Opinion ID: 1747901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: equitable charge as a limitation

Text: The majority holds that the Marlin Provision makes Marlin a conditional beneficiary, giving rise to the equitable charge. I disagree. It seems to me that in so holding, the majority has totally ignored the significance of Drummet's use of the term commission not once, but twice in the disputed portion of the will. By its terms, the Marlin Provision grants Marlin only a right to a commission. A commission is the recompence, compensation or reward of an agent, salesman, [etc.], when the same is calculated as a percentage of the amount of his transactions or on the profit to the principle. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 246 (5th ed. 1979). Webster's defines commission as ... a fee paid to an agent or employee for transacting a piece of business or performing a service .... WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (1975). In short, a commission is nothing more than consideration for services performed, thereby precluding the idea of a gift. Williams v. McKnight, 402 S.W.2d 505 (Tex.1966); Kearse v. Kearse, 276 S.W. 690 (Tex. Comm'n.App.1928, jdgmt. adopted). The case relied on by the majority to authorize an equitable charge is distinguishable. In Rubio v. Valdez, 603 S.W.2d 346 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court distinguished between language which creates a condition and that which imposes an equitable charge on a devise. There, the will devised the real estate of the testator to Jesus Valdez ... upon his paying to my other children,... the total sum of Ten Thousand and NO/100 ($10,000) Dollars, .... Relying on this court's opinion in Haldeman v. Oppenheimer, 126 S.W. 566 (Tex.1910), the Rubio court determined: Where the real estate is devised to the person who by the will is directed to pay the legacy, it has frequently been decided that such legacy is an equitable charge upon the real estate so devised. (Emphasis added). Rubio at 348. Haldeman, like Rubio, involved wills which clearly enumerated specific legacies. I find no authority where an equitable charge was imposed based on language creating bilateral duties and obligations between two devisees. Indeed, I find it difficult to conceive of how such language could clearly and decisively create a legacy from which an equitable charge may arise. To interpret the Marlin Provision as bequeathing such a specific legacy would be inappropriate. First, this would directly contradict the commission language. Further, after the residuary of an estate is given, there is simply nothing left to give. Finally, the two cases cited by the court of appeals validating conditional gifts are not applicable. Each of those cases involved a limitation on the devisee's use and enjoyment of the estate, not by way of an equitable charge. In Minor v. Hall, 225 S.W. 784 (Tex.Civ. App.-Galveston 1920, writ dism'd), the will bequeathed certain property ... this to hold good if Fannie does as I request her. (Fannie was to pay certain funeral debts and carry out other monetary conditions.) In Messer v. Carnes, 71 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1934, no writ), the court upheld a conditional bequest conditioned upon donee's support and care of the testatrix for life. Both of these cases involve a will providing for a true conditional bequest. That is, the beneficiary was entitled to the bequeathed property upon a stated condition that, if not fulfilled, would divest the donee's interest. This divestiture is, of course, the essence of a condition. In the present case, there is no language which could be construed as an intent to divest Mrs. Drummet of her interest in the event the commission was not paid. At the same time, Marlin's right to a commission was conditioned upon his performing duties as a real estate agent. That is, he had to produce a ready, willing and able buyer for the property. That condition was not fulfilled. The case most analagous to the situation here is Mason & Mason v. Brown, 182 S.W.2d 729 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1944, writ ref'd w.o.m.). In Brown, the testator executed an otherwise proper will with a provision which read: I appoint Mason & Mason attorneys for Elizabeth Brown [the beneficiary of the estate]. Soon after the will was probated, she became dissatisfied with the firm and discharged them. Although noting that the case was one of first impression in Texas, the court stated that Where presented, the courts uniformly held that such a provision was merely suggestive, precatory in nature, and not binding upon the executor. Id. at 733. In so holding, the court noted that There is no such office or position known to the law as `attorney of an estate.' It is clear to me that Drummet's intent was to compensate Marlin for his services as real estate agent. Had he wanted to give Marlin 6% of the sales proceeds, he would not have framed it in terms of a commission. Since he did not act as real estate agent in the sale of the property, Marlin is entitled to nothing under the will. The intent of the testator must be drawn from the will, not the will from the intent. Huffman v. Huffman, 339 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.1960). Furthermore, since there is no such thing in the law as real estate agent of an estate, the testator was precluded from imposing such a binding duty on either Marlin or Mrs. Drummet. I would hold that the Marlin Provision attempts to create an executory agency contract between Marlin and Mrs. Drummet. I would further decline to recognize, as a matter of law, that a will purporting to devise a fee simple may be used to impose contractual obligations on two non-consenting parties. Rather, I would deem such language to be merely suggestive or precatory in nature.