Opinion ID: 162589
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sterling & DeSumma

Text: 48 The Third and Fourth Circuits have concluded that the fruits doctrine simply does not apply to Miranda violations even after Dickerson. United States v. Sterling, 283 F.3d 216, 218-19 (4th Cir.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 2606, 153 L.Ed.2d 792 (2002); United States v. DeSumma, 272 F.3d 176, 180-81 (3d Cir. 2001), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 122 S.Ct. 1631, 152 L.Ed.2d 641 (2002). Both of these cases held that the physical fruits of a Miranda violation were admissible. Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219 (shotgun found in vehicle as a result of Miranda violation); DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180-81 (gun found in vehicle as a direct result of Miranda violation). Both Sterling and DeSumma relied on substantially the same reasoning, focusing primarily on an isolated passage in Dickerson. Dickerson noted at the outset of the opinion that  Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts. 530 U.S. at 432, 120 S.Ct. 2326. Later in the opinion, in the course of rejecting various arguments supporting the erroneous view that Miranda was not a constitutional decision, the Court stated: 49 The Court of Appeals also noted that in Oregon v. Elstad we stated that [t]he Miranda exclusionary rule ... serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself. Our decision in that case — refusing to apply the traditional fruits doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases — does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. 50 Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (emphasis added, citations and internal quotations omitted). 51 Both Sterling and DeSumma viewed this language as amounting to an endorsement of the rule that the Wong Sun exclusionary rule does not apply to the physical fruits of a Miranda violation. Sterling, 283 F.3d at 219; DeSumma, 272 F.3d at 180. Sterling explained: 52 Although Dickerson held Miranda to be with Constitutional significance, Miranda only held that certain warnings must be given before a suspect's statements made during custodial interrogation can be admitted into evidence. In addition, we are of opinion that the Court's reference to and reaffirmation of Miranda 's progeny indicates that the established exceptions, like those in Tucker and Elstad, survive. Thus, the distinction between statements and derivative evidence survives Dickerson. In fact, Dickerson reiterated the distinction made in Elstad by stating that: Our decision in that case — refusing to apply the traditional `fruits' doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases — does not prove that Miranda is a nonconstitutional decision, but simply recognizes the fact that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. 53 283 F.3d at 219 (emphasis in original, citation omitted). 54 There are at least two serious problems with the reasoning in DeSumma and Sterling. First, we respectfully disagree with their conclusion that Dickerson 's reference to the controlling force of  Miranda and its progeny in this Court forecloses the argument that the physical fruits of a Miranda violation may be suppressed. Although we agree that, based on this language, the holdings of Elstad and Tucker survive Dickerson, neither Elstad nor Tucker involved the physical fruits of a Miranda violation; as explained above, Elstad expressly contrasted the subsequent confession it found admissible from physical fruits, while Tucker expressly limited its holding to pre- Miranda interrogations. See Patterson, 485 U.S. at 922-24, 108 S.Ct. 1093 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). By wholly undermining the doctrinal foundation upon which those holdings were built, Dickerson effectively left Elstad and Tucker standing but prevented lower courts from extending their holdings. Of course, prior to Dickerson many lower courts (including this one) already had expanded the holdings of Elstad and Tucker by concluding that Miranda violations do not require suppression of physical fruits, but Dickerson explicitly limited its saving language to Miranda 's progeny in this Court. 530 U.S. at 432, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (emphasis added). Far from endorsing pre- Dickerson lower court case law, then, Dickerson instead signaled the contrary view. 55 The second fundamental problem with the reasoning in DeSumma and Sterling is that the language that they rely on for the proposition that Dickerson endorsed the extension of Elstad to physical fruits in fact said only that Elstad recognizes ... that unreasonable searches under the Fourth Amendment are different from unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441, 120 S.Ct. 2326 (emphasis added). The critical question, of course, is how the two are different. At oral argument in the present case, the Government argued only that the way that Fourth Amendment violations differ from Fifth Amendment violations is that the Wong Sun fruits doctrine applies to the former and not the latter. This argument already has been rejected by the Supreme Court. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 442 & n. 3, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984) (noting that the Court has applied the fruits doctrine to violations of the Fifth Amendment, citing Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 79, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964)); Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-61, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). Although Dickerson itself does not explain how searches under the Fourth Amendment are different, Elstad does just that: a procedural Miranda violation differs in significant respects from violations of the Fourth Amendment, which have traditionally mandated a broad application of the `fruits' doctrine. 470 U.S. at 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (emphasis added). 7 This language indicates that Miranda violations are different because a narrowed application of the fruits doctrine applies to Miranda violations, not because the fruits doctrine does not apply at all. Cf. id. at 306, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (referring to [t]he Miranda exclusionary rule). 56 Of course, Elstad 's explanation of how application of the fruits doctrine is different in Miranda cases begs the question of what a broad application means. We conclude that the broad application of the fruits doctrine is that defined in Nix: the prosecution is not to be put in a better position than it would have been in if no illegality had transpired. 467 U.S. at 443, 104 S.Ct. 2501. Application of the fruits doctrine in the Miranda context is not broad because a number of exceptions to this pure rule have been recognized, circumstances where the prosecution is permitted to benefit from the Miranda violation. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285; Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48, 94 S.Ct. 2357; New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 657, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550 (1984) (unwarned answers to questions in a situation posing a threat to the public safety may be used); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 & n. 2, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971) (unwarned statements may be used for impeachment on cross-examination). 57 One could argue that further narrowing of the pure fruits doctrine in the Miranda context — narrowing beyond that already effectuated by the holdings of Elstad and Tucker 8 — also is appropriate. However, we are unpersuaded that the additional narrowing articulated in DeSumma and Sterling (refusing to apply the fruits exclusion to physical evidence obtained as a result of the illegally obtained confession) reflects a correct understanding of the way in which Miranda violations are, in Dickerson 's words, different from Fourth Amendment violations. 58 A blanket rule barring application of the fruits doctrine to the physical fruits of a Miranda violation would mark a dramatic departure from Supreme Court precedent. The Court consistently has recognized that deterrence of police misconduct, whether deliberate or negligent, is the fundamental justification for the fruits doctrine. Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43, 104 S.Ct. 2501 (The core rationale consistently advanced by this Court for extending the exclusionary rule to evidence that is the fruit of unlawful police conduct has been that this admittedly drastic and socially costly course is needed to deter police from violations of constitutional and statutory protections.); see also Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (identifying trustworthiness and deterrence as the two rationales for a broad fruits suppression rule); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447, 94 S.Ct. 2357 (noting the deterrent purpose of the exclusionary rule). The Court also has been consistent in narrowing the scope of the fruits doctrine in the Miranda context only where deterrence is not meaningfully implicated. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308-09, 105 S.Ct. 1285 (stating that admission of voluntary post-warning statements will not undercut deterrence because the suspect remains free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a [post-warning] statement to the authorities); Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447-48, 94 S.Ct. 2357 (explaining that the deterrence rationale loses much of its force in that case because the unwarned interrogation occurred prior to Miranda 's issuance). 59 In sharp contrast with Elstad and Tucker, however, the rule argued for by the Government here risks the evisceration of the deterrence provided by the fruits doctrine, as this case well illustrates. As a practical matter, the inability to offer Patane's statements in this case affords no deterrence, because the ability to offer the physical evidence (the gun) renders the statements superfluous to conviction. See generally United States v. Kruger, 151 F.Supp.2d 86, 101-02 (D.Me. 2001) (The exclusion of the cocaine, the substance — indeed essence — of the suppressed statements, is necessary to deter law enforcement officers from foregoing the administration of Miranda warnings....), overruled by Faulkingham, 295 F.3d at 92-94; Yale Kamisar, On the Fruits of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony, 93 Mich. L.Rev. 929, 933 (1995) (Unless the courts bar the use of the often-valuable evidence derived from an inadmissible confession, as well as the confession itself, there will remain a strong incentive to resort to forbidden interrogation methods.); David A. Wollin, Policing the Police: Should Miranda Violations Bear Fruit?, 53 Ohio St. L.J. 805, 843-48 (1992) (Police officers seeking physical evidence are not likely to view the loss of an unwarned confession as particularly great when weighed against the opportunity to recover highly probative nontestimonial evidence, such as a murder weapon or narcotics.). The present case is hardly anomalous in this respect, as demonstrated by the multitude of reported cases where the record demonstrated that the interrogating authorities intentionally (and in some cases pursuant to official policy and training) violated a suspect's Miranda rights in order to procure derivative evidence. E.g., United States v. Orso, 234 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir.2000), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 266 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir.2001) (en banc); Henry v. Kernan, 197 F.3d 1021, 1026, 1028 (9th Cir.1999); Pope v. Zenon, 69 F.3d 1018, 1023-24 (9th Cir. 1995), overruled by Orso, 266 F.3d 1030; Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1224-27 (9th Cir.1992); United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 373 (8th Cir.1989); United States v. Esquilin, 42 F.Supp.2d 20, 33 (D.Me.1999), aff'd, 208 F.3d 315 (1st Cir. 2000). 60 Further, the rule urged upon us by the Government appears to make little sense as a matter of policy. From a practical perspective, we see little difference between the confessional statement The Glock is in my bedroom on a shelf, which even the Government concedes is clearly excluded under Miranda and Wong Sun, and the Government's introduction of the Glock found in the defendant's bedroom on the shelf as a result of his unconstitutionally obtained confession. If anything, to adopt the Government's rule would allow it to make greater use of the confession than merely introducing the words themselves. 61 Accordingly, we decline to adopt the position of the Third and Fourth Circuits that the Wong Sun fruits doctrine never applies to Miranda violations.