Opinion ID: 2521384
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Determining Whether a Contest to a Ballot-Title Concerns the Substance or the Form or Content of the Ballot Title

Text: We agree with Cacioppo that section 1-11-203.5 does not time-bar a constitutional challenge to the substance of an approved ballot issue. For purposes of defining substance as it pertains to this question, we determine that a matter involves the substance of a ballot issue if it relates to the language in the ballot title itself (specifically, the submission clause) and if it is such that it would be legally impossible for the court adjudicating the ballot title contest to reform or reword the ballot title ascontemplated by the statuteto any constitutionally or statutorily acceptable level. Stated differently, the contest involves the substance of the ballot issue if, regardless of any contest filed before the election, the ballot issue as approved cannot be upheld under the laws or constitution of the state. See, e.g., Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335, 1350 (Colo.1994); affd on different constitutional grounds, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996) (overturning, due to a conflict between the voter-approved law and the U.S. Constitution, an election on an initiative that would have barred, by state constitution, laws protecting individuals from discrimination based on sexual orientation). If the claim alleges that the ballot issue as passed cannot stand under the laws of this state, it is substantive in nature and thus not subject to the time requirements of either section 1-11-203.5 or section 1-11-213, which governs the time for appeal concerning challenges to election results. Cacioppo asserts that all of his claims concerning the ballot issue are substantive because they derive from constitutional mandate. The District argues that they are all time-barred by section 1-11-203.5 because each of the claims addresses the form or content of the ballot title. To determine whether Cacioppo's suit against the District was indeed time-barredand thus, to determine whether we may review the district court's order addressing the merits of Cacioppo's contestwe must first review each of the claims and determine whether they: (a) relate to the form or content of the ballot title; (b) raise doubts only about the results of the election; or (c) address the substance of the ballot issue itself. Accordingly, we analyze each of his claims in turn.
Cacioppo's first claim alleges that because the ballot issue proposed a phased-in tax increase, article X, section 20, clause (3)(c) of the Colorado Constitution required the ballot titles submission clause to disclose the final... full fiscal year dollar increase instead of the first ... full fiscal year dollar increase. Because the trial court concluded that this claim related to the substance of the ballot issue and not the form or content of the ballot title, it heard evidence on this matter. Because it determined that the tax increase was not a phased-in tax increase, it ruled in favor of the District on the merits. While we do not specifically take issue with the trial court's conclusion, we conclude that the claim involved only the form or content of the ballot title and, therefore, that it was not appropriate for the court to hear evidence on the claim outside the five-day limitation of section 1-11-203.5. As noted above, clause (3)(c) of article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution states that [b]allot titles for tax or bonded debt increases shall begin, SHALL (DISTRICT) TAXES BE INCREASED (first, or if phased in, final, full fiscal year dollar increase) ANNUALLY ...? Thus, for all tax increases except those that are phased-in, the taxes first full fiscal year dollar increase is required to be in the ballot title; for a phased-in tax, the final full fiscal year dollar increase. The District's ballot title asked voters, SHALL THE EAGLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-50J TAXES BE INCREASED $3,115,827 ANNUALLY AND BY SUCH AMOUNTS AS ARE RAISED THEREAFTER BY THE IMPOSITION OF A MILL LEVY WITHOUT LIMITATION AS TO AMOUNT OR RATE ... AS PROVIDED BY LAW ... ? Cacioppo argued that the tax increase was phased-in. The District countered that the ballot issue called for an increase of $3,115,827 for the first year and that any increase thereafter was limited by statute. The trial court heard expert testimony concerning the nature and definition of a so-called phased-in tax as well as testimony relating to the District's intent regarding the tax and concluded that because there were no set incremental increases to be phased-in by the Districtrather, increases, if any, are determined by statutory formulathat the ballot title was appropriately worded. The trial court's inquiry into the matter, though untimely, is the kind of proceeding contemplated by section 1-11-203.5. First, the claim clearly involves the form or content of the ballot title. Indeed, the pertinent language of Colorado Constitution, article X, section 20, clause 3(c) refers only to the wording and order of the ballot title and not to the substance of what voters can approve. Cacioppo does not dispute that the District could have asked voters to approve a phased-in tax in any certain amount, only that it proceeded to do so in an illegal fashion. Second, the trial court heard evidence about the tax increase and concluded that it did not constitute a phased-in tax. Thus, had the trial court concluded the tax increase was phased-in, it had evidence at its disposal to allow it to accurately reform and reword the ballot title to conform to clause 3(c) of article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution; the court could have replaced the $3,115,827 figure with the figure for the final full fiscal year increase. Because this type of inquiry lends itself to the summary adjudication provided in section 1-11-203.5, the claim did not involve the substantive limits of the ballot issue itself. In summary, because Cacioppo's first claim alleged a form or content defect with the ballot title and because the alleged defect could have been corrected by the trial court following a summary adjudication under section 1-11-203.5, the claim was required by section 1-11-203.5 to be brought within five days of the District's setting of the ballot title. Because it was not, and because Cacioppo has failed to show any cause why it was not, we conclude that the claim was time-barred by section 1-11-203.5. See City of Glendale v. Buchanan, 195 Colo. 267, 578 P.2d 221, 223-24 (1978) (noting that where the general assembly has provided procedures for challenging [a] ballot title prior to elections, invalidating an election on that basis would be costly and disruptive, and cannot be justified unless good cause is shown why no challenge was made before the election) (internal citations omitted).
Cacioppo next argues that by asking voters if taxes should be increased $3,115,827 ANNUALLY, the ballot issue was susceptible to two different interpretations: (1) that the District may increase taxes by $3,115,827 the first year and thereafter by statutorily calculated increments or (2) that the District may increase taxes by $3,115,827 each year indefinitely. He bases his argument on the ambiguity of the word annually in the ballot title. Cacioppo does not allege a constitutional or statutory bar to that interpretation; he claims instead that if the District did interpret the ballot issue to allow an indefinite year-by-year $3,115,827 increaseand did levy such an increasethat they misled voters into believing that there would only be an initial increase of $3,115,827, since interpretation (1), above, he claims, is the more reasonable one. Because there is no claim that the District has levied a tax in accordance with interpretation (2), and because Cacioppo does not claim that the mere susceptibility to this interpretation alone renders the ballot issue illegal, we presume he seeks declaratory relief only on this claim. [12] The trial court refused to address this issue, ruling that the claim was not ripe for decision. We similarly decline to address this issue for two reasons. First, because the District has not applied any interpretation to the mill levy increase other than the one it purported to, this claim asks this court to answer a hypothetical question about possible future interpretations to the law, which we cannot do. Second, article X, section 20, clause 3(c) of the Colorado Constitution required the ballot title to be worded as it was, including use of the term annually immediately following the tax increase figure. Because Cacioppo has not filed a facial challenge to that constitutional provision, we decline to address the constitutionality of the ballot titles wording.
Cacioppo asks us to declare that the tax increase at issue in this case cannot be interpreted to permit a year-by-year increase by the District of $3,115,827. Importantly, actions for declaratory judgment are meant to settle and to afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. XX-XX-XXX, 5 C.R.S. (2003). A court's jurisdiction exists in such actions only if the case contains a currently justiciable issue or an existing legal controversy, rather than the mere possibility of a future claim. Bd. of County Comm'rs. v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, LLP, 45 P.3d 693, 698 (Colo. 2002). A declaratory judgment action requires the plaintiff to assert present and cognizable rights and calls, not for an advisory opinion upon a hypothetical basis, but for an adjudication of present right upon established facts. Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Dist. Court, 862 P.2d 944, 947 (Colo.1993). No court can appropriately adjudicate a mattereven one for declaratory judgmentin the absence of a showing that a judgment, if entered, would afford the plaintiff present relief. Id. Above all, there must be a present and actual legal controversy and not a mere possibility of a future legal dispute over some issue. Id. at 948; see also Bickel v. City of Boulder, 885 P.2d 215, 234 (Colo.1994) (holding, in a case involving possibly future illegal action permitted by a bond initiative, that this court is not empowered to give advisory opinions based on hypothetical fact situations) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, there is no allegation that the District has attempted to increase the mill levy beyond the initial $3,115,827 in the first full fiscal year. Cacioppo was fearful of this possible interpretation even before the election and wrote to Strakbein, the District's Finance Director, who assured him that the District had no intention to raise taxes over $3 million each year, despite any alternative interpretation of the ballot issue. Moreover, the District insists in this appeal that the tax increase is not susceptible to the alleged interpretation and that it has no designs to raise taxes by over $3 million each year. Thus, Cacioppo asks us to interpret and declare the limits of the tax increase based on the hypothesis that the District may at some future point attempt to raise taxes by over $3 million each year indefinitely. Because there is no existing controversy regarding the limits of the tax increase, we conclude that this issue is not justiciable and we decline to address it. See In re Proposed Initiatives, English Language Education, 44 P.3d 213, 215-16 (Colo.2002) (We have only a limited role in ballot-title proceedings. In general we will not interpret or construe the future legal effects of a proposed initiative.).
Additionally, we note that the language to which Cacioppo objects is mandated by clause 3(c) of article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution. The ballot issue pertinently reads: SHALL [THE DISTRICT] TAXES BE INCREASED $3,115,827 ANNUALLY... ? Clause 3(c) requires that: Ballot titles for tax or bonded debt increases shall begin, SHALL (DISTRICT) TAXES BE INCREASED (first ... full fiscal year dollar increase) ANNUALLY ... ? Thus, the ballot issues diction is constrained by the very provision Cacioppo seeks to enforce. Because Cacioppo chose not to challenge the requirements of clause 3(c), we decline to address the matter further.
Cacioppo further argues that the ballot issue was unconstitutional because the notice required by article X, section 20, clause 3(b) of the Colorado Constitution that accompanied the ballot title contained incorrect financial data. [13] Clause 3(b) requires that notices be sent to voters no later than thirty days before the election. Among other information required to be included in the notice sent to voters is the estimated or actual total of district fiscal year spending for the current year and each of the past four years, and the overall percentage and dollar change. Colo. Const. art. X, § 20, 3(b)(ii). The notice that was sent to voters stated the following: Actual historical and current estimated fiscal year spending information: Year Fiscal Year Spending ---- -------------------- 1996-97 (actual) $26,308,412 1997-98 (actual) $27,234,253 1998-99 (actual) $26,316,661 1999-2000 (actual) $27,608,603 2000-01 (estimated) $29,766,182 Overall percentage change in fiscal year spending over the five year period from 1996-97 through 2001-01: 13% Overall dollar change in fiscal year spending over the five year period from 1996-97 through 2000-01: $3,457,770 Estimated 2001-02 fiscal year spending without taking into account the tax increase authorized by the ballot proposal: $33,618,907 Estimated 2002 tax increase authorized by the ballot proposal: $3,115,827. Cacioppo assertsand the District agreesthat the notice failed to strictly comply with clause 3(b)(ii) of article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution because the District's five-year comparison did not include the District's then current fiscal year, which would have been July 1, 2001, through June 30, 2002, but instead included the District's spending for its then previous fiscal year, July 1, 2000, through June 30, 2001. The notice does contain the required estimated current fiscal year spending ($33,618,907), but does so below the year-by-year comparison. Because the notice included the comparison of the wrong five-year period, the notice provided an erroneous overall percentage change in fiscal spending proposed by the tax increase (13% instead of 23%) and an erroneous overall dollar change ($3,457,770 instead of $6,384,654). Not only does Cacioppo claim that the notice failed to strictly comply with clause 3(b), he alleges that the District intentionally misled voters into voting for an increase that appeared to be smaller than it was. Thus, he argues that the election should be overturned on this basis. The trial court recognized, however, that the notice does contain the required estimated current fiscal year spending. It noted that while the overall percentage and dollar amount increases were incorrect, the voters had all the required information thirty days before the election, and could have made their own conclusions about the actual percentage and dollar amount increases. Further, Strakbein, who completed this portion of the notice for the District, admitted her error and testified that she simply misread the constitution and believed that current fiscal year spending meant the spending for that calendar year. Based on this testimony, the trial court concluded that there was no intent to mislead voters and that the District had substantially complied with all constitutional requirements. It therefore refused to overturn the election on these grounds. Cacioppo has appealed that ruling on the merits and the District has cross-appealed the ruling on the grounds that this claim is time-barred by section 1-11-203.5. However, because this claim goes to the information provided in the constitutionally required notice and not the ballot title, we determine that section 1-11-203.5 is inapplicable and does not bar the claim. Indeed, because the notice is not required to be sent to voters until thirty days prior to the election, it would be impossible for a person to object to information contained in the notice within five days of the ballot title's setting, as section 1-11-203.5 requires. We note, however, that Cacioppo now challenges a ballot issue based on information contained in a notice that he and other voters had access to before the election. And, he challenges the results of the ballot issue based on the allegedly misleading nature of the notice. He does not argue that the District is without legal or constitutional authority to raise the tax, only that it improperly persuaded voters to approve the tax increase. Thus, the challenge does not concern the substance of the ballot issue. Accordingly, we conclude that this particular claim was time-barred by section 1-11-213(4), which requires those seeking to contest the results of a ballot issue election to file a written statement of intent to contest the election within ten days after the official survey of returns. [14] Because Cacioppo filed this contest well past that ten-day window, the trial courtand now this courtwas and is without jurisdiction to hear the claim. Cf. Bickel, 885 P.2d at 227 (in a case where the contest was made before the election, holding that courts may overturn an election only where a ballot issue fails to substantially comply with article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution).
Cacioppo finally argues that the ballot issue election should be overturned because the District intentionally misled voters into thinking that they were voting solely for a cost-of-living increase when part of the tax increase was intended to be used for a performance pay program. Cacioppo asserts that the results of the election were wrongfully obtained by the District because the ballot title's only stated purpose for the tax increase was to provide a cost-of-living increase for employees. The ballot title pertinently reads: SHALL THE EAGLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-50J BE INCREASED $3,115,827 ANNUALLY ... FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROVIDING THE DISTRICT WITH AN ANNUAL SUPPLEMENTAL COST OF LIVING ADJUSTMENT AS AUTHORIZED BY THE SCHOOL FINANCE ACT OF 1994...? Below the ballot title, the notice that went out to voters includes comments filed in favor of the proposal by the District. Those comments include the following statement: Of the $3.1 million raised by this measure, two-thirds will go toward a general cost-of-living pay increase for all teachers and staff, and one-third will support a performance pay program to reward teachers for outstanding student achievement. Cacioppo does not allege that the District lacks the authority under the ballot issue to divert some of the increased revenue away from the cost-of-living increase to a performance pay program. He claims instead that by excluding that information from the ballot title itself, the District intentionally misrepresented the true purpose of the ballot issue. Thus, he argues, the election should be overturned on that basis. Similar to the preceding claim, however, we note that because funding of the performance pay program was mentioned in the constitutionally required notice, Cacioppo's objection is based on information that was available to him and all other Eagle County voters prior to the election. Thus, the claim concerns the means through which the District obtained the election results and not the substantive limits of the ballot issue itself. Because the claim ultimately depends upon information included in the notice and addresses matters beyond the form or content of the ballot title, we determine that it is not time-barred by section 1-11-203.5. However, because it does not involve the legality or the constitutionality of the ballot issue's substance, and instead concerns only the means through which election results were obtained, we conclude that the claim is subject to the time limits of section 1-11-213.4, which, as explained above, require a challenge to election results to be filed within ten days after the official survey of returns. Because this claim was not filed within that timeframe, we, as well as all other courts, are without jurisdiction to address the claim.