Opinion ID: 865853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the jury selection process was

Text: CONSTITUTIONALLY INFIRM AND REQUIRES REVERSAL OF PITCHFORD’S CONVICTION AND SENTENCE OF DEATH. 1 Loden v. State, 971 So. 2d 548, 562 (Miss. 2007) (quoting Balfour v. State, 598 So. 2d 731, 739 (Miss. 1992)). 2 Id. (quoting Irving v. State, 361 So. 2d 1360, 1363 (Miss. 1978)). 4 ¶12. In his first assignment of error, Pitchford makes three arguments, which we shall address in turn. A. Whether The State Discriminated On The Basis Of Race In Its Peremptory Strikes In Violation of Batson v. Kentucky. ¶13. Citing Batson v. Kentucky,3 Pitchford asserts the State exercised its peremptory strikes in a racially discriminatory manner.4 In Batson, the United States Supreme Court held that the State of Kentucky was prohibited from racially discriminating through its exercise of peremptory strikes.5 Building on Batson, the Supreme Court later stated that the Constitution forbids striking even a single juror for a discriminatory purpose.6 For purposes of analyzing a claim of discrimination in jury selection, Batson and its progeny have established a three-step inquiry for courts to follow. ¶14. First, the party objecting to the peremptory strike of a potential juror must make a prima facie showing that race was the criterion for the strike. Second, upon such a showing, the burden shifts to the State to articulate a race-neutral reason for excluding that particular juror. Finally, after a race-neutral explanation has been offered by the prosecution, the trial court must determine whether the objecting party has met its burden to prove that there has 3 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986). 4 The record of the racial make-up of the venire is not well-preserved. Much of the information upon which we must rely comes from handwritten notations on jury lists which are included in the record. Some of the notations are illegible and, although substantially similar, the information on the jury lists does not match the information recited in Pitchford’s brief. 5 Id. at 82-84. 6 Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 128 S. Ct. 1203, 1208, 170 L. Ed. 2d 175 (2008) (internal citations omitted). 5 been purposeful discrimination in the exercise of the peremptory strike, i.e., that the reason given was a pretext for discrimination.7 Prima facie showing ¶15. As stated, a trial court faced with a Batson challenge must determine whether the defense 8 has made a prima facie showing that race was the criterion for the prosecution’s strike. This Court has held that the required prima facie showing can be made by demonstrating that the percentage of the State’s peremptory strikes exercised on members of the protected class was significantly higher than the percentage of members of the protected class in the venire.9 ¶16. Pitchford points out in his brief that the State used only seven of its peremptory strikes, four of which removed African-Americans from the venire. As a result, only one African-American remained on the jury of fourteen (twelve jurors and two alternates). This, Pitchford argues, is incompatible with the fact that, in 2006, African-Americans made up approximately forty percent of Grenada County’s population. In that regard, the following exchange occurred at trial: MS. STEINER: Allow us to state into the record there is one of 12 – of fourteen jurors, are non-white, whereas this county is approximately, what, 40 percent? 7 Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 917 (Miss. 2007) (citations omitted). 8 Although we use the defense as an example, a Batson challenge may be brought by the prosecution if it suspects that the defense has exercised a peremptory strike based on the race (or other protected classification) of the prospective juror. 9 Strickland v. State, 980 So. 2d 908, 916 n.1 (Miss. 2008) citing Flowers, 947 So. 2d at 935. 6 MR. BAUM: The county is 40 percent black. THE COURT: I don’t know about the racial makeup, but I will note for the record there is one regular member of the panel that is black, African American race. In his motion for a new trial, Pitchford stated the following: The state was allowed to use all of its peremptory challenges to remove all but one African-American from the jury resulting in a jury composed of less than 10% African-American citizens selected from a county with nearly a 45% African-American population. Although Pitchford’s counsel made these assertions, he presented the trial judge no evidence of the racial makeup of Grenada County. And regardless of the racial makeup of Grenada County, we are persuaded that the record supports the trial court’s finding of a prima facie showing of discrimination. ¶17. The racial makeup of the venire subject to the State’s peremptory strikes 10 was fourteen whites (seventy-four percent), and five blacks (twenty-six percent). Thus, statistically speaking,11 if all other factors were equal, the State’s peremptory strikes should approximate these percentages, resulting in the state striking either one or two African- 10 We do not refer to the entire venire responding to their jury summonses, but rather to the members of the venire who were actually subject to the State’s decision to keep or strike, that is, the first twelve presented to the State, plus the seven who replaced the State’s seven strikes. Those nineteen veniremen were the only members of the entire venire against whom the State could possibly have discriminated. The racial makeup of the members of the venire who were never considered for peremptory strikes is not relevant to the inquiry. 11 For purposes of analyzing the prima facie showing, we recognize that a cold statistical analysis will determine only whether the percentage of the State’s peremptory strikes of AfricanAmericans was significantly higher than the racial makeup of the venire. However, we fully recognize that, in the real world, there may be many legitimate reasons for the percentage imbalance. Indeed, once a statistical imbalance is established, the State is allowed to explain its reasons for each strike. 7 Americans.12 However, the State used fifty-seven percent of its peremptory strikes on African-Americans. Stated another way, the State used fifty-seven percent of its peremptory strikes (four out of seven) to remove African-Americans from a venire comprised of twentysix percent African American and seventy-four percent white. While the difference in these percentages is not so great as to constitute, as a matter of law, a prima facie finding of discrimination, it is sufficient for a trial judge – who was “on the ground” and able to observe the voir dire process, and in the exercise of sound discretion – to so find. ¶18. We cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Pitchford made a prima facie case of discrimination. A prima facie case, however, is nothing more than a level of suspicion the trial judge finds significant enough to merit further inquiry. Race-neutral reasons – pretext ¶19. Because the trial judge was persuaded that Pitchford had demonstrated a prima facie case of discrimination, he then required the State to provide its race-neutral reason for each peremptory strike exercised on an African-American. The four black jurors struck by the State were: Carlos Fitzgerald Ward, Linda Ruth Lee, Christopher Lamont Tillmon, and Patricia Ann Tidwell. On appellate review, we give great deference to the trial court's findings of whether or not a peremptory challenge was race-neutral . . . . Such deference is necessary because finding that a striking party engaged in discrimination is largely a factual finding and thus should be accorded appropriate deference on appeal . . . . Indeed, we will not overrule a trial court on a Batson ruling unless the 12 26% x 7 = 1.8. 8 record indicates that the ruling was clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence.13 Carlos Ward ¶20. As to its race-neutral reasons for striking Ward, the prosecutor stated: We have several reasons. One, he had no opinion on the death penalty. He has a two-year-old child. He has never been married. He has numerous speeding violations that we are aware of. The reason that I do not want him as a juror is he is too closely related to the defendant. He is approximately the same age as the defendant. They both have never been married. In my opinion he will not be able to not be thinking about these issues, especially on the second phase. And I don’t think he would be a good juror because of that. ¶21. In Lockett v. State,14 this Court included an appendix of “illustrative examples” of race-neutral reasons upheld by other courts which includes age and marital status. The trial judge found the State’s proffered race-neutral reason acceptable. We cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion. Linda Ruth Lee ¶22. In stating its race-neutral reason for striking prospective juror Lee, the prosecutor stated: S-2 is black female, juror number 30. She is the one that was 15 minutes late. She also, according to police officer, police captain, Carver Conley, has mental problems. They have had numerous calls to her house and said she obviously has mental problems. . . . 13 Lynch v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254, 1270 (Miss. 2004) (quoting Walker v. State, 815 So. 2d 1209, 1214 (Miss. 2002)). 14 517 So. 2d 1346, 1356-57 (Miss. 1987). 9 ¶23. That a juror “obviously has mental problems” was clearly a race neutral reason. The trial judge found the State’s proffered race-neutral reason acceptable. We cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion. Christopher Lamont Tillmon ¶24. The State proffered the following reason for exercising a peremptory strike against Tillmon: S-3 is a black male, number 31. Christopher Lamont Tillmon. He has a brother who has been convicted of manslaughter. And considering that this is a murder case, I don’t want anyone on the jury that has relatives convicted of similar offenses. ¶25. This Court has recognized a juror’s (or family member’s) criminal history to be a raceneutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge. 15 The trial judge found the State’s proffered race-neutral reason acceptable. We cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion. Patricia Anne Tidwell ¶26. The State proffered the following reason for striking Tidwell: S-4 is juror number 43, a black female, Patricia Anne Tidwell. Her brother, David Tidwell, was convicted in this court of sexual battery. And her brother is now charged in a shooting case that is a pending case here in Grenada. And also, according to police officers, she is a known drug user. ¶27. The trial judge found the State’s proffered race-neutral reason acceptable. We cannot say the trial judge abused his discretion. Pretext ¶28. Pitchford argues on appeal that the State’s proffered race-neutral reasons were a pretext for discrimination. Pitchford points out that some of the reasons the State proffered 15 Lynch v. State, 877 So. 2d 1254, 1271-72 (Miss. 2004). 10 for its strikes of blacks were also true of whites the State did not strike. Although Pitchford devoted a considerable portion of his brief and oral argument before this Court to his pretext argument, he did not present these arguments to the trial court during the voir dire process or during post-trial motions. ¶29. This Court has held that, “[i]f the defendant fails to rebut, the trial judge must base his [or her] decision on the reasons given by the State.” 16 ¶30. As stated, Pitchford provided the trial court no rebuttal to the State’s race-neutral reasons. We will not now fault the trial judge with failing to discern whether the State’s race-neutral reasons were overcome by rebuttal evidence and argument never presented. ¶31. Pitchford also argues that the totality of the circumstances shows that the State’s peremptory challenges were exercised in a discriminatory manner. Pitchford points out the fact that the State used only seven of its twelve peremptory challenges, striking four of five blacks on the panel, but only three of thirty-five whites. Pitchford points out that, even though the State had five available peremptory strikes, it failed to strike whites who shared similar characteristics to some of the blacks who were struck for cause. ¶32. We find this to be Pitchford’s attempt to present his pretext argument in another package. As already stated with respect to each of the four African-Americans struck by the 16 Berry v. State, 802 So. 2d 1033, 1037(Miss 2001); Manning v. State, 735 So. 2d 323, 339 (Miss. 1999) (“It is incumbent upon a defendant claiming that proffered reasons are pretextual to raise the argument before the trial court. The failure to do so constitutes waiver.”); Woodward v. State, 726 So. 2d 524, 533 (Miss. 1997) (“In the absence of an actual proffer of evidence by the defendant to rebut the State’s neutral explanations, this Court may not reverse on this point”). 11 State, Pitchford failed to provide any argument concerning pretext during the Batson hearing.17 We will not entertain those arguments now. B. Whether The Trial Court Otherwise Deprived Defendant Of A Jury Comprised As Required By The Sixth And Fourteenth Amendments. ¶33. As to this assignment of error, Pitchford makes two arguments: first, that the death qualification process, itself, so disproportionately impacts black jurors that it amounts to a violation of the Equal Protection Clause; and second, that the trial judge improperly removed for cause jurors who were properly qualified. ¶34. The State asserts that this entire line of argument is procedurally barred because Pitchford failed to raise a contemporaneous objection when the jurors were excused. Pitchford contends, however, that he preserved the issue by objecting prior to the court’s releasing any of the individuals identified as Witherspoon-ineligible.18 We find that Pitchford is correct, and that this issue was properly preserved for appeal. Racial Discrimination as a result of death-qualification process. ¶35. At the conclusion of voir dire, the trial court excluded thirty of the thirty-five prospective black jurors for cause. The record reveals that most (and Pitchford alleges in his brief that all) were excluded because they were philosophically unable to consider imposing a sentence of death. Pitchford argues that the disproportionate exclusion of blacks for cause 17 We agree with Presiding Justice Graves’s argument that – in adjudicating the pretext issue – the trial judge must look at the totality of the circumstances and all of the facts. However those circumstances and facts do not include arguments not made by Pitchford’s counsel. 18 See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S. Ct. 1770, 20 L. Ed. 2d 776 (1968) (State may not exclude jurors for cause because of general objections to the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against its infliction). 12 “creates a prima facie case that the Equal Protection Clause has been violated.” In other words, Pitchford argues that, in general, the percentage of African-Americans who oppose the death penalty is higher than the percentage of whites. ¶36. This Court, addressing a similar argument, has held that “a defendant has no right to a petit jury composed in whole or in part of persons of his own race.” 19 The gist of the holdings in these cases is that – in the context of the right to a trial by a jury of one’s peers – one’s peers are not determined by one’s race, so this argument has no merit. ¶37. Pitchford also argues that the trial judge’s questioning and exclusion of four panel members was error. Pitchford argues that Witherspoon does not require exclusion of prospective jurors who cannot impose the death penalty. ¶38. Although Witherspoon does not address the issue, the following clear language from a subsequent case does: Witt held that “the proper standard for determining when a prospective juror may be excluded for cause because of his or her views on capital punishment . . . is whether the juror's views would 'prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath.'  469 U.S. at 424, 105 S. Ct. at 852 (quoting Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45, 100 S. Ct. at 2526). Under this standard, it is clear from Witt and Adams, the progeny of Witherspoon[,] that a juror who in no case would vote for capital punishment, regardless of his or her instructions, is not an impartial juror and must be removed for cause.20 19 Underwood v. State, 708 So. 2d 18, 28-29 (Miss. 1998) (quoting Pinkney v. State, 538 So. 2d 329, 346-47 (Miss. 1988), vacated on other grounds by Pinkney v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 1075, 110 S. Ct. 1800, 108 L. Ed. 2d 931 (1990). 20 Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 728-29, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992). See also Grayson v. State, 806 So. 2d 241, 254 (Miss. 2001) (strike for cause proper where potential juror’s viewpoint on the death penalty “[w]ould prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath”) quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S. Ct. 2521, 65 L. Ed. 2d 581 (1980)). 13 ¶39. Although the four jurors in question indicated on their questionnaires that they could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances, Pitchford points out that, during voir dire, defense counsel asked these prospective jurors some variation of “could you consider both, not could you vote for one. Could you consider, think about both and make a decision as to which one you wanted to vote for,” to which they answered in the affirmative. However, the trial judge later undertook voir dire of those four panel members and asked them “Can you consider the death penalty or would you not be able to consider it,” to which each of the four replied that they could not consider it. ¶40. We find Morgan to be directly on point. The trial judge did not commit error by striking for cause the jurors who indicated they could not impose the death penalty. C. Whether the Trial Court Erred in Precluding the Defense From Questioning Prospective Jurors Concerning Their Ability to Consider Mitigating Evidence. ¶41. Pitchford next argues that the trial court improperly prevented him from asking potential jurors whether they would consider specific mitigating factors. During voir dire, the following exchange occurred: DEFENSE: . . . Mr. Pitchford is 19, just turned 19, I think, or maybe 20. I’m getting old. Does anybody here who thinks what happened to you, if anything, or during your lifetime before you got charged with a crime should not count in deciding whether you receive life or death? STATE: Your Honor, I object again because we are getting into the jury deciding on mitigators and aggravators at this point. And this is definitely not proper. ¶42. The trial judge informed Pitchford’s counsel that, while he would be allowed to ask questions as to whether the jurors would be able to consider the mitigating factors presented 14 by the court, he would not be allowed to get into specifics. Pitchford’s counsel responded, “I certainly don’t intend to do that,” and continued his voir dire of the jury. ¶43. Voir dire of a jury “is conducted under the supervision of the court, and a great deal must, of necessity, be left to its sound discretion.” 21 Pitchford now argues that it was error for the trial court to preclude his questions concerning the kinds of mitigation evidence he planned to introduce. ¶44. Pitchford cites no authority directly supporting this proposition. He cites Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman,22 Penry v. Johnson,23 Tennard v. Drake,24 and Smith v. Texas,25 each of which is inapposite. Although these cases discuss the type of mitigation evidence that may be presented to a jury and how it should be instructed for sentencing, they say nothing of the defendant’s right to conduct voir dire. ¶45. In Trevino v. Johnson,26 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit addressed an argument almost identical to the one presented by Pitchford. The Court stated: Trevino . . . argues that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to inquire during voir dire whether three prospective jurors were able to consider youth as a potentially mitigating factor. Trevino contends that youth is a relevant mitigating factor of great weight, Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 116, 102 S. Ct. 869, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1982), and that under Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1992), the trial court's refusal 21 Foster v. State, 639 So. 2d 1263, 1274 (Miss. 1994) (quoting Morgan, 504 U.S. at 729). 22 550 U.S. 233, 127 S. Ct. 1654, 167 L. Ed. 2d 585 (2007). 23 532 U.S. 782, 121 S. Ct. 1910, 150 L. Ed. 2d 9 (2001). 24 542 U.S. 274, 124 S. Ct. 2562, 159 L. Ed. 2d 384 (2004). 25 550 U.S. 297, 127 S. Ct. 1686, 167 L .Ed. 2d 632 (2007). 26 168 F. 3d 173, 182-83 (5th Cir. 1999). 15 to allow him to question the jurors regarding youth violated his due process rights. ... This circuit has previously stated that Morgan only involves the narrow question of whether, in a capital case, jurors must be asked whether they would automatically impose the death penalty upon conviction of the defendant. United States v. Greer, 968 F. 2d 433, 437 n.7 (5th Cir.1992) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166, 1208 (10th Cir.1998) ([W]e have held that Morgan does not require a court to allow questions regarding how a juror would vote during the penalty phase if presented with specific mitigating factors. Other courts have issued similar rulings, holding that Morgan does not require questioning about specific mitigating or aggravating factors.) (citation omitted); United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1113 (10th Cir.1996) (finding that Morgan only requires questioning during voir dire regarding whether jurors would automatically impose the death penalty, and it does not require specific questioning regarding mitigating factors), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1213, 117 S. Ct. 1699, 137 L. Ed. 2d 825 (1997); United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 879 (4th Cir. 1996) (finding it was not an abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to allow detailed questioning during voir dire concerning specific mitigating factors), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S. Ct. 2414, 138 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1997), and cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S.Ct. 2414, 138 L.Ed.2d 179 (1997), and cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1253, 117 S. Ct. 2414, 138 L. Ed. 2d 179 (1997). After applying the AEDPA-mandated standard of review to these state-court findings and conclusions, we cannot say that Trevino has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right on this issue. We therefore decline to issue Trevino a [certificate of appealability] on this issue.27 ¶46. We agree with this interpretation of Morgan, that is, a trial court is not required to allow questions regarding how a juror would vote during the penalty phase, if presented with specific mitigating factors. Thus, we find no merit in this assignment of error.