Opinion ID: 179428
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants Lanzer and Romes

Text: Reid Machinery and Robinson sued Deputies Lanzer and Romes in their individual capacities, and the deputies argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. “Under the doctrine of qualified immunity, government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Qualified immunity is a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutional right, and (2) whether the constitutional right was “clearly established” at the time of the violation. Pearson v. Callahan, --- U.S. ---, 129 S. Ct. 808, 815–16 (2009). This court may “exercise [its] sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” Id. at 818. 5 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al.
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . .” U.S. CONST . amend. IV. This court has concluded that, under the Fourth Amendment, police officers may stop a vehicle if they have reasonable suspicion of an ongoing crime. United States v. Hughes, 606 F.3d 311, 316 n.8 (6th Cir. 2010). Reasonable suspicion requires less proof than probable cause, but it must be “‘more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch.’” United States v. Garrido, 467 F.3d 971, 981 (6th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). We “‘must look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002)). Officers are permitted “to draw on their own experience and specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained person.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiffs first argue that the deputies needed probable cause to effectuate the stop and detain the truck because the stop was not investigatory but rather “the first step in executing a plan calculated to detain and impound the vehicle at the County Engineers’ Garage.” Appellants Br. at 32. They rely on a phone call between Deputy Romes and a Pioneer, Ohio police officer that occurred in the morning before the deputies stopped Robinson to argue that the deputies had already decided, at the time of the stop, to impound it at the garage. This argument fails, however, because “the permissibility of a traffic stop turns not on subjective intent, but rather on objective fact.” 6 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al. Hughes, 606 F.3d at 315 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996)). The court “‘may not look at the officer’s ordinary routine, or his conduct or conversations that occurred before or after the stop to invalidate the stop as pretextual.’” Id. at 317 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 828 (1994)). The plaintiffs also argue that the deputies have offered what they term “post hoc rationalizations” to justify the stop of the truck, including that the deputies had conducted research on the truck’s SHP prior to initiating the stop. Appellants Br. at 23, 35. The plaintiffs, however, offer no evidence to contradict the evidence in the record that the deputies, experienced in weight enforcement, observed the truck impeding traffic and observed that it had a visible load, bulging tires, and sluggish movement. App. at 1124 (statement of Romes and Lanzer); id. at 1126 (citation report). The deputies’ on-the-scene observations alone gave them reasonable suspicion that the truck was traveling in violation of Ohio law, and thus justified the stop of the truck. Cf. Brierley v. Schoenfeld, 781 F.2d 838, 841 (10th Cir. 1986) (concluding that the officer, experienced in truck enforcement, had reasonable suspicion that the truck was overweight “based upon his observation of the squatty rear-axle tires”). We must also consider whether the scope and duration of the stop violated the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Bell, 555 F.3d 535, 541 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 2887 (2009). After stopping the truck, reviewing the SHP, and briefly inspecting the truck, the deputies had reason to believe that the load was not secured properly and that the load’s width exceeded the width stated in the permit—potential violations that would render the SHP void. These 7 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al. particularized and objective facts continued to support the deputies’ original suspicion that the truck and load were in violation of Ohio’s weight and size laws, and justified the continued detention of the truck and Robinson for further investigation.6 Upon review of the record, we conclude that the deputies’ investigation was “reasonably related in scope to [the] circumstances justifying the original [stop].” Bell, 555 F.3d at 541 (internal quotation marks omitted). It was also reasonable for the deputies to ask Robinson to move the truck to a nearby side road where it would be safer to weigh and measure more accurately the truck. See Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 504 (1983) (“[T]here are undoubtedly reasons of safety and security that would justify moving a suspect from one location to another during an investigatory detention . . . .”); United States v. Perez, 440 F.3d 363, 372 (6th Cir.) (“The investigative means used should also be the least intrusive means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicions in a short period of time.” (emphasis added) (citing Royer, 460 U.S. at 500)), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1014 (2006); cf. V-1 Oil Co. v. Means, 94 F.3d 1420, 1427–28 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that it was reasonable for the officer “to order the truck to the port of entry three to five miles away for a safety inspection . . . because it was safer than a roadside inspection”). In light of the duration, the stop was no “longer than reasonably necessary for the [deputies] to complete the purpose of the stop,” Bell, 555 F.3d at 541, and the deputies were not “dilatory in their investigation.”7 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 687–88 (1985). 6 This is not a case in which the original purpose of the stop was completed yet the deputies continued to detain the vehicle. See, e.g., Garrido, 467 F.3d at 981. 7 The four-and-a-half-hour duration of the stop in this case exemplifies that the stop of a large commercial truck for suspected weight or load violations is much different than the typical 8 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al. Finally, the deputies’ decision to follow the county’s policy of escorting superload trucks to the county garage and keeping them there until a valid permit is obtained also does not violate the Fourth Amendment.8 See United States v. Kimes, 246 F.3d 800, 805 (6th Cir. 2001) (“Discretion as to impoundment is permissible ‘so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of criminal activity.’” (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375–76 (1987)); “The Fourth Amendment permits impoundment decisions . . . that are objectively justifiable . . . regardless of an officer’s subjective intent.” (citing Whren, 517 U.S. at 812)), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1085 (2002). For these reasons, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that the deputies did not violate the plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights, and therefore were entitled to qualified immunity. automobile stop for traffic violations. We note that it may be more appropriate to analyze the warrantless stop, inspection, and weighing of commercial trucks under the pervasively regulated industries doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987). See United States v. Dominguez-Prieto, 923 F.2d 464, 465 (6th Cir.) (applying Burger to Tennessee’s commercial trucking inspection program), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936 (1991); see also United States v. Steed, 548 F.3d 961, 967 n.5 (11th Cir. 2008) (collecting cases concluding that commercial trucking is a pervasively regulated industry); United States v. Delgado, 545 F.3d 1195, 1201–02 (9th Cir. 2008) (same), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1383 (2009). Because the parties did not raise the issue, however, we decline to consider whether Ohio’s weight and size laws provide a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant under Burger. 8 The plaintiffs also allege that the deputies told Robinson that he needed a Williams County permit and a court order to have the truck released. The district court concluded that these allegations are insufficient to support a Fourth Amendment claim. Reid Mach., Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d at 864. The plaintiffs fail to develop any argumentation relating to these allegations before this court, and therefore we deem the issue waived. La Quinta Corp. v. Heartland Props. LLC, 603 F.3d 327, 338 n.5 (6th Cir. 2010). 9 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving “any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” U.S. CONST . amend. XIV, § 1. Reid Machinery alleges both procedural and substantive due-process claims. With respect to procedural due process, Reid Machinery argues that there is no appeal or review process of the deputies’ decision to void the SHP, and that the process to apply for a replacement permit does not satisfy due process. With respect to substantive due process, Reid Machinery argues that (1) the conditions contained in the SHP were “unlawfully formulated,” Appellants Br. at 38–41; (2) the Director of ODOT unlawfully imposed an additional penalty by including special conditions to the permit; (3) the special conditions were unlawful because the Director did not generate the conditions; and (4) the conditions subject those holding permits to arbitrary enforcement. We need not address the merits of Reid Machinery’s due-process claims, however, because it cannot show that the alleged procedural and substantive due-process violations were caused by actions of the defendant deputies. The district court noted that the “[p]laintiffs use ‘substantive due process’ as an umbrella under which they group several attacks on features of the Ohio system of weight and dimension restrictions, and the Special Hauling Permits that are issued as a part of that system.” Reid Mach., Inc., 614 F. Supp. 2d at 865–66 (emphasis added). In other words, the dueprocess complaints concern the Ohio permitting scheme. Reid Machinery does not tie its complaints about the permitting system to actions taken by defendants Lanzer and Romes. See Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (“[T]o establish personal liability in a § 1983 action, it is enough to show that 10 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al. the official, acting under color of state law, caused the deprivation of a federal right.” (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)); McKinley v. City of Mansfield, 404 F.3d 418, 438 (6th Cir. 2005) (“‘[A] public official is liable under § 1983 only if he causes the plaintiff to be subjected to a deprivation of his constitutional rights.’” (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142 (1979))), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1090 (2006). The only potential connection between the deputies’ actions and Reid Machinery’s dueprocess complaints is the deputies’ “decision to revoke a permit.” Appellants Br. at 24. Reid Machinery argues that the deputies “subjected [plaintiffs] to enforcement of a patently unlawful criteria [sic] . . . .” Id. at 48. An officer’s action taken “in good-faith reliance on a presumptively valid [law] is valid regardless of a subsequent judicial determination of its unconstitutionality.” Risbridger v. Connelly, 275 F.3d 565, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 33 (1979)); see also Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347, 366–67 (6th Cir. 2007) (Sutton, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (collecting cases). Even if we assume, arguendo, that the Ohio permitting scheme violates the Reid Machinery’s due-process rights, the deputies have immunity because “we cannot conclude that a reasonable officer would have known that [enforcement of the SHP scheme] in this situation would violate due process.” Risbridger, 275 F.3d at 573. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants Lanzer and Romes on Reid Machinery’s § 1983 claim of due-process violations. 11 No. 09-3665 Reid Machinery Inc. et al. v. Lanzer et al.