Opinion ID: 2556168
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is There a Statutory Right to Seek Judicial Review in This Case and, If So, from What Governmental Action?

Text: A petition for judicial review proceeding in a circuit court must be authorized specially by a legislative enactment, be it a public local law or a State statute. [18] See Dvorak v. Anne Arundel County Ethics Comm'n, 400 Md. 446, 450, 929 A.2d 185, 187-88 (2007) ([A]n examination of the relevant Maryland Code provisions and the legislative enactments of the subject local governmental body is necessary to determine whether, in a given case, there is a right of appeal or judicial review from the final decision of an administrative body.); Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 273, 884 A.2d 1171, 1189 (2005) ([I]n order for an administrative agency's action properly to be before this Court (or any court) for judicial review, there . . . must be a legislative grant of the right to seek judicial review.). There is no provision in the State Critical Area Program regulatory scheme authorizing judicial review of either the local or State decisions to amend a county Critical Area plan or program. Thus, in the present case, the only possible legislative source purporting to supply such special authorization is the Kent County Policy, seemingly adopted initially by resolution of the County Commissioners on 9 March 1999, and amended by resolution on 1 December 2009. Assuming that the Policy constitutes (or is the equivalent of) a public local law or ordinance sufficient to grant authority for a judicial review action, [19] we must determine from what governmental actionlocal or Statedoes the Policy grant the right to seek judicial review. Put simply, courts generally will review only a final decision of an agency. [20] See generally Rochvarg, supra § 4.5, at 110. An action is considered final when it dispose[s] of the case by deciding all question[s] of law and fact and leave[s] nothing further for the administrative body to decide. Willis v. Montgomery County, 415 Md. 523, 534, 3 A.3d 448, 455 (2010); see Arroyo v. Bd. of Educ. of Howard County, 381 Md. 646, 666 n. 16, 851 A.2d 576, 588 n. 16 (2004). In the administrative context, more specifically, we have stated that not every administrative order which determines rights and liabilities, or from which legal consequences flow, is final and thus subject to judicial review. Generally, to be final, an administrative order must also leave nothing further for the agency to do. Holiday Spas v. Montgomery County Human Relations Comm'n, 315 Md. 390, 396, 554 A.2d 1197, 1200 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). Where, however, any remaining administrative procedures or processes are deemed ministerial, the initial agency determination is reviewable immediately. See, e.g., Foley v. K. Hovnanian at Kent Island, LLC, 410 Md. 128, 159, 978 A.2d 222, 241 (2009); City of Bowie v. Prince George's County, 384 Md. 413, 443, 863 A.2d 976, 993 (2004). [21] Applying these principles to the facts of the present case is a rather straightforward exercise. Under the Policy as it existed as of 9 March 1999 and as amended on 1 December 2009, it seems clear that effectively Petitioners, at most, had a facial right to seek judicial review of only the final approval action by the Commission. [22] This is so because, at all times, the Policy stated expressly that no local approval action was effective until the Commission gave its approval (putting aside the potential need to reconcile any differences between the local and State approvals, such as exist in the present case). Further, the Commission may override ultimately the County's decision to approve a growth allocation request. In effect, the Commission's action may replace and supercede, or at least subsume, the local action where both actions, at their core, represent an approval. It cannot be said, then, that there is nothing further for the administrative body [here, the Commission] to decide or that the Commission's action on the growth allocation request is merely ministerial. Accordingly, the County's approval of the growth allocation request was not a final and appealable action, and, thus, the Court of Special Appeals was correct to dismiss Petitioners' appeal, although the intermediate appellate court should have gone further and vacated the Circuit Court's judgment (on the merits of the County's approval) and remanded the matter to the Circuit Court with directions to dismiss Petitioners' judicial review action. [23] , [24]