Opinion ID: 4328912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lulling

Text: Tiger Steel argues in the alternative that even if the limitations period was three years, the trial court erred in determining that no genuine dispute of material 14 Ruppert, 2 App. D.C. at 302 (internal quotation marks omitted). 19 fact existed as to whether Symbion “lulled” Tiger Steel into inaction that equitably tolled the running of the limitations period that commenced on the date of the debt acknowledgment.15 Specifically, Tiger Steel cites correspondence from Symbion in mid-2014 that “left open the possibility that Symbion would honor its commitments” and a communication as late as January 2015 that “indicated that payment was still a possibility although not at the agreed amount.” Tiger Steel asserts that even after Symbion told Tiger Steel that Symbion lacked funds to pay the full agreed-upon amount, Symbion “continued to lull Tiger Steel into complacency by delaying [Tiger Steel’s] requests to speak to Symbion’s CEO personally, and suggesting that Symbion was rethinking its offer.” In the District of Columbia, “a defendant cannot assert the bar of the statute of limitations[] if it appears the defendant has done anything that would tend to lull the plaintiff into inaction, and thereby permit the limitation prescribed by the statute to run.” Daniels, 100 A.3d at 142 (internal quotation marks and brackets in 15 Tiger Steel does not identify which material facts purportedly remain in dispute. Instead, it appears to argue that the reasonableness of its conduct (the facts of which do not appear to be in controversy) remains at issue. Where the facts are undisputed, the question of reasonableness is for the court. Cf. Greycoat Hanover F St. Ltd. P’ship v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 657 A.2d 764, 768 (D.C. 1995) (“Reasonableness will often be a question for the jury, but where, as here, the evidence as to timing is uncontradicted, reasonableness of the delay may become a question of law.”). 20 original omitted). To establish lulling, the plaintiff must show that the defendant engaged in affirmative misconduct; “mere silence or failure to disclose” is generally not enough. Id. (internal quotation marks and alterations in original omitted). In addition, and importantly in this case, “[i]f ample time to file suit within the statutory period exists after the circumstances inducing delay have ceased, there is no estoppel against pleading the bar of the statute.” Interdonato v. Interdonato, 521 A.2d 1124, 1135 (D.C. 1987) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Superior Court determined that the documentary evidence showed that by 2013, a year before the three-year limitations period ran in November 2014, “it was clear . . . that the only amount that Symbion would pay was $300,000, far below the debt,” and that Tiger Steel “knew or reasonably should have known at that point that [it was] not going to recover” under the terms of the debt acknowledgment letter. We agree with that determination. Tiger Steel has not identified any affirmative conduct by Symbion after Symbion sent Tiger Steel the September 28, 2013, letter describing Symbion’s financial difficulties and offering Tiger Steel the “haircut” sum of $300,000 as a “final settlement,” “that could have caused Tiger Steel reasonably to believe that Symbion would pay the full debt acknowledged in the November 23, 2011, letter. In November 2013, Symbion reaffirmed that it would not pay the full amount of debt it had acknowledged. The 21 record then shows that Symbion ignored Tiger Steel’s repeated attempts over fourand-a-half months to contact Symbion’s CEO. We cannot find that Symbion “lull[ed] Tiger Steel into complacency” or somehow “suggest[ed] that Symbion was rethinking its [$300,000] offer” by avoiding substantive contact with Tiger Steel for months on end, conduct that was akin to “mere silence.” As to CEO Hinks’s brief email of May 15, 2014, which Tiger Steel points to as suggesting that Symbion “was rethinking its offer,” the email states only that when Hinks was back from travel, he would “give [Tiger Steel] a proper answer.” The email cannot reasonably be read to imply that the proper answer would be “revert[ing] back” to the amount Symbion acknowledged in the November 23, 2011, letter. In short, any act of lulling ceased more than a year before the expiration of the new limitations period. Since there was still “ample time to file suit”16 within the three-year statutory period after Tiger Steel knew or reasonably should have known that Symbion did not intend to pay its debt voluntarily, the Superior Court properly ruled that the lulling doctrine — a “very narrow equitable exception”17 — 16 Interdonato, 521 A.2d at 1135. 17 Daniels, 100 A.3d at 142 (internal quotation marks omitted). 22 did not apply, and the court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Symbion and against Tiger Steel. We therefore affirm the judgment.