Opinion ID: 854072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Young's Reckless Homicide Instruction

Text: Reckless homicide [2] is an inherently included lesser offense of murder and thus the first part of the Wright test is satisfied. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. The only difference between the two crimes is the mens rea the State must show to obtain a conviction. Compare Ind.Code Ann. § 35-42-1-1 (West Supp.1997) with Ind.Code Ann § 35-42-1-5 (West 1986). The issue in Young's case is thus whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute about whether Young knowingly or recklessly killed Roney when he fired the first shots from the Oldsmobile. [3] A person engages in conduct knowingly if, when he engages in the conduct, he is aware of a high probability that he is doing so. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(b) (West 1986). One engages in conduct recklessly if he or she engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(c) (West 1986). The trial court did not make findings regarding whether a serious evidentiary dispute existed on the issue of Young's mens rea. Instead, the judge simply stated to the defense counsel that Young was not entitled to lesser included instructions because he had raised an alibi defense. [4] (R. at 516.) Presenting an alibi defense does not automatically bar instructions on a lesser included offense. See, e.g., Shelby v. State, 258 Ind. 439, 440, 281 N.E.2d 885, 886 (1972) (defendant was charged with robbery and presented an alibi defense but was convicted of theft, a lesser included offense of robbery). On the other hand, it may be somewhat pertinent in making the central inquiry which remains whether there is a serious evidentiary dispute in regard to the element or elements differentiating the greater offense from the lesser. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567. [5] The evidence about Young's state of mind at the time he fired the shot that killed Korey Roney is both conflicting and obscure. Several witnesses acknowledged that they knew Raylon from the neighborhood and there had been no problems between Raylon and those who were in the front yard that night, some even stated that Raylon was a friend. (R. at 214-15, 230-31, 250, 269, 288, 242.) Willie Pargo and Glen Underwood testified that Raylon had no reason to be upset with Korey, and that Raylon and Korey had engaged in friendly conversation just a month and a half before the shooting. (R. at 214, 243-44.) Raylon's harsh words, what's up now, punk m___ f___?, however, could indicate to a jury that Raylon desired to do more than simply scare those on the front lawn. Eyewitness testimony, indeed the testimony of those who were in the line of fire, disputes this inference however. No witness stated that he thought Raylon was actually aiming his gun at any specific person. Danille Hampton, only seven feet away from Raylon at the time of the first shots, could not determine whether Young was shooting at anyone in particular or just engaged in wild shooting. Damon Brookins testified; he was just shootin' ... dude was pullin' off, you know. (R. at 269.) Though shooting in the direction of numerous people only twenty feet away is obviously reckless behavior no matter whether one is in a set or moving position, whether Raylon's acts are sufficient to show he was aware of a high probability that his act would kill is less certain. While it is Raylon's mental state when he fired the shot which actually killed Korey that would determine whether he committed murder or reckless homicide, a jury might glean inferences from the larger pattern of shots fired to determine this specific mens rea. Of the estimated six shots fired, one bullet hit Korey in the back of the head and was discovered on the ground near where Korey lay after being hit, another was discovered rather far away in a wall of the home next door. (R. at 367-68.) These neighbors described their home as being shot up at the same time the above events occurred. (R. at 428.) A crime scene specialist was unable to say whether the recovered bullets were fired at random targets or specifically aimed. Also possibly relevant is the fact that Raylon returned and fired four more shots though all except Korey were inside the home. Korey was prone on the ground during this time but was not shot again. A jury considering these facts could well have found Raylon was acting recklessly but not knowingly when he fired the shot that killed Korey. Firing a handgun towards a group of people only twenty feet away is certainly an act committed in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of the harm that might result, and a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct, Ind.Code Ann. § 35-41-2-2(c) (West 1986), but given the specific facts of this case, a jury might reasonably decide that such behavior did not reflect a knowing killing. It is the jury's prerogative to decide such questions of fact. We conclude that the evidence before this jury represented a genuinely disputed matter and that it was error to refuse the instruction. Young is entitled to a new trial. Wright, 658 N.E.2d at 567.