Opinion ID: 848804
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Clarification of the Scope of this Action

Text: The majority's ardent response to my dissent suggests I have misunderstood its position and the scope of its holding. Ultimately, the reader will judge the accuracy of that accusation. Nevertheless, I believe a certain degree of clarification is required. The majority claims that plaintiff only alleged a sexual-harassment claim and, therefore, there is no need for [it] to reach out and address whether the CRA recognizes a claim for hostile work environment based on anything other than sexual harassment. Ante at 138. However, this position disregards the allegations articulated in plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff claimed the conduct of defendant's employees, in sexually harassing [d]ecedent Rich, constitutes sexual discrimination in violation of MCL 37.2101 ... et seq. (Emphasis added.) Plaintiff stated that the harassment included, but was not limited to, frequent comments regarding [d]ecedent Rich's gender, weight and ability as a Capitol Security Officer and, on many occasions, [Findsen] made hostile and offensive comments to [d]ecedent Rich regarding her sex, weight and ability as a Capitol Security Officer. Though the majority cannot dispute sex discrimination, as proscribed by M.C.L. § 37.2202(1), has been alleged, it apparently presumes that plaintiff seeks recovery only under a narrow subcategory of sex discrimination, i.e., sexual harassment as defined by M.C.L. § 37.2103(i)(iii). The majority claims that this assumption justifies its refusal to entertain a hostile-work-environment claim based on sex, which includes gender. Unfortunately, this interpretation deprives plaintiff of a fair and honest reading of the complaint and altogether ignores plaintiff's position, as repeatedly documented in her briefs to the circuit court, the Court of Appeals, and this Court. Plaintiff noted that both federal and Michigan courts are increasingly recognizing claims for workplace harassment that go beyond traditional sexual harassment cases. [11] To support this claim, plaintiff's counsel cited Michigan precedent holding that harassment based on any one of the enumerated classifications [in M.C.L. § 37.2202] is an actionable offense. See n. 11, each citing Malan v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 212 Mich.App. 585, 538 N.W.2d 76 (1995). I am unable to identify what more plaintiff's counsel could have pleaded or argued in the written submissions to clarify plaintiff's theory for the majority. Perhaps because the written submissions are adequate to establish plaintiff's claim, the majority attempts to support its narrow interpretation by shifting the focus to counsel's comments at oral argument. Ante at 138 n. 17. Justice Markman queried plaintiff's counsel, asking him whether he agreed with defense counsel that all of [plaintiff's] eggs in this case are in the sexual harassment basket and that sexual discrimination other than sexual harassment hasn't been pleaded here. Plaintiff's counsel, Mr. Boog, responded. Mr. Boog: We haven't been given an opportunity to plead that because we could not amend our complaint but at the time we did this it was considered a sexual harassment based on gender based on federal decisions that came down at that time. Justice Taylor continued this line of questioning. Justice Taylor: Now, that being the case, you are attempting to come under the sexual harassment, is that right. Mr. Boog: Yes, but with the understanding that I don't believe the statutory language excludes other types of sexual harassment besides what's in Section 103 and 104, the definitions that we've talked about.