Opinion ID: 2737777
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The “Entwinement” Test

Text: Grogan fares no better under an entwinement theory of state action. Under that theory, state action may exist when a private entity “is entwined with governmental policies, or when government is entwined in its management or control.” Brentwood Academy, 531 U.S. at 296 (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Grogan argues that the disciplinary charges and her suspension without a hearing amounted to state action because New York imposes a variety of regulatory requirements on volunteer ambulance and emergency services organizations 6 We also note that the fire department’s performance of a public function was only one of two independent reasons we gave in Janusaitis for subjecting the department’s personnel decisions to the strictures of the First Amendment. The other sufficiently independent reason for finding state action, and one that does not obtain here, see Section II, infra, was that the town had so “insinuate[d] itself into a position of interdependence with the Department” that the actions of the Department could properly be viewed as those of the town itself. See Janusaitis, 607 F.2d at 23 (internal quotation marks omitted). 13 like BGVAC. For example, New York law provides that an ambulance service may not operate within the state unless it first obtains a certificate from the New York Department of Health. See N.Y. Pub. Health Law § 3005. A number of statewide and regional emergency services councils established under the Department of Health are responsible for setting the minimum standards necessary to obtain such certificates, and the Department has authority to inspect ambulance services and to suspend or revoke their certificates. See id. § 3002–3004-a; N.Y.C.R.R. § 800.16. Although these statutes and regulations demonstrate that New York is involved in the “creation, funding, licensing, [and] regulation” of volunteer ambulance organizations, that fact alone is insufficient to support a finding of state action with respect to the disciplinary actions that form the basis of Grogan’s complaint. See Cranley, 318 F.3d at 112. Instead, Grogan is required to show that the State is so entwined with BGVAC’s management that its personnel decisions are fairly attributable to the State. See, e.g., United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 941 F.2d 1292, 1296 (2d Cir. 1991) (“The question is not whether the decision to establish the [private entity] was state action, but rather whether the [private entity’s] decision to sanction [the plaintiffs] may be fairly attributable to the Government.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Our decision in Horvath v. Westport Library Association is instructive on this point. See 362 F.3d 147, 151–54 (2d Cir. 2004). In that case, the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against a library association in Westport, Connecticut, complaining that it violated her right to due process when it terminated her employment without affording her notice and an opportunity to be heard. See id. at 149, 151. In reaching our conclusion that the plaintiff’s termination was state action, we found it relevant, but not dispositive, that the library association’s budget was “almost exclusively composed of public funds.” Id. at 151–52. Instead, we found the decisive factor to be the amount of control that Westport could potentially exercise over the library’s “internal 14 management decisions,” as shown by the town’s authority to appoint one-half of the library’s board of directors. See id. at 152–54 (citing Lebron v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 400 (1999) (corporation considered a state actor when “the Government creates a corporation by special law, for the furtherance of governmental objectives, and retains for itself permanent authority to appoint a majority of the directors of that corporation”)). Westport’s control over half of the library’s board, coupled with the public funding the library received, was evidence of such “pervasive entwinement” between the town and the library that the library’s management decisions could be considered state action. See id. at 154. Here, while we may safely presume that BGVAC derives the vast majority of its funding from public sources given its $362,000 yearly contract with the Town and the contractual provision permitting the Town to audit BGVAC’s finances, Grogan has introduced no evidence suggesting that the Town appoints any portion of BGVAC’s Board or has any say in BGVAC’s management or personnel decisions. Nor has she presented any evidence to suggest that the Town played any role in the disciplinary process that resulted in her suspension. BGVAC’s contract with the Town, moreover, identifies it as an “independent contractor” and expressly disclaims any employment or agency relationship between BGVAC and the Town. See Joint App’x at 317–18. On these undisputed facts, we conclude as a matter of law that the Town is not sufficiently entwined with BGVAC’s management as to render Grogan’s suspension without a hearing “state action.”