Opinion ID: 1105501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was Payne denied his right to a speedy trial?

Text: Payne argues that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial because there was a 25-month delay between his indictment and his trial. Payne contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in its application of the following factors set out in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), for a court to consider when analyzing a speedy-trial claim: (1) the length of the delay; (2) reasons for the delay; (3) when the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial; and (4) any prejudice that the defendant has suffered because of the delay. Payne argues that the court erred in weighing the Barker factors by not including in the length of the delay the six months it took to find a judge to hear the case. He contends that the six months that passed between the retirement of one judge and the appointment of another should have been weighed against the State. The procedural history of Payne's case is as follows: March 25, 1992 Payne was arrested in Dade County, Florida. (C.R.49.) April 16, 1992 Payne was indicted by a Cullman County grand jury on three counts of capital murder. (C.R.2.) April 22, 1992 Payne made his initial appearance in court. (C.R.3-4.) April 29, 1992 Payne moved to dismiss the indictment. (C.R.17-18.) April 30, 1992 Payne filed 4 motions: (1) a motion to compel the state to elect whether to proceed on the first, the second, or the third count of the indictment; (2) another motion to dismiss the indictment; (3) a petition for psychiatric evaluations to determine his competency at the time of the offense and his competency to stand trial; and (4) a motion to vacate the State's discovery order and for a protective order, requesting that the State be prohibited from taking hair, blood, saliva, and urine samples. (C.R.20-30.) May 6, 1992 Payne moved for a continuance on his motion for psychiatric evaluations, which was scheduled to be heard on May 7, 1992; Payne moved for a change of venue and requested a hearing on this issue. (C.R.34-35.) May 7, 1992 Payne filed an ex parte application for investigative expenses, requesting a hearing on the issue; Payne also moved for permission to file other motions. (C.R.38-48.) May 8, 1992 Payne moved to suppress his statement and requested a hearing on this issue. (C.R.49-54.) May 13, 1992 Payne moved to suppress certain physical evidence and requested a hearing on this issue. (C. 55-58.) May 14, 1992 Payne moved to continue the trial, which was set for May 18, 1992. (C.R.59-59A.) June 10, 1992 Payne moved to continue the the psychiatric evaluation and change of venue hearings. (C.R.60-61.) July 15, 1992 Payne again moved to continue the hearings on the psychiatric evaluation and change of venue. (C.R.62-63.) September 3, 1992 The hearing on Payne's motion for psychiatric evaluation and change of venue was held. The trial court ordered psychiatric evaluations for Payne and denied the change of venue motion. (Supp.vol.3, 1-84.) (C.R.64-65.) October 26, 1992 The trial court found Payne competent to stand trial and set trial for December 14, 1992. (C.R.66-67.) November 30, 1992 Payne requested to individually voir dire the jury and to sequester those who had been questioned individually from those who had not. (C.R.68-80.) December 1, 1992 The State moved to continue the trial, which was set for December 14, 1992, because the blood-type analysis had not been completed. (C.R.81-82.) December 17, 1992 Payne moved for a pretrial determination of the admissibility of certain evidence, specifically requesting a hearing 60 days before trial. (C.R.85-86.) December 18, 1992 The trial court set a hearing for a pretrial determination of the admissibility of evidence, for January 7, 1993. (C.R.210.) January 7, 1993 At the hearing, the trial court ordered the State and Payne to file briefs on the legal issues presented regarding the admissibility of certain evidence. (Supp.vol.4, pp. 1-205.) (C.R.208.) January 20, 1993 The State moved to extend the time for filing the requested briefs. (C.R.87-88.) January 21, 1993 The trial court extended the time to file briefs, to February 10, 1993. (C.R.208.) February 5, 1993 Payne moved to further extend the time for filing briefs; the trial court extended the time to March 10, 1993. (C.R.89-90, 208.) March 19, 1993 The State moved to continue the trial, which had been set for March 22, 1993, because DNA testing had not been completed. (C.R.90-91.) March 25, 1993 The trial court denied Payne's motion to suppress his statement and certain evidence seized from his automobile. (C.R.97-98.) April 10, 1993 Payne petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus, challenging the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress his statement and evidence seized from his car. (C.R.208.) April 12, 1993 Payne filed an ex parte request for investigative expenses. (C.R.91-97.) April 13, 1993 The trial court granted Payne's request for investigative expenses. (C.R.211.) April 23, 1993 The Court of Criminal Appeals denied Payne's petition for the writ of mandamus. Ex parte Payne, 626 So.2d 651 (Ala.Crim.App.1993); Payne petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus. (C.R.97-98.) May 14, 1993 Payne moved for a continuance pending this Court's ruling on the mandamus petition. (C.R.99-100.) June 9, 1993 the trial court continued the trial, pending this Court's review of Payne's petition and pending resolution of Payne's motion concerning out-of-state witnesses. (C.R.101-02.) June 14, 1993 This Court denied the writ of mandamus. (C.R.103.) August 30, 1993 Payne moved for production of witnesses, an incarcerated person; he also petitioned for certification of the materiality of out-of-state witnesses. (C.R.103-108.) September 10, 1993 The presiding judge in the circuit denied both of the motions filed on August 30, 1993, noting that the trial date had not been set, because of the retirement of Judge Riley. (C.R.108-09, 211.) November 10, 1993 Payne moved for a speedy trial. (C.R.112.) November 12, 1993 Payne again moved for production of witnesses and a certification of materiality of out-of-state witnesses. (C.R. 113-19, 122.) January 12, 1994 Newly appointed Circuit Judge Frank Brunner recused because he had previously been appointed guardian ad litem for the victim's minor daughter. (C.R. 211.) January 14, 1994 Payne again moved for a speedy trial. (C.R.124-25.) January 24, 1994 The presiding circuit judge recused because he had just had surgery and was still recuperating. (C.R.211.) January 25, 1994 The presiding circuit judge notified the Chief Justice of this Court of his recusal and requested that the case be assigned to another circuit judge. (C.R.126.) January 28, 1994 Payne filed a motion for the court to reconsider all previously filed motions. (C.R.127.) February 3, 1994 This Court entered an order appointing Judge Robert Austin to hear the case. Judge Austin set a pretrial conference for February 14, 1994. (C.R.129-130.) February 14, 1994 Payne made a motion in limine. (C.R.131-34.) March 7, 1994 Payne moved to dismiss the indictment, alleging a failure to give him a speedy trial. (C.R.136-38.) [1] March 11, 1994 The motion to dismiss was denied and trial was set for May 23, 1994. (C.R.138-39.) May 3, 1994 Payne moved for production of witnesses and a certification of the materiality of an out-of-state witness, for the third time. (C.R.140-143.) May 23, 1994 The trial began. (R.T. 1.) The Court of Criminal Appeals held that the delay of 25 months between indictment and trial was not presumptively prejudicial, because much of the delay was due to the problem of finding a judge to hear the case. That court wrote, This delay is not attributable to either the prosecution or Payne. 683 So.2d at 452. The court reviewed the remaining Barker factors and found no violation of Payne's right to a speedy trial. Payne contends that the Court of Criminal Appeals should have weighed against the State the delay due to the problem of finding a judge to hear the case. The United States Supreme Court has written: A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government rather than with the defendant. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. We must consider the Barker factors. There were 25 months between indictment and trial. There were several reasons for the delay of the trial: From Payne's April 16, 1992, indictment to the first setting of trial for May 18, 1992Payne filed at least 9 motions, including a motion for a continuance. From June 10, 1992, to September 3, 1992, Payne filed several motions, including a motion for a psychiatric evaluation and for a hearing on that motion. On October 6, 1992, the trial court found Payne competent to stand trial and set trial for December 14, 1992. On December 1, 1992, the State made its first motion for a continuance. On December 17, 1992, Payne moved for a pretrial hearing on whether to suppress certain evidence. The requested hearing was set for January 7, 1993. At the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to file briefs. Subsequently, both the State and Payne requested additional time to file their briefs. On March 19, 1993, the State moved for a continuance because DNA testing was not complete. On March 25, 1993, the trial court denied Payne's motion to suppress. In April 1993, Payne asked for investigative funds, which the trial court granted. Also in April, Payne petitioned the Court of Criminal Appeals for a writ of mandamus regarding the suppression issue. The writ was denied on April 23, 1993. Payne then petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus regarding the suppression issue. On May 14, 1993, Payne moved for a continuance pending this Court's ruling on the mandamus petition. The trial court granted the continuance on June 9, 1993. On June 14, 1993, this Court denied the writ. The delay caused by the retirement of one judge and the recusal of two others began in September 1993 and ended on February 3, 1993, when this Court appointed a judge to hear the case. On September 10, 1993, the presiding circuit judge denied two of Payne's motions regarding witnesses because the trial judge sitting on the case had retired. Two months later, on November 10, 1993, Payne moved for a speedy trial. Until November 1993-19 months after the indictment Payne had not asserted his right to a speedy trial. On November 12, 1993, Payne filed another motion regarding witnesses. The next action in the case occurred on January 12, 1994, when a new judge was appointed for the circuit in which Payne had been indicted. That same day, the new judge recused, because of a conflict of interest arising from the fact that he had been guardian ad litem for the victim's minor daughter. On January 14, 1994, Payne again moved for a speedy trial. On January 24, 1994, the presiding judge in the circuit recused because of health problems. On January 25, 1994, he notified the Chief Justice of his recusal, and on February 3, 1994, this Court appointed another judge to hear the case. On that same day, the trial judge set a pretrial hearing for February 14, 1994. On March 7, 1994, Payne filed a motion to dismiss, alleging a denial of a speedy trial [2]  that motion was denied on March 11, 1994. The trial began on May 23, 1994. Payne contends that it should be presumed that he suffered some prejudice by the 25-month delay. He argues that there was no need for him to present any evidence of prejudice, arguing that under Barker a showing of prejudice comes from the fact of pretrial incarceration and from witnesses'loss of memory occurring because of the length of time, citing Barker 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. at 2193. Whether a defendant has been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial cannot be determined by an inflexible rule, but must be determined on a case-by-case basis. In determining that question, a court must weigh the conduct of the prosecution and the conduct of the defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2191-92. Looking at the Barker factors and the facts presented in this case, we cannot say that Payne was denied his right to a speedy trial. Weighing any presumed prejudice from the 25-month delay and attributing to the State the 6-month delay caused by the lack of a trial judge, we must conclude that Payne was not denied a speedy trial. It is undisputed that Payne did not assert his right to a speedy trial until 19 months after the indictment had been filed. The State did not purposefully attempt to delay the trial, and any delay caused by the lack of a judge should be weighed less heavily against the State than a purposeful delay, according to Barker. In weighing any prejudice Payne might have suffered, we consider the interests the right to a speedy trial was designed to protect, i.e., preventing oppressive incarceration, minimizing the defendant's anxiety, and, most important, limiting the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Barker. Because Payne presented no specific incidents of prejudice or impairment to his defense, we have looked at any presumed prejudice to Payne. Although between the indictment and the trial Payne spent 25 months in jail and certainly was anxious as to the outcome of his case, we cannot say that this alone is enough to outweigh the other factors. Payne contends that witnesses' loss of memory also prejudiced him. However, Payne does not point to any specific witness who failed to remember the events of the alleged offense. Even presuming some prejudice based on loss of memory as loss of memory, given that loss of memory is rarely reflected in the record, we cannot say that this factor would outweigh the other factors. We note that the State's case would also be affected by witnesses' loss of memory occurring because of the delay in trial; however, this loss of memory can work to the defendant's favor. We hold that the Court of Criminal Appeals did not err in determining that Payne was not denied his right to a speedy trial.