Opinion ID: 1511834
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Viability of Carol Cloutier's Appeal.

Text: On July 7, 1977 the Bank instituted a civil action in the Superior Court (Cumberland County) against Dominique Cloutier to recover an unpaid balance alleged due on a promissory note. Although his answer to the complaint included a counterclaim naming him and his wife Carol as the counterclaimants, the Bank's reply treated Dominique Cloutier as the only counterclaimant. When the Bank subsequently amended its complaint to add Carol, a co-signor of the promissory note, as a defendant, her answer to the amended complaint neither newly asserted a counterclaim nor referred to the one previously filed. On November 4, 1977, the Bank moved for summary judgment on the amended complaint. Before a decision was made on this motion, the Cloutiers moved to amend their counterclaim, to add the allegation that the Bank had converted to its own use certain personal property belonging to Defendants. . .. (emphasis added) On December 15, 1977 the motion for summary judgment was granted, and in accordance with the Justice's order, judgment on the amended complaint was entered in favor of the Bank against the Cloutiers in the sum of $23,524.18. Several months later, on May 22, 1978 the Bank moved for summary judgment in its favor against the Defendants on their counterclaim . . .. (emphasis added) The motion was granted on June 30, 1978, and on the same day judgment was entered on the counterclaim against both Dominique and Carol Cloutier. The record reveals that the Bank supported its motion for summary judgment on the counterclaim by filing an affidavit specifically addressing the issues raised by the conversion claim and, further, that the Bank participated in arguing the conversion issues to the presiding Justice. The record discloses that the Justice considered the conversion claim and that his decision on the counterclaim was intended to be an adjudication of all of the issues it raised, including the conversion cause of action alleged by the purported amendment to it. [1] The Bank asserts that Carol Cloutier's appeal must be dismissed because she did not utilize proper procedure to become a counterclaimant. The premise of this contention is the assumption that even though Carol was named as a counterclaimant in the counterclaim included in the answer filed by Dominique, she did not thereby become a counterclaimant since she was not yet a defendant in the original action who had been served with a pleading. We find this underlying premise erroneous and therefore reject the claim that Carol Cloutier's appeal is not viable. Rule 13(h) M.R.Civ.P., entitled Joinder of Additional Parties, states: Persons other than those made parties to the original action may be made parties to a counterclaim . . . in accordance with the provisions of Rules 19 and 20. Rule 13(h) M.R.Civ.P. is identical to Rule 13(h) F.R.C.P., and Rules 19 and 20 M.R. Civ.P. are in substance the same as Rules 19 and 20 F.R.C.P. Accordingly, we deem the decision of the United States District Court in Lanier Business Products v. Graymar Company, 342 F.Supp. 1200 (D.Md.1972), which is based on reasoning that we find most persuasive, to be strong authority against the Bank's position. Although the ambiguity in the words be made in Rule 13(h) may indicate need of a motion for leave of court and a court order of joinder, the ambiguity is resolved by the authorization in Rule 20(a) for all persons to join as plaintiffs to assert any right to relief . . . in respect of or arising out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences, provided that the assertion of such right will give rise to a question of law or fact common to all the persons so joining. As Lanier Business Products, supra, clarifies, such permissive joinder of parties as plaintiffs does not apply exclusively to joining in the complaint by which a civil action is commenced. Relative to a counterclaim, the claiming party is regarded as a plaintiff. Accordingly, the authorization in Rule 20(a) for the joinder of plaintiffs extends to counterclaimants who, therefore, are authorized to join in the bringing of a counterclaim in the same manner as persons are authorized to join in a complaint as plaintiffs; leave of court and a court order of joinder are not requirements in either instance. Here, then, pursuant to Rules 13(h) and 20(a) in combination, the counterclaim included in the answer of Dominique effectively joined Carol as a counterclaiming party, despite the absence of an order of court, [2] provided that the other requirements of Rule 20(a) were satisfied. It is not disputed that these other requirements were met; the rights asserted by the Cloutiers plainly arose out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and give rise to a question of law or fact common to . . . both of them. The appeal of Carol V. Cloutier is properly before us.