Opinion ID: 2625741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Basis of Petitioner's Justification for Filing the Instant Petition Was Eviscerated by Medellin

Text: The United States is a signatory to the Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. 77, and its Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, April 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 325, T.I.A.S. No. 6820 (Optional Protocol). Article 36 of the Vienna Convention provides: 1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions relating to nationals of the sending State: [¶] (a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State; [¶] (b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph; [¶] (c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he expressly opposes such action. [¶] 2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under the Article are intended. (Vienna Convention, art. 36, 21 U.S.T. at pp. 100-101.) [4] The Optional Protocol provides that disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the [Vienna] Convention shall lie within the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. (Optional Protocol, art. 1, 21 U.S.T. at p. 326.) [5] Petitioner was among the 54 Mexican nationals convicted of a capital offense on behalf of whom Mexico instituted proceedings in the ICJ, in which it asked the ICJ to find that the United States had violated article 36. ( Avena, supra, 2004 I.C.J. at pp. 19-20, par. 12.) The ICJ concluded that in the cases of 51 of the Mexican nationals the United States had breached its obligation under article 36 to inform detained Mexican nationals of their rights under that article and to notify the Mexican consular post of the [their] detention, as a result of which the United States further violated its article 36 obligation to permit consular officers to communicate with and have access to their nationals, ... to visit their detained nationals and to enable Mexican consular officers to arrange for legal representation of their nationals. ( Avena, at pp. 53-54, par. 106(1)-(4).) Having concluded that the United States breached its obligations under article 36 as to the 51 Mexican nationals, including petitioner, the ICJ addressed what legal remedies should be considered for the breach. ( Avena, supra, 2004 I.C.J. at p. 58, par. 115.) The ICJ rejected Mexico's request for annulment of the convictions and sentences. ( Id. at p. 60, par. 123.) Instead, the ICJ prescribed, as a remedy, review and reconsideration of these nationals' cases by the United States courts ... with a view to ascertaining whether in each case the violation of Article 36 committed by the competent authorities caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of criminal justice. ( Id. at p. 60, par. 121.) The ICJ explained further: The question of whether the violations of Article 36, paragraph 1, are to be regarded as having, in the causal sequence of events, ultimately led to convictions and severe penalties is an integral part of criminal proceedings before the courts of the United States and is for them to determine in the process of review and reconsideration. In so doing, it is for the courts of the United States to examine the facts, and in particular the prejudice and its causes, taking account of the violation of the rights set forth in the Convention. ( Id. at p. 60, par. 122.) The ICJ concluded further, however, that this freedom in the choice of means for such review and reconsideration is not without qualification. ( Avena, supra, 2004 I.C.J. at p. 62, par. 131.) The ICJ explained that the required review and reconsideration must take place within the overall judicial proceedings relating to the individual defendant concerned, and that procedural default doctrines could not bar the required review and reconsideration. ( Id. at p. 66, par. 141.) Moreover, the ICJ required that the violation of article 36 be reviewed independently of due process provisions of the United States Constitution. (2004 I.C.J. at p. 63, pars. 133-134.) The ICJ explained: The rights guaranteed under the Vienna Convention are treaty rights which the United States had undertaken to comply with in relation to the individual concerned, irrespective of the due process rights under United States constitutional law. In this regard, the Court would point out that what is crucial in the review and reconsideration process is the existence of a procedure which guarantees that full weight is given to the violation of the rights set forth in the Vienna Convention, whatever may be the actual outcome of such review and reconsideration. ( Id. at p. 65, par. 139.) [6] Following the Avena decision, another of the Mexican nationals involved in that proceeding, Jose Ernesto Medellin, brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas. In upholding the denial of his petition, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected Medellin's reliance on Avena as a basis for his claim that his Vienna Convention rights had been violated. ( Medellin v. Dretke (5th Cir. 2004) 371 F.3d 270, 279-280.) The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether federal courts were bound by the Avena judgment without regard to procedural default and whether federal courts should give effect to that judgment, as a matter of judicial comity and uniform treaty interpretation. ( Medellin v. Dretke (2005) 544 U.S. 660, 661 [161 L.Ed.2d 982, 125 S.Ct. 2088] ( per curiam ).) However, on February 28, 2005, President George W. Bush issued a memorandum that stated in part: I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, that the United States will discharge its international obligations under the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals ( Mexico v. United States of America) (Avena ), 2004 ICJ 128 (Mar. 31), by having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision. [7] Medellin then filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Observing that the state-court proceeding may provide Medellin with the very reconsideration of his Vienna Convention claim that he now seeks in the present proceeding, the high court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted. ( Medellin v. Dretke, supra, 544 U.S. 660, 662 ( per curiam ).)
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed Medellin's habeas corpus petitionhis secondbecause in its view neither the Avena decision nor the Presidential Memorandum constituted binding federal law that could displace a state procedural limitation on successive petitions. ( Ex parte Medellin (Tex.Crim.App. 2006) 223 S.W.3d 315, 352.) The Supreme Court again granted certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the Texas court. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1353].) The Supreme Court specifically rejected Medellin's argument that the Avena decision and/or the Presidential Memorandum is a binding federal rule of decision that pre-empts contrary state limitations on successive habeas petitions. ( Id. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1356], italics added.) (6) With respect to Medellin's claim that Avena itself constituted binding federal law, the court examined the treaties through which the United States had submitted to the jurisdiction of the ICJ and concluded that none of these treaty sourcesthe Optional Protocol, the United Nations Charter, and the ICJ statutewere self-executing, and, therefore did not create binding federal law in the absence of implementing legislation, and because it is uncontested that no such legislation exists, we conclude that the Avena judgment is not automatically binding domestic law. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1357].) [8] (7) Nor was the court persuaded that the President, acting unilaterally through the Presidential Memorandum, could create such binding domestic law. The court cited Justice Jackson's familiar tripartite scheme for evaluating executive action in the area of foreign policy decisions. First, `[w]hen the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate.' [Citation.] Second, `[w]hen the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain.' [Citation.] ... Finally, `[w]hen the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb,' and the Court can sustain his actions `only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.' [Citation.] ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1368].) Here, the non-self-executing nature of the treaty sources of ICJ jurisdiction not only refutes the notion that the ratifying parties vested the President with the authority to unilaterally make treaty obligations binding on domestic courts, but also implicitly prohibits him from doing so. When the President asserts the power to `enforce' a non-self-executing treaty by unilaterally creating domestic law, he acts in conflict with the implicit understanding of the ratifying Senate. His assertion of authority, insofar as it is based on the pertinent non-self-executing treaties, is therefore within Justice Jackson's third category, not the first or even the second. ( Id. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1369].) Finally, the court rejected the alternative argument advanced by the President that the memorandum was a valid exercise of his authority to resolve claims disputes with other nations. The court found inapposite the cases cited by the government that involved the making of executive agreements to settle civil claims between American citizens and foreign governments or nations. The court noted, the Government has not identified a single instance in which the President has attempted (or Congress has acquiesced in) a Presidential directive issued to state courts, much less one that reaches deep into the heart of the State's police powers and compels state courts to reopen final criminal judgments and set aside neutrally applicable state laws. [Citation.] The Executive's narrow and strictly limited authority to settle international claims disputes pursuant to an executive agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memorandum. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at p. 1372].)
Insofar as petitioner seeks to justify his successive petition on the grounds that Avena and/or the Presidential Memorandum constitute binding federal law that overrides state procedural defaults, Medellin is a complete and negative response to his argument. Nonetheless, petitioner purports to discern within the Medellin decision elements that support a finding that Petitioner's present petition is based on previously unavailable facts and law. First, petitioner refers to the court's discussion in Medellin of its earlier Vienna Convention claim decision, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon (2006) 548 U.S. 331 [165 L.Ed.2d 557, 126 S.Ct. 2669] for the proposition that a petitioner may request `appropriate accommodations' from the trial court to secure `the benefits of consular assistance.' From this language, petitioner argues he was deprived of such accommodation when the trial court denied his request for a continuance at trial to contact the Mexican consulate. Petitioner is wrong. Sanchez-Llamas consolidated the cases of two foreign nationals, Moises Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican, and Mario A. Bustillo, a Honduran, both of whom sought review of their convictionsSanchez-Llamas for attempted murder, among other counts, and Bustillo for first degree murder based on the asserted failure of law enforcement authorities to comply with article 36. Sanchez-Llamas sought to suppress incriminating statements he had made to the police, notwithstanding that he had waived his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [16 L.Ed.2d 694, 86 S.Ct. 1602], as a penalty for violation of his article 36 rights. Bustillo attempted to raise his article 36 claim for the first time in his petition for habeas corpus but the claim was dismissed as procedurally barred because he had failed to raise it at trial or on direct appeal. ( Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, supra, 548 U.S. at pp. 339-342.) Neither man was one of the 51 individuals named in the Avena decision. The issues in Sanchez-Llamas were identified as (1) whether Article 36 of the Vienna Convention grants rights that may be invoked by individuals in a judicial proceeding; (2) whether suppression of evidence is a proper remedy for a violation of Article 36; and (3) whether an Article 36 claim may be deemed forfeited under state procedural rules because a defendant failed to raise the claim at trial. ( Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, supra, 548 U.S. at p. 342.) In order to respond to the petitioners' claims, the court answered the first question by assuming, without deciding, that such rights could be individually invoked ( id. at p. 343); held, as to the second question, that neither the Vienna Convention nor the court's own precedents supported application of the exclusionary rule as a remedy for a violation of article 36 rights (548 U.S. at pp. 343-350); and, as to the third question, in an answer that foreshadowed its decision in Medellin, held that state procedural defaults did apply to such claim (548 U.S. at p. 360). Petitioner contends that certain language in Sanchez-Llamas was subsequently cited by the Supreme Court in Medellin as a basis to create procedural rules requiring states to accommodate defendants who may be foreign nationals with respect to their Vienna Convention rights. But nowhere in Sanchez-Llamas itself does the court address this issue, nor do the court's references to Sanchez-Llamas in Medellin even advert to this issue. To the contrary, the pages in Medellin to which petitioner refers us for their discussion of Sanchez-Llamas simply reinforce Medellin 's conclusion that ICJ decisions are not binding federal law and do not override state procedural rules. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. ___, fn. 8 ___, ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1361, fn. 8, 1364, 1367].) We are at a loss to perceive in either decision support for petitioner's claim that the trial court in this case was required to have granted his request for a continuance to contact the Mexican consulate. Moreover, this is one of the same claims petitioner raised in his first habeas corpus petition. He provides no justification for revisiting our denial of that petition on this ground. Second, petitioner asserts that Medellin now establishes a three-day rule within which notice to a foreign national of his consular rights must be given to avoid violating the Vienna Convention. Again, petitioner misconstrues the language. The Supreme Court noted that, in denying Medellin 's first application for state postconviction relief, the Texas trial court ruled that the claim was both procedurally barred because Medellin had not raised it at trial and also without merit finding that Medellin had `fail[ed] to show that any non-notification of the Mexican authorities impacted on the validity of his conviction or punishment.' [Citation]. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___ [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1354-1355].) In a footnote explaining the trial court's ruling, the Supreme Court observed that the ICJ in Avena had concluded that the Vienna Convention's requirement of consular notification `without delay' is satisfied where notice is provided within three working days, but that in Medellin's case he had confessed within three hours of his arrest, before there could be a violation of his Vienna Convention right to consulate notification. ( Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at p. ___, fn. 1 [128 S.Ct. at p. 1355, fn. 1].) Thus, the Supreme Court did not approve or disapprove the ICJ's three-day ruleindeed, the court's reference to this rule occurred in that portion of its decision describing the procedural history of Medellin's case, not within its analysis of his claims. Moreover, the purpose of this reference was simply to explain the basis of the state trial court's denial of Medellin's application for postconviction relief, not to announce any procedural rule with respect to when consular notification must be made. Finally, it is clear that in this case petitioner was aware of his right of consular notification by the time of his trialwhen he requested a continuance to consult with the Mexican consul. He failed to demonstrate in his first petition and he fails to demonstrate here that he suffered any prejudice because he was not notified of those rights at the time of his arrest. Third, petitioner contends:  Medellin establishes for the first time that the requirements of Breard v. Greene [, supra, 523 U.S. 371] apply to cases addressed under Avena. That finding necessarily includes Breard 's recognition that the denial of an evidentiary hearing `prevents [petitioner] from establishing that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights prejudiced him.' In other words, petitioner maintains that Breard requires an evidentiary hearing to resolve the merits of a Vienna Convention claim, and that Medellin adopted this holding with respect to the 51 individuals subject to the Avena decision. Petitioner fails to provide a citation to the page in Medellin where, according to him, the Supreme Court adopted Breard 's requirement of an evidentiary hearing. Our review of Medellin 's several citations to Breard fails to support his claim. (See Medellin v. Texas, supra, 552 U.S. at pp. ___, fn. 9, ___, ___, fn. 14 [128 S.Ct. at pp. 1361, fn. 9, 1363, 1370, fn. 14].) In any event, the premise of petitioner's argumentthat Breard requires such hearingsis utterly inaccurate. Petitioner cites a portion of Breard that concluded a federal habeas corpus petition was barred by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996's provision that an evidentiary hearing shall not be provided with respect to a federal habeas corpus petition based upon a violation of treaties of the United States, if the petitioner `has failed to develop the factual basis of [the] claim in State court proceedings.' ( Breard v. Greene, supra, 523 U.S. at p. 376.) Breard concluded that this provision prevents Breard from establishing that the violation of his Vienna Convention rights prejudiced him. Without a hearing, Breard cannot establish how the Consul could have advised him, how the advice of his attorneys differed from the advice the Consul would have provided, and what factors he considered in electing to reject the plea bargain that the State offered him. ( Ibid. ) Accordingly, Breard held only that the petitioner could not prevail on his habeas corpus claim because federal law precluded an evidentiary hearing when the petitioner had failed to develop his claim in state court. To the extent it is relevant to this case it reinforces the Supreme Court's subsequent ruling in Medellin that procedural defaults apply to Vienna Convention claims. It certainly does not stand for the proposition for which petitioner advances itthat determination of the merits of such claims requires an evidentiary hearing. Finally, petitioner argues that he is not required to establish absolute proof of a different outcome but only a prima facie showing of prejudice. But we determined, in reviewing his first habeas corpus petition, that he had not done so when we denied it on the merits. Again, however, petitioner's factual showing of entitlement to relief has not significantly changed from his original petition to this one. Next, seizing upon the possibility that either the United States Congress might yet authorize compliance with the Avena decision or the Mexican government may continue to press its case through diplomatic channels, petitioner urges us to stay proceedings in this case to see whether either of these efforts bears fruit. [9] Although he initially requests a 90-day stay, there is, of course, no guarantee that any action will have taken place at either the legislative or diplomatic level and he would undoubtedly request a further stay once the initial 90-day stay has expired. Such a course of action would ill serve the importance of finality of judgments [citation], and the interest of the state in the prompt implementation of its laws. ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 764.) We decline to issue such a stay at this juncture. [10] Finally, we observe that petitioner makes no attempt to bring himself within the miscarriage of justice exception to successiveness as outlined in Clark. ( In re Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 797-798.)