Opinion ID: 172856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Approaches Taken in Other Circuits

Text: The opinions of our sister circuits to have considered the question also support the conclusion we reach today. While the other circuits have not explicitly characterized the analysis under § 16(a) as a two-step process as we do, their opinions buttress the notion that to determine whether appellate jurisdiction under § 16(a) exists, you look first to how the motion was characterized, and then to the nature of the relief sought. The D.C. Circuit, for example, in Bombardier Corp. v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 333 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C.Cir.2003), focused on the plain language of Section 16. It concluded that the movant's Rule 12 motion was neither a motion to compel arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 4 nor a motion to stay arbitration under 9 U.S.C. § 3, and so no appellate jurisdiction existed under § 16(a). Id. In Wabtec Corp. v. Faiveley Transport Malmo AB, 525 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir.2008), the Second Circuit also noted the importance of the plain language of § 16(a), and further noted that the movant's motion focused on preventing [the plaintiff] from resolving any dispute in the courts, rather than purely seeking arbitration, and thus that no appellate jurisdiction followed. Finally, the First Circuit in Fit Tech, Inc. v. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp., 374 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir.2004), looked more directly to the facts of the case before it to determine that the defendant clearly [was] invoking the [arbitration] remedy, even if a stay rather than dismissal ensues. Thus, appellate jurisdiction was appropriate. See id. Our approach to this issue, laid out in the next section, melds the approaches taken by the other circuits into a coherent, two-step process.