Opinion ID: 683501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: DOD Directives

Text: A. 55 The DOD Directives use somewhat different wording to define a homosexual than does the Academy regulation: 56 Homosexual means a person, regardless of sex, who engages in, desires to engage in, or intends to engage in homosexual acts.... 57 DOD Directive 1332.14.H.1.b. (1), 32 C.F.R. Pt. 41, App. A (1991) (superseded). Steffan's lawsuit takes aim primarily at the Directives because the phrase desires to engage in is claimed to extend the definition of homosexual into the realm of a service member's private thoughts. The DOD regulations are unconstitutional, Steffan argues, because they allow for the expulsion of service members on the basis of their inner feelings alone. They are irrationally overbroad--and thus fail rational basis review--because they define the class of excludable persons to reach those who merely harbor homosexual impulses, without requiring any indications that such impulses are likely to be reflected in admittedly impermissible homosexual conduct. Steffan's complaint purports to challenge the Directives as applied and on their face (although his brief is ambiguous on the point). 58 As we have noted, however, Steffan's counsel agreed at oral argument that the Directives constitutionally could be applied to a service member who stated that he was a homosexual and who meant by the statement that he actually engaged in homosexual conduct. This concession, that some situations exist to which the Directives may constitutionally be applied, renders Steffan's facial challenge defective. [U]nder our constitutional system courts are not roving commissions assigned to pass judgment on the validity of the Nation's laws. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 610-11, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2915, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973). For this reason, [c]onstitutional judgments ... are justified only out of the necessity of adjudicating rights in particular cases. Id. at 611, 93 S.Ct. at 2915. Accordingly, outside the First Amendment context, see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-22, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1105-06, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972), a facial challenge to a legislative Act ... must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act would be valid. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745, 107 S.Ct. 2095, 2100, 95 L.Ed.2d 697 (1987) (emphasis added). By his own admission, Steffan cannot meet this requirement. 59 Where, as here, a statute or regulation has some concededly constitutional applications, a successful challenger must demonstrate that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the particular facts of [his] case. Id. at 745 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. at 2100 n. 3. To this end, we are told, see Appellant's Reply Br. at 10, that when Steffan answered affirmatively to the question whether he was a homosexual he was obliged to reveal, and therefore must be deemed to have revealed, his innermost desires. Steffan, however, has not at any stage in this litigation sought to show why and how the DOD Directives were actually applied to him in an unconstitutional manner. He never disputed that he was a homosexual; indeed, he forthrightly admitted it at his hearing and declined to add anything to his response. (It will be recalled that he had actually invoked his right to refuse to discuss the matter with Naval investigators.) He did not point to that part of the DOD Directives' definition of homosexual that includes those persons who desire[ ] to engage in ... homosexual conduct as the reason for his answer. He never gave any explanation as to what he meant, or did not mean, when he stated that he was a homosexual. And he never claimed (even when he wrote to the Secretary of the Navy a year and a half after his resignation) that it was only the desires component of the Directives--the alleged unconstitutionally overbroad aspect--that enmeshed him in the definition. 60 Normally, a case such as this would arise as an appeal from a military adjudication under the Administrative Procedure Act. The APA provides a right to review agency action only to those adversely affected or aggrieved by such action, see 5 U.S.C. Sec. 702 (1988), and in order to establish a grievance resulting from the application of a regulatory term, a party would first have to show whether and how that term was applied to him. This is all the more so when the petition for review is based on a claim of unconstitutionality. Continental Air Lines, Inc. v. Department of Transp., 843 F.2d 1444, 1455-56 (D.C.Cir.1988) (constitutional challenges to congressional statute must be raised in agency proceedings to be preserved for review by appellate court); Meredith Corp. v. FCC, 809 F.2d 863, 872-74 (D.C.Cir.1987) (remanding for agency initially to address constitutional challenges to its own policy). Although this case comes to us as a collateral challenge based on the Constitution rather than the APA, that route does not alter the desirability of an agency elucidation as to the meaning of that part of the Directive that Steffan claims was crucial to his discharge. Where on the spectrum between intentions and mere fantasies does the military's interpretation of the word desires fall? Because the only administrative bodies that can decide that question were never pressed by Steffan to do so--indeed were never even alerted to the issue--we cannot know. 61 Only on appeal (almost seven years after his resignation) did Steffan fix upon the desires language in the definition as the root of his legal difficulty. If the Navy's procedures (which have not been brought before us) require internal appeal before resorting to collateral challenge, see Darby v. Cisneros, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2539, 2548, 125 L.Ed.2d 113 (1993), it might well have been thought that Steffan had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by agreeing to the disposition of his case at the Academy. The Navy did raise this precise argument in a recent Ninth Circuit case, Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir.1994), in which a naval officer was dismissed under a ruling of a Discharge Board (the lowest level in the administrative proceedings) for having stated on national television, Yes, I am in fact gay. The Navy pointed out that further administrative proceedings appealing the decision to the Board for Correction of Naval Records would provide a record for judicial review and would clarify confusion as to the regulatory definition of homosexual, which the parties disputed. The Ninth Circuit, rather astoundingly in our view, rejected the exhaustion argument on the grounds that the Discharge Board had been advised that a service member is conclusively deemed to be a homosexual if he makes a statement to that effect (which, of course, is not what the DOD Directives themselves said, see DOD Directive 1332.20.H.1.c. (2), (providing for separation on the basis of statement unless there is a further finding that the member is not a homosexual)), and that the Navy had not indicated that the disposition of the case would be any different on appeal. Meinhold, 34 F.3d at 1477. It should be obvious that this sort of reasoning would destroy the exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine. 18 62 In this case, although the government did in fact assert an exhaustion defense of some sort, it was rejected by the district court and the issue was not raised on appeal. It will be recalled also that the documents Steffan signed, with the advice of counsel, to facilitate his resignation specifically acknowledged that he would risk discharge if he pressed his appeal and for that reason explicitly waived his right to seek review. The government apparently initially asserted a variation of a waiver defense as well, which was also rejected and not appealed. As neither the waiver nor exhaustion arguments are before us, it would not be appropriate for us to consider them sua sponte. Cf. National Wildlife Fed'n v. Burford, 835 F.2d 305, 316-18 (D.C.Cir.1987) (discussing district court's discretion to enforce exhaustion claims raised against plaintiffs by nongovernmental third parties). 63 Still, in making an as-applied challenge, it is Steffan's burden--and the government does make this point--to show exactly how the Directives were applied against him illegally. Steffan seeks to meet this obligation by admitting that he entertains homosexual desires and arguing that such admission alone would be sufficient under the DOD Directives to cause his termination. The difficulty with Steffan's inventive position, however, is that even under his theory of the case he would only have a constitutional claim if his statement had meant that he harbored homosexual desires and yet had neither engaged in or intended to engage in homosexual conduct. Otherwise, the desires portion of the definition would not have been crucial to his discharge. 64 Steffan insists that the Navy never alleged that he engaged in homosexual acts or intended to do so. That is true but, it seems to us, quite beside the point. After all, the Navy never alleged that Steffan had homosexual desires. Steffan openly admitted his homosexuality, and under the circumstances there was no reason for the Navy to proceed further. If Steffan had wished to explain that his admission was based only on his desires--and not his conduct or intentions--he could have done so and joined the issue. The government would have been obliged, in that event, either to rest on his explanation (more naturally, he would have been at least asked what he meant by desires) or to pursue further evidence of intent or conduct. In that manner, one could subsequently determine whether the Navy had relied on only the desires portion of the definition and therefore whether it had actually been applied to Steffan. 65 Indeed, the government in its brief before this court, while conceding that the word desires may be ambiguous in isolation, tells us that the Department of Defense interprets the term as conduct related, i.e., bordering on intent, and referring to the actual prospect of future acts. If the Directives were interpreted in this way--notwithstanding their different language--to mean essentially the same as the Academy regulations, then, as we have already held, it would pass constitutional muster. If, instead, the word desires were interpreted to extend the definition of homosexual to persons not likely to engage in homosexual conduct, a different question would be presented; but Steffan has not indicated, in his framing of the case, that he is affected by that possible (if far-fetched) definition. 66 The dissent nevertheless argues that nothing Steffan could have said before the Performance Board would have been remotely relevant to his predicament. Dissent at 716-17. We simply do not understand how our colleagues can so conclude. Had Steffan responded yes to the question whether he was a homosexual but also said that he meant only that he entertained homosexual thoughts, it is not at all clear to us what the Board would have done. The Board might well have determined that under those circumstances it should enter a further finding that the member is not a homosexual, as the Directives contemplate. Or, the Board might then have sought to determine the parameters of the term desires. Does the term mean something close to an actual intent to engage in homosexual conduct or, as the original panel in this case concluded, mere inclinations and fantasies. Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 66 (D.C.Cir.1993), vacated and rehearing en banc granted (D.C.Cir. Jan. 7, 1994). We must bear in mind that although Steffan has implicitly conceded that he harbors homosexual desires, he has never explained how he defines that term. 67 Steffan was, moreover, amply represented by counsel (compare dissent at 717). If he believed that he was obliged to answer the question affirmatively solely because of the desires portion of the DOD Directives, it surely would have occurred to his counsel that the appropriate predicate for a constitutional challenge would include an explanation of what Steffan meant--and did not mean--by his answer. 68 As the record stands, Steffan has made no effort either in the Academy proceeding, in his subsequent letter to the Secretary of the Navy, or even in his suit in federal court to demonstrate how the Directives' allegedly overbroad definition of homosexual was applied to him. Putting the proceedings before the Board aside, it seems to us that Steffan has no conceivable basis, once he came to federal court with a collateral challenge, for not stating in his allegations exactly how the desires portion of the Directives injured him. Steffan seeks to blur the distinction between an as-applied and a facial challenge; he wishes to attack the Directives at the point he believes they are weakest legally without shouldering the burden requisite to such an attack--a demonstration that the supposedly irrationally overbroad definition had a real impact on him. This he cannot do. 69 To be sure, as the dissent emphasizes, dissent at 717-18, this case has been before this court before. In Steffan v. Cheney, 920 F.2d 74 (D.C.Cir.1990) (per curiam), we reversed the district court's dismissal of the case as a sanction for Steffan's refusal to answer deposition questions about whether he had engaged in homosexual conduct during or after his tenure as a midshipman. Steffan asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege and also objected that the questions were not relevant. The district court disagreed on the theory that Steffan's conduct, even subsequent to dismissal, would be germane to the question of remedy--that is, whether, if he had been illegally dismissed, he could still be ordered commissioned. We held that the government was obliged to defend the discharge based on the administrative record before the Board at the time of its action and disagreed with the district court as to its remedial rationale. Id. at 76. 70 We decidedly did not say that Steffan's conduct prior to his dismissal was categorically irrelevant to the case; we expressly envisioned the possibility that conduct-related issues might be relevant on some other ground. Id. Neither we nor the district court even considered at that point whether Steffan had an obligation in making an as-applied challenge to indicate that his statement embracing homosexual status was not linked to homosexual conduct, or the intent to engage in that conduct. 71 The dissent's assertion that We also specifically rejected the government's argument that because of a 'rebuttable presumption' or 'celibate homosexual exception' in the regulations, Steffan was presumptively caught by the conduct or intent prongs of the regulation until he demonstrated otherwise, dissent at 718, is simply not accurate, and therefore the dissent's contention that we have reversed the prior panel decision is incorrect. Our entire treatment of the question was contained in the following footnote: 72 The Government now argues that Steffan's admission of homosexuality raised a rebuttable regulatory presumption that he had a prediliction [sic] to commit, and had committed, homosexual acts. This argument, not raised in the district court, finds no support in the record. 73 Id. at 76 n.  (emphasis added). As we contemplated, the government, on remand, did present the argument in the district court, which is why the next time the case appeared before this court, see Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 64-65 (D.C.Cir.1993), vacated and reh'g en banc granted (D.C.Cir. Jan 7, 1994), the panel treated the issue on the merits and did not assert that it was foreclosed, as the dissenters now argue, by the law of the case doctrine. Dissent at 718 & n. 25 (citing Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d at 64-65). 19 B. 74 Alternatively, we think Steffan lacks standing to bring his particular challenge to the DOD Directives. Steffan may well have Article III standing, which requires only injury in fact (his termination from the Academy) that is fairly traceable to the Directives (assuming, for purpose of this section of our opinion, that the Directives rather than the Academy regulations were the basis for his termination). But a litigant must still pass through the prudential standing barrier, and Steffan does not. Prudential standing is of course, like Article III standing, a jurisdictional concept. Normally we would focus on that issue first before considering whether Steffan brought a viable claim. But in this case the two issues are quite intertwined; it is only after a careful dissection of Steffan's claim that it also becomes apparent that he lacks standing to litigate the issue he wishes us to decide. 20 75 Absent certain limited exceptions--such as in the First Amendment context, see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520-22, 92 S.Ct. 1103, 1105-06, 31 L.Ed.2d 408 (1972), where some impediment to the assertion by a rightholder of his or her own rights exists, see Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410-11, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 1370-71, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991), or where litigants have been allowed to assert the rights of third parties in order to protect a threatened relationship, see Wulff v. Singleton, 428 U.S. 106, 112-16, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2873-75, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 195, 97 S.Ct. 451, 455-56, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); see also Fair Employment Council v. BMC Marketing Corp., 28 F.3d 1268, 1277-78 (1994)--prudential standing notions mandate that a plaintiff's suit seek to vindicate his own legal rights or interests, not those of some absent third party. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499-500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2205-06, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975); Nordlinger v. Hahn, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2332, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992). This requirement means that there must be a connection between the injury suffered and the legal right or theory asserted. Prudential standing, then, again like Article III standing, focuses in part on causation. But unlike Article III, which requires a plaintiff merely to show a connection between his injury and the governmental action he challenges, see Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, 102 S.Ct. 752, 758-59, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982), prudential standing requires the existence of a further link between the injury and the legal right asserted by the plaintiff. For if the alleged wrongfulness of the injurious action challenged, that is, the asserted violation of a legal right, was not causally related to the injury suffered--if, in other words, it was not the illegal aspect of the action challenged that harmed the plaintiff--then the suit in question would not be one to vindicate that plaintiff's own rights. One cannot vindicate what has never been threatened. 76 The legal right or interest on which Steffan rests his claim for relief is a right against discharge (which he terms punishment) on the basis of his thoughts or desires--what he sometimes calls his status. That claim only vindicates his own rights or interests if Steffan's discharge was, as we have noted, due solely to his desires. If, on the other hand, Steffan had by his statement meant that he had actually engaged or intended to engage in homosexual conduct, so as to have qualified as a homosexual under the Directives irrespective of the desires clause, then his challenge to that clause would vindicate no cognizable interest of his. 77 In order for Steffan's claim for relief to be based on the assertion of his own right or interest, then, the legal wrong he ultimately alleges--the inclusion of the term desires in the Directives--must have led to his discharge. In turn, for Steffan's discharge to have been caused by the inclusion of the desires clause in the Directives, each of the following five facts would have to be true: Steffan did not engage or intend to engage in homosexual conduct; Steffan read the Directives (or learned about them) and determined that they defined the term homosexual to include one who desires to engage in homosexual conduct; Steffan understood desires to mean a mental state sufficiently removed from intent as to approach simple thoughts and thereby create a constitutional problem (Steffan, after all, conceded that if the verb desires was virtually synonymous with intent the Directives would be constitutional 21 ); when Steffan answered yes to the question are you a homosexual, he meant by that answer only that he had such a desire to engage in homosexual conduct; and, finally, the military defined desires to mean something similar to that understanding. It is evident that Steffan has failed adequately to allege the existence of any of them. 78 Taking the last point first, Steffan, as we have already explained, never obliged the Navy to give the term meaning by applying it in an adjudication. Instead, he asks us to assume a meaning, one that is sufficiently expansive to raise a constitutional issue. Perhaps, if the word desires had an obvious interpretation in this context Steffan's claim might be defensible, but as oral argument made clear, that is hardly so. The possible meanings stretch from a publicly expressed passion (which would seem to be practically indistinguishable from intent) to a fleeting private imagining. Steffan does not simply ask us to speculate as to the Navy's understanding, which would itself be inappropriate--he would have us provoke, rather than avoid, a possibly difficult constitutional issue. 79 Turning to Steffan--his experiences, his knowledge, and his state of mind when he answered the fateful question affirmatively--the crucial gap in his allegations is the absence of any claim that as of the time he answered he had not engaged or intended to engage in homosexual conduct. If he had, the military would have been entitled even under his constitutional theory to terminate him from the Academy. For under such circumstances, his desires would not be independent of conduct and therefore of no particular relevance to the military--or to him--when he answered the question. Steffan's causal argument implicitly is that he, not the Board, interpreted the Directives to oblige him to answer the question Are you a homosexual? affirmatively, but that claim is not plausible or logical unless at the time Steffan's only reason for answering yes was his desires. Understandably, Steffan has never suggested that he meant only that he harbored homosexual desires and that by desires he referred to something so removed from an intention as to constitute a pure thought. For that matter, he does not claim that he had even heard of the definition of homosexual in the DOD Directives. In sum, Steffan has not even attempted to trace his injury to the legal infirmity in the regulations he would have us address. 80 Steffan would have us rule on a delicate question of law in what is, in truth, a hypothetical case. For all the record shows, and for all the pleadings reveal, Steffan declared himself to be a homosexual because he in fact engaged in homosexual conduct. As applied to such facts, the regulations would be, by Steffan's own admission, constitutional. Were the military to discharge someone on the basis of a statement that the member was homosexual, and were that member to indicate that he had neither engaged nor intended to engage in homosexual conduct, that person would be an appropriate plaintiff to bring a case focusing on the constitutionality of the desires to engage in clause in the Directives. This is not such a case. 22 81   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 82 So ordered. 83