Opinion ID: 1408861
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trust Contest

Text: Appellants argue that the trusts are invalid due to undue influence by the Williams Children and/or Thad. Under North Carolina law, which is similar to South Carolina law, undue influence requires that: there must be something operating upon the mind of the person whose act is called in judgment, of sufficient controlling effect to destroy the free agency and to render the instrument, brought into question, not properly an expression of the wishes of the maker, but rather the expression of the will of another. It is the substitution of the mind of the person exercising the influence for the mind of the testator, causing him to make a will which he otherwise would not have made. In re Will of Andrews, 299 N.C. 52, 261 S.E.2d 198, 199 (1980). Undue influence must be proved by the greater weight of the evidence. Id. The Appellants must carry their burden of presenting specific evidence that [Testator's] will was the result of `overpowering' and `fraudulent influence' exerted by [the Williams Children and/or Thad] which overcame [Testator's] will. Estate of Whitaker, 144 N.C.App. 295, 547 S.E.2d 853, 858 (2001). There are several factors that the North Carolina courts look to in determining whether undue influence was exerted over the testator. In re Will of Andrews, supra . The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence of undue influence is usually stated as follows: (i)t is generally proved by a number of facts, each one of which, standing alone, may have little weight, but taken collectively may satisfy a rational mind of its existence. Id. at 200. Analyzing the North Carolina factors one-by-one it is apparent that summary judgment was proper: (1) Old age and physical and mental weakness. Appellants presented evidence that Testator was an elderly man who occasionally showed signs of physical and mental weakness. (2) The person signing the paper is in the home of the beneficiary and subject to his constant association and supervision. Appellants contend the Williams Children lived in the home of Testator. However, evidence that a beneficiary lived with the Testator must be coupled with evidence of constant association and supervision. Appellants presented no evidence that Testator was subject to the Williams Children's constant supervision or association and admit that Testator was free to leave the house, drove himself to work everyday, and freely associated with other friends, family members, and colleagues. (3) Others have little or no opportunity to see him. There is no evidence to support this factor. (4) The will is different from and revokes a prior will. Appellants presented evidence that the Williams Children were not included in any of the estate plans previous to the 1996 plan and contended Testator intended to treat his children equally. However, Testator had never treated his children equally in previous estate plans. Beginning in 1981, Scott received a specific bequest, which increased substantially in all of the subsequent revisions, including the one executed two days before Testator's death, which increased Scott's trust share from $500,000 to $750,000. Although the Williams Children were not included in the previous wills, there was evidence that Mim had disinherited the Williams Children, and that Testator changed his estate plan to make sure they were provided for. Also, there was evidence that Testator did not approve of Mim's marriage to Neiman, and wanted to insure Mim's bequest passed to her children, and not to Neiman. (5) It is made in favor of one with whom there are no ties of blood. This element is not applicable, as the Williams Children are the grandchildren of the Testator. (6) It disinherits the natural objects of his bounty. This element is also not applicable. (7) The beneficiary has procured its execution. Appellants presented evidence that Thad arranged for the execution of the documents, and was heavily involved in the entire process. However, the Appellants presented no evidence that Thad, or the Williams Children, were present at the execution of any of the documents, nor that they procured the execution. Also, Thad is not a beneficiary of the estate plan. Analyzing North Carolina jurisprudence, and applying these factors in the light most favorable to the Appellants, there is no evidence to make out a prima facie case of undue influence under North Carolina law. [7] Appellants presented evidence of the first factor, [b]ut evidence of mental or physical condition standing alone is not evidence of undue influence. In re Ball's Will, 225 N.C. 91, 33 S.E.2d 619, 621 (N.C.1945). The only other evidence Appellants presented was that the will was different from prior wills. There is no specific evidence of an overpowering or fraudulent influence exerted over Testator, therefore the summary judgment motion was proper and we affirm the trial court's ruling. Estate of Whitaker, supra .
Scott argues that the trust was not funded at its creation, and therefore was not validly created. We disagree. There is sufficient evidence that the trusts were funded. Testator expressed an intent to create a trust, designated beneficiaries and a trustee, and funded the trust. In order to create an enforceable trust it is necessary that the donor or creator should part with his interest in the property to the trustee by an actual conveyance or transfer, and, where the creator has legal title, that such title should pass to the trustee. Tyson v. Henry, 133 N.C.App. 415, 514 S.E.2d 564, 565 (1999). Under the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, [i]f the owner of property executes an instrument purporting to transfer to another in trust such property as he may designate thereafter, the conveyance is incomplete and no trust arises unless and until he designates and transfers the property.  § 26 cmt. e (1959) (emphasis added). There is evidence that a ten dollar bill was attached to the trust documents when Testator executed the documents. The trust agreement obviously may precede the transfer of title, as well as occur at the time of the transfer. George Gleason Bogert, Trusts and Trustees, § 141,10 (2d ed., West 1979). Even if Testator did not fund the trust at the moment the documents were signed, the trusts were funded as of March 21, 1997, one year prior to Testator's death, as evidenced by a partnership agreement. See, e.g. Burbridge v. First Nat. Bank and Trust Co. of Oklahoma City, 415 P.2d 591 (Ok.1965) (No property or assets were listed in the trust agreement or attached thereto as exhibits. The trust did not become operative as to any of the settlor's assets when the trust agreement was drawn up, but only later when property was specifically transferred and delivered to the trustee by the settlor.) We therefore conclude that all of the required elements for the formation of a trust were met.