Opinion ID: 612660
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Balancing Governmental Interest Against Nature of Intrusion

Text: We conclude our analysis of whether the force used by Wells was reasonable by balancing the gravity of the intrusion on the individual against the government's need for that intrusion. Miller, 340 F.3d at 964. The intermediate force used by Wells indisputably constituted a significant intrusion upon Young's liberty interests. In assessing the countervailing governmental interest that we must balance against that intrusion, as explained above, all three factors traditionally used to assess the government's interest weigh against a finding that the force used in this case was reasonable. First, the immediate threat to safety of the officer or others, Miller, 340 F.3d at 964, was negligible: Wells has never argued that Young posed any sort of safety threat prior to his use of pepper spray, and to the extent that he argued in the district court that his baton blows were justified by fears for his safety, such arguments would, at most, suffice to raise a jury question as to whether it was reasonable for him to fear an assault from a man who had failed to wear his seatbelt and was armed only with broccoli and a tomato  a man who had not in any way threatened him or indicated any propensity for violent behavior. Second, the crimes involved in Young's traffic stop were non-violent misdemeanors committed in a manner that gave no indication of dangerousness to Wells or others, and thus not sufficiently severe to justify the use of significant force. Finally, Young was not actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee. As well, while not included among the factors we traditionally consider, the fact that Wells could have feasibly employed less intrusive measures prior to his use of force suggests that the government's interest in the use of significant force was extremely limited, if not altogether non-existent. Having determined that the force allegedly used against Young was significant and that the governmental interest in the use of that force minimal, we conclude that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to Young, the force used by Wells was excessive in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Our conclusion comports with the logical notion that it is rarely necessary, if ever, for a police officer to employ substantial force without warning against an individual who is suspected only of minor offenses, is not resisting arrest, and, most important, does not pose any apparent threat to officer or public safety. Indeed, we have found the use of pepper spray to be excessive in such circumstances even when a warning was provided. Headwaters Forest Defense v. County of Humboldt, 276 F.3d 1125, 1129-30 (9th Cir.2002) ( Headwaters II ). In Headwaters II, police officers used pepper spray upon non-violent environmental protesters who entered a lumber company's headquarters, linked themselves together using self-releasing lock-down devices known as black bears, and refused to disengage even after police officers ordered them to do so and warned them that they would be pepper sprayed if they did not comply. Id. at 1127-28. Emphasizing that pepper spray was unnecessary to subdue, remove, or arrest the protesters, id. at 1130, and that the officers had non-violent means of extricating the protesters from the black bears, id., we held that, the use of pepper spray on the protestors' eyes and faces was plainly in excess of the force necessary under the circumstances, and no reasonable officer could have concluded otherwise. Id. at 1131. So, too, here, Wells's purported use of pepper spray and baton blows in response to Young's failure to obey an order would be plainly in excess of the force necessary under the circumstances, id., and thus excessive under the Fourth Amendment.