Opinion ID: 2424301
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legislative Ethics

Text: The MdTA contends that the Agreement constituted a contract[] under which one party [would] obtain[] compensation for using personal influence over legislators, or legislation, to benefit another, in violation of Maryland law. Stated another way, the MdTA posits that the Agreement is improper because it (1) calls for the use of personal influence rather than persuasive facts and arguments, see Wildey v. Collier, 7 Md. 273, 279 (1854), and (2) is dependent upon the defeat of legislation. See Md.Code (1984, 2009 Repl.Vol., 2010 Supp.), State Government Article (S.G.), § 15-713(1)(i) (A regulated lobbyist may not ... be engaged for lobbying purposes for compensation that is dependent in any manner on ... the enactment or defeat of legislation....). The FOP retorts that the Agreement only required that ... FOP members present the legislators with factual information explaining their preference for the [take-home vehicle p]rogram over collective bargaining. Moreover, the FOP disputes the characterization of the Agreement as contingent on the defeat of legislation. The FOP argues that [t]he Agreement states [only] that the FOP will ` ask sponsors to withdraw the collective bargaining bills.' (Emphasis added.) It does not require that the FOP `defeat[]' the bills ... or ... that the two bills not be passed. After a survey of relevant Maryland law and treatises, the Court of Special Appeals determined that whether ... contracts contemplate[] improper influence upon State officials is a question of fact.... Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 170, 5 A.3d at 1200; see id. (stating that the Court of Appeals in Frenkil v. Hagan, 146 Md. 94, 105, 125 A. 909, 913 (1924), remanded for an evidentiary determination of whether the contracting parties expected to advocate to exert improper `political influence'). In the present case, the intermediate appellate panel concluded that the FOP's uncontroverted affidavits ... describ[ed] advocacy that, on its face, was above-board. Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 171, 5 A.3d at 1201. With respect to the contingent-agreement argument, the Court of Special Appeals held that the Agreement did not represent a prohibited arrangement under S.G., § 15-713(1)(i). Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 172, 5 A.3d at 1202. The panel stressed that Maryland caselaw is concerned with contingent financial incentive[s], and the present Agreement involves only public policy compromises.... Id. To describe the trade-offs struck in the course of lawmaking as `compensation' on a `contingency basis,' the Court of Special Appeals concluded, is to stretch the meaning of those terms beyond their breaking point. Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 172-73, 5 A.3d at 1202. Thus, as neither the [FOP nor] its members [were] ... disinterested parties hired to represent others' interest without any personal stake in the outcome, the statute governing lobbyists is inapplicable. Md. Transp. Auth., 195 Md.App. at 172, 5 A.3d at 1202 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). But see S.G., § 15-701(a)(1)(ii) (defining regulated lobbyist as an entity that, for the purpose of influencing any legislative action ...[,] communicates with an official or employee of the Legislative Branch ... and ... earns at least $5,000 compensation for all such communication and activities); Brief of Respondent at 17, 19 (describing the multimillion dollar THV program, which required the FOP's promise to communicate with two legislators, as a benefit for all MdTA police officers).