Opinion ID: 618190
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of Kendra Cyr

Text: Kendra Cyr [2] met Michael Pelletier in 2000 and the two began dating after Pelletier was released from jail in 2001. She testified that Pelletier told her that Fogg was one of his customers. [3] Cyr also testified that she collected money from Fogg on Pelletier's behalf while Pelletier was incarcerated. Fogg argues that the trial court erroneously admitted Cyr's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), which provides that statements by coconspirators during the course of and in furtherance of a conspiracy are not hearsay. He takes specific aim at the in furtherance of prong of the rule. As there was no objection at trial, we review for plain error. See United States v. Rodriguez, 525 F.3d 85, 100 (1st Cir.2008) (employing plain error review where defendant did not seek a ruling at the close of the evidence regarding coconspirator statements) (citing United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1st Cir.1977)). [4] To succeed under this exacting standard, Fogg must demonstrate that the district court made an error that was clear or obvious, which affected the defendant's substantial rights and also seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Mitchell, 596 F.3d 18, 25 (1st Cir.2010). Admission of a coconspirator statement requires that four elements be satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence: 1) a conspiracy must have existed; 2) the defendant must have been a member of it; 3) the declarant must also have been a member; and 4) the declarant's statement must have been in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Colón-Díaz, 521 F.3d 29, 35-36 (1st Cir.2008). As previously noted, Fogg contests only whether Pelletier's statement to Cyr that Fogg was one of his drug customers was in furtherance of the conspiracy. We have little trouble answering in the affirmative. A statement is in furtherance of a conspiracy if it tends to advance the objects of the conspiracy as opposed to thwarting its purpose. Rodriguez, 525 F.3d at 101. Fogg asserts that rather than enhancing the object of the conspiracy, Pelletier's statements about Fogg's involvement was mere idle chatter underlain by personal rather than conspiratorial motives. We disagree. Cyr admitted to having a role in the conspiracy in which she accompanied Pelletier on drug deliveries and also collected money for him while he was in jail. Without question, Pelletier's relaying to Cyr the identity of a customer who owed Pelletier money so that Cyr could collect it was in furtherance of the conspiracy. See United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1180 (1st Cir. 1993) (We think it is common groundand common sensethat the reporting of significant events by one coconspirator to another advances the conspiracy.). We find no error, plain or otherwise, in the admission of Pelletier's statements to Cyr.