Opinion ID: 1843539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finality and Appealability

Text: At the outset, we note that none of the appellants challenges the specific amounts awarded the plaintiffs-cross appellants. They challenge only the entitlement vel non to an award of attorney fees in this action.
The appellants first contend that the Reese Fee Order was interlocutory and insist that, because it addressed only the liability for fees, but postponed until a future date the actual assessment of the fees, it was not such an order as could be made final pursuant to Rule 54(b). In other words, they contend, Rule 54(b) did not authorize the certification of the Reese Fee Order as a final judgment. We agree with this contention. Not every order has the element of finality necessary to trigger the application of Rule 54(b). Tanner v. Alabama Power Co., 617 So.2d 656, 656 (Ala.1993) (Rule 54(b) confers appellate jurisdiction over an order of judgment only where the trial court `has completely disposed of one of a number of claims, or one of multiple parties' (emphasis in Tanner )). For the application of this rule in the specific context of an award of attorney fees, see Sidag Aktiengesellschaft v. Smoked Foods Products Co., 813 F.2d 81 (5th Cir.1987). The Sidag case arose out of an action commenced in 1979 by Sidag Aktiengesellschaft and Sicilia di R. Biebow & Co. (Sidag) against, among others, Smoked Foods Products Company and Sales U.S.A., Inc. (Sales). Id. at 82. On September 19, 1984, following a number of judgments adverse to Sidag, a magistrate ordered Sidag to `pay the expenses and attorneys' fees incurred by' Sales `in obtaining [an] Order of Dismissal [in that stage of the litigation] and in continuing to defend against Plaintiffs' claims since July 28, 1982.' Id. at 83. At that time, however, the magistrate merely directed Sales to submit by affidavit an itemized list of its said costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees [within] thirty days. Id. Nevertheless, by an order dated September 26, 1984, the magistrate attempted to certify the September 19 order as a final judgment, stating in part: Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, the court now expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay and hereby directs entry of separate final judgment ... awarding said dismissed parties costs and attorneys' fees against plaintiffs in accordance with the Order... dated September 19, 1984.... Id. On the appeal of the judgment of dismissal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed ... the dismissal of all claims against Sales. Id. Thereafter, Sales filed in the district court its itemized costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees. Id. Subsequently, the magistrate, by order dated August 28, 1986 and entered August 29, 1986, approved a portion of the attorneys' fees and expenses claimed by Sales, in various amounts totaling $27,365.32. Id. Although the August 28, 1986, order awarding a definite sum in attorney fees was never certified as final, Sidag appealed. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit dismissed the appeal as being from an interlocutory order. Id. at 84. In doing so, it explained: Rule 54(b) certification has no purpose other than to make final a given adjudication which would otherwise be nonfinal by reason of, but only by reason of, the continued presence in the same suit of other undisposed of claims or parties. Only a fully adjudicated whole claim against a party may be certified under Rule 54(b). See Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wetzel, 424 U.S. 737, 742-44, 96 S.Ct. 1202, 1206, 47 L.Ed.2d 435 (1976).... If a purported Rule 54(b) certification of a ruling respecting a claim is not authorized by that rule, the certification is wholly ineffective.... Here the magistrate's September 1984 Rule 54(b) certification purported to certify for appeal his ruling that Sidag was liable for Sales' attorneys' fees. The certification in respect to attorneys' fees was ineffective because the whole of Sales' claim against Sidag for attorneys' fees had not been adjudicated since the amount of recoverable fees remained undetermined (and, indeed, what the magistrate purportedly certified in this regard was not the whole attorneys' fees claim, but only the liability portion thereof).... Just as an order ... dismissing with prejudice all Sidag's claims against [one defendant] only, but not touching any of Sidag's claims against Smoked Foods or Sales' attorneys' fees claim against Sidag, would not be appealable in the absence of a Rule 54(b) certificate, so also the 1986 order fixing the amount of Sales' attorneys' fees was not appealable without such a certificate. 813 F.2d at 84 (emphasis in original; footnote omitted). See also Fort v. Roadway Express, Inc., 746 F.2d 744, 747 (11th Cir.1984) (an order finding [a party] liable for fees without determining the amount thereof is not a final appealable judgment with regard to the issue of attorney's fees). Sidag is substantively indistinguishable from this case. Both cases involve two separate attorney fee orders. There, as here, the trial court, in the first order, purported to certify a holding of fee liability without fixing the amount. In both cases, the trial court subsequently entered an order fixing the amount, but failed to certify the latter order as final pursuant to Rule 54(b). Here, as there, the order actually awarding fees was, without the requisite certification, not final and appealable. That, of course, is the reason this Court issued its March 20, 1997, order to Judge Greenhaw allowing further action. In a related argument, the James Appellants contend that even the liability order of March 31, 1993, was not a `final order'; could not be certified under Rule 54(b); and was not appealable to this Court, regardless of such certification. Brief of [James] Appellants, at 9. In this way, theyonce again urge us to revisit and review the order entered in the Liability Phase, an order that became final pursuant to Rule 54(b) on June 9, 1993, and therefore appealable, and from which no appeal was taken. This Court has been presented with arguments as to the reviewability of the Liability Phase judgment on no less than three prior occasions. First, Joyce Pinto and others (the Pinto intervenors) strenuously urged us to review the Liability Phase on various grounds. Brief of Pinto Appellants (Case Nos. 1931030 & 1931031), at 41-49. We considered those arguments and rejected them without substantive discussion in Pinto v. Alabama Coalition for Equity, 662 So.2d 894, 900 (Ala.1995). Second, soon after his election, Governor James sought a writ of prohibition in this Court directing Judge Reese `to vacate his [order] ... of March 31, 1993.' Id. at 898. On April 10, 1995, we unconditionally denied the petition as it related to the [Liability Phase]. Id. In the order denying that relief, we explained clearly that the judgment in the Liability Phase became final and appealable on June 9, 1993, and that no appeal had been taken therefrom. Id. n.2. Third, in Ex parte James, 713 So.2d 869 (Ala.1997), both in briefs and in oral arguments, the James Appellants again urged us to review the Liability Phase. Most significantly, during the oral argument of that case, the James Appellants presented the identical argument now presented here, namely, that the Liability Phase judgment was a noncertifiable order and was, therefore, still reviewable. In our opinion released on January 10, 1997, we clearly rejected that argument. Specifically, we stated: [U]nlike the Liability Phase, which `ascertained and declared the rights of the parties,' Taylor v. Taylor, 398 So.2d 267, 269 (Ala.1981), by declaring the challenged system unconstitutional, and which became final on June 9, 1993, the Remedy Plan does not `ascertain[] and declare[] the rights of the parties and settle[] the equities' as to any party in this action. 713 So.2d at 873 (emphasis original). Justice Almon, in a special concurrence, explained even more succinctly: It is clear beyond question that the Liability Order became final under traditional, well-established principles of law. The following parties chose not to appeal from the Liability Order: then Governor of Alabama Guy Hunt; Speaker of the House of Representatives James Clark; then State Finance Director Robin Swift; and then Superintendent of Education Wayne Teague; and the members of the State Board of Education. It makes no legal difference to the finality of that order that other persons, who may disagree with that decision not to appeal, now hold those offices. 713 So.2d at 886-87 (footnote omitted). The James Appellants rely on Tanner v. Alabama Power Co., 617 So.2d 656 (Ala. 1993). Tanner, however, is inapposite to this issue. That case involved premature appeal[s] from an order of the Jefferson County Circuit Court granting an application of Alabama Power Company (`APCo') for condemnation of a right-of-way over the Tanners' property. 617 So.2d at 656. In that case, [t]he trial judge, before determining the amount of damages, entered an order purporting to certify the order as a `final judgment' pursuant to Ala. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Id. This Court dismiss[ed] the appeals as premature, holding that the failure of the trial court to assess the damages to which the Tanners were entitled rendered ineffective its Rule 54(b) certification. 617 So.2d at 657. For its rationale, the Court relied extensively on Ala. Code 1975, § 18-1A-289 (conditioning the condemnor's right to enter the property pending an appeal upon the payment of the sum ascertained and assessed by the verdict of the circuit court, or the bond thereof in the circuit court for the defendant); and § 18-1A-290 (requiring payment of damages and compensation assessed at any time within 90 days after the assessment thereof, or, in case an appeal is taken, within 60 days after the appeal is determined). 617 So.2d at 657. These statutes, the Court concluded, `seemed clearly to indicate that the legislature intended that judgments in condemnation cases become final only after assessment of damages.' Id. (Emphasis added in Tanner. ) Indeed, the rule on which the James Appellants rely is properly stated as follows: A judgment for damages to be final must ... be for a sum certain determinable without resort to extraneous facts. Jewell v. Jackson & Whitsitt Cotton Co., 331 So.2d 623, 625 (Ala.1976) (emphasis in original). Otherwise stated: Where the amount of damages is an issue, ... the recognized rule of law in Alabama is that no appeal will lie from a judgment which does not adjudicate that issue by ascertainment of the amount of those damages.  Moody v. State ex rel. Payne, 351 So.2d 547, 551 (Ala.1977) (emphasis added). The following cases clearly illustrate the application of this rule.  Automatic Sprinkler Corp. of America v. B. F. Goodrich Co., 351 So.2d 555 (Ala.1977), involved an action commenced by the B. F. Goodrich Company (Goodrich) against H. K. Ferguson Company (Ferguson) and Automatic Sprinkler Corporation of America (A.T.O.), arising out of a spill of a highly toxic environmental contaminant on [Goodrich's] premises. 351 So.2d at 556. Goodrich sought damages based on claims of breach of contract, negligence, and breach of express and implied warranties. Id. (Emphasis added.) The trial court entered partial summary judgments on the issue of liability against [Ferguson] and A.T.O. Id. (Emphasis added.) More specifically, the judgments stated: The monetary amount of plaintiff's recovery shall be determined hereafter in these proceedings. Id. at 557. Although the judgments also contained the language required for Rule 54(b) certification, this Court held that they were nonfinal and nonappealable. Id. at 557. It explained [t]hat a judgment is not final when the amount of damages has not been fixed by it. Id. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Alldridge v. Metro Bank, 398 So.2d 314 (Ala.Civ.App.1981), involved an action by Metro Bank, the holder of a security interest in a boat, motor, and trailer, against Billy Joe Alldridge, who had purchased the chattels from Thurston Glaze, from whom Metro Bank had acquired its security interest. 398 So.2d at 315. Metro Bank claimed that Alldridge had wrongfully detained and converted its secured collateral. Pursuant to these claims, it sought compensatory and punitive damages. Id. The trial court entered a summary judgment in favor of Metro Bank. In its judgment, however, it expressly reserved for a jury trial the determination of the amount of the damages to be awarded. Id. at 316. The court entered a Rule 54(b) certification of finality. The Court of Civil Appeals, however, held that the judgment was not such a final judgment under [Rule] 54(b) as [would] support an appeal. 398 So.2d at 316. Citing Automatic Sprinkler, the court explained that the purported Rule 54(b) certification was ineffective to transform the order determining liability into a final judgment, where the issue of damages had yet to be submitted to a jury. 398 So.2d at 317. This Public School Equity Funding Case is qualitatively different from these damages cases and is subject to the well-established rule stated in Ex parte Elyton Land Co., 104 Ala. 88, 91, 15 So. 939, 940 (1894): The test of the finality of a decree to support an appeal is not whether the cause remains in fieri, in some respects, in the court of chancery, awaiting further proceedings, necessary to entitle the parties to the full measure of the rights it has been declared they have; but whether the decree which has been rendered, ascertains and declares these rightsif these are ascertained and adjudged, the decree is final and will support an appeal. (Emphasis added.) The question in Elyton Land Co. was whether a decree entered in favor of Rebecca Denny, who had sought an assignment of her dower rights in real estate held by her late husband, was final and appealable. 104 Ala. at 91, 15 So. at 939-40. The Court noted that a number of issues remained to be determined, stating: Whether dower should be assigned by metes and bounds; or whether compensation should be decreed in lieu of such assignment; which of the defendants should be charged with the payment of rents, for what parts of the lands, and what portions; whether the rents should be computed on the basis of the enhanced value of the lands because of the improvements, or without regard to such improvements, were incidents, consequential to the decree the court had rendered, adjudging that the complainant was entitled to be endowed of the lands; essential to the execution of that decree, and to confer upon her the possession and enjoyment of the rights, the decree adjudged she was entitled to have and enjoy. 104 Ala. at 91-92, 15 So. at 940 (emphasis added). However, the Court declared that the essential facts, the finding of which was necessary to the entry of a final decree, were: the marriage, the seisin of the husband during coverture, his death and the possession of the lands, claiming to be tenants of the freehold, by the defendants charged to be in possession and so claiming. 104 Ala. at 90, 15 So. at 940. It explained: These facts constitute the equity of the case; they embrace the substantial merits of the controversy; from them arise the material issues of fact and of law, upon which the legal and equitable rights of the parties depend. Id. Concluding that the decree ascertaine[d] and declare[d] the concurrence and coexistence of [the essential] facts; and from them deduce[d] the legal conclusion, the Court held that the decree was final and appealable. 104 Ala. at 90, 91, 15 So. at 940. This rule has been expressed and applied in recent cases. See, e.g., Taylor v. Taylor, 398 So.2d 267 (Ala.1981); McCulloch v. Roberts, 290 Ala. 303, 276 So.2d 425 (1973); Sexton v. Sexton, 280 Ala. 479, 482, 195 So.2d 531, 533 (1967); Newton v. Ware, 271 Ala. 444, 450, 124 So.2d 664, 669-70 (1960); Ellison v. Ellison, 628 So.2d 855 (Ala.Civ.App. 1993); Moore v. Casey, 439 So.2d 164 (Ala. Civ.App.1983); Wesley v. Brandon, 419 So.2d 257 (Ala.Civ.App.1982). In Newton, we said: Equity decrees may be partly final and partly interlocutory. A decree which ascertains and declares the rights of the parties and settles the equities is a final decree, although it provides for further proceedings under the direction of the court in order to carry the decree into effect. If there is a decree directing further proceedings under the direction of the court in order to make the final decree effective, such decree is interlocutory and remains within the control of the court because as to such decree and further proceedings thereunder the cause remains in fieri. 271 Ala. at 450, 124 So.2d at 670, quoted in Taylor and Sexton. Even more significantly from the point of view of this case, [i]n equity cases there can be more than one final judgment from which an appeal may be taken.  Norris v. Norris, 406 So.2d 946, 948 (Ala.Civ. App.1981) (emphasis added); see also Chadwick v. Town of Hammondville, 270 Ala. 618, 621, 120 So.2d 899, 902 (1960). This is so because there may remain ... other matters in which the equities have not been settled or proceedings necessary to enforce the judgment previously entered. A court has inherent power to issue such orders or process as necessary to render its judgment effective. 406 So.2d at 948; Monroe v. Monroe, 356 So.2d 196 (Ala.Civ.App.1978). Indeed, the Liability Phase order of this bifurcated action falls within this latter rule. This is because the Liability Phase order did nothing more than declare the challenged statutory scheme unconstitutional, and, in doing so, put to rest these constitutional issues. In that respect, it differed not at all from the approach adopted in Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186 (Ky.1989), which the James Appellants, in Ex parte James, offered as exemplary of the proper judicial role. If the trial court, like the Rose court, had merely invalidated the statutory scheme and then abdicated any further role in favor of the legislature, no colorable argument could have been made that the declaratory judgment it entered was nonappealable. That these damages cases, and the rule derived therefrom, are inapplicable to this case should be readily apparent. Unlike those cases, this case did not at any time anticipate the assessment of damages. It involved the plaintiffs' equitable and constitutional claims that Alabama's public school system does not offer equitable and adequate educational opportunities to the schoolchildren of the state, as is constitutionally required, and the enforcement of the declaratory and injunctive relief the plaintiffs requested. Opinion of the Justices No. 338, 624 So.2d 107, 110 (Ala.1993). The Liability Phase order, which formed the basis for the Reese Fee Order, was, therefore, a judgment that would support an appeal.
Although we agree with the appellants that Rule 54(b) did not authorize the certification of the Reese Fee Order as a final judgment, we cannot conclude, as they urge us to do, that the noncertifiability of the Reese Fee Order provides a basis for a reversal of the Greenhaw Fee Order, which has now been properly certified in accordance with our March 20, 1997, order. Specifically, they contend that Judge Greenhaw erroneously concluded that she could not revisit the issue of the entitlement vel non to an award of attorney fees, believing, incorrectly, that the Reese Fee Order had become final and unchallenged by a timely appeal. Thus, they argue, because the Greenhaw Fee Order is based on a false premise, the judgment on which it is based must be reversed and the cause remanded for consideration as to whether the plaintiffs-cross appellants are, in fact, entitled to any award of fees. In support of this proposition, they cite the following portion of the Greenhaw Fee Order: This matter is before the court on applications for attorneys' fees and expenses filed by Plaintiffs' attorneys and Defendants' responses and opposition thereto. On March 31, 1993, the trial court entered judgment granting Plaintiffs injunctive and declaratory relief in what is commonly referred to as the `liability order.' On June 9, 1993, this order was made final pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.C.P. and the judgment was not appealed. On the same day a separate order was entered, which was also certified as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), A.R.C.P., and no appeal was taken from it. This order provided, in part: `8. The plaintiffs are entitled and allowed their costs and expenses, including the award of reasonable attorneys' fees for the attorneys for the plaintiffs, in such amounts as the court shall hereafter determine upon application of the plaintiffs ....' The threshold issue is whether this court has authority to award attorneys' fees pursuant to this order. As stated these orders were made final, which is in marked contrast to the October 22, 1993, Remedy Order wherein the court specifically retained jurisdiction over the matter. Furthermore, the Petition For Writ of Prohibition, Or Alternatively, For a Writ of Mandamus, filed by defendants did not include the above referenced June 9, 1993 order. That petition involved the orders of March 31, 1993, October 22, 1993 and December 3, 1993. Moreover, the Supreme Court of Alabama in its order of April 10, 1995 denying the petition, again determined that final orders not appealed within the time allowed cannot be considered by that Court. Finally, on April 18, 1996, the Supreme Court lifted its stay with regard to the issue of attorneys' fees. Based on the foregoing, this court is of the opinion the June 9, 1993 order allowing an award of attorneys' fees is final and a determination may be made regarding entitlement to such fees. (Emphasis added.) We disagree with the appellants' arguments for reversal on this ground, for two reasons. First, this Court has written: `Judgments are to be construed like other written instruments.' Hanson v. Hearn, 521 So.2d 953, 954 (Ala.1988). `Rules applicable to the construction and interpretation of contracts are applicable to the construction and interpretation of judgments.' Id.  Inter-Connect, Inc. v. Gross, 644 So.2d 867, 868 (Ala.1994). Simply stated, we construe the Greenhaw Fee Order as constituting an independent review of the Reese Fee Order. Particularly significant is Judge Greenhaw's statement: The threshold issue is whether this court has authority to award attorneys' fees pursuant to [the Reese Fee] [O]rder. (Emphasis added.) She followed up this statement with thorough analyses of various theories under which attorney fees might be awarded. Eventually, she concluded that she had authority to award fees to Harper and ADAP pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorney Fee Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and to ACE pursuant to the common fund theory. [1] Moreover, the amounts she awarded were substantialtotalling $3,599,735. Had she not concluded, based on an independent assessment of the right to attorney fees, that her court [had] authority to award attorneys' fees, regardless of the Reese Fee Order, she would, it seems likely, have awarded only nominal sums. Suffice it to say that these factorsher detailed analyses and the substantial amount of fees she ultimately awardedare entirely inconsistent with the appellants' construction of her order, namely, that it did not constitute an independent assessment of the entitlement. The language in the Greenhaw Fee Order on which the appellants rely may be regarded as harmless surplusage. This conclusion is fully consistent with the well-established rule that [a] correct decision will not be disturbed even if the court gives the wrong reasons. Davison v. Lowery, 526 So.2d 2, 4 (Ala.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 854, 109 S.Ct. 140, 102 L.Ed.2d 113 (1988). See also Hood v. Wilson, 496 So.2d 76 (Ala.Civ.App.1986). Thus, to the extent the Greenhaw Fee Order is otherwise correct, we will not reverse it based on any misconception Judge Greenhaw may have had regarding the finality of the Reese Fee Order.