Opinion ID: 625289
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Need for Expert Opinion on Causation

Text: Expert testimony may be introduced even when not strictly necessary if it will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 702. Because the Union Pacific did not argue at trial that an expert was required, we will not decide whether an expert is necessary to show causation for this kind of physical condition. Instead, the perspective for our analysis is this: could jurors make a finding as to causation based on the evidence that they had? In deciding whether this evidence was sufficient, Huffman urges us to consider a non-FELA case, in which we discussed proof of causation for a cumulative trauma injury in a common-law negligence action. Gutierrez v. Excel Corp., 106 F.3d 683, 686 n. 3 (5th Cir.1997) (noting that because the employer did not subscribe to the Texas workers' compensation system, the suit was brought as a negligence action). The basis of liability under FELA is not simply that an injury occur while an employee is at work but also that some negligence occurred. Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 543, 114 S.Ct. 2396. The Gutierrez court allowed a jury in a negligence action to infer causation for a cumulative trauma injury even without expert witnesses. Gutierrez, 106 F.3d at 687. In Gutierrez, cumulative trauma injury was characterized as `wear and tear' on the tissue surrounding joints, ligaments, and tendons. [It] refers not to one specific injury, but to numerous disorders caused by the performance of repetitive work over a long period of time. Id. at 686. The theory of negligence in that case was that an electric knife used by assembly line workers was known to cause cumulative trauma disorders (CTDs), and the defendants failed to adopt safety measures to reduce the trauma. Id. The risk factors for CTDs were shown through guidelines published by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), a division of the United States Department of Labor. Id. The guidelines identified the risk factors to the upper extremities present in the meat packing industry. Id. OSHA had published guidelines offering suggestions on minimizing those risk factors. Id. There was evidence that such measures had not been implemented at this workplace. Id. at 687-88. The Gutierrez court also examined whether the kind of injuries that the OSHA documents stated would arise from cumulative trauma matched the kind of injuries suffered by the plaintiffs: Injuries that may be classified as CTDs include, but are not limited to, carpal tunnel syndrome in the wrist, rotator cuff tendinitis in the shoulder, and nerve compression. While CTDs are generally not caused by any one specific traumatic event, there are certain risk factors associated with cumulative trauma, including repetition, force, vibration, cold, and posture. Id. at 686. The Gutierrez court held that there was evidence that the working situation at the Whizard table was rife with conditions known to cause, or at least to be associated with, [CTD]. Id. at 688. The plaintiff whose proven injuries were the kind recognized as CTDs was granted a new trial. Id. at 690. As to her, medical records suggest that her injury was `probably caused' from repetitive work. Id. Two plaintiffs whose specific injuries were ones that were not categorized as CTDs were not entitled to recover. Id. at 689. The court stated that it was not necessary for all plaintiffs bringing negligence claims for [CTDs to] present medical or other expert testimony specifically stating that there is a direct causal link between a defendant's actions and a plaintiff's injury. Id. First, plaintiffs could show they were negligently exposed to the risk factors present in the work-environment that are known to be associated with [CTD]. Id. Second, plaintiffs could show through medical evidence that they suffered from the particular injuries collectively referred to as [CTDs] that are caused by a combination of these risk factors. Id. Not requiring expert testimony in Gutierrez was consistent with Chief Judge Clark's useful summary of the capabilities of jurors: a jury can draw inferences on the basis of common sense, common understanding and fair beliefs, grounded on evidence consisting of direct statements by witnesses or proof of circumstances from which inferences can fairly be drawn. Fontenot, 714 F.2d at 20 (quoting Schulz, 350 U.S. at 527, 76 S.Ct. 608). In Gutierrez, what substituted for expert testimony was proof that certain kinds of injuries result from certain kinds of workthat drew from expert analysis made by OSHAand proof that the plaintiff engaged in that kind of work and suffered that kind of injury. Our sister circuits have dealt with related issues. In determining liability under FELA, one of the other circuits recognized that if general causation evidence is offered, a jury question certainly can be created even without expert testimony going directly to the question of specific causation. Hardyman v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 243 F.3d 255, 268 (6th Cir.2001). In that case, the court noted that evidence from the treating physician of the plaintiff's injury, the kinds of activities that result in that injury, the risk factors for the development of that injury, and evidence that those risk factors existed in the plaintiff's job was sufficient to create a jury question. Id. at 269. A recent Seventh Circuit decision took a different approach. Myers v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 629 F.3d 639 (7th Cir.2010). There, the long-time railroad worker had job duties and cumulative trauma injuries similar to Huffman's. Id. at 640-41. The worker argued that he merely needed to have an expert establish that conditions of his employment could cause certain kinds of injuries, and have his physician testify that these were the injuries that he had developed. The district court granted summary judgment for the railroad because no expert testified that his injuries were caused by the railroad's negligence. Id. at 641-42. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the nature of the trauma injuries that [the plaintiff] accumulated required expert testimony establishing specific causation. Id. at 645. The court noted the debate over how plaintiffs must establish causation under FELA, and acknowledged the Sixth Circuit's decision in Hardyman and cited this court's decision in Gutierrez. Id. at 642-43. The Union Pacific presses upon us a ruling from still another circuit in which the claim was based on a chemical exposure. See Claar v. Burlington N. R.R. Co., 29 F.3d 499 (9th Cir.1994). In addition to evidence that certain chemicals the plaintiff was exposed to at work caused the kind of injuries he suffered, the court also required expert testimony to show that the chemicals in fact did cause the plaintiff's injuries. Id. at 504. The Claar court noted two Supreme Court decisions that arguably stand for the proposition that, in order to create an issue for the jury, a FELA plaintiff need show only the mere possibility that a defendant's actions caused his injuries. Id. at 503-04 (citing Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963); Lavender v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S.Ct. 740, 90 L.Ed. 916 (1946)). One of the cited precedents involved a railroad worker who became seriously ill after an insect bite. Gallick, 372 U.S. at 109-10, 83 S.Ct. 659. Evidence of the existence of a stagnant pond next to where the employee worked, which provided a breeding place for insects, was sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a jury question on causation. Id. at 114, 83 S.Ct. 659. In the other case, there was little evidence upon which jurors could rely to decide between the deceased having been killed along the tracks by a metal hook hanging from a negligently maintained rail car or having instead been murdered. Lavender, 327 U.S. at 648-51, 66 S.Ct. 740. The jury was nonetheless free to make the inference that supported FELA liability. Id. at 652, 66 S.Ct. 740. In both cases, there was evidence that the death could have been caused by the condition created by the railroad. The jurors were free to choose among the possibilities. [4] The argument Huffman advances is that Gutierrez -style proof of causation should be applied to his FELA claim, and if it is, he proved enough. As a common law negligence case, Gutierrez required a plaintiff to prove that an employer's negligence was a substantial factor in bringing about the employee's injury. This level of causation is much higher than in FELA cases. We certainly do not hold Huffman to this higher standard. We do not see Gutierrez as an evidentiary model that we must decide may or may not apply in FELA cases. Instead, our task is simply to decide whether there was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer based on their common sense and common understandingthat Huffman's negligently-directed work with the Union Pacific contributed in any way to his development of osteoarthritis. The evidence need not show a substantial contribution but it must allow an inference that some contribution occurred. We now examine the evidence.