Opinion ID: 1964773
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plaintiff's Expert Testimony Excluded

Text: In his next argument, Green submits that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting St. Francis Hospital's Motion in Limine to exclude the testimony of Green's expert witness with regard to the post-fall standard of care. Green argues that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting the motion because such evidence was necessary to establish a continuous course of negligent conduct by the hospital. Green also asserts that the evidence was relevant to demonstrate that the hospital attempted to conceal its negligence. At a pretrial hearing on St. Francis Hospital's Motion in Limine, the trial judge granted the motion to exclude the testimony of Green's expert witness relating to the post-fall standard of care. The trial judge reasoned that the evidence was not relevant, because there was no dispute over the appropriate standard of care following a patient's fall. The trial judge also reasoned that admitting such evidence would be confusing to the jury, because there was no evidence that an alleged breach of the post-fall standard of care was the proximate cause of Green's injuries. D.R.E. 401 defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact in consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Under D.R.E. 402, evidence is not admissible unless it is relevant. In order to determine whether evidence is relevant, the trial judge must examine the purpose for which [the] evidence is offered. [16] Such purpose must be of consequence to the action and advance the likelihood of the fact asserted. [17] To establish a claim for medical negligence, Green was required to show that a breach of the standard of care was the proximate cause of his injuries. [18] Green asserts that the expert testimony regarding the standard of care following a patient's fall was offered to establish the continuous course of the hospital's negligence. D.R.E. 702, which governs the use of expert testimony, provides: [i]f scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The trial judge has a special obligation to ensure that scientific testimony is relevant. [19] In this case, there was no dispute over the standard of care following a patient's fall. Rather, the dispute was a factual one: whether Green told Nurse Meadows that he had fallen  thereby triggering the need for the post-fall duties  or whether Green told Nurse Meadows that he just sat down. The record reflects that Nurse Meadows testified that certain procedures should be followed after a patient's fall and conceded that those procedures were not followed in Green's care. Thus, the standard of care following a patient fall was not a fact in issue in the case. Assuming that Green was able to establish that St. Francis Hospital breached the standard of care for procedures following a patient's fall, there is no evidence to suggest that a breach of those procedures proximately caused the injuries sustained by Green in the fall. Therefore, expert evidence regarding the post-fall standard of care procedures was not relevant. Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion in granting St. Francis Hospital's Motion in Limine to exclude Green's expert from testifying regarding the post-fall standard of care. Green also argues that the evidence was relevant to establish a cover-up. The record reflects that Green was able to present evidence of post-fall standards of care that he felt supported a cover-up theory. The trial judge properly reasoned, if there was no dispute regarding what the post-fall standards were and Green was able to establish through lay testimony that those standards were not followed in Green's case, there was no reason to permit the very same cover-up evidence to be admitted through what would have been the cumulative testimony of Green's expert witness.