Opinion ID: 1542243
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: Errors in the Charge Given.

Text: The argument upon the suggested errors to the charge covers slightly over sixteen pages in the brief. As a whole, it is a running fire upon the general unfairness of the charge with discussion of several specific instances. As to many of these instances there was no assignment of error or no proper assignment under the Rules. There are but five matters which are covered by any assignment or by a proper assignment under the Rules. The first of these (assignment 29(h) is aimed at the statement in the charge that it is not necessary for the jury to find that the defendants, in conspiring, considered that the effect of their conspiracy would be to affect interstate commerce or that one of the purposes of the conspiracy was to affect such commerce. Obviously, this statement by the court is correct. All that is necessary is that the conspiracy shall be to do something, the natural effect of which will be to affect interstate commerce. The second item (assignment 29(i) is directed at a statement by the court that if the evidence of the witnesses outlining the effect of stoppage of the motion picture industry in St. Louis is to be believed and is believed by you, the result, of course, is direct and substantial interference with or effect upon interstate commerce. The criticism is that this is an improper comment upon the evidence and is argumentative in that it states to the jury that if they believe certain evidence they must believe that there is direct and substantial interference with interstate commerce. There is no proper basis for this criticism. It is not for the jury to determine what is or what is not interstate commerce  that is a question of law. It is for the court to charge the jury that if certain facts covered by the evidence are shown then there is such interference. This is what the court stated and its statement is proper. The third item (assignment 29(m) is levelled at a statement by the court that unless the Government has proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a conviction must ensue. It is obvious that if the court used the word conviction instead of acquittal such was merely a slip of the tongue and that it would be quite obvious to the jury that such was the case. However this may be, this matter was called to the attention of the court in connection with the exceptions to the charge and the court promptly and effectively corrected the misstatement. The fourth item (assignment 30) is aimed at a statement by the court to the effect that if appellants had in mind two purposes in extorting the money  one to enrich themselves and the other to gain proper wages for the members of the union  the fact that one purpose was unlawful under the Act would justify conviction. Much is made that such a view is in the teeth of the prohibition in the Act (Section 420d), the argument being that no court of the United States shall construe or apply any of the provisions of the Act in such manner as to impair, diminish, or in any manner affect the rights of bona-fide labor organizations in lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof, as such rights are expressed in existing statutes of the United States. It seems to us an astonishing proposition that labor racketeers can coerce employers or anybody else to give them personal bribes in connection with wage negotiations and then escape punishment under this Act if any benefit in wages is obtained in those negotiations. Obviously, the only purpose or possible reason for employers bribing such racketeers in connection with wage negotiations is to secure lower wages than honest negotiations would probably produce. How such a situation could possibly result in anything but harm to the innocent members of the labor organization is not clear. It must be true that such innocent members are best served by representatives who honestly try to procure the best wages possible and who have no divided, much less bribed, allegiance in such negotiations. The final item (assignment 31) is to that part of the charge which appellants denominated as a so-called Allen instruction. The argument is that this portion of the charge was extremely coercive and practically urged the minority to give in to the majority and `vote for a conviction'. There have been criticisms of this general character of instruction in several cases cited by appellants. It seems to us any vice in this kind of statement depends upon the situation at the time it is given and upon the language used by the court. The objection is, of course, that such character of instruction may have coercive effect upon jurors. If such statement is made in the face of an existing disagreement in the jury it is quite evident that its entire force would be felt as applying to an existing situation which had developed. Language which might be innocent if uttered before submission of the case to the jury might be regarded as harmful if applied to a specific existing disagreement. Here the caution was given as part of the charge before submission. The language used by the court seems careful and temperate. It contains no suggestion of coercion and we cannot see how any reasonable member of the jury could believe that he was not entirely free to disagree if he felt such was his duty.