Opinion ID: 572239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Coin Dealing As a Fundamental Right

Text: 19 Appellants appear to argue that the ordinance is unconstitutional because it fails to provide an exception for coin dealers. 25 However, the principal case cited by appellants in support of their argument that an exception should be created actually permits a very similar regulation of all secondhand dealers, including those who deal in precious metals. 26 Although some courts have found that precious metal dealers have not traditionally been subject to the same degree of regulation as dealers in liquor and firearms, 27 these distinctions were drawn in the context of fourth amendment challenges to laws permitting warrantless inspections of precious metal dealers' businesses. 28 The Orlando ordinance does not authorize such inspections. 20 Even were coin dealers entitled to greater freedom from regulation in conducting their businesses than others, the challenged Orlando ordinance does not in any way prevent appellants from conducting their trade in coins. Orlando City Code § 43.54(1)(b) specifically excepts coins with an intrinsic value less than their numismatic value from regulation. Orlando City Code § 43.54(1)(c) specifically excepts gold bullion coins. The ordinance thus does not require appellants to report their transactions in collectible coins. It merely requires appellants to report transactions of items such as flatware and jewelry. In other words, the ordinance only regulates appellants when appellants are not acting as coin dealers but as secondhand goods dealers generally. 21 In an argument related to the one just discussed, appellants seem to maintain that they have a right to privacy in their business transactions greater than that traditionally afforded to other businesses and that the ordinance interferes with their fundamental right to engage in coin dealing. 29 It goes almost without saying that there is no fundamental right to engage in coin dealing. Orlando's ordinance need only withstand analysis under the rational basis test, used for economic regulation. We fail to see in what way appellants could show that the ordinance is not rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, as Orlando clearly has an interest in halting transfers of stolen goods. 22 In summary, appellants have not shown that the Orlando ordinance (which appears fairly innocuous to us) is unconstitutional on any ground.