Opinion ID: 76470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Nelson v. Campbell

Text: 10 In his § 1983 complaint in the district court and in his current Motion before this Court, Robinson emphasizes the United States Supreme Court's recent grant of certiorari in Nelson v. Campbell and argues that we must stay his execution until Nelson is decided by the Supreme Court. 3 We disagree for two reasons. First, the grant of certiorari alone is not enough to change the law of this circuit or to justify this Court in granting a stay of execution on the possibility that the Supreme Court may overturn circuit law. See Ritter v. Thigpen, 828 F.2d 662, 665-66 (11th Cir.1987); Thomas v. Wainwright, 788 F.2d 684, 688-89 (11th Cir. 1986); Bowden v. Kemp, 774 F.2d 1494, 1494 (11th Cir.1985). Second, and more important, the Defendants point out that there are material factual and legal distinctions between Nelson and this case in any event. 11 In Nelson, the petitioner had severely compromised veins, and Alabama proposed to use a cut-down procedure to gain venous access preliminarily to the lethal injection. 347 F.3d at 911. Nelson claimed that this cut-down procedure, and not the lethal injection itself, constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. Alabama's cut-down procedure would require making a two inch incision in Nelson's upper arm for the purpose of locating a peripheral vein to perform a central line procedure. Id. at 911, n. 1. In light of this circuit's precedent, the majority opinion in Nelson properly determined that Nelson's § 1983 claim was the functional equivalent of a second habeas petition and dismissed Nelson's § 1983 complaint because Nelson did not obtain this Court's permission to file a second habeas petition prior to filing in the district court as required by 28 § U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). 347 F.3d at 912. The majority opinion also correctly concluded that even had Nelson sought court permission to file a second habeas petition, the facts alleged indicated that Nelson's application would have been denied for failure to meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Id. 12 The dissent in Nelson stressed that petitioner Nelson was not challenging his execution by lethal injection and was not seeking to avoid lethal injection. Id. at 913-15 (Wilson, J., dissenting). Instead, Nelson merely requests that a different, more humane procedure know as `percutaneous central venous cannulation' be used to carry out his execution, rather than the outmoded and painful `cut down' procedure. Id. at 915. The dissent continued that [r]egardless of which procedure is used, Nelson will be executed by lethal injection in accordance with his sentence. Id. Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the bottom line in this case is that the outcome of Nelson's petition has no effect on either his sentence or his conviction, and therefore cannot properly be construed under any circumstances as the equivalent to a subsequent habeas petition. Id. 13 In contrast, Robinson's § 1983 complaint does challenge his execution by lethal injection as violative of the Constitution and seeks to avoid entirely execution by lethal injection. Thus, whether this Court's decision about the cut-down procedure in Nelson is affirmed or reversed, Robinson's § 1983 complaint will remain the functional equivalent of a successive habeas petition. 14 We recognize that paragraph 25 of Robinson's § 1983 complaint does contain this summary and speculative allegation: The Plaintiff has severely compromised blood flow due to high blood pressure and hypertension. Plaintiff's condition increases the likelihood (a) that Defendants will mutilate Petitioner by performing a cut-down or central line, an invasive surgical procedure for which Defendants are not trained.... In their response to the district court, the Defendants correctly pointed out that [d]espite the hyperbole of Robinson's complaint, there is no indication that his veins are compromised in the same manner as Nelson's, nor is there any indication that either a cut-down procedure or a central line procedure will be necessary. The Defendants further emphasized that the cut-down procedure is necessary only when a suitable vein cannot be located. There is no factual basis and no proffered evidence to support the notion that Robinson's veins are compromised in any fashion or the speculation that any cut-down procedure may be necessary. 4 15 Further, in the district court and now on appeal, the Defendants also properly point out that Robinson's lethal injection claim is essentially the same as in the cases of Kevin Zimmerman and Billy Frank Vickers, both of whom were executed by lethal injection following denials of stays of executions based upon substantially the same lethal injection claims as those contained in Robinson's § 1983 complaint. See Vickers v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1196, 157 L.Ed.2d 1224, 2004 WL 168080 (U.S. Jan. 28, 2004) (stay denied); Zimmerman v. Johnson, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 979, 157 L.Ed.2d 792 (Dec. 15, 2003) (stay denied); see also Beck v. Rowsey, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 980, 157 L.Ed.2d 811 (Jan. 8, 2004) (Supreme Court vacated stay entered by district court). 5 The Defendants stress that the Supreme Court denied stays of execution in these cases even after Nelson. On appeal, the Defendants also cite In re Roe, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1196, 157 L.Ed.2d 1224, 2004 WL 189771 (U.S. Feb. 2, 2004), as an additional case where the defendant, like Robinson, challenged the drugs used in the lethal injection, but the Supreme Court denied a stay of execution even after Nelson. 16 We agree with the Defendants and conclude that Plaintiff Robinson's § 1983 complaint challenges and seeks to avoid his execution by lethal injection and therefore necessarily implicates the validity of his death sentence. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2372-73, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Any alleged claims about the cut-down procedure lack an evidentiary basis in this record. 6