Opinion ID: 1801755
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The prosecutor's closing argument concerning the evidence

Text: Defendant asserts that certain comments during the prosecutor's closing argument improperly drew attention to defendant's decision not to testify, indicated that defendant had the burden to present an affirmative defense and to prove his innocence, and disparaged defense counsel. Therefore, he claims, the comments violated his right to a fair trial and due process of law under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and article I, section 7 of the California Constitution. During his closing argument, the prosecutor read portions of defense counsel's cross-examination of taxicab dispatcher Virginia Turner. These excerpts included defense counsel's question, whether it was true that when defendant came to the taxicab office at 2:00 a.m. on the night of the crimes, he had to knock on the door extensively to wake Turner up, and Turner's response, No. The prosecutor also noted defense counsel's question, whether Turner saw a man named Reese that night, and Turner's response, Not that I recall, no. Next, the prosecutor observed that when defense counsel asked whether Turner recalled speaking with a defense investigator in 1993, she responded, Yes, I did. Defense counsel then inquired, Do you recall telling him that a gentleman named Reese was out in the parking lot at the carports along with David Hargrove, Brian Jones, [and defendant]? Turner answered, I don't recall. Finally, defense counsel asked Turner, Do you also recall telling him that approximately 10:00 in the evening, you saw Michael and Reese walking through the alley? Turner responded, I don't recall. After reading these portions of the cross-examination of Turner, the prosecutor urged the jury to [l]ook at the question. What's the insinuation? The insinuation is that she did say those things previously, and it puts in your mind the thought that [defendant] is with Reese walking around the alley and is seen by people there. But there's no evidence of that, only the defendant's statement when he's trying to use this person, Reese, as an alibi for this missing time gap that he has. Had Virginia Turner actually said these things to a defense investigator, don't you think they would have produced the defense investigator to say, `Yeah. I interviewed her. Here's what she said.' [¶] You can conclude from the fact that the defense investigator wasn't presented to you that these insinuations are false, and all they can do possibly is mislead you as to what the evidence is in this case. After the prosecutor concluded the first portion of his closing argument, and outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel stated that the defense team had been unable to locate the investigator who conducted interviews of witnesses in 1993, before these attorneys represented defendant. He stated: There are reasons why we could not find him that we could not present to the jury. There are reasons between [cocounsel] and myself why we decided that that impeachment was not necessary. Questions were asked of witnesses in regard to reports and statements that they gave to that investigator and asked if they recalled those statements. He asserted the prosecutor's argument constituted impermissible commentary upon defense counsel's decision to call or not call witnesses, and requested the court to instruct the jury again pursuant to CALJIC No. 2.11: Neither side is required to call as witnesses all persons who may have been present at any of the events disclosed by the evidence or who may appear to have some knowledge of these events. Neither side is required to produce all objects or documents mentioned or suggested by the evidence. The trial court stated it had not previously heard of any problem in locating an investigator, and expressed the view that [t]he problem here is that if you didn't talk to the witnesses or interview the witnesses or they wouldn't talk to you, which is oftentimes the case, ... to see what their response would be without having the witness available to back it up, it's a risk. And if the person, as in this case, testifies they don't remember saying that, then you're left with an empty sack, so to speak, because you have no way of bringing it forward. But it doesn't prevent the prosecution from commenting as was done in this particular case. The court concluded it was not necessary to reinstruct the jury with CALJIC No. 2.11. There is no merit in defendant's contention that the trial court should have reinstructed the jury that neither side was required to call all potential witnesses, because defendant has not established that the prosecutor argued that a party was required to call all potential witnesses. [34] Defendant's additional contentions fail becausedefendant having failed to raise them belowthey are forfeited on appeal, and because they lack merit in any event. Although the exchange described above reflects that defense counsel complained only that the prosecutor's argument constituted impermissible comment upon defense counsel's decision to call or not call witnesses, defendant now claims he objected that the prosecutor's comments were an improper back-door comment on defendant's silence .... In support of this assertion, he relies upon an objection made by his counsel earlier during the prosecutor's closing argument. Our review of the record, however, reflects that the earlier objection related to the prosecutor's stated intention to highlight representations made in the defense opening statement that were not proved; the earlier objection did not address the prosecutor's stated intention to highlight insinuations made through the cross-examination of witnesses. [35] Therefore, defendant forfeited the claim that the prosecutor's statements concerning insinuations made through cross-examination constituted an improper comment upon defendant's silence. ( People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1333 [65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259] ( Bradford ).) Similarly, defendant has not cited anything in the record establishing that he claimed below that the prosecutor's comments concerning the cross-examination of Turner shifted the burden of proof to defendant to prove his whereabouts on the evening of the crimes, or that these comments disparaged defense counsel. He has therefore forfeited these claims. ( Ibid. ) (9) In any event, had defendant preserved these claims, they would fail. First, with respect to defendant's right not to testify, [i]t is now well established that although Griffin [ v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229]] prohibits reference to a defendant's failure to take the stand in his own defense, that rule `does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses. [Citations.]' [Citations.] ( People v. Vargas (1973) 9 Cal.3d 470, 475 [108 Cal.Rptr. 15, 509 P.2d 959].) The prosecutor's comments merely drew attention to the absence of the investigator as a witness for the defense, rather than to defendant's absence from the witness stand. [36] Had defendant testified, he might have contradicted Turner's recollection, but this possibility does not transform the prosecutor's observations into a veiled comment upon defendant's decision not to testify. (See People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1229 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1] [a prosecutor may not claim that evidence is uncontradicted if the defendant is the only person who could refute the evidence, but if others could have contradicted the evidence the prosecutor may comment upon the state of the evidence].) Second, with respect to the burden of proof, the prosecutor's comments merely established that, contrary to insinuations made during cross-examination, Turner's testimony was unimpeached. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury would have understood the prosecutor's remarks to suggest that defendant had the burden to establish his own whereabouts that evening. ( People v. Clair (1992) 2 Cal.4th 629, 662-663 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 564, 828 P.2d 705] [in evaluating claims concerning prosecutorial remarks, the test is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misconstrued or misapplied the words].) [37] Third, with respect to comments that assertedly disparaged defense counsel, defendant complains of only the following statement: You can conclude from the fact that the defense investigator wasn't presented to you that these insinuations are false, and all they can do possibly is mislead you as to what the evidence is in this case. This statement challenges the insinuationsnot the characterof defense counsel. (See People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 112 [246 Cal.Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37] [A prosecutor may vigorously argue his case, marshalling the facts and arguing inferences to be drawn therefrom.].) In contrast, the case law upon which defendant relies involves direct attacks upon defense counsel and the jury. ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 866 [180 Cal.Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776] [prosecutor suggested during penalty phase closing arguments that jurors who had voted to acquit on certain counts acted in disregard of the law]; People v. Pitts (1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 606, 705 [273 Cal.Rptr. 757] [prosecutor accused defense counsel of contributing to the ruination of a witness's life and of knowingly presenting perjured testimony].) Nothing in the prosecutor's arguments in the present case may be characterized as a deceptive or reprehensible means to persuade the jury. (See People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 447 [3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610] [In general, a prosecutor commits misconduct by the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade either the court or the jury.].) Nor did the prosecutor's arguments render [defendant's] trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny him due process. ( Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 645 [40 L.Ed.2d 431, 94 S.Ct. 1868]; see People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1084 [255 Cal.Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619] [prosecutorial misconduct implicates the defendant's federal constitutional rights only if it is so egregious that it infects the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process].)