Opinion ID: 867478
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Violation of Right to Counsel

Text: ¶ 59 Moody next argues that evidence obtained in violation of his right to counsel was used to undermine his insanity defense and influence the court's determination of his mental competence. Moody raises two claims arising from this alleged violation of his rights: first, that the State violated his right to counsel when it ignored his request for an attorney before taking handwriting, fingerprint, blood, and hair samples; and, second, that the State intruded into the attorney-client relationship by making derogatory comments about counsel and eavesdropping on a telephone conversation between Moody and his attorney.
¶ 60 Moody contends that by refusing to honor his request for counsel after he was served with the search warrant for physical characteristics, the State violated his right to counsel. ¶ 61 Shortly after Moody was extradited to Arizona, Tucson Detective Karen Wright and Pima County Detective Michael Ying served him with a search warrant seeking physical characteristics, such as hair, blood, fingerprints, and handwriting samples. Moody indicated that he had no attorney and requested a public defender. After contacting the prosecutor, however, the detectives denied his request. Moody then complied with the warrant and gave samples of hair and blood, was fingerprinted and photographed, and gave a handwriting sample. Before his second trial, Moody moved to suppress this evidence. The trial court denied that motion and the State presented the evidence at trial. ¶ 62 As relief for the asserted violation of his rights, Moody claims that the trial court should have suppressed this evidence. We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary issue, see State v. Prion, 203 Ariz. 157, 160, ¶ 14, 52 P.3d 189, 192 (2002), but review constitutional issues and purely legal issues de novo, see State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 201, ¶ 21, 84 P.3d 456, 466 (2004) (analyzing Fourth and Fifth Amendment issues). ¶ 63 Moody's pretrial motion to suppress was based on Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.2(a), which guarantees a criminal defendant the right to have counsel present during the taking of physical evidence. Moody does not rely on Rule 15.2 on appeal, however, and we therefore do not analyze that claim. ¶ 64 Instead, on appeal, Moody relies upon two additional arguments raised but not ruled upon below: a Sixth Amendment right to have counsel present and a general right to access counsel derived from a line of driving under the influence (DUI) cases based on Rule 6.1(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure. ¶ 65 On the first issue, federal case law is clear that Moody had no right to have counsel present at the taking of physical evidence. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel extends to all critical stages of the criminal process. Iowa v. Tovar, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 158 L.Ed.2d 209 (2004). The taking of non-testimonial physical evidence, however, is not a critical stage of the proceedings. See, e.g., Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 267, 87 S.Ct. 1951, 18 L.Ed.2d 1178 (1967) (holding that taking of a handwriting sample is not a critical stage of the proceedings); United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963, 971 (9th Cir.1971) (holding that taking of fingerprints and hair samples is not a critical stage of the proceedings); cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227-28, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967) (stating that analysis of fingerprints, blood, and hair is not a critical stage because there is minimal risk that his counsel's absence at such stages might derogate from his right to a fair trial). Consequently, Moody had no right to have the evidence suppressed based on the denial of his Sixth Amendment rights. ¶ 66 Second, Moody argues that by refusing his custodial request to speak with counsel before the taking of the physical evidence, the State interfered with his rule-based right of access to counsel and that the evidence should therefore have been suppressed. Rule 6.1(a) of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure provides a criminal defendant with the right to consult in private with an attorney ... as soon as feasible after [being] taken into custody. This court has stated that, regarding a suspect in custody, the state may deny the right to consult with an attorney only when the exercise of that right will hinder an ongoing investigation. Kunzler v. Pima County Superior Court, 154 Ariz. 568, 569, 744 P.2d 669, 670 (1987). Although the State has not shown that counsel would have hindered the investigation in this case, Moody had not been assigned an attorney when the warrant was served. This court has also stated that [i]f the defendant is indigent and cannot afford an attorney, the state need not wait until one is appointed before continuing its detention procedures. McNutt v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 7, 10 n. 2, 648 P.2d 122, 125 n. 2 (1982). The taking of the fingerprint evidence would clearly qualify under this exception for detention procedures. ¶ 67 Even if this court were to conclude that Moody's right to consult counsel under Rule 6.1(a) was violated as to the other evidence, however, Moody fails to demonstrate that suppression would be required. Federal jurisprudence is clear that if evidence could have been obtained despite the violation of right to counsel, there is no reason to keep that evidence from the jury. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 447, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984). For suppression to be appropriate, there must be a nexus between the violation and the evidence seized. Id. (stating that the exclusionary rule requires the suppression of evidence gained as a result of a government violation of a defendant's rights). [6] In Moody's case, the physical evidence was seized pursuant to a valid warrant, and the samples would have been collected whether or not Moody had an opportunity to speak with an attorney. Consequently, the nexus between the alleged violation and the evidence seized is absent; therefore, the policies underlying the exclusionary rule would not require suppression of this evidence. ¶ 68 Moody relies on a line of cases based on Rule 6.1 of the Arizona Rules of Criminal Procedure for the proposition that a defendant has the right to confer with counsel before taking a test for physical evidence. Those cases, however, all involve and are limited to the seizure of evidence of intoxication. See, e.g., Kunzler, 154 Ariz. at 568-70, 744 P.2d at 669-71; State v. Holland, 147 Ariz. 453, 711 P.2d 592 (1985); McNutt, 133 Ariz. at 7, 648 P.2d at 122; State v. Rosengren, 199 Ariz. 112, 14 P.3d 303 (App.2000). Only in these cases has the reviewing court either dismissed the charges against the defendant or affirmed suppression of non-testimonial, physical evidence as a sanction for the state's violation of a defendant's rights under Rule 6.1(a). ¶ 69 These cases addressed violations of Rule 6.1 in the context of impaired drivers. See Kunzler, 154 Ariz. at 568, 744 P.2d at 669(DUI); Holland, 147 Ariz. at 454, 711 P.2d at 593(DUI); McNutt, 133 Ariz. at 8, 648 P.2d at 123(DUI); Rosengren, 199 Ariz. at 115, 14 P.3d at 306 (manslaughter). Such investigations raise unique concerns that justify exemption from the general rule: In a D[U]I investigation, it is crucial for both the state and the defendant to gather evidence relevant to intoxication close in time to when the defendant allegedly committed the crime. Otherwise, any alcohol that may have been in the blood will have decomposed before the blood can be tested. McNutt, 133 Ariz. at 10 n. 2, 648 P.2d at 125 n. 2. As the court suggested in McNutt, DUI investigations are unique because of the evanescent nature of blood- and breath-alcohol evidence. See id. Thus, these DUI cases establish the required nexus between the violation and remedy: Denial of counsel may deprive a defendant of an opportunity to obtain exculpatory evidence and therefore justifies suppression of evidence. Id. at 10, 648 P.2d at 125. ¶ 70 Moody's case differs in that the physical evidence taken from him was not subject to disappearing or dissipating as is breath- or blood-alcohol evidence. The officers made it clear that the warrant sought only non-testimonial evidence and that they would not be asking Moody any questions regarding the murders while taking the evidence. Additionally, because the evidence was seized pursuant to a valid warrant, [7] it is unlikely that an attorney would advise Moody to defy the warrant and refuse to submit to the search. [8] For those reasons, we agree with those courts that have held that the necessity for counsel was minimized. E.g., Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-47, 104 S.Ct. 2501. Consequently, even if Rule 6.1(a) requires that a defendant be afforded the opportunity to contact counsel before administration of a search warrant for physical characteristics, Moody has failed to demonstrate why suppression would be appropriate in this case. He therefore has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to suppress the physical evidence.
¶ 71 Moody claims that the State interfered in his relationship with counsel in two ways during a two-month span at the beginning of Moody's detainment in early 1994. ¶ 72 In February of 1994, a Pima County corrections officer made derogatory statements about Moody's first attorney, Daniel Grills. When Grills brought this to the court's attention, Judge Hantman ordered the Sheriff's Department to avoid contact with Moody concerning legal matters. The State contends that this error was remedied by our decision in State v. Moody, 192 Ariz. 505, 968 P.2d 578 (1998). We agree. Moody has failed to explain how, if at all, any prejudice stemming from this incident survived the reversal and affected him on retrial. Consequently, we address only Moody's second claim. ¶ 73 Two months later, on April 4, 1994, Pima County Corrections Officer Alan Chaffey, who had previously been instructed by his supervisor to keep an eye on Mr. Moody and report any observations he found interesting, overheard Moody make a phone call to his attorney in which Moody discussed his idea for a legal defense that he had read about ... in two books. Officer Chaffey then searched Moody's cell and discovered two books about alien abduction: Communion and The Breakthrough, Communion Continues. ¶ 74 Before retrial, Moody moved to dismiss the charges against him, alleging that the State intentionally interfered in the attorney-client relationship. The trial court denied that motion without elaboration. Contending that the prosecutor took deliberate actions to penetrate the attorney-client privilege and destroy counsel's relationship with his client, Moody now claims that the trial court erred in denying the motion and asks us to vacate his convictions and dismiss the charges against him. ¶ 75 We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to dismiss for an abuse of discretion. State v. Hansen, 156 Ariz. 291, 294, 751 P.2d 951, 954 (1988) (citing State v. Pickett, 121 Ariz. 142, 145, 589 P.2d 16, 19 (1978)). ¶ 76 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 2, Section 24 of the Arizona Constitution guarantee a criminal defendant the right to assistance of counsel. This right includes protection against improper intrusions by the prosecutor or other government agents into the confidential relationship between a defendant and his attorney. State v. Warner, 150 Ariz. 123, 127, 722 P.2d 291, 295 (1986). We recognize that effective representation is not possible without the right of a defendant to confer in private with ... counsel. Holland, 147 Ariz. at 455, 711 P.2d at 594; see also Ariz. R.Crim. P. 6.1(a). ¶ 77 The defendant bears the initial burden to establish an interference in the attorney-client relationship. Once he does so, the state bears the burden of demonstrating that the defendant was not prejudiced by the interference and must convince the court beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant received a fair trial. Warner, 150 Ariz. at 128, 722 P.2d at 296. ¶ 78 Addressing the first part of this equation, Moody claims that the correction officer's actions in eavesdropping on his conversation interfered with his relationship with counsel. The relevant inquiry, however, is whether the state interfered with the confidential relationship between a defendant and his attorney. Id. at 127, 722 P.2d at 295 (emphasis added). The State argues that Moody waived his interest in the confidentiality of the telephone call and that the corrections officer did not interfere in a confidential attorney-client relationship. The evidence showed that Officer Chaffey was sitting approximately fifteen feet from Moody during the conversation; that Moody knew the officer was there but made no attempt to protect the contents of his conversation by turning his back, speaking softly, or covering his mouth; and that Officer Chaffey did not have to listen closely or eavesdrop to hear what Moody was saying. ¶ 79 Although not binding on our resolution of confidentiality requirements, our case law on evidentiary privilege is instructive. The cases suggest that one who knows that his conversation may be overheard and makes no effort to safeguard against interception may waive a claim of confidentiality. In De Leon v. Territory, 9 Ariz. 161, 168-69, 80 P. 348, 351 (1905), Arizona's landmark case on privilege, this court held that the defendant waived his spousal communications privilege when he wrote a letter to his wife from jail knowing that the jailers would open the letter. Similarly, in State v. Summerlin, 138 Ariz. 426, 434-35, 675 P.2d 686, 694-95 (1983), we held that the spousal communication privilege was waived because the defendant spoke to his wife knowing that police officers could hear him and were listening to him. And the court of appeals recently held that [t]he presence of a third person will usually defeat the [attorney-client] privilege on the ground that confidentiality could not be intended with respect to communications that the speaker knowingly allowed to be overheard by others foreign to the confidential relationship. State v. Sucharew, 205 Ariz. 16, 22, ¶ 11, 66 P.3d 59, 65 (App.2003) (quoting Morris K. Udall, et al., Law of Evidence § 71, at 128 (3d. ed.1991)) (alteration in original). While some factual distinctions exist, this case law suggests that Moody knowingly waived his privacy interest in the content of the conversation. ¶ 80 Although eavesdropping on privileged calls and opening privileged materials intrude into the attorney-client relationship, see State v. Pecard, 196 Ariz. 371, 376-78, ¶¶ 26-37, 998 P.2d 453, 458-60 (App.1999) (finding an intrusion into the attorney-client relationship where defendant's telephone calls with his attorney were recorded, his privileged mail to and from his attorney was opened, and privileged work product documents were taken from his cell), the facts in Moody's case are not nearly so extreme. There was no surreptitious eavesdropping, recording, or reporting of communications or affect that were not readily apparent to anyone who had been in the vicinity. ¶ 81 Although the trial court's denial of Moody's motion to dismiss included no specific findings, we presume that the court was aware of the relevant law and applied it correctly in arriving at its ruling, see State v. Medrano, 185 Ariz. 192, 196, 914 P.2d 225, 229 (1996), and we can affirm the ruling on any basis supported by the record. See State v. Robinson, 153 Ariz. 191, 199, 735 P.2d 801, 809 (1987) (reviewing evidentiary rulings). Based on the evidence before us, we find no abuse of discretion. The trial judge may have found the corrections officer's testimony credible, a determination to which we would defer. See State v. Hughes, 13 Ariz.App. 391, 393, 477 P.2d 265, 266-67 (1970) (deferring to the trial court's credibility evaluation). On the basis of that testimony, the trial court may reasonably have concluded that Moody waived the confidentiality of the communication with his attorney by making no effort to safeguard the content of his conversation. Thus, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in denying this motion to dismiss. ¶ 82 Because we conclude there was no intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, we need not address whether Moody was prejudiced by any intrusion. Similarly, we need not address how, if at all, Moody was prejudiced by the prosecution forwarding Officer Chaffey's report to the mental health experts. Chaffey discovered the books during a routine investigation of Moody's cell. The overheard telephone conversation is necessary to give context to the books sufficient to raise a claim that the discovery inculpated the attorney-client relationship. Consequently, our conclusion that the trial court did not err in finding that Moody waived any confidentiality interest resolves this issue as well.