Opinion ID: 569313
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The RLA, Collective Bargaining, and the Right to Object

Text: 14 The labor relations of interstate carriers have been a subject of congressional enactments since 1888. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 755-56, 81 S.Ct. 1784, 1793, 6 L.Ed.2d 1141 (1961). Since the Railway Labor Act of 1926, Congress has ... consistently adhered to a regulatory policy which places the responsibility squarely upon the carriers and the unions mutually to work out settlements of all aspects of the labor relationship. Id. at 757, 81 S.Ct. at 1794. In 1934, Congress revised the 1926 Act to strengthen the unions and lessen the possibility of interference from employers, e.g., company unions. Id. at 759, 81 S.Ct. at 1795. Of importance to the question before us was the decision to empower an exclusive bargaining representative elected by a majority of all employees: 15 It was made explicit that the representative selected by a majority of any class or craft of employees should be the exclusive bargaining representative of all the employees of that craft or class. The minority members of a craft are thus deprived by the statute of the right, which they would otherwise possess, to choose a representative of their own, and its members cannot bargain individually on behalf of themselves as to matters which are properly the subject of collective bargaining. Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents.... 16 Id. at 759-60, 81 S.Ct. at 1795 (citations omitted). Thus, the Act's creation of an exclusive bargaining representative gave the unions a clearly defined and delineated role to play in effectuating the basic congressional policy of stabilizing labor relations.... Id. at 760, 81 S.Ct. at 1795. The exclusive bargaining representative system continues to the present; however, three subsequent decisions by Congress and the Supreme Court frame the present problem: the interpretation of the duty of fair representation in the RLA; the passage of § 2, Eleventh to the RLA; and the creation of a right to object in the RLA. 17 At the time of the 1934 revisions, Congress considered the issue of union security provisions. A security provision usually provides that, as a condition of employment, an employee must join the union. Unlike other industries, only one union in the railway industry had security provisions in a contract. Id. at 751, 81 S.Ct. at 1790. Although in 1934 the railway unions attempted to obtain legislation permitting security provisions, the final bill provided that [n]o carrier ... shall require any person seeking employment to sign any contract or agreement promising to join or not to join a labor organization. Id. at 753, 81 S.Ct. at 1792. The unions raised the issue again during World War II but a presidential Emergency Board rejected the provision. Id. 18 In 1950, Congress reevaluated the union security question primarily in terms of its relationship to the financing of the unions' participation in the machinery created by the Railway Labor Act to achieve its goals. Id. at 755, 81 S.Ct. at 1793. The emerging concern involved the realization that the union's performance of collective bargaining functions entailed the expenditure of considerable funds. Id. at 760, 81 S.Ct. at 1796. Expenditure of funds had gained significance after the Supreme Court's decision in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 65 S.Ct. 226, 89 L.Ed. 173 (1944), which ensured that the union's expenditure of funds for collective bargaining had to be spent equally on nonunion members. 19 In Steele, the union had excluded from membership, by the constitution and ritual of the Brotherhood, black railroad workers. Id. at 194, 65 S.Ct. at 228. The union, purporting to act as representative of the entire craft of firemen, id. at 195, 65 S.Ct. at 228, but without informing the Negro firemen or giving them opportunity to be heard, id., then negotiated to restrict, and ultimately end, the employment of black firemen. The Court held that the union's practice violated its statutory duties. The Court explained that, under the RLA, [t]he labor organization chosen to be the representative of the craft or class of employees is thus chosen to represent all of its members, regardless of their union affiliations or want of them. Id. at 200, 65 S.Ct. at 231. Basing the decision on the nature of a democratic system, the Court declared: 20 Unless the labor union representing a craft owes some duty to represent non-union members of the craft ... the minority would be left with no means of protecting their interests or indeed their right to earn a livelihood by pursuing the occupation in which they are employed.... It is a principle of general application that the exercise of a granted power to act in behalf of others involves the assumption toward them of a duty to exercise the power in their interest and behalf, and that such a grant of power will not be deemed to dispense with all duty toward those for whom it is exercised unless so expressed. 21 We think that the Railway Labor Act imposes upon the statutory representative of a craft at least as exacting a duty to protect equally the interests of the members of the craft as the Constitution imposes upon a legislature to give equal protection to the interests of those for whom it legislates. Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to create and restrict the rights of those whom it represented, ... but it has also imposed on the representative a corresponding duty. 22 Id. at 201-02, 65 S.Ct. at 231-32. 23 After Steele, [u]nder the statutory scheme, a union's status as exclusive bargaining representative carries with it the duty fairly and equitably to represent all employees of the craft or class, union or nonunion. Street, 367 U.S. at 761, 81 S.Ct. at 1796. Thus, in the 1950s, the unions, now with the unquestionable duty of equal and fair representation of all employees regardless of union membership, argued that if they had to represent all employees, it was only fair to spread the costs among all employees. As one spokesman for the unions stated,  'We believe that it is essentially unfair for nonmembers to participate in the benefits of those activities without contributing anything to the cost.'  Id. (citation omitted). 24 Eventually, Congress decided that it might be unfair to permit  '[n]onunion members ... [to] share in the benefits derived from collective agreements negotiated by the railway labor unions but [to] bear no share of the cost of obtaining such benefits.'  Id. at 762, 81 S.Ct. at 1796 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., at 4). An amendment to the RLA passed as [t]hese considerations overbore the arguments in favor of the earlier policy of complete individual freedom of choice. Id. at 763, 81 S.Ct. at 1797. The amendment, § 2, Eleventh provided: 25 Eleventh. Union security agreements; check-off 26 Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter, or of any other statute or law of the United States, or Territory thereof, or of any State, any carrier or carriers as defined in this chapter and a labor organization or labor organizations duly designated and authorized to represent employees in accordance with the requirements of this chapter shall be permitted-- 27 (a) to make agreements, requiring, as a condition of continued employment, that within sixty days following the beginning of such employment, or the effective date of such agreements, whichever is the later, all employees shall become members of the labor organization representing their craft or class: Provided, That no such agreement shall require such condition of employment with respect to employees to whom membership is not available upon the same terms and conditions as are generally applicable to any other member or with respect to employees to whom membership was denied or terminated for any reason other than the failure of the employee to tender the periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership. 28 (b) to make agreements providing for the deduction by such carrier or carriers from the wages of its or their employees in a craft or class and payment to the labor organization representing the craft or class of such employees, of any periodic dues, initiation fees, and assessments (not including fines and penalties) uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership: Provided, That no such agreement shall be effective with respect to any individual employee until he shall have furnished the employer with a written assignment to the labor organization of such membership dues, initiation fees, and assessments, which shall be revocable in writing after the expiration of one year or upon the termination date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner. 29 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (subsections (c) and (d) omitted). Thus with the passage of § 2, Eleventh, two major components of the RLA were in place. And with the provision's passage came the judicial interpretation of it, and later, a parallel provision in the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), § 8(a)(3), to create the right to object. 30 After § 2, Eleventh's passage, the unions, under their interpretation of the section, negotiated union security provisions and began to charge all employees--members and nonmembers--equal dues. The constitutionality of § 2, Eleventh was almost immediately challenged. But, in Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 76 S.Ct. 714, 100 L.Ed. 1112 (1956), the Court held that the requirement for financial support of the collective bargaining agency, under § 2, Eleventh did not violate the First or Fifth Amendments. Id. at 238, 76 S.Ct. at 721. 31 In 1961, a new challenge appeared, brought by employees who did not want their compelled contribution to go to the union's traditional involvement in political activities. The Court answered this question against the background of § 2, Eleventh's origins: 32 The history of union security in the railway industry is marked first, by a strong and long-standing tradition of voluntary unionism on the part of the standard rail unions; second, by the declaration in 1934 of a congressional policy of complete freedom of choice of employees to join or not to join a union; third, by the modification of the firm legislative policy against compulsion, but only as a specific response to the recognition of the expenses and burdens incurred by the unions in the administration of the complex scheme under the Railway Labor Act. 33 Street, 367 U.S. at 750-51, 81 S.Ct. at 1790-91. The Street Court concluded that Congress did not completely abandon the policy of full freedom of choice embodied in the 1934 Act, but rather made inroads on it for the limited purpose of eliminating the problems created by the 'free rider.'  Id. at 767, 81 S.Ct. at 1799. And thus, the Court construed § 2, Eleventh to deny the unions, over an employee's objection, the power to use his exacted funds to support political causes which he opposes. Id. at 768-69, 81 S.Ct. at 1800. 34 Hanson and Street had involved private employees, union shops, and the RLA. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 83 S.Ct. 1453, 10 L.Ed.2d 670 (1963), raised the legitimacy of the agency shop. General Motors argued that § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA only discussed membership and the agency shop, which did not require actual membership, therefore, was not permitted. 6 The agency shop would not entitle employees to attend union meetings, vote upon ratification of agreements negotiated by the union, or have a voice in the internal affairs of the union. Id. at 737, 83 S.Ct. at 1456. The Court concluded that agency shops were acceptable, explaining that membership as used in the section as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core. Id. at 742, 83 S.Ct. at 1459. 7 The Court noted, Also wide of the mark is respondent's further suggestion that Congress contemplated the obligation to pay fees and dues to be imposed only in connection with actual membership in the union, so as to insure the enjoyment of all union benefits and rights by those from whom money is extracted. Id. at 744 n. 12, 83 S.Ct. at 1460. 8 35 The Court applied General Motors to the RLA and, in Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 452 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 1894 n. 13, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984), found § 2, Eleventh to authorize negotiation of an agency shop. Agency shops were once again addressed in Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977), this time in the context of public-sector employee unions in a non-RLA case. The Court held that an agency shop clause in a collective bargaining agreement covering governmental employees was constitutionally valid but that the union could not use money from objecting employees to support ideological or political activities not related to duties as collective bargaining representative. Id. at 235-36, 97 S.Ct. at 1799-1800. Recently, in Communications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735, 108 S.Ct. 2641, 101 L.Ed.2d 634 (1988), the Court concluded that a union under the NLRA § 8(a)(3) also could not use money collected from objecting nonmember employees for activities unrelated to collective bargaining. 36 The cases have answered a number of questions. The RLA is constitutional and permits agency shops. The RLA requires that the union as collective bargaining representative fairly represent all employees but that, in exchange, the union may collect money from all employees to cover these expenses. And, under the RLA, nonmember objecting employees can only be compelled to pay for activities germane to collective bargaining. In none of these cases, however, was the Court asked to decide whether an employee had a right to be a member of the union chosen as the collective bargaining agent while paying only the costs associated with collective bargaining activities. 37 Kidwell argues vigorously that the prior decisions of the Court use language indicating that all employees, including union members, may object and thus they compel the result here. We disagree. In not one of the cases did the Court hold the union members employed in an agency shop had a right to object. 38 The confusion arises because the early cases--Hanson and Street--involved union-shop provisions. In a union shop, because every employee is technically a union member, the cases did not distinguish between union members and nonmembers. Nevertheless, the Court, even when referring to union shops, recognized that the membership of an objecting employee, albeit technically a union member, differed from the union membership held by employees who wanted to be union members. For example, in Railway Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 83 S.Ct. 1158, 10 L.Ed.2d 235 (1963), the Court noted that [a]lthough the Agreement requires employees to become union members within the 60-day period, in fact petitioners do not insist that employees actually join the union, but regard payment of the uniform exactions required by the Agreement as complete compliance therewith. Id. at 116 n. 2, 83 S.Ct. at 1161 n. 2. See General Motors, 373 U.S. at 742, 83 S.Ct. at 1459 (membership as a condition of employment is whittled down to its financial core); Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 106 n. 16, 105 S.Ct. 3064, 3071 n. 16, 87 L.Ed.2d 68 (1985) ([A]n employee required by a union security agreement to assume financial 'membership' ... [is] a 'member' of the union only in the most limited sense). 39 Even when actual agency shops began to be addressed, the Court continued to perceive a distinction. For example, the Abood Court concerned itself with reversing the ruling of the Michigan Court of Appeals that state law 'sanctions the use of nonunion members' fees for purposes other than collective bargaining.'  431 U.S. at 232, 97 S.Ct. at 1798 (quoting Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 60 Mich.App. 92, 230 N.W.2d 322, 326 (1975)). Thus, although language used by the Court could be perceived differently without regard to the facts of the case, the issue addressed was only whether the Michigan law that required nonmembers to pay agency fees used for non-collective bargaining purposes was permissible. Indeed, in Abood, the Supreme Court implied that it was the additional requirement of a union-shop arrangement that each employee formally join the union that might not be constitutionally permissible. Id., 431 U.S. at 217 n. 10, 97 S.Ct. at 1791 (emphasis added). 40 Similarly, in Ellis v. Railway Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 104 S.Ct. 1883, 80 L.Ed.2d 428 (1984) the Court perceived a difference between voluntary members and those whose membership is forced upon them. Id. at 445, 104 S.Ct. at 1891. Moreover, the Court repeatedly referred to nonmembers as the objecting employees. For example, the Court wrote that it would be perverse to read it [§ 2, Eleventh] as allowing the union to charge to objecting nonmembers part of the costs of attempting to convince them to become members. Id. at 452 n. 13, 104 S.Ct. at 1894 n. 13. Similarly, the Court stated that [w]e would have no hesitation in holding ... that the union lacks authorization under the RLA to use nonmembers' fees for death benefits they cannot receive. Id. at 455 n. 14, 104 S.Ct. at 1896 n. 14. And, the Court permitted expenditures for social activities after noting that these activities are formally open to nonmember employees. Id. at 449, 104 S.Ct. at 1893. 41 The most recent cases to be decided, perhaps recognizing the issue that Kidwell raises, carefully distinguish between union member and nonmember employees. For example, in Beck, the Court wrote that § 2, Eleventh of the RLA does not permit a union, over the objections of nonmembers, to expend compelled agency fees on political causes. 487 U.S. at 745, 108 S.Ct. at 2648; see id. at 752, 758, 759, 760, 761, 108 S.Ct. at 2651, 2655, 2655, 2656, 2656. We have followed the approach in Dashiell v. Montgomery Co., Md., 925 F.2d 750, 754 (4th Cir.1991) (The First Amendment will not tolerate a compulsory subsidization, even if only temporarily, by nonunion employees of fees used for union activities unrelated to collective bargaining.). 42 After having examined these cases, we believe that, as a semantic matter, the early cases based the right to object on compelled membership and the most recent cases extend the right to object in an agency shop only to nonmembers. Thus, we suspect that to the degree the Court can be said to have addressed the matter, its precedent goes against Kidwell. However, we conclude that the issue has not been directly addressed, i.e., conclusively decided, and so we move beyond semantics.