Opinion ID: 1219316
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Allegations of Judicial Misconduct

Text: Defendant next contends the trial court engaged in a variety of misconduct necessitating reversal of the judgment. None of the claims has merit. First, defendant asserts that the trial court, in rendering the sentence of death, improperly considered the special circumstance set forth in section 190.2, subdivision (a)(5) (murder to prevent arrest) and the sentencing factor contained in section 190.3, factor (b) (prior use of force or violence). The court's references to these sections were made at the start of the penalty retrial in the course of responding to defendant's motion for a finding that the record was insufficient as a matter of law to justify a finding of aggravation. The court properly observed that it was not in a position to consider such a motion before the presentation of the evidence. It then noted that the evidence might potentially show a murder to prevent arrest, or the presence of prior criminal activity involving the use of violence or force. The court did not indicate, however, that either of these provisions was applicable to the facts of the case. Indeed, the court subsequently rejected as unsupported by the evidence any implication that the children were killed because of the possibility that they might talk to people and turn [defendant] into the police department. The court also specifically found no evidence of any prior criminal activity by defendant involving the use of force or violence. Hence, there was no error. (12) Defendant next contends the trial court prejudicially interfered with potential witnesses in mitigation. He refers to a statement by Mr. Welby (the court appointed investigator) when called as a witness at the penalty retrial. Welby testified that he had interviewed 30 to 35 people. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Welby to identify the people he had interviewed. Welby responded: The four people that were here today, and another, Conrad Hill, who is a local barber in town, I think he was excused by Judge Metheny. For whatever reason, I don't know. They were the only ones that were actually willing to talk at all about [defendant]. The record contains no other reference to the individual whom the trial court purportedly excused. It does not show whether he was in fact excused, the reasons for such action if it occurred, or even whether he had any mitigating evidence to offer. Neither defense counsel nor Mr. Landau made any objection or effort to pursue the matter. On the record, therefore, any claim of error is sheer speculation, and does not support a finding of prejudice. Defendant also claims the trial court improperly based the multiple-murder special-circumstance finding (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)) on the murders of the two children. At an early point in the penalty retrial, the court observed that the killings of the little girls were not premeditated. That there was not malice aforethought. Relying on this statement, defendant asserts that the finding of second degree murder as to the two children was invalid, and therefore the special circumstance finding must fall. The contention lacks merit. First, the trial court had specifically found that the killings of the two children constituted second degree murder during the guilt phase. This court affirmed that finding in defendant's first appeal. ( Deere I, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 368.) The issue was not before the trial court at the penalty phase retrial, and therefore is not cognizable on this appeal. Moreover, the court's comment was of no consequence; the context in which it was stated, the initial sentencing, was later mooted by the presentation of mitigating evidence and the resentencing. Furthermore, it is readily apparent, from the context of the remark itself, that the court simply misspoke itself. The court's express intention was to reaffirm that the murders were in the second degree because of the absence of premeditation and deliberation, not the absence of malice aforethought. As the court later explained when it redetermined the penalty after the presentation of mitigating evidence: I found their murder to be in the second degree because there was no evidence of any anticipating that [defendant] would find those children there when they walked in with daddy. There isn't any evidence to that effect. So that's where I stop on that particular point. Hence, there is no basis for a finding of error or misconduct in this regard. Defendant next contends that the court improperly relied on section 190.2, subdivision (a)(10) (witness killing) in its sentencing decision. The record shows, however, that the court made no reference to this special circumstance in its statement of decision. Indeed, as noted earlier, the trial court specifically found that the evidence did not support a finding that the children were killed to prevent them from reporting defendant to the police. (13) Finally, defendant asserts that the trial court's initial decision to impose a sentence of death rendered the subsequent resentencing (following the introduction of mitigating evidence) a mockery. Nothing in the record, in logic or in law supports defendant's claim that the court was disqualified from hearing the matter. Its initial sentencing decision followed and was based, in part, on defense counsel's refusal to introduce any evidence in mitigation. It does not follow that the court was disabled, as a result, from rendering an objective verdict after it heard a full presentation of the mitigating evidence. On the contrary, the record indicates that the trial court remained scrupulously fair and objective throughout the proceedings. It carefully weighed and considered both the aggravating and mitigating evidence after they were presented. Indeed, neither defense counsel nor Mr. Landau challenged the impartiality of the trial court at any point during the proceedings. We find, accordingly, no merit to the claim of error.