Opinion ID: 2162363
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Prosecutor's Closing Argument Remarks Without Evidentiary Basis

Text: During his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor commented on the failure of the victim, Woodward, to testify at trial. Three other people gave a statement. Where are those three other people? Where do you think they are? Where is Edward Woodward? Can you blame him for not coming here even if he still lives in Delaware after what happened to him for doing nothing? For doing nothing? Can you blame him for not wanting to come in here, sitting on this stand and pointing the finger? [The] State doesn't blame him. Johnson's trial attorney did not object to these comments. Instead, he argued that there was no evidence that witnesses were intimidated or otherwise induced to be absent from the trial. Johnson's appellate attorney argues that the prosecutor's comments amounted to plain error. Attorneys must be afforded certain flexibility in making closing arguments to a jury. The prosecutor in his final summation should not be confined to a repetition of the evidence presented at trial. He is allowed and expected to explain all the legitimate inferences of the appellants' guilt that flow from that evidence. [80] Such advocacy is not without limitations. [81] This Court has approved, inter alia, the following standards of the American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice: 5.8 Argument to the jury. (a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw. (b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his [or her] personal belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt of the defendant. (c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions or prejudices of the jury.       5.9 Facts outside the record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to refer to or argue on the basis of facts outside the record whether at trial or on appeal, unless such facts are matters of common public knowledge based on ordinary human experience or matters of which the court may take judicial notice. [82] In Johnson's case, the prosecutor's remarks to the jury about Woodward's absence from trial did not comport with these well-established standards for closing arguments. It is unnecessary for this Court to decide the magnitude of harm caused by those isolated remarks, however, since we have already concluded that Johnson is entitled to receive a new trial. [83]