Opinion ID: 1913753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Denial of Jury Instruction

Text: Stetter argues that the trial court erred in rejecting his proposed jury instruction. Stetter claims that, by refusing his jury instruction, the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the proper standard of conduct for a defendant to be found guilty of manslaughter in the first-degree and therefore, his motion for a new trial should have been granted. Stetter, relying upon State v. Seidschlaw, 304 N.W.2d 102 (S.D.1981), argues that manslaughter in the first-degree requires proof that the use of the automobile was of such a nature that death or serious bodily harm was a probable result. Id. at 106. According to Stetter, while his proposed jury instruction defined the correct standard of conduct under Seidschlaw, the trial judge merely instructed the jury as to the elements, refusing to instruct the jury on any proper standard of conduct. Stetter's proposed jury instruction provided: In order to convict defendant of Manslaughter in the 1st degree, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct consisted of driving behavior manifesting willful and wanton misconduct. Jury instructions are adequate, if, when considered as a whole, they correctly state the law and inform the jury. State v. Gillespie, 445 N.W.2d 661, 664 (S.D.1989) (citations omitted). Jury Instruction No. 14 provided: The elements of the offense of manslaughter in the first degree as charged in Count I-B of the Indictment, each of which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, are: 1. That the defendant at the time and place alleged in the indictment, caused the death of Krista Baker. 2. That the killing by the defendant was by means of a dangerous weapon. 3. That the defendant did so without design to effect the death of Krista Baker. Jury Instruction No. 15 provided: The words dangerous weapon as used in these instructions mean: any firearm, knife or device, material or substance, whether animate or inanimate, which is calculated or designed to inflict death or serious bodily harm, or by the manner in which it is used death or serious bodily harm is a probable result. (Emphasis added). While Seidschlaw does state that [t]he driving behavior contemplated in SDCL 22-16-15 can be compared to `wilful and wanton misconduct,' as defined in the guest statute cases, 304 N.W.2d at 106 (citation omitted) (emphasis added), this language is dicta. As Stetter himself noted in his brief, Seidschlaw stands for the proposition that the first-degree manslaughter statute requires proof that the use of the automobile was of such a nature that death or serious bodily harm was a probable result.  Id. (emphasis added). What Stetter failed to note was that Jury Instruction No. 15 accurately instructed the jury on the Seidschlaw standard of conduct that he argues for in his brief. The fact that the standard of care was included in the definition of dangerous weapon is not shown to be error. Stetter has failed to demonstrate that the jury instructions, as a whole, failed to correctly state the law and inform the jury. Gillespie, 445 N.W.2d at 664.