Opinion ID: 2630572
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Interests in Favor of Allocution and Suppression Are Weak in This Case

Text: ¶ 127 The right to allocute was originally recognized in part because the accused was considered incompetent to testify at trial. State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 370 (Utah 1993) (Durham, J., dissenting) (detailing historical justifications for allocution). While an accused today may testify on his or her behalf, an accused may instead exercise his or her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent during trial. When this occurs, the interests in favor of allocution are at their highest, because the accused has not yet addressed the court or given a statement in mitigation. Id. at 370-71 (arguing that although the original reasons for allowing an accused to allocute no longer exist, modern courts now justify it on the ground that it permits an accused to present mitigating information). ¶ 128 Here, however, Maestas not only testified at trial, but in so doing gave the ultimate in mitigating statementshe denied his guilt. His allocution rights were thus vindicated when he testified at trial. His admission of the crime at sentencing was not the exercise of any legitimate right; taken together with his contradictory trial testimony, it was a transparent attempt to manipulate the system. To now suppress Maestas's allocution statement would, in my mind, sanction and encourage such duplicity.