Opinion ID: 499056
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nature of the Complaint

Text: 8 A state prisoner may not bring a civil rights action in federal court under Sec. 1983 to challenge either the validity of his conviction or the fact or duration of his confinement. Those challenges may be made only by petition for habeas corpus. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 489-90, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1836, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (barring prisoners' Sec. 1983 suits seeking injunction against allegedly unconstitutional revocation of good time credits where that relief would result in reducing the length of plaintiffs' confinement). A federal habeas petition, of course, may not be entertained until the petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(b) (1982); Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 92 S.Ct. 509, 512, 30 L.Ed.2d 438 (1971). 9 In contrast, a civil rights action for damages, insofar as it does not also seek to void or shorten the term of imprisonment, is not a challenge that should be made by means of a habeas petition: 10 If a state prisoner is seeking damages, he is attacking something other than the fact or length of his confinement, and he is seeking something other than immediate or more speedy release--the traditional purpose of habeas corpus. In the case of a damages claim, habeas corpus is not an appropriate or available federal remedy. 11 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 494, 93 S.Ct. at 1838 (emphasis in original); see Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 554-55, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 2973-74, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974) (though inmates' request for injunctive relief that would speed their release could not be granted in Sec. 1983 action, their constitutional claim for damages was properly entertained). Such a damages action not only may be brought by a state prisoner in federal court under Sec. 1983, it may be commenced without any requirement of prior exhaustion of state remedies. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 494, 93 S.Ct. at 1838. 12 Mack's complaint is a civil rights complaint and is not properly characterized as a habeas petition. Though he complains that the defendants' failure to produce Jefferson violated his Sixth Amendment right and that [t]his failure caused [Mack] to lose a[n] essential witness, thus causing [him] to be convicted and incarcerated, he stops short of alleging that his conviction is invalid, and he does not request that he be released from prison. Rather, the complaint assumes that Mack will remain confined for the entire length of the sentence, and it demands damages for each day of his ordered confinement. Were the present claim essentially a habeas petition, it would be mooted if Mack prevailed on appeal from his conviction; but in fact if Mack were to prevail on that appeal and he were then retried and acquitted, his present claim would not be mooted. Rather, his several years in prison would have been unwarranted and his claim for damages would remain for adjudication after his release by the state court. 13 Nor would an affirmance of Mack's conviction necessarily negate the basis for his claim for damages, for, as discussed in the following section, it is likely that the state appellate court will not reach the question of the propriety of the action or inaction by the sheriffs. 14 Accordingly, we conclude that Mack's claim for damages on the ground that the defendant sheriffs violated his constitutional rights by failing to produce the witness attacks something other than the fact or length of Mack's confinement, seeks something other than his immediate or more speedy release, and does not depend on the validity of his conviction. Treatment of the complaint as a petition for habeas corpus was thus not proper, and the case should not have been dismissed for lack of exhaustion. 15