Opinion ID: 852891
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Provisional Order Modification

Text: Contending that his real income considerably decreased during the two-year pendency of the dissolution proceedings, the husband contends that the trial court erroneously declined to retroactively modify its order for provisional maintenance and child support by effecting the requested reduction through adjustment in the final distribution of the marital estate. Br. of Appellee at 43. The petition for dissolution was filed by the wife on January 10, 2000. On February 2, 2000, the trial court's provisional orders required the husband to pay child support of $679.73 per week, granted the wife exclusive possession of the marital residence, and ordered the husband to pay the monthly mortgage indebtedness. Additional provisional findings were entered on August 29, 2000, including an order that the husband pay maintenance to the wife in the sum of $4,000 per month retroactive to January 10, 2000. Supplemental Appendix of Appellant at 4-5. This determination was based on the husband's 1999 annual income plus his 2000 bonus to the date of the hearing although the husband testified that he may leave his employment at Preferred Anesthesia Consultants, Incorporated (PAC) in the near future. Id. at 6. The husband points to a separate order entered August 29, 2000, stating in part: That the [husband] shall be given leave to present testimony and evidence on the issue of the alleged change in his financial circumstances since the presentation of testimony and evidence on provisional matters.... That the maintenance order entered this date, August 29, 2000, shall continue in effect, however, the Court advises that said Order is based on the parties' incomes from the period of January 10, 2000, through July 31, 2000. In the event that at trial, the court determines that a modification of the maintenance order is appropriate, any amount of overpayment towards the maintenance award shall be deducted from the [husband's] maintenance arrearage. Appellee's Supplemental Appendix of June 23, 2004, at 1-2. He contends that the trial court viewed its maintenance order of August 29, 2000, order as a modifiable order, subject to revision on a retroactive basis, and that the trial court intended to hear evidence on the issue at trial with an eye toward modifying the order if the evidence supported modification. Id. at 10. The final decree did include findings summarizing the obligations imposed by the provisional orders of February 2 and August 29, 2000. The decree also found that on July 31, 2000, the husband voluntarily discontinued his employment with PAC... whereby he surrendered his partnership and ownership interest, and on August 1, 2000, began providing pain management services through Pain Management Associates (PMA), an entity formed and owned by the husband and another former employee/shareholder/partner of PAC. Appellant's Appendix at 156. The decree expressly found that the husband could have chosen to continue his employment, partnership and shareholder status with PAC and [to] provide general anesthesia services, but not pain management services, id., that the husband likely would have taken financial measures to maintain the standard of living for his wife and children during the transition from his employment with PAC to PMA, that the indebtedness incurred by the husband during the pendency is not an unreasonable hardship and that the husband had the financial ability to pay his maintenance obligations as previously ordered. Id. at 157. The final decree ordered that the [husband's] prayer to retroactively modify the provisional orders is denied. Id. at 165. The husband contends that the trial court erred in refusing to retroactively reduce his provisional obligations so as to reflect his real income. Br. of Appellee at 42. He urges that during the start-up time associated with the opening of his new practice in pain management, he lacked the means to pay the provisional maintenance and support orders. Arguing that the evidence established that he was entitled to a reduction in his temporary support obligation, the husband urges that the trial court erred in declining to grant such reduction through an adjustment of the final distribution of the marital estate. The Court of Appeals declined to address this contention, noting that Indiana Appellate Rule 14(A) provides that interlocutory orders for the payment of money may be appealed as a matter of right by filing a notice of appeal within thirty days of the interlocutory order. Because an order of temporary support and maintenance is an order for the payment of money, the Court of Appeals held that by failing to appeal within thirty days following the denial of his request for modification, the husband waived any error that occurred, and he may not now appeal the interlocutory order on appeal of the final judgment. Bojrab, 786 N.E.2d at 721. Shortly after the Court of Appeals issued its decision, we decided Georgos v. Jackson, 790 N.E.2d 448 (Ind.2003), which held that, even though an interlocutory order may be appealable as of right under Appellate Rule 14(A)(2), there is no requirement that an interlocutory appeal be taken. Id. at 452. A claimed error in an interlocutory order is not waived for failure to take an interlocutory appeal but may be raised on appeal from the final judgment. Id. [3] , [4] As to the merits of the husband's challenge to the trial court's decision not to retroactively modify support and maintenance, we find no error. Here the trial court found that the husband voluntarily left one position for another and that he could have remained at his prior position, that he would have taken financial measures to maintain the standard of living for his wife and children during the transition, and that he had the capacity to finance the support and maintenance during this time. While legitimate reasons may exist for a parent to leave one position and take a lower paying position other than to avoid child support obligations, this is a matter entrusted to the trial court and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion. See Elliott v. Elliott, 634 N.E.2d 1345, 1348-49 (Ind.Ct.App.1994); Ullery v. Ullery, 605 N.E.2d 214, 215 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). Considering the facts most favorable to the judgment without reassessing credibility or reweighing the evidence, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in the present case.