Opinion ID: 2127673
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Suppression of Lineup Identification

Text: The State argues that exclusion of defendant's lineup identification is insupportable under either section 10 (privilege against self-incrimination) or section 2 (due process protections) of article I of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §§ 2, 10). We agree. While we have found that defendant's statement was properly suppressed due to the invalidity of a purported waiver of the right to counsel under section 10, which also violated due process, it does not follow that suppression of evidence of the lineup identification was also proper. Section 10 `protects an accused only from being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature   .' ( People ex rel. Bowman v. Woodward (1976), 63 Ill.2d 382, 385, 349 N.E.2d 57, quoting Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757, 761, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830, 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 914.) This court has also determined that a pretrial lineup does not involve compelling an accused to give evidence of a testimonial nature. (See People v. Nelson (1968), 40 Ill.2d 146, 153, 238 N.E.2d 378.) As a consequence, section 10 extends no right to counsel to a defendant while undergoing a pretrial lineup, and principles associated with that right to counsel could not have been violated by defendant's participation in the lineup. The question of the right to counsel at a pretrial lineup may only involve the right which is conferred by the sixth amendment or article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8). Decisions of this court show, however, that this right to counsel has been consistently interpreted as arising only when adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated. (See People v. Johnson (1973), 55 Ill.2d 62, 73, 302 N.E.2d 20; People v. Reese (1973), 54 Ill.2d 51, 60, 294 N.E.2d 288.) A lineup which is held after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings without the presence of counsel for the accused is unconstitutional. Once it has been determined that a lineup violates this right to counsel, any evidence adduced by the prosecution that a witness identified the defendant at the lineup is subject to a per se rule of exclusion. People v. Curtis (1986), 113 Ill.2d 136, 143, 100 Ill.Dec. 735, 497 N.E.2d 1004. In this case, there is no question that adversary judicial proceedings had not been initiated at the time that defendant underwent the lineup. Defendant, then, was not entitled to the assistance of counsel at the lineup, and his right to counsel under section 8 could not have been violated. Since defendant possessed no right to counsel at the lineup under either section 10 or 8, suppressing evidence of defendant's lineup identification could not have served to safeguard either of those rights. ( Cf. People v. Winsett (1992), 153 Ill.2d 335, 352, 180 Ill.Dec. 109, 606 N.E.2d 1186 ( Miranda exclusionary rule is judicially created device designed to safeguard defendant's constitutional rights by barring the use of statements taken in disregard or related constitutional principles).) The exclusionary sanction applied by the trial court here bore no relation to any violation of constitutional rights or principles under either section 8 or 10 and was insupportable on those bases. Suppression of defendant's lineup identification here is also insupportable under section 2 (due process). Assuming that a violation of section 2 had been found, the exclusionary rule's limitations would apply. This court recognizes the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine to apply where police violate a defendant's constitutional rights. The constitutional violation is termed the poisonous tree and any evidence which the State obtains by exploiting that constitutional violation is subject to suppression as the fruit of that poisonous tree. (See Winsett, 153 Ill.2d at 351, 180 Ill.Dec. 109, 606 N.E.2d 1186.) When police conduct results in a violation of constitutional rights, evidence obtained as a result of that violation, and only evidence so obtained, is to be suppressed. New York v. Harris (1990), 495 U.S. 14, 110 S.Ct. 1640, 109 L.Ed.2d 13. Here, evidence of defendant's lineup identification could not be considered the fruit of the alleged violation of due process rights. The police conduct, assuming that it violated due process, does not result in defendant being subjected to the lineup identification. Defendant would have been required to participate in the lineup regardless of whether he had been allowed to consult with his attorney or was informed that his attorney was present. (See Nelson, 40 Ill.2d at 152, 238 N.E.2d 378 (holding defendant does not have a right to refuse to submit to lineup).) Because the lineup identification was not the fruit of that alleged police misconduct, there could be no basis to suppress evidence of the lineup identification. We conclude that the trial court erred in suppressing defendant's lineup identification on this basis as well. For the foregoing reasons, we would affirm the trial court's order suppressing any statements defendant made after his attorney was present at the station and refused access to him. We would reverse the trial court's order suppressing evidence of the lineup identification of defendant. The judgments of the appellate and circuit courts are therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. Appellate court affirmed in part and reversed in part; circuit court affirmed in part and reversed in part; cause remanded.