Opinion ID: 3012008
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ada & phra

Text: The Supreme Court recently has stated that the primary purpose of the ADA is to diminish or to eliminate the stereotypical thought processes, the thoughtless actions, and the hostile reactions that far too often bar those with disabilities from participating fully in the Nation’s life, including the workplace. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 122 S.Ct. 1516, 1522-23 (2002). In order to make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADA and PHRA1, a plaintiff must establish that s/he (1) has a disability, (2) is a qualified individual, and (3) has suffered an adverse employment action because of that disability. Gaul v. Lucent Techs. Inc., 134 F.3d 576, 580 (3d Cir. 1998).
The ADA defines disability, the first requirement of a discrimination case, as, (A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. S 12102(2). Because Buskirk does not appeal the _________________________________________________________________ 1. The PHRA and the ADA are basically the same . . . in relevant respects and ‘Pennsylvania courts . . . generally interpret the PHRA in accord with its federal counterparts.’  Rinehimer v. Cemcolift, Inc., 292 F.3d 375, 382 (3d Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996)). 8 District Court’s rejection of his claim of an actual disability or record of impairment, this appeal focuses solely on the third category of disability, that of being regarded as having an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. The regulations addressing this category of disability define an individual who is regarded as having such an impairment as one who, (1) Has a physical or mental impairment that does not substantially limit major life activities but is treated by a covered entity as constituting such limitation; (2) Has a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities only as a result of the attitude of others toward such impairment; or (3) Has none of the impairments defined in paragraph (h)(1) or (2) of this section but is treated by a covered entity as having a substantially limiting impairment. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(l) (2001). Buskirk’s claim is grounded in the first definition because he argues that he had a physical impairment that limited his ability to perform some work, but did not substantially limit any major life activities, and that Apollo Metals regarded that impairment as one that limited major life activities. In order to determine whether Apollo Metals regarded Buskirk as disabled, we must consider the information Apollo Metals had regarding Buskirk’s condition and its response to that information. In Olson v. General Electric Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 954-55 (3d Cir. 1996), we held that a reasonable factfinder could have found that the employer perceived the employee to be disabled where the evidence showed that a supervisor knew of the employee’s illness and hospitalizations and that this knowledge factored into its hiring decision. [E]ven an innocent misperception based on nothing more than a simple mistake of fact as to the severity, or even the very existence, of an individual’s impairment can be sufficient to satisfy the statutory definition of a perceived disability. Deane v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc). Further, in another regarded as case, we 9 held that the analysis focuses not on [the plaintiff] and his actual disabilities, but rather on the reactions and perceptions of the persons interacting or working with him. Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 108-09 (3d Cir. 1996) (stating that the mere fact that an employer is aware of an employee’s impairment is insufficient to demonstrate . . . that the employer regarded the employee as disabled). [I]n general, an employer’s perception that an employee cannot perform a wide range of jobs suffices to make out a ‘regarded as’ claim. Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 1999). In Taylor, we concluded that Taylor’s employer regarded Taylor as disabled due to its conclusion, based on a mistaken interpretation of his medical records, that Taylor was unable to perform a wide range of jobs, not just his previous position. See id. In that case, we stated that if an impairment at a certain level of severity would constitute a disability, then it follows that an employer who perceives an employee as having such an impairment perceives the employee as disabled. Id.; see also Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 492 (1999) (stating that a regarded as plaintiff is required to show that the employer regards him or her as unable to work in a broad class of jobs). Here, Apollo Metals terminated Buskirk because it believed that Buskirk was not presently able and not expected to be able to perform [his] former position, with or without reasonable accommodation[ ], since[he] sustained [his] injury, and that it had no position that meets [his] limited physical capabilities. App. at 658. The company was familiar with Buskirk’s injury and medical treatment and surmised that he was unable to perform any work. Several vacancies in positions other than a box maker became available after Buskirk’s release from work and Apollo Metals concluded that Buskirk was unable to work in any of those positions. In a letter to the union dated July 3, 1997, Schnabel wrote that [a]lthough[Buskirk]’s condition has shown improvement through increased lifting capacity, there still exists a concern about his ability to perform any of the job classifications. The job classifications state lifting requirements but also general physical activity. App. at 666. These perceptions support 10 Buskirk’s contention that Apollo Metals regarded him as disabled. Moreover, on appeal Apollo Metals no longer appears to dispute that it regarded Buskirk as disabled but instead focuses its argument on its obligations to a regarded as employee. Because the evidence shows that Apollo Metals perceived Buskirk to be unable to perform any of its positions based on his medical condition, Buskirk presented sufficient evidence to satisfy the first prong of a discrimination case under the ADA and PHRA.
In order to pass the second prong of the test for disability discrimination, a plaintiff must prove that s/he is a qualified individual. Qualified individual is defined as one who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. S 12111(8). The EEOC regulations divide this inquiry into two parts: (1) whether the individual has the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the position sought, and (2) whether the individual, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of that position. 29 C.F.R.S1630.2(m). Neither party disputes that Buskirk satisfied the first part of the inquiry in that he had the qualifications to perform the positions sought. Additionally, both parties agree that Buskirk could not return to his former position as a box maker and thus could not perform the essential functions of that job without reasonable accommodation. Buskirk claims that the reasonable accommodation that he requested, and to which he was entitled, was transfer upon vacancy to one of the six positions listed in the union’s June 1997 letter. The ADA provides that reasonable accommodations include, inter alia, job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, [and] reassignment to a vacant position. 42 U.S.C. S 12111(9)(B). The duty to provide a reasonable accommodation is subject to certain limitations. For example, an employer is not required to provide a reasonable accommodation if it would impose an undue 11 hardship, 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(p), if it would pose a direct threat to the safety of the employee or others, 29 C.F.R. S 1630.15(b)(2), see Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 2049 (2002), or if to do so would conflict with seniority rules, see US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett , 122 S.Ct. 1516 (2002). However, the courts of appeals are divided as to whether the employer is obliged to provide reasonable accommodations to a regarded as plaintiff, and we have not answered the question directly.2 Once again, we will _________________________________________________________________ 2. In Deane v. Pocono Medical Center, 142 F.3d 138, 148-49 n.12 (3d Cir. 1998) (en banc), we examined, but did not decide, whether an employer is required to provide reasonable accommodations to an employee it perceives as disabled and reviewed the primary arguments on each side of the debate. On the side of requiring the provision of reasonable accommodations, we noted that the plain language of the ADA does not differentiate between regarded as plaintiffs and plaintiffs who are actually disabled, id., and cited School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 288-89 (1987), where the Supreme Court held that employers have an obligation to provide reasonable accommodations to employees who are regarded as disabled under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. S 701 et seq. In Arline, the Supreme Court stated that by protecting regarded as employees from discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, Congress acknowledges that society’s accumulated myths and fears about disability and disease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that flow from actual impairment. Id. at 284. Finally, in Deane we recognized the plaintiff ’s argument that failure to mandate reasonable accommodations for ‘regarded as’ plaintiffs would undermine the role the ADA plays in ferreting out disability discrimination in employment. 142 F.3d at 148 n.12. On the other side of the debate, we acknowledge[d] the considerable force of the argument that mandating reasonable accommodations would both permit healthy employees to demand changes in their working conditions through the threat of litigation and create a windfall for legitimate ‘regarded as’ disabled employees who, after disabusing their employers of their misperceptions, would nonetheless be entitled to accommodations that their similarly situated co-workers are not, for admittedly non-disabling conditions. Id. at 149 n.12; see also Taylor v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 177 F.3d 180, 196 (3d Cir. 1999) (noting that it seems odd to give an impaired but not disabled person a windfall because of her employer’s erroneous perception of disability, when other impaired but not disabled people are not entitled to accommodation) 12 reserve the answer to this question for a future case because, as we explain forthwith, we conclude that Apollo Metals provided Buskirk with reasonable accommodations. Having reached this conclusion, we need not answer the difficult question of whether Apollo Metals was obligated to do so.
Apollo Metals provided Buskirk with a series of light duty assignments, medical leaves of absence, and reduced hours from the date of his original injury in February 1996 through his termination on May 30, 1997. By May 30, 1997, Apollo Metals had provided these light duty positions and reduced hours for almost fifteen months. Although Apollo Metals initially terminated Buskirk, after negotiation of a grievance filed on behalf of Buskirk by his union, Apollo Metals eventually changed Buskirk’s status to that of a leave of absence, during which period Buskirk was entitled to receive workers’ compensation benefits. The ADA does not require an employer to create a new position to accommodate an employee with a disability. See Shiring v. Runyon, 90 F.3d 827, 831 (3d Cir. 1996) (interpreting analogous section of Rehabilitation Act). Nor is an employer required to transform a temporary light duty position into a permanent position. See Mengine v. Runyon, 114 F.3d 415, 418 (3d Cir. 1997) (interpreting analogous section of Rehabilitation Act). Buskirk does not dispute that Apollo Metals need not have created such a position, but argues that there were vacancies in less strenuous positions to which he should have been transferred after _________________________________________________________________ (citing Deane, 142 F.3d at 149 n.12). We did not decide the issue in either Deane or Taylor. Thus far, the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits have held that regarded as employees are not entitled to reasonable accommodations. See Weber v. Strippit, Inc. 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1078 (2000); Workman v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161 F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998). The First Circuit has held that regarded as employees are entitled to reasonable accommodations. Katz v. City Metal Co., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996). 13 May 30, 1997, the date of the letter that stated he was being terminated. However, prior to the medical release on December 10, 1998, Buskirk’s own doctors stated that he could not return to permanent work. His treating physician, Dr. Barry Pollack, stated on September 30, 1996, that Buskirk could only perform light duty work for four hours a day and that he was limited to lifting no more than ten pounds, and reiterated these limitations on October 28, 1996. None of the doctors’ notes written prior to the termination in May 1997 (changed to leave of absence) stated that he could perform full-time, permanent work. The medical reports that were issued subsequent to the May 1997 letter were not entirely consistent in their articulation of Buskirk’s limitations, but together they demonstrate that Buskirk did not receive medical leave to return to regular work before December 10, 1998. On June 25, 1997, Buskirk’s chiropractor, Dr. Mark Kuhns, wrote that Buskirk’s work restrictions had been lightened and that he could lift a maximum of thirty pounds occasionally, twenty pounds frequently, and could work eight hours a day, five days a week. Although this evaluation showed signs of improvement, Apollo Metals advised the union by letter on July 3, 1997: there still exists a concern about his ability to perform any of the job classifications. The job classifications state lifting requirements but also general physical activity. Since [Buskirk] does not have a full release his status remains as worker[s’] compensation leave. App. at 666. Buskirk argues that he was released to work on March 2, 1998 when Dr. Dane Wukich, an independent medical examiner, determined that Buskirk was capable of returning to medium work and was capable of working full time with the restriction of 50 pounds. App. at 673. However, Buskirk was examined one day later by his treating physician, Dr. Pollack, who stated that Buskirk continues to improve but is not yet ready to return to regular work. App. at 654. Dr. Pollack did not release Buskirk to return to work until December 10, 1998, when he wrote that Buskirk was released with a 40 lb. lifting limit. This is a permanent restriction. App. at 655. After 14 receiving this release, Apollo Metals placed Buskirk in the first vacancy that arose in one of the less strenuous positions he requested, thereby reasonably accommodating Buskirk in a position for which he was physically qualified.3 Arguably, the evidence shows that Buskirk did not meet the second prong of the EEOC’s definition of a qualified individual, but the parties have focused instead on the obligation to provide accommodation. Nor could a reasonable jury conclude that Apollo Metals did not engage in the interactive process with Buskirk. From the date of injury until the date that Buskirk resumed working at Apollo Metals, representatives of Apollo Metals frequently communicated with Buskirk’s union representative, Thomas Novack, regarding Buskirk’s ability to return to work. Novack testified that he was in an ongoing dialogue with Apollo Metals and that Apollo Metals cooperated with him in his efforts on behalf of Buskirk. App. at 405. Apollo Metals allowed and expected Novack to bid on vacancies on behalf of Buskirk and evaluated Buskirk’s ability to work in light of his medical evaluations as transmitted by Buskirk or his union representatives. Buskirk argues that the question of whether Apollo Metals reasonably accommodated him is a question of fact that should have gone to the jury and was not appropriate for disposition on a Rule 50 motion. Generally, the question of whether a proposed accommodation is reasonable is a question of fact. See Hovsons, Inc. v. Township of Brick, 89 F.3d 1096, 1101 (3d Cir. 1996). However, pursuant to Rule 50, the District Court should enter judgment as a matter of law [i]f during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard _________________________________________________________________ 3. Although Apollo Metals does not raise this as a defense, it is of some interest that the Supreme Court recently upheld an EEOC regulation requiring that an  ‘individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of the individual or others in the workplace.’  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 122 S.Ct. 2045, 2049 (2002) (quoting 29 C.F.R. S 1630.15(b)(2)). A direct threat means asignificant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by reasonable accommodations. 29 C.F.R. S 1630.2(r) (adding that the assessment should consider the duration of the risk and the nature, severity, and likelihood of the potential harm). 15 on an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1). Here, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Buskirk, we agree with the District Court that a reasonable jury could not have found that Apollo Metals did not reasonably accommodate Buskirk. In addition, because Apollo Metals has reinstated Buskirk and no longer misperceives his medical condition, we see no need for any additional remedies. See Deane, 142 F.3d at 149 n.12 (If it turns out that a ‘regarded as’ plaintiff who cannot perform the essential functions of her job is not entitled to accommodation . . ., he or she need not necessarily be without remedy. The plaintiff still might be entitled to injunctive relief against future discrimination.) (citations omitted). Thus, whether or not Apollo Metals was required to provide Buskirk with a reasonable accommodation, it did so and Buskirk’s challenge under the ADA fails.