Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Refusal to Excuse Prospective Jurors Because of Their Views Favoring Capital Punishment

Text: (10a) Defendant contends in substance that the trial court erred under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 16, of the California Constitution, with their impartial-jury guaranties, when it refused to excuse prospective jurors Silvio P. Trapani, Betty V. Chadwick, Russell C. Wong, and William H. Wisecarver, Jr., for actual bias because of their views favoring capital punishment. At individual sequestered voir dire, defendant challenged prospective jurors Trapani, Chadwick, Wong, and Wisecarver, as relevant here, because of their views favoring capital punishment. The People presented opposition. The trial court overruled the challenges. It turned out that prospective jurors Trapani, Chadwick, Wong, and Wisecarver were not among those chosen to serve as jurors or alternates. Chadwick and Wisecarver were not drawn into the jury box as potential jurors or alternates. Trapani and Wong were drawn as potential jurors, but were removed by defendant's peremptory challenge. When the selection of the jurors was completed, defendant had seven peremptory challenges remaining out of twenty-six; when the selection of the alternates was completed, he had two remaining out of five. Defendant now claims that the trial court erred by overruling his for cause challenges against prospective jurors Trapani, Chadwick, Wong, and Wisecarver. (11)(See fn. 8.) For purposes here, we shall assume  against the People's argument  that the point is preserved for review and is in fact meritorious. [8] But as will be shown, reversal is not required. (12) It appears that with the exception of an improper `Witherspoon exclusion'  which, of course, is not presented here  an erroneous ruling on a `for cause' challenge is not automatically reversible but is subject to scrutiny for prejudice under harmless-error analysis. ( People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1247.) This principle applies generally: it matters not whether the error merely offends state law or amounts to a violation of the United States Constitution. (See ibid. ) Prejudice turns on whether the defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury was affected. That is certainly true when state law is implicated. ( People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087 [259 Cal. Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659].) It is also true, we believe, when a federal constitutional violation is involved. State-law error of this sort, bearing as it does on penalty in a capital case, is reviewed under the reasonable possibility standard of People v. Brown (1988) 46 Cal.3d 432, 446-448 [250 Cal. Rptr. 604, 758 P.2d 1135]. Error of federal constitutional dimension, by contrast, is scrutinized under the reasonable doubt standard of Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710-711, 87 S.Ct. 824]. ( People v. Coleman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 768.) The two tests are the same in substance and effect. ( People v. Brown, supra, at p. 467 (conc. opn. of Mosk, J.) [citing Chapman v. California, supra, at p. 24 (17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711), which treats as equivalent the federal constitutional reasonable possibility and reasonable doubt standards].) (10b) After review, we can discern no prejudice flowing from the erroneous overruling of defendant's for cause challenges against prospective jurors Trapani, Chadwick, Wong, and Wisecarver. It is evident that defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury was not affected thereby. None of the foregoing persons served as a juror or even as an alternate. On this record, none could have tainted the panel's members with his or her alleged bias. Accordingly, none could have influenced the process or result of the deliberations. That an allegedly biased juror might have sat had he or she not been removed by peremptory challenge does not implicate the right to a fair and impartial jury in any substantial way. Defendant disagrees with our conclusion that reversal is not required. He argues against the applicability of harmless-error analysis. In People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at page 1247, we rejected such a point. He relies on language in Gray v. Mississippi, supra, 481 U.S. at page 665 [95 L.Ed.2d at page 637], that the relevant inquiry is `whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial court's error.' (Italics in original.) But as we explained in Gordon, that language was all but disapproved in Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81.... (50 Cal.3d at p. 1247.) It is the merest speculation whether an erroneous ruling on a `for cause' challenge might actually have had any significant effect and, if so, whether such effect might have helped or harmed the defendant. Hence, the inquiry identified by the Gray court cannot serve as a principled basis on which to conclude that the error should be deemed automatically reversible as a general matter, or even that it caused any harm in an individual case. ( Ibid. ) Defendant then argues against the application of harmless-error analysis here. But any harm he may have suffered is conjectural at best. He effectively conceded the point below: as noted, he did not express any dissatisfaction with any of the persons selected as jurors or alternates. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the fact that the trial court  at his own request  employed a modified version of the struck-jury system is of no consequence for the applicability of harmless-error analysis or even the actual application of such analysis in this case. Under the method of jury selection employed here, each side was able to exercise its peremptory challenges with knowledge of the state of mind of the prospective jurors who might be drawn into the jury box and also with knowledge of the order in which they would be drawn  knowledge that it would not have had if the jury-box method had been used. Accordingly, each side could calculate, in some rough way, the relative cost and benefit of any given peremptory: the possible benefit was, of course, the present removal of a prospective juror whom the party considered objectionable; the possible cost was the inability to remove at a later time a prospective juror whom the party considered more objectionable still. We do not believe  and certainly defendant does not show  that the method of jury selection employed here calls for a rule or result different from that stated above. [9]