Opinion ID: 1288094
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Supervisory Liability

Text: The third certified question involves the issue of whether a supervising police officer can be civilly liable for the wrongful actions of his subordinate officers. Because we retain flexibility in determining how to address questions that are certified to us, [17] we will reframe the third question as follows: Whether a supervising police officer can be held liable for the wrongful actions of his subordinate officers in connection with an alleged civil rights violation? [18] While Appellee appears to suggest in her brief that supervisory liability exists under a traditional master/servant relationship, this mechanism for imposing liability is nonexistent. As the district court explained in Mackay v. Lowe, 529 F.Supp. 504 (E.D.Pa. 1982): [I]mposition of vicarious liability on supervisory officials for allegedly unconstitutional acts by their subordinates is inappropriate because supervisors and their subordinates are fellow servants of the same master-employer ... and thus the master-servant relationship, a prerequisite for vicarious liability, is lacking between these individuals. Id. at 505 (quoting Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F.Supp. 136, 148 (E.D.Pa.1977)). In the recent decision of in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009), a case filed by a Pakistani Muslim in connection with his arrest and detention following the September 11, 2001, attacks, [19] the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of supervisory liability in the federal analog to a section 1983 case, otherwise known as a Bivens case. [20] Addressing the issue of vicarious liability, the high court stated: [R]espondent correctly concedes that Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. ... Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to Bivens and § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution. ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1948. The Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that `knowledge and acquiescence [by supervisors] in their subordinates' use of discriminatory criteria to make classification decisions among detainees' was sufficient to find that the supervisors had committed a constitutional violation. Iqbal, ___ U.S. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Concluding that the term `supervisory liability' is a misnomer in a section 1983 suit or a Bivens suit, the high court determined: Absent vicarious liability, each Governmental official, his or her title notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct. In the context of determining whether there is a violation of clearly established right to overcome qualified immunity, purpose rather than knowledge is required to impose Bivens liability on the subordinate for unconstitutional discrimination; the same holds true for an official charged with violations arising from his or her superintendent responsibilities. Id. at ___, 129 S.Ct. at 1949.