Opinion ID: 2994717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mason’s Claim

Text: In his reply brief, perhaps recognizing the problems with using coworker conduct to prove a claim of supervisor harassment, Mason contends that he properly presented a claim based on coworker harassment in the first place, in addition to his claim based on supervisor harassment. If so, he now contends that Shands’ excluded testimony is relevant to proving the coworker aspect of his claim. The district court’s accurate conclusion that Mason only presented a claim for supervisor harassment was clearly critical to its evidentiary ruling. Because Mason does not dispute this conclusion until his reply brief, this new argument is waived. See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 405 n. 5 (7th Cir. 2000). Assuming this argument were preserved, it is of course true, as Mason notes, that Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) only requires a short and plain statement that will provide the defendant with fair notice of his claim. See Ryan v. Mary Immaculate Queen Ctr., 188 F.3d 857, 860 (7th Cir. 1999). But as we have noted, Mason’s complaint does not fairly notify SIU that he is claiming coworker harassment. Although he attempts to magnify the meaning of paragraph twenty-three of his complaint,/5 it is not only silent on coworker conduct, but it is inextricably sandwiched between two paragraphs specifically discussing supervisor harassment. Mason might have been able to shoehorn a claim for coworker harassment into paragraph twenty-three for purposes of surviving a motion to dismiss by alleging hypothetical facts about harassing coworkers. But even then the hypotheticals would have to be consistent with his allegations of supervisor harassment. See Holman, 211 F.3d at 405. Aside from the fact that he has produced no evidence of his being harassed by coworkers, Mason has consistently represented that he was claiming supervisor harassment. He did so during discovery, and he repeatedly testified at trial that this was indeed his claim. His one brief comment concerning his coworkers-- that while they generally talked to him, after he returned from his nine-month absence sometimes they wouldn’t- -is hardly sufficient, given the overwhelming thrust of his testimony, to place SIU on notice that he was (now) claiming an additional type of hostile work environment. Certainly by the time a plaintiff testifies in his case in chief, a defendant is entitled to rely on the notice that the complaint has given him when its allegations are confirmed by the plaintiff’s own trial testimony. See Vidimos, Inc. v. Laser Lab Ltd., 99 F.3d 217, 222 (7th Cir. 1996). To allow Mason to introduce evidence of alleged coworker harassment via Shands’ testimony would be allowing him to amend his complaint to include a new claim based on coworker harassment. See Chaveriat v. Williams Pipe Line Co., 11 F.3d 1420, 1428-30 (7th Cir. 1993). At this late stage of the case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in not allowing Mason to do so. Id. at 1430 (court does not abuse its discretion when it prevents unfair prejudice to defendant from admitting evidence that would inject a new claim late in the proceedings)./6