Opinion ID: 2381571
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discretionary and Ministerial Functions.

Text: The majority has outlined in some detail the distinction between discretionary and ministerial governmental functions. I have no quarrel with much of its discussion. I cannot agree, however, that because the determination of the duration of the clearance interval at Wisconsin and Fessenden was a de facto part of the District's overall traffic plan, the decision to set it at four seconds was necessarily a protected discretionary act. In my opinion, this proposition, followed to its logical conclusion, would insulate the District from liability for negligent conduct under circumstances which the discretionary function doctrine was never designed to reach. As Judge (later Attorney General) Griffin Bell wrote for the court in Fowler v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 343 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.1965), the defense of sovereign privilege imposes a drastic impingement on personal liberty, and is recognized only because the impingement is considered justified in order to encourage public officials to fearlessly discharge the duties of their office. Id. at 154. Not every governmental decision which involves some exercise of discretion is insulated from review, for it would be difficult to conceive of any official act, no matter how directly ministerial, that did not admit of some discretion in the manner of its performance, even if it involved only the driving of a nail. 18 EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, § 53.04.10, at 157 (3d ed.1993) (quoting Ham v. Los Angeles, 46 Cal.App. 148, 189 P. 462, 465 (1920)). The goal of the discretionary function exception is to prevent judicial `second-guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2764-65, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). The discretionary function exception applies only to conduct that involves the permissible exercise of policy judgments. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 537, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1959, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988). Accordingly, when that exception is invoked, the court must make a particularized and fact-specific inquiry to determine whether the acts or omissions in question flowed from a choice based on economic or social policy. Prescott, supra, 973 F.2d at 700. That inquiry is designed to determine not whether the government employee has a choice, but whether that choice is a policy judgment. Id. (citations omitted). Moreover, there is persuasive authority for the proposition that governmental conduct is insulated from liability only where the official or employee actually exercised some discretion. 18 MCQUILLIN, supra, § 53.04.10, at 157 (emphasis added). Immunity for discretionary activities serves no purpose except to assure that courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the province of coordinate branches of government. Accordingly, to be entitled to immunity the state must make a showing that such a policy decision, consciously balancing risks and advantages, took place. The fact that an employee normally engages in discretionary activity is irrelevant if, in a given case, the employee did not render a considered decision. Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782, 73 Cal.Rptr. 240, 249 n. 8, 447 P.2d 352, 361 n. 8 (1968) (emphasis added); 18 MCQUILLIN, supra, § 53.04.10 at 160 n. 7. [3] Although some decisions reflect a different focus, [4] proof that an administrative decision was not based on economic or social considerations is surely probative on the question whether the discretionary function exception applies, especially where, as in this case, the testimony of the District's own representatives, described infra at pp. 458-459, demonstrates that the failure to weigh such factors was the norm rather than the exception. There is no dispositive District of Columbia precedent on the precise question presented to us, but I believe that the approach of the courts in this jurisdiction has been generally consistent with the authorities which I have cited. It has long been established that the District has a ministerial duty to maintain the streets in a reasonably safe condition for travel, and that this is an exception to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. Wagshal v. District of Columbia, 216 A.2d 172, 173 (D.C.1966); see also District of Columbia v. Pace, 498 A.2d 226, 230 (D.C.1985). In Wagshal, this court, citing Urow v. District of Columbia, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 316 F.2d 351 (1962) (per curiam), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826, 84 S.Ct. 69, 11 L.Ed.2d 59 (1963), recognized that the District's determination whether or not to place a traffic light at a particular intersection was discretionary and protected by sovereign immunity. Wagshal, 216 A.2d at 173. We held, however, that there can be no immunity if the plan that is adopted creates a hazard on the road, either because of its inherent unreasonableness or because of negligence in its administration.  Id. at 173-74 (emphasis added). More recently, we observed that [t]he fact that in a particular case an [employee] might have alternative courses of action from which to choose, and this choice might involve a certain degree of judgment, does not elevate the [employee's] decision to the level of `basic policy.' WMATA v. O'Neill, 633 A.2d 834, 839 (D.C.1993) (quoting Lopez v. Southern California Rapid Transit, 40 Cal.3d 780, 221 Cal.Rptr. 840, 849, 710 P.2d 907, 916 (1985)). Only a few months ago, in Cope v. Scott, 310 U.S.App.D.C. 144, 45 F.3d 445 (1995), the United States Court of Appeals unanimously held that the decision where to place slippery when wet signs in Rock Creek Park was not grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime and did not implicate political, social, or economic policy choices of the sort that Congress intended to protect [by granting immunity.] Id. at ___, 45 F.3d at 452. The court rejected the government's contention that the balancing of safety considerations against the aesthetic appearance of Beach Drive represented a protected discretionary function. My colleagues contend that Cope was erroneously decided, [5] and that Urow, not Cope, controls. The 2:1 decision in Urow is, however, distinguishable in a decisive respect. See note 12, infra, and preceding text. Moreover, although Cope is not binding on us, we ought at least to pause before we reject a very recent decision of our federal appellate colleagues across the street and place the contemporary law of sovereign immunity in the District of Columbia in unnecessary disarray. See Hornstein v. Barry, 560 A.2d 530, 536-37 n. 15 (D.C.1989) (en banc). [6]