Opinion ID: 1254179
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: construction of wisconsin constitution

Text: The defendant next claims that the search was not valid as an incident to the arrest under art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution. The defendant alleges that this provision of the Wisconsin Constitution confers greater protection from searches and seizures than the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution. The defendant, however, does not urge the court to construe the Wisconsin Constitution as defining a substantively different test for a search incident to arrest. Instead, he essentially claims that we should reject Belton's conclusion that the interior of an automobile is within the immediate presence or control of a defendant who is not actually in the vehicle during the search. [4] Whether the interior of an automobile is an area from which a defendant might secure a weapon or evidentiary items is a question of constitutional fact, which we review independently of the trial court. These questions are not questions of evidentiary or historical fact, but rather are questions that require application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Woods, 117 Wis. 2d 701, 715, 345 N.W.2d 457 (1984). The reason for independent appellate review of constitutional facts is because '[t]he scope of constitutional protections, representing the basic value commitments of our society, cannot vary from trial court to trial court, or from jury to jury.' Id., quoting from State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis. 2d 284, 305-06, 128 N.W.2d 645 (1964) (Wilkie, J., concurring). We must determine whether to reject Belton's treatment of the constitutional fact at issue in this case with the above principle in mind. The Wisconsin constitutional provision relating to searches and seizures is art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effect_against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall_issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched-and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis added.) That provision is virtually identical to the fourth amendment of the federal constitution: The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis added.) But for a few inconsequential differences in punctuation, capitalization and the use of the singular or plural form of a word, the texts of art. I, sec. 11 and the fourth amendment are identical. This court has consistently and routinely conformed the law of search and seizure under the state constitution to that developed by the United States Supreme Court under the fourth amendment. In State v. Paszek, 50 Wis. 2d 619, 624, 184 N.W.2d. 836 (1971), we stated: This court has recognized that art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution is substantially like the fourth amendment of the United States Constitution, and that the standards and principles surrounding the fourth amendment are generally applicable to the construction of art. I, sec. 11. Accord State v. Beal, 40 Wis. 2d 607, 612, 162 N.W.2d 640 (1968); see State v. Prober, 98 Wis. 2d 345, 351,297 N.W.2d 1 (1980). Numerous recent examples exist where this court has followed the precedent of the United States Supreme Court in search and seizure cases. In State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis. 2d 102, 349 N.W.2d 453 (1984), we followed the principles for determining the sufficiency of a consent to a search that were articulated by the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973). In State v. Boggess, 115 Wis. 2d 443, 453-57, 340 N.W.2d 516 (1983), we adopted the totality of the circumstances test for determining probable cause enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). In State v. Callaway, 106 Wis. 2d 503, 519-20, 317 N.W.2d 428 (1982), and State v. Wisumierski, 106 Wis. 2d 722, 727-28, 317 N.W.2d 484 (1982), we repudiated the doctrine of automatic standing for persons accused of possessary offences, in accord with the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980). Finally, in State v. Fillyaw, 104 Wis. 2d 700, 710-11, 312 N.W.2d 795 (1981), we abandoned the traditional rules for determining a defendant's standing to challenge an unconstitutional search, abandoning the legitimately on the premises test in favor of an expectation of privacy test, in conformity with the Supreme Court's decision in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978). One reason this court has refused to interpret Wisconsin's search and seizure provision differently than the Supreme Court has interpreted the fourth amendment is to prevent the confusion caused by differing standards. We said in Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 634, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974), that search and seizure law is marked by hair-splitting distinctions and a complexity masked by simple formulations. It is obvious that police officers must often find it confusing as they enforce the law and investigate crime. Thus, we are reluctant to construe our state constitutional provision differently than the fourth amendment, especially since the two provisions are intended to protect the same interests and we are unconvinced that the Supreme Court provides less protection than intended by the search and seizure provision of the Wisconsin Constitution. It is always conceivable that the Supreme Court could interpret the fourth amendment in a way that undermines the protection Wisconsin citizens have from unreasonable searches and seizures under art. I, sec. 11, Wisconsin Constitution. This would necessitate that we require greater protection to be afforded under the state constitution than is recognized under the fourth amendment. We have not reached that point with the Supreme Court's adoption of the Belton bright-line rule for determining the scope of a search incident to an arrest, insofar as an automobile is concerned. The Belton rule is a simple and reasonable rule governing the search of an automobile after an arrest is made. A police officer may assume under Belton that the interior of an automobile is within the reach of a defendant when the defendant is still at the scene of an arrest, but the defendant is not physically in the vehicle. We cannot say as a matter of fact in all cases that a defendant never could regain access to the interior of an automobile after initially leaving the vehicle. Thus, we would seriously undermine police security if we adopted as a matter of constitutional fact the rule that the interior of an automobile never is within the reach of a suspect who is outside the vehicle at the arrest scene; such a rule would prohibit all automobile searches as an incident to arrest, unless the defendant was allowed to remain in the automobile during the search, which increases the risk of danger to the officer. We cannot subscribe to such a limitation on the search incident to arrest rule. The only other alternative to the Belton rule would be to permit searches on a case-by-case basis when the police believe that a suspect may escape from their control and regain access to an automobile. This alternative is unworkable, however, because such momentary escapes are not predictable. The rule would effectively prevent automobile searches, or at least eliminate any uniform rule of search. Given that we determine constitutional facts on an independent basis to assure the uniform application of constitutional rights, such as an ad hoc test for determining whether a defendant had access to the interior of an automobile is undesirable. Thus, we conclude that Belton is a reasonable application of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. By adopting the Belton rule, Wisconsin police officers can follow the fourth amendment's mandates without worrying about whether some different restrictions might be imposed on them under the Wisconsin Constitution. Uniformity of interpretation, as long as consistent with the protections of art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution, reduces to a minimum the confusion and uncertainty under which the police must operate. Moreover, conforming Wisconsin's search and seizure law to that developed by the Supreme Court under the fourth amendment is not only consistent with the text of Wisconsin's search and seizure provision, its constitutional history and its judicial history, but it is also in accord with sound public policy. [1] Thus, we hold that Belton is consistent with art. I, sec. 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution.