Opinion ID: 771050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 37 We uphold an NLRB decision when substantial evidence supports its findings of fact and when the agency applies the law correctly. See Northern Mont. Health Care Ctr. v. NLRB, 178 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999). The substantial evidence test compels us to evaluate the entire record, although we may not displace the NLRB's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though [we] would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before [us ] de novo. Walnut Creek Honda Assocs. 2, Inc., v. NLRB, 89 F.3d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1996). Indeed, we must enforce the Board's judgment if, given the record, a reasonable jury could reach the same conclusions. See Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1998). The test is decidedly objective. See id. Furthermore, we give special deference to the Board's credibility findings. See Nabors Alaska Drilling, Inc. v. NLRB, 190 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 1999). 38 We also defer to the rules imposed by the NLRB if: (1) they are  `rational and consistent with the [National Labor Relations Act],'  see Allentown Mack , 522 U.S. at 364 (quoting Fall River Dyeing & Finishing Corp. v. NLRB , 482 U.S. 27, 42 (1987)); and (2) the Board's  `explication is not inadequate, irrational or arbitrary,'  see id. (quoting NLRB v. ErieResistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963)). 39 Unlike all other major federal administrative agencies, the NRLB uses adjudication instead of formal rule making to promulgate most of its legal rules. See id. at 374. Even so, the NLRB remains subject to the Administrative Procedure Act requirement of reasoned decision making. See id. The Supreme Court has therefore warned: Because reasoned decision making demands it, and because the systemic consequences of any other approach are unacceptable, the Board must be required to apply in fact the clearly understood legal standards that it enunciates in principle . . . .  Id. at 376. When and to the extent that the NLRB does not apply its enunciated rules in this manner, it is not entitled to the substantial deference it can ordinarily expect as it interprets its regulations. See id. at 377, 118 S.Ct. 818. 4 40 Finally, we overturn the Board's chosen means of remedying an unfair labor practice only for an abuse of discretion. See New Breed Leasing Corp. v. NLRB, 111 F.3d 1460, 1464 (9th Cir. 1997). We are not authorized to substitute our judgment for the Board's if it is simply a question of how best to correct the effects of unfair labor practices. See id. Thus, our power under the Act to make and enter a decree .. . modifying, and enforcing as so modified orders of the NLRB is limited to the confines of law and does not infiltrate the more spacious domain of policy. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 899 (1984). Moreover, we must resolve any doubts about the remedy against the perpetrator of the unfair labor practice, in this case Alaska Pulp. NLRB v. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 112, 992 F.2d 990, 993 (9th Cir. 1992).