Opinion ID: 6497671
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: a fine fit

Text: ¶26 The majority begins its analysis by noting, [a]s a practical matter, [Wis. Stat.] § 32.09(6g)'s before-and-after methodology is a poor fit for TLEs.5 This emphasis on practical[ity] and fit is antithetical to the job of the judge, which is to apply the statute's meaning despite judicial misgivings, not to second-guess the legislature's wisdom in choosing to enact it. Although the majority purports to apply the statute's plain meaning, it couches its explanation for deciding TLEs are something other than easements in consequentialist rather than textual terms, another transparent revelation of the results-oriented motivations underlying its opinion. Container Life Cycle Mgmt. v. Dep't Nat. Res., 2022 WI 45, ¶78, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting). The majority rejects the statutory text, which applies——without limitation or qualification——to easements, in favor of a construction the majority thinks will produce sensible, desirable results, since that is surely what the legislature must have intended. But it is precisely because people differ over what is sensible and what is desirable that we elect those who will write our laws——and expect courts to observe what has been written. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 22 (2012). ¶27 For at least the third time this term, the majority misappropriates the absurd or unreasonable results canon of 5 Majority op., ¶14. 4 No. 2020AP307.rgb statutory construction as a cover for rewriting a statute it deems deficient. [E]rror-correction for absurdity can be a slippery slope. It can lead to judicial revision of public and private texts to make them (in the judges' view) more reasonable. Id. at 237. It is a misuse of the canon to invoke it as a tool for discarding the plain meaning of an unambiguous statute in favor of an interpretation preferred by the majority. Brown County v. Brown Cnty. Taxpayers Ass'n, 2022 WI 13, ¶84, 400 Wis. 2d 781, 971 N.W.2d 491 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting). The oddity or anomaly of certain consequences may be a perfectly valid reason for choosing one textually permissible interpretation over another, but it is no basis for disregarding or changing the text. See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 237. ¶28 Although the absurd or unreasonable results canon applies only rarely and in rather narrow circumstances, many courts cannot resist the temptation to invoke it to justify a preferred outcome. Container Life Cycle Mgmt., __ Wis. 2d __, ¶79. The absurdity doctrine applies only to textual errors that may be fixed 'by changing or supplying a particular word or phrase whose inclusion or omission was obviously a technical or ministerial error.' Schwab v. Schwab, 2021 WI 67, ¶44 n.1, 397 Wis. 2d 820, 961 N.W.2d 56 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) (quoting Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 238); see also State ex rel. Associated Indem. Corp. v. Mortensen, 224 Wis. 398, 402, 272 N.W. 457 (1937) (explaining the unreasonable results canon does not . . . justify a court in amending the 5 No. 2020AP307.rgb statute or giving it a meaning to which its language is not susceptible merely to avoid what the court believes are inequitable or unwise results). ¶29 In this case, the majority changes the text to exempt TLEs from a statute that facially and when read in context with surrounding statutes unequivocally applies to any sort of easement, whether temporary or permanent. See State v. Grunke, 2008 WI 82, ¶31, 311 Wis. 2d 439, 752 N.W.2d 769 (explaining the unreasonable results canon applies only when [a different] interpretation would render the relevant statute contextually inconsistent or would be contrary to the clearly stated purpose of the statute). Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6g) does not display any obvious technical or ministerial errors, so the unreasonable results canon cannot justify the majority's insertion of the word permanent as a limitation on the types of easements to which the statute applies. Nothing about the statutory language makes it susceptible to such judicial amendment, particularly because the majority's revision also violates the text of § 32.09(intro.) by creating just compensation cases to which the statute does not apply despite an unequivocal command to apply it to all matters involving the determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings[.] ¶30 [T]he ideal rule for the honest judge is, 'garbage in/garbage out[.]' Antonin Scalia, Q&A Justice Antonin Scalia, C-SPAN (July 19, 2012), https://www.c- span.org/video/transcript/?id=8335. If you're dealing with an inane statute you are duty bound to produce an inane result. 6 No. 2020AP307.rgb Id. Properly interpreted, there is nothing inane about Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g) or its application to a TLE. The before-andafter methodology actually fit[s] just fine, and the majority is wrong to conclude otherwise; however, even if the majority's concerns were valid, the unreasonable results canon would not apply. The unreasonable results canon is not a license to inject judicial policy preferences into the written law. If courts ignored the law every time they deem a result unreasonable, the rule of law would be supplanted by the rule of judges. Schwab, 397 Wis. 2d 820, ¶44 n.1. Misapplication of the canon disturbs the constitutional allocation of power among the branches of government. Container Life Cycle Mgmt., __ Wis. 2d __, ¶79. ¶31 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6g) instructs the evaluator to assess the fair market value immediately before the property became encumbered and its value immediately thereafter. Effectively, for a TLE, the evaluator must capture the [d]iminution of the fair market value of the property during the period of the taking. 9 Nichols on Eminent Domain § G.32.08[1][e] (2021). As this treatise acknowledges, sometimes determining the diminution in fair market value caused by the taking of a TLE is challenging; however, this court is not at liberty to cast aside a statutory command merely because its application may be difficult. ¶32 Consider if Backus were trying to sell his property on the date of the taking, which is the statutory date of evaluation for purposes of the fair market value calculations. 7 No. 2020AP307.rgb 118th St. Kenosha, LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Transp., 2014 WI 125, ¶37 n.13, 359 Wis. 2d 30, 856 N.W.2d 486 (The 'date of evaluation' generally is the date on which the easement is acquired.). Before the taking, Backus' property was worth $308,000, so he uses that as the list price. Prospective buyers learn that Waukesha County has a TLE giving it: [The] right to construct a highway project, including the placement or removal of soil, grading of roadway slopes, and the creation of fill or cut slopes in the . . . area to match the new roadway grade, as well as the right of ingress and engress as long as required for the construction of the highway project, including the right to preserve, protect, remove or plant thereon any vegetation that the highway authorities may deem necessary or desirable. . . . The above temporary limited easement is to terminate upon the completion of this project or on the day the highway is open to the traveling public, whichever is later. The fair market value of Backus' property is adversely impacted by the TLE; prospective buyers prefer to purchase unencumbered property. The damage to fair market value in this case may be amplified by the TLE's expansive and unlimited rights accorded the government. The right to construct a highway project clause is followed by including, after which the TLE details a non-exhaustive list of what the construction right encompasses. A canon of construction presumes include and its derivatives introduce[] examples and not an exhaustive list. Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 132. The TLE grants Waukesha County the additional right to make permanent changes to the land (e.g., remove or plant thereon any vegetation). Although the incursion may be temporary, in some situations the aftereffects 8 No. 2020AP307.rgb are not. Backus alleges this is one of those cases, and in denying Waukesha County's motion for summary judgment, the circuit court properly recognized this disputed issue of fact belongs to the jury to resolve. ¶33 The majority creates the illusion that this TLE was set to terminate upon the completion of the construction project, ignoring the actual terms of the TLE. The majority truncates the TLE's termination language,6 which provides, [t]he above temporary limited easement is to terminate upon the completion of this project or on the day the highway is open to the traveling public, whichever is later. (Emphasis added.) By the TLE's own terms, the public improvement could be complete but the TLE would not expire if the highway were not open to the traveling public[.] Contrary to the majority's assertion, all TLEs do not expire at the completion of the construction project.7 ¶34 The majority's poor fit rationale rests on its erroneous belief that all TLEs terminate upon project completion. They don't. As the majority notes, the after value is calculated assuming 'the completion of the public improvement.'8 Because the majority erroneously believes that all TLEs expire upon completion of the public improvement it erroneously concludes that to assume completion of the public 6 Id., ¶3 n.3. 7Id., ¶11 (quoting Wisconsin DOT Real Estate Program Manual 2.4.6.4 (updated Mar. 2020)). 8 Id., ¶16 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6g)). 9 No. 2020AP307.rgb improvement is to also assume the termination of the TLE. In other words, the 'before' value captures the value of the property before the TLE exists and the 'after' value assumes the TLE has ceased to exist. A before-and-after valuation therefore never captures the actual value of the TLE while it exists.9 The majority misinterprets the statutory language. ¶35 Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6g)'s method of determining damages does not calculate after damages based on the expiration of the TLE; rather, [t]he 'date of evaluation' generally is the date on which the easement is acquired. 118th St. Kenosha, LLC, 359 Wis. 2d 30, ¶37 n.13. Accordingly, compensation for an easement is calculated by considering the fair market value of the whole property immediately before and after the 'date of evaluation' which is the date on which the easement is acquired. Id., ¶37. If the majority applied the actual terms of the TLE instead of hypothetical facts (apparently based on assertions in Wisconsin Department of Transportation (DOT) guidance documents), the before-and-after methodology (properly applied) could easily capture the impact of the TLE on the fair market value of the property. Wisconsin Stat. § 32.09(6g) may require the evaluator to assume completion of the public improvement; however, it does not command the evaluator assume the highway is open to the public. ¶36 What the majority characterizes as the actual value of the TLE while it exists10 may be captured by language of the 9 Id. 10 Id. 10 No. 2020AP307.rgb statute the majority does not address anywhere in its opinion11: In determining severance damages under this paragraph, the condemnor may consider damages which may arise during construction of the public improvement, including damages from noise, dirt, temporary interference with vehicular or pedestrian access to the property and limitations on use of the property. Wis. Stat. § 32.09(6)(e). And if those damages do not adequately capture the property owner's actual damages, the statute does not preclude consideration or utilization of other measures of damages because the compensation to be paid by the condemnor is without restriction because of enumeration under § 32.09(6g).