Opinion ID: 1483399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Permitting Questions and Evidence as to Money Received by the Appellant in 1938?

Text: We have set out some of the questions and answers pertinent to this inquiry in our discussion of the first point. We need not reiterate them now. The question of whether or not Johnson had received money from the numbers backers in the last two months of 1937 was pertinent to the issues presented by the indictment in the case. As we have stated Martin Michael, sometimes known as Jack Southern, had testified that he paid no money to Johnson after he, Michael, took over the office of paymaster for protection of the numbers banks. Johnson on cross-examination asserted that he had received no money from the numbers backers in the latter part of the year 1937. Thereafter on cross-examination, as we have already indicated, he was asked whether he had received money from the numbers backers in 1938 and admitted that he had done so. We can perceive no error in questioning the defendant in detail as to what he did with respect to his income tax return for the year 1937, whether he received money in 1938 from the numbers game, from whom he received it, and what he did with it. These questions properly were designed to test the credibility of the defendant's original statement that he did not receive money from the numbers backers in the last two months of 1937 for it places some strain upon credulity to suppose that the payments made to him for protection over a period of years were suddenly halted for two months within the time covered by the indictment only to be resumed by Johnson's own admission immediately thereafter. As a matter of fact, upon cross-examination, Johnson had already testified, without any objection from his counsel,    when I got ready to send every month or few months, I would send memorandums up showing what my net income was during that period; they would be filed until I made up my income tax. Further cross-examination as to the duration of this practice within the time limits of the indictment was entirely proper. This was recognized by defendant's counsel in his objection to the question, And how long did you keep up that practice? Johnson's counsel in explaining his objection to that question stated, I want to urge that nothing after the date, the end of 1937 is admissible   . The incongruity between the admission by Johnson of his continuing to send slips from which his income tax returns were made up to his office throughout the whole of 1937 and the testimony as to the alleged non-delivery of money to him during the last two months of that year is manifest. It throws into sharp relief the issue of Johnson's credibility which the questions of the cross-examiner were designed to test. An examination of the transcript also discloses the whole extraordinary story told by the appellant to the effect that $1,200 was delivered to him weekly; that he kept slips showing the net sums remaining in his hands after he had deducted the expenses of his personal political machine and that he returned the balance in 1935, 1936 and 1937 as commissions or other commissions. The appellant was in fact testifying to a system which he said he pursued in making up his income tax returns. He gave this information in the course of his examination-in-chief by his own counsel. It was perfectly proper in our opinion to permit cross-examination within reasonable limits as to the system pursued by him in years prior and subsequent to the taxable years in question. This also constituted a proper test of the appellant's credibility. See Bonness v. United States, 9 Cir., 20 F.2d 754; Tinkoff v. United States, 7 Cir., 86 F.2d 868, certiorari denied 301 U.S. 689, 57 S.Ct. 795, 81 L.Ed. 1346; United States v. Dalhover, 7 Cir., 96 F.2d 355; Cravens v. United States, 8 Cir., 62 F.2d 261, certiorari denied 289 U.S. 733, 53 S.Ct. 594, 77 L.Ed. 1481; Alderman v. United States, 5 Cir., 31 F.2d 499, certiorari denied 279 U.S. 869, 49 S.Ct. 515, 73 L.Ed. 1006; and Madden v. United States, 9 Cir., 20 F.2d 289. [3] We cannot conclude that the trial court erred in the exercise of its discretion in permitting the cross-examination here in issue Gowling v. United States, 6 Cir., 64 F.2d 796; Silverman v. United States, 1 Cir., 59 F.2d 636, certiorari denied 287 U.S. 640, 53 S.Ct. 89, 77 L.Ed. 554; Hewitt v. United States, 8 Cir., 110 F.2d 1, certiorari denied 310 U.S. 641, 60 S.Ct. 1089, 84 L.Ed. 1409. Compare United States v. Reed, 2 Cir., 96 F.2d 785, certiorari denied 305 U.S. 612, 59 S.Ct. 71, 83 L.Ed. 399; United States v. Waldon, 7 Cir., 114 F.2d 982, certiorari denied 312 U.S. 681, 61 S.Ct. 549, 85 L.Ed. 1119. But quite apart from the foregoing, the witness answered but three questions over objection; as to the others he claimed his privilege against self-incrimination. The learned trial judge probably erred in Johnson's favor in allowing him to claim his privilege to avoid testifying upon material issues when he had submitted himself as a witness. But this worked in Johnson's favor. The fact that he claimed privilege cannot be deemed to have prejudiced him. There is no authority for holding that because a defendant in his capacity as a witness claims his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination that he is prejudiced thereby. In Raffel v. United States, supra, 271 U.S. at page 497, 46 S.Ct. at page 568, 70 L.Ed. 1054, the Supreme Court stated that when a defendant takes the stand in his own behalf    he does so as any other witness, and within the limits of the appropriate rules he may be cross-examined as to the facts in issue.    His waiver is not partial; having once cast aside the cloak of immunity, he may not resume it at will, whenever cross-examination may be inconvenient or embarrassing. The privilege has been described as    an option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry. 8 Wigmore on Evidence, 3rd Ed., § 2268, p. 388. See, also, O'Connell v. United States, 2 Cir., 40 F.2d 201, certiorari dismissed 296 U.S. 667, 51 S.Ct. 658, 75 L.Ed. 1472. That the defendant would have incriminated himself by answering the questions which were asked him was extremely unlikely. The trial judge applied the privilege very liberally in his behalf. But in any event Johnson gave no answer to any question which might have incriminated him and therefore he has taken no hurt. We conclude that no further discussion is necessary upon this point.