Opinion ID: 2295192
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: DCYF's Efforts to Reunify Armand and Gabrielle

Text: Armand contends on appeal that the trial justice committed reversible error in finding that DCYF made reasonable efforts to reunify Gabrielle and her father. When it seeks to terminate parental rights, subsequent to presenting sufficient evidence to support [a finding of parental unfitness], DCYF must additionally demonstrate to the Family Court that it has made reasonable efforts to strengthen the parent-child relationship in accordance with the provisions of § 15-7-7(b)(1). [14] In re Brooklyn M., 933 A.2d 1113, 1125 (R.I.2007); see also In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156; In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d at 882. In addition, when DCYF attempts to terminate parental rights pursuant to § 15-7-7(a)(3), which requires that the child has been placed in the legal custody or care of DCYF for at least twelve months, the parent must be offered or receive services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed. [15] As a result of both that statutory mandate and the need to protect the parent's fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and management of his or her child, DCYF [must] prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it made reasonable efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship prior to filing a TPR petition. In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 203; see also In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d at 882. The criterion of reasonable efforts is subject to a case-by-case analysis [that takes] into account, among other things, the conduct and cooperation of the parents. In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d at 618; see also In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 203. Moreover, in our consideration of whether or not DCYF has made reasonable efforts, we employ a totality of the circumstances approach, pursuant to which the efforts required from DCYF to satisfy the reasonable efforts standard vary with the differing capacities of the parents involved. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d 1202, 1209 (R.I.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have recognized, however, that, even when DCYF has made the required reasonable efforts, reunification may not always be possible. For that reason, provided that reasonable efforts have been made, we do not fault the agency when the treatment received does not resolve the underlying problem or when a parent's recalcitrance to treatment precludes reunification. In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 203; see also In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d at 882 (stating that DCYF need not undertake extraordinary efforts to reunite parent and child (internal quotation marks omitted)).
It is of significance to note that DCYF need not be the sole provider of the necessary services to the parent(s); we have expressly indicated that the services may be offered by the agency or received elsewhere.  In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 203 (emphasis added); see also In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156 (stating that DCYF must ensure that services are offered or received). However, regardless of whether the services are offered by DCYF or provided by another source, it is well established that such services must be offered or received, regardless of the unlikelihood of their success. In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 203 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also § 15-7-7(a)(3); In re Steven D., 23 A.3d at 1156. For example, in In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 203-04, DCYF was not required to provide additional drug counseling to the parent because she had been independently receiving substance abuse treatment from the time her daughter was initially removed from her care until the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights. Similarly, in the instant case, DCYF was not required to provide additional substance abuse counseling to Armandsince he had already been receiving such counseling from Becky Chartier of NRI Community Services since July of 2008. Elsewhere in our opinion in In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 204, however, we stated that it was wholly unreasonable for DCYF not to include any mental health treatment in the parent's case plan because her mental illness was one of the primary barriers to her reunification with her daughter. Moreover, in that case, her caseworkers either knew in fact, or should have known, about the concerns of the mother's drug counselor concerning the paralyzing effects of her depression and her high risk for relapse. Id. [16] The circumstances in the instant case are readily distinguishable from those relative to mental health treatment in In re Natalya C. because Armand was receiving mental health treatment from Mr. Petrin. We consider it significant that, in the three years prior to trial, Louis Petrin of NRI Community Services had been working with Armand concerning his depression, his substance abuse issues, and his cognitive impairment. DCYF was aware that Armand had sought and was regularly receiving those services to remedy both his substance abuse and his mental health issues. Indeed, Laura Nevins of DCYF testified that she did not make any referrals for Armand because he was making them on his own. Moreover, it was Ms. Nevins's testimony that she requested and received a report concerning Armand's mental health treatment from his NRI Community Services clinician. Accordingly, in the present case, it was not necessary for DCYF to provide duplicative services to a parent who was already receiv[ing] services to correct the situation which led to the child being placed. See § 15-7-7(a)(3).
This Court has had occasion to indicate that [t]here must be a limit to the extension of reasonable efforts. In re Kayla N., 900 A.2d at 1209 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, in our assessment of the reasonable efforts of DCYF, we look also to the conduct and cooperation of the parents. In re Jose Luis R.H., 968 A.2d at 883; see also In re Natalya C., 946 A.2d at 203; In re Nicole B., 703 A.2d at 618. In the instant matter, the DCYF caseworker (Ms. Nevins) created case plans every six months and attempted to work with Armand with respect to those plans. However, although Armand was involved with the first case plan, it was Ms. Nevins's testimony that thereafter Armand was homeless and not available, or did not want to speak with [her]. Moreover, Ms. Nevins would contact Mr. Petrin when she needed to get in touch with Armand, but was unable to reach Armand himself. Therefore, due to the fact that Armand often could not be reached, Ms. Nevins was unable to engage in case planning with him. It was also Ms. Nevins's testimony that Armand had been inconsistent with respect to visitation. At the time of trial, Armand had also been receiving counseling for both his substance abuse and mental health issues. According to Dr. Parsons, NRI Community Services (which provided Armand with counseling with respect to those issues) strongly recommended that Armand not be reunified with Gabrielle because, in its view, Armand was unable to provide for her physical, developmental, or emotional needs. In view of the foregoing findings of fact that are supported in the record, we perceive no basis for holding that the trial justice clearly erred in concluding that DCYF's efforts to strengthen the parent child relationship were reasonable.