Opinion ID: 765284
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Liberty Interest Creating a Procedural Due Process Violation

Text: 20 Dr. Draghi next contends that he had a protectible liberty interest in his employment and calling, which he was denied without due process. The concept of liberty protected by the due process clause has long included occupational liberty--'the liberty to follow a trade, profession, or other calling.' Wroblewski v. City of Washburn, 965 F.2d 452, 455 (7th Cir. 1992) (citing Lawson v. Sheriff of Tippecanoe County, 725 F.2d 1136, 1138 (7th Cir. 1984)). The cases have consistently drawn a distinction, however, between occupational liberty and the right to hold a specific job. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment secures the liberty to pursue a calling or occupation, and not the right to a specific job. Wroblewski, 965 F.2d at 455; Lawson, 725 F.2d at 1138. It stretches the concept too far to suggest that a person is deprived of 'liberty' when he simply is not rehired in one job but remains as free as before to seek another. Roth, 408 U.S. at 575. 21 The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not make the denial of a liberty interest actionable; it only makes the denial of a liberty interest without due process actionable. Thus, if a party is given notice and an opportunity to respond at a pre-termination hearing, due process has been afforded. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546 (holding that in the context of public employment, the essential requirements of due process are notice and an opportunity to be heard). 22 In this case, we need not determine whether Dr. Draghi had a liberty interest in his employment and calling, because even if we assume that he did have such a liberty interest, the undisputed facts show that he was given all that procedural due process requires--notice and an opportunity to respond to the charges against him at a pre- termination hearing. By his own admission, Dr. Draghi had at least two pre-termination hearings; one before the PRC and one before the Hearing Committee. Dr. Draghi's amended complaint states, in pertinent part: 23 Beginning on October 27, 1993, the [PRC] . . . met pursuant to Section 7a of Article VIII of the [Hospital's] Bylaws to consider [the] charges and to review the suspension of Draghi's privileges. The [PRC] . . . took approximately 20 hours of testimony, including six hours of testimony from Draghi. . . . On November 22, 1993, the [PRC] . . . issued its report to the [EMS]. 24 . . . 25 On or about December 28, 1993, pursuant to the Bylaws, Draghi requested a hearing before the Hearing committee. Draghi was given written notice of the recommendation of the [EMS] and of its intention to convene a Hearing Committee . . . in a letter of January 10, 1994. 26 . . . 27 The Hearing Committee held hearings in a trial- type setting, with representatives of the management of [the] . . . Hospital, including . . . an Assistant State's Attorney . . . prosecuting the charges against Draghi, and Draghi and his representatives defending against them. Over a period of more than 150 days the Hearing Committee took approximately 15 days of testimony, examined medical and other records, received oral and written arguments, and deliberated. 28 Amend. Comp., at para.para. 58-59, 62, 64. 29 Although the Board rejected the Hearing Committee's and the EMS's recommendation that Dr. Draghi be reinstated, we will not conclude that Dr. Draghi was not afforded due process. Due process requires that Dr. Draghi be given a hearing so that he may present his side of the story. The hearing serves as an initial check against mistaken decisions--essentially, a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46 (citations omitted). The hearing need not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge. Id. at 545. Assuming that Dr. Draghi had a liberty interest, that interest did not include the right to reinstatement at the Hospital. The Board was under no duty to accept the recommendation of the Hearing Committee or the EMS. Article VII, sec. 6d of the Hospital's Bylaws provides that the Board is entrusted with the power to review the recommendation[s] and supporting documents and make a final decision on the corrective action. That is precisely what the Board did, and we will not dispute their decision. As the Eleventh Circuit held in Shahawy v. Harrison: 30 [O]ur role on review of such actions is not to substitute our judgment for that of the hospital's governing board or to reweigh the evidence regarding the renewal or termination of medical staff privileges. Rather, the court is charged with the narrow responsibility of assuring that the qualifications imposed by the Board are reasonably related to the operation of the hospital and fairly administered. In short, so long as staff selections are administered with fairness, geared by a rationale compatible with hospital responsibility, and unencumbered with irrelevant considerations, a court should not interfere. 31 875 F.2d 1529, 1533 (11th Cir. 1989). 32 Accordingly, we need not reach the determination of whether Dr. Draghi had a liberty interest in his employment and calling; even assuming that he had such an interest we find that Dr Draghi has not presented facts showing that he was not afforded due process prior to his termination from the Hospital. 33