Opinion ID: 1995818
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The business operated from a home exception

Text: The primary issue before us is whether the Woolwich Board of Appeals, in deciding that Baker's businesses did not qualify for the exception for a business operated from a home, abused its discretion, committed an error of law, or made findings not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Driscoll v. Gheewalla, 441 A.2d 1023, 1026 (Me.1982). The controlling zoning ordinance provides for that exception as follows: Business operated from a home shall be permitted as an exception provided it is not injurious to health or the environment, nor because of smell, noise, smoke, fumes, nor for any other reason, is objectionable or detrimental to the well being of the Town. Provision must be made for parking on the premises to accommodate the average number of vehicles which will be attracted by the business at any time. Art. 4, § C, Town of Woolwich Planning Ordinance. The Planning Board found that it is implicit [in the exception] that the home must exist first and be the predominant use or function of the premises. Finding that Baker's primary or intended use of the premises was commercial or business as opposed to residential and that Baker's use of the premises has in fact been at least half, if not predominantly business oriented, the Planning Board refused to grant Baker the exception. We agree as a matter of law with the Planning Board's interpretation of the exception. See Putnam v. Town of Hampden, 495 A.2d 785, 787 (Me.1985). That interpretation is supported by case law. In examining a similar exception, the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Town of Milford v. Bottazzi, 121 N.H. 636, 433 A.2d 1269 (1981), explained that only those home occupations `customarily incidental to the use of the premises as a dwelling, and ... subordinate to the residential use of the property' merit exceptions. Id. 433 A.2d at 1270 (quoting 2 R. Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 13.02 (2d ed.1976)). That court noted that the term home occupation is widely used in zoning ordinances throughout the country, and emphasized that all [definitions of that term] have as a common purpose the allowance of only those businesses that do not adversely affect or undermine the residential character of the neighborhood. Id. Most important, the court found that the operation of a public [repair] garage, however, has been held not to be a home occupation. Id., 433 A.2d at 1271 (citing Perez v. Borough of Kennett Square, 18 Pa.Commw. 425, 427, 336 A.2d 437, 438 (1975); Piper v. Moore, 163 Kan. 565, 574, 183 P.2d 965, 972 (1947)). On Baker's complaint under Rule 80B, the Superior Court correctly affirmed the decision of the Woolwich Board of Appeals that the use of his property in a residential zone did not qualify for the business operated from a home exception. The Superior Court correctly held that that exception did not provide Baker any defense to the injunctive relief and civil penalties sought by the Town on its counterclaim.