Opinion ID: 1404492
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Right Violated Clearly Established?

Text: The second question in considering the denial of qualified immunity is whether the right violated was clearly established. Although we conclude there is insufficient evidence that Scott's conduct violated the constitution, because we conclude there is sufficient evidence regarding Fortner's conduct, this inquiry is necessary. See Scott v. Harris, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 1774, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007) (If, and only if, the court finds a violation of a constitutional right, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established . . . in the specific context of the case. (Quotation omitted, omission in original)). A right is clearly established if it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151. In determining whether a right was clearly established, we must define the right allegedly violated at the appropriate level of specificity before [we] can determine whether it was clearly established. Craighead, 399 F.3d at 962. The Supreme Court, however, has made it clear that there need not be a case with materially or fundamentally similar facts in order for a reasonable person to know that his or her conduct would violate the Constitution. Young, 508 F.3d at 875 (quotations omitted). A right is clearly established if the law, as established at the time of the events in question, gave the officials fair warning that their alleged conduct was unconstitutional. Id. (alteration and quotation omitted). We conclude that Fortner had fair warning that driving recklessly while transporting a shackled inmate who had been denied the use of a seatbelt and ignoring requests to slow down violated the constitutional prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. There is no question that it was clearly established that subjecting inmates to unreasonable and substantial risk of harm constituted a constitutional violation. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S.Ct. 1970; Fruit, 905 F.2d at 1150. While there are not any published cases from our circuit directly addressing deliberate indifference in the context of prisoner transportation, Morgan is on point. 39 F.3d 1184, 1994 WL 610993, . The court in Morgan stated, While a constitutional claim cannot be based on mere negligence, when prison officials intentionally place prisoners in dangerous situations or manifest deliberate indifference for their safety, the Eighth Amendment is violated. Id. (internal citation omitted). The facts in Morgan that were sufficient to support a conclusion that an officer transporting an individual was deliberately indifferent are sufficiently similar to the conduct alleged of Fortner to make it clear to a reasonable officer that the conduct was unconstitutional. Moreover, even discounting Morgan 's significance because it was unpublished, `officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances.' Craighead, 399 F.3d at 962 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002)). Other cases addressing deliberate indifference to the safety of prisoners provided notice that the conduct engaged in by Fortner was unconstitutional, making the right clearly established. Cf. id. (finding no prior cases presenting the same factual circumstances in an excessive force claim, but concluding nonetheless that the right allegedly violated was clearly established because the prior case law, while factually distinct, would have put a reasonable officer on notice that the challenged conduct was unconstitutional).