Opinion ID: 1476684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: White Victim Statement

Text: The issue created by the white victim statement springs from Dunn's testimony. Dunn testified that while she was walking with Harris, looking for a car to carjack, she asked him what his plans were for the impending victim: I said what you going to do with the people. He said if it's a black person, he's going to tie them up and leave them somewhere. If it's a white person, he's going to kill them. Soon after, she repeated that statement: He said if it was a white person he was going to kill them. Later in her testimony, she explained that she chose not to abandon Huggins during the carjacking because [defendant] said he was going to kill the person if they [were] white. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial based in part on the surprise testimony. [10] The court denied the motion, stating that the white victim statement was an admission of the defendant, and thus admissible. The court expressed no concern about undue prejudice, noting that the jury was well interviewed with regard to the racial aspects of this case. Defendant now contends that he was denied a fair trial by the State's pre-trial failure to disclose that Dunn attributed to Harris a stated intention to spare a black victim but to kill a white one, and he further argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion for mistrial based on the discovery rule violation.
Prosecutor Zarling testified to the difficulty he had in preparing Dunn to testify, due to her inconsistent recitations of the details of her testimony. The general structure of her version of what had occurred remained constant, but details did not. Zarling stated that she was the most difficult witness that [he has] ever had to deal with. He stated that when he prepared her for trial, Dunn informed him about Harris's white victim statement. That was sometime between January 3rd and January 22, 1996, which was after jury selection was completed but before Dunn's trial testimony. We note that Dunn testified on cross-examination that she had told the prosecutors of the statement before she pled guilty (which was before Harris's trial began; however, her prior statements to policewritten and those reduced to writingdo not mention the white victim statement). Timing aside, the prosecutor admitted that he had an obligation to disclose the statement and felt professionally chagrined for failing to fulfill it. He stated candidly that [i]t never occurred to him to turn it over. Once jury selection was over, he was not primarily concerned with racial issues because the State did not present the crime as racially motivated. And, he explained that with Dunn's continually changing recitations he had no idea what she would include in her testimony. Zarling also stated that he did not elicit deliberately the white victim statement.
Rule 3:13-3(c)(2) obligates the State to provide in discovery all records of statements or confessions ... by the defendant..., and a summary of any admissions or declarations against penal interest made by the defendant that are known to the prosecution but not recorded. PCR counsel argues that the State violated that rule and the effect was devastating because Dunn's statement turned an interracial crime into a bias crime. As a result, defendant was denied a fair trial. The State primarily contends that defendant was not prejudiced by the discovery violation. Defense counsel was on notice before trial that there was evidence in the State's case of defendant's racial bias. That knowledge provoked the extensive voir dire, which we reviewed and found satisfactory on direct appeal. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 165-68, 716 A. 2d 458. Indeed, Call testified at the PCR hearing that knowledge of the white victim statement would not have changed his voir dire questioning because the defense had delved into the racial issues over and over again. According to the State, if the statement was devastating, it was only because it showed intent to kill. However, that intent was not debatable because Harris shot Huggins twice. Further, the State emphasizes that the case was not prosecuted as a racial crime. Defendant's goal was to rob and kidnap; there was no evidence that he chose Huggins because he wanted to kill a white person. Thus, the State argues that he killed to avoid apprehension for the kidnapping, carjacking, and rape. Lastly, the State contends that the white victim statement could not have sandbagged the defense because it did not interfere with the primary defense strategy of attacking Dunn's credibility, or hurt the defense theory that Dunn pulled the trigger. As noted, trial counsel moved for a mistrial based on Dunn's statement, but defendant did not appeal denial of the motion. Rule 3:22-4 procedurally bars defendant's claim that he was denied a fair trial unless enforcement of the bar would result in a fundamental injustice or would be contrary to the State or Federal Constitution. R. 3:22-4(b), -4(c). Nonetheless, the substantive merit of defendant's claim requires that we determine whether appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to appeal the trial court's denial of his mistrial motion. The Strickland/Fritz test governs claims that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance. State v. Morrison, 215 N.J.Super. 540, 546, 522 A. 2d 473 (App.Div. 1987), certif. denied, 107 N.J. 642, 527 A. 2d 463 (1987); see also State v. Moore, 273 N.J.Super. 118, 125, 641 A. 2d 268 (App.Div.1994) (stating that ineffective assistance of counsel claims, particularly ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, are congruous with the exceptions to the procedural bar of R. 3:22-4 because they... (2) involve infringement of constitutional rights; or (3) present exceptional circumstances involving a showing of fundamental injustice). As to the reasonableness of not taking the appeal, we note that a mistrial should be granted only in those situations which would otherwise result in manifest injustice. State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360, 383, 251 A. 2d 99 (1969); see also R. 3:20-1 (The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the defendant a new trial if required in the interest of justice.). Furthermore, [t]he granting of a mistrial is within the sound discretion of the trial judge. DiRienzo, supra, 53 N.J. at 383, 251 A. 2d 99. Thus, we would not have disturbed the trial court's denial of a mistrial unless there [was] a clear showing of mistaken use of discretion by the trial court, Greenberg v. Stanley, 30 N.J. 485, 503, 153 A. 2d 833 (1959), or unless manifest injustice would ... result. State v. LaBrutto, 114 N.J. 187, 207, 553 A. 2d 335 (1989). The question is whether defendant can demonstrate manifest injustice due to the State's discovery violation. Denials of mistrial motions have been overturned where a different trial strategy would have been employed but for the discovery violation. State v. Blake, 234 N.J.Super. 166, 175, 560 A. 2d 702 (App.Div.1989) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 412 So. 2d 1042, 1044-45 (La.1982)); see also, United States v. Lewis, 511 F. 2d 798 (D.C.Cir.1975); United States v. Padrone, 406 F. 2d 560 (2d. Cir.1969). Here we must determine whether defense strategy might have differed significantly. PCR counsel spent considerable time asking trial counsel how knowledge of the white victim statement would have affected their questioning of potential jurors during voir dire. However, if Zarling did not learn of the statement until jury selection was completed, then that line of questioning was irrelevant. In any event, Call testified at the PCR hearing that had he known about the white victim statement before Dunn's testimony, it would not have affected the defense strategy at all. He stated that defense counsel treated the case as racially charged from the beginning and that testimony is supported by the trial record. Dunn was the witness who attributed the white victim statement to Harris, and the essence of the defense strategy was to undermine her credibility. We are not persuaded that her attribution of the white victim statement to Harris had an appreciable effect on that strategy. Furthermore, the defense never was forced to contend with the theory that Harris committed a hate or bias crime. The State never referred to the white victim statement in arguing to the jury about Harris's motives. Instead, it argued that Harris murdered Huggins to escape detection for the kidnapping and rape. One could have argued that Harris raped and tortured Huggins because he already had formed the intention to kill a white person; however, the State did not advance that argument. The State's summation, in particular, demonstrates the lack of significance given the white victim statement in this prosecution. Thus, although Dunn three times stated that Harris intended to kill a white victim, the statement did not introduce a shocking new element that trial counsel had to defend. Harris's animosity towards white people was made known to the jury through others' testimony. For example, in addition to Dunn, both Tariq and Brian Goss testified that Harris had referred to Huggins as a white bitch. We add also that we already have determined that the voir dire on potential jurors' racial attitudes was sufficiently probing to meet constitutional standards. Harris I, supra, 156 N.J. at 164, 716 A. 2d 458. The jurors filled out a questionnaire covering their racial attitudes and the court asked them individually about specific answers given on the questionnaire, noting that [t]he court discharged every juror who responded `unsure' on the questionnaire concerning whether the race of defendant and the victim would affect his or her judgment. Ibid.
In conclusion, we do not regard the white victim statement as having had the potential to force the defense to change its strategy. Defendant has not made the requisite showing that the State's discovery violation resulted in a manifest injustice. LaBrutto, supra, 114 N.J. at 207, 553 A. 2d 335. Accordingly, appellate counsel would not have had a successful appeal on the mistrial denial. We neither regard appellate counsel as unreasonable for not including this issue in the appeal, nor do we find that defendant was prejudiced by the failure to appeal.