Opinion ID: 2264807
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Peoples Savings Bank v. Bufford [4]

Text: ¶ 42 What other wrecking ball can the majority find to smash through the barriers Arnold established to protect private property rights in Washington? The majority digs up a relic of a case from 1916, addressed briefly in Arnold, 75 Wash.2d at 150, 152, 449 P.2d 800, 450 P.2d 815. See majority at 1122. But Peoples Savings Bank v. Bufford , the feeble champion and sole justification of the majority's position that an entire acre of land can be slight under Arnold, cannot bear the weight of the majority's desperate wishes. See 90 Wash. at 208-09, 155 P. 1068. ¶ 43 There, Bufford bought one city lot in a row of identical lots in Seattle, but built his house on the wrong lot by mistake. Id. at 204-05, 155 P. 1068. Peoples Savings Bank owned the lot upon which he built his house and offered to resolve the matter by swapping the bank's deed for that property for Bufford's deed to a vacant, but otherwise identical, lot. Id. at 208, 155 P. 1068. Bufford refused, instead hoping to keep the lot to which he already held title and to obtain the bank's lot for free by adverse possession. See id. at 206-08, 155 P. 1068. That didn't work. See id. The court resolved the matter by letting the bank have its proposed deed swap. Id. at 209, 155 P. 1068. ¶ 44 Now let us be perfectly clear on this. Bufford is a six-page opinion from 1916, almost entirely about adverse possession, that devotes only one paragraph to a vague discussion of equitable relief. Here it is: Both parties have asked for equitable relief. Each of them have asked that their title be quieted in lot five in block ten. At the beginning of the trial, appellant [Peoples Savings Bank] offered to make a deed to respondents [Bufford] for lot five in block ten in consideration of a deed to lot five in block seven. The first maxim in equity is: He who seeks equity must do equity. Considering that each party was acting in entire good faith, and each party has paid taxes upon their record titles during all these years; and that no claim was made to both lots by respondents until after the ten-year period after the first possession had run, we think it would be inequitable to permit appellant to oust respondents, or to permit respondents to refuse to either deed lot five in block seven or to reimburse appellant for the taxes it has paid upon the lot upon which they have erected their home. Equity will not give respondents more than they could have claimed at law if the mistake had been discovered in time to bring an action of ejectment. Bufford, 90 Wash. at 208-09, 155 P. 1068. ¶ 45 Bufford is a decision with thin analysis, issued nearly 100 years ago, stemming from very unique facts. It is not, to say the least, the paradigmatic case for the majority to expand and rewrite Arnold. The Arnold court itself cited Bufford for the proposition that considerations of equity and good faith mistakes were appropriate when determining whether a trespasser must be removed from the landowner's property. Arnold, 75 Wash.2d at 150, 449 P.2d 800, 450 P.2d 815 (citing Bufford, 90 Wash. at 209, 155 P. 1068). Arnold then reasoned that Bufford, among other cases,  support [ s ] the premise that a mandatory injunction can be withheld as oppressive when ... it appears (and we particularly stress), that [the five Arnold requirements are satisfied: (1) encroacher acted in good faith, (2) slight damage to landowner, (3) no real limit on landowner's future use of remaining property, (4) impractical to move encroachment, and (5) the balance of equities enormously favors encroacher]. Id. at 152, 449 P.2d 800, 450 P.2d 815 (emphasis added). ¶ 46 One could read this support passage to mean the principles expressed in Bufford support the Arnold analysis. And that is certainly the case. In its brief analysis, Bufford mentions both good faith and equity as grounds upon which it forgoes ejecting Bufford from the Peoples Savings Bank's lot. 90 Wash. at 208, 155 P. 1068. Arnold adopts those as its first and fifth requirements. See Arnold, 75 Wash.2d at 152, 449 P.2d 800, 450 P.2d 815. Thus, Bufford lends doctrinal support to Arnold. See id. This interpretation of support is untroubled by the fact that Bufford did not raise, address, or accept the other three requirements set forth in Arnold. ¶ 47 But the majority reads the statement in Arnold, that Bufford supports the standard set forth, to mean that if applied, the facts in Bufford would satisfy the five Arnold factors: particularly relevant here is that the landowner suffered only slight damage and would receive slight benefit upon return of the encroached property. The majority then concludes that because Bufford involved an entire parcel of property, instead of an entire acre of a 30-acre property, the amount of lost property that can constitute slight damage to the landowner under the second Arnold requirement is up to and including the landowner's entire property. Majority at 1122. ¶ 48 There are two problems with this extrapolation from Bufford. Bufford didn't apply all five of the Arnold factors. It is irresponsible for the majority to attempt to add meat to the decayed bones of Bufford; the Bufford court did not consider three of the factors nor did it develop an evidentiary record for us to do so now. ¶ 49 But if the majority insists playing Dr. Frankenstein, a resurrected Bufford does not support the majority's claim that Arnold permits a trial court to take Proctor's acre of property. The facts of Bufford are easily distinguishable. The Bufford court's focus was whether it was equitable for the bank to give up its lot in exchange for an essentially identical lot. 90 Wash. at 208-09, 155 P. 1068. The damage to the bank was slight and the benefit of the return of its original lot equally slight because the bank would receive one of two essentially identical lots regardless of the outcome. See Arnold, 75 Wash.2d at 152, 449 P.2d 800, 450 P.2d 815. Here, Proctor is not receiving essentially identical land in exchange, but rather the court-determined market value of his property. The difference (and ensuing damage and benefit) is not slight and the remedy forced on Proctor ignores the uniqueness of land and the inability to substitute it uniformly for money. See Crafts, 161 Wash.2d at 25-26, 162 P.3d 382. ¶ 50 Furthermore, in Bufford the bank suggested the exchange at the beginning of the trial. 90 Wash. at 208, 155 P. 1068. Where the bank expressed that it would accept the deed swap, and assuming the obviousthat the bank would not volunteer to damage itself or sustain unnecessary losses the Bufford court could have reasonably assumed the bank viewed its own damage as slight. Again, Proctor emphatically states and discusses why his losses are not slight. Ultimately, Bufford was driven by its unique facts and does not justify the majority's expansion of Arnold.