Opinion ID: 1712255
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Extrinsic Evidence Attacking Credibility

Text: During the cross-examination of Williams, defense counsel attempted to attack Williams' credibility by introducing into evidence a handwritten letter, dated July 14, 1999. The letter, addressed to defendant, reads as follows: Big Glynn Say man what's up with you i know your head is f[____] up about everything. But don't worry about it man. When we go to court i will explan to them people the truth. that you an [sic] had nothing to do with them charge. Man i m sorry that i had to use you up like i did. please understand man when them people got that gun i know all them other things was going to come up on me about them murders. Man I an [sic] want them people to give me the electric chair so i did that too you so i can get this little sentent [sic] and run. Now that i got that i will let them know the truth man so don't worry alright how is your family doing i know they mad with me from being on you like i did but i will leave it up to you to explan what the play is about you jest try to understand man you boy had to do it like that to be kool and get back with me Your boy Funk In the course of his cross-examination of Williams, defense counsel handed the letter to Williams and asked him to examine it. Williams denied writing the letter, denied the letter is in his handwriting, and denied signing his name to the letter. Under questioning, Williams admitted his nickname is Funky Ron, but denied ever signing his name Funk. He also testified to his prison housing assignment and Department of Corrections number, both of which match the return address listed on the letter. The State objected, and the trial court apparently sustained the objection in an off-the-record bench conference. At the close of defendant's case, defense counsel again attempted to introduce the letter, moving to enter the letter into evidence along with several other documents admittedly signed by Williams, so the jury could compare the signatures and decide whether William actually signed the letter. The State again objected, arguing the letter was both unreliable and an untimely disclosed statement of alibi, and thus should be excluded under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 727. [21] The trial court took the matter under advisement, and later ruled the letter inadmissible under LSA-C.E. art. 403 and art. 607(D)(2), for the reasons stated in argument by the State. Defendant contends the trial court erred in excluding the letter, arguing it was clearly admissible as impeachment evidence attacking Williams' credibility. As an initial matter, we note that pursuant to LSA-C.E. art. 901(B)(3), authentication of handwriting may be made by non-expert opinion or by comparison with authenticated specimens by the trier of fact or by an expert witness. [22] Kid Gloves, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank of Jefferson Parish, 600 So.2d 779, 781 (La.App. 5 Cir.1992). Louisiana courts have long held the law permits the trier of fact to compare for itself known and contested handwriting samples. State v. Barrow, 31 La.Ann. 691, 692 (1879); State v. Walters, 25,587, pp. 9-10 (La.App. 2 Cir. 1/19/94), 630 So.2d 1371, 1376. Furthermore, Louisiana has long sanctioned the impeachment of a witness in a criminal trial by his or her prior inconsistent statements. LSA-C.E. art. 607(D)(2); State v. Owunta, 99-1569 (La.5/26/00), 761 So.2d 528, 529. If the witness has had a fair opportunity to admit the fact and has failed distinctly to do so, as provided in LSA-C.E. art. 613, extrinsic evidence of the statement is admissible, not to prove the truth of the matter asserted, but to establish the fact of contradiction for impeachment of the general credibility of the witness. Id.; State v. Burbank, 02-1407, p. 3 (La.4/23/04), 872 So.2d 1049, 1051. Of course, the admissibility of extrinsic evidence to impeach credibility of a witness is subject to the relevancy balancing test of LSA-C.E. art. 607(D)(2), which requires the court to determine whether the probative value of the evidence on the issue of credibility is substantially outweighed by the risks of undue consumption of time, confusion of the issues, or unfair prejudice. LSA-C.E. art. 607(D)(2); State v. Cousin, 96-2973, pp. 8-13 (La.4/14/98), 710 So.2d 1065, 1069-72. Defendant directs this court's attention to State v. Walters, supra . In that case, the prosecutor questioned the defendant's daughter about a letter she allegedly authored. The witness denied the signature on the letter was hers. The prosecutor then instructed the witness to sign her name on a blank piece of paper and offered the signatures into evidence, arguing they were relevant for impeachment purposes: if the witness would deny a signature that was arguably hers, the rest of her testimony might be unworthy of belief. Relying upon LSA-C.E. art. 607(D)(2), the court held the signatures were properly admitted into evidence for the jury to compare and then determine credibility of the witness. In this case, defense counsel presented the letter signed Your boy Funk to Williams, who denied the handwriting was his and the signature was his signature. Defense counsel then introduced several documents Williams acknowledged bore his signature. Pursuant to Walters, once Williams denied his signature on the letter, defense counsel was entitled to impeach Williams' testimony on the premise that if he would deny a signature that was arguably his, the rest of his testimony might be equally unworthy of belief. Nevertheless, the trial court refused to receive the letter in evidence, apparently on the court's determination that the letter was a surprise and therefore unduly prejudicial to the State. [23] The record, however, does not support that determination. To the contrary, the record reveals the State had prior knowledge of the letter's existence, as it had asked three days earlier that the letter be produced in discovery, arguing unsuccessfully to the trial court that it presented an alibi defense. Further, when defense counsel moved to introduce the letter, the State argued it was not admissible, but nonetheless indicated the State had a former FBI agent on standby, presumably to present expert testimony challenging the authenticity of the letter. Given the State's awareness of the letter and apparent preparations to meet this evidence, there is no basis for any conclusion by the trial court that the State was surprised by the letter and unduly prejudiced thereby. When combined with the letter's claim the defendant had nothing to do with them charge, the letter has the potential to be highly probative of the issue of Williams' credibility, or the lack thereof. Under such circumstances, the trial court's determination that undue consumption of time, confusion, or unfair prejudice substantially outweighed the letter's impact on Williams' credibility appears to be an abuse of discretion, and runs counter to established jurisprudence. Barrow, 31 La. Ann. at 692; Walters, 25,587 at 9-10, 630 So.2d at 1376. [24] Nevertheless, a trial error does not provide grounds for reversal of a defendant's conviction and sentence unless it affects substantial rights of the accused. LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 921; State v. Johnson, 94-1379, pp. 16-17 (La.11/27/95), 664 So.2d 94, 101-102. The test is whether there is a reasonable possibility the error might have contributed to the conviction and whether the court can declare a belief that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, supra ; State v. Green, supra . The reviewing court must find the verdict actually rendered by this jury was surely unattributable to the error. Johnson, 94-1379 at 16-17, 664 So.2d at 101-102; Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). In this case, the record is replete with evidence leading to this conclusion. Fleet Boats secretary Debbie Wilson testified that while she left work shortly before the murder, she had been at her desk when Robinson arrived at the office that day. From her vantage point, she could observe his car as he drove up, exited the car, and entered the office. She did not see him speak to anyone in the parking lot, and he did not have any visitors during the entire time she was present in the office. Nevertheless, police found defendant's fingerprints on a cigarette pack in Robinson's office. Further, defendant stipulated police found a Bryco .380 pistol in his possession. A ballistics expert matched this gun to a bullet recovered from the scene. Additionally, a post office employee reported she observed two men in a gray Chevrolet pull into the parking lot of the post office just before the shooting. Williams testified he waited in the post office parking lot while defendant entered the Fleet Boats office and robbed and shot Robinson and Jackson. Finally, although Jackson was unable to identify defendant in a line-up, he did testify he remembered Williams as an employee. However, he did not identify Williams as the job applicant who approached him that afternoon and later robbed and shot Robinson and him. Given this evidence, we find that any error in the exclusion of the letter was clearly harmless. [25] Because the trial court did not err in excluding the Corning Laboratories form indicating that Williams had tested positive for marijuana while employed at Fleet Boats or the hospital records suggesting that Robinson was shot by a disgruntled employee, and because any error in the exclusion of the letter allegedly written by Williams was clearly harmless, the defendant was not deprived of the opportunity to present a defense. The trial court's evidentiary rulings do not undermine the reliability of the jury's verdict in this case. Defendant's assignments of error Numbers 2, 3, 4, and 5 lack merit.