Opinion ID: 2353090
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of the June 28, 2006, Order

Text: [¶ 12] Kathleen contends that the court erred by concluding that the UCLSA does not apply to her request for support for the parties' daughter, who has a disability, from age nineteen to age twenty-one. The updated version of the UCLSA, contained in its entirety at 19-A M.R.S. §§ 3501-3506, contains no provision that states that a parent has a duty to continue to support a disabled child beyond her nineteenth birthday, or that a child, or a parent on behalf of the child, can seek to enforce such a duty against an obligor parent. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in concluding that the UCLSA is not applicable, and there is no need for us to address Harvey's argument, raised in his motion to dismiss, that the issue is now moot or that Kathleen lacks standing.
[¶ 13] Kathleen further argues that the court erred by failing to require Harvey to reimburse her for a percentage of the costs of a summer program for their disabled daughter. Pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, Harvey is responsible for paying a specified portion of medical expenses, and is responsible for other expenses only as he is able. The court's findings that the summer program is not a medical expense, does not fall into the category of other expenses for the girls, and that Harvey was not otherwise able to pay for the program, are not clearly erroneous. See Lee v. Maier, 1999 ME 62, ¶ 6, 728 A.2d 154, 156.
[¶ 14] Harvey contends in his cross-appeal of the June 2006 order that the District Court erred by failing to reduce any obligation he might owe to Kathleen, based on several considerations. [¶ 15] Harvey first asserts that he should be credited for what he alleges to be overpayments for health insurance coverage for their daughters. All of those payments occurred several years prior to his filing the motion to amend the divorce judgment. Reductions in such health care support obligations can be made retroactive only to the date that a party is served a motion to amend. See White v. Nason, 2005 ME 73, ¶ 15, 874 A.2d 891, 895. Accordingly, the District Court did not err in failing to reduce health care obligations paid by Harvey pursuant to an order that required him to provide the children with health care coverage prior to his motion to amend that child support order. [¶ 16] Harvey also contends that he paid more than he was required to on a marital debt pursuant to the terms of the settlement agreement, and that the court erred when it declined to offset his child support obligation by the amount of that overpayment. The appropriate procedure for obtaining post-judgment relief from a decree dividing marital property is a motion for relief from judgment under M.R. Civ. P. 60(b). Wardwell v. Wardwell, 458 A.2d 750, 752 (Me.1983). Harvey did not move the court for relief from the judgment with respect to marital property, and the District Court did not err in failing to offset Harvey's child support obligation by an alleged overpayment of marital debt pursuant to the property settlement when the issue was not properly before the court. See id. [¶ 17] In his final challenge to the June 2006 order, Harvey argues that, because the youngest daughter has been receiving disability payments, any payments that Kathleen may be entitled to receive from Harvey should be reduced pursuant to 19-A M.R.S. § 2001(5) (2006), governing gross income, or 19-A M.R.S. § 2007(3)(D) (2006), governing deviation from support guidelines. In Ouellette v. Ouellette, 687 A.2d 242, 243 (Me.1996), we rejected the argument that Harvey now makes that the youngest daughter's social security benefits should be counted as part of one of the parents' gross income pursuant to section 2001(5). The court also acted within its discretion when it considered the daughter's income received from social security pursuant to section 2007(3)(D), but nevertheless declined to deviate from the child support guidelines in this case. See Ouellette, 687 A.2d at 243.