Opinion ID: 1188928
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Sergeant Welsh's Expert Testimony

Text: Morris's final argument is that the district court should not have admitted testimony by Sergeant Marc Welsh, who testified as an expert for the government. The government offered Welsh's testimony to explain common practices of street-level narcotics sales, including what quantities of drugs are generally possessed for purposes of distribution rather than individual consumption. Welsh testified that 23.7 grams of heroin would be consistent with distribution quantity. The rub, however, is that Welsh was also the supervisor of the MNU at the time the unit raided 707 Albert. Testimony by other members of the search team and by Welsh himself on cross-examination made it clear that Welsh was personally involved in executing the warrant on the house. Morris claims that Welsh's dual roleas both investigator and expert witnesscaused his testimony to run afoul of the Federal Rules of Evidence, particularly Rules 704(b) and 403. We disagree. Government prosecutors often call expert witnesses to discuss common practices employed by drug dealers. See United States v. Foster, 939 F.2d 445, 451 & n. 6 (7th Cir.1991) (collecting cases and noting that our circuit is quite familiar with the use during trial of expert testimony as to the methods used by drug dealers); see also United States v. Anderson, 61 F.3d 1290, 1297 (7th Cir.1995). We have upheld the practice in a number of contexts related to the narcotics trade. See United States v. Upton, 512 F.3d 394, 401 (7th Cir.2008) (discussing various contexts); see also, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 933 F.2d 417, 428-29 (7th Cir.1991) (use of short phone calls to avoid detection); United States v. Solis, 923 F.2d 548, 551 (7th Cir.1991) (use of beepers); United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1988) (use of narcotics code words). For many drug crimes, the government bears the burden of proving that the defendant possessed a given state of mind often, as here, the intent to distribute narcotics. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). But it is usually difficult or impossible to provide direct evidence of a defendant's mental state. Cf. Pavlick v. Mifflin, 90 F.3d 205, 209 (7th Cir.1996) (Direct evidence of knowledge is difficultsometimes impossibleto obtain; therefore the Supreme Court has held that [a defendant's mental state] need not be proven by direct evidence.). Instead, an individual's intent is generally proven through circumstantial evidence, often in the form of expert testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d 1236, 1239-43 (7th Cir.1994) (examining in depth the role of expert testimony by law enforcement officers as circumstantial evidence of an individual's intent); Solis, 923 F.2d at 551 (finding expert testimony helpful to establish ... intent through circumstantial evidence); cf. Pavlick, 90 F.3d at 209 (Whether a [defendant acted with a requisite mental state] is a question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference from circumstantial evidence. (quotations omitted)). As we have explained, experts simply describe[ ] in general terms the common practices of those [hypothetical individuals] who clearly do possess the requisite intent, leaving unstated the inference that the defendant, having been caught engaging in more or less the same practices, also possessed the requisite intent. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1239. The jury is then left to decide whether to make the logical connection from the expert's testimony to the case at hand. In offering expert testimony as circumstantial evidence of a defendant's intent, however, courts must be wary that the expert witness not cross into the jury's realm or otherwise risk prejudicing the jury. See Fed.R.Evid. 704(b), 403. Morris contends Welsh's testimony did both. Rule 704 governs opinions that witnesses offer on so-called ultimate issues. The rule is divided into two parts, a general rule and an exception. The general rule states that testimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Fed.R.Evid. 704(a). The exception provides as follows: No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. Id. 704(b). [3] Under the rule, the potential problem arises when experts stray from their analysis of detached facts and offer opinions regarding the defendant's actual mental state; such conclusions are meant to be the exclusive province of the jury. It must be clear from the expert's testimony that he was merely identifying an inference that might be drawn from the circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest, and was not purporting to express an opinion as to the defendant's actual mental state. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1240 (quotations omitted). Rule 403, meanwhile, permits a court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Testimony runs the risk of being overly prejudicial when, as here, the expert witness was a law enforcement officer who was also involved in the investigation at issue. See Upton, 512 F.3d at 401; Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1242; see also United States v. Alvarez, 837 F.2d 1024, 1030 (11th Cir.1988) (discussing the serious risk of undue prejudice that arises from a government agent testifying as an expert); United States v. Brown, 776 F.2d 397, 401 n. 6 (2d Cir.1985) (noting that the risk of prejudice is increased when the expert opinion is given by the very officers who were in charge of the investigation (quotations omitted)). The danger is that the jury may attach undue weight to the officer's testimony, either by mistaking an expert opinion for what is really only an eyewitness observation, or by inferring that the officer's opinion about the criminal nature of the defendant's activity is based on knowledge of the defendant beyond the evidence at trial. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1242 (quotations omitted). We find that the content and context of Sergeant Welsh's testimony avoided the potential pitfalls contemplated by Rules 704 and 403. Perhaps most importantly, Welsh testified only as an expert. This is a marked difference from previous cases dealing with this issue, where the relevant witness took the stand as both a lay witness and an expert. See, e.g., Upton, 512 F.3d at 398; United States v. Mansoori, 304 F.3d 635, 653 (7th Cir.2002); Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1238; United States v. de Soto, 885 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir.1989). Here, the government produced numerous members of the Metro Narcotics Unit who testified to the events of June 2, 2005, the day of the raid on 707 Albert. Sergeant Welsh was not one of them. Instead, Welsh's testimony focused exclusively on his expert opinions regarding the drug trade in Rockford and his analysis of the facts related to Morris's case, e.g., that 23.7 grams of heroin, possessed by anyone, would be consistent with distribution quantity. Never once did Welsh refer to Lonnie Morris specifically or even allude to his impressions or recollections from the day of the search, nor did he express an opinion about Morris's actual state of mind. See Mancillas, 183 F.3d at 706 (concluding that a dual-role witness based his opinion on his knowledge of the drug trade rather than on any alleged or conceived familiarity with the working of [the defendant's] mind); Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1243. This is not to say that the jury was unaware of Welsh's role in the Morris investigation. Several government witnesses referred to Sergeant Welsh during their testimony, and Welsh acknowledged on the stand that he was the supervisor of the MNU and had been involved in the search of 707 Albert. Notably, however, virtually all of Welsh's statements regarding his role in the investigation were not brought out by the government but rather were elicited by defense counsel on cross-examination. The government's decision not to use Welsh as a fact witness was an important step in avoiding potential juror confusion or crossing the line into improper opinion. See Mansoori, 304 F.3d at 654 (recognizing a reduced potential for prejudice where the government structures testimony in such a way as to make clear when the witness is testifying to facts and when he is offering his opinion as an expert). In addition, the district court gave a standard instruction to the jury, reminding it of the following: You should judge [expert] testimony in the same way that you judge the testimony of any other witness. The fact that such a person has given an opinion does not mean you're required to accept it. Give the testimony whatever weight you think it deserves considering the reasons given for the opinion, the witness' qualifications, and all the other evidence in the case. We have found the use of similar instructions to be another factor mitigating against jury confusion. See, e.g., id. (finding it helpful when the jury was instructed that the fact an expert has given an opinion does not mean that it is binding upon you or that you are obligated to accept the expert's opinion as to the facts). Given these facts, we conclude that the district court did not admit Sergeant Welsh's testimony in violation of Rule 704(b) because it was made clear in the nature of the examination[ ] that the opinion [was] based on the expert's knowledge of common criminal practices, and not on some special knowledge of the defendant's mental processes. Lipscomb, 14 F.3d at 1242. For the same reasons, Welsh's testimony was not unfairly prejudicial and did not violate Rule 403.