Opinion ID: 2543191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Wheeler/Batson Challenges

Text: Defense counsel objected to the peremptory challenges of three jurors, two Hispanic and one Black, on the grounds that they were based on race or ethnicity, and that the jury was the product of invidious discrimination and was not representative of the community. ( Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 86, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 271-272, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) The trial court denied these objections. Defendant now claims error. A. Factual Background After exercising two uncontested peremptory challenges, the prosecutor challenged R.R., a Hispanic male. Counsel made a Wheeler motion, citing R.R.'s questionnaire, in which he stated he thought the death penalty was imposed too seldom. The questionnaire also revealed that R.R. was employed as a machine operator for a beer distributor, had a wife employed as a substitute teacher and two young children and was basically ... a real mainstream down the middle fair juror. Counsel also noted that R.R. had a couple of DUI's but indicated that he learned his lesson. The trial court noted that R.R. on his questionnaire stated he sometimes feels cops have attitudes because he feels they have too much power. The court then ruled that the defense had not made a prima facie showing of discrimination. The court noted that this was the first Hispanic excused and that the court had observed at least one item that might be of significance to an attorney. While finding no prima facie case, the trial court invited the prosecutor to make an observation or observations as to why he excused R.R. The prosecution declined to do so, stating that it would be counterproductive in light of his understanding of the law. After the defense exercised its sole peremptory challenge and the prosecution exercised another unanswered challenge, the defense made a Wheeler motion to the challenge against C.K., who was a Black male. Counsel stated that C.K. was a man who appeared to be in his 60's, an Air Force veteran who did not have any problem with the death penalty, and had been on a prior jury which had rendered a guilty verdict. He appeared to be an extremely neutral fair citizen. The trial court again did not find a prima facie showing. The court first observed that K.Y., a Black woman, had been seated as a juror. He further noted that the large number of C.K.'s stepchildren and relatives who had been in trouble with the law and had been in prison, was a factor that was unique to C.K. [5] After exercising another uncontested peremptory challenge, the prosecution challenged F.D., an Hispanic male. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based on the prosecution's discriminatory challenges and the systematic exclusion of Hispanics from the jury. He stated that F.D. appeared to be in his late 50's and was a postal carrier with children and grandchildren and a great respect for law enforcement, who expressed the belief that the death penalty was imposed too seldom. The trial court this time ruled that a prima facie case had been made and directed the prosecutor to explain the reasons for the challenge. The prosecutor explained that the prospective juror's demeanor and the manner in which he answers questions struck me as an individual who was indecisive, perhaps did not understand what he was being asked. He further stressed that on his questionnaire it stated that he did not know if he could impose the death penalty much. The trial court denied the motion, noting that his own observations were in accord with the prosecutor's, that F.D. appeared to have trouble focusing on what was being said and coming to grips with the issues, and that there were long pauses as he attempted to determine whether or not he could impose the death penalty. B. Legal Contentions Defendant contends the trial court erred in finding no prima facie case had been made with respect to R.R. and C.K. under the principles articulated in Wheeler and Batson. [6] A prima facie case of discrimination in jury selection under federal law can be made out by offering a wide variety of evidence, so long as the sum of the proffered facts gives `rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' ( Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 169, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129.) As we have explained: [O]ur Wheeler decision ... alluded to a `reasonable inference' of group bias as a basis for a prima facie showing and also called for the defendant to establish a `strong likelihood' that a juror has been peremptorily challenged on the basis of group bias. ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280, 281[, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748].) Our subsequent decision holding that both of the quoted terms were essentially the same as the Batson standard, and that a prima facie showing called for a demonstration that it was `more likely than not' that group bias accounted for the challenge, was disapproved in Johnson, supra, [545 U.S. at pp. 165-167, 173, 125 S.Ct. at pp. 2415-2416, 2419] (reversing People v. Johnson (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1302[, 1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270]). ( People v. Cornwell (2005) 37 Cal.4th 50, 73, 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622.) In cases in which the trial court found no prima facie showing of discrimination in jury selection, and it is unclear what standard the trial court employed in making its determination, we have reviewed the record independently to discern whether a prima facie showing has been made under the proper inference of discriminatory purpose standard. (See id. at pp. 71-74, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 117 P.3d 622; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 553-554, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) As to Prospective Juror R.R., we conclude the trial court did not err in determining a prima facie case had not been made. Although R.R. was presumably a member of a cognizable racial or ethnic group, there was nothing else to indicate group bias. At the time his removal was challenged, he was the only Hispanic prospective juror to have been considered. His expressed sentiment of skepticism toward the police and his two DUI misdemeanor convictions prosecuted by the same office that was trying this case, one of which was approximately five years before the trial, serve as neutral bases for the peremptory challenge. It is true that defendant's challenge may be somewhat stronger when the challenge is viewed in light of the subsequent challenge to another Hispanic juror, F.D. However, as we have recently held, a trial court has no sua sponte duty to reexamine rulings on previous Wheeler/Batson motions once it determines that a prima facie case has been made as to one juror. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 549, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) Defendant did not request that the trial court revisit R.R.'s challenge after the court had found a prima facie case of discrimination in the F.D. challenge, and we review whether the trial court's decision was correct at the time it was made and not in light of subsequent events. Moreover, even if the trial court had been asked to revisit the R.R. challenge, we find no basis for concluding that its determination would have been different. The prosecution's reasons for excusing F.D. based on his demeanor and his hesitation regarding his ability to impose the death penalty were strongly confirmed by the trial court's own independent observations, as discussed above. Therefore the challenge to F.D. would have added little to defendant's Wheeler motion with respect to the R.R. challenge. [7] We also conclude that the trial court did not err in finding no prima facie case with respect to the challenge of Prospective Juror C.K. As discussed, a significant number of his stepchildren and blood relatives had been in trouble with the law and had been to prison, and he stated that I have so many relatives that have been in and out of court ... I would have to have four or five pages to write down ... the different trials that they went through. At least some of them had been involved in the Kern County criminal justice system. One of his stepchildren had been prosecuted for rape by the Kern County District Attorney's Office approximately three or four years before the present trial took place, a prosecution that resulted in an acquittal. C.K. had personally been involved in helping some of his relatives through the criminal justice system. The above taken together constitutes a substantial race-neutral basis for a peremptory challenge. Moreover, he was the only prospective Black juror peremptorily challenged, and at the time of the challenge a Black woman had been seated on the jury. The subsequent seating of another Black juror reinforces our confidence that the trial court did not err in ruling that defendant had not carried his burden of making a prima facie case of discrimination. Defendant also contends that comparative analysis of prospective minority jurors subject to peremptory challenge and seated White jurors demonstrates the prosecution's discriminatory intent. Assuming without deciding that appellate courts are obliged to undertake comparative analysis in the present case (see Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196; People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 546, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076), we disagree that the comparative analysis that defendant presents in this court assists his case. Defendant points to three jurors who had some supposedly comparable experience with law enforcement or involvement in the criminal justice system. Prospective Juror L.J. had a son who had been convicted of a marijuana-related misdemeanor. L.J. did not have nearly as extensive a family involvement in the criminal justice system as did C.K., and did not express a negative attitude toward law enforcement officers as did R.R. Another juror, E.G., had had a daughter-in-law whose brother was convicted of murder but, unlike C.K., the juror did not appear to have any connection to the case or attend court proceedings. A closer question is presented by Juror S.M. S.M.'s husband was a witness in the highly publicized murder trial of Patrick Dunn, which was the subject of a book, Mean Justice, by Edward Hulme that was highly critical of the prosecutor in this case, District Attorney Ed Jagels, and the criminal justice system in Kern County. S.M. stated she felt that there were some things that weren't properly brought out by the prosecution, which would have led to more a favorable result for Dunn. Therefore S.M., unlike C.K., came away from her experience with the Kern County criminal justice system with a belief that the prosecution, and in all likelihood the prosecutor in the present case, had been unfair to a defendant, and in particular a murder defendant. S.M. did profess that this experience would not affect her ability to be a fair juror on a murder trial, but so did C.K. Unlike R.R., she had not been recently prosecuted by the Kern County District Attorney, but neither had C.K. On the other hand, S.M.'s husband was a witness in a Kern County trial, whereas some members of C.K.'s family had been defendants. Although it is difficult to explain on the cold record and without the benefit of having heard the prosecutor's reasons for the peremptory challenge of C.K., why S.M. was seated and C.K. was not, we do not believe this difficulty should be a basis for concluding there was prima facie case that a Wheeler/Batson violation had been committed. Our confidence in the results of appellate comparative analysis is somewhat diminished when there is a lone questionable peremptory challenge and the record reveals a sound, objectively plausible basis for the challenge. ( People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1254, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 (cone, opn of Mosk, J.) ( Jackson ).) Moreover, C.K. was the only Black juror to be peremptorily challenged: (Cf. Miller-El v. Dretke, supra, 545 U.S. 231, 241, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2325, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 [10 Black prospective jurors struck and one on panel].) Although, to be sure, a Wheeler/Batson violation may occur with a single discriminatory challenge, when as here there is a legitimate basis for dismissing the prospective juror and no pattern of discrimination appears as to Black jurors, a court should be hesitant to infer a Wheeler/Batson violation when comparative analysis raises questions as to a single prospective juror, particularly given the legitimate role that subjective factors may have in a prosecutor's decision to challenge or not challenge jurors peremptorily. ( Jackson, supra, at p. 1254, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254 (cone. opn. of Mosk, J.).) We therefore conclude that there was no prima facie case that a Wheeler/Batson violation was committed in excluding C.K.