Opinion ID: 1683665
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial court properly denied Appellant's motion to suppress as a matter of law.

Text: Having found the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress was supported by substantial evidence, this Court must now determine de novo whether the trial court correctly applied the rule of law to the facts of this case. Finding no error in its application, we believe the trial court correctly applied the law as it exists today. The warnings of Miranda are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 2364, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). In further protecting this right, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of waiver in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). There the Supreme Court held that when an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, such as Edwards, having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. Id. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880 (emphasis added). In a footnote, the Supreme Court in Edwards, supra , noted that several decisions of the Courts of Appeals have recognized that a valid waiver of an accused's previously asserted Fifth Amendment right to counsel is possible. See e.g., White v. Finkbeiner, 611 F.2d 186, 191 (7th Cir.1979) (in certain instances, for various reasons, a person in custody who has previously requested counsel may knowingly and voluntarily decide that he no longer wishes to be represented by counsel); Kennedy v. Fairman, 618 F.2d 1242 (7th Cir.1980); United States v. Rodriguez-Gastelum, 569 F.2d 482, 486 (9th Cir.1978) (en banc) (stating that it makes no sense to hold that once an accused has requested counsel, [he] may never, until he has actually talked with counsel, change his mind and decide to speak with the police without an attorney being present) cert. denied, 436 U.S. 919, 98 S.Ct. 2266, 56 L.Ed.2d 760 (1978). See generally Cobbs v. Robinson, 528 F.2d 1331, 1342 (2d Cir.1975); United States v. Grant, 549 F.2d 942 (4th Cir.1977), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Whitehead v. United States, 435 U.S. 912, 98 S.Ct. 1463, 55 L.Ed.2d 502 (1978); United States v. Hart, 619 F.2d 325 (4th Cir. 1980); United States v. Hauck, 586 F.2d 1296 (8th Cir.1978). The rule in the Fifth Circuit is that a knowing and intelligent waiver cannot be found once the Fifth Amendment right to counsel has been clearly invoked unless the accused initiates the renewed contact. See e.g., United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300 (5th Cir.1977); United States v. Priest, 409 F.2d 491 (5th Cir.1969). Waiver is possible, however, when the request for counsel is equivocal. Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513 (5th Cir.1979) (en banc). See Thompson v. Wainwright, 601 F.2d 768 (5th Cir.1979). Id. at 486, 101 S.Ct. 1880. While it is true that Appellant did request the services of an attorney, there is no law to support any notion that the police or the Commonwealth's Attorney was responsible for securing such services, although they routinely do. The United States Supreme Court has also addressed this issue.  Miranda does not require that attorneys be producible on call, but only that the suspect be informed. . . that he has the right to an attorney before and during questioning, and that an attorney would be appointed for him if he could not afford one. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 204, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 2881, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989). Although case law certainly supports Appellant's right to be free from interrogation once he asserts his right to counsel and right to remain silent, waiver of this right can and did occur in this case when Appellant reinitiated conversation with the police, albeit at the suggestion of his mother. On this point, we note several cases where an accused's relative speaks with him prior to his waiving the rights addressed herein. In Adkins v. Commonwealth, 96 S.W.3d 779 (Ky.2003), the defendant's brother asked the police if he could speak to the defendant so that he may be able to encourage him to confess, thereby gaining a more favorable plea bargain. There, as here, the Appellant urged this Court to find that the relative was an agent of the police in encouraging him to confess to his crime. In that case, this Court stated that [i]t is well-established that only `state action' implicates a defendant's rights under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Section Eleven of the Constitution of Kentucky. Id. at 790 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). This state action was further construed to apply to situations where private individuals are used to facilitate custodial interrogation on behalf of the police. This Court has previously described two circumstances where such would be the case. In the first, the private entity is acting in accordance with a court order or governmental regulation and is thus viewed as a state actor. See Adkins, 96 S.W.3d at 791. The second circumstance occurs when the government otherwise `exercised such coercive power or such significant encouragement that it is responsible for [the private party's] conduct.' Id. (quoting United States v. Garlock, 19 F.3d 441, 443 (8th Cir.1994)). Finding the second circumstance applicable in Adkins , this Court found that it was immaterial that the police knew the brother's intentions to encourage the defendant to confess. [The officer] was not required to bar the jailhouse doors simply because he knew that a member of Appellant's family intended to induce him to confess. And, when [the brother] expressed his desire to share information relevant to the murder investigation, [the officer] was not required to refuse to listen. If any coercion occurred here, it was applied by Appellant's own brother, not the police. Id. at 791-92. Similarly, in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987), the United States Supreme Court found no functional equivalent of custodial interrogation when, in the presence of two officers, a wife was allowed to speak with her husband following his arrest and the giving of Miranda rights. Despite the fact the officers knew that the defendant might incriminate himself, the Court found the statements admissible and held that under both Miranda and Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the defendant in that case was not interrogated. See Mauro, 481 U.S. at 527, 107 S.Ct. at 1935. This Court believes Adkins and Mauro, supra , applicable to the case at bar. Testimony has shown the Appellant's mother freely volunteered to speak with her son to encourage him to confess in order to gain more favorable treatment. No evidence was offered to rebut such a claim; the officers testified they gave her no promises and reiterated that she could not be asked to speak with Appellant on behalf of the state. The statement was admissible and the trial court properly ruled as such. Accordingly, this Court finds the Appellant was not subjected to custodial interrogation or its functional equivalent when his mother asked to speak with him, thereby prompting his waiving of his Miranda rights and giving of the incriminating statement, and we hold that Appellant voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to have counsel present at his interrogation and his right to remain silent when he reinitiated communication with the police. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the Warren Circuit Court. All concur.