Opinion ID: 8312489
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: breach of settlement and unjust enrichment claims

Text: Plaintiff Yu's claims for unjust enrichment and breach of the settlement agreement-Counts Two and Six-were released by her when she settled the 2011 Lawsuit and, in any event, are insufficiently pled. These independent grounds warrant dismissal of Yu's claims.
Defendants contend that Yu's claims for unjust enrichment and breach of settlement are precluded by res judicata based on the dismissal with prejudice of the 2011 Lawsuit. See, e.g. , LRF's Mot. to Dismiss at 14-15. It is true that Yu asserts some of the same causes of action in this lawsuit that she previously brought in the 2011 Lawsuit, including for unjust enrichment (Count III in the 2011 Lawsuit; Count II here) and breach of the settlement agreement (Count V in the 2011  Lawsuit; Count VI here), and that she alleges many of the same facts in this lawsuit that formed the basis of her claims in the 2011 Lawsuit. But Yu expressly disclaims that she is suing for any alleged conduct that occurred prior to October 21, 2011-the date of dismissal of the 2011 Lawsuit. FAC ¶¶ 133, 145. And Yu has alleged misconduct based on some facts that post-date the 2011 Lawsuit. See id. ¶¶ 64, 68. Res judicata does not preclude claims based on facts not yet in existence at the time of the original action. Drake v. FAA , 291 F.3d 59 , 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) ; accord Apotex, Inc. v. FDA , 393 F.3d 210 , 218 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ; see also Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 24 cmt. f (1982) (Material operative facts occurring after the decision of an action with respect to the same subject matter may in themselves, or taken in conjunction with the antecedent facts, comprise a transaction which may be made the basis of a second action not precluded by the first.). Hence, res judicata does not bar Yu's claims. But Yu is not completely out of the woods. Defendants' stronger argument is that Yu's claims are barred by the release that she negotiated when she dismissed the 2011 Lawsuit. See, e.g. , LRF's Mot. to Dismiss at 14-24. The 2011 Release-a contract executed by and between Yu, Wu, the LRF, the LHRO, and the YHRT 10 -states that Yu released all claims of every kind and nature whatsoever in law, equity or otherwise, past, present or future, ascertained or unascertained, whether now known or unknown, suspected or unsuspected, and whether or not concealed or hidden, which have existed or may have existed, or which do exist or may exist, without regard to subsequent discovery or the existence of additional or different facts, from the beginning of the world to the date of this Agreement arising out of or related in any manner to all prior dealings between the parties, without limitation, including but not limited to any events or circumstances alleged or which could have been alleged in the Civil Action. 2011 Release at 2. Yu contends that because she has changed the legal theory from the 2011 Lawsuit-i.e., she now alleges breach of the settlement's primary humanitarian purpose-the 2011 Release does not apply. Pls.' Opp'n at 38. Not so. The broad language of the release belies this argument and prevents Yu from evading the release by merely altering her legal theory or by discovering additional claims that she could have, but failed to, allege previously. 11 See 2011 Release at 2. Yu has not sufficiently explained why the violation of the humanitarian purpose theory could not have been alleged in the prior action. Hence, it is barred by the comprehensive 2011 Release. Even if Yu's claims were not precluded by the 2011 Release, they fail for independent reasons. Yu's breach of settlement claim is insufficient because the  amended complaint fails to identify any specific provisions of the Wang Settlement that defendants allegedly breached. See Kaar v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 2016 WL 3068396 , at  (N.D. Cal. June 1, 2016) (To claim a breach of contract in federal court[,] the complaint must identify the specific provision of the contract allegedly breached by the defendant.); Spinelli v. Nat'l Football League , 96 F.Supp.3d 81 , 131 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) ( Twombly - Iqbal standards of federal pleading require a complaint to identify, in non-conclusory fashion, the specific terms of the contract that a defendant has breached.); Saha v. George Washington Univ. , 577 F.Supp.2d 439 , 443 (D.D.C. 2008) (plaintiff failed to state a claim because he had not identified specific breached provisions). Indeed, the amended complaint is completely lacking any reference to a section or provision of the Wang Settlement that defendants supposedly violated. Instead, Yu provides generalized allegations of breach that are untethered to the actual contractual provisions. For example, her allegation that [t]he Settlement was breached upon ... the depletion of Trust assets to such an extent that it culminated in the breach of the Settlement, FAC ¶ 144, is conclusory, circular, and fails to identify a settlement provision that was breached. Her claim that a breach occurred because defendants depleted the trust assets and did not use them exclusively (or primarily) to provide humanitarian and legal assistance to Chinese dissidents, id. , ignores that the Wang Settlement expressly permits the YHRF to be spent to resolve claims primarily by such persons ...; and ... for payment of [LRF's] operating expenses and the Foundation's education work conducted in the United States in support of human rights. Wang Settlement at 113. Similarly missing from the amended complaint is an identification of any contractual provision tied to the alleged breach arising from Yahoo's failure to review all of Wu and the LRF's activities. FAC ¶ 144. And the alleged termination of the primary humanitarian purpose is not a breach that plaintiff has connected to any obligation found in the settlement agreement. See Edmond v. Am. Educ. Servs. , No. 10-cv-0578, 2010 WL 4269129 , at  (D.D.C. Oct. 28, 2010) (Without a contractual duty, there can be no breach of contract. (internal quotation marks omitted) ). Hence, the breach of settlement claim fails. Yu's unjust enrichment claim is likewise deficient. That claim is based on the alleged enormous financial benefits obtained by Wu and LRF as a result of Yu signing the Wang Settlement, and alleges that defendants obtained unjust benefits ... as a result of Wu and the LRF's breaches of the Settlement's requirements. FAC ¶¶ 133-34. Thus, the unjust enrichment claim is based on the terms of the Wang Settlement, and turns on defendants' alleged breaches of those terms. While the existence of an express contract does not always foreclose a claim for unjust enrichment-and courts have sometimes permitted a party to plead this as an alternative theory in certain circumstances, see, e.g. , Shtauber v. Gerson , 239 F.Supp.3d 248 , 256 (D.D.C. 2017) -courts require an allegation that the contract is invalid or unenforceable. See Falconi-Sachs v. LPF Senate Square, LLC , 142 A.3d 550 , 556 (D.C. 2016) ; see also United States ex rel. Morsell v. Symantec Corp. , 130 F.Supp.3d 106 , 129 (D.D.C. 2015) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim and stating that this alternative claim[ ] must be supported by, at the very least, an allegation that there is no valid contract (internal quotation marks omitted) ); United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs. , 800 F.Supp.2d 143 , 160 (D.D.C. 2011) (finding plaintiff could not sustain claim for unjust enrichment without an allegation  that there [was] no valid contract); Plesha v. Ferguson , 725 F.Supp.2d 106 , 112 (D.D.C. 2010) (dismissing claim for unjust enrichment pled in the alternative when plaintiff attached a copy of the agreement to the complaint and neither party disputed the validity of the agreement). No such allegation of invalidity or unenforceability is made here. Courts have found similarly infirm unjust enrichment claims that, as here, rest on the terms of an express contract. See Albrecht v. Comm. on Employee Benefits of Fed. Reserve Employee Benefits Sys. , 357 F.3d 62 , 69 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (dismissing unjust enrichment claim that rests on the terms of the [express contract]); In re APA Assessment Fee Litig. , 766 F.3d 39 , 47 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (Insofar as the terms of the contracts governed the matter in dispute, they precluded an unjust enrichment claim.); Movahedi v. U.S. Bank, N.A. , 853 F.Supp.2d 19 , 29 (D.D.C. 2012) (Defendants are correct that when the claim for unjust enrichment is based on the terms of the contract, a claim for unjust enrichment is unavailable.). Hence, Yu's unjust enrichment claim will be dismissed. 12