Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Admonish the Prospective Jurors

Text: In preliminary proceedings, the court organized the jury pool into groups, telling certain prospective jurors to return for voir dire after lunch, while assigning others future times and days in which they were to return to court for voir dire. Before the latter jurors left the courtroom, the trial court did not admonish them against discussing the case, reading or listening to media accounts, or visiting the scene of the crimes. Defendant acknowledges that the statutory requirement that jurors be admonished (§ 1122) applies only after a jury is sworn and thus does not expressly apply to this preliminary period in the jury selection process. ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1094, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478.) Nevertheless, he contends the trial court's failure to admonish the jury violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a reliable guilt and penalty verdict, as well as his analogous rights under the state Constitution. We have explained that the giving of the admonition to prospective jurors during the voir dire process constitutes a sound judicial practice ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1094, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478), but that failure to do so does not constitute error. Because our Horton opinion makes no mention of whether we considered all the constitutional bases defendant now asserts, Horton does not fully dispose of defendant's claim. We nevertheless find three reasons why the claim is meritless. First, defendant failed to object or call the trial court's attention to the lack of an admonishment. The issue is thus forfeited on appeal. (Cf. People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 175, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629 [where § 1122 applies, a timely objection is necessary].) Second, even assuming the issue were preserved for appeal, we are unaware of any constitutional requirement that our trial courts admonish prospective jurors so far in advance of a trial. Certainly defendant does not cite any authority to that effect. Third, any prospective jurors who discuss the case, form opinions, view the crime scene, or do legal research can be discovered during the voir dire process and be either excused or rehabilitated at that time. Although defendant directs our attention to a few jurors who may have acquainted themselves with the law after being notified they might be chosen for the jury, he fails to explain why his right to a fair trial and an impartial jury could not be protected by rehabilitating those jurors or excusing them for cause or peremptorily if they could not be rehabilitated. He thus fails to show prejudice. ( People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 175, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) Defendant's ability to strike such jurors also protects his rights under both the state and federal Constitutions to a reliable verdict. Defendant also contends his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to ask the court to admonish the prospective jurors. He claims his counsel could have had no conceivable tactical reason for the omission. Even assuming that to be true, defendant fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced. Accordingly, he does not show his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective under either the state or federal Constitution. ( In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257, 259 Cal.Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.)