Opinion ID: 2092304
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Could defendant's wife consent to the seizure of October 12?

Text: When the officers returned on October 12, they asked the wife if she would get the checks and the notebook which had been seen on the previous day's search in the bedroom. She did so with little or no conversation with the officers. Defendant argues that his wife could not waive his rights by delivering the specified items to the police officers. The Court of Appeals did not base their decision of the seizure issue on the wife's consent. [18] Following People v Flowers, 23 Mich App 523; 179 NW2d 56 (1970) the Court of Appeals stated in dicta that the wife was an outsider and could not waive the right of a charged party. 32 Mich 610, 631. There is no Michigan case directly in point. In People v Weaver, 241 Mich 616; 217 NW 797 (1928), the question was whether the constitutional right of the defendant wife to immunity from the unreasonable search of her home, one owned by her, may be waived by her husband. In holding that the evidence obtained in the search should have been suppressed, the Court stated: Defendant [wife] owned this property, was there conducting a boarding and rooming house, and, so far as this record discloses, was supporting herself.    To hold that the waiver signed by her husband nearly two years before prevents her from here asserting her constitutional rights would place such rights into the care and keeping of the husbands of all the married women of the state. 241 Mich 616, 623. In People v Azukauckas, 241 Mich 182; 216 NW 408 (1927) the question was whether defendant, a bootlegger, could object to a warrant where the householder to whom liquor had been delivered as part of a sale did not. Certain Court of Appeals cases relied on by defendant will be considered later. Both of these cases are distinguishable on the facts from the instant case. Authority in other states is widely split on the question of whether a wife can consent to a search of the husband's premises and a seizure of his property. [19] The United States Supreme Court has not yet passed on this particular question. In Amos v United States, 255 US 313, 317; 41 S Ct 266; 65 L Ed 654 (1921), the Supreme Court held that a wife could not consent to a search of her husband's premises when the consent was a product of coercion. It stated: We need not consider whether it is possible for a wife, in the absence of her husband, thus to waive his constitutional rights, for it is perfectly clear that under the implied coercion here presented, no such waiver was intended or effected. [20] An additional highly relevant factor in this case is that at the time of the search and seizure, the defendant and his wife owned the property jointly. [21] This leads to the question of whether persons with at least equal interests in the premises or property with the one asserting the constitutional immunity against unreasonable searches and seizures may consent to a search of such premises or property notwithstanding the husband-wife relationship. [22] There are four recent cases in which the United States Supreme Court has considered the matter of consent to search by some one other than the defendant but a person who has some proprietary interest in the place and sometimes in the object searched or searched for. Chapman v United States, 365 US 610; 81 S Ct 776; 5 L Ed 2d 828 (1961); Stoner v California, 376 US 483; 84 S Ct 889; 11 L Ed 2d 856 (1964); Bumper v North Carolina, 391 US 543; 88 S Ct 1788; 20 L Ed 2d 797 (1968); Frazier v Cupp, 394 US 731; 89 S Ct 1420; 22 L Ed 2d 684 (1969). These four cases along with Amos, supra, establish four guidelines, two of which are pertinent in the instant case: 1. If the search is coerced, the search and its fruits are illegal whatever the other circumstances are. Bumper, supra, and see also Amos, supra . 2. An owner may not give consent to search premises of a tenant unless contractually provided for. Chapman, supra, and Stoner, supra . 3. An owner may give consent to search of a room in a house which is commonly used and not the part of the house assigned to defendant, particularly if the object of the search is also commonly used. Dicta in Bumper, supra . 4. The owner of a house may give consent to search a container (a duffel bag) jointly used by the owner and the defendant and left in the householder's house. Frazier, supra . In Bumper v North Carolina, 391 US 543; 88 S Ct 1788; 20 L Ed 2d 797 (1968), the Supreme Court dealt with the problem of a consent given under coercive circumstances. In this case, petitioner lived with his grandmother in a house owned by her. She also owned the rifle that was seized. The Court left no doubt that the grandmother, in the absence of coercion, could have consented to the search. It stated: Mrs. Leath owned both the house and the rifle. The petitioner concedes that her voluntary consent to the search would have been binding upon him.    The rifle was used by all members of the household and was found in the common part of the house. 391 US 543, 548, fn 11.