Opinion ID: 1784340
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issue: Whether Holland's confession should have been excluded?[2]

Text: Holland filed a motion to suppress his confession; he based his motion on the failure of Detectives Payne and Terrell to cease all custodial interrogation after he had allegedly invoked his right to an attorney. The trial judge held a lengthy suppression hearing and then issued an opinion in which he declared the confession admissible: OPINION AND ORDER On a former day a Motion to Suppress was heard. Present were the Defendant, Gerald James Holland; his attorneys, Earl Stegall and Lisa Dodson; and the District Attorney, Cono Caranna and his assistant, Margaret Alfonso. After hearing the evidence and arguments of the attorneys, cases were submitted to the Court and the motion was taken under advisement. ..... The Defendant contends that the statements of the Defendant and resulting physical evidence are not admissible because the Defendant made a non-ambiguous request for an attorney prior to giving his taped statement. The more credible evidence does not support this contention. Although there was a conflict in the testimony concerning the issue of an attorney, the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant did not ask for an attorney nor did he invoke his right to an attorney prior to giving his taped statement. The Defendant was mirandized orally and by writing. He then asked, Don't you think I need a lawyer? The officer responded by again advising the Defendant of his right to an attorney  his constitutional right to an attorney; and that, if he did not want to talk to them he did not have to; that there were two sides to every story, they had heard one side and they wanted to hear his side. The Defendant responded, Ok he would talk to them. In Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 107 S.Ct. 828, 93 L.Ed.[2d] 920 (1987), the United States Supreme Court was confronted with the admissibility of an oral confession. The Defendant, after being mirandized, had clearly stated that he would not make a written statement without an attorney, yet, he agreed to and did give them an oral confession. In reversing the Connecticut Supreme Court and holding that the oral confession was admissible, Justice Rehnquist in a 7/2 decision stated at page 927: The fundamental purpose of the Court's decision in Miranda was to assure that the individual right to choose between speech and silence remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process .. . Once warned, the suspect is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities. (emphasis added) Having been properly warned, the Defendant exercised his own volition and decided to make a statement to the authorities. The proof further established beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was Mirandized, that he understood his rights, that he freely signed a waiver of his rights; that the Defendant freely, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his constitutional rights without any threats, promises or coercion by the officers. Vol. I, at 75-77. When validity of a confession is challenged on appeal, an initial inquiry must be conducted. This Court must determine whether the trial judge applied proper legal standards in his evaluation of facts. For example, the judge must have required the State to prove all facts prerequisite to admissibility beyond a reasonable doubt. Jones, 461 So.2d at 697; Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 753 (Miss. 1984); Stevens v. State, 228 So.2d 888, 889 (Miss. 1969); Dover v. State, 227 So.2d 296, 300 (Miss. 1969); Harvey v. State, 207 So.2d 108, 115 (Miss. 1968). If the judge applied the proper standards, then this Court must determine from a review of the entire record whether the fact-finding is supported by substantial evidence. Jones, 461 So.2d at 697; Neal, 451 So.2d at 753 (employing both clearly-erroneous and substantial-evidence standards of review); see Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1617, 48 L.Ed.2d 1, 8 (1976) (review of record not limited to evidence before trial judge at suppression hearing). If the judge applied proper legal standards and his factfinding is supported by substantial evidence, then this Court may not disturb his decision to validate the confession. Jones, 461 So.2d at 697.
In the case sub judice, neither Holland nor the State disputes the trial judge's fact-finding. Accord Appellant's Brief at 27 ([T]here is no factual dispute; the issue presented is essentially a legal question.). Indeed, no one seems to dispute the judge's citation of law. The dispute, in essence, is whether the judge reached the right conclusion after applying relevant law to the undisputed facts. Holland contends the judge should have concluded: (1) that his question  Don't you think I need a lawyer?  constituted an unambiguous request for an attorney and, therefore, the officers should have ceased interrogation; alternatively (2) that his question constituted an ambiguous request and, therefore, the officers should have ceased interrogation except for that intended to clarify. Holland adds that, because improper interrogation did not cease, his subsequently-obtained confession should be deemed inadmissible. Appellant's Brief at 22-28. The State of course rejects Holland's contention and, basically, concurs in the trial judge's conclusion. Appellee's Brief at 17-21. Resolution of this dispute will entail an in-depth, step-by-step analysis of both evidence and relevant law.

The first step will require a determination of whether Holland's question constituted an ambiguous invocation of his right to an attorney. The constitutional principles governing custodial interrogation are well-established. One principle dictates that custodial interrogation must be preceded by advice to the putative defendant (hereinafter defendant) regarding the Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent and to have an attorney present. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. at 1639, 16 L.Ed.2d at 726. If the right to remain silent is invoked, the interrogation must cease. If the right to have an attorney present is invoked, the interrogation must cease until [one] is present. Id., quoted in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, 386 (1981); see also Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95, 105 S.Ct. 490, 492, 83 L.Ed.2d 488, 493-94 (1984) ( per curiam ) (This is a rigid prophylactic rule.). Under either circumstance, interrogation may commence or resume in the absence of an attorney if the defendant: (1) initiated further discussions with the police; and (2) knowingly and intelligently [and voluntarily] waived the right ... invoked. Smith, 469 U.S. at 95, 105 S.Ct. at 492, 83 L.Ed.2d at 494; United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 976 (2d Cir.1988). The right to have an attorney present must be specifically invoked. Edwards, 451 U.S. at 482, 101 S.Ct. at 1884, 68 L.Ed.2d at 385. This may be accomplished in any manner and at any stage of the process. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444-45, 86 S.Ct. at 1612-13, 16 L.Ed.2d at 706-07. And courts must give a broad, rather than a narrow, interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel, and this principle applies whether the defendant's request is explicit or equivocal. Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104, 1106 (11th Cir.1990) (quoting Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633, 106 S.Ct. 1404, 1406, 89 L.Ed.2d 631, 640 (1986)). If a defendant makes equivocal or ambiguous utterances which could be interpreted as an invocation, then the trend is to require cessation of interrogation except for strictly-limited inquiry for clarification purposes. Gotay, 844 F.2d at 974 (The trend ... is to adopt that when a suspect makes an equivocal statement that can arguably be construed as a request for counsel, interrogations must cease except for narrow questions designed to clarify the earlier statement and the suspect's desire for counsel.); see Towne, 899 F.2d at 1106; United States v. Porter, 776 F.2d 370 (1st Cir.1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1048, 107 S.Ct. 2178, 95 L.Ed.2d 835 (1987); United States v. Cherry, 733 F.2d 1124, 1130-31 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1056, 107 S.Ct. 932, 93 L.Ed.2d 983 (1987); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir.1985). [3] This Court has joined the trend by permitting an interrogator to clarify ambiguous utterances. See, e.g., Kirkland v. State, 559 So.2d 1046, 1048 (Miss. 1990); Berry v. State, 575 So.2d 1, 5-8 (Miss. 1990). Precedents do not establish a bright line rule for determining what sorts of statements amount to equivocal requests for an attorney. Towne, 899 F.2d at 1106; see Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1391 n. 4 (9th Cir.1990) (The totality of circumstances test, which is used to determine whether an accused has `knowingly and voluntarily' waived his Miranda rights, has no role in the determination of whether an accused's request for counsel is clear or equivocal.) (quoting Owen v. Alabama, 849 F.2d 536, 539 (11th Cir.1988)). This determination is critical, though, because incriminating information is inadmissible evidence if elicited after ambiguous utterances and prior to clarification. Gotay, 844 F.2d at 975; Fouche, 776 F.2d at 1405 (citing cases); Anderson v. Smith, 751 F.2d 96, 104 n. 9 (2d Cir.1984). In the case sub judice, the trial judge found that Holland had asked the detectives: Don't you think I need a lawyer? The judge then applied the law to this fact-finding and seems to have concluded that Holland's question constituted a declination of his right to have an attorney present. This conclusion is inconsistent with case law. As noted, precedents do not establish a bright-line rule for determining whether an utterance is ambiguous, and the United States Supreme Court has twice expressly declined to address the issue. Towne, 899 F.2d at 1106; see Connecticut v. Barrett, 479 U.S. 523, 529 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 828, 832 n. 3, 93 L.Ed.2d 920, 928 n. 3 (1987); Smith, 469 U.S. at 96, 105 S.Ct. at 493, 83 L.Ed.2d at 494; see also Gotay, 844 F.2d at 974-75 (The Supreme Court has not defined `ambiguity' in this context or ruled on the consequences thereof.). Precedents do, however, establish that questions such as the one posed by Holland are ambiguous and require clarification. The recent case  Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104 (11th Cir.1990)  is particularly instructive. In Towne, the Eleventh Circuit held that the defendant's question  Officer, what do you think about whether I should get a lawyer?  was ambiguous and required clarification. Id. at 1107-08 (citing cases in which an interrogating officer was asked by the defendant for advice on whether he should exercise his right to get an attorney). The Court explained that [s]uch questions reveal to the interrogating officer that the defendant is contemplating exercising his right to have an attorney present, and under [established case law], the officer should clarify the defendant's wishes before proceeding further. Id. at 1109 (citing cases); see Norman v. Ducharme, 871 F.2d 1483, 1486 (9th Cir.1989) (defendant's question  [Do you think I] should see a lawyer?  deemed ambiguous); U.S. v. Fouche, 833 F.2d 1284 at 1286-87 (9th Cir.1987) (defendant's question  What should I do?  deemed ambiguous). [4] Questions like Holland's are not only to be characterized as ambiguous  not only as a matter of law  but also as a matter of definition. Accord Knight v. State ex rel. Moore, 574 So.2d 662, 668 (Miss. 1990) (disposition of the issue ... require[s] comprehension of the `popular use of the word as shown by the dictionaries') (quoting O.W. Holmes' opinion in Commonwealth v. Wright, 137 Mass. 250, 251-52 (1884)). Definitionally, a question is [a]n expression of inquiry that invites or calls for a reply or a subject or point open to controversy [or] under discussion or being considered. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1015 (2d ed. 1985). Conversely, a declaration is [a]n explicit or formal statement or announcement). Id. at 372. Thus, when a suspect poses a question, interrogators should be permitted to respond for purposes of clarification; this plain-English or common-sense approach is consistent with the sound law pronounced in Towne and numerous other cases. [5] See, e.g., Robinson v. Borg, 918 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir.1990) (In analyzing a defendant's request for counsel, we take a defendant's words `understood as ordinary people would understand them.') (quoting Barrett, 479 U.S. at 529, 107 S.Ct. at 832, 93 L.Ed.2d at 928). In sum, Holland's question constituted an ambiguous invocation as a matter of law and as a matter of definition. [6] With the foregoing in mind, this Court must now determine whether the police detective responded to Holland's ambiguous invocation within constitutional parameters. That is, did the detective tailor his response solely for the purpose of clarifying the ambiguity?