Opinion ID: 2486921
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Service upon an Agent Authorized by Law

Text: The Court of Civil Appeals in its opinion further notes, but rejects the applicability in this case of, the principle that service of process may be made upon an agent who is authorized by law to receive service of process on behalf of the defendant. 70 So.3d at 1227. I agree that this principle is not applicable to service upon Kathy James as a purported agent of LVNV, but I do not understand the particular principle discussed by the Court of Civil Appeals in the same manner as does that court. Specifically, the Court of Civil Appeals quotes Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd. v. Ayers, 886 So.2d 45 (2003), for the principle that `[t]o establish proper service on a corporation by service on an alleged agent not authorized by appointment of the corporation, a plaintiff must prove that the corporation exercised a high degree of control over the alleged agent. 886 So.2d at 51 (quoting Horizons 2000, [Inc. v. Smith, ] 620 So.2d [606,] 607 [(Ala. 1993)].)' 70 So.3d at 1227 (quoting Kingvision, 886 So.2d at 51); see also Horizons 2000, Inc. v. Smith, 620 So.2d 606, 608 (Ala.1993) (noting that a high degree of control would require much more control than would suffice to support an imposition of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior ). Kingvision and Horizons 2000 both relied upon Ex parte Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 443 So.2d 880 (Ala.1983). Volkswagenwerk, however, concerned whether service of process upon a subsidiary corporation was sufficient service as to a parent corporation in a piercing-of-the- corporate -veil analysis. This Court stated the pertinent law as follows: The party seeking to prove proper service must at least show that the parent corporation `exercises such control and domination over the subsidiary that it no longer has a will, mind or existence of its own, and operates merely as a department of the parent corporation.' Professional Investors Life Ins. Co., Inc. v. Roussel, 445 F.Supp. 687, 698 (D.Kan. 1978). Alternatively, the party seeking to have service on the subsidiary and the parent may show that `[T]he parent corporation has complete control over the subsidiary, conducting its business and creating its policies ... (or the subsidiary) is a mere adjunct and instrumentality of the parent ... (or the) subsidiary corporation is merely a dummy by means of which the parent corporation does business in the state ....'  Fletcher's Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 8773 at 527-528, cited in, Stoehr v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 429 F.Supp. 763, 766 (D.Neb.1977). Volkswagenwerk, 443 So.2d at 884 (emphasis added). We concluded that the [r]espondent ha[d] submitted overwhelming evidence of the high degree of control had by [the parent corporation] over the internal affairs of [the subsidiary corporation] and that service upon the subsidiary corporation as the agent in fact of the parent corporation was sufficient. 443 So.2d at 885. This analysis obviously is inapposite where the proposed agent is an individual. In Horizons 2000, upon which Kingvision also relied, this Court discussed, but actually stopped short of deciding, the applicability of the rule of Volkswagenwerk  to a situation involving physical delivery of service to an individual. The Court noted that it was fairly debatable whether Tompkins was `controlled' in a respondeat superior sense, as the Smiths say he was, or whether he was an independent contractor for Horizons, as Horizons says he was. However, Volkswagenwerk indicates that the plaintiff must show that the defendant exercised a `high degree of control' over the alleged agent in order for the court to imply the authority to be an agent for service of process; certainly, Volkswagenwerk would require much more control than would suffice to support an imposition of liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Although there may be some evidence of slight `control' in this case, the plaintiffs presented no evidence that Horizons had the `high degree of control' over Tompkins necessary to support a finding that he had authority to accept service of process for Horizons. Horizons 2000, 620 So.2d at 607-08. In discussing the Volkswagenwerk rule, however, this Court noted: [W]e assume, arguendo, that the law would in this context impute `authorized agent' status. Horizons very briefly alludes to this issue in a footnote to its argument on appeal. Given the lack of discussion or analysis of this question by the parties, we do not address it here. 620 So.2d at 607 n. 1. I caution against continuing down the road of attempting to apply Volkswagenwerk's piercing-of-the- corporate -veil analysis to cases where it is inapposite, i.e., where the proposed agent is a natural person rather than another corporation.