Opinion ID: 153397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Private Searches

Text: 6 The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures by government actors. Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475, 41 S.Ct. 574, 576, 65 L.Ed. 1048 (1921). However, Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures is wholly inapplicable 'to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.'  United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113, 104 S.Ct. 1652, 1656, 80 L.Ed.2d 85 (1984) (quoting Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 662, 100 S.Ct. 2395, 2404, 65 L.Ed.2d 410 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)); see also United States v. Leffall, 82 F.3d 343, 347 (10th Cir.1996). However, in some cases a search by a private citizen may be transformed into a governmental search implicating the Fourth Amendment if the government coerces, dominates or directs the actions of a private person conducting the search or seizure. Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 796 (10th Cir.1989). In such a case, the private citizen may be regarded as an agent or instrumentality of the police and the fruits of the search may be suppressed. 7 In Pleasant, we observed that two important inquiries to aid in the determination of whether a private person becomes an agent or instrumentality of the police are whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and ... [whether] the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his own ends. Id. at 797 (quoting United States v. Miller, 688 F.2d 652, 657 (9th Cir.1982)). We are satisfied that knowledge and acquiescence, as those terms are used in Pleasant and the cases cited therein, encompass the requirement that the government agent must also affirmatively encourage, initiate or instigate the private action. See id. at 797-98. The totality of the circumstances guides the court's determination as to whether the government coerces, dominates or directs the actions of a private person. Id. at 796 (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 489, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2049-50, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) (plurality opinion)). 8 It is clear that if a government agent is involved merely as a witness, the requisite government action implicating Fourth Amendment concerns is absent. Leffall, 82 F.3d at 347-48; accord United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961, 965 (6th Cir.1980) (requiring more than the mere presence of a police officer to implicate the Fourth Amendment). In some affirmative way, the police must instigate, orchestrate, encourage or exceed the scope of the private search to trigger application of the Fourth Amendment. See United States v. Lambert, 771 F.2d 83, 89 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 474 U.S. 1034, 106 S.Ct. 598, 88 L.Ed.2d 577 (1985). As stated by the Ninth Circuit: 9 While a certain degree of governmental participation is necessary before a private citizen is transformed into an agent of the state, de minimis or incidental contacts between the citizen and law enforcement agents prior to or during the course of a search or seizure will not subject the search to fourth amendment scrutiny. 10 United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir.1981). Fourth Amendment concerns simply are not implicated when a private person voluntarily turns over property belonging to another and the government's direct or indirect participation is nonexistent or minor. Pleasant, 876 F.2d at 797. While government agents may not circumvent the Fourth Amendment by acting through private citizens, they need not discourage private citizens from doing that which is not unlawful. Leffall, 82 F.3d at 347-48. 11 Here, the search in question is not a governmental search implicating the Fourth Amendment because Mr. McCartney had a legitimate, independent motivation to search the package, Walther, 652 F.2d at 792; see also United States v. Reed, 15 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir.1994), namely, his independently formed belief that something was dangerous about the package, 9 R. 95-96, and his concern for the passengers on the bus on which the package was to be shipped, id. at 59-60. The police in no way instigated, orchestrated or encouraged the search. The district court so found. Mr. McCartney testified that the police neither told nor encouraged him to search the package, id. at 95-96, and the district court further concluded that Mr. McCartney would have opened the package even if the police had not responded to his call, 3 R. doc. 145 at 7. Fourth Amendment protection does not apply to the de minimis police involvement in the search of Mr. Smythe's package; the search remained a private one. Leffall, 82 F.3d at 347-48. 12 We finally note that the drug field test conducted by Agent Hughes of the contents of Mr. Smythe's package did not offend the Fourth Amendment because field tests are not searches within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 122-23, 104 S.Ct. at 1661-62. Such tests determine only whether or not a substance is a controlled substance, a fact that is not the source of a legitimate expectation of privacy. Id. 13 AFFIRMED.