Opinion ID: 1420061
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Principal Business Purpose

Text: As noted above, the Ordinance defines adult video stores as a commercial establishment which, as one of its principal business purposes, offers for sale or rental for any form of consideration covered material as defined by the Ordinance. The City Code itself does not contain a definition of principal business purpose. Furthermore, no South Carolina court has construed the meaning of this phrase. Language from the City Code provides some limited guidance on the issue: A commercial establishment may have other principal business purposes that do not involve the offering for sale or rental of material depicting or describing specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas and still be categorized as adult bookstore or adult video store. Such other business purposes will not serve to exempt such commercial establishment from being categorized as an adult bookstore or adult video store so long as one of its principal business purposes is the offering for sale or rental for consideration the specified materials which depict or describe specified sexual activities or specified anatomical areas. COLUMBIA CITY CODE § 6-3147. Justice Scalia's dissent in FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) provides one definition of principal business purpose. While the majority opinion did not discuss the term, Justice Scalia opined: In addition, in order to qualify for regulation under the ordinance the business that provides such live nudity or such sexually explicit depictions or descriptions must do so as one of its principal business purposes... [T]he phrase as one of its principal business purposes can connote that the material containing the specified depictions and descriptions does not merely account for a substantial proportion of sales volume but is also intentionally marketed as material of that character. All of the establishments at issue, therefore, share the characteristics that they offer (1) live nudity or hardcore sexual material, (2) as a constant, intentional objective of their business. But there is still more. With the single exception of adult motion picture theater, the descriptions of all the establishments at issue contain some language that suggests a requirement that the business hold itself forth to the public precisely as a place where sexual stimulation of the described sort can be obtained.... A business can hardly have as a principal purpose a line of commerce it does not even promote.... Given these indications of the importance of holding forth contained in all except one of the definitions, it seems to me very likelyespecially if that should be thought necessary to sustain the constitutionality of the measurethat the Dallas ordinance in all its challenged applications would be interpreted to apply only to businesses that not only (1) offer live nudity or hardcore sexual material, (2) as a constant and intentional objective of their business, but also (3) seek to promote it as such.... Id. 493 U.S. at 260-61, 110 S.Ct. at 623. Justice Scalia's approach could be one analysis the City may adopt for dealing with the First Amendment issues inherent in the Ordinance. Such an analysis would allow businesses such as Pic-A-Flick to rent movies such as Titanic without fear of violating the Ordinance because the sexually explicit nature of some of the content of this movie is not promoted as material that is covered by the Ordinance. Also, Pic-A-Flick would be able to operate a back room containing the covered material as long as it did not hold itself out to the public as a place where such material can be obtained. [4]