Opinion ID: 494684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Emmert's Hearsay Statements

Text: 18 The district court also excluded Powell's testimony that Emmert told him that he was afraid of the government agents. The court ruled that such testimony was hearsay not excepted by Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3), which provides that the hearsay rule does not exclude: 19 (3) Then existing mental, emotional, or physical condition. A statement of the declarant's then existing state of mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition (such as intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, and bodily health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed ... 20 (limiting language emphasized). The district court ruled that Rule 803(3) did not except Powell's testimony from the hearsay rule because it was a statement of memory or belief to prove the fact remembered or believed.... While we review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion, United States v. McClintock, supra, the district court's construction of the rules of evidence is reviewed de novo. United States v. Owens, 789 F.2d 750, 757 (9th Cir.1986). 21 This court has identified three factors bearing on the foundational inquiry on admissibility under Rule 803(3): contemporaneousness, chance for reflection, and relevance. United States v. Ponticelli, 622 F.2d 985, 991 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980), overruled on other grounds, United States v. De Bright, 730 F.2d 1255, 1259 (9th Cir.1984). Defendants contend that the district court erred by failing to apply this analysis. We disagree. The court focused not on the foundation requirements of the state of mind exception, but assumed arguendo that the testimony met the general Rule 803(3) requirements. The court then properly focused on the memory-or-belief limitation on Rule 803(3). 22 Appellants contend that United States v. Kelly, 722 F.2d 873 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1070, 104 S.Ct. 1425, 79 L.Ed.2d 749 (1984), construed the limiting language in Rule 803(3). Kelly merely concluded that the trial court properly admitted testimony as to the defendant's declarations tending to show state of mind in a criminal prosecution which required proof of state of mind. 722 F.2d at 878. The decision does not discuss the language limiting the scope of Rule 803(3). 23 United States v. Cohen, 631 F.2d 1223 (5th Cir.1980), reh'g denied, 636 F.2d 315 (1981), is factually similar to this case. It also specifically addresses the limiting language in Rule 803(3). In Cohen, witnesses were called by the defense to corroborate the defendant's direct testimony of threats made by Galkin, a co-conspirator. The witnesses would have testified as to Cohen's out-of-court declarations that he was threatened. The Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of this evidence: 24 Appellant seeks to stretch the limited scope of admissibility under F.R.E. 803(3). That rule by its own terms excepts from the ban on hearsay such statements as might have been made by Cohen of his then existing state of mind or emotion, but expressly excludes from the operation of the rule a statement of belief to prove the fact believed.... [T]he state-of-mind exception does not permit the witness to relate any of the declarant's statements as to why he held the particular state of mind, or what he might have believed that would have induced the state of mind. If the reservation in the text of the rule is to have any effect, it must be understood to narrowly limit those admissible statements to declarations of condition--I'm scared--and not belief--I'm scared because Galkin threatened me. 25 631 F.2d at 1225 (emphasis added). Because the reasoning in Cohen is compelled by the limiting language of Rule 803(3), we adopt it and apply it to this case. Powell was to testify that Emmert declared that he was scared because of the threats made by the agents, who Emmert thought were members of a crime family. Since Powell's testimony would have fallen within the belief category and would not have been limited to Emmert's current state of mind, it was properly excluded. OUTRAGEOUS GOVERNMENT CONDUCT 26 Finally, defendants argue that the government's role in the drug transaction was objectively so outrageous as to have violated their right to due process of law. The court, after trial and a post-trial hearing, denied their motion to dismiss the indictment on this ground. We review the denial of their motion to dismiss de novo as a question of law, United States v. Bogart, 783 F.2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir.1986), while viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and accepting the court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous. United States v. Bagnariol, 665 F.2d 877, 880 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 962, 102 S.Ct. 2040, 72 L.Ed.2d 487 (1982). 27 The Supreme Court recognized the defense of outrageous governmental conduct in United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973), and Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484, 96 S.Ct. 1646, 48 L.Ed.2d 113 (1976). This Court recently analyzed the defense in United States v. Bogart, supra. Bogart limits the availability of the defense to extreme cases and compels an affirmance in this case. 28 At the outset, we note that Arriaga lacks standing to object to the government's activities in this case since he was never an actual target of the investigation. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1433. Emmert was not initially a target of the government's investigation, but became a target when Powell introduced him to Mosteller and Vasquez. 29 There are two categories of cases in which law enforcement conduct becomes constitutionally unacceptable: (1) the government utilizes unwarranted physical or mental coercion to effectuate the crime; or (2) the police completely fabricate the crime solely to secure the defendant's conviction. Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1438. Appellants argue both theories. A. Mental Coercion 30 Emmert contends that government agents coerced him to proceed with the drug transaction with threats and intimidation and, further weaves into his argument that by offering a $200,000 finder's fee for relatively little work, and because Powell and Emmert had never bought or sold drugs previously, the government conduct was outrageous. We turn first to the threats. 31 The trial court found that there was no independent evidence of coercive threats. 2 Such a finding is consistent with the jury finding that Emmert was not entrapped because of the same threats and intimidation. The court's finding of fact is not clearly erroneous. 32 The same threats by government agents may theoretically be the basis for both an entrapment defense and a due process claim for unwarranted mental coercion, however, the standards for the two defenses are different. In Bogart we noted the distinction between a due-process claim for outrageous government conduct, which is determined objectively, and the subjective entrapment defense. 783 F.2d at 1435. Furthermore, the standard for a due process claim is much higher than the standard for a statutory entrapment defense. See Bogart, 783 F.2d at 1435 (due process defense must not swallow up the entrapment rule). 33 Express or implied threats may be warranted under certain circumstances. In United States v. Reynoso-Ulloa, 548 F.2d 1329, 1339 (9th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926, 98 S.Ct. 2820, 56 L.Ed.2d 769 (1978), this Court rejected a due process defense based on alleged threats by a government informant in a drug deal. We noted that threats must be viewed in their context and may not always constitute outrageous conduct: 34 The threat must be viewed in the context of the vulgarity and 'puffing' engaged in by all participants in the transaction.... This Court may judicially notice the fact that trafficking in drugs is a sordid business, and often involves persons of the lowest caliber. When viewed in this context, [the government informant's] threat fails to rise to the level of conduct violative of 'fundamental fairness, shocking to the universal sense of justice.' Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234, 80 S.Ct. 297, 304, 4 L.Ed.2d 268 (1960). 35 548 F.2d at 1339. Because threats of the kind found here--scarcely more than bluster--are ordinary bargaining tactics in drug deals, government agents may need to engage in such unsavory conduct to maintain their cover. Indeed, in this case, agent Vasquez had to allay Emmert's and Emery's suspicions that he was a police officer. The threats convinced Emmert that Vasquez was a mobster with whom he could do business. 36 We also reject the argument that the amount of the finder's fee offered Emmert and Powell renders the government's conduct outrageous. Like the intimidation, large sums of money are common to narcotics enterprises and necessary to create a credible cover for undercover agents. Furthermore, Mosteller's offer of the large finder's fee was not intended as bait for college students, but as a method to smoke out a supplier capable of selling large quantities of cocaine. 37 Finally, we address Emmert's contention that selecting Powell and Emmert makes the investigation outrageous. Even though Mosteller did not know whether Powell was a drug dealer, he knew Powell was probably in a position to know someone who was by virtue of attending a party where cocaine was served. Under these circumstances, asking Powell whether he knows a drug supplier is not outrageous. Emmert did not become a target of the investigation until he voluntarily accepted Powell's invitation to meet with Mosteller. At that first meeting between Emmert and Mosteller, Powell introduced Emmert as someone who could arrange a drug sale. Targeting Emmert was thus the result of Powell's and Emmert's own voluntary conduct, and was not outrageous. 38 For these reasons, the criminal investigation in this case, including the threats, intimidation, large finder's fee, and targeting of Powell and Emmert for investigation, does not constitute mentally coercive outrageous government conduct that shocks the conscience. Russell, 411 U.S. at 432, 93 S.Ct. at 1643. B. Fabrication of Crime 39 Defendants also claim that the government agents entirely fabricated the drug transaction. They cite the district court's finding that there was no evidence that Emmert or Powell had been involved in prior drug transactions. As we noted in Bogart, the inquiry into the defendants' predisposition to commit the crime is relevant to the subjective entrapment defense. When evaluating the merits of a due process claim, however, courts should consider the government's conduct objectively, without regard to the defendants' predisposition. 783 F.2d at 1433. 40 Government agents may approach people already engaged in or contemplating criminal activity. United States v. O'Conner, 737 F.2d 814, 817-18 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1218, 105 S.Ct. 1198, 84 L.Ed.2d 343 (1985). In the course of an undercover narcotics investigation, an agent may provide something of value to a criminal enterprise to gain the confidence of those involved in illicit activity. United States v. Lomas, 706 F.2d 886, 890-91 (9th Cir.1983). Emmert was drawn into this conspiracy by Powell. When the government agents first targeted Emmert for investigation, he had expressed interest in receiving a portion of the finder's fee in exchange for brokering cocaine supplied by Cioe. He was therefore contemplating criminal activity and further investigation was appropriate. 41 Law enforcement conduct becomes constitutionally unacceptable where government agents engineer and direct the criminal enterprise from start to finish. United States v. So, 755 F.2d 1350, 1353 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Ramirez, 710 F.2d 535, 539 (9th Cir.1983). Generation of new crimes merely for the sake of pressing criminal charges against the defendant also constitutes outrageous government conduct. Ramirez, 710 F.2d at 540. The Bogart decision points out that due process claims under this theory have been successful only where the government essentially manufactured the crime. 783 F.2d 1436 (discussing Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.1971); United States v. Twigg, 588 F.2d 373 (3d Cir.1978); United States v. Batres-Santolino, 521 F.Supp. 744 (N.D.Cal.1981)). 42 This case is fundamentally different than Greene v. United States, 454 F.2d 783 (9th Cir.1971). In that case, the government essentially manufactured the crime. An undercover agent was involved in the defendant's illegal still operation for two years. The agent offered to supply raw materials, an operator and location for the still. The government actually sold sugar to the defendants at wholesale prices. The agent also purchased the still's entire production. This court concluded that the government could not involve itself so directly and continuously for such a long period of time and then prosecute its collaborators. 454 F.2d at 787. In this case, the government was on only one side of the transaction: Powell and Emmert independently arranged the cocaine supply from co-defendant Cioe. The government did not fabricate the crime in this case. 43 AFFIRMED.