Opinion ID: 2268995
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The award and Sam's contentions

Text: After denying Sam's first three post-trial motions, the superior court granted Kathleen's motion for full reasonable fees of $7,272.87. Sam argues that it was error to award full fees. [6] The January 2009 full-fees order cited four subparagraphs of Civil Rule 82(b)(3) in support and largely accepted Kathleen's contentions. [7] Citing Rule 82(b)(3)(F), the order found that the claims Sam made in those motions were not reasonable, and that full fees were therefore necessary. It stated that Sam's first motion to compel was largely an untimely motion to reconsider, and that to the extent it sought compliance with an earlier order, his motion did not cite the earlier order or explain his failure to do so. It found that Sam's motion to correct was also an untimely motion to reconsider, was founded on an incorrect legal premise, and identified a mistake that was not clerical. And it found that Sam's second motion to compel was redundant and that Kathleen never should have been put to the expense of defending the motion at all. Citing Rule 82(b)(3)(G), it concluded that awarding full fees was also appropriate . . . for vexatious and bad faith litigation conduct, as set forth above. Citing Rule 82(b)(3)(H), it found that awarding full fees was appropriate because the effort and fees imposed on Kathleen were unreasonably large compared to the value of the items at stake. Citing Rule 82(b)(3)(K)'s other equitable factors provision, it found that awarding full fees was appropriate because Sam's decision to continu[e] the litigation of matters that could or should have been litigated at trial, or that were in fact litigated to conclusion at trial, effectively devalue[d] the assets awarded to Kathleen by requiring her to litigate repeatedly over the same issues. Sam argues that the record does not support the finding that his motions were ill-founded or made in bad faith. He asserts that his motions were directed at items of personal property that he had been awarded but never received, and did not challenge the original property award. [8] He also implies that full fees were not warranted as a matter of law on his first motion to compel because it partially succeeded. We usually review for abuse of discretion a Rule 82 award of full reasonable attorney's fees. [9] An abuse of discretion exists if an award is arbitrary, capricious, manifestly unreasonable, or the result of an improper motive. [10] Because the award of actual fees calls into question Sam's litigation conduct and the potential merits of Sam's underlying three motions, we assess de novo the legal and factual viability of his motions and review relevant findings of fact for clear error. [11] A prevailing party in a civil case is normally entitled to an award of attorney's fees, per Rule 82. [12] Divorce cases are usually excepted from this general rule; fees awards in divorce cases are typically based on the parties' relative economic situations and earning powers, rather than prevailing party status. [13] This divorce exception to Rule 82 is based on a broad reading of AS 25.24.140(a)(1), and on the reality that there is usually no prevailing party in a divorce case. [14] Nonetheless, we have held that Rule 82 applies to post-judgment modification and enforcement matters in domestic relations disputes [15] and that fees are appropriately awarded under the prevailing-party standard of Rule 82 as to post-judgment money and property disputes. [16] Rule 82 consequently applies to the parties' post-judgment enforcement motions in this case. Normally only partial fees are awarded under Rule 82, [17] but Rule 82(b)(3) lists factors that may permit a court to depart from a partial fees award calculated under Rule 82(b)(1) and (2), and to award enhanced or even full reasonable fees. [18] We have held that [i]n general, a trial court has broad discretion to award Rule 82 attorney's fees in amounts exceeding those prescribed by the schedule of the rule, so long as the court specifies in the record its reasons for departing from the schedule. [19] A Rule 82(b)(3) award of full fees is manifestly unreasonable absent a finding of bad faith or vexatious conduct. [20] Black's Law Dictionary defines bad faith as [d]ishonesty of belief or purpose. [21] In the attorney's fees context, we have equated bad faith with devoid of good faith. [22] Therefore, enhanced fees may be awarded under any of the subparagraphs of Rule 82(b)(3), but full fees may be awarded under Rule 82(b)(3) only if the vexatious or bad faith conduct standard of Rule 82(b)(3)(G) is satisfied. As we stated above, whether it was error to award full reasonable fees as to Sam's first three motions turns on their potential merit. [23]