Opinion ID: 2467000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: memorandum concurring in part and dissenting in part

Text: Once again this Court is faced with administrative unrest in the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit. Three associate circuit judges now ask us to quash Administrative Order No. 9-1986 which requires that preliminary hearings be held not less than six (6) days after the date of said prisoner's preliminary arraignment and Administrative Order 13-1986 which limits these associate circuit judges from setting more than fifteen preliminary hearings on any one of the twelve (12) dockets established for preliminary hearings and misdemeanor trials each week. I believe that these orders are within the general administrative authority of the Presiding Judge. Mo. Const. art. V, § 15.3. I concur in the Court's order overruling the motion as to these Administrative Rules. These associate circuit judges also ask that we appoint a special master to act as presiding judge of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit. The history of this vexing situation can be traced through Gregory v. Corrigan, 685 S.W.2d 840 (Mo. banc 1985), and Nolan v. Stussie, 695 S.W.2d 869 (Mo. banc 1985), to In re: Rules of the Circuit Court for the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, 702 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. banc 1985) (hereafter the October 11 decision). In the October 11 decision, this Court suspended the operation of that part of Mo. Const. art. V, § 15.3, which purports to grant to associate circuit judges the right to participate in the election of the presiding judge in the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit. Id. at 459. The October 11 per curiam weighed the right of the people to an orderly administration of justice against the right of the people to speak through the Constitution, and determined that the constitutional provisions could not be enforced. I joined the October 11 decision because of the seriousness of the threat to the orderly administration of justice within the Circuit, and with the intent that the solution proposed in that opinion was (1) temporary, and (2) limited in application to the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit. My concurrence was also born of the hope that such a strong statement of the Court's resolve to remedy the inexcusable intramural bickering in that circuit would act as a catalyst in bringing about an amicable resolution to [the Circuit's] problems. Id. at 457. It now appears that this hope was without foundation. With the benefit of hindsight, I now believe that I was incorrect in joining in the October 11 decision, even to the extent of the limited, temporary nature in which I believe it was cast. While it is beyond dispute that both factions in the Circuit share faultand there is plenty of that to go aroundthe October 11 decision appears to have encouraged those who felt vindicated by it to express their victory in radical terms. On February 27, 1986, the Presiding Judge of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit issued Administrative Orders to Associate Circuit Judges George R. Gerhard, Joseph A. Goeke, III, Daniel J. O'Toole and Dennis J. Quillin purporting to relieve the named associate circuit judges of their dockets and directing that they relinquish control of their courtrooms and chambers. This Court stayed these Administrative Orders by order on February 28, 1986. This Court's order directed the named associate circuit judges to carry out and perform all of the duties and functions of their office until further order of this Court or until further order of the circuit judges acting through the Presiding Judge of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit pursuant to this Court's Per Curiam in case No. 67397 [the October 11 decision]. To the extent that this Court's order of February 28, 1986, prevented the Presiding Judge from enforcing his Administrative Orders of February 27, 1986, I concurred in the Court's order. The fact remains that there is no constitutional or statutory authority in the Presiding Judge to order the removal of these associate circuit judges from their courtrooms and chambers and to relieve them of the dockets in these circumstances. Each of these movants is holding office according to the mandates of Mo. Const. art. V. The Presiding Judge holds no greater claim to his office than do the movants. A presiding judge is to have general administrative authority over the court and its divisions. Mo. Const. art. V, § 15.3. Such power does not, in my view, include the power to suspend another judge from his judicial duties for the reasons expressed by the Presiding Judge. See Graham v. Cannon, 574 P.2d 305 (Okla.1978). In the absence of appropriate action by the circuit judges to quash the February 27, 1986 Administrative Orders of the Presiding Judge, I believe this Court should enter its order quashing those orders, sua sponte. I further believe that our responsibility to assure the people of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit of the orderly administration of justice demands that we take an additional step. With regret, I respectfully submit that this Court can no longer avoid direct intervention into the administration of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit. The animosities which exist between the judges of that circuit have clouded judgment on each side. In the October 11 per curiam, this Court stated: In the event that there be any further evidence of inability of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit to operate the circuit so as to assure the orderly administration of justice, this Court is prepared to relieve any then serving presiding judge of his or her duties and to assign a neutral judge to supervise the circuit subject to the approval of this Court until such time as the orderly administration of justice be assured in the Twenty-First circuit. The people of St. Louis County are entitled to nothing less. (Emphasis added). In re: Rules of the Circuit Court, id. at 460. I am convinced that the time has come for us to intervene. This has never been a legal problem. It has always been a managerial problem. Had we recognized that fundamental fact on October 11, we could have avoided the necessity of this Court determining that we cannot and will not enforce that part of art. V, § 15.3, which purports to grant to associate circuit judges the right to participate in the election of the presiding judge.... Id. at 459. Were I empowered to do so, I would exercise our supervisory authority under Mo. Const. art. V, § 4, and appoint a jurist from outside the geographic boundaries of the Eastern District Court of Appeals as presiding judge of the Circuit, to serve with the full authority of this Court, until such time as the orderly administration of justice is restored in the Circuit. /s/EDWARD D. ROBERTSON, Jr., Judge DONNELLY and RENDLEN, JJ., concur. WELLIVER, Judge, concurring in result. I concur in result. [1] I agree that the cases and law cited and collected in the principal opinion constitute a clear and scholarly statement of the law applicable to the case, i.e., that the Commission on Retirement, Removal and Discipline of Judges (hereinafter Commission) has no jurisdiction to hear this case. I agree that there is not one line of evidence in the record to support the alleged charges against Judge Voorhees. The principal opinion having so correctly and properly concluded that under our Constitution the Commission is not the proper entity to deal with the breakdown, I read and reread the opinion searching for guidance as to how this Court is going to deal with solving the St. Louis County judicial breakdown. Finding no such guidance, and finding a number of purported conclusions and statements with which I cannot agree, and seeing omissions which I deem vitally important to determination of this case, and, which leave unexposed what I believe to be one of the basic underlying causes of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit problem, precludes me from lending my name to more than the limited result of the opinion. In February 1985 in Gregory v. Corrigan, 685 S.W.2d 840, 845 (Mo. banc 1985), (Welliver, J. dissenting) I stated with reference to the Twenty-First Circuit problem, [t]his is no time for half solutions. Two and one-half years later, I now suggest that a half solution today constitutes a total abdication of our constitutionally mandated duty to administer and run the courts. Mo. Const. art. V, §§ 4.1 and 8. This cause is not just a limited disciplinary proceeding against Judge Voorhees, it is the on-going problem of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit. In this unique set of circumstances, we are not limited to the discipline issues only. It is our duty and obligation to deal with the broader continuing problem of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit.
The statement that the conduct of the associate circuit judges in passing around bottles of candy pills labeled I Don't Give A Shit Pills in ridicule of the orders issued by their superiors, arguably represents an exercise of a First Amendment Right of the associate circuit judges, offends both my understanding of the law and my sense of justice. In my view, the First Amendment does not bestow on the associate circuit court judges a right to give the citizens of St. Louis County I Don't Give A Shit Pills in lieu of the orderly administration of justice. Nor, can I participate in telling the citizens of St. Louis County that [w]e [as a Court] deem this incident trivial, [this statement deleted from the principal opinion subsequent to original circulation of this opinion] when I know that it has in fact deprived them of their fundamental right to have an orderly administration of justice for the past several years.
In some respects, the principal opinion is as notable for its omissions as it is for its length. Omitted from the principal opinion are many of the facts and details about how and why this charge is before the Commission. Omitted is the fact that as long ago as May 20, 1983, we were at least informally advised that the Commission considered that it had no jurisdiction over the St. Louis squabble. The position of the Commission was as clearly and plainly stated as is the applicable law and the result obtained by the principal opinion. I don't think we should get in the middle of this squabble over how that court is to be run since I think that's completely outside our function and charge. It is my position that it is incumbent on the Presiding Judge of the St. Louis County Circuit Court, and the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of this state to give directives to the judges of that Court, and if that is unavailing and the judges violate the direct orders of the chief administrative judge in this state, I think we should act. Letter dated May 20, 1983 from Judge Robert G. Russell, Judicial Member of the Commission to all Commission Members and to Chief Justice Albert L. Rendlen, circulated to all judges of this Court by Chief Justice Rendlen on May 24, 1983. In The Matter of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, No. 65081, not reported. This Court first intervened into the St. Louis County judicial breakdown when we ordered and directed the Court of Appeals, Eastern District, to investigate and make recommendations for solving the matter. In The Matter of the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, No. 65081, not reported. This resulted in there being sent to our Court majority and minority reports, [2] and, a resulting division of the court of appeals almost as well defined as that existing in the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit itself. The majority report was filed by Presiding Judge Stewart and Judge Gerald Smith, the minority report by Judge Robert Dowd. The failure of this constitutionally authorized delegation [3] of authority by our Court to the Court of Appeals to deal with the problem was obvious from the time of the filing of those reports. With the filing of the reports, the ball was returned to this Court where I believe it has remained, either poorly played, halfplayed or unplayed until this moment. To the extent discussed by the principal opinion, the continuing proceedings in our Court are accurately described. Omitted from the principal opinion are those matters that would make far more clear and understandable the beginnings of these proceedings before the Commission, some of which are found in the transcripts of this hearing, and, some of which were found in an envelope in the file marked Exhibits I, J, K & L, deposited by Resp[ondent] [Voorhees]. These exhibits were rejected at hearing before the Commission, ordered by this Court filed in this proceeding on May 28, 1987, and deposited in this Court's file June 2, 1987. There appears on the sealing tab side of the envelope a handwritten entry: Opened and inspected by Blackmar, J., 6-22-87 1:45 p.m. and resealed in presence of Beth McHaney (Deputy Clerk). [4] Attached and appended hereto as Appendix 1. Understanding the full implications of this proceeding requires full and open disclosure of these exhibits. Pertinent parts are attached and appended hereto as Appendix 2, pages 202-206, and 205; Appendix 3, Appendix 4, and Appendix 5, page 207. Respondent's Exhibit I, marked as Appendix 2, pages 202 and 203, (names of judges deleted) reflects that Respondent Voorhees' predecessor, Presiding Judge William Corrigan, on March 15, 1985, a year before the charges were filed against Judge Voorhees, filed a complaint against five associate judges. The Commission, by letter of August 2, 1985, Appendix 3, replied that the Commission had no jurisdiction over administration of courts. The Commission apparently ignored the fact that the complaint made was that the associate judges, in disobedience of administrative orders, had failed to turn over bank accounts over which individual associate judges had control. Article V, § 24.3 of the Missouri Constitution provides that wilful neglect of duty is a ground for discipline including removal from office. It is of interest to note that the record reflects that as much as $500,000 of bank accounts may have been involved, many accounts being interest free accounts. It is also of interest to note that Presiding Judge Corrigan's report of the judges to the Commission was several months prior to our holding in In re: Rules of Circuit Court for the Twenty-First Judicial Circuit, 702 S.W.2d 457 (Mo. banc 1985), in which we suggested reporting judges to the commission for failure to carry out duties be considered as an alternative in accordance with the Guidelines of the Presiding Judge's Handbook. Also, it is of interest to note that substantially the same complaint was filed with then Chief Justice Albert Rendlen. Appendix 2, pages 203-204. It was in this background that on March 17, 1986, the Commission notified Presiding Judge Voorhees that complaints had been made against him by reason of his having issued his February 27 orders ordering Associate Circuit Judges Gerhart, Goeke, O'Toole, and Quillin to get out of their offices, which he said was for the purpose of assigning judges who would handle the dockets. Commission Exhibit 8, attached and appended hereto and marked as Appendix 6. No reference is made to this notice in the principal opinion. The notice does not say specifically who filed the charges. The charge stated that Judge Voorhees had wrongfully issued the orders against the four named associate circuit judges, that the facts in the orders were false, that Judge Voorhees had acted in excess of his authority and that the orders constituted discipline, making it obvious as to who the real parties in interest were. The same four judges had, as the principal opinion states, on February 28, 1986, brought the same complaints to our Court. We stayed the orders and directed the four judges to comply with directions of the presiding judge. Apparently dissatisfied with our staying the orders and our backing the presiding judge, they sought what might prove to be a more friendly forum [5] in which to seek relief and in effect to review our action. Judge Voorhees' response was delayed by reason of his attorney being absent, but on April 11, he responded substantially as his testimony is reflected in the principal opinion. See Commission Exhibit 9. The exhibit included the signed statement of thirteen circuit judges, a majority of the circuit judges, stating that they had authorized Judge Voorhees to issue the orders to the four associates. On July 14, 1986, the Commission served notice on Presiding Judge Voorhees that they had voted and ordered a cease and desist order against him. Commission Exhibit 10, attached and appended as Appendix 7. [Footnote 1 to the principal opinion was added subsequent to the original circulation of this opinion.] No mention is made in the principal opinion about this cease and desist order. Judge Voorhees was ordered to cease and desist from ever entering orders like the orders issued to the four associate judges. After responding to the Commission as he had before responded, Commission Exhibit 11, the Commission on September 28 notified Judge Voorhees, Commission Exhibit 12, attached and appended as Appendix 8, that [i]f the cease and desist order in subparagraph (b)2 [Rule 12.08] is issued the person under investigation shall either; (a) Agree in writing to comply with the order in which case the complaining party shall be notified of such action; (b) Refuse to agree in writing to comply with the order, in which case formal proceedings shall be instituted. Respondent Voorhees' then attorney, F. William McCalpin notified the Commission that Judge Voorhees will not either directly or indirectly admit that his Orders violated any canon of judicial ethics or any Supreme Court Ruling. Commission Exhibit 13. The Commission then issued its notice and order of hearing dated December 5, 1986, which is discussed in and substantially set forth in the principal opinion. Commission Exhibit 14. The original charges, the cease and desist charges that Judge Voorhees had issued orders in excess of his authority, were abandoned. In the Notice of hearing, Judge Voorhees was charged with a new charge, i.e. failing to report to the Commission misconduct of the four associate judges. Hearing was set for January 28, 1987. At this point, looking at and understanding Judge Voorhees' alternatives becomes vitally important to understanding the full implications of this proceeding.