Opinion ID: 177521
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Equitable Tolling Analysis

Text: Aside from the District Court's Rule 15(c) analysis, it also determined, while purportedly applying a Rule 12(b)(6) standard, that no class member could rely on equitable tolling to save an otherwise untimely TILA/HOEPA claim. [18] The Court reasoned that no class member could show any active misleadingapart from the alleged fraudulent disclosures and omissions in the HUD-1 Statements provided to borrowers by the defendant banks necessary to support the invocation of equitable tolling based on a fraudulent concealment theory. We are concerned that the District Courtin the context of making a determination as to class certification under Rule 23concluded, as a matter of law and finding of fact, that no member of the 44,000 person class could rely on equitable tolling to save an otherwise untimely TILA/HOEPA claim. Moreover, we have doubts regarding the Court's conclusion even if a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis were appropriate. It relied on our decision in Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380 (3d Cir.1994), an employment discrimination case, where we affirmed the dismissal (under Rule 12(b)(6)) of an untimely failure-to-hire claim, noting that nowhere in the complaint [did the plaintiff] allege that [her employer] misled her, actively or otherwise, with respect to this claim. Id. at 1391 n. 10. However, we also vacated the dismissal of the plaintiff's untimely discriminatory discharge claim, noting that the equitable tolling issue was raised in the context of a motion to dismiss pursuant to [Rule] 12(b)(6), and, [t]herefore, all that was required of [the plaintiff] at this stage was that she plead the applicability of the doctrine, which she had done. Id. at 1391-92 (listing the factual inquiries [that] must be undertaken before a proper resolution of the equitable tolling issue can be reached). Indeed, our Court (and our sister circuit courts) have reasoned that, because the question whether a particular party is eligible for equitable tolling generally requires consideration of evidence beyond the pleadings, such tolling is not generally amenable to resolution on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See, e.g., Huynh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 465 F.3d 992, 1003-04 (9th Cir.2006) (Generally, the applicability of equitable tolling depends on matters outside the pleadings, so it is rarely appropriate to grant a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss (where review is limited to the complaint) if equitable tolling is at issue.); Reiser v. Residential Funding Corp., 380 F.3d 1027, 1030 (7th Cir.2004) (rejecting RFC's argument that plaintiffs' claims were untimely under the one-year periods of limitations contained in both the TILA and the RESPA, and noting that because the period of limitations is an affirmative defense it is rarely a good reason to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)). In any event, whether the type of fraudulent concealment alleged by the Objectors (and, as we discuss below, that asserted by the named plaintiffs in connection with their untimely RESPA claims) can, as a matter of law, provide a successful basis for equitable tolling under TILA/HOEPA was not before the District Court. [19] Its analysis of the merits of the equitable tolling theory advanced by the Objectors was essentially an inquiry into which party [would] prevail on the merits of the TILA/HOEPA claims the Objectors sought to assert. [20] Hydrogen Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 317 n. 17.