Opinion ID: 2638592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Effect of Hicks v. State on Sovereign Immunity

Text: {10} In Hicks v. State, 88 N.M. 588, 590-92, 544 P.2d 1153, 1155-57 (1975), this Court abolished common law sovereign immunity. Cockrell relies on Hicks for two related arguments in the present case. First, Cockrell contends that Alden was based on common law sovereign immunity and that, [b]ecause the doctrine of common law sovereign immunity has been abolished in New Mexico, Alden has no application in claims against the State of New Mexico. But see Hydro Conduit Corp. v. Kemble, 110 N.M. 173, 178 n. 2, 793 P.2d 855, 860 n. 2 (1990) ([T]he common law now recognizes a constitutionally valid statutory imposition of sovereign immunity, and such immunity must be honored by the courts where the legislature has so mandated.). Alternatively, Cockrell relies on this Court's characterization of Hicks as generally abolish[ing] the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity in all its ramifications, whether in tort or contract or otherwise, except as implemented by statute or as might otherwise be interposed by judicial decision for sound policy reasons. Torrance County Mental Health Program, Inc. v. N.M. Health & Evr't Dep't, 113 N.M. 593, 597, 830 P.2d 145, 149 (1992). Based on this language, Cockrell argues that the State has waived immunity under Hicks because the Legislature has not enacted a statute reestablishing sovereign immunity as it pertains to federal statutory claims in general and FLSA claims in particular. Cockrell contends that the legislative response to Hicks through Section 37-1-23, which provides that the State is immune from contract actions that are not based on a valid written contract, and the Tort Claims Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 41-4-1 to -27 (1976, as amended through 2001), which provides immunity for liability for any tort except as otherwise waived, NMSA 1978, § 41-4-4(A) (2001), reestablished only a narrow immunity for the State that does not extend to FLSA claims. We believe both of these arguments are answered by the Supreme Court's opinion in Alden. {11} Contrary to Cockrell's assertion, the Supreme Court did not rest its opinion in Alden on common law sovereign immunity. Although the sovereign immunity of the States derives at least in part from the common-law tradition, the structure and history of the Constitution make clear that the immunity exists today by constitutional design. Alden, 527 U.S. at 733, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Within the specific realm of federalism, the judicially created doctrine of sovereign immunity was transformed into a constitutional principle by the ratification of the United States Constitution. Thus, in the limited context of a private action for money damages authorized by a federal statute, the States do retain a constitutional immunity from suit in their own courts. Id. at 745, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (emphasis added). {12} In Hicks, this Court recognized that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is one of common law, judicially created. 88 N.M. at 589, 544 P.2d at 1154. Because we addressed only the State's liability for damages in a common law tort action, we determined that sovereign immunity has always been a judicial creation without statutory codification and, therefore, can also be put to rest by the judiciary. Id. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155. We had no need to address the statutory sovereign immunity that did not yet exist, nor could we have foreseen the constitutional significance attributed to sovereign immunity in the limited context of federalism by the Supreme Court in Alden. Our abrogation of sovereign immunity in Hicks was therefore limited to common law sovereign immunity from common law causes of action. For the simple reason that constitutional sovereign immunity was beyond the scope of the issue presented in Hicks, our holding in that case cannot be characterized as inconsistent with Alden's recognition of a constitutional sovereign immunity or as effectuating a waiver of constitutional sovereign immunity. See Torrance County, 113 N.M. at 597, 830 P.2d at 149 ([W]e cannot agree . . . that Hicks's sweeping abolition of sovereign immunity carried away all defenses of governmental entities, based on their role as state-created entities, regardless of the nature of the claims asserted or the relief sought.). {13} Indeed, being presented with this issue for the first time, we do not believe that it is within this Court's province to decide whether the State should subject itself to liability for a federal claim filed in state court. Under the principle of separation of powers embodied in Article III, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution, we believe this is a matter for the Legislature. Unlike the decision to do away with common law principles, Hicks, 88 N.M. at 590, 544 P.2d at 1155, which is within this Court's power, the decision to waive this State's constitutional sovereign immunity would represent an alteration of the constitutional balance of power between the Federal Government and the State of New Mexico that was struck by the Supreme Court in Alden. In addition, this decision involves the allocation of scarce resources among competing needs and interests [that] lies at the heart of the political process. Alden, 527 U.S. at 751, 119 S.Ct. 2240. If the principle of representative government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between competing interests must be reached after deliberation by the political process established by the citizens of the State.... Id. The question in this circumstance is not the continued legitimacy of a court-made rule; it is instead the public policy in New Mexico of the proper relationship between the federal and state governments. We believe that a policy decision of this magnitude, going to New Mexico's most fundamental political processes, id., is particularly unsuited for judicial resolution as a matter of state constitutional law. As we have recognized, it is the particular domain of the legislature, as the voice of the people, to make public policy. Torres v. State, 119 N.M. 609, 612, 894 P.2d 386, 389 (1995) (noting that [t]he judiciary . . . is not as directly and politically responsible to the people as are the legislative and executive branches of government). Thus, in order to refrain from unduly encroaching on a core function of the legislative branch of government under Article III, Section 1, see State ex rel. Taylor v. Johnson, 1998-NMSC-015, ¶ 23, 125 N.M. 343, 961 P.2d 768, we conclude that it is within the sole province of the Legislature to waive the State's constitutional sovereign immunity. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 752, 119 S.Ct. 2240 (A State is entitled to order the processes of its own governance, assigning to the political branches, rather than the courts, the responsibility for directing the payment of debts. If Congress could displace a State's allocation of governmental power and responsibility, the judicial branch of the State, whose legitimacy derives from fidelity to the law, would be compelled to assume a role not only foreign to its experience but beyond its competence as defined by the very Constitution from which its existence derives.) (citation omitted). {14} Based on his argument that Alden has no application in New Mexico, Cockrell also argues that Hicks ' abolition of common law sovereign immunity, when combined with the principle of federal supremacy, precludes the Legislature from asserting sovereign immunity. Cockrell contends that the Legislature cannot enact a statutory immunity that is inconsistent with federal law and that Congress's application of the remedial provisions of the FLSA, in 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), against the State as an employer is binding on New Mexico through the Supremacy Clause. We reject this argument based on the foregoing analysis of Alden and Hicks. We also reject Cockrell's reliance on federal supremacy. Under Article VI of the United States Constitution, as well as Article II, Section 1 of the New Mexico Constitution, the federal Constitution and federal laws are the supreme Law of the Land. However, in order to be supreme, a federal law must be made in Pursuance of the United States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI. As the Supreme Court recognized in Alden, the Supremacy Clause enshrines as `the supreme Law of the Land' only those Federal Acts that accord with the constitutional design. 527 U.S. at 731, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Similarly, the state supremacy clause cannot confer on Congress the authority to exercise a power that is withheld by the United States Constitution. Congress's authority stems from the United States Constitution, not from the New Mexico Constitution. We reject any contention that substantive federal law by its own force necessarily overrides the sovereign immunity of the States. When a State asserts its immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law but the implementation of the law in a manner consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the States. Alden, 527 U.S. at 732, 119 S.Ct. 2240. Because Congress' powers under Article I of the Constitution do not include the power to subject States to suit at the hands of private individuals, Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 80, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000), the private remedial provisions of the FLSA as applied against the States are constitutionally invalid and of no force and effect unless and until a state waives its constitutional sovereign immunity. [2] {15} We determine that Hicks does not render Alden inapplicable in New Mexico. The constitutional sovereign immunity created by the United States Constitution survived our opinion in Hicks, and therefore, the Legislature need not have enacted a statute to reestablish this immunity. But see Hartman v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 22 P.3d 524, 529 (Colo.Ct.App.2000) (cert. granted Apr. 23, 2001) (concluding that an FLSA claim did not lie in tort and that the state legislature had created statutory immunity only for tort actions). This State, by virtue of its sovereign role in the Union, is constitutionally immune from private suits for damages under a federal statute. If the State is to consent to Congress's encroachment on this vital aspect of federalism, it must be a decision of the Legislature. Thus, we now consider Cockrell's argument that the Legislature has waived the constitutional sovereign immunity recognized by Alden.