Opinion ID: 3134725
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Comments by the Court

Text: Defendant next argues that comments by the circuit court regarding the expected length of the sentencing hearing deprived him of a fair hearing on eligibility by suggesting that the court believed defendant would be found eligible for the death penalty. For example, during voir dire , the circuit court made the following statements to a panel of prospective jurors: “And finally, is there anyone who would be seriously inconvenienced, and I stress the word seriously inconvenienced by serving on this jury? We have spoken with the attorneys, everybody anticipates that this case will be over next Monday. There is a chance it will be over Friday. There is a chance it may go to Tuesday, but everybody anticipates it should be over Monday. If there is anybody seriously inconvenienced, please raise your hand.” In addition, on the first day of the eligibility hearing, the circuit court apologized for keeping the jurors late the previous night, but told them: “Had we not picked the jury yesterday, we would still be in the jury selection process today which means that we would delay everything one additional day and so while you probably weren’t too happy last night you probably will be happier Friday or Monday or whenever we’re done with the case that we don’t have to come back an extra day.” At the end of the day, the circuit court informed the jurors, “I’ve been speaking with the attorneys and we do anticipate that we should be able to finish the case by Monday.” According to defendant, these comments were improper because they suggested to jurors that the court assumed defendant would be found eligible for the death penalty and that an aggravation-mitigation hearing would be necessary. Further, defendant asserts that the circuit court’s comments indicated the defendant’s own attorneys shared this assumption. He claims that the prejudice from these remarks is demonstrated by the short time the jury spent deliberating the eligibility question. Thus, defendant contends that a new sentencing hearing is required. The State responds that defendant waived this issue for review by failing to object to the circuit court’s comments at trial. The State also challenges defendant’s argument on the merits. According to the State, the circuit court’s comments were innocuous and “routine housekeeping.” As defendant argues, this court has relaxed the waiver rule when the asserted error involves the conduct of the circuit court. See Kliner , 185 Ill. 2d at 161; People v. Nevitt , 135 Ill. 2d 423, 455 (1990); People v. Sprinkle , 27 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01 (1963). We will, therefore, address the merits of defendant’s argument despite his failure to object to the circuit court’s comments at trial. The circuit court is charged with the responsibility of ensuring that all defendants receive a fair trial. People v. Burrows , 148 Ill. 2d 196, 250 (1992). Because of its great influence on jurors, the circuit court must “exercise restraint over [its] utterances and refrain from unnecessary disparagement of issues.” Terrell , 185 Ill. 2d at 487. Comments by the circuit court will not, however, amount to reversible error unless they are material or had a probable effect on the jury’s verdict. People v. Brown , 172 Ill. 2d 1, 38-39 (1996). In an analogous case, People v. Shum , 117 Ill. 2d 317 (1987), this court held that the circuit court’s remarks about the expected length of the trial were proper. In Shum , during voir dire , the circuit court provided prospective jurors with an estimate of the length of the defendant’s trial. During the trial, the circuit court also told the jury when it could expect to be sequestered. The defendant argued that these comments denied him a fair trial. We found no error based on the circuit court’s statements regarding the length of the trial. Instead, we found that the court’s statements permitted prospective jurors to determine whether they would be able to serve on the jury during the entire trial. This was an appropriate exercise of the court’s responsibility for informing prospective jurors of the scope of their duty. Shum , 117 Ill. 2d at 345-46. Similarly, the circuit court’s remark about when the jury could expect to be sequestered was proper because it was consistent with the circuit court’s responsibility for organizing the court and its consideration for the jury. Shum , 117 Ill. 2d at 346. As in Shum , we find no error in the circuit court’s comments regarding the estimated length of the sentencing hearing in this case. It was appropriate for the circuit court to provide prospective jurors with an estimate of the length of defendant’s sentencing hearing in order to determine their ability to serve on the jury throughout the sentencing hearing. With respect to the circuit court’s comments during the hearing, we find that they were proper in light of the circuit court’s administrative responsibilities at the sentencing hearing. See Shum , 117 Ill. 2d at 346; see also People v. Eyler , 133 Ill. 2d 173, 205-06 (1989) (circuit court’s comments did not indicate to the jury that it assumed the defendant would be found guilty). Moreover, during voir dire and at the conclusion of the eligibility hearing, the circuit court instructed jurors that, if they did not unanimously find defendant eligible for the death penalty, the second phase of the sentencing hearing would not take place. In addition, before the jury began its deliberations with respect to eligibility, the circuit court stated: “Neither by these instructions nor by any ruling or remark which I have made do I mean to indicate any opinion as to the facts or as to what your verdict should be.” We cannot conclude that the circuit court’s estimate of the length of the sentencing hearing had any effect on the eligibility verdict. Accordingly, we decline to grant defendant a new sentencing hearing on this basis.