Opinion ID: 808395
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Engage in sexual conduct with a

Text: person under eighteen years of age who is not the spouse of the offender. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.11. Subsection A of the felonious assault statute is identical to the Ohio aggravated assault statute, minus the mitigating element of provocation. State v. Deem, 533 N.E.2d 6 Having so held, we need not reach Anderson’s argument that the statute’s mens rea requirement of “knowingly” instead of “purposeful” falls short of the requirements set forth in Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2008). Begay clarified the meaning of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), but “sa[id] nothing about” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i)—the clause on which our holding rests. See Gloss, 661 F.3d at 320. No. 10-3273 United States v. Anderson Page 15 294, 299 (Ohio 1988). Therefore, because we have held, see Part VII.A, supra, that a conviction under the Ohio aggravated assault statute qualifies as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), the same must follow for subsection A of the felonious assault statute. We accordingly hold that a conviction under Ohio RevisedCode § 2903.11(A) qualifies as a violent felony under 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Nonetheless, Anderson briefly contended at oral argument that the documents before the district court did not necessarily establish the nature of his prior felonious assault conviction as required by Shepard, 544 U.S. at 26. Where it is possible to violate a statute in a way that would constitute a violent felony and in a way that would not, we “consider the indictment, guilty plea, or similar documents to determine whether they necessarily establish the nature of the prior conviction.” Gibbs, 626 F.3d at 352. Although subsection A of the felonious assault statute qualifies as a violent felony, subsection B, which prohibits persons who know that they have HIV or AIDS from engaging in sexual conduct under certain circumstances, does not readily qualify as a violent felony. Anderson argued at oral argument that because it would be possible to violate the Ohio felonious assault statute in a way that would constitute a violent felony and in a way that would not, resort to Shepard-approved documents is required to establish the nature of the prior conviction. However, Anderson did not raise this Shepard argument in his initial appellate brief. Indeed, he proceeded in his brief as though he was convicted under subsection A of the statute. (See Appellant’s Br. at 14–15.) Rather, it was the government that, preemptively, briefed this issue and responded to it. Moreover, Anderson did not file a reply to the government’s brief in which he could have addressed the Shepard issue, and he only touched briefly upon the issue at oral argument. Accordingly, Anderson has waived this argument on appeal. See Marks v. Newcourt Credit Grp., Inc., 342 F.3d 444, 462 (6th Cir. 2003) (“An appellant waives an issue when he fails to present it in his initial briefs before this court.”); Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 403 n.18 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“We do not address defendants’ belated argument . . . [because] [i]t was not presented to this court in the initial briefs on appeal and is therefore waived.”). No. 10-3273 United States v. Anderson Page 16 Therefore, we find that Anderson’s felonious assault conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA.