Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Court's Denial of Continuance for New Trial and Modification of Sentence Hearing

Text: The penalty verdict was returned November 4, 1991. Defense counsel (Daniel Blum) was unable to attend because he was in court elsewhere, but another deputy public defender stood in for him. With the agreement of both parties, hearing on the automatic motion for modification of sentence (§ 190.4, subd. (e)), and sentencing itself, was set for December 5, 1991, 31 days later. On December 5, Blum appeared, but immediately asked for a few more days to prepare. He stated he had just returned from a two-week vacation and had spent the previous day reviewing the trial record in order to prepare a motion for new trial; he also stated he had just one minute ago received the probation and sentence report, and had not had time to review it with defendant. The court denied the request, stating: You've known about this sentencing quite a while. I believe you spoke with my court reporter and told my court reporter you would be ready today. The court did, however, allow counsel until 10:30 a.m. to prepare (the record does not show at what time court initially convened). Defendant contends the court abused its discretion in denying a continuance when counsel in a capital case was unprepared to argue for a new trial and modification of sentence, and a short continuance would not have prejudiced the People or disrupted the orderly administration of justice. He also contends the court's refusal cause[d] defense counsel's conduct to be ineffective, requiring reversal. The determination of whether a continuance should be granted rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, although that discretion may not be exercised so as to deprive the defendant or his attorney of a reasonable opportunity to prepare. ( People v. Hawkins (1995) 10 Cal.4th 920, 945, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 897 P.2d 574; People v. Maddox (1967) 67 Cal.2d 647, 652, 63 Cal.Rptr. 371, 433 P.2d 163; People v. Fontana (1982) 139 Cal. App.3d 326, 333, 188 Cal.Rptr. 612.) By that standard, no abuse of discretion appears here: defense counsel had ample opportunity to prepare before (or during or instead of) his vacation, made no complaint during that periodindeed, he apparently indicated he would be readyand later gave no explanation as to why he had not used the time available to prepare. Nor has defendant shown that the lack of a continuance rendered his attorney's assistance constitutionally ineffective. The record demonstrates neither that counsel performed below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney in arguing the new trial and modification motions, nor that the single additional step defendant asserts should have been taken was reasonably likely to affect the result. [14] ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839.)