Opinion ID: 1903593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether pruitt received ineffective assistance of counsel.

Text: ¶ 7. Pruitt first argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, although he limits this claim to two points. First, Pruitt notes that this attorney at trial told the jury in closing arguments that either Pruitt or Michael Deas (a handyman who worked for Nell Deronja and had an opportunity to commit the crime) killed Easterling, thereby eliminating the possibility that a third person killed Easterling. Second, Pruitt complains that his trial attorney failed to object to the admission of a transcript of his statement to Detective Ruspoli confessing to the crime and furthermore failed to object to the trial court's failure to give a cautionary instruction regarding the statement. ¶ 8. The standard of review for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is the familiar two-part test articulated by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984): the defendant must prove, under the totality of the circumstances, that (1) his attorney's performance was defective and (2) the deficiency deprived the defendant of a fair trial. This review is highly deferential to the attorney, and there is a strong presumption that the attorney's conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Hiter v. State, 660 So.2d 961, 965 (Miss.1995). With respect to the overall performance of the attorney, counsel's failure to file certain motions, call certain witnesses, ask certain questions, or make certain objections fall within the ambit of trial strategy and do not give rise to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Cole v. State, 666 So.2d 767, 777 (Miss.1995).
¶ 9. Pruitt first argues that his trial counsel was ineffective as a result of the following statement made during closing arguments: First of all, there's no question about where everybody lives and where the house is and all that came and stayed with his Aunt Nell the Thursday night before this happened. There's no question at all. There is a question as to when Michael Deas came there and why he came there. And I want to say this for sure: There was a killerthere is a killer in the courtroom either right now or that has been this week. Either John Pruitt killed that lady or Michael Deas killed that lady. It's just that simple; one of the two of them. It had to be one of the two. It had to be. No question about that; and that's why I want to look at both of them rather than just John Pruitt. Michael Deas was a transient handyman who worked for Nell Deronja in exchange for room and board for himself and his girlfriend. Deas and the girlfriend moved into the backroom of Deronja's home on the day of the murder, and Deas met Pruitt and shared a beer with him that morning. Deas testified that he saw Pruitt again later that afternoon but that Pruitt did not acknowledge his call. Deas spent the rest of that afternoon working by himself on a shed on Deronja's property which was near Easterling's house. Deas continued to work for Deronja for about a month after the murder. At the time of the trial, Deas was in jail in Cobb County, Georgia, on charges of violating his parole. ¶ 10. The record reflects that Deas was the only witness to physically place Pruitt near the scene of the crime, and Pruitt's attorney at trial went to great lengths to suggest to the jury that Deas himself was the killer and that Pruitt's jailhouse confession was coerced. Pruitt now argues basically that his attorney overplayed his hand, so to speak, by eliminating the possibility that some unidentified third person was the actual killer. While Pruitt may be correct in his assessment of his counsel's tactics, the argument at issue here still fails because it falls under the ambit of trial strategy. Further, focusing as much attention as possible on Deas, a transient ex-con who had only moved in that very day, would seem more effective than merely speculating about some unknown assailant. Therefore, this issue cannot support an ineffective assistance claim.
¶ 11. Pruitt also argues that his trial attorney erred by not objecting when a transcript of his confession was admitted into evidence along with the audio recording of it. In fact, however, the record reflects that Pruitt had lodged a continuing objection to any discussion of his inculpatory statement which was acknowledged by the trial court as the transcripts were being passed out. Thus, there is no reason why a separate objection would be needed to preserve this issue on appeal. In any case, Miss.Code Ann. § 99-17-37 (2000) states that [a]ll papers read in evidence on the trial of any cause may be carried from the bar by the jury, and we have interpreted this to allow juries to take the transcripts of recordings played during trial. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 604 (Miss.1995). This assignment of error is also without merit.