Opinion ID: 493289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Standard to Facts of this Case

Text: 23 The district court then turned to an analysis of the facts of the case contained in the material submitted to it in support of and in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. It determined that Toro's submissions reasonably could be construed as meeting the first two prongs of the Credit Alliance test. A reasonable inference can be made that Krouse knew that the reports it furnished to Summit were to be used by Summit to induce Toro's extension of credit and distributing rights based on Toro's reliance on the information contained in the reports. Id. at 995. 24 However, the district court determined that, on the third prong, the complaint and the supporting evidence fail. Id. Toro's affidavits, concluded the district court, fail to present evidence which shows the necessary connection between plaintiffs and defendants. They clearly show a relationship among three parties, with Summit forming the joint between Toro and Krouse. The third side of the triangle, however, remains open. Id. at 995. The court failed to find in the remaining material submitted by either Toro or Krouse any allegation that would close the gap. 2 Accordingly, it concluded:Because Indiana would adopt the most restrictive of the three standards currently used to determine the availability of a cause of action to third parties allegedly injured by negligently performed services by an accountant, Krouse's motion for summary judgment must be granted. None of the evidence presents a genuine issue as to whether Krouse had the necessary contact with Toro which evinces Krouse's understanding of Toro's actual reliance on the reports Krouse furnished to Summit. 25 Id. at 996. 26 Finally, the district court turned to the statute of limitations issue. While its disposition of the liability issue made it unnecessary to reach this question, the district court held that 27 if a different standard of liability applied in this case that would permit Toro to go forward with its cause of action, the dates that Toro received the reports at issue would control as to the statute of limitations issue. Further evidence would have to be developed on this point, since these dates are not apparent from the record. Presumably, however, Toro would have received the reports from Summit shortly after Summit received them from Krouse. In all likelihood, therefore, this would result in the elimination of the 1981 and 1982 reports as elements of the cause of action. 28 Id. at 997. III