Opinion ID: 577188
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for severance properly denied

Text: 29 Reed asserts that the trial court's refusal to sever his trial caused him to suffer prejudice from the spillover effect of the voluminous evidence concerning Lehder. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 14. In considering a motion for severance, a court must weigh the prejudice inherent in a joint trial against the interests of judicial economy. United States v. Eyster, 948 F.2d 1196, 1213 (11th Cir.1991).  '[S]everance will be granted only if a defendant can demonstrate that a joint trial will result in specific and compelling prejudice to the conduct of his defense.'  Id. (quoting United States v. Walker, 720 F.2d 1527, 1533 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1108, 104 S.Ct. 1614, 80 L.Ed.2d 143 (1984)). We review the district court's balance of interests for abuse of discretion. Eyster, 948 F.2d at 1214. 30 To prove compelling prejudice Reed must demonstrate the jury's inability to make an individualized determination as to each defendant. United States v. Meester, 762 F.2d 867, 883 (11th Cir.1985); see United States v. Marszalkowski, 669 F.2d 655, 660 (11th Cir.1982). The mere fact that Reed was involved in a complex conspiracy involving voluminous evidence pertaining to a co-conspirator is insufficient to demonstrate compelling prejudice. See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d 1501, 1510 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Casamayor, 837 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir.1988). The trial court in the instant case significantly reduced any possibility of prejudice by instructing the jury to consider each offense and each defendant separately. See United States v. Smith, 918 F.2d at 1510. Denial of Reed's motion for severance was therefore not an abuse of discretion. 31