Opinion ID: 2976663
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process Arguments

Text: Vushaj’s first due process argument is that both the Immigration Judge and the Board applied the wrong legal standard in evaluating her asylum claim. Specifically, she contends that each failed to decide whether there had been a “fundamental change in circumstances,” id. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A) (emphasis added), so as to rebut the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Rather, she argues, each applied a less stringent test. In the Immigration Judge’s opinion, she points to the following sentence as evidence that the wrong legal standard was applied: “The [Department of Homeland Security] argues, however, that there has been a 6 substantial change in country conditions and circumstances that adequately rebuts the regulatory presumption of a well-founded fear of persecution . . . .” JA 35 (emphasis added). And in the Board’s decision, she points to its statement that: “significant changes have occurred in that country that have rebutted the presumption that she has a well-founded fear of future persecution.” JA 5 (emphasis added). Vushaj’s argument is not persuasive. First, the Immigration Judge uses the term “substantial” merely to describe the government’s position, not to set forth the applicable legal standard. Moreover, although significant and substantial are not synonyms for fundamental, fundamental changes can certainly also be significant or substantial. Finally, there is nothing in either the Immigration Judge’s opinion or the Board’s order to suggest that the failure to use the word “fundamental” was based on a misunderstanding of the standard that applied. Vushaj’s second due process argument is that the Board did not give the Immigration Judge’s order the meaningful review which due process requires. She argues that the Board’s two-paragraph decision, consisting of only a brief procedural history, a statement that it affirmed the Immigration Judge’s decision with a citation to its own decision in In re Burbano, 20 I & N Dec. 872, 874 (BIA 1994), and one substantive statement agreeing with the Immigration Judge’s finding that the changes in Albania rebutted the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution, was inadequate to satisfy due process. This argument is foreclosed by controlling precedent. See Gishta v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 972, 980 (6th Cir. 2005). In Gishta, as in the present case, the Board did not invoke its authority to affirm without opinion, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(4), but rather exercised its authority to “issue a brief order affirming, modifying, or remanding the decision under review,” see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5). The Board’s decision in 7 Gishta, like its decision in the present case, included a citation to In re Burbano and a brief statement addressing only one aspect of the Immigration Judge’s decision. In considering whether the Board thereby violated the petitioners’ due process rights, the Sixth Circuit held: The board’s independent review of the case is demonstrated by its citation of In re Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), which states that a brief decision affirming the immigration judge’s decision does not mean that the board did not exercise its independent review authority over the case, but rather the board adopts or affirms the immigration judge’s decision when it is “in agreement with the reasoning and result of that decision.” Id. at 874. [Moreover,] the board’s specific finding that the Gishtas’ inadequate interpretation argument failed for lack of prejudice and provided no basis for reversing the immigration judge’s decision also demonstrates that the board independently reviewed the case. Gishta, 404 F.3d at 980. Accordingly, Vushaj’s second due process argument fails.