Opinion ID: 774554
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Thorton's Substantial Limitation in Performing Manual Tasks

Text: 88 Although the ADA itself does not define the term substantial limitation any more than it definesmajor life activity, the Supreme Court's precedents and the EEOC's interpretative regulations once again provide guidance. The Supreme Court has explained that a substantial limitation is more than a mere difference in the plaintiff's ability to perform a major life activity, and must be in fact substantial. Yet, ADA protection is not limited to individuals with  `utter inabilities.'  Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999) (quoting Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641). Likewise, the Court in Sutton stated that  `substantially' suggests considerable or specified to a large degree. 527 U.S. at 491 (citation and other internal marks omitted). 89 The EEOC, in turn, defines substantially limited  as: 90 (i) Unable to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general population can perform; or 91 (ii) Significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the condition, manner, or duration under which the average person in the general population can perform that same major life activity. 92 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(1) (emphases added). Factors to consider in determining whether an impairment is substantially limiting include the nature as well as the severity and duration of the impairment. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(j)(2). 93 Of particularly great importance to the current case is a dichotomy that the majority ignores: While major life activities are defined by their importance in the lives of people in general, McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233-34, the ultimate determination of whether a person is substantially limited as to a particular activity or class of activities, and therefore has a disability under the ADA, requires an individualized inquiry. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (citing Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 64142 and 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. §§ 1630.2(j)) (The determination of whether an individual has a disability is not necessarily based on the name or diagnosis of the impairment the person has, but rather on the effect of that impairment on the life of the individual.). 94 Substantial impairment analysis, then, requires a focus on (1) the nature of the impairment -that is, exactly what is it that the individual cannot do; and (2) how seriously that inability affects the life of the individual concerned, a consideration that depends upon knowledge of that person's life circumstances. In making that determination, there is no basis for leaving out -as the district court did in this case 6 -or minimizing -as does the majority's en masse, quantitative approach to assessing the significance of various manual tasks -tasks that a grown individual performs in the workplace, any more than there is a basis for leaving out the tasks that a student performs in school. Nor is there any basis for focusing on tasks that involve biological survival or personal care, rather than participation in the larger society. 95 B. Putting the pieces of the puzzle together, I conclude that (1) an inability to perform the manual tasks involved in operating a computer and handwriting can be a sufficiently substantial impairment in the performance of manual tasks to constitute a disability, and (2) given Thornton's personal circumstances, the inability either to operate a computer or write by hand does substantially limit her ability to participate in contemporary society. 96 (i) As to the first point, concerning whether the inability physically to commit words to paper can be a substantial limitation in performing manual tasks: Following the lead of the Rehabilitation Act regulations, see n. 3, supra, the current articulation in the administrative regulations refers to manual tasks as a group as an example of a major life activity. Yet, performing manual tasks involves the use of arms, hands, fingers, and many individual muscles and bones, as well as hand-eye coordination mediated by the brain; different kinds of physiological problems can result in widely varying impacts, resulting in the ability to carry out somemanual tasks but not others. 97 There is no basis in the statute, or in the regulation, for concluding that an individual must demonstrate a limitation in each and every possible manual task, or in some proportion of all the possible manual tasks in the world, in order for the person to qualify as substantially limited. 7 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(i). Rather, where the nature of an individual's impairment is such that she cannot carry out the particular physiological tasks essential to communicating in writing, her impairment in carrying out manual tasks can be sufficiently substantial simply because of the importance of those particular manual tasks in modern society. 98 Any doubt in this regard is resolved by the provisions of the statute itself, as well as by statutory interpretations, of particular pertinence in the educational field: 8 99 First, Congress expressly included educational and professional courses and examinations in the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12189. The Department of Justice issued a regulation pursuant to §§ 12189 specifying that any examination must be selected and administered so as to best ensure that, when the examination is administered to an individual with a disability that impairs sensory, manual, or speaking skills, the examination results accurately reflect the individual's aptitude or achievement level . . . , rather than reflecting the individual's impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills . . . . 100 28 C.F.R. §§ 36.309(b) (emphases added); see also 34 C.F.R. §§§§ 104.13(b), 104.35(b)(3), 104.42(b)(3) (Department of Education regulations pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act using similar language for preschool through post-secondary education and employment testing). These regulations also explain that an appropriate auxiliary aid, which the entity administering the examination must provide (unless it would fundamentally alter the test or impose an undue burden), includes transcribers for individuals with manual impairments. §§ 36.309(b); see also id. at (c) (requiring auxiliary aids for individuals with manual impairments in the classroom). 101 These regulations appear to focus exclusively upon the impact of manual impairments on the educationally-related manual skills of communicating in writing, without requiring that the impaired individual also be impaired in carrying out a wide range of other manual tasks. Any other understanding would make little sense: If a student is impaired with regard to fine motor skills and cannot write or use a computer, the fact that she has no problem dressing herself or cleaning her room is not going to be of much help to her in getting an education. 102 Second, in accord with this understanding of the statute and the regulations, the Department of Education's Office for Civil Rights has specifically held that the inability to write is a substantial limitation in the major life activity of performing manual tasks. See University of Colorado, 1993 NDLR (LRP) LEXIS 1156; 4 NDLR (LRP) 211 (OCR June 30, 1993). The OCR explained: 103 The complainant's medical records indicate that she has rheumatoid arthritis in her hands which substantially affects her ability to write. The ability to perform manual tasks is recognized as a major life activity [under the Rehabilitation Act]. Because the complainant's condition substantially limits a major life activity, and she met the technical standards for admission, OCR finds that the complainant was a qualified handicapped person . . . . 104 Id. at - (emphasis added). In coming to this conclusion, OCR did not ask whether the student could drive, do her own laundry, cut foamboard, see Chanda, 234 F.3d at 1223, or grip tools with hands and arms extended at or above shoulder levels for extended periods of time. See Williams v. Toyota Motor Mfg. Kentucky, Inc., 224 F.3d 840, 843 (6th Cir. 2000), cert. granted, 121 S. Ct. 1600 (Apr. 16, 2001). Rather, the agency recognized that given the importance of written communication to success in modern society, an impairment the nature of which impedes the physical ability to communicate in writing can itself be a substantial limitation in the activity of performing manual tasks. 105 (ii) As to the second point, whether Thornton's life circumstances were such that her difficulties with using her hands and arms to put words to paper (or computer screen) was a substantial limitation in performing the manual tasks important to her life: 106 Thornton's 25 year career in journalism has depended upon her ability to engage in written communication. Indeed, committing words to paper (or, now, computer) is the nub of her chosen profession, and, as such, is both what she has spent a large percentage of her waking hours doing for many years and the core of her economic well-being. That she can still dress herself, drive, and do the laundry does not detract from this reality, any more than such residual skills detract from the reality that a test-taker who cannot write or use a computer is not going to demonstrate his or her relevant aptitude or achievement on a written examination unless accommodated. Moreover, McClatchy's doctor diagnosed Thornton's injury as permanent, providing additional strong evidence that Thornton's limitations in performing manual tasks are substantial. Cf. Chanda, 234 F.3d at 1223 (finding summary judgment for the defendant appropriate where the plaintiff acknowledged that he could resume, after having completed a medical leave, the manual tasks in which he claimed limitations). 107 So Thornton is permanently limited in carrying out manual tasks that for most people are critical to participation in contemporary society, as well as critical to the manner in which she herself has heretofore led her life. As such, she is substantially limited in performing manual tasks. 108 (iii) I emphasize that my approach to this statutory maze will not result in finding a substantial limitation in performing manual tasks whenever an employee is substantially impeded in carrying out the manual tasks involved in carrying out his or her job, for three reasons: For one thing, I would require, before any individualized inquiry, an inquiry into the general, societal importance of the particular manual task. Additionally, the particular manual task here at issue, using one's arms and hands physically to communicate in writing, is one as to which there is specific statutory and administrative attention and recognition, recounted above; I do not believe that that is true with regard to any other major subspecies ofmanual tasks. And third, in looking at the impact of a limitation in performing manual tasks on an individual, I would consider both the longevity of that individual's dependence on that task and the permanence of the impairment. 109 The majority applied, instead, a vaguely-articulated standard that takes no account of either modern social and economic realities or the role of such practical considerations in applying the ADA's disability definition. I therefore respectfully dissent. 9 Notes: 1 There is some evidence in the record tending to disprove the documents and testimony Thornton submitted concerning the extent of her disability -namely, evidence indicating that she engaged in activities after leaving her reporting job that required writing and keyboarding, although the amount of time spent on those activities continuously and intermittently is not specified. That evidence indicates that there may be a genuine issue of material fact regarding the extent of her disability. It does not, however, alter the basic legal questions involved in this appeal from the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of McClatchy -whether, on the evidence as presented by Thorton , she has met her burden of demonstrating a disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act. See Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 498 n.3 (2000). 2 Thornton is also impaired, although to what extent is unclear, from performing other manual tasks, including ironing, vacuuming, shampooing, and certain food preparation procedures (including chopping and opening jars). For purposes of this dissent, however, I focus on the questions whether severe limitations in performing the manual tasks necessary to conduct written communication can establish a substantial limitation in carrying out manual tasks to constitute a disability under the ADA, and whether the evidence in this case showing such limitations did establish a disability sufficient to withstand a motion for summary judgment. 3 Although Congress authorized several agencies to issue regulations interpreting Titles I, II, and III of the ADA, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 12116, 12134, 12149, no agency was expressly authorized to issue regulations construing the generally applicable definition section of the statute. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479. The interpretive regulations, nonetheless, are generally useful for guidance, especially when they are not challenged but instead, as here, are relied upon by the parties to the case. Cf. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480; McAlindin, 192 F.3d at 1233 n.6. Additionally, because the particular regulations defining major life activities mimic the parallel regulation under the Rehabilitation Act, they enjoy a statutory imprimatur: As Bragdon recognized, under 42 U.S.C. §§12201(a),the ADA must be construed to be consistent with regulations issued to implement the Rehabilitation Act. 524 U.S. at 638. 4 This list is illustrative, not exhaustive. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639. 5 I note that learning to read and write are discrete activities from reading and writing. Thornton, for example, knows how to write but now is severely limited from doing so. 6 The district court reached the same result as the majority by describing the only activities that Thornton could not do -housework beyond basic chores, participating in certain sporting activities, and performing certain cooking tasks, and then concluding that these tasks constituted too narrow a range of tasks to indicate that Thornton was substantially limited in the manual tasks major life activity. The district court's utter exclusion of Thornton's writing and keyboarding restrictions from its manual tasks analysis can only be explained by an assumption that tasks that are useful in earning a living, although useful for other purposes as well, for some reason do not count at all in substantial limitation analysis. 7 The majority concluded that Thornton waived the issue of whether written communication alone constitutes a major life activity. Whether or not that is the case, Thornton did not waive the contention that in considering whether an individual is impaired in performing manual tasks, an inability to perform the tasks involved in using a computer and writing is entitled to particular weight. Rather, her manual tasks argument --sketchy as it is -does assert that she is substantially limited in performing that class of major life activities primarily because of her writing and keyboarding limitations. I note, additionally, although the point is not of particular consequence to this dissent, that I do not think that Thornton did waive the issue of whether written communication alone constitutes a major life activity. In her briefs, Thornton claimed that her limitations in writing and keyboarding constituted a substantial limitation in a major life activity--exactly what the ADA requires a plaintiff to show to establish disability. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(A). The statute itself does not divide major life activities into various categories; it is the regulation's non-exhaustive categorization of major life activities, Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 639, not Thornton's claim under the statute itself, upon which the majority relies to determine that Thornton waived this issue. Nor do the EEOC's regulations indicate that manual tasks is necessarily onemajor life activity, rather than a group of such activities. Where the party's argument sufficiently flags the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions and amasses pertinent facts, the language used to refer to the argument should not determine whether a legal argument has been waived. Cf., Benitez-Pons v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 1998) (where plaintiff muddles the doctrines of equitable estoppel and equitable tolling [but] . . . asserts elements of both doctrines, we will analyze the equitable arguments under both estoppel and tolling theories.). 8 I have already explained why educational applications of the substantially limits . . . one or more of the major life activities definition of disability should be taken into account in construing the same language in the employment context -that all parts of the statute share a single disability definition, so that the same basic concepts should govern in all the contexts covered by the ADA. See p. 10932-33, supra. 9 As noted at the outset, I also believe that the majority's analysis concerning the major life activity of working is wrong. In particular, I do not agree with the majority's reading of Broussard v. University of California, 192 F.3d 1252 (9th Cir. 1999) as requiring in all instances that the plaintiff bring forward specific evidence about relevant labor markets to defeat summary judgment on a claim of substantial limitation in the major life activity of working. Ante at 10919-20. Rather, the Broussard court's foremost concern appears to have been that the vocational specialist in that case drew conclusions about the plaintiff's capacity to perform various jobs based on a fundamental misreading of the medical and vocational evidence concerning her physical restrictions. 192 F.3d at 1258-59. Moreover, the plaintiff's job, animal technician, was specialized and unusual; faced with evidence that Broussard, a laboratory technician, had difficulty feeding laboratory mice by hand, no jury reasonably could have determined, without more, that her impairments precluded her from performing any broad range of jobs or class of jobs. Here, in contrast, the impact of the inability to use a keyboard or to handwrite on Thornton's labor market participation is a matter of common knowledge, not requiring expert evidence at the summary judgment stage. Compare Wellington v. Lyon County Sch. Dist., 187 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1999) (affirming a finding of substantial limitation in the major life activity ofworking without requiring expert labor market evidence, where the scope of limitation could be surmised from the record and common knowledge.) I do not address further the working major life activity issue, however, both because the majority's error is neither so plain nor so devastating in its impact as its manual tasks holding, and because we have been directed to consider major life activities other than working in the first instance. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at 492 (quoting 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, App. §§ 1630.2(j) (noting that the major life activity of working is somewhat circular, and that the EEOC recommends determining whether an employee is substantially impaired in some other major life activity before addressing whether she was so limited in the major life activity of working). This last, sensible direction, I note, refutes once more any contention that work-related activities must be antiseptically separated out or downplayed in determining substantial limitation in a discrete major life activity.