Opinion ID: 1626418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion Sovereign Immunity

Text: Section 14, Ala. Const. 1901, provides: [T]he State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity. The wall of immunity erected by § 14 is nearly impregnable. This immunity may not be waived. Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142 (Ala.2002) (citations omitted). This Court has long held that ``the circuit court is without jurisdiction to entertain a suit against the State because of Sec. 14 of the Constitution.'' Larkins v. Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So.2d 358, 364 (Ala.2001) (quoting Alabama State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797 So.2d 432, 435 (Ala.2001), quoting in turn Aland v. Graham, 287 Ala. 226, 229, 250 So.2d 677, 678 (1971)). `[A]n action contrary to the State's immunity is an action over which the courts of this State lack subject-matter jurisdiction.' Larkins, 806 So.2d at 363. Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Transp., 978 So.2d 17, 21 (Ala.2007). This Court has also noted on several occasions that there are exceptions to the State's sovereign immunity. One such exception is when a party `seeks a declaration under the Declaratory Judgments Act, § 6-6-220 et seq., Ala.Code 1975, construing a statute and applying it in a given situation.' 978 So.2d at 21 (quoting Latham v. Department of Corr., 927 So.2d 815, 821 (Ala.2005)). In Alabama Department of Transportation v. Harbert International, Inc., 990 So.2d 831, 841 (Ala. 2008), this Court clarified, however, that [t]he purpose of the so-called `exception' to § 14 allowing declaratory-judgment actions is to give direction to State officers. Consistent with the other `exceptions' to § 14 immunity, we hold that only State officers named in their official capacity  and not State agencies  may be defendants in such proceedings. It is undisputed that UAH is a State entity. Off Campus's original complaint named UAH as the sole defendant. Under Harbert and pursuant to § 14, UAH was not a proper defendant for Off Campus's declaratory-judgment action because it is absolutely immune from suit. Accordingly, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the complaint against UAH. As noted above, Off Campus later purported to amend its complaint, without objection from UAH, adding UAH president David Williams as a defendant. Under our recent precedents, however, this amendment of the original complaint did not cure the jurisdictional defect that existed at the time the original complaint was filed. See Alabama Dep't of Corr. v. Montgomery County Comm'n, 11 So.3d 189, 193 (Ala.2008) (holding that [b]ecause the original complaint named only a party that has absolute State immunity, it failed to trigger the subject-matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. Consequently, it was a nullity. The purported amendment of a nullity is also a nullity.). Consistent with Alabama Department of Corrections, we hold that Off Campus's purported amendment to its complaint was a nullity, as was the trial court's order purporting to grant UAH and Williams's motion for a summary judgment and to deny Off Campus's. Thus, Off Campus's appeal of the trial court's order is void and is due to be dismissed. See Gallagher Bassett Servs., Inc. v. Phillips, 991 So.2d 697, 701 (Ala.2008) (stating that a void judgment will not support an appeal).