Opinion ID: 2979707
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Substantive Unreasonableness

Text: Pizzino challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence on two grounds: that the court afforded the Guidelines an unreasonable weight and that it imposed a sentence greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of § 3553.6 6 Pizzino raises a third substantive attack on his sentence: that the court failed to consider the pertinent § 3553(a) factors. Yet this challenge essentially mirrors his procedural argument that the court failed to demonstrate that it considered the § 3553(a) factors and requires no separate analysis. - 10 - No. 09-2146 United States v. Pizzino “This court applies a presumption of substantive reasonableness in reviewing sentences that are within the Guidelines range.” United States v. Polihonki, 543 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir. 2008). The presumption, however, “is not binding” and does not “insist that one side, or the other, shoulder a particular burden of persuasion or proof lest they lose their case,” Rita, 551 U.S. at 347; rather, it lacks “independent legal effect,” and “simply recognizes the real-world circumstance that when the judge’s discretionary decision accords with the Commission’s view of the appropriate application of § 3553(a) in the mine run of cases, it is probable that the sentence is reasonable,” id. at 350–51. Still, “[i]n general, we must give due deference to the district court’s conclusion that the sentence imposed is warranted by the § 3553(a) factors. The fact that [we] might have reasonably concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to justify reversal of the district court.” United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568, 582 (6th Cir. 2007) (second alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).7 Pizzino first claims that the sentencing court afforded the Guidelines an unreasonable amount of weight. We ordinarily decline to suggest what weight the district courts must give to the 7 Contrary to this authority, Pizzino posits that Guidelines-range sentences for childpornography offenses “should not be accorded any indicia of reasonableness.” Rita, which announced this presumption-of-reasonableness doctrine, noted that the Guidelines generally incorporate the Sentencing Commission’s extensive empirical data, and thus “reflect a rough approximation of sentences that might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives.” 551 U.S. at 350. The Guidelines’ child-pornography sections, however, are not based upon empirical studies, but “congressional mandates.” Several district courts have echoed Pizzino’s reservations about these particular provisions. See, e.g., United States v. Beiermann, 599 F. Supp. 2d 1087, 1104 (N.D. Iowa 2009) (“U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2 . . . does not reflect empirical analysis, but congressional mandates that interfere with and undermine the work of the Sentencing Commission.”). Nonetheless, Rita’s language is clear. The presumption of reasonableness attaches to all sentences within the Guidelines range; there is no “empirical evidence” prerequisite. - 11 - No. 09-2146 United States v. Pizzino appropriate Guidelines range or to any other § 3553(a) factor. See, e.g., United States v. Webb, 403 F.3d 373, 385 n.9 (6th Cir. 2005). A district court does not necessarily commit reversible error by attaching great weight to any single factor, Gall, 552 U.S. at 56–57, but “[i]f a district court entirely discounted all but one [§] 3553(a) factor, then that court would presumably be giving an unreasonable amount of weight to that factor,” United States v. Thomas, 395 F. App’x 168, 174 (6th Cir. 2010). Where “a district court explicitly or implicitly considers and weighs all pertinent factors, a defendant clearly bears a much greater burden in arguing that the court has given an ‘unreasonable amount of weight’ to any particular one.” Id. Given our deference toward district courts’ sentencing decisions, we hesitate to hold that the district court unreasonably weighed the § 3553(a) factors. As we concluded in our earlier discussion, the district court in this case did not entirely discount all but one § 3553(a) factor; its colloquy implicitly and explicitly referenced several. Nor does it appear that the court committed serious error such as relying on a clearly erroneous finding of fact or clearly misapplying the law. See Nelson, 296 F. App’x at 481. Though the court may have attached greater weight to the Guidelines than to other § 3553(a) factors, this action alone is not a reversible abuse of discretion. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 56–57. Finally, Pizzino questions the substantive reasonableness of his sentence because, in his words, “the district court . . . impos[ed] a sentence which is greater than necessary to comply with the purposes of [18 U.S.C. § 3553].” Indeed, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) requires that a district court “impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to comply with its purposes. - 12 - No. 09-2146 United States v. Pizzino Nonetheless, Pizzino conflates the district court’s sentencing mandate with the appellate court’s standard of review. See Bolds, 511 F.3d at 578 (“Reasonableness[—not parsimony—]is the standard appellate courts use to evaluate the district court’s accomplishment of its sentencing task.”). “[A defendant’s] mere allegation that the sentence imposed is greater than necessary to achieve the goals of punishment outlined in § 3553(a) is insufficient to rebut the presumption of reasonableness.” United States v. Dexta, 470 F.3d 612, 616 (6th Cir. 2006). Moreover, Pizzino’s position conflicts with precedent: “[W]hile district courts perhaps have the freedom to sentence below the child-pornography guidelines based on disagreement with the [G]uidelines, they are certainly not required to do so.” United States v. Mikowski, 332 F. App’x 250, 256 (6th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added). Pizzino’s final claim, which merely restates the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), provides no independent grounds upon which to challenge the reasonableness of his sentence on appeal.