Opinion ID: 1983550
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Disclosure of the Informant's Identity

Text: Finally, Braxton argues that the trial court erred by not disclosing the identity of an informant whose information served as the basis for the search warrant. Braxton asserts that the informant's testimony was essential to show that he was merely a visitor, not a resident of the apartment, and that the trial court should have held an in camera hearing to determine what the informant's testimony would be. Although in general the government is privileged to withhold the identity of an informant who gives information to law enforcement officers about violations of the law, this privilege must occasionally give way when the identification of an informant is essential to a fair trial. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627-28, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). Nevertheless, we will overturn a trial court's denial of a request for disclosure of an informant only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Lyons, 448 A.2d 872, 875 n. 6 (D.C.1982) (citing cases). Relying on Roviaro, Braxton claims that there was such an abuse in this case because the informant's testimony was material to his defense. This claim is without merit. There is no indication in the record that revealing the identity of the informant was essential to a fair trial for either appellant. In Roviaro, unlike this case, the informant was the sole participant in the transaction and, aside from the police officers, was the only witness. By contrast, in the instant case, the informant was neither a participant nor a witness to the undercover sales but merely a person who had purchased drugs at 1012 Harvard Street approximately three days earlier. Mere speculation that the informer might possibly be of some assistance is not sufficient to overcome the public interest in the protection of the informer. Lannom v. United States, 381 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041, 88 S.Ct. 784, 19 L.Ed.2d 833 (1968). The burden is on the person seeking disclosure to demonstrate that the informer is not merely an informer but rather a participant, an eyewitness, or someone who could give direct testimony on the events at issue. United States v. Lyons, supra, 448 A.2d at 874. We hold that Braxton did not meet that burden, see Hamilton v. United States, 395 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1978), and thus that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disclose the identity of the informant.