Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Competency During Guilt Phase

Text: Defendant first argues that during the guilt phase, the trial court had before it evidence suggesting that he lacked a rational understanding of the proceedings and the ability to assist his counsel, and thus committed reversible error in failing to declare a doubt and order a hearing as to his competency. Defendant cites the testimony of several of his family members that his mood and behavior had changed in the months and weeks before the shootings, including an increase in his drinking of alcohol, with attendant memory lapses, and nightmares and unpredictable conduct. Defendant also relies on Dr. Vicary's testimony that he suffered from bipolar disorder and was psychotic at the time of the offenses and continuing until the time of trial. In particular, Dr. Vicary noted that defendant experienced paranoid delusions and hyperreligiosity, i.e., a religious fervor of such intensity, to the exclusion of virtually any other interest, that it seemed to be part of his mental illness rather than faith alone. Defendant also, Dr. Vicary observed, distrusted him and tried to convert him and defense counsel to his religious beliefs. Defendant also points to his own testimony, which he asserts was filled with tangential responses to the questions of counsel and strange, irrelevant statements, often marked by a seemingly psychosis-induced preoccupation with a newly embraced religion and an obsession with his own and society's unworthiness. [3] His testimony, he further notes, frequently undermined the defense case, contradicted that of other witnesses, and was internally inconsistent. Defendant even made offensive statements about the victims and inflammatory comments about religion and race, referring to Benjamin Alcala and his relatives as Mexican thieves and to Eugene Layton as a gorilla. As the Attorney General urges, however, defendant's family members' testimony regarding his past behavior did not support an inference that defendant was unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist his counsel in a rational manner. And [e]ven supposing defendant is correct that the various examples of his rambling, marginally relevant speeches cited in his briefing may constitute evidence of some form of mental illness, the record simply does not show that he lacked an understanding of the nature of the proceedings or the ability to assist in his defense. ( People v. Koontz (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1041, 1064, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335.) As we have recognized, more is required to raise a doubt than mere bizarre actions [citation] or bizarre statements [citation]. ( People v. Laudermilk (1967) 67 Cal.2d 272, 285, 61 Cal. Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228.) Nor did Dr. Vicary's testimony that defendant suffered from a psychotic mental illness reasonably compel a declaration of a doubt as to his competency; Dr. Vicary himself, in fact, concluded defendant's version of events was in places false and self-serving, and he believed defendant was competent to testify despite his illness. Accordingly, because there was not substantial evidence of incompetency, the trial court did not err in failing to hold proceedings to determine defendant's competency during the guilt phase of trial.