Opinion ID: 1179473
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the superior court abused its discretion by refusing to excuse hackney for cause

Text: The question thus presented is whether the decision to retain Hackney was an abuse of discretion. The trial court's decision will be reversed only in exceptional circumstances and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Mitchell v. Knight, 394 P.2d 892, 897 (Alaska 1964). See also Sirotiak v. H.C. Price Co., 758 P.2d 1271, 1275 (Alaska 1988). Dalkovski argues that Hackney's knowledge of Dalkovski's July 1979 statement about the mix-up in the lots was prejudicial, and the refusal to excuse Hackney was thus an abuse of discretion. We agree. The critical inquiry is whether the knowledge of the facts prevents the juror from rendering an impartial verdict based solely on the evidence presented at trial. Knowledge by a juror of incidental or collateral facts ... will not render him incompetent to sit in the trial of a case. Wells, 235 So.2d at 708. In Sirotiak, 758 P.2d at 1277, we held that a potential juror who expressed a bias against large damage awards may sit on a jury if the juror makes a good faith statement that he or she will be fair, impartial and follow instructions. When questioned by the court and the two attorneys, Hackney indicated that he could serve fairly and impartially and that his personal knowledge would not influence his verdict. Hackney's statement satisfied the Sirotiak test. However, Sirotiak does not control here. A juror's personal knowledge of facts is a different matter than a juror's bias or prejudice. A juror with personal knowledge may base his or her verdict on facts not in evidence and may improperly divulge these facts to other jurors. [4] Other jurors are less likely to be swayed by one juror's bias or prejudice than by that juror's statement of fact. The juror with personal knowledge therefore presents a greater threat to the litigants' right to a fair trial. We conclude that a higher standard prevails for retaining jurors with personal knowledge of facts of the case. [T]he judge should always look closely into the matter. A juror with any material knowledge of the facts in the case on trial should be excused for cause unless it is beyond question that such juror can try the case and return a verdict only on the evidence introduced in the courtroom. Jordan, Jury Selection § 5.15 at 83 (1980). The primary goal is to secure a fair and competent jury, and nothing should be permitted to exist that might throw the least doubt upon that fact. Wells, 235 So.2d at 711. Spiroski originally purchased the lot in May of 1978. The misrepresentation of the boundaries occurred on or before May 8, 1978. Dalkovski purchased the lot from Spiroski on August 13, 1979 and filed suit on August 12, 1982. The applicable statute of limitations is two years. AS 09.10.070. The statute of limitations does not begin to run until the claimant discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, the existence of all elements essential to the cause of action. Russell v. Municipality of Anchorage, 743 P.2d 372, 375 (Alaska 1987). Dalkovski's claim is thus time barred unless he did not know of and reasonably failed to discover the misrepresentation until August 13, 1980. Hackney's knowledge that Dalkovski was aware of a mix-up on July 20, 1979 was thus very prejudicial to Dalkovski. This was not an incidental or collateral fact, but one that would defeat Dalkovski's claim completely. Given the importance of an impartial jury and the availability of an alternate juror, we conclude that it was an abuse of discretion for Judge Cranston to retain Hackney as a juror.