Opinion ID: 854681
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Montone‟s Claims

Text: Montone appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment on her claims under § 1983 for retaliation for political affiliation and speech, in violation of the First Amendment. We will address each issue in turn.
Our jurisprudence governing political association retaliation claims under the First Amendment has its origins in the Supreme Court‟s “trilogy” of “political patronage cases.” Goodman v. Pa. Tpk. Comm’n, 293 F.3d 655, 663 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62 (1990)). From these cases and their progeny, “we have derived a three-part test to establish a claim of discrimination based on political patronage in violation of the First Amendment.” Galli v. N.J. Meadowlands Comm’n, 490 F.3d 265, 271 (3d Cir. 2007). First, the plaintiff must establish that “she was employed at a public agency in a position that does not require political affiliation.” Id. Second, the plaintiff must show that she engaged in conduct protected by the First Amendment. Id. And finally, the 12 plaintiff must prove that the constitutionally-protected conduct was a substantial or motivating factor for the adverse employment action. Id. The first two prongs of the test for political affiliation retaliation are not in dispute here. Montone was employed as an officer with the JCPD, a position where political affiliation is not “an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved.” Branti, 445 U.S. at 518; see also Elrod, 427 U.S. at 367 (“Limiting patronage dismissals to policymaking positions is sufficient to achieve this governmental end. Nonpolicymaking individuals usually have only limited responsibility and are therefore not in a position to thwart the goals of the in-party.”). Similarly, Montone‟s political support of Manzo was constitutionally protected conduct. See Branti, 445 U.S. at 519 (“[I]t is manifest that . . . continued employment . . . cannot properly be conditioned upon . . . allegiance to the political party in control . . . .”); Galli, 490 F.3d at 272 (“[A] plaintiff can meet the second prong of a prima facie political discrimination claim if she suffers because of active support for a losing candidate . . . .”). Accordingly, the matter in dispute here concerns the third prong of the test: whether Montone‟s political support of Manzo “was a substantial or motivating factor” in the decision to not promote her from sergeant to lieutenant. Galli, 490 F.3d at 271. The District Court focused specifically on this prong of the test, ultimately finding that Montone “offered no evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that [her] political affiliation or other protected conduct was a substantial motivating factor in the decision not to promote [her].” Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, 13 at . We find that in so holding the District Court misapplied the summary judgment standard. The District Court first erred by drawing unfavorable inferences against Montone, the non-movant. The District Court concluded, for example, that when Troy told DeStefano that he was “okay” because DeStefano “didn‟t try to hurt us,” (M.A. 1792), “[n]o reasonable trier of fact could infer from the DeStefano testimony that Troy was speaking about political affiliation or protected conduct.”6 Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at . The District Court, relying on Whalen‟s testimony, determined that “hurt” in this context referred to Montone “making threats against someone‟s son and nephew, which upset that person‟s wife.” Id. Accordingly, the District Court found that “the decision not to promote Plaintiff was based on personal animus, not retaliation for political affiliation or activities or other protected conduct,” and that “the „you didn‟t hurt us‟ evidence does not raise any 6 Troy and Jersey City argued before the District Court that such statements were inadmissible hearsay. The District Court did not rule on the issue because it concluded that this evidence, “even if admitted, fails to raise factual disputes sufficient to defeat the motions for summary judgment . . . .” Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at  n.3. We hold that these statements made by Troy are not hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2), and thus the District Court properly considered the statements in resolving the summary judgment motions. See Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(A) (defining as “not hearsay” a statement that is “offered against an opposing party and . . . was made by the party in an individual or representative capacity . . . .”). 14 factual dispute about the motivating factor element.” Id. This conclusion, however, directly contradicts DeStefano‟s own understanding of the conversation. According to his deposition testimony, DeStefano understood Troy to mean that he, DeStefano, was “okay” precisely because he had not “come out against [Healy] in the election.” (M.A. 1792.) DeStefano‟s understanding is consistent with Montone‟s claim that Troy set out to block her promotion to lieutenant because she had sought to prevent Healy‟s election. Troy attacks DeStefano‟s credibility by noting that his statement was not contained in DeStefano‟s original Certification obtained by Montone‟s counsel in August, 2005, and that DeStefano is a plaintiff in the Astriab litigation, a case “whose success . . . is entirely dependent on Montone‟s success herein . . . .” (Troy‟s M. Br. 25.) Furthermore, Troy notes that DeStefano‟s testimony could be interpreted differently – at one point, DeStefano testified to rumors concerning Montone stepping on the foot and spitting in the face of Healy‟s spouse, for example. (See M.S.A. 383.) Troy suggests that he could have been referring to this incident when he discussed how Montone had “hurt us.” (M.A. 1792.) While Troy may ultimately prevail on this point, “[i]n considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may not make credibility determinations or engage in any weighing of the evidence; instead, the non-moving party‟s evidence „is to be believed[,] and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.‟” Marino v. Indus. Crafting Co., 358 F.3d 241, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). On this issue, the District Court appears to have made credibility determinations, weighed the evidence against Montone, and failed to draw all justifiable inferences in her favor. Stated 15 otherwise, it would not be unreasonable to construe Troy‟s “you didn‟t hurt us” statement as referring to Montone‟s opposition to Healy. Furthermore, the District Court, despite appearing to have accepted Montone‟s argument that Jersey City and Troy‟s justifications for not promoting any lieutenants were pretextual, erred in concluding that a jury could not draw from that fact an inference that the non-promotion of Montone was intended to retaliate for her political activity. Troy contended that promotions to lieutenant were suspended for legitimate budgetary and operational reasons. But the District Court observed: Examining Plaintiff's evidence as a whole, and making every reasonable inference in favor of Plaintiff, as the nonmovant, a reasonable trier of fact, hearing Plaintiff's evidence, could easily find that Chief Troy bore ill will toward Plaintiff and was determined not to promote her to Lieutenant. Moreover, there is evidence which, if credited by the trier of fact, supports the inference that he bore such ill will toward Plaintiff that he stopped all promotions to Lieutenant during his tenure as Chief, even though this decision may have been a poor one from the perspective of 16 the organizational needs of the Police Department. Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at . The District Court determined, however, that “[a]t best, this constitutes evidence of retaliation. None of this . . . is probative of the motive for the retaliation.” Id. It is by now axiomatic that a plaintiff in an employment retaliation case may avoid summary judgment by offering evidence that discredits the reasons articulated by the defense for the adverse employment action. See, e.g., Stephens v. Kerrigan, 122 F.3d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1997). By presenting evidence that casts doubt on Troy‟s articulated rationale for suspending all promotions to the lieutenant position, Montone is entitled to have the trier-of-fact decide whether it was a general dislike of her that motivated Troy, or whether it was personal animosity that sprung from Montone‟s vocal opposition to the candidacy of Troy‟s patron. Indeed, in Stephens, we held that summary judgment was not appropriate where plaintiffs “made a sufficient showing to discredit [defendant‟s] proffered reasons for not promoting from the lieutenants lists and thus [were] entitled to have a fact finder determine whether their political affiliation or non-support was a substantial or motivating cause of the failure to promote.” 122 F.3d at 183. The District Court here similarly agreed with Montone that Jersey City and Troy‟s proffered reasons were pretextual, but then granted summary judgment to the defendants rather than allowing a fact finder to determine whether Montone‟s political activities during the election were the real reason behind her non-promotion. 17 The District Court‟s dismissal of evidence of a pattern of political patronage in Jersey City was also improper. See Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at  (“Evidence that, during Mayor Healy‟s administration, other people have gotten jobs or promotions in Jersey City for political reasons may have some minimal probative value as background, but it is clearly insufficient by itself to support an inference that Plaintiff was retaliated against.”) As we held in Goodman, “a history of improper promotion practices using sponsorship as a factor” may, when presented with other facts, prove to be “sufficient circumstantial evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find that political affiliation was a substantial factor in the decision not to promote . . . .” Id. at 674. In this case, there are other facts that, when combined with evidence of political patronage, suffice to defeat summary judgment. In particular, there is the evidence of recommendations that the number of lieutenants on the police force be increased as well as evidence that there were promotions to every other rank but lieutenant during Troy‟s tenure as Police Chief that, when considered in combination with a history of political patronage, supports a reasonable inference that Montone was not promoted in retaliation for her political activity. The District Court also erred in giving substantial weight to evidence that Troy promoted at least one of candidate Manzo‟s supporters, Edwin Gillan. Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at  n.6. While this may be relevant evidence for the fact finder to consider when ultimately determining if Montone was in fact retaliated against based on her political activity, it does not preclude a jury from finding that Montone‟s support for Manzo was the motivating factor in not receiving a promotion. At the summary judgment stage, Montone need only “„make a showing sufficient to establish 18 the existence of [the] element[s] essential to [her] case . . . .‟” Katz v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 972 F.2d 53, 55 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)). Her showing in this case is not overcome by the fact that one supporter of Healy‟s opponent was promoted, especially given the evidence of how active Montone was in supporting Manzo. The three-prong test for retaliation for political affiliation does not require that Montone prove that every other supporter of Healy‟s opponent also suffered retaliation. In summary, the District Court misapplied the summary judgment standard by weighing evidence and drawing inferences against Montone, the non-movant, even after acknowledging that she presented sufficient evidence to show that the reasons proffered by Jersey City and Troy for her non-promotion may have been pretextual. The District Court also improperly dismissed evidence of a culture of political patronage in Jersey City, and erred in granting summary judgment based upon evidence of the promotion of another Manzo supporter. Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at  n.6. Accordingly, we vacate the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment for the defendants on the political affiliation claim.
We now turn to Count Four: whether Montone was retaliated against for speech protected under the First Amendment. We analyze Montone‟s claim, arising as it does in the public employment context, under a three-part test: (1) was the plaintiff speaking as a citizen rather than as a public employee discharging her employment duties; (2) did the 19 plaintiff‟s statements address a matter of public concern as opposed to a personal interest; and (3) did the plaintiff‟s employer have “„an adequate justification for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general public‟ as a result of the statement [the employee] made.” Gorum v. Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 185 (3d Cir. 2009), (quoting Garretti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418 (2006)). The District Court held that Montone‟s free speech claim failed the second part of the test – that the speech at issue involve a matter of public concern, observing that she “neither precisely identifies the speech that she contends was on matters of public concern, nor makes any case at all that such speech was on matters of public concern.” Id. Quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), the District Court then granted summary judgment to Jersey City and Troy on this claim because “when a public employee speaks not as a citizen upon matters of public concern, but instead as an employee upon matters of only personal interest, absent the most unusual circumstances, a federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee‟s behavior.” Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147). 20 Montone‟s allegedly protected speech concerns in large measure her complaints of gender inequality in the workplace dating back to the 1990s, when she successfully brought a sexual harassment lawsuit. Montone continued to complain of sexual harassment even after that lawsuit was concluded. In 2003, she informed a captain in the JCPD that Troy, who was then a lieutenant, was sexually harassing Officer Marisa Johnston. We addressed the question of whether a public employee‟s speech regarding sexual harassment can constitute protected speech in Azzaro v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 110 F.3d 968 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc), where the plaintiff, a former Allegheny County employee, was fired after reporting that she was sexually harassed by an assistant to the County Commissioner. Id. at 970. The plaintiff subsequently sued the County and two County employees, alleging, inter alia, retaliation for speech protected by the First Amendment, in violation of § 1983. Id. at 975. Applying the analytical framework laid out by the Supreme Court in Connick, we noted that the key to the “public concern” inquiry is “whether expression of the kind at issue is of value to the process of self-governance.” Id. at 977. We further explained that “the issue is whether it is important to the process of selfgovernance that communications on this topic, in this form and in this context, take place.” Id. We observed that “[r]acial discrimination in the assignment of school personnel . . . was characterized by the Connick Court as „a matter inherently of public concern.‟” Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n.8). Extending this reasoning, we noted that gender discrimination, “when practiced by those exercising authority in the name of a public official, is as much a matter of public concern as racial discrimination practiced under 21 similar circumstances.” Id. at 978. We also noted, however, that not “all public employee complaints about sexual harassment are matters of public concern,” and that examination of “all of the surrounding circumstances” is required when making such a determination. Id. at 980. A circumstance that weighed in favor of finding that the communication in Azzaro involved a matter of public concern was that the alleged harassment “brought to light actual wrongdoing on the part of one exercising public authority that would be relevant to the electorate‟s evaluation of the performance of the office of an elected official.” Id. at 978. While Montone‟s allegations of gender discrimination and harassment do not directly concern an elected official, as even Johnston‟s sexual harassment complaint against Troy occurred prior to Healy‟s election and appointment of Troy as chief, the fact that Montone‟s speech would not directly help the public evaluate an elected official‟s performance is not dispositive. For example, in Campbell v. Galloway, 483 F.3d 258 (4th Cir. 2007), the plaintiff, a former police officer, sued the Town of Southern Pines, the police department, and several town employees, alleging, inter alia, First Amendment retaliation when she was fired after filing several complaints of sexual harassment with the police chief, as well as a gender discrimination and retaliation charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Id. at 262-64. In reviewing the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment for the defendants, the Fourth Circuit noted that, while “not every statement about sexual discrimination involves a matter of public concern, our cases have provided little concrete guidance on the question of when such a complaint amounts 22 to an issue of public concern.” Id. at 269. The Campbell Court explained that this was perfectly acceptable: We see no reason to try to articulate any sort of bright-line rule in this case, nor are we certain that a bright-line rule would be consistent with the Supreme Court's directive that we engage in a case-and fact-specific inquiry to determine “[w]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern,” by considering “the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.” Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48). The Fourth Circuit noted that “[t]o conclude, as the defendants would have us do, that a personal complaint about discrimination affecting only the complaining employee can never amount to an issue of public concern could improperly limit the range of speech that is protected by the First Amendment.” Id. (emphasis in original). Shifting to the facts in that matter, the Campbell Court noted that the plaintiff “complained about multiple instances of inappropriate conduct directed towards her,” and wrote a letter to the police chief where she “also included complaints about inappropriate conduct directed towards other females.” Id. As that case also concerned a grant of summary judgment to defendants, the Fourth Circuit “view[ed] the complaints in the light most favorable to [the plaintiff],” and concluded that 23 her “complaints about sexual discrimination do amount to matters of public concern.” Id. We find Campbell’s reasoning persuasive. There are at least three separate instances of alleged sexual harassment here,7 and the inappropriate conduct was not directed solely at Montone. Although no elected figure is involved, these facts otherwise present a stronger argument that Montone‟s speech was related to a matter of public concern than was presented in Azzaro, which referred only to a single incident. See 110 F.3d at 980 (“We do believe, however, that under all of the surrounding circumstances, Azzaro's reports address a matter of public concern even though they referred to a single incident.”). Accordingly, we hold that Montone was engaged in protected activity as her speech involved a matter of public concern. Once the public concern “threshold” is met, “we must balance between the interest of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the [public employer], in promoting efficiency of the public services it performs through its employee.‟” Miller v. Clinton County, 544 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Pickering v. Bd. Of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). We find, as we did in Azzaro, that “[s]triking the appropriate balance in this case is not difficult,” as “those governmental 7 The three instances are the sexual harassment lawsuit from the 1990s, Montone‟s complaint against Carter from 2002-2003, and Montone‟s escalation of Johnston‟s sexual harassment claim against Troy from 2002. See Montone, 2011 WL 2559514, at . 24 interests are negligible here.” 110 F.3d at 980. As in Azzaro, “[w]e fail to see how” Montone‟s speech “could have posed any threats to the government‟s interest in efficiency or effectiveness,” especially in those instances when she used internal mechanisms to voice her grievances. Id. (finding that defendant‟s affirmative recognition that “complaints about sexual harassment were important to its ability to serve the public . . . [constituted] an acknowledgement . . . that communications in the manner and place of [plaintiff‟s] do not pose an undue threat of disruption”). Accordingly, we hold that Montone has demonstrated that her interest in the speech at issue outweighs Jersey City‟s interest in efficiency. While not every one of Montone‟s statements addressed a matter of public concern,8 and while Montone will still have to demonstrate at trial that she was acting as a citizen and not as a police officer when she engaged in what she claims to be protected conduct, and that her speech was a substantial or motivating factor in her non-promotion, the District Court erroneously granted summary judgment for the defendants on Montone‟s free speech claim by concluding that her gender discrimination complaints did not involve matters of public concern. Accordingly, we vacate the grant of summary judgment on the free speech claim.