Opinion ID: 790004
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Regulation of BD and GBL as Controlled Substance Analogues Under Federal Law

Text: 65 Turcotte first claims that the Dietary Supplements Health and Education Act of 1994 (DSHEA), 21 U.S.C. § 321, precludes regulation of GBL and BD since both substances are dietary supplements and thus must be treated as food under the DSHEA. (Appellant's Br. at 29.) Turcotte also asserts that because GBL is a List I chemical under 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(33) and 802(34), pursuant to an April 2000 DEA Final Rule, GBL is not subject to regulation. These arguments are, at best, unpersuasive and, at worst, disingenuous. The district court noted below that the DSHEA does not prevent the classification of GBL as a controlled substance analogue, 286 F.Supp.2d at 952, and the government points out that GBL meets the DSHEA's definition of a drug and is known as a common industrial chemical. (Appellee's Br. at 30-31.) In fact Turcotte himself labeled his shipments of Verve to Internet customers as cleaning supplies or supplies, not dietary supplements. Id. The DSHEA does not address GBL or BD specifically, so both parties are essentially attempting to shoehorn these substances into the DSHEA's general definitions. This is a dubious enterprise considering that the CSA addresses the status of GBL explicitly, stating that it is a List I chemical under 21 U.S.C. §§ 802(33) and 802(34). This appears the more relevant provision for our purposes. 66 Perhaps realizing this, Turcotte next claims that GBL's status as a Listed chemical under the CSA precludes its regulation as a controlled substance. To support this contention, Turcotte points to a DEA regulation which states, in part, that [c]hemical mixtures containing GBL ... are not subject to regulation. 65 Fed.Reg. 21,645 (Apr. 24, 2000). But this line of argument is patently without merit. The very regulation cited by Turcotte also explicitly states that the CSA, at 21 U.S.C. § 802(32), expressly provides that the designation of GBL or any other chemical as a Listed chemical does not preclude a finding that the chemical is a controlled substance analogue and subject to the provisions of 21 U.S.C. 813. 65 Fed.Reg. 21,645 (Apr. 24, 2000) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)) (emphasis added). See also Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 128 n. 6 (also ruling that GBL's status as a listed chemical under DEA regulations does not preclude its regulation as a controlled substance analogue under the CSA). In fact Turcotte himself concedes that the clear provisions of the CSA (at 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(B)) doom his argument, though he tries to blunt the impact of this point by hiding it in a footnote. See Appellant's Br. at 30 n. 11 (conceding that GBL's designation as a listed chemical does not preclude a finding that the chemical is a controlled substance analogue. 21 U.S.C. § 802(32)(B).). 67 Having obliterated his own argument regarding GBL's susceptibility to regulation, Turcotte next argues in the alternative that, even if GBL can be regulated as a controlled substance analogue (as he concedes), the various laws and regulations cited here render GBL's status confusing, and the rule of lenity should be applied to reverse his conviction. (Appellant's Br. at 31-32.) While the rule of lenity instructs that ambiguity in the meaning of a statutory provision should be resolved in favor of the defendant, this principle is only applicable where there is a grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language and structure of the Act. U.S. v. Ranum, 96 F.3d 1020, 1030 (7th Cir.1996) (quoting United States v. Neal, 46 F.3d 1405, 1410 (7th Cir.1995)) (internal quotations omitted). In other words, the rule of lenity only serves as an aide for resolving an ambiguity; it is not to be used to beget one. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961). 68 As just discussed, the law is perfectly clear on this point: As per both the CSA itself and the DEA regulation cited by Turcotte, GBL is not exempt from regulation under the CSA as a controlled substance analogue. Turcotte himself acknowledges this fact in his brief. See Appellant's Br. at 30, n. 11. See also Ansaldi, 372 F.3d at 128 n. 6 (observing that the DEA regulation [concerning GBL] does not even purport to remove any substance from the realm of criminal conduct.). The rule of lenity is not applicable here. This is especially so given our rejection of Turcotte's vagueness claims 13 — it would be passing strange for us to rule that a statute, while not unconstitutionally vague, is sufficiently ambiguous to trigger the rule of lenity. 69 For all of these reasons, Turcotte's claim that federal law precludes the regulation of GBL as an analogue of GHB are patently without merit.