Opinion ID: 901120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for substitute counsel.

Text: [¶ 22.] Talarico claims the trial court erred in denying his motion for substitute counsel. We review the denial of a motion for substitute counsel under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Loftus, 1997 SD 94, ¶ 13, 566 N.W.2d 825, 827. [¶ 23.] Talarico asserts that due to irreconcilable disputes over defense strategy and a break down in communication, his motion for substitute counsel should have been granted. We have held, [a]ppointment of substitute counsel is warranted only upon a showing of good cause and where substitution will not unreasonably disrupt the judicial process. State v. Irvine, 1996 SD 43, ¶ 9, 547 N.W.2d 177, 180. In addition this Court held in State v. Fender, `[W]hen [a] defendant alleges the existence of a dispute leading to a destruction of communication and a breakdown in the attorney-client relationship, the judge is obligated to inquire whether such allegations are true.' 484 N.W.2d 307, 309 (S.D.1992) (quoting People v. Bass, 88 Mich.App. 793, 279 N.W.2d 551, 555 (1979)). Furthermore, this Court in Fender, held that a defendant must be given an opportunity to present his `good cause' justifying a change in counsel. Id. [¶ 24.] The trial court followed these procedures with Talarico. The trial court held a hearing on November 19, 2001, January 7, 2002, and on February 26, 2002 to discuss Talarico's repeated request for substitute counsel. At each hearing the trial court asked the defendant why he needed substitute counsel. He claimed that he and his attorney had irreconcilable differences about his defense and that they had a break down in communication. At each request, the trial court took note of Talarico's complaints and questioned him in depth to determine their basis. After consideration, the trial court found the defendant's reasons insufficient. [¶ 25.] A defendant's right to counsel does not contemplate that an accused may take charge of the case after an attorney has been appointed, or dictate its course, or make counsel's educated judgment the pawn of an unreasonable and obdurate malefactor. State v. Pieschke, 262 N.W.2d 40, 46 (S.D.1978). Moreover, any problems with communication were due to Talarico's refusal to cooperate with his attorney. At the January 7, 2002 hearing the trial court asked the defendant, [A]nd that's your choice not to cooperate, isn't it? To which the defendant replied, You bet it is, yeah. A defendant is not entitled to substitute counsel when the break down in communications is caused by the defendant's admitted refusal to cooperate. Irvine, 1996 SD 43, ¶ 13, 547 N.W.2d at 181. Additionally, the trial court expressed concern that the defendant would not be satisfied with any counsel. We do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for substitute counsel.