Opinion ID: 801002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Explicit Link View

Text: Although the ADA is a separate and distinct statute from Title VII, the ADA does not contain its own enforcement provisions. Instead it incorporates the powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a). The five provisions referenced in this incorporating provision are summarized as follows: 42 U.S.C.2000e-4 (Equal Employment Opportunity Commission): Sets forth the powers, composition, etc. of the EEOC. 42 U.S.C.2000e-5 (Enforcement Provisions): Describes powers of the EEOC to prevent unlawful employment practices, cross-referencing the definitions of such practices in 2000e-2 and 2000e-3; describes process of filing charges with the EEOC and related State or local enforcement proceedings; sets forth the rules for filing related civil actions; and specifies the remedies available to the plaintiff in such actions. 42 U.S.C.2000e-6 (Civil Actions by the Attorney General): Sets forth the procedures under which the Attorney General may bring action against employer engaged in unlawful employment practices. 42 U.S.C.2000e-8 (Investigations): Describes evidentiary issues pertaining to charges filed under 2000e-5. 42 U.S.C.2000e-9 (Conduct of hearings and investigations pursuant to section 161 of Title 29): Links the EEOC's powers to that of the National Labor Relations Board. The only provision among these five related to remedies is § 2000e-5. The only subsection pertaining to the issues before this Court is § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), which provides certain relief and prohibits other relief under specific circumstances. Most of the circuit courts that have reviewed the matter have either assumed or concluded that the ADA incorporates the entire procedural scheme from Title VII: the motivating factor standard for liability expressed in § 2000e-2(m) and the same decision defense to damages set forth in § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). See Doane v. City of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir.1997) (recognizing that 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(m) and 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) apply in actions brought pursuant to the ADA); see also Baird ex rel. Baird v. Rose, 192 F.3d 462, 470 (4th Cir.1999); Buchanan v. City of San Antonio, 85 F.3d 196, 200 (5th Cir.1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300, 1301 (8th Cir.1995). The Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc . decision by the Seventh Circuit challenges the assumptions implicit in these decisions. 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010). The court notes that Title VII's motivating factor test appears in the statute's liability section, 2000e-2(m). The ADA's incorporation of powers, remedies, and procedures does not directly reference this provision and, Serwatka reasons, the motivating factor standard is therefore not incorporated into the ADA. Id. The question that Serwatka leaves inadequately addressed is this: If the ADA's incorporation provision does not incorporate the motivating factor test, what does it incorporate with regard to remedies in civil suits? To answer this question, we must scrutinize more closely 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), keeping in mind that the ADA provides no other enforcement or remedies provision: On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, the court (i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and (ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A). This provision does two things: it permits certain relief (declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys fees) and it prohibits other relief (e.g., damages, reinstatement orders). But this permitting and prohibiting is within a very narrow context, i.e., when the employee has demonstrated that discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision under § 2000e-2(m) and the employer has, in turn, proven that he would have made the same decision had discriminatory animus not been a factor. By incorporating this provision into the ADA, Congress effectively declared that ADA plaintiffs are entitled to the remedies (and the limits on remedies) described therein. Since these remedies have meaning only in the context just described, it is more than reasonable to assume that the entire context, meaning both the motivating factor test and the same decision test, is also incorporated into the ADA. This conclusion is underscored by the fact that 2000e-2(m), the motivating factor test for liability, is expressly referenced (twice) in this expressly incorporated provision. Serwatka bases its contrary assumption on a quote from a law student note stating, The motivating factor amendment [to Title VII] is not a power, remedy, or procedure; it is, instead, a substantive standard of liability. 591 F.3d at 962 (quoting John L. Flynn, Note, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 Geo. L.J.2009, 2042 (1995)). What this statement ignores is that Title VII's remedies provision assumes the application of its substantive standard of liability. Perhaps more importantly, to effectively edit out the reference to 2000e-2(m) is to render Title VII's only remedies section devoid of meaning as to the ADA, nullifying Congress's clearly expressed intent to incorporate into the ADA Title VII's remedies. Under the most basic rules of statutory construction, such a reading is impermissible. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Roger Miller Music, Inc., 396 F.3d 762, 769 (6th Cir.2005) (Courts are to make every effort to interpret provisions so that other provisions in the statute are not rendered inconsistent, superfluous, or meaningless.); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 527, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating that the Court's task is to give meaning to the law in a way that avoids producing an absurd result). The only interpretation of the ADA's incorporation provision that does not render its incorporation of § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) meaningless is that the ADA incorporates Title VII's two-part burden-shifting framework.