Opinion ID: 4556240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Resistance to Arrest

Text: The third Graham factor considers whether the suspect “is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” 490 U.S. at 396. We have held that “[i]f a suspect actively resists arrest and refuses to be handcuffed, officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment by using 3 Plaintiff points out that his medical expert, Dr. Werner Spitz, examined Kapuscinski’s postmortem photos and concluded that there was evidence of more than two taser wounds, “which contradicts Defendants’ position they only tased Mr. Kapuscinski twice.” Appellant’s Br. at 11. That is, however, all Dr. Spitz contradicts. Plaintiff has not refuted the points in the officers’ testimony that are critical to assessing the threat he posed—that Kapuscinski was non-compliant with their verbal commands, that he refused to roll over and instead attempted to stand up, and that he appeared extremely belligerent. Plaintiff has provided no evidence, and has not identified anything in the officers’ depositions, that contradicts these aspects of their account. - 12 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. a taser to subdue him.” Hagans, 695 F.3d at 509. The district court found that Kapuscinski was actively resisting arrest because he “was certainly hostile, belligerent and thrashing.” R. 34, Dist. Ct. Order, PageID # 753. It noted that Kapuscinski’s violent assault of Christina and the officers’ testimony that he was “uncontrollable . . . within feet of them refusing arrest commands” justified this determination. Id. Additionally, the court reasoned, “[t]he capstone that marked his active resistance was his decision to stand up after eleven verbal commands to either roll over or remain on the ground.” Id. It found that officers are not required by the Fourth Amendment “to grapple hand-to-hand with a suspect who threatens their physical safety.” Id. This Court has identified active resistance where “some outward manifestation—either verbal or physical—on the part of the suspect had suggested volitional and conscious defiance.” Eldridge v. City of Warren, 533 F. App’x 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2013). In Hagans, the suspect evinced active resistance by refusing to allow himself to be handcuffed and wrestling with officers. 695 F.3d at 507, 510–11. In Foos v. City of Delaware, 492 F. App’x 582, 584–85, 590–91 (6th Cir. 2012), we held there was active resistance where a suspect who had crashed into a concrete pillar revved his engine rather than respond to an officer’s attempt to get his attention, reached into his backseat when back-up arrived as if to retrieve a weapon, and continued to thrash about violently after officers broke his car’s window with an axe. In Eldridge, this Court stated: If there is a common thread to be found in our caselaw on this issue, it is that noncompliance alone does not indicate active resistance; there must be something more. It can be a verbal showing of hostility . . . [i]t can also be a deliberate act of defiance using one’s own body, as in Hagans, or some other mechanism, such as the truck in Foos. 533 F. App’x at 535. We then held that a man who was driving erratically and had crashed into a concrete barricade and refused to obey officer commands to exit his vehicle until he was tased was - 13 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. not actively resisting arrest. Id. at 530–31; 535. The suspect remained in his vehicle and assured officers that he was fine. Id. at 530–31. He did not evince active resistance because he engaged in no aggressive or physical behavior. Id. at 535. Instead, “the only individuals conveying any sense of aggression were the two officers.” Id. It was later determined that the man was having a hypoglycemic episode. Id. at 531. Moreover, in Kent, this Court found no active resistance on the part of the plaintiff while he was being confronted by police in his home. 810 F.3d at 393–94. Paramedics and police officers were at Kent’s home because his father was unresponsive. Id. at 387. Kent grew increasingly agitated as the paramedics worked on his father because he knew that his father had a living will with a “do not resuscitate” order. However, because Kent could produce no proof of the will, the paramedics attempted to revive his father. Id. at 387–88. Officers at the scene ordered Kent to calm down but he refused. Id. at 388. When an officer told Kent that he would be tased if he did not control himself, Kent said—with his hands raised and his back to the wall—“Go ahead and Taze me, then.” Id. The officer did so, and Kent was handcuffed. Id. at 388–89. We held that under those circumstances, Kent was not actively resisting the officers when he was tased because was not attempting to flee from the officers and he never resisted handcuffing. Id. at 393–94. Ultimately, Kent did no more than fail to comply with an officer’s command. Id. In the present case, Kapuscinski resisted arrest by refusing to comply with the officers’ demands that he roll over and by physically attempting to stand up. These actions reflect a “deliberate act of defiance using one’s own body.” Eldridge, 533 F. App’x at 535; see also Hagans, 695 F.3d at 510–11 (finding active resistance where plaintiff wrestled with officers and refused to be handcuffed). Unlike the situation in Eldridge, Officer Mitchell was not the only one “conveying - 14 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. a[] sense of aggression.” 533 F. App’x at 535. In fact, it was Kapuscinski’s refusal to comply with officer instructions to release Christina that prompted the deployment of tasers in the first place. Moreover, while Foos involved a driver whose active resistance came in the form of revving his engine and appearing to reach for a weapon, 492 F. App’x at 584–85, 590–91, Kapuscinski similarly failed to respond to an officer’s attempt to get his attention and instead began to act belligerently. And wholly unlike Kent, Kapuscinski had no reasonable explanation for his hostility towards the officers, nor was Kapuscinski’s kicking akin to Kent’s “agitated hand gestures.” 810 F.3d at 391. Importantly, in that case, Kent ceased his hand movements prior to being tased and instead had his hands raised and his back against the wall—emphasizing his lack of active resistance to the officers. Id. at 391–92. Kapuscinski, conversely, did not cease attempting to stand up until Mitchell successfully incapacitated him. Therefore, Kapuscinski was actively resisting arrest.4 After considering the three Graham factors and taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, we conclude that Mitchell’s use of force was reasonable. Kapuscinski’s death is undeniably tragic; lethal force was not intended nor was it apparently deemed necessary by the responding officers. However, the law allows officers sufficient breathing room to respond adequately to threats to themselves and others, even when those responses have unintended fatal consequences. Mitchell’s taser use fits within that grant of discretion as articulated by the Supreme Court in Graham and expounded in numerous cases by this Court, including those cited above. 4 We have said that “[i]n determining whether officers used excessive force, courts have placed great weight on officers’ failure to warn a suspect before deploying a taser.” Gradisher v. City of Akron, 794 F.3d 574, 585 (6th Cir. 2015). Plaintiff does correctly note that Mitchell did not warn Kapuscinski before deploying his taser. However, it is unclear from the record what difference a warning would have made in the present case, or whether there appeared to be time to warn before Kapuscinski charged the officers. Robinson warned Kapuscinski before attempting to tase him a second time and it is clear that Kapuscinski refused to heed any of his commands. - 15 - Case No. 19-1582, Kapuscinski v. City of Gibraltar, et al. See, e.g., Hagans, 695 F.3d at 511 (finding that Hagans’ death, caused in part by taser shocks, did not change the fact that the use of a taser against him was reasonable). Thus, summary judgment was appropriately granted to Mitchell.