Opinion ID: 2978134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clark’s Sentence

Text: Clark next contends that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the district court did not consider, as part of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, Clark’s misguided youth, lack of family life, mental problems, and his lesser role in the offense. Following United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-62 (2005), we review sentences for reasonableness. In reviewing a sentence for procedural reasonableness, we must “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). -11- We review only for plain error because Clark failed to object to his sentence after the district court asked for Bostic objections. See United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872-73 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that failure to object after the sentencing judge pronounces the sentence and asks for any objections will result in plain error review). To establish plain error, Clark must show “(1) error, (2) that was obvious or clear, (3) that affected [Clark’s] substantial rights, and (4) that affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” United States v. Vonner, 516 F.3d 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (internal quotations and citations omitted). We find such error “[o]nly in exceptional circumstances . . . where the error is so plain that the trial judge was . . . derelict in countenancing it . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In United States v. Rita, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2468 (2007), the Supreme Court explained that a sentencing court should “set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking authority.” The sentencing court is not required to explicitly consider each of the § 3553(a) factors or to engage in “ritualistic incantation,” but the record must “demonstrate[] that the sentencing court addressed the relevant factors in reaching its conclusion.” United States v. Trejo-Martinez, 481 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir. 2007). Here, we find that the district court properly addressed all of the relevant § 3553(a) factors. The district court explained that, in reaching the sentence, the court considered Clark’s personal history as “a very young man” who has “engaged in a lot of criminal conduct in his very short life.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). The district court also explained that it considered the need “to protect the public,” Clark’s “personal characteristics,” the “seriousness of the offense,” “the need to afford adequate deterrence,” and “the guidelines as well as the mandatory-minimum sentence that results -12- from the [conviction for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking offense pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)],” which are all § 3553(a) considerations. See id. § 3553(a)(1)-(2). Indeed, the district court’s consideration of the § 3553(a) factors is reflected in that court’s decision to impose the lowest sentence recommended by the Guidelines and to further recommend that Clark receive substance abuse and mental health treatments. Accordingly, finding no clear error, we must reject Clark’s claim.