Opinion ID: 2632698
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Remaining claims pertaining to guilty plea

Text: Means asserts that the district court erred by denying him an evidentiary hearing on other claims raised in his habeas petition because he set forth specific allegations that were not belied by the record. [36] Means specifically alleges that, because he was taking medication for his manic depression when he entered his guilty plea, he was not competent to plead guilty, and the district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he entered his plea knowingly and intelligently. Means further contends that the district court should have held a hearing on whether his plea was voluntary because, at the time he pleaded guilty, the district court did not mention that as a result of the conviction he would be subjected to lifetime supervision upon his release from prison. The State responds only to the first argument. When the district court granted an evidentiary hearing on Means's claim that his counsel was ineffective in failing to perfect an appeal after Means asked for an appeal, the court also denied all other claims set forth by Means. In its order, the district court found the following claims by Means to be without merit: claims that his plea was involuntary because the court's sentencing canvass was inadequate as a matter of law and that the court violated the Fourteenth Amendment [37] when it failed to request a competency hearing. The court stated that the record clearly demonstrated that during the court's canvass Means received a complete explanation of the nature of the charge, possible penalties and the right to a trial. The court stated that Means had competent counsel present, and Means had indicated that he understood his rights, that he was pleading guilty because he was guilty, and that no promises had been made to him. We conclude that the district court correctly denied Means an evidentiary hearing on his contention of mental incompetence. However, the contention that Means knew nothing about mandatory lifetime supervision merited an evidentiary hearing; the district court erred in denying him a hearing on this issue. A post-conviction habeas petitioner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing only if he supports his claims with specific factual allegations that if true would entitle him to relief. [38] However, if the record belies the petitioner's factual allegations, the petitioner is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. [39] Means's allegation that the psychotropic medications he was taking for manic depression rendered him incompetent is belied by the record. At Means's initial arraignment, the district court asked him if he had ever been treated for a mental disorder. To his counsel's surprise, Means answered in the affirmative. After allowing Means and his counsel an opportunity to confer, the district court asked them if they were okay. Means's counsel responded in the affirmative. Although the district court's initial canvass, by itself, was tenuous in resolving the question of Means's mental competency, the results of Means's subsequent examinations by Dr. Robert Brewer, a psychiatrist licensed in Nevada, and Dr. Gary Solomon, a forensic research specialist, indicate that Means was competent. Additionally, at the request of the Division of Parole and Probation's Pre-sentence Investigation Unit, John S. Pacult, a licensed clinical social worker, completed a psychosexual evaluation of Means. Pacult met with Means for four hours. He indicated that Means was oriented to person, time and place, and that he appeared to be of average intelligence, and his thought process and memory appeared intact. Both the initial arraignment transcript and the transcript of Means's plea indicate that Means responded appropriately to questions and appeared to be fully cognizant of the proceedings. Finally, neither Means, his counsel nor the district court raised concerns about Means's mental competence. It was not until the habeas corpus petition that Means raised the issue. At or before trial, [t]he test to be applied in determining competency `must be whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding  and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him.' [40] The record supports the conclusion that Means understood the proceedings and was able to rationally consult with his counsel. Therefore, the district court did not err by denying an evidentiary hearing on this allegation as the allegation is belied by the record. Means next contends that he was never informed that a sentence of lifetime supervision would follow his prison term and that, without a full awareness of the sentence, his guilty plea was unintelligent and involuntary. Means asserts that the district court erred in refusing him an evidentiary hearing on this issue. For a guilty plea to be valid, the defendant must voluntarily enter the plea under circumstances that are fundamentally fair. [41] If the defendant is unaware of the direct consequences of the plea, the defendant cannot knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty. [42] In Palmer v. State , we held that lifetime supervision imposed pursuant to NRS 176.0931 is a direct consequence of a guilty plea, and therefore, a defendant pleading guilty must be aware of it to enter a knowing and voluntary plea. [43] Here, when Means entered his guilty plea, the district court, in its canvass, failed to inform Means that his conviction required that he be subject to lifetime supervision upon release from prison. However, that failure may not constitute reversible error if the totality of the circumstances revealed by the record otherwise demonstrate that the defendant was aware of the consequence prior to entry of the plea, and was so informed either by the written plea agreement, by counsel, or in some other manner. [44] The record indicates that the lifetime supervision term was specifically set out in the written guilty plea memorandum. However, the record also indicates that although Means pleaded guilty on May 15, 2001, he did not sign the plea memorandum until August 20, 2001, at his sentencing hearing. Hence, the record does not belie Means's allegation that he was unaware of the lifetime supervision requirement at the time that he entered his guilty plea. The record reveals that, during his plea canvass, Means was not questioned as to whether he understood that he would be subject to lifetime supervision. The fact that the record also contains a plea agreement signed more than three months after Means pleaded guilty reveals nothing because the correct inquiry concerns what Means knew at the time he entered his plea. Therefore, the district court erred by denying Means an evidentiary hearing on this claim. [45] Upon remand, Means is entitled to pursue the claim that his conviction was obtained in violation of the United States Constitution and the Nevada Constitution [46] because his guilty plea was unknowing, involuntary and unintelligent and entered without knowledge of all the direct consequences. [47] To sustain his claim, Means must, consistent with our earlier comments, establish by a preponderance of the evidence the fact that he entered his guilty plea without knowledge that he would be subject to lifetime supervision upon his release from prison.