Opinion ID: 2087959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: constitutionality of the pennsylvania death penalty statute

Text: Appellant raises numerous constitutional challenges to the Pennsylvania death penalty statute, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711. [18] Foremost among these challenges is his contention that the statute creates a conclusive presumption favoring imposition of the death penalty by precluding the sentencing body from granting mercy or leniency to a defendant. Appellant claims that the consideration of mercy or leniency is precluded by the statute's direction that the court instruct the jury that the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance . . . and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(c)(1)(iv). Although it is true that the Pennsylvania death penalty statute does not allow a jury to avoid imposition of a death sentence through the exercise of an unbridled discretion to grant mercy or leniency, the statute permits the defendant to introduce a broad range of mitigating evidence [19] that can support the finding of one or more mitigating circumstances which may outweigh the aggravating circumstances found by the jury. Appeals for mercy and leniency can be founded upon and made through introduction of evidence along this broad spectrum of mitigating circumstances. The channelling of considerations of mercy and leniency into the scheme of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is consistent with the mandate of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 89, 34 L.Ed.2d 163 (1972), that the discretion of the sentencing body in capital cases be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2932, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976), reh. denied, 429 U.S. 875, 97 S.Ct. 197, 50 L.Ed.2d 158 (1976). Contrary to appellant's assertion, the United States Supreme Court decision in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978), does not require that the sentencing body be given discretion to grant mercy or leniency based upon unarticulable reasons. Lockett holds that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. Id. 438 U.S. at 604, 98 S.Ct. at 2964-65. (Emphasis in original; footnotes omitted). The Pennsylvania statute clearly permits consideration of such evidence. Specifically, Section 9711(e)(8) permits the introduction of any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(e)(8). Thus, we find no merit to appellant's constitutional challenges to the Pennsylvania death penalty statute.