Opinion ID: 2069680
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Principles of Collateral Estoppel

Text: Van Milligan also contends that collateral estoppel principles should not have been applied to prevent him from presenting evidence at his discharge hearing. The police board determined that the transcript of the Federal district court proceeding, with respect to Grosse's civil rights suit against Van Milligan, was adequate basis to resolve the charges filed against Van Milligan by the police chief. The record reveals that when Van Milligan initially filed his action for administrative review of the police board's decision, the trial court remanded the cause to the board for the limited purpose of allowing Van Milligan to present evidence regarding whether his conduct during the Grosse incident fell within the parameters of the rules and training he had received as a probationary officer. On remand, the police board permitted the introduction of such evidence. However, the board did not allow the introduction of additional evidence regarding Van Milligan's alleged assault, battery, or violation of Federal civil rights during the Grosse incident. The board again found against Van Milligan and affirmed its original decision to terminate his employment. Thereafter, the trial court considered and rejected Van Milligan's second request for administrative review of the board's termination of his employment. Thus, Van Milligan was not afforded the opportunity to present additional evidence, at his disciplinary hearing, regarding the issues of whether his conduct during the Grosse incident amounted to an assault, battery, or violation of Grosse's Federal civil rights. The police board's decision to exclude this additional evidence which Van Milligan sought to introduce relied upon principles of offensive collateral estoppel. This court recently reviewed the doctrine of offensive collateral estoppel in In re Owens (1988), 125 Ill.2d 390, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248. As explained in Owens, offensive collateral estoppel occurs when a plaintiff seeks to foreclose a defendant from litigating an issue the defendant has previously litigated unsuccessfully in another action. ( Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 397, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248.) This court counseled against an unrestricted use of offensive collateral estoppel ( Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 399, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248), noting that application of the doctrine in the second suit permits the plaintiff to `adopt a wait and see attitude [during litigation of the first lawsuit], in the hope that the first action by another plaintiff will result in a favorable judgment.' ( Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 398, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248, quoting Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore (1979), 439 U.S. 322, 330, 99 S.Ct. 645, 651, 58 L.Ed.2d 552.) This court also noted that principles of fairness counseled against the unrestrained offensive use of collateral estoppel. ( Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 399, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248.) In this respect, it was noted that, if the defendant initially did not foresee the like lihood of later litigation involving the same subject matter, the defendant would be placed in a difficult predicament if a second suit were commenced and if additional, or different, liability were imposed in the second lawsuit. ( Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 399, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248.) This court further observed: The[se]    considerations indicate to us that courts must be more cautious in allowing collateral estoppel to be used offensively than in allowing it to be used defensively. In our view, in ordinary civil cases, circuit courts must have broad discretion to ensure that application of offensive collateral estoppel is not fundamentally unfair to the defendant, even though the threshold requirements for collateral estoppel are otherwise satisfied. The threshold requirements    are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the one presented in the suit in question, (2) there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior adjudication, and (3) the party against whom estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication. ( Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 399-400, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248.) Based upon these considerations, this court determined in Owens that, although factual findings in a criminal case could be given offensive collateral estoppel effect in an attorney disciplinary suit, the factual findings of a civil fraud case could not be the basis for collateral estoppel against the respondent to an attorney disciplinary action. ( Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 400-01, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248.) The court reasoned that the risk of unfairly imposed discipline is too great, and the economy to be gained too minimal, to warrant such an abridgement of the disciplinary process. Owens, 125 Ill.2d at 401, 126 Ill.Dec. 563, 532 N.E.2d 248. The reasoning of Owens is equally applicable to the present cause. Although it would appear that the threshold requirements of collateral estoppel might be satisfied in this case, we believe it would be highly unfair to the police officer, Van Milligan, if offensive collateral estoppel effect were given to the factual findings of the Federal civil rights suit in this subsequent disciplinary proceeding in which the police chief seeks the officer's discharge. We believe that the police officer's substantial interest in a full hearing, where the grounds for any discipline imposed will be fully and fairly litigated, militate against the application of principles of offensive collateral estoppel in this case. Accordingly, we conclude that Van Milligan is entitled to a new disciplinary hearing where he will be permitted a full opportunity to present evidence in response to the disciplinary charges lodged against him. Van Milligan further argues that the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed, because the decision to discharge him was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The police board determined that Van Milligan's conduct during the July 1982 arrest showed a substantial shortcoming in his performance as a police officer and that his continued employment would cause a material impairment to the discipline and efficiency of the municipality's police force. We have thoroughly reviewed the evidence of record. Based upon that review, we cannot say that the police board's decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence or wholly unsupported by the evidence presented for its consideration. (See, e.g., Launius v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners (1992), 151 Ill.2d 419, 428, 435-36, 177 Ill.Dec. 407, 603 N.E.2d 477.) However, our determination is not to be considered conclusive on remand, and we express no opinion with regard to the result that should obtain in a new disciplinary hearing. For the reasons stated, the judgments of the appellate court and the circuit court are reversed, the decision of the police board is set aside, and the cause is remanded to the police board for further proceedings consistent herewith. Appellate court reversed; circuit court reversed; board decision set aside; cause remanded.