Opinion ID: 1809482
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the court erred in overruling the motion for a directed verdict, and erred in granting State's instruction S-2, and in refusing Townsend's instruction D-9.

Text: The lower court overruled Townsend's motion for a directed verdict requested upon the State resting its case. This Court has repeatedly said when considering a motion for a directed verdict, it must consider the evidence introduced in the light most favorable to the State, accepting all evidence introduced by the State as true, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom. McGee v. State, 569 So.2d 1191, 1192 (Miss. 1990); Barnwell v. State, 567 So.2d 215, 217 (Miss. 1990); Davis v. State, 530 So.2d 694, 703 (Miss. 1988). If there is sufficient evidence to support a guilty verdict, the motion for directed verdict must be overruled. Id. Townsend argues that once the State rested, he moved for a directed verdict and one of the grounds assigned for the motion was the prosecution's failure to prove that the contraband was under the knowing dominion and control of Townsend. The trial court overruled the motion on this ground, as well as on another ground. In reviewing the record and the trial court's reasoning, there exists ample evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty. It is apparent from the record that the officers were justified in searching the car incident to a valid arrest and indeed obtained further probable cause based upon the officers' smelling of marijuana smoke in the car giving the officers a justifiable reason to search the containers within Townsend's immediate control. Further, Townsend was the sole occupant of the vehicle and the officers ran a check on the car and found it titled in Townsend's name. Moreover, the bag containing methamphetamine was in plain view on the passenger side floorboard, it was within his immediate control, and Townsend should have known it was in his car. Thus, this Court concludes that the evidence and inferences flowing therefrom do provide ample evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty of possession of methamphetamine.
We must answer whether the trial court erred in granting the State's instruction S-2, which reads as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that where a person is occupying and exercising control over an automobile, he is presumed to be in constructive possession of the contents of the automobile. Townsend objected to this instruction as not being a true statement of the law. He further argued that there must be some evidence to indicate knowing possession other than simply occupying and exercising control over the automobile. The trial court overruled the objection and granted the instruction. In response, Townsend submitted jury instruction D-9, which read: The Defendant is charged by indictment with the crime of possession of a controlled substance, namely methamphetamine. To constitute a possession, there must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was aware of the presence and character of the particular substance, in this case, methamphetamine, and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it. Where the particular substance is not in the actual physical possession of the Defendant, there must be sufficient facts to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance involved was subject to the Defendant's dominion or control. The burden of proof in this case is on the State of Mississippi, and unless the State has presented evidence sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance involved was subject to the Defendant's dominion or control and that the Defendant was intentionally and consciously in possession of it, then it is your sworn duty to return a verdict of not guilty. If you return a verdict of not guilty, the form of that verdict, written on a separate sheet of paper, shall be as follows: We, the jury find the Defendant not guilty. (emphasis added). The State objected to the instruction as being a misstatement of the law. The trial court agreed with the State's position on Instruction D-9, as evinced by the following comment: BY THE COURT: I don't think the law is such that a person has to have his hand on it to be in physical possession. As I stated, this fellow was the sole occupant and driver of this vehicle. This bag in which the substance was within, was within an arm's reach. I don't see how he can say he is not in actual physical possession of it. I think the instruction is well taken and will be given excluding the third paragraph. Do you care to offer it as amended? BY MR. BROOKS (Townsend's attorney): No, your honor. Any deficiencies that Instruction S-2 had would have been cured by D-9, as the unoffending portion of D-9 spoke to the jury's need to find that the defendant was beyond a reasonable doubt aware of the presence and character of the particular substance, in this case, methamphetamine, and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it. However, the defense counsel refused to delete the offending and superfluous portion of D-9, and would not submit an amended version, upon the lower court's request. The defense counsel made this choice without objection. Townsend is therefore procedurally barred from raising this issue at this point when he did not do so at trial or in his motion for new trial. Davis v. State, 660 So.2d 1228 (Miss. 1995); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263 (Miss. 1994); Box v. State, 610 So.2d 1148 (Miss. 1992). This Court agrees with the trial court's offer to amend the instruction, which was declined by defense counsel. This Court has found previously that when contraband is found on premises owned by the Defendant, a presumption of constructive possession arises. Cunningham v. State, 583 So.2d 960, 962 (Miss. 1991); see also Esparaza v. State, 595 So.2d 418, 426 (Miss. 1992) (holding [w]hen drugs are found on premises, exclusive control provides significant proof of constructive possession) (emphasis added). Thus, this Court concludes that there was no reversible error as to the denial of Instruction D-9, as the offending portion was confusing to the ultimate law on constructive possession, and the amended version sought by the lower court from defense counsel was not submitted by defendant. As to the granting of S-2, this Court's standard in reviewing jury instructions is to read all instructions together and if the jury is fully and fairly charged by other instructions, the refusal of any similar instruction does not constitute reversible error. Lee v. State, 529 So.2d 181, 183 (Miss. 1988). This Court does not review jury instructions in isolation. Malone v. State, 486 So.2d 360, 365 (Miss. 1986). The lower court along with S-2, granted S-1, which reads as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that if you believe from the evidence in this case beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time and place charged in the indictment and testified about, that the Defendant, William B. Townsend, Jr., did wilfully unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his conscious control a Schedule II controlled substance, namely methamphetamine, in Leake County, Mississippi, then it is your duty to find the Defendant guilty as charged. In the event you find the Defendant guilty, the form of your verdict should be as follows: We, the Jury, find the Defendant, William B. Townsend, Jr., Guilty as charged. This Court notes Miller v. State, 634 So.2d 127, 129 (Miss. 1994), where we stated: [c]onstructive possession has been the subject of frequent interpretation by this Court. Actual physical possession need not be shown for conviction if the contraband is in the constructive possession of the accused. If the substance is subject to the defendant's dominion or control, it is said to be within ... his constructive possession. In Curry v. State, 249 So.2d 414, 416 (Miss. 1971), this Court stated: [T]here must be sufficient facts to warrant a finding that [the] defendant was aware of the presence and character of the particular substance and was intentionally and consciously in possession of it. It need not be actual physical possession. Miller v. State, 634 So.2d 127, 129-30 (Miss. 1994) (emphasis added). Here, however, Instruction S-2, says that where a person is occupying and exercising control over an automobile, he is presumed to be in possession of contents (i.e. drugs found therein) of the automobile. This alone is an incorrect statement of the aforementioned law; however, coupled with Instruction S-1, which speaks to conscious control over the illegal substance, there is no error looking at the jury instructions as a whole. Moreover, as previously discussed, the lower court wanted Instruction D-9, which also would have made a more complete version of the law on constructive possession, but the defense counsel refused to tailor D-9 to eliminate the troubling elements in it, and would not submit an amended version. The blame for poor choices by defense counsel cannot be placed on the doorstep of the lower court.