babysat as often as two or three times a week for short periods and that Michael would occasionally pay cash or sometimes do work for the defendants. Lois testified that she did not receive payment on this particular occasion. She enjoyed the opportunity to spend time with Braxton. The plaintiffs claim this arrangement was a quid pro quo and that the defendants received sufficient consideration to clothe Braxton with the status of being a business invitee while on the premises for babysitting purposes. In Palmtag v. Gartner Constr. Co., 245 Neb. 405, 415, 513 N.W.2d 495, 502 (1994), we stated: In general, an invitee is a person who goes on the premises of another in answer to the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant on the business of the owner or occupant for the mutual advantage of both parties. In Skinner v. Ogallala Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 262 Neb. 387, 631 N.W.2d 510 (2001), we stated that if the invitation relates to the business of the one who gives it, or is given for the mutual advantage of a business nature for both parties, the party receiving the invitation is an invitee. Contrary to the plaintiffs' assertion, we find that the evidence did not establish that Braxton was a business invitee or that the defendants were involved in a babysitting business. We cannot conclude that because the defendants enjoyed the company of Braxton, there was a mutual advantage of a business nature between the parties. Braxton's visits to the defendants' home did not relate to a babysitting business operated by the defendants, and the relationship between the defendants and Braxton did not constitute a business venture. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs' motion to amend their petition. The plaintiffs also claim that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on the theory that Braxton was a business invitee or, in the alternative, in refusing to modify the instruction to include a duty to inspect the premises and protect Braxton from any dangerous conditions. To establish reversible error from a court's refusal to give a requested instruction, an appellant has the burden to show that (1) the tendered instruction is a correct statement of the law, (2) the tendered instruction is warranted by the evidence, and (3) the appellant was prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the tendered instruction. Mobeco Indus. v. City of Omaha, 257 Neb. 365, 598 N.W.2d 445 (1999). As previously discussed, there was no evidence to establish that Braxton was a business invitee on the defendants' premises. The plaintiffs failed to establish that this instruction was warranted by the evidence. Therefore, the trial court properly refused to so instruct the jury. The plaintiffs argue that if the jury was not given a business invitee instruction, then the instruction given should have been modified to include a duty to inspect. The plaintiffs claim that even though the original petition did not specifically allege a failure to inspect, the other allegations of negligence are broad enough to encompass the duty to inspect. The plaintiffs argue that the instruction given by the trial court did not provide as much protection as the business invitee instruction and was therefore contrary to the law and public policy aimed at the protection of young children. The plaintiffs assert that in premises liability cases involving children, the jury should be instructed that the owner or occupier had a duty to inspect the premises. The jury was instructed to assess whether Lois had negligently supervised Braxton. Lois testified that Eugene always put away his tools in the storage room and that he never left sharp items lying in low places. The evidence does not establish that Lois knew or should have known that there was a dangerous condition existing on the premises which would impose a duty on her to inspect the home.