Opinion ID: 1890344
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prematurely Filed Appeals

Text: As a part of his argument, Appellee also asserts that an appeal filed prematurely to an order allowing it cannot be effective as an appeal or relate forward to the later order. It is correct that [a] rule requiring automatic dismissal for a tardy appeal in civil cases is necessary to provide finality to the trial court's judgment so that the litigant prevailing at the trial level can then execute on the judgment or otherwise enforce the terms of a final order. Johnson, 885 S.W.2d at 950. But the reasons for finality that provide the underpinning for mandating automatic dismissal of a tardy notice of appeal do not adhere to a premature notice of appeal.... Id. Certainly, [t]he federal courts have long construed a notice of appeal filed prematurely as relating forward and filed after entry of judgment. Id. at 949; see also FirsTier Mortgage Co. v. Investors Mortgage Insurance Co., 498 U.S. 269, 273, 111 S.Ct. 648, 112 L.Ed.2d 743 (1991) (The Rule[, FRCP 4(a)(2),] recognizes that, unlike a tardy notice of appeal, certain premature notices do not prejudice the appellee and that the technical defect of prematurity therefore should not be allowed to extinguish an otherwise proper appeal.) Moreover, in Board of Regents of Western Kentucky University v. Clark, 276 S.W.3d 819 (Ky.2009), we upheld the validity of a prematurely filed appeal. Relying upon the reasoning in FirsTier Mortgage Co ., and Johnson, we pointed out: [D]espite the premature nature of these notices, they nonetheless put appellees on notice of the intent to appeal before expiration of the thirty day time limit in CR 73.02(1)(a), and thus served the essential purpose of the rule. Furthermore, this Court noted that the particular circumstances of the Johnson case where a litigant could have mistakenly believed that a final judgment had been entered and where the trial court's nonfinal order would be appealable if followed by the formal entry of judgmentsuggested that it would not be unreasonable to file a notice of appeal prematurely. Id. at 821 (internal citations omitted) (Therefore, we hold that as in Johnson, supra , Clark's notice of appeal can relate forward to the time when the trial court's interlocutory judgment became final and can be properly heard and decided by the Court of Appeals.) Like Johnson, CR 73.02(1)(e)(i) (effective in 2009) now recognizes the validity of prematurely filed notices of appeal and their effectiveness when an order disposing of the last such remaining motion is entered. Under CR 73.02(1)(e)(i), if the judgment is thereafter altered or amended, or a party intends to challenge a post-judgment order on such motions, he may then file a notice of appeal, or an amended notice of appeal, within the time prescribed from the entry date of the last such remaining motion. CR 73.02(1)(e)(ii). However, if there is no change post-judgment, he does not. Here, Appellant filed his notice of appeal on September 10, 2007 (within the forty-day time period allowed by CR 73.02(1)(d)) along with his motion requesting the ten-day extension and citing his grounds for excusable neglect. On October 22, 2007, the trial court entered the order extending the time for appeal by ten days, finding that Appellant had shown excusable neglect for [the] failure to learn of the entry of [the] judgment. This was sufficient. However, the trial court also added relief in the alternative, vacating the August 1, 2007 order denying the motion for new trial and JNOV, ordering it re-entered as of October 22, 2007. In addition, it ordered that Appellant's notice of appeal, previously tendered on September 10, 2007, is hereby ordered filed as of this date. (Emphasis added). This alternative theory of relief varied from the relief suggested by Appellant's order tendered with the motion, which proposed only the ten-day extension of time. Aside from the issue created by the trial court's alternative relief, Appellant's notice of appeal appeals from the correct judgment and order overruling Appellant's motion for new trial and JNOV, although one may consider the date of the order overruling may have changed under the alternative relief. That being said, there is simply nothing that needs to be amended in the notice of appeal to disclose the order or judgment appealed from. Thus, Appellee was put on notice of the appeal and the matters appealed from within the appropriate time allowed under CR 73.02(1)(d). Appellee also asserts, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that Appellant had to file a new notice of appeal within ten days of the October 22, 2007 order, even though such a filing would be outside the window of forty days allowed under CR 73.02(1)(d). The question then becomes, why and what for? Such a premise does not appear from the language of 73.02(1)(d) and runs contrary to the logic of Johnson, Board of Regents of Western Kentucky , and FirsTier Mortgage Co ., all of which are based upon a common-sense rule: that if an otherwise appropriate notice of appeal is filed as to an order or judgment of a trial court and it appears otherwise reasonable under the circumstances, precedents, and the rules of procedure applicable to have done so, the notice of appeal may operate prospectively. Thus, in this instance, we disagree with the opinion of the Court of Appeals. Here, the filing of the notice of appeal within the context of CR 73.02(1)(a), along with a reading of CR 73.02(1)(d), indicates a cautious and reasonable approach to the dilemma with the view that the trial court, by giving Appellee a chance to respond, would not, in most instances, be able to rule on the motion prior to the running of the forty-day time period. Appellee's construction of Rodgers notwithstanding, a plain reading of CR 73.02(1)(a) and (d) would counsel against waiting to file the notice of appeal past the forty-day period provided in the statute. Although, we have already noted that Rodgers merely approved the tendering of the notice of appeal within the forty-day time period, and did not purport to prohibit its filing as we now clarify, we also note that Rodgers was premised upon the later issuance of a nunc pro tunc order, which is not the case herein, as the order extending the time period was effective only as of the date of its entry, October 22, 2007, which we find is appropriate and reasonable under the power granted the circuit court to extend the time for filing as envisioned by CR 73.02(1)(d). It is more appropriate to resolve procedural issues by a plain reading of the rule rather than the employment of tricks of time. Thus, to the extent that Rodgers holds that the trial court must enter a nunc pro tunc order to extend the time to appeal for ten days under CR 73.02(1)(d)in the event the trial court cannot, for reasons of fairness, enter the order within the forty-day window Rodgers is overruled. We hold, therefore, that upon the entry of the trial court's order on October 22, 2007 granting Appellant the ten-day extension as requested under CR 73.02(1)(d), said order was effective to grant the extension of time and the notice of appeal, although filed prematurely, was effective as of the date filed, given the order of extension.