Opinion ID: 199356
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Request for Accommodation

Text: 26 We next address whether Reed has met her burden of proving that her requested accommodation was facially reasonable. Ordinarily, this would involve an analysis of the accommodation at issue, which, in this case, would be permission to walk away from any stressful conflict, regardless of whether it was with a co-worker or a supervisor. That analysis would turn in part on the particular circumstances of the workplace. Some of the more obvious and visible circumstances, such as the general culture of the workplace, we might expect Reed to address as part of her burden. Other specifics that are more within the control or knowledge of the employer, such as its management strategy or its need to maintain a strict hierarchy, might better belong in LePage's defense. Given the lack of such particulars in the factual record developed here, it would be difficult to say whether Reed's suggested accommodation is facially reasonable. 27 We need not concern ourselves with the reasonableness of Reed's accommodation, however, because Reed has failed to prove another essential element of her burden: that she ever sufficiently requested the accommodation in question. This is the fatal flaw in Reed's case. She never adequately put LePage on notice of her disability and need for accommodation. Specifically, Reed never made LePage sufficiently aware that she had a disability marked by occasional fits of rage and consequently needed some sort of special accommodation. Moreover, even had Reed made LePage so aware, and had she subsequently been granted an accommodation permitting her to walk away not only from conflicts with co-workers but also from conflicts with supervisors, she was never prevented from invoking any such accommodation during her fateful meeting in June of 1996. These grounds suffice to dispose of her case. 28 The ADA imposes liability on an employer for not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an employee. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). Because an employee's disability and concomitant need for accommodation are often not known to the employer until the employee requests an accommodation, the ADA's reasonable accommodation requirement usually does not apply unless triggered by a request from the employee. Henry Perrett, Jr., 1 Americans With Disabilities Act Handbook, § 4.17, at 121 (3d ed. 1997) (collecting cases). 7 The employee's request must be sufficiently direct and specific, giving notice that she needs a special accommodation. Wynne v. Tufts Univ., 976 F.2d 791, 795 (1st Cir. 1992) (quoting Nathanson v. Medical Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1381 (3d Cir. 1991)). At the least, the request must explain how the accommodation requested is linked to some disability. The employer has no duty to divine the need for a special accommodation where the employee merely makes a mundane request for a change at the workplace. See EEOC, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, FEP (BNA) 405:7601, at 7605-06 (March 1, 1999) (request for new office chair because current one is uncomfortable does not provide sufficient notice that accommodation is needed due to a disability), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/docs/accommodation.html. 8 29 Here, the record shows that, during her meetings with Norton and Pelletier following her altercation with the mechanic in March 1995, Reed gave scant indication that, due to a disability, she needed some special sort of accommodation as to conflicts at work, some permission to walk away from conflicts beyond that ordinarily granted to employees. She did not, for example, explain to her supervisors that the altercation with the mechanic was due to her having bipolar disorder, which can lead to episodes of rage, and that as a result she needed a special accommodation. Nor did she reveal that the altercation had led her to be hospitalized for psychological trauma, which likewise could suggest the need for a special accommodation. Rather, all that happened was that her altercation with a co-worker came up in a meeting about her attendance, and Pelletier made the commonplace suggestion that in the future she walk away from such situations before they got out of hand. Indeed, it was such stock advice that Reed did not even have to request it: Pelletier brought up the idea on his own; Reed merely acquiesced in it. 30 Reed's attempt to dress up this advice as some sort of special accommodation, allowing her to walk away even from supervisors if their supervision became too stressful, ignores the context in which the advice was given. It was given in the aftermath of a fight Reed had had with a co-worker. Thus Norton understood the advice given Reed to be that, if she ever got in a problem with a co-worker . . . , just leave . . . ; don't stay there and have harsh words. It was the same advice he gave to all workers; its purpose was to prevent employees from getting into fights on the floor. Pelletier understood the advice similarly. Moreover, Reed was further advised that after walking away from a conflict, she should find a supervisor to help settle the matter -- again indicating that the sort of conflicts being contemplated were ones between Reed and her co-workers. 31 Taken in context, then, the only accommodation Reed ever requested was simply that she be permitted to walk away from conflicts with co-workers in order to go get a supervisor. As the district court recognized, it is a vastly different matter for an employee to be given permission to walk away from a supervisor engaged in the act of supervision. Again, had Reed revealed her mental illness and its consequences in any detail to her supervisors, they might have been expected to construe her self-perceived accommodation request differently. Reed neglected to do so. The only hint she gave of any disability was a vague reference to her therapist, who on earlier occasions had sent notes to LePage indicating Reed was being seen for depression. But Reed gave no notice of the aspect of her illness relevant to the accommodation she sought, namely, her psychological inability to control rage. 9 32 In any event, even were we to assume dubitante that Reed adequately requested an accommodation allowing her to walk away from conflicts with supervisors, Reed was never prevented from exercising such accommodation during her June 1, 1996 meeting with Callahan. At the meeting, after Reed grew angry with Callahan for refusing to discuss the possibility of a shift change, and amidst Norton's pleas that she calm down, Reed was not prevented from walking away. It is true that Callahan told Reed that if she walked out she would not work that day; but the record makes clear that all Callahan meant was that Reed could not begin her shift (which was to start in a few minutes) until finishing the return-to-work meeting. Even after Reed's initial outburst, Callahan explicitly reassured Reed that she was not threatening to fire her if she left. Nonetheless, Reed did not excuse herself in order to cool off; instead, she stayed in order to mount a belligerent, vituperative attack on Callahan, leaving the supervisor feeling physically threatened. 33 At no time did Reed ever ask to leave the room to calm down; at no time was such a request refused. Even had Reed earlier been granted general permission to walk away from conflicts with supervisors, such accommodation assumes that Reed would take the initiative and walk away. 10 Here she chose not to do so. She stayed, with the ensuing consequences. Reed was never stopped from walking away; nor was she fired for walking away. She was fired for verbally abusing and threatening her supervisor, when she could have avoided doing so. Thus, her case on reasonable accommodation fails. 11 The ADA is not a license for insubordination at the workplace. 34 Affirmed. Costs to appellees.