Opinion ID: 514758
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 9E Associates Limited Partnership Agreement

Text: 9 The Sacks next contend that Rothberg breached paragraph 14 of the Settlement Agreement by failing to provide liens, notice of settlement dates, or payment of the accelerated balance when he entered into the 9E Associates Limited Partnership Agreement on April 4, 1985. Sacks Resp.Br. at 4-5. Their argument widely misses the mark. Paragraph 14 merely requires that Rothberg provide Mrs. Sacks with written notice of the settlement of any transfer or other disposition no less than 20 days prior to the settlement date. It is undisputed that the settlement date for the present transaction was December 29, 1986. Thus, as the District Court correctly found, no default could have occurred at the time the complaint was filed on April 1, 1986. 2 10 The Sacks also request that we determine the date on which a sale, transfer or other disposition of the Central Liquor property occurred as a result of the 9E Agreement. The District Court rebuffed this very request on the grounds that it presented a new theory of recovery not included in the original complaint and that, accordingly, it would unfairly prejudice Rothberg because of its eleventh-hour appearance in the litigation. We agree. The Sacks are not asking us to review the District Court's earlier denial of their motion to amend the complaint. Rather, they are inviting us to rule on an issue raised only after the close of pleadings. We decline the invitation. Rothberg was simply not given a fair opportunity below to respond to this issue; basic principles of due process and the orderly conduct of litigation protect litigants from the unenviable task of defending against arguments advanced in this belated fashion. See Conair v. N.L.R.B., 721 F.2d 1355, 1372 (D.C.Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1231 (1984); Evans Products Co. v. West American Ins. Co., 736 F.2d 920, 923-24 (3d Cir.1984).