Opinion ID: 398814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Disparate Treatment Model

Text: 22 Although the appellant structured his evidence to fit a disparate impact case, a review of the record makes clear that Pouncy also claimed that Prudential discriminated against its black employees by treating them differently from its white employees. Thus, the appellant also attempted to prove a classwide disparate treatment case. In contrast to a disparate impact case, motive must be proved in a disparate treatment case. Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 395 (5th Cir. 1981). Moreover, to succeed in a disparate treatment case, Pouncy had to prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or 'accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts. (He) had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that racial discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure-the regular rather than the unusual practice. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. at 1855 (footnote omitted). 23 Statistical evidence is also of central importance in a disparate treatment case. It may be used to show both motive and a pattern or practice of racial discrimination. In a proper case, we may infer racial discrimination if gross statistical disparities in the composition of an employer's work force can be shown. Id. at 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. at 1854 n.15. When the statistical showing is sufficiently strong in a disparate treatment action, (the) plaintiffs' prima facie case can be made without additional evidence establishing that (the) defendant purposefully treated minorities protected under Title VII less favorably than other persons. Wilkins, 654 F.2d at 395. 24 Statistical evidence, however, must be meaningful. 25 Because of the significant role that statistics can play in discrimination cases and of their inherently slippery nature, it is imperative that they be used properly. While gross statistical disparities may alone establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination in a proper case, the Supreme Court has cautioned that statistics are not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances. 26 Id. (quoting Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 340, 97 S.Ct. at 1857). With this caveat in mind, we advert to the statistical evidence comprising the appellant's case.
27 The appellant introduced a series of exhibits comparing the mean salary of Prudential employees hired in 1973 through 1978 and still on the payroll in 1978. The exhibits were prepared by selecting from a 1978 list of Prudential employees all black employees hired in 1973. The weekly salaries of these employees were added together and the sum was then divided by the number of employees producing a mean salary for a black employee at Prudential hired in 1973 and still with Prudential 5 years later. This process was repeated for white employees and black employees hired in each year, 1973 through 1978 inclusive, and still with Prudential. This exercise showed that when compared to black employees hired in the same year, white employees had a greater mean weekly salary. See 499 F.Supp. at 449. 28 The district judge characterized the appellant's series of exhibits as a naked comparison of average weekly salaries without regard to level of skill, education and training (from which n)o meaningful conclusion can be drawn, much less a prima facie case. 9 Id. We agree. The appellant's statistical evidence is deficient because it fails to take into account the fact that a number of factors operate simultaneously to influence the amount of salary (an employee) receives. Wilkins, 654 F.2d at 402. The discrepancies between the mean salary of black employees and the mean salary of white employees hired in specific years may be explained by any number of nondiscriminatory factors. Different job levels, different skill levels, previous training, and experience: all may account for unequal salaries in an environment free of discrimination. The appellant's exhibits make the baseless assumption that the mean salary of employees, by race and by year hired, should be equal regardless of the level at which the employee originally was hired. Under the appellant's analysis, an attorney hired at level 20 with a salary of $20,000 would be compared with a file clerk of a different race with a salary of $6500 if both were hired in the same year. From this inconclusive evidence we are unable to hold that Prudential's black employees, as a class, were the victims of employment discrimination. 10
29 The appellant also introduced two series of exhibits focusing on the allocation of promotions within Prudential's work force. One series of exhibits revealed that, with few exceptions, in each year from 1973 to 1975 the percentage of black employees receiving promotions to supervisory and managerial positions, levels 10 through 84, was less than the percentage of blacks in Prudential's work force. The other series of exhibits showed that, with one exception in 1975, when comparing, by race, employees promoted to levels 5 through 12 in the years from 1973 to 1977, black employees had a greater mean number of years of service with Prudential than white employees. The district judge was persuaded by neither of the appellant's series of exhibits that Prudential discriminated against its black employees in awarding promotions. 11 499 F.Supp. at 455. We agree with the district judge that the appellant's promotional evidence does not demonstrate that Prudential has discriminated impermissibly against its black employees. 30 The series of exhibits that show the percentage of employees, by race, promoted to managerial and supervisory positions at Prudential in each year were prepared simply. The number of promotions to each level, from level 10 to level 82, for each year from 1973 to 1975, were tallied. Then, each sum was analyzed to determine the number of white employees and the number of black employees receiving a promotion to that level that year. Percentages of white employees and black employees were then calculated. 31 Although the percentage of black employees that had received promotions to levels 10 through 82 generally is far less than the percentage of black employees in Prudential's work force, we refuse to infer that Prudential treated its black employees less favorably in awarding promotions. The appellant's argument that this evidence demonstrated that Prudential discriminated against its black employees in promotions says nothing of the required comparison to a qualified pool of employees presumptively eligible for promotion. See Wilkins, 654 F.2d at 401. Instead, the appellant makes the baseless assumption that all employees are equally qualified for all positions-an assumption specifically rejected by the district judge as not supported by the evidence. 499 F.Supp. at 454. 32 The appellant's other series of exhibits on promotions at Prudential was prepared by finding the sum of the number of years of service at Prudential for each employee, by race, promoted to each level, 5 through 12, at the time of promotion. These sums were then divided by the number of employees, by race, promoted to the different levels. The resulting statistic-the mean number of years of service at Prudential for employees, by race, at each level-indicated that, with one exception, black employees were employed by Prudential longer than white employees before being promoted to each level. 33 Like the district judge, we refuse to infer from this presentation that Prudential's black employees are disfavored in promotions. 34 (T)his exhibit does not reflect the level of hire of the employees whose promotion rates are compared. Such an omission could result in misinterpretation of data. As an example, (the exhibit) indicates that Blacks averaged 7.16 years of service prior to promotion (to level 9 in 1975). But if these same white employees had been college hires (hired in at level 8) and had taken an average of 5.8 years to advance one level, and the black employees had been entry level hires (level 2) and had required an average of 7.16 years to advance 7 levels, the same data would indicate that Blacks actually enjoyed a more rapid rate of advancement than Whites. 35 Thus, as defendant's expert testified and as these contrasting results demonstrate, no conclusions can be drawn from such an analysis of years prior to promotion, without more, because its results cannot be attributed to any one cause-in this instance, it cannot be determined whether a certain number of years prior to promotion results from the relative level of hire or rate of promotion. 36 499 F.Supp. at 455 (footnotes omitted). We previously have suggested that the mean length of time between promotions may be relevant in proving discrimination. Wilkins, 654 F.2d at 402. But that was not proved in this case. The appellant's evidence on promotions did not establish that Prudential's black employees were the victims of disparate treatment. 12
37 The district judge held that the appellant's utilization statistics, fully described in his findings, see 499 F.Supp. at 459, established a prima facie case of employment discrimination, see id. He went on to conclude, however, that Prudential's  'more refined, accurate and valid statistics,'  id., reflecting a gradual but steady increase in the percentage of black employees in all levels of Prudential's work force, was inconsistent with any policy of discrimination during the time period relevant to this lawsuit, id. at 460. 38 In this appeal, Prudential argues that the appellant's utilization statistics did not make out a prima facie case of employment discrimination. We see, however, no reason to decide this question for, whether or not a prima facie case was established, and no matter what burden, if any, shifted to Prudential, it is abundantly clear, considering the evidence that the number and percentage of black employees steadily increased in all levels of Prudential's work force, see id. at 459-61, that on the ultimate issue-whether Prudential had discriminated against its black employees-the district judge was justified in concluding as he did. 13 See Movement for Opportunity and Equality v. General Motors Corp., 622 F.2d 1235, 1245 (7th Cir. 1980). Likewise, any claim of the appellant that his utilization evidence mandated a finding of discrimination is without merit.