Opinion ID: 1088164
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the trial court erred in granting the state's peremptory challenges of jurors on the basis of gender which amounted to intentional discrimination in violation of the equal protection clause and then improperly denied defendant bounds peremptory challenges, even after a gender neutral explanation had been given.

Text: The voir dire in this case was conducted the day after J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994), was handed down by the United States Supreme Court which extended Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), protection to gender. This Court holds that all of the case law following and interpreting Batson now applies to J.E.B. and gender discrimination issues. In other words, race-neutral reasons are also permissible gender-neutral reasons, and the same analysis from Batson applies. In following that decision, the trial judge explained to the attorneys that a peremptory strike would have to be based both on a race-neutral and a gender-neutral reason for it to be granted. With no other guidance than Batson and its progeny, along with J.E.B., the trial judge proceeded with voir dire, and both sides entered objections to the peremptory strikes made by the other side. Bounds argues that the State intentionally sought to exclude males from the jury panel using its peremptory strikes, thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause. Bounds fails to note in his brief and to call this Court's attention to the fact that all of his peremptory strikes were used in an attempt to exclude females from the jury. We fail to see how justice can be served by allowing Bounds to argue to this Court that the trial court committed error by allowing the State to exclude males from the jury with its peremptory strikes, while he tried to exclude females from the jury. However, at each objection entered by Charles Wright, Bounds' attorney, Dave Harbour, the assistant district attorney gave gender-neutral reasons for the strike. Further, Harbour noted for the record that one of the jurors he passed over, was a male. This was not a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Bounds further argues to this Court that the trial judge denied his peremptory strikes of three jurors even after he gave gender-neutral reasons. The Court notes that the trial court allowed several other of Bounds' peremptory strikes. The trial judge should give a clear and reasonably specific explanation for his ruling when determining if an explanation is sufficiently gender-neutral. Hatten v. State, 628 So.2d 294, 298 (Miss. 1993); see also Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1350 (Miss. 1987). For the strikes that were denied by the trial court, there was no explanation given. The J.E.B. decision was noted by this Court in Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235, 1246 (Miss. 1994), when the Court brought to the trial courts' attention the extension of Batson to gender-based exclusion of jurors. J.E.B. explained that Failing to provide jurors the same protection against gender discrimination as race discrimination could frustrate the purpose of Batson itself. Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender can be used as a pretext for racial discrimination. Allowing parties to remove racial minorities from the jury not because of their race, but because of their gender, contravenes well-established equal protection principles and could insulate effectively racial discrimination from judicial scrutiny. Duplantis, 644 So.2d at 1246. The peremptory strikes, the objections to those strikes, and the judge's ruling were made on the record as follows: BY MR. WRIGHT: D-4 will be Ms. Dorman. BY MR. HARBOUR: Objection.       BY THE COURT: Give me a reason for striking Juror No. 45. BY MR. WRIGHT: The family of the Guins live on or around Pine Springs Road. The incident occurred on Pine Springs Road. And there may be some relationship or knowledge of the folks, of the Guins. BY MR. HARBOUR: Judge, there is no evidence of that. BY THE COURT: I'm not going to allow that strike.       BY MR. WRIGHT: Well, I'll proffer to the Court that the incident occurred on Pine Springs Road or about Pine Springs Road. BY THE COURT: Mr. Wright, you can make your statement and then I'm going to make a ruling and we're going to move on. We're not going to argue about each juror.       BY MR. WRIGHT: Number 32. BY MR. HARBOUR: Objection, judge. BY THE COURT: Give me an explanation for striking Juror No. 32. BY MR. WRIGHT: She didn't respond to any of the questions. I had no eye contact with her. She seemed indifferent to the situation that was presented during voir dire. BY MR. HARBOUR: I will agree with Mr. Wright that she didn't respond to any questions, Judge. BY THE COURT: I'm not going to accept that strike for those reasons.       BY MR. WRIGHT: Strike No. 24. BY MR. HARBOUR: Objection, Judge. The list reflects that she has a female's name, I believe she's a female. Mr. Wright has stricken nearly exclusively females and my notes reflect that she did not respond to any question during voir dire. BY MR. WRIGHT: That's the basis of my striking her. She was indifferent to the questioning. She seemed listless and inattentive. BY THE COURT: All right. I will deny that request to strike her. Though not denying all of Bounds' peremptory strikes, the judge did deny those above, even after hearing the gender-neutral reasons. Such findings will not be reversed unless they appear clearly erroneous or against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Hatten, 628 So.2d at 299. This Court allows the trial court great deference in determining whether the offered explanation under the unique circumstances of the case is truly a gender-neutral reason. Stewart v. State, 662 So.2d 552, 558 (Miss. 1995). The problem here is there is no clear or specific explanation for his ruling as required by Lockett. Hatten, 628 So.2d at 299. As noted by this Court in Stewart, a peremptory challenge does not have to be supported by the same degree of justification required for a challenge for cause. Id.; Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. at 1723; Harper v. State, 635 So.2d 864, 867 (Miss. 1994); Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188, 192 (Miss. 1989). The trial judge did not give a basis for the denial of the peremptory strikes after the gender neutral reasons were given. He just stated on the record that he was denying the claim. There is no way to tell from the record why he denied the strike. This is clearly contrary to the earlier holdings of this Court. Clear and reasonably specific explanations for his ruling should be made on the record. Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1350. In light of this Court's previous rulings interpreting Batson, which is now applicable not only to race but also to gender as a result of J.E.B., the trial judge committed reversible error in not giving clear and reasonably specific explanations for his denial of Bounds' peremptory strikes. In Lockett, this Court listed in an appendix cases from other jurisdictions which provided racially neutral reasons for striking a potential juror. Id. at 1356-57. Several of those cases listed inattentiveness as a valid racially neutral reason for striking a juror. Id. The Court in Lockett borrowed the rationale from United States v. Forbes, 816 F.2d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir.1987), and held that a potential juror's demeanor is sufficient as a race-neutral reason to allow a peremptory strike. Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1351. Because J.E.B. extended the holding in Batson to gender, demeanor is a proper gender-neutral reason to allow a peremptory strike. In the case sub judice, the trial judge disallowed Bounds' two peremptory strikes based on the juror's lack of eye contact, inattentiveness, lack of responsiveness to questioning, and general indifference to the voir dire process. In other words, Bounds gave reasons that described the jurors' demeanor; yet, he was denied the peremptory strike for that reason. This Court joined a variety of other jurisdictions in accepting demeanor as a legitimate, race-neutral basis for a peremptory challenge. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 628 (Miss. 1995). Further, the trial judge did not make a clear and reasonably specific record as to what his reason was in denying the peremptory strike. This was error requiring reversal because it violated the holdings in Batson and J.E.B. The trial judge denied one of Bounds' peremptory strikes because the gender-neutral reason given by Bounds' attorney was not supported by the record. BY MR. WRIGHT: D-4 will be Ms. Dorman. BY MR. HARBOUR: Objection.       BY THE COURT: Give me a reason for striking Juror No. 45. BY MR. WRIGHT: The family of the Guins live on or around Pine Springs Road. The incident occurred on Pine Springs Road. And there may be some relationship or knowledge of the folks, of the Guins. BY MR. HARBOUR: Judge, there is no evidence of that. BY THE COURT: I'm not going to allow that strike. Even when Bounds' made a proffer to the trial judge that the alleged burglary and kidnapping happened in an area where the juror lived, the trial judge would not grant the peremptory strike. BY MR. WRIGHT: Well, I'll proffer to the Court that the incident occurred on Pine Springs Road or about Pine Springs Road. BY THE COURT: Mr. Wright, you can make your statement and then I'm going to make a ruling and we're going to move on. We're not going to argue about each juror. This Court in Lockett declined to limit an attorney's use of legitimate informational sources available as to jurors. Id. at 1353. Also, the attorney did not have to question the juror in open court before such information could be used as a racially neutral reason to make a peremptory strike, as long as there was no evidence of racial discrimination. Id. Certainly, this must also apply to gender-neutral reasons for peremptory strikes. In Appendix I of the Lockett decision this Court listed race-neutral reasons for allowing peremptory strikes in an attempt to provide some guidance to the trial judges in Mississippi. Living near the defendant was one of the reasons listed for allowing a race-neutral peremptory strike. Id. at 1356, citing Taitano v. State, 4 Va. App. 342, 358 S.E.2d 590 (1987). Although there was no evidence presented, other than Mr. Wright's proffer, to the effect that Juror No. 45 lived on or around Pine Springs Road, according to Lockett, no more was needed. Further, if living near the defendant has been adopted by this Court to be an acceptable race-neutral reason, the Court finds that it is not too tenuous to interpret the prior case law and hold that living near the victim is also an acceptable reason to allow a peremptory strike. This Court has repeatedly held that a race [gender]neutral reason for a peremptory strike does not have to rise to the level of a challenge for cause. Walker, 671 So.2d at 628; Griffin v. State, 607 So.2d 1197, 1202 (Miss. 1992); Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1352. The trial judge committed reversible error by not allowing Bounds' peremptory strikes after the reasons were articulated to the court. Therefore, this case should be remanded for a new trial based on this issue.