Opinion ID: 853121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bloody Gauze on the Trash Can

Text: Warner next argues that police violated the Fourth Amendment by improperly seizing evidence from a trash can next to his house and by searching his premises with a warrant not supported by probable cause. In the hours following Rokop's murder, police learned that Warner and Rokop had dated a year earlier. Rokop's acquaintances suggested that Warner was someone who might have reason to harm her. Police twice went to Warner's residence seeking to question him about the murder. On the initial visit, the police left a message with Warner's girlfriend. On their second visit, they knocked on the front and side doors but received no answer. Warner kept his trash can near the side door; it was partially concealed from view by a three-foot, L-shaped fence. (R. at 1633, 1639.) One policeman noticed a wad of gauze that was stained reddish-brown sitting atop the can. (R. at 1634.) Both officers who were on the scene stated that based on their experience, they believed the gauze was blood-stained. (R. at 87, 1649.) Police called an evidence technician to Warner's home to test the stained gauze; it tested positive for blood. (R. at 1636.) Based upon this information, the police obtained a search warrant and discovered blood droplets in the house and bloody clothing hidden in the trash. Tests revealed Rokop's blood on the clothing. Over Warner's motion to suppress and timely objections, the State used all of this evidence at trial. The Fourth Amendment protects [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Searches and seizures conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendmentsubject only to a few specifically established and well delineated exceptions. Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 372, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993) (citations omitted). One such exception is the plain view exception, which provides that if police are lawfully in a position from which to view the object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant. Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 135-37, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). This case fits within the plain view exception. The police were lawfully in a position to view the evidence. After twice finding Warner away from home, they knocked on the side door, and from there saw the gauze in plain view. The police were legitimately on the premise to question Warner as part of their initial investigation. The plain view doctrine is applicable when police are not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently come across an incriminating object. Id. at 135, 110 S.Ct. 2301 (citations omitted). Moreover, the incriminating character of the evidence was immediately apparent to the police. Upon viewing the gauze, both believed that the gauze was soaked with blood. (R. at 87, 1649.) Having viewed the evidence in a public place from a lawful vantage point and having immediately recognized its incriminating character, the police properly seized the bloody gauze. Warner's claim that the search warrant used to discover his bloody clothing hidden in the garbage was not supported by probable cause is also without merit. To be valid, a warrant and its underlying affidavit must comply with the Fourth Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as Indiana constitutional and statutory law. Gray v. State, 758 N.E.2d 519, 521 (Ind. 2001). The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth before him ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). As the reviewing court, our duty under the Fourth Amendment is to determine whether the magistrate issuing the warrant had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Id. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317. While we give significant deference to the magistrate's determination, our search for substantial basis must focus on whether reasonable inferences drawn from the totality of the evidence support the determination. Houser v. State, 678 N.E.2d 95, 99 (Ind.1997). When they sought the search warrant, police had the following information: (1) a bloody crime scene in which the victim's jugular vein was partially severed, (R. at 12); (2) statements from Rokop's friends that Rokop and Warner had dated a year earlier, (R. at 12-13, 1628-29, 1647); and (3) stained gauze from Warner's residence that tested positive for the presence of blood, (R. at 13, 1636). [4] Given this information, the judge had a substantial basis for concluding that a fair probability existed that contraband or evidence of the crime would be found at Warner's residence. The court properly denied Warner's motion to suppress the evidence collected under the search warrant.