Opinion ID: 843020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: hobbs and brown should be reaffirmed

Text: It is well established that overruling precedent must be undertaken with caution. This Court does not lightly overrule settled decisions construing any section of a standing statute. Smith v. Lawrence Baking Co., 370 Mich. 169, 177, 121 N.W.2d 684 (1963). Adhering to decided cases is generally `the preferred course because it promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions, and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial process.' Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 463, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000), quoting Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251, 118 S.Ct. 1969, 141 L.Ed.2d 242 (1998). Before this Court overrules a decision deliberately made, it should be convinced not merely that the case was wrongly decided, but also that overruling it will result in less injury than in following it. McEvoy v. Sault Ste Marie, 136 Mich. 172, 178, 98 N.W. 1006 (1904). Before overruling established precedent, this Court must decide whether: (1) the earlier case was wrongly decided, (2) the earlier case defies practical workability, (3) reliance interests would work an undue hardship if the earlier case was overruled, and (4) changes in the law or facts no longer justify the earlier decision. Robinson v. Detroit, 462 Mich. 439, 464-465, 613 N.W.2d 307 (2000). Under Robinson, the first conclusion this Court must reach before overruling precedent is that the earlier case was wrongly decided. A majority of this Court considered this very issue 11 years ago and concluded that Hobbs was not wrongly decided. Brown, supra at 366, 550 N.W.2d 215. I continue to agree with the conclusion reached in Brown. These cases are part of a 30-year-old line of decisions. The line of cases preceding Hobbs and Brown provide the proper context in which to evaluate them. The cases leading up to Hobbs and Brown represent thoughtfully made, deliberate decisions. I disagree with the majority's implication that before 1970, the constitutionality of notice provisions was firmly established. Ante at 47. According to the majority, Grubaugh v. City of St. Johns, 384 Mich. 165, 180 N.W.2d 778 (1970), represented an abrupt departure in finding that a 60-day notice provision violated due process where a plaintiff had been incapacitated during the notice period because of the allegedly tortious conduct of defendant. Ante at 47; 384 Mich. at 175-176, 180 N.W.2d 778. In fact, Grubaugh afforded us the first opportunity to consider the constitutionality of the notice provisionthis issue had not been squarely presented in previous cases. Id. at 167, 180 N.W.2d 778. Two cases that closely preceded Grubaugh, Boike v. City of Flint, 374 Mich. 462, 132 N.W.2d 658 (1965), and Trbovich v. Detroit, 378 Mich. 79, 142 N.W.2d 696 (1966), make clear that their decisions to enforce the notice provisions as written were not constitutionally based. The constitutionality of section 8, [which is the provision requiring that notice of injury be given to city within 60 days,] insofar as it applies to infants or others under legal disability, has not as yet been put to test. Boike, supra at 464, 132 N.W.2d 658 n. Similarly, Justice Black's supplemental opinion in Trbovich remarked that the Court was bound to apply plainly written notice statutes as written, given that no constitutional question had been raised below. Trbovich, supra at 88, 142 N.W.2d 696. It is disingenuous for the majority to characterize Grubaugh as an aberration, while implying that the previous decisions of this Court had endorsed the constitutionality of the notice statutes with an implicit rational basis review. Ante at 47. This Court does not ordinarily rule on the constitutionality of a statute if the question of its constitutionality was not raised in the lower court or this Court. Ridenour v. Bay Co., 366 Mich. 225, 243, 114 N.W.2d 172 (1962). The question presented in Moulter v. Grand Rapids, 155 Mich. 165, 118 N.W. 919 (1908), was one of statutory construction, not constitutionality; while the appealing party claimed that the notice provision was unreasonable and void, we disclaimed any authority to decide the statute's reasonableness. Id. at 169, 118 N.W. 919. If we had actually engaged in a rational basis review of the notice statute in Moulter, the reasonableness of the statute would have been a fundamental part of the inquiry. The test to determine whether legislation enacted pursuant to the police power comports with due process is whether the legislation bears a reasonable relation to a permissible legislative objective. Shavers v. Attorney General, 402 Mich. 554, 612, 267 N.W.2d 72 (1978). Unlike Moulter and its successors, Grubaugh undertook a thorough constitutional analysis of the notice requirements of the general highway statute. [1] This Court concluded that the notice provision of the general highway statute violated due process where it extinguished the claim of a plaintiff who was mentally or physically incapacitated during the notice period due to the alleged tortious act of a state or municipal defendant. Grubaugh, supra at 176, 180 N.W.2d 778. Because the case was disposed of on due process grounds, the equal protection argument was not examined. Id. at 176-177, 180 N.W.2d 778. Shortly after Grubaugh, we considered a broader constitutional challenge to a 60-day notice provision of the general highway statute [2] in Reich v. State Hwy. Dep't, 386 Mich. 617, 194 N.W.2d 700 (1972). This Court followed Grubaugh in holding that the statute violated due process as applied to minors. Reich, supra at 622, 194 N.W.2d 700. As for the remaining plaintiffs, who were presumably competent adults, we held that the notice provision violated equal protection because it arbitrarily and unreasonably split victims into two differently treated subclasses: victims of governmental negligence and victims of private negligence. Id. at 623, 194 N.W.2d 700. This Court subsequently held that notice requirements are not necessarily unconstitutional if there is a legitimate purpose and the period is not unreasonably short. Carver v. McKernan, 390 Mich. 96, 100, 211 N.W.2d 24 (1973). The reasonableness of a period depends in part on the purpose served by the notice requirement. Id. We noted that failure to give notice may result in prejudice to the government relating to the purpose served by the notice provision. Id. Thus, the government is required to show prejudice before a claim can be dismissed on the basis of failure to meet the notice requirement. Id. We should be mindful of this history when considering the Hobbs and Brown decisions. When this Court addressed the 120-day notice requirement of MCL 691.1404 in Hobbs, we examined the notice provision and the reasons justifying it in light of the Grubaugh, Reich, and Carver decisions. This Court deliberately concluded that actual prejudice to the state from lack of notice within 120 days was the only legitimate purpose it could posit for the notice provision of § 1404. Hobbs, supra at 96, 247 N.W.2d 754. Accordingly, unless actual prejudice is shown, the plaintiff's claim is not barred by failure to give notice within the required period. Id. In Brown, we invalidated a statute on equal protection grounds because it imposed a 60-day notice requirement for claims involving county road commissions when MCL 691.1404, providing a 120-day notice period, also potentially governed the claim. Brown, supra at 363-364, 550 N.W.2d 215. After deciding that the 120-day period of § 1404 applied, we reaffirmed Hobbs 's interpretation of that provision. Id. at 368, 550 N.W.2d 215. The majority contends that the notion that notice provisions are or may be unconstitutional has no claim to being defensible constitutional theory. Ante at 50. But it is this Court's role to construe statutes to avoid unconstitutionality, if possible, by a reasonable construction of the statutory language. United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 618, 74 S.Ct. 808, 98 L.Ed. 989 (1954). The validity of the Hobbs and Brown decisions must be evaluated in view of our earlier constitutional rulings in Grubaugh, Reich, and Carver. With due consideration of this Court's precedent in the area of government notice provisions, the Hobbs Court made a reasoned decision that the 120-day notice provision might be unconstitutional if dismissal did not serve the posited purpose of avoiding prejudice. Like Hobbs and its predecessors, the primary concern in Brown was the constitutionality of a legislative scheme that draws arbitrary distinctions between litigants. Michigan is not the only jurisdiction that has invalidated notice provisions on constitutional grounds. While it certainly represents a minority position, decisions in Nevada, Iowa, Minnesota, West Virginia, and Washington have also held governmental immunity notice provisions constitutionally infirm. [3] Still others have enforced notice provisions after engrafting exceptions for minority or incapacity to avoid unconstitutionality. In Schumer By and Through Schumer v. City of Perryville, 667 S.W.2d 414, 418 (Mo., 1984), the court noted that it had previously held the application of the notice provision to incapacitated persons unconstitutional; in the case at hand, it extended this rationale to people who were under the legal disability of minority during the notice period. As evidenced by these decisions, these states, as well as Michigan before the instant case, certainly considered the idea that notice provisions may be unconstitutional to be a defensible constitutional theory. Further, as Justice Kelly discusses at length, the Legislature has acquiesced with our construction of MCL 691.1404 since the Hobbs decision, including our presumption of the statute's sole purpose. Ante at 73-75. If the Legislature did not agree with our presumption, in the 31 years since Hobbs was decided, it could have easily responded by elaborating on the other governmental interests served by the notice provision. The Hobbs decision did not foreclose the possibility that the notice provision served other legitimate state interests other than prejudice; it merely stated that this Court could only posit one purpose. Hobbs, supra at 96, 247 N.W.2d 754. If the Legislature had responded in any way to our inference, we would have had reason to reevaluate the constitutionality of MCL 691.1404 in light of the Legislature's action.