Opinion ID: 75479
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Asylum & Withholding Testing Countries

Text: 22 To the extent that the Al Najjars contend that they will be denied entry into the UAE and Saudi Arabia on account of imputed terrorist opinions, we likewise reject this argument, as there is no record evidence that the UAE and Saudi Arabia have ever, or will ever, exclude individuals with such opinions. Accordingly, we find substantial, probative evidence supporting the BIA's finding that the Al Najjars failed to demonstrate persecution on such a ground. Next, the Al Najjars argue that they are natives of Palestine and that the BIA abused its discretion in determining that the UAE and Saudi Arabia were the appropriate countries for consideration of their asylum and withholding claims. The Al Najjars contend that they are stateless and argue that the IJ should have tested their petitions by reference to Israel, the country with political control over their homeland in Palestine. The statutory methodology for determining the potential country of deportation is different from that utilized to pinpoint the asylum testing country. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), with 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (1995) (repealed by IIRIRA § 307(a), now codified at INA § 241, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)). Because these statutory provisions contemplate different procedures, we address the argument as to asylum and withholding separately. Beginning with the Al Najjars' asylum claims, the INS contends that Emirate and Saudi residence was appropriate because a refugee for purposes of asylum is tested by reference to the country of such person's nationality, or in the case of a person having no nationality, ... any country in which such person last habitually resided. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). Since the Al Najjars repeatedly asserted they were stateless Palestinians, the Service argues that the BIA was required by § 1101(a)(42)(A) to test their asylum claims by reference to the country in which they last habitually resided. The Al Najjars counter that their nationality is Palestinian and, therefore, that Israel should have been designated as the asylum testing country. [S]tatelessness alone does not warrant asylum, as all asylum applicants must demonstrate the same well-founded fear of persecution under INA § 101(a)(42)(A). See Faddoul, 37 F.3d at 190. Indeed, the INA expressly contemplates that there will be asylum applicants with a nationality, and those with no nationality. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). In the case of an applicant with no nationality, section 1101(a)(42)(A) tests the petition by reference to the country of last habitual residence. See id. This means that where an applicant is stateless, the well-founded fear inquiry may be directed to the individual's last habitual residence, and not the country of the alien's nationality. Before the BIA and IJ, the Al Najjars consistently argued that they were stateless Palestinians, and we will not permit them to interpose a different argument on appeal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c). Thus, to the extent that the Al Najjars now argue in their brief to this court and in oral argument that their asylum claim should be tested by reference to Israel, we refuse to consider this argument because it was not raised below.23 We will, however, consider the other articulation of the Al Najjars' argument which was argued before the immigration courts: whether the IJ improperly identified the UAE and Saudi Arabia as the Al Najjars' last habitual residence. The last habitual residence designation is a question of fact. As such, we review this conclusion under a deferential substantial evidence test. See Mazariegos, 241 F.3d at 1323-24. The IJ made implicit, but not explicit, findings on the question of last habitual residence. We find substantial record evidence supporting these implicit findings. Although Fedaa is of Palestinian ancestry, she was born in Saudi Arabia and lived there with her parents and siblings for twenty-three years before coming to the United States. Fedaa attended secondary school and college in Saudi Arabia. In fact, other than her residence in Tampa, Florida, Fedaa has lived in no other country. Furthermore, almost every living member of Fedaa's close family presently resides in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. Thus, we readily conclude that there is substantial evidence supporting the IJ's determination that Saudi Arabia is Fedaa's last habitual residence. As for Mazen, he was born in Palestine and lived there for only one year before moving to Saudi Arabia and residing there for thirteen years with his parents and five siblings. Thereafter, Mazen moved to Egypt, living there for eight years. After completing his bachelor's degree at a university in Egypt, Mazen moved to the UAE in 1979. He lived in the UAE until 1981, working for a consulting firm in a construction business in Ajman, UAE. Upon leaving the UAE, Mazen ventured to the United States to commence his master's work in North Carolina. At the hearing before the IJ, Mazen's attorney stated that he was offering evidence regarding the UAE as relevant to the issue of political asylum, because that's his last area of habitual abode. Indeed, before the 23 The Al Najjars claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that Israel should have been used as the asylum testing country, was not raised below and is belied by their position before the immigration courts. Before the IJ, the Al Najjars consistently asserted that they were stateless Palestinians with legal residency rights in no country in the world. In their petitions for asylum, suspension, and withholding, both Fedaa and Mazen listed their Citizenship as Stateless and before the IJ, the Al Najjars' attorney stressed the fact that neither Fedaa or Mazen had legal citizenship rights anywhere in the world. After the IJ designated the UAE and Saudi Arabia as the proper asylum testing countries under the statute, the Al Najjars appealed to the BIA and did not in any way challenge the IJ's designation of the UAE and Saudi Arabia as the asylum testing countries. Not only did the Al Najjars fail to raise, or even vaguely argue, this issue of Israeli nationality below—which is enough to preclude consideration of this argument in the court of appeals—but this argument is wholly inconsistent with their position of statelessness, which they unwaveringly adhered to in the immigration courts. IJ and BIA, Mazen never contested the designation of the UAE as his last habitual residence. Despite this, Mazen asks us to entertain his complaints on this issue. We will not consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c); Asencio v. INS, 37 F.3d 614, 615-16 (11th Cir.1994) (per curiam) (Under § 106(c) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c), a court lacks jurisdiction to consider a claim which has not first been presented to the Board, as an alien must exhaust the administrative remedies available to him prior to obtaining judicial review.); Ka Fung Chan v. INS, 634 F.2d 248, 258 (5th Cir.1981). Moreover, an alien may not contest a designation on appeal which he invited and acquiesced in below. Accordingly, we reject the Al Najjars' contentions that the UAE and Saudi Arabia were improperly designated as their last habitual residence and affirm the IJ's designations. As for the IJ's designation of Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the appropriate countries of removal under § 1253(a),24 we likewise affirm. Section 1253 authorize[d] the Attorney General to specify the country to which the alien will be sent, once the alien's designation fails or the alien refuses to designate such a country. Ademi v. INS, 31 F.3d 517, 520 (7th Cir.1994). The Attorney General's discretion under § 1253(a), which has been delegated to the Board, see 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d), is to be aided by seven statutory guidelines, see 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a). While § 1253(a) gives the alien the power initially to designate the deportation country, when that designation fails or the alien refuses to specify such a country, the provision reposes very broad discretion in the Board to designate the removal country. See Ademi, 31 F.3d at 520-21. Here, the Al Najjars did not exercise their right to designate the country of deportation initially, so the immigration courts made this designation for them under § 1253(a). This procedure was mandated by § 1253(a), and we find no error here. 24 This provision designates the countries to which an alien may be deported, giving each alien the right initially to designate the deportation country, and if the country designated by the alien fails ... [the] deportation of such alien shall be directed to any country of which such alien is a subject, national, or citizen if such country is willing to accept him into its territory. If the government of such country fails finally to advise the Attorney General or the alien within three months following the date of original inquiry, or within such other period as the Attorney General shall deem reasonable ... then such deportation shall be directed by the Attorney General within his discretion and without necessarily giving any priority or preference because of their order as herein set forth either—(1) to the country from which such alien last entered the United States; (2) to the country in which is located the foreign port at which such alien embarked for the United States or for foreign contiguous territory; (3) to the country in which he was born; (4) to the country in which the place of his birth is situated at the time he is ordered deported; (5) to any country in which he resided prior to entering the country from which he entered the United States; (6) to the country which had sovereignty over the birthplace of the alien at the time of his birth; or (7) if deportation to any of the foregoing places or countries is impracticable, inadvisable, or impossible, then to any country which is willing to accept such alien into its territory. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a). The Al Najjars' contentions that statelessness somehow alters the removal country designation are without merit. Instead, § 1253(a) clearly defines the procedure to be followed in all cases, without reference to statelessness. Where, for any reason, the alien refuses to designate the removal country, the designation is committed to the Board to be determined in accordance with seven statutory guidelines. See 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a). We find that there was no abuse of discretion in designating the UAE and Saudi Arabia as the removal countries; there is substantial evidence in the record as a whole demonstrating Fedaa's and Mazen's nexus to these countries. Accordingly, we reject the Al Najjars' argument that the removal countries were improvidently designated under § 1253(a). For the first time at oral argument, the Al Najjars cited Kuhai v. INS, 199 F.3d 909 (7th Cir.1999), Andriasian v. INS, 180 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir.1999), and Kossov v. INS, 132 F.3d 405 (7th Cir.1998), to support their contention that the IJ improperly designated the asylum and deportation testing countries. In Kuhai, Kossov, and Andriasian, the immigration courts did not give the aliens adequate notice of the designated removal country and, as a result, the applicants were deprived of an opportunity to offer statutorily required, country-specific evidence necessary to establish eligibility for relief under the INA. See Kuhai, 199 F.3d at 912-14 (Despite the fact that neither party briefed the issue, the Board [sua sponte] modified the order of the immigration judge to change Kuhai's country of deportation from Uzbekistan to Ukraine.); Andriasian, 180 F.3d at 1041 (reversing, as violative of due process, the BIA's affirmance of the IJ's decision to adopt, after the close of all evidence, an additional country of deportation); Kossov, 132 F.3d at 407-08 (reversing, as violative of due process, a husband and wife's consolidated deportation proceedings because both the hearing before the IJ and BIA's review concentrated almost exclusively on Latvia ... [y]et the order itself deports the Kossovs to Russia, not Latvia.). Kuhai, Kossov, and Andriasian address immigration proceedings that do not afford adequate notice regarding changes in the country of deportation. Inadequate notice might raise due process concerns by depriving an alien of his or her opportunity to mount a case for relief insofar as asylum and withholding require an alien to establish the necessary country-specific showings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (requiring proof of a well-founded fear of persecution on account of a statutorily protected factor in the country of the alien's nationality or last habitual residence); 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a) (requiring that an alien demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that his or her life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion). In the instant appeal, the Al Najjars were not denied the opportunity to contest the proposed country of deportation or last habitual residence designations. To the contrary, there was ample notice and opportunity to adduce evidence. Thus, unlike Kuhai, Kossov, and Andriasian, the Al Najjars' proceedings involved no lack of notice that the UAE and Saudi Arabia, respectively, were the appropriate petition-testing countries. Accordingly, the Al Najjars' cases involve no such due process concerns.25