Opinion ID: 2023838
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Collins-Morales

Text: However, subsequent to Tiller, the United States Supreme Court altered the second element of its test for determining whether a criminal law is ex post facto. In Collins v. Youngblood, the Court rejected the requirement that a statute disadvantage an offender. The effect of Collins was to reestablish the  Calder categories as the controlling definition of an ex post facto law: '1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offence, in order to convict the offender. ' (Emphasis in original.) Collins, 497 U.S. at 41-42, 110 S.Ct. at 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d at 38-39, quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390,1 L.Ed. 648, 650 (1798). Over a century later, the Court summarized the Calder categories as follows: `It is settled, by decisions of this Court so well known that their citation may be dispensed with, that any statute which punishes as a crime an act previously committed, which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for a crime, after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available according to law at the time when the act was committed, is prohibited as ex post facto.' Collins, 497 U.S. at 42, 110 S.Ct. at 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d at 39, quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 169-70, 46 S.Ct. 68, 68-69, 70 L.Ed. 216, 217 (1925). The Court in Collins held that [t]he Beazell formulation is faithful to our best knowledge of the original understanding of the Ex Post Facto Clause: Legislatures may not retroactively alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. Collins, 497 U.S. at 43,110 S.Ct. at 2719, 111 L.Ed.2d at 39. In California Department of Corrections v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499, 115 S.Ct. 1597, 131 L.Ed.2d 588 (1995), the Court applied the analysis used in Collins to a California statutory amendment that permitted a decrease in the frequency of parole hearings from once every year to every three years. The Court reaffirmed its rejection of an offender's disadvantage as an element in the test for determining whether a criminal law was ex post facto: Our opinions in Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller suggested that enhancements to the measure of criminal punishment fall within the ex post facto prohibition because they operate to the `disadvantage' of covered offenders. [Citations.] But that language was unnecessary to the results in those cases and is inconsistent with the framework developed in Collins v. Youngblood [citation]. After Collins, the focus of the ex post facto inquiry is not on whether a legislative change produces some ambiguous sort of `disadvantage,' nor    on whether an amendment affects a prisoner's ' opportunity to take advantage of provisions for early release,'    but on whether any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty by which a crime is punishable. (Emphasis in original.) Morales, 514 U.S. at 506 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. at 1602 n. 3, 131 L.Ed.2d at 595 n. 3. Morales teaches that a statute that decreases the frequency of parole hearings will violate the ex post facto prohibition only when it produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes. This inquiry cannot be embraced within a formula or stated in a general proposition, but rather is a matter of degree. However, where the legislative adjustment creates only a speculative and attenuated possibility of increasing punishment, it cannot be considered ex post facto. Morales, 514 U.S. at 509, 115 S.Ct. at 1603, 131 L.Ed.2d at 597. The Court distinguished Morales from Lindsey, Weaver, and Miller in that the statutes at issue in those cases had the purpose and effect of enhancing the range of available prison terms. Morales, 514 U.S. at 507, 115 S.Ct. at 1602, 131 L.Ed.2d at 596. The Morales Court held that the California statutory amendment in that case did not produce a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes and, thus, was not ex post facto. In reaching its conclusion, the Court specifically noted ameliorating features of the California parole scheme-two of those features which, in the Illinois scheme, the Tiller court did not find constitutionally significant. The Morales Court noted that the amended California statute requires the parole board to find that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted prior to the next scheduled hearing date. Morales, 514 U.S. at 511, 115 S.Ct. at 1604, 131 L.Ed.2d at 598. The Court also noted the practice of the parole board to consider at any time a prisoner's request for an earlier parole hearing. Morales, 514 U.S. at 512-13, 115 S.Ct. at 1604-05, 131 L.Ed.2d at 599. The Court concluded that the California statutory amendment created only the most speculative and attenuated risk of increasing the measure of punishment attached to the covered crimes. Morales, 514 U.S. at 514, 115 S.Ct. at 1605,131 L.Ed.2d at 599. It is clear that the reasoning of the Court in Morales contravenes this court's reasoning in Tiller. Dissenting from the majority opinion in Morales, Justice Stevens listed decisions, including Tiller, which have held that the retroactive application of a statute that decreases the frequency of formerly annual parole hearings constricts an inmate's opportunity to earn early release and, therefore, constitutes increased punishment in violation of the ex post facto prohibition. Morales, 514 U.S. at 519, 115 S.Ct. at 1608, 131 L.Ed.2d at 603 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Souter, J.). Several of those courts have acknowledged that Morales has overruled that holding. See, e.g., Roller v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 234-35 (4th Cir.1997); Jones v. Georgia State Board of Pardons & Paroles, 59 F.3d 1145, 1149 n. 8 (11th Cir.1995). We must do likewise. We hold that Morales has overruled that part of Tiller that discusses the issue of ex post facto. Applying the reasoning of Morales to the present case, we conclude that amended Corrections Code section 3-3-5(f) is not an ex post facto law. We remember the admonition of Morales that the ex post facto inquiry cannot be contained in a formula or general proposition. Rather, the question is simply whether the statute at issue produces a sufficient risk of increasing the measure of punishment. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 509, 115 S.Ct. at 1603,131 L.Ed.2d at 597. Subsequent to Morales, the Supreme Court identified three ameliorating characteristics of the California statutory amendment in Morales that supported the decision to uphold the law. First, the amendment affected a narrow class of prisoners-multiple murderers-who had little chance of being released on parole. Second, the amendment did not alter the date of a prisoner's initial parole hearing and, thus, affected only those initially deemed unsuitable for parole. Third, the parole board retained the authority to tailor the frequency of subsequent parole hearings to the particular circumstances of the individual prisoner. Lynce, 519 U.S. at n. 16, 117 S.Ct. at 898 n. 16, 137 L.Ed.2d at 75 n. 16. Turning to amended section 3-3-5(f), it is true that the provision applies to all prisoners and not to any particular prisoner class. However, this characteristic, by itself, is not constitutionally determinative. Other ameliorating characteristics of amended section 3-3-5(f) insure that the provision does not enhance the range of available prison terms or the substantive criteria for determining a prisoner's eligibility or suitability for parole. In other words, the amended provision does not have the prohibited effect of increasing punishment. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 510 n. 7, 115 S.Ct. at 1604 n. 7, 131 L.Ed.2d at 597 n. 7. Next, amended section 3-3-5(f) is tailored to the determination of the likelihood that a prisoner would be released sooner than an extended parole hearing date. Amended section 3-3-5(f) does not affect the date of a prisoner's initial parole hearing; it affects the timing only of subsequent hearings. Accordingly, the provision does not affect any prisoner unless the Board has first concluded, after a hearing, not only that a prisoner is unsuitable for parole, but also that it is not reasonable to expect that parole would be granted at a hearing prior to the scheduled rehearing date. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f) (West 1996); see Morales, 514 U.S. at 511, 115 S.Ct. at 1604,131 L.Ed.2d at 598. Also, the Board retains the authority under amended section 3-3-5(f) to tailor the frequency of subsequent parole hearings to the particular circumstances of the individual prisoner. The amendment explicitly provides that if the Board makes the special finding, then the Board can schedule the next hearing no later than three years after the parole denial. 730 ILCS 5/3-3-5(f) (West 1996). Thus, the amendment allows the Board to set the next parole hearing date anytime between the one-year minimum and the three-year maximum, as a prisoner's particular circumstances dictate. See Morales, 514 U.S. at 511-12, 115 S.Ct. at 1604, 131 L.Ed.2d at 598. Further, an Illinois prisoner may seek a parole hearing at anytime based on new facts or extraordinary circumstances which could not have been known to the prisoner at the time of his interview or which have arisen subsequent to the time of the interview which have not been previously considered. 20 Ill. Adm.Code § 1610.100(a)(2) (1996); see Morales, 514 U.S. at 512-13, 115 S.Ct. at 1604-05,131 L.Ed.2d at 599. Based on all of these ameliorating characteristics, we cannot say that amended Corrections Code section 3-3-5(f) will have any constitutionally significant effect on any prisoner's actual term of confinement. Therefore, we hold that it does not violate the constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws.