Opinion ID: 198229
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Real Possibility Instruction

Text: 53 One of the cornerstones of the criminal trial is that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The term beyond a reasonable doubt is one of the most bandied, but perhaps least precisely defined phrases in criminal law. Here, the trial judge used a modified version of the Federal Judicial Center form book instruction for beyond a reasonable doubt. Below is the instruction as given, underlined to show the part we discuss: 54 In a criminal case the burden of proving guilt is on the government. It has that burden throughout the entire trial. A defendant never has to prove his innocence. The right of a defendant to put the government to its proof is one of the most fundamental guarantees of our Constitution. It means that the defendant has no obligation to produce any evidence or to testify. Thus, you may not draw an inference of guilt from the fact that a defendant did not testify. You may not even discuss that fact in your deliberations. Again, the burden rests solely upon the government to prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 55 Now, what is proof beyond a reasonable doubt? The term is often used, and probably pretty well understood intuitively, although it is not easily defined. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt or proof to a mathematical certainty. Everything in our common experience is open to some possible or imaginary doubt. It does, however, mean that the evidence must exclude any reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt. 56 A reasonable doubt may arise not only from the evidence produced but also from the lack of such evidence. A reasonable doubt exists when, after weighing and considering all the evidence in the case, using your reason and common sense, you cannot say that you have a firm and settled conviction that the charge is true. 57 It is not enough for the government to establish a probability, even a strong probability, that a defendant is more likely guilty than not. That is not enough. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be proof of such a convincing character that you can, consistent with your oath as jurors, conscientiously base your verdict upon it. If you so find as to a defendant, you will return a verdict of guilty. On the other hand, if you think there is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty of the charges, you must give the defendant the benefit of that doubt and find him not guilty. 58 Tr. 10/21 at 108-09. The challenged sentence in this instruction is substantially copied from the Federal Judicial Center form book. See Federal Judicial Center, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions 28 (1988) (Instruction 21). 59 Rodrguez's argument is directed at the phrase real possibility in the sentence, On the other hand, if you think there is a real possibility that the defendant is not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty. He argues that the trial judge equated reasonable doubt with real possibility. Rodrguez contends that the district court exacerbated an already bad situation when it further explained that the jury could draw inferences using reason and logic and in light of reason and common sense. He claims that worse still, the district court then failed to give an instruction stating that the standard for drawing an inference is not the same as the standard for finding guilt, thus creating a reasonable likelihood that the jury would apply an impermissibly low standard of proof to the government's case against the defendants. 60 The Supreme Court has held that a reasonable doubt is, at a minimum, one based on reason, so [a] fanciful doubt is not a reasonable doubt. Victor, 511 U.S. at 17, 114 S.Ct. 1239. Victor makes that distinction in the context of approving the phrase not a mere possible doubt. Id. 61 [T]he Constitution does not require that any particular form of words be used in advising the jury of the government's burden of proof. Id. at 5, 114 S.Ct. 1239. The challenged passage from the Federal Judicial Center form book instruction is recommended by Justice Ginsburg in her concurrence in Victor. See id. at 26-27, 114 S.Ct. 1239 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). The trial judge may require a real possibility of doubt because [a] fanciful doubt is not a reasonable doubt. Id. at 17, 114 S.Ct. 1239. The phrase real doubt does not suffer the infirmity of requiring the jury to have grave uncertainty, substantial doubt, and a real tangible substantial basis for doubt, before they can acquit, as the unconstitutional instruction did in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39, 40, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991). 62 Here, the likelihood of juror confusion or mistake is extremely remote. We conclude that the instructions overall left the jury with an accurate impression of the presumption of innocence and of the substantial burden faced by the prosecution in establishing the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There was nothing improper with either the challenged sentence or the instructions as a whole.