Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Marlow's Testimony Regarding Coffman's Participation

Text: Coffman contends that in response to the prosecutor's cross-examination, Marlow gave inadmissible opinion testimony on the central question of her guilt and thereby violated her constitutional rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury on every element of the charges, to confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses, and to a fair and reliable determination of the facts upon which the guilt and penalty verdicts were based. (See Evid.Code, § 800.) The claim is, in substance, one of erroneous admission of evidence, subject to the standard of review for claims of state law error. (See People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) Coffman forfeited this contention by failing to make a contemporaneous objection. ( People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 545, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137 [routine application of state evidentiary law does not implicate the defendant's constitutional rights]; Evid.Code, § 353, subd. (a).) For the reasons that follow, had Coffman preserved the claim, we would conclude the challenged testimony represented not Marlow's opinion of Coffman's guilt, but rather his own concessions and recollection of events. The prosecutor began his cross-examination of Marlow by reading from count 2 of the information, which charged Marlow and Coffman with kidnapping Corinna Novis, and asking if the charge were true. Marlow acknowledged he intentionally kidnapped Novis. The prosecutor continued: And your testimony is Miss Coffman went along with it all the way and helped you kidnap her, correct? Marlow answered, That was the reason, to get a car and money to go to Arizona. The prosecutor then read count 3, charging defendants with kidnapping for robbery, and asked if the allegation were true. Marlow's counsel then objected on the basis the question asked for a legal conclusion. The court overruled the objection, noting: It is not a legal proposition. He didn't ask him if he was guilty, he just asked if that statement was true. [ļ] That's a question of fact. [ļ] Now, if he asked was he guilty, that's fine. You have a good objection. [ļ] But he is just asking a question of fact whether that ... is a true statement. Continuing his cross-examination of Marlow, the prosecutor asked: Your testimony is that when Corinna Novis was kidnapped for purpose of robbery, Miss Coffman went along freely and voluntarily; is that correct? Marlow answered, She is the one who approached Miss Novis to start with. Without objection, the prosecutor asked: Okay. In other words, she was an active, willing participant in that crime? Marlow answered in the affirmative. The prosecutor then inquired about count 4 charging robbery. On or about November 7, 1986, in the above named judicial district, the crime of robbery in violation of Penal Code section 211, a felony, was committed by James Gregory Marlow and Cynthia Lynn Coffman, who did willfully, unlawfully and by means of force and fear take personal property from the personal possession and immediate presence of Corinna D. Novis. [ļ] That's true also, isn't it? Marlow assented. You robbed Corinna Novis, correct? Marlow demurred: I didn't rob her. I didn't take nothing from her. The prosecutor asked: A purse, a wallet, a car? Well, a car. And a purse? I never took her purse. The prosecutor clarified: I mean, if you and Miss Coffman were operating as a team and she actually took the purse instead of you, well â . Well, then we both took it, Marlow replied. The court then sustained Marlow's counsel's objection on the basis that the question called for a legal conclusion. The prosecutor resumed: During all these crimes, were you and Miss Coffman acting as a team? Marlow responded affirmatively. A witness may not express an opinion on a defendant's guilt. ( People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 47, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 103; People v. Brown (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 820, 827-829, 172 Cal.Rptr. 221.) The reason for this rule is not because guilt is the ultimate issue of fact for the jury, as opinion testimony often goes to the ultimate issue. ( Torres, supra, at p. 47, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 103; Brown, supra, at pp. 827-828, 172 Cal.Rptr. 221; see Evid. Code, § 805.) Rather, opinions on guilt or innocence are inadmissible because they are of no assistance to the trier of fact. To put it another way, the trier of fact is as competent as the witness to weigh the evidence and draw a conclusion on the issue of guilt. ( Torres, supra, at p. 47, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 103.) Coffman contends the admission of Marlow's testimony regarding her culpability violated these longstanding principles. She asserts there was no foundational showing that Marlow understood the legal definitions of the crimes about which he was questioned. She also asserts Marlow had no basis upon which to make any admission or confession of her guilt, and for these reasons his testimony was irrelevant. Coffman further contends that Marlow's status as the only living witness to the crimes, besides herself, rendered his testimony highly prejudicial. We conclude Coffman's argument lacks merit. In context, the prosecutor was attempting, with some success, to get Marlow to concede the truth of the allegations against him and to describe, as a percipient witness, the degree of defendants' coparticipation during the commission of the offenses against Novis. We see in Marlow's testimony the expression of an opinion regarding neither Coffman's guilt nor her credibility or state of mind.