Opinion ID: 852409
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Contract Claims Against State Agencies

Text: Raybestos contends that statutory provisions other than AOPA authorize its claim. Specifically, Raybestos points to Indiana Code section 34-13-1-1(a), which allows claims against the State for breaches of both express and implied contracts. Raybestos essentially contends that this provision overrides the exclusive jurisdiction provision of AOPA. We think these statutory provisions are not inconsistent and collectively demonstrate that Raybestos's claim is not well founded. Rather than apparently inconsistent provisions, AOPA and the statutes governing state contracts fit nicely together. AOPA does not completely foreclose contract claims against state agencies. For example, exempted from AOPA's coverage are agency contracts for the acquisition, leasing, or disposition of property, or the procurement of goods or services. Ind.Code Ann. § 4-21.5-2-5(11) (West Supp.2008). This exemption mirrors the provisions found in Indiana Code sections 4-13-2-14.1 and 4-13-2-14.2, which require contracts with state agencies to be in writing and approved by the Commissioner of the Indiana Department of Administration, the Director of the Indiana State Budget Agency, and the Attorney General. IDEM asserts that the Agreed Order does not meet these requirements, and Raybestos concedes this point but responds that the requirements do not apply to its claim because these formalities apply only to contracts for purchases of goods or services. Raybestos argues that the limited application of these requirements to contracts for goods or services is shown by their placement in a chapter labeled Administrative Management of State Services, Employees, Purchases, and Property. To the extent Raybestos argues that the chapter name requires a particular interpretation, the General Assembly has instructed that the descriptive headings of titles, articles, and chapters are intended for organizational purposes only and are not intended to affect the meaning, application or construction of the statute they precede. I.C. § 1-1-1-5(f). But assuming these requirements apply only to contracts for goods or services, this merely reflects the point that the very same contracts are exempted from the exclusive judicial review provisions. In other words, presumably because a contract for the purchase of goods or services will support a claim for damages, it is exempted from the exclusive jurisdiction provision of AOPA. Raybestos concedes the Agreed Order is not such a contract. It therefore is not exempted from AOPA.