Opinion ID: 2305456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: New Trial on Damages Alone

Text: [¶ 27] Finally, Patricia contends that if a new trial was warranted, it should have been on damages only. Patricia, however, offers no analysis of how two separate juries could decide the closely-linked issues of the degree of comparative negligence and the appropriate reduction of damages, nor does she offer any authority for the proposition that a new trial can be granted on damages alone in a comparative negligence case. She cites McKellar v. Clark Equipment Co., 101 F.R.D. 93, 95 (D.Me.1984), where the federal court granted a bifurcated trial in a comparative negligence case, but that opinion actually undermines her argument. The decision to bifurcate in McKellar was based on the court's conclusion that the issues of comparative fault and damage reduction can be treated as free-standing issues which, if tried to the same jury, may be resolved in strict accordance with the requirements of the substantive law of the State of Maine on comparative negligence. Id. (emphasis added). In the present case the question of damages is `so interwoven with that of liability that the former cannot be submitted to the jury independently of the latter without confusion and uncertainty, which would amount to the denial of a fair trial.' 2 FIELD, MCKUSICK & WROTH, MAINE CIVIL PRACTICE § 59.2 (2d ed.1970) (quoting Gasoline Prods. Co. v. Champlin Refining Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500, 51 S.Ct. 513, 75 L.Ed. 1188 (1931)). The court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a complete new trial. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.