Opinion ID: 794332
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Heading: Tampering with a Motor Vehicle as a Crime of Violence

Text: 5 We review de novo whether a prior conviction constitutes a crime of violence under the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Kendrick, 423 F.3d 803, 809 (8th Cir.2005). Under Missouri law, a person commits the crime of tampering with a motor vehicle if [h]e or she knowingly receives, possesses, sells, alters, defaces, destroys or unlawfully operates an automobile ... or other motor-propelled vehicle without the consent of the owner thereof. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 569.080.1(2). The statute thus criminalizes both tampering by operation and tampering by possession. 6 We have held that a subset of activity criminalized by this statute, tampering by operation, is a violent felony for purposes 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and, thus, a crime of violence for purposes of § 4B1.2. 3 United States v. Johnson, 417 F.3d 990, 997-99 (8th Cir.2005), reh'g denied, No. 04-1839 (8th Cir. May 3, 2006). In Johnson, we recognized that tampering by operation involves exactly the same risk-creating elements as theft or attempted theft of a vehicle, which we held to be crimes of violence in United States v. Sun Bear, 307 F.3d 747, 753 (8th Cir.2002). Like vehicle theft, tampering by operation creates the risk of a violent confrontation with the vehicle's owner or with law enforcement, places the criminal in control of a potentially deadly or dangerous weapon, . . . and makes it likely that `the thief may be pursued, or perceive a threat of pursuit, and drive recklessly, turning any pursuit into a high-speed chase with potential harm to innocent people, to the police, and to the thief himself.' Id. at 999 (quoting Sprouse, 394 F.3d at 580-81). Because the Missouri statute is overinclusive, we applied the categorical approach developed in Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 125 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205 (2005), and Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), to determine if the conduct underlying the conviction fell within the statutory category of tampering by operation. Because the charging document stated that Johnson's conduct involved tampering by operation, we held that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence. Johnson, 417 F.3d at 997-99. 7 After Johnson was decided, our court en banc revisited the definition of violent felony found in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (and by implication the definition of crime of violence in § 4B1.2) in United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir.2006) (en banc). In McCall, we held that a finding of serious potential risk within the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) requires that, although physical injury need not be an element of the offense, the inherent potential for harm must be present, if not in every violation, at least in a substantial portion of the circumstances made criminal by the statute. Id. at 972. We have since affirmed that the potential for harm described in Johnson continues to qualify tampering by operation under the Missouri statute as a crime of violence after McCall. United States v. Adams, 442 F.3d 645, 646-47 (8th Cir.2006); cf. United States v. Livingston, 442 F.3d 1082, 1087 (8th Cir. 2006) (following the reasoning of McCall and Johnson to hold that breaking or entering a vehicle does not cross the line into what constitutes a violent felony due to the difference in the dangers inherent in operating a vehicle as opposed to merely possessing a vehicle). 8 In this case, the Presentence Investigation Report (PSR) cited the charging document underlying the 1995 tampering conviction to show that Bockes knowingly and without consent of the owner possessed and unlawfully operated a motor vehicle. The charging document, of course, is acceptable documentary evidence as contemplated by Shepard. See 544 U.S. at 26, 125 S.Ct. 1254. Although Bockes objected to the characterization of the conviction in the PSR as a crime of violence, he did not object to the underlying facts recited from the charging document. Because Bockes did not object and this is a case where the PSR described conduct derived from documents Taylor or Shepard permit, the Government was not obliged to introduce at sentencing the documentary evidence Taylor or Shepard requires. McCall, 439 F.3d at 974. Therefore, the district court did not err in finding that Bockes's conviction for tampering by operation under the Missouri statute is a crime of violence for § 4B1.2 purposes.