Opinion ID: 894743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Expert Testimony and Proof of Manufacturing Defect

Text: In products liability cases, we have recognized three types of defect: marketing, design, and manufacturing. Am. Tobacco Co. v. Grinnell, 951 S.W.2d 420, 426 (Tex.1997). A manufacturing defect exists when a product deviates, in its construction or quality, from the specifications or planned output in a manner that renders it unreasonably dangerous. Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex.2004). A plaintiff must prove that the product was defective when it left the hands of the manufacturer and that the defect was a producing cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Id. To establish proof of a manufacturing defect that caused the tread separation, plaintiffs relied on the expert testimony of Richard Grogan, and to a lesser extent on the expert testimony of Alan Milner and Jon Crate. [1] The theory presented by this trio was that the tire failed because the skim stock was contaminated with hydrocarbon wax at the plant where it was manufactured, causing the belts to separate. Skim stock is a specially formulated rubber compound that coats the steel belts in a steel-belted radial tire and through vulcanization holds them together. In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 106 S.W.3d 730, 731 (Tex.2003). Cooper Tire complains that the testimony of all three experts was inadmissible. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. TEX. R. EVID. 702. Expert testimony is admissible if (1) the expert is qualified, and (2) the testimony is relevant and based on a reliable foundation. Helena Chem. Co. v. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d 486, 499 (Tex.2001); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex.1995). If the expert's scientific evidence is not reliable, it is not evidence. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 713 (1997). The trial court's determination that these requirements are met is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Wilkins, 47 S.W.3d at 499. The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 558. Admission of expert testimony that does not meet the reliability requirement is an abuse of discretion. Guadalupe-Blanco River Auth. v. Kraft, 77 S.W.3d 805, 810 (Tex.2002). In deciding whether an expert is qualified, the trial court must ensur[e] that those who purport to be experts truly have expertise concerning the actual subject about which they are offering an opinion. Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 719 (Tex.1998) (quoting Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 152 (Tex.1996)). Scientific testimony is unreliable if it is not grounded in the methods and procedures of science, and amounts to no more than a subjective belief or unsupported speculation. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993)). We have also recognized that expert testimony is unreliable if there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion proffered. Gammill, 972 S.W.2d at 727 (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146, 118 S.Ct. 512, 139 L.Ed.2d 508 (1997)). We are not required . . . to ignore fatal gaps in an expert's analysis or assertions that are simply incorrect. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Ramirez, 159 S.W.3d 897, 912 (Tex. 2004). A flaw in the expert's reasoning from the data may render reliance on a study unreasonable and render the inferences drawn therefrom dubious. Under that circumstance, the expert's scientific testimony is unreliable and, legally, no evidence. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 714. In Robinson, we identified six factors that trial courts may consider in determining whether expert testimony is reliable: 1. the extent to which the theory has been or can be tested; 2. the extent to which the technique relies upon the subjective interpretation of the expert; 3. whether the theory has been subjected to peer review and/or publication; 4. the technique's potential rate of error; 5. whether the underlying theory or technique has been generally accepted as valid by the relevant scientific community; and 6. the non-judicial uses which have been made of the theory or technique. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d at 557. We emphasized in Robinson that these factors are non-exclusive and that Rule 702 contemplates a flexible inquiry. Id. In Gammill, we recognized that the Robinson factors cannot always be used in assessing an expert's reliability, but there must be some basis for the opinion offered to show its reliability. 972 S.W.2d at 726. We further made clear in Gammill that the Robinson relevance and reliability requirements apply to all expert testimony. Id. The trial court is not required to admit opinion evidence which is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert. Id. at 727 (quoting Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146, 118 S.Ct. 512). If the expert brings only his credentials and a subjective opinion, his testimony is fundamentally unsupported and therefore of no assistance to the jury. Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 712. Rule 702, by its terms, only provides for the admission of expert testimony that actually assists the finder of fact. Under these well-established standards, we review the testimony of plaintiffs' experts Grogan, Milner, and Crate.