Opinion ID: 2624191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: We Adopt a Neutral-Principles Approach to Resolving Church Property Disputes.

Text: In 1871 the United States Supreme Court first addressed a dispute over ownership of church property stemming from a rift between two religious factions of a local church in Watson v. Jones. [18] In analyzing the dispute, the Court distinguished between churches with congregational or independent organizations, governed solely within themselves, and those where a congregation was part of a larger, structured denomination. When property disputes arose in hierarchical churches, the Court adopted an approach deferential to the hierarchy, explaining: [W]e think the rule of action which should govern the civil courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.[ [19] ] While courts began to make exceptions to the Watson deference approach for fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, [20] the Watson approach was not substantially modified until the United States Supreme Court's decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church. [21] Presbyterian Church involved the withdrawal of two local churches from the Presbyterian church because the local organizations believed that certain actions of the general church were departures from the doctrine and practice in force when they became affiliated with the church. [22] The local churches denounced the jurisdiction of the general church, and an administrative commission appointed by the general church (after it failed to broker a reconciliation) acknowledged the withdrawal of the local church and took over the local churches' property. [23] The local churches did not appeal to higher church tribunals but instead filed a civil suit in the Georgia courts. [24] The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the local churches that was based on the theory that Georgia law implied a trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church on the sole condition that the general church adhere to tenets of faith existing at the time of affiliation by the local churches. [25] The United States Supreme Court reversed, reasoning that the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of religionthe interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role.[ [26] ] Significantly, in reaching its decision the Supreme Court in Presbyterian Church laid the foundation for a competing view of the proper role of civil courts in resolving church property disputes when it found that not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without establishing churches to which property is awarded. But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern.[ [27] ] In a concurring opinion in Maryland & Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Justice Brennan elaborated on the Court's decision in Presbyterian Church, noting that a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or tenets of faith. [28] He noted that courts could adopt the Watson approach, enforcing property decisions made within a hierarchical church by the highest authority within the church that ruled on the dispute. [29] Citing Presbyterian Church, he noted that [n]eutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes provide another means for resolving litigation over religious property. Under the formal title doctrine, civil courts can determine ownership by studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws. Again, however, general principles of property law may not be relied upon if their application requires civil courts to resolve doctrinal issues. For example, provisions in deeds or in a denomination's constitution for the reversion of local church property to the general church, if conditioned upon a finding of departure from doctrine, could not be civilly enforced.[ [30] ] In Jones v. Wolf, the latest United States Supreme Court decision to offer guidance to state courts in resolving church property disputes, a five-to-four majority of the Court expressly declined to find that the First Amendment requires the states to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authorities, and held that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute. [31] Its discussion in Jones clearly suggested that while states retain the leeway to implement the deference approach of Watson, the neutral-principles approach is the preferred approach. The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general  flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties.[ [32] ] While expressing some reservations about the neutral-principles approach, the majority of the Court had sharper criticism for the Watson approach when addressing a dissent that would require compulsory deference. The dissent suggests that a rule of compulsory deference would somehow involve less entanglement of civil courts in matters of religious doctrine, practice, and administration. Under its approach, however, civil courts would always be required to examine the polity and administration of a church to determine which unit of government has ultimate control over church property. In some cases, this task would not prove to be difficult. But in others, the locus of control would be ambiguous, and [a] careful examination of the constitutions of the general and local church, as well as other relevant documents, would be necessary to ascertain the form of governance adopted by the members of the religious association. In such cases, the suggested rule would appear to require a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity. The neutral-principles approach, in contrast, obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church property disputes. The dissent also argues that a rule of compulsory deference is necessary in order to protect the free exercise rights of those who have formed the association and submitted themselves to its authority. This argument assumes that the neutral-principles method would somehow frustrate the free-exercise rights of the members of a religious association. Nothing could be further from the truth. The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to inhibit the free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods. Under the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a church property dispute is not foreordained. At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property. They can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.[ [33] ] Following Jones, state courts were permitted to adopt either the neutral-principles approach or the compulsory-deference approach, resulting in a split among the jurisdictions. For example, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in Presbytery of Beaver-Butler of the United Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Middlesex Presbyterian Church, [34] when considering which of the competing approaches to adopt, cited California, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Missouri, South Dakota, and Ohio as among those jurisdictions adopting the neutral-principles view, [35] with Florida, Iowa, Michigan, New Jersey, and West Virginia adhering to the Watson approach. [36]
While the issue of resolution of church property disputes has never come squarely before us, and is thus an issue of first impression in Alaska, we have had the opportunity to address the proper role of civil courts in evaluating disputes between churches and church employees, and have adopted an approach similar to the neutral-principles approach. In Marshall v. Munro, we held that while this court did not have jurisdiction over a breach of contract claim because employment disputes within churches are core ecclesiastical concerns outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts, [37] we did have jurisdiction over defamation and intentional interference with contract claims against a minister because it was not necessary to involve ourselves in qualifications for the ministry when considering the elements of the defamation claim. [38] In McAdoo v. Diaz , we faced another defamation claim against a minister and, citing Marshall v. Munro, noted that we would allow claims against the minister for libel to proceed because they did not touch the merits of any core religious questions or present a religious question. [39] Considering our precedents, the superior court's analysis, the weight of authority favoring the neutral-principles approach, and the compelling logic of the opinion of the majority of the United States Supreme Court in Jones, we adopt the neutral-principles approach when resolving property disputes between religious organizations.