Opinion ID: 1256272
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The test as applied to the instant case

Text: ¶ 22 Factual findings made by trial courts in conducting excessiveness inquiries must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331 n. 10, 118 S.Ct. 2028 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 574-75, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985)). However, the question of whether a fine is constitutionally excessive requires the application of a constitutional standard to the facts of the individual case. In that context, de novo review of the question is appropriate. See id. (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 134 L.Ed.2d 911 (1996)). ¶ 23 The police seized from the defendant property less than two pounds of marijuana in three searches within eighteen months, with a street value of approximately $7,200.00. The trial court found that [f]orfeiture of this real property has served a remedial purpose of removing this drug house from the stream of narcotic commerce, thereby serving the public by removing a drug safehouse from its ongoing criminal use, and by cleansing the site of significant and ongoing drug distribution activities. The trial court concluded that the forfeiture is the result of extensive, serious conduct by the claimant [Cannon] which presented significant threat of harm and cost to society. ¶ 24 We do not condone any degree of drug trafficking; we recognize the great cost the State incurs in investigating, pursuing, and convicting offenders. We also understand the broad-scale effect of drug trafficking on society. As the trial court observed: The use and sale of controlled substances is one of the single most serious factors affecting and utilizing the resources of the courts and the criminal justice system, both on the state and federal level. However, these findings and conclusions are not sufficient to support this forfeiture in view of other factors. ¶ 25 Measured by any standard, Cannon's drug operation was small, involving possession of less than two pounds of marijuana for sale in an eighteen month span. The trial court apparently agreed with this assessment at the time of trial when Cannon was placed on probation, although a jury had found her guilty of three felonies and a misdemeanor on charges stemming from the first search of her home. See supra note 1. The court allowed her to remain on probation after being convicted of an additional felony resulting from the second search. Cannon's actual fines and surcharges imposed on charges arising out of the first and second searches [11] totaled only $4,625.00. Cannon was also subject to $5,035.10 as a tax or penalty for possessing nonstamped illegal drugs. In sum, the actual fines, surcharges, and penalties imposed amounted to $9,660.10. ¶ 26 The State argues that Cannon faced maximum possible penalties of approximately $130,425.00 and substantial prison time. It repeatedly stresses these maximum possible penalties, contending that these amounts should be used for measurement, as opposed to the actual penalties. The trial court also used these theoretical figures extensively in addressing the gravity of Cannon's offenses in its findings of fact and conclusions of law. The trial court on remand declared simply that the value of the property forfeited does not grossly exceed the potential fines and fees in this case. ¶ 27 The State argues that this fact alone shows that the forfeiture is not grossly disproportionate. However, the State does not provide any legal support for its comparison of theoretical maximum penalties with the value of the forfeited property. [12] While reference to the maximum penalties is helpful in determining the gravity of the offenses, it has limited relevance in determining proportionality. Here, the trial court placed too much reliance on the maximum penalties in its analysis of proportionality instead of focusing on the actual fines and penalties imposed. ¶ 28 When we compare the (1) gravity of Cannon's conduct; (2) the actual fines, surcharges, and penalties of $9,660.10 imposed; and (3) her probation on the prison and jail sentences, with the value of the forfeited real property at approximately $80,000.00, we must conclude that there is a gross disproportionality here under the standards set forth in Bajakajian, and the forfeiture cannot be sustained.