Opinion ID: 1330284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Caps

Text: Respondents argue, as an additional basis upon which to affirm the judgment below that the monetary caps contained in the TCA do not apply to their causes of action. [2] We agree. In Southeastern Freight Lines v. City of Hartsville, 313 S.C. 466, 443 S.E.2d 395 (1994), we held the Legislature's adoption of the Uniform Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasor's Act (Uniform Contribution Act) impliedly repealed the statutory tort claims cap set forth in section 15-78-120(a)(1), which was adopted by the Legislature as part of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act in 1986. We recently recognized, in Dykema v. Carolina Emergency Physicians, 348 S.C.2d 549, 560 S.E.2d 894 (2002), that the statutory caps set forth in XX-XX-XXX(a)(3) & (a)(4) were likewise impliedly repealed by adoption of the Uniform Contribution Act. Accordingly, the statutory caps of subsections (a)(3) & (a)(4) were repealed upon adoption of the Uniform Contribution Act, April 5, 1988. Although the Legislature reenacted the provisions of section 15-78-120(a)(1) with 1994 Acts No. 497, Part II, Section 107, this Act did not reenact subsections (a)(3) & (a)(4). Dykema. In 1997, the Legislature enacted 1997 Act No. 155, Part II, § 55, in which it reenacted section 15-78-120, in toto. The reenactment of section 15-78-120 states that it takes effect upon approval by the Governor [June 14, 1997] and applies to claims or actions pending on that date or thereafter filed, except where final judgment has been entered before that date. 1997 Act No. 155, Part II, § 55(F). However, in Steinke v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, 336 S.C. 373, 520 S.E.2d 142 (1999), we addressed the Legislature's 1997 reenactment of section 15-78-120, and its attempt to reinstate the caps with respect to claims which were then pending. We held that a judicial [interpretation] of a statute is determinative of its meaning and effect, and any subsequent legislative amendment to the contrary will only be effective from the date of its enactment and cannot be applied retroactively. 336 S.C. at 402, 520 S.E.2d at 157. Accordingly, we held the legislature could not retroactively reenact the caps to apply to claims filed prior to amendment. Id. Steinke went on to hold, however, that the Legislature was free to reinstate the statutory caps in future cases. Although Steinke held the Legislature could not retroactively reinstate caps with respect to claims filed prior to June 14, 1997, it did not address whether such caps could be reinstated with respect to other claims or actions pending. We finally resolved this question in Simmons v. Greenville Hospital System, Op. No. 25708, 2003 WL 22004109 (S.C.Sup.Ct. filed August 25, 2003). In Simmons, the plaintiffs' cause of action accrued in 1992, prior to the effective date of both the 1994 and 1997 reenactments of the caps, but was not filed until after the respective effective dates in 1998. Because the caps were not in effect at the time the plaintiffs' claim accrued, we held that the Legislature could not reach back and change the status of plaintiffs' claims without violating the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. In short, we held that the Legislature had authority to reinstate the caps, but it could only do so prospectively, with respect to those claims that arose or accrued after the effective date of the reenactments. Id. Here, the negligent act or acts occurred on January 3, 1997, but both complaints (Cody's complaint and the Williamsons' complaint) were filed on October 20, 1997. The claims arose or accrued prior to the effective date of the 1997 Act that reenacted subsections (a)(3) & (a)(4) of § 15-78-120, but were not filed until after the effective date of the 1997 Act. As we determined in Simmons, the date of accrual is the determinative date. Both Cody's and the Williamsons' claims arose or accrued before the reinstatement of the caps within subsections (a)(3) & (a)(4) took effect. Therefore, neither party's recovery is limited by the caps within the TCA, and the District must pay the parties the remainder of the stipulated damages.