Opinion ID: 557842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Departure on the Basis of Tribal Court History

Text: 41 Under the theory that [a] defendant's record of past criminal conduct is directly relevant to the purposes of sentencing under the Comprehensive Criminal Control Act, U.S.S.G. Ch. 4, Pt. A, intro. comment., the Guidelines mandate a computation of criminal history points, leading to a determination of a criminal history category. The appropriate sentencing range under the Guidelines is determined from the sentencing table using the defendant's total offense level and criminal history category. 42 A sentence for a tribal court conviction is not counted in the calculation of a defendant's criminal history category. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.2(i). If, however, reliable information indicates that the criminal history category does not adequately reflect the seriousness of the defendant's past criminal conduct or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, the court may consider imposing a sentence departing from the otherwise applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3, p.s. The Guidelines note that such departure may be based on information concerning tribal offenses not used in computing a defendant's criminal history category. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3(a), p.s. 43 Though Indian tribes do not have the full attributes of sovereignty, United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 1112, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886), tribes retain the power to prescribe laws for their members and to punish infractions of these laws. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-24, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 1085-87, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978). Criminal tribal courts, however, may not impose punishment greater than $5000 or one year imprisonment, or both, per offense. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1302(7). Persons convicted under tribal laws are entitled to be represented by counsel at tribal court proceedings provided that they pay for the representation themselves. 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1302(6). But there is no absolute right of counsel in tribal courts. United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389, 1391-92 (9th Cir.1989). 44 In the case at hand, the defendant was convicted of two misdemeanor assault and battery offenses, in 1979 and in 1983, in a Northern Cheyenne Tribal Court. The offenses are described in the Cheyenne Code of Indian Tribal Offenses, Ch. V, Sec. 2. 15 The maximum sentence allowed under the section was six months or $300. Brady received sentences of $50 or 25 days for the 1979 conviction, and $150 or 15 days for the 1983 conviction, far below the maximum of an already minor offense. Brady was not represented by counsel at either proceeding. 45 An upward departure in Brady's criminal history category based on these two tribal convictions is not justified for two reasons. First, criminal history departures are warranted only when the criminal history category significantly underrepresents the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit further crimes, thus placing the defendant in a category where his history is significantly more serious than that of most defendants in the same criminal history category. U.S.S.G. Sec. 4A1.3, p.s. 46 The sentencing court in this case does not refer to the seriousness of Brady's tribal convictions, but only to their evidence of the propensity of the defendant to harm others in society. But the five examples listed by the Commission as possible grounds for departure all make reference to previous serious or large-scale offenses which have not been included in the criminal history calculation. 16 Neither of Brady's tribal assault convictions, both sentences of less than 30 days, represent this level of seriousness. Nor do these tribal court convictions make Brady's criminal history significantly more serious than histories of other offenders in category I as required by the Guidelines policy statement for Sec. 4A1.3. Furthermore, the court did not explain how Brady's two convictions create a propensity in the defendant to commit future crimes, given the minor character of his past offenses. 47 Second, both of Brady's convictions were obtained in uncounseled proceedings. The Sixth Amendment requires that no indigent criminal defendant be sentenced to a term of imprisonment unless the State has afforded him the right to assistance of appointed counsel in his defense. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 374, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 1162, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979) (emphasis added). We agree with the plurality in Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 100 S.Ct. 1585, 64 L.Ed.2d 169 (1980), that the constitutional rule enunciated in Scott also requires that an uncounseled misdemeanor conviction [may] not be used collaterally to impose an increased term of imprisonment upon a subsequent conviction. Id. at 226, 100 S.Ct. at 1587 (Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 224, 100 S.Ct. at 1586 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 449, 92 S.Ct. 589, 593, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972) (remanding for resentencing because district court considered two unconstitutionally invalid felony convictions in imposing an enhanced sentence); United States v. Williams, 891 F.2d 212, 214 (9th Cir.1989) (The consensus of [the Baldasar ] concurrences is that an uncounseled conviction which is invalid for the purposes of imposing a sentence of imprisonment, though valid in itself for imposing a nonprison sentence, is also invalid for enhancing a sentence of imprisonment.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1496, 108 L.Ed.2d 631 (1990). Contra United States v. Eckford, 910 F.2d 216 (5th Cir.1990) (holding that prior decisions of the Fifth Circuit have rejected the plurality's view in Baldasar that uncounseled misdemeanor convictions cannot be used to increase a term of imprisonment during sentencing for a subsequent criminal offense). 48 The government's main argument is that the prior tribal convictions played only a small role in the departure. Because the sentencing court did not indicate the extent each factor played in the sentence departure, it is impossible to determine the precise sentence enhancement attributable to the court's reliance on the uncounseled convictions. Nonetheless, we hold that any term of imprisonment imposed on the basis of an uncounseled conviction where the defendant did not waive counsel violates the Sixth Amendment under Baldasar. 17 49 Any portion of the sentence that is based on Brady's prior tribal convictions is an unreasonable sentence under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3742(f)(2). The convictions are simply not serious enough to warrant an upward grade in Brady's criminal history category. Their use unconstitutionally imposes a sentence based on an uncounseled conviction. We remand the criminal history category issue and note that the tribal court convictions may not be used to depart from the Guidelines.