Opinion ID: 545466
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Role of State Law

Text: 22 Where the Government would prove a violation of the Travel Act by establishing that a defendant made use of, or aided and abetted another in making use of, a facility in interstate commerce for the purpose of promoting an unlawful activity, we adopt the position, now held by most of the circuits, that the prosecution must show that the activity was unlawful under a specific state law. See United States v. DeLuna, 763 F.2d 897, 907 (8th Cir.1985); United States v. Bertman, 686 F.2d 772, 774 (9th Cir.1982); United States v. Goldfarb, 643 F.2d 422, 430 (6th Cir.1981); United States v. Dansker, 537 F.2d 40, 47 (3d Cir.1976); United States v. Brown, 505 F.2d 261, 262 (4th Cir.1974); United States v. Kahn, 472 F.2d 272, 277 (2d Cir.1973); see also United States v. Arruda, 715 F.2d 671, 681 (1st Cir.1983); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 854-55 (2d Cir.1983); United States v. Hathaway, 534 F.2d 386, 398 (1st Cir.1976). We believe that this approach is compelled by the plain language of Sec. 1952(b), which defines unlawful activity as 23 any business enterprise involving [inter alia ] prostitution offenses in violation of the laws of the State in which they are committed or of the United States. 24 This approach is fully consistent with United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969). The Court there upheld the adequacy, under the Travel Act, of an indictment that charged the defendants with traveling in interstate commerce with intent to carry on extortion. Because the law of the State in which the extortionate conduct took place prohibited it under the heading of blackmail rather than extortion, the defendants argued that the indictment failed to allege the requisite violation of state law. The Court rejected that argument, stating that the inquiry is not the manner in which States classify their criminal prohibitions but whether the particular State involved prohibits the extortionate activity charged, which the defendants did not dispute. Id. at 295, 89 S.Ct. at 539. 25 In closing, the Court also stated that the indictment encompasses a type of activity generally known as extortionate and that the acts for which [defendants] have been indicted fall within the generic term extortion as used in the Travel Act. Id. at 296, 89 S.Ct. at 539. On the basis of those remarks, the Fifth Circuit has taken the position that the elements of the state law prohibiting the activity are not incorporated into and made elements of the Travel Act offense. In United States v. Conway, 507 F.2d 1047 (1975), that court held that the district court had not committed reversible error when it failed to define arson under the relevant state law in charging the jury on the elements of a Travel Act offense. Taking Nardello to mean that it is sufficient if the acts charged in the indictment fall within the generic meaning of the predicate offense, the court concluded that in Sec. 1952 cases state law merely serves a definitional purpose. 'Arson' is a commonly used and understood word.... There is no requirement that the jury be instructed on the [State's] definition of arson.... Id. at 1051-52; see also United States v. Rizzo, 418 F.2d 71, 80 (7th Cir.1969) (Proof that a state law has actually been violated is not a necessary element of the offense defined in Section 1952.), with which compare United States v. Zemater, 501 F.2d 540, 544 (7th Cir.1974) (Travel Act plain language appears to require that the activity following the travel violates the law of the jurisdiction in which it occurs). 26 We believe that the Fifth Circuit's reading of Nardello confuses the Supreme Court's holding--that the label under which a listed offense is proscribed in state law is irrelevant--with the distinct proposition that no violation of any state statute is required in order to make out a violation of the Travel Act. At most, Nardello establishes that, in addition to violating state law, the predicate offense must fall within the generic meaning of the offenses enumerated in Sec. 1952(b). See also Taylor v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 2157, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990) (generic meaning of burglary as used in Career Criminals Amendments Act, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(e), refers to state laws with certain elements). 27 The Government here agrees that state laws are incorporated by reference into the federal Travel Act, noting only that the circuits disagree on the question of whether these laws are completely incorporated. According to the Government, however, [t]he jury charge adequately incorporated the state laws ... and any added comment that the laws were merely 'definitional' was insignificant when considered in context. 28 We will turn to the adequacy of the charge in a moment. Our point here is that in this Circuit in order to make out a violation of the Travel Act based upon an underlying violation of state law, the Government must prove that the predicate activity falls within one of the categories listed in Sec. 1952(b) and that it is punishable under the law of the state in which it occurred. The Government must also prove that, in making use of the facilities of interstate commerce, the defendant had the intent, with respect to each element of the relevant state offense, required in order to make out a violation of the state law.