Opinion ID: 790408
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Right to Restitution

Text: 41 The principal argument made by both sets of petitioners is that the Settlement Agreement, by requiring releases of third parties, unfairly compromises the right of crime victims to receive full restitution. Specifically, the petitioners contend that (1) the $715 million Victim Fund that will be made available to victims will not have the capacity to provide full restitution to the many victims of the Rigases' crimes; and (2) paragraph 8 of the Settlement Agreement, which releases members of the Rigas Family (except for John J. and Timothy J. Rigas) from liability and indemnifies them from judgments against third parties, also jeopardizes the victims' ability to obtain full restitution from parties who might be found jointly and severally liable with the Rigases. 42 Petitioners assert that § 3771(a)(6) entitles them to full and timely restitution, omitting to mention, however, that such restitution must be as provided in law. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(6). This important modifier makes it clear that Congress recognized that there would be numerous situations when it would be impossible for multiple crime victims of the same set of crimes to be repaid every dollar they had lost. The question before us is whether the district court abused its discretion by approving the Settlement Agreement, given its obligation under the CVRA to ensure that the victims are afforded rights to restitution as provided by law. We hold that the district court did not. 43 Under the MVRA, victims of any offense against property under Title 18, including any offense committed by fraud or deceit, are not entitled to mandatory restitution if the district court determines that the number of identifiable victims is so large as to make restitution impracticable, or that determining complex issues of fact related to the cause or amount of the victim's losses would complicate or prolong the sentencing process to a degree that the need to provide restitution to any victim is outweighed by the burden on the sentencing process. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(c)(3). Thus, the MVRA provides that, under these two circumstances, victims are not entitled to mandatory restitution. The district court determined that the victims in this case were numerous and that the complexity of resolving a multitude of factual and causal issues would extend the sentencing process inordinately. As a basic predicate to this complexity, it is undisputed that there are potentially tens of thousands of victims of the Rigases' crimes. Second, the amount of losses of those victims has not been established and doing so would indisputably take a great deal of time. Clearly, this case fits within the dual exceptions contained in the MVRA, and the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding to accept the provisions of the Settlement Agreement as reasonable substitute restitution, as permitted by the MVRA. 44 Further, the CVRA does not grant victims any rights against individuals who have not been convicted of a crime. Concomitantly, neither the Government nor the sentencing court are restricted by the CVRA from effecting reasonable settlement or restitution measures against non-convicted defendants. To the extent that the Government recognizes that victims would have difficulty in effecting any recoveries from the Rigas family members because of difficulties in proof of culpability and because of security interests affecting the family's assets, petitioners cannot meet their burden in showing that the Government or the district court acted unreasonably in entering the Settlement Agreement or approving it. Additionally, the district court in no way treated the victims unfairly or without respect for [their] dignity and privacy, 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8), but rather took into consideration the numerosity of victims, the uncertainty of recovery, and the prospect of unduly prolonging the sentencing proceedings when adopting the settlement, factors which Congress has required the court to consider. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(2).