Opinion ID: 2145069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discovery Order Violation

Text: Rodney Brooks accompanied Appellant on the evening of the shooting. Brooks testified in statements to police and at his deposition that he did not have a gun that evening and that Appellant had fired two shots. At trial, Brooks related a contradictory story. Brooks testified that he did have a gun and fired it before Appellant fired one shot. In response to this change in testimony, the State decided to call a probation officer, Melinda Page. Page could testify that Brooks was willing to perjure himself for Appellant's sake. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing Page's testimony because the State did not disclose her name until the day of her appearance. The court's discovery order stated: The Court being duly advised in the premises now finds that pursuant to local Criminal Rule 13, the State of Indiana is ordered to furnish to Defendant within thirty (30) days from this date [January 14, 1994], the following discovery: 1. The names, last known addresses, dates of birth, and social security numbers of persons whom the State intends to call as witnesses ... The Court further finds that the order herein shall be continuing and that respective counsel shall provide discoverable information to opposing counsel promptly, and including, the trial date. (R. at 28.) The State violated the discovery order by calling Page. Appellant requested that the court not allow Page to testify. Appellant claimed that Brook's testimony did not surprise the State and that the State acted in bad faith since the prosecutor knew that he might need to call Page as a witness a week before the trial. Appellant contends that the trial court erred in ruling otherwise. We find the trial court committed no error by allowing Page's testimony. The trial court has discretion to appropriately sanction a party for failure to abide by a discovery order. Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 170 (Ind.1987). Only if the court abuses this discretion will we reverse the court's decision. Id. Indiana Trial Rule 37(B)(2) provides for sanctions for failure to obey a discovery order and applies in criminal cases. IND. TRIAL RULE 37(B)(2); Glover v. State, 441 N.E.2d 1360, 1363 (Ind.1982); Lund v. State, 264 Ind. 428, 345 N.E.2d 826, 829 (1976). Courts generally remedy a situation where a party fails to disclose a witness by providing a continuance rather than by disallowing the testimony. Wiseheart v. State, 491 N.E.2d 985, 988 (Ind.1986); Lund, 345 N.E.2d at 829. When determining the proper remedy, a court must focus on whether the State acted in bad faith and whether the testimony will substantially prejudice the defendant. Carter, 512 N.E.2d at 170-71; Wiseheart, 491 N.E.2d at 988; Lund, 345 N.E.2d at 829. Also, a court may consider whether the State is responding to a surprise at trial. See Gibbs v. State, 538 N.E.2d 937, 942 (Ind.1989); Wiseheart, 491 N.E.2d at 990; Collins v. State, 549 N.E.2d 89, 93 (Ind.Ct.App.1990). The trial court allowed Page's testimony because the court did not find the State acted in bad faith. Rather the court found that Brook's testimony surprised the State and made it necessary for the State to call Page. Before making a final ruling to allow the testimony, the court allowed Appellant's counsel to speak with Page. The court also offered the possibility of a continuance after Page's testimony, if necessary. Additionally, Appellant's trial counsel cross-examined Page. We do not find clear error in the court's finding that the State acted out of genuine surprise. Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony.