Opinion ID: 2028236
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: free speech and free association

Text: Next, Pick asserts that L.B. 7 violates his rights to free speech and free association as guaranteed by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and to free speech as guaranteed by Neb. Const. art. I, § 5, because he was denied the right to run as a candidate in the 1992 general election. Dendinger argues that his rights to free speech and free association were similarly violated because he was denied the right to vote in the 1992 general election. The constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech is the same under both the Nebraska and the U.S. Constitutions. State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 236 N.W.2d 794 (1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 96 S.Ct. 2791, 49 L.Ed.2d 683 (1976). Therefore, we do not distinguish between the two constitutions in our analysis of this issue. The U.S. Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 1570, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983), has set forth the analytical framework for 1st and 14th Amendment challenges to specific provisions of state election laws: [A court] must first consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate. It then must identify and evaluate the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. In passing judgment, the Court must not only determine the legitimacy and strength of each of those interests, it also must consider the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights. Only after weighing all these factors is the reviewing court in a position to decide whether the challenged provision is unconstitutional. Although L.B. 7 is a redistricting law and not an election law per se, appellants' First Amendment challenge to the statute is based upon its effects on Pick's rights as a candidate and Dendinger's rights as a voter. These are the same rights implicated in various state election statutes which have been the subject of the U.S. Supreme Court's review. See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 112 S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992); Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra ; Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982). Therefore, we find it useful to adopt the reasoning and analytical framework of the Court in the election statute cases in our analysis of appellants' claims. We first proceed to consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to appellants' rights. Appellants seek to characterize their First Amendment rights to run for elective office and to vote as fundamental rights, the violation of which is entitled to strict scrutiny by this court. However, the right to run for elective office is not a fundamental right. Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972). Furthermore, Pick is not forever prohibited from running for state legislator by L.B. 7. He is free to pursue his candidacy in future elections in his new district should he choose to do so. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that an election statute which specifically imposed a delay on the candidacy of certain individuals was not constitutionally unsound. See Clements v. Fashing, supra . In Clements, the Court held that a statute requiring state officers to await the conclusion of their terms of office before running for the Texas Legislature was a de minimis interference with candidacy which did not impair interests protected by the First Amendment. In this case, the delay to candidacy occasioned by L.B. 7 is not directed at Pick or at any other candidate, but is merely incidental to the purpose of the statute. Therefore, we find that any alleged injury to Pick occasioned by the delay to his candidacy is a de minimis interference which does not violate Pick's fundamental rights under the First Amendment and will not invoke strict scrutiny of the offending statute. As to the alleged violation of appellant Dendinger's rights, we note that, although certain rights of voters are fundamental, not all restrictions on voting impose constitutionally suspect burdens upon voters' rights. See Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra . This court has stated that because Nebraska staggers the terms of its state legislators, it would be a practical impossibility to redistrict without depriving some voters of the right to vote for a legislative representative for a period of 2 years. See Carpenter v. State, 179 Neb. 628, 139 N.W.2d 541 (1966). In the absence of evidence that L.B. 7 was a form of invidious discrimination specifically directed at depriving the voters in the former district 19 of the right to exercise their elective franchise, the 2-year delay is no more than the inevitable result of redistricting. We conclude that L.B. 7 does not create any significant impairment of Dendinger's First Amendment rights. Next, we examine the precise interests put forward by the State as justification for the burden imposed by L.B. 7. As previously noted, L.B. 7, an amendment to L.B. 614, was enacted in response to the mandate of this court in Day v. Nelson, 240 Neb. 997, 485 N.W.2d 583 (1992), because the Legislature had unconstitutionally divided Madison County in violation of Neb. Const. art. III, § 5. We find the State's interest in correcting an unconstitutional redistricting scheme in response to this court's mandate to be both strong and unquestionably legitimate. Finally, in applying the Anderson balancing test, we consider the extent to which the State's interests make it necessary to burden the appellants' rights. It being mandatory that the Legislature redistrict Madison County and, of necessity, some surrounding districts, it was inevitable that the rights of some voters and some candidates would be affected. Appellants do not claim that the redistricting process is directed at them personally or that the Legislature's objective was to single out a particular class of voters or candidates. The fact that appellants, rather than other voters and candidates, have been affected by L.B. 7 is merely a byproduct of the Legislature's exercise of its discretion pursuant to Neb. Const. art. III, § 5, in selecting a constitutionally permissible redistricting plan for Madison County. See Hlava v. Nelson, 247 Neb. 482, 528 N.W.2d 306 (1995). On balance, we find that the State's interest in devising a constitutional scheme of redistricting far outweighs any burden upon appellants' state and federal rights to free speech and free association which may have been occasioned by such redistricting. This assignment of error is without merit.