Opinion ID: 2320924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Muhammad's Motion to Sever

Text: Muhammad argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his case from those of Marks and Riley and that the supposedly conflicting defenses of the defendants and the disparity of proof as to his guilt, compared with the proof against Marks and Riley, resulted in manifest injustice. For three reasons, we hold that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in denying Muhammad's request for severance. First, the murders were jointly committed by all three co-defendants; second, the evidence was substantial against each defendant; and third, the record reveals no manifest prejudice to Muhammad (or either of the other defendants, for that matter) resulting from their joinder in a single trial. We review the denial of a motion to sever for abuse of discretion. E.g., Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 996 (D.C.1991). When multiple defendants are charged with jointly committing a criminal offense, there is a strong presumption that they will be tried together. Id.; see Super. Ct.Crim. R. 8(b). Properly joined defendants may request a severance at any time under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 14 if trying the defendants together prejudices any party. Ray v. United States 472 A.2d 854, 856 (D.C.1984); accord, Ingram, 592 A.2d at 996. Severance is not called for, however, when co-defendants simply blame each other and are mutually hostile to one another. Rather, severance is required only when a defendant shows that (1) a clear and substantial contradiction between the respective defenses' causes inherent irreconcilability between them and (2) that the irreconcilability creates a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone demonstrates that both are guilty. Id. (emphasis added; citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A court should grant a severance only if there is a serious risk that a joint trial could compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence. Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 539, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993). Muhammad's argument is essentially that he was prejudiced because his co-defendants attempted to shift responsibility for the crimes to him. We find no merit in this argument. Unfair prejudice does not arise merely because defendants are mutually hostile and attempt to blame each other. Ingram, 592 A.2d at 996. We find nothing in the record that would support Muhammad's claim that his co-defendants asserted defenses that were irreconcilable with his. Furthermore, none of the three appellants testified at trial. All of the evidence heard by the jury came from witnesses whose testimony would be admissible in separate trials. The court also limited the effectiveness of the blame-shifting theory of Muhammad's co-defendants by giving jury instructions to limit the impact of any suggestion by Riley's and Marks' counsel that Muhammad was the leader of the assault on the two Littles brothers. We are fully satisfied that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, or otherwise err, in denying the motion for severance. [25]