Opinion ID: 1598918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for directed verdict, both at the close of the state's case and at the close of the entire case, and in denying motion for new trial.

Text: ¶ 75. This issue is similar to Issue V above in that it challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. As stated supra, considering all evidence in the light most consistent with the verdict, evidence presented was sufficient to support the verdict. See McFee, 511 So.2d at 133-34. ¶ 76. The facts, as discussed in detail above, reveal that there was sufficient evidence on which to convict Burns for capital murder. Phillip Hale, the co-defendant, testified that he and Burns agreed to rob McBride. He left the room and when he returned, Burns was stabbing McBride. Phillip Hale testified that Burns said he killed McBride because he did not want any witnesses. Jeff Hale also testified that both Phillip and Burns recounted the robbery and murder to him shortly after the murder. Further, Janie Taylor testified that immediately after the murder both Burns and Phillip Hale returned to her trailer where Burns told her that he had just killed the man at the Town House Motel. ¶ 77. For the reasons discussed above and in Issue V, supra we find that the trial judge was correct in denying the motion for directed verdict and as such this issue is without merit.
¶ 78. In his next assignment of error, Burns alleges that it was error for the State to make reference to prior crimes committed by Burns. In the State's direct examination of Phillip Hale, he testified that Burns killed McBride because he did not want to go back to the pen. Burns argues his motion for mistrial should have been granted. The exchange to which Burns refers as reflected in the record follows: Q. Why was it that what did JoJo say about stabbing him, why he stabbed him? A. Stabbed me? Q. No, why he stabbed Mike McBride? A. Well, he said if he he could turn us in. Q. Okay. A. And he didn't want to go back to the pen. Q. Have you talked with JoJo about this over the well, over the last over the next year? Did y'all talk about it? Did he talk about stabbing Mike McBride at any time? A. No, sir. MR. YOUNG: We have no further questions at this time, your Honor. THE COURT: We're going to take a recess before cross-examination. Remember my instructions. Don't discuss the case. About a 15 minutes [sic] recess, will probably be your last one of the day. You may be excused. (THE JURY IS EXCUSED FROM THE COURTROOM.) MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, I would like to go on the record briefly. THE COURT: All right. I'll hear you. MR. ELLIS: Your Honor, Mr. Hale, in the course of answering the last question, mentioned a prior incarceration by the Defendant. I admit it's very brief; I think his words were, He didn't want to go back to the pen. There has been no evidence placed in no evidence of character placed in, and I think it would be improper at this time. I move for a mistrial. Barring that, I would ask that the State admonish Mr. Hale and any future witnesses that the mention of Mr. Burns' prior criminal record is not proper. THE COURT: I understand that. MR. ELLIS: I mean, I don't I honestly, Judge, don't think the jury may have placed much importance in it, but it was mentioned, and now it places the defense in a position of having to explain possibly. THE COURT: Do you want me to direct them to disregard that statement? MR. ELLIS: No, your Honor. I don't think that helps any. I THE COURT: All right. The the question was asked and I had heard it a half of the response earlier, when Mr. Hale testified that Mr. Kingsley [1] stated that he killed him because he didn't want to be identified later. And the question was asked again and in addition to saying he didn't want to be identified, he said that Mr. Burns said he didn't want to go to the pen. This, according to the testimony that I heard, was a statement that was allegedly made while all this was going on, by Defendant Burns, that this witness has testified to. Your motion for mistrial is overruled. MR. ELLIS: Yes, your Honor. I would ask that the State please instruct their witnesses about that though, if I don't want careless words. THE COURT: I understand. I've already ruled on it on an earlier motion, but on the guilt phase, we will not go into anything dealing with defendant's record. MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, one thing, if I could add, I really didn't mean to go into that. But then on the other hand, this is something the Defendant said at the time he was killing McBride, Mr. McBride, and it is also part of the motive for him killing the man, so that he couldn't be identified and would have to go back to the penitentiary. The State argues that whether or not the prosecution intended to elicit this testimony from Hale, it was admissible. Rule 404(b) of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence reads as follows: (b) Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 404(b) Miss.R.Evid. ¶ 79. The State asserts that the information that came out during Phillip Hale's testimony was admissible to show motive that Burns killed McBride so that he could not be identified and be sent back to the penitentiary. We agree. It is clear that Burns' motive for killing McBride was to do away with any witnesses to the crime. ¶ 80. In Mack v. State , we warned prosecutors and trial courts to approach evidence of other crimes with caution. Snelson v. State, 704 So.2d 452, 455 (Miss.1997) ( citing Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1313 (Miss.1994)). However, we went on to say in Mack that because of the close connection of a specific monetary objective and because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt, we conclude that the error in admitting ... evidence [showing that the defendant purchased crack cocaine after robbing and killing Fulton] if any, is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 1313. We find that because of the close connection between Burns' objective and McBride's death, admitting the evidence was at worst harmless error. ¶ 81. In the case sub judice, the trial judge asked the defense counsel if he would like the jury admonished to disregard the statement to which he answered no. Then, the trial judge refused to grant a mistrial based on his reasoning that the statement was a statement that was allegedly made while all this was going on, by Defendant Burns. Secondly, even if the judge's decision to deny the motion for mistrial could be taken as admitting the evidence, this Court finds that the judge determined that the probative value of the fact that McBride was murdered so that Burns would not have to go back to the pen outweighed the potential for prejudice against the defendant. The judge determined that there was ample evidence showing that the primary objective of Burns' actions was to prevent him from going back to the `pen'. See Snelson, 704 So.2d at 455. ¶ 82. Furthermore, counsel for defendant, as evidenced by the above exchange, was not too concerned about the testimony regarding the pen. Counsel for the defendant even went so far as to state, I honestly, Judge, don't think the jury may have placed much importance in it.... The trial judge asked him if he wanted an instruction issued to the jury to disregard the statement to which Mr. Ellis answered no. Mr. Ellis also did not want a limiting instruction informing the jury that it could not use the prior incarceration in determining Burns' guilt in the case at bar. ¶ 83. Moreover, this Court has said many times that evidence of prior crimes is admissible to show motive. See generally Warren v. State, 709 So.2d 415 (Miss.1998); Hunt v. State, 538 So.2d 422 (Miss.1989); Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89 (Miss.1987); Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235 (Miss. 1994); Smith v. State, 499 So.2d 750 (Miss. 1986); Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242 (Miss.1995) ¶ 84. In McLemore, we said that the [r]easoning behind this rule is to protect against a jury convicting a defendant just because he has committed other crimes and not because the prosecution has proven that he is guilty of the crime for which he is accused.... The exception to this rule would be where the evidence of the other crimes is admitted to show motive or intent and that these acts may have been done in furtherance of such motive or intent. McLemore v. State, 669 So.2d 19, 22-23 (Miss.1996). ¶ 85. Rule 404(b), M.R.E., precludes evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts to show that the defendant acted in conformity therewith. However, if evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is offered to prove motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, it is admissible under M.R.E. 404(b). Parker v. State, 606 So.2d 1132, 1136-37 (Miss.1992) ( citing Lewis v. State, 573 So.2d 719, 722 (Miss.1990); Robinson v. State, 497 So.2d 440, 442 (Miss.1986)). Even evidence not admissible because prejudicial under Rule 403 may be admissible under Rule 404(b). Jenkins v. State, 507 So.2d 89, 92 (Miss.1987). ¶ 86. Following the abundance of case law available on this issue, the evidence now before this Court for review was admissible to show motive. Burns felt he had to kill McBride to prevent his returning to the penitentiary. This issue is without merit.
¶ 87. Burns' tenth assignment of error once again challenges the sufficiency of the evidence. Burns argues that the State relied on unbelievable and often inconsistent testimony from Phillip Hale, Jeff Hale and Janie Taylor. Burns further claims that these witnesses were inherently incredible. ¶ 88. Citing Noe v. State to support its proposition, the State argues that the court properly instructed the jury to weigh the evidence of alleged accomplices with great caution. `The jury has the duty to determine the impeachment value of inconsistencies or contradictions as well as testimonial defects of perception, memory and sincerity.' Noe v. State, 616 So.2d 298, 303 (Miss. 1993) ( quoting Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983, 989 (Miss.1980)). The jury who is the sole judge of the weight and worth of the testimony as its proper function, had before it the duty to determine the evidence it would accept as true and that which it would reject as untrue. Wilson v. State, 234 So.2d 303, 311-12 (Miss.1970) ( citing Alexander v. State, 251 Miss. 847, 171 So.2d 517 (1965); Bond v. State, 249 Miss. 352, 162 So.2d 510 (1964)). ¶ 89. As a general rule a trial judge should not hesitate to grant a cautionary instruction when the State is relying upon the testimony of co-conspirators. Wheeler v. State, 560 So.2d 171, 173 (Miss. 1990) ( quoting Derden v. State, 522 So.2d 752, 754 (Miss.1988)). Such was not the case here. The judge in the case sub judice instructed the jury that the testimony of alleged accomplices should be weighed with great caution and the Jury may disbelieve their testimony all together, if they believe it untrue, the jury being the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses. The judge properly issued the instruction. Therefore, this issue is without merit. ¶ 90. Reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, there was sufficient evidence to convict Burns of capital murder. For these reasons, this issue is without merit.
¶ 91. In his eleventh assignment, Burns argues that the court below committed reversible error when it allowed unduly gruesome autopsy photographs into evidence. Burns alleges that the photographs were admitted solely to inflame the passions of the jury. ¶ 92. The State argues that the photographs were not unduly prejudicial but were highly probative. In McNeal v. State , this Court cautioned trial courts to consider all the facts and circumstances surrounding the admission of inflammatory photographs. Specifically, the trial court must consider, (1) whether the proof is absolute or in doubt as to the identity of the guilty party, and, (2) whether the photographs are necessary evidence or simply a ploy on the part of the prosecutor to arouse the passion and prejudice of the jury. McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d 151, 159 (Miss.1989). ¶ 93. This Court has allowed photographs to show the different wounds to the victim, Jenkins v. State, 607 So.2d 1171, 1175 (Miss. 1992), and in cases where they aided in the description of the circumstances of the murder and the corpse. Westbrook v. State, 658 So.2d 847, 849 (Miss.1995). ¶ 94. The photographs in question were autopsy photos, as well as, crime scene photos of the victim. Their probative value was that they accurately depicted the wounds suffered by McBride, which were stipulated to in the autopsy report prepared by Dr. Emily Ward, the state medical examiner at the time of McBride's death. Based on the broad discretion afforded the trial judge, the case law, and the pictures themselves, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting these photographs. This assignment of error is without merit.
¶ 95. Burns next maintains that the trial judge erred in denying him funds to hire an independent psychologist to assist his defense. In denying his motion for an independent psychiatrist, the trial judge found: THE COURT: Very well. Your motion is partly granted and partly denied. I will furnish you a handwriting expert. You have demonstrated the requisite need for that. However, with respect to the psychiatrist, based on the motion and statements made here in court, the Court does not feel that there is a showing having been made that would demonstrate the necessity of that expert. The record is silent and the motion is silent with respect to any mental problems this defendant may have experienced in the past, any irrational behavior between the defendant and defense counsel. For that reason those reasons I'm going to deny that portion of your motion as it relates to the psychiatrist. Anything further? ¶ 96. The State argues that counsel for Burns, in his motion for a psychiatrist, only stated that at the time the crime was committed, Mr. Burns may have been diminished capacity to some extent. The State cites Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss. 1997), in support of the proposition that, [d]etermination of whether the State must pay for an expert witness for an indigent defendant must be made on a case by case basis. ¶ 97. While there is no shortage of law on this issue, all of the cases previously decided by this Court rely on Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). The United States Supreme Court said in Ake, [w]e therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the State must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we have discussed, and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the States the decision on how to implement this right. Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 480-81 (Miss. 1988) ( quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087). Counsel for Burns offers nothing more than undeveloped assertions that Burns needed an expert. There was never any evidence that Burns actually had any psychological problems, mental illness or would be a danger to society. ¶ 98. The Supreme Court has said that there is no due process violation in denying expert assistance where the defendant offered only undeveloped assertions that the expert would be beneficial. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). Something more than `undeveloped assertions that the requested assistance would be beneficial' is required. Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314, 321 (Miss. 1992) ( quoting Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 125 (Miss.1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1970, 118 L.Ed.2d 570 (1992)). ¶ 99. Burns' motion for an independent psychiatrist was at best vague. Defense counsel never outlined the specific cost, value and purpose of an expert or investigator as required by this Court in Harrison v. State, 635 So.2d 894, 900-02 (Miss.1994). There was no indication whatsoever that Burns suffered from diminished capacity when the murder was committed other than empty assertions by his attorney. There was no reference to any potential incompetence regarding Burns' ability to stand trial. For these reasons, this issue is without merit.
¶ 100. Burns' thirteenth assignment of error charges that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his request for a manslaughter instruction. Burns claims that a reasonable jury could have convicted him of manslaughter if it found that defendant was not guilty of armed robbery, but did find that Burns killed McBride without malice afore-thought. ¶ 101. The State argues first that Burns failed to request a manslaughter instruction. Secondly it contends that Burns failed to object to the court's lesser included instruction of murder. Finally, the State argues that Burns did not include the failure to give a manslaughter instruction in his motion for a new trial. ¶ 102. The following exchange occurred immediately following the objections to the jury instructions: THE COURT: ... Either side desire any additional instructions than those I've indicated I'm going to give? MR. YOUNG: No, your Honor. THE COURT: Defendant? MR. ELLIS: No, your Honor. The only reference to a lesser included offense instruction was offered by the State, and it was ultimately withdrawn by the State. The following exchange occurred: INSTRUCTION NO. P-1st-5: THE COURT:P-1st-5 was withdrawn by the State; is that correct? MR. GEDDIE: I believe so, your Honor. Give me one second here. THE COURT: Lesser included manslaughter. MR. YOUNG: Yes, sir, it's withdrawn. Finally, the State argues that there was absolutely no evidence or reasonable inference presented [by the defendant] that would justify a manslaughter verdict. ¶ 103. This Court has addressed a very similar issue in Griffin v. State, 557 So.2d 542, 549 (Miss.1990) (holding that defendant convicted of capital murder while in the commission of a robbery was not entitled to a manslaughter instruction). The Court said in Griffin that [t]his homicide having occurred during the course of a robbery, it was capital murder, regardless of the intent of Griffin. Id. In the case sub judice, Burns was engaged in the commission of robbery when McBride was killed. Thus, no manslaughter instruction was required to be given. ¶ 104. The record reveals that Burns never offered any mitigating evidence that would justify manslaughter rather than murder. There was nothing to indicate that this murder was done in the heat of passion. Because the burden to overcome the presumption of murder lies with the defendant, Nicolaou v. State, 534 So.2d 168, 171-72 (Miss.1988), and because Burns failed to meet this burden, this issue is without merit.
¶ 105. Burns next asserts that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the underlying crime of armed robbery. The State argues that P-1st-3A adequately instructed the jury on the elements of armed robbery. ¶ 106. The only objection made by Burns regarding this instruction was to the sufficiency of the evidence. Thus, the State argues that this issue is procedurally barred citing Conner v. State, 632 So.2d 1239, 1255 (Miss.1993) (holding that an objection on one or more specific grounds constitutes a waiver of all other grounds). ¶ 107. The procedural bar notwithstanding, this issue has no merit. The jury was adequately informed of the elements of armed robbery. Burns never argues otherwise. Rather the only argument counsel for Burns ever made was in reference to the sufficiency of the evidence. The sufficiency of the evidence is discussed at issue V, supra. We find that there is ample evidence to support Burns' intent to rob McBride. Further, the evidence supported Burns' conviction of capital murder while in the commission of armed robbery and as such, this issue is without merit.