Opinion ID: 1998534
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Recusal of Sentencing Judge

Text: Prior to the commencement of the eligibility phase of the death penalty hearing, defendant filed a motion for an in camera hearing. The motion sought to obtain information regarding whether ex parte communications from the sheriff's department had been made to the trial judge regarding threats to the trial judge by defendant and whether such information had prompted the trial judge to order additional security for herself, including having someone start her car. The motion further stated defendant's concern that such ex parte contacts reflected adversely on defendant at the sentencing hearing. The motion concluded that the trial court erred in not timely notifying defendant about the additional security arrangements and therefore requested an in camera hearing to address this matter. After hearing arguments by defense counsel regarding this motion, the trial court denied any improper ex parte contacts, and refused defendant's request for an in camera hearing. Defendant now argues that, under these circumstances, the trial judge erred in failing to recuse herself from the sentencing hearing or, at a minimum, from the hearing on defendant's motion. Initially, we note that the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether he or she is prejudiced against the defendant. See People v. Evans, 125 Ill.2d 50, 80, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360 (1988). The trial judge's decision will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See People v. Wilson, 37 Ill.2d 617, 621, 230 N.E.2d 194 (1967). After considering the record, we find that the trial judge did not abuse her discretion in not recusing herself from either considering the motion or presiding over the sentencing hearing. A judge should disqualify himself or herself where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including instances where the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. See 155 Ill.2d R. 63(C)(1)(a). In this case, there is no basis for questioning the trial judge's impartiality and no indication of prejudice against defendant. The record contains no evidence of any ex parte communications concerning the merits of this case. The trial judge denied any improper contacts with anyone from the sheriff's department regarding threats by defendant and the need for additional security. Rather, the trial judge indicated that additional security was routinely ordered in capital cases. Moreover, when sentencing defendant, the trial judge neither referred to any alleged threats made by defendant against the court nor gave any indication that such threats influenced her sentencing decision or impeded her ability to give defendant a fair trial. Parenthetically, we note that a trial judge has the duty to protect the safety of individuals in the courtroom by ordering additional security measures when necessary. In People v. Ashford, 168 Ill.2d 494, 214 Ill.Dec. 237, 660 N.E.2d 944 (1995), the defendant argued that the sentencing judge had improperly considered an ex parte memorandum from the sheriff's department. The memorandum recommended additional security procedures at the sentencing hearing because defendant was prone to violent outbursts and planned to disrupt the courtroom following sentencing. This court held that there was no evidence that the sentencing judge improperly considered the memorandum for sentencing purposes, after noting that the sentencing judge did not refer to the memorandum or indicate that it influenced his sentencing decision. See Ashford, 168 Ill.2d at 508, 214 Ill.Dec. 237, 660 N.E.2d 944. We likewise find that the trial judge here merely instituted additional security measures, and did not engage in conduct that might result in questioning the judge's impartiality. We therefore reject defendant's claim as unsupported by the record.