Opinion ID: 2520113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Admissibility of the defendant's prior arrest for aggravated battery

Text: K.S.A. 60-407(f) states that all relevant evidence is admissible. Relevant evidence is defined in K.S.A. 60-401(b) as evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact. A material fact is one that is significant under the substantive law of the case and properly at issue. State v. Faulkner, 220 Kan. 153, 156, 551 P.2d 1247 (1976). Courts must also balance the probative value versus the prejudicial effect of the evidence. State v. Saenz, 271 Kan. 339, Syl. ¶ 5, 22 P.3d 151 (2001). Review of the record indicates that the trial court was not admitting the evidence of the aggravated battery into evidence pursuant to K.S.A. 60-455. The trial court stated that the evidence went to the veracity of his reason why he knew Sheriff Caldwell. The court then determined that the probative value outweighed the prejudicial effect, and stated that it was allowing the evidence in based on the totality of the circumstances. According to the defendant's own testimony, he first became aware of the law enforcement officers' presence at his house when he looked out his window and saw Sheriff Caldwell's Chevy Blazer. During his confession, the defendant stated that he saw Sheriff Caldwell outside of his house and immediately recognized him. Sheriff Caldwell also testified that he announced his presence by knocking on the door and yelling, Clay County Sheriff's Department. We have a search warrant. Open the door. Although the defendant claimed that he did not hear Sheriff Caldwell yelling, he admitted to hearing the knocking, knowing that Sheriff Caldwell and the officers were coming into his house, and knowing that they were there to arrest him and take him back to jail. Therefore, the defendant's personal knowledge of Sheriff Caldwell tended to prove that the defendant knew when he pulled the trigger that he was shooting a law enforcement officer. However, before the videotape was introduced, Sheriff Caldwell had already given a partial explanation of how he knew the defendant before the shooting: Q. Did you know [the defendant] before November 16th of 1999? A. Yes, I did. Q. Did he know you? A. Yes. Q. Now, what are you basing that answer on? A. Well, I've talked to Jeff a lot of times. I knew him when he was in high school. Q. Okay. A. We would see each other, we would visit, he would call me by name. Q. So he knew you fairly well? A. Well, yes. Q. I mean, he knew who you were? A. Yes. This testimony offered a sufficient explanation of how the defendant knew that Sheriff Caldwell was one of the officers who was at his house to arrest him. The additional evidence of the prior arrest for aggravated battery, although relevant to the same issue, thus had little probative value and should have been excluded. As the admission of the prior arrest for aggravated battery was erroneous, we must now determine whether the error was harmless. The admission or exclusion of relevant evidence in a criminal case is governed by two rules, the harmless error rule and the federal constitutional error rule. K.S.A. 60-261 sets out the harmless error rule. Error in the admission or exclusion of evidence by the court is not grounds for granting a new trial or setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. When reviewing the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence, the error is harmless if no substantial right of the defendant is involved. Error in the admission or exclusion of evidence in violation of a constitutional or statutory right of a party is governed by the federal constitutional error rule. An error of constitutional magnitude is serious and may not be held to be harmless unless the appellate court is willing to declare a belief that the error is harmless. Before an appellate court may declare such an error harmless, the court must be able to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. Where the evidence of guilt is of such direct and overwhelming nature that it can be said that evidence erroneously admitted or excluded in violation of a constitutional or statutory right could not have affected the result of the trial, such admission or exclusion is harmless. State v. Sanders, 258 Kan. 409, 418-19, 904 P.2d 951 (1995). K.S.A. 60-261 also encompasses the federal harmless error rule under Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states: Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. Holmes, 272 Kan. at 498. Applying the dual test, it is clear that the admission of the prior arrest for aggravated battery was not inconsistent with substantial justice, did not affect the substantial rights of the defendant, and had little, if any, likelihood of changing the results at trial. The evidence of guilt in this case was overwhelming. The defendant admitted to every element of all four crimes except for premeditation. As more than enough evidence was presented for this court to declare beyond a reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of changing the result at trial, the error was harmless.