Opinion ID: 1265601
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Staso Was Entitled To A New Peremptory Disqualification.

Text: We believe it prudent to adopt a bright-line by which litigants can determine whether they have a right under Civil Rule 42(c) to disqualify the assigned judge. A refiled suit, which is assigned a new docket number, for which new filing fees are imposed, and for which new process must issue, provides this necessary bright-line. Thus, a refiled suit even if identical to a case dismissed under Civil Rule 16.1(g), is a new action for Civil Rule 42 purposes. Were we to hold otherwise, the resulting uncertainties would leave litigants unable to ascertain their rights under Civil Rule 42. [4] Alaska Rule of Civil Procedure 42(c)(1) provides: In an action pending in the Superior or District Courts, each side is entitled as a matter of right to a change of one judge and of one master. This rule is controlling because although AS 22.20.022 creates the substantive right of peremptory disqualification, Civil Rule 42(c) controls the procedure and scope of such disqualifications in civil proceedings. Tunley v. Municipality of Anchorage Sch. Dist., 631 P.2d 67, 70-71 (Alaska 1981). [5] The parties agree that Staso's refiled suit is substantively the same as the case dismissed under Civil Rule 16.1. His refiled complaint is an exact copy of the complaint filed in the original case. Thus, in ruling on this petition we must answer the question of whether a refiled suit is a new action which gives rise to a right of peremptory disqualification under Civil Rule 42(c). Staso makes essentially one argument: he should have been entitled to a change of judge in the refiled suit because it was procedurally separate from the case dismissed pursuant to Rule 16.1(g). Although he concedes that the refiled suit is identical to the case previously dismissed, he argues that it is not the same action or proceeding within the meaning of Rule 42. [6] Staso correctly observes that this court and the Alaska Court of Appeals have consistently held that a party is not entitled to a second peremptory disqualification of a judge, or to relief from the waiver or timeliness requirements of Rule 42, where the proceeding in which the disqualification sought is ancillary to and a continuation of the underlying ... action. Webber v. Webber, 706 P.2d 329, 330 (Alaska App. 1985) (holding that a defendant in a criminal contempt proceeding is not entitled to disqualify peremptorily the trial judge who presided over the civil matter out of which the contempt charge arose, because the contempt proceeding was not a new action giving rise to a new right to disqualify the judge). [7] The State argues that the prior decisions of this Court and the Alaska Court of Appeals demonstrate that the right to a single peremptory challenge of a judge attaches to a substantive action, without regard to its procedural status. The State correctly notes that in Gieffels v. State, 552 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1976), we held that a judge, who has been peremptorily disqualified under Criminal Rule 25(d) in an earlier proceeding under an indictment which was later dismissed, cannot conduct the later proceedings which arise from a second identical indictment. The controversy in Gieffels involved the criminal analog to Civil Rule 42. The court in Gieffels followed the reasoning in McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1974): [W]here two proceedings involve the same defendant and the necessity of proving the same facts and issues, a judge who was preempted in the prior proceeding is automatically disqualified from presiding at any proceeding against the defendant in which those same charges [are] at issue. Gieffels, 552 P.2d at 665 ( quoting McKinnon, 526 P.2d at 25). These cases demonstrate that in a number of situations, collateral proceedings are considered the same action for Civil Rule 42(c) purposes. However, they can be distinguished from the case at bar. Staso correctly asserts that all of the prior cases addressing peremptory disqualification of a judge concern a collateral or later proceeding in a single case. In no prior case was the later or collateral proceeding filed as a separate case. [8] Specifically, McKinnon and Gieffels are distinguishable because the issue in both cases is whether a judge already peremptorily disqualified could hear later proceedings relating to the original case. [9] See Gieffels v. State, 552 P.2d 661 (Alaska 1976); McKinnon v. State, 526 P.2d 18 (Alaska 1974). For the foregoing reasons we hold that a refiled suit, even if identical to a case dismissed under Civil Rule 16.1(g), is a new action for Civil Rule 42 purposes. In coming to this conclusion we recognize that in prior cases this court has emphasized substantive similarity between proceedings when determining whether the proceedings were collateral proceeding for Civil Rule 42 and Criminal Rule 25 purposes. However, drawing a bright-line where a refiled case is given a new docket number, new filing fees are imposed, and new process is served is necessary to avoid uncertainties which would leave litigants unclear of their rights under Civil Rule 42.