Opinion ID: 1980879
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appointment of a Special Prosecutor

Text: We turn first to Corn's claim the trial court erred in denying his motion for appointment of a special prosecutor. As Corn correctly notes, we have held that professional ethics prohibit a lawyer from prosecuting a criminal case if by reason of his professional relation with the accused, he has acquired a knowledge of facts upon which the prosecution is predicated or which are closely interwoven. State ex rel. Meyers v. Tippecanoe County Court (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1377,1378. Alternatively, a lawyer must be disqualified if the pending case is substantially related to a matter in which the lawyer previously represented another client. Id. In Meyers, Prosecutor John Meyers had represented a defendant in the appeal of a 1974 burglary conviction and at trial for a 1977 theft conviction. Later, Meyers prosecuted the same defendant for theft and being a habitual criminal, alleging the 1974 and 1977 cases as two of the three underlying felonies needed for the habitual offender determination. We concluded his earlier participation as the defendant's public defender bore a substantial relationship to the pending case and held the trial court properly disqualified both Meyers and the entire staff of the prosecutor's office. Id. at 1379. Corn's situation can be readily distinguished. The case in which Demkovich represented Corn was not even one of the three felony convictions the State used for the habitual offender prosecution. Moreover, Demkovich had only a minimal role at the pre-trial hearing in the current case and did not prosecute him. The deputy prosecutor's involvement in the earlier and unrelated case was not substantially related to the present habitual offender conviction. In light of these factors, the trial court was correct to deny Corn's request for a special prosecutor.