Opinion ID: 2102261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Taylor Law

Text: Based on their status as employee organizations and public employers (Civil Service Law § 201 [5], [6]), both parties couch their arguments in the context of the Taylor Law (Civil Service Law art 14). In 1967 the State Legislature enacted the Taylor Law, [1] which governs labor relations in the public sector. It deals with rights and relationships involved in public employment, such as organizing, collective bargaining, the prohibition of strikes by public employees, and the creation of the Public Employment Relations Board. The Taylor Law contemplates two types of arbitration: compulsory and permissive. The former is found in Civil Service Law § 209 and involves what has been termed interest arbitration. This deals, in essence, with terms and conditions of employment not previously agreed upon. Normally those disputed issues are settled by negotiation, but the Legislature provided that if an impasse occurs in collective negotiations involving public employees, the compulsory arbitration provisions of Civil Service Law § 209 come into play (see, City of New York v Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn., 89 NY2d 380, 386-387; Matter of City of Newburgh v Newman, 69 NY2d 166, 170-171; see generally, Anderson and Krouse, Interest Arbitration: The Alternative to the Strike, 56 Fordham L Rev 153 [1987]; Craver, The Judicial Enforcement of Public Sector Interest Arbitration, 21 B C L Rev 557 [1980]). In addition to imposing these obligations, the Taylor Law permits public sector parties to submit CBA grievances to arbitration (Civil Service Law § 204). This species of arbitrationgrievance arbitrationis at issue in this case. The question whether a particular grievance is arbitrable under the Taylor Law has occupied the courts of this State in scores of cases over the last three decades (see also, Coleman, Grievance Arbitration in the Public Sector: Status, Issues and Problems, 17 J Collective Negotiations 89 [1988]).