Opinion ID: 2363011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mr. Russell's Veteran's Status

Text: On appeal, both Channel 36 and the DOA question Russell's eligibility for veteran's status. Some of their contentions, however, are undercut by the parties' own pretrial stipulations. Under § 36-5-7, an honorably discharged veteran [3] of the armed forces who has fifteen years of service credit with the state qualifies for full status in his position. [4] As Russell correctly notes on appeal, both Channel 36 and the DOA stipulated in an Agreed Partial Statement of Facts [5] signed by all parties on August 16, 1999, that Russell is an honorably discharged veteran with fifteen (15) years of `service credit' as described in R.I.G.L.1956 § 36-5-7. The stipulations of fact concerning Russell's military service and fifteen years of service credit preclude the authority and the DOA from now arguing that Russell is lacking either one of these two statutory prerequisites for full status in his job. Concerning stipulations, this Court has held: A stipulation entered into with the assent of counsel and their clients, relative to an evidentiary fact or an element of a claim, is conclusive upon the parties and removes the issue from the controversy. It is no longer a question for consideration by the tribunal. Therefore, absent an agreement of the parties to do so, a stipulation has the attributes of a consent order or consent judgment and cannot be set aside simply because a litigant no longer wants to be bound by its terms. In re McBurney Law Services, Inc., 798 A.2d 877, 881-82 (R.I.2002). The tribunal referred to in McBurney was a court-appointed valuation panel; nevertheless, that specific context was immaterial to the Court's holding concerning the binding effect of stipulations on which all parties had agreed. Generally, the prevailing force of stipulations on subsequent appeals is widely accepted: When an adverse party is willing to stipulate to the truth of a certain allegation, the party having the burden of proving that allegation is relieved from proving it, that is, a stipulation renders proof unnecessary and both prevents an independent examination by a judicial officer or body with respect to the matters stipulated and binds the parties on appeal. 73 Am.Jur.2d Stipulations § 17 at 500-01 (2001). The DOA argues that because the trial court previously had denied its motion for summary judgment, the stipulations were the law of the case, which at the time, the state was required to accept, even though the state vigorously disagreed with that ruling. The DOA cites no authority to support this notion, and we respectfully disagree. In Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v. National Health Foundation, 119 R.I. 823, 829, 384 A.2d 301, 305 (1978) this Court held that the rule of the law of the case does not have the finality of the doctrine of res adjudicata and that an earlier denial of summary judgment did not preclude a subsequent motion for directed verdict on an expanded record. The denial of a motion for summary judgment merely determines that a fact issue is involved, and does not even establish the law of the case. 73 Am.Jur.2d Summary Judgment § 62 at 701 (2001). Moreover, because neither Channel 36 nor the DOA moved at trial to withdraw or repudiate any of the agreed-upon stipulations, the issue has not been preserved for appeal. [6] Mr. Russell specifically cited the relevant pretrial stipulations in his post-trial memorandum below, so the DOA's contention that Russell did not preserve the right to invoke these same stipulations before this Court is unavailing. The extent to which the stipulations undermine arguments against Russell's attainment of full status, however, requires further exploration. Because the DOA and Channel 36 stipulated that Russell obtained fifteen years of service credit in part by working for the authority, they are precluded from advancing on appeal any attacks against Russell's veteran's status that challenge his acquisition of that service credit. The validity of Russell's Certificate of Veteran's Status and the jurisdiction of the administrator of adjudication become irrelevant. Russell's status as a classified, unclassified or nonclassified employee is similarly moot for purposes of determining his eligibility under § 36-5-7. Channel 36 and the DOA also argue, however, that the exception for employees of the state government whose method of appointment, salary and term of office is specified by statute set forth in § 36-5-7(a)(3) puts Russell's position with Channel 36 outside the scope of the statute and the full status it confers. To support this position, they refer to Casey v. Sundlun, 615 A.2d 481 (R.I.1992) and Donnelly v. Almond, 695 A.2d 1007 (R.I.1997). In Casey, the plaintiff was a sheriff whose term was expressly fixed at ten years under G.L.1956 § 42-29-1, [7] but this Court did not reach the issue of whether the statutory basis of the sheriff's term precluded him from veteran's status under § 36-5-7. Casey, 615 A.2d at 481-82. Instead, we rejected the sheriff's bid for tenure because the specific power of appointment reserved for the governor in § 42-29-1 trumped the general assurance of tenure found in § 36-5-7. Casey, 615 A.2d at 483. The facts found in Donnelly are more akin to Russell's plight. In Donnelly, the plaintiff was a sheriff's deputy who also claimed veteran's status under § 36-5-7, but this Court held that because his term of office was specified by statute, he did not have full status in his position. Donnelly, 695 A.2d at 1009. Channel 36 and the DOA both submit that because G.L.1956 § 16-61-8 empowers the authority's general manager to appoint employees, § 36-5-7(a)(3) disqualifies Russell from attaining full status just as surely as it did Mr. Donnelly. The trial court distinguished Russell's case from Donnelly because there the appointing sheriff's term was fixed by statute at ten years, but that § 16-61-8 places no such term limit on the authority's general manager. See Donnelly, 695 A.2d at 1009. Observing that this Court had deemed Mr. Donnelly's term to be coincident with the term of office of the appointing sheriff, id., the trial court found that Russell's position with the authority was not similarly tied to any statutorily fixed term and decreed § 36-5-7(a)(3) inapplicable as a result. Based on our review of the statute in question, we also believe that, in the circumstances of this case, the general manager's statutory duty to appoint employees does not bring Russell within the ambit of the exemption for employees whose method of appointment, salary, and term of office is specified by statute. Section 36-5-7(a)(3). Even assuming Mr. Russell's term of office was subject to the will of Mrs. Farmer, his tenure at Channel 36 was not coterminous with her incumbency as general manager. We therefore affirm the Superior Court's holding concerning his veteran's status.