Opinion ID: 2336320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: collateral criminal charges

Text: Appellant's sixth claim of error is that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a mistrial following various witnesses' testimony about collateral criminal charges. The first such testimony was given by an FBI agent, Sean Walsh. He stated that one of the means of locating Appellant was featuring his case on the television show America's Most Wanted. Also, Brian Borg of the Toronto Police Department testified that he was provided with pictures that were shown on the television show. Appellant maintains that the jury was hopelessly tainted by this testimony because the television show is famous for helping locate wanted criminals. He argues that the jury selected was free from opinions based on media coverage of the case and that the mentioning of the television show was the very prejudice that the parties were trying to prevent in the first place. Also, that by mentioning the show, it would refresh the memory of jurors who had forgotten about seeing Appellant's case on the show. The Commonwealth argued that the testimony was relevant to what happened after Appellant fled. The standard for reviewing the denial of a mistrial is abuse of discretion. [15] A mistrial is appropriate only where the record reveals `a manifest necessity for such an action or an urgent or real necessity.' [16] We hold that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court because there was no manifest necessity to grant a mistrial. However, although there was no error in the order denying a mistrial, this evidence should not have been admitted. Walsh was testifying about the FBI's attempts to locate Appellant and in doing so mentioned the name of a popular television show. This was prejudicial and upon retrial, an objection to the testimony about the television show should be sustained. Evidence that Appellant fled to Canada, of course, would be admissible upon retrial. [17]
Appellant also contends that testimony by Walsh that Appellant had been charged with the collateral federal crime of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution was irrelevant and highly inflammatory. The Commonwealth argues this testimony is allowed by Commonwealth v. Howard which states that all facts and circumstances showing the evasion or resistance of arrest, even though they disclose the commission of another crime, are competent upon a trial of the defendant for the first offense. [18] Appellant does not disagree with this case, rather he argues that testimony that he was charged with a crime with respect to flight is different from the facts and circumstances permitted by this case. The criminal charge against Appellant is not a fact and circumstance surrounding his fleeing the country. The fact that Appellant had fled the country was revealed at trial by Appellant himself. It was revealed that Appellant had been captured through coordination of United States and Canadian authorities and this evidence was properly admitted. However, evidence that a warrant was issued adds nothing to the proof and is unfairly prejudicial to Appellant. Upon retrial, the Commonwealth may prove that Appellant fled the United States and was captured with the cooperation of Canadian authorities. Evidence that an arrest warrant was issued should be excluded.
Candie Bray, Appellant's sister, testified on behalf of Appellant. On direct examination, she testified that Appellant was afraid of the York family, that bad blood existed between Appellant and the York family, that the Yorks were a large family in Marshall County, and that even Audrey was afraid of members of her own family. Defense counsel then asked her if she was surprised Appellant went to Canada to which she replied she was not. On cross examination the Commonwealth asked Candie who in the York family Appellant was afraid of. She replied that he was afraid of Mary because she was out to get him. The Commonwealth responded that it was Appellant who had assaulted Mary and continued to question Candie concerning the events of this assault which involved a shooting incident for which Appellant was criminally charged. On redirect, Appellant's counsel asked Candie if she knew that Appellant was only convicted of disorderly conduct and that others present had guns with them. Candie replied no to each of these. Appellant contends that Candie's statement about Mary did not permit the Commonwealth to advance a line of questioning concerning why Mary was out to get him. The Commonwealth disagrees arguing that it opened the door to such questioning. Candie's statement that Mary was out to get him did indeed open the door to further questioning regarding the meaning of the statement. Although defense counsel asked several questions regarding the shooting incident and the relationship between Appellant and the York family and his fear of them, the questioning allowed by the trial court did not amount to an abuse of discretion. [19]