Opinion ID: 1742511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: The Exclusion of Dr. Perry Prestholdt

Text: The defendant argues that the trial court wrongly allowed the State to exclude venireman Dr. Perry Prestholdt (a professor of psychology) for cause, and that the error mandates that the death sentence be vacated. If the granting the State's challenge of Dr. Prestholdt were error, it would not be subject to harmless error review. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 667-68, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2056-57, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987) (not subject to harmless error review). It would invalidate the death sentence, but not the conviction. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, n. 21, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (affects only penalty). See also State v. Smith, 340 So.2d 247, 250-51 (La.1976); State v. Hunter, 340 So.2d 226, 231-32 (La.1976). However, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing Dr. Prestholdt or any other juror for cause. The state has a legitimate interest in obtaining jurors who [will] follow their instructions and obey their oaths. State v. Williams, 96-1023, p. 5 (La.1/21/98); 708 So.2d 703 (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980)). The state may require that jurors will consider and decide the facts impartially and conscientiously apply the law as charged by the court. Id. Not all death penalty opponents are subject to removal for cause, however. [T]hose who firmly believe that the death penalty is unjust may nevertheless serve ... in a capital case so long as they state clearly that they are willing to set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 176, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 1766, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986) (emphasis added). In accordance with these statements of law, Louisiana has enacted La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2), which allows the state to challenge for cause: The juror tendered in a capital case who has conscientious scruples against the infliction of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him; (a) That he would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case before him; (b) That his attitude toward the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath; or (c) That his attitude toward the death penalty would prevent him from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.... In addition, a juror may be unqualified if he is not impartial, whatever the cause [unless] he declares, and the court is satisfied, that he can render an impartial verdict according to the law and the evidence. La.C.Cr.P. art. 797(2). To be properly excluded from the jury for cause, a prospective juror need not state unequivocally that he or she could not impose the death penalty. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 419, 105 S.Ct. 844, 849, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). There need be no ritualist adherence to a requirement that a prospective juror make it `unmistakably clear... that [she] would automatically vote against the imposition of capital punishment....' Id. (citations omitted, emphasis in original). The Witt Court continued: What common sense should have realized experience has proved: many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been made unmistakably clear... there will be situations where the trial judge is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law ... this is why deference must be paid to the trial judge who sees and hears the juror. Id., 469 U.S. at 424-25, 105 S.Ct. at 852-53; Williams, 96-1023, pp. 8, 10; 708 So.2d at 710 (where trial judge noted potential juror's obvious struggle with voir dire questions regarding the death penalty). See also State v. Nicholson, 437 So.2d 849, 853 (La.1983) (where judge noted prospective juror's body English). Accordingly, the law only requires that the trial court's decision be fairly supported by the record reviewed as a whole. Witt, 469 U.S. at 431, 105 S.Ct. at 856. See also Williams, 96-1023, p. 10; 708 So.2d at 710 (trial judge should not merely consider correct answers in isolation, but potential juror's answers as a whole). In support of his arguments that Dr. Prestholdt should have been seated, the defendant cites cases decided under the pre-1990 Code of Criminal Procedure article 798. See State v. Berry, 391 So.2d 406, 410 (La. 1980); State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526, 533 (La.1988). Prior to 1990, the article required that the prospective juror must have made it unmistakably clear that he or she would automatically impose a life sentence no matter what the evidence. The current article, in effect at the time of the murder and trial, reflects the United States Supreme Court's Witt jurisprudence and eliminates the unmistakably clear requirement. It is also no longer necessary to show that the prospective juror would automatically vote to impose life imprisonment. Now it need only be shown that the prospective juror's attitude would prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision. La.C.Cr.P. art. 798(2)(b). On examination by the court, Dr. Prestholdt conceded that he was very uncomfortable with the death penalty. When Mr. Bryant, the district attorney, asked Dr. Prestholdt whether his conscientious scruples would prevent or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision, Dr. Prestholdt indicated that he would like to say that he could be impartial, but realistically, say, well, that's not true. It is apparent even from the transcript that Dr. Prestholdt conceded that his views on the death penalty would impair his partiality. If the circumstances under which a prospective juror could vote for the death penalty are too narrowly limited, the prospective juror may be properly discharged for cause. This is similar to the issue we recently discussed in Williams, 96-1023; 708 So.2d 703. In our Williams opinion, we recognized that prospective jurors were properly excluded when their ability to decide on the death penalty would be substantially impaired by the presence of a mitigating factorin that case the defendant's youth. Williams, 96-1023, pp. 9-10; 708 So.2d at 713. A juror must be able to consider mitigating factors. But when the trial judge, within his or her discretion, determines that a prospective juror's attitude towards a mitigating factor constitutes a substantial impairment of the juror's ability to impartially decide the case, then the prospective juror may be excluded. Williams, 96-1023, p. 10; 708 So.2d at 713. See also State v. Jordan, 420 So.2d 420 (La.1982) (prospective juror properly excused where he would vote for death penalty only if he witnessed the crime); State v. Nicholson, 437 So.2d 849, 854 (La.1983) (prospective juror would only vote for death penalty in a mass murder on the scale of Adolf Hitler or Charles Manson); State v. Lindsey, 543 So.2d 886, 895-96 (La.1989) (prospective juror might vote for death where a person murdered 35 elementary school children). In voir dire Dr. Prestholdt said that in order for hin to vote for the death penalty there would have to be no mitigating circumstances. He later modified this requirement to little or none. The prosecutor then asked Dr. Prestholdt: If there was anything, any mitigating factor brought up, then you would automatically vote against the death penalty? Dr. Prestholdt: Automatically is a little harsh. But yes. If you're asking me what my biases are. In relation to the death penalty my biases would be to vote against the death penalty. On the whole, Dr. Prestholdt's requirement that there be no mitigating evidence appears enough to justify disqualification. The trial judge was in the best position to interpret Dr. Prestholdt's statements in the context in which they were given and he did not abuse his discretion in excluding Dr. Prestholdt. More significantly, however, Dr. Prestholdt volunteered, without being asked, that his views on the death penalty would affect his consideration of the evidence during the guilt phase of the trial. A prospective juror may be removed for cause if the juror's attitude toward the death penalty would prevent him from making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt.... La. C.Cr.P. art 798(2)(c); State v. Welch, 368 So.2d 965 (La.1979). Dr. Prestholdt said: I know that my opinions about the death penalty as consequences for crime will somehow affect the judgments that are made, and my view of the evidence. Mr. Bryant: I understand. It would also affect your view of the evidence. Is that correct? Dr. Prestholdt: Realistically, I believe that's true. Mr. Walker, defense counsel, tried to rehabilitate Dr. Prestholdt. Mr. Walker: And I think I understood you to say that you could be fair during  there's no question about your ability to be fair during the first stage of the trial where the death penalty is not an issue, the only issue is guilt or innocence? Dr. Prestholdt: No. I will try to be fair. Realistically and honestly, the fact that there is a death penalty as a consequence of a juror's decision in this case, it has to have some impact on the way I view evidence and the way I make decisions. Dr. Prestholdt's admission that his attitude toward the death penalty would influence his view of the evidence of guilt or innocence is basis for his dismissal. In sum, Dr. Prestholdt was, at best, equivocal as to whether he could follow the judge's instructions as to the burden of proof or the death penalty. Though he sometimes suggested that he would try to follow the judge's instructions and impartially consider either the evidence or the penalty, he consistently backed off of this position by reiterating his opposition to the death penalty. Dr. Prestholdt also voluntarily noted the effect his opposition would likely have on the determination of guilt or innocence. The trial judge saw Dr. Prestholdt's facial expressions and body language, and he heard the tone and inflection of his voice. The trial judge also applied the proper standard under Witt and article 798 when he found that Dr. Prestholdt's attitude toward the death penalty would prevent him or substantially impair him from making an impartial decision. Under these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in dismissing Dr. Prestholdt for cause.