Opinion ID: 1445615
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jackson v. Indiana

Text: The petitioner in Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. 715, was a mentally defective deaf mute who had been charged with committing two robberies in July 1967. Under Indiana procedure, comparable to California's system, a hearing was held to determine petitioner's capacity to stand trial. The report of the examining doctors concluded that Jackson's inability to hear or communicate, coupled with his mental deficiency, left him unable to understand the nature of the charges against him or to participate in his defense. The doctors had grave doubts that Jackson would ever develop the necessary communicative skills to enable him to regain the capacity to stand trial. Accordingly, the court ordered Jackson committed to the state department of mental health until such time as the department should certify that Jackson is sane. By the time the case was decided by the United States Supreme Court, Jackson had been committed for three and one-half years. The court concluded that, in light of the evidence indicating that Jackson would never regain his competence, he faced an indefinite commitment void under constitutional principles of equal protection and due process. The court noted that under Indiana law, but for the pendency of unproved criminal charges, Jackson could not be so committed, at least without a showing that he was dangerous to others or unable to care for himself. Moreover, the court explained, persons civilly committed in Indiana may obtain their release once they no longer require custodial care, whereas Jackson may not be released until he regains his competence to stand trial, a standard not necessarily related to his need for care or treatment. Accordingly, the court held that by holding Jackson to both a more lenient commitment standard and a more stringent release standard than applicable to persons not charged with criminal offenses, Indiana's procedure denied Jackson equal protection of the laws. (See Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 [15 L.Ed.2d 620, 86 S.Ct. 760].) As the court explained, If criminal conviction and imposition of sentence are insufficient to justify less procedural and substantive protection against indefinite commitment than that generally available to all others [as was held in Baxstrom, supra ], the mere filing of criminal charges surely cannot suffice. (406 U.S. at p. 724 [32 L.Ed.2d at p. 443].) Further, the court determined that Jackson's indefinite commitment violated due process, for it was not supported by any of the various justifications requisite to an extended commitment of mentally ill persons, namely, dangerousness to self, dangerousness to others, and the need for care or treatment or training. ( Id. at p. 737 [32 L.Ed.2d at p. 450].) As the court stated, At least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed. ( Id. at p. 738 [32 L.Ed.2d at p. 451].) Jackson was committed for the purpose of enabling him to regain his competence to stand trial, yet the record established that this purpose was not being, and probably never would be, achieved. Accordingly, the court adopted the so-called rule of reasonableness of the lower federal courts (see United States v. Curry (4th Cir.) 410 F.2d 1372, 1374; United States v. Walker (N.D.Cal.) 335 F. Supp. 705, 708-709), and declared: We hold, consequently, that a person charged by a State with a criminal offense who is committed solely on account of his incapacity to proceed to trial cannot be held more than the reasonable period of time necessary to determine whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain that capacity in the foreseeable future. If it is determined that this is not the case, then the State must either institute the customary civil commitment proceeding that would be required to commit indefinitely any other citizen, or release the defendant. [Fn. omitted.] Furthermore, even if it is determined that the defendant probably soon will be able to stand trial, his continued commitment must be justified by progress toward that goal. In light of differing state facilities and procedures and a lack of evidence in this record, we do not think it appropriate for us to attempt to prescribe arbitrary time limits. (406 U.S. at p. 738 [32 L.Ed.2d at p. 451]; see also McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 407 U.S. 245 [32 L.Ed.2d 719, 92 S.Ct. 2083] [invalid, indefinite commitment for observation of convicted felon].) The court rejected Jackson's contention that the pending criminal charges against him should be ordered dismissed because he was denied a speedy trial or because his indefinite commitment denied him due process. The court noted that these issues had not been presented to, or ruled upon by, the Indiana courts in the prior proceedings. The court also noted the possibility that Jackson might, under appropriate Indiana procedure, be permitted to raise certain defenses such as insufficiency of the indictment, or make certain pretrial motions, through counsel even though Jackson himself remains incompetent. The case was accordingly remanded to the state courts for further proceedings. In view of the similarities between California and Indiana procedure, it seems evident that we must adopt Jackson's rule of reasonableness in order to comply with the constitutional principles which controlled that case. As in Indiana, the standards for commitment and release of persons sought to be civilly committed in this state are significantly different than those prescribed by Penal Code section 1367 et seq., for persons found to be incompetent to stand trial. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.; Thorn v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 666 [83 Cal. Rptr. 600, 464 P.2d 56]; In re Gonzales, 6 Cal.3d 346 [99 Cal. Rptr. 17, 491 P.2d 809]; cf. In re Franklin, supra, 7 Cal.3d 126, 146.) For example, to detain (beyond an initial 72-hour treatment and evaluation period and an additional 14-day intensive treatment period) those persons alleged to have threatened, attempted or actually inflicted physical harm to others, the court or jury must first find that such threat, attempt or harm actually occurred, and that the person as a result of mental disorder, presents an imminent threat of substantial physical harm to others, ... (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5304.) On the present record, it is at least questionable whether, but for the unproved charges against them, petitioners could be committed under section 5304. This seems especially true of petitioner Davis, whose charges are evidently based solely upon his falling asleep in a laundromat. (2) Moreover, we accept Jackson's premise that due process demands that the duration of commitments to state hospitals must bear some reasonable relation to the purpose which originally justified the commitment. For example, in In re Gary W., 5 Cal.3d 296, 302-303 [96 Cal. Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201], we noted that the chief purpose of a juvenile commitment to the Youth Authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 1800 et seq., is to provide treatment for the underlying cause of the ward's dangerousness, and that any person so committed who is not receiving treatment may seek his release through appropriate habeas corpus procedures. Similarly, in In re Franklin, supra, 7 Cal.3d 126, 136-138, we explained that pre-hearing institutional commitment under Penal Code section 1026 of persons acquitted of a criminal offense by reason of their insanity may extend no longer than reasonably necessary to determine whether or not they have recovered their sanity. In the instant cases, commitment of petitioners Cowan, Davis and Palma was justified as necessary to provide observation, care and treatment of their mental condition, with a view toward restoring their capacity to stand trial. (See Pen. Code, § 1370; Note, Incompetency to Stand Trial, 81 Harv.L. Rev. 454, 462.) Under Jackson v. Indiana, supra, 406 U.S. 715, and the authorities cited above, if petitioners are making no reasonable progress toward that goal, they must be released or held subject to alternative commitment procedures. Unlike the situation in Jackson, however, the record in the cases before us furnishes no basis for concluding that petitioners are not likely to respond to treatment. Accordingly, it would be premature for us to order petitioners released from confinement at this time. In view of the fact, however, that petitioners have been confined in state hospitals for several months, we believe that the hospitals' authorities should report without undue delay regarding the current status of petitioners' progress toward competence. [4] Such reports should be prepared for all persons heretofore or hereafter committed as incompetent to stand trial, and should be submitted to the superior court which originated the commitment. (3) With respect to future commitments, we think that in order to comply with Jackson's demands the trial courts should henceforth direct the appropriate state hospital authorities to commence an immediate examination of the person committed and, within a reasonable time, [5] report to the court the result of that examination and estimate the additional time probably necessary to restore the person to competence. Should the person committed desire to challenge the report's conclusions, reasonable opportunity should be provided him to do so. [6] If the report discloses that there exists no reasonable likelihood that the person will recover his competence to stand trial in the foreseeable future, then the court should either order him released from confinement or initiate appropriate alternative commitment proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5000 et seq.). On the other hand, if the report is optimistic regarding the person's probable recovery, the court should continue his commitment and require the hospital authorities to furnish, within a reasonable time, [7] additional periodic reports regarding the person's progress. (4) The trial court necessarily must exercise sound discretion in deciding whether, in a particular case, sufficient progress is being made to justify continued commitment pending trial. To guide its discretion, the trial court should consider, among other things, the nature of the offense charged, the likely penalty or range of punishment for the offense, and the length of time the person has already been confined. Obviously, if a defendant is charged only with a minor misdemeanor a lengthy commitment to state hospital normally would be unjustified. On the other hand, if, despite the minor nature of the charge upon which defendant is currently held, the hospital authorities have cause to believe the defendant constitutes a serious threat to his own safety or that of others, they should report those beliefs to the court so that it may order the initiation of appropriate commitment proceedings, as indicated above.