Opinion ID: 2071104
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Creation of a Life Estate

Text: The Renieres first argued that the language of the deed forecloses any possibility that Gerlach has a life estate in the property. Specifically, they maintained that because Fiske first conveyed the estate in fee to his daughter and thereupon attempted to cut down his and Helen's fee simple interest in the property by a subsequent reservation of a life estate, the conveyance is void. We disagree. In support of their argument, the Renieres rely upon the rule of construction set forth in Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. City of Woonsocket, 48 R.I. 345, 137 A. 411 (1927), which states that when a testator has made an absolute estate in fee in land    a subsequent provision inconsistent with the absolute nature of that gift shall be regarded as a repugnant provision and treated as void in law. Id. at 347, 137 A. at 412. We are of the opinion that this repugnancy principle has no application to the facts of this case. In Chile v. Beck, 452 A.2d 626 (R.I.1982), we acknowledged the repugnancy principle referred to in City of Woonsocket, but stated that, this rule, like any other [rule of] construction, must be subordinated, as here, to the testatrix's intent and must yield to that intent.452 A.2d at 627. (Emphasis added.) We are bound to give the language in the deed such an interpretation as will carry out the grantor's intent. See id. at 628. We are satisfied, as the Renieres conceded, that in executing the instant quitclaim deed, it was Fiske's intent to create a life estate for Gerlach. It is clear from an examination of the record that not only was it Fiske's desire to create a joint tenancy with rights of survivorship with his daughter, but that Fiske also intended to provide for Gerlach by giving her shelter and comfort throughout her life, as long as she maintained the property and paid the real estate taxes and other expenses. Fiske and Gerlach were long-time companions, and had resided together at 11 Ausdale Road for many years. Also, we note that it was Donald who complied with Fiske's requests by arranging for the deed to be drawn in accordance with Fiske's instructions, and that it was duly executed and recorded, yet it is the Renieres who are seeking to have the life estate nullified by alleging that the deed was improperly drafted. The clause in the deed read, [s]ubject to and reserving a life tenancy to BARBARA GERLACH, and we are satisfied that this language, on its face and in light of the facts of this case, manifests an intent on the part of Fiske to create a life estate for Gerlach. Further, as early as 1910, this Court rejected the notion that technical words of conveyance are required to effectively convey an estate. We stated in Disley v. Disley, 30 R.I. 366, 75 A. 481 (1910), that where there is a challenge to the creation of a life estate for lack of technical words of grant, that challenge would under the old-time strictness of the common law, perhaps be a good one, but no longer would be valid in light of the present law governing conveyancing. Id. at 373, 75 A. at 484. The position advanced by plaintiffs would in effect have this Court return to the strict harshness of the common law governing conveyances and to ignore the intent of the grantor. We decline this invitation.