Opinion ID: 1200092
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prejudgment InterestMandatory and Calculated by Trial Court

Text: W.Va.Code, 56-6-31 [1981] provides, in part, for the addition of prejudgment interest at the annual rate of ten percent on an award of special damages or liquidated damages. The term special damages is defined in that statute to include medical expenses ... and similar out-of-pocket expenditures, as determined by the court.  (emphasis added) Under that statute, special or liquidated damages shall bear interest from the date the right to bring [an action for] the same shall have accrued, as determined by the court.  (emphasis added) [4] The appellants argue that an award of prejudgment interest under this statute is mandatory. We agree. W.Va.Code, 56-6-31 [1981] uses mandatory language: [S]pecial or liquidated damages shall bear interest[.] Shall generally should be read as requiring action. Weimer-Godwin v. Board of Education, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 369 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1988), citing Manchin v. Browning, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1982). Other courts deciding this issue under similar statutes have held that prejudgment interest must be added to the damages recovered. Specifically, prejudgment interest is recoverable, not as a matter of discretion, but as a matter of right, that is, as a matter of law, in personal injury and wrongful death actions, unless the statute or court rule in question provides otherwise. See State v. Phillips, 470 P.2d 266, 272, 273-74 n. 27 (Alaska 1970); Smith v. JBJ Ltd., 694 P.2d 352, 354 (Colo. Ct.App.1984); Pray v. Narragansett Improvement Co., 434 A.2d 923, 930-31 (R.I. 1981); In re Certification of Question from United States District Court, 369 N.W.2d 658, 659 n. 1, 661 (S.D.1985). See generally Comment, The Availability of Prejudgment Interest in Personal Injury and Wrongful Death Cases, 16 U.S.F.L. Rev. 325 (1982) (citing, at 340 n. 110, fourteen of the states whose statutes or court rules at that time authorized recovery of prejudgment interest in personal injury and wrongful death cases); annotation, Validity and Construction of State Statute or Rule Allowing or Changing Rate of Prejudgment Interest in Tort Actions, 40 A.L.R. 4th 147 (1985), especially §§ 10-11. [5] The appellee relies, however, upon certain language of this Court in Hardman Trucking, Inc. v. Poling Trucking Co., ___ W.Va. ___, 346 S.E.2d 551 (1986) (per curiam) which, according to the appellee, stands for the proposition that the recovery of prejudgment interest on special or liquidated damages is discretionary, not mandatory. The language in question is: Ascertainable pecuniary losses, upon which prejudgment interest as an element of compensatory damages may be awarded, are losses that are certain or capable of being rendered certain by reasonable calculation. Id. at ___, 346 S.E.2d at 556. We do not believe this language means an award of prejudgment interest on special or liquidated damages, pursuant to W.Va. Code, 56-6-31 [1981], is permitted but not required. In the first place, the issue under discussion in Hardman Trucking was not whether an award of prejudgment interest is mandatory or discretionary but, rather, whether lost profits and repair costs constitute ascertainable pecuniary losses, which are subject to prejudgment interest. Secondly, the word may in the above quoted language was used in the sense of authorized to be awarded or within the power of the court to award, not in the sense of permitted, but not required, to be awarded. See Weimer-Godwin v. Board of Education, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 369 S.E.2d 726, 730 (1988); Manchin v. Browning, ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 296 S.E.2d 909, 915 (1982) (may generally should be read as conferring both permission and power). Finally, that may in Hardman Trucking meant power, not permission, in that case is indicated by the only language in Hardman Trucking specifically referring to W.Va.Code, 56-6-31 [1981]:  W.Va. Code, 56-6-31 [1981] includes lost income and damages to tangible personal property within the definition of `special damages' upon which prejudgment interest is to be paid. Hardman Trucking, ___ W.Va. at ___ n. 4, 346 S.E.2d at 556 n. 4 (emphasis added). Next, an issue related to whether the recovery of prejudgment interest is mandatory under W.Va.Code, 56-6-31 [1981] is whether the trial court, as opposed to the jury, is to make the calculation and add such interest to the award of special or liquidated damages. We hold that the trial court has that duty. It is clear that W.Va.Code, 56-6-31 [1981], see supra note 4, requires the trial court to determine which damages are special damages and to determine the date on which the right to bring the action for such damages accrued. As to whether the trial court, not the jury, is to calculate and add the prejudgment interest under that statute, this Court is of the opinion that the logic of Carper v. Kanawha Banking & Trust Co., 157 W.Va. 477, 207 S.E.2d 897 (1974), is also applicable here. In that case a statute declared that all interest pursuant to the terms of a contract providing for interest at a usurious rate shall be void. In an action alleging a violation of the usury statute, the jury found for the plaintiff. The trial court modified and expanded the jury's verdict by ruling that all interest provided by the contract was void. On appeal to this Court the defendants argued that the trial court had invaded the province of the jury. This argument was rejected. Justice Haden, writing for a unanimous court on this point, held that when usury is proved, the statute, by operation of law, avoids all the interest involved in the usurious instrument, and [t]he effective vehicle to implement the operative provisions of this law is the court and not the jury. Id. at 515-16, 207 S.E.2d at 920. Moreover, [t]he avoidance [in the case of usury] or allowance of interest in the proper case [that is, when the applicability of the statute is established by the evidence,] is the command of the statute a court must follow to protect the legal efficacy of its judgment. Id. at 516, 207 S.E.2d at 920. Finally, [t]he jury is to determine facts; the court must execute and apply the policy of the law. Id. at 515, 207 S.E.2d at 920. Similarly, it has been specifically held elsewhere that the jury was not to be instructed as to prejudgment interest for calculation thereof by the jury, when the statute requires the court to add the prejudgment interest onto the verdict. Cartwright v. Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc., 593 P.2d 104, 120 (Okla.Ct.App.1978), cert. denied (Okla. Mar. 19, 1979). Even when the statute or court rule does not expressly require the court to calculate the prejudgment interest and add the same to the verdict, the calculation of prejudgment interest is not a jury function, unless the statute or court rule so provides. See In re Certification of Question from United States District Court, 369 N.W.2d 658, 659 n. 1, 662 (S.D.1985). Instead, the calculation of prejudgment interest is a matter which is ministerial in nature, not involving fact finding, a point recognized by those state legislatures which impose upon the clerk of the court the duty of calculating and adding prejudgment interest. See, e.g., Pepin v. Beaulieu, 102 N.H. 84, 88-89, 151 A.2d 230, 235 (1959); Pray v. Narragansett Improvement Co., 434 A.2d 923, 930-31 (R.I.1981). In fact, as stated by the court in DiMeo v. Philbin, 502 A.2d 825 (R.I.1986), it is reversible error for a trial court to advise the jury in such a manner that the jury is able to compute the amount of prejudgment interest which will be added by the court. Human nature being what it is, it is highly unlikely that a jury, informed [directly or indirectly] of how much interest will be added [by the court], could prevent this information from influencing its decision on the amount of damages to be awarded. Id. at 826-27. In that case the trial court instructed the jury not to consider the matter of interest in arriving at a damage award, but informed them that prejudgment interest would be added at the rate of twelve percent per year and that the accident had occurred six years prior to trial, thus making it clear to the jury that whatever amount it awarded would be increased by seventy-two percent. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island agreed with the plaintiff that the trial court's detailed discussion of prejudgment interest was prejudicial to him. The court held that the trial court, upon inquiry by the jury, must state only that the jury is not to consider prejudgment interest on damages subject to the same. Id. at 827. Based upon all of the above, this Court holds that under W.Va.Code, 56-6-31, as amended, prejudgment interest on special or liquidated damages is recoverable as a matter of law and must be calculated and added to those damages by the trial court rather than by the jury. A procedural point should be made here. Because prejudgment interest under W.Va.Code, 56-6-31 [1981] is to be recovered only on special or liquidated damages, a special interrogatory should be submitted to the jury for it to designate the amount of special or liquidated damages. Kirk v. Pineville Mobile Homes, Inc., ___ W.Va. ___, ___, 310 S.E.2d 210, 213 (1983); In re Certification of Question from United States District Court, 369 N.W.2d 658, 662 (S.D.1985). [6] When this procedure is not followed and only a general verdict is returned, the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on the entire amount of the general verdict containing special or liquidated damages in unspecified amounts. See syl. pt. 3, Kirk v. Pineville Mobile Homes, Inc., ___ W.Va. ___, 310 S.E.2d 210 (1983).