Opinion ID: 814985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cunningham was prejudiced by his counsel’s

Text: failure to call Dr. Vicary to testify because there is a reasonable probability that his testimony would have changed the jury’s verdict. Had Cunningham’s attorneys called Dr. Vicary to testify and submitted his report into evidence, there is a reasonable probability that the testimony would have changed at least one juror’s vote. Dr. Vicary is a Diplomate of the American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology and a Diplomate of the American Board of Forensic Psychiatry. Over the past twenty-five years, he has been qualified as a scientific expert and has testified at about 500 trials regarding the mental health of criminal defendants. Scientific and expert testimony contains an “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness.” United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148, CUNNINGHAM V . WONG 47 1152 (9th Cir. 1973). Admissible expert testimony is meant to provide the jury with “appreciable help” in their determinations. Id. Here, Dr. Vicary’s testimony and report would offer an illuminating medical perspective on Cunningham’s behavior by shedding light on his prior convictions, substance abuse, traumatic family background, and mental illness. This evidence would have added significant mitigating weight by appreciably helping the jury to understand Cunningham’s mental capacity during his crimes. Prior to drafting his ten-page medical report, Dr. Vicary met with Cunningham on six different occasions, spoke with Cunningham’s mother, reviewed police, autopsy, and recent psychological testing reports, and viewed Cunningham’s jail medical chart. From all this information, Dr. Vicary concluded that Cunningham suffered from a “chronic underlying depressive mental illness” for which alcohol was a “major exacerbating factor.” He further found that Cunningham has “long-standing serious psychiatric problems.” With regard to Cunningham’s traumatic family experience, Dr. Vicary noted that those experiences “caused a major impairment in his self-esteem.” He further found that Cunningham’s problems in school “led to additional negative experiences such as being rejected by peers.” Dr. Vicary reported that Cunningham’s “sense of unworthiness appears to have led him to sabotage his own success whether that occurred in treatment, work or interpersonal relationships.” Dr. Vicary further noted that Cunningham has “[f]or many years… suffered from symptoms of anxiety and depression” and that alcohol abuse “exacerbated his mental deterioration.” He noted that Cunningham would keep his “deeper thoughts and feelings to himself” and “store 48 CUNNINGHAM V . WONG frustrations until rare, aggressive outbursts,” usually triggered by alcohol, would occur. Finally, although Dr. Vicary found that it “seems highly likely that [Cunningham’s] future adjustment in prison will be positive,” Dr. Vicary felt that without proper access to psychiatric treatment and medication in prison, Cunningham’s serious psychiatric problems “could culminate in a psychotic breakdown or suicide attempt.” Dr. Vicary made this determination without any prior medical, psychological, social, or family history from Cunningham’s trial counsel. Had Dr. Vicary known more about Cunningham’s past, Dr. Vicary stated that he would have done further inquiry into Cunningham’s potential brain damage. He would have administered a Wexler Adult Intelligence Test and Reitan test. Depending on the result, he would have then ordered a “full battery of neuropsychological testing.” Nevertheless, if called as a witness, in addition to the conclusions from his report noted above, Dr. Vicary would have explained “the negative effects of experiencing such a dysfunctional family life as a child and would have been able to provide some context and explanation for Mr. Cunningham’s later apparent inability to conform his behavior to society’s norms.” He would have further testified that “there is an increased chance of substance abuse in families where there is a pattern of alcoholism . . . [and] [w]ith [Cunningham’s] family history, [Dr. Vicary] would have been able to put Mr. Cunningham’s alcoholism and other substance abuse in a readily understandable family context.” Dr. Vicary also would have explained from a medical standpoint, Cunningham’s “violent behavior . . . as CUNNINGHAM V . WONG 49 being intimately and directly related to his chronic and acute substance abuse.”
duplicative. The majority concludes that this overwhelmingly mitigating yet excluded testimony would have been duplicative of testimony that was already presented to the jury either by Cunningham personally or his mother. I disagree. First, the majority is incorrect that Dr. Vicary’s expert opinion that Cunningham suffered from a “chronic underlying depressive mental illness” could have been “easily inferred” by the jury through Cunningham’s own testimony. The idea that Cunningham in his own trial had the sophistication to articulate his own diagnosis to the jury is completely without merit. There is nothing to suggest that Cunningham was even aware that he suffered from “chronic underlying depressive mental illness.” Moreover, an expert opinion is very different from a lay opinion, especially a defendant’s opinion. An expert opinion is one from an objective third party that carries an “aura of special reliability and trustworthiness” and bestows upon the jury “appreciable help” in understanding matters with which they are unfamiliar. Amaral, 488 F.2d at 1152; See Ivkovic & Hans, Jurors’ Evaluations of Expert Testimony: Judging the Messenger and the Message, 28 Law & Soc. Inquiry 441, 445 (2003) (noting that the “majority of jurors” who participated in a study “agreed that expert testimony was crucial to the outcome of their cases” (citing Champagne et. 50 CUNNINGHAM V . WONG al., Expert Witness in the Courts: An Empirical Examination, 76 Judicature 5–10 (1992))). A defendant’s testimony, on the other hand, may be viewed by the jury as a desperate attempt to save himself. In fact, in this case, Cunningham’s counsel conceded during closing arguments that Cunningham did not have much credibility with the jury. His counsel stated: “[Cunningham] would have not much credibility with you. I don’t think he has much credibility with you.” Here, the majority assumes the jury is informed in the field of psychiatry enough so that it could deduce from Cunningham’s testimony that “such illness plagued” him. The majority also assumes that the jury gave the same weight to Cunningham’s testimony as it would Dr. Vicary’s testimony. In a case where the result of its affirmation is a death sentence, the majority sadly fails to perceive the impact of its loose assumptions. Finally, while Cunningham’s counsel and the state prosecutor made Cunningham’s mental health a factor for the jury to consider in deciding Cunningham’s punishment, their arguments could not replace expert mental health testimony. Cunningham’s counsel repeatedly implied during their closing arguments that Cunningham was not mentally sound. Cunningham’s counsel called him “twisted,” “strange,” “crazy,” and “warped.” He said Cunningham’s actions did not “make sense” and that “there’s something wrong” with Cunningham. He stated that Cunningham, in fact, “needed some psychological help at a very early age.” He noted Cunningham took actions that were not justified by “most rational minds.” He further stated that Cunningham had a “problem from the git-go.” CUNNINGHAM V . WONG 51 Indeed, the prosecutor even put the question to the jury whether Cunningham suffered from some mental illness that would in some way account for his behavior. In her closing argument, the prosecutor stated that: “Cunningham described himself as being sick. He needs psychiatric help.” She told the jury that Cunningham’s sentencing reports stated that “psychological help” was recommended. She commented that Cunningham himself described that he had been “in and out of psychology in the jail system.” But, she also argued that “[t]here isn’t a magic pill that makes somebody who is this type of person into the type of person that you are.” She then told the jury moments later, “If this isn’t a case that deserves the death penalty, who does? Who deserves it if this man does not?” Despite Cunningham’s counsel’s and the prosecutor’s statements that Cunningham had some type of mental deficiency, the jury did not have the benefit of expert testimony to provide direct evidence of such deficiencies. By suggesting a “causal nexus” between Cunningham’s abusive childhood and his crime, expert testimony could have “impact[ed] the quality and strength of the mitigation evidence” and offered a persuasive explanation of Cunningham’s crimes. State v. Tucker, 160 P.3d 177, 201 (Cal. 2007); see also Douglas v. Woodford, 316 F.3d 1079, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that counsel’s failure to present expert testimony explaining a possible causal link between defendant’s childhood and his crime was prejudicial). Therefore, the testimony from Dr. Vicary would not be cumulative, but instead highly probative in understanding the effect of Cunningham’s childhood abuse and mental illness on his crimes. 52 CUNNINGHAM V . WONG
consider to conclude that Dr. Vicary’s testimony would have “opened the door to rebuttal.” The majority concludes that even if Dr. Vicary had presented evidence of Cunningham’s depressive mental illness, such testimony “would have opened the door to rebuttal by a state expert.” As both parties concede in their supplemental briefs, pursuant to Pinholster this court can now consider only the evidence that was before the California Supreme Court, including exhibits, declarations, deposition transcripts, and evidentiary hearing testimony first introduced in the district court habeas proceedings. The majority itself recognized that, “we may not consider evidence raised for the first time during the district court’s evidentiary hearing.” The decision in this court must “rest[] solely on the record before the state court.” The California Supreme Court was only presented with Dr. Vicary’s report and his additional declaration. As described above, Dr. Vicary’s report would not have been duplicative and would have provided valuable insight from a medical perspective to help aid the jury in its weighty decision whether to sentence Cunningham to death. As the Supreme Court recently explained, even where a state expert undermines a defense expert’s conclusions, “it [is] not reasonable to discount entirely the effect that [the expert’s] testimony might have had on the jury.” Porter v. McCullom,