Opinion ID: 1227867
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: slow pleas

Text: (8a) Our inquiry now is whether the submission in this case was a slow plea. If it was, the judgment must be reversed because defendant was not advised of his privilege against self-incrimination. ( People v. Levey, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 653.) If it was not, the Bunnell errors must be evaluated under the Watson test for prejudice. (9) In People v. Tran (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 680, 683, footnote 2 [199 Cal. Rptr. 539], the Court of Appeal ventured to define the term slow plea. It is an agreed-upon disposition of a criminal case via any one of a number of contrived procedures which does not require the defendant to admit guilt but results in a finding of guilt on an anticipated charge and, usually, for a promised punishment. Perhaps the clearest example of a slow plea is a bargained-for submission on the transcript of a preliminary hearing in which the only evidence is the victim's credible testimony, and the defendant does not testify and counsel presents no evidence or argument on defendant's behalf. Such a submission is tantamount to a plea of guilty because the guilt of the defendant [is] apparent on the basis of the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and ... conviction [is] a foregone conclusion if no defense [is] offered. ( Bunnell v. Superior Court, supra, 13 Cal.3d at p. 602; accord People v. Levey, supra, 8 Cal.3d at p. 651.) Submissions that are not considered slow pleas include those in which (1) the preliminary hearing involves substantial cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses and the presentation of defense evidence or (2) the facts revealed at the preliminary examination are essentially undisputed but counsel makes an argument to the court as to the legal significance to be accorded them. ( In re Mosley, supra, 1 Cal.3d at pp. 924-925, fn. 9.) The wide variety of submissions that fall between these extremes, however, present troublesome classification problems. When the defendant reserves the right to testify or offer evidence and the record shows no sign of negotiations between defendant and prosecution, the submission may or may not be a slow plea. Some defendants submit their cases on the transcript simply to achieve the effect of a guilty plea without actually having to admit guilt in open court and on the record. Others submit not to contest guilt but to avoid expensive or burdensome trials or to impress upon the trial judge the mitigating factors for sentencing. Some defendants appear to concede guilt as to one or more of the offenses but contest it as to others. (8b) An appellate court, in determining whether a submission is a slow plea, must assess the circumstances of the entire proceeding. It is not enough for a reviewing court to simply count the number of witnesses who testified at the hearing following the submission. A submission that prospectively appeared to be a slow plea may turn out to be part of a full-blown trial if counsel contested the sufficiency of evidence for those counts or presented another potentially meritorious legal argument against conviction Conversely, a submission that did not appear to be a slow plea because the defendant reserved the right to testify and call witnesses or to argue the sufficiency of the evidence (see People v. Guerra (1971) 21 Cal. App.3d 534, 538 [98 Cal. Rptr. 627]) may turn out to be a slow plea if the defense presented no evidence or argument contesting guilt. If it appears on the whole that the defendant advanced a substantial defense, the submission cannot be considered to be tantamount to a plea of guilty. Sometimes, a defendant's best defense is weak. He may make a tactical decision to concede guilt as to one or more of several counts as part of an overall defense strategy. A submission under these circumstances is not a slow plea, and the trial court is not constitutionally compelled by Boykin and Tahl to administer the guilty-plea safeguards to assure that the tactical decision is voluntary and intelligent. The advisements and waivers in such a case are required only as a matter of the judicial policies that underlie our decision in Bunnell. In this case, defendant waived his right to jury trial on the murder, burglary, and robbery charges, as well as the arming allegations. [5] The parties submitted the case to the court on the preliminary hearing transcript, with both sides reserving the right to present evidence. Defendant was advised that the submission required him to waive his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses who had testified at the preliminary hearing, and that on the basis of the preliminary hearing transcript, the court could find him guilty of all charges. Defendant said he understood and waived his right to confrontation. Counsel also stipulated that the court would hear evidence on defendant's motion to suppress under Penal Code section 1538.5 and his motion to suppress his statements under Evidence Code section 402 as part of the court trial. The preliminary hearing evidence on which the case was submitted was that defendant had proposed the burglary of the residence of one Mr. Houts, defendant's former employer, to his brother Curtis. While defendant waited in the car, Curtis found Mr. Houts, struck him with a sawed-off shotgun, forced him to sign two blank checks, tied him up, and shot him in the back. When Curtis came out and asked defendant what to do next, defendant threw up his hands and walked away, saying, Hey you did it. You're going to have to deal with it. Curtis killed Mr. Houts with another shot, and both men cleaned the home and buried the body, then drove off in the victim's car. The magistrate suppressed defendant's first confession to these crimes, but admitted a second one. There was also evidence that Curtis had robbed two convenience stores, using a sawed-off shotgun. Defendant's second confession included an admission that he had been the getaway driver in these robberies. Defendant presented no evidence at the preliminary hearing, though defense counsel did actively cross-examine the witnesses. The trial court also heard four prosecution witnesses and five defense witnesses, including defendant. Most of the testimony related to the suppression motions. The court denied the motions and admitted both confessions into evidence. Additional evidence presented by the prosecution included testimony by Percy Owens, defendant's employer some time before he worked for Mr. Houts. Owens had fired defendant because he suspected defendant was involved in the theft of some of his property. Subsequently, defendant confronted Owens with a shotgun, struck him, stole a pistol, demanded that Owens sign some checks, and drove off in Owens's car. Defendant's family testified that Curtis was violent and defendant was not and that Curtis was the leader and defendant the follower. Defendant testified consistently with his confession that he planned to burglarize the Houts residence only if no one was home. Curtis was selected to approach the house because he was unknown to Houts. If Houts was not home, Curtis was to signal defendant to come to the house. If Houts was home, Curtis was only to ask if there was any work for him on the ranch. Defendant testified that he neither planned nor intended for Curtis to rob Houts or force him to sign checks. Although he was aware Curtis had a shotgun with him, defendant did not discuss this with Curtis. Defendant argues that the partial submission on the preliminary hearing transcript was tantamount to a guilty plea, since he put on no defense to the convenience store robberies and admitted involvement in the burglary and did not put on a full defense to the crimes against Mr. Houts. Rather, defendant attempted to prove that he did not have the independent malice that he thought was required for an accomplice's liability in a felony murder. Because this court rejected defendant's theory of independent malice in an opinion that was filed five months after the trial ( People v. Dillon (1983) 34 Cal.3d 441, 465-476), defendant contends that he in effect presented no defense to the crimes against Mr. Houts. Considering the submission in the context of the evidence, the suppression motions, and defense counsel's argument, we find that the submission was not tantamount to a plea of guilty. Defendant put on the best defense he could. Although he presented no evidence contesting his involvement in the convenience store robberies, defense counsel established by cross-examination of the victims that they could not link defendant to the crimes. He had convinced the court at the preliminary hearing that his first confession to driving the getaway car should be suppressed. If the trial court had agreed and, in addition, found the second confession to be tainted by the first, the evidence would have been insufficient to convict defendant of these robberies. Defense counsel also contested defendant's guilt for the crimes related to Mr. Houts. Although defendant did not dispute the essential facts relating to these crimes, and indeed admitted them on the stand, counsel argued that Curtis unforeseeably acted on his own when he proceeded with the burglary and other crimes after finding Mr. Houts at home, that defendant was not an aider and abettor in the robbery of Mr. Houts, and that defendant withdrew from any criminal conspiracy before Curtis fired the shot that killed Mr. Houts. Defendant also put on witnesses whose testimony supported an inference that he did not share his brother's criminal intent. We conclude that the circumstances of the submission clearly establish that it was not a slow plea of guilty. (10) Although the trial court erred in failing to advise defendant that the submission required him to waive his right against self-incrimination, and in failing to advise fully on the range of punishment, the record does not show it was reasonably probable the outcome would have been more favorable to defendant if he had been properly advised. There was overwhelming evidence, including defendant's own testimony, that defendant participated in the burglary and that Curtis used a weapon in the course of that offense. This evidence clearly established defendant's culpability in the robbery and murder. Nor is it reasonably probable that full advice on the range of punishment would have prompted defendant to have proceeded any differently. He thought he could refute his criminal complicity in the murder and robbery and sought to avoid conviction in the other robberies by excluding his confession. He knew that he risked a term of 25 years to life; it is unlikely that he would have changed his strategy had he known the full risk was 32 years to life. The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.