Opinion ID: 2177550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: wmata

Text: Appellants do not here argue that either WMATA or the District is liable for the original decision to locate the bus stop at the corner of Third and M Streets. Rather, they claim that the 1967 widening of M Street made the bus stop a safety hazard, and that appellees' alleged negligence was their failure to remedy the hazard. Appellants first contend that WMATA, as a common carrier, owes a duty of reasonable care to prospective passengers of its transit system. WMATA breached this duty, they say, by ignoring its own safety standards and allowing the continued existence of a dangerous bus stop. According to appellants, immunity should not attach to these breaches as a matter of public policy. More specifically, appellants maintain that WMATA is statutorily liable because the relocation and maintenance of its stops are proprietary activities. Thus, they argue, the trial court erred in ruling that WMATA was immune from suit. WMATA responds that, under District of Columbia law, it owes no duty of care to prospective passengers on its transit system. Further, even if it did owe such a duty and breached it, the trial court correctly ruled that it was immune from suit because its alleged acts of negligence were governmental, not proprietary. We agree with both of WMATA's arguments.
We reject appellants' contention that WMATA owed a special duty of care to the victims of the accident, who were prospective passengers on its transit system. WMATA, like any common carrier, owes a duty of reasonable care to its passengers. D.C. Transit System, Inc. v. Carney, 254 A.2d 402, 403 (D.C.1969); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965); see Standardized Civil Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 8.1 (1981). This duty arises, however, only in a carrier-passenger relationship. A common carrier has no special duty to non-passengers. See RESTATEMENT, supra, § 314A comment c; Standardized Civil Jury Instructions, supra, No. 8.2 (carrier's duty begins when the intending passenger makes his first contact with the bus in the act of entering it). More than twenty years ago, in a case in which the plaintiff was injured when she fell at a bus stop while waiting for a bus, this court affirmed a judgment n.o.v. in favor of the bus company. We held: [U]ntil a person has placed himself in some substantial sense in the custody or under the control of the carrier, he is not a passenger and no special duty of care is owed him. An intent to become a passenger is not enough to confer that status or to charge the carrier with the duty to exercise that degree of care owed by a carrier in the transportation of a passenger. Baker v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 248 A.2d 829, 831 (D.C.1969) (citations omitted). A duty of care may also arise if the property upon which an individual stands when injured is either owned by or under the control of the carrier. See Webster v. Capital Transit Co., 91 U.S.App.D.C. 303, 304, 200 F.2d 134, 135 (1952) (carrier had no obligation growing out of ownership or control because the platform where plaintiff was injured was neither its property nor under its control); cf. Chvala v. D.C. Transit System, Inc., 113 U.S.App.D.C. 171, 306 F.2d 778 (1962) (automobile struck streetcar loading platform which carrier had statutory duty to maintain, mark, and light; directed verdict for carrier reversed). In the instant case, none of the victims of the accident was boarding or leaving a WMATA bus. Rather, they were all waiting on the sidewalk, which was owned not by WMATA but by the District of Columbia. Thus WMATA owed no duty to the victims other than a general duty to exercise ordinary care in the operation of its buses so as to avoid injuring the citizenry. 18 E. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 53.108 (3d ed.1984); see Standardized Civil Jury Instructions, supra, No. 8.10 (common carrier has no responsibility to maintain or repair public space at a bus stop). Since no WMATA vehicle or property was involved in this case, we conclude that Baker v. D.C. Transit is controlling on the issue of WMATA's duty. We hold accordingly that WMATA owed the victims no duty of care because they were not its passengers at the time they were injured.
The trial court ruled that WMATA was immune from suit under section 80 of the WMATA Compact, D.C.Code § 1-2431(80) (1987). [3] We agree. Even assuming that WMATA owed a duty of care which it breached, the court was correct in holding WMATA immune from suit for its alleged acts of negligence. Section 80 establishes a governmental-proprietary test for deciding which of WMATA's activities may subject it to tort liability. Hall v. WMATA, 468 A.2d 970, 972 (D.C.1983); see Dant v. District of Columbia, 264 U.S.App.D.C. 284, 289-290, 829 F.2d 69, 74-75 (1987). Whether an activity is proprietary or governmental is a question of federal law because the WMATA Compact is an Act of Congress. Sanders v. WMATA, 260 U.S.App.D.C. 359, 362, 819 F.2d 1151, 1154 (1987); Morris v. WMATA, 251 U.S.App.D.C. 42, 44, 781 F.2d 218, 220 (1986). In deciding the category in which to place WMATA's allegedly negligent acts, the trial court adopted the approach suggested by McQuillin, namely, that `[t]he underlying test is whether the act is for the common good of all without the element of special corporate benefit or pecuniary profit.' 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra, § 53.29, quoting Bolster v. Lawrence, 225 Mass. 387, 390, 114 N.E. 722, 724 (1917); accord, Nathan v. WMATA, 653 F.Supp. 247, 248 (D.D.C.1986) (governmental functions are those which are for the benefit of the general public). Appellants argue that this common good test is overly broad and would render section 80 superfluous, since all of WMATA's activities are essentially oriented to serving the public. Appellants are certainly correct that, in many instances, the common good test is of little help, for proprietary activities may benefit the public as well as the agency performing them. See Johnson v. Detroit Metropolitan Airport, 133 Mich.App. 603, 606, 350 N.W.2d 295, 297 (1984) (noting that an earlier case repudiates by implication the `common good of all' test). We agree with the District of Columbia Circuit that the more appropriate inquiry is whether a particular activity involves a legislative, administrative, or regulatory policy decision or merely implements such a decision. Only the former type of action, a policy decision, is a discretionary function which should be immune from second-guessing by a jury. Sanders, supra, 260 U.S.App.D.C. at 362-364, 819 F.2d at 1154-1155; see Berkovitz ex rel. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538-539, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 1959-1960, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988); Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35-36, 73 S.Ct. 956, 967-968, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953); Dant, supra, 264 U.S.App.D.C. at 288-290, 829 F.2d at 73-75; Urow v. District of Columbia, 114 U.S.App.D.C. 350, 351-352, 316 F.2d 351, 352-353, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 826, 84 S.Ct. 69, 11 L.Ed.2d 59 (1963). In the instant case, then, the issue of WMATA's immunity comes down to a question of whether its alleged acts of negligence are characterized as discretionary decisions or ministerial execution of those decisions. [4] Appellants assert, of course, that WMATA's acts and omissions fall in the latter category. They cite WMATA's policy of ensuring passenger safety, set forth in its System Safety Program Plan (SSPP) and related documents, as proof that WMATA's discretion is limited by established standards. They also claim that WMATA failed to follow its own standards by maintaining a hazardous bus stop and failed to train its staff properly in implementing these safety standards. But the gist of appellants' complaint is really that WMATA was negligent in not relocating the bus stop to a safer place after 1967. Assuming that relocation was even the responsibility of WMATA, [5] appellants' claims relate more to design, a discretionary function, than to implementation. While the provision of mass transportation by WMATA is itself a proprietary activity, Qasim v. WMATA, 455 A.2d 904, 906 (D.C.) (en banc), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 929, 103 S.Ct. 2090, 77 L.Ed.2d 300 (1983), we hold that the design and planning of a transportation system are governmental activities because they involve quasi-legislative policy decisions which are discretionary in nature and should not be second-guessed by a jury. See, e.g., Dant, supra, 264 U.S.App.D.C. at 289-290, 829 F.2d at 74-75 (design of fare collection system); Sanders, supra, 260 U.S.App.D.C. at 364, 819 F.2d at 1156 (drug testing of all WMATA employees involved in accidents); Nathan, supra, 653 F.Supp. at 248 (design of stairwell in subway station); see also Urow, supra, 114 U.S.App.D.C. at 351, 316 F.2d at 352 (placement of traffic control device); Freeman v. City of Norfolk, 221 Va. 57, 60, 266 S.E.2d 885, 886 (1980) (decision to install or not to install traffic lights, roadway markings, guardrails, and like devices on public streets). But see Gillot v. WMATA, 507 F.Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C.1981) (failure to make WMATA-owned parking lot safe by taking certain security measures is actionable negligence). Only the negligent operation of such a system or the negligent implementation of such a design may be characterized as proprietary. See, e.g., Dant, supra, 264 U.S.App.D.C. at 290, 829 F.2d at 75; [6] Heffez v. WMATA, 569 F.Supp. 1551, 1553 (D.D.C.1983) (WMATA employee was carrying out a proprietary function, to wit, managing the Van Ness subway station), aff'd without opinion, 252 U.S.App.D.C. 18, 786 F.2d 431 (1986). A decision to relocate or not to relocate the bus stop after 1967 would involve safety planning, not implementation or operation of a safety plan. See 18 E. McQUILLIN, supra, § 53.41 (failure to reconstruct or upgrade is planning, a governmental function). Indeed, the allegedly hazardous condition of the stop itself arose from a traffic control plan, the District's decision to widen M Street. Appellants do not allege that WMATA, in implementing its safety policy, engaged in any negligent acts which created the dangerous condition, nor do they claim that WMATA allowed the bus stop to deteriorate. Despite the existence of a general safety policy and the broad statements in the SSPP, the record contains no specific safety guidelines which would implement the policy and limit WMATA's discretion in choosing to relocate a bus stop. Compare Berkovitz, supra, 486 U.S. at 536, 542-548, 108 S.Ct. at 1958, 1961-1965 (decision to license vaccine not discretionary when statutory and regulatory standards prescribe course of action which agency must follow in making its decision). In trying to bring their claims under the proprietary or ministerial umbrella, appellants are really seeking to establish as affirmative negligence what is essentially passive conduct: WMATA's failure to take or enforce safety precautions. Without more specific evidence in the record of either safety requirements or an actual omission of an identifiable duty, we see no basis for finding WMATA liable. Were we to hold otherwise, a jury would be forced to speculate on whether adoption of precautionary measures by WMATA might have prevented the accident. The impossibility of such speculation is one of the main reasons why policy decisions receive immunity in the first place. We therefore hold that, even if WMATA owed a duty to the persons waiting at the bus stop who were injured as a result of Mr. Williams' conduct, it cannot be held liable for their injuries because the design and placement of the bus stop are governmental functions immune from tort liability under section 80 of the WMATA Compact.