Opinion ID: 1399479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hylla's Conduct

Text: Having determined that § 101(a)(2) is limited to speech concerning matters of union concern, we must next determine whether Hylla's conduct was so related. In the First Amendment context, [w]hether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684. As this court has observed in McGee, when a government employee speaks `as an employee upon matters only of personal interest,' such as many personnel matters, the First Amendment does not offer protection. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708. On the other hand, when a government employee speaks `as a citizen'  that is, outside the scope of employment  on `matters of public concern,' the First Amendment offers protection if the speech survives the Pickering balancing test.... 471 F.3d at 920. In Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006), the Supreme Court further clarified Connick by holding that when public employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline. Applying these notions to the LMRDA context, it is clear that when a union member or elected officer speaks out about matters that relate solely to that individual's interest, § 101(a)(2) protection does not arise. [4] In this case, there were two incidents for which Hylla was allegedly disciplined: (1) his use of profanity towards Swanson, and (2) his alleged threat towards Gilbertson. We conclude that Hylla's conduct in neither instance involved a matter of union concern, but instead was solely focused on Hylla's personal interests. When Hylla remarked well, fuck you to Swanson, he was agitated that he was being singled out by Swanson's decision to record workplace attendance. Thus, almost by its very terms, Hylla's remark did not relate to the general interests of the union membership, but rather related to a concern about his unique situation. This is not the type of speech that § 101(a)(2) was designed to protect. Hylla's remark had little connection to any general union interest and instead may be more readily understood as individual insubordination. At best, the speech was directed at a particular administrative policy  that according to Hylla's own pleadings was adopted in order to single out a particular officer  rather than anything concerning the governance of the union generally. Hylla's conduct towards Gilbertson was of a similarly personal nature. Even if it is assumed, as Hylla argues, that his conduct was non-threatening, the conduct did not implicate the general interests of the union. Gilbertson was a clerical employee who had no control over the attendance policy and was acting at the direction of Swanson. Under such circumstances, no matter of general union interest was involved in Hylla's confrontation with Gilbertson. Nevertheless, in arguing that his conduct did implicate the general interests of the union, Hylla contends that [n]ot only was [he] complaining about being singled out, he was complaining that Swanson, [Tom] Truhler and Gilbertson and the office as a whole were not keeping accurate track of his time. (Emphasis added.) By its very terms, however, this argument demonstrates the personal nature of Hylla's conduct. Hylla's remarks did not relate to anything that involved the interests of the union generally, but instead were personal grievances about the way he was being treated. Just as such speech would not be protected in the First Amendment context, Congress did not intend for such speech to be protected under Title I of the LMRDA. Hylla, however, counters that because the System Board's policies impacted his performance as an elected union officer, the general interests of the union membership were implicated when he complained about these policies directed against him. Although in a very remote sense this may be true, it does not serve to convert [Hylla's] personal grievances into a matter of [union] concern. Crain v. Bd. of Police Comm'rs of Metro. Police Dep't of St. Louis, 920 F.2d 1402, 1411 (8th Cir.1990). As this court observed in Crain, where it was argued that what were purely personal grievances were a matter of public concern because they impacted the griever's family, [a]ny management decision, e.g., the size of a salary increase or the number of company holidays, affects the employees and their families; this is decidedly not the proper test for determining what speech implicates a matter of public concern. Id. Similarly, any nuance in Hylla's working conditions, whether it be his parking space or office temperature, could potentially affect his performance as an elected union officer. To say that such concerns implicate the general interests of the union, however, would swallow the rule. In every case, if we were to go down the rabbit's hole far enough, it would be hyperbolized that the general interests of the union  or for that matter the public  would be implicated. As such, we reject Hylla's argument. To better illustrate why Hylla's argument fails, it is helpful to juxtapose Hylla's conduct with that which the Court found to create a cause of action under § 102 in Lynn. In Lynn, an elected union officer spoke in opposition to a proposed dues increase pursued by other members of the union leadership. 488 U.S. at 349-50, 109 S.Ct. 639. After the proposed dues increase was defeated by a vote of the union membership, the elected officer was notified that he was being removed `indefinitely' from his [elected] position... specifically because of his outspoken opposition to the dues increase. Id. at 350, 109 S.Ct. 639. Because the elected officer's dismissal was specifically predicated upon his outspokenness regarding a matter of union governance, it was clear that his § 101(a)(2) rights had been violated and that a chilling effect may arise that would harm the union's democratic governance. Clearly in contrast to Lynn, the concerns raised by Hylla do not beget any such issues. At the core, Hylla was removed because of his individualized insubordination. There was no union interest in allowing Hylla to conduct himself as he did. His dispute is purely personal in nature. It does not implicate union interests nor did his termination threaten to chill TCIU's democratic governance. As such, Hylla's claim that he was terminated for such conduct is not protected under § 101(a)(2) and therefore the courts lack jurisdiction of the claims under § 102 of the LMRDA.