Opinion ID: 1131067
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: evidence of garner's wealth

Text: Defendants next contest the trial court's refusal to exclude evidence of Garner's wealth until a prima facie finding of liability for punitive damages could be made by the court. The trial court rejected defendants' objections and allowed plaintiffs to refer to Garner's substantial wealth in the opening statement and again during Garner's examination. Defendants first claim that the trial court should not have instructed the jury to consider wealth as a factor in assessing punitive damages. Defendants raise this claim for the first time on appeal. With limited exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal. [27] Because no valid exceptions exist, we do not address this issue. Next, defendants allege that the trial court erred by not requiring a finding of liability for punitive damages before admitting evidence of Garner's wealth as mandated by Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(2). [28] The appropriate standard of review for a trial court's interpretation of statutory law is correction of error. [29] The trial court found that subsection 78-18-1(2) was not applicable because it specifically applies only to claims for punitive damages arising on or after May 1, 1989. [30] Plaintiffs' claims arose prior to the statute's effective date, the court reasoned, thereby precluding its application. Defendants now argue that plaintiffs' claims arose after the statute's effective date, when the wood construction was actually discovered in May of 1990. However, defendants failed to present this argument to the court below and, indeed, conceded in their motion in limine that plaintiffs' claims arose before the statute went into effect. Therefore, they may not raise this issue on appeal. [31] Defendants also argue that subsection 78-18-1(2) is procedural and therefore should have been applied retroactively at trial. They rely on Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, Inc., [32] in which we stated, `Procedural statutes enacted subsequent to the initiation of a suit ... apply not only to future actions, but also to accrued and pending actions as well.' [33] This exception to the general rule that statutes are applied prospectively only [34] is valid. However, the specific legislative mandate that subsection 78-18-1(2) applies only to claims for punitive damages arising on or after May 1, 1989, precludes application of the exception here. Therefore, that subsection provides no assistance to defendants. Our discussion of wealth does not stop there, however. Although both the parties and the trial court focused on subsection 78-18-1(2)'s application as being the determinative issue, defendants also generally argue that the wealth evidence was prejudicial, raising concerns under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. Plaintiffs' attorney revealed Garner's substantial wealth to the jury, with the court's acquiescence, in his opening statement. Over defendants' vehement objections, plaintiffs were also allowed to present Garner's financial statement (listing his assets at over seven million dollars) and tax returns to the jury. Defendants argue that regardless of the statute's application, admission of evidence of Garner's wealth deprived them of a fair trial on the issue of liability. Prior to the enactment of subsection 78-18-1(2), a general concern for use of wealth evidence existed at common law. [35] We recognize the potentially prejudicial effect information of a defendant's wealth can have in a jury trial. As one scholar noted, [R]ich men do not fare well before juries, and the more emphasis placed on their riches, the less well they fare. [36] In Wilson v. Oldroyd , this court first contemplated a bifurcated procedure for determining liability and assessing punitive damages: As to admitting testimony concerning defendant's financial condition: It is for the trial court to determine in the first instance whether the facts are such that malice can be found, and if so, it is well settled that it is proper to receive evidence and consider the wealth of the defendant as bearing upon the issue of punitive damages. [37] Hence, before section 78-18-1 was enacted in 1989, evidence of a defendant's wealth could be admitted after the trial court determined that the plaintiff had made a prima facie showing of liability for punitive damages. This court has not elaborated on the necessity of a prima facie showing since Wilson was decided in 1954, and subsection 78-18-1(2) now supersedes that decision. However, we must decide for the purposes of this case whether an adequate prima facie showing was made. We think that it was. Our review of the record reveals that the trial court actually did determine that a sufficient showing of malice was made and that wealth evidence could be admitted. However, the court did not make that determination until the close of plaintiffs' case-in-chief, after Garner's substantial wealth was already revealed to the jury. Although the record is devoid of an actual prima facie finding prior to that time, the trial court did have sufficient information before it on which such a showing could be made. That information included the parties' extensive summary judgment motions relating to the release, detailed trial briefs, and two motions in limine. By the time the trial began, the court was well versed on both sides' evidence and was adequately prepared to make a prima facie finding concerning the existence of malice before any wealth evidence was admitted. We find that the trial court substantially complied with the common law procedure in place prior to enactment of subsection 78-18-1(2) and did not err by admitting evidence of Garner's wealth. [38]