Opinion ID: 1628675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sanctionable misconduct

Text: Having determined that federal court findings are an appropriate basis for state disciplinary action and that state attorney disciplinary actions do not constitute punishments that come within the purview of the double jeopardy prohibition, this Court must now consider the specific charges against Respondent. Because the individual counts are based respectively on the separate federal court cases, this Court will examine each federal case separately to determine if violations of the Missouri Rules follow from the federal court findings.
In White v. General Motors Corp., 699 F.Supp. 1485 (Kan.1988), Respondent represented two clients, Frederick White (White) and Benjamin Staponski (Staponski), who brought claims against General Motors Corporation (GM) for wrongful discharge and breach of contract. White also brought a separate claim against GM for slander. The district court found insufficient legal and factual bases to support these claims and ordered summary judgment for GM. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions against Respondent after finding that she had engaged in numerous acts of misconduct. White v. General Motors Corp., 126 F.R.D. 563 (Kan.1989). The district court's findings in the White case may be summarized as follows: 1. Respondent failed to make a reasonable factual inquiry before filing the wrongful discharge complaint. Id. at 565. Both of her clients had previously executed documents releasing GM from employment-related claims, and she knew of the existence of the releases before she filed the wrongful discharge complaint. Id. Nevertheless, she filed the wrongful discharge complaint without first obtaining copies of the releases. Id. 2. Respondent pursued White's slander claim without making a reasonable inquiry to determine whether that claim was wellfounded in fact. Id. at 565-66. The only proposed witness to the alleged slander had stated in an affidavit that she had not spoken with GM regarding White, but Respondent continued to press this claim after the affidavit had made it apparent that there was no factual basis to do so. Id. 3. Respondent disregarded well-established Kansas law by arguing that the determination of whether the facts surrounding the signing of the release constituted duress was initially a jury question, rather than a question of law. Id. at 566. Respondent's attempt to distinguish the court's previous decision on this issue was specious because it presented a distinction without a difference. Id. In this way, Respondent advanced her claims without having a reasonable basis to believe that those claims were well-founded in law. Id. 4. Respondent's argument that the releases signed by plaintiffs were ambiguous, which was her excuse for continuing to use the releases, was not well-founded in fact or law. Id. Although she claimed that the releases were unclear regarding claims unknown at the time the releases were entered, the releases unequivocally discharged any and all claims, known or unknown. Id. 5. Respondent advanced the action for an improper purpose, not only by filing suit, but also by threatening to contact the media and government agencies before suit was ever filed. Id. at 567. The improper purpose was evident by the fact that she had failed to make a reasonable inquiry to determine that the claims were well-founded. Id. 6. Respondent needlessly increased the cost of litigation by making voluminous discovery requests that would not have been necessary had she made a reasonable inquiry to determine that the claims were well-founded in the first place. Id. Based on these findings, the district court ordered Respondent to pay GM's costs and attorney's fees totaling $172,382.19. White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 678 (10th Cir.1990). The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings but remanded for reconsideration of the appropriate amount of sanctions. Id. at 683. On remand, the district court reduced the amount of sanction to $50,000, White v. General Motors Corp., 139 F.R.D. 178, 183 (Kan.1991), and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the sanction on appeal. White v. General Motors Corp., 977 F.2d 499, 503 (10th Cir.1992). Informant charges in Count I that the conduct for which Respondent was sanctioned in the White case also constitutes a violation of Rules 4-3.1, 4-3.2, 4-8.4(a), and 4-8.4(d) of the Missouri Rules. Rule 4-3.1 forbids an attorney from bringing a proceeding or asserting an issue unless there is a non-frivolous basis for doing so. A claim is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully substantiated. Rule 4-3.1(Comment). However, continuing to pursue a claim once it becomes apparent that there is no factual basis to support that claim is clearly contrary to the requirements of the rule. By pursuing White's slander claim even after it became apparent that there was no factual basis for that claim, Respondent violated Rule 4-3.1. Rule 4-3.2 requires an attorney to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation. In the White case Respondent 1) filed a wrongful discharge claim without first obtaining copies of the employee releases knowing that they existed, 2) pursued a slander claim after it had become apparent that there was no factual basis for the claim, 3) pursued issues of duress and ambiguity that were not wellfounded in law, and 4) engaged in voluminous discovery to support claims that were not well-founded in fact or law. By engaging in that conduct, Respondent failed to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation and thus violated Rule 4-3.2. Rule 4-8.4(a) states that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct. By violating Rules 4-3.1 and 4-3.2, Respondent has necessarily violated Rule 4-8.4(a). See In re Oberhellmann, 873 S.W.2d 851, 854 (Mo. banc 1994). Rule 4-8.4(d) states that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. By engaging in the conduct that constituted violations of Rules 4-3.1 and 4-3.2, Respondent also violated Rule 4-8.4(d).
In Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 138 F.R.D. 675 (W.D.Mo.1990), the court found that Respondent attempted to use a forged document to support the plaintiff's sexual harassment claim. Id. at 680-82. This document was a computer generated report on which a forged handwritten note had been added. The note read: Carol, you feel good! Danny. Id. at 677. The court also found that Respondent continued to rely on this document as support for her client's claim long after she learned that the document was a forgery. Id. at 683. In particular, she continued to engage in discovery, filed amended designations of experts, and submitted supplemental deposition testimony. Id. at 681. After rejecting Respondent's theory that the forged document was manufactured by some unknown person in an attempt to discredit her client, Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 138 F.R.D. 684, 688-89 (W.D.Mo.1991), the court imposed monetary sanctions of $30,000. Id. at 690. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's findings regarding Respondent's sanctionable conduct, but remanded for reconsideration of the appropriateness of the sanction. Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 974 F.2d 982, 983-85 (8th Cir.1992). Subsequently, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's reduced sanction of $25,000 noting that Respondent knowingly offered a falsified document into evidence. Pope v. Federal Express Corp., 49 F.3d 1327, 1328 (8th Cir.1995). Informant charges in Count II that Respondent has violated Rules 4-3.1, 4-3.2, 4-3.3(a)(4), 4-3.4(b), 4-8.4(a), 4-8.4(c), and 4-8.4(d) of the Missouri Rules. This Court holds that Respondent violated Rule 4-3.1 by pursuing a claim that lacked a non-frivolous basis because she pursued her client's claim after it had become apparent that the claim was not well-founded in fact. Respondent also violated Rule 4-3.2 by failing to make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation, because she continued to engage in discovery and to file documents with the court after it had become apparent that her client's claim was not well-founded in fact. Respondent also violated Rule 4-3.3(a)(4), which forbids a lawyer from knowingly ... offer[ing] evidence that the lawyer knows to be false and requires a lawyer to take reasonable remedial measures if the lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity. Not only did Respondent fail to take remedial measures when she became aware that the document was a forgery, but also she continued to make use of the document by offering it as evidence. Further, Respondent violated Rule 4-8.4(c), which states that [i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to ... engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation, by continuing to depend upon a document that she knew to be a forgery. Respondent also violated Rules 4-8.4(a) and 4-8.4(d) by committing multiple rule violations and by engaging in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice. Informant also charged Respondent with a violation of Rule 4-3.4(b), which forbids a lawyer from falsifying evidence. Although Respondent certainly used the manufactured document in the proceedings, the Pope court did not find that she manufactured the document or assisted anyone in manufacturing the document. Because the origins of the manufactured document remain unclear, this Court finds no violation of Rule 4-3.4(b).
In Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 129 F.R.D. 655 (W.D.Mo.1990), Respondent represented her client in bringing a Title VII claim against GM. Id. at 656. After the court had reached a final judgment on the underlying claim, the court considered defendant's motion for sanctions and found that Respondent had engaged in numerous acts of misconduct. Id. at 656-57. The following is a brief summary of the district court's findings in the Perkins case: 1. Respondent made unsupported allegations that a GM manager had been the subject of prior sexual harassment charges. Id. at 660-62. She raised these allegations of misconduct in correspondence and interrogatories, as well as at trial, although she had failed to make a reasonable inquiry into the charges and had never produced any factual basis in support. Id. 2. Respondent made an affirmative misrepresentation regarding the date when she learned that a potential party's place of residence had changed. Id. at 663. Respondent stated in support of a motion to join that party that she had only recently learned that the party had moved out of Missouri. Id. Her statements were a misrepresentation, however, because she had indicated her knowledge of the party's relocation in a suit the year before. Id. 3. Respondent intentionally withheld the name of a senior GM manager who could potentially serve as a significant witness in her client's case. Id. at 664-66. Respondent failed to disclose the senior manager's name in response to GM's interrogatories and failed to later amend her responses to those interrogatories, all in an attempt to surprise GM at trial. Id. at 665-66. 4. Respondent deliberately misrepresented her ability to connect the testimony of several witnesses to her client. Id. at 669. The Court had advised Respondent that she could present testimony of witnesses regarding the work environment at GM only if she showed that her client was aware of the experiences of those witnesses. Id. She then presented several work environment witnesses with the assurance that she would connect those witnesses with her client's case, but she failed to make that connection with most of those witnesses. Id. In fact, no reasonable basis existed for asserting that she could connect those witnesses to her client. Id. 5. Respondent filed a recusal motion that had no reasonable basis in fact or law. Id. at 672. The Eighth Circuit subsequently affirmed the district court's findings regarding all aspects of Respondent's misconduct. Perkins v. General Motors Corp., 965 F.2d 597, 600-02 (8th Cir.1992). As a result of this misconduct, Informant charges in Count III that Respondent has violated Rules 4-3.1, 4-3.2, 4-3.3(a)(1), 4-3.4(a), 4-3.4(d), 4-8.4(a), and 4-8.4(d) of the Missouri Rules. This Court holds that Respondent violated Rule 4-3.1 by 1) alleging the misconduct of a GM manager when that allegation had no factual support and 2) filing a frivolous recusal motion that lacked any basis in fact or law. Respondent also violated Rule 4-3.2 by misrepresenting her knowledge of a potential party's residence and by withholding the identity of a witness in an attempt to surprise GM at trial. These actions prevented expeditious litigation by complicating the proceedings and causing unnecessary delays. Perkins, 129 F.R.D. at 664. Rule 4-3.3(a)(1) states that [a] lawyer shall not knowingly ... make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal. Respondent violated this rule by falsely representing to the court that she lacked knowledge of a potential party's change of residence and by falsely representing that she could connect the testimony of work environment witnesses to her client. Rule 4-3.4(a) states that [a] lawyer shall not ... unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence. Respondent violated this rule by intentionally withholding the name of a potentially helpful witness in an attempt to surprise the defendant at trial. Rule 4-3.4(d) states that [a] lawyer shall not ... fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an opposing party. Respondent violated this rule by failing to diligently answer GM's interrogatories with disclosure of the name of a GM employee believed to have knowledge that could be imputed to GM. The instances of Respondent's misconduct that have resulted in violations of the above noted rules also constitute violations of Rules 4-8.4(a) and 4-8.4(d).
In Platt v. Jack Cooper Transport, Co., 959 F.2d 91 (8th Cir.1992), the Eighth Circuit found that Respondent had previously filed a frivolous sanctions motion against opposing counsel in the trial court and was pursuing a frivolous appeal from the denial of that motion. Id. at 96. The court also found that Respondent's actions were detrimental to her own client and noted that her actions were apparently based upon Respondent's personal animosity towards the district court judge and opposing counsel. Id. For this misconduct, the court imposed sanctions of $2500. Id. at 96-97. Informant charges in this final Count that Respondent has violated Rules 4-3.1, 4-3.2, 4-8.4(a), and 4-8.4(d) of the Missouri Rules. We hold that Respondent violated Rule 4-3.1 by pursuing the sanction motion and appeal, which were proceedings for which she lacked a non-frivolous basis. In addition, Respondent violated Rule 4-3.2 because the frivolous sanctions motion and the frivolous appeal prevented the expeditious litigation of the case. Finally, the instances of Respondent's misconduct that constitute violations of the above noted rules also establish violations of Rules 4-8.4(a) and 4-8.4(d).