Opinion ID: 1781095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the granting of a permanent injunction was contrary to the evidence and the law.

Text: Again, we cannot agree with the contention of appellants. No point would be served by detailing the testimony of the numerous witnesses who testified that the operation of the track was a nuisance. Virtually all testified that the operation produced noise and dust that disturbed their enjoyment and use of their lands. . . this noise and dust prevented them from getting outside their houses when races were being held ... the noise made sleeping impossible ... the noise prevented normal conversation outdoors... television could not be enjoyed. According to one witness, the noise resembled four or five men out there with chainsaws cutting down trees. Two complained about trespassers who crossed their property to reach the track. The testimony reflected that the area involved was a semi-rural residential area with only a few commercial establishments. Witnesses for appellants testified that the area where appellees resided already contained some commercial enterprises, including an Alcoa plant. The court received testimony that appellants had spent over $36,000.00 to build their track, that races had been conducted only on a few Sundays each month, and that appellants planned to develop an automobile and motorcycle speedway on their grounds, complete with parks, trees and grandstands. Appellant also offered three witnesses, living within a three-quarter mile radius of the track, who said that the noise from the track did not disturb them. Finally, appellants called an expert, an engineer who specialized in sound measurements for radio stations. The witness measured sound levels from five motorcycles at appellants' track and made computations that purportedly reflected noise levels for thirty motorcycles. He also made computations for noise levels from race cars. On cross-examination, however, the witness admitted that appellant Baker had supplied the measuring instrument used in the tests, and that he had never used such an instrument before. Moreover, he had not checked the instrument for correct calibration. DuVall and Baker testified that there were plans to place mufflers on the motorcycles in the future, but no expert testified as to the value of these devices in reducing noise. The opinion in Durfey v. Thalheimer, 85 Ark. 544, 109 S.W. 519, sets forth the rule that applies to nuisances resulting from the operation of a business: It is the duty of everyone to so use his property as not to injure that of another, and it matters not how well constructed or conducted a [business] may be, it is nevertheless a nuisance if it is so built as to destroy the comfort of persons owning and occupying adjoining premises, creating annoyances which render life uncomfortable, and it may be abated as a nuisance. Though no Arkansas cases have considered whether the operation of a motor vehicle racetrack may create a nuisance, other jurisdictions provide several decisions on the issue. See generally Annotation, 41 A.L.R.3d 1273. The general rule of these cases, illustrated in Bedminster v. Vargo Dragway, Inc., 434 Pa. 100, 253 A.2d 659, is in accord with that of the Durfey case, supra, i. e., while not a nuisance per se, a motor vehicle racetrack may become a nuisance either because of the locality in which it is carried on or because it is conducted in an improper manner. In particular, other courts have found that satisfactory evidence of noise, fumes and dust from a racetrack, disrupting the activities of surrounding landowners, may constitute sufficient grounds for declaring the racetrack a nuisance. Bedminster v. Vargo Dragway, Inc., supra ; Sakler v. Huls, Ohio Com.Pl., 20 Ohio Ops.2d 283, 183 N.E.2d 152. Appellants Baker and DuVall testified that they planned to increase the extent of their operations by building a new racetrack and including automobile races in future programs. We think that a preponderance of the testimony clearly establishes that previous races conducted by appellants seriously interfered with the enjoyment of neighboring residential property, and we find no error in the ruling by the court that same constituted a nuisance. However, the court also restrained appellants from operating an automobile racetrack, and under our cases this phase of the court's order must be modified. [4] In Cooper v. Whissen, 95 Ark. 545, 130 S.W. 703, we stated that where an injunction is sought merely on the ground that a lawful project will be put to a use that will constitute a nuisance, the court will ordinarily refuse to restrain the construction or completion of the project, leaving a plaintiff free to thereafter assert his rights in the proper manner if the contemplated use results in a nuisance. It was pointed out that ordinarily an injunction, in such instances, will not be granted unless the act threatened is a nuisance per se. While we have no cases on the subject, it appears generally speaking, that the operation of a motor vehicle racetrack is not a nuisance per se. See Annotation, 41 A.L. R.3d 1276. In fact, we know of no case to the contrary. Accordingly, the restraining order issued by the Saline County Chancery Court is modified to the extent of setting aside such order insofar as it relates to the racing of automobiles. Let it be emphasized, however, that this modification is due to the fact that insufficient evidence was offered relative to automobile racing to justify such restraining order and appellants, if proceeding further with plans to develop an automobile racetrack, will do so entirely at their own risk, for as pointed out in Cooper v. Whissen, supra , a claimant is free to assert his rights thereafter in an appropriate manner if the contemplated use results in a nuisance. Affirmed as modified.