Opinion ID: 1770740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: False Issuing

Text: Although the evidence is constitutionally sufficient to support a conviction of forgery by false issuing, we conclude that the district court committed trial error by preventing the defendant from exercising his right to confront and cross-examine two of the prosecution witnesses, Kirk Tracy and Bobbie Lindsey, as to evidence tending to show whether defendant had intent to defraud or knowledge of forgery when he endorsed and issued the check. In order to prove forgery by false issuing, the state must show that defendant was guilty of [i]ssuing or transferring, with intent to defraud, a forged writing, known by the offender to be a forged writing.... La. R.S. 14:72 (para. 2). The prosecution presented cogent evidence that the check in question was stolen from the automobile dealership while defendant was its employee, that the signatures of the makers did not belong to any employee of the dealership and that the dealership owed defendant only $30.34 at the time he endorsed and transferred the $550 check. In cross-examining the prosecution witnesses, defense counsel sought to overcome this evidence of defendant's intent to defraud and knowledge of forgery by asking such questions as whether the company ever paid its employees bonuses, whether defendant was owed a bonus, what were the company's methods and times of remunerating car salesmen, how many cars the defendant had sold in December, whether the company owed defendant any additional money, whether defendant had put up a deposit on a demonstrator which was due to be repaid to him, what were the company's procedures regarding employees' use of demonstrators, and what were the circumstances under which the dealership recovered the demonstrator automobile which had been assigned to defendant. In each instance the trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the question. With respect to virtually every question, the prosecutor failed to state any grounds for his objection and the court failed to give any reason for its ruling. The trial court's rulings constituted error and misuse of discretion. For two centuries Anglo-American judges and lawyers have regarded the opportunity of cross-examination as an essential safeguard of the accuracy and completeness of testimony, and they have insisted that the opportunity is a right and not a mere privilege. McCormick, On Evidence, § 19, at 47 (3rd ed. 1984); 5 J. Wigmore, Evidence, § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974). The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of an accused in a criminal prosecution to be confronted with the witnesses against him. This right is secured for defendants in state as well as federal criminal proceedings. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406, 85 S.Ct. 1065, 1069, 13 L.Ed.2d 923, 928 (1965). The confrontation clause of our state constitution directly affords each accused the right to confront and cross-examine the witness against him, ... La. Const. art. 1, § 16. Confrontation means more than being allowed to confront the witnesses. Our state constitution expressly guarantees a defendant the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. Id. The U.S. Supreme Court cases construing the Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause hold that a primary interest secured by it is the right of cross-examination. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 347, 353 (1974) (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418, 85 S.Ct. 1074, 1076, 13 L.Ed. 2d 934, 937 (1965)). Cross-examination is the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of his testimony are tested. Subject to the discretion of a trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interrogation, the cross-examiner is not only permitted to delve into the witness's story to test the witness's perceptions and memory, but the cross-examiner has traditionally been allowed to impeach, i.e., discredit, the witness. Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. at 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d at 353; State v. Nash, 475 So.2d 752, 754-755 (La.1985); State v. Hillard, 398 So.2d 1057, 1059-1060 (La. 1981); State v. Toledano, 391 So.2d 817, 820 (La.1980). The three main functions of cross-examination are: (1) to shed light on the credibility of the direct testimony; (2) to bring out additional facts related to those elicited on direct; and (3) to bring out additional facts which tend to elucidate any issue in the case. McCormick, supra, § 29, at 63; See La.R.S. 15:280; Proposed Louisiana Code of Evidence, art. 611(B) and the comments thereto. See also Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 415-417, 94 S.Ct. at 1110-1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 353-354; State v. Nash, supra. Defense counsel's questions were reasonably calculated to serve all of the main functions of cross-examination. First, the cross-examination was reasonably calculated to bring out additional facts related to those elicited on direct and to other issues in the case. Each question was designed to elicit relevant evidence, namely, evidence having a tendency to make the material fact of intent to defraud or knowledge of forgery more or less probable than it would have been without the evidence. Second, the cross-examination was reasonably designed to shed light on the credibility of the state's witnesses. Generally, a party, to attack the credibility of a witness, may examine him concerning any matter having a reasonable tendency to disprove the truthfulness or accuracy of his testimony. State v. McClinton, 399 So.2d 178, 181 (La.1981); State v. Weathers, 320 So.2d 895, 898 (La.1975); see, e.g., Proposed Louisiana Code of Evidence art. 607. One of the main lines of attack upon the credibility of a witness is an attack by showing a defect of capacity in the witness to observe, remember or recount the matters testified about. McCormick, supra, § 33, at 73. Here the test of relevancy is not whether the answer sought will elucidate any of the main issues, but whether it will to a useful extent aid the court or jury in appraising the credibility of the witness and assessing the probative value of the direct testimony. McCormick, supra, § 29, at 63-64. One of the recognized approaches to questioning for this purpose is the exploratory line designed to test by experiment the ability of the witness to remember detailed facts of the nature of those he recited on direct, or his ability accurately to perceive such facts, or his willingness and capacity to tell the truth generally, without distortion or exaggeration. A rule limiting this line of questions to those relevant to the main issues would cripple the usefulness of this kind of examination. Id. Consequently, we believe that the defense counsel's cross-examination inquiry as to defendant's possible entitlement to bonuses, repayment of deposits, or other additional remuneration was proper examination on matter having a reasonable tendency to disprove the truth or accuracy of the testimony on direct examination. Although we recognize that the trial judge should have discretionary power to control the extent of examination, the court in the present case imposed much too tight a rein on the cross-examiner and unduly curbed the usefulness of the examination. From our examination of the record we see no threat of undue prejudice to a witness, waste of time from extended exploration, or substantial harm to the complaining party that would justify such a restraint. See Alford v. U.S., 282 U.S. 687, 694, 51 S.Ct. 218, 220, 75 L.Ed. 624, 629 (1931); McCormick, supra, § 29, at 64-65. Indeed, on the basis of the limited cross-examination that was permitted, the jury might well have thought that defense counsel was engaged in an inquiry into totally irrelevant evidence or that the court held the particular witnesses in such high esteem that they were to be considered beyond question or reproach. Moreover, it is evident that to make any legitimate effort to bring out additional facts relevant to the case and to shed light on the witnesses' credibility, defense counsel should have been permitted to expose to the jury the facts from which the jurors, as sole triers of fact and credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to whether the defendant was due additional sums from the dealership or reasonably could have believed that he was. These facts were crucial to the jurors' fair and impartial determination of whether the defendant endorsed the check with intent to defraud and with knowledge of forgery. The defendant was thus denied the right of effective cross-examination which is a constitutional error of the first magnitude. State v. Nash, supra, 475 So.2d at 755; see Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 318, 94 S.Ct. at 1111, 39 L.Ed.2d at 355; Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131, 88 S.Ct. 748, 749-750, 19 L.Ed.2d 956, 958-959 (1968); Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3, 86 S.Ct. 1245, 1246, 16 L.Ed.2d 314, 316-317 (1966). It is well established that a substantial denial of the right to cross-examine for bias or interest cannot be regarded as harmless error, for it violates a right to confrontation fundamental to a fair trial. State v. Nash, supra, 475 So.2d at 755; State v. Senegal, 316 So.2d 124, 126-127 (La.1975); State v. Elias, 229 La. 929, 933-934, 87 So.2d 132, 134 (1956). Further, we see no reason to believe that only cross-examination directed at bias is sufficiently important to require this constitutional protection. Cross-examination involves discrediting a witness's perceptions and memory as well as his veracity. See Davis v. Alaska, supra, 415 U.S. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1110, 39 L.Ed.2d 353-354. Other impeachment techniques often provide more effective means of attacking credibility. For example, evidence of prior inconsistent statements is highly damaging to a witness's credibility and has been thought to produce at least as much impact on a jury as cross-examination directed at bias. McCormick, supra, § 33, at 72-73; Note, Constitutional Restraints on the Exclusion of Evidence in the Defendant's Favor: The Implications of Davis v. Alaska, 73 Mich.L. Rev. 1465, 1471 (1975). In the present case, a demonstration that the dealership owed the defendant more money, or that he reasonably could have thought it did, would have been highly effective in discrediting the direct testimony. The existence of a constitutional violation should depend not upon the category of impeachment but upon whether the defendant was prevented from using any impeachment that would have been potentially effective in his case.