Opinion ID: 801968
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Clinton Lee10

Text: On appeal, Lee’s “sole challenge is to the sufficiency of the evidence.” However, there was evidence presented at trial that Lee became aware of the fraudulent prescriptions at Onward in October 2008 but wanted to deliver medical equipment for Vinitski anyway, thereby knowingly volunteering to join the conspiracy. Moten testified that she informed Lee: (1) about the forged prescriptions used by Onward; (2) that Onward used marketers who received commissions for bringing in beneficiaries who purchased durable medical equipment; (3) that Onward billed Medicare and got paid for equipment that had not been delivered or ordered; and (4) that the beneficiaries Onward delivered equipment to were 10 Lee was sentenced to three years probation, supervised release, and a special assessment. 10 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 11 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 receiving equipment they did not need.11 However, even after Lee learned of the illegal activity at Onward, Moten testified that Lee still wanted to deliver durable medical equipment for Onward. Indeed, Lee enrolled in a training class, paid for by Vinitski, in order to make deliveries for Vinitski and told Moten that he was taking the class “[s]o he could learn how to set up equipment so he could do deliveries and know how to set it up.” Moten testified that Vinitski told her to go with Lee on the first delivery after he took the class so that Moten could teach Lee about the paperwork he needed to use during deliveries. Moreover, Lee testified that he knew when he took the class that Onward’s business “didn’t appear to be right.”12 Lee argues that the evidence against him is insufficient because: (1) he never made any fraudulent deliveries and (2) he never profited from the health care fraud as the only money he was paid by Vinitski was for electrical work he had done for Onward. However, to prove conspiracy, the government is not required to prove that the accused profited from the conspiracy. See Jackson, 700 F.2d at 185 (explaining that to prove conspiracy, the government must “prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy existed, that the accused knew of the conspiracy, and that he knowingly and voluntarily joined it”). Indeed, Moten testified that when Vinitski had not called Lee to do any deliveries, he was 11 Lee argues that, “mere knowledge does not show that he joined into the conspiracy,” relying on a trio of “dope house” cases: United States v. Ocampo, 964 F.2d 80, 82 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989, 991–93 (2d Cir. 1983); and United States v. Hyson, 721 F.2d 856, 862–63 (1st Cir. 1983). We do not, however, hold that the fact that Lee was aware of the criminal activity at Onward is, alone, enough to prove he joined the conspiracy. 12 Lee contends that the course he took dealt with the repair of motorized wheelchairs. However, the jury heard Moten’s testimony and Lee’s testimony and was shown Defendant’s Exhibit 12, the course book for the class. From that evidence, the jury was entitled to make necessary credibility determinations. Loe, 262 F.3d at 432 (5th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the jury “retains the sole authority to weigh any conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of the witnesses.”). Furthermore, the jury’s credibility determination was reasonable considering that Lee admitted after his arrest that Vinitski had “enrolled him in a training class for the installation and repair of . . . medical equipment.” 11 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 12 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 frustrated and wondered “so why did she have him take the class” where he learned how to put together medical equipment. After Lee’s arrest, Lee told agents that he was interested in getting into the durable medical equipment business because people involved in that business were making a lot of money and everybody was “going to the government trough.” Moreover, Moten testified that Vinitski was looking for a way to pay Grant for redoing the forged prescriptions because she could not pay Grant directly and that Lee suggested to Moten that he could serve as a third party through whom Vinitski could route her payments to Grant. Lee argues that Moten’s testimony about the possibility of forming a company to facilitate payment of Grant for the prescriptions Lee knew were forged “is of no moment” because there is no evidence that Lee ever contacted Grant about the possibility or took any other steps. However, Lee’s suggestion that he could help funnel the payments when he already knew the activity was illegal certainly provides evidence that Lee knowingly and willingly (even if unprofitably) sought to participate in the fraud. Finally, Lee’s numerous telephone conversations with Vinitski between October 2008 and February 2009 could reasonably have led the jury to infer that Lee’s relationship with Vinitski was more than that of an occasional electrician (the relationship Lee claims).13 Lee argues that the mere association with conspirators will not support an inference of participation in a conspiracy. However, this court has held that “even minor participation in the conspiracy may serve as the basis for a conviction” and that a defendant’s “[v]oluntary 13 Lee called Vinitski 141 times and talked for 816 minutes; Vinitski called Lee 101 times and talked for 1,017 minutes. When Lee was asked what he spoke with Vinitski about during late November/December, he answered “[w]e talked about electrical stuff there at the office, we talked about stuff there, phone, we talked about her daughter, Kimberly, we talked about her Internet not working right at her house, and just pretty much everything.” No other evidence was presented about the topics of conversation during the phone calls between Lee and Vinitski. Lee also called Grant 58 times for a total of 145 minutes and Grant called Lee 94 times totaling 747 minutes. 12 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 13 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 participation may be inferred from a collocation of circumstances.” United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 277 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). B. Admission of Vinitski’s statements under Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) This court reviews the district court’s admission of Vinitski’s statements for plain error because Grant failed to object below to the admission of the statements under Federal Rule of Evidence 802(d)(2)(E). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 673 (5th Cir. 1997). Plain error requires: (1) error; (2) that is clear or obvious; (3) that affects substantial rights; and (4) if those elements are satisfied, the court of appeals may exercise its discretion to remedy the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Puckett v. United States, 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1429 (2009). Grant argues that Vinitski’s out-of-court statements, elicited through the testimony at trial of Okonkwo and Moten, are hearsay, and therefore not admissible. See Fed. R. Evid. 802. Appellees argue that Vinitski’s statements are admissible because they are not hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), an out-of-court statement offered against a party is not hearsay and is therefore admissible, if it was made “by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E) (as restyled, effective Dec. 1, 2011). The statements at issue concern Vinitski’s plan to deal with the forged prescriptions by paying Grant the money he demanded to redo them, as well as possible arrangements for making payment to Grant through a third party, Lee.14 14 The statements Grant contends were inadmissible include: (1) Okonkwo’s testimony that Vinitski told him Grant was demanding Vinitski pay him $10,000 “to redo the paperwork” on the prescriptions with Grant’s forged signature; (2) Okonkwo’s testimony that Vinitski told him she was going to pay $10,000 to Grant; (3) Moten’s testimony that Vinitski told her Grant asked for money in exchange for fixing the prescriptions with Grant’s forged signature; (4) 13 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 14 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 Grant contends that Vinitski’s statements were not in furtherance of the conspiracy because they “can be characterized as mere hand-wringing.” However, “[s]tatements regarding the payment of money for services rendered in accomplishing the illegal goals of a conspiracy can be considered to be ‘in the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.’” United States v. Garcia, 995 F.2d 556, 561 (5th Cir. 1993). Therefore, statements involving the payment of Grant for redoing the forged fraudulent prescriptions are in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit health care fraud. Grant also contends that Vinitski’s statements could not have been made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy because the statements were made after the objective of the conspiracy, to receive money from Medicare based on fraudulent prescriptions for durable medical equipment, had already been accomplished. Grant contends that, “Onward received the second set of prescriptions along with the government payment in early to mid November [2008].” However, Onward did not bill Medicare for the second set of forged prescriptions (with Grant’s forged signature) until November 25, 2008. It is reasonable to believe that Onward would not have received full payment by early December for claims that were not even submitted until November 25. Furthermore, the government alleged a conspiracy that continued until 200915 and included as one of its objectives “concealing the submission of false and fraudulent claims to Medicare and the receipt and transfer of the proceeds from the fraud.” Moten’s testimony that Okonkwo told Vinitski that Grant had already been paid for the prescriptions; and (5) Moten’s testimony that Vinitski asked her whether Lee would be willing to accept Vinitski’s payments to Grant on Grant’s behalf. 15 The government contended at oral argument that the end of the conspiracy was March 31, 2009, the date of the last phone call between Grant and Vinitski. We also note that Onward did not voluntarily surrender its status as an eligible Medicare supplier until August 2009. 14 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 15 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 Regardless, this court has held that, “[e]fforts to conceal an ongoing conspiracy obviously can further the conspiracy by assuring that the conspirators will not be revealed and the conspiracy brought to an end.” United States v. Phillips, 219 F.3d 404, 419 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted); see United States v. Broussard, 80 F.3d 1025, 1039 (5th Cir. 1996) (“Given that concealment is often a necessary part of a conspiracy, statements made to aid the concealment are made in furtherance of the conspiracy.”).16 Vinitski’s statements showing that Grant was asking for $10,000 to redo the forged prescriptions in late November or early December 2008 were made to aid the concealment of the conspiracy. Therefore, the district court did not plainly err by considering Vinitski’s out-of-court statements regarding Grant’s payment for forged prescriptions to have been statements made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Burton, 126 F.3d 666, 674–75 (5th Cir. 1997) (explaining that the admission of a statement under the co-conspirator hearsay provision was not plain error where it was not “clear” or “obvious” that the statement was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy); see United States v. Trejo, 610 F.3d 308, 319 (5th Cir. 2010) (“Plain error is error so clear or obvious that the trial judge and prosecutor were derelict in countenancing it, even absent the defendants’ timely assistance in detecting it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 16 Grant relies on Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440 (1949), and Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1957), to argue that Vinitski’s statements were not in furtherance of the conspiracy because they involve agreements among conspirators only to avoid detection. Both Grunewald and Krulewitch, however, involve “desperate attempts to cover up after the crime begins to come to light.” Grunewald, 353 U.S. at 403 (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see Krulewitch, 336 U.S. at 444 (holding that a statement “made in furtherance of an alleged implied but uncharged conspiracy aimed at preventing detection and punishment” is not admissible. Here, Vinitski’s statements did not involve covering up a conspiracy that was already over or that was already being investigated; instead, Vinitski’s statements involved the payment of Grant for his part in the conspiracy (the writing of fraudulent durable medical equipment prescriptions for submission to Medicare). 15 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 16 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 C. Prosecutorial misconduct Grant argues that the government’s second cross-examination of him constituted prosecutorial misconduct. “Improper prosecutorial comments constitute reversible error only where the defendant’s right to a fair trial is substantially affected.” United States v. Stephens, 571 F.3d 401, 407–08 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 355–56 (5th Cir. 2005)). To analyze claims of prosecutorial misconduct, this court first considers “whether the prosecutor made an improper remark,” and, if so, “ask[s] whether the defendant was prejudiced.” Id. at 408 (quoting United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 358 (5th Cir. 2007)). On May 26, 2010, Grant testified and the government cross-examined him about his Medicare billing for overseeing nurses who visited home health care patients. Grant admitted that he had submitted bills for three patients after the patients had died. Later, on June 1, 2010, Grant moved to reopen his case so that he could offer an explanation for this billing. Grant’s counsel explained that Medicare regulations permit a physician to bill for oversight services during a 60-day “certification period” after seeing the patient at the beginning of the period and that “only after notification of death . . . would he not thereafter be permitted to bill.” The district court granted the motion to reopen. During the government’s second cross-examination of Grant, the prosecutor reasonably elicited information from Grant regarding his compliance with Medicare’s billing requirements for oversight services. Specifically, the prosecutor questioned Grant regarding a letter, found in Grant’s patient records, that a home health care agency had sent to his office dated May 4, 2009, notifying him that patient Jesse Clay had died, and Grant’s subsequent submission of two bills for oversight services after the date of the letter (on May 15, 2009 and June 13, 2009). The prosecutor also questioned Grant about the 16 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 17 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 incomplete records he maintained for Clyde Grice, a patient for whom Grant had billed Medicare for oversight services after the patient’s death. Grant argues that, “the government had no good faith basis for accusing Dr. Grant of improperly billing for the dead patients.” However, the prosecutor’s cross-examination appropriately drew the jury’s attention to (1) Grant’s billing for services rendered to Jesse Clay two times after the date of the letter in Grant’s patient records notifying Grant of her death; (2) Grant’s lack of knowledge about how long he had been overseeing the three patients in question (Grice, Clay, and Collins), what their medical problems were, or how they died; and (3) the incomplete records maintained for Clyde Grice and past accusations that Grant had failed to maintain adequate medical records. The government’s cross-examination was not aimed at proving that the Grant violated accepted Medicare billing practices solely by billing for oversight services rendered after patients’ deaths; instead, it was aimed at showing Grant’s knowledge and intent inasmuch as he billed Medicare after he was notified Jesse Clay died and that Grant’s incomplete medical records facilitated incorrect billing.17 “In the context of cross-examination, no misconduct can arise for a question asked for a valid reason.” United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 414 (5th Cir. 1998). Therefore, the government’s cross-examination of Grant did not constitute reversible prosecutorial misconduct. D. Missing witness instruction Generally, we review a district court’s failure to provide a requested jury instruction “under an abuse of discretion standard, affording the trial court substantial latitude in describing the law to the jurors.” United States v. Rios, 636 F.3d 168, 171 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Santos, 589 F.3d 759, 17 Because the prosecutor’s cross-examination in this case was not improper, we need not reach whether “the defendant’s right to a fair trial [was] substantially affected.” See Stephens, 571 F.3d at 407–08 (citing Holmes, 406 F.3d at 355–56). 17 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 18 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 764 (5th Cir. 2009)). “A district court should not grant a missing witness instruction unless the individual (1) is peculiarly within one party’s power to produce, and (2) would provide testimony that will elucidate facts at issue.” Id. Grant focuses on the first part of this test, arguing that the district court’s failure to provide the requested missing witness instruction was an abuse of discretion because Vinitski was “‘peculiarly within the power’ of the government to call as a witness.” To support this contention, Grant notes that Vinitski had pled guilty and was awaiting sentencing. Grant argues that “while subject to being subpoenaed by the defense, she certainly would have refused to testify for the defense,” referencing a probability that Vinitski would have invoked her Fifth Amendment right not to testify. We have examined the consensus of caselaw, however, that holds that a co-conspirator who pleads guilty and is awaiting sentencing is not peculiarly within the government’s control so as to justify a missing witness instruction. Rios, 636 F.3d at 172 (affirming a district court’s denial of a missing witness instruction and holding that “the government’s failure to grant immunity to a witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment right not to testify does not by itself entitle a defendant to a missing witness instruction.”).18 Here, Vinitski was not called by either party, so it is not clear whether she would have invoked her Fifth Amendment right had the defense chosen to call her, nor is it clear whether the government would have refused to grant her immunity. Grant has provided no other support for why he could not have called Vinitski as a witness himself. 18 This court explained in Rios that, “[t]he Fifth Circuit has yet to address whether a witness who relies upon his or her constitutional right not to testify is peculiarly within the government’s control. Every circuit that has considered the question, though, has held that the government’s ability to grant immunity does not make a witness who invokes the Fifth Amendment right not to testify peculiarly available to the government.” Rios, 636 F.3d at 171 (internal citations omitted). 18 Case: 11-20013 Document: 00511881596 Page: 19 Date Filed: 06/08/2012 No. 11-20013 Therefore, Grant has not proven that Vinitski was peculiarly within the control of the government. Id.19 Moreover, the government’s decision not to call Vinitski as a witness was already addressed in the jury instructions. The district court instructed jurors that, “[t]he law does not require the prosecution to call as witnesses all persons . . . who may appear to have some knowledge of the matters at issue at this trial . . . . However, in judging the credibility of the witnesses who have testified and in considering the weight and effect of all the evidence that has been produced, the jury may consider the prosecution’s failure to call other witnesses or to produce other evidence shown by the evidence to be in existence and available.” Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to elaborate with a missing witness instruction.