Opinion ID: 2353690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sua sponte postjudgment orders

Text: The defendant's final claim of error concerns postjudgment orders entered sua sponte by the trial court in its memorandum of decision announcing the judgment. The court, citing Yontef v. Yontef, 185 Conn. 275, 288, 440 A.2d 899 (1981), stated that th[e] court's orders as contained herein shall remain in effect as postjudgment orders from the date of this judgment through the twenty-day period subsequent to the date of this judgment and through any appeal of the court's judgment which is taken by the defendant. The defendant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because the order exceeded the scope of postjudgment orders permitted in Yontef v. Yontef, supra. We agree. In Yontef v. Yontef, supra, 293-94, we stated: In the interest of minimizing the emotional trauma so often imposed upon the children of divorce, a trial court should, at or before the time of its judgment, inquire whether its custody order is apt to be acceptable to the parties or is apt to be further litigated upon appeal. If an appeal appears likely, the court should enter whatever interim postjudgment order it deems most appropriate, in the exercise of its broad discretion, taking into consideration the needs of the minor children for continuity, stability and well-being as well as the need of the parent who appeals for a fair opportunity fully to present his or her case. These legitimate needs are not, in all probability, apt to be protected if dissatisfied parties are able to intervene unilaterally, without judicial supervision, to effect changes in custody pending appeal. A court exercising its equitable jurisdiction with regard to custody has the duty to assure itself that its judgment will be implemented equitably to serve the best interests of the children for the near as well as for the more distant future. Our concern in Yontef was to ensure an orderly transition [from prejudgment status to postjudgment status] that protects the primary interests of the children in a continuous, stable custodial placement during the period in which the enforcement of the judgment is stayed. Yontef v. Yontef, supra, 291-92; Practice Book § 3065. The Yontef decision was not intended, however, to permit the trial court to issue orders effectively negating the stay provisions of § 3065. The orders sanctioned in Yontef are intended solely to stabilize the custody situation by ensuring that a judicial custody order will be in effect during the pendency of any appeal taken. This precludes the parents from giving in to the temptation for disruptive self-help to effectuate a change in custody. Yontef v. Yontef, supra, 292. A trial court, however, should not make sua sponte postjudgment orders on issues other than custody. If the prevailing party wants to have other portions of the judgment become immediately effective, he or she may make a motion to terminate the stay pursuant to Practice Book § 3065, and obtain a prompt resolution of the question. A sua sponte order terminating the stay, however, would permit the trial court to prejudge the merits of termination, and deprive the losing party of an opportunity for a full hearing. In areas other than custody, there is no compelling policy reason to justify unilateral trial court action of the kind recommended in Yontef. It was, therefore, error for the trial court to make such postjudgment orders affecting the rights of the parties other than the custody of the children. We nevertheless reject the defendant's suggestion that we reverse the judgment, because this court previously corrected this claimed error when we granted the defendant's motion to stay these orders. [7] There is no error.