Opinion ID: 3053055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction over legal challenges

Text: Next, the government argues that we should dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioners’ challenge is nothing more than a challenge to the BIA’s discretionary determination that Petitioners failed to establish their eligibility for cancellation of removal because they did not demonstrate that their removal to Mexico would cause an 2 The government cites Silva v. Gonzales, 463 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006), in support of this argument. 12620 FIGUEROA v. MUKASEY “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to their qualifying relatives. Petitioners, on the other hand, argue that we do have jurisdiction because they are not challenging the IJ’s discretionary determinations, but instead are challenging the IJ’s decision on the ground that the IJ applied the wrong legal standards. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, we have jurisdiction to review final orders of the BIA which call for a petitioner’s removal. See Chuyon Yon Hong v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 1030, 1034 (9th Cir. 2008). We lack jurisdiction, however, to review the BIA’s discretionary determination that an alien failed to prove that her removal would result in “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” See Martinez-Rosas v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 926, 929-30 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)3). [4] Notwithstanding the jurisdiction-stripping provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), the REAL ID Act of 2005 restored judicial review of “constitutional claims or questions 3 Section 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, and except as provided in subparagraph (D), and regardless of whether the judgment, decision, or action is made in removal proceedings, no court shall have jurisdiction to review— (i) any judgment regarding the granting of relief under section 1182(h), 1182(i), 1229b, 1229c, or 1255 of this title[.] Section 1229b pertains to cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for certain nonpermanent residents. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b. As we have discussed, to be eligible for an adjustment of status under § 1229b, an alien must “establish[ ] that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence.” Id. § 1229b(b)(1)(D). FIGUEROA v. MUKASEY 12621 of law raised upon a petition for review filed with a[ ] . . . court of appeals.” See Pub. L. No. 109-13, Div. B., § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 310 (2005), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).4 “The plain language of the REAL ID Act grants jurisdiction to appellate courts to review questions of law presented in petitions for review of final orders of removal, even those pertaining to otherwise discretionary determinations.” Afridi v. Gonzales, 442 F.3d 1212, 1218 (9th Cir. 2006). We have construed § 1252(a)(2)(D) to provide jurisdiction for challenges to the agency’s interpretation and application of § 1229b(b)(1)(D)’s “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard based upon international law, see Cabrera-Alvarez v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that we had jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA’s interpretation of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard violated international law), and constitutional law, see Martinez-Rosas, 424 F.3d at 930 (holding that we had jurisdiction to consider whether the agency’s application of the “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” standard violated the petitioner’s constitutional right to due process); Ramirez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 1001, 1005 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Whether the BIA’s interpretation of the hardship standard violates due process is not a ‘judgment regarding the granting’ of cancellation of removal relief. Rather, it presents a question of statutory construction.”). On the other hand, we have construed 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i) and § 1252(a)(2)(D) to preclude review of a challenge based upon the application of the law to the facts 4 Section 1252(a)(2)(D) provides: Judicial review of certain legal claims Nothing in subparagraph (B) or (C), or in any other provision of this chapter (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section. 12622 FIGUEROA v. MUKASEY of the particular case, even when that challenge is cloaked as a legal challenge. See Martinez-Rosas, 424 F.3d at 930 (concluding that the petitioner’s argument that the IJ violated her right to due process by misapplying the facts of her case to applicable law was “nothing more than an argument that the IJ abused his discretion, a matter over which we have no jurisdiction”). Here, Petitioners do not argue that the IJ made a legal error by misapplying the facts of their case to the applicable law; rather, they argue that the IJ made legal errors in understanding the meaning of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.”5 While our Circuit has not directly addressed whether we have jurisdiction over challenges based on the IJ’s employment of an improper legal standard when construing the meaning of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” the Seventh Circuit has: Neither the IJ nor the Board thought that his moth- er’s hardship would be “exceptional and extremely unusual,” the statutory standard for cancellation of removal based on hardship to an alien’s immediate relative. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1). We lack jurisdiction to review [petitioner’s] contention that the agency should have exercised discretion in his favor. ... The REAL ID Act of 2005[, however,] creates an exception for constitutional contentions and other pure issues of law. [Petitioner] does advance [an] argument[ ] that meet[s] this description. . . that the immigration judge made a legal error in understand- 5 See Petitioner’s Brief at 21 (“[T]he Alvarez family maintains that the IJ . . . made a legal mistake in holding that the hardship standard required a showing of ‘unconscionability.’ ”); id. at 39-41 (arguing that the IJ failed to consider the effect that the parents’ removal would have on the citizenchildren). FIGUEROA v. MUKASEY 12623 ing the meaning of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” Mireles v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 965, 968-69 (7th Cir. 2006) (statutory citation omitted). The Seventh Circuit then concluded that it had jurisdiction to hear the petitioner’s challenge, but ultimately decided that the IJ in that case “used the right legal standard.” Id. at 969. [5] In addition, we have concluded in other contexts that we have jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA failed to apply the proper legal standard even when the underlying decision was a discretionary one. For example, we have held that we have jurisdiction to consider whether the BIA failed to apply the correct legal standard in determining whether the petitioner’s specific crime was a “particularly serious crime,” even though whether a crime is particularly serious is a discretionary determination which we lack jurisdiction to review. See Afridi, 442 F.3d at 1217-21. In Afridi, the petitioner sought review of the BIA’s failure to interpret “particularly serious crime” consistently with its own precedent. Id. at 1217. We characterized that challenge as one that raised “questions of statutory construction,” and concluded that whether the BIA employed an improper standard in making that determination is a question of law which we have jurisdiction to review. See id. at 1218-19 (“While we cannot reweigh evidence to determine if the crime was indeed particularly serious, we can determine whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard in making its determination.”). [6] We also have explicitly rejected the view that because the IJ’s decision is discretionary, it is beyond our review even if the IJ misapplies the law. In Hernandez v. Aschroft, 345 F.3d 824 (9th Cir. 2003), the government argued that we lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision that the nonviabiliy of petitioner’s marriage was a proper basis for denying her adjustment status even though the BIA’s precedent had long established that the nonviability of a marriage at the 12624 FIGUEROA v. MUKASEY time of adjustment is not a permissible basis for denying a petition. Id. at 845-47. The government further argued that we lacked jurisdiction to review that error because the adjustment of status is a matter left to the BIA’s discretion. See id. at 845. Rejecting that argument, we held in Hernandez that we do have jurisdiction to hear such a challenge: The BIA has no discretion to make a decision that is contrary to law. . . . A nonprecedential decision by the BIA in defiance of its own precedential case law simply cannot be classified as discretionary. . . . As we have explained before, the BIA must exercise its discretion within the constraints of law. . . . . When the BIA acts where it has no legal authority to do so, it does not make a discretionary decision, and such a determination is not protected from judicial review. Because the decision made by the BIA was contrary to law, it was not discretionary and jurisdiction exists to review the determination. Id. at 846-47 (internal citations, footnote, emendations, and quotation marks omitted). [7] Because Petitioners argue that the IJ failed to follow BIA precedent and misconstrued the statute when determining whether Petitioners had demonstrated “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D), we hold that we have jurisdiction to review their challenge.