Opinion ID: 2960055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attempted Burglary Is a Violent Felony

Text: Lynch argues, as he did below, that his 1985 conviction for attempted burglary in the third degree is not for a violent felony. His argument fails because this Court’s decision in United States v. Andrello, 9 F.3d 247 (2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam), and the Supreme Court’s recent decision in James v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1586 (2007), compel the conclusion that the attempted burglary of which Lynch was convicted is a violent felony under the ACCA. In Andrello, this Court held that the crime of attempted burglary in the third degree under New York law, the same crime at issue here, constitutes a “violent felony” because it falls under the ACCA’s residual provision. 9 F.3d at 249-50. There, we looked to New York law and found that in order for a defendant to be convicted of attempted burglary, the defendant must have carried the project forward “within dangerous proximity to the criminal end to be attained,” and that “mere preparation” was not enough. Id. at 249 (quoting People v. Bracey, 360 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (N.Y. 1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, this Court explained that since burglary itself is a crime that inherently involves a risk of personal injury, the crime of attempted burglary under New York law, which requires proof of conduct that would present a serious potential risk of attainment, must be considered a crime that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. at 249-50; cf. United States v. Brown, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2008 WL 239055, at -11 (2d Cir. Jan. 30, 2008) (applying Andrello to hold that third degree burglary under New York law is a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)). We added: “The fact that the underlying substantive offense may not be accomplished is not pertinent.” Id. at 250. 8 The Supreme Court’s recent decision in James, holding that attempted burglary under Florida law is a “violent felony” under the ACCA, 127 S. Ct. at 1590, confirms the soundness of our reasoning in Andrello.5 The Court concluded that attempted burglary fell under the residual provision of the ACCA, id. at 1597-98, as a crime that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). It explained that attempted burglary, as defined by Florida law,6 is an offense that “involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” because Florida law requires an “overt act” for attempted burglary and because such an attempt poses the same kind of risks as a completed burglary. Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)).7 The Court commented that “while the statutory language [defining attempt] is broad, the Florida Supreme Court has considerably narrowed its application in the context of attempted burglary, requiring an ‘overt act directed toward entering or remaining in a structure or conveyance.’” Id. at 1594 (quoting Jones v. State, 608 So. 2d 797, 799 (Fla. 1992)). Such an “overt act” toward committing a burglary, said the Court, would pose “the same kind of risk” as, or an even greater risk than, that posed by a completed burglary because the “main risk” arises “from the possibility of a face-to- 5 In James, the Supreme Court cited Andrello, among other circuit decisions, noting that “every Court of Appeals that has construed an attempted burglary law similar in scope to Florida’s has held that the offense qualifies as a ‘violent felony’ under [the ACCA’s] residual provision.” James, 127 S. Ct. at 1595 & n.3. 6 Florida law defines burglary as “entering or remaining in a structure or conveyance with the intent to commit an offense therein,” Fla. Stat. § 810.02(1), and defines attempt as “any act toward the commission of such offense,” Fla. Stat. § 777.04(1). 7 The Supreme Court distinguished Court of Appeals’ decisions holding to the contrary as “involv[ing] attempt laws that could be satisfied by preparatory conduct that does not pose the same risk of violent confrontation and physical harm posed by an attempt to enter a structure illegally.” James, 127 S. Ct. at 1595-96. 9 face confrontation between the burglar and a third party—whether an occupant, a police officer, or a bystander—who comes to investigate.” Id. at 1594-95. The Court explained that while “many completed burglaries do not involve such confrontations,” “attempted burglaries often do” because “it is often just such outside intervention that prevents the attempt from ripening into completion.” Id. at 1595. The reasoning of both Andrello and James applies equally in this case and compels the conclusion that Lynch’s attempted burglary is a violent felony for purposes of the ACCA. Under New York law, “[a] person is guilty of burglary in the third degree when he knowingly enters or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein,” N.Y. Penal Law § 140.20, and is guilty of attempt when “he engages in conduct which tends to effect the commission of such crime,” id. § 110.00. Presaging the Supreme Court’s analysis of comparable Florida law in James, we said in Andrello that the New York courts have narrowed the definition of attempt to require proof of conduct that “carr[ies] the project to within dangerous proximity of its accomplishment.” Andrello, 9 F.3d at 249. We went on to conclude that because burglary “inherently involves a risk of personal injury” and because attempted burglary requires proof that the defendant could potentially attain the fruition of such inherently risky behavior, attempted burglary is indeed a crime that “‘involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” Id. at 249-50 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Where a defendant like Lynch has come within “dangerous proximity” to having completed the burglary, such conduct certainly presents the “possibility of a face-to-face confrontation between the burglar and a third party . . . who comes to investigate.” James, 127 S. Ct. at 1594. Following James, therefore, we reaffirm our holding in Andrello that attempted burglary in the third degree 10 under New York law constitutes a “violent felony” cognizable under the ACCA. Lynch asserts two other arguments, both of which lack merit. He first argues, relying on Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 17 (2005), that because New York’s burglary statute is non-generic and because he never admitted to any facts in his plea that would support a finding that he attempted to commit a generic burglary, the ACCA cannot apply.8 This argument misses the mark. While a conviction must qualify as a generic burglary to fit within the specific statutory reference to “burglary” in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (identifying as a violent felony any crime that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another”), a non-generic burglary may nevertheless qualify as a violent felony under the statute’s residual provision. This conclusion derives from the Supreme Court’s decision in James, which rejected James’s argument that the Florida attempted burglary offense could not be a violent felony because the burglary statute is non-generic. James, 127 S. Ct. at 1599. It explained that while Florida’s burglary statute is not limited to generic burglary, that conclusion is not dispositive, because the Government does not argue that James’ conviction for attempted burglary constitutes “burglary” under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). Rather, it relies on the residual provision of that clause, which—as the Court has recognized—can cover conduct that is outside the strict definition of, but nevertheless similar to, generic burglary. 8 As we have already observed, see supra n.3, in Taylor, the Supreme Court drew a distinction between statutes that rely on the generic definition of burglary, i.e., “unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with intent to commit a crime,” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 598, and statutes that “define burglary more broadly, e.g., by eliminating the requirement that the entry be unlawful, or by including places, such as automobiles and vending machines, other than buildings,” id. at 599. New York Penal Law § 140.20 falls into the latter category in light of the state’s expansive definition of “building” to include “any structure, vehicle or watercraft used for overnight lodging of persons . . . or an inclosed motor truck, or an inclosed motor truck trailer.” N.Y. Penal Law § 140.00(2). 11 Id. at 1599-600 (citing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600 n.9). Just as we need not address whether Lynch’s conviction was for an attempt to commit a generic burglary, we need not consider Lynch’s argument that the district court considered impermissible evidence in making that determination.9 Lynch’s second argument, that Congress did not intend to include attempted burglary as a violent felony under the ACCA, is also unavailing. The Supreme Court in James specifically rejected James’s argument that the residual provision should be read to extend to completed offenses only, reasoning that “nothing in the plain language of [the residual clause] . . . prohibits attempt offenses from qualifying as ACCA predicates when they involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. at 1591-92. The Court also rejected James’s argument that the legislative history of the ACCA indicated that Congress did not intend to include attempt offenses in the residual provision. Id. at 1593. Instead it concluded that 9 Lynch asserted that the district court’s consultation of the facts underlying his attempted burglary conviction, as stated in his federal PSR, violated Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005). Shepard instructed that in cases where a prior conviction was based on a guilty plea, a sentencing court may consult the “written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented” to determine whether that prior offense is a violent felony. 544 U.S. at 16. Here, Lynch’s federal PSR contained facts about his attempted burglary conviction that were derived from the state PSR prepared at the time of his guilty plea to that offense. While our disposition of the issue involving attempted burglary does not require us to decide whether the district court may consider such facts, we do note that this Court’s jurisprudence in this area is not particularly clear. See United States v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415, 425 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding district court’s use of state PSR from different prior conviction permissible to establish fact of prior conviction considered for ACCA sentence enhancement); United States v. Palmer, 68 F.3d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1995) (concluding district court may not use facts alleged in federal PSR prepared for current conviction to determine whether prior conviction was “crime of violence” under the Guidelines); United States v. Pearson, 77 F.3d 675, 677 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding remand not required where district court relied on federal PSR that incorporated facts from state PSR, not objected to by defendant, to determine prior conviction was “controlled substance offense” for purposes of career offender sentence enhancement under Guidelines). 12 “neither the statutory text nor the legislative history discloses any congressional intent to categorically exclude attempt offenses from the scope of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s residual provision.” Id. We need go no further. IV. Criminal Possession of a Weapon Is a Violent Felony Lynch also argues that his 1989 conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree is not a violent felony under the ACCA. Lynch asserts that since he never admitted to having “intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another,” his conviction was based on “mere possession” and cannot constitute a violent felony. Lynch, however, pled guilty to the charge at issue in state court. Under New York law, “[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when he possesses a machine-gun or loaded firearm with intent to use the same unlawfully against another.” N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03 (McKinney 1989).10 Thus, the “essential elements” of Lynch’s crime of conviction are “knowing and unlawful possession” of a loaded weapon and “the intent to use it unlawfully against another.” People v. Jamerson, 472 N.Y.S.2d 148, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984). The question before this Court, then, is whether a conviction under § 265.03 based on a guilty plea constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. Other courts have squarely held that similar offenses for unlawful possession of a weapon constitute violent felonies because they fall under the ACCA’s residual provision. See, e.g., United States v. Mathews, 453 F.3d 830, 837 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding that possession of a weapon by a felon “with intent to use the same unlawfully against another” is categorically a violent felony under the residual clause of the 10 Although New York Penal Law § 265.03 was amended in 1998 to, inter alia, include “disguised gun” as another type of weapon to which the statute applies, the material elements of the crime have remained the same. See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03 (McKinney 2000). 13 ACCA because it “involves a very significant probability of physical injury to a victim”); United States v. Childs, 403 F.3d 970, 971 (8th Cir. 2005) (holding that possession of a short-barreled shotgun is a violent felony under the ACCA’s residual clause because “sawed-off shotguns are inherently dangerous and lack usefulness except for violent and criminal purposes” (internal quotation marks omitted)). This Court, in United States v. Danielson, 199 F.3d 666, 672 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam), considered whether a conviction under § 265.03 based on a jury verdict would constitute a violent felony. We observed, without holding, that “possession of a ‘loaded firearm with intent to use it unlawfully against another’ would be a violent felony under the ACCA in that the offense ‘involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’” Id. at 671-72 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 265.03 and 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Danielson went on to address a concern unique to a jury trial, where the jury is required to find the element of intent.11 We do not have to engage in that additional analysis, however, because Lynch unequivocally pled guilty to the crime, and by doing so he necessarily admitted his guilt with respect to both elements of the statutory offense: possession of the loaded weapon 11 Under New York law, there is a rebuttable presumption that possession of a weapon is evidence of intent to use the weapon unlawfully against another. See N.Y. Penal Law § 265.15(4). Because Danielson was convicted by a jury, this Court thought it was necessary to look beyond the statutory definition of the crime and consider the jury charge to ensure that the jury was required to find the element of intent based on more than just the statutory presumption. Danielson, 199 F.3d at 672. By examining the jury charge, as is permissible under Taylor, 495 U.S. 575, this Court was reassured that Danielson had been convicted of more than “mere possession,” because the jury had been instructed that it had to determine whether it was Danielson’s “conscious aim or objective” to use the loaded firearm against another. Danielson, 199 F.3d at 673. Because in convicting him for the weapons offense the state jury was required to find, in fact, that Danielson had the requisite intent, this Court concluded that Danielson’s prior offense of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree was indeed a violent felony under the residual provision of the ACCA. 14 and intent to use it unlawfully against another. See McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969) (“[A] guilty plea is an admission of all the elements of a formal criminal charge . . . .”); see also United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 570 (1989) (“A guilty plea is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various acts. It is an admission that he committed the crime charged against him.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).12 It is beyond question that possessing a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully against another involves conduct “that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). For these reasons, we hold that Lynch’s conviction for criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of New York law is for a violent felony under the ACCA.