Opinion ID: 1561466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Standard of Review for Giglio Claims

Text: Under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 92 S.Ct. 763, 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972), the prosecutor is prohibited from knowingly presenting false testimony against the defendant. In order to demonstrate a Giglio violation, a defendant must show that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false evidence was material. Tompkins v. State, 994 So.2d 1072, 1091 (Fla.2008) (quoting Rhodes v. State, 986 So.2d 501, 508-09 (Fla.2008)). Once the first two prongs are established by the defendant, the false evidence is deemed material if there is any reasonable possibility that it could have affected the jury's verdict. Tompkins, 994 So.2d at 1091. The State then has the burden to prove that the false testimony was not material by demonstrating it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Rhodes, 986 So.2d at 509). The DiGuilio harmless error test requires the State to prove `that there is no reasonable possibility that the error contributed to the conviction.' Guzman v. State, 941 So.2d 1045, 1050 (Fla.2006) (quoting State v. DiGuilio, 491 So.2d 1129, 1138 (Fla.1986)). A Giglio claim presents mixed questions of law and fact, and this Court will defer to the factual findings of the circuit court that are supported by competent, substantial evidence and review the application of the law to the facts de novo. See Lynch v. State, 2 So.3d 47, 83 (Fla.2008) (citing Sochor, 883 So.2d at 785). At the jury trial, Anthony Williams testified that he and Hurst were cellmates in the Escambia County jail, where they discussed the Popeye's murder. Williams testified that Hurst told him [t]hat he had participated in it. At the evidentiary hearing, Williams, currently serving a life sentence for armed robbery, testified that he committed perjury at Hurst's trial when he testified that Hurst told him he participated in the crime. According to Williams, on the day of trial he told the prosecutor that he did not want to testify and the prosecutor said that I knew to do the right thing and he would take care of me in the long run. Williams interpreted this to mean if he testified, he would get some leniency, but as it turned out he did not. The prosecutor, David Rimmer, testified at the evidentiary hearing that he never talked to Anthony Williams about his cases and that he never made any promises to him about his pending cases. Rimmer said Williams' main concern was being kept apart from Hurst and I told him I could take care of that: I could keep him separated from Timothy Hurst and any other inmates that he felt might try to harass him. Rimmer explained, I never give them any indication that I'm going to do anything. I always, in fact, cut them off and tell them to start with, I can't make you any promises.... And the only promise I can make is that I'll keep them separated from the other inmates, from the defendant. After hearing testimony from Williams and the prosecutor, the postconviction court denied relief on the claims. First, the postconviction court found that Williams' evidentiary hearing testimony recanting his trial testimony was not credible and noted that Williams had waited over two years to report that Hurst had not confessed. The court also found that the State did not fail to disclose any promises made to Williams in violation of Brady because the court found, based on the testimony of prosecutor Rimmer, that no promises were made. We will not second-guess the postconviction court on this issue of credibility of the witnesses and agree that no Brady violation has been shown. The postconviction court also concluded that a Giglio violation had not been proven. Hurst contends that the prosecutor argued falsely when he said during closing argument: There's been no testimony that the inmates want reductions in their sentences. There's been no testimony that that's why they came forward; none whatsoever.... There's been no testimony that these inmates have tried to get a reduction in their sentence. Based on the testimony presented and found credible at the evidentiary hearing, the trial court correctly concluded that no promises of leniency had been made to Williams. Thus, this Giglio claim that the prosecutor argued falsely is refuted by competent, substantial evidence, and we will not substitute our judgment for that of the circuit court on these questions of fact and determination of credibility. Because Hurst has not demonstrated a Brady violation or a Giglio violation in relation to witnesses David Kladitis, Lee-Lee Smith, or Anthony Williams, relief is denied on this claim.
Hurst next contends (1) that Anthony Williams' recantation of his trial testimony that Hurst confessed and Williams' admission to committing perjury at Hurst's trial constitute newly discovered evidence requiring a new trial; (2) that Lee-Lee Smith's post-trial indictment and conviction as an accessory after the fact in connection with the Popeye's murder is newly discovered evidence that would have significantly impeached his harmful trial testimony, thus requiring a new trial or at least a new sentencing; and (3) that the admission by a trial witness, Carl Hess, that he never interviewed Hurst, as he testified at trial, is newly discovered evidence that requires a new trial. As explained below, we find that Hurst failed to demonstrate that a new trial is required based on any of his newly discovered evidence claims. First, we set forth the standard of review for claims of newly discovered evidence.