Opinion ID: 1104955
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Argersinger and Scott

Text: In Argersinger a case that resulted from this Court's holding in State ex rel. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 236 So.2d 442 (Fla.1970)the United States Supreme Court explained that the expansive right-to-counsel language appearing in Gideon v. Wainwright [11] was not limited to felony cases. The High Court explained: [T]he problems associated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial.... [T]he prospect of imprisonment for however short a time will seldom be viewed by the accused as a trivial or `petty' matter and may well result in quite serious repercussions affecting his career and his reputation. ... [A]bsent a knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial. Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 36-37, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (emphasis supplied) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73, 90 S.Ct. 1886, 26 L.Ed.2d 437 (1970)). The Court also addressed the importance of appointed counsel for defendants when entering pleas: Beyond the problem of trials and appeals is that of the guilty plea, a problem which looms large in misdemeanor as well as in felony cases. Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly by the prosecution. Id. at 34, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (emphasis supplied). Some justices interpreted the prospect of imprisonment language appearing in Argersinger as indicating that the right to counsel attached whenever the charged offense was punishable by imprisonment. See, e.g., Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 382-89, 99 S.Ct. 1158, 59 L.Ed.2d 383 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (advocating that the Court adopt an authorized imprisonment standard similar to the one Florida employs today). In Scott, however, the High Court clarified that Argersinger limited indigent defendants' Sixth Amendment right to appointed counsel to cases in which the defendant is actual[ly] imprison[ed]. Scott, 440 U.S. at 373, 99 S.Ct. 1158. But, in clarifying Argersinger, Scott did not disturb the Argersinger Court's rationale for ensuring that indigent defendants do not face jail time as the result of uncounseled misdemeanorsuncounseled misdemeanors lack the requisite reliability to impose imprisonment. See Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 35-36, 92 S.Ct. 2006 (`The misdemeanor trial is characterized by insufficient and frequently irresponsible preparation on the part of the defense, the prosecution, and the court. Everything is rush, rush.' ... There is evidence of the prejudice which results to misdemeanor defendants from this `assembly-line justice.' (citation omitted)); see also Baldasar, 446 U.S. at 227, 100 S.Ct. 1585 (Marshall, J., concurring) (We should not lose sight of the underlying rationale of Argersinger, that unless an accused has `the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,'... his conviction is not sufficiently reliable to support the severe sanction of imprisonment. (emphasis supplied) (quoting Powell, 287 U.S. at 68-69, 53 S.Ct. 55)).