Opinion ID: 1043839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lovlaces’ Standing to Sue

Text: The Copleys contend that the Lovlaces do not have standing to bring suit because they do not meet the definition of “grandparent” used in the Grandparent Visitation Statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(e). The Lovlaces respond that this issue is waived because the Copleys failed to raise it in the trial court. “When a statute creates a cause of action and designates who may bring an action, the issue of standing is interwoven with that of subject matter jurisdiction and becomes a jurisdictional prerequisite.” Osborn v. Marr, 127 S.W.3d 737, 740 (Tenn. 2004). The Grandparent Visitation Statute applies only to persons who satisfy the statutory definition of the term “grandparent.” See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(a) (“Any of the following circumstances, when presented in a petition for grandparent visitation . . . necessitates a hearing if such grandparent visitation is opposed by the custodial parent or parents.” (emphasis added)); id. § 36-6-306(e) (defining “grandparent”). “As a result, a court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear a petition for grandparent visitation unless the party filing the petition has standing.” Spears v. Weatherall, 385 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). Appellate courts must consider subject matter jurisdiction even if parties fail to raise or preserve the issue. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(b); In re Estate of Trigg, 368 S.W.3d 483, 488 n.2 (Tenn. 2012); Osborn, 127 S.W.3d at 740. Thus, notwithstanding the Copleys’ failure to raise this issue in the trial court, or to list it in the appropriate section of their brief in this Court,6 we will consider whether the Lovlaces lack standing, as this issue is interwoven with subject matter jurisdiction. The Copleys’ argument that the Lovlaces lack standing is based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306(e), which provides: Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, as used in this section and in § 36-6-307, with regard to the petitioned child, the word “grandparent” includes, but is not limited to: 6 The issue section of the Copleys’ brief states in relevant part only that “[t]he Lovlaces’ courtordered visitation should be terminated.” Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 27(b) requires an appellee to include in an appellate brief a statement of any issues the appellee wishes to raise in addition to those issues raised by the appellant. An appellee’s failure to list issues in accordance with Rule 27(b) may result in waiver. See Hodge v. Craig, 382 S.W.3d 325, 335 (Tenn. 2012). -14-

Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(e) (emphasis added). According to the Copleys, because the Lovlaces have no biological connection to the minor child and because Mrs. Lovlace and Mr. Lovlace are the adoptive parent and stepparent, respectively, of the minor child’s biological father, neither satisfies the foregoing statutory definition of “grandparent.” In response, the Lovlaces assert that they fall within the statutory definition of “grandparent” “by reason of common sense, logic, and constitutional considerations.” We conclude, as did the Court of Appeals, that the definition of “grandparent” in the Grandparent Visitation Statute encompasses the Lovlaces. Resolution of this issue requires the construction of a statute. We have recently reiterated the familiar rules of statutory construction. When interpreting a statute, courts must ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent without restricting or expanding the statute’s intended meaning. Our task is to examine the text of the statute and, if the language used is unambiguous, we simply apply the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. As we recently observed, courts must (1) give these words their natural and ordinary meaning, (2) consider them in the context of the entire statute, and (3) presume that the General Assembly intended to give each of these words its full effect. Every word in a statute is presumed to have meaning and purpose. If, after examining the text of the statute, it becomes clear the statute is ambiguous, we may reference the broader statutory scheme, the history of the legislation, or other sources to discern its meaning. However, these non-codified external sources cannot provide a basis for departing from clear codified statutory provisions. Garrison v. Bickford, 377 S.W.3d 659, 663 (Tenn. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306(e) is unambiguous. Its use of the phrase “includes, but is not limited to,” in conjunction with three categories of persons who qualify as a “grandparent,” clearly evinces the Legislature’s intent not to limit the statutory definition of “grandparent” to only the three listed categories. The phrases, “includes, but is not limited to” and “including but not limited to,” are generally deemed to be terms of enlargement, not -15- of restriction. See Owings v. Owings, No. W2005-01233-COA-R3-CV, 2006 WL 3410702, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2006) (interpreting the Child Support Guidelines’ use of the phrase “including but not limited to” as supporting a broad definition of gross income, not limited to the enumerated categories); Raybon v. McElrath, No. M2001-01295-COA-R3-JV, 2003 WL 22401276, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2003) (same); see also Moore v. Nashville Elec. Power Bd., 72 S.W.3d 643, 650 n.5 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting the Tennessee Human Rights Act’s use of the phrase “including but not limited to” as providing an “extensive” list of remedies). Indeed, even when “including” is used alone in conjunction with a list of items, it serves as a term of enlargement, not one of restriction. “When a statutory definition states that it ‘includes’ specific items, we have held that the ‘enumerated items are illustrative, not exclusive.’” State v. Marshall, 319 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tenn. 2010) (quoting Gragg v. Gragg, 12 S.W.3d 412, 415 (Tenn. 2000)). The statutory definition of “grandparent” includes two categories that do not require proof of a biological relationship with the child. Mrs. Lovlace, as the adoptive parent of the minor child’s biological father, and Mr. Lovlace, as the stepparent of the minor child’s biological father, qualify as “grandparents” under the expansive definition of the term “grandparent” used in the Grandparent Visitation Statute. Thus, we hold that the Lovlaces have standing and, as a result, the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction.7 B. Effect of Tennessee Code Annotated Section 36-1-121(f) and the Minor Child’s Adoption The Copleys also assert that the reservation of the Lovlaces’ visitation rights in the March 26, 2009 Final Order of Adoption was void and of no effect. According to the Copleys, Mr. Copley’s adoption of the minor child served to terminate the Lovlaces’ visitation rights pursuant to the Grandparent Visitation Statute.8 7 In reaching this holding, we have not considered the extent or quality of the Lovlaces’ relationship with the minor child, as this is not a relevant consideration in determining whether a petitioner satisfies the statutory definition of “grandparent.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(e). This consideration becomes relevant to determining substantial harm and the best interests of the child only after a petitioner has established standing by satisfying the statutory definition of “grandparent.” Id. 8 Once again, this issue is not listed in the issue section of the Copleys’ brief. Because of the significance of the issue and because the Copleys’ assertion, if correct, would render moot many of the remaining issues, we will address the matter as a preliminary issue, rather than in the context of the Copleys’ argument that the Lovlaces’ visitation should be terminated. -16- The March 26, 2009 Final Order of Adoption was not appealed; thus, it became final and entitled to full force and effect “regardless of whether it was entered in error, unless and until a party obtains dissolution of the order through operation of the judicial system of review.” In re Estate of Rinehart, 363 S.W.3d 186, 189 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). By raising this challenge in the Hickman County Chancery Court proceeding, the Copleys essentially mounted a collateral attack on the Lewis County Final Order of Adoption. “A collateral attack is an attempt to avoid, defeat, or evade a judgment, or to deny its force and effect, in some incidental proceeding not provided by law for the express purpose of attacking it.” Andrews v. Fifth Third Bank, 228 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). If an action or proceeding is brought for the very purpose of impeaching or overturning a judgment, it is a direct attack upon it . . . . On the other hand, if the action or proceeding has an independent purpose and contemplates some other relief or result, although the overturning of the judgment may be important, or even necessary to its success, then the attack upon the judgment is collateral. In re Estate of Rinehart, 363 S.W.3d at 190 n.6 (quoting Gentry v. Gentry, 924 S.W.2d 678, 679-80 (Tenn. 1996)). “Only a void order may be collaterally attacked in another forum.” Id. at 190. An order is void, and subject to collateral attack, only where the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, ruled on an issue wholly outside of the pleadings, or lacked personal jurisdiction over the party complaining about the order. Id.; Andrews, 228 S.W.3d at 107. Neither the March 26, 2009 Final Order of Adoption nor the specific provision reserving the Lovlaces’ visitation rights is void. The Chancery Court for Lewis County did not lack subject matter jurisdiction, did not rule on matters wholly outside the pleadings, and did not lack jurisdiction over the minor child or the Copleys. According to the Copleys, however, their collateral attack is appropriate because a provision of the Adoption Statute, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-121(f), conflicts with a provision of the Grandparent Visitation Statute, see Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(d)(1), which addresses the effect of an adoption on visitation rights. The Copleys contend that the Adoption Statute takes precedence over the Grandparent Visitation Statute, and as a result, renders void the provision of the Final Order of Adoption reserving the Lovlaces’ visitation rights. We disagree. The Copleys’ contentions require a determination of the proper interplay between these two statutory provisions. The relevant provision of the Adoption Statute states: -17- The adoptive parents of a child shall not be required by any order of the adoption court to permit visitation by any other person, nor shall the order of the adoption court place any conditions on the adoption of the child by the adoptive parents. Any provision in an order of the court or in any written agreement or contract between the parent or guardian of the child and the adoptive parents requiring visitation or otherwise placing any conditions on the adoption shall be void and of no effect whatsoever; provided, that nothing under this part shall be construed to prohibit “open adoptions” where the adoptive parents permit, in their sole discretion, the parent or guardian of the child who surrendered the child or whose rights to the child were otherwise terminated, or the siblings or other persons related to the adopted child, to visit or otherwise continue or maintain a relationship with the adopted child; and provided further, that the permission or agreement to permit visitation or contact shall not, in any manner whatsoever, establish any enforceable rights in the parent or guardian, the siblings or other related persons. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-121(f) (emphasis added). The relevant provision of the Grandparent Visitation Statute declares: (1) Notwithstanding the provisions of § 36-1-121, if a relative or stepparent adopts a child, the provisions of this section apply. (2) If a person other than a relative or a stepparent adopts a child, any visitation rights granted pursuant to this section before the adoption of the child shall automatically end upon such adoption. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(d) (emphasis added). In determining whether these statutory provisions conflict, and in resolving any existing conflict, we are guided by the following rules of statutory construction. First, a construction which places one statute in conflict with another is to be avoided, and we must endeavor to resolve any possible conflict between statutes in favor of each other in order to provide a harmonious operation of laws. Graham v. Caples, 325 S.W.3d 578, 582 (Tenn. 2010). Second, “[w]here a conflict is presented between two statutes, a more specific statutory provision takes precedence over a more general provision.” Id. Finally, courts may presume that the General Assembly is aware of its own prior enactments and knows the state of the law when it enacts a subsequent statute. Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 527 (Tenn. 2010). -18- Applying the foregoing principles, we conclude that the statutes do not conflict. The relevant provision of the Adoption Statute was enacted in 1995. The relevant provision of the Grandparent Visitation Statute was enacted two years later. Not only is the Grandparent Visitation Statute the more specific and more recently enacted statutory provision, its statutory text clearly and unambiguously carves out a narrow, limited exception, in the case of grandparent visitation and stepparent adoption, to the more general rule stated in the Adoption Statute. Mr. Copley was the minor child’s stepparent at the time of the adoption. We conclude, therefore, that the exception in the Grandparent Visitation Statute, specifically Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-306(d)(1), controls. Thus, Mr. Copley’s adoption of the minor child did not terminate the visitation rights the Lovlaces received pursuant to the Agreed Order. The provision of the Final Order of Adoption reserving the Lovlaces’ visitation rights is not void and is consistent with the exception for stepparent adoptions in the Grandparent Visitation Statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(d)(1).9 C. Denial of Visitation The Copleys assert that because the record includes no finding that they ever denied the Lovlaces visitation with the minor child, the Grandparent Visitation Statute was not implicated.10 We do not agree. The Grandparent Visitation Statute expressly provides that an initial petition for grandparent visitation may only be filed “if such grandparent visitation is opposed by the custodial parent or parents.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(a). Unlike divorcing or unmarried parents who may agree that visitation is appropriate but disagree merely about the details of a visitation schedule, a petitioner relying upon the Grandparent Visitation Statute must establish in the first instance that the custodial parent opposed or denied grandparent visitation. Huls v. Alford, No. M2008-00408-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4682219, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 22, 2008). “The term ‘opposed’ includes situations both where visitation is 9 Although not necessary to our analysis, we further note that Mrs. Copley, as the minor child’s biological parent, was not within the scope of the protection afforded by the Adoption Statute, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-121(f), as she was not an “adoptive parent[],” and that she too agreed to the reservation of the Lovlaces’ visitation rights in the March 26, 2009 Final Order of Adoption. We also note that the Agreed Order expressly contemplated the Lovlaces’ continued visitation with the minor child even if Mr. Rochelle’s parental rights were subsequently terminated, as occurred by virtue of his consent to Mr. Copley’s adoption of the minor child. 10 Again, the Copleys fail to list this issue in the appropriate section of their brief. Because of the significance of this issue and because the Copleys’ assertion, if correct, would render moot many of the remaining issues in this appeal, we address it as a preliminary matter, rather than in the context of their argument that the Lovlaces’ visitation should be terminated. -19- denied totally and where visitation is technically not opposed, but the frequency and/or conditions imposed by the parents on visitation are such that it equates to a denial of visitation.” Id.; see also Angel v. Nixon, No. M2010-00554-COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 4483915, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2010); Wilson v. Gladden, No. E2008-02283-COAR3-CV, 2009 WL 2176460, at  (Tenn. Ct. App. July 22, 2009). The Grandparent Visitation Statute “cannot be used by grandparents who think they are entitled to more or different visitation in the absence of a finding that the parents actually or effectively ‘opposed’ visitation.” Huls, 2008 WL 4682219, at ; see also Angel, 2010 WL 4483915, at  n.2. We recognize, therefore, that parties must have experienced problems in cooperation in order to invoke the Grandparent Visitation Statute in the first place. The Copleys now challenge the Agreed Order because it allegedly lacks an explicit finding of denial of, or opposition to, grandparent visitation. This contention amounts to a collateral attack on a final order, which no party previously sought to modify or set aside. As we have already noted, “[o]nly a void order may be collaterally attacked in another forum.” In re Estate of Rinehart, 363 S.W.3d at 190. An order is void and subject to collateral attack only where the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, ruled on an issue wholly outside of the pleadings, or lacked jurisdiction over the party complaining about the order. Id.; Andrews, 228 S.W.3d at 107. The Agreed Order includes none of these defects, nor do the Copleys even so contend. The Agreed Order therefore is not subject to collateral attack. Moreover, the factual basis of the Copleys’ challenge is without merit. While the Agreed Order lacks an explicit finding that the Copleys opposed grandparent visitation, the Agreed Order expressly granted the Lovlaces visitation pursuant to the Grandparent Visitation Statute. The Lovlaces’ petition clearly alleged opposition. The parties, both represented by counsel, appeared on the hearing date set to contest the allegations. They then entered into an agreement. Implicit therein was the Copleys’ acknowledgment that the prerequisites of the Grandparent Visitation Statute had been satisfied. Additionally, the trial court found in its January 5, 2011 Order, which is the subject of this appeal, that “at the time the Agreed Order was entered, there was a clear basis for the establishment of grandparent visitation.” The evidence in the record does not preponderate against this finding. The Copleys appear also to contend that, when petitioning the trial court to modify visitation, the Lovlaces were subject to a renewed requirement that they demonstrate a denial of, or opposition to, visitation.11 The Grandparent Visitation Statute does not contain any provision governing modification of court-ordered grandparent visitation. As a result, the statute does not mandate, or even address, whether grandparents must prove opposition to, or 11 Indeed, the only instances of additional voluntary visitation to which the Copleys point in their brief all occurred after the Agreed Order. -20- denial of, visitation as a prerequisite when seeking modification of court-ordered visitation. Even assuming such a showing is required, the Copleys’ own counter-petition for termination satisfies this showing and evidences their opposition to the Lovlaces’ visitation.12 II. Modification or Termination of Grandparent Visitation This appeal involves competing petitions for modification and termination of previously court-ordered grandparent visitation. Tennessee’s Grandparent Visitation Statute in no way addresses modification or termination of court-ordered grandparent visitation. Thus, we must determine, as an issue of first impression, the appropriate burdens of proof and standards to be applied where a grandparent and a parent seek to modify and terminate, respectively, court-ordered grandparent visitation. The Lovlaces petitioned to increase their court-ordered visitation, and the Copleys petitioned to terminate the Lovlaces’ visitation. The record indicates that the matter was litigated in the trial court pursuant to the burdens of proof and standards generally applicable to modification of visitation between two parents. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-101(a)(2)(c) (2010). As already noted, the Court of Appeals disagreed, in three separate opinions, as to the burdens of proof and standards to be applied in these circumstances. As might be expected, the Lovlaces now urge this Court to adopt the burdens of proof and standards applied by the trial court. In contrast, the Copleys urge this Court to adopt, in part, the burdens of proof and standards adopted by a majority of the Court of Appeals, which would require grandparents seeking modification of visitation to satisfy a higher standard than parents seeking modification or termination of grandparent visitation. The Copleys further urge this Court to adopt the additional standard applied by one member of the Court of Appeals, and hold that, in all proceedings involving grandparent visitation, a rebuttable presumption exists that parental preferences and decisions are in the best interests of children. For the reasons articulated below, we hold that parties—parents and grandparents alike—seeking modification or termination of court-ordered grandparent visitation must make two showings. First, a party petitioning for modification or termination must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence a material change in circumstances. If this showing is made, the party must next prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the requested modification or termination of visitation is in the best interests of the child. To determine whether 12 We note that the General Assembly has amended the Grandparent Visitation Statute, effective July 1, 2011, to include as one of the factors courts may consider in determining the best interests of the child “[a]ny unreasonable deprivation of the grandparents’ opportunity to visit with the child by the child’s parents or guardian, including denying visitation of the minor child to the grandparent for a period exceeding ninety (90) days.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-307(8) (Supp. 2012). -21- modification or termination is in the best interests of the child, courts shall consider the factors enumerated in the Grandparent Visitation Statute. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-307. The divided opinion of the Court of Appeals in this case is representative of the divide that exists across the country. As the authors of one recent article noted, there exists a “current nationwide cacophony of grandparent and third-party visitation laws across the United States. The landscape of these laws across the country is as varied as the scenery itself from Maine to Alaska. There is no uniformity among state laws; and there is no authority of guidance for state legislatures.” Daniel R. Victor and Keri L. Middleditch, Grandparent Visitation: A Survey of History, Jurisprudence, and Legislative Trends Across the United States in the Past Decade, 22 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 391 (2009). “[T]he entire nation is a virtual ‘wild west’ of wide-ranging trial court interpretations and appellate court decisions that attempt to reconcile the language in the one United States Supreme Court case that has touched upon this issue.” Id. at 391-92. The jurisprudence of other jurisdictions, therefore, offers limited guidance on the issue in this appeal. Moreover, the lone United States Supreme Court decision, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), like Tennessee’s Grandparent Visitation Statute and our own prior jurisprudence, addresses only initial requests for grandparent visitation, not requests for modification or termination of court-ordered grandparent visitation. Nonetheless, some guidance can be gleaned from our own jurisprudence, the lone United States Supreme Court decision, and, to a lesser extent, the jurisprudence of other jurisdictions. A. Burdens of Proof and Standards in Initial Grandparent Visitation Proceedings We begin with the text of the Grandparent Visitation Statute, which, in pertinent part, provides: (a) Any of the following circumstances, when presented in a petition for grandparent visitation to the circuit, chancery, general sessions courts with domestic relations jurisdiction or juvenile court in matters involving children born out of wedlock of the county in which the petitioned child currently resides, necessitates a hearing if such grandparent visitation is opposed by the custodial parent or parents: (1) The father or mother of an unmarried minor child is deceased; (2) The child’s father or mother are divorced, legally separated, or were never married to each other; -22- (3) The child’s father or mother has been missing for not less than six (6) months; (4) The court of another state has ordered grandparent visitation; (5) The child resided in the home of the grandparent for a period of twelve (12) months or more and was subsequently removed from the home by the parent or parents (this grandparent-grandchild relationship establishes a rebuttable presumption that denial of visitation may result in irreparable harm to the child); or (6) The child and the grandparent maintained a significant existing relationship for a period of twelve (12) months or more immediately preceding severance of the relationship, this relationship was severed by the parent or parents for reasons other than abuse or presence of a danger of substantial harm to the child, and severance of this relationship is likely to occasion substantial emotional harm to the child. (b)(1) In considering a petition for grandparent visitation, the court shall first determine the presence of a danger of substantial harm to the child. Such finding of substantial harm may be based upon cessation of the relationship between an unmarried minor child and the child’s grandparent if the court determines, upon proper proof, that: (A) The child had such a significant existing relationship with the grandparent that loss of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child; (B) The grandparent functioned as a primary caregiver such that cessation of the relationship could interrupt provision of the daily needs of the child and thus occasion physical or emotional harm; or (C) The child had a significant existing relationship with the grandparent and loss of the relationship presents the danger of other direct and substantial harm to the child. (2) For purposes of this section, a grandparent shall be deemed to have a significant existing relationship with a grandchild if: -23- (A) The child resided with the grandparent for at least six (6) consecutive months; (B) The grandparent was a full-time caretaker of the child for a period of not less than six (6) consecutive months; or (C) The grandparent had frequent visitation with the child who is the subject of the suit for a period of not less than one (1) year. (3) A grandparent is not required to present the testimony or affidavit of an expert witness in order to establish a significant existing relationship with a grandchild or that the loss of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child. Instead, the court shall consider whether the facts of the particular case would lead a reasonable person to believe that there is a significant existing relationship between the grandparent and grandchild or that the loss of the relationship is likely to occasion severe emotional harm to the child. (4) For the purposes of this section, if the child’s parent is deceased and the grandparent seeking visitation is the parent of that deceased parent, there shall be a rebuttable presumption of substantial harm to the child based upon the cessation of the relationship between the child and grandparent. (c) Upon an initial finding of danger of substantial harm to the child, the court shall then determine whether grandparent visitation would be in the best interests of the child based upon the factors in § 36-6-307. Upon such determination, reasonable visitation may be ordered. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (2010) (emphasis added).13 13 Grandparent visitation was first provided for by the General Assembly in 1971. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1101 (Supp. 1972). The Grandparent Visitation Statute subsequently was amended on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1101 (Supp. 1975); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-301 (Supp. 1985); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-306 and -307 (Supp. 1997); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 36-6-306 and -307 (Supp. 2000); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306 (2010); Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-307 (Supp. 2012). As already explained, quotations and citations in this opinion are to the current version of the Grandparent Visitation Statute, the language of which is in all relevant respects the same as that of the statute in effect at the time of the proceedings in the trial court. We need not and do not address amendments adopted subsequent to the trial court proceedings because none affects this Court’s determination of the appropriate burdens and standards in cases involving petitions to modify or terminate court-ordered grandparent visitation. -24- The Grandparent Visitation Statute next enumerates the factors that courts must consider when initially determining whether grandparent visitation is in the best interests of a child. In determining the best interests of the child under § 36-6-306, the court shall consider all pertinent matters, including, but not necessarily limited to, the following: (1) The length and quality of the prior relationship between the child and the grandparent and the role performed by the grandparent; (2) The existing emotional ties of the child to the grandparent; (3) The preference of the child if the child is determined to be of sufficient maturity to express a preference; (4) The effect of hostility between the grandparent and the parent of the child manifested before the child, and the willingness of the grandparent, except in case of abuse, to encourage a close relationship between the child and the parent or parents, or guardian or guardians of the child; (5) The good faith of the grandparent in filing the petition; (6) If the parents are divorced or separated, the time-sharing arrangement that exists between the parents with respect to the child; and (7) If one (1) parent is deceased or missing, the fact that the grandparents requesting visitation are the parents of the deceased or missing person. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-307(1)-(7) (Supp. 2012).14 The statutory requirement of “an initial finding of danger of substantial harm to the child,”15 before consideration of the child’s best interests, is a codification of this Court’s holding in Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573 (Tenn. 1993). In Hawk, this Court declared the Grandparent Visitation Statute then in effect, which allowed courts to order grandparent 14 Again, as is evident, the statute does not by its terms address modification or termination of courtordered grandparent visitation. 15 Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-6-306(c). -25- visitation based solely upon a finding that such visitation was in the child’s best interest, unconstitutional under article I, section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution as applied to a married couple whose fitness as parents was unchallenged. Id. at 577. In light of the right of privacy afforded by the Tennessee Constitution, the Hawk Court concluded that, “when no substantial harm threatens a child’s welfare, the state lacks a sufficiently compelling justification for the infringement on the fundamental right of parents to raise their children as they see fit.” Id. “[T]o prevent judicial second-guessing of parental decisions,” the Hawk Court required courts considering a request for grandparent visitation to “make an initial finding of harm to the child before evaluating the ‘best interests of the child.’” Id. at 581. Three years later, this Court extended the holding of Hawk, requiring a showing of substantial harm, from the context of the “intact, nuclear family with fit married parents,” id. at 577, to a grandparent visitation case in which the child’s biological parents were divorced and the child had been adopted by her stepfather, Simmons v. Simmons, 900 S.W.2d 682 (Tenn. 1995). Seven years after Hawk, the United States Supreme Court addressed grandparent visitation. In Troxel, the Supreme Court considered a federal constitutional challenge to a Washington state statute, which allowed anyone to petition for visitation with a child at any time and authorized courts to grant visitation solely on the basis of the child’s best interests, without affording any deference to parental decisions as to visitation. A plurality of the Supreme Court held in Troxel that the Washington state statute, as applied to the case before it, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution by imposing an unconstitutional infringement on the parents’ fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of their children. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65, 67, 73. The plurality further held that “if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some special weight to the parent’s own determination.” Id. at 70. The plurality declined, however, to consider whether “the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a precedent to granting visitation.” Id. at 73. As the plurality explained, “[w]e do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context.” Id. The requirement of an initial finding of substantial harm enunciated in Hawk, and subsequently codified in the Grandparent Visitation Statute, imposes a more specific, and arguably stricter, standard than the “special weight” requirement enunciated by the plurality in Troxel. See, e.g., Troxel, 530 U.S. at 96 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Showing substantial harm is the specific and sole manner in which grandparents in this State may overcome the constitutional deference initially afforded parental decisions regarding grandparent visitation. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 581; Angel, 2010 WL 4483915, at  n.3. -26- B. Proceedings to Modify or Terminate Grandparent Visitation As already noted, the Grandparent Visitation Statute, Hawk, and Troxel all addressed initial requests for visitation, not petitions to modify or terminate court-ordered grandparent visitation. Although we have not before been called upon to address the appropriate burdens of proof and standards to be applied to petitions for modification of grandparent visitation, this Court has addressed these issues in the context of a grandparent custody order. Blair v. Badenhope, 77 S.W.3d 137 (Tenn. 2002). In Blair, the child’s biological father petitioned the court to modify a prior consent order, which had granted custody of the child to her maternal grandmother. In seeking modification, the father asserted a material change in circumstances and alleged that he had a superior parental right to the custody of his daughter, pointing out that he had never been adjudged to be an unfit parent. Id. at 139-40. In a four-to-one decision, the Blair Court rejected the father’s reliance on the superior parental rights doctrine. The majority held that “a natural parent cannot generally invoke the doctrine of superior parental rights to modify a valid order of custody, even when that order resulted from the parent’s voluntary consent to give custody to the non-parent.” Id. at 139. “Instead, a natural parent seeking to modify a custody order that grants custody to a non-parent must show that a material change in circumstances has occurred, which makes a change in custody in the child’s best interests.” Id. In so holding, the majority acknowledged that “the Tennessee Constitution protects the fundamental right of natural parents to have the care and custody of their children.” Id. at 141. The Blair majority emphasized, however, that unlike prior cases addressing the rights of parents to the care and custody of their children, Blair did not “involve the standards applicable in making an initial award of child custody between a parent and a non-parent. Rather, we are asked to address whether our Constitution enables parents to assert the superior parental rights doctrine in order to modify a valid court order awarding custody to a non-parent.” Id. (emphasis added). The majority viewed this distinction as critically important, explaining: Though we have broadly recognized that the right of parental privacy in this state is fundamental, nothing in the language of our Constitution, nor in the volumes of our case law, suggests that the superior rights doctrine should assist a parent to obtain custody of a child when a valid court order properly transferred custody from that parent in the first instance. Nor is there any suggestion from these sources that our right to privacy extends so far as to warrant application of the superior rights doctrine even when that valid order results from the natural parent voluntarily consenting to give custody of the child to a non-parent. Because all of our prior cases discussing awards of custody to a natural parent from a non-parent have been those in which the initial transfer of -27- custody from the natural parent was not accomplished with a valid court order or was not consensual, these cases cannot be properly used to “say what the law is” on this issue in Tennessee. Id. at 143 (citations omitted). After examining cases from other jurisdictions, the Blair majority summed up its conclusions: As these cases demonstrate, parents in the initial custody proceedings enjoy a strong presumption that they are entitled to the physical custody of their children. However, having once protected the rights of natural parents to the care and custody of their children, no constitutional principle demands that natural parents again be afforded a presumption of superior rights in a subsequent modification proceeding. Of course, where an initial order does not exist, or is otherwise invalid, then the Constitution requires a court to apply the superior rights doctrine. However, because these circumstances do not exist in this case, we disagree that the Tennessee Constitution compels application of that doctrine in the face of a lawful and valid court order vesting custody of [the child] in her grandmother. Id. at 146 (emphasis added). The majority also summarized its conclusions, based on the law of other jurisdictions, regarding the effect of a parent’s voluntary consent to the transfer of custody on the parent’s ability later to rely on the presumption of superior parental rights. As these cases powerfully demonstrate, a parent’s voluntary consent to cede custody to a non-parent defeats the ability of that parent to later claim superior parental rights in a subsequent proceeding to modify custody. Presuming that a parent is afforded the opportunity to assert superior parental rights in the initial custody proceeding, then the parent’s voluntary transfer of custody to a non-parent, with knowledge of the consequences of that transfer, effectively operates as a waiver of these fundamental parental rights. Under these circumstances, therefore, the Constitution does not again entitle the natural parent to assert superior parental rights to modify a valid custody order, even if no court has previously found the natural parent to be unfit. Id. at 147-48 (emphasis added). -28- The Blair majority then announced its holding concerning the burdens and standards that apply between a parent and a grandparent in custody modification proceedings. Based on our prior case law interpreting [a]rticle I, section 8 in this context, and given the overwhelming authority from other jurisdictions on this issue, we conclude that our Constitution does not accord natural parents a presumption of superior rights to modify an existing and valid order of custody, even when that order results from the parent voluntarily agreeing to give custody to the non-parent. Though strong in many respects, no aspect of the fundamental right of parental privacy is absolute, and a parent who is given the opportunity to rely upon the presumption of superior rights in an initial custody determination may not again invoke that doctrine to modify a valid custody order. Absent proof of the custody order’s invalidity or proof that the parental rights were not protected in the initial custody proceeding, the child’s interest in a stable and secure environment is at least as important, and probably more so, than the parent’s interest in having custody of the child returned. Accordingly, we hold that a natural parent is not generally entitled to invoke the doctrine of superior rights to modify a valid custody order awarding custody to a non-parent. Instead, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances—for instance, the natural parent was not afforded an opportunity to assert superior parental rights in the initial custody proceeding; the custody order is invalid on its face; the order is the result of fraud or procedural illegality; or the order grants only temporary custody to the non-parents—a trial court should apply the standard typically applied in parent-vs-parent modification cases: that a material change in circumstances has occurred, which makes a change in custody in the child’s best interests. As in all other cases, the burden of establishing these factors rests upon the party seeking the change in custody. Id. at 148 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In reaching this holding, the Blair majority rejected the dissent’s suggestion, based upon Troxel, that the majority had improperly failed to acknowledge the presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Id. at 149. The Blair majority criticized the dissenting opinion, stating: In our view, the dissent gives too little weight to the interests of the child in a stable and secure environment, and it risks subjecting the child to the whims and caprice of a parent. Indeed, if, as the dissent maintains, a parent’s voluntary decision to give custody to a non-parent is made with the best -29- interests of the child as the paramount factor, can we not also suppose that the best interests of the child should again be the paramount factor when deciding whether custody should be returned to the natural parent? We see no compelling reason why the Constitution would command otherwise, provided that the rights of the parent were protected in the initial determination. Id. at 149 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The Blair majority also reasoned that applying the superior parental rights doctrine in custody modification proceedings would, in effect, create a situation analogous to a show-cause process in which the custodial non-parent would have to show cause why the child should not be returned . . . even in the face of a valid order transferring custody away from that parent . . . unless the child’s custodian can show that a change in custody would result in substantial harm to the child. Id. at 149. The majority believed that “such a process would effectively render existing orders of custody to non-parents practically worthless” and create “practical problems for the