Opinion ID: 2159195
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Evidence of Defendant's Past Conduct at the Guilt Phase

Text: Defendant contends that testimony concerning two instances of past conduct was improperly admitted into evidence during the guilt phase, thereby depriving him of a fair trial. The first incident concerned defendant's purchase of the sawed-off shotgun in Pennsylvania one or two months before the shooting of Officer Garaffa. Rose purchased the gun from Gordon Seale, a forklift operator in Pottstown, Pennsylvania. The State called Seale as a witness. Over defense counsel's objection, Seale testified that Rose paid him sixty dollars for the gun, which he needed because he was having some problems over in Jersey with some niggers. The trial court rejected the contention that the testimony was irrelevant and unduly inflammatory, concluding that it was material to the third count of the indictment charging defendant with possession of the shotgun with a purpose to use it unlawfully. N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a. The court stated: [T]he fact of the matter is the testimony I've heard so far all seems to indicate Officer Garaffa came by here, that no one expected [him] to go by there. There was no evidence Mr. Rose expected him. It would seem to me based on the very charge in the indictment that the very purpose for which he had the gun is relevant so the State can prove in fact he had the weapon on August 8th for the purpose of using it unlawfully. Defendant also objects to the admission of testimony concerning a second incident that occurred in an Irvington schoolyard one to one-and-a-half weeks before the shooting of Officer Garaffa. Rose's friend Nicholas Silva testified that on the day in question he, Paul Palermo, and defendant intended to confront one Coley Hunter, whom Silva described as    a black guy that I had trouble with and Teddy had trouble with and my brother had trouble with. Silva testified that when he, Palermo, and Rose left their car to walk to the schoolyard, in order to find Hunter, defendant removed his sawed-off shotgun from the trunk. He placed it in his right pants pocket, which had a hole in it, so the shotgun just went down his leg. According to Silva's testimony, he told defendant to put the gun away. Defendant replied, Fuck it, I don't give a shit. The trial court permitted Silva to testify about Rose's statement to him, overruling defense counsel's objection that the comment was irrelevant. The State argues that the testimony concerning both incidents is material to the charge that defendant possessed the shotgun on August Eighth with a purpose to use it unlawfully. Primarily, however, the State asserts that the testimony was admissible under Evidence Rule 55 to establish intent and absence of mistake or accident. Referring to defense counsel's opening statement [5] as putting in issue defendant's state of mind when he shot Officer Garaffa, the State argues that the disputed testimony was offered to establish the requisite mens rea essential to convictions for purposeful or knowing murder   . Defendant challenges the admission of this testimony on several grounds. He contends that the charge of possession of the shotgun for an unlawful purpose was not contested, citing concessions made by defense counsel in his opening statement. [6] In addition, he cites the trial court's charge to the jury on the count charging possession of the shotgun with an unlawful purpose. Defendant asserts that the charge characterized this count as inseparable from the shooting itself, and permitted the jury to find that proof of the shooting also constituted proof of defendant's unlawful purpose, thereby obviating the need for evidence of unrelated events to prove defendant's unlawful purpose. Defendant also challenges the admissibility of this testimony under Evidence Rule 55, citing State v. Soney, 177 N.J. Super. 47, 59 (App.Div. 1980), certif. denied, 87 N.J. 313 (1981), for the proposition that evidence of commission of a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion [is inadmissible] to show a disposition to engage in such conduct at another time. Defendant also contends that the testimony should have been excluded under Evidence Rule 4 because any probative value that it possessed was outweighed by the risk that its admissibility would create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of confusing the issues or of misleading the jury. Finally, defendant claims reversible error because of the trial court's failure to instruct the jury concerning the limited purpose for which the evidence was admitted. Evid.R. 6. We agree that the testimony concerning defendant's reason for purchasing the shotgun as well as the testimony describing his conversation with Nicholas Silva on the way to the schoolyard were inadmissible to prove that on August 8, 1984, defendant possessed the shotgun with the purpose to use it unlawfully. We held in State v. Harmon, 104 N.J. 189 (1986), that a violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a requires proof not only that the accused intended to use the weapon, but that he intended to use it to accomplish a criminal purpose. Id. at 203. In the absence of a proffer by the State of an intention to offer evidence that defendant's unlawful purpose in possessing the weapon on August Eighth was related to his problems with blacks or to his hostility toward Coley Hunter, we find no relevance whatsoever in the testimony at issue to the charge that on the date in question defendant possessed the shotgun for an unlawful purpose. Although it is a close question, we find the testimony somewhat relevant to the issue of defendant's state of mind at the time of shooting and thus admissible under the criteria set forth in Evidence Rule 55 as evidence of intent or absence of mistake or accident. We agree with the State's contention that it was obligated to prove defendant's state of mind, and that defense counsel's opening could fairly be construed as contesting that the shooting was knowing or purposeful. Supra at 487 n. 5. Defendant's request at the close of the guilt phase for a charge of aggravated manslaughter lends support to the State's contention. We view the testimony concerning the schoolyard incident, which suggested defendant's willingness to use the shotgun offensively against Coley Hunter, to be somewhat probative on the question whether defendant's shooting of Officer Garaffa was purposeful or accidental. We reach the same conclusion, but with greater reservation because the relevance is more attenuated, about the explanation offered by defendant to Gordon Seale when he purchased the shotgun. That testimony perhaps suggested that defendant was inclined to use the shotgun offensively against others; hence, although inadmissible to prove that he shot Officer Garaffa, it was slightly probative on the question whether the shooting was purposeful or accidental. Our articulation of the rationale concerning the possible grounds for admission of this evidence underscores the necessity for according some measure of discretion to trial courts in ruling on the admissibility of evidence that may be both material and inflammatory. In our view, the preferred disposition would have been to admit the evidence of the schoolyard conversation, but exclude the conversation with Gordon Seale under Evidence Rule 4 because of its limited relevance and its capacity to prejudice the jury. Nevertheless, because the evidence of guilt was overwhelming, we consider the admission of the testimony concerning defendant's conversation with Seale, in the guilt phase, to be harmless error, and not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. Finally, we fully agree with defendant's contention, conceded by the State, that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury concerning the limited purpose for which this evidence was admitted, Evid.R. 6, constituted error. Unquestionably, the jury should have been told that the evidence was to be considered only on the question whether the State had sustained its burden of proof that the shooting was knowing or purposeful. In view of the substantial evidence of defendant's guilt, we do not find that the court's failure to give this limiting instruction constituted reversible error in the guilt phase of the trial. We discuss below the effect of the trial court's omission during the penalty phase to afford the jury a limiting instruction concerning evidence of prior acts of defendant that was elicited during the penalty phase. Infra at 503-509. Accordingly, we affirm defendant's convictions for murder and for the related offenses. [7]