Opinion ID: 439952
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: objections in the district court

Text: 71 During the course of the District Court proceedings, Byers made three objections implicating significantly the psychiatric examination of which he now complains. The first occurred several months before trial when the Government moved for, and the court ordered, Byers' temporary commitment to a federal facility at Springfield, Missouri, for such an examination. Byers resisted the motion on the grounds that this was unnecessary in light of his earlier examination at Saint Elizabeths' Hospital, in Washington, D.C., and that the remoteness of Springfield would subject him to needless hardship. 4 72 During trial, an objection was registered against the introduction of testimony by Dr. Nicola Kunev, a psychiatrist employed at Springfield, which hinted strongly that Byers may, at his wife's suggestion, have concocted the theory of his insanity plea. Byers opposed this testimony primarily on the grounds that it lacked probative value and was extremely prejudicial, 5 and he attempted to demonstrate that it was unreliable 6 --in his words, total speculation. 7 Byers' counsel also remarked briefly upon the difficulty of cross-examination occasioned by destruction of Dr. Kunev's interview notes and silence of the official interview reports on this aspect of his testimony. 8 73 The third objection came at the close of trial when, in support of a motion for a new trial, Byers contended that the District Court had admitted Dr. Kunev's testimony 9 in violation of a statute admonishing that statements made by an accused to his psychiatrist during an examination conducted pursuant to its provisions shall [not] be admitted into evidence against the accused on the issue of guilt in any criminal proceeding. 10 74 Contrary to an earlier representation to this court, 11 Byers now would have us find that these three objections, cumulatively if not singly, tendered his present constitutional claims to the District Court sufficiently to warrant their consideration on appeal. 12 In my view, they are wholly inadequate to that end. 75 Federal Criminal Rule 51 directs a party not only to make[ ] known to the court the action which he desires the court to take or his objection to the action of the court, but also to explicate the grounds therefor. 13 This provision and its forerunners have consistently been interpreted to require an objection sufficiently clear and specific 14 to apprise the trial court and opposing counsel of the claim distinctly, in order that the purported error may be addressed and hopefully cured at that time. 15 Of equal importance to this litigation are holdings of the Supreme Court and other federal tribunals that vague or general objections do not suffice to preserve constitutional claims; 16 in such cases, the orthodox rule of evidence requiring specification of the objection is buttressed by the uniform policy requiring constitutional questions to be raised at the earliest possible stage in the litigation. 17 Tested by these standards, it simply is not enough to say merely that objections tendered to the District Court may in some sense have reflect[ed] 18 some of the concerns implicated by the constitutional provision relied on. 19 76 Byers urges us to acknowledge Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights which have yet to be recognized by any federal court, and which, if validated, would impose substantial affirmative duties upon the Government. Of the three objections proffered by Byers to support the contention that he presented his current claims to the District Court, two may be dismissed out of hand. Neither Byers' objection to the Government's motion for commitment for the Springfield examination nor his motion for a new trial predicated on the alleged statutory violation even remotely revealed or suggested either of the constitutional theses he now advances. 77 The third objection upon which Byers relies--that particular testimony of Dr. Kunev was inadmissible because it lacked probative value and was prejudicial--merits closer scrutiny, but ultimately proves to be no more beneficial to his cause. At no time did Byers invoke either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment eo nomine, or even hint that he intended an objection of constitutional dimensions. His counsel did observe briefly that cross-examination of Dr. Kunev would be hampered by the latter's failure either to preserve his interview notes or to refer in official reports to the challenged topic of the testimony. This was hardly sufficient, however, to communicate the nature and scope of Byers' constitutional claims to the court, or even to intimate that he thought the testimony would derogate his privilege against self-incrimination or trammel his right to assistance of counsel. 20 Indeed, if Byers had in mind a Fifth or Sixth Amendment foundation for the objection, he could appropriately and much more beneficially have made it before Dr. Kunev began to testify. 78 Given these circumstances, I cannot believe that Byers presented the objection with sufficient clarity and particularity to apprise trial participants of the specific constitutional components now claimed for it. From all appearances, the objection arose simply pursuant to Federal Evidence Rule 403, which authorizes trial judges to exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 21 We should not, by indulgence in vastly overgenerous hindsight, construe it to germinate and preserve Byers' current Fifth and Sixth Amendment positions. 79