Opinion ID: 371239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Adoptions of the Master's Report.

Text: 39 Plaintiffs have suggested that in view of certain actions of Judge Lord, including his adoption of the Master's report on two occasions without opinion, his unwillingness to delay his April 30, 1979 ruling pending further settlement negotiations, and his recusal of himself immediately after issuing the April 30, 1979 order, Judge Lord may either have abused his discretion or exercised no discretion in denying their application for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs suggest that it would be appropriate for this Court to study in depth the record on appeal and ourselves grant the injunction they seek, or else to remand the case to the district court for reconsideration of the whole matter by the new judge assigned to the case, Judge Devitt. We limit ourselves to the following comments on these suggestions. 40 First, when the first four appeals were remanded for further consideration by the district court of the Master's report, Judge Lord informed plaintiffs that we're just going to take the time to go through this very thoroughly, page by page, and look at every objection you will have . . . .  Three months later Judge Lord readopted the Master's report. Even though no opinion was issued, we can only assume that Judge Lord did what he said he was going to do; certainly plaintiffs have made no showing to the contrary. We find no abuse of discretion in Judge Lord's denial of plaintiffs' motion without opinion, based as it was on his adoption of the Master's thorough and well-supported report. 41 Second, we have in fact studied the record on appeal in sufficient depth to convince ourselves that the Master's findings, conclusions and recommendations are amply supported by the evidence and the law. 42 Third, plaintiffs can still have what they have requested a thorough review of their claims on the merits by a different district judge; they need only bring the case to trial. 43 Finally, we find no impropriety in Judge Lord's failure to recuse himself prior to issuing his April 30, 1979 order, or in his refusal to delay that order pending further negotiations. The basis for the recusal was the recent involvement in the case of a law firm with which Judge Lord's son-in-law is associated. That firm's involvement was tangential at best: the evidence is that the firm had not been retained to represent any party in the proceedings before Judge Lord, but rather (by agreement of both sides) to act as the scrivener to prepare a settlement document. Judge Lord learned only very late in the proceedings at most four days before the April 30 order of the firm's involvement. By then he himself had been involved with the case for over a year and a half, and was prepared to rule for the second time on plaintiffs' November 21, 1977 motion. He was acting under a mandate from this Court, issued over five months previously, to make a prompt ruling. Reassignment of the case to another judge prior to the ruling would only have further delayed the proceedings. By his own account, Judge Lord had already delayed his ruling while you folks went ahead and negotiated; negotiations had been going on almost since the suit was filed, and defendants had objected to any further delay. We find no impropriety or abuse of discretion in Judge Lord's decision to rule when he did.