Opinion ID: 758304
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The weight to be assigned to the plaintiff's rebuttal

Text: 26 Although the plaintiff cannot always avoid summary judgment by showing the employer's explanation to be false, we read Hicks (and other relevant caselaw) to mean that such a showing does have considerable evidentiary significance. First, when the plaintiff rebuts the employer's own explanation of its challenged acts, this eliminates the principal nondiscriminatory explanation for the employer's actions. Events have causes; if the only explanations set forth in the record have been rebutted, the jury is permitted to search for others, and may in appropriate circumstances draw an inference of discrimination. As the Court said in Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 98 S.Ct. 2943, 57 L.Ed.2d 957 (1978): 27 A prima facie case under McDonnell-Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts with some reason, based his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race. 28 Id. at 577, 98 S.Ct. 2943 (citations omitted). In this passage the Court was explaining why it is permissible to grant judgment for the plaintiff on the basis of an unrebutted prima facie case: because, in the absence of a legitimate explanation, we infer the existence of an illegitimate one. Similarly when the plaintiff has discredited the employer's explanation for its acts, and no other plausible explanation is readily at hand, Furnco's logic would seem to apply as well, and to at least permit (if not compel, as in Furnco) an inference of discrimination in an appropriate case. 29 If the jury can infer that the employer's explanation is not only a mistaken one in terms of the facts, but a lie, that should provide even stronger evidence of discrimination. As Hicks said, [t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particularly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity) may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742 (emphasis added). This is so because, according to ordinary evidentiary principles (which we have been instructed to apply in employment discrimination cases, see Aikens, 460 U.S. at 716, 103 S.Ct. 1478), a lie is evidence of consciousness of guilt. The jury can conclude that an employer who fabricates a false explanation has something to hide; that something may well be discriminatory intent. See Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir.1990) (If the only reason an employer offers for firing an employee is a lie, the inference that the real reason was a forbidden one ... may rationally be drawn); Wallace v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., 103 F.3d 1394, 1400 (7th Cir.1997). 30 Such an inference is of course in line with how evidence of consciousness of guilt is treated in other cases, criminal or civil. An employer that concocts a false explanation for an employment decision is in a like position to a criminal defendant who offers a false alibi: the jury may consider the fact that the defendant has presented a false alibi in deciding his guilt. See United States v. Hughes, 716 F.2d 234, 240-41 (4th Cir.1983); United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1191 (10th Cir.1982). In this circuit, we have repeatedly treated false statements by a defendant as credible evidence of consciousness of guilt. See, e.g., United States v. Morgan, 914 F.2d 272, 276 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam) (citing a defendant's lie about possessing a claim check for a suitcase containing drugs in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence); see also United States v. Johnson, 46 F.3d 1166, 1171 (D.C.Cir.1995) (finding it appropriate to admit as evidence of consciousness of guilt a drug defendant's false claim, made to explain the source of his income, that he worked at a sporting goods store). 31 Of course, as the Court explained in Hicks, an employer's lie does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law. But Hicks also made plain that a lie carries substantial risks, including the risk of sanctions, Hicks, 509 U.S. at 521-22, 113 S.Ct. 2742, and the more mundane risk that the lie will lead the jury to draw an adverse inference. Indeed, the employer's fear that the jury will draw an adverse inference from a false explanation is a vital element of the McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting procedure. Without it, employers would have little incentive to look for and present the real reasons for their employment decisions, undercutting the purpose of the McDonnell-Douglas framework, which is to compensate for the fact that direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also TWA v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985). 8 32 To summarize, we can do no better than to quote Hicks once more. In an appropriate case, [t]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant will allow it to infer intentional discrimination. 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742. (As we observe above, it is difficult, if not impossible, to say in any concise or generic way under what precise circumstances such an inference will be inappropriate. 9 ) If disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity, id., the likelihood of intentional discrimination is increased, permitting thefactfinder to infer discrimination more readily.