Opinion ID: 1781968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the death penalty for juveniles without any prior criminal record or without any particularized findings being made before being transferred to stand trial as an adult violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the united states constitution and article three, section 28 of the mississippi constitution.

Text: Foster was seventeen years of age at the time he is alleged to have robbed Hankins Superette in Columbus and killed the store clerk, George Shelton. He had no prior criminal convictions. Generally, the youth court has exclusive jurisdiction over criminal cases brought against defendants under the age of eighteen. See Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-105(d) (Supp. 1992) and 43-21-151(1) (Supp. 1992). Where the youth court has such exclusive jurisdiction, juveniles may not be tried as adults unless the youth court, in its own discretion, decides to transfer jurisdiction of the alleged offense ... or a lesser included offense to the criminal court which would have trial jurisdiction of such offense if committed by an adult. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157 (Supp. 1992). Before it may transfer a juvenile for trial in the circuit courts, however, the youth court must first conduct a bifurcated hearing and: 1) determine ... [that] probable cause exists to believe that the child committed the alleged offense; and 2) find by clear and convincing evidence that there are no reasonable prospects of rehabilitation within the juvenile system. Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157(3) and (4) (Supp. 1992). Section 43-21-157(5) enumerates the following factors as the criteria to be considered by the youth court in determining a child's reasonable prospects of rehabilitation within the juvenile justice system: (a) Whether or not the alleged offense constituted a substantial danger to the public; (b) The seriousness of the alleged offense; (c) Whether or not the transfer is required to protect the community; (d) Whether or not the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated or wilful manner; (e) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, greater weight being given to the offense against persons, especially if personal injury resulted; (f) The sophistication, maturity and educational background of the child; (g) The child's home situation, emotional condition, and lifestyle; (h) The history of the child, including experience with the juvenile justice system, other courts, probation, commitments to juvenile institutions or other placements; (i) Whether or not the child can be retained in the juvenile justice system long enough for effective treatment or rehabilitation; (j) The dispositional resources available to the juvenile justice system; (k) Dispositional resources available to the adult correctional system for the child if treated as an adult; and ( l ) Any other factors deemed relevant by the court. Under Mississippi law, these juvenile certification procedures do not take place if a child commits an act, which if committed by an adult would be punishable under state or federal law by life imprisonment or death, Miss. Code Ann. 43-21-151(1) (Supp. 1992), because original jurisdiction is vested in the circuit courts under such circumstances. In addition, juveniles who commit capital offenses become automatically eligible for the death sentence, because Mississippi law places no minimum age limit on the imposition of the death penalty. See Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101 (1972). Thus, in the instant case, §§ 43-21-151(1) and 99-19-101 of the Code combined to allow Foster, 17 at the time of his offense, to be tried and convicted of a capital offense and receive the death sentence, without there ever having been a preliminary determination that he should be tried as an adult, and despite the fact he had no prior criminal convictions. Foster argues this process violates the 8th Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the precedent of Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), and Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988). He also contends the analogous prohibition contained in article 3, § 28 of the Mississippi Constitution has been violated. The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that cruel and unusual punishments shall not be inflicted. The Eighth Amendment prohibitions have been made applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution. Article 3, § 28 of the Mississippi Constitution forbids the infliction of cruel or unusual punishment. [1] The United States Supreme Court has already decided through the cases of Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702 (1988), Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989), and Wilkins v. Missouri, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306 (1989) that sentencing a fifteen year-old offender to death is per se cruel and unusual punishment, Thompson, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 101 L.Ed.2d 702, and imposing the death penalty on a sixteen or seventeen year-old offender does not constitute such a per se violation. Stanford and Wilkins, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 106 L.Ed.2d 306. In Thompson, Justice Stevens wrote for a plurality including Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun. Justice O'Connor concurred in the judgment. The Thompson plurality was drawn to its ultimate conclusion by a belief that sentencing fifteen year-old offenders to death would offend civilized standards of decency. 487 U.S. 815, 838, 108 S.Ct. 2687, 2700, 101 L.Ed.2d 702, 720. They confirmed their belief by considering state and federal legislative enactments, statistical evidence as to behavior of juries, and the principle that less culpability should attach to crimes committed by juveniles. Stanford and Wilkins were presented together. The Stanford and Wilkins defendants were seventeen and sixteen, respectively, when they committed their offenses. A plurality of the Court, Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, White, and Kennedy, did not believe a national consensus could be discerned against imposing the death sentence on sixteen or seventeen defendants. 492 U.S. 361, 380, 109 S.Ct. 2969, 2980-81, 106 L.Ed.2d 306, 325. Justice O'Connor concurred in this conclusion. Id. In the case at bar, Foster is not questioning whether his age of time of his offense  seventeen  renders him per se ineligible for the death penalty. He, instead, raises the first-impression claim that Eighth Amendment proportionality strictures require that, before a juvenile offender can be tried as an adult and sentenced to death, a pretrial judicial inquiry considering the defendant's individual circumstances must be conducted to determine whether the defendant should be tried and sentenced as an adult offender. Foster contends, moreover, that had such a procedure been undertaken in his case, his lack of a criminal history would have militated against a clear and convincing finding that he had no reasonable prospects of rehabilitation within the juvenile system, as required by Mississippi's certification statute. See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-157(4) (Supp. 1992). Certification procedures were undertaken in both Stanford and Wilkins. In both cases, the Supreme Court, in upholding the death sentences imposed, placed emphasis on the existence of those certification procedures and the findings drawn from them by the State court judges. The Supreme Court noted, [T]he determinations required by juvenile transfer statutes to certify a juvenile for trial as an adult ensure individualized consideration of the maturity and moral responsibility of 16- and 17-year-old offenders before they are even held to stand trial as adults. 492 U.S. at 375, 109 S.Ct. at 2978, 106 L.Ed.2d at 322. The Court also noted that, in accordance with Kentucky law, the Kentucky juvenile court conducted a certification hearing concerning defendant Stanford and found certification for trial as an adult to be in the best interests of Stanford and the State, [s]tressing the seriousness of [Stanford's] offenses and the unsuccessful attempts of the juvenile system to treat him for numerous instances of past delinquency. 492 U.S. at 367, 109 S.Ct. at 2974, 106 L.Ed.2d at 316. With respect to defendant Wilkins, the Court observed, Relying on the `viciousness, force, and violence' of the alleged crime, petitioner's maturity, and the failure of the juvenile system to rehabilitate him after previous delinquent acts, the juvenile court made the necessary certification. Id. Wilkins had been in and out of juvenile facilities since the age of eight for various acts of burglary, theft, and arson, had attempted to kill his mother by putting insecticide into Tylenol capsules, and had killed several animals in his neighborhood. 492 U.S. at 367, 109 S.Ct. at 2974, 106 L.Ed.2d at 317. Despite the emphasis the Stanford Court placed on certification procedures and findings, no procedural challenge concerning certification was before the Court, and the Court never explicitly and unequivocally declared that individualized certification findings are constitutionally required for juveniles charged with capital offenses. Nevertheless, the views of at least a majority of the Court on this issue can be discerned from the positions they expressed in Stanford and Thompson. Justices Stevens and Blackmun joined Justices Brennan and Marshall on the Thompson plurality that declared that sentencing fifteen-year-old offenders to death per se was a violation of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment clause. In that case, the plurality restricted their judgment to fifteen-year-old offenders for the expressed reason that imposition of the death penalty on older juveniles was not presented to them at that time. 487 U.S. at 838, 108 S.Ct. at 2700, 101 L.Ed.2d at 720. The Court was presented with such scenarios shortly thereafter in Stanford and Wilkins; and there, Justices Blackmun and Stevens, along with Justice Marshall, joined Justice Brennan in proclaiming, I believe that to take the life of a person as punishment for a crime committed when below the age of 18 is cruel and unusual and hence is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 492 U.S. at 382, 109 S.Ct. at 2982, 106 L.Ed.2d at 326. From these expressed opinions, it is clear that Justices Stevens and Blackmun, who absolutely disfavor putting juveniles to death, would require at a minimum a prerequisite that juveniles be certified as sufficiently mature, morally responsible and lacking in rehabilitative potential before they be put to death.