Opinion ID: 786420
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: De minimis authority

Text: 12 Unless Congress has been extraordinarily rigid, there is likely a basis for an implication of de minimis authority to provide exemption when the burdens of regulation yield a gain of trivial or no value. Ala. Power Co. v. Costle, 636 F.2d 323, 360-61 (D.C.Cir.1979). Determination of when matters are truly de minimis naturally will turn on the assessment of particular circumstances, and the agency will bear the burden of making the required showing. Id. at 360. 13 The EPA argues that the Part D NSR program is inapplicable to attainment areas, so that the requirement disappears upon redesignation. After redesignation, Part D NSR is replaced by a PSD, another permitting program designed to ensure maintenance of the NAAQS in attainment areas. Compare 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(c)(5), 7503 (requiring NSR for SIPs governing nonattainment areas) with 42 U.S.C. § 7471 (requiring PSD in SIPs governing attainment areas). Therefore, requiring NSR approval prior to redesignation would provide de minimis environmental benefit. 14 The petitioners argue that that the NSR requirement is rigid, and the EPA's action was a departure from the statute. They argue that the court in Alabama Power made it clear that the focus of de minimis authority is whether a statute's literal terms lead to absurd or futile results. Id. at 360 n. 89 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). They argue that the clear Congressional mandate in this case does not lead to an absurd result and that the EPA did not have authority to depart. They urge that requiring an NSR program in Cleveland furthers the Act's purpose because it provides much greater assurance than does a PSD program that the area will maintain its NAAQS. 15 It is not necessary in this case to reach the question of whether the EPA exceeded or misstated its de minimis authority to depart from the statute. The EPA approved Ohio's Part D NSR program in a final rule issued January 10, 2003. Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans; Ohio, 68 Fed.Reg. 1366 (Jan. 10, 2003). The deadline for challenges to the rule expired March 11, 2003, and none were filed. If we were to remand the redesignation to the EPA, it would result in a duplicative rulemaking to redesignate the Cleveland area once again. The NSR program would not be implemented as approved, as NSR programs are only required in nonattainment areas. Under the doctrine of prudential mootness, we decline to reach the specific issue of whether Ohio's NSR program should have been fully approved prior to redesignation as the circumstances have changed, and we can no longer afford petitioners any meaningful relief on this point. See S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Smith, 110 F.3d 724, 727 (10th Cir.1997); Chamber of Commerce of United States of America v. United States Dep't of Energy, 627 F.2d 289, 291 (D.C.Cir.1980) (In some circumstances, a controversy, not actually moot, is so attenuated that considerations of prudence and comity for coordinate branches of government counsel the court to stay its hand, and to withhold relief it has the power to grant.). 16 However, the approval of Ohio's NSR program does not moot the rest of the issues on appeal. Petitioners argue that because of the belated approval, the EPA may now claim that the NSR program was not contained in the implementation plan before redesignation, and is therefore not a required maintenance contingency measure within the meaning of § 175A. 3 Our decision in this case declining to address the propriety of redesignation absent an approved NSR program is in no way an invitation for the EPA to circumvent the mandates of the CAA. The NSR should have been approved before redesignation, and for the purposes of addressing petitioners' claims regarding § 175A, we will treat it as if it had been. 17