Opinion ID: 3025789
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: A federal court has jurisdiction to entertain a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) “only if [a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the constitution or federal law.” DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 441 (3d Cir. 2005); see also Obado v. New Jersey, 328 F.3d 716, 717 (3d Cir. 2003) (“[F]or a federal court to have jurisdiction, a petitioner must be in custody under the conviction he is attacking at the time the habeas petition is filed.”). The term “custody” extends beyond physical confinement, and encompasses other “significant restraints on . . . liberty” that are “not shared by the public generally.” Jones v. Cunningham, 371 6 The Magistrate Judge also found that Leyva’s procedural default could not be excused because, “[t]hough petitioner has alleged cause and prejudice for this default, he has not shown that the court’s failure to consider this claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Leyva v. Williams, No. Civ.A. 04-3697, 2005 WL 746042, at  (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2005). As explained below, however, a petitioner’s procedural default may be excused by a showing of “cause and prejudice” or a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” See, e.g., Lines v. Larkins, 208 F.3d 153, 166 (3d Cir. 2000); McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 260, 263 (3d Cir. 1999). See generally 2 James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §§ 26.3 & 26.4 (5th ed. 2005). -7- U.S. 236, 242, 240 (1963). The requirement is satisfied when a petitioner is on probation. Lee v. Stickman, 357 F.3d 338, 342 (3d Cir. 2004) (“It is . . . clear that being on probation meets the ‘in custody’ requirement for purposes of the habeas statute.”). “In making a custody determination, [federal courts look] to the date that the habeas petition was filed.” Barry v. Bergen County Probation Dept., 128 F.3d 152, 159 (3d Cir. 1997); see also Lee, 357 F.3d at 342 (“[W]hat matters for the ‘in custody’ requirement is whether Lee was in custody at the time his habeas petition was filed.”). Although Leyva was in custody when he filed his habeas petition, he no longer is. After a petitioner’s release from custody, we consider his habeas case moot unless he “can demonstrate he will suffer some collateral consequences if his conviction is allowed to stand.” DeFoy, 393 F.3d at 441-42, 442 n.3. Significantly, though, we may presume “collateral consequences when a litigant challenges a criminal conviction.” United States v. Kissinger, 309 F.3d 179, 181 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968)); see also Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 8 (1998) (“In recent decades, we have been willing to presume that a wrongful criminal conviction has continuing collateral consequences . . . .”). In this case, the government does not dispute that Leyva would suffer collateral consequences should his criminal conviction be allowed to stand. Presuming such consequences, we conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 and 2254, and that we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253. See Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 99 (3d Cir. 2005).