Opinion ID: 1387132
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officer Fujihara's Opinion Testimony

Text: In Hawai`i, admission of opinion [testimony] is a matter within the discretion of the trial court, and only an abuse of that discretion can result in reversal. State v. Tucker, 10 Haw.App. 73, 89, 861 P.2d 37, 46, reconsideration denied, 9 Haw.App. 660, 894 P.2d 117, cert. denied, 75 Haw. 582, 863 P.2d 989 (1993) (citing Sherry v. Asing, 56 Haw. 135, 148, 531 P.2d 648, 658 (1975)). Generally, to constitute an abuse [of discretion,] it must appear that the [trial] court clearly exceeded the bounds of reason or disregarded rules or principles of law or practice to the substantial detriment of a party litigant. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i at 144, 890 P.2d at 1184 (citation omitted). Acknowledging the abuse of discretion standard of review, Toyomura urges that the district court erred in permitting Officer Fujihara to testify about whether [he, i.e., Toyomura] failed the [FSTs], whether [he] was intoxicated, and whether [his] BAC was in excess of .10% ... and in relying on this testimony to convict [him]. Toyomura's opening brief at 5. Specifically, Toyomura relies on State v. Nishi, 9 Haw.App. 516, 852 P.2d 476 (1993), in making the following argument: [A] police officer may not testify, without proper foundation, about his opinion about whether a DUI defendant is intoxicated... based on [FSTs].... In Nishi there was literally no evidence about the officer's training in administering and interpreting the [FSTs]. In this case, the only foundation laid was that Officer Fujihara had been trained in 1982 by the people from the National Highway Safety Traffic Administration and later from the [Honolulu Police Department's] Training Division.... There was no ... testimony about the officer's training other than these bare facts. There was no testimony about what the training consisted of or what the officer was told about interpreting the field sobriety tests or why the tests could be interpreted in certain ways or what the scientific basis was for interpreting the tests. The officer was never qualified as [an] expert or offered as an expert by the [prosecution] until the [prosecution] asked him ... questions ... over defense objections. In fact, when Officer Fujihara first started testifying about the [FSTs], defense counsel objected, and the Court stated that it would only consider the officer's testimony as a lay witness.... In direct contradiction to this statement by the Court, the Court later allowed Officer Fujihara to testify as an expert and give his opinion. Officer Fujihara stated that his opinion was based on his observations and on the field sobriety test .... Worse still, the Court later stated that it definitely relied on all of the testimony of Officer Fujihara in convicting [Toyomura]. In Nishi, the [Intermediate Court of Appeals, i.e., the] ICA found harmless error because the trial court specifically stated that it did not rely on the officer's opinions in convicting the Defendant in that case. In this case, by contrast, [the trial court] told [Toyomura] that the accident caused by [Toyomura] was not enough to convict him, and the Court had to rely on  everything  that he heard from both officers to convict [him].... There is simply no question that the rule in Nishi was violated in this case, and [Toyomura's] conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered if this case is not dismissed on Double Jeopardy grounds. Toyomura's opening brief at 7-8 (citation and record references omitted) (emphases in original). Although it is facile and seductive, Toyomura's argument fails to establish that his DUI conviction must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial. In Nishi, the district court convicted the defendant (Nishi), inter alia, of DUI, in violation of HRS § 291-4(a)(1). On appeal, Nishi contended that the district court had committed reversible error when it allowed the arresting police officer to render an opinion as to the results of the FSTs that he had administered to Nishi. Affirming the conviction, the Nishi court reasoned as follows: Hawaii Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule 701 provides as follows: Opinion testimony by lay witnesses. If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue. The commentary to HRE Rule 701 states that Rule 701 retains the common-law requirement that lay opinion be based upon firsthand knowledge[.] Thus, for... opinion testimony to be admissible under HRE Rule 701, the witness must have personal knowledge of matter than forms the basis of testimony of opinion; the testimony must be based rationally upon the perception of the witness; and of course, the opinion must be helpful to the jury (the principle test). 1 J. Strong, McCormick on Evidence (hereafter McCormick ) § 11, at 45-46 (4th ed. 1992) (footnotes omitted). The rational test means whether the opinion is one which a normal person would form on the basis of the observed facts. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence (hereafter Weinstein's Evidence ) ¶ 701[02], at 701-18 (1992) (footnote omitted). Also, where relevancy requires, a foundation must be laid as to the witness' personal knowledge of facts to which the observed facts are being compared. McCormick § 11 at n. 22. Finally, Rule 701 is a rule of discretion. Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 701[02] at 701-31. We apply the foregoing principles in analyzing [Nishi's] contention. [A] lay witness may express an opinion regarding another person's sobriety, provided the witness has had an opportunity to observe the other person. State v. Murphy, 451 N.W.2d 154, 155 (Iowa 1990). However, the [Hawai`i] Supreme Court [has] observed that: [F]ield sobriety tests are designed and administered to avoid the shortcomings of casual observations. 1 Am. J.Crim.L. 96 (1967). State v. Arsenault, 115 N.H. 109, 111, 336 A.2d 244, 246 (1975). They are premised upon the relationship between intoxication and the externally manifested loss of coordination it causes. Id. at 113, 336 A.2d at 247. They essentially require a suspected driver to go through prescribed routines so his physical characteristics may be observed by the police. State v. Wyatt, 67 Haw. 293, 302, 687 P.2d 544, 551 (1984). In [Hawai`i], it is common knowledge that, where a police officer reasonably believes that a motorist is DUI, the officer will order him [or her] out of the car and administer [FSTs] to the motorist with his [or her] consent. Police departments conduct training sessions for police officers relating to the administering of [FSTs] and print and issue to officers [FST] work sheets containing instructions to be given to motorists undergoing these tests. In re Doe, 9 Haw.App. 406, 408-09, 844 P.2d 679, 681 (1992).... The [prosecution] argues that [the arresting officer's] opinion testimony that [Nishi] failed the [FST] was rationally based upon his perception of [Nishi] on the night of his arrest[,] ... [and] the testimony was helpful to understanding [the arresting officer's] conclusions regarding [Nishi's] physical condition. The [prosecution] therefore concludes that [the arresting officer's] opinion testimony met the requirements of HRE Rule 701 and was properly admitted into evidence. We do not believe that the opinion testimony met the rationality test. Here, [the arresting officer] did not merely testify that based on his perception of [Nishi's] lack of coordination he was of the opinion that [Nishi] was intoxicated. Rather, the officer's opinion was that [Nishi] failed to pass the [FSTs] that [Nishi] had undertaken to perform. A normal person may not necessarily form such an opinion if he or she had not been taught to grade the performance of the three [FSTs]. In other words, this was a situation where foundational evidence as to [the arresting officer's] knowledge of HPD's field sobriety testing procedures was necessary. The record discloses no foundational evidence in this regard. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in admitting [the arresting officer's] opinion testimony into evidence. However, the admission of [the arresting officer's] opinion testimony did not prejudice [Nishi] and was harmless error. In this case, the court, not a jury, was the trier of fact. The record clearly discloses that the court did not consider or rely upon [the arresting officer's] opinion testimony. The court stated: I'm not really, frankly, looking at the officer's specific evaluation. I'm evaluating the picture that I get of what [Nishi] did that day. .... [Nishi's] balance was extremely poor from what I can see here. He had balance and coordination problems on every one of the tests. Consequently, although [the arresting officer's] opinion testimony was improperly admitted into evidence, it was harmless error. Nishi, 9 Haw.App. at 521-24, 852 P.2d at 479-80 (footnotes omitted) (some brackets in original). We now apply the Nishi analysis, which we hereby expressly adopt and approve, to the facts of the present case. Toyomura is correct in his assertion that a police officer may not testify, without proper foundation, about his opinion about whether a DUI defendant is intoxicated... based on [FSTs] (emphasis added). See Nishi, 9 Haw.App. at 523, 852 P.2d at 480. Toyomura is also correct in observing that insufficient foundation was laid to permit Officer Fujihara, based on Toyomura's performance of the FSTs, to render a lay opinion as to whether he was intoxicated, inasmuch as the prosecution elicited no testimony establishing that (1) the horizontal gaze nystagmus, one-leg stand, and walk-and-turn procedures were elements of the HPD's official FST protocol, (2) there was any authoritatively established relationship between the manner of performance of these procedures and a person's degree of intoxication, and (3) Officer Fujihara had received any specific training in the administration of the procedures and the grading of their results. See id. Therefore, Toyomura is correct that Officer Fujihara was improperly permitted to render an opinion that he ( i.e., Toyomura) was intoxicated based in part on Officer Fujihara's assessment of the results of the FSTs. See id. at 523-24, 852 P.2d at 480. Finally, Toyomura is correct in his assertion that Officer Fujihara was neither properly offered as an expert witness [19] nor regarded as such by the district court, which expressly stated that (1) it was considering only ... the observations of the officer and not his grading of the FSTs themselves and (2) it would consider Officer Fijihara's testimony from a lay point of view. Toyomura is simply wrong, however, in concluding that the rule in Nishi was violated in this case in such a manner as to require that his DUI conviction be vacated. As the trial court correctly noted, any ... lay person, including a police officer, can have an opinion regarding sobriety. See id. at 522, 852 P.2d at 479. As set forth above, Officer Fujihara expressly testified that, over the course of his approximately nineteen years as a police officer, he had an opportunity to observe people who had been drinking and at different levels[.] And, as noted, the record reflects that the trial court both assured Toyomura that he was considering Officer Fujihara's testimony only from a lay point of view and that the trial court applied its independent assessment of the evidence in finding Toyomura guilty of DUI. We have no reason to construe the trial court's statement that everything that it heard about Toyomura's condition on the evening in question told it that Toyomura was drunk constituted a breach of the trial court's promise. See State v. Aplaca, 74 Haw. 54, 65-66, 837 P.2d 1298, 1304-05 (1992) (presuming that trial court applied the correct standard of proof). [E]rror is not to be viewed in isolation and considered purely in the abstract. It must be examined in the light of the entire proceedings and given the effect which the whole record shows it to be entitled. In that context, the real question becomes whether there is a reasonable possibility that error might have contributed to conviction. State v. Heard, 64 Haw. 193, 194, 638 P.2d 307, 308 (1981) (citations omitted). Where there is a wealth of overwhelming and compelling evidence tending to show the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are deemed harmless. State v. Nakamura, 65 Haw. 74, 80, 648 P.2d 183, 187 (1982) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Examined in the light of the entire proceedings and given the effect that the whole record shows it to be entitled, we are convinced that there is no reasonable possibility that any improper lay opinion testimony on the part of Officer Fujihara contributed to Toyomura's DUI conviction. Accordingly, we hold that any error in the admission of that testimony was harmless.