Opinion ID: 203058
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Second Motion in Limine[11]

Text: At the motion to suppress hearing, Coffey testified that he confiscated Brown's phone when Brown was arrested, called it from his own phone using the number DeVlaminck had provided, and that it rang. On cross-examination, Brown confronted Coffey with Brown's phone records from that evening, which show one call at 7:29 p.m. and the next at 8:40 p.m. Coffey testified that he must have called at 8:40 p.m., while still at the Brown property. Brown then showed Coffey a booking sheet indicating that Brown had been booked at 8:15 p.m., and that a cell phone had been inventoried as one of Brown's possessions. Coffey responded that this entry did not necessarily mean that Brown's phone was seized at 8:15 p.m. Three days later, Brown's counsel sent a letter to the Assistant U.S. Attorney asking to be provided with records of Coffey's cell phone showing the telephone call to Dennis Brown's cell phone. The Government did not provide such records. Brown then filed the motion in limine, claiming that any testimony on Coffey's confirmatory phone call should be excluded on the ground that it is contradicted by affirmative undisputed evidence in the record, including Brown's cell phone records, the booking sheet, and police records that show Coffey was at the Salisbury police station interrogating DeVlaminck between 8:15 p.m. and 9:25 p.m. Brown also asserted that the testimony should be barred because the Government failed to hand over Coffey's phone records in spite of Brown's request. At trial, prior to Coffey's testimony, Brown reminded the district court of the still-pending motion in limine, emphasizing that it should be granted because the Government had failed to hand over Coffey's phone records. The Government responded that it did not have the records. The district court issued a brief oral ruling disposing of the motion: The records were equally accessible to both sides. [Brown] could have issued a subpoena for them. So the motion is denied. Testimony at trial on this issue was predictably confused. An officer who was present at Brown's arrest testified that Coffey dialed Brown's number immediately after confiscating the phone and that it rang. Coffey testified on direct examination that he called the phone and it rang, but that he did not remember whether he called while still at Brown's property or sometime later. On cross-examination, Coffey testified that, despite what was reflected in the 8:15 p.m. booking entry, we were still looking at [Brown's] personal property, that the phone was sent to another police station, and that the Salisbury Police did not have physical possession of that phone at 8:15. When shown evidence that he was at the Salisbury police station interrogating DeVlaminck between 8:15 p.m. and 9:25 p.m., Coffey acknowledged that he was not still at the Brown property at 8:40 p.m., when Brown's phone records show an incoming call. Brown now appeals the district court's denial of his motion in limine. He argues that Coffey's phone records were Brady material because they would have directly contradicted Coffey's testimony on a key issue: the fact that Coffey called the number DeVlaminck provided and Brown's phone rang bolstered the Government's claim that it was Brown with whom DeVlaminck had been speaking during the earlier controlled phone conversation. Evidence that no phone call was made would also tend to discredit Coffey in general. The Supreme Court's holding in Brady requires the Government to disclose exculpatory evidence in its possession that is material either to guilt or to punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Information is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Caro-Muñiz, 406 F.3d 22, 29 (1st Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Rosario-Peralta, 175 F.3d 48, 53 (1st Cir.1999)). To vacate a conviction because of a Brady violation, the defendant must make a three-part showing: [1] the evidence at issue [was] favorable to [him], either because it is exculpatory, or because it is impeaching; [2] that evidence [was] suppressed by the [s]tate, either willfully or inadvertently; and [3] prejudice . . . ensued. United States v. Josleyn, 206 F.3d 144, 153 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999)). The Government maintains that Coffey's phone records are not, and never have been, in its custody or control, and that it therefore has no obligation to seek them out and disclose them. See United States v. Bender, 304 F.3d 161, 163 (1st Cir.2002). Yet even assuming for the sake of argument that Coffey's phone records were in the actual or constructive possession of the Government, and that they would indicate that Coffey made no call to Brown's phone on the evening in question, Brown has still failed to satisfy the third element of the Strickler test  that is, that prejudice ensued. See United States v. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d 12, 35 (1st Cir.2003) ( Brady does not provide[] grounds for relief unless the exclusion or failure to produce prejudiced [the] defense.). The jurors heard Coffey's testimony and that of the other officer, had the booking sheet and Brown's phone records before them, and still decided the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that Brown possessed the guns recovered from DeVlaminck. They obviously believed Coffey notwithstanding the implausibilities in the relevant portions of his testimony, or disbelieved him but believed the considerable quantum of other evidence  such as DeVlaminck's and L'Esperance's testimony  linking Brown to the guns. It is highly unlikely that the verdict would have been any different had Coffey's phone records been in evidence, no matter what they may have indicated, or that the records or Coffey's testimony in response to them would have put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict. United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 114 (1st Cir.2004); see also United States v. Dumas, 207 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.2000) (Impeachment evidence, even that which tends to further undermine the credibility of the key Government witness whose credibility has already been shaken due to extensive cross-examination, does not create a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist where that evidence is cumulative or collateral. (quoting United States v. Shelton, 588 F.2d 1242, 1248 (9th Cir.1978))). The failure to provide the purported Brady material did not prejudice Brown, and the district court's refusal to exclude Coffey's testimony on the confirmatory phone call was accordingly not error.