Opinion ID: 1204963
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The applicable case law

Text: In People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18, the prosecution subjected the key complaining witness, a rape victim, to hypnosis on the eve of trial for the purpose of `filling the gaps' in her story. ( Id., at p. 23.) The trial court denied defendant's motion to exclude the witness's testimony, and at trial the victim testified to several matters that she had been unable to recall prior to being hypnotized. ( Id., at pp. 29-30.) In Shirley, this court reversed the defendant's conviction, finding, inter alia, that the use of hypnosis to restore the memory of a potential witness is not generally accepted as reliable by the relevant scientific community. ( Id., at pp. 66-67.) We held that the testimony of a witness who has undergone hypnosis for the purpose of restoring his memory of the events in issue is inadmissible as to all matters relating to those events, from the time of the hypnotic session forward. ( Ibid. ) Significantly, we noted in Shirley, supra, that our disapproval of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness was not absolute. We set forth several limitations on the rule excluding such testimony. (31 Cal.3d at pp. 67-68.) First, we observed, when the prosecution seeks to question such a witness on a topic wholly unrelated to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session, his [or her] testimony as to that topic would not be rendered inadmissible.... ( Id., at p. 67, original italics.) Second, we recognized a valid purpose in allowing hypnosis by the police for purely investigative purposes, subject to our caveat that any person so hypnotized will not be allowed to testify as a witness to the events that were the subject of the hypnotic session. ( Id., at pp. 67-68.) Third, we noted that the improper admission of testimony from a previously hypnotized witness is not reversible per se; its effect is measured under the prejudicial-error standard set forth in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]. ( People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 68.) We took no position in Shirley, supra, with respect to the admissibility of testimony from witnesses who had been hypnotized prior to the date our decision was filed, March 11, 1982. (31 Cal.3d at p. 67, fn. 53.) In People v. Guerra, supra , which also involved a hypnotized rape victim, we held the principles set forth in Shirley applied to all cases not yet final on March 11, 1982. (37 Cal.3d at p. 390.) Because defendant's case was on appeal and therefore not final on March 11, 1982, Shirley is applicable to the present appeal. (See also People v. Hayes (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1260, 1269 [265 Cal. Rptr. 132, 783 P.2d 719] [reaffirming Shirley's retroactivity].) Guerra, supra, foreshadowed our consideration of the question whether prehypnotic evidence, i.e., matters recalled and related by a witness prior to the hypnotic session, is admissible. (37 Cal.3d at pp. 427-429.) In a concurring opinion, Justice Kaus explained why he believed such evidence should be admissible, observing the probable reliability and potential importance of the evidence justifies its admission. ( Id., at p. 431 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.).) Because the issue was unnecessary to the resolution of the Guerra appeal, the majority in Guerra left the question unanswered. ( Id., at p. 429.) We revisited the issue of prehypnotic evidence in People v. Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1260. The defendant in Hayes was charged with murder, rape of the murder victim's spouse, and other offenses occurring in 1979. Marie G., the rape victim, furnished the responding police officer with a description of her assailant and his accomplice. Within hours, the police hypnotized her to assist a police artist in creating a composite sketch of the assailant, and to develop more information regarding the offenses. ( Id., at p. 1262.) Pursuant to decisions in Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d 18, and Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d 385, this court in Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d 1260, held that the admission at trial of Marie's post hypnotic testimony, notably her positive identification of defendant as her assailant, required reversal of the convictions. ( Id., at pp. 1262-1263, 1270; see also People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 149-151 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561]; People v. Miller (1990) 50 Cal.3d 954, 982-986 [269 Cal. Rptr. 492, 790 P.2d 1289].) With regard to her pre hypnotic testimony, we held it would be admissible at retrial as to events the trial court found were recalled and related prior to the hypnotic session. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1263, 1270-1273.) In reaching this conclusion, the Hayes opinion agreed with Justice Kaus's view that cases in which the prehypnotic evidence was obtained prior to this court's decision in Shirley, evoked `a special need to ensure that in our zeal to protect the citizenry from the hazards of hypnosis, we do not create a greater injustice by an after-the-fact disqualification of crucial witnesses who have relevant  frequently vital  information that is not tainted by the hypnosis.' ( People v. Hayes, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1271, quoting People v. Guerra, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 431 (conc. opn. of Kaus, J.).) Our holding in Hayes governs the admissibility of all prehypnotic evidence predating January 1, 1985. (49 Cal.3d at p. 1273.) (1a), (2a) With the foregoing principles in mind, we turn to defendant's contention that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the testimony of the previously hypnotized witnesses, Bridget Wilvert and Lorraine Werts.