Opinion ID: 75167
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law Providing for Equal Civil Rights

Text: Conley alleges that the eminent domain action filed by ASU denied his rights under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and 1985(3), and under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the first prong of Rachel, we must determine whether any of these asserted rights falls within the scope of § 1443(1). The phrase “any law providing for . . . equal civil rights” refers to laws “providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality,” and does not include rights of “general application available to all persons or citizens.” Rachel, 384 U.S. at 792. Our predecessor circuit, in a case very similar to the one presented by Conley, held that a defendant’s “right to a fair trial and equal protection of the laws and [his] rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not arise from legislation providing for specific civil rights in terms of racial equality . . . .” See Sunflower County Colored Baptist Ass’n v. Trustees of Indianola Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., 369 F.2d 795, 796 (5th Cir. 1966). Therefore, to the extent Conley relies upon broad 7 assertions under the Equal Protection Clause or § 1983, those rights are insufficient to support a valid claim for removal under § 1443(1). However, in City of Greenwood v. Peacock, decided on the same day as Rachel, the United States Supreme Court recognized that § 1981 qualifies under § 1443(1) as a law providing specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality. See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 825 (1966).6 Furthermore, neither the Supreme Court nor this circuit has addressed whether § 1985(3), the other federal statute cited by Conley, qualifies as an “equal civil rights” statute. For purposes of this appeal, we assume without deciding that § 1985(3) meets Rachel’s definition of an equal civil rights statute under § 1443(1).7 See Davis v. 6 42 U.S.C. § 1981 provides: All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of all persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other. 7 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) states: If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire . . . for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising a right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages, occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the 8 Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1049-50 (3d Cir. 1997) (declining to address whether § 1985(3) constitutes an “equal civil rights” statute within the meaning of § 1443(1), but noting that there are “strong arguments on both sides in terms of jurisprudence”). Nonetheless, we conclude that the district court properly remanded this action because, for reasons described herein, we find that Conley has failed to satisfy the second prong of Rachel.