Opinion ID: 1908357
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: WMATA's obligations as a common carrier.

Text: The plaintiff in a negligence action bears the burden of proof on three issues: the applicable standard of care, a deviation from that standard by the defendant, and a causal relationship between that deviation and the plaintiff's injury. Toy v. District of Columbia, 549 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). WMATA contends that the evidence as to each of these elements was insufficient, as a matter of law, to satisfy Ms. Jeanty's burden. We disagree. A common carrier transports precious human cargo, and the courts have long analyzed the relationship between the carrier and its passengers accordingly. The Supreme Court declared almost one and a half centuries ago that [w]hen carriers undertake to convey persons by the powerful but dangerous agency of steam, public policy and safety require that they be held to the greatest possible care and diligence. Philadelphia & Reading R.R. Co. v. Derby, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 468, 486, 14 L.Ed. 502 (1852). [4] Twenty-eight years later, the Court stated that although a common carrierin that case a railroad does not warrant the safety of the passengers, at all events, its agents must observe the utmost caution characteristic of very careful, prudent men and must exercise extraordinary vigilance aided by the highest skill. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U.S. 451, 456, 26 L.Ed. 141 (1880). The foregoing principles have long been a part of the law of the District of Columbia. In Capital Traction Co. v. Copland, 47 App. D.C. 152, 159 (1917), the court, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Roy, stated that common carriers are bound to exercise extraordinary vigilance [aided] by the highest skill for the purpose of protecting their passengers against injury resulting from defects in ways or instrumentalities used by the carriers. This requirement has grown [o]ut of the special solicitude [shown by the courts] for the safety of human cargo, Birchall v. Capital Transit Co., 34 A.2d 624, 625 (D.C. 1943), and no rule is better established than that which holds a common carrier to the highest degree of care towards its passengers for hire. Missile Cab Ass'n, Inc. v. Rogers, 184 A.2d 845, 847 (D.C.1962); see also Sebastian v. District of Columbia, 636 A.2d 958, 962 (D.C.1994) (quoting Missile Cab Ass'n, supra ). In Schaller v. Capital Transit Co., 99 U.S.App.D.C. 253, 254, 239 F.2d 73, 74 (1956) (per curiam), a case in which the plaintiff was injured while alighting from a bus, the court held that it is the duty of a carrier to use the highest degree of care in, inter alia, provid[ing] [to the passenger] safe and convenient means of entering and leaving the bus. Notwithstanding these authorities, however, we have held, as the Supreme Court did in Roy, supra, 102 U.S. at 456, that a carrier is not an insurer of its passengers' safety. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Smith, 173 A.2d 216, 217 (D.C.1961). On the contrary, the passenger has the burden of proving negligence, i.e., that the carrier failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances. See, e.g., Bray v. D.C. Transit Sys., Inc., 179 A.2d 387, 388-89 (D.C.1962). In D.C. Transit Sys., Inc. v. Carney, 254 A.2d 402, 403 (D.C.1969), the court quoted from the cases holding that common carriers are held to the highest degree of care, but opined that there are no categories of care; i.e., the care required is always reasonable care. More recently, we have stated that although the language in our cases speaks of the high degree of care required of a common carrier, the cases all hold that a common carrier is subject to essentially the same standard as any other alleged tortfeasor, i.e., an obligation to exercise due care. Sebastian, supra, 636 A.2d at 962 (citing McKethean v. WMATA, 588 A.2d 708, 712 (D.C.1991)); cf. Pazmino v. WMATA, 638 A.2d 677, 679 n. 3 (D.C.1994) (noting the variations in our precedents in the articulation of the standard, but emphasizing that the greater the danger, the greater the care that must be exercised). Whether or not all of our cases can be fully harmonized with respect to the existence or non-existence of a separate standard of care for common carriers, [5] all of the decisions recognize that the standard is always contextual, and that the carrier's relation to, and duties toward, its passengers constitute the critical context in which the carrier's conduct is evaluated. The carrier's duty of care, vigilance, and foresight applies with particular force to the maintenance of its equipment. [A] common carrier is bound to exercise a high or the highest degree of care and diligence in the ... maintenance, inspection, and use of its conveyances and their appliances.... 14 AM.JUR.2D Carriers § 1028, at 450 & nn. 12 & 13 (1964 & Supp.1998). We have stated that [a] bus company, like any other common carrier, is bound to inspect its vehicles to be certain they are in proper operating order and free from any condition which may be dangerous to passengers. Bray, supra, 179 A.2d at 389. Because a carrier must use the highest degree of care in assuring the safety of its passengers, its vehicles and equipment must be vigilantly and regularly inspected. Burnell v. Sportran Transit Sys. Co., 421 So.2d 1199, 1201 (La.App.), writ denied, 423 So.2d 1183 (La.1982). The duty to inspect is not continuous; the carrier need not, for example, immediately re-inspect a bus whenever snow begins to fall, for the timing of inspections must be consistent with the practical operation of the bus. Bray, supra, 179 A.2d at 389. [6] Nevertheless, [c]arriers are under the highest duty to provide and maintain suitable and safe equipment and appliances.... [N]othing can exempt [carriers] from liability as for defects therein, except that they are latent ones which no reasonable degree of skill and diligence would discover or prevent. Southeastern Greyhound Lines v. Callahan, 244 Ala. 449, 13 So.2d 660, 663 (1943) (citation omitted); see also Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Roman's Guardian, 232 Ky. 285, 23 S.W.2d 272, 274 (1929) (carrier must use the utmost care and skill ... to inspect [its equipment] and keep the same in repair, and to prevent it from becoming defective); Leslie v. Georgia Power Co., 47 Ga.App. 723, 171 S.E. 395, 395 (1933) (inspections should be adequate and sufficient, and should be made with such frequency as the liability to impairment reasonably requires (citations omitted)). In light of the common carrier's obligation as described above, the courts are generally agreed that when a passenger is injured by machinery and appliances wholly under the carrier's control, this fact is sufficient prima facie to show negligence. Humphries v. Queen City Coach Co., 228 N.C. 399, 45 S.E.2d 546, 548 (1947). [7] As the court stated in an early case in this jurisdiction, [i]t is undoubtedly the law that, as between passenger and carrier, where the causes which produce the accident are peculiarly within the knowledge of the carrier, the plaintiff may make out a prima facie showing of negligence merely by proving the relation of the parties and the happening of the accident. In such a case an inference of negligence arises which calls for rebuttal by defendant carrier, and which, in the absence of rebuttal or explanation, is sufficient to send the case to the jury and to support a verdict for plaintiff. Pistorio, supra note 5, 46 App.D.C. at 485-86. These decisions are consistent with fundamental considerations of fairness, see United States v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 355 U.S. 253, 256 n. 5, 78 S.Ct. 212, 2 L.Ed.2d 247 (1957), for the facts relating to the maintenance and inspection of a vehicle's equipment are peculiarly within the knowledge of the carrier and, upon a showing of injury resulting from a malfunctioning appliance, the burden should be allocated accordingly. Cf. Selma, Rome & Dalton R.R. Co. v. United States, 139 U.S. 560, 568, 11 S.Ct. 638, 35 L.Ed. 266 (1891). [8] A prima facie showing of negligence is ordinarily sufficient to require submission of the case to the jury, Pistorio, supra note 5, 46 App.D.C. at 485-86, at least in the absence of evidence establishing contributory negligence as a matter of law. Humphries, supra, 45 S.E.2d at 548. [9]