Opinion ID: 1997771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) provides:

Text: Notwithstanding compliance with other subchapters of this chapter, no person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit to be emitted into the outdoor atmosphere substances in quantities which [sic] shall result in air pollution as defined herein. [(Emphasis added).] Although the words cause, suffer, allow or permit are not defined in N.J.S.A. 26:26-19(e) or N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a), the plain language of the regulation  no person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit....  indicates that some volitional act is required to impose liability. In Department of Health v. Roselle, 34 N.J. 331, 169 A. 2d 153 (1961), we interpreted a provision of the New Jersey Air Pollution Control Code (the Code) that had the exact same language. In Roselle, the Department of Health charged the operators of a refuse dump with a violation of the Code, which provided that [n]o person shall cause, suffer, allow or permit open burning of refuse.... Id. at 336, 169 A. 2d 153. (Emphasis added). That charge had resulted from the outbreak of fires of unknown origin, just like the fire at Alden Leeds. Ibid. Chief Justice Weintraub, speaking for the Court, found that the defendants could not be found to have violated the statute (or the injunction issued thereto) without evidence that they somehow started the fires, stating: The word cause is clear enough, and if defendants had set the fires in question, their violation of the injunction would be plain, and the vagueness of the words suffer, allow or permit would not relieve them of responsibility. But plaintiff disavowed a charge that defendants started the fires and indeed disavowed knowledge of their origin. [ Id. at 349-50, 169 A. 2d 153.] Although the cause, suffer, allow or permit language in the two regulations is identical, the majority criticizes the Appellate Division for applying the Roselle Court's interpretation to the language of N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). Even though the Code in Roselle targeted a more specific cause of air pollution  the open burning of refuse  than the regulation here  targeting emissions generally  the Court's treatment of the identical language in a similar environmental statute is significant precedent. As stated by this Court in Roselle, it is evident that cause suggests some catalyst  some act or failure to act by the party charged with causing the emission which started, precipitated, or lead to the result  here the release of air contaminants into the atmosphere. If the fire were caused by Alden Leeds' negligent storing of the chemicals or, indeed, if the fire was the result of the spontaneous combustion of the chemicals, even properly stored, then I would find that Alden Leeds violated N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). In those situations, Alden Leeds' actions would have been a catalyst to the release of pollutants. For example, in DeEugenio & Sons v. Division of Envtl. Quality, 92 N.J.A.R. 2d (EPE) 47, 1992 WL 257715 (1992), aff'd, No. A-4055-91T2 (App. Div. April 2, 1993), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 480, 634 A. 2d 527 (1993), a peach farmer secured the necessary permits to burn peach tree trimmings. Due to wind change, the fire was responsible for the improper emission of smoke into the atmosphere and the farmer was deemed to have violated N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a). Although the farmer did not act negligently, he did set the fire. See also Department of Health v. Concrete Specialties, Inc., 112 N.J. Super. 407, 410, 271 A. 2d 595 (App.Div. 1970) (finding that defendant whose equipment caused smoke to be emitted into air violated regulation promulgated under APCA because defendant allowed and permitted emission of smoke). But the fire here was started by an unknown third person. Alden Leeds did nothing to cause the fire. There is no evidence that Alden Leeds either by an affirmative act or an act of omission caused, suffered, allowed or permitted the release. Causation is not established where the result would have occurred without any action on Alden Leeds' part. State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 69 N.J. 102, 111, 351 A. 2d 337 (1976) (holding because nuclear power plant was only accelerating condition that would naturally have occurred, it was not charged with polluting creek in violation of N.J.S.A. 23:5-28). The mere storage of the chemicals by Alden Leeds was not the catalyst that caused the fire or the subsequent emission of contaminants into the air. By its plain language, N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) requires the DEP to show by a preponderance of evidence that Alden Leeds caused, suffered, allowed or permitted the release of the contaminants into the air. The DEP has failed to do so. The majority analogizes N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2(a) to common law strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. However, under common law strict liability, [t]he strong current of authority provides that forces of nature and actions of third parties that bring about damaging events from ultrahazardous activities relieve a defendant of liability. W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 79, at 563 (5th ed. 1984). Therefore, the analogy to common law strict liability provides no support for a construction of N.J.A.C. 7:27-5.2a that would hold a defendant liable even when an unknown third party caused the release of pollutants.