Opinion ID: 1119859
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Contentions Related to the Robbery Charge

Text: Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the robbery conviction. (15) In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must draw all inferences in support of the verdict that can reasonably be deduced and must uphold the judgment if, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 86 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) (16a) Defendant agrees there is sufficient evidence that he stole victim Houser's two rings, but contends there is insufficient evidence that the intent to take them arose before rather than after death. (17) If the intent to steal arose only after force was used, the offense is theft, not robbery. ( People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 688 [268 Cal. Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887]; People v. Ramkeesoon (1985) 39 Cal.3d 346, 351 [216 Cal. Rptr. 455, 702 P.2d 613].) (16b) Defendant told the police that he found the rings in a trash can. He claims this statement was corroborated by the testimony of Houser's boyfriend, Brown, that she was not wearing the rings when she left home the night before the murder. Because of this, he argues, she must have had them in her purse or elsewhere on her person, and he did not find them until after he dragged the body to the spot where it was found. The purse was found near the body. The contention misstates the testimony. Brown said Houser was not wearing the rings when he last saw her, but that she routinely wore them when she went out. When he last saw her she was wearing blue jeans. When murdered, she was wearing a leopard skin design dress. The jury could reasonably infer that, following her routine, she put the rings on when she changed her clothes to go out. Although the evidence was not overwhelming, the jury could also reasonably find defendant intended to steal the rings before he killed her. As we recently noted, when one kills another and takes substantial property from the victim, it is ordinarily reasonable to presume the killing was for purposes of robbery. ( People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 688.) Substantial evidence supports the verdict.
(18a) Defendant also contends that the court prejudicially erred in the robbery instructions. We agree, and reverse the robbery conviction, the related firearm-use enhancement, and the robbery special circumstance. We reject the contention that the error also requires reversal of the first degree murder verdict as to victim Houser. Although we have found sufficient evidence to support a verdict that the intent to steal arose before death, the evidence was not overwhelming. There was evidence to support a contrary finding, including defendant's statements to the police. The court gave the standard instructions on robbery and the robbery special circumstance, but did not specifically instruct that if defendant formed the intent to steal only after the killing, he was guilty at most of the lesser included offense of theft. We recently rejected defendant's contention that the court had a sua sponte duty to give such an instruction. ( People v. Webster (1991) 54 Cal.3d 411, 443-444 [285 Cal. Rptr. 31, 814 P.2d 1273].) However, the court also did not instruct on any lesser included offenses of robbery. This was error. Since there was evidence that defendant was guilty only of theft rather than robbery, the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct on theft as a lesser included offense. ( People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 690; People v. Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 351.) Nothing in the record suggests the error was invited. (See People v. Cooper, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 827-831.) The error was prejudicial as to the robbery count and the robbery special circumstance. (19) An error in failing to instruct on lesser included offenses requires reversal unless it can be determined that the factual question posed by the omitted instruction was necessarily resolved adversely to the defendant under other, properly given instructions. ( People v. Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d at pp. 351-352.) We cannot so determine in this case. In People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pages 690-693, we found similar instructional error harmless, but for reasons which do not apply to this case. In Turner, the jury was given special instructions highlighting the issue of `after-formed intent.' ( Id. at p. 691, italics in original.) In contrast to Ramkeesoon, supra, 39 Cal.3d 346, the special instructions in this case did require the jury to confront and decide the issue of `after-formed intent.' The jurors were told emphatically not to convict defendant of robbery or first degree felony murder, or to find the robbery-murder special circumstance true, if they believed it reasonably possible that he killed for reasons unrelated to theft and stole only as an incidental afterthought. ( Id. at pp. 692-693.) (18b), (20) Here, the jury was instructed on and found true the robbery special circumstance, but the instructions did not focus on the after-formed intent question, or on whether the jury, having found defendant guilty of robbery, could find the robbery special circumstance not true. As we recently explained, although there is no sua sponte duty to give such instructions, their presence or absence is pertinent to deciding whether reversible prejudice had arisen from the trial court's erroneous failure to furnish any instructions or verdict forms on lesser included offenses supported by the evidence. ( People v. Webster, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 444, italics in original.) Other factors relied on in Turner in finding harmless error are absent here. In Turner, the jury found first degree felony murder based on robbery and returned a death verdict knowing that a murder in the commission of robbery was the sole basis of the defendant's eligibility for the death penalty. (50 Cal.3d at p. 693.) Here, the jury was instructed on rape-felony-murder as well as robbery, and there were additional special circumstances, including three murders. Unlike Turner, we cannot say with confidence that the jury necessarily considered the question of `after-formed intent' and rejected this `mere theft' theory on its merits. ( Id. at p. 691.) Hence, we reverse the robbery count, the related firearm-use enhancement, and the robbery special circumstance. (21a) Defendant argues that the first degree murder conviction as to Houser must also be reversed because the court instructed on robbery-felony-murder as well as rape-felony-murder and premeditated murder. We disagree. (22) The general rule is that when the prosecution presents its case to the jury on alternate theories, some of which are legally correct and others legally incorrect, and the reviewing court cannot determine from the record on which theory the ensuing general verdict of guilt rested, the conviction cannot stand. ( People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 24; People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 69.) (21b) Here, we can determine that the verdict rested on at least one correct theory. The jury found true the rape-murder special circumstance. Since the jury thus necessarily found the killing was committed in the course of a rape or attempted rape, the robbery instructions were of no consequence to the murder charge. ( People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 779 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419].)