Opinion ID: 1487979
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Cross-Racial Identification

Text: In general, a cross-racial identification occurs when an eyewitness of one race is asked to identify a particular individual of another race. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J.CRIM. L. 207, 211 (Spring 2001). Over the past half-century, a growing body of scientific laboratory and field research concerning eyewitness cross-racial identifications has emerged suggesting that some witnesses are better able to identify members of their own race, but are significantly impaired when attempting to identify individuals of another race or ethnicity. Id. at 211. This phenomenon has been termed the own-race or other-race effect, or own-race bias. See Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification: What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 230, 230 (March 2001). The majority of research on the cross-race effect has been conducted in the laboratory setting where subjects have been tested in a controlled environment using what has been termed facial recognition paradigms to evaluate the existence of the cross-race effect in various individuals. See Siegfried Ludwig Sporer, The Cross-Race Effect, Beyond Recognition of Faces in the Laboratory, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 170, 173 (March 2001). In 1984, Sheri Lynn Johnson, then an Assistant Professor of Law at Cornell University, defined a facial recognition paradigm for conducting laboratory studies regarding the ability to identify members of other races: In the typical laboratory experiment in face recognition, subjects view photographs of a number of faces that are later randomly mixed with a new set of faces. Usually the length of observation time is carefully controlled. The subject then is asked to select the old faces from among the new faces. Each subject's performance is measured by plotting hits against false alarms, and compiling the scores statistically into a single measure of observer sensitivity. In studies investigating the own-race effect, the performance of the subjects is aggregated by race and then each racial group's accuracy is measured on same-race and other-race photos. Differences in the aggregated scores are then tested for statistical significance. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-Racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L.REV. 934, 938 (June 1984) (footnotes omitted). Numerous of these studies have shown that the own-race effect is strongest when white participants attempt to recognize black faces. See e.g., P. Barkowitz & John Brigham, Recognition of Faces: Own Race Bias, Incentive, and Time Delay, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 255, 261 (1982); E.J. Chance, A.G. Goldstein & L. McBride, Differential Experience and Recognition Memory for Faces, 97 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 243, 249, 250-51 (1975); T.S. Luce, The Role of Experience in Inter-Racial Recognition, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL BULL. 39, 40 (1974); Roy Malpass, Racial Bias in Eyewitness Identification, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 42, 43 (1974). In one study, white subjects misidentified black faces two-to-three times more often than they misidentified white faces. See Roy S. Malpass & Jerome Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 330, 330-34 (1969). [6] Scientists conducting laboratory studies on the cross-race effect have disagreed on whether cross-racial impairment affects all races. At least four studies have found that black eyewitnesses do not experience cross-racial impairment in that they do not have difficulties in recognizing individuals from other races. See Barkowitz et al., supra, 12 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. at 261; Chance et al., supra, 97 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. at 249, 250-51; J.F. Cross, J. Cross & J. Daly, Sex, Race, Age and Beauty As Factors In Recognition of Faces, 10 PERCEPTION & PSYCHOPHYSICS 393, 394 (1971); Malpass, supra, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. at 43. Conversely, other studies have reported that black witnesses experience some degree of own-race effect and are significantly less able to identify white faces than faces of their own race. See R.E. Galper, Functional Race Membership and Recognition of Faces, 37 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 455, 458 (1973); Luce, supra, 1 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL BULL. at 40. [7] Only three published field studies have investigated the cross-race effect. See Sporer, supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 176. In one field study, black and white subjects posing as customers visited a series of convenience stores browsing for a few minutes and then went to the register to pay. See John C. Brigham et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications in a Field Setting, 42 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 673, 681 (1982). Researchers would then ask the convenience store clerks, some black and others white, to identify the customers from a photo array. Id. The study found some evidence of the cross-race effect in white clerks identifying black customers. Id. According to the study, the overall accuracy rate for all participants was only 34.2%, with black participants being more accurate 69.2% than whites 39.9%. Id. Specifically, white clerks misidentified white customers 34.9% of the time and misidentified black customers 54.8% of the time. Id. A second field study conducted in 1988 was modeled after the Brigham study and included Hispanic participants in addition to black and white clerks and customers. See Stephanie J. Platz & Harmon M. Hosch, Cross-Racial/Ethnic Eyewitness Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOLOGY 972, 977-78 (1988). Overall, the study found evidence of the cross-race effect. Id. White clerks correctly identified white customers 53.2% of the time, which was significantly higher as compared to the identification of black (40.4%) or Hispanic (34.0%) customers. The sample of black participants was too small to reveal any statistically significant evidence of own-race bias. Id. [8] Most recently, researchers conducted a field study in South Africa and England in which black and white participants were asked to view individuals (also black and white) in a lineup and then were asked to identify photos of individuals from the line-up. See Daniel Wright, Catherine Boyd & Colin Tredoux, Eyewitness Identification, A Field Study of Own-Race Bias in South Africa and England, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 119 (2001). The researchers found a cross-race effect in both black and white participants; however, other researchers have noted that the study's findings are difficult to compare to previous studies because of the procedures used to compile the data. See Sporer, supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 177. Overall, there is strong consensus among researchers conducting both laboratory and field studies on cross-racial identification that some witnesses are more likely to misidentify members of other races than their own. See Wells & Olson, supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 230 (stating that it is reasonable to conclude that there is internal validity to the studies showing the other-race effect). Although many scientists and researchers conducting these studies agree that some witnesses exhibit own-race bias, they disagree on the extent to which such bias affects eyewitness identification due to the variations in the statistical data showing a cross-race effect. See Sporer, supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 177; Deborah Bartolomey, Cross-Racial Identification Testimony and What Not To Do About It, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & Law 247, 249 (March 2001). In analyzing the results of the laboratory and field studies, researchers and other professionals have advanced theories to explain the existence of the cross-race effect. One initial theory was that individuals with prejudicial attitudes toward members outside of their race were more likely to exhibit own-race bias. See Christian A. Meissner & John C. Brigham, Thirty Years of Investigating the Own-Race Bias in Memory for Faces A Meta-Analytic Review, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW 3, 7 (2001). Early research indicated that racial attitudes appeared to influence the degree of stereotyping assigned to other-race members and that people with less prejudiced racial attitudes were better at recognizing people outside of their race. Id. This explanation, however, has not garnered wide support in the scientific community because researchers have failed to find a correlation between racial attitudes and the own-race effect. Id. A second theory called the ethnocentric or physiognomic homogeneity explanation hypothesizes that people exhibit own-race bias because members of a particular race have similar characteristics making it difficult to differentiate among the members. Johnson, supra, 69 CORNELL L.REV. at 945. This theory also has been criticized as ignoring evidence of anthropological studies of human faces finding no difference in perceived similarities between own and other-race faces. Id. at 943-44. A number of researchers have posited a third theory, the interracial contact theory, to explain the existence of own-race bias, stating that the quality or number of interracial contacts may play a role in the extent of own-race bias demonstrated by a particular individual. Meissner et al., supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 8. Researchers have proposed that increased contact with other-race individuals may increase a person's ability to recall features of other-race faces by: (a) reducing the likelihood of stereotypic responses and increasing the likelihood that individuals may look for more individuating information, (b) influencing individuals' motivation to accurately recognize other-race persons through associated social rewards and punishments, or (c) reducing the perceived complexity of unfamiliar other-race faces. Id. The validity of the interracial contact theory is unsettled and has not been widely accepted as a cause for own-race bias. Id. Another point of contention among researchers and scholars regarding the legitimacy of the cross-race effect is whether the results of both the laboratory and field studies are applicable to real-world situations where a victim or witness confronts an assailant and then later must attempt to identify that person. See Wells & Olson, supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 230. Proponents of the studies argue that there is no particular reason to think that the other-race effect ... does not apply [to] eyewitnesses in actual criminal cases, id., whereas others contend that studies on cross-racial identification bear little resemblance to real-life crimes. Bartolomey, supra, 7 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & Law at 249. There have not been studies on whether the cross-race effect is impacted by traumatic events. Id. One suggested alternative is that researchers conduct archival studies in which information from real criminal cases is accessed through court records and analyzed for evidence of the cross-race effect in eyewitnesses. See Wright et al., supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 120-21. This alternative, however, has not been utilized by researchers studying the own-race effect on the ground that it is difficult to draw conclusions from the information because researchers cannot control the particular situations and it would be difficult to know if a witness actually had been mistaken in his or her identification. Id. Because there is debate concerning the results of the studies on cross-racial identification, researchers and other professionals have questioned whether courts should recognize the own-race effect in cases involving cross-racial identification of a defendant by a victim or witness. See Wells & Olson, supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 230; Rutledge, supra, 28 AM. J.CRIM. L. at 211, compare Bartolomey, supra, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW at 230. Some courts, however, when addressing the issue of a cross-racial identification of a criminal defendant, without crediting the studies themselves, have permitted jury instruction or closing argument on cross-racial identification. See e.g., People v. Carrieri, 4 Misc.3d 307, 777 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (N.Y.App.2004) (permitting closing argument on cross-racial identification and stating that the quality of cross-racial witness identification fell within the ambit of jurors' general knowledge and life experience); State v. Wiggins, 74 Conn.App. 703, 813 A.2d 1056, 1059 (2003) (stating that closing argument may be employed to demonstrate the problems that might arise as a result of cross-racial identification); State v. Cromedy, 158 N.J. 112, 727 A.2d 457, 467-68 (1999) (allowing jury instruction on cross-racial identification and stating that there is a widely held commonsense view that members of one race have greater difficulty in accurately identifying members of a different race); People v. Sanders, 11 Cal.4th 475, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420, 435 (1995) (holding that defendant had not been prejudiced by trial court's refusal of expert testimony on eyewitness identification because defense counsel had been allowed to argue the problems of cross-racial identification in closing argument); State v. Cunningham, 863 S.W.2d 914, 923 (Mo.App.1993) (noting that counsel may discuss the problems with cross-racial identification in closing argument); State v. Patterson, 103 N.C.App. 195, 405 S.E.2d 200, 207 (1991) (upholding defendant's conviction based upon eyewitness identification, in part, because counsel had been allowed to argue the difficulties of cross-racial identification in closing argument).