Opinion ID: 1998760
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Treating Physician Preference

Text: [I]n workers' compensation cases, the medical opinion of a treating physician is generally entitled to greater weight than the opinions of doctors who have been retained to examine a claimant solely for the purpose of litigation. Kralick v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 842 A.2d 705, 711 (D.C. 2004) (collecting cases). While a hearing officer, as the trier of fact, is entitled to reject the testimony of a treating physician, he may do so only if the examiner sets forth specific and legitimate reasons for doing so. Mexicano v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 806 A.2d 198, 205 (D.C.2002) (emphasis added) ( quoting Olson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 736 A.2d 1032, 1041 (D.C.1999)). The rationale for the treating-physician preference is twofold. In comparison with an assessment by a doctor who has been retained solely for purposes of litigation, a treating physician's opinion is considered more reliable because the treating physician is (1) less apt to be consciously or subconsciously biased by the litigation, and (2) more likely to be familiar with the patient's condition because he or she has typically spent a greater amount of time with the patient. Kralick, 842 A.2d at 712. At the core of this second prong is the common sense principle that a physician who has treated a patient over a substantial period of time is likely to have more insight into the patient's condition than a doctor who has had only one or two interactions with a patient and who has examined the patient in the context of possible or actual litigation. Where an agency or hearing officer has not accorded preference to the opinion of a treating physician, and has failed to provide an adequate explanation for the decision not to do so, this court will not allow the resulting ruling to stand. See, e.g., id. at 705 (reversing where the ALJ's explanation for rejecting the treating physician's opinion was based on a misapprehension of fact); Mexicano, 806 A.2d at 205 (holding that the hearing examiner rejected the treating physician's opinion for insufficiently persuasive reasons); Clark v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 772 A.2d 198, 204 (D.C.2001) (setting aside administrative decision because the hearing officer failed to give adequate consideration to the deposition testimony of a treating physician); Upchurch v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 783 A.2d 623, 629 (D.C.2001) (setting aside administrative decision because [e]ven assuming, arguendo, that the examiner did consider the [treating physician's] deposition, she failed to explain [satisfactorily] why she rejected his opinion, as explicitly mandated by the law in this jurisdiction).