Opinion ID: 3014440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: see, Dia, 353 F.3d at 228.

Text: In answering this question we do not paint on a blank canvas. The Supreme Court and this Court 6 In Sol v. INS, 274 F.3d 648, 651 have recently construed the range of (2d Cir. 2001), the Second Circuit read our section 2241 review at least so far as to earlier decision in Catney v. INS, 178 F.3d establish what it comprehends at a 190, 195 (3d Cir. 1999), as holding that minimum. In St. Cyr, the Supreme Court section 2241 review does not embrace rejected the Government’s argument that “‘denial of discretionary relief to a classic habeas review encompassed only criminal alien.’” Respectfully, this reading review of substantial constitutional or of our decision in Catney was incorrect. jurisdictional questions. The Supreme While the context of our comment on Court ruled that “pure questions of scope of review may have been somewhat law”—such as whether the Attorney ambiguous, it actually related to review on General had legal authority to waive direct appeal of a deportation order from removal— fell within the ambit of the BIA, and did not address habeas traditional habeas review. Id. at 301. This review. At any rate, the Second Circuit Court has recently interpreted such correctly anticipated the position that we now take in this decision. 8 We believe that, under section exclusive judge of the 2241, habeas proceedings do not embrace existence of those facts, and review of the exercise of discretion, or the no other tribunal, unless sufficiency of the evidence. Our expressly authorized by law conclusion is supported by the history of to do so, is at liberty to interpretation of the general habeas reexamine or controvert the provision over the years; by the structure sufficiency of the evidence of the immigration laws as amended in on which he acted. 1996; and by the reasoning of St. Cyr Id. itself. Until the 1952 amendments to the
immigration law allowed broader APA- Over a century ago, Congress styl e j u d i c i a l r e v i e w f o r I N S enacted an early version of a zipper clause determinations, the Court had hewed by mandating that exclusion decisions of mainly to this circumscribed scope of immigration officials were to be final, review, with slight modification. See subject only to review within the executive Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86 , 97, 102 branch. Act of March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5; (1903); United States ex rel. Vajtauer v. 26 Stat. 827, 828, 1115. Shortly thereafter, Commissioner of Immigration at Port of the Supreme Court considered an appeal New York, 273 U.S. 103 (1927); Bridges from the denial of a writ of habeas corpus v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 149, 156 (1945); by an excluded citizen of Japan. The Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 122Court acknowledged that because the 23 & n.14 (1946). So long as there was alien’s liberty was restrained, she was sufficient procedural fairness to comport “doubtless entitled to a writ of habeas with due process, courts were not to corpus to ascertain whether the restraint is “weigh the evidence” and were required to lawful.” Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. honor the administrative decisions “even 651, 660 (1892) (italics in original). But though they may be erroneous.” Estep, the court observed: 327 U.S. at 122.7 [T]he final determination of those facts may be entrusted by Congress to executive 7 Both Vajtauer and Estep indicated officers; and in such a case, that the writ of habeas corpus might issue as in all others, in which a where there is “no basis in fact”— i.e., no statute gives a discretionary evidence—for a determination. See power to an officer, to be Vajtauer, 273 U.S. at 110; Estep, 327 U.S. exercised by him upon his at 122. This may have been either as a own opinion of certain facts, matter of reviewing the legal basis for the he is made the sole and agency’s jurisdiction, Estep, 327 U.S. at 122-23, or as a matter of due process, see 9 As we have already observed, when warranted a new hearing. the passage of the APA in 1946 first raised But the petitioner also raised the the prospect that immigration decisions contention that “‘in all similar cases the might be reviewable under the broader [ B IA ] ha [ d] e xe r cise d f a vorable standards of abuse of discretion and discretion.’” Id. at 264 n.5. This substantial evidence, the Supreme Court argument was rejected by the Supreme specifically rejected that approach in the Court, which pointedly observed: context of habeas corpus. Heikkila, 345 U.S. at 236-37. The Court held that, It is important to emphasize whatever the minor adjustments in the that we are not here measure of habeas review over the years, reviewing and reversing the habeas corpus must always be based on manner in which discretion bedrock requirements of due process, was exercised. If such were rather than the “very different . . . statutory the case we would be [i.e., APA] standard of review, e.g., discussing the evidence in deciding on ‘the whole record’ whether the record supporting or there is substantial evidence to support undermining the alien’s administrative findings of fact.” Id. at claim to discretionary relief. 236. Heikkila concluded that “it is the Rather, we object to the scope of inquiry on habeas corpus that Board’s alleged failure to differentiates use of the writ from judicial exercise its own discretion, review as that term is used in the contrary to existing valid Administrative Procedure Act.” Id. regulations. United States ex rel Accardi v. Id. at 268. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954), is Despite the Court’s essential particularly instructive on this point. The constancy in restricting the use of habeas habeas corpus petition in that case was corpus to assertions of constitutional or based, inter alia, on the argument that the statutory violations, the statutory landscape Attorney General had impermissibly changed in 1952. Congress’s choice in the interfered with the discretion that had been 1952 immigration law amendments not to delegated by regulations to the BIA, expressly supersede or modify the APA for thereby violating those regulations. The immigration determinations effectively Supreme Court held that this transgression broadened the scope of judicial review of of the regulations violated due process and INS determinations. See Shaughnessy v. Perdiero, 349 U.S. at 51-52. In point of fact, the broadened scope of review was Heikkila 345 U.S. at 235-36 & n. 11; see literally applicable only to direct appeal of also Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 41-42 INS determinations under the APA. But it (1924); Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, was not long before courts viewed 274 (1912). 10 Congress as having intended to augment require that in habeas cases: traditional habeas review with broader [T]he appropriate standard APA-style review. Compare Jay v. Boyd, of review in such cases is 351 US. 345, 354-55 (1956) (explaining whe the r the a ge nc y’s that executive discretion to suspend decision is “arbitrary, deportation is “a matter of grace” and capricious, and abuse of “unfettered discretion”) with United States discretion or otherwise not ex rel Hintopolous v. Shaughnessy, 353 in accordance with the law.” U.S. 72, 77 (1957) (rejecting a challenge 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) [the to suspension based on claim of abuse of APA]. discretion and arbitrary and capricious reasoning).8 Put another way, in effect . . . This standard of review courts began treating APA judicial review is consistent w ith the as one of the laws of the United States legislative history of the enforceable through the habeas statute. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 . . . . Once the habeas provisions of the immigration statute were added in 1961, 746 F.2d 989, 991 (3d Cir. 1984). 9 they were viewed as consistent with a It seems fair to say, then, that standard of judicial review calling for classic immigration cases under section APA-style examination of the exercise of 2241 before 1952 were reviewed for discretion and substantiality of evidence. constitutional and legal error only, and that In Moret v. Karn, this Court read the 1952 immigration cases that arose under the i m m ig r a t io n ame ndm ents ( a s habeas writ between 1952 and 1996 were supplemented by the 1961 legislation) to treated under the same standard of review as direct appeals from the BIA—that is to say, under broader APA review of 8 Because the Court in Hintopolous rejected a challenge based on abuse of discretion, the court did not actually consider whether such a challenge was 9 Some of the courts adopting the within the scope of habeas review. See view that section 1105a created a basis for Hintopolous, 353 U.S. at 78-79. habeas corpus jurisdiction independent Decisions during the 1961 to 1996 from 28 U.S.C. § 2241 have found that, time-frame, however, appear to treat the from 1961 to 1996, broader review was APA standard of review as applicable available exclusively through 1105a without any distinction between direct habeas, and that 2241 habeas was available review under old section 1105a(a) and only to aliens asserting constitutional or habeas corpus under old section 1105a(b). statutory violations. See Gutierrez-Chavez See, e.g., Mondragon v. Ilchert, 653 F.2d v. INS, 298 F.3d 824, 827-28 (9th Cir. 1254, 1255-56 (9th Cir. 1980). 2002). 11 discretion and of the sufficiency of the 1996 statutory “zipper” language that evidence. states:
questions of law and fact, That brings us to the 1996 including interpretation and amendments under AEDPA and IIRIRA. application of constitutional The government initially advocated that and statutory provisions, the amendments to the INA enacted by arising from any action AEDPA and IIRIRA be treated as taken or proceeding brought precluding all judicial examination of to remove an alien from the removal determinations in the cases of United States under this criminal aliens. The Supreme Court, subchapter shall be available however, rejected that view. See St. Cyr, only in judicial review of a 533 U.S. at 312. The Court held that final order under this Congress succeeded only in repealing section. direct appellate review of such cases and the special immigration habeas provisions 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(9). The judicial review of section 1105a; what remained was the section, 8 U.S.C. § 1252, in turn provides original section 2241 habeas remedy. That for direct review by the courts of appeals fact in itself suggests that the scope of of BIA decisions, but prohibits it in the review one would expect to find under the case of criminal aliens. residual section 2241 is no greater than The meaning of the term “judicial what existed before Congress began to review” became the critical interpretive graft APA-style review onto habeas issue presented to the Supreme Court. If jurisdiction in 1952. judicial review meant all review by any To be sure, St. Cyr does not court, as the government and the explicitly set forth the boundaries of dissenting Justices urged, then the zipper habeas review of removal actions under clause and the criminal alien preclusion section 2241, nor does it expressly address clause, taken together, made removal of whether review of discretion or criminal aliens totally unreviewable under administrative fact-finding is available. the statutory scheme. If “judicial review” See Sol, 274 F.3d at 651. But the actual was a term of art referring only to a certain reasoning in the St. Cyr decision compels type of court review, however, then what the conclusion that under section 2241 as was precluded was not all review by the it currently stands, the broader species of courts, but only review of a certain kind. review for substantial evidence and abuse The majority in St. Cyr adopted the of discretion typical of APA challenges latter interpretation, seizing upon the must be wholly out of bounds. earlier decision in Heikkila to differentiate In St. Cyr, the Court confronted the between “judicial review” in a specific 12 sense, and court review under the style “judicial review” for criminal aliens traditional habeas writ. See St. Cyr, 533 by eliminating direct “judicial review” in U.S. at 312 (citing Heikkila). The Court the courts of appeals. What remained for declared: “In the immigration context, criminal aliens facing removal was only ‘judicial review’ and ‘habeas corpus’ have the core section 2241 habeas provision historically distinct meanings.” St. Cyr, with its narrower scope of pure legal 533 U.S. at 311 (citing Heikkila, 345 U.S. review. at 236). But for this distinction to make The Supreme Court in St. Cyr also sense in reading the 1996 zipper addressed the provision of AEDPA that amendments, there had to be some specifically eliminated one of the 1961 significant difference between the scope of special habeas provisions of the INA, by review under “judicial review” and that deleting 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(10). St. Cyr, under section 2241 habeas corpus. 533 U.S. at 308-10. The Court held that Otherwise, the amendments’ withdrawal of the repeal of this section 1105a special “judicial review” on the one hand would habeas provisions did not implicitly repeal be nullified on the other hand by the the residual habeas statute, section 2241. retention of habeas corpus with identical Again, that interpretation can make sense scope of court review. In other words, a only if, as we have seen, section 2241 definition of habeas corpus jurisdiction residual habeas corpus is understood to that made the scope of claims available on carry a more limited scope of review than habeas review coextensive with the scope the broader APA-style review which the of claims available on direct review would courts applied under section 1105a. See necessarily render the preclusion provision Gutierrez-Chavez v. INS, 298 F.3d 824, of AEDPA and IIRIRA utterly pointless 828 (9th Cir. 2002). Were section 1105a and would create an internal contradiction review and section 2241 review to have within the immigration statutes. identical scope, the repeal by AEDPA and As a matter of logic, therefore, the IIRIRA of the former—and not the Court necessarily recognized that the latter—would appear to be a vain or “limited role played by the courts in incomplete legislative act. habeas corpus proceedings was far In short, to accept Bakhtriger’s narrower than the judicial review contention here that section 2241 habeas authorized by the APA.” Id. at 312. In review incorporates an examination of the effect, the Court reaffirmed the rule set exercise of discretion or weight of the forth in Heikkila. And by drawing that evidence in the underlying removal distinction as to scope of review, the Court proceedings would be to erase the was able to give meaning to the 1996 distinction between “judicial review” and statutory preclusion provision. For under habeas review that was an indispensable this interpretation, AEDPA and IIRIRA ingredient in the reasoning of St. Cyr. See succeeded in precluding broader APA- 533 U.S. at 311-12. Bakhtriger’s 13 argument would also wholly nullify the of asylum. For the reasons stated above, content of the preclusion provisions that these matters are not reviewable under the Congress enacted and would defy decades residual habeas provision—28 U.S.C. § of the history of interpretation of section 2241. Indeed, the BIA’s determination 2241. Accordingly, we believe that the that the circumstances of Bakhtriger’s case scope of review under section 2241 must do not rise to the level of other cases in be confined to questions of constitutional which the authorities have exercised their and statutory law. discretion in favor of asylum is precisely the sort of application of discretion that the Our interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court declined to review in decisions in other circuits. In the wake of Accardi, 347 U.S. at 264. In Accardi, the St. Cyr, we are not aware of any cases that petitioner’s challenge to the exercise of have upheld habeas review of factual discretion by the immigration officials was findings or discretionary determinations in effectively the same as that mounted by criminal alien removal cases. Rather, all Bakhtriger—the “allegation that the circuits to decide the issue have limited appellant was treated differently from criminal alien habeas petitions to other aliens similarly situated.” 206 F.2d constitutional challenges or errors of law. at 901. The Supreme Court expressly See Bravo v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 590, 592- affirmed the court of appeals in its refusal 93 (5th Cir. 2003); Gutierrez-Chavez, 298 to entertain that challenge to discretion F.3d at 828; Carranza v. INS, 277 F.3d 65, (although the Court ultimately reversed on 72 (1st Cir. 2002); Sol, 274 F.3d at 651; another ground). Accardi, 347 U.S. at 264 Bowrin v. INS, 194 F.3d 483, 490 (4th Cir. n. 5. We reject Bakhtriger’s identical 1999). 10 challenge to discretion here. We join them. Perhaps recognizing that his effort