Opinion ID: 2972268
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Traffic Stop of Faulkner’s Car

Text: Faulkner claims that the evidence obtained during the traffic stop of his vehicle should be suppressed because the police were not justified in making the stop. However, because there was probable cause to believe that Faulkner was violating a traffic law, the officers were justified in stopping Faulkner’s car. -5- No. 04-5589 United States v. Faulkner Stopping a vehicle and detaining its occupants is considered a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Freeman, 209 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2000). A traffic stop is therefore subject to the constitutional requirement that it not be “unreasonable” under the totality of the circumstances. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809 (1996). “As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred.” Id. In this case, the stop of Faulkner was reasonable because there was probable cause to believe that a traffic violation had occurred. A Memphis City Ordinance states that (a) No driver shall stop, stand or park a vehicle abreast of another vehicle parallel to the curb or in any other manner so as to interrupt or interfere with the passage of other vehicles on any street except in the case of public emergency or when directed by a police officer. (b) It shall be unlawful to leave any vehicle standing in any street when such vehicle constitutes a hazard to public safety or an obstruction to traffic. MEMPHIS, TENN., CODE § 21-139. Officer Schafer testified, and the district court found, that Faulkner “inexplicably stopped his car towards the middle of the road.” Officer Schafer testified that Faulkner remained stopped in the middle of the road for approximately 15-20 seconds before the officers initiated the stop and that maneuvering around Faulkner’s car would have required driving in the other lane of traffic. Shafer testified that driving in the other lane of traffic would have been “very unsafe.” Although Faulkner claims that he did not stop the car until the police pulled him over, and that, when he did stop, he pulled his car directly beside the curb, the magistrate judge found that Faulkner’s version of events was not credible. There is not sufficient contrary -6- No. 04-5589 United States v. Faulkner evidence to render the magistrate judge’s credibility determination clearly erroneous. Therefore, taking Officer Schafer’s version of events as true, there was probable cause to believe that Faulkner was violating Memphis Ordinance § 21-139. Accordingly, the initial stop of Faulkner’s vehicle was justified.