Opinion ID: 625607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court Review under 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c)

Text: Prior to 1990, the authority to naturalize aliens and the authority to remove aliens were vested, respectively, in the courts and the Attorney General. See 8 U.S.C. '' 1251, 1421(a) (1988); see also Shomberg v. United States, 348 U.S. 540, 543B44 (1955). As naturalization and removal were mutually exclusive, this bifurcation of authority sometimes led to Aa race between the alien to gain citizenship and the Attorney General to deport him.@ Id. at 544. In 1950, intending to end this race, Congress enacted 8 U.S.C. ' 1429, providing that Ano petition for naturalization shall be finally heard by a naturalization court if there is pending against the petitioner a deportation proceeding . . . .@ 8 U.S.C. ' 1429 (1952); see also Shomberg, 348 U.S. at 544B45. In 1990, Congress conferred upon the Attorney General, Asole authority to naturalize persons as citizens of the United States . . . .@ Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, ' 401(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5038 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(a)). With authority for both naturalization and removal vested in the Attorney General, ' 1429 was amended to read, Ano application for naturalization shall be considered by the Attorney General if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding . . . .@ 8 U.S.C. ' 1429; ' 407(d)(3), 104 Stat. at 5041 (amending 8 U.S.C. ' 1429). Thus, priority for removal proceedings was maintained. The Immigration Act of 1990 did not, however, remove the courts entirely from the naturalization process. Rather, the Act reaffirmed the right of a 7 petitioner to judicial review by giving the district courts the power to review, de novo, decisions by the Attorney General denying naturalization. ' 401(c), 104 Stat. at 5038 (codified at 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c)).4 We are now faced with the question, unresolved by the statute, of whether ' 1429 forecloses judicial review pursuant to ' 1421(c) whenever a removal proceeding is pending. Prior to the 1990 amendments, we held in In re Terzich, 256 F.2d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1958), that courts could not exercise jurisdiction over naturalization so long as a removal proceeding was pending. However, we have since questioned, in a nonprecedential opinion, whether Terzich remains valid in light of the 1990 amendments. See Apokarina v. Ashcroft, 93 F. App=x. 4 Section 1421(c) reads in relevant part: A person whose application for naturalization under this subchapter is denied, after a hearing before an immigration officer under section 1447(a) of this Title, may seek review of such denial before the United States district court for the district in which such person resides in accordance with chapter 7 of title 5. Such review shall be de novo, and the court shall make its own findings of fact and conclusions of law and shall, at the request of the petitioner, conduct a hearing de novo on the application. 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c). 8 469, 471B72 (3d Cir. 2004). Today we resolve the question raised in Apokarina by holding that district courts have jurisdiction to review a denial of naturalization during the pendency of removal proceedings and may issue a declaratory judgment regarding the lawfulness of such denial. In resolving this question, we must address both the district courts= jurisdiction and their capacity to grant effective relief. On the issue of jurisdiction, we find the Ninth Circuit=s analysis of the issue compelling. See De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042 (9th Cir. 2004). In Bellajaro, the Ninth Circuit found that [n]othing in the text [of ' 1421(c)] limits the jurisdiction so conferred to review of denials when there is no removal proceeding pending. By the same token, the text of ' 1429 B which does constrain consideration of naturalization applications during the pendency of a removal proceeding B clearly applies to the Attorney General. There is no hint in the language of ' 1429 that it also applies to the courts. Id. at 1046. Based on the plain language of the statute, we concur with the Ninth Circuit that there is Ano textual basis for concluding that jurisdiction vested in district courts by ' 1421(c) is divested by ' 1429.@ Id.; see also Zayed v. United States, 368 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2004) (A[W]e do not read the amended ' 1429 as divesting the district courts of the jurisdiction granted under ' 1421(c).@). 9 The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the district court could not review the denial of naturalization in Bellajaro because, while ' 1429 did not remove the court=s jurisdiction, it did limit the scope of review. Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1043B44. The Ninth Circuit held that Awhere . . . the INS has denied an application for naturalization on the basis of ' 1429 because removal proceedings are pending, the district courts have jurisdiction to review the denial but the scope of review is limited to >such= denial.@ Id. at 1046B47; see also Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906 (AWhere the INS has denied an application for naturalization on the ground that removal proceedings are pending, therefore, the district court=s de novo review is limited to review of that threshold determination.@). A denial by the Attorney General pursuant to ' 1429, however, is different from the situation presented in this case, where Gonzalez=s naturalization application was denied by the Attorney General on the merits. As the decision under review is on the merits, jurisdiction is appropriate for a review and decision on the merits pursuant to ' 1421(c). Cf. Bellajaro, 378 F.3d at 1046 (A[A decision on the merits] is a determination that the Attorney General has not yet made because of ' 1429, and it is one that the district courts, which no longer have the authority to naturalize, can not make in the first instance.@). Resolving the question of jurisdiction, however, is not the end of the matter. Having decided that district courts have jurisdiction, we must now address the more difficult issue of what, if any, relief a district court may grant.5 This issue is more 5 Unlike the dissent, we do not think we can affirm the 10 vexed because, pursuant to ' 1421(c), the sole authority to naturalize rests with the Attorney General, and such authority is limited by ' 1429. This has led the Sixth Circuit to declare that Athe restraints that ' 1429 imposes upon the Attorney General prevent a district court from granting effective relief under ' 1421(c) so long as removal proceedings are pending.@ Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906. District Court=s decision to take jurisdiction and decide the case on the merits without addressing the capacity to grant relief. In order for a district court to decide the case on the merits, it must it must be able to provide a meaningful remedy B otherwise dismissal for failure to state a claim would be the appropriate outcome as in Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906 (A[W]e do not read the amended ' 1429 as divesting the district courts of the jurisdiction granted under ' 1421(c). . . . [T]he restraints that ' 1429 imposes upon the Attorney General prevent a district court from granting effective relief under ' 1421(c) so long as removal proceedings are pending.@), and Ajlani v. Chertoff, 545 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2008) (A[W]e conclude that the district court properly dismissed Ajlani=s ' 1447(b) claim [permitting district court review if a petition for naturalization is not decided within 120 days] for failure to state a claim on which naturalization relief could be granted while removal proceedings were pending.@). 11 We are in agreement with the Sixth Circuit that Congress did not Aintend[] the priority of removal proceedings over naturalization proceedings to be altered by the 1990 amendments.@ Id. at 905B06. In light of this conclusion, we also agree that a district court cannot order the Attorney General to naturalize an alien who is subject to pendent removal proceedings. See id. at 906 n.5 (disagreeing with Ngwana v. Att=y Gen., 40 F. Supp. 2d 319, 322 (D. Md. 1999) (ordering alien naturalized despite pendency of removal proceedings)).6 However, we do not conclude that district courts are, therefore, precluded from hearing a denial of naturalization case on the basis that no effective relief can be granted.7 Rather, we find 6 For this same reason, although we agree with the District Court=s determination that it had both jurisdiction and the capacity to grant relief in this case, we do not endorse the District Court=s rationale. The District Court found that ' 1429=s prohibition on the Attorney General Aconsidering an application for naturalization@ is inapplicable to a court order of naturalization because an order is not an application. Gonzalez, 684 F. Supp. 2d at 562B63. Thus, a court order to naturalize an alien while in removal proceedings does not run afoul of the post-1990 version of ' 1429. Id. We cannot endorse the District Court=s reasoning because it does not comport with the priority of removal proceedings. Unlike the District Court we find no reason to believe that the 1990 amendments altered the priority of removal that was established with the introduction of ' 1429 in 1950. See Zayed, 368 F.3d at 905B06. 7 In this regard, we disagree with the Second Circuit=s 12 that declaratory relief is appropriate and sufficient in this context. holding in Ajlani, 545 F.3d at 241 and the Fifth Circuit=s holding in Saba-Bakare v. Chertoff, 507 F.3d 337, 340B41 (5th Cir. 2007). 13 The Sixth Circuit raised the possibility of declaratory relief in Zayed but did not endorse it for two reasons. First, the plaintiff in Zayed did not request declaratory relief. Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906. Second, the Court determined that declaratory relief would likely be effective only in light of the Board of Immigration Appeals= (ABIA@) decision in In re Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 236 (1975). Zayed, 368 F.3d at 906B07. In In re Cruz, the BIA held that a court declaration could provide prima facie eligibility for 8 C.F.R. ' 1239.2(f) (2011) (formerly 8 C.F.R. ' 242.7), which Apermit[s] the alien to proceed to a final hearing on a pending application or petition for naturalization when the alien has established prima facie eligibility for naturalization and the matter involves exceptionally appealing or humanitarian factors . . . .@ The BIA reasoned that, because Aneither [the BIA] nor immigration judges have authority with respect to the naturalization of aliens,@ prima facie eligibility for naturalization could be established only Aby an affirmative communication from the [Immigration and Naturalization Service8] or by declaration of a court . . . .@ In re Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. at 237. However, the Sixth Circuit noted that whether In re Cruz remained good law after the 1990 amendments to the INA is in question. Zayed, 368 F.3d at 907 n.6 (citing Apokarina, 93 F. App=x at 472). 8 Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002), the Immigration and Naturalization Service has ceased to exist, and its enforcement functions have been transferred to the Department of Homeland Security. 14 Since Zayed, the BIA has reaffirmed its decision in In re Cruz. See In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. 103, 106 (2007); see also Zegrean v. Att=y Gen., 602 F.3d 273, 275 (3d Cir. 2010) (deferring to the BIA=s interpretation of ' 1239.2(f)). Recognizing that the 1990 amendments to the INA divested the district courts from jurisdiction to grant or deny applications for naturalization in the first instance, the BIA found that an affirmative declaration from the Department of Homeland Security would be required to establish prima facie eligibility. See In re Hidalgo, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 106. We are confident that the BIA would also accept the declaration of a district court properly exercising its jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. ' 1421(c). But we do not rest our decision on this basis. Rather, for the reasons discussed below, we find that declaratory relief is appropriate notwithstanding whatever role it may play in terminating a removal proceeding under 8 C.F.R. ' 1239.2(f). Declaratory relief strikes a balance between the petitioner=s right to full judicial review as preserved by ' 1421(c) and the priority of removal proceedings enshrined in ' 1429. Maintaining the petitioner=s right to judicial review of a naturalization denial is consistent with Congressional intent, as evidenced by the creation of ' 1421(c). Rather than vest full and final authority to grant or deny a naturalization application with the Attorney General, Congress gave the district courts the power of de novo review.9 To hold that district courts are 9 The legislative history of the Immigration Act of 1990 also supports this view. In discussing HB 1630 C the House companion bill to SB 358, which introduced the Immigration 15 precluded from review by ' 1429 whenever removal proceedings are pending raises the possibility that review may be cut off by the actions of the Attorney General. See Kestleboym v. Chertoff, 538 F. Supp. 2d 813, 818 (D.N.J. 2008); Ngwana, 40 F. Supp. 2d at 321B22. Such a possibility is contrary to the intent of Congress as expressed in the structure of the statute. Declaratory relief, in the form of a judgment regarding the lawfulness of the denial of naturalization, permits the alien a day in court, as required by ' 1421(c), while not upsetting the priority of removal over naturalization established in ' 1429 because it affects the record forCbut not the priority ofCremoval proceedings, thereby preserving both congressionally mandated goals, a de novo review process and the elimination of the race to the courthouse.