Opinion ID: 542860
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Steinegger's Other Contentions

Text: 37 Steinegger contends that the district court erred in dismissing its claim for summary eviction of Prime and in denying Steinegger attorney's fees in connection with its successful defense of Prime's claims. We find no merit in either contention.
38 Steinegger contends that under Connecticut law it is entitled to have summary process to evict a tenant if the tenant has failed to pay the appropriate rent, and that since the district court ruled that Prime breached the lease through its miscalculation of the percentage rents due, this ruling in and of itself proved defendants' entitlement to a judgment of possession, and the court should have upheld its claim for summary eviction of Prime. We see no basis for reversal. 39 Connecticut's summary eviction statute provides, in pertinent part, that a lessor of real property who wishes to regain possession of the premises on account of nonpayment of rent may give the lessee eight days' notice to quit the property. Conn.Gen.Stat. Sec. 47a-15a; see id. Sec. 47a-23(a). If, after the expiration of the eight days, the lessee has not quit possession, the lessor may file a summary process complaint to obtain immediate possession, id. Sec. 47a-23a, and [i]f, on the trial of a summary process complaint it is found that the defendant is the lessee of the complainant and holds over after the termination of the lease or rental agreement ... and that notice to quit has been given as provided in this chapter, yet that the defendant holds possession or occupancy after the expiration of the time specified in such notice to quit, ... the court shall forthwith enter judgment that the complainant recover possession, id. Sec. 47a-26d. In the summary process suit, then, the lessor must prove the underlying allegations in order to obtain a judgment of eviction. Housing Authority of East Hartford v. Hird, 13 Conn.App. 150, 155, 535 A.2d 377, 380-81, app. denied, 209 Conn. 825, 552 A.2d 433 (1988). 40 In the present case, the district court apparently found that Steinegger did not adequately prove that it was entitled to summary process under the statute. Though Steinegger claimed entitlement to such process because of Prime's non-payment of rent, the court viewed Prime's conduct not as nonpayment but rather as an underpayment based on [t]he parties disagree[ment] over an accounting mechanism used to police a lease provision. We see no clear error in the district court's finding that there had not been nonpayment within the meaning of the statute.
41 Finally, Steinegger contends that it was entitled to an award of attorney's fees under the lease for its successful defense of Prime's claims. The lease provided, in pertinent part, that 42 [i]f, on account of any breach or default by Lessee in Lessee's obligations under the terms and conditions of this lease, it shall become necessary or appropriate for Lessor to employ or consult with an attorney concerning or to enforce or defend any of Lessor's rights or remedies hereunder, Lessee agrees to pay any reasonable attorney's fees. 43 The district court noted that under this provision, fees are appropriate only when the lessee breaches or defaults under the terms of the lease. 1989 Decision at 31 (emphasis in original). Finding that the claims of Prime and Steinegger were neither mutually dependent nor inextricably intertwined, id. at 32, the court ruled that the lease did not authorize an award to Steinegger for its defense of Prime's claims because those claims were premised on an alleged breach of the agreement by Steinegger, the lessor. We see no error in this ruling. 44 In construing the terms of a lease, the court is generally required to give the document's language its ordinary meaning unless a technical or special meaning is clearly intended. See, e.g., Hatcho Corp. v. Della Pietra, 195 Conn. 18, 485 A.2d 1285, 1287 (1985); Ingalls v. Roger Smith Hotels Corp., 143 Conn. 1, 118 A.2d 463, 465 (1955). The language and placement of the lease's phrase on account of any breach or default by Lessee in Lessee's obligations under the terms and conditions of this lease, plainly sets the boundaries of the parties' agreement as to the lessee's obligation to pay the lessor's attorney's fees. The lease thus gives the lessor the right to recover attorney's fees only when it is forced to litigate because of a breach by the lessee. 45 Prime's suit did not involve any alleged breach by Prime. Rather, it alleged that the withholding by Steinegger of consent to Prime's assignment of the lease to Ramsinghani constituted (1) a breach by Steinegger, and (2) a tort by Steinegger. The issues raised by these claims were independent of any issues as to Prime's performance of its own obligations to pay rent. We conclude that the court properly denied Steinegger's claim for attorney's fees in connection with the defense of Prime's claims.