Opinion ID: 891600
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Defendant was entitled to UJI 14-2116: Mistake of Fact as to the victim's identity as a peace officer.

Text: {33} We next address whether Defendant was entitled to UJI 14-2216, mistake of fact as to the victim's identity as a peace officer. The propriety of jury instructions given or denied is a mixed question of law and fact. Mixed questions of law and fact are reviewed de novo. State v. Salazar, 1997-NMSC-044, ¶ 49, 123 N.M. 778, 945 P.2d 996. {34} Ignorance or mistake as to a matter of fact or law is a defense if it negatives a mental state required to establish a material element of the crime, except that if the defendant would be guilty of another crime had the situation been as he believed, then he may be convicted of the offense of which he would be guilty had the situation been as he believed it to be. 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 5.6 (2d ed.2003). Generally, a defendant is entitled to UJI 14-2216 when there is a question of fact as to whether or not the defendant knew that the victim was a law enforcement officer; UJI 14-2216 Use Note 1; and, consequently, the jury reasonably could find the defendant not guilty of the crime charged and/or guilty of certain lesser included offenses that do not require proof of the victim's identity as a peace officer. See Nozie, 2007-NMCA-131, ¶ 4, 142 N.M. 626, 168 P.3d 756 (UJI 14-2216 requires the jury to acquit the defendant of the offense against a peace officer if the jury has a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant knew the victim was a peace officer. If the jury acquits the defendant due to a mistake as to the victim's status as a peace officer, UJI 14-2216 requires the jury to consider the parallel lesser-included offense not involving a peace officer as the victim.). {35} We agree with the Court of Appeals that Defendant had tendered an appropriate mistake of fact instruction and that the evidence supported the issuance of this instruction because a reasonable jury could have found that Defendant was in a dazed, disoriented, and intoxicated state and that, in this state, he believed that the person he attacked in the lot was the private security guard who had followed him into the field from the supermarket parking lot. Defendant's theory of ignorance or mistake was supported by the State's own witnesses and, contrary to the argument of the prosecutor, did not depend upon Defendant taking the stand to directly deny knowledge. See [ State v. ] Mantelli, 2002-NMCA-033, ¶ 16, 131 N.M. 692, 42 P.3d 272 (observing that the State's evidence may support an instruction requested by the defendant); State v. Castañeda, 2001-NMCA-052, ¶ 21, 130 N.M. 679, 30 P.3d 368 (noting general rule that a defendant's state of mind may be proved by circumstantial evidence). That there are views of the evidence that support a finding adverse to Defendant is not a reason for denying Defendant an instruction so long as the evidence viewed most favorably to Defendant supported Defendant's theory of the case. Id. at ¶ 10. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals properly determined that Defendant was entitled to the requested jury instruction. {36} We caution, however, that [o]rdinarily, a defendant is not entitled to a specific instruction where the jury has already been adequately instructed upon the matter by other instructions. State v. Venegas, 96 N.M. 61, 628 P.2d 306 (1981). In the present case, the jury was not instructed that knowledge of the victim's status as a peace officer is an essential element of the crime of aggravated battery upon a peace officer, which the State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See supra part II.B. We therefore need not decide whether a mistake of fact instruction, when issued in conjunction with a proper instruction on the essential elements of the crime, would be cumulative or superfluous. See State v. Bunce, 116 N.M. 284, 287, 861 P.2d 965, 968 (1993) ([T]he trial court need not give a mistake of fact instruction where the intent element of the crime is adequately defined by the other instructions given by the trial court.); Venegas, 96 N.M. at 62-63, 628 P.2d at 307-08 (holding that the defendant was not entitled to a mistake of fact instruction because such an instruction would be duplicative of other instructions); State v. Sparks, 102 N.M. 317, 324, 694 P.2d 1382, 1389 (Ct. App.1985) ([T]he trial court may properly refuse a requested instruction if it gives undue emphasis to the defendant's theory of the case.). We refer this matter to the Uniform Jury Instruction Criminal Committee, however, to assess the continued validity of UJI-14-2216 in light of our modification of the Uniform Jury Instructions regarding the essential elements of aggravated battery upon a peace officer, battery upon a peace officer, and aggravated assault upon a peace officer.