Opinion ID: 171021
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Jessica's Prior Statement

Text: To begin our discussion of Mr. Caraway's first two evidentiary challenges, we provide a brief overview of some legal principles regarding use at trial of a witness's prior statements. Ordinarily a prior statement by a testifying witness cannot be used at trial. If offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it is inadmissible hearsay unless, roughly speaking, the statement was sworn testimony inconsistent with the witness's trial testimony or, if consistent with the witness's trial testimony, is offered to rebut a charge that the witness's trial testimony is a recent fabrication or the result of an improper influence or motive. See Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(1). Evidence of a prior inconsistent statement can be used to impeach the witness, see United States v. Bao, 189 F.3d 860, 866 (9th Cir.1999), but under the law of this circuit, a written statement offered for impeachment cannot itself be introduced as evidence if the witness admits making that statement, see United States v. Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232 (10th Cir.1987). Also, counsel may use a prior statement to refresh the recollection of a witness who cannot remember a past event, see 4 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence, § 612.03 (2d ed.2008), but doing so does not render the document thereby admissiblethe best practice being for the trial court to have the witness silently read the material. See N.M. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 454 F.2d 328, 337 (10th Cir. 1972); see also Fed.R.Evid. 612 (use by opposing party of document used to refresh witness's recollection). Finally, in recognition of the difficulty jurors can have in considering a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes without also improperly using the statement as substantive evidence of what it asserts, the Carter doctrine in this circuit sets limits on prosecutorial use of prior inconsistent statements. See United States v. Carter, 973 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.1992). Under Carter a prosecutor cannot ask a witness about a prior inconsistent statement by the witness if the primary purpose of calling the witness is to have the jury hear the prior statement and use it as substantive evidence of guilt, [1] even though it is ostensibly offered only for impeachment. We now turn to the specifics of this case. On direct examination by the government, Jessica testified that in November 2006 she had given postal investigators a written statement that she had driven Shawn to the post office on January 28, 2004; in response to a later question, she asserted that she had not taken Shawn to the post office and that the written statement had been a lie. A copy of her written statement was admitted into evidence. (Although the record does not reveal whether it was ever given to the jury, we will assume that it was). In closing argument the prosecutor said that Jessica's written statement corroborated Shawn's testimony, although the district court later instructed the jury that the statement was to be considered only for impeachment. Mr. Caraway argues (1) that it was error to admit the oral testimony regarding her prior statement and for the prosecutor to use it as substantive evidence, and (2) that it was error to admit the written statement into evidence.
Leading up to the testimony in question, the prosecutor had asked Jessica about her father's reaction to her mother's leaving, his threats to harm Owens and her mother, whether she had heard explosions at her house in 2003, the type of mechanical work her father did, and whether he had experimented with explosives. On several occasions, when Jessica's answer was inconsistent with her grand-jury testimony, the prosecutor reminded her of that testimony, and she sometimes modified her answer. The following exchange then took place: Q. Okay. And then also at the grand jury you deny knowing who mailed the bomb; is that correct? A. Yes. Q. Okay. And then later on, you gave a statement stating that you had mailed the bomb or notexcuse me, I'm sorry, I misspoke. You gave a statement that you drove Shawn Caraway to the post office and he mailed the bomb at the post office. Do you remember that? A. Yes, I made that statement. R. Vol. 5 at 422. Jessica explained that she had felt pressured by her mother and Owens to make the statement and that she had wanted investigators to leave her alone because she was seven-months pregnant. The prosecutor then gave her the written statement to review. He asked her to familiarize herself with it, to confirm that it was written in her own hand, and to confirm that it was prefaced with language stating that she had made the statement of [her] own free will and accord, without coercion, threat, or promise of reward. Id. at 424 (internal quotation marks omitted). At that point, defense counsel objected that the prosecutor's questions were leading. The court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then asked, Did you drive Shawn Caraway to the Wamego post office? and Jessica answered, No, I did not. Id. at 425. The prosecutor again asked if the statement said that it was made without coercion and if it was written in her own hand. Jessica again offered an explanation for giving the statement and said that she had lied in giving it. The prosecutor read the statement line by line, asking Jessica to confirm or refute each sentence in it. She said that it was all a lie. After an interlude in which the prosecutor pursued an unrelated line of questioning, the prosecutor moved to admit Government Exhibit 12, Jessica's written statement to the postal inspectors on November 2, 2006. Defense counsel objected: The statement, of course, is technically and clearly hearsay. She has admitted every line in it. To admit it and give it to a juryto the jury would be prejudicial. She's explained it, she's talked about it. And I think under Rule 403 it's far more prejudicial than it is probative, especially since she's gone through every line and explained every one already and the jury has heard it. To have this go into the jury room serves no purpose, other than to bring contrary testimony into the jury. Id. at 432. The prosecutor responded, As far as prejudice goes, any damage is already done because it's been read in open court. Id. at 433. He added, And to feel better, we can give a limiting instruction stating that it can be offered for impeachment. Id. To this, defense counsel objected that it was not impeachment. The court then admitted the written statement. After Jessica's testimony, the government called Postal Inspector Paul Mezzanotte, who had taken Jessica's statement. He testified that he had administered an oath to Jessica before taking her statement and that she had not appeared to be under the influence of any coercion, threat, or promise. He said that she had been a little upset but polite and that she had not hesitated in making the statement that she drove Shawn to the post office. Mezzanotte testified that after giving the statement, Jessica had met her mother and Owens outside and had given them both hugs. In closing argument the prosecutor addressed the credibility of Shawn's testimony. He asked them to consider whether Shawn appeared to be lying on the stand and to take into account that Shawn's motive for initially lying about mailing the bomb was to protect himself and his sister. The prosecutor suggested that Shawn's story had always been consistent on its most important detailthat he had seen the device at his house. He also urged the jury to consider whether Shawn's story was corroborated, and he said that it was in several respects: Shawn's description and diagram of the bomb matched the actual bomb, the types of materials found in the house supported Shawn's assertion that the bomb was made in the house, and Jessica's testimony about the threats and hearing explosions matched Shawn's. He continued: Also, before she denied it on the stand, Jessica Caraway corroborated his statement to the postal inspectors that he mailed it because, remember, Jessica Caraway had made a statement saying that she drove Shawn to the Wamego post office before she denied it on the stand. Id. Vol. 8 at 659-60. This was a substantive use of Jessica's prior inconsistent statement; it was not being used just to impugn her veracity when testifying that she did not drive Shawn to the post office. At the close of trial the court gave the jury the following instruction: You have heard evidence that before this trial certain witnesses made statements that may be different from his or her testimony in court. This is known as impeachment with a prior inconsistent statement. These earlier statements were brought to your attention only to help you decide how believable the testimony in this trial was. You cannot use the earlier statements as proof of anything else. You can only use them as one way of evaluating the testimony here in court. Exhibit 12 and Exhibit C-4 are examples of earlier statements introduced as prior inconsistent statements. Id. Vol. 1, Doc. 59, Instr. No. 33. Exhibit 12 was Jessica's written statement.
Mr. Caraway argues that it was error to admit Jessica's oral testimony about the prior statement and error for the prosecutor to use it as substantive evidence. Because Mr. Caraway made no objection to the admission of the oral testimony about the prior statement, we apply plain-error review. See United States v. Lamy, 521 F.3d 1257, 1265 (10th Cir.2008); Fed.R.Evid. 103(d). Plain error occurs when there is (1) error, (2) that is plain, which (3) affects substantial rights, and which (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir.2005) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted). Mr. Caraway argues that the introduction of the testimony was a violation of the Carter rule. See Carter, 973 F.2d at 1512-14. Carter, however, does not apply to this fact situation. In Carter a witness for the government gave testimony unfavorable to the government. Id. at 1511. The prosecutor then impeached the witness with his prior statements to the contrary. Id. The defendant argued on appeal that the court erred in allowing the impeachment because the prosecutor knew how the witness was going to testify and called him for the purpose of placing into evidence the impeachment testimony. Id. at 1512. We disagreed with the defendant's assessment of the prosecutor's purpose but acknowledged that [t]he government may not introduce evidence of prior statements under the guise of impeachment for the primary purpose of placing before the jury substantive evidence which is not otherwise admissible. Id. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted). Carter, because of the risk that the jury will misuse impeachment evidence, would exclude otherwise admissible evidence when the record clearly and unequivocally establishes that the party's primary purpose in calling the witness or in asking the question was to utilize a prior hearsay statement as substantive evidence. Id. at 1513. Because of the proof required, reversible Carter error is rare (there is no example in our circuit). Cf. United States v. Clifton, 406 F.3d 1173, 1185-86 (10th Cir.2005) (Hartz, J., concurring and dissenting in part) (discussing difficulties with the purpose inquiry). The reason that the oral testimony concerning Jessica's prior statement does not raise a Carter question is that it was not offered for impeachment. When it was offered, she had yet to testify whether she had driven Shawn to the post office. The prosecutor asked Jessica about her prior statement before he asked for her current position. Although a different sequence of events could have presented facts suited to a Carter analysis, Carter does not provide the appropriate test here. Nevertheless, it was improper for the government to elicit Jessica's prior statement before she gave inconsistent testimony and then to use that statement as substantive evidence in closing argument. As just noted, Jessica's statement to investigators was not impeachment evidence because she had yet not testified to the contrary. And it could not be used substantively because for that purpose it would be inadmissible hearsay: an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, falling into no exception. See Fed.R.Evid. 801-804. Had the prior statement first been introduced at the proper timethat is, after she testified that she had not driven Shawnit would still have been error for the government to use it as substantive evidence in its closing argument. See Regan-Touhy v. Walgreen Co., 526 F.3d 641, 651 (10th Cir.2008). In any event, even if we assume that there was Carter error, so that the prior statement was not admissible for any purpose, the error does not rise to plain error. We will not reverse a conviction for plain error unless all four prongs of the plain error test are satisfied. Here, the third prongprejudicehas not been satisfied. Under the third prong, a defendant must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would have been different. United States v. Fields, 516 F.3d 923, 944 (10th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, Mr. Caraway must demonstrate a reasonable probability that he would not have been found guilty if Jessica's prior statement had not been presented to the jury. Mr. Caraway argues that without Jessica's statement about giving her brother a ride to the post office, Shawn's testimony was wholly uncorroborated and was significantly weaker. Aplt. Br. at 21. We disagree. Shawn's claim that his sister drove him to the post office is a relatively minor detail, one that does not directly implicate Mr. Caraway. Contrary to Mr. Caraway's assertion, the core of Shawn's testimony was substantially corroborated, most critically by the diagram of the device he drew for investigators, which Mr. Caraway concedes is proof that Shawn had seen the device. In addition, both his sister and his mother corroborated his testimony about the threats his father made, his sister corroborated his testimony that there were explosions on the Delia property in 2003, and the postal clerk corroborated his testimony that he paid for postage with a $20 bill. Moreover, Shawn's testimony was merely one part of a strong case against Mr. Caraway. We cannot say that it was reasonably probable that Jessica's prior statement was a critical factor for the jury.
Mr. Caraway argues that it was error for the district court to admit into evidence the written copy of Jessica's statement to postal inspectors. We understand him to be making three arguments on appeal regarding the admission of this statement: (1) that it was hearsay, (2) that it violated the Carter rule, and (3) that it was improper to admit it because Jessica did not deny having made the statement. We address each in turn. Mr. Caraway timely raised at trial a hearsay objection to the written statement. We have already explained why the content of the statement, if used substantively, would be inadmissible hearsay. If admitted for impeachment purposes, however, it is not hearsay. The district court gave a jury instruction that stated that prior inconsistent statements are admitted only to help you decide how believable the testimony in this trial was, R. Vol. 1, Doc. 59, Instr. No. 33, and told the jury that it could not use the earlier statements as proof of anything else, id. This instruction explicitly referred to Exhibit 12. Mr. Caraway has not argued that the instruction was inadequate in informing the jury that the statement was admissible only for impeachment. Thus, the prior statement was admitted only for the proper purpose of impeachment, and the jury was given a limiting instruction not to use it substantively. The court did not improperly admit hearsay. As for the Carter issue, we have already observed that Mr. Caraway made no Carter objection at trial, and our review is therefore for plain error. Even if he could establish a Carter error here, Mr. Caraway cannot demonstrate plain error for the same reason discussed above: given the relative unimportance of the statement and the strong evidence of his guilt, he cannot show the required prejudice. Mr. Caraway's last allegation of error regarding Jessica's written statement is that it was admitted [n]otwithstanding her admissions on the stand. Aplt. Br. at 17. When the government moved to introduce the written statement, she had, as defense counsel protested, already admitted every line in it. R. Vol. 5 at 432. In Soundingsides, 820 F.2d 1232, we held that the district court had erred in allowing the government to present extrinsic evidence of prior inconsistent statements by two witnesses, both of whom admitted making the statements. We explained: Where the witness does not deny making a prior inconsistent statement, there is clearly no rationale for the introduction of a prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 1240 (internal quotation marks omitted). We did not address in Soundingsides whether those particular errors would in themselves require reversal; we held only that in light of the weak, circumstantial murder case against the defendant, the admission of the prior statements together with the improper admission of evidence of the defendant's beatings of a former girlfriend was not harmless error. Id. at 1243. We hold that the improper admission of Jessica's written statement was harmless error. As previously stated, the evidence was hardly central to the trial. Moreover, the jury had already heard the entire statement, broken down line by line, and any additional emphasis on it that resulted from the admission of the written statement was minimal. [A] non-constitutional error is harmless unless it had a substantial influence on the outcome or leaves one in grave doubt as to whether it had such effect. United States v. Griffin, 389 F.3d 1100, 1104 (10th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). We do not believe that the admission of the statement had such an influence on the outcome of the case.