Opinion ID: 1918473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Election statutes are to be liberally construed.

Text: We are to liberally construe Minnesota's election laws, guided by the principle that [s]tatutory regulations of the election franchise must be so construed as to insure, rather than defeat, full exercise thereof when and wherever possible. Flakne v. Erickson, 213 Minn. 146, 151, 6 N.W.2d 40, 42 (1942). Here, instead of liberally construing the term obvious error in counting to ensure the full protection of the voting franchise, the court, applying a narrow construction, concludes that the erroneous rejection of validly cast absentee ballots cannot be corrected under either section 204C.38 or .39. Such a narrow interpretation is inconsistent with our past election law cases. For example, in Scow v. Gutches, we considered whether an election contest could be brought after a tie vote because the statute only provided for a contest after one candidate was declared elected. 129 Minn. 301, 303, 152 N.W. 639, 639 (1915). Although noting that a strict and technical construction of the statute would prohibit an election contest as there was no declared winner, we concluded that the statute should be liberally interpreted to permit an election contest in order to ascertain the true result of the election. Id. at 303-04, 152 N.W. at 640. Similarly, in Grimsrud v. Johnson, a case involving the use of improper ballots in a school board election, we concluded that the improperly used ballots should be counted even though a literal reading of the statute would have indicated otherwise. 162 Minn. 98, 99-100, 202 N.W. 72, 73 (1925). We concluded that voters should not be disenfranchised [b]ecause some officer having to do with the election has not fully carried out what the statutes direct him to do . . . if it can be avoided by any reasonable interpretation. Id. at 100, 202 N.W. at 72. Finally, in Andersen, we considered whether to permit correction of obvious error in counting and recording, even though the statutorily prescribed timeline had not been followed. 264 Minn. at 261-62, 119 N.W.2d at 5. While a literal reading of the statute would have barred corrections, as the statute provided for correction while canvassing the votes, we construed the statute at issue to effectuate its purpose. Id. at 262-63, 119 N.W.2d at 5-6. In doing so, we noted that, while it would have been better for the errors to have been corrected during the initial canvass as provided by statute, the overall object of declaring the candidate with the most legal votes the winner should take priority over a prescribed method that could result in declaring the loser the winner. Id. at 271, 119 N.W.2d at 10-11. Here, by its narrow construction of the phrase obvious error in counting, the court's decision works to defeat, not ensure, the full exercise of the voting franchise.