Opinion ID: 775404
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Opinion Testimony Identifying Handwriting

Text: 82 The final evidentiary challenge is more serious. James Donahue, an IRS agent, testified that certain documents in evidence were in Scott's handwriting. Donahue had followed Scott through a number of IRS investigations over a number of years, beginning when Donahue participated in the 1989 search. Donahue testified on voir dire that during this time he had seen examples of Scott's handwriting that included three to five letters, five to ten court pleadings, signature cards to open three bank accounts in Scott's name, fifty or sixty checks and deposit slips for those accounts, five to ten money orders, applications to file tax returns electronically, two driver's licenses, a pilot's license, and five to ten forms Scott had signed as part of booking procedures at police stations, among others. Donahue also saw Scott sign a document in his presence: a fingerprint card at the marshal's office during an earlier investigation. 83 Scott made two objections to Donahue's testimony as a whole, which he renewed after the voir dire. First, he objected that Donahue had acquired familiarity with Scott's handwriting for purposes of the litigation, and thus could not testify as a lay witness under Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(2). Second, he objected that despite Donahue's exposure to Scott's handwriting Donahue nevertheless lacked sufficient familiarity with that handwriting to testify. The district court overruled Scott's objections, but required Donahue to refer to the documents in general terms in order to avoid undue prejudice to Scott. The jury was not told that the documents providing the basis for Donahue's familiarity came from earlier investigations, arrests, and seizures. 84 Donahue then identified Scott's signature and handwriting on various documents which the government had previously introduced as found in Scott's possession. These documents included a birth certificate in the name of Ralph Swoboda, a list of names, which included Scott's codefendants, the purported signature of Randy LaPlante on Western Union forms, an application for a copy of Daniel Richard Brogan's birth certificate, and similar papers. To some of these Scott objected on an individual basis as unduly prejudicial under Federal Rule of Evidence 403; to others, he did not. The district court overruled all such objections. 85 In admitting the testimony, the district court relied on Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which reads: 86 If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness' testimony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness, and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness' testimony or the determination of a fact in issue, and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702. 87 Fed. R. Evid. 701. The district court distinguished Rule 901 as dealing only with authentication as a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence, and therefore not with evidence that had already been admitted. The court reasoned in the alternative that if Rule 901 did apply, Rule 901(b)(2) (on which Scott relied) would nevertheless permit admission. The Rule states: 88 By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the requirements of this rule: 89 . . . . 90 (2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of handwriting, based upon 91 familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation. 92 Fed. R. Evid. 901(b). 93 Scott argues primarily that the correct rule for considering admissibility of such handwriting authentication or identification evidence is Rule 901(b)(2), and that the evidence was inadmissible because Donahue came to know Scott's handwriting through his criminal investigation of Scott. 94 Rule 901(b) illustrates two ways of authenticating or identifying through the testimony of a witness the handwriting on a document as being written by a particular person. The handwriting may be identified through a lay witness who has familiarity with the alleged author's handwriting and who did not acquire that familiarity for purposes of the litigation. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(2); United States v. Tipton, 964 F.2d 650, 655 (7th Cir. 1992) (surveying cases). Alternatively, the handwriting may be identified as the alleged author's handwriting by an expert, who lacks such familiarity except as acquired for purposes of the litigation but has the requisite expertise and who compares the sample with specimens which have been authenticated. 13 Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(3); see also Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(2) advisory committee's note (Testimony based upon familiarity acquired for purposes of the litigation is reserved to the expert . . . .). 95 The district court ruled that Rule 701 governed and that Rule 901 did not apply. 14 This is an issue of law we review de novo. We hold that both rules must be satisfied. 96 The essence of the district court's reasoning was that the documents that contained the handwriting had already been admitted into evidence. As such, they had, of course, been authenticated or identified. Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). Authentication refers to evidence that tends to prove that a document is what its proponent claims it to be. The documents were earlier authenticated as documents found in the search of Scott's car or home, and admitted as such. The handwriting on those documents was not previously authenticated as evidence that tended to prove that the handwriting was Scott's. To prove that point, the evidence had to comply with Rule 901. 15 97 Whether Donahue's testimony satisfied Rule 901 depends on the purpose of the requirement that the familiarity of a lay opinion witness with handwriting may not be acquired for purposes of the litigation. This limitation is properly understood in light of the common law tradition with which Rule 901(b)(2) and Rule 901(b)(3) break. English courts, and early American courts, placed strict limits on testimony concerning identification of handwriting by its style, called comparison of hands. 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1991, at 253 (Chadbourn rev. 1978). Professor Wigmore explains that when this rule was at its strictest, no witness was permitted to identify handwriting in a criminal case unless the witness had seen the document in question written or signed. Over time, however, courts came to permit handwriting identification based on ever-looser degrees of familiarity: one who had seen the alleged author sign other documents, or one who had seen samples of writing known to be by that author over a period of time, could give such testimony. Id. §§ 1992-1993, at 257-62. 98 Rule 901(b)(2) retains only one vestige of the common law rule. A lay witness may not enter court, see for the first time two samples of handwriting, and identify the contested sample as written by the same person as the previously authenticated sample; the result is the same, moreover, if the witness compared the two samples before entering the courtroom. See, e.g., United States v. Pitts, 569 F.2d 343, 348 (5th Cir. 1978) (affirming the exclusion of the testimony of a lawyer-witness who had compared a single contested sample of handwriting to a single authenticated one in preparing for a previous trial). After all, such a comparison could be made as easily by the jury as by the witness. Therefore, lay witness testimony without familiarity would not be helpful to the jury and would be prohibited by Rule 701 even if Rule 901 did not exist. Cf. Wigmore, supra, § 1993, at 260 (observing that the common-law opinion rule would preclude lay witness testimony without familiarity). 99 This case involves no such situation. Donahue became familiar with Scott's handwriting over the course of several years, and he did so not for the purpose of testifying, but instead for the purpose of solving a crime. Scott was perfectly entitled to argue to the jury that Donahue's interest in securing a conviction colored Donahue's perception of Scott's handwriting. Cf. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (discussing in another context the pressures facing those engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime). That possibility, however, did not require the district court to exclude the evidence under Rule 901(b)(2). 100 We may dispense quickly with Scott's remaining objections to Donahue's testimony. Scott makes a different argument that Donahue was not sufficiently familiar with Scott's signature to testify. This fact-bound ruling is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Gilbert, 181 F.3d at 60. It is true that Donahue conceded that he saw Scott sign his name only once. Other categories of experience can, however, demonstrate familiarity, such as seeing signatures on writings purporting to be those of the alleged author when the circumstances would indicate that they were genuine. 2 McCormick on Evidence § 221, at 42 (J. Strong ed., 5th ed. 1999). The rule for which Scott seems to contend -- not only a strict requirement that the witness see the alleged author in the act of signature, but also a further demand that this occur multiple times -- is far too strict. See United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196, 202 (8th Cir. 1976) (permitting authentication testimony on the basis of a single exposure to an uncontested signature and a single exposure to a contested one). In this case, there was enough familiarity on the part of the witness to admit the testimony. Scott's arguments go rather to the weight of the evidence. Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 901.04[2], at 901-20 (J. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2001). Scott took advantage of this, and cross-examined the agent on the paucity of actual sightings of Scott endorsing his signature. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion and no error. 101 Scott also argues he was prejudiced by the implicit message, conveyed by the use of an IRS agent to identify his handwriting, that the government had been investigating him for a long time and probably for other things. The district court admirably restricted direct testimony to this effect. Nevertheless, Scott would have us say that the remaining prejudice still substantially outweighed the probative value of the evidence so that the district court was bound to exclude the testimony under Rule 403. We cannot so hold. The district court's discretion in the Rule 403 balancing inquiry is broad. E.g., Daigle v. Me. Med. Ctr., Inc., 14 F.3d 684, 690 (1st Cir. 1994). Even if the government might have done better to use an expert witness for the handwriting identification, as Scott argues, and even if another district court might permissibly have excluded the evidence on this basis, the availability of a less prejudicial method of proof is only a factor to be weighed in the Rule 403 inquiry and does not control this case. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 advisory committee's note (The availability of other means of proof may also be an appropriate factor.) (emphasis added); see generally Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180-92 (1997) (discussing the proper analysis of less prejudicial methods of proof). In light of its careful attention to the problem of prejudice, the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the evidence under Rule 403. 16