Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The name and case number of all murder complaints and informations filed in the Sacramento Municipal Court and the Sacramento Superior Court, respectively, in the last seven years.

Text: (b) A detailed description of how the prosecution generally decided to plead the aforementioned category of cases (i.e., how it chose to allege either second degree murder, first degree murder without special circumstances, or first degree murder with special circumstances). (c) A detailed description of how the prosecution generally decided what to allow the defendants to plead guilty to in the aforementioned category of cases. (d) Copies of all written matter of any sort that discuss or describe how murder cases should be plead [ sic ] or how murder cases should be resolved by plea. (e) The nature of the murder charges in the complaints and informations noted in paragraph 1 [ sic ] above (e.g., second degree murder, first degree murder without special circumstances, or first degree murder with special circumstances), and the plea bargain last offered by the prosecution to the defendant in each of these cases. Defendant made his motion under the United States and California Constitutions  specifically, the cruel and unusual punishments clauses of the Eighth Amendment and article I, section 17; the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, sections 7 and 15; and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7. Defendant based his motion on a claim to the following effect: the policies (if any) and practices of the Sacramento County District Attorney with regard to the filing of special circumstance allegations and/or the seeking of the death penalty were, or at least might be, arbitrary and capricious. Subsequently, he purported to expand the ground of the motion to include a claim that these policies and practices revealed, or at least suggested, invidious discrimination  for example, against defendants, like himself, charged with the murder of a Caucasian victim. (As noted, defendant himself is Caucasian.) Defendant sought the information and material described above in order to sensibly present a motion to dismiss the special circumstances alleged herein, or to prohibit the prosecution from seeking death. In aid of the showing he set out to make in support of his motion, defendant requested that the court order an evidentiary hearing, at which he intended to call, among other witnesses, the Sacramento County District Attorney and present and former members of his office. The People opposed defendant's motion for discovery and his request for an evidentiary hearing. After argument, the court denied both the motion and the request. Defendant now contends that by so doing, the court erred. (25) A ruling on a motion to compel discovery  like that here  is subject to review for abuse of discretion. (See, e.g., Hill v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 812, 816-823 [112 Cal. Rptr. 257, 518 P.2d 1353, 95 A.L.R.3d 820].) (26) We find no abuse of discretion in this case. Of course, the party moving to compel discovery must provide, inter alia, a plausible justification for the information and/or material he seeks. ( Ballard v. Superior Court (1966) 64 Cal.2d 159, 167 [49 Cal. Rptr. 302, 410 P.2d 838, 18 A.L.R.3d 1416]; accord, Griffin v. Municipal Court (1977) 20 Cal.3d 300, 306 [142 Cal. Rptr. 286, 571 P.2d 997].) The court could reasonably have concluded that defendant failed in this regard. Further, it could reasonably have concluded that he could not have supplied what was lacking after an evidentiary hearing. To be sure, the facts that he proffered showed that the Sacramento County District Attorney treated different defendants differently. But those facts were simply insufficient to support a claim that the district attorney's policies and practices might be arbitrary and capricious or invidiously discriminatory. Defendant argues to the contrary, but he is unpersuasive. For example, he attacks the basis of the court's ruling. In denying his motion, the court stated that it was doing so solely under Kennan v. Superior Court (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 576 [177 Cal. Rptr. 841]. [13] Defendant says that Kennan is factually inapposite. He is wrong. The record here, as summarized above, and the record there, as described on pages 579 to 581 of 126 Cal. App.3d, are similar. Defendant then says that Kennan is legally unsound. Here too he is wrong. Contrary to his assertion, that opinion does not hold that prosecutorial policies and practices relating to the death penalty are immune from federal or state constitutional scrutiny. Given a reasonable reading, it simply stands for the unobjectionable proposition that the exercise of discretion in this area does not amount per se to a constitutional violation. (Compare People v. Kennan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 504-507 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081] [stating at p. 505 that [a]s the opinion in Kennan v. Superior Court noted, prosecutorial discretion to select those eligible cases in which the death penalty will actually be sought does not in and of itself evidence an arbitrary and capricious capital punishment system or offend principles of equal protection, due process, or cruel and/or unusual punishment under either the federal or state charter].)