Opinion ID: 145609
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individual Acts of Retaliation

Text: We turn first to Roman's five specific retaliation claims. Roman argues on appeal that the district court erred in finding that she had not made out a prima facie case of retaliation. She incorrectly argues that the district court looked only to whether she had suffered adverse employment actions and that the court should have considered more broadly whether she had been subject to any materially adverse action that might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington Northern, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405 (internal quotation marks omitted); Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 51 (1st Cir.2008). In fact, the district court did consider the evidence under the Burlington Northern standard. Potter insists that Roman, as a federal employee, can at most only bring a retaliation claim for personnel actions affecting employees under Title VII's federal employee anti-discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). [3] The broader standard, Potter argues, applies only to private sector retaliation claims, under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a), pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in Burlington Northern. Roman counters that she may, nonetheless, bring her claim under the broader standard because § 2000e-3(a) is incorporated into Title VII's federal employee anti-discrimination provision through § 2000e-16(d) and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). The Supreme Court has not decided whether federal employees can make retaliation claims under Title VII. The Court alluded to some of these arguments in Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 553 U.S. 474, 128 S.Ct. 1931, 170 L.Ed.2d 887 (2008), but did not resolve them. Id. at 1941 & n. 4. Before Gomez-Perez this court had recognized retaliation claims by federal employees under § 2000e-3(a). See, e.g., DeCaire v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1, 19 (1st Cir.2008). Here, we need not address these questions, or whether the actions alleged by Roman, under Burlington Northern, might well have dissuaded a reasonable employee from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405. We assume, dubitante, that Roman made out a prima facie case as to all of her Title VII retaliation claims. Nonetheless, Roman's claims fail under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach because she has not shown either pretext or that the acts at issue resulted from retaliatory animus in light of the employer's explanation. See Enica v. Principi, 544 F.3d 328, 343 (1st Cir.2008). Once a plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of retaliation, the burden shifts to the defendant, Potter, to articulate a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for [the USPS's] employment decision[s]. Id. If Potter provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to Roman to show that `the proffered legitimate reason is in fact a pretext and that the job action was the result of the defendant's retaliatory animus.' Id. (quoting Calero-Cerezo v. United States Dep't of Justice, 355 F.3d 6, 26 (1st Cir.2004)). Roman alleges five incidents of retaliation; as to each, we conclude that Potter has provided legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for the actions and Roman has not provided evidence that would permit a reasonable factfinder to find either pretext or retaliatory animus. See Dennis v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., 549 F.3d 851, 857 (1st Cir. 2008). We note that during this period of claimed retaliation she received favorable performance evaluations, a bonus, and no reduction in pay or benefits. 1. The most serious of the retaliation claims concerns the USPS's initial failure, beginning with Roman's November 18, 2005, paycheck, to immediately approve pay for Roman as part of her FMLA leave for a period of approximately four weeks in late November and early December 2005. Rather, the USPS records showed her as away without leavea consequence of a mistake described below. It is undisputed that Roman received all of her withheld pay in January 2006. [4] Potter does not dispute that Roman was approved for FMLA leave from September 3, 2005, through March 3, 2006. Nor does he dispute that this was to be paid FMLA leave. The evidence is that Roman initially submitted written forms and was paid; she was not paid when she switched from paper to using an electronic system. This was due to bureaucratic confusion; she was paid again when the confusion was cleared up and ultimately received the full amount. Potter presented a legitimate nonretaliatory explanation, supported by evidence. There is no dispute that when Roman first took leave there was some confusion about how Roman was to submit her Notice of Absence (3971) forms. Nonetheless, Roman was paid. On November 10, Roman was approved for FMLA leave and she began using a new automated voice recognition telephone system to report her absences. After Roman began using the automated system, Rodriguez did not approve Roman's leave because Rodriguez mistakenly believed that Roman was still required to sign and submit to Rodriguez a 3971 form, as was true earlier. The automated system was newly implemented during that year. Significantly, the evidence is that a number of other managers had made the same mistake as to other employees. The mistake as to Roman was corrected when the FMLA coordinator, Ricardo Gonzales, told Rodriguez that under the new automated system it was not necessary for Roman to have signed the 3971 form. Potter's evidence shows that when Rodriguez learned of the mistake, she promptly approved Roman's leave. As a result, Roman's pay immediately resumed, and Rodriguez filled out pay-adjustment certificates to ensure that Roman was paid in full the salary that had been withheld. Roman, as a result, suffered no financial loss. There is no evidence that Rodriguez's misunderstanding was motivated by retaliation, especially in light of the fact that a new system was being implemented and that the same mistake happened with other employees as well. Roman has failed to provide any evidence that Potter's explanation is pretext, much less that Rodriguez's initial mistake was motivated by retaliatory animus. Roman says she believes this delay in payment was motivated by retaliatory animus, but that belief is not enough to show pretext or animus. [W]e need not credit inferences that `rely on tenuous insinuation.' Dennis, 549 F.3d at 858 (quoting Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731, 743 (1st Cir.1995)). 2. Roman also alleges that USPS management retaliated against her by causing the Postal Police, in July 2005, to issue her five traffic citations, which totaled $250 (but were later voided), for traffic violations on USPS property, and by giving her a warning letter for the same violations. The evidence is that a Postal Police officer, Lieutenant Jose Ramirez, issued Roman the citations after witnessing her speed through the customer and employee parking lots, drive through two stop signs, and fail to show identification when she entered the employee lot. Three other USPS employees, including managers Claudio and Rodriguez, observed the same thing. Roman's failure to show her identification to the officer was also captured on tape by a security camera. The Postal Police do issue citations for such violations so no differential treatment is shown. Further, Postmaster Rodriguez herself had earlier been issued a citation for not displaying a required badge on her car after parking it in the employee lot, showing uniform application of the rules. Roman does not dispute that the citations were issued and later cancelled but says she did not violate any traffic rules and so the issuance must have been retaliatory. She relies on her husband's limited testimony that he did not see Roman speeding in the customer parking lot. Roman argues that the true reason that the officer issued the citations was as part of a scheme to retaliate against her in July 2005 for having filed a complaint in December 2004. [5] None of these assertions rebut Potter's explanation and evidence that four people witnessed Roman committing the violations. As to the warning letter, it states that it was in response to the driving incidents on July 6, 2005. Her supervisor, after holding a pre-disciplinary interview, issued the letter because Roman had just had a May 2005 car accident in a USPS vehicle and as a result attended a safe driving course. Despite attending the course and her earlier accident, Roman had now committed traffic violations. As per USPS policy, the warning letter was only to remain in Roman's personnel file for two years. On its face, the letter is not retaliatory; there was a legitimate reason for it to issue. Roman's subjective belief in retaliation is not enough. 3. Roman also alleges that Claudio's August 2005 decision to reassign local responsibility for the rollout of USPS's Customer Connect Program (CCP) (which Roman had helped to prepare) to two postmasters, both also female, was an act of retaliation. This decision did not cause any reduction in Roman's pay. At the time of the decision, the CCP had not yet begun in Puerto Rico and was due to be rolled out. Roman had previously been responsible for the preparatory work, and members of the marketing department, as well as officials who visited Puerto Rico to begin the program's roll-out, agreed that Roman had done a good job. Potter has given the legitimate, nonretaliatory explanation that responsibility for the CCP was reassigned because the CCP, as an operations program that relies on mail carriers to deliver marketing materials and recruit customers, would be more effectively run by the postmasters, who manage mail carriers. Roman presents no evidence showing this explanation to be pretext. Whether or not Roman did a good job in preparing the program before its launch does not address the fact that senior management believed the program would be more effectively managed by postmasters after its launch. Based on this, Potter has also adequately explained why Roman was not permitted to attend the September 23, 2005, Customer Connect training and why Claudio wanted Roman's name removed from materials associated with the program. Roman was no longer responsible for the program. She has presented no evidence showing this explanation to be a pretext. 4. Additionally, Roman claims that Claudio and Rodriguez retaliated against her on September 30, 2005, by physically bumping into Roman as she attempted to enter the office building through a security door. Potter explains that this incident was an accident; the security door was not working on that day and Roman rushed to get through the door. It is undisputed that the three bumped into each other, and, as Roman admits, this happened while all three people were trying to move simultaneously through a door. Claudio and Rodriguez were leaving the building while Roman was trying to enter. Roman's mere assertion that the incident was an intentional assault is insufficient to show pretext. The evidence is that it was an accident. In any event, there is no evidence linking the conduct to any retaliatory animus. Specifically, there is no evidence that Claudio and Rodriguez deliberately bumped into Roman in retaliation for her having filed an EEO complaint. 5. Finally, Roman alleges that Postmaster Rodriguez retaliated against her on September 30, by informing Roman that her detail to the Marketing Department had ended and that Roman should report to Rodriguez for work on October 4, 2005. Rather than do that, Roman chose to take sick leave and accrued annual vacation time. As a result, she never actually reported to work under Rodriguez. There is no evidence that this decision to return Roman to her permanent position was retaliatory. Roman's job description stated that she reported to Postmaster Rodriguez, and Roman had been on detail to the Marketing Department for two years. Rodriguez, in December 2004, had attempted to meet with Roman to tell Roman that, if she wished to stay in the Marketing Department, she should bid for a permanent position there; Roman refused to meet with Rodriguez. There is no evidence this management decision that Roman should return to her regular position after completion of a temporary assignment was based on retaliatory animus. As to Roman's allegation that the decision was somehow linked to the bumping incident earlier that day, Roman's manager in the Marketing Department testified, and it was not rebutted, that the decision to end Roman's detail had been made before the bumping incident occurred.