Opinion ID: 1315723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to redact references to victim's pregnancy

Text: Kelly raises only one issue regarding the guilt phase of his trial. He argues that the trial court erred by not redacting from his confession references to Shealy's pregnancy. We disagree. Kelly gave the Lowell police a written statement which the State introduced at trial. In his statement, Kelly confessed to slitting Shealy's throat and stabbing her repeatedly. Basically, Kelly's explanation for why he killed Shealy was that his attack was in response to Shealy's request for sex. He stated that while he worked at the KFC, Shealy would always proposition him sexually. Kelly stated that on January 5, 1996, he went to the KFC after closing time and saw Shealy in the office. According to Kelly, Shealy again propositioned him for sex, grabbed him, and asked him not to leave. He stated that he duct-taped Shealy's hands behind her back so she would not touch him. Kelly said that as he went to leave, Shealy got her hands free, grabbed him and started hitting him. Kelly stated that he then took out his knife, slit her throat and continued to stab her while she kept grabbing at him. Kelly told the Lowell police that Shealy then fell to the floor and was gasping for air. To keep her from getting up, Kelly said that he again taped her hands behind her back. Kelly made two references to Shealy's pregnancy in his statement. First, he stated that he did know that Shirley was pregnant. Second, Kelly stated that Shealy asked him to stay and have sex with her and that she told him since she was pregnant already he could not get her pregnant if they had sex. At the outset of the guilt phase, Kelly moved to exclude any evidence that Shealy was pregnant. The State informed the trial court that it planned on introducing Kelly's statement which, as detailed above, included references to the pregnancy. Kelly then moved to redact those references. The trial court denied the motion. With the exception of Kelly's statement, the State did not introduce any evidence about Shealy's pregnancy during the guilt phase of the trial. Kelly presented no witnesses in his defense. At Kelly's request, the jury was instructed on voluntary manslaughter. In the State's guilt phase closing argument, Shealy's pregnancy was mentioned twice without objection. The State argued that Kelly had the perfect victim. He's got a pregnant lady. Is she going to do what he says? Yes, ma'am. Yes, sir. The State noted the pathologist's testimony that there were no defensive wounds and no blood on Shealy's hands. The State therefore argued that Kelly's statement that Shealy's hands were free during the attack was not credible. Specifically, the State argued that if her hands were free, What is she going to do? She's going to be covering up. She's going to be trying to avoid it. She's pregnant. Kelly contends that the trial court should have redacted his statement to remove the references to Shealy's pregnancy because the evidence was not relevant, or, alternatively, the probative value of this evidence was outweighed by its unfairly prejudicial impact. We disagree. Evidence is relevant and admissible if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Rules 401, 402, SCRE. Nevertheless, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Rule 403, SCRE. Unfair prejudice means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, such as an emotional one. State v. Alexander, 303 S.C. 377, 382, 401 S.E.2d 146, 149 (1991) (citation omitted). The trial court is given broad discretion in ruling on questions concerning the relevancy of evidence, and its decision will be reversed only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. Id. at 380, 401 S.E.2d at 148. The jury was instructed on both murder and voluntary manslaughter. [2] Thus, there was an issue on the presence or absence of malice. See State v. Gandy, 283 S.C. 571, 573, 324 S.E.2d 65, 66-67 (1984) (voluntary manslaughter is distinguished from murder because the vital element of malice is missing) implicitly overruled on other grounds by Casey v. State, 305 S.C. 445, 409 S.E.2d 391 (1991); S.C.Code Ann. §§ 16-3-10, 16-3-50 (1985 & Supp.1999). `Malice' is the wrongful intent to injure another and indicates a wicked or depraved spirit intent on doing wrong. State v. Kelsey, 331 S.C. 50, 62, 502 S.E.2d 63, 69 (1998). We believe the evidence of Shealy's pregnancy was relevant to the issue of intent, i.e., whether Kelly acted with malice. The State's theory of the case was that Kelly planned his crimes. [3] Because Kelly knew Shealy was pregnant, and thus, particularly vulnerable, the jury could infer that Kelly had consciously selected a perfect victim. Such evidence of planning certainly negates voluntary manslaughter which requires a showing of provocation. Additionally, although the evidence of Shealy's pregnancy came directly from Kelly's own statement, this evidence tended to refute Kelly's version of how the attack occurred. Therefore, Kelly's references to the pregnancy made it less probable that he committed voluntary manslaughter. See Rule 401, SCRE. Moreover, the fact that Kelly killed a pregnant woman, in our opinion, indicates a wicked or depraved spirit intent on doing wrong. State v. Kelsey, supra . The evidence was, therefore, probative on the issue of whether Kelly acted with malice. Kelly argues that this evidence undeniably had an emotional impact on the jury, and thus should have been excluded because it was unfairly prejudicial. As discussed above, the evidence was relevant to the only real issue in the guilt phasethe presence or absence of malice. Accordingly, we believe the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. Compare State v. Garner, 304 S.C. 220, 403 S.E.2d 631 (1991) (prejudicial effect of evidence of other crimes outweighs its probative value when purpose for which it is admitted is not a contested issue) with State v. Simmons, 310 S.C. 439, 427 S.E.2d 175 (1993) (probative value of other-crimes evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect where the issue of intent was a contested one), reversed on other grounds by Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994). [4] We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of Shealy's pregnancy in the guilt phase. State v. Alexander, supra . Accordingly, Kelly's convictions are affirmed.