Opinion ID: 1058040
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the plaintiff injured in the course and scope of employment?

Text: To be compensable under the workers' compensation law, an injury must aris[e] out of and in the course of employment. Tenn.Code Ann. § 50-6-102(13) (2005). In Tennessee, as in most jurisdictions, the statutory requirements that the injury arise out of and occur in the course of the employment are not synonymous, although both elements exist to ensure a work connection to the injury for which the employee seeks benefits. Blankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Sandlin v. Gentry, 201 Tenn. 509, 300 S.W.2d 897, 901 (1957)). The phrase arising out of refers to cause or origin and in the course of refers to time, place and circumstances. Hill v. Eagle Bend Mfg., Inc., 942 S.W.2d 483, 487 (Tenn.1997). An injury arises out of the employment when there is a causal connection between the conditions under which the work is required to be performed and the resulting injury. Blankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354 (citing Fritts v. Safety Nat'l Cas. Corp., 163 S.W.3d 673, 678 (Tenn.2005)). An injury occurs in the course of employment if it takes place within the period of the employment, at a place where the employee reasonably may be, and while the employee is fulfilling work duties or engaged in doing something incidental thereto. Blankenship, 164 S.W.3d at 354 (citation omitted). As a general rule, an employee is not acting within the course of employment when the employee is going to or coming from work unless the injury occurs on the employer's premises. See Howard v. Cornerstone Med. Assoc., 54 S.W.3d 238, 240 (Tenn.2001); Lollar v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 767 S.W.2d 143, 150 (Tenn. 1989). For example, the employer's parking lot is considered part of the employer's premises, see Lollar, 767 S.W.2d at 150, but [once] the employee has exited the parking area and begins traveling on personal time, away from the employer's premises, he is no longer in the course of employment. McCurry v. Container Corp. of America, 982 S.W.2d 841, 845 (Tenn.1998). There are, however, several exceptions which bring an employee's travel to and from work within the course and scope of his employment. Phillips v. A & H Constr. Co., 134 S.W.3d 145, 152 (Tenn. 2004). One such exception is the special errand exception. Id.; see also Stephens v. Maxima Corp., 774 S.W.2d 931 (Tenn. 1989). Under this exception, an employee may be compensated for an off-premises injury while performing some special act, assignment or mission at the direction of the employer. Stephens, 774 S.W.2d at 934. When an employee, having identifiable time and space limits on his employment, makes an off-premises journey which would normally not be covered under the usual going and coming rule, the journey may be brought within the course of employment by the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself. Upon review of the cases in which other jurisdictions have applied the special errand rule there is a common thread that the employee is usually injured while performing some special act, assignment or mission at the direction of the employer. Id. (citations omitted). In Stephens , the employee was involved in a fatal automobile accident one mile from her place of employment when, during her lunch break, she had gone home to retrieve an employment record which had to be turned in to her employer. In denying compensation and holding that the special errand or mission exception did not apply, this Court stated the evidence was not sufficient to show the employer had instructed, directed or even suggested that the employee return home to get the employment record and that such action on her part had been her decision. Id. However, this special errand exception was found to apply in two cases decided by the Workers' Compensation Panel which have facts similar to those in the case at hand. First, in Carter v. Utica Mutual Ins. Co., No. E2002-01779-SC-WCM-CV, 2003 WL 22080788 (Tenn.Workers Comp.Panel, Aug.27, 2003), the employee, who worked in Chattanooga, Tennessee, was injured while traveling home from Atlanta where she was to have attended a seminar for her employer. The Panel held that the special errand exception applied because: The employee's general work duties did not require any travel activities. On the day in question, she was required by her employer to attend the seminar in Atlanta thereby exposing her to risks she would not normally encounter in going to and coming from her work in Chattanooga. She was to be paid regular wages for attending the seminar and was to be reimbursed for mileage expenses. While attending, she would have been engaged in activities beneficial to her employer. Id. at . Likewise, in Carter v. Phoenix Restaurant Group, No. 03S01-9602-CH-00013, 1997 WL 26296 (Tenn. Workers' Comp. Panel, Jan. 23, 1997), the claimant, an assistant manger trainee at a Wendy's in Johnson City, was instructed to go to the employer's Kingsport, Tennessee location for mandatory testing. The employee did and was injured in a traffic accident in route to her home from Kingsport following the test. She was paid for the time required to take the test, but was not reimbursed for mileage. The court held that the special errand exception applied. Id. at . In this case, the plaintiff was hired to work at Dyer Nursing Home, located in Dyer, Tennessee. Thus normal travel from her home to and from Dyer Nursing Home would not be considered to be in the course and scope of her employment under the going to and coming from work rule. See Stephens, 774 S.W.2d at 934. However, the accident occurred while the plaintiff was on her way to an orientation session that was being held in Bells, Tennessee, approximately thirty miles away from the nursing home in Dyer. This trip falls with in the special errand or mission exception because it was a special assignment at the direction of the employer, and the fact that the trouble and time of making the journey, or the special inconvenience, hazard, or urgency of making it in the particular circumstances, is itself sufficiently substantial to be viewed as an integral part of the service itself. Stephens, 774 S.W.2d at 934.