Opinion ID: 664055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Vuitton Argument

Text: 10 In arguing that the Attorney General should not have served as prosecutor because of his role in the civil litigation, Terry relies primarily on Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 107 S.Ct. 2124, 95 L.Ed.2d 740 (1987). Vuitton focused on the danger of entrusting the coercive powers of the state to counsel for a private litigant, and held that counsel for a party that is the beneficiary of a court order may not be appointed as a prosecutor in a contempt action alleging violation of that order. Unlike the usual Vuitton situation, this case involves the appointment of a government attorney as the contempt prosecutor. Like the United States Attorney, who was first asked by the district court to prosecute the contempt charges but declined, the Attorney General of the State of New York represents a sovereignty and is presumed to act with a sense of impartiality. 11 Despite this presumption, two circuits have held that Vuitton concerns may be implicated by appointment of a government attorney as prosecutor in a contempt proceeding. See United States ex rel. SEC v. Carter, 907 F.2d 484 (5th Cir.1990); FTC v. American Nat'l Cellular, 868 F.2d 315 (9th Cir.1989). Carter held that the appointment of SEC attorneys to prosecute appellants' violation of receivership injunctions entered in a suit brought by the SEC transgressed Vuitton principles, where the SEC attorneys who conducted the prosecution also litigated the underlying civil action and their prosecution was not supervised by the United States Attorney's Office. The court was further concerned by the prospect that the SEC attorneys had not disinterestedly pursued appellants' convictions, as evidenced by the fact that they overstated and misrepresented appellants' wrongdoing in their appellate briefs. 12 In American National Cellular, the Ninth Circuit ruled that appointment of government lawyers can lead to reversible error under Vuitton in certain circumstances, such as where an attorney's involvement in the underlying civil litigation clouds his judgment while prosecuting the contempt action. The Ninth Circuit found, however, that under the facts of the case before it, the involvement of FTC attorneys in the prosecution of appellant's contempt charges did not result in reversible error. American Nat'l Cellular, 868 F.2d at 320. The Ninth Circuit relied on the fact that the United States Attorney participated in the contempt prosecution and that the FTC attorneys who litigated the underlying civil action were only marginally involved, if at all, in the prosecution. 13 We agree with the Ninth Circuit that Vuitton does not automatically disqualify government attorneys who bring a civil action from serving as special prosecutors in a subsequent contempt proceeding, and that where a case involves appointment of a government attorney, the court must examine the particular facts of the case to determine if reversible error has occurred. See id. at 319. In the present case, we conclude, based on our review of the record, that the Attorney General's involvement with the underlying civil action did not present an actual or apparent conflict of interest requiring his disqualification. Several facts are particularly relevant to our decision. First, the only financial interest the Attorney General had in the underlying civil litigation (the possibility that attorneys' fees would be paid, not to the Attorney General or his office, but to the general coffers of the State of New York) was too remote to implicate a conflict. Second, the Attorney General could not profit financially from the criminal contempt prosecution since any fine imposed would be paid to the United States and the district court determined before the prosecution began that it would not award attorneys' fees. Third, at the time of the prosecution, the civil contempt charges against Terry had been dismissed. 14 Fourth, and quite significant in our view, at the time of the contempt prosecution there were no ongoing activities in the underlying civil action that could cloud the Attorney General's judgment in the criminal case or exert undue pressure on Terry. Although we learned at oral argument that the district court has recently ordered the parties in the civil case to submit a schedule for completion of discovery and filing of pre-trial orders or motions for summary judgment, we do not believe this renewed activity in the civil action calls into question the Attorney General's impartiality during the prior contempt proceedings. It is undisputed that the civil case had been inactive since the time the preliminary injunction was issued until the court's recent order. The Attorney General was therefore not involved in the type of simultaneous activity that would give him an unfair advantage in either proceeding. As a final point, we conclude that the Attorney General's dual role could not have led to discovery abuse since any discovery obtained in the criminal proceeding, in which there was no grand jury, would be as readily obtainable in the underlying civil litigation. 15 Terry also argues that the potential for abuse with a dual role prosecutor is demonstrated by the fact that in his criminal trial, the Attorney General used materials obtained through discovery in parallel civil contempt proceedings of Terry's co-defendants. The Attorney General's concurrent prosecution of the civil and criminal contempt charges is not a concern addressed by Vuitton. The criminal proceeding does not involve vindication of an order issued in the civil contempt proceedings; rather, both proceedings seek vindication of the injunction issued in the underlying civil litigation. Vuitton does not suggest that different attorneys need to be appointed to prosecute parallel contempt proceedings. In addition, the evidentiary materials in question (deposition testimony of two witnesses and tapes of Terry's radio talk show programs) provided no unfair advantage to the Attorney General in the criminal case since they would have been available to any prosecutor through the criminal discovery process. Indeed, the Attorney General was prepared to call the two deponents as witnesses at the criminal trial, but defense counsel stipulated to admission of their civil deposition transcripts. Thus, there was no potential for the Attorney General to achieve a discovery advantage by his role in the civil contempt proceedings and, in fact, none was achieved.