Opinion ID: 2793897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Jurisdiction in this case arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although denials of summary judgment are not usually a final judgment, “district court denials of qualified immunity may be appealed as collateral orders where (1) the defendant is a public official asserting the defense of qualified immunity, and (2) the issue appealed concerns not which facts the parties might be able to prove, but whether certain alleged facts reflect a violation of clearly established law.” Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 2002). Put differently, the appeal must “present[] a neat abstract [issue] of law rather than the question of whether the record demonstrates a genuine No. 14-3334 Wenk et al. v. O’Reilly et al. Page 10 issue of fact for trial.” Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 298 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995) (holding that a “[d]istrict [c]ourt’s determination that the summary judgment record . . . raised a genuine issue of fact” is not immediately appealable). Where an appeal “make[s] some factual arguments” but “also presents . . . discrete legal question[s],” we can exercise jurisdiction over the legal questions while declining to address the factual arguments. Marvin v. City of Taylor, 509 F.3d 234, 237 (6th Cir. 2007). In this case, Schott “make[s] some factual arguments” but “also presents . . . discrete legal question[s],” as indicated in the analysis below. See id. Thus, we will consider her legal arguments while declining to review her factual arguments.