Opinion ID: 194735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the entry of summary judgment

Text: The merits of the appeal need not detain us. Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The rule's mechanics are well known. Once the movant demonstrates an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986), the nonmovant must establish the existence of at least one genuine issue of material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where, as here, a motion for summary judgment has been granted, appellate review is plenary. Hence, we must evaluate the entire record in the ambiance most flattering to the summary judgment loser, indulging all reasonable inferences in her favor, in order to determine the propriety of the order. See Mesnick v. General Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816, 822 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 2965 (1992); Griggs-Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir. 1990); Mack v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 11Neither the Commissioner nor the appellees have contended that any idiosyncracy in Puerto Rico's direct action statute, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 26, 2003, compels a different result. Because of this fact, and because of the utter lack of prejudice to the insurer in the posture of this case, we do not reach the question of whether a liquidator of an insolvent Puerto Rico insurance company may have greater rights to insist upon a local forum when the company is a party to the underlying suit solely by virtue of the direct action statute. 19 871 F.2d 179, 181 (1st Cir. 1989). In this diversity action, the substantive law of Puerto Rico controls. See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78. The statute of limitations governing negligence actions is one year . . . from the time the aggrieved person has knowledge of the injury. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, 5298 (1990). Knowledge of the injury, under Puerto Rico law, is a term of art. It requires a showing of both notice of the injury and notice of the person who caused it. Colon Prieto v. Geigel, 115 D.P.R. 232, 247, 15 Official Translations 313, 330 (1985) (citation omitted). Limitations defenses may appropriately be resolved at the summary judgment stage if reasonable minds could not differ about the legal effect of the properly documented facts of record, taken in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. See Kali Seafood, Inc. v. Howe Corp., 887 F.2d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1989); Mack, 871 F.2d at 181. In this case, Fragoso admittedly knew of the injury her mother's demise and she was informed shortly thereafter of the possible link between the injury and medical malpractice. She treated this information as credible and acted upon it, promptly retaining an attorney to explore that very nexus. The question in this case, then, is whether appellant's failure to acquire notice of the person or persons who caused the injury tolled the limitations period. We, like other courts, recognize that it is unfair, by and large, to bar a tort action by the mere passage of time if a 20 plaintiff, exercising due diligence, cannot ascertain the tortfeasor's identity. Because self-induced ignorance of the tortfeasor's identity will not interrupt the limitations period, [t]he key inquiry under this prong of the `knowledge' requirement is whether plaintiff knew or `with the degree of diligence required by law' would have known whom to sue. Kaiser v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 872 F.2d 512, 516 (1st Cir. 1989) (citations omitted). This means that an inquiring court must ascertain whether ignorance of a fact reflects the plaintiff's negligence, because, if it does, the limitations clock will continue to tick. See Santiago Hodge v. Parke Davis & Co., 833 F.2d 6, 8 (1st Cir. 1987); Colon Prieto, 115 D.P.R. at 244, 15 Official Translations at 327-28. Just as the limitations period will be suspended only upon a clear showing of diligent efforts to discover the cause of the injury or death, Aldahonda-Rivera v. Parke Davis & Co., 882 F.2d 590, 594 (1st Cir. 1989), so the law requires a clear showing of diligent efforts to discover the identity of likely defendants before suspending the prescriptive period. Under Puerto Rico law, if a plaintiff sues in tort more than a year after the injury took place, she bears the devoir of persuasion with respect to proving that she lacked the knowledge which would have enabled her to sue within the prescriptive period. See Kaiser, 872 F.2d at 516; Santiago Hodge, 833 F.2d at 7. Here, appellant, who sued long after the year had passed, wholly failed to carry her corollary burden. The record reflects 21 an extraordinary delay well over four years between the time appellant first had reason to believe that someone's negligence had caused her mother's death and the time she actually took aim at a particular cadre of defendants. Moreover, the delay was never credibly explained. Although appellant argued before the district court that difficulties in procuring the hospital record caused the delay, her argument was based on freestanding allegations and was, therefore, appropriately rejected. We have made it crystal clear that, in opposing summary judgment, a litigant may not rest upon mere allegations in, say, an unverified complaint or lawyer's brief, but must produce evidence which would be admissible at trial to make out the requisite issue of material fact. Kelly v. United States, 924 F.2d 355, 357 (1st Cir. 1991); accord United States v. One Lot of U.S. Currency ($68,000), 927 F.2d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1991); Garside v. Osco Drug, Inc., 895 F.2d 46, 50 (1st Cir. 1990); Mack, 871 F.2d at 181. The only material of evidentiary weight produced in plaintiff's opposition to the summary judgment motion was a partial transcript of her deposition a deposition in which she acknowledged the passage of time but failed to explain it away. Her counsel's arguments, contained in a memorandum filed with the district court, did not suffice to bridge this chasm; after all, proffers that depend not on verified facts but on arrant speculation, optimistic surmise, or farfetched inference cannot forestall summary judgment. Kelly, 924 F.2d at 357. We have 22 warned, time and again, that the decision to sit idly by and allow the summary judgment proponent to configure the record is likely to prove fraught with consequence. Id. at 358. So it is here. Because the record evinced no credible basis for concluding anything other than that the prescriptive period expired due to some unexplained cause (not excluding appellant's inattentiveness), summary judgment was appropriately entered.