Opinion ID: 1291731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Decree in the Case at Bar Fits Within the Exception

Text: ¶ 12 The appellant asserts that the divorce decree in the matter before us was not a consent decree, but merely the product of an agreed, waiver divorce. He supports this assertion by arguing that a consent decree requires a separate, written agreement other than the divorce decree, and cites Stuart, and Ettinger v. Ettinger, 1981 OK 130, 637 P.2d 63. Although those two cases involved separate, written agreements from the decree, we see little to be gained by requiring a separate, written agreement. Requiring a separate writing does nothing to further the intent of a consent judgment that there be agreement of the parties concerning the details of the settlement. The cases cited intend to assure that consent judgments be negotiated settlements, as any contract would be, and not merely reflect the acquiescence of a default decree. ¶ 13 Looking to the decree in the case at bar, there are several provisions to support the trial court=s conclusion that the decree was a consent decree. Finding number 6 in the decree provides: That the parties have entered into an agreement as to the division of the jointly acquired property of the marriage; that said division is fair and equitable, and that the agreement of the parties should be approved. The trial court then orders, that the Agreement of the parties as to the division of the jointly acquired property of the marriage, be and the same is hereby approved as fair and equitable. Two following paragraphs set forth the terms of the Agreement. The paragraph quoted earlier concerning the support alimony asserts that it is pursuant to the agreement of the parties. And finally, above the signatures of the parties, is the sentence, Approved as correctly stating our understanding of the Agreement of the parties.