Opinion ID: 895851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion to Exclude Witness

Text: [¶ 26] Eldred argues the trial court erred when it granted the State's motion in limine to exclude Eldred's witness, University of North Dakota English Professor George Slanger. We review a trial court's disposition of a motion in limine under a different standard than a motion to suppress, deferring to the trial court's discretion to determine whether evidence is relevant. Williston Farm Equip., Inc. v. Steiger Tractor, Inc., 504 N.W.2d 545, 548 (N.D. 1993). We will not reverse a trial court's decision absent an abuse of discretion. Id. at 549. [¶ 27] Eldred intended to call Slanger to apparently testify, under his interpretation of section 62.1-02-01(2), the statute did not apply to Eldred and this interpretation would support Eldred's requested jury instruction on the affirmative defense of mistake of law. [¶ 28] Section 12.1-05-09 states, in relevant part: Mistake of law. Except as otherwise expressly provided, a person's good faith belief that conduct does not constitute a crime is an affirmative defense if he acted in reasonable reliance upon a statement of the law contained in: 1. A statute or other enactment. 2. A judicial decision, opinion, order, or judgment.    [¶ 29] The mistake of law defense is ordinarily not applicable when the governing statute does not contain a culpability requirement. State v. Fridley, 335 N.W.2d 785, 789 (N.D.1983). [¶ 30] Strict liability does not always preclude affirmative defenses. E.g., State v. Rasmussen, 524 N.W.2d 843, 845 (N.D.1994) (public policy factors support affirmative defense to driving under suspension in life-threatening circumstances). However, a mistaken belief as to the law is seldom available as a defense. E.g., State v. Nygaard, 447 N.W.2d 267, 271 (N.D.1989) (excuse based on a mistaken belief is not available for strict-liability offense of failing to stop after an accident). [¶ 31] Section 62.1-02-01 does not have a culpability requirement. It is a strict-liability statute. Although Eldred contends section 62.1-02-01 is criminal, and the willful culpability requirement of N.D.C.C. § 12.1-02-02(2) [5] should be read into section 62.1-02-01, we have stated section 12.1-02-02(2) is only applicable to Title 12.1, and the willful culpability level will not be read into other chapters unless the legislature specifically states as such. Nygaard, 447 N.W.2d at 270 (citing City of Dickinson v. Mueller, 261 N.W.2d 787, 789 (N.D.1977)). Eldred violated the statute by having the shotgun in his car. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Slanger to testify as to the mistake-of-law defense.