Opinion ID: 71990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary judgment in favor of Gulf Copper.

Text: We review a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. Mahaffey v. Gen. Sec. Ins. Co., 543 F.3d 738, 740 (5th Cir.2008). A district court should grant summary judgment when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). In making this determination, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Mahaffey, 543 F.3d at 740. TODCO presents its allegations of error in four parts: (1) the district court erroneously found that TODCO presented no evidence of Gulf Copper's control of the entire vessel; (2) the court misinterpreted control, which would have excused TODCO if Gulf Copper had been in control of the entire rig at the time of loss; (3) the district court errantly focused on control of the work, not on control of the rig; and (4) TODCO should not have been assigned the burden of proof to show Gulf Copper was not entitled to indemnity. All of these arguments relate to the evidence and the law on the question of control. Consequently, we consider them together. The district determined that the relevant inquiry was whether Gulf Copper had obtained control over the vessel sufficient to preclude indemnity under the contract. In the district court, both parties implicitly agreed that the property to be controlled under the agreement was the rig, THE 256. Even in their original appellate briefs, both parties referred only to control of the vessel when marshaling facts in support of their positions. However, at oral argument and in its post-argument briefs in which we sought a precise explanation of the claim, TODCO recast the pertinent issue. Specifically, TODCO argued that it need only prove that Gulf Copper controlled the portion of the vessel over which the work was being performed when the fire occurred. Our review of the record reveals that this argument was not made before the district court. Although the parties did argue about the relevance of facts showing one party's control of the work, neither party argued that liability hinged on control over a specific section of the rig less than the whole. We will not consider an argument asserted for the first time on appeal. LeMaire v. La. Dep't of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 387 (5th Cir.2007). This marks the second point in our opinion in which we table an argument now being made, and return to the arguments made in the district court. The parties are ably represented and surely are making what in their considered judgment are the best ones. We cannot, though, conclude that a district court erred regarding analysis it was not asked to consider. See id. Thus, no purpose is served by considering the new arguments. With these restrictions, we now look to the question of control in the contractual indemnity provision. The contract stipulates that Texas law governs. Because the terms are not defined in the contract, Texas law directs that they be given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning. DeWitt County Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Parks, 1 S.W.3d 96, 101 (Tex.1999). One major dictionary describes control as the power or authority to guide or manage. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 496 (1993). While no Texas court has analyzed control in these circumstances, at least one Texas appellate court has applied this definition in a similar context. See Rendleman v. Clarke, 909 S.W.2d 56, 60 (Tex. App.  Houston [14th Dist.] 1995). Rendleman addressed an issue of premises liability, but its discussion of control is still instructive. Specifically, the Rendleman court found that a subcontractor did not control a construction site when multiple other subcontractors were also at work on it, and the contractor performed substantial coordinating functions. Id. at 60-61. Applying the same basic framework, we consider whether there is any genuine issue of material fact supporting TODCO's theory that Gulf Copper exercised the power or authority to guide or manage the rig THE 256 as a whole. Although TODCO presents evidence demonstrating Gulf Copper's duties on the vessel, most of these facts pertain only to control over Gulf Copper's specific project. For instance, TODCO notes that Gulf Copper was performing work on the rig the night of the fire, that Gulf Copper maintained a fire watch, and that it had independent safety protocols in place. The actual work it was performing does not prove Gulf Copper controlled any more than a limited project on the rig. It does not establish that Gulf Copper could guide or manage the vessel. As in Rendleman, the evidence showed that TODCO directed and coordinated the bulk of the work performed by the many unrelated contractors also on board. While there was evidence that Gulf Copper controlled access to the shipyard, it is undisputed that TODCO determined who could board the rig and at all times monitored ingress and egress on the vessel. Indeed, TODCO apparently managed the daily work conducted on the rig during the reactivation process leading up to the fire. Additionally, Gulf Copper demonstrated that TODCO had safety procedures for the entire rig in addition to Gulf Copper's own precautions. The Texas Supreme Court has also considered the issue of control in other legal contexts. One example was whether a premises owner controlled an independent contractor. Dow Chem. Co. v. Bright, 89 S.W.3d 602, 607-08 (Tex.2002). The court determined that a party in legal control designates the timing and sequence of events concerning the controlled person or object. Id. at 609. Here, it is clear that TODCO retained ultimate control over the timing and sequence of activities on THE 256. There is no evidence that Gulf Copper had any input concerning the overall management of the vessel. Accordingly, TODCO controlled the vessel under Texas law. As to control in the present case, some facts are disputed. To preclude summary judgment, though, an issue of fact must be both genuine and material. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will preclude summary judgment. Willis v. Roche Biomedical Labs., Inc., 61 F.3d 313, 315 (5th Cir.1995). The disputed issues of fact here do little more than provide cumulative evidence on the issues we have already discussed. For example, whether TODCO had a skeleton crew on board the night of the fire neither proves nor disproves its control of the rig as a whole. Similarly, whether a TODCO employee  or any person  barricaded the rig in the moments after the fire does not necessarily speak to control at all. These disputes do not affect the outcome. Viewed in the light most favorable to TODCO, these factual disagreements do not create a material issue of fact concerning control of the vessel. TODCO had the power or authority to guide or manage the rig THE 256. Consequently, TODCO must indemnify Gulf Copper.