Opinion ID: 764814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Travelers' Cross-Appeal

Text: 27 Travelers principally argues on its cross-appeal that the district court erred in refusing to give what Travelers terms a same actor instruction an instruction to the effect that where the plaintiff is hired and fired by the same decisionmaker (especially within a short period of time) the jury may infer that the decisionmaker did not act with discriminatory animus. In particular, Travelers requested the following instruction: 28 In this case, you have heard undisputed evidence that Hal Dufault hired the plaintiff in to [sic] the LP & E Communications Unit in 1988 when she was 44 years old, and that Mr. Dufault also made the decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment in January of 1994 when she was 49 years old. On the basis of these undisputed facts that Mr. Dufault both hired the plaintiff and decided to terminate her employment, within a short time span of five years, you may infer that his decision to terminate her employment was not motivated by her age. 29 Although the district court refused to so instruct the jury, it later explained to the attorneys that it was perfectly appropriate for defense counsel to argue ... that there's an inference the jury can draw that there was no age discrimination because of that. In fact, defense counsel did take the opportunity in his closing argument to urge the jury to draw this inference. 7 30 The parties agree that we have previously recognized the availability of the same actor inference. In Grady v. Affiliated Cent., Inc., 130 F.3d 553 (2d Cir.1997), cert. denied --- U.S. ----, 119 S.Ct. 349, 142 L.Ed.2d 288 (1998), we affirmed a district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant in an employment discrimination case. In the process, we made the following, pertinent observation: 31 Although each case must involve an examination of all the circumstances, some factors strongly suggest that invidious discrimination was unlikely. For example, when the person who made the decision to fire was the same person who made the decision to hire, it is difficult to impute to her an invidious motivation that would be inconsistent with the decision to hire. This is especially so when the firing has occurred only a short time after the hiring. 32 Id. at 560 (citations omitted). 8 We then proceeded to examine the record evidence and determined that it would not permit a reasonable factfinder to infer that the plaintiff was the victim of discrimination. One of many considerations that influenced that decision was the fact that the plaintiff had been hired and fired within eight days by the same individual. See id. at 561. 33 However, we did not have occasion in Grady to adopt a rule requiring district courts to instruct jurors on the availability of the same actor inference, and we decline to impose such a rule here. The district court properly permitted Travelers to urge the jurors to draw this commonsensical inference from the facts, and we see no reason why the jurors would have needed an instruction from the judge in order to consider doing so.
34 Travelers also argues that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 50. In particular, Travelers argues that the trial evidence failed to permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Banks was discharged due to her age. On the basis of the trial evidence catalogued above, we conclude that the district court properly denied this motion. 35 One of Travelers' arguments deserves specific discussion. Travelers argues that it has asserted a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision to discharge Banks namely, Dvorachek's superior score on the evaluations conducted by Dufault and Grabowski and that Banks has failed to show that this asserted reason was actually pretext for discrimination. See, e.g., Austin v. Ford Models, Inc., 149 F.3d 148, 152-53 (2d Cir.1998) (discussing shifting-burden test used to evaluate ADEA claims). As discussed above, the trial evidence would have allowed a reasonable juror to infer that Travelers pre-selected Dvorachek and did not actually base its decision to discharge Banks rather than Dvorachek on its purported staff adjustment process. In addition, the evidence would have allowed a factfinder to conclude that Banks had the superior qualifications. Nevertheless, Travelers argues that even if the decision to retain Dvorachek over Banks was unfair, the record does not include any evidence on which a finder of fact could reasonably attribute such unfairness to discrimination on account of Banks's age. 36 We recognize that a disparity in the ages of an ADEA plaintiff and her replacement or successor will not, by itself, always suffice to demonstrate invidious discrimination. First of all, the discrepancy in age may be too small to stand by itself as a predicate for a finding of discrimination. See O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313, 116 S.Ct. 1307, 134 L.Ed.2d 433 (1996) (inference of discriminatory basis for discharge can not be drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly younger) (emphasis added). In addition, we have recognized that where the record contains evidence of other possible non-discriminatory reasons for discharge apart from the reason shown to be pretextual an inference of discrimination may not be reasonable. See Hollander v. American Cyanamid Co., --- F.3d ----, 1999 WL 170733, at  5 & n. 3,  37 7 & n. 5 (2d Cir. Mar.29, 1999) (noting that plaintiff was replaced by two employees, one of whom was 11 years younger, but concluding as follows: [T]he record before us shows that the stated reason may have been a pretext for various non-discriminatory reasons. This is not a case in which a finder of fact could reasonably conclude that [plaintiff's] termination was, more probably than not, due to age discrimination because no other, non-discriminatory explanation was possible.). In the instant case, however, the 22-year difference in the ages of Banks and Dvorachek can hardly be considered insignificant as a matter of law. In addition, this is not a case like Hollander, in which the record contained a variety of plausible non-discriminatory reasons for the plaintiff's discharge. Assuming that the jury concluded as it was permitted to do on the facts presented that Dvorachek was selected over Banks even though Banks was recognized as the better qualified candidate, the record appears to be devoid of any consideration other than the wide age discrepancy between the two candidates that could explain such preferential treatment accorded Dvorachek. Under the circumstances presented here, the jury was entitled to infer that age was the decisive factor in this contest between the only two candidates for the remaining position. Because Travelers has failed to present a persuasive ground on which to upset the jury's verdict in Banks's favor, we conclude that the district court properly denied defendant's Rule 50 motion.