Opinion ID: 177823
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy to Launder Proceeds of Marijuana Trafficking

Text: Count Three of the indictment charged Adams with conspiring to purchase, mail, and cash postal money orders and to transfer money via Western Union with the intent to promote the further distribution of marijuana, knowing that the money involved represented the proceeds of marijuana trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i) and § 1956(h). This charge required the government to prove that the defendant was in fact part of the conspiracy to launder money, and ... `(1) conducted a financial transaction with the proceeds of an illegal activity; (2) knew the property represented illegal proceeds; and (3) conducted the transaction with the intent to promote the carrying on of the [specified] unlawful activity.' United States v. Lee, 558 F.3d 638, 641 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Malone, 484 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir.2007)). After an independent review of the record, we agree that the evidence was indeed insufficient to support the jury's verdict on this count. Bowline's purchase of postal money orders during her second and third trips to St. Louis in some respects constituted the best evidence of money laundering. We may infergiven Bowline's role as a courier, the fact that the money orders were purchased with cash that came into Adams' possession after Bowline carried marijuana to St. Louis, and that Bowline purchased the money orders on Adams' behalf and at his behestthat these transactions involved the proceeds of Adams' marijuana sales and that Bowline would have surmised as much. Furthermore, the fact that Adams directed her to purchase these orders in amounts no greater than $2,500 and not to buy them all at a single post office evidenced an effort to structure the transactions so as to avoid attracting the attention of the authorities and to conceal the source of the funds used to purchase the money orders. But Adams was not charged under the concealment prong of the statute, section 1956(a)(1)(B), but rather the promotion prong, section 1956(a)(1)(A), which, as we have noted, requires proof of an intent to promote the carrying on of the unlawful activity from which the funds involved were derivedin this case, marijuana trafficking. But as the parties agree, the record contains no evidence that Bowline appreciated that the purpose of the money order purchases was to promote continued marijuana trafficking, such that the jury could infer that she and Adams were conspiring to launder money with that aim. Bowline testified that Adams did not tell her why he was purchasing money orders and that she had no idea of what the money orders were used for. R. 461 at 56-57. Proof along those lines is indispensable to a conspiracy conviction under the promotion prong of the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 317-18 (5th Cir.2010). The same flaw in the evidence, plus a second, exists with respect to the money orders that Bowline cashed in California following her first trip to St. Louis. There is no evidence that the cash Bowline obtained in exchange for the money orders was used to promote further marijuana trafficking and that Bowline understood as much. At the same time, there is no evidence that these money orders represented the proceeds of marijuana trafficking, as opposed to the sale of Ecstasy (recall that Bowline carried Ecstasy as well as marijuana to St. Louis on her first trip) or stolen electronics, in which Adams also dabbled. There are similar problems with respect to two different transfers of funds by wire that occurred during Bowline's third trip to St. Louis. Recall that while Bowline was driving from California to St. Louis, she ran out of money and had Adams wire her $100. Perhaps it is safe to assume that Bowline used the wired funds in furtherance of marijuana trafficking (by buying gasoline for the car, for example). But there was no evidence as to the source of those funds, so no reasonable juror could conclude that they were the proceeds of marijuana trafficking. During the same trip, while Bowline and Adams were in St. Louis, Adams directed her to wire $2,000 to Johnson. However, Johnson testified that this represented payment for the cocaine he had given Adams to sell in St. Louis; so this transaction did not involve the proceeds of marijuana trafficking. There were financial transactions involving other individuals, but these fare no better as proof of a money laundering conspiracy. On one occasion, Adams used money orders to pay Gomez for marijuana that Gomez had fronted to Adams previously. Gomez accepted this form of payment (in contrast to Barrios, who told Gomez, I ain't a bank (R. 462 at 241) when Gomez tried to pay Barrios with the same money orders), but there is no evidence that would support the inference that, in doing so, he was conspiring with Adams to launder the proceeds of his marijuana trafficking. Johnson also accepted money orders from Adams, but in payment for cocaine rather than marijuana. Finally, the evidence revealed that Adams used money orders to pay the rent on his California apartment and to buy a restored Cadillac. But nothing in the record would support the inference that Adams engaged in these transactions with the intent to promote further marijuana sales. Adams has reviewed a number of additional transactions, but these transactions involved cash rather than money orders or wire transfers and as such were not the types of transactions referred to in the indictment or the jury instructions. Consequently, we need not address them. Our review of the trial record confirms that the evidence would not permit a reasonable finder of fact to find each of the elements of the money laundering conspiracy charge proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Adams is therefore entitled to a judgment of acquittal on Count Three.