Opinion ID: 4470839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Necessity of Termination

Text: [¶22] Finally, the father argues that the trial court erred in concluding that his parental rights needed to be terminated in order for the stepfather to adopt the children. Instead, the father argues, the trial court could have granted the adoption petition without terminating his rights, leaving the children with 14 three legal parents. This argument reflects a misunderstanding of Title 18-A adoption proceedings and is not persuasive. [¶23] The Probate Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. Marin v. Marin, 2002 ME 88, ¶ 9, 797 A.2d 1265. The Adoption Act grants the Probate Court jurisdiction over adoption petitions. 18-A M.R.S. § 9-103(1)(a) (2018); see also In re Melanie S., 1998 ME 132, ¶ 8, 712 A.2d 1036. Before the court may grant a petition for adoption, however, written consent is required from each of the adoptee’s living parents, unless an exception is satisfied. 18-A M.R.S. §§ 9-302(a)(2), (b) (2018). A parent’s consent is not required if his or her parental rights have been terminated pursuant to 22 M.R.S. §§ 4050-4059 (2018).3 Limited by its statutory mandate, the Probate Court is left with two choices in the face of a nonconsenting parent: deny the petition for adoption because the petitioner has failed to prove that the nonconsenting parent is unfit or, if the petitioner has established that the parent is unfit and that adoption would be in the child’s best interest, terminate the nonconsenting parent’s parental rights, thereby obviating the need for the parent’s consent. See Adoption of Isabelle T., 2017 ME 220, ¶ 12, 175 A.3d 639 (noting that the The Title 22 termination procedures are incorporated by reference in 18-A M.R.S. § 9-204, which 3 authorizes the Probate Court to terminate parental rights in conjunction with an adoption petition. 15 Adoption Act does not authorize rehabilitation or reunification efforts prior to or instead of termination of parental rights). We review a trial court’s determination of its own authority de novo. Bonner v. Emerson, 2014 ME 135, ¶ 9, 105 A.3d 1023. [¶24] Here, the father was a living parent of both prospective adoptees and, as such, the trial court could not grant either petition without his consent, which the father did not provide. 18-A M.R.S. § 9-302(a)(2). The mother filed petitions to terminate the father’s parental rights, and the trial court granted those petitions. Only after the court determined that the father’s consent was not legally necessary—because his rights had been terminated—could it proceed to consider the adoption petitions. [¶25] The trial court did not have the authority to pursue the third option described by the father: an open adoption granted with his parental rights intact but without his written consent. Although the Maine Parentage Act contemplates more than two parents, the Adoption Code does not. Title 18-C M.R.S. §9-308 states that the effect of an adoption is to “divest[] the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, immunities, duties and obligations to each other as parent and child, except an adoptee inherits from the adoptee’s former parents if provided in the adoption decree.” 18-C M.R.S. § 9-308(6) 16 (2019) (emphasis added). The Code contains no provision for parents who wish to “consent” to the adoption of their children by someone else, unless those consents are accompanied by voluntary termination of parental rights. [¶26] The trial court did not err in failing to consider an adoption not authorized by law. The entry is: Judgments affirmed. Caleb J. Gannon, Esq., and John E. Baldacci, Jr., Esq. (orally), Lipman & Katz, Augusta, for appellant father Maryellen Sullivan, Esq., and Joe Lewis, Esq. (orally), Port City Legal, Portland, for appellees mother and stepfather Kennebec County Probate Court docket numbers A2018-4689 and A2018-4690 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY