Opinion ID: 1975112
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Remand for Resentencing

Text: ¶ 19. On the multiplicitous child enticement counts, Church received concurrent 24-year probation terms, consecutive to the prison term on the sexual assault count. Rather than simply vacating one of the two counts of child enticement held to be multiplicitous and remanding for a corresponding amendment to the judgment of conviction, the court of appeal vacated all remaining sentences in the case and remanded for resentencing. Church, 223 Wis. 2d at 665-66. The court of appeals cited this court's decision in Gordon as requiring resentencing on the surviving counts. Id. We disagree. ¶ 20. In Gordon, the defendant was convicted and sentenced as follows: kidnapping, 15 years; robbery, eight years concurrent; burglary, eight years concurrent; and second-degree murder, 15 years consecutive. Gordon, 111 Wis. 2d at 134-35. The defendant appealed, alleging that the conviction and sentence for kidnapping, which was the predicate felony for the second-degree murder conviction, violated double jeopardy. Id. at 135. We concluded that the conviction and sentence for kidnapping as well as second-degree murder predicated upon kidnapping violated double jeopardy, and vacated the kidnapping count. Id. at 146. However, we also summarily vacated the sentences on the surviving counts: The sentence for second-degree murder, robbery, and burglary must also be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing on all charges. Id. (citing State v. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, 290, 322 N.W.2d 264 (1982); Robinson v. State, 102 Wis. 2d 343, 356, 306 N.W.2d 668 (1981); State v. Upchurch, 101 Wis. 2d 329, 335-36, 305 N.W.2d 57 (1981); Ronzani v. State, 24 Wis. 2d 512, 520, 129 N.W.2d 143 (1964)). ¶ 21. We did not further explain in Gordon the circumstances under which a remand for resentencing is required when one or more counts in a multi-count case is vacated on appeal, leaving other counts intact. It is clear, however, that the elimination on double jeopardy grounds of one of the four counts in Gordon disturbed the original sentence structure, which called for the defendant to serve a total of 30 years in prison. The two eight-year sentences for robbery and burglary were concurrent, but the two 15-year sentences for kidnapping and second-degree murder were consecutive. Vacating the kidnapping conviction and sentence upset the overall sentencing structure, frustrating the intent of the original sentence. Remand for resentencing was necessary and appropriate, to allow for a restructuring of the remaining sentences to carry out the intent of the original dispositional scheme. ¶ 22. Remand for resentencing in Gordon was supported by the precedent cited in the case. In Morris, 108 Wis. 2d 282, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to two and one-half years for armed robbery and two years consecutive for concealing identity. We held that concealing identity was not a separate offense, but, rather, a penalty enhancer, and therefore the two sentences for what was a single, enhanced offense, violated double jeopardy. Id. at 283. In ordering a remand for resentencing, we invoked our decision a year earlier in Robinson, 102 Wis. 2d at 356, which had also involved separate sentences for armed robbery and concealing identity: In Robinson this court said: Accordingly, rather than attempting to infer at the appellate level what sentence the trial court would have imposed had it proceeded on the proper assumption that concealing identity aggravates armed robbery but does not stand as a separate substantive offense, we conclude that the trial court is the proper court to resentence the defendant under a correct application of the law. We therefore vacate the judgment of conviction for concealing identity, vacate both sentences as imposed, and remand to the trial court for resentencing on the conviction of armed robbery, under circumstances where identity was concealed. Morris, 108 Wis. 2d at 290 n.5 (quoting Robinson, 102 Wis. 2d at 356). ¶ 23. Similarly, in Upchurch, 101 Wis. 2d 329, we concluded that separate, consecutive one-year sentences for possession of a controlled substance and habitual criminality violated double jeopardy, because the repeater statute was a penalty enhancer, not a separate offense. Id. at 335. We remanded for resentencing on the single, enhanced offense in order not to frustrate the intent of the original sentence. Id. at 336 (holding that a contrary result would tend to make the sentencing proceeding a game wherein a misstatement by the trial judge would result in a windfall to the defendant). ¶ 24. Also, in Ronzani, 24 Wis. 2d 512, the defendant was convicted of attempted armed robbery and third-degree murder (then also known as felony murder), predicated upon the attempted armed robbery, and sentenced to 15 years on the felony murder count, and ten years consecutive on the attempted armed robbery count. We concluded that the conviction and sentence on the attempted armed robbery count was error because attempted armed robbery was a lesserincluded offense of third-degree felony murder predicated on the attempted armed robbery. Id. at 519. We remanded for resentencing because the reversal of the attempted armed robbery count disturbed the structure of the overall sentence: We have determined to remand for resentencing because the original sentence of Ronzani for third-degree murder may reflect the trial court's erroneous conclusion that a consecutive sentence could also be given for the attempted armed robbery. Ronzani, 24 Wis. 2d at 520. ¶ 25. We have never held, however, that remand for resentencing is always required, even where the vacated count in a multi-count case has no affect whatsoever on the overall sentence structure, as is the case here. The court of appeals correctly noted our overstatement and under-explanation of the  Ronzani-Gordon line of cases in Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670. The supreme court subsequently explained what it referred to as the Ronzani-Gordon line of cases in this way: The Ronzani-Gordon line of cases demonstrates that when a defendant is convicted of and sentenced for two offenses which are later held to be the same offense, and when one conviction and sentence is vacated on double jeopardy principles, the validity of both punishments is implicated, the sentences for both offenses are illegal, and resentencing on the valid conviction is permissible. State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 681, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985). However, this explanation apparently overlooks the fact that the court in Gordon used this rationale to invalidate not only the sentence on the conviction that was the same offense for double jeopardy purposes, but also the sentences on the other, separate offenses, the convictions of which were not involved in the double jeopardy challenge. This analysis in Martin does not explain the reason for vacating the sentences on the convictions that are not involved in the double jeopardy challengethere is nothing invalid or illegal about them. Church, 257 Wis. 2d, ¶ 14 n.7. [2-5] ¶ 26. A double jeopardy bar to one conviction and sentence in a multi-count case does not operate to invalidate the sentences on all the remaining counts, nor does it necessarily invalidate the sentence on the specific surviving parallel count which gave rise to the double jeopardy challenge. The court of appeals was entirely correct that there is nothing invalid or illegal about the sentences on the counts that remain after a successful double jeopardy challenge. Martin and the Ronzani-Gordon line of cases hold that resentencing is procedurally and constitutionally permissible if the invalidation of one sentence on double jeopardy grounds disturbs the overall sentence structure or frustrates the intent of the original dispositional scheme. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d at 682. Resentencing is unnecessary, and certainly not required, where, as here, the invalidation of one count on double jeopardy grounds has no affect at all on the overall sentence structure. ¶ 27. As we have noted, however, Church himself requested resentencing as a remedy for the multiplicity of the child enticement counts. He argued at resentencing for reimposition of the same overall sentence. Instead, he received four more years in prison. But for his successful appeal, Church would be serving a 13-year sentence. Because of his successful appeal, he is now serving a 17-year sentence.