Opinion ID: 24438
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cornelius loe

Text: A Cornelius Loe argues that his conspiracy conviction should be reversed, asserting that his prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. The government alleged only one act in furtherance of the conspiracy that fell within the five-year statute of limitations.3 Cornelius Loe argues that the overt act alleged in the indictment could not support a conviction. The indictment alleged that the defendants conspired to commit the following acts: To devise and intend to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud insurance companies and to obtain money and 3 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3282 (2000) (articulating a five-year limitations period). 4 property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses and promises and [to do so in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (mail fraud) and in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (wire fraud)]. Given the statute of limitations, the Government had to prove an act in furtherance of the conspiracy after September 11, 1992. The indictment alleged: On or about December, 1992, BABO BEAZLEY LOE, C.D. LOE, JR. and LOE's HIGHPORT, INC. effected a settlement of the lawsuit and received a portion of the fraudulently obtained insurance proceeds. These allegations arose out of the following circumstances: In July 1991, the Loes' insurer, Lexington, interpleaded $638,388.34 in state court to determine the portion of proceeds due to the Loes and one of their tenants, David Hull. Hull apparently had refused to endorse Lexington insurance checks that he received, checks made out jointly to him and the Loes.4 According to the Government, the vast majority of the interpleaded funds resulted from the insurance fraud undertaken by the Loes. On March 27, 1991, the state court ordered that $624,867.795 be paid to the Loes and that $15,520.55 be retained in the court registry. The court's calculation was incorrect, as these amounts sum to $640,388.34. The investment firm 4 Hull had been the lessee of a restaurant located on the marina. Cornelius Loe allegedly attempted to enlist Hull in the conspiracy. In the wake of Hull's refusal to participate, the Loes ejected him from the premises and indicated that the restaurant would not be reopened. Litigation ensued. 5 Each of these sums was paid with interest; the amounts shown reflect only principal. 5 handling the proceeds consequently paid the Loes only $622,867.79. By subsequent order, the court awarded Hull $13,520.55, leaving $2,000 in the account. All of these events occurred before September 11, 1992. Meanwhile, the Loes sued Hull over a debt. In November or December, 1992, Hull's attorney and the Loes' attorney negotiated a possible settlement of litigation between the two parties. Hull's attorney proposed a disposition of the funds remaining in the registry account from this and earlier interpleader actions. Following this conversation, Hull's attorney asked the court to disburse $17,500 from an earlier interpleader to the Loes, plus the $2,000 remaining by mistake, and to disburse the remainder to Hull. The motion explained that the $17,500 was actually owed to Hull, but should be given to the Loes to settle the debt litigation. The court entered an order of disbursement on February 10, 1993.6 Based on these facts, Cornelius Loe contends, first, that the $2,000 payment was merely the result of the conspiracy, and not its object. He argues that the object of the conspiracy was defrauding the insurance company. As the fraud was completed outside the limitations period, Cornelius argues that the 6 The motion made clear that LHI was entitled to the $2,000 as a result of the prior mistaken order. The court's subsequent order of disbursement specifically included a $2,000 disbursement to Babo Loe as trustee of LHI. 6 Government can not demonstrate the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement.7 We are unpersuaded by Loe's argument. Receipt of the money was an object, and not merely a collateral result, of the conspiracy. The indictment so alleged, and a rational trier of fact could have arrived at this conclusion. Our holding in United States v. Girard8 is instructive. In Girard, we reversed the dismissal of an indictment, which the district court had found barred by the statute of limitations. The defendant in that case had allegedly conspired to defraud the government by rigging contract bids. Only the final payment was within the statute of limitations; the bid rigging had occurred long before.9 We held that the receipt of the money was properly alleged as an object of the conspiracy, which did not end until the last payment was made. Girard's overt act was the acceptance and retention of the payment.10 We made the common sense observation that the object of the conspiracy was not the making of rigged bids itself, but the subsequent receipt of the proceeds.11 Similarly, 7 See Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1957). 8 744 F.2d 1170 (5th Cir. 1984). 9 Girard, 744 F.2d at 1171. 10 Id. at 1173. 11 Id. at 1172. The cases cited by Cornelius Loe are consistent with this reasoning, yet are factually distinguishable. In United States v. Colon-Munoz, 192 F.3d 210, 227-29 (1st Cir. 1999), the court held that obtaining specified property was the object of the conspiracy. Following the purchase of the property, a conspirator made payments on a loan financing the purchase. The court 7 receipt of the $2,000 in this case constituted an overt act falling within the limitations period. Cornelius Loe also contends that actions taken by Hull's attorney are not actions taken by conspirators and therefore cannot be actions taken in furtherance of a conspiracy.12 This argument fails, first, because receipt of the money by the Loes was an overt act within the scope of the conspiracy. Moreover, a rational jury could conclude that the Loes, as parties to the settlement agreement with Hull, took some overt action in connection with the terms of the agreement. Third, Cornelius Loe argues that, even if the $2,000 payment made in February 1993 was an act in furtherance of the conspiracy, the indictment failed to allege this act. Loe notes that the indictment only alleged the 1992 settlement. In assessing whether a conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371 withstands a statute of limitations challenge, this Court has held that the overt acts alleged in the indictment and proved at trial mark the duration of correctly concluded that these later actions were not undertaken in furtherance of the conspiracy. See id. In United States v. Davis, 533 F.2d 921, 926 (5th Cir. 1976), we found that acts taken after false statements were made to the government were not part of a conspiracy. We emphasized that defendants were charged with conspiring to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1001, noting that the object of this offense was the making of false statements itself. We contrasted that offense with conspiracy to defraud the government. See id. at 927-28. As the conspiracy at issue in this case involves wire and mail fraud, it is distinguishable from Davis. 12 See United States v. Manges, 110 F.3d 1162, 1170 (5th Cir. 1997) (holding that, where a conspirator did not mail the letter implicated in mail fraud, the mailing by another person was insufficient to support conviction). 8 the conspiracy.13 Proof of an unalleged act can not surmount the statute of limitations bar. Loe's argument fails, however, because the motion to disburse the $2,000 was itself part of the settlement, which was negotiated in November or December 1992. The indictment indicated that Appellants had effected a settlement and received a portion of the fraudulently obtained insurance proceeds. The broad language of the indictment was sufficient to encompass the Loes' receipt of the $2,000. Finally, Cornelius Loe contends that the $2,000 is interest from the interpled funds and consequently not the insurer's money. This argument is creative advocacy, but wrong. The $2,000 unquestionably represented the remainder of the principal originally registered with the court.14 B Cornelius Loe further contends that the district court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding the statute of limitations in its aiding and abetting instruction for the conspiracy count. Count 17 of the indictment charged Appellants with (1) conspiring 13 See Davis, 533 F.2d at 929. 14 Babo Loe adopts Cornelius Loe's arguments. For the reasons given above, they also fail. Indeed, Babo Loe's case is much weaker, as the $2,000 check was issued in her name. 9 to violate the mail and wire fraud statutes, and (2) aiding and abetting this conspiracy, violating 18 U.S.C. § 2. As we understand his argument, Cornelius Loe asserts that it is unclear from the verdict whether the jury convicted him of aiding and abetting or for his role as a member of the conspiracy itself. He argues that the actus reus of aiding and abetting must itself occur within the limitations period. Where the aidor-abettor's acts fall outside this period, it is irrelevant that the overt acts taken by the conspirators were not time-barred. According to Cornelius Loe, the jury should have been informed of this distinction. We doubt the validity of Loe's proposition. An aidor-abettor is guilty in a derivative sense; his guilt is contingent on the acts of another.15 Courts have recognized this relationship by holding that aiding and abetting is governed by the statute of limitations applicable to the predicate offense.16 One could reasonably conclude that, as long as the acts of the conspirator were not time-barred, it is of no moment that the aidor-abettor's conduct fell outside the limitations period. We need not decide this, however, as Cornelius Loe was a party to the Hull litigation. A rational jury could have found that any acts of aiding and 15 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (2000); United States v. Campbell, 426 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1970) (18 U.S.C. § 2 does not define a crime; rather it makes punishable as a principal one who aids or abets the commission of a substantive crime.). 16 See United States v. Musacchia, 900 F.2d 493, 499 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated on other grounds, 955 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1991); Campbell, 426 F.2d at 553; United States v. Gressett, 773 F. Supp. 270, 281 (D. Kan. 1991). 10 abetting committed by Cornelius Loe fell within the five-year limitations period. Even if we were to accept Cornelius Loe's argument, however, the jury instructions sufficiently informed the jury that the conspiracy limitations period applied to the aiding and abetting offense. The court admonished the jury to consider the instructions as a whole and to consider the aiding and abetting instructions together with the conspiracy instructions. We do not find that the court abused its discretion in incorporating the statute of limitations by reference.17 C Cornelius Loe also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under Count 17. The applicable standard of review requires us to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.18 The voluminous evidence in the record affirms that Loe's challenge is meritless. We decline Loe's invitation to re-weigh the credibility of the witnesses.19 17 See United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 1994) (reviewing a court's refusal to submit a proposed jury instruction for abuse of discretion). 18 See United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 341 (5th Cir. 1993). 19 See United States v. Bailey, 444 U.S. 394, 414-15 (1980) (stating that it is for the jury, and not the court, to determine the credibility of witnesses). 11 D Loe challenges the jury instructions for the conspiracy, mail fraud, and wire fraud counts based on the court's failure to define materiality. Materiality is an element of the offenses of mail and wire fraud, and must be included in the jury charge.20 In this case, the court instructed the jury that the fraud must be material; the only alleged error is its failure to define the term.21 We review a trial court's refusal to include a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion, according the trial court substantial latitude in formulating the charge.22 We find reversible error only where the requested instruction is substantially correct; the actual charge given the jury did not substantially cover the content of the proposed instruction; and where the omission of the proposed instruction would seriously impair the defendant's ability to present a defense.23 20 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 25 (1999); United States v. Pettigrew, 77 F.3d 1500, 1510-11 (5th Cir. 1996). 21 The court instructed the jury in the following manner: For purposes of both the mail and wire fraud statutes, a scheme to defraud includes any scheme to deprive another of money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises. A representation may be false when it constitutes a half truth, or effectively conceals a material fact, provided it is made with intent to defraud. 22 Pettigrew, 77 F.3d at 1510. 23 Id. 12 The court only deviated from the instruction proposed by Appellants in refusing to define material.24 We have held that failure to charge materiality to the jury requires reversal, without considering whether the error was harmless.25 However, we have not found that failure to define materiality compels the same response. This is not a case where the actual instructions failed to substantially cover the content of the proposed instruction.26 Given the evidence presented at trial, which demonstrated that Appellants' fraud increased the insurers' payments by millions of dollars, the court's failure to define material was nothing more than harmless error.27