Opinion ID: 2178052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Equitably Acquired Vested Rights

Text: [¶23] KRV contends that the September amendment cannot be retroactively applied to require denial of its application because there is evidence that the September amendment was enacted in bad faith and with the sole purpose of preventing KRV from continuing with its project. KRV contends that because of the existence of bad faith, KRV equitably acquired vested rights to pursue its development in accordance with the terms of the ordinance that existed when KRV filed its application. [¶24] Generally, neither the submission of a development application, nor the issuance of a development permit, establishes vested rights. Thomas v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 381 A.2d 643, 647 (Me.1978). This is because `all property is held in subordination to the police power.' Id. (quoting R.A. Vachon & Son, Inc. v. City of Concord, 112 N.H. 107, 289 A.2d 646, 648 (1972)). Although a party may acquire vested rights as a result of equitable considerations, mere reliance on the language of an existing ordinance, or the incurrence of preliminary expenses to satisfy application requirements, is not sufficient to establish vested rights. Sahl v. Town of York, 2000 ME 180, ¶ 13, 760 A.2d 266, 270. We have recognized, however, that bad faith or discriminatory enactment of a zoning ordinance for the purpose of preventing a legal use by the applicant may confer vested rights on the applicant. Thomas, 381 A.2d at 647. [¶25] Although we have recognized that a party may equitably acquire vested rights, parties have had difficulty in proving the requisite bad faith or discriminatory enactment. In Waste Disposal Inc. v. Town of Porter, the plaintiff filed an application to construct a solid waste disposal facility. 563 A.2d 779, 779 (Me.1989). After Waste Disposal filed its application, the Town voters enacted a moratorium in direct response to Waste Disposal's plan. Id. at 780 & n. 2. There was evidence that the moratorium was necessary because there was an absence of rules governing landfills. Id. at 780 n. 2. While the moratorium was in effect, the Town amended the land use ordinance, and later, enacted a solid waste ordinance. Id. at 781 n. 4. We found that Waste Disposal failed to demonstrate that the Town acted in bad faith when it enacted the moratorium and subsequent amendments to the town ordinance. Id. at 782. [¶26] In Fisherman's Wharf Assocs. II, we held that Fisherman's Wharf Associates failed to prove bad faith or discriminatory enactment when it filed its permit application two months after the proposed ordinance amendment had been filed. 541 A.2d at 161, 164. Similarly, there was no indication of bad faith in Thomas, when the Bangor Planning Department had been working on a new ordinance far before Thomas filed his permit application. 381 A.2d at 644, 647. The new ordinance was a complete revision of the prior ordinance and was plainly not directed at Thomas's application. Id. at 647. [¶27] Although a party may equitably acquire vested rights by showing bad faith or discriminatory enactment, the surrounding circumstances must be more severe than the circumstances presented in this case. Because KRV is requesting an equitable remedy, its knowledge of the situation must be taken into account. See Thomas v. Fales, 577 A.2d 1181, 1183 (Me. 1990). In this case, there is evidence that discussions regarding the mixed-use districts started taking place during Town Council meetings shortly after KRV filed its sketch plan and before it filed its plan application. Although KRV filed its application before the petition to enact the June ordinance amendment was filed, the petition was filed almost two months before KRV entered into its purchase and sale agreement with Hynes. The petition had been filed weeks before KRV contends that it made substantive changes to its plan in order to comply with requests from the Board. KRV also had actual notice of the pending amendment when the attorney for the citizen group advised KRV of the proposed changes in May. [¶28] In addition to considering KRV's knowledge of the pending amendment and opposition to the development, we also consider the lack of evidence of bad faith on the part of the town officials. This is not a case in which every time the developers complied with a request, town officials hastily erected barriers. Commercial Props., Inc. v. Peternel, 418 Pa. 304, 211 A.2d 514, 519 (1965). In Commercial Properties, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the rezoning ordinance did not apply against the plaintiffs because it was special legislation, aimed at the plaintiff's property, and there was evidence that while the plaintiffs attempted to secure a grading permit so that they could obtain a building permit, the township officials changed the law so that a building permit was required in order to obtain a grading permit. Id. at 518-19. [¶29] Similarly, in United States Cellular Corp. v. Bd. of Adjustment, the Iowa Supreme Court found bad faith when the Board denied the plaintiff's application without any legal justification, and the resulting delay provided the Board with time to enact a new ordinance that prohibited the requested use. 589 N.W.2d 712, 719 (Iowa 1999). Likewise, in State ex rel. Humble Oil & Refining Co. v. Wahner, the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that equitable considerations prevented the Town of Allouez from applying an amended zoning ordinance when the plaintiff's application was repeatedly denied, and one month after the plaintiff commenced certiorari and mandamus proceedings, the Town amended the zoning ordinance so as to prohibit the plaintiff's requested use of the area. 25 Wis.2d 1, 130 N.W.2d 304, 311-12 (1964). [¶30] Finally, in Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, the planning commission delayed approving the plaintiff's permit until the city council changed the parcel's zoning designation so as not to allow the requested use. 515 N.W.2d 390, 395-96 (Neb.1994). The Nebraska Supreme Court held that the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously and held that the zoning change did not promote the general welfare, but was simply a reaction to the concerns of the citizens. Id. at 400. The court noted that the neighborhood association's express objective to prevent the construction of a convenience store should not be imputed to the city, but disapproved the delay on the part of city officials so as to allow the change of zoning request to `catch up' with the use permit such that the two could be considered in conjunction with each other. Id. [¶31] There is no evidence that the Kittery Planning Board engaged in delaying tactics, nor is there other evidence of bad faith on the part of any town official. See Commercial Props., 211 A.2d at 518-19; United States Cellular Corp., 589 N.W.2d at 719; Humble Oil & Refining, 130 N.W.2d at 311; Whitehead Oil, 515 N.W.2d at 400. That fact, in conjunction with KRV's knowledge of the pending ordinance changes, leads us to conclude that this is not the case in which equity demands that KRV acquire vested rights.