Opinion ID: 1210963
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Any Matter

Text: Ms. Miller argues that it is wrong to find the evidence irrelevant because the IDEA provides an opportunity to present complaints with respect to any matter relating to ... the provision of a free appropriate public education to such child. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6) (emphasis added). However, this language does not provide blanket coverage for any issue a parent wishes to raise. The Supreme Court has warned against judicial encroachment on educational policy. See Rowley, 458 U.S. at 208, 102 S.Ct. 3034. And in McQueen, we observed that [t]he role of the § 1415 process is to resolve a complaint about the education of a specific child.  488 F.3d at 874 (emphasis added). Ms. Miller has not persuaded us that S.M.'s relief will be inadequate absent alteration in APS's entire system. The Supreme Court's decision in Winkelman ex rel. Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 127 S.Ct. 1994, 167 L.Ed.2d 904 (2007), does not support Ms. Miller's unbounded interpretation of any matter. In Winkelman, the Court addressed the question of whether the rights protected by the IDEA belonged to the child alone or to both the parents and the child, concluding that various provisions accord parents independent, enforceable rights [under the IDEA]. 127 S.Ct. at 2002. In reaching its conclusion that parents were also real parties in interest (and thus able to proceed unrepresented by counsel), the Court examined § 1415(b)(6). The Court described § 1415(b)(6) as providing [a] wide range of review and as empower[ing] parents to bring challenges based on a broad range of issues. Id. at 2002, 2004. It also noted more generally that the IDEA contained provisions for expansive review and extensive parental involvement. Id. at 2002. The Court concluded that, because the IDEA does not differentiate... between the rights accorded to children and the rights accorded to parents, a parent may be a `party aggrieved' for purposes of § 1415(i)(2) with regard to `any matter' implicating these rights. Id. at 2004. Our conclusion that the additional evidence was not relevant here is not undercut by the Supreme Court's commentary about the breadth of the any matter language. The Court's analysis was focused on parents' role in the statutory procedures, and its general remarks provides no guidance regarding the outer boundaries of any matter. We agree that parents can bring challenges to a broad range of issues. But where a parent has been awarded relief that would be adequate if complied with, we have no obligation to permit a speculative argument about the school district's inability to comply with that award. Because the evidence was not relevant to the district court's review of whether additional relief was appropriate, we cannot find the exclusion of the evidence to be an abuse of discretion. [7]