Opinion ID: 695553
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Public Housing

Text: 28 Robinson next contends that a public housing lease remains viable longer than a lease of a private dwelling, and that possession by the tenant may preserve a public housing lease even if it does not preserve a private one, citing Thorpe v. Housing Authority of Durham, 393 U.S. 268, 274, 89 S.Ct. 518, 522, 21 L.Ed.2d 474 (1969) and Chicago Housing Authority v. Harris, 49 Ill.2d 274, 275 N.E.2d 353 (1971). In Thorpe, the Housing Authority of the City of Durham, North Carolina brought an eviction action and received an order to have Thorpe removed from her apartment. Id., 393 U.S. at 271, 89 S.Ct. at 520. The Housing Authority gave no reason for evicting Thorpe and was not required to do so at that time. Thorpe challenged the eviction on due process grounds. While the case was still on appeal, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) issued a circular requiring local housing authorities to inform tenants of the reasons for eviction and to give tenants an opportunity to reply. Id. at 272, 89 S.Ct. at 520. The United States Supreme Court held that the circular was to apply retroactively to a tenant still residing in the apartment pending the outcome of an eviction appeal. Id. at 274, 89 S.Ct. at 522. With respect to Thorpe, Robinson argues that the Court would not have required retroactive application of the circular if Thorpe had not retained an interest in the lease. From this, Robinson contends that it could be deduced that Thorpe's lease was not terminated until Thorpe actually vacated the premises. 29 Chicago Housing Authority v. Harris, 49 Ill.2d 274, 275 N.E.2d 353 (1971), involved a similar scenario, where a HUD circular requiring an impartial hearing was issued after the tenant's eviction but before she vacated the premises. The state court determined that it was required to apply Thorpe and that the circular applied retroactively. Id., 275 N.E.2d at 356. Because in both cases the tenants were still in possession when the circulars were issued, Robinson argues that under both federal and state law a public housing lease cannot end until a tenant is no longer in possession. 30 These cases do not support Robinson's contention that a lease remains viable, no matter what actions have been taken to abrogate it, until the resident has actually vacated the premises. Rather the courts in Thorpe and Harris held that special procedural protections for public housing tenants created while the tenant's eviction was still being appealed could be applied to that eviction. The housing authorities in these cases were required to revisit the eviction process in spite of the fact that it had already been completed prior to the issuance of the new circular. But the reason for this requirement was that new procedural protections were created while the tenant was challenging her eviction, not the fact that the tenant remained in possession. As the Court explained, the circular should be applied to all tenants still residing in McDougald Terrace ... not only because it is designed to insure a fairer eviction procedure in general, but also because the prescribed notification is essential to remove a serious impediment to the successful protection of constitutional rights. 393 U.S. at 283, 89 S.Ct. at 527. 31 While the fact that the tenant was still in possession may have played some role in the Court's decision to apply the new provisions retroactively, that fact cannot be construed to extend an interest in a lease (or the right to have the lease assumed by a bankruptcy trustee) to any public housing tenant whose lease has been validly terminated but who has not yet been forcibly evicted. Robinson's eviction is not being challenged here. She was not denied any procedural protections; she is simply attempting to assume a validly terminated lease under the bankruptcy code. The Thorpe Court's decision to apply the circular to any tenant still residing in [the] projects on the date of this decision does not give her that ability. 393 U.S. at 274, 89 S.Ct. at 522. 32 We note that under ordinary landlord and tenant law, a tenant's status as a resident of public housing generally does in some respects enhance her rights. In re Sudler, 71 B.R. 780, 786 (Bankr.E.D.Penn.1987). However, this enhancement arises from the additional layers of procedures landlords must take to terminate a lease. Id. (The governmental agency which owns a public housing premises must adhere strictly to both federal Regulations and to pertinent state law before it can succeed in terminating the rights of such tenants, or issues of constitutional dimension arise.). Unlike the tenants in Thorpe and Harris, Robinson makes no argument that any federal regulatory or state law procedure designed to protect the interest of public housing tenants was not followed in her case, or that new laws have been recently adopted which provide new procedural protections. 33 Generally, courts have not treated public housing tenants differently in determining when a lease is unexpired for purposes of lease assumption under 11 U.S.C. Sec. 365. Talley, 69 B.R. 219 (making no distinction between housing subsidized by the government and other types of housing, and accordingly applying state law to determine bankruptcy assumption of lease); Cunningham, 159 B.R. at 233 (holding that a tenant is not entitled to more protection in determining lease termination simply because she is a tenant in a federally subsidized housing unit). We acknowledge that HUD may enact regulations which afford more protection to public housing residents, sometimes creating additional steps the landlord must take before evicting a resident. But we cannot infer from this the conclusion that Robinson asks us to acknowledge--that a lease has not yet been terminated in the case of a public housing resident as long as the tenant is still in possession. Robinson makes no argument that requisite procedures were not followed, and thus has no claim for special treatment as a public housing tenant.