Opinion ID: 77044
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impact of Our Decision

Text: 31 Having concluded that proof of actual damages is not necessary for an award of liquidated damages, we turn to the impact that this conclusion will have on this case and future litigation filed pursuant to the DPPA in this Circuit. While we have devoted a significant portion of this opinion to the words in sub-section (b)(1), we have not yet touched the four powerful words preceding that sub-section. 32 Section 2724(b) begins, [t]he Court may award. 18 U.S.C. § 2724(b) (emphasis added). The use of the word may suggests that the award of any damages is permissive and discretionary. See DirecTV, 371 F.3d at 818 (concluding that the district court correctly determined that liquidated damages under the ECPA are discretionary). This common-sense principle of statutory construction is by no means invariable, however, and can be defeated by indications of legislative intent to the contrary or obvious inferences from the structure and purpose of the statute. Id. at 817 (quoting United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 706, 103 S.Ct. 2132, 76 L.Ed.2d 236 (1983)). Since there is neither legislative history nor obvious inferences from the structure that suggests a contrary intent, we conclude that the use of the word may implies a degree of discretion. See id. Thus, the district court, in its discretion, may fashion what it deems to be an appropriate award. Among the options for the district court is the option to award actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages in the amount of $2,500. In fashioning an appropriate award, the district court may also consider the other forms of relief that are available and were requested by Kehoe — punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees and costs, and the destruction of all of Kehoe's personal information illegally obtained from motor vehicle records. 8