Opinion ID: 2085441
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Heading: Standards for Reviewing the Constitutionality of Presumptions

Text: A presumption is a legal device which permits or requires the fact finder to assume the existence of a presumed or ultimate fact, after certain predicate or basic facts have been established. See generally M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 302.1, at 85 (6th ed.1994). This court has stated that presumptions may be divided into two broad categories: permissive and mandatory. People v. Hester, 131 Ill.2d 91, 99-100, 136 Ill.Dec. 111, 544 N.E.2d 797 (1989). A permissive presumption, or inference, is one which merely allows, but does not require, the fact finder to infer the existence of the ultimate or presumed fact upon proof of the predicate fact, without placing any burden on the defendant. County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 792 (1979). With a permissive presumption, the fact finder is free to accept or reject the suggested presumption. Hester, 131 Ill.2d at 99, 136 Ill. Dec. 111, 544 N.E.2d 797. A mandatory presumption, on the other hand, is one where the fact finder is not free to reject the proffered presumption. A mandatory presumption may be conclusive, that is `an irrebuttable direction' [citations], or it may shift the burden of proof. Hester, 131 Ill.2d at 99, 136 Ill.Dec. 111, 544 N.E.2d 797. Mandatory, irrebuttable presumptions (or conclusive presumptions) relieve[ ] the State of its burden of persuasion by removing the presumed element from the case entirely if the State proves the predicate facts. Francis, 471 U.S. at 317, 105 S.Ct. at 1972, 85 L.Ed.2d at 355. Once such a presumption is triggered, the defendant is not allowed to attempt to rebut the connection between the proven and presumed facts. Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 517, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2456, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 46-47. Mandatory presumptions which shift the burden of proof are commonly referred to as rebuttable presumptions, and may be further divided into two groups: those that shift the burden of production to the defendant and those that shift the burden of persuasion. See generally J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 303.06, at 303-18 (2d ed.1997); S. Jacobson, Mandatory and Permissive Presumptions in Criminal Cases: The Morass Created by Allen, 42 U. Miami L.Rev. 1009, 1019-22 (1988). When a mandatory rebuttable presumption shifts the burden of production to the defendant, the fact finder must find the presumed fact upon proof of the predicate facts only if the defendant fails to offer some quantum of evidence which would tend to rebut the presumed fact. If that quantum of evidence is produced, the presumption is eliminated. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16, 99 S.Ct. at 2225 n.16, 60 L.Ed.2d at 792 n. 16. When a rebuttable presumption shifts the ultimate burden of persuasion to the defendant, then, upon proof of the predicate facts, the fact finder is required to find the presumed fact unless the defendant persuades it not to do so. Allen, 442 U.S. at 157 n.16, 99 S.Ct. at 2225 n.16, 60 L.Ed.2d at 792 n.16. Inferences and presumptions play a vital role in the expeditious resolution of factual questions ( Hester, 131 Ill.2d at 98, 136 Ill.Dec. 111, 544 N.E.2d 797) and are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding. Allen, 442 U.S. at 156, 99 S.Ct. at 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d at 791. However, the use of presumptions and inferences to prove an element of a crime may raise due process concerns. The due process clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970). Thus, the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments set limits upon the power of Congress or that of a state legislature to make the proof of one fact or group of facts evidence of the existence of the ultimate fact on which guilt is predicated. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 1245, 87 L.Ed. 1519, 1524 (1943). See also, e.g., Francis, 471 U.S. at 313, 105 S.Ct. at 1970, 85 L.Ed.2d at 352-53. The United States Supreme Court has held that when there is some corroborating evidence of the defendant's guilt, the constitutionality of permissive presumptions should be judged under a more likely than not standard. Under this standard, the permissive presumption will satisfy due process concerns if the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the predicate fact. Allen, 442 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. at 2230, 60 L.Ed.2d at 798. However, where the permissive presumption is the sole and sufficient basis for a finding of guilt, the presumed fact must flow beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven, predicate fact. Allen, 442 U.S. at 166-67, 99 S.Ct. at 2229-30, 60 L.Ed.2d at 797-98. This court has adopted these tests for permissive presumptions. Hester, 131 Ill.2d at 100, 136 Ill.Dec. 111, 544 N.E.2d 797; People v. Housby, 84 Ill.2d 415, 420, 50 Ill.Dec. 834, 420 N.E.2d 151 (1981). The United States Supreme Court has long held that mandatory irrebuttable presumptions are unconstitutional. See, e.g., Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 521-23, 99 S.Ct. at 2458-59, 61 L.Ed.2d at 49-51 (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952), and United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 98 S.Ct. 2864, 57 L.Ed.2d 854 (1978)). The Court has explained that irrebuttable mandatory presumptions are unconstitutional because they conflict with the presumption of innocence. Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 523, 99 S.Ct. at 2459, 61 L.Ed.2d at 50. With respect to mandatory rebuttable presumptions, the Supreme Court at one time indicated that all such presumptions would be upheld as constitutional, so long as the presumed fact flowed beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven, predicate fact. See Allen, 442 U.S. at 167, 99 S.Ct. at 2230, 60 L.Ed.2d at 798; see also Hester, 131 Ill.2d at 99, 136 Ill.Dec. 111, 544 N.E.2d 797 (noting, though not relying upon, the reasonable doubt standard for mandatory presumptions set forth in Allen ); Housby, 84 Ill.2d at 420, 50 Ill.Dec. 834, 420 N.E.2d 151. However, after the Allen decision, the Supreme Court made it clear that mandatory rebuttable presumptions which shift the burden of persuasion are per se unconstitutional. The Supreme Court has reasoned that mandatory rebuttable presumptions which shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant are unconstitutional because they relieve the State of its burden to prove every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 524, 99 S.Ct. at 2459, 61 L.Ed.2d at 51; see also Francis, 471 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. at 1971, 85 L.Ed.2d at 353 ([s]uch [mandatory] presumptions violate the Due Process Clause if they relieve the State of the burden of persuasion on an element of an offense); Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 401-02, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1891-92, 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 447-48 (1991); Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265-66, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2420-21, 105 L.Ed.2d 218, 221-22 (1989) ( per curiam ); see also People v. Ziltz, 98 Ill.2d 38, 44, 74 Ill.Dec. 40, 455 N.E.2d 70 (1983); Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 303.06(4)(a), at 303-29; N. Roth & S. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional Crossroads, 70 Cornell L.Rev. 446, 466-69 (1985) ( Sandstrom 's inescapable import is that both conclusive presumptions and mandatory presumptions shifting the burden of persuasion [are unconstitutional]). Neither this court nor the United States Supreme Court has ruled on the constitutionality of mandatory presumptions which place a burden of production on a defendant, but which do not place the burden of persuasion on him. See Francis, 471 U.S. at 314 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. at 1971, 85 L.Ed.2d at 353 n.3 (We are not required to decide in this case whether a mandatory presumption that shifts only a burden of production to the defendant is consistent with the Due Process Clause, and we express no opinion on that question). However, the majority of commentators who have considered the question conclude that presumptions which impose a burden of production upon the defendant, like those that impose a burden of persuasion, are unconstitutional on their face. See, e.g., M. Graham, Geary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 304, at 118 (6th ed.1994); M. Graham, Presumptions-More Than You Ever Wanted to Know and Yet Were Too Disinterested to Ask, 17 Crim. L. Bull. 431, 441 (1981); Note, After Sandstrom: The Constitutionality of Presumptions That Shift the Burden of Production, 1981 Wis. L.Rev. 519, 524, 545-54 (1981); 42 U. Miami L.Rev. at 1021. In addition, several states, following the example set forth in proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 303, have enacted rules of evidence which expressly prohibit the use of all mandatory presumptions in the criminal context, both those that shift the burden of persuasion and those that shift the burden of production. See, e.g., Neb.Rev.Stat. § 27-303(2) (1997) (The judge is not authorized to direct the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused); Haw.Rev.Stat. § 626-1, Rule 306(a) (1997); Or.Rev.Stat. § 40.125 (1996); see also Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 303, at 303-1 (discussing proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 303); G. Fenner, Presumptions: 350 Years of Confusion and It Has Come To This, 25 Creighton L.Rev. 383, 402 (1992). Using the example of a jury instruction, one court has explained the constitutional problems created by a mandatory presumption which shifts the burden of production to the defendant: Instructing a jury that under certain circumstances it must draw a particular inference infringes upon both the right to trial by jury on that element and the right to have the State prove every element of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] Such an instruction is in reality just a polite form of a partial directed verdict, a procedural device which is `abhorrent to the criminal law.' [Citations.] A mandatory presumption, even a mere production-shifting one, may also place undue pressure on a defendant to waive his right to remain silent. [Citation.]    When the defendant presents no evidence to rebut this presumption, the jury is required to find an element of the crime, effectively removing that issue from the jury's consideration. In addition, the State is relieved of its burden of proving the element in question beyond a reasonable doubt. Both of these consequences violate the defendant's constitutional rights. (Emphasis in original.) Washington v. Johnson, 100 Wash.2d 607, 617, 674 P.2d 145, 151-52 (1983). But see Davis v. Allsbrooks, 778 F.2d 168, 173 (4th Cir.1985) (holding that production-shifting presumptions are to be judged under same standard as permissive presumptions); Muller v. Wisconsin, 94 Wis.2d 450, 472, 289 N.W.2d 570, 583-84 (1980) (same). We agree that in the area of criminal law, mandatory rebuttable presumptions which shift the burden of production to the defendant are unconstitutional. A production-shifting presumption places a burden on the defendant to come forward with a certain quantum of evidence to overcome the presumption. If the defendant does not satisfy that burden, the judge is required, in effect, to direct a verdict against the defendant on the element which is proved by the use of the presumption. This result conflicts with the longstanding rule that a verdict may not be constitutionally directed against a defendant in a criminal case. See, e.g., Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 516 n.5, 99 S.Ct. at 2455 n.5, 61 L.Ed.2d at 46 n.5; United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 572-73, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1355, 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 652 (1977). In sum, we agree with the commentator who noted that, [s]ince a verdict may not be directed against an accused, the burden of production with respect to an element of a crime    may never be shifted to the defendant. 17 Crim. L. Bull, at 441. Therefore, we hold that such a presumption violates the due process clause of the United States Constitution for the reasons discussed above. These same reasons lead us to hold separately that a mandatory production-shifting presumption also violates the due process clause of the Illinois Constitution.