Opinion ID: 2116083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: parmar's pro se filings

Text: Parmar also contends that this court should adopt the prison delivery rule announced in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988), and that his pro se notice of appeal and poverty affidavit were timely filed under the rule. The appellant in Lack, who was imprisoned, delivered his notice of appeal to prison authorities for mailing to the district court within the 30-day federal time period mandated by 28 U.S.C. § 2107 (1994). However, his notice of appeal was not stamped filed by the district court until 1 day after the expiration of the time period. Nonetheless, the Court held that the appellant's notice of appeal was timely filed. The Court acknowledged that a notice of appeal is typically not considered filed until it is actually received by the clerk of the district court. However, the Court stated that prisoners acting pro se are in an unusual position in that they cannot personally travel to the courthouse to see that the notice is stamped `filed.' 487 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 2379. Instead, they are at the mercy of prison authorities ... who may have every incentive to delay. Id. The Court also noted that the applicable statute neither defined when a notice of appeal has been filed nor designated the person with whom it must be filed. Therefore, the Court held that a prisoner acting pro se files a notice of appeal on the date it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the clerk of the district court. While this court recognizes that the rationale for such a rule makes a good deal of sense, Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. at 277, 108 S.Ct. 2379 (Scalia, J., dissenting), jurisdictional statutes must be strictly construed, see Barney v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 144 Neb. 230, 13 N.W.2d 120 (1944). Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 2107, § 25-1912 specifically states that an appeal shall be perfected by filing [a notice of appeal and docket fee] in the office of the clerk of the district court within 30 days. (Emphasis supplied.) This court cannot construe in the office of to mean in the hands of prison authorities for forwarding to the office of. Indeed, this court has previously interpreted the word filed in § 25-1912 to mean received in the office of the clerk of the district court. See, State v. Schmailzl, 248 Neb. 314, 534 N.W.2d 743 (1995); Molczyk v. Molczyk, 154 Neb. 163, 47 N.W.2d 405 (1951). To say that jurisdiction may be lodged in the supreme court in any other manner than that provided by the plain words of the statute amounts to judicial legislation. Barney v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, 144 Neb. at 239, 13 N.W.2d at 124-25 (Carter, J., concurring). As we have already indicated, when a poverty affidavit is substituted for the docket fee it must be filed within the time and in the manner required for filing the docket fee. See State v. Schmailzl, supra ; State v. Haase, 247 Neb. 817, 530 N.W.2d 617 (1995). According to § 25-1912, the docket fee, like the notice of appeal, must be filed in the office of the clerk of the district court. Moreover, this court has clearly held that the receipt of a poverty affidavit in a location other than the office of the clerk of the district court is insufficient to perfect an appeal. State v. Schmailzl, supra (holding that poverty affidavit was invalid when offered during hearing); Barney v. Platte Valley Public Power and Irrigation District, supra (holding that appeal was not perfected when docket fee was paid to clerk of Supreme Court rather than clerk of district court). Thus, there is no statutory basis in which to conclude that the prison delivery rule applies in Nebraska. See, e.g., Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or. 72, 948 P.2d 722 (1997), and State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118 (Utah App.1997) (declining to adopt rule because it is inconsistent with state law). Although there may be good reasons to consider a prisoner's pro se notice of appeal and poverty affidavit filed when it is given to prison officials for forwarding to the district court, see, e.g., In re Jordan, 4 Cal.4th 116, 840 P.2d 983, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 878 (1992), and Kellogg v. Journal Communications, 108 Nev. 474, 835 P.2d 12 (1992) (adopting rule), this court has no power to do so without statutory authorization, see In re Interest of Noelle F. & Sarah F., 249 Neb. 628, 544 N.W.2d 509 (1996) (stating that when Legislature fixes time for taking appeal, courts have no power to extend time directly or indirectly). `[A]bsent some violation of due process, the Legislature may prescribe the time in which an appeal must be taken, even if the procedure, on careful reflection, is foolish or contrary to other procedures provided.' State ex rel. Labedz v. Beermann, 229 Neb. 657, 667, 428 N.W.2d 608, 615 (1988), quoting In re Covault Freeholder Petition, 218 Neb. 763, 359 N.W.2d 349 (1984). We decline to adopt the prisoner delivery rule and conclude that prisoners acting pro se are subject to the same filing rules as other litigants.