Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factor (b) aggravating evidence

Text: Defendant challenges several aspects of the penalty phase instructions and arguments related to section 190.3, factor (b) (The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence.). Three instances of criminal activity involving the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence were introduced in aggravation of penalty under factor (b). These were:

Defendant contends there was no evidence that the razor blades he possessed in jail were dangerous weapons, or that he used or threatened the use of force in connection with possessing them. He argues that as a matter of law his possession of the razor blades could not constitute a violation of section 4574 or properly serve as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). He is wrong on both scores. Section 4574 provides, in pertinent part, any person who, while lawfully confined in a jail ... possesses therein any ... deadly weapon, ... is guilty of a felony.... Deputy Shafia testified that during a search of defendant's jail cell on April 26, 1990, six loose razor blades, and two additional safety razor heads containing blades, were found located throughout his cell, randomly placed. Deputy Shafia testified inmates are allowed to keep up to two safety razors in their cells for shaving, that the jail rules do not allow them to take apart the safety razors or remove the blades, and that homemade slashing weapons are commonly constructed by removing such blades and melting them into a plastic toothbrush handle or similar object. Deputy Shafia testified further that defendant appeared upset that the search was being undertaken, and right in the middle of it defendant stated to him, in an angry voice, I'm going to get the gas chamber and before I leave here I'm going to take out a deputy. The evidence that defendant possessed numerous razor blades that had been removed from safety razors in the manner commonly used to construct jailhouse weapons, and placed randomly throughout his cell, all in contravention of jailhouse rules, constituted a violation of section 4574. Although defendant was not observed using the razor blades as deadly weapons, his possession of the blades and their placement throughout the cell (supportive of inferences that defendant wanted to be able to gain easy access to the blades from anywhere in his cell, or alternatively, that if his cell was searched it would be less likely that all the blades would be found) was sufficient to support an inference that they were being possessed for use as deadly weapons. Defendant's assertion that there was no direct evidence he actually intended to manufacture a weapon (i.e., affix handles to the blades) does not undermine our conclusion that a violation of section 4574 was demonstrated. Defendant's possession of the razor blades for use as deadly weapons was validly considered as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), as it constituted criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (See People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 589, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142 [a defendant's knowing possession of a potentially dangerous weapon [here, loose razor blades] in custody is admissible under factor (b)].) The circumstance that defendant voiced a threat to take out Deputy Shafia or another jailhouse deputy while the search was underway further serves to characterize defendant's possession of the contraband as an implied threat to use force or violence. Defendant further contends that as a matter of law his threat voiced to Deputy Shafia could not constitute a violation of section 69 or properly serve as evidence in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b). Again, he is mistaken. Section 69, in pertinent part, proscribes attempts, by means of any threat or violence, to deter or prevent any executive officer from performing any duty imposed upon such officer by law ... in the performance of his duty.... Deputy Shafia testified defendant was upset that the search of his cell was being undertaken, and right in the middle of it defendant stated to him, in an angry voice, I'm going to get the gas chamber and before I leave here I'm going to take out a deputy. Deputy Shafia was an executive officer within the meaning of section 69, and to the extent his official duties included overseeing the custody and control of defendant and his fellow inmates, a threat to kill a deputy constituted an attempt to deter or prevent Deputy Shafia from performing his official duties. In any event, we agree with respondent that, In the factual context in which the threat was made by [defendant], it is reasonable to infer [defendant's] threat to kill a deputy was made with the intent to deter or prevent Deputies Shafia and Spencer from performing their duties related to the search. The fact that Deputy Shafia testified he did not take the threat personally does not undermine this conclusiona violation of section 69 does not require a showing of the state of mind of the recipient of the threat. (Cf. § 71 [threatening public employees and officers and school officials]; see People v. Tuilaepa, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 590, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142.) Defendant observes that a violation of section 69 requires a specific intent to interfere with the executive officer's performance of his duties (see People v. Patino (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 11, 27, 156 Cal.Rptr. 815), and that the jury was not so instructed. Although specific instruction on the elements of other crimes introduced in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b) is generally not required (see People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 711, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640), here the jury was instructed, through the language of CALJIC No. 3.30 (concurrence of act and general criminal intent), that general criminal intent was required for the crime of threatening an executive officer within the meaning of section 69. The error, however, was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There was evidence that defendant harbored the requisite specific intent. Under the factual circumstances in which the threat was made (right in the middle of the search, and in an angry tone of voice), it is reasonable to infer the threat was intended to deter or prevent Deputy Shafia and his partner from performing their duties related to the ongoing search of defendant's cell. That evidence notwithstanding, given defendant's attempted murder of Officer Dunavent by placing a gun to his head and pulling the trigger, and his prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer in 1984, any misinstruction on the intent element of a violation of section 69 in connection with factor (b) was clearly harmless. Last, defendant contends the trial court erroneously allowed doublecounting of evidence of his 1984 prior conviction of assault with a deadly weapon (vehicle) on a peace officer under section 190.3, factors (b) and (c). We have, however, in many past cases held that such double-counting is generally permissible, as each factor has a separate purpose. (See, e.g., People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 549, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385; People v. Price, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 472, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 230, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302; People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 764, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741.) Moreover, there is no merit to defendant's claim that the manner in which evidence of the prior conviction and evidence of the facts of the crime underlying the prior conviction was presented to the jury caused them to believe that evidence of two separate assault crimes was being offered in aggravation. It is true that the prosecutor asked the court to instruct on the elements of assault with a deadly weapon generally, rather than assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer, apparently for the purpose of avoiding undue confusion. However, the prosecution and defense twice stipulated at trial to the fact of the prior conviction, and the evidence presented at the penalty phase made it abundantly clear that the prior assault with a deadly weapon conviction to which defendant stipulated was based on the same assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer in 1984, about which further factual evidence was being presented under factor (b).