Opinion ID: 853232
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Indiana's Successive Prosecution Statute

Text: Williams argues the Court 20 charges violate double jeopardy. (Appellant's Br. at 10.) He also argues the prosecution of these charges was barred by Indiana Code § 35-41-4-4(a) because they should have been brought by way of the same information as required by Indiana Code § 35-34-1-10(c). ( Id. at 13.) We conclude that the Court 20 charges were barred by Indiana's successive prosecution statute, and therefore do not reach Williams' constitutional claims. Indiana Code Ann. § 35-41-4-4(a) (West 1998) provides: A prosecution is barred if all of the following exist: (1) There was a former prosecution of the defendant for a different offense or for the same offense based upon different facts. (2) The former prosecution resulted in an acquittal or a conviction of the defendant or in an improper termination under section 3 [IC XX-XX-X-X] of this chapter. (3) The instant prosecution is for an offense with which the defendant should have been charged in the former prosecution. (Emphasis added.) Williams' circumstances satisfy the first two statutory provisions. Williams was convicted in a former prosecution for possession of cocaine as a result of his October 12th arrest. Thus, the outcome of this case centers on whether the instant prosecution is for offenses with which Williams should have been charged in the previous prosecution. The words should have been charged must be read in conjunction with Indiana's joinder statute. Sharp v. State, 569 N.E.2d 962, 967 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (citing State v. Burke, 443 N.E.2d 859 (Ind.Ct. App.1983)). The joinder statute provides in relevant part: A defendant who has been tried for one (1) offense may thereafter move to dismiss an indictment or information for an offense which could have been joined for trial with the prior offenses under section 9 of this chapter. [4] The motion to dismiss shall be made prior to the second trial, and shall be granted if the prosecution is barred by reason of the former prosecution. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-34-1-10(c) (West 1998) (footnote added). Our Court of Appeals has characterized the statute this way: Thus, our legislature has provided that, where two or more charges are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, they should be joined for trial. State v. Wiggins, 661 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Ind. Ct.App.1996) (emphasis in original). This statutory scheme provid[es] a check upon the otherwise unlimited power of the State to pursue successive prosecutions. Wiggins, 661 N.E.2d at 881. Where the State chooses to bring multiple prosecutions for a series of acts constituting parts of a single criminal transaction, it does so at its own peril. This Court has interpreted the language of Indiana's successive prosecution statute on only one occasion. In Seay v. State, 550 N.E.2d 1284 (Ind.1990), the defendant made four separate sales of controlled substances to a police informant and an undercover police officer in the late summer and early fall of 1986. Id. at 1286. The defendant was tried and convicted of dealing in a controlled substance for sales made on July 14, 1986, and August 4, 1986. Id. While the jury was deliberating, the State filed additional charges based on sales made August 14, 1986, and September 2, 1986. Id. Seay argued the subsequent prosecution was barred by Ind.Code § 35-34-1-10(c) and § 35-41-4-4. Id. at 1287. We held that these four events were sufficiently separated by time and place that joinder was not required and subsequent prosecutions were thus permissible. Id. at 1288.