Opinion ID: 6348790
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Compensation of court appointed experts,

Text: compensation of interpreters, and salaries, fees, expenses, and costs of special interpretation services under section 1828 of this title. A bill of costs shall be filed in the case and, upon allowance, included in the judgment or decree. 28 U.S.C. § 1923 provides: (a) Attorney’s and proctor’s docket fees in courts of the United States may be taxed as costs as follows: $20 on trial or final hearing (including a default judgment whether entered by the court or by the clerk) in civil, criminal, or admiralty cases, except that in cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where the libellant recovers less than $50 the proctor’s docket fee shall be $10; $20 in admiralty appeals involving not over $1,000; $50 in admiralty appeals involving not over $5,000; $100 in admiralty appeals involving more than $5,000; 14 MOSKOWITZ V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “costs” as “[t]he charges or fees taxed by the court, such as filing fees, jury fees, courthouse fees, and reporter fees.”). “Against this background, this Court understandably declared in 1967 that with the exception of the small amounts allowed by § 1923, the rule ‘has long been that attorney’s fees are not ordinarily recoverable [as costs] . . . .’” Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975) (citing recent cases in accord and quoting Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967)). $5 on discontinuance of a civil action; $5 on motion for judgment and other proceedings on recognizances; $2.50 for each deposition admitted in evidence. (b) The docket fees of United States attorneys and United States trustees shall be paid to the clerk of court and by him paid into the Treasury. (c) In admiralty appeals the court may allow as costs for printing the briefs of the successful party not more than: $25 where the amount involved is not over $1,000; $50 where the amount involved is not over $5,000; $75 where the amount involved is over $5,000. MOSKOWITZ V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK 15 (ii) Attorney’s fees are generally available under Rule 41(d) In Evans v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 623 F.2d 121 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam), the Eighth Circuit allowed a $200 attorney fee without explanation as to its reasoning, but noted that it was “satisfied the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding defendant-appellee $200 attorney fees,” implying that attorney’s fees are not available under Rule 41(d) as a matter of right, but only when such awards are within the district court’s discretion. Id. at 122. However, it is unclear by what standard the Eighth Circuit relied upon in evaluating whether the district court had abused its discretion, and accordingly, we do not find this decision to be of any persuasive value. (iii) Attorney’s fees are available under Rule 41(d) if the underlying statute so provides The Third Circuit, Fourth Circuit, Fifth Circuit, and Seventh Circuit have each held that courts may award attorney’s fees as costs under Rule 41(d) if the substantive statute underlying the claim provides for attorney’s fees. See Garza v. Citigroup Inc., 881 F.3d 277, 279 (3rd Cir. 2018); Andrews v. Am.’s Living Ctrs., LLC, 827 F.3d 306, 311 (4th Cir. 2016); Portillo v. Cunningham, 872 F.3d 728, 739 (5th Cir. 2017); Esposito v. Piatrowski, 223 F.3d 497, 501 (7th Cir. 2000). Each of these cases relied on Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985) to reach this holding: In Marek, the Supreme Court addressed whether attorneys’ fees are awardable under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, which allows for the imposition of “costs” when a plaintiff rejects a settlement offer that turns out to be greater than the ultimate judgment 16 MOSKOWITZ V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK at trial. As with Rule 41(d), the drafters of Rule 68 neither defined the term “costs” nor explained its intended meaning, and made no reference to attorneys’ fees. After examining the plain text of Rule 68, the Court concluded legal fees may be awarded under Rule 68, but only where expressly authorized by some applicable statute or other authority. This holding recognized the continued vitality of the American Rule and reaffirmed that there must be statutory authority or other authority to award attorneys’ fees. Garza, 881 F.3d at 282–83 (cleaned up); but see Horowitz v. 148 S. Emerson Assocs. LLC, 888 F.3d 13, 26 n.6 (2nd Cir. 2018). (iv) Attorney’s fees are available under Rule 41(d) if bad faith is proven The Second Circuit, Fourth Circuit, and Tenth Circuit have each held that courts have the discretion to award attorney’s fees pursuant to Rule 41(d) whenever there is proof of bad faith, vexatiousness, wanton actions, or forum shopping in the filing of the original action. 8 See Horowitz v. 148 S. Emerson Assocs. LLC, 888 F.3d 13, 25–26 (2nd Cir. 2018); Andrews, 827 F.3d at 311 (4th Cir. 2016); 8 For convenience, unless otherwise noted, all uses of “bad faith” in this opinion mean “bad faith, vexatiousness, wanton actions, or forum shopping.” MOSKOWITZ V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK 17 Meredith v. Stovall, 2000 WL 807355, at  (10th Cir. June 23, 2000) (unpublished). 9 In Horowitz, a Lanham Act case, the Second Circuit determined that the “scheme” of 41(d), “deterren[ce] to forum shopping and vexatious litigation,” would be “substantially undermined” if attorney’s fees were not recoverable under Rule 41(d) in cases of bad faith, as actions quickly filed and dismissed likely would not incur “expenses routinely recoverable as costs.” Horowitz, 888 F.3d at 25– 26 (cleaned up). The court determined the plaintiff had engaged in both forum shopping and vexatious litigation when it filed a case in a Georgia state court and then dismissed the case “immediately after” the state court “stated its belief that the action was meritless and that its filing likely contravened an order of another court, which was itself addressing substantially related claims.” Id. at 23. The plaintiff then filed another similar suit in federal court in New York. In awarding attorney’s fees under Rule 41(d), the Second Circuit concluded that “[t]his is the precise type of litigation tactic that Rule 41(d) is meant to deter.” Id. Likewise, in the unpublished decision of Meredith, the Tenth Circuit held that “[t]he purpose of [Rule 41(d)] is to prevent the maintenance of vexatious law suits and to secure, where such suits are shown to have been brought repetitively, payment of costs for prior instances of such vexatious conduct,” and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees as costs under Rule 9 Regarding bad faith, the Third Circuit has distinguished between an award of attorney’s fees under Rule 41(d) as “costs” and a federal court’s inherent power to award attorney’s fees under the bad faith exception to the American Rule, Garza, 881 F.3d at 284–85 (3rd Cir. 2018), an approach consistent with the Fifth Circuit. Portillo, 872 F.3d at 740 n.29 (5th Cir. 2017). 18 MOSKOWITZ V. AMERICAN SAVINGS BANK 41(d). Meredith, 2000 WL 807355, at  (cleaned up). And in Andrews, the Fourth Circuit awarded attorney’s fees under Rule 41(d) by relying upon the general “inherent powers” of a federal court to award attorney’s fees when the losing party has been found to have acted in bad faith. Andrews, 827 F.3d at 311–12 (citing Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257–60); but see Garza, 881 F.3d at 284–85 (3rd Cir. 2018); Portillo, 872 F.3d at 740 n.29 (5th Cir. 2017).