Opinion ID: 1609410
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality of Iowa Code section 306C.11.

Text: The district court ruled that if the booster signs do not fit the on-premise exception, then the statutory prohibition against their display deprives the high school of due process, takes its property without just compensation and violates its right to freedom of speech. On appeal, the DOT begins by noting that the high school limited its constitutional claims to alleged First Amendment breaches, that is, claims that the statute violates protected commercial speech and liberty of speech. It asserts the other constitutional bases for the court's decision have not been preserved for our review. We agree. See Garwick v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 611 N.W.2d 286, 288 (Iowa 2000) (failure to raise constitutional issue before agency prevents preservation of claim for judicial review and on appeal). Two free-speech claims are before us. First, the DOT challenges the district court's finding that the distinction drawn in section 306C.11 between on-premise and off-premise signs amounts to an unconstitutional content-based regulation of commercial speech. Second, the DOT contests the court's conclusion that section 306C.11, as applied to these signs, unconstitutionally restricts speech without advancing the state's interest in traffic safety or aesthetics. Fundamental principles guide our resolution of these issues. Content-based speech regulations are forbidden by the Constitution. Members of City Council of City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2128, 80 L.Ed.2d 772, 786 (1984). But, as the DOT rightly argues, the district court has misinterpreted the meaning of content-based as applied to the facts of this case. Content-based statutes favor some viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others. Id. at 804, 104 S.Ct. at 2128, 80 L.Ed.2d at 786 (emphasis added). Section 306C.11 does not differentiate between types of advertising devices based on viewpoint. The statute regulates signage by location, a distinction having nothing to do with content. The United States Supreme Court has recognized this distinction, clearly holding that offsite commercial billboards may be prohibited while onsite commercial billboards are permitted. Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 2895, 69 L.Ed.2d 800, 818 (1981). Other courts have routinely rejected the argument put forth by the high school here. See, e.g., Messer v. City of Douglasville, 975 F.2d 1505, 1509 (11th Cir.1992) (city ordinance prohibiting off-premise billboards is viewpoint neutral); Nat'l Adver. Co. v. Chicago, 788 F.Supp. 994, 997-98 (N.D.Ill.1991) (distinction between on-site and off-site advertising not aimed toward the suppression of an idea or a viewpoint). The district court erred when it interpreted section 306C.11 to the contrary. As for the claim that section 306C.11 otherwise unconstitutionally restricts the high school's freedom of speech, we are guided by the four-part test articulated by the Supreme Court in Metromedia: (1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further than necessary to accomplish the given objective. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507, 101 S.Ct. at 2892, 69 L.Ed.2d at 815. We observe at the outset that the speech being regulated here is of a commercial nature and thus afforded lesser constitutional protection than other forms of expression. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 563, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d 341, 349 (1980). Because the booster signs neither advertise illegal activity nor are they misleading, however, the state's power to restrict them is circumscribed. Id. at 563-64, 100 S.Ct. at 2350, 65 L.Ed.2d at 349. Thus we move to the second part of the Metromedia test. The DOT asserts that section 306C.11 advances the state's interests in traffic safety and aesthetics. The Supreme Court has held these are substantial governmental goals. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 507-08, 101 S.Ct. at 2892, 69 L.Ed.2d at 815; accord Messer, 975 F.2d at 1510-11. This court has long recognized our legislature's intent to echo Congress's national highway beautification and safety goals by regulating signage along Iowa's primary roadways. Iowa Dep't of Transp. v. Nebraska-Iowa Supply Co., 272 N.W.2d 6, 13 (Iowa 1978), overruled on other grounds by Estate of Grossman v. McCreary, 373 N.W.2d 113, 114 (1985); accord Meredith Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 648 N.W.2d 109, 115 (Iowa 2002). In short, there can be little doubt that section 306C.11 addresses a substantial governmental interest in protecting the traveling public while preserving the landscape adjoining Iowa's highways. The high school nevertheless asserts that the record contains no evidence that section 306C.11 directly advances the goals it purports to address, thus failing the third prong of the Metromedia test. The fact is, the DOT does not need statistics or reports to enforce the plain mandate of the statute. It is the challenger who bears the burden of overcoming the presumptive constitutionality of a statute by negating every reasonable basis on which the law might be upheld. Brazelton, 623 N.W.2d at 584. The high school has not met that burden here. Finally, the Constitution requires that the challenged statute be no more extensive than is necessary to meet the state's articulated interests. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566, 100 S.Ct. at 2351, 65 L.Ed.2d at 351. In that connection we note that section 306C.11 is less prohibitive than the ordinance at issue in Metromedia. There the Supreme Court upheld a statute prohibiting all outdoor off-premise advertising. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 493-96, 101 S.Ct. at 2885-87, 69 L.Ed.2d at 805-08. Iowa Code section 306C.11 only prohibits advertising devices within 660 feet of the right-of-way. As the DOT suggested in its early correspondence with school officials over this controversy, they need only mount the signs so that they are not visible from the traveled portion of highway 297. And, of course, the statute does not affect the myriad other ways the school may lawfully recognize its boosters. In summary, Iowa Code section 306C.11 draws a legitimate distinction between on-premise and off-premise signs and regulates the signage at issue here consistent with constitutional norms pertaining to commercial speech. The district court's contrary judgment must be reversed and the court of appeals decision affirming that ruling, vacated. We remand to the district court for entry of an order affirming the DOT's removal notice. DECISION OF COURT OF APPEALS VACATED; DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.