Opinion ID: 4554030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Surveillance-Camera Evidence

Text: Prior to trial, Ryan Bundy had submitted an affidavit in which he claimed to have seen a device with a telephoto lens on a tripod overlooking Bundy’s house. The government opposed the request for information about this device as a “fantastic fishing expedition.” On the fourth day of trial, witness testimony confirmed that the government had indeed set up a camera overlooking Bundy’s property, and that the camera had a live feed to the BLM’s command center. The defendants assert that this camera contributed to their feeling of being surrounded and, hence, helped rebut the government’s position that the defendants deceitfully claimed that they feared for their lives because of government snipers. Two specific pieces of evidence about the camera were withheld. Both of these documents were prepared in 2014, and both confirm the existence of the surveillance camera set up to monitor the Bundy Ranch. The first document is the Egbert 302 prepared in April 2014. The Egbert 302 recounts that on April 6, 2014, Egbert went to investigate issues with the camera after its live feed had been lost. The government produced the Egbert 302 a week into trial, apparently in response to a defense request for any video recordings from the surveillance camera. Upon reviewing the 302 at the November 8 hearing, the district court agreed with the defense that evidence related to the camera was material. The court ordered the government to turn over any evidence related to the camera. Following this order, the government provided a second document, the “Law Enforcement Operations Order,” on November 17, 2017. That document 26 UNITED STATES V. BUNDY was prepared in March 2014, in advance of the impound operation. The document records that an Internet camera was to be set up “with a view of the Bundy residence.” The district court concluded that the documents were Brady material because the camera’s “location” and “proximity to the home” showed that “its intended purpose was to surveil the Bundy home,” which “potentially rebuts the allegations of defendants’ deceit” in stating that they felt surrounded by snipers. The court found that the disclosure was untimely and the failure to disclose was prejudicial. The court also concluded that the government had been misleading in its earlier representations that the camera was not meant to surveil the Bundy home. Given that the Law Enforcement Operations Order specifically stated that the camera was to be placed “with [a] view of Bundy residence,” the district court agreed with the defendants that “this information potentially rebuts the allegations of the defendants’ deceit . . . about being surrounded, about the BLM pointing guns at them, and using snipers.” The government assails the district court’s conclusion by arguing that a lone surveillance camera is unremarkable and proves nothing. As such, it claims that the withholding of these two pieces of evidence created no appreciable prejudice to the defense. But the government misses the point. This evidence undermined the government’s theory that the defendants intentionally lied about fearing government snipers surrounding the property. The government could have argued the significance of the evidence to the jury, but it is hard to see how the government could argue that the evidence was irrelevant, much less a “fantastic fishing expedition.” UNITED STATES V. BUNDY 27 Whether a jury would ultimately find the evidence convincing and lead to an acquittal is not the measuring rod here. Because no verdict was rendered, the usual “retrospective test, evaluating the strength of the evidence after trial has concluded” is not applicable here. United States v. Olsen, 704 F.3d 1172, 1183 (9th Cir. 2013). “[T]he retrospective definition of materiality is appropriate only in the context of appellate review”; thus, “trial prosecutors must disclose favorable information without attempting to predict whether its disclosure might affect the outcome of the trial.” Id. n.3; see United States v. Safavian, 233 F.R.D. 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2005) (“[T]he government must always produce any potentially exculpatory or otherwise favorable evidence without regard to how the withholding of such evidence might be viewed . . . as affecting the outcome of the trial. The question before trial is not whether the government thinks that disclosure of the information or evidence . . . might change the outcome of the trial going forward, but whether the evidence is favorable and therefore must be disclosed.”). Since the new evidence emerged mid-trial, neither the district court (in the first instance) nor we (as a reviewing court) can measure prejudice against all the evidence produced during the trial. Rather, the district court had to assess the relative value of the Egbert 302 and the Law Enforcement Operations Order on the basis of the indictment, the pretrial proceedings, the opening statements, and the evidence introduced up to that point. In that light, there can be no question but that this was Brady material and that it should have been disclosed to the defense well in advance of the start of trial. This evidence was obviously favorable to the defense—it could have helped show that the defendants had a basis for feeling that their property was surrounded by snipers surveilling the home. 28 UNITED STATES V. BUNDY The government also argues that even if it should have disclosed the fact of the camera, the defendants could not have suffered prejudice because they knew about the camera. While the defendants may have known about the camera’s existence—that is confirmed in Ryan Bundy’s affidavit—they had no specific information about the camera. They did not know what kind of equipment the government was using, its sophistication, and its purpose. And it was not until the documents were released that it became evident that the camera was deliberately placed so it would have a view of the Bundy home—contradicting the government’s representation that it was only placed “to cover the roads” near the Bundy Ranch. Thus, the district court’s finding that the defense was prejudiced because it would have developed a stronger case if this evidence had been timely provided is not clearly erroneous.