Opinion ID: 1179950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted Bruton Error

Text: Extrajudicial statements of each defendant were received at trial over objections of the nonconfessing defendants. In each instance the purported declarant took the witness stand to deny having made the extrajudicial statement. Bruton v. United States, supra, 391 U.S. 123, holds that it is a denial of the right to cross-examination, guaranteed to a defendant in a criminal case by the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment, to admit at a joint trial an extrajudicial confession of a codefendant which implicates the defendant, despite instructions to the jury to disregard the confession as evidence against the nonconfessing defendant. ( In re Hill (1969) 71 Cal.2d 997, 1008 [80 Cal. Rptr. 537, 458 P.2d 449].) We held in Hill that until such time as the Supreme Court affirmatively indicates that cross-examination of the confessing codefendant at trial is adequate under the confrontation clause, we feel compelled to hold that the admission of his confession is constitutional error of the type condemned by Bruton. ( Id. at p. 1013.) (7) The United States Supreme Court subsequently held that when the confessing codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies making the alleged out-of-court statement and testifies favorably to the defendant, there has been no denial of the defendant's rights protected by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. ( Nelson v. O'Neil (1971) 402 U.S. 622, 629-630 [29 L.Ed.2d 222, 228-229, 91 S.Ct. 1723].) The same rule applies when the codefendant testifies and affirms his out-of-court statement. ( People v. Sosa (1972) 26 Cal. App.3d 514, 518 [103 Cal. Rptr. 58].) (8) Rosoto and Vlahovich seek to distinguish Nelson on the ground that they had joint counsel who could not effectively cross-examine his clients. But each fails to suggest anything favorable to him which further cross-examination might have produced, and we may not presume that counsel did not exercise due diligence on behalf of each of his clients. The order to show cause is discharged, and the petition for writ of habeas corpus and for writ of coram vobis is denied. Mosk, J., and Clark, J., did not participate therein. Petitioner's application for a rehearing was denied April 17, 1974. Mosk, J., did not participate therein.