Opinion ID: 2460345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Burden of Production

Text: One further point of confusion remains: Who carries the burden of production to establish that there is no reasonable possibility or reasonable probability that the error affected or will affect the outcome? In the context of a motion for mistrial, we have frequently imposed the burden of production on the defendant. See, e.g., State v. Foster, 290 Kan. 696, 717, 721, 233 P.3d 265 (2010) (statutory harmless error). In other cases, we have often stated the standard in a burden-neutral fashion, merely concluding an appellate court must be convinced the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. E.g., State v. Wells, 289 Kan. 1219, 1233, 1238-39, 221 P.3d 561 (2009) (statutory harmless error and Chapman ). A recent case considered by the United States Supreme Court raises a question of whether the burden can be imposed on a defendant if the federal constitutional harmless error standard is being applied. In Gamache v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 591, 178 L.Ed.2d 514 (2010), the Court denied a petition for writ of certiorari in which a criminal defendant sought review of the California Supreme Court's finding that a federal constitutional error was harmless. Although the Court unanimously voted to deny the petition, four justices joined in a statement pointing out that the California court had incorrectly required a defendant to establish prejudice from the alleged error, stating: Under our decision in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), the prosecution must carry the burden of showing that a constitutional trial error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See also Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 635, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005) (`[W]here a court, without adequate justification, orders the defendant to wear shackles that will be seen by the jury . . . [t]he State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the [shackling] error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained' (quoting Chapman, 386 U.S., at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824)); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, n. 7, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004) (`When the Government has the burden of addressing prejudice, as in excusing preserved error as harmless on direct review of the criminal conviction, it is not enough to negate an effect on the outcome of the case') (citing Chapman, 386 U.S., at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295-296, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991) (`The Court has the power to review the record de novo in order to determine an error's harmlessness. In so doing, it must be determined whether the State has met its burden of demonstrating that the error did not contribute to [defendant's] conviction' (citations omitted)). The California Supreme Court, however, stated, `[I]n the absence of misconduct, the burden remains with the defendant to demonstrate prejudice under the usual standard for ordinary trial error.' 48 Cal.4th, at 397, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d, at 387 (emphasis added). It is not clear what the court intended in allocating the burden to the defendant to demonstrate prejudice, but if it meant to convey that the defendant bore the burden of persuasion, that would contravene Chapman. [Citations omitted.] Gamache, 131 S.Ct. at 592. The four justices concluded the allocation of the burden did not impact the conclusion that the error was harmless in Gamache. Nevertheless, the four justices noted the allocation of the burden of proving harmlessness can be outcome determinative in some cases and in future cases the California courts should take care to ensure that their burden allocation conforms to the commands of Chapman.  Gamache, 131 S.Ct. at 593. We heed this warning even though Gamache is not controlling as it is merely a statement by four justices related to a denial of certiorari. We do so because we find the justices' statements persuasive for several reasons. First, because the standard of review (like the applicability of harmless error) is part and parcel of the federal right itself, a state court may be prohibited from adopting standards of review that are more deferential than the standards adopted by federal courts. 7 LaFave, Israel, King & Kerr, Criminal Procedure § 27.5(e) (3d ed. 2007). Second, we agree with the four justices that the allocation of the burden can be outcome determinative and, in such a case, Chapman would require the party favored by the errorusually the Stateto carry the burden of production. Third, a state court decision that is contrary to or applies the federal constitutional harmless error standard in an `objectively unreasonable' manner, is subject to federal habeas review. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17-18, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003). Finally, on occasion we have appropriately imposed the burden on the State as the party benefitting from the alleged error. E.g., State v. Kleypas, 272 Kan. 894, 1084, 40 P.3d 139 (2001), cert. denied 537 U.S. 834, 123 S.Ct. 144, 154 L.Ed.2d 53 (2002). Consequently, the better practice is to express the federal constitutional harmless error standard as we did in Kleypas: A constitutional error may be declared harmless where the [party benefitting from the error] proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not [affect substantial rights, meaning it did not] contribute to the verdict obtained. Kleypas, 272 Kan. at 1084, 40 P.3d 139 (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. 824). Because we ultimately apply the federal constitutional harmless error standard in this case, we need not determine which party carries the burden of production regarding the effect of a nonconstitutional error under K.S.A. 60-261 or K.S.A. 60-2105.