Opinion ID: 1360487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Understanding Martin's Dismissal

Text: To get a real grasp of what this case is all about, it is helpful to examine why Martin was targeted for dismissal. Martin's dismissal was part of an organized plan by Sears to purge middle-management employees. In 1982, in order to make cut-backs in personnel costs, Sears adopted a plan for reducing its complement of permanent employees. By eliminating long-term employees and hiring new or part-time employees Sears believed that it would be able, overall, to pay lower salaries and to pay out less in salaries, profit sharing and other employee benefits, including retirement benefits. This employee-reduction plan had a name: Ideal Basic Organization. Martin had been with Sears for twenty-four years at the time the company targeted him for annihilation under its dreaded (to quote Martin's testimony) Ideal Basic Organization (IBO) plan. In order to further the goals of the IBO, Sears made what could very well appear to a jury as a pretextual and insubstantial charge of minor improprieties [3] against Martin and dredged up some stale, minor rule violations out of Martin's long employment past and used these violations as an excuse to terminate him for cause. The manner in which Sears effectuated its IBO plan in Martin's case was that the company chose not to fire him outright and honestly but, rather, to force him to quit by reducing him in rank and salary so that after twenty-four years of service to Sears, the company ordered him back to about the same position that he was in when he first joined the Sears organization. Martin may have both a contract claim and a tort claim against Sears because of the way Sears treated him; and the trial court should not have entered judgment against him without giving him a trial. Evidence in this case would support a conclusion that Martin's employment relationship with Sears changed over the years. As a senior, managerial employee, Martin could not be terminated without the approval of a vice-president. It was because of this status that a Sears vice-president interfered with the process of dismissing Martin for cause and ruled that even in light of the charges of documented misconduct levied against Martin, the vice-president would not allow [Martin's accusers] to terminate him. It would appear that Martin had reached a point in his relationship with Sears at which no one had the understanding or belief that he could be tossed away like an old shoe. To me it is highly probable that Sears management itself believed it could terminate Martin only if the company were able to prove conclusively documented misconduct. [4] Employee misconduct is a serious charge; and, according to the Sears personnel manual, an employee may not be  released [for documented misconduct] unless the unit has a written statement signed by the employee admitting the act, or there is other conclusive evidence of the act. [5] (Emphasis added.) Since Martin made no written admissions of fault, it follows then that Sears, by the language of its own manual, had to prove its case against Martin by conclusive evidence before he could be released. It is hard to say whether this conclusive burden of proof is comparable to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard or the standard of clear and convincing evidence, but in either event Sears imposes on itself a heavy burden when it decides to discharge an employee for cause on charges of employee misconduct. In this regard I would point out first that if Sears really believed that Martin was an at-will employee, it is not likely that it would have undertaken to marshal conclusive evidence that Martin was guilty of misconduct. Secondly, I would say (although it really has no bearing on the question of whether Martin was an at-will employee as a matter of law) that it is plain from the record that there is no conclusive evidence that Martin was guilty of the type of wrongdoing that would have justified Sears in dismissing for cause this twenty-four year, permanent employee. Sears agrees that there was insufficient cause to terminate Martin. Sears' counsel informs us that a Sears vice-president acknowledged: No, you can demote him but I'm not going to allow you to terminate him. I must assume from this statement that there were not sufficient grounds to terminate Martin. Whether, of course, demoting Martin to an entry-level employee was, in fact, the same as terminating him is a question that must be answered by a factfinder. [6] In short, if the newly-aligned Majority of this court had not decided (without actually saying so) to overrule D'Angelo and to refuse to permit a dismiss-only-for-cause employment contract to be infer[red] from the dealings and practices of the parties, this case would have to be sent back for a jury trial. D'Angelo, 107 Nev. at 709, 819 P.2d at 209. There are a number of dealings and practices of these parties from which a cause-only relationship could be inferred. The most telling of all are the dealings and practices engaged in by Sears when it decided to get rid of Martin. Before I go on to consider Sears' tort liability, I want to conclude by stressing the fact that, in its dealings with Martin, Sears never pretended that after all those years with the company it still had the right to fire Martin without cause. Surely employers can put into their handbooks and hiring documents a declaration that employment is to be at-will, but at-will at the time of hiring is not necessarily at-will forever. [7]