Opinion ID: 2996964
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Patricia Stuart’s Testimony

Text: Hite argues that the district court erred in allowing Stuart to testify that she witnessed the defendant spin the chamber of the revolver and pull the trigger a couple of times. Hite claims that this testimony was inadmissible as evidence of other crimes under Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence and, in the alternative, was unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. The district court held that although evidence of “other crimes” is generally inadmissible character evidence under Rule 404(b), however, if the evidence referred to is “inextricably intertwined” with the facts of the case, like the Stuart’s proffered testimony, it only needs to be found admissible under Rule 403. We review the evidentiary decisions of the trial court for an abuse of discretion.10 See United States v. Thomas, 321 F.3d 627, 630 (7th Cir. 2003), accord United States v. Thompson, 286 F.3d 950, 968 (7th Cir. 2002). As this court has explained on numerous occasions, “evidence concerning the chronological unfolding of events that led to an indictment, or other circumstances surrounding the crime, is not 10 Hite argues incorrectly that the determination of whether or not evidence falls within the scope of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) should be reviewed de novo. To support this proposition he cites a Ninth Circuit decision, United States v. Rrapi, 175 F.3d 742, 748 (9th Cir. 1999). However, this court has consistently held that evidentiary decisions, including those concerning Rule 404(b) are reviewed only for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 216 F.3d 611, 614 (7th Cir. 2000) (“We review rulings determining the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) for an abuse of discretion.”). 12 No. 02-2808 evidence of ‘other acts’ within the meaning of Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).” United States v. Ramirez, 45 F.3d 1096, 1102 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing various other cases). Such evidence is “inextricably intertwined” with the events surrounding the charged crimes and, therefore, is admissible unless unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403. See United States v. Miller, 327 F.3d 598, 603 (7th Cir. 2003). Acts satisfy the inextricably intertwined doctrine if they are necessary to “complete the story of the crime on trial; their absence would create a chronological or conceptual void in the story of the crime; or they are so blended or connected that they incidentally involve, explain the circumstances surrounding, or tend to prove any element of, the charged crime.” United States v. Ojomo, 332 F.3d 485, 489 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Senffer, 280 F.3d 755, 764 (7th Cir. 2002)); accord United States v. Bogan, 267 F.3d 614, 621-22 (7th Cir. 2001). Because the evidence presented to the trial court indicated that Stuart’s testimony, as to Hite’s possession of the illegal firearms, would prove his knowledge and intention to exercise control over the prohibited firearms, the judge found that this was “not evidence of other crimes, but [was] inextricably intertwined with the offenses.” We find that the district court’s exercise of discretion in ruling on this point was proper. In order to convict Hite on either charge in the indictment, the government had the burden of establishing that the defendant knowingly possessed the firearms in question. See 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d); 18 U.S.C. § 922(k); see also United States v. Lloyd, 71 F.3d 1256, 1266 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Possession may be either actual or constructive. Constructive possession is the ability to control the gun.”). Therefore, because Stuart’s restricted testimony as to the event tends to establish the possession element of the charged crimes, it is unquestionably the type of evidence contemplated by the inextricably intertwined doctrine, thus it is allowable. See Ojomo, 332 F.3d at 489. No. 02-2808 13 We also agree with the court’s ruling to limit Stuart’s testimony under Rule 403. The district court found that testimony regarding “that part of this incident characterized as Russian roulette or the pointing of the gun and the pulling of the trigger at her face or head” would be prejudicial and thus Stuart was specifically prohibited from testifying as to that part of the incident. The defense argues the court did not go far enough in limiting Stuart’s testimony. Specifically, the defense argues that Stuart should not have been allowed to testify that Hite pulled the trigger of revolver a couple of times while inside a building. We disagree with the defense and hold that the limiting instruction and evidentiary determination made by the district court was squarely within that court’s discretion. See United States v. Morris, 957 F.2d 1391, 1399 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is well established that a trial judge’s assessment of relative probative value and unfair prejudice is generally accorded great deference because of his firsthand exposure to the evidence and his familiarity with the course of the proceeding.”) (quoting United States v. Briscoe, 896 F.2d 1476, 1498 (7th Cir. 1990)).