Opinion ID: 1302649
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: stephens

Text: In People v Stephens, supra , this Court overruled a prior decision which disallowed certain lesser misdemeanor offense instructions. [2] We realized that a more flexible approach was required. In essence, the standard we adopted was: Whenever an adequate request for an appropriate misdemeanor instruction is supported by a rational view of the evidence adduced at trial, the trial judge shall give the requested instruction unless to do so would result in a violation of due process, undue confusion, or some other injustice. [ Id., 255.][ [3] ] We concluded that this rule for lesser included misdemeanor instructions would better serve the goals of preventing harassment of the defendant, limiting compromise verdicts, and avoiding jury confusion. The rule which we developed was adopted from the United States Court of Appeals decision in United States v Whitaker, 144 US App DC 344; 447 F2d 314 (1971). Indeed, our conditions parallel the Whitaker reasoning. Although we do not follow the federal approach for lesser included felony offenses, we do so in the separate misdemeanor realm. This distinction must be made because the federal courts acknowledge only necessarily lesser included offenses; cognate offenses instructions are simply not allowed. Hence, instructions for lesser misdemeanor offenses are less freely given, and, even when the conditions of Stephens are met, a trial court retains substantial discretion to accept or deny a request. There are five conditions in the Stephens test. The first condition of Stephens is that a proper request be made. That is, the party must inform the court of exactly what lesser offenses are being requested. See also People v Herbert Smith, 396 Mich 362; 240 NW2d 245 (1976). The second condition requires that an appropriate relationship exist between the charged offense and the requested misdemeanor. This appropriate or inherent relationship has a two-part inquiry. First, the greater and lesser offenses must both relate to the protection of the same interests. Second, they must be related in an evidentiary manner so that, generally, proof of the misdemeanor is necessarily presented as part of the proof of the greater charged offense. [4] The third condition of Stephens demands that the requested misdemeanor be supported by a rational view of the evidence at trial. This requirement differs significantly from our decision in People v Ora Jones, 395 Mich 379; 236 NW2d 461 (1975), in which instructions on necessarily included felonies are automatically given, and instructions on cognate included felonies are given if the evidence could support a conviction. For a request for an instruction on a lesser included misdemeanor to be granted, not only must the evidence justify a conviction of the misdemeanor, but, as the Whitaker court required: [P]roof on the element or elements differentiating the two crimes must be sufficiently in dispute so that the jury may consistently find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser included offense. [144 US App DC 347.] This Court found additional guidance from the United States Supreme Court. [A] lesser-offense charge is not proper where, on the evidence presented, the factual issues to be resolved by the jury are the same as to both the lesser and greater offenses. Berra v United States, [351 US 131; 76 S Ct 685; 100 L Ed 1013 (1956)]; Sparf v United States, 156 US 51, 63-64 [15 S Ct 273; 39 L Ed 343 (1895)]. In other words, the lesser offense must be included within but not, on the facts of the case, be completely encompassed by the greater. A lesser-included offense instruction is only proper where the charged greater offense requires the jury to find a disputed factual element which is not required for conviction of the lesser-included offense. Berra v United States, supra ; Sparf v United States, supra, at 63-64. [ Sansone v United States, 380 US 343, 349-350; 85 S Ct 1004; 13 L Ed 2d 882 (1965).] The United States Supreme Court reasoned that to hold otherwise would be to invite the jury to determine punishment by choosing between the felony and the misdemeanor. [5] Id., p 350, n 6. Thus, the differentiating elements must be factually disputed, and the dispute must be great enough for a jury to rationally reject the existence of the greater offense and accept the existence of the lesser misdemeanor offense. The fourth condition of Stephens is that if the prosecutor requests the instruction, the defendant must have adequate notice of it as one of the charges against which he may have to defend. The fifth condition for receiving a misdemeanor instruction requires that the requested instruction not result in undue confusion or injustice. This Court considered that any attempt at formulating an exclusive, mechanistic guideline would be to ignore the reality of variations in fact and law at the trial court level. Accordingly, we vested substantial discretion in the trial judge in determining whether the cause of justice would be served by giving lesser included misdemeanor instructions on the facts of any given case. 416 Mich 265. We articulated the standard for reversal to be upon a finding of an abuse of discretion. Id.