Opinion ID: 184387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opening of Filing Window Created

Text: by Section 6976(a)(1) We must next decide when the filing window opens, that is,what promulgation as used in section 6976(a)(1) means. The holding in National Grain & Feed Ass'n, Inc. v. OSHA,845 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1988), is instructive. There this courtstated: Based on the plain meaning of [the jurisdictionalstatute], the ordinary usage of the term promulgate, and thelack of any specific agency regulation defining the date ofpromulgation, we conclude that an OSHA standard is promulgated on the date that it is published in the Federal Register. Id. at 346 (emphasis added).3 We read National Grainto establish a default rule: If the agency does not define theterm by regulation and if the statute supports (or at leastdoes not foreclose) the interpretation, promulgation is accorded its ordinary meaning--i.e., publication in the Federal Register. See also United Techs. Corp. v. OSHA, 836 F.2d52, 54 (2d Cir. 1987) (As the term is generally used, 'promulgate' means 'to make known by open declaration' or 'to make... public the terms' of a rule of law. See Webster's ThirdNew Int'l Dictionary 1816 (1981). We conclude that theamendments in this case were promulgated when they werepublished in the Federal Register ....), cited with approvalby National Grain, 845 F.2d at 346 (We agree [with UnitedTechnologies' holding], at least in the absence of a validOSHA regulation fixing some other [window-opening] date.); cf. Western Union, 773 F.2d at 377-78 (dismissing petition aspremature because filed six days before challenged OSHAregulation published in Federal Register); Waterway Communications, 851 F.2d at 405-06 (dismissing petition as pre__________ 3 In so concluding, the court relied (at least in part) on the factthat OSHA had defined issuance of the regulation--an action thestatute made antecedent to promulgation--as the date on which acopy of the regulation is filed with the Office of the FederalRegister. We are confronted with an analogous circumstance herebecause EPA's own de-listing regulation defines antecedent action--i.e., final action on a de-listing petition--as the date ofFederal Register publication. See infra discussion, p. 11. mature because filed eighteen days before FCC notifiedpublic of licensure). As was the case with OSHA in National Grain, EPA hasnot defined promulgation by regulation. Moreover, section6976(a)(1) itself does not manifest that the word is to be givena special meaning. The ordinary usage of the verb promulgate and the noun promulgation has not changed sinceNational Grain was decided. Accordingly, we believe National Grain's default rule applies and therefore concludethat promulgation as used in section 6976(a)(1) means Federal Register publication. Horsehead nonetheless contends that we should find thatthe de-listing rule was promulgated on the day it wassigned because EPA has consistently interpreted its obligation to promulgate a rule by a date certain--whetherimposed by statute or by court order--to be met by theAdministrator's signing of the final rule. Horsehead arguesthat EPA should not be permitted to apply a differentinterpretation to RCRA's judicial review provision. While weare troubled by EPA's stance that it can construe promulgation to mean one thing under section 6976(a)(1) but another to determine compliance with a statutory or court-orderedpromulgation deadline, we cannot agree that merely signingthe final rule is sufficient to open the section 6976(a)(1) filingwindow. As the Supreme Court observed almost five decades ago,an agency must give some notice of the substance of itsfinal action before that action can be deemed ripe for judicialreview: Of course, the [Federal Power] Commission has considerable administrative discretion to decide when an order may fairly be deemed to have been issued. Section 16 of the [Natural Gas] Act provides that Orders of the Commission shall be effective on the date and in the manner which the Commission shall prescribe. But surely [an order] cannot be said to have been issued for purposes of defining rights and the seeking of reconsideration by an aggrieved person if its substance is merely in the bosom of the Commission. Knowledge of the substance must to some extent be made manifest. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 676(1950); accord Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Bingham, 570 F.2d 965, 969 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (Leventhal, J.,concurring) (observing that signing OSHA regulation, withoutcommunication of its substance to interested members ofpublic, would not suffice to open filing window). Moreover, we think Horsehead's interpretation is inconsistent with the Congress's unambiguously expressed intent thatpetitions be filed within ninety days from the date of ...promulgation. If the section 6976(a)(1) filing window openson the date of signature, it must close ninety days aftersignature.4 Yet according to Horsehead's interpretation, ifEPA had not distributed copies of the signed de-listing rule inadvance of its publication, and if interested parties had nototherwise received actual notice of the rule, the signature-topublication delay here--which is probably not unusual-- __________ 4 Horsehead suggests that the section 6976(a)(1) filing windowopens on the signing date and closes ninety days after the date ofFederal Register publication. If we agreed with Horsehead, wewould extend the section 6976(a)(1) filing window here from ninetyto 104 days. We think that any such extension is plainly proscribedby the Congress's express intent to establish a ninety-day filingperiod, by Supreme Court precedent and by Fed. R. App. P. 26(b). See United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 93-94 (1985) ([W]ithrespect to filing deadlines a literal reading of Congress' words isgenerally the only proper reading of those words.... Faced withthe inherent arbitrariness of filing deadlines, we must, at least in acivil case, apply by its terms the date fixed by the statute.); but cf.id. at 94 n.10 (dicta regarding possible exceptions); see also Fed. R.App. P. 26(b) (Nor may the court enlarge the time prescribed bylaw for filing a petition to enjoin, set aside, suspend, modify, enforceor otherwise review, or a notice of appeal from, an order of anadministrative agency, board, commission or officer of the UnitedStates, except as specifically authorized by law.). Nor does Horsehead's invocation of 44 U.S.C. s 1507 alter ourconclusion. That provision merely states that a party withoutactual notice of a regulation cannot be bound by the regulation untilit is filed with the Office of the Federal Register and a copy madeavailable for public inspection. would have effectively shortened the filing period by twoweeks. Horsehead next argues that even if the de-listing rule wasnot promulgated when signed, EPA's pre-publication distribution of it should be deemed to constitute promulgationunder this court's holdings in Saturn Airways, Inc. v. CivilAeronautics Board, 476 F.2d 907 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and Industrial Union, supra. We find, however, that neither casesupports Horsehead's interpretation of section 6976(a)(1)promulgation as synonymous with pre-publication distribution of a signed rule. First, in Saturn Airways, this court was asked to determine whether petitions seeking review of a final order of theCivil Aeronautics Board were filed prematurely. The onlyquestion was whether filing of the review petitions precededissuance of an order by the Board. 476 F.2d at 909 (1973)(emphasis added). In the absence of statutory languagedeclaring when an order became reviewable, Saturn Airwaysheld that a petition for review was not premature if filed afterthe Board had [both] taken what it deemed to be officialaction and issued a press release that communicated thesubstance of that action ... to the public. Id. (citing SkellyOil Co., 339 U.S. at 676). While Saturn Airways may beinstructive in determining when a matter is ripe for review inthe absence of statutory language so providing, we think itlargely beside the point here where we must construe theexpress language provided by the Congress. Cf. WesternUnion, 773 F.2d at 377 ([W]e deal with statutory textsrather than disembodied purposes....). Second, in Industrial Union, this court was asked toconstrue a statute establishing the requirements for judicialreview of a final OSHA order or regulation. The statute, 29U.S.C. s 655(f), provided that [a]ny person who may beadversely affected by a standard issued under this sectionmay at any time prior to the sixtieth day after such standardis promulgated file a petition challenging the validity of suchstandard. Industrial Union, 570 F.2d at 967 n.2 (emphasisadded). A sharply-splintered court concluded that the petition--filed after the OSHA standard was signed and was distributed and explained to representatives of some of theparties--was not prematurely filed under section 655(f). Id.at 968-71, 76-79. While Judges Leventhal and Fahy so concluded in Indus- trial Union, each wrote (and reasoned) separately.5 Id. Tothe extent that a common rationale supports their opinions,we think it is this: In the absence of a regulation (orstatutory language) defining the key terms of a jurisdictionalstatute, we should defer to an agency's interpretation of thatstatute if it is reasonable. Id. at 969; compare id. (Leventhal, J.) (It is not part of our judicial function, nor do wehave any inclination, to dictate to agencies how they may ormay not promulgate their actions. Agencies are vested withconsiderable discretion in such matters.... We should givedeference to the agency's choice if it is reasonable.) (citationomitted), with id. at 976 (Fahy, J.) (The Secretary of Laborthroughout these proceedings has maintained that the rulingwas issued [before the petition was filed], and it is recognizedthat his position is entitled to weight.).6 __________