Opinion ID: 160150
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Analytical Factors

Text: 43 Two additional considerations may generally be helpful in determining whether state action constitutes impermissible compulsion. The first is a distinction drawn between a privilege and a penalty. Defendants argue that a transfer from medium to maximum security housing and the attendant loss of privileges for refusing to participate in a prisoner treatment program do not constitute a penalty or punishment. Rather, these consequences are merely part of the Department's system of privileges and incentives utilized to encourage inmates to participate in programs. In other words, the State argues that punishment only occurs in response to a wrongful act taken by a prisoner. 44 This circuit has held that the characterization of state action as either withdrawing a privilege or imposing a penalty is indicative of whether the action constitutes compulsion. In United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 982 (10th Cir. 1995), the court held that the denial of a downward adjustment under § 3E1.1 does not constitute a penalty or an enhancement of sentence for purpose of the Fifth Amendment. In reaching this conclusion, we explained: 45 There is a difference between increasing the severity of a sentence for failure to demonstrate remorse and refusing to grant a reduction from the prescribed offense level. 'It is one thing to extend leniency to a defendant who is willing to cooperate with the government; it is quite another thing to administer additional punishment to a defendant who by his silence has committed no additional offense.' 46 Id. at 982-83 (citations omitted). 47 We do not believe that the distinction between a penalty and a privilege should be used as an absolute test for compulsion, but we believe that the distinction may be helpful in determining whether the government has sought to compel self-incriminating testimony. 11 Though it would be inappropriate to find compulsion in a situation where the state has unquestionably imposed a penalty but that penalty is so de minimis in nature as to have no compulsive effect, that is not the situation here. In this case, Plaintiff was placed in medium security housing before prison staff recommended that he participate in the SATP. His participation in the SATP was not part of his sentence or court-ordered. As noted by the district court, the consequences attendant to an inmate's refusal to participate in the SATP under IMPP 11-101 are exactly the same as those punishments automatically imposed upon a prisoner for termination from a work assignment for cause, offenses for which felony charges are filed by a state prosecutor, or disciplinary convictions for offenses such as theft, drunkenness, use of narcotics, sodomy, riot, arson, assault, sexual activity, a relationship with staff, and possession of contraband. See App., Vol. I at 24-25; Lile, 24 F. Supp.2d at 1155 n.3. Thus, it appears that in this case the Department's transfer action and the resulting loss of privileges are properly characterized as imposing penalties. This serves to buttress our conclusion that the loss and restriction of the earned privileges corresponding to Level III status solely for refusing to provide incriminating information constitute potent and substantial penalties that would likely cause Plaintiff to feel that he has no choice other than to incriminate himself. 48 The second consideration that bears on whether the government has sought to compel self-incrimination is the automaticity of the penalty. The district court found that the prison administrative sanctions attendant to [P]laintiff's refusal, automatically imposed by operation of IMPP 11-101, Lile, 24 F. Supp.2d at 1158, are impermissibly coercive because they present a costly burden to [P]laintiff's exercise of his rights under the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 1159. In several Supreme Court cases which all deal with attempts by prisoners or parolees to invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege and which hold that no constitutional violation occurred, none of the prisoners or parolees were automatically penalized for asserting the privilege. See, e.g., Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, Murphy, 465 U.S. 429, and Baxter, 425 U.S. 308. We believe that the distinction between an automatic and a conditional consequence is helpful in determining whether government action rises to the level of compulsion. See Cunningham, 431 U.S. at 808 n.5 (distinguishing Baxter on the ground that the penalty in that case was not imposed automatically). That said, the automaticity of a consequence is not dispositive in our determination because it fails to take into account the severity of the penalty. It remains worth noting that, unlike the consequences at issue in Woodard, Murphy, and Baxter, the adverse consequences in this case would be imposed on Plaintiff automatically once he refused to admit responsibility and disclose his sexual history and thereby refused to participate in the SATP. See App., Vol. 1 at 24 (An inmate shall be automatically reduced to Level I for . . . [r]efusal to participate in the recommended programs at the time of placement. (IMPP 11-101, pt. IV.B.2.)).