Opinion ID: 2107679
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion to Vacate the Judgment

Text: Before this Court, plaintiff contends that the trial justice abused her discretion by refusing to vacate the judgment. Rule 60(b)(2) allows a trial justice to relieve a party from judgment if the party has newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b). In passing on the correctness of a decision under Rule 60(b)(2), this Court's review is limited to an examination of the decision to determine the correctness of the order granting or denying the motion, not the correctness of the original judgment. Greenfield Hill Investments, LLC v. Miller, 934 A.2d 223, 224 (R.I.2007) (mem.) (citing McBurney v. Roszkowski, 875 A.2d 428, 435 (R.I.2005)). A motion to vacate a judgment is left to the sound discretion of the trial justice and such a ruling will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Id. (citing Medeiros v. Anthem Casualty Insurance Group, 822 A.2d 175, 178 (R.I.2003)). Specifically, with regard to Rule 60(b)(2), a motion to vacate should not be granted unless (1) the evidence is material enough that it probably would change the outcome of the proceedings and (2) `the evidence was not discoverable at the time of the original hearing by the exercise of ordinary diligence.' Medeiros, 822 A.2d at 178 (quoting Forcier v. Forcier, 558 A.2d 212, 213 (R.I.1989)). Even if both of these requirements are met, the motion must be made within a reasonable time and not more than one year after the judgment. Flynn v. Al-Amir, 811 A.2d 1146, 1150 (R.I.2002). [U]ndue delay may bar relief, even if the motion is made before the one-year period has expired. Sansone v. Morton Machine Works, Inc., 957 A.2d 386, 396 (R.I. 2008) (quoting Waldeck v. Domenic Lombardi Realty, Inc., 425 A.2d 81, 83 (R.I. 1981)). In any event, one year is the extreme limit for a viable motion under Rule 60(b). Id. (citing Tierney v. Conley, 590 A.2d 865, 866 (R.I.1991)). Here, plaintiff asserted that he had new evidence, which included hypothetical testimony from Fannie Mae, and also claimed that Fannie Mae's alleged unethical corporate culture, which became public because of federal investigations into the organization, were grounds for a new trial. [9] The trial justice first addressed the timing of the Rule 60(b)(2) motion. Although she noted that the motion was made within the one-year time-frame, the trial justice nonetheless suggested that the delay was unreasonable because the motion was filed one week short of the one-year deadline, and plaintiff had known the identity of the author of the Fannie Mae letter since the April 2006 judgment was entered. The trial court also focused on the fact that plaintiff delayed moving to vacate the judgment until all of his other avenues of relief had been denied. Ultimately, the trial justice found that, even if timely, plaintiff had failed to demonstrate either that the new evidence was material or that such evidence was not discoverable at the time of the trial. First, concerning the federal investigation into Fannie Mae, the trial justice determined that there was no indication that the regional office involved in this transaction was implicated in the scandal in any way; further, she found that when it consented to pay a $400 million penalty, Fannie Mae did not admit guilt. For both these reasons, the evidence of Fannie Mae's purported unethical culture was immaterial and had no bearing on plaintiff's defense whatsoever. The trial justice then found that the hypothetical evidence about RIHMFC's sale of the mortgage also was not material and that plaintiff had failed to prove that it was not discoverable during the trial. The plaintiff never demanded that the author of the Fannie Mae letter be deposed or called as a witness. Rather, on the morning of trial he merely asked that at the completion of today's hearing, that at a further time he be allowed to get the rest of this information from Fannie Mae. There was not a formal motion to depose the witness until plaintiff filed a motion to vacate the judgment, nearly one year after the trial court's judgment. Accordingly, we are satisfied that plaintiff's motion to vacate the judgment in this case properly was denied.