Opinion ID: 2387745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: ¶ 7 For purposes of the ICWA, tribal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over child custody proceedings involving Indian children who are domiciled within the reservation. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29 (1989) ( Holyfield ); 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) of the ICWA. [4] Indian children of parents domiciled on the reservation are also considered domiciled on the reservation. This was the Court's holding, although the parents tried to avoid the ICWA by going off the reservation for the child's birth. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 48-49, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1608. Thus, because Indian children born off the reservation were considered domiciled on the reservation, the tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction of a voluntary adoption by non-Indian adoptive parents. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30, 49, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 1609. ¶ 8 In contrast to the present case, it is undisputed that neither M.S., K.S., nor their parents, resided on the reservation. We must therefore consider 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) [5] which concerns jurisdiction over child custody proceedings for non-domiciliary Indian children. The Tribe contends transfer to tribal court may occur in this case, absent good cause to the contrary. The State responds that although § 1911(a) applies to  any child custody proceeding [6] involving an Indian child, § 1911(b) applies only to transfers of foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceedings. [emphasis added] ¶ 9 The trial court's denial of transfer to tribal court was based on its findings of good cause to the contrary, as noted above, but not because the Tribe's transfer request came after the termination proceeding ended. However, in support of the trial court's judgment, the State argued on appeal that because the Tribe did not move to transfer this case to tribal court at the time of the foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceedings, transfer was not required or allowed under § 1911(b). COCA agreed. ¶ 10 The record indicates the timeliness of the motion to transfer jurisdiction was not raised in the trial court but was first raised on appeal. The Tribe argued it could not be considered. COCA held that if the Tribe, as the Appellant, had raised an issue for reversal for the first time on appeal, consideration of it would be foreclosed, but that an Appellee is free to raise an argument which provides an additional reason to affirm the judgment, citing McMinn v. City of Oklahoma City, 1997 OK 154, 952 P.2d 517. ¶ 11 Regardless of the trial court's reasoning, COCA's construction of § 1911(b) constitutes a question of law which affects the intent and purpose of the ICWA. COCA's opinion also denies tribal court jurisdiction over an ICWA proceeding involving two members of its tribe, in favor of Oklahoma courts. It therefore affects our jurisdiction, as well.