Opinion ID: 2524514
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the Superior Court Err When It Granted State Farm's Motion for Summary Judgment and Denied Shaw's Cross-Motion?

Text: Shaw's insurance policy provided coverage for bodily injury ... caused by accident arising out of the operation, maintenance[,] or use of an uninsured ... or underinsured motor vehicle. State Farm admits that Shaw was shot by Murphy, and does not contest Shaw's contention that Murphy's vehicle was underinsured. Shaw's injuries will thus be covered by her State Farm policy if they were (1) caused by an accident that (2) arose out of the operation, maintenance[,] or use of Murphy's truck.
At the outset Shaw argues that her injuries were caused by accident, noting that an intentional event may nonetheless be an accident within the policy language if it is both unexpected and unintended by the injured party: [I]n analyzing whether a particular incident is an accident for purposes of uninsured motorist coverage, the courts should view the incident from the injured party's perspective. Thus if the event causing the injury is unintended and unexpected from the injured party's viewpoint, the injury is deemed to have occurred as a result of an accident. [5] State Farm does not take issue with this principle, or even mention it on appeal. In the superior court State Farm adverted to this principle, but explicitly declined to contest it. We agree with Shaw on this point. What counts as an accident is not defined by Shaw's insurance policy. When the language of a policy provides no guidance in the definition of its terms, we may determine the policy's meaning by examining case law interpreting similar provisions. [6] We have previously defined the term `accident' as `anything that begins to be, that happens, or that is a result which is not anticipated and is unforeseen and unexpected.'  [7] Further, we have held that whether an occurrence is unanticipated, unforeseen, and unexpected is to be determined from the perspective of the insured. [8] Shaw, of course, was the insured under her State Farm policy. State Farm has not contested Shaw's assertion that [t]he shooting was completely unexpected, and that until she saw the gun in Murphy's hand she had [no] indication of any kind that [he] would shoot [her]. Accordingly, Shaw's injuries were caused by accident. We would need to say no more were it not for an apparent conflict between our holding here and one of our statements in a recently decided case, Kim v. National Indemnity Co. [9] In Kim, we briefly addressed the question of whether a minor who had been sexually assaulted by a cab driver was entitled to recover under the uninsured motorist provision of the cab driver's insurance policy. [10] We first held that the cab driver was not covered by his general insurance agreement, which restricted coverage to injuries caused by accidentbecause the driver's abuse of the minor was intentional, not accidental. [11] We further held that the uninsured motorist provision does not cover [the minor] L.W.'s injury for the same reasons that the general insuring agreement does not: L.W.'s injury did not result from an `accident.'  [12] Under the general insurance agreement, however, it was the cab driver who was the insured; under the uninsured motorist provision, by contrast, it was the minor passenger who was the insured. Because the intentional assault was not expected by the victim, what was not an accident from the perspective of the insured cab driver could still have been an accident from the perspective of the insured minor. To the extent that our statement in Kim suggests otherwise, it is overruled. The result in Kim was correct based on the briefing in that case. In arguing that the minor's injuries should be covered under the uninsured motorist provision, the appellant in Kim argued that if liability coverage would have been provided under the general insurance agreement but for the presence of a separate abuse and molestation exclusion, then coverage should still be provided under the uninsured motorist provision because the abuse and molestation exclusion did not apply to that provision and public policy would not bar such a result for the molester would not benefit. Our holding that liability coverage would not be provided under the general insurance agreement (regardless of the abuse and molestation exclusion), [13] however, defeated the appellant's conditional argument for coverage under the uninsured motorist provision. Because the appellant in Kim did not argue that the abuse could have been an accident from the minor's perspective even though it was not an accident from the tortfeasor's perspective, he abandoned that point on appeal. [14]
The crux of the parties' dispute is whether the accident arose out of the operation, maintenance, or use of Murphy's truck. Shaw argues that Murphy used his truck to stalk her, trap her, surprise her, and shoot her. [15] State Farm argues, to the contrary, that it was mere coincidence that Murphy shot Shaw from his truck, and that Murphy's use of his truck thus had no legally significant causal connection to the shooting. In Criterion Insurance Co. v. Velthouse, we had occasion to address the question of when an injury arises out of the use of a motor vehicle. [16] Mack Velthouse, while horsing around with friends in his parked vehicle, picked up a loaded shotgun and accidentally shot James Harman. [17] Harman sought coverage under Velthouse's insurance policy, which extended coverage to bodily injury ... arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the owned auto. [18] We noted in Velthouse that there must be  some causal connection between the `use' of the vehicle and the injury. [19] Observing that there is an insufficient causal connection between the use of a vehicle and an injury where the vehicle is the mere situs of the injury-causing accident, [20] we approvingly cited those more recent cases which refuse[d] to interpret `use' as meaning other than use of the vehicle in its inherent status as a vehicle. [21] But we noted that most courts do not require proximate cause in its strict legal sense; rather they only require that the vehicle be more than the mere situs of the accident and that the use of the vehicle relate to its inherent use as a motor vehicle. [22] Because the accident could just as easily have occurred in a field or in the home as in Velthouse's parked truck, we held that it had no connection with the use of Velthouse's vehicle as a matter of law. [23] Our holding in Velthouse is paralleled by the Minnesota Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Klug. [24] In Klug, the court noted that [t]he legal issue of whether an accident arises out of the use ... of an automobile is a recurring question which defies a simple test. Instead, each case presenting such a question must, to a great degree, turn on the particular facts presented. [25] Russell Klug was driving home from work when Daniel Bahe, a coworker, pulled up beside him and shot him with a shotgun. [26] As Klug accelerated, Bahe fired a second shot, sped up and rammed Klug from behind, and chased Klug down the highway until Klug was able to duck onto an exit ramp and escape. [27] The Minnesota court set out three general factors to consider when addressing the issue of whether an accident arises out of the use of an automobile: (1) [T]he extent of causation between the automobile and the injury; [28] (2) [W]hether an act of independent significance occurred, breaking the causal link between `use' of the vehicle and the injuries inflicted; [29] and (3) [W]hat type of `use' of the automobile was involved. [30] The Minnesota Supreme Court eventually concluded that the requisite degree of causation existed, noting that Bahe had used his car to keep up with Klug for over two miles in order to try to shoot him, had not left his car before shooting Klug, and had used his car not only to maneuver himself into a position to harm Klug but also to maneuver Klug into a position from which Klug could be harmed. [31] Although the parties dispute the circumstances surrounding the shooting, Shaw's account of the attack resembles the Minnesota Supreme Court's description of the attack on Klug. According to Shaw, the shooting was simply the last act in Murphy's nightlong use of his truck to stalk her and trap her in a position where she could be harmed. Moreover, Shaw alleges that Murphy's attack required the use of his truck as a truck. Shaw insists that she would have kept driving if Murphy had not blocked her with his pickup, would not have waited for Murphy to approach her in her car had he been on foot, and would not have let Murphy into her home had he come to the door. According to State Farm's account, by contrast, Murphy was not stalking Shaw in his truck, but simply happened to be waiting in it for her to emerge from her home. State Farm also argues that Murphy's truck did not block Shaw from turning onto Independence Drive, but that she slowed of her own accord to talk to Murphy. Finally, State Farm insists that Murphy could just as easily have come up to Shaw's car on foot to shoot her while she waited to tell him to leave her alone and go home.