Opinion ID: 2980913
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Coconspirator Testimony

Text: Lamar first argues that the district court’s decision to admit coconspirator statements without making a preliminary determination as to their admissibility warrants a new trial. Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) excludes from the hearsay rule statements that are “made by the party’s coconspirator during and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” Before such statements may be admitted, however, the government must establish “three foundational prerequisites”: “that a conspiracy existed; that [the] defendant was a member of the conspiracy; and that the declarant’s statement was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.” United States v. Conrad, 507 F.3d 424, 429 (6th Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Maliszewski, 161 F.3d 992, 3 No. 10-6133 United States v. Lamar 1007 (6th Cir. 1998)). These prerequisites must be established by a preponderance of the evidence based on the district court’s findings of fact. Id. (citing Fed. R. Evid. 104(a)). Prior to trial, Lamar’s defense counsel filed a motion for a pretrial hearing pursuant to United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978), to determine the admissibility of any coconspirators’ statements that the government would seek to admit under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.1 The government then filed a bill of particulars detailing its intent to rely on testimony of coconspirators and the facts it sought to prove at trial, including the scope of the conspiracy, Lamar’s role as a drug supplier, and the details surrounding a particular sale of cocaine that was negotiated with Lamar on May 6, 2008 and executed the following day. After reviewing the government’s proffered evidence, the district court determined that a pretrial hearing was unnecessary and denied Lamar’s request, deciding instead to admit the coconspirators’ hearsay statements conditionally subject to the government’s eventual demonstration of their admissibility. The district court stated that it was “satisfied, assuming the Government is able to admit evidence consistent with its Bill of Particulars, that there will be sufficient evidence of a conspiracy to distribute powder and/or crack cocaine which includes both Defendant Lamar and the declarants, and that those statements were made during and in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy.” R. 51 (Dist. Ct. Order at 4). Lamar’s challenge to the adequacy of the district court’s factual determination on the admissibility of the coconspirator statements is refuted by the record. Instead, as the trial record 1 Although Lamar’s original attorney was removed due to a conflict of interest while the motion was pending, his newly retained counsel filed a motion seeking to move forward with the original request for a pretrial hearing. 4 No. 10-6133 United States v. Lamar clearly demonstrates, the district court did make the requisite finding. Toward the end of the first day of trial and before the government began playing the recorded telephone calls for the jury, the district judge stated for the record his determination that the government had produced sufficient non-hearsay testimony to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy existed involving Lewis and Lamar, that any statements in 2008 were made during the conspiracy, and that statements setting up cocaine purchases or deliveries were in furtherance of the conspiracy. After reviewing the record, we do not find those determinations to be erroneous. Cf. United States v. Gonzalez, 501 F.3d 630, 636–37 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming a district court’s general finding that statements fell within the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule where the government had presented a substantial amount of non-hearsay testimony about the interactions between members of an alleged drug conspiracy). To the extent that Lamar’s claim challenges the district court’s refusal to grant a pretrial hearing, it is without merit. Our cases make clear that the district court has considerable discretion in determining how best to handle evidentiary issues. See, e.g., United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 152 (6th Cir. 1979) (“A trial judge must have considerable discretion in controlling the mode and order of proof at trial . . . .”), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). Although a “mini hearing” to determine whether the government may use coconspirator statements is one method of ensuring conformance with the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, it is by no means the only one. See id. A district court is also at liberty to “admit the hearsay statements subject to later demonstration of their admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence,” id. at 153, which is exactly 5 No. 10-6133 United States v. Lamar what the district court did here. There was no error on this ground. Because Lamar has not raised any specific objections to the sufficiency of the evidence on any one of the three foundational factors described above, no further analysis is needed. We conclude that a retrial is not warranted on the basis of the district court’s admission of the coconspirator statements.