Opinion ID: 782222
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Right to Confront a Witness

Text: 42 Schreane next argues that the district court erred in allowing Officer Topping to testify that during the stop Duckett exclaimed, He has a gun, referring to Schreane. He contends that the admission of this statement under the hearsay exception of excited utterances deprived him of his constitutional right to confront a witness. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Duckett's statement as an excited utterance, and the admission of this statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. 43 Schreane does not address whether Duckett's statement qualifies as an excited utterance; instead, he seems to argue that regardless of whether Duckett was under the stress of excitement, the district court should have rejected the introduction of Duckett's spontaneous statement because it was a statement made by a co-defendant who had a strong interest in shifting at least some of the responsibility for the burglary from himself onto [the defendant]. The flaw of this assignment of error is that it fundamentally misunderstands longstanding jurisprudential insight that excited utterances — in and of themselves and regardless of the source — contain inherent guarantees of truthfulness, Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1057 (6th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071, 104 S.Ct. 980, 79 L.Ed.2d 217 (1984), that render adversarial testing unnecessary and thus satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). 44 An excited utterance is defined as [a] statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. Fed.R.Evid. 803(2). The rationale for this hearsay exception is that such statements are given under circumstances that eliminate the possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation, and that therefore the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement provide sufficient assurance that the statement is trustworthy and that cross-examination would be superfluous. Wright, 497 U.S. at 820, 110 S.Ct. 3139 (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Haggins, 715 F.2d at 1057 (explaining that the assumption underlying [the excited utterance] exception is that a person under the sway of excitement precipitated by an external startling event will be bereft of the reflective capacity essential for fabrication and that, consequently, any utterance he makes will be spontaneous and trustworthy) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, contrary to Schreane's assertion, the dispositive inquiry we must make is not whether Duckett had a motive to shift criminal liability to the defendant, but whether Duckett's statement was made under genuine conditions of excitement that removed the elements of reflection and contrivance from his words. 12 See United States v. Tocco, 135 F.3d 116, 127-28 (2d Cir.1998) (finding that an accomplice's statement inculpating a defendant in an arson was properly admitted as an excited utterance regardless of the accomplice's participation in the crime), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1096, 118 S.Ct. 1581, 140 L.Ed.2d 795 (1998). 45 If Duckett's statement qualifies as an excited utterance, which necessarily means that it carries sufficient indicia of reliability and trustworthiness, then the judicial inquiry is at an end. A criminal defendant's right to confront witnesses is not violated by the introduction of hearsay testimony where either the hearsay statement falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception, or where it is supported by a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980). The excited utterance exception, which is at least two centuries old and may in fact have its origins in late 17th century English common law, is without question a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 356 n. 8, 112 S.Ct. 736, 116 L.Ed.2d 848 (1992) (citing Thompson v. Trevanion, 90 Eng.Rep. 179 (K.B.1694)). 46 An appellate court reviews all evidentiary rulings — including constitutional challenges to evidentiary rulings — under the abuse-of-discretion standard. See General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997) (stating that [a]ll evidentiary decisions are reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard). An abuse of discretion will be found upon a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors. Super Sulky, Inc. v. United States Trotting Ass'n, 174 F.3d 733, 740 (6th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 871, 120 S.Ct. 172, 145 L.Ed.2d 146 (1999). 47 In Haggins, we held that a statement qualifies as an excited utterance if three elements are met. First, there must be an event startling enough to cause nervous excitement. 715 F.2d at 1057. Second, the statement must be made before there is time to contrive or misrepresent. Id. Third, the statement must be made while the person is under the stress of the excitement caused by the event. Id. For purposes of determining spontaneity, [t]estimony that the declarant still appeared nervous or distraught and that there was a reasonable basis for continuing [to be] emotional[ly] upset will often suffice. Id. at 1058 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the instant case, as Schreane himself appears to concede, the record amply supports a finding that Duckett's statement fell within the excited utterance exception. 48 On the first element, Officer Topping observed Duckett and Schreane arguing in the car immediately after they had committed a burglary, a crime to which the defendant pleaded guilty in state court. Certainly, the burglary itself may constitute a startling event, but even if it did not, the subsequent verbal altercation between Duckett and Schreane (one where Schreane apparently threatened to use the gun on Duckett) qualifies as a startling event. Second, immediately upon observing the patrol car, Duckett jumped out of the vehicle and quickly approached Topping, yelling He has a gun! The short length of time between the burglary and the statement, and/or the argument and the vocalization, did not afford Duckett enough time to contrive a story for the officer's benefit. 13 Last, Topping described Duckett as being genuinely nervous, scared, excited, eager to get away from the vehicle, speaking in a high-pitched voice and in need of being slowed down. Duckett's excited physical demeanor supports a finding that Duckett made his statement while still under the sway of excitement. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Duckett's statement as an excited utterance, and, as a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the statement did not violate the Confrontation Clause. 14 49 AFFIRMED.