Opinion ID: 1849974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: was the trial court's award of periodic alimony and other support in the aggregate, so excessive as to constitute an abuse of discretion?

Text: The foregoing standard of review also applies to the award of periodic alimony and the other provisions of the settlement. Notwithstanding that, this Court has not hesitated in the past to find abuses of discretion and intervene to increase the amount of alimony that the lower court allowed. See Cleveland v. Cleveland, 600 So.2d 193 (Miss. 1992); Tutor v. Tutor, 494 So.2d 362 (Miss. 1986); Rainer v. Rainer, 393 So.2d 475 (Miss. 1981). Likewise, this Court has reduced the amount allowed by the lower court or reversed the award of alimony outright in some cases. Brendel v. Brendel, 566 So.2d 1269 (Miss. 1990); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 519 So.2d 891 (Miss. 1988); Lowry v. Lowry, 229 Miss. 376, 90 So.2d 852 (1956). This Court has long considered nine areas when reviewing an award or denial of periodic alimony: (1) the health of the husband and his earning capacity; (2) the health of the wife and her earning capacity; (3) the entire sources of income of both parties; (4) the reasonable needs of the wife; (5) the reasonable needs of the child; (6) the necessary living expenses of the husband; (7) the estimated amount of income taxes the respective parties must pay on their incomes; (8) the fact that the wife has the free use of the home, furnishing and automobile, and; (9) such other facts and circumstances bearing on the subject that might be shown by the evidence. Brabham v. Brabham, 226 Miss. 165, 176, 84 So.2d 147, 152 (1955); Powers v. Powers, 568 So.2d 255, 259 (Miss. 1990). This Court has reaffirmed that the chancellor should consider the reasonable needs of the wife and the right of the husband to lead as normal a life as possible with a decent standard of living. Gray v. Gray, 562 So.2d 79, 83 (Miss. 1990), cited in Cleveland v. Cleveland, 600 So.2d 193, 197 (Miss. 1992). Before considering the nine individual considerations, we should review the judgment of the chancellor and the obligations imposed upon Richard Tilley: 1) Responsibility for the payment of the mortgage(s), taxes, insurance and maintenance over $100.00 on the marital home. Joyce has full use and possession of the house until the last child is emancipated, after which the house is to be sold and the proceeds split. 2) $1,500 monthly in child support. 3) Full hospitalization coverage for the minor children, such as doctor, dental, orthodontic, psychological and eye care. 4) Payment of all private school tuition, payment of college education, and adequate and safe transportation for the children until they become emancipated. 5) $1,500 monthly periodic alimony. 6) $150,000 lump sum alimony, payable yearly at $15,000 and the legal rate of interest. 7) Responsibility for keeping life insurance policies in effect to cover all obligations of child support and lump sum alimony. 8) Payment of all debts from marriage. 9) Payment of plaintiff's attorney's fees. Next, we look at the nine factors set out in Brabham in their application to the facts at hand. The health of both parties is generally good [5] , but Richard obviously has a much higher earning capacity than his wife. However, it does seem that she will earn about $12,000 a year. It appears the living expenses listed by Joyce are unreasonable. While we want a spouse to maintain a standard of living as close to her married state as possible, it appears some costs listed are unreasonable. Her listed expenses also appear to calculate the children's needs, which have been provided for through the child support and other considerations. On the other hand, Richard's listed living expenses seem reasonable. As to income tax, Richard clearly is in the upper bracket. In Gray v. Gray, 562 So.2d 79, 83 (Miss. 1990), this Court said the chancellor should consider the reasonable needs of the wife and the right of the husband to lead as normal a life as possible with a decent standard of living. Considering that admonishment, this judgment seems unsettling. Certainly Joyce and the children deserve to enjoy a nice standard of living with many amenities of life. But the blunt truth is that now two families will have to live on the same salaries that once supported one family. There is no way the standard of living can remain as high as it once might have been. The other problem is Richard Tilley's debt burden. According to the record, Richard Tilley will have to pay a total of $11,038.34 a month under the terms of the judgment, but only has a monthly net income of $7,306.00. It appears the chancellor was either punishing Richard Tilley for the grounds of divorce, or flatly ignoring his resources. Richard has not even been left enough monthly income for a standard of living, much less a reasonable one. In Mississippi, alimony should be awarded to the wife in accordance with her needs with consideration being given to the ability of the husband to make the payments. Dudley v. Light, 586 So.2d 155, 161 (Miss. 1991); Brendel v. Brendel, 566 So.2d 1269, 1272 (Miss. 1990). Alimony is not a punishment and should not be so used. Taylor v. Taylor, 348 So.2d 1341, 1344 (Miss. 1977) (Smith, dissenting). However, it seems clear the chancellor might have been trying to punish Richard Tilley for his actions. We find the Chancellor abused his discretion in ordering Richard Tilley to pay aggregate monthly support beyond his means. As such, we reverse and remand to the trial court for determination of a more equitable judgment of support, including both periodic alimony and lump sum alimony, in line with this opinion and this state's law. REVERSED AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, SULLIVAN, BANKS, McRAE and ROBERTS, JJ., concur.