Opinion ID: 2075955
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Applicable principles of construction.

Text: We are thus confronted with a rather nebulous statutory provision which is subject to a number of possible interpretations, none of which provides results compatible with what we believe to have been the legislative purpose. Without presuming to second-guess the Council, we suggest that its goals would find readier vindication in a more flexible provision which would permit the court to consider such factors as good faith or lack thereof, the extent and gravity of the violation, [43] the financial condition of the defendant, and the degree to which he profited from his wrong. See Howard, supra, 3 Ohio App.3d at 191-92, 444 N.E.2d at 471-72; cf. J. STEIN, DAMAGES AND RECOVERY § 197, at 393-94 (1972 & 1989 Supp.) (dealing with punitive damages). We have previously noted that Section 42-235(a), as written, is difficult to reconcile textually with the District's notion that the failure to report or deliver each individual item represents a separate violation mandating a separate civil penalty. Assuming, arguendo, that this question is in doubt, our conclusion is reinforced by the canon of construction which we find decisive here in case of ambiguity. The rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly, is perhaps not much less old than construction itself. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 76, 95, 5 L.Ed. 37 (1820) (per Marshall, C.J.). Statutes imposing penalties will not be construed to include anything beyond their letter, even though it may be within their spirit. County of Merrick v. Beck, 205 Neb. 829, ___, 290 N.W.2d 642, 645 (1980); see also United States v. Harris, 177 U.S. 305, 309, 20 S.Ct. 609, 611, 44 L.Ed. 780 (1900). A court may not interpret a penal statute so as to increase the penalty which it authorizes when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what the legislature intended. Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209, 214, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958); see Dobbs v. Neverson, 393 A.2d 147, 154 (D.C.1978). The rule of strict construction rests on the fear that expansive judicial interpretations will create penalties not originally intended by the legislature. SUTHERLAND, supra, § 59.03, at 11. [I]n case of doubt concerning the severity of the penalty prescribed by a statute, construction will favor a milder penalty over a harsher one. Id. at 12; Government of Virgin Islands v. Douglas, 812 F.2d 822, 833 (3d Cir.1987); see also Bifulco, supra, 447 U.S. at 387, 100 S.Ct. at 2252. Although the rule of strict construction of penal statutes is most often invoked in the context of criminal prosecutions, it applies with equal force here. If there is some sanction in a statute to compel obedience beyond mere redress to an individual for injuries received, then the statute is at least to that extent penal. SUTHERLAND, supra, § 59.01, at 2. The inclusion of such sanctions does not necessarily make the entire statute penal in nature. Id. The UPA is quintessentially remedial to the extent that it puts an end to private escheats, and we have construed it generously in regard to its substantive reach. See page 1234, supra. [T]here is no legal obstacle to the remedial portions of a statute being construed liberally, and those that impose penalties or forfeitures being construed strictly. Fisher v. Bethesda Discount Corp., 221 Md. 271, 276, 157 A.2d 265, 268 (1960); see also Nuclear Corp. of America v. Hale, 355 F.Supp. 193, 197 (N.D.Tex. 1973), and authorities there cited. In Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955), a prosecution under the Mann Act, the question presented was whether the simultaneous transportation of more than one woman across state lines for immoral purposes constituted one offense or several. The Supreme Court ruled that it was only one. Speaking through Justice Frankfurter, the Court explained that [w]hen Congress has the will it has no difficulty in expressing itwhen it has the will, that is, of defining what it desires to make the unit of prosecution and, more particularly, to make each stick in a faggot a single criminal unit. When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity ... This in no wise implies that language used in criminal statutes should not be read with the saving grace of common sense with which other enactments, not cast in technical language, are to be read.... It merely means that if Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses, when we have no more to go on than the present case furnishes. Id. at 83-84, 75 S.Ct. at 622. The foregoing language casts grave doubt upon the District's notion that every stick in the faggot i.e., every unreported abandoned official check and deposit generates a separate civil penalty of up to $1,000. Selecting what we regard as the least of three evils, we hold that a failure to report property as required constitutes a single violation for purposes of the civil penalty provision, and that every other duty imposed by the Act is subject to a similar analysis. On remand, the trial judge should therefore determine how many conceptually distinct duties under the statute Riggs breached, and should impose civil penalties accordingly.