Opinion ID: 1847393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether the order entered by the chancery court was in fact an agreed order?

Text: ¶ 17. Mrs. Rushing claims she entered an agreement to settle the unresolved issues in this case only after the chancellor incorrectly admitted the tape recording of her conversations into evidence. Mrs. Rushing claims that because she felt compelled to settle the issues of adultery and child custody after the tape recording was admitted into evidence, this somehow means the trial court's judgment rises to a level of fraud. We disagree. ¶ 18. Prior to 1991, one could not appeal a consent judgment in chancery court. Statutory law provided An appeal may be taken to the supreme court ... from any final decree of the chancery court, not being by consent, by any of the parties or legal representatives of such parties.... Mississippi Code Ann. § 11-51-3 (1972) (emphasis added); see also In re Guardianship of Hiatt, 194 So.2d 495, 495 (Miss.1967) (holding an appeal cannot be taken from a consent decree or judgment of a trial court by one of the parties to the consent decree or judgment...). Then, in 1991, Section 11-51-3 was amended to provide: An appeal may be taken to the Supreme Court from any final judgment of a circuit or chancery court in a civil case, not being a judgment by default, by any of the parties or legal representatives of such parties.... ¶ 19. While Mississippi law now permits a party to appeal a consent judgment in chancery court, consent agreements are not ordinarily subject to appellate review. The Court's opinion in Askew v. Askew, 699 So.2d 515 (Miss.1997) proves insightful. ¶ 20. In Askew, we considered whether and when M.R.C.P. 60(b) may be used to set aside an agreed judgment in a divorce case concerning custody and support. Rule 60(b) states: On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of the adverse party; .... (6) any other reason justifying relief from the judgment. ¶ 21. In Askew, the husband sought to set aside an agreed judgment of divorce in which he had relinquished physical and legal custody of his minor children to his wife while retaining visitation privileges. The husband filed a motion for relief from the agreed judgment pursuant to M.R.C.P. 60(b), alleging fraud and misrepresentation by the wife. The lower court denied the husband's motion finding there was an agreed judgment between the parties and the motion to set aside was an inappropriate method to come before the court. ¶ 22. In affirming the lower court's decision, we held the lower court should have entertained the husband's Rule 60(b) motion insofar as it alleged fraud and misrepresentation, but stated it was apparent from the record that the husband really had no evidence to substantiate these claims, and he was simply attempting to relitigate the matters which had been agreed to and settled. In holding that a Rule 60(b) motion should be denied where it is merely an attempt to relitigate, we stated: While a motion under Rule 60(b) may lie to attack an agreed judgment of divorce, the allegation and indicated evidence should be such as would convince a court that what is sought is not simply an opportunity to litigate that which is already settled. Here the allegations made were outstanding at the time of the settlement. Having foregone the first opportunity to fully litigate those allegations, [the husband] should not be allowed to reopen based upon the very same allegations. Id. at 520. ¶ 23. Although Mrs. Rushing did not file a Rule 60(b) motion, she is, in essence, attacking the lower court's judgment claiming admission of the tape recording into evidence somehow rises to a level of fraud. We can find no evidence of fraud here. As previously stated, the trial court's admission of the tape recording into evidence was proper, and the fact that admission of this evidence caused Mrs. Rushing to feel compelled to settle the issues of adultery and child custody in no way supports her claim that the trial court's judgment is somehow fraudulent.