Opinion ID: 2343191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: van zandt's deposition testimony (# 13, 21, 22, & 28)

Text: Five (5) days before trial, the Commonwealth moved the trial court to allow it to take the deposition of Appellant's ex-wife, Bylynn Van Zandt, for use at trial. According to the Commonwealth, Ms. Van Zandt, a resident of Oklahoma, was unable to travel to Kentucky for the trial because of complications with her pregnancy. Over Appellant's objection, the trial court granted the Commonwealth's motion, and counsel for both the Commonwealth and Appellant traveled to Oklahoma and took Ms. Van Zandt's deposition via video. Ms. Van Zandt testified that she had met up with Appellant and Reese in Texas shortly after their escape and had brought Appellant money and certain items  handcuffs, music tapes, and clothing. The Commonwealth used Ms. Van Zandt's testimony to link Appellant to the items found in Brady's pickup truck and thereby discredit Appellant's defense that he was not in Kentucky. At trial, the video was played twice for the jury  once during the Commonwealth's case-in-chief and again during the jury deliberations at the jury's request. Appellant raises a series of arguments with respect to Ms. Van Zandt's testimony, specifically: (a) the trial court erred by allowing the Commonwealth to introduce the video deposition without proving that Ms. Van Zandt was constitutionally unavailable to testify; (b) the Commonwealth's discovery violations in connection with Ms. Van Zandt's video deposition warrant a new trial; and (c) the trial court erred when it replayed Ms. Van Zandt's testimony during the jury's deliberations, but allegedly discouraged the jury from rehearing other witnesses' testimony. We find none of Appellant's arguments persuasive and we find no error in the trial court's rulings. As to Appellant's first argument, we observe that RCr 7.20(1) permits the introduction of deposition testimony at a criminal trial under certain circumstances: At the trial or upon any hearing, a part or all of a deposition, so far as otherwise admissible under the rules of evidence, may be used if it appears: that the witness is dead; or that the witness is out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of sickness or infirmity, or that the party offering the deposition had been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena.... While RCr 7.20(1) permits the introduction of deposition testimony if it appears ... that the witness is out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, the United States Supreme Court held in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), that a witness's mere absence from the jurisdiction does not make that witness unavailable for trial. Id., 390 U.S. at 723, 88 S.Ct. at 1321, 20 L.Ed.2d at 259. Consequently, [r]eliance upon [RCr 7.20(1)] ... is not conclusive when a defendant claims a denial of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation. Lovett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 103 S.W.3d 72, 82 (2003). See also id. at 84. In short, a witness is not `unavailable' for purposes of ... the confrontation requirement unless the prosecutorial authorities have made a good-faith effort to obtain his presence at trial. Barber, 390 U.S. at 724-5, 88 S.Ct. at 1321-22, 20 L.Ed.2d at 260. This constitutional dimension of witness unavailability is reflected in the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. See Robert G. Lawson, The Kentucky Evidence Law Handbook, § 8.45(IV) at 433 (3d ed. Michie 1993) (A showing that would meet the requirements of [KRE 804] would simultaneously satisfy the constitutional dictates of the Confrontation Clause.) The Commonwealth argues that Ms. Van Zandt was unavailable to testify in person at Appellant's trial because of complications associated with her pregnancy at the time. KRE 804(a)(4) provides: `Unavailability as a witness' includes situations in which the declarant  (4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity[.] At a hearing on the Commonwealth's motion seeking the trial court's authorization to take Ms. Van Zandt's deposition for presentation at trial, the Commonwealth explained that Ms. Van Zandt's attorney had contacted them regarding his client's medical condition and that Ms. Van Zandt's physician subsequently faxed a letter showing that she's not able  medically able to travel. The record reflects that the Commonwealth handed the physician's letter to Appellant's trial counsel. In a subsequent pleading, the Commonwealth explained that: [T]he witness is unable to travel to Kentucky for medical reasons. During the 2:30 p.m. August 13, 1998 telephone conference call, the Commonwealth stated that the information precipitating the request for a deposition had been received that same day. The Commonwealth had been informed that the witness is approximately 5½ months pregnant. She was reported to have been hospitalized that day for surgery associated with her pregnancy and, for the duration of trial, she is under a doctor's order not to travel.... The accuracy of this reported information can be explored during the deposition itself. The trial court's findings in its written order for Appellant's transport to the deposition in Oklahoma reflect that the trial court accepted the Commonwealth's proof as to Van Zandt's unavailability: it further appearing that it is necessary due to the medical condition of an essential witness to take the out of state deposition of said witness, Bylynn Van Zandt, and it further appearing that to adequately protect the defendant Michael Dale St. Clair's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation his appearance at that deposition is necessary.... Appellant argues that the failure of the Commonwealth to produce any sworn testimony as to Van Zandt's unavailability to testify at trial made the introduction of her deposition improper. It is black-letter law that [t]he ultimate question is whether the witness was unavailable despite good-faith efforts undertaken prior to trial to locate and present that witness [and] ... the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that predicate, Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 74-5, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2543-44, 65 L.Ed.2d 597, 613 (1980). Cf. Justice v. Commonwealth, Ky., 987 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1998) (put [ting] the onus on the party offering evidence under KRE 804(b) to show that the witness was unavailable). However, the KRE 104(a) & (b) preliminary determination of [w]hether a witness is `unavailable,' ... is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial judge whose decision will not be reversed unless it is clearly unreasonable. Lovett, 103 S.W.3d at 83. See also Brooks v. Commonwealth, Ky., 114 S.W.3d 818, 821-22 (2003). And, the trial judge has the discretion to determine the sufficiency of the showing which would justify the reading of an absent witness'[s] testimony [.] Bruce v. Commonwealth, Ky., 441 S.W.2d 435, 437 (1969). Although the Commonwealth could have made a much cleaner record in this regard by tendering the letter from Ms. Van Zandt's physician to the court, filing with the Court an affidavit from either the physician or the prosecutor himself, see Brooks, 114 S.W.3d at 821, or questioning Ms. Van Zandt as to her physician's orders during the video deposition, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Ms. Van Zandt unavailable on the basis of the Commonwealth's assurances. See Ruppee v. Commonwealth, Ky., 821 S.W.2d 484, 486 (1991); Bruce, 441 S.W.2d at 437. Appellant raises three (3) allegations of error concerning alleged discovery violations in connection with Ms. Van Zandt's testimony. As to the first, we agree with Appellant that the trial court should have sustained Appellant's objection to Ms. Van Zandt's testimony that Appellant had told her about breaking into this old man's house because the Commonwealth had not complied with RCr 7.24(1) by disclosing the substance of this oral incriminating statement known by the attorney for the Commonwealth to have been made by Appellant to Ms. Van Zandt. For the reasons outlined above in Part III(D)(2), however, Appellant's own subsequent testimony as to his crimes at Stephens's home makes the error harmless. We find Appellant's other arguments, which allege that the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory evidence, unpersuasive. Prior to the video deposition and outside the presence of Appellant and his counsel, the Commonwealth asked Ms. Van Zandt to identify the clothing found in Brady's vehicle, and Ms. Van Zandt told the prosecution that the blue jeans and army jacket were not the clothes she had brought to her husband when she met him in Texas. Appellant asserts that the Commonwealth's failure to disclose this allegedly exculpatory evidence to the defense in a timely fashion, i.e., prior to or during the video deposition when Appellant's trial counsel would have an opportunity to preserve testimony to that effect for presentation at trial, violated the Commonwealth's duties as established in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). In Brady , the United States Supreme Court held that the suppression of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Id., 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218. It is fundamental, however, that the materiality of a failure to disclose favorable evidence must be evaluated in the context of the entire record. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976). And the mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome does not establish materiality in the constitutional sense. Id., 427 U.S. at 112 n. 20, 96 S.Ct. at 2401-02, 49 L.Ed.2d at 354 n. 20. Because we find no reasonable probability that Ms. Van Zandt's statement as to the clothing found in Brady's pickup would have changed the verdict in this case if disclosed to the defense and introduced at trial, we find no Brady violation in the Commonwealth's failure to disclose it. Because there is no evidence whatsoever that the Commonwealth gave or promised Ms. Van Zandt anything in exchange for her testimony, we find no merit in Appellant's contention that the Commonwealth violated its Brady duties by failing to disclose an agreement, deal, or understanding that, from all indications, did not exist. Appellant's trial counsel vigorously cross-examined Ms. Van Zandt as to her motivations for testifying and her concerns that she could be charged as a co-conspirator for assisting Appellant after his escape. As to Appellant's final allegation of error concerning Ms. Van Zandt's testimony, we observe that [a]ny decision to allow the jury to have testimony replayed during its deliberations is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Baze v. Commonwealth, Ky., 965 S.W.2d 817, 825 (1997). The trial judge in this case did not abuse that discretion when it replayed Ms. Van Zandt's videotaped deposition over Appellant's objection that doing so would improperly highlight her testimony. Both times the videotaped deposition was played, the trial court admonished the jury to give the witness the same credence... that you would give her if she were here to testify in person. We disagree with Appellant's contention that the trial court, in its response to a juror's inquiry whether it was possible to review transcripts of the witness' [sic] testimony ... back in the jury room, limited or chilled the jurors' ability to request that additional testimony be read back to them. The trial court correctly answered [y]ou cannot review transcripts back in the jury room. see RCr 9.74, and explained [i]f you want a particular witness' [sic] testimony read back to you by the reporter the Court will consider that request. Given that the trial court had the discretion as to whether and to what extent trial testimony would be re-read at the jury's request, the court's additional commentary  [b]earing in mind that we don't want to read back the whole trial that's been going on for three weeks  did not deprive Appellant of due process.