Opinion ID: 609814
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 14 1. Sufficiency of the evidence. The evidence has already been summarized. It demonstrates that a reasonable jury could have found the essential elements of the offense under the counts of the indictment. The jury did not need to believe Calise's denials. 15 2. The personnel records. In United States v. Henthorn, 931 F.2d at 31, we held that the government has a duty to produce personnel files requested by the defense if the information in the files is material to the defense. One personnel record, submitted by the government and inspected in camera by the court, showed that one ATF agent had, in a previous case, been characterized by a federal magistrate as giving testimony that was absolutely incredible. The testimony had been an essential part of an ATF prosecution. The government in the present case obtained from the magistrate a written statement undermining his earlier conclusion: That phrase ['absolutely incredible'] was not what I intended and not what I meant, and I was wrong to use any such terminology. Nonetheless, the agent's trial testimony in this case might have been differently regarded by the jury if the defense had been able to bring out what was in his file. It was error to deny the defense access. 16 We must then ask whether the error was harmless. The prosecution has the burden of showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the jury verdict. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 1260, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827-828, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 17 The agent in question received the shotgun and hacksaw in Honolulu when they were mailed there by the ATF office in Las Vegas. Gun and hacksaw were then transmitted by this agent to the ATF laboratory in Rockville, Maryland, where the marks of the hacksaw on the gun were noted. If this agent had had the opportunity to turn the shotgun into an illegal size before it was measured by the ATF, his veracity would have been relevant and so his personnel records would have been relevant to the defense. However, the gun was measured in Las Vegas and was determined to be illegally short before it was sent to him. He consequently could not have changed it to an illegal size. His testimony merely established that the gun and hacksaw passed through his hands. Any doubt cast on his credibility would not have affected the verdict. The error in keeping secret his personnel file was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 18 3. The right to silence. On appeal Calise presses the point made in his motion for mistrial that it was error to permit testimony about his reluctance to speak with Agent Whiteley over the telephone. Calise was not in custody so Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), does not apply. The evidence was offered in the prosecution's case-in-chief, so Brecht v. Abrahamson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1716-17, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (April 21, 1993), does not apply. Although it is permissible for the prosecution to comment on a defendant's pre-arrest silence for impeachment purposes, see id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1716, citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 2129, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), the use of noncustodial silence to prove a case-in-chief has not been passed on by this circuit. Other circuits have divided. Compare United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir.1991) (pre-custodial silence admissible); with Coppola v. Powell, 878 F.2d 1562, 1568 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 969, 110 S.Ct. 418, 107 L.Ed.2d 383 (1989); United States v. Caro, 637 F.2d 869, 876 (2d Cir.1981); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.1987); United States v. Burson, 952 F.2d 1196, 1200-01 (10th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1702, 118 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992). 19 We need not decide the issue here because the trial court instructed the jury that Calise had every right not to speak with this agent or any other agent and no negative inference can be taken by you against him if in fact you find that he did not wish to speak to him. 20 As to Calise's objection to the testimony about his refusal to sign the Miranda waiver, there was no objection at trial nor was the admission of this testimony plain error. The prosecution was obligated to show that the ATF read Calise his rights and that Calise waived those rights as a foundation for the admission of the interrogation. United States v. Smith, 638 F.2d 131, 133 (9th Cir.1981). Calise orally agreed to speak to the agents and therefore explicitly waived his rights. Signing of the form was not essential for waiver to occur. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). 21 4. The measurement of the shotgun. The court took the law on the measurement of the shotgun from the definition of firearms provided by 22 C.F.R. § 179.11. The court correctly defined barrel length and left the factual determination of the length of the shotgun barrel in question to the jury. United States v. Griffin, 705 F.2d 434, 436 (11th Cir.1983). 22 5. The enhancement for obstruction of justice. Perjury by a defendant during his trial is an obstruction of justice. It need not be established by a separate trial. United States v. Dunnigan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1118, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). A defendant has the right to testify truthfully. His constitutional right is not a license to lie on the witness stand. Id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. The district court could properly conclude from the evidence heard in this trial that Calise perjured himself by his denials and so obstructed the justice the government sought. 23 AFFIRMED.