Opinion ID: 1427180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Construction of Supplemental Base of Operations

Text: The ATC advances the proposition that supplemental base of operations includes any location other than the base of operations where an air taxi operator represents that it engages in air commerce, including the location it has flown to after leaving its base of operations. We find this interpretation of supplemental base of operations to be a violation of AIRPAC's right to free speech. Statutes should be construed, wherever possible, so as to conform to the constitutions of the United States and Alaska. McCracken v. State, 518 P.2d 85, 88 (Alaska 1974). The First Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, protects commercial speech, which is communication proposing a commercial transaction. Central Hudson v. Public Service, 447 U.S. 557, 561-2, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2348-49, 65 L.Ed.2d 341, 65 L.Ed.2d 341, 347 (1980). However, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the U.S. Constitution accords a lesser protection to commercial speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression. Id. at 563, 100 S.Ct. at 2350. Commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment, if the test of Central Hudson is met. In Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 103 S.Ct. 2875, 77 L.Ed.2d 469 (1983), the court summarized the test. It stated that: In Central Hudson we adopted a fourpart analysis for assessing the validity of restrictions on commercial speech. First, we determine whether the expression is constitutionally protected. For commercial speech to receive such protection, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. Id., at 566, 101 S.Ct. 2343, 65 L.Ed.2d 341. Second, we ask whether the governmental interest is substantial. If so, we must then determine whether the regulation directly advances the government interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Ibid. Bolger, ___ U.S. ___, 103 S.Ct. at 2881, 77 L.Ed.2d at 478. In the instant case, there is no allegation of false or misleading advertisement. Nor is the communication related to an illegal activity (such as illegal drug use). ( See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 496, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1192, 71 L.Ed.2d 362, 370 (1982). AIRPAC, Inc. holds a valid operating certificate under AS 02.05.040 and is authorized to engage in air commerce between its base of operations and any location within the state. AS 02.05.050(d)(6). However, we find that the Central Hudson test has not been met in regard to ATC's argument that the government has a substantial interest in limiting AIRPAC's right to solicit customers for its back-haul trip from Anchorage to Dutch Harbor. Part of the policy and purpose of the Air Commerce Act is to promote safe, adequate, economical and efficient service by air carriers and to provide for fair and equitable competition. AS 02.05.010. [8] It is clear that a certified air taxi operator can represent that it flies from the base of operations to location `X'. AS 02.05.050(d)(5) and AS 02.05.250(7). It is also clear that upon request, the air taxi operator may take passengers and/or cargo back to its base of operations and in fact must do so if the request is reasonable and if it is able. AS 02.05.150(1). Air safety is in no way compromised by permitting a certified air taxi operator to represent that it returns to its base of operations as it is already licensed to take passengers and/or cargo back to its base of operations. Furthermore, restricting an air taxi operator's right to solicit business for the flight back to its base of operations inhibits economical and efficient service. The incentive for an air taxi operator to establish and maintain air service from its base of operations is reduced if it cannot advertise that it provides service back to its base of operations; such a restriction also results in higher fares to compensate for these potential but lost revenues. We therefore hold that the Air Commerce Act implies that an air taxi operator, which leaves its base of operations and flies to location `X', can represent that it returns back to its base of operations and that a supplemental base has not been created if it makes such a representation. [9] Thus we conclude that AIRPAC has not created an unauthorized supplemental base in Anchorage because its aircraft was merely returning back to its base of operations in Dutch Harbor. We, therefore, affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment for the reasons set forth in this opinion. AFFIRMED.