Opinion ID: 2524105
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Section 22-105 Is Constitutional

Text: Alcozer contends that section 22-105 violates his rights to both due process and equal protection under the law by placing a financial consideration between him and his statutory right to file an initial postconviction petition and by targeting him as a prisoner to the exclusion of nonincarcerated petitioners. The State counters that section 22-105 is constitutional because the General Assembly rationally designed it to serve a legitimate government purpose: to discourage prisoners from filing frivolous pleadings and recoup some of the costs generated by the filing of frivolous pleadings. We review the constitutionality of a statute de novo. People v. Malchow, 193 Ill.2d 413, 418, 250 Ill.Dec. 670, 739 N.E.2d 433 (2000). Legislative enactments enjoy a strong presumption of constitutionality, and the burden rests upon the challenger to demonstrate the invalidity of a particular statute. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill.2d 519, 529, 228 Ill.Dec. 626, 689 N.E.2d 1047 (1997). A reviewing court has the duty to construe a statute to uphold its validity whenever reasonably possible. People v. Huddleston, 212 Ill.2d 107, 129, 287 Ill.Dec. 560, 816 N.E.2d 322 (2004). We now consider Alcozer's due process argument.
Alcozer contends that section 22-105 of the Code violates his due process rights because it unfairly subjects him to pecuniary punishment for attempting to exercise a state-granted postconviction remedy, in violation of his due process right of meaningful access to the courts. The State admits that there is a fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts, but that this right does not encompass the right to litigate without expense and fees. The parties do not dispute that [i]t is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977). Alcozer argues that section 22-105 violates due process because it interferes with a prisoner's fundamental right of access to the courts. We reject Alcozer's basic premise that section 22-105 interferes with his right to meaningful access to the courts. The language of the statute belies this argument. The legislature made clear in section 22-105(a) that [n]othing in this Section prohibits an applicant from filing an action or proceeding if the applicant is unable to pay the court costs (735 ILCS 5/22-105(a) (West 2006)). In People v. Conick, 232 Ill.2d 132, 141, 327 Ill.Dec. 516, 902 N.E.2d 637 (2008), this court recognized that the General Assembly enacted section 22-105 to curb the large number of frivolous collateral pleadings filed by prisoners which adversely affect the efficient administration of justice, and to compensate the courts for the time and expense incurred in processing and disposing of them. From a plain reading of section 22-105, we determine that the statute does not impinge upon a prisoner's fundamental right to access to the courts because fees are assessed only after a legal document is found to be frivolous. At most, the statute only affects a prisoner's right to file frivolous legal documents without being responsible for the costs, but does not prohibit prisoners from exercising their right to petition for postconviction relief. We therefore reject Alcozer's argument that section 22-105 violates due process and it burdens a prisoner's fundamental right of access to the courts. Alcozer also argues that section 22-105 violates due process when applied to first-time pro se petitioners for postconviction relief. As this court has recognized, the purpose of section 22-105 is to compensate courts for some of the expense incurred in adjudicating frivolous petitions for postconviction relief, whether initial or successive. People v. Conick, 232 Ill.2d 132, 141, 327 Ill.Dec. 516, 902 N.E.2d 637 (2008). In Conick, this court stated: For the purposes of section 22-105, the status of the petition as either original or successive is not significant. [Citation.] The trial court must still examine every request for postconviction relief whether it be an initial petition subject to review under the `gist' standard [citation] or a proffered successive petition subject to the more exacting cause and prejudice standard [citation]. Conick, 232 Ill.2d at 141-42, 327 Ill.Dec. 516, 902 N.E.2d 637. Section 22-105 does not impinge upon any prisoner's right to file a postconviction petition, whether the prisoner is a pro se first-time petitioner or a successive petitioner. Accordingly, we reject Alcozer's argument that section 22-105 violates due process as applied to first-time pro se petitioners for postconviction relief. We also reject Alcozer's argument that section 22-105 violates due process because it lacks a mens rea component and its application is not limited to petitions filed by prisoners who know their claims are frivolous. Alcozer fails to explain how the lack of a mens rea component interferes with his right of access to the courts or how this argument is in any way related to his due process argument. Under the plain language of the statute, section 22-105 does not restrict a prisoner's meaningful access to the courts. Accordingly, we conclude there is no due process violation based on restriction of court access. We now consider whether section 22-105 violates equal protection.
Alcozer argues that section 22-105 violates equal protection on its face because it treats prisoners who file frivolous pleadings differently from nonincarcerated persons who file frivolous pleadings. The State contends that section 22-105 is rationally related to the state's interest in maintaining the efficiency of our legal system and that there is a reasonable basis for distinguishing between prisoners and others seeking similar relief. Constitutional challenges to statutes under due process and equal protection require the same essential analysis. People v. Kimbrough, 163 Ill.2d 231, 242, 206 Ill.Dec. 84, 644 N.E.2d 1137 (1994) (Although expressed in slightly different language, the standards used to determine the constitutionality of a statute under the due process and equal protection clauses are identical.). It is the nature of the right affected that dictates the level of scrutiny we employ in determining whether the statute meets constitutional requirements. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill.2d 296, 307, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839 (2008). If the challenged statute implicates a fundamental right or discriminates based on a suspect classification of race or national origin, the court subjects the statute to strict scrutiny analysis and will uphold the statute only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling State interest. People v. Shephard, 152 Ill.2d 489, 500, 178 Ill.Dec. 724, 605 N.E.2d 518 (1992); People v. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d 178, 204, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288 (2004); Napleton, 229 Ill.2d at 307, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839. Under an equal protection analysis, suspect classifications are based on race or national origin. People v. Botruff, 212 Ill.2d 166, 176-77, 288 Ill.Dec. 105, 817 N.E.2d 463 (2004). If the statute does not affect a fundamental constitutional right or involve a suspect classification, the rational basis test applies, requiring the statute bear a rational relationship to the purpose the legislature intended to achieve by enacting it. Shephard, 152 Ill.2d at 500, 178 Ill.Dec. 724, 605 N.E.2d 518. Additionally, [a] third tier of constitutional scrutiny lies between deferential rational basis review and strict scrutiny, and is known as intermediate scrutiny, and has been applied to review classifications based on gender, illegitimacy, and those classifications that cause certain content-neutral, incidental burdens to speech. Napleton, 229 Ill.2d at 308, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839. To withstand intermediate scrutiny, the legislative enactment must be substantially related to an important governmental interest. Napleton, 229 Ill.2d at 308, 322 Ill.Dec. 548, 891 N.E.2d 839. Prisoners are not a suspect class. Where, as here, the legislation does not discriminate against a suspect class, the rational basis test applies. Cornelius, 213 Ill.2d at 203-04, 290 Ill.Dec. 237, 821 N.E.2d 288. A statutory classification meets the rational basis requirement if it the legislation is rationally related to a legitimate State goal. Shephard, 152 Ill.2d at 500, 178 Ill.Dec. 724, 605 N.E.2d 518. If any set of facts can reasonably be conceived to justify the challenged legislation, the court must uphold its constitutionality. Botruff, 212 Ill.2d at 177, 288 Ill.Dec. 105, 817 N.E.2d 463. Whether a rational basis exists for a classification is a question of law reviewed de novo. In re A.A., 181 Ill.2d 32, 38, 228 Ill.Dec. 905, 690 N.E.2d 980 (1998). Alcozer relies on Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 16 L.Ed.2d 577 (1966), in arguing that section 22-105 fails under a rational basis review. In Rinaldi, the Supreme Court struck down a New Jersey law requiring incarcerated individuals to reimburse the costs of their transcripts upon denial of appellate relief. The Supreme Court explained that [t]here is no defensible interest served by focusing on th[e] distinction [between incarcerated and nonincarcerated appellants] as a classifying feature in a reimbursement statute, since it bears no relationship whatever to the purpose of the repayment provision. Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309, 86 S.Ct. 1497. The Court observed that the New Jersey law did not similarly burden a man who has received a suspended sentence or been placed on probation, regardless of how high his subsequent earnings may be, nor did the law require repayment at all from an unsuccessful appellant who has been sentenced only to pay a fine. Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 308, 86 S.Ct. 1497. Further, Rinaldi recognized that once a state establishes avenues of appellate review, those avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the courts. Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 310, 86 S.Ct. 1497. In other words, any financial burden tied to the avenues of appellate review must be applied with an even hand. Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 311, 86 S.Ct. 1497. The Supreme Court has consistently and repeatedly recognized that when states provide for appellate or collateral review of criminal convictions, they may not discriminate on the basis of poverty. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891 (1956) (requiring a free transcript, or other means of affording effective appellate review, for indigent defendants seeking to appeal); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 79 S.Ct. 1164, 3 L.Ed.2d 1209 (1959) (clerk must docket indigent petitioner's motion for leave to appeal despite inability to pay filing fee); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 81 S.Ct. 895, 6 L.Ed.2d 39 (1961) (once a state grants a postconviction right, inability to pay filing fee cannot limit its exercise); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892 (1963) (inability to pay for transcript cannot hinder appeal from denial of petition for writ of error coram nobis ); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963) (finding unconstitutional line between rich and poor where merits of indigent defendant's first direct appeal are decided without benefit of counsel); Long v. District Court, 385 U.S. 192, 87 S.Ct. 362, 17 L.Ed.2d 290 (1966) (indigent defendant must be allowed free transcript to appeal denial of habeas relief); Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 89 S.Ct. 580, 21 L.Ed.2d 601 (1969) (indigent defendant must be allowed free transcript of habeas hearing to facilitate filing new habeas petition in higher court). Alcozer argues that, like the statute struck down in Rinaldi, section 22-105 should be struck down because there is no rational reason to burden prisoners exclusively when nonincarcerated individuals might also file for postconviction relief, even when the purpose is to deter frivolous appeals. We find Alcozer's reliance on Rinaldi and the long line of United States Supreme Court cases misplaced because section 22-105 is entirely distinguishable from those statutes found unconstitutional. Rinaldi found that the New Jersey statute violated equal protection because its classification of those subject to it was unsupported by reason, in that it financially burdened many prisoners whose appeals, though unsuccessful, were not frivolous, and leaves untouched many whose appeals may have been frivolous indeed. Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309-10, 86 S.Ct. 1497. In contrast to the statute in Rinaldi, section 22-105 was enacted by the General Assembly to stem the tide of frivolous filings by prisoners who have been convicted and, in most instances, have had their `cases' subjected to additional forms of appellate review. Conick, 232 Ill.2d at 143, 327 Ill. Dec. 516, 902 N.E.2d 637. We determine that section 22-105 withstands the rational basis test because the imposition of fees and costs following a frivolous finding of a prisoner's document is rationally related to the legislature's goal of stemming the tide of frivolous filings by prisoners. See Botruff, 212 Ill.2d at 177, 288 Ill.Dec. 105, 817 N.E.2d 463. When the challenged legislation can be upheld on any set of facts, the court must uphold its constitutionality. Botruff, 212 Ill.2d at 177, 288 Ill.Dec. 105, 817 N.E.2d 463. Here, section 22-105 only applies to prisoners who file frivolous pleadings, a permissible distinction related to the purpose of the classification to achieve permissible ends. Rinaldi, 384 U.S. at 309, 86 S.Ct. 1497. Accordingly, we hold that section 22-105 does not violate equal protection of the law.