Opinion ID: 6326729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: tfdcpa

Text: We next address whether the district court erred in awarding attorney’s fees to the Debt-Collection Defendants against Wood and Chatman as Ozmun’s counsel under the TFDCPA. Wood and Chatman argue that, because the FDCPA’s fee shifting provision cannot be used to sanction a plaintiff’s attorneys, the district court also erred in awarding the Debt-Collection Defendants attorneys’ fees and costs against Ozmun’s attorneys under § 392.403. They argue that § 392.403(c) is almost word-forword identical to the sanctions provision of §1692k(a)(3), and that “[i]dentical statutes demand identical interpretations.” We agree. 8 Foretold by Evans v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 889 F.3d 337 (7th Cir. 2018). 11 Case: 19-50397 Document: 00516252490 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/24/2022 No. 19-50397 Aside from standard principles of statutory construction, Texas state court precedents confirm that the TFDCPA should be construed in the same manner as the FDCPA.9 Additionally, Texas state courts routinely discuss Texas’ jurisprudence on attorneys’ fees and statutory fee shifting using the same reasoning as our court employed in Tejero when discussing the parallel federal jurisprudence. For example, our court in Tejero stated that fee shifting statutes should be strictly construed against recovery because of the long-standing and deeply established nature of the so-called ‘American Rule’ in which parties bear their own attorney’s fees. See Tejero, 955 F.3d at 46263 (“Because of the common-law origins of the [American Rule], statutes that alter it are to be read with a presumption favoring the retention of longestablished and familiar legal principles. . . . . That a statute is sufficiently specific and explicit to authorize one type of fee award does not make it sufficiently specific and explicit to authorize another type of fee award.” (citing Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2164 (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Similarly, Texas courts have noted that “Texas has long adhered to the American Rule with respect to awards of attorney's fees,” Tucker v. Thomas, 419 S.W.3d 292, 295 (Tex. 2013), and thus “[a]ny award of fees is limited by the wording of the statute or contract that creates an exception to the American Rule.” . JCB, Inc. v. Horsburgh & Scott Co., 597 S.W.3d 481, 491 (Tex. 2019), reh'g denied (Oct. 4, 2019). 9 See, e.g., In re Eastman, 419 B.R. 711, 731 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2009) “[T]he structure of the Texas statute is modeled on the federal enactment and so should be similarly construed. . .. Stated another way, for the same reasons that the Defendants are liable under § 1692e(5) of the FDCPA in the Fifth Circuit, they are liable under § 392.301(a)(8)”) (internal citations removed); see also Prophet v. Joan Myers, Myers & Assocs., P.C., 645 F.Supp.2d 614, 617 (S.D.Tex.2008) (“... the conduct made unlawful by that act is virtually identical to the conduct made unlawful by the FDCPA”). As the district court noted in its opinion in this case, “Section 392.403 of the Texas Finance Code is the TFDCPA's analogue to § 1692k(a)(3).” 12 Case: 19-50397 Document: 00516252490 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/24/2022 No. 19-50397 We thus hold that the TFDCPA also does not authorize the award of attorney’s fees as against a plaintiff’s counsel.