Opinion ID: 1439515
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was It Properly Located on Tract 71?

Text: Sanders apparently is claiming that the trial court erred in locating the easement on tract 71; he contends that the Hugg plat clearly shows that the entrance is located on tract 72. On appeal, we examine the record to determine whether the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, i.e. if it contains evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Clovis Nat'l Bank v. Harmon, 102 N.M. 166, 168, 692 P.2d 1315, 1317 (1984). We resolve disputed facts in favor of the prevailing party below, indulging all reasonable inferences in support of the verdict. Id. Lutz and Garrett contend that Sanders did not raise this issue in his docketing statement, and thus waived his right to have the issue considered on appeal. However, the docketing statement is not jurisdictional, and it is within our discretion to consider error properly preserved below and presented in appellant's brief, although omitted from the docketing statement. Gallegos v. Citizens Ins. Agency, 108 N.M. 722, 731, 779 P.2d 99, 108 (1989). Accordingly, we will consider the merits of the issue raised by plaintiff. An easement should be construed according to its express and specific terms as a manifestation of the intent of the parties. If the grant or reservation is ambiguous, the parties' intention must be determined from the language of the instrument as well as from the surrounding circumstances. Kennedy v. Bond, 80 N.M. 734, 736, 460 P.2d 809, 811 (1969). The evidence indicates that the easement was granted by express agreement of Lutz' and Sanders' predecessor in interest, and the location was defined in the granting instrument as traversing tract 71. Further, in the amended easement agreement, the description of the easement is cross-referenced to the Hugg plat and identified as the existing roadway easement as marked on the plat; the plat shows this easement as running through tract 71. Evidence indicates that the circumstances surrounding the creation of the easement support this view. Lutz apparently intended, as part of a future conveyance of tract 72 to a third party, to reserve a right to an easement across tract 72 for herself; the evidence supports a conclusion that the easement across tract 72 is entirely distinct and separate from the easement relevant to this proceeding. Plaintiff, nevertheless, maintains that the location of the easement was always on tract 72, and that it was on tract 72 when he acquired the property. Evidence submitted at the trial indicates that the entrance of the easement was erroneously located on tract 72 by the original grantee, and its placement there was not the intent of the parties. In any case, although the parties' conduct may be indicative of their intent and may assist the court in filling in missing or ambiguous details, it does not permit a disregard of the language in the conveyance. Martinez v. Martinez, 93 N.M. 673, 676, 604 P.2d 366, 369 (1979). We find that the language of the grant, in combination with the circumstances surrounding the grant of the easement as evinced during the trial, provides adequate support for the trial court's conclusions. Thus, despite Sanders' contentions to the contrary, the record supports the court's finding that the easement runs across tract 71 only, and we affirm the court's determination on this issue. Sanders argues that the placement of the easement on tract 71 is unsafe, and that the easement should be revised. However, we find adequate support in the record for a determination that the easement as defined by the trial court is safe, and we reject this contention.