Opinion ID: 2405703
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims against Bishop McDonald

Text: In his motion to dismiss filed below, appellee Bishop McDonald asserted that Cherepski's case was barred by the three-year statute of limitations for tort actions. Ark.Code Ann. § 16-56-105 (1987). It is well settled that a defense of limitation is an affirmative defense. Id. [1] When it is clear on the face of the complaint that the plaintiff's action is barred, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statute of limitations was tolled. Id., citing First Pyramid Life Ins. Co. v. Stoltz, 311 Ark. 313, 843 S.W.2d 842, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 114 S.Ct. 290, 126 L.Ed.2d 239 (1992). On appeal, Cherepski asserts that the statute was tolled due to Bishop McDonald's fraudulent concealment. While such concealment does suspend the running of the statute of limitations, the suspension remains in effect only until the party having the cause of action discovers the concealment or should have discovered it by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Id. Cherepski filed this lawsuit on August 16, 1993. Thus, for his complaint to have been timely filed, he must neither have known, nor have been able to discover through reasonable diligence, the alleged fraudulent concealment on the part of Bishop McDonald before August 16, 1990. The complaint alleges that, in September of 1988, Bishop McDonald, aware of the fact that Father Walker had allegedly been involved in sexual misconduct at the Philadelphia Diocese, brought him to the Little Rock Diocese. In 1989, Bishop McDonald extended Walker's assignment. In late 1989 or early 1990, Bishop McDonald assigned Father Walker to Cherepski's church, St. Theresa's. On March 6, 1990, Bishop McDonald had a conversation with Cherepski in which he asked Cherepski not to call any of his priests as witnesses in the upcoming divorce trial. On the face of the complaint, it appears that these allegations against Bishop McDonald are barred. Thus, the burden shifted to Cherepski to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the statute was tolled. On appeal, Cherepski contends that examples of Bishop McDonald's concealment include his denial in a 1990 deposition that he had any knowledge of the relationship between Father Walker and Susan, and Edith Cherepski's letter and other evidence showing that the statement in his deposition was false. However, paragraph 8 of Cherepski's amended complaint states that he asked Bishop McDonald to intervene shortly after September of 1989 to help remove Walker from his family's life. Similarly, Edith Cherepski's letter to Bishop McDonald, in which she complained that Father Walker is apparently involved in breaking up the Cherepski family, is dated November 17, 1989. The record simply does not support Cherepski's assertion of fraudulent concealment on the part of Bishop McDonald, and he cannot avail himself of the benefit of tolling of the statute on this basis. See Alexander v. Flake, supra . The evidence leaves no room for a reasonable difference of opinion that the statute barred these claims against Bishop McDonald; therefore, the trial court correctly ruled that no material factor was left in dispute. Thus, the only remaining claim against Bishop McDonald is the allegation that he and the Walkers have interfered with Cherepski's attempts to have his marriage to Susan annulled.