Opinion ID: 6491238
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Hui’s Remaining Contentions

Text: The Hui maintains that the circuit court erred in concluding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether the Hui was entitled to a contested case hearing. The Hui argues that, “inasmuch as no contested case hearing was held, it must be decided whether a contested case hearing should have been held.” (Citation omitted.) In support of its foregoing contention, the Hui relies on International Brotherhood of Painters and Allied Trades v. Befitel, 104 Hawai'i 275, 88 P.3d 647 (2004) [hereinafter, International Brotherhood ]. The Hui asserts that a contested case hearing should have been held because the Hui “met its burden of showing that there [wa]s a reason to believe that ... Myers failed to perform according to the conditions the LUC imposed and failed to perform the representations or commitments she made to the LUC[.]” Stated differently, the Hui essentially argues that its motion for an order to show cause should have been granted, and, thus, a contested case hearing should have been held thereon. Myers asserts that “[ajppellate courts, upon determining that they lack jurisdiction—or that any other courts previously considering the case lacked jurisdiction— shall not require anything other than a dismissal of the appeal or action.” (Citation omitted.) In support of her foregoing contention, Myers relies on Pele Defense Fund v. Puna Geothermal Venture, 77 Hawai'i 64, 69 n. 10, 881 P.2d 1210, 1215 n. 10 (1994). Myers argued that Pele Defense Fund had criticized an earlier decision by the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA), Simpson v. Department of Land and Natural Resources, 8 Haw.App. 16, 791 P.2d 1267 (1990), that had remanded a case to an agency with directions to hold a contested case hearing when there was no appellate jurisdiction in the first instance. In Simpson, the ICA held that a public hearing required by law is not a contested case where (1) the agency has properly promulgated specific procedures for a contested ease hearing and (2) a party has failed to follow such procedures. Id. at 24-25, 791 P.2d at 1273. The petitioner had applied for a mooring permit from the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) and participated in a public hearing required by law. Id. at 18, 791 P.2d at 1270. The petitioner, however, did not request a contested case hearing. Id. at 19, 791 P.2d at 1271. After the Board of Land and Natural Resources denied the petitioner’s application for a mooring permit, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal to the circuit court. Id. The circuit court dismissed the appeal on the ground that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction inasmuch as there was no final decision from a contested case. Id. at 19-20, 791 P.2d at 1271. On appeal, the ICA agreed with the circuit court that the petitioner’s appeal was not from a contested case. Id. at 18, 791 P.2d at 1270. However, the ICA reversed and remanded to the circuit court with a direction to remand to the DLNR for a contested case hearing because “the minimum requirements of fairness required the DLNR to inform [the petitioner] that ... he had a right to request a ‘contested case hearing.’ ” Id. Four years later, this court in Péle Defense Fund criticized the decision of the court in Simpson to reverse and remand to the circuit court. This court stated in a footnote: Although the ICA found that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction because [the petitioner] did not participate in a contested ease, it nonetheless reversed the dismissal of [the petitioner’s] claim and remanded with direction to remand the matter to the DLNR for a contested case hearing. Lacking jurisdiction, the circuit court could do nothing hit dismiss the appeal. Requiring a remand to the DLNR with instructions to provide a contested case hearing directly contradicts the proper finding of a lack of jurisdiction in Simpson. Jurisdiction is the base requirement for any court considering and resolving an appeal or original action. Appellate courts, upon determining that they lack jurisdiction—or that any other courts previously considering the case lacked jurisdiction—shall not require anything other than a dismissal of the appeal or action. Without jurisdiction, a court is not in a position to consider the case further. 17 Hawai'i at 69 n. 10, 881 P.2d at 1215 n. 10 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphases added); see Bush, 76 Hawai'i at 136, 870 P.2d at 1280 (holding that judicial review by the circuit court of the agency’s denial of the appellants’ request for a contested case hearing as well as review of the merits of the agency’s decision “is unattainable due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction”). In the instant case, the Hui essentially argues that it is entitled to a contested case hearing because its motion for an order to show cause should have been granted, not denied. 16 As such, the Hui essentially requests this court to review the LUC’s order denying the Hui’s motion for an order to show cause and determine that the LUC erred in denying the Hui’s motion. Such a request, however, “is unattainable due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.” Bush, 76 Hawai'i at 136, 870 P.2d at 1280. As discussed supra, the January 2004 hearing was not a contested case hearing for the purpose of obtaining judicial review pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a) because it did not determine the rights, duties, or privileges of specific parties. Consequently, the circuit court correctly dismissed the Hui’s appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and, “[Hacking jurisdiction, the circuit court could do nothing but dismiss the appeal.” Pele Defense Fund, 77 Hawai'i at 69 n. 10, 881 P.2d at 1215 n. 10. Accordingly, we overrule Simpson to the extent that it required a remand to the DLNR with instructions to provide a contested ease hearing when it lacked jurisdiction to do so. Moreover, the Hui’s reliance on International Brotherhood is misplaced. In International Brotherhood, this court held that the circuit court lacked subject matter jurisdiction inasmuch as a contested case hearing was not required in the determination by the director of the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations (DLIR) to register an apprenticeship program pursuant to HRS § 372-4 (1993) (relating to the establishment of an apprenticeship counsel which shall sit in an advisory capacity to the director on matters within the jurisdiction of the DLIR dealing with apprenticeship programs). 104 Hawai'i at 276, 88 P.3d at 648. This court determined that a contested case hearing was not required because, inter alia, approval of the registration request by the director did not require a constitutionally mandated due process hearing. Id. at 284, 88 P.3d at 656. Inasmuch as this court concluded that the circuit court lacked subject matter juris- • diction to entertain the appeal, this court did not review the merits of the director’s decision approving the registration request. Id. at 280-81, 88 P.3d at 652-53 (stating that the appellants’ first point of error that “the circuit court erred in concluding that it had subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to HRS chapter 91 when the agency did not hold a contested case hearing and where none was required” was dispositive). As such, International Brotherhood is consistent with this court’s prior holdings in Pele Defense Fund and Bush relating to subject matter jurisdiction and, therefore, does not support the Hui’s contention that the circuit court erred in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the Hui was entitled to a contested case hearing. In other words, International Brotherhood does not support the proposition that a circuit court may review the merits of the agency’s decision when the circuit court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to HRS § 91-14(a). 17 Thus, we hold that the circuit court did not err in concluding that it did not have jurisdiction to determine whether the Hui was entitled to a contested case hearing.
Lastly, the Hui argues that, “[i]f the [circuit [cjourt has no jurisdiction to determine if an appellant were entitled to a contested case hearing after having requested one, any agency could arbitrarily and capriciously deny anyone a hearing at any time, regardless of whether such hearing were required by law, and the aggrieved party could never obtain judicial review of such denial.” However, in this case, the Hui did not request a contested case hearing. Indeed, the Hui concedes that “there is no procedural vehicle for ‘[ajny party or interested person’ to obtain a contested case hearing on whether a petitioner has failed to perform according to the conditions imposed or has failed to perform according to the representations or commitments she made[.j” Consequently, the Hui’s assertion is without merit.