Opinion ID: 1807671
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court erred in considering the jury verdict in favor of Nizielski to be advisory.

Text: In a unanimous opinion, we stated in Orr v. Kneip, 287 N.W.2d 480 (S.D. 1979): ... consequently, in the instant case, the equity powers of the court were not invoked and the jury verdicts cannot be considered advisory, since advisory juries are available only in actions which sound in equity, SDCL 15-6-39(c). (Emphasis supplied mine). Orr thus implies that on equitable issues a jury's verdict is advisory only, but if the action is one at law, a jury cannot serve in an advisory capacity. This is the settled law in South Dakota. Since this action does not sound in equity, the trial court erred in considering the jury verdict in favor of Nizielski to be advisory. Furthermore, we believe that fundamental fairness requires upholding this jury verdict after the conclusion of the trial because of several procedural factors. We believe that there was consent by both parties to a trial by a non-advisory verdict under SDCL 15-6-39(c). The trial court entered a finding that there was no right to a jury trial, four days after the conclusion of the jury trial. We cannot believe that it is fair to treat a jury's verdict as advisory only after the jury has returned its verdict. The critical issue is the timing of a court's decision to treat the jury's verdict as advisory. We generally adopt the reasoning in Bereda v. Pickering Creek Industrial Park, Inc., 865 F.2d 49 (3d Cir.1989). In Bereda the court stated: Were a district judge able to indicate that it would treat the jury's verdict as advisory after the jury had returned its verdict, the part of Rule 39(c) allowing for a non-advisory jury in cases not triable of right by a jury would be effectively excised from the rule in such a case. All jury verdicts in cases not triable by right by a jury would effectively be advisory, as the district judge could always rule that the verdict was advisory if the judge did not agree with the jury's verdict. (emphasis by the court). We further note that although an informal telephone conference took place on the day before the trial; however, there was no motion made pursuant to the Rules of Civil Procedure as denoted by SDCL 15-6-7(b) and no hearing was held under SDCL 15-6-6(d). No lower court decision or order was made or entered and under the state of the pleadings, we hold that the parties reasonably expected the jury verdict to be binding. For future guidance, we advise the circuit courts of this state that a circuit court judge must notify opposing parties of a jury's advisory status no later than the time at which the jury selection has begun. This is to ensure fair notice to the litigants of the arena in which they find themselves in; and, further so that they can knowledgeably proceed with a mental determination as to how they can effectively conduct voir dire examination having a basic viewpoint of the role of the jury in the proceeding. Accord: Hildebrand v. Board of Trustees, 607 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.1979). Reversed with instructions to reinstate the jury's verdict. WUEST, C.J., and, MORGAN and MILLER, JJ., concur. SABERS, J., concurs in result.