Opinion ID: 2511804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: R.E. 404(a)(2) Evidence

Text: [¶ 17] Appellant claims the district court erred in refusing evidence offered by the defense under W.R.E. 404(a)(2). A trial court's decision on the admissibility of evidence is entitled to considerable deference, and will not be reversed on appeal unless the appellant demonstrates a clear abuse of discretion. Vigil v. State, 2010 WY 15, ¶ 11, 224 P.3d 31, 36 (Wyo.2010). We have described the standard of an abuse of discretion as reaching the question of the reasonableness of the trial court's choice. Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria. It also means exercising sound judgment with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. In the absence of an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb the trial court's determination. The burden is on the defendant to establish such abuse. Holloman v. State, 2005 WY 25, ¶ 10, 106 P.3d 879, 883 (Wyo.2005). If we conclude the trial court erred, we must then determine if the error was prejudicial. Bromley v. State, 2009 WY 133, ¶ 24, 219 P.3d 110, 116 (Wyo. 2009). An error is prejudicial if there is a reasonable possibility the verdict might have been more favorable to the appellant if the error had never occurred. Callen v. State, 2008 WY 107, ¶ 5, 192 P.3d 137, 141 (Wyo. 2008). The burden of proving prejudicial error rests with the appellant. Skinner v. State, 2001 WY 102, ¶ 25, 33 P.3d 758, 767 (Wyo.2001). [¶ 18] Appellant contends that the district court erred in failing to allow evidence that G.C. would become violent when intoxicated. He asserts the evidence was relevant to his claim of self defense and was properly admissible pursuant to W.R.E. 404(a)(2), which provides: (a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is not admissible for the purpose of proving that he acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except;... (2) Character of Victim.Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that the victim was the first aggressor[.] [¶ 19] During cross-examination, defense counsel asked G.C. if he ever had too much to drink and became violent. G.C. responded that he had not. To counter this testimony, Appellant called A.L., the alleged victim in a domestic battery involving G.C., to testify. The district court and counsel engaged in the following discussion regarding her testimony: [Prosecution]: Judge, it's my understanding she's alleged to be a victim in a potential battery with [G.C.]. I don't see how any of her testimony would be relevant to these proceedings. [Defense Counsel]: ... This is a direct refutation of what [G.C.] said when he was on the stand here.... [G.C.] has testified under oath that he does not get belligerent and hit people when he's drinking, and I believe that she can say that's not true. . . . [Prosecution]: Judge, it's my understanding that [A.L.] is expected to testify that approximately three months ago she may have been in [G.C.'s] presence at such time he was intoxicated and violent, aggressive, or something like that. I think if that testimony is offered to impeach his statement that he washe doesn't get violent when he drinks, that there should be a limiting instruction to that effect that the Court should give.... [Defense Counsel]: Your Honor, I wouldn't have a problem with a limiting instruction, but in this case [G.C.] is not the defendant, so I don't see what the point is. [COURT]: Well, the point is that it seems to me that the inferences, since you're offering it for impeachment, merely go to whether or not [G.C.] told all of the truth, not to his character. [Defense Counsel]: That's correct. [COURT]: All right. So you won't be permitted to argueyou can argue that he was untruthful, if that, in fact, is the way the testimony came out, but to argue that he's a batterer as a result of this testimony is something completely different, isn't it? [Defense Counsel]: Yes. [COURT]: Okay. [Defense Counsel]: I have no problem with that. (Emphasis added.) Appellant contends that the district court erred when it limited A.L.'s testimony to impeachment purposes. He asserts that the testimony should have been admitted under W.R.E. 404(a)(2) as proof that G.C. was the first aggressor. [¶ 20] It is settled law that a proponent of evidence has the burden to apprise the trial court that a rule of evidence permits the admission of that evidence. Moe v. State, 2005 WY 149, ¶ 9, 123 P.3d 148, 151 (Wyo.2005). [T]he offer of proof must specifically indicate the purpose of the testimony. Pack v. State, 571 P.2d 241, 245 (Wyo.1977). Defense counsel did not offer the evidence for substantive proof of the victim's character. From the context of the discussion above, it is clear that the evidence was being introduced to impeach G.C.'s testimony. Defense counsel stated he had no problem offering the testimony for impeachment purposes only. He also assured the court that he did not intend to argue that G.C. was a batterer. Appellant never sought admission of the evidence for a purpose allowed by W.R.E. 404(a)(2). [¶ 21] Additionally, even though the district court stated the testimony was admitted for impeachment purposes only, no limiting instruction was ever given to the jury. A.L. testified that she and G.C. lived together for about three weeks, and that he became violent after consuming alcohol. She also testified as follows: [Defense Counsel]: And what did he usually drink? [A.L.]: Traveler vodka and a 6-pack of beer. Q: And whenwhen those happened, did he become belligerent? A: Belligerent and violent. Q: Okay. What did he do? A: Pulled my hair. Refused to let me leave. Slap me on the back of the head. Q: Okay. Did you ever try to get away? A: Yes, I did. Q: What happened? A: He ripped my hair out. Q: And A: Held me against my will. Q: Would he let you leave? A: No. Q: Get between you and the door? A: Uh-huh. Q: And so if he were to tell us that he does not get belligerent when he drinks A: That is not the truth. Q: that's not true? A: He does get very violent. Defense counsel made reference to A.L.'s testimony in his closing statements: [T]he guy says when he drinks, he doesn't get belligerent, that he doesn't get violent. Well, you heard [A.L.]. I can't speak for a lot of people, or any others, but at least he didn't tell you the truth in that respect. He did not tell the truth. Because no limiting instruction was given, the jury was free to consider A.L.'s testimony as evidence that G.C. had a character trait for violence when he was intoxicated. The jury could also consider the testimony as corroborating evidence of Appellant's theory that G.C. was the first aggressor. Appellant has failed to establish abuse of discretion or prejudice. [¶ 22] Appellant also claims the district court erred when it did not allow him to introduce evidence that G.C. had been convicted of misdemeanor battery in February 2007. The conviction included an affidavit of probable cause stating that G.C. was intoxicated during the incident. During cross-examination, after G.C. denied that he became violent when intoxicated, defense counsel requested a conference at the bench: [Defense Counsel]: Just to give you notice, I'm going to pursue the charges he's had where he ... got drunk and hit women and was convicted for that. They're misdemeanor charges, but this is not a [W.R.E.] 609 type situation. [3] This is directly in response to his statement it never happened. (Emphasis added.) The prosecution objected, claiming the questions constituted improper impeachment and were irrelevant. Defense counsel responded: They have to do with the issues in this case, Your Honor. This is not 609 impeachment. This isthe issue in this case is ... whether this man reacts that way under the [influence of] alcohol, and he's directly denied it, and I need to be able to ask him about those two and why he's in jail right now. (Emphasis added.) The district court did not allow Appellant to question G.C. about the incident during cross-examination. [¶ 23] Although defense counsel clearly stated which rule did not apply, he did not apprise the court that he sought admission of the evidence under W.R.E. 404(a)(2). Though it is unclear, the discussion indicates that Appellant sought admission of the evidence for impeachment purposes. Defense counsel did not argue that the evidence supported a theory that G.C. was the first aggressor and never mentioned Appellant's theory of self defense. Additionally, Appellant made no explicit offer of proof concerning the misdemeanor battery. [T]here is only one prudent way for an offer of proof to be made at trial. The attorney who seeks to offer evidence, which has been refused or to which an objection has been upheld, should take the initiative. The offer of proof should then take the form of counsel's eliciting the proposed testimony directly from the witness, or entering the tangible evidence in the record, all outside of the hearing of the jury. Rudolph v. State, 829 P.2d 269, 275 (Wyo. 1992). The lack of an offer of proof impacts the district court's ruling and severely impedes appellate review. Hermreck v. State, 956 P.2d 335, 338 (Wyo.1998). Appellant did not preserve the offered evidence in the record and his assertion that the evidence was admissible under W.R.E. 404(a)(2) is raised for the first time in this appeal. Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude the district court abused its discretion. [¶ 24] We also find that Appellant has failed to establish that he was prejudiced by the ruling. The defender can only use that degree of force necessary to relieve the risk of harm. Braley v. State, 741 P.2d 1061, 1067 (Wyo.1987), quoting Leeper v. State, 589 P.2d 379, 383 (Wyo.1979). The jury was instructed on the law of self defense as follows: JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 13 If the defendant had reasonable grounds to believe and did believe that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm from which the defendant could be saved only by using deadly force against an assailant, the defendant had the right to use deadly force in self-defense. Deadly force means force which is likely to cause death or serious bodily harm. The circumstances under which the defendant acted must have been such as to produce in the mind of a reasonably prudent person, similarly situated, the reasonable belief that the assailant was about to kill the defendant or do serious bodily harm to the defendant. The danger must have been apparent, present and imminent or must have appeared to be so under the circumstances. If the defendant believed that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, and that deadly force was necessary to repel such danger, and if a reasonable person in a similar situation seeing and knowing the same facts would be justified in believing that he was in similar danger, the defendant would be justified in using deadly force in self-defense. The defendant would be justified even though the appearance of danger later proved to be false and there was actually neither purpose on the part of the assailant to kill the defendant or do the defendant serious bodily harm nor imminent danger that it would be done, nor actual necessity that deadly force be used in self-defense. If the person so confronted acts in self-defense upon such appearance of danger from honest belief, the right of self-defense is the same whether the danger is real or merely apparent. JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 15 One who has reasonable grounds to believe that another will attack him, and that the anticipated attack will be of such a character as to endanger his life or limb, or to cause him serious bodily harm, has a right to arm himself for the purpose of resisting such an attack. If the defendant armed himself in reasonable anticipation of such an attack, that fact alone does not make the defendant the aggressor or deprive the defendant of the right of self-defense. [¶ 25] Appellant testified that he and G.C. engaged in a shoving match. They were scrapping and wrestling. He stated that he grabbed the knife because he did not want to get hurt and wanted to get out of the situation. He never indicated that he feared G.C. would kill him or inflict serious injury. There was no evidence that Appellant was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, or that other circumstances existed justifying the multiple stabbings. Appellant has failed to demonstrate any likelihood that the verdict would have been more favorable had the district court allowed the evidence. [¶ 26] Affirmed.