Opinion ID: 2590156
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 8 Both the Bradburys and the Valencias present this appeal as an appeal of right taken from a final order under section 78-2-2(3)(j) of the Utah Code. [3] However, acquiescence of the parties is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on the court, and a lack of jurisdiction can be raised by the court or either party at any time. A.J. Mackay Co. v. Okland Constr. Co., 817 P.2d 323, 325 (Utah 1991). Where an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss. See id. ¶ 9 An appeal is improper if it is taken from an order or judgment that is not final, see Utah R.App. P. 3(a), unless it fits within an exception to the final judgment rule. See A.J. Mackay, 817 P.2d at 325. For an order or judgment to be final, it must dispose of the case as to all the parties, and finally dispose of the subject-matter of the litigation on the merits of the case.' Kennedy v. New Era Indus., Inc., 600 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979) (citations omitted). In other words, a judgment is final when it ends the controversy between the parties litigant. Id. ¶ 10 This court has consistently upheld the final judgment rule. See, e.g., A.J. Mackay, 817 P.2d at 325-26 (dismissing appeal because counterclaim remained pending before trial court); Kennedy, 600 P.2d at 535-37 (dismissing appeal because cross-claim remained pending before trial court). To be final, the trial court's order or judgment must dispose of all parties and claims to an action. Recently we held that a trial court must even determine attorney fee awards before a judgment is final. See ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Raile, 2000 UT 4, ¶ 15, 998 P.2d 254. [4] ¶ 11 In this case, the order granting the Bradburys' motion for summary judgment was not a final order because the Valencias' counterclaim and Perry City's intervening claim remain pending before the trial court. Therefore, under the final judgment rule, we do not have jurisdiction over this appeal because the Valencias are not appealing from a final order or judgment. ¶ 12 However, orders and judgments that are not final can be appealed if such appeals are statutorily permissible, see In re Southern Am. Ins. Co., 930 P.2d 276, 278-79 (Utah Ct.App.1996), if the appellate court grants permission under rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, see A.J. Mackay, 817 P.2d at 325, or if the trial court expressly certifies them as final for purposes of appeal under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, see id. [5] We therefore next examine whether the Valencias' appeal falls under an exception to the final judgment rule. ¶ 13 No statute grants an exception to the final judgment rule in this particular case, nor have the Valencias appealed an interlocutory order by following the steps outlined in rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. Therefore, neither of these exceptions applies to this appeal. ¶ 14 However, it appears from the Valencias' brief that they may have intended the trial court to enter a rule 54(b) certification to allow them to appeal the summary judgment order. In their brief, the Valencias explain, [T]he trial court, being advised of the remaining counterclaim at the status hearing September 24, 1998, certified the issue here on appeal by its `Order' dated October 2, 1998, allowing defendants to re-institute their appeal. However, the October 2, 1998 order from the trial court did not certify the Valencias' appeal as required by rule 54(b). Instead, the October 2 order simply amended, nunc pro tunc, the date of its summary judgment order from September 14 to October 2 to allow the Valencias a full thirty days to file their appeal. As such, the October 2 order does not make an express determination by the court that there is no just reason for delay, Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b), nor does it make an express direction for the entry of judgment, id., as required by rule 54(b). For these reasons, we conclude the Valencias' appeal is not proper under rule 54(b). [6] As a result, we lack jurisdiction to review the Valencias' appeal and accordingly dismiss.