Opinion ID: 494203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Legislative Approval under ANILCA

Text: 13 The agency rejected Nevitt's final proof requesting approval of his homestead claim. After Nevitt appealed this decision to the district court on July 23, 1980, Congress enacted ANILCA with an effective date of December 2, 1980. Section 3215(a) of Title 16 of the U.S. Code, provided for legislative approval of all homestead applications, bypassing the regular BLM adjudication process. Those applications pending as of December 2, 1980 were legislatively approved on the 180th day following the effective date, May 31, 1981, unless a protest was filed. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(a) (1985). If a timely protest was filed, the homestead claim did not receive legislative approval, and BLM held the homestead application for adjudication. Id. Subsection (b) allowed the entryman to amend the original land description if said description designates land other than that which the applicant intended to claim at the time of application and if the description as amended describes the land originally intended to be claimed. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(b) (1985). The statute continued, [i]f the application is amended, this section shall operate to approve the application or to require its adjudication, as the case may be, with reference to the amended description only. Id. If an amendment was filed, the BLM sent a notice to all interested parties, who then had 60 days in which to file a protest. Id. 14 Because Nevitt wanted to ensure that a certain cabin was included within his claim, on May 29, 1981, Nevitt filed an amended land description entitled Amended Description of Homestead Claim, Additional to Original Description in order to Include Lands which may be Additional to Original Entry. As required by 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(a), the BLM sent notice of the amended description to interested parties and received protests, filed by Owens and Halverson, within the 60-day period. The agency denied legislative approval of Nevitt's homestead claim, and the district court affirmed this decision. 15 Nevitt stated in his amended description that he wanted to include lands which may be additional to those originally described if errors exist in the original staking or final survey (not yet done), which errors may result in lands existing, which were originally intended to be claimed, outside those lands described in the original description. Furthermore, he explained that the filing was made pursuant to Subsection (b) of Section 1328 of Public Law 96-487. Thus, Nevitt's amended description, on its face and by his own characterization, meets the statutory requirements of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(b). 16 Nevitt asserts that the agency failed to follow its existing procedures for the amendment of homestead applications. His position would have required the BLM to perform two adjudications, one at the time the agency accepted an amendment and a second when proper protests were filed. However, none of the cases that Nevitt cites supports this contention. 17 Nevitt also claims that the protest and adjudication provisions of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(b) apply only to the amended portion of his entry and not to the total parcel. Therefore, he contends his claim as originally described should have received legislative approval. Nevitt cites the phrase in 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(b) with reference to the amended land description only for this contention. But read in light of the prior sentence, the amended land description refers to the land originally intended to be claimed. The legislative history of Sec. 905(c) of ANILCA, the provision upon which Sec. 1328 is largely based, further supports this interpretation. Furthermore, the IBLA stated that the amended or corrected land description refers to the total parcel that appellant intended to claim[.] The agency's interpretation is reasonable and thus entitled to great deference. Udall, 380 U.S. at 16-17, 85 S.Ct. at 801-02, quoting Bowles v. Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14, 65 S.Ct. 1215, 1217, 89 L.Ed. 1700; Olivares, 685 F.2d at 1177. 18 Because Nevitt filed a valid amendment under 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(b), this filing triggered an additional protest period provided by 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(b). We must then consider whether Owens or Halverson filed a protest that met the requirements of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(a)(3)(C), not whether either protester is actually entitled to any improvements located on Nevitt's homestead. This provision states that a homestead application shall not be legislatively approved if a person or entity files a protest with the Secretary stating that the applicant is not entitled to the land described in the application and that said land is the situs of improvements claimed by the person or entity. 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(a)(3)(C) (1985). If a protest meets these criteria, the homesteader's claim and protesters' claims are to be adjudicated, pursuant to 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(a), under the requirements of the relevant homestead law, in this case, 43 U.S.C. Sec. 164. 19 Both Halverson's and Owens' protests, which are part of the record, satisfy the requirements of 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3215(a)(3)(C). The protests challenge Nevitt's entitlement to the property and claim an interest in a cabin allegedly within Nevitt's homestead. These protests, even if later found to be invalid, are enough to block legislative approval of Nevitt's pending homestead application. Therefore, the agency correctly denied legislative approval of Nevitt's homestead application and properly held it for adjudication. 20 AFFIRMED.