Opinion ID: 885762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: rate

Text: ¶22 The District Court awarded attorney and paralegal fees at 1996 rates: McGarvey and Heberling's hourly rates were set at $125 per hour and McGarvey's paralegal rate was set at $50 per hour. DOT contends that the District Court was without authority to award fees using 1996 rates. DOT argues that fees must be awarded at the hourly rate in effect at the time the services were provided. The Slacks argue that the District Court had the authority to award fees at current rates rather than incurred rates to compensate for delay and inflation. The Slacks also contend that enhancement for delay has been authorized by the majority of federal circuits. file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-589%20Opinion.htm (7 of 18)1/18/2007 10:05:50 AM file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/cu1046/Desktop/opinions/00-589%20Opinion.htm ¶23 Whether an award of necessary litigation expenses pursuant to § 70-30-306, MCA, can be enhanced for delay by using current rather than historic hourly attorney rates is a matter of first impression. The statute defining the necessary expenses of litigation is silent with regard to whether a court may adjust the necessary expenses of litigation by awarding attorney fees at current rates to account for delay in payment. Section 70-30-306(2), MCA, simply provides that [r]easonable and necessary attorney fees are the customary hourly rates for an attorney's services in the county in which trial is held. There are no judicial decisions allowing or precluding enhancement for delay. ¶24 We see no reason why an enhancement for delay may not be part of a [r]easonable and necessary attorney fee award pursuant to § 70-30-306(2), MCA. We note that 42 U.S. C. § 1988, the federal provision which allows a court to grant a reasonable attorney's fee to prevailing parties in federal civil rights actions, is also silent with regard to enhancement of fees for delay. However, the United States Supreme Court has held that an appropriate enhancement for delay, whether by the application of current rather than historic rates or otherwise, is within the contemplation of § 1988. Missouri v. Jenkins (1989), 491 U.S. 274, 283-84, 109 S.Ct. 2463, 2469, 105 L.Ed.2d 229. As the Supreme Court observed: Our cases have repeatedly stressed that attorney's fees awarded under this statute are to be based on the market rates for the services rendered. . . . Clearly, compensation received several years after the services were rendered . . . is not equivalent to the same dollar amount received reasonably promptly as the legal services are performed, as would normally be the case with private billings. Jenkins, 491 U.S. at 283, 109 S.Ct. at 2469 (citations omitted). ¶25 Fees awarded pursuant to § 70-30-306, MCA, are also based on market rates. See § 7030-306(2), MCA (providing that fees are to be based on customary hourly rates). Compensation awarded at historic hourly rates years after the services are provided is not equivalent to the same amount received reasonably promptly as the services are performed. Accordingly, we conclude that a district court may award an appropriate enhancement for delay as part of an award of reasonable and necessary attorney fees.