Opinion ID: 1667146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The application of Stromberg v. California

Text: ś 47. On appeal Thorson argues for the first time that his death sentence must be vacated due to the rule of independent sufficiency announced in Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S.Ct. 532, 75 L.Ed. 1117 (1931). Two rules were derived from Stromberg. First, a general verdict must be set aside if the jury was instructed that it could rely on any of two or more independent grounds, and one of those grounds is insufficient, because the verdict may have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 881, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2745, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). Thorson argues this rule of Stromberg applies because although the jury was given three separate aggravators to consider, the jury only properly found one aggravator to exist, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(d). Thorson's arguments are barred by his failure to present it to the trial court. Notwithstanding the procedural bar of raising this issue for the first time on appeal, this Court has previously determined that the jury properly found all three aggravators which were properly submitted to them to exist. Therefore, this rule of Stromberg does not apply. ś 48. The second rule of Stromberg encompasses a situation in which the general verdict on a single-count indictment or information rested on both a constitutional and an unconstitutional ground. Zant, 462 U.S. at 882, 103 S.Ct. 2733. Thorson argues this rule is applicable again citing the jury's nonstatutory and presumed, disassociated articulation of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(e). Notwithstanding the procedural bar, this Court has previously discussed this issue and has determined that the jury properly found that Thorson committed the offense for the purpose of avoiding arrest. Therefore, the second rule of Stromberg also is inapplicable to the case at bar. This issue is also without merit.