Opinion ID: 1914715
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: City of St. Petersburg v. Mathews

Text: In Mathews, a twenty-month-old child, who had been playing in a public park, fell into a drainage creek and drowned. In the parent's wrongful death action against the city, the complaint alleged: 7. The water, into which the deceased fell, is a concrete encasement of Booker Creek with vertical sides and sidewalks to the north and south of the concrete edges. On top of the edges, at a distance of approximately ten (10) feet apart, are holes installed in such a manner they may support a barrier or fence. At or about Sixth Street and Roser Park, on the north side of Booker Creek, there is a park or playground which is frequented by children. Nowhere along the edge of or along side of the Booker Creek encasement is there a barrier, fence or other guard against children falling into or playing within the encasement. The waterway is so constructed as to prevent and seriously impede rescue of any child who might fall in. There is no method or manner in which to escape from the waterway should escape be made necessary or should rescue be attempted. 8. The Defendant, City of St. Petersburg, is negligent in causing to exist and be maintained at Sixth Street and Roser Park Drive an attractive nuisance in that the existence [sic] of the concrete waterway, constructed so as to be a trap, is in such close proximity to and part of a playground and sidewalk as to present a dangerous condition. The Defendant knew or should have known by the exercise of due care and caution, that children are likely to and frequently to play in close proximity to the waterway. The condition, as a trap, is one the Defendant knew or should have known and that it realized or should have realized, involved an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily injury to such children and that children, because of their immature age, discretion and experience, do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling in a concrete waterway or coming within the area made dangerous by it, and would be lured to and tempted to run and play in and near the Booker Creek encasement. A motion to dismiss Mathews' complaint, filed by the city, was granted by the trial judge, who held that: [I]t is not necessary to discuss the question of attractive nuisance raised by the Motion, because whether or not to incase Booker Creek with vertical concrete sides and whether or not to install a barrier or fence along the sides of Booker Creek are policy decisions of the CITY. These items are discretionarily policy matters, planning or judgment governmental features, and as such cannot be the subject of traditional tort liabilities. A.L. Lewis, etc., v. Metropolitan Dade County, 376 So.2d 32 (Fla. 3 DCA 1979); Commercial Carrier Corp. v. Indian River County, 371 So.2d 1010 (Fla. 1979). The Second District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for further proceedings, citing its decisions in Collom v. City of St. Petersburg, 400 So.2d 507 (Fla.2d DCA 1981), and Neilson v. Department of Transportation, 376 So.2d 296 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). The district court held that [w]hile the city had the discretion to decide whether to alter the natural state of Booker Creek, once it decided to do so, the alterations had to be designed and performed in a reasonable manner. 400 So.2d at 842. On this basis, the court concluded that Mathews had stated a cause of action for negligence against the city, and the case was remanded for a determination of whether the city's encasement of the creek and its failure to erect a barrier or fence along the encasement created a dangerous condition which proximately caused or contributed to the child's death. As in Collom, the city seeks reversal of the district court's action, contending that the adoption of a drainage system plan involves judgmental, planning-level decisions immune from suit. Mathews agrees that the city's decision to encase the sides of the creek and alter its natural state is a judgmental, planning-level function. Mathews asserts, however, that the Second District Court of Appeal is correct in holding that once the city decided to alter the natural state of the creek, the alterations had to be designed and performed in a reasonable manner. Mathews further contends that the city's resources should not be considered because a city may not deliberately eliminate safety features to save money once it has commenced a project.