Opinion ID: 1597407
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Muehleman's Self-Representation

Text: Muehleman contends that the trial court erred by failing to follow this Court's September 17, 2002, order, which reversed for a new sentencing proceeding and directed the trial court to immediately advise Muehleman that he had a right to be represented by appointed counsel during his resentencing. He also contends that the trial court failed to hold a proper Faretta [9] hearing before allowing him to waive counsel and represent himself at his resentencing. We find no merit in either of these contentions. The record reflects that the trial court adequately followed our September 17, 2002, directive that Muehleman be immediately advised of his right to counsel and that he was afforded a proper Faretta hearing before the commencement of the penalty phase trial. As noted earlier, Muehleman was granted leave to represent himself by the trial court in an order dated March 31, 1999, which was entered after a Faretta hearing held during relinquishment of jurisdiction from this Court. Even so, a defendant's right to counsel applies at each crucial stage of the proceedings, and [w]here the right to counsel has been properly waived, the State may proceed with the stage at issue; but the waiver applies only to the present stage and must be renewed at each subsequent crucial stage where the defendant is unrepresented. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 968 (Fla.1992); see also Ibar v. State, 938 So.2d 451, 469 (Fla.2006); Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.111(d)(5) (2003) (If a waiver is accepted at any stage of the proceedings, the offer of assistance of counsel shall be renewed by the court at each subsequent stage of the proceedings at which the defendant appears without counsel.). As explained below, Muehleman insisted on his right to represent himself throughout the resentencing proceedings, even though the trial court advised him of his right to appointed counsel at every critical stage in the proceedings and urged him to accept appointed counsel or standby counsel on several occasions due to the complexities of the proceeding and the serious nature of the possibility of a sentence of death. The record also reflects that the trial court held a proper Faretta hearing before allowing Muehleman to represent himself at his resentencing proceeding. On December 12, 2002, at the first hearing held after remand, the judge began by indicating that one of the first things we need to determine right off the bat is an attorney. Muehleman immediately cut off that line of discussion with his announcement that he was not going to have one and that he desired to represent himself. No formal Faretta hearing was held at that time, although the court did warn Muehleman that he was concerned about waiver of an attorney because Muehleman was facing another possible death sentence. At that same first pretrial hearing, the court also offered to appoint standby counsel for Muehleman, which he refused. The lengthy colloquy with Muehleman about appointed counsel, which occurred at the first hearing held after our order of remand, satisfied our directive that Muehleman be immediately advised of his right to counsel. Moreover, the trial court properly offered counsel to Muehleman at subsequent proceedings. During the January 21, 2003, pretrial hearing the issue of waiver of counsel was again discussed briefly. At the February 12, 2003, hearing the judge asked Muehleman if he still wanted to represent himself and was advised that he did. The issue of standby counsel was again discussed, but none was appointed because Muehleman said he was looking into the possibility of private counsel. When the State asked the court to conduct another Faretta hearing, Muehleman immediately objected to any further Faretta inquiry, arguing that the prior Faretta inquiry is still in force. The State again asked that a Faretta inquiry be conducted at the April 15, 2003, pretrial conference and Muehleman again objected. He stated that the only thing that was required of the court was that he be offered assistance of counsel at each subsequent stage. Muehleman then stated, The court has fulfilled it. It has been made clear that I am standing pro se. At that same April 15 hearing, the trial court expressed concern that Muehleman had claimed brain damage in the first penalty phase. Muehleman responded that [i]t's waived and there is no present mental or medical reason that prohibits me from presenting this defense. Muehleman did not raise any issue of competency in the proceedings below or in this appeal. When the trial court asked Muehleman to confirm that he wanted to represent himself, Muehleman did so, and further expressly rejected any standby counsel, even though the judge advised him he would be at a tremendous disadvantage in the resentencing hearing without an experienced death penalty attorney available to assist him. When the State expressed concern about Muehleman's rejection of counsel, Muehleman again objected to any Faretta type inquiry. On May 16, 2003, the State asked the court to appoint counsel to consult with Muehleman about his expressed intent not to offer any mitigation. Muehleman objected to any counsel being forced on him and said, There is nothing wrong with my present mental competence. He made clear that he opted this case out of state-provided representation. The trial court again warned Muehleman that if he presented no mitigation at the new penalty phase, he would have waived the right to ever present it. At the next hearing, on May 19, 2003, the trial court again offered Muehleman appointed counsel and indicated it would conduct a full Faretta inquiry at that time. Muehleman objected to the Faretta inquiry and refused to answer many of the questions posed to him. Muehleman now contends the inquiry that was conducted was inadequate. We disagree. At that May 19 hearing, the court advised Muehleman of his right to appointed counsel and asked him if he understood that an attorney would be appointed if he could not afford one. Muehleman would not respond. Muehleman did confirm having received a copy some years earlier of the charge against him, and said that he discussed the charge with the attorney representing him at that time. When asked if he understood the possible penalty was death, Muehleman confirmed that he knew the two possible penalties that could be imposed-death or life in prison. When asked if he had ever been diagnosed with or treated for a mental illness, he did not answer. The court asked Muehleman about his level of education and Muehleman again did not respond, but confirmed that he could read and write. Muehleman refused to answer many of the questions posed by the court, but it was apparent on the record, from his pro se verbal and written appearances before the court, that he was articulate, understood the charges and possible penalty, knew various aspects of the law pertaining to the penalty phase, and knew that he had both a right to appointed counsel and a right to represent himself. Muehleman was also advised that a lawyer would possess experience and knowledge necessary in the case and that Muehleman would be at a great disadvantage if he represented himself. When the issue of standby counsel was again raised by the court, Muehleman objected to appointment of standby counsel and thus none was appointed. In addition to making the inquiry required by Faretta, the trial court also advised Muehleman that his stated jurisdictional objection to Judge Brandt Downey presiding over the case, rather than Judge Crockett Farnell, the original judge in the case, was not likely to be upheld on appeal and that Muehleman's non-participation on this basis would be a waiver of his right to present mitigation. Muehleman confirmed that he understood this. At the conclusion of the Faretta inquiry, the court stated on the record that Muehleman was competent to represent himself, understood the significance of his actions, understood the nature of the proceedings, and was entitled to represent himself. On June 23, 2003, when the second penalty phase proceeding began with jury selection, the trial court again offered Muehleman the assistance of counsel, which he rejected. He was again offered, but rejected, counsel at the Spencer hearing on September 5, 2003. Clearly, Muehleman insisted on the right to represent himself throughout the proceedings. Under the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Faretta and this Court's precedent, once an unequivocal request for self-representation is made, the trial court is obligated to hold a hearing, to determine whether the defendant is knowingly and intelligently waiving his right to court-appointed counsel. Tennis v. State, 997 So.2d 375, 378 (Fla.2008) (citing Hardwick v. State, 521 So.2d 1071, 1074 (Fla.1988)). The Supreme Court stated in Faretta: The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. 2525. Faretta also advised: Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experience of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, so that the record will establish that he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with eyes open. 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). The United States Supreme Court in Indiana v. Edwards, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2379, 171 L.Ed.2d 345 (2008), reaffirmed the importance of Faretta as the foundational `self-representation' case, because the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments include a `constitutional right to proceed without counsel when' a criminal defendant `voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so.' Edwards, 128 S.Ct. at 2383 (quoting Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807, 95 S.Ct. 2525). Edwards makes clear, however, that the constitution permits states to insist upon representation by counsel for those defendants competent enough to stand trial but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves. Id. at 2388. Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.111 also recognizes the right of an accused to represent himself or herself, and sets forth certain requirements that must be met before waiver of counsel may be found by the trial court. The rule provides in pertinent part: (d) Waiver of Counsel. .... (2) A defendant shall not be considered to have waived the assistance of counsel until the entire process of offering counsel has been completed and a thorough inquiry has been made into both the accused's comprehension of that offer and the accused's capacity to make a knowing and intelligent waiver. Before determining whether the waiver is knowing and intelligent, the court shall advise the defendant of the disadvantages and dangers of self-representation. (3) Regardless of the defendant's legal skills or the complexity of the case, the court shall not deny a defendant's unequivocal request to represent himself or herself, if the court makes a determination of record that the defendant has made a knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. We noted in Tennis that the Supreme Court in Edwards gave trial courts more discretion in the context of a Faretta inquiry to examine a defendant's mental competency and mental capacity to represent himself and that in certain instances a defendant may be precluded from exercising his or her right to proceed pro se after the trial court conducts a Faretta inquiry. Tennis, 997 So.2d at 378. [10] The record reflects that the trial court's inquiry regarding Muehleman's demands to represent himself and the court's determination on the record met the requirements of both Faretta and rule 3.111, as modified by the considerations mandated by Edwards. The trial court ruled on the record, after the Faretta hearing held May 19, 2003, as follows: Pursuant to Faretta, again I will make a finding, as did Judge Farnell back, I believe, it was in March of '99, make a finding that Mr. Muehleman is competent to represent himself, he understands the significance of his actions, he understands the proceedings that we are going to be going into, he is educated, he can read, he can write, and under Faretta, he is certainly entitled to represent himself. The record in this case supports the judge's findings and shows that Muehleman was lucid, literate, articulate, and appeared to have a clear understanding of what he was facing. We also emphasize that Muehleman has not alleged either in the trial court or this Court, nor does the record provide any basis to find, that he suffered from a severe mental illness to the point where [he was] not competent to conduct trial proceedings by [himself]. Edwards, 128 S.Ct. at 2388. [O]nce a court determines that a competent defendant of his or her own free will has `knowingly and intelligently' waived the right to counsel, the dictates of Faretta are satisfied, the inquiry is over, and the defendant may proceed unrepresented. Hernandez-Alberto v. State, 889 So.2d 721, 729 (Fla.2004) (quoting State v. Bowen, 698 So.2d 248, 251 (Fla.1997)). When that occurs, [t]he court may not inquire further into whether the defendant `could provide himself with a substantively qualitative defense,' for it is within the defendant's rights, if he or she so chooses, to sit mute and mount no defense at all. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Bowen, 698 So.2d at 251). Moreover, [w]here a competent defendant `knowingly and intelligently' waives the right to counsel and proceeds unrepresented `with eyes open,' he or she ipso facto receives a `fair trial' for right to counsel purposes. Potts v. State, 718 So.2d 757, 759-60 (Fla.1998) (quoting Bowen, 698 So.2d at 252). The trial court's inquiry satisfied the constitutional predicate for allowing self-representation. It also provided the trial court with a proper basis to determine that Muehleman made a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to appointed counsel. The record is replete with clear indications that Muehleman knew he had a right to appointed counsel, was offered counsel at every critical stage of the proceedings, and was advised of the risks of self-representation, but expressly and unequivocally rejected counsel in favor of self-representation at every turn. Muehleman made clear, over and over, that he did not want counsel forced upon him and that it was his personal and constitutional right to represent himself. He rejected any concern that he had a mental deficiency that could affect his ability to represent himself. Muehleman made the choice with eyes open, see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525 confirming to the trial court that he knew he was gambling his life on that self-representation. In this case, the fact that Muehleman was granted his request to represent himself, and subsequently chose to present no mitigation whatsoever, does not establish that the trial court erred in allowing him to follow that chosen path. The record supports a finding that Muehleman proceeded down that path voluntarily, knowing he was staking his life on the choices he made. Muehleman has demonstrated no error in the rulings of the trial court on this issue and, accordingly, relief is denied on this claim.