Opinion ID: 204228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Court Proceedings

Text: Birmingham filed his complaint on August 23, 2006, and filed an amended complaint (the Complaint) on December 20, before any defendants answered. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(1) (allowing one amendment without court permission if defendant has not responded). The Complaint named Experian, Equifax, and TransUnion as defendants and listed the following Verizon Defendants: [1] Verizon Communications, Inc., and Vodafone Group, PLC, a joint venture dba Verizon Wireless; [2] Cellular Inc. Network Corporation, Utah RSA 6 Limited Partnership, Verizon Power Partners Inc. and Wasatch Utah RSA No. 2 Limited Partnership dba Verizon Wireless; [3] Verizon Wireless Utah, LLC operating under the name and style of Verizon Wireless; [4] Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC, operating under the name and style of Verizon Wireless. Aplt.App., Vol. I at 1. The Complaint stated that any reference to Verizon was a reference to whichever of the above named Verizon entities in fact provided cellular telephone service to the Plaintiff and billed him for the cellular telephone service complained of below. Id. at 5. It alleged that the Verizon Defendants violated the FCRA, 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b), and were liable under Utah law for negligence, defamation, invasion of privacy, and violations of the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act. An answer was filed on February 5, 2007, for Verizon Communications Inc.; Cellular, Inc. Network Corporation; Utah RSA 6 Limited Partnership; Verizon Power Partners, Inc.; Wasatch Utah RSA No. 2 Limited Partnership; Verizon Wireless Utah, LLC, operating under the name and style of Verizon Wireless; and Verizon Wireless (VAW) LLC. Vodafone Group, Plc, which had been named in the Complaint as belonging to a Verizon Wireless joint venture with Verizon Communications Inc., did not file an answer. On April 17, 2007, the district court issued a scheduling order requiring fact discovery to be completed by November 15. Birmingham's scatter-gun naming of Verizon Defendants perhaps made sense at the outset of the lawsuit. Determining who was the precise entity that had caused the alleged harm could have been a substantial challenge. But, as the following account shows, the matter was clarified within months, and Birmingham, inexplicably, did not respond appropriately. The first important information came to Birmingham the same day as the district court's scheduling order (April 17, 2007), about two months after the Verizon Defendants filed their answer. Counsel for the Verizon Defendants (Verizon's counsel) sent Birmingham's counsel a letter stating that Verizon Wireless (VAW), LLC was the only defendant that could have done business with Birmingham, because it was the only named entity that was licensed to provide cellular service in Mr. Birmingham's market. Id., Vol. IV at 1533. He requested that Birmingham stipulate to dismissal of the other entities, but Birmingham did not agree. The record reflects no further activity in the case until November 13, when the parties filed a joint motion to extend the discovery deadline to February 15, 2008. The district court granted the motion. Two days before that deadline, Birmingham moved for entry of default against Vodafone Group, Plc, which entered a special appearance (through Verizon's counsel) to oppose the motion, claiming improper service of the complaint. The court scheduled a hearing on the motion; but Birmingham's counsel failed to appear, and the court denied the motion. On the deadline for completing discovery, Birmingham moved to extend the deadline, complaining of difficulties posed by the defendants in conducting discovery. Although they did not object to the extension, the Verizon Defendants' response objected to Birmingham's characterization of their behavior. The district court extended the discovery deadline to May 15, 2008. On May 7, 2008, Birmingham's counsel served Verizon's counsel with a notice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) that defendant Verizon Communications Inc. and nonparty Vodafone Group, Plc, as the members of a joint venture doing business as Verizon Wireless, designate a representative to testify at a deposition regarding Birmingham's claims. Verizon's counsel promptly responded that it would not be producing these witnesses because no representative or employee of Verizon Communications Inc. had knowledge of the subject matter of the Complaint, and because Vodafone Group, Plc was not a party to the suit. He reiterated that Verizon Wireless (VAW), LLC was the only named entity that could have had business with Birmingham. Between May 12 and May 14, counsel exchanged a series of emails on the matter. Birmingham's counsel maintained that Verizon Wireless was the party in interest to the suit, and that, according to an attached copy of an SEC filing from 2003, Verizon Communications, Inc. and Vodafone Group, PLC, were directly doing business as partners through a partnership named Cellco Partnership, dba as Verizon Wireless. Id., Vol. V at 1644 (emphasis omitted). He also requested that, given the confusion, each of the Verizon Defendants provide individual responses to his discovery requests, instead of the joint responses that had been previously provided. Verizon's counsel responded with a letter describing the corporate structure of the relevant entities. The letter explained that Verizon Wireless is not a company, but a trade name; that 172 entities do business under the Verizon Wireless umbrella, with most of them having permission to use the Verizon Wireless trade name; and that [t]here are so many entities for tax reasons, and because of the nature of the cellular telephone services industry and FCC oversight of that industry. Id. at 1651. It said that Verizon Communications Inc. and Vodafone Group, Plc do not have a partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless. Rather, they indirectly own an entity called Cellco Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless through indirect subsidiaries (that is, subsidiaries separated from the parent by one or more levels of intermediate subsidiaries): Verizon Communications Inc. indirectly owns 55% of Cellco through five indirect subsidiaries: (1) Bell Atlantic Cellular Holdings, L.P., (2) NYNEX PCS Inc., (3) PCSCO Partnership, (4) GTE Wireless Incorporated, and (5) GTE Wireless of Ohio Incorporated; and Vodafone Group, Plc indirectly owns 45% of Cellco through two indirect subsidiaries: (1) PCS Nucleus, L.P., and (2) JV PartnerCo, L.L.C. Id. at 1651-52. In a follow-up letter on May 15, 2008, the discovery deadline, Verizon's counsel proposed a compromise to resolve the dispute over the noticing of a Rule 30(b)(6) witness: Birmingham could serve a Rule 30(b)(6) notice on Verizon Wireless (VAW), LLC in exchange for Birmingham's dismissing without prejudice all Verizon Defendants except Verizon Wireless (VAW), LLC. On that same day, Birmingham filed another motion for more time to complete discovery. The motion complained that Birmingham's counsel had been thwarted in taking depositions of representatives of defendant Verizon Communications Inc. and nonparty Vodafone Group, Plc. It also argued that by providing collective responses to discovery, the Verizon Defendants had effectively admitted that all of these entities act together and that all were involved in or are fully culpable for the transactions of which [Birmingham] complains. Aplt. Supp.App. at 29. The response from Verizon's counsel disputed Birmingham's version of the discovery dispute. It explained that (1) Verizon Wireless is a trade name and (2) because Verizon Communications Inc. holds stock in a number of subsidiaries and conducts no other business, it never had a business relationship with Birmingham, and its employees had no involvement or knowledge of the events giving rise to his complaint. These assertions about Verizon Communications Inc.'s noninvolvement were reiterated in its motion for summary judgment filed shortly thereafter, on May 30, 2008. Attached to the motion was an affidavit by Bernadette Miragliotta, who was responsible for handling Verizon Communications Inc.'s litigation matters. It repeated the statements previously made by Verizon's counsel regarding the status of Verizon Communications Inc. as a mere holding company whose subsidiaries owned 55% of Cellco, which it described as a Delaware general partnership that provides wireless telecommunications services. Aplt.App., Vol. I at 122. Birmingham failed to file a response to the summary-judgment motion, and the district court granted the motion on July 15. In the meantime, on June 5, 2008after the filing of the affidavit regarding Verizon Communications Inc. and Cellco, but before the grant of the summary-judgment motionthe district court held a hearing on Birmingham's motion to extend discovery. Birmingham's counsel stated that the primary issue was the Verizon Defendants' failure to respond to the request to provide a witness under Rule 30(b)(6). Id. at 132. Verizon's counsel said once more that his clients could not comply with the request because Birmingham had not served the 30(b)(6) deposition notices on the proper parties. He maintained the position that Verizon Wireless VAW, LLC was the only named defendant that could have had any business dealings with Birmingham, and added that he believed that the people that sent the credit report are employed by an entity that's not even a defendant called Cellco Partnership. Id. at 139. In response, Birmingham's counsel asserted that Cellco was a party to the action. Verizon's counsel again explained that Verizon Communications Inc. and Vodaphone Group, Plc were merely holding companies that indirectly owned Cellco through subsidiaries and were not Cellco partners. He proposed a compromise: If Birmingham's counsel sent the Rule 30(b)(6) notice to Verizon Wireless VAW, LLC (and not to Verizon Communications Inc. and Vodafone Group, Plc), then he would produce a witness with knowledge of the report of Birmingham's information to the credit-reporting agencies, even if that witness turned out to be employed by Cellco. He named nine potential witnesses but could not confirm at that time which entityCellco or Verizon Wireless (VAW), LLCemployed each one. The district court ordered Verizon's counsel to produce the witness or witnesses from his list of names and extended discovery to August 15, 2008. It warned that it would not extend discovery past that date and that it would not consider any additional motions to continue. On July 25, 2008, two weeks after the court granted Verizon Communications Inc.'s summary-judgment motion, Birmingham's counsel sent an email to Verizon's counsel stating that [i]t is now apparent that the Verizon Wireless we are dealing with is Cellco Partnership. Aplee. Supp.App. at 117. The email attached a proposed stipulation to amend the Complaint, which included the following statement: Plaintiff incorrectly named Verizon Communications and Vodafone Group, PLC, as parties to this action. The correct party to be named is Cellco Partnership, a Delaware general partnership doing business as Verizon Wireless. Id. at 119. In an email dated July 28, Verizon's counsel stated that his clients would so stipulate if you agree to dismiss the other Verizon entities, all of which are improperly named. If you agree to do so, I will accept service for Cellco. Id. at 122. Emails then went back and forth discussing whether the amendment would relate back to the filing of the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c), and Verizon's counsel ultimately agreed on August 8 that the amendment would relate back. An hour later, however, Birmingham's counsel requested the additional stipulation that all discovery responses will fully apply to Cellco to the same degree as if it had responded to those requests. Id. at 148. In an August 11, 2008, letter, Verizon's counsel refused to accept the additional condition, explaining that his clients were not willing to renegotiate the prior stipulation and that if Birmingham did not intend to abide by the original agreement, the Verizon Defendants would not stipulate to the filing of the second amended complaint. He further explained that even if his clients were willing to renegotiate, he could not agree to a stipulation that would certify that the prior discovery responses prepared and submitted by other separate entities (which have been defendants for over one year) are complete and accurate as to Cellco. Aplt.App., Vol. V at 1657. Counsel did state, however, that he was willing to consider a compromise in which Cellco would review and supplement responses filed by other Verizon-related entities, if necessary. Id. Birmingham never responded to the August 11 letter. On August 15, 2008, the Verizon Defendants produced for deposition Scott Scarbrough, one of the potential witnesses named at the June 5 hearing. Scarbrough testified that he was a Cellco employee and provided information regarding the report on Birmingham's account to the credit-reporting agencies. The remaining Verizon Defendants (Verizon Communications Inc. had already been granted a summary judgment) filed two motions to dismiss and two for summary judgment on August 21, 22, and 29, 2008, just before the September 1 deadline for dispositive motions. The motions addressed the merits of Birmingham's claims, not the question of who was the proper defendant. Birmingham made repeated requests for extensions of time to respond. The Verizon Defendants agreed to five requests to extend Birmingham's time to respond to their two motions for summary judgment, giving him until December 8. Birmingham, however, did not meet the extended deadlines. On December 8 he filed a memorandum in opposition to only one of the motions. He did not file his memorandum in opposition to the other summary-judgment motion until January 7, 2009, thirty days after the filing deadline and only two days before the hearing on the motions (which had been postponed from the original scheduled date of November 13, 2008). The next day, January 8, Birmingham filed a motion requesting the district court to accept the untimely opposition brief; an accompanying memorandum argued (1) that his failure to file by December 8, 2008, was excusable neglect under Rule 6(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because unanticipated litigation demands had made it impossible to complete his memorandum on time; (2) that under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c) his submission of materials in opposition to the summary-judgment motion was permitted until the day before the hearing; and (3) that his opposition brief incorporated the arguments from his brief in opposition to the Verizon Defendants' other summary-judgment motion, which had been timely filed. [2] The district court held the hearing on January 9, 2009, as scheduled. On January 26 and March 13 it issued orders granting in part and denying in part the Verizon Defendants' motions. By February 25 all other defendants had settled or been granted summary judgment. The March 13 order stated that the court would address at the final pretrial conference the question whether there remain genuine issues of material fact requiring a trial, id., Vol. IV at 1344; and the court scheduled that conference for April 28. On April 28, 2009-14 minutes before the final pretrial conference was to beginBirmingham's counsel filed a motion under Rules 15(a) and 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to amend the Complaint to add Cellco as a defendant. Although the motion stated that the grounds for the motion were more fully stated in a supporting memorandum, the memorandum was not filed until the next day. The district court began the conference by asking whether Cellco was the only remaining defendant. Verizon's counsel responded that Cellco was not a party and that he had notified Birmingham's counsel of the need to add Cellco as a defendant over a year before, but that Birmingham's counsel had failed to do so. Verizon's counsel then recounted the history of the issue, asserting that by May 2007 Birmingham had been notified that he had not named the right defendant; that during the dispute over Birmingham's motion to extend the time for discovery and at the hearing on June 5, 2008, he had made it clear that Cellco was the proper defendant in the action; that Birmingham's counsel had conceded as much during the summer-of-2008 negotiations to stipulate to a proposed amended complaint; and that after those negotiations had broken down in August 2008, Birmingham's counsel had made no mention of the issue until four days before the final pretrial conference, when he had informed Verizon's counsel of his intention to file the motion to amend the complaint. Birmingham's counsel provided only one explanation for the delay in moving to amend: that the various dispositive motions were filed either immediately before or immediately after his deposition of Scarbrough and that those motions fully occupied things until they were decided. Id., Vol. V at 1939. He contended that Birmingham had been short-sheeted in discovery and stated that he would like the opportunity to take the 30(b)(6) deposition of Cellco Partnership. Id. at 1941. He also argued that Cellco was already a party. Verizon's counsel disputed Birmingham's excuse for delay. He asserted that there was time to amend before the dispositive motions were filed and after the motions had been heard by the court in January 2009. The district court said that it wished to bring this matter to a head, id. at 1940, and that the central question was whether or not Cellco was present as a defendant. It declared that it would not allow further discovery, explaining that Birmingham could not now complain about inadequate discovery responses because he should have filed a motion to compel rather than fuss around for another six or eight or ten months or a year. Id. at 1942. After hearing argument from the parties, the court determined that Cellco was not a party, and it stated that once Birmingham had become aware that the proper defendant was Cellco, he should have moved to add Cellco as a defendant. The court concluded that it had no alternative but to deny [the belated] motion to amend and it must dismiss the case because ... the wrong parties are here and the right party is not. Id. at 1951-52. At a hearing on June 5, 2009, to consider Verizon counsel's proposed order of dismissal, Birmingham made further arguments that Cellco was already a party in the case. The district court overruled Birmingham's objections, but it made the dismissal without prejudice just to make sure that we're not mistaken as to the identified partnership. Id. at 2010.