Opinion ID: 201350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Per Se Approach or Course of Proceedings

Text: 81 Alexander invites us to adopt a bright-line, or per se, approach to resolving a complaint's ambiguity or silence on the issue of capacity, such as that employed by the Eighth Circuit. Under this approach, a defendant governmental official is presumed to be sued solely in his or her official capacity unless the complaint specifically states otherwise. See, e.g., Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531, 535 (8th Cir.1999) ([O]nly an express statement that [governmental officials] are being sued in their individual capacity will suffice to give proper notice to the defendants....); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coll., 72 F.3d 615, 620 (8th Cir.1995) ([P]laintiff's complaint [must] contain a clear statement of her wish to sue defendants in their personal capacities.). In Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir.1989), the Eighth Circuit emphasized the importance of giving governmental officials clear notice of the capacity in which they are being sued at the outset of litigation — in the complaint itself. Early and explicit notice permits governmental official defendants who are subject to personal liability for monetary damages to assess matters crucial to their litigation strategy, including the propriety of raising particular defenses available only to governmental officials sued in a particular capacity. For example, while an official-capacity defendant may raise the defense of sovereign immunity, a personal-capacity defendant may assert objectively reasonable reliance on existing law, a defense not available to official-capacity defendants. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985) (setting forth defenses to liability under § 1983 to illustrate the basic distinction between personal- and official-capacity actions). Defendants with early notice of potential personal liability may also assess the availability of insurance coverage and whether there are potential conflicts of interest that might require separate representation of defendants. Charron v. Picano, 811 F.Supp. 768, 772 (D.R.I.1993). 82 Notwithstanding the concerns reflected in the Eighth Circuit's analysis, the other circuits have, with virtual unanimity, adopted the course of proceedings test as the better approach. 25 The Supreme Court has also acknowledged that: 83 in many cases, the complaint will not clearly specify whether officials are sued personally, in their official capacity, or both. The course of proceedings in such cases typically will indicate the nature of the liability sought to be imposed. 84 Graham, 473 U.S. at 167 n. 14, 105 S.Ct. 3099 (quoting Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 469, 105 S.Ct. 873, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985)). We now join the multitude of circuits employing the course of proceedings test, which appropriately balances a defendant's need for fair notice of potential personal liability against a plaintiff's need for the flexibility to develop his or her case as the unfolding events of litigation warrant. In doing so, we decline to adopt a formalistic bright-line test requiring a plaintiff to use specific words in his or her complaint in order to pursue a particular defendant in a particular capacity. However, we do not encourage the filing of complaints which do not clearly specify that a defendant is sued in an individual capacity. To the contrary, it is a far better practice for the allegations in the complaint to be specific. A plaintiff who leaves the issue murky in the complaint runs considerable risks under the doctrine we adopt today. 85 Under the course of proceedings test, courts are not limited by the presence or absence of language identifying capacity to suit on the face of the complaint alone. Rather, courts may examine the substance of the pleadings and the course of proceedings in order to determine whether the suit is for individual or official liability. Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir.1993). Factors relevant to this analysis include the nature of the plaintiff's claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, particularly claims of qualified immunity. Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 n. 1 (6th Cir.2001); see also Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir.1995). A court may also take into consideration whether the parties are still in the early stages of litigation, Moore, 272 F.3d at 772 n. 1, including whether amendment of the complaint may be appropriate. No single factor is dispositive in an assessment of the course of proceedings. Throughout, the underlying inquiry remains whether the plaintiff's intention to hold a defendant personally liable can be ascertained fairly. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 61.