Opinion ID: 482542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of CERCLA to Pre-1980 Acts

Text: 17 Appellants first argue the district court erred in applying CERCLA retroactively, that is, to impose liability for acts committed before its effective date, December 11, 1980. CERCLA Sec. 302(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9652(a), provides that [u]nless otherwise provided, all provisions of this chapter shall be effective on December 11, 1980. Appellants argue that CERCLA should not apply to pre-enactment conduct that was neither negligent nor unlawful when committed. Appellants argue that all the conduct at issue occurred in the early 1970s, well before CERCLA became effective. Appellants also argue that there is no language supporting retroactive application in CERCLA's liability section, CERCLA Sec. 107, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607, or in the legislative history. Appellants further argue that because CERCLA imposes a new kind of liability, retroactive application of CERCLA violates due process and the taking clause. We disagree. 18 The district court correctly found Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively. Id. at 839. We acknowledge there is a presumption against the retroactive application of statutes. See United States v. Security Industrial Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79, 103 S.Ct. 407, 413, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982). We hold, however, that CERCLA Sec. 302(a), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9652(a), is merely a standard 'effective date' provision that indicates the date when an action can first be brought and when the time begins to run for issuing regulations and doing other future acts mandated by the statute. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.Supp. 1064, 1075 (D.Colo.1985); cf. Von Allmen v. Connecticut Teachers Retirement Board, 613 F.2d 356, 359-60 (2d Cir.1979) (veterans statute). 19 Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is manifestly clear that Congress intended CERCLA to have retroactive effect. The language used in the key liability provision, CERCLA Sec. 107, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607, refers to actions and conditions in the past tense: any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substances owned or operated, CERCLA Sec. 107(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(2), any person who ... arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal, CERCLA Sec. 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(3), and any person who ... accepted any hazardous substances for transport to ... sites selected by such person, CERCLA Sec. 107(a)(4), 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9607(a)(4). See, e.g., United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. 162, 220 (W.D.Mo.1985); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.Supp. at 1069-73; United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) 1753, 1760-62 (D.S.C.1984) 4 ; United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F.Supp. at 1259; United States v. Price, 577 F.Supp. 1103, 1111-12 (D.N.J.1983); Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Georgeoff, 562 F.Supp. 1300, 1312 (N.D.Ohio 1983); United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 556 F.Supp. 54, 57 (N.D.Ill.1982); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F.Supp. 1100, 1113-14 (D.Minn.1982); see generally Developments in the Law--Toxic Waste Litigation, 99 Harv.L.Rev. 1498 (1986) (Developments ). 20 Further, the statutory scheme itself is overwhelmingly remedial and retroactive. CERCLA authorizes the EPA to force responsible parties to clean up inactive or abandoned hazardous substance sites, CERCLA Sec. 106, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 9606, and authorizes federal, state and local governments and private parties to clean up such sites and then seek recovery of their response costs from responsible parties, CERCLA Secs. 104, 107, 42 U.S.C. Secs. 9604, 9607. In order to be effective, CERCLA must reach past conduct. CERCLA's backward-looking focus is confirmed by the legislative history. See generally H.R.Rep. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 6119 (CERCLA House Report). Congress intended CERCLA to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites. Id. at 22, 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News at 6125. 21 The district court also correctly found that retroactive application of CERCLA does not violate due process. 579 F.Supp. at 840-41. Appellants argue CERCLA creates a new form of liability that is designed to deter and punish those who, according to current standards, improperly disposed of hazardous substances in the past. We disagree. 22 It is by now well established that legislative Acts adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational way. [L]egislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because it upsets otherwise settled expectations. This is true even though the effect of the legislation is to impose a new duty or liability based on past acts. 23 Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 15, 96 S.Ct. 2882, 2892, 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976) (citations omitted). Due process is satisfied simply by showing that the retroactive application of the legislation is itself justified by a rational legislative purpose. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 730, 104 S.Ct. 2709, 2718, 81 L.Ed.2d 601 (1984). Provided that the retroactive application of a statute is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose furthered by rational means, judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches.... Id. at 729, 104 S.Ct. at 2718. 24 Appellants failed to show that Congress acted in an arbitrary and irrational manner. Cleaning up inactive and abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites is a legitimate legislative purpose, and Congress acted in a rational manner in imposing liability for the cost of cleaning up such sites upon those parties who created and profited from the sites and upon the chemical industry as a whole, NEPACCO, 579 F.Supp. at 841. See United States v. Ottati & Goss, Inc., 630 F.Supp. 1361, 1398-99 (D.N.H.1985); United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 221-22; United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F.Supp. at 1072-73; United States v. South Carolina Recycling & Disposal, Inc., 20 Env't Rep. Cases (BNA) at 1761-62; see generally Developments, 99 Harv.L.Rev. at 1556-62. We hold retroactive application of CERCLA to impose liability upon responsible parties for acts committed before the effective date of the statute does not violate due process. 25 Appellants also summarily argue retroactive application of CERCLA constitutes an unconstitutional taking of property. We disagree. First, because appellants do not have a property interest in the Denney farm site, we question appellants' standing to raise a taking issue. Second, we hesitate to characterize the government's cleanup as a taking at all; the government's cleanup of the Denney farm site has not deprived the property owner of any property interest. See United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F.Supp. at 216-17. Instead, the government's cleanup of the site abated an imminent and substantial endangerment to the public health and the environment, thus eliminating a public nuisance and restoring value to the property by removing the hazardous substances. See generally Developments, 99 Harv.L.Rev. at 1564-65 & nn. 111, 114, citing Blaymore, Retroactive Application of Superfund: Can Old Dogs Be Taught New Tricks?, 12 B.C. Envtl.Aff.L.Rev. 1, 43-46 (1985).