Opinion ID: 29915
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: to institute and prosecute suits without

Text: giving security therefore, and to appeal from judgments of the courts . . . . Dallas, Tex., Charter ch. II, § 1(2) (1999). 23 Id. 24 453 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. 1970). No. 01-11398 -15- judicial notice of the establishment of all districts.25 The Texas Supreme Court stated that this language “quite plain[ly]” “gives general consent for District to be sued in the courts of Texas” such that immunity from suit is expressly waived.26 More recently, in Travis County v. Pelzel & Assoc.,27 the Texas Supreme Court again addressed whether a statute “clearly and unambiguously” waives the State’s immunity from suit. Section 89.004(a), entitled “Presentation of Claim,” provides that “[a] person may not sue on a claim against a county unless the person has presented the claim to the commissioners court and the commissioners court has neglected or refused to pay all or part of the claim.”28 The court held that this language did not waive Travis County’s immunity from suit because the statute did not state clearly and unambiguously that Travis County could be sued. Rather, the court found that the provision just as easily could simply create a condition precedent to suit.29 Important to this conclusion was the finding that the original statutory language providing that the county may “sue and be sued” was deleted in 1879 25 Id. at 813 (emphasis added). 26 Id. 27 77 S.W.3d 246 (Tex. 2002). 28 TEX. LOCAL GOV’T CODE ANN. § 89.004(a) (Vernon 1999). 29 Pelzel, 77 S.W.3d at 250. No. 01-11398 -16- to leave text “largely resembling the current statute” in place.30 As stated by the Texas Supreme Court, “well over a hundred years ago, the Legislature deleted the only language arguably waiving sovereign immunity, suggesting that it intended to preserve counties’ immunity from suit.”31 In so concluding, the court discussed Missouri Pacific in some detail. However, it did not overrule its prior holding. Instead, the Pelzel court distinguished the less-than-clear legislative expression of waiver in the “Presentation of Claim” statute from the “sue and be sued” language applicable to navigation districts found by the Missouri Pacific court to “quite plain[ly]” waive immunity from suit.32 As stated, the City asserts that four Texas courts of appeals have held that similar “sue and be sued” provisions do not waive the State’s immunity from suit.33 While this is an accurate statement of Texas law, it is a well-settled principle that in diversity cases, we “seek guidance by looking to the precedents established by intermediate state appellate courts” only when the 30 Id. at 249-50. 31 Id. at 250. 32 Id. 33 See, e.g., City of Dallas v. Reata Constr. Corp., 83 S.W.3d 392, 398 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2002, no pet.); Jackson v. City of Galveston, 837 S.W.2d 868, 871 (Tex. App. – Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied); Townsend v. Memorial Med. Ctr., 529 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex. Civ. App. – Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Childs v. Greenville Hosp. Auth., 479 S.W.2d 399, 401 (Tex. Civ. App. – Texarkana 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.). No. 01-11398 -17- state supreme court has not spoken on an issue or there has been some intervening change in the law that requires us to make an Erie guess regarding how the Texas Supreme Court would most likely decide an issue.34 Here, the Texas Supreme Court has addressed the question we are called upon to now answer, and the state appellate court decisions cited by the City do not persuade us to veer from this precedent. The cases cited by the City, for the most part, either follow pre-Missouri Pacific law or completely fail to mention Missouri Pacific.35 Moreover, as argued by the Webbs, the City’s argument that the “sue and be sued” provision is just a recognition of its corporate capacity to sue and be sued is also belied by the fact that the vast majority of state courts of appeals to address the express legislative waiver question in the context of similar “sue and be sued” clauses follow Missouri 34 Howe v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Herrmann Holdings Ltd. v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 302 F.3d 552, 558 (5th Cir. 2002) (“[I]n deciding this case, we are required to make an Erie guess as to what the Texas Supreme Court would most likely decide.”) 35 See, e.g., Reata Constr. Corp., 83 S.W.3d at 398 (following Jackson (discussed infra) without citing to Missouri Pacific, to find the “sue and be sued” provision “simply speak[s] to the City’s capacity to sue and its capacity to be sued when immunity has been waived.”) (emphasis in original); Jackson, 837 S.W.2d at 871 (simply following Townsend (discussed infra) without analysis); Townsend, 529 S.W.2d at 267 (relying solely on Childs (discussed infra), which, in turn, relied solely on cases decided before Missouri Pacific, to hold that a hospital district is immune from suit despite a “sue and be sued” statutory provision); Childs, 479 S.W.2d at 401 (relying on pre-Missouri Pacific cases to find, without discussion, no waiver of immunity from suit). No. 01-11398 -18- Pacific as controlling Texas Supreme Court precedent.36 We find controlling Texas Supreme Court authority for the district court’s holding that the City has expressly waived its immunity from suit in this case and see no need to certify the 36 See, e.g., Tarrant County. Hosp. Dist. v. Henry, 52 S.W.3d 434, 448 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2001, no pet.) (“It is well settled that this type of [sue and be sued] statutory provision is a consent to suit, resulting in waiver of immunity from suit.”); Alamo Comm. Coll. Dist. v. Obayashi Corp., 980 S.W.2d 745, 748 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (stating that “[b]y subjecting junior college districts [] to the same general law applicable to independent school districts [through a provision that states the district can sue and be sued], it appears to us, clearly and unambiguously, the Texas Legislature granted its consent to sue junior college community districts and we so hold”); Engelman Irrigations Dist. v. Shields Bros., Inc., 960 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1997) (finding that the irrigation district was not entitled to immunity from suit because of a “sue and be sued” clause), pet. denied per curiam, 989 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. 1998); Knowles v. City of Granbury, 953 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied) (“As a home-rule municipality, Granbury may sue and be sued. Had it wanted to exempt itself from liability, it could have . . . Because the Local Government Code and Granbury’s charter provide that the city may be sued, its immunity from suit is [] waived.”); Avmanco, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 835 S.W.2d 160, 165 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 1992, writ dism’d as moot) (“While there is no general law waiving the State’s immunity from suit where liability is sought because of breach of contract, the City is liable here because both the State and the City have enacted legislation providing their respective consents to suits against the City. Furthermore, the city charter of Grand Prairie itself provides that the City may sue and be sued.”); Dillard v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 806 S.W.2d 589, 593 & n.3 (Tex. App. – Austin 1991, writ denied) (concluding that through a “sue and be sued” provision, the Texas Legislature gave its consent for an independent school district to be sued). No. 01-11398 -19- question of express waiver to the Texas Supreme Court.37 Express legislation provides that the City may be sued. As a home-rule municipality, the City may exempt itself from suit. It has not done so here. As its resolution is not essential to our holding, we do not address the Webbs’ final argument that the City waived its right to assert immunity from suit by “accepting the benefits of the gifts, subject to the terms and conditions thereof.”