Opinion ID: 2581100
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The death penalty law adequately narrows the class of death-eligible offenders. (People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.)

Text: (2) Consideration of the circumstances of the crime under section 190.3, factor (a) does not result in arbitrary or capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; see Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 987-988, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750.) Defendant's argument that a seemingly inconsistent range of circumstances can be culled from death penalty decisions proves too much. What this reflects is that each case is judged on its facts, each defendant on the particulars of his offense. Contrary to defendant's position, a statutory scheme would violate constitutional limits if it did not allow such individualized assessment of the crimes but instead mandated death in specified circumstances. (See generally Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586, 602-606, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973.) (3) The death penalty law is not unconstitutional for failing to impose a burden of proof  whether beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence  as to the existence of aggravating circumstances, the greater weight of aggravating circumstances over mitigating circumstances, or the appropriateness of a death sentence. ( People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 1054, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Unlike the statutory schemes in other states cited by defendant, in California `the sentencing function is inherently moral and normative, not factual' [citation] and, hence, not susceptible to a burden-of-proof quantification. ( People v. Hawthorne (1992) 4 Cal.4th 43, 79, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 841 P.2d 118; see also People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at pp. 262-263, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) (4) The jury is not constitutionally required to achieve unanimity as to aggravating circumstances. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) Recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 have not altered our conclusions regarding burden of proof or jury unanimity. (See People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 275, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) (5) The absence of a requirement the jury make written findings does not render the law unconstitutional. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044.) (6) Nor is it defective in failing to require intercase proportionality review. ( People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) (7) The jury may properly consider evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity involving force or violence under factor (b) of section 190.3 and need not make a unanimous finding on factor (b) evidence. ( People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 584, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347; see People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 263, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) Contrary to defendant's implication, the court must instruct, on its own motion, that no juror may consider any alleged other violent crime in aggravation of penalty unless satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed it [citations]. ( Anderson, at p. 584, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) (8) [T]he use of certain adjectives  i.e., `extreme' and `substantial'  in the list of mitigating factors does not render the statute unconstitutional [citation]. ( People v. Prieto, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123.) (9) The trial court is not required to instruct that certain statutory factors can only be considered in mitigation. ( Tuilaepa v. California, supra, 512 U.S. at p. 979, 114 S.Ct. 2630.) Since there is no requirement that the court identify which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating (see, e.g., People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 178, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357), neither must it restrict the jurors' consideration of the evidence in this regard. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 990, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) (10) Death penalty defendants are not denied equal protection because the statutory scheme does not contain disparate sentence review. ( People v. Jenkins, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1053, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288, 232 Cal.Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115.) (11) Nor is the law constitutionally deficient because the prosecutor retains discretion whether or not to seek the death penalty. ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 462, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) (12) The prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who express scruples about imposing the death penalty does not violate any constitutional guarantee. ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 648-649, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Nor does the fact that we generally leave to the judgment of the trial court the determination whether a prospective juror's attitude toward imposing the death penalty will support an excusal for cause. (See Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424-429, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) (13) The fact that trial judges are elected does not undermine their fairness or impartiality when ruling on penalty modification applications pursuant to Penal Code section 190.4, subdivision (e). (See Evid.Code, § 664; People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644-645, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 528, 2 P.3d 1081; People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 49, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495, 825 P.2d 388; see also DePew v. Anderson (6th Cir.2002) 311 F.3d 742, 752-753; Stretton v. Disciplinary Bd. of Supreme Court of Pennsylvania (3d Cir.1991) 944 F.2d 137, 142.) (14) The use of victim impact evidence is constitutionally permissible. ( Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 822, 111 S.Ct. 2597.)