Opinion ID: 1832275
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: The right to contest an election is only conferred by statute, and contestants must strictly comply with the provisions of the statute in order to confer jurisdiction. Bauman v. Maple Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 649 N.W.2d 9, 13 (Iowa 2002) (When a statute prescribes a procedure for review, that procedure must be strictly followed to confer jurisdiction.). Thus, contestants are limited to the scheme provided by the legislature. This procedure includes proceedings before the contest court, as well as appeals to district court. See de Koning v. Mellema, 534 N.W.2d 391, 394 (Iowa 1995) (The rule is quite generally recognized that to initiate special proceedings, such as election contest proceedings, the statutory provisions necessary to confer jurisdiction must be strictly complied with by the contestants.). There are numerous statutory procedures that must be followed to convene a contest court in a disputed election. See id. at 394-95 (describing the procedure outlined in Iowa Code chapters 57 and 62). These procedures are largely unique to the election process, and they are generally not supplemented by our rules of civil procedure applicable to courts. Bauman, 649 N.W.2d at 15-16 (declining to apply the Iowa rules of civil procedure to election contests). Yet, when it comes to the judicial review process following a decision by a contest court, Iowa Code section 62.20 is the only statutory provision that provides for an appeal of contest court decisions regarding public measure elections. See Iowa Code § 62.20. Moreover, section 62.20 is noticeably generic, and untenanted by directions beyond the procedures for a bond to stay execution of the contest court judgment. See id. The statute simply permits a party against whom judgment [was] rendered [to] appeal within twenty days to the district court. Id. The district court is then required to hear the appeal in equity and determine anew all questions arising in the case. Id. The school district takes the position that the appeal is a carefully regulated process that must be strictly followed to confer jurisdiction on the district court. It offers the detailed procedures under our court rules applicable to appeals to supplement the vagueness under the statute, beginning with the fundamental requirement of the filing of a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment. See Iowa R.App. P. 6.6 (An appeal . . . is taken and perfected by filing a notice with the clerk of the court where the order, judgment, or decree was entered. . . .). While this approach offers some appeal, it does not find support from the language of the statute. In the same way as we strive to uphold those legislative requirements written into the statute through strict compliance, we must not defeat the legislative process by imposing requirements where none exist. See, e.g., Eysink v. Bd. of Supervisors, 229 Iowa 1240, 1244, 296 N.W. 376, 378 (1941) (This court has no power to write into the statute words which are not there.). For that reason, we have refused to supplement the statutory requirements governing election contests with the procedural requirements applicable to courts of law. See Bauman, 649 N.W.2d at 15-16 (refusing to apply the Iowa rules of civil procedure to election contests, except where the rules have been expressly endorsed). Moreover, the issue we confront is only whether the district court acquired jurisdiction to decide the controversy based on the procedure employed by Taylor. [3] It is clear that Taylor invoked the jurisdiction of the district court for the purpose of appealing the decision of the contest court. Taylor did not commence an independent action to dispute the results of the election. Instead, he properly commenced the action through a contest court, and his petition in district court indicated he was pursuing the matter as an appeal pursuant to section 62.20, and in doing so he asked the court to reverse the decision of the contest court. Under the circumstances, we find the filing of this petition was sufficient to meet the statutory requirements for making an appeal.