Opinion ID: 1497822
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: A valid, final judgment on the merits

Text: The novel question we must decide is whether an order of the trial court not final for purposes of appellate review may nonetheless justify application of collateral estoppel when every other requirement of the doctrine has been met. In the particular circumstances of this case, where Mr. Davis' voluntary dismissal of his complaint is responsible for his inability to obtain appellate review, we answer this question affirmatively. An aggrieved party may appeal as of right from a final order or judgment of the Superior Court. D.C.Code § 11-721(a)(1). To be final, and therefore reviewable, an order must dispose[] of the whole case on its merits so that the court has nothing remaining to do but to execute the judgment or decree already rendered. Dyer v. William S. Bergman & Assocs., 635 A.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C.1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, subject to limited exceptions not applicable here, Section 11-721 bars an appeal unless the order appealed from disposes of all issues in the case; it must be final as to all the parties, the whole subject matter, and all of the causes of action involved. L.A.W. v. M.E., 606 A.2d 160, 161 (D.C.1992). Judge Mitchell's February 2, 1990 order denying the motion for a blood test was not final in this sense because it left unresolved, among other issues, whether Mr. Davis was entitled to a divorce and how much, if any, child support he would have to pay. See id. at 160-61 & n. 1 (orders finding appellant to be child's father and determining temporary child support not final where question of permanent support had not been decided); McDiarmid v. McDiarmid, 594 A.2d 79, 80, 82 (D.C.1991). Judge Mitchell's January 10, 1991 denial of the motion to vacate also was not final since it left unresolved the same issues, which were pending through Mrs. Davis' counterclaim (now amended to include a prayer for divorce). Finally, Judge Mitchell-Rankin's dismissal for failure to meet the voluntary separation requirement of § 16-904(a)(2) was a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, see Williams v. Williams, 378 A.2d 668, 669-70 (D.C.1977) (per curiam), and therefore was not on the merits for collateral estoppel purposes. See Clay v. Faison, 583 A.2d 1388, 1390-91 & n. 11 (D.C.1990) (alternative holding). [5] Our decisions hold that, as a general rule, an order not final for the purpose of appeal lacks the required finality to support collateral estoppel. See L.A.W. v. M.E., 606 A.2d at 161 (The temporary child support determination made by the hearing commissioner... did not render the order final since hearing commissioner orders are not directly reviewable by this court); Ali Baba Co., 482 A.2d at 425 n. 17 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 28.1 (1982)) (collateral estoppel ought not to be applied when party against whom preclusion is sought could not, as a matter of law, have obtained review of the judgment in the initial action); see also Rhema Christian Ctr. v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 515 A.2d 189, 196 (D.C.1986) (issue was actually raised and resolved in the first proceeding, thus became finally adjudicated upon Rhema's failure to petition this court for review). But cf. Lassiter, 447 A.2d at 461 n. 10 (dictum) (view that non-reviewability of judgment prevents application of preclusion doctrines should not prevail automatically here where appellant had advanced no argument as to why the [earlier] proceeding may have been deficient). On the other hand, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 13, 27-28, which has frequently guided this court in application of collateral estoppel, [6] is ambiguous on the issue. Section 28 and the comment thereto imply that finality for appeal purposes is integral to the question of finality for purposes of collateral estoppel. [7] At the same time, Section 13 states that for purposes of issue preclusion ... `final judgment' includes any prior adjudication of an issue that is determined to be sufficiently firm to be accorded conclusive effect. Id. at § 13. Comment g to the section acknowledges that reviewability is one of several factors supporting the conclusion that the decision is final for the purpose of preclusion, but cautions that to hold invariably that [issue preclusion] is not to be permitted until a final judgment in the strict sense has been reached in the first action can involve hardship[, such as] needless duplication of effort and expense in the second action to decide the same issue.... In particular circumstances the wisest course is to regard the prior decision of the issue as final for the purpose of issue preclusion without awaiting the end judgment. Id. at § 13, cmt. g; see also id. at § 13, cmt. g, illus. 2-3. The Reporter's Note to comment g quotes Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.1961), for the proposition that `[f]inality' in the context here relevant may mean little more than that the litigation of a particular issue has reached such a stage that a court sees no really good reason for permitting it to be litigated again. Given this uncertain state of the law, we hold, as a matter of first impression in this jurisdiction, that when the other requirements for collateral estoppel have been established, a party who voluntarily dismisses the action and thereby prevents a previous determination of an issue from becoming embodied in a valid, final judgment on the merits may be estopped from relitigating that issue. Were the law otherwise, as Judge Holder recognized, a plaintiff such as Mr. Davis who received an adverse ruling on an essential issue fully litigated in the trial court could dismiss his suit, bring an identical action, and contest the issue all over again. Issue preclusion is a judicially developed doctrine designed, among other purposes, to `relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits.' Mendoza, supra note 3, 464 U.S. at 158, 104 S.Ct. at 571 (citation omitted). Mr. Davis has had evidentiary hearings spanning five days on the question of paternity testing and twice lost on the issue. It is hard to imagine any justification for requiring the trial court to expend further resources and Mrs. Davis to incur additional legal expenses to give him another chance to make his case. Appellant perceives an inconsistency between this holding and the one dismissal rule of Super.Ct.Civ.R. 41(a), which provides that (if the notice of dismissal or stipulation does not state otherwise) a voluntary dismissal is without prejudice and does not operate[] as an adjudication upon the merits unless the plaintiff has once dismissed in any court ... an action based on or including the same claim. But while Rule 41(a) prevents application of res judicata to a first voluntary dismissal, it says nothing about whether a dismissal may serve to nullify resolution of an issue essential to the action that has been fully and fairly litigated in the trial court. In the circumstances of this case, we hold that it may not. Mr. Davis has offered no other reason for his dismissal than that his relationship with his attorney had become irrevocably strained. The values served by issue preclusion are too important to be held hostage to an inquiry whether a dismissal has resulted from a personal problem of this sort rather than a desire to retreat and fight another day.