Opinion ID: 2971784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Smith - Discharge

Text: In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, Smith must show that (1) she is a member of a protected class, (2) she was terminated from her employment, (3) she was qualified for the position in question, and (4) she was replaced by a nonprotected person or a similarly situated nonprotected employee was treated more favorably. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992). We affirm the grant of summary judgment on Smith’s discriminatory discharge claim because she failed to submit sufficient evidence to establish the fourth element of a prima facie case. Smith does not argue that a similarly situated employee was treated more favorably, and she failed to prove that she was replaced by someone outside the protected No. 03-1916 13 class. Smith asserts that Nelson’s promotion to organizer was a sham and an attempt by SEIU to appear racially neutral in terminating Smith. She fails to point to any evidence in the record, however, regarding Nelson’s qualifications or experience. Bald assertions are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Bryant v. Kentucky, 490 F.2d 1273, 1275 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that an opponent to a summary judgment motion may not rest merely upon “conclusory and unsupported allegations, rooted in speculation”). Even if she had established a prima facie case, summary judgment was nonetheless proper because Smith failed to show that SEIU’s proffered reasons were pretextual. Schneider stated that one of the reasons for Smith’s discharge was her disrespectful treatment of fellow employees. One of the specific examples Schneider cited was the July 13 incident with Khermohamed. Smith argues that the overwhelming evidence shows that she was not involved in an altercation with Khermohamed. A plaintiff can meet his burden of showing pretext by producing evidence that the employer’s proffered reason for his discharge was false. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000). We have adopted an “honest belief” rule with regard to an employer’s proffered reason for discharging an employee. Majewski v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 274 F.3d 1106, 1117 (6th Cir. 2001). “[A]s long as an employer has an honest belief in its proffered nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee, the employee cannot establish that the reason was pretextual simply because it is ultimately shown to be incorrect.” Id. The employer has an honest belief in its reasons if the employer No. 03-1916 14 reasonably relied “on the particularized facts that were before it at the time the decision was made.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Schneider relied on the following particularized facts in making the termination decision: (1) Khermohamed and Davis signed statements accusing Smith of verbally abusing Khermohamed on July 13; (2) Condra had asked Davis to falsely report the July 13 incident, which undermined his credibility when he gave a statement stating that Davis, not Smith, was being verbally abusive that day; (3) a meeting had been called by coworkers to discuss complaints about Smith’s treatment of fellow employees; and (4) several organizers signed a statement denying that Khermohamed ever accused Hobbs of sex discrimination. Smith has failed to present any evidence to refute Schnieder’s honest belief that Smith engaged in inappropriate conduct toward her fellow employees that justified her discharge. Smith argues that Khermohamed’s letter should have been discounted because she was a disgruntled employee,6 and it was unreasonable to discount Condra’s eyewitness account of the July 13 incident. Even if we were to accept this reasoning, this is not enough to prove that Schneider’s decision to terminate Smith for inappropriate treatment of fellow employees was unreasonable or pretextual. Smith does not discount the evidence of her false statements to Hobbs and the complaints of other organizers about her mistreatment of them. This information supports Schneider’s decision to terminate Smith because of her inappropriate treatment of her fellow employees. Moreover, it was not unreasonable for Schneider to question the credibility of Condra’s statement in the face of not only Khermohamed’s 6 Condra attempted to discharge Khermohamed on August 6, the day she wrote her letter describing the July 13 incident, but Condra’s decision was overruled by his superiors. No. 03-1916 15 statement but also Davis’s statement, as well as the tape recording where Condra asked Davis to lie about what happened on July 13. Because Smith failed to meet her burden of proving SEIU’s proffered reasons for her termination were pretextual, we affirm the grant of summary judgment.