Opinion ID: 4027701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Trial Court’s Review

Text: The defendant petitioned the trial court for a writ of certiorari. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105(b)(3); Tenn. R. Crim. P. 38(a); see also State v. McKim, 215 S.W.3d 781, 788 (Tenn. 2007). In conducting its review, the trial court was obligated to presume that the district attorney general correctly denied diversion, State v. Curry, 988 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tenn. 1999), to examine only the evidence considered by the prosecutor, Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 177; see also Curry, 988 S.W.2d at 157 (citing State v. Winsett, 882 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993)), and to not reweigh that evidence or pass upon the intrinsic correctness of the decision but, rather, to review “the method used by the district attorney general,” State v. Yancey, 69 S.W.3d 553, 558-59 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-15-105(b)(3) (1997 & Supp. 2001); Ben H. Cantrell, Review of Administrative Decisions by Writ of Certiorari in Tennessee, 4 Mem. St. L. Rev. 19, 28 (1973)). In determining whether an abuse of prosecutorial discretion occurred, the trial court was required to consider whether the prosecutor either (1) failed to consider and articulate all the relevant factors or considered and relied upon an irrelevant factor, or (2) made a decision unsupported by substantial evidence. Richardson, 357 S.W.3d at 627 (citing McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 788-89). The district attorney general‟s failure to consider all relevant factors, including any substantial evidence favorable to the defendant, constitutes an abuse of discretion, even if the reasons stated for denying diversion are supported by the record. See Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 178. Although a trial court may conduct an evidentiary hearing when necessary “to resolve any factual disputes raised by the district attorney general or the defendant,” Bell, 69 S.W.3d at 177 (citing Curry, 988 S.W.2d at 158), the trial court here did not conduct an evidentiary hearing of this sort. Rather, the trial court held a hearing on the petition in open court at which the parties presented argument and ultimately denied the defendant‟s petition in a ruling from the bench.4 In doing so, the trial court stated that it had considered “the evidence that‟s there and the reasonableness” of the prosecutor‟s decision. The trial court specifically addressed “the circumstances [of the alleged offense] in terms of [its] relationship to the issue of the amenability of the defendant” and 4 As we stated in Stephens, when ruling on a petition for writ of certiorari in a pretrial diversion case, a trial judge should enter a written order confirming that she has satisfied her obligation to “examine each relevant factor in the pretrial diversion process to determine whether the district attorney general has considered that factor and whether the district attorney general‟s finding with respect to that factor is supported by substantial evidence” is crucial for subsequent appellate review. Yancey, 69 S.W.3d at 559. Although the order in this case granting the defendant permission to seek an interlocutory appeal references an order entered earlier on the denial, no such order appears in the record. The only written reference is a minute entry for June 16, 2014. - 10 - the notion that the defendant, not the victim, escalated the verbal disagreement to physical altercation. The trial court also discussed the defendant‟s amenability to correction and concluded that the evidence indicated the defendant escalated the situation and lost his temper, leading the defendant to hit the student, which “suggests a lack of control on [the defendant‟s] part [and] . . . support[s] a finding that [the defendant] lacks amenability to correction or rehabilitation.”