Opinion ID: 2296715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process Claims Barred

Text: Panuski first contends that the State failed to prove the elements of DCP because the State could only show that he knowinglyand not intentionallypossessed the images. He further contends that his acceptance of the plea does not foreclose a due process claim based on insufficient evidence. This claim is barred under Rule 61(i)(3). Panuski did not raise it on direct appeal, nor has he shown a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. The Superior Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Panuski's first claim as procedurally barred. Nor can Panuski prevail on the merits of this claim. In Fink v. State, a defendant indicted on ten counts of DCP made a similar claim based on insufficiency of the evidence. [6] Similar to the case here, the defendant had accepted the State's plea bargain allowing him to plead guilty to one of the ten counts. On appeal, this Court affirmed the denial of defendant's postconviction motion. [7] We explained, by pleading guilty to the charge of Unlawfully Dealing in Child Pornography, Fink is foreclosed from challenging the sufficiency of the State's evidence on that charge. [8] Similarly, Panuski's plea of guilty to two charges of DCP here forecloses a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence underlying that charge. Menna v. New York [9] does not require a different result. There, the United States Supreme Court held that [w]here the State is precluded by the United States Constitution from haling a defendant into court on a charge, federal law requires that a conviction on that charge be set aside even if the conviction was entered pursuant to a counseled plea of guilty. [10] Thus, the state appellate court could not affirm a conviction merely on grounds that the defendant's double jeopardy claim had been waived by a guilty plea. [11] But, in Menna the United States Supreme Court further explained that a guilty plea renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction if factual guilt is validly established. [12] Here, as in Fink, any challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence does not affect the fact that the defendant admitted his guilt to DCP. [13] Panuski's guilty plea thus forecloses his claim that the State lacked sufficient evidence to prevail on that charge. The Superior Court properly denied Panuski's due process claims.