Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Bias Claim (Lewis)

Text: Lewis claims he was denied due process and an impartial judge under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. (See Tumey v. Ohio (1927) 273 U.S. 510, 47 S.Ct. 437, 71 L.Ed. 749.) We disagree. By way of background, Lewis filed three disqualification motions in propria persona during the long interval between the filing of the information in December 1989 and the start of jury selection in January 1993. On August 15, 1991, Lewis filed a disqualification motion invoking Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. On January 6, 1992, Lewis filed a disqualification motion invoking Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. On December 9, 1992, Lewis orally presented another disqualification motion invoking Code of Civil Procedure section 170.1. At bottom, he claimed the trial court (Judge Jacqueline A. Connor) systematically favored the prosecution due to a bias against parties appearing in propria persona. He also complained about the denial of his Pitchess motions. All three disqualification motions were denied. Proceedings were suspended after the first motion. A judge appointed by the Judicial Council (Orange County Superior Court Judge James L. Smith) found no bias on the part of the trial court. The superior court denied the second motion as untimely, and denied the third motion as lacking a sufficient factual basis. Defendant petitioned for a writ of mandate after the second motion. The Court of Appeal denied that petition as untimely. He also sought a writ of mandate after the third motion. The Court of Appeal denied that petition for absence of facts and record showing entitlement to extraordinary relief. Lewis now asserts, for the first time, that the trial court showed bias in (1) making evidentiary rulings unfavorable to the defense, such as excluding a plastic bag containing a cocaine-like powder found at the crime scene, (2) mishandling Marsden issues (see People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118, 84 Cal.Rptr. 156, 465 P.2d 44 ( Marsden )), (3) making negative comments about Lewis's efforts to delay the trial and feign mental illness, and (4) mishandling Lewis's mental competence to stand trial. All such matters touch on substantive claims addressed later in this discussion. Meanwhile, in resolving the claim of judicial bias, we summarize the relevant facts as follows. Following pretrial hearings in April and October 1992, the trial court rejected defense efforts to admit a plastic bag containing a cocaine-like substance found in the Mount Olive Church after the capital crime. Initially, the court posited that if defendants' fingerprints were not found on the bag, and the bag was found to contain cocaine, the bag could come into evidence to advance a theory, otherwise poorly supported, that someone else committed the murders and left cocaine at the crime scene. The defense checked the bag for fingerprints, but never sought to have the contents tested. The court ruled the evidence was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible. On February 2, 1993, near the close of the prosecution's guilt case-in-chief, Lewis presented a Marsden motion. By then, Richard Leonard had represented Lewis either as counsel or advisory counsel for over two years. During that time, and as discussed later, Lewis vacillated between professional representation and self-representation. Hence, much like a brawl that defendants had caused in the courtroom the previous day, on February 1, the trial court apparently viewed the Marsden motion as another effort to delay the jury verdict. [6] The trial court emphasized that, aside from the courtroom brawl, Lewis had largely cooperated with, and behaved well toward, counsel. In denying the motion, the court relied, in part, on Lewis's apparent attempt to generate conflict and distrust by physically attacking counsel late in the case. Near the end of the Marsden hearing, Lewis declined to speak further and refused to remain in the courtroom. On February 10, 1993, the day before the guilt verdict, the court noted outside the jury's presence that Lewis had made an ineffectual attempt to injure himself, and that Lewis seemed to be trying to delay the proceedings with disruptive behavior. On February 22, 1993, the trial court faced the issue of Lewis's mental competence between the guilt and penalty phases. The court commented on the creative array [of] talents he has for delay. Finally, Lewis's counsel, the trial court, and the prosecutor all believed that Lewis was competent to stand trial. Each indicated at times that various outbursts, including Lewis and Oliver's assault on counsel, were feigned attempts to persuade the court and the jury of mental illness that did not exist. For instance, the court commented that Lewis behaved inappropriately, [but] there was no indication of any mental impairment observed by my deputies or anybody here in this courtroom, including myself. When the foregoing events occurred, Lewis did not call the trial court's attention to the comments and rulings he now cites as evidence of judicial bias. In general, if the trial court refuses or fails to disqualify itself, the complaining party must seek disqualification at the earliest practicable opportunity after discovery of the facts constituting the ground for disqualification. In doing so, the party must bring to the trial court's attention all of the facts later cited on appeal in support of the judicial bias claim. ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1111, 40 Cal. Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321.) By failing to do so when the relevant events occurred, Lewis has forfeited the right to complain about them on appeal. ( Ibid. ) For similar reasons, he has lost any additional claims that the trial court's alleged bias affected subsequent rulings. ( Ibid.; cf. People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 346, 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545 [declining to decide similar forfeiture issue when the substantive claim lacks merit]; People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322, 334-335, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 710, 862 P.2d 710 [suggesting defendant may claim on appeal that judgment is constitutionally invalid due to judicial bias].) In any event, we see no violation of Lewis's right to be tried before an impartial judge. As we later explain, the court correctly applied the law in excluding evidence of the baggie containing cocaine. It made this ruling only after giving the defense ample opportunity to show relevance. Regarding the Marsden motion, the court reasonably found no actual breakdown in the attorney-client relationship. Again, it gave Lewis a fair chance to show the opposite was true. Finally, the comments suggesting Lewis was feigning mental incompetence, and had used outbursts and other tactics to manipulate and delay the proceedings, did not suggest that the court had prejudged competence or could not be fair. Such observations were supported by the record, including expert testimony introduced at a hearing on Lewis's competence. The bias claim fails on the merits.