Opinion ID: 2599852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Allocation Based on Contribution of Each Heir's Claim to the Settlement Fund

Text: Wife contends the trial court erred in apportioning the settlement fund based on evidence of the decedent's alleged intent to divorce her, because that evidence was not introduced in the wrongful death action itself or considered in arriving at the amount of the settlement. To support this contention, she relies on the following passage from Changaris, supra, 231 Cal. App.2d at page 313, 41 Cal.Rptr. 774: [W]hether the lump sum be ascertained by trial or by compromise, no plaintiff can have any proper reason for contesting the right of any other plaintiff. If a party be defeated in his right to share, that does not increase the right of any other to a larger award. The right of each party plaintiff to recover, as well as the amount rightfully to be recovered, is separate and apart from the like rights of all the others and is neither added to nor lessened by the success or failure of any other party in establishing a right to recover or in proving the amount to be awarded under such right.  (Italics added.) This passage, Wife argues, establishes a rule that prohibits heirs from attempting to increase their damages by attacking the claims of other heirs and precludes the trial court from allocating a settlement based on evidence the alleged tortfeasor did not consider in calculating the settlement amount. In other words, she explains, a trial court must allocate a settlement by considering the relative contribution that each heir's claim made to the settlement fund, just as the trial court's role after a wrongful death jury award is to make an allocation that reflects the extent to which each heir's claim for damages contributed to the total award. [8] We find multiple reasons for rejecting these contentions. First, Wife overlooks a significant fact in this case. Wife and Daughter, while represented by separate counsel, entered into a stipulation providing, in the event they could not agree on an allocation of damages following the verdict or settlement of the wrongful death action, that either party would have the right to a further trial regarding apportionment, and that either party could call additional witnesses not previously disclosed. Reasonably viewed, their stipulation reflected an agreement that resolution of the competing interests of Wife and Daughter in the $1.1 million settlement could be based on consideration of otherwise admissible testimony from witnesses who did not testify at the trial against the nonsettling defendants. We see no reason why this stipulation should not be honored. (See Cohn v. Bugas (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 381, 392, 116 Cal. Rptr. 810; Bemer v. Bemer (1957) 152 Cal.App.2d 766, 771, 314 P.2d 114 [a stipulation may lawfully include or limit the issues to be tried, whether or not such issues are pleaded].) Second, we find the reasoning of Changaris flawed because it fails to recognize that heirs may have competing interests in a settlement fund, which will often be less than the sum of the separate claims. As the Court of Appeal reasoned below, In the face of this reality, the Changaris court inexplicably denied the existence of any adversity between the wrongful death plaintiffs, saying `no plaintiff can have any proper reason for contesting the right of any other plaintiff.' ( Changaris, supra, 231 Cal.App.2d at p. 313, 41 Cal.Rptr. 774.) If that proposition were true, a statutory provision for judicial apportionment would be [largely] unnecessary. Courts adjudicate disputes, and disputes do not arise unless the litigants' respective interests are adverse, [¶] The Canavin court identified the potential tension between co-plaintiffs in a wrongful death case as the raison d'etre for judicial apportionment. 'The 1949 statutory amendment to provide for judicial apportionment appears based upon legislative acknowledgment of the respective heirs' competing interests in the lump-sum award. ' ( Canavin, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 533, 196 Cal.Rptr. 82, italics added.) And quite obviously, competing interests cannot be adjudicated unless litigants are entitled to challenge their adversary's position. [9] Third, the assessments and intentions of a settling defendant are irrelevant to the merits of the heirs' competing claims; therefore, they deserve no consideration in a judicial apportionment proceeding. Just as a defendant has no interest in the division which the plaintiffs may make among themselves, or which may be made for them, of the damages recovered in a wrongful death trial ( Robinson v. Western States Gas etc. Co. (1920) 184 Cal. 401, 410, 194 P. 39; see Canavin, supra, 148 Cal. App.3d at p. 537, 196 Cal.Rptr. 82), so, too, the division of a lump-sum wrongful death settlement is of no concern to the settling defendant ( Smith v. Premier Alliance Ins. Co., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 698, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 461; Spearman v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1105, 1113, fn. 3, 230 Cal.Rptr. 264). Indeed, a defendant's offer to settle may be based on inadequate information due to incomplete discovery, or a failure to reasonably investigate the claims, or some other consideration having little to do with the merits of the heirs' competing claims. Thus, whether or not the heirs have stipulated to the introduction of additional witness testimony on the issue of apportionment, the trial court's decision should not be dependent upon what a settling defendant considered relevant in calculating a compromise sum. Wife also relies on Collins v. Hemet Valley Hospital Dist. (1986) 186 Cal. App.3d 922, 231 Cal.Rptr. 92 ( Collins ) to support her position. In that case, the trial court granted a petition filed on behalf of a decedent's minor child for approval of a $100,000 settlement with a defendant in a wrongful death action; it then issued a second order determining that the parents of the decedent, who filed the action along with the minor, were not heirs or dependent parents of the decedent and therefore were not entitled to share in the settlement. ( Id. at pp. 925-926, 231 Cal.Rptr. 92.) Collins reversed, finding:  The trial court was not called upon to determine whether Mr. and Mrs. Collins were actually `dependent' parents of the decedent. That would have been a proper question to be determined in a trial of the wrongful death action, but there was no trial; there was a settlement based not on actual facts but claimed facts, and the fairness of the proposed settlement and division of the proceeds should have been determined on the basis of the claimed facts and the circumstances that produced the settlement offer. ( Id. at p. 928, 231 Cal.Rptr. 92.) Collins is not on point. Unlike the case before us, Collins concerned a guardian ad litem's petition for court approval of a settlement of a minor's claim, and, presumably, the showing required for such approval. (§ 372 [guardian ad litem may compromise a minor's claim with court approval]; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 7.950 [requirements for petitions for approval of a compromise of a minor's claim].) Moreover, while Collins purported to speak to the issue of apportionment, it did not involve any stipulation between the decedent's parents and the minor's guardian ad litem for a further trial on apportionment, so it is unclear how Collins might have ruled had  [t]he trial court [been] called upon to determine whether Mr. and Mrs. Collins were actually `dependent' parents of the decedent.  ( Collins, supra, 186 Cal. App.3d at p. 928, 231 Cal.Rptr. 92.) Finally, Collins did not identify any case law or other authority in reaching the conclusions quoted above. Accordingly, Collins fails to provide meaningful support for Wife's contrary views. We conclude the trial court was not required to allocate the $1.1 million in settlement proceeds based solely on the evidence admitted at the trial against the nonsettling defendants or on the perceived contribution that each heir's damages claim supposedly made to the settlement amount.