Opinion ID: 2519689
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusive Means of Judicial Review

Text: RCW 36.70C.030(1) states that This chapter replaces the writ of certiorari for appeal of land use decisions and shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions, except that this chapter does not apply to .... [enumerated exceptions not relevant to this case]. (Emphasis added.) While LUPA states that it replaces the writ of certiorari, it does not limit judicial review to quasi-judicial land use decisions. In fact it expressly states that LUPA shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions. (Emphasis added.) The common law writ of certiorari has been codified in chapter 7.16 RCW as the writ of review, which generally grants review of only quasi-judicial determinations. [111] The Court of Appeals reads LUPA to include that same limitation. However, LUPA makes no reference to chapter 7.16. RCW. Reading LUPA together with chapter 7.16 RCW to ascertain legislative intent is not consistent with rules of statutory interpretation. [112] In ascertaining the legislative intent in the enactment of a statute, the state of the law prior to its adoption must be given consideration. But where ... a statute is plain and unambiguous, it must be construed in conformity to its obvious meaning without regard to the previous state of the common law. [113] Construing the express language of RCW 36.70C.030(1) ([t]his chapter replaces the writ of certiorari for appeal of land use decisions and shall be the exclusive means of judicial review of land use decisions) (emphasis added) according to its obvious meaning without regard to previous common law or, in this case, chapter 7.16. RCW, all land use decisions are subject to LUPA unless specifically excluded under RCW 36.70C.030. [114]