Opinion ID: 167519
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consent to a Limited Search

Text: Next M s. Concepcion-Ledesma argues that the search of her vehicle was not consensual. The district court held that she consented to a limited search of her “bag and stuff,” but not to a general search of the entire van. She argues that she did not voluntarily consent to any search. W e review the district court’s factual findings for clear error, and its legal conclusion as to the reasonableness of the search de novo. United States v. M cKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1296 (10th Cir. 2000). W ithout reasonable suspicion, a w arrantless search of luggage or a vehicle is unreasonable, notwithstanding verbal consent by the owner, if the “consent to - 12 - the suspicionless search was involuntary.” United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206 (2002). The Supreme Court has held that officers need not expressly inform suspects that they are free to go before requesting permission to conduct a search. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U .S. 33, 39–40 (1996). Instead, “[v]oluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances.” Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 248–49 (1973). The central question is whether “a reasonable person would believe he w as free to leave or disregard the officer’s request.” United States v. M anjarrez, 348 F.3d 881, 885–86 (10th Cir. 2003). In our traffic stop cases, we have identified a number of factors that suggest that an encounter was not consensual, including the “threatening presence of several officers,” the “use of aggressive language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with an officer’s request is compulsory,” the “prolonged retention of a person’s personal effects such as identification,” the “absence of other members of the public,” and the officer’s failure to advise the defendant that she is free to leave. United States v. Hill, 199 F.3d 1143, 1147–48 (10th Cir. 1999); see also United States v. Broomfield, 201 F.3d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 2000). Conversely, we have pointed to other factors as evidence that an encounter was consensual, including an officer’s “pleasant” manner and a tone of voice that is not “insisting,” M cSwain, 29 F.3d at 563, a public location such as “the shoulder of an interstate highway, in public view,” United States v. Soto, 988 F.2d 1548, 1558 (10th Cir. 1993), and the prompt return of the defendant’s identification and - 13 - papers, United States v. Zapata, 997 F.2d 751, 757 (10th Cir. 1993). None of these factors is dispositive, however, as “a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter” to determine whether consent was voluntary. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439 (1991); see also Hill, 199 F.3d at 1148. In this case, after filling out a written warning for the temporary tag violation, Trooper Ranieri returned to the van and returned M s. ConcepcionLedesma’s license and registration. After explaining the warning, he added in an ordinary, nonthreatening voice, “Thank you girls. You have a safe one.” M em. & Order 5. At that point, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave. Phrases like “thank you” and “have a safe one” signal the end of an encounter, and afford a defendant an opportunity to depart. Although he did not explicitly inform M s. Concepcion and her passenger that they were free to leave, Trooper Ranieri’s words of farewell suggested that any subsequent discussion was consensual. Following that exchange, Trooper Ranieri asked whether M s. ConcepcionLedesma and her passenger had “anything, uh, weapons or any type of illegal stuff in the back.” Id. When they replied that they did not, he asked, “Could w e look, could we take a minute to look back there? Just your bag and stuff.” Id. The request was phrased as a question and spoken in an ordinary tone of voice. The women replied, “Yeah.” Id. Nothing about this line of - 14 - questioning— conducted in public view on an interstate highway— suggests coercion or intimidation. See United States v. Elliott, 107 F.3d 810, 814 (10th Cir. 1997) (holding that traffic stop became consensual once the officer returned the driver’s documentation, noting that “there is no indication his questioning was accompanied by any coercive show of authority”). Accordingly, their consent to a limited search of “your bag and stuff” was voluntary. M s. Concepcion-Ledesma points out that a second officer, Trooper Dean, was present at the scene, and reminds us that the presence of multiple officers may cut against the conclusion that consent was voluntary. Yet Trooper Dean arrived only after M s. Concepcion-Ledesma consented to a limited search of the back of her vehicle. Appellee’s Supp. App. 91 (“Q. W ere you present when [Trooper Ranieri] asked for consent? A . No.”). She also characterizes Trooper Ranieri’s language as “aggressive.” A plt. Br. 24. The videotape reveals not a hint of aggression during the exchange concerning the search, however, and she appears to concede that Trooper Ranieri only raised his voice later in the encounter, after expanding the search to include the hidden compartment. Neither of these factors could have rendered M s. Concepcion-Ledesma’s consent involuntary because they took place after she gave permission for the search. At the time she consented, Trooper Ranieri was alone and his tone of voice was ordinary, even amiable. - 15 - At bottom, M s. Concepcion-Ledesma’s complaint is that Trooper Ranieri never explicitly told her she was free to leave. The Supreme Court has admonished, however, that an officer’s failure to inform the defendant that she is free to leave, standing alone, does not make an encounter nonconsensual. Drayton, 536 U.S. at 206. Under the circumstances, we have no difficulty concluding that M s. Concepcion-Ledesma voluntarily consented to a search of her “bag and stuff” in the rear of the van. C. Probable Cause to Search the H idden Compartment In the proceedings below , Trooper Ranieri testified that he understood M s. Concepcion-Ledesma to have consented to an unrestricted search of the entire van. The phrase “your bag and stuff,” he explained, meant anything and everything the police might find, even if it meant prying open panels and removing foam inserts from the walls of the van. The government has (wisely) abandoned this position on appeal, and now concedes that M s. ConcepcionLedesma only consented to a limited search that “did not extend to the areas behind the panels.” Br. of Appellee 16. Nonetheless, the government maintains that the search was proper because, in the course of performing the consensual search “in the back,” the troopers discovered evidence of a secret compartment that provided probable cause for a more extensive search. The district court held that the presence of screws and ill-fitting panels in the back of the van, which indicated the presence of a hidden compartment, - 16 - together w ith the defendants’ extreme nervousness, the suspicious nature of their travel plans, the absence of luggage sufficient for their stated purpose, and the newness of the vehicle, constituted probable cause to search the van. M em. & Order 19. On appeal, this Court must accept the factual findings of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous, and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the determination of the district court. United States v. W illiam s, 271 F.3d 1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 2001). In this case, the basic facts are not disputed. As to the ultimate legal conclusion regarding w hether, in light of those facts, the officers had probable cause to search, we must apply a de novo standard of appellate review. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996). In conducting this de novo review, we must “look at the ‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see w hether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1981)). As the phrase suggests, a “totality of the circumstances” test does not depend on whether any particular factor is innocent when considered in isolation, but on whether, taken as a whole, the facts observed by the law enforcement officers indicate a fair probability that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence. United States v. Nielsen, 9 F.3d 1487, 1489–90 (10th Cir. 1993). - 17 - W hen conducting a “totality of the circumstances” analysis of reasonable suspicion or probable cause, this Court typically examines each factor invoked by law enforcement and credited by the district court, “look[ing] not only to the facts supporting probable cause, but also to those that militate against it.” United States v. Valenzuela, 365 F.3d 892, 897 (10th Cir. 2004); see, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 364 F.3d 1185, 1190–94 (10th Cir. 2004); United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1126-34 (10th Cir. 2005). Even where a particular factor, considered in isolation, is of “limited significance” and must be “discount[ed],” it nonetheless may affect the Fourth Amendment analysis when combined with other indicia of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Johnson, 364 F.3d at 1192; see also Santos, 403 F.3d at 1133–34. “[N]o single factor is determinative, and we view the circumstances in their totality rather than individually.” Valenzuela, 365 F.3d at 897. By examining and evaluating the various factors, an appellate court can advance the purposes served by de novo review. As the Supreme Court has explained, “de novo review tends to unify precedent and will come closer to providing law enforcement officers with a defined ‘set of rules which, in most instances, makes it possible to reach a correct determination beforehand as to whether an invasion of privacy is justified in the interest of law enforcement.’” Ornelas, 517 U.S. at 697–98 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 458 (1981)). The ultimate question is w hether “‘the facts and circumstances w ithin the officers’ knowledge, and of which they have reasonably trustworthy - 18 - information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being comm itted.’” United States v. Edwards, 242 F.3d 928, 934 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. M aher, 919 F.2d 1482, 1485 (10th Cir. 1990)).
The first and most significant factor invoked by the government and credited by the district court is the evidence of a hidden compartment in the back of the van driven by M s. Concepcion-Ledesma. This Court has repeatedly held that “evidence of a hidden compartment can contribute to probable cause to search.” United States v. M ercado, 307 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Vasquez-C astillo, 258 F.3d 1207, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001); United States Anderson, 114 F.3d 1059, 1066 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Nicholson, 17 F.3d 1294, 1297–98 (10th Cir. 1994). In United States v. Jurado-Vallejo, 380 F.3d 1235, 1236 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Jurado-Vallejo I”), a Kansas trooper traveling on an interstate highway approached a Ford Expedition from the rear and noticed “modifications to the vehicle’s bed and underbody that suggested the presence of a hidden compartment.” Specifically, the trooper noticed a “lift” low ering the vehicle’s underbody three inches from its bed, squared off edges on the vehicle’s bed suggesting a modification from the factory model, and a suspicious seam that had been bonded and coated. Id. at 1236–37. W e determined that “[w]hether - 19 - probable cause to search a vehicle can be based on evidence of a hidden compartment depends on two factors: (1) the probative value of the evidence— that is, the likelihood that there really is a hidden compartment; and (2) the likelihood that a vehicle with a hidden compartment would, in the circumstances, be secreting contraband.” Id. at 1238. The second factor, we held, was “not a concern” because “[i]f the vehicle had a hidden compartment, it was highly likely to contain contraband.” Id. Indeed, we found it “hard to conceive of a legitimate use for a large hidden storage compartment in any vehicle, let alone one with the cargo space of a Ford Expedition.” Id. at 1238–39. The first factor, however, was difficult to evaluate based on the district court’s order. W e therefore remanded the case and asked the district court to make factual findings concerning the credibility of the trooper’s testimony. Id. at 1239. On remand the district court credited the trooper’s testimony, but nonetheless held that he lacked probable cause to conduct a search. United States v. Jurado-Vallejo, 380 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2004) (“Jurado-Vallejo II”). The district court emphasized that the trooper had not inspected the passenger side or undercarriage of the vehicle, and had not touched or probed any of the wheel w ells. Id. W e reversed, holding that “if the district court credited [the trooper’s] testimony, there was probable cause to search.” Id. The question is not “whether [the officer] could have done more to confirm that the vehicle had a hidden compartment,” and there is no requirement that visual observations be - 20 - corroborated by touch or smell. Id. Rather, the issue is whether the evidence of a hidden compartment was sufficient to “‘warrant a [person] of reasonable caution to believe that evidence of a crime w ill be found at the place to be searched.’” Id. at 1241–42 (quoting United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352 F.3d 1325, 1330 (10th Cir. 2003)). Jurado-Vallejo II stands for the proposition that visual evidence of a hidden compartment, without more, may provide probable cause to conduct or expand a search. In this case, Troopers Ranieri and Dean observed several suspicious modifications to the vehicle immediately upon opening the back doors to the van. The side panels appeared to have been removed and reattached repeatedly, the “screw s and stuff w ere all scarred and marked up,” and the carpet and panels were no longer aligned. Appellee’s Supp. App. 44–45. Trooper Ranieri’s suspicion “skyrocketed” when he saw those alterations, id. at 45, all of which were plainly visible from the troopers’ position in the back of the van, where M s. ConcepcionLedesma explicitly authorized them to go. See M em. & Order 5 (responding that she had no contraband “in the back” and authorizing Trooper Ranieri to “look back there”). Because the evidence was highly probative of the existence of a secret compartment, and because it is difficult to imagine a licit purpose for a large hidden compartment in a vehicle the size of a Chevy van, these signs of a hidden compartment strongly suggest— and perhaps even singlehandedly establish— probable cause to search behind the side panels in the rear of the van. - 21 -
Any doubts about probable cause to expand the search are dispelled by three suspicious aspects of M s. Concepcion-Ledesma’s initial conversation with Trooper Ranieri. First, the small amount of luggage in the back of the van was inconsistent with the women’s stated travel plans to spend up to two weeks in Los Angeles, and their intention to “find some friends” for a two-week stay was implausible. See U nited States v. Ozbirn, 189 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding probable cause based in part on a “vague description” of travel plans); United States v. Arango, 912 F.2d 441, 447 (10th Cir. 1990) (finding probable cause to arrest based on evidence of a secret compartment along with “the inadequate amount of luggage in the truck for [the defendant’s] purported twoweek vacation”). Second, M s. Concepcion-Ledesma denied any association with any other vehicles traveling nearby, which was suspicious because Trooper Ranieri had observed two other vehicles— including one from M ichigan, judging by its license plates— traveling close together with the van in the slow lane on I- 70. Third, the district court found that M s. Concepcion-Ledesma’s “extreme nervousness” contributed to probable cause. M em. & Order 19. Although “nervousness is a sufficiently common— indeed natural— reaction to confrontation with the police,” we have held that “extraordinary and prolonged nervousness can weigh significantly in the assessment” of probable cause or reasonable suspicion. Santos, 403 F.3d at 1127. These circumstances, together with the evidence of a - 22 - hidden compartment discovered in the course of the consensual search, easily provide probable cause for a search of the side panels of the rear of the van.
Other factors mentioned by the officer are of little weight under the facts of this case. There is nothing suspicious about carrying a cell phone and an atlas or road map w hile driving on an interstate highway, and we are puzzled as to why Trooper R anieri believes otherw ise. See United States v. Wood, 106 F.3d 942, 947 (10th Cir. 1997). Also, under the circumstances of this case little weight should be attached to the fact that M s. Concepcion-Ledesma took a newly purchased van on a long trip. Travelers frequently acquire a new vehicle in anticipation of a long trip out of concern that an older vehicle will break down before reaching the destination. W e assign no weight to Trooper Ranieri’s equivocal testimony that he smelled air freshener inside the vehicle. This Court “has consistently held that the scent of air freshener is properly considered as a factor in the probable cause analysis” where it might suggest a conscious attempt to mask the smell of contraband. United States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1178 (10th Cir. 2000). But in this case, even after an exhaustive search, the police found no air freshener in the vehicle, and the officer testified that the “sweet, fruity smell could have been placed in the vehicle a few days before by the dealer or the seller.” M em. & Order 4. The district court apparently did not find this slight, perhaps non- - 23 - existent, air freshener scent suggestive of a conscious attempt to hide the smell of contraband, and neither do we. Finally, the district court found that the “destination and route of travel” contributed to probable cause. M em. & Order 19. W hen asked about her travel plans, M s. Concepcion-Ledesma stated that she was driving from Detroit to Los Angeles. That route was suspicious, according to Trooper Ranieri, because she was “coming from an area where narcotics is [sic] usually warehoused or narcotics is [sic] stored . . . to another source city.” Appellee’s Supp. App. 39. On that theory, however, the route should not have been suspicious at all. The van was traveling from a drug “warehouse destination” to a drug “source city,” and therefore should have been empty. Drug couriers do not transport drugs away from the warehouse and back to the source. This logical gap precludes us from relying on the route as the basis for probable cause.
Notwithstanding our conclusion that some of the factors on which the officers relied were of little or no weight under the facts of this case, we have no hesitation in affirming the district court’s finding of probable cause based on the totality of the circumstances. Troopers R anieri and Dean had probable cause to expand their search in light of the evidence of a secret compartment, inadequate amount of luggage for a one- or two-week trip, M s. Concepcion-Ledesma’s denial of any relationship with the other M ichigan vehicles traveling nearby, and the - 24 - women’s extreme nervousness. Their warrantless search was therefore reasonable under the automobile exception, and the district court properly denied M s. Concepcion-Ledesma’s motion to suppress.