Opinion ID: 78597
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Drug and Stun Gun Evidence

Text: Culver first asserts that the district court improperly admitted evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that he drugged and used a stun gun on K.W. on November 11, 2003. We review the district court's admission of prior crimes or bad acts under [Rule] 404(b) for abuse of discretion. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir.2005). The government presented evidence that Culver drugged K.W. with Valium and Xanax and that he attempted to drug K.W. with Ambien. K.W. testified that Culver gave her two blue pills from an Aleve bottle on November 11. K.W. said that she took one of the pills and threw one of them away in the kitchen garbage can. The police found an Aleve bottle containing 13 Valium tablets and 24 Xanax tablets at the Hoover residence and recovered a Xanax tablet from the kitchen garbage can. K.W. tested positive for Valium, and although the Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences did not attempt to determine the specific quantity of Valium in K.W.'s blood, a departmental representative testified that test data suggested that K.W. had taken a single acute dose of Valium. Sharon Brasuell testified that she found a vaginal syringe containing K-Y Jelly and a white pill under K.W.'s bed and that she discharged the pill from the syringe and placed the pill in a Pamprin bottle containing identical white pills. The Pamprin bottle recovered by the police at the Hoover residence contained six Ambien tablets. In addition, the police found computer printouts detailing the effects of Valium and Ambien in Culver's Jeep. The government also presented evidence that Culver shocked K.W. on her upper back with a stun gun. K.W. testified that she awoke to a shocking sensation on her upper back late in the evening on November 11 and that Culver was in her bed when she awoke. When the police arrived on the scene, they took pictures of marks on K.W.'s upper back that appeared to have been made by a stun gun, and they found a stun gun box in the closet of Culver's bedroom. Rule 404(b) provides that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.... Fed.R.Evid. 404(b). We have explained that Rule 404(b) is one of inclusion which allows [other act] evidence unless it tends to prove only criminal propensity. United States v. Cohen, 888 F.2d 770, 776 (11th Cir.1989). The list provided by the rule is not exhaustive and the range of relevancy outside the ban is almost infinite. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Evidence of prior bad acts must meet a three-part test for admissibility: (1) the evidence must be relevant to an issue other than defendant's character; (2) the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice; [and] (3) the government must offer sufficient proof so that the jury could find that defendant committed the act. United States v. Ellisor, 522 F.3d 1255, 1267 (11th Cir.2008) (quoting Ramirez, 426 F.3d at 1354). The government did not offer the evidence that Culver drugged and shocked K.W. to establish that Culver's character made him more likely to commit the charged offense. To the contrary, the government submitted evidence that Culver had the knowledge and the means to render K.W. unconscious to explain to the jury why K.W. could not remember the filming of the tape and why the female depicted on the tape remained completely motionless. The drug and stun gun evidence was offered for a non-character-related purpose. In assessing the probative value of the extrinsic evidence, we evaluate the Government's incremental need for the evidence to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, `the overall similarity of the extrinsic and the charged offenses and the closeness or remoteness in time of the charged to the extrinsic offense.' Ellisor, 522 F.3d at 1268 (quoting United States v. Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 805 (11th Cir.1983)). Although several months elapsed between the filming of the child pornography and Culver's drugging and shocking of K.W., the government's incremental need for the drug and stun gun evidence to overcome any potential doubt generated by K.W.'s inability to remember the events in question and the overall similarity between the acts depicted on the tape and the events of November 11 render the drug and stun gun evidence highly probative. Furthermore, although the drug and stun gun evidence may have had a prejudicial effect, we cannot say that the evidence's potential for undue prejudice substantially outweighed the evidence's probative value. With respect to the third prong of the Rule 404(b) admissibility test, Culver contends that the government did not offer proof sufficient for the jury to conclude that he drugged and shocked K.W. because he was acquitted of these acts in state court. Culver's state trial is irrelevant to the issue before us. In our view, the government presented sufficient evidence in the federal trial for the jury to conclude that Culver drugged and shocked K.W, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence.