Opinion ID: 2321640
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty Arising Under the Industrial Safety Act

Text: Appellants look to the ISA to support their argument that CRSS had a statutory duty of care to Presley. The ISA requires that [e]very employer shall furnish a place of employment which shall be reasonably safe for employees, [and] shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards. . . . D.C.Code § 32-808(a). The ISA defines an employer as someone having control or custody of any place of employment or of any employee. D.C.Code § 32-802(1). An examination of our existing case law interpreting the meaning of custody or control, which we undertake below, demonstrates why appellants' reliance on the ISA to argue that CRSS was an employer, and thus had a duty to Presley, is misplaced. Appellants nonetheless assert that CRSS exercised the necessary control or custody over the workplace or of any employee to be considered an employer under the ISA because: 1) there is compelling evidence demonstrating that CRSS exercised the requisite control or custody; 2) their expert witness testified that CRSS had the standard of care to anticipate, plan for and monitor expected [safety] hazards, including those falling under the cooling tower placement project, notwithstanding its contractual obligations; and 3) CRSS assisted the State Department in acquiring the permit for use of the athletic fields where the cooling towers were assembled. However, we conclude that each of these arguments is without merit. To determine whether CRSS was an employer such that the statutory duty to provide a safe workplace under the ISA was triggered, an examination of our existing case law interpreting the meaning of control or custody of the worksite is illustrative. In particular, when an employer does not have direct custody or control over the employee, as in the present case, we have emphasized ownership of the worksite and authority with respect to safety rules in finding that an entity is an employer under the ISA. In Traudt v. Potomac Electric Power Co., 692 A.2d 1326 (D.C.1997), we reviewed a grant of summary judgment for the general contractor and reversed. 692 A.2d at 1329. There, an independent contractor's employee was injured while attempting to remove asbestos with a screwdriver from energized electric cables. Id. at 1330-31. We found it important that PEPCO retained ownership of the workplace and the electric cables, asserting this form of control concretely by dictating that work on the cables was to be done while they were energized. Id. at 1331. We also emphasized that PEPCO insisted on compliance with its own as well as public safety rules and reserved the right to inspect that work, direct stoppage, and require replacement or supplementation of personnel and equipment in case of noncompliance with the contract. Id. Thus, we held that PEPCO's ownership of the manhole system and the electric cables, together with the authority it reserved in the contract to monitor [the independent contractor's] work and perform other work simultaneously at the job site, established its control of the `place of employment' sufficient to make it Traudt's employer for purposes of the statute. Id. Similarly, we determined that the defendant was an employer under the ISA in Velásquez v. Essex Condominium Ass'n, 759 A.2d 676 (D.C.2000), where we reviewed the grant of summary judgment and affirmed. 759 A.2d at 678. Essex Condominium Association, the owner of Essex Condominiums, and the property manager (together, Essex) contracted with an independent contractor, Ev-Air-Tight, to renovate the concrete facade of its building. Id. Velásquez was employed by Ev-Air-Tight and was injured in a fall from a scaffold being used in the renovation project. Id. We emphasized that the contract between Essex and Ev-Air-Tight required Ev-Air-Tight to obey . . . the rules and regulations which may from time to time during [its] work be promulgated by [Essex] for various reasons such as safety, health, preservation of property or maintenance of a good and orderly appearance to the area. Id. at 679 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, we held that Essex constituted an employer within the meaning of the ISA because Essex owned the property where the work was performed and retained authority to promulgate rules and regulations and monitor the work performed by Ev-Air-Tight. Id. at 681. [9] Our decisions in Traudt and Velásquez reflect the principle that the ISAparticularly its definition of employeris to be read broadly. See Martin v. George Hyman Constr. Co., 395 A.2d 63, 70 (D.C. 1978). However, even with broad interpretations, Traudt and Velásquez do not support a determination that CRSS was an employer under the ISA. CRSS did not, under the contract here, have the degree of control over the workplace to qualify as an employer that was present in both Traudt and Velásquez. In contrast to the employers in Traudt and Velásquez, CRSS did not own the property on which the injured individual was working. More importantly, CRSS did not maintain the same degree of authority with respect to safety rules as the employers did in Traudt and Velásquez. Although appellants place much emphasis on the CQM contract language requiring CRSS to monitor and report on various safety violations, CRSS did not have the authority to rectify safety violations directly under the CQM contract. Rather, the CQM contract required CRSS to inspect, review, monitor, and report, and then submit the reports to the GSA, which in turn submitted them to Grimberg to take the appropriate actions. [10] Although the CRSS safety reports indicate that CRSS had limited authority to stop work in situations where it actually observed imminent danger situationsand it appears that on occasion CRSS stopped the work of Grimberg employees to correct safety hazards it observed first-handthe reports also state that CRSS was not responsible for performing periodic and exhaustive surveys of the work environment in regard to safety. Furthermore, even in viewing the testimony of Joseph Angsten, Grimberg's project manager, in the light most favorable to appellants, we cannot say that his testimony establishes that CRSS had the level of authority with respect to safety rules such that it can be deemed an employer under the ISA. Although Angsten testified that CRSS inspectors' responsibilities with respect to monitoring compliance with safety regulations included walking the site on a daily basis and bringing any problems to the attention of Grimberg, he could not recall if CRSS inspectors ever stopped work at the site if they encountered safety hazards. [11] Thus, CRSS' limited authority falls well short of the level of contractual authority retained by the employers in Traudt and Velásquez, where the employers were responsible for promulgating and implementing specific safety regulations. Nonetheless, appellants argue that the most compelling evidence one can imagine to demonstrate control over the safety aspects of the employment and the place of employment is the draft notices that Grimberg proposed to send to its subcontractors, which Grimberg sent to CRSS in advance for approval. However, the draft notices do not state that Grimberg requested CRSS' approval; rather, they noted the actions that Grimberg took in response to the safety violations that CRSS noted in its safety reports. Furthermore, Grimberg noted that [i]f for any reason a sub-contractor cannot operate in a safe manner, [Grimberg] will take corrective measures. Also, appellants' reliance on a CRSS safety report that they claim demonstrates that not only did CRSS exercise the authority to stop the work, they exercised the ultimate control over the workplace, the power to discharge an employee for failing to comply with safety code requirements, is misplaced. The safety report stated that CRSS [o]bserved a selected employee working from an elevated area without fall protection; a fall hazard of approximately 12 feet, after which the [e]mployee was cautioned of the hazard and supervisor [was] notified. The report further stated that if the worker was seen without the use of fall protection again, he would be removed. However, the report did not state and there was no testimony about who cautioned the employee and who would have removed the employee if he was seen without the use of fall protection again. Thus, even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to appellants, we cannot say that there is evidence in the record to support that CRSS was an employer as defined under the ISA. In support of their contention that CRSS nevertheless exercised custody and control over the workplace in a manner sufficient to bring CRSS within the ambit of the ISA, appellants point to the expert testimony of Terry Lane, a former OSHA Area Director. Lane testified that CRSS had the standard of care to anticipate, plan for and monitor expected [safety] hazards, including those falling under the cooling tower placement project, notwithstanding its limited contractual obligations. Relying on the applicable ANSI standard, Lane testified that CRSS had to conduct and implement a hazard analysis describing potential hazards and actions required to provide a safe and healthful workplace, which was to be undertaken at the initiation of a construction project and for the critical stages of work. Lane further testified that based on this duty, CRSS failed to anticipate, plan for, and monitor expected [safety] hazards. However, this duty falls well short of the expansive type of obligations with respect to safety that we held amounted to the requisite custody or control to be deemed an employer in Traudt and Velásquez, as there is no evidence that CRSS promulgated safety regulations or breached an obligation to maintain a constant presence at the workplace to oversee safety requirements. Angsten's testimony that CRSS inspectors' responsibilities with respect to monitoring compliance with safety regulations included walking the site on a daily basis and bringing any problems to the attention of Grimberg does not amount to an obligation to promulgate safety regulations or maintain a constant presence at the workplace to oversee safety requirements. It is undisputed that no CRSS investigators were on site on the day that Presley was injured. The evidence (or permissible inferences from evidence) that CRSS had some authority to stop work and perhaps, at times, might have intervened with Grimberg to remind them of safety requirements, shows, at most, limited and infrequent interactions that are insufficient to establish that CRSS had the requisite control, in fact, over the workplace when Presley was injured. Particularly where an entity does not own the workplace, liability under the ISA must be grounded on facts showing authority and actual control. See Velásquez, supra, 759 A.2d at 681 (noting that an employer's responsibility under the [ISA] for a particular injury is commensurate with the nature and extent of the control that it exercises in fact over the workplace). Thus, even viewing Lane's testimony in the light most favorable to appellants, we cannot say that there is evidence in the record to support that CRSS was an employer as defined under the ISA. [12] Appellants also contend that CRSS' role in assisting the State Department in the acquisition of the permit to use the athletic fields was evidence that CRSS exercised control and custody of the workplace, thus demonstrating that it was an employer pursuant to § 32-802(1) of the ISA. However, the acquisition of the permit to use the athletic fields does little to bolster appellants' claim that CRSS was an employer under the ISA. Although CRSS assisted in the acquisition of the permit to use the athletic fields, the permit was issued to the State Department and does not mention CRSS. We cannot say that such limited involvement indicates that CRSS had control or custody over the workplace. In conclusion, CRSS lacked the requisite control or custody over the workplace to be considered an employer under the ISA. See D.C.Code § 32-802(1). CRSS' principal role was as a consultant to the State Department. CRSS did not own the worksite, did not promulgate safety regulations, had only limited authority to stop work, did not normally act directly to rectify safety violations, and was not required to maintain a constant presence at the workplace. Therefore, CRSS had no duty to Presley under the ISA to ensure that safety procedures were followed. [13]