Opinion ID: 2994830
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: F.R. sec. 1630.2(l).

Text: It is important to note that, in order to establish a regarded as claim, it is not enough for a plaintiff to show that the employer knew of the plaintiff’s impairment. See Davidson v. Midelfort Clinic, Ltd., 133 F.3d 499, 510 (7th Cir. 1998). The plaintiff must also show that the employer believed that one or more of the plaintiff’s major life activities were substantially limited by the plaintiff’s impairment. See id.; see also 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(l). Such major life activities include, for example, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. Sinkler v. Midwest Prop. Mgmt. Ltd. Partnership, 209 F.3d 678, 683-84 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(i)). The plaintiff must select the major life activities that he will attempt to prove the employer regarded as being substantially limited by his impairment. See Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1998); Sinkler, 209 F.3d at 683. In this case, Amadio has alleged that Ford regarded his hepatitis as limiting only his major life activity of working. However, before we can decide whether Ford regarded Amadio’s hepatitis as limiting his ability to work, we must first take a detour to decide what facts may inform our analysis of Amadio’s regarded as claim. Perhaps the best evidence that exists to support Amadio’s claim resides in the affidavit that he submitted in response to Ford’s motion for summary judgment. In his affidavit, Amadio alleged that in February 1995 he told Lafayette, I’m blind in one eye, I just learned that I have hepatitis B so come on, give me a break and quit riding me about the medical leaves. Amadio further alleged that Lafayette replied by saying that he had heard hepatitis B was contagious and maybe [Amadio] should not come around the Plant. Amadio’s affidavit statements directly contradict the testimony he gave at an earlier deposition, during which he was asked, Was there any point in time when you told a Ford employee, a management person, that you were handicapped or disabled? To this question, Amadio simply responded, No. Further, at his deposition Amadio was asked at length about conversations he had with Lafayette, and not once did Amadio disclose the conversation he alleged in his affidavit. He even answered in the negative after being asked, Just for the sake of completeness can you remember at all any other difficult conversations with Lou Lafayette other than anything you’ve testified to so far? Amadio responds to the contradictions in his testimony by arguing that Ford should have asked more specific questions at his deposition. It is, however, difficult to imagine how Ford could have been more specific. At the very least, being told that one’s ailment is contagious and that one is no longer welcome around the plant certainly seems to qualify as a difficult conversation. Amadio should have mentioned it as such during his deposition, especially given his detailed recollection of other conversations with Lafayette. For example, Amadio was asked the following questions during his deposition: Then I believe you said that Lou Lafayette gave you a hard time and said things along the lines of you need to show up to work; is that a fair characterization of your testimony? [affirmative response omitted] . . . Can you tell me as specifically as you can exactly what he said in that regard? In response, Amadio remembered that sometime between January 27, 1995 and February 3, 1995, Lafayette told him to get your ass back to work or you’re going to get your ass fired. It is by now well-settled that a party may not attempt to survive a motion for summary judgment by manufacturing a factual dispute through the submission of an affidavit that contradicts prior deposition testimony. Consequently, [w]here a deposition and affidavit are in conflict, the affidavit is to be disregarded unless it is demonstrable that the statement in the deposition was mistaken, perhaps because the question was phrased in a confusing manner or because a lapse of memory is in the circumstances a plausible explanation for the discrepancy. Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 67-68 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Slowiak v. Land O’Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993)). As already noted, Amadio provided no acceptable explanation for his failure to describe Lafayette’s alleged statements during his deposition. As such, because Amadio’s affidavit directly contradicts his prior deposition testimony, the affidavit is inadmissible, and we will only consider Amadio’s deposition testimony. See Piscione v. Ernst & Young, L.L.P., 171 F.3d 527, 532-33 (7th Cir. 1999); Slowiak, 987 F.2d at 1295. Amadio rightly points out that Lafayette’s testimony is seemingly contradictory as well. In Lafayette’s affidavit in support of Ford’s motion for summary judgment, Lafayette maintained that, at the time of his decision to terminate Amadio he did not know that Amadio had been suffering from blindness in his left eye, had hepatitis or had any other infection. On the other hand, Lafayette testified at his deposition that he was of the opinion that he was aware of Amadio’s medical information prior to terminating Amadio. Just as a non-moving party may not use a contradictory affidavit to manufacture a factual dispute for the purpose of surviving summary judgment, a moving party may not rely on a contradictory affidavit to negate the existence of a factual dispute for the purpose of winning summary judgment. As a result, and because we view the record in a light most favorable to Amadio, we assume that Lafayette was aware of Amadio’s hepatitis at the time Lafayette terminated Amadio’s employment. Thus, after excluding the contradictory affidavits, and viewing the remaining facts in the light most favorable to Amadio, we are left with the following facts against which to examine Amadio’s claim that Ford regarded him as disabled: (1) Amadio never told a Ford employee that he was handicapped or disabled; (2) Amadio never had a difficult conversation concerning his hepatitis with Lafayette; and (3) Lafayette knew of Amadio’s hepatitis before he terminated Amadio’s employment. On these facts, no reasonable jury could find that Ford regarded Amadio as having a disability that substantially impaired his ability to work. There is no evidence that Amadio ever discussed the reasons for his medical leaves with the labor relations department at the assembly plant, or with Lafayette in particular. Even though we assume, for purposes of reviewing a grant of summary judgment, that Lafayette did know of Amadio’s hepatitis at the time Lafayette terminated Amadio’s employment, this knowledge is insufficient, in itself, to show that Lafayette regarded Amadio as substantially limited in the life activity of working. To divine from the known facts the conclusion that Lafayette terminated Amadio’s employment out of a fear of Amadio’s hepatitis would require us not to draw a reasonable inference in Amadio’s favor, as we are required to do in reviewing an order of summary judgment, but to engage in speculation. It is well-settled that speculation may not be used to manufacture a genuine issue of fact. See Gorbitz v. Corvilla, Inc., 196 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 1999); Patterson v. Chicago Assoc. for Retarded Citizens, 150 F.3d 719, 724 (7th Cir. 1998). Accordingly, Amadio has failed to show that Ford regarded him as being disabled. 2. Even if Amadio had been able to prove that Ford regarded him as having a disability, Amadio would still need to establish that, with or without reasonable accommodation, he could perform the essential functions of his employment position. See Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1998); see also 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(8); 29 C.F.R. sec. 1630.2(m). We first recognized work attendance as an essential requirement of employment in Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admin., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (7th Cir. 1995) (attendance required of clerical worker position). Since Vande Zande, the list of occupations in Seventh Circuit cases requiring attendance as an essential function has grown to include, in addition to clerical worker, the positions of teacher, Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999 (7th Cir. 1998), account representative, Corder v. Lucent Tech., Inc., 162 F.3d 924 (7th Cir. 1998), production employee, Waggoner v. Olin Corp., 169 F.3d 481 (7th Cir. 1999), and plant equipment repairman, Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894 (7th Cir. 2000). While we will not say that attendance is an essential function of every employment position, Amadio’s position on the assembly line at Ford’s assembly plant can easily be added to the attendance required list. Indeed, the requirement that an employee be in attendance is especially true in factory positions . . . where the work must be done on the employer’s premises; maintenance and production functions cannot be performed if the employee is not at work. Jovanovic, 201 F.3d at 900. It is clear that Amadio’s record of attendance does not meet even the minimum requirements of his position. Amadio took 23 medical leaves during his last three years of employment (totaling approximately eighteen months of absence) and was disciplined several times in connection with his absenteeism. We have consistently found that plaintiffs who have attendance records similar to or substantially better than Amadio’s do not qualify for protection under the ADA. See Jovanovic, 201 F.3d at 900 (employee missing twenty-four days in past twelve months not qualified); Waggoner, 169 F.3d at 485 (employee missing 5 months of work, and showing up late or not at all for forty days in a fourteen-month period, not qualified); Corder, 162 F.3d at 928 (employee missing eighteen months of work not qualified); Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003- 04 (employee missing eighteen months of work not qualified). Similarly, Amadio’s lengthy absences from a job that requires regular attendance lead us to conclude that Amadio could not perform all essential functions of his employment position. 3. When a disabled employee cannot perform the essential functions of a job, the court must consider whether any reasonable accommodation by the employer would help the employee to perform those functions. See Cochrum v. Old Ben Coal Co., 102 F.3d 908, 911 (7th Cir. 1996); see also 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A). The ADA states that reasonable accommodation may include job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations for individuals with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12111(9)(B). However, if an accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the employer’s business, the accommodation need not be made. 42 U.S.C. sec. 12112(b)(5)(A). The facts relevant to a determination of whether a medical leave is a reasonable accommodation are the facts available to the decision-maker at the time of the employment decision. See Bay v. Cassens Transp. Co., 212 F.3d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 2000); Nowak, 142 F.3d at 1003. When an employee is unable to perform the essential function of attending his employment, few, if any, reasonable accommodations exist. In fact, if an employee cannot regularly attend work, the only imaginable accommodation is an open-ended schedule that allows the employee to come and go as he pleases. This is especially true of employees like Amadio who seemingly take advantage of a company’s apparently generous leave policy to show up for only a few days at a time between absences that occasionally stretch over several months. We are thus led here to the same conclusion we reached in Jovanovic: We would be hard-pressed to imagine a manufacturing facility that could operate effectively when its employees are essentially permitted to set their own work hours, and we thus reject such a schedule as an unreasonable accommodation under the circumstances of this case. 201 F.3d at 899 n.9. Amadio attempts to distinguish his case by arguing that his poor attendance record is not indicative of his ability to work at the time he was fired. Amadio maintains that he eventually would have been able to work had Ford reasonably accommodated him with the one week of additional medical leave he requested as necessary to return to full health. Amadio bases this argument on his appearance at the assembly plant medical section on March 9, 1995, the day after he was terminated, with a doctor’s note giving his expected date of return to work as March 17, 1995. Undoubtedly, a short, one-week medical leave constitutes a reasonable accommodation in many circumstances. Here, however, we have already determined that Amadio is unable to regularly attend his job. Thus, in order to claim that a continued absence from his job would have been a reasonable accommodation, Amadio must do more than merely allege that he would have been able to return to work on a full-time basis if only he had been given one more week of leave. In Amadio’s case, Ford had every reason to believe that giving Amadio additional leave would be an ineffectual gesture. Amadio’s record of attendance clearly indicated that, even if he had returned to work in one week, he was not likely to remain for very long before a new ailment afflicted him. Amadio took 23 medical leaves, and was absent for more than 70 weeks during the last three years of his employment. In addition, during his employment at Ford, Amadio was disciplined on several occasions for absenteeism, including a 30-day layoff for insufficient documentation of a medical leave, a one-week layoff relating to a previous medical leave, and a number of three-day and one-day layoffs. In light of these facts, the extension of Amadio’s already lengthy leave by one more week would have been a futile concession, not a reasonable accommodation./3 Indeed, while we have not considered this fact in rendering our decision, we note that Ford’s suspicions were ultimately realized; in spite of Amadio’s contention that he merely needed one week before being able to return to work, he did not in fact find a new job until over one year had elapsed because his hepatitis remained actively symptomatic. Amadio makes one last attempt to show that an extended leave would have been a reasonable accommodation by arguing that Ford was bound by its obligations under the CBA, which explicitly provided for medical leaves. However, the fact that Ford generously granted extended leaves to its employees--in rare cases, up to two years-- does not necessarily bind Ford to repeatedly grant successive leaves to Amadio, especially since Amadio had a history of abusing his medical leave status. Usually, an employee on medical leave will be absent for a determinate period of time. In such a circumstance, an employer can hire temporary help or otherwise plan to compensate for the employee’s absence on the production line. However, with a chronically absent employee like Amadio, the employer never knows when the employee’s medical leave will really terminate since the employee is likely to request yet another leave shortly after returning to work following the previous leave. This pattern of behavior prevents the employer from ever being able to adequately compensate for the missing employee’s frequent, yet unpredictable absences. While an employer should show patience when an employee first falls sick, if an employer bends over backwards to accommodate a disabled worker . . . it must not be punished for its generosity by being deemed to have conceded the reasonableness of so far-reaching an accommodation. Vande Zande, 44 F.3d at 545; see also Duckett v. Dunlop Tire Corp., 120 F.3d 1222, 1225 (11th Cir. 1997) (An employer is not necessarily required to apply its own established business policy as a reasonable accommodation.); Myers v. Hose, 50 F.3d 278, 284 (4th Cir. 1994) (A particular accommodation is not necessarily reasonable, and thus federally mandated, simply because the [employer] elects to establish it as a matter of policy.). As noted, Ford was more than generous when it granted Amadio the numerous and extended leaves he has received; Ford was under no duty to continue to do so indefinitely, given that Amadio showed no promise of ever committing himself to his work.