Opinion ID: 3015223
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparate treatment: Discriminatory animus

Text: claims & facially discriminatory classification claims Generally, to prevail on a disparate treatment claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that some discriminatory purpose was a “motivating factor” behind the challenged action. See Cmty. Hous. Trust v. Dep’t of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 257 F. Supp. 2d 208, 225 (D.D.C. 2003) (“It is well settled that a defendant’s decision or action constitutes disparate treatment, or intentional discrimination, when a person’s disability was a ‘motivating factor’ behind the challenged action or decision.”); Tsombanidis v. City of W. Haven, 129 F. Supp. 2d 136, 151 (D. Conn. 2001) (citing Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)). The discriminatory purpose need not be malicious or invidious, nor need it figure in “solely, primarily, or even predominantly” into the motivation behind the challenged action. Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 225; Tsombanidis, 129 F. Supp. 2d at 151; see also Horizon House, 804 F. Supp. at 696 (“In order to prove intentional discrimination it is not necessary to show an evil or hostile motive. It is a violation of the FHAA to discriminate even if the motive was benign or paternalistic.”). The plaintiff is only required to “show that a protected characteristic played a role in the defendant’s decision to treat her differently.” Cmty. Hous. Trust, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 225 (citing Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265). 18 Where a regulation or “policy facially discriminates on the basis of the protected trait, in certain circumstances it ‘may constitute per se or explicit . . . discrimination’” because “the protected trait by definition plays a role in the decision-making process, inasmuch as the policy explicitly classifies people on that basis.” DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 726 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Ass’n, 780 F. Supp. 1195, 1197 (N.D. Ill. 1991)). Hence, where a plaintiff demonstrates that the challenged action involves disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination, or a facially discriminatory classification, “a plaintiff need not prove the malice or discriminatory animus of a defendant.” Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995). Rather, the focus is on the “explicit terms of the discrimination.” Int’l Union, United Auto. Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991).