Opinion ID: 2632408
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Heading: Constitutionality of California's Capital Sentencing Scheme

Text: Defendant argues that various features of California's capital sentencing scheme violate the federal and California Constitutions. We previously have considered and consistently rejected these challenges. Because defendant provides no persuasive reason why we should reexamine our capital punishment precedent, we reject these challenges. California's capital sentencing scheme adequately narrows the class of offenders eligible for the death penalty. ( People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 573, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182; People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 566, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 154, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) The special circumstances outlined by the sentencing scheme are not overinclusive in scope. ( People v. Ray, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 356, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 296, 914 P.2d 846.) Section 190.2, which lists the special circumstances that narrow the class of murders for which the death penalty can be utilized, adequately provides criteria for identifying and restricting which murders are eligible for the death penalty. ( People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450.) Likewise, section 190.3, factor (a), which directs the jury to consider in determining the penalty the circumstances of the crime, has consistently survived constitutional challenges. ( People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 574, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182; People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 566, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) Consideration of the factors in aggravation outlined by section 190.3 does not invite arbitrary or capricious sentencing. ( People v. Visciotti (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1, 76, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 495,825 P.2d 388.) A jury is not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) individual aggravating factors exist (except for other crimes); (2) the aggravating factors substantially outweigh the mitigating ones; or (3) death is the appropriate penalty. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 614, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; People v. Kipp, supra, 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1137, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450.) These conclusions are not modified by the recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403. ( People v. Morrison (2004) 34 Cal.4th 698, 709, 21 Cal. Rptr.3d 682,101 P.3d 568.) Moreover, `[b]ecause the determination of penalty is essentially moral and normative [citation], and therefore different in kind from the determination of guilt,' the federal Constitution does not require the prosecution to bear the burden of proof or burden of persuasion at the penalty phase. ( People v, Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 643[, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376]....) ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240,317, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433; see also People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 859, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152.) Further, jurors need not agree unanimously on the existence of particular factors in aggravation. ( People v. Boyette (2002)29 Cal.4th 381, 466,127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) While all the jurors must agree death is the appropriate penalty, the guided discretion through which jurors reach their penalty decision must permit each juror individually to assess the potential aggravating factors. ( People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 41, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229.) The series of normative judgments involved in deciding whether a particular circumstance is indeed aggravating and, if so, what weight it should be given, cannot be fitted into a scheme of unanimous jury factfinding. ( Ibid. ) The trial court is not required to instruct the jury that there is no burden of proof at the penalty phase. ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 417-418, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708.) Nor is there a constitutional requirement that the jury make written findings disclosing the reasons for the penalty determination. ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 859, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249; People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 805, 248 Cal.Rptr. 126,755 P.2d 310.) Further, intercase proportionality review is not constitutionally required. ( People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692, 741, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; People v. Majors (1998) 18 Cal.4th 385, 432, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 684, 956 P.2d 1137.) The jury may consider unadjudicated offenses as aggravating offenses. ( People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 316, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433; People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 566, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) The use of adjectives like extreme and substantial in the list of potential mitigating factors does not impermissibly restrict the jury's consideration of mitigating factors. ( People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 365, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) Finally, neither the federal nor the state Constitution requires the trial court to instruct the jury that section 190.3's statutory mitigating factors are relevant solely as potential mitigating factors, and not as aggravating factors. ( People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 564, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420.) Defendant's arguments that California's death penalty law deprives capital defendants of equal protection are not persuasive. As stated above, we have established that intercase proportionality review, jury unanimity on aggravating circumstances, written findings disclosing the reasons for the penalty determination, and a requirement that the prosecution bear the burden of proof or burden of persuasion at the penalty phase are not constitutionally required. (See People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 741, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; People v. Boyette, 29 Cal.4th at p. 466, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Fauber, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 859, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249; People v. Sapp, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 317, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433.) A successful equal protection claim must show that `the state has adopted a classification that affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.' ( People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 571, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29.) [B]y definition, a defendant in a non-capital case is not similarly situated to his capital case counterpart for the obvious reason that the former's life is not on the line. ( People v. Superior Court (Sturm ) (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 172, 185,11 Cal.Rptr.2d 652.) Finally, international law does not compel the elimination of capital punishment in California. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 127, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.)