Opinion ID: 20143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: refusal to reopen voir dire

Text: 24 Soria contends that his right to an impartial jury under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments was violated when the trial court refused to reopen the voir dire questioning of a prospective juror to determine whether he had a bias against Soria. The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 799, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2036 (1975) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. Id. at 800, 95 S.Ct. at 2036. 25 At the conclusion of voir dire, defense counsel requested that it be reopened as to Juror Ramus for the limited purpose of inquiring, pursuant to the requirements of Article 35.16(10), as to whether or not, from hearsay or otherwise, there is established in his mind such a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the Defendant that would influence his verdict. In support of that motion, defense counsel offered the following testimony of the court's bailiff, who was coordinating the scheduling of the prospective jurors. 26 Juror Ramus phoned the bailiff, apparently after remembering that during voir dire he had been asked whether he recalled hearing about this murder case prior to being called as a prospective juror. He informed the bailiff that he recalled hearing, while working on a construction project at a savings bank the previous summer, about a woman who worked at that bank whose son, grandson, or some male relative had been murdered. However, Ramus could not remember the names involved. The bailiff further testified that it had been determined the victim's mother was working at that bank during that time. The trial court denied the motion to reopen voir dire. 27 On direct appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeals found that:further questioning under article 35.16(a)(10) was not indicated for this purpose in the present context because the information communicated to the bailiff did not raise an issue that Ramus had established in his mind a conclusion as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant. The fact that he may have overheard casual conversation about the incident months earlier, without any mention of [Soria's] name or other intimation that [Soria] might be responsible for the crime, does not, therefore, suggest a challenge for cause which [Soria] was prevented from fully exploring. 28 Soria now asserts that there was a duty incumbent upon the trial court . . . to examine whether Mr. Ramus, having remembered substantial contact with the victim's mother at her place of business, held a bias against the defendant on the issue of guilt or on the issue of punishment. Soria's assertion that Juror Ramus had substantial contact with the juror is not supported by the bailiff's testimony. More important, as quoted above, the state court found that the juror may have overheard casual conversation about the incident months earlier, without any mention of Soria's name or other intimation that Soria might be responsible for the crime. Soria has not rebutted these findings with clear and convincing evidence. Thus, we must view his claim of denial of an impartial jury with these facts in mind. 29 In Andrews v. Collins, 21 F.3d 612 (5th Cir. 1994), we addressed a similar claim. In that case, the petitioner contended that the state court erred in refusing to reopen voir dire prior to trial to determine whether a juror, who had been a distant relative of the victim, was biased. More specifically, a daughter of the juror in question had been married to the victim's grandson, who was deceased at the time of trial. 30 In that case, we construed the petitioner's argument to be that, as a matter of law, bias must be imputed to the juror. We rejected the petitioner's argument, explaining that, during voir dire, the prospective juror stated that he did not know of any reason why he could not be a fair and impartial juror and that the record contained no evidence indicating that the juror's tenuous relationship had any effect on the proceedings. 6 Andrews, 21 F.3d at 620-21. Under those circumstances, we refused to impute bias to the juror. 7 31 In the instant case, like the juror in Andrews, Juror Ramus stated during voir dire that he did not know of any reason whatsoever that [he] couldn't be a fair and impartial juror in this case. He further stated that he had no opinion or conclusion respecting the outcome of the case and that he could be fair and impartial. When asked whether he had read or heard anything about this case, Juror Ramus replied, Not that I remember. I read the paper every morning, but it doesn't stick. It seems like I remember it, but I don't remember anything about it.(emphasis added). 8 Additionally, as in Andrews, there is no indication that the information Juror Ramus overheard had any effect on the proceedings. 32 In light of Soria's failure to rebut the state court's finding that Juror Ramus simply overheard casual conversation regarding the killing without reference to Soria's guilt, he cannot show that he was denied his right to be tried by an impartial jury. Accordingly, he has failed to make a substantial showing regarding the denial of a federal right with respect to this claim. 33