Opinion ID: 494566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Tenure Issue

Text: 35 In remanding the case, we asked the district court to determine whether any aspect of the relationship between the special division of this court and the Independent Counsel requires consideration of the constitutionality of the statute even if the Attorney General's appointment is otherwise valid. 50 As indicated above, we requested the district court to address this question because, upon initial inspection, we were unsure whether the Supreme Court's decision in Bowsher v. Synar required us to address the question of the constitutionality vel non of the removal provisions of the Ethics Act, 51 even though no one alleges that the Attorney General is likely to seek Walsh's removal in the foreseeable future. In Bowsher the Court 36 reject[ed the] argument that consideration of the effect of a removal provision is not ripe until that provision is actually used.... [I]t is the Comptroller General's presumed desire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress, which creates the here-and-now subservience to another branch that raises separation-of-powers problems. The Impeachment Clause of the Constitution can hardly be thought to be undermined because of non-use. 37 106 S.Ct. at 3189 n. 5 (citation omitted). 38 In this case, the removal provisions in the Ethics Act and in the Attorney General's regulation are identical. 52 In general, they provide that the Attorney General may remove Walsh for cause only. What differentiates the two schemes is that the Attorney General may rescind or amend the regulation, thereby withdrawing the delegated authority or Walsh's security of tenure, whereas in order to effect the parallel result under the Ethics Act, the Congress and the President, or Congress overriding a veto, would have to legislate to repeal the statute, arguably a less likely development. North appears to argue that Walsh's more secure status under the Ethics Act, combined with the fact that under the Act's removal provisions the court that appointed him would review his removal, creates in Walsh a here-and-now subservience to the Special Division and, under Bowsher, compels us to reach the merits of his constitutional challenge. 53 39 In Bowsher, the constitutional claim was ripe because the removal provision, by making the Comptroller General the servant of the Congress and not of the President, necessarily had an immediate and real impact on how he performed his duties. 54 Under the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, the Comptroller General's duties involved the question of how to allocate scarce government monies; as illustrated by the budget controversies from which that Act emerged, it is particularly in the context of fiscal policy that th[e] system of division and separation of powers produces conflicts, confusion, and discordance.... Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S.Ct. at 3187. In that context, too, one's institutional allegiance goes a long way, if not all the way, in determining how one acts: or, as is often said of such interbranch conflicts, where one stands depends upon where one sits. The three-judge district court opinion 55 on which Bowsher relied for its ripeness analysis makes the point that assertion of the authority to remove has an impact distinct from the mere possibility that an officer will in fact be removed. 56 It is the prior assertion of authority to remove embodied in the tenure statute that has the immediate effect, and presumably the immediate purpose, of causing the Comptroller General to look to the legislative branch rather than the President for guidance in making his day-to-day budgetary decisions under the Deficit Reduction Act. Synar v. United States, 626 F.Supp. at 1393 (emphasis added). Thus the Comptroller General--out of a presumed desire to avoid removal by pleasing Congress--would be significantly influenced in making decisions determining, in substantial part, whether the petitioners would receive anticipated federal benefits. Id. at 1392. So viewed, the Supreme Court in Bowsher was virtually compelled to conclude that the separation of powers question was ripe for review even though the removal provision had not been exercised and, in fact, might never be. 57 40 In contrast, while North claims to suffer a harm from the removal provisions of the Ethics Act that he challenges as unconstitutional, he does not identify any way in which this here-and-now effect is even arguably felt by him. 58 We have already held that the Attorney General's parallel appointment provides Walsh with the legal authority, independent of the Ethics Act, to conduct the grand jury investigation from which this case arises. In light of this parallel source of authority, any harm to North that is a sufficiently direct and immediate consequence of the Ethics Act must involve an investigative or prosecutorial activity that Walsh would not undertake if he depended for his authority solely upon the Attorney General's regulation. In other words, North could only feel an immediate impact from the Act's removal provisions at this juncture if Walsh, without the benefit of the Act, would not take a certain action out of fear that the Attorney General would rescind or amend the regulation in order to abolish or limit his authority thereunder, but with the Act in place does so act, disregarding the risk that the Attorney General will remove him or limit his authority because the Special Division acts as the guarantor of his authority under the Ethics Act. 41 There is not the slightest reason to believe, however, that Walsh would not have convened the grand jury and issued the challenged subpoena to North if the Ethics Act did not exist. The Attorney General, by creating the Office of Independent Counsel: Iran/Contra in the image of the independent counsel's office under the Ethics Act, intended that Walsh would conduct his investigation just as he would pursuant to his identical authority under the Ethics Act so that, even if the Act were held unconstitutional, its absence would not in any way impair Walsh's investigation or prosecutions. In fact, the Attorney General stated as much in the preamble to the regulation. 59 42 Furthermore, even if Walsh had acted in a manner demonstrably beyond the Attorney General's delegation of authority, during the course of this investigation but apart from issuing this subpoena, it would be of no avail to North on this appeal. In accordance with the principles we announced in Deaver v. Seymour, and in our opinion remanding this case to the district court, North may litigate only the lawfulness of the specific subpoena issued to him, not that of such other investigative or prosecutorial actions as Walsh may undertake. 60