Opinion ID: 2570681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of Evidence about July 1998 Incident

Text: Vasquez argues that the district judge erred in admitting evidence about the July 1998 incident in which he had pushed and bitten Robin. He suggests that this court has disallowed admission of marital discord evidence of this type as an exception to the procedure employed under K.S.A. 60-455. See State v. Gunby, 282 Kan. 39, 47-60, 144 P.3d 647 (2006). He also argues that the evidence was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial and that the absence of an appropriate limiting instruction requires reversal of his convictions. Vasquez is correct that evidence of marital discord qualifying as another crime or civil wrong is subject to evaluation for admission under K.S.A. 60-455 rather than independent of it. The evidence at issue heretestimony about Vasquez' commission of domestic battery of Robinunquestionably qualifies as evidence of another crime or civil wrong. K.S.A. 60-455 provides in pertinent part: [E]vidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion. . . is inadmissible to prove his or her disposition to commit [a] crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference that the person committed another crime or civil wrong on another specified occasion but . . . such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact including motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity[,] or absence of mistake or accident. One of our most recent cases focusing on K.S.A. 60-455 evidence is State v. Reid, 286 Kan. 494, 186 P.3d 713 (2008). In Reid, we clarified the analytical steps to be taken and the standard of appellate review to be applied to each step. [T]he K.S.A. 60-455 analysis requires several steps. . . . [T]he court must determine that the evidence is relevant to prove a material fact, e.g., motive, knowledge, and identity. The court must also determine that the material fact is disputed. Additionally, the court must determine that the probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential for producing undue prejudice. Finally, the court must give a limiting instruction informing the jury of the specific purpose for admission whenever 60-455 evidence comes in. [Citations omitted.] 286 Kan. at 503, 186 P.3d 713. Referencing our 2006 decision in Gunby, 282 Kan. at 47-48, 56-57, 144 P.3d 647, which did away with marital discord as an independent basis for admission of other crimes and wrongs evidence, Reid made clear that it was refining and extending the Gunby discussion: While Gunby established that evidentiary rules may be applied either as a matter of law or in the exercise of the trial court's discretion, depending on the contours of the rule in question, this particular determination only occurs `[o]nce relevance is established.' 282 Kan. at 47, 144 P.3d 647. Gunby did not establish our standard of review for analyzing relevance of certain K.S.A. 60-455 evidence. [T]he legislature has defined `relevant evidence' as `evidence having any tendency in reason to prove any material fact.' This statutory definition bears some resemblance to one found in Federal Rule of Evidence 401: `Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.' Several treatises have recognized that the federal rule contains both a probative, i.e., relevancy, element and a materiality element. Reid, 286 Kan. at 504, 186 P.3d 713,. Our Reid decision then observed that materiality merged into the federal rule on relevancy through inclusion of the `requirement that the fact proved must be of consequence to the determination of the action.. . . . Determining whether evidence is consequential depends on the applicable substantive law.' 286 Kan. at 504-05, 186 P.3d 713 (quoting Mueller & Kirkpatrick, Evidence Practice Under the Rules § 4.2, pp. 228-29 [2d ed.1999]; citing 1 Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, § 401.02[2] [9th ed. 2006] [Both traditional requirements of relevance analysis-that evidence must relate to issues that are properly in dispute and that it must shed some light on those issues-are combined into one rule. Whether an issue is properly in dispute is, of course, determined by the applicable substantive law.]). The Kansas statute, K.S.A. 60-401(b), mirrors its federal counterpart. As Reid stated, `Evidence having any tendency in reason to prove' suggests the probative element, while `any material fact' suggests the materiality element. Reid, 286 Kan. at 505, 186 P.3d 713. Moreover, both elements have a place under K.S.A. 60-455 because of the statute's references to both relevance i.e., probativenessand materiality. 286 Kan. at 505, 186 P.3d 713. In other words, the concept of relevance under Kansas law includes both whether evidence is probative and whether it is material. On appeal, the question of whether evidence is probative is judged under an abuse of discretion standard; materiality is judged under a de novo standard. 286 Kan. at 507-09, 186 P.3d 713. With respect to relevance overall, Reid concluded: Obviously, if either the probative or materiality element's standard is not met, then the evidence is inadmissible. If both standards are met, then the appellate court proceeds to the next step(s) in the [K.S.A.] 60-455 analysis established in Gunby.  Reid, 286 Kan. at 509, 186 P.3d 713. The second step under K.S.A. 60-455, i.e., whether the fact was in issue at trial, is judged on appeal under a de novo standard. An appellate court is as capable as a district court of discerning whether a particular fact was in issue from a cold record. The third step, the district judge's weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect, is reviewed on appeal for abuse of discretion, a more deferential standard. See Reid, 286 Kan. at 512. If evidence qualifies for admission under K.S.A. 60-455 but no limiting instruction was given, the standard of review should match that applied to other jury instruction issues. If the defense requested a limiting instruction and was refused, or it otherwise objected to its omission by the district judge, the standard on appeal is that set out in K.S.A. 60-261; to be reversible, the error must be inconsistent with substantial justice. See Gunby, 282 Kan. at 48, 57-59, 144 P.3d 647. If the defense did not request a limiting instruction and it failed to object to its omission, the absence of a limiting instruction is reviewed on appeal under the clearly erroneous standard of K.S.A. 22-3414(3). Reid, 286 Kan. at 513, 186 P.3d 713. `Instructions are clearly erroneous only if the reviewing court is firmly convinced there is a real possibility that the jury would have rendered a different verdict if the error had not occurred.' [Citation omitted.] State v. Shirley, 277 Kan. 659, 666, 89 P.3d 649 (2004). At the time of Vasquez' trial, it was accepted practice to admit marital discord evidence independent of K.S.A. 60-455. To avoid error, a district judge need not have followed the three steps under the statute or given a prophylactic limiting instruction. See, e.g., State v. Mayberry, 248 Kan. 369, 384-85, 807 P.2d 86 (1991); State v. Green, 232 Kan. 116, 119-23, 652 P.2d 697 (1982). This changed with Gunby, 282 Kan. at 49, 144 P.3d 647. Yet Gunby also unequivocally held that the list of facts in K.S.A. 60-455 was meant to be exemplary rather than exclusive. 282 Kan. at 56, 144 P.3d 647. Since Gunby, then, marital discord evidence could be admissible to demonstrate motive for a crime or some other fact, as long as the three-part test under K.S.A. 60-455 was met and a limiting instruction given. 282 Kan. at 56-57, 144 P.3d 647. In addition, we stated: [T]the admission of K.S.A. 60-455 evidence without the explicit relevance inquiries, particularized weighing of probative value and prejudicial effect, or prophylactic limiting instruction is not inevitably so prejudicial as to require automatic reversal. On the contrary it may be harmless. Gunby, 282 Kan. at 57, 144 P.3d 647; see K.S.A. 60-261. Gunby applies to this case, which was on direct appeal at the time Gunby was filed. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 268, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) (citing Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 [1987]); State v. Francis, 282 Kan. 120, 126-27, 145 P.3d 48 (2006); State v. Barnes, 278 Kan. 121, 124-27, 92 P.3d 578 (2004). Thus it is clear that the district judge in Vasquez' case erred, albeit innocently, by admitting marital discord evidence independent of K.S.A. 60-455. We must evaluate the effect of that error, if any. To do so, we must examine whether the evidence would have been admissible if the three-part test of K.S.A. 60-455 had been applied correctly. If so, because Vasquez did not seek a limiting instruction and none was given, we must next examine whether the absence of the instruction amounted to clear error requiring reversal. Vasquez argues that the evidence of the July incident fails the three-part test because it was not relevant to prove any material fact in issue at his triple murder trial. We disagree. Addressing the legal question of the materiality element of relevance first, we hold that motive was clearly material to the jury's task in this triple murder trial. Although motive is not an element of premeditated first-degree murder, evidence of its existence can be highly persuasive circumstantial evidence of guilt. It is the moving power that impels one to action for a definite result. Reid, 286 Kan. at 504, 186 P.3d 713 (citing State v. Jordan, 250 Kan. 180, 190, 825 P.2d 157 [1992]). It `supplies the jury with some degree of explanation, responding to a juror's natural tendency to wonder why a defendant behaved in the manner described by the State. Often it is a prominent feature of the State's theory of its case.' Reid, 286 Kan. at 504, 186 P.3d 713 (quoting State v. Engelhardt, 280 Kan. 113, 128, 119 P.3d 1148 [2005]); see also State v. Hughes, 286 Kan. ___, ___, 191 P.3d 268 (2008); (discussing motive); State v. Carapezza, 286 Kan. ___, ___, 191 P.3d 256 (2008) (same). Here, the State attempted to prove that Vasquez killed out of anger and jealousy, i.e., that he had a motive to kill his wife because of the separation she instigated and her new romantic relationship with Dinkel. The question of whether the evidence of the July 1998 domestic battery incident was probative on motive is somewhat more difficult, because the incident was fairly remote in time from the murders. However, that temporal remove is ameliorated by the fact of Vasquez' absence from the country for several weeks. It is also ameliorated by our recognition that anger and jealousy in troubled romantic relationships are not necessarily logical or linear. Neither are they strictly time-bound. Rather, these volatile emotions may wax and wane; they may build over time or be tamped down by sudden or slow reconciliation. In the circumstances before us, the district judge's decision to permit the State to prove motive by demonstrating the existence of discord between Vasquez and Robin in the several months leading to the murders would not have been an abuse of discretion. Employing a de novo standard, our review of the record also demonstrates there would have been no error in deciding that motive was actually in issue in Vasquez' trial. As mentioned, the State's theory was that Vasquez killed out of anger and jealousy. His testimony directly contradicted that theory. He advanced an alternate explanation for why he was staying at his sister's home after his return from Mexico and denied that he and Robin had marital problems of any kind. We move next to the balance of probative value and prejudicial effect. On this part of the test, it is not enough for Vasquez to show that the evidence was prejudicial. It undoubtedly was, as is all or most of the evidence introduced by the State in any murder trial. See State v. Miller, 284 Kan. 682, 703, 163 P.3d 267 (2007). Rather, to demonstrate an abuse of discretion, he must show that unfair or undue prejudice arising from the admission of the evidence substantially outweighed its probative value. Vasquez cannot do so here. The State put on convincing circumstantial proof of Vasquez' guilt; it included ample evidence of his estrangement from Robin. Under these circumstances, the July incident did not give the jury its sole or even a predominant independent reason to convict Vasquez. Had the district judge conducted this balance under K.S.A. 60-455, it would not have been an abuse of discretion for him to conclude that the evidence could come in. Indeed, the contribution of this evidence to the ultimate verdicts was most likely minimal. Finally, we address the absence of a limiting instruction under the clearly erroneous standard. Given our expectation of minimal impact from this evidence, we have no hesitation in holding that the absence of a limiting instruction in this case was not clear error. An instruction telling the jury that it could consider the July incident only to the extent it was probative of motive or another particular fact in issue would have improved Vasquez' trial, but the trial was fair and its result reliable without it.