Opinion ID: 170512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Trial court's refusal to allow testimony from defense expert witness

Text: In his sixth issue, Gilson argues that the state trial court's refusal to allow his expert witness, Dr. Wanda Draper, to testify regarding the credibility of the Coffman children's testimony violated his constitutional rights. We begin our analysis of this issue by reviewing the key events that culminated in the state trial court's ruling. On April 2, 1998, the state trial court, at Gilson's request, conducted an in camera hearing regarding the competency of the surviving Coffman children to testify during the State's case-in-chief. Tr. Vol. IV at 840. During that hearing, Gilson presented the testimony of Dr. Wanda Draper, who holds a Ph.D in child development and was a professor in the Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences in the College of Medicine at the University of Oklahoma. Draper indicated that she had concerns about the competency of the Coffman children to testify. Id. at 855. To begin with, Draper noted that the children for a period of months were living under the assumption [created by their mother and Gilson] that one of their brothers [Shane] had run away, but the assumption was that he was still alive. And then that changed and they discovered that he [wa]s not alive. Id. Draper questioned whether the children could appreciate the obligation to tell the truth when their own mother lied to them. . . . Id. at 859. Draper also noted that [t]he stories between and among the children ha[d] changed, id. at 862, and she opined that the children ha[d] had enough trauma in their lives that it would be very difficult for them over time to recall accurately what actually happened. Id. at 863. At the conclusion of Draper's testimony, Gilson's counsel moved to suppress the testimony of the Coffman children based on their lack of competence to accurately testify about events relevant to the case. Id. at 890. The state trial court overruled that motion, but reserved a final ruling on each of the children's competency to testify until it had heard their individual voir dire examinations. Id. at 895. With respect to the testimony of Dr. Draper, the state trial court concluded it d[id] not meet the Daubert standards to qualify as expert direct testimony regarding credibility, and that credibility . . . [wa]s a matter for the finder of fact. Id. On April 7, 1998, during the course of the prosecution's case-in-chief, the state trial court conducted voir dire proceedings to determine the competency of each of the children to testify. At the conclusion thereof, the state trial court determined that all of the children were competent to testify. Id. Vol. VII at 1540. The State proceeded to introduce the testimony of each of the children, and Gilson's trial counsel was allowed to cross-examine each child. During his own case-in-chief, Gilson renewed his request to present the testimony of Dr. Draper regarding the credibility of the Coffman children's testimony. The state trial court denied that request. a) Clearly established Supreme Court precedent Gilson identifies Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), and Chambers v. Mississippi 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), as providing the clearly established federal law applicable to this claim. In Davis, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of allowing a criminal defendant to adequately cross-examine prosecution witnesses. In particular, the Court noted that the exposure of a [prosecution] witness' motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally protected right of cross-examination. 415 U.S. at 316-17, 94 S.Ct. 1105. Such cross-examination, the Court noted, would be directed toward revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of the witness as they may relate directly to issues or personalities in the case at hand. Id. at 316, 94 S.Ct. 1105. If this right is violated, the Court held, no amount of showing of want of prejudice would cure it. Id. at 318, 94 S.Ct. 1105 (internal quotation marks omitted). In Chambers, the defendant in a Mississippi state criminal proceeding sought to introduce reliable evidence that a prosecution witness had, orally and through a written confession (that was later recanted), admitted being guilty of the murder offense that Chambers was charged with. The state trial court refused to allow Chambers to cross-examine the witness on credibility. Although the Mississippi Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, the Supreme Court granted Chambers' petition for writ of certiorari and reversed. In doing so, the Court noted that [t]he right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Few rights, the Court held, are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. In the exercise of this right, the Court held, the accused, as is required of the State, must comply with established rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability in the ascertainment of guilt and innocence. Id. b) OCCA's rejection of Gilson's claim In his direct appeal, Gilson challenged the state trial court's refusal to admit the testimony of Dr. Draper, arguing that the state trial court's ruling was unreasonable and violated his constitutional rights. The OCCA did not address Gilson's latter argument, and instead simply affirmed the state trial court's evidentiary ruling: [Gilson] . . . argues the trial court erred in excluding the trial testimony of Dr. Draper. After hearing in-camera testimony from Dr. Draper, the trial court found the testimony does not meet the Daubert standards to qualify as expert direct testimony regarding credibility. The credibility, again, is a matter for the finder of fact. The trial court did allow the defense the opportunity to have Dr. Draper serve as expert advisory counsel and remain in the courtroom during the children's testimony to advise the defense as to areas of possible cross-examination and closing argument. Further, prior to closing their case-in-chief, defense counsel `renewed the request to call Dr. Draper to the stand. The court denied the request, but accepted Dr. Draper's in-camera testimony as an offer of proof. The admission of expert testimony is governed generally by 12 O.S.1991, § 2702. In areas of novel scientific evidence, this Court has adopted the standard set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). See Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328 (Okl.Cr.1995). In Daubert, the Supreme Court stated that such expert testimony is admissible only if it is both relevant and reliable. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597, 113 S.Ct. at 2799. This inquiry into reliability and relevance is two-fold. The reliability prong requires the expert opinion testimony be about scientific knowledge. Taylor, 889 P.2d at 329. The relevance prong involves the requirement that the proffered testimony assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Id. at 330. [Gilson] argues Dr. Draper's testimony undoubtedly involved `scientific knowledge', and that the relevant question here is whether Dr. Draper's testimony would have assisted the trier of fact. While we appreciate [Gilson]'s offer to reduce our work by focusing on only one prong of the Daubert analysis, we find it necessary to review both prongs of the analysis in order to properly evaluate the trial court's ruling and resolve [Gilson]'s allegation of error. In Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 1174, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999), the Supreme Court extended Daubert to testimony based on technical and other specialized knowledge. The Court stated whether Daubert 's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability, in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine. 526 U.S. at 152, 119 S.Ct. at 1176. Reviewing the record under the criteria set forth in Daubert and Kumho we find Dr. Draper's qualifications as an expert do not seem to be in doubt. She testified to having a Ph.D. in Child Development and working and teaching in the field of child development for approximately twenty years. She also stated that during the previous ten years she had participated in a hands-on program which worked directly with abused and neglected children. The trial court seems to have excluded her testimony based upon her theory that the children were not competent to testify, and not upon her lack of qualifications. Dr. Draper testified generally to factors to be considered in determining whether a child could be a competent witness including capacity and ability to observe, intelligence, memory, ability to communicate. When asked whether it would be correct to say that failing to properly interview or elicit information from a child can taint or impact their ability to then accurately relate an event?, she answered [t]hat's a very great possibility, yes. Dr. Draper then addressed the Coffman children specifically. Dr. Draper stated she interviewed each of the Coffman children individually and studied material from the court proceedings and DHS. She gave her conclusion as to whether each of the Coffman children was competent to testify. She generally concluded that based upon the children's life history of trauma, abuse and neglect, and the effect that has on memory and ability to recall, combined with the death of their brother Shane, and the numerous interviews conducted in connection with the court proceedings, none of the Coffman children were competent to testify at trial. A review of the record shows there was no testimony regarding whether Dr. Draper's theory of the effect of trauma on the child's ability to be a competent witness has been or can be tested. There was no showing of its general acceptance in the field of child development. Further, Dr. Draper testified only as to a great possibility that improper interview techniques could impact a child's ability to relate an event. Dr. Draper interviewed each of the children only once, just prior to trial, and asked each of them five or six uniform questions. She testified she had no knowledge of whether the statements the children made concerning the facts of the case were embellished or false. She also stated that piecemeal disclosure of the facts is common among child abuse victims. Having thoroughly reviewed the record, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony. Dr. Draper's testimony did not meet the Daubert requirements of scientific knowledge and the testimony would not have assisted the trier of fact. Once the trial court determined the children were competent witnesses, Dr. Draper's testimony would have been confusing and its speculative nature would not have been relevant to the jury's determination of the credibility of children's testimony. Accordingly, we find the testimony was properly excluded. This assignment of error is denied. Gilson I, 8 P.3d at 907-08 (internal paragraph numbers omitted). c) Gilson's challenge to the OCCA's analysis Because the OCCA did not address Gilson's argument that the state trial court's ruling violated his constitutional rights, we must review those arguments de novo. See Young, 486 F.3d at 663 (If the state court did not decide a claim on the merits, and it is not otherwise procedurally barred, we review the district court's legal conclusions de novo.). In doing so, however, we may not provide habeas corpus relief on the basis of state court evidentiary rulings unless they rendered the trial so fundamentally unfair that a denial of constitutional rights results. Because a fundamental-fairness analysis is not subject to clearly definable legal elements, when engaged in such an endeavor a federal court must tread gingerly and exercise considerable self-restraint. Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 999 (10th Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Despite Gilson's general assertion that his constitutional rights were violated, his supporting arguments focus almost exclusively on the merits of the state trial court's evidentiary ruling. For example, Gilson complains that, contrary to the conclusion reached by the OCCA, the trial judge based his ruling on Dr. Draper's conclusions, not on her methodology or her scientific knowledge. Aplt. Br. at 101. Gilson argues that once the judge ruled the children were competent under Oklahoma Evidence Rules 2601 and 2603, the issue was no longer admissibility but the weight the jury should give their testimony, and Dr. Draper's expertise should have been allowed to assist the jury in that evaluation. Id. In other words, Gilson argues, the trial judge failed in his gatekeeper role because he did not perform the proper rudimentary tests to assess the admissibility of Dr. Draper's testimony in' light of Daubert and its Oklahoma progeny, Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319 (Okla. Crim.App.1995). Id. at 101-02. Similarly, Gilson argues that [t]he OCCA perpetuated the trial judge's error by holding Dr. Draper to the outmoded general acceptance standard of Frye v. U.S., 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923). Id. at 107. This, Gilson argues, is now merely an additional though not exclusive factor in the Daubert analysis. . . . Id. Gilson also asserts that [t]he OCCA further erred because it did not apply the proper standard of review to the proposition of error regarding the testimony of Dr. Draper. Id. at 108. More specifically, Gilson argues that because the state trial judge failed in his gatekeeper role, the review of this failure should have been de novo and not for abuse of discretion. Id. Given the fundamental fairness analysis that applies to this issue, as well as the self-restraint that we are bound to exercise in this setting, we conclude that Gilson's arguments can be easily disposed of without delving into all of their specifics. Although Gilson argues in essence that the state trial court applied Oklahoma's evidentiary rules unfairly, a review of the trial transcript firmly establishes otherwise. As noted, the sole focus of Draper's proposed testimony was the credibility of the Coffman children's trial testimony. Although Draper was formally trained in child development, nothing about her educational or professional background necessarily qualified her to provide expert testimony on an issue normally' reserved exclusively for the jury, i.e., witness credibility. Indeed, we have long held the credibility of a witness is generally not an appropriate subject for expert testimony because, in part, it encroaches upon the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations. . . . United States v. Adams, 271 F.3d 1236, 1245 (10th Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see United States v. Smith, 156 F.3d 1046, 1053-54 (10th Cir.1998) (affirming district court's decision to exclude proposed expert testimony on subject of eyewitness identification); cf. United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1407 (10th Cir.1997) (Although the use of experts to bolster witness credibility is disfavored, no absolute rule prohibits utilizing expert testimony for this purpose.). Moreover, it is important to emphasize that, notwithstanding the state trial court's exclusion of Draper's testimony, Gilson was allowed to extensively cross-examine the Coffman children and to explore any alleged inconsistencies between their trial testimony and their prior sworn testimony. Thus, we conclude the state trial court's ruling was neither unreasonable nor rendered Gilson's trial fundamentally unfair. In terms of the two Supreme Court cases cited by Gilson, the state trial court's evidentiary ruling did not result in a deprivation of Gilson's right to adequately cross-examine prosecution witnesses (as discussed in Davis ) [16] , nor did it deprive Gilson of his right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations (as discussed in Chambers ). [17] As noted, Gilson's trial counsel was afforded a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine each of the Coffman children, and in doing so was able to attack their credibility and place that issue before the jury. Further, Gilson's trial counsel vigorously attacked the children's credibility during the first-stage closing arguments. E.g., Tr., Vol. X at 2168 (These kids know they have to come in here and say as many bad things about Don Gilson to make sure he's convicted.); id. (Unfortunately, with all those pressures and in light of all the trauma that these kids have been through, that combination renders them unreliable, unbelievable.). We therefore conclude that Gilson is not entitled to federal habeas relief on this claim.