Opinion ID: 2134029
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Sexual Misconduct

Text: Our authority to review the judicial misconduct of Judge Gerard can be found in Iowa Code chapter 602. Specifically, we may [d]iscipline or remove the judicial officer for persistent failure to perform duties, habitual intemperance, willful misconduct in office, conduct which brings judicial office into disrepute, or substantial violation of the canons of judicial ethics. Iowa Code § 602.2106(3)(b). The justification implicated here is conduct that brings disrepute to the judicial office. In order to determine if this justification for discipline has been met with regard to Judge Gerard's relationship with the assistant county attorney, we must also determine if Judge Gerard's actions violated the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. We find the evidence from the record supports the following factual background. Judge Gerard had a sexual relationship with an assistant county attorney. This relationship remained secret for approximately two months. During this time, the assistant county attorney appeared before Judge Gerard on behalf of the State on a regular basis. Several intimate encounters were shared in various rooms of the courthouse where Judge Gerard presided. Both Judge Gerard and the assistant county attorney were married to other people. Upon discovery, Judge Gerard cooperated fully with the investigation and case reassignments. There is no evidence that Judge Gerard's relationship with the assistant county attorney prejudiced any defendant who appeared before him during this time. Judge Gerard was charged with violating Canons 1, 2(A), and 3(D)(1)(c) of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. The commission found him in violation of each canon as a result of his affair with the assistant county attorney. We agree. We do not come to such a conclusion lightly, however. We recognize that this was intended to be a private relationship between consenting adults. Although both were married to other people, we normally would be loath to interfere in such personal matters. In this case, however, the private aspects of the affair are secondary to the public problems it has created.
Canon 1 of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should ... observe[ ] high standards of conduct so that the integrity and independence of the judiciary may be preserved. This canon imposes a duty upon a judge that rises above the normal responsibilities he has as an attorney. A judge is simply held to a higher standard of conduct by virtue of his office. This standard may make what the judge does in private a public concern because judges have a special public responsibility as judicial officers. In re Inquiry Concerning Eads, 362 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Iowa 1985). Similarly, Canon 2(A) of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should respect and comply with the law and should act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Public confidence is a fragile thing. We have recognized that public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper judicial conduct. In re Eads, 362 N.W.2d at 551. As such, we require judges to freely and willingly accept restrictions on their conduct `that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen.' Id. (citation omitted). We find that the sexual relationship between Judge Gerard and the assistant county attorney violated both canons. In examining all circumstances of the conduct engaged in by Judge Gerard, we begin by considering the egregious nature of his actions. Because the affair occurred with a subordinate public servant, going undisclosed for several weeks, this raises several issues of bias, improper influence, and impartiality. Rather than disclose this relationship, Judge Gerard allowed it to remain hidden from all who appeared before him against the assistant county attorney. Judge Gerard decided that he was the best judge of what information defendants were entitled to know and withheld this information potentially to their detriment. Such a supercilious response is an offense to our rules of disclosure and recusal. This is a serious judicial infraction. Under these circumstances, the integrity of this office suffered as well as the integrity of the judicial system. Judge Gerard's decisions were called into question, and his fitness was challenged. In addressing similar circumstances, the court in In re Flanagan stated: Although it may be difficult to assess the degree to which the public at large now may condone or disapprove of one having a sexual affair with a married person, we are persuaded that, in general, such conduct is regarded as improper when it involves a subordinate in a professional, highly sensitive public context. Moreover, we think it is fair to say that a member of the public, aware of the aforementioned combination of [facts], would reasonably conclude that the integrity of the judiciary was likely to be impaired. In re Flanagan, 240 Conn. 157, 690 A.2d 865, 881 (1997) (emphasis added). We find this language to be persuasive. Accordingly, Judge Gerard's conduct had the opposite result strived for in Canon 1. In regard to Canon 2(A), Judge Gerard adamantly argues that no one has been able to find any evidence that he acted partially toward the State and, therefore, this mitigates his misconduct. We cannot agree. It is immaterial that the judge's association may not have had a detrimental impact on defendants appearing before him. The key concern of this canon is the appearance of impropriety. In this situation, once the public learned of the judge's relationship with the State's attorney who appeared before him daily, the appearance of bias was very real. We find the commission's analysis of Canon 2(A) to be very persuasive. The commission concluded: This behavior undermines the integrity of the judicial system. What is the public to think when they learn the assistant county attorney was having a sexual relationship with a judge before whom she appeared? What is the public to think when they learn the sexual conduct was taking place in the courthouse? More importantly, what is a criminal defendant to think when the judge sentences that defendant or overrules that defendant's motion to suppress, when the assistant county attorney with whom he is having a sexual relationship was arguing the case on behalf of the State? (Emphasis added). Other courts have addressed the effect judicial misconduct may have on public perception. Members of the judiciary should be acutely aware that any action they take, whether on or off the bench, must be measured against exacting standards of scrutiny to the end that public perception of the integrity of the judiciary will be preserved. There must also be a recognition that any actions undertaken in the public sphere reflect, whether designedly or not, upon the prestige of the judiciary.... That is not to say, of course, that Judges must cloister themselves from the day-to-day problems of family and friends. But it does necessitate that Judges must assiduously avoid those contacts which might create even the appearance of impropriety. Lonschein v. State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 50 N.Y.2d 569, 430 N.Y.S.2d 571, 408 N.E.2d 901, 902 (1980) (citation omitted). Moreover, [t]he duty to avoid creating an appearance of impropriety is one of taking `reasonable precautions' to avoid having `a negative effect on the confidence of the thinking public in the administration of justice.' In re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 788 P.2d 716, 723 (Alaska 1990) (quoting In re Bonin, 375 Mass. 680, 378 N.E.2d 669, 682-83 (1978)). And finally, [w]hile it is true that adultery is no longer a criminal offense, the mere fact that conduct is less than criminal does not mean that, if a judge engages in it, he may not diminish public confidence in the judiciary. A judge's conduct is held to a higher standard than that of the average citizen, and must be beyond reproach, at least when that conduct is directly connected to his professional office and functions. In re Flanagan, 690 A.2d at 881 (emphasis added). Our court has also had the opportunity to speak about this canon. We have noted specifically: Judges must be particularly sensitive about their social relationships with lawyers. Although judges are not required to terminate friendships with lawyers, they must regulate their relationships to avoid even the appearance of impropriety. Prudence dictates that judges be especially sensitive about their associations with attorneys who are likely to appear before them in the courtroom. In re Eads, 362 N.W.2d at 551 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Judge Gerard was neither prudent nor forthcoming about his relationship with a lawyer who appeared before him daily. As such, this secret relationship, upon discovery, did contribute to diminished public confidence in our judicial system. See In re Flanagan, 690 A.2d at 881. The harm was compounded by the fact that it occurred in the public courthouse. This conduct was a serious misuse of the judge's privilege to work and serve there as a servant of the citizens of Iowa. It also demonstrated a lack of discretion by engaging in what was intended to be private conduct in a public place which, nevertheless, had the potential to become a public matter. A judge's unethical or seemingly unethical behavior ... detracts from the efficient administration of justice and the integrity of the judicial office, as it diminishes respect for the judiciary in the eyes of the public. In re Judge, 788 P.2d at 722. Accordingly, Judge Gerard's actions violated Canon 2(A).
Canon 3(D)(1)(c) of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct states: A judge should disqualify himself ... in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned... [such as] where: The judge knows that [he] ... has ... any ... interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding. This canon places an affirmative duty on the judge to make himself aware of the consequences of his relationships and conduct. When circumstances are such in his life that someone might reasonably question his partiality in a particular matter, he has an obligation to make those conflicts known or recuse himself. It was not Judge Gerard's right to make these decisions for the affected parties. We agree with the commission that this paternalistic attitude on behalf of the judge is contrary to Iowa law. The failure to disclose his relationship with the assistant county attorney or recuse himself where appropriate was not only poor judgment, but suggests to the reasonable onlooker that Judge Gerard's impartiality was affected. Therefore, Canon 3(D)(1)(c) was violated.
With due respect to Judge Gerard's past and future legal contributions, we cannot ignore the gravity of his actions and their effect on the legal community and public confidence. Given the violations of these three canons of judicial conduct, Judge Gerard has brought disrepute to his coveted office. We also find that his actions in this regard violate Iowa Code section 602.2106(3)(b). Judge Gerard misused his power as a public servant. He also misused his access to the public courthouse. While in hindsight he can admit that he acted improperly, this is no buffer for the public erosion of confidence that resulted from Judge Gerard's indiscretions with the assistant county attorney. As such, we adopt the holding of the commission regarding Judge Gerard's failure to recuse himself from cases handled by the assistant county attorney with whom he was having a sexual affair. We also agree with the commission's findings on his misuse of the courthouse. Because of these violations, there must be public accountability of [Judge Gerard] for [his] disciplinary infractions. In re Eads, 362 N.W.2d at 551. The integrity of his office was diminished by his failure to recognize the seriousness of his actions. The public must be protected, others must be deterred from similar misconduct, and confidence in the judiciary must be vindicated. Id. Our goal is not to punish the wrongdoer but to restore public confidence in the system and its officers. In re Miera, 426 N.W.2d 850, 858 (Minn.1988).