Opinion ID: 2799581
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of the Categorical Approach

Text: The heightened standard of Matter of Jean applies by its own terms only to aliens convicted of violent or dangerous crimes. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 383; see also Matter of K–A–, 23 I. & N. Dec. 661, 666 (BIA 2004). Torres-Valdivias argues that the BIA erred by failing to apply the categorical approach in determining whether his conviction for sexual battery triggered the heightened Matter of Jean standard. We disagree. Adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255 is a discretionary form of relief. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2) (“[T]he Attorney General may adjust the status of the alien to that of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence . . . .” (emphasis added)). In the context of the BIA’s discretionary decisions, we have noted that “it is proper [for the BIA] to look to probative evidence outside the record of conviction in inquiring as to the circumstances surrounding the commission of [a] crime in order to determine whether a favorable exercise of discretion is warranted.” Tokatly v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 613, 621 (9th Cir. 2004) (second alteration in original) (quoting Matter of Mendez-Moralez, 21 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303 n.1 (BIA 1996)). Indeed, in Matter of Jean itself, the Attorney General looked at the facts underlying Jean’s conviction, including those found in a medical examiner’s report—and therefore outside the records of conviction—to conclude that she was a violent or dangerous individual who should not be granted the form 12 TORRES-VALDIVIAS V. LYNCH of discretionary relief she had applied for. See 23 I. & N. Dec. at 375, 383. It is not surprising that both our precedent and the Attorney General’s decision in Matter of Jean counsel against the application of the categorical approach in this context. The categorical approach, as laid out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), requires a court to look only at the statutory definition of a prior offense of conviction and ignore any facts not found in judicially noticeable records of conviction. This approach applies where “Congress intended that [a certain statutory] provision be triggered by crimes having certain specified elements . . . .” Id. at 588. In the immigration context, this approach therefore generally applies in determining whether an alien is removable in the first instance or whether he is statutorily barred from various forms of relief. See, e.g., Tokatly, 371 F.3d at 621 (noting that the categorical approach applies “in order to determine whether an alien’s prior conviction constitutes a basis for removal under the INA”); Castrijon-Garcia v. Holder, 704 F.3d 1205, 1212 (9th Cir. 2013) (applying the categorical approach to determine whether an offense constituted a crime involving moral turpitude, which would render the alien ineligible for cancellation of removal). Contrasted with questions of statutory removability and eligibility for relief, for which Congress intended specific crimes to trigger removal or statutory bars to relief, the question here is very different. In light of the discretionary language used in 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i), Congress plainly intended for the Attorney General (and, by extension, his delegate the BIA) to exercise his discretion in adjudicating applications for adjustment of status under any standards that the Attorney General (or the BIA itself) deems appropriate to establish. TORRES-VALDIVIAS V. LYNCH 13 In sum, the BIA’s decision not to apply the categorical approach to guide the exercise of its discretion is consistent with our case law as well as with the Attorney General’s and the BIA’s precedential decisions. Accordingly, we uphold the BIA’s refusal to apply the categorical approach in this case.