Opinion ID: 4529730
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: Boateng argues that the BIA erred in determining that he could safely relocate within Ghana. Boateng also argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he was not eligible for humanitarian asylum. We discuss each of Boateng’s challenges in turn. 11 Case: 19-11594 Date Filed: 04/29/2020 Page: 12 of 17 A. Substantial Evidence Supports the BIA’s Determination that Boateng Was Ineligible for Asylum and Withholding of Removal Because He Can Reasonably Relocate Within Ghana. Boateng argues that the BIA erred in determining that he was ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal. “Any alien who is physically present in the United States . . . may apply for asylum.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(1). The government has discretion to grant asylum if the applicant establishes that he is a “refugee.” Id. § 1158(b)(1)(A). A refugee is a person “who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself . . . of the protection of, [his . . . country of nationality] because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Id. § 1101(a)(42)(A). To establish asylum eligibility, the applicant must, with specific and credible evidence, show “(1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor,” or (2) “a well-founded fear that the statutorily listed factor will cause . . . future persecution.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). An applicant who establishes past persecution is presumed to have a wellfounded fear of future persecution. See Diallo v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 596 F.3d 1329, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010). The government can rebut the presumption by showing, by a preponderance of evidence, either (1) a fundamental change in circumstances in the applicant’s country of nationality such that the applicant no longer has a well- 12 Case: 19-11594 Date Filed: 04/29/2020 Page: 13 of 17 founded fear of persecution because of a statutorily-protected ground, or (2) that the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of his country of nationality, and—under all the circumstances—it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to relocate. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)-(B). Here, both the IJ and the BIA were satisfied that Boateng suffered past persecution. We therefore discuss whether substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Boateng lacked a well-founded fear of future persecution. Because the BIA’s decision discussed only whether Boateng could reasonably relocate within Ghana to avoid future persecution, we focus our analysis on that question. 3 Boateng argues that substantial evidence does not support the finding that he can reasonably relocate within Ghana. 4 In determining whether relocation would be reasonable, the factfinder must consider the following factors: 3 Although the IJ also concluded that the government had met its burden by establishing a fundamental change of circumstances in Ghana, the BIA did not address this issue, having concluded that the government had met its burden to show that Boateng could relocate within Ghana. Because we review only those portions of the IJ’s decision that the BIA adopts or agrees with, we do not address whether the government has proven that circumstances have changed in Ghana. Malu v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 764 F.3d 1282, 1289 (11th Cir. 2014). 4 Boateng also argues that the BIA erred in concluding that he had not challenged the IJ’s determination that he could avoid future persecution by relocating within Ghana—the first question in the relocation analysis. Specifically, he argues that the BIA erred in finding that he had conceded that the IJ “correctly found ‘a specific area of the country where the risk of persecution to the respondent falls below the well-founded fear level.’” AR. at 12. To properly raise an issue before the BIA, precise legal terminology and well-developed arguments are not required, but the petitioner must make more than “[u]nadorned, conclusory statements.” Indrawati v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 779 F.3d 1284, 1297 (11th Cir. 2015). The petitioner must argue the “core issue now on appeal” before the BIA and do so sufficiently for the BIA to review and correct any asserted errors. Id. at 1297 (internal quotation marks omitted). Unless the issue is a 13 Case: 19-11594 Date Filed: 04/29/2020 Page: 14 of 17 [W]hether the applicant would face other serious harm in the place of suggested relocation; any ongoing civil strife within the country; administrative, economic, or judicial infrastructure; geographical limitations; and social and cultural constraints, such as age, gender, health, and social and familial ties. Id. § 1208.13(b)(3). Here, the BIA determined that the government had successfully met its burden in rebutting the presumption of future persecution by demonstrating that it was reasonable for Boateng to relocate within Ghana. Boateng disagrees. Boateng first argues that relocation would be unreasonable because he is not fluent in English and the record does not support the BIA’s determination that he can speak English. 5 The BIA’s determination is supported by substantial evidence, purely legal one, “the BIA cannot review and correct errors without the petitioner first providing [his] argument’s relevant factual underpinnings.” Id. at 1298. In his brief to the BIA, Boateng made nothing more than conclusory statements that the government had failed to prove he could avoid future persecution by relocating to another area within Ghana. Boateng’s brief merely restated the legal test, that relocation “must be in an area of the country where [the applicant] has no well-founded fear of persecution” and “the location must present circumstances that are substantially better than those giving rise to the original claim.” AR. at 28-29. Although these are correct statements of law, Boateng provided no facts or explanation showing why these requirements were not met in his case. Although he argued thoroughly that relocation given his circumstances would be unreasonable, he articulated no reasons why he cannot avoid future persecution by relocating outside of majority Muslim areas. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(A)- (B). Because Boateng failed to contest the reasons for the IJ’s findings on this issue to the BIA on appeal, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. 5 Boateng also argues that relocation would be unreasonable because, as a result of the television broadcast of his interaction with the imam in the mosque, he is known in the Muslim community throughout Ghana—as evidenced by the fact that he was beaten away from his community. This argument, however, goes to whether Boateng would face future persecution in other parts of Ghana because of his Christian faith, the first part of the relocation analysis. Because, as we have explained, Boateng did not make this argument to the BIA, we may not address it. 14 Case: 19-11594 Date Filed: 04/29/2020 Page: 15 of 17 however. Despite the fact that Boateng checked a box on his asylum application that he was not fluent in English, he indicated elsewhere on the application that he speaks English and Twi, and at his hearing he often interrupted his interpreter to respond directly to questions in English. Boateng next argues that the BIA failed to evaluate whether Boateng will suffer other ills and persecution if he were to relocate because he is physically disabled and lacks familial ties in other parts of Ghana. Although Boateng has leg injuries, evidence in the record suggests that he can still move normally and controls his pain with medication. Additionally, although Boateng’s lack of familial support elsewhere in Ghana supports his position that relocation in his case is not reasonable, it is only one relevant consideration. See id. § 1208.13. Here, the BIA evaluated Boateng’s arguments, including that he suffers from leg injuries and potentially lacks familial support, and weighed them against the other factors suggesting he could relocate, such as that he is an adult, is willing to learn a trade, and successfully traveled through other countries to the United States. We can reverse a factual determination by the BIA only where the evidence compels a contrary conclusion. Lopez, 914 F.3d at 1297. We cannot say that is the case here. We thus conclude that the BIA did not err in determining that despite the presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution arising out of Boateng’s proof of past persecution, the government met its burden to rebut the presumption 15 Case: 19-11594 Date Filed: 04/29/2020 Page: 16 of 17 by establishing that it was reasonable for Boateng to relocate within Ghana. And because substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Boateng failed to satisfy the standard for asylum eligibility, we also conclude that substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that he failed to satisfy the higher standard for withholding of removal. See Zheng v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 451 F.3d 1287, 1292 (11th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that when a petitioner fails to establish a claim of asylum on the merits, he also fails to establish eligibility for withholding of removal). B. Substantial Evidence Supports the BIA’s Conclusion that Boateng Is Ineligible for Humanitarian Asylum. We now turn to Boateng’s argument that the BIA erred in concluding that he was ineligible, alternatively, for humanitarian asylum. An asylum applicant may qualify for asylum despite being unable to show a well-founded fear of future persecution if he can: (1) “demonstrate[] compelling reasons for being unwilling or unable to return to the country arising out of the severity of the past persecution;” or (2) “establish[] that there is a reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(iii). Courts refer to relief under this provision as “humanitarian asylum.” Mehmeti v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 572 F.3d 1196, 1200 (11th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 16 Case: 19-11594 Date Filed: 04/29/2020 Page: 17 of 17 Humanitarian asylum requires the petitioner “first to show severe harm and long-lasting effects.” Id. This relief is reserved for only the most extraordinary cases. Id. at 1200-01; see also Bucur v. I.N.S., 109 F.3d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1997) (describing humanitarian asylum as being reserved for extreme persecution such as “the case of the German Jews, the victims of the Chinese ‘Cultural Revolution,’ survivors of the Cambodian genocide, and a few other such extreme cases” (internal citation omitted)). Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s conclusion that the harm Boateng suffered, although severe, does not rise to the level of severity required to demonstrate eligibility for humanitarian asylum. See Mehmeti, 572 F.3d at 120001. Boateng was beaten on multiple occasions, but these beatings did not result in injuries that required him to seek further medical treatment. He has leg injuries, but there is no evidence in the record that these injuries are in any way related to his persecution in Ghana. Accordingly, we conclude that the BIA did not err in determining that Boateng was ineligible for humanitarian asylum.