Opinion ID: 2130950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did trial court erroneously instruct the jury regarding the duty to retreat?

Text: There was no dispute defendant and Douglas were in their own home when the shooting occurred. An issue of self-defense was inherent in the facts disclosed by the record. Defendant timely objected that instruction 16 inadequately stated the law of self-defense, leading the jury to believe she had a duty to retreat to avoid an assault in her own home. Instruction 16 was an effort to instruct the jury on the law of self-defense. It properly placed on the State the burden of proof to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not acting in self-defense. State v. Overstreet, 243 N.W.2d 880, 884 (Iowa 1976). This instruction set out the four conditions which must be met to justify homicide, identified most recently in State v. Beyer, 258 N.W.2d 353, 356 (Iowa 1977) and State v. Fisher, 246 N.W.2d 918, 920-921 (Iowa 1976). Trial court's instruction stated the second condition as follows: 2. The Defendant must retreat as set out later in this instruction. Later in the instruction the following language appeared: One who is assaulted in their own home is not bound to avoid the conflict by retreating from the premises. They are bound to avoid the conflict if there is evidence available to them as a reasonable and prudent person that in any way, other than by retreating, it can be avoided. But one who is assaulted, or threatened with assault in their own home is not bound to retreat in order to avoid attack; but may, without retreating, repel force with force, even to the extent of taking the life of the attacker. The fact that the Defendant and Douglas Lee Jacoby were in their own home and each had equal rights there is immaterial. This instruction obviously lacked a useful clarity in the situation disclosed by the evidence. It would have been more appropriate simply to tell the jury defendant was in her own home and had no duty to retreat. Instead of stating it was immaterial that both defendant and Douglas were in their own home and each had equal rights, trial court could have employed the language of State v. Leeper, 199 Iowa 432, 442, 200 N.W. 732, 736 (1924): [T]he fact that the assailant is also an occupant of the home, with an equal right there, does not put upon the one assaulted any duty to retreat. Nonetheless, in the instruction here under scrutiny, the general itemization of conditions justifying homicide imposed the duty to retreat only as set out later in this instruction. Later in the instruction, the jury was told twice that a person in her own home was not obligated to retreat. We should avoid a minute, technical or hypocritical analysis. Skalla v. Daeges, 234 Iowa 1260, 1270, 15 N.W.2d 638, 643 (1944). An overview of the instruction in its entirety convinces us it was minimally adequate to advise the jury of defendant's right to stand her ground in her own home. We find no error requiring reversal on this issue.