Opinion ID: 1110731
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Flora's objections to prosecutor's remarks made in closing.

Text: ¶ 44. Flora next argues it was error for the trial court to overrule his objections to improper and prejudicial comments made by the prosecutor on closing rebuttal. The prosecutor reminded the jury of all of the physical evidence against Flora and then said if you acquit him, you will disregard every piece of physical evidence entered by the State ... and you will only believe Milton Flora. The prosecutor added [t]hat's the only way you let him go. Flora objected, arguing that the jury should not be told that they let him go. ¶ 45. The standard of review that appellate courts must apply to lawyer misconduct during opening statements or closing arguments is whether the natural and probable effect of the improper argument is to create unjust prejudice against the accused so as to result in a decision influenced by the prejudice so created. Sheppard v. State, 777 So.2d 659, 661 (Miss. 2000). Attorneys are allowed a wide latitude in arguing their cases to the jury. However, prosecutors are not permitted to use tactics which are inflammatory, highly prejudicial, or reasonably calculated to unduly influence the jury. Id. ¶ 46. Flora argues that Banks v. State, 725 So.2d 711 (Miss.1997), should apply in this case. In Banks, this Court addressed a similar issue, where the prosecutor in closing arguments told the jury that if they set Banks free, that he would walk out of [the] courthouse was the most frightening part. Id. at 718. This Court found that statement to be improper, stating it implied a possibility that Banks would commit crimes in the future if acquitted. Id. However, there were many other errors leading to a reversal in Banks, not the least of which was that there was virtually no evidence linking Banks to the crime. Id. at 713. ¶ 47. This Court also addressed improper comments during closing arguments in Dancer v. State, 721 So.2d 583, 589 (Miss.1998), in which the prosecutor had warned jurors that if they acquitted Dancer, he would walk out of the courtroom and into their neighborhood. Although this statement was made to arouse fear in the jurors, an impermissible tactic, this Court held that, due to the overwhelming evidence against Dancer, the improper comment did not result in a decision made out of prejudice, and therefore, did not constitute reversible error. Id. at 590. ¶ 48. The comment in the present case simply informed the jury that they were the ones who had the power to convict Flora or to acquit him. It in no way implied that Flora would commit any crimes if acquitted. Unlike Banks, and much like Dancer, there was ample evidence against Flora to conclude the jury's decision was not improperly influenced by the prosecutor's comment. ¶ 49. Flora also complains of another comment made by the prosecutor during closing rebuttal. When discussing the jury instructions, the prosecutor said that a verdict of manslaughter would be a cop-out and that this was not a manslaughter case. Flora objected, stating that the comment is accusing the court of getting them to compromise or cop-out. The trial judge overruled the objection and said, [w]ell, that's her language, her argument. The jury has been instructed on following the jury instructions, and that what the lawyers say is not facts if it goes outside the record. So overruled. It's argument. ¶ 50. Flora also relies on Sheppard, in which this Court held it was improper for the prosecutor to tell the jury that if the jury voted to acquit, he wanted them to call him and explain their rationale for finding the defense witnesses credible, so he could explain it to the victim's family. Sheppard, 777 So.2d at 661. We held that [t]he purpose of the remarks was to prejudice the defense, as well as to give the jurors the impression that if they did not convict, the prosecutor was going to subject them to personal ridicule, embarrassment and questioning. Id. at 662. In the present case, the prosecutor's statement that a verdict of manslaughter would be a cop-out, while possibly riding the line between acceptability and unacceptability, in no way threatened the jury. The added safeguard of the trial court's admonition to the jury that they were to follow the instructions and that what the prosecutor said that went outside the record was not fact, but her language, was sufficient for us to hold that, at most, this was harmless error.