Opinion ID: 1212404
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: General Conspiracy Principles

Text: The essence of the crime of conspiracy, of course, `is the agreement . . . to commit one or more unlawful acts.' United States v. Jones, 482 F.3d 60, 72 (2d Cir.2006) ( Jones ) (quoting Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53, 63 S.Ct. 99, 87 L.Ed. 23 (1942)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1306, 167 L.Ed.2d 119 (2007). Where there is an agreement to commit an unlawful act, [t]hat agreement is 'a distinct evil,' which 'may exist and be punished whether or not the substantive crime ensues.' United States v. Jimenez Recio, 537 U.S. 270, 274, 123 S.Ct. 819, 154 L.Ed.2d 744 (2003) (quoting Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 65, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997)) (emphasis ours). Where, as here, the indictment contains a conspiracy charge, 'uncharged acts may be admissible as direct evidence of the conspiracy itself.' United States v. Miller, 116 F.3d 641, 682 (2d Cir.1997) (quoting United States v. Thai, 29 F.3d 785, 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 977, 115 S.Ct. 456, 130 L.Ed.2d 364 (1994)), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 905, 118 S.Ct. 2063, 141 L.Ed.2d 140 (1998). `[I]n order to prove a single conspiracy,' rather than multiple conspiracies, `the government must show that each alleged member agreed to participate in what he knew to be a collective venture directed toward a common goal.' United States v. Berger, 224 F.3d 107, 114 (2d Cir.2000) ( Berger ) (quoting United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 963 (2d Cir.1990) ( Maldonado-Rivera )); see, e.g., United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d 860, 876 (1981), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1110, 102 S.Ct. 3493, 73 L.Ed.2d 1373 (1982). `The coconspirators need not have agreed on the details of the conspiracy, so long as they agreed on the essential nature of the plan.' Berger, 224 F.3d at 114 (quoting Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 963). Indeed, in order for a single conspiracy to be found, it is not necessary that the conspirators even know the identities of all the other conspirators. See, e.g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557, 68 S.Ct. 248, 92 L.Ed. 154 (1947); Jones, 482 F.3d at 72; United States v. Gleason, 616 F.2d 2, 16 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1082, 100 S.Ct. 1037, 62 L.Ed.2d 767 (1980). Where an alleged conspiracy encompass[es] members who neither know one another's identities . . . nor specifically know of one another's involvement, United States v. Sureff, 15 F.3d 225, 230 (2d Cir.1994), it is permissible for the jury to find that there was a single conspiracy so long as a reasonable juror could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt '(1) that the scope of the criminal enterprise proven fits the pattern of the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment, and (2) that the defendant participated in the alleged enterprise with a consciousness of its general nature and extent.' United States v. Rosa, 11 F.3d 315, 340 (2d Cir. 1993) (quoting Beech-Nut, 871 F.2d at 1192), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1042, 114 S.Ct. 1565, 128 L.Ed.2d 211 (1994). Nor need the goals of all the participants be congruent for a single conspiracy to exist, so long as the participants agree on the essential nature of the enterprise and their goals are not at cross purposes. Beech-Nut, 871 F.2d at 1192 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Heinemann, 801 F.2d 86, 92 & n. 1 (2d Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1094, 107 S.Ct. 1308, 94 L.Ed.2d 163 (1987). In an ordinary bribery conspiracy, for example, the goals of the participants are not congruent, for the goal of the payer of the bribe is to influence an action or decision by the bribe's recipient; the goal of the bribe's recipient is to obtain money. Further, [c]hanges in membership, differences in time periods, and/or shifting emphases in the location of operations do not necessarily require a finding of more than one conspiracy. Jones, 482 F.3d at 72; see, e.g., United States v. Martino, 664 F.2d at 876-77; United States v. Vila, 599 F.2d 21, 24 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 837, 100 S.Ct. 73, 62 L.Ed.2d 48 (1979). [C]hanges in membership do not necessarily convert a single conspiracy into multiple conspiracies, . . . especially where the activity of a single person was 'central to the involvement of all,' United States v. Langford, 990 F.2d 65, 70 (2d Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Moten, 564 F.2d 620, 625 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 942, 98 S.Ct. 438, 54 L.Ed.2d 304 (1977)). And `a single conspiracy is not transformed into multiple conspiracies merely by virtue of the fact that it may involve two or more phases or spheres of operation, so long as there is sufficient proof of mutual dependence and assistance.' Berger, 224 F.3d at 114-15 (quoting Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 963); see, e.g., United States v. Williams, 205 F.3d 23, 33 (2d Cir.) (single conspiracy not transformed into multiple conspiracies simply by lapse of time, change in membership, or a shifting emphasis in its locale of operations) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 885, 121 S.Ct. 203, 148 L.Ed.2d 142 (2000); United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1106 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 55, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975). Where a conspiracy statute, such as 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), does not require proof of an overt act and the indictment alleges a conspiracy [that] contemplates a continuity of purpose and a continued performance of acts, Spero, 331 F.3d at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted), and the government has introduced sufficient evidence to show that such a conspiracy existed, the conspiracy  is presumed to exist until there has been an affirmative showing that it has been terminated, id. (emphasis in Spero ) (internal quotation marks omitted); see id. at 60-61. [A] RICO conspiracy continues until the objectives of the conspiracy are either accomplished or abandoned. Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., United States v. Rastelli, 870 F.2d at 838; United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d 705, 713 (2d Cir.1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022, 108 S.Ct. 1995, 1996, 100 L.Ed.2d 227 (1988). Thus, the statute of limitations for a RICO conspiracy does not begin to run until the objectives of the conspiracy have been either achieved or abandoned. United States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 264 (2d Cir.1992) ( Eisen ), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1029, 113 S.Ct. 1840, 1841, 123 L.Ed.2d 467 (1993); see, e.g., United States v. Persico, 832 F.2d at 713. Where the government has presented sufficient evidence to show a conspiracy that has continuing purposes or goals, the burden is on the defendant to prove that the conspiracy was terminated or that he took affirmative steps to withdraw. See, e.g., Spero, 331 F.3d at 60-61; United States v. Flaharty, 295 F.3d 182, 192 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 936, 123 S.Ct. 37, 154 L.Ed.2d 237 (2002); United States v. James, 609 F.2d 36, 41 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905, 100 S.Ct. 1082, 63 L.Ed.2d 321 (1980). To show that the conspiracy was terminated, the defendant need[s] to present evidence from which the jury could . . . f[i]nd that the goals of the conspiracy were accomplished in some final manner. Spero, 331 F.3d at 61 (emphasis added). For a defendant to show that he withdrew from the conspiracy, proof merely that he ceased conspiratorial activity is not enough. See, e.g., Eisen, 974 F.2d at 268. He must also show that he performed some act that affirmatively established that he disavowed his criminal association with the conspiracy, id. (internal quotation marks omitted), `either the making of a clean breast to the authorities, or communication of the abandonment in a manner reasonably calculated to reach co-conspirators,' Berger, 224 F.3d at 118 (quoting United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 388 (2d Cir.1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 960, 85 S.Ct. 647, 13 L.Ed.2d 555 (1965)). And the defendant must not take any subsequent acts to promote the conspiracy or receive any additional benefits from the conspiracy. Berger, 224 F.3d at 118.