Opinion ID: 2708480
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Government’s Improper Statements

Text: Next, Pollock claims he was denied a fair trial and sentencing hearing because the prosecutor mischaracterized certain pieces of evidence. Because Pollock did not object to these alleged mischaracterizations below, our review is for plain error only. United States v. Phillips, 745 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2014). When a defendant challenges certain statements made by a prosecutor, we engage in a two part inquiry: first, we determine if the statements were improper; and second, we determine if the statements deprived the defendant of a fair trial. United States v. Wolfe, 701 F.3d 1206, 1211 (7th Cir. 2012). We consider five factors to determine whether the remarks prejudiced the defendant: ‘(1) the nature and seriousness of the misconduct; (2) the extent to which the comments were invited by the defense; (3) the extent to which any prejudice was ameliorated by the court’s instruction to the jury; (4) the defense’s opportunity to counter any prejudice; and (5) the weight of the evidence supporting the conviction.’ Id. (quoting United States v. Adams, 628 F.3d 407, 418-19 (7th Cir. 2010)). We begin with the mischaracterization that the Government concedes occurred six times during the trial. The prosecutor repeatedly stated that Clayes saw a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol the night he was at Pollock’s home. This was incorrect. Clayes’ actual testimony was that he saw “a pistol, a semiautomatic pistol,” but he did not mention the caliber No. 13-2764 9 or any other identifying characteristic. Despite this error, the Government argues that the addition of the caliber was a minor detail and did not deprive Pollock of a fair trial. We agree. Pollock does not dispute that Clayes’ unequivocal testimony was that Pollock showed him “a pistol, a semiautomatic pistol.” The “.45 caliber” was a minor detail that the prosecutor seemingly inadvertently added to this fact, and his addition of this detail was not “serious misconduct.” Further, during his closing argument, Pollock’s counsel pointed out to the jury that Clayes never said he saw a .45 caliber semiautomatic pistol, just that he saw a semiautomatic pistol. He therefore had at least some opportunity to correct the prosecutor’s error. Finally, the weight of the evidence against Pollock cuts against his argument that the “.45 caliber” addition deprived him of a fair trial. As the Government notes, the fact that Pollock showed Clayes a semiautomatic pistol and then placed it in the trunk of his car, along with other boxes that eventually revealed more guns, may have led the jury to conclude that Pollock placed, and thus at one time possessed, all of the guns in the trunk of his car. Appellee’s Br. at 43. But, the fact that the gun was specifically a .45 caliber pistol adds little to that inference. Id. Of course, the prosecutor in this case should have been more prudent in ensuring he accurately summarized Clayes’ testimony, but the misstatements certainly do not support Pollock’s contention that he was denied a fair trial. Pollock has failed to establish that “the outcome of the proceedings would have been different” had the prosecutor correctly stated that Clayes testified that he only knew the gun Pollock showed him was a semiautomatic pistol. United States v. 10 No. 13-2764 Bowman, 353 F.3d 546, 550 (7th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Anderson, 303 F.3d 847, 854 (7th Cir. 2002)). With regard to the sentencing hearing, Pollock argues that the prosecutor mischaracterized Bowyer’s testimony. Bowyer testified about the moments following her rape as follows: He [Pollock] says you’ve got one hell of an alimony [sic]. He says, you got DNA. I’m sure that they will fingerprint the truck. You got your daughter as a witness that he took me. He says, you got one alibi. He says, we might just end it now … He says that we should go out to the garage and he had a 45 hidden out in the garage somewhere and put our heads to- gether and blast our brains out, one shot. Sentencing Tr. at 34. At sentencing, the Government summarized this testimony as follows: He made the comment, well, you have my DNA; you could really get me in a lot of trouble. So he is trying to convince her not to go to the authorities. He is threatening her with the .35 [sic] and at that time the kidnapping is still a continuing offense. Id. at 89-90. Pollock first objects to the insertion of the word “my” before “DNA,” arguing that the DNA Bowyer testified about referred to DNA evidence on the truck, not Pollock’s semen. We disagree. DNA evidence is not the same as fingerprint evidence, and Pollock only referenced the truck with regard to his fingerprints. However, assuming Pollock thought fingerprints could leave DNA, Bowyer clearly testified that Pollock discussed the evidence she “had” against him before No. 13-2764 11 suggesting they kill themselves. Whether this evidence she “had” against him came in the form of fingerprints or DNA from the rape is not dispositive. Pollock also argues that Bowyer’s testimony does not reflect that she felt Pollock was threatening her in order to prevent her from reporting the incident to the police. Thus, he argues that the prosecutor generally mischaracterized her testimony. We disagree. A logical inference to be drawn from Bowyer’s testimony is that Pollock threatened her to prevent her from going to the authorities. Pollock may disagree with the inference the Government drew from her testimony, but this does not mean the prosecutor mischaracterized it. 3 In short, the prosecutor did not mischaracterize Bowyer’s testimony at the sentencing hearing, and his addition of such a minor detail—the fact that the pistol was a .45 caliber— during the trial did not deprive Pollock of a fair trial.