Opinion ID: 2299614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Alleged Judicial Improprieties

Text: Lastly, Brian asserts that the hearing justice show[ed] a bias toward [Jo-An] and [her counsel], as he often    suggested strategy and actions to take against [Brian] and allegedly made various accusatory statements to and about Brian. Brian also purports error in that the general magistrate, who had formerly recused himself from the case, signed an order in this case. It is well established that a party alleging judicial bias carries a substantial burden of proof to show that the asserted prejudice impaired the fairness of the trial. In re Jermaine H., 9 A.3d 1227, 1230 (R.I.2010) (quoting In re Shawn B., 864 A.2d 621, 624 (R.I.2005)). It must be proven that the Family Court justice had personal bias or prejudice by reason of a preconceived or settled opinion of a character calculated to impair his impartiality seriously and to sway his judgment. Id.; see also State v. Howard, 23 A.3d 1133, 1136 (R.I.2011); Parrillo v. Parrillo, 495 A.2d 683, 685 (R.I.1985). It does not appear from the record that Brian moved for the recusal of the hearing justice [20] or objected to the general magistrate's signing of the July 9, 2010 order. As a result, under this Court's well settled raise-or-waive rule, Brian has waived any right to challenge these alleged judicial improprieties on appeal. See In re Damien M., 819 A.2d 213, 213, 214 (R.I. 2003) (mem.) (holding that because the father had not objected to the trial justice's questions, moved for a mistrial, or otherwise attempted to disqualify the trial justice because of his alleged improper questioning during the trial, he had therefore waived any right to challenge the trial justice's alleged bias on appeal). However, even if these issues properly had been preserved, they would not benefit Brian. The general magistrate's signing of the July 9, 2010 order was a ministerial act without any real consequence on the disposition of this case. That order was the mere memorialization of a bench order given by the hearing justice. While a recused magistrate or justice should avoid any activity in a case from which he or she formerly is recused, we do not deem it per se error if one such magistrate or justice partakes in ministerial acts requiring no independent decision making. Thus, in this case, where the general magistrate merely signed an order that had already been effectuated by the oral order of the hearing justice, judicial partiality has not been established. See State v. Lyons, 924 A.2d 756, 763 (R.I.2007) (stating that defendant carries the substantial burden of proof to show that the asserted prejudice impaired the fairness of the trial (quoting In re Shawn B., 864 A.2d at 624)). Similarly, there is no merit to the allegation that the hearing justice exhibited partiality or bias. Brian points to what he claims was the hearing justice's accus[ation] [that Brian was] intimating to the [c]ourt that he [was] an expert on roofing [21] and his statement that Brian was having fun with this, [22] to show such bias. These statements, at best, represent mere criticism by the hearing justice, which this Court consistently has held is insufficient to establish judicial bias. See Lyons, 924 A.2d at 763; In re Damien M., 819 A.2d at 213. In fact, upon our review of the record, it is clear to us that the hearing justice exhibited great patience and impartiality in the face of Brian's continued lack of cooperation and unabashed attempt to avoid his court-ordered obligation to pay child support. We therefore conclude that the hearing justice maintained the requisite judicial impartiality and that Brian's assertions are without merit.