Opinion ID: 2175676
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: B: Scope of the Ruling

Text: Appellants also contend that even if the motive evidence was permissible as initially contemplated by the trial court, their mistrial motions should have been granted because the drug evidence which actually came in exceeded the narrowly drawn category dictated by the in limine Drew ruling, in effect becoming proscribed Category A and B material. [10] Appellants objected to government questions to Cole about her first meeting with appellants before the distribution at Penny's in November. After the court overruled the objection, the witness testified that she had seen the appellants in Penny's on an earlier occasion when she had come in to use drugs there, and that on the November distribution day Bullock gave out testers (samples of the drug) and returned later seeking runners (drug dealers). Both appellants moved for a mistrial, which the trial court denied, ruling instead that the testimony was still within the rules set down earlier for Category C evidence because the tester-runner testimony concerned the same November occasion, and thus was previously contemplated as coming within the purview of Category C. Later in Cole's testimony, both appellants again moved for a mistrial when Cole broadly intimated that she had dealt drugs for appellants at times other than the November occasion. The trial court, apparently believing the testimony that had already come in was harmless, if it had exceeded the scope of Category C at all, dealt with the motion by proposing to give the jury a cautionary instruction, which appellants considered unhelpful and urged the court not to give. See supra note 8. Appellant Bullock additionally argues that a mistrial should have been granted in at least five other circumstances involving Drew evidence of drug dealing going beyond the scope of the trial court's in limine ruling. The evidence at issue included statements that Cole work[ed] for Bullock; that Bullock handed a witness bundles; that Smith was told he was not to leave the block until he sold all of his heroin; that Bullock told Brown to give him his shit; and that Cole owed Bullock money for two packages of heroin. Finally, at oral argument, Bullock's counsel highlighted as prejudicial testimony that Bullock had a certain block whose drug business he solely controlled. The trial court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny a mistrial motion, and we will not overturn its determination unless it is unreasonable, irrational, or unfair or the situation is so extreme that failure to reverse would result in a miscarriage of justice. ( Charles ) Lee v. United States, 562 A.2d 1202, 1204 (D.C.1989). We cannot see any abuse of that wide discretion in the instances advanced by the appellants on appeal. [11] In almost all of the situations presented, either the objections were sustained; [12] the evidence was well within the Category C limits according to the trial court's discretionary judgment; or the admission was not objected to and hence reversible only for plain error, which we find appellants could not show here, cf. Hill, supra, slip op. at 11 (no plain error where properly admissible Drew evidence took up almost half of the trial). With the principle established that the drug-related activity evidencing the motive leading to the killing might be put to the jury, occasional slippage in the scope of that evidence cannot be deemed so prejudicial as to mandate the granting of a new trial, as argued here. [13]