Opinion ID: 2461960
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Commission Has Implied Jurisdiction To Hear Interlocutory Appeals.

Text: We next consider whether the Commission has implied jurisdiction to hear interlocutory appeals. We have previously held that the Board has implied powers. In Wausau Insurance Cos. v. Van Biene we decided that the Board had implied jurisdiction to apply equitable principles, such as estoppel, in workers' compensation proceedings. [21] And we decided that the Board had implied jurisdiction to set aside a compromise and release agreement because of fraud in Blanas v. Brower. [22] In both instances we determined that the implied power was necessarily incident to the Board's express powers. [23] In deciding whether an administrative agency has properly exercised an implied power, other courts have considered whether the implied power is consistent with the legislature's objectives in granting powers to the administrative agency, [24] the nature of the administrative proceeding, [25] and whether the circumstances, in relation to the type of proceeding, require the agency to exercise its implied and incidental powers. [26] Applying these principles here, we hold that the Commission has implied jurisdiction to review interlocutory Board orders. The Commission performs a quasi-judicial function that is akin to appellate review. [27] In some circumstances, delay of review until a final decision on the merits can make review pointless. This case is one example: Review of an improper refusal to change venue is pointless after a final decision on the merits when there may be no further proceedings. Similarly, if the Board improperly required an employee to undergo a psychiatric examination, a delay in review could subject the employee to an intrusive and unnecessary examination. [28] Discretionary appellate review of non-final orders may at times be necessary to ensure fundamental fairness to the parties. The goal of the statutory amendment that established the Commission was to increase the efficiency and flexibility of the current system ... and reduce some of its costs. [29] The legislation eliminated superior court review of workers' compensation cases and substituted review by the Commission. [30] Creation of the Commission was intended to provide `consistent, legally precedential decisions in an expeditious manner.' [31] Discretionary review jurisdiction in the Commission can further all of these goals: increasing efficiency, providing precedential decisions from a body with expertise in workers' compensation, and reducing costs in workers' compensation appeals. Discretionary review can speed the ultimate resolution of a case when review concerns a controlling legal issue. [32] In this case, the ultimate decision on the merits may have been delayed, [33] but we agree with Voorhees that the venue question was one which would evade meaningful review without interlocutory appellate jurisdiction. We have already noted that, in creating the Commission, the legislature intended to replace review by the superior court with review by the Commission. We agree with Voorhees that the legislature wanted those seeking review of Board decisions to have the same procedural rights of review that they had in the superior court. We recognize, as Monzulla argues, that the discretionary review previously available in the superior court has a different origin [34] than the Commission's authority to hear interlocutory appeals, but nothing in the legislative history indicates that the legislature wanted employers or employees to have fewer rights of review before the Commission than before the superior court. We conclude that the Commission had implied jurisdiction to grant discretionary review of the venue decision. [35]