Opinion ID: 2394055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Public Figure / Public Official

Text: For their first point on appeal, Appellants argue that Jarrell Southall was neither a public official nor a public figure at the time of the articles' publication. We disagree. Whether a person is a public official or a public figure is a mixed question of fact and law to be determined by the trial court. Fitzhugh, 330 Ark. 561, 954 S.W.2d 914 (1997) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974) and Cornett v. Prather, 293 Ark. 108, 737 S.W.2d 159 (1987)). We recently discussed the issue of when an individual is considered to be a public figure: In Gertz , the Supreme Court held that public figures normally enjoy greater access to effective channels of communication and, thus, have more realistic opportunities to counteract false statements than do private individuals. The Court described public figures as those persons who: have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either event, they invite attention and comment. Id. at 345. A private individual, on the other hand, has not accepted public office nor assumed an influential role in ordering society. Id. (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 1996, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967) (Warren, C. J., concurring in result)). A private individual has not relinquished his interest in the protection of his own good name, and consequently has a more compelling case for redress of injury inflicted by defamatory falsehood. Id. Holding that the designation of a public figure may rest on either of two alternative bases, the Court stated: In some instances an individual may achieve such pervasive fame or notoriety that he becomes a public figure for all purposes and in all contexts. More commonly, an individual voluntarily injects himself or is drawn into a particular public controversy and thereby becomes a public figure for a limited range of issues. In either case such persons assume special prominence in the resolution of public questions. ... Absent clear evidence of general fame or notoriety in the community, and pervasive involvement in the affairs of society, an individual should not be deemed a public personality for all aspects of his life. It is preferable to reduce the public-figure question to a more meaningful context by looking to the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. Fitzhugh, 330 Ark. 561, 579-80, 954 S.W.2d 914, 924 (emphasis added) (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351-52, 94 S.Ct. at 3012-13). Since the Court's decision in Gertz , courts have construed the term public figure narrowly, with an emphasis on the plaintiff's status in relation to the subject of the defamatory article. Id. This court has held that neither a former United States Attorney nor a private attorney were public figures, ( see Fitzhugh, 330 Ark. 561, 954 S.W.2d 914; Dodrill v. Arkansas Democrat Co., 265 Ark. 628, 590 S.W.2d 840 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1076, 100 S.Ct. 1024, 62 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980)). This court has, however, held that an assistant law school dean was a public figure ( see Gallman v. Carnes, 254 Ark. 987, 497 S.W.2d 47 (1973)), as were a sheriff, a deputy sheriff, a city police officer, ( see Pritchard v. Times Southwest Broadcasting, Inc., 277 Ark. 458, 642 S.W.2d 877 (1982); Hollowell v. Arkansas Democrat Newspaper, 293 Ark. 329, 737 S.W.2d 646 (1987); Lancaster v. Daily Banner-News Publishing Co., Inc., 274 Ark. 145, 622 S.W.2d 671 (1981)), and a chairman of the board of governors of a county memorial hospital ( see Drew v. KATV Television, Inc., 293 Ark. 555, 739 S.W.2d 680 (1987)). In Fitzhugh, 330 Ark. 561, 954 S.W.2d 914, the plaintiff's photograph appeared in an article about the Whitewater investigation in which it was reported that another man named Fitzhugh was indicted by a federal grand jury. We determined that the plaintiff, a former United States Attorney for eight years, was neither a public official nor a public figure, because the substance of the defamatory article bore no relation to his position as a federal prosecutor. We held that, as to the category of limited-purpose public figure, there was no evidence that Fitzhugh had thrust himself into the vortex of the Whitewater controversy, or that he had engaged the public's attention in an attempt to influence the outcome of the controversy. Id. at 582, 954 S.W.2d at 926. We held further that Fitzhugh had not, by virtue of his having been a federal prosecutor for eight years, occup[ied] a position of persuasive power and influence or one of especial prominence in the affairs of society, such that he could be labeled an all-purpose public figure. Id. at 582-83, 954 S.W.2d at 926. We concluded that Fitzhugh had not achieved such general fame or notoriety throughout the area where the article was published that would render him a public personality for all purposes. Here, in contrast to the factual situation presented in Fitzhugh , we conclude that, in the present context, Jarrell Southall was a limited-purpose public figure on the subject of environmental issues. The evidence demonstrated that he enjoyed a prominent role in the creation and enforcement of environmental legislation in this state. Southall himself stated in his deposition that he had conducted interviews with the media, had talked to radio and television reporters, had been a lobbyist at the state legislature, and had been fairly prominent in the public debate over the regulation of hazardous waste. By his own statements, Southall has demonstrated that he had thrust himself into the vortex of the public controversy surrounding the subject of hazardous waste. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court's assessment of Southall as a public figure for the limited purpose of environmental issues was not erroneous. It is thus not necessary that we reach the issue of whether Southall is considered to be a public official for the purpose of construing the two articles in question.