Opinion ID: 6341486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Clear and obvious error

Text: The Government alleged that Stoglin had a serious violent felony based on his 1999 guilty plea to one count of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in Texas court, which resulted in a ten-year sentence. 1 Aggravated assault is not included in the enumerated offense clause of § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i). Accordingly, Stoglin’s sentence was properly enhanced only if it falls under the elements clause of § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). In Borden 2, the Supreme Court held that an offense requiring the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person cannot be an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) “violent felony” if it criminalizes reckless conduct. See Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1825. In relevant part, and with language identical to that of ACCA’s elements clause, § 3559(c)(2) defines a “serious violent felony” as an “offense . . . that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). A person commits aggravated assault in Texas “if the person commits assault as defined in [Texas Penal Code] § 22.01 and the person: (1) causes serious bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse; or (2) uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.” Tex. Penal Code § 22.02(a)(1) & (2). An assault under Texas Penal Code § 22.01 is committed when a person: 1 This court granted the Government’s motion to supplement the appellate record with copies of the state court documents. 2 Because Borden was decided while Stoglin’s case was pending on direct appeal, he is entitled to the benefit of that decision. See United States v. Escalante-Reyes, 689 F.3d 415, 423 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (“[W]here the law is unsettled at the time of trial but settled by the time of appeal, the ‘plainness’ of the error should be judged by the law at the time of appeal.”). 4 Case: 21-50206 Document: 00516321453 Page: 5 Date Filed: 05/17/2022 No. 21-50206 (1) intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes bodily injury to another, including the person’s spouse; (2) intentionally or knowingly threatens another with imminent bodily injury, including the person’s spouse; or (3) intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when the person knows or should reasonably believe that the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative. § 22.01(a)(1)-(3). In our recent decision in United States v. Gomez Gomez, 23 F.4th 575 (5th Cir. 2022), we observed that Texas aggravated assault under Texas Penal Code §§ 22.01(a)(1), 22.02(a)(2) “includes three indivisible mental states, one of which is recklessness.” (citations omitted). We held, therefore, that the offense could not qualify as a “crime of violence” under the elements clause of 18 U.S.C. 16(a), because it was almost identical to the elements clause of the ACCA interpreted in Borden. We also noted that despite the vote being split 4-1-4, Borden is not limited to the facts under the rule set forth in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977), because “Justice Thomas and Justice Kagan (writing for herself and three fellow justices) both conclud[ed] that an offense requiring the ‘use of physical force against the person of another’ entails a mental state beyond mere recklessness.” Id. at 577 n.1 (citations omitted). We have also held that, in the context of a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding, an offense that qualifies as a “violent felony” under the ACCA’s elements clause also qualifies as a “serious violent felony” under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) because the language of the two clauses is “very similar.” United States v. Parker, 3 F.4th 178, 181 (5th Cir. 2021). Conversely, then, an offense that does not qualify as a violent felony under ACCA’s elements 5 Case: 21-50206 Document: 00516321453 Page: 6 Date Filed: 05/17/2022 No. 21-50206 would not qualify as a serious violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii) because the language of the two clauses is “very similar.” Indeed, the state court papers reflect that Stoglin was charged with and admitted to intentionally and knowingly causing bodily injury, which tracks the language of § 22.01(a)(1). As noted above, § 22.01(a)(1) prohibits intentional, knowing, or reckless conduct. Although the Texas indictment alleges and the plea agreement finds that Stoglin committed the offense intentionally or knowingly rather than recklessly, the Government acknowledges that the mens rea requirement of § 22.01(a)(1) is not divisible, and therefore the crime that Stoglin pleaded to and was convicted of could be committed recklessly. See Gomez-Perez v. Lynch, 829 F.3d 323, 328 (5th Cir. 2016) (concluding that the mens rea requirement of § 22.01(a)(1) is not divisible in determining whether an offense is a crime of moral turpitude under the immigration statutes). Therefore, under Borden, because Texas aggravated assault can be committed recklessly, Stoglin has not committed a serious violent felony as defined by § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii). Consequently, the district court committed a clear and obvious error.