Opinion ID: 2683890
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: We Defer to the Department of Education’s

Text: Position that a Child With a Disability May Be Eligible for Special Educational Benefits Under More Than One Category Although we held in E.M., 652 F.3d at 1007, that Plaintiffs had not waived their contention that E.M.’s auditory processing disorder could qualify him for special education as a child with an “other health impairment,” the merits of this contention had not been previously addressed. In addressing the contention in the first instance, the district court did not have the benefit of the perspective of the Department of Education (“DOE”). On appeal, the DOE has participated as an amicus curiae. Thus, in reviewing the district court’s reading of 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i), we have 22 E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD the benefit of the views of the agency charged by Congress with administering the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1406, 1416.10 In 1991, the DOE issued a Joint Policy Memorandum that explained that a child with attention deficit disorder or attention deficit hyperactivity disorder might qualify for special education benefits under one of three categories of the IDEA’s definition of “child with a disability” – “other health impairment,” “specific learning disability,” or “serious emotional disturbance.” 18 IDELR 116 (Sept. 16, 1991). In 1994, the DOE’s Office of Special Education Programs issued a letter explaining that a child with chronic fatigue syndrome could qualify for special education under the “other health impairment” category or under another category if the child met the criteria for that category. Letter to Fazio, 21 IDELR 572 (Apr. 26, 1994). The DOE asserts that while these documents do not address auditory processing disorders, they reflect the Secretary’s position that a particular condition may qualify for benefits under more than one of the IDEA categories. The DOE asserts that its interpretation of a “child with a disability” is consistent with the history and purpose of the IDEA. Congress first enacted the IDEA in 1970 “to reverse this history of neglect” of disabled children in the United States. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 52. Congress subsequently expanded the definition of children with disabilities to 10 Section 1406 authorizes the Secretary of Education to issue certain regulations “necessary to ensure that there is compliance” with the IDEA. Section 1416 authorizes the Secretary to monitor, review and enforce the implementation of the IDEA. E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD 23 include specific learning disabilities,11 autism and traumatic brain injury,12 and children between the ages of three and nine who experienced developmental delays.13 These amendments furthered the IDEA’s overarching substantive goal “to ensure that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education that emphasizes special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs.” 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A); Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230, 244–45 (2009) (noting the IDEA’s express purpose as set forth in the statute and holding that “[a] reading of the Act that left parents without an adequate remedy when a school district unreasonably failed to identify a child with disabilities would not comport with Congress’ acknowledgment of the paramount importance of properly identifying each child eligible for services.”). The DOE further claims that its perspective is consistent with a State and local school district’s duty under the “child find” provisions of the IDEA. See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3). The DOE argues that considering a child’s condition under only one possible category of disability, when more than one might apply, elevates a myopic concern with the child’s specific classification over determining the child’s actual educational needs. See Heather S. v. Wisconsin, 125 F.3d 1045, 1055 (7th Cir. 1997) (noting “whether Heather was described as cognitively disabled, other health impaired, or 11 See Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, § 4(1), 89 Stat. 773, 775. 12 See Education of the Handicapped Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-476 § 101, 104 Stat. 1103. 13 See Individual with Disabilities Education Act Amendments for 1997, Pub. L. No. 101-105, § 602(3)(B), 111 Stat. 37, 42–43. 24 E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD learning disabled is all beside the point. The IDEA concerns itself not with labels, but with whether a student is receiving a free and appropriate education.”); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(B) (“Nothing in this chapter requires that children be classified by their disability so long as each child who has a disability listed in section 1401 of this title and who, by reason of that disability, needs special education and related services is regarded as a child with a disability under this subchapter.”). Where a statute speaks clearly to the precise question at issue, we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.” Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). However, “if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 843. The Supreme Court has noted that deference may be extended to an agency’s perspective not only when it exercises its rulemaking authority, but also when an agency authorized to administer a statute interprets its own regulation or the statute by other means. In Chase Bank USA, N.A. v. McCoy, 131 S. Ct. 781 (2011), the federal agency presented its position in an amicus brief and the Supreme Court held: “we defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own regulation, advanced in a legal brief, unless that interpretation is ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’” Id. at 880 (quoting Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997)). In Capistrano Unified School District v. Wartenberg, 59 F.3d 884 (9th Cir. 1995), the DOE clarified its position in a “letter to all chief state school officers,” and we held that the agency was “entitled to deference in its interpretation of the statute, E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD 25 because the interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the existing statutory language.” Id. at 894. The Supreme Court has recognized that even where the express delegation of specific interpretive authority is implicit and the agency has not engaged in the process of rulemaking or adjudication, an agency’s decision may still be entitled to Chevron deference. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–30 (2001). Moreover, even when an agency’s decision does not qualify for Chevron deference, “an agency’s interpretation may merit some deference whatever its form, given the ‘specialized experience and broader investigations and information’ available to the agency, . . . and given the value of uniformity in its administrative and judicial understandings of what a national law requires.” Id. at 234 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 139–40 (1994)). We need not determine whether DOE’s policy letters and amicus brief command Chevron deference as we find its interpretation of the statute persuasive under Skidmore. Here, as the district court’s resort to a canon of construction implicitly admits, Congress’ intent is not clear. Title 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i) offers a number of ways in which an individual can qualify as a “child with a disability.” Some of the proffered categories are quite specific, for example: “orthopedic impairments,” “autism,” and “traumatic brain injury.” Other categories appear to be relatively broad, such as “intellectual disabilities,” “hearing impairments,” and “serious emotional disturbance.” It is not clear from the statute whether the category “other health impairments” was intended as an alternate category or an additional category. In other words, Congress did not indicate whether “other health impairments” was limited to disabilities that did not fit 26 E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD into any of the other listed categories or included disabilities that might also fit within another category. Because Congress was not clear, we must consider the DOE’s interpretation. We find neither of the grounds advanced in support of a restricted interpretation of the statute to be persuasive. Certainly, the application of a canon of construction should yield to Congress’ purpose in passing the IDEA of ensuring that all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A). Children with disabilities will be disadvantaged if they have to select one category to the exclusion of any other category. In many instances, neither the child nor the parents will initially know which category encompasses the child’s disability. Indeed, compelling a selection of one category seems contrary to the school district’s child find duty. Upon further inspection, the second proffered ground, a fear that allowing a disability to qualify under more than one category will “negate and render superfluous” the distinct requirements for various categories, proves to be unfounded. As the DOE asserts and the district court found, the regulations that defined “specific learning disability” and “other health impairments” in California in 2005 pertained to two different categories of impairment with distinct criteria. Viewing the requirements side by side reveals their distinctiveness. E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD 27 Specific Learning Other Health Disability Impairment Cal. Educ. Code § 56337 34 C.F.R. § 300.7(c)(9) (2005)14 (2005) - severe discrepancy - limited strength, vitality or alertness - due to disorder of the - due to chronic or acute basic psychological health problems processes - cannot be otherwise - adversely affects child’s ameliorated educational performance A severe discrepancy, which all parties agreed in 2005 required a difference of 22.5 points between tested ability and performance, is not the same thing as a condition that limits “strength, vitality or alertness.” Also, it appears that a “disorder of the basic psychological processes” is distinct from “chronic or acute health problems.” Of course, a “disorder” could also be a “health problem,” but presumably a child could be otherwise very healthy and still have a “disorder of the basic psychological processes.” The third criterion was also different. An “other health impairment” only required a showing that the condition adversely affects the child’s educational performance, whereas a “specific learning disability” required a showing that other educational tools were inadequate. Perhaps, as the district court found, the third criterion for an “other health impairment” might be 14 As noted, both the California Education Code and the Code of Federal Regulations have been amended since 2005. 28 E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD easier to meet than the third criterion for a “specific learning disability,” but the different provisions of the categories’ other criteria indicate that an “other health impairment” is not necessarily easier to show than a “specific learning disability.” Regardless of the comparative difficulty of qualifying for benefits under the different categories, the two categories definitely have different requirements and appear to address different facets of disabilities. Thus, the fact that a particular child might qualify under both categories is in no way contrary to or inconsistent with Congress’ purposes in enacting the IDEA. A contrary position would create the possibility that a child with a disability could be denied special education benefits not because he did not qualify for benefits, but because the child, his parents, or the school district’s initial selection of one category barred consideration of a more appropriate category. The district court, faced with a question of first impression, reasonably turned to a canon of construction to interpret an ambiguous statute. On appeal we have the benefit of a presentation by the DOE, which is charged by Congress with enforcing the IDEA. Because Congress did not clearly address the issue, and because we determine that the DOE’s interpretation of the statutes and regulations is reasonable and furthers the overall intent of the IDEA, we defer to the agency’s interpretation. Accordingly, we hold that a “child with a disability” may seek to qualify for special education benefits under more than one of the categories listed in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(i). E.M. V. PAJARO VALLEY USD 29