Opinion ID: 2085062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Consolidation of the Indictments

Text: Defendant contends that the court should not have granted the prosecution's motion to consolidate the assault and murder indictments for trial. He further asserts that after consolidation he had the right to plead guilty to the assault charges over the prosecution's objection and proceed to trial on the murder charges only. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing consolidation ( see People v Lane, 56 NY2d 1 [1982]). CPL 200.20 (2) (b) permits joinder of offenses based on different criminal transactions when such offenses, or the criminal transactions underlying them, are of such nature that either proof of the first offense would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the second, or proof of the second would be material and admissible as evidence in chief upon a trial of the first. The April 1998 assault and October 1998 murder of Jill Cahill fit this provision because the prosecution based one of its murder charges on Jill's potential testimony in the assault trial, making proof of the assault relevant to the murder case. Thus, the offenses were joinable and consolidation was proper ( see People v Bongarzone, 69 NY2d 892 [1987]). We also reject defendant's argument that he should have been allowed to plead guilty to only the assault portion of the consolidated indictment. From the time defendant was indicted for assault until the court consolidated the assault and murder indictmentsa period of approximately seven monthsdefendant could have pleaded guilty to the assault indictment. Once the court consolidated the indictments, defendant could plead guilty to the entire indictment (if the prosecution determined that it would no longer seek the death penalty) [9] but not to only a portion of it ( see CPL 220.10 [2], [4]). [10] Unless the People and the court consented, such a plea was untenable.