Opinion ID: 1230380
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Construction of the Election Exception

Text: The fundamental principle in constitutional construction is that effect must be given to the intent of the Framers of such organic law and of the people who ratified and adopted it. State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship, 157 W.Va. 100, 108, 207 S.E.2d 421, 427 (1973); see also State ex rel. Mountaineer Park, Inc. v. Polan, 190 W.Va. 276, 279, 438 S.E.2d 308, 311 (1993). Accordingly, our analysis in this case begins with the language of Article VI, § 15. See Randolph County Bd. of Educ. v. Adams, 196 W.Va. 9, 15, 467 S.E.2d 150, 156 (1995); Polan, 190 W.Va. at 283, 438 S.E.2d at 315 (stressing that [a]s in every case involving the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision, analysis must begin with the language of the constitutional provision itself). Where a provision of a constitution is clear in its terms and of plain interpretation to any ordinary and reasonable mind, it should be applied and not construed. Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 150 W.Va. 71, 143 S.E.2d 791 (1965); see also Syl. pt. 1, State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 159 W.Va. 513, 223 S.E.2d 607 (1976). Importantly, at this stage of interpretation, [c]ourts are not concerned with the wisdom or expediencies of constitutional provisions, and the duty of the judiciary is merely to carry out the provisions of the plain language stated in the constitution. Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Casey v. Pauley, 158 W.Va. 298, 210 S.E.2d 649 (1974). In this case, we fail to discern any unequivocal meaning from the wording of the exception language. Reasonable persons can easily disagree as to the scope of the phrase, offices to be filled by election by the people. We are not the first court to recognize ambiguity in such a provision: The Supreme Court of California long ago recognized the ambiguity inherent in similar language contained in the California Constitution of 1849, stating that the inclusion of such an exception had the effect of injecting doubt and uncertainty as to limitation thereby placed upon the operation of the language which preceded it. Did the exception mean that the language preceding it should not apply to the appointment of a legislator who should run and be elected to another elective office during the term for which he had been elected a member of the senate or general assembly? Or did the exception mean that the prohibition should not apply to the appointment of a legislator to an elective office, that is, an office normally filled by election by the people? Carter v. Commission on Qualifications of Judicial Appointments, 14 Cal.2d 179, 182-83, 93 P.2d 140, 142 (1939). Questions of constitutional construction are in the main governed by the same general rules applied in statutory construction. Syl. pt. 1, Winkler v. State School Bldg. Auth., 189 W.Va. 748, 434 S.E.2d 420 (1993). Because the exception clause of Article VI, § 15 is ambiguous, ordinary principles employed in statutory construction must be applied to ascertain such intent. Blankenship, 157 W.Va. at 108, 207 S.E.2d at 427. Of course, [t]he object of construction, as applied to written constitutions, is to give effect to the intent of the people in adopting it. Syl. pt. 3, Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp., 146 W.Va. 543, 122 S.E.2d 436 (1961). Respondents assert that because the Emoluments Clause restricts an individual's right to hold public office, it must be construed in favor of eligibility. In support of this argument, respondents cite to State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, supra , where this Court stated in syllabus point 3, in part, that [i]n the event of ambiguity a constitutional amendment will receive every reasonable construction in favor of eligibility for office .... According to Governor Underwood, [o]nly where a constitutional provision clearly and unambiguously precludes a gubernatorial appointment may such appointment be invalidated by the judiciary. [18] We reject this standard in the present context. While a strong public policy exists in favor of eligibility for public office, Oceanographic Comm'n v. O'Brien, 74 Wash.2d 904, 914, 447 P.2d 707, 712 (1968), in this case we are faced with the competing consideration of maintaining a constitutionally-mandated separation between the executive and legislative branches of government. Again, the Emoluments Clause is aimed not just at eliminating self-dealing on the part of legislators; rather, it is also intended to forestall even the remotest possibility of executive influence over the legislature. The Emoluments Clause is therefore part of our rigorous system of interbranch separation of powers, ancillary to the fundamental directive set forth in Article V, § 1 of the West Virginia Constitution. [19] As we stated in syllabus point 1, in part, of State ex rel. Barker v. Manchin, 167 W.Va. 155, 279 S.E.2d 622 (1981), the doctrine of separation of powers is part of the fundamental law of our State and, as such, it must be strictly construed and closely followed. See also In re Dailey, 195 W.Va. 330, 333, 465 S.E.2d 601, 604 (1995) (stating that [t]he commitment of this Court to a strict application of the doctrine of separation of powers ... [has] been unwavering.); State ex rel. Meadows v. Hechler, 195 W.Va. 11, 14, 462 S.E.2d 586, 589 (1995) (The separation of powers doctrine expressly stated in our constitution is a core principle of our system of government....). Petitioner Robb is correct in pointing out that we are not concerned in this case with the right of an individual to stand for election to public office, which this Court has stressed is a fundamental right that can only be infringed upon by a showing of compelling state interest, White v. Manchin, 173 W.Va. 526, 543, 318 S.E.2d 470, 488 (1984); instead, we are faced with the question of whether an individual who has already been elected to (and assumed) a position in the Legislature may thereafter be appointed to another governmental post during an existing term of office. Under these circumstances, where the dangers comprehended by the Emoluments Clause are so readily apparent, we fail to discern any overarching public policy favoring eligibility. We therefore reject respondents' argument that the Emoluments Clause of Article VI, § 15 should be strictly construed in favor of eligibility. In support of their basic argument that the exception language in Article VI, § 15 exempts legislators who are appointed to offices that are elective in nature (rather than offices affirmatively filled by election by the people), respondents point to two cases from Alabama and California. In these cases, the courts held that because the constitutional prohibition pertains exclusively to appointments, the exception must be construed to relate to the nature of the appointed office if it is to have any significant meaning. The Supreme Court of Alabama concluded in Opinion of the Justices, 279 Ala. 38, 38-39, 181 So.2d 105, 106-107 (1965), that [i]f the section ended just before the word except, no member of the Legislature could ever be appointed, during his term, to any office created by the Legislature of which he was a member. But the words, except such offices as may be filled by election by the people must have some meaning. The only reasonable conclusion is that excepted from the rule of Section 59 is an appointment to an office which may be filled by an election by the people. (Emphasis added.) Likewise, in Carter v. Commission on Qualifications of Judicial Appointments, 14 Cal.2d 179, 93 P.2d 140 (1939), the California Supreme Court concluded as follows: If the section as originally adopted had any other meaning than the exception removed elective offices from the operation of the prohibitory clause, the inclusion of the exception was meaningless and surplusage, for the section would then mean that legislators were ineligible for appointment except when they obtained their offices by election. There is, of course, a well-defined and fundamental difference between the acquisition of an office by appointment on the one hand, and by election on the other. ... Some meaning must be ascribed to the excepting clause and when we seek to ascertain it, the reasonable, if not the only logical conclusion is that the exception had the effect of describing the kind and character of the offices thereby removed from the operation of the prohibitory clause and not the method which the offices were to be filled. Id. at 186, 93 P.2d at 142 (emphasis added). [20] This Court has traditionally adhered to the rule that if possible, effect should be given to every part and to every word of a constitutional provision and that, unless there is some clear reason to the contrary, no part of the fundamental law should be regarded as surplusage. Syl. pt. 2, in part, Diamond v. Parkersburg-Aetna Corp., supra . In this case, however, Article VI, § 15 proscribes election as well as appointment to office. The exception language of our Constitution can therefore be construed as requiring popular election without rendering it meaningless i.e., the exception clause pertains to a class of election, election[s] by the people. Respondents' argument becomes more persuasive, however, when we consider the earlier Virginia constitutions upon which Article VI, § 15 was based. The Virginia Constitutions of 1830 and 1851 merely proscribed appoint[ment], rather than election to office. Thus, at first blush, the rationale of the Alabama and California supreme courts would appear applicable. A distinction between the terms elected and appointed was recognized in this jurisdiction as early as 1866, when Judge Harrison noted in dissent: The term `elected,' generally speaking, imports popular election. The term `appointed' excludes that idea and refers the office or trust to some other source. Ex Parte Faulkner, 1 W.Va. 269, 298-99 (1866) (Harrison, J., dissenting). However, the Virginia Constitution of 1830 apparently did not employ these words as mutually exclusive terms. For example, while the instrument used the term appoint to refer to the General Assembly's act of selecting the attorney general and officers of the militia (above the rank of brigadier general), it described the comparable power of the legislature to select the governor and various judges in terms of elect[ing]. Other courts interpreting early state constitutions have made similar observations in concluding that the term appointed can be broadly read as encompassing the word elected. In State ex rel. Wagner v. Compson, 34 Or. 25, 54 P. 349 (1898), the Oregon Supreme Court, in interpreting its state constitution, observed that The word `appoint' was probably used as a more comprehensive term, to convey the idea of a mode of constituting or designating an officer, whether by election or otherwise. In fact, the words `elect' and `appoint' seem to have been regarded as synonymous by the convention. The word elect simply means to pick out, to select from among a number, or to make choice of, and is synonymous with the words choose, prefer, select, and it was evidently used in this sense in the constitution. While the words elect and appoint are not ordinarily synonymous, we think a careful examination of the language of our constitution will show that, in some instances, the framers of that instrument have used them as such. 34 Or. at 32-33, 54 P. at 351 (quoting People ex rel. Aylett v. Langdon, 8 Cal. 1 (1857)). See also Wagner v. City of San Angelo, 546 S.W.2d 378, 379 (Tex.Civ.App.1977) ([T]he term appointment appears to be used in this section [of the statute] as a more comprehensive term, to convey the idea of a mode of constituting or designating the head of the department, whether selected by appointment, election, or otherwise.) (citing Compson, supra ). The insertion of the word elected into the West Virginia Constitution of 1872 may properly be viewed as merely clarifying the intent of the original Framers of the provision in question. Consequently, we find no merit in respondents' argument that the exception language of Article VI, § 15 would be rendered nugatory or meaningless when construed as requiring de facto popular election. Given the long history of the emoluments clause in our jurisdiction, we are drawn back to the Virginia Constitution of 1830, where the exception language at issue today was first included. A frequently relied upon canon of construction is that statutes relating to the same subject should be construed together as far as possible to determine legislative intent: Statutes which relate to the same subject matter should be read and applied together so that the Legislature's intention can be gathered from the whole of the enactments. Syl. pt. 3, Smith v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'r, 159 W.Va. 108, 219 S.E.2d 361 (1975); see Syl. pt. 3, Boley v. Miller, 187 W.Va. 242, 418 S.E.2d 352 (1992). The same rule applies, of course, with equal force when discerning the intent of framers of constitutions. Blankenship, 157 W.Va. at 108, 207 S.E.2d at 427. Not only did Article III, § 8 of the Virginia Constitution of 1830 contain an emoluments clause essentially indistinguishable from that which we construe today, it also provided in the very same section that no law increasing the compensation of the members shall take effect until the end of the next annual session after such law shall have been enacted. [21] The striking aspect of the compensation clause is that it effectively required an intervening popular election before any increase in pay could take effect. Viewing the Emoluments Clause in the context of this closely-related provision, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the Framers of the 1830 Constitution (or the drafters of later constitutions) on the one hand intended to expose legislative pay increases to prior electoral scrutiny, but on the other hand nevertheless acquiesced in permitting legislators to obtain similar gain through non-elective appointments to office. Our jurisprudence abhors such illogic. See State v. Kerns, 183 W.Va. 130, 135, 394 S.E.2d 532, 537 (1990) (recognizing duty of this Court to avoid whenever possible a construction of a statute which leads to absurd, inconsistent, unjust or unreasonable results); State ex rel. Simpkins v. Harvey, 172 W.Va. 312, 321, 305 S.E.2d 268, 277 (1983) (citing earlier cases). Consideration of the 1830 Virginia Constitution is not an idle academic exercise. The constitutional restriction on the Legislature's ability to vote itself an immediate pay increase survived until the latter part of this century. The requirement that any legislative pay raise be preceded by a popular election was carried over into Article IV, § 10 of the Constitution of 1851. [22] The first West Virginia Constitution, ratified in 1863, went even further by specifying the rate of pay for legislatorseffectively requiring a constitutional amendment to implement any increase in compensation. See W. Va. Const. of 1863, art. IV, § 33. This approach was also employed in Article VI, § 33 of the 1872 Constitution. As we recognized in State ex rel. Holmes v. Gainer, 191 W.Va. 686, 690, 447 S.E.2d 887, 891 (1994), [t]his constitutional requirement made it extremely difficult to get a legislative compensation constitutional amendment to increase legislative salaries passed with any frequency by the voters. Only two pay increases (in 1920 and 1954) were passed by constitutional amendment prior to 1970, when the section was substantially rewritten to place the responsibility for initiating pay increases in the hands of an independent citizens legislative compensation commission. The notion that the Emoluments Clause is part of a broader design to provide the electorate with an advance opportunity to pass upon potentially self-serving increases in compensation is also bolstered by reference to constitutional provisions pertaining to executive pay. The 1863 West Virginia Constitution prohibited any increase or decrease in compensation during a public officer's term of office. W. Va. Const. of 1863 art. III, § 9. [23] This prohibition remains operative in Article VI, § 38 of our present Constitution. [24] The Court previously discussed at length the purpose underlying this provision: The command of the Constitution that the salary of no public officer shall be increased or diminished during his term of office, is a wise and salutary mandate. Its purpose is to establish definiteness and certainty in the salaries of public officers and to protect and safeguard the independence, the security, and the efficiency of the occupant of every public office. It assures the people that those who serve them as public officers shall give their services during their terms for the amount of compensation for which they were willing to serve and have been selected, and for which they were expected by the people to serve at the time of their entrance upon the performance of their duties. It prevents attacks upon officials by those who may be possessed, at any time, of the means and the will to influence or control their course of conduct through added income at public expense; and it removes the possibility of increasing in that manner the financial burden of the people by those who possess and exercise the power of government and the authority of public office. The benefits which result from the operation of this provision of the Constitution promote sound and orderly administration of government, and this provision may not be dispensed with, circumvented, or ignored. Harbert v. County Court of Harrison County, 129 W.Va. 54, 62-63, 39 S.E.2d 177, 185 (1946) (emphasis added); see also Delardas v. County Court of Monongalia County, 155 W.Va. 776, 781, 186 S.E.2d 847, 851 (1972). As Professor Bastress notes, this provision provides a measure of independence and protection for public officials because they will not be influenced by the promise of a raise or the threat of a salary decrease. Conversely, the section prevents those in positions of power in the government from using that power to extract unreasonably high salaries. Robert M. Bastress, The West Virginia State Constitution 164 (1995). With respect to the latter purpose, the ultimate check as to elective officers comes from the fact that this provision ensures an intervening popular election prior to the implementation of any increase in compensation. To construe the exception language of Article VI, § 15 in the manner suggested by respondents would thus require that we ignore the broader constitutional scheme intended by the Framers. The fact that a vital part of that designthe limitation on the Legislature's ability to increase its pay without an express or presupposed referendumhas since been altered by constitutional amendment, does not diminish the considerable force that these antecedent provisions bring to bear in construing the Emoluments Clause at issue. Indeed, it is well established that when an article has two distinct sections dealing with related matters, amendment[ ] to one section is not an amendment to the others because it is presumed that if the legislature had intended an amendment to apply to both sections it would have expressed such an intent. 1A Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 22.34, at 298 (5th ed.1991) (footnote omitted). Our reading of the language of Article VI, § 15 is further strengthened when we consider the experiences of the drafters of our present Constitution, who reintroduced the Emoluments Clause into the organic law of this jurisdiction. The abuses that occurred during Reconstruction, which resulted most notably from a lack of popular accountability, must surely have moulded the thinking of the Framers of the 1872 Constitution, such that they would have intended that true, representative democracy would hold sway whenever possible. Our construction of the provision in question faithfully takes those motivations into account. Consequently, we hold that Article VI, § 15 of the West Virginia Constitution, with one exception, renders a member of the Legislature ineligible to be elected or appointed to a civil office for profit in this State, which has been created, or the emoluments of which have been increased, during the legislator's term of office. We also hold that the exception for offices to be filled by election by the people, operates to allow an otherwise ineligible legislator to gain public office through popular election. In effect, only a vote of the people can overcome the impediment imposed by the Emoluments Clause. In light of such holding, we are compelled to grant the mandamus relief sought by petitioners. We must stress, however, that the holding in this case does not pose a significant obstacle to otherwise highly qualified persons gaining appointive office. Importantly, the provision in question applies only to a legislator's current term of office. Upon the expiration of such term, a legislator again becomes eligible for appointment to civil office. [25] Moreover, the Emoluments Clause places no disability whatsoever on a legislator who gains office through election by the people. Thus, we fail to see how our conclusion today will have any serious negative impact upon the ability of members of the Legislature to later serve the people of this State.