Opinion ID: 2521563
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preliminary Hearings in Colorado

Text: Before the holdings of either Roberts or Crawford, we noted that the admissibility of prior testimony depended on the nature of the proceeding at which the prior testimony was made. People v. Smith, 198 Colo. 120, 125, 597 P.2d 204, 207 (1979), overruled on other grounds by People v. Vance, 933 P.2d 576 (Colo.1997), overruled by Griego v. People, 19 P.3d 1 (Colo.2001) ( Vance overruled Smith on grounds that materiality is an issue that must be submitted to the jury; Griego later overruled Vance on the proper standard of review for such an error). In particular, we examined whether prior testimony given at a preliminary hearing provided an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. Id. at 125-26, 597 P.2d at 207-08. In deciding that question, we looked to the purpose of the preliminary hearing. Id. We concluded that due to the limited nature of the preliminary hearing, the opportunity for cross-examination was insufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208. We now reiterate that holding. A preliminary hearing is limited to matters necessary to a determination of probable cause. Id. at 125, 597 P.2d at 207. The rights of the defendant are therefore curtailed: evidentiary and procedural rules are relaxed, and the rights to cross-examine witnesses and to introduce evidence are limited to the question of probable cause. Id. A defendant has no constitutional right to unrestricted confrontation of witnesses and to introduce evidence at a preliminary hearing. By rule, defendants have the right to a preliminary hearing under certain circumstances, and pursuant to the rule a defendant `may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf.' Crim. P. 7(h)(3). However, the preliminary hearing is not intended to be a mini-trial or to afford the defendant an opportunity to effect discovery. Id. at 125-26, 597 P.2d at 207-08 (quoting Rex v. Sullivan, 194 Colo. 568, 571, 575 P.2d 408, 410 (1978)). Hence, a preliminary hearing does not provide the same safeguards as a trial. Additionally, the judge's findings at a preliminary hearing are restricted to a determination of probable cause. Id. at 125, 597 P.2d at 207. A judge may not engage in credibility determinations unless the testimony is incredible as a matter of law. Id. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208; Hunter v. Dist. Court, 190 Colo. 48, 52-53, 543 P.2d 1265, 1268 (1975); People v. Ramirez, 30 P.3d 807, 809 (Colo.2001) (Testimony is incredible as a matter of law if it is in conflict with nature or fully established or conceded facts. It is testimony as to facts which the witness physically could not have observed or events that could not have happened under the laws of nature.). Aside from the exceptionally rare instance of credibility as an issue of law, defense counsel has no legitimate motive to engage in credibility inquiries and may be prohibited from doing so. Smith, 198 Colo. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208; Hunter, 190 Colo. at 52-53, 543 P.2d at 1268. Thus, the right to cross-examination may be curtailed by the judge in all but the most unusual circumstances. Id. Because credibility is not at issue and probable cause is a low standard, once a prima facie case for probable cause is established, there is little defense counsel can do to show that probable cause does not exist. Therefore, as a practical matter, defense counsel may decline to cross-examine witnesses at the preliminary hearing, understanding that the cross-examination would have no bearing on the issue of probable cause and that the judge may limit or prohibit the cross-examination. Thus we conclude that the opportunity for cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is very limited. Further, the opportunity for cross-examination regarding the credibility of a witness, as a matter of fact, exists only to the extent that an attorney persists in asking questions that have no bearing on the issues before the court, and such irrelevant questioning is not prohibited by the court. Given the limited nature of the preliminary hearing in Colorado, we held in Smith that the Colorado Confrontation Clause precludes the admission of the transcript of a preliminary hearing at a subsequent trial when the witness whose testimony is sought has become unavailable. Id. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208 (compare California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970) (in California case, where preliminary hearing constitutes a mini-trial, unavailable witness's prior testimony at preliminary hearing admissible)). We relied in Smith on the Supreme Court's analysis in Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968), that there has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation requirement where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceedings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant. The Supreme Court first held in Barber that the state did not establish unavailability. Id. at 724-25, 88 S.Ct. 1318. Additionally, it rejected the notion that the defendant had waived his right to confront the witness by not cross-examining him at the preliminary hearing. Id. at 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318. The Court noted that even if defense counsel had cross-examined the witness at the preliminary hearing, the Confrontation Clause still would not be satisfied on the facts of that case. Id. Citing the differences between a trial and a preliminary hearing, the Court concluded that cross-examination at the preliminary hearing would not have provided the same opportunity for exploration into the case. Id. The right to confrontation is basically a trial right. It includes both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the demeanor of the witness. A preliminary hearing is ordinarily a much less searching exploration into the merits of a case than a trial, simply because its function is the more limited one of determining whether probable cause exists to hold the accused for trial. Id. The Court's decision in Barber that the exception to the right of confrontation arises only when a witness is unavailable and previously gave testimony that was subject to cross-examination by the defendantthus foreshadowed its decision in Crawford requiring the same. Thus, we have held that the preliminary hearing does not satisfy Confrontation Clause requirements. Smith, 198 Colo. at 126, 597 P.2d at 208; see also Commonwealth v. Smith, 436 Pa.Super. 277, 647 A.2d 907, 912-15 (1994)(because issue of credibility important at trial, and because credibility not an issue at preliminary hearing, preliminary hearing testimony inadmissible because defendant did not have a full and fair opportunity for cross-examination); cf. People v. Rosa, 302 A.D.2d 231, 231-32, 754 N.Y.S.2d 279 (N.Y.App.Div.2003) (suppression hearing did not provide full and fair opportunity for cross-examination; little incentive to impeach credibility); Nazworth v. State, 352 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla.App.1977) (bond hearing, the purpose of which was limited to setting bond, did not afford defendant a proper opportunity for cross-examination). Other states are split on whether a preliminary hearing provides an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. See generally Francis M. Dougherty, J.D., Annotation, Admissibility Or Use In Criminal Trial Of Testimony Given At Preliminary Proceeding By Witness Not Available At Trial, 38 A.L.R.4th 378, § 6 (2004). Nonetheless, we do not wish to change the scope of the preliminary hearing by overruling our decision in Smith that a preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate opportunity for cross-examination. As the Attorney General recognized in oral argument, Smith is good law; it prevents the preliminary hearing from becoming a mini-trial which would expend time and resources the judiciary does not possess. Changing the purpose of these hearings would impact all criminal cases, not just those with Confrontation Clause issues. Preliminary hearings are limited to a determination of probable cause so that they do not become mini-trials. Were we to allow extensive cross-examination by defense counsel so as to prevent any Confrontation Clause violations at trial if a witness were to become unavailable, we would turn the preliminary hearing in every case into a much longer and more burdensome process for all parties involved. Therefore, we do not expand the scope of preliminary hearings in order to allow them to satisfy Confrontation Clause requirements. Rather, we merely reiterate our holding in Smith; although a defendant must have been provided with a prior adequate opportunity to cross-examine an unavailable witness before the State can admit that witness's previous testimony into evidence, the preliminary hearing does not provide an adequate opportunity to cross-examine sufficient to satisfy the Confrontation Clause requirements.