Opinion ID: 1763829
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred when it refused to order reasonable attorney fees to the guardian ad litem?

Text: ¶ 6. Smith argues that the youth court erred by approving payment for only $4,000 of her $13,787.81 fee. [3] She contends that she put much more time into In re L.D.M. than other guardians ad litem in Warren County put into their cases, only two other guardians ad litem have worked more than five hours on a delinquency case, and that the court had no case to accurately compare with In re L.D.M. She argues that the court did not find her fees unreasonable, but only in excess of the amount normally paid to attorneys in Warren County, and that any comparison of the present case to cases from the Warren County Chancery Court is not supported by any evidence. ¶ 7. We review the grant or denial of attorney's fees under an abuse of discretion standard. Ladner v. Logan, 857 So.2d 764, 773 (Miss.2003). Miss.Code Ann. § 43-21-121(6) (Rev.2000) states that [u]pon order of the youth court, the guardian ad litem shall be paid a reasonable fee as determined by the youth court judge or referee out of the county general fund as provided under Section 43-21-123. To be eligible for such fee, the guardian ad litem shall submit an accounting of the time spent in performance of his duties to the court. (emphasis added). ¶ 8. Smith states that guardians ad litem have an affirmative duty to zealously represent the child's best interest. M.J.S.H.S. v. Yalobusha County Dep't of Human Servs., 782 So.2d 737, 741 (Miss. 2001). She also cites language that a guardian ad litem is to be compensated for his or her efforts. See Miss. R. Civ. P. 17(d) (In all cases in which a guardian ad litem is required, the court must ascertain a reasonable fee or compensation to be allowed and paid to such guardian ad litem for his service rendered in such cause, to be taxed as a part of the cost in such action.); In re Newsom, 536 So.2d 1 (Miss.1988). However, she does not point to anything that indicates that the youth court's decision was unreasonable or that it abused its discretion as to the amount of compensation. ¶ 9. This Court has listed factors to be weighed when considering the proper amount of attorney fees to be awarded: (1) the relative ability of the parties; (2) the skill and standing of the attorney employed; (3) the nature of the case and novelty and difficulty of the questions at issue; (4) the degree of responsibility involved in the management of the case; (5) the time and labor required; (6) the usual and customary charge in the community; and (7) preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case. Lahmann v. Hallmon, 722 So.2d 614, 623 (Miss.1998) (citing McKee v. McKee, 418 So.2d 764, 767 (Miss.1982)). ¶ 10. Although the youth court did not mention the McKee factors, it is evident that factors three and six weigh heavily in favor of the trial court's decision. The youth court explained that the reasonableness of Smith's fee had to be based on the normal amount of compensation paid to guardians ad litem in the locality. It stated that other cases in the chancery court as complex as the present case only warranted $2,000 in fees, and that the normal fee paid to guardians ad litem is under $500 per hearing in cases that normally require only one hearing. It found that $500 per hearing is reasonable because there is a steady flow of lawyers willing to accept similar cases at that rate. The youth court then recognized the complexity of In re L.D.M. and awarded Smith a higher amount than what it considered reasonable for the usual case. It is clear that the court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to order payment of the Smith's entire fee; its award of only $4,000 of Smith's fee was reasonable.