Opinion ID: 2616871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denver Buick

Text: As noted, the trial court held that § 22.-6-8 was unenforcible under the terms of Denver Buick. Because of this holding, Oil Co. states: Consequently, the issue presented by the instant appeal is whether the people of the City of Englewood, by and through the City Charter, granted to City Council the power which it purported to exercise in the enactment of Section 22.6-8. In Denver Buick this court invalidated a Denver ordinance which it characterized as: . . . impos[ing] onerous and unreasonable conditions and terms [on the continuance of a non-conforming use] and describ [ ing ] numerous events and means by which the . . . use may be terminated . . . . (Emphasis in original text.) Section 617 of the Denver Zoning Ordinance related to nonconforming uses, their continuance and the termination thereof. In the majority opinion in Denver Buick, which invalidate the provisions of Section 617, it was stated: In the first place, the charter of the City and County of Denver, which was amended in 1923 to include therein Sec. 219-A authorizing the city council to pass zoning laws, confers none of the powers upon the city council which it purported to exercise with relation to nonconforming uses as set forth in Section 617-1 of the ordinance. [1] The charter provision, which certainly defines the limits of the Council's authority within that area not controlled by constitutional provision, reads as follows:       `Section 2. . . . and within such districts it may regulate and restrict the erection, construction, reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of buildings, structures or land . . . . (Emphasis added.) `Section 3. Purposes in View. Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire, panic and other dangers; . . . . Such regulation shall be made with reasonable consideration among other things, to the character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout the City and County of Denver.' The majority opinion stated that the three sections of the charter set out above and in the footnote define[s] the limits of Council's authority within the area not controlled by constitutional provision. The majority of the court then concludes that Section 617 attempts to legislate many things not within the purview of the charter, writing: . . . Certainly the people have never expressed any intention by implication or otherwise that the City Council should have power to impose the drastic regulations upon owners of property theretofore used for lawful purposes, requiring them to make reports, to submit to annual questionnaires, to record certificates which garble and confuse their titles to real estate, to lose their rights to lawfully use real estate by short time vacancies or short time presumptive abandonment, or to lose such rights by reason of unfortunate disasters such as fire, wind, insurrection or inability to procure tenants for a period of one year, etc., all without regard to depressions, panics, or other unforeseen causes over which the property owner has no control.. . . (Emphasis added.) It thus appears that this court did not invalidate the Denver ordinance on the basis of its unreasonableness, but solely upon the ground that the charter did not delegate authority to the Council to legislate on the subject of termination of nonconforming uses. It is with this basic concept that we disagree. Before leaving Denver Buick, the italicized language in Section 617-2 should be noted. The Denver Charter granted Council the power to regulate and restrict reconstruction, alteration, repair or use of buildings. This delegation of authority alone would seem to be enough to sustain reasonable restrictions on the repair or reconstruction and use of buildings wholly or substantially destroyed in order to effect the purposes of Section 1 of the Charter. To the extent that the specific delegation of power may have been deficient, the rule is that in the interpretation of a municipal charter the municipality, in addition to those expressly granted, has powers necessarily implied in order to carry out the granted powers. City of Central v. Axton, 150 Colo. 414, 373 P.2d 300; City of Golden v. Ford, 141 Colo. 472, 348 P.2d 951. The power to zone cannot be effective without the power to ultimately, under reasonable conditions, terminate that which does not conform.