Opinion ID: 1059740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Evidence of Unadjudicated Criminal Behavior

Text: On August 10, 17, and 18, 1998, pursuant to Code § 19.2-265.3:2, the Commonwealth filed notices of its intent to present evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct of the defendant at the sentencing phase of the trial. Walker asserts that admission of this evidence was error on three primary grounds: (1) without a positive connection of the evidence to the defendant by some standard of proof, the evidence does not meet the test of relevancy; (2) due process requires proof of unadjudicated prior criminal acts beyond a reasonable doubt when such conduct is relied upon to expose the defendant to greater or additional punishment; and (3) the use of unadjudicated criminal acts evidence denies the defendant his due process rights to notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard on evidence used against him which also results in denial of the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. We reject all three of these arguments for the reasons discussed below. First, we have previously held that evidence of prior violent criminal conduct, whether or not adjudicated, is relevant to the determination of a defendant's future dangerousness because it has a tendency to show that the accused would commit criminal acts of violence in the future. Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 284-85, 351 S.E.2d 1, 11-12 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3220, 96 L.Ed.2d 706 (1987). Whether the evidence produced establishes the ultimate fact at issue must, of course, be tested by some standard of proof. Here, the ultimate issue of fact was Walker's future dangerousness, which the Commonwealth was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. Walker cites no authority for the proposition that each piece of evidence offered to prove the ultimate issue of fact must itself also be tested by some standard of proof. Rather, that evidence is tested by the credibility or weight the fact finder chooses to give it. See Gray v. Commonwealth, 233 Va. 313, 346-47, 356 S.E.2d 157, 175-76, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 873, 108 S.Ct. 207, 98 L.Ed.2d 158 (1987). Therefore, we reject Walker's assertion that the evidence of unadjudicated criminal acts did not meet the test of relevancy because that evidence was not established by any standard of proof. Next Walker relies on and quotes from McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 2411, 91 L.Ed.2d 67 (1986), for the proposition that evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct is subject to the reasonable doubt standard of evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial because it expose[s] the defendant to greater punishment and presents a radically different situation from the usual sentencing procedures. The Supreme Court in McMillan considered whether due process was offended by a statute which raised the minimum sentence if the trial court in the sentencing phase found that a defendant had visibly possessed a firearm in the commission of the charged offense. The trial court's finding did not have to be beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant in that case argued that the evidentiary standard of beyond a reasonable doubt was required because visible possession of a firearm was, in effect, an element of the offense. He argued further that even if it was not an element of the offense, due process required application of the reasonable doubt standard because a finding of visible possession subjected the defendant to a greater penalty. The Supreme Court disagreed, concluding that visible possession of a firearm was not an element of the offense charged, and that the trial court's finding did not subject the defendant to a greater penalty but only raised the minimum sentence. Id. at 95, 106 S.Ct. 2411. In the course of its discussion, the Court observed that, had the trial court's finding of visible possession of a firearm exposed the defendant to greater or additional punishment, the argument that the finding was an element of the crime subject to the reasonable doubt standard of proof would have at least more superficial appeal. Id. at 88, 106 S.Ct. 2411. The Court also observed that if the sentencing proceeding was radically different, the reasonable doubt standard may be applied to post-trial findings. Id. at 89, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Contrary to Walker's assertion, these comments do not impose a due process requirement that the Commonwealth prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in the unadjudicated criminal conduct offered as evidence in the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. These comments merely suggest that such a burden of proof may be required for a factual finding that exposes the defendant to greater punishment when such finding is made in a sentencing proceeding that is radically different from the normal sentencing proceeding. Even if this suggestion were the rule, the Virginia death penalty sentencing statute satisfies that rule. The finding that exposes the defendant to the death penalty is that of future dangerousness, or alternatively, vileness, which by statute must be supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See Code § 19.2-264.4(C). Furthermore, in McMillan, the Supreme Court specifically cited its holding in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 214, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281 (1977), for the proposition that the state need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact it recognizes as a circumstance affecting the severity of punishment. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 84, 106 S.Ct. 2411. Therefore, we reject Walker's assertion that due process requires that evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct admitted to show the defendant's future dangerousness is subject to the reasonable doubt standard. Finally, Walker asserts that the use of the unadjudicated criminal conduct evidence denies him a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the evidence used against him, thus denying him effective assistance of counsel. Walker had notice of the evidence the Commonwealth intended to introduce and the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses offering this evidence. He does not claim such notice was inadequate nor does he contend that his counsel's performance was inadequate. Rather Walker argues, on a more general level, that counsel defending against prior unadjudicated criminal conduct [evidence] is beyond the resources and realm of effective representation in defending a single capital crime. By this argument Walker seeks to raise a Sixth Amendment claim without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial. Whether or not such a claim might be sufficient in limited circumstances, it cannot prevail in this case. The United States Supreme Court has found constitutional error without inquiring into counsel's actual performance only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). For example, where counsel was totally absent, was prevented from assisting the accused during a critical stage of the proceeding, or was prevented from exercising independent judgment in the manner of conducting the defense, the Supreme Court has presumed that counsel was ineffective and that the defendant was thus prejudiced. See id. at 659 n. 25, 104 S.Ct. 2039; Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976)(attorney barred by law from consulting with client during overnight recess); Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 95 S.Ct. 2550, 45 L.Ed.2d 593 (1975)(attorney barred by law from giving summation at bench trial); Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 92 S.Ct. 1891, 32 L.Ed.2d 358 (1972)(requirement that defendant be first defense witness); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932)(counsel for defendant charged with capital offense appointed on day of trial). The admission of evidence of unadjudicated criminal conduct, unlike the cases cited above, does not present circumstances justifying a presumption of ineffective assistance of counsel. After having obtained a guilty verdict, the Commonwealth was burdened by statute with the responsibility of proving beyond a reasonable doubt either future dangerousness or vileness before the death penalty could be imposed. As discussed above, the unadjudicated criminal conduct was relevant to Walker's future dangerousness, Walker had notice that such evidence would be used, and he had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses through whom the Commonwealth offered this evidence. Accordingly, we find that admission of this evidence did not violate Walker's due process or Sixth Amendment rights to effective assistance of counsel and a meaningful opportunity to defend himself.