Opinion ID: 1637335
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Bishop's Sixth Amendment Right to Confrontation under the United States Constitution and Article 3, Section 26 of the Mississippi Constitution Was Violated.

Text: ¶ 8. Bishop asserts that his right to confrontation was violated when the trial court admitted the out-of-court statements of C.C. through the testimony of her mother, A.C., and Brenda Donald. Bishop relies on Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), a case decided under Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), which provided that a hearsay statement not falling within a deeply-rooted hearsay exception was not admissible under the confrontation clause unless it contained substantially particularized guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to the firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions. Bishop's reliance on these cases is in error, as Ohio v. Roberts was overruled by the United States Supreme Court in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). See also Whorton v. Bockting, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1179-80, 167 L.Ed.2d 1, 9 (2007); Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006). ¶ 9. The confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment provides: In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. In Crawford, the United States Supreme Court held that `the Confrontation Clause of the Federal Constitution's Sixth Amendment bars the admissibility of out-of-court testimonial statements by an unavailable witness offered in a criminal trial to prove the truth of a matter asserted (also known as hearsay) unless the defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness about the statement.' Bailey v. State, 956 So.2d 1016, 1027 (Miss.Ct.App.2007) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). ¶ 10. The inquiry, therefore, turns on whether the statements offered against Bishop were testimonial statement[s] within the context of the confrontation clause. Only [testimonial] statements of this sort cause the declarant to be a witness within the meaning of the Confrontation Clause. It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 2273, 165 L.Ed.2d 224, 237 (2006) (emphasis added). However, Crawford did not provide a firm definition of testimonial, but rather provided examples of testimonial evidence, including prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, at a former trial, and statements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52-53, 124 S.Ct. 1354. This Court has concluded that a statement is testimonial when it is given to the police or individuals working in connection with the police for the purpose of prosecuting the accused. Hobgood v. State of Mississippi, 926 So.2d 847, 852 (Miss.2006). ¶ 11. In the case sub judice, the trial court admitted statements of C.C. that were given to her mother, A.C., and to her therapist, Brenda Donald. It is noteworthy that the trial court held a lengthy, pre-trial hearing on the admissibility of these statements, as well as on whether the testimony of Dr. Porter would be admissible. The trial court found that the child was sent to Dr. Porter by law enforcement for the purpose of gathering evidence against Mr. Bishop. The trial court applied this Court's determination in Hobgood regarding what is considered a testimonial statement and determined that under Hobgood it (C.C.'s statements to Dr. Porter) is testimonial and is a violation of the confrontation clause. ¶ 12. The trial court further applied this Court's definition of testimonial statement in its determination that C.C.'s spontaneous statement to her mother was non-testimonial. A.C. is not a police officer, and was not working in conjunction with law enforcement for the purposes of prosecuting Bishop when C.C. disclosed to her that Bishop had been sexually abusing her. Moreover, the record reflects that statements made by C.C. to her mother were completely spontaneous. ¶ 13. Finally, the trial court determined that Brenda Donald's interactions with C.C. were strictly for the purposes of treatment and not for any prosecutorial purpose. In fact, Brenda Donald had completed eight or nine therapeutic sessions with C.C. at the time of the pre-trial hearing. The evidence reflects that C.C. was brought to Donald by her family members solely for treatment purposes. From the testimony of Donald, the trial court found nothing to indicate that the child's statements were suggested or solicited by Donald, that many of them were spontaneous narratives and that they were obtained for medical and psychological treatment. ¶ 14. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court was correct in its determination that the statements made by C.C. to her mother, A.C., and to Brenda Donald were non-testimonial in nature. Furthermore, because these statements were non-testimonial, they do not trigger the protections of the confrontation clause. Therefore, Bishop's assertion that his right to confrontation was violated is without merit.