Opinion ID: 1831783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Adverse Cross-Examination by Codefendant Doorbal

Text: Next, Lugo claims that his right to a fair trial was impinged by codefendant Noel Doorbal's adverse cross-examination of several State witnesses. Lugo asserts that this cross-examination attempted to shift all blame to Lugo and effectively compelled Lugo to defend against two different prosecution teams: the State and his codefendant, Doorbal. Lugo asserts a litany of instances in the record in which he alleges that cross-examination by Doorbal made him appear to be doubly guilty in the eyes of the jury. However, we agree with the State that in most, if not all, of the instances cited by Lugo, Doorbal's cross-examination of witnesses amounted to an examination of the evidence the State had presented. This evidence in many instances not only inculpated Lugo but also Doorbal. Each defendant in a trial is entitled to engage in vigorous cross-examination of the witnesses presented against him. See, e.g., Oakes v. State, 746 So.2d 510, 511 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999) (stating that a defendant in a criminal case has the constitutional right to fully cross-examine a prosecution witness concerning events about which the witness testified during direct examination). Moreover, in many of the instances which Lugo cites as being improper adverse cross-examination by codefendant Doorbal, Lugo failed to object to preserve the issue for review. This leaves fundamental error as the only basis for relief and we decline to apply such doctrine to grant relief on this issue. Moreover, in McCray v. State, 416 So.2d 804 (Fla.1982), we concluded that in a trial in which appellant McCray asserted that his right to a fair trial was violated because the defenses of [his] codefendants... were completely antagonistic to his defense, id. at 806, the joint trial of McCray and his codefendants did not in any way prejudice the right of [McCray] to a fair determination of his guilt or innocence of the offense [of first-degree murder]. Id. at 807. We noted in McCray that the appellant had a full opportunity to cross-examine all witnesses brought against him, and that the evidence was not so complex that the jury could not understand the case, apply the evidence, and make individualized determinations of guilt regarding each defendant. See id. at 806-07. These same circumstances hold true in Lugo's case and lead us to the conclusion that Lugo was not deprived of his right to a fair determination of his guilt or innocence of the offense[s] charged. Id. at 807. We therefore deny relief on this issue. [52]