Opinion ID: 1712758
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Make an Independent Determination of the Valuation Issues.

Text: We consider plaintiff's second and third claims of error together because they are closely related. He contends that, even if his evidentiary showing was insufficient to shift the burden of proof to the board of review, the district court was required to weigh the evidence in its totality and make an independent determination on the valuation issues. We agree with this description of the district court's role in the trial of assessment cases. See, e.g., Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Review, 281 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Iowa 1979); Bartlett & Co. Grain v. Board of Review, 253 N.W.2d 86, 89 (Iowa 1977). In the present case, the district court resolved the burden of proof issue against the plaintiff and then concluded its written decision as follows: The plaintiff testified in his own behalf. Is plaintiff a disinterested witness? This court concludes he is not.... [P]laintiff has attempted to show throughout the trial a method to compute a lower valuation.... [P]laintiff's testimony is not credible since he has a pecuniary interest at stake. Because only one witness was competent to testify, plaintiff has failed to satisfy his burden of proof [citing section 441.21(3)]. We believe this statement by the court misinterprets the legal consequences of being an interested witness under section 441.21(3). This circumstance does not affect the competency of the witness. It only means that the witness's testimony may not be considered in determining whether the burden of proof shifts to the board of review. It does not mean that the witness's testimony may not be considered on the merits of the issues presented. We do not, however, remand the matter to the district court for additional findings as the plaintiff has requested. We are empowered to decide the ultimate issues involved de novo on appeal. Equitable Life Insurance Co. v. Board of Review, 281 N.W.2d at 827. In making such determinations, we are guided by the principle that no presumption of validity is to be accorded the challenged valuation. See Tiffany v. County Board of Review, 188 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Iowa 1971); James Black Dry Goods Co. v. Board of Review, 260 Iowa 1269, 1276, 151 N.W.2d 534, 538 (1967). Nevertheless, because the property owner has not effectively shifted the burden of proof, he must establish by a preponderance of evidence that the challenged valuation is excessive, inadequate, inequitable or capricious. Wunschel v. Board of Review, 217 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1974). Viewed in this light, we believe that the evidence as a whole fails to establish that any of the challenged assessments are too high or are otherwise inequitable. Plaintiff's arguments are based primarily on his own views concerning the relative values of his property and property which he deems to be comparable thereto. Our review of his evidence, however, leads to the conclusion that it is fatally deficient with regard to those factors of productivity and earning capacity which must be considered in evaluating agricultural real estate under section 441.21(3). Neither the valuations undertaken by the inheritance tax appraisers nor the comparisons drawn in plaintiff's own testimony purport to take account of those factors required to be considered by this statute. These deficiencies in plaintiff's proof deprive his arguments of persuasive effect. We have considered all claims advanced and find no basis for disturbing the judgment of the district court. AFFIRMED.