Opinion ID: 2013326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: IBP's NEGLIGENCE

Text: In determining whether IBP was free from neglect, we are guided by the general rule of law set forth in Larson. In Larson, the appellant chose to send a transcript for filing in Lincoln through the U.S. Postal Service. The appellant mailed the transcript on October 17, 1930, from Creighton, Nebraska, anticipating that it would arrive the same day, which was 1 day before the final day of the statutory appeal period. However, the transcript did not arrive at the clerk's office until October 20. Although the court in Larson was not squarely presented with the alleged negligence of both the appellant and the court official, as in this case, the court discussed the effect of an agent's negligence in those situations where an appellant's appeal is untimely filed. The court stated: The appellant selected the United States mail for the purpose of transporting the transcript from Creighton, Nebraska, to the office of the clerk of the supreme court in Lincoln, Nebraska.... The appellant has thus selected the United States mail as his agent to transport and deliver the transcript to the office of the clerk of the supreme court. The agent was selected by the appellant, and the negligence of the agent, if any, was the negligence of the appellant. Larson v. Wegner, 120 Neb. 449, 452-53, 233 N.W. 253, 254-55 (1930). The court found that the appellant's conduct did not qualify for the exception and denied the appellant's motion requesting the court to consider his appeal timely. The present case is similar to Larson in that both IBP and the appellant in Larson selected agents to file documents with a court. IBP selected UPS as its agent to file its application for review. The application needed to be filed by the end of the business day on November 9, 2000, and UPS arrived at the State Capitol Building at 9:53 a.m. that day. At that time, UPS was informed that the clerk's office of the Workers' Compensation Court had relocated. UPS still had the entire day to locate the clerk's office and file the application on time. However, UPS did not discover the location of the clerk's office until 5:29 p.m. As a result, IBP's application for review was not timely filed. IBP's situation also resembles Drier v. Knowles Vans, Inc., 144 Neb. 619, 14 N.W.2d 222 (1944), another case in which an appellant similarly selected an agent for filing. In Drier, an appeal from the justice of the peace court was dismissed because the appellant's required bond for appeal was not filed on time. The appellant's attorney, who could not find the specific street address for the justice of the peace, had chosen to mail the bond 3 days before the filing deadline to `Judge Woolsey, Justice of the Peace, Lancaster County, Lincoln, Nebraska.' Id. at 621, 14 N.W.2d at 224. According to the appellant, the postal authorities first delivered [the bond] to the wrong address and finally to the justice on September 14, 1 day after the filing deadline. Id. The appellant argued, inter alia, that the postal authorities were at fault and that the appeal should not be deemed untimely. This court determined that the postal authorities' actions did not excuse the appellant's untimely filed bond, stating, Having so selected his agent, [the appellant] placed the burden upon that agent to search out and find the justice in Lincoln, Nebraska. The agent performed the task, but too late. The delay here was occasioned by the [appellant's] laches in proceeding as he did. Id. at 623, 14 N.W.2d at 225. We recognize that Larson and Drier involved the filing of a transcript and bond, respectively, while the present case involves the filing of an application for review. However, the same principles apply equally in each situation. We determine that in the same way the appellants in Larson and Drier were not free from neglect, neither was IBP, through its agent, UPS. The record simply does not disclose any reason why, despite having knowledge of the court's relocation at 9:53 a.m., well prior to the close of the court's business day, IBP's agent could not have located the clerk's office and timely filed the application. In making this determination, we note from the exhibits attached to the parties' stipulation it is clear that the office telephone numbers for the Workers' Compensation Court remained unchanged despite the court's relocation. In addition to the actions of IBP's agent as discussed above, the stipulation of facts before us shows that for several weeks before and after the relocation on March 1, 2000, a Notice of Relocation of the Workers' Compensation Court's State Capitol Building offices was included with every mailing from the Clerk of the Court. This Notice clearly stated: Effective March 1, 2000, the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court's State Capitol Offices, located on the twelfth and thirteenth floors, will be relocated to the old Federal Courthouse, 129 North 10th Street, Lincoln, Nebraska. Office phone numbers will remain the same. The Notice also provided specific instructions for DELIVERIES: When a physical location address is required (FedX, UPS, deliveries, etc.) please use: Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court 129 North 10th Street, Suite 300 Lincoln, NE, 68508. (Emphasis supplied.) The Internet Web site of the Workers' Compensation Court also included a notice For Immediate Release dated 02/10/00 which contained the same relocation information and provided identical UPS delivery instructions. The stipulation further shows that the Workers' Compensation Court had been at its relocated address for 8 months 8 days before IBP's attempted filing. During this time, as the stipulation demonstrates, the written call of the Workers' Compensation Court, which clearly identified the new location of the clerk's office, included cases involving IBP on May 24 and August 30, 2000, months prior to November 9, 2000. For these reasons, we cannot conclude that the delay in filing IBP's application for review was caused without fault of [IBP and] solely by the act or omission of the court official. See Larson v. Wegner, 120 Neb. 449, 452, 233 N.W. 253, 254 (1930). We determine that IBP was not free from neglect as required under Larson for a court to consider an untimely filed appeal.