Opinion ID: 185896
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Contents of the Bid Package: A Discretionary Decision?

Text: 24 This case poses the following question: does WMATA's discretion to select a particular project design encompass the discretion to determine the content of that project's bid package? 10 On appeal, KiSKA answers this question in the negative, arguing that (1) WMATA lacks the discretion to conceal and/or misrepresent material information from contractors and (2) such tortious conduct does not involve the exercise of a `policy judgment.' Br. for Appellant at 20. 11 25 Applying the two-stage analysis outlined above, see supra Part II.A.1, we find that KiSKA has failed to cite any statute, regulation or policy that specifically prescribes the content of WMATA's IFBs. Unable to identify support for its position within the four corners of the WMATA Compact, KiSKA relies upon two external sources of authority to argue that WMATA failed, in this case, to follow the prescribed course of conduct: (1) contract cases that recognize a government agency's duty to disclose pertinent facts to contractors with whom the agency contracts, Br. for Appellant at 23-24, and (2) a Federal Transit Administration (FTA) circular providing that all contract solicitations must `[i]ncorporate a clear and accurate description of the technical requirements for the material, product, or service to be procured,' id. at 24 (quoting JA 1068). 26 KiSKA maintains that the general obligation to abide by the covenant of good faith and fair dealing specifically prescribed the contents of the bid package, requiring WMATA to disclose to KiSKA all material information. We disagree. Although the covenant of good faith and fair dealing undoubtedly constrains WMATA's behavior within the context of its contractual relationships, KiSKA's misrepresentation claims sound in tort, not contract. Given that section 80 distinguishes between tort claims and contract claims, affording a limited waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the former and a complete waiver of sovereign immunity with respect to the latter, D.C.CODE ANN. § 9-1107.01(80), we must agree with the district court's conclusion that the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is not the kind of specific dictate that renders WMATA's acts merely ministerial, First Order at 6 (emphasis in original). Cf. Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1217 (holding that employment provisions of WMATA Compact hardly constrain WMATA's discretion over whom it will employ and how it will train and supervise employees). 27 The FTA circular likewise fails to circumscribe WMATA's discretion with respect to the contents of the bid package. 12 A regulation constrains discretion if it `specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow' such that `the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.' Gaubert, 499 U.S. at 322, 111 S.Ct. at 1273 (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1958-59, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988)). Although the FTA circular obligates WMATA to [i]ncorporate a clear and accurate description of the technical requirements for the material, product, or service to be procured, JA 1068, the circular does not specifically prescribe a course of action for WMATA to follow in specifying the contents of a bid package. In our view, an administrative ukase that mandates only clarity and accuracy does not constrain WMATA's discretion with respect to the particular documents to include within a bid package. Cf. Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1023 (D.C.Cir.2000). Given KiSKA's failure to produce persuasive authority to the contrary, we conclude that WMATA had broad discretion to determine the contents of the tunnel project's bid package. 13 28 Next, KiSKA argues that WMATA cannot satisfy the second step of the sovereign immunity inquiry, i.e., whether the exercise of such discretion is grounded in social, economic, or political policy. Cope, 45 F.3d at 448 (internal quotations omitted). As we recognized in Cope, [d]etermining whether a decision is `essentially political, social, or economic' is admittedly difficult, since nearly every government action is, at least to some extent, subject to `policy analysis.' Id. (quoting Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 800 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C.Cir.1986)). `Budgetary constraints,' we observed, `underlie virtually all economic activity.' Id. at 449 (quoting ARA Leisure Servs. v. United States, 831 F.2d 193, 196 (9th Cir. 1987)). 29 To avoid the exception swallowing the rule, we have held that the mere association of a decision with regulatory concerns is not enough [to render that decision `discretionary']; exempt decisions are those `fraught with ... public policy considerations.' Id. (quoting Sami v. United States, 617 F.2d 755, 767 (D.C.Cir.1979)). We therefore concluded in Cope that [t]he mere presence of choice—even if that choice involves whether money should be spent—does not trigger the [discretionary function] exemption. Id. 30 WMATA argues that its employees had to, and did, exercise judgment when they decided that the [bid package] would not benefit from [the] inclusion of superseded, discarded design concepts. Br. for Appellee at 31. Citing the court's decision in Red Lake, WMATA maintains that its decisions regarding the manner in which its policies are implemented or enforced are themselves discretionary because such decisions directly affect the feasibility and practicality of the program, and require the agency to establish priorities for the accomplishment of its policy objectives by balancing the objectives sought to be obtained against such practical considerations as staffing and funding. Id. at 31-32 (quoting Red Lake, 800 F.2d at 1196 (internal quotations omitted)). WMATA thus reasons that its decision not to include thousands of pages of draft or superseded design documents in the bid package is a perfect example of such discretion. Id. at 32. 31 While KiSKA's claim presents a closer question than those decided in cases past, we believe that the district court correctly held that WMATA's discretionary decision to exclude certain design documents from the tunnel project's bid package is susceptible to policy judgment. Cope, 45 F.3d at 448. Specifically, WMATA's decision required consideration of budgetary constraints and economic expediency. While at first glance WMATA's fiscal considerations may appear to pale in comparison to those implicated in hiring decisions, see Beebe, 129 F.3d at 1287-88; Burkhart, 112 F.3d at 1217, those considerations involve more than simply packaging, duplication and distribution costs. If WMATA were to release unreliable or mistaken reports indicating an inflated need for dewatering wells, for example, the reports could cause contractors to similarly inflate their bids. Of course, WMATA may not withhold all unfavorable information from contractors; if it did, WMATA might soon find few firms willing to submit bids on its projects. WMATA must therefore exercise its policy judgment to balance the goal of fair disclosure against the sensible withholding of unreliable information. 32 Although KiSKA argues that WMATA's position assumes the merits of the issue, i.e., that the information concealed from bidders was not `material,' Reply Br. at 9 (emphasis in original), KiSKA's position, in contrast—given that the merits of a claim will rarely be known before a court establishes its jurisdiction over that claim—would permit endless contractor challenges to WMATA's final specifications. While KiSKA may disagree with WMATA's decisions regarding the materiality of a given set of documents, such judgments are, in our view, WMATA's to make. We therefore conclude that the content of the tunnel project's bid package is a discretionary decision susceptible to policy judgment and, accordingly, affirm the district court's dismissal of KiSKA's tort claims on sovereign immunity grounds. 14