Opinion ID: 797512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Protection & Substantive Due Process

Text: 31 In disposing of Torres's equal protection and substantive due process 7 claims, we hold that the stop-time rule is rationally grounded. See Appiah v. INS, 202 F.3d 704, 709-10 (4th Cir.2000) (applying rational basis review to substantive due process and equal protection challenges to stop-time rule). With the stop-time rule, Congress intended to prevent aliens from continuing to accumulate time toward the continuous residency requirement after INS had issued an order to show cause to an alien. Sibanda v. INS, 282 F.3d 1330, 1335 (10th Cir.2002). By mandating the stop-time rule, Congress also removed an alien's incentive for prolonging removal hearings in order to become eligible for cancellation of removal. Appiah, 202 F.3d at 710. These purposes are valid governmental objectives. 32 Torres argues that the statutory scheme is irrational because the stop-time rule applies only to § 1229b(a)(2) (seven years of continuous residence) and not to § 1229b(a)(1) (five years from lawful admission) and so the incentive to prolong removal proceedings persists. We do not follow this logic. An alien must satisfy all three requirements of § 1229b(a) to be eligible for cancellation. If § 1229b(a)(2) cannot be satisfied, then the alien is ineligible for cancellation of removal notwithstanding the alien's compliance with § 1229b(a)'s other provisions. If an alien is short of the seven years required under § 1229b(a)(2), he is ineligible for cancellation of removal and so it does not matter that the alien's time counted toward permanent residency still accrues under § 1229b(a)(1). Accordingly, prolonging the removal proceedings will be unavailing. 33 Torres also complains that the stop-time rule lacks a rational basis because it (1) denies cancellation to lawfully admitted aliens who have not been continuously present in the country for seven years, (2) while granting eligibility for aliens who may have been in the country unlawfully (and subsequently gained legal permanent residence) but have nonetheless been in the country for the requisite seven years. 34 We disagree that these classifications fail rational basis review. Section 1229b(a)(1) provides that aliens eligible for cancellation must have been lawfully admitted for permanent residence for at least five years. Congress may have determined that after five years of lawful residence and seven years of physical presence in the country, aliens should be eligible for cancellation of removal regardless of their prior unlawful presence in the country. While the policy objective may not be perfectly advanced by these provisions, only a reasonable relationship to the objective and the chosen means need be shown. 35 The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that over no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over the admission of aliens, and it has long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments [is] largely immune from judicial control. Thus, in determining whether a rational basis exists for making distinctions between classes of aliens, we are especially deferential. 36 Latu, 375 F.3d at 1020 (internal quotations omitted). If Congress chooses to treat aliens who were formerly present illegally but legalized their status more favorably than those who commit drug crimes, it is not our role to second-guess the governmental objective. 37 Since we find no constitutional infirmity with § 1229b(a) and the stop-time rule, we need not address Torres's arguments about alternate interpretations of the stop-time rule.