Opinion ID: 783863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interference With a Protected Interest

Text: 16 Like the parties, we assume that non-custodial parents, such as John, have a constitutionally protected interest in visiting their children. All agree that this interest is an aspect of parents' right to care, custody, and control of their offspring. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000) (collecting cases). The disagreement concerns whether Richardson's conduct interfered with this interest. 17 According to Richardson, no interference occurred because reasonable people in John's position would have understood that they did not need to follow her instruction not to visit Jaidah. No one has suggested that Richardson could unilaterally alter the terms of John's divorce decree or that she could force him to comply with her safety plan. Indeed, DCFS's deputy director, Edward Cotton, testified without contradiction that absent a court order, cooperation is essential to separate parents suspected of abuse from their children. 18 Richardson's argument proceeds by analogy to the law governing seizures of criminal suspects. As Richardson rightly observes, a seizure does not occur when the police approach people on the street and pose questions, ask for identification, or request consent to search their belongings — provided that cooperation is not induced by coercive means. United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 200-01, 122 S.Ct. 2105, 153 L.Ed.2d 242 (2002); United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir.2002) (en banc). Fourth Amendment protections arise only when a reasonable person would not feel free to leave the police presence, or if leaving is impractical, when a reasonable person would not feel free to decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); United States v. Jerez, 108 F.3d 684, 689 (7th Cir.1997). 19 John does not argue that these rules form an inappropriate framework for analyzing claims of official interference with noncustodial parents' visitation with their children. The treatment indeed is sensible because interference with the parental right to care, custody, and control ordinarily is measured through the objective lens of the Fourth Amendment. E.g., Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492, 520 (7th Cir.2003); Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1019 (7th Cir.2000); Darryl H. v. Coler, 801 F.2d 893, 901 n. 7 (7th Cir.1986). Nor does John contend that his proffered explanation for obeying Richardson — his having heard on television that disobeying DCFS caseworkers could spell the end of his parental rights or lead to foster care for Jaidah — was reasonable. John argues instead that regardless of whether he knew that Richardson could not prevent him from visiting his daughter, he was required to obey her commands. Just as motorists must halt immediately when the police order them to stop, see McNair, 279 F.3d at 465, John insists that he could not ignore Richardson's instructions. 20 In one respect, John has a point. On May 1 — when Richardson first called John — he had no information other than what was furnished in the message left on his answering machine. Based on that message, a reasonable person might not have realized immediately that Richardson could not override his divorce decree or force him to submit to her safety plan. 21 But just one day later, John had an opportunity to speak with Richardson and ask about the scope of her authority. And within two weeks of that conversation, John had enlisted an attorney and met with Richardson — a meeting that was delayed by a week because of his final exams. By then, a reasonable person with the resources available to John, would not have left Richardson's authority unquestioned, just as reasonable motorists (to borrow John's analogy) do not remain stopped on the roadside for weeks after the officer who ticketed them drives off. John's contention that Richardson prevented him from seeing Jaidah after she wrapped up her investigation on June 16 thus is doubly unpersuasive: Richardson only a month earlier said not to see Jaidah during the investigation, and she never suggested that she would have an ongoing role in the case. 22 Given that the May 16 meeting at the attorney's office was postponed by a week at John's request and that his divorce decree entitled him only to biweekly visitation. Richardson's conduct deprived John of association with Jaidah at most for one day — her May 2 birthday. We say at most because the record could support a finding that Richardson was not even responsible for this missed visit. Jaidah's mother after all was the one who told John that Jaidah was too sick to see him on her birthday. But given the jury's verdict, we assume that John acted on account of Richardson's instruction instead of Richelle's lie, meaning that the case comes down to whether this one-day interference is enough to sustain John's procedural and substantive due process claims.