Opinion ID: 869748
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: AUSA Zubrod’s Statements as a Party

Text: Admission Ciavarella contends that the District Court erred by excluding statements made by Assistant U.S. Attorney Gordon Zubrod at Mericle‟s plea hearing, arguing that the evidence would have reinforced Ciavarella‟s defense that the payments were not bribes or kickbacks.8 Following presentation of the Government‟s case-inchief, Ciavarella sought to admit the following statement by Zubrod made at Mericle‟s plea hearing. 8 We review the District Court‟s decision to exclude evidence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Bobb, 471 F.3d 491, 497 (3d Cir. 2006). “However, to the extent the District Court‟s admission of evidence was based on an interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the standard of review is plenary.” Id. 29 Referral fees are a common place practice. . . . Fee splitting between the parties, for example, between Judge Ciavarella and Mr. Powell, that kind of fee splitting is also a common practice in the real estate business. . . . This is not a kickback or a bribe in any sense. It is a common practice. It is not a legal quid pro quo. It is a common practice between businessmen in real estate transactions. Mr. Mericle simply paid a finder‟s fee to the judges in accordance with standard practice. To him, his payment of the fee was what he had done hundreds of times before and was not related to the office that the judges held or any decisions by the judges. . . . App. 1537. In response, the District Court sought to clarify that Zubrod‟s description of referral fees addressed only Mericle‟s state of mind and not the intent of other participants. The Court inquired: THE COURT: What you‟re suggesting is that any relationship Mr. Mericle had to the juvenile centers that were constructed by him or his company was entirely different than any relationship that may have existed between Mr. Powell and the two judges that you were referring to; is that correct? MR. ZUBROD: That‟s correct . . . . [Powell] understood it to be a quid pro quo that he would 30 not get juveniles anymore if he didn‟t pay up the money. . . . THE COURT: [I]t‟s my recollection that in the case of the two judges you represented that there was a quid pro quo between Mr. Powell and between the judges. That is not the case [as to Mericle‟s intent]; is that correct? MR. ZUBROD: That‟s correct, Your Honor. There‟s no quid pro quo. App. 1539. Ciavarella argued that Zubrod‟s statement was a party admission that Mericle‟s payments were not a bribe or kickback but were permissible referral fees. The District Court refused to allow the statements to be used as party admissions but permitted Ciavarella to represent that the statements supported Mericle‟s mental state concerning the payments. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(A) permits the admission of statements made by a party opponent. Ciavarella argues that “[t]he rule simply requires that the admission at issue be contrary to a party‟s position at trial.” Ciavarella‟s Br. at 30.9 We must consider whether the Government has 9 We have stated that “[t]o be admissible [under Rule 801(d)(2)], a party‟s admission „must be contrary to that party‟s position at the time of the trial.‟” United States v. Ferri, 778 F.2d 985, 991 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Butler v. S. Pa. Co., 431 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1970)). However, other 31 adopted inconsistent or mutually contradictory positions in its successive series of suits against Mericle and Ciavarella. Zubrod‟s statement only referred to Mericle‟s intent about the payments and not the intent or state of mind of Ciavarella, Conahan, or Powell, which was the focus of the Government‟s case against Ciavarella. Zubrod stated that Powell “understood it to be a quid pro quo,” while to Mericle, his payment was a fee and was “standard practice,” not a “quid pro quo.” App. 1539. Thus, the Government‟s position at Ciavarella‟s trial—that Ciavarella ordered juvenile offenders to detention in exchange for money—is neither an inconsistent nor a mutually contradictory position from its theory at Mericle‟s plea hearing. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the District Court‟s exclusion of Zubrod‟s statements at Mericle‟s plea hearing.10 courts have addressed whether the admission must be against the party‟s interest and have concluded that Rule 801(d)(2)(A) contains no such limitation. See, e.g., United States v. McGee, 189 F.3d 626, 632 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing cases). Because Ciavarella only argues that Zubrod‟s statements should have been admissible because they were contrary to the Government‟s position at trial, we need not address whether to relax our limitation on the admissibility of a party opponent‟s statements. 10 Moreover, under the District Court‟s ruling, Ciavarella could have introduced Zubrod‟s statement through Mericle‟s cross-examination. 32