Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to instruct on provocation

Text: In a related contention, defendant asserts the trial court erred in failing to instruct on its own motion that provocation inadequate to reduce a killing from murder to manslaughter nonetheless may suffice to negate premeditation and deliberation, thus reducing the crime to second degree murder. (See CALJIC No. 8.73; see also People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 132, 169 P.2d 1.) CALJIC No. 8.73 explains this concept. [26] The Attorney General contends that CALJIC No. 8.73 is a pinpoint instruction relating particular evidence to an element of the offense, and therefore need not be given on the court's own motion. We agree. We have recently stated, albeit in dicta, that CALJIC No. 8.73 is a pinpoint instruction. ( People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 214-215, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717 [where CALJIC No. 8.73 was requested and trial court agreed to give it but for some reason failed to do so, there was no error because no evidence supported the giving of the requested instruction]; People v. Mayfield (1997) 14 Cal.4th 668, 778, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 928 P.2d 485 [on appeal, defendant could not complain that CALJIC No. 8.73, which was given, was ambiguous or otherwise inadequate when he failed to request any modifications at trial].) This conclusion is supported by People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588, a murder case in which we held the trial court was not required to instruct on its own motion that the jury should consider the defendant's voluntary intoxication in determining whether defendant premeditated and deliberated. ( Id. at pp. 1117-1120, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) We noted that because the defense of diminished capacity had been abolished, [i]ntoxication is now relevant only to the extent that it bears on the question of whether the defendant actually had the requisite specific mental state. Thus, it is now more like [] `pinpoint,' instructions . . . to which a defendant is entitled upon request. Such instructions relate particular facts to a legal issue in the case or `pinpoint' the crux of a defendant's case. . . . They are required to be given upon request when there is evidence supportive of the theory, but they are not required to be given sua sponte. ( People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588; see also id. at p. 1120, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588 [instruction relating evidence of intoxication to premeditation and deliberation does not involve a general principle of law as that term is used in cases imposing a sua sponte duty to instruct].) Similarly, under the principles expressed in CALJIC No. 8.73, provocation is relevant only to the extent it bears on the question whether defendant premeditated and deliberated. ( People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 1119, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) Because CALJIC No. 8.73 relates the evidence of provocation to the specific legal issue of premeditation and deliberation, it is a pinpoint instruction as that term was defined in People v. Saille, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pages 1119-1120, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588, and need not be given on the court's own motion. (Accord, People v. Middleton (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 19, 30-33, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 366 [CALJIC No. 8.73 is a pinpoint instruction that need not be given on the court's own motion]; People v. Lee (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 1724, 1732-1734, 34 Cal. Rptr.2d 723 [same]; Comment to CALJIC No. 8.73 (6th ed. 1998) (July 2002 rev.) [no sua sponte duty to instruct]; Bench notes to CALCRIM No. 522 (1st ed.2005) [no sua sponte duty to instruct with CALCRIM analogue to CALJIC No. 8.73].) Defendant relies on People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673. There, we stated in dictum that a sua sponte instruction on provocation and second degree murder must be given `where the evidence of provocation would justify a jury determination that the accused had formed the intent to kill as a direct response to the provocation and had acted immediately' to carry it out. ( Id. at pp. 42-43, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673, quoting People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329, 185 Cal Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311; see also People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1129, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159 [no sua sponte duty to instruct pursuant to CALJIC No. 8.73 where no evidence supported the instruction]; but see People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1250, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225 [noting inconsistency between Johnson and Perez on the one hand, and Mayfield on the other].) Johnson cited People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, for the proposition that the court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the principles contained in CALJIC No. 8.73. Wickersham, however, held only that an instruction on second degree murder must be given when the evidence supports the theory that the defendant killed in response to provocation and thus without premeditation and deliberation. Wickersham did not state that the trial court must explain the principles spelled out in CALJIC No. 8.73. Accordingly, Johnson's reliance on Wickersham for the proposition that CALJIC No. 8.73 must be given on the court's own motion was erroneous. Indeed, in Johnson the trial court had instructed on second degree murder; thus, Wickersham was inapposite. Nor is our conclusion inconsistent with People v. Valentine, upon which CALJIC No. 8.73 is based. There, the defendant killed the victim during an argument after the victim accused the defendant of trespassing and, according to the defense, swore at defendant and shoved him. The defendant was convicted of first degree murder. We reversed based on a host of instructional errors. ( People v. Valentine, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 137-144, 169 P.2d 1.) We also suggested the instructions on heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter were misleading because the jury might have understood them as implying that provocation that was inadequate to reduce the murder to manslaughter was irrelevant to any issue. But in that case, the court also had instructed the jury erroneously that: (a) if the defendant possessed the specific intent to kill, the killing was first degree murder (thus blurring the distinction between first and second degree murder); and (b) the defendant bore the burden of raising a reasonable doubt as to the degree of the murder. ( People v. Valentine, supra, 28 Cal.2d at pp. 130-134, 169 P.2d 1.) Valentine does not stand for the general proposition that the standard heat-of-passion voluntary manslaughter instructions are always misleading in a homicide case where the jury is instructed on premeditated murder and there is evidence of provocation, or that such manslaughter instructions always must be accompanied by instructions on the principle of inadequate provocation set out in CALJIC No. 8.73. In the absence of instructional errors such as were present in Valentine, the standard manslaughter instruction is not misleading, because the jury is told that premeditation and deliberation is the factor distinguishing first and second degree murder. Further, the manslaughter instruction does not preclude the defense from arguing that provocation played a role in preventing the defendant from premeditating and deliberating; nor does it preclude the jury from giving weight to any evidence of provocation in determining whether premeditation existed. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that CALJIC No. 8.73 is a pinpoint instruction that need not be given on the court's own motion.