Opinion ID: 1167064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: stern

Text: In Stern the commission found wilful misconduct in petitioner's alteration of the date of an Affidavit in Support of Hearing on Contempt and prejudicial conduct in issuance of a no-bail arrest warrant unsupported by either a criminal complaint or a contempt affidavit. The master sustained both charges only as prejudicial conduct. On October 25, 1978, Gary Stern appeared in petitioner's court on traffic infractions. He made remarks that petitioner deemed offensive. Petitioner partially dealt with Stern's case and then, according to petitioner, instructed Stern to remain until the end of the calendar. Stern testified he felt free to leave. During a recess Stern departed, taking with him the court docket on his case. Petitioner immediately issued an arrest warrant, servable at night, citing the traffic offenses and also misdemeanors under Penal Code sections 166 (contempt) and 488 (theft). The warrant specified no bail and was on a form that stated, A verified complaint was made before me on this day that the offense set forth above was committed. Apart from the traffic infractions, no complaint had been filed. On October 26 Stern consulted Keller. Next day petitioner received in the mail from Stern the stolen docket, a letter making a formal apology ... as ordered by you, and a check for $10, the original bail set on the citation. On November 3d Stern was arrested on the warrant; Keller filed for habeas corpus in superior court; and Stern was released on his own recognizance. Petitioner was served with that petition no later than November 6. On November 7 the clerk typed, and petitioner signed, an Affidavit in Support of Hearing on Contempt in Stern, reciting that Stern had appeared on petitioner's traffic arraignment calendar on October 25, made disruptive remarks, stolen the docket, and departed contrary to court order. Also recited was receipt on October 27 of Stern's letter and check and the stolen docket. The clerk first typed on the affidavit the current date, November 7. On petitioner's direction, she whited that out and inserted October 27. Petitioner's only explanation of the change is that October 27 was when he started the rough draft. The commission described the date change as alteration of a document. Yet editing the draft was not alteration since the document was then unsigned and thus incomplete. The change is better described as backdating. The commission argues that petitioner changed the date to bolster his position in the habeas proceeding. Keller's clerk had examined the Stern file in petitioner's court on November 1 and ascertained the absence of any affidavit concerning contempt. At the habeas hearing on December 4 petitioner unhesitatingly admitted, under Keller's cross-examination, that the affidavit was typed November 7 and changed to the date of the rough draft. Petitioner argues that backdating to October 27 would not cure the absence of documentary support for the October 25 arrest warrant. But the affidavit's reference to events of October 27 would have been inconsistent with any earlier backdating. (12) We agree with the master that petitioner's motivation for backdating the affidavit is not clear. It was, though, done deliberately; and petitioner knew or should have known that it would create a false impression that he had signed on the earlier date. We infer that whatever petitioner's purpose it was not the faithful discharge of judicial duties. Backdating the affidavit was wilful misconduct. (13) We agree with the commission that issuance of the no-bail arrest warrant without the filing of a criminal complaint or initiation of a contempt proceeding (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1211, 1211.5) was prejudicial conduct. Though conceding error, petitioner urges that he believed in good faith that he was acting within his summary contempt power. That consideration may have led the commission to refrain from finding wilful misconduct; it does not preclude our finding prejudicial conduct. (See fn. 4, ante. )