Opinion ID: 2232729
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Jury Access to Death Penalty Request

Text: Taylor also contends that the cumulative effect of Instruction 17 and the presence in the jury room of the withdrawn death sentence request was to permit the State to have a de facto additional partial closing argument with the effect of tipping the balance from a finding of sudden heat by improperly highlighting one portion of the evidence and by urging an improper legal conclusion. In support of this contention, Taylor relies on Thomas v. State, 259 Ind. 537, 289 N.E.2d 508 (1972) (reversible error to allow written witness statements to be taken into the jury room where the statements were admitted only for impeachment and not for the truth of the matters set forth); Ortiz v. State, 265 Ind. 549, 356 N.E.2d 1188 (1976) (no error to re-read to the jury at its request a statement by one defendant to police that had been admitted into evidence); and Shaffer v. State, 449 N.E.2d 1074 (Ind.1983) (reversible error to allow the jury to listen to three and one-half hours of testimony during deliberations). These cases are all inapposite. At issue here is the impact of the presence in the jury room of two items: (1) an instruction and (2) extraneous material, the dismissed death sentence request. Neither presents the presence of selected pieces of evidence in the jury room. The trial court has discretion to submit written instructions to the jury after they have been read in their entirety. Lineback v. State, 542 N.E.2d 195, 197 (Ind.1989). Because the instruction was not reversible error, and the trial court has discretion to allow instructions in the jury room, no reversible error occurred by its inclusion with the body of instructions submitted to the jury. The death penalty request should not have been submitted to the jury. However, the trial court proceeded correctly to evaluate the effect, if any, of this error and determined there was none. The jury may be examined as to exposure to improper extrinsic materials during deliberations. Fox v. State, 457 N.E.2d 1088, 1093 (Ind.1984). The State bears the burden of establishing that the extrinsic material was harmless. Butler v. State, 622 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (Ind. Ct.App.1994), reh'g denied, trans. denied. The trial court's evidentiary hearing disclosed that the jury foreman did not remember seeing or reading the death penalty request, but did remember one female juror's asking about it after the verdict was reached. Only one juror, a woman, remembered seeing the document, and also recalled having some discussion with someone about it, but could not remember if it was during or after deliberations. She did not believe the document was read to the jury. A third juror remembered that after the verdicts had been reached one of the jurors mentioned seeing something about the State's requesting the death penalty, but no one else could recall the incident. The other nine jurors did not see the document, and did not recall its being read to them. The trial court concluded, Because of the difficulty in people remembering as to what actually had occurred, the Court's of the opinion that whatever did occur, did not influence these jurors' opinion.... The court found the State carried its burden of establishing the extrinsic material was harmless. That finding is not clearly erroneous, and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Taylor's motion to set aside the verdicts and for mistrial.