Opinion ID: 672074
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jury instruction on effect on interstate commerce

Text: 8 We review a challenged jury instruction under a plain error standard when the defendant fails to object to the instruction at trial. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15-16, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1046-47, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). 4 An instruction is not plainly erroneous unless there was an egregious error, one that directly leads to a miscarriage of justice. United States v. Busacca, 863 F.2d 433, 435 (6th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 1640, 104 L.Ed.2d 156 (1989). In any event, this court must evaluate claimed error in light of the entire trial record. Young, 470 U.S. at 16, 105 S.Ct. at 1046. 9 Where a jury instruction is given in the alternative, and any one of the alternative instructions is in error, the verdict must be assumed to have rested exclusively on the insufficient ground. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 881, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2745, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). Failure to define accurately the elements of an offense, moreover, may constitute plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b); United States v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912, 921 (6th Cir.1972) (holding that failure to give accurate instructions on elements of an offense is grave error, not excused or waived by failure to request a proper instruction). Under the Hobbs Act, the basis of the indictment, the government must establish that there was extortion and that the extortion obstructed, delayed or affected interstate commerce. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218-19, 80 S.Ct. 270, 273-74, 4 L.Ed.2d 252 (1960). 10 The district court gave three alternative instructions, pursuant to which the jury might find the alleged extortion had the requisite effect on interstate commerce as suggested by the government: 11 (1) The government asserts that the alleged conspiracy had the potential to diminish the assets of Riverside Downs.... 12 (2) The government also asserts that the alleged conspiracy actually affected commerce through the making of interstate telephone calls.... 13 (3) Finally, the government asserts that had the conspiracy succeeded, it would have resulted in the flow of goods and services in interstate commerce.... 14 If you find unanimously that the government has proven any one of these beyond a reasonable doubt, then the necessary effect on interstate commerce has been shown. 15 (emphasis added). 16 That third part of the instruction is at issue on this appeal. The defendant argues that this last part of the instruction is erroneous because it permits the jury to find an effect on interstate commerce based upon the result or consequences of the extortion rather than the alleged extortion. The defendant argues that such construction of the Hobbs Act is wrong, being contrary to congressional intent, the rules of statutory construction, and established precedent. The defense relies specifically on United States v. Mattson, 671 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir.1982). 17 In Mattson, the victim of the extortion and scheme was an employee of Playboy Enterprises. The defendants forced the victim to pay out of his own personal funds in order to obtain an electrician's license. Playboy had encouraged the employee/victim to obtain the license so that the employee could undertake certain repairs and improvements and save Playboy the cost of obtaining outside contractors. Rejecting a jury instruction offered by the government that would allow the jury to find that success in the extortion and scheme would result in a requisite effect on interstate commerce, Mattson held that the benefit to Playboy resulted not from the extortion itself, but from the beneficial result of the extortion. Id. at 1025. The court then concluded that such an instruction was beyond the reach of the Hobbs Act, which requires that interstate commerce be effected by extortion, not by the result of extortion. Id. The Seventh Circuit accordingly refused to expand the Hobbs Act to all instances in which the success of the scheme to extort had some indirect effect on interstate commerce. Id. 18 The government, in response, contends that Mattson is distinguishable, involving a victim that was an individual who was not personally engaged in interstate commerce. The government notes that the Seventh Circuit concluded that the holding would have been different if a business entity were the victim. See Mattson, 671 F.2d at 1024-25. On the other hand, the government argues that the challenged jury instruction in this case is consistent with our holding in United States v. Peete, 919 F.2d 1168, 1174 (6th Cir.1990). In Peete, we held that federal jurisdiction existed if the victim of attempted extortion was engaged in interstate commerce, and the attempted extortion had the realistic probability of affecting interstate commerce. Peete, 919 F.2d at 1174-75. Like the real estate developer in Peete, who would have purchased supplies and materials that passed into interstate commerce, Riverside Downs would have purchased goods and supplies outside of Kentucky. We are guided by Peete and, therefore, overrule the defendant's contentions in this regard. See also United States v. Boulahanis, 677 F.2d 586, 589 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016, 103 S.Ct. 375, 74 L.Ed.2d 509 (1982). 19