Opinion ID: 1776993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: THE MAYNARD v. CARTWRIGHT QUESTION

Text: Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988), relates to the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance in a capital (death penalty) case. In the present case, the lower court instructed the jury that it could consider two (2) aggravating circumstances, i.e. (1) the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of robbery and was committed for pecuniary gain, and (2) the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. The jury found that those aggravating circumstances were supported by the evidence and were sufficient to impose the death penalty and that there were insufficient mitigating circumstances to outweigh the aggravating circumstances. The appellant offered no objection to the aggravating circumstance especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel and he has not assigned as error the granting of that instruction. Therefore, the question should be procedurally barred here. However, in the light of Maynard v. Cartwright, supra , and because of this Court's responsibility under Mississippi Code Annotated § 99-19-105 (Supp. 1988) for review of a death penalty case, we consider the Maynard v. Cartwright question. In brief, Maynard, supra, authored by Mr. Justice White, held: (1) the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance was unconstitutionally vague, as it did not offer sufficient guidance to the jury in deciding whether to impose the death penalty; (2) the presence of another, unchallenged, aggravating circumstance did not sustain the death sentence where Oklahoma had no procedure for attempting to save a death penalty when one of several aggravating circumstances was held to be invalid or unsupported by evidence; and (3) the effect of recent decisions of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals limiting the aggravating circumstance to cases in which torture or serious physical abuse was present was to be decided in the first instance by state courts. 108 S.Ct. at 1853. The present case is distinguished from Maynard v. Cartwright, an Oklahoma case, in that Oklahoma had no procedure for addressing the correctness of a death penalty when one of several aggravating circumstances found by the jury was held to be invalid or unsupported by evidence. The Oklahoma Court simply vacated the death sentence and automatically imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. The United States Supreme Court said: The State also insists that the death penalty should stand because the jury found two aggravating circumstances, one of which was unchallenged and is sufficient to sustain the sentence. When this case was decided, however, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would not attempt to save the death penalty when one of several aggravating circumstances found by the jury was found invalid or unsupported by the evidence. As the Tenth Circuit said, there was no provision for curing on appeal a sentencer's consideration of an invalid aggravating circumstance. Id., at 1482. If this was the case at that time, and the State does not dispute it, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted for not itself undertaking what the state courts themselves refused to do. 108 S.Ct. at 1860. Unlike Oklahoma, this Court (Mississippi) has held and established unequivocally through the years that when one aggravating circumstance is found to be invalid or unsupported by the evidence, a remaining valid aggravating circumstance will nonetheless support the death penalty verdict. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). See Mississippi cases: Edwards v. Scroggy, 849 F.2d 204 (5th Cir.1988); Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.1987); Nixon v. State, 533 So.2d 1078 (Miss. 1987); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1987); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317, 1336 (Miss. 1987); Faraga v. State, 514 So.2d 295, 309 (Miss. 1987); Johnson v. State, 511 So.2d 1333, 1337 (Miss. 1987); Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 945 (Miss. 1986); Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 314 (Miss. 1986); Wiley v. State, 484 So.2d 339, 351-52 (Miss. 1986); Edwards v. State, 441 So.2d 84, 92 (Miss. 1983); Tokman v. State, 435 So.2d 664, 670 (Miss. 1983); Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 743 (Miss. 1982). In the Mississippi case of Edwards v. Scroggy , the erroneous admission of a misdemeanor conviction in the sentencing phase was before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court said: Considering the extent of Edwards' criminal record, it is inconceivable that the erroneously admitted misdemeanor conviction of carrying a concealed weapon affected the jury's decision. ... Assuming that the misdemeanor conviction of carrying a concealed weapon is necessary to support the jury's finding of this aggravating circumstance, appellant's argument nevertheless must fail. The Court in Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), held that the invalidation of one aggravating circumstance did not require the vacation of the death penalty so long as there were other valid aggravating circumstances remaining. [Footnote omitted]. The jury in this case found six aggravating circumstances and the invalidation of one of them would not require vacation of the death sentence. See Rault v. Butler, 826 F.2d [299] (5th Cir.1987); cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 14, 97 L.Ed.2d 803 (1987); Celestine v. Butler, 823 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1987); Evans v. Thigpen, 809 F.2d 239 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 3278, 97 L.Ed.2d 782 (1987). The district court correctly rejected this claim. 849 F.2d 204, 211 (5th Cir.1988). In a footnote to the above-quoted passage, the Fifth Circuit commented on as follows: Maynard v. Cartwright, ___ U.S. ___, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 99 L.Ed.2d [372] (1988), just decided by the Supreme Court does not undermine this conclusion. In Maynard, the petitioner was sentenced to death following a finding by an Oklahoma jury of two statutory aggravating circumstances: an especially heinous, atrocious or cruel murder and the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person. The Supreme Court determined that the first aggravating circumstance was invalid; the second remained unchallenged. The Court, however, instead of reinstating the death penalty, approved a remand of the case to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. But the opinion makes it clear that the Court approved this remand because Oklahoma law was unclear on whether the sentence of death should be set aside if one of the aggravating circumstances was found invalid and others remained unchallenged. Consequently, the case was remanded to the Oklahoma court to determine as a matter of state law whether the sentence should be set aside. Unlike Oklahoma law, however, Mississippi law is clear that one invalid aggravating circumstance will not suffice to overturn a death penalty where other valid aggravating circumstances remain. Edwards v. State, 441 So.2d 84, 89, 92 (Miss. 1983). 849 F.2d at 211, n. 7 (5th Cir.1988). The United States Supreme Court in Maynard v. Cartwright held that the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance left the jury with unchanneled discretion and that the Oklahoma court had never adopted a limiting construction of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. Not so in Mississippi. This Court has placed a limiting construction on especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. In Coleman v. State, 378 So.2d 640 (Miss. 1979), the Mississippi Court adopted the construction found in Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.1978), which held: What is intended to be included are those capital crimes where the actual commission of the capital felony was accompanied by such additional acts as to set the crime apart from the norm of capital felonies  the conscienceless or pitiless crime which is unnecessarily torturous to the victim. 578 F.2d at 611. (Emphasis added) [Emphasis the Court's]. 378 So.2d at 648. See Jordan v. State, 464 So.2d 475, 478 (Miss. 1985). In Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737 (Miss. 1982), this Court applied a limiting construction of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel holding that those cases in which mental torture and aggravation were inflicted on the victim the same may also be considered as applying to that aggravating circumstance. In Maynard v. Cartwright, the U.S. Supreme Court said: We also do not hold that some kind of torture or serious physical abuse is the only limiting construction of the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance that would be constitutionally acceptable. ___ U.S. at ___, 108 S.Ct. at 1859-60, 100 L.Ed.2d at 382. In the case sub judice, the lower court gave seven (7) instructions to the jury, which singly and collectively told the jury that regardless of aggravating circumstances, they were not required to impose the death penalty; that, if the jury found there were no mitigating circumstances, the jury still was not required to inflict the death penalty. Examples of those instructions follow: 1230, 1231, 1235, 1238, 1242 The Court instructs the Jury that although this Court has in other instructions listing [sic] specific mitigating circumstances which you are to consider in determining whether or not Chandler Clemons suffers the death penalty or should be sentenced to life imprisonment, you may consider other proof adduced by the Defendant which is mitigating in nature and which you feel is worthy of your consideration in determining whether or not the Defendant should be sentenced to death or given life imprisonment.       The Court instructs the Jury that even if you find there are no mitigating circumstances in this case which are worthy of your consideration, you may still sentence Chandler Clemons to life imprisonment.       The Court instructs the Jury that you need not find any mitigating circumstances in order to return a sentence of life imprisonment.       The Court instructs the Jury that even though you have convicted Chandler Clemons of capital murder, that conviction alone is insufficient to warrant you returning a penalty of death unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that any one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in other instructions given to you by the Court exist and that they outweigh any mitigating circumstances.       The Court instructs the Jury that you must consider any evidence of mitigating circumstances. However, you cannot consider any aggravating factors not specifically mentioned. If you have a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, you are obliged to resolve that doubt in favor of Chandler Clemons. Considering that this Court has placed a limiting construction on the aggravating circumstance of especially heinous, atrocious or cruel; that Mississippi law holds one invalid aggravating circumstance will not suffice to overturn a death penalty where one or more valid aggravating circumstance(s) remains; the brutal and torturous facts surrounding the murder of Arthur Shorter; and the narrowing instructions given to the jury by the lower court; it is inescapable that Maynard v. Cartwright does not dictate the outcome of the case sub judice. Further, as the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals said in Edwards v. Scroggy, supra : Considering the extent of Edwards' criminal record, it is inconceivable that the erroneously admitted misdemeanor conviction of carrying a concealed weapon affected the jury's decision. We likewise are of the opinion beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's verdict would have been the same with or without the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating circumstance.