Opinion ID: 1189909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: March 3, 2003 to May 16, 2003

Text: After March 3, 2003, § 13-29-1.2 specifically authorized the School District to bus Bethesda students, but it did not require the School District to do so. The law stated that [s]chool districts may provide transportation to nonpublic school students if no additional public funds are expended to provide the transportation. S.D. Codified Law § 13-29-1.2 (emphasis added). As noted above, a plaintiff may not simply allege a generalized grievance, but he or she must instead demonstrate a concrete injury. In analyzing standing, the Supreme Court has repeatedly found that a plaintiff lacks standing to sue when the plaintiff cannot demonstrate specific injuries. See, e.g., Lujan, 504 U.S. 555, 112 S.Ct. 2130; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). In Warth, various plaintiffs, including a home builders' association, challenged allegedly discriminatory zoning ordinances. 422 U.S. at 495, 95 S.Ct. 2197. The Supreme Court held that members of the home builders' association lacked standing because [t]he complaint refer[red] to no specific project of any of its members that [was] currently precluded either by the ordinance or by respondents' action in enforcing it. Id. at 516, 95 S.Ct. 2197. The complaint did not claim that any member had applied for a building permit or variance for any current project, and there was no indication that respondents ... delayed or thwarted any project currently proposed by Home Builders' members, or that any of its members ... [took] advantage of the remedial processes available under the ordinance. Id. The Court concluded that insofar as the complaint [sought] prospective relief, Home Builders... failed to show the existence of any injury to its members of sufficient immediacy and ripeness to warrant judicial intervention. Id. The Court also rejected the claims of another plaintiff when neither the complaint nor any materials of record indicate[d] that any member of Housing Council ... [took] any step toward building housing in Penfield. Id. at 517, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Thus, the Court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing when they failed to demonstrate even a mere application for a building permit or zoning variance. Id. at 516, 95 S.Ct. 2197. Likewise in Lujan, the Supreme Court held that simply demonstrating past travels to certain international destinations and the desire to return there without specific travel plans failed to support standing for two members of the Defenders of Wildlife who were challenging a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior. 504 U.S. at 562-64, 112 S.Ct. 2130. In the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA), Congress passed a citizen-suit provision, allowing a private citizen to sue to enjoin anyone alleged to be in violation of the ESA. Id. at 571-72, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The members of the Defenders of Wildlife were challenging a rule promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior interpreting § 7 of the ESA, which required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that projects they funded did not threaten endangered species. Id. at 557-58, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The Secretary interpreted § 7 of the ESA to apply only to actions taken in the United States or on the high seas, and not to actions taken in foreign nations. Id. at 559, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The two members of the Defenders of Wildlife claimed that this interpretation would increase the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened species. Id. at 562, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The members stated in affidavits that they had previously visited Egypt and Sri Lanka and intended to do so again with hopes of observing the native endangered animals in their natural habitats. Id. at 563-64, 112 S.Ct. 2130. The Court found that these two members' profession of their intent to return without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day [would] be [did] not support a finding of the `actual or imminent injury' required to establish standing. Id. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. Other courts also have found that if a plaintiff is required to meet a precondition or follow a certain procedure to engage in an activity or enjoy a benefit and fails to attempt to do so, that plaintiff lacks standing to sue because he or she should have at least taken steps to attempt to satisfy the precondition. See, e.g., T.L.J. v. Webster, 792 F.2d 734, 739 n. 5, 740 (8th Cir. 1986) (finding that plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge procedures to obtain a bypass to required parental consent for an abortion when they had never attempted to obtain the judicial bypass); Gilles v. Davis, 427 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir.2005) (holding that a campus speaker lacked standing to challenge the university's permit policy because the speaker never applied for a permit); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Appleyard, 513 F.2d 575, 577 (4th Cir.1975) (concluding that a trucker lacked standing to challenge an injunction against operating without a certificate or permit from the ICC when he failed to show that he ever applied for a permit or that he could not obtain one). Here, there is no evidence that the Puckets actually requested that the School District reinstate busing after § 13-29-1.2 became effective on March 3, 2003. The Puckets' counsel confirmed at oral argument before this court that the Puckets did not request that busing be resumed after § 13-29-1.2 became effective, instead assuming that the School District understood what the Puckets wanted without a specific request. [7] In her deposition, Spitzer acknowledged that she never asked anyone from the School District to reinstate busing of Bethesda students after March 3, 2003, and that she did not have the Puckets request that the School District resume busing either. Puckets' App. at 283. However, we may find a plaintiff has standing even if he or she has failed to take steps to satisfy a precondition if the attempt would have been futile. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 944 n. 2, 102 S.Ct. 3456, 73 L.Ed.2d 1254 (1982) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge Nebraska water laws even though they had not applied for a permit because the permit clearly would not have been granted and the application would have been futile); S.D. Mining Ass'n v. Lawrence County, 155 F.3d 1005, 1008-09 (8th Cir.1998) (holding that plaintiffs had standing to challenge a county ordinance that prohibited issuance of new permits for surface metal mining even though they had not applied for a permit because any application would have been futile); Bach v. Pataki, 408 F.3d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir.2005) (finding that a Virginia resident had standing to challenge a New York statute prohibiting issuance of a concealed-weapon permit even though he had not applied for a permit because he had been told that he was ineligible and applying for a permit would have been futile). Here, though, there was no allegation or evidence that a request by the Puckets to reinstate busing of Bethesda students after § 13-29-1.2 became effective would have been futile. In fact, the record indicates that the School District made it clear that it was willing to resume busing for the Bethesda students as soon as it was authorized to do so`and as soon as the insurance issue was resolved. Spitzer's busing log demonstrates repeated instances of the efforts of Hagedorn and others associated with the School District to reinstate busing. She recorded that Hagedorn told her that the majority of the School District's board wanted to continue busing and that Hagedorn was working to resolve the insurance issue. Even while passing the official motion to discontinue busing, which occurred only at Spitzer's request, the board members clearly expressed their support for Bethesda students, with one member noting that all of you[] should know that there isn't a single one of us sitting at this table that doesn't want your kids picked up. Even after it stopped busing Bethesda students, the School District actively sought legislation authorizing it to resume busing them. Spitzer noted in her busing log that Tom Harmon, the School District's attorney, told her that the School District was interested in proposing legislation to resolve the issue and thought it could be resolved by the end of February 2003 and that Hagedorn said he would help support legislation authorizing busing when it was proposed. At the December 9, 2002 school board meeting, one board member suggested that those in attendance contact the state legislature to get the legislation introduced. Hagedorn said that he had told Spitzer that he would write letters of support and offered to go to a hearing before the legislature to support any proposed legislation. The School District's board even offered to contact specific legislators who could sponsor the bill. The School District's expressed support, continuous efforts to resolve the busing issue and willingness to work to get legislation passed so that it could bus Bethesda's students all indicate that a request to resume busing after § 13-29-1.2 became effective almost certainly would have been successful and would not have been futile. The Puckets argue that the School District should have known that they still wanted busing or should have understood that their request was ongoing. In fact, their counsel claimed at oral argument that  they didn't ask for it because the board had not reversed their decision, but the School District had no reason to believe that the Puckets wanted busing to resume without a specific request. The Puckets' counsel offered that it was understood that they wanted busing resumed. However, by proffering a nebulous claim that the School District should have understood that the Puckets wanted busing resumed without actually requesting it, the Puckets failed to show the existence of any injury ... to warrant judicial intervention. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 516, 95 S.Ct. 2197. This is especially true in light of the School District's ongoing expression of its desire to resume busing as soon as it was authorized to do so. In fact, the evidence leads us to believe that the Puckets may well have deliberately failed to request that the School District reinstate busing in an attempt to create a case or controversy for the overriding purpose of challenging the constitutionality of the South Dakota Constitution provisions. Spitzer, at the behest of the Puckets' attorney, requested that the motion terminating busing include a statement that the School District was discontinuing busing based on the South Dakota Constitution. Despite being aware of the School District's willingness to further the legislative efforts to allow its busing of Bethesda students, neither Spitzer nor the Puckets even inquired about the School District's willingness to resume busing after the new law became effective. In fact, upon hearing that the School District wanted to pursue legislative action to quickly resolve the busing problem, instead of offering to work with the School District to get legislation passed, Spitzer responded by stating that there was going to be a lawsuit. On appeal, the Puckets dedicated nearly half of their argument solely to attacking the South Dakota Constitution provisions. In light of the strong evidence that the School District would have resumed busing if the Puckets had requested it, as it ultimately did shortly after being served with this lawsuit on May 8, 2003, we cannot sanction the Puckets' attempt to manufacture a lawsuit designed to challenge the South Dakota Constitution provisions without having met the essential elements of standing. Therefore, the Puckets lack standing to challenge the failure to reinstate busing between March 3 and May 16, 2003, because they failed to take even the simple step of requesting that the School District resume busing, which we cannot conclude would have been futile.