Opinion ID: 2636144
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant's Imprisonment

Text: In support of its argument, the State cites State v. Nicholson, 243 Kan. 747, 763 P.2d 616 (1988), a case which the Court of Appeals found distinguishable. In Nicholson, the defendant sought dismissal of criminal charges, claiming the statute of limitations barred the prosecution because there was an unreasonable delay in executing the warrant that had not been served for over 2 years. During that 2-year period, Nicholson was in the custody of the Kansas State Industrial Reformatory (KSIR). Within 3 months of issuing the warrant, the State notified KSIR of the existence of a warrant and requested that a detainer be placed on Nicholson. Shortly after KSIR received the detainer request, it notified Nicholson of the detainer. During Nicholson's term of imprisonment at KSIR, he made no attempt to assert his right to dispose of the detainer pursuant to the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, K.S.A. 22-4301 et seq. 243 Kan. at 748-49, 763 P.2d 616. The Nicholson court described the narrow issue on appeal as whether, under the facts of this case, the failure to execute the arrest warrant while appellee was incarcerated at the KSIR constitutes unreasonable delay. 243 Kan. at 748, 763 P.2d 616. Noting that the statutory definition for arrest is the taking of a person into custody, the Nicholson court held the State was not expected to execute the criminal arrest warrant by arresting the defendant when he was already in custody. 243 Kan. at 749-50, 763 P.2d 616; see K.S.A. 22-2202(4) (defining arrest); see also State v. Clark, 222 Kan. 65, 67, 563 P.2d 1028 (1977) (A detainer is a hold order or informal demand by one exercising public authority for the possession of a person already in lawful custody.). The Nicholson court further emphasized the generally recognized principle that a person already in custody cannot be arrested on an outstanding warrant from another county or jurisdiction. 243 Kan. at 750, 763 P.2d 616 (citing Hayes v. United States, 367 F.2d 216, 221 [10th Cir.1966]; State v. Bowman, 106 Kan. 430, 435-36, 188 P. 242 [1920]; 6A C.J.S., Arrest § 5). For these reasons, the court held there was no unreasonable delay in executing the warrant. 243 Kan. at 750-51, 763 P.2d 616. The court stated: In this case, the delay in complying with the statutory requirements for execution of an arrest warrant was not `unreasonable' because it was impractical, if not impossible, to arrest the defendant as long as he was already in custody. While it may have been possible for the Barton County Sheriff to secure the release of the appellee from the custody of the secretary of corrections for purposes of executing the warrant and taking appellee before the magistrate in Barton County, he was under no obligation to do so. 243 Kan. at 750, 763 P.2d 616. Here, the Court of Appeals panel noted several distinctions between Nicholson and this case. First, the panel stated that [d]etermining whether delay in executing an arrest warrant should toll the applicable statute of limitations requires a different analysis from determining whether there has been a due process deprivation in the case of prosecution delay in revoking probation. 38 Kan. App.2d at 470, 167 P.3d 382. Next, the panel observed that Nicholson had the right to dispose of his detainer through the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act but made no attempt to do so; whereas, according to the Court of Appeals, the Act has no application to this case. 38 Kan.App.2d at 470, 167 P.3d 382; see, e.g., State v. Julian, 244 Kan. 101, 105, 765 P.2d 1104 (1988) (one who has been released from custody by parole, probation, or otherwise may not rely upon speedy trial provisions of Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act); Robison v. State, 278 N.W.2d 463 (S.D.1979) (the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act [S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 23-24A] not applicable to detainers lodged for parole violations). Another distinguishing factor found by the Court of Appeals panel was that Nicholson involved the construction of statutes having no application or relevance to this case. Also, although it is impossible to arrest a person already in custody, the panel stated that it is quite possible to transport someone in custody to another county to answer charges there. 38 Kan.App.2d at 470, 167 P.3d 382. The final distinguishing factor found by the Court of Appeals was that the State has offered no explanation or excuse whatsoever for the noncompliance with the district court's order to transport Hall to McPherson County. 38 Kan.App.2d at 470, 167 P.3d 382. Rejecting Nicholson, the Court of Appeals examined cases from other jurisdictions. It noted federal authorities were split, but two out-of-state cases, which had been cited in Haines, supported the view that the State waived a violation if it did not serve a revocation warrant even if the probationer was in prison on other charges. The panel decided to embrace the rationale of those cases that formed the conceptual underpinning for the Haines decision. 38 Kan.App.2d at 470-71, 167 P.3d 382. The two decisions cited in Haines are People v. Diamond, 59 Mich.App. 581, 229 N.W.2d 857 (1975), and State v. Murray, 81 N.M. 445, 468 P.2d 416 (1970). In the earliest of these two cases, Murray, the court did not explain the rationale of its decision in depth, but did state that the waiver rule was based upon due process. 81 N.M. at 449, 468 P.2d 416. In the later of the cases, Diamond, the court looked to several federal cases discussing due process considerations in probation revocation proceedings. The Michigan court observed there were several questions those authorities did not answer. Regarding the question of whether due process required the prompt execution of the warrant, the court noted the holdings in Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, and Gagnon, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, but concluded: These cases however, do not address whether a warrant issued for a probation violation must be executed within a reasonable time before the defendant is imprisoned. 59 Mich.App.2d at 587 n. 4. Following other courts, the Michigan court determined it would require reasonable diligence in the execution of the warrant. Then, the court addressed the specific issue in this case, the impact of a probationer's incarceration on the waiver rule. In doing so, the court noted: We are cognizant of the split of authority as to whether authorities must execute a warrant while the defendant is incarcerated or whether they may wait until defendant is released, and then execute the warrant. Fitzgerald v. Sigler, 372 F.Supp. 889 (D.D.C.1974); Cook v. United States Attorney General, 488 F.2d 667 (C.A.5, 1974). 59 Mich.App.2d at 585 n. 2. The Michigan court held the warrant must be executed even though the defendant was in prison.