Opinion ID: 201924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Substantive Rights/Interference Claim

Text: 39 The two courts noted that Colburn, by his own admission, would not have been able to return to work until April 15, 2003, well after the expiration of his FMLA leave. 3 Because the Department of Labor regulations interpreting the FMLA state that an employee has no right to reinstatement [i]f the employee is unable to perform an essential function of the position because of ... the continuation of a serious health condition, the courts concluded that Colburn's interference with substantive rights claim fails because Nichols was under no obligation to reinstate him. 29 C.F.R. § 825.214(b); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 2612(a), (b), 2614(a). That conclusion is plainly correct, and the substantive rights interference claim was properly dismissed.