Opinion ID: 1329964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: emotional distress and punitive damages award

Text: The last issue concerns whether the trial court erred in failing to grant the Appellants' motion for remittitur on the emotional distress and punitive damages awards. [44] The Appellants assert that the circuit court failed to recognized the dangers warned of by this Court in Harless v. First National Bank (Harless II), 169 W.Va. 673, 289 S.E.2d 692 (1982), and Dzinglski, [45] which were manifested in the jury's verdict. The Appellants maintain that [t]he ... [Appellee's] paucity of evidence regarding the alleged emotional distress she suffered makes it obvious that, on its face, the jury's award of $500,000 in damages for this claim was excessive and necessarily contained a punitive element. The Appellee, however, asserts that the award of punitive damages was consistent with this Court's decision in Harless II. Much confusion has arisen regarding whether an award of punitive damages can be made where damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress have already been awarded. Today, we attempt to resolve this confusion. We begin by reexamining the first case in which we held that both damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages could be awarded. In Harless II, we held in syllabus point five that: Because there is a certain openendedness in the limits of recovery for emotional distress in a retaliatory discharge claim, we decline to automatically allow a claim for punitive damages to be added to the damage picture. We do recognize that where the employer's conduct is wanton, willful or malicious, punitive damages may be appropriate. 169 W.Va. at 674, 289 S.E.2d at 694, Syl. Pt. 5. We further stated that `[t]he recovery for emotional distress as well as other compensatory damages such as lost wages should adequately compensate the plaintiff.' Id. at 692, 289 S.E.2d at 703. We also cautioned that a claim for emotional distress without any physical trauma may permit a jury to have a rather open-hand in the assessment of damages. Additionally, a jury may weigh the defendant's conduct in assessing the amount of damages and to this extent[,] emotional distress damages may assume the cloak of punitive damages. Id. at 690, 289 S.E.2d at 702. More recently, however, in syllabus point eight of Dzinglski, we held: In permitting recovery for emotional distress without proof of physical trauma when the distress arises out of the extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally caused by the defendant, damages awarded for the tort of outrageous conduct are essentially punitive damages. Therefore, in many cases emotional distress damages serve the policy of deterrence that also underlies punitive damages. 191 W.Va. at 281, 445 S.E.2d at 222, Syl Pt. 8. This holding in Dzinglski was predicated upon language from our previous decision in Mace v. Charleston Area Medical Center Foundation, Inc., 188 W.Va. 57, 422 S.E.2d 624 (1992), wherein we expressed our concern that in cases where damages for emotional distress are sought, `a claim for emotional distress without any physical trauma may permit a jury to have a rather open-hand in the assessment of damages.' 191 W.Va. at 288, 445 S.E.2d at 229 (quoting Harless II, 169 W.Va. at 690, 289 S.E.2d at 702); see also Wells v. Smith, 171 W.Va. 97, 104, 297 S.E.2d 872, 879 (1982) overruled on other grounds by Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 186 W.Va. 656, 413 S.E.2d 897 (1991) (recognizing that cause of action for tort of outrageous conduct permits recovery of damages for emotional distress without proof of physical trauma where distress arises out of extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly caused by defendant and that [d]amages awarded for the tort of outrageous conduct are essentially punitive damages). In Dzinglski, the lower court allowed the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury; however, the lower court struck the award of punitive damages based upon the defendant's post-trial motion objecting to the award. Specifically, we stated that [b]y allowing the jury to consider punitive damages, the trial court permitted the jury to stack punitive damages upon punitive damages, thereby effectively imposing two punitive damage verdicts against Weirton Steel for the same acts. The trial court's decision to dismiss Mr. Dzinglski's claim for punitive damages correctly avoided this double recovery. 191 W.Va. at 288, 445 S.E.2d at 229. The quandary results because, according to Harless II, there are cases where both damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages are proper; but, by the same token, under Dzinglski, there are also circumstances where punitive damages are to be considered double recovery where damages for intentional infliction for emotional distress with no physical trauma are also awarded by the jury. In attempting to clarify the law on this issue, we focus on a delineation of specific circumstances under which jury awards for both intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages will be considered a double recovery. [46] This issue arises in connection with claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress without proof of physical injury. See Harless II, 169 W.Va. at 690, 289 S.E.2d at 702 and Dzinglski, 191 W.Va. at 281, 445 S.E.2d at 222. In cases where the jury is presented with an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, without physical trauma or without concomitant medical or psychiatric proof of emotional or mental trauma, i.e. the plaintiff fails to exhibit either a serious physical or mental condition requiring medical treatment, psychiatric treatment, counseling or the like, any damages awarded by the jury for intentional infliction of emotional distress under these circumstances necessarily encompass punitive damages [47] and, therefore, an additional award for punitive damages would constitute an impermissible double recovery. Where, however, the jury is presented with substantial and concrete evidence of a plaintiff's serious physical, emotional or psychiatric injury arising out of the intentional infliction of emotional distress, i.e. treatment for physical problems, depression, anxiety, or other emotional or mental problems, then any compensatory or special damages awarded would be in the nature of compensation to the injured plaintiff(s) for actual injury, rather than serving the function of punishing the defendant(s) and deterring such future conduct, a punitive damage award in such cases would not constitute an impermissible double recovery. To the extent that this holding conflicts with our decision in Dzinglski, it is hereby modified. See 191 W.Va. at 281, 445 S.E.2d at 222, Syl. Pt. 8. Where a jury verdict encompasses damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, absent physical trauma, as well as for punitive damages, it is incumbent upon the circuit court to review such jury verdicts closely and to determine whether all or a portion of the damages awarded by the jury for intentional infliction of emotional distress are duplicative of punitive damages such that some or all of an additional award for punitive damages would constitute an impermissible double recovery. If the circuit court determines that an impermissible double recovery has been awarded, it shall be the court's responsibility to correct the verdict. This holding is in no way to be construed as requiring corroboration of a plaintiff's intentional infliction of emotional distress claim, nor are we requiring the introduction of expert testimony to prove the plaintiff's claim. See Slack, 188 W.Va. at 152, 423 S.E.2d at 555; Syl. Pt. 4, Tanner v. Rite Aid of West Virginia, 194 W.Va. 643, 461 S.E.2d 149 (1995). All that we intend from this decision is that in order to collect damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as punitive damages in the same action, the jury must be presented with some quantifiable measure of compensatory damages sustained from the intentional infliction of emotional distress so that it is clear that those damages are not duplicative punitive damages. The evidence presented by the Appellee in the instant case with regard to the mental and emotional damages she sustained was scant. The Appellee testified that [t]hey [the Appellants] destroyed my professional reputation and how she trusts people, that they probably tore me down as a person, I think, and that I just am not happy, I'm depressed most of the time. Additionally, the Appellee's mother, with whom the Appellee resides, testified that her daughter was a completely different person who didn't trust her family anymore because of what occurred. She also stated that her daughter had become irritable and withdrawn. In light of the paucity of evidence presented by the Appellee with regard to the mental and psychological damages sustained as a result of the Appellants' actions, this case presents a prime example of the type of case originally contemplated by this Court in Dzinglski, [48] where the compensatory damages awarded for intentional infliction of emotional distress are indeed punitive in nature. [49] It is clear that in its award of damage for the Appellee's emotional distress, the jury was, in effect, punishing the Appellants for their intentional and outrageous conduct. Accordingly, the trial court erred in not granting the Appellants' motion for remittitur setting aside the punitive damages awards entered against them on the grounds that punitive damages are duplicative of the jury's award of damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress. See Mace, 188 W.Va. at 67, 422 S.E.2d at 634 (upholding jury's damage award for intentional infliction of emotional distress and finding punitive damage award unwarranted). Based on the foregoing, the decision of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County is affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded so that the trial court can enter an order remitting the punitive damages previously awarded in this case. Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part; and remanded with directions.