Opinion ID: 1444402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Count Sixteen: Improper Conduct in the Rivas Matter

Text: Petitioner, sitting as a visiting judge in the Madera Justice Court of Madera County, was assigned to preside in a criminal case against Lisa Rivas. On April 3, 1990, the district attorney filed a peremptory challenge against petitioner under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6. Petitioner called the Rivas case the next day, noting that the hearing was just a motion to disqualify. When petitioner asked about the March 30 preliminary hearing, the district attorney started to respond, and then stated: No offensePeople filed a [Code of Civil Procedure section] 170.6 motion, so I don't think the Court should inquire into what happened on the 30th. [¶] People are prepared to let this Court set some new dates closer to today's date to help [defense counsel] and his client and for that limited purpose only. When petitioner again asked about the prior hearing, the district attorney stated that the inquiry was inappropriate, given the disqualification motion. Petitioner then stated, without any input from defense counsel: Well, first we have got to find out whether the defendant's constitutional rights and statutory rights were violated with respect to a speedy preliminary hearing before you can get to any issues. In response to the district attorney's continued objection, petitioner stated, I don't think you can use [Code of Civil Procedure section] 170.6 to violate constitutional rights, and I want to make that determination before I proceed. Over the district attorney's objection, petitioner then considered the speedy hearing question. Defense counsel asserted that Rivas had not waived her right to a speedy preliminary hearing. The district attorney, while continuing to object, asserted that Rivas had waived time so that the court could hear certain defense motions. When the district attorney asserted that petitioner lacked jurisdiction to determine whether Rivas had waived time, petitioner replied, You're wrong, and explained, You cannot file a [Code of Civil Procedure section] 170.6 [motion] and violate somebody's constitutional rights or statutory rights. Petitioner then directed the court reporter to get her notes from the preliminary hearing. Because the reporter's notes were not readily accessible, petitioner continued the hearing to April 6. He explained that [t]he only issue he would consider at the continued hearing was whether Rivas had waived time, explaining, I can't hear [the case] for any other purposes. On April 6, the district attorney sought and obtained an alternative writ of mandate and prohibition ordering petitioner to accept the peremptory challenge in the Rivas matter or to show cause for not doing so, and prohibiting him from presiding in [the] case until further order of [the issuing] court. The district attorney served the writ on petitioner. At defense counsel's request, petitioner called the Rivas matter later that day. At the start of the hearing, petitioner acknowledged that he was in possession of the writ. [22] Responding to a question about his intent in light of the writ, petitioner explained: I cannot hear this case for any other purpose than to determine whether [Rivas's] ten-day in custody right to a prelim[inary hearing] had been violated, and take judicial notice if that has been violated ... [¶] ... based on the record, the court records. I can't hear any contested issue of fact or law. The district attorney disagreed with petitioner, insisting that he could take no action in the case of any kind, including considering the speedy hearing question. In response, defense counsel urged petitioner to determine the speedy hearing issue, arguing that it did not involve the merits of the case and that the constitutional right to be free from illegal detention outweighed the prosecution's statutory right to disqualify. Petitioner replied to defense counsel: I think the defense ought to file a writ with the superior court that granted this writ, advising that court that your client's constitutional rights or statutory rights at least are being violated by keeping her in custody past her ten-day limit without her waiver, and without finding a good cause by the magistrate that continued the case. I think that's your remedy. After a comment from defense counsel, petitioner continued: It just shocks me that this can happen, that people that are supposed to be protectors of the peoples' rights, protecting of property, protecting of everything that we stand for, are playing games this way. It's just shocking to me. Petitioner continued: I feel very strongly I don't want anything to do with this court again in Madera, and I'm going to take action to try to keep myself from even coming down here anymore. That's how strongly I feel about it. It's shocking to be associated with officers of the court, people who have pledged to uphold the law and support the Constitution, take this kind of action. It just shocks me beyond belief. Makes me embarrassed to even be associated with such people. [¶] Anyway, that's your remedy, I think.... Finally, after defense counsel insisted that Rivas was being remanded to custody without any redress of her grievances, petitioner commented, Seems to me she has some legal remedies. Petitioner took no further action in the case. On this record, we agree with the Commission's unanimous conclusion that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct in his handling of the Rivas matter, but not for all of the reasons that the Commission cited. The Commission concluded that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct by fail[ing] to transfer the Rivas case after the filing of the [peremptory challenge] and [deciding] to continue the case to his own calendar. However, we agree with the special masters that petitioner's initial decision to consider the speedy hearing question despite the peremptory challenge at most constituted a legal error. Although Code of Civil Procedure section 170.6 prohibits a properly challenged judge from hear[ing] any matter ... which involves a contested issue of law or fact, as the Commission notes, under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.4, subdivision (a)(1), a disqualified judge may [t]ake any action or issue any order necessary to maintain the jurisdiction of the court pending the assignment of a judge not disqualified. Under Penal Code section 859b, [w]henever [a] [criminal] defendant is in custody, and absent a waiver or good cause, the court shall dismiss the complaint if the preliminary examination is set or continued beyond 10 court days from the time of the arraignment,... and the defendant has remained in custody for 10 or more court days solely on that complaint.... Petitioner's belief that, notwithstanding the peremptory challenge, he could determine the speedy hearing question to preserve the court's jurisdiction had at least enough merit to prevent the holding of it from constituting misconduct. ( Wenger, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 647, fn. 13, 175 Cal.Rptr. 420, 630 P.2d 954.) [A] judge should not be disciplined for mere erroneous determination of legal issues, including questions of limitations on the judicial power, that are subject to reasonable differences of opinion. [Citation.] ( Gubler v. Commission on Judicial Performance (1984) 37 Cal.3d 27, 47-48, 207 Cal.Rptr. 171, 688 P.2d 551.) Nor on this record do we find that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct in resuming the hearing on April 6 despite issuance of the writ or in suggesting that Rivas's remedy was to petition for a writ. On April 4, petitioner had continued the case to April 6, and called the case on that date only at the request of defense counsel. Defense counsel and the prosecutor then argued about whether petitioner could consider the speedy hearing issue despite issuance of the writ. Defense counsel insisted that petitioner could proceed because Rivas's constitutional rights outweighed the prosecution's statutory right of disqualification and the illegal detention issue did not present a factual issue or touch on the merits of the case. Only then did petitioner, concluding that he could not proceed, suggest that Rivas file a writ, stating: I think that's your remedy. We conclude that these actions did not constitute prejudicial misconduct. [23] Nevertheless, we agree with the Commission that petitioner's comments at the end of the April 6 hearing constituted prejudicial misconduct. As we have noted, petitioner expressed shock[] and embarrass[ment] about the conduct of the officers of the court, and accused them of playing games notwithstanding their pledge to uphold the law, support the Constitution, and protect the peoples' rights. Petitioner also proclaimed that he did not want anything to do with this court again in Madera. We agree with the Commission that petitioner committed prejudicial misconduct in responding to his peremptory disqualification by publicly criticizing the prosecutors and the Madera court on the record. (See Kloepfer, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 842, 264 Cal.Rptr. 100, 782 P.2d 239 [inappropriate remarks about counsel]; In re Rasmussen, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 538, 236 Cal.Rptr. 152, 734 P.2d 988 [basing misconduct finding on intemperate, open-court criticism of a fellow judge]; Gonzalez, supra, 33 Cal.3d at p. 371, 188 Cal. Rptr. 880, 657 P.2d 372 [judge committed misconduct by making insulting and derogatory comments from the bench and in his chambers impugning the character and competence of his judicial colleagues].)