Opinion ID: 2782926
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mackey’s In-court Identification

Text: As to Mackey’s in-court identification of Goudeau, Goudeau has again provided no reason for us to question the identification or to believe that a reasonable jurist could vary from the OCCA’s conclusion. Ordinarily, we consider whether a courtroom identification was tainted by a pre-trial confrontation by considering: (1) the prior opportunity of the witness to observe the defendant during the criminal act; (2) the degree of attention of the witness; (3) the accuracy of the witness’s prior identification; (4) the witness’s level of certainty; and (5) the time between the crime and the confrontation. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114–116 (1977). Goudeau does not seem to contest any of these five factors, instead simply making the conclusory assertion that Mackey’s identification was tainted. Mackey had a more than adequate opportunity to see Goudeau while he committed the crime, and was absolutely certain in his identification of Goudeau as the perpetrator at trial. We can see no grounds for granting a COA on this claim. c. Evidentiary Harpoons and Evidence of a Prior Suspended Sentence We also must deny Goudeau’s claims for a COA based on evidentiary harpoons and admission of evidence of a prior suspended sentence. Both of these challenges are to state-court evidentiary rulings, and thus are based on state law. As a federal habeas court, we lack authority to review a state court’s interpretation or application of its own state laws unless the rulings “rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair that a denial of constitutional rights [resulted].” Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir. 2002) -- 6 (internal quotation marks omitted). The OCCA did not believe that the pieces of testimony identified by Goudeau should be considered “evidentiary harpoons” under Oklahoma law, and Goudeau has not demonstrated how this ruling rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. As to the admission of evidence of his prior suspended sentence, this evidence was presented at the sentencing phase of Goudeau’s trial. Just as with evidentiary issues at trial, Goudeau must demonstrate to us that the admission of this evidence denied him a fundamentally fair sentencing procedure. Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1180 (10th Cir. 2012). While the OCCA determined that this evidence was improperly admitted, it found this error harmless. We can see no basis for a reasonable jurist to disagree. While evidence of this suspended sentence was improperly admitted at sentencing, evidence of two other felonies was unquestionably properly admitted. As Goudeau’s sentencing range was based on “two or more felonies,” it is impossible for him to claim the improper admission of this third felony rendered his sentencing fundamentally unfair. d. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Goudeau’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel also fail based on the OCCA’s application of Oklahoma state law. Goudeau’s entire basis for this claim is that his trial counsel should have objected at trial to the introduction of evidence that the OCCA determined was properly admitted under state law. As the evidence was properly admitted, no reasonable jurist could find deficient Goudeau’s trial counsel’s failure to object to its admission. e. Prosecutorial Misconduct -- 7 Goudeau believes his trial was infected with prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically, he contends that in his opening statement the prosecutor invoked sympathy for the victim by stating that the items stolen belonging to Mackey’s son Charles included pain medication, and that Charles needed the medication because he had been injured serving in Afghanistan. Goudeau also suggests the prosecutor’s closing statement invoked societal alarm by stating that people like Goudeau chose elderly victims because it made it easier to successfully complete the crime. While prosecutorial misconduct can warrant habeas relief, the standard for granting such relief is particularly high when the misconduct is not alleged to have denied the defendant the benefit of a specific provision of the Bill of Rights, or to have “so prejudiced a specific right . . . as to amount to a denial of that right.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). The prosecutor’s comments here cannot be said to have done either, and do not even seem improper. This claim does not warrant the granting of a COA. f. Life Sentence Goudeau also contests the imposition of a life sentence for his crime. Goudeau’s sentence was within the range set by state law, and ordinarily habeas review “ends once [the court] determine[s] the sentence is within the limitation set by statute.” Dennis v. Poppel, 222 F.3d 1245, 1258 (10th Cir. 2000). There is no reason why a review of Goudeau’s sentence should proceed beyond this determination. g. Cumulative Error -- 8 Goudeau’s final contention is that the cumulative effect of trial errors deprived him of a fair trial. Cumulative error exists when the “cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to prejudice the defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error.” Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d at 992 (quoting United State v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990)). Goudeau here seeks to aggregate a harmless error of state law (the admission of his prior suspended sentence at sentencing) and a harmless error of constitutional law (the admission of testimonial hearsay). We agree with the magistrate that there is no way that these errors, even in the aggregate, denied Goudeau a fundamentally fair trial. A COA need not issue on these grounds.