Opinion ID: 1478977
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: absence of jurisdiction.

Text: The Superior Court had no jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's suit for divorce unless he had been a bona fide resident of this State for two years prior to the filing of the complaint. N.J.S. 2 A :34-10. Residence in this context signifies domicile, nothing less. Voss v. Voss, 5 N.J. 402 (1950). A person whose capacity for domicile is limited by law to that of a temporary sojourner cannot qualify as a divorce suitor in our courts. Gosschalk, a Holland national, was granted an immigrant's visa on October 16, 1953. Under it for the first time he was lawfully admitted for permanent residence in this country. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101( a )(17)(20). Concededly, thereafter his intention to remain here permanently gave him the right to establish a domicile. His complaint was filed on November 23, 1954, only 13 months later. So the court had no jurisdiction of his alleged cause of action unless his residence in New Jersey prior to that date can be added to make up the two-year requirement. The answer depends upon whether his sojourn under a visitor's visa permitted him to establish a domicile. The majority accept the view of the Appellate Division that a domicile may be created by physical presence and the existence of animus manendi for the requisite period. But there is another element, namely, legal capacity to choose the domicile. 1 Beale, The Conflict of Laws, 108 (1935); Minor, Conflict of Laws, 109 (1901); 17 A Am. Jur., Domicil, § 20, pp. 211-212; cf. In re Collins' Estate, 11 N.J. Misc. 233 ( Surr. 1932); Hess v. Kimble, 79 N.J. Eq. 454 ( Ch. 1911). If legal competence to do so is not present, it matters not what the person's actual intention may be. According to Gosschalk, in July 1950, while domiciled in Holland, he formed the desire to reside in the United States permanently. He had business interests here as well as in Holland. In furtherance thereof on July 17, 1950 he obtained a confirmation of his application for immigration to this country from the consulate office in Rotterdam. This simply denoted that he became listed as one of many persons who were seeking and awaiting authorized emigration. In November 1950 he came here lawfully but on a visitor's visa. On a number of previous occasions he had occupied the same status and was aware of its significance. In order to obtain it, he had to establish: (1) that he had a residence in Holland which he had no intention of abandoning; (2) that he intended to remain in the United States temporarily; (3) that he intended in good faith and would be able to depart at the expiration of the temporary stay; (4) that he was in possession of a passport permitting him to return to the country of his residence; (5) that he had made adequate financial provision to enable him to carry out the purpose of his travel and his sojourn, and his departure from the United States. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101( a )(15)( B ); Besterman, Commentary on the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 37. There can be no doubt about the authority of Congress to specify these conditions. Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 97, 23 S.Ct. 611, 47 L.Ed. 721 (1903). Gosschalk's visa was marked Visitor's Permit and said over his signature: The holder agrees to (1) depart from the United States at the expiration of stay authorized by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service (2) surrender this document at time of departure. In addition, his passports had stamped on them Temporary visitor. At intervals thereafter he signed and swore to documents entitled Application to Extend Time of Temporary Stay. They recited his foreign residence as 15 Raphaelplein, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, that he was admitted for a temporary period (stating it), that he came as a non-immigrant and that he was in possession of a return passage or ticket. In none of these applications did he give Weehawken as his mailing address; one in Flushing, Long Island, New York, was used. He remained in the United States (except for some trips abroad) under extensions of his visitor's visa until he was given immigrant status. Certain of the administrative regulations adopted to implement the Immigration and Nationality Act are significant. Under 8 C.F.R. 214.2, 214.4 and 214b.1, an alien is admitted as a non-immigrant only upon condition that he will maintain the non-immigrant status; that he will depart from the United States within six months unless the time is extended, and that any extension shall continue to be subject to the same limitations. These facts make it obvious that as a matter of law Gosschalk was here as a temporary visitor, and that he would not have been allowed in the country nor would he have been given extensions of the length of visit if he had professed the intention he now claims as to permanent residence. Assuming his veracity with respect thereto, the illegal intention, which must be considered in violation of the regulations of his allegedly adopted country and utterly inconsistent with the exercise of good faith in seeking entry as a visitor, should not entitle him to much relief in a court of equity. But the primary significance of his position is that he did not have the legal capacity to remain here permanently. So his intention with respect to domicile was incapable of fruition. Clothed in its most favorable legal raiment, it might be said that in effect he contemplated making his home here if and when he attained immigrant status (or perhaps became a lawful treaty trader under a treaty permitting permanent stay  to be discussed later). In other words, a domicile would come into existence when he was free to choose it, i.e., upon the happening of the condition. 17 A Am. Jur., Domicil, supra; Beale, supra, § 20.2; Minor, supra, § 57; cf. Sprague v. Sprague, 131 N.J. Eq. 104, 107 ( E. & A. 1942). The Appellate Division predicated its opinion largely upon Greiner v. Bank of Adelaide, 176 Misc. 315, 26 N.Y.S. 2 d 515 ( Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1941), Townsend v. Townsend, 176 Misc. 19, 26 N.Y.S. 2 d 517 ( Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1941), and Taubenfeld v. Taubenfeld, 276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S. 2 d 757 ( App. Div. 1949), leave to appeal denied 276 App. Div. 918, 94 N.Y.S. 2 d 827 ( App. Div. 1950). These cases are neither persuasive nor decisive. The first two did involve visitors' visas. But they were decisions of the heart and not of the law. They cited no supporting authorities but premised the result on the unusual circumstances (which certainly are not present here). The circumstances were that the native lands of the plaintiffs were occupied by the Nazis and they could not return. In effect, they were granted asylum, and compassion manifestly played its part in the search for a base for recognition of residence. Note the comment in Schwallbach v. Schwallbach, 84 N.Y.S. 2 d 345 ( Sup. Ct. Sp. Term 1948), affirmed 276 App. Div. 825, 93 N.Y.S. 2 d 716 ( App. Div. 1949). In the Taubenfeld case, where the issue was presented on a preliminary motion for pendente lite relief, it was said in a short and inconclusive memorandum that the matter of residence should not be determined on affidavits but reserved for trial; also that [276 App. Div. 873, 93 N.Y.S. 2 d 759] plaintiff may maintain this action, even though she is not domiciled in this State, because it affirmatively appears that she was actually sojourning or dwelling here at the time the offence was committed and when the action was commenced. A short dissent expressed the view espoused in this opinion, i.e., Mere presence in the jurisdiction is not sufficient, even when coupled with a wish or desire to remain there when such desire is thwarted by a legal disability. And the holding of these cases may be viewed also in the light of the statement of the United States Supreme Court in McGrath v. Kristensen, 340 U.S. 162, 176, 71 S.Ct. 224, 232, 95 L.Ed. 173 (1950), which was delivered against a similar background:    [W]e cannot conclude, without regulations so defining residence, that a sojourn within our borders made necessary by the conditions of the times was residence within the meaning of the statute. Other cases on the federal scene throw some light upon our problem and lend support to a conclusion that Gosschalk should not be regarded as a person possessed of a bona fide domicile here. In Sleddens v. Shaughnessy, 177 F. 2 d 363 (2 Cir. 1949), it appeared that Sleddens entered the United States with his family as a visitor on business and was given a visitor's permit for six months. After the expiration of an extension of the permit, deportation proceedings were brought against him on the ground that he had entered the country as an immigrant without an immigration visa. The proofs showed that prior to his entry Sleddens knew that he would be unable to obtain an immigration visa for three or four years; that he sought to come to America to establish a business enterprise; and that when he came here he had no intention of returning to his homeland. He testified that when he was given a visitor's permit, his intention was to remain here permanently, if possible. The court sustained the deportation order, holding that by entering as a visitor with a present intent to remain permanently if possible, he was an immigrant not in possession of a valid immigration visa. United States ex rel. Feretic v. Shaughnessy, 221 F. 2 d 262 (2 Cir. 1955), certiorari denied 350 U.S. 822, 76 S.Ct. 49, 100 L.Ed. 735 (1955), is of like import. There a seaman was admitted to this country as a non-immigrant under what is now 8 U.S.C.A. § 1101( a )(15)( D ). His papers were in order as a  bona fide alien seaman temporarily here and with the intention of departing at the expiration of his leave. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals said: In reality, however, his own unequivocal testimony compels a finding that when he left the ship he intended to stay here permanently if he could. Under these circumstances, we have no doubt that his entry was illegal. In effect he perpetrated a fraud upon the immigration authorities when he induced them to let him off the ship on the basis of the usual papers presented by bona fide alien seamen; and he was not `a bona fide nonimmigrant'. No amount of sympathy for an alien who wishes to disassociate himself from a communistic regime in the country of his birth can furnish justification or excuse for disregarding the plain mandate of the statute. See to like effect: Duran-Garcia v. Neelly, 246 F. 2 d 287 (5 Cir. 1957); Del Castillo v. Carr, 100 F. 2 d 338 (9 Cir. 1938); Lukman v. Holland, 149 F. Supp. 312 ( D.C. Pa. 1957); In re Chow's Petition, 146 F. Supp. 487 ( D.C.N.Y. 1956); United States ex rel. Alexandrovich v. Commissioner of Immigration, 13 F. 2 d 943 ( D.C.N.Y. 1925); cf. Buscema v. Buscema, 20 N.J. Super. 114 ( Ch. Div. 1952). Much argument is incorporated in Gosschalk's brief to the effect that he is and should be considered as a treaty trader. The Appellate Division refers to him as a provisional treaty trader. No such status appears to be authorized in the statute. The act, section (a)(15)(E), defines a treaty trader to be: An alien entitled to enter the United States under and in pursuance of the provisions of a treaty of commerce and navigation between the United States and the foreign state of which he is a national, and the spouse and children of every such alien if accompanying or following to join him:    or (ii) solely to develop and direct the operations of an enterprise in which he has invested, or of an enterprise in which he is actively in the process of investing, a substantial amount of capital;. (Commonly called treaty investors. Besterman, supra, p. 40.) (Emphasis added) Assuming for the moment that plaintiff came here as a treaty trader (which, as will appear, was impossible), he would still occupy the position of a temporary visitor admitted for a period of time fixed by the admitting immigration officer. 8 C.F.R. § 214 e. 2. And he would have to establish that He intends in good faith, and will be able, to depart from the United States upon the termination of his status. 22 C.F.R. § 41.71. Or if the length of the stay was fixed in an existing treaty, such proviso would control even if it were for permanent residence. ( E.g., Treaty with Switzerland of November 25, 1850, procl. Nov. 9, 1855, 11 Stat. 587, 588, Art. 1; or the 1880 treaty with China, 22 Stat. 826, which was later modified by statute. Hing Lowe v. United States, 230 F. 2 d 664 (9 Cir. 1956).) Whatever the particular status with respect to duration, it would end if the treaty were terminated. 8 C.F.R. § 214 e. 4. See, generally, Auerbach, Immigration Laws of The United States, 136-138 (1955). But when Gosschalk was admitted, there was no trade treaty between Holland and the United States in existence. There is none to this day and he could not possibly qualify as a treaty trader or investor. In an effort to circumvent this incontrovertible fact, plaintiff adorns himself with the description of provisional treaty trader. This straw comes from a notation appearing on his visa (which is specifically called Visitor's Permit) as follows: Mr. Eddy Gosschalk would be eligible for a 3(6) visa if the appropriate treaty between the United States and the Netherlands were in effect. James A. Niederjohn. American Vice-Consul. (Emphasis added) This gratuitous statement, not even made by a person who occupied the capacity of an admitting officer (see Besterman, p. 46), cannot make him a treaty trader. The fact is that the visa given classed him as a temporary visitor for business or pleasure. The vice-consul's note may have been of some influence with the immigration authorities in this country when the applications for extension of the six months stay were made. But, so far as the record shows, it could have no legal effect on his visitor's status. Certainly it cannot be deemed to wipe out his legal disability to establish a domicile in the United States. That disability was removed on October 16, 1953, when the condition he hoped for materialized and he became a quota immigrant. Then he became invested with capacity to establish a domicile. But that date was less than two years before his divorce action was instituted. Consequently the court was without authority to act in the matter.