Opinion ID: 1699241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Causal Negligence of Henry Junkans.

Text: Because of the defective scaffold, the jury found Henry Junkans negligent in failing to furnish a place of employment as free from danger to frequenters as the nature thereof reasonably permitted. The jury also found that such negligence was not a cause of the accident, but the trial court changed the answer. Henry Junkans was an owner of the property involved and was helping in the construction of his own house. Mr. Cloeter was engaged to rough in the house. The other carpenters were employees of Mr. Cloeter, were paid by him, and were under his supervision. However, the record establishes that Henry Junkans did not turn over complete control of the premises to Mr. Cloeter. Henry Junkans personally worked on the job and also purchased some of the materials necessary for the job, although other materials were bought by Mr. Cloeter. In addition, Mr. Junkans  engaged such other tradesmen as the excavators, plumbers, and electricians. The trial court instructed the jurors that it was their duty to determine if Mr. Junkans retained control of his premises. Their finding that Mr. Junkans was negligent reflects a conclusion that he did retain control of the premises, and we consider that there is credible evidence to support this position. In Potter v. Kenosha (1955), 268 Wis. 361, 372, 68 N. W. (2d) 4, this court held that when an owner turns over to an independent contractor the complete control and custody of his premises and the contractor then creates a hazardous condition, the responsibility therefor does not rest with the owner. The record in the instant case leads to the conclusion that Henry Junkans retained sufficient control to share the onus for the unsafe scaffold. The appellants also contend that there can be no liability on the part of Henry Junkans because of the absence of notice to him of the defect. Either actual or constructive notice of an unsafe nonstructural condition is essential in order to make a finding of liability on the part of an employer regarding a frequenter on the premises. Uhrman v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc. (1957), 2 Wis. (2d) 71, 75, 85 N. W. (2d) 772. Henry Junkans, as the owner of a place of employment, stood in the shoes of the employer by reason of his retention of control of the premises; he was therefore entitled to notice. The trial court instructed the jury that in order to find that Henry Junkans did not maintain the scaffold as safe as the nature of the place reasonably permitted, the jury would have to find that he knew or should have known of the defect in time to remedy it. Assuming that the condition of the scaffold was a temporary defect associated with the structure, Mr. Junkans was entitled to notice thereof. While a separate question of the issue of notice was not  submitted, the issue was properly covered in the court's instructions; this is a procedure which we expressly approved in Krause v. Veterans of Foreign Wars Post No. 6498 (1960), 9 Wis. (2d) 547, 553, 101 N. W. (2d) 645. Although the scaffold was constructed by Mr. Cloeter, Henry Junkans had previously used the scaffold and must be charged with notice of its condition. The jury could properly have concluded that the defects which brought about the accident were not ones which arose moments before the accident; rather they were flaws which should have been apparent to Mr. Junkans at the time he personally used the scaffold. In addition, Mr. Junkans was working on the house at the time of the accident and actually observed Mr. Lee's fall. This would bring the case within the concept of notice expressed in Rudzinski v. Warner Theatres (1962), 16 Wis. (2d) 241, 249, 114 N. W. (2d) 466. We are satisfied that the jury could properly determine that there was constructive notice to Henry Junkans. This court described the concept of constructive notice in the Uhrman Case, supra, at page 75, as follows: Constructive notice of course is neither notice nor knowledge, but a mere shorthand expression. We say a person has constructive notice of something when for the promotion of sound policy or purpose he is to be treated as if he had actual notice, whether or not he had it in fact. The appellant Henry Junkans further contends that the trial court erred in changing the jury's answer as to causation. There was testimony on the part of a safety engineer from the Wisconsin industrial commission that safety orders of the commission with respect to scaffolding had not been complied with. Specifically, the commission's orders require that a platform be at least 23 inches wide for the height of a scaffold such as is involved in the case at bar.  There is testimony in the record which establishes that the west end of the platform consisted of a plank not wider than 12 inches. The commission also has an order requiring that a scaffold be inspected, and such inspection was not made in the instant case. The aforementioned evidence relative to violation of the commission's orders was not rebutted. In Candell v. Skaar (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 544, 549, 89 N. W. (2d) 274, Mr. Justice FAIRCHILD stated: Where there is a failure to fulfil a duty under the safe-place statute and an accident occurs which performance of the duty was designed to prevent, the law presumes that the damage was caused by the failure. The presumption may be rebutted, but if not rebutted by evidence, the plaintiff has met his burden of proof. There is testimony that if the safety orders of the industrial commission had been met the accident suffered by plaintiff Lee would not have occurred. We conclude that the change of the answer on causation was warranted.