Opinion ID: 794151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Thorn's appeal

Text: 9 Thorn asserts that his sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing on three grounds. Each of those grounds, which we discuss below, raises a threshold question as to what is properly before us to be considered on this appeal. 10 A. Imposition of a nine level increase for creating a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury 11 At the initial sentencing, the District Court declined to increase the Clean Air Act violations' base offense level under Sentencing Guidelines § 2Q1.2(b)(2), which provides: If the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury, increase by 9 levels. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Q1.2(b)(2). 1 On appeal this Court rejected the District Court's finding that medical evidence and evidence of exposure to asbestos was too uncertain, and we remanded with instructions to impose the nine-level increase. Thorn I, 317 F.3d at 117-19. 12 At Thorn's resentencing, the District Judge commented on this Court's remand decision, disagreeing with its reasoning. He explained that — contrary to Thorn I's conclusion that two legal errors marked his earlier analysis — he had not misunderstood § 2Q1.2(b)(2) as either (i) requiring a showing of actual injury or death, rather than a substantial likelihood of those results, or (ii) limiting its applicability to situations in which persons other than non-participants are at risk. Rather, according to the District Judge, the finding that Dr. Levin's testimony was insufficient to support an enhancement under § 2Q1.2(b)(2) was attributable to an adverse credibility assessment, which the district judge described as follows: 13 The [District] Court based its conclusion on the facts after reviewing all the evidence before it and determined that the government's proof, particularly the testimony of Dr. Levin, was unsupported by the available medical evidence and was to some extent incredible. In other words, the [District] Court made a credibility determination that found that Dr. Levin's testimony was unconvincing and too speculative a basis upon which to conclude that there was substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury. 14 The District Judge then imposed the nine-level increase. In doing so, however, his statements on the record give rise to appellant Thorn's argument on this appeal that this Court should reverse its prior ruling and defer to what the District Judge has now articulated as his view of the evidence at the time he originally decided not to impose the increase. 15 The law of the case doctrine counsels against revisiting our prior rulings in subsequent stages of the same case absent cogent and compelling reasons such as an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. United States v. Tenzer, 213 F.3d 34, 39 (2d Cir.2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). While we recognize that we are not bound by the law of the case, id., it is nevertheless clear that the circumstances here do not present cogent or compelling justification to reverse the decision of the Thorn I panel that directed the District Court to impose the nine-level enhancement under § 2Q1.2(b)(2). 16 The resentencing clarification, in which the District Court characterized its conclusion as an adverse credibility assessment, adds little to its original explanation for concluding that Thorn's conduct did not create a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury. At the initial sentencing, the District Court ruled that [t]here's just insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that any illness that might result from exposure to asbestos would cause serious bodily injury. On remand, the District Court explained that at the original sentencing it had determined that the Government's proof was unsupported and to some extent incredible and that Dr. Levin's testimony was unconvincing and too speculative. Nothing in the resentencing remarks indicates that the newly denominated credibility assessment derived from observing the witness's demeanor rather than from the substance of the testimony. While the former commands great deference, the latter may be reviewed meaningfully by examining the transcript. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575, 105 S.Ct. 1504, 84 L.Ed.2d 518 (1985) (noting that while Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure commands greater deference to findings based on credibility, it is not to suggest that the trial judge may insulate his findings from review by denominating them credibility determinations); see also Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 163-64 (2d Cir.2004) (discussing circumstances in which credibility determinations have been found clearly erroneous). This simply is not a situation in which the District Court relied on `the look or manner of the witness: his hesitation, his doubts, his variations of language, his confidence or precipitancy, his calmness or consideration' or any other quality that a review of the transcript would not reveal. See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 470 (2d Cir.1946) (quoting Regina v. Bertrand, (1865-67) L.R. 1 P.C. 520, 535 (Austl.)). Rather, the District Court's assessment that the testimony was incredible, unconvincing and too speculative is essentially the same as its initial finding that evidence was insufficient — both pertain to the content of the testimony, not to the witness's delivery. 17 Significantly, Thorn I did not remand for further findings or clarification, but expressly rejected the District Court's conclusion that the proof was insufficient in terms of medical evidence or evidence of exposure to asbestos. The Court found it beyond peradventure that asbestos-related diseases, such as mesothelioma, asbestosis, and lung cancer, constitute serious bodily injury under the Guidelines. Thorn I, 317 F.3d at 118 n. 7. Congress recognized the dangers of friable asbestos and identified it as a hazardous air pollutant in the early 1970s, and this Court has long acknowledged the attendant health risks. See LaBounty v. Coughlin, 137 F.3d 68, 74 n. 5 (2d Cir.1998) (citing Envtl. Encapsulating Corp. v. City of New York, 855 F.2d 48, 50 (2d Cir.1988)). We held in Thorn I : 18 Thus, given the absence of an articulated reason to reject this undisputed evidence, it was clear error for the District Court to find that there was insufficient evidence that Thorn's conduct resulted in a substantial likelihood that at least one, if not several, of his former employees would develop devastating, life-threatening, asbestos-related diseases. 19 Thorn I, 317 F.3d at 119. This Court's previous conclusion resulted only from a definite and firm conviction that a mistake [was] committed. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948). We agree, and we decline to disturb what has already been decided. 20 B. Denial of Thorn's request for downward departure based on the nature and extent of the risk created by the Clean Air Act violations 21 Thorn also contends that after imposing the nine-level enhancement directed by Thorn I, the District Court mistakenly concluded that it had no authority to consider a three-level downward departure. Thorn argued for the first time at resentencing that a departure from the nine-level enhancement was justified based on the nature of the risk created and the number of people subjected to it. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2Q1.2(b)(2), cmt. n. 6. The Government contends that the District Court correctly concluded that it was constrained by Thorn I's mandate from considering the departure. 22 In the initial sentencing proceedings, Thorn opposed the Government's application for the § 2Q1.2(b)(2) nine-point enhancement, consistently arguing that the adjustment should not apply. Thorn asserted that the Government's proof was insufficient to demonstrate that the Clean Air Act offenses resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury warranting imposition of an enhancement pursuant to § 2Q1.2(b)(2). In addition, Thorn's presentence memorandum and his initial appellate brief advocated the propriety of refusing the enhancement or granting a departure based on the fact that the persons at risk for death or serious injury were co-conspirators. See Brief of Appellee/Cross-Appellant Joseph P. Thorn, at 11, n. 7, Thorn I, 317 F.3d 107 (No. 01-1669); Defendant's Sentencing Memorandum and Motion for Downward Departure, entered Aug. 2, 2001, at 14-15, United States v. Thorn, Docket No. 00-CR-088 (N.D.N.Y.). We specifically rejected this argument in Thorn I, finding that § 2Q1.2(b)(2) is not limited to situations in which the offense conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons other than participants in the offense. Thorn I, 317 F.3d at 118 (declining to find a restriction not set forth expressly in the Guideline, given that the Sentencing Commission knows how to limit an enhancement based on victim complicity, i.e. § 2K1.4(a)(1)). 23 Thorn does not assert on this appeal that the District Court could have based a departure on an absence of innocent victims. Rather, Thorn now argues that the District Court erred by refusing to consider a departure based on the nature of the risk created and the number of people placed at risk, pursuant to Application Note 6 of § 2Q1.2(b)(2), a theory he argued for the first time at his resentencing hearing. 24 Where necessitated by specific error(s), resentencing is limited, not de novo. United States v. Quintieri, 306 F.3d 1217, 1225-29 (2d Cir.2002) (unless the Court specifically provides for de novo sentencing or the spirit of the mandate requires de novo sentencing, a defendant may not raise matters not litigated at the initial sentencing). Thorn I identified particular sentencing issues necessitating remand, narrowly directing imposition of the nine-level enhancement under § 2Q1.2(b)(2) without inviting the District Court to consider downward departures. Thorn I, 317 F.3d at 117-19. 25 It is clear that the remand in this case was for limited, not de novo, resentencing. In this context, we will consider the issue of the three-level departure waived if Thorn, at the time of the initial sentencing, had both an opportunity and incentive to raise it before the sentencing court or on appeal. See Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1229 (concluding that the law of the case ordinarily prohibits a party, upon resentencing or an appeal from that resentencing, from raising issues that he or she waived by not litigating them at the time of the initial sentencing). Prior to the initial sentencing, Thorn knew that the Government was arguing for the § 2Q1.2(b)(2) enhancement and that the decision as to whether to impose it would be up to the District Court. Thorn had every incentive both to argue against the adjustment and to seek to diminish it on any available basis in the event it was imposed. He did so, however, only on the grounds of victim complicity. 26 Even in the case of a limited remand, we will not consider an issue waived if a sentencing determination becomes relevant only after appellate review or if the matter is based on circumstances arising after the original sentence was imposed. See id. at 1229-30. Neither of these exceptions applies to the downward departure arguments at issue. Although the District Court initially declined imposition of the nine-level enhancement, thereby obviating further argument for departure, notice that the Government sought the adjustment gave Thorn the incentive and opportunity to assert every possible basis for departure. In addition, any facts relating to the nature and extent of the risk created by the offense conduct existed at the time of the original sentencing and subsequent appeal and, therefore, should have been raised to the District Court and to this Court at that time. Id. at 1229 n. 7 (a defendant who did not request a downward departure at an initial sentencing has waived the right to do so at a subsequent sentencing based on any grounds available at the first sentencing (emphasis added)); see also United States v. Carpenter, 320 F.3d 334, 341 (2d Cir.2003) (departure arguments based on grounds existing when the original sentence was imposed were issues for [defendant] to establish at his first sentencing and sustain on appeal, if ever). 27 In addition, even if Thorn could have raised the argument on resentencing, we conclude that the facts foreclose a downward departure based on the nature and extent of the risk of death or serious injury resulting from Thorn's violations of workplace standards. Evidence at trial demonstrated that during the relevant period approximately 700 people, some of them young teenagers, worked on A+ friable asbestos projects amidst visible and substantial emissions of asbestos fibers, frequently without the benefit of respiratory protection. 2 On this record, it is simply not sustainable as a matter of law that an Application Note 6 downward departure could be given because the risk to health was not sufficiently serious or the number of people endangered was too small to support a nine-level enhancement. Thorn I implicitly held as much. See United States v. Ben Zvi, 242 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir.2001) (stating that law of the case doctrine `forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court' (quoting United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir.1993))). The District Court correctly concluded that it could not consider the three-level downward departure from the nine-level enhancement under § 2Q1.3(b)(2) mandated by this Court. C. Imposition of restitution 28 Prior to the original sentencing, the Probation Officer's presentence report identified 130 A+ projects involving illegal asbestos abatement, false air analysis and mail fraud during the relevant period. Based on victim loss declarations, the Probation Department determined that restitution should be imposed, and at the original sentencing the District Court ordered Thorn to pay restitution in the sum of $299,593.40, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663A, which provides in relevant part: 29 (a)(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, when sentencing a defendant convicted of an offense described in subsection (c), the court shall order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim of the offense . . . 30 (2) For the purposes of this section the term victim means a person directly and proximately harmed as a result of the commission of an offense . . . 31 . . . . 32 (c)(1) This section shall apply in all sentencing proceedings for convictions of. . . any offense . . . 33 (B) in which an identifiable victim or victims has suffered a physical injury or pecuniary loss. 34 18 U.S.C. § 3663A. 35 Thorn's challenge to the restitution order is not preserved for appeal. For the reasons discussed in Point I.B, supra, Thorn waived his objection by not raising it when he first had the incentive and opportunity to do so. Having made no objection at the first sentencing hearing and on the first appeal, he still did not object to the restitution order before the District Court at the time of the second sentencing proceeding. 36 We find no cogent or compelling reason to overlook Thorn's failure to raise the issue of restitution at any prior point in these proceedings. See Quintieri, 306 F.3d at 1230. Nor does the imposition of restitution constitute plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731-32, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (under Rule 52(b), the discretion to correct forfeited errors should not be exercised unless the error is plain, affects substantial rights and seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This portion of the Amended Judgment is affirmed.