Opinion ID: 783999
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Title VII-Hostile Environment

Text: 63
64 With respect to Dr. Hildebrandt's hostile work environment claim, we believe that Morgan requires that we conclude that the district court erred in limiting its review of her claim to acts occurring after July 10, 1997. Under Morgan, [a] hostile work environment claim is comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one `unlawful employment practice.' Morgan, 122 S.Ct. at 2074. Consequently, [p]rovided that an act contributing to the claim occurs within the filing period, the entire time period of the hostile environment may be considered by a court for the purposes of determining liability. Id. Because Dr. Hildebrandt alleges several acts as part of her hostile work environment claim that arose after July 10, 1997, she can reach beyond the limitations period to bring forth evidence of facts prior to that time that contributed to the hostile environment. 65 However, a court of appeals can affirm a district court's grant of summary judgment on any ground that finds support in the record. See Conley v. Vill. of Bedford Park, 215 F.3d 703, 709 (7th Cir.2000). As explained in greater detail below, we do not believe that Dr. Hildebrandt has set forth a prima facie case of hostile work environment sexual harassment, and we affirm the district court's judgment on that basis. 66
67 An employer violates Title VII when discrimination based on sex ... create[s] a hostile or abusive work environment. Adusumilli v. City of Chi., 164 F.3d 353, 361 (7th Cir.1998) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Workplace harassment must be sufficiently severe or pervasive to be actionable. Haugerud v. Amery Sch. Dist., 259 F.3d 678, 692-93 (7th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 13 Harassment is not limited to acts of sexual desire, but rather is a broad term which encompasses all forms of conduct that unreasonably interfere with an individual's work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment. Id. at 692 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Yet, not all workplace conduct that may be described as `harassment' affects a term, condition, or privilege of employment within the meaning of Title VII. Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361. Thus, [t]o prevail on a hostile environment claim, the plaintiff must show that the work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. Haugerud, 259 F.3d at 692-93. An objectively hostile environment is one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and a court must consider all the circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it was physically threatening or humiliating; or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Finally, and significantly in this case, the harassment must have occurred because of the sex of the complainant, thus we ask whether she was exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of the other sex [were] not exposed. Haugerud, 259 F.3d at 692. 68 We now shall examine Dr. Hildebrandt's primary factual allegations in light of our hostile work environment case law. 14 69 First, Dr. Hildebrandt argues that she was subject to [o]ne or two off-color remarks made in her presence. Appellant's Br. at 9. Dr. Hildebrandt does not elaborate on those remarks, but the record indicates that there were two distasteful jokes made by coworkers, neither of which were directed at or told to Dr. Hildebrandt — she only overheard them. We have recognized that simple teasing and offhand comments generally will not amount to discriminatory changes in the terms and conditions of employment. Adusumilli, 164 F.3d at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, second-hand harassment, that is, comments not directed to the plaintiff, do not have the same impact as harassment directed at the plaintiff. Id. at 362. 70 Second, Dr. Hildebrandt argues that Mr. Little required Dr. Hildebrandt to submit monthly goals, while her male counterparts were not subject to the same requirement. Appellant's Br. at 10. The record does not support this contention. Mr. Little explained in his deposition that each of the program administrators was required to submit monthly accomplishment statements. Each program administrator had his own way of doing so; some filed very informal monthly statements. See Defendant's Ex.8B at 353-54. Dr. Hildebrandt argues that she additionally was required to state her future goals as well as her accomplishments. She brought as evidence of this requirement two such monthly goal statements that she had submitted to Mr. Little in 1993. Plaintiff's Exs.198 & 199. At most, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Hildebrandt, the record indicates that Dr. Hildebrandt had the extra burden of including her future goals in her monthly statement of accomplishments, although the statement itself was a requirement for all program administrators, male and female. See Defendant's Ex.8B at 354. 71 Third, Dr. Hildebrandt noted that Mr. Little advised Dr. Hildebrandt that she would be subject to quarterly reviews after 1998, but, apparently, did not similarly advise the male program administrators. See R.1 at ¶¶ 37-38; R.44 at ¶¶ 37-38. 72 Fourth, Dr. Hildebrandt notes that Gillespie sat in on her evaluations after 1998 and that her male coworkers were evaluated only by Mr. Little. 73 Fifth, Dr. Hildebrandt alleges that she was not allowed to communicate directly with district foresters, but instead was forced to communicate with them through Gillespie and that the male program administrators were not subject to the same requirement. However, the evidence demonstrates that the male program administrators were required to speak through Gillespie on specified projects with the district foresters. See R.80 Supplemental Aff. of Hildebrandt at ¶ 54. At most, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to Dr. Hildebrandt, she was required to go through Gillespie on more projects than were the men, but the men were also required to do so, at least on occasion. 74 Dr. Hildebrandt has failed to show that these acts constitute an objectively hostile work environment. Harassment, in the context of Title VII, involves conduct that unreasonably interferes with a person's work performance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. Ngeunjuntr v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 146 F.3d 464, 467 (7th Cir.1998). The enumerated acts alleged by Dr. Hildebrandt at most inconvenienced her, and there is no evidence that any of them unreasonably interfere[d] with her work. Id. 75 In addition to the allegations just analyzed, Dr. Hildebrandt makes several general allegations of unequal treatment. She claims that Ms. Brown and Mr. Little bottlenecked her work and that Ms. Brown gave Dr. Hildebrandt's work lower priority; 15 that the level of her staff support since 1991 has been diminished by over 50%; 16 and that she was not allowed to work with interns as extensively as the men. 17 However, these [b]are allegations not supported by specific facts are insufficient in opposing a motion for summary judgment. Schroeder v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 875 F.2d 613, 620 (7th Cir.1989); Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767, 773 (7th Cir.2003) (Conclusory allegations, unsupported by specific facts, will not suffice.).