Opinion ID: 2518270
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Asserted Error Relating to the Exclusion of Evidence of Irene's Prior Sexual Conduct as an Alternative Explanation for Her Injuries

Text: The Attorney General's principal argument against the admission of Irene's prior sexual conduct as an alternative explanation for the injuries to her mouth and cervix is that defendant forfeited the claim by failing to alert the trial court of the precise theory for admission of the evidence. (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) The record, however, reveals that the substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence were made known to the court. As set forth above, defendant's motion argued that Irene's nonstrangulation injuries could have been the product of her sexual activity earlier that day. Indeed, the trial court recognized that the defense sought to offer Irene's sexual activity as an innocent explanation for her vaginal injuries and characterized that as the most persuasive point in the motion. The real reason the trial court excluded the evidence was, as the Attorney General acknowledges, because it believed the defense had no compelling need to provide an innocent explanation for the condition of Irene's genitalia because such an explanation would not negate the more powerful evidence of sexual assaultthe strangulation. The Attorney General concedes that this reasoning was flawed, but assigns the blame for any confusion to defendant himself, who, he argues, did not assert that appellant would admit to strangling Irene and, therefore, that the defense could distinguish between (1) Irene's injuries caused by an assault that appellant would admit and (2) Irene's injuries caused by a sexual assault that appellant would deny. We disagree. At the time of the motion, defense counsel had already announced in opening statement that the defense would not be contesting the strangulation. We therefore conclude that defendant adequately informed the court of the substance, purpose, and relevance of the evidence of Irene's prior sexual activity. Defendant argues, and the Court of Appeal found, that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing to investigate Irene's sexual conduct that day. Evidence Code section 782, subdivision (a)(3) provides that a court shall order a hearing out of the presence of the jury and allow the questioning of the complaining witness concerning the witness's prior sexual conduct [i]f the court finds that the offer of proof is sufficient. We find that the offer of proof was sufficient. There was expert testimony that the injuries to Irene's cervix and to her mouth could have been caused by consensual sex and that these injuries could have been inflicted three to five hours before the strangulation injuries. The testimony of other witnesses indicated that the strangulation injuries must have been inflicted sometime between 4:30 and 5:30 p.m.meaning that Irene could have suffered the injuries to her mouth and cervix through consensual sex that occurred as early as 11:30 a.m. Irene had reportedly told a nurse at the rape treatment center that she had had consensual sex earlier that day, and she had apparently explained to the prosecutor that this had occurred with her boyfriend sometime that morning. Taken together, this evidence offered the possibility that the condition of Irene's cervix and mouth could have been explained by her consensual activity with her boyfriend that morning. If credited, this chain of reasoning could have created a reasonable doubt as to defendant's guilt of the sex-related offenses. The trial court should have conducted a hearing to permit defendant to establish the truth of the hearsay reports of Irene's sexual activity that day and the timing of that activity, and to explore the possible connection between that activity and the condition of Irene's mouth and cervix as viewed at the hospital that evening. The failure to conduct the hearing was assuredly harmless as to the cervical injuries, however, inasmuch as the trial court did ultimately conduct a hearing as to those injuries after defendant filed a motion for new trial based on the exclusion of the evidence of Irene's sexual activity earlier that day. Although the court had already determined that the exclusion of this evidence was not error with respect to the digital penetration count, it decided to allow the victim to be examined to reduce the scope of speculation by this court or others or any other court regarding the issue of prejudice, and to complete the record thereon. This hearing, which was closed to all but counsel and court staff, was limited to exploring the relationship between the morning consensual sex and Irene's vaginal injuries. At the hearing, Irene testified that she and her boyfriend had had sex that morning twice between 9:00 a.m. and noon, that he did not insert any foreign object inside her, and that he did not do anything that might have cut or injured her cervix. Because the evidence at the posttrial hearing rebutted the defense theory of relevance, we can conclude that the failure to conduct the hearing during the trial was harmless, in that the record now shows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion at trial in excluding the evidence of Irene's sexual conduct. ( U.S. v. Azure (8th Cir. 1988) 845 F.2d 1503, 1505-1506.) The Court of Appeal erred in ruling otherwise. No hearing was ever held to determine whether Irene's earlier sexual activity could have accounted for her oral injuries, however. The Attorney General contends that defendant's offer was insufficient to justify a hearing with respect to the oral injuries because the offer did not itself contain evidence that the earlier sexual activity had encompassed oral copulation. We do not believe that this was fatal to defendant's claim. The offer of proof was not a fishing expedition. Rather, defendant identified a specific basis, consisting of hearsay recorded in hospital records and statements relayed by the prosecutor, for believing that Irene had engaged in sexual activity during the relevant time period. The record does not contain Irene's original statements, but both parties variously referred to Irene's sexual activities, experience, encounters, and intercourse. These terms are broad enough to encompass oral sex. Even if they were not, there is no indication in the record that Irene's statement at the hospital was intended to be an exhaustive catalog of her sexual activity that day. Accordingly, we agree with the Court of Appeal that the trial court erred in failing to conduct a hearing under Evidence Code section 782 to investigate whether Irene's prior sexual activity could have provided an alternative explanation for her oral injuries. [1] However, even if one were to assume that a hearing would have established the existence and relevance of oral sexual conduct by the victim earlier that day, the exclusion of such evidence was harmless under any standard. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant digitally penetrated the victim, as the victim had testified and contrary to defendant's testimony that he had no sexual contact with the victim at all. In making this finding, the jury necessarily rejected defendant's claim that he had lashed out violently (but not sexually) at the victim because of his lifelong fear of having his penis bitten off during oral sex. Moreover, defendant's testimony about his lifelong fear of oral sex was thoroughly rebutted by his admissions that he had demanded oral sex from Nina T. in 1992 and that he engaged in oral sex with his current girlfriend. Because defendant has offered no other basis on which the jury could have credited Irene's testimony that defendant forcibly penetrated her digitally but would have disbelieved her testimony that defendant forced her to orally copulate him, any error in excluding evidence of her prior sexual conduct was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.