Opinion ID: 4196342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Which court first assumed jurisdiction over

Text: the property at stake. This factor applies when both forums exercise jurisdiction over the same property, and addresses the concern “that the parallel proceedings will result in inconsistent dispositions of [such property].” Seneca Ins. Co., 862 F.3d at 842. The Supreme Court has held “that the court first assuming jurisdiction over property may exercise that jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.” Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 818. We held that this Colorado River factor was “dispositive” in 40235 Washington St. Corp. v. Lusardi, 976 F.2d 587, 589 (9th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). There, the appellee first filed a quiet title action in state court regarding disputed property, and the appellant then filed a quiet title action concerning the same property in federal court, along with a claim for declaratory relief. Id. at 588. We affirmed MONTANORE MINERALS V. BAKIE 11 the district court’s decision to stay the federal proceedings because “[a] quiet title action is a proceeding in rem,” and “[i]n proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, the forum first assuming custody of the property at issue has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed.” Id. at 589. Thus, “under Colorado River, the district court was required to stay the federal quiet title action.” Id. (emphasis added); see also Sexton, 713 F.3d at 538 (“[W]here there are ‘pending state court proceedings’ involving a single property, the first Colorado River factor bars us from exercising jurisdiction over that property . . . .”). Further, the district court was “required” to stay the appellant’s declaratory relief claim, even though it was not in rem or quasi in rem, because it “involve[d] the same question” as the in rem claim, and could be resolved in state court. Lusardi, 976 F.2d at 589. In this case, the first factor does not require a stay, as it did in Lusardi, because Montanore did not bring an in rem or quasi in rem action in state court; it sought a declaration that the Subject Claims were invalid under state and federal law. Cf. id. However, while we decline to apply a categorical rule requiring a stay under the first factor in this case, we still hold that this factor favors a stay. The state court first obtained jurisdiction over the Subject Claims, and the parallel proceedings presented the risk of inconsistent dispositions of the Subject Claims. While the state court determined that the Subject Claims were valid, in the federal action doubts concerning claim validity permeated the decision to award no compensation for the taking, strongly suggesting inconsistent views of the validity of the property in the two actions. See Part I.C infra.