Opinion ID: 1652181
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the indictment was void as a matter of law

Text: ¶ 18. Harrison argues that the indictment against him was insufficient because it did not say that goods were kept in the church for use, sale, deposit, or transportation. Harrison failed to preserve this error for appeal by challenging the sufficiency of the indictment by demurrer. However, as Harrison contends, there is no waiver of such an issue where it is alleged that an essential element of a crime is omitted from an indictment. Taylor v. State, 214 Miss. 263, 58 So.2d 664 (1952). In Taylor this court held that since the intent to steal was an essential element of the crime the appellant's failure to demur to the indictment did not constitute a waiver of his right to raise the question on his motion for a new trial and on appeal. Taylor, 214 Miss. at 268, 58 So.2d at 666 (citations omitted). However it should be noted that the sufficiency of the indictment was not even presented in the motion for a new trial. ¶ 19. This assignment of error is based more on punctuation and form rather than any substantive merit. The indictment was inartfully drafted in pertinent part as follows: That STEVEN HARRISON, KEVIN WALTERS, late of the County aforesaid, did on or about the 01st day of January in the year of our Lord, 1996, in the County and State aforesaid, unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously break and enter Lowery Creek Church, located at Rt. 1 Seminary, with the felonious and burglarious intent to take, steal and carry away the goods, or valuable things, for use, sale, deposit or transportation, against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. Miss.Code Ann. § 97-17-33 (1994), the statute under which Harrison was charged, prohibits the breaking and entering, with intent to steal, of any building in which any goods, merchandise, equipment or valuable thing shall be kept for use, sale, deposit or transportation. ¶ 20. Harrison's only cited authority is Brown v. State, 209 Miss. 636, 48 So.2d 131 (1950). In that case we reversed the trial court for sustaining a demurrer to the indictment. We quoted an earlier case which said: Under this statute, the breaking and entering of a house of the character therein described with intent to steal therein is burglary only where goods, merchandise, or other valuable things are kept therein `for use, sale, deposit or transportation.' Consequently, the purpose for which the goods, etc., are kept in the building is one of the elements of the offense created by the statute, and must be alleged in the indictment either in the words of the statute or their equivalent.... Brown, 209 Miss. at 640, 48 So.2d at 132 (quoting Cannon v. State, 133 Miss. 567, 570, 98 So. 63, 64 (1923)). In this case we have a different situation. Although the indictment is inartfully drafted, unlike the Brown case, the words are contained in the indictment. ¶ 21. Furthermore the Brown case was decided before the adoption of Rule 7.06, Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules. This Court explained that Whatever may have been the law in former days, our starting point today for consideration of a question such as this [whether the indictment was legally adequate for aggravated assault although it did not include the words `under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life'] is Rule 2.05, Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court Practice [now Rule 7.06]. Harbin v. State, 478 So.2d 796, 798 (Miss.1985). The indictment under which Harrison was charged contained each of the seven items required under Rule 7.06 of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules. Harrison has not shown that the misplacement of the words for use, sale, deposit or transportation prejudiced him in any way or that he was unaware of what crime he was charged with committing or that he was unable to prepare an adequate defense because of the indictment. ¶ 22. The State further argues that this Court has looked at a similar situation before in Henderson v. State, 445 So.2d 1364 (Miss. 1984). In Henderson, we considered an indictment and found that although inartfully worded, it did sufficiently charge the defendant with business burglary. Id. at 1368. The Court stated, So long as from a fair reading of the indictment taken as a whole the nature and cause of the charge against the accused are clear, the indictment is legally sufficient. Id. The State points out that the indictment under consideration in this case could be read two ways: that the goods or valuable things were kept for use, sale, deposit or transportation, or that Harrison stole them for one of these purposes. This is a fair reading of the indictment as it is written. We find that the indictment was legally sufficient in that Harrison was properly advised of what crime he was being accused and it did contain the necessary elements of the crime charged. ¶ 23. In conclusion, we find that the out-ofcourt statement testified to at trial by Shoemake was inadmissible hearsay. It was offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted, that something was missing from the church after the break-in. However, on the record as whole we are convinced this error was harmless and Harrison received a fair trial. ¶ 24. The evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. In addition, the indictment was legally sufficient, although inartfully drafted. It did meet all the necessary requirements and gave Harrison sufficient knowledge of what crime he was being accused of in order to enable him to prepare an adequate defense. ¶ 25. CONVICTION OF BURGLARY AND SENTENCE OF FIVE (5) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AFFIRMED. PRATHER, C.J., PITTMAN, P.J., and McRAE, JAMES L. ROBERTS, Jr., SMITH, MILLS and WALLER, JJ., concur. BANKS, J., dissents with separate written opinion.