Opinion ID: 2382410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was defendant's statement constitutionally privileged as the expression of an opinion?

Text: Although at common law an expression of opinion might have been actionable as defamatory in the event that such an expression was sufficiently derogatory of another to cause harm to his reputation, 3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 566 at 170-71 (1976), that rule now appears to have been rendered unconstitutional by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 41 L.Ed.2d 789 (1974). In that case the Court observed: Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. Id. at 339-40, 94 S.Ct. at 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d at 805. As a result of the foregoing observation, the Restatement of Torts on this subject was modified so that § 566 now provides: A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion. 3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 566 at 170. In the comment to § 566, the reporter's notes indicate: A simple expression of opinion based on disclosed or assumed nondefamatory facts is not itself sufficient for an action of defamation, no matter how unjustified and unreasonable the opinion may be or how deragotory it is. Id. at 173. Shortly after this revision, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Orr v. Argus-Press Co., 586 F.2d 1108, 1114 (6th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 960, 99 S.Ct. 1502, 59 L.Ed.2d 773 (1979), noted, It is now established as a matter of constitutional law that a statement of opinion about matters which are publicly known is not defamatory. We applied these principles to a derogatory expression of opinion in Hawkins v. Oden, ___ R.I. ___, 459 A.2d 481 (1983). In that case we held that the facts upon which the derogatory opinion was based were publicly known and that therefore the opinion, whether justified or not, was constitutionally privileged as a matter of law. In the case at bar, not only were the facts upon which the opinion was based fully disclosed but those facts had also been supplied by plaintiff himself. In effect, plaintiff contends that these facts rendered defendant's expression of opinion wholly unjustified. There seems no doubt, however, that defendant's statement of opinion concerning plaintiff's publications and the characterization thereof was based wholly upon the four-page list that had been submitted to the committee by plaintiff. Thus, the facts were fully disclosed. Considering defendant's memorandum in its entirety, we conclude that his statements relating to the quality and extent of plaintiff's publications during his period of service at Providence College constituted an opinion based upon the four-page summary furnished to the committee by plaintiff. Given this posture of events, it became the function of the court to determine whether defendant's statement to Dr. Thomson was capable of bearing a defamatory meaning in that it might be reasonably understood to imply the assertion of undisclosed facts. Hawkins, ___ R.I. at ___, 459 A.2d at 484; 3 Restatement (Second) Torts § 566, comment c at 173. Consequently, this was an appropriate determination to be made on motion for summary judgment. Rhode Island Recreational Building Authority v. Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island, ___ R.I. ___, ___, 494 A.2d 537, 539 (1985); Ludwig v. Kowal, ___ R.I. ___, ___, 419 A.2d 297, 301 (1980). We are of the opinion that on the record presented to the trial justice, one could only conclude that the facts upon which the defendant's opinion was based were wholly disclosed in plaintiff's own supporting summary of research activities and publications. Given the constitutional privilege and the facts as described by plaintiff, himself, defendant was undoubtedly entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law.