Opinion ID: 2630681
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Clarification of discretionary certification

Text: Given the juvenile court's justifiable confusion over the interplay between the presumptive and discretionary certification standards, we take this opportunity to clarify the guidelines for discretionary certification. Again, under NRS 62B.390(3), a minor may rebut presumptive certification with clear and convincing evidence that he or she has emotional or behavioral problems or substance abuse issues that substantially contributed to the conduct and that may be appropriately treated through the juvenile court's jurisdiction. This constitutes a clear statement by the Legislature that emotional or behavior problems or substance abuse issues, which are amenable to treatment in the juvenile court, could be grounds for not certifying a minor. But under the discretionary certification guidelines, we have stated that a minor cannot avoid certification merely by a showing of amenability to treatment in the juvenile court. [15] Because amenability to treatment is an express factor in rebutting presumptive certification but cannot be used alone to avoid discretionary certification, we clarify that under discretionary certification, the juvenile court may consider substance abuse issues or emotional or behavioral problems that contributed to the minor's conduct, as well as the extent to which those issues or problems are amenable to treatment in the juvenile court. These personal factors, however, are not the most weighty and controlling and may be considered only in close cases. The substantive guidelines governing discretionary certification under NRS 62B.390(1) are set forth in In the Matter of Seven Minors, and consist of a matrix of three factors for the juvenile court to consider: (1) the nature and seriousness of the charged offense(s); (2) the persistency and seriousness of past adjudicated or admitted criminal offenses; and (3) personal considerations such as age, maturity, character, personality and family relationships. [16] Seven Minors explains that the first two factors are given the most weight and that certification may be based on either of those factors standing alone, whereas personal considerations come into play in close cases where neither of the first two factors impels certification. [17] Our decision in Seven Minors constituted a move away from considering the minor's best interest and toward the interests of public safety and welfare, including accountability, punishment, deterrence, and retribution. [18] That is, once transfer is justified on the basis of public interest and safety, the juvenile court need not consider the minor's best interest or amenability to treatment, except insofar as such considerations bear on the public interest. [19] But while we indicated in Seven Minors that subjective evaluations and prognostications as to whether a given youth is or is not likely to respond favorably to juvenile court treatment will no longer be the court's primary focus in transfer proceedings, [20] we did not prohibit personal factors from being taken into account. We acknowledged that a decision not to transfer may be proper when individual considerations such as maturity, emotional stability, family support, and positive psychological and social evaluation require a finding that the public interest and safety are best served by retaining the youth in the juvenile system. [21] Moreover, we pointed out that retention in the juvenile system favors the long-term public interest when the minor has a good chance of becoming a productive and law-abiding citizen under juvenile court cognizance. [22] As set forth in Seven Minors, the emphasis in discretionary certification is still on public safety and welfare, and either the seriousness of the offense or the minor's delinquent past alone may justify certification. But in close cases, when neither of the first two factors clearly compels certification, the juvenile court may consider personal factors, including the minor's amenability to treatment in the juvenile court, and may decline certification based on the totality of all of the factors. Again, the district court retains broad discretion in making discretionary certification decisions in accordance with the guidelines set forth in Seven Minors. [23] In sum, we conclude that the juvenile court properly applied the certification statute by considering discretionary certification after William had rebutted presumptive certification. However, in light of the juvenile court's understandable quandary over applying the discretionary certification standard and its view that William's personal attributes could not be considered, we reverse the certification order and remand this matter to the juvenile court to reconsider certification under our clarification of the discretionary certification standard.