Opinion ID: 2582605
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the governmental tort claims act

Text: ¶ 11 AMR's immunity from liability turns on our construction of the GTCA. In enacting the GTCA in 1984, [13] the Oklahoma Legislature expressly adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity, freeing the state, its political subdivisions, and all their employees acting within the scope of their employment, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions, [14] from liability for torts. However, following the modern trend, [15] the Legislature also waived sovereign immunity by extending governmental accountability to all torts for which a private person or entity would be liable subject only to the act's specific `limitations and exceptions.' [16] In waiving sovereign immunity, the Legislature restricted the waiver only to the extent and in the manner prescribed in the act. [17] ¶ 12 The GTCA prescribes the manner in which any person asserting a claim against the state or a political subdivision must proceed. Among other things, a claimant must present written notice of a claim within one year of the date the loss occurs. [18] If a person asserting a claim against the state or a political subdivision fails to present timely notice, the claim is forever barred. [19] ¶ 13 AMR describes itself as a private corporation that has contracted with EMSA, a public trust, to operate the dispatching and field operations of the emergency medical services. AMR contends that by virtue of the contract it has become the designated operations contractor for EMSA and thus an agency of EMSA, a political subdivision under the GTCA. AMR takes the position that as an agency of EMSA, it must be sued in conformity with the requirements of the GTCA and therefore it is entitled to notice of the claim within one year of the date the loss occurs under § 156 of the GTCA. [20] ¶ 14 Sullins, on the other hand, responds that the Oklahoma Legislature did not extend the status of an agency, with its concomitant immunity, to a private entity solely on the basis that the entity provides services to or for a public trust. Sullins argues that AMR is an independent contractor under common law theories of agency. Accordingly, Sullins maintains that AMR is a non-governmental entity and not entitled to notice under the GTCA. A PRIVATE ENTITY IS NOT AN AGENCY OF A PUBLIC TRUST UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL TORT CLAIMS ACT MERELY BECAUSE IT CONTRACTS WITH A PUBLIC TRUST TO PROVIDE THE SERVICES WHICH THE PUBLIC TRUST IS AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE. ¶ 15 In considering AMR's contention that it is an agency of EMSA, our analysis must begin with the definitional portion of the GTCA, § 152(8) which defines a political subdivision. That subsection defines a political subdivision to include, among other entities, a public trust where the sole beneficiary or beneficiaries are a city, town, school district or county. [21] The definition of a political subdivision also embraces all its institutions, instrumentalities or agencies. [22] ¶ 16 Since the definition of a political subdivision includes its agencies, we must turn to another subsection of the definitional portion of the GTCA. Subsection 152(2), defines agency as follows: As used in this act, Section 151 et seq. of this title: . . . 2. Agency means any board, commission, committee, department or other instrumentality or entity designated to act in behalf of the state or a political subdivision. . . . (Emphasis added.) If AMR is an entity designated to act in behalf of EMSA, a public trust, then it is an agency of EMSA, a political subdivision under the GTCA. ¶ 17 In resolving this question, we must construe the meaning of the statutory language entity designated to act in behalf of the state or a political subdivision. The rules of statutory construction are well established. First and foremost, we must give effect to the Legislature's intent. [23] If the language is clear and unambiguous, the plain meaning of the statute reflects the legislative intent and no further construction is required or permitted. [24] However, when the meaning of a statutory provision is unclear or its application is uncertain, the language is to be given a reasonable and sensible construction. [25] ¶ 18 The statutory language in question, entity designated to act in behalf of the state or a political subdivision, is not so clear as to be beyond interpretation. The meaning of the language is doubtful and uncertain because it is susceptible to multiple interpretations. Accordingly, rules of statutory construction may be used to ascertain the statute's meaning. [26] ¶ 19 In our attempt to discern the intended meaning of the language entity designated to act in behalf of a political subdivision, we are guided by the legal maxim noscitur a sociis. Under the maxim, the meaning of a doubtful word may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of words associated with it. [27] The definition of agency in § 152(2) expressly includes a board, commission, committee, or department of the state or a political subdivision. Each of these entities is either a body organized to execute a governmental function or a division of governmental administration. Stated otherwise, these are entities through which the state or a political subdivision acts in the administration of government. ¶ 20 A private entity such as AMR is not an entity designated to act in behalf of the state or a political subdivision merely because it contracts with a public trust to provide services which the public trust is authorized to provide. Notwithstanding the fact that it may be providing a public service, a private entity such as AMR does not act in the administration of government. It is not charged by law with the responsibility of conducting any public business. It is organized by private citizens pursuant to general corporate laws. It is not controlled by or answerable to the public, but is governed by its own board of directors. Its employees are not governmental employees. Except as it has voluntarily obligated itself by contract, it is not required to provide services or remain in existence. In summary, it possesses all the attributes of a private business enterprise, a non-governmental entity. ¶ 21 Other factors support our conclusion that a private entity such as AMR is not an entity designated to act in behalf of the state or a political subdivision merely because it contracts with a public trust to provide services that the public trust is authorized to provide. We observe that the terms private corporation, private entity and operations contractor are absent from the statutory definition of agency. Had the Legislature intended to include these entities, it could have specifically referenced them in defining agency. It did not. We cannot divine immunity from a silent text, nor will we read immunity into doubtful and ambiguous legislative language. [28] ¶ 22 Moreover, the GTCA expressly excludes independent contractors or an employee of independent contractors from the definition of employee, indicating that the Legislature intended to exclude public contractors from the immunity provisions of the GTCA. [29] Expressions of doubtful meaning will be construed so as to promote harmony in the various provisions of a statute and give practical effect to the intention of the legislature if possible. [30] ¶ 23 We find nothing in the statutory language of the GTCA to support the notion suggested by the dissent that the Legislature intended to allow a public trust, by public contract, to declare a private entity a public agency and thus confer immunity upon that private entity. We conclude that the Legislature did not intend to include a private entity such as AMR in the definition of agency merely because the entity contracts with a public trust to provide services to the public. Accordingly, we answer the reformulated certified question in the negative. A private entity is not an agency of a public trust under the Governmental Tort Claims Act merely because it contracts with the public trust to provide the services which the public trust is authorized to provide. REFORMULATED CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED. ¶ 24 HARGRAVE, C.J., WATT, V.C.J., and LAVENDER, KAUGER, and SUMMERS, JJ., concur. ¶ 25 OPALA, J., concurs in result. ¶ 26 HODGES and WINCHESTER, JJ., dissent. OPALA, J., concurring in result. ¶ 1 The court holds today that a private entity is not a public trust's agency within the meaning of the Governmental Tort Claims Act merely because it is contractually obligated to a public trust to provide the latter with services. I concur in the court's bottom-line answer but not in its pronouncement. The determinative issue here is whether the defendant American Medical Response of Oklahoma, Inc. [AMR] may claim implied immunity from tort liability as a municipal agency. Just as the court does today, I would also answer in the negative. My bottom line is that EMSA (a public trust) lacks statutory power to confer public agency status on AMR (a nongovernmental entity).