Opinion ID: 1833487
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Judgment of the Hinds County Chancery Court

Text: ¶ 21. Additionally, DHS argues that 1991 order of dismissal entered by the Hinds County Chancery Court should also bar litigation of the jurisdictional issue. The order is somewhat ambiguous as to exactly which action it is dismissing and on what grounds. DHS argues that the order is a conclusive determination by the chancery court that the Canadian court had jurisdiction over the parties regarding Kern's requests for a divorce, for child support, and for child custody. Shelnut contends that the order is a conclusive determination by the chancery court that the Canadian court had jurisdiction over the parties regarding only Kern's request for a divorce. ¶ 22. Prior to the Canadian court's determination of the petition filed by Kern, Shelnut filed two actions in the Hinds County Chancery Court. The first, a petition for child custody and support, was assigned to Chancellor Denise Sweet Owens as case number 138,362. The second, a petition for divorce, was assigned to Chancellor Robinson as case number 141, 954. Kern challenged the jurisdiction of the chancery court in the custody action. On April 2, 1990, Chancellor Sweet denied Kern's motion to dismiss, finding that the chancery court had concurrent jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter with the Canadian court. On September 20, 1990, the two actions before the chancery court were consolidated by agreement of the parties, and the child custody and support action was assigned to Chancellor Robinson along with the divorce action. On July 5, 1990, the Canadian court entered its order adjudicating the issues of child custody and child support and declaring the parties divorced. On January 8, 1991, Chancellor Robinson entered an Order of Dismissal, which stated as follows: This cause came on to be heard on the motion of the Defendant, Gaye-Lynn Kern Shelnut, to dismiss the Complaint for Divorce as filed by the Plaintiff, Edward E. Shelnut, and the Court having considered the motion to dismiss of Gaye-Lynn Kern Shelnut and having taken into consideration that a divorce has been entered between these parties in the Province of Saskatchewan, Country of Canada, and further finding that the marital relationship and finding that the Canadian court had jurisdiction in that cause found that the divorce existing between these parties in Canada was a valid divorce and further found that no purpose could be served by pursuing a divorce in the Chancery Court of the First Judicial District of Hinds County, Mississippi. The Court therefore finds that the Complaint for Divorce should be dismissed as moot. (emphasis added). The only case number on the chancery court's order is 141,954, the number of the divorce action. ¶ 23. Shelnut successfully argued before Chancellor Robinson that the above order issued by him referred only to the divorce action and not to the action for child custody or support. Shelnut's attorney submitted to the court a letter written by him to his client after the order was issued explaining the contents of an unrecorded conversation which had taken place in chambers prior to the issuance of the 1991 order. The letter states: Judge Robinson then stated that the sequence of process notwithstanding, he felt that the issue of obtaining a divorce had already been settled in Canada. He said that as far as he was concerned, the parties were divorced. I pointed out that there was much more at issue than the simple marital status of the partieswhether they were now single or still married. I explained that there were issues of child custody, visitation and support payments.... Judge Robinson ... stated that unless Gaye-Lynn came to Mississippi and subjected herself to the jurisdiction of his Court, he would not enter any Orders enforcing the Canadian decree for child support. He also commented that unless you went to Canada and submitted to its jurisdiction, any Order here would be as a practical matter unenforceable in Canada against Gaye-Lynn. Subsequent to the hearing regarding the enforceability of the Canadian judgment, Chancellor Robinson found that the 1991 order of dismissal was not dispositive on the issue of the personal jurisdiction of the Canadian court, but that the order was merely intended to acknowledge that the Canadian court had dissolved the marriage of the parties in the nature of an in rem action. ¶ 24. The face of the 1991 order of dismissal, referred only to the divorce action between the parties. The letter produced by Shelnut's attorney recounting the conversation in chambers as well as the chancellor's subsequent interpretation of his own order support this conclusion. Furthermore, though Shelnut's divorce action and child custody and support action had been consolidated, the order refers only to the divorce action, and the case number found on the order is only that of the divorce action. ¶ 25. It is the conclusion of this Court that the order does not constitute an adjudication of the personal jurisdiction of the Canadian court with regard to its ability to determine the issue of child support. Thus, the 1991 order of dismissal, in and of itself, did not preclude Shelnut's litigating the jurisdictional issue before the chancery court. ¶ 26. However, as discussed above, the Canadian court's judgment does preclude re-litigation of the jurisdictional issue.