Opinion ID: 415388
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ill Rev.Stat. ch. 70, paragraphs 1-2.2 (1981). Section 2 of the Act provides in part:

Text: Every [wrongful death] action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and, except as otherwise hereinafter provided, the amount recovered in every such action shall be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person and in every such action the jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death, to the surviving spouse and next of kin of such deceased person. 2 I.R.C. Sec. 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on account of personal injuries or sickness. This section has been interpreted to include damage awards in wrongful death actions. See Rev.Rul. 54-19, 1954-1 C.B. 179; Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490, 496 & n. 12, 100 S.Ct. 755, 759 & n. 12, 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980) 3 Rule 402 provides: All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. 4 Rule 401 provides: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Liepelt held that evidence of the income tax that would have been due on lost income is demonstrably relevant, 444 U.S. at 495, 100 S.Ct. at 758, in a wrongful death action under FELA, whose measure of recovery is 'the damages ... [that] flow from the deprivation of the pecuniary benefits which the beneficiaries might have reasonably received,'  id. at 493, 100 S.Ct. at 757, quoting Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 70, 33 S.Ct. 192, 196, 57 L.Ed. 417 (1913). 5 Rule 403 provides: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 6 The pattern jury instructions recommend that in a case of wrongful death of an adult leaving lineal survivors the jury be instructed that: [i]n determining pecuniary loss ... you may consider what benefits of pecuniary value, including money, goods, and services the decedent might reasonably have been expected to contribute to the [survivor] had the decedent lived, bearing in mind the following factors concerning the decedent: 1 What he customarily contributed in the past; 2 What he earned or what he was likely to have earned in the future; 3 What he spent for customary personal expenses [and other deductions]; 4 What instruction, moral training, and superintendence of education he might reasonably have been expected to give his [child] [children] had he lived; 5 His age; 6 His health; 7 His habits of industry, sobriety, and thrift; 8 His occupation 7 Our conclusion would be different if Illinois interpreted its own substantive law to include a right to such a possible bonus. It is only because the result in Hall seems to depend on its view of the requirements of federal law (a characterization reinforced by the Illinois Supreme Court's abstract formulation of the measure of damages in wrongful death cases) that we find it not controlling. Cf. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1395, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (when state ground for decision is dependent on federal law, a federal question is presented); Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 568, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 2853, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977) (same) 8 This case's posture distinguishes it from Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d at 1097, in which the Fifth Circuit refused to order a new trial for failure to give a tax instruction, because there was no indication that the verdict had been inflated. Here, we review the rules for a future trial, not a completed one 9 Such tax evidence need not be limited to the amount of tax the decedent would have paid on lost income. Because damage awards are reduced to present value with the expectation that by investment they will replace a lost future income stream, and because the interest so earned is taxable as income, see In re Air Crash Disaster, 526 F.Supp. at 227 n. 1, it may be necessary to consider evidence on the amount by which the damage award should be increased to account for this tax. See Liepelt, 444 U.S. at 495, 100 S.Ct. at 758