Opinion ID: 1740134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: error in entering default judgment

Text: The authority of a trial court to enter a default judgment is set out in Rule 55(a), (b) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure (MRCP). Prior to January 1, 1982, the effective date of the MRCP, default judgment and decrees pro confesso were governed by statutes and case law. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-121 (circuit court), and Miss. Code Ann. § 11-5-17 (chancery court). Under previous Mississippi decisions, the law stated that a judgment by default could not be taken against a defendant when an answer was pending, even if the answer is filed out-of-time or [was] defective in form or substance, unless it is such that it may be treated as a mere nullity. Randall v. Gunter, 181 Miss. 332, 179 So. 362 (1938); Dalton v. Rhodes Motor Co., 153 Miss. 51, 120 So. 821 (1929); Hambrick v. Dent, 70 Miss. 59, 11 So. 608 (1892). Thus, in Taylor v. McNairy, 42 Miss. 276 (1862), we held no default could be entered where an undisposed plea was on file. In Mayfield v. Barnard, 43 Miss. 270 (1870), we held that where there was on file a plea which might ultimately be treated as a nullity, and a demurrer had been interposed as to such plea, no default judgment could be entered against the defendant until the trial court had ruled on the demurrer. This Court held that where a plea had been stricken as frivolous it was within the trial court's discretion to enter a judgment for want of a plea, or to allow another plea. In this proceeding, SSLIC, together with the other defendants, filed a general denial immediately after the State made a motion for default judgment. The State's motion to strike the answer was denied by the chancellor. Consequently, at the time the default was entered, an answer as to which the chancellor had overruled a motion to strike was pending. It is thus clear that under pre-rules procedure, the chancellor erred in granting a default judgment. Turning now to our new rules, Rule 55(a), (b) in pertinent part states: (a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by these rules and that fact is made to appear by affidavit or otherwise, the clerk shall enter his default. (b) Judgment. In all cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If the party against whom judgment by default is sought has appeared in the action, he (or if appearing by representative, his representative) shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at least three days prior to the hearing of such applications; however, judgment by default may be entered by the court on the day the case is set for trial without such three days' notice. Under Rule 55 a party who has made no appearance whatsoever by himself or an attorney is not entitled to any notice before entry of default by the clerk, and entry of default judgment by the trial court. In this case there had been an appearance of sorts by the defendants, and if an attempt had been made to secure a judgment by default prior to the trial date, the three day notice provision of Rule 55(b) would have been necessary. See Charlton L. Davis & Co. v. Fedder Data Center, 556 F.2d 308 (5th Cir.1977) (appearance broadly defined); Segars v. Hagerman, 99 F.R.D. 274 (N.D. Miss. 1983). However, since there was no effort to secure a pre-trial date default judgment, and instead the default judgment was rendered on the trial date, the three day notice provision of Rule 55(b) does not apply in this case. We are thus confronted with the question: there being on file an answer which the chancellor had upon motion refused to strike, and with the parties appearing in person and by counsel on the date of trial, requesting a continuance, was it error for the court to render judgment by default? In the recent case of Wheat v. Eakin, 491 So.2d 523 (Miss. 1986), we held that where there was a defective plea that may have been subject to a motion to strike, it was error to enter judgment by default in absence of such motion and order. Since we have not specifically interpreted this question under our rules, we must also rely on Federal court decisions under Rule 55. Federal Rule 55 has no provision for a court's inherent authority to enter a default judgment on the trial date without notice. Hwever, it is well established that a federal judge may enter default judgment for failure to prosecute or to comply with procedural rules. Flaska v. Little River Marine Construction Co., 389 F.2d 885, 887 (5th Cir.1968); Fisher v. Taylor, 1 F.R.D. 448 (E.D.Tenn. 1940). Of a court's wide range of remedies, however, the entry of default judgment is the most drastic, and should be applied only in extreme circumstances. Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 283 F.2d 730, 733 (2nd Cir.1960); Durgin v. Graham, 372 F.2d 130, 131 (5th Cir.1967); accord Wheat v. Eakin, 491 So.2d 523, 526 (Miss. 1986) (disposition of cases on their merits favored over default). We are not confronted with a situation where the chancellor struck an answer and gave a default judgment. Under the facts of this case, the lower court might have been justified in striking the answer. But however barren of substance this answer appears in this appeal record, the fact remains the chancellor declined to strike it. The State plausibly argues that the answer was a nullity because the denial was not made in good faith with knowledge of the pleadings. See MRCP Rule 11. Again, we must reiterate that the answer was not stricken by the lower court. The State has filed no cross-appeal arguing that the chancellor abused his discretion in allowing the answer. Neither are we faced with a simple refusal to continue the case. What confronts us is a default judgment which terminated the contest. If a party duly served with process has made no appearance whatever, either in pleading or in person, then a default judgment is, of course, proper. Strain v. Gayden, 197 Miss. 353, 20 So.2d 697 (1945). Yet, if there is on file some pleading not an absolute nullity, or there is an appearance by a party either in person or by representative and the trial court discerns a sincere effort to contest the case, no judgment by default should be entered. In this case the defendants passed this test. The chancellor could very properly have refused a continuance, or granted a few days' continuance and kept the TRO in effect. Yet, under the facts of this case, rendering a judgment by default removed any possibility of a hearing on the merits on all issues, and the learned chancellor erred in doing so. REVERSED AND REMANDED. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J. and DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.