Opinion ID: 2575997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Criminal Activity Involving Force

Text: Defendant contends the trial court committed prejudicial error in not instructing the jury that it could not consider evidence that defendant had committed crimes other than those with which he was charged unless the jury found the other crimes were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Our law does require the jury to be so instructed. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 429, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000; People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 53-54, 188 Cal.Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279; see CALJIC No. 8.87.) The failure to do so is prejudicial if it is reasonably possible the failure to instruct affected the jury's verdict. ( People v. Avena, supra, at p. 429, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) The Attorney General argues that the failure to so instruct the jury here was not prejudicial. We agree. The evidence against defendant at the penalty phase consisted primarily of victim impact testimony, evidence of his conduct underlying his 1986 conviction for the residential robbery of Sharon Galiano and her four-year-old daughter, and evidence of his other convictions before the verdict of guilt of the offenses charged in this case. Defendant's assignment of error here concerns the trial court's failure to instruct as to the evidence of his conduct during the 1986 robbery. The prosecutor's closing argument made two related references to criminal activity involving the use of force or violence or the implied threat to use force or violence involving the 1986 robbery. (ง 190.3, factor (b).) He first commented that the jury could consider the residential robbery of Sharon Galiano and her four-year-old daughter and then commented on a letter defendant wrote while incarcerated at the Sacramento County jail asking somebody to take care of Sharon Galiano, a letter the prosecutor described as threatening Galiano. The records of defendant's convictions for the 1986 robbery of Galiano and possession of a sawed-off shotgun relating to that robbery were before the jury, the trial court instructed the jury that it could not consider those prior convictions unless it found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was the person convicted of those crimes, and defendant admitted committing and being convicted of the robbery. Although defendant denied pointing the shotgun at Galiano's four-year-old daughter, he testified that he may have accidentally pointed the gun at Galiano and that he pointed the gun at people when [he] walked through the door of Galiano's house. Defendant also admitted to writing a letter while in the Sacramento County jail asking somebody to take care of Sharon Galiano. Defendant testified that by tak[ing] care of Sharon Galiano he meant to try to bribe her not to testify against him, not to kill her. It is not reasonably possible in light of the above described evidence that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it could not consider evidence of prior crimes unless the jury found the other crimes proved beyond a reasonable doubt affected the jury's verdict. With the exception of disputing that he pointed the gun at Galiano's four-year-old daughter during the 1986 residential robbery, defendant admitted the facts underlying the robbery and the robbery conviction. Even as to the pointing of the gun during the robbery, defendant admitted that he pointed it at people when he came through the door of Sharon Galiano's residence. The only people there were Galiano and her four-year-old daughter. The only evidence before the jury concerning the letter defendant wrote from jail asking somebody to take care of Sharon Galiano was defendant's own testimony that he meant to have someone bribe, not kill, Galiano. In view of the substantial aggravating evidence presented, the evidence of defendant's letter about Galiano is not such that it would have played any significant role in the jury's decision. Moreover, defendant was not entitled to the reasonable doubt instruction for other crimes of which he had been convicted. The instruction applies only to unadjudicated violent criminal activity. ( People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 766, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 203, 976 P.2d 754.) Here, the other crimes evidence consisted primarily of defendant's adjudicated conduct, that is, the conduct that had resulted in his prior convictions for robbery and illegal weapon possession. The evidence of defendant's other criminal activity not resulting in convictions, such as the letter about Galiano, was relatively insignificant, so that it is not reasonably possible the trial court's failure to instruct on the reasonable doubt standard as to those other crimes affected the jury's verdict. Our conclusion that defendant was not prejudiced by the trial court's failure to instruct on crimes other than those charged in this case is not changed by defendant's assertion, without supporting record citations or elaboration, that the prosecutor insinuated throughout the case that defendant committed other threatening or violent criminal conduct. Specifically, defendant claims the prosecutor referred to: defendant's unlawful possession of firearms; threats to Doreen Westbrook; prison assaults; unspecified criminal activity perhaps involving an attempted murder on March 9, 1993 (presumably the Loaf shooting); and a threat to kill Sharon Galiano's husband. All of this conduct was either admitted by defendant, was established by records of defendant's convictions, primarily concerned individuals other than defendant, or was at most a passing reference by the prosecutor.