Opinion ID: 886001
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: issues

Text: ¶ 27 Did the District violate Bryan's constitutional right to know and participate? ¶ 28 The District Court's conclusions of law contain four sections entitled Writ of Mandate, Writ of Prohibition, Right to Participate, and Right to Know//Open Meetings. In the Right to Know//Open Meetings section, the District Court concluded that the District did not violate Bryan's constitutional right to know because it provided [Bryan] and the general public the right to observe its deliberations and to access all public records considered and generated in making its decision. In the Right to Participate section, the District Court concluded that the District adequately notified the public regarding pertinent meetings and sufficiently afforded Bryan a reasonable opportunity to submit data, views, or arguments orally and in written form. Therefore, the District Court denied Bryan the relief she requested and dismissed her complaint. ¶ 29 Bryan maintains that the District Court erred at the outset when it segregated its right to participate and right to know analyses. Bryan contends that Article II, Sections 8 and 9, are inextricably linked by way of Article II, Section 8's, reasonable opportunity proviso. The District, on the other hand, insists that the Article II, Section 8 and 9, rights are separate and distinct. It argues that neither Article II, Section 8, nor its implementing statutes, condition participation on a prior review of documents. ¶ 30 The delegates' discussions regarding the adoption of Article II, Sections 8 and 9, do not appear to support the District's separate and distinct proposition. Admittedly, the delegates did not often refer specifically to the two provisions' interrelationship during their open discussions. However, there are several references in the Constitutional Convention transcripts which reveal the fundamental link between the right to know and participate. In expressing reservations about the privacy exception contemplated in the right to know, Delegate Martin claimed that an exception could close much of government to all citizens, frustrating their ability to participate in the decision making process .... Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1672 (emphasis added). Later, Delegate Ask reiterated that we have in the Bill of Rights ... that they want... to participate in government the right to know, the right to participate. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. VII at 2560. ¶ 31 Perhaps we find little discussion regarding the provisions' interrelationship because of the resounding clarity in the comments to Article II, Section 9. In the comments accompanying Article II, Section 9, the Bill of Rights Committee stated: The committee, with two dissenting votes, and after considerable reflection, adopted this provision explicitly establishing a public right to know.... It is a companion to the preceding right of participation. Both arise out of the increasing concern of citizens and commentators alike that government's sheer bigness threatens the effective exercise of citizenship. The committee notes this concern and believes that one step which can be taken to change this situation is to Constitutionally presume the openness of government documents and operations. [Emphasis added.] Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. II at 631. While the two provisions do contain somewhat different language and prescribe somewhat different rights, the above comment clearly indicates that the Bill of Rights Committee, and subsequently the delegates as a whole, acknowledged the inextricable association between the companion provisions. For, as some commentators have noted, [t]o participate effectively and knowledgeably in the political process of a democracy one must be permitted the fullest imaginable freedom of speech and one must be fully apprised of what government is doing, has done, and is proposing to do. Larry M. and Deborah E. Elison, Comments on Government Censorship and Secrecy, 55 Mont. L.Rev. 175, 177 (1994). Therefore, we will not analyze the two provisions in a vacuum, separate and distinct from one another, as urged by the District. We now turn our attention to the particulars of the purported violations.
¶ 32 As indicated above, Article II, Section 9, contains two components: the right to examine documents and the right to observe the deliberations of public bodies or agencies. Bryan argues that the spreadsheet which contained the rating system was a public document subject to public examination. Therefore, Bryan alleges that the District violated her right to examine documents when it failed to distribute the rating system version of the spreadsheet following the Rimrock parents' request. ¶ 33 As we stated in Becky v. Butte-Silver Bow Sch. Dist. 1 (1995), 274 Mont. 131, 136, 906 P.2d 193, 196: Any review of Article II, Section 9, of the Montana Constitution necessarily involves a three-step process. First, we consider whether the provision applies to the particular political subdivision against whom enforcement is sought. Second, we determine whether the documents in question are documents of public bodies subject to public inspection. Finally, if the first two requirements are satisfied, we decide whether a privacy interest is present, and if so, whether the demand of individual privacy clearly exceeds the merits of public disclosure. We have already determined that Article II, Section 9, applied to the actions of the Facilities Committee. Further, this case does not implicate the privacy interest prong of the three-part test, nor does the District assert otherwise. Therefore, for purposes of Bryan's Article II, Section 9, allegation, we need only examine whether the requested spreadsheet was a document of a public body subject to public inspection. ¶ 34 The District and Amicus Curiae indicate that the Legislature has promulgated statutes to implement an individual's right to examine documents at § 2-6-101, et seq., MCA. According to the District and Amicus Curiae, the public is entitled to examine only those documents which constitute public writings, pursuant to § 2-6-101(2), MCA. The District insists that the spreadsheet did not constitute a public writing until it was considered and relied upon by Board members to make their decision at the April 9, 2001 meeting and, therefore, not subject to the right of examination until that time. ¶ 35 In Becky, 274 Mont. at 137, 906 P.2d at 196, this Court acknowledged that the Montana Constitution does not define `documents... of ... public bodies.' We noted that the definition of public writings, contained in § 2-6-101(2), MCA, proved useful in interpreting the constitutional language. However, we then departed somewhat from the narrowly crafted definition of public writings and stated: Although documents of public bodies is not defined in the Montana Constitution, it must reasonably be held to mean documents generated or maintained by a public body which are somehow related to the function and duties of that body. Becky, 274 Mont. at 138, 906 P.2d at 197. Therefore, while we did discuss the public writings factors delineated in § 2-6-101(2), MCA, we ultimately interpreted the constitutional documents of public bodies much more broadly than the legislative construct. ¶ 36 As indicated above, the Facilities Committee was a public body. Further, Cabrera generated the spreadsheet and rating system to assist in the function of that body's charge, while acting in his capacity as a member of the Facilities Committee. Therefore, we conclude that the spreadsheet was a document of a public body subject to public inspection prior to the April 9, 2001, board meeting. ¶ 37 In apparent anticipation of this conclusion, the District claims that it did not violate Bryan's right to know because the Rimrock parents did not make an intelligent request for the document. The District indicates that the Rimrock parents contacted the superintendent's office and requested a head-to-head comparison of the schools which contemplated some thirty-five various criteria. The District insists that no such document existed. Therefore, as the parents did not submit an intelligent request for the desired spreadsheet, the District maintains that it did not violate Bryan's right to examine public documents. ¶ 38 As indicated above, the Rimrock parents contacted the District's chief administrator on April 4, 2001, and requested a head-to-head comparison of the affected schools. The District denied knowledge of any information regarding such a comparison. On April 6, 2001, the Rimrock parents again phoned the superintendent's office with a request for the purported comparison. However, this time, the parents propounded a more specific request they requested a copy of the spreadsheet to which Cabrera referred in his April 5, 2001, television interview. Again, the District claimed ignorance but now implies that had the parents framed their request in a different manner, they may have achieved a better result. ¶ 39 When the delegates adopted Article II, Section 9, they essentially declared a constitutional presumption that every document within the possession of public officials is subject to inspection. See Associated Press, Inc. v. Department, 2000 MT 160, ¶ 85, 300 Mont. 233, ¶ 85, 4 P.3d 5, ¶ 85 (Nelson, J., specially concurring). Yet, the District would purport to temper the constitutional right of inspection based on the gatekeeper's interpretation of the request. To impose such a hypertechnical constraint on the lay public would frustrate the maxim of liberal interpretation and subvert the constitutional mandate on open government. Here, it certainly does not shock the bounds of reason to consider that one might contact a school district's chief administrator in an effort to acquire information on school closures. Further, the Rimrock parents' request for Cabrera's head-to-head comparison is not so unintelligible that it justifies nondisclosure. Therefore, we hold that the District violated Bryan's right to examine public documents when it failed to divulge the rating system version of the spreadsheet for public inspection upon request. Consequently, the District Court erred when it concluded otherwise.
¶ 40 Before we delve into the merits of the parties' arguments on Article II, Section 8, we find it useful to reference the provision's genesis and the delegates' motivation for memorializing such a protection. In its accompanying comments to the proposed text of Article II, Section 8, the Bill of Rights Committee stated: The committee unanimously adopted this section in response to the increased public concern and literature about citizen participation in the decision-making processes of government. The provision is in part a Constitutional sermon designed to serve notice to agencies of government that the citizens of the state will expect to participate in agency decisions prior to the time the agency makes up its mind. In part, it is also a commitment at the level of fundamental law to seek structures, rules and procedures that maximize the access of citizens to the decision-making institutions of state government. The committee believes that this is eminently proper and that it will have a salutary effect not only on the quality of the final decisions, but more important, on the deliberative and political capabilities of the citizenry. It is hoped that this provision will play a role in reversing the dissatisfactions increasingly expressed regarding bureaucratic authority insulated from public scrutiny and participation. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. II at 630-31. Further, in deliberations prior to the adoption of Article II, Section 8, delegates offered the following insight into the scope of the right of participation: Delegate Dahood: What is intended by Section 8 is that any rules and regulations that shall be made and formulated and announced by any governmental agency, which of course are going to affect the citizens of this state and the common welfare, shall not be made until some notice is given so that the citizen will have a reasonable opportunity to participate with respect to his opinion, either for or against that particular administrative action. .... Delegate Foster: ... I think that we should be very well aware of what this committee is attempting to do. The continuing growth of bureaus has brought a new dimension to our representative form of government. We have drawn clearer lines of election for legislative officials. We have devised a more responsive system of selection and election for judicial officials. We have retained an extensive elective process for our executive officials. But what of the bureaus, the long arm of government with which the average citizen most often comes in contact; the long arm of government which is not responsive to elective officials; the long arms of government with which many, if not most, of our Montana citizens have met frustrating resistance and/or indifference? Elections do not materially affect the bureaus. Political pressures are not sufficient to juvenate [sic] response to public need. Public awareness and access seem to be the only tools to remind the great mass of public servants that their job is to serve the needs of the public and no other; they are paid by tax dollars to benefit the public above all else. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1655, 1657. ¶ 41 Using the aforementioned directives as a backdrop, we now turn to the parties' Article II, Section 8, contentions. Since the District failed to disclose the requested information, Bryan insists that the District did not afford her a reasonable opportunity to participate on April 9, 2001. In other words, Bryan claims that she could not effectively exercise her Article II, Section 8, right to participate on April 9, 2001, because the District violated her Article II, Section 9, right to examine public documents. The District concedes that a school board is an agency subject to the provisions of Article II, Section 8. However, the District suggests that an individual's reasonable opportunity to participate is satisfied when the person succeeds in submitting her views to the agency. The District claims that it fulfilled its obligations to Bryan as it distributed the information considered by the School Board and provided her with an opportunity to speak at its April 9, 2001, meeting. ¶ 42 Essentially, the parties' dispute hinges on the interpretation of the reasonable opportunity language found in Article II, Section 8, and § 2-3-111, MCA. In discussions prior to the provision's adoption, Delegate Garlington expressed similar concerns regarding the opportunity prescribed in Article II, Section 8: Mr. Chairman, I have said before, I think it is the responsibility of this body to be to deliberate carefully and not to do things that are going to create a lot of difficulty and confusion in the future. I am concerned about what is meant by the phrase opportunity for citizen participation in the operation of government.... And I bring this up so that we can look at these words and make sure that whatever we draft here really states what our intention is and if there are limits to what we're authorizing. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1654-55. While the delegates did not specifically debate the definition of reasonable, Delegate Dahood did offer this incite into the term: Mr. Chairman, I do not experience any particular problem in having the word reasonable substituted. I'm sure that my committee would not have any particular difficulty. I think, in our judgment, feasible was synonymous with reasonable but somewhat more expansive; but I think, as a lawyer, having been confronted with the use of the word reasonable so many times, having seen it defined so many times, that I think the definition that the law would give it would certainly serve the purpose that we intend to serve by Section 8. Montana Constitutional Convention, Vol. V at 1653. ¶ 43 Black's Law Dictionary defines reasonable as 1. Fair, proper, or moderate under the circumstances .... Black's Law Dictionary 1272 (7th ed.1999). Within the context of Rule 12(c), M.R.Civ.P., this Court has stated that a party has a reasonable opportunity to act if he or she is fairly apprised. See Rafanelli v. Dale, 1998 MT 331, ¶ 22, 292 Mont. 277, ¶ 22, 971 P.2d 371, ¶ 22. Other jurisdictions have expanded upon these equitable notions to include a meaningful component to the reasonable standard. See Schwartz v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission (1975), 168 Conn. 20, 357 A.2d 495, 497 (conducting a just public hearing means that the public is given the opportunity to participate at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner ....); Florida Power & Light Co. v. United States (D.C.Cir.1988), 846 F.2d 765, 771 (The APA requires the Commission to provide notice of its proposed rulemaking adequate to afford `interested parties a reasonable opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process.' Such notice must not only give adequate time for comments, but also must provide sufficient factual detail and rationale for the rule to permit interested parties to comment meaningfully.) ¶ 44 While we decline this opportunity to adopt some mechanical formula interpreting reasonable opportunity, we conclude that, at a minimum, the reasonable opportunity standard articulated in Article II, Section 8, and § 2-3-111, MCA, demands compliance with the right to know contained in Article II, Section 9. It is evident from the comment to Article II, Section 8, that the delegates sought to expose the activities of those bureaucratic authorities which were once isolated from public scrutiny. However, if we adopt the District's position, agencies could once again invoke the autonomy of the long arm government structure through delegation. Such a superficial interpretation of the right to participate to simply require an uninformed opportunity to speak would essentially relegate the right of participation to paper tiger status in the face of stifled disclosure and incognizance. Given the tenor of the delegates' insistence upon open government and citizen participation, we find it improbable that they envisioned and subsequently memorialized such a hollow right. ¶ 45 Certainly, as the District suggests, Bryan was given the opportunity to voice her concern regarding the school closure recommendation. However, she participated under a distorted perspective in light of the District's partial disclosure of information. At the evidentiary hearing, Bryan testified that upon receiving the rating system, following the April 9, 2001, meeting, she identified many serious flaws and errors in its analysis. She claims that she could have undermined the basis for the committee's recommendation if she had had the opportunity ... [and] might have swayed the one vote that was needed to keep her children's school from being closed. ¶ 46 As the United States Supreme Court stated: The right to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence, but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren one. Those who are brought into contest with the Government in a quasijudicial proceeding aimed at the control of their activities are entitled to be fairly advised of what the Government proposes and to be heard upon its proposals before it issues its final command. Morgan v. United States (1938), 304 U.S. 1, 18-19, 58 S.Ct. 773, 776, 82 L.Ed. 1129. In essence, when the District violated Bryan's right to know, it reduced what should have been a genuine interchange into a mere formality. Therefore, we hold that the District did not provide Bryan with a reasonable opportunity to participate at the April 9, 2001, meeting. Consequently, the District Court erred when it concluded that the District did not violate Bryan's Article II, Section 8, right of participation.