Opinion ID: 343232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sponsorship.

Text: 25 First, the consolidated complaints charge that the Union violated §§ 8(b)(1) (A) and (2) in the selection of applicants for registration as Class B longshoremen by requiring sponsorship by its members who were also Class A longshoremen. 26 We agree with the finding of the Board that the sponsorship program was a form of discrimination in violation of §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and (2). There is substantial evidence in support of this finding. Universal Camera Corp. v. N. L. R. B., 1951, 340 U.S. 474, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456. 27 First, Phillips' testimony was that, according to a Union officer, the sponsorship program was in effect during the six-month period preceding his filing of the unfair labor practice charge in the Gatlin case. 1 Specifically, on February 20, 1969, Phillips inquired as to what kind of consideration would be given (his 1967 application) (R. 28, Gatlin transcript 44-45). Godfrey, the Union's secretary-treasurer, asked Phillips if he had a sponsor. Phillips said that he did not and was not aware that he needed one. Godfrey replied that everybody knows you have to have a sponsor. The conversation ended when Godfrey said, (Y)ou don't have a sponsor so I can't very well tell you what to do about it but there will be some applications out in the near future. I can't say when but you better fill out one and get a sponsor in the meantime. 28 The Trial Examiner in the Gatlin hearing accepted Phillips' testimony as credible, and that finding was not disturbed on the remand of this case. We see no reason why we should not accept it. 29 The Union argues that the crucial date was the filing of Phillips' application for Class B registration in 1967, but his conversation with Godfrey shows that on February 20, 1969, the Union was still requiring Class B applicants have a Union sponsor. 30 In addition, on October 2, 1968, within the relevant six-month period, and during negotiations with PMA, the Union submitted a list of Class B applicants. It listed the names of the applicants and, opposite each, the name of a Class A Union member sponsor. (Gatlin Exhibit No. 3) The minutes of those negotiation meetings show that the Union was continuing to insist upon the sponsorship program during the crucial time period. Those events are sufficient to establish the existence of the unfair labor practice during the relevant period. Other evidence received by the Board helps to shed light on the true character of matters occurring within the limitations period and thus, under Local 1424, supra, may be considered by the Board. Much of that information reveals how the sponsorship program functioned. 31 The next question is whether the sponsorship requirement violated §§ 8(b)(1) (A) and (2). Section 8(b)(2) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3) of this section . . ., and § 8(a)(3) prohibits an employer from engaging in any discrimination which encourages or discourages membership in a labor organization. 32 The Union argues that the evidence does not show that all Class A sponsors were Union members and thus does not show that the sponsorship program discriminated between Union and Non-Union workers. The Board found that at various times approximately six men who were members of Class A were not Union members. Three of those men may have eventually joined the Union. (Remand transcript at 86, 104.) There is no information in the record as to whether any of those non-Union Class A members ever sponsored a Class B applicant. Considering that the Union membership (i. e., Class A, Union members) fluctuated around 3,000 during the relevant period, the number of non-Union Class A members was insignificant. In addition, in the PMA case, the Union stipulated that, if called, witnesses would testify that (a) sponsor in connection with the registration process is a member of Local 13, or a former member with a valid withdrawal card, who recommends the applicant for registration. (R. at 132-33.) 33 The Union states that the connection between Union membership and sponsorship was the fortuitous result of the fact the (sic ) most 'A' longshoremen became Union members. (Brief at 21.) The Board was not bound to accept the Union's claim that such a connection was fortuitous, and it did not do so. In all but an insignificant number of cases, only Union members could or did sponsor applicants for Class B registration. Thus, the Board properly found that, for all practical purposes, Class A sponsors were also Union members, and concluded that, given the facts of this case, the sponsorship program was a form of discrimination based on Union membership. 34 The Board also concluded that the discrimination is unlawful. Such a conclusion is proper where encouragement or discouragement of union membership is the foreseeable consequence or likely effect of the discrimination. Radio Officers' Union v. N.L.R.B., 1954, 347 U.S. 17, 45, 74 S.Ct. 323, 98 L.Ed. 455. Here, each Union member who qualified as a sponsor was entitled to sponsor one person for Class B membership. That privilege was, in essence, a reward for being a Union member. Moreover, to qualify for Class B registration, thus becoming entitled to a preference over non-registered individuals, workers had to seek out Union members and ask their support. If they refused, the result was to block their Class B registration. 35 As the administrative law judge stated in his remand decision: 36 (T)hese sponsors had been clothed by the Union with power over the livelihood of employees seeking registered employment status, including the power to deny sponsorship to an individual for wholly irrelevent (sic ) or personal reasons or even because of an applicant's antiunion sentiments . . .. For, a plan which requires sponsorship by the Union's members can only lead applicants to believe that there is a connection between his (sic ) views toward the Union and his (sic ) chances of obtaining a sponsor. (R. at 365.) 37 The natural effect of this sponsorship practice would be to encourage membership in the Union by creating a discrimination in hiring in favor of Class B registrants who had been sponsored by Union members. We agree with the Board that the effect of the Union's sponsorship plan was to encourage Union membership, and that it thus violated §§ 8(b)(1)(A) and (2) of the Act. 38 The Union attempts to justify its reliance upon sponsorship by arguing that it was trying to give its black Class A registrants an equal chance to sponsor. The Board rejected that defense, stating that during the June, 1967, to February, 1970, period the Union was not . . . motivated by any concern with giving the group of black members . . . who had been initiated into the Union from 1948 to March 7, 1951, . . . the same opportunity to sponsor as other groups. (R. at 363.) Other procedures could have been followed to increase black membership without relying upon sponsorship, and the record also shows that by continuing and expanding the sponsorship program and by using seniority in determining sponsorship eligibility, black sponsors were, arguably, being discriminated against. That evidence supports the Board's finding that this is not a valid defense. 39 The Board also found, in support of its conclusion that the sponsorship program was unlawful, and as an alternative ground, that the Union's insistence upon that program violated its duty of fair representation under Section 9 of the Act. We agree. A bargaining agent which serves as the exclusive representative of the employees has a duty to represent all the employees fairly. Vaca v. Sipes, 1967, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842. This duty is violated when the Union acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or invidious manner in regard to an employee. Kling v. N.L.R.B., 9 Cir., 1975, 503 F.2d 1044, 1046. 40 In this case, selection for Class B registration had a substantial impact upon an employee's opportunities for employment because of the referral preference given to Class B members over non-registered workers. The Union's sponsorship system was not a rational means for determining the qualifications of Class B applicants; rather, it served as a form of patronage for Union members. Thus, by insisting upon this sponsorship system, the Union violated its duty to represent fairly all the employees in the unit including those Class B applicants who did not have sponsors. 41