Opinion ID: 884137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Regulatory authority over all subdivisions

Text: With respect to the powers and duties of local boards of health, § 50-2-116, MCA, provides in pertinent part that local boards shall, subject to the provisions of 50-2-130, adopt necessary regulations that are not less stringent than state standards for the control and disposal of sewage from private and public buildings that is not regulated by Title 75, chapter 6, or Title 76, chapter 4. Section 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA. By its terms, § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, explicitly authorizes local boards of health to promulgate regulations for the control and disposal of sewage which is not otherwise regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. [3] Thus, our first inquiry is into the scope and application of Title 76, chapter 4, pursuant to which the DEQ derives authority to regulate sanitation in subdivisions. Title 76, chapter 4, part 1, provides for state regulation by the DEQ of sanitation in subdivisions. Specifically, § 76-4-104(1), MCA, mandates that the DEQ adopt reasonable rules, including adoption of sanitary standards, necessary for administration and enforcement of sanitation in subdivisions. For the purposes of the state's regulatory authority over sanitation in subdivisions, § 76-4-102(13), MCA, defines a subdivision as a division of land or land so divided that creates one or more parcels containing less than 20 acres. Section 76-4-103, MCA, further explains that [a] subdivision shall comprise only those parcels of less than 20 acres which have been created by a division of land. The state may, accordingly, regulate sanitation in subdivisions which contain parcels with fewer than twenty acres each, but is statutorily precluded from regulating those subdivisions in which each parcel of land contains more than twenty acres. Thus, that portion of § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, which mandates that local boards of health adopt regulations for the control and disposal of sewage ... that is not regulated by ... Title 76, chapter 4, clearly directs local boards of health to regulate sanitation in subdivisions which contain parcels of more than twenty acres each. Indeed, the parties agree that § 50-2-116, MCA, requires that local boards of health adopt regulations governing sanitation in subdivisions with parcels of more than twenty acres. The critical issue in this case, however, is whether § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, authorizes local boards of health to promulgate regulations for those subdivisions, such as the Green Acres Subdivision, comprised of parcels with fewer than twenty acres each. In this cas, the Lewis and Clark County Board of Health refused to approve the plat for the Green Acres subdivision, citing to Section 3.1(1)(d) of the Lewis and Clark County On-Site Wastewater Treatment Regulations as the basis for its decision. The Lewis and Clark County On-Site Wastewater Treatment Regulations, including Section 3.1(1)(d), were specifically promulgated pursuant to § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA. Resolution of this appeal thus depends upon an accurate interpretation of § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA. As noted above, because the District Court concluded that local boards of health derive such authority from Montana's Subdivision and Platting Act, it did not reach the pivotal question of whether § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, authorizes local boards of health to regulate sanitation in subdivisions comprised of parcels with fewer than twenty acres. Skinner Enterprises argues that, because Title 76, chapter 4, provides for DEQ regulation of sanitation in major and minor subdivisions containing parcels with fewer than twenty acres, local boards of health can derive no authority from § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, to similarly regulate those subdivisions. In so arguing, Skinner Enterprises relies primarily upon the plain language of § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, which mandates that local boards of health adopt regulations for the control and disposal of sewage that is not regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. Skinner Enterprises correctly notes that neither § 50-2-116, MCA, nor any other provision of the Montana Code, contains specific language granting local boards the authority to regulate major or minor subdivisions comprised of parcels with fewer than twenty acres each. Therefore, Skinner Enterprises urges, the DEQ retains all regulatory authority over sanitation in all such subdivisions, including the Green Acres subdivision at issue in the present case. Despite the absence of specific delegatory language in § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, respondents nonetheless argue the Montana Legislature intended § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, to conform with past practice and to confer upon local boards of health discretionary regulatory authority over subdivisions comprised of parcels with fewer than twenty acres. Respondents urge that § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, is ambiguous in two respects, and therefore suggest that to accurately interpret the statute this Court must turn to evidence of legislative history to ascertain the Legislature's intent. Respondents argue that § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, is ambiguous when construed in conjunction with § 76-4-122, MCA. Specifically, respondents argue that for this Court to conclude § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, divests local boards of health of their longstanding authority to regulate sanitation in all subdivisions would be for it to render the terms of § 76-4-122, MCA, inoperative and reach an absurd result. To avoid such a result, respondents argue, this Court must construe these statutes in a way which gives meaning and effect to both § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, and § 76-4-122, MCA. Respondents additionally argue that, because local boards of health were statutorily authorized to regulate sanitation in subdivisions prior to 1991, had the Legislature intended to divest them of that authority by way of the 1991 amendment to § 50-2-116, MCA, it would have done so with explicit prohibitory language to that effect. Because the Legislature included no language of prohibition, respondents contend, it clearly did not intend to divest local boards of their regulatory authority. At a minimum, respondents argue, the absence of any explicit language divesting local boards of their authority to regulate sanitation in subdivisions with parcels containing fewer than twenty acres creates an ambiguity as to whether the Legislature indeed intended to so diminish the regulatory authority of local boards of health.
In support of their assertion that this Court must resort to legislative history in this case, respondents argue that § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, is ambiguous when construed in conjunction with § 76-4-122, MCA, which provides in pertinent part that: (1) The county clerk and recorder shall not file or record any map or plat showing a subdivision unless it complies with the provisions of this part. (2) A county clerk and recorder may not accept a subdivision plat for filing until one of the following conditions has been met: (a) the person wishing to file the plat has obtained approval of the local health officer having jurisdiction and has filed the approval with the reviewing authority, and the reviewing authority has indicated by stamp or certificate that it has approved the plat and plans and specifications ad that the subdivision is subject to no sanitary restriction whenever reviewing authority approval is necessary; or (b) whenever reviewing authority approval is not necessary, the person wishing to file the plat has obtained a certificate from the governing body that the subdivision is inside a master planning area or a class 1 or class 2 municipality and will be provided with municipal facilities for the supply of water and disposal of sewage and solid waste. Respondents argue the express terms of § 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, require that a person seeking to file a subdivision plat with the county clerk and recorder obtain both state review and local approval. Respondents note that the Legislature does not perform useless acts, and thus argue the Legislature would not require both state and local approval if local approval were merely predicated upon the very rules and regulations used to obtain state approval. Respondents contend that local approval occurs under rules and regulations adopted pursuant to § 50-2-116, MCA, and thus differs substantively from approval by the reviewing authority, be it either the local board of health pursuant to § 76-4-104(3)(b), MCA, or the DEQ, which occurs pursuant to DEQ rules and regulations. In response, Skinner Enterprises points to that portion of § 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, which specifies that a person need only obtain approval from the local health officer having jurisdiction. In this case, Skinner Enterprises argues the local health officer did not have regulatory jurisdiction over the Green Acres subdivision, because, pursuant to § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, it has no authority to regulate sanitation in subdivisions otherwise regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. Skinner Enterprises argues that Green Acres, a major subdivision containing parcels with fewer than twenty acres each, is clearly regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4, and that the local health officer thus has no regulatory jurisdiction. Accordingly, Skinner Enterprises argues a decision by the local board of health pursuant to § 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, approving or denying the Green Acres subdivision, would have to be a ministerial, nondiscretionary one because the local board had no regulatory jurisdiction pursuant to § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, to promulgate regulations upon which it could premise a discretionary decision to either approve or disapprove the subdivision. Section 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, does indeed require that, before filing a subdivision plat with the county clerk and recorder, a person obtain approval from the local board of health, by and through the local health officer having jurisdiction, as well as approval from the reviewing authority. As discussed above, the DEQ may delegate to qualified local boards of health the authority to review select subdivisions, including those with five or fewer parcels. Section 76-4-104(3), MCA. Thus, depending on the subdivision in question, the reviewing authority may be either the local board of health or the DEQ. See § 76-4-102(9), MCA (defining reviewing authority as the department or a local department or board of health certified to conduct a review under 76-4-104). Even where the DEQ has properly delegated to the local board of health the authority to review a proposed subdivision, however, the DEQ must still make a final decision on the subdivision. Section 76-4-128(2), MCA. Thus, pursuant to § 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, a person must ultimately obtain both state and local approval by the board of health before filing a subdivision plat with the county clerk and recorder. Looking to § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, Skinner Enterprises argues for an interpretation of Montana's statutory scheme which would confer upon local boards of health no regulatory authority over sanitation in subdivisions otherwise regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. To construe § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, as thus suggested by Skinner Enterprises, would be to create an irreconcilable conflict between § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, and that portion of § 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, which clearly requires the local board of health with jurisdiction, by way of its local health officer, to approve all subdivision plats. Were local boards, as Skinner Enterprises contends, without authority to promulgate regulations for the control and disposal of sewage, this would not deprive them of jurisdiction pursuant to § 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, but would instead simply render their approval meaningless. Thus, to hold approval by the local board of health is a ministerial, nondiscretionary act which occurs pursuant to the very rules and regulations promulgated by the state would indeed be to render § 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, inoperative. In construing a statute, this Court must read and construe each statute as a whole so as to avoid an absurd result and to give effect to the purpose of the statute. Christenot v. State, Dept. of Commerce (1995), 272 Mont. 396, 401, 901 P.2d 545, 548. Indeed [s]tatutes do not exist in a vacuum, [but] must be read in relationship to one another to effectuate the intent of the statutes as a whole. Marsh v. Overland (1995), 274 Mont. 21, 28, 905 P.2d 1088, 1092. This Court will, if possible, construe statutes so as to give effect to all of them. Mercury Marine v. Monty's Enterprises, Inc. (1995), 270 Mont. 413, 417, 892 P.2d 568, 571; § 1-2-101, MCA. When more than one statute applies to a given situation, such construction, if possible, is to be adopted as will give effect to all. Schuman v. Bestrom (1985), 214 Mont. 410, 415, 693 P.2d 536, 538. In the present case, the terms of § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, mandate that local boards of health adopt regulations ... for the control and disposal of sewage ... that is not regulated by ... Title 76, chapter 4. Thus, at first glance, it appears that § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, does not confer upon local boards of health the authority to promulgate regulations regarding sanitation in subdivisions, such as Green Acres, which contain parcels with fewer than twenty acres each, because those subdivisions are otherwise regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. Having held, however, that such a construction of § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, would conflict with the express terms of § 76-4-122(2)(a), MCA, we determine such an application would lead to an absurd result. To avoid this result, as respondents argue, this Court must review the legislative history to accurately ascertain the intent of the Legislature.
Respondents additionally argue the absence of any explicit language in § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, prohibiting local boards of health from regulating sanitation in subdivisions with parcels containing fewer than twenty acres creates an ambiguity as to whether the Legislature intended to so limit their regulatory authority. Although § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, precisely mandates that local boards of health regulate sanitation in those subdivisions not regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4, it is utterly silent with respect to whether local boards have discretionary authority to regulate those subdivisions, such as Green Acres, which are in fact regulated by the state. Thus, § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, neither prohibits local boards of health from regulating subdivisions with parcels containing fewer than twenty acres, nor does it explicitly empower them to do so. In support of its argument, Skinner Enterprises points to that canon of statutory construction pursuant to which this Court is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained within the statute, but is not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted. Section 1-2-101, MCA. It is not this Court's office, Skinner Enterprises asserts, to insert what the Legislature did not, and to construe § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, as providing local boards of health with discretionary authority to regulate subdivisions already regulated by the state. Skinner Enterprises maintains that § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, expressly retains regulation of all subdivisions comprised of parcels with fewer than twenty acres, with the state. Indeed, interpreted in a vacuum, the plain language of § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, does not, on its face, explicitly empower local boards of health to promulgate regulations regarding sanitation in subdivisions with parcels containing fewer than twenty acres. Neither does the language explicitly prohibit local boards of health from adopting sanitation regulations for subdivisions with parcels containing fewer than twenty acres. Thus the ambiguity, argue respondents. Respondents further urge against an interpretation which would deprive local boards of this regulatory authority because it takes into account neither the statutory context in which § 50-2-116, MCA, appears, nor its legislative history. Initially, with respect to legislative history, the parties agree that, prior to 1991, local boards of health had authority to regulate sanitation in all subdivisions, including those with parcels containing fewer than twenty acres. In 1991, however, the Montana Legislature amended § 50-2-116, MCA, to include the provision at issue in this case. Section 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA. By adding the following language to § 50-2-116(1), MCA, the Legislature specifically mandated that local boards: (i) adopt necessary regulations that are no less stringent than state standards for the control and disposal of sewage from private and public buildings that is not regulated by Title 75, chapter 6, or Title 76, chapter 4. The parties vigorously dispute the implications of this 1991 amendment. Skinner Enterprises argues the amendment effectively diminished the regulatory authority held by local boards of health, in fact divesting them of their longstanding power to regulate sanitation in subdivisions otherwise regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. In contrast, respondents argue the 1991 amendment to § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, actually expanded local board of health regulatory authority. Respondents note the amendment commands local boards of health to adopt regulations for those subdivisions containing parcels with more than twenty acres, because those subdivisions are not regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. Respondents additionally argue, however, that § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, continues to permit, but does not mandate, local boards of health to regulate those subdivisions containing parcels with fewer than twenty acres which are regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. Respondents point to the absence of specific language divesting local boards of their authority to regulate subdivisions also regulated by the state, and argue that had the Legislature intended to so diminish local board of health regulatory authority, it would have done so with specific language to that effect. Although respondents argue § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, is clear on this point, they alternatively urge that the absence of explicit statutory language divesting local boards of their authority at a minimum renders § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, ambiguous. We conclude the absence of specific language either granting or prohibiting local boards from regulating subdivisions with parcels containing fewer than twenty acres renders § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, ambiguous, and therefore compels us to investigate the legislative history to derive the precise intent of the Legislature. Indeed, review of pertinent legislative history indicates that for us to construe § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, as prohibiting local boards of health from regulating those subdivisions with parcels containing fewer than twenty acres, would be for us to reach a result clearly not intended by the Legislature. In relying on evidence of legislative history to accurately interpret § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, we are, of course, aware that [o]ur function in construing and applying statutes is to effectuate the legislature's intent. To determine legislative intent, we first look to the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. If the legislature's intent can be determined by the plain language of the words used, we may not go further and apply other means of interpretation. It is only when the intent cannot be determined from the language of the statute that we will examine legislative history. Thomas Brothers v. Cargill, Inc. (1996), 276 Mont. 105, 110, 915 P.2d 226, 229 (quoting Gulbrandson v. Carey (1995), 272 Mont. 494, 500, 901 P.2d 573, 577) (citations omitted). With respect to statutory construction, we have identified defining the objectives the legislature sought to achieve as our prime consideration. Hern Farms, Inc. v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Co. (1996), 280 Mont. 436, 441, 930 P.2d 84, 87. In the present case, the legislative history of § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, clearly reveals an intent on the part of the Legislature to expand, rather than diminish, the authority held by local boards of health with respect to regulating sanitation in subdivisions. In 1991, neither the state, pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4, nor local governing bodies, pursuant to the Montana Subdivision and Platting Act, had statutory authority to regulate subdivisions comprised of parcels with more than twenty acres. [4] Thus, pursuant to the statutory scheme in effect prior to 1991, no one entity was required to regulate sanitation in those subdivisions comprised of parcels with more than twenty acres each. As a result of a continued increase in residential development, Montana was facing a potentially serious health problem. Many septic systems were being installed without being subject to any regulation whatsoever. In response to this problem, the Legislature enacted H.B. 162, to fill in the gaps and mandate that local boards of health regulate those subdivisions not otherwise regulated by the state. The title of House Bill 162, pursuant to which the Legislature enacted the 1991 amendments to § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, is: An act requiring the Board of Health and Environmental Sciences to establish minimum standards for the control and disposal of sewage from private and public buildings; requiring local boards of health to adopt regulations that are no less stringent than state standards for the control and disposal of sewage from private and public buildings; providing for appeal of a local variance to the Department of Health and Environmental Sciences; amending sections 50-2-16 and 75-5-305, MCA; and providing an applicability date. As a rule, the Legislature titles a bill to reflect what the bill does. The title of H.B. 162 says nothing about divesting from local boards of health their discretionary authority to regulate sanitation in subdivisions also regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4. Moreover, the statement of intent attached to H.B. 162 provides in pertinent part that: Following the adoption of minimum state standards, local boards of health shall adopt regulations for new septic and sewage disposal systems that are no less stringent than state standards. Local governments are not required to regulate septic and sewage disposal systems that the department of health and environmental sciences reviews and regulates under the requirements of Title 75, chapter 6, pertaining to public water systems or the requirements of Title 76, chapter 4, pertaining to subdivisions. As with the title of H.B. 162, the statement of intent says nothing about diminishing or taking away local board of health authority to regulate sanitation in subdivisions. Rather, that portion of the statement of intent which provides that [l]ocal governments are not required to regulate septic and sewage disposal systems otherwise regulated by the state pursuant to Title 76, chapter 4, clearly evidences the Legislature's intent that local government authority to regulate those systems be discretionary. There is simply nothing in the legislative history of H.B. 162 that even hints that the Legislature intended to remove from local boards of health the authority to adopt sanitary regulations in all subdivisions. To give effect to the intent of the Legislature and to avoid reaching an absurd result, we hold that § 50-2-116(1)(i), MCA, confers upon the board discretionary authority to regulate sanitation in the Green Acres subdivision. Although we do so by way of a different analysis, we conclude, as did the District Court, that local boards of health have statutory authority to regulate subdivisions, regardless of size.