Opinion ID: 742598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: RICO Sentencing

Text: 156 In determining Miller's sentence for his RICO conviction, the district court looked to the Guidelines offense level for aiding and abetting first-degree murder, see Guidelines §§ 2X2.1, 2A1.1(a), which prescribed a sentence of life imprisonment. Miller challenges the court's use of the aiding-and-abetting guideline, arguing that since the state offense of murder facilitation does not require an intent that a murder occur, see N.Y. Pen. L. § 115.10 (McKinney 1987) (It is no defense to a prosecution for criminal facilitation that ... [t]he defendant himself ... did not act with the intent required for the commission of the underlying offense), aiding and abetting murder has a higher scienter requirement than facilitation of murder and hence was an inappropriate frame of reference. We disagree. 157 For a defendant convicted of a RICO offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962, the Guidelines base offense level is the higher of 19 or the offense level that would be applicable to the defendant's underlying racketeering activities. See Guidelines § 2E1.1. The commentary to § 2E1.1. states that [i]f the underlying conduct violates state law, the offense level corresponding to the most analogous federal offense is to be used. Id. Application Note 2; see also Guidelines § 2X5.1 (for an offense for which no guideline expressly has been promulgated, sentencing court must apply the most analogous offense guideline; if there is no analogous guideline, the court is to proceed with due regard for the relationship of the sentence imposed to sentences prescribed by guidelines applicable to similar offenses and offenders, and to the applicable policy statements of the Sentencing Commission, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). Since the determination of an analogous guideline involves the application of a guideline to the facts of a case, ... 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) mandates that we give 'due deference' to such applications by the district court, rather than review them de novo. United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 968 n. 6 (2d Cir.1996). A sentence imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline will only be reversed if it is plainly unreasonable. Id. at 966 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(4)). 158 In the present case, the district court noted the substantive difference between criminal facilitation, described in New York's § 115.05, and the federal offense of aiding and abetting; but it found that aiding and abetting was the closest offense dealt with by the Guidelines and was especially close to the offense described in New York's § 20.00: 159 [O]n the surface of it intending to murder someone is a different crime than facilitating the murder without any intention yourself of killing the victim. .... However, if you're talking about which guideline most closely resembles the offense of conviction, given the fact that there was charged not only the facilitation but also violation of Section 20 of the New York Penal Law, which is virtually [the same as our] aiding and abetting, I think .... [t]he guideline that most closely resembles the offense of conviction in this case, given the facts of this case and the level of Mr. Miller's knowledge relative to Bolden, is the aiding and abetting of a murder. 160 (Miller Sentencing Transcript at 15.) 161 We can see no basis on which to disturb the district court's conclusion that, on the facts of this case, aiding and abetting provided the most appropriate analogy. 162