Opinion ID: 2979210
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Officer Hornback’s liability

Text: Section 1983 provides a civil enforcement mechanism for inmates who suffer constitutional injuries at the hands of “[a]ny person acting under color of state law.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Totman contends that Officer Hornback, in his capacity as a Metro corrections officer, used excessive force against Totman in violation of the latter’s constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment or, in the alternative, the Fourteenth Amendment. At the time of oral argument, this circuit had not yet determined the exact point at which a Fourth Amendment “seizure” ended and “pretrial detention” began in the excessive-force context. Such a determination is significant because different constitutional amendments apply depending on how one characterizes the status of a person in official custody—whether that person is held pursuant to a “seizure,” a “detention,” or a “sentence.” Phelps v. Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 299 (6th Cir. -13- No. 09-5764 Totman v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Gov’t et al. 2002) (“The question of which amendment supplies [a § 1983 plaintiff’s] rights is not merely academic, for the standards of liability vary significantly according to which amendment applies.”). Both parties therefore asked the court to decide which constitutional standard applied to Totman’s claim of excessive force during his booking process. Since oral argument, this court has decided the legal issue. In Aldini v. Johnson, Nos. 093183, 09-3258, __ F.3d __, 2010 WL 2573467 (6th Cir. June 29, 2010), the court ruled that a defendant arrested without a warrant is protected from excessive force by the Fourth Amendment until his or her probable-cause hearing. Id. at  (holding that “the dividing line between the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment zones of protection at the probable-cause hearing”). The circumstances of this case—specifically, Totman’s citation and arrest summary report—demonstrate that he was arrested without a warrant. We will accordingly analyze Totman’s claim under the Fourth Amendment excessive-force standard. “The Fourth Amendment prohibits the use of excessive force by arresting and investigating officers.” Smoak v. Hall, 460 F.3d 768, 783 (6th Cir. 2006). Under the Fourth Amendment standard, courts must determine whether a particular use of force is reasonable based on “the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). This reasonableness inquiry “is an objective one: the question is whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Id. at 367. In evaluating the reasonableness of the force used, courts must examine “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, -14- No. 09-5764 Totman v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Gov’t et al. and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 307 (6th Cir. 2001) (citations and quotation marks omitted). “This standard contains a built-in measure of deference to the officer’s on-the-spot judgment about the level of force necessary in light of the circumstances of the particular case.” Burchett v. Kiefer, 310 F.3d 937, 944 (6th Cir. 2002). During his deposition, Totman testified that he was involved in two distinct physical altercations with Metro corrections officers. The first took place in the booking area, where Officers Stachoulas and Hornback took him to the floor. Officer Hornback testified that Totman was being disruptive and refusing to follow instructions concerning the booking process. Officers Stachoulas and Hornback accordingly used force in order to gain compliance. Significantly, Totman does not dispute that he was refusing to follow the officers’ commands or even that he physically resisted their efforts to take him to the single cell. He thus has not refuted Officer Hornback’s testimony that some force was needed to engender Totman’s compliance with the officers’ instructions. The sole issue, therefore, is whether the force used by Officer Hornback was unconstitutionally excessive. We are not asked to determine whether the cumulative force allegedly used by all of the involved officers was excessive because only Officer Hornback was sued as a named defendant. Totman was unable to specifically identify Officer Hornback as one of those who was kicking him or who drove a knee into his back. He conceded that he did not know which officers were purportedly beating him once he was on the floor and, after a careful review of the record, we have found no evidence indicating that Officer Hornback himself kicked or beat Totman. Officer -15- No. 09-5764 Totman v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Gov’t et al. Hornback, in contrast, testified unequivocally that he did not put his knee on Totman’s back and that he did nothing more than maintain a vascular-restraint hold on Totman until the latter was handcuffed. The incident report in fact states that Officer Stachoulas was the one who put his knee on Totman’s back, but Totman did not name Officer Stachoulas as a defendant. And despite being given two opportunities to amend his complaint, Totman failed to add any of the other officers involved in this incident as defendants in the case. As the party responding to a properly supported motion for summary judgment, Totman bore the burden to “set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2). But Totman offered no evidence to refute Officer Hornback’s testimony that Hornback did not kick, beat, or knee Totman while the two of them were in the booking area. Our dissenting colleague suggests that this deficiency is remedied by Totman’s second amended complaint, which alleges that Totman suffered extensive injuries because of his treatment by Officer Hornback. We recognize that a “verified complaint . . . carries the same weight as would an affidavit for the purposes of summary judgment.” See El Bey v. Roop, 530 F.3d 407, 414 (6th Cir. 2008). But Totman’s second amended complaint is not in fact verified by Totman (although it is titled a “verified” complaint). Nevertheless, the first amended complaint contains the same factual allegations as the second amended complaint and includes a verification. The only difference between the first and second amended complaints is that the second amended complaint added claims under the Fourteenth Amendment. We therefore will consider whether the statements in Totman’s first amended complaint raise a genuine issue of material fact. (Totman’s original complaint, although verified, did not contain specific facts to support his claims.) -16- No. 09-5764 Totman v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Gov’t et al. To constitute evidence sufficient to support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, an affidavit “must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and show that the affiant is competent to testify on the matters stated.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1). Totman verifies that his first amended complaint “is true and correct to the best of [his] knowledge and belief,” which indicates that the allegations of the complaint go beyond Totman’s personal knowledge and extend to matters within Totman’s belief. His beliefs, however, do not meet the evidentiary standard set forth in Rule 56(e)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See id.; see also Alpert v. United States, 481 F.3d 404, 409 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that the affiant’s “statement . . . based upon his ‘belief’ . . . did not demonstrate the personal knowledge required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)”). Totman’s deposition testimony clarified which portions of the complaint were within Totman’s knowledge and which portions were merely his beliefs. He testified that, although he knew that Officer Hornback took him to the ground in the booking area, he did not know who beat him while he was down. Totman’s allegation in his complaint that Officer Hornback beat him is therefore nothing more than speculation, and speculation is not admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 602 (“A witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”). Moreover, whether Totman identified Officer Hornback as one of the officers who beat him is a dispositive issue in this case, despite the dissent’s arguments to the contrary. Totman has sued only Officer Hornback for the alleged beating. But Officer Hornback has sworn that he did not beat Totman, and Totman’s claim that he was beaten by unknown officers does not contradict Officer -17- No. 09-5764 Totman v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Gov’t et al. Hornback’s statement because the record contains no statements from the other officers in the booking area on the night in question denying that they were involved in the altercation. Given the possibility that one or more of them beat Totman, there is no factual dispute in the record that would preclude a grant of summary judgment in favor of Officer Hornback. The dissent also notes Totman’s purported allegation “that he only verbally resisted the officers prior to their tackling him.” But we are unable to locate any statement in Totman’s complaint that supports this contention. Although Totman alleges that he “pleaded with the officers to stop,” he does not say that he was complying with the officers’ commands, either verbally or physically. Accordingly, Totman’s verified complaint does not raise a genuine issue of material fact concerning the first alleged instance of force against him. The second instance of force that Totman describes purportedly occurred in the single cell in the rear security area. At that point, Totman was handcuffed. Totman provided the following testimony during his deposition about which officers took him to the cell: Q. Okay. Did Officer Hornback escort you to the single cell? A. I believe he was one of them. There was [sic] a few of them. Him, the—I can’t think of that guy’s name for nothing. Stav . . . Q. Stavros [Stachoulas]? A. Stavros. Q. Stavros? A. Stavros. Q. Okay, So it was Officer Hornback and Officer Stavros [Stachoulas] that took you back to the single cell? -18- No. 09-5764 Totman v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Gov’t et al. A. And Peterson. Q. Who? A. Peterson. Q. Okay. A. And I believe the—that the other—the one that Maced me, I believe he was like in the back—back of them. You know, there was [sic] like three or four of them that put me in there. Totman was thus not entirely certain that Officer Hornback was among the officers who took him to the single cell. In any event, he does not contend that the officers used excessive force while they were in the process of escorting him. Totman was also unable to describe with particularity what took place once he was there. He said that “they” continued to “rough[] [him] up a little bit,” but then conceded that he was not actually punched while in the rear security area. Totman further testified that the officers “continue[d] kicking me around a little bit” and that he “just kind of played opossum.” He was lying face down and therefore could not tell “who was doing what.” Totman was then left in the cell handcuffed for two or three hours. Officer Hornback testified at his deposition that he did not escort Totman to the rear security area and that he did not go back to that area at all during Totman’s detention in the single cell. Given Totman’s lack of certainty concerning whether Officer Hornback was one of the officers who took him to the rear security area, and his total inability to identify which officers purportedly kicked him once he was there, Totman has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact concerning whether Officer Hornback used excessive force against Totman while the latter was in the single cell. And we again -19- No. 09-5764 Totman v. Louisville Jefferson County Metro Gov’t et al. note that, despite having two opportunities to amend the complaint, Totman failed to name as a defendant any individual officer other than Officer Hornback. Totman’s uncertainty cannot create a genuine issue of material fact where Officer Hornback flatly denies even being present in the rear security area, much less using any force against Totman while there. See, e.g., Schlueter v. S. Energy Homes, Inc., 252 F. App’x 7, 9-10 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that an “equivocal and conclusory” statement in an affidavit provided to oppose summary judgment cannot give rise to a genuine issue of material fact). In sum, Totman has not raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding Officer Hornback’s alleged use of excessive force in either the booking area or the rear security area. The district court’s grant of summary judgment to Officer Hornback on Totman’s excessive-force claim was therefore appropriate due to Totman’s lack of proof.