Opinion ID: 2188128
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Wrinkles's Claim

Text: Wrinkles was required to wear a stun belt restraint at trial. He once again claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt and sentencing proceedings because counsel did not object to the restraint. This claim has been raised repeatedly and thoroughly vetted in the post-conviction court, on appeal from the denial of post-conviction relief, in habeas corpus proceedings in federal district court, and on federal appeal from the denial of habeas relief. Each time, the courts have concluded that Wrinkles was not denied effective assistance of counsel. While Wrinkles now seeks the chance to litigate this claim again based in part on differences in how the various courts rejected it, we conclude that the denials of relief were largely complementary. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel involves two components. First, the petitioner must establish that counsel's performance was deficient, in that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Second, the petitioner must establish that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. In other words, the petitioner must show that but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. See id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052. [2] Throughout his post-conviction and habeas corpus proceedings, and again in his successive post-conviction papers, Wrinkles has argued that counsel should have objected to the use of the stun belt. As acknowledged in this Court's opinion in Wrinkles II that prospectively barred the use of stun belts in Indiana courtrooms, this manner of restraint has the potential to compromise the presumption of innocence and a defendant's ability to participate in his own defense. See Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1193-95. In this case, Wrinkles asserts he was prejudiced because, according to Wrinkles, several jurors either saw or otherwise were aware that Wrinkles was wearing a stun belt. Much ink has been devoted to this factual question. See Post-Conviction Record (R.) at 582-84, 590, Wrinkles II (No. 82S00-9803-PD-170) (post-conviction court's findings of fact and conclusions of law); Wrinkles II, 749 N.E.2d at 1192, 1195; Wrinkles v. McBride, No. IP-01-1668-C-T/K, slip op. at 7-9; Wrinkles v. Buss, 537 F.3d at 815-23; id. at 823-29 (Rovner, J., dissenting). Each time a court has reviewed this claim, however, the court has concluded Wrinkles was not deprived of his right to effective assistance of counsel. In its detailed 43-page order denying post-conviction relief, the post-conviction court concluded that Wrinkles failed to meet his burden of proving that the belt was visible or that the jury knew about it. R. at 583. In so deciding, the post-conviction court found the juror affidavits relied upon by Wrinkles to be inconsistent with one another, inconsistent with the bailiffs affidavit, inconsistent with the recollections of both of Wrinkles's trial attorneys, and not subjected to cross-examination. See id. Further, in a hearing on post-judgment motions, the post-conviction court found additional juror affidavits tendered by Wrinkles after the hearing to be cumulative and not of a nature that would have any effect on the court's ruling. R. at 669. The post-conviction court's factual findings were carefully considered by this Court in affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, by the federal district court in denying Wrinkles's petition for writ of habeas corpus, and by the Seventh Circuit in affirming the denial of habeas relief. Each time the post-conviction court's findings have been reviewed, relief has been denied. Just as importantly, Wrinkles's failure to establish the prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance claim is not limited to whether jurors were aware of the belt. The post-conviction court also found a lack of prejudice because jurors already knew Wrinkles was incarcerated and because the evidence overwhelmingly established Wrinkles's guilt. See R. at 590. We agree with the post-conviction court on these points. Further, the evidence in this case leaves little doubt regarding both the existence and weight of the multiple murder aggravator rendering Wrinkles eligible for the death penalty, and this Court independently evaluated the propriety of Wrinkles's sentence on direct appeal. See Wrinkles I, 690 N.E.2d at 1168-73 & n. 31; see also Baird v. State, 604 N.E.2d 1170, 1182 (Ind.1992) (characterizing the multiple murder aggravator as an aggravating circumstance in the highest range). In the middle of the night, Wrinkles dressed in camouflage and face paint, cut the phone lines, kicked in the door of the Fulkersons' home, shot and killed two people in the presence of children, then shot and killed a third person after pursuing her as she attempted to flee the carnage. Wrinkles has fallen far short of showing a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel's lack of objection to the imposition of a stun belt restraint, the result of Wrinkles's trial or sentencing would have been different. Indeed, we say that given these facts there is no reasonable doubt that re-litigating the prejudice prong of Wrinkles's claim would lead to the conclusion that his lawyers' handling of the matter contributed to the verdict or penalty.