Opinion ID: 2510403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Issue 3: Did the district court err in instructing the jury on issues relating to the commitment, treatment, and possible release of Foster?

Text: Finally, Foster asserts the district court improperly instructed the jury concerning his commitment, treatment, and possible release. Because he objected, the following standard of review applies, as taken from the KSVPA case of In re Care & Treatment of Hay, 263 Kan. 822, 841-42, 953 P.2d 666 (1998). `It is the duty of the trial court to properly instruct the jury upon a party's theory of the case. Error regarding jury instructions will not demand reversal unless [it results] in prejudice to the appealing party. Instructions in any particular action are to be considered together and read as a whole, and where they fairly instruct the jury on the law governing the case, error in an isolated instruction may be disregarded as harmless. If the instructions are substantially correct, and the jury could not reasonably be misled by them, the instructions will be approved on appeal.' The objected-to Instruction No. 2 states: This proceeding has been commenced by the filing of a petition by the petitioner, State of Kansas. This trial is to determine whether the respondent, Randy A. Foster is a sexually violent predator who should be civilly committed to the custody of the Secretary of Social and Rehabilitation Services for control, care and treatment until such time as his mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that he is safe to be at large. It is the duty of the jury to determine whether Randy A. Foster is a sexually violent predator. You have nothing whatever to do with the nature of any civil commitment or the length of any commitment which may follow in the event you find that the respondent is a sexually violent predator. The jury was also given Instruction No. 10, which states: You must weigh and consider this case without favoritism for or prejudice against either party. You must not be influenced by anything not within the issues of the case. Sympathy should not enter into your deliberations. Foster asserts that the jury instructions direct the jury to determine whether Foster should be committed for care and treatment until he is safe to be at large. He argues that the safe to be at large language suggested to the jury that Foster would have been unleashed on society if the jury failed to find him a sexually violent predator. The State replies that the instruction's language was contained in the applicable statute, K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 59-29a07(a), and that the language was necessary to clarify the nature of the proceedings due to defense counsel's assertion during trial that the State wished to keep Foster incarcerated. K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 59-29a07(a) provides: The court or jury shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator. If such determination that the person is a sexually violent predator is made by a jury, such determination shall be by unanimous verdict of such jury. Such determination may be appealed. If the court or jury determines that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed to the custody of the secretary of social and rehabilitation services for control, care and treatment until such time as the person's mental abnormality or personality disorder has so changed that the person is safe to be at large. Such control, care and treatment shall be provided at a facility operated by the department of social and rehabilitation services. Based on the plain language of the statute, a jury shall only determine whether the individual is a sexually violent predator; the jury shall not determine control, care, or treatment. See also In re Care & Treatment of Lair, 28 Kan. App. 2d 51, 53-54, 11 P.3d 517, rev. denied 270 Kan. 898 (2000) (upholding exclusion of evidence pertaining only to control, care and treatment). In support of his argument of reversible error, Foster cites People v. Collins, 10 Cal. App. 4th 690, 12 Cal. Rptr. 2d 768 (1992). In Collins, when defendant became eligible for parole following his conviction for grand theft, the Board of Prison Terms ordered him committed to a state mental hospital. Thereafter, a jury trial took place to determine whether he satisfied the criteria of a mentally disordered offender. The jury was instructed that Collins would be released on parole unless the contrary was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 Cal. App. 4th at 694. The jury received two verdict forms. The first stated that Collins met the criteria and should be treated as an inpatient; the second stated that he did not meet the criteria and should be released on parole. The California Court of Appeal held that it was error to instruct the jury on the consequences of the mental illness conclusion because the instruction encouraged the jury to ignore evidence and decide the case based on fear of the offender's release. 10 Cal. App. 4th at 695-96. The court noted that the error was exacerbated by the directory language of the verdict forms, as well as the prosecutor's statements that Collins would go back to the streets if the jury did not find him to be a mentally disordered person. 10 Cal. App. 4th at 696. As our Court of Appeals noted in rejecting Foster's argument, Collins is distinguishable. In the present case, the language at issue was not included on the verdict form; rather, it was included in a jury instruction. In addition, the State did not emphasize to the jury that Foster would be released into society pending the decision. Further, the jury was specifically instructed that it had nothing whatever to do with the nature of any civil commitment or the length of any commitment which may follow in the event you find that the respondent is a sexually violent predator. (Emphasis added.) Nevertheless, in his dissent, Judge Greene found that Instruction No. 2 was even more harmful than its parallel in Collins because it clearly implied or presupposed that Foster suffered from a `mental abnormality or personality disorder' and was subject to commitment until `he is safe to be at large.' 33 Kan. App. 2d at 733 (Greene, J., dissenting). In finding that the instruction did not improperly emphasize the issue of treatment, the majority cited Boone v. State, 147 S.W.3d 801 (Mo. App. 2004). There, the Missouri Court of Appeals dealt with a similar instruction issue in a sexually violent predator case. Unlike in Kansas, the applicable Missouri statute provides in pertinent part: If the trial is held before a jury, the judge shall instruct the jury that if it finds that the person is a sexually violent predator, the person shall be committed to the custody of the director of the department of mental health for control, care and treatment. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 632.492 (2005). The Boone court instructed the jury based on the statute: [i]f you find [Boone] to be a sexually violent predator, [Boone] shall be committed to the custody of the director of the department of mental health for control, care and treatment. 147 S.W.3d at 808. The Missouri Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not err in submitting the instruction to the jury because it did not have a substantial potential for prejudicial effect. An average jury would understand that a finding that Boone was [a sexually violent predator] would subject him to the `control, care and treatment' of the department of mental health. 147 S.W.3d at 808. See also Lewis v. State, 152 S.W.3d 325, 329-30 (Mo. App. 2004); Smith v. State, 148 S.W.3d 330, 336 (Mo. App. 2004); Care and Treatment of Scates v. State, 134 S.W.3d 738, 742 (Mo. App. 2004) (discussing sexually violent predator jury instructions that follow substantive law). We hold that our jury Instruction No. 2 accurately states the law as set forth in K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 59-29a07(a). We also observe that it provides conditional language three different times: This trial is to determine whether the respondent, Randy A. Foster is a sexually violent predator, and It is the duty of the jury to determine whether Randy A. Foster is a sexually violent predator. Finally, You have nothing whatever to do with the nature of any civil commitment or the length of any commitment which may follow in the event you find that the respondent is a sexually violent predator. (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, it does not suggest to the jury that Foster's treatment is in the jury's hands, and it does not instill fear that Foster would be unleashed on society. We conclude that the instructions, when read as a whole, fairly and accurately state the law of the case. In re Care & Treatment of Hay, 263 Kan. at 841-42. Nevertheless, even the majority of the Court of Appeals panel acknowledged that the second sentence of Instruction No. 2 was not artfully drafted and contained unnecessary language about Foster's potential care and treatment. 33 Kan. App. 2d 722. Accordingly, upon remand, the district court may consider modifying that sentence for clarity so it reads as follows: This trial is to determine whether the Respondent, Randy A. Foster, is a sexually violent predator. The Court of Appeals is reversed. The district court is reversed, and the case is remanded for a new trial in accordance with the directions provided by this opinion. LOCKETT, J., Retired, assigned.