Opinion ID: 2246860
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ballots Lacking Precinct Numbers

Text: The appellant argues that 14 absentee ballots without precinct numbers are invalid and should not have been counted. These 14 ballots may be divided into two categories: (1) 10 ballots in which the sole irregularity complained of is the absence of a precinct number; and (2) four ballots which, in addition to not having a precinct number, also bear the title Niles Township. Only the first category of ballots is addressed in this section. The second category of ballots is discussed in the next section, which considers the validity of ballots with the wrong precinct number. Section 7-20 of the Election Code states that [o]n the back or outside of the primary ballot of each precinct, so as to appear when folded, shall be printed the words `Primary Ballot,' followed by designation of said precinct, the date of the primary and a facsimile of the signature of the election authority who furnished the ballots. Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 7-20. There has not been as yet a construction of section 7-20, but a number of decisions have interpreted a similar provision in the Election Code which sets out the form, contents and manner of printing of ballots used in general elections. (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 46, par. 16-3.) Section 16-3 specifies that there shall be printed on the back of each ballot card    the words `Official Ballot,' followed by the number of the precinct or other precinct identification,    the date of the election and a facsimile of the signature of the election authority who has caused the ballots to be printed. At first, our courts gave section 16-3 a mandatory construction and held that ballots which did not strictly comply with all of the printing requirements set out in that section were invalid. See, e.g., People ex rel. Mattingly v. Snedeker (1918), 282 Ill. 425, 118 N.E. 782 (election void because the ballots used did not contain the words Official Ballot, followed by the designation of the polling place for which the ballot was prepared, the date of the election and the facsimile signature of the officer who caused the ballots to be printed); People ex rel. Vance v. Bushu (1919), 288 Ill. 277, 123 N.E. 517 (election voided because ballots did not contain the facsimile signature of the town clerk on the back thereof); People ex rel. Childress v. Illinois Central R.R. Co. (1921), 298 Ill. 516, 131 N.E. 624 (ballots which did not designate the polling place were invalid). In Hester v. Kamykowski (1958), 13 Ill.2d 481, 150 N.E.2d 196, however, the court overruled decisions which held all such requirements mandatory, and held that failure to strictly comply with statutory requirements as to the form of the ballot will not necessarily render a ballot void. The court conceded that printing errors which interfere with the voters' ability to freely exercise their choice ( e.g., ballots which do not provide for write-in candidates) or which destroy the secrecy of the ballot ( e.g., translucent envelopes) will invalidate the affected ballots. The court concluded, however, that unintentional errors in printing will not void the ballot where they do not affect the merits of the election. Applying these principles to the facts before it, the Hester court stated: In the instant case the form of ballot failed to disclose on the back or outside the words `Official Ballot' and the date of the election, nor did it anywhere designate the polling place for the particular ballot although there were four polling places in the election.    We are of the opinion that under the present circumstances these irregularities, standing alone, would not, of themselves, justify throwing out the entire number of ballots. [Citation.] Expressions of this court to the contrary    insofar as they construe the requirements as mandatory regardless of the circumstances and effects in the particular case, represent an unduly strict application and can no longer be accepted as correctly stating the rule. By enforcing with too great technical exactness the provisions concerning the form of ballots the very object of those provisions in securing a fair election may be defeated. ( Hester, 13 Ill.2d at 487-88, 150 N.E.2d 196.) Under Hester, technical irregularities, including the absence of a precinct designation on the ballot, do not justify voiding the affected ballot. The appellant argues that Hester should not be controlling because the court did not consider section 17-16 of the Election Code, which states: No ballot without the official endorsement shall be deposited in the ballot box, and none but ballots provided in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be counted. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 17-16.) The appellant argues that the second clause in section 17-16 makes the printing requirements set out in section 16-3 mandatory, in that it specifically prohibits election judges from counting ballots which do not strictly comply with the provisions of the Election Code. Section 17-16, however, applies only to general elections and precludes the counting of ballots defective as described which may be used in such elections. Here, we are considering ballots used in a primary election. Section 7-51 of the Election Code, which regulates primary elections, simply states that no primary ballots without the endorsement of a judge's initials thereon shall be counted. That section, unlike section 17-16, does not have a general provision that only ballots provided in accordance with the provisions of the act shall be counted. Moreover, the appellant's claim that the second clause of section 17-16 was intended to include a prohibition of the counting of ballots which do not contain a precinct number is unconvincing. The second clause of section 17-16, stating that none but ballots provided in accordance with the provisions of this Act shall be counted, does not void every ballot with printing irregularities. Rather, that clause was designed to require the use of only official ballots provided by the election authorities and to invalidate unofficial ballots which might be supplied by candidates, political parties or indeed prepared by the voters themselves for a personal touch. The appellant also relies upon Pinkston v. Holland (1971), 133 Ill.App.2d 865, 272 N.E.2d 247, for the proposition that ballots which do not bear a precinct designation are invalid. In Pinkston, the court voided an election for village officers because the ballots lacked a printed facsimile of the signature of the clerk who caused the ballot to be printed, as required by section 16-3 of the Election Code. Instead, the clerk had manually signed her name on the ballots on the evening before the election. The court concluded that the printed facsimile requirement specified in section 16-3 was mandatory in nature. The question here was not involved in Pinkston. Moreover, the court in Pinkston did not attempt to distinguish this court's Hester decision, which construed the printing requirements in section 16-3 as directory. Instead, the court relied upon a series of cases which were impliedly overruled in Hester. Under this court's holding in Hester the absence of a precinct identification on certain ballots, standing alone, did not invalidate those ballots. Section 7-20 must be regarded as directory only.