Opinion ID: 4680544
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proving Copyright Infringement

Text: “Copyright and patents, the Constitution says, are to ‘promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’” Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1195 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8). To that end, the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., establishes the prerequisites for copyright and sets limits on its scope. Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1195–96 (explaining that Congress weighs “the advantages and disadvantages” of copyright protection and establishes “its boundaries and conditions, the existence of exceptions and exemptions, all by exercising its own constitutional power to write a copyright statute”). The basic prerequisites are these: “Copyright protection subsists … in original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression … .” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). “Originality is a constitutional requirement” arising by implication from the Constitution’s reference to “authors” and “writings.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). The threshold for originality is low: “Original, as the term is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses 10 No. 19-2716 at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Id. at 345 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER AND DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.01[A], [B] (1990)). The Act lists categories of works that qualify for copyright protection, including “literary works,” “musical works,” “dramatic works,” and “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,” among others. § 102(a)(1), (2), (3), (5). “Architectural plans” and “technical drawings” are included in the statutory definition of “pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works” and can be copyrighted in this category. § 101. Until 1990, however, architectural works were not included in § 102(a) as a stand-alone category of protected works. That left some uncertainty about the status of constructed designs—i.e., the buildings themselves—among other complexities in this corner of copyright law. 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2A.09[A] (Rev. ed. 2020); 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:101–3:107, Westlaw (database updated March 2021). In 1990 Congress amended the Act to create a separate category of “architectural works” in the § 102(a) list, implementing our nation’s obligations under the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works. See Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 701–706, 104 Stat. 5133 (1990) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(8)). The 1990 legislation added the following definition for the new statutory term “architectural work”: An “architectural work” is the design of a building as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architec- tural plans, or drawings. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement No. 19-2716 11 and composition of spaces and elements in the design, but does not include individual stand- ard features. Id. § 702 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101). Importantly, the Act limits the scope of copyright protection even for “works that the definitional provisions might otherwise include.” Google, 141 S. Ct. at 1196. One prominent limitation captures the traditional copyright principle known as the “idea/expression dichotomy”—the line that separates copyrightable expression from noncopyrightable ideas and facts. Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. 302, 328 (2012). Section 102(b) codifies this principle: “In no case does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.” The Act creates a cause of action for infringement and provides as a general matter that “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive [statutory] rights of the copyright owner … is an infringer.” 17 U.S.C. § 501(a); see also id. § 501(b) (providing a cause of action). This generalization doesn’t shed much light on what it takes to prove a claim, but the courts have developed and explained the plaintiff’s burden of proof. The doctrine begins with this statement from the Supreme Court: “To establish infringement, two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. This concise formulation obscures a good deal of complexity beneath the surface, but it provides a basic framework for the claim. 12 No. 19-2716 The first element—ownership of a valid copyright—is not contested here. Design Basics registered its floor plans with the United States Copyright Office, and Signature does not dispute its ownership or the validity of the copyrights. We therefore assume, as we did in Lexington Homes, “that Design Basics owns the plans and that the plans are entitled to some copyright protection, i.e., they were created independently and possess a modicum of creativity” to satisfy the minimal originality requirement. 858 F.3d at 1099. This litigation turns on the second element, as many infringement cases do. At this step of the general framework, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant “cop[ied] … constituent elements of the [copyrighted] work that are original.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. This element actually encompasses two distinct questions, although our caselaw hasn’t always neatly separated them. The first question is whether, as a factual matter, the defendant copied the plaintiff’s protected work (as opposed to independently creating a similar work); the second question is whether the copying “went so far as to constitute an improper appropriation.” Atari, Inc. v. N. Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 614 (7th Cir. 1982); see also 4 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B] (Rev. ed. 2020) (explaining the two components of the second element in the Feist framework). The Ninth Circuit refers to these distinct subsidiary elements as “copying” and “unlawful appropriation.” Rentmeester v. Nike, Inc., 883 F.3d 1111, 1117 (9th Cir. 2018). The Second Circuit uses the terms “copying” and “wrongful copying.” Zalewski v. Cicero Builder Dev., Inc., 754 F.3d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 2014). Whatever the nomenclature, the point is to capture the important differences between the two. No. 19-2716 13 In all infringement cases, the plaintiff must prove, as a factual matter, that the defendant actually copied his work. Lexington Homes, 858 F.3d at 1099. “Proof of copying by the defendant is necessary because independent creation is a complete defense to copyright infringement.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117. For “[n]o matter how similar the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s works are, if the defendant created his independently, without knowledge of or exposure to the plaintiff’s work, the defendant is not liable for infringement.” Id. Importantly, proof of actual copying is necessary but not sufficient to establish liability for infringement. “Not all copying … is copyright infringement,” Feist, 499 U.S. at 361, so the plaintiff must also prove that the defendant’s copying was wrongful—i.e., that the defendant took enough of his protected expression (as opposed to unprotectable ideas, concepts, facts, etc.) to constitute unlawful appropriation of his expressive work. Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117; Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 100–01. The first of these subsidiary elements—let’s call it “actual copying” or “copying in fact”—can be proved either directly or indirectly. Direct evidence is rare, so many cases turn on inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence. A circumstantial case of actual copying requires: (1) evidence that the defendant had access to the plaintiff’s copyrighted work (enough to support a reasonable inference that the defendant had an opportunity to copy); and (2) evidence of a substantial similarity between the plaintiff’s work and the defendant’s work (enough to support a reasonable inference that copying in fact occurred). Lexington Homes, 858 F.3d at 1099; see also Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117; Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 100–01. 14 No. 19-2716 We have acknowledged the possibility that an accused work may bear such “an uncanny resemblance” to a copyrighted work that copying is “the only plausible explanation” for the similarity. Lexington Homes, 858 F.3d at 1100. In such a case, “further proof of access may not be required.” Id. But the exception is “rare” and reserved for “unusual cases.” Id. Ordinarily, “to prove a circumstantial case of copyright infringement, the plaintiff must separately prove both access and similarity.” Id. Confusion sometimes arises because the test for unlawful appropriation—a distinct inquiry—also looks for substantial similarity between the defendant’s work and the plaintiff’s work. As the Second Circuit has explained, “a close similarity between two works is often relevant to proving both actual copying and wrongful copying.” Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 101 (emphasis added). Accordingly, the cases often use “the same term—‘substantial similarity’—to describe both the degree of similarity relevant to proof of copying and the degree of similarity necessary to establish unlawful appropriation.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117. But “[t]he term means different things in those two contexts.” Id. The difference hinges on the distinction between the protected and unprotected elements in the plaintiff’s work. Id.; see also Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 101. When used as a test for actual copying in a circumstantial case, the requirement of “substantial similarity” is not limited to the protected elements of the plaintiff’s work. Similarities that relate to either the protected or unprotected elements of the plaintiff’s work may be probative of actual copying; the inquiry simply looks for the kind and degree of similarity that “one would not expect to arise if the two works had been created independently.” Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117. Put somewhat No. 19-2716 15 differently, in a circumstantial case, the plaintiff has the burden to show that the two works are so similar that copying is a better explanation for the similarities than pure coincidence. But “similarity that relates to unprotected elements is probative only of [actual] copying—not wrongful copying.” Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 101 (emphasis added). Wrongful copying—unlawful appropriation—requires substantial similarities between the defendant’s work and protected elements in the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. Rentmeester, 883 F.3d at 1117. “When an original work contains many unprotected elements, … a close similarity between it and a copy may prove only copying, not wrongful copying.” Zalewski, 754 F.3d at 101. To preserve the distinction between these two concepts, we will follow the Second Circuit’s lead and use the term “probative similarity” to refer to the degree of similarity necessary to support an inference of actual copying and the term “substantial similarity” to refer to the test for wrongful copying or unlawful appropriation. Id. Our circuit, like most others, uses the “ordinary observer” test for unlawful appropriation: “whether the accused work is so similar to the plaintiff’s work that an ordinary reasonable person would conclude that the defendant unlawfully appropriated the plaintiff’s protect[a]ble expression by taking material of substance and value.” Wildlife Express Corp. v. Carol Wright Sales, Inc., 18 F.3d 502, 508–09 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting Atari, 672 F.2d at 614). 3 3 See also Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 259 F.3d 25, 33–34 (1st Cir. 2001); Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212 F.3d 1210, 1214 (11th Cir. 2000); Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987); 16 No. 19-2716