Opinion ID: 2318701
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of the Statutory Framework

Text: Whether retroactive modification is permissible within the statutory framework is determined by interpretation of Sections 8-103(c) and 11-107(b) of the Family Law Article. The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is the ascertainment of legislative intent. See Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 757 (1993). Our investigation of legislative intent begins with the words of the statute. See Torboli v. Torboli, 365 Md. 52, 63, 775 A.2d 1207, 1214 (2001)(quoting Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995)). In examining the language of the statute, we ascribe to those words their ordinary and commonly understood meaning. See Graves v. State, 364 Md. 329, 346, 772 A.2d 1225, 1235 (2001). Where the plain meaning of a statute is unambiguous, it must be construed without forced interpretations designed to limit its application. In re: Adoption/Guardianship No. A91-71A, 334 Md. at 557, 640 A.2d at 1095. Thus, if the legislative intent is apparent from the text of the statute itself, we end our inquiry and allow the plain meaning of the statute to govern our interpretation. See Martin v. Beverage Capital Corp., 353 Md. 388, 399, 726 A.2d 728, 733 (1999). The express statutory allowance for modification of alimony awards, as set forth in Section 11-107(b) of the Family Law Article, does not use any language which prohibits an order of retroactive modification, or conversely, authorizes only prospective modification. Under Section 11-107(b), the only words of limitation and guidance to the trial court in exercising its discretion to modify an alimony award is the phrase as circumstances and justice require. Md.Code, § 11-107(b) of the Family Law Article. [8] The predecessor to Section 11-107(b) contained similar language, which also encompassed the language of Section 8-103(c): ... Furthermore, any provision in the deed or agreement in respect to alimony, support and maintenance of the husband or wife is subject to modification by the court to the extent the court deems just and proper regardless of the manner in which the provisions with respect to the alimony, support and maintenance are expressed or stated unless there is an express waiver of alimony, support and maintenance by the husband or wife or unless the provisions of the deed, agreement, or settlement specifically state that the provisions with respect to the alimony, support and maintenance of the husband or wife are not subject to any court modification. Md.Code, Art. 16, § 28 (1957, 1981 Repl. Vol.). See also, Md.Code, Art. 16, § 37 (1951); Md.Code, Art. 16, § 42 (1939). We have taken the position that alimony awards may be modified from time to time depending on the needs and financial circumstances of the parties. See Blaine v. Blaine, 336 Md. 49, 70, 646 A.2d 413, 423 (1994); Goldberg v. Goldberg, 290 Md. at 209, 428 A.2d at 473; Stevens v. Stevens, 233 Md. 279, 282, 196 A.2d 447, 449 (1964); Sugarman v. Sugarman, 197 Md. 182, 188, 78 A.2d 456, 459 (1951); Langrall v. Langrall, 145 Md. 340, 344-45, 125 A. 695, 697 (1924). In Winkel v. Winkel, 178 Md. 489, 15 A.2d 914 (1940), we explained that, [t]he doctrine is founded in an equality of right and obligation, and its enforcement is indifferent to whether the change is in the relief of one spouse, so long as the rights of the other are not denied. It is patent that of its nature alimony is in amount subject to variations from time to time as the circumstances, needs, and pecuniary condition of the parties change. Id. at 499, 15 A.2d at 918-19. Thus, we noted that, the time when such modification may become effective was in the discretion of the chancellor. Id. at 496, 15 A.2d at 917. In its discourse with counsel for Gary Langston, the in banc panel emphasized that the parties' Separation Agreement did not contain language specifically permitting retroactive modification of the alimony award: Court: Where is the language which says it is retroactive prior to the date of filing of the petition to modify the alimony? Where does it say that? Counsel for respondent: It doesn't say that, Your Honor. Court: I know. Counsel for respondent: Butbut the plain meaning of the wordsyou are saying that the parties had to have intended that there be an affirmative requirement to do that, andand it doesn't say it, so there is no requirement that either party come to Court. It saysit really Court: But it is just like any other case, if they want to modify it Counsel for respondent: Right. Court:by consent they can, but in the event one party has to come to Court, which is what happened in this case, how do you make that leap that it is retroactive prior to the filing of the petition? Counsel for respondent: Because there is a provision, there is a built in reduction that says it may be modified, and then it tells everybodyit tells the parties how you do it. Court: What the formula is.