Opinion ID: 2138278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: To convey the unencumbered fee of the parcel of land to the investor in accordance with the commitment.

Text: In witness whereof, we have hereunto set our hands and seals this 10th day of November, 1961. /s/ JOHN MARKS, /s/ F.B. HAMILTON, /s/ PETER MILROY, /s/ W.M. HAMILTON, PROFESSIONAL FACILITIES CORPORATION, BY /s/ JOHN F. RIPPLINGER, Vice President 11/10/61 Defendants filed answer, alleging affirmative matters in defense. It included as a special defense the following: Special Defenses, Your defendants will rely upon the following defenses: That the alleged exhibit under which plaintiff predicates its claim and seeks to recover is invalid and unenforceable for the reason that same is vague, lacks mutuality, and is totally without consideration, and consequently, for the foregoing reasons is unenforceable. Pretrial was had. The court's statement thereof contained the following: Plaintiff seeks to recover in assumpsit for commission due for services rendered. Defendant joins issue in answer and asserts affirmative defense. The suit came on for trial and a jury was empanelled. Defendants then moved to dismiss on the pleadings because the alleged contract on which suit was brought, as set forth in the copy attached to plaintiff's declaration, constituted no contract at all, was vague and lacked mutuality, and imposed no obligations on anybody. The court granted defendants' motion. Plaintiff appeals. We think that defendants' contention and the lower court's holding that the quoted instrument was not a contract and bound no one to anything definite or specific were well taken. It was and is, at most, a memorandum of intention to reach an agreement later. This the plaintiff's attorney acknowledged in open court when the court pointed out that the alleged contract did not specify the amount of financing to be procured by plaintiff for defendants, but provided only that defendants should pay plaintiff 2% of the amount of the funds requested or accepted by it. Plaintiff's counsel conceded that the instrument left it open for defendants to decide how much to request or accept. The agreement, if any, of defendants to pay plaintiff, as expressed in the words 2% of the amount of the funds requested or accepted could never ripen into an obligation to pay until defendants should request or accept funds. While plaintiff's declaration alleged that the amount of financing agreed upon was $160,000, the instrument alleged by plaintiff to be the contract on which suit was brought, refutes the allegation by disclosing that no amount was agreed upon. There is no allegation that defendants ever requested or accepted a certain amount. The conditions upon which defendants' liability for a fee were to depend are not alleged to have been fulfilled at any time. In Hansen v. Catsman, 371 Mich 79, 82, this Court said: It is well recognized that it is possible for parties to make an enforceable contract binding them to prepare and execute a subsequent agreement. In such a case, where agreement is expressed on all essential terms, the instrument is considered a contract, and is considered a mere memorial of the agreement already reached. 1 Corbin, Contracts, § 29. It is further to be noted, however, that `If the document or contract that the parties agree to make is to contain any material term that is not already agreed on, no contract has yet been made; and the so-called contract to make a contract is not a contract at all.' Corbin, supra, p 68. See, also, 6 MLP, Contracts, § 27. So here, a material term had not yet been agreed upon. The alleged contract attached to the declaration, upon which suit was based, is not a contract at all. See, also, Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc., v. Waldo, 289 Mich 316. Question is raised as to the timeliness of defendants' motion. In L.J. Mueller Furnace Co. v. Wayne Circuit Judge, 226 Mich 672, it was held that defects in a pleading, such as failure to state a case, are not waived by failure to raise objection within time provided by rule. Motion to dismiss for such reason could be made at any time. GCR 1963, 117 embodies the old motion to dismiss under former rules as well as the old motion for summary judgment for failure to state a cause of action. This combination in the rule does not serve to diminish the former force and effect of a motion to dismiss or to alter the time when it may effectually be made. Moreover, in this particular case, defendants had made an earlier motion to dismiss, based on essentially the same grounds, but did not bring it on for hearing before because of counsel for plaintiff's statement to defense counsel that, by mistake, the wrong exhibit had been attached to the declaration as the alleged contract and that he would amend to attach the proper exhibit. This was done, but defendants' position was that it was no better than the first insofar as stating a cause of action was concerned. The lower court apparently agreed. So do we. Affirmed. Costs to defendants.