Opinion ID: 3014097
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: BIA’s Treatment of Persecution Claims

Text: We now consider Allan’s due process arguments regarding his claims of prosecution. Allan first maintains that the BIA denied him due process by failing to “explain its basis for its conclusion that the first incident [in which Israeli soldiers -11- detained him, stomped on his picture of Bruce Lee, and kicked him in the shins] did not [rise] to the level of persecution or why the evidence submitted was insufficient.” Brief for Appellant at 17. It is well established that “[a] decisionmaker must ‘actually consider the evidence and argument that a party presents’” for that body’s procedures to comport with due process. Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Llana-Castellon v. INS, 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994)). In Abdulai, the alien contended that he was likely to be persecuted upon his return to Nigeria because he was a member of an opposition political party. We found that the BIA met this requirement by specifically noting that the IJ had determined that the alien had failed to submit evidence showing that he was a member of a political party. Id. at 550 (“From [the BIA’s] statements, one can deduce that the BIA was aware that Abdulai was a Nigerian seeking asylum on the basis of political persecution, that there had been issues involving a change in the Nigerian government and his failure to document his membership in a political party, and that the IJ’s decision evinced dissatisfaction with his meeting the requisite burden of proof. This is sufficient [to comport with the ‘on-the-record review’ requirement of due process].”). In applying Abdulai in this case, we must keep in mind the nature of the question before the BIA. “Persecution” includes “threats to life, confinement, torture, and economic restrictions so severe that they constitute a threat to life or freedom.” Fatin v. INS, 12 F.3d 1233, 1240 (3d Cir. 1993). While the concept of “persecution” for these -12- purposes may not be limited to these specifically enumerated actions, the concept “denotes extreme conduct” and “does not encompass all treatment that our society regards as unfair, unjust, or even unlawful or unconstitutional.” Id. at 1240 & n.10. The crux of Allan’s argument regarding the incident in question was whether the conduct of the Israeli soldiers – in detaining him, emptying his bag, stomping on his Bruce Lee picture, and kicking him in the shins – rose to the high level needed to amount to persecution. This was a simple, line-drawing question, and although the BIA did no more than state in conclusory fashion that this incident did not “rise to the level of persecution,” due process did not require more under the circumstances. Abdulai demands that the BIA consider an alien’s claim and the supporting evidence; it does not require that the BIA expound in detail on simple determinations. We similarly hold that the BIA did not violate due process in its treatment of the second, more serious incident, in which Israeli soldiers allegedly shot at Allan’s feet. As to this incident, the BIA offered the following analysis: “Coming on the heels of a physical altercation between the police and villagers, we find no evidence that this incident was motivated by a statutorily protected ground.” App. at 7. This discussion was sufficient to meet the on-the-record review requirement enunciated in Abdulai, as it provided a reason for the BIA’s rejection of the notion that the second incident amounted to persecution or indicated a likelihood of future persecution – i.e., that it was likely that the police were simply accosting villagers, such as Allan, after the violent confrontation -13- that occurred without regard to their “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”