Opinion ID: 726057
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: $41,167 For Additional Work Reflected in the Daily Reports

Text: 81 The jury awarded EPC $41,167 in damages for miscellaneous work reflected in the daily reports, such as snow and debris removal. Since these reports were produced daily, and while EPC was still on the worksite, we find that there was sufficient waiver of the notice provision. In addition, Alverson testified that the amount owed was $41,167. Again, that the daily reports were not admitted into evidence is not dispositive, for the reasons already stated. Moreover, there was apparently a stipulation covering the admissibility of the daily work reports. MMCC's objection, based on its interpretation of the stipulation that it would not have objected to the admission of the daily reports via a competent witness because it would then have had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness, is a red herring. MMCC could have used the daily report to cross-examine and impeach Alverson's conclusions. Again, we conclude that EPC offered probative evidence for the jury to reasonably conclude that EPC carried its burden of persuasion on the extra work claim based on the daily work reports. E. EVERGREEN'S DELAY DAMAGES CLAIM 82 The jury awarded EPC $157,302 in delay damages. Like the extra work provision, the subcontract included a no-damages-based-on-delays clause: 83 The Sub-contractor shall be entitied [sic] to no compensation or damages of any kind or nature by reason of any delay on the part of the Contractor in the prosecution by the Sub-contractor of the work called for hereunder. 84 Even if no-damage-for-delay clauses do not violate New York public policy, Corinno Civetta Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 67 N.Y.2d 297, 502 N.Y.S.2d 681, 685-86, 493 N.E.2d 905, 909-10 (1986); Kalisch-Jarcho, Inc. v. City of New York, 58 N.Y.2d 377, 461 N.Y.S.2d 746, 749-50, 448 N.E.2d 413, 416 (1983), and as such may be enforced, there are four exceptions to that general rule: 85 Generally, even with such a clause, damages may be recovered for: (1) delays caused by the contractee's bad faith or its willful, malicious, or grossly negligent conduct, (2) uncontemplated delays, (3) delays so unreasonable that they constitute an intentional abandonment of the contract by the contractee, and (4) delays resulting from the contractee's breach of a fundamental obligation of the contract. 86 Corinno, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 686, 493 N.E.2d at 910. See also Kalisch-Jarcho, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 749-50, 448 N.E.2d at 416-417 (willful or grossly negligent conduct; intentional wrongdoing). Lest the exceptions swallow the rule, delay clauses proscribe damages for a broad range of both reasonable and unreasonable delays. Corinno, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 683, 493 N.E.2d at 907; Kalisch-Jarcho, 461 N.Y.S.2d at 749-51, 448 N.E.2d at 416. 87 Moreover, the abandonment of the contract exception is limited to those situations where the contractee is responsible for delays which are so unreasonable that they connote a relinquishment of the contract by the contractee with the intention of never resuming it. Corinno, 502 N.Y.S.2d at 688, 493 N.E.2d at 912. The breach of contract exception is also a narrow one and applies only for the breach of a fundamental, affirmative obligation the agreement expressly imposes on the contractee. Typical of such claims are those in which the contractee has failed in its obligation to obtain title to the work site or make it available to the contractor so that it may commence construction of the agreed upon improvements. Id. Finally, the contractor's burden of proving the exception is a heavy one. Manshul Constr. Corp. v. Board of Educ., 160 A.D.2d 643, 559 N.Y.S.2d 260, 261 (1st Dep't), lv. to appeal denied, 76 N.Y.2d 709, 561 N.Y.S.2d 913, 563 N.E.2d 284 (1990). Therefore, the jury must have determined that Merritt had notice of the delay claims and that one of the Corinno exceptions to the delay clause applied. 88 The district court refused to grant MMCC's post-trial motion to set aside the delay damages verdict: 89 [I] find there was an evidentiary basis for the jury to read out of the Subcontract the written notice of claim requirement.... 90 ... The record provides a clear basis for the jury's refusal to enforce the no damage for delay clause, as there was substantial testimony about bad faith and malicious conduct by MMCC, particularly Dennis Capolino. The evidence of bad faith included, among other things, the following: DeLello testified that MMCC failed to honor its repeated promises to provide surveyors that Evergreen required to begin its trench work. Both DeLello and Scaglione testified that MMCC spoon-fed payments to Evergreen; Evergreen was delayed in part because of a crippling lack of capital, which prevented Evergreen from hiring sufficient personnel to advance its work expeditiously. MMCC grossly inflated backcharges, in what the jury could have reasonably viewed as a willful, malicious attempt to break Evergreen. DeLello also testified that MMCC stole from Evergreen excavated material worth $20,000. This material had been stockpiled ... by Evergreen for use as backfill. The record is replete with evidence of Dennis Capolino's mistreatment of DeLello. 91 Evergreen, 890 F.Supp. at 1221-22 (footnote omitted). Regarding MMCC's claim that EPC failed to prove its damages, the district court wrote: 92 DeLello testified as to the cause of Evergreen's delays, and generally as to the additional costs incurred. This testimony provided a basis for apportioning the damages, and buttressed the testimony of Alverson. Alverson testified in detail about Evergreen's damages due to delay caused by MMCC. [He] described three categories of delay damages.... He calculated Evergreen's total damages due to delay as $184,032. Alverson explained the basis for this amount, including the standard industry rates for construction equipment set by the New York State Department of Transportation, the additional costs for personnel, telephones, and so forth. 93 Furthermore, the jury charge made it clear that delay damages were only for costs actually sustained by Evergreen and caused by MMCC. I charged the jury that [i]f you find in favor of Evergreen on any or all of its delay claims, you may award Evergreen damages for additional costs it proves were incurred as a result of delays ... caused by [MMCC]. I further cautioned the jury to not engage in speculation or guess-work; Evergreen must have provided you with a sufficient basis for making a reasonable calculation of damages. 94 Id. at 1222-23 (footnote omitted). Alverson calculated delay damages to be $167,302, to which he added a 10% profit reaching a total of $184,032.20. The jury awarded $157,302. Viewing the testimony in a light most favorable to the prevailing party, the court concluded that the evidence was legally adequate to support the jury verdict. 95 1. The Contention That EPC Failed to Meet Its Burden of Establishing a Delay 96 MMCC first argues that since the subcontract did not set a date for EPC's completion, the jury erred in accepting EPC's claim that its work was to be completed in four months. It points to the provision requiring EPC to excavate trench rock at $90 per cubic yard, and the extra work order, where EPC agreed to drill and blast mass rock at $35 per cubic yard. MMCC also argues that EPC's expert admitted that when EPC signed the subcontract it did not know the amount of trench rock and could not say it could be done in four months. Alverson also testified that the addition of the mass rock change order necessarily added completion time. MMCC argues that a reasonable time for completion should have been implied. Young v. Whitney, 111 A.D.2d 1013, 490 N.Y.S.2d 330, 331 (3d Dep't 1985) (citations omitted); United States ex rel Falco Constr. Corp. v. Summit Gen. Contracting Corp., 760 F.Supp. 1004, 1012 (E.D.N.Y.1991) (reasonable time depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case) (citations omitted). 97 The jury did not have to accept EPC's claim that the work was to be completed in four months to find for EPC on its delay claim. The Corinno exception, based on uncontemplated delay, anticipates this situation: [E]ven broadly worded exculpatory [delay] clauses ... are generally held to encompass only those delays which are reasonably foreseeable, arise from the contractor's work during performance, or which are mentioned in the contract. Id. at 686, 493 N.E.2d at 910. For example, if the mass rock excavation itself had taken four months (the supposed time frame for EPC's participation in the project) and then the laying of the pipelines had taken another four months, we doubt EPC would have a delay damages claim because the compensation for the mass rock exhumation was to be made on a cubic-yard basis. This type of delay is contemplated and falls outside the ambit of the Corinno exceptions. However, EPC based its delay damages claim at least in part on the lack of surveyors, which was uncontemplated, unreasonable and directly interfered with the work which EPC had contracted to complete. 98 Similarly, the bad faith exception focuses on the contractee's conduct and how it impacted the contractor's performance, more than the parties' intent regarding the time to complete. In sum, the jury need not have found that the parties intended for Evergreen to complete its work in four months for the Corinno exceptions to apply. 99 2. The Contention that EPC Proof of Delay Damages was Inadequate as a Matter of Law 100 Delay damages are measured by the difference between the contract price ... to do the [job] and ... total job costs, including overhead and profits, if applicable. Wolff & Munier, Inc. v. Whiting-Turner Contracting Co., 946 F.2d 1003, 1010 (2d Cir.1991) (citing Columbia Asphalt Corp. v. New York, 70 A.D.2d 133, 420 N.Y.S.2d 36, 38-39 (3d Dep't 1979), lv. to appeal denied, 49 N.Y.2d 702, 426 N.Y.S.2d 1027, 403 N.E.2d 459 (1980); Whitmyer Bros., Inc. v. New York, 63 A.D.2d 103, 406 N.Y.S.2d 617, 620 (3d Dep't), aff'd 47 N.Y.2d 960, 419 N.Y.S.2d 954, 393 N.E.2d 1027 (1979)). Only actual costs will be awarded. Alverson testified that EPC incurred $62,826 in equipment standby costs; $81,338 in extended field costs; and $23,138 in general field conditions, which included a reasonable salary for a field superintendent. To this he added a 10% profit and overhead for a total delay damage claim of $184,032.20. Merritt argues that EPC's proof of delay damages was inadequate as a matter of law because it was only offered by EPC's expert, whose opinions were not based on any foundation testimony or documents. We think plaintiff's expert testimony was sufficient for a reasonable juror to conclude that plaintiff had carried its burden of persuasion on the damages issue. Any lack of detail as to the amount of damages could have been explored on cross examination and goes to the weight of the evidence, not the existence of evidence. 101 3. The Contention That MMCC Was Improperly Held Responsible For All Delays 102 MMCC also argues that the delay damage verdict should be reversed because it was improperly held responsible for all of EPC's delay claims. Delay damages should be apportioned among responsible parties. Wolff & Munier, 946 F.2d at 1010 (citing Columbia Asphalt, 420 N.Y.S.2d at 38-39; Fehlhaber Corp. v. New York, 410 N.Y.S.2d at 920, 928 (3d Dep't 1978), lv. to appeal denied, 48 N.Y.2d 604, 421 N.Y.S.2d 1029, 396 N.E.2d 486 (1979)). EPC's president and expert both admitted that its delay claim failed to consider its own fault in delay, even though the Army Corps of Engineers halted EPC's blasting operations for safety reasons for two or two and-a-half weeks. In addition, both DeLello and Alverson admitted that EPC would not have had a sufficient workforce or equipment when it was first on the site if there had been contract work available as anticipated; that there were weather-caused delays which Alverson testified he discounted; and layout was EPC's responsibility, except for surveying for the drainage structures. Apparently based on that testimony, the jury did apportion damages, as it was required to do by the instructions: it awarded $157,302, rather than the $184,032.20 claimed by EPC. We think there was an adequate basis, even if just barely, for that award. 103 4. The Contention That The Notice Provision Was Not Waived 104 EPC's president testified that mandatory notice was not given and that the first written notice to MMCC of EPC's delay claim was its complaint. MMCC claims that this failure alone warrants reversal on this issue, relying on Port Chester Elec. Constr. Corp. v. HBE Corp., 978 F.2d 820 (2d Cir.1992). The district court wrote: 105 As discussed above [in the extra work section], I find there was an evidentiary basis for the jury to read out of the Subcontract the written notice of claim requirement. Hence, plaintiff was not barred by the requirement of a written notice of claim from pursuing its claim for delay damages. 106 Evergreen, 890 F.Supp. at 1221. But just because the notice provision was waived for purposes of the extra work claim, supra, does not mean the same provision was waived for purposes of the delay damages claim. The district court held that the evidence supported the conclusion that MMCC was well aware that EPC was performing extra work, but neither the court nor EPC has indicated how MMCC was on notice of any claim for delay damages. We think the judge should make a more detailed finding of what the evidence was to support a finding of waiver as to the delay damages clause. See Port Chester, 978 F.2d at 823 (Because we do not know for which delays the district court will hold [defendant] responsible, we leave it to that court to decide in the first instance the adequacy of the pertinent notices of claim.) Therefore, we vacate the district court's decision not to grant judgment as a matter of law as to the delay damages claim. On remand, the district court's review of the record should determine what evidence, if any, would have supported the jury's verdict as to waiver of this notice provision. Obviously, if it finds such evidence, the court should identify and specify what it was. On the other hand, if the district court finds insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict on this issue, it should either dismiss the claim as a matter of law or, after reviewing the jury instructions on the issue, if it finds that the jury was insufficiently instructed, the district could should include the issue in the new trial that must be held with respect to the cost-to-complete issue. F. MERRITT MERIDIAN'S COSTS TO COMPLETE 107 The jury found EPC not liable for breach of contract and refused to grant MMCC any completion costs for unfinished work after EPC left the worksite. On a post-trial motion, defendants requested a new trial on the cost-to-complete issue, claiming that its costs were $305,357; the district court denied the motion but did reduce EPC's award by $30,398--the amount Alverson essentially conceded as MMCC's costs to complete the project. 6 MMCC and GICA agree with the district court that the jury erred in failing to credit MMCC any completion costs but appeal the decision of the district court denying it a new jury trial on the issue. 108 There are many ways in which a judge controls a jury. Federal district court judges determine the admissibility of evidence, see, Fed.R.Evid. 104, 402, 403; they may summarize and comment on the evidence, see, e.g., United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 385 (2d Cir.1996) (criminal); Zinman v. Black & Decker (U.S.), Inc., 983 F.2d 431, 436 (2d Cir.1993) (civil) (citing Ah Lou Koa v. American Export Isbrandtsen Lines, 513 F.2d 261, 263 (2d Cir.1975)); they may question a witness, see e.g., Anderson v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 509 F.2d 1119, 1131 (2d Cir.1974); they instruct the jury on the law to apply; and under certain circumstances judges may grant summary judgment, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), and judgment as a matter of law, Fed.R.Civ.P. 50(a). Once a jury is given the opportunity to decide an issue, its decision is still somewhat reviewable: 109 The judge may not substitute the verdict he would have rendered on the evidence for that actually rendered by the jury. But he may avoid what in his professionally trained and experienced judgment is an unjust verdict by vacating it and causing the matter to be tried again by a second jury. Thus, the essential institution of jury trial is respected and an expedient middle ground is maintained between the absence of any control over a jury's verdict on conflicting evidence, on the one hand, and judicial usurpation of the fact finding function, on the other. 110 Crane v. Consol. Rail Corp., 731 F.2d 1042, 1047 (2d Cir.) (quoting Lind v. Schenley Industries, 278 F.2d 79, 91 (3d Cir.) (en banc ) (Hastie, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835, 81 S.Ct. 58, 5 L.Ed.2d 60 (1960)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854, 105 S.Ct. 179, 83 L.Ed.2d 114 (1984). 111 Here, the jury instructions mentioned that any award to EPC could be reduced by the costs MMCC incurred to complete EPC's work. Despite EPC's expert's admission that MMCC incurred just over $30,000 in costs to complete, the jury ignored the evidence and refused to award MMCC any such costs. The district court certainly did not err in concluding that the jury failed to properly complete its task. The lower court did, however, usurp the jury's role by concluding that MMCC's costs were $30,398. Because the district court was faced with conflicting evidence--EPC's expert testimony compared with MMCC's documentation of its costs--it should have granted a new trial on the cost-to-complete issue. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(a)(1); In re Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 310, 40 S.Ct. 543, 546, 64 L.Ed. 919 (1920) (No one is entitled in a civil case to trial by jury unless and except so far as there are issues of fact to be determined.); Walker v. New Mexico & SPR Co., 165 U.S. 593, 596, 17 S.Ct. 421, 422, 41 L.Ed. 837 (1897) ([The Seventh Amendment] requires that questions of fact in common law actions shall be settled by a jury, and that the court shall not assume directly or indirectly to take from the jury or to itself such prerogative.). Therefore, we vacate the district court's decision regarding the cost-to-complete issue and remand for a jury trial on that question. We note that since the jury answered special interrogatories directed to, inter alia, the issue of MMCC's costs to complete, a partial new trial on that issue is appropriate because it clearly appears that [that issue is] sufficiently distinct and separable from the others [and] that a trial of [that issue] alone may be had without injustice. Boucher v. U.S. Suzuki Motor Corp., 73 F.3d 18, 23 (2d Cir.1996) (per curiam ) (internal quotations and citations omitted). G. SANCTIONS, ATTORNEYS' FEES, AND COSTS 112 The district court sanctioned MMCC $35,000 for its Rule 11 violations against EPC and $50,000 for its Rule 11 violations against TPI. On appeal, EPC seeks, pursuant to Rule 11, 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994), or the court's inherent power, its lodestar amount against MMCC and GICA; TPI seeks additional Rule 11 sanctions from MMCC. 113 A district court's decision to award sanctions is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Under the American Rule, the cost of attorneys' fees is not ordinarily shifted onto the losing party. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1271 (2d Cir.1986) (citing Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 1616-17, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 918, 107 S.Ct. 1373, 94 L.Ed.2d 689 (1987). Therefore, any sanction or shifting of fees and costs which is made, need not reflect actual expenditures. 114 Since Rule 11 applies only to pleadings, motions, and other papers, the lodestar amount is clearly inappropriate because it would shift a far greater proportion of attorneys' fees than those which were incurred because of any meritless pleading, motion or other paper. In addition, not all of MMCC's claims were meritless. The district court credited MMCC for its costs to complete and we are vacating and remanding the delay damages award; and, EPC should not recover costs incurred for the prosecution of its own prima facie business tort and punitive damages claims, both of which were dismissed as a matter of law. It is clear that the district court did not abuse its discretion in failing to award EPC its lodestar amount pursuant to Rule 11. 115 In addition, § 1927 applies to attorneys, not parties, and thus it cannot provide the basis for the award of fees against a party. See, e.g., United States v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, et al., 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir.1991); Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1273. Finally, lest the court's inherent powers swallow the American Rule, awards made pursuant to this power are to be made restrictively. Id., at 1272 (citing Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 344 (2d Cir.1986)). Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to impose a greater sanction. H. OTHER FEES AND COSTS 116 Evergreen argues that the district court abused its discretion in making the awards for other fees and costs. Specifically, EPC sought $8,708.67 in process server fees and witness fees, but was awarded only $429.46; it sought $17,690.78 in photocopying costs but was awarded $5,000; it sought $31,125.05 in expert witness fees, all of which were denied; and it sought $4,608.04 in electronic computer research costs, which were also denied in full. 117 Generally, Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d) allows the district court to award the prevailing party its costs. However, the types of witness fees which may be shifted are limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1821 (1994), and the types of costs which may be shifted are limited by 28 U.S.C. § 1920. Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437, 441-42, 107 S.Ct. 2494, 2497-98, 96 L.Ed.2d 385 (1987). In other words, the district court has no discretion to award costs not authorized by statute or contractual provision. See id. at 439, 445, 107 S.Ct. at 2496, 2499 (party's own expert witness fees). But if costs are authorized, the determination of amounts is vested in the sound discretion of the district court. Fed.R.Civ.P. 54(d); Furman v. Cirrito, 782 F.2d 353, 355 (2d Cir.1986). 1. Process Server and Witness Fees 118 EPC issued and served 29 subpoenas, with a cost of $1,526.20 in process server fees and $1,773.20 in witness fees in 1991, when the case was originally set for trial. However, because of an inadequate jury pool the case could not be tried that term (EPC Brief at 40; GICA Brief at 39 n.17). The case was again set for trial in 1994, and EPC issued and served 55 subpoenas, with process server costs of $2,389.75 and witness fees of $3,019.52. EPC appeals the award of $429.46, arguing that the district court abused its discretion in making such a small award when its costs were so great. 119
120 A prevailing party will not be entitled to private process server fees if there is no statutory authority for shifting them. Some courts have shifted private process server costs pursuant to § 1920(1). E.g., Alflex Corp. v. Underwriters Laboratories, Inc., 914 F.2d 175, 177-78 (9th Cir.1990) (per curiam ) (based on § 1920(1) at least in part), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 812, 112 S.Ct. 61, 116 L.Ed.2d 36 (1991); Tang How v. Edward J. Gerrits, Inc., 756 F.Supp. 1540, 1545 (S.D.Fla.1991), aff'd 961 F.2d 174 (11th Cir.1992); Card v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 126 F.R.D. 658, 662 (N.D.Miss.1989), aff'd w/o opinion, 902 F.2d 957 (5th Cir.1990). However, we must follow the Crawford reasoning, and we concur with the Eighth Circuit that the plain language of § 1920 clearly does not authorize the shifting of private process fees. Crues v. KFC Corp., 768 F.2d 230, 234 (8th Cir.1985). See also Zdunek v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 100 F.R.D. 689, 692 (D.D.C.1983); Goldstein v. GNOC, Corp., No. 90-0496, 1994 WL 456360 at  2-3 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 22, 1994). 121 Courts have found other authority for shifting private process server fees. At least one other court within this circuit has allowed the cost when it is reasonable. Big R Food Warehouses v. Local 338 RWDSU, 896 F.Supp. 292, 299-300 (E.D.N.Y.1995) ($55). But reasonableness is the analysis we apply when the fees have been granted; it does not provide any authority for granting the fees in the first instance. Other courts have shifted the fee pursuant to a local rule. See, e.g., Cody v. Private Agencies Collaborating Together, Inc., 911 F.Supp. 1, 6 (D.D.C.1995) (Local Rule 214(d) subpart 11); Coulter v. Newmont Gold Co., 873 F.Supp. 394, 395 (D.Nev.1994) (Local Rule 205-2). However, there is no local rule in the Southern District of New York that is relevant. Finally, some courts have shifted the cost because of the trend toward substitution of private process servers for the U.S. Marshals Service. Riofrio Anda v. Ralston Purina Co., 772 F.Supp. 46, 55 (D.P.R.1991), aff'd, 959 F.2d 1149 (1st Cir.1992); Roberts v. Homelite Div. of Textron, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 637, 640-41 (N.D.Ind.1987). At least one court has specifically read § 1921(a)(1) in conjunction with § 1920(1) and allowed these costs. Griffith v. Mt. Carmel Medical Ctr., 157 F.R.D. 499, 507-08 (D.Kan.1994): 122 Although § 1920(1) refers simply to fees of the marshal, it must be read in light of § 1921 which states that the marshals or deputy marshals shall routinely collect, and a court may tax as costs, fees for ... [s]erving ... process in any case or proceeding [and] [s]erving a subpoena or summons for a witness. ... Given the apparent congressional intent to make service of process a taxable item, [citing Alflex, supra ] and due to the substitution of private process servers for the U.S. Marshal Service in recent years, [citing Roberts, supra ] the court believes the taxation of costs for special process servers is justifiable. However, such costs should be taxable only to the extent that they do not exceed the costs that would have been incurred had the Marshal's office effected service, since only the Marshal's fee amount is actually statutorily authorized. 123 (other citations omitted). We think this provides the most persuasive basis for allowing the award of private process server fees should the district court have chosen to award them. However, this interpretation does not mandate that the court's discretion be exercised in that fashion, and thus the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award process server fees for 1991 or 1994.b. Witness Fees 124 There is a general presumption that only the costs of those witnesses who actually testify at trial may be shifted. Moreover, the presumption can be overcome if it appears that a court order or some other extrinsic circumstance rendered his testimony unnecessary. McGuigan v. CAE Link Corp., 155 F.R.D. 31, 35-36 (N.D.N.Y.1994) (quoting 10 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2678 at 377 (2d Ed.1983)). 125 Since the 1991 trial was cancelled for reasons beyond EPC's control (i.e., lack of a jury pool), they should have been awarded witness fees and travel expenses for those who were subpoenaed in 1991 and actually testified in 1994. The amount awarded roughly covered the fees and expenses of the three who were on both lists and the four on the 1994 list. We decline to find that the district court abused its discretion inasmuch as there is no evidence that those others did not testify for some objective reason such as a stipulation as to what they would say, see, id., 155 F.R.D. at 35, 36 (citation omitted), or because the court decided their testimony would be redundant, see Marino v. Town of Kirkland, New York, 146 F.R.D. 49, 51 (N.D.N.Y.1993). 2. Photocopying Costs 126 Evergreen sought $17,690.78 in photocopying costs but was awarded $5,000, and now appeals the district court's award. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) allows the costs of exemplification and copies of papers necessarily obtained for use in the case to be shifted. Photocopying costs may be recovered even though the underlying document was not admitted at trial. M.T. Bonk Co. v. Milton Bradley Co., 945 F.2d 1404, 1410 (7th Cir.1991) (photocopying costs which are reasonably incurred). Evergreen did not, however, itemize those costs or explain why all those copies were necessary. Since $5,000 represented the court's estimate of the cost of photocopying the exhibits offered at trial and other papers submitted by plaintiff in connection with [the] trial, Evergreen, 890 F.Supp. at 1228, it appropriately cabined its discretion. The $5,000 award was not an abuse of discretion. 3. Expert Witness Fees 127 The district court was clearly correct in denying expert witness fees. We are at a loss to see how Evergreen could seek them in light of Crawford and West Virginia Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 86-87, 111 S.Ct. 1138, 1140-41, 113 L.Ed.2d 68 (1991). 4. Electronic Computer Research Costs 128 EPC sought $4,608.04 in Westlaw costs, which the district court denied in full. In Standley v. Chilhowee R-IV School Dist., 5 F.3d 319, 325 & n. 7 (8th Cir.1993) (citing Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College, 702 F.2d 686, 695 (8th Cir.1983)), the Eighth Circuit held that computer costs are part of the attorneys' fees and not to be taxed separately. See also Haroco, Inc. v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chicago, 38 F.3d 1429, 1440-41 (7th Cir.1994); cf. Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 633 (10th Cir.1995) (computer research costs not statutorily authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1920). We agree that computer research is merely a substitute for an attorney's time that is compensable under an application for attorneys' fees and is not a separately taxable cost. See, Haroco, 38 F.3d at 1441. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to shift the cost of this item.