Opinion ID: 215345
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Michael's Interactions with Linda

Text: We conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Linda to testify that Michael beat her in 1990 and that Curley later pressured her to lie in court about Michael's assault of a police officer in 1994. This evidence was not sufficiently similar to the charged crimes to allow the jury to reasonably infer Linda's fear. See Peterson, 808 F.2d at 974. Curley was charged with traveling across state lines with the intent to harass or intimidate Linda, and with using a computer for the same illegal purpose. There was no allegation that Curley conspired with his brother or his family to commit these crimes. Furthermore, Michael's activities did not parallel any of the underlying conduct. No evidence was presented that Michael or any other family member accompanied Curley to the New Jersey repair shop or otherwise participated in the charged conduct. The government argued that the perjury scheme was similar to Curley's threat to kill Linda and escape punishment because both showed that criminal punishment did not deter Curley. True, when Curley threatened Linda in 2006, his plan to avoid prison was to put the house up, [and] get a good attorney. But there is little similarity between this threat and the earlier alleged perjury scheme involving Michael. The district court relied on the fact that Linda once saw Curley's sister following her in 2006 to justify admitting the evidence involving his brother because collectively it showed that this Curley clan would come after [Linda]. Yet, Linda only testified that she saw Curley's sister driving behind her once and that, after she took a detour, only Curley was following her. There was no connection between his sister's single act in 2006 and his brother's activities twelve years earlier. See Larson, 112 F.3d at 605. The government offered no evidence to suggest that Curley conspired with Michael against Linda at any time between 1994 and 2006 or that Michael was anywhere in the picture in 2006. Thus, the probative value of the evidence of Michael's actions toward Linda in 1990 and 1994 was slim. See Gordon, 987 F.2d at 908. At the same time, there was a high risk that the evidence of Michael's conduct would unfairly prejudice Curley. The activities were not closely parallel, and the evidence served no real purpose other than to show that Michaelnot Curleyhad a bad character. See Massino, 546 F.3d at 132-33. There was a risk that the jury indeed would speculate that the Curley clan was coming after Linda, rather than focusing on the allegations in the indictment. Although the district court issued an instruction regarding the evidence's limited purpose in its charge to the jury, limiting instructions cannot be regarded as a guaranty against prejudice. Figueroa, 618 F.2d at 946. We conclude that the instruction here was not sufficient, given the low probative value of the evidence and the high risk of prejudicial effect. See id. at 943. Moreover, the instruction did not come until well after the evidence was presented and after summations. See United States v. Royer, 549 F.3d 886, 901 (2d Cir.2008) (reasoning that timely cautionary instructions . . . reduced the potential for prejudice arising from inflammatory testimony); Pitre, 960 F.2d at 1120 (affirming admission of evidence under Rule 403 where the district judge gave proper limiting instructions . . . both during the trial and in his charge to the jury following summations). Because this evidence had a greater risk of prejudice than the testimony of Curley's abuse of Linda, a single instruction in the jury charge was not sufficient. Accordingly, we hold that the district court erred in admitting the evidence relating to Michael.