Opinion ID: 597117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pretrial detainee excessive force standard

Text: 18 In our determination of what standard of due process applies to claims of excessive use of force brought by pretrial detainees, we are first guided by Bell. Bell concerned the constitutionality of conditions or restrictions of pretrial detention and concluded that the proper inquiry is whether these conditions amount to punishment of the detainee. To determine if a condition or restriction amounts to punishment, a court must decide whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. Absent proof of an official's expressed intent to punish, the determination of whether a condition is punishment turns on whether an alternative purpose to which the restriction may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned to it. 19 While this inquiry works well for claims of improper conditions or restrictions, it does not lend itself to analysis of claims of excessive use of force in controlling prison disturbances. In Bell, the Court stated that the government must be able to take steps to maintain security and that [r]estraints that are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment.... 24 Bell further noted that there is no reason to distinguish between pretrial detainees and convicted inmates in reviewing challenged security practices because there is no basis to conclude that pretrial detainees pose any lesser security risk that convicted inmates. 25 20 For these reasons, we conclude that excessive use of force claims by pretrial detainees should not be analyzed under Bell 's conditions of confinement standard. Instead, we are guided by the standard announced in Whitley and Hudson. While these cases specifically addressed claims of excessive use of force brought by convicted prisoners, it is impractical to draw a line between convicted prisoners and pretrial detainees for the purpose of maintaining jail security. Moreover, the Court indicated in Hudson that many of its concerns in Whitley were not limited to Eighth Amendment claims but arise whenever guards use force to keep order. 26 It further observed that claims based on excessive force and claims based on conditions of confinement are different in kind. 27 21 Therefore, when a court is called upon to examine the amount of force used on a pretrial detainees for the purpose of institutional security, the appropriate analysis is that announced in Whitley and Hudson: whether the measure taken inflicted unnecessary and wanton pain and suffering depends on whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 28 22 Often, of course, there will be no evidence of the detention facility official's subjective intent, and the trier of fact must base its determination on objective factors suggestive of intent. 29 The trier of fact would need to examine the need for the application of force, and the threat 'reasonably perceived by the detention facility official.'  30 When appropriate, the trier of fact must reflect in this calculus that the detention facility official may have had to act quickly and decisively. The trier of fact should also consider any efforts to temper the severity of a forceful response. 31 ] [T]he extent of injury suffered by an inmate is one factor that may suggest 'whether the use of force could plausibly have been thought necessary' in a particular situation, 'or instead evinced such wantonness with respect to the unjustified infliction of harm as is tantamount to a knowing willingness that it occur.'  32 23 Our conclusion that Whitley and Hudson provide the correct standard for excessive force suits brought by pretrial detainees means that this Circuit's test in Shillingford has no continuing force. 33 Neither Whitley nor Hudson requires that a detention facility official's conduct be so excessive and outrageous that it shocks the conscience. And it is clear that Shillingford 's severe injury element did not survive Hudson. 24 Here the district court found, as to the upstairs incident, that Wiggins's use of the choke hold and other force used to subdue a non-resisting Valencia and render him temporarily unconscious was unreasonable and was an excessive use of force. The district court further found that the force Wiggins inflicted on Valencia in the drunk tank while Valencia was handcuffed, kneeling, and non-resisting was for no other purpose than to punish him prior to any adjudication of wrong doing[,] was clearly excessive and was not in good faith. The court specifically found Wiggins's actions to be excessive, maliciously and sadistically applied. 25 As such, we have no difficulty finding that, in both the upstairs and downstairs incidents, Wiggins used force maliciously and sadistically to cause harm, not in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline. Neither do we have difficulty deciding that the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding Wiggins's use of force grossly disproportionate to the need for action and inspired by malice. The district court credited Valencia's testimony that he did not resist Wiggins at any time, either in the cell or in the drunk tank, and we see no basis for reversing that finding. The same is true for the district court determination's that Wiggins's malice is evident from the very excessiveness of his conduct--this was no careless or unwise excess of zeal, as Wiggins now asserts.