Opinion ID: 2517596
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Restriction Regarding the Age of the Victim

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed numerous errors in conducting voir dire during the guilt phase of the trial and the penalty phase retrial. For the reasons that follow, we find no error. Defendant asserts the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's request for additional voir dire, at both the guilt phase and second penalty phase, regarding the victim's age. With respect to the guilt phase, defense counsel proposed a juror questionnaire that included the questions: (1) It is expected that you will hear testimony regarding the multiple stabbing death of a eight-year-old girl. [11] Do you expect that such testimony would so upset you that you could not honestly be fair and impartial? and (2) If such evidence is introduced and proved to your individual satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt, do you believe that would prompt you to automatically urge the death penalty regardless of any potential mitigating factors? In a second proposed juror questionnaire, defense counsel proffered the following question: Please explain if the fact that the victim in this case is an eight-year-old little girl would prohibit you from being a fair and impartial juror in this case? [12] The court denied each party's request for a written juror questionnaire and declined to permit the defense's proposed questions during the voir dire on the ground they improperly would ask that the prospective jurors prejudge the evidence in the case. Thereafter, the court denied defense counsel's request to conduct direct voir dire of the jurors as well as follow-up voir dire. Ultimately, the trial court conducted the entire voir dire and did not permit defendant or the prosecutor to question the jurors directly. At the penalty retrial, defense counsel repeated his request for additional voir dire to ascertain whether prospective jurors would harbor a bias against defendant because the victim was a child. At that trial, both the prosecutor and defense counsel were allowed to conduct direct voir dire, and defense counsel questioned certain jurors regarding any bias they would have because the victim was a child. Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error both at the initial trial and the penalty retrial by denying defendant's request for additional voir dire focusing upon the victim's age and inquiring concerning the effect, if any, of the victim's age upon the prospective jurors' ability to remain fair and impartial. As a threshold matter, because error occurring in the death-qualification of the jury at most may be prejudicial only as to the penalty phase, any error in the death qualification of the first jury is irrelevant because that jury decided only defendant's guilt. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in conducting voir dire of the first jury, such error did not affect the penalty verdict and was harmless. Defendant contends the circumstance that at the penalty retrial certain prospective jurors were excused for cause on the basis of bias triggered by the victim's age establishes that the first jury, which was not questioned so extensively, was prejudicially biased. She speculates that had the trial court permitted more extensive questioning of the initial jury regarding the circumstance that the victim was a child, that jury would not have acted out of bias and would have returned a verdict of life without possibility of parole, thereby eliminating the need for a penalty retrial. This theory is pure speculation and finds no support in the record. Accordingly, even if the trial court erred in conducting voir dire of the first jury, any such error did not affect the penalty verdict and was harmless. With regard to the second penalty phase jury, defendant concedes the trial court allowed defense counsel to question prospective jurors at the penalty retrial regarding the victim's age, and that such questioning revealed a bias in favor of the death penalty on the part of some prospective jurors who then were excused for cause. Although the trial court rejected defendant's specific questions concerning whether the victim's age would impair the prospective jurors' ability to remain fair and impartial, [13] it nonetheless permitted extensive questioning on this subject. Notably, the court agreed with defense counsel that the victim's age might affect the prospective jurors' views. Indeed, the prosecution posed no objection to asking prospective jurors whether they would be biased to the point they could not be fair and impartial if the victim is a nine-year-old child. Accordingly, the court agreed to inform the prospective jurors at the outset that defendant had been found guilty of killing a nine-year-old child, and that the victim died of multiple stab wounds. When appropriate, the court also reiterated the circumstances of the crime during questioning of individual prospective jurors. Thereafter, during the course of extensive questioning of each prospective juror conducted in open court in the presence of all the prospective jurors, numerous prospective jurors conceded that the circumstance the victim was a child might affect his or her ability to be fair and impartial. Those jurors thereafter were excused for cause. [14] Additionally, defense counsel was permitted to question prospective jurors regarding the circumstance that the victim was a child even when the prospective juror had not declared that such information might lead to bias. [15] In sum, although the trial court declined to inquire specifically of each prospective juror concerning the impact, on his or her ability to remain impartial, of the circumstance that the victim in this case was a child, the record reveals that the issue was discussed exhaustively throughout the voir dire conducted at the penalty retrial. All of the prospective jurors repeatedly were made aware of the unusual circumstances of this case, and numerous prospective jurors revealed that the victim's young age would prevent their serving as fair and impartial jurors. Numerous other prospective jurors candidly told the court that this circumstance would weigh heavily on them, but maintained they nonetheless could retain an open mind, and defense counsel was permitted to fully examine each of those jurors regarding the sincerity of those stated beliefs. In light of the exhaustive examination of the issue during the penalty retrial, we discern no prejudicial error in the trial court's rejection of defendant's specific proposed question regarding the victim's age.