Opinion ID: 1436580
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Mootness as to Arrington

Text: Arrington has not challenged the finding of contempt, which was entered in October, 2005, and from which no appeal was taken. His appeals are from the orders entered in October and November, 2006, and go only to the purge and the sanction  his incarceration in default of purge conditions that he could not meet in time to avoid the incarceration. The State contends that, because, during the pendency of the appeal, the Circuit Court declared his contempt purged and ordered his release from confinement, the appeal has become moot and should be dismissed as such. [7] The State is correct that Arrington's appeal has become moot. The only status of which he complains no longer exists. As noted, he does not challenge the finding of contempt; nor does he complain about the requirement that he obtain employment to which an earnings lien may be attached. His attack is directed solely to the order that he be incarcerated until such time as he obtains that employment or posts $2,000 bail, but that order has been vacated and, in light of the court's finding that the contempt for which that sanction was imposed has been purged, it may not be reinstated. Arrington's situation is quite different from those in which we have entertained appeals from contempt findings in the absence of a sanction. In Bryant v. Social Services, supra, 387 Md. 30, 874 A.2d 457, the appellant, charged with contempt for failure to pay child support, was, in effect, placed on a criminal probation and ordered, among other things, to submit to periodic drug testing and to attend Narcotics Anonymous or other self-help meetings. When he failed to comply with those requirements, the court found him in civil contempt, and, although no imprisonment or other sanction was imposed, those two requirements remained in effect. He appealed from that contempt order, complaining that those requirements, addressed to his drug addiction, were impermissible conditions to the enforcement of a child support order and that the court had no authority to base a contempt finding on a violation of those conditions. His challenge was to the contempt finding itself. Noting that Bryant had never been incarcerated or otherwise sanctioned for violating the two conditions and that the probation order that imposed those conditions had expired, the State moved to dismiss the appeal as moot. We denied the motion. We pointed out that Maryland Code, § 12-304(a) of the Cts. & Jud. Proc. Article expressly permits a person to appeal from any order or judgment passed to preserve the power or vindicate the dignity of the court and adjudging him in contempt of court and that the statute did not require, as a condition to the appeal, that the adjudication of contempt be accompanied by a sanction. We observed as well that [a] finding of contempt, even without the immediate imposition of punishment or sanction, leaves the defendant adjudged to have wilfully violated a court order and may well leave the defendant subject to future punishment at the will of the court. Id. at 45, 874 A.2d at 465. As we have indicated, that is not the case here. Arrington complains only about the validity of the incarceration, which no longer exists and which cannot, in light of the court's finding that the contempt has been purged, be reinstituted absent a new finding of contempt. Nor can we discern any indirect or collateral consequences of the orders he has appealed that might preclude a finding of mootness. Compare Toler v. MVA, 373 Md. 214, 817 A.2d 229 (2003). Nonetheless, in exceptional situations, we have addressed issues in cases that are technically moot, when [t]he urgency of establishing a rule of future conduct in matters of important public concern is imperative and manifest, or where the matter involved is likely to recur frequently, and its recurrence will involve a relationship between government and its citizens, and upon any recurrence, the same difficulty which prevented the appeal at hand from being heard in time is likely again to prevent a decision. Lloyd v. Supervisors of Elections, 206 Md. 36, 43, 111 A.2d 379, 382 (1954); Matthews v. Maryland-National Capital Park & Planning Com'n, 368 Md. 71, 96, 792 A.2d 288, 303 (2002); Hammen v. Baltimore County Police Dept., 373 Md. 440, 450, 818 A.2d 1125, 1131 (2003). This is such a case. It appears from both the record in this case and from uncontradicted representations made at oral argument that a practice has developed in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of committing fathers found in contempt for failure to comply with child support orders to Dismas House or the Baltimore City Detention Center until such time as they obtain employment through a work release program or satisfy other conditions they are unable to meet in time to avoid the incarceration. The validity of that practice, which may affect hundreds of recalcitrant parents whose cases come before that court, is what is being challenged by both Arrington and McLong, and it is urgent and imperative that the issue be resolved.