Opinion ID: 2049120
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Whether Application Of Bill 91-10 To MRA Was Arbitrary And Capricious

Text: MRA argues that Bill 91-10 unfairly targeted MRA and that Harford County's application of Bill 91-10 to MRA was arbitrary and capricious. The Board rejected MRA's argument that Bill 91-10 was arbitrary and capricious, noting that Bill 91-10 applied to all rubble landfills in Harford County and that there were sufficient reasons for deeming it emergency legislation: Council meetings and public hearings were well attended, often to overflowing with citizens appearing in opposition to, not one, but five landfill operations either operating or proposed. The Board's finding regarding the arbitrary and capricious nature of Bill 91-10 will itself be deemed arbitrary, unreasonable and capricious if we find that it was made without substantial supporting evidence. Tauber v. County Bd. of Appeals for Montgomery County, 257 Md. 202, 212, 262 A.2d 513, 518 (1970). There is sufficient evidence on the record to support the Board's finding under the substantial evidence standard. There were four other proposed rubble landfill projects at the time Bill 91-10 passed, some of which were also negatively affected. Arden McClune, Chief of Capital Planning and Development for the Department of Parks and Recreation, testified that in addition to MRA's proposed landfill, the County was looking at plans for the Tollgate, Spencer's, and rubble landfills. Bill 91-10 also would have applied to the proposed Harford Sands/Fort Hoyle landfill, which was not yet operational and had prompted citizen concerns about traffic and proximity to a school. The record is replete with complaints of residents who lived near these landfills. It is not surprising that the result of this public outcry was a tightening of the zoning laws with respect to rubble landfills. MRA argues that because of the animus towards the proposed rubble landfill, the County singled out MRA's proposal when passing Bill 91-10 and points to testimony indicating that the County was poised to stop MRA in its efforts. We briefly discussed this argument in MRA II, 342 Md. at 505 n. 15, 677 A.2d at 582 n. 15, and brought cases to MRA's attention regarding the motivation of legislators. This included the Supreme Court's decision in Daniel v. Family Security Life Insurance Company, 336 U.S. 220, 224, 69 S.Ct. 550, 552, 93 L.Ed. 632 (1949), which noted that a judiciary must judge by results, not by the varied factors which may have determined legislators' votes. We cannot undertake a search for motive. We also pointed out our holding in Workers' Compensation Commission v. Driver, 336 Md. 105, 118, 647 A.2d 96, 103 (1994), cert. denied sub nom. 513 U.S. 1113, 115 S.Ct. 906, 130 L.Ed.2d 789 (1995): It is well-settled that when the judiciary reviews a statute or other governmental enactment, either for validity or to determine the legal effect of the enactment in a particular situation, the judiciary is ordinarily not concerned with whatever may have motivated the legislative body or other governmental actor. Those cases guide us here. Thus, we shall not delve into the motives of legislators when there is ample evidence that Bill 91-10 was directed at landfills in general and was emergency legislation because of the great public concern over all of the proposed landfills at the time. 3. Estoppel MRA argues that Harford County is estopped from applying its newly enacted zoning regulation to MRA's property on Gravel Hill Road. MRA rests its argument both on principles of equitable estoppel and zoning estoppel.