Opinion ID: 131149
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: title ii provisions

Text: BCRA § 201, which requires disclosure of electioneering communications, including those coordinated with the party but independent of the candidate, does not substantially relate to a valid interest in gathering data about compliance with contribution limits or in deterring corruption. Contra, ante, at 196. As the above analysis of Title I demonstrates, Congress has no valid interest in regulating soft-money contributions that do not pose quid pro quo corruption potential. In the absence of a valid basis for imposing such limits the effort here to ensure compliance with them and to deter their allegedly corrupting effects cannot justify disclosure. The regulation does substantially relate to the other interest the majority details, however. See ibid. This assures its constitutionality. For that reason, I agree with the Court's judgment upholding the disclosure provisions contained in § 201 of Title II, with one exception. Section 201's advance disclosure requirement  the aspect of the provision requiring those who have contracted to speak to disclose their speech in advance  is, in my view, unconstitutional. Advance disclosure imposes real burdens on political speech that post hoc disclosure does not. It forces disclosure of political strategy by revealing where ads are to be run and what their content is likely to be (based on who is running the ad). It also provides an opportunity for the ad buyer's opponents to dissuade broadcasters from running ads. See Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant/Cross-Appellee National Right to Life Committee, Inc., et al. in No. 02-1733 et al., pp. 44-46, and nn. 42-43. Against those tangible additional burdens, the Government identifies no additional interest uniquely served by advance disclosure. If Congress intended to ensure that advertisers could not flout these disclosure laws by running an ad before the election, but paying for it afterwards, see ante, at 200, then Congress should simply have required the disclosure upon the running of the ad, Burdening the First Amendment further by requiring advance disclosure is not a constitutionally acceptable alternative. To the extent § 201 requires advance disclosure, it finds no justification in its subordinating interests and imposes greater burdens than the First Amendment permits. Section 212, another disclosure provision, likewise incorporates an advance disclosure requirement. The plaintiffs challenge only this advance disclosure requirement, and not the broader substance of this section. The majority concludes this challenge is not ripe. I disagree. The statute commands advance disclosure. The Federal Election Commission has issued a regulation under § 212 that, by its terms, does not implement this particular requirement. See 68 Fed. Reg. 404, 452 (2003) (to be codified at 11 CFR § 109.10(c)(d)). Adoption of a regulation that does not implement the statute to its full extent does not erase the statutory requirement. This is not a case in which a statute is ambiguous and the agency interpretation can be relied upon to avoid a statutory obligation that is uncertain or arguable. The failure of the regulation at this point to require advance disclosure is of no moment. Contra, 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 251 (per curiam). The validity of § 212 is an issue presented for our determination; it is ripe; and the advance disclosure requirement, for the reasons given when discussing the parallel provision under § 201, is unconstitutional. Contra, ante, at 212 (declining to address the ripeness question in light of the majority's rejection of the challenge to advance notice in § 201).
The majority permits a new and serious intrusion on speech when it upholds § 203, the key provision in Title II that prohibits corporations and labor unions from using money from their general treasury to fund electioneering communications. The majority compounds the error made in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U. S. 652 (1990), and silences political speech central to the civic discourse that sustains and informs our democratic processes. Unions and corporations, including nonprofit corporations, now face severe criminal penalties for broadcasting advocacy messages that refe[r] to a clearly identified candidate, 2 U. S. C. A. § 431(20)(A)(iii) (Supp. 2003), in an election season. Instead of extending Austin to suppress new and vibrant voices, I would overrule it and return our campaign finance jurisprudence to principles consistent with the First Amendment.
The Government and the majority are right about one thing: The express-advocacy requirement, with its list of magic words, is easy to circumvent. The Government seizes on this observation to defend BCRA § 203, arguing it will prevent what it calls sham issue ads that are really to the same effect as their more express counterparts. Ante, at 185, 193-194. What the Court and the Government call sham, however, are the ads speakers find most effective. Unlike express ads that leave nothing to the imagination, the record shows that issue ads are preferred by almost all candidates, even though politicians, unlike corporations, can lawfully broadcast express ads if they so choose. It is a measure of the Government's disdain for protected speech that it would label as a sham the mode of communication sophisticated speakers choose because it is the most powerful. The Government's use of the pejorative label should not obscure § 203's practical effect: It prohibits a mass communication technique favored in the modern political process for the very reason that it is the most potent. That the Government would regulate it for this reason goes only to prove the illegitimacy of the Government's purpose. The majority's validation of it is not sustainable under accepted First Amendment principles. The problem is that the majority uses Austin, a decision itself unfaithful to our First Amendment precedents, to justify banning a far greater range of speech. This has it all backwards. If protected speech is being suppressed, that must be the end of the inquiry. The majority's holding cannot be reconciled with First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765 (1978), which invalidated a Massachusetts law prohibiting banks and business corporations from making expenditures for the purpose of influencing referendum votes on issues that do not materially affect their business interests. Id., at 767. Bellotti was decided in the face of the same arguments on which the majority now relies. Corporate participation, the Government argued in Bellotti, would exert an undue influence on the outcome of a referendum vote. Id., at 789. The influence, presumably, was undue because immense aggregations of wealth were facilitated by the unique state-conferred corporate structure. Austin, 494 U. S., at 660. With these state-created advantages, id., at 659, corporations would drown out other points of view and destroy the confidence of the people in the democratic process, Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 789. Bellotti rejected these arguments in emphatic terms: To be sure, corporate advertising may influence the outcome of the vote; this would be its purpose. But the fact that advocacy may persuade the electorate is hardly a reason to suppress it: The Constitution `protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.' Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U. S., at 689.... `[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment....' Buckley, 424 U. S., at 48-49. Id., at 790-791. Bellotti similarly dismissed the argument that the prohibition was necessary to protec[t] corporate shareholders by preventing the use of corporate resources in furtherance of views with which some shareholders may disagree. Id., at 792-793. Among other problems, the statute was overinclusive: [It] would prohibit a corporation from supporting or opposing a referendum proposal even if its shareholders unanimously authorized the contribution or expenditure.... Acting through their power to elect the board of directors or to insist upon protective provisions in the corporation's charter, shareholders normally are presumed competent to protect their own interests.... [M]inority shareholders generally have access to the judicial remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements.... Assuming, arguendo, that protection of shareholders is a `compelling' interest under the circumstances of this case, we find `no substantially relevant correlation between the governmental interest asserted and the State's effort' to prohibit appellants from speaking. Id., at 794-795 (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 485 (1960)). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U. S. 209 (1977) (providing analogous protections to union members). Austin turned its back on this holding, not because the Bellotti Court had overlooked the Government's interest in combating quid pro quo corruption, but because a new majority decided to recognize a different type of corruption, Austin, 494 U. S., at 660, i.e., the same corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth, ibid., found insufficient to sustain a similar prohibition just a decade earlier. Unless certain narrow exceptions apply, see Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U. S. 238 (1986) (MCFL), the prohibition extends even to nonprofit corporations organized to promote a point of view. Aside from its disregard of precedents, the majority's ready willingness to equate corruption with all organizations adopting the corporate form is a grave insult to nonprofit and for-profit corporations alike, entities that have long enriched our civic dialogue. Austin was the first and, until now, the only time our Court had allowed the Government to exercise the power to censor political speech based on the speaker's corporate identity. The majority's contrary contention is simply incorrect. Contra, ante, at 203 (Since our decision in Buckley, Congress' power to prohibit corporations and unions from using funds in their treasuries to finance advertisements expressly advocating the election or defeat of candidates in federal elections has been firmly embedded in our law). I dissented in Austin, 494 U.S., at 695, and continue to believe that the case represents an indefensible departure from our tradition of free and robust debate. Two of my colleagues joined the dissent, including a Member of today's majority. Ibid. (O'CONNOR and SCALIA, JJ.). See also id., at 679 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). To be sure, Bellotti concerns issue advocacy, whereas Austin is about express advocacy. This distinction appears to have accounted for the position of at least two Members of the Court. See 494 U.S., at 675-676 (Brennan, J., concurring) (The Michigan law ... prohibits corporations from using treasury funds only for making independent expenditures in support of, or in opposition to, any candidate in state elections. A corporation remains free ... to use general treasury funds to support an initiative proposal in a state referendum (citations omitted)); id., at 678 (STEVENS, J., concurring) ([T]here is a vast difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other). The distinction, however, between independent expenditures for commenting on issues, on the one hand, and supporting or opposing a candidate, on the other, has no First Amendment significance apart from Austin 's arbitrary line. Austin was based on a faulty assumption. Contrary to JUSTICE STEVENS' proposal that there is vast difference between lobbying and debating public issues on the one hand, and political campaigns for election to public office on the other, ibid., there is a general recognition now that discussions of candidates and issues are quite often intertwined in practical terms. See, e.g., Brief for Intervenor-Defendant Sen. John McCain et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., p. 42 (`[The] legal ... wall between issue advocacy and political advocacy... is built of the same sturdy material as the emperor's clothing. Everyone sees it. No one believes it' (quoting the chair of the Political Action Committee (PAC) of the National Rifle Association (NRA))). To abide by Austin 's repudiation of Bellotti on the ground that Bellotti did not involve express advocacy is to adopt a fiction. Far from providing a rationale for expanding Austin, the evidence in these consolidated cases calls for its reexamination. Just as arguments about immense aggregations of corporate wealth and concerns about protecting shareholders and union members do not justify a ban on issue ads, they cannot sustain a ban on independent expenditures for express ads. In holding otherwise, Austin forced a substantial amount of political speech underground and created a species of covert speech incompatible with our free and open society. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U. S., at 406 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). The majority not only refuses to heed the lessons of experience but also perpetuates the conflict Austin created with fundamental First Amendment principles. Buckley foresaw that the distinction between discussion of issues and candidates and advocacy of election or defeat of candidates may often dissolve in practical application, 424 U. S., at 42; see also id., at 45. It recognized that `[p]ublic discussion of public issues which also are campaign issues readily and often unavoidably draws in candidates and their positions, their voting records and other official conduct.' Id., at 42, n. 50. Hence, `[d]iscussions of those issues, and as well more positive efforts to influence public opinion on them, tend naturally and inexorably to exert some influence on voting at elections.' Ibid. In glossing over Austin 's opposite  and false  assumption that express advocacy is different, the majority ignores reality and elevates a distinction rejected by Buckley in clear terms. Even after Buckley construed the statute then before the Court to reach only express advocacy, it invalidated limits on independent expenditures, observing that [a]dvocacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the discussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or defeat of legislation. 424 U. S., at 48. Austin defied this principle. It made the impermissible content-based judgment that commentary on candidates is less deserving of First Amendment protection than discussions of policy. In its haste to reaffirm Austin today, the majority refuses to confront this basic conflict between Austin and Buckley. It once more diminishes the First Amendment by ignoring its command that the Government has no power to dictate what topics its citizens may discuss. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U. S. 530 (1980). Continued adherence to Austin, of course, cannot be justified by the corporate identity of the speaker. Not only does this argument fail to account for Bellotti, 435 U. S., at 777 (The inherent worth of the speech in terms of its capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual), but Buckley itself warned that [t]he First Amendment's protection against governmental abridgment of free expression cannot properly be made to depend on a person's financial ability to engage in public discussion. 424 U. S., at 49; see, also id., at 48-49; Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U. S. 92 (1972). The exemption for broadcast media companies, moreover, makes the First Amendment problems worse, not better. See Austin, 494 U. S., at 712 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (An independent ground for invalidating this statute is the blanket exemption for media corporations.... All corporations communicate with the public to some degree, whether it is their business or not; and communication is of particular importance for nonprofit corporations); see also id., at 690-691 (SCALIA, J., dissenting) (Amassed corporate wealth that regularly sits astride the ordinary channels of information is much more likely to produce the New Corruption (too much of one point of view) than amassed corporate wealth that is generally busy making money elsewhere). In the end the majority can supply no principled basis to reason away Austin 's anomaly. Austin 's errors stand exposed, and it is our duty to say so. I surmise that even the majority, along with the Government, appreciates these problems with Austin. That is why it invents a new justification. We are now told that the government also has a compelling interest in insulating federal elections from the type of corruption arising from the real or apparent creation of political debts. Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant FEC et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., p. 88. [E]lectioneering communications paid for with the general treasury funds of labor unions and corporations, the Government warns, endea[r] those entities to elected officials in a way that could be perceived by the public as corrupting. See 251 F. Supp. 2d, at 622-623 (Kollar-Kotelly, J.) (stating the Government's position). This rationale has no limiting principle. Were we to accept it, Congress would have the authority to outlaw even pure issue ads, because they, too, could endear their sponsors to candidates who adopt the favored positions. Taken to its logical conclusion, the alleged Government interest in insulating federal elections from ... the real or apparent creation of political debts also conflicts with Buckley. If a candidate feels grateful to a faceless, impersonal corporation for making independent expenditures, the gratitude cannot be any less when the money came from the CEO's own pocket. Buckley, however, struck down limitations on independent expenditures and rejected the Government's corruption argument absent evidence of coordination. See 424 U. S., at 51. The Government's position would eviscerate the line between expenditures and contributions and subject both to the same complaisant review under the First Amendment. Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U. S., at 161. Complaisant or otherwise, we cannot cede authority to the Legislature to do with the First Amendment as it pleases. Since Austin is inconsistent with the First Amendment, its extension diminishes the First Amendment even further. For this reason § 203 should be held unconstitutional.
Even under Austin, BCRA § 203 could not stand. All parties agree strict scrutiny applies; § 203, however, is far from narrowly tailored. The Government is unwilling to characterize § 203 as a ban, citing the possibility of funding electioneering communications out of a separate segregated fund. This option, though, does not alter the categorical nature of the prohibition on the corporation. [T]he corporation as a corporation is prohibited from speaking. Austin, 494 U. S., at 681, n. (SCALIA, J., dissenting). What the law allows  permitting the corporation to serve as the founder and treasurer of a different association of individuals that can endorse or oppose political candidates  is not speech by the corporation. Ibid. Our cases recognize the practical difficulties corporations face when they are limited to communicating through PACs. The majority need look no further than MCFL, 479 U. S. 238, for an extensive list of hurdles PACs have to confront: Under [2 U. S. C.] § 432 [(1982 ed.)], [MCFL] must appoint a treasurer, § 432(a); ensure that contributions are forwarded to the treasurer within 10 or 30 days of receipt, depending on the amount of contribution, § 432(b)(2); see that its treasurer keeps an account of every contribution regardless of amount, the name and address of any person who makes a contribution in excess of $50, all contributions received from political committees, and the name and address of any person to whom a disbursement is made regardless of amount, § 432(c); and preserve receipts for all disbursements over $200 and all records for three years, §§ 432(c), (d). Under § 433, MCFL must file a statement of organization containing its name, address, the name of its custodian of records, and its banks, safety deposit boxes, or other depositories, §§ 433(a), (b); must report any change in the above information within 10 days, § 433(c); and may dissolve only upon filing a written statement that it will no longer receive any contributions nor make disbursements, and that it has no outstanding debts or obligations, § 433(d)(1). Under § 434, MCFL must file either monthly reports with the FEC or reports on the following schedule: quarterly reports during election years, a pre-election report no later than the 12th day before an election, a postelection report within 30 days after an election, and reports every 6 months during nonelection years. §§ 434(a)(4)(A), (B). These reports must contain information regarding the amount of cash on hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identification of each political committee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making contributions, and any persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200; the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by 12 different categories; the names of all authorized or affiliated committees to whom expenditures aggregating over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding debts and obligations, and the settlement terms of the retirement of any debt or obligation. § 434(b). In addition, MCFL may solicit contributions for its separate segregated fund only from its `members,' §§ 441b(b)(4)(A), (C), which does not include those persons who have merely contributed to or indicated support for the organization in the past. Id., at 253-254. These regulations are more than minor clerical requirements. Rather, they create major disincentives for speech, with the effect falling most heavily on smaller entities that often have the most difficulty bearing the costs of compliance. Even worse, for an organization that has not yet set up a PAC, spontaneous speech that refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office becomes impossible, even if the group's vital interests are threatened by a piece of legislation pending before Congress on the eve of a federal election. See Brief for Appellant Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. in No. 02-1756 et al., p. 37. Couple the litany of administrative burdens with the categorical restriction limiting PACs' solicitation activities to members, and it is apparent that PACs are inadequate substitutes for corporations in their ability to engage in unfettered expression. Even if the newly formed PACs manage to attract members and disseminate their messages against these heavy odds, they have been forced to assume a false identity while doing so. As the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) points out, political committees are regulated in minute detail because their primary purpose is to influence federal elections. The ACLU and thousands of other organizations like it, however, are not created for this purpose and therefore should not be required to operate as if they were. Reply Brief for Appellant ACLU in No. 02-1734 et al., p. 15. A requirement that coerces corporations to adopt alter egos in communicating with the public is, by itself, sufficient to make the PAC option a false choice for many civic organizations. Forcing speech through an artificial secondhand endorsement structure . . . debases the value of the voice of nonprofit corporate speakers . . . [because] PAC's are interim, ad hoc organizations with little continuity or responsibility. Austin, 494 U.S., at 708-709 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting). In contrast, their sponsoring organizations have a continuity, a stability, and an influence that allows their members and the public at large to evaluate their . . . credibility. Id., at 709. The majority can articulate no compelling justification for imposing this scheme of compulsory ventriloquism. If the majority is concerned about corruption and distortion of the political process, it makes no sense to diffuse the corporate message and, under threat of criminal penalties, to compel the corporation to spread the blame to its ad hoc intermediary. For all these reasons, the PAC option cannot advance the Government's argument that the provision meets the test of strict scrutiny. See, e.g., id., at 657-660; MCFL, 479 U.S. 238; see also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) (When the purpose and design of a statute is to regulate speech by reason of its content, special consideration or latitude is not accorded to the Government merely because the law can somehow be described as a burden rather than outright suppression). Once we turn away from the distraction of the PAC option, the provision cannot survive strict scrutiny. Under the primary definition, § 203 prohibits unions and corporations from funding from their general treasury any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which  (I) refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office; (II) is made within (aa) 60 days before a general, special, or runoff election for the office sought by the candidate; or (bb) 30 days before a primary or preference election, or a convention or caucus of a political party that has authority to nominate a candidate, for the office sought by the candidate; and (III) in the case of a communication which refers to a candidate for an office other than President or Vice President, is targeted to the relevant electorate. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(A)(i) (Supp. 2003). The prohibition, with its crude temporal and geographic proxies, is a severe and unprecedented ban on protected speech. As discussed at the outset, suppose a few Senators want to show their constituents in the logging industry how much they care about working families and propose a law, 60 days before the election, that would harm the environment by allowing logging in national forests. Under § 203, a nonprofit environmental group would be unable to run an ad referring to these Senators in their districts. The suggestion that the group could form and fund a PAC in the short time required for effective participation in the political debate is fanciful. For reasons already discussed, moreover, an ad hoc PAC would not be as effective as the environmental group itself in gaining credibility with the public. Never before in our history has the Court upheld a law that suppresses speech to this extent. The group would want to refer to these Senators, either by name or by photograph, not necessarily because an election is at stake. It might be supposed the hypothetical Senators have had an impeccable environmental record, so the environmental group might have no previous or present interest in expressing an opinion on their candidacies. Or, the election might not be hotly contested in some of the districts, so whatever the group says would have no practical effect on the electoral outcome. The ability to refer to candidates and officeholders is important because it allows the public to communicate with them on issues of common concern. Section 203's sweeping approach fails to take into account this significant free speech interest. Under any conventional definition of overbreadth, it fails to meet strict scrutiny standards. It forces electioneering communications sponsored by an environmental group to contend with faceless and nameless opponents and consign their broadcast, as the NRA well puts it, to a world where politicians who threaten the environment must be referred to as `He Whose Name Cannot Be Spoken.' Reply Brief for Appellant NRA et al. in No. 02-1675 et al., p. 19. In the example above, it makes no difference to § 203 or to the Court that the bill sponsors may have such well-known ideological biases that revealing their identity would provide essential instruction to citizens on whether the policy benefits them or their community. Nor does it make any difference that the names of the bill sponsors, perhaps through repetition in the news media, have become so synonymous with the proposal that referring to these politicians by name in an ad is the most effective way to communicate with the public. Section 203 is a comprehensive censor: On the pain of a felony offense, the ad must not refer to a candidate for federal office during the crucial weeks before an election. We are supposed to find comfort in the knowledge that the ad is banned under § 203 only if it is targeted to the relevant electorate, defined as communications that can be received by 50,000 or more persons in the candidate's district. See 2 U.S.C.A. § 434(f)(3)(C) (Supp. 2003). This Orwellian criterion, however, is analogous to a law, unconstitutional under any known First Amendment theory, that would allow a speaker to say anything he chooses, so long as his intended audience could not hear him. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-765 (1972) (discussing the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas (internal quotation marks omitted)). A central purpose of issue ads is to urge the public to pay close attention to the candidate's platform on the featured issues. By banning broadcast in the very district where the candidate is standing for election, § 203 shields information at the heart of the First Amendment from precisely those citizens who most value the right to make a responsible judgment at the voting booth. In defending against a facial attack on a statute with substantial overbreadth, it is no answer to say that corporations and unions may bring as-applied challenges on a case-by-case basis. When a statute is as out of bounds as § 203, our law simply does not force speakers to undertake the considerable burden (and sometimes risk) of vindicating their rights through case-by-case litigation. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003). If they instead abstain from protected speech, they har[m] not only themselves but society as a whole, which is deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas. Ibid. Not the least of the ill effects of today's decision is that our overbreadth doctrine, once a bulwark of protection for free speech, has now been manipulated by the Court to become but a shadow of its former self. In the end the Government and intervenor-defendants cannot dispute the looseness of the connection between § 203 and the Government's proffered interest in stemming corruption. At various points in their briefs, they drop all pretense that the electioneering ban bears a close relation to anticorruption purposes. Instead, they defend § 203 on the ground that the targeted ads may influence, are likely to influence, or will in all likelihood have the effect of influencing a federal election. See Brief for Appellee/Cross-Appellant FEC et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., pp. 14, 24, 84, 92-93, 94; Brief for Intervenor-Defendant Sen. John McCain et al. in No. 02-1674 et al., pp. 42-43. The mere fact that an ad may, in one fashion or another, influence an election is an insufficient reason for outlawing it. I should have thought influencing elections to be the whole point of political speech. Neither strict scrutiny nor any other standard the Court has adopted to date permits outlawing speech on the ground that it might influence an election, which might lead to greater access to politicians by the sponsoring organization, which might lead to actual corruption or the appearance of corruption. Settled law requires a real and close connection between end and means. The attenuated causation the majority endorses today is antithetical to the concept of narrow tailoring.
As I would invalidate § 203 under the primary definition, it is necessary to add a few words about the backup provision. As applied in § 203, the backup definition prohibits corporations and unions from financing from their general treasury funds any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication which promotes or supports a candidate for that office, or attacks or opposes a candidate for that office (regardless of whether the communication expressly advocates a vote for or against a candidate) and which also is suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate. 2 U.S.C.A. § 434f(3)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2003). The prohibition under the backup has much of the same imprecision as the ban under the primary definition, though here there is even more overbreadth. Unlike the primary definition, the backup contains no temporal or geographic limitation. Any broadcast, cable, or satellite communications not just those aired within a certain blackout period and received by a certain segment of the populationare prohibited, provided they promote, support, attack, or oppose a candidate. There is no showing that such a permanent and ubiquitous restriction meets First Amendment standards for the relationship between means and ends. The backup definition is flawed for the further reason that it is vague. The crucial wordspromotes, support, attack, oppose  are nowhere defined. In this respect the backup is similar to the provision in the Federal Election Campaign Act that Buckley held to be unconstitutionally vague. Cf. 424 U.S., at 39-44 (`No person may make any expenditure . . . relative to a clearly identified candidate during a calendar year which, when added to all other expenditures made by such person during the year advocating the election or defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1,000'). The statutory phrase suggestive of no plausible meaning other than an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate cannot cure the overbreadth or vagueness of the backup definition. Like other key terms in the provision, these words are not defined. The lack of guidance presents serious problems of uncertainty. If plausible means something close to reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances, speakers will be provided with an insufficient degree of protection and will, as a result, engage in widespread self-censorship to avoid severe criminal penalties. Given the statute's vagueness, even defendants' own experts disagree among themselves about whether specific ads fall within the prohibition. Hence, people of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [the backup definition's] meaning and differ as to its application, Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926). For these reasons, I would also invalidate the ban on electioneering communication under the backup definition.
Before concluding the analysis on Title II, it is necessary to add a few words about the majority's analysis of § 204. The majority attempts to minimize the damage done under § 203 by construing § 204 (the Wellstone Amendment) to incorporate an exception for MCFL -type corporations. See MCFL, 479 U.S. 238. Section 204, however, does no such thing. As even the majority concedes, the provision does not, on its face, exempt MCFL organizations from its prohibition. Ante, at 211. Although we normally presume that legislators would not deliberately enact an unconstitutional statute, that presumption is inapplicable here. There is no ambiguity regarding what § 204 is intended to accomplish. Enacted to supersede the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment that would have carved out precisely this exception for MCFL corporations, § 204 was written to broaden BCRA's scope to include issue-advocacy groups. See, e.g., App. to Brief for Appellant NRA et al. in No. 02-1675 et al., pp. 65a, 67a (Sen. Wellstone) ([I]ndividuals with all this wealth will make their soft money contributions to these sham issue ads run by all these . . . organizations, which under this loophole can operate with impunity to run poisonous ads. I have an amendment that . . . make[s] sure . . . this big money doesn't get [through]). Instead of deleting the Snowe-Jeffords Amendment from the bill, however, the Wellstone Amendment was inserted in a separate section to preserve severability. Were we to indulge the presumption that Congress understood the law when it legislated, the Wellstone Amendment could be understood only as a frontal challenge to MCFL. Even were I to agree with the majority's interpretation of § 204, however, my analysis of Title II remains unaffected. The First Amendment protects the right of all organizations, not just a subset of them, to engage in political speech. See Austin, 494 U.S., at 700-701 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (The First Amendment does not permit courts to exercise speech suppression authority denied to legislatures).
Title II's vagueness and overbreadth demonstrate Congress' fundamental misunderstanding of the First Amendment. The Court, it must be said, succumbs to the same mistake. The majority begins with a denunciation of direct campaign contributions by corporations and unions. It then uses this rhetorical momentum as its leverage to uphold the Act. The problem, however, is that Title II's ban on electioneering communications covers general commentaries on political issues and is far removed from laws prohibiting direct contributions from corporate and union treasuries. The severe First Amendment burden of this ban on independent expenditures requires much stronger justifications than the majority offers. See Buckley, supra, at 23. The hostility toward corporations and unions that infuses the majority opinion is inconsistent with the viewpoint neutrality the First Amendment demands of all Government actors, including the Members of this Court. Corporations, after all, are the engines of our modern economy. They facilitate complex operations on which the Nation's prosperity depends. To say these entities cannot alert the public to pending political issues that may threaten the country's economic interests is unprecedented. Unions are also an established part of the national economic system. They, too, have their own unique insights to contribute to the political debate, but the law's impact on them is just as severe. The costs of the majority's misplaced concerns about the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth, Austin, supra, at 660, moreover, will weigh most heavily on budget-strapped nonprofit entities upon which many of our citizens rely for political commentary and advocacy. These groups must now choose between staying on the sidelines in the next election or establishing a PAC against their institutional identities. PACs are a legal construct sanctioned by Congress. They are not necessarily the means of communication chosen and preferred by the citizenry. In the same vein the Court is quite incorrect to suggest that the mainstream press is a sufficient palliative for the novel and severe constraints this law imposes on the political process. The Court should appreciate the dynamic contribution diverse groups and associations make to the intellectual and cultural life of the Nation. It should not permit Congress to foreclose or restrict those groups from participating in the political process by constraints not applicable to the established press.