Opinion ID: 2543191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Allow Voir Dire on Question of Religious Affiliation

Text: The jury questionnaire contained a question about whether the prospective juror attended religious services regularly and about whether religious affiliation or beliefs would cause any problem sitting in judgment in a criminal case. Defense counsel requested a question about the prospective juror's denominational preference, which the trial court refused, remarking that I would be the first to say ... it is helpful to know that, but also think there are a couple of cases out there that seem to indicate that's not appropriate inquiry. Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in not allowing inquiry into such preference, thereby violating his rights to due process and a jury trial. We disagree. The trial court has considerable discretion in determining the scope of voir dire. (Code Civ. Proc, § 223; see People v. Carter (2005) 36 Cal.4th 1215, 1250-1251, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 838, 117 P.3d 544.) In the present case, the trial court cannot be said to have exercised its discretion, given its belief, as quoted above, that it had no discretion to permit inquiry into denominational preference. Although exclusion of a prospective juror on grounds of religious affiliation is improper (see In re Freeman (2006) 38 Cal.4th 630, 643, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 850, 133 P.3d 1013), it is not necessarily true that inquiry into such affiliation is forbidden during voir dire. Membership in a particular religious denomination or sect indicated on a jury questionnaire may alert the trial court and counsel to a potential bias in favor of or against the death penalty that requires further exploration at voir dire. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 118, 109 Cal.Rptr.2d 31, 26 P.3d 357 [prospective juror identified himself with a particular denomination that believes that God is the only person with the right to take someone's life.].) It does not follow, however, that a trial court's refusal to allow a denominational preference or affiliation question was either erroneous or prejudicial. In the present case, voir dire included extensive inquiry by the trial court, the prosecution, and defense counsel into prospective jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty. For example, in the case of K.Y., who was eventually seated on the jury, the trial court asked her, as it did all prospective jurors, whether she had any conscientious opinions about the death penalty that would cause her to vote either automatically for or against the death penalty. When she stated that she was spiritually against the death penalty, the trial court, the prosecutor and defense counsel asked a number of follow-up questions to clarify her position. Given this extensive inquiry into prospective jurors' views on the death penalty, the trial court was not required to place a question on denominational preference on the jury questionnaire to be used as a preliminary indication of pro- or antideath-penalty bias. Defendant contends that the refusal to ask such a question was particularly damaging in the present case because, as explained more extensively below, one of the jurors, T.F., committed misconduct by reading biblical verses aloud during deliberations. Of course, the reasonableness of the trial court's decision must be considered at the time the decision was made and not with the benefit of hindsight. Moreover, defendant points to no concrete evidence indicating that such an inquiry would have led to T.F.'s exclusion from the jury. Nor does he contend that voir dire regarding T.F.'s death penalty views was inadequate. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in refusing a question on denominational preference.