Opinion ID: 438686
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Gregory Krivakuca

Text: 38 Gregory Krivakuca was employed by H & W as a molder who ran the Foundry from April 11, 1980 until his discharge on December 22, 1980. 17 He was the only molder in the Foundry and the record reveals that his absence from the Foundry resulted in serious production problems. He served as Union secretary from September 18, 1980 until the date of his discharge, and in that position he claimed involvement in the majority of grievances filed during that period. Krivakuca was terminated in December 1980 at which point he had accumulated nine unexcused absences. 18 The General Counsel argued that Krivakuca was the subject of unlawful discrimination because (1) he had not missed any days of work between the time he received his first disciplinary notice (November 14, 1980) and receipt of his final discharge notice on December 17, 1980, and (2) H & W refused a written excuse for November 7, 10, and 11, 1980, on which dates Krivakuca was caring for his seriously ill son. 39 The ALJ rejected the first ground urged by the General Counsel. H & W offered testimony to explain why a time lag occurred when a disciplinary slip was issued 19 and how suspensions were specifically timed to minimize interference with the ongoing work in the Foundry. Thus, the fact that Krivakuca returned from a three-day suspension on November 21, 1980 to learn that he was to be suspended for the next five workdays--affording him no time to improve his attendance record 20 --is mitigated by the ALJ's finding that Krivakuca was on constant notice that his attendance record was among the poorest in the plant and that [H & W] was very concerned about it. (App. 24). This finding is substantiated by Krivakuca himself, who testified that everytime he missed a day of work, his supervisor would talk to him about it, (App. 286, 299), including a conversation in September 1980 when Bollman told Krivakuca that H & W could not put up with a baby-sitter problem any longer and that this was the last time that would happen. (App. 279, 299). We therefore agree with the ALJ (and the Board) that H & W did not discriminate against Krivakuca in applying Rule 30 and suspending Krivakuca in November 1980. 40 As to the second ground urged by the General Counsel, the ALJ found that H & W's rejection of Krivakuca's written excuses for his absence on November 7, 10, and 11 was discriminatory. Krivakuca explained that he stayed home on November 7, 1980 to care for his son. The next day, Saturday, November 8, Krivakuca took his son to the hospital emergency room and there obtained a slip, which another employee brought in for him on Monday, November 10. Krivakuca stayed home with the child November 10 and 11, returning to the hospital on November 11 for a follow-up visit as had been recommended by the doctor. (App. 787). On November 12, Krivakuca returned to work, bringing another hospital slip for the previous day. (App. 788). H & W rejected the proffered excuses on November 14 (App. 788). According to Krivakuca, Giannotti stated that excuses from doctors would be accepted only if they were for the employee and not if they were for employees' children. (App. 266). 41 The ALJ emphasized that there is a great deal of difference between a baby sitting problem on one hand, and the emergency treatment of a severely ill child on the other. (App. 24). He also noted that H & W had tolerated absences of other employees who accompanied someone else for medical care. (Id.) The ALJ concluded that H & W's change in attitude and sudden hard-hearted attitude could be attributed only to Krivakuca's protected activities. We disagree. 42 Even if one concludes that the General Counsel carried his burden of establishing a prima facie case--by pointing to (1) other instances where medical excuses were accepted from employees who merely accompanied family members on doctor's visits and (2) the timing of Krivakuca's discharge (immediately following a grievance meeting in which he was a key figure)--we are persuaded that H & W also carried its burden of showing that Krivakuca would have been discharged in any event regardless of his protected activities. 43 Krivakuca had accumulated six absences prior to his son's illness. He remained home with his son Friday, Monday, and Tuesday, claiming that the examining physician at the hospital told him he had to make a decision regarding taking care of his seriously ill son. (App. 269). The hospital report prescribes only bed rest and increased fluid intake, however, thereby belying the ALJ's reference to an extended emergency situation. Furthermore, there is no legal principle which prevents a company from making a hard-hearted judgment in the face of compelling business justifications. See Central Freight Lines, 255 NLRB 509, 510 (1981) ([H]owever 'compelling' or sympathetic Southerland's reasons for missing work may have been, it was still within [the employer's] province to act on Southerland's absences.). The record reveals that Krivakuca's constant absences from work had severe adverse effects on H & W's production schedule. (App. 591, 650-51). It should be remembered that at that time, Krivakuca was the only molder in H & W's Foundry. As stated by Arbitrator Jenkins in Phillips Petroleum Company, 44 ... The Company is entitled to insist on reasonable attendance. While an employee may be perfectly capable of doing a job, the job does not get done by him if he is not there. The Company is entitled to have an employee that will get the job done. If an employee has repeated absences over a long period, even if such absences are justified, he becomes of so little value as to justify his termination. 45 48 L.A. 402, 404-06 (Jenkins, 1967). 46 Krivakuca had the worst attendance record of any H & W employee during his eight-month tenure there. (App. 595, 926). He was aware of the production problems his absences caused, had assured his supervisor that the problem would be taken care of, and he had received a last chance warning in September 1980. What is more, H & W treated as excused seven of Krivakuca's absences that occurred after his appointment to Union office (App. 855, 926). Nothing prohibited H & W from finally drawing a line and strictly enforcing its own work rule, and sympathy for Krivakuca's plight should not color our evaluation of H & W's conduct with regard to one of its critically important, but constantly absent, employees. Although we sympathize with Krivakuca's unfortunate situation, we also understand an employer's need to employ dependable workers, and we conclude that H & W satisfied its burden of showing that Krivakuca would have been discharged without regard to his Union activities on account of his abysmal attendance record. Finding no substantial evidence to support the Board's contrary conclusion, we therefore decline to enforce that part of the Board's order that dealt with Gregory Krivakuca.