Opinion ID: 2318576
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fraud Instruction

Text: We also find no merit in WIP's challenge to the trial court's jury instruction on fraud. WIP proffered the instruction: A promise or contractual commitment is fraudulent if, at the time of its making, the promisor has no present intention of carrying it out.... A representation as to future events is considered a misrepresentation of fact where the evidence shows that the promise was made without the intent to perform. The trial court delivered the following instructions: For the maker of a statement to be liable for fraud, the maker must have known or believed that the statement was false.... Intent to deceive means that the maker of the statement must have specifically intended that the representation be made, that it be made to the person who actually received it, that it should convey a certain meaning, that it be believed ... [and] acted upon in a certain way.... Intent ordinarily cannot be proved directly, because there is no way to look inside another's person's mind, but you may infer intent from the surrounding circumstance. The trial court rejected WIP's instruction because it found it was covered in the other instructions. We agree with this conclusion. The refusal to grant an instruction is not grounds for reversal when the charge as given, although in a more general form, fully informs the jury as to the law. Wingfield v. Peoples Drug Store, Inc., 379 A.2d 685, 688 (D.C.1977). In Wingfield, we rejected the appellant's challenge to a general standard jury instruction in lieu of her detailed proposed instruction because the substance of the proposed instruction was covered by the general instruction. We have often defined fraud consistent with the given instruction: (1) a false representation, (2) in reference to material fact, (3) made with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with the intent to deceive, and (5) upon which action is taken in reliance. [16] Bennett v. Kiggins, 377 A.2d 57, 59 (D.C.1977). WIP's instruction reflects merely one specific wayalbeit tailored to its claims in this casethat one can commit fraud. If a jury had found that appellees had no intention to perform when they executed the AMA, they would necessarily have found that appellees signed the contract knowing its affirmation to be false and intending WIP to rely on it through performance. Applying Wingfield, supra , therefore, we are confident that the jury was adequately informed on the law of fraud and simply decided against WIP's particular theory on the issue. [17] For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury.