Opinion ID: 1881123
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: liability of private landowners for artificial condition

Text: When the Mortons purchased their property, it had a preexisting drainage system or artificial condition. The Court of Appeals correctly held that determination of the Mortons' liability as to the drainage system rests on their acts or omissions in maintaining it. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Mortons were not subject to liability because Danny Morton testified that he had no trouble with the pipe on his property and therefore had no reason to repair it. That is not the proper legal standard for determining liability when a possessor acquires land with existing artificial conditions. The proper standard is set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 366: One who takes possession of land upon which there is an existing structure or other artificial condition unreasonably dangerous to persons or property outside of the land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by the condition after, but only after, (a) the possessor knows or should know of the condition, and (b) he knows or should know that it exists without the consent of those affected by it, and (c) he has failed, after a reasonable opportunity, to make It safe or otherwise to protect such persons against it. Under § 366, a person taking possession of land is required to make reasonable inspection and inquiry as to the condition of the land. Comment c, Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 366. Ignorance of an existing problem is not an excuse. This is especially true where the purchaser has long, continued occupation and use of the land. A possessor who has used the land for years may reasonably be presumed to know every condition or danger upon it, or to have failed to exercise reasonable care to investigate and discover it. Ibid. The Mortons purchased the property in question in June 1993. J.C. drowned in 1996. However, Danny Morton's history with the property is much more extensive than three years. The property was initially owned by Morton's father and Morton worked on the property for his father. Morton then bought the property from his father, eventually sold it in 1989, and then repurchased it in 1993. Prior to the accident, Danny Morton had resided for 17 years on Richmond Avenue property directly adjacent to his Richmond Avenue business property. Under § 366, the Mortons may reasonably be presumed to know of the flooding problem related to the 42-inch drainage pipe. In fact, Danny Morton testified that he witnessed flooding almost every year and recognized the dangers associated with flooding. The Mortons argue that they did nothing to increase the volume of water. But that is irrelevant to the determination of whether they failed, after reasonable opportunity, to make the drainage system safe. Danny Morton testified that he did absolutely nothing to maintain, alter or fix his drainage system. Under § 366, the trial court erred in holding that the Mortons could not be subject to liability. It is a fact question for the jury to determine whether the Mortons had occupied and used the land for a long enough period of time to create a presumption that the Mortons knew of the dangerous condition or failed to exercise reasonable care to investigate and discover it. Finally, the Mortons argue that the flooding water in Potts' parking lot did not originate from their property. But, the Mortons also admitted that flooding occurred regularly on their property. The question of the origin of the water is a classic fact question for the jury. Maddox v. Peacock Coal Co., Ky., 281 S.W.2d 704, 707 (1955). The Mortons had a continuing duty to exercise reasonable care and diligence to maintain their drainage pipe sufficiently to allow free passage of water. Chesapeake & O.R. Co. v. Saulsberry, 262 Ky. 31, 88 S.W.2d 949, 951 (1935). As in Chesapeake, the Mortons can be subject to liability for failure to maintain an adequate opening for the flow of water. Id. at 950. For the reasons set forth above, this case is reversed as to all Appellees and remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with the holdings of this opinion. LAMBERT, C.J.; STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur. COOPER, J., concurs with the result only as to POTTS by separate opinion in which he is joined by GRAVES and KELLER, JJ.; concurs with the result only as to MORTON by separate opinion in which he is joined by GRAVES, J.; and dissents with the result as to the City of Mt. Sterling by separate opinion in which he is joined by GRAVES and KELLER, JJ. GRAVES, J., concurs with the result only as to POTTS and MORTON, and dissents with the result as to the City of Mt. Sterling. KELLER, J., concurs with the result only as to POTTS, dissents with the result as to the City of Mt. Sterling, and dissents with the result as to MORTON by separate opinion.