Opinion ID: 1938332
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the probation provision

Text: A final challenge to the statute remains for our consideration. Defendant contends that the provision governing the grant of probation to guilty but mentally ill persons violates the equal protection and due process clauses of our Federal and state constitutions [7] by providing that the period of probation shall not be for less than 5 years. MCL 768.36(4); MSA 28.1059(4). The challenged statutory provision provides: (4) If a defendant who is found guilty but mentally ill is placed on probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court pursuant to law, the trial judge, upon recommendation of the center for forensic psychiatry, shall make treatment a condition of probation. Reports as specified by the trial judge shall be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing court. Failure to continue treatment, except by agreement with the treating agency and the sentencing court, shall be a basis for the institution of probation violation hearings. The period of probation shall not be for less than 5 years and shall not be shortened without receipt and consideration of a forensic psychiatric report by the sentencing court. Treatment shall be provided by an agency of the department of mental health, or with the approval of the sentencing court and at individual expense, by private agencies, private physicians, or other mental health personnel. A psychiatric report shall be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing court every 3 months during the period of probation. If a motion on a petition to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, the probation officer shall request a report as specified from the center for forensic psychiatry or any other facility certified by department of mental health for the performance of forensic psychiatric evaluation.
Defendant contends that the requirement of a minimum period of probation for defendants found to be guilty but mentally ill denies equal protection because it adversely affects their fundamental liberty interest vis-a-vis defendants found generally guilty of the same probationable offenses, without establishing a compelling state interest for the different treatment. This provision, it is argued, also subjects defendants found guilty but mentally ill to a greater deprivation of liberty than other guilty defendants on the basis of mental illness, without requiring a showing that the mental illness exists at the time of sentencing. Defendant also argues that even if mental illness at the time of sentencing is a legitimate consideration for differentiating between defendants, the statute still offends equal protection because it mandates treatment for the mentally ill class that will not be provided. Consequently, this classification is said to be unconstitutionally arbitrary. Defendant's final contention is that this provision violates due process by failing to provide a hearing on the issue of mental illness at the time of sentencing before imposing a more severe term of probation on guilty but mentally ill defendants than would otherwise be provided defendants convicted of the same probationable offenses.
We note at the outset that it is our duty to presume the constitutionality of a statute and construe it as constitutional unless the contrary clearly appears. People v McQuillan, 392 Mich 511, 536; 221 NW2d 569 (1974); Sullivan v Michigan State Board of Dentistry, 268 Mich 427, 429-430; 256 NW 471 (1934). It is evident from a reading of the probation provision, in the context of the entire statute, that the mental illness of defendants sentenced under it is the basis for the specific statutory directive for a five-year period of probation. Concededly this provision does not explicitly require an inquiry into a defendant's mental health at the time of sentencing. However, we find that it obviously contemplates such an inquiry and implicitly requires one. This statutory provision specifically requires the sentencing judge who places on probation a defendant who has been found guilty but mentally ill to make treatment a condition of probation upon the recommendation of the Center for Forensic Psychiatry. Practically speaking, no such recommendation could be made until the center has been afforded the opportunity to evaluate the defendant's mental health and to determine the need for treatment, if any. Conversely, the sentencing court could not determine that treatment need not be a condition of probation until after it has considered all relevant factors, including the defendant's mental health. Consequently, we hold that this statute requires a sentencing court to obtain a report from the Center for Forensic Psychiatry evaluating a defendant's present mental health prior to sentencing a defendant found guilty but mentally ill.
Defendant appears to contend that more than this is required. He maintains, on the authority of People v McQuillan, supra , that guilty but mentally ill defendants are entitled by due process requirements to a hearing on the issue of their present mental health. If defendant means that a full civil commitment hearing akin to that provided in McQuillan is required, we do not agree. McQuillan held that a person who had been found not guilty by reason of insanity could not thereafter and on that basis be committed automatically to the Department of Mental Health. That verdict only established that there was a reasonable doubt as to defendant's sanity at the time of the crime and thus he was not to be held criminally responsible for his acts. Consequently, because institutionalization would constitute a significant restriction on such a person's right to liberty, due process required a sanity hearing to determine that person's present mental condition and equal protection required that the hearing be substantially similar to other civil commitment proceedings. 392 Mich 537. Guilty but mentally ill defendants are in a wholly different position than defendants found not guilty by reason of insanity. The former have been found beyond a reasonable doubt to have been 1) guilty of an offense, 2) mentally ill at the time of the commission of the offense, and 3) not legally insane at the time of the offense. They no longer have a right to unfettered liberty. They have been convicted of a crime. Their only interest is in obtaining a term of probation similar to other persons convicted of the same crime. The McQuillan Court recognized that [d]ue process analysis focuses on the question of which rights and protections are essential to constitutional procedure in a given situation. 392 Mich 530-531. This is consistent with the general approach taken by the United States Supreme Court for testing challenged state procedures under a due process claim. As recently stated by that Court, its general approach requires a balancing of the private interest that is affected by the official action, the state's interest in the procedures it has adopted, and how well the procedures protect against arbitrariness in the making of the official decision. Parham v J R, 442 US 584, 599-600; 99 S Ct 2493; 61 L Ed 2d 101 (1979). The private interest that is affected by the official action challenged here is one that is legislatively created. In People v Rial, 399 Mich 431, 437; 249 NW2d 114 (1976), this Court recognized, citing MCL 771.4; MSA 28.1134, that probation, in lieu of sentencing, is purely a matter of grace, not of right. It rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, People v Marks, 340 Mich 495, 499; 65 NW2d 698 (1954), with the source of the trial court's probation authority in the Legislature. People v Davis, 392 Mich 221, 226; 220 NW2d 452 (1974). Consequently, we are not evaluating a restriction on defendant's fundamental right to liberty, but a restriction on the granting of an interest that is legislatively created. Balanced against this interest is the state's interest in assuring that mentally ill criminals are provided supervised treatment for their mental illness for a sufficient period of time to assure that their mental health is restored. We find that defendant's interest in the legislatively created sentencing alternative of probation will be protected adequately if the sentencing court is required to obtain a report on defendant's present mental health prior to sentencing and provides a procedure for review to allow shortening or discontinuing the period of probation if the reasons for the five-year period no longer obtain. Such procedures strike a constitutional balance between defendant's interest in a period of probation of less than five years and society's interest in assuring that mentally ill criminals are provided supervised treatment for a period of time sufficient to determine that their mental health is restored. We have already found that this statute requires a report on defendant's present mental health prior to sentencing. We hold further that the statute permits a sentencing court to place a defendant on probation for a shorter period than five years and provides for periodic review of the continuing need for treatment and a procedure for discontinuing probation when there is no further need for treatment. The apparently mandatory five-year period of probation is actually a qualified command to sentencing courts. The pertinent statutory language reads: The period of probation shall not be for less than 5 years and shall not be shortened without receipt and consideration of a forensic psychiatric report by the sentencing court. MCL 768.36(4); MSA 28.1059(4). In order to give commonsense meaning to the second phrase of this sentence, we read it as authorizing the sentencing court to shorten the presumptive five-year period of probation if any forensic psychiatric report obtained prior to sentencing or during the period of probation indicates that a shorter period would be appropriate. Periodic review of the continuing need for treatment is statutorily required: A psychiatric report shall be filed with the probation officer and the sentencing court every 3 months during the period of probation. MCL 768.36(4); MSA 28.1059(4). Furthermore, the statute clearly authorizes a sentencing court to discontinue probation on the motion of the defendant when there is no further need for treatment. If a motion on a petition to discontinue probation is made by the defendant, the probation officer shall request a report as specified from the center for forensic psychiatry or any other facility certified by [the] department of mental health for the performance of forensic psychiatric evaluation. MCL 768.36(4); MSA 28.1059(4). We find these provisions afford guilty but mentally ill defendants who are placed on probation required due process protections. [8]
We cannot accept defendant's argument that the classification of guilty but mentally ill defendants in the probation provision of this statute infringes on a fundamental right and can only be sustained if it satisfies a compelling state interest. As we have already stated, a guilty but mentally ill defendant has no right to the exercise of unfettered liberty. Such a defendant has been found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a judicial proceeding providing the full panoply of rights and protections guaranteed to the criminally accused under both our Federal and state constitutions. Such a defendant's liberty may be constitutionally circumscribed by the state. Consequently, we construe this argument as a challenge to the legislative classification of guilty persons who are mentally ill vis-a-vis guilty persons who are not. The classification of mentally ill in this context has none of the indicia of a suspect class. [9] Because neither a suspect class nor a fundamental right is involved in this classification, it will be upheld in the face of an equal protection challenge under both our Federal and state constitutions if it rationally furthers the object of the legislation. San Antonio Independent School Dist v Rodriguez, 411 US 1, 40, 55; 93 S Ct 1278; 36 L Ed 2d 16 (1973); McGinnis v Royster, 410 US 263, 270; 93 S Ct 1055; 35 L Ed 2d 282 (1973); In re Kasuba Estate, 401 Mich 560, 568-569; 258 NW2d 731 (1977). This is also in accord with the statement of the United States Supreme Court quoted approvingly by this Court in McQuillan, 392 Mich 534. Equal protection does not require that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made. Baxstrom v Herold, 383 US 107, 111; 86 S Ct 760; 15 L Ed 2d 620 (1966). It is apparent that the Legislature's object in creating this new verdict was to assure supervised mental health treatment and care for those persons convicted under the laws of our state who are found to be suffering from mental illness, in the humane hope of restoring their mental health and possibly thereby deterring any future criminal conduct on their part. In order to assure this treatment, the Legislature provided that probationary terms for guilty but mentally ill persons will be for a rebuttable five-year period under the continuing supervision of the sentencing court. The Legislature also provided that the probation could be shortened or discontinued if the need for treatment no longer obtained. We think this classification rationally furthers the legislative object of providing supervised mental health treatment and care to guilty but mentally ill defendants who are placed on probation. Finally, we cannot find this statute created an arbitrary classification because the mandated treatment would not be provided to guilty but mentally ill defendants placed on probation. We have already held the sentencing trial court was an inappropriate forum to decide this question in this case. We find no violation of equal protection in the statute's probation provision.