Opinion ID: 895313
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty to rectify

Text: In determining the existence of a duty in this case, we assume, as the parties do, that Keller's work created an unreasonably dangerous condition at the sitea fifteen-foot-gap between the end of the guardrail and the embankment wide enough for a car to pass through. We first consider whether Keller owed a duty to rectify the condition. [6] The presence of an unreasonably dangerous condition, of course, weighs in favor of recognizing a duty. See id. The consequences of placing a duty on Keller to rectify the condition in these circumstances, however, lead us to conclude that Keller owed no such duty. Keller's contract with the County required absolute compliance with the contract specifications, and there is summary judgment evidence that any deviation from the specifications could have jeopardized federal funding for the project. Further, it is undisputed that O'Malley certified Keller's compliance with the contract specifications and the County accepted and paid Keller for the work. While certainly every construction contract implicitly assumes that the contractor will conform to contract specifications, we distinguished in Strakos between the duties that may be imposed upon a contractor that has some discretion in performing the contract and a contractor that is left none: [T]he contractual provisions . . . are not couched in directory wording of that certainty which would require a conclusion that the act of leaving the hole was at the time of its origin and thereafter the act of Harris County and not that of the contractor, as is sometimes the case where a builder merely follows plans and specifications which have been handed to him by the other contracting party with instructions that the same be literally followed. Strakos, 360 S.W.2d at 803 (Suppl. Op. on rehearing). Because the contract in Strakos neither required nor forbade the contractor from filling in or marking holes that comprised the dangerous condition, but instead left the choice to the contractor's discretion, the contractor bore a duty to rectify it. Id. at 791. In this case, any decision that Keller would have made to rectify the dangerous condition would have had the effect of altering the terms of the contract. Moreover, because Keller did not own the property, it was not in a position to make decisions about how to make the premises safe. Amicus curiae the Associated General Contractors of Texas, Inc. maintains that imposing liability upon contractors in Keller's position for what is ultimately a faulty design would substantially increase the costs of construction. The AGC argues that contractors currently rely on the expertise of engineers who design and prepare construction plans and specifications to ensure that the completed work will be safe. They further contend that the imposition of a duty when a contract requires absolute compliance with plans and specifications would require contractors to hire their own professionals to ensure that a completed project will not be unduly dangerous. The AGC's concerns further illustrate the difficulties inherent in imposing the type of duty on a contractor that has been advanced by the Foremans. Given the consequences of recognizing a duty under the circumstances this case presents, we hold that Keller had no duty to rectify the gap contemplated by the designs and specifications.