Opinion ID: 1107651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Conflict with Other District Courts of Appeal

Text: The second issue of conflict is whether BOLEO is a felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual. In Hearns, the district court held that BOLEO is not invariably a qualified offense for VCC sentencing because mere unwanted touching, which is one basis for a battery conviction, does not amount to the use or threat of physical force or violence. 912 So.2d at 379; see also Hudson v. State, 800 So.2d 627, 628-29 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001) (holding that the crime of shooting into or throwing deadly missiles into a building, whether occupied or unoccupied (§ 790.19, Fla.Stat.(1997)), does not, by definition, involve physical force or violence against an individual and therefore cannot be a qualifying felony under the VCC statute). This holding conflicts with cases from the First, Second, and Fourth District Courts of Appeal, all of which have held that BOLEO does involve the use or threat of physical force or violence and therefore is a qualifying offense under a similar statute. On this point, we agree with the Third District. At first blush, the district court's decision appears reconcilable with the other cases because they involve different statutes. Unlike Hearns, which involved section 776.08, the other districts have decided this issue in the context of the prisoner releasee reoffender (PRR) statute, section 775.082, Florida Statutes (2000). The PRR statute, like the VCC statute, is intended to deter recidivism by imposing longer sentences on repeat offenders. The PRR statute applies to defendants who commit qualifying offenses within three years of being released from a state correctional facility. Like the VCC statute, it lists felonies that qualify for sentence enhancement: Prison releasee reoffender means any defendant who commits, or attempts to commit: a. Treason; b. Murder; c. Manslaughter; d. Sexual Battery; e. Carjacking; f. Home-invasion robbery; g. Robbery; h. Arson i. Kidnapping; j. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon; k. Aggravated battery; l. Aggravated stalking; m. Aircraft piracy; n. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb; o. Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual . . . within 3 years of being released from a state correctional facility. . . . § 775.082(9)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2000). As with the VCC statute, although the statute specifically names some types of batteries (sexual battery and aggravated battery), it does not mention BOLEO. Subsection (o), however, contains the same language as the final clause of section 776.08: Any felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual. We have held that where the Legislature uses the exact same words or phrases in two different statutes, we may assume it intended the same meaning to apply. See Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202 (Fla.1958). Because the two statutes use identical language, whether BOLEO is a qualifying offense must be answered consistently under both the VCC statute and the PRR statute. Several cases from the First, Second and Fourth Districts have held that BOLEO is a qualifying offense under subsection ( o ) of the PRR statute. None of them, however, analyzes the statute in any depth or compares it to the elements of a BOLEO offense. See, e.g., Spann v. State, 772 So.2d 38 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000) (holding that BOLEO is a qualifying offense for sentence enhancement under subsection ( o ) of the PRR statute without analyzing the statute); Brown v. State, 789 So.2d 366, 367 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (relying on Spann in holding that BOLEO is a qualifying offense under the PRR); State v. Crenshaw, 792 So.2d 582, 583 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (following Brown ); Branch v. State, 790 So.2d 437 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) ([B]attery on a law enforcement officer [is] a qualifying offense that falls within the ambit of statutory subsection [775.082(9)](a)(1)( o ), which includes `[a]ny felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against an individual.'). None of these cases explicitly analyzes the BOLEO or the battery statute to determine whether BOLEO is a felony that involves the use or threat of physical force or violence. They simply assume that BOLEO satisfies this description. One judge, however, did analyze the issue in some depth. In Jenkins v. State, 884 So.2d 1014 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004), although the majority followed its decision in Branch, the dissent argued that BOLEO cannot be a qualifying offense under the PRR statute because it is not necessarily a forcible felony. Id. at 1017 (Ervin., J., concurring and dissenting). Judge Ervin analyzed our decision in Perkins, and although that case involved a different statute, he concluded that [u]nder the Perkins reasoning, the identical language in the PRR Act means that the elements of a qualifying third-degree felony must encompass the use or threat of physical force or violence. Because unwanted touching under section 784.03(1)(a)(1) may not necessarily be a violent act, it cannot be a qualifying offense for PRR sentencing. Id. at 1018. We agree with Judge Ervin's assessment.