Opinion ID: 1379180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reviewability of Allegations of Deprivation of Constitutional Rights by the Military

Text: The State argues that civilian courts should not review Bowen's allegation that he was deprived of his constitutional rights by the military because (1) the courts of Alaska do not have jurisdiction over this matter, (2) state law is pre-empted by federal law in this area, (3) such claims are nonjusticiable, and (4) Bowen did not exhaust his administrative remedies. We reject each of these arguments.
The State argues that the superior court acted beyond the jurisdiction of a state appellate court in ruling that the process mandated by federal regulation for separation of members from the AGR program and for determining eligibility for separation pay violates the due process requisites of the state constitution. The State further argues that this court would also exceed its jurisdiction if it were to uphold the decision of the superior court. [4] The State's argument regarding jurisdiction [5] misperceives what occurred below. The superior court was not asked to rule on the constitutionality of any federal statute or of ANGR 35-03. Furthermore, the superior court did not rule that any federal statute or regulation violates the state constitution. The superior court held that, pursuant to federal law, the state constitution's due process clause must be followed before separation pay may be withheld or reduced. The court also determined that Bowen, as a member of the state National Guard, is a state employee. State courts have jurisdiction to decide cases regarding the discharge of members of the National Guard who are state employees. E.g., Sorrentino v. Ohio Nat'l Guard, 53 Ohio St.3d 214, 560 N.E.2d 186, 190-91 (1990) (recognizing court's jurisdiction to decide cases regarding discharge of state National Guard members not in active federal service under modern militia system). The superior court was correct in both regards. We hold that Alaska has jurisdiction in this case.
The State argues that Congress and the Secretary of the Air Force have acted to regulate comprehensively the administration of the AGR program in the Alaska Air National Guard, including the procedures to be followed in the case of separation, and that the states are pre-empted from applying additional and different procedures. [6] The State further argues that even where federal law or regulation does not comprehensively occupy the field, state law cannot stand if it conflicts with federal regulation. [7] While the federal government might have acted to regulate comprehensively the administration of the AGR program in the Alaska Air National Guard, it has not done so. Examination of two federal laws shows this. First, 32 U.S.C. § 324(b) allows termination of a National Guard officer as provided by the laws of the State. [8] Congress has chosen to affirm, rather than abridge, the states' role in terminating officers of their National Guards. This is clear recognition that state law may provide additional termination requirements. Second, analysis of ANGR 35-03 shows that the regulation was drafted with the applicability of state laws in mind. Chapter 6, section 6-5(a) of the regulation provides in relevant part that personnel will be involuntarily removed from full-time National Guard duty only IAW [in accordance with] procedures prescribed herein and only after the state Adjutant General determines that all applicable laws and regulations have been complied with. (Emphasis added.) Given that termination of a National Guard officer may only be as provided by the laws of the State under 32 U.S.C. § 324(b), and given that the Adjutant General must determine that all applicable laws have been complied with, it is clear that applicable state constitutional provisions must be enforced in the termination process. [9] Nothing in the federal statute or regulations appears to disallow the application of state constitutional requirements in addition to the procedures set out in ANGR 35-03; indeed, the statute and regulations invite state law participation in the termination process. We therefore conclude that Congress has neither expressly nor impliedly pre-empted state law in this field. Only one termination procedure exists, which eliminates the possibility of conflicting decisions. Given the language in ANGR 35-03 and 32 U.S.C. § 324, there is no inherent conflict between the termination procedures set forth in ANGR 35-03 and additional state constitutional procedural safeguards. In short, there is no conflict with federal law. Therefore, we conclude there is no federal pre-emption and affirm the ruling of the superior court.
The State argues that AGR separation and separation pay issues are nonjusticiable. [10] The State cites a test adopted in Christoffersen v. Washington State Air Nat'l Guard, 855 F.2d 1437, 1442 (9th Cir.1988). [11] We decline to apply the Christoffersen test because Bowen is a state employee, not a federal employee. Furthermore, the question whether deprivation of property rights by an Alaska administrative agency is sufficient to invoke constitutional due process is not one of military expertise or one which causes interference with the military mission. [12] This court is not being called upon to intrude into any issues of military doctrine or other matters committed to the expertise of military commanders. Rather, we are asked to review the decision of the superior court that analyzed the actions of the DMVA and determined that it transgressed the constitutional rights of one of its employees. We therefore hold the issues on appeal in this case are justiciable.
The State argues that in concluding that Bowen was entitled to an adversarial hearing under state law before his separation pay could be reduced, the superior court overlooked Bowen's failure to exhaust his intraservice administrative remedies in this regard. The State contends that Bowen could have sought relief from the Air Force Board for Correction of Military Records (AFBCMR) under 10 U.S.C. § 1552 and 32 C.F.R. § 865.1 et seq. The State asserts that the AFBCMR is available, upon application by a member of the National Guard, to review a nonretention decision on a claim that it was the result of error or injustice and to correct the member's records and reinstate pay and other federal compensation or benefits that were lost. This issue not having been properly raised before the superior court, we will not consider it on appeal. [13] We have previously held: Waiver in superior court may occur either in a suit initiated there, or when the superior court is reviewing agency action. In agency review, an issue may be abandoned on appeal to the superior court, either by failing to include it in the points on appeal or by inadequate briefing. Nenana City Sch. Dist. v. Coghill, 898 P.2d 929, 934 (Alaska 1995) (citation omitted). See also Zeman v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 699 P.2d 1274, 1280 (Alaska 1985) (As a general rule, a party may not present new issues or advance new theories to secure a reversal of a lower court decision.) (citing O'Neill Investigations, Inc. v. Illinois Employers Ins. of Wausau, 636 P.2d 1170, 1175 n. 7 (Alaska 1981)); Williams v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co., 650 P.2d 343, 351 (Alaska 1982) (holding argument not raised before superior court will not be considered on appeal). The State concedes that it did not raise this issue specifically before the superior court, but contends that its arguments before the court specifically and impliedly urged deference to the existing military administrative process and avoidance of judicial interference. The State asserts that this is a central theme of the exhaustion principle. Citing this court's adoption of a liberal approach in determining whether an issue was raised in the superior court, [14] the State submits that the exhaustion issue should not be deemed waived. In its brief before the superior court the State argued the following: A. Major Bowen Was Not a State Employee. B. If Major Bowen Is Not a State Employee, Then His Employment Is a Federal Matter and Beyond the Jurisdiction of This Court. C. Regardless of Who the Employer Was, the Employment Contract Made Federal Regulations Applicable to Major Bowen's Employment. D. Federal Law Governs the Right to and Nature of Any Hearing. E. The Procedures in ANGR 35-03 Satisfy the Requirements of Due Process. Obviously, none of these arguments included a claim that Bowen failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. Additionally, we have reviewed the entire text of each argument set out under each of these headings. None raises the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Even when viewing the State's pleadings before the superior court liberally, there is no allegation whatsoever of the issue now argued before this court. Therefore, we hold that this issue was waived because the State failed to include it in its brief to the superior court. Nenana City Sch. Dist., 898 P.2d at 934.