Opinion ID: 2450126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Substantial Step Issue

Text: As stated above, our task is to determine whether the defendant's actions in this case constitute a substantial step toward the commission of second degree murder under the new statute. The substantial step issue has not yet been addressed by a Tennessee court in a published opinion, and the question is made more difficult by the fact that the legislature declined to set forth any definition of the term, preferring instead to leave the issue of what constitutes a substantial step [to the courts] for determination in each particular case. § 39-12-101, Comments of Sentencing Commission. In addressing this issue, we first note that the legislature, in enacting § 39-12-101, clearly looked to the criminal attempt section set forth in the Model Penal Code. That section provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (1) Definition of attempt. A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for commission of the crime, he: (a) purposely engages in conduct which would constitute the crime if the attendant circumstances were as he believes them to be; or (b) when causing a particular result is an element of the crime, does or omits to do anything with the purpose of causing or with the belief that it will cause such result, without further conduct on his part; or (c) purposely does or omits to do anything which, under the circumstances as he believes them to be, is a substantial step in a course of conduct planned to culminate in his commission of the crime Model Penal Code, Section 5.01 (emphasis added.) The State argues that the striking similarity of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101 and the Model Penal Code evidences the legislature's intention to abandon the old law of criminal attempt and instead adopt the Model Penal Code approach. The State then avers that the model code contains examples of conduct which, if proven, would entitle, but not require, the jury to find that the defendant had taken a substantial step; and that two of these examples are applicable to this case. The section of the model code relied upon by the State, § 5.01(2), provides, in pertinent part, as follows: (2) Conduct which may be held substantial step under paragraph (1)(c). Conduct shall not be held to constitute a substantial step under paragraph (1)(c) of this Section unless it is strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose. Without negativing the sufficiency of other conduct, the following, if strongly corroborative of the actor's criminal purpose, shall not be held insufficient as a matter of law: ..... (e) possession of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, which are specially designed for such unlawful use or which can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; (f) possession, collection or fabrication of materials to be employed in the commission of the crime, at or near the place contemplated for its commission, where such possession, collection or fabrication serves no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances; ..... (emphasis added.) The State concludes that because the issue of whether the defendant's conduct constitutes a substantial step may be a jury question under the model code, the jury was justified in finding her guilty of attempting to commit second degree murder. The defendant counters by arguing that despite the similarity of Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-12-101 and the Model Penal Code's attempt provision, the legislature intended to retain the sharp distinction between mere preparation and the act itself characteristic of such decisions as Dupuy . She supports this assertion by pointing out that although the legislature could have easily included the examples set forth in § 5.01(2) of the model code, the Tennessee statute does not include the examples. The defendant concludes that the new statute did not substantially change Tennessee attempt law, and that her conviction must be reversed because her actions constitute mere preparation under Dupuy . Initially, we cannot accept the argument that the legislature intended to explicitly adopt the Model Penal Code approach, including the examples set forth in § 5.01(2). Although § 39-12-101 is obviously based on the model code, we agree with the defendant that the legislature could have, if it had so desired, simply included the specific examples in the Tennessee statute. That it did not do so prohibits us from concluding that the legislature explicitly intended to adopt the model code approach in all its particulars. This conclusion does not mean, however, that the legislature intended to retain the distinction between mere preparation and the act itself. Moreover, while we concede that a strong argument can be made that the conviction conflicts with Dupuy because the defendant did not place the poison in the cup, but simply brought it to the crime scene, we also are well aware that the Dupuy approach to attempt law has been consistently and effectively criticized. One persistent criticism of the endeavor to separate mere preparation from the act itself is that the question is ultimately not one of kind but of degree; [1] the act itself is merely one of the termini on a continuum of criminal activity. Therefore, distinguishing between mere preparation and the act itself in a principled manner is a difficult, if not impossible, task. [2] See U.S. v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir.1988); U.S. v. Brown, 604 F.2d 347, 350 (5th Cir.1979); Levenbook, Prohibiting Attempts and Preparations, 49 U.M.K.C.L.Rev. 41 (1980); Hall, Criminal Attempt  A Study of Foundations of Criminal Liability, 40 Yale L.J. 789, 821-22 (1940). The other principal ground of criticism of the Dupuy approach bears directly on the primary objective of the law  that of preventing inchoate crimes from becoming full-blown ones. Many courts and commentators have argued that failing to attach criminal responsibility to the actor  and therefore prohibiting law enforcement officers from taking action  until the actor is on the brink of consummating the crime endangers the public and undermines the preventative goal of attempt law. See People v. Terrell, 99 Ill.2d 427, 77 Ill.Dec. 88, 92, 459 N.E.2d 1337, 1341 (1984); U.S. v. Prichard, 781 F.2d 179, 182 (10th Cir.1986); U.S. v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1040 (2d Cir.1976). See generally Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation, and Conspiracy, 61 Colum.L.Rev. 571, 586-611 (1961). The shortcomings of the Dupuy rule with respect to the goal of prevention are particularly evident in this case. As stated above, it is likely that under Dupuy no criminal responsibility would have attached unless the poison had actually been placed in the teacher's cup. This rigid requirement, however, severely undercuts the objective of prevention because of the surreptitious nature of the act of poisoning. Once a person secretly places a toxic substance into a container from which another person is likely to eat or drink, the damage is done. Here, if it had not been for the intervention of the teacher, she could have been rendered powerless to protect herself from harm. After carefully weighing considerations of stare decisis against the persuasive criticisms of the Dupuy rule, we conclude that this artificial and potentially harmful rule must be abandoned. We hold that when an actor possesses materials to be used in the commission of a crime, at or near the scene of the crime, and where the possession of those materials can serve no lawful purpose of the actor under the circumstances, the jury is entitled, but not required, to find that the actor has taken a substantial step toward the commission of the crime if such action is strongly corroborative of the actor's overall criminal purpose. [3] For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. ANDERSON, C.J., and REID and WHITE, JJ., concur. BIRCH, J., files separate concurring and dissenting opinion.