Opinion ID: 1711589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the circuit court erred in denying the requested circumstantial evidence instruction of the defendant.

Text: ¶ 14. Alexander argues that since the evidence against him is purely circumstantial in nature, the State has the burden of proving him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable theory of innocence under Givens v. State, 618 So.2d 1313 (Miss.1993). Good authority persuades us that there should have been a jury instruction directing the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt in order to convict. Alexander relies heavily upon Keys v. State, 478 So.2d 266, 267 (Miss.1985), where we held that: It is the law in this state that, where the evidence for the prosecution is wholly circumstantial in nature, the accused is entitled upon request to have the jury instructed that, before they may convict, they must find that each element of the offense has been established beyond a reasonable doubt and to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. See, e.g., Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 461-62 (Miss.1984). There is, to be sure, loose talk in some of our cases to the effect that the circumstantial evidence instruction must be given where only one of the elements of the offense charged is established circumstantially. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 447 So.2d 645, 646 (Miss.1984); King v. State, 315 So.2d 925, 926 (Miss.1975); Love v. State, 208 So.2d 755, 757 (Miss. 1968). A correct statement of the law is that the instruction must be given only where the prosecution is without a confession and wholly without eyewitnesses to the gravamen of the offense charged. (footnote omitted). ¶ 15. We believe reasonable persons might disagree whether a statement about a box is tantamount to a confession of possessing drugs. Alexander made the statement to Ray Hill while he was trapped in the wrecked truck, hanging upside down, bleeding and suffering from a broken limb. Hill never testified that Alexander mentioned anything about drugs, and no drugs were found at the scene of the accident. Alexander was tested for the presence of drugs in his blood immediately after the accident, and the results were negative. Joe Allen testified that Alexander wanted a piece of stereo equipment commonly referred to as a kick-box removed from the wrecked truck. Instead of the drug residue being found in a box, the residue was found in a flannel shirt that was never identified as belonging to Alexander. No testimony was offered by the State as to why Alexander would have been wearing a long-sleeve flannel shirt in late Junethe middle of summer. ¶ 16. We have noted that the definition of circumstantial evidence gives rise to linguistic problems which do not fit into nice, neat mutually exclusive categories of either direct or circumstantial evidence, holding that, Circumstantial evidence is evidence which, without going directly to prove the existence of a fact, gives rise to a logical inference that such a fact does exist. Conversely, eye witness testimony is thought of as direct evidence. Keys, 478 So.2d at 268. But Hill's testimony about Alexander mentioning a box would not qualify as direct evidence because Alexander's statement, under the circumstances, was hardly an admission and certainly not a confession. ¶ 17. In Jones v. State, 635 So.2d 884, 887 (Miss.1994), we concluded that where intent alone is sought to be proved by circumstantial evidence, no instruction on circumstantial evidence is necessary. See also Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798 (Miss.1984); 23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1250 (1961). The case sub judice is distinguishable from Jones because the defendant in that case was charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, and he admitted to actual physical possession of marijuana. In the instant case Alexander was not in physical possession of any controlled substance. The State was not attempting proof of the singular element of intent but was trying to prove constructive possession with competent evidence connecting Alexander to the cocaine and methamphetamine residue. ¶ 18. The most troubling fact of all is that the shirt containing the drug residue was not found until at least five hours after the wreck. In that five hour period, the truck was unsecured by law enforcement, allowing a dangerous window of opportunity for someone to plant the evidence. To take the State's position and construe a statement concerning a box as an admission of drug possession is a radical expansion of the testimony and facts contained in the record. The denial of Alexander's requested circumstantial evidence instruction was therefore error.