Opinion ID: 1820187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of Prayer for Recovery of Plaintiff's Attorney Fees in the Audubon County Action.

Text: We next consider defendants' claim on appeal that they established a right to recover a statutory penalty, costs, and attorney fees because the plaintiff in the petition filed in Audubon County prayed for a recovery of attorney fees in a consumer credit transaction. In this court, defendants posit their right to such relief on Iowa Code sections 537.7103(4)(h) and 537.7103(5)(d). These statutes provide, in part: 4.... The following conduct is fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading within the meaning of this subsection: . . . . h. A representation that an existing obligation of the debtor may be increased by the addition of attorney's fees ... when in fact such fees or charges may not legally be added to the existing obligation. . . . . 5. A debt collector shall not engage in the following conduct to collect or attempt to collect a debt: . . . . d. The collection of or the attempt to collect interest or other charge, fee or expense incidental to the principal obligation unless the interest or incidental charge, fee, or expense is expressly authorized by the agreement creating the obligation and is legally chargeable to the debtor... Plaintiff contends that these claims are raised for the first time on appeal and should not be considered for this reason. Based upon our examination of the record, we agree with this contention. Both the pleadings and defendants' opening statement in the district court indicated to the trial court that their only theory in that court based on an improper attempt by plaintiff to recoup attorney fees was based on section 537.2507. That section precludes inserting provisions for recovery of attorney fees in a contract or note evidencing a consumer credit obligation. The trial court found that the note in the present case did not violate this section, and defendants do not contest this finding on appeal. The argument now raised involving the debt collection practices proscribed by sections 537.7103(4)(h) and 537.7103(5)(d) were not urged by defendants until after the evidence was closed in the trial court. They first indicated reliance on these statutes on a brief filed with the district court following conclusion of the trial. We find that this belated reliance on the statutes last cited was untimely. It denied the plaintiff any opportunity to defend against this claimed violation by showing, as permitted by section 537.5201(7), that the prayer for relief in the Audubon County action was inadvertently drafted, unintentional, or resulted from a bona fide error. We conclude that the district court acted well within its discretion in refusing to consider those claims.