Opinion ID: 181032
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Were the Prosecutor's Conduct and Remarks Improper?

Text: The first step in the prosecutorial-misconduct analysis is to determine whether the conduct and remarks at issue were improper. The first set of allegedly inappropriate remarks related to the honesty and moral character of the prosecution team. Responding to a number of comments made during closing arguments for the defendants, the government's attorney, Mr. Kadon, suggested that the defense had labeled the prosecution team abusive and horrible and evil people. Kadon then stated: First of all, I think the biggest thing you heard [during the defense's argument] was that this is a big conspiracy, that the conspirators are not seated behind me; the conspirators are seated over there where I am. I mean, I'm a conspirator, I guess; that Ms. Porter, Mr. Josephs, the federal police that have been investigating this case, somehow the Postal Inspection Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Food and Drug Administration, the Department of Justice, the United States Attorney's Office and the Criminal Investigation Division of the Internal Revenue Service all got together and conspired, that over the last several years all we thought about every single day when we came to work was how we were going to get these guys. Kadon then suggested that he hope[d] [the jury] d[id]n't believe that, and he went on to argue that it is kind of preposterous that we would all get together and lie to do this, that this case is somehow worth everythingour reputations, our lives, our familiesjust because convicting this guy or these people is so important to us. The defendants contend that these remarks constitute improper prosecutorial vouching, which typically occurs when a prosecutor supports the credibility of a witness by indicating a personal belief in the witness's credibility[,] thereby placing the prestige of the office of the United States Attorney behind that witness. Francis, 170 F.3d at 550 (emphasis added). Here, however, Kadon did not vouch for the credibility of a witness. Rather, he spoke to the likelihood that the government's attorneys had engaged in a monomaniacal witch-hunt. Furthermore, he did not overtly suggest that the government's attorneys were honest or morally superior. Instead, he suggested that the prosecution team had no motive to lie. That said, we do think Kadon went a bit overboard, and his remarks veered into dangerous territory. The next allegedly improper remarks pertained to Kadon's opinion of the defendants. At one point, Kadon posed and then answered the following series of rhetorical questions: Do I believe that these people were weak, that they sought self-aggrandizement, personal gain, and they sought it at the expense of other people, consumers? And, in fact, it's okay to lie to banks, because who cares about them anyway? Do I believe that they believe that? Yes. These remarks were also inappropriate. As the defendants correctly note, it is improper for a prosecuting attorney in a criminal case to state his personal opinion concerning ... the guilt of a defendant. United States v. Krebs, 788 F.2d 1166, 1176 (6th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Daniels, 528 F.2d 705, 709 (6th Cir.1976)); see also United States v. Bess, 593 F.2d 749, 755 (6th Cir.1979) (Implicit in an assertion of personal belief that a defendant is guilty, is an implied statement that the prosecutor, by virtue of his experience, knowledge and intellect, has concluded that the jury must convict. The devastating impact of such `testimony' should be apparent.). In this case, Kadon plainly voiced a personal belief regarding the guilt of the defendants. While he did not directly state that he believed the defendants were guilty, he stated that, in his mind, they were weak and sought wealth and notoriety at the expense, both literal and figurative, of the consuming public. Thus, Kadon's remarks were improper. Next, we must consider Kadon's statements about his time in the JAG Corps. In the middle of his summation, Kadon remarked: And, you know, when I was on active duty, I worked for a guy named Gary Harrell, whohe was kind of a famous guy. If you have ever seen the movie Black Hawk Down, he was in the movie Black Hawk Down. He's a Green Beret. And he would always tell me when we talked about thingsI was his JAG officer, but I don't fly Black Hawkshe would always say, you know, Karl, life is full of choices. You make your choices and accept the consequences, about the things that we were doing with respect to prosecuting the war on terror. The defendants argue that the prosecutor's remarks about his military service and his quasi-famous colleague were improper. With respect to these remarks, the government concedes impropriety, acknowledging that the remarks were entirely irrelevant to the closing argument. We agree. The remarks served no purpose other than to enhance Kadon's stature in the eyes of the jury, and they were therefore inappropriate. This conclusion is especially apparent when one considers the good guys/bad guys dichotomy that the remarks create when paired with Kadon's statements regarding the weakness and cupidity of the defendants. The fourth set of statements at issue touched on the relevance of the grand jury's decision to indict the defendants. Following his comments about his stint in the armed forces, Kadon noted that all 112 counts in the indictment were things that a grand jury determined were probable cause, these people committed these crimes, that's what that means. Sometime thereafter, Kadon returned to the mindset of the grand jury, stating that [t]he grand jury believed [the defendants] committed crimes. These remarks were plainly out of bounds. As this court stated in Bess, it is always improper for a prosecutor to suggest that a defendant is guilty merely because he is being prosecuted or has been indicted. 593 F.2d at 754; see United States v. Bowen, 500 F.2d 41, 42 (6th Cir. 1974) (holding that it was improper for a prosecutor to state that an eyewitness identification was good enough when it was presented to the grand jury). Here, there is no question that Kadon invoked the grand jury's probable-cause determination when arguing for a finding of guilt. His remarks were therefore improper. The fifth set of remarks at issue involved individuals who had filed complaints but had not testified at trial. [42] First, Kadon stated that, despite floods of complaints to Berkeley and the BBB, the government had made a strategic decision not to bring[] in a million people or hundreds of thousands of people to testify that Berkeley was shipping them unwanted supplements. Then, Kadon remarked that thousands of callers had unsuccessfully attempted to call Berkeley and that the government did not have to go and have everyone here say: I called; it was a problem. The defendants argue that these comments impermissibly convey[ed] the impression that evidence not presented to the jury, but known to the prosecutor, support[ed] the charges against the defendant[s] and ... thus jeopardize[d] the defendant[s'] right to be tried solely on the basis of the evidence presented to the jury. Hodge v. Hurley, 426 F.3d 368, 378 (6th Cir.2005). However, the defendants are incorrect. The remarks in question merely alluded to evidence already before the jury, namely, testimony that droves of customers had complained and that scores of others had tried in vain to do the same. In suggesting that those witnesses could have testified, the government was simply explaining their absence. As a result, these remarks were permissible. The penultimate allegation of prosecutorial impropriety stems from a remark about the coconspirators who testified at trial. [43] Specifically, Kadon stated: And if you believe that there was an agreement to put this on between the people here at the table, the ones who were charged and the people that testified, they pled guilty to doing that, that's one part of the conspiratorial element right there, those people. This declaration was not improper. While it is true that a jury may not ... consider the guilty plea of any [other] person as evidence of guilt on the part of the defendant [standing trial], United States v. Stavroff, 149 F.3d 478, 484 (6th Cir.1998), Kadon's remark did not directly implore the jurors to consider the guilty pleas of the defendants' coconspirators. Instead, Kadon simply added an identifier as to whom the charged defendants were shown to have conspired witha number of other defendants who had pleaded guilty. That portion of his statement did not lie at the core of the message he was intending to convey, which was that the jurors should convict if they found the existence of a conspiratorial agreement. Consequently, Kadon's statement should not be deemed inappropriate. [44] Lastly, the defendants argue that Kadon engaged in improper conduct, specifically by employing the government's rebuttal argument as an impermissible second attempt at a full-scale closing. The defendants contend that the government deliberately limited its initial closing argument to a 45-minute long [sic] broad-brush overview of its evidence, and withheld many of its most pointed arguments for rebuttal. Appellant's Br. at 75. However, the defendants' argument fails. True, a number of cases suggest that the government may not advance any new contentions on rebuttal. See, e.g., United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 26 (2d Cir.1979) (indicating that prejudice might have arisen if a rebuttal argument containing new assertions had not been followed by surrebuttal). However, the defendants point to nothing in Kadon's rebuttal argument that was raised for the first time after their summation. Furthermore, to the extent that Kadon made any new arguments in response to assertions made by the defense, those new arguments were permissible. See United States v. Sarmiento, 744 F.2d 755, 765 (11th Cir. 1984).