Opinion ID: 1399781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: should the instruction on rescue have been given?

Text: The defendant's argument is brief; it was that There was nothing in respondent's testimony indicating that he was trying to protect or rescue his brother when he attempted to stop the falling elevator by the strength of his hands and arms alone. Furthermore, as stated above, the brother could have jumped off at any time. He was not trapped in any sense of that word, as is the situation in the classic case where the rescue doctrine applies. See French v. Chase, 48 Wash. (2d) 825, where the rescuee was pinned beneath a car. [9] The plaintiff saw his brother being carried upward on the tilting chute, and his brother rode the lower end of the chute until the other end hit the ground and it collapsed. Everything happened in a matter of split seconds. Had the plaintiff been permitted the retrospective view of counsel, he could have concluded that his brother was not trapped and that he could extricate himself from his difficulty. He might have realized too, given time, that the lower end of the chute (as shown in the picture and sketch) could go no higher than the length of the B frame would permit, as it was fastened both to the axle and the chute. The plaintiff's decision, however, was instinctive and instantaneous. From other testimony the jury could conclude that the seeming peril was the result of the negligence of the defendant. As said in Wagner v. International R. Co. (1921), 232 N.Y. 176, 181, 133 N.E. 437, 19 A.L.R. 1: ... The law does not discriminate between the rescuer oblivious of peril and the one who counts the cost. It is enough that the act, whether impulsive or deliberate, is the child of the occasion. The rescue instruction was proper. Other exceptions, relative to instructions given or requested, have been answered by what has heretofore been said in the opinion. Our apparent skepticism, as to the establishment of proximate cause with relation to one of the grounds of claimed negligence, is not to be misconstrued as any reflection on the plaintiff's case or his right to recover. We are satisfied that entirely apart from that claimed ground of negligence, this was a proper case to go to the jury on the basis of res ipsa loquitur, and that the jury could, from all the circumstances, properly draw an inference of negligence against the defendant. The judgment is affirmed. FINLEY, C.J., WEAVER, ROSELLINI, and FOSTER, JJ., concur.