Opinion ID: 2248973
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: permanently residing in the united states

Text: We agree with the appellate court that Castillo and Jimenez were permanently residing in the United States as of IRCA's effective date. In Holley v. Lavine (2d Cir.1977), 553 F.2d 845, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in construing identical PRUCOL language found in the Aid to Families with Dependant Children program, concluded that an alien need not live here forever to be permanently residing in the United States. The Holley court based its determination on Congress' definition of permanent as found in the Immigration and Nationality Act (Nationality Act), the statute which IRCA amended: `The term permanent means a relationship of continuing or lasting nature, as distinguished from temporary, but a relationship may be permanent even though it is one that may be dissolved eventually at the instance either of the United States or of the individual, in accordance with law.' ( Holley, 553 F.2d at 850, quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(31) (1988).) In addition, the Nationality Act defines the term residence as the place of general abode, which is the principal, actual dwelling place in fact, without regard to intent. (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(33) (1988).) Finally, although the term temporary is not defined anywhere in the Nationality Act, the words temporary and temporarily are used in section 1101(a) of the Nationality Act in referring to students, tourists, business visitors and workers admitted for specific jobs. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(B), (a)(15)(F), (a)(15)(H), (a)(15)(J) (1988). On the date at issue here, November 6, 1986, we believe Castillo and Jimenez fell more closely under the permanent than the temporary classes of residents described by Congress. As one court has stated, `The common characteristics of    temporary relationships is that they exist for a defined purpose with a defined end, and there is never any intention of abandoning the country of origin as a home.' (Emphasis in original.) ( Gillar v. Employment Division (1986), 300 Or. 672, 682, 717 P.2d 131, 138, quoting Sudomir v. McMahon (9th Cir.1985), 767 F.2d 1456, 1467 (Canby, J., dissenting).) On the date of IRCA's passage both plaintiffs were able to show that they had continuously resided in the United States from well before January 1, 1982, the date required by IRCA section 1255a(a)(2). Both men had United States addresses, held long-term employment here and paid taxes to both the State and Federal governments so as to have the required relationship of continuing or lasting nature with the United States. The record makes no indication that either man had a principal, actual dwelling place anywhere but in this country. The Department makes much of the fact that IRCA adjusted the status of Jimenez and Castillo from that of being undocumented to that of being lawfully admitted for temporary residence. (Emphasis added.) (8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (1988).) The Department vigorously objects that an alien cannot be a lawful temporary resident of the United States while, at the same time, be permanently residing here. We note, however, that FUTA section 3304(a)(14)(A) itself provides that parolees are permanently residing in the United States under color of law even though section 212(d)(5) of the Nationality Act states that such aliens are paroled into the United States temporarily. (See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) (1988).) We agree with the appellate court that whether an alien is residing in this country permanently or temporarily is determined by the nature and not simply the title of his immigration status. 207 Ill.App.3d at 811, 152 Ill.Dec. 717, 566 N.E.2d 404. In support of its position, the Department relies on Sudomir v. McMahon (9th Cir.1985), 767 F.2d 1456, and Esparza v. Valdez (D.Colo.1985), 612 F.Supp. 241, aff'd (10th Cir.1988), 862 F.2d 788, both cases which denied PRUCOL status to aliens who had filed applications for asylum. However, both Sudomir and Esparza were cases decided prior to IRCA's enactment. As discussed below, Congress itself recognized IRCA-eligible aliens as a special class of aliens entitled to special statutory protections. (See 207 Ill.App.3d at 809, 152 Ill.Dec. 717, 566 N.E.2d 404.) Castillo and Jimenez are, therefore, unlike the aliens before the court in either Sudomir or Esparza who were merely tolerated during the period necessary to process their applications. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1462. For these reasons we conclude that both Castillo and Jimenez resided here permanently, at least from IRCA's effective date, November 6, 1986.