Opinion ID: 2334566
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Analytical Framework for Due Process Clause Challenges

Text: ¶ 6 The first issue in dispute is whether this case is governed by the analytical framework set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), or the framework set out in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 445, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992). This issue is, at least theoretically, a significant one because the Medina framework is far less intrusive than that approved in Mathews.  Id. at 446, 112 S.Ct. 2572. ¶ 7 Due Process Clause challenges arising in the context of competency hearings in criminal proceedings are governed by the analytical framework set forth in Medina. State v. Heddrick, 166 Wash.2d 898, 904 n. 3, 215 P.3d 201 (2009). Indeed, Medina itself concerned the dictates of the Due Process Clause in precisely such a context. In Medina, a criminal defendant was charged with multiple felonies, including first degree murder. 505 U.S. at 440, 112 S.Ct. 2572. Prior to trial, Medina's counsel requested a hearing to determine whether Medina was competent to stand trial. Id. Under California statute, the party asserting a lack of competence bore the burden of establishing incompetence by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Medina argued that the statute violated the Due Process Clause by placing the burden of proof on him to demonstrate his incompetence. Id. at 442, 112 S.Ct. 2572. The United States Supreme Court specifically rejected the Mathews test because the challenge arose in the criminal law context. Id. at 443, 112 S.Ct. 2572 (In our view, the Mathews balancing test does not provide the appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural rules which, like the one at bar, are part of the criminal process.). ¶ 8 As in Medina, the competency hearing at issue in the present case arose in the context of criminal proceedings. The United States Supreme Court decision in Medina is therefore dispositive of the fact that the present case, in which Hurst relies exclusively on the federal constitution, is not governed by Mathews. ¶ 9 Hurst's arguments in favor of the Mathews framework are unavailing. Hurst is correct that in Born v. Thompson, 154 Wash.2d 749, 755-57, 117 P.3d 1098 (2005), which concerned the requirements of the Due Process Clause in competency proceedings that were part of prosecution for commission of a misdemeanor, we applied the Mathews analytical framework. In Born, however, the parties did not brief the applicability of the Medina framework. See Suppl. Br. of Pet'r Born, and Suppl. Br. of Resp'ts, Born v. Thompson , No. 74126-3. Instead, the parties focused on the applicability of Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), which in turn relied upon the Mathews factors, see id. at 425-27, 99 S.Ct. 1804. Accordingly, we decided Born under the framework of Mathews and Addington. Born, 154 Wash.2d at 754-55, 117 P.3d 1098; id. at 778-79, 117 P.3d 1098 (Owens, J., dissenting); see RAP 12.1(a) ([T]he appellate court will decide a case only on the basis of issues set forth by the parties in their briefs.); cf. State v. Brousseau, 172 Wash.2d 331, 346 n. 8, 259 P.3d 209 (2011) (Though the usefulness of the Mathews test in resolving the due process question presented here may be debated, Brousseau relies heavily on the test in his briefing, and the State has not argued for a different test.). The failure of the parties in Born to raise, as an issue, the appropriate Due Process Clause framework does not compel us to employ the incorrect Mathews framework in this case. This is particularly true given that after our decision in Born we expressly recognized Medina as the controlling framework. Heddrick, 166 Wash.2d at 904 n. 3, 215 P.3d 201. [2]