Opinion ID: 2790598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Additional Writing and Timing Requirements

Text: We also question some of Homoly’s proposed interpretations of the writing and timing requirements in the parties’ agreements. For example, Homoly does not provide any support for his assertions that § 6.03(D) of the operating agreement requires “signed written consent” for loans in excess of $10,000, or that the parties cannot designate the money from Robl Construction as a loan or request a guarantee after the receipt of funds. (Emphasis added). In Homoly’s view, the Company had to obtain his consent before receiving any money from Robl Construction, even though he and Robl Construction had not yet decided whether the Company would treat the initial advances as a capital contribution or a loan. As we read it, § 6.03(D) prohibits only “[t]he creation of any obligation or commitment of the Company, including the borrowing of funds, in excess of $10,000” without super-majority consent. (Emphasis added). At the least, the language is open to an interpretation under which the parties intended to require super-majority consent only before the Company was bound, and an undesignated advancement of funds does not necessarily impose any obligation on the Company. -11- A reasonable jury could find there was no such binding obligation or commitment from the Company unless and until the parties decided to treat the advances as a loan. At that point, the jury could reasonably find the requisite consent. Even if the timing of the advances—as opposed to the obligation to repay—is unambiguously relevant, Homoly’s analysis is incomplete. Most of the advances occurred after the 2006 email exchange and after disputed communications about the alleged loan. Homoly argues the evidence does not establish the Company “complied with the Super-Majority-in-Interest requirements necessary to even allow such loan(s) to be authorized prior to each being made.” But if the parties agreed to a single revolving loan, as Robl Construction contends, with support from the email, we would not expect a separate consent before each advance. To the extent the parties intended a series of smaller loans, record testimony from Vera Robl, Steve Robl, and Homoly describing frequent discussions about such loans plausibly suggests multiple loan requests from Homoly. Even absent direct evidence of consent for each advance, some of Robl Construction’s alleged advances do not run afoul of § 6.03(D) because they do not exceed $10,000. Homoly does not account for these obvious inconsistencies and conceptual gaps.