Opinion ID: 145740
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First and Second State Habeas

Text: In 1998, Smith sought state habeas relief. Under state law the petition was untimely. The Court of Criminal Appeals, over a dissent, rejected an argument that neglect by Smith's counsel merited equitable tolling. Ex parte Smith, 977 S.W.2d 610 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (en banc); see id., at 614 (Overstreet, J., dissenting). Texas then amended its filing rules to allow the exception the Court of Criminal Appeals had declined to create. The statutory change permitted Smith to file for habeas relief. Smith filed his second habeas petition before this Court's decision in Penry II. He argued once more that the special issues were inadequate: In Penry [I], the Supreme Court ... held that the former Texas capital sentencing statute did not provide an adequate vehicle for expressing its reasoned moral response to [mitigating] evidence in rendering its sentencing decision. Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus Pursuant to Section 4A of Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure in No. W91-22803-R(A) (Tex.Crim. App.), p. 191, Record 193 (internal quotation marks omitted). Smith acknowledged the trial court tried to solve the problem with the nullification charge, but he explained that [i]t confounds common sense to suggest jurors  who are sworn to tell the truth  would ever understand that they were authorized to answer [special-issue] questions falsely. Id., at 193, Record 195. Smith continued: Nothing in the special issues themselves linked the `nullification' instruction to the specific questions asked; nothing in the special issues themselves authorized the jury to consider mitigating evidence when answering the questions; nothing in the special issues themselves authorized the jury to answer the questions `no' when the truthful answer was `yes'; in short, nothing in the special issues permitted the jury to apply the `nullification' instruction. Id., at 194, Record 196. Smith conceded he had not objected to the nullification charge but confirmed that he had challenged the special-issues statute and that the Court of Criminal Appeals had reached the merits of this claim on direct review. The State, relying upon a procedural bar different from and indeed contradictory to the one it now raises, responded that [t]his claim [was] procedurally barred as it was both raised and decided on the merits on direct appeal. 1 App. 156; see also id., at 157 (describing Smith's position as an identical complaint and an identical argument to his claim on direct appeal). The State contended, in the alternative, that Smith's position was meritless because the nullification charge cured any problem with the special issues. Respondent's Original Answer and Response to Applicant's Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus in No. W91-22803-R(A) (Tex. Crim.App.), pp. 136-139, Record 467-470. The state trial court denied habeas relief on the ground Smith was procedurally barred from raising the same claim denied on direct review absent a subsequent change in the law so as to render the judgment void .... Ex parte Smith, No. W91-22803-R, 86-87 (265th Dist. Ct. of Dallas Cty., Texas, Apr. 5, 2001).