Opinion ID: 2499529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Suppression of letter seized by jail personnel

Text: Maestas argues that the district court erred by refusing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to suppress the letter he wrote to Amy while he was in custody in Utah. He argued below that the letter should be suppressed because he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in correspondence sent from jail and had no notice that his outgoing mail would be confiscated by jail officials. On appeal, Maestas raises the notice issue and also argues for the first time that confiscation of the letter violated his First Amendment rights and was not justified by a legitimate penal interest. The notice argument lacks merit. At a hearing on the motion, the prosecutor relayed that, according to a Utah jail official, inmates are provided with a handbook that explains that outgoing mail, except communications to attorneys, is subject to monitoring. Maestas denied receiving the handbook. The district court determined that the jail had a right to monitor [mail] for security reasons and that Maestas proffered no authority suggesting that he was entitled to notice before his mail was confiscated. We conclude that the district court did not err in this regard. Maestas failed to raise his First Amendment claim below. That failure leaves us to consider the claim in the context of plain error. See NRS 178.602. The claim is not amenable to plain-error review for two reasons. First, under the circumstances presented, we cannot say that any error is plain because it is not so unmistakable that it reveals itself by a casual inspection of the record. Patterson v. State, 111 Nev. 1525, 1530, 907 P.2d 984, 987 (1995) (internal quotation omitted). For example, because the issue was not raised below, the record is not sufficiently developed for us to determine whether the jail policy regarding outgoing mail is reasonably related to legitimate penal interests. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89-90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987) (discussing factors that are relevant in determining reasonableness of prison regulation). We therefore lack an adequate basis upon which to review this claim. See Wilkins v. State, 96 Nev. 367, 372, 609 P.2d 309, 312 (1980) (observing that while this court may consider constitutional issues raised for the first time on appeal, it will not do so unless the record is developed sufficiently both to demonstrate that fundamental rights are, in fact, implicated and to provide an adequate basis for review). Second, the alleged error is not clear under current law. Gaxiola v. State, 121 Nev. 638, 648, 119 P.3d 1225, 1232 (2005) (internal quotation omitted). In particular, there does not appear to be a consensus as to whether the exclusionary rule applies to evidence obtained in violation of the First Amendment. Compare United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320, 328 (2d Cir.1972) (concluding that where seizure of allegedly obscene materials is not preceded by a procedure which affords a reasonable likelihood that non-obscene materials will reach the public, the proper remedy is the return of the allegedly obscene materials to those from whom they were seized, not suppression of these items at a subsequent obscenity trial), vacated on other grounds, 413 U.S. 913, 93 S.Ct. 3047, 37 L.Ed.2d 1023 (1973), reaffirmed on remand, 491 F.2d 905 (2d Cir.1973), and United States v. Bush, 582 F.2d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir.1978) (concluding that in obscenity prosecution appropriate remedy for violation of First Amendment is return of property, not suppression of evidence at trial), with United States v. Hale, 784 F.2d 1465, 1469 (9th Cir.1986) (concluding that magazine that was basis for child pornography and obscenity convictions but not specified in search warrant was improperly seized and subject to exclusion because magazine was arguably protected by First Amendment at time of seizure), abrogated on other grounds by New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875, 106 S.Ct. 1610, 89 L.Ed.2d 871 (1986), as stated in U.S. v. Weber, 923 F.2d 1338, 1343 n. 6 (9th Cir.1990), and State v. Bumanglag, 63 Haw. 596, 634 P.2d 80, 92 (1981) (concluding that in prosecution for promoting pornography the suppression of the seized films as evidence would be the only effective sanction for the relevant infringements of first and fourth amendment freedoms).