Opinion ID: 788670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Issues Raised by the Hospital

Text: 12 At the heart of this case lies the question whether the Hospital's decision to discipline Herrera violated his rights to freedom of speech or freedom of association guaranteed by the First Amendment. The Hospital contends that the anti-adornment component of its dress code is content-neutral and does not implicate free speech or free association. The anti-adornment policy states that ONLY pins representing the professional association and the most current hospital service award may be worn. 11 Plaintiffs counter that this policy, as applied by the Hospital, effectively affixes conditions to public employment that violate the First Amendment expression rights of Hospital employees such as Herrera and others similarly situated. 13 Although government employees have not relinquished the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest, 12 the government as employer is entitled to manage employees to an extent that includes hiring, firing, and disciplining them. 13 When a public employer adopts a policy that impinges on the speech of its employees, though, we apply the Pickering/Connick balancing test, weighing the interests of the employee, as a citizen, to comment on matters of public concern against the interests of the government, as an employer, to promote efficiency in its providing of services. 14 14 In this circuit, we have integrated that balancing test into a larger four-step analysis: First, the employee must demonstrate that the speech at issue addressed a matter of public concern. If it can be characterized as such, we next apply the Pickering/Connick balancing test, thereafter continuing to the final two steps only if we conclude that, on balance, the public employee's speech rights outweigh the public employer's interest in the efficient providing of services. These first two steps are legal in nature and are for the court to resolve. 15 The third and fourth steps are factual in nature, requiring determinations first whether the protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment decision; and, second, if it was, then whether the employer would have made the same employment decision in the absence of the protected speech, a but for inquiry. 16 15
16 As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether the dress code is an official Hospital policy, for local governmental entities may be held liable under § 1983 only if deprivations of rights result from implementation of an official policy or custom. 17 It is thus error to assess liability to a local governmental unit for employment and personnel decisions made by officials who lack final policymaking authority in that area. 18 Here, the Hospital argues in its appellate brief that Durham, the supervisor who actually disciplined Herrera, has no policymaking authority, much less final policymaking authority. Therefore, urges the Hospital, no final policymaking authority was involved in the decision to suspend Herrera, so there can be no liability here at all. 17 The precedent relied on by the Hospital, however, addresses factual circumstances distinguishably different from those that frame the instant case. Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, for example, addresses when municipal liability may be imposed for a single decision by municipal policymakers. 19 Similarly, City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik deals with defin [ing] the proper legal standard for determining when isolated decisions by municipal officials or employees may expose the municipality itself to liability under § 1983. 20 Those cases, in other words, dealt with isolated acts that arguably were outside official policy; and, under such circumstances, it is appropriate to determine whether the state actor involved had final policymaking authority that would expose the municipality to liability. 18 It is well settled, however, that a municipality may be held liable if its official policies cause [its] employees to violate another person's constitutional rights. 21 In other words, a municipality may be held liable if it cause[s] a constitutional tort through `a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers,' 22 even if that official policy is enforced by someone who has no final policymaking authority. This last fact does not change the character of the alleged injury or the policy under which that injury occurred; it is still an injury ... inflicted by a government's `lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy,' for which municipalities [can] be held liable. 23 The crucial question, therefore, is whether the dress code is an official policy of the Hospital, not whether the Hospital employee who enforced the terms of that policy had final policymaking authority. 19 That the Hospital's dress code is an official policy is not seriously contested. Instead, the Hospital misleadingly focuses on the decision-making authority of its employee, Durham. As Plaintiffs correctly point out, though, the dress code policy (1) was adopted by the Hospital's Administrator and its Dress Code Committee, (2) bears a policy number, MCH-1027, and (3) was officially revised in July 1999. Furthermore, some members of the Hospital's Board of Directors—the very entity identified by the Hospital as its official, final policymaker—stated in affidavit testimony that the dress code was valid and enforceable. And, finally, if the dress code was not an official policy or was otherwise invalid, the Hospital had several opportunities to disavow it during Herrera's disciplinary process, but never did. 20 These factors fully support the conclusion that, at the very least, the final policymaker identified by the Hospital (the Board) delegated the authority to establish the dress code to the Administrator. As the Supreme Court explained in Pembaur, if the Board delegated its power to establish final employment policy ... the [delegate's] decisions would represent county policy and could give rise to municipal liability. 24 We conclude that, at a minimum, such a delegation occurred in the instant case, and that the Administrator's establishment and promulgation of the dress code constitute official Hospital policy. 21
22 We have never before decided expressly whether pro- or anti-union lapel pins constitute speech on a matter of public concern, although we assumed that they do in U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Federal Labor Relations Authority. 25 Noting that we have never explicitly made such a holding, the Hospital insists that, in wearing the pin, Herrera was speaking as an employee, not as a citizen, on matters that address only his personal interest and personal employment conditions. The Hospital's repeated assertions on this point—that Herrera's speech only related to the terms and conditions of [Herrera's] employment and duties ... [it] related solely to his employment and not to a matter of concern to the community— simply do not hold water. 23 First, the speech at issue, constituting as it did a show of support for the union and serving as it did to inform other employees (and those members of the public who saw it) that a union organizing drive was in progress, indisputably concerned the employment terms and conditions of all potential union members, not just Herrera. Furthermore, the goals of union organizing at a functioning public facility will almost always entail potential costs and benefits that directly affect and concern the community at large, not just the employment conditions of that facility's workers. A successful union organizing drive can lead to price fluctuations for services provided by the facility, changes in the types of services offered by the facility, and political pressures centered around worker satisfaction. 26 Obviously, then, it is simply incorrect to characterize a Union Yes button as addressing issues that are solely and inherently personal. 24 Second, as the district court noted in its summary judgment order, courts that have considered this question have typically held that speech regarding union activities is speech on a matter of public concern. In Boddie v. City of Columbus , for example, we recognized the reality that speech in the context of union activity will seldom be personal; most often it will be political speech. 27 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has noted that [t]he urge to unionize certainly falls within the category of expression that is `fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community ...' 28 And, in Thornhill v. Alabama , the Supreme Court stated that labor relations are not matters of mere local or private concern. 29 Although the Hospital cites case law indicating that publicizing a personal employment grievance is not speech on a matter of public concern, 30 Herrera was not trying to publicize a personal employment grievance: Nothing in the record of this case would indicate that the Union Yes button was related to anything other than the ongoing organizing effort. 25 In contrast, the cases relied on by the district court and cited on appeal by Plaintiffs support the conclusion that speech regarding general union activities is speech on a matter of public concern. 31 We easily conclude that Herrera's wearing of the union lapel pin is appropriately classified as speech regarding general union activities, not speech publicizing a personal employment grievance, and is therefore speech on a matter of public concern. 26 The Hospital attempts to make a corresponding argument that the speech at issue here (Union Yes) did not sufficiently inform the public as to be helpful, so that even if the subject of the speech is of public interest, the content of this particular communication renders it unprotected. 32 The Hospital also contends that Herrera's limited contact with the public supports its argument on this point. We disagree on both contentions. The very fact that a union organizing drive was occurring at the Hospital is particularized information about which the public may be interested, and that information, as well as the viewpoint championed by those who wear the button, is adequately conveyed by the words Union Yes. As for Herrera's limited contact with the public, we have held that speech on a matter of public concern can be protected, even if that speech occurs only in the workplace. 33 Moreover, the Hospital undercuts its own argument by acknowledging that Herrera did come in contact with members of the public (albeit not in any interactive capacity), such as, for example, at the cafeteria, in the hallways, and on the stairs. 34 Ironically, in addressing the Pickering/Connick balancing test, the Hospital inconsistently argues that Herrera had frequent and direct contact with the public. Yet the Hospital conceded in its Trial Brief that Herrera's employment does not entail significant interaction with the public (emphasis added). 35 For non-spoken speech to be communicated, it is visibility by the public that satisfies; interaction is not required. 27
28 The thrust of the Hospital's argument on this second step of our test is that the dress code policy is entitled to deference because it is critical to the Hospital's mission in that it creates an appearance of impartiality and promotes uniformity, discipline, and esprit de corps among the hospital's employees. 36 Although the Hospital lifts this argument almost verbatim from this circuit's precedent on non-adornment policies similar to the one here at issue, that precedent deals in large part with public employers that are law enforcement agencies or other paramilitary organizations. Thus, that precedent is inapposite and provides scant — if any — support for the Hospital's argument. 29 In Daniels v. City of Arlington, 37 for example, we explained that: 30 [T]he city ... has the right to promote a disciplined, identifiable, and impartial police force by maintaining its police uniform as a symbol of neutral government authority, free from expressions of personal bent or bias. The city's interest in conveying neutral authority through that uniform far outweighs an officer's interest in wearing any non-department-related symbol on it. 38 31 This reasoning rests almost entirely on the key fact that a police force, as the only arm of municipal government that is authorized to use force on citizens, must avoid any appearance of favoritism or bias and — just as important — any signal that might cause confusion as to who is and who is not a law enforcement officer. This reasoning was also the foundation of a case cited by the Daniels panel (and misguidedly cited by the Hospital here), U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Federal Labor Relations Authority. 39 There, we explained that the border patrol .... is a para-military law enforcement unit, and as such, has many of the same interests as the military in regulating its employees' uniforms. 40 Because of this similarity of mission and means between the military and the INS, our FLRA panel held that the border patrol's anti-adornment policy was similarly entitled to deference. 41 32 This reasoning simply does not apply to the instant situation, despite the Hospital's close emulation of the language from FLRA in an apparent effort to bolster its claim that its dress code policy is entitled to such deference. The paramilitary reasoning of our FLRA opinion cannot be stretched to apply to the non-medical, non-administrative, maintenance and clerical staff of a public hospital. The wearing of a pin by a carpenter and other Integrated Services employees, who are merely seen by, but do not interact extensively with, members of the public, cannot be seriously said to undermine (1) the public's perception of neutrality and impartiality among the Hospital's professional and quasi-professional medical and administrative staff, or (2) the esprit de corps among these kinds of employees. 42 As Plaintiffs accurately note, this case lacks the unique circumstances and requirements of para-military and law enforcement organizations. Even though the Hospital's carpenters, plumbers, janitors, and other maintenance staff are glimpsed from time to time by patients, family members, and visitors, they do not interact directly with them; neither are such employees ever called on to enforce or administer the health care laws of the state. The Hospital's efforts to obscure the clear line between these classes of employees by painting with too broad a brush is feckless. 33 The other cases relied on by the Hospital are similarly distinguishable, and equally inapposite. In Smith v. U.S., 43 for example, we found no constitutional violation when a psychologist at a Veteran's Administration hospital was discharged after he refused to remove a pin depicting a dove (a ubiquitous peace or anti-war symbol) superimposed on an American flag. That incident occurred at the close of the Vietnam War, and the case was decided on the basis of trial testimony that some of the Vietnam veterans who were being treated personally by the psychologist were quite likely to find the pin upsetting, which in turn would be detrimental to such patients' welfare. 44 This is a circumstance unique to the treating psychologist/patient relationship and obviously cannot be analogized to apply to a carpenter who has no meaningful contact with patients or their families. Again, the bright line between medical staff and blue collar maintenance employees cannot be crossed. 34 Undaunted, the Hospital nevertheless contends that Herrera had frequent and direct contact with the public, and furthermore that if we were to accept that he did not have such contact, then his speech could not have been on a matter of public concern. In so doing, the Hospital attempts to manufacture a Catch-22 for the Plaintiffs by arguing that they are attempting to have it both ways by arguing that Herrera had enough public contact to make his speech on a matter of public concern, but not enough public contact for purposes of the Pickering / Connick balancing test. On the contrary, it is obviously the Hospital that is trying to have it both ways. In its argument on the public concern element, the Hospital contends that Herrera admits he did not have any significant contact with the public (emphasis added); a point actually conceded by the Hospital in its original Answer when it admitted that Herrera's position of employment with Defendant Hospital does not entail significant interaction with the public (emphasis added). As shall be seen, the difference between contact and interaction is telling. The district court declined to give conclusive effect to that admission because all the parties seemed to have overlooked [it] in their arguments before that court, 45 which nevertheless observed that the admission was highly indicative of the Defendants' stance on this issue before it became critical to the case. 46 The definitive aspect of the Hospital's schizophrenic posturing here is its conflating of two very different aspects of Herrera's presence, vis-a-vis the public: (1) contact that is passive visibility that facilitates speech, and (2) direct interaction which, if present, might affect the public's perception of his employer's neutrality. 35 In stark contrast to the Hospital's flawed comparison, Plaintiffs' position is neither inconsistent nor internally contradictory. They accurately assert that Herrera's position does not entail significant interaction with the public.... [Herrera] worked in patient rooms that had been vacated for repairs or renovation.... [Herrera] only encountered the public in passing, such as brief encounters in the hallways, elevators, or cafeteria (emphasis added). Such contacts, however fleeting, are quite sufficient for Herrera's lapel pin to alert the public to the fact that a labor organizing drive is ongoing, but fall well short of the active, functional interaction (such as that between law enforcement officers and the public or psychiatrists and their patients) needed to affect negatively the Hospital's medical or administrative operations. Passive visibility and active interaction weigh quite differently on the Pickering / Connick balancing beam. The nature of Herrera's performance of his employment as a carpenter, with the frequency of its visibility and the infrequency of its interaction with the public, is such that the Hospital has failed to demonstrate how suppressing the lapel-pin speech of personnel like Herrera was necessary for the efficient providing of Hospital services. 36 The Hospital also argues that Herrera's speech had the effect of workplace disruption, which is a factor to be considered in conducting the balancing test. The Hospital would emphasize the anecdotal incident when Durham instructed Herrera to remove the button and Herrera responded with If you want it off, then you take it off. 47 On this point, the district court ruled: 37 Just as other courts have found that refusing to obey an order that implicates an employee's First Amendment rights is not a sufficient reason for disciplining the employee, this Court holds that an employer's insistence upon enforcing an unconstitutional policy cannot create the very disruption the policy purports to prevent. 48 38 The district court also recognized that the button-wearing speech at issue here caused no workplace disruption, either in the Durham incident or on a prior occasion when approximately 30 Hospital employees wore the buttons. 49 Finally, as the district court observed, there was no evidence that Herrera's productivity suffered as a result of wearing the button; quite to the contrary, he received consistently positive performance evaluations, with the lone exception of the dress code violation. 50 39 The instant situation differs markedly from, for example, Connick v. Myers, in which the speech at issue involved an assistant district attorney's distribution during work hours of a questionnaire that was critical of that professional's supervisors. 51 Here, as emphasized by the district court, Herrera's mute lapel-pin speech was not a public criticism of a close supervisor or a challenge to the Hospital's authority; neither did it pose any threat whatsoever to the efficient performing of the Hospital's medical or administrative functions. 52 Obviously, the particular work environment in Connick was a key factor. The Supreme Court emphasized that maintaining harmonious relationships is essential to efficiency in a district attorney's office, which is, after all, tantamount to a government law firm. A custodial or maintenance worker, such as a carpenter, wearing a pro-union button during his work shift cannot be analogized to a doctor, nurse, technician, or administrator employed by a medical center, just as such a maintenance worker cannot be analogized to an assistant district attorney or deputy sheriff. In sum, Herrera's speech on a matter of public concern outweighs any effect it might have on the Hospital's providing services to the public. Herrera passes the Pickering / Connick balancing test with flying colors. 40
41 This brings us to the third step in our testing. On the question whether Herrera's speech was a motivating factor for his punishment, the district court emphasized that the Hospital had essentially conceded this point in its Trial Brief when it stated: If Plaintiff Herrera had removed the button from his uniform on any of the numerous occasions he was asked to do so by his supervisors, he would not have been disciplined. 53 Furthermore, noted the district court, other circuits have concluded that refusing to obey an order that implicates an employee's First Amendment rights is not a sufficient reason for disciplining the employee. 54 And, the lack of disciplinary action meted out to employees who knuckled under and removed their buttons demonstrates beyond cavil that the continued wearing of the button in violation of the dress code was at least a motivating factor behind Herrera's discipline, notwithstanding the Hospital's strenuous contentions to the contrary. After all, the only employee disciplined was Herrera, who was the only employee who continued to wear the button. 55 42 But even if we concede arguendo that insubordination too was a cause of the adverse employment action (which we address more fully below), none can contend, at least not in full candor, that insubordination was the sole reason. Stated differently, the record evidence establishes beyond peradventure that Herrera's protected speech was also a (if not the ) motivating factor. 43
44 Independently, Herrera's employment file provides the answer to the question whether he would have suffered the adverse employment action but for the protected speech. His employment record contains no negative marks, comments, or references to any other incidents of misconduct whatsoever. And, even though that record on its face indicates that Herrera was disciplined for insubordination, it goes on to make abundantly clear that the insubordination for which he was punished arose from Durham's thrice-repeated, unconstitutional order to correct a dress code violation. 56 The record even notes the dress code's policy number. Under these circumstances, it is specious at least — mendacious at most — for the Hospital to contend that it would have reached the same [employment] decision ... in the absence of the protected conduct. 57 Like Poor Richard's proverbial horse-shoe nail, if Herrera had not engaged in the protected speech, he would not have been ordered to cease; if he had not been so ordered repeatedly, he would not have repeatedly refused to cease; if he had not repeatedly (and increasingly emphatically) refused to cease, the charge of insubordination and the ensuing adverse employment decision would never have been made. 58 This is a generous characterization, as the claim that insubordination was the motivation for the disciplinary action has the distinct ring of provocation and post-hoc rationalization. 45 The Hospital's attempt to cast its adverse action as disciplining Herrera only for insubordination, which action would have been taken regardless of the protected speech, proves too much. Under this theory, any public employer could stifle the First Amendment speech rights of employees with impunity. If an employer wanted to stop an employee from engaging in constitutionally protected speech (that is, speech on a matter of public concern that does not impede the employer's efficient operation), it need only order the employee to cease. If the employee obeys, the employer has succeeded in quashing protected speech; if the employee refuses, he has been insubordinate and is subject to being fired or suspended, thus again stopping the protected speech. This would be win-win for public employers interested in quashing protected speech, but it would be lose-lose for the First Amendment. 46 Still the Hospital protests that it was not Herrera's continued breach of the dress code and refusal to desist that constituted the insubordination; rather, it was his fighting words (I'm not going to take it off. If you want it off, then you take it off) to Durham for which he was disciplined. Not only does Herrera's employment record put the lie to this pretextual explanation by referring to the dress code by policy number; the record facts eschew the Hospital's attempt to portray the incident as some highly charged belly bumping altercation. There was no indication at trial that Herrera had been insubordinate or disruptive in any way on the day of his suspension, other than in the brief, Durham-provoked confrontation. That episode clearly was incited (or exacerbated) by Durham himself. 59 Under these circumstances, it is obvious that the adverse employment action would not have occurred but for the protected speech and the supervisor's persistent, unconstitutional efforts to squelch that speech.