Opinion ID: 174766
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: RealtyU's Right to Use the ASR Marks before July 12, 2006

Text: Appellants contend that RealtyU never had any right to use the ASR marks, notwithstanding any acquiescence that may have occurred after July 12, 2006. The district court's finding of consent is a factual determination that we review for clear error. See Fremont Gen. Corp., 514 F.3d at 1020 (noting that a district court's factual findings established consent and could not be overturned without a showing that the finding was clearly erroneous); Gonzalez-Caballero v. Mena, 251 F.3d 789, 795 (9th Cir.2001) (noting that a district court's factual finding of consent was not clearly erroneous); PIC Realty Corp. v. Evans, 605 F.2d 476, 483 (9th Cir.1979) (agreeing with the district court that the bankruptcy court's finding of no consent was not clearly erroneous). A district court's finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is (1) `illogical,' (2) `implausible,' or (3) without `support in inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.' Hinkson, 585 F.3d at 1262. The district court found explicitly that SAC had permission or an implied license to use the ASR marks from September 8, 2005 until July 12, 2006. Although it did not make such an explicit finding with respect to RealtyU, because it declined to award damages based on RealtyU's use of the ASR marks, it must have decided implicitly that RealtyU also had consent of some type to use the ASR marks before July 12, 2006. In addition, `[w]e may affirm on any basis supported by the record, whether or not relied upon by the district court.' Fremont Gen., 514 F.3d at 1020 n. 8 (citation omitted). The district court determined that Kennedy signed agreements with SAC in September 2005 and he and his company promptly began to cooperate with RealtyU and/or SAC to market his ASR program. It also found expressly that the purpose of Swanepoel's proposed business venture was to provide Appellants with access to the RealtyU affiliates across the country and the large number of students they provide. Thus, the purpose of the agreement between KCREE and SAC was to allow RealtyU and its affiliates to use the ASR marks. This determination is neither illogical nor implausible: in order for RealtyU to provide SAC with ASR student fees, it had to use the ASR marks. However, Appellants contend that RealtyU had consent to use the marks only if it paid a licensing fee for that use  a fee that should have been paid to SAC. While the district court did not make an explicit factual determination as to this point, its implicit conclusion that RealtyU or its affiliates did not have to pay a licensing fee is supported by inferences that may be drawn from the record. Kennedy testified at trial as follows: Q: [Counsel] If I understand what you're saying, you're testifying that you made an agreement and memorialized it in the stock purchase agreement that Kennedy Center itself would not have to pay the thousand dollar a year licensing fee, right? A: [Kennedy] Likewise Q: And neither would RealtyU? A: That's correct. [ ] (ER 31:7-13.) Kennedy continued to explain: Q: So if I understand things, neither Kennedy Center nor Seller Agency Council are [ sic ] required to pay the annual licensing fee? A: That is correct. Q: What about RealtyU affiliate schools? A: I believe that it's basically that it's up to RealtyU. I mean, they don't have to charge the licensing fee if they don't want to. The actual annual license fee. Q: So Seller Agency Counsel could waive the license fee for the RealtyU school? A: That is correct. That is correct. (ER 32:6-16.) The district court's factual determination that Appellants consented to RealtyU's use of ASR marks prior to July 12, 2006 is not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, RealtyU may be liable only for infringement occurring after it received the cease-and-desist letter on July 12, 2006, and then only if Appellants did not consent or acquiesce to that use.