Opinion ID: 2648104
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Steps to Obtain a Warrant

Text: Finally, Mr. Christy argues that inevitable discovery is inappropriate - 13 - because the officers in this case took no steps to obtain a warrant before the illegal search. Aplt. Rep. Br. 13. He asserts that evidence of steps to obtain a warrant—the first Souza factor—is a prerequisite to applying inevitable discovery rather than a factor for the court to consider. Id. at 13-14. We disagree. While we have referred to preliminary steps to obtain a warrant as a “prerequisite,” Souza, 223 F.3d at 1205, and a “requirement,” Cunningham, 413 F.3d at 1204 n.1, these descriptions are likely dicta. See United States v. Sanders, 43 F. App’x 249, 254 n.2 (10th Cir. 2002) (unpublished). 4 A close reading of Souza and its underpinnings indicates that an effort to obtain a warrant is but one factor of the inevitable discovery doctrine in this circuit. The ultimate question when applying inevitable discovery to factual situations like the one here is “how likely it is that a warrant would have been issued” and the evidence found. Souza, 223 F.3d at 1204. In Souza, we stated that inevitable discovery does not apply when the government’s only argument is that it had probable cause at the time of the search, but “may” apply where police have “taken steps in an attempt to obtain a search warrant.” Id. at 1203. We relied upon the Fourth Circuit in stating that the government must show that “the police would have obtained the necessary warrant absent the illegal search,” and that this “might include proof that . . . the police . . . took steps to obtain a 4 We cite this case only for its persuasive value. Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 10th Cir. R. 32.1 - 14 - warrant” before the search. Id. at 1203-04 (quoting United States v. Allen, 159 F.3d 832, 841 (4th Cir. 1998)) (emphasis added). We quoted the Seventh Circuit in stating that inevitable discovery requires “probable cause plus a chain of events that would have led to a warrant.” Id. at 1204 (quoting United States v. Brown, 64 F.3d 1083, 1085 (7th Cir.1995)). Thus, evidence of steps to obtain a warrant is one way the government might meet its burden of showing that a warrant would have ultimately been obtained, but not the only way. 5 The district court’s conclusion that Officer Carvo would have successfully obtained a warrant independent of the illegal search is supported by the record, even though no steps to obtain a warrant had been initiated at the time of the search. Officer Carvo had strong probable cause to suspect Mr. Christy of at least two crimes, and was cross-designated to obtain 5 We are mindful of the concern of other courts that applying inevitable discovery where officers have probable cause but simply choose not to obtain a warrant would do harm to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Mejia, 69 F.3d 309, 320 (9th Cir. 1995); United States v. Johnson, 22 F.3d 674, 683 (6th Cir. 1994). But we reiterate that probable cause on its own is not enough; inevitable discovery requires that the district court have a “high level of confidence” that the warrant would have—not could have—been issued, Souza, 223 F.3d at 1205, and the government bears the burden of proof, id. at 1203. The district courts thus stand as gatekeeper, preventing officers from foregoing the warrant process entirely by always relying on inevitable discovery. And to the extent officers might do that, requiring the government to always show preliminary steps to obtain a warrant is not the cure. Officers may easily initiate the warrant process with no intention of seeing it through, knowing they have satisfied a prerequisite to inevitable discovery, and conduct a search before the warrant is issued or denied. The better course is to continue to give discretion to the district courts to consider this a factor of “great importance” in the inevitability determination. See id. at 1204. - 15 - state and federal search warrants. He would have been authorized to obtain a federal search warrant for the California crime if evidence of it was in New Mexico, Christy, 810 F. Supp. 2d at 1233; see also 2 LaFave et al., Search & Seizure: A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 3.1(b) n.29 (5th ed.), and the district court credited testimony that officers had easily obtained similar warrants in the past, id. at 1281. Thus, Officer Carvo would in fact have obtained a search warrant, and the evidence in question would have been discovered legally, had the illegal search not discovered it first. AFFIRMED. - 16 -