Opinion ID: 2623676
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Riggs's Counterclaim Relates Back to the Date of MacDonald's Complaint.

Text: MacDonald argues that even if there is evidence of defamation the jury should have been barred from considering it because of the two-year statute of limitations for defamation lawsuits. [9] MacDonald filed her complaint on March 21, 2003, and Riggs filed his answer and counterclaim on April 15, 2003. MacDonald argues that because the statute of limitations on defamation is two years, Riggs was barred from relying on evidence of defamatory statements made prior to April 15, 2001. All of the evidence at trial concerned statements made after the assault occurred on April 2, 2001, but before April 15, 2001. We hold that Riggs's counterclaim should relate back to the date of the complaint. Much of the Alaska jurisprudence on relation back deals with amendments to pleadings. Civil Rule 15(c) specifies that amendments to pleadings relate back to the date of the original pleading if the claim or defense in the amendments arose out of the conduct, transaction or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading. Under Rule 15(c) [a] compulsory counterclaim relates back to the date of a party's answer; a permissive counterclaim does not. [10] This court has not yet dealt with the issue presented here: whether a defendant's counterclaim should relate back to the date the plaintiff filed the complaint. Unlike Civil Rule 15, Civil Rule 13, which addresses counterclaims, does not specify when and if a counterclaim should relate back to the date of the plaintiff's complaint. Many federal jurisdictions have addressed this question. [11] Most federal courts have elected to toll the statute of limitations for compulsory counterclaims from the date the complaint is filed: Although there is some conflict on the subject, the majority view appears to be that the institution of plaintiff's suit tolls or suspends the running of the statute of limitations governing a compulsory counterclaim. This approach precludes plaintiff, when the claim and counterclaim are measured by the same period, from delaying the institution of the action until the statute has almost run on defendant's counterclaim so that it would be barred by the time defendant advanced it. Nor is plaintiff apt to be prejudiced by the tolling of the statute, since he presumably has notice at the time he commences his action of any counterclaim arising out of the same transaction as his suit. Moreover, the necessarily close relationship between the timely claim and the untimely counterclaim should insure that the latter is not stale in the sense of evidence and witnesses no longer being available; they should be as accessible for adjudicating the counterclaim as they are for the main claim.[ [12] ] We find the majority federal rule to be based on sound policy. Therefore, if Riggs's counterclaim is compulsory, it will relate back to the date of MacDonald's complaint. Under Alaska Civil Rule 13(a) a counterclaim is compulsory if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim. When determining whether a counterclaim is based on the same transaction or occurrence we look to such things as whether the claims are logically related; whether they involved the same testimony, parties, and exhibits; whether the facts are related in time, space, and origin; and whether the two claims form a convenient trial unit. [13] Here, both MacDonald's claim and Riggs's counterclaim are closely related to Riggs's involvement in the assault, so they are related in origin. The two claims also involve the same parties and the same exhibits and formed a convenient trial unit. Finally, Riggs's counterclaim was logically related to MacDonald's assault claim. If the jury had found for MacDonald on the assault claim against Riggs, it would not have been able to find for Riggs on the defamation claim since a defendant is not liable for true statements. Therefore, we find that Riggs's counterclaim was compulsory and relates back to the date of MacDonald's complaint and Riggs may recover for any defamatory statements made by MacDonald after March 21, 2001. Because the assault occurred on April 2, 2001, any defamatory statements regarding his role in the assault would have been made after that date.