Opinion ID: 2632329
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs' Claim for Continuing Nuisance Adequately Invoked Injunctive Relief

Text: {34} The majority acknowledges that Plaintiffs' complaint included a request for the injunctive relief set forth above in the demand for judgment. However, the majority concludes that Plaintiffs' failure to set forth any injunctive relief in the body of the complaint restricts the relief sought to money damages and precludes the trial court from awarding injunctive relief. I respectfully disagree with this conclusion on three separate bases: (1) it is inconsistent with the rules of pleading in New Mexico; (2) it overlooks language in the complaint; and (3) it conflicts with the trial court's discretion to award proper relief. {35} First, Rule 1-008(A) NMRA 2002 merely requires a demand for judgment for the relief to which [the pleader] deems himself [or herself] entitled following a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Rule 1-008(A) does not require the pleader to set forth the relief in both the body of the complaint and in the demand for judgment. [N]otice pleading does not require that every theory be denominated in the pleadings-general allegations of conduct are sufficient, as long as they show that the party is entitled to relief and the averments are set forth with sufficient detail so that the parties and the court will have a fair idea of the action about which the party is complaining and can see the basis for relief. Schmitz v. Smentowski, 109 N.M. 386, 389-90, 785 P.2d 726, 729-30 (1990). Rule 1-008(A) also does not require that injunctive relief be pleaded with particularity, and Rule 1-008(E) provides that [n]o technical forms of pleading ... are required. Nevertheless, the logical effect of the majority's interpretation of Plaintiffs' complaint in this case is to require the technical pleading of injunctive relief with particularity. I believe this heightened pleading requirement for injunctive relief is inconsistent with our liberal pleading rules. See Sanchez v. City of Belen, 98 N.M. 57, 60, 644 P.2d 1046, 1049 (Ct.App. 1982) (New Mexico adheres to the broad purpose of the rules of pleading and construes them liberally. The general policy on pleadings require that an adjudication on the merits rather than technicalities of procedures and form shall determine the rights of the litigants.). {36} Second, I believe that Plaintiffs' complaint gives fair notice to Defendants that injunctive relief is both requested and, assuming the allegations of the complaint to be true, warranted. See Schmitz, 109 N.M. at 389, 785 P.2d at 729 (The theory of pleadings is to give the parties fair notice of the claims and defenses against them, and the grounds upon which they are based.). Plaintiffs alleged that Defendants are mandatorily required not to conduct their operations in such a manner as to potentially pollute the natural resources including portions of the underlying shallow fresh water aquifer.... It is possible for the Defendants to conduct their day-to-day operations without polluting the environment, and if such pollution occurs, to promptly and properly clean up the pollution before it spreads and restore the property to its uncontaminated condition. The pollution is abatable and can be cleaned up in an economically feasible manner, taking into consideration the natural resources that have already been polluted and the natural resources that will be polluted if the abatement and clean up are not performed by the Defendants. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants have caused pollution and contamination, and their subsequent and continuous failures to clean up or adequately clean up such pollution and contamination, has permitted and allowed further pollution and contamination to occur. This wrongful conduct has caused and will cause further additional damage each day Defendants permit or allow such contamination to persist. (Emphasis added.) Based on these factual allegations, Plaintiffs pursued a count for private nuisance on the basis that Defendants owe the Plaintiffs the duty to conduct their operations and maintain their equipment and well materials in such a manner that they do not create and/or maintain a nuisance.... The afore described acts and omissions of the Defendants unreasonably interferes with, and will continue to unreasonably interfere with, the use and enjoyment of Plaintiffs' Ranch and the normal and expected use and enjoyment of not only the surface and subsurface soils or strata of Plaintiffs' ranch, but, in addition, the use and enjoyment of portions of the underlying groundwater. (Emphasis added.) As the majority recognizes, Plaintiffs then requested injunctive relief in the demand for judgment. {37} Even if Plaintiffs were required to plead their request for injunctive relief with particularity, these allegations should suffice. Under Rule 1-008(F), [a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice. Plaintiffs' complaint clearly alleged a continuing nuisance and included a statement of facts supporting this claim. In a nuisance action, [m]onetary damages are inadequate where the harm is continuing in its nature, Scott v. Jordan, 99 N.M. 567, 572, 661 P.2d 59, 64 (Ct.App.1983), and where damages would not provide adequate compensation for the injury, injunctive relief is proper. Padilla v. Lawrence, 101 N.M. 556, 562, 685 P.2d 964, 970 (Ct.App.1984). By alleging a continuing nuisance, referring to abatement, and requesting injunctive relief, Plaintiffs' complaint gave Defendants more than adequate notice of the existence and nature of a claim for equitable relief in the form of abatement or injunction. In other words, in addition to monetary damages, Plaintiffs want Defendants to stop polluting and to clean up the pollution they have allegedly caused. I therefore respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusion that the complaint was limited to monetary damages. {38} Third, I do not believe that the complaint controls the form of relief available in a continuing nuisance claim. Rule 1-054(C) NMRA 2002 expressly provides that every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in the party's pleadings. Under this rule, New Mexico now clearly allows any appropriate relief to be granted in a case regardless of what is specifically requested in the pleadings.... Thus the filing of a complaint seeking relief of one sort is not an irrevocable election of remedies precluding the granting of relief of another kind. State ex rel. Newsome v. Alarid, 90 N.M. 790, 798-99, 568 P.2d 1236, 1244-45 (1977). {39} As Scott and Padilla recognize, injunctive relief is an appropriate remedy for a continuing nuisance. When an equitable ground exists, courts of equity have power to give relief against either public or private nuisances by compelling the abatement or restraining the continuance of an existing nuisance, or enjoining the commission or establishment of a contemplated nuisance. Hase v. Summers, 35 N.M. 274, 275, 295 P. 293, 293 (1930) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). Thus, as long as a plaintiff establishes a continuing nuisance for which there is no adequate and complete remedy at law, Padilla, 101 N.M. at 562, 685 P.2d at 970, a trial court has the discretion to award injunctive relief under Rule 1-054(C) regardless of whether the complaint includes injunctive relief in the demand for judgment. {40} The majority misunderstands my reliance on Rule 1-054(C). I do not contend that a trial court could award injunctive relief sua sponte, see Scott, 99 N.M. at 572, 661 P.2d at 64 (noting that injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy that requires a showing of irreparable injury for which there is no adequate and complete remedy at law), or that the object of a suit is determined by the relief deemed appropriate by the trial court after a determination of liability. Instead, I rely on Rule 1-054(C) to demonstrate that the object of Plaintiffs' claim cannot be determined solely by the demand for judgment in the complaint. Even accepting the majority's restricted reading of the complaint in this case, Plaintiffs would still be able to transform the object of their claim by demonstrating at trial that they have suffered an irreparable injury for which there is no adequate remedy at law, thereby invoking the trial court's discretion to award injunctive relief under Rule 1-054(C). For the three reasons articulated above, I believe that Plaintiffs' continuing nuisance claim should be construed as implicating equitable relief in the form of abatement or injunction for purposes of assessing the proper venue under Section 38-3-1. {41} I conclude that Plaintiffs' nuisance claim has as part of its object an interest in land within the meaning of Section 38-3-1(D)(1), making venue proper only in Lea County. I would therefore affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' complaint for improper venue. The majority holding otherwise, I respectfully dissent. I CONCUR: JOSEPH F. BACA, Justice.