Opinion ID: 196161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Charting a Course.

Text: 48 To this point, we have held (1) that, as a general proposition, supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims is not precluded in Title VII actions; (2) that, in this case, had proper procedures been employed, the district court could appropriately have exercised supplemental jurisdiction over a claim brought pursuant to Puerto Rico Law 17; and (3) that the district court remains empowered, in its discretion, to entertain a Law 17 claim on remand. This means, of course, that remand ranks as a viable option from our standpoint. 49 We believe that remand is not only a viable option but also the best available course. In the first place, a hoary policy of the law favors the disposition of claims on the merits. See, e.g., HMG Prop. Investors, Inc. v. Parque Indus. Rio Canas, Inc., 847 F.2d 908, 917 (1st Cir.1988) (discussing need to consider the policy of the law favoring the disposition of cases on the merits). In the second place, considerations of fairness counsel in favor of a remand as opposed to a disposition by fiat. After all, a trial is a search for the truth, not merely a battle of wits between jousting attorneys. Third--and perhaps most important--our determination rests upon a close analysis of the nature of the decisionmaking that a remand would entail. We explain briefly. 50 The multifaceted decision about whether to permit the plaintiff to proffer a Law 17 claim and whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over it lies in the heartland of judicial discretion. Because the plaintiff neither pleaded nor otherwise seasonably advanced a Law 17 claim, the court may in its discretion simply deem the case concluded and enter a take-nothing judgment on the pleaded claims. In the alternative, the court may in its discretion choose to reopen the proceedings and invite the plaintiff to move, under Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a), for leave to amend her complaint in order to assert a Law 17 claim. If that is done, the court (and the parties) will then face a series of judgment calls. For example, adjudicating the Rule 15 motion necessitates a further exercise of the court's discretion. 11 See Coyne v. City of Somerville, 972 F.2d 440, 446 (1st Cir.1992); Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 59 (1st Cir.1990). The court will also have to determine whether it will exercise supplemental jurisdiction, another decision that is largely discretionary. See, e.g., Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 (explaining that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right); see also Newman, 930 F.2d at 963 (reviewing factors pertinent to the use or withholding of supplemental jurisdiction); cf. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367(c)(3) (expressly authorizing a district court to decline the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction when it has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction). 51 Given the critical role of discretion in the decisions that must be made, we think that the district court is better equipped to take the laboring oar and to determine whether the case should proceed (and if so, on what terms). As we have remarked before, [t]he very nature of a trial judge's interactive role assures an intimate familiarity with the nuances of ongoing litigation--a familiarity that appellate judges, handicapped by the sterility of an impassive record, cannot hope to match. Dopp v. Pritzker, 38 F.3d 1239, 1253 (1st Cir.1994). Here, choosing not to remand would effectively ignore the district court's special competence in the realm of discretionary decisionmaking. Because we can discern no basis for displacing the trier in so peremptory a manner, we conclude that remand represents the most appropriate remedy in this instance.