Opinion ID: 1782357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Summary Judgment on the Remaining Counts

Text: In their brief on appeal, the Fogartys ask this Court to clarif[y] that at most, the Trial Court granted a partial summary judgment on the fraud count only. The Fogartys point to the different statutes of limitations that govern several of their other claims. Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill contend that the summary judgment on the fraud count bars all other counts, because Jane Fogarty stated in her deposition that she wouldn't be here today if the land had been conveyed free and clear. Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill argue that, based on this statement, because the predicate act of fraud is barred, all other counts in the Fogartys' complaint are likewise barred. Nowhere in their briefs do Confederate Money, Southworth, or McGill cite any law, statutory or otherwise, or any other authority for the proposition that a summary judgment on one count based on the statute of limitations for that count necessitates a summary judgment on the remaining counts, some subject to longer statutes of limitations. Furthermore, Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill did not deal so expansively with the scope of their summary-judgment motions when they were challenged by the Fogartys in the trial court. Specifically, in their brief in response to the motions for a summary judgment, the Fogartys stated that the [m]ovants request that partial summary judgment be entered on one aspect of one of the fourteen counts . . . as to three of the . . . Defendants. (Emphasis added.) Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill responded that, because this alleged misrepresentation cannot be the basis for a viable fraud action since the two-year statute of limitations ran out long ago, the Fogartys' theory of multiple independent fraudulent acts/misrepresentations disintegrates into nothing more than an attempted end run around the statute of limitations. (Emphasis added.) Absent from the response is any contention that if a summary judgment was appropriate as to the fraud count a summary judgment was appropriate as to all counts. In the trial court, Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill did not refute the Fogartys' efforts to limit the scope of the summary judgment to the fraud count; they merely argued that the statute of limitations bars all aspects of the fraud count. The trial court, however, entered a summary judgment in favor of Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill on all counts, giving the movants more than they actually sought in their motion. Before this Court, Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill have modified their argument to support that result, claiming that [b]ecause all of the Fogartys' claims were grounded in Confederate Money's alleged acts of fraud, the trial court properly dismissed all of the claims against Confederate Money, not just the fraud count. The Fogartys were entitled to rely on the description of the scope of the summary-judgment motions that Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill gave in the trial court, i.e., they sought a summary judgment only on the fraud count. Even if we were to treat the summary-judgment motions as comprehensive, as previously noted Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill have not provided us with any authority to support the view that successful defense of one count based upon a shorter statute of limitations justifies the dismissal of all counts arising from the same transaction, some of which are governed by longer statutes of limitations. Such a proposition of law, if we were to accept it, would surely constitute an affirmative defense as to which Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill would bear the burden of proof, though we do not reach the merits of the validity of such a defense here. See Buist v. Time Domain Corp., 926 So.2d 290, 293 (Ala.2005) (A defendant bears the burden of proving an affirmative defense.). Before the trial court, Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill never produced any credible evidence in support of this theory. This Court stated in Payton v. Monsanto Co., 801 So.2d 829, 834 (Ala.2001), regarding the movant's burden of production of evidence on a motion for a summary judgment: `The manner in which the movant's burden of production is met depends upon which party has the burden of proof . . . at trial. If the movant has the burden of proof at trial, the movant must support his motion with credible evidence.' (Quoting Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903, 909 (Ala.1999).) Clearly, Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill would have had the burden of proving this affirmative defense at trial, and they thus had it on the motions for a summary judgment. The only evidence presented in support of the motions for a summary judgment related to the statute of limitations on the Fogartys' fraud count. As a result, Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill never satisfied their obligation to make a prima facie showing that they were entitled to a summary judgment on all of the Fogartys' counts. Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d at 909. On the record before this Court, Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill never successfully shifted the burden to the Fogartys to prove that the statute of limitations for the fraud count did not bar those remaining 13 counts. See Lacy v. Mini Warehouse World, 835 So.2d 154, 157 (Ala.2002) (Lyons, J., concurring specially). Indeed, their failure to do so is entirely consistent with the narrower scope of the summary-judgment motions, as presented to the trial court. Because Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill failed to meet their burden of production in support of a summary judgment on the remaining 13 counts, the trial court erred in entering a summary judgment in favor of Confederate Money, Southworth, and McGill and against the Fogartys on all counts.