Opinion ID: 745393
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I believe he did.

Text: 31 Q. --in excess of $10,000? A. (Witness nods head affirmatively.) 32 J.A. 67. Ms. Renckens also says in her affidavit, which was prepared by Agent Toomey, see J.A. 72, that she informed Mr. LEAK that since the amount of cash exceeded $10,000, I was required by law to prepare a CTR. J.A. 36. 33 However, upon closer examination Ms. Renckens' testimony does not provide the solid proof of knowledge that the government claims. Earlier in Ms. Renckens' testimony, Mr. Leak's lawyer questioned her about what she remembered telling Mr. Leak. The exchange went as follows: 34 Q. Now, do you recall what you said to him about the CTR? 35 A. I couldn't tell you exactly. What I--I can tell you what I would probably have said. It's been so-- 36 Q. All right. Is there a routine that you-- 37 A. Just routinely, we say, Due to the large amount of this check, we would need to file a currency transaction report with the IRS and the North Carolina Department of Revenue, who we also report to. 38 Q. Do you recall if he asked you any questions at that point? 39 A. I don't believe he did, if I can remember. 40 Q. And would you go into any more detail than just the statement you just gave? That would be your routine thing to say to customers? 41 A. Right.... 42 J.A. 58-59 (emphasis added). 43 The above testimony makes clear that Ms. Renckens only claims to have told Mr. Leak about the reporting requirements in the context of cashing a check. Ms. Renckens never claims that she told Mr. Leak that CTRs were also required for cash deposits. Since it is certainly riskier for a bank to cash a check than to accept a cash deposit, it is reasonable for Mr. Leak to have assumed that CTRs were required only for check cashing. Ms. Renckens did respond affirmatively when asked whether she felt that Mr. Leak understood that CTRs were required for both withdrawals and deposits. But again, her testimony about what she probably told Mr. Leak does not mention anything about deposits. Because Ms. Renckens did not offer any specific factual support for her belief that Mr. Leak understood the reporting requirement for deposits, we cannot credit Ms. Renckens' belief as proof of Mr. Leak's knowledge. See Fed.R.Evid. 701 (lay witness's testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are ... rationally based on the perception of the witness). It would be especially inappropriate at this point to accept Ms. Renckens' inference that Mr. Leak had full knowledge because on summary judgment all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [the nonmovant's] favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255, 106 S.Ct. at 2513. 44 Moreover, Curtis Leak says in his affidavit that his exchange with Ms. Renckens did not enlighten him about the reporting requirements. Mr. Leak do[es]n't remember [Ms. Renckens] saying anything about CTRs or any form required by the IRS. J.A. 93. At the time he cashed the check, Mr. Leak felt I was being hassled because I had a $15,000 check and I was black. J.A. 93. As a consequence, Mr. Leak claims that he wasn't paying attention and I don't remember what was said because I was so irritated that I was being treated like I was. J.A. 93. In any event, Mr. Leak alleges that when he made the deposits to pay off his mortgage he neither thought of nor saw any relationship between cashing the $15,000 check and the manner in which I made my deposits. J.A. 93. 45 The rest of the government's evidence is substantially less compelling. The government does not have any direct evidence that Mrs. Leak knew of the reporting requirements, but it does go to great lengths in discussing her accounting and financial background. Her experience in these areas may have some relevance for the ultimate fact-finder, but there is no evidence that the reporting requirements at issue here were part of her experience. The government also attempts to introduce a wide-ranging collection of evidence through a second affidavit from Agent Toomey. In this second affidavit, however, Agent Toomey makes broad assertions, relying on his personal opinions and information from others unknown. We have serious doubts as to whether these assertions could survive Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)'s requirement that summary judgment affidavits be made on personal knowledge and be admissible in evidence. 4 Even if this material could meet the standards of admissibility, it is not sufficient to support summary judgment. For example, Agent Toomey claims that the Leaks bought a Porsche in 1989 using $13,000 in cash. He also claims that an incomplete Form 8300, which is similar to a CTR, was discovered in the dealership's files under Karen Leak's name. Toomey fails to discuss how he learned of this information; more importantly, he presents no evidence that the Leaks actually knew about the Form 8300 or the requirement to fill one out. Similarly, Toomey says that the Leaks prepared a fraudulent college financial aid form, that the Leaks failed to file tax returns, and that Karen Leak intentionally tried to deceive him about the timing of the filing of certain returns. If submitted in admissible form, this additional evidence might be useful to the ultimate fact-finder as support for the government's theory about the Leaks' motive. However, the evidence is too indirect and underdeveloped, even when combined with the government's other evidence, to show that no genuine issue of material fact remains. 46 The government contends that our decision in United States v. Wollman, 945 F.2d 79 (4th Cir.1991), requires summary judgment against the Leaks. In Wollman, however, there was no issue as to the claimants' knowledge of the reporting requirements. The claimants there offered no evidence suggesting that they did not know of the reporting requirement and failed to offer any affidavits claiming a lack of knowledge. Wollman, 945 F.2d at 81. In fact, the claimants conceded that a bank teller had informed them of the requirements and that a motivating factor in their deposit transaction was to avoid entanglement with the IRS. Id. at 81-82. Since the claimants never alleged ignorance of the requirements, there was no question that the [claimants] knew of the reporting requirements and that they were imposed by the government. Id. at 82. In this case, however, whether the Leaks had knowledge of the requirements is very much in dispute. 47 Although we conclude that the government's evidence in this case is insufficient to support summary judgment in light of the Leaks' affidavits, we do not mean to imply that the Leaks could have defeated summary judgment with only the bare, unexplained claim that they were not aware of the reporting requirements. The evidence put forward by a claimant must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. In this case, we believe that the Leaks have proffered evidence that, if believed, would enable a rational jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that they did not have knowledge of the reporting requirements. Mr. Leak claims that he made small deposits in order to protect his personal security. Although the district court may be correct that this method of depositing does not afford the best means of protection, we do not find Mr. Leak's explanation so incredible that it can be dismissed out of hand. As the owner of a business (a night club) that generated large sums of cash in a high crime area, Mr. Leak had an important reason to be concerned for his personal security. Mr. Leak believed that his method of making smaller deposits was the safest thing to do, noting that in the past, [he had] overheard bank tellers discussing other people's accounts. J.A. 93. Courts have recognized that an individual's attempt to protect his personal security may offer a legitimate explanation for a series of smaller deposits. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 145, 114 S.Ct. 655, 661, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994) (noting that individuals may mak[e] cash deposits in small doses, fearful that the bank's reports would increase the likelihood of burglary); Dollar Bank, 980 F.2d at 241 (finding that a jury could rationally believe a claimant structured deposits in order to avoid publicity about his wealth that would increase the likelihood of theft). Given the lack of direct proof that the Leaks knew or were informed of the reporting requirements for cash deposits, we cannot say that their explanation lacks so completely in credibility that summary judgment for the government is warranted. 5 48 We recognize that the Leaks' complicated series of deposits, along with the testimony of Ms. Renckens, might be sufficient to convince a jury that the Leaks violated 31 U.S.C. § 5324(a)(3). However, we would invade the province of the jury if we were to find that the Leaks' claims of ignorance were too incredible to be believed. The district court made such a finding in the course of applying the wrong standard, and it drew the ultimate inference in favor of the government (and against the nonmovants). See J.A. 132 (Claimant's depositing practices ... permit the inference that he knew the transaction reporting requirements existed.). In inferring from the underlying circumstances that the Leaks had knowledge of the reporting requirements, the district court completely rejected as unbelievable the Leaks' sworn denials and explanations. The evidence proffered in this case does not permit such a credibility determination at the summary judgment stage. There is a genuine issue of material fact. Accordingly, the award of summary judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded for trial. 6 49 REVERSED AND REMANDED.