Opinion ID: 849265
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Breach of Duty of Public Office

Text: The statute defines incompatible offices as public offices held by a public official which, when the official is performing the duties of any of the public offices held by the official, results in the subordination of one public office to another, the supervision of one public office by another, or [a] breach of duty of public office. MCL 15.181(b); MSA 15.1120(121)(b). The parties agree that this case does not involve the first two prohibited situations. We therefore limit our review to determining whether defendant's performance of her duties resulted in a breach of duty of public office. We conclude that defendant's positions are not inherently incompatible because only a potential breach of duty of public office arises from the ability of the township to contract with the county for the collection of its delinquent personal property taxes. Under the statute, incompatibility exists only when the performance of the duties of one of the public offices results in one of the three prohibited situations. By using the phrase results in, the Legislature clearly restricted application of the statutory bar to situations in which the specified outcomes or consequences of a particular action actually occur. [12] That a breach of duty may occur in the future or that a potential conflict exists does not establish incompatible offices. The official's performance of the duties of one of the offices must actually result in a breach of duty. The Attorney General recognized this limitation in 1979-1980 OAG No. 5626, pp. 537-542 (January 16, 1980). The Attorney General explained: [I]n many situations the public official may be able to perform the functions of two public offices without breaching a duty of either office by simply not performing a function which may constitute a breach of duty. By way of illustration, under the common law the authority of two public entities to contract with each other would prohibit the same person from serving both in positions of influence in determining whether to approve, amend or implement the contract since the person could not give complete loyalty to one entity without some sacrifice of loyalty to the other. This would be true even if the two public entities had not contracted with each other in the past or contemplated doing so in the foreseeable future. It was the potential for conflict which was determinative, even though no actual conflict of duties has occurred.... Where, however, incompatibility arises only when the performance of the duties of the two offices results in a breach of duty of a public office, there is not incompatibility until the two public entities actually enter into contractual negotiations with each other. Also, in such cases, the public officer or employee may avoid breaching his or her duty of loyalty by abstaining from participating in the consideration of the contract. We agree with the Court of Appeals that a breach of duty arises when a public official holding dual offices cannot protect, advance, or promote the interest of both offices simultaneously. Public officers and employees owe a duty of loyalty to the public. 63C Am. Jur. 2d, Public Officers and Employees, § 247, p. 690. All public officers are agents, and their official powers are fiduciary. They are trusted with public functions of the good of the public; to protect, advance and promote its interests.... People ex rel. Plugger v. Twp. Bd. of Overyssel, 11 Mich. 222, 225 (1863) (opinion of Manning, J.). The Court of Appeals, however, erroneously held that a breach of duty exists when an issue arises in which one constituency's interests may conflict with the interests of a separate constituency represented by the official. 233 Mich.App. at 382, 592 N.W.2d 745. In so concluding, the Court failed to recognize that the statute focuses on the manner in which the official actually performs the duties of public office. The Court thus disregarded the statutory language requiring an actual breach of duty. [13] In this case, the circuit court erred in granting summary disposition for plaintiff under MCR 2.116(C)(10). [14] The township and the county unquestionably may contract for the collection of delinquent personal property taxes. MCL 211.56(3); MSA 7.100(3). Defendant coordinates the division of the county treasurer's office that handles day-to-day collection matters. Although defendant potentially could be placed at both ends of a contract between the county and a local unit of government, the record reflects that Harrison Township had no existing contract with the county and was not negotiating a contract with it. Under these circumstances, no incompatibility exists between defendant's positions until the public entities actually enter into contractual negotiations. A public official in defendant's position may avoid breaching the duty of loyalty by not participating in the preliminary consideration of a possible agreement with the county. [15] The circuit court therefore erred in granting summary disposition for plaintiff. In light of the absence of any genuine issue of material fact, the court should have granted summary disposition for defendant under MCR 2.116(I)(2). Accordingly, we remand to the circuit court for entry of an order granting summary disposition for defendant.