Opinion ID: 1058597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant Scheve's Motion for a New Trial

Text: We next review Scheve's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial after amending the judgment. Scheve argues that he was prejudiced in preparing for trial because the trial court had ruled prior to trial that the jury would be required to allocate fault between Scheve and Fisher and because the trial court erred in allowing the jury to consider punitive damages. A trial court's decision regarding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is discretionary in nature, and we accord such rulings great deference. We will only disturb such a decision if it amounts to an abuse of discretion. See Henry v. Goins, 104 S.W.3d 475, 479 (Tenn.2003). With regard to Scheve's argument that he was prejudiced by the trial court's pre-trial ruling as to the allocation of fault, our decision in this case renders this issue moot. With respect to Scheve's argument that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to award punitive damages, we note that the trial court instructed the jury that [p]unitive damages may be considered if, and only if, the Plaintiff has shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that the Defendant has acted recklessly. See Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn.1992). In light of Fisher's testimony, his prior criminal record, and his history of substance abuse, we conclude that the trial court did not err by instructing the jury on punitive damages. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Scheve's motion for a new trial.