Opinion ID: 2974065
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Challenge

Text: Hibbler argues that the government’s peremptory challenge of a black juror because of her youth violated her equal protection rights. Specifically, he contends that (1) the explanation the government offered did not relate to the case, so it was insufficient to rebut the presumption of a race-based motivation; and (2) the government’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse all jurors under age 24 resulted in the creation of a distinct group of excluded jurors, which differentiates this case from others that have found no equal protection violation for exclusion on the basis of age. Hibbler raised a general challenge to the government’s use of age as a factor in exercising its peremptory challenges, so we will review the issues relating to the use of a juror’s age as a basis for exclusion de novo, as they are questions of law, and review the district court’s determination that the government’s exercise of peremptory challenges was not based on race for clear error, as it is a question of fact. See United States v. Mahan, 190 F.3d 416, 423 (6th Cir. 1999). Exercising peremptory challenges based on the race of prospective jurors violates those potential jurors’ equal protection rights, and the party opposing the party exercising the challenges in that discriminatory way has standing to litigate those jurors’ rights. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-16 (1991). Case law is clear that the United States is bound by the same standards as the States with regard to equal protection rights through the “equal protection component” of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. See United States v. Angel, 355 F.3d 462, 471 (6th Cir. 2004); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954). 8 To raise a successful Batson challenge, a party must first make out a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) the dismissed juror is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) there is evidence the party is using peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the removed juror’s race; and (3) these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the party has used the practice to remove potential jurors on account of the jurors’ race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 59 (1992). If the opponent of the peremptory challenge makes a prima facie showing, the other party must come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging the juror. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. This explanation does not need to be persuasive or even plausible, so long as it is race-neutral. United States v. Forrest, 402 F.3d 678, 687 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing McCurdy v. Montgomery County, Ohio, 240 F.3d 512, 521 (6th Cir. 2001)). Once this burden of production is met, the opponent of the peremptory challenge must show that the proffered reason is a pretext for discrimination. Id. The burden of persuasion is at all times on the party opposing the use of the peremptory challenge. Id. The district court’s findings that the proffered reason for the challenge is race-neutral and that the party opposing the strike has failed to show that the proffered reason is pretextual are factual findings that are based at least in part on credibility determinations, and we give those findings great deference. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 365 (1991).
The district court did not determine whether Hibbler had made out a prima facie case, but proceeded directly to the question of whether Hibbler had shown that the government’s race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge was pretextual. Whether Hibbler made out a prima facie case is therefore moot, see Jackson, 347 F.3d at 604 (“once a party offers a race-neutral explanation 9 for a peremptory challenge and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant [has] made a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination becomes moot”), but we note in passing that we believe that Hibbler would have been able to do so. With the dismissal of Harris and Holmes, the government had used all four of its peremptory challenges on black jurors, and only one black juror remained on the panel. This at least raises an inference of a racial motivation. The government put its reasons for dismissing Harris and Holmes on the record, stating that it had reason to believe that Holmes might be biased against the Memphis Police Department and that it felt Harris was young and had little life experience. Hibbler’s only response was that although neither the Supreme Court nor this court has held that age is an impermissible factor for purposes of a peremptory challenge – and therefore may not be the basis for a Batson challenge – age is not a legitimate race-neutral reason for peremptorily challenging a black juror. It is clear that age, as a general matter, is not a prohibited reason for excluding a juror with a peremptory challenge. See United States v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071, 1075 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. McCoy, 848 F.2d 743, 745 (6th Cir. 1988). Moreover, age does not correlate with any particular race more closely than with other races, so as to act as a proxy for race. See Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 769 (1995) (per curiam). The district court’s finding that Hibbler failed to rebut the government’s proffered explanation in this regard was not erroneous.
Hibbler’s second argument is based on language from Batson, stating that the party making the contested peremptory challenge “must articulate a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (emphasis added). Hibbler contends that this creates a 10 requirement that the party relate the proffered reason to the facts or circumstances of the particular case; specifically, he argues that the government had to show how Harris’s youth and inexperience would impair her “ability to impartially weigh the evidence and render a verdict in this case.” The Supreme Court expressly rejected this very argument in Purkett, stating that this language in Batson was meant only to “refute the notion that a prosecutor could satisfy his burden of production by merely denying that he had a discriminatory motive or by merely affirming his good faith.” 514 U.S. at 769. This argument is meritless.
Finally, Hibbler argues that even though the courts have uniformly held that parties are free to challenge jurors based solely on their age, one of the reasons for this holding is that a “young person” is not part of a “discrete and insular” group, which is required for protection under the Equal Protection Clause. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 352 (1987); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977). As we noted in Maxwell, “young adults” do not “comprise a distinct group.” 160 F.3d at 1075 (quoting Ford v. Seabold, 841 F.2d 677, 682 (6th Cir. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Hibbler argues here that by exercising a peremptory challenge to excuse a 23-yearold, but not exercising peremptory challenges to excuse two 24-year-olds, the government has created a distinct group comprising those 23 years old and younger. This, he claims, is different from a group consisting of all “young adults.” We need not address here the question of whether for purposes of an equal protection claim based on age a line can legitimately be drawn between young people who are 23 years old and young people who are 24 years old, because there is no evidence that in this case the government actually drew such a line or treated the two age groups differently. It was no more the government 11 than Hibbler that drew the line between 23-year-olds and 24-year-olds; it was Hibbler, after all, who exercised peremptory challenges to exclude Hall and Ray, the two 24-year-olds. Moreover, because there was only one juror in the venire within the 23-year-old and younger group, there could be no showing that the government followed a pattern of selecting jurors within the allegedly protected group for peremptory challenges, which would raise an inference of differing treatment. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97. Finally, the government did not rely solely on Harris’s age in excusing her, but also relied on her lack of employment and life experience in general, and government counsel stated on the record that she would have challenged one of the 24-year-old jurors on similar grounds had counsel had enough peremptory challenges remaining. There is simply no evidence that the government purposely treated the 23-year-old juror differently from the 24-year-old jurors based on the one-year difference in their respective ages. See Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 818 (6th Cir. 2005); Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (disparate impact on a group is not sufficient; where disparate impact is shown, the party must show that the government singled the group out for differing treatment because of, rather than in spite of, the disparate impact). Hibbler has not shown any error in the district court’s ruling.
The Supreme Court has made clear that “the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.” Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. The district court had before it at the time it made its decision only the government’s proffered raceneutral reasons for striking Harris and Holmes, and nothing from Hibbler to show that the reasons 12 given were a pretext or that the real reason was racially motivated. Because it was Hibbler’s duty to do so as the “opponent of the strike,” the district court did not err in its determinations.