Opinion ID: 2273400
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reasonableness of Representation

Text: In Smith's case, defense counsel did not request a specific instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony and none was given. In order to determine whether this claimed error was objectively reasonable representation under Strickland, we must first examine the merits of the claimed error. [T]he state of the law is central to an evaluation of counsel's performance.... A reasonably competent attorney patently is required to know the state of the applicable law. [26] At the time of Smith's trial, it was well established that, in Delaware, a defendant is entitled, upon request, to a specific jury instruction concerning the credibility of accomplice testimony in cases where the State's evidence includes the testimony of an accomplice. In Bland, this Court approved the use of the following jury instruction in such cases: A portion of the evidence presented by the State is the testimony of admitted participants in the crime with which these defendants are charged. For obvious reasons, the testimony of an alleged accomplice should be examined by you with suspicion and great caution. This rule becomes particularly important when there is nothing in the evidence, direct or circumstantial, to corroborate the alleged accomplices' accusation that these defendants participated in the crime. Without such corroboration, you should not find the defendants guilty unless, after careful examination of the alleged accomplices' testimony, you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that it is true and that you may safely rely upon it. Of course, if you are so satisfied, you would be justified in relying upon it, despite the lack of corroboration, and in finding the defendants guilty. [27] In Cabrera, we approved the use of a variation on the above-quoted Bland instruction: Cabrera's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court erred by giving a jury instruction on accomplice testimony that did not match the language approved by this Court in Bland v. State and incorporated in the pattern jury instructions. Instead of instructing the jury that the testimony of an accomplice should be examined with suspicion and great caution, the trial court advised the jury that the testimony should be examined with caution. Cabrera does not contend that this choice of wording was confusing or that it misstated the law. Accordingly, under well settled standards governing jury instructions, Cabrera's appeal fails. [28] After Cabrera, in Bordley v. State, [29] this Court rejected a claim that the trial judge committed error in failing to instruct the jury to examine [the accomplice's] testimony `with caution.' [30] In Bordley, the trial judge declined to give the instruction from either Bland or Cabrera and, instead, gave the revised pattern jury instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony, as follows: The testimony of the alleged accomplice, someone who said that [he/she] participated with another person in the commission of a crime, has been presented in this case. [John Doe] may be considered an alleged accomplice in this case. The fact that an alleged accomplice has entered a plea of guilty to the offense charged does not mean that any other person is guilty of the offense charged. As stated elsewhere in these instructions, you are the sole judges of the credibility of each witness and of the weight to be given to the testimony of each. You may consider all the factors which might affect [a] witness' credibility, including whether the testimony of the accomplice has been affected by self-interest, by an agreement [he/she] may have with the State, by [his/her] own interest in the outcome of the case, by prejudice against the Defendant, and whether or not the testimony is corroborated by any other evidence in the case. [31] In Bordley, we stated: Although the trial judge in the present case did not instruct the jury to examine Cry's testimony with caution, the trial judge should be granted wide latitude in framing his jury instruction. Moreover, a trial court's instructions will not be the basis for reversible error if they [correctly state the law and] `are reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices and standards of verbal communication.' [32] Although in Bordley we approved an instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony that did not include the with caution language employed in Bland and Cabrera, we did not overrule either Bland or Cabrera. Our explanation for approving the different language used in Bland, Cabrera and Bordley cases was that the trial judge should be granted wide latitude in framing his [or her] jury instruction. [33] Smith's case is different from Bland, Cabrera and Bordley. Unlike what occurred in those proceedings, in Smith's case defense counsel did not request a specific instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony. Smith argues that by virtually any definition of objectively reasonable performance under Strickland, Smith's trial attorneys must be charged with the knowledge that the trial court would have been required to give a specific instruction on the credibility of DeShields' testimony if such an instruction had been requested. According to Smith, it should have been apparent to [his] trial counsel that DeShields' credibility was not only central to the State's case again Smith, but also that the irreconcilable conflicts in the testimony and the lack of corroborating evidence made this case a paradigmatic Bland/Cabrera situation. Indeed, Smith's former trial attorneys filed an affidavit with the Superior Court in response to Smith's Rule 61 Motion. In that affidavit, they offered no tactical or strategic reason for such an omission, and conceded error in failing to request such an instruction. Despite that concession, this Court must make an independent assessment of the record for error. [34] This Court has not addressed the failure to request a specific jury instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony in the context of a Strickland claim. Other courts that have considered the question, however, have held that such failure amounted to a deficient performance of trial counsel under Strickland: There is no reasonable trial strategy for failing to request the cautionary accomplice testimony instruction and corroboration instruction.... We cannot envision an advantage which could have been gained by withholding a request for th[ese] instruction[s]. [35] We agree. Smith was entitled to a Bland -type of instruction on accomplice credibility, if requested, as a matter of law. Smith's trial attorneys did not request such an instruction. The record reflects that a specific Bland -type of instruction would have focused and guided the jury's assessment of the credibility of DeShields, whose uncorroborated testimony was central to the State's case against Smith as DeShields' accomplice. Accordingly, we hold that the failure of Smith's trial counsel to request a specific instruction on the credibility of accomplice testimony amounted to deficient attorney performance under the first part of our Strickland analysis.