Opinion ID: 2507985
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Selection: Adequacy of Voir Dire of Prospective Jurors

Text: The trial court conducted voir dire under Code of Civil Procedure former section 223, which, at the time of defendant's trial, provided that in a criminal case the court shall conduct the examination of prospective jurors, but that the parties upon a showing of good cause may supplement the examination. (As added by Prop. 115, approved by voters June 5, 1990.) The court permitted the parties to prepare a detailed jury questionnaire designed to streamline the voir dire process. The court also privately questioned individual prospective jurors, when it believed that sequestered questioning was necessary. Defendant now makes several claims regarding the voir dire. We address each claim separately.
Before the penalty phase, the defendant filed a motion asking the court to permit counsel to conduct voir dire in a manner similar to that used in civil cases under Code of Civil Procedure section 222.5, rather than the voir dire process used in criminal cases, including death penalty matters, under Code of Civil Procedure former section 223 (as added by Prop. 115, approved by voters June 5, 1990). The prosecution filed a short opposition and the court denied the motion. Defendant's motion attacked, on equal protection grounds, the constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure section 223, as enacted in 1990 as a part of Proposition 115. The statute, both as enacted and at present, provides that in all criminal cases, including those involving the death penalty, the trial court shall conduct the voir dire of any prospective jurors..., where practicable, ... in the presence of other prospective jurors. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223; see People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46 ( Waidla ).) As Waidla observed, the change in voir dire procedure abrogated prior law which had required individual and sequestered voir dire in capital cases. ( Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 713, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46; Covarrubias v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1168, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91 ( Covarrubias ) [section 223 abrogated former individual voir dire procedure required under Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301].) Defendant's contention rests on his belief that this provision of Code of Civil Procedure former section 223 unfairly places the voir dire in the hands of the court, and allows counsel to ask questions on a showing of good cause only. [5] By contrast, defendant observes, Code of Civil Procedure section 222.5, gives counsel in a civil action the right to examine, by oral and direct questioning, prospective jurors. The difference between civil and criminal case voir dire, defendant claims, denied him equal protection under the state and federal Constitutions. We conclude, as the Courts of Appeal have, that Code of Civil Procedure former section 223 did not violate the equal protection clauses of the United States and California Constitutions, and reject defendant's claim that his equal protection challenge is subject to the strict scrutiny doctrine, which is applicable when there is a significant interference with the exercise of a fundamental right. ( Lucas v. Superior Court (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 733, 738, 250 Cal.Rptr. 76.) The right to voir dire the jury is not constitutional, but is a means to achieve the end of an impartial jury. ( People v. Estorga (1928) 206 Cal. 81, 84, 273 P. 575.) In addition, the peremptory challenge is not a constitutional necessity but a statutory privilege. ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 281, fn. 28, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748.) Therefore, there is no constitutional right to any particular manner of conducting the voir dire and selecting a jury so long as such limitations as are recognized by the settled principles of criminal law to be essential in securing impartial juries are not transgressed. ( People v. Boulerice (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 463, 474, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 279 ( Boulerice ).) Federal and state courts have held, however, that the Legislature may establish reasonable regulations or conditions on the right to a jury trial as long as the essential elements of a jury trial are preserved, including number of jurors (12), unanimity, and impartiality. ( Boulerice, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 474, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 279.) The purpose of Code of Civil Procedure former section 223 was to curb commonly known abuses during the voir dire process in criminal cases. ( Boulerice, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 474, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 279.) As the People observe, therefore, the statute's distinction between criminal and civil voir dire is constitutional as long as it is rationally related to a legitimate state purpose under the rational relationship test, a test met here. ( People v. Leung (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 482, 496, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 290 ( Leung ).) By enacting Code of Civil Procedure section 223, the voters sought to prevent abuse of the jury selection process in criminal cases. Prevention of abuse of a statutory right is a legitimate purpose, and the voters' action was aimed at achieving a legitimate purpose rationally related to the distinction made by the law. ( Leung, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 496, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 290.) Because the classification drawn by Code of Civil Procedure section 223 was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, it did not deny defendant his equal protection rights under the California and United States Constitutions. ( Leung, supra, 5 Cal.App.4th at p. 496, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 290.)
Defendant next contends the trial court abused its discretion because it conducted group voir dire under Code of Civil Procedure former section 223, and did not use its discretion to engage in sequestered and individual voir dire as also allowed under the statute. [6] Section 223 requires that voir dire of any prospective jurors must, where practicable, occur in the presence of other jurors, and applies in all criminal cases, including death penalty cases. Under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, sequestration is left to the trial court's discretion, based on the court's determination that it is practicable to conduct voir dire in the presence of other prospective jurors. ( Covarrubias, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 1172, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 91.) In support of his claim, defendant includes two affidavits, one from retired Superior Court Judge Norman Spellberg, and one from jury consultant Therese Waller, a psychologist and staff member of the National Jury Project. In the affidavits, the jury selection experts give their opinions on the potentially unfair effect of the statutory voir dire procedures, including the apprehension prospective jurors may feel when voir dire is conducted in the presence of other prospective jurors. Although the court did indicate that group voir dire would save time and was convenient, given the courtroom size (and its inability to accommodate all prospective jurors at once), it did not, defendant contends, appropriately weigh the fact that the prospective jurors had been exposed to substantial pretrial publicity and another venire person's experience with an unsolved murder, both of which could desensitize the panel to its task of determining the appropriate penalty. In review of potential error under Code of Civil Procedure section 223, we apply the abuse of discretion review standard to the trial court's denial of defendant's request to conduct individual voir dire of prospective jurors. ( Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) In considering defense counsel's claim that every question of every juror should be outside the presence of the other jurors, the trial court expressly stated that it had discretion to order individual and sequestered voir dire if group voir dire was impracticable. The court specifically permitted the parties to prepare a jury questionnaire designed to streamline the voir dire process and to ensure that the pretrial publicity did not taint or bias the jurors' view of the case. The court admonished the jurors not to read any newspaper articles about the case and, even though some jurors did later read accounts of the trial, nothing suggests that the voir dire process was responsible for their actions. The court also offered to permit defense counsel to conduct private questioning of particular jurors when necessary and, in order to ensure the panel was impartial, conduct in-depth questioning of jurors who indicated they strongly believed in capital punishment. Nor do the declarations discussed above assist defendant's argument. The declarations are general in character and do not point to problems in this case. In addition, the declarations do not undermine the constitutionality of Code of Civil Procedure section 223. The trial court's approach to group voir dire, and its thoughtful questioning on specific points, were reasonable, and we find no abuse of discretion in the court's conduct. (See People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180-1181, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130 [trial court's reasonable approach to group voir dire upheld].)
The trial court excused for cause a prospective juror who indicated on her questionnaire that a friend of hers had been murdered. She gave a detailed account of the murder, and the court ascertained that she could not be fair and impartial. Another prospective juror who did not serve on the panel mentioned that the first juror's story had influenced him. Defendant now claims that the prospective juror who was excused should have been questioned in private, and the court should have delivered a curative admonition to the other prospective jurors. Defendant forfeited his right to raise any error because he never asked the court to question privately the prospective juror whose friend had been murdered and did not request an admonition for the remaining panel members. ( People v. Sanchez (1995) 12 Cal.4th 1, 61-62, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129 ( Sanchez ) [failure to object to court's questioning of prospective juror during voir dire forfeits claim].) On the merits, we find the trial court's careful questioning of the panel ensured the removal of the first prospective juror, and there is no indication that the second prospective juror's remarks that he was influenced by the account of the unrelated murder affected the other prospective jurors or undermined the court's ability to empanel a fair and impartial jury. ( People v. Martinez (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1456, 1465-1467, 279 Cal.Rptr. 858 [using totality of circumstances test to evaluate effect of juror's remark on other prospective jurors].)
Defendant next complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a fair and unbiased jury because the court refused to remove jurors who were exposed to the media and who were sensitive to issues involving gender bias. (See People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 852-853, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15 [trial court must conduct adequate voir dire to ensure defendant's constitutional right to an impartial jury].) Initially, we note that defendant has forfeited the right to raise any alleged error because he failed to object on either basis during trial. ( Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 61-62, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) Even on the merits, we would reject the claims. The jury questionnaire that the parties provided the court fully explored potential media bias and whether the jurors could avoid media exposure. The questionnaire also probed the effect of media exposure on the panel and satisfied the court that the voir dire adequately probed the media question. In addition, the trial court supplemented the questionnaire with follow-up questioning on potential media exposure. For example, the court's discussion with prospective Juror C. about the potential media influence on her views of the case proceeded as follows: [Court] Now that you have sat through this process before, do you feel you have heard something about the case, or heard something about the case beyond what is in this questionnaire answer? [Juror C.] I remember reading a little bit about the  it, when it happened. [Court] Would you be able to set aside what you might have read about it, and decide this case based on the evidence  [Juror C.] Yes. [Court] Received here? [Juror C.] Yes, I can. [Court] You heard the questions I have asked other jurors that may have read something about this. It is important that this case be decided with a fresh mind, based only on evidence that appears here in the courtroom. [Juror C.] Um-hum, yes. [Court] Okay. Even though you may have some vague recollection about reading something, the case can not be based on that. Would you be able to set that aside and listen to the evidence here? [Juror C.] Yes, I can. The above colloquy is typical of the trial court's follow-up voir dire on media exposure, and adequately explored the potential for prejudice. After reviewing the entire voir dire of all prospective jurors, we are satisfied that the inquiry into possible media bias was adequate under the Sixth Amendment. We find no error here. Defendant's additional claim that gender bias was not fully explored on voir dire is also without merit. First, defendant failed to preserve the issue by timely objection. ( Sanchez, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 61-62, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 843, 906 P.2d 1129.) In addition, his claim that gender bias caused him to commit the murders is without merit. The jury had ample evidence that defendant's violent acts were not gender specific, and that his prior criminal activity included several acts of violence against men. For example, defendant committed acts of violence against male jail and prison personnel and threatened to harm male acquaintances, including Jess Martin, Mary Cagle's boyfriend. In addition, the fact that the jury may have been exposed to a newspaper article discussing defendant's apparent disdain for women serving in combat does not make his gender bias defense claim any more credible, and his attempt to blame Cagle for inciting his murder spree is nothing more than an attempt to refuse to take responsibility for the brutal murders. Because the case did not involve a credible gender bias claim, no need arose for the additional voir dire questioning on the subject.
Defendant also claims that the court inadequately conducted follow-up questioning of another prospective juror who was excused for cause because she strongly believed she could not impose the death penalty. The record is devoid of any objection from defendant or any question offered by defendant in an attempt to rehabilitate the juror, indicating defendant forfeited his right to raise the claim. In addition, as the record shows, the court's questioning of that juror revealed significant bias against the death penalty. She indicated she could never vote to impose the penalty, regardless of the evidence, and repeated similar sentiments when the court's questioning continued. Given the prospective juror's adamant bias against imposing the death penalty, we find no error in the removal for cause. Defendant's claim that the prosecutor improperly exercised peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors who opposed the death penalty or were neutral to the penalty has been considered and rejected in other cases. (See, e.g., People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 912, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 967-968, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214.)