Opinion ID: 1823510
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Will the Product of Undue Influence?

Text: Pirtle and Prchal next contend that they presented substantial evidence showing that the will was the product of Tucker's undue influence. This Court has held: A presumption of undue influence arises when: (1) there is a confidential relationship between a favored beneficiary and the testator, (2) the influence of the beneficiary is dominant and controlling in that relationship, and (3) there is undue activity by the beneficiary in procuring the execution of the will. Hayes v. Apperson, 826 So.2d 798, 802 (Ala.2002); accord Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So.2d 113, 117 (Ala.1995). In considering these elements, this Court has recognized: `[I]t is next to impossible to produce direct evidence of the exercise of undue influence over another person. Frequently the best evidence which can be offered for either [the] proponent [of a will] or [the] contestant is circumstantial, tending only to support inferences which can be drawn therefrom.' Smith v. Moore, 278 Ala. 173, 177, 176 So.2d 868, 871 (1965); see also Crump v. Moss, 517 So.2d at 612 (noting that the evidence required `to raise a presumption of undue influence' can be either direct or circumstantial). Ex parte Henderson, 732 So.2d 295, 299 (Ala.1999) (bracketed language in original). Additionally, a trial court should not look at individual facts or evidence in isolation in determining whether the evidence supports the element of undue influence. . . . Hayes, 826 So.2d at 803. [T]he facts shown by the evidence are not considered in a vacuum; rather, `each fact should be considered in the context of the entire situation and in light of the other two criteria for determining undue influence.' Crump [v. Moss ], 517 So.2d [609] at 613 [(Ala. 1987)]. Henderson, 732 So.2d at 299. Keeping in mind these principles, we review each element to determine whether Pirtle and Prchal presented substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tucker exerted undue influence over Miller.
The parties stipulated that Tucker and Miller had a confidential relationship. They dispute whether there was substantial evidence showing that Tucker was a favored beneficiary under Miller's will. This Court has defined a favored beneficiary as [o]ne who, in the circumstances of the particular case, has been favored over others having equal claim to the testator's bounty. An unnatural discrimination, leading to a natural inference that advantage has been taken by one in position so to do; and shown to have been busy in getting such will executed. Cook v. Morton, 241 Ala. 188, 192, 1 So.2d 890, 892 (1941). Citing Clifton v. Clifton, 529 So.2d 980, 983 (Ala.1988), in which this Court stated that the `equal claim' of others refers not to the laws of descent and distribution, but to the facts of the particular case, and Windham v. Pope, 474 So.2d 1075 (Ala. 1985), Tucker asserts that there is no evidence indicating that Pirtle and Prchal had an equal claim to Miller's bounty or that any discrimination in Tucker's favor was unnatural. According to Tucker, under the particular facts of this case, Pirtle and Prchal's claim was not equal because they had had only minimal contacts with their grandfather, they had not been involved in his daily life, and they had left Miller to Tucker's care. (Tucker's brief at 31-32.) The statement from Clifton originated from this Court's explanation in Cook, supra, that the fact that a wife received more under a will than she would have under dower and homestead laws was not a determinative test of whether she was a favored beneficiary. Cook, 241 Ala. at 192, 1 So.2d at 892. Instead, the Court reviewed the evidence to see whether the wife had dominating power over her husband. 241 Ala. at 192, 1 So.2d at 892. In light of its original context, this statement does not require us to ignore wholly the fact that Pirtle and Prchal were Miller's closest living issue. In Windham, this Court reversed a judgment entered on a jury verdict in favor of a will contestant. 474 So.2d at 1076. The testator, a widower with no children, executed a will leaving one parcel of property to the daughter of his brother-in-law. Although the evidence showed that the brother-in-law was present when the testator signed the will and that both he and his daughter had helped the testator with his financial affairs, this Court found that there was no evidence indicating that others had a claim to the testator's sympathy or benevolence which was equal to or greater than the devisee's. . . . The record is devoid of evidence as to who the natural objects of the testator's bounty might have been. He was a widower without children. There was no evidence tending to show that he was closer to some other person or persons than he was to [his brother-in-law's daughter]. 474 So.2d at 1077. Furthermore, because the will devised only one portion of the testator's estate and there was no evidence showing the value of the remaining estate or how it would be distributed, it was mere speculation to conclude that [the devisee] was to receive a disproportionate share of the estate under the will. 474 So.2d at 1077. The facts underlying this Court's decision in Windham differ materially from those of this case. Unlike the testator in Windham, Miller had blood descendants his granddaughters, Pirtle and Prchal  who would have inherited Miller's entire estate under Alabama's laws of intestacy. Ala.Code 1975, § 43-8-42. Furthermore, Miller's will devises his entire estate to Tucker, not just one part. We can, therefore, determine that the will significantly favors Tucker over Pirtle and Prchal. Pirtle and Prchal presented evidence indicating that Miller wanted them to have either his entire estate, whatever money was left in his estate, or $100,000. This evidence shows that Pirtle and Prchal were objects of his bounty and raises an inference that their claim to Miller's bounty was equal to Tucker's, whereas in Windham, there existed no evidence on which to make a similar determination. Finally, although it is clear that Tucker helped Miller in the latter stages of Miller's life, the evidence does not show that he helped Miller so much that the the testamentary disposition [of Miller's entire estate to Tucker] is proper as a matter of law. Armstrong v. McGee, 579 So.2d 1310, 1314 (Ala.1991). As stated in the definition of favored beneficiary, whether one is a favored beneficiary depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. See also Cleveland v. Central Bank of the South, 574 So.2d 741, 744 (Ala.1990) (finding sufficient evidence that proponent was a favored beneficiary, particularly when this issue is viewed in the light of the totality of the evidence). Under the circumstances of this case as revealed in the evidence discussed above, Pirtle and Prchal have presented substantial evidence indicating that they had a claim to Miller's bounty equal to Tucker's and that the will favors Tucker over them. Therefore, there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tucker was a favored beneficiary.
For Pirtle and Prchal to survive a summary-judgment motion, there must be substantial evidence indicating that Tucker's influence over Miller was dominant and controlling in the relationship. In considering what evidence satisfies this requirement, this Court has held on numerous occasions that the fact that a beneficiary controls the personal, business, and household affairs of a testator is evidence of a dominant and controlling influence. Hayes v. Apperson, 826 So.2d at 804 (reversing judgment for proponent of will). The evidence shows that Tucker provided Miller's sole means of transportation at the end of his life and that Miller was dependent on Tucker for two meals and his medicine each day. Tucker helped Miller pay his bills, ultimately gained power over Miller's financial affairs, and used that power to transfer certificates of deposit worth over $200,000, which benefited himself. Tucker accompanied Miller into his doctors' examination rooms and cared for Miller when he was released from the hospital. During the month preceding the execution of his will, Miller was hospitalized twice; during the first hospitalization, he exhibited signs of confusion, disorientation, and an unwillingness to comply with the hospital staff. Miller had poor eyesight in the months preceding his death and had difficulty reading. Tucker's wife prepared Miller's will and a power of attorney for Miller in Tucker's favor. Tucker did not always inform Miller's family members when he was hospitalized, and after the will was executed, Tucker used the power of attorney to issue a do-not-resuscitate order and to instruct the hospital staff to notify only him when Miller was admitted or released. The evidence thus shows Tucker's control over Miller's financial and numerous of his personal affairs. When that evidence is coupled with the evidence of Miller's diminished mental state during his hospitalization the month preceding the execution of the will, a jury could determine that Tucker's influence in the relationship was dominant and controlling. See, e.g., Hayes, 826 So.2d at 804; Allen v. Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 117. Furthermore, although the events occurred after Miller signed the will, we note that the transfer of the certificates of deposit and the do-not-resuscitate order certainly show a controlling influence by Tucker. This Court has recognized that whether the beneficiary was the dominant party in the relationship is usually a question of fact for the jury, and the jury may review the often circumstantial evidence as to whether there were controlling influences over the testator's behavior. Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 117; see also Ex parte Helms, 873 So.2d 1139, 1148 (Ala.2003). Accordingly, although no single piece of evidence in this case is alone sufficient to withstand summary judgment, when taken together the evidence constitutes substantial evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Tucker had a dominant and controlling influence in his relationship with Miller. Thus, summary judgment was not appropriate.
Finally, to survive the summary-judgment motion as to their undue-influence claim, Pirtle and Prchal must present substantial evidence of undue activity by Tucker in procuring the execution of Miller's will. Undue activity in the procurement or execution of a will may . . . be proved by circumstantial evidence. Sconyers, 669 So.2d at 117. This Court has described this sort of activity in the procurement of a will as being where the primary beneficiary `[is] active in and about the execution and preparation of said will, such as the initiation of the proceedings for the preparation of the will, or participation in such preparation, employing the draftsman, selecting the witness, excluding persons from the testat [or] at or about the time of the execution of the will, concealing the making of the will after it was made, and the like. . . . ' Hayes, 826 So.2d at 803 (quoting Reed v. Shipp, 293 Ala. 632, 636, 308 So.2d 705, 708 (1975)). In Hayes, the evidence showed that the proponent had drafted the testator's will; had employed someone whom he had provided with specially lined paper to type the will; had arranged for the execution of the will and had selected the witnesses; and had excluded the testator's friend from the execution of the will. The notary testified that she did not know the nature of the documents being signed, and the testator's brother, who executed a will prepared by the proponent on the same day, stated the same. The proponent was present in the room when the documents were handled and executed and left only when the notary asked the testator if she understood what she was doing. Also, the proponent had previously attempted to have a will prepared and signed by the testator. Under these facts, this Court reversed the trial court's judgment in favor of the proponent, finding that the judgment, which followed a bench trial and had been based on ore tenus evidence, was against the great weight of evidence. 826 So.2d at 804. Additionally, this Court has found substantial evidence of undue activity in the following cases. In Helms, supra, this Court held that the contestants to the will had presented substantial evidence precluding a judgment as a matter of law on the basis that the proponent had engaged in undue activity to procure the execution of the will; the evidence showed that the proponents obtained money and property from the testator; one proponent suggested the lawyer who drafted the . . . will; one proponent must have driven [the testator] to the office where the will was executed, and both proponents falsely denied any knowledge of the . . . will. . . . 873 So.2d at 1149. Similarly, in Sconyers, supra, this Court reversed a summary judgment despite testimony that the testator was alert and intelligent, when the evidence also showed that the testator exhibited signs of Alzheimer's disease days before the execution of the will, the testator's affairs were solely in the hands of the proponent, and the will radically deviated from the testator's previous will. This Court stated: In light of the circumstances of this case, a jury could infer that the 1992 will's radical deviation from the bequests made in the 1990 will was the product of undue influence. 669 So.2d at 117. Keeping these precedents in mind, we turn to the evidence presented in this case by Pirtle and Prchal. That evidence shows that Tucker was with Miller when Miller purchased the will kit. Tucker's wife, whose testimony neither side presented, typed the will, which left Miller's entire estate to Tucker. The will was a radical departure from Miller's statements to Pirtle and Prchal that he wanted them to have everything and his statements to Tucker that he wanted Pirtle and Prchal to have whatever was left. Tucker disclaimed knowledge of the contents of the will and failed to advise Miller's family that he had executed a will. Tucker drove Miller to the notary's office to have the will executed and was present during the execution. Although the notary asked Miller whether he knew what he was signing and he responded that he did, she did not question him about the contents of the document. After it was executed, Miller gave the signed will to Tucker. Additionally, Tucker's wife prepared a power of attorney for Miller appointing Tucker his attorney in fact, which Tucker subsequently used for his own financial gain. A court does not look at individual facts or evidence in isolation in determining whether the evidence supports the element of undue influence. . . . Hayes, 826 So.2d at 803. A jury could reasonably infer from the evidence, when viewed in its totality, that Tucker was unduly active in procuring the execution of the will, which left the entirety of Miller's estate to Tucker. A jury could also reasonably infer that Tucker merely acted in accordance with Miller's wishes. Because the evidence, therefore, gives rise to a genuine issue of material fact regarding undue activity, it is a matter to be determined by a jury. Accordingly, Pirtle and Prchal presented substantial evidence supporting each element of their undue-influence claim, and there existed genuine issues of material fact that precluded a summary judgment as to this claim.