Opinion ID: 2996563
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Existence of Conspiracy

Text: Liability under § 1985 must be predicated on a finding that two or more people agreed to violate the plaintiff’s civil rights. See 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Upon examination of the record, we must conclude that Mr. Williams has not produced sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to violate any of 8 his federally protected rights. 7 (...continued) department spokesman, nor was Mr. Williams wearing his uniform); R.80, Ex.Toth Declaration at ¶ 7 (stating that comment in the media was made “at the time of the trial”); R.1 at 4 (Mr. Williams’ complaint stating that his comment was made “concerning the verdict” in the Dickens case). 8 In addition to Mr. Williams’ claims that the defendants conspired to deprive him of his First Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, his complaint also alleges violations of § 1985 based on the deprivation of his Due Process and Equal Protection rights. Moreover, Mr. Lauck and Mr. Toth are alleged to have violated 42 U.S.C. § 1983; but they were not in a position to fire Mr. (continued...) 16 No. 02-1231 We begin our appraisal of Mr. Williams’ conspiracy claim by noting that our case law makes clear that: To establish § 1983 liability through a conspiracy theory, a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) a state official and private individual(s) reached an understanding to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, Starnes [v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 39 F.3d 1394, 1397 (7th Cir. 1994)]; and (2) those individual(s) were “willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents.” Adickes [v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)]. Fries v. Helsper, 146 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 1998). Although a conspiracy certainly may be established by circumstantial evidence, we have stressed that such evidence cannot be speculative. For instance, in Goetzke v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2002), we concluded that the existence of numerous phone calls between alleged conspirators, “standing alone, merely proves that [the individuals] remained in contact. . . . To assert that the calls are evidence of a conspiracy is simply speculation.” Id. at 778. Although a nonmoving party’s own deposition may constitute affirmative evidence to defeat summary judgment, conclusory statements in the deposition do not create an 8 (...continued) Williams, so any liability must be based on the theory that their participation in the alleged conspiracy violated § 1983. See Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 28-29 (1980) (noting that “[p]rivate parties who corruptly conspire with a judge in connection with such conduct are thus acting under color of state law within the meaning of § 1983 . . . .”); Tarkowski v. Robert Bartlett Realty Co., 644 F.2d 1204, 1206 (7th Cir. 1980) (concluding that private parties may be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for jointly engaging with public officials in the denial of civil rights). No. 02-1231 17 issue of fact. See Mills v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n of Belvidere, 83 F.3d 833, 843 (7th Cir. 1996). In Johnson v. University of Wisconsin-Eau Claire, 70 F.3d 469, 482 (7th Cir. 1995), we noted that the plaintiff had “not offered evidence to rebut the [defendant’s] claim that [the defendant’s] decision was based on [] legitimate factors, since [] unsupported conjecture is not competent evidence in this regard.” We must conclude that Mr. Williams has not introduced evidence to support his assertions of a conspiracy. He relies upon expressions of displeasure by various public officials with his public statement and his unsupported conjecture that this statement created a conspiracy to fire him for exercising his right to free speech. Mr. Williams’ “smoking gun” is Sheriff Seniff’s statement in the termination hearing: I think you have strained relations with the prosecutors [sic] office, with the South Bend Police Department and with a lot of the public. You’ve damaged relationships. I told you before I got calls from the mayor’s [sic] office, I got calls from the Chief of Police, I got calls from the FOP, I got calls from the Prosecutors [sic] Office. Yes, I think you are straining relations. R.39, Ex.1 at 3. This statement indicates that various individuals expressed displeasure with Mr. Williams’ statement; it does not provide evidence of an agreement on the part of those who expressed the displeasure to deprive Mr. Williams of his rights. As additional evidence of Mr. Toth’s participation in the alleged conspiracy, Mr. Williams introduced the deposition testimony of Alan Lieb, an acquaintance and political supporter of Mr. Toth. Lieb stated that he had called Mr. Toth and said, “Chris, [] I can’t believe you’re involved with this case. . . . I’d like to see what I can do, if there’s anything I can do to get you out of this.” R.75, Ex.Alan Lieb Dep. at 59. To which Mr. Toth responded, “There’s nothing you can 18 No. 02-1231 do. I’m right in the middle of it.” Id. Lieb testified that Mr. Toth told him a number of people had called him to complain about Mr. Williams’ comment in the media. See id. at 60. Lieb also stated that Mr. Toth indicated that he was “involved in the termination of employment.” Id. at 66-68. However, Lieb had trouble remembering Mr. Toth’s exact words. When initially asked whether the “involvement” could have been simply a complaint to Sheriff Seniff, Lieb responded, “No, not when there’s a termination involved, no. No. Absolutely not.” Id. at 66. However, Lieb ultimately admitted that the level of involvement “very possibl[y]” could have referred only to Mr. Toth’s call to Sheriff Seniff to complain about Mr. Williams’ comment. Id. at 67-68. Additionally, Lieb admitted that Mr. Toth did not elaborate on the level of his “involvement.” Id. at 68. This vacillating testimony only confirms that Mr. Toth was involved in the events surrounding Mr. Williams’ termination, and Mr. Toth readily admitted that he had complained to Sheriff Seniff about Mr. Williams’ statement. We cannot say, however, that this testimony constitutes evidence from which a conspiracy may be inferred. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Mr. Lauck and Mr. Toth on all § 1985 claims and on all § 1983 claims based on participation in a conspiracy was appropri- 9 ate. 9 We note that the district court granted Mr. Toth’s motion to dismiss Mr. Williams’ claims against him in his official capacity pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), reasoning that, in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Congress did not overturn the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity. See R.41 at 20 (citing Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 345 (1979)). The district court held that prosecuting attorneys in Indiana are state officials, precluding suit against them in their official capacity under the Eleventh (continued...) No. 02-1231 19