Opinion ID: 1528391
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: control by the landlord

Text: Even if we disregard the prior cases holding the landlord has no duty toward people injured by dangerous conditions created by the tenant inside non-public leased premises, and even if the Court wanted to join the minority of courts that follow Uccello, there should still be no liability because the landlord had no control over Rampage. In the instant case the landlord had no control over what happened inside the tenant's residence because, contrary to the assertion of the majority, the landlord had no right to evict the tenant for keeping a dog. Ms. Matthews' theory of recovery is that the landlord had control over the dog and could have prevented her child's injuries by evicting her friend for violating the no pets clause in the friend's lease, but under this lease the landlord could not have evicted the tenant for violation of the no pets clause for two separate and distinct reasons. First, the lease did not provide that the landlord could repossess the premises for a breach of the no pets clause. Second, even if the lease had so provided, the landlord had waived the right to terminate the lease for violations of the no pets clause as to this tenant and probably for all of the tenants in the development. The relevant statutory provision on termination of leases for breaches other than for failure to pay rent is Maryland Code (1974, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Real Property Article, ง 8-402.1, which vests authority in the District Court, under certain circumstances, to order the eviction of a tenant for breach of the tenant's lease. Saundra Brown v. Housing Opportunities Commission of Montgomery County, 350 Md. 570, 572, 714 A.2d 197, 197 (1998). That statute provides in pertinent part:  ง 8-402.1. Breach of lease. (a) Complaint to District Court; summons to appear, notice; continuance.โ When a lease provides that the landlord may repossess the premises if the tenant breaches the lease, and the landlord has given the tenant 1 month's written notice that the tenant is in violation of the lease and the landlord desires to repossess the premises, and if the tenant or person in actual possession refuses to comply, the landlord may make complaint in writing to the District Court of the county where the premises is located.    (b) Judgment of District Court; appeal. โIf the court determines that the tenant breached the terms of the lease and that the breach was substantial and warrants an eviction, the court shall give judgment for the restitution of the possession of the premises and issue its warrant to the sheriff or a constable commanding him to deliver possession to the landlord in as full and ample manner as the landlord was possessed of the same at the time when the lease was entered into. (Emphasis added). Md.Code (1974, 1996 Repl.Vol., 1997 Supp.), Real Property Art., ง 8-402.1. See also DOUGLS M. BREGMAN & GARY G. EVERNGAM, MARYLAND LANDLORD-TENANT LAW PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at 92 (2d ed. 1994)(Section 8-402.1 permits an action for repossession in the event of a breach of a lease which contains a provision allowing the landlord to repossess in the event of a breach.). The lease at issue in the instant case contained a no pets clause but does not contain any provision permitting the landlord to repossess in the event of a breach, and therefore, the landlord had no way to evict a tenant with a dog until the lease period ended. Cf. Kimberly Shields v. Arthur Wagmar, 350 Md. 666, 714 A.2d 881 (1998), where the lease period had ended and the tenant was a month-to-month tenant. The probable reason why the lease did not provide that breach of the no pets clause would permit the landlord to repossess the premises becomes apparent when we examine that clause. The no pets clause was for the protection of the landlord, not for the protection of others; it did not bar only vicious pets or only dangerous pets, it barred all pets from even being on the premises. When the no pets clause is examined in context, it is obvious why the parties intended that violations of House Rules were not substantial breaches justifying repossession by the landlord. The lease provides: Covenants No. 1 to No. 30 which appear on the reverse side of this Lease Agreement and Covenants No. 1 to No. 39 which appear on Lease Agreement Exhibit B. are a part of this contract and Lessee acknowledges that he read and agreed to such covenants. Covenants number 1 through 30 are on the last page of the lease and are headed House Rules. The provision states: The resident agrees to comply with the following rules and regulations which shall be deemed to be a part of the lease. Breach of these rules and regulations shall be deemed to be a default of the lease. Without setting forth all 30 of the covenants or house rules some examples of these rules include: 2. Not obstruct nor use any of the stairways and sidewalks for any other purpose than for ingress to, and egress from the demised premises; 4. No baby carriages, bicycles, carts or hand trucks are to be left in the common areas or courts of the development; 6. Not place or hang anything from windows or place upon window sills; 7. Not shake or hang any tablecloths, bedding, clothing, curtains or rugs from any of the windows or doors; 9. Not use venetian blinds, shades, awnings, or window guards, except as permitted in writing by the owners; 10. Not make any alterations, additions or improvements to the apartments of the demised premises, including, but not limited to the painting thereof, the installation of wallpaper, T.V. or other antennas, screens or other enclosures; 15. Not to install carpeting in the apartment without written permission from management; 16. Not to store personal items outside of the apartment; 18. Not to have any pets on the premises. 30. Resident agrees to maintain the electric service to the apartment during the term of his/her tenancy. (Emphasis added) Not only did the lease fail to provide that breach of any of the 30 House Rules or covenants would permit the landlord to repossess the premises, it is obvious that this was a deliberate omission and a tenant's violation of one or more of the House Rules, although defaults, were not substantial breaches and should not result in the tenant forfeiting the lease. The lease and relevant statutes are quite clear; the landlord could not have evicted Ms. Morton for violating the no pets on the premises clause. There is another reason why the landlord could not evict Rampage's owner. The no pets clause was inserted by the landlord and could be waived by the landlord. Since the landlord found out about the tenant's dog in October and still accepted November's rent, December's rent, January's rent, and February's rent, even before the attack in February, the landlord had already lost any ability to evict the tenant. In Chertkof v. Southland Corp., 280 Md. 1, 371 A.2d 124 (1977), we summed up the law on a landlord's waiver of breaches by the tenant and said: Thus, we apply in Maryland the universal rule that a waiver of forfeiture may occur by an acceptance of rent which accrues after the lessor is on notice that a breach has been committed by the lessee. Ammendale Normal v. Schrom, [264 Md. 617, 624, 288 A.2d 140, 143-44 (1972) ]; Morrison v. Smith, 90 Md. 76, 83, 44 A. 1031[, 1032] (1899); cf. In Re Hook, 25 F.2d 498, 499 (D.Md.1928) (distraint for rent, accruing after right to declare forfeiture, constituted waiver; `[t]he acceptance of rent, eo nomine, generally, if not always, has [the effect of waiving the forfeiture]'). The underlying rationale for the rule is simple enough: acceptance of rent accruing after the breach is an affirmation of the tenancy and a recognition of its continuation; in effect, the lessor elects to continue the relationship of landlord and tenant. 280 Md. at 5-6, 371 A.2d at 127. The landlord apparently recognized the inability to terminate leases for violation of the no pets on the premises clause because one of the plaintiff's witnesses testified that many of the tenants had dogs. For the indicated reasons, the landlord could not have evicted Ms. Matthews' friend, and therefore, the landlord had no control over Rampage's presence within the tenant's apartment until the tenant's lease expired. The tenant brought the dog into the apartment, and the tenant maintained and had sole control over the dog. Ms. Matthews' cause of action is against the tenant. Requiring landlords to enforce no pets clauses will probably not make dog owners give up their pets; it will just make them more mobile, and probably would not have prevented the injury in the instant case. The Nevada Supreme Court, in Wright v. Schum, supra , held that landlords are not liable for injury to third persons caused by their tenants' pets, and one of the reasons it gave is particularly appropriate to the instant case. [H]olding landlords liable for the actions of their tenants' vicious dogs by requiring them to evict tenants with dangerous dogs would merely result in the tenants' moving off to another location with their still dangerous animals. 781 P.2d at 1143. In the instant case, Ms. Matthews and Ms. Morton were lifelong friends. Ever since they were children, Ms. Matthews visited her friend with the same frequency everywhere her friend lived. There is every reason to believe she would have continued to visit her friend wherever she lived, even if the landlord had evicted her for keeping a dog. The majority makes another inaccurate appellate factual finding when it states: Even before bringing such an action, the landlord, when it first received notice of the dangerous incidents involving Rampage, could have informed Morton that harboring the pit bull was in violation of her lease, could have told her to get rid of the aggressive animal, and could have threatened legal action if she failed to do so. 351 Md. at 558, 719 A.2d at 126. Rampage was owned by the father of Ms. Morton's son, and she was keeping Rampage while he was in prison. We cannot speculate that she would have or could have made other arrangements for the dog. In addition, to even suggest the landlord could fulfill its legal obligations by writing Ms. Morton to tell her of the terms of her own lease seems rather strange in light of the legal presumption that she knows the terms of the lease she entered into.