Opinion ID: 4512151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Invocation of the Privilege

Text: Greer does not dispute the relevance of questions concerning incidents of sexual abuse against Mirlis, but he argues that the series of questions that elicited his invocation of the privilege were cumulative and unduly prejudicial, and that the district court ʺerred in its decision not to prohibit, or reasonably limit, questioning about critical and potentially inflammatory allegations of sexual abuse.ʺ Defs.‐Apps. Br. at 27‐28. We hold that the district - 16 - court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence of Greerʹs invocation of the privilege in the manner that it did.
ʺWe review for abuse of discretion the district courtʹs admission into evidence of a witnessʹs invocation of the Fifth Amendment.ʺ Woods, 864 F.3d at 170 (citation omitted). To be admissible, a witnessʹs invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self‐incrimination must satisfy Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 403. See LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 1997); Brinkʹs, 717 F.2d at 710. Under Rule 401, evidence is relevant if it ʺmakes a consequential fact more or less probable.ʺ In re 650 Fifth Ave. & Related Props., 934 F.3d 147, 171 (2d Cir. 2019) (citing Fed. R. Evid. 401). We have held that factfinders may draw ʺadverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.ʺ Woods, 864 F.3d at 170 (quoting Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976)); see 650 Fifth Ave., 934 F.3d at 171; Brinkʹs, 717 F.2d at 707 (ʺThe privilege is merely an option of refusal, not a prohibition of inquiry and it is universally conceded that the question may be put to the witness on the stand. . . .ʺ (internal quotation marks omitted)). - 17 - Relevant evidence, however, may be excluded ʺif its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice . . . or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.ʺ Fed. R. Evid. 403. ʺWhile [the analysis under Rule 403] is case specific, the mere fact that a Fifth Amendment invocation is ʹdamningʹ to a partyʹs position does not preclude its introduction,ʺ but ʺinvocations that cross the line to ʹinflammatoryʹ are more likely to fail under Rule 403.ʺ 650 Fifth Ave., 934 F.3d at 171 (quoting Brink’s, 717 F.3d at 710). As a function of its discretion under Rule 403, a district court controls the form in which evidence of the privilege invocation reaches the jury. Id. at 171‐72 (distinguishing between content and form with respect to admission of evidence that the witnesses invoked the privilege); Rad Servs., Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 808 F.2d 271, 277 (3d Cir. 1986). And the dramatization of a partyʹs presentation of evidence may ʺtip[] the Rule 403 scale from ʹdamningʹ to ʹinflammatory.ʹʺ 650 Fifth Ave., 934 F.3d at 172 (quoting Brinkʹs, 717 F.2d at 710). The dissent in Brinkʹs foreshadowed the issue of factfinders being induced to draw prejudicial adverse inferences from a witnessʹs privilege invocation by counselʹs ʺsharpʺ practice of conducting a ʺsystematic interrogation of witnesses on direct examination . . . know[ing] they will assert the privilege - 18 - against self‐incrimination.ʺ 717 F.2d at 715 (Winter, J., dissenting). One principal concern was that a party would ask fact‐specific, leading questions ʺdesigned to suggest to the jury that but for the privilege the answer in each case would have been ʹyesʹʺ and ʺinevitably invite[] jurors to give evidentiary weight to questions rather than answers.ʺ Id. at 716. The dissent was also concerned that the strategy would ʺeffectively den[y] the right of cross‐examination since the witness cannot even be made to explain why the privilege has been invoked, much less to contradict the intended inference.ʺ Id. On the other hand, it was precisely these kinds of questions ‐‐ fact‐specific, leading questions ‐‐ that the majority in Brinkʹs held were permissible. Id. at 715‐16 (dissent quoting questions). We revisited the issue surrounding dramatization of a witnessʹs privilege invocation in 650 Fifth Avenue. There, the district court permitted the Government to present the jury with videotapes of witnesses, who did not testify at trial, ʺdeclining to answer question after question during their depositions.ʺ 650 Fifth Ave., 934 F.3d at 172. We held that the ʺparad[ing] of videotapes, which the Government strategically spread out across multiple days of trial, was substantially more prejudicial and redundant than probativeʺ because ʺ[t]he videotapes repeatedly reminded the jury of the witnessesʹ decisions not to - 19 - testifyʺ and ʺrepeatedly put the Governmentʹs incriminating questions in the jurorsʹ minds ‐‐ questions the parties agreed were not evidence and that the court allowed the Government to submit as an exhibit.ʺ Id. In evaluating the risk of unfair prejudice that may result from the manner in which a party introduces his evidence, we may compare the district courtʹs course of action against evidentiary alternatives. Id. (reasoning that district court could have employed ʺ[s]ubstantially less prejudicial and redundant alternativesʺ such as a stipulation or a more limited showing of videotape evidence of witnessesʹ invocation of the privilege); accord Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committeeʹs note to the 1972 proposed rules (ʺavailability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factorʺ in deciding whether to exclude on grounds of unfair prejudice); Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 184 (1997) (holding that probative value of evidence ʺmay be calculated by comparing evidentiary alternativesʺ).
Because Greer and Yeshiva concede that his invocation of the privilege was relevant, we focus on whether the elicitation of that evidence at trial withstands scrutiny under Rule 403. It does. While the evidence of Greerʹs - 20 - invocation of the privilege against self‐incrimination was surely ʺdamning,ʺ it was not unfairly prejudicial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence in the manner that it did. First, Greerʹs invocation of the privilege was highly probative. His refusal to answer such basic questions as whether he forced Mirlis to have sex with him when Mirlis was a child is telling. ʺSilence is often evidence of the most persuasive character.ʺ United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153‐54 (1923) (quoted with approval in Baxter, 425 U.S. at 319). Second, there was substantial independent evidence to corroborate the inference. See Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318 (ʺ[T]he Fifth Amendment does not forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify in response to probative evidence offered against them.ʺ); Doe ex rel. Rudy‐ Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1264 (9th Cir. 2000) (ʺ[A]n adverse inference can be drawn when independent evidence exists of the fact to which the party refuses to answer.ʺ). Of course, Mirlis testified in painful detail as to Greerʹs abuse of him; he was subjected to cross‐examination, and the jury believed him. There was other evidence of Greerʹs abuse of Mirlis as well, including the assistant principalʹs testimony. Clearly, the jury did not base its decision ʺsolelyʺ on - 21 - Greerʹs refusal to testify. See Cerro Gordo Charity v. Firemanʹs Fund Am. Life Ins. Co., 819 F.2d 1471, 1482 (8th Cir. 1987). Third, the district court gave the jury limiting instructions during Greerʹs testimony and again at the end of the trial. Indeed, after Greer had answered a few questions about whether he had invoked the privilege at his deposition and whether he intended to invoke the privilege at trial, he asserted the privilege only once before the district court intervened to give a limiting instruction. After Greer invoked the privilege a few more times, the court reminded the jury ʺ[s]ame instruction as before.ʺ D. Ct. Doc. No. 230 at 95. And soon thereafter, the district court sustained the objection on the grounds the questions had become cumulative. Mirlisʹs counsel ceased asking questions about the sexual assaults. Fourth, Greer asserted the privilege inconsistently. He answered many questions, including questions inquiring as to whether he had sexually abused Mirlis when he was a student. For instance, shortly after invoking the privilege, Greer denied that he had sexually abused Mirlis in the woods in Hamden. Greer also invoked the privilege in response to questions with no apparent implication that Greer had engaged in criminal conduct, such as - 22 - whether he taught religious and secular studies. As the district court observed, the jury was likely swayed by ʺGreerʹs selective invocation of his rights rather than by his assertion of the [privilege].ʺ D. Ct. Doc. No. 300 at 28. In 650 Fifth Avenue, where the Government presented a ʺparade of videotapes,ʺ ʺspread out across multiple days of trial,ʺ of witnesses at their depositions refusing to answer question after question, we concluded that ʺthe district courtʹs failure to moderate the Governmentʹs extreme tactic was an abuse of discretion.ʺ 650 Fifth Avenue, 934 F.3d at 172. Here, Mirlisʹs use of Greerʹs invocation of the privilege was not extreme, and the district court in fact moderated the presentation of the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the evidence of Greerʹs invocation of the privilege in the circumstances here.