Opinion ID: 1057832
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plain Error Criteria

Text: Under plain error review, this Court will grant relief only where five prerequisites are met: (1) the record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court; (2) a clear and unequivocal rule of law was breached; (3) a substantial right of the accused was adversely affected; (4) the accused did not waive the issue for tactical reasons; and (5) consideration of the error is necessary to do substantial justice. State v. Smith, 24 S.W.3d 274, 282 (Tenn.2000) (quoting State v. Adkisson, 899 S.W.2d 626, 641-42 (Tenn.Crim. App.1994)). It is the accused's burden to persuade an appellate court that the trial court committed plain error. State v. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d 349, 355 (Tenn.2007) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)).
As to the first prerequisite, we acknowledged in our previous decision that the record clearly establishes what occurred in the trial court. Gomez I, 163 S.W.3d at 652. In short, the record reflects the offenses of which the Defendants were convicted and the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects the meticulous process used by the trial court in crafting individualized sentences for each Defendant pursuant to the applicable statutory provisions.
We next considered in Gomez I whether the trial court breached a clear and unequivocal rule of law by applying enhancement factors based on facts not found by a jury to increase the length of the Defendants' sentences to the maximum allowable in the applicable range. We determined that it did not. Id. at 661-62. We now revisit that analysis.
We begin with a brief review of the line of cases beginning with Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), and culminating in Cunningham . In Apprendi , the United States Supreme Court considered a state sentence that had been increased beyond the statutory maximum upon the trial judge's determination that the defendant had committed the crime `with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity.' 530 U.S. at 469, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp.1999-2000)). The Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment prohibited the enhanced sentence, id. at 497, 120 S.Ct. 2348, and stated, [o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. In Blakely v. Washington , the defendant was convicted of a felony under Washington law for which he was subject to a sentence of forty-nine to fifty-three months unless the trial judge found `substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence.' 542 U.S. 296, 299, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004) (quoting Wash. Rev.Code Ann. § 9.94A.120(2) (West 2000)). Finding that the defendant had committed the offense with deliberate cruelty, the trial court increased the defendant's sentence to ninety months. Applying the rule of Apprendi , the Supreme Court held the defendant's sentence unconstitutional. Id. at 305, 124 S.Ct. 2531. The Court emphasized that the statutory maximum for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. In other words, the relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings. When a judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts which the law makes essential to the punishment, and the judge exceeds his proper authority. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-04, 124 S.Ct. 2531 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court addressed this issue in the context of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005). Booker was convicted by a jury of possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. The corresponding base sentence pursuant to the Guidelines was 210 to 262 months. The trial court increased Booker's sentence to 360 months after determining that the preponderance of the evidence established that Booker had possessed a quantity of drugs greater than that determined by the jury's verdict. Finding that there was no relevant distinction between the sentence imposed pursuant to the Washington statutes in Blakely and the sentence[] imposed pursuant to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, id. at 235, 125 S.Ct. 738, the Supreme Court ruled Booker's sentence violative of the Sixth Amendment. Id. at 244, 125 S.Ct. 738. In Cunningham , the Supreme Court considered California's determinate sentencing law. Cunningham had been convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child under the age of fourteen. Under California's statutory sentencing scheme, Cunningham was subject to imprisonment for a lower term sentence of 6 years, a middle term sentence of 12 years, or an upper term sentence of 16 years. 549 U.S. at ___, 127 S.Ct. at 860. The trial court was required to sentence Cunningham to the middle term, however, unless it found one or more aggravating facts. At a sentencing hearing, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence six aggravating circumstances and one mitigating circumstance. Concluding that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstance, the judge sentenced Cunningham to the upper term sentence of sixteen years. In finding that California's sentencing scheme violated the Sixth Amendment, id., the Supreme Court emphasized that the crucial inquiry under Apprendi is the maximum sentence allowed under the relevant statutory scheme based solely on those facts reflected by the jury's verdict (or admitted by the defendant). Id. at 860. In examining California's sentencing scheme, the Court first determined that the key California Penal Code provision states that the sentencing court ` shall order imposition of the middle term' absent `circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the crime.' Id. at 866 n. 10 (quoting Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 1170(b)) (emphasis in Cunningham ). The Court next recognized that, [u]nder California's [determinate sentencing law], an upper term sentence may be imposed only when the trial judge finds an aggravating circumstance. Id. at 868. For Sixth Amendment purposes, then, the middle term prescribed in California's statutes, not the upper term, is the relevant statutory maximum. Id. Because the trial court sentenced Cunningham to the upper term sentence based on judicially determined facts not otherwise reflected by the jury's verdict or admitted by the defendant, the Court held that the sentence violated Cunningham's Sixth Amendment rights. Id. at 871.
This appeal is governed by Tennessee's Criminal Sentencing Reform Act of 1989 (the Reform Act) which, prior to its amendment in 2005, established a presumptive sentence for each class of felonies other than capital murder. Absent enhancing or mitigating factors, the presumptive sentence for Class B, C, D, and E felonies was the minimum in the applicable range. [7] Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(c) (Supp.2001). For Class A felonies, the presumptive sentence absent enhancing or mitigating factors was the midpoint in the applicable range. Id. A sentencing court could not increase a defendant's sentence above the presumptive sentence except upon the application of statutory enhancement factors. See id.; see also State v. Jones, 883 S.W.2d 597, 601 (Tenn.1994) (The sentence imposed [for most felonies] cannot exceed the minimum sentence in the range unless the State proves enhancement factors.). A sentencing court determined the existence of enhancement factors by a preponderance of the evidence. See State v. Carico, 968 S.W.2d 280, 287 (Tenn.1998). Once the trial court found enhancement factors, it had the authority to set the sentence above the minimum in [the sentencing] range but still within the range. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(d) (Supp.2001). The weight afforded enhancement factors was left to the trial court's discretion. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210, Sentencing Comm'n Cmts. (1997); see also State v. Shelton, 854 S.W.2d 116, 123 (Tenn.Crim.App.1992). In sum, a maximum sentence could not be imposed absent a judicial finding of enhancement factors. In our previous analysis of the Reform Act, which was conducted in light of Booker but without the benefit of Cunningham , we determined that the relevant inquiry is whether the Reform Act mandates imposition of a sentence increased above the presumptive sentence when a judge finds an enhancement factor. Gomez I, 163 S.W.3d at 661 (emphasis changed). We interpreted Booker to hold that the mandatory increase of a sentence is the crucial issue which courts must consider in determining whether a particular sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment. Id. Because the Reform Act did not require a trial court to increase a sentence upon finding one or more enhancement factors, we held that the Reform Act did not offend the Sixth Amendment under Apprendi . Id. We are instructed by Cunningham , however, that [i]f the jury's verdict alone does not authorize the sentence, if, instead, the judge must find an additional fact to impose the longer term, the Sixth Amendment requirement is not satisfied. 127 S.Ct. at 869. Applying Cunningham , we conclude that the Reform Act failed to satisfy the Sixth Amendment insofar as it allowed a presumptive sentence to be enhanced based on judicially determined facts. [8] That is, to the extent the Reform Act permitted enhancement based on judicially determined facts other than the fact of a prior conviction, it violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Apprendi , Blakely , and Cunningham . In this case, the trial court increased all of the Defendants' sentences beyond the presumptive sentences on the basis of two enhancement factors: their previous history of criminal convictions or criminal behavior in addition to those necessary to establish the appropriate range, and upon its determination that each was a leader in the commission of an offense involving two (2) or more criminal actors. Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-114(1), (2) (Supp. 2001). As to the Defendants' convictions for facilitation of felony murder, the trial court also applied as an enhancement factor that each possessed or employed a firearm, explosive device or other deadly weapon during the commission of the offense. Id. at (9). On appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that the trial court had properly applied factors (1) and (2) but that application of factor (9) was not supported by the evidence. Nevertheless, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the Defendants' maximum sentences. The trial court's application of the enhancement factor for a previous history of criminal convictions does not offend the Sixth Amendment. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348. Having reconsidered the Reform Act in light of Cunningham , we now conclude that the trial court's application of the two other enhancement factors breached a clear and unequivocal rule of law. [9] The second prerequisite for plain error review is therefore satisfied.
We turn now to the third criterion for plain error review: whether a substantial right of the accused has been adversely affected. The State concedes that this prerequisite has been satisfied, and we agree with that concession. According to the Supreme Court, the trial court's determination that enhancement factors (2) and (9) were applicable to increase the Defendants' sentences deprived the Defendants of their Sixth Amendment right to have a jury determine whether those enhancement factors applied. See Cunningham, 127 S.Ct. at 860 (holding that the trial court's imposition of a harsher sentence on the basis of judicial factfinding denied petitioner his right to a jury trial).
The fourth consideration for plain error review is whether the record indicates that the Defendants waived their Sixth Amendment claims for tactical reasons. Neither the pleadings filed by the Defendants with the trial court nor the transcript of the sentencing hearing provides any indication as to why the Defendants initially failed to raise a Sixth Amendment challenge to the trial court's use of enhancement factors (2) and (9). In their pre- Gomez I briefs before this Court, however, both Defendants argued that their Sixth Amendment claims for relief from their sentences did not arise until Blakely was decided, more than two years after their sentencing hearing. It is true that this Court has refused to find plain error where the record discloses that the alleged error resulted from a tactical choice by the defense. For instance, in Smith, the Court of Criminal Appeals determined sua sponte that the defendant was entitled to relief for plain error because the trial court did not provide the jury with a particular instruction regarding an evidentiary matter. 24 S.W.3d at 282. However, this Court subsequently determined that the defendant had not objected to admission of the evidence and that the record was clear that the defense's decision not to object . . . was a result of a deliberate, tactical trial strategy. Id. at 283. Indeed, during oral argument before this Court, defense counsel conceded that the decision not to object . . . was a `tactical decision.' Id. Accordingly, this Court determined that the defendant was not entitled to relief under the plain error doctrine. Id. at 284; cf. Bledsoe, 226 S.W.3d at 355 (holding that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in granting relief for plain error where the defendant failed to include in his appeal key parts of the record resulting in uncertainty as to whether the defendant's failure to request a particular jury instruction was a tactical decision); Studdard v. State, 182 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Tenn.2005) (holding that all of the criteria for plain error were not met because [t]he record strongly suggests the defendant pleaded guilty to . . . a lower grade offense [than that charged] for tactical reasons). In contrast, the record in this case is silent and does not establish that the Defendants made a tactical decision to waive their Sixth Amendment claims. Rather, it appears that defense counsel, like many others in the legal community, did not realize until Blakely was decided that the Defendants had a potential claim for relief under Apprendi . [10] Accordingly, we conclude that the fourth prerequisite for plain error has been met.