Opinion ID: 794505
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Burden of Proof on Sentencing Enhancement

Text: 38 Mr. Hines also submits that the district court erred in requiring him to bear the initial burden of production concerning whether his false identification was that of an actual individual. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i), cmt. 9(A). The district court held that, although the Government has the ultimate burden of proof for sentencing enhancements, it is not required to prove anything until the defendant presents sufficient evidence refuting the applicability of the enhancement. R.31 at 90. The Government concedes, and we agree, that the district court's conclusion is inconsistent with our precedent and, therefore, resentencing is appropriate. 39 This court's case law clearly places upon the Government a burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [a particular] sentencing enhancement is warranted. United States v. Ewing, 129 F.3d 430, 434 (7th Cir.1997). The district court was correct in recognizing that forfeiture principles require a defendant to make a specific objection to a sentencing enhancement. However, no principle of law requires that such an objection be supported by the testimony of a witness called by the defense; an oral or written statement of reasons for the objection suffices to place the court and the Government on notice of the content of the challenge. See United States v. Gracia, 272 F.3d 866, 872, 877 (7th Cir.2001) (requiring the Government to carr[y] its burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence regarding [sentencing enhancement] matters, when the defendant filed written objections to the Presentence Report but presented no additional evidence at the sentencing hearing (internal quotation marks omitted)). In this case, the defense objected in writing to the sentencing enhancements recommended in the Presentence Report, including the 2-point enhancement under § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i). These objections were repeated orally at the sentencing hearing. These measures were certainly sufficient to require the Government to carry its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the false information used by Mr. Hines was that of an actual person, as required by the Commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(C)(i), cmt. 9(A). The Government concedes that it did not meet this burden. Agent Brown testified that the name on the Ohio driver's license, Huthiafa Abdul-Hakeem, as well as the birth date cited on the license, does not belong to a real person. See R.31 at 32-33. While Agent Brown could not state conclusively whether the social security number fraudulently used by Mr. Hines had been issued previously by the United States Government, this lack of information merely reflects a lack of proof on the Government's part—not that, as the district court held, the defendant was required to rebut this uncertainty by calling additional witnesses. 40 An incorrect application of the guidelines, as occurred here, requires resentencing under the post- Booker sentencing regime. United States v. Scott, 405 F.3d 615, 617 (7th Cir.2005). Therefore, we remand the case to the district court to recalculate Mr. Hines' sentence in light of this opinion.