Opinion ID: 797838
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Well-Founded Fear of Persecution and Changed Country Conditions

Text: 48 After making his adverse credibility determination, the IJ found that even if Mapouya was credible, he has not shown that he has a well-founded fear of persecution in light of the changed circumstances in his country. The BIA, addressing only the rebuttable presumption evidence, 19 elaborated on the IJ's conclusion. The BIA reasoned that even if the respondent testified credibly and established past persecution, the record contains evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption that the respondent's life or freedom would be threatened in the future. Specifically, the BIA cited specific passages from the Country Reports that allegedly demonstrated that Mapouya no longer has a well-founded fear of future persecution. 20 49 The BIA's decision is in error, however. The reasoning in the IJ's and BIA's respective opinions fails to consider the additional, corroborating evidence Mapouya provided that tends to show he still faces an individualized threat of future persecution, notwithstanding the changed country conditions described in the Country Reports. 50 An applicant can establish the persecution element in an asylum application by two alternative methods: (1) prove that he or she has suffered past persecution, or (2) show that he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution. Gilaj, 408 F.3d at 283. See also Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 389 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a)-(b)); Filipi, 127 Fed.Appx. at 851 (the applicant has two options in trying to show persecution). Under the first option, an applicant may prove that `he or she has suffered persecution in the past, ' at which point there is a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Filipi, 127 Fed.Appx. at 852 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)) (emphasis added). Under the other option, the applicant may show that he or she has a well-founded fear of future persecution, 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2), which `must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.' Id. (quoting Mikhailevitch, 146 F.3d at 389) (emphasis added). The Sixth Circuit has held that an applicant `cannot rely on speculative conclusions or mere assertions of fear of possible persecution, but instead must offer reasonably specific information showing a real threat of individual persecution.' Mateo v. Gonzales, 217 Fed.Appx. 476, 484 (6th Cir.2007) (citing Harchenko v. INS, 379 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir.2004) (citations omitted)). 51 If past persecution raises the rebuttable presumption, the government may rebut that presumption by showing that conditions in the applicant's country have changed so `that the applicant no longer has a well-founded fear of persecution.' Filipi, 127 Fed.Appx. at 852 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)). However, [t]he INS must do more than show that circumstances in the country have fundamentally changed; the INS must also show that such change negates the particular applicant's well-founded fear of future persecution. Mateo, 217 Fed. Appx. at 480 (citing Ouda v. INS, 324 F.3d 445, 452 (6th Cir.2003)). If the government rebuts the presumption, the applicant must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution notwithstanding the changed country conditions. Liti, 411 F.3d at 639. 52 For guidance in this case, the Liti opinion is instructive. In Liti, the majority ultimately concluded that the BIA erred in affirming the IJ's adverse credibility determination. Liti, 411 F.3d at 637. It then turned to the issue of changed country conditions, noting that to establish their asylum claim, the Litis must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution notwithstanding the political change which has occurred in Albania since they left in 1990. Id. at 639. This the Litis failed to do because the only evidence they provided to rebut the changed country conditions was their own testimony—to which the majority stated that even if the applicant is credible, the absence of reasonably available corroborating evidence can lead to a finding that an applicant has failed to meet her burden of proof. Id. at 640 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The majority indicated that the result would have been different had the Litis provided corroborating evidence to refute the Country Reports in their individual case. Id. (Without such evidence, we agree with the BIA that in light of the fundamentally changed conditions in Albania, the Litis failed to satisfy their burden of demonstrating a well-founded fear of future persecution if they were to return.) (emphasis added). 53 Similar reasoning can be found in other Sixth Circuit cases. See, e.g., Daneshvar v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 615, 625 (6th Cir. 2004) (denying asylum based on evidence of changed country conditions in Iran when petitioner has presented no credible evidence that he will be singled out for different treatment if he is deported back to Iran.); Cacani v. Gonzales, 188 Fed. Appx. 444, 446-47 (6th Cir.2006) (denying review of asylum petition because generalized evidence offered to rebut changed country conditions evidence did not demonstrate that [petitioner] would face the requisite individualized threat of harm.) 54 Here, the situation is somewhat different than Liti, because Mapouya presented corroborating evidence not from his own mouth, but from two independent sources in Africa, and that corroborating evidence shows an individualized threat of harm to Mapouya. Indeed, in Liti, the majority faulted petitioners for not getting corroborating evidence from family members still living in Albania, Liti, 411 F.3d at 640, who presumably could have provided affidavits of on the ground conditions in Albania to refute State Department reports of changed country conditions. In Mapouya's case, perhaps the letters were properly discredited for some reason, but this does not appear anywhere in either the IJ's or BIA's discussion of changed country conditions. Even if the government can prove that country conditions in Congo have changed since 1997, the government must also show by a preponderance of the evidence that such change negates Mapouya's individualized well-founded fear of persecution. The letters, which specifically inform that ethno-political violence continues notwithstanding the Country Reports' generalized description, and that Mapouya is a wanted man in the government's eyes, needed to be carefully weighed against the Country Reports in order for a proper decision to have been made. Therefore the BIA's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, and the BIA or IJ on remand must carefully weigh Mapouya's corroborating evidence against the Country Reports. 55