Opinion ID: 2262950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Is the Regulation Narrowed To Protect Only the Valid State Interest Involved?

Text: Thus, we agree with the respondent that the state's interest in these circumstances is such that a reasonable curtailment of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments is not constitutionally offensive. The petitioner and the amicus, however, contend that even if some regulation is permissible the instant rule as drawn is overbroad, vague and unnecessarily restrictive. We agree. The infringement occasioned by Rule []301 may only be sustained where it is reasonably related to the reduction of the backlog. That end can be obtained, however, only where the delay in the subject attorney's cases has been occasioned primarily by that attorney's inability to appear for cases that are otherwise ready for disposition. Where cases remain untried for any reason or combination of reasons other than the defense attorney's inability to appear for trial, invocation of Rule []301 would have no relationship to the objective the rule was designed to meet. On its face, Rule []301 gives every indication that it operates automatically once the stated limit of old cases has been exceeded, the only exception being defendants who are fugitives or whose cases are in deferred status by reason of incompetency or other good and sufficient reason, . . . While the rule permits disputes as to the accuracy of the list of year old cases, no procedure is provided to challenge the reason for the delay in any particular case. An attorney who is available and willing to proceed to trial on all of his cases could nevertheless fall within the ambit of the rule as it is presently drafted even though the delay was occasioned by the prosecution's failure to be prepared, the failure of witnesses to appear, or by any number of other reasons that are unrelated to the attorney's availability. Where certain `fundamental rights' are involved, . . . legislative enactments must be drawn narrowly to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-308 (1940); see Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 460, 463-464 (1972) (WHITE, J., concurring). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1972). It would derrogate from the important rights involved in this case to permit their deprivation in situations where they in no way conflict with the legitimate state purpose sought to be served. The rule is thus fatally overbroad. Nor is it a sufficient answer that the rule permits relief upon good cause shown. Divestment of the important constitutional rights at issue here cannot be justified by a standard so vague as to be susceptible to arbitrary and inequitable interpretations. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378-79 (1964); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-151 (1959). Where a statute is reasonably susceptible to two interpretations, courts must presume that the Legislature intends the result that does not offend the Constitution. American Power & Light Co. v. S.E.C., 329 U.S. 90 (1946). This doctrine, however, cannot be invoked to save the rule in question because the defect here is the absence of any standard. We are not faced with the interpretation of an ambiguous document but rather the failure of the drafters of the rule to provide any standards. Further the rule is also defective in that it fails to provide adequate guidance to those enforcing it and those subject to it. It contains no standards as the amount of responsibility for delay necessary to make a particular case relevant for purposes of the rule's prohibition. Nor does it provide a procedure by which these matters are to be determined. We therefore find the rule too vague and overbroad. The writ of prohibition against the enforcement of Rule []301 of the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County is hereby granted and the Court of Common Pleas, Philadelphia County, is restrained from proceeding against the petitioner under its provisions. Mr. Chief Justice JONES and Mr. Justice ROBERTS concur in the result.