Opinion ID: 209543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: This court's new definition of process was rejected in Gottschalk v. Benson

Text: In Benson the claimed invention was a mathematical process for converting binary-coded decimal numerals into pure binary numbers. The Court explained that a mathematical formula unlimited to a specific use was simply an abstract idea of the nature of fundamental truths, phenomena of nature, and abstract intellectual concepts, as have traditionally been outside of patent systems. 409 U.S. at 67, 93 S.Ct. 253. However, the Court explicitly declined to limit patent-eligible processes in the manner now adopted by this court, stating: It is argued that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a different state or thing. We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of our prior precedents. It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a computer. We do not so hold. Id. at 71, 93 S.Ct. 253. The Court explained that the requirements of our prior precedents did not preclude patents on computer programs, despite the statement drawn from Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 787-88, 24 L.Ed. 139 (1876), that [t]ransformation and reduction of an article `to a different state or thing' is the clue to the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular machines. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70, 93 S.Ct. 253. Although this same statement is now relied upon by this court as requiring its present ruling, maj. op at 956 & n. 11, the Court in Benson was explicit that: We do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not meet [the Court's] prior precedents. The Court recognized that Cochrane's statement was made in the context of a mechanical process and a past era, and protested: It is said we freeze process patents to old technologies, leaving no room for the revelations of the new, onrushing technology. Such is not our purpose. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, 93 S.Ct. 253. Instead, the Court made clear that it was not barring patents on computer programs, and rejected the argu[ment] that a process patent must either be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate to change articles or materials to a `different state or thing' in order to satisfy Section 101. Id. Although my colleagues now describe these statements as equivocal, maj. op. at 956, there is nothing equivocal about We do not so hold. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71, 93 S.Ct. 253. Nonetheless, this court now so holds.