Opinion ID: 1803417
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Loss of Society, Comfort and Companionship

Text: Relying on Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145 (N.D.1965), McBane argues that North Dakota does not allow recovery of damages for `loss of society, comfort and companionship' even when it is alleged that they are of the type capable of being associated with an economic or pecuniary loss. As we have already noted, this court held in Haug v. Great Northern Ry. Co., supra, 77 N.W. at 101, that the only damages recoverable in this action are for the pecuniary loss. Nothing can be recovered for the loss of society. In Scherer v. Schlaberg, 18 N.D. 421, 122 N.W. 1000, 1002 (1909), the court held: The rule regarding the measure of damages recoverable by the father for the death by wrongful act of a minor child seems to be the probable value of the services of the child during minority, considering the cost of support and maintenance during the early and helpless part of its life. Obviously, if that rule were literally followed today, the average child would have a negative worth. Sanchez v. Schindler, 651 S.W.2d 249, 251 (Tex.1983). As the authors observed in Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 127, p. 952 (5th ed. 1984): Where pecuniary loss to survivors is still the ostensible standard for recovery, the decedent who is not in the labor market has presented a special problem, since such a person is not making direct money contributions to survivors, and there is certainly no direct pecuniary loss. Yet it has almost always seemed unjust to say that a child, or nonworking wife or mother, or an aged person is worth nothing to his survivors, and juries have at times rendered substantial verdicts in such cases. In Stejskal v. Darrow, 55 N.D. 606, 215 N.W. 83 (1927) and Kalsow v. Grob, 61 N.D. 119, 237 N.W. 848 (1931), this court specifically held that a father could not recover damages in a wrongful death action for loss of the society and companionship of a child. While clinging to the pecuniary loss standard, the court in Henke v. Peyerl, 89 N.W.2d 1, 9 (N.D.1958), however, held that the pecuniary damages recoverable for the wrongful death of a child included the `comfort    of a kind, faithful and loving child.' The court in Henke, supra, 89 N.W.2d at 11, also held: Pecuniary loss need not be established by proof in dollars and cents. A substantial loss will be presumed. The measure of damages allowed in Henke, supra, was reaffirmed in Grenz v. Werre, 129 N.W.2d 681 (N.D.1964). We note that in wrongful death actions not arising out of the death of a child, this court has taken an expansive view of the kinds of losses for which pecuniary damages may be recovered. See Quam v. Wengert, 86 N.W.2d 741 (N.D. 1957) and Geier v. Tjaden, 74 N.W.2d 361 (N.D.1955) (loss of care and protection, counsel, advice and other intangibles); Dahl v. North American Creameries, Inc., 61 N.W.2d 916 (N.D.1953) (the value of nurture and instruction); Umphrey v. Deery, 78 N.D. 211, 48 N.W.2d 897 (1951) (loss of any benefit or advantage capable of being estimated in money). As McBane has correctly pointed out, this court did say, in Larson v. Meyer, 135 N.W.2d 145, 158 (N.D.1965), that [i]n construing this statute [§ 32-21-02, N.D.C.C.], this court has held that in an action thereunder damages are to be awarded only for pecuniary loss and may not be awarded for loss of society and companionship or in the way of solatium. The case did not involve an action to recover damages for the wrongful death of a child. Further, the statement in Larson v. Meyer was dictum supporting the court's determination that the trial court committed prejudicial error in the December 1962 jury trial of that action by receiving into evidence a Christmas card photograph of the Larson family when there was no dispute as to the decedent's identity, health or physical condition, and could only have been offered to arouse sympathy, passion, and prejudice. We do not glean from Larson v. Meyer an intention to overrule, disavow, or limit Henke and Grenz, which afforded recovery for the `comfort    of a kind, faithful and loving child,' which falls within loss of companionship, society and comfort for which the trial court awarded damages in this case. Nor, for that matter, do we glean an intention to overrule, disavow or limit prior decisions, such as Dahl, Geier, and Quam, which allowed recovery for nurture, instruction, training, protection, care, advice, counsel, and other intangibles. Were it not dictum, this court's statement in Larson v. Meyer that damages may not be awarded for loss of society and companionship would be an anachronism in this court's decisional history leading to the recoverability of damages for loss of society. It would also be an aberration in our regional jurisprudence. See McKee v. Thompson, 558 F.Supp. 68 (D.N.D.1983), in which Judge Van Sickle observed that courts in Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Dakota and Wisconsin allow the recovery of damages for such losses. Loss of society and comfort is an item usually recognized and made the basis for an award [ Prosser & Keeton on Torts, § 127, pp. 951-952 (5th ed. 1984) ] in what today is probably a numerical majority of jurisdictions [S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death 2d, 3:49, p. 313 (1975)]. One plausible explanation for the trend toward allowing these elements of damages is that the society, care and attention of a deceased parent or spouse (for example) are `services' having financial value which may be both measured and compensated. And, as was stated in the ATLA-NACCA Law Journal [18 NACCA L.J. 379 (1956)] with regard to the death of a minor child: `The death of a minor child is a deep emotional wounding, and it may be admitted that there is a decided tendency for the law to compensate for the grievous injury to family feelings involved in the death of such children or, phrased otherwise, to place a money value upon that lost companionship, deprived presence, and the co-adventuring implicit in the parent-child relationship. This enlarged view suggests that these deprivations are services, financially compensable, lost to the survivors of the deceased child. The sentimental aspects of family life may be materialized without being vulgarized.' S. Speiser, Recovery for Wrongful Death 2d, § 3:49, p. 321 (1975). We conclude that one may recover damages for loss of society, comfort and companionship in an action for the wrongful death of a child. While previous decisions of this court have implicitly authorized such damages, we deem it appropriate to clarify the matter and overrule our prior decisions to the extent that they are contrary to the conclusion we reach in this case. Therefore, to the extent that Kalsow v. Grob, supra , and Stejskal v. Darrow, supra , held that a parent may not recover damages in a wrongful death action for the loss of the society and companionship of a child, those decisions are hereby overruled.