Opinion ID: 6331052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The SCTCA Claims

Text: The Timpsons also challenge two aspects of the district court’s jury instructions for their SCTCA claims. “We review a district court’s decision to give a particular jury instruction for abuse of discretion, and review whether a jury instruction incorrectly stated the law de novo.” United States v. Miltier, 882 F.3d 81, 89 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal citations omitted). First, the Timpsons argue the court erred in instructing the jury that the Board and DDSN could be liable under the SCTCA only if they committed “gross negligence,” that is, if they failed “to exercise slight care” or consciously failed “to do something which [was] incumbent upon [them] to do or [did] [some]thing intentionally that [they] ought not to [have] do[ne].” J.A. 3714. The Timpsons maintain that, under Madison ex rel. Bryant v. Babcock Center, Inc., 638 S.E.2d 650 (S.C. 2006), the appropriate standard required the Board and DDSN to provide “reasonable care and treatment,” which “may be established and defined by the common law, statutes, administrative regulations, industry standards, or a defendant’s own policies and guidelines.” Id. at 659–60. Finding no error in the district court’s instruction, we affirm. 23 The SCTCA “governs all tort claims against governmental entities and is the exclusive civil remedy available in an action against a governmental entity or its employees.” Shirley’s Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 743 S.E.2d 778, 783 (S.C. 2013); see also S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-20(b) (“The remedy provided by this chapter is the exclusive civil remedy available for any tort committed by a governmental entity, its employees, or its agents[.]”). To that end, the statute provides several exceptions to liability, including a provision establishing that a “governmental entity is not liable for a loss resulting from” “responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any student, patient, prisoner, inmate, or client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner.” S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60(25) (emphasis added). Thus, as the district court correctly found, the statute expressly establishes gross negligence as the applicable standard of care for the Timpsons’ claims stemming from Johnny’s care in the group homes. And, as the Supreme Court of South Carolina clarified in Etheredge v. Richland School District One, 534 S.E.2d 275 (S.C. 2000), “[g]ross negligence is the intentional conscious failure to do something which it is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do. It is the failure to exercise slight care.” Id. at 277 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted). Contrary to the Timpsons’ argument, Madison did not change this analysis. There, the Supreme Court of South Carolina found that, by “accept[ing] the responsibility of providing care, treatment, or services to a mentally retarded or disabled client,” DDSN “ha[d] a duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising the client and providing appropriate 24 care and treatment to the client.” Madison, 638 S.E.2d at 660. But as the court made clear, [w]hen a governmental entity owes a duty of care to a plaintiff under the common law and other elements of negligence are shown, the next step is to analyze the applicability of exceptions to the waiver of immunity contained in S.C. Code Ann. § 15-78-60 which are asserted by the governmental entity. Id. (emphasis added). And in proceeding to that next step—which, as quoted above, provides that a governmental agency is not liable for “responsibility or duty including but not limited to supervision, protection, control, confinement, or custody of any . . . patient . . . or client of any governmental entity, except when the responsibility or duty is exercised in a grossly negligent manner,” S.C. Code § 15-78-60(25) (emphasis added)—the Supreme Court of South Carolina simply determined that whether DDSN had acted in a grossly negligent manner was a factual issue for the jury. It did not, as the Timpsons would have it, remove the gross negligence standard from the SCTCA’s exceptions to the waiver of immunity provision (i.e., the second step of the analysis). Thus, the district court correctly instructed the jury as to the appropriate standard of care. For their second SCTCA challenge, the Timpsons claim the district court erred in instructing the jury that DDSN could not be held liable unless Tiny Greer’s employees were also its employees. But in Young v. South Carolina Department of Disabilities & Special Needs, 649 S.E.2d 488 (S.C. 2007)—the decision on which the district court relied in framing this instruction—the Supreme Court of South Carolina made clear that “[t]he plain language of the statutes and ordinances establishes the Board as a separate entity from DDSN and grants the Board the authority to hire employees.” Id. at 491. And because “the Board has been established as a separate entity with powers and duties separate from 25 DDSN. . . , the doctrine of non-delegable duty does not apply.” Id. at 492. In other words, DDSN is not liable for the conduct of the Board or the Board’s employees (including those who work at Tiny Greer). Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in framing its instruction on this issue.