Opinion ID: 1843606
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: B. Other States

Text: In City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40 (R.I.1995), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island held that the method for funding Rhode Island public schools was not unconstitutional. It stated that the question of how schools are funded was not a justiciable issue. The Supreme Court of Rhode Island held: Notwithstanding our personal dedication to education and our appreciation of its significance in the lives of people of all ages, it is clearly our duty to determine the law, not make the law. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 3105, 41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1061 (1974). We have held ante that the task of designing a system of financing public education has been delegated to the General Assembly under article 12, not to the courts. Consequently, we refrain from scaling the walls that separate law making from judging, for `[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative ... the judge would then be the legislator.' The Federalist Papers, No. 47 at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). `[S]o long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the legislature and the executive ... the general liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter.' The Federalist Papers, No. 78 at 466 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). After reviewing cases of the United States Supreme Court on the separation of powers, Justice Powell concluded: `Functionally, the doctrine may be violated in two ways. One branch may interfere impermissibly with the other's performance of its constitutionally assigned function. Alternatively, the doctrine may be violated when one branch assumes a function that more properly is entrusted to another.' I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 963, 103 S.Ct. 2764, 2790, 77 L.Ed.2d 317, 352 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring). In the case before us, plaintiffs have urged that we do both. First, they urged us to interfere with the plenary constitutional power of the General Assembly in education. Second, by urging that we order `equity' in funding sufficient to `achieve learner outcomes,' `plaintiffs have asked that the court take on a responsibility explicitly committed to the Legislature.' Moreover, plaintiffs have asked the judicial branch to enforce policies for which there are no judicially manageable standards. Absent such standards, we must determine whether the case is justiciable: `First, we must decide whether the claim presented and the relief sought are of the type which admit of judicial resolution. Second, we must determine whether ... the issue presented [is] a political questionthat is, a question which is not justiciable in ... court because of the separation of powers provided by the Constitution.' Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 516-17, 89 S.Ct. 1944, 1961, 23 L.Ed.2d 491, 514 (1969). 662 A.2d at 57-58. (Emphasis added.) City of Pawtucket, which was cited in the main opinion as a case holding that school funding was not a political question, is very strong precedent for the opposite holding. It stands against judicial involvement in the debate over the funding of schools. It clearly holds that such matters are policy questions that the courts must leave to the legislature. The allocation of scarce funds is a matter that should be left to the Legislature, not to the judiciary. The Supreme Court of Illinois recently held in Edgar, supra, that the State of Illinois's method of funding public schools did not violate that state's constitution by producing inequalities in the funding of public schools. The Illinois Supreme Court held: Historically, this court has assumed only an exceedingly limited role in matters relating to public education, recognizing that educational policy is almost exclusively within the province of the legislative branch. Section 1 of article VIII of the 1870 Constitution provided that `[t]he general assembly shall provide a thorough and efficient system of free schools, whereby all children of this state may receive a good common school education.' Ill. Const. 1870, art. VIII, § 1. As discussed earlier, except in matters relating to school district boundaries, this court consistently held that questions relating to the efficiency and thoroughness of the school system were left to the wisdom of the legislative branch. This principle has likewise been applied with respect to the efficiency requirement in the 1970 Constitution. See Cronin v. Lindberg, 66 Ill.2d 47, 58, 4 Ill.Dec. 424, 360 N.E.2d 360 (1976) (law reducing state aid to schools that failed to operate for a school year of a specified minimum duration was not reviewable under the efficiency requirement). More generally, it has been stated that section 1 of article VIII of the 1870 Constitution was both `a mandate to the legislature and a limitation on the exercise of the [legislative] power. The mandate is to provide a thorough and efficient system of schools, and the limitations are that they shall be free to all children of the State and such that all children may receive a good common school education.' People ex rel. Leighty v. Young, 309 Ill. 27, 33, 139 N.E. 894 (1923); see also People ex rel. Hepfer v. Price, 310 Ill. 66, 73, 141 N.E. 409 (1923). Yet, while the requirement that schools provide a `good common school education' was explicitly recognized to be a limitation on the legislature's power to enact public school laws, that limitation was not among those held generally capable of judicial enforcement. Edgar, 174 Ill.2d at 24-25, 220 Ill.Dec. at 177, 672 N.E.2d at 1189. The Illinois Supreme Court further stated: The constitution provides no principled basis for a judicial definition of high quality. It would be a transparent conceit to suggest that whatever standards of quality courts might develop would actually be derived from the constitution in any meaningful sense. Nor is education a subject within the judiciary's field of expertise, such that a judicial role in giving content to the education guarantee might be warranted. Rather, the question of educational quality is inherently one of policy involving philosophical and practical considerations that call for the exercise of legislative and administrative discretion. To hold that the question of educational quality is subject to judicial determination would largely deprive the members of the general public of a voice in a matter which is close to the hearts of all individuals in Illinois. Judicial determination of the type of education children should receive and how it can be best provided would depend on the opinions of whatever expert witnesses the litigants might call to testify and whatever other evidence they might choose to present. Members of the general public, however, would be obliged to listen in respectful silence. We certainly do not mean to trivialize the views of educators, school administrators and others who have studied the problems which public schools confront. But nonexpertsstudents, parents, employers and othersalso have important views and experiences to contribute which are not easily reckoned through formal judicial factfinding. In contrast, an open and robust public debate is the lifeblood of the political process in our system of representative democracy. Solutions to problems of educational quality should emerge from a spirited dialogue between the people of the State and their elected representatives. In delegate Fogal's words, ... `let the citizens keep pushing for higher-quality education.' 2 Proceedings 767. Edgar, 174 Ill.2d at 28-29, 220 Ill.Dec. at 179, 672 N.E.2d at 1191. The Illinois Supreme Court went on to follow Rodriguez, saying that the right to equal educational funding was not a fundamental right for the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause. The Edgar court also said that equal funding of public education by the State of Illinois would conflict with both the concept of liberty and local control of schools. The concept of `local control' in public education connotes not only the opportunity for local participation in decisionmaking but also `the freedom to devote more money to the education of one's children.' Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 49-50, 93 S.Ct. at 1304-05, 36 L.Ed.2d at 52; see also Lujan v. Colorado State Board of Education, 649 P.2d 1005, 1023 (Colo.1982) (`[local] control is exercised by influencing the determination of how much money should be raised for local schools, and how that money should be spent'). Edgar, 174 Ill.2d at 38, 220 Ill.Dec. at 184, 672 N.E.2d at 1196. Many other states have come to the same conclusion. See Thompson v. Engelking, 96 Idaho 793, 537 P.2d 635 (1975) (holding that the educational funding system was not unconstitutional even though money was not distributed equally because to hold that money must be distributed evenly would be to enter the area of public education funding, which is the province of the legislature), followed in Idaho Schools for Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 850 P.2d 724 (1993); Hornbeck v. Somerset County Bd. of Educ., 295 Md. 597, 458 A.2d 758 (1983) (concluding that the state constitutional requirements for a thorough and efficient system of education did not require equal funding and noting that responsibility for funding issues belongs to the legislature or to the people by means of a constitutional amendment); Britt v. North Carolina State Board of Education, 86 N.C.App. 282, 357 S.E.2d 432 (1987), dismissal allowed, rev. denied, 320 N.C. 790, 361 S.E.2d 71 (1987) (constitutional mandate that equal opportunities shall be provided for all students does not confer upon each student a right to substantially equal education); Fair School Finance Council of Okla., Inc. v. State, 746 P.2d 1135 (Okla.1987) (the state constitution places few restrictions on how the legislature provides a school system for the state, and as long as the legislature acts within its powers the actions of the legislature are constitutional; and there is no requirement of equal funding of public schools); Kukor v. Grover, 148 Wis.2d 469, 436 N.W.2d 568 (1989) (disparities in funding of local school districts does not violate the right to a public education; principle of local control is a constitutionally based and protected precept); and Richland County v. Campbell, 294 S.C. 346, 364 S.E.2d 470 (1988) (concluding that unequal funding does not violate the state's equal protection clause, noting that it is within the legislative duties to determine what is necessary to meet the constitutional duty to maintain and provide public education). Moreover, numerous courts have wholly rejected the notion that unequal funding of public schools violates certain provisions in state constitutions. See Milliken v. Green, 390 Mich. 389, 212 N.W.2d 711 (1973) (concluding that the state does not have a duty to provide equally funded education but is required only to provide an adequate education); Danson v. Casey, 33 Pa.Cmmw. 614, 382 A.2d 1238 (1978), affirmed, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 (1979) (constitutional mandate to provide for a thorough and efficient system of public education to serve the needs of the Commonwealth does not require absolute equality in educational services or expenditures, and the inequalities in funding public schools do not make the method of funding public schools unconstitutional); Shofstall v. Hollins, 110 Ariz. 88, 515 P.2d 590 (1973) (holding that the state constitutional provisions requiring a uniform system of public education are not violated merely because the funding is not ultimately equal); Skeen v. State, 505 N.W.2d 299 (Minn.1993) (education financing system did not violate state constitutional requirements for a general and uniform system of education because that phrase did not require full equalization of spending; the court will not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature); Olsen v. State, 276 Or. 9, 554 P.2d 139 (1976) (constitutional requirement for a uniform system of schools not violated by a system that permits the local districts to spend different amounts on education); Lujan v. Colorado State Bd. of Educ., 649 P.2d 1005 (Colo.1982) (finding that the present system of educational funding did not violate the state constitutional requirements for a thorough and uniform system of education, because that phrase did not require equal spending for all students).