Opinion ID: 161232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jurisdiction: Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss Appeal

Text: 13 We must first address the Bowens' motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. The Bowens contend the parties' agreement that the district court's ruling shall be final forecloses any appellate review. We disagree and deny the motion. 14 Under 9 of the FAA, parties must express their intentions regarding judicial confirmation of an arbitration award in their arbitration agreements. 9 U.S.C. 9. The statute contemplates judicial confirmation of arbitration awards only when the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the award made pursuant to the arbitration. Id. We have held that this requires some language manifesting the parties' intenteither explicitly or implicitlyto have judgment entered on the award. Ok. City Assocs. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 923 F.2d 791, 795 (10th Cir. 1991); accord Smiga v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 766 F.2d 698, 705 (2d Cir. 1985). We have also observed that some courts have found that a finality clause is enough to constitute an agreement to have judgment entered by a federal court under 9 because this would be the only way to fulfill the parties' intent to make the award final and binding. Ok. City Assocs., 923 F.2d at 794. In this case, the parties' agreement that the district court's ruling be final may be construed as nothing more than a finality clause expressing their intent to have the district court enter judgment on the arbitration award. Indeed, because the rules chosen by the parties do not include a provision regarding judicial confirmation, the parties had to supplement the rules to ensure judgment be entered on the award under the FAA. 15 In addition, although parties to an arbitration agreement may eliminate judicial review by contract, their intention to do so must be clear and unequivocal. See Dep't of Air Force v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 775 F.2d 727, 733 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding parties did not completely waive right to appeal when agreement specified further rights of appeal are hereby waived except that all articles must be in conformance with law and Executive Order); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Am. Arbitration Ass'n, 478 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1973) (While it has been held that parties to an arbitration can agree to eliminate all court review of the proceedings, the intention to do so must clearly appear. (citations omitted)). The language in the parties' agreement does not clearly evince their intent to waive appellate review. In fact, the very statute from which we derive our jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. 1291, grants appellate courts jurisdiction from all final decisions of the district courts. Hence, by agreeing that the district court's ruling shall be final, the parties have merely reinforced the appellate jurisdiction conferred by 1291. The Bowens' best argument is that the word final is ambiguous, but courts have long recognized the common law rule that ambiguous language be construed against the drafter of that language. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62-63 (1995). Having suggested the modified language, the Bowens may not now claim the benefit of the doubt. Id. at 63.