Opinion ID: 2277244
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Co-Defendant's Statement Implicating Defendant

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, Evid.R. 63(9)(b), a statement made by Thompson outside of defendant's presence, that this nigger [referring to Hunt] just killed a nigger on the sixth floor. Taylor's trial testimony conflicted with her own sworn statement to the police, in which she stated: It was around 2:30 when Kenneth Thompson came in and around. They had blood all over them. I asked them what happened. He [referring to Thompson] said he just killed a nigger. Following a Evidence Rule 8 hearing, which was conducted immediately before Taylor's testimony, the trial court ruled that the version of Thompson's statement that implicated defendant could be admitted through Taylor under Evidence Rule 63(9)(b) as a statement made by a co-conspirator during the course of a conspiracy, the scheme to dispose of evidence to hinder apprehension or prosecution. Defendant first argues that no conspiracy existed at the time the challenged statement was made, and that even if the statement was made in the course of, it was not in furtherance of the conspiracy. The State responds that the conspiracy between Thompson and defendant to murder Lawson included a plan to conceal their criminal conduct, and that Thompson made the statement to solicit Taylor's help. According to the State, the statement was made both in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy to murder. Alternatively, the State contends that the statement was made in the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy to hinder apprehension or prosecution. The co-conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule, Evidence Rule 63(9)(b), provides in relevant part: A statement which would be admissible if made by the declarant at the hearing is admissible against a party if    at the time the statement was made the party and the declarant were participating in a plan to commit a crime or civil wrong and the statement was made in furtherance of that plan. To gain admission under Evidence Rule 63(9)(b), a statement must satisfy three conditions: (1) the statement must be made in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the statement must be made during the course of the conspiracy; and (3) the prosecution must demonstrate by a fair preponderance of evidence, independent of the hearsay, that the conspiracy existed and that the defendant participated in it. State v. Phelps, 96 N.J. 500, 509-10, 518 (1984). The third condition was designed to reduce the fear that a defendant might be convicted or held liable in damages solely on the basis of evidence that he has had no opportunity to impeach or refute. Id. at 510-11. We first consider whether the record supports the proposition that the statement was made in furtherance of and during the course of the conspiracy. According to Taylor's statement to the police, Thompson asked her to get the garbage bags in which defendants disposed of their blood-stained clothes and knives. At trial, Taylor stated that she then tossed one of the garbage bags into a dumpster and another onto the roof of a nearby building. Thus, evidence supports the proposition that the challenged statement was made by Thompson to Taylor to obtain her help in disposing of the evidence of the murder. Arguably, however, Thompson's statement was made not in furtherance of a conspiracy, but merely in response to Taylor's inquiry about defendant's identity and the reason he was in Thompson's apartment. Nonetheless, we find that the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that the statement was committed during the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy to hinder apprehension or prosecution. With respect to the third element of the Phelps test, there was overwhelming evidence, independent of the hearsay argument, linking defendant either to a conspiracy to murder or to a conspiracy to hinder apprehension. Fennell, Charlotte Hunt, Taylor, and Thompson all suggested that Thompson and defendant conspired to murder Lawson. Furthermore, Taylor described how defendant and Thompson assisted each other in cleaning up and in disposing of their blood-stained clothes and knives. All this suggests that the defendants conspired to hinder their apprehension or prosecution. Finally, our review of the record leads us to conclude that even if the challenged testimony was erroneously admitted, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325 (1971); R. 2:10-2. At trial, testimony was elicited on the State's direct examination of Taylor: Q. When the two of them came in with blood, did you ask anybody what happened? A. Two of them didn't come in. Q. When they came. A. When James? Q. When they came in, one behind another. A. When James Hunt came in, I asked him who is  I said, Who are you, what you doing in here and he was just looking, you know. Q. Did you ask Raheem [Thompson] anything? A. Yeah, I was asking him, he just was saying, he just killed somebody on the sixth floor, he just killed a man on the sixth floor. Q. I'm sorry. You were asking who? A. He was telling me that. THE COURT: Just read back the answer, the question and answer. (At this time the court reporter read back the last question and answer.) BY MR. GOLDEN: Q. I'm sorry, I'd like you to repeat that again what exactly did Raheem say to you? A. He said, this nigger just killed a nigger on the sixth floor, that's what he said to me. Q. That's exactly what he said? A. Yes, he did. Q. Referring to who? A. To James Hunt, he didn't know his name, he said, this nigger just killed the nigger on the sixth floor, stay in there and just calm down because I was crying and, you know, upset. That testimony by Taylor conflicted with her statement to the police on December 3, 1982, in which she suggested that Thompson had implicated himself, not defendant. When confronted with her prior inconsistent statement, Taylor claimed that she meant to say in the statement that Thompson had implicated defendant, not himself. On the identity of Lawson's killer, Taylor's sworn statement to the police and her trial testimony were in apparent conflict. For this and other reasons, the prosecutor acknowledged on summation that Taylor was a liar. Given the overwhelming proof that defendant killed Lawson and Taylor's questionable credibility, we conclude that any error in admitting her testimony was harmless. See State v. D'Arco, 153 N.J. Super. 258, 266 (App.Div. 1977) (court did not consider whether hearsay statements were properly admitted under Evidence Rule 63(9)(b) because the independent proof of the substantive crimes showed that admission could not be harmful error).