Opinion ID: 784588
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Credibility Factors

Text: 99 In addition to his general and vague reliance on the form of Arulampalam's testimony, the IJ commented on Arulampalam's ignorance of what the initials LTTE stand for (despite his calling them Tigers and knowing the name of the sought Tamil homeland, Eelam); the improbability of his bypassing checkpoints on the way to Colombo; and his lack of knowledge of the registration procedure once in the city. These criticisms of Arulampalam's testimony are grounded only in speculation by the IJ and cannot rebut petitioner's credibility, for they are unsupported by the record. 100 To wit, the IJ's belie[f] that experienced soldiers would be able to guard against such easy evasion of [roadblocks] is pure hypothesis, as are his estimation of what type of registration would be acceptable to the police and his observation that: The Court feels that if [Arulampalam] had actually gone to Colombo and been registered, he would have understood what it meant, and he probably would have registered himself rather than some third party registering him, which would seem to defeat the purpose of registration and probably not be acceptable to the police. See Salaam v. INS, 229 F.3d 1234, 1238 (9th Cir.2000) (per curiam) (This Court reverses an adverse credibility determination that is based on speculation and conjecture and is not supported by evidence in the record.) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Lopez-Reyes v. INS, 79 F.3d 908, 912 (9th Cir.1996) (IJ's astonishment regarding aspects of petitioner's testimony was conjecture that could not substitute for substantial evidence). Those who escape from ethnic conflict are not always privy to details of how their families hold hostile authorities at bay or smuggle them out of danger. Absent information being distributed on a need to know basis, there would be many fewer survivors of repressive regimes. 101 Nor does Arulampalam's omission at the airport of specific details about his torture that were later revealed in his testimony support the adverse credibility finding. The airport interview was fully consistent with Arulampalam's later testimony; the only difference was the level of detail. See Singh v. INS, 292 F.3d 1017, 1021 (9th Cir.2002) (Requiring evidentiary detail from an airport interview not only ignores the reality of the interview process, but would, in effect, create an unprecedented preasylum application process.); see also Bandari v. INS, 227 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir.2000) ([T]he mere omission of details [in an asylum application] is insufficient to uphold an adverse credibility finding.) (citations omitted). From the moment of his arrival at the Honolulu airport, Arulampalam mentioned beating and stated that he was detained by the police from October 8 2000 ... until October 238 [ sic ] 2000. They did hit me while I was in their custody. Notes from the credible fear interview state that [a]pplicant was physically harmed during last arrest. In his asylum application, Arulampalam described in some detail the forms of torture that he experienced at the police station. In this context, the IJ's concern about a lack of great detail about such horrific torture in the airport statement and the asylum officer's notes is not merited. 102 The government argues that Arulampalam could have easily corroborated his dubious testimony regarding the alleged severe torture he suffered, adding that Arulampalam presented no documentation from any of the people who resided in [his cousin's Colombo] house that he was in fact tortured. We disagree with the related contention that this case is like Sidhu v. INS, 220 F.3d 1085, 1092 (9th Cir.2000), which held that where the IJ has reason to question the applicant's credibility, and the applicant fails to produce non-duplicative, material, easily available corroborating evidence and provides no credible explanation for such failure, an adverse credibility finding will withstand appellate review. Here, as we have developed, the IJ had no good reason to question Arulampalam's credibility. 103 Moreover, the government distorts our holding in Sidhu by omitting two crucial elements. First, Arulampalam was not given an opportunity at his IJ hearing to explain his failure to produce material corroborating evidence. Id. at 1091. Second, it is inappropriate to base an adverse credibility determination on an applicant's inability to obtain corroborating affidavits from relatives or acquaintances living outside of the United States — such corroboration is almost never easily available. Id. at 1091-92; see also Ladha v. INS, 215 F.3d 889, 901 (9th Cir.2000) ([A]n alien's testimony, if unrefuted and credible, direct and specific, is sufficient to establish the facts testified without the need for any corroboration.). 104 In sum, a reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude that the IJ's adverse credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. See He v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir.2003).