Opinion ID: 867213
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court's sanctions

Text: ¶ 59 Cota argues that a mistrial should have been granted or, at the least, Milne's testimony precluded. But preclusion is required only when no less stringent sanction will suffice. State v. Fisher, 141 Ariz. 227, 246, 686 P.2d 750, 769 (1984). We apply a four factor test to determine whether preclusion is appropriate: (1) how vital the precluded witness is to the proponent's case, (2) whether the opposing party will be surprised and prejudiced by the witness' testimony, (3) whether the discovery violation was motivated by bad faith or willfulness, and (4) any other relevant circumstances. State v. Smith, 123 Ariz. 243, 252, 599 P.2d 199, 208 (1979). ¶ 60 The trial court appropriately considered these factors. It found Milne's testimony extremely relevant and important to the State's case and that there was no bad faith. It also found that any prejudice to Cota could be cured by additional disclosure, interviews, and continuances. Cota had access to all relevant information before cross-examining Milne and identifies no area in which the cross-examination would have materially differed had he been granted more time. ¶ 61 Cota argues that a new trial is ordinarily the remedy for a Brady violation. But many Brady violations are discovered after trial, when no other remedy could suffice. Here, the trial court had other options and did not abuse its discretion by using them. The sanctions imposed sufficiently protected Cota's due process rights. Cf. State v. Jessen, 130 Ariz. 1, 4, 633 P.2d 410, 413 (1981) (finding no reversible error when previously undisclosed exculpatory information is revealed at trial and presented to the jury).