Opinion ID: 2537799
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment Was Proper on the Equal Protection Claim.

Text: Falke argues that the Borough ordinance violates the guarantee of equal protection in the Alaska Constitution. We examine equal protection claims under a sliding scale of scrutiny levels. [10] We begin by weigh[ing] the importance of the interests affected. [11] As the right asserted becomes more fundamental ... [,] the challenged law is subjected to more rigorous scrutiny at a more elevated position on our sliding scale. [12] Purely economic interests, such as freedom from disparate taxation[,] lie[] at the low end of the continuum of interests protected by the equal protection clause and so are subject to the most relaxed scrutiny on our sliding scale. [13] Under this relaxed scrutiny, we will uphold laws if they serve a legitimate public purpose [14] and impose only classifications that bear[] a fair and substantial relationship to that purpose. [15] Because the classification imposed by the Borough ordinance affects only economic interests, the fair and substantial relationship test applies. [16] Falke argues that disputed facts precluded summary judgment on his constitutional challenge. Specifically, he maintains that the ordinance does not actually motivate some property owners to pay their taxes on time. [17] Falke also argues that regardless of the resolution of any factual dispute the Borough was not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We disagree on both points. There is no dispute of fact that precludes summary judgment as to the first prong of the fair and substantial relationship test  that is, whether the ordinance's purpose is legitimate. According to the Borough, the purpose of the ordinance's classification is to encourage prompt payment of residential property taxes. Falke contends that the ordinance does not in fact encourage those in arrears to pay and argues that he is entitled to prove this through witness testimony. Though his argument may be relevant to the second prong of the test  whether the ordinance's classification is fairly and substantially related to its purpose  we can fully address the first prong of the test without resolving claims about the ordinance's effectiveness in achieving its purpose. The Borough's goal in limiting the exemption to those who are current in their taxes is to motivate prompt payment of taxes, and this is a legitimate public purpose. [18] Turning to the second prong of the test, we must examine whether the Borough has demonstrated a fair and substantial relationship between means and end. Falke's argument seems to be that penalizing late payment of taxes in any way discriminates against the poor. But this reasoning would apply to late-payment penalties authorized by AS 29.45.250  a statute that Falke does not seek to invalidate, but rather relies on. Moreover, his argument does not address the main issue. It is not enough to show that an otherwise fair and reasonable law fails to achieve its purpose in a handful of individuals. Falke's argument does not explain, as it must, why the ordinance's effect  directly motivating most residents to act in a certain manner  does not bear a fair and substantial relationship to the ordinance's purpose  motivating just such an action. Falke raises no credible argument to challenge the Borough's position that rewarding Borough residents by a small reduction in their future taxes will encourage them to pay their taxes promptly and that the exemption's restrictions thus bear a fair and substantial relationship to the purpose of motivating prompt payment of residential property taxes.