Opinion ID: 1909218
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The PSFVRA

Text: The State has a compelling interest in protecting children from sexual abuse. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Ct., 457 U.S. 596, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982). Protecting children from family violence, including sexual abuse, is the primary purpose of the PSFVRA. La.R.S. 9:361. To effectively protect children, the Legislature has imposed a mandatory suspension of custody and visitation against those parents proven to have sexually abused their children. The PSFVRA provides, in pertinent part: If any court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, that a parent has sexually abused his or her child or children, the court shall prohibit all visitation and contact between the abusive parent and the children, until such time, following a contradictory hearing, that the court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the abusive parent has successfully completed a treatment program designed for such sexual abusers, and that supervised visitation is in the children's best interest. La.R.S. 9:364(D). The Legislature enacted the PSFVRA because it recognized that the discretion formerly granted to judges regarding custody and visitation in sexual abuse situations was wholly inadequate in curbing family violence, including sexual abuse of children. La.R.S. 9:361 [3] ; La.R.S. 46:2131 [4] ; 1993 La. Acts 261, § 9, repealing La.R.S. 9:574 (wherein a judge had discretion to grant visitation to a parent who had sexually abused his or her child). Through the PSFVRA, therefore, the Legislature has expressed its determination that the best interests of the child would best be served by suspending the abusive parent's visitation pending that parent's completion of the program designed to inhibit further abuse. At issue, then, is not the innocence or guilt of the parent, but the best interests and custody of the child. La.R.S. 9:361; La.R.S. 9:364; In re A.C., 93-1125 (La.10/17/94), 643 So.2d 743, on reh'g, cert. denied sub nom. A.St.P.C. v. B.C., 515 U.S. 1128, 115 S.Ct. 2291, 132 L.Ed.2d 292 (1995). With respect to the best interests of the child, the Legislature noted that general custody and visitation laws were based on an assumption that divorcing parents acted in their children's best interests. However, it observed that laws designed to act in the children's best interest may actually effect a contrary result due to the unique dynamics of family violence. La.R.S. 9:361. Moreover, the Legislature was concerned that child custody or visitation provided further opportunities for the family violence, including sexual abuse, to continue following divorce or separation. La. R.S. 9:361. Therefore, once a judge had determined, as a matter of fact, that a parent had sexually abused his or her child, the PSFVRA removed the judge's discretion regarding custody and visitation, and mandated that no visitation occur between the abused child and abusive parent until the parent had successfully completed treatment designed to curb the parent's harmful behavior. La.R.S. 9:364. Because of the harsh results of a judge's finding of abuse, the Legislature raised the standard of proving the abuse from the ordinary preponderance standard to clear and convincing. In re A.C., 643 So.2d at 743. Significantly, the Legislature, while enhancing the burden of proof, did not remove any gate-keeping discretion from the judge regarding admissibility of evidence. It is important to note the distinction between issues of admissibility of evidence and burdens of proof. See generally FRANK L. MARAIST & HARRY T. LEMMON, 1 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 11.7(1) & (7) (1999) (where burden of proof requires a plaintiff to produce evidence in sufficient strength to meet the evidentiary standard, and admissibility concerns relevancy and competency). Issues of admissibility, based upon foundation, verification and authenticity and bearing on the trustworthiness and reliability of the documents, differ from the sufficiency of proof, which goes to the weight and reliability of the evidence offered to meet the burden of proof. Cole Oil & Tire Co. v. Davis, 567 So.2d 122, 131 (La.App. 2 Cir.1990). The standard applied to each issue may also differ. State v. Lobato, 603 So.2d 739 (La.1992) (The standard for determining the admissibility of evidence is less than what is required to convict.). A trial court's determinations regarding what evidence is admissible for the trier of fact to consider and whether a plaintiff has sufficiently proven its case will not be overturned absent clear error. Id.; United States v. Taylor, 802 F.2d 1108 (9th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094, 107 S.Ct. 1309, 94 L.Ed.2d 164 (1987).