Opinion ID: 2808901
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Destruction hearing and double jeopardy

Text: W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 (1981) provides: Except as provided in section twenty-one [§ 19-20-21] of this article,7 no person shall own, keep or harbor any dog known by him to be vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons, whether or not such dog wears a tag or muzzle. Upon satisfactory proof before a circuit court or magistrate that such dog is vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons or other dogs or animals, the judge may authorize the humane officer to cause such dog to be killed. 7 Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 19-20-21 (1981), any person may keep “a dog which is generally considered to be vicious, for the purpose of protection,” but the person must acquire a special license to do so from the county assessor and secure the animal as directed by the statute. 14 (Footnote added). Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 19-20-19, “A person who violates any of the provisions of this article for which no specific penalty is prescribed is guilty of a misdemeanor . . . .” The elements of the crime described in W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 are that a person (1) own, keep, or harbor (2) any dog (3) known to the person (4) to be vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting other people. As with any crime, if one of the elements of the crime cannot be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, then the person charged with the crime must be acquitted. In the case at bar, the Blatts were found not guilty of violating W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 because the circuit court determined that they did not know their dog was vicious. In other words, the circuit court found that the third element of the crime— knowledge—was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. Following the acquittal, the circuit court conducted a destruction hearing to determine whether the dog should be destroyed. The Blatts argue that the circuit court erred by holding a destruction hearing and proceeding to order the destruction of the dog despite having acquitted the Blatts of violating W. Va. Code § 19-20-20. The Blatts also assert that the destruction hearing violated double jeopardy principles. 15 With regard to whether the circuit court erred by holding a destruction hearing, the Blatts rely on language in Durham v. Jenkins, 229 W. Va. 669, 673, 735 S.E.2d 266, 270 (2012), which states, “For a magistrate or circuit court to obtain authority to order a dog killed, the magistrate or judge must first find, upon conducting a criminal proceeding, that a crime described in the first sentence of § 19-20-20 has been committed.” We determine that this language in Durham is overly restrictive in light of the statute and our actual broader holding in Durham interpreting that statute, which states that “[t]he authority to order a dog killed pursuant to W. Va.Code § 19–20–20 (1981), stems solely from a criminal proceeding.” Syl. pt. 4, in part, Durham, 229 W. Va. 669, 735 S.E.2d 266 (emphasis added). Specifically, a conviction in a criminal proceeding is not a prerequisite to the separate consideration of whether a dog should be destroyed. Thus, to clarify the application of this statute and our holding in Durham, we now hold that for a magistrate or circuit court to determine that a person has committed the crime described in W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 (1981), it must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person (1) owned, kept, or harbored (2) any dog (3) known to the person (4) to be vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting other people. However, the magistrate or circuit court need not determine that a crime has been committed pursuant to W. Va. Code § 19-20-20 (1981) to proceed, at its discretion, to order the destruction of a dog pursuant to that statute. To order the destruction of a dog pursuant to this statute, the magistrate or circuit court must determine that there is satisfactory proof that the dog is dangerous, vicious, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons or other dogs or 16 animals. Accordingly, we determine that the circuit court did not err by engaging in a proceeding collateral to the criminal matter to determine whether Tinkerbell should be destroyed pursuant to W. Va. Code § 19-20-20. Similarly, the destruction hearing did not violate double jeopardy principles. The double jeopardy clause of the West Virginia constitution “provides immunity from further prosecution where a court having jurisdiction has acquitted the accused.” Syl. pt. 1, in part, Conner v. Griffith, 160 W. Va. 680, 238 S.E.2d 529 (1997); see also W. Va. Const. art. III, § 5 (“No person shall . . . be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offence.”); U.S. Const. amend. V (“No person shall . . . be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . .”). At the time of the destruction hearing, the prosecution of the Blatts had ended, and the destruction hearing did not place them in jeopardy of life or liberty for the offense of knowingly owning, keeping, or harboring a dog that is vicious, dangerous, or in the habit of biting or attacking other persons. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court did not err by conducting a destruction hearing collateral to the criminal proceeding.