Opinion ID: 1926517
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: common law and strict liability claims

Text: [¶ 10] Dunelawn next contends that their claims for negligence, strict liability, [11] and breach of the warranty of habitability survive application of the general statute of limitations as well as the Condominium Act's statute of limitations, because they did not accrue until the date of the fire. [¶ 11] Title 14 M.R.S.A. § 752 (1980) provides, [a]ll civil actions shall be commenced within 6 years after the cause of action accrues and not afterwards ... except as otherwise specially provided. Generally, a cause of action accrues when a party suffers a judicially cognizable injury. See Porter v. Philbrick-Gates, 2000 ME 35, 745 A.2d 996, 998 n. 2. Thus, a contract cause of action accrues at the time of breach. See Kasu Corp. v. Blake, Hall & Sprague, Inc., 582 A.2d 978, 980 (Me. 1990). A tort action accrues when the plaintiff suffers harm to a protected interest. See Johnston v. Dow & Coulombe, Inc., 686 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Me.1996). When the Legislature does not give explicit directions, `definition of the time of accrual ... remains a judicial function.' Nevin v. Union Trust Co., 1999 ME 47, ¶ 24, 726 A.2d 694, 699 (quoting Anderson v. Neal, 428 A.2d 1189, 1191 (Me.1981)). [¶ 12] Pursuant to the general rules of accrual, all of the claims accrued either at the time that construction was completed, in the case of Dunelawn Owners' Association, or at the time of purchase, in the Caffrays's individual cases. It was at those times that Gendreau breached a duty to, respectively, construct a condominium and convey a condominium unit free of material defects. See, e.g., Andreoli v. John Henry Homes, Inc., 297 Ill.App.3d 151, 231 Ill.Dec. 622, 696 N.E.2d 1193, 1196 (1998) (holding that the time of accrual ... governing a purchaser's suit against a builder to recover for latent defects in the purchaser's new house begins from the date when the house is conveyed); Jaworsky v. Frolich, 850 P.2d 1052, 1054 (Okla.1992) (applying rule that the statute of limitations starts to run for breach of a construction contract ... `when the contract is completed'); Stephens v. Creel, 429 So.2d 278, 280 (Ala. 1983) (holding that breach of warranty of habitability is a contract claim that accrues when the defendant completes performance); Calamel v. Ridge View Realty Corp., 115 A.D.2d 279, 496 N.Y.S.2d 154, 154 (1985) (In our view, plaintiffs' claim is essentially one for breach of contract and, therefore, could not accrue later than the date the contract was completed ....). [¶ 13] Dunelawn argues that we should apply the discovery rule to their claims for breach of warranty, strict liability, and negligence. The discovery rule is an exception to the general rule that accrual occurs at the time of a judicially cognizable injury. See Anderson, 428 A.2d at 1191-92 (holding that a cause of action based on an allegedly negligent title search accrues at the time the plaintiff discovers, or reasonably should have discovered, his injury) (Dufresne, A.R.J., dissenting). [¶ 14] The basis for our ruling in Anderson was that the reliance placed upon the attorney by the client and the lack of means for discovery place the client in a situation akin to that of one who has had a cause of action fraudulently concealed from him. Id. at 1192. The significance of the fiduciary relationship to the application of the discovery rule was reiterated most recently in Nevin, 1999 ME 47, ¶ 30, 726 A.2d at 700, in which we applied the discovery rule to claims against a fiduciary providing financial management services. Although the facts of this case present a difficult to discover breach, the absence of a fiduciary relationship in these facts prevents the application of the discovery rule. See Nevin, ¶ 25 at 699; see also Johnston, 686 A.2d at 1066-67 (declining to apply a discovery rule in an action against surveyors for negligent preparation of a survey); [12] cf. Bozzuto v. Ouellette, 408 A.2d 697, 699 (Me.1979) ([I]gnorance of the defendant's misfeasance for about seven years does nothing by itself to prevent the running of the statute of limitations.). [¶ 15] Dunelawn finally contends that the statute of limitations should not be applied to implied warranty claims. They suggest instead that the appropriate inquiry should be what constitutes a reasonable warranty duration. See, e.g., Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Wyo.1975) (holding that the duration of liability is determined by the standard of reasonableness and the failure of a septic system within a year of its construction violated the warranty of habitability associated with the sale of a new home); Hershey v. Rich Rosen Constr. Co., 169 Ariz. 110, 817 P.2d 55, 61 (1991) (holding that because a stucco exterior has a normal life expectancy in the Arizona desert of thirty to fifty years the trial court did not err in its factual determination that the implied warranty of habitability reasonably extended twelve years beyond the date of construction); cf. Terlinde v. Neely, 275 S.C. 395, 271 S.E.2d 768, 769 (1980) (holding that the length of time for latent defects to surface ... should be controlled by the standard of reasonableness). Thus, Dunelawn contends that ten plus years is not an unreasonable time span for the implied warranty of habitability to cover their electrical systems. [¶ 16] Although the reasonable duration of an implied warranty may be an appropriate inquiry when it is raised as a defense to an implied warranty claim, we reject the contention that an implied warranty claim should survive the statute of limitations because the implicit duration of the warranty exceeds the limitations period. Because the implied warranty was breached at the time of construction and conveyance, the statute of limitations essentially imposes a limit to the implied warranty's duration. [13] Accordingly, the implied warranty claim is barred as a matter of law. The entry is: Judgment affirmed.