Opinion ID: 2601704
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: utah code section 78-15-6(3) is constitutional

Text: ¶ 9 The first question certified to us is whether Utah Code section 78-15-6(3) is constitutional. This question stems from a decision made by this court in 1985 and the legislature's subsequent response. In Egbert I, we raised a concern as to the constitutionality of section 78-15-6(3), but we did not address the issue as it fell outside the scope of the question certified to us. 2007 UT 64, ¶ 8 n. 3, 167 P.3d 1058. ¶ 10 The Egberts assert that section 78-15-6 is unconstitutional and that to hold otherwise would be a violation of the Utah Constitution's provisions regarding enactment of legislation. They reference Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), where we addressed the constitutionality of the Utah Product Liability Act. Specifically, we examined Utah Code section 78-15-3. Id. at 672. We held that section 78-15-3 was unconstitutional under the open courts provision of article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution because it was a statute of repose which barred claims before the cause of action arose. See id. at 681-83. We also determined that because the legislature would not have enacted sections 78-15-4 to -6 without section 78-15-3, the Act was nonseverable. Id. at 686. We therefore held that sections 78-15-4 to -6 were also unconstitutional. Id. at 685-86. ¶ 11 In 1989, the legislature enacted a new section 78-15-3. In doing so, it changed the statute of repose to a statute of limitations. Act of Feb. 20, 1989, ch. 119, § 1, 1989 Utah Laws 268; Utah Code Ann. § 78-15-3 (Supp. 1990). This change resolved the constitutional problems dealt with in Berry. See Egbert I, 2007 UT 64, ¶ 8 n. 3, 167 P.3d 1058. The legislature, however, took no action regarding section 78-15-6. See id. Because it did not, the Egberts argue that section 78-15-6 remains void. Although this would generally be the consequence of the legislature's failure to reenact the nonseverable parts of the statute, subsequent actions by the legislature and this court require a different conclusion. ¶ 12 When a court declares a statute unconstitutional, the statute becomes void. An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886); see also Rossborough Mfg. Co. v. Trimble, 301 F.3d 482, 491 (6th Cir.2002) ([W]hen a statute is held to have been unconstitutional as of its enactment, that statute is void ab initio. ); In the Interest of R.A.S., 249 Ga. 236, 290 S.E.2d 34, 35 (1982) ([O]nce a statute is declared unconstitutional and void, it cannot be saved by a subsequent statutory amendment, as there is, in legal contemplation, nothing to amend.); Reyes v. Texas, 753 S.W.2d 382, 383 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (It is the general rule that an unconstitutional statute, even though having the form and name of law, in reality is no law and in legal contemplation is as inoperative as if it had never undergone the formalities of enactment. Such a statute leaves the question that it purports to settle just as it was prior to its ineffectual enactment. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Hence, [a] statute once held void cannot be revived by repeal and reenactment. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 300 (1999). And [w]here a statute is unconstitutional and void when enacted, the subsequent removal of the constitutional objections thereto does not, by operation of law, give it force and effect. Id. ¶ 13 Undoubtedly, this court's ruling in Berry declared section 78-15-6 to be unconstitutional. With that declaration, section 78-15-6 became void. Nissan, however, argues that by curing the constitutional defect of section 78-15-3 and reenacting section 78-15-3, the legislature made the nonseverable sections of the statutory scheme valid once more. [2] While this theory of implied validation has been adopted elsewhere, we reject its application in this context. ¶ 14 Under the theory of implied validation, [t]he legislature, by repeatedly recognizing a law that is invalid for failure to comply with certain constitutional requirements as to form and procedure, may ratify it and make it valid. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 8 (1999). Implied validation, however, is generally used to validate an invalid statute by passing a constitutional amendment that cures the constitutional infirmity. Id.; see also Beck v. Beck, 814 S.W.2d 745, 747 (Tex. 1991) (explaining the doctrine of implied validation). This occurs in one of three ways. The first is by a specific provision in the amendment that shows expressly or by necessary implication that [the amendment] was intended to operate retrospectively by validating antecedent unconstitutional legislation. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 87 (2005); see, e.g., Bonds v. State Dep't of Revenue, 254 Ala. 553, 49 So.2d 280, 281-82 (1950) (ruling a void act was validated by a subsequent constitutional amendment, which expressly validated and confirmed the void act). The second occurs where a legislature enacts a statute in anticipation of an amendment and the legislature prescrib[es] the manner of giving effect to [the] amendment[]. 16 C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 88 (2005); see also Burrell v. Miss. State Tax Comm'n, 536 So.2d 848, 860 (Miss.1988). The third happens when a statute is enacted in anticipation of a constitutional amendment and the statute and amendment are debated and considered together in the same session of the legislature. Ex parte S. Ry. Co., 556 So.2d 1082, 1090 (Ala.1989). ¶ 15 Although the situation here is arguably analogous, it does not involve a constitutional amendment. Moreover, even if it were advisable to extend the theory of implied validation in a purely statutory context, the theory would not work here. We recognize that Senate Bill 25, the bill leading to the enactment of section 78-15-3, referred to section 78-15-5, which was one of the sections we found unconstitutional in Berry. Yet, neither the bill nor the statute mentioned section 78-15-6. Also, we have not been directed toward anything that shows the legislature passed section 78-15-3 to cure section 78-15-6. Moreover, we are not convinced that validation should be permitted by implication. As the problem before us illustrates, reliance on implication in law-making causes confusion. When the question arises whether a law is a law, we think it best, and mandatory under the constitution, that the legislature give clear notice of its law-making intent by following the constitutional provisions established for the passage of law. This method is simple, and its consequence is clear. Accordingly, we reject Nissan's argument that the cured statute of limitations in section 78-15-3 impliedly validated section 78-15-6. If a law struck down is to become constitutional once more, the legislature must cure the constitutional defect and enact the law in accordance with the legislative process. ¶ 16 Although we reject Nissan's theory of implied validation, we acknowledge that there has been an assumption of section 78-15-6's constitutionality for roughly twenty years, an assumption that we conclude has become in essence a common law rule. The common law ... includes those rules of law which do not rest for their authority upon any express or positive statute or other written declaration, but rather upon statements of principles found in the decisions of the courts. 15A Am.Jur.2d Common Law § 1 (2000). [T]he common law is the rule of decision in cases not otherwise provided for by statute. State v. Lawrence, 98 Idaho 399, 565 P.2d 989, 990 (1977). It is the law of necessity. Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Strnad, 255 Kan. 657, 876 P.2d 1362, 1367 (1994). ¶ 17 Since Berry, Utah appellate courts have applied the rule previously codified in section 78-15-6 in thirteen cases. [3] The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the United States District Court for the District of Utah have also applied the rule in at least seven cases. [4] We hold therefore that through two decades of judicial articulation, Utah courts have filled the void by adopting implicitly into the common law the same rule as that enunciated by section 78-15-6. We do so based on the length of time, the consistency of holdings, the continued reliance on the rule, and necessity. We note that if the rule itself were unconstitutional, there could be no adoption of it through common law, but that is not the case here. ¶ 18 In addition, though section 78-15-6 became a common law rule over a 20-year period, the legislature has recently recodified it as part of the statutory scheme. In 2008, the legislature recodified and revised Title 78 of the Utah Code. It specifically renumbered and recodified section 78-15-6 as section 78B-6-703. The Egberts argue that this recodification was purely administrative and cannot qualify as legislative action. We disagree. ¶ 19 A revision or codification of statutes is something more than a restatement of the substance thereof.... It implies a reexamination of them ... in a corrected improved form. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 266 (1999). Unlike a compilation, a revision and recodification requires legislative action. See id. Through this legislative action, the legislature enacts, and makes of force as a statute, every provision in the entire work which it has under consideration, whether or not such provisions had been previously enacted by the legislature. Id. § 270. ¶ 20 Here, the legislature passed House Bill 78 for the Recodification and Revision of Title 78. In accordance with article VI, section 22 of the Utah Constitution, the legislature read the bill three separate times in each house before its passage. Moreover, not only did the legislature make stylistic changes to the statute, it also made a substantive change. The legislature deleted the statute's former section (2), which defined the phrase unreasonably dangerous. See Title 78 Recodification & Revision, ch. 3, § 975, 2008 Utah Laws 475. [5] Accordingly, because of this recodification and revision, section 78-15-6 has now been fully enacted as required by the constitution. [6] ¶ 21 We therefore answer the federal district court's first certified question in the affirmative. Section 78-15-6 of the Utah Code became constitutional following the 2008 recodification by the legislature. For cases filed after Berry but before the 2008 recodification, section 78-15-6 was not statutory law, but the rule contained therein was in force as part of the common law.