Opinion ID: 5120203
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ongoing Violation

Text: The more challenging aspect of Ex parte Young analysis is the proviso that the suit must seek relief against an “ongoing” violation of federal law. An ongoing violation of federal 18 No. 20-3325 law is one that is “continuing.” Green, 474 U.S. at 68. Because Ex parte Young is limited to federal-court orders “granting prospective injunctive relief to prevent a continuing violation of federal law,” the doctrine does not apply when “federal law has been violated [only] at one time or over a period of time in the past.” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 277–78 (1986). This part of the inquiry may seem simple at first, but “the difference between the type of relief barred by the Eleventh Amendment and that permitted under Ex parte Young will not in many instances be that between day and night.” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 667. This case lies in that twilight zone. It presents a difficult question of first impression: Is there an ongoing violation of federal law when the alleged violation is a procedural error committed by a state actor at a discrete point in time? The commissioners argue that the due-process violation (if there was one) was complete when the permit was approved and thus cannot be considered “ongoing” for purposes of Ex parte Young. Driftless insists that the violation is ongoing so long as the permit remains in force and effect and the Commission continues to exercise jurisdiction over the transmission companies in the present by virtue of its power to enforce, amend, or rescind the permit. Three cases are instructive here, although none is precisely on point. The first is Verizon v. Public Service Commission of Maryland. There, the telecommunications carrier Verizon negotiated an interconnection agreement with its competitor WorldCom as required by federal law. The state agency with jurisdiction over the matter approved the agreement, but a few months later, WorldCom filed a complaint with the agency accusing Verizon of violating the agreement. The No. 20-3325 19 agency ruled in favor of WorldCom on grounds pertaining to state contract law. Verizon then filed a federal lawsuit against the agency’s commissioners in their official capacities alleging that the agency’s order was preempted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and a recent FCC ruling. Verizon, 535 U.S. at 639–40. The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar Verizon’s suit. Id. at 635. Verizon’s prayer for injunctive relief asked the federal court to enjoin the state officials “from enforcing the order in contravention of controlling federal law.” Id. at 645. That was sufficient to bring the case within Ex parte Young. Id. The second relevant precedent is MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 222 F.3d 323 (7th Cir. 2000), another telecommunications case, though one from this court. There, the Illinois and Wisconsin utility commissions arbitrated several interconnection agreements between telecommunications companies. One of them sued the commissioners in their official capacities claiming that the approved agreements violated the Telecommunications Act. The commissioners raised sovereign immunity, arguing that “if any violations occurred, they occurred in the past,” so Ex parte Young did not apply. Id. at 345. We disagreed, observing that the “challenged determinations are still in place, and the [plaintiffs] seek to have the commissioners conform their future actions, including their continuing enforcement of the challenged determinations, with federal law.” Id. The final case is Town of Barnstable v. O’Connor, 786 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2015), which involved a challenge to a state agency’s energy policy. A Massachusetts utility commission approved a merger between two electricity companies. The Town of Barnstable, joined by an environmental group and 20 No. 20-3325 several other plaintiffs, filed a federal suit alleging that the merger was incompatible with the Federal Power Act and also violated the dormant Commerce Clause. Citing Verizon, the First Circuit rejected the commissioners’ claim of sovereign immunity. The court held in relevant part that “the continued enforceability of the [merger agreement] represents an ongoing violation of federal law because [it] binds the parties to abide by the [agreement’s] allegedly unconstitutional terms.” Id. at 139. At first glance these cases seem closely analogous to this one. But there is a distinction. Each of these cases raised a substantive violation of federal law: the challenged stateagency determinations authorized the regulated parties to conduct their ongoing activities in violation of an FCC order, the Telecommunication Act, and the Federal Power Act and Commerce Clause, respectively. In contrast, this case raises a discrete procedural violation: the alleged due-process error occurred when commissioners with disqualifying conflicts of interest approved the power-line permit. In other words, Driftless does not assert that the permit substantively violates federal law (at least not in this suit); it challenges only the process by which the permit was issued. In the end, we’re not convinced that the difference between substance and procedure is decisive. As the First Circuit observed in Town of Barnstable, the “continued enforceability” of an unlawful state-agency decision can amount to an ongoing violation of federal law. Nothing in Ex parte Young or its successors suggests that the distinction between substantive and procedural violations makes a difference, so we hesitate to draw that line here. The relevant inquiry is whether the suit seeks prospective relief against an No. 20-3325 21 ongoing violation of federal law. A permit issued in violation of due process remains unlawful as long as it is in force and effect. The commissioners point to Sonnleitner v. York, 304 F.3d 704 (7th Cir. 2002), which has surface similarity to this case— it too involved a due-process claim—but on close review is distinguishable. Sonnleitner involved a suit by a state employee who was demoted without a predisciplinary hearing. He later prevailed at a postdeprivation hearing but was not reinstated, in part due to his own procedural missteps. He then sued his supervisors in federal court seeking an injunction reinstating him to his position. He alleged that the denial of a predisciplinary hearing violated his right to due process. We held that the claim was barred by sovereign immunity. Id. at 718. Because the plaintiff was “eventually given an opportunity to tell his side of the story” at the postdeprivation hearing, we concluded that his due-process claim concerned “at most, a past rather than an ongoing violation of federal law.” Id. Our holding in Sonnleitner turned on the fact that the plaintiff had received a postdeprivation hearing that complied with due-process requirements. After the postdeprivation hearing, the alleged error in the predeprivation process could not be characterized as “ongoing.” The due-process violation at issue here is different. Driftless contends that the Commission’s approval of the permit was tainted by adjudicator bias in violation of the Due Process Clause. Finally, the commissioners argue that if this case is allowed to proceed under Ex parte Young, then all manner of final state-agency rulings will suddenly become reviewable in federal court based on allegations of adjudicator bias. This 22 No. 20-3325 would complicate state judicial review of agency rulings and erode state sovereign immunity. It could also open the floodgates to federal suits by parties complaining about biased state administrative adjudicators. We are sensitive to these concerns. Federal courts are not oversight boards designed to police the final actions of state agencies. Cf. River Park, Inc. v. City of Highland Park, 23 F.3d 164, 165 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Federal courts are not boards of zoning appeals.”). Challenges to state administrative actions usually belong in state courts, which are interested in and fully capable of ensuring that state agencies comply with federal due-process requirements. See Coeur d’Alene, 521 U.S. at 276 (“Where, as here, the parties invoke federal principles to challenge state administrative action, the courts of the State have a strong interest in integrating those sources of law within their own system for the proper judicial control of state officials.”). At bottom, these concerns rest on federalism principles. State sovereign immunity is, of course, rooted in the anchoring structure of our system of federalism. So too, however, is abstention doctrine. The commissioners’ arguments about federalism and comity are valid, but we think they are better addressed by abstention doctrine. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the due-process claim against them satisfies the requirements of Ex parte Young and now move to the abstention question.