Opinion ID: 2981256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dugalic’s Appeal

Text: On appeal, Dugalic argues that (1) the district court erred in admitting certain testimony, (2) there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence introduced at trial, (3) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiring to commit money laundering, (4) there was insufficient evidence to convict him of conspiring to distribute more than 100 kilograms of marijuana, (5) the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial, (6) the district court abused its discretion by refusing to conduct an in camera review of potential Brady material, and (7) his sentence was substantively unreasonable. All of Dugalic’s claims lack merit.
Dugalic first argues that the district court erred in allowing Agent Hughes to testify about the meaning of certain code words used by members of Dadanovic’s organization.1 On direct examination, Agent Hughes testified about the DEA’s investigation, as well as his opinion that drug dealers often use code words to disguise their dealings. Then, on cross-examination, one of Dugalic’s co-defendants repeatedly asked Agent Hughes what code words were used in this case, and Agent Hughes responded that members of Dugalic’s organization referred to money as “wheat,” marijuana as “green,” and cocaine as “material.” The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Hughes’s answers. Agent Hughes’s testimony helped the jury understand the meaning of the defendants’ coded conversations, 1 Dugalic mistakenly challenges Officer Ryan Bartlett’s testimony, even though Officer Bartlett did not testify about the meaning of any code words. -7- Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton and the district court gave an appropriate cautionary instruction so that the jury could give proper weight to this testimony. This court has repeatedly recognized that, in drug cases, officers can testify as to the meaning of code words. See United States v. Fontao, 83 F.3d 423, 1996 WL 189306,  (6th Cir. 1996) (table); United States v. Garcia, 72 F.3d 130, 1995 WL 712757,  (6th Cir. 1995) (table). In particular, we have held that a district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing an FBI agent to testify “as to the words or jargon used in the intercepted conversations.” United States v. Webber, 259 F. App’x 796, 802 (6th Cir. 2008). Similarly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Agent Hughes’s testimony. Dugalic’s citation of United States v. Blakely, 375 F. App’x 565 (6th Cir. 2010), does not advance his argument. It is true that, in Blakely, this court stated that it was “likely improper” when a federal agent offered his own interpretation of a vague phone call that “did not include many words or terms with which a juror would have been unfamiliar,” although we ultimately held that any error in this regard was harmless. Blakely, 375 F. App’x at 570-71. In this case, Agent Hughes was not simply offering his own interpretation of a phone call; rather, he was testifying about specific code words used in the drug trade. Accordingly, Dugalic’s reliance on Blakely is misplaced. Dugalic’s suggestion that Agent Hughes was not qualified to testify as an expert is likewise without merit. Agent Hughes was a special agent with the DEA for over ten years, had prior law enforcement experience as a Border Patrol agent and with the Coast Guard, participated in “hundreds, if not thousands” of drug cases, including cases involving marijuana and cocaine, was familiar with the use of wiretaps, and had specialized training in several areas, including drug identification and the clandestine production of drugs. Clearly, Agent Hughes was qualified to -8- Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton testify about the meaning of code words used in the drug trade. And the fact that many of the defendants’ conversations were initially in Bosnian or Serbian is immaterial because there is no dispute that those conversations were properly translated. In short, Dugalic’s argument that the district court erred in admitting Agent Hughes’s testimony is unavailing.
Dugalic next argues that there was a fatal variance between the indictment and the evidence introduced at trial because, although the indictment alleges that he and several other people were all involved in a single conspiracy to distribute cocaine, the proof at trial actually demonstrated multiple conspiracies. However, when viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence supported a finding of a single conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The Government’s proof revealed a “chain conspiracy” with Dadanovic running the show from Indianapolis. Once Dadanovic received cocaine from Mexico, he directed his subordinates, including Dugalic and others, to deliver the cocaine to various regional distributors in Tennessee, Kentucky, West Virginia, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Illinois. Dadanovic’s drivers assisted with these deliveries. The regional distributors then distributed the cocaine at the local level. Through this hierarchy, Dadanovic’s organization distributed hundreds of kilograms of cocaine and handled millions of dollars. Dugalic argues that this was not a single enterprise, but rather multiple, smaller enterprises. To support his argument, Dugalic claims that “there was significant evidence” that his brother and co-defendant, Omer, “had a separate organization” in Pittsburgh, with his own purchasers and delivery men. Dugalic, however, cites none of this “significant evidence” and ignores the -9- Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton Government’s evidence that he discussed possible cocaine transactions with Omer. Moreover, in order to prove a single conspiracy, the Government need not show that each member of the conspiracy knows of, or is involved in all of, the activities that comprise the conspiracy. United States v. Warner, 690 F.2d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 1982). Instead, all that is required is that each conspirator “‘agreed to participate in what he knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 876 (2d Cir. 1981)). There was ample evidence that Dugalic agreed to participate in what he knew to be a largescale international drug trafficking organization led by Dadanovic and directed toward the goal of making money to continue the tiered enterprise. Dugalic told the Government’s cooperating witness, Jones, that his cocaine supplier was a Bosnian man with ties to a Mexican drug cartel, moved approximately 200 kilograms of cocaine per month, transported the drugs by using multiple vehicles with hidden compartments, and made thousands of dollars. Dugalic then sold cocaine to Jones and repeatedly met and spoke with Dadanovic, Hamilton, Yanes, Batlak, and others about other cocaine transactions. While Dugalic may not have known every member of Dadanovic’s organization, and may not have been aware of all of the organization’s activities, there was certainly sufficient evidence from which the jury could find a single conspiracy. In other words, we cannot say that the evidence “can reasonably be construed only as supporting a finding of multiple conspiracies.” Warner, 690 F.2d at 548 (emphasis added). Dugalic cites United States v. Swafford, 512 F.3d 833 (6th Cir. 2008), but that case is distinguishable. In Swafford, the Government attempted to prove a “wheel conspiracy,” with Swafford acting as the hub, connected to various customers by spokes. Swafford, 512 F.3d at 842. - 10 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton The Government, however, failed to prove the existence of a common goal or enterprise, and, therefore, we found a “rimless wheel conspiracy,” with Swafford engaging in multiple conspiracies with individual customers. Id. That situation created a fatal variance from the indictment, which charged a single conspiracy. Id. at 842-44. Notably, however, we stated in a footnote: “this is not a ‘chain conspiracy’ where the existence of a single conspiracy is proved by the fact that operators at different levels are connected by a common scheme or enterprise.” Id. at 842 n. 3. Here, the jury heard clear evidence of a “chain conspiracy,” with Dadanovic at the top, Dugalic and others below him, and the regional distributors further down the chain. Accordingly, Dugalic’s reliance on Swafford is misplaced and his argument that there was a variance between the indictment and the evidence at trial is without merit.
Dugalic next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding that he conspired to commit money laundering. Count 4 of the indictment alleged that Dugalic and others conspired to commit money laundering by transporting proceeds of unlawful drug activity from Kentucky to Texas, Mexico, and elsewhere, knowing that the property involved represented the proceeds of drug trafficking, both with the intent to promote the carrying on of drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), and to conceal and disguise the nature, location, source, ownership, and control of the proceeds of this drug trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). Viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, the evidence was sufficient to support that charge. - 11 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton As already mentioned, the evidence at trial showed that large quantities of drugs were brought from Mexico into the United States and delivered to Dadanovic. Dadanovic then directed his subordinates, including Dugalic and others, to deliver the drugs to various regional distributors in multiple states, including Kentucky. Once the regional distributors sold the drugs, they sent money back to Dugalic and his colleagues, who in turn sent money back to Dadanovic. In order to facilitate this process, Dugalic worked personally to collect on debts from regional distributors, and Batlak delivered money to Dugalic and then to Dadanovic. Once Dadanovic was paid, he concealed the money and sent it back to Mexico in order to receive the next shipment of drugs. This is evidenced by the following facts: (1) just weeks after a Nissan truck was seen with Dadanovic, police stopped the same truck in Texas and seized over $230,000 from a hidden compartment inside; (2) Batlak testified that Dadanovic received drugs from Mexico; and (3) Dadanovic himself admitted that he had a “partner” in Mexico. All of this evidence reveals a cycle in which drugs went down the chain of Dadanovic’s organization and drug money went back up the chain, in a concealed fashion, in order to keep the illegal enterprise going. That is precisely what the Government alleged in the indictment. Nevertheless, Dugalic claims that the Government failed to present any evidence that he agreed to commit the crime of money laundering or that he knowingly joined the conspiracy. But that is not true. The Government put on proof that, after he distributed cocaine, Dugalic repeatedly received money from Batlak, worked personally to collect on debts from regional distributors, and sent money to Dadanovic, all before Dadanovic sent this money back to Mexico in anticipation of more drugs. Taken in the light most favorable to the Government, this evidence was more than - 12 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton sufficient for the jury to find an agreement between Dugalic and his co-defendants to launder drug proceeds and that Dugalic knowingly and voluntarily joined that agreement. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Dugalic conspired to commit money laundering.
Dugalic next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s finding on Count 3—that he conspired to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Dugalic, however, does not dispute, in any meaningful way, the jury’s findings that he conspired to distribute marijuana or that the conspiracy involved at least 100 kilograms of marijuana. Rather, Dugalic only argues that it was not “reasonably foreseeable to him” that the conspiracy involved at least 100 kilograms of marijuana, as opposed to some lesser quantity. Dugalic’s argument is without merit because the Government was not required to show that he knew the exact quantity of marijuana involved in order to obtain a conviction under § 846. United States v. Villarce, 323 F.3d 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2003). The Government however was only required to prove that Dugalic knew that “some quantity” of marijuana was involved. Id. at 438. The Government more than met its burden, introducing evidence that Dugalic and others discussed marijuana transactions, including transactions involving Jerdin Yanes; Batlak repeatedly delivered marijuana, including 500 pounds for Yanes; and Dugalic himself received marijuana from Yanes. In short, the Government presented sufficient evidence to convict Dugalic on Count 3.
Dugalic was also not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Dugalic’s claim that “the district court denied the public access to the courtroom during the entirety of the closing - 13 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton arguments” is inaccurate. In reality, the district court gave the parties and the public advance notice that, once closing arguments began, it would lock the courtroom doors in order to prevent the jury from being distracted by “anyone coming in and out.” The district court then followed this procedure. Thus, the public was not denied access to the courtroom during closing arguments; it was merely prevented from entering and leaving the courtroom while those arguments were going on. Not only did Dugalic not object to the lack of distractions, he now fails to cite any legal authority suggesting that the district court’s procedure was improper. Indeed, the case that Dugalic does cite, Presley v. Georgia, is clearly distinguishable because there the trial court expressly excluded the public from attending the jury voir dire. 130 S.Ct. 721, 722 (2010). Here, since the district court allowed the public to attend the entire trial, including closing arguments, it did not violate Dugalic’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.
The district court also did not abuse its discretion by refusing to conduct an in camera review of potential Brady material. We have recognized that a district court is not required to conduct an in camera review of such material where a prosecutor clearly represents to the district court that all Brady material has been disclosed to the defense and there is no evidence of misconduct by the prosecutor. United States v. Carmichael, 232 F.3d 510, 516-17 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Hernandez, 31 F.3d 354, 361 (6th Cir. 1994). Here, although one of Dugalic’s co-defendants asked the district court to conduct an in camera review of notes from a police interview with Batlak to determine if redacted portions of those notes contained Brady material, the prosecutor told the district court that he had reviewed the notes in question and provided the defense with all Brady - 14 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton material. Since there is no allegation or evidence of misconduct by the prosecutor, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining the defense’s request. While Dugalic concedes that the district court was not required to conduct an in camera review, he argues that this court should nevertheless reverse his convictions because the district court mistakenly thought that it lacked the authority to do so. When defense counsel asked the district court to look at the exhibit for Brady material, the district court asked rhetorically, “Doesn’t the U.S. get to make that call?” While somewhat unclear, the court’s language can be taken as reflecting the rule of Carmichael and Hernandez, and we do not read the court’s language as deeming itself barred from looking at the material in question. The district court asked the prosecutor if he had provided the defense with all Brady material and the prosecutor answered that he had. The district court relied on the prosecutor’s answer and moved on. Since this was well within the district court’s discretion, Dugalic’s claim that the district court committed reversible error is baseless.
Dugalic’s sentence was also substantively reasonable. This court affords Dugalic’s 365month sentence a presumption of reasonableness because it falls within the applicable guidelines range. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). Dugalic has failed to rebut this presumption. First, there is no merit to Dugalic’s suggestion that the district court did not meaningfully consider that “the amounts [of cocaine] he directly was involved with are but a small percentage of the larger picture.” The district court agreed with Dugalic “that at times he was seeking low level quantities of drugs,” but found that Dugalic “was also involved in much larger quantities of drugs.” - 15 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton The district court correctly summarized the evidence, saying “this was a far-reaching international conspiracy where money was going to Mexico [and] significant quantities of drugs were coming in. The defendant Mr. Dugalic did bring people into the conspiracy, including the mother of his two children. He was a significant player in this case.” Thus, despite Dugalic’s suggestion to the contrary, the district court thoroughly and accurately considered the nature and circumstances of his offenses. Second, Dugalic’s argument that the district court failed to consider his history and characteristics is also baseless. Dugalic emphasizes that he has no criminal history and has two small children for whom he was the primary breadwinner. The district court expressly considered these factors, noting Dugalic’s “absence of a criminal history” and the fact that a long prison sentence would leave Dugalic’s children “without a father for a significant period of time.” Nevertheless, after considering the extensive conspiracy in this case and balancing the remaining § 3553(a) factors, the district court found that a sentence in the middle of the guidelines range was appropriate. This was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, Dugalic’s claim that his case is akin to United States v. Delgadillo, 318 F. App’x 380 (6th Cir. 2009), is unavailing. In Delgadillo, this court remanded a case for resentencing because the district court “just briefly mentioned § 3553(a)” and did not address the defendant’s history and characteristics at all. Delgadillo, 318 F. App’x at 386-87. Here, the district court thoroughly considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, including several aspects of Dugalic’s history and characteristics, but found that, on balance, a sentence within the guidelines range was appropriate. - 16 - Nos. 11-5154, 11-5145 United States v. Kemal Dugalic and Donta Hamilton Accordingly, Delgadillo is clearly distinguishable from this case and Dugalic’s argument that his sentence was substantively unreasonable is without merit.