Opinion ID: 2268995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether It Was An Abuse Of Discretion To Award Kathleen Full Reasonable Attorney's Fees On Sam's First Three Post-Trial Motions

Text: After denying Sam's first three post-trial motions, the superior court granted Kathleen's motion for full reasonable fees of $7,272.87. Sam argues that it was error to award full fees. [6] The January 2009 full-fees order cited four subparagraphs of Civil Rule 82(b)(3) in support and largely accepted Kathleen's contentions. [7] Citing Rule 82(b)(3)(F), the order found that the claims Sam made in those motions were not reasonable, and that full fees were therefore necessary. It stated that Sam's first motion to compel was largely an untimely motion to reconsider, and that to the extent it sought compliance with an earlier order, his motion did not cite the earlier order or explain his failure to do so. It found that Sam's motion to correct was also an untimely motion to reconsider, was founded on an incorrect legal premise, and identified a mistake that was not clerical. And it found that Sam's second motion to compel was redundant and that Kathleen never should have been put to the expense of defending the motion at all. Citing Rule 82(b)(3)(G), it concluded that awarding full fees was also appropriate . . . for vexatious and bad faith litigation conduct, as set forth above. Citing Rule 82(b)(3)(H), it found that awarding full fees was appropriate because the effort and fees imposed on Kathleen were unreasonably large compared to the value of the items at stake. Citing Rule 82(b)(3)(K)'s other equitable factors provision, it found that awarding full fees was appropriate because Sam's decision to continu[e] the litigation of matters that could or should have been litigated at trial, or that were in fact litigated to conclusion at trial, effectively devalue[d] the assets awarded to Kathleen by requiring her to litigate repeatedly over the same issues. Sam argues that the record does not support the finding that his motions were ill-founded or made in bad faith. He asserts that his motions were directed at items of personal property that he had been awarded but never received, and did not challenge the original property award. [8] He also implies that full fees were not warranted as a matter of law on his first motion to compel because it partially succeeded. We usually review for abuse of discretion a Rule 82 award of full reasonable attorney's fees. [9] An abuse of discretion exists if an award is arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or the result of an improper motive. [10] Because the award of actual fees calls into question Sam's litigation conduct and the potential merits of Sam's underlying three motions, we assess de novo the legal and factual viability of his motions and review relevant findings of fact for clear error. [11] A prevailing party in a civil case is normally entitled to an award of attorney's fees, per Rule 82. [12] Divorce cases are usually excepted from this general rule; fees awards in divorce cases are typically based on the parties' relative economic situations and earning powers, rather than prevailing party status. [13] This divorce exception to Rule 82 is based on a broad reading of AS 25.24.140(a)(1), and on the reality that there is usually no prevailing party in a divorce case. [14] Nonetheless, we have held that Rule 82 applies to post-judgment modification and enforcement matters in domestic relations disputes [15] and that fees are appropriately awarded under the prevailing-party standard of Rule 82 as to post-judgment money and property disputes. [16] Rule 82 consequently applies to the parties' post-judgment enforcement motions in this case. Normally only partial fees are awarded under Rule 82, [17] but Rule 82(b)(3) lists factors that may permit a court to depart from a partial fees award calculated under Rule 82(b)(1) and (2), and to award enhanced or even full reasonable fees. [18] We have held that [i]n general, a trial court has broad discretion to award Rule 82 attorney's fees in amounts exceeding those prescribed by the schedule of the rule, so long as the court specifies in the record its reasons for departing from the schedule. [19] A Rule 82(b)(3) award of full fees is manifestly unreasonable absent a finding of bad faith or vexatious conduct. [20] Black's Law Dictionary defines bad faith as [d]ishonesty of belief or purpose. [21] In the attorney's fees context, we have equated bad faith with devoid of good faith. [22] Therefore, enhanced fees may be awarded under any of the subparagraphs of Rule 82(b)(3), but full fees may be awarded under Rule 82(b)(3) only if the vexatious or bad faith conduct standard of Rule 82(b)(3)(G) is satisfied. As we stated above, whether it was error to award full reasonable fees as to Sam's first three motions turns on their potential merit. [23]
We first consider Sam's initial motion to compel. It made three requests: (1) return of the road fabric purchased for the Glacier property; (2) reimbursement for fuel Sam purchased for the Glacier property and imposition on Kathleen of an unpaid Glacier property fuel invoice; and (3) return of some 28 items of Azalea personal property. The superior court largely denied the three requests, but denial does not in itself establish that the requests were made vexatiously or in bad faith. The issue is not whether they were ultimately unsuccessful, but whether they were collectively or individually so lacking in merit that it is permissible to infer that Sam or his lawyer acted in bad faith or engaged in vexatious litigation conduct. [24] If a request was either legally or factually so deficient as to reasonably permit an inference of vexatious or bad faith litigation conduct, we must affirm the award as to that request. Conversely, to prevail on appeal, Sam must demonstrate that the request was neither legally nor factually so deficient as to permit such an inference. Although we have never said so explicitly, our cases suggest that a motion to compel is procedurally appropriate if the moving party has an established legal right to the relief sought. [25] The question is therefore whether it would have been unreasonable for a litigant in Sam's position to believe that he had an established legal right to the requested items. The disputed rolls of road fabric appear to have been part of the Glacier personalty, which the findings and conclusions had expressly awarded to Sam. Sam's road fabric request thus sought items that arguably had been awarded to him. This request was not so legally deficient as to warrant an inference of vexatiousness or bad faith. The road fabric request was also factually sufficient. The exhibits supporting the motion included letters between the parties' lawyers discussing the road fabric. Kathleen's lawyer's letters did not deny the existence of the rolls, or that they had been on the property, although one denied any concealment or interference with Sam's opportunities to recover the fabric. Admissible facts therefore reasonably permitted inferences that at least three rolls of road fabric were missing, that Kathleen possessed the Glacier property at relevant times, and that she might have somehow prevented Sam from recovering the missing rolls or knew what had happened to them. Whether Kathleen permitted Sam's brother to take the rolls or whether the rolls were still at the Glacier property during her possession, the request seeking an accounting of the road fabric was potentially meritorious. We turn to Sam's fuel request. Sam had argued at trial that he should get an offset for one-half the cost of a tank-load of fuel for the Glacier property, but his first motion to compel asserted that Kathleen was responsible for the cost of the entire tank-load, and that she should also pay for another billed, but unpaid for, delivery. The divorce findings and conclusions did not specifically mention Sam's reimbursement request; they instead generally provided that the utility obligations would simply go with their respective properties, and awarded the Glacier realty to Kathleen. That general provision could reasonably be read as imposing the fuel obligation, at least as to any unpaid fuel invoice, on Kathleen. Because it relied on that provision, Sam's post-trial fuel request was at least in part not so legally deficient as to give rise to a reasonable inference of vexatiousness or bad faith. [26] Sam's fuel request was also factually sufficient, at least in part. Trial testimony supported the request for reimbursement of the fuel Sam had paid for, and exhibits filed with his motion included the unpaid invoice and correspondence between the lawyers discussing the fuel dispute. Kathleen's memorandum in opposition did not even mention the unpaid invoice. Even though they denied any legal basis for Sam's fuel claims, the letters from Kathleen's lawyer did not deny any salient facts. The exhibits therefore reasonably permitted inferences that Sam had filled the tank after separation, and that when Kathleen took possession of the Glacier home following the divorce, she acquired fuel that Sam had paid for and fuel that no one had yet paid for. These facts would have supported the grant of his fuel request had Sam succeeded in convincing the court that the utility obligations that went with the Glacier property included either or both of the fuel bills. Finally, we turn to the sufficiency of the request for the Azalea items. Sam asserted below that they were non-marital or inherited. Even though the parties ultimately waived the opportunity to litigate the division of the Azalea personalty on that basis, [27] by ordering Kathleen to return the heirlooms if she had them, the superior court implicitly concluded that the heirlooms were indeed Sam's. Because neither party appealed the heirloom order, we do not independently inquire into that aspect of Sam's request; instead, we accept as law of the case the superior court's conclusion that Sam had a right to those items. [28] We therefore conclude that Sam's request was not so legally deficient as to warrant an inference of vexatious or bad faith litigation conduct. It is unclear whether the superior court used heirlooms rigorously [29] or as a shorthand reference to all of the items Sam sought. Some were not heirlooms, and Sam had no legitimate claim to others. [30] But it does not matter precisely what the court intended, because the heirloom order established the substantial legal sufficiency of Sam's request as to most of the disputed Azalea items. Nor was the Azalea request factually deficient. The heirloom order necessarily accepted Sam's contention that these items were his. Admissible facts reasonably permitted an inference that Kathleen either still had the items or knew what had happened to them. Sam's motion with respect to the Azalea items was therefore not so factually deficient as to give rise to an inference of vexatious or bad faith conduct. Thus, with minor exceptions, each of Sam's three requests had potential legal and factual merit. Because most of the requests actually or ostensibly sought to recover items Sam could have reasonably believed had been awarded to him in the property division, Sam's first motion to compel was not so legally deficient as to support an award of full fees. We do not need to consider whether a finding of vexatious or bad faith conduct could stand if a party's litigation efforts largely had no potential merit or were not fairly disputable. The three requests made in Sam's first motion to compel were not, individually or collectively, so lacking in legal or factual merit that full fees could be awarded under Rule 82(b)(3)(G). [31] The January 2009 order granting full fees also made findings under other subparagraphs of Rule 82(b)(3). But because full fees may not be awarded under Rule 82(b)(3) except under Rule 82(b)(3)(G), [32] these other findings could support an award of full fees only if they reasonably permit an inference of vexatious or bad faith litigation conduct satisfying Rule 82(b)(3)(G). The order states that a full fees award was also appropriate under Rule 82(b)(3)(G), for vexatious and bad faith litigation conduct, as set forth above.  (Emphasis added.) Several of these prior as set forth abovefindings were relevant. Thus, the order had found that the claims made by Sam in the motions at issue were not reasonable. And it had found that the first motion to compel was made long after trial, was largely an untimely reconsideration motion, and cited no order to be enforced. In a subsequent findingand thus not one set forth abovethe order characterized Sam's conduct as pursuing baseless and unsupported claims after trial. [33] To the extent these other findings pertain to the potential legal or factual merit of the first motion to compel, they do not warrant an award of full fees, for the reasons we discussed above. We therefore conclude that it was error to award full reasonable fees as to Sam's first motion to compel.
We turn to Sam's second motion to compel, filed while his first was pending. Both were decided the same day, some three months after Sam filed the second motion; the court denied the second as redundant, and later awarded Kathleen full fees as to it because she never should have been put to the expense of defending [against] the [second] motion at all. In response to a question from this court at oral argument, Sam's lawyer agreed that the second motion was redundant. But we note that the second motion addressed only the Azalea items (not the road fabric or fuel claims), and that it elaborated on the Azalea items request legally and factually, in asserting that most of the items were personal to Sam's family and were owned by Sam before the marriage, and that the remaining items were attached to his military career. It was also accompanied by Sam's affidavit, which explained the provenance of many of the disputed items. The second motion was filed April 18, 2008, several days before Kathleen filed her opposition to Sam's first motion. No doubt many or all of the contentions advanced in Sam's second motion to compel and its supporting papers could or should have been raised in the first. Kathleen therefore might have been awarded enhanced fees for having to address the Azalea items twice, initially in opposing the first motion, and then in addressing the expanded contentions in the second. But even though both motions sought the same 28-some items, the second motion and the supporting affidavit helpfully clarified the potential merit in Sam's request. Mere redundancy, under the circumstances, does not justify awarding full reasonable fees as to the second motion. Moreover, the heirloom order established that at least some of the claims made in Sam's second motion had merit. And because Sam filed the second motion before the heirloom order granted him partial relief on his first motion, bad faith cannot be inferred from his effort to refine his as-yet unresolved contentions. Our comments about Sam's first motion to compel and the Rule 82(b)(3)(F), (G), (H), and (K) findings apply equally to his second motion to compel. We therefore conclude that Kathleen was not entitled to full fees on Sam's second motion to compel.
The superior court also awarded Kathleen full fees as to Sam's motion to clarify the alleged clerical mistake, characterizing it as an untimely reconsideration motion that did not address any mistake that could be considered clerical. That characterization was correct: Sam's motion identified an asymmetry in the two QDROs, but identified no clerical error or mistake correctable under Civil Rule 60(a) or Civil Rule 60(b)(1). And Sam could have raised the issue when he sought clarification of the findings soon after they were entered. We affirm the award of full fees as to Sam's motion to correct. [34]
Because the court described Sam's three motions as baseless and unsupported, we consider whether they collectively justified an award of full fees. That finding addressed only the three motions, not Sam's post-trial conduct generally. We are well aware that trial courts are in the best position to accurately assess the parties' motives and decide whether posttrial claims were or could have been raised at trial. And trial courts must have the tools to keep litigants from sparring on after the closing trial bell has rung. But we conclude that Sam's three motions were not collectively so baseless and unsupported as to justify full fees under the vexatious or bad faith conduct standard of Rule 82(b)(3)(G). We reaffirm that trial courts are not without tools to provide substantial relief: they can award enhanced Rule 82(b)(3) feesalthough not full feeseven absent vexatious or bad faith conduct. In short, we reverse the full fees award as to Sam's two motions to compel and affirm the award as to Sam's motion to correct. Kathleen supported her fees request with a certificate of counsel and an exhibit specifying the legal services required by each of Sam's motions, and Sam's appeal raises no dispute about the value of services performed in opposing each motion. We therefore affirm the $2,299.50 award of fees incurred in opposing his motion to correct, and reverse the $4,842 award of full fees incurred on his two motions to compel. We do not foreclose the superior court on remand from awarding Kathleen enhanced fees on Sam's motions to compel. But we observe that a rapid and economical close to this entire dispute is in the interest of both parties and that tertiary fees litigation is unlikely to be productive.