Opinion ID: 2332073
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: 59:2-3 Discretionary activities

Text: (a) A public entity is not liable for an injury resulting from the exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the entity; (b) A public entity is not liable for legislative or judicial action or inaction, or administrative action or inaction of a legislative or judicial nature.    We determine that for vindication of his constitutional liberty right, Sergeant Nicoletta is only entitled, if he wishes it, to a post-termination hearing not so much for the limited purpose described by Justice Mountain in Williams, supra  to clear any damage to his reputation, but rather to attempt to dislodge the specter of possible Civil Service debarment from further public employment. He would thus have opportunity to try to persuade the Commission, in its basic discretion nevertheless ( N.J.S.A. 58:5A-2), to change its determination as to his ouster. As we have seen, it must not be supposed that this Court, in these circumstances, has authority to reinstate him to his position or award back pay. These decisions inhere in the Commission under the statute. Inasmuch as Nicoletta had no property interest that was taken from him and his dismissal, even without cause, was within the statutory province of the Commission, it is only the loss of his liberty interest which was implicated in the due process deficiency, and it is only the due process right related to that interest which can be restored to him by the power of this Court. As stated by the Supreme Court in Roth, supra : The purpose of such notice and hearing is to provide the person an opportunity to clear his name. Once a person has cleared his name at a hearing, his employer, of course, may remain free to deny him future employment for other reasons. [408 U.S. at 573 n. 12, 92 S.Ct. at 2707, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 558-59]. In the circumstances of this case, bearing in mind the Supreme Court's softening of the effect of the Roth reputation-stigma factor, this quoted expression could be read to substitute (for the thrust of such opportunity to clear his name) the expression to contest the basis upon which his discharge and resulting potential employment disqualification would rest. Such was the sense of the Law Division holding in a comparable case, Campbell v. Atlantic Cty. Bd. of Freeholders, 145 N.J. Super. 316 (1976). A Board of Freeholders had terminated and thus removed from the public service, without prior notice or hearing, a non-tenured, at will employee (because of his indictment for a criminal offense, of which he was later acquitted). The Law Division identified a liberty interest right to procedural due process, as we do here. The sole remedy offered was described by that court: An appropriate and adequate hearing as to the relevance of plaintiff's discharge under N.J.A.C. 4:1-8.14 may be conducted before this court. For that purpose    the court retains jurisdiction. A full evidentiary hearing may be held, at plaintiff's option, to establish the circumstances of his removal from the public service and their relevance to the application of N.J.A.C. 4:1-8.14. In all other respects plaintiff's claims are rejected. [145 N.J. Super. at 330]. The Appellate Division only recently affirmed this decision, 158 N.J. Super. 14 (App. Div. 1978), particularly noting that plaintiff still has available to him, at his option, a full evidentiary hearing before the trial court for the purposes outlined by that court. We assume that these courts did not intend the term full evidentiary hearing to extend beyond that type described in Morrissey v. Brewer, supra , which we have decided to be sufficient to accommodate the needs of government to operate efficiently, yet fully acquit the constitutional right under discussion. Further, we believe and decide that such hearing should not, at least where the employer is in esse, be before the court but rather (in a non-civil service case) before the employer, as in Williams, supra. This for at least two principal reasons: 1. The post-termination hearing is designed to restore to the employee as nearly as possible the procedural right of which he was deprived, a hearing, albeit a pre-termination hearing, before his employer. 2. The decision as to termination or, if the employer should reverse its decision at the hearing, to permit resumption of the employment, should be that of the employer and not of the court. This comports with the firmly established principle that issues within the bailiwick and expertise of an administrative agency should be adjudicated in the first instance by the agency, subject to judicial review. Cf. Division 540, Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO v. Mercer County Improvement Auth., 76 N.J. 245 (1978) (judicial review of arbitrator's award). More practically, the courts of New Jersey under present circumstances are in no position to assume additional burdens where constitutional or other rights may be sufficiently protected in another tribunal by adherence to fair procedural rules. Not only are the courts reeling under their present obligations but face new ones, which should not be needlessly or gratuitously augmented. [4] After the fair hearing, before his employer, to which Sergeant Nicoletta is entitled, the Commission is free to reaffirm or not its prior decision, in conformity with its statutory power. The hearing which we order is the only just and proper relief that can be afforded by this Court under its constitutional authority. Reversed. PASHMAN, J., concurring. I join fully in the well-reasoned analysis of the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court which clearly establishes plaintiff's entitlement to, and non-receipt of, procedural due process in the dismissal proceedings below. Plaintiff's dismissal from public service implicated his constitutionally protected liberty interest and obligated his governmental employer to afford him the safeguards of procedural due process in effecting the termination of his employment. I write separately in an attempt to clarify the rights and duties of governmental employers vis-a-vis their nontenured employees in this context and to note my concern over certain observations made in Part III of the majority opinion which take a rather grudging view of this Court's power to review the personnel actions of the Commission.