Opinion ID: 1897473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Effect of the Manville Trust on This Case

Text: Under the Settlement, the rights and duties of the Trust and all class members, as well as the procedures for processing and evaluating claims against the Trust, are governed by an annexed document known as the Trust Distribution Process (TDP). [19] Asbestos Litigation IV, 78 F.3d at 770; Asbestos Litigation III, 878 F.Supp. at 577-578. The TDP provides that the Trust shall be treated in litigation between Beneficiaries of the Trust as a legally responsible tortfeasor under applicable law, without the introduction of further proof. Id. at 591. The TDP then sets forth the applicable rules for contribution and set-off according to the laws of the several states and the District of Columbia: In general, the TDP refers to local law for the calculation of the set-off, recognizing different rules in three categories of states: pro tanto states, in which the judgment against nonsettling defendants is reduced by the amount paid or agreed to be paid by a released party; pro rata states, in which the total liability is divided equally among all defendants held to be responsible tortfeasors, and the judgment is reduced by a released party's pro rata share of liability; and apportionment states, in which liability is apportioned by the factfinder among those found to be tortfeasors, and the amount of the judgment is to be reduced with reference to the apportioned share of a released or absent tortfeasor. Asbestos Litigation IV, 78 F.3d at 770-771; see also Asbestos Litigation III, 878 F.Supp. at 591-594. In Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d 1244 (D.C.1996), this court outlined the rules of contribution and set-off in the District of Columbia. When a plaintiff has settled with a party who has been deemed liable, the court awards the non-settling tortfeasor a pro rata credit  i.e., a percentage reduction based on the number of defendants  against the verdict. Id. at 1248; see Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S.App. D.C. 129, 132, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (1962). On the other hand, [w]hen the plaintiff has settled with a party whose culpability has not been determined or with a party whom the finder of fact has not found liable, the court awards the non-settling defendant a credit against the verdict in the amount of the settlement, dollar for dollar ( pro tanto ). Berg v. Footer, 673 A.2d at 1248-1249 (citing Snowden v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 147 U.S.App. D.C. 204, 205-206, 454 F.2d 1047, 1048-1049 (1971)). Since the TDP expressly states that the Manville Trust is to be treated as a legally responsible tortfeasor, Asbestos Litigation III, 878 F.Supp. at 591, the pro rata rule is the proper method for calculating the amount of the set-off in the instant case. Berg, 673 A.2d at 1248; see Asbestos Litigation IV, 78 F.3d at 777 (Because under the Settlement Agreement the Trust is deemed to be a settling joint tortfeasor, any judgment a Trust beneficiary health claimant obtains in the District of Columbia against defendants other than the Trust will be reduced pro rata ); see also id. at 771 (refusing to allow District of Columbia claimants to opt out of the Settlement, which would cap the amount received at 10 percent of the claim's value, even though District of Columbia law would require that a judgment against a co-defendant would be reduced by the Trust's full pro rata share of the verdict). Appellants cite Asbestos Litigation II, 982 F.2d at 730-731, for the proposition that the Manville Trust cannot be considered a joint tortfeasor. Their reliance on that decision is plainly wrong. First, the cited case cannot be regarded as interpreting the Settlement because it predated the Settlement by three years. Second, the language on which appellants rely is taken out of context and, as a result, is misleading. When read in context, the language cited by appellants merely states what the co-defendants in that case believed the court should hold, not what the court actually did hold. See Asbestos Litigation II, 982 F.2d at 731. Finally, appellants argue that a pro rata set-off is inequitable because their claims against the Manville Trust have been disqualified and are not in line for settlement. Appellants allege that they have never [received] nor will they ever receive a settlement with Manville Trust. This assertion is made for the first time on appeal and thus is not entitled to consideration by this court. See, e.g., D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 48 (D.C.1988); Spellman v. American Security Bank, 504 A.2d 1119, 1126 (D.C.1986); Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App. D.C. 367, 369-370, 384 F.2d 319, 321-322 (1967). Moreover, Owens-Corning has submitted an affidavit from Karin Croft, Director of Operations and Strategic Planning for the Manville Trust, stating that appellants' claims, at their own request, have merely been placed on inactive status so as to allow for deferral of their settlement offers. While we do not rely in any way on this affidavit in deciding (or rather, declining to decide) this claim, it does suggest that appellants' situation is not as dire as they maintain.