Opinion ID: 821509
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted trial court bias in voir dire

Text: Defendant first asserts the trial court repeatedly intervened in voir dire questioning to rehabilitate death-leaning prospective jurors who, on the basis of their questionnaire responses, would have been subject to defense challenges for cause. He argues the court‘s leading and suggestive questions to these prospective jurors were not designed to ferret out bias, but rather to have the prospective jurors change their questionnaire responses and hide their biases. In contrast, he urges, life-leaning prospective jurors were excused after cursory questioning without any extensive efforts at rehabilitation. He argues the court‘s manner of questioning allowed death-leaning prospective jurors to conceal disqualifying biases, thus preventing the reasonable exercise of defense challenges for cause; forced defendant to use peremptory challenges against prospective jurors who should have been removed for cause; ―stacked‖ the jury pool with pro-death-penalty jurors and ―skewed‖ it lopsidedly in favor of the state and a death penalty verdict, thus rendering the exercise of defense peremptory challenges ―irrelevant‖ and ―futile‖; and deprived him of a fair and impartial jury. (See Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729-734; Mu’Min v. Virginia (1991) 500 U.S. 415, 425-426.) He contends the error is ―structural‖ (Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 309) and requires reversal regardless of whether any particular ruling on a challenge for cause was in error. Referring to the rule regarding forfeiture of claims of error in the denial of defense challenges for cause (see post, at pp. 46-47), the Attorney General initially contends defendant forfeited his claim for purposes of appeal by agreeing to the jury without exhausting his peremptory challenges. Here, however, defendant 26 raises a different argument. He asserts the court‘s manner of questioning was itself so biased as to be inadequate to root out juror partiality. He claims the court‘s questioning was not designed to uncover juror bias, but instead was designed to, and did, conceal bias, rendering it impossible for defendant to obtain a fair jury. Defendant thus raises a threshold challenge to the adequacy of the trial court‘s voir dire that we must address first, because it affects the validity of all of the court‘s rulings on challenges for cause. (See Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 729 [―part of the guarantee of a defendant‘s right to an impartial jury is an adequate voir dire to identify unqualified jurors‖]; Mu’Min v. Virginia, supra, 500 U.S. 415.) In the past, we have reached the merits of similar claims notwithstanding the defendant‘s failure to object to the assertedly disparate questioning in the trial court. (People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 439, fn. 8; People v. Thornton (2007) 41 Cal.4th 391, 419-425; People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 485 & fn. 2, 487-488; see also People v. Mills (2010) 48 Cal.4th 158, 189 [construing claim as one of judicial misconduct and assuming, without deciding, it is preserved despite defendant‘s failure to object in the trial court].) In any event, here defendant did object to the trial court‘s manner of questioning. Toward the end of the first day of individual voir dire, following the questioning of Prospective Juror Y.C. and the court‘s denial of defendant‘s challenge for cause, the following exchange between the court and counsel took place: Defense counsel: ―My second objection is that the court‘s using leading questions in [an] attempt to lead the juror down the path towards rehabilitation. I mean, if it‘s this particular juror and in particular is a clear cut case where you can take someone who initially answering the questionnaire with no pressure on them will set out some very strong preconceived notions concerning the death penalty 27 and the course of trial and through skillful leading questions have them in effect do a 180 degrees turn while standing before the court. I think that basically causes the juror to hide their true biases and [prevents] a reasonable exercise of challenges for cause.‖ The Court: ―Thanks for the ‗skillful phraseology.‘ ‖ Defense counsel: ―Nothing but skillful. There is nothing about that. You were skillful as a lawyer. You are skillful as a judge.‖ The prosecutor: ―Your Honor, except as to different areas of questioning, I think I need to join [defense counsel‘s] objection.‖ The Court: ―You think I‘m skillful in those areas too, Mr. [Prosecutor]?‖ The prosecutor: ―Yes, your Honor. I think you are very skillful. That‘s the problem.‖ The Court: ―Thank you. Well, thank you for your praise. But I don‘t think I have done anything improper.‖ Accordingly, defendant apprised the court that he believed it was improperly rehabilitating death-leaning prospective jurors with ―skillful leading‖ questions. Although defendant did not, at that time or any time thereafter, object to the court‘s assertedly less thorough questioning of life-leaning prospective jurors, we think the implications of defendant‘s objection were sufficiently clear that we may review the merits of his claim. On the merits, however, defendant‘s claim fails. Trial courts possess broad discretion over both ―[d]ecisions concerning the qualifications of prospective jurors to serve‖ (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 445) and the manner of conducting voir dire (People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 420 [trial court ― ‗possesse[s] discretion to conduct oral voir dire as necessary and to allow attorney participation and questioning as appropriate.‘ [Citations.]‖). Indeed, decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this area ―have made clear that 28 ‗the conduct of voir dire is an art, not a science,‘ so ‗ ―[t]here is no single way to voir dire a juror.‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖ (People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 737.) ― ‗The Constitution . . . does not dictate a catechism for voir dire, but only that the defendant be afforded an impartial jury.‘ ‖ (Ibid., quoting Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 729.) In evaluating claims of judicial bias during the conduct of deathqualification voir dire, we have stressed that ―[t]rial courts must of course ‗be evenhanded in their questions to prospective jurors . . . and should inquire into the jurors‘ attitudes both for and against the death penalty to determine whether these views will impair their ability to serve as jurors.‘ ‖ (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 189; accord, People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 446.) Evenhandedness is encouraged because ―[i]t is entirely possible . . . that even a juror who believes that capital punishment should never be inflicted and who is irrevocably committed to its abolition could nonetheless subordinate his personal views to what he perceived to be his duty to abide by his oath as a juror and to obey the law of the State.‖ (Witherspoon, supra, 391 U.S. at p. 515, fn. 7; see Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176 [―It is important to remember that not all who oppose the death penalty are subject to removal for cause in capital cases; those who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law.‖].) Nonetheless, the trial court has ― ‗broad discretion over the number and nature of questions about the death penalty. . . .‘ ‖ (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 189.) ―[W]e cannot predicate a finding of error merely on the number of questions the court asks‖ death-leaning and life-leaning jurors. (Id. at p. 190, citing People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 425.) Indeed, on appeal, ―[a] reviewing court should not require a trial court‘s questioning of each prospective 29 juror in the Witherspoon-Witt context [citations] to be similar in each case in which the court has questions, lest the court feel compelled to conduct a needlessly broad voir dire, receiving answers to questions it does not need to ask.‖ (People v. Thornton, at p. 425; see also People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 446447.) Finally, ― ‗ ―[d]espite its importance, the adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to appellate review. The trial judge‘s function at this point in the trial is not unlike that of jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions.‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 661, quoting Mu’Min v. Virginia, supra, 500 U.S. at p. 424.) For these reasons, the court‘s manner of conducting voir dire will not be disturbed on appeal unless it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. (People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1250; see Mu’Min v. Virginia, supra, 500 U.S. at pp. 425-426.) Here, defendant points to 23 death-leaning prospective jurors whom he asserts the court improperly rehabilitated, and 11 life-leaning prospective jurors whom he contends the court peremptorily excused without similar efforts at rehabilitation. We have carefully reviewed the questionnaire responses and voir dire transcripts of these prospective jurors and of the jurors ultimately chosen, as well as the transcript of the voir dire of all other prospective jurors who were individually questioned. Our review leads us to conclude the court did not abuse its discretion or display bias in its questioning of either death-leaning or lifeleaning prospective jurors, and its voir dire was adequate to enable it to determine whether the prospective jurors‘ views on the death penalty qualified them to sit on a capital jury. We begin with an analysis of the voir dire of Y.C., the prospective juror whose voir dire led to the defense objection set forth above. On her questionnaire, 30 Y.C. stated that she ―strongly support[ed]‖ the death penalty. Asked to explain her views on the death penalty, she wrote ―If ‗you‘ think another‘s life is inconsequential — prepare to pay the ultimate penalty! — if ‗you‘ decide to take that person‘s life —.‖ In response to a question about her views regarding a case involving the murder of an elderly man with a shotgun during a robbery, she wrote that everyone convicted of such a murder should receive the death penalty because ―The murder was probably not necessary.‖ However, when asked whether she would base her penalty decision on the evidence and instructions presented at the penalty phase, she responded in the affirmative. Asked her views regarding the frequency with which the death penalty is imposed, she wrote that she believed the penalty was used ―too seldom‖ because ―death row is overcrowded with convicted & sentenced criminals way overdoing the appeal time — too much money spent supporting these folks!‖ She believed the death penalty should be mandatory for murder and murder with special circumstances, should be possible and was appropriate for ―any murder,‖ and was inappropriate for anything but murder and murder with special circumstances. She answered in the affirmative to a question asking whether she would automatically vote for the death penalty if defendant was convicted of murder with a special circumstance; but she also wrote in response to a different question that before deciding on the penalty, she would want to know ―why he had such little disregard [sic] for another human life.‖ In response to questions regarding her views on the ―eye for an eye‖ principle, she wrote that she believed in that adage based on religious conviction, that to her it meant ―If you sin against another & take their life prepare to lay down your own,‖ and that she could not set aside that concept and apply the principles the court would give her. She further wrote in response to pertinent questions that she had religious or moral training regarding the death penalty from ―family & church,‖ and she did ―not know‖ if she could set aside such training and decide the case 31 according to the law given by the court. She answered ―no‖ to a question asking whether she could set aside her personal feelings regarding what the law should be and follow the law as instructed by the court. In response to a question asking whether she could agree to accept the court‘s representation that life without possibility of parole means the defendant would be sentenced to life without possibility of parole, she wrote ―do not know.‖ Asked whether the costs of either incarceration or the appellate process would be a consideration for her in deciding on the penalty, she answered ―yes‖ to both. Finally, she answered ―yes‖ to a question asking whether her feelings were such that in every case that reached a penalty phase she would automatically vote for the death penalty rather than life without possibility of parole.9 Defendant argues these questionnaire responses alone would have subjected Y.C. to a challenge for cause, but the court went to ―extraordinary lengths to rehabilitate [her], leading her to contradict everything she had answered in the questionnaire.‖ We conclude the court did not abuse its broad discretion in conducting the voir dire of Y.C. As defense counsel acknowledged during the voir dire of a different prospective juror, the questionnaire was ―designed to get [the venireperson‘s] first impressions‖ regarding the matters discussed; the purpose of voir dire was to determine whether or not those first impressions represented ―solid, firm convictions.‖ As is readily apparent from a review of the relevant portion of the voir dire, the court‘s questioning was designed to do precisely that. The court began by noting what appeared to it to be a conflict 9 Y.C. also answered ―yes‖ to a question asking whether she would in every case automatically vote for life without possibility of parole, but on voir dire she confirmed this was a ―wrong answer.‖ 32 between Y.C.‘s questionnaire response indicating she thought everyone convicted of the murder of an elderly man with a shotgun during a robbery should be put to death, regardless of the evidence regarding penalty introduced by the parties, and her response indicating that if selected as a juror, she would listen open-mindedly to the penalty phase evidence and base her decision solely on the evidence and the court‘s instructions. This led Y.C. to volunteer that she was confused about ―the first part and the penalty part,‖ prompting the trial court to launch into a detailed explanation of the two phases of a death penalty trial and the purpose of each, the decision to be made at the penalty phase, and the meaning of ―aggravation‖ and ―mitigation.‖ Having ascertained that Y.C. understood these concepts, the court asked whether, if the case reached the penalty phase, Y.C. would be able to vote for the death penalty if she believed the evidence in aggravation outweighed that in mitigation, and conversely, whether she would be able to vote for life in prison without possibility of parole if she felt the evidence in mitigation outweighed that in aggravation. When Y.C. hesitated in response to the latter portion of the question, and seemed at a loss for words, the court queried whether she meant she would need to hear all of the evidence before making a decision to impose life without possibility of parole, and Y.C. agreed. The court then ascertained that Y.C. would not hesitate to vote for either penalty if she believed that was what the evidence indicated. Next, the court addressed Y.C.‘s responses indicating she believed in the ―an eye for an eye‖ principle and could not set that concept aside and apply the principles given by the court. The court asked whether Y.C. wanted to change the latter answer in light of the answers she had previously given in court, and she agreed, explaining she had had difficulty concentrating on the questionnaire given the time of day and the number of people in the jury assembly room when she filled it out. The court then moved on to Y.C.‘s views on the penalty of life in 33 prison without possibility of parole. The court asked whether, if selected as a juror, Y.C. would conduct herself in the jury room as if imposing such a sentence meant defendant ―will stay there without parole,‖ and Y.C. again agreed. The court proceeded similarly with the question regarding the costs of incarceration and appeals, asking whether Y.C. meant that she would, if selected, tend to vote for the death penalty because she believed it was less expensive. When Y.C. responded in the affirmative, the court asked if she would agree to not ―put dollars and [cents] either way before any other consideration.‖ Y.C. agreed, indicating she would not ―take lightly‖ the penalty decision. Finally, the court explored Y.C.‘s response indicating she would ―in every case automatically‖ vote for the death penalty because of her feelings. The court asked whether, based on Y.C.‘s responses to the previous questions, her answer now would be ―no,‖ and she agreed, commenting she had found the questionnaire ―rather tricky‖ and the court should ―[j]ust change everything.‖ The court‘s conduct of the voir dire of Y.C. did not exceed the bounds of permissible discretion. The court asked questions testing Y.C.‘s questionnaire responses that were inconsistent or indicated confusion, to clarify her beliefs and to assess how firmly Y.C. held these beliefs as a prelude to determining whether Y.C. could perform the duties of a juror. When Y.C. confirmed that she was confused about the two-phase nature of the trial, the court was well within its discretion in explaining these matters to her and ascertaining whether, in light of her new understanding, she could impose either penalty option. As we have explained, ―we ordinarily defer to the court‘s determination that a prospective juror‘s answers require clarification‖ (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 446), and ―[w]e see nothing improper in the court‘s explaining the law‖ to a prospective juror whose questionnaire responses gave rise to concerns in the court‘s mind. (People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 423.) The court 34 similarly was within its discretion in ascertaining whether, in light of her new understanding, Y.C. wished to change her pro-death-penalty responses to other questions. ―Clearly the court found it necessary to ask [Y.C.] questions to reach a decision about her, and doing so was not unfair to defendant.‖ (Id. at p. 422.) Further, although we caution against overreliance on leading questions10 to the exclusion of more open-ended questions because the authority of the trial judge may cause a prospective juror to give what he or she perceives to be a ―correct‖ answer rather than a considered statement of his or her true views, we conclude the court‘s use of leading questions here did not fall outside the wide range of its discretion. Prospective jurors unschooled in the law may have difficulty fully articulating their views or forecasting how they would conduct themselves if selected as a juror in a death penalty case, particularly when they are asked to express themselves using legal terms and concepts that may be entirely new to them. (Cf. Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 7 [recognizing some venirepersons may be unable to articulate their views].) In such a situation, prompting the prospective juror with leading questions may be the only way for the court to obtain a clear answer. (See People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 190 [―court‘s occasional use of leading questions when attempting to rehabilitate ‗death-leaning‘ jurors‖ did not ―suggest a lack of impartiality‖ because ―[w]e assume the trial court formulated its questions based on the individual characteristics of each juror‖].) Finally, the court did not prevent defendant‘s 10 ―A ‗leading question‘ is a question that suggests to the witness the answer that the examining party desires.‖ (Evid. Code, § 764.) 35 counsel from engaging in follow-up questioning of Y.C. if he chose, but counsel elected not to do so. (See Code Civ. Proc., former § 223.)11 The analysis is the same with respect to the remaining 22 prospective jurors whom defendant claims the court improperly rehabilitated. A review of the questionnaire responses and voir dire of these prospective jurors indicates the court orally questioned them regarding their views on the death penalty when their written responses to critical questions were blank or appeared to the court to create a conflict or to reflect confusion or a misunderstanding of the capital trial process. In most such cases, including Prospective Jurors J.E., M.C., J.O., D.O., G.T., J.J., M.E., I.W., R.Z., C.Ph., L.H, R.L., S.W., F.G., M.A., C.Pa., E.S., M.S., L.V., the court began by noting the blank response or the apparent conflict and then engaged in an explanation of the law similar to that given to Prospective Juror Y.C., stopping at critical junctures to ascertain whether the prospective juror understood the explanation.12 Having ascertained that each prospective juror understood the process, the court then asked each whether he or she would have ―a 11 At the time of defendant‘s trial in 1996, that section provided as follows: ―In a criminal case, the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors. However, the court may permit the parties, upon a showing of good cause, to supplement examination by such further inquiry as it deems proper . . . . [¶] . . . [¶] The trial court‘s exercise of its discretion in the manner in which voir dire is conducted shall not cause any conviction to be reversed unless the exercise of that discretion has resulted in a miscarriage of justice, as specified in Section 13 of Article VI of the California Constitution.‖ (Code Civ. Proc., former § 233, as adopted by voters (Prop. 115, § 7) June 6, 1990.) 12 Two individuals included in this claim did not fit this pattern. The court found it unnecessary to explain the phases of the case and the nature of aggravating and mitigating evidence to Juror L.G-H. And the court‘s voir dire of Juror C.H. was very brief, encompassing only one transcribed page, and covered only her experience as a crime victim. We find nothing improper in the voir dire of these jurors. 36 problem‖ or ―any hesitancy‖ in voting for either penalty option if, after weighing all the circumstances, he or she believed the evidence called for it. Some prospective jurors who initially expressed reluctance to impose life in prison without possibility of parole, or who could not imagine themselves doing so if they found defendant guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances (e.g., Prospective Jurors J.E., J.O., and M.A.), changed their responses when the court explained the concept of mitigating evidence or when examples of mitigating evidence were given. Often the court found it necessary, as with Prospective Juror Y.C., to explain that it would be improper for the individual, if selected as a juror, to vote based on a belief that a person sentenced to life in prison without parole could someday be released, to consider the costs of incarceration or appeals, or to follow the ―eye for an eye‖ adage instead of the law given by the court; the court then obtained the prospective juror‘s assurance that he or she would set aside his or her personal beliefs and follow the law as instructed by the court (e.g., Prospective Jurors J.J., J.M., I.W., L.G-H., R.L., M.A., C.Pa., and M.S.). Although the court often used the ―do you understand‖ questioning format when explaining the law and sometimes employed leading questions, after defendant objected the court displayed an awareness of the issue and even caught and corrected itself during questioning of Prospective Juror R.Z. Moreover, the court often asked open-ended questions and allowed the prospective jurors to express themselves in their own way when they were willing and able to do so (e.g., Prospective Jurors F.G. and M.S.). In sum, the record reflects the court questioned each prospective juror in a manner consistent with its assessment of that person‘s ―individual characteristics‖ (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 190) and asked questions and explained the law it felt necessary to come to a decision about the ability of the prospective juror to serve on the jury. (People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 422-423.) 37 As with Prospective Juror Y.C., and for similar reasons, we find no abuse of the court‘s broad discretion in its manner of questioning these prospective jurors.13 13 At oral argument, defendant‘s counsel identified Juror C.P. as the ―most egregious‖ example of assertedly improper rehabilitative questioning. We conclude the trial court‘s manner of questioning C.P. was not an abuse of discretion. On her questionnaire, Juror C.P. expressed very strong pro-deathpenalty views and some hesitancy about her ability to put aside those views. For example, she wrote that she ―strongly support[ed]‖ the death penalty if the murder was ―premeditated‖ and there was ―past criminal history.‖ She wrote that she was ―sick and tired of appeals & paroles & shortened time served.‖ She wrote that everyone convicted of the murder of an elderly man with a shotgun during a robbery should receive the death penalty, regardless of the evidence regarding penalty introduced by the parties, because the defendant ―was armed and invaded a home with robbery planned possibly — He was armed ‗in case he needed the gun.‘ ‖ She wrote that if selected as a juror, she would agree to listen openmindedly to the penalty evidence and base her decision solely on such evidence and the court‘s instructions, but she ―would have a hard time, however, if it were a ‗cold-blooded‘ act.‖ She felt the death penalty was used too seldom, explaining ―too many prisoners released on parole or appeals — waste of tax $$‖ She wrote she felt the death penalty should be mandatory for ―murder, violent crimes — & perhaps rape under certain circumstances.‖ She wrote that the costs of incarceration and appeals would be a factor for her in deciding penalty because she was ―fed up with tax $$ used to house inmates (& pampering them with frivo[li]ties).‖ Asked whether she would hesitate to vote for a verdict of guilt or a true finding on the special circumstance allegation in order to avoid the task of deciding on the penalty, she wrote she ―would try to be open-minded — I simply just have a problem with compromising penalty for FIRST –Degree murder.‖ Asked whether there was anything about defendant‘s appearance that would prevent her from deciding the case based upon the law and the evidence and not upon prejudice, sympathy, pity, or bias, C.P. wrote in part: ―Sympathy or pity would play no part — My sympathy or pity would be reserved for the victim and family.‖ And asked whether she had formed any opinion about this case based upon completing the questionnaire, C.P. wrote ―I hope not — the term ‗murder‘ doesn‘t set with me — but I‘d have to hear all evidence.‖ C.P.‘s answers, however, hinted that she misunderstood the nature of special circumstances and the function of the penalty phase. For example, she wrote she would not automatically vote for either a penalty of death or a penalty of life imprisonment without possibility of parole if defendant were found guilty of murder with a special circumstance, because ―I would need to hear the details of (footnote continued on next page) 38 Defendant contends, nonetheless, that the error here is not only that the court rehabilitated death-leaning prospective jurors, but that it failed to take the same steps with life-leaning prospective jurors, instead summarily excusing them after brief questioning. He contends the court failed to explain the two phases of the trial, the nature of aggravating and mitigating evidence, and the weighing (footnote continued from previous page) the special circumstances,‖ and it ―would depend on the special circumstances — if there were no special circumstances I would vote for the death penalty.‖ Given the inconsistency in some of C.P.‘s questionnaire responses, her responses indicating she would not automatically impose either penalty, and her apparent confusion about the nature of special circumstances and other aspects of the trial process, the court was fully justified in attempting to educate this juror by engaging in a detailed explanation of the phases of a capital case, explaining that the defendant had not yet been found guilty and the circumstances of the crime had not yet been proved, explaining that neither penalty option was favored, and asking probing questions to determine C.P.‘s true state of mind. The questioning bore out that C.P. was indeed confused. For example, when the court asked C.P. about her response indicating she would ―need the hear the details of the special circumstances‖ in deciding penalty, C.P. responded, ―I think deep down I have a question of what special circumstances are.‖ After listening to the court‘s explanations and responding to further questions, C.P. affirmed she would not automatically vote for either penalty, she could follow the court‘s instructions, and she would not consider cost in deciding penalty. She reaffirmed these answers (as well as her initial confusion) in response to additional questioning by defendant‘s counsel. Defendant complains the court phrased its questions in unduly leading terms. For example, in questioning C.P. about her response on the questionnaire indicating the death penalty should be ―mandatory‖ for certain types of crimes, the court asked ―[w]hen you said ‗mandatory‘ did you mean that it automatically [should] be imposed if a person is found guilty of it, or did you mean that it should be an available penalty?‖ C.P. responded, ―It should be an available penalty.‖ Again, although we caution against overreliance on leading questions, we conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by employing them here (see People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 190), particularly with this juror whose misunderstanding of many aspects of the trial and penalty process was so apparent. 39 process to such prospective jurors, and failed to determine whether they could set aside their personal views and follow the law. Defendant points to 11 prospective jurors whom he contends the court summarily dismissed in this manner.14 Again, we have examined the questionnaire responses and voir dire transcript related to these 11 prospective jurors — as compared to the responses and transcript related to the alleged death-leaning jurors and prospective jurors — and conclude the court‘s manner of questioning them was not an abuse of discretion. First, we note defendant stipulated to the excusal of Prospective Juror J.L. because his religious beliefs prohibited him from judging another person. Further, defendant expressed a willingness to stipulate to the excusal of Prospective Jurors R.R. and B.C. based on their questionnaire responses before they were even brought in for individual questioning. The court was fully justified in short-circuiting the questioning of these three prospective jurors. For the eight remaining prospective jurors, the court‘s questioning generally followed a pattern similar to the questioning of Prospective Juror M.F., which we set out in full: The Court: ―Hi, Mr. [F.]. How are you? [¶] We‘re just going to ask you a couple of questions in this matter. [¶] You indicate that you . . . oppose the death penalty?‖ Prospective Juror M.F.: ―Right.‖ The Court: ―Correct?‖ 14 Defendant also mentions Prospective Juror D.S., whom the court excused summarily because of bias against testimony from law enforcement officers. But the court also summarily excused six other prospective jurors due to bias in favor of the testimony of law enforcement officers. Thus, defendant‘s mention of D.S. does not support his claim that the court exhibited bias in favor of the prosecution. 40 Prospective Juror M.F.: ―Yes.‖ The Court: ―Okay. Do you feel that there are any circumstances under which the — if the defendant were found guilty of the crime that he is charged with and the special circumstances are proved, do you feel that there are any circumstances which you would vote for the death penalty?‖ Prospective Juror M.F.: ―No, I don‘t.‖ The Court: ―In other words, if the evidence, and I‘m not saying that it would, showed that this crime was exceedingly vicious and callous and horrible, and if the evidence, and I‘m not saying that it does, were to show that the defendant was a particularly vicious, brutal and horrible person, under no circumstances do you believe that you could impose the death penalty; is that correct?‖ Prospective Juror M.F.: ―I don‘t believe I could.‖ The prosecutor: ―Move to excuse for cause, Your Honor.‖ The Court: ―All right. You‘re excused. Thank you, Mr. [F.].‖ We conclude the court‘s manner of questioning these prospective jurors fell within its broad discretion. The written questionnaire responses of these venirepersons left little or no cause to believe that extensive questioning would render them eligible to serve. Several — including J.B., G.F-M., N.C., O.B., and A.M. — wrote on their questionnaires that they would ―never under any circumstances impose [the] death penalty, regardless of the evidence‖; others, including M.F. and B.H., wrote they ―oppose[d]‖ or ―strongly oppose[d]‖ the death penalty. Each of these seven also wrote that they would automatically impose life in prison without possibility of parole if defendant were convicted of murder with special circumstances. Often, these prospective jurors included strong language explaining why they held these views. For example, Prospective Juror G.F-M. wrote ―two wrongs do not make a right. Whoever is the executioner 41 is a murderer also.‖ Prospective Juror N.C. wrote ―I could not live with myself if I was the cause of another person‘s death,‖ repeating the same sentiment numerous times in the questionnaire. Similarly, Prospective Juror A.M. wrote, ―I don‘t think I could live with myself knowing I sent someone to their death.‖ Prospective Juror J.B. wrote, ―I feel some people deserve it but I‘m not going to determine it.‖ Four of these venirepersons — J.B., N.C., G.F-M., and O.B. — wrote their opposition to the death penalty was based on religious or moral beliefs they could not set aside. Others, such as Prospective Juror M.F., based their views on practical considerations such as cost. Notably, the questionnaire responses of these prospective jurors were, with few exceptions, internally consistent; that is, their expressions of general feelings in opposition to the death penalty were coupled with answers indicating they could not set aside their personal moral or religious views and follow the law, and for that reason they would always vote against the death penalty regardless of the evidence. Further, none of their questionnaire responses indicated they misunderstood the capital trial process as it had been explained to them both orally and on the questionnaire; rather, their responses suggested that regardless of the process, they personally could not or would not participate in the decision to sentence someone to death. Under these circumstances, the court reasonably could conclude that neither extensive questioning nor an explanation of the law was ―likely to render the[se] venireperson[s] qualified to sit in a capital case.‖15 (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 190.) 15 The questionnaire responses of two prospective jurors identified by defendant as summarily excused did not fit this pattern. Prospective Juror B.H.‘s answers were somewhat internally inconsistent and she left many responses blank. Comparing the questionnaire and voir dire responses of this prospective juror with those of two death-leaning prospective jurors, the concurring opinion finds a ―lack (footnote continued on next page) 42 Here, the court orally questioned each of the identified prospective jurors regarding whether he or she could not impose the death penalty even if the evidence showed defendant had committed a horrible, vicious crime and was a horrible, vicious person. Such a formulation, while straying from what we have previously approved as satisfying the standard set forth in Witt, was adequate to assess whether there was any ―realistic, practical possibility‖ the prospective jurors could impose the death penalty in this case. (People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 432; cf. ibid. [asking prospective jurors ―whether there was a realistic, (footnote continued from previous page) of symmetry in the court‘s voir dire of pro- and anti-death-penalty jurors whose written questionnaires presented the same degree of ambiguity.‖ (Conc. Opn., p. 12.) The concurring opinion argues that this asserted lack of symmetry ―cannot itself be explained by anything having to do with the [prospective] jurors‘ demeanor because the disparity in questioning occurred at the very beginning of each juror‘s voir dire.‖ (Conc. Opn., p. 10.) We note, however, that the trial court had an opportunity to observe B.H.‘s demeanor both during the group questioning that preceded individual, sequestered voir dire, and while B.H. responsed to the first five questions posed to her on individual voir dire, before it asked the question that the concurring opinion finds to be significantly different from those asked of death-leaning prospective jurors. Moreover, that the court might have had reasonable cause to explain the law to B.H. or to question her more extensively cannot establish a pattern of discriminatory questioning in violation of defendant‘s rights. (See People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 447 [small sample of jurors allegedly disparately questioned insufficient to establish a practice of bias where court questioned over 150 venirepersons].) We discuss this prospective juror in more detail, post. Prospective Juror C.Z. left many answers on the questionnaire blank, including all the questions related to the death penalty. Her oral voir dire revealed she had limited English skills, but she did clearly state, ―I don‘t like to judge a person, how you say, I don‘t believe in the death penalty or anything like that,‖ and ―not for me to say, no, sir.‖ She also affirmed that she could never vote for the death penalty under any circumstances, regardless of the nature of the crime or the defendant. Again, the trial court‘s manner of questioning this prospective juror appeared tailored to her ―individual characteristics‖ and was not an abuse of discretion. (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 190.) 43 practical possibility the juror could consider either penalty option‖ sufficient to satisfy Witt].) The court had the opportunity to assess each prospective juror‘s demeanor, both before and during questioning, and to evaluate whether each was sincerely expressing his or her views. Although the court did not explain the law in detail to these venirepersons, this omission was not an abuse of discretion in light of their questionnaire responses and the questions the court did ask. (See People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 425.) Because the trial court who ―observes and speaks with a prospective juror . . . gleans valuable information that simply does not appear on‖ the cold record (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451), we normally defer to that court‘s determination that further questioning would not be fruitful (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 190), and we do so again here. Further the court here did not prevent defendant from asking followup questions in an effort to rehabilitate these prospective jurors. Defense counsel did so on several occasions, but for the most part even he did not see the need to explain to these individuals the phases of a death penalty trial or the duty of a juror to set aside personal beliefs. (Cf. People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610, 644 [when counsel, advised of the court‘s intention to excuse a prospective juror, declined an opportunity for further voir dire to clarify the prospective juror‘s views, we assume ―counsel accepted that the record as it stood was sufficient to support the intended ruling‖].) Although the foregoing is sufficient to resolve defendant‘s claim of biased questioning, we additionally note the remainder of the voir dire record does not support defendant‘s contention. The court excused death-leaning Prospective Jurors D.M., D.Mi. I, and L.S. without extensive efforts at rehabilitation. The court also engaged in lengthy questioning — including an explanation of the phases of a capital case and the duty of a juror to weigh aggravating and mitigating evidence in deciding penalty — with Prospective Jurors M.V. and 44 D.Mi. II, both of whom expressed hesitation about imposing the death penalty in their written and/or oral responses. These examples illustrate the court‘s effort to be fair. In sum, we reiterate that trial courts must be scrupulously ― ‗evenhanded‘ ‖ in conducting death qualification voir dire. (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 189; accord, People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908-909.) Given the ―broad discretion‖ traditionally afforded to trial courts in this context (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 189), we conclude the court‘s manner of conducting voir dire in this case did not rise to the level of abuse of discretion, bias, lack of impartiality, or fundamental unfairness, and we reject defendant‘s claim that the voir dire was inadequate. Finally, in addition to his threshold procedural claim regarding the manner of the court‘s voir dire, defendant also asserts the court erred substantively by applying different and more stringent criteria to evaluate life-leaning prospective jurors than it applied to death-leaning prospective jurors. As in previous cases, we address this claim on the merits notwithstanding defendant‘s failure to object on these precise grounds in the trial court. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at p. 902, fn. 10; People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 439, fn. 8; People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 419-425.) We conclude the claim lacks merit. The record demonstrates the court excused for cause both death-leaning and lifeleaning prospective jurors whose questionnaire responses and oral voir dire, taken together, left the court with the ― ‗ ―definite impression‖ ‘ ‖ (People v. Abilez, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 498) that they would never, under any circumstances, impose one or the other of the penalty options, and thus that their personal beliefs about the death penalty would ― ‗prevent or substantially impair the performance of [their] duties as a juror.‘ ‖ (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 424.) Conversely, the court did not excuse prospective jurors who, although expressing serious 45 reservations about or difficulty with imposing one penalty or the other, did not leave such an impression. These included Prospective Juror R.L., who stated ―I think so‖ and ―I think I could‖ impose life; Prospective Juror M.A., who stated she would find it ―difficult‖ to impose life; Prospective Juror M.V., who stated he would ―struggle‖ with the decision to impose death; Prospective Juror D.S., who stated he ―possibly‖ could impose death; Prospective Juror D.Mi. II, who stated imposing death would be ―difficult‖; Prospective Juror L.B., who said ―I think I could‖ impose death; and Prospective Juror K.T., who said he would have ―reservations‖ about imposing death. We find no merit to defendant‘s contention that the court applied disparate substantive standards when evaluating prospective jurors. d. Assertedly erroneous denials of defense challenges for cause Defendant contends the court erroneously denied his challenges for cause to 15 of the prospective jurors discussed in the previous part: Prospective Jurors J.E., I.W., Y.C., M.E., J.J., J.M., R.Z., R.L., S.W., F.G., M.A., C.Pa., M.S., L.V., and G.T. He alleges the erroneous denials cumulatively ―stacked‖ the jury pool against him, inhibited the exercise of defense peremptory challenges, and resulted in a biased and pro-death-penalty jury being chosen. ―As a general rule, a party may not complain on appeal of an allegedly erroneous denial of a challenge for cause because the party need not tolerate having the prospective juror serve on the jury; a litigant retains the power to remove the juror by exercising a peremptory challenge. Thus, to preserve this claim for appeal we require, first, that a litigant actually exercise a peremptory challenge and remove the prospective juror in question. Next, the litigant must exhaust all of the peremptory challenges allotted by statute and hold none in reserve. Finally, counsel (or defendant, if proceeding pro se) must express to the 46 trial court dissatisfaction with the jury as presently constituted.‖16 (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 186; accord, People v. Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at pp. 45-46.) ―In addition, the issue may be deemed preserved for appellate review if an adequate justification for the failure to satisfy these rules is provided.‖ (People v. Mills, supra, at p. 186, fn. 8; see also People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 34 (conc. opn. of Werdegar, J.).) Here, although defendant employed peremptory challenges against Prospective Jurors J.E., J.J., M.E., R.L., and L.V., he used only 16 of his 20 allotted peremptory challenges during selection of the regular jurors and none of his four allotted peremptory challenges during selection of the alternate jurors. Nor did defendant express any dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected, or request additional peremptory challenges. ―[T]he existence of unused peremptory challenges strongly indicates defendant‘s recognition that the selected jury was fair and impartial.‖ (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 581.) In an apparent attempt to justify his failure to exhaust peremptory challenges, defendant claims the court‘s biased questioning and assertedly erroneous denials of challenges for cause so ―stacked‖ the pool with death-leaning jurors as to ―overwhelm‖ the defense peremptory challenges and render their exercise ―irrelevant.‖ He speculates that even had the defense used all of its peremptory challenges, ―a biased jury would still have resulted . . . due to the Court‘s ability and demonstrated inclination to ‗seed‘ the panel with pro-deathbiased prospective jurors in a quantity sufficient to overwhelm the defense 16 All three of these requirements apply to any case tried after our decision in People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, at page 121. (See People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 186-187.) This case was tried in 1996; therefore, the postCrittenden rule applies. 47 peremptory challenges.‖ He asserts, ―it would have been futile to challenge too many of the earlier chosen objectionable jurors, beyond the extremely biased, if the remaining eligible pool had an equal or possibly even higher proportion of objectionable jurors.‖ Moreover, he claims, ―the presence in the pool of so many ‗rehabilitated‘ jurors with extreme pro-death-penalty biases‖ also prejudiced him because ―challenging the moderately biased risked their substitution with the extremely biased.‖ Thus, defendant contends, his objection to the court‘s questioning methodology and his challenges for cause to specific prospective jurors were sufficient in and of themselves to preserve his claim for appeal. Defendant‘s argument fails both factually and legally. On a factual level, we have concluded in the previous part that the trial court did not improperly rehabilitate pro-death-penalty prospective jurors or otherwise exhibit bias in its voir dire questioning. Accordingly, defendant‘s assertion that the exercise of additional peremptory challenges would have been futile rests on nothing but speculation. On a legal level, we rejected a similar argument in People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th 158. There, the defense exercised all but one of its allotted peremptory challenges. On appeal, defendant argued his failure to exhaust peremptory challenges was justified because he needed to hold one peremptory challenge in reserve in the event he needed it to excuse a particular prospective juror, L.S., whom he claimed ―was strongly pro-death-penalty.‖ (Id. at p. 186.) We disagreed, reasoning ―acceptance of this excuse would swallow the rule entirely, for a defense attorney might in every case wish to hold challenges in reserve for strategic reasons.‖ (Ibid.) Here, defendant in essence argues he needed to hold four peremptory challenges in reserve in case he needed to challenge any of the assertedly death-leaning prospective jurors whom the court had improperly rehabilitated. Mills, however, forecloses the argument. 48 For the first time in the reply brief, defendant appears to modify his argument that his failure to exhaust peremptory challenges was justified. He contends, without citation to the record, that after jury selection was completed the only prospective jurors remaining in the pool were nine extremely pro-deathpenalty venirepersons whom the court had improperly rehabilitated: J.O., Y.C., J.M., R.Z., S.W., F.G., M.A., C.Pa., and M.S. The court had denied defendant‘s for-cause challenges to eight of these prospective jurors. Thus, he claims, ―no amount of challenges . . . could have improved the jury‖ ultimately selected. Were defendant correct that only these nine prospective jurors remained the in the pool, and had he expressed dissatisfaction with the jury ultimately selected and requested additional peremptory challenges, we might agree that defendant‘s failure to exhaust his peremptories was justified and reach the merits of his claim that the trial court erroneously denied his challenges for cause. In People v. Clark, we reached the merits of defendant‘s claim that the trial court erroneously denied defense challenges for cause when defense counsel: (1) used peremptory challenges to remove some of the complained-of prospective jurors, but declined to use her final peremptory challenge because the person in line to fill the next vacancy in the jury box was a prospective juror whom defendant had unsuccessfully challenged for cause; (2) expressed dissatisfaction with the jury as then constituted; and (3) asked for additional peremptory challenges. (People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 901-902.) Our review of the record, however, does not support defendant‘s contention that the only persons who had not yet been called to the jury box after jury selection was completed were the nine he identifies. As noted above, following hardship excusals, the court and counsel individually questioned 158 prospective 49 jurors. During this phase, 73 were excused for cause or for hardship, leaving 85 eligible prospective jurors at the start of the exercise of peremptory challenges.17 During selection of the 12 regular jurors, defendant exercised 16 peremptory challenges and the prosecution exercised 15, leaving 42 prospective jurors remaining when the selection of alternate jurors began. These 42 included, of course, those ultimately selected as alternate jurors: A.H., R.W., R.T., and M.L. Defendant does not claim any of these four individuals was biased or improperly rehabilitated, and he did not challenge any of them for cause. Had defendant exercised all of his peremptory challenges during selection of the regular jurors, one or more of them might have been seated on the regular jury. During the selection of alternate jurors, defendant exercised no peremptory challenges and the prosecution exercised four; one person called to the jury box was excused based on a late-developing hardship. Thus, by our calculation, even after selection of the alternate jurors, 33 venirepersons remained in the pool and on the random list. Defendant has not shown, with citations to the record, that the nine he claims were unacceptable were next in line to fill vacancies in the jury box. (Cf. People v. Clark, supra, 52 Cal.4th at pp. 901-902.) Accordingly, we find no merit to defendant‘s contention that the exercise of additional defense peremptory challenges would have been futile. His claim that the court erroneously denied defense challenges for cause is thus forfeited. 17 As explained above, following the exercise of challenges for cause the court generated a ―random list‖ of the remaining prospective jurors, which was supplied to counsel. During the exercise of peremptory challenges, prospective jurors were called to be seated in the jury box in the order appearing on the random list. The ―random list‖ is not part of the record on appeal. Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume the random list included all 85 prospective jurors remaining after the exercise of challenges for cause. 50 Even were we to find the claim preserved for review, however, we would reject it on the merits. To prevail on this claim, ―defendant must demonstrate that the court‘s rulings affected his right to a fair and impartial jury.‖ (People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114.) Here, none of the 15 identified prospective jurors sat on defendant‘s jury. (Ibid.; accord, People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 187.) Further, although defendant used five of his peremptory challenges to remove some of these 15 from the jury, the loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner ― ‗is grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.‘ ‖ (People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 487, italics added, quoting Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 89.) Here, defendant did not challenge for cause any of the 12 jurors who decided his case.18 Moreover, as we explain post, none of the 12 jurors was biased against defendant. Because defendant ―was not forced to tolerate an incompetent juror‖ as a result of having used peremptory challenges to excuse the five prospective jurors identified above, and because none of the 10 other prospective jurors whom defendant unsuccessfully challenged sat on his jury, the court‘s assertedly erroneous denials of challenges for cause ―could not have affected [defendant‘s] right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury.‖ (People v. Mills, supra, at p. 187.) e. Assertedly erroneous excusals for cause Defendant contends the trial court erred by excusing Prospective Jurors M.F. and B.H. ―primarily based on their written answers to the juror questionnaire . . . without making any rehabilitative efforts similar to those made for‖ death18 Nor did he challenge for cause any of the alternate jurors; however, none participated in either the guilt or the penalty deliberations. 51 leaning prospective jurors. He contends the court‘s ―short and quick‖ questioning was designed to eliminate these prospective jurors as quickly as possible. Prospective Juror M.F. wrote on his questionnaire that he opposed the death penalty, explaining ―I feel by the time the accused is put to death he must [be] tried over & over again. Life imprisonment seems more economical.‖ He wrote he did not believe everyone convicted of the shotgun robbery murder of an elderly man should be put to death. He wrote he believed the death penalty was used too often, explaining ―Don‘t feel we need to keep having trials to keep someone alive after he‘s already been given the death sentence.‖ When asked to identify crimes for which the death penalty was appropriate, he wrote, ―I am opposed to the death penalty but I don‘t know how I would feel if the crime involved one of my family.‖ Asked to identify crimes for which that penalty was inappropriate, he wrote, ―death penalty is inappropriate I believe in life imprisonment.‖ He wrote if defendant were found guilty of first degree murder with special circumstances he would automatically vote for life in prison without parole because it is ―punishment enough,‖ and he would not want to know anything about defendant before deciding on the penalty. He wrote he did not believe in the ―eye for an eye‖ principle, and although he would accept the court‘s assurance that the sentence of life in prison without possibility of parole meant exactly that, the costs of imprisonment and appeals would be a consideration for him in deciding penalty because ―I read an article a few years back stating life imprisonment is actually more cost effective.‖ Tellingly, he wrote he would not listen open-mindedly to the evidence at the penalty phase and base his decision on such evidence and the court‘s instructions, and he could not set aside his personal feelings regarding what the penalty should be and follow the law because he ―can‘t see spending tax dollars on [appeals] for death penalty verdicts.‖ Finally, he wrote that he would 52 automatically vote against the death penalty and for life in prison without parole in every case, regardless of the evidence introduced at the penalty phase. As explained ante, at pages 40-41, on voir dire the court first asked M.F. whether it was correct that he opposed the death penalty, and he said ―Yes.‖ The court then asked whether, if defendant were found guilty of the charged crime and the special circumstances were found true, there were ―any circumstances‖ under which M.F. felt he would vote for the death penalty, and he responded, ―No, I don‘t.‖ Probing further, the court asked whether M.F. believed he could vote for the death penalty if the evidence showed ―the crime was exceedingly vicious and callous and horrible‖ and the defendant ―was a particularly vicious, brutal, horrible person,‖ and M.F. again responded, ―I don‘t believe I could.‖ The prosecutor challenged M.F. for cause, and the court excused him. Defendant did not object to the excusal; nor did he ask for the opportunity to question M.F.19 The record amply supports the trial court‘s conclusion that M.F.‘s views about the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror. M.F.‘s written responses on the juror questionnaire were consistent and unambiguous. He consistently wrote that he would automatically vote against the death penalty and in favor of life in prison without parole if the case reached the penalty phase, and that he could not set aside his personal 19 Because this case was tried before our decision in People v. McKinnon, supra, 52 Cal.4th 610, no objection in the trial court was required to preserve for review defendant‘s claim of error in excusals for cause. (See id., at pp. 635-643 [adopting, prospectively only, a requirement of a contemporaneous objection to an allegedly erroneous Witherspoon/Witt excusal to preserve the issue for appeal], overruling People v. Velasquez (1980) 26 Cal.3d 425, 443.) We may consider defendant‘s failure to object to these excusals, however, to the extent it supports our conclusion that the excusals were proper. (People v. McKinnon, supra, at pp. 644, 650, 651.) 53 opposition to the death penalty in deference to the law. On oral voir dire he confirmed there were no circumstances under which he could vote to impose the death penalty, even if the evidence showed the crime to be extremely aggravated and the defendant unredeemable. Because the court had the opportunity to assess M.F.‘s demeanor, we defer to its implicit assessment that his responses were credible. (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451; see Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9.) On this record, we have no trouble concluding the court did not err in finding M.F. would be substantially impaired in this case. Prospective Juror B.H. wrote on her questionnaire that she opposed the death penalty, but did not provide an explanation. She wrote that she did not believe everyone convicted of the shotgun robbery murder of an elderly man should get the death penalty. She wrote that she ―do[esn‘t] hear‖ of the death penalty being used too often. Asked to identify those crimes for which she believed the death penalty should be mandatory, possible or appropriate, she wrote ―No. ?‖ and ―None. ?‖ She also wrote, however, that the death penalty was inappropriate ―under no circumstances.‖ She wrote that she would not automatically vote for the death penalty if defendant were convicted of murder with special circumstances, but answered ―No ?‖ to the counterpart question asking whether she would vote automatically for life in prison without parole. She wrote that she would want to know ―nothing‖ about defendant before deciding on the penalty, that she did not believe in the ―eye for an eye‖ principle, and that she could accept the court‘s assurance that a sentence of life in prison without parole would mean exactly that. She wrote that the costs of incarceration for life would be a consideration in her penalty decision, explaining ―I feel it would be better [than] the death penalty.‖ She further wrote that she would vote against a verdict of guilt, or against finding the special circumstances true, in order to avoid having to decide the penalty because ―I feel against the death penalty.‖ She also wrote 54 that she would automatically vote against the death penalty in every case, regardless of the evidence, because ―[I‘m] against the death penalty.‖ Notably, however, B.H. wrote that she could set aside her personal feelings regarding what the penalty should be, listen to the evidence, and follow the law and the court‘s instructions. The voir dire of Prospective Juror B.H. proceeded as follows: The Court: ―All right. First of all, in answer to Question 9, you indicated that you oppose the death penalty, correct?‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―Yes.‖ The Court: ―And then in 10 and 11 . . . you were asked to explain your views on the death penalty. You left that blank.‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―Uh-huh.‖ The Court: ―And can you explain either, A, why you left it blank, or B, what your views are?‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―Because I didn‘t know what to put down.‖ The Court: ―Okay. So you just weren‘t sure what to say?‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―Uh-huh.‖ The Court: ―And have your views on the death penalty changed over time?‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―No.‖ The Court: ―I‘m not clear here on some of your answers exactly what you feel here. [¶] Is your feeling about the death penalty such that under no circumstances could you vote to approve it?‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―Under no circumstances.‖ The Court: ―None whatsoever?‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―None whatsoever.‖ 55 The Court: ―Okay. So if — even if this were the most horrible crime in history?‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―Even if.‖ The Court: ―And even if the defendant was the worst person in history, you could not — ‖ Prospective Juror B.H.: ―I don‘t believe in it.‖ The Court: ―All right. Thank you, ma‘am. You‘re excused.‖ Defense counsel did not object to the excusal; nor did he ask for the opportunity to question B.H. The record amply supports the trial court‘s conclusion that B.H.‘s views regarding the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of her duties as a juror in this case. Although her written questionnaire responses were somewhat ambiguous, her answers on oral voir dire made it quite clear that because of her beliefs, she was unwilling to vote to impose the death penalty under any circumstances, even if this were the most ―horrible crime in history.‖ Again, the court had the opportunity to assess B.H.‘s demeanor, and we defer to its implicit assessment that her responses were credible. (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451; see Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9.) No abuse of discretion appears. Defendant argues deference to the trial court‘s rulings on these challenges for cause is unwarranted because the court ruled primarily on the basis of the written questionnaires, without any in-depth questioning. He likens this case to Stewart, in which we concluded the trial court had erred by excusing five prospective jurors for cause based solely on their written responses to the juror questionnaire. (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 440-454.) In doing so, we did not defer to the trial court‘s assessment because it was ―informed by no more information than the cold record of the five prospective jurors‘ check marks 56 and brief handwritten comments — the exact same information‖ we had before us. (Stewart, supra, at p. 451; accord, United States v. Chanthadara (10th Cir. 2000) 230 F.3d 1237, 1270 [―because the trial court here was not in a position to observe [the prospective juror‘s] demeanor, it was in no better position than an appellate court to assess her answers‖].) Defendant argues the same reasoning applies here because the court‘s oral questioning was so brief. We disagree. Unlike in Stewart, here the court did not base its decision solely on M.F.‘s and B.H.‘s written responses to the questionnaire. Instead, the court questioned them orally and in person, outside the presence of other jurors. It thus had the opportunity to assess their demeanor, both before and during questioning, as well as the sincerity of their responses. Even a brief session of oral voir dire such as occurred here provides valuable information to the trial court that is unavailable from a review of the cold record. Here, the court had a sufficient opportunity to observe the prospective jurors‘ demeanor, tone of voice, apparent level of confidence, facial expressions and body language. (See People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 451; see also Uttecht, supra, 551 U.S. at p. 9; Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 426 [―deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror‖].) Moreover, as explained above, we defer to the trial court‘s implicit determination that additional questioning would not have rendered these prospective jurors eligible to serve. (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 190; People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 446.) We do so because that determination itself was based on all the circumstances, including the individual‘s questionnaire responses, his or her responses on oral voir dire, and his or her demeanor in court. It follows that we likewise must defer to the trial court‘s ultimate assessment of the credibility of statements the prospective jurors made in response to the court‘s questioning. 57 Defendant contends, nonetheless, that the evidence cited above failed to establish a proper basis for excusing M.F. and B.H. Relying on the proposition that prospective jurors ―who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve as jurors in capital cases so long as they state clearly that they are willing to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law‖ (Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176), he complains these prospective jurors were not given the opportunity to state they could set aside their personal beliefs. We disagree. Here, Prospective Juror M.F. twice wrote on his questionnaire that he would be unable to set aside his personal beliefs and apply the law. The trial court, having assessed M.F.‘s demeanor, was entitled to credit those responses. Although B.H. stated on her questionnaire that she could set aside her personal views, her clear answers on oral voir dire contradicted those statements. The trial court, ―aided as it undoubtedly was by its assessment of [B.H.‘s] demeanor, was entitled to resolve [any ambiguity] in favor of the State.‖ (Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at p. 434.) Defendant also notes that in Stewart we held the prospective jurors‘ ―bare written response[s]‖ were insufficient to establish a basis for exclusion for cause absent clarifying follow-up questioning ―during which the court would be able to further explain the role of jurors in the judicial system, examine the prospective juror‘s demeanor, and make an assessment of that person‘s ability to weigh a death penalty decision.‖ (People v. Stewart, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 448, italics added.) By this statement, we did not suggest that a trial court is in all instances required during oral questioning to explain the role of jurors in the judicial system. Rather, as explained above, trial courts possess considerable discretion to formulate the questions to be asked on voir dire and to tailor those questions to the needs of each individual prospective juror. (People v. Mills, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 189-190; People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 446; People v. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at pp. 419-425.) Here, the trial court 58 reasonably could have concluded an explanation of the role of jurors in the judicial system was not ―likely to render [M.F. and B.H.] qualified to sit in a capital case.‖ (People v. Mills, supra, at p. 190.) Finally, relying on People v. Heard (2003) 31 Cal.4th 946, defendant asserts the trial court ―could easily have followed up with additional questions designed to probe beneath the surface questionnaire responses,‖ and could have ―provided an explanation of the governing legal principles‖ and explored M.F.‘s and B.H.‘s ability to follow them. In Heard, we determined that a prospective juror‘s response to a single question on the questionnaire was insufficient to support his removal for cause when the juror later changed that response on oral voir dire after an explanation of the governing legal principles. (Id., at pp. 964965.) We further noted that the prospective juror‘s responses on oral voir dire did not support a conclusion that his views regarding the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror, and added, ―[i]f the trial court remained uncertain as to whether [Prospective Juror] H.‘s views concerning the death penalty would impair his ability to follow the law or to otherwise perform his duties as a juror, the court was free, of course, to follow up with additional questions.‖ (Id. at p. 965.) Here, by contrast, M.F. and B.H. were not excused based on questionnaire responses that were contradicted on voir dire. To the contrary, M.F.‘s written and oral responses were consistent. Although B.H.‘s oral responses contradicted some of her written ones, like M.F.‘s they were sufficient to remove any uncertainty from the trial court‘s mind regarding whether she was unfit to serve as a juror in this case, and also were adequate to support the court‘s conclusion that her views would substantially impair the performance of her duties. Under such circumstances, further questioning was not required. 59 f. Assertedly biased jury Defendant finally contends his jury was composed of biased and pro-death jurors. Relying principally on the questionnaire responses of the 12 sitting jurors, defendant contends that all either expressed views that would make the death penalty mandatory in all murder cases or had a strong bias in favor of the death penalty. He further asserts that four jurors had been crime victims or had family members who were crime victims, five had connections with law enforcement, two had ―opinions‖ regarding mental health testimony, and all 12 had personal experience with alcohol and/or drugs. Defendant did not challenge for cause any of the seated jurors; nor did he exhaust his peremptory challenges or object to the jury as constituted at the completion of jury selection. His claim therefore fails unless he can prove actual bias. (People v. Foster (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1301, 1325, citing Johnson v. Armontrout (8th Cir. 1992) 961 F.2d 748, 754.) ― ‗Actual bias‘ is ‗the existence of a state of mind on the part of the juror in reference to the case, or to any of the parties, which will prevent the juror from acting with entire impartiality, and without prejudice to the substantial rights of any party.‘ ‖ (People v. Foster, supra, at p. 1325, quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1)(C).) Our review of the record reflects none of the 12 jurors who decided defendant‘s case exhibited actual bias against him. Defendant relies primarily on the jurors‘ questionnaire responses in claiming they held disqualifying views on the death penalty and other matters. But as noted above (ante, at p. 32), the parties and the court in this case considered the questionnaire to be merely the starting point for the court‘s assessment of prospective jurors‘ fitness to serve. Here, the trial court questioned each of the jurors about most of the questionnaire responses defendant identifies as signifying bias, and both the defense and the prosecution were given the opportunity to question them about any additional areas of 60 concern.20 Each juror satisfied the court and apparently counsel on voir dire that he or she could be fair despite holding strong opinions on the death penalty, or having been the victim of a crime, or having relatives or friends in law enforcement, or having personal experience with or opinions about drugs, alcohol, or psychiatric testimony. Moreover, we have concluded above that the trial court did not exhibit a lack of impartiality in conducting voir dire, thus rejecting defendant‘s claim that the voir dire was insufficient to uncover juror bias. On this record, we find no evidence that any juror was actually biased against defendant.