Opinion ID: 2994337
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Castro contends that the district court erred in refusing to vacate the order of dismissal because the failure to file the pretrial order resulted from excusable neglect and because the fact that the district court failed to give Castro an express warning before dismissing his case resulted in a violation of due process making the order dismissing the case manifestly void. As an initial matter, we note that Castro has waived his right to challenge the district court’s January 8, 1998 order dismissing his case. He did not file a notice of appeal within thirty days after the order was entered as required under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), nor did he file any motions under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4) which would have tolled the time to file his notice of appeal./2 Therefore, Castro’s appeal is limited to the district court’s denial of his motion to vacate which we will treat as a motion under Rule 60(b). See Blaney v. West, No. 99- 1524, 2000 WL 370056, at  (7th Cir. Apr. 12, 2000) (citing Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978), for the proposition that an appeal from the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.). We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion. Cash v. Illinois Div. of Mental Health, No. 99-1456, 2000 WL 355679, at  (7th Cir. Apr. 7, 2000) (citing Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 131 F.3d 625, 628 (7th Cir. 1997)). Under Rule 60(b)(1), a district court may vacate a final judgment based on mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. Attorney carelessness can constitute excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1). Federal Election Comm’n v. Al Salvi for Senate Comm., 205 F.3d 1015, 1020 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assoc., 507 U.S. 380 (1993)). However, Rule 60(b)(1) relief is discretionary, and our review is, therefore, extremely deferential. Id. (citing United States v. Golden Elevator, Inc., 27 F.3d 301, 303 (7th Cir. 1994)). A district judge’s ruling on a Rule 60(b)(1) motion will stand unless no reasonable person could have acted as the judge did. Id. (quoting Golden Elevator, Inc., 27 F.3d at 303). Given the facts of the present case together with our deferential standard of review, we find that Judge Bucklo did not abuse her discretion in denying Castro’s motion for Rule 60(b)(1) relief. As was the case in Federal Election Commission v. Al Salvi for Senate Committee, the circumstances of the present case may arguably constitute excusable neglect. See id. at 1020. However, they do not compel that conclusion. See id. The district court considered Castro’s reasons for delay as proffered in the motion to vacate and determined that Castro knew of the deadlines established by the court but chose to ignore them. This determination is not clearly unreasonable. We do not address Castro’s due process claim under Rule 60(b)(4) because this issue was not raised in his motion to vacate. The district court’s denial of Castro’s motion to vacate is AFFIRMED. /1 Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), the court may relieve a party from a final judgment for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, . . .; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. /2 As previously noted, Castro’s motion to vacate was filed on February 8, 1998, one month after judgment was entered and, therefore, did not toll the time for appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(vi), which requires that motions for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60 be filed no later than ten days after judgment is entered to toll the time for appeal.