Opinion ID: 2335688
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sufficient Cause Requires Nexus Between Misconduct and Teaching Effectiveness

Text: ¶ 29 The employment contract of a nonprovisional teacher may not be terminated except for sufficient cause. RCW 28A.400.300(1). Sufficient cause is not defined by statute; thus, our courts have construed the phrase to give it meaning. ¶ 30 This court in Hoagland interpreted sufficient cause to mean a showing of conduct which materially and substantially affects the teacher's performance. Hoagland, 95 Wash.2d at 428, 623 P.2d 1156 (emphasis added). [I]t would violate due process to discharge a teacher without a showing of actual impairment to performance. Id. at 429, 623 P.2d 1156. We noted that because the statutes do not stipulate certain conduct as per se grounds for dismissal, it will be a question of fact whether the complained of acts constitute sufficient cause. Id. at 428, 623 P.2d 1156. We listed eight factors that should be considered prior to dismissal of a teacher, [15] noting that they are relevant to any determination of teacher effectiveness, the touchstone for all dismissals. Id. at 430, 623 P.2d 1156. These factors were designed to ensure that if a teacher's conduct outside the profession is the basis for dismissal, the conduct has some nexus to performance of duties as a teacher. Id. at 428, 623 P.2d 1156. We have, however, observed that, in some instances, teacher misconduct can be so egregious that the sufficient cause determination can be made as a matter of law. Mott v. Endicott Sch. Dist. No. 308, 105 Wash.2d 199, 203, 713 P.2d 98 (1986). ¶ 31 Our decision in Clarke harmonizes these two concerns: [s]ufficient cause for a teacher's discharge exists as a matter of law where the teacher's deficiency is unremediable [ sic ] and (1) materially and substantially affects the teacher's performance, Hoagland, [95 Wash.2d at 428, 623 P.2d 1156], Mott, [105 Wash.2d at 203, 713 P.2d 98]; or (2) lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose. Pryse [ v. Yakima Sch. Dist. No. 7 ], 30 Wash. App. [16,] 24, 632 P.2d 60 [(1981)]; Potter [ v. Kalama Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 402 ], 31 Wash.App. [838], 842, 644 P.2d 1229 [(1982)]. Clarke v. Shoreline Sch. Dist. No. 412, 106 Wash.2d 102, 113-14, 720 P.2d 793 (1986) (first emphasis added). We consider the Hoagland factors to determine whether a teacher's conduct substantially undermines a teacher's effectiveness. We also noted in Clarke that [f]irst, not all eight [ Hoagland ] factors will be applicable in every teacher discharge case. Second, these factors are not necessarily applicable when the cause for dismissal is the teacher's improper performance of his duties.... Nevertheless, these factors are helpful in determining whether a teacher's effectiveness is impaired by his classroom deficiencies. [16] Id. at 114, 720 P.2d 793 (internal citations omitted). ¶ 32 The Court of Appeals first deviated from our stated rule in Clarke in Sauter v. Mount Vernon School District No. 320, 58 Wash.App. 121, 791 P.2d 549 (1990). Relying on Pryse and Potter, [17] the Sauter court eliminated the remediability prong of the second Clarke test. Sauter, 58 Wash.App. at 130-31, 791 P.2d 549. The Sauter testsufficient cause for a teacher's discharge exists as a matter of law where the teacher's deficiency is (1) irremediable and materially and substantially affects the teacher's performance or (2) lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purposeeradicated the significant protections previously afforded teachers by the sufficient cause standard. [18] Under the Sauter test, any misconduct will be grounds for discharge because, by definition, misconduct is behavior that lacks any positive educational aspect or legitimate professional purpose. Id. at 130, 791 P.2d 549. ¶ 33 The ramifications of the modified- Clarke rule are glaringly apparent in Vinson. The Clarke rule as modified by Vinson holds that any time a teacher, in the course of his job, engages in conduct lacking any professional purpose, that teacher may be discharged. Vinson, 154 Wash.App. at 230, 225 P.3d 379. This creates a per se rule of discharge under which any school-day lapse, no matter how minor and no matter the context, will always constitute sufficient cause for the teacher's discharge. Essentially, the Vinson court, relying on Sauter, removes the required nexus between alleged teacher misconduct or deficiency and teaching performance. We reject this alteration of our Clarke rule. The nexus requirement finds root in the constitution. See, e.g., Hoagland, 95 Wash.2d at 429, 623 P.2d 1156 ([I]t would violate due process to discharge a teacher without showing actual impairment to performance.). ¶ 34 Sufficient cause may be found as a matter of law, without applying the Clarke test or Hoagland factors, in only the most egregious cases. We hold that where a teacher engages in sexually exploitive conduct or physical abuse of a student, sufficient cause is established as a matter of law; the Clarke test and Hoagland factors (if applicable, see Clarke, 106 Wash.2d at 114, 720 P.2d 793) must be applied in all nonflagrant instances of misconduct.