Opinion ID: 2976497
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clarksville’s Motions

Text: The instant case is remarkable, in part, because it involves the same police department and contains several overlapping facts with Austion v. City of Clarksville, 244 F. App’x 639 (6th Cir. 2007). Kenneth Austion (“Austion”) is an African-American who worked as a police officer in the Department. Like Hall, Austion brought an action against Clarksville alleging violations of Title VII and the Tennessee Human Rights Act. Specifically, Austion alleged claims of discrimination against him on the basis of race when the Department denied him a promotion, a racially hostile work environment, and retaliation, as well as a race-based demotion. Id. at 643, 646. A jury found Clarksville liable regarding all four of Austion’s claims. Id. at 646. 11 Shared facts between Austion and the instant lawsuit include: the use of the word “nigger” as a racial slur in the late 1980s; the racist cartoon; the noose; and the circulation of Captain Brooks’s letter defending Chief Smith. Id. at 643-44, 646. Other facts on the record in Austion parallel the retaliatory actions taken against Hall for filing grievances and complaints: Chief Smith’s yelling at Austion in retaliation for filing his charge with the EEOC, an investigation of Austion regarding illegal drug and prostitution activity, and a change in Austion’s on-call schedule from mostly daytime to mostly nighttime hours. Id. at 645. In addition, Austion, like Hall, testified that he was aware of racist remarks by Department employees and that a racially hostile work environment had a negative effect on his work environment and personal life. Id. at 652. The records in Austion and the instant case do differ regarding some facts. Facts in Austion not mirrored in the record supporting Hall’s allegations include: the presence of racially insensitive figurines on a police officer’s desk and the suspicion placed on Austion by investigators for a driveby shooting at another officer’s house. Id. at 645-56. The facts present in this case but that were absent in Austion include: the prohibition on Hall’s riding with Blakely; the disciplinary report regarding Hall’s use of a Department computer; the accusation that Hall refused to respond to a crime scene; the accusation that Hall investigated another detective’s case; a superior’s use of a racial slur specifically targeting Hall; a racially derogatory email circulated in 2005; and the requirement that Hall undergo a “pre-bump” process regarding his work assignment. In Austion, we affirmed the district court’s denial of Clarksville’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law regarding both Austion’s hostile-work-environment and retaliation claims, as well as the denial of Clarksville’s motions for a new trial and for remittitur. Id. at 651-54. The evidence in Hall’s case is at least as persuasive as the evidence that we reviewed in Austion. 12 In its memorandum of law attached to its order denying Clarksville’s motion for summary judgment, the district court explained why genuine issues of material fact existed regarding Hall’s hostile-workenvironment and retaliation claims. Dist Ct. Record #52 at 14-18 (Mem. Denying Def.’s Mot. Dismiss & Mot. Summ. J.). As required by our summary-judgment standard, these issues were resolved by the jury. We are not now at liberty to reweigh the evidence, but rather we must evaluate whether a reasonable juror could have reached the conclusions reached by the jury in this case. In denying Clarksville’s Rule 50 and Rule 59 motions following trial, the district court incorporated its prior memorandum of law denying the motion for summary judgment and elaborated further why it was rejecting Clarksville’s arguments for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Dist. Ct. Record #140 at 2 (Mem. Denying Def.’s Mots. J. as a Matter of Law & a New Trial). We agree with the district court’s holding that Clarksville has presented no convincing argument “that the jury erred in returning a verdict in favor of [Hall] on his hostile work environment claim.” Id. at 6. We also agree with the district court that “[t]he jury was well within its province to find that [Hall] was subjected to retaliation for his protected Title VII activity.” Id. In view of the evidence submitted to the jury and in light of the district court’s well-reasoned explanation for its decision, we affirm the district court’s denial in this case of Clarksville’s motions for judgment as a matter of law and for a new trial. Finally, the jury awarded Hall $100,000 damages on his hostile-work-environment claim and $50,000 damages on his retaliation claim. This is less than the $200,000 total the jury awarded the plaintiff in Austion on the basis of similar facts ($100,000 for Austion’s hostile-work-environment claim and $100,000 for his retaliation claim). Id. at 653. We concluded in Austion that the jury award was “not against the [clear] weight of evidence and [did] not shock the conscience of this 13 court.” Id. at 654. We similarly conclude in this case that the jury award is not excessive, did not result from bias or prejudice, and does not shock the conscience of the court. Therefore the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying remittitur.