Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Victim-impact Argument

Text: (40) In his opening and reply briefs, defendant contends portions of the prosecutor's argument were improper under the decision in Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529] and violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, because the prosecutor focused on the effect of the murder on the victim's children. (See also South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805 [104 L.Ed.2d 876, 109 S.Ct. 2207].) In his supplemental brief, defendant acknowledges that the decision in Booth was largely overruled (as was the decision in Gathers ) in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597]. ( People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 535 [7 Cal. Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101].) Defendant, however, relies upon a concurring opinion in Payne for the proposition that a prosecutor's reference to the impact of the crime upon the victim may, in a particular case, violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution if it so infects the sentencing proceeding so as to render it fundamentally unfair.... ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. ___, ___ [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 740, 111 S.Ct. 2597] (conc. opn. of O'Connor, J.).) Defendant did not object at trial to this portion of the prosecutor's argument and, therefore, is precluded from raising this issue on appeal. ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 976 [281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131].) Nothing in our decisions in People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, 112-113, or People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 771-772 [239 Cal. Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250], cited by defendant, suggests a contrary rule. Defendant's contention also fails on the merits. The prosecutor's remarks were not so inflammatory as to divert the jury's attention from its proper role or invite an irrational response. [Citation.] ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th 173, 235.) Defendant further urges us to reconsider our recent holding, in People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787 [1 Cal. Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436], that evidence of the harm caused by the defendant's actions is admissible at the penalty phase under section 190.3, factor (a), as one of the circumstances of the crime. The arguments raised by defendant were considered and rejected in Edwards (see also People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th 173, 235), and we have not been presented with any argument that would justify a reexamination of this ruling.