Opinion ID: 3062855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of Fifth and Sixth Amendment Rights

Text: Brown argues that the district court violated the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution by sentencing him above his statutory maximum sentence for the indicted § 922(g) offense based on facts about his prior convictions that were not charged in the indictment or found by a jury. He concedes that his arguments are subject to plain error review, and that they are “arguably contrary” to our precedent but he seeks preservation of the issue for further review. Brown failed to object to the court’s consideration of his prior convictions when sentencing him. When a party fails to raise an issue before the lower court, we review the issue for plain error. United States v. Jones, 289 F.3d 1260, 1265 (11th Cir. 2002). Plain error occurs if (1) there was error, (2) that was plain, (3) that affected the defendant’s substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affected the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. “[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial 5 guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000). Brown did not object to the PSI’s characterization of three of his predicate convictions as a “violent felony,” and thus, he admits to that characterization. See United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (failure to raise objections to matters contained in the PSI constitutes an admission of these facts). Moreover, we have held that “the government need not allege in its indictment and need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant had prior convictions for a district court to use those convictions for purposes of enhancing a sentence.” Id. at 1329. Thus, because these statements are admitted as true, contrary to Brown’s assertion, a jury did not need to find these facts. See id. at 1329-30. Moreover, as Brown acknowledges, the Supreme Court’s binding precedent forecloses this argument. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998) (holding that, when recidivism is considered as a sentencing factor, as in the ACCA, it is not an offense element). Thus, there was no error, plain or otherwise. 6