Opinion ID: 2226732
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gothenburg Board of Education

Text: France signed the letter and, according to Oldham, remarked: `I guess that represents the feeling of the Board of Education.'  France testified that he signed the letter only on behalf of himself and not upon authorization by the school board. Oldham then gave France a letter of resignation which said, in part: [A]s per our verbal conversation last night at the Board meeting, I feel it to be in my best interest to inform you of my resignation. The school board accepted Oldham's resignation on April 9, 1979. Section 48-628(a) provides, in part, that: An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: (a) For the week in which he has left work voluntarily without good cause, if so found by the Commissioner of Labor, and for not less than seven weeks nor more than ten weeks which immediately follow such week, as determined by the commissioner according to the circumstances in each case. In construing this language we have said: [T]o `leave work voluntarily,' ... means to intentionally sever the employment relationship with the intent not to return to, or to intentionally terminate, the employment. Powers v. Chizek, 204 Neb. 759, 764, 285 N.W.2d 501, 504 (1979). MacFarland, Aplnt. v. Unemploy. Comp. Bd., 158 Pa.Super. 418, 45 A.2d 423 (1946), which was cited in Powers, defined voluntary as meaning an employee who left of his own volition and was not discharged. A similar definition, also quoted in Powers, was that voluntary means that the claimant, by his or her own choice, intentionally, of his or her own free will, terminates the employment. Allen v. Core Target City Y. Prog., 275 Md. 69, 338 A.2d 237 (1975). See, also, 76 Am.Jur.2d Unemployment Compensation § 59 at 956 (1975). Powers dealt with the question of whether an employee discharged for failing to appear for work, in the belief that she had already been fired, terminated her employment voluntarily. In Powers the question arose because it was unclear whether the employee intended and acted to terminate her employment; in this case the question of voluntariness arises because it is unclear whether the employer intended and acted to terminate the employment relationship or, in other words, to discharge the employee. Upon de novo review we hold that the District Court correctly found that Oldham did not terminate his employment voluntarily. The record shows that France, not Oldham, first raised the issue of Oldham's reelection. Likewise, it is undisputed that Oldham desired to remain in his position as superintendent for at least another year, and told the school board of his desire. When Buddenberg asked the school board members whether they would change their minds and let Oldham stay for one more year, no one encouraged him to remain. It was only after this exchange that resignation was mentioned. The record is devoid of any evidence showing that Oldham had expressed a desire to resign prior to this discussion or that there was any question of misconduct, on his part, involved. It is clear that he resigned only because the school board members who had the power to reelect him intended not to do so. Since we find that Oldham did not terminate his employment voluntarily, we need not reach the issue of whether he had good cause under § 48-628(a) for his actions. Next, we turn to the issue of attorney fees. The first mention of attorney fees in this record was at the District Court level where both Oldham and the Gothenburg Public School District sought an award of attorney fees for the appeal. The court ordered the Commissioner to pay Oldham reasonable attorney fees. The Commissioner argues that the court lacked statutory authority to do so. This court has said many times that an award of attorney fees is erroneous unless permitted by statute or uniform practice. Suhr v. City of Seward, 201 Neb. 51, 266 N.W.2d 190 (1978); Warren v. Warren, 181 Neb. 436, 149 N.W.2d 44 (1967). Neither statute nor uniform practice permits the District Court upon appeal to order an adverse party to pay attorney fees incurred by an unemployment compensation claimant. Oldham suggests that § 48-646 authorizes such an award. That section provides, in part, that: Any individual claiming benefits in any proceeding before the commissioner or an appeal tribunal or his or its representative or a court may be represented by counsel or other duly authorized agent, and such counsel may either charge or receive for such services a reasonable fee to be approved by the commissioner. The commissioner may, in special cases, pay such fee from the Employment Security Administration Fund. Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be guilty of a Class II misdemeanor. In construing a statute, we have consistently held that the language used by the Legislature should be considered to determine its intent and the words used should be given their plain meaning. Weiss v. Union Ins. Co., 202 Neb. 469, 276 N.W.2d 88 (1979); PPG Industries Canada Ltd. v. Kreuscher, 204 Neb. 220, 281 N.W.2d 762 (1979). In plain language, § 48-646 deals with the fees charged to a claimant by his own attorney, approval of such fees by the Commissioner, and payment of fees in special cases by the Commissioner. It plainly provides that the amount of any fee charged to the client by his attorney requires approval by the Commissioner, including any fee for services in any court. The record does not show that any request was ever made to the Commissioner for approval of fees charged. Consequently, there is no showing of any special circumstances which would require payment by the Commissioner from the Employment Security Administration Fund. This statute in no way provides for an award of attorney fees by the District Court where such award was first sought on appeal by the parties and there was no issue on the appeal concerning any determination by the Commissioner as to the reasonableness of fees assessed a claimant by his own attorney or the eligibility of a claimant to have his attorney fees paid by the Commissioner under § 48-646. We affirm the finding of the District Court that Oldham did not terminate his employment voluntarily, and reverse on the issue of attorney fees. AFFIRMED IN PART, AND IN PART REVERSED.