Opinion ID: 1696930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Defendant's Constitutional Rights Were Violated by a Failure to Voir Dire the Jury Regarding Bias

Text: ¶ 8. Jordan argues that his constitutional rights to a fair trial were violated because the court, the prosecution, and defense counsel at trial failed to voir dire the jury regarding their prior knowledge of the case from community discussion and the media. Jordan asserts that the entire jury pool was biased because of the pretrial publicity surrounding the killing of Davis, who was a freshman football player at HCC, a school supported by tax dollars and located in a very small community. ¶ 9. Jordan concedes that jurors were asked general questions regarding their prior knowledge of the case, but argues that the trial court and counsel failed to follow up with proper questioning. He asserts that there was no questioning of the jury pool regarding bias, ill-will, or prejudicial feelings against Jordan, as a non-student accused of shooting an HCC student at a social event. Furthermore, Jordan argues that it was error for the trial court and defense counsel not to ask potential jurors about their affiliation with HCC. ¶ 10. In his appellate brief, Jordan cites United States v. Parker, 877 F.2d 327 (5th Cir.1989) and Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-5-79 (Rev.2007), which describes when a potential juror may serve despite having an impression as to guilt or innocence. Jordan also cites Mississippi Code Annotated Section 99-15-35 (Rev. 2007), which sets out the grounds for change of venue. To the extent that Jordan is raising a claim regarding venue, defense counsel never moved for a change of venue, nor did the trial court rule on this issue. Therefore, this claim is procedurally barred. Dedeaux Util. Co. v. City of Gulfport, 938 So.2d 838, 846 (Miss.2006) (citation omitted). ¶ 11. When reviewing the conduct of voir dire, this Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. Jackson v. State, 791 So.2d 830, 835 (Miss.2001). Moreover, abuse of discretion will only be found where a defendant shows clear prejudice resulting from undue lack of constraint on the prosecution or undue constraint on the defense. Id. at 835-36 (citation omitted). A jury selection procedure is proper if it gives the defendant a fair opportunity to ask questions of individual jurors which may enable the defendant to determine his right to challenge that juror. Stevens v. State, 806 So.2d 1031, 1062 (Miss.2001) (citations omitted). Furthermore, [i]t is well founded that the trial judge has the discretion to excuse potential jurors for cause if the court believes the juror could not try the case impartially. Woodward v. State, 533 So.2d 418, 424 (Miss.1988) (citing Burt v. State, 493 So.2d 1325, 1327 (Miss. 1986)). ¶ 12. The record reflects that defense counsel was not restricted in examining the venire. Defense counsel did not move to quash the venire, and did not object to the jury that was impaneled. During the trial court's voir dire of the jury, Judge Lewis informed the venire that they must ignore information relating to the case that they gained outside the courtroom. Defense counsel followed up by questioning potential jurors individually at the bench to determine what knowledge they had regarding the case in order to determine whether they could be fair and impartial. ¶ 13. The trial court did not abuse its discretion regarding jury selection. Judge Lewis questioned jurors about their ability to be fair and impartial before impaneling the jury, and there is no indication that defense counsel was restricted during jury selection. Therefore, we find this issue to be without merit.