Opinion ID: 2763492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Legal Requirements for an RPA Action

Text: ESA section 7 provides that “[i]f jeopardy or adverse modification is found [during consultation], the Secretary shall suggest those reasonable and prudent alternatives which he believes would not . . . ,” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A), 18 Nevertheless, we can see where the district court got derailed into thinking that NMFS blamed continuing CVP/SWP operations for exotics in the Delta. See In re Consolidated Salmonid Cases, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 870. NMFS essentially makes this statement, without any record support, in its summary of the indirect mortality component of the BiOp. 2009 Salmonid BiOp at 382. The district court properly questioned this conclusion: NMFS did not support the assertion that continuing CVP/SWP operations cause that level of environmental decline. Although NMFS seemed to say as much on page 382 of the BiOp, the crux of its indirect mortality argument is in the pages preceding the summary on page 382. NMFS makes clear that the question is not whether “altered project operations reduce [or exacerbate] the presence of exotics?” but rather “whether altered project operations could keep more fish in the main delta where they are less likely to come into contact with exotic species and die?” As explained, NMFS believes the answer to this question is yes, and it supported its conclusion by relying on the best available science. See, e.g., id. at 651. SAN LUIS V. LOCKE 61 “jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered [or threatened] species . . .” or result in adverse modification of critical habitat, id. § 1536 (a)(2). Reasonable and prudent alternatives are alternative actions identified during formal consultation that (1) “can be implemented in a manner consistent with the intended purpose of the action,” (2) “can be implemented consistent with the scope of the Federal agency’s legal authority and jurisdiction,” (3) are “economically and technologically feasible,” and (4) “the Director believes would avoid the likelihood of jeopardizing the continued existence of listed species or resulting in the destruction or adverse modification of critical habitat.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. The first three of these factors are the non-jeopardy factors developed by the agency. The final is the jeopardy factor, and it is taken from ESA section 7. See Delta Smelt, 747 F.3d at 634. Under these provisions, the district court reversed and remanded several RPA Actions because the agency did not (1) explain how each RPA Action is “essential to avoid jeopardy,” In re Consolidated Salmonid Cases, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 922; see also id. at 897 n.26, or (2) explain how each RPA Action complies with § 402.02’s three non-jeopardy factors. We recently held in Delta Smelt that these are not the correct legal standards under which to evaluate an RPA Action. As we further clarify below, neither section 7 nor § 402.02 require NMFS to explain why each Action is “essential” or to fully elucidate the non-jeopardy factors. 62 SAN LUIS V. LOCKE
Explain How Each RPA Action Is Essential To Avoid Jeopardy The district court held that § 402.02 requires NMFS to show how each RPA Action is essential to avoid jeopardy.19 The effect of this holding was to impose an onerous, highly precise standard on NMFS under which the district court invalidated RPA Actions anytime NMFS did not explain why the Action was necessary, over all others, to preserve the species. See, e.g., In re Consolidated Salmonid Cases, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 898. As we explained in Delta Smelt, neither the ESA nor its implementing regulations require this level of precision from the agency. The ESA requires only that the agency impose RPAs that are “not likely to jeopardize” the species or its habitat. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2), (b)(3)(B). The regulations interpret this section as requiring the agency to develop RPAs “that the Director believes” would avoid jeopardy. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02. This moderate and deferential language is a far cry from that which would impose a strictly essential requirement. Rather, this language imposes a “flexible standard for the consulting agency” that does not require the Secretary “to explain why he chose one RPA over another . . . .” Delta Smelt, 747 F.3d at 624 (citing Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 19 The district court articulated its holding as requiring NMFS to explain how each RPA Action is an “essential component of an overall RPA designed to avoid jeopardy.” In re Consolidated Salmonid Cases, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 897 n.26. But in practice, the district court invalidated BiOp provisions when NMFS failed to explain how they were “essential to avoid jeopardy . . . .” Id. at 922. That is the holding we review. SAN LUIS V. LOCKE 63 143 F.3d 515, 523 (9th Cir. 1998)). Under this deferential standard, the agency need not pick the best RPA or the one most likely to avoid jeopardy. Id. Rather, we give the agency flexibility to choose among several appropriate alternatives. We will uphold that choice so long as it is reasonably supported based on a review of the record as a whole. See Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 143 F.3d at 523.
Articulate Compliance with the Non-Jeopardy Factors The district court also held that Agency regulations require NMFS to describe how each RPA Action meets § 402.02’s non-jeopardy factors. See In re Consolidated Salmonid Cases, 791 F. Supp. 2d at 917. It invalidated several RPA Actions, including Action IV.4.2, for failing to establish compliance with these factors. We hold that the district court erred in interpreting § 402.02. Again, this issue is largely controlled by Delta Smelt. We said in Delta Smelt that, “[n]othing in § 402.02 obligates the [consultation agency] . . . to address the non jeopardy factors when it proposes RPAs. Section 402.02 is a definitional section; it is defining what constitutes an RPA, not setting out hoops that the [consultation agency] . . . must jump through.” 747 F.3d at 635. Thus, while “a ‘thorough’ documentation of jeopardy/adverse modification in the BiOp is always required, . . . documentation of the non jeopardy factors is only required when the RPA fails to meet a non jeopardy factor.” Id. at 635–36. Based on this conclusion, we rejected the district court’s finding that the agency acted arbitrarily or capriciously by failing to include “some exposition in the 64 SAN LUIS V. LOCKE record of why the agency concluded (if it did so at all) that all four regulatory requirements for a valid RPA were satisfied.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Salazar, 760 F. Supp. 2d 855, 957 (E.D. Cal. 2010), aff’d in part rev’d in part by Delta Smelt, 747 F.3d 581. This holding applies with equal force here. NMFS is not required to document its compliance with § 402.02’s nonjeopardy factors. Rather, it needed only to fairly conclude— based on the record—that the proposed RPAs do not further jeopardize the listed species or adversely affect critical habitats. See Delta Smelt, 747 F.3d at 635. We evaluate whether it did so below.