Opinion ID: 77744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prong Two: Qualified Individual

Text: In order to make out the second prong of his prima facie case, Holly must prove that he is a qualified individual that is, someone with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365. Accordingly, an ADA plaintiff must show either that he can perform the essential functions of his job without accommodation, or, failing that, . . . that he can perform the essential functions of his job with a reasonable accommodation. D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1229 (quotation marks omitted). An accommodation is reasonable and necessary under the ADA, in turn, only if it enables the employee to perform the essential functions of the job. Lucas v. W.W. Grainger, Inc., 257 F.3d 1249, 1259-60 (11th Cir.2001); LaChance v. Duffy's Draft House, Inc., 146 F.3d 832, 835 (11th Cir.1998); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(1)(ii) (The term reasonable accommodation means: . . . Modifications or adjustments to the work environment, or to the manner or circumstances under which the position held or desired is customarily performed, that enable a qualified individual with a disability to perform the essential functions of that position . . . . (emphasis added)). If the individual is unable to perform an essential function of his job, even with an accommodation, he is, by definition, not a `qualified individual' and, therefore, not covered under the ADA. In other words, the ADA does not require the employer to eliminate an essential function of the plaintiff's job. D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1229 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). On the other hand, the ADA may require an employer to restructure a particular job by altering or eliminating some of its marginal functions. Lucas, 257 F.3d at 1260 (emphasis added). Holly argues that Clairson failed to accommodate his disability by not allowing him to occasionally clock in to work late and make up any lost time during breaks or overtime, as he had been allowed to do for fifteen years prior to the implementation of the new policy. Clairson responds that strict punctuality, as defined by its policy, is an essential function of Holly's position as mold polisher, and that as such, it is not required to eliminate this critical function. Assuming arguendo that this is true (and we return to this central question below), it is clear from the fact that Holly violated Clairson's punctuality policy on several occasions, and indeed by Holly's own admission, that his disability prevents him from performing this function without an accommodation. It is also clear that permitting Holly to occasionally clock in late and make up lost time over breaks and after hours would not allow him to perform the function of strict punctuality, as defined by Clairson's policy, according to which tardiness by mere seconds constitutes an infraction which cannot be made up, regardless of the cause of the tardiness. Thus, assuming that strict punctuality, as defined by Clairson's no-fault policy, is an essential function of Holly's position, the accommodation Holly suggests would require [Clairson] to eliminate an essential function of [Holly's] job, something the ADA does not require Clairson to do. We therefore agree with the district court that if strict punctuality is indeed an essential function of Holly's position as a mold polisher, then he cannot perform this function with or without reasonable accommodation, he is therefore not a qualified individual under the ADA, and his claims ultimately must fail. However, Holly argues that strict punctualityclocking in at precisely 7 a.m. each morningis a marginal, not an essential, function of his position. A reasonable accommodation may include parttime or modified work schedules. Stewart v. Happy Herman's Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir.1997) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B)); EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 2 EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH), § 902, No. 915.002 (Oct. 17, 2002) [hereinafter EEOC Enforcement Guidance], Question 36 (Possible reasonable accommodations could include adjustments to starting times. . . . Example: An employee with major depression is often late for work because of medication side-effects that make him extremely groggy in the morning. His scheduled hours are 9:00 a.m. to 5:30 p.m., but he arrives at 9:00, 9:30, 10:00, or even 10:30 on any given day. . . . [I]f this individual can [perform his job responsibilities] by regularly working a schedule of 10:00 a.m. to 6:30 p.m., a reasonable accommodation would be to modify his schedule so that he is not required to report for work until 10:00 a.m.). Thus, Holly argues that rather than terminating him, Clairson could have reasonably accommodated him simply by altering this marginal function to allow him occasionally to clock in late and make up that time during breaks or after his shift ends, the very course of conduct followed by Clairson for the bulk of Holly's employment. It is by now clear that essential functions are the fundamental job duties of a position that an individual with a disability is actually required to perform. Earl, 207 F.3d at 1365; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)(i). Moreover, consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8); see also D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230. Applying this factor to the case at hand, the district court found ample evidence that punctuality is an essential function of Holly's position. Order at 16. The court cited the existence of the punctuality policy itself, Clairson's rationale for the policy, as stated in the handbookthat tardy employees may delay assembly operations and force other employees to stand idle, and Kilkelly's testimony that tardiness and attendance were concerns for the employer. Id. In relying almost exclusively on this evidence, the district court stressed that it is within the employer's discretion to determine what job functions are essential and it is beyond dispute that Clairson made attendance and punctuality essential functions, both through its discipline of employees and clearly established policies. Id. at 16-17. However, when considering the employer's judgment regarding what is an essential function, we have previously considered not only the company's official position, but also testimony from the plaintiff's supervisor. See, e.g., D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230. Here, the two men who supervised Holly for the vast majority of his many years at Clairson, including his last year or so during which the new policy was in effect, each testified that Holly's job was not time sensitive, and, notably, that precise punctuality didn't matter. Nilson said that [i]n the Mold Shop Department a tardiness issue did not affect how work was done, versus, as it is in production. Manufacturing is really sensitive where mold building is not. Miller similarly testified that mold polishing wasn't as time sensitive as other areas, so that if somebody stayed late, as opposed to coming in early, it wouldn't really matter as long as the work was done. Thus, we think the record fairly reflects a genuine issue of material fact on this factor alone. [12] Moreover, [w]hether a function is essential is evaluated on a case-by-case basis by examining a number of factors.  D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230 (quotation marks omitted and emphasis added); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i) (Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential. . . . (emphasis added)). Thus, as we observed recently in D'Angelo, although the employer's view is entitled to substantial weight in the calculus, this factor alone may not be conclusive[ ]. Id. at 1233. Indeed, if it were considered to be conclusive, then an employer that did not wish to be inconvenienced by making a reasonable accommodation could, simply by asserting that the function is essential, avoid the clear congressional mandate that employers mak[e] reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of such covered entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A). According to the EEOC's regulations implementing the ADA, other factors to be considered include: (1) the amount of time spent on the job performing the function, (2) the consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function, (3) the terms of the collective bargaining agreement, (4) the work experience of past incumbents in the job, and (5) the current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230 (quotation marks omitted) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)); see also Davis v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir.2000) (same). In addition, the EEOC regulations identify three nonexclusive bases on which a job function may be deemed essential: (1) the reason the position exists is to perform the function; (2) there are a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of the job function can be distributed; and (3) the function is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position was hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. D'Angelo, 422 F.3d at 1230 (quotation marks omitted) (citing § 1630.2(n)(2)). Several of these factors have little or no bearing on this case. The record contains no information, for instance, regarding the terms of any collective bargaining agreement, or the work experience of current and past mold polishers (other than the testimony of Miller and Nilson, both former mold polishers, that this job is not time-sensitive). A few other factors apply to some extent to the situation at hand but are not very illuminating. Thus, for instance, mold polishers spend very little time on the job performing the function of strict punctuality, the reason the position of mold polisher exists is certainly not to perform the function of being punctual, and Holly was not hired for his expertise in performing the highly specialized function of punctuality. On the other hand, to the extent that strict punctuality is important, one polisher's duty to be punctual cannot be redistributed to another polisher. Far more illuminating in this case is a consideration of the consequences of not requiring Holly to perform the function of strict punctuality. According to Clairson, these consequences would be dire. The reason that employee tardiness is such an issue at Clairson, it says, is that tardy employees can delay Clairson's assembly operations and force other employees to stand idle until the tardy employee's portion of the product assembly can be completed. Clairson says that this reasoning holds equally true for the position of mold polisher, and that punctuality is an essential function of Holly's position because [Holly] is one of many employees involved in assembling products for Clairson. As Holly stated himself in his deposition, `some jobs take 80 hours to complete and another job might take 10 minutes.' Consequently, tardiness can slow product assembly. Memo. of Law in Support of Mtn. for Sum. J. at 8; see also id. at 9 ([Clairson's] manufacturing business requires its employees to work together to assemble products and punctuality is therefore essential.). The district court agreed, and found that Holly worked on the assembly line, polishing the steel tooling after it was formed from the molds. Order at 2. This record, however, is not so clear. As a threshold matter, the record does not suggest that Holly worked on the assembly line. To the contrary, the record indicates that the mold shop where polishers work is actually separate from the assembly line which was in a different room of the warehouse, and that Holly and others polish the molds after they come off of the assembly line. Miller testified, for example, that Holly polished the steel tooling after we were finished machining it  (emphasis added). Even Kilkelly testified that as mold polisher, Holly  would sit at a table and the steel molds that come off of the from another area, mold maker, the steel must be polished (emphasis added). Nor is there any record evidence that mold polishers are required to work together [with other employees] to assemble products. That is, there is no evidence that other mold polishers would need to wait for Holly to arrive in order to complete their own mold polishing. Nor is there any evidence of any post-polishing stage of manufacturing, such that employees in that department would have their work delayed by the tardiness of a mold polisher. Cf. EEOC Enforcement Guidance, Question 43 (If the result of modifying one employee's work hours . . . is to prevent other employees from doing their jobs, then the significant disruption to the operations of the employer constitutes an undue hardship.). Instead, the best inference we can draw from this record in favor of the plaintiffwhich we must do given the procedural posture in which we review itis that mold polishing, as Miller and Nilson explained, is a fairly solitary, non-time-sensitive activity. Thus, whatever may be said of Clairson employees who work on the assembly line, there is precious little in this record to support the claim that a mold polisher's occasional tardinessusually by only one minutecould delay Clairson's assembly operations and force other employees to stand idle until [his] portion of the product assembly can be completed, or that a mold polisher's tardiness can slow product assembly. [13] The district court considered the argument that Holly's work as a mold polisher was not time sensitive, but rejected it: The fact that his polishing projects, by themselves, were not necessarily performed under strict deadlines does not mean that attendance and punctuality were not essential functions. As Holly himself testified, some of his polishing jobs would take several hours, or even several days. By not arriving to work on time, he was slowing down his production, increasing overhead, and potentially increasing overtime costs. Id. at 16. But there is no discussion whatsoever in this record of Clairson's overhead costs under any circumstances, and we can find no record evidence to support the court's finding of increased overhead. Indeed, it is particularly difficult to imagine an actual increase in overhead costs due to Holly's tardiness since the vast majority of the time he was late by only one minute, and the accommodation he was permitted for some fifteen years, and which he seeks again now, involves his making up any lost time the same business day. Similarly, there is no record evidence that Holly was paid overtime in the past when he made up lost time during his breaks or after his shift, nor has he requested overtime pay as part of the accommodation he currently seeks. In sum, although Clairson makes the bare assertion that strict punctuality by mold polishers is important in order to keep production moving, the record contains virtually no evidence that Holly needed to work with others to complete his work, that his tardiness ever caused production to slow down or caused any other detriment to Clairson, or that he ever failed to complete his molds on time. To the contrary, Holly's supervisors, former mold polishers themselves, testified that Holly's work was not time-sensitive, that he was able to make up his lateness the same day without impacting business, and that he was a valuable employee they fought to retain. These factors distinguish this case from Earl, relied on by Clairson and the district court, where we held, after considering not only the employer's emphasis on the importance of punctuality, but also the importance of [her] timely presence at her job as store area coordinator, that punctuality was indeed an essential function of the plaintiff's position. 207 F.3d at 1366. Unlike Holly's position of mold polisher, the store area coordinator was shouldered with the time-sensitive duty of preparing her area of the store for customers each morning. If the plaintiff were tardy for her morning shift, then her area would not be ready for the usual influx of morning customers, and if she were tardy for a later shift, employees working the shift before hers would be forced to work overtime waiting for her to arrive. See id. As a result, the most that can be said for Clairson's position is that a genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether punctuality as defined by Clairson's policy is an essential element of Holly's job, and it was thus error for the district court to have taken this issue away from the fact-finder and awarded summary judgment to Clairson. [14]