Opinion ID: 2602282
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counts One and Two: The Cothran Grievance.

Text: ¶ 14 On 20 December 1994 the District Court, Pontotoc County, appointed respondent to serve as co-conservator of Mary L. Cothran (Ms. Cothran), an elderly woman confined to a nursing home. In July of 1993, Ms. Cothran's nephew, Tom Cothran (Mr. Cothran), had discovered that the person then serving as his aunt's conservator had been embezzling money and/or property from her estate. In appointing respondent as Ms. Cothran's new conservator, the court directed him to seek restitution of the assets embezzled by the former conservator as well as pursue legal action against anyone who might be liable for the loss. [29] ¶ 15 Prior to respondent's appointment, Mr. Cothran had engaged a Tulsa accounting firm to investigate and report on the amount embezzled. The report was not provided to respondent until April or early May 1995. Respondent, theorizing that the former conservator's law partners might be liable along with the former conservator, then met with lawyers for all three in an effort to negotiate a settlement. On 22 May 1995, while these negotiations were proceeding, Ms. Cothran died. ¶ 16 When the negotiations failed to produce a settlement, respondent filed an action in June 1995 against the former conservator and his law partners to recover the embezzled funds. Having as yet not filed a probate proceeding nor sought the appointment of a special administrator, [30] respondent filed the action in his capacity as conservator. [31] The action was filed within the limitations period, which was set to expire in July. In November 1995, several months after the limitations period expired, the court dismissed the action without prejudice on the grounds that it had not been brought in the name of the real party in interest. Respondent made no request of the district court prior to the suit's dismissal for a reasonable time to effectuate a substitution of the proper party [32] nor did he attempt to re-file the action under the state's reviver statute within a year after the dismissal. [33] Neither did he appeal the decision. Respondent's inaction deprived the estate of the opportunity to recover approximately $375,000. [34] ¶ 17 Respondent did not file a probate proceeding for Ms. Cothran's estate until 20 February 1997, almost two years after she died. Respondent testified that Mr. Cothran began pressing him to file a probate proceeding in the fall of 1995. Respondent also stipulated that Mr. Cothran prepared a final accounting of the conservatorship, which he, respondent, never filed. Although he stipulated that he received the final accounting from Mr. Cothran in May 1995, he testified at the PRT hearing that the stipulation was in error and that he did not in fact obtain it until March 1997. [35] Respondent's explanation for not filing it after that date  that he thought he was no longer the estate's attorney  is not supported by the record, which contains a letter dated mid-July 1997 indicating that Minter would be meeting that day with Mr. Cothran and his sister to discuss issues remaining in the case. It was not until 26 September 1997 that Mr. Cothran sent respondent a letter asking him to withdraw from the probate and informing him that new counsel had been retained. Respondent never filed a motion to withdraw. ¶ 18 Respondent stipulated that Mr. Cothran felt that Respondent failed to properly communicate with him about the status of the conservatorship and probate. Despite this acknowledgment of Mr. Cothran's feelings about the level of communication between them, respondent testified that he believed he properly communicated with Mr. Cothran. Mr. Cothran did not testify. [36] ¶ 19 The trial panel concluded that respondent violated the following sections of the Oklahoma Rules of Professional Conduct (ORPC): Rule 1.1(failing to provide competent representation), [37] Rule 1.3 (failing to act with reasonable diligence in representing a client), [38] Rule 1.4 (failing to keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter), [39] Rule 1.16(d) (failing to take reasonable steps upon termination of representation to protect a client's interests), [40] Rule 3.2 (failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation), [41] and Rule 8.4(d) (engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice). [42] The panel also concluded that respondent's misconduct violated the terms of Rule 1.3 of the Rules Governing Disciplinary Proceedings (RGDP) (engaging in acts contrary to prescribed standards of conduct and bringing discredit upon the legal profession). [43] ¶ 20 We agree that the record provides clear and convincing evidence respondent failed to provide competent and diligent representation to the Cothran estate in violation of ORPC Rules 1.1 and 1.3, and that he failed to expedite litigation in violation of ORPC Rule 3.2. [44] We also agree with the trial panel's conclusion that respondent violated the provisions of RGDP Rule 1.4. Despite respondent's contention that he frequently communicated with Mr. Cothran, it is clear from the evidence that respondent did not inform Mr. Cothran that he was so disquieted by the prospect of handling a probate proceeding that he might not, or would not, be able to render that legal service. This was critical information regarding the status of the legal matters entrusted to respondent and Mr. Cothran was entitled to be informed of it. No matter how many conversations and meetings were held or what else respondent told Mr. Cothran, his failure to be honest with him about his competence to handle the probate establishes a violation of ORPC Rule 1.4. ¶ 21 We disagree with the trial panel's conclusion that respondent violated ORPC Rule 1.16(d). The complaint does not allege facts and the record fails to establish that respondent failed to take steps after discharge to protect his client's interests. Nevertheless, the complaint does allege and the evidence does establish a violation of ORPC Rule 1.16(a)(5), which requires a lawyer to withdraw upon being discharged. [45] The fact that the Bar did not specifically charge a violation of this rule is of no consequence. [46] The provisions of RGDP Rule 6.2, which govern the contents of disciplinary complaints, demand only that the complaint set forth the specific facts constituting the misconduct, and does not require the lawyer to be notified of the specific disciplinary rule that the misconduct violates. [47] The Bar discharged its duty to provide adequate notice by alleging that Respondent failed to timely remove himself from representation in the Mary L. Cothran Estate as requested by the personal representative, Tom Cothran. Respondent stipulated that he did not withdraw from the Cothran representation as requested. The evidence establishes a violation of ORPC Rule 1.16(a)(5). ¶ 22 The Bar also charged respondent with violating ORPC Rule 8.4(d) by engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice and RGDP Rule 1.3 by engaging in behavior contrary to prescribed standards of conduct and bringing discredit upon the legal profession. In its brief the Bar indicates that it brought these charges based upon the totality of the circumstances constituting Counts One and Two of the complaint. Respondent asserts that nothing in the complaint, including the bare citation of the rules in its boilerplate paragraphs, informs him that the charges are based on the totality of the circumstances. This, he urges, constitutes a violation of his right to due process. ¶ 23 Due process must be afforded an accused attorney in a bar disciplinary proceeding. [48] Compliance with due process requires the Bar to allege facts sufficient to put the accused lawyer on notice of the conduct upon which the charges of professional misconduct are based. [49] It is the duty of this court, not that of the parties by stipulation or otherwise, to examine the facts de novo and determine which ethical rules are applicable. [50] As long as the respondent has notice of the facts underlying the misconduct charges, it is within the court's discretion whether to look at those facts as discrete instances of misconduct or consider them as part of a larger set of circumstances. The Bar's invitation to review respondent's conduct in the context of the totality of the circumstances is entirely appropriate and does not violate respondent's due process claim to notice and to an opportunity to be heard. ¶ 24 While we disagree with respondent that the application of Rule 8.4(d) to his misconduct would violate his right to due process, we do agree with respondent's contention that his conduct in the Cothran matter was not prejudicial to the administration of justice. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Bourne, [51] the court reviewed Oklahoma case law applying ORPC Rule 8.4(d). In every case, the respondent's conduct included some element of deceit, dishonesty, misrepresentation, criminality, sexual misbehavior or other morally reprehensible conduct. [52] The Bar has cited no case where the court has held that lack of competence and diligence alone, the gravamen of respondent's misconduct in the Cothran matter, is a sufficient basis for a charge that the lawyer's conduct is prejudicial to the administration of justice. In State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association v. Spadafora, [53] we said, Rule 8.4(d) may not be used to establish professional misconduct unless the complained acts were the sort that were `previously disapproved by case law, statute, court rules or the lore of the profession.' [54] The Bar has not cited any case law, statute, or court rules, other than the substantive violations of the ORPC and RGDP, the breach of which would serve to establish that respondent engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of judicial process. [55] We hence hold that the Bar has not met its burden with respect to a violation of ORPC Rule 8.4(d). Of that violation respondent stands exonerated. ¶ 25 As for RGDP Rule 1.3, we find that there is clear and convincing evidence that respondent's conduct violates that provision.