Opinion ID: 1201607
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parasitic Recovery: Immune System Impairment and/or Cellular Damage as Physical Injury

Text: Because it initially appeared plaintiffs might have suffered damage to their immune systems, we solicited the views of the parties on whether such damage constitutes physical injury. (1) We did so because it is settled in California that in ordinary negligence actions for physical injury, recovery for emotional distress caused by that injury is available as an item of parasitic damages. ( Crisci v. Security Insurance Co. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 425, 433 [58 Cal. Rptr. 13, 426 P.2d 173]; Merenda v. Superior Court (1992) 3 Cal. App.4th 1, 8-9 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 87].) Where a plaintiff can demonstrate a physical injury caused by the defendant's negligence, anxiety specifically due to a reasonable fear of a future harm attributable to the injury may also constitute a proper element of damages. (E.g., Jones v. United Railroads of San Francisco (1921) 54 Cal. App. 744 [202 P. 919] [affirming damages for emotional distress endured up to time of trial where plaintiff reasonably feared permanent disability in the future as direct and proximate result from physical injury received in accident].) Although the availability of parasitic damages for emotional distress engendered by a fear of developing cancer in the future appears to be an issue of first impression in California, [6] other jurisdictions have concluded that such damages are recoverable when they are derivative of a claim for serious physical injuries. For example, the court in Ferrara v. Galluchio (1958) 5 N.Y.2d 16, 21-22 [176 N.Y.S.2d 996, 1000, 152 N.E.2d 249, 71 A.L.R.2d 331] upheld an award of emotional distress damages based on the plaintiff's fear of cancer where she had been negligently burned in X-ray treatments and later advised by a dermatologist to have her tissue examined every six months as cancer might develop. (Accord, Dempsey v. Hartley (E.D.Pa. 1951) 94 F. Supp. 918, 920-921 [fear of breast cancer due to traumatic breast injury]; Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co. (1912) 159 N.C. 327 [74 S.E. 885, 886] [fear stemming from sarcoma liable to ensue from burn wound].) In these cases, the existence of a present physical injury, rather than the degree of probability that the disease may actually develop, is determinative. No California cases address whether impairment of the immune system response and cellular damage constitute physical injury sufficient to allow recovery for parasitic emotional distress damages. Courts in other jurisdictions that have considered this issue recently have come to differing conclusions. Plaintiffs, citing several such cases, contend that immune system impairment and cellular damage is a physical injury for which parasitic damages for emotional distress are available. (E.g., Werlein v. United States (D.Minn. 1990) 746 F. Supp. 887, 901, 906 [chromosomal breakage and damage to cardiovascular and immunal systems sufficient to satisfy present physical injury requirement for recovery of emotional distress damages where medical experts were prepared to testify as to such injury and authenticity of plaintiffs' symptoms]; Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co. (D.Mass. 1986) 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-1227 [subcellular harm or harm affecting body's ability to fight disease and causing harm to body's organ systems sufficient to support claim for emotional distress]; cf. Barth v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. (N.D.Cal. 1987) 661 F. Supp. 193, 196 [hereafter Barth ] [determining that, under California law, injury to immune system is form of actionable physical injury]; [7] Brafford v. Susquehanna Corp. (D.Colo. 1984) 586 F. Supp. 14 [although availability of emotional distress damages not specifically discussed, claim for physical injury allowed to proceed where evidence showed that chromosomal damage caused by radiation operated to deprive plaintiffs of a certain degree of immunity].) Conversely, Firestone contends that mere subcellular changes that are unaccompanied by clinically verifiable symptoms of illness or disease do not constitute a physical injury sufficient to support a claim for parasitic emotional distress damages. To support this contention, Firestone relies on a case in which workers' claims for fear of cancer from asbestos exposure were denied because they had failed to show that their fear was based on knowledge that their lungs were functionally impaired. ( In re Hawaii Federal Asbestos Cases (D.Hawaii 1990) 734 F. Supp. 1563, 1569-1570.) There it was held that a physical injury was not established by the mere presence of asbestos fibers in the lungs or by evidence of physiological changes in the lungs such as pleural thickening and pleural plaques. ( Id., at p. 1567.) Firestone also relies on cases holding that in the absence of some verifiable impairment, asbestos-related subcellular changes do not give rise to valid claims for physical injury. (E.g., Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp. (3d Cir.1985) 758 F.2d 936, 942 [although availability of emotional distress damages not discussed, subclinical injury resulting from exposure to asbestos held insufficient to constitute requisite actual loss or damage under Federal Employers' Liability Act]; Owens-Illinois v. Armstrong (1991) 87 Md. App. 699 [591 A.2d 544, 560-561] [pleural plaques and pleural scarring do not cause functional impairment or harm and therefore are not compensable].) It is not clear from the record in this case, however, that these plaintiffs' emotional distress is parasitic to this type of supposed injury. The statement of decision by the trial court does not include an express finding that plaintiffs' exposure to the contaminated well water resulted in physical injury, cellular damage or immune system impairment. The court made no mention of plaintiffs' immune system response, cellular systems or cells, and made no specific determination of damage or impairment thereto. While the trial court concluded that plaintiffs do have an enhanced susceptibility or risk for developing cancer and other maladies, it characterized this as a presently existing physical condition, not as a physical injury. We conclude, therefore, that we lack an appropriate factual record for resolving whether impairment to the immune response system or cellular damage constitutes a physical injury for which parasitic damages for emotional distress ought to be available. [8]