Opinion ID: 1984491
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Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Extinguishment of Prior Convictions.

Text: Relying on our decision in State v. Soppe , Stoen argues that the State cannot use his pre-amendment OWI offenses to enhance his punishment because his prior offenses have been extinguished by operation of law. In Soppe, the defendant was charged with second-offense OWI based on a prior OWI charge that had resulted in a deferred judgment pursuant to Iowa Code section 907.3. 374 N.W.2d at 650. Prior to commission of the pending OWI violation, the applicable statute had been amended to specifically include deferred judgments in determining whether a violation charged is a first, second, or subsequent offense. Id. at 652. The dispute focused on whether the legislature intended to include deferred judgments granted prior to the amendment. Id. Based on the unique nature of a deferred judgment, we held that the legislature did not intend to retroactively count such proceedings in determining whether punishment for the current offense should be enhanced. Id. at 652-53. Our decision rested on our conclusion that the defendant had acquired a vested right when he consented to the deferred judgment. Id. at 653. At that time, the defendant was promised that upon completion of the requirements for this sentencing option, the offense would be removed from his records. Id. at 652. Deprivation of this right, we held, would violate Iowa Code section 4.13, which preserves any previously acquired rights from extinguishment by a statutory amendment. [3] Id. at 653. The facts before us vary significantly from Soppe. [4] The primary distinction is that Stoen's prior violations were convictions, not deferred judgments. See State v. Ueding, 400 N.W.2d 550, 552 (Iowa 1987) (distinguishing Soppe on the basis that its holding was ... anchored on the peculiar and evaporating nature of a deferred judgment). Stoen points to no statute analogous to the deferred judgment sentencing statute that expressly extinguishes or expunges OWI convictions older than six years from a defendant's record. Compare Iowa Code § 907.3 (Upon fulfillment of the conditions of probation [for a deferred judgment], the defendant shall be discharged without entry of judgment.  (Emphasis added.)); Soppe, 374 N.W.2d at 652 (noting that a defendant consenting to a deferred judgment... was assured that upon completion of probation he or she would have no `record' ); State v. Farmer, 234 N.W.2d 89, 92 (Iowa 1975) (The manifest purpose of the deferred [judgment] procedure is to permit a defendant to avoid otherwise inevitable conviction and a judicial record of the criminal charge.), with Iowa Code § 321J.2(3) (providing only that OWI convictions occurring more than six years earlier would not be considered); id. § 321.12 (providing for destruction of OWI records after twelve years). There was certainly no provision in section 321J.2(3), which established the former six-year window, that convictions older than six years would expire or, as the defendant argues, evaporate from legal existence. Consequently, we conclude Stoen acquired no right prior to the 1997 amendments that convictions older than six years would be expunged from his criminal record. Stoen has not been deprived of a vested right by the legislative expansion of the window for prior offenses from six years to twelve years. Consequently, Iowa Code section 4.13(2) does not prevent the application of the twelve-year window to him. See Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Iowa Dist. Ct., 587 N.W.2d 774, 776 (Iowa 1998) (holding section 4.13(2) saves only ... a right or privilege ... that was acquired, accrued or accorded prior to the change in the law). AFFIRMED.