Opinion ID: 1919018
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tate's June 20, 2003, and September 12, 2001, arrests

Text: ¶ 19. Tate argues that the trial court should not have allowed the State to introduce evidence of his June 20, 2003, arrest for possession of marijuana and possession with intent to deliver and his September 12, 2001, arrest for possession of marijuana. The trial court allowed the State to cross-examine Tate about these arrests after concluding that Tate had opened the door by claiming on direct examination that he was no longer involved in selling drugs. ¶ 20. Tate further argues that the admission of the June 20, 2003, arrest is reversible error because this arrest occurred after the incident for which he was on trial and because this arrest was not a rebuttal of Tate's testimony. He points out that, in his trial testimony, he acknowledged that he smoked marijuana, but denied selling it, and that his arrest for possession of marijuana does not rebut his statement that he did not sell marijuana. Furthermore, Tate points out that his September 12, 2001, arrest was dismissed or nolle prossed, and therefore was not a conviction or active charge, and should not have been presented to the jury. ¶ 21. The State responds that Tate's June 20, 2003, arrest was admissible in response to Tate's testimony that he did not engage in marijuana commerce. [9] The State points out that the arrest was for possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, and therefore it does rebut Tate's testimony that he did not sell marijuana. The State further says Tate opened the door when he claimed he no longer sold marijuana, and the conviction was properly admitted to impeach him under Morgan v. State, 741 So.2d 246, 254-55 (Miss.1999). ¶ 22. The State points out that Smothers v. State, 756 So.2d 779, 784 (Miss.Ct.App.1999), holds that a conviction that occurred subsequent to the crime for which the defendant is on trial is properly admissible. ¶ 23. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the State to question Tate about the June 20, 2003, and September 12, 2001, arrests as rebuttal to Tate's testimony. In ruling on this issue, the trial court stated: I know it is probably a close question, but I think by claiming such in the presence of this jury that he has invited cross-examination on that subject. The proverbial barn door has been opened. That is, Supreme Court Justice Robertson alluded to in one case of how wide the door was opened. In my considered judgment as a Trial Judge, the door is open sufficiently wide for the State to be able to question him about the June incident, so that is going to be my ruling. I'm going to allow cross-examination on other acts of alleged misconduct relating to the issue of this defendant's previous disposition as well as evidence of a later incident since the door, in my judgment, has been sufficiently opened on direct examination for the State in the normal course of cross-examination to question the accused regarding that assertion to the jury that he no longer has been involved in drugs. ¶ 24. We find the learned trial judge's reasoning to be exactly correct. In light of Tate's testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Tate had opened the door for cross-examination on his drug-related activities. Moreover, Tate has not shown prejudice or that a substantial right has been adversely affected by this ruling, and for a case to be reversed on the admission or exclusion of evidence, it must result in prejudice and harm or adversely affect a substantial right of a party. K-Mart Corp. v. Hardy ex rel. Hardy, 735 So.2d 975, 983 (Miss.1999) (citing Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 132 (Miss.1991)).