Opinion ID: 2552096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Evidence of Ms. F.'s Unfitness and Section 5-323

Text: In assessing whether Ms. F.'s parental rights should be terminated, the juvenile court made the following findings with respect to each of the applicable statutory provisions contained within Section 5-323(d):  The Department had adequately presented the referrals to Ms. F., who did not adequately respond to the referrals. See F.L. § 5-323(d)(1)(iii). Ms. F. provided conflicting testimony as to how long she had been clean from drugs, and had not provided the Department, or the court, with any proof that she had completed drug treatment. Regarding housing, the only documentation that she provided to the court was an unsigned copy of a settlement statement, which [did] not contain her name on it. Moreover, with respect to Ms. F.'s cleaning business (Cathy's Spic & Span Cleaning Services) the only documentary evidence was one type-written invoice from October 2008 that ha[d] no verification except for [Ms. F.'s] testimony that [it was] a bill she submitted. Finally, Ms. F. has made a stab at participating [in parenting classes], but she ha[d] not since completed one.  Ms. F. had made positive efforts to maintain contact with the Children, adjust her circumstances to facilitate the Children's return, and communicate with the Department. Yet, Ms. F. had failed to live up to her commitments under the . . . service agreements and there had been limited to no contact between Ms. F. and the Fas. See F.L. §§ 5-323(d)(2), (d)(2)(i).  Ms. F. had been paying $150 per month in child support, as required by court order. See F.L. § 5-323(d)(2)(ii).  There was insufficient evidence to show that extending the eighteen month period allowed for parental adjustment would be in the best interests of the Children. See F.L. § 5-323(d)(2)(iv).  There was no evidence that Ms. F. had abused the Children, chronically or otherwise, nor that she had subjected the children to sexual abuse or torture; there was, however, evidence of neglect, including life-threatening neglect. Some of this neglect had served as the basis for the Children's original CINA adjudications. See FL §§ 5-323(d)(3)(i), (d)(3)(iii).  There was no specific evidence that Ms. F. had refused drug treatment, but she had failed to carry out her commitments under the service agreements to enter drug treatment and drug screening. See FL § 5-323(d)(3)(ii)(2).  There was no evidence of the following: that either of the Children or Ms. F. tested positive for drugs at either Amber or Mark's birth; that Ms. F. had committed, aided, or abetted relevant crimes; or that Ms. F. had involuntarily lost parental rights to any of the Children's siblings. See FL §§ 5-323(d)(3)(ii)(1), (d)(3)(iv), (d)(3)(v).  With regard to the Children's emotional state, the court examined the state of their ties with Ms. F., the Fas, and each other, as well as how termination of parental rights would affect those connections and the Children's well-being. See FL § 5-323(d)(4). On the whole, the evidence suggested that the Children's visitation with Ms. F. had been positive, yet the Children experience some anxiety as a result of continued visitation with Ms. F. Additionally, the Children had adjusted well to their new placement, which the court described as a warm and loving home in which [the Children] refer to the foster parents as Mom and Dad or Mommy and Daddy. Amber's level of performance in kindergarten was additional evidence of a good adjustment to the placement . . . . After analyzing the relevant statutory factors, the court turned its attention to the presumption that it was in the Children's best interests to maintain Ms. F.'s parental rights: [W]e turn now to [the] substantive presumption of law, . . . that it is in the best interest to remain in the care and custody of their parents. And the issue is whether . . . that presumption has been overcome by clear and convincing evidence showing either that the parent is unfit or that exceptional circumstances exist. The court found the evidence clear and convincing that Ms. F. had a longstanding substance abuse problem, one that she had yet to overcome, and thus she was an unfit mother. [12] Accordingly, the court concluded that its was in the Children's best interests to terminate Ms. F.'s parental rights. [13] On appeal, Ms. F. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the court's finding of parental unfitness. We disagree, and hold that the court's findings are supported by testimonial and documentary evidence. According to the juvenile court, Ms. F.'s problems with substance abuse was [t]he key issue as to her parental unfitness. The court noted her long history of illegal drug use (benzodiazepines and heroin, in particular), and it found that, despite being given numerous referrals for drug treatment, Ms. F. ha[d] not responded adequately to those referrals. This finding is supported by Ms. F.'s own admission of heroin use in the past, and the fact that Ms. F. never provided the Department or the court with any proof of her recovery. She did not produce any verifying information about her claimed participation in a Narcotics Anonymous program, nor did she admit into evidence any proof that she had submitted to drug testing. Instead, she provided inconsistent testimony about how long she had been free from drugs, saying first that she had been clean since 2006 and was coming up on two years clean[,] and then changing that to 2005 and three years clean on cross-examination. Moreover, Ms. F. failed to abide by the conditions of numerous service agreements which she entered into with the Department. This was established by six different case plans submitted into evidence which stated that, for over a year, Mother ha[d] not met the terms of her service agreement. Once again, Ms. F. did not produce any evidence to rebut these assertions. Indeed, with regard to the condition that she attend parenting classes, Ms. F. even testified that she attended only three classes out of the requisite twelve before making the unilateral decision that they were unnecessary because they taught her the same exact thing that she learned in her prior parenting classes. Overall, Ms. F.'s uncooperative attitude signaled to the court that there [was] not enough evidence of hope for a change in the future. Ultimately, we see no error in the juvenile court's assessment that this evidence was clear and convincing as to Ms. F.'s unwillingness to alter her previously unfit conduct. Finally, the court's findings specific to the Children's emotional state and its conclusion that [t]he likely impact of terminating parental rights on the child's well being is that [the placement] will continue to be a stable home environment . . . . [because the] children ha[d] adjusted to the placement is supported by the testimony of two social workers. Both Okafor and Smith testified about the Children's emotional attachment to the Fas and the emotional strain caused by visits with Ms. F. Additionally, Ms. F. admitted that her children had referred to her as Ms. [C]athy instead of mom or mother, and that she had to correct them. In a TPR case, we must treat the juvenile court's evaluation of witness testimony and evidence with the greatest respect. See Cecil County Dep't of Soc. Svcs. v. Goodyear, 263 Md. 611, 622, 284 A.2d 426, 431 (1971) (holding, in a TPR case, that where the record showed enough evidence to support a trial court's findings, the greatest respect must be accorded the opportunity [it] had to [observe] the witnesses[.]). Here, Ms. F. offers no counter to the juvenile court's finding, and presents no reason why we should not credit its determinations with respect to the Children's emotional states. Consequently, we can find no clear error in the juvenile court's conclusions.