Opinion ID: 522285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Mental Disease or Defect

Text: 31 Given our decision to reverse and remand, we briefly comment on an issue which may be of importance at Brown's new trial. Prior to the trial appealed from, Brown decided not to raise an insanity defense. He also chose not to present expert testimony concerning his mental condition bearing on guilt under Fed.R.Crim.P. 12.2(b). Instead, Brown offered lay testimony that he tried to commit suicide, that his mother unsuccessfully sought psychiatric care for him, that his mother thought that he was depressed, that he made statements to his relatives regarding his fears that the assailant was out to kill him, and that he had no recollection of the events after they occurred. 32 The trial court excluded the lay testimony offered by the defendant. The court thought that the evidence was offered to show that Brown suffered from a mental disease or defect, and that the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984 (the Act), 18 U.S.C. Sec. 17, 6 made the evidence inadmissible. The Act provides in part: 33 (a) Affirmative defense.--It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at the time of the commission of the acts constituting the offense, the defendant, as a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature and quality of the wrongfulness of his acts. Mental disease or defect does not otherwise constitute a defense. 34 (Emphasis added). 35 We recently construed the scope of the Act. United States v. Twine, 853 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.1988). In Twine we considered the legislative history of the Act and the case law construing its impact on the admissibility of mental defect evidence in cases not involving the insanity defense. We noted the district court's opinion in United States v. Frisbee, 623 F.Supp. 1217, 1221 (N.D.Cal.1985), which held that the Act did not bar evidence tending to absolve a defendant of criminal liability by negating an element of the offense. The court in Frisbee reasoned that the Act only barred testimony of mental defect evidence to excuse admittedly criminal behavior in conjunction with an affirmative defense. Id. We explicitly agreed with Frisbee and held that 36 Congress intended to restrict a defendant's ability to excuse guilt with mental defect evidence, curtailing the insanity defense. But Congress did not intend to eliminate a defendant's ability to disprove guilt with mental defect evidence. 37 Twine, 853 F.2d at 679 (footnote omitted). 38 At Brown's new trial, any evidence of a mental defect offered to show that Brown lacked the specific intent to commit first degree murder should therefore not be excluded on the basis of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 17. If the evidence is excluded, it must be excluded on other grounds. 7 39 REVERSED AND REMANDED.