Opinion ID: 2638722
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sovereign Immunity as Applied in this Case

Text: Because the parties do not appeal the court of appeals' decision that the University is immune from Hartman's FLSA retaliation claim, we only address the applicability of sovereign immunity to Hartman's remaining FLSA retaliation claim against Middleton and Travis in their individual capacities. Middleton and Travis argue that Hartman's remaining FLSA retaliation claim is barred by sovereign immunity because it is really a claim against the state and they are only nominal defendants. Hartman argues that she has sued Middleton and Travis in their individual capacities for their willful and wanton retaliatory conduct, and not as nominal defendants. Therefore, Hartman claims that under Alden, Middleton and Travis do not enjoy sovereign immunity. As previously discussed, the sovereign immunity afforded to the state extends to public officials when the state is the real party against which relief is sought. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347. However, sovereign immunity does not foreclose an action against an individual state official, in his or her individual capacity, seeking damages solely from the individual state official, and not from the state treasury. Id. at 757, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Therefore, we must determine whether Hartman's claim is one that seeks redress from Middleton and Travis personally, or whether Hartman's claim is in essence a claim against the state. Under the CGIA, the state may be liable for claims against one of its employees. Section 24-10-110(1)(b)(I) provides that the state is liable for [t]he payment of all judgments and settlements of claims against any of its public employees where the claim against the public employee arises out of injuries sustained from an act or omission of such employee occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of employment, except where such act or omission is willful and wanton or where sovereign immunity bars the action against the public entity. § 24-10-110(1)(b)(I) (emphasis added). According to the express language of section 24-10-110(1)(b)(I), the state is not liable for its employees' willful and wanton conduct. Thus, the state would not be liable for any willful and wanton acts committed by Middleton and Travis. Rather, Middleton and Travis would be personally liable for any damage award. Furthermore, under section 24-10-110(1)(b)(I), the state is also not responsible for any judgments against individual defendants if sovereign immunity bars the action against the state. Thus, assuming arguendo, that Middleton and Travis' conduct was not willful and wanton, the state is still not liable because under the CGIA the state is immune from Hartman's FLSA retaliation claim. Hartman, 22 P.3d at 529-30. In other words, regardless of the outcome of Hartman's claim against Middleton and Travis, the state does not incur liability. Because any damages awarded to Hartman would not expend itself on the public treasury, the FLSA retaliation claim against Middleton and Travis plainly emerges as one not against the state. Pennhurst State Sch., 465 U.S. at 101 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. 900. Middleton and Travis assert, however, that if Hartman is unsuccessful in proving willful and wanton conduct, under section 24-10-110(1)(a), the state will be required to indemnify them for the defense costs associated with Hartman's suit. Thus, Middleton and Travis argue that because their defense costs must, under Colorado law, be paid from public funds in the state treasury, Hartman's claim is a suit against the state and is thus barred by sovereign immunity. Middleton and Travis are correct in that the CGIA requires the state to provide defense costs for all its employees unless the fact finder determines he or she was acting outside the scope of duty when the injury creating the liability occurred. § 24-10-110(1)(a). Section 24-10-110(1)(a) provides: A public entity shall be liable for: (a) The costs of defense of any of its public employees, whether such defense is assumed by the public entity or handled by the legal staff of the public entity or by other counsel,... except where such act or omission is willful and wanton.... Thus, under section 24-10-110(1)(a), Middleton and Travis may be entitled to indemnification by the state for their defense costs if Hartman fails to prove that they acted willfully or wantonly. However, the purpose of state sovereign immunity is to protect the state against involuntary liability. See Duckworth v. Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 650 (7th Cir.1985). If the state chooses to pay defense costs for its employees, it has voluntarily assumed that liability. Sovereign immunity is concerned with claims that by their nature must be paid from public funds, not actions directed against individuals that may be satisfied with state monies solely because the state has chosen to provide indemnification. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663-66, 94 S.Ct. 1347. Thus, although state monies may ultimately be used for defense expenses against a state official sued in his individual capacity when the plaintiff is unable to prove that the state official's acts were willful and wanton, the state's sovereign immunity does not extend to its employees because the state voluntarily assumed the obligation to indemnify them. See Griess v. State of Colo., 841 F.2d 1042, 1046 (10th Cir.1988)(holding that the state cannot extend its sovereign immunity to all its employees by the assumption of an illusory obligation for indemnification.). Here, the state's obligation to pay for Middleton and Travis' defense costs derives not from the nature of Hartman's claim, but from an entirely collateral, voluntary undertaking on the part of the state. Section 24-10-110(1)(a), on which Middleton and Travis rely, is only an agreement between the state and its employees and cannot be invoked as a basis for cloaking individual officers with the state's sovereign immunity. The fact that the state is required to indemnify Middleton and Travis for defense costs does not turn Hartman's claim into a claim against the state. The state's constitutional sovereign immunity cannot be manipulated in such a manner. Id. Accordingly, we hold that a state cannot confer a derivative constitutional sovereign immunity upon its employees by assuming an obligation to indemnify them. Therefore, Hartman's claim against Middleton and Travis in their individual capacities for willful and wanton conduct is not barred by sovereign immunity.