Opinion ID: 2141968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Distinction from Reckless Manslaughter

Text: Reckless homicide cannot be elevated into depraved indifference murder merely because the actions of the defendant created a risk of death, however grave or substantial that risk may have been. Otherwise, manslaughter in the second degree would routinely and automatically become depraved indifference murder inasmuch as the victim (who was, after all, killed) was necessarily exposed to a grave or substantial risk of death. The critical statutory language that separates second-degree manslaughter from depraved indifference murder is the defendant's underlying depraved indifference. [C]ircumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life are not established by recklessness coupled only with actions that carry even an inevitable risk of death. We therefore make clear that depraved indifference is best understood as an utter disregard for the value of human life  a willingness to act not because one intends harm, but because one simply doesn't care whether grievous harm results or not. Reflecting wickedness, evil or inhumanity, as manifested by brutal, heinous and despicable acts, depraved indifference is embodied in conduct that is so wanton, so deficient in a moral sense of concern, so devoid of regard of the life or lives of others, and so blameworthy as to render the actor as culpable as one whose conscious objective is to kill ( Russell, 91 NY2d at 287 [internal quotation marks omitted]). [8] Quintessential examples are firing into a crowd ( see e.g. People v Jernatowski, 238 NY 188 [1924]); driving an automobile along a crowded sidewalk at high speed ( see People v Gomez, 65 NY2d 9 [1985]); opening the lion's cage at the zoo; placing a time bomb in a public place; poisoning a well from which people are accustomed to draw water; opening a drawbridge as a train is about to pass over it and dropping stones from an overpass onto a busy highway. Oftentimes it will not be easy to determine whether a defendant's conscious objective was to kill or merely to injure a victim. But those are the hard choices to be weighed by the trier of fact. Depraved indifference murder was never meant as a fallback crime enabling courts and juries to avoid making these difficult decisions. We therefore make clear that the statutory provision that a defendant act [u]nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life constitutes an additional requirement of the crime  beyond mere recklessness and risk  which in turn comprises both depravity and indifference, and that a jury considering a charge of depraved indifference murder should be so instructed ( see People v Register, 60 NY2d 270, 276 [1983] [depraved indifference murder statute requires in addition not only that the conduct which results in death present a grave risk of death but that it also occur `(u)nder circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life']). We depart slightly from the Register formulation, however, in that we make clear that the additional requirement of depraved indifference has meaning independent of the gravity of the risk. As the present cases illustrate, to focus, as the dissent does, on only the degree of risk presented by a defendant's reckless actions gives insufficient guidance to prosecutors, courts and juries struggling to distinguish between these very different crimes. For with the critical inquiry thus cast, it becomes difficult for trial and appellate courts to determine as a matter of law whether given conduct has established a very substantial or merely substantial risk of death, particularly because this determination must, by definition, always be made with the hindsight that the endangered victim did in fact die. That being so, it is hard for a court exercising meaningful review ever to deny that the jury could reasonably have concluded that the defendant's conduct must have created a very substantial (i.e., grave) risk of death, since it actually succeeded in causing death. Although the dissent proclaims its faith in the ability of jurors to make the fine distinction between a grave, transcendent risk of death justifying a conviction of second-degree murder or a substantial risk of death warranting a manslaughter conviction (dissenting/concurring op at 227), it also concludes that there was no rational view of the evidence to support the conclusion that McPherson demonstrated a depraved indifference to the victim's life. But of course, the trial judge found otherwise, and was affirmed by the Appellate Division. When depraved indifference murder is properly understood, twin-count indictments  charging both intentional homicide and depraved indifference murder  should be rare. Twin-count submissions to a jury, even rarer. For by the time the proof has been presented, it should be obvious in most cases whether or not the evidence establishes an intentional [killing] or no other ( People v Wall, 29 NY2d 863, 864 [1971]). Thus, where twin-count indictments are lodged, trial courts should presume that the defendant's conduct falls within only one category of murder and, unless compelling evidence is presented to the contrary, dismiss the count that is least appropriate to the facts (Abramovsky and Edelstein, 55 Syracuse L Rev at 491). In sum, whether a small, finite or rare category, depraved indifference murder should not be routinely charged to a jury. Focus on the three statutory factors that distinguish depraved indifference murder  circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, recklessness and a grave risk of death to another person  should again make clear that the statute properly applies only to the unusual case.