Opinion ID: 848724
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Essential Functions of a Detroit Police Officer

Text: The dispute in this case primarily concerns whether the EFL tasks are essential to plaintiff's former police officer position. [9] If so, plaintiff must show that he is able, with or without accommodation, to perform these functions; otherwise, he may not proceed on a claim under either the ADA or the PWDCRA. If plaintiff shows that he is able to perform the essential functions of the position, he may proceed to demonstrate that the department discriminated against him in one of the ways set forth in the acts.
Regarding what the essential functions of an employment position are, Congress specifically provided under the ADA that consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential functions of the job. 42 USC 12111(8). [10] The Equal Opportunity Employment Commission (EEOC) regulations provide that the term essential functions means the fundamental job duties of the employment position the individual with a disability holds or desires. The term `essential functions' does not include the marginal functions of the position. 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(1). A function may be essential if, inter alia: (i) [t]he reason the position exists is to perform that function; (ii) [there is a] limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed; and/or (iii)[t]he function [is] highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. [29 CFR 1630.2(n)(2)(i)-(iii).] The EEOC regulations further provide: Evidence of whether a particular function is essential includes, but is not limited to: (i) The employer's judgment as to which functions are essential; (ii) Written job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job; (iii) The amount of time spent on the job performing the function; (iv) The consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function; (v) The terms of a collective bargaining agreement; (vi) The work experience of past incumbents in the job; and/or (vii) The current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. [29 CFR 1630.2(n)(3).][ [11] ] Because the plaintiff bears the overall burden of demonstrating under the ADA that he is a qualified individual with a disability, the burden of proving that a challenged function is not essential lies with the plaintiff. See Laurin v. Providence Hosp., 150 F.3d 52 (C.A.1, 1998). Further, a contrary position would be at odds with § 12111(8), which requires that consideration shall be given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential.... We find compelling the court's analysis of this issue in Hamlin v. Charter Twp. of Flint, 942 F.Supp. 1129, 1138 (E.D.Mich., 1996), in which Judge Rosen stated succinctly: Pretty clearly, placing the burden on the employer to show a certain job function is essential would place courts and jurors in the position of second-guessing an employer's business judgment as to what the essential functions of a job are, without even requiring the plaintiff challenging the function to first come forward with evidence that the function is not essential.[ [12] ] In analyzing whether the EFL tasks are essential to plaintiff's former position, the EEOC regulations suggest that courts must undertake a factual analysis of the relevant factors. The dominant consideration in this factual analysis is that plaintiff was a police officer. A police officer is a member of a profession charged with carrying out what arguably constitute primary functions of government, protecting the citizenry from criminals and preserving domestic tranquility. A police officer performs functions that are indispensable to our free and ordered society. In Michigan, a police officer is responsible for the prevention and detection of crime and the enforcement of the general criminal laws of this state. MCL 28.602(k)(i). A police officer is a member of a highly regulated profession, subject to a broad range of municipal and state rules and policies, not to mention the constraints of the federal and state constitutions. Each of these regulations is designed to ensure that a police officer performs the functions of his position within the boundaries of public policy. When the police officer acts outside these boundaries, adverse consequences may be considerable, including the failure to detect and apprehend criminals, the erosion of the freedoms of citizens, transgressions of the Constitution, and a general undermining of the well-being of society. As a police officer, plaintiff was entrusted with the full measure of the responsibilities of his position. The statutory law in Michigan further defines the role of a police officer, and provides guidance regarding the essential functions that enable a police officer to perform his duties. MCL 92.2, for example, provides that a city council, such as that of the city of Detroit may make and establish rules for the regulation and government of the police, prescribing and defining the powers and duties of policemen and nightwatchmen, and shall prescribe and enforce such police regulations as will most effectually preserve the peace and good order of the city, preserve the inhabitants from personal violence, and protect public and private property from destruction by fire and from unlawful depredation.... Pursuant to these powers, the city of Detroit has given the department the authority to promulgate rules that will enable the department and its officers to effectively maintain the peace in the city. In response, the department promulgated the EFL. [13] Because the EFL was formulated in accordance with MCL 92.2 and with the purpose of satisfying the statutory obligations imposed on defendant and its police officers, the defendant's claim that the functions included in that list are essential to police officer positions is, in this Court's opinion, highly persuasive. [14] Further, it is the duty of all sheriffs, deputy sheriffs, constables, policemen and public officers, to arrest and prosecute all persons of whose violation of the [Michigan Penal Code] they may have knowledge or reasonable notice, and for each neglect of such duty, the officer so offending shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. MCL 750.52 (emphasis added). MCL 479.13 provides that every peace officer shall arrest, on sight or upon warrant, any person found violating or having violated, any provision of [the Motor Carrier Act].... See also MCL 765.26 and MCL 764.1b. Thus, the ability to effect arrests is not only a duty arising from the police officer's general obligation to maintain the peace, but it is a duty specifically imposed on police officers. An officer who neglects to attempt to make an arrest where necessary has committed a criminal offense. It is apparent that the EFL is a compilation of functions that the department expects an officer will be able to perform so that he may adequately preserve the peace and good order of the city, preserve the inhabitants from personal violence, and protect public and private property from destruction by fire and from unlawful depredation, MCL 92.2, and thereby satisfy his professional and legal duties. As noted above, EEOC regulation 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(2)(i) provides that an alleged job function may be essential if the reason the position exists is to perform the function.... Accordingly, there is no question that the reason cities such as Detroit hire police officers and fund their positions is so that the officers will perform those functions necessary to adequately maintain the peace and enforce the laws of the community. [15] MCL 92.2 grants municipalities the authority to prescribe and enforce police regulations that will most effectively serve these ends, and the department promulgated the EFL pursuant to this authority. Thus, the police officer positions exist specifically for the purpose of performing the very tasks identified in the EFL. Further, EEOC regulation 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(2)(ii) provides that a function may be essential if there are a limited number of employees available among whom the performance of that job function can be distributed.... In fact, there is a highly limited number of police officers available among whom the performance of the EFL tasks can be distributed. Because of budgetary constraints, there is a limited number of officers that the department employs to effectively police and patrol the entire city of Detroit, a city of nearly one million people that serves as the center of a metropolitan area of more than four million people and that functions as an international gateway into the United States. [16] Additionally, EEOC regulation 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(2)(iii) provides that a function may be essential if it is highly specialized so that the incumbent in the position is hired for his or her expertise or ability to perform the particular function. In fact, because of the nature of the obligations under which police officers labor, the police officer position involves highly specialized responsibilities such that new officers are hired specifically for their ability to perform the EFL tasks. [17] Only a small portion of the overall population would be physically and otherwise equipped to carry out such responsibilities. Thus, the EEOC regulations at 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(2) lead to the conclusion that the EFL tasks constitute essential functions of a police officer position. As further noted above, EEOC regulation 29 CFR 1630.2(n)(3) provides a nonexhaustive list of factors that may be considered in determining a position's essential functions. The first factor is [t]he employer's judgment.... Section 1630.2(n)(3)(i). This factor has already been discussed and clearly does not weigh in favor of plaintiff's argument. The second factor, [w]ritten job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job, § 1630.2(n)(3)(ii), is not relevant in this case because neither side has presented evidence relating to any job description prepared before plaintiff was hired. However, because the written job description currently used by the department includes the EFL tasks, and because, at least since 1975, the department has maintained a written job description that includes many tasks similar to those on the EFL, this factor too does not appear to weigh in plaintiff's favor. Another EEOC factor is [t]he consequences of not requiring the incumbent to perform the function.... Section 1630.2(n)(3)(iv). If defendant, rather than plaintiff, is correct in its assessment of the necessary functions of the police officer position, then the consequences of siding with the plaintiff would potentially exact a considerable cost on the ability of defendant to carry out its responsibilities. As earlier noted, the duties of the police officer position are essential to carrying out what is arguably the primary function of government, protecting the citizenry from criminals and preserving domestic tranquility. Thus, this factor likewise does not weigh in plaintiff's favor. Another EEOC factor refers to the terms of a collective bargaining agreement [CBA].... Section 1630.2(n)(3)(v). Plaintiff notes that there is nothing in the CBA that prevents the department from employing individuals with disabilities or making accommodations for these individuals. Although that may be the case, there has been no evidence presented to this Court that a decision by the department to refrain from doing so violates the CBA. Thus, this factor also does not weigh in favor of the plaintiff. This leaves three remaining factors from the EEOC nonexhaustive list to consider, all of which are relied on by plaintiff in support of his case. These are [t]he amount of time spent on the job performing the function, [t]he work experience of past incumbents in the job, and [t]he current work experience of incumbents in similar jobs. Section 1630.2(n)(3)(iii), (vi), (vii). These three factors implicate similar considerations. Plaintiff claims that in his CAU position, he was never called upon to perform the EFL tasks and that other employees in similar positions were likewise not required to perform these tasks. Thus, plaintiff argues that the EFL tasks are not essential functions of his and similar positions. Were this Court to agree with this analysis, we would effectively be eviscerating the CAU and other similar positions of their police officer significance. We decline to do this because the fact remains that these positions are advertised as police officer positions, hired as police officer positions, supervised as police officer positions, governed by laws pertaining to police officer positions, and subject to the terms and benefits of police officer positions. Further, such positions are supported by public funds appropriated for the employment of police officers and they must be filled by applicants who satisfy the standards for police officers. Moreover, to ensure satisfaction of its critical public obligations, the department has determined that all Detroit police officers, including those who need not regularly engage in patrol functions, must be constantly capable of performing those functions during times of riots or crises, or special circumstances, such as the recent electrical blackout or, more predictably, during large special event gatherings, such as the Detroit Thanksgiving Day parade, the Fourth of July fireworks, or major sporting events such as the upcoming Super Bowl. While it may be true that plaintiff, as well as other individual officers, have been rarely called on to perform EFL tasks, this does not obviate the fact that these tasks remain essential to the police officer position. [18] Accordingly, under the relevant EEOC standards, there is no genuine question of material fact presented in the record before us that the EFL tasks are essential to plaintiff's former police officer position. [19] Therefore, we reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, and reinstate the circuit court's grant of summary disposition on this issue in favor of defendant. Unless plaintiff can, with or without reasonable accommodation, perform the EFL tasks, his claim under the ADA must be dismissed. [20]
The Court of Appeals noted in its opinion that [t]he ADA's `qualified' language and the PWDCRA's `disability' language require essentially the same analysis... [and] the result under either statute is the same. [21] We agree that both statutes require essentially the same analysis, and in the predominant number of cases, the result under either statute may well be the same. However, because the acts are not identical, and because federal laws and regulations are not binding authority on a Michigan court interpreting a Michigan statute, we caution against simply assuming that the PWDCRA analysis will invariably parallel that of the ADA. [22] Unlike the ADA, the PWDCRA does not provide specific guidance regarding what the duties of a particular job are. Thus, the task falls upon the judiciary to determine how to resolve relevant disputes in the absence of a more specific legislative directive. In doing this, we take into account a number of considerations. First, we take cognizance of the obvious fact that there is statutory silence on this matter in the PWDCRA and that something more than silence is required, in our judgment, to warrant redefining the role of the employer in determining the scope of job positions within its purview. That is, there is no indication anywhere in the PWDCRA that the employer's customary responsibilities in this regard were to be altered by the act, and we decline to read any such indication from the act's silence. Therefore, in the absence of any contrary indication, we believe that the customary responsibilities of the employer in defining the scope of job positions are unaffected by the act and that the judgment of the employer in terms of such scope is entitled to substantial deference by the courts under the PWDCRA. Second, we take into consideration that the PWDCRA is an antidiscrimination statute. It is not a statute designed to regulate, or to set governmental standards for, particular employment positions. Nor is it a statute designed to enable judges to second-guess, or to improve upon, the business judgments of employers. Rather, the PWDCRA's purpose is to ensure that [t]he opportunity to obtain employment... without discrimination because of a disability is established as a protected civil right. MCL 37.1102(1). In order to avoid transforming the PWDCRA from an antidiscrimination statute into something that is unwarrantedly broader, we believe that the judgment of the employer regarding the duties of a given job position is entitled to substantial deference. Third, our analysis regarding what constitute the duties of a particular job is premised on an assumption that the employer is the single most interested person in the world in the success of his business. Therefore, as a general matter, it can reasonably be expected that the functions or duties that the employer specifies for a given position will be those reasonably well-designed to effect the success of such business. It is contrary to the economic interests of a reasonable employer to define a job position in a manner that is either inadequate or irrelevant. While the employer's own judgment about the duties of a job position will not always be dispositive, it is nonetheless always entitled to substantial deference. Finally, in Chmielewski we stated that in interpreting provisions of the HCRA [the former PWDCRA], analogous federal precedents are persuasive, although not necessarily binding....