Opinion ID: 60771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discrimination and Defamation Claims

Text: We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. Greenwell v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 486 F.3d 840, 841 (5th Cir. 2007). Summary judgment may be granted only if there exists no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
Morrison has not offered direct evidence of discrimination; therefore, we analyze his claim under the familiar burden-shifting framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03 (1973); McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556-57 (5th Cir. 2007). Because the District terminated Morrison’s employment, he satisfies the requirements for a prima facie case under this 3 No. 07-10917 framework.2 However, the District offered several legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to terminate Morrison. The District cites Morrison’s poor job performance generally and, more specifically, his failure to submit timely and accurate time sheets, making unapproved modifications to his work hours, failure to submit leave forms for his absences, and scheduling special events at the Natatorium without proper notification. The burden shifted back to Morrison to demonstrate (1) that the defendants’ proffered reasons are not true (pretext theory) or (2) even if the reasons are true, the defendants’ decision was motivated in part by Morrison’s race (mixed-motive theory). Rachid v. Jack in the Box, 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). Morrison first argues that the District’s proffered reasons are “simply pretext” and “verifiably false.” To support this argument, Morrison suggests that Dudenhoeffer’s trustworthiness is “questionable,” argues that he was not given an opportunity to refute Dudenhoeffer’s allegations of deficient job performance, asserts that his other supervisor, Ritchie, did not understand Dudenhoeffer’s concerns over Morrison’s performance, and Ritchie would have approved a more flexible schedule for Morrison. But none of these assertions verify the allegation of falsity; Morrison points to no record evidence that would demonstrate pretext. Therefore, Morrison has failed to put forth evidence that would rebut any of the District’s proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons. See Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. System, 271 F.3d 212, 220 (5th Cir. 2001). Morrison also attacks the District’s decision to terminate him under the mixed-motive theory, arguing that he was treated differently than underperforming white employees because of his race. However, Morrison has not shown that these employees were given preferential treatment under 2 As did the district court, we reject Morrison’s argument that the District’s decision to place him on one day of paid decision-making leave constitutes an “adverse employment action” for purposes of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. McCoy, 492 F.3d at 559-60. 4 No. 07-10917 circumstances “nearly identical” to his own. See Okoye v. Univ. of Texas Houston Health Science Center, 245 F.3d 507, 514 (5th Cir. 2001). He offers three examples of alleged “differential” treatment. One employee was not disciplined despite watching pornographic material at work; another was not disciplined despite being caught asleep on the job. These violations of District policy are wholly dissimilar to those committed by Morrison. Finally, he alleges that a white employee at the Natatorium engaged in time sheet violations but was not disciplined or terminated; however, this employee’s infractions were not discovered until after her resignation, precluding the District from taking any disciplinary action against her. These comparisons do not support an inference of racially motivated decision-making by the District. See id. at 514-15. The District has articulated several legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for its decision to terminate Morrison. Morrison has failed to rebut these proffered reasons with record evidence. Thus, his claim for discrimination under Title VII fails.
Morrison alleges that the District’s decision to place him on decisionmaking leave and terminate him both constitute retaliatory acts under Title VII. In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Morrison must show that (1) he engaged in protected activity, (2) he experienced an adverse employment action following the protected activity, and (3) a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. McCoy, 492 F.3d at 55657. If a prima facie case of retaliation is established, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is employed. Id. at 557. We accept Morrison’s argument that he engaged in protected activity when he orally complained of race-based discrimination to Dudenhoeffer’s supervisor 5 No. 07-10917 on December 13, 2004.3 Morrison also alleges that both his placement on one day of paid decision-making leave and his termination constitute adverse employment actions. Even were we to make the generous assumption that placing an employee on one day of paid leave is an adverse employment action, Morrison fails to establish the requisite causal link between his lodging the oral complaint and the District’s decision to place him on leave. Undisputed record evidence shows that the decision to place Morrison on leave was made on December 8, five days prior to Morrison’s voicing his complaint. Morrison’s termination occurred approximately two months after his oral complaint. Assuming this two-month time period is sufficient to establish a causal link and satisfy the elements of Morrison’s prima facie case, the District explained that the termination was a result of documented job performance deficiencies that occurred during Morrison’s post-leave probationary period. “[O]nce the employer offers a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason that explains both the adverse action and the timing, the plaintiff must offer some evidence from which the jury may infer that retaliation was the real motive.” Swanson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997). On appeal, Morrison asserts that he “can surely make his prima facie case of retaliation;” this may be, but he just as surely fails to offer any evidence that would rebut the District’s proffered nondiscriminatory reasons for his termination. Morrison’s subjective belief that he was treated unfairly, even Ritchie’s alleged belief that Morrison was treated unfairly, is not sufficient to 3 We assume that this allegation – taken from Morrison’s deposition testimony – is true. We note, however, that Morrison also filed a written grievance on the same day. The written grievance made no mention of race and gave no indication that Morrison believed he was opposing racially-motivated actions by Dudenhoeffer or the District. As the district court correctly noted, the written grievance does not constitute protected activity. See Tomanovich v. City of Indianapolis, 457 F.3d 656, 663 (7th Cir. 2006) (“Although filing an official complaint with an employer may constitute statutorily protected activity under Title VII, the complaint must indicate the discrimination occurred because of sex, race, national origin, or some other protected class.”). 6 No. 07-10917 rebut the specific nondiscriminatory reasons offered by the District. Little v. Republic Refining Co., Ltd., 924 F.2d 93, 96 (5th Cir. 1991). For these reasons, Morrison’s Title VII retaliation claim also fails.
Finally, Morrison claims that Dudenhoeffer defamed him by telling a third party that Morrison was terminated for fighting. Texas law recognizes slander per se and slander per quod. Moore v. Waldrop, 166 S.W.3d 380, 384 (Tex. App. 2005). Morrison argues that Dudenhoeffer’s statement constitutes slander per se because it caused injury to his office, business or profession. See id. The district court properly rejected this argument. In order to constitute slander per se under this analysis, a statement must be “so obviously harmful” to the defendant’s professional reputation that damages may be presumed. See e.g., Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inv. v. Tucker, 806 S.W.2d 914, 921 (Tex. App. 1991) (statement suggesting that stock broker would lose his license was slanderous per se “because it is aimed at his conduct as a licensed stockbroker and it asserts a matter incompatible with his practicing that profession”); Bradbury v. Scott, 788 S.W.2d 31, 38 (Tex. App. 1989) (“To charge an employee with dishonesty in his dealings with his employer is slanderous per se . . . .”). Dudenhoeffer’s alleged statement does not rise to the level of “so obviously harmful” to Morrison’s occupation or profession that a court may presume he has suffered damages. Thus, Morrison must prove that his reputation was actually damaged as a result of Dudenhoeffer’s statement. Moore, 166 S.W.3d at 384. The district court found that Morrison had offered no evidence of actual damages. On appeal, Morrison does not dispute this finding. Instead, he suggests only that the district court misapplied the law because “[i]n a defamation per se context, damages are presumed without proof of injury.” As noted above, Dudenhoeffer’s statements were not per se defamatory. Because Morrison fails to point us to 7 No. 07-10917 any evidence of actual damage, we conclude that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Dudenhoeffer on Morrison’s defamation claim. In light of the forgoing, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the District and Dudenhoeffer.