Opinion ID: 1801948
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged improper admission of Danny Phinney's hearsay statements

Text: On direct examination during the prosecution's guilt phase case-in-chief, Danny Phinney testified that on a date and time that he could not independently recall, he met defendant at an auto parts store. Defendant owed Phinney money. Phinney went to defendant's brother's house, where he looked at some items, including two jewelry boxes, jewelry, coins, a tooled leather wallet containing a driver's license bearing the name Mirck or Merck and a birth date in the early 1900's, and two Social Security checks with the name Merck on them. Phinney testified that he would not have remembered any of these facts had he not seen the paperworki.e., a transcript of an interview he had given police in December 1984 about the events described above. However, he remembered out of my mind that a 1922 silver dollar was among the coins he saw at the house. Over defendant's hearsay objection, Detective Diederich testified that he interviewed Phinney on December 21, 1984, while Phinney was in custody following his arrest in October. The interview was tape-recorded and transcribed. During the interview, Phinney stated that the meeting with defendant at the auto parts store occurred during the first week of September 1984. Phinney also described various items of property he had seen at defendant's brother's house, including coins (one bearing the date 1922), costume jewelry, two government-type checks totaling about $600 made out to someone named Merck with an address on McClean Street, and a leather wallet with a driver's license and some other cards inside. After the interview, Phinney pointed out for Diederich the house in which he had seen the items. Defendant contends Phinney's December 1984 statement to Diederich was hearsay inadmissible under any exception. The trial court held a lengthy hearing and concluded the statement was admissible in part as a prior inconsistent statement (Evid. Code, § 1235), in part as a prior consistent statement ( id., § 1236), and alternatively as a past recollection recorded ( id., § 1237). Because we conclude the statement was admissible on the latter ground, we do not address the first two. (17) Evidence Code section 1237 permits evidence of a witness's past statement if the statement would have been admissible if made by him while testifying, the statement concerns a matter as to which the witness has insufficient present recollection to enable him to testify fully and accurately, and the statement is contained in a writing which: [¶] (1) [w]as made at a time when the fact recorded in the writing actually occurred or was fresh in the witness' memory; [¶] (2) [w]as made . . . (ii) by some other person for the purpose of recording the witness' statement at the time it was made; [¶] (3) [i]s offered after the witness testifies that the statement he made was a true statement of such fact; and [¶] (4) [i]s offered after the writing is authenticated as an accurate record of the statement. (Evid. Code, § 1237, subd. (a).) Here, Phinney testified he had no idea of when his meeting with defendant at the auto parts store occurred, and that he would not have remembered any of what he had seen at defendant's brother's house, other than a 1922 silver dollar, but for having read a transcript of his December 1984 interview with police. He also testified he could not remember what he told officers during the December 1984 interview. Accordingly, the first requirement of the statute is met: Phinney had insufficient independent recollection to testify fully and accurately about the events in 1984. Defendant contends nonetheless that Phinney's December 1984 statement was inadmissible because it was not made at a time when the facts recorded were fresh in Phinney's memory. (Evid. Code, § 1237, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant notes the interview with Diederich took place over three months after Phinney's meeting with defendant supposedly occurred. But defendant did not argue below that the three-month lapse rendered the statement inadmissible; he may not do so now. (Evid. Code, § 353; see People v. Miller (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 412, 422 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 773], disapproved on other grounds in People v. Cortez (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1223, 1240 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 733, 960 P.2d 537].) In any event, the argument lacks merit. Defendant points to no authority for the proposition that such a lapse of time between the events recorded and the time of the recording renders a past statement inadmissible under Evidence Code section 1237, and we are aware of none. (Cf. People v. Miller, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 422 [recorded statement made at least three weeks after recorded events occurred was admissible under Evid. Code, § 1237].) Indeed, federal courts have admitted statements made after even greater lapses of time under the federal counterpart to section 1237, Federal Rules of Evidence, rule 803(5) (28 U.S.C.). [21] ( U.S. v. Patterson (9th Cir. 1982) 678 F.2d 774, 778-779 [10 months]; U.S. v. Williams (6th Cir. 1978) 571 F.2d 344, 348-350 [six months]; U.S. v. Senak (7th Cir. 1975) 527 F.2d 129, 139-142 [three years].) These courts reason that district courts should have the flexibility to consider all pertinent circumstances in determining whether the matter was fresh in the witness's memory when the statement was made. ( U.S. v. Patterson, supra, 678 F.2d at p. 779.) We see no reason why a similar approach should not govern under Evidence Code section 1237. Here, Phinney's statement to Diederich describing the items he saw and when he saw them was fairly detailed, and he had sufficient recollection to lead Diederich to the house in which he had seen the items. Accordingly, there was a sufficient basis for concluding the events were reasonably fresh in Phinney's mind at the time he spoke to Diederich. Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the statement because Phinney could not reliably vouch for its truthfulness, as Evidence Code section 1237, subdivision (a)(3) requires. We disagree. Phinney repeatedly testified that he told Diederich the truth to the best of his ability. Defendant points out that Phinney admitted that his memory in 1984 was jumbled and scrambled because of the drugs he had been taking; that he sometimes suffered from delusions; that he had talked to Diederich only to exonerate [him]self from his association with the Colt .25-caliber pistol and to give the officers enough information so that he could get out of jail; and that he had seen a newspaper article about the Merck murders before he spoke to Diederich. Phinney further admitted that he might have lied to Diederich about his personal involvement in the trade of the Colt .25-caliber pistol between defendant and Lutts. But by the time Phinney spoke to Diederich he had been in custody for over two months, and Diederich testified that Phinney did not appear delusional or to be on drugs or going through withdrawal. Phinney admitted he spoke with the officers because he wanted to get out of jail, but pointed out that he had to give the officers enough fact to be substantiated. Furthermore, the only subject about which Phinney said he might have lied was his involvement in the gun transaction, which was not the subject of the portion of Phinney's statement the prosecution sought to introduce, and when confronted with the inconsistency between his 1984 and 1994 statements on the subject Phinney forthrightly admitted he might have lied in 1984. Finally, defense counsel thoroughly cross-examined Phinney about his multiple motives and opportunity to lie to Diederich, and a copy of a newspaper article Phinney might have read was admitted into evidence. The jury no doubt considered all of these factors in deciding the weight to be accorded to Phinney's 1984 statement. Under the circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the statement was sufficiently reliable to be admitted under section 1237. (Cf. People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1293-1294 [18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1] [statement admissible under Evid. Code, § 1237 despite witness's delusions and drug problems at time of trial, where witness had sufficient recall of the events surrounding the statement that the trial court could conclude it was reliable]; U.S. v. Edwards (9th Cir. 1976) 539 F.2d 689, 691-692 [witness's statement to police admissible under rule 803(5) of Fed. Rules of Evid., 28 U.S.C., notwithstanding witness's admission that he was drunk when he made the statement].) Defendant next asserts that because Judge Felice did not personally observe Phinney's testimony, he was not in a position to rule on the reliability of Phinney's assurance that he had told Diederich the truth. As we have explained, whether an adequate foundation for admission of a statement under Evidence Code section 1237 has been established turns on whether the declarant's testimony that [the] statement was true was reliable, and the trial court who hears the declarant's testimony has the best opportunity to assess its credibility. ( People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at pp. 1293-1294.) But we have never held that the judge who heard the declarant's testimony is the only judge who may assess its credibility, particularly where, as here, that judge is no longer available. Here, Judge Felice read the relevant portions of Phinney's testimony and entertained extensive argument regarding the statement's trustworthiness. Based on Phinney's testimony that he had told Diederich the truth, Judge Felice ruled the statement would be admissible, but only assuming Diederich could testify that Phinney did not appear delusional or intoxicated at the time he made the statement. Diederich did so testify. Again, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion. (18) Defendant finally contends that admitting Phinney's statement to Diederich pursuant to Evidence Code section 1237 violated his rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution. As defendant acknowledges, we have in the past rejected this precise contention. ( People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1292, fn. 32; see also People v. Miller, supra, 46 Cal.App.4th at p. 424.) Defendant urges us to reconsider Cummings in light of Crawford v. Washington, supra, 541 U.S. 36, but that case does not aid him. As the high court there explained, admitting a witness's testimonial hearsay statement does not violate the Sixth Amendment where, as here, the witness appears at trial and is subject to cross-examination about the statement. ( Crawford, supra, at pp. 59-60, fn. 9; see also California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149, 162 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 90 S.Ct. 1930].) Defendant contends there can be no constitutionally effective cross-examination when the witness cannot recall the facts related in the hearsay statement. (See People v. Simmons (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 677 [177 Cal.Rptr. 17] [finding a confrontation clause violation due to witness's memory lapse]; but cf. California v. Green, supra, 399 U.S. at pp. 168-170 [leaving question open].) But the high court has squarely rejected that contention, concluding that when a hearsay declarant is present at trial and subject to unrestricted cross-examination, the traditional protections of the oath, cross-examination, and opportunity for the jury to observe the witness' demeanor satisfy the constitutional requirements, notwithstanding the witness's claimed memory loss about the facts related in the hearsay statement. ( United States v. Owens (1988) 484 U.S. 554, 559-560 [98 L.Ed.2d 951, 108 S.Ct. 838].) Nothing in Crawford casts doubt on the continuing vitality of Owens. Here, as in Cummings, Phinney was cross-examined extensively about his drug use, mental illness, multiple motives to lie, and other factors potentially affecting his truthfulness at the time he made his 1984 statement. (Cf. People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1292, fn. 32.) The weight of these factors, and their effect on the statement's credibility, were for the jury to decide. We find no constitutional violation.