Opinion ID: 1704512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in denying Sprik's motions to declare prior convictions invalid for enhancement under Part II.

Text: Sprik moved the trial court for an order declaring the June 18, 1984 felony theft conviction in Arizona and the November 23, 1977 escape conviction in Florida invalid to support the Part II Information as a habitual offender under SDCL § 22-7-7. Sprik's motions were denied and he was found to be a habitual offender. A prior conviction carries a presumption of regularity. State v. Moeller, 511 N.W.2d 803, 815 (S.D.1994) (Amundson, J., concurring in result) (citing State v. Randen, 497 N.W.2d 107, 109 (S.D.1993)). In Stuck v. Leapley, 473 N.W.2d 476 (S.D.1991), we outlined the various burdens of proof in habitual offender proceedings. [W]here the defendant places the constitutional validity of the prior convictions in issue by a motion to strike or other appropriate means, the state has an initial burden of proving the existence of prior valid convictions by a preponderance of the evidence. [W]hen state meets its initial burden of proof, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that the prior convictions are invalid. This appears to require a plea transcript indicating that the prior plea was not valid, or testimony to that effect by a participant in the plea proceeding (i.e., defendant, defendant's attorney, the prosecutor, the judge, etc.). Stuck, 473 N.W.2d at 478-79 (emphasis in original) (footnote and citations omitted), see Randen, 497 N.W.2d at 109. Sprik argues that there is an insufficient factual basis to support the two prior convictions. SDCL 23A-7-14 provides that [t]he court shall defer acceptance of any plea except a plea of nolo contendere until it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the offense charged or to which the defendant pleads. The transcript of the Change of Plea for the 1984 felony theft conviction reveals the State's response to the court's request for the facts concerning the crime: On or about March 28th of this year the defendant and one Michael Eskeats were at the Flagstaff Mall. The defendant went into Kay's Jewelers, contacted the clerk in there and told her he was just looking. A phone rang and the clerk went to answer the phone. When she came out, the defendant was gone and so were the two watches. Shortly after that two officials of the Kay's Jewelers found the defendant and Mr. Eskeats out on North 89 across from the mall. They confronted the two men, and each of the two men, Eskeats and the defendant here, produced a watch. The two watches had a value in excess of a hundred dollars; in fact, each watch was worth over a hundred dollars. Mr. Eskeats informed the officers that he had waited outside while he watched Mr. Sprik go in and take the watches from the stand. Mr. Sprik was positively identified by the clerk at the jewelry store as the person who she had seen enter the store before she went to answer the phone. Clearly, this transcript details the factual basis for Sprik's 1984 felony theft conviction. And while a plea of guilty cannot stand unless the record in some manner indicates a free and intelligent waiver of the three constitutional rights mentioned in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)  self-incrimination, confrontation and jury trial  and an understanding of the nature and consequences of the plea, Randen, 497 N.W.2d at 108-09 (citing Nachtigall v. Erickson, 85 S.D. 122, 128, 178 N.W.2d 198, 201 (1970)), the record indicates that Sprik, who was represented by counsel, acknowledged reading, understanding, agreeing to, and signing, the plea agreement. The court then informed Sprik that by pleading he gave up certain rights including the right to keep your plea of not guilty, to have a trial by jury at which you would be represented by counsel, the right to confront and cross examine witnesses against you, the right to present evidence, testify in your own behalf if you wish to do so and to subpoena witnesses in your defense, and the right to remain silent and refuse to testify at trial. Sprik replied that he understood these rights and was willing to give them up. The record indicates a free and intelligent waiver by Sprik of his Boykin rights. A Florida Official Court Reporter was unable to locate any transcripts or stenographic records concerning Sprik's 1977 conviction for escape. The Plea, Waiver and Consent, however, which was signed by Sprik and his attorney, indicates that Sprik was represented by counsel and states that he was fully advised of his constitutional rights. Moeller, 511 N.W.2d at 815 (Amundson, J., concurring in result). In Stuck, we held that state met its initial burden of proving the constitutional validity of prior convictions challenged by a habeas corpus petitioner by submitting records of the convictions showing that, at the time the petitioner entered his guilty pleas, he was fully advised of his constitutional rights and was represented by counsel. Because the petitioner failed to offer plea transcripts indicating that the prior pleas were not valid and failed to offer any other evidence or testimony to that effect, we held that he failed to meet his burden of showing some invalidity in the prior convictions and upheld his habitual offender conviction. Moeller, 511 N.W.2d at 815 (Amundson, J., concurring in result) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Here, as in Stuck, the State met its initial burden of proving the constitutional validity of the 1977 conviction for escape. As noted above, the State submitted records indicating that at the time Sprik entered his guilty plea, he was represented by counsel and fully advised of his constitutional rights. Therefore, the burden shifted to Sprik to show that the escape conviction was invalid. Randen, 497 N.W.2d at 109 (citation omitted). Because Sprik failed to offer a plea transcript or testimony by a participant indicating that the prior plea was not valid, Sprik has failed to meet his burden of showing that the escape conviction was invalid. Moeller, 511 N.W.2d at 815 (Amundson, J., concurring in result). Finally, Sprik argues that the record of the 1984 theft conviction does not describe any intent, either specific or general. We agree with the trial court that it appears that the elements of the offense to which the prosecuting attorney addressed himself met the elements in Arizona and would meet with sufficient interpretation the elements of the offense in South Dakota[.] Sprik has not shown that the trial court erred in denying his motions to declare his prior convictions invalid for enhancement under Part II. We affirm. MILLER, C.J., and WUEST and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur. HENDERSON, J., dissents.