Opinion ID: 1707762
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: is the majority violating the constitution?

Text: As I have tediously attempted to make clear, the majority and I are poles apart. But, if the majority is correct in its conclusion it repeatedly tells us, even with exclamation points, that the consideration for Lackey's lease was grossly inadequate, shocks the conscience, and amounts to a donation of public lands prohibited by the Constitution, then under the very decisions it cites and relies upon Mr. Thompson's lease is void. Returning to the majority's authorities, State ex rel. Kyle, Attorney General v. Dear, supra, 209 Miss. at 279, 46 So.2d at 104, holds a lease for a grossly inadequate consideration violates § 95 and is void. Then, the majority quotes Keys v. Carter, supra, 318 So.2d at 864, that such a lease was and is void. (Majority Opinion, p. 9.) And Holmes v. Jones, supra, 318 So.2d at 869, holds such a lease void on its face. And finally, quoting Talley v. Board of Supervisors of Smith County, supra, 323 So.2d at 550, the majority tells us such a lease is void. (Majority Opinion, p. 9.) If the majority has correctly characterized the consideration paid by Lackey, then Thompson's lease is void. Void. A conveyance in contravention of the Constitution is of course against public policy and is void. Whelchel v. Stennett, 192 Miss. 241, 254, 5 So.2d 418, 419-420 (1943); McGowan v. State, 184 Miss. 96, 105, 185 So. 826, 829 (1939), ... the Constitution is the highest known law. No act prohibited by it can be given validity. It is a piece of trash paper. It cannot be resurrected. It cannot have life breathed into it by a county board, a state official, and certainly should not by this Court. Theobald v. Deslonde, 93 Miss. 208, 214, 46 So. 712, 713-714 (1908); Holman v. Ringo, 36 Miss. 390 (1859). See: Dayton v. Nell, 43 Minn. 246, 248, 45 N.W. 231, 232 (1890); Schneider v. Greater M. & S. Circuit, 259 N.Y.S. 319, 325, 144 Misc. 534, 538 (1932). 92 C.J.S., Void, pp. 1024-1025: Generally speaking, a void act is incurable, and is wholly without force or effect as to all persons and for all purposes and incapable of being or being made otherwise. Primarily, the word void implies an act utterly of no effect, and, in its most unlimited sense, implies an act of no effect at all, and a nullity, ab initio. In one sense, and perhaps in the strictest and most accurate conception of its meaning, void involves the idea of utter ineffectiveness in all situations and for all purposes, leaving the effect of the void transaction the same as though it had not taken place, and a void act is one which is entirely null, not binding on any part, and not susceptible of ratification or confirmation; and its nullity cannot be waived... . [Footnotes omitted] Indeed, the majority's, Keys v. Carter, supra , tells us that a void lease must be struck and the lessee treated as though the lease never existed, and a trespasser on the property: However, the remedy is the voiding of the lease rather than its continuation for the remainder of the 25 year period with damages prospectively figured for each year of its future existence. In the event that the unequivocal allegations of the bill should be sustained by the chancellor upon trial of the case, an immediate cancellation of the lease would ensue and a judgment against defendants for such damages as might be proved and be found actually to have resulted from the inception of the lease to the date of its cancellation as an unconstitutional donation would be justified. See, Koonce v. Board of Supervisors of Grenada County, 202 Miss. 473, 32 So.2d 264 (1947). 318 So.2d at 864. The majority even tells Mr. Thompson that regardless of how unfortunate it may be, this Court must follow the law. (Majority Opinion, p. 12.) He is informed, The Court considers it appropriate to repeat a remark made in Transamerica Co. v. Paine Supply Co., 194 So.2d 490, 491 (Miss. 1967), that `we know of no way in which custom can change the law as written.' Having used these Mississippi decisions as a basis for declaring the leases were violative of § 95, the majority is clearly obligated to follow the legal conclusion reached by this Court in each of them that such leases are void. How does the majority handle this legal conclusion reached by its own cited authorities? This inevitable conclusion? It does not follow them. It does not even attempt to distinguish them. Instead, it conveniently ignores this part. Lo and behold, the majority tells us: On the authority of Section 95 and the many cases applying it to sixteenth section lands, the Court holds that the 1955 and 1960 leases were voidable at the election of the state as trustee may be attacked. (Majority Opinion, p. 10.) Not void, but voidable. There is vast gulf between void and voidable, as I will demonstrate below. How can the majority change something that is void into voidable? Beats me. Does not even bother to explain. Just does it. Decisions of this Court should be hallmarks of clarity, consistency and caution. Petroleum Land Services gave this advice to the trustees, telling them the district did not have to cancel the lease, just go to the leaseholders and get the right price, and reinstate the leases for the remainder of their terms. Some desperate leaseholders paid this ransom, as the record shows. Thompson, however, recognized the absurdity of this proposal. If someone could come out of the cabbage patch and tell him the lease he held was no good, what was to keep someone down the road from coming out of another cabbage patch and saying what was now proposed was not just as invalid? Better to take his loss and forget it. One at least can understand Petroleum Land Services being somewhat limited in legal knowledge. And, what does the majority tell the district trustees they can do? After putting a stick of dynamite under 400-600 sixteenth section lease titles in Forest, it tells all leaseholders, lienholders, title insurance companies, This Court favors repose of title in real estate transactions. (Majority Opinion, p. 12.) Of course there will have to be a little adjustment period, and this case is remanded to the trustees for action consistent with the 1978 Reform Act. [6] (Majority Opinion, p. 12.) Miss. Code Ann. § 29-3-69 of that Act prohibits any lease term exceeding 40 years, and all leases must be for an annual rental at a fair market value. The leaseholders who have already done what the school district, upon Petroleum Land Services' advice, told them, paid seventy-five percent gross rental of the land assessment at the time of the original lease, and had their original leases reinstated, will be quite pleased to learn that too was contrary to law and worthless. A critical part of Forest is now at the mercy of any misguided or politically motivated secretary of state, and the local trustees and board of trustees have been given a glorious administrative headache. Can anyone conceive a sensible person being willing to invest any substantial sum in a new home or commercial building on this section? Hooray. The majority has given this sixteenth section in Forest all the attraction of Sodom and Gomorrah.