Opinion ID: 1282574
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence Regarding Existence of Contract

Text: The plaintiff does not allege that this case involves either wills which themselves disclose a contract to make certain disposition of property, or a contract in which services were rendered in consideration of a promise to devise or bequeath property; rather, he contends that while the wills themselves do not refer to each other or disclose any contract,    nevertheless taken into consideration, together with all the facts and circumstances surrounding their execution, they provide proof of a contract. To prove that contract, he emphasizes the 1959 wills themselves, the history of the family relationships, the circumstances surrounding execution of the wills, and the statements of Charles, Sr., and Lillian.
The parties agree that the 1959 wills of Charles, Sr., and Lillian were executed at the same time and place, prepared by the same attorney, attested by the same witnesses, and identical (except that where Lillian's will referred to Charles, Charles' will referred to Lillian). The mere fact that two persons simultaneously made wills providing for the same ultimate disposition of property does not establish that they acted pursuant to any binding agreement to do so. Similar tastes, or love and affection for each other, can just as well account for such wills. American National Red Cross v. Wilson, supra, 274 Or. at 240, 545 P.2d 883; Taylor v. Wait, supra, 140 Or. at 684-85, 14 P.2d 283. [10] The wills of Charles, Sr., and Lillian should be considered with all the other peculiar facts of this case to determine whether it is much more probable that a contractual agreement, rather than some other reasons, caused Charles, Sr., and Lillian to execute the 1959 wills. Taylor, 140 Or. at 685, 14 P.2d 283.
There is no important disagreement about the relationships between members of the Willbanks family. We agree with the Court of Appeals that: The record is replete with evidence of Lillian's animosity toward her son, Charles, Jr., and her grandson, Will   and her favoritism toward her granddaughter LaVonne   ; the record also establishes that Charles, Sr., did not share those feelings but had good relationships with all. 70 Or. App. at 434, 689 P.2d 1004. The testimony of Charles, Jr.'s, wife, Lorraine, of the plaintiff, and of two long-time family friends established Lillian's hostility to Charles, Jr., and her preference for LaVonne over plaintiff, which she often expressed with gifts to LaVonne. Lillian's affection for LaVonne did not diminish even after a legal battle between them during 1975-76 over LaVonne's management of Lillian's assets while serving as conservator; Lillian forgave the judgment that was entered against LaVonne in that case and retained LaVonne as the primary beneficiary in her 1978 will and 1980 codicil. Lorraine and plaintiff also testified that Charles, Sr., was not so biased and got along well with Charles, Jr., plaintiff and LaVonne. The differing affections of Charles, Sr., and Lillian for family members created tensions between the two of them concerning disposition of their property. Lorraine testified to a conversation in which Charles, Sr., told her I want to divide whatever I have equally between my grandchildren.    I can't leave a lot to my son because it just makes family matters worse. Q. What was he referring to when he said it would make family matters worse? A. Well, my mother-in law and he didn't agree about evidently, what was going on and she did not want Will or Charles to have anything. And he felt that Will and LaVonne should be treated equally. Plaintiff related an incident in which his grandfather bought him an accordion worth over $500, which Lillian did not want Charles, Sr., to buy: Q. How do you know your grandmother didn't like that? A. It was very obvious. On the way to town she didn't speak to my grandfather, she didn't speak to me. Plaintiff testified about a conversation with Charles, Sr., in December, 1967: One of the things he wanted to say was the reason that my father was only briefly mentioned in the will because it was a trade-off with my grandmother.    Q. Did he indicate why he was cutting your father off? A. Yes, he said it was a trade-off with my grandmother because it was the only way that she would agree to split the estate 50-50.    Q. Did he indicate anything or make any statement to the effect that he was attempting to keep peace with your grandmother? A. That  that was the gist of the conversation. That's the only way that he could have a tolerable relationship with my grandmother. Plaintiff testified that Charles also told him in early summer of '68 that the only way he could get my grandmother to agree to that was to    take my father out of the will.
Besides testimony by Lorraine and plaintiff that years later Charles, Sr., told them how he and Lillian had written their wills, the trial court heard testimony by Marie Martin, secretary to the attorney, Biggs, who drafted the wills. We agree with the trial court and Court of Appeals that her testimony established that Charles, Sr., and Lillian initially disagreed about their wills, but thereafter somehow came to an agreement. We accept Martin's testimony as establishing the following. In regular practice, once a client had decided what he or she wanted in a will, Biggs would call Martin in to take his dictation regarding terms of the will. Biggs did this because it enabled clients to hear what was being dictated and to make necessary corrections and changes then rather than later, and because Biggs himself wasn't good at memory work. On the Willbanks' first visit to Biggs' office, Biggs did not call Martin in, but as they were leaving, they were not too happy apparently from what I gathered and Mr. Biggs said to them, well, you go and talk it over and come back. And if you want to make the will, fine. Martin testified to a conversation she had with Biggs after the Willbanks left the office, but did not clarify what Biggs said to them about what kind of wills he was willing to prepare for them. Biggs told Martin that the Willbanks couldn't agree as to what they wanted   . [T]he problem was, that Mr. Willbanks wanted a will that couldn't be broken, both of them to make wills that couldn't be broken.    And she didn't want that kind of will. Q.    Then what happened? A. Well, he told me that he would not make that kind of a will. He said that if they wanted that kind of will, they would have to go to another attorney, that he would not make that type of will. Later she testified that [Biggs] told [Charles, Sr.,] if they wanted that kind of will, they would have to go to someone else. On cross examination by defendant's counsel, Martin testified that Biggs had a policy against either a joint will, one document signed by both parties, or a will where they agree in the will that they cannot break it or change it after the death of the other. Q.    Isn't that the essence it was going to be a joint will or a will which would contain within its four corners some reference to an agreement not to revoke? A. Yes, that's right. On redirect, she testified that If the party died, the other one couldn't change it, he would not draft that kind of will. While there is no doubt that Biggs had a policy against preparing either joint or mutual wills that could not be revoked, it is not clear how well he communicated that policy to his clients or what they understood it to mean. Martin was not present during Biggs' conversation with the clients. Mr. and Mrs. Willbanks later returned to Biggs' office, and Biggs called Martin in to take dictation of the wills. Again, she had not been present during Biggs' consultation with them. During dictation, she heard no statements by Lillian and no reference to joint wills or to revocability of the wills. Martin testified that when Mr. and Mrs. Willbanks returned to sign the wills, Lillian was asked in that usual format whether it was her last will and testament. Martin couldn't tell you verbatim what was the words, but Lillian's answer was to the effect that Well, it isn't exactly what I wanted but I will go along with Charles. She could not remember whether Lillian used the word compromise, and recalled no comments by Charles, Sr., at that time. On cross-examination, she agreed with defendant's counsel that these ended up being mutual and reciprocal wills in common which is what a large percentage of husbands and wives make routinely. She testified further that Biggs never drafted a will that one spouse could not change after the other died; however, had there been any agreement that these wills could not be revoked, she testified, Biggs would have mentioned that to Lillian and would have expressly dictated that agreement as part of the 1959 wills. On February 20, 1969, two months after Charles, Sr.'s, death, Lillian, accompanied by LaVonne, returned to Biggs' office to make a new will. Again, Martin took Biggs' dictation in Lillian's presence. Lillian stated that she did not feel that plaintiff could take care of money and that she therefore wanted to favor LaVonne. Martin did not remember any statements by anyone at that time about the 1959 will, and she heard Biggs make no objection to Lillian's preparing a new will.
While Martin's testimony about Lillian's remark that she would go along with Charles was the only evidence of a statement by Lillian about her testamentary intentions, three witnesses testified to statements by Charles, Sr. One witness, long-time family acquaintance Gene Greenslitt, merely stated that on one occasion Charles, Sr., told him that his two grandchildren would end up with [the property]    they was both going to be equal and I didn't see any difference. Greenslitt testified to no statement indicating disagreement or agreement with Lillian. The second, Lorraine, said that in September, 1964, Charles told her that I want to divide whatever I have equally between my grandchildren, as he couldn't leave much to his son because it just makes family matters worse since Lillian did not want Will or Charles [Jr.] to have anything. He said he had fixed the will so plaintiff and LaVonne will both share alike. In 1968, on the family farm, Charles, Sr., told Lorraine and plaintiff that plaintiff and LaVonne are going to be treated exactly alike. The third witness, plaintiff, testified that in December, 1967, in early summer, 1968, and on the 1968 occasion when Lorraine was also present, Charles, Sr., told him that he would give very little of his estate to Charles, Jr., but that when Charles, Sr., and Lillian were both dead, the estate would be split evenly between plaintiff and LaVonne. During the first of these conversations, Charles made the remarks about a tradeoff to keep peace with Lillian and during the second, the comment that this was the only way he could get [Lillian] to agree, to which we have already referred, Part IV C, supra.