Opinion ID: 2087727
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: When the Stop Occurred

Text: The question of when a seizure has occurred is perhaps the most critical issue. The State contends that Jones' failure to stop and remove his hands from his coat is an independent factor supporting the seizure, based on the fact that Jones started walking away and ignored the Officer's orders before he was seized. We assume arguendo, but need not decide, that if a person attempts to flee before being seized, the court may consider the attempt to flee, and any information derived therefrom, as one factor in deciding whether a police officer had an articulable basis for effecting the seizure. [18] But, in our view, if the seizure preceded the attempt to flee, that attempt or any information derived therefrom, is not a proper factor in assessing the validity of a seizure. In Terry, the United States Supreme Court held that a seizure occurs when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of the individual. [19] In INS v. Delgado, [20] the Court refined this standard to mean that a seizure has occurred only `if, in view of all the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' [21] The Court further refined this standard in Michigan v. Chesternut [22] by focusing not on whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave but on whether the officer's conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. [23] In 1991, however, the United States Supreme Court carved out a controversial exception to the Chesternut standard in its interpretation of the rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. In California v. Hodari D., [24] the United States Supreme Court held that, even when an officer has manifested a show of authority, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment further requires either physical force ... or, where that is absent, submission to the assertion of authority. [25] The majority in Hodari D. found that the Chesternut standard states only a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for seizure ... effected through a `show of authority.' [26] Thus, the majority in Hodari D. found that a show of authority by itself, even if it would cause a reasonable person to believe that he or she was not free to leave, is not alone sufficient for a seizure giving rise to the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. In Hodari D., two police officers in an unmarked car rounded a corner and observed several youths huddled around a small red car parked at the curb. When the youths saw the officers' car approaching they apparently panicked, and took flight. [27] Their suspicion aroused, the officers separated to chase the youths, who went in different directions. One officer caught up with Hodari, who tossed away what turned out to be crack cocaine just before being tackled by the officer. The state conceded that the officers had lacked reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Hodari simply upon seeing him run. The officers had not said or done anything to make the juveniles reasonably believe that they were not free to leave. The Court held that because Hodari was not seized until tackled, the discarded crack cocaine was admissible. [28] The case now before us presents a different situation. By ordering Jones to stop and remove his hands from his coat, Patrolman Echevarria engaged in conduct that would communicate to a reasonable person that he or she was not free to ignore the police presence. The reasonableness of Patrolman Echevarria's suspicion must rest on the facts known to him at the time he ordered Jones to stop. He had no reasonable and articulable ground to suspect that Jones was committing, had committed or was about to commit a crime. In Hodari D., the officers had not seized the defendant before the defendant's flight. Even assuming that flight (combined with other articulable factors and when not provoked by an unwarranted police seizure) may provide sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion to justify a seizure, that did not occur here, and therefore this case is distinguishable from Hodari D. [29] The State relies on Hodari D. for the proposition that seizure does not occur until the officer uses physical force or the defendant submits to the authority of the officer. Hodari D. is binding precedent for this Court insofar as it interprets the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution because the almost two hundred year old doctrine of judicial review established the United States Supreme Court as the final arbiter of the United States Constitution. [30] But in this case, our holding rests not on the Fourth Amendment but on the Delaware detention statute, 11 Del. C. § 1902, and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution. The Delaware Constitution, like the constitutions of certain other states, may provide individuals with greater rights than those afforded by the United States Constitution. For example, we have held that the Delaware Constitution provides greater rights than the United States Constitution in the preservation of evidence used against a defendant, [31] the right of confrontation, [32] the right to counsel, [33] and the right to trial by jury. [34] Hodari D. is not consistent with our view of when a person is seized within the meaning of Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution in that Hodari D. would allow a police officer lacking reasonable suspicion to create that suspicion through an unjustified attempted detention. A number of states have likewise interpreted Hodari D. as inconsistent with the protections provided by their state constitutions. [35] The issue in the present case is whether the search and seizure language in the Delaware Constitution means the same thing as the United States Supreme Court's construction of similar language in the United States Constitution. To answer that question requires this Court to apply a logical, deductive analytical process. Our comprehensive historical analysis of the right to trial by jury in Claudio demonstrates that the guarantees in the Delaware Constitution for trial by jury were originally intended to be greater than those in the United States Constitution and remain that way. Several other states have developed useful criteria for determining whether a provision in the United States Constitution has a meaning identical to a similar provision on the same subject in a state's constitution. The following is a partial list of those non-exclusive criteria from other states as marshalled by Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme Court in his 1982 concurrence in State v. Hunt: [36] (1) Textual Language  A state constitution's language may itself provide a basis for reaching a result different from that which could be obtained under federal law. Textual language can be relevant in either of two contexts. First, distinctive provisions of our State charter may recognize rights not identified in the federal constitution. . . . Second, the phrasing of a particular provision in our charter may be so significantly different from the language used to address the same subject in the federal Constitution that we can feel free to interpret our provision on an independent basis .... (2) Legislative History  Whether or not the textual language of a given provision is different from that found in the federal Constitution, legislative history may reveal an intention that will support reading the provision independently of federal law. . . . (3) Preexisting State Law  Previously established bodies of state law may also suggest distinctive state constitutional rights. State law is often responsive to concerns long before they are addressed by constitutional claims. Such preexisting law can help to define the scope of the constitutional right later established. (4) Structural Differences  Differences in structure between the federal and state constitutions might also provide a basis for rejecting the constraints of federal doctrine at the state level. The United States Constitution is a grant of enumerated powers to the federal government. Our State Constitution, on the other hand, serves only to limit the sovereign power which inheres directly in the people and indirectly in their elected representatives. Hence, the explicit affirmation of fundamental rights in our Constitution can be seen as a guarantee of those rights and not as a restriction upon them. (5) Matters of Particular State Interest or Local Concern  A state constitution may also be employed to address matters of peculiar state interest or local concern. When particular questions are local in character and do not appear to require a uniform national policy, they are ripe for decision under state law. Moreover, some matters are uniquely appropriate for independent state action.... (6) State Traditions  A state's history and traditions may also provide a basis for the independent application of its constitution . . . . (7) Public Attitudes  Distinctive attitudes of a state's citizenry may also furnish grounds to expand constitutional rights under state charters. While we have never cited this criterion in our decisions, courts in other jurisdictions have pointed to public attitudes as a relevant factor in their deliberations. [37] The enumerated criteria, which are synthesized from a burgeoning body of authority, are essentially illustrative, rather than exhaustive. They share a common thread  that distinctive and identifiable attributes of a state government, its laws and its people justify recourse to the state constitution as an independent source for recognizing and protecting individual rights. [38] As noted earlier, [39] the search and seizure provision in the Delaware Constitution preceded the adoption of the Fourth Amendment and was originally like a similar provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution. When the Delaware Constitution was amended in 1792 after the Fourth Amendment had already been adopted, Delaware continued to follow the search and seizure language from the Pennsylvania Constitution rather than the language in the Fourth Amendment. Delaware adopted the first search and seizure protections for its citizens in September of 1776 as part of the Declaration of Rights and Fundamental Rules of the Delaware State, which read as follows: Sect. 17. That all warrants without oath to search suspected places, or to seize any person or his property, are grievous and oppressive; and all general warrants to search suspected places, or to apprehend all persons suspected, without naming or describing the place or any person in special, are illegal and ought not to be granted. Delaware's Declaration of Rights was based upon a similar provision in the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights. The chairman of the committee that drafted Delaware's Declaration of Rights was George Read. On September 17, 1776, Read wrote that the Declaration of Rights... has been completed somedays past but there being nothing particularly in it  I did not think it an object of much curiosity, it is made out of the Pensilvania [sic] & Maryland Draughts. [40] Delaware ratified the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution on January 28, 1790. [41] Pennsylvania adopted a new state constitution in 1791. Delaware adopted a new constitution in 1792. The Delaware Constitution of 1792 resembled in some ways the federal constitution because of the presence of John Dickinson and Richard Bassett, who had served as members of the Philadelphia Convention, and because the members were familiar with the federal constitution. [42] Article I in the 1792 Delaware Constitution contained a [B]ill of [R]ights of nineteen provisions, which was mostly a rewriting of the Declaration of Rights of the Delaware [C]onstitution of 1776. Some portions showed that the members were familiar with the [1791] [C]onstitution of Pennsylvania. [43] The search and seizure provision in the 1792 Delaware Constitution exemplifies that familiarity because it tracks a similar provision in the 1791 Pennsylvania Constitution. In a 1991 case, Commonwealth v. Edmunds , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court undertook a comprehensive historical review of the search and seizure provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution. [44] The Edmunds Court concluded that the history of that provision reflected different and broader protections than those guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. [45] In a 1996 case, Commonwealth v. Matos , the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that the construction of the United States Constitution in Hodari D. by the United States Supreme Court was inconsistent with the constitutional protections afforded under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. [46] That conclusion was based on the fact that the survival of the language now employed in Article I, Section 8 through over 200 years of profound change in other areas demonstrates that the paramount concern for privacy first adopted as part of our organic law in 1776 continues to enjoy the mandate of the people of this Commonwealth. [47] We reach the same conclusion with regard to the search and seizure provision in the Delaware Constitution based upon its historical convergence for more than two hundred years with the same provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution. The history of search and seizure in Delaware reflects the same commitment to protecting the privacy of its citizens. As we have previously noted, that commitment is illustrated by Delaware's nighttime search warrant statute which, even in its original version adopted by the Delaware General Assembly almost 150 years ago, required a stricter standard than probable cause before a court could issue a nighttime search warrant. [48] The United States Constitution establishes a system of dual sovereignty: a federal government and state governments. That system has horizontal and vertical aspects. [49] Vertical federalism binds the states to the will of the federal sovereign government with regard to the enumerated powers that have been surrendered. Horizontal federalism permits the states to look to the jurisprudence of sister states in defining the sovereign powers that have been reserved for state governments. Although the facts are different, the 1992 Connecticut Supreme Court case of State v. Oquendo illustrates the application of state constitutional protections that exceed those provided by the Fourth Amendment as interpreted by the Hodari D. Court. [50] Oquendo has particular relevance here because one of the applicable Connecticut constitutional provisions relating to searches and seizures is identical to Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution. [51] Moreover, these provisions in the Constitutions of Delaware and Connecticut, as well as Pennsylvania, New Jersey and other states tracing their roots to the thirteen original colonies, share venerable origins that precede the adoption of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [52] In Oquendo, the court invalidated a search because it found that the police lacked a reasonable and articulable suspicion on the following facts: When asked by the police to approach the police car, the defendant handed his duffel bag (later found to contain cocaine) to another individual. [53] When instructed to bring the duffel bag with him, the defendant grabbed the bag and ran away. Upon giving chase, the officer saw the defendant throw the duffel bag in the woods. The duffel bag was found to contain cocaine. Other incriminating evidence related to a homicide (for which the defendant was later charged) was later found in the same wooded area. The Connecticut Supreme Court said: The state urges this court to read the definition of a seizure, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court in California v. Hodari D., supra , into ... our state constitution. The state argues that since [the officer] never applied physical force to the defendant's person and the defendant did not submit to [the officer's] assertion of authority when he ordered the defendant to stop, the defendant's state constitutional rights were not implicated. [54] . . . . ... [W]e decline to adopt the restricted definition of a seizure employed by the United States Supreme Court in Hodari D. and adhere to our precedents in determining what constitutes a seizure under the state constitution. [55] . . . . ... [W]e are persuaded that a reasonable person in the defendant's position would not have believed that he was free to ignore [the officer's] instructions and walk away. Accordingly, we conclude that a seizure took place within the meaning of ... the Connecticut constitution. [56] . . . . Having determined that a seizure of the defendant took place, we must next determine whether the trial court properly concluded that the seizure was based on a reasonable and articulable basis of suspicion. We conclude that the trial court's determination was clearly erroneous. [57] . . . . We recognize that police on patrol perform a variety of functions. Thus, a police officer, in carrying out his duties, may stop and speak to an individual on the street without necessarily implicating the individual's constitutional rights. We acknowledge, furthermore, that the police must enjoy a certain degree of latitude in making investigative stops. Nevertheless, the requirement of a reasonable and articulable factual basis for an investigative stop must be met. We have consistently stated that a police officer's decision to detain an individual for investigatory purposes must be predicated `on more than a mere hunch.' We are persuaded that the informational basis advanced by [the officer] to justify his stop of the defendant, which [the officer] himself characterized as a hunch, was insufficient to support a reasonable and articulable suspicion. In a close case like the present one, the balance ought to be struck on the side of the freedom of the citizen from governmental intrusion. To conclude otherwise would be to elevate society's interest in apprehending offenders above the right of citizens to be free from unreasonable stops. The record in the present case does not disclose circumstances which, viewed in their totality, yielded sufficient specific and articulable facts to make constitutionally reasonable [the officer's] detention of the defendant. Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant was illegally seized, in violation of article first, §§ 7 and 9 of the Connecticut constitution. [58] In our view, the reasoning of the Oquendo Court and that of the other state supreme courts noted above [59] is persuasive. Accordingly, we decline to follow Hodari D. to the extent set forth in this opinion. Although our opinion in Quarles cites Hodari D., the Quarles case is consistent with our decision today because in Quarles the Court used the Fourth Amendment standard articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chesternut to find that the police had not seized the defendant before the defendant's flight. [60] The Quarles decision was based solely on defendant's contention that his Fourth Amendment rights had been violated. In Quarles, the defendant did not assert a violation of either the statute or the Delaware Constitution, both of which were relied upon by Jones in the Superior Court and on this appeal. In Quarles, no question existed that the Terry -stop was a seizure. There, we said that a Fourth Amendment seizure clearly occurred where defendant's stopping was an act of submission to a show of authority by the police because under all the circumstances, `a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.' [61] This Court in Quarles focussed instead on whether the police conduct [could] survive constitutional scrutiny by applying the standard from Terry, which we summarized as holding that [u]nder the Fourth Amendment, a police seizure can be justified only when, based upon specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the belief that a crime is being or has been committed. [62] The Court in Quarles based its decision on a combination of both objective facts and the subjective impressions of the police officer who was trained and experienced in spotting and interdicting drug trafficking. [63] In our view, the question presented by Jones of when a seizure has occurred under Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution requires focusing upon the police officer's actions to determine when a reasonable person would have believed he or she was not free to ignore the police presence. Under that analysis, Jones was seized within the meaning of Section 1902 and Article I, § 6 when Patrolman Echevarria first ordered him to stop and remove his hands from his pockets. If that seizure was not based upon reasonable and articulable suspicion, anything recovered as a result of that seizure is inadmissible at trial. [64] We conclude that Jones' actions in walking away from Patrolman Echevarria and his refusal to obey or submit to the officer's commands to stop and remove his hands from his pockets did not furnish grounds for reasonable and articulable suspicion to effect the seizure.