Opinion ID: 4529971
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Uvaldo-Gomez's testimony

Text: Manuel Uvaldo-Gomez8, a government informant, testified that he tried to get involved in the conspiracy by approaching a woman, Drucaste, who told him about the conspiracy's operations, such as bringing drugs into the community through the piers. Gómez and Hernández, both of whom worked at the piers at various times relevant to the charged conspiracy, objected to these statements' admission as hearsay. The district court admitted them as nonhearsay party-opponent statements by a coconspirator under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). As the statements' proponent, the government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the declarant, Drucaste, and the defendant[s], Gómez and Hernández, were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977). We review the defendants' preserved challenges for clear error. United States v. Ciresi, 697 F.3d 19, 25–26 (1st Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 8The witness's name appears as Osvaldo-Gomes in the appellants' briefs but as Uvaldo-Gomez in the government's brief. - 34 - Although a closer question than the government admits, the district court's determination that Drucaste and the defendants were members of the same conspiracy was not erroneous. Because of the deferential standard of review, a defendant seeking to overturn a trial court's Petrozziello ruling carries a heavy burden: A finding is clearly erroneous when although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Where the evidence is susceptible of two plausible interpretations, the trier of fact's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous. United States v. Newton, 326 F.3d 253, 257 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting Reich v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 44 F.3d 1060, 1080 (1st Cir. 1995)). [A] coconspirator's statement, standing alone, is insufficient to meet the preponderance standard [and] some extrinsic proof of the declarant's involvement in the conspiracy [is required]. Id. at 258 (quoting Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1181). Such proof exists here: Uvaldo testified to his own knowledge of Drucaste's involvement in the drug-trafficking conspiracy; indeed, that is why he went to her to inquire about how he himself could join the conspiracy. The defendants conceded as much at trial -- their objections concerned not whether Drucaste was a coconspirator, but whether her statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy. - 35 - Drucaste's statements were in furtherance of the conspiracy because they tend[ed] to promote one or more of the objects of the conspiracy. Ciresi, 697 F.3d at 28 (quoting United States v. Piper, 298 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2002)).9 She told Uvaldo to talk to a Dominican who was a runner for Cascote if he wanted to become a pusher. Such a statement made for the purpose of inducing or continuing participation in the conspiracy [is] in furtherance of the conspiracy. Id. at 29 (quoting United States v. Pelletier, 845 F.2d 1126, 1128 (1st Cir. 1988)). And she told Uvaldo that incarcerated conspiracy members' families would be provided money and that the drugs came in through the piers. [S]haring . . . pertinent information about a conspiracy's mode of operation furthers the conspiratorial ends. Id. (quoting Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1181).