Opinion ID: 2548669
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure of Trial Court to Appoint Different or Substitute Counsel

Text: [¶26] For this argument we employ the following standard of review: We review the refusal to appoint substitute counsel for an abuse of discretion: While a trial court has the power in its discretion to appoint substitute counsel, its refusal to do so is not error unless an abuse of discretion is shown. A factual showing of good cause for the appointment of substitute counsel is essential to the demonstration of an abuse of discretion, and good cause is to be found in incompetence, commitment to a position or an interest which would conflict with the furnishing of an effective defense to the accused, or other good reason to conclude that appointed counsel is unable to furnish effective assistance. Bell v. State, 994 P.2d 947, 951 (Wyo. 2000) ( quoting Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1071 (Wyo. 1978)). The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a meaningful relationship with appointed counsel; the purpose of providing assistance of counsel is to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair trial. Bell, 994 P.2d at 951. A defendant has no right to the appointed counsel of his choice nor to counsel who would blindly follow his instructions. Vargas v. State, 963 P.2d 984, 990 (Wyo. 1998). In evaluating Sixth Amendment claims, `the appropriate inquiry focuses on the adversarial process, not on the accused's relationship with his lawyer as such.' Bell, 994 P.2d at 951-52 ( quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159, 108 S.Ct. 1692, 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988)). A court's own evaluation of counsel and the effect of any substitution upon the scheduled proceedings are proper considerations in addition to the reasons given for a defendant's dissatisfaction. State v. Stenson, 132 Wash.2d 668, 940 P.2d 1239, 1272 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1008, 118 S.Ct. 1193, 140 L.Ed.2d 323 (1998). Allen v. State, 2002 WY 48, ¶27, 43 P.3d 551, ¶27 (Wyo. 2002); also see Stout v. State, 2001 WY 114, ¶7, 35 P.3d 1198, ¶7 (Wyo. 2001). [¶27] The Public Defender's chief trial counsel, Wyatt Skaggs, one of the most experienced criminal defense attorneys in Wyoming, entered his appearance on Strickland's behalf on February 9, 2001. Because irreconcilable differences developed between client and counsel, Skaggs was permitted to withdraw by order entered on March 1, 2001. Eventually two other public defenders were appointed to represent Strickland. In a letter filed in the district court on May 31, 2001, Strickland explained why the attorney/client relationship had failed with Mr. Skaggs, and why he felt his new attorneys were incompetent, ineffective and/or negligent in their representation of him. A principal concern was the failure of his counsel to obtain the services of an expert witness. The district court responded to that letter, explaining that any such request must be in the form of a motion and urging Strickland to confer with his counsel in that regard. Defense counsel broached the subject with the district court on June 6, 2001, at the hearing on Strickland's motion to suppress (the trial commenced on June 18, 2001). The district court limited his comments to urging communication and cooperation between client and counsel, and again indicating that any concerns needed to be brought by motion. The matter was not further called to the trial court's attention in the form of a motion until July 2, 2001, after Strickland's trial was complete. At that time he asked that new counsel be appointed to represent him in filing a motion for new trial. [¶28] Our holding in Allen, ¶32, is dispositive of this issue: A district court has a duty to make some formal inquiry into, or engage the defendant in a colloquy regarding, the defendant's reasons for dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel when substitution of counsel is requested. United States v. Anderson, 189 F.3d 1201, 1210 (10th Cir. 1999) ( quoting Johnson v. Gibson, 169 F.3d 1239, 1254 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 972, 120 S.Ct. 415, 145 L.Ed.2d 324 (1999)); United States v. Graham, 91 F.3d 213, 221 (D.C. Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 1136, 117 S.Ct. 1003, 136 L.Ed.2d 882 (1997). Such an inquiry not only helps the defendant (especially when the request is pro se) adequately to express the reason for his dissatisfaction with counsel, thereby promoting confidence in the integrity of the process and in the jury's verdict, but also creates an opportunity for the court to ease the defendant's concern if it is ill-founded.... Graham, 91 F.3d at 221. However, even if appellant demonstrates that the district court did not properly address his motions to substitute counsel, he must demonstrate that the error was prejudicial to his case (i.e., that he was not afforded effective representation as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment). Graham, 91 F.3d at 221. This Court having found that appellant's defense counsel was not ineffective, appellant has not met his burden on this issue. Clearly it would have been the better practice for the district court to have reserved a few extra minutes to hear anything additional Strickland had to say, beyond what was in his letter, and to have treated his letter as a motion for substitute or new counsel. Indeed, there will be circumstances where such a hearing is mandatory and identifying those circumstances at the time such an issue arises can be difficult. A few minutes at a hearing could be a very valuable asset to affirming a case such as this on appeal. However, we have exhaustively reviewed this record and can only conclude that Strickland's counsel were not ineffective, indeed, they performed their function quite well. The district court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing substitute counsel under the circumstances of this case.