Opinion ID: 747792
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ADEA and MHRA Age Discrimination Claims

Text: 16 Snow next argues that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on her age discrimination claims brought under the ADEA and the MHRA. Both the ADEA and the MRHA prohibit an employer from discharging an employee within a protected age group (40 years old and over) because of that employee's age. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(a)(1), 631(a); Minn.Stat. § 363.03 subd. 1(2)(b). Moreover, like appellant's disability claim, her age discrimination claims under both statutes are governed by the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Bevan v. Honeywell, Inc., 118 F.3d 603, 613 (8th Cir.1997) (Bevan ) (citing Rothmeier v. Investment Advisers, Inc., 85 F.3d 1328, 1338-39 (8th Cir.1996); Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 710 (Minn.1992)). 17 Snow asserts that she established a prima facie case for age discrimination by showing that (1) she was forty-nine years old when terminated, and thus, a member of the protected group; (2) she performed competently and satisfactorily for over 28 years, indicating that she was a qualified individual within the meaning of the statute; and (3) after her termination, the number of employees in her department increased from 16 to 20 and her duties were assigned to other employees. RMC relied on Snow's lack of certification as its nondiscriminatory reason for her termination. On the ultimate issue of intentional age discrimination, Snow alleged that she was terminated because she was the senior most employee [at RMC], making good money. (Snow Depo. at 81). In essence, Snow argues that she was terminated because she had been employed at RMC longer than the other then-current employees, and thus earned a comparatively higher salary. The district court granted RMC summary judgment in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Hazen Paper v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338 (1993) (Hazen Paper ), and the precedent in this circuit. See Hanebrink v. Brown Shoe Co., 110 F.3d 644, 647 (8th Cir.1997) (Hanebrink ); Slathar v. Sather Trucking Corp., 78 F.3d 415, 418 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 179, 136 L.Ed.2d 118 (1996); Bialas, 59 F.3d at 763. 18 In Hazen Paper, the Court held that there is no disparate treatment under the ADEA when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the employer's age. Id. at 609, 113 S.Ct. at 1705. The plaintiff in Hazen Paper alleged discrimination on the ground that his employer fired him because his pension was close to vesting. Id. The Court held that firing an employee on this basis is not actionable under the ADEA. The Court reasoned that, because age and years of service are analytically distinct, an employer can take account of one while ignoring the other, and thus it is incorrect to say that a decision based on years of service is necessarily 'age-based.'  Id. at 611, 113 S.Ct. at 1707. Under Hazen Paper, the evidence in the instant case is insufficient, as a matter of law, to show that Snow's termination was based upon her age. Id. at 611-13, 113 S.Ct. at 1707; see also Hanebrink, 110 F.3d at 647 (Employment decisions motivated by characteristics other than age such as salary and pension benefits, even when such characteristics correlate with age, do not constitute age discrimination.). 19 While we agree with the district court's conclusion that RMC is entitled to summary judgment on Snow's age discrimination claims under Hazen Paper, we also note that a plaintiff may, in some instances, prove intentional discrimination by relying on the evidence proffered to establish his or her prima facie case under the burden-shifting method. See Hicks, 509 U.S. at 511, 113 S.Ct. at 2749 ([T]he factfinder's disbelief of the reasons put forward by the defendant ... may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination.) (emphasis added). However, appellant has failed to proffer any competent evidence (direct or indirect) of age discrimination beyond that which is intended to support her prima facie case, and the evidence proffered in support of Snow's prima facie case is not sufficient to create a genuine dispute regarding intentional age discrimination. We therefore agree with the district court that RMC was entitled to summary judgment on appellant's ADEA and MHRA claims. 6