Opinion ID: 422273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the supervisory status of piotrowski

Text: 2 The following factual findings of the ALJ, which we conclude are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, were adopted by the Board on review. Respondent, Ajax Tool Works, Inc., is an Illinois corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing chisels. In April, May, and June of 1980, the night shift at respondent's Franklin Park plant consisted of approximately 30 hourly-paid employees working from 4:00 p.m. to 1:30 a.m. in two departments, the machine shop and the forge shop. The night shift comprised approximately one-third of respondent's total work force. 3 David Shea, foreman of the forge shop, and Joe Capriatti, foreman of the machine shop, both admitted supervisors, worked on the day shift, and usually left the plant by 5:00 p.m., leaving Peter Piotrowski as the single leadman on the night shift for the two departments. Piotrowski was knowledgeable in the operation of the plant and its machinery, especially the machine shop. He was familiar with the entire line of chisels produced by the company, and knew all of the machine settings and the adjustments necessary to produce each variety. 4 Piotrowski was the highest paid hourly-rated employee in the plant. All of his superiors were salaried. He reported for work daily at 3:00 p.m., one hour before the remaining employees on the night shift. Between 3:00 p.m. and 4:00 p.m., Shea and Capriatti briefed him on the night shift production requirements. They generally left Piotrowski to implement their instructions. He assigned night shift employees to particular tasks on particular machines in a manner consistent with Shea's and Capriatti's instructions. With respect to the machine shop, this meant that Piotrowski decided which of the 18 employees would work on which machine; with respect to the forge shop, this decision apparently was made by foreman Shea, to be implemented by Piotrowski. 1 5 When the night shift employees arrived at work, they checked with Piotrowski as to which tasks they were to perform because he frequently changed their assignments. Although they usually worked on the same machine as the previous day, at times they were reassigned to another machine, and often they were given a new task on the same machine. When an employee had finished a specific task during the shift, Piotrowski reassigned him to another. When necessary, Piotrowski was expected to set up machines for the production run. He also made adjustments in the settings as needed, and at times attempted to repair machines broken on the night shift. When a machine became dysfunctional, he assigned the operator to another machine or task. When not performing these enumerated duties, Piotrowski sat at his desk and read. 6 Piotrowski had no authority to hire or fire employees on his own initiative; he was, however, responsible for seeing that production requirements and quality standards were met, and that discipline was maintained. On one occasion, employee Villegas handled an order incorrectly; Piotrowski rejected it and required Villegas to do it again. On another occasion, Piotrowski ordered Villegas to refrain from attempting to repair a machine, stating that it was not his job to do so. Piotrowski enforced the ten minute limit on coffee breaks, and generally ensured that working time was spent working. Piotrowski's orders generally were obeyed, presumably because they were backed by a degree of power. On one occasion, he sent an employee home, with consequent loss of pay, for reading a novel in the washroom. On another occasion, Piotrowski argued with an employee and threatened to have him fired. The employee subsequently was discharged. 2 7 On several occasions, Piotrowski sent home men who were too intoxicated to work safely; he was authorized by respondent to do so. Piotrowski had instructions to telephone the plant manager or company president whenever an emergency arose that he could not handle; this did not occur frequently. The employees who testified viewed Piotrowski as the equivalent of a supervisor. Piotrowski identified his position as that of supervisor of the night shift when first questioned on his company status, and according to his testimony, he viewed himself as the individual in charge. 8 If an employee failed to punch a time card, Piotrowski initialled the card to vouch for the time. In addition, employees were required to report to him if they wanted time off. Piotrowski was the sole night shift employee who possessed keys to the plant and to a desk wherein valuable company property was stored. He was responsible for locking the plant each night after all employees had left. 9 At appropriate times, Piotrowski testified, he discussed with the foremen whether particular employees should receive raises, and he made recommendations. Two company witnesses testified that he did not. The ALJ noted that the conflicting testimony probably stemmed from different conceptions of the term recommendation, respondent's witnesses apparently contending that formal recommendations were not elicited or received, and Piotrowski contending that the foremen asked his opinion. The ALJ found obvious the fact that the company would have been unable to make informed decisions on prospective raises absent an evaluation by the only individual well-informed on night shift employees' attitudes and conduct, factors admittedly considered. 10 On the basis of these facts, the ALJ concluded that Piotrowski was a supervisor within the meaning of § 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act, with authority to direct responsibly the work of other employees. Noting that although many of Piotrowski's duties were routine in nature, and some were clearly those of a skilled employee rather than a supervisor, the ALJ stressed that Piotrowski was solely responsible for the plant on the night shift, for directing the work of the 30 night shift employees, for meeting shift production requirements, for meeting quality standards, and for maintaining discipline. The ALJ also noted that if Piotrowski were not a supervisor, the entire night shift would have been without supervision of any kind from 5:00 P.M. to 1:30 A.M.
11 Section 2(11) of the National Labor Relations Act defines the term supervisor as follows: 12 The term 'supervisor' means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment. 13 29 U.S.C. § 152(11). 14 It is well-established that section 2(11) is to be read in the disjunctive; possession of any one of the above indicia of supervisory status is sufficient to render an employee a statutory supervisor. See, e.g., NLRB v. Brown Specialty Co., 436 F.2d 372, 375 (7th Cir.1971). 15 The parties disagree on whether Piotrowski had the authority to independently assign and responsibly direct his night shift coworkers. Respondent contends that any authority possessed or exercised by Piotrowski did not require the use of independent judgment, but was merely of a routine nature. 16 As an initial matter, respondent contends that because neither the ALJ nor the Board made a specific finding that Piotrowski exercised independent judgment in directing the work of other employees, the conclusion that Piotrowski is a supervisor is insufficient as a matter of law. We find no merit in this argument. Although the ALJ did not track the exact language of section 2(11) in drafting his findings, he concluded that Piotrowski was a supervisor after noting that many of his duties were routine in nature. Implicit in this conclusion is a finding that Piotrowski exercised independent judgment in directing the work of other employees. The language of the ALJ's concluding findings clearly was meant to convey the concept of independent judgment. See Dynamic Machine Co. v. NLRB, 552 F.2d 1195, 1201 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827, 98 S.Ct. 103, 54 L.Ed.2d 85 (1977). 17 Having concluded that the findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole, we turn to an examination whether the conclusion that Piotrowski was a supervisor has a reasonable basis in law. In reviewing cases involving this issue, we permit the Board a large measure of informed discretion. NLRB v. Process Corp., 412 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir.1969). 18 The ALJ concluded that in the machine shop, Piotrowski determined which employee would operate which machine. Uncontroverted evidence also revealed that Piotrowski was responsible for reassigning employees when they had completed a particular task during the shift. No evidence was presented that Shea and Capriatti briefed Piotrowski on reassignments. Although the ALJ did not specify which factors were taken into account in making assignment and reassignment decisions, it seems apparent that Piotrowski had to assess the requirements of the job and the relative abilities of particular employees in making assignments that would allow the production quotas to be met. Such discretion must be exercised in accordance with a managerial judgment as to the best interests of the employer. Cf. NLRB v. Res-Care, Inc., 705 F.2d 1461 (7th Cir.1983). No evidence was adduced that work was assigned automatically to the employee who was operating the particular machine on which the job had to be run. Although the reassignments may not have called for the exercise of sophisticated judgment, it appears that the decisions involved the exercise of some independent judgment. The same is true of the initial work assignments in the machine shop. This is a sufficient basis for a finding of supervisory status. See American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, 640 F.2d 893 (7th Cir.1981); NLRB v. Adam & Eve Cosmetics, Inc., 567 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.1977); Dynamic Machine Co. v. NLRB, supra, 552 F.2d at 1201. 19 We further note that Piotrowski was responsible for ensuring that quality standards were met. On one occasion Piotrowski rejected an incorrectly handled order and required the employee to redo it. We believe this action required an exercise of independent judgment. 20 The record is replete with other indicia of Piotrowski's supervisory status: (1) he was responsible for maintaining discipline and for ensuring that working time was spent working; on one occasion he sent an employee home with consequent loss of pay for reading a novel in the washroom; he was authorized by respondent to send home men who were too intoxicated to work safely; he exercised this authority on several occasions; (2) there is evidence that Piotrowski effectively recommended that an employee be discharged, cf. NLRB v. Harmon Industries, Inc., 565 F.2d 1047, 1050 (8th Cir.1977); (3) Piotrowski was responsible for locking the plant each night; (4) Piotrowski spent no time engaged in actual production activities; when not setting up or adjusting machines or directing the work of other employees, he sat at a desk and read, cf. NLRB v. Monroe Tube Co., Inc., 545 F.2d 1320, 1324-25 (2d Cir.1976); NLRB v. Orr Iron, Inc., 508 F.2d 1305 (7th Cir.1975) (per curiam); Precision Fabricators v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 567 (2d Cir.1953); and (5) Piotrowski was the highest-ranking employee in the plant on the night shift; if Piotrowski were not a supervisor, one-third of respondent's total work force would be without supervision, see Southern Indiana Gas & Electric Co. v. NLRB, 657 F.2d 878, 886 (7th Cir.1981); American Diversified Foods, Inc. v. NLRB, supra, 640 F.2d at 896. 21 Having reviewed the entire record, including evidence that fairly detracts from the Board's conclusion, we find that it contains such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support [the] conclusion. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 477, 71 S.Ct. 456, 459, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951). Although we justifiably may have reached a different conclusion had the issue been before us de novo, we do not have the power to displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views .... Id. at 488, 71 S.Ct. at 465.