Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Court's Direction to Defense Counsel Limiting Argument on Penalty

Text: After refusing a proposed instruction that the jurors, if they found the aggravating circumstances to outweigh the mitigating circumstances, may, but need not, return a death verdict, [12] the court, at prosecution request, advised defense counsel he would not be permitted to argue to the same effect. Specifically, the court said, You may not argue, Mr. Blum, that if in fact the jury finds the aggravating outweigh the mitigating that they give life without parole. Counsel replied, Of course not. Although trial counsel's response suggests he had no desire or intention to argue that the jury could return a sentence of life without parole even if they found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating, defendant now contends the court precluded counsel from so arguing and thereby deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and his Eighth Amendment right to reliable penalty phase procedures. For the proposition that counsel should have been permitted to argue for life even if the jury found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating, defendant cites People v. Myers (1987) 43 Cal.3d 250, 233 Cal.Rptr. 264, 729 P.2d 698, People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131, People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712, and People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756, reversed on other grounds in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293. From the principles outlined in those cases, however, it is clear the trial court here committed no prejudicial error. In People v. Myers, supra, 43 Cal.3d at page 276, 233 Cal.Rptr. 264, 729 P.2d 698, the lead opinion stated the penalty jury's obligation is not simply to determine whether aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors and then impose the death penalty as a result of that determination, but rather it is to determine, after consideration of the relevant factors, whether under all the circumstances `death is the appropriate penalty' for the defendant before it. The jury here was so instructedthey were told they must determine from all the circumstances which penalty was justified and appropriate (see ante, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d p. 45, fn. 12, 995 P.2d p. 177, fn. 12)and nothing in the court's direction precluded defense counsel from so arguing. Indeed, counsel, without objection, told the jurors they could apply whatever moral or sympathetic value you feel appropriate, that they could show mercy and sympathy, that for a death verdict the aggravating circumstances must so substantially outweigh the mitigating that it warrants death, and that they were not to return a death verdict unless they believed, from all the circumstances, that execution of defendant was the proper thing to do. In People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at page 979, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131, the court observed that under our law [t]he jury may decide, even in the absence of mitigating evidence, that the aggravating evidence is not comparatively substantial enough to warrant death. People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at page 921, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712, and People v. Stansbury, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 1065, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756, quote that passage from Duncan with approval. Again, the jury here was informed, by both argument and instructions, of the principle that the weighing process involved was a normative process and that to return a death verdict they must find the aggravation to be of sufficient substance to warrant that punishment. They were instructed to return a death verdict only if they found that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. (See ante, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d p. 45, fn. 12, 995 P.2d p. 177, fn. 12.) Nothing in the court's direction to counsel precluded him from so arguing, and, indeed, he did so at length and without objection: The worst of the worst deserve the death penalty. This is a very serious crime, but we save the worst of the worst for the worst, and we'll get into that later.... To return a judgment of death, you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death. That's a very important word, `so substantial.' To me, it means a lot more than one outweighs the other. It has to substantially outweigh the other. In other words, the factors for death have to be so substantially greater than the mitigating circumstances thatand if that isn't true, then you're not to give death. It's the law, and I'm sure you want to follow that law. (Italics added.) Thus, the jurors in this case were amply informed, by instruction and argument, that they were to be guided by the listed aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but were free to assign those factors the moral and sympathetic value they deemed proper, and were to return a death verdict only if, considering all the circumstances, the aggravation was so substantial in comparison with the mitigation as to make death the appropriate penalty. This is the weighing process as our cases describe it; beyond this process of normative comparison, no distinct additional step is required to determine the proper penalty. ( People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 254, 250 Cal.Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25; accord, People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 920-921, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.)