Opinion ID: 473005
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: CCE and Predicate Acts

Text: 23 To establish guilt under the continuing criminal enterprise statute, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848, the government must prove: 1) a felony violation of the federal narcotics law; 2) as part of a continuing series of violations; 3) in concert with five or more persons; 4) for whom the defendant is an organizer or supervisor; 5) from which he derives substantial income or resources. United States v. Schuster, 769 F.2d 337, 340 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 75 (4th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1005, 102 S.Ct. 1642, 71 L.Ed.2d 874 (1982). The statute requires an agreement in a design or plan as well as concerted activity. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 148-49, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 2214-15, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977). The predicate acts here, conspiracy to manufacture methamphetamine and phencyclidine, are based on the conspiracy statute at 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846. This statute punishes attempts or conspiracies to violate the drug laws. 24 Grayson urges that his prior convictions under section 846 bar his successive prosecution for a CCE offense. Recently, in Garrett v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985), the Supreme Court considered the question whether the government could prosecute CCE charges based in part on conduct for which the defendant had been convicted previously for importing marijuana. Garrett was indicted in March 1981, in the Western District of Washington and subsequently pleaded guilty to one count of importation of marijuana. Thereafter, in July 1981, Garrett was indicted in the Northern District of Florida for conspiring to import marijuana, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 952, 960, 963, conspiring to possess marijuana with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 841, 846, using a telephone to facilitate illegal drug activities, 21 U.S.C. Secs. 963, 846, 843(b), and engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848. In the Florida trial, evidence underlying Garrett's prior conviction in Washington was introduced to prove one of three predicate offenses that must be shown to make out a CCE violation. Garrett was convicted on the CCE count, the two conspiracy counts, and the telephone facilitation count. Garrett was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment and a $100,000 fine on the CCE count, the prison term being concurrent with the prison terms on the other counts but consecutive to the prison term from the Washington conviction. Rejecting Garrett's contention that his Washington conviction barred the subsequent CCE prosecution in Florida, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Washington offense and the CCE offense were not the same under the double jeopardy clause, and hence that successive prosecutions and cumulative sentences for these offenses were permissible. 25 In its review of the double jeopardy question, the Supreme Court considered whether Congress intended that the CCE be a separate offense from the underlying predicate offenses. The Court held, after extensive legislative analysis, that [t]he language, structure, and legislative history of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse, Prevention and Control Act of 1970, however, show in the plainest way that Congress intended the CCE provision to be a separate criminal offense which was punishable in addition to, and not as a substitute for, the predicate offenses. Garrett, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 2412. The Court noted that it would be illogical for Congress to intend that a choice be made between the predicate offenses and the CCE offense in pursuing major drug dealers. Id. 105 S.Ct. at 2415. 26 The Court next considered whether prosecution for a CCE offense after an earlier prosecution for a predicate offense is constitutional under the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court held that it did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause to prosecute the CCE offense after the prior conviction for one of the predicate offenses. The CCE offense is not the same offense as one or more of its predicate offenses within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. The Supreme Court then noted that in order to properly analyze the successive prosecution issue, we must examine not only the statute which Congress has enacted, but also the charges which form the basis of the [g]overnment's prosecution here. Id. at 2415-16. As a result, the Court held that because the Florida CCE charge included acts which took place after the date of the Washington indictment, the CCE offense charged had not been completed at the time the Washington indictment was returned; hence, the evidence of the Washington importation offense could be used to prove one of the predicate offenses for the Florida CCE offense. Id. at 2419. 27 Although Garrett involved a substantive predicate offense rather than a conspiracy predicate offense, the rationale and conclusions of the opinion are equally applicable to a prior conviction for a predicate conspiracy offense. Section 848(b)(1) of Title 21 defines the required predicate offenses of a CCE as violations of any provision of either subchapters I or II of Chapter 13 of Title 21 the punishment for which is a felony. Under the plain terms of the statute, therefore, conspiracies under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 for which the punishment is a felony clearly qualify as predicate acts. Moreover, in that portion of Garrett dealing with the issue of successive prosecutions, Garrett, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 2411-19, the Court consistently refers only to predicate offenses and does not limit, in any way, its holding to substantive predicate offenses. It was only in reference to the cumulative punishment issue that the Court in Garrett referred to Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 97 S.Ct. 2207, 53 L.Ed.2d 168 (1977), and distinguished conspiracies from substantive predicate offenses. 7 Id. 105 S.Ct. at 2420. 28 The case of Jeffers is not to the contrary. In Jeffers, a plurality opinion, the Court was presented with successive prosecutions for conspiracy under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 846 and continuing criminal enterprise under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 848. However, the Court never directly decided the issue of the propriety of successive prosecutions, holding instead that because the defendant had objected to the government's motion to jointly try the cases his action deprived him of any right that he might have had against consecutive trials. Jeffers, 432 U.S. at 154, 97 S.Ct. at 2218. Furthermore, in Jeffers, unlike both Garrett and the present case, the two offenses--the conspiracy and the CCE--covered the exact same time period and, according to the government much of the evidence planned for the Sec. 848 trial was based on the same transactions as those involved in the Sec. 846 case. Id. at 142, 97 S.Ct. at 2211. 29 Here, as in Garrett, the CCE charge included numerous offenses both distinct from the two prior conspiracy convictions as well as subsequent to the date of indictment in each of the prior cases. Count three, the CCE charge against Grayson, occurred [f]rom in or about March 1977 to in or about November 1983. Grayson App. at 42a. The prior indictment against Grayson in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania was filed on May 19, 1977, and the conspiracy of which Grayson was convicted existed from on or about March 29, 1977, to on or about May 4, 1977. Grayson App. at 285a. The District of Maryland indictment was filed on February 23, 1983, and Grayson's conspiracy conviction there covered the period December 1982 up to and including on or about January 28, 1983. Grayson App. at 289a. The indictment here alleges a total of 26 predicate acts against Grayson in Count two, the RICO charge, all of which the government also relied upon as predicates for the CCE charge in Count three. Govt.App. at 775a-876a. Twenty-five of those predicate acts occurred after the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indictment was filed, and three occurred after the filing of the District of Maryland indictment. Grayson App. at 17a-24a. The evidence at trial showed Grayson continued to be involved in illegal drug activity as part of the CCE through July 1983, at least four to five months after the return of the Maryland indictment. Govt.App. at 451a-56a, 693a-95a, 712a-14a. 30 Accordingly, in view of Garrett and under the facts of this case, the admission of Grayson's two prior conspiracy convictions as predicate acts for the CCE charge did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause.