Opinion ID: 1692959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: NCIC Search

Text: Soukharith argues that the intrusion required for Chatfield to perform an NCIC records check on Karen's license plates amounts to an investigatory stop, which requires a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct. Soukharith relies on Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215 (Wyo.1994). His reliance is misplaced. At issue in Wilson was whether a brief detention for the purpose of completing a computerized warrants check is an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 223. Although Wilson does state that a seizure to conduct a computerized identification check without reasonable suspicion is not permitted, (emphasis supplied) id. at 222, the holding indicates that without a seizure, no reasonable suspicion is required. If there is no detention or seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, then the Fourth Amendment safeguard against an unreasonable seizure is not implicated in an encounter between a private citizen and a police officer. State v. Twohig, 238 Neb. 92, 469 N.W.2d 344 (1991). A seizure in the Fourth Amendment context occurs  `only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.'  Id. at 102, 469 N.W.2d at 351 (quoting Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988)). It is axiomatic that without a seizure, reasonable suspicion is not required. Chatfield simply made an NCIC check. Chatfield did not turn on his cruiser's lights or pull alongside Soukharith prior to receiving the results of the check, and Soukharith continued to drive without interference while the check was conducted. Clearly, Soukharith was free to leave under these circumstances. We conclude that no reasonable suspicion was necessary for Chatfield to conduct the check because Soukharith was not seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and thus, his Fourth Amendment rights were not implicated.