Opinion ID: 2317878
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Redial Function

Text: Appellant's next issue is similar to his claim of a due process violation resulting from the Commonwealth's loss of the blood evidence. In this issue, Appellant claims a due process violation resulting from the coroner's use of Sherri Chamberlain's telephone at the crime scene, which destroyed any evidence that could have been obtained from the telephone's redial function. [6] Appellant claims that the lost evidence may have been exculpatory if, in fact, no call to Mrs. Ulrich had been placed from Sherri's telephone, and that it may have been destroyed in bad faith. Alternatively, apparently recognizing that he cannot demonstrate the exculpatory nature of the redial function or the Commonwealth's bad faith, as required pursuant to federal due process law, see Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333 (1988); Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (1984), Appellant urges this Court to grant relief under the state due process clause and our holding in Deans, 610 A.2d 32. [7] The Commonwealth argues that because Appellant has not and cannot establish that the redial function possessed exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, as required by Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528, or that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith in regard to the loss of the redial function, as required by Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333, he has no basis for relief under the federal due process clause. With respect to his state due process claim, the Commonwealth argues first that Appellant did not raise a state due process claim with respect to the redial function before the trial court, and it is therefore waived. Second, even if we were to apply Deans pursuant to state due process law, the Commonwealth argues that Appellant is not entitled to relief because the redial function was not central to the Commonwealth's case; indeed, the Commonwealth did not introduce evidence derived from the telephone's redial function. The trial court dismissed Appellant's federal due process claim because there was no indication that the redial function was exculpatory or that the Commonwealth acted in bad faith. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528; Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333. Moreover, because the Commonwealth did not seek to introduce evidence related to the redial function, the trial court reasoned that Appellant was not entitled to relief pursuant to our interpretation of the federal due process clause in Deans, 610 A.2d at 34. Although we ultimately determine that Appellant is not entitled to relief under federal due process, we recognize that this case presents a facially difficult issue. The centerpiece of the Commonwealth's case against Appellant was Mrs. Ulrich's testimony that she received the telephone call from the victim, and her husband's corroborating testimony that he observed the telephone handset next to Sherri's lifeless body. The only evidence that could have countered the Commonwealth's theory that the victim placed the telephone call to Mrs. Ulrich was destroyed by the coroner. Notwithstanding the facial appeal of Appellant's argument, under the well-established federal due process construct, he cannot prevail. Appellant cannot meet his burden under the federal due process clause because he concedes, as he must, that he can demonstrate neither the exculpatory value of the redial function nor bad faith on the part of the Commonwealth. See Appellant's 1997 Brief at 49 (urging the Court not to require the missing evidence to be exculpatory or destroyed in bad faith, as required under federal law). Although he asserts that the evidence was exculpatory or destroyed in bad faith, he offers nothing to substantiate these assertions. See Appellant's 2011 Brief at 32 (claiming that the redial function is evidence that the defense believes was exculpatory and that the destruction of that evidence may have been done in bad faith). Appellant's assertions, with nothing more, are not sufficient to entitle him to federal due process relief. See Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 489, 104 S.Ct. 2528 (holding that the exculpatory nature of the missing evidence must be apparent); Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58, 109 S.Ct. 333 (requiring a criminal defendant to show bad faith on the part of the police to warrant due process relief from the failure to preserve potentially useful evidence). Turning to Appellant's entitlement to relief under the state due process clause, Appellant did not claim before the trial court that the Pennsylvania Constitution provided an independent basis for relief. His state due process claim, therefore, is waived. Commonwealth v. Colavita, 606 Pa. 1, 993 A.2d 874, 891 (2010) ([C]ourts should not reach claims that were not raised below.); Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.). Moreover, as explained above, this Court's focus on the centrality of the missing evidence to the Commonwealth's case in Deans was overruled by this Court in Snyder. Although one member of the Court expressed approval of this concept for purposes of state law in a concurring opinion, see Snyder, 963 A.2d at 409 (Baer, J., concurring), the Court has never held that the state due process clause differs from the federal due process clause in this respect. We decline to consider whether state due process should depart from federal due process with regard to missing evidence where this argument was not directly advanced in the court below. Although this is a troubling issue, we conclude that no relief is warranted.