Opinion ID: 1707925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Judgment of Acquittal on Felony Murder

Text: Pearce also moved for a judgment of acquittal on the theory of felony murder, arguing that the State failed to establish that he was an aider or abetter of an underlying kidnapping and presented no proof of his intent to participate in a kidnapping that would support a theory of first-degree felony murder. The trial court denied the motion and submitted the case to the jury. Pearce now argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion. As discussed above, there are two ways in which first-degree murder can be proven under Florida law: through a premeditated design to kill or when the killing occurs during the course of an enumerated felony, including kidnapping. See § 782.04(1), Fla. Stat. (1999). In order to prove kidnapping in Pearce's case, the State had to prove three elements: (1) Pearce forcibly or by threat confined and abducted Crawford and Tuttle against their will; (2) Pearce had no lawful authority to do so; and (3) Pearce acted with the intent to inflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victims or another person. See § 787.01(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (1999). Both Havner and Tuttle testified that Pearce ordered them into the business office, waved a gun around, and pointed the gun at them. Tuttle testified that Pearce threatened to shoot him in the head if he did not perform oral sex on him. Tuttle also testified that he repeatedly asked Pearce if he could leave and Pearce told him no. Havner and the others present testified that Pearce slammed her head against the air conditioner and threatened to shoot her in the head. Testimony also showed that Pearce refused to let the boys go when asked by Havner and Loucks at separate times. Even though Pearce may have left the victims alone in the office several times, there was little opportunity for them to escape from the business premises, which were surrounded by a high fence topped with barbed wire and behind a locked gate. According to Havner's brother, Havner was hysterical even after Pearce permitted her to leave and that she spent the rest of the night placing phone calls trying to verify the safety of Tuttle and Crawford. Havner testified that she was afraid of Pearce, that Pearce was irate, and that she and her companions were not free to leave the business location where Pearce confined them. Pearce called his associate Butterfield, told him that he needed some help because he had been ripped off, and asked Butterfield to come armed. Butterfield arrived with Brittingham and Smith, who were also visibly armed. According to Butterfield, Pearce was calling the shots and was in charge. Tuttle and Crawford were ordered into the car by Pearce, who had a gun in his hand. Brittingham testified that he interpreted Pearce's actions as threatening to the boys. Tuttle testified that he did not feel that he or Crawford was free to leave. Pearce stated his intent was to rough up the boys and teach them a lesson for losing his money. Pearce drove the car to a deserted area, ordered Tuttle out of the car, and instructed Smith to break his jaw or pop him in the jaw. Pearce then drove a short distance more and ordered Crawford out of the car. Because the victim's liberty was never restored prior to his death, there was a continuing kidnapping here. See Stephens v. State, 787 So.2d 747, 754 (Fla. 2001) (citing with approval State v. Stouffer, 352 Md. 97, 721 A.2d 207, 215 (1998)). Pearce also argues that, in order to obtain his conviction for the acts of Smith under the felony murder rule, the State must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that Smith killed Crawford in furtherance of the kidnapping or a common criminal design, and not as an independent act of his own. However, because the State presented competent, substantial evidence that Pearce orchestrated the kidnapping and violence against the victims, it was a jury question whether the murder was an independent act of Smith. The independent act doctrine that Pearce asserts arises when one cofelon, who previously participated in a common plan, does not participate in acts committed by his cofelon, `which fall outside of, and are foreign to, the common design of the original collaboration.' Ray v. State, 755 So.2d 604, 609 (Fla.2000) (quoting Dell v. State, 661 So.2d 1305, 1306 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)). Under these limited circumstances, a defendant whose cofelon exceeds the scope of the original plan is exonerated from any punishment imposed as a result of the independent act. Id. Where, however, the defendant was a willing participant in the underlying felony and the murder resulted from forces which they set in motion, no independent act instruction is appropriate. Id. (emphasis added); see also Lovette v. State, 636 So.2d 1304 (Fla. 1994). Here, Pearce set the kidnapping in motion, brought Smith into contact with the victims, gave Smith a functioning weapon that was used as the murder weapon, and drove the victims to a remote location where the shootings occurred. Only a finding that the criminal episode had ceased might give significance to Pearce's argument. Ray, 755 So.2d at 609. The facts do not support such a conclusion here. Thus, there was sufficient evidence to deny Pearce's motion for judgment of acquittal on felony murder. Although Pearce raises no other issues relating to his convictions, we have reviewed the evidence and find sufficient evidence to support his convictions. See Fla. R.App. P. 9.142(a)(6) (In death penalty cases, the court shall review the evidence to determine if the interest of justice requires a new trial, whether or not insufficiency of the evidence is an issue presented for review.). Accordingly, we affirm Pearce's convictions for first-degree murder with a firearm and attempted first-degree murder with a firearm.