Opinion ID: 2996363
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gang Violence

Text: Defendants next argue for a new trial based on the trial court’s admission of evidence relating to violence perpetrated by defendants and other members of the Project Kings. Defendants acknowledge that “each time violence was introduced the district court expressed consternation,” and in some cases ruled that such evidence could not be admitted. (Joint Br. 14). They argue, however, that despite the court’s rulings the jury still heard significant amounts of evidence about gang violence and that the trial court abused its discretion in not granting them a new trial based on the jury’s exposure to this evidence. Even assuming that the jury was improperly allowed to hear evidence about violence, once again it is not at all apparent that the error “had a substantial influence over the jury.” Walton, 217 F.3d at 449. The evidence of violence that did come in was comparatively slight in light of the length of this trial, which lasted four weeks and Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 9 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690 produced a trial transcript nearly 3,300 pages long. Out of this large record, defendants point to only five instances where gang violence was mentioned. All of these references were brief (most of them consisting only of one sentence or less in the record) and were properly handled by the trial judge, either by sustaining a defense objection or by allowing the evidence in on a limited basis. Such meager references to violence could hardly have had a substantial influence on the jury’s decision. Further, we recently held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of violence in a similar drug conspiracy case. United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 969 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing in evidence that defendants had been involved in several shootings and an alleged kidnaping because it showed how members of the drug conspiracy conducted business); see also United States v. Diaz, 176 F.3d 52, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (affirming admission of evidence of violence committed on behalf of drug conspiracy because it explained the mutual trust between coconspirators); United States v. Molina, 75 F.3d 600, 602 (10th Cir. 1996) (affirming admission of evidence of defendant’s repossession of car at gunpoint because it showed his organizational role in the drug conspiracy); United States v. Rodrequez, 859 F.2d 1321, 1327 (8th Cir. 1988) (affirming admission of evidence that defendant beat a person with a pistol for failure to repay a loan because it showed how conspiracy operated). Thus, we see no way in which the admission of the violence evidence in question here could have produced a “result . . . inconsistent with substantial justice.” Walton, 217 F.3d at 449 (quotations omitted). We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant defendants a new trial. 10 Nos. 99-2299, 99-2505, 99-2514, 99-2570, 99-2598, 99-2763, 99-2983, 01-1690