Opinion ID: 1746259
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: intentional or consciously indifferent failure to answer

Text: In order to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default judgment against the Estate, we must first consider whether the Estate's failure to answer was intentional or the result of conscious indifference. Generally, when a party relies on an agent or representative to file an answer, the party must establish that the failure to answer was not intentional or the result of conscious indifference of either the party or the agent. See Carey Crutcher, Inc. v. Mid-Coast Diesel Servs., Inc., 725 S.W.2d 500, 502 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1987, no writ); Wells v. Southern States Lumber & Supply Co., 720 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, no writ). Under the circumstances here, the inaction of the California probate attorney, Sherman Lans, meets the first Craddock test element, because an attorney is under no duty to answer a lawsuit until the client is actually served and requests the attorney to file an answer. There is no evidence in the record that anyone in Lans' firm was aware the executors had been served or was requested to file an answer before entry of the default. The failure of the Estate's attorneys to answer, under the facts, could not have been intentional or the result of conscious indifference. The Texas Secretary of State is also deemed to be an agent of the Estatebut only for service of process. TEX.CIV.PRAC. & REM.CODE § 17.044(c). The Secretary of State was obviously not legally authorized or required to answer the lawsuit, and the executors were not relying on him to do so. The Estate was not required to negate intent or conscious indifference on the part of the Secretary of State. Finally, without actual knowledge of the pending litigation, the executors' failure to answer before entry of the default judgment could not have been intentional or the result of conscious indifference. See Cliff v. Huggins, 724 S.W.2d 778, 779 (Tex.1987). Whether the executors' failure to answer was intentional or the result of conscious indifference is a fact question. See Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex. 1984); Dallas Heating Co. v. Pardee, 561 S.W.2d 16, 20 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Had the executors' affidavits not been challenged, the executors' motion and affidavits asserted facts which, if true, would negate intentional or consciously indifferent conduct. Strackbein, 671 S.W.2d at 38-39. But, McMurrey clearly did challenge the executors' affidavits by filing objections pursuant to TEX. R.CIV.P. 215(2)(b)(4) and noticing the executors' depositions. Under such circumstances, contested issues are ordinarily decided after a hearing at which witnesses present sworn testimony in person or by deposition rather than by affidavit. Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps, 842 S.W.2d 266 (Tex.1992). McMurrey should have been allowed an opportunity to develop and present evidence of her own at such an evidentiary hearing. [3] The trial court generally may not resolve disputed fact issues regarding intent or conscious indifference on affidavits alone. See Healy v. Wick Bldg. Sys., Inc., 560 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Moreover, as the party seeking protection from discovery, the Estate bears the burden of proof. Weisel Enters., Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56 (Tex.1986). The Estate is required to plead its basis for seeking protective relief and to show particular, specific and demonstrable injury by facts sufficient to justify protection. Masinga v. Whittington, 792 S.W.2d 940 (Tex. 1990). Here, that burden was not met. See Giffin v. Smith, 688 S.W.2d 112, 114 (Tex.1985). The record contains no evidence to support a finding that the Estate should be protected from discovery. The executors refused to be deposed. While the trial judge may exercise some discretion in granting protective orders, this discretion is not unlimited. Masinga, 792 S.W.2d at 940. The trial court's failure to rule on the Estate's motion for protective order denied McMurrey the opportunity to develop and present evidence. Denial of discovery without an exercise of informed discretion constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. Weisel Enters., 718 S.W.2d at 58. The trial court should have taken steps to assure McMurrey's right to discovery on the issue of whether the Estate satisfied the first element of Craddock. The trial court may not short circuit the adversary process simply because the executors failed to submit to deposition. TransAmerican Nat'l Gas Co. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913, 918 & n. 8 (Tex.1991). Because the Estate's motion for new trial presented questions of material fact upon which evidence must be developed and heard, the cause must be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Hensley v. Salinas, 583 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1979). Should the Estate continue to refuse to comply with proper discovery requests, the trial court may, after notice and hearing, make such orders as are just, and in accordance with TEX.R.CIV.P. 215.