Opinion ID: 2709070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ross’s Motions to Dismiss the Indictment

Text: Next, Ross contends that the district court should have granted his motions to dismiss the indictment because his 1997 discharge letter probably contained restoration‐ of‐rights language that could have misled him into believing that his right to possess a firearm was restored regardless of his prior felony offenses and because the government could not prove that Ross knew that the handgun had traveled in interstate commerce. “We review questions of law in a district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss an indictment de novo.” United States v. Sarraj, 665 F.3d 916, 920 (7th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. White, 610 F.3d 956, 958 (7th Cir. 2010)). But we review the district court’s factual determinations for clear error. United States v. Loera, 565 F.3d 406, 411 (7th Cir. 2009). Ross first argues that none of his felony convictions predating the 1997 discharge letter could be used as predicate offenses for the felon‐in‐possession charge. “Any conviction … for which a person … has had civil rights restored shall not be considered a conviction for purposes of [a felon‐in‐possession charge], unless such … restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or receive firearms.” 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). Under our precedent, this “anti‐mousetrapping provision” applies if the “the state sent [the defendant] a document stating that his principal civil rights have been restored, while neglecting to mention the continuing firearms disability ….” Buchmeier v. United States, 581 F.3d 561, 566–67 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc). But “inclusion of a date that ties the letter [sent by the state to the defendant] to a single sentence implies that rights have been restored with respect to the convictions underlying that sentence only.” United States v. Burnett, 641 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 2011). Here, the evidence establishes that the discharge letter Ross likely received in 1997 probably contained restoration‐of‐rights language but did not mention Ross’s continuing firearms disability. But the government offered unrebutted evidence that such a letter would also have contained a reference to the specific date of completion of No. 13‐2015 Page 8 his sentence that he was serving for his 1992 convictions. Accordingly, the 1997 letter would only imply rights restored related to the 1992 convictions. And the discharge letter Ross received in 1988, which related to his sentence for his 1985 conviction, did not contain restoration‐of‐rights language. The evidence also established that any discharge communication Ross received with respect to his sentences for his convictions in the early 1980s would not have contained restoration‐of‐rights language. Consequently, pursuant to Buchmeier and Burnett, the district court correctly concluded that Ross’s 1992 convictions could not be used as predicate offenses for the felon‐in‐ possession charge, but that his 1980s convictions could be. Ross argues that the rule from Burnett—that discharge letters are conviction‐ specific—should not apply to him because the letter that he likely received in 1997 is no longer available. Perhaps Ross is concerned that his 1997 discharge letter may not have actually referenced the specific date of completion of his sentence for his 1992 convictions. But Ross stipulated that he believed that his 1997 discharge letter was like the sample one, and the sample letter included a reference to the sentence‐completion date. The burden of proving that his rights have been restored is upon Ross. United States v. Foster, 652 F.3d 776, 791 (7th Cir. 2011). Given, the government’s contrary (and unrebutted) evidence, and Ross’ stipulation, Ross did not meet this burden.4 Alternatively, Ross argues that the government cannot prove that he knew that the handgun had traveled in interstate commerce. But we have repeatedly rejected the argument that, in a prosecution under § 922(g), the government must prove that the defendant knew that the firearm had traveled in interstate commerce. See, e.g., Sarraj, 665 F.3d at 921 (“The interstate nexus requirement is a factual predicate, not a mens rea element of the crime that would require proof of defendant’s knowledge of facts supporting the nexus.”); United States v. Lindemann, 85 F.3d 1232, 1241 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Thus it has consistently been held that for statutes in which Congress included an ‘interstate nexus’ for the purpose of establishing a basis for its authority, the government … need not prove that the defendant knew the ‘interstate nexus’ of his actions.”); United States v. Castor, 937 F.2d 293, 298 (7th Cir. 1991) (same). Ross urges us to overturn this precedent, and cites a Supreme Court decision construing a penalty‐ 4 Furthermore, Ross’s argument that Burnett ought not apply to cases in which the discharge letter is unavailable would create perverse incentives because it would put an offender who does not retain his discharge letter in a better position than one who does. No. 13‐2015 Page 9 enhancing provision that applies when an “offender ‘knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person.’” Flores‐Figueroa v. United States, 556 U.S. 646, 647 (2009) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1) (emphasis removed)). The Supreme Court concluded that “the statute requires the Government to show that the defendant knew that the ‘means of identification’ he or she unlawfully transferred, possessed, or used, in fact, belonged to ‘another person.’” Id. But the statute that the Supreme Court construed in Flores‐Figueroa was worded very differently than § 922(g)(1). Moreover, Flores‐Figueroa came down well before our decision in Sarraj. Therefore, Flores‐Figueroa does not compel us to revisit Sarraj and its progenitors. Santos v. United States, 461 F.3d 886, 891 (7th Cir. 2006) (“We require a compelling reason to overturn circuit precedent.” (quotation marks omitted)). To the extent Ross seeks to preserve this argument for possible review by the Supreme Court, he has done so. Ross was not entitled to have the indictment dismissed.