Opinion ID: 1697522
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mandatory and Direct Judicial Suspensions

Text: The lack of direct judicial involvement in the license suspension in Bolware's case is to be contrasted with the circumstances faced by the Fourth District in the cases discussed and disapproved by the majority. In all of these cases the Fourth District concluded that because the license revocations imposed by the sentencing court were a direct and immediate consequence of the defendant's plea and conviction in his criminal case, the defendant was entitled to be informed either by counsel or the trial court of the mandatory revocation. For example, in Daniels, the controlling statute mandated that the sentencing court suspend the defendant's driving privileges immediately upon the defendant's conviction of a drug offense. 716 So.2d at 828-29. And, in Whipple v. State, 789 So.2d 1132 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Stoletz v. State, 875 So.2d 572 (Fla.2004), the sentencing court, acting on a statutory mandate, permanently revoked defendant's driving privileges upon his criminal conviction even though the revocation was not discussed in the plea colloquy and the revocation came as a complete surprise to the defendant. Id. at 1134-35. This same sort of fact pattern has been presented to the Fourth District in other cases. See Nordelus v. State, 889 So.2d 910, 911 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Prianti v. State, 819 So.2d 231, 232 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). In Major, we cited both Daniels and Whipple with approval in holding that defendants must be apprised only of the direct consequences of a plea and not the collateral, indirect consequences. 814 So.2d at 429, 431 n. 5. In fact, we quoted from the Daniels opinion at great length to support our holding on the direct versus collateral issue. Major, 814 So.2d at 429. In his appellate filings the petitioner has called our attention to numerous other instances where the Legislature has mandated that driver's license revocation be directly imposed by the sentencing courts as an additional sanction in a wide variety of criminal or juvenile settings: It seems the legislature agrees, and has associated loss of privileges with numerous non-traffic related offenses, frequently unashamedly calling it punishment. See for example ... Fla. Stat. § 790.22(5)(a) (expressly makes suspension of driving privileges a part of the penalty for a minor being in a possession of a firearm); Fla. Stat. § 948.01(3)(a) (specifically allows the Court to revoke or suspend a driver's license as part of a community based sanction during the course of community control plans); Fla. Stat. § 984.09(4)(d) (expressly defining the suspension of a child's driving privileges as an appropriate punishment for contempt of court, as does Fla. Stat. § 985.216(4)(d)). Generally in delinquency cases the Court may revoke or suspend the child's drivers license, Fla. Stat. § 985.231(a)(4). Finally, Fla. Stat. § 322.055 expressly requires the Court to direct the department to revoke driving privileges of any person 18 years of age or older convicted of possession or sale or conspiracy to possess, sell or traffic in any controlled substance. No nexus to driving is required for the operation of any of these statutes. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 3-4. The enactment of these statutes make it apparent that the Legislature has chosen to mandate that sentencing courts directly impose the additional sanction of driver's license revocation in a significant number of criminal and juvenile prosecutions, even where the charged offense is unrelated to highway safety. The decision to make license revocation an additional direct sanction in a drug possession case, for example, is obviously an attempt to add an effective additional penalty against a criminal defendant, and is distinguishable from the collateral administrative scheme invoked in Bolware's case by the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.