Opinion ID: 147109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The right of defense.

Text: The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees the right of a criminal defendant to have a public trial, to confront the witnesses against him and to obtain witnesses in his favor. These guarantees are incorporated by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, binding the states. Due process includes a right to `a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) citing California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). That constitutional right is violated by the exclusion of probative admissible evidence that another person may have committed the crime. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302-03, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). In Chambers, the defendant sought to introduce the testimony of three individuals to whom a third party had confessed to committing the murder for which Chambers was on trial. Id. at 298, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The Mississippi State Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of this evidence because it was hearsay and not subject to exception under state evidentiary rules which, at the time, recognized only declarations against pecuniary interest. The United States Supreme Court noted that the hearsay statements involved in the case were made under circumstances that provided assurance of their reliability: the confessions were made spontaneously shortly after the murder, corroborated by some other evidence in the case, and were self-incriminatory. Id. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The Supreme Court ultimately determined that under the facts and circumstances of that case, exclusion of the evidence violated Chambers' constitutional rights. Id. at 303, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Stating that [f]ew rights are more fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense, the Supreme Court noted that the rejected testimony bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and that the testimony also was critical to Chambers' defense. Id. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. In these circumstances, where constitutional rights directly affecting the ascertainment of guilt are implicated, the hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice. Id. Chambers controls. The state court excluded as hearsay Rory Keim's testimony that Henry Garza, dead at the time of Kristi's trial, had admitted that his partners had murdered Charlie Bateson in error, and the California court of appeal affirmed that ruling. [1] As in Chambers, Garza's statement was against his penal interest. He admitted the murder had been committed by his partners. He exposed himself to the risk of criminal prosecution. At a minimum, he was an accessory after the fact. Cal. Pen.Code §§ 32-33. At a maximum he was an accessory before the fact or a co-conspirator with the killers and subject to the same penalty as the actual murderer. Bompensiero v. Superior Court, 44 Cal.2d 178, 281 P.2d 250, 256 (1955); Cal. Pen.Code §§ 971, 182(a). As in Chambers, Garza's statement was made shortly after the murder, albeit not to a close acquaintance. As in Chambers, the incriminating statement was corroborated by other evidence in the case: (1) an acquaintance of Delgado's indicated that Garza and the former tenant of Kristi's home, Frank Delgado, were involved in drug deals together and had been seen in the house with $40,000 worth of illegal drugs, (2) a confidential informant told police three days after the murder that Delgado had been the intended victim because he had ripped off several people in drug deals, [2] and (3) a neighbor saw a car linked to both Garza and Delgado on the street in front of Kristi's house a few hours before the murder. The excluded testimony thus bore substantial guarantees of trustworthiness and was critical to Kristi's defense. Cf. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038; Chia, 360 F.3d at 1006-07 (applying Chambers ). [3] As is usually the case with pieces of evidence, each item of information Kristi sought to introduce gave meaning and coherence to Garza's admission, put it in context, and explained it. The state court of appeal, however, addressed each item independently without connecting it to the chain of circumstances, thereby missing the probative force of the whole chain. By deeming Garza's statement to Keim inadmissible hearsay, the state court of appeal dismissed the remaining pieces of evidence as providing only motive and opportunity to commit the crime, because there was no direct or circumstantial evidence that a third party had done so. Had Garza's statement been admitted, however, this missing element would have been supplied, and the remaining pieces of the puzzle would have become more relevant. The denial of Kristi's right to present a defense was compounded and magnified by factual mistakes made by the court of appeal in the course of disposing of the evidence offered. The testimony of John Voet that identified the car in the cul-desac on the morning of the murder, April 17, was misstated by the court, putting the car there a day earlier on April 16, erroneously leading the court to conclude this evidence was not even probative. [4] The rulings of the state courts were prejudicial to Kristi's defense. Exclusion of the evidence of Garza's admission and Delgado's drug-dealing stripped her of evidence that someone other than she had probably committed the murder of her husband. Nor, as the state argues, was this evidence merely cumulative of other evidence in the trial. That Kristi's first statement to the police mentioned the drug-dealing at Fir Street was no substitute for Oney Rhoades' statement that he saw Garza and Delgado with a large amount of drugs at Fir Street, nor was it a substitute for Garza's admission that his partners committed the murder. Statements made by Kristi, the defendant, could not have been given near the level of weight as this independent evidence. Because Kristi was prevented from presenting this evidence, she was prevented from offering any alternate theory as to who might have committed the crime. The jury would not have been confused by such evidence. It would probably have been led to a state of reasonable doubt. The murder called out for a murderer. The trial as conducted by the superior court and as approved by the court of appeal left only Charlie's wife in view as the murderer. An accused does not have an unfettered right to present any evidence he or she wishes. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988). However, as Chambers teaches, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case, at times a state's rules of evidence cannot be mechanistically applied and must yield in favor of due process and the right to a fair trial. 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. 1038. As in Chambers, the excluded testimony here bore persuasive assurances of trustworthiness and was critical to [Kristi's] defense. Id. California's application of its evidentiary rules denied Kristi her constitutional right to present a defense. That Kristi confessed to the crime does not detract from the prejudice flowing from her inability to present the defense of third party culpability, especially since she vigorously contested the truthfulness of that confession. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the rule of Chambers and other cases involving improper denials of the right to present a defense, when it overturned a South Carolina conviction in which a defendant was denied the opportunity to present evidence of third party culpability because of the strength of forensic evidence in that case. See Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-31, 126 S.Ct. 1727, 164 L.Ed.2d 503 (2006). The error in this case had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, and therefore is not harmless. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637-38, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). The California court of appeal's conclusion to the contrary constitutes an objectively unreasonable application of Chambers. See Chia, 360 F.3d at 1006-07. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the district court is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED to it with direction to issue the writ.