Opinion ID: 1801861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Double Jeopardy Protection: Section 1023

Text: (11) Although the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment permits retrial of the One Strike allegation at issue here, we have observed that federal law sets the minimum standards of double jeopardy protection, and, [u]nder California law, in some instances, an accused may be entitled to greater double jeopardy protection than that afforded under the federal Constitution. [Citations.] ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 302.) Accordingly, we consider whether defendant's second trial on the One Strike allegation violated California's statutory provision against double jeopardy. (12) Section 1023 states: When the defendant is convicted or acquitted or has been once placed in jeopardy upon an accusatory pleading, the conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged in such accusatory pleading, or for an attempt to commit the same, or for an offense necessarily included therein, of which he might have been convicted under that accusatory pleading. The statute implements the protections of the state constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, and, more specifically, the doctrine of included offenses. [Citations.] Underlying this principlethat a conviction of a lesser included offense is a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the greater offenseis the notion that, once a conviction on the lesser offense has been obtained, `to [later] convict of the greater would be to convict twice of the lesser.' [Citations.] ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 305-306.) In Fields, the defendant was charged with several offenses after he caused a fatal collision while driving intoxicated. ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 296.) The jury deadlocked on the greater offense of gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)) but convicted on the separately charged lesser included offense of vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated (§ 192, subd. (c)(3)). ( Fields, at pp. 296-297.) Because of the jury's express deadlock, we concluded its conviction on the lesser included offense was not an implied acquittal of the greater offense. Thus, his retrial on the greater offense was not constitutionally prohibited. ( Id. at pp. 298-305.) We nevertheless applied existing case law to conclude retrial was barred by statute. (13) Nearly 50 years before Fields, we interpreted section 1023 to mean that a conviction for a lesser included offense bars a later prosecution for the greater offense. ( People v. Greer (1947) 30 Cal.2d 589, 597 [184 P.2d 512].) Underlying Greer 's interpretation of section 1023 ... was the concern that, if such were not the rule, `section 1023 could be vitiated by the simple device of beginning with a prosecution of the lesser offense and proceeding up the scale.' ( People v. Greer, supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 597.) ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 307.) We adhered to this interpretation in Fields, holding that section 1023 prohibits the retrial of a greater offense after a defendant's conviction of a lesser included offense even when there has been no express or implied acquittal of the greater offense. ( Fields, at p. 307.) We observed that a contrary rule would result in numerous and formidable practical difficulties, such as whether the second jury should be advised of the defendant's previous conviction and how to resolve potentially inconsistent verdicts on the lesser included offense. ( Id. at p. 307 & fn. 5.) Our decision in Fields was grounded in an established rule of trial procedure known as the acquittal-first rule. ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 309.) In Stone v. Superior Court, supra, 31 Cal.3d at page 519, we held a defendant's constitutional rights require that the jury be permitted to render a partial verdict of acquittal on a greater offense when they are deadlocked only as to a lesser included offense. To aid trial courts in fulfilling this constitutional obligation, we suggested the court provide separate verdict forms for each offense but stressed, [t]he jury must be cautioned, of course, that it should first decide whether the defendant is guilty of the greater offense before considering the lesser offense .... ( Ibid. ) We clarified this rule in People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322 [250 Cal.Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572], a case involving jury deadlock on the greater offense but not the lesser. We explained that in all trials of included offenses, the jury must acquit of the greater offense before returning a verdict on the lesser included offense, although it can consider or discuss the offenses in any order it chooses. ( Id. at p. 330.) The acquittal-first rule protects a defendant from retrial when the jury agrees that the greater offense was not proven but cannot agree on a lesser included offense. Without the rule, a general declaration of mistrial would disguise the fact that the jury agreed the defendant was not guilty of the greater offense, making the defendant subject to retrial on both the greater and lesser offenses. The problem in Fields arose because the defendant's jury was not advised of its obligation to return a verdict on the greater offense first, before rendering a verdict on the lesser included offense. We explained that a jury's verdict on a lesser included offense only is incomplete and constitutes an irregular verdict that is `mistaken in the law.' ( Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 310-311.) If the jury renders only a verdict of guilty on the lesser offense, we stated that the trial court should decline to receive the verdict and should direct the jury to reconsider its lone verdict in light of the acquittal-first rule of People v. Kurtzman . ( Fields, at p. 310.) If the court fails to do so, and instead records the partial verdict and discharges the jury, we held section 1023 requires the consequences of this `mistake in the law' to be borne by the People, not the defendant, such that the conviction of the lesser offense will bar the People from retrying the greater, notwithstanding the jury's deadlock on that charge. ( Fields, at p. 311.) When the jury is instructed on the acquittal-first rule and hangs on the more serious offense, the prosecution is put to a choice: It may either move for a mistrial and set the entire matter for a retrial (§§ 1140, 1141), or, if it wishes to accept a verdict on the lesser charge and forgo a chance to convict on the greater, the prosecution may ask the court to dismiss the greater charge in the interest of justice (§ 1385). ( Fields, at p. 311.) As we recognized in Fields, the whole point of the Stone / Kurtzman rule is to provide a procedure whereby the jury's intent is clear, and legitimate interests of both the defendant and the People are honored. Defendant seeks to divorce Fields from this intricate context and extend its holding to the retrial of penalty allegations. Starting from the premise that Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at page 490, requires a penalty allegation to be treated as the functional equivalent of a greater offense, defendant argues his conviction for the lewd act offense alone is essentially the same as a conviction for a lesser included offense. Because he stood convicted of the lewd act offense at the close of the first trial, defendant argues retrial of the greater offense on which the first jury deadlocked, i.e., the One Strike allegation, was barred by section 1023 and our holding in Fields. Under defendant's reasoning, any time a jury convicts the accused of an offense but deadlocks on a related sentencing allegation, either the entire case would have to be retried or the deadlock would have to be given the same effect as an acquittal, barring retrial of the allegation. Neither Apprendi nor Fields requires this result. (14) As discussed, ante, at pages 101 to 103, the penalty provisions set forth in our state's Penal Code differ in significant ways from both greater and lesser included offenses and greater and lesser degrees of the same offense. [A] penalty provision prescribes an added penalty to be imposed when the offense is committed under specified circumstances. ( Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 661.) Under California law, a sentencing enhancement or penalty allegation is not a complete offense in itself. It is separate from the underlying offense and does not set forth elements of the offense or a greater degree of the offense charged. [Citations.] ( Ibid. ) Conceptually, a penalty provision is an appendage that attaches to an offense and, if proven, prescribes additional punishment for the crime. ( People v. Wolcott (1983) 34 Cal.3d 92, 100-101 [192 Cal.Rptr. 748, 665 P.2d 520].) Another important difference between a greater offense and a penalty provision, for our purposes, is that [t]he jury does not decide the truth of the penalty allegation until it first has reached a verdict on the substantive offense charged. [Citation.] ( Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 661.) Here, defendant's attempt to extend Fields to penalty allegations encounters a significant practical obstacle. It is only logical for the jury to decide first whether a defendant committed the substantive offense before considering whether the appended sentencing facts are true. If the substantive offense is not proven, there is no crime and thus no sentence to be aggravated. Our interpretation of section 1023 in Fields was grounded on the acquittal-first rule of Stone and Kurtzman (see Fields, supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 308-311), but no such rule governs the order of verdicts on sentencing allegations. We have never held that a jury's conviction of an offense alone, without an accompanying acquittal on alleged penalty factors, constitutes an irregular verdict or a mistake of law. Indeed, the whole point of alleging the enhancing factors separately, and requiring a separate jury determination under Apprendi, is that they function to increase the punishment for the underlying crime. If the jury determines the enhancing allegations are not proven, that separate determination stands, but it does not undermine the jury's conviction on the substantive offense. (15) For these reasons, we have previously rejected the argument that a conviction on an underlying offense is enough in itself to bar retrial of attached sentencing allegations. As noted in Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pages 661-662, a defendant's conviction of the underlying substantive offense does not (on double jeopardy grounds) bar further proceedings, such as retrial, on a penalty allegation. [Citation.] Thus, the circumstance that the jury has returned a verdict on the underlying offense, but is unable to make a finding on the penalty allegation, does not constitute an `acquittal' of (or otherwise bar retrial of) the penalty allegation on the ground of double jeopardy. [Citations.] The question now is whether Apprendi requires us to overrule this holding by treating penalty allegations as substantive elements of an offense for purposes of section 1023, the state statute governing retrial of included offenses. We conclude it does not. Apprendi held that every finding that exposes the defendant to punishment, or increases the punishment possible for a crime, must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at p. 490; see Oregon v. Ice (2009) 555 U.S. ___, ___ _ ___ [172 L.Ed.2d 517, 129 S.Ct. 711, 716-717] [listing sentencing facts to which Apprendi has been applied].) The high court's holding stemmed from the Fifth Amendment right to due process and the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. ( People v. Izaguirre (2007) 42 Cal.4th 126, 131 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 148, 164 P.3d 578] ( Izaguirre ); see Apprendi, at p. 476.) Apprendi thus requires that any sentencing provision that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum be treated as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense for purposes of a defendant's federal constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. ( Apprendi, at p. 494 & fn. 19; Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 326.) This holding parallels the California sentencing scheme. Both substantive offenses and sentencing allegations require that certain facts be established before the jury can conclude the allegations have been proven. In addition, although Apprendi itself was not grounded on principles of federal double jeopardy protection ( Izaguirre, at p. 131), we have extended its reasoning to bar retrial of a penalty allegation after the equivalent of an acquittal under the federal double jeopardy clause. ( Seel supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 548-549.) However, to say that a penalty provision must sometimes [11] be treated as the functional equivalent of an element for claims arising under the federal Constitution does not mean such provisions are now elements for all purposes under California law. We rejected this notion in Izaguirre, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pages 133-134. (See also People v. Sloan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 110, 123 [64 Cal.Rptr.3d 137, 164 P.3d 568].) Izaguirre addressed the application of Apprendi to California's multiple conviction rule. In general, a person may be convicted of, although not punished for, more than one crime arising out of the same act or course of conduct. `... Section 954 generally permits multiple conviction. Section 654 is its counterpart concerning punishment. It prohibits multiple punishment for the same `act or omission.' When section 954 permits multiple conviction, but section 654 prohibits multiple punishment, the trial court must stay execution of sentence on the convictions for which multiple punishment is prohibited. [Citations.] ( People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1226-1227 [45 Cal.Rptr.3d 353, 137 P.3d 184].) A judicially created exception to this rule prohibits multiple convictions based on necessarily included offenses. ( Id. at p. 1227; People v. Montoya (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1031, 1034 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 902, 94 P.3d 1098].) The defendant in Izaguirre sought to graft Apprendi onto these state law rules, arguing his convictions for two firearm enhancements should have been stricken because they were necessarily included in his conviction for the greater offense of first degree murder with a driveby shooting special circumstance. ( Izaguirre, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 129-130, 132.) He argued this result followed from Apprendi 's directive that a crime and its attached sentence enhancement be treated as the functional equivalent of a single greater crime. ( Izaguirre, at p. 130; see Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 539, fn. 2.) We disagreed and found Apprendi 's holding inapposite to the question of whether enhancements must be considered in defining necessarily included offenses for purposes of the multiple conviction rule. ( Izaguirre, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 133.) To the extent the firearm-related enhancements in question stood to increase punishment, Apprendi 's holding, grounded on the Fifth Amendment right to due process and Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, requires only that they be tried to a jury and found true beyond a reasonable doubt, which they were. ( Izaguirre, at p. 133.) We also observed that the federal double jeopardy concerns addressed in Seel, supra, 34 Cal.4th 535, were not at issue because the defendant's claim concerned multiple convictions imposed in a unitary trial, not successive prosecutions. ( Izaguirre, at pp. 133-134.) Finally, we rejected the defendant's argument that conduct enhancements are the functional equivalent of completed offenses or convictions for purposes of the multiple conviction rule, noting it had no support in case law. ( Id. at p. 134.) Conduct enhancements cannot be imposed standing alone as additional punishment. By definition, an enhancement is `an additional term of imprisonment added to the base term.' (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.405(3); see People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 101 [86 Cal.Rptr.2d 893, 980 P.2d 441].) For that reason alone, an enhancement cannot be equated with an offense. (See People v. Chiu (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1260, 1265 [7 Cal.Rptr.3d 193].) ( Izaguirre, at p. 134.) Thus, reasoning that enhancements are not legal elements of the offenses to which they attach, we concluded they should not be considered in defining necessarily included offenses under the multiple conviction rule. ( Id. at p. 128, italics added.) (16) Defendant here also seeks to expand Apprendi to a state statute relating to an area entirely under the aegis of state law. However, the United States Supreme Court has made it clear that Apprendi, and cases following it, did not alter state substantive law. In Schriro v. Summerlin (2004) 542 U.S. 348 [159 L.Ed.2d 442, 124 S.Ct. 2519], the court rejected an argument that Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, created a substantive change in the law because Apprendi converted aggravating factors into the functional equivalent of elements of greater offenses. The high court explained that Apprendi and Ring did not create new substantive elements of offenses; rather, they simply held that when findings function like elements of greater offenses by increasing punishment, they must be made by a jury under the reasonable doubt standard. (See Schriro v. Summerlin , at p. 354.) More recently, the court has observed that the sovereign authority of states in maintaining their own criminal justice systems counsels against extending Apprendi beyond its specific context. ( Oregon v. Ice, supra, 555 U.S. at pp. ___ _ ___ [129 S.Ct. at pp. 718-719].) As Justice Ginsburg noted, members of the high court have warned against `wooden, unyielding insistence on expanding the Apprendi doctrine far beyond its necessary boundaries.' [Citation.] ( Id. at p. ___ [129 S.Ct. at p. 719].) Our holding in Izaguirre illustrates that sentencing enhancements or other penalty provisions need not be treated as actual elements of offenses for all conceivable state law purposes, but only where the defendant's claim implicates a federal constitutional right under the Fifth or Sixth Amendment. In California, sentence enhancements are not `equivalent' to, nor do they `function' as, substantive offenses. ( People v. Wims (1995) 10 Cal.4th 293, 307 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 241, 895 P.2d 77], overruled on another ground in Sengpadychith, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 326.) Apprendi does not require or enable us to rewrite the Penal Code to convert penalty provisions such as the one at issue here into elements of offenses. [I]t is the function of the legislative branch to define crimes and prescribe punishments .... ( In re Lynch (1972) 8 Cal.3d 410, 414 [105 Cal.Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921].) Under California law, the One Strike allegation on which defendant's first jury deadlocked was not a greater offense that incorporated the underlying lewd act crime as a lesser included offense. It was simply a penalty allegation. While Fields does not apply, Bright does. Bright holds that a conviction on an underlying substantive offense does not bar retrial of a penalty allegation on which the first jury deadlocked. ( Bright, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 661.) Under Apprendi, the One Strike allegation had to be tried to a jury, and under Seel an acquittal on the allegation would have barred retrial. However, these federal constitutional requirements do not persuade us to impose even more sweeping double jeopardy protections under California statutory law. Retrial of the One Strike allegation did not violate section 1023.