Opinion ID: 703968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Prosecutorial Comments

Text: 45 Pointing to prosecutorial comments about the Klan and about the defendants' racist attitudes, the defendants also contend that the government convicted them by putting the [d]efendants' ideology on trial. The prosecutorial comments in question were about evidence of the defendants' racial animus which was relevant not only as to motive but also to prove an element of the crime. To secure a conviction under Sec. 3631, the government needed to prove that the defendants' intended to interfere with the Ruffins' housing rights because of their race. The fact that evidence of this intent and the defendants' ultimate attack on the Ruffins is linked to Klan activities did not bar its presentation to the jury, nor did it make prosecutorial comments about that evidence improper. The First Amendment ... does not prohibit the evidentiary use of speech to establish the elements of a crime or to prove motive or intent. Evidence of a defendant's previous declarations or statements is commonly admitted in criminal trials subject to evidentiary rules dealing with relevancy, reliability, and the like. Mitchell, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2201. 5. The Judge's Comments at Sentencing 46 At sentencing, the district court judge expressed her concern about the racial hatred preached by the Klan and her hope that the defendants would change their racist attitudes. Before imposing sentence on Stone, the court made the following remarks: 47 Mr. Stone, I have some things I'd like to say to you prior to imposing sentence. This case reminds us that racism in America is not over. During the trial, there was an initial attempt to portray this as some sort of a prank based in part apparently on what was said to Ms. Ruffin by a sheriff's deputy when he responded to her call. This was no prank. This was an intentional act of discrimination. And in my opinion, you were the instigator of this act of intimidation and the leader of it. 48 You were the head of the Klan. The Grand Dragon was your title. I don't know if it's still your title or not. For years in America, the Klan has stood for intolerance, bigotry, hatred. It's been at the core and the center of racial violence in America. The Ku Klux Klan has been responsible--and I want you to think about [ ] what the Ku Klux Klan has been responsible for--for shooting, mutilating, the lynching of innocent black American citizens. It's been responsible for bombings and burnings of black churches. It's been responsible for the murders of civil rights workers. 49 You and your wife were both members of the Klan, and you have two children. I don't need to tell you this, but children aren't born with prejudice. It's a wonderful thing to think about that children are born in this world with--they don't have any prejudices. Children learn prejudice. I hope that this event will not cause your sons to believe somehow that the Ruffins or someone else is responsible for the sentence that you will now receive. I hope somehow that they can recognize that America is great because of our cultural diversity. Our diversity in America is a strength, not a weakness. 50 As you know, I'm sure it's been explained to you at great length by Mr. Nail, the guidelines, of course, enacted by Congress are dictating in large part the sentence that you're going to be receiving today. If it were within my power, it would be the wish of the Court to erase any racial hatred that you or your family members or your friends might still harbor. Of course, I'm a federal judge and have a lot of power, but that's not one of the things that's within my power. So because I'm not able to do that, I just have to hope that one day those feelings that you apparently feel towards members of the black race will change. And I hope the feelings of those in your community will change that support your beliefs, because racism cannot thrive in a community that says we won't tolerate these attitudes, and we won't tolerate these types of actions. 51 We live in a country, Mr. Stone, where people have the right to live where they want to and not be interfered with or intimidated because of their race or color. And you didn't recognize that to be a fact, and now you're going to suffer the consequences. 52 Although the details varied somewhat, the court made similar remarks before sentencing Daniel and Stewart. 53 The defendants complain about the court's remarks and argue that their sentences were affected by their ideology. The record shows, however, that each defendant received a sentence at the lower end of the guideline range with no upward departure. Thus, the record reflects that the defendants were not sentenced based upon their membership in the Klan or their racial beliefs, but instead based upon their crimes and the relevant United States Sentencing Guidelines. Cf. United States v. Rosenberg, 806 F.2d 1169, 1180 (3d Cir.1986) (finding the record, and in particular, the sentencing minutes, do not justify amici's concern that the court imposed the sentences as a punishment for the defendants' exercise of their [F]irst [A]mendment rights.), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1070, 107 S.Ct. 2465, 95 L.Ed.2d 873 (1987). 54 Even if the district court had factored the racist attitudes behind the crime into the sentences imposed, we seriously doubt that it would have been error. In Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 3418, 77 L.Ed.2d 1134 (1983), the trial judge considered the racial hatred which motivated the crime in deciding to sentence the defendant to death. A majority of the Court rejected the contention that it was improper to do so. Id. at 948-49, 103 S.Ct. at 3424 (plurality opinion of Rehnquist, J., joined by Burger, C.J., and White and O'Connor, JJ.) (The United States Constitution does not prohibit a trial judge from taking into account the elements of racial hatred in this murder.); id. at 970, 103 S.Ct. at 3435 (concurring opinion of Stevens, J., joined by Powell, J.) (the judge's candid exposition of his deeply felt concern about racial crimes had no bearing on any statutory aggravating circumstance, but in and of itself it does not undermine the legitimacy of the ultimate sentence.). 55 To the extent that the defendants simply complain about being lectured by the judge at sentencing, we are not sympathetic. What the Alabama Supreme Court once said in a different context fits here as well: 56 The trial judge is a human being, not an automaton or a robot. He is not required to be a Great Stone Face which shows no reaction to anything that happens in his courtroom. Testimony that is amusing may draw a smile or a laugh, shocking or distasteful evidence may cause a frown or scowl, without reversible error being committed thereby. We have not, and hopefully never will reach the stage in Alabama at which a stone-cold computer is draped in a black robe, set up behind the bench, and plugged in to begin service as Circuit Judge. 57 Allen v. State, 290 Ala. 339, 342-43, 276 So.2d 583, 586 (1973). The Sentencing Guidelines have taken much discretion out of the sentencing process and have made the determination of punishment a more mechanical process, but we are not yet at the punch in and print out stage of judging. There is still room in our system of justice for some expression of humanitarian ideals and for remarks such as those the district court made.