Opinion ID: 2366561
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Child Interview

Text: [¶ 11] Mother asserts the district court incorrectly interpreted KES as prohibiting it from interviewing the child once Father objected. Father asserts that once he objected to the interview Mother had the burden of suggesting alternative procedures for presenting the child's preference. He contends she failed to meet that burden and simply failed to follow through with putting the child's preference before the district court. [¶ 12] This Court has long held that a district court judge may interview a child to determine his or her preference for living with one or the other parent, provided that the child is of sufficient age to understand the effect of expressing a preference. Douglas v. Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 331 P.2d 840, 844 (1958), superseded by statute as recognized in In Interest of MKM, 792 P.2d 1369 (Wyo.1990). See also, Tytler v. Tytler, 15 Wyo. 319, 338, 89 P. 1, 6 (Wyo.1907). When a district court interviews a child, its decision should state the preference the child expressed and the extent to which it took the child's preference into consideration in arriving at a custody determination. Douglas, 331 P.2d at 845. District courts should receive young children's statements with caution, keeping in mind that they may be easily influenced. Id. A child's expression of a preference is not conclusive. Id. at 844. Rather, a child's wishes are only one factor to be considered in determining custody. Curless v. Curless, 708 P.2d 426, 429 (Wyo. 1985). However, consideration of a child's wishes aids the district court in making a custodial determination which is in the child's best interests. Love v. Love, 851 P.2d 1283, 1290 (Wyo.1993), quoting Yates v. Yates, 702 P.2d 1252, 1255 (Wyo.1985). A child's welfare is not served if his or her wishes are not considered by the district court. Love, 851 P.2d at 1291. Though the child's preference is but one factor to consider, his or her preference should receive serious consideration. Id. [¶ 13] In cases like the present one where one parent objects to an interview, we have recognized due process implications if an interview is conducted without fashioning procedures to protect the parents' rights to be apprised of all of the evidence upon which the custody determination is based and have an opportunity to challenge or explain the child's statements. KES, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d at 784. In KES, over the mother's objection, the district court conducted a private interview with a child. On appeal, mother claimed the district court abused its discretion in conducting the interview. We noted the procedure in place then, which allowed private interviews between a judge and a child in a custody proceedings but required the decision letter to reflect the child's preference and the weight it was given, did not protect the parents' due process rights. We said: Under the current procedure, parents have no way of knowing the contents of the interview or of challenging the manner in which the interview was conducted or the reliability of the information revealed therein. In order to ameliorate this problem, we hold that if one or both parents object to a private interview between the child and judge in a custody proceeding, no such interview should take place. Rather, the parties or the district court should fashion a suitable alternate procedure for obtaining evidence of the child's custody preference. In some instances, in-court testimony may be appropriate. An interview with the child in chambers, either with counsel present or recorded in some fashion, may also suffice. Additionally, a neutral third party may be appointed with the consent of the parties to speak with the child and to report to the court or to the parties. Id., ¶¶ 19-20, 107 P.3d at 785. We expressly stated the examples of procedures we provided in KES were not intended to be exhaustive. To the contrary: Because each custody case involves unique parties and circumstances, the parties or the district court may fashion any procedure that effectively protects the parents' due process rights and minimizes the stress and trauma to the child. In doing so, the balance must weigh in favor of the child's best interests. Consequently, if the parties do not consent to a reasonable method of obtaining evidence of the child's preference, the court may conduct an interview in chambers, with counsel present, and with attention paid to the method most likely to preserve the parents' right to due process under the circumstances. Id., ¶ 20, 107 P.3d at 785 (emphasis added). We held the district court abused its discretion when it conducted a private interview with the child despite the mother's objection, reversed the custody determination and remanded for further proceedings. [¶ 14] As the above discussion makes clear, we did not hold in KES that no interview may occur unless both parents agree. Rather, we held that when a parent does not consent, the parties or the court should fashion a procedure that protects the parents' rights while minimizing the stress and trauma to the child with the balance weighing in favor of the child's best interests. Id. In the event the parents are not able to agree on a reasonable method of obtaining evidence of the child's preference, the district court may conduct an in-chamber interview with counsel present and with attention to protecting the parents' due process rights. Id. [¶ 15] In the present case, the result of Father's objection was that the district court did not consider the son's preference. That is contrary to the rule in Wyoming that the child's expression of a preference must be considered. The appropriate course of action upon Father's objection was for the parties or the district court to come up with a suitable procedure for obtaining the evidence of his preference. Mother suggested an in-chambers interview with counsel present. If Father objected to her suggestion and the parties were unable to agree on another reasonable method of obtaining the evidence, the district court could have conducted the interview in chambers with counsel, recorded the interview, required the child to testify in court, appointed a neutral third party to speak with the child and report back to the parties and the court, or fashioned another suitable procedure for presenting the evidence. By not fashioning any procedure, not obtaining the evidence and consequently not considering the child's preference, the district court abused its discretion.