Opinion ID: 1386250
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence of Defendant's Prior Felony Convictions for Sale of a Controlled Substance and Attempted Criminal Possession of a Weapon Under Factor (c) of Section 190.3

Text: (21) As evidence in aggravation, the prosecution sought to prove that defendant had sustained two other felony convictions in New York for sale of a controlled substance and for possession of a firearm. (ง 190.3, factor (c).) [11] Although the prosecution gave notice of its intent to offer such evidence, the notice did not specify the method by which the prosecution intended to prove the prior convictions. Accordingly, the trial court limited the prosecution to proving the convictions by means of documentary evidence. After the trial court had overruled defendant's objection to admission of evidence of the two prior felony convictions, defendant offered to stipulate to those convictions. He then proposed alternative stipulations that would prevent the jury from learning that the offenses occurred at the same time and that he had used a firearm during a drug offense. The prosecution, however, refused to stipulate to a sanitized version of the convictions. Ultimately, the parties agreed to a stipulation, which was read to the jury. [12] Defendant raises multiple challenges to the admission of the two prior felony convictions. As a threshold matter, the Attorney General invites us to hold that by stipulating to those prior convictions defendant waived his previously raised objections. We decline to do so. Defendant objected to the admission of evidence of the prior felony convictions on the grounds asserted here, but the trial court overruled his objection. We conclude that defendant has preserved those issues for appeal. (See People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 190-191 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949].) Defendant stipulated to the facts of his two prior New York convictions only after the trial court had overruled his objection. Under these circumstances, the stipulation served to control the form of the evidence, not to concede admissibility. (See Warner Constr. Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (1970) 2 Cal.3d 285, 299-300, fn. 17 [85 Cal. Rptr. 444, 466 P.2d 996]; 3 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (3d ed. 1986) ง 2015, p. 1975.) (22) Defendant contends that his New York felony conviction for attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (N.Y. Penal Law ง 265.02 (Consol. Laws)) was inadmissible as a prior felony conviction under factor (c) of section 190.3, because in California he would have been guilty only of a misdemeanor. (Compare ง 12031, subd. (a) [carrying a loaded firearm is a misdemeanor].) Defendant cites sections 667, subdivision (a), 667.5, subdivision (f), and 668, which specify the circumstances for using prior convictions to enhance punishment of a subsequent offense, drawing an analogy between section 190.3, factor (c) and those statutes. We have rejected essentially the same argument in People v. Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d 991, 1037-1039. There we noted that in contrast to the enhancement provisions, which place express limitations on the use of out-of-state prior felony convictions, factor (c) provides without limitation that the trier of fact shall consider in determining penalty `[t]he presence or absence of any prior felony conviction.' (49 Cal.3d at p. 1039, italics in original.) Because factor (c) contains no language limiting the out-of-state felony convictions to those that would qualify as felonies in California, its reference to `prior felony convictions' includes any prior conviction which was a felony under the laws of the convicting jurisdiction. (49 Cal.3d at pp. 1038-1039.) Nor is the constitutional requirement of equal protection violated by permitting a penalty phase jury to consider a defendant's out-of-state felony convictions that would not be admissible for purposes of sentence enhancement. As we observed earlier, the purposes served by the two procedures are not similar. ( Ante, p. 136.) Defendant also contends that the statutory scheme allowing introduction of a New York felony conviction for conduct that in California would only be a misdemeanor creates the risk prohibited by the Eighth Amendment that the death penalty will be arbitrarily or capriciously imposed. We disagree. It is not arbitrary or capricious to allow a jury deciding penalty to consider a defendant's willingness to engage in felonious conduct even if that conduct is not felonious in California. (23) Defendant further argues that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the two prior New York felony convictions under Evidence Code section 352, and in failing to balance prejudice to him against the probative value of those convictions before ruling that the evidence was admissible. Under People v. Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d 1, 25, the record must affirmatively show that the trial judge did in fact weigh prejudice against probative value when ruling on an Evidence Code section 352 motion. Here, as defendant points out, such a showing does not appear on this record. A trial court has limited discretion under Evidence Code section 352 in deciding whether to admit documentary evidence of a prior felony conviction as aggravating evidence at the penalty phase of a capital case. (See People v. Karis (1988) 46 Cal.3d 612, 641 [250 Cal. Rptr. 659, 758 P.2d 1189].) Factor (c) of section 190.3 expressly allows the admission of evidence of prior felony convictions. Thus, the trial court's discretion to exclude such evidence under Evidence Code section 352 is limited to the form of the evidence, that is, [t]he manner in which the prosecution seeks to present its case.... ( People v. Karis, supra, at p. 641, fn. 21.) Here, the trial court limited the prosecution to documentary evidence consisting of court records to prove the prior felony convictions. This method of proof minimized any possible prejudice that might have arisen from proving defendant's prior felony convictions. Under these circumstances, the trial court's failure to explicitly set forth its weighing process was harmless. (See People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 447 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135].) (24) Finally, defendant contends that telling the jury of the dates on which the prior felonies were committed, as opposed to the dates of conviction, exceeded the permissible scope of prior-felony-conviction evidence admissible under section 190.3, factor (c). We reject that contention. Prior felony convictions not involving force or violence are relevant to the death penalty determination only for their most material purpose โ to demonstrate that the capital offense was undeterred by prior successful felony prosecutions. ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 202, italics in original.) Allowing the jury to consider the date of the criminal conduct underlying a prior felony conviction is consistent with this limited purpose. Here, the two prior felony offenses occurred on the same day. The jury's knowledge of that date exposed one additional fact, namely, that defendant was armed during a drug sale. Even if we were to conclude that admission of the date of the prior offenses was improper, there is no reasonable possibility that such error affected the penalty verdict. ( People v. Brown, supra, 46 Cal.3d 432, 447.)