Opinion ID: 547275
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Chain of Delegation

Text: 23 Assuming the Attorney General may delegate his appointment power, Plesinski argues that the person to whom the Attorney General had delegated his authority, the Deputy Attorney General, had not properly redelegated that authority either to the Director or to the official renewing Feldman's appointment on May 2, 1988. The Deputy Attorney General did not officially redelegate the appointment authority to Director Cinciotta until January 31, 1989. Thus, Feldman was not authorized to act as Special Assistant U.S. Attorney during Plesinski's indictment and prosecution. 24 The government acknowledges that [i]t is undisputed in the instant case that the Deputy Attorney General did not execute a written delegation of the power to appoint Special Assistant United States Attorneys to the Office of the Attorney Personnel Management during the period February 16, 1988 to January 30, 1989. However, it argues the absence of such a writing during that period does not invalidate Feldman's appointment. The government relies on United States v. Balistrieri, 779 F.2d 1191, 1209 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1095, 106 S.Ct. 1490, 89 L.Ed.2d 892 (1986), in which the court held that a letter of authorization is not essential to the validity of an appointment under Sec. 515(a) if there is sufficient evidence the special prosecutor was in fact authorized to appear in the proceedings. 25 The government's argument misses the mark. The issue in this case is not whether or when a particular appointment was made as in Balistrieri, but whether the appointing official had the authority to make the appointment. It is undisputed that the Deputy Attorney General had not redelegated his appointment authority to the officer who appointed Feldman on May 2, 1988. Thus, no evidence could be presented to the effect that Feldman was in fact authorized to appear in the proceedings against Plesinski. 26 Contrary to Plesinski's suggestion, however, Feldman's unauthorized appearance on behalf of the government did not deprive the district court of jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings. Granted, 28 U.S.C. Secs. 516 and 547 reserve litigation in which the United States is a party either to officers of the Department of Justice or to U.S. Attorneys. 6 However, while he appeared in court alone on several occasions, Feldman testified he was not the only government attorney assigned to the case and that he was at all times acting under the direction and supervision of an Assistant U.S. Attorney. Under these circumstances, the court retained its jurisdiction over Plesinski's prosecution despite Feldman's unauthorized participation. See United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 108 S.Ct. 1502, 1511, 99 L.Ed.2d 785 (1988) (Court lacked jurisdiction unless a proper representative of the Government participated in the action); Home News Publishing Co. v. United States, 329 F.2d 191, 193 (5th Cir.1964) (court retained jurisdiction where Assistant U.S. Attorney stands responsible for conduct of the trial); United States v. Denton, 307 F.2d 336, 338-39 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 923, 83 S.Ct. 292, 9 L.Ed.2d 232 (1962). 27 Nor did Feldman's unauthorized presence before the grand jury require a dismissal of the indictment. In United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 71-72, 106 S.Ct. 938, 942, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986), the Supreme Court adopted the harmless error standard of Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a) 7 for violations of Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(d) 8 . See also Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 2373, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (a District Court may not dismiss an indictment for errors in grand jury proceedings unless such errors prejudiced the defendants). Where a dismissal is sought for nonconstitutional errors, dismissal of the indictment is appropriate only 'if it is established that the violation substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is 'grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial influence of such violations. Id. 108 S.Ct. at 2374 (quoting Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 78, 106 S.Ct. at 945 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). 28 Plesinski has not demonstrated nor does he claim that Feldman's unauthorized presence as an observer 9 substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict him. Nor does he claim the grand jury proceedings were fundamentally unfair for that reason. 10 Under these circumstances, the district court did not err in denying Plesinski's motion to dismiss the indictment. 29 Similarly, the district court properly refused to rehear previously decided motions based on Feldman's unauthorized participation. 11 Again, Plesinski does not claim that he was prejudiced by Feldman's participation in the pretrial motions. He merely claims that he is entitled to have a duly authorized and properly qualified representative of the government study, analyze, and present the government's position with respect to these motions. In fact, while Feldman may have prepared and argued the government's responses to several of Plesinski's pretrial motions, he testified that his actions were subject to [the supervising Assistant U.S. Attorney's] approval and that he did not make the final decisions in connection with the prosecution. Under these circumstances, Plesinski has already received the remedy which he requests today. 30 And finally, while the district court denied Plesinski's motion that Feldman be barred from any further participation in the proceedings, the court made it clear that any future participation was conditioned on a cure in the unauthorized appointment. Feldman did not appear on behalf of the government again until Plesinski's sentencing, at which time the defective appointment had been cured. It was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny Plesinski's motion upon the condition of a cure.