Opinion ID: 2275833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: KRS 532.110(1)(c) Limits Stambaugh's Sentence.

Text: This case revolves around the proper interpretation of KRS 532.110(1)(c) and (d). KRS 532.110 provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) When multiple sentences of imprisonment are imposed on a defendant for more than one (1) crime, including a crime for which a previous sentence of probation or conditional discharge has been revoked, the multiple sentences shall run concurrently or consecutively as the court shall determine at the time of sentence, except that: ... (c) The aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not exceed in maximum length the longest extended term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for the highest class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed. In no event shall the aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms exceed seventy (70) years; and (d) The sentences of a defendant convicted of two (2) or more felony sex crimes, as defined in KRS 17.500, involving two (2) or more victims shall run consecutively. The intent of KRS 532.110(1) is to first recognize the discretion of the trial court in imposing sentence in criminal cases, and then to list the exceptions the legislature imposed on that discretion. There are four areas of exception, including that the aggregate of indeterminate terms cannot exceed the maximum length for the longest extended term which would be authorized under the PFO statute for the highest class of crime for any of the convictions, and never more than 70 years; and that two or more felony sex offenses involving two or more victims must run consecutively. Since Stambaugh's victims were all less than twelve years of age, his sexual abuse convictions were all Class C felonies. [2] The maximum permissible aggregate prison term in KRS 532.080 to which a person convicted of Class C felonies could be sentenced is twenty years. [3] So a defendant convicted of multiple Class C felonies typically would be subject to a maximum aggregate punishment of twenty years' imprisonment. KRS 532.110(1)(d) provides, in essence, that a person convicted of two or more qualifying sexual felonies involving two or more victims must be sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment. There is no question that Stambaugh's four convictions for sexual abuse in the first degree are qualifying sexual felonies for purposes of KRS 532.110(1)(d). [4] There is also no question that Stambaugh's crimes were committed against multiple victims, three to be exact, as is required for KRS 532.110(1)(d) to apply. Accordingly, there is no doubt that the provisions of KRS 532.110(1)(d) apply to Stambaugh. In plain language, in this case KRS 532.110(1)(d) would appear to require Stambaugh to be sentenced to four consecutive ten-year sentences for a total maximum sentence of forty years' imprisonment. On the other hand, subsection (1)(c) of that same statute would appear to cap Stambaugh's sentence at a maximum of twenty years' imprisonment. This appears to create an inconsistency between the two subsections of the statute. Of course, we must attempt to harmonize seemingly divergent statutory directives if it is reasonably possible to do so. [5] And Stambaugh contends the two subsections at issue can be harmonized. According to Stambaugh, the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision of KRS 532.110(1)(d) applies only until the general sentencing cap of KRS 532.110(1)(c) has been met. In other words, the trial court in the case at hand would have been required to sentence him to consecutive terms of imprisonment until the total term of imprisonment reached twenty years the cap under KRS 532.110(1)(c)after which any remaining sentences must be ordered to run concurrently. Ultimately, we conclude that Stambaugh's proposed reading is a reasonable way to harmonize the two subsections of the statute. All subsection (1)(d) says is that sexual offenses must run consecutively. For example, three convictions for sex abuse in the first degree, where it is a Class D felony, with a maximum penalty of five years (and a maximum extended term of 20 years under the PFO statute), could all be run consecutively with no impact on subsection (1)(c) at all. Thus when the consecutive sentences for lesser sex crimes are less than 20 years, the two sections obviously cannot be in conflict. The intent behind (1)(d) was to remove judicial discretion when sentencing sex offenses generally by requiring that the sentences be run consecutively. Had (1)(d) not been enacted, sentencing courts, under the text of subsection (1) could run lesser sexual offenses concurrently, leading to a scenario where a trial court could, at the extreme, sentence a sex offender convicted of fifty counts of sex abuse to one year in prison. The legislature acted to remove that possibility in sex crime cases, reflecting the general public's view that these crimes are particularly heinous, and sex offenders should not be able to receive unduly light treatment. However, none of this conflicts with the purpose of (1)(c). For years, state governments, and particularly Kentucky, have struggled with prison overcrowding. Incarceration carries a steep cost to the taxpayer. In enacting (1)(c), the legislature determined that there must be a reasonable limit on the amount of time given for punishment, doing a cost-benefit analysis. In doing so, the legislature focused on the aggregate of consecutive terms, and specifically limited the aggregate time served to not exceed the maximum length for the longest extended term which would be authorized under the PFO statute for the highest class of crime for any of the convictions. The legislature even went further, and made sure that a sentence of life could not be imposed by expressly stating that in no event could the aggregate of sentences exceed 70 years. The mandatory nature of the in no event language and the use of shall not in (1)(c) indicate the strength of the legislature's intentions about aggregate sentences. Admittedly, subsection (1)(d) was enacted after (1)(c), and the legislature did not state whether (1)(c) controlled over (1)(d) (though it clearly could have). But neither did the legislature say that (1)(d) controlled over (1)(c). Such a statement was unnecessary, because the mandatory language in (1)(c) speaks for itself, and the intent of (1)(d)to prevent light sentences in sex offensesis not harmed by limiting the aggregate length of time to serve any more than any other category of felony. The two sections operate independently of each other until the highest classes of sex offenses become the convictions. Unless the legislature intended to eviscerate (1)(c) in sex offense cases, there is no reason to read more into (1)(d) than is there. The language in (1)(c) is clear and mandatory, and can certainly be applied to sex offenses the same as any other type of offense. Since the two subsections have entirely different purposes, it is not surprising that the legislature saw no need for undue verbiage. It is clear, then, that the legislature intended for sentencing judges to run sex offense sentences consecutively, but with a limit on the allowable aggregate sentence. Under such a reading, this Court gives effect to both subsections of KRS 532.110, which we are required to do, if possible, when construing a statute, and also here under the rule of lenity. As such, the trial court's imposition of consecutive sentences but with an maximum aggregate of twenty years was not erroneous.