Opinion ID: 844272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motions for Change of Venue

Text: Before jury selection, defendant moved unsuccessfully for a change of venue; he renewed this motion after the jury had been selected, and he again raised the issue after trial. He now contends the trial court‟s denials of these motions violated his rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a reliable penalty determination under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. 1. Defendant’s pretrial motion for change of venue
In November 1996, defendant filed a pretrial motion for change of venue. He argued that the ongoing local media coverage and the community‟s expression of sympathy for Denise and her family made the case “an Orange County experience” by placing “a very personal face” on the Huber family‟s story. Defendant claimed that local news reports had portrayed him in sensational and negative terms and had speculated that he was a serial killer, that he had engaged in necrophilia, and that he had stalked previous girlfriends. He also cited news stories describing otherwise inadmissible evidence of his guilt, including a videotaped police interrogation where he was seen invoking his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436), descriptions of searches on his property for other possible victims, and stories of him handcuffing and assaulting 20 other women. Included with the motion were copies and clippings of over 250 newspaper articles and numerous videotapes of television news stories related to the case. Defendant also attached to the motion a report of a random telephone survey of 401 Orange County residents conducted in September 1996 by defense expert Edward J. Bronson, Ph.D., professor of public law at California State University, Chico. According to the report, 83 percent of the participants knew of the case. Of those who recognized the case, 70 percent said that defendant was definitely or probably guilty of murder, and 72 percent said he should receive the death penalty. A second defense survey conducted in February 1997 showed nearly identical percentages. The trial court held a hearing on the motion in February 1997. The parties stipulated that Orange County was the third most populous county in California and the fifth most populous county in the nation, with a population of 2,563,971 in 1995. At the hearing, defense expert Bronson testified that Orange County had responded to Denise‟s disappearance and murder much as a small community would have. The media coverage, he explained, portrayed Denise and her parents in a very positive light, while doing the opposite for defendant. He noted that his telephone surveys showed a clear positive relationship between a participant‟s propensity to follow the news and the participant‟s prejudgment of guilt. The surveys showed prejudgment rates in the 70 percent range, the second highest Bronson had seen in the 15 or so surveys he had conducted in capital cases. In his experience, even in the worst cases the rate of prejudgment of a death sentence is typically near 50 percent. Based on the surveys, the volume of stories in the local news media, and the inflammatory language in those stories, he concluded that defendant could not receive a fair trial in Orange County. 21 Prosecution expert Ebbe Ebbesen, a psychology professor at the University of California, San Diego, faulted defense expert Bronson‟s September 1996 telephone survey for not distinguishing among participants based on the extent of their knowledge about the case, and for not asking test questions to determine whether participants were answering truthfully. In Dr. Ebbesen‟s view, Bronson‟s survey question concerning prejudgment of guilt biased the participants towards believing defendant was guilty because it mentioned that defendant had been charged with murder but failed to mention the prosecution‟s burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and Ebbesen criticized the survey for failing to measure the strength of the participants‟ opinions as to defendant‟s guilt and the appropriate penalty. Using the raw data from defense expert Bronson‟s telephonic survey, Dr. Ebbesen isolated those participants who knew nothing about the case and those who were familiar with the case but had not prejudged defendant‟s guilt. Using these criteria, he concluded that 47.6 percent of the survey‟s participants fell into one of these two categories. In Dr. Ebbesen‟s view, the publicity would not lead prospective jurors to form fixed opinions, as such opinions are fixed by preexisting attitudes about proof and the judicial system. In the nearly 40 cases in which the prosecution had consulted him, he had not seen the defense present sufficient evidence to prove that a change of venue was necessary to provide the defendant with a fair trial. In rebuttal, Ronald Dillahey, a psychology professor at the University of Nevada, Reno, testified for the defense that the telephonic survey by defense expert Bronson revealed a high awareness level that jeopardized the fairness of a trial in Orange County. According to him, the participants‟ prejudgment of defendant‟s guilt and death sentence was much higher in this survey than in other similar studies, which typically show that between 15 and 22 percent of people 22 believe a defendant is probably guilty just because he is charged and that in California 63 percent support the death penalty over a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Those who are generally predisposed to assume guilt are attracted to news about crime, and such exposure strengthens their prejudgment of guilt. But, Dillahey stated, there is no reliable way to measure how fixed an opinion may be, and it is very difficult for jurors to set aside knowledge of the case in reaching their opinions. In denying defendant‟s motion, the trial court found the testimony of all three experts helpful but biased in favor of their respective parties. The court criticized the defense survey for not measuring the strength of the participants‟ opinions. It acknowledged the high level of publicity, but it found that the publicity was “relatively unspectacular.” And it cited Orange County‟s large population as the strongest factor supporting its conclusion that defendant could receive a fair trial there. Defendant unsuccessfully sought a writ of mandate in the Court of Appeal, challenging the trial court‟s denial of his motion for a change of venue. Defendant also filed a petition for review in this court, which we denied.
Defendant argues that the trial court should have granted his pretrial motion for change of venue. We disagree. A motion for change of venue must be granted when “there is a reasonable likelihood that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the county” in which the defendant is charged. (§ 1033, subd. (a).) The trial court‟s initial venue determination as well as our independent evaluation must consider five factors: “ „(1) nature and gravity of the offense; (2) nature and extent of the media coverage; (3) size of the community; (4) community status of the defendant; and 23 (5) prominence of the victim.‟ [Citations.]” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370, 1394.) On appeal, a successful challenge to a trial court‟s denial of the motion must show both error and prejudice, that is, that “at the time of the motion it was reasonably likely that a fair trial could not be had in the county, and that it was reasonably likely that a fair trial was not had. [Citations.]” (People v. Davis (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539, 578.) Although we will sustain the trial court‟s determination of the relevant facts if supported by substantial evidence, “ „[w]e independently review the court‟s ultimate determination of the reasonable likelihood of an unfair trial.‟ ” (People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 598.) As to the first factor — the nature and gravity of the offense — here the charged crimes of kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder were serious offenses. But the presence of this factor, standing alone, does not require a change of venue. (See, e.g., People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1125, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 421, fn. 22.) With regard to the second factor — the nature and extent of the media coverage — the coverage of the case was heavy, particularly after discovery of Denise‟s naked body, which had been in defendant‟s freezer for three years. Defendant submitted 289 newspaper articles and editorials covering the case from the time of Denise‟s disappearance until the end of jury selection. Almost all of the major television stations in Southern California covered the case; defendant submitted television segments that were, in combination, more than four hours long. But the number of newspaper stories and the length of the television coverage are somewhat misleading because of the large number of newspapers and television stations in media-saturated Southern California. Most of the news stories appeared in two large, widely read newspapers (the Los Angeles Times and the Orange County Register), but some appeared in papers that were likely to be 24 read only in smaller segments of Orange County (the Daily Pilot, the San Clemente Sun Post, and the Excelsior Weekly). And the large number of television stations in the Los Angeles basin (defendant submitted segments from eight different stations) resulted in far more total minutes of coverage than would have been likely in a small community served by only one or two stations. According to defendant, a few news reports pertained to matters that were inadmissible at trial and contained potentially prejudicial information. For example, some early reports suggested that the police believed defendant might be a serial killer, that he was fascinated by mass murderers, and that he was perhaps a necrophiliac. Some television stations reported that defendant had left a grenade at his former Orange County home, which had to be recovered by a bomb squad; that a neighbor had reported seeing several young boys going in and out of that home late at night while defendant lived there; and that defendant kept a videotape library that featured stories of infamous mass murderers. But these stories appeared in the summer of 1994, when defendant was arrested, and the trial did not take place until the spring of 1997, almost three years later. It is reasonable to infer that the memories of any prospective jurors who read these newspaper stories or listened to these television reports would have been dimmed by the passage of time. (See Patton v. Yount (1984) 467 U.S. 1025, 1034 [“That time soothes and erases is a perfectly natural phenomenon, familiar to all”].) The newspaper and television reports at the time of trial were generally factual, containing no inadmissible or prejudicial material, except that some mentioned that Denise‟s parents wanted defendant to receive the death sentence. (See Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 830, fn. 2 [“the admission of a victim‟s family members‟ . . . opinions about . . . the appropriate sentence violates the Eighth Amendment”].) Although the heavy media coverage (factor two) weighed in favor of a change of venue, this factor did not necessarily require a change of venue. For 25 example, in People v. Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, we upheld the trial court‟s denial of a motion for change of venue by an accused serial killer, even though the trial court itself had “described the media coverage of the murders and defendant‟s arrest as „saturation.‟ ” (Id. at p. 434.) With respect to the third factor — the size of the community — we agree with the trial court that this weighed strongly against a change of venue. At the time of trial, Orange County was a major metropolitan area, with a population of over two and a half million people, making it one of the most populous counties not only in California but also in the United States (fifth largest). When, as here, there is a “large, diverse pool of potential jurors, the suggestion that 12 impartial individuals could not be empanelled is hard to sustain.” (Skilling v. United States (2010) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [130 S.Ct. 2896, 2915].) This circumstance weighed “ „heavily against a change of venue.‟ ” (People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1396; see also People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 434; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 224.) The fourth factor — community status of the defendant — did not weigh heavily for or against a change of venue. There is no evidence that defendant or his family was well known before defendant‟s arrest for the murder; he grew up in Orange County, had no criminal record, and was not associated with any group (such as a disfavored racial minority or juvenile street gang) towards which the community was “likely to be hostile.” (Odle v. Superior Court (1982) 32 Cal.3d 932, 940; compare with People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1131-1132.) Thus, this was a “neutral factor[].” (Odle, at p. 942.) Arguing that the fifth factor — the victim‟s community status — weighed in favor of a change of venue, defendant contends that Denise became well known in Orange County after her disappearance. Defendant notes that dozens of pictures of her appeared in the major Southern California newspapers, and that 26 local television stations repeatedly broadcast her picture and video clips of her celebrating her last birthday. Similarly, Denise‟s parents became known locally as the media chronicled their search for their daughter and their grief on learning of her death. But there was no evidence that Denise “came from an extended family with long and extensive ties to the community.” (People v. Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1129.) And there was no evidence that the potential jury pool in Orange County was comprised of persons who personally knew Denise. Denise and her family came to the public‟s attention first through the publicity surrounding Denise‟s sudden and unexplained disappearance after being stranded on a freeway late at night with a flat tire, and then from the discovery, three years later, of her naked body stored in a freezer inside a rental truck parked at defendant‟s Arizona home. These aspects would have followed the case to any county to which venue was changed. (See Odle v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d 932, 942 [murdered police officer became “posthumous celebrity” because of his “status as an officer, killed in the line of duty,” but “that aspect of the case would follow . . . to whatever community in which venue ultimately resides”].) Even if, as defendant contends, the publicity caused some residents to feel a connection to Denise‟s family, nothing indicated that such sentiments were widespread in a densely populated county with numerous cities and communities. Accordingly, this factor — the victim‟s community status — did not weigh in favor of a venue change. “When pretrial publicity is at issue, „primary reliance on the judgment of the trial court makes [especially] good sense‟ because the judge „sits in the locale where the publicity is said to have had its effect‟ and may base [the] evaluation on [the judge‟s] „own perception of the depth and extent of news stories that might influence a juror.‟ ” (Skilling v. United States, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. 27 at p. 2918].) Here, we agree with the trial court‟s conclusion that defendant did not show a reasonable likelihood that he could not receive a fair and impartial trial in Orange County. The trial court‟s denial of defendant‟s pretrial motion for a change of venue was therefore proper. 2. Defendant’s post-jury-selection change of venue motion a. Facts The trial court ordered 1,200 prospective jurors to appear on April 7, 1997. The prospective jurors were brought before the court in eight groups of 150. The court introduced the parties, described the case and the estimated length of trial, and directed the prospective jurors to fill out either a hardship form excusing jury service (if appropriate) or a one-page questionnaire regarding their exposure to pretrial publicity in this case. By the end of the day, after many prospective jurors were dismissed for hardship, 475 remained. The questionnaires on pretrial publicity revealed that 81 percent of the prospective jurors had prior knowledge of the case, approximately half of whom had formed the opinion that defendant was guilty and/or should receive the death penalty if convicted. Of these, 46 percent, or 110 of the prospective jurors, said they were unable to set that opinion aside. The answers to the questionnaires and some additional showings of hardship led to the dismissal of a number of prospective jurors. The 343 who remained were told to complete a five-page questionnaire concerning their attitudes about the death penalty. The court questioned and dismissed several who claimed hardship from serving as a juror, a few of whom also expressed an inability to give defendant a fair trial. At the end of the day, approximately 250 prospective jurors remained. 28 The trial court questioned those remaining prospective jurors about their views on the death penalty. After dismissing several jurors because of their views on the death penalty, the trial court conducted an inquiry based on defense counsel‟s claim of troubling comments made by several prospective jurors during the jury selection; some of those comments were quoted in a newspaper article. On the first day of jury selection, one dismissed juror allegedly told a group of remaining prospective jurors in the courthouse elevator area to “hang” defendant. That same day, while completing his questionnaire on pretrial publicity, a prospective juror wrote that another prospective juror had told him “defendant is „guilty as hell.‟ ” Another, in her questionnaire, asked the trial court not to have her go back to work on Fridays because she feared being confronted and overwhelmed by curious coworkers. Prospective Juror No. 138, who wrote in the questionnaire that he knew little about the case and had not prejudged defendant‟s guilt or penalty, was called into the judge‟s chambers and admitted yelling in front of a group of prospective jurors that he did not want to look “at that piece of scum [defendant].” Thereafter, the trial court asked the remaining prospective jurors if they had heard the opinions of other prospective jurors on the case. Nine said they had. (None of these jurors was ultimately impaneled.) According to these prospective jurors, other prospective jurors had said that defendant “is just obviously guilty,” and “should definitely be put to death,” “should fry,” and should “get the ax.” Some had heard Prospective Juror No. 138 describe defendant as “scum” and go into a “tirade” about criminal defendants in general. Others reported hearing some prospective jurors disclose their reading of articles about the case and hearing that the victim‟s head had been cut open and gashed. With the exception of Prospective Juror No. 138, none of the prospective jurors who had made these comments was identified. 29 The trial court also asked the prospective jurors if they had been exposed to media reports about the case since the day they had to report for jury duty. Twenty-six (none of whom was ultimately impaneled) said they had. Two reported reading only headlines and a few lines of some newspaper articles; some reported merely hearing brief snippets about the case on the radio or television. But five had read a long newspaper article about the case appearing in the Orange County Register. Several had heard negative comments from friends, family, or coworkers about the case and defendant. One juror inadvertently heard a discussion about the case in her gym class and at that point learned more about the case. Defense counsel requested that the trial court ask the prospective jurors whether any had heard opinions about the case from friends, family, and coworkers. The court denied the request but permitted the parties to make this inquiry during individual questioning. Defendant moved to quash the venire, arguing that the prospective jurors were having “vitriolic” conversations that created an “atmosphere” against him, and that it was impossible to determine how many panelists were exposed to or involved in these discussions because many of the prospective jurors who participated in them had not come forward. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that, out of the large group of prospective jurors only a “handful, if it is even that,” of objectionable conversations had occurred. For the next five and a half days, the trial court questioned some 150 prospective jurors. First, 12 prospective jurors were called into the jury box and questioned in the presence of all the remaining prospective jurors. As individual jurors were dismissed for cause or by peremptory challenge, each was replaced by a prospective juror in the audience. Defense counsel lodged a continuing objection for cause to any juror who had pretrial knowledge of the case, which the 30 court overruled with a standing order. In all, the court examined over 170 prospective jurors on issues other than claims that jury service would be a hardship. During voir dire, 32 prospective jurors said they would automatically vote for death and would have difficulty setting aside that opinion; 24 of these jurors had previously indicated in the questionnaire on pretrial publicity that they had not prejudged defendant‟s penalty or, if they had, they could set that opinion aside. Five testified that their knowledge of the case led them to think that death was the only appropriate penalty for defendant. One of them, Prospective Juror No. 174, when asked what defendant‟s sentence should be, said, “fry him,” which prompted laughter in the courtroom. Sixteen prospective jurors expressed compassion for murder victim Denise Huber‟s parents or fear relating to Denise‟s abduction. One of them said she could not be fair because “I see [Denise‟s] face in front of me all the time now, and it is so scary,” and four described seeing a banner for Denise in the years she was missing and feeling empathy for her and her family. One of those four, Prospective Juror No. 353, was impaneled. Seven of these 16 prospective jurors mentioned having daughters around the same age as Denise when she disappeared and expressed feelings about the case as a result. Two of these seven — Prospective Jurors Nos. 219 and 384 — eventually were impaneled as jurors, while a third, Prospective Juror No. 277, was impaneled as an alternate. Some prospective jurors were asked whether they felt pressure from the community. Many said they did not, but nine said they had received unsolicited opinions from friends, family, or coworkers. Of these nine, four were eventually impaneled as jurors. One, Prospective Juror No. 411, disclosed that when she told a friend and her husband that she was being called as a juror in this case, her husband jokingly told her to “fry him.” Another, Prospective Juror No. 353, 31 described his coworkers as having a “just fry him attitude.” Still others, Prospective Jurors Nos. 219 and 134, said their coworkers were trying to offer them their views of the case. All of the prospective jurors in question, however, said they would not be affected by other people‟s opinions. Near the end of jury selection in May 1997, the defense exhausted its 20 peremptory challenges; the trial court refused a defense request for additional challenges. The prosecution, with five unused peremptory challenges, accepted the 12 prospective jurors, and the court proceeded to select four alternates. After the defense exhausted all of its peremptory challenges against the alternate jurors, defense counsel expressed dissatisfaction with all of the jurors and again requested additional peremptory challenges, which the trial court denied. As the court was about to release the unselected individuals from jury duty, Juror No. 200, who had been seated as an alternate, interrupted the court, saying she was no longer sure she could be fair. She explained: “I‟ll be honest, I‟m having a hard time even looking at the defendant.” To replace her, the trial court resumed jury selection. After a handful of prospective jurors were questioned, the prosecution accepted the alternates. Defense counsel made a third request for additional peremptory challenges, mentioning that Juror No. 331, just seated as an alternate, had written in her questionnaire that she believed in an “eye for an eye,” unless the defendant was insane or had remorse, although on voir dire she testified that she could be fair and would consider the relevant legal factors before imposing a penalty of death. The trial court found Juror No. 331‟s testimony credible, but before ruling on the defense request for additional peremptory challenges, it held a hearing in chambers to consider notes it had received from two prospective jurors (Prospective Jurors Nos. 285 and 432) regarding two seated jurors (Jurors Nos. 154 and 236). 32 At that hearing, the two complaining prospective jurors explained that Jurors Nos. 154 (seated in the jury) and 236 (an alternate) had not disclosed that they knew each other and were old friends. The complaining prospective jurors said they had heard those two jurors repeatedly discuss details of the case throughout jury selection. Prospective Juror No. 285 recalled that on the second day of jury selection, she heard Juror No. 154 tell a group of about seven prospective jurors that Denise had been bludgeoned, how her family was expected in court that day, and that the family needed “closure.” And Jurors Nos. 154 and 236 were overheard saying that “no one would know if we talked on the phone.” Complaining Prospective Juror No. 285 said she heard Juror No. 236 make “endless” comments during voir dire, pointing out certain things that subjected prospective jurors to dismissal. Prospective Juror No. 285 stated that many prospective jurors viewed the jury selection process as merely a “challenge” to win a seat in the jury box, an attitude that disappointed and upset her. Her comments echoed comments made three days earlier by Prospective Juror No. 256, who told the court in chambers that there appeared to be “a rush for people wanting to be on this jury so badly for some reason” and that people were changing their answers “so they can stay.” The trial court separately questioned Jurors Nos. 154 and 236 about the allegations. Juror No. 236 acknowledged knowing Juror No. 154 for 23 years, but she denied discussing the case with her or anyone else. Juror No. 154 reluctantly acknowledged that she might have discussed the case with Juror No. 236, but she could not recall what they talked about. The court disbelieved both jurors and excused them from further jury service. Jury selection resumed. The trial court gave each party two extra peremptory challenges and allowed defense counsel to divide them between the seated jurors and the alternates. As jury selection continued, Prospective Juror 33 No. 393, during her questioning, spontaneously disclosed that she had heard two other prospective jurors discuss their disbelief that they were “breathing the same air as” defendant. The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against her. After both parties exhausted their challenges for the alternate jurors, defense counsel made another request for additional challenges, which the trial court denied. The court then swore in the 12 jurors and 4 alternates. The 12 jurors selected remained throughout the case and none of the alternates was seated. After the jury had been selected, defendant renewed his motions to quash the venire and to change venue, or, in the alternative, to sequester the jury. In support, defense counsel noted that the trial court had dismissed roughly 215 prospective jurors based on perceived bias against defendant stemming from publicity and their views on the death penalty, that many prospective jurors had expressed their bias in court in front of the other prospective jurors, and that many of the prospective jurors had been exposed to negative opinions about defendant from friends, family, and coworkers. The defense also presented evidence that, after a lull in coverage in 1995 and most of 1996, at least 40 articles had appeared in local newspapers in the period between the trial court‟s denial of defendant‟s initial change of venue motion and the end of jury selection, many of which were on the front page. Three local newspapers, five local televisions stations, and three radio stations had filed requests for extended media coverage, indicating that interest in the case remained high. The trial court denied defendant‟s motions, agreeing with the prosecution that the selection process had successfully eliminated the prospective jurors who held fixed opinions, and had not caused the remaining jurors to become biased. 34 b. Analysis Defendant contends the jury selection process demonstrated “ „a reasonable likelihood‟ ” (People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 578) that a fair trial could not be held in Orange County, and that the trial court therefore erred in denying his renewed motions to quash the venire and to change venue. In evaluating this claim, our independent review encompasses “ „the voir dire of the actual, available jury pool and the actual jury panel selected.‟ ” (People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 279, quoting People v. Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 1125.) We reject defendant‟s contention. True, the jury selection process indicated that defendant‟s case was well known in Orange County, and that there was considerable community sentiment that he was guilty of murdering Denise and should be executed for that crime. Out of an original pool of 1,200 prospective jurors, 475 jurors remained after the first round of hardship eliminations. Of these 475 prospective jurors, 110 had prejudged defendant‟s guilt and/or penalty of death (if convicted) and were unable to set that opinion aside. But all of these jurors were eliminated early on; only 16 of these 110 prospective jurors were questioned during jury selection. Some persons with biases remained after the screening of the publicity questionnaires. Prospective jurors who had claimed no bias in their questionnaires called defendant “scum” and said he should “fry,” and a number of prospective jurors who had written in their questionnaires that they could be fair testified on voir dire that they could only impose a penalty of death. Other prospective jurors acknowledged discussing the case or viewing media coverage of it. Two prospective jurors who were nearly seated failed to disclose that they were longtime friends who wanted to surreptitiously discuss the case over the telephone. Some prospective jurors believed that other panelists were trying to give answers that would result in their selection as jurors. (See People v. Williams, supra, 48 35 Cal.3d 1112, 1131, quoting People v. Tidwell (1970) 3 Cal.3d 62, 74-75 [“ „the juror may consider himself honored and fortunate to be selected to culminate a community‟s anger against‟ ” a defendant “ „accused of killing [a] respected member[] of that community‟ ”].) Nevertheless, none of the problematic prospective jurors survived the selection process. The trial court properly excused all of the biased prospective jurors for cause; on appeal, defendant does not identify a single prospective juror as to whom the court erroneously denied a defense challenge for cause. The huge number of prospective jurors initially summoned (1,200) ensured that an ample number of unbiased prospective jurors remained after the biased ones had been excused. The comments by prospective jurors about wanting to “fry” defendant were inappropriate. Also improper was the conduct of Jurors Nos. 154 and 236, who concealed their friendship and ignored the trial court‟s admonition not to discuss the case. But the trial court responded appropriately: It gave the parties additional peremptory challenges, and it carefully questioned prospective jurors about whether they had heard other prospective jurors commenting about the case and, if so, whether any of those comments would affect their ability to be fair. These measures were sufficient to ensure a fair selection process. Turning to the 12 empanelled jurors, 10 of them had prior knowledge of the case. Defendant points out that one of them, Juror No. 219, mentioned in the questionnaire on pretrial publicity that he believed defendant was guilty, but he added that he could put that opinion aside. Another one, Juror No. 289, did not prejudge defendant‟s guilt, but added that, “there did seem to be a great deal of evidence against him.” A third, Juror No. 411, expressed sympathy for the Huber family; she described seeing the banner on the freeway seeking information about 36 Denise‟s whereabouts and recalled repeatedly thinking “about how scary it was to not have a cell phone if something were to happen.” Defendant further notes that several seated jurors had been exposed to comments about the case by members of the community. Jurors Nos. 411 and 353 described friends, family members, or coworkers offering them the unsolicited opinion that defendant should “fry.” (See p. 32, ante.) Two others, Jurors Nos. 219 and 134, described coworkers trying to offer their opinions of the case. (Ibid.) And Juror No. 384, the eventual foreperson, had extensive pretrial knowledge of the case.3 But the circumstance that most of the actual jurors have prior knowledge of a case does not necessarily require a change of venue. (See, e.g., People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th 539, 580 [all 12 jurors with prior knowledge of the case]; People v. Ramirez, supra, 39 Cal.4th 398, 434 [11 jurors with prior knowledge of the case]; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 678, overruled on other grounds as recognized in People v. Hill (1998)17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1 [10 jurors exposed to media coverage of the case]; People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 13961397 [eight jurors with prior knowledge of the case].) “The relevant question is 3 Defendant also points out that three jurors remained on the panel whom one might have expected the defense to dismiss with peremptory challenges for reasons unrelated to their knowledge of the case. Juror No. 134‟s cousin had been beaten to death, and her sister had been raped. The ex-husband of Juror No. 228 had killed his sister and was imprisoned. Juror No. 384, in addition to having extensive knowledge of the case (see text, ante), had been previously married to an Orange County deputy district attorney, had known the trial judge when he was an attorney in that same office, was the child of a police officer, and was dating an officer. She had had a close friend who was the victim of an unsolved murder years earlier. She stated that after Denise‟s disappearance, she went over “security” with her daughter and told her to stay in the car and rely on her cell phone if she found herself in a similar situation. The defense unsuccessfully exercised a challenge for cause against her. 37 not whether the community remembered the case, but whether the jurors . . . had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant.” (Patton v. Yount, supra, 467 U.S. at p. 1035.) Here, all 12 jurors testified under oath that they could put aside outside influences and fairly try the case. Although such assertions of impartiality do not automatically establish that the defendant has received a fair trial, “a review of the entire record of voir dire may still demonstrate that pretrial publicity had no prejudicial effect.” (People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1168.) Here, our independent review of the record shows that the selection process resulted in a panel of jurors untainted by the publicity surrounding this case, and we see no evidence that any of them held biases that the selection process failed to detect. 3. Defendant’s motion for a new trial a. Facts After the jury‟s penalty verdict, defendant filed a motion for a new trial, asserting that during trial the jury had been exposed to comments or views about the case that were expressed outside the courtroom and were prejudicial to defendant. He relied on declarations from three jurors: Jurors Nos. 219, 134, and 218. Juror No. 219 declared that several coworkers were “a bit hostile” to him for being away from work for so long and that “maybe a half dozen comments” from coworkers expressed belief in defendant‟s guilt. He told his coworkers that he did not welcome their comments. During the trial, his 21-year-old daughter mentioned driving by the site of murder victim Denise‟s disappearance on the freeway and seeing flowers left there to commemorate the sixth anniversary of Denise‟s disappearance. The juror stated that this incident did not affect him “as a juror in any way.” 38 Juror No. 134 declared that during trial, three of her coworkers told her to “ „Hang ‟em‟ ” and tried to read her “things from the newspaper on the case.” She told them to stop and left. Juror No. 218 stated that after the guilt phase verdict, she received “several unsolicited comments” from a person at work to “ „Hang ‟em.‟ ” Defendant also submitted a newspaper article and an editorial cartoon published in the Orange County Register. The article, which appeared the day after the jury returned its guilt phase verdict, solicited readers to participate in a telephone poll asking, “Should Famalaro be executed?” The next day, the paper published the results: Of 1,312 responses, 99 percent chose death as the appropriate penalty. With regard to the cartoon, which appeared on the day the jury returned its penalty verdict, it mocked the defense for seeking mercy on defendant‟s behalf. The trial court denied defendant‟s motion for a new trial, noting that before their selection the jurors had said they could be impartial, and mentioning the absence of evidence indicating that the media coverage had improperly influenced any of the jurors. b. Analysis Defendant argues that the circumstances surrounding the trial, viewed as a whole, were so inflammatory as to create a presumption of prejudice. We disagree. The United States Supreme Court has presumed prejudicial violations of due process in cases where the influence of the media was so pervasive as to render the trial “ „a hollow formality,‟ ” “conducted in a circus atmosphere” or in “a courthouse given over to accommodate the public appetite for carnival.” (Murphy v. Florida (1975) 421 U.S. 794, 799, quoting Rideau v. Louisiana (1963) 39 373 U.S. 723; accord, Estes v. Texas (1965) 381 U.S. 532; Sheppard v. Maxwell (1966) 384 U.S. 333; see also People v. Leonard, supra, 40 Cal.4th 1370, 13941395.) None of those circumstances was present here. Although local media coverage was heavy during the trial, and a news report introduced into evidence states that spectators filled the courtroom‟s seats, the trial appears to have been conducted in a temperate and rational manner. The trial was far from “lacking in the solemnity and sobriety to which a defendant is entitled in a system that subscribes to any notion of fairness and rejects the verdict of a mob.” (Murphy v. Florida, supra, 421 U.S. at p. 799.) “A presumption of prejudice . . . attends only the extreme case.” (Skilling v. United States, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2915].) Because this is not such a case, the presumption of prejudice does not apply here. Defendant contends that even if the presumption of prejudice is inapplicable, the totality of circumstances, both before and during trial, demonstrates “a reasonable likelihood that a fair trial was not had” (People v. Williams, supra, 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1126). In evaluating this contention, we have independently reviewed the entire record, taking into consideration the proceedings pertaining to venue, the voir dire and the jury selected, the events at trial, and the declarations in defendant‟s posttrial motion for a new trial. “Reviewing courts are properly resistant to second-guessing the trial judge‟s estimation of a juror‟s impartiality, for that judge‟s appraisal is ordinarily influenced by a host of factors impossible to capture fully in the record — among them, the prospective juror‟s inflection, sincerity, demeanor, candor, body language, and apprehension of duty.” (Skilling v. United States, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___, [130 S.Ct. at p. 2918].) Here, the trial court determined before trial that even though the jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity, as well as the 40 comments of coworkers and the comments of other prospective jurors, they nonetheless could fairly try the case. After trial, the court determined that defendant had received a fair trial, even though coworkers had urged three of the jurors to impose the death penalty and media coverage remained heavy throughout the trial (see pp. 39-40, ante). In conducting our independent review, we give substantial weight to each of these determinations by the trial court. After considering all of the evidence, we reject defendant‟s claim that there is a reasonable likelihood that he did not receive a fair trial. B. Failure to Conduct Individual Sequestered Jury Selection Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion when it refused his repeated requests for individual sequestered examination of prospective jurors during jury selection. (See Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80-81, superseded by statute as recognized by People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713; see also Code Civ. Proc., § 223 [abrogating Hovey‟s requirement that jury selection in capital cases be individualized and sequestered].) Defendant contends the error violated his rights to a fair trial by an impartial jury and to a reliable penalty determination under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. In the trial court, defendant had argued that questioning the prospective jurors individually and outside the presence of the other prospective jurors was necessary to prevent the creation of bias among those prospective jurors who, unlike other prospective jurors, were unfamiliar with the case. He renews that argument on this appeal, claiming that the record of jury selection indicated that the prospective jurors were “exposed to a poisonous environment.” He points to comments by some prospective jurors that defendant should “fry,” and that they felt uncomfortable looking at, and breathing the same air as, defendant. He also 41 notes the remarks by some prospective jurors that they learned about the case by sitting through jury selection, and that their knowledge of the case had led them to believe in defendant‟s guilt, with death as the appropriate penalty. Individual sequestered jury selection is not constitutionally required, and jury selection is to take place “where practicable . . . in the presence of the other jurors in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 223; see People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 493.) Accordingly, in reviewing a trial court‟s denial of a defendant‟s motion for individual sequestered jury selection, we apply the “abuse of discretion standard,” under which the pertinent inquiry is whether the court‟s ruling “falls outside the bounds of reason.” (Lewis, at p. 494.) Group voir dire may be “ „impracticable when, in a given case, it is shown to result in actual, rather than merely potential, bias.‟ ” (Ibid., quoting People v. Vieira, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 288.) Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. True, during the unsequestered jury selection process it became apparent that some prospective jurors had prejudged defendant‟s guilt and believed he should be executed. But whenever a defendant is charged with a heinous crime that is widely publicized, potential jurors are likely to learn that some members of the community have prejudged the defendant‟s guilt and punishment. The trial court here acted within its discretion when it implicitly concluded that in this case exposure to such comments did not automatically impair the ability of all prospective jurors to fairly decide the case. The record reveals no incidence of a prospective juror‟s mention in the jury selection process of inadmissible evidence that would have prejudiced the defendant. 42