Opinion ID: 1485182
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Court erred in allowing Richard Sawyer to testify in regard to market value and damages and in refusing to strike his testimony.

Text: Mr. Sawyer's qualifications as an appraiser of timberlands and as an expert witness with respect to their fair market value are not challenged. What is asserted here by the State is that the witness improperly relied on hearsay information in forming his opinion and that he erroneously employed what the State describes as a multiplication method to arrive at the fair market value of the land. The evidence discloses that although he did not cruise the area, he spent one day and part of another inspecting it; that he had available and made use of the right-of-way plans of the taking area, aerial photographs, forest growth type maps, and U.S. Geodetic Survey topographical maps; and that he had a cruise made of the taking area for his use. He was familiar with the market for timber in the area and obtained information from buyers and sellers with respect to comparable sales. The State's primary attack on his testimony stems from his use of International's stumpage inventory to which we have already referred. This inventory began with a cruise of the area made by employees of the forest engineer department of International in 1949. The cruise information was checked against aerial photographs made annually and the remeasuring of plots every five years. The amount of cut was scaled on the ground year by year. By estimating growth and subtracting the cut, International was able to maintain a current inventory of both growing and merchantable stumpage. The witness, having determined from an examination of the market that there is an identifiable relationship between the value of the standing timber on timberland and the fair market value of the land as enhanced by the timber, used the inventory as one factor in arriving at fair market value of the land. Although the inventory information was hearsay and not itself admissible on direct examination in proof of value, it was a proper matter for consideration by the expert in forming his own opinion of market value of the land. In Warren v. Waterville Urban Renewal Authority (1967) 235 A.2d 295, 300 (Me.) we said: The opinion of an expert is not necessarily rendered inadmissible or incompetent because it may be based on knowledge of facts gained from hearsay sources. Any expert worthy of the name must of necessity assimilate prior learning derived from the experiences of others. As an expert witness he draws upon various sources of information whose credibility or trustworthiness he must determine in the light of his expertness. It would completely frustrate the use of expert witnesses if they were obliged to substantiate each single factor upon which their ultimate opinion must depend upon firsthand personal knowledge or personal experience. If some of the expert's factual information is derived from sources fairly trustworthy though hearsay and he has as such the ability to coordinate and evaluate that information with all the other facts in his possession secured through personal observation, the trial court may in the exercise of a sound discretion permit the expert's ultimate opinion to be considered by the jury. (Emphasis supplied) So also we said in Knox Lime Company, supra at page 827 of 230 A.2d, While as we have said, a valuation based upon a multiplication of these elements is so speculative that it must be rejected, such facts themselves may be considered by the knowledgeable expert and by the court and jury, as may any advantageous or disadvantageous situations as to production or marketing, but `only as contributing factors to the ascertainment of market value rather than as the criterion thereof.' So here the witness had the capacity to judge the validity of the inventory method employed by International and to check the results against his own observations, examination of aerial photographs and the like. That he accepted inventory figures with respect to quantity of standing timber, nature, type and extent of growth, stand per acre and the amount of cut over and non-productive land does not render his ultimate opinion as to the fair market value of the entire property before and after the taking inadmissible. It was but one of a number of factors which aided him in forming an opinion. It may be properly noted that this inventory was maintained by International for many years prior to the taking, not in anticipation thereof, but for the orderly management and control of its own operations. As such, it was more than ordinarily trustworthy as a hearsay factor to be considered by the expert. We see here no departure from the rules governing proper use of hearsay factors by expert witnesses as clearly recognized and defined by Warren and Knox. It is significant that the inventory itself was not offered in evidence on direct examination. As independent probative evidence it would presumably have been excluded under the hearsay rule at that stage. Knox Lime Company, supra. Common sense dictates, however, that the willing seller of timberland property and the willing buyer thereof will take into account what they deem to be the fair market value of the standing timber thereon in determining what is a fair price for the land on which the timber stands. This is precisely what both expert witnesses for plaintiffs did in this case. The State's position that the witnesses did no more than to take International's inventory and multiply the quantity by the going price of stumpage in order to produce a value of the entire property is not supported by the evidence. No error is shown.