Opinion ID: 1910048
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Asegieme

Text: Either Respondent or an unlicensed assistant in Respondent's office drafted a letter dated January 6, 1999, signed by George Udeozor, Chief Executive Officer of Optimum Care Medical Center, Inc., and addressed to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This letter read, in pertinent part, as follows: Re: Employment Verification for Toyin Asiegeme [sic] Dear Sir or Madam: We wish to confirm that Ms. Toyin Aseigeme [sic] referenced above, is currently employed full time by our clinic, and has been since February 1, 1998. Ms. Asiegeme [sic] is a Registered Nurse who has carried our [sic] her duties diligently. Her rate of pay at this time is $18.00 per hour. Should you have any further questions, you may contact the undersigned. Sincerely, Optimum Care Medical Center, LLC It is undisputed that the contents of this letter were false. [14] Ms. Asegieme was not employed by Optimum on January 6, 1999, nor had she been employed there on February 1, 1998, as asserted in the letter, or at any other time. She had not carried out her duties diligently, for she had no duties to carry out. Her rate of pay was not $18.00 per hour; indeed, Optimum was not paying her anything. The Hearing Committee found that this letter was submitted to INS by Ms. Asegieme pursuant to Respondent's instruction, when she was in fact not then currently employed. The Board, in its Finding of Fact No. 65, wrote that Respondent assur[ed] Ms. Asegieme that she should not be concerned about presenting INS with a letter on Optimum Care Medical Center, LLC letterhead that stated she was currently employed by Optimum  her erstwhile sponsor  when in fact she was not currently so employed. (Emphasis added.) Ms. Asegieme testified unequivocally that Respondent was aware that she was not employed by Optimum, that she expressed her concern to him about the untruthfulness of the statements in the letter, but that Ukwu simply told her not to worry about it. In spite of the presentation to the INS, at Respondent's direction, of this totally false letter, neither the Hearing Committee nor the Board found that Mr. Ukwu's conduct violated Rule 8.4(c). According to the Hearing Committee, there was conflicting and uncorroborated testimony on both sides as to whether Respondent was aware of the fact that Ms. Asegieme was not then currently employed. The Committee added that there is not sufficiently clear and convincing evidence to find a violation. The Board accepted this explanation by the Hearing Committee. We do not agree. It is true that there was conflicting testimony. Respondent did in fact, claim that he was unaware that Ms Asegieme was not employed by Optimum. But if  and it is a very big if  Mr. Ukwu really had not known, he demonstrably should have known, but he obviously made no effort to find out. [15] It was Respondent who directed Ms. Asegieme to present the letter to the INS, and it was therefore his responsibility to know whether the letter was true or false. It cannot be gainsaid that if he had bothered to ask Ms. Asegieme whether she was working for Optimum, and whether she had been so employed since February 1998, as the letter stated, she would have told him that she had not. There is no suggestion in the record that the information in the January 6, 1999 letter came from Ms. Asegieme; on the contrary, the contents were known by Ms. Asegieme to be false. It was Respondent or one of his unlicensed assistants who procured the letter from Optimum, and who required Ms. Asegieme to pay for it (a practice criticized by Bar Counsel's expert witness, Michael Maggio, as inappropriate). [16] The client had nothing at all to do with the securing of the letter, and she testified that Mr. Ukwu even chided her for telephoning Optimum. Rule 8.4(c) is not to be accorded a hyper-technical or unduly restrictive construction. In In re Hager, 812 A.2d 904 (D.C.2002), we stated: We have given a broad interpretation to Rule 8.4(c), as recapitulated recently in In re Arneja, 790 A.2d 552, 557 (D.C. 2002). [Dishonesty] encompasses conduct evincing `a lack of honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; [a] lack of fairness and straightforwardness. . . .' In re Shorter, 570 A.2d 760, 767-68 (D.C. 1990) (per curiam) (citation omitted); accord, Slattery, supra, 767 A.2d at 213. See In re Carlson, 745 A.2d 257, 258 (D.C.2000) (per curiam) (dishonesty may consist of failure to provide information where there is duty to do so); In re Jones-Terrell, 712 A.2d 496, 499-500 (D.C.1998) (violation found despite lack of evil or corrupt intent); In re Reback, 487 A.2d 235, 239 (D.C.1985) (per curiam), vacated but adopted and incorporated in relevant part, 513 A.2d 226 (D.C.1986) (en banc) (dishonesty in filing second complaint to replace one dismissed because of negligent inattention.). Dishonesty is also the most general term in Rule 8.4(c), encompassing fraudulent, deceitful, or misrepresentative behavior, In re Wilkins, 649 A.2d 557, 561 (D.C.1994) (per curiam), but also applying to conduct not covered by the latter three terms, which describe degrees or kinds of active deception or positive falsehood. Shorter, supra, 570 A.2d at 768. Indeed, it has been suggested that sufficiently reckless conduct is enough to sustain a violation of the rule. Jones-Terrell, supra, 712 A.2d at 499. Id. at 916; see also In re Cleaver-Bascombe, 892 A.2d 396, 404 (D.C.2006) (an attorney who recklessly maintains inadequate time records, and consciously disregards the risk that she may overcharge a client (or here, the CJA fund), also engages in dishonesty within the meaning of Rule 8.4(c).) Thus, even if Respondent's conduct was in reckless disregard of the truth rather than specifically intended to deceive  a rather dubious hypothesis on this state of facts, and in light of the Board's Finding No. 65  he would have violated Rule 8.4(c). Under these circumstances, the question before us is one of law, subject to de novo review. Specifically, we must determine whether, under the standard articulated in Hager, a Respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) by directing a client to file with the IRS a letter containing representations that Respondent, at a minimum, should have known were false, and by reassuring her not to worry about it. We conclude as a matter of law that he did. [17]