Opinion ID: 882757
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: probative value outweighs the prejudicial effect

Text: Romero asserts that the incidents with T.N and C.S. were so dissimilar that to allow the jury to hear evidence of his conviction for sexual assault upon T.N. was unfairly prejudicial to Romero. In McKnight, we recognized that mere prejudicial effect is not a sufficient reason to refuse admission of prior acts evidence. Moreover, probative evidence will frequently be prejudicial to a party. See McKnight, 820 P.2d at 1283-84 (citing State v. Paulson (1991), 250 Mont. 32, 817 P.2d 1137). In the present case, the testimony of T.N. was clearly prejudicial, but because it satisfies the other requirements of the modified Just rule, such prejudice alone is not a sufficient reason to refuse admission. McKnight, 820 P.2d at 1284. The jury was properly instructed and admonished regarding the testimony on Romero's prior crime. T.N.'s testimony established without question the similarity in the assaults upon T.N. and C.S. We conclude that the probative value of the evidence of Romero's prior crime substantially outweighed the prejudicial effect of admitting it. We conclude that the evidence of other acts was not inadmissible for any reason argued by the defendant. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted evidence of Romero's prior sexual assault. The District Court's judgment and conviction are affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and GRAY, NELSON and HUNT, JJ., concur.