Opinion ID: 2222745
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Allegations of Bias.

Text: Some of the objectors claim the commission and its chairman, Maurice Van Nostrand, were so biased that they were effectively denied a fair hearing, and thus deprived of constitutional and statutory rights, requiring reversal of the agency action under section 17A.19(8). They claimed Van Nostrand's bias stemmed from a conflict of interests caused by his position as a member of the Iowa Energy Policy Council and several comments made by him, both at the franchise hearing and at an Energy Council meeting. Their assertion that being a member of the Energy Policy Council creates a conflict of interests reads too much into the statute creating the council. Section 93.7(12), The Code, provides that one of the duties of the council is to examine and determine whether additional state regulatory authority is necessary to protect the public interests and to promote the effective development, utilization and conservation of energy resources. . . . The objectors take the last part of that section out of context and argue that Van Nostrand has a duty to promote the development of electric utility lines and that that duty is inconsistent with being an independent decision maker on whether or not this particular utility line is necessary. However, that is not the way in which we read the code section; it says that the Energy Policy Council is to determine whether additional state regulatory authority is necessary to promote the development of utilities. We do not believe the legislature intended to place the commissioner in two positions which have built-in conflicts of interest. See § 4.6(5), The Code (consequences of particular construction to be considered in statutory interpretation). Another ground for asserting personal bias of Van Nostrand is a statement which he made at the franchise hearing. He spoke to several of the objectors and advised them that electrical consumption has to be satisfied and that they should keep the lines of communication with the power companies open in the hope of being able to influence the placement of poles on their property. The objectors argue that this shows that the chairman had a closed mind as to whether or not he would grant this particular franchise. The objectors also point out several comments made by Van Nostrand at an Energy Policy Council meeting. He said that most objectors are merely interested in having transmission lines cross other peoples' property, that few of the objections are good objections and that most of the objectors are more interested in their financial interest and advocated that the Energy Policy Council drum up support for the utilities' position. The objectors do not point to any personal bias of the other commission members, but argue that the commission's rulings during the course of the hearing evidenced such a personal bias. These objectors say that [w]hile the remaining members of the Commission were not as loquacious as their chairman in demonstrating personal bias and pre-judgment of the issues in this cause, it is [objectors'] contention that a review of the entire record in this matter leads to the inescapable conclusion that the entire Commission should have been disqualified for personal interest in these particular proceedings. The core of this contention is that it was the Commission's failure to perform its duties pursuant to chapter 17A of the Code which is principally responsible for what has been characterized as a procedural nightmare. An agency ruling on allegations of bias of an agency member is reviewed de novo, § 17A.17(4), The Code, and we have examined the record of these proceedings under that standard. The burden of showing reversible bias is upon the objectors, because there is a rebuttable presumption of regularity attending official acts of the commission. Cedar Rapids Steel Transportation, Inc. v. Iowa State Commerce Commission, 160 N.W.2d 825, 836 (Iowa 1968) (evidence of alleged bias held to be insufficient to rebut presumption). The objectors have set forth no standards by which to assess their allegations of claimed bias. At the outset, we find nothing in the record to show disqualifying bias of the non-presiding members of the commission. The objectors rely merely upon their failure to perform [their] duties under ch. 17A, thereby causing a procedural nightmare. Allegations of the commissioners' disregard of the statute might be a basis for reversal on the merits on judicial review of the agency action under section 17A.19. Such violations may also be evidence of bias, which together with other facts, may be sufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity of the proceedings. However, standing alone they are palpably insufficient to rebut the presumption of regularity of the proceedings of the commission. The activities of Chairman Van Nostrand present a closer question. We have already determined that his statutory position on the Iowa Energy Policy Council did not automatically disqualify him; now we must decide if any of his activities did. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that [a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his activities. (Emphasis added.) We believe that agency personnel charged with making decisions of great import, as in this case, should be guided by the rationale of that canon. However, while we do not approve the gratuitous statements attributed to him, we do not believe the remarks of Van Nostrand were of such a nature as to require his disqualification. In Hortonville Joint School District No. 1 v. Hortonville Education Association, 426 U.S. 482, 96 S.Ct. 2308, 49 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), the Supreme Court said that taking a position, even in public, on a policy issue related to the dispute does not disqualify a decision maker. In order to disqualify him, it must be shown that he is not capable of judging a particular controversy fairly on the basis of its own circumstances. 426 U.S. at 493, 96 S.Ct. at 2314, 49 L.Ed.2d at 9 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421, 61 S.Ct. 999, 1004, 85 L.Ed. 1429, 1435 (1941)). We said in Cedar Rapids Steel, moreover, that alleged bias becomes a justiciable issue only as it bears on the fairness of the hearing. It cannot be imputed to the fact-trier retroactively, as it were, because his mind has absorbed the impressions left by a full and fair hearing. 160 N.W.2d at 837 (quoting A. O. Smith Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board, 343 F.2d 103, 110 (7th Cir. 1965)). Van Nostrand's statements at the Energy Policy Council that few objections are good, that most objectors are motivated by financial considerations and that most objectors merely want the lines to cross other peoples' property, while they might be interpreted as leaning toward the general view that electrical transmission franchises should be extended, are not shown to be directly referable to this particular line or to the objections to it. This presents a factual context clearly distinguishable from Texaco, Inc. v. F. T. C., 336 F.2d 754 (D.C. Cir. 1964), relied upon by the objectors. In Texaco, the chairman of the commission indicated in a speech made during the pendency of a matter then before the commission what the outcome was going to be. As to the statement by Van Nostrand that the parties should keep the lines of communication open, the objectors have not shown this was anything other than what it appeared to be on its facean effort to insert a conciliatory note in a hotly contested and emotional matter. Upon our de novo review of the record before the commission, we find no basis for disqualification of the chairman or of the other members of the commission on the grounds of bias. Along a similar line, some objectors complain that Chairman Van Nostrand violated the specific terms of section 17A.17(2) because of ex parte communications he had with employees of the petitioning utility. That section provides in part: Unless required for the disposition of ex parte matters specifically authorized by statute, parties or their representatives in a contested case shall not communicate, directly or indirectly, in connection with any issue of fact or law in that contested case, with individuals assigned to render a proposed or final decision or to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in that contested case, except upon notice and opportunity for all parties to participate as shall be provided for by agency rules. The ex parte communications complained of occurred after the commission had dismissed the franchise petition. On both occasions the power company officials called Van Nostrand to discuss the reasons for the dismissal. There is no evidence that there was input from those officials which could influence a matter then pending or which would go to the merits of their petitions once they were refiled. Therefore, the parties and commission chairman were not shown to have violated the letter of the statute. However, there are means available under our procedural rules for parties to request more specific findings and conclusions in such a manner as to inform opposing parties of their actions and avoid the appearance of impropriety almost certain to attend any one-sided discussion of matters in controversy. Our view of this matter is similar to that concerning the allegations of bias: while we do not approve of such conversations, we do not believe they require reversal.