Opinion ID: 1597851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Intentional and Systematic Discrimination

Text: Next, Bates raises various claims relating to his jury selection. First, Bates argues that the jury selection process in his case was unconstitutional. Attacks on a jury selection process must be raised on direct appeal. Robinson v. State, 707 So.2d 688, 698 (Fla.1998); Spenkelink v. State, 350 So.2d 85 (Fla.1977). Accordingly, this claim provides no basis for postconviction relief. Even if Bates' claim was not barred, it is meritless. To establish a claim that the jury venire fails to reflect a cross-section of the community in violation of the Sixth Amendment, Bates must prove: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process. Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); see also Gordon v. State, 863 So.2d 1215, 1218 (Fla. 2003) (quoting and applying Duren ). Bates did not allege any facts that could establish that any discrepancy was systematic. See Gordon, 863 So.2d at 1218 (Because Gordon has not initially established a prima facie showing in his motion that [African-Americans] were systematically excluded from the jury selection process, his claim was properly summarily denied by the trial court.). Accordingly, this claim was meritless. Further, to the extent Bates argues that his jury was intentionally chosen in a discriminatory manner, this claim is also not a basis for postconviction relief. Claims of intentional discrimination in jury selection should be raised on direct appeal. Robinson, 707 So.2d at 690 nn. 1, 2 (finding Robinson's race discrimination claim procedurally barred for failure to raise it on direct appeal); see also Gaskin v. State, 737 So.2d 509, 512 n. 5, 513 n. 6 (Fla.1999) (finding Gaskin's claim that he was denied a fair trial based on a discriminatory jury selection process procedurally barred for failure to raise it on direct appeal), receded from on other grounds by Nelson v. State, 875 So.2d 579 (Fla.2004). Finally, Bates argues in this claim that his resentencing counsel and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise these same jury selection claims at his resentencing and on appeal, respectively. In order to be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this claim, Bates had to set out in his motion a proper claim on the merits . . . that counsel could have advanced. Gordon, 863 So.2d at 1218. Bates failed to establish in his postconviction motion how counsel could have argued these alleged jury selection errors successfully. Because Bates has not established that these claims could be argued successfully, his counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise them. Rutherford v. Moore, 774 So.2d 637, 643 (Fla.2000). Further, we have previously rejected claims of jury discrimination couched in ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See, e.g., Robinson, 707 So.2d at 699 (In the final analysis, most of these [jury discrimination] issues could and should have been raised on direct appeal and are procedurally barred, even if couched in ineffective assistance language. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Accordingly, this claim was appropriately summarily denied.