Opinion ID: 2046927
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Does ASFA override ICWA?

Text: [¶ 18.] The primary question here is whether ICWA's requirement to provide active efforts to prevent the breakup of Indian families is overridden or excused by the provisions of ASFA. The State argues that ASFA relieves DSS of any duty it held under ICWA to provide active efforts to reunite J.S.B. with his father. This is so, the State argues, because ASFA provides that reasonable efforts ... shall not be required to be made with respect to a parent of a child if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that ... the parent has subjected the child to aggravated circumstances (as defined in State law, which definition may include but need not be limited to abandonment, torture, chronic abuse, and sexual abuse)[.] 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). The State asserts that either the father [h]as a documented history of abuse and neglect associated with chronic alcohol or drug abuse or he [h]as exposed the child to or demonstrated an inability to protect the child from substantial harm or the risk of substantial harm, and the child or another child has been removed from the parent's custody because the removed child was adjudicated abused and neglected by a court on at least one previous occasion. See SDCL 26-8A-21.1. Thus, the State argues, DSS was under no duty to make active efforts to provide remedial services to the father. [¶ 19.] SDCL 26-8A-21.1 provides: Nothing in § 26-8A-21 requires reunification of a child with a parent who: (6) Has a documented history of abuse and neglect associated with chronic alcohol or drug abuse; (7) Has exposed the child to or demonstrated an inability to protect the child from substantial harm or the risk of substantial harm, and the child or another child has been removed from the parent's custody because the removed child was adjudicated abused and neglected by a court on at least one previous occasion.... [¶ 20.] SDCL 26-8A-21.1 states that nothing in SDCL 26-8A-21 requires reunification of a child with a parent where the delineated aggravated circumstances are present. [5] However, the language of SDCL 26-8A-21.1 specifically limits application of the state-defined aggravated circumstances to SDCL 26-8A-21. In no way does the language of SDCL 26-8A-21.1 relieve DSS of its burden to provide active efforts as prescribed by ICWA. In sum, while the presence of aggravated circumstances may eliminate the need to provide reasonable efforts under SDCL 26-8A-21, it does not remove DSS's requirement to provide active efforts for reunification under ICWA. [6] [¶ 21.] If it is perhaps open to question whether our Legislature understood the terms reasonable efforts and active efforts to be interchangeable, we do not think Congress intended that ASFA's aggravated circumstances should undo the State's burden of providing active efforts under ICWA. Three rules of statutory construction dictate otherwise. See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., 530 U.S. 1, 6, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 1947, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000). First, ICWA clearly offers no exception to its requirement of active efforts. And ASFA does not mention ICWA, much less state that its exceptions to reasonable efforts should apply to ICWA's active efforts. In fact, no provision in ASFA specifically purports to modify ICWA. It would seem illogical that ASFA would implicitly leave unchanged certain ICWA provisions, like notice to tribes, intervention, and transfer to tribal courts, while modifying others. [7] Second, the rules of statutory construction require that the more specific statute controls. In re T.H.M., 2002 SD 13, ¶ 7, 640 N.W.2d 68, 71. As between the two acts, ICWA is the more specific. ICWA deals with a discrete segment of our population, Native American families, who Congress found were best served by maintaining their relationships with their tribes and extended families. ICWA specifically imposes higher evidentiary standards and different protections for parents whose rights are subject to termination than do termination proceedings under state law. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(d) (active efforts) and § 1912(f) (proof supported by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expert witnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child.). Third, when interpreting a statute pertaining to Indians, the United States Supreme Court has stated, statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of the Indians, with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit.... Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 766, 105 S.Ct. 2399, 2403, 85 L.Ed.2d 753 (1985); See, e.g., Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 838, 102 S.Ct. 3394, 3399, 73 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1982). As Congress found when it enacted ICWA, it is to the benefit of Indian children to remain within their families and only after active efforts to reunite those families have proven unsuccessful should the children be removed. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1978). [¶ 22.] The State argues that the Supreme Court of Alaska's decision in J.S. v. State, 50 P.3d 388, 392 (Alaska 2002), lends support to the conclusion that ASFA modifies ICWA. In that case, however, the court wrote, [a]lthough this case is not governed by ASFA, that act is useful in providing guidance to congressional policy on child welfare issues. Id. As the court itself acknowledged, its remarks on this point were dicta. Moreover, we can find no case directly holding that ASFA modifies ICWA, and the parties have cited none. Nonetheless, to the extent that the decision in J.S. can be read to state that ASFA supersedes ICWA, we respectfully disagree with the Alaska Supreme Court. [¶ 23.] Finally, our decision in the case of In re D.B. is distinguishable. 2003 SD 113, 670 N.W.2d 67. There, we explained that the Indian mother did not object, present contradictory evidence, or in any way attempt to contest the application of ASFA by the trial court. Id. ¶ 16. That was not the situation here. Because ASFA does not override ICWA, we conclude that the trial court erred in ruling that DSS was relieved of making active efforts to reunite J.S.B. with his father.