Opinion ID: 1455998
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Meaning of Unlawful Act

Text: (1a) The People argue that the unlawful act element of both section 192(b) and section 192(c) may be any misdemeanor or infraction and that the Court of Appeal erred in its reading of Stuart. The People observe that the Court of Appeal's construction of section 192(c)(1) overlooks the relationship between section 192(c)(1) and the alternate type of vehicular manslaughter defined in section 192(c)(2) [5] and leads to anomalous results that could not have been intended by the Legislature. As construed by the Court of Appeal, the act of extremely reckless and factually dangerous driving which proximately results in a death is not an unlawful act under section 192(c)(1) if the grossly negligent conduct that caused the death occurred in the commission of a misdemeanor violation of the Vehicle Code, but that misdemeanor was not inherently dangerous. Defendant, as did the Court of Appeal, relies in part on past rulings made in the context of involuntary manslaughter under section 192(b). Section 192(b) defines the traditional, common-law-derived form of involuntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony. Defendant argues that this court held in Stuart that the unlawful act to which section 192(b) referred had to be a misdemeanor that was inherently dangerous. Therefore, he reasons, the misdemeanor predicate for conviction under section 192(c)(1) also must be inherently dangerous in the abstract. In his view, the circumstances of the commission of the particular misdemeanor are not a consideration. Defendant relies also on decisions in which this court restricted operation of the felony-murder rule to inherently dangerous felonies. (See, e.g., People v. Burroughs, supra, 35 Cal.3d 824, 829; People v. Nichols (1970) 3 Cal.3d 150, 163 [89 Cal. Rptr. 721, 474 P.2d 673]; People v. Phillips (1966) 64 Cal.2d 574, 582 [51 Cal. Rptr. 225, 414 P.2d 353]; People v. Williams (1965) 63 Cal.2d 452, 458 [47 Cal. Rptr. 7, 406 P.2d 647]; People v. Ford (1964) 60 Cal.2d 772, 795 [36 Cal. Rptr. 620, 388 P.2d 892].) (2a) The issue in this case is one of statutory construction. The legislative intent underlying section 192(c) must be ascertained and, to the extent the plain language of that section permits, any judicial construction must be consistent with and further that purpose. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1859; Walnut Creek Manor v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1991) 54 Cal.3d 245, 268 [284 Cal. Rptr. 718, 814 P.2d 704].) (1b) The language of section 192, and our decision in Stuart construing identical language in section 192(b), support the People's argument that, when an involuntary manslaughter charge under section 192(c)(1) is based on a theory that the victim's death was caused by the defendant driving a vehicle in the commission of an unlawful act, the unlawful act element of the offense that must be dangerous to human life or safety is not the misdemeanor itself in the abstract, but the conduct of the defendant in the circumstances in which the violation occurred. To support a conviction of violating section 192(c) the circumstances of the violation, not the offense in the abstract, must be dangerous to human life and safety. The Court of Appeal recognized that the use of the term in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony in both section 192(b) and section 192(c)(1) reflects legislative intent that the same meaning be accorded the term in each subdivision. However, the Court of Appeal concluded that in Stuart, by which it was bound (see Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937]), this court had held that the unlawful act not amounting to felony that caused death must be an inherently dangerous misdemeanor. Stuart was decided after the enactment of the predecessor of present section 192(c)(1), and thus was not considered by the Legislature in drafting that section. Nonetheless, Stuart applies, since the use of the same phrase  unlawful act, not amounting to felony  in sections 192(b) and 192(c) suggests that the Legislature intended that the phrase be given the same meaning in both sections. (2b) In construing a statute, unless a contrary intent appears ( Union Iron Wks. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1922) 190 Cal. 33 [210 P. 410]; Russ-Field Corp. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's (1958) 164 Cal. App.2d 83 [330 P.2d 432]), the court presumes that the Legislature intended that similar phrases be accorded the same meaning ( Corey v. Knight (1957) 150 Cal. App.2d 671 [310 P.2d 673]), particularly if the terms have been construed by judicial decision. ( Los Angeles Met. Transit Authority v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen (1960) 54 Cal.2d 684, 688 [8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 355 P.2d 905]; Nishikawa Farms, Inc. v. Mahony (1977) 66 Cal. App.3d 781 [136 Cal. Rptr. 233].) (1c) On its face, section 192(c)(1) does not include a requirement that the unlawful act, not amounting to felony be an offense that is inherently dangerous in the abstract. In Stuart, we observed that [w]ords such as `unlawful act, not amounting to felony' have been included in most definitions of manslaughter since the time of Blackstone [citations] and even since the time of Lord Hale, `unlawful act' as it pertains to manslaughter has been interpreted as meaning an act that aside from its unlawfulness was of such a dangerous nature as to justify a conviction of manslaughter if done intentionally or without due caution. [Citations.] To be an unlawful act within the meaning of section 192, therefore, the act in question must be dangerous to human life or safety and meet the conditions of section 20 [i.e., be committed with criminal intent.] ( Stuart, supra, 47 Cal.2d 167, 173.) [6] The Court of Appeal understood Stuart to require, for a conviction of any form of involuntary manslaughter under section 192, including vehicular manslaughter, that the defendant commit an unlawful act, i.e., a misdemeanor, that is inherently dangerous in the abstract. It misunderstood Stuart. In stating that the act in question must be dangerous to human life or safety and meet the conditions of section 20 ( Stuart, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 173), we did not in Stuart require that the unlawful act, not amounting to felony, constitute an inherently dangerous act, or be malum in se. Instead, we required that commission of the unlawful act involve criminal culpability, i.e., have been done in a dangerous manner. Thus, we explained that only if defendant had intentionally or through criminal negligence prepared, compounded, or sold an adulterated or misbranded drug, would his violation ... be an unlawful act within the meaning of section 192 of the Penal Code. ( Id. at p. 174.) Significantly, we cited in Stuart several cases in support of our conclusion, some of which involved vehicular manslaughter. ( Stuart, supra, 47 Cal.2d 167, 173.) The first two cases cited, both from California, involved deaths in the course of violations of the speed laws. ( Ibid., citing People v. Mitchell (1946) 27 Cal.2d 678 [166 P.2d 10] [a person commits an unlawful act within the meaning of section 192 if he violates the speed laws designed to prevent injury] and People v. Pearne (1897) 118 Cal. 154, 158 [50 P. 376] [reversing conviction of involuntary manslaughter based on the unlawful act of exceeding the speed limit on the ground that the charge should rest upon the commission of an act done without due caution and circumspection.].) We also cited a Nebraska case, Thiede v. State (1921) 106 Neb. 48 [182 N.W. 570, 15 A.L.R. 237], which is directly on point here. (3) In Thiede, the court held that the mere violation of a speed statute is not an unlawful act sufficient to constitute manslaughter if death ensues: We believe the rule to be that, though the act, made unlawful by statute, is an act merely malum prohibitum and is ordinarily insufficient, still, when such an act is accompanied by negligence or further wrong, so as to be, in its nature, dangerous, or so as to manifest a reckless disregard for the safety of others, then it may be sufficient to supply the wrongful intent essential to criminal homicide, and, when such act results in the death of another, may constitute involuntary manslaughter. (182 N.W. at p. 572.) As Thiede shows, an act in its nature, dangerous ( ibid. )  i.e., of a dangerous nature ( Stuart, supra, 47 Cal.2d 167, 173)  is not necessarily an inherently dangerous act as defendant contends. Another decision cited, People v. Pavlic (1924) 227 Mich. 562 [199 N.W. 373, 374, 35 A.L.R. 741], stands for the same principle, i.e., that commission of an unlawful act consisting of a statutory prohibition will constitute manslaughter if performed under such circumstances as to supply the intent to do wrong and inflict some bodily injury. (Italics added.) The court in Pavlic used an example that is in point here: This is well illustrated in those cases where one kills another while driving an automobile at an unlawful rate of speed. The unlawful act of exceeding the speed limit is not in itself criminal, but if done in a careless manner, in reckless disregard of the safety of others, and death results, the offender is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. ( Ibid. ) [7] (1d) Thus, Stuart does not require an act inherently dangerous in the abstract for any form of manslaughter. It merely requires that the unlawful act causing death be committed through criminal negligence. ( Stuart, supra, 47 Cal.2d 167, 174.) People v. Wright, supra, 60 Cal. App.3d 6, on which the Court of Appeal and defendant rely for their understanding of Stuart, also erroneously read Stuart as holding that under section 192(b) the misdemeanor offense itself must be inherently dangerous. However, the court which decided Wright, after considering People v. Williams, supra, 13 Cal.3d 559, 563-564, has since concluded, properly, that assault and battery, neither of which is an inherently dangerous misdemeanor, may be predicates for a conviction of involuntary manslaughter under section 192(b). (See People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal. App.3d 371, 382-383 [181 Cal. Rptr. 682].) Although bound by what it believed to be the holding of Stuart, the Wright court itself recognized the anomaly created by that construction of section 192(b)  an unintended killing resulting from a misdemeanor that is not inherently dangerous would not be punishable as manslaughter even if committed with gross negligence. ( People v. Wright, supra, 60 Cal. App.3d 6, 11, fn. 5.) The result of this erroneous understanding of Stuart in Wright was to exempt from the scope of liability for involuntary manslaughter the killing of a child whose death was caused by physical abuse inflicted by her parents, a result that could not have been contemplated by the Legislature. We are satisfied therefore that the offense must be dangerous under the circumstances of its commission. The inherent or abstract nature of a misdemeanor which underlies an involuntary manslaughter charge is not dispositive. Defendant argues alternatively that, because only an inherently dangerous felony may be the predicate for conviction of second degree murder (§ 187) under the felony-murder rule, it follows that only an inherently dangerous misdemeanor should qualify under section 192. Nothing in the history or language of sections 192(b) and 192(c) supports that theory. Moreover, the second degree felony-murder rule, which substitutes the mental state present in the commission of the felony for the malice element of murder when a death occurs in the commission of an inherently dangerous felony ( People v. Patterson (1989) 49 Cal.3d 615, 626 [262 Cal. Rptr. 195, 778 P.2d 549]), is not relevant to understanding the elements of manslaughter. The judicial limitation on application of the felony-murder rule to killings committed in furtherance of inherently dangerous felonies exists only to ensure that malice, which is not an element of manslaughter, is established. The felony-murder rule artificially imposes malice as to one crime because of defendant's commission of another and thereby satisfies the standard of culpability necessary to raise a homicide to murder. ( People v. Phillips, supra, 64 Cal.2d 574, 583, fn. 6.) The doctrine has been limited to felonies that are inherently dangerous because the felony-murder rule erodes the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability. ( People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 783 [44 Cal. Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130].) The Legislature has provided express standards of culpability in section 192(c). It is not the function of this court to rewrite or restrict those standards. Nor would there be reason to do so in construing and applying section 192(c)(1). It applies only when the violation of a misdemeanor statute or ordinance is committed through conduct that qualifies as gross negligence. A conviction of involuntary manslaughter under these circumstances poses no threat of eroding the relation between criminal liability and moral culpability.