Opinion ID: 1967394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: relevancy of testimony regarding threats made to john eddy by stephen kelly

Text: Both defendants claim as error the trial justice's admitting into evidence John Eddy's testimony that a man named Stephen Kelly impliedly threatened him if he testified against defendants. The defendants assert that evidence of such threats is irrelevant to the issue of consciousness of guilt because of the absence of evidence linking the threats made by Kelly to defendants. Although we agree that generally evidence of threats made to a witness is admissible only upon a showing that the defendant approved, encouraged, or acquiesced in the making of those threats, it is our determination that due to the circumstances under which the challenged testimony was presented, its admission was not erroneous. The defense of defendants Burke and Crosby was based in part on a theory that defendants were being railroaded for a crime which had been committed by someone else. In the cross-examination of Eddy, both counsel attempted to lay a foundation for such a conversation between Eddy and Kelly. This inquiry elicited from Eddy a response that he had been approached and threatened by Kelly. Within the scope of redirect examination the prosecutor asked for more details about the conversation. In response to the objection of defense counsel the trial justice stated, [I]t is my understanding that on cross-examination Kelly approached me [ sic ] and said something and this is what this is pertaining to. Overruled. Go ahead. Eddy thereupon answered the question posed, relating fully a conversation in which Kelly admonished Eddy not to testify against defendants. [3] It should be noted that Kelly was later presented as a defense witness and testified that Eddy told him that he [Eddy] got word from the street that he knew who robbed the place. He said that them guys [Burke and Crosby] was getting railroaded. We are of the opinion that neither the evidence concerning the threats, nor the evidence about the railroading were competent on the issue of guilt or innocence. The threat made by Kelly was not connected sufficiently to defendants to permit an inference that it was attributable to them or either of them. See, e.g., Stewart v. State, 398 So.2d 369 (Ala. Crim. App. 1981); People v. Lybrand, 115 Cal. App.3d 1, 171 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1981); Campbell v. Commonwealth, 564 S.W.2d 528 (Ky. 1978); cf. State v. Esposito, 73 R.I. 94, 54 A.2d 1 (1947) (interference with witness admissible if defendant's involvement in such interference can reasonably be inferred from facts). By the same token, Mr. Eddy's opinion based upon information from the street was wholly incompetent as the result of the absence of first-hand information on the part of the witness. E.g., Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 12 L.Ed. 581 (1849); Clark's Executors v. Van Riemsdyk, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 153, 3 L.Ed. 688 (1815); McGinn v. B.H. Gladding Dry Goods Co., 40 R.I. 348, 101 A. 129 (1917). However, under the general doctrine of fighting fire with fire, we cannot say that the trial justice abused his discretion in allowing redirect examination on a point that had been opened on cross-examination by counsel for defendant Burke. Under the principle of curative admissibility known as fighting fire with fire, the prior introduction of inadmissible evidence for a certain class of facts permits the trial justice to allow the introduction of answering inadmissible evidence pertaining to the same matter. McCormick on Evidence, § 57 at 146-49 (Cleary 3d Ed. 1984); 1 Wigmore, Evidence, § 15 at 733-37 & n. 3 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983). When, as in this case, one party seeks the admission of inadmissible evidence without objection by his opponent, the allowance of answering evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial justice. McCormick on Evidence at 148; 1 Wigmore at 731. Here, counsel for both the defendants sought to elicit from Eddy an admission that he had had with Kelly the conversation Kelly later testified to at trial. This conversation, during the course of which Eddy allegedly stated that the defendants were being railroaded, was, as we have explained previously, clearly inadmissible. Eddy responded to questioning about his conversation with Kelly by stating that Kelly threatened him. On redirect, the prosecutor inquired further into this conversation whereupon the trial justice ruled the question permissible as pertaining to the conversation counsel referred to on crossexamination. We cannot, therefore, say that the trial justice abused his discretion in overruling the defendants' objection to the admission of the challenged testimony. For the reasons stated, the defendants' appeal is denied and dismissed, the judgments of conviction are affirmed, and the papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court.