Opinion ID: 780593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantial Likelihood of Death or Serious Bodily Injury

Text: 28 Sentencing Guideline § 2Q1.2(b)(2) directs a district court to increase the base offense level for a Clean Air Act violation by nine levels [i]f the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.2(b)(2) (2000). Application note 1(i) to § 1B1.1 (which was denominated application note 1(j) at the time of Thorn's sentencing) defines serious bodily injury as injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty; or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1, cmt. n. 1(i) (2002). Neither the Guidelines nor case law define substantial likelihood; we adopt the meaning given to this language in the preliminary injunction context, namely, that substantial likelihood means considerably more likely. See Abdul Wali v. Coughlin, 754 F.2d 1015, 1026 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that parties seeking a preliminary injunction that would grant the movant substantially all the relief he ultimately seeks and not merely maintain the status quo must show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, i.e., that their cause is considerably more likely to succeed than fail), overruled on other grounds, O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987). 6 29 Thus, the District Court should have applied the nine-level enhancement under § 2Q1.2(b)(2) if Thorn's Clean Air Act violations made it considerably more likely that a person would develop an injury involving extreme physical pain or the protracted impairment of a function of a bodily member, organ, or mental faculty, or requiring medical intervention such as surgery, hospitalization, or physical rehabilitation. To trigger the enhancement, death or serious bodily injury need not result from the offense conduct; in fact, such actual death or serious bodily injury could warrant an upward departure under the Guideline. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Q1.2, cmt. n. 6 (2000). The District Court found 30 that there was too much uncertainty in the evidence both in terms of available medical science as well as evidence of exposure in the present case to say that with any degree of certainty any personnel suffered serious bodily injury or death. The people involved here did get involved voluntarily in the underlying criminal conduct, co-conspirators in most instances, they willfully refused to use available safety equipment which could reduce their risk of injury. There's just insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that any illness that might result from exposure to asbestos would cause serious bodily injury, so I'm not going to enhance it.... 31 We respectfully disagree and think the District Court's ruling involved two errors of law. First, that the evidence may not have established with any certainty that A+ workers actually suffered serious bodily injury or death, in the District Judge's words, is not germane to our analysis. The nine-level enhancement applies when the offense resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury and not only when the offense actually caused such illness or death. 32 Second, it is not relevant under § 2Q1.2(b)(2) that some of Thorn's workers may have been co-conspirators. As the government argues, the Sentencing Commission knows how to limit an enhancement based on the creation of substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to the victims of an offense and not to permit an enhancement when those put at risk were co-conspirators. For example, § 2K1.4(a)(1) directs district courts to apply a greater base offense level when the offense created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to any person other than a participant in the offense. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2K1.4(a)(1) (2000). Section 2Q1.2(b)(2) includes no similar restriction on the class of individuals put at substantial risk by the offense conduct, and we decline to read such a limitation into the Guideline. Thus, we find that § 2Q1.2(b)(2) is not limited to situations in which the offense conduct created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to persons other than participants in the offense. 33 To the extent the District Court found that the evidence was too uncertain to support a finding that Thorn's conduct resulted in a substantial likelihood of death or serious bodily injury, we find that this factual finding constituted clear error. 7 The facts relevant to this enhancement are admittedly complicated because A+'s workers already were at some risk of developing these injuries as a result of their decision to work in a field that is dangerous even when all precautions are taken. Further, many of these workers were at risk of contracting some of these diseases, such as lung cancer, as a result of their decision to smoke, and some increased their exposure to asbestos by choosing not to wear respirators. The District Court seemed to take this volitional behavior into account when it noted that the people involved were involved voluntarily and willfully refused to use available safety equipment. 34 That some workers smoked 8 or failed to wear protective gear did not absolve Thorn of his duty, under the law, to comply with federal laws, including his obligation as an employer not to permit violations of safety regulations. Evidence shows that Thorn did not direct his workers to wear respirators. More importantly, in some instances, Thorn failed to provide respirators, replacement filters, sufficient quantities of protective gear, and decontamination units, despite specific requests from workers for these mandated protections. 35 We acknowledge that asbestos abatement is a dangerous profession that places workers at risk of developing asbestos-related diseases even when they and their employers comply fully with the law. But that asbestos abatement inherently imposes risks on its workers does not preclude a finding that Thorn's illegal behavior resulted in a substantial likelihood (as opposed to some undefined possibility based on the general dangers of the industry) of death or serious bodily injury to these workers. 36 We find that there is clear, undisputed testimony in the record that at least some of A+'s workers were considerably more likely, as a result of Thorn's Clean Air Act violations, to develop asbestos-related disease than if they had performed abatement under lawful conditions. Dr. Levin testified, based on the evidence in the record of many workers' sustained, routine exposure to visible emissions without respiratory protection, that among A+'s workers there will be asbestos-related disease with virtual certainty. Moreover, he offered unequivocal and unrefuted testimony concerning the Billetts brothers' exposure to asbestos as a result of Thorn's conduct. That is, as noted earlier, even assuming one-third less exposure to asbestos than Angelo had claimed in his testimony, Levin opined that there was virtually no chance that Angelo would escape developing asbestos-related scarring lung disease with impairment of lung function. 37 Thus, given the absence of an articulated reason to reject this undisputed evidence, it was clear error for the District Court to find that there was insufficient evidence that Thorn's conduct resulted in a substantial likelihood that at least one, if not several, of his former employees would develop devastating, life-threatening, asbestos-related diseases.