Opinion ID: 1356144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Computer-Assisted Legal Research

Text: {18} Chrysler's second issue is whether its computer-assisted legal research was reasonable and necessary and whether it should be awarded costs for this expense as the prevailing party. Chrysler argues that this type of research is more cost effective and efficient, and it was thus complying with this Court's policy that parties should attempt to curb unreasonable and unnecessary expenses of litigation. Chrysler asserts that, because the issues in this case were complex and involved questions of first impression, this Court should conclude that this type of research is reasonable and necessary and, thus, a taxable cost of litigation. {19} The district court should exercise [its] discretion sparingly when considering expenses not specifically authorized by statute and precedent. Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 363, 862 P.2d at 1222; accord Smith v. Village of Ruidoso, 1999-NMCA-151, ¶ 43, 128 N.M. 470, 994 P.2d 50 (reversing an award of costs for mediator's fees and noting consistency with the Supreme Court's reluctance... to expand the list of recoverable costs, and our admonitions to trial courts to carefully, cautiously, and sparingly exercise their discretion when considering expenses not authorized by statute or precedent); Gillingham v. Reliable Chevrolet, 1998-NMCA-143, ¶¶ 30, 32, 126 N.M. 30, 966 P.2d 197 (concluding that the district court did not adequately explain the reasoning behind the award of unusual costs and reversing and remanding for reconsideration). Although not an exclusive list, this Court has described costs as including fees for transcripts, depositions, photocopies, and expert witnesses, and stated that these costs have been historically considered by our legislature and courts to be recoverable. Dunleavy, 116 N.M. at 363, 862 P.2d at 1222; accord Pioneer, 109 N.M. at 231, 784 P.2d at 418 (noting that costs within the trial court's discretion have included depositions, witness fees, transcript fees, special master fees, filing fees, and service of process fees). Chrysler argues that computer-assisted legal research is not similar to attorney time for conducting research but, instead, is more analogous to other taxable costs. Chrysler was awarded costs for, among other items, expert witness fees and depositions. We do not agree that computer-aided legal research is more similar to these costs than to an attorney's time performing legal research. The substance of the work is legal research; the form of that research, whether with computer or microfilm or books, should not alter that fact, and litigants should not have the option of designating expenses of legal research as costs. Friedlander v. Nims, 583 F.Supp. 1087, 1089 (N.D.Ga.1984) (holding that computerized legal research expenses are properly considered a component of attorney's fees and are not recoverable as costs); accord Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev. 670, 856 P.2d 560, 567 (1993) (Attorneys incur computer research expenses as a function of their research of the law. Thus, this expense is more closely related to the attorney's fee than to the kinds of recoverable costs defined [by statute, such as witness fees and deposition costs].). {20} Chrysler asserts that if computer-assisted legal research expenses are not recoverable as costs, attorneys will increase their hourly rates and decrease the use of a more economical method of performing research. We disagree. When an attorney is faced with a choice between using high-priced attorney time or incurring more economical computer legal research expenses, the fact that the computer legal research expenses are not taxable costs will rarely be the decisive factor. In most cases, it will not be a relevant factor. Bjornen v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 81 Hawai'i 105, 912 P.2d 602, 606 (Ct.App.1996). {21} The Court of Appeals noted that the majority of courts have declined to award charges for computer-assisted research as costs. Key II, 1999-NMCA-028, ¶ 19, 127 N.M. 38, 976 P.2d 523; accord O'Bryhim v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 997 F.Supp. 728, 737 (E.D.Va.1998) (The majority of federal courts subscribe to the view that costs of computer legal research are properly reflected as part of the law firm's overhead and, as such, are a factor to be included in the setting of attorneys fees as opposed to ordinary costs.), aff'd, 188 F.3d 502 (4th Cir.1999); A.M.E., Inc. v. Azstar Cas. Co. (In re Liquidation of Azstar Cas. Co.), 189 Ariz. 27, 938 P.2d 76, 77-78 (Ct.App.1996) (concluding that computer legal research is to be included as attorney fees rather than costs), approved by Ahwatukee Custom Estates Management Ass'n v. Bach, 193 Ariz. 401, 973 P.2d 106, 108-09 (1999) (en banc); Bjornen, 912 P.2d at 606 (agreeing with the majority rule that expenses for computerized legal research are a component of attorney fees and are not taxable costs); Bergmann, 856 P.2d at 567 (concluding that computer-aided legal research expenses are a function of attorneys' research, related to attorney fees rather than costs); Snyder v. Lovercheck, 992 P.2d 1079, 1091 (Wyo.1999) (We conclude that computer research expenditures are included within attorney's fees and are not taxable as costs.). We agree with the Court of Appeals on this issue and conclude that computer-assisted research is more analogous to attorney fees. [U]nder the American Rule the prevailing party normally does not receive attorney fees; thus, Chrysler is not entitled to recover legal research expenses. Schroeder v. Memorial Med. Ctr., 1997-NMSC-046, ¶ 6, 123 N.M. 719, 945 P.2d 449. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chrysler recovery of computer-aided research expenses as costs.