Opinion ID: 3045202
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Kidd’s Unlawful Demotion Claim

Text: Kidd contends the district court erred in rejecting Kidd’s unlawful demotion claim because she raised it for the first time in her Response to Mando’s Motion 9 Case: 12-12090 Date Filed: 09/27/2013 Page: 10 of 32 for Summary Judgment. We need not consider Kidd’s argument, however, because we find that her claim fails on the merits. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under Title VII the plaintiff must show that she was “subjected to an adverse employment action.” Ferrill v. Parker Group, Inc., 168 F.3d 468, 472 (11th Cir. 1999). An adverse employment action is “a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001) (emphasis omitted). In the context of an unlawful demotion claim, the plaintiff must show she was assigned “significantly different responsibilities” or her employer made a decision that “caus[ed] a significant change in benefits.” Webb-Edwards v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff’s Office, 525 F.3d 1013, 1031 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because Kidd suffered neither a decrease in pay nor a loss of title — but only a loss of supervisory responsibilities — she needs to show that her case is one of those “unusual instances” where the change in responsibilities was “so substantial and material that it [] indeed alter[ed] the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges’ of [her] employment.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1245. This Kidd has not done. When Anderson was terminated, Cheong appointed Kidd to temporarily manage the accounts payable department, but not the accounts receivable department (which went to another employee). Practically speaking, 10 Case: 12-12090 Date Filed: 09/27/2013 Page: 11 of 32 this meant Kidd supervised the two accounts payable clerks and approved invoices and handled wire payments. At no point, however, did Kidd hold herself out as the assistant accounting manager, express interest in the position, or assume supervisory responsibilities over the accounts receivable clerks. Nor did anyone in the accounting department ever refer to her as the assistant accounting manager.7 Still, Kidd was of the view that she “absorbed Mr. Anderson’s position.”8 When Seo became the assistant accounting manager Kidd slowly began to lose the supervisory responsibilities she assumed when Tim Anderson was terminated. Those responsibilities went to Seo, and Kidd’s responsibilities reverted to those she had before Tim Anderson’s departure. 9 Because Kidd’s demotion claim is grounded on a loss of supervisory responsibility, it is one our circuit does not favor. “Work assignment claims strike at the very heart of an employer’s business judgment and expertise because they challenge an employer’s ability to allocate its assets in response to shifting and competing market priorities.” Davis, 245 F.3d at 1244. And it is by now 7 Kidd represents that “[o]ther employees in the Accounting and Purchasing Department at Mando assumed that Kidd assisted in managing the Accounting Department.” A review of the record shows that Kidd may have been overreaching here. As she testified, it was only one of Mando’s engineers who thought that she was the accounting manager. 8 Kidd was not unique in this respect. After Anderson’s termination several accounting department employees assumed greater responsibility than they had before his termination. 9 See Kidd Dep. 314:21-315:1 Q: Okay. So instead of having you do a certain job that you used to do, BW [Seo] started doing the job? A: Yes. 11 Case: 12-12090 Date Filed: 09/27/2013 Page: 12 of 32 axiomatic that “Title VII is not designed to make federal courts sit as a superpersonnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decisions,” id. at 1245 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Elrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 939 F.2d 1466, 1470 (11th Cir. 1991)). Yet this is precisely the role Kidd asks us to assume. Regardless of whether in Kidd’s view her reduced load had “a tangible adverse effect on [her] employment,” an “employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling.” Id. at 1239. The touchstone is instead whether the allegedly adverse employment action was “materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. Kidd’s demotion claim — grounded on a loss of supervisory responsibility of the accounts payable department, not a loss of salary or benefits — does not rise to that level. Nor is it “unusual.” See id. at 1244 (holding that “some blow to [a plaintiff’s] professional image . . . is simply not enough to prevail”). 10 Thus, regardless whether the district court erred in failing to consider Kidd’s unlawful demotion theory on the merits, her claim still fails because the evidence she offers in support of her contention that she suffered an adverse employment action is insufficient to make out a prima facie case. 11 10 It appears that Kidd was bothered less by the loss of supervisory responsibilities than the way in which the responsibilities were taken away. Kidd testified: “I don’t think the frustration came in not having those job duties, it’s the way it [was] handled and how [Seo] took them away from me.” Cf. Davis, 245 F.3d at 1242 (“the protections of Title VII simply do not extend to everything makes an employee unhappy”). 12 Case: 12-12090 Date Filed: 09/27/2013 Page: 13 of 32