Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Inadequate Instruction on Lingering Doubt

Text: Defense counsel submitted a proposed instruction on lingering or residual doubt. The court gave the instruction as modified, omitting certain text, which apparently consisted of the struck-through portions below: Although proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt has been found, you may demand a greater degree of certainty for the imposition of the death penalty. The adjudication of guilt is not infallible and any lingering doubt you entertain on the question of guilt may be considered by you in determining the appropriate penalty, including the possibility that at some time in the future, facts may come to light that have not yet been discovered. Each individual juror may consider as a mitigating factor residual or lingering doubt as to whether the defendant killed the victim. Lingering or residual doubt is defined as a state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and all possible doubt. Thus if any individual juror has a lingering or residual doubt about whether the defendant intentionally killed the victim, he or she must may consider this as a mitigating factor and assign to it the weight you deem appropriate. Defendant contends the court's modification diluted the instruction on lingering doubt, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We disagree. Though we have characterized the omitted second sentence of the defense proposal favorably as a straightforward instruction ( People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 219, 279 Cal.Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949), we have never suggested that it was required in every, or any, case. The remaining portions adequately convey the concept of lingering doubt and its proper relevance to the penalty decision. Nor does defendant cite any decision holding that a juror's lingering doubt must, as opposed to may, be considered in mitigation. (See Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 979, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750 [A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision].)