Opinion ID: 2814835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: plaintiffs’ title vii and fmla claims

Text: FAIL BECAUSE PLAINTIFFS’ “EMPLOYER” EMPLOYS LESS THAN THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES REQUIRED FOR APPLICATION OF TITLE VII OR FMLA Because the relevant facts were set forth comprehensively in the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation (Docket 194) and in the district court’s Order (Docket 198), we refer to the facts only as appropriate in our application of the law 2 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 3 of 15 to the relevant facts. Both plaintiffs were employed by the Board, not by Chattooga County. The Board employs fewer than fifteen employees, the required number for applicability of Title VII, and far fewer than the requisite number for applicability of FMLA. Plaintiffs’ argument that the Board employed at least fifteen employees fails because the members of the Board itself are not employees. Rather, they are the employer. Plaintiffs can satisfy the numerosity requirement only if they could succeed in their argument that the Board and the County constitute a single “employer” for purposes of Title VII and FMLA. 1 However, plaintiffs’ argument fails because plaintiffs cannot satisfy the test set forth in Lyes. 1 As a threshold matter, plaintiffs urge us to decline to entertain the merits of either the single employer numerosity issue or the Eleventh Amendment issue. They argue that the district court abused its discretion in allowing the Board to amend its pleadings after the magistrate judge raised these issues. After careful consideration of the briefs, the record, and full exploration at oral argument, we cannot conclude that there has been an abuse of discretion under the particular facts and circumstances here, where the issue raised by the parties is closely related to the issues raised by the magistrate judge; where the magistrate judge was led inevitably to the new, closely-related issues by the plaintiffs’ own position with respect to the issue raised by the parties; and where additional discovery was allowed and the new issues were fully briefed by the parties. The cases relied on by plaintiffs are distinguished from the instant case, not only by the foregoing facts, but also because the Board here is a public agency such that strong federalism and comity concerns counsel against ignoring the fact that the Georgia legislature has declared that such boards of tax assessors shall be separate entities and almost entirely independent of the respective county governments. Moreover, with respect to the numerosity issue, we note that it is an element of plaintiffs’ cause of action – not an affirmative defense – and that it was pled only implicitly in plaintiffs’ complaint. And, with respect to the Eleventh Amendment immunity issue, plaintiffs never argued in the district court that the Board’s failure to assert it in its initial pleadings constituted a waiver. Indeed, even on appeal, the waiver argument was neither raised in a straightforward manner nor briefed. 3 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 4 of 15 The Lyes opinion summarized the test as follows: To summarize, we hold that in assessing whether multiple governmental entities are a single “employer” under Title VII, we begin with the presumption that governmental subdivisions denominated as separate and distinct under state law should not be aggregated for purposes of Title VII. That presumption may be rebutted by evidence establishing that a governmental entity was structured with the purpose of evading the breach of federal employment discrimination law. Absent an evasive purpose, the presumption against aggregating separate public entities will control the inquiry, unless it is clearly outweighed by factors manifestly indicating that the public entities are so closely interrelated with respect to control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that they should be counted together under Title VII. The standard we adopt is not whether a fact finder reasonably could conclude the plaintiff has overcome the presumption. Instead, the standard is whether the fact finder reasonably could conclude the plaintiff has clearly overcome the presumption. The adverb “clearly,” which derives from the federalism concerns we have discussed, is meant to be limiting. It is a thumb on the scale and sometimes it will be decisive because federalism concerns should sometimes be decisive. 166 F.3d at 1345. The Lyes opinion also set forth several factors that guide our determination of whether one entity “exerts or shares control over the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship of another entity to such a substantial As will be apparent from our discussion below, Georgia’s statutory scheme and case law reveals a clear intent that Georgia’s boards of tax assessors are separate from, and independent of, the respective local county governments. The boards of assessors are subject to extensive controls from the state level, but little to no control by the local county government, all in service of the State’s purpose to equalize statewide the valuation of real estate for ad valorem tax purposes. Strong federalism and comity concerns persuade us that we should not ignore this clear legislative intent of the State, as plaintiffs would have us do. 4 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 5 of 15 extent that it clearly outweighs the presumption that the entities are distinct.” Id. The factors include: (1) interrelationship of operations and centralized control of labor operations; (2) the authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge; (3) the authority to establish work schedules or direct work assignments; and (4) the obligation to pay or the duty to train the charging party. Id. The four listed factors are not intended to be all inclusive; rather, the analysis is based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Our analysis begins with the state law. As set forth both by the district court and the magistrate judge below, Georgia law clearly establishes the Board as a separate and independent entity. The obvious purpose of the state legislation was to equalize the assessment of property for ad valorem taxation statewide, and thus to subject the process to controls from the state level, independent of control by the local county-level government. Georgia’s statutory scheme and its case law make clear that it is the Board – not the County – that has “control over the fundamental aspects of the employment relationships” with respect to these plaintiffs. See id. Chambers v. Fulford, 495 S.E.2d 6 (Ga. 1998), holds: O.C.G.A. § 48-5-260 establishes a comprehensive system for the administration and equalization of property taxes. The statute was enacted to Create, provide, and require a comprehensive system of the equalization of taxes on real property within this state by the establishment of uniform state-wide forms, records, and 5 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 6 of 15 procedures, and by the establishment of a competent full-time staff for each county of this state to: (A) Assist the board of tax assessors of each county … Id. at (1). O.C.G.A. § 48-5-290 creates a county board of assessors for each county in the State . . . . O.C.G.A. § 48-5-262(c)(1) establishes the minimum tax appraiser staffing requirement for each county . . . . The rate of compensation payable to a staff appraiser is determined by the state revenue commissioner and payable from county funds. O.C.G.A. § 48-5-263(c). ... [I]n all matters dealing with county tax appraisers it is the board of tax assessors and not the board of commissioners which acts as the “governmental board [which] has the authority to act for the county.” Spell v. Blalock, supra, at 462, 254 S.E.2d 842 (“[t]he authority to hire and fire appraisers . . . is not a power vested in the [county board of] commissioners.”). Because the power to hire and fire Powell as a tax appraiser rests with the Wheeler County Board of Tax Assessors, see id.; O.C.G.A. § 48-5-298(a), it follows that the authority to alter the duration of the employment contract remains with that body, not with the board of commissioners, which previously approved the contract. 495 S.E.2d at 8. From the foregoing recitation of Georgia law, it is clear that Georgia has established the Board as a separate entity, independent of the local county government, thus triggering the Lyes presumption. Pursuant to Lyes, that presumption can be rebutted only if “it is clearly outweighed by factors manifestly indicating that the public entities are so closely interrelated with respect to control of the fundamental aspects of the employment relationship that they should be 6 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 7 of 15 counted together under Title VII.” 166 F.3d at 1345. Applying Lyes’s four guiding factors to the facts of this case as established by Georgia law, it is clear that the presumption is not rebutted. Rather, application of the factors overwhelmingly indicates that it is the Board – not the County – which has “control over the fundamental aspects of the employment relationships.” See id. Chambers makes it clear that it is the Board – not the County – which has control of labor operations [Lyes factor number 1]; the authority to hire, transfer, promote, discipline or discharge [factor number 2]; and the authority to establish work schedules or direct work assignments [factor number 3]. See 495 S.E.2d at 8. With respect to factor number 4 – the obligation to pay or the duty to train the charging authority – the rate of compensation for each appraiser, O.C.G.A. § 48-5- 263(a)(1), and the training, id. § 48-5-268, are determined at the state level. While county funds comprise the major source of funding, at least the minimum level of funding is established, O.C.G.A. § 48-5-263(a)(1), and mandated, id. § 48-5- 263(c), at the state level. Thus, the four factors listed by Lyes overwhelmingly establish that it is the Board – not the County – that controls the fundamental aspects of the employment relationships. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, it is true that the County provides the building in which the tax appraisers work, maintains the building, provides payroll and human resources services, and other administrative services. 7 Case: 14-14475 Date Filed: 07/07/2015 Page: 8 of 15 However, such administrative services are tangential to the “fundamental aspects of the employment relationships” and fall far short of creating a genuine issue of fact with respect to plaintiffs’ heavy burden to “clearly overcome the presumption.” See Lyes 166 F.3d at 1345. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiffs’ Title VII and FMLA claims fail for failure to satisfy the numerosity requirements of the respective statutes. 2