Opinion ID: 535572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequacy of the Trial Court's Findings

Text: 19 The trial court's decision in this case is ambiguous in its findings, so we are at a loss to assess the merits of the appellants' appeal. On the one hand, the District Court's judgment in Palmer I suggests that between 1982 and mid-1984 the District discriminated against Palmer in failing to promote him, but that after mid-1984 the District acted toward Palmer pursuant to legitimate business reasons. If so, and if there is no reason to toll Title VII's charge-filing period, then, as Palmer's counsel conceded at oral argument, his complaint must be rejected as untimely. However, Palmer I and Palmer II also suggest that the District's discriminatory treatment of Palmer may have extended beyond mid-1984. See, e.g., Palmer I, slip op. at 3, reprinted in A. 63 (District offered no evidence that policy of making race a factor in Fire Department promotions had changed); id. at 4-5, reprinted in A. 64-65 (Mayor's policy goal was achieved in part ... by leaving the Communications Division without a Deputy Chief until after plaintiff retired and was replaced); Palmer II, slip op. at 2, reprinted in A. 70 (Palmer's allegations of discrimination after mid-1984 not found unconnected with his allegations of discrimination before that time). 20 It is possible that the trial court intended to find that the District had a mixed motive for not promoting Palmer after mid-1984. However, such a finding would require an application of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). Alternatively, the trial court may have believed that only the effects of the District's earlier discriminatory treatment of Palmer remained after mid-1984. But on this theory--absent some reason to toll the statute--the complaint was filed outside Title VII's filing period. It is well settled that effects alone are not sufficient to defeat a time bar, even under a continuing violations theory of liability. See Milton v. Weinberger, 645 F.2d 1070 (D.C.Cir.1981); United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). 21 While we recognize that there are several possible ways to construe the District Court's findings and conclusions, no single interpretation is evidently correct. Thus, because we cannot discern the District Court's rationale for its judgment, and because the trial court's decision contains seemingly inconsistent findings, we must remand for further proceedings. 22 On remand, the District Court must make specific findings as to whether the District discriminated against Palmer after mid-1984, applying the principles of either Burdine and McDonnell Douglas or Price Waterhouse. If there was such discrimination, then it would appear that Palmer's complaint was timely filed. 3 If the complaint was not timely filed, then the trial court must determine whether an application of the discovery rule might toll the limitations period. 4 See Wislocki-Goin v. Mears, 831 F.2d 1374, 1380-81 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 936, 108 S.Ct. 1113, 99 L.Ed.2d 274 (1988) (discovery rule available for Title VII claim); Tucker v. United Parcel Service, 657 F.2d 724, 726 (5th Cir.1981) (same); see also Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818 n. 22, 100 S.Ct. 2486, 2493 n. 22, 65 L.Ed.2d 532 (1980) (reserving judgment on availability of discovery rule). If the appellee requests the trial court to consider the applicability of a discovery rule, then the court must also consider whether Palmer is free to raise the issue at this juncture in the litigation (not having raised it during the initial trial).