Opinion ID: 2809264
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Federal Conspiracy Claims

Text: “A civil conspiracy under § 1983 [or Bivens] is ‘an agreement between two or more persons to injure another by unlawful action.’” Bazzi v. City of Dearborn, 658 F.3d 598, 602 (6th. Cir. 2011) (quoting Revis v. Meldrum, 489 F.3d 273, 290 (6th Cir. 2007)). A plaintiff must show that (1) a “single plan” existed; (2) defendants “shared in the general conspiratorial objective” to deprive the plaintiff of his constitutional rights, and (3) “an overt act was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy that caused [the plaintiff’s] injury.” Hooks v. Hooks, 771 F.2d 935, 944 (6th Cir. 1985). “It is well-settled that conspiracy claims must be pled with some degree of specificity and that vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts will not be sufficient to state such a claim under [Bivens or] § 1983.” Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 1987). Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 30 The district court held that neither Webb nor Price alleged with specificity the existence of a common plan among the law-enforcement Defendants. Price, 2013 WL 1303783, at ; Webb, 2013 WL 1303776, at . But “[r]arely in a conspiracy case will there be direct evidence of an express agreement among all the conspirators to conspire, . . . [and] circumstantial evidence may provide adequate proof of conspiracy.” Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 528 (6th Cir. 2000). The facts in this case provide circumstantial evidence that could enable a reasonable jury to infer the existence of a shared conspiratorial plan to frame Webb and Price. Drawing factual inferences in Webb’s favor, Metcalf misdated the N-17 recording of the conversation setting up the drug buy; Lucas, Metcalf, and/or Cross deleted exculpatory evidence from the N-18 recording of the drug buy; and Lucas testified and reported falsely about the misdated call and about what occurred at the drug buy. While each of these alleged misdeeds may have occurred independently, they are sufficiently intertwined so as to suggest an agreement between the perpetrators. Webb therefore presented sufficient evidence of a common plan between Lucas, Metcalf, and Cross to violate his rights. Drawing factual inferences in Price’s favor, Faith falsely reported that he and Metcalf saw Price leave his Glessner Avenue home and followed him to South Adams Street. It is unlikely that Faith would have made this false report without at least having Metcalf’s tacit support. Lucas corroborated Faith’s false report by falsely identifying the man who arrived on South Adams Street as Price in his report and grand-jury testimony. This corroboration permits the inference of an agreement to falsely identify the arriving person. Price therefore presented sufficient evidence of a common plan between Lucas, Metcalf, and Faith to violate his rights. The district court also noted that “Plaintiff does not identify overt acts attributable to particular individuals.” Price, 2013 WL 1303783, at . But the overt-act element requires only that at least one of the alleged conspirators committed an overt act or omission in furtherance of the conspiracy. Hooks, 771 F.2d at 944. The Plaintiffs have identified several overt acts, including false testimony, false reporting, and alteration of recordings. Accordingly, we reverse the grants of qualified immunity as to Webb’s § 1983 and Bivens conspiracy claims Nos. 14-3443/3444 Webb, et al. v. United States, et al. Page 31 against Lucas, Metcalf, and Cross, and as to Price’s § 1983 and Bivens conspiracy claims against Lucas, Metcalf, and Faith. The Plaintiffs’ § 1983 and Bivens conspiracy claims against the remaining individual Defendants fail because those claims rely exclusively on misconduct in the wider Operation Turnaround context. Webb and Price were required to show that the remaining individual Defendants shared a common plan to violate their constitutional rights. See Robertson, 753 F.3d at 622. While the remaining individual Defendants may have been involved in framing other Operation Turnaround targets, Plaintiffs produced no evidence that any of them personally participated in framing Webb or Price, and therefore it cannot be inferred that these Defendants joined in a common plan to frame Webb or Price. Ibid. Price also alleged that law-enforcement Defendants conspired to deprive him of his civil rights in violation of § 1985. To state a § 1985 claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges or immunities of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States.” Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518-19 (6th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court requires that § 1985 claims contain allegations of “class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.” Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). The class must be based upon race or other “inherent personal characteristics.” Browder v. Tipton, 630 F.2d 1149, 1150 (6th Cir. 1980). Because Price did not allege class-based discrimination and failed to provide evidence of class-based animus, the district court properly held that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity as to the § 1985 claim. See Vakilian, 335 F.3d at 518-19.