Opinion ID: 3043848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ineffective-Counsel Claim

Text: On appeal, Capshaw argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to the admission of cell phone records at trial. To prevail on an 7 Case: 14-12873 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 8 of 13 ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, Capshaw must show that: (1) counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). Capshaw bears the burden of proof on both prongs of an ineffectivecounsel claim. Johnson v. Alabama, 256 F.3d 1156, 1176 (11th Cir. 2001). To prove deficient performance, Capshaw must show that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, as measured by prevailing professional norms. Chandler v. United States, 218 F.3d 1305, 1313 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). We need not “address both components of the inquiry if [Capshaw] makes an insufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S. Ct. at 2069. Capshaw cannot establish that his attorney’s performance was deficient for failing to object to the admission of cell phone records. His trial counsel would not have prevailed on such an objection under the governing law, and thus counsel’s performance was not deficient for failing to object. It is undisputed that the government obtained a court order, under 18 U.S.C. § 2703, requiring Sprint Nextel to produce the cell phone records of Capshaw and three other people to show calls between them during the period of the murder-forhire plot. Obtaining those telephone records through a § 2703 court order did not violate the Fourth Amendment. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 8 Case: 14-12873 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 9 of 13 S. Ct. 2577, 2582 (1979) (holding that telephone company records of calls made from a defendant’s home did not require the government to seek a search warrant). Capshaw had no reasonable expectation of privacy in these Sprint Nextel records. Regardless of any subjective expectation (about which we have no evidence), it was unreasonable for Capshaw to assume that information about his cell phone calls could not be made available to the government by the third-party telephone company. See id. at 744, 99 S. Ct. at 2582. (“When he used his phone, petitioner voluntarily conveyed numerical information to the telephone company and ‘exposed’ that information to its equipment in the ordinary course of business.”); see also Rehberg v. Paulk, 611 F.3d 828, 843 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that defendant lacked reasonable expectation of privacy in phone and fax numbers dialed). At Capshaw’s trial, the cell phone records were introduced to show Capshaw’s use of a “facility of interstate commerce” in the course of his murderfor-hire plot. The records introduced also contained the assigned numbers of the cell phone towers used to route Capshaw’s calls. Capshaw, however, makes no specific argument about historical location information drawn from these tower numbers. This is not surprising, because the government did not seek to admit Capshaw’s cell phone records to prove his location, but only to prove he used a cell phone to arrange the murder-for-hire of his wife. 9 Case: 14-12873 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 10 of 13 At the time of Capshaw’s trial, no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit law required the government to seek a search warrant for the cell phone records procured in this case. Rather, the government was required, by statute, to procure a court order under 18 U.S.C. § 2703. It did so. Though not available to Capshaw’s counsel at the time, this Court’s binding precedent confirms that the claim Capshaw says his counsel should have raised had no merit back in 2011 and has no merit now. See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 513 (11th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“Following controlling Supreme Court precedent[,] . . . we hold that the government’s obtaining a § 2703(d) court order for production of [a cellular telephone company’s] business records . . . did not constitute a search and did not violate the [defendant’s] Fourth Amendment rights.”). Thus, counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise this issue. See Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 917 (11th Cir. 2001) (counsel is not ineffective for failing to argue a meritless claim); United States v. Winfield, 960 F.2d 970, 974 (11th Cir. 1992) (same). We recognize that, at trial, the government introduced not only Capshaw’s cell phone records, but also the cell phone records of the other individuals to whom Capshaw made calls in furtherance of his murder plot. The Supreme Court has consistently held that Fourth Amendment rights may not be vicariously asserted. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174, 89 S. Ct. 961, 966-67 (1969). 10 Case: 14-12873 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 11 of 13 Capshaw thus lacked the necessary standing to challenge the introduction of the cell phone records of the other individuals. Assuming Capshaw successfully challenged the introduction of his own cell phone records, the same evidence (demonstrating his use of a telephone in his murder-for-hire plot) was introduced through other means. Counsel’s performance was not deficient for this reason also.