Opinion ID: 374068
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Procedural Path To The Fifth Circuit

Text: 15 The Keiser, Fleck and Lortscher actions were filed in 1972, 1973, and 1974 respectively. The Keiser and Fleck cases were consolidated in May, 1974; in February, 1975 all three cases were consolidated as the Coliseum Properties Cases. Record, vol. III, at 106. The docket sheets in the record indicate that some discovery took place in early 1974; that an order staying the proceedings against defendant CPI was filed in October, 1974; and that in December, 1974 the plaintiffs were directed to file a brief regarding the bankruptcy proceedings of several of the defendants (including CPI) and the need for a stay order. The three plaintiffs filed a memorandum asserting that there should be only one jury trial on the issue of fraud, and that the defendants should not be permitted to have a separate trial of that issue before the bankruptcy court. Record, vol. I, at 57-69. 6 In March, 1975 the court issued an order stating its intention that the Coliseum Properties Cases be tried on all issues as to all parties, despite the fact that some of the parties herein may be in the process of bankruptcy adjudications. . . . Previous stays as to any parties for such reason shall be dissolved. Record, vol. I, at 145. 16 Discovery in the three consolidated cases continued from December, 1974 through February, 1977. During this period the criminal defendants in United States v. Spiegel were tried and convicted, and their motions for new trial were denied. 7 17 On April 27, 1977, defendant-appellee Paul Y. Hughes submitted a motion for summary judgment in the Fleck and Lortscher cases, along with a statement of undisputed material facts, a brief, and an affidavit. Record, vol. II, at 78-88; vol. III, at 162-172. Although the Fleck and Lortscher actions had previously been consolidated with the Keiser case, no motion for summary judgment against Keiser was filed at this time. At a pretrial conference on May 6, 1977 the court directed the plaintiffs in the Fleck and Lortscher cases to respond to the motion for summary judgment within ten days. In response to a request for additional time, the court noted that 18 where you have got a pro se motion in a case that's as complicated as this, that it is going to be one of those that all you have to point out is that there are complicated facts with respect to the matter and, therefore it is not a case for summary judgment. It is hard for me to see, in a case that's been going for seven years on a case with jurisdictional matters, how you are going to have any real basis for a substantive summary judgment. 19 Record, vol. IV, at 27. 20 Plaintiffs Fleck and Lortscher submitted their responses to the motion for summary judgment on May 10, 1977. The motion was granted by the court on June 9, 1977; plaintiffs subsequently submitted motions for reconsideration. On June 30, 1977 defendant Hughes filed a response to the Fleck and Lortscher motions for reconsideration. That same day he also filed a motion for summary judgment in the Keiser case, having inadvertently omitted the Keiser action from the caption of his April 27 motion for summary judgment. After further supplementation of the motions and responses by all parties, the court, on August 26, 1977, entered an order denying the Fleck and Lortscher motions to reconsider and granting Hughes' motion for summary judgment in the Keiser case. Record, vol. I, at 313. Thereafter, final judgment was entered in favor of defendant Hughes, the court noting that the claim against Hughes has been adjudicated by the granting of summary judgment which was based on the finding that Hughes formed no part of the conspiracy of which plaintiff(s) complain. Record, vol. I, at 327. Plaintiffs appeal the grant of Hughes' motion for summary judgment. We reverse.