Opinion ID: 1143719
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: carmen suchan's interest in the real property sold at execution

Text: After the execution sale, Carmen Suchan sought an order in magistrate court to show cause as to why George Suchan should not be held in contempt for refusing to execute a mortgage securing Carmen's alleged interest in all the real property awarded George by the partition order. The partition order directed that the $273,739.40 portion owed Carmen be reduced to a promissory note and secured by a real estate mortgage on all of the real property awarded to the Defendant... . (Emphasis added.) The magistrate court interpreted the partition order as having immediately conveyed Carmen's undivided one-half community real property interest to George. The magistrate found that all the real property awarded to George by the partition order had been sold. Since the only real property awarded to George by the partition order was Carmen's one-half community real property interest, the magistrate necessarily determined the partition order had conveyed that property to George. (The magistrate concluded George had no real property interest in which to give Carmen a mortgage interest.)
In Supreme Court No. 15460, Carmen argues the magistrate court misinterpreted the partition order as immediately conveying Carmen's community real property interest to George. The standard of our review of the magistrate courts' interpretation depends upon whether the order contained an ambiguity. The rules of construction of contracts and written documents in general apply to the interpretation of court orders. Evans v. City of American Falls, Idaho, 52 Idaho 7, 18, 11 P.2d 363 (1932); In re Callnan's Estate, 70 Cal.2d 150, 74 Cal. Rptr. 250, 449 P.2d 186 (1969); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Byrne, 76 N.J. Super. 256, 184 A.2d 163 (1962). Interpretation of an ambiguous document presents a question of fact. Cf. Roberts v. Hollandsworth, 582 F.2d 496, 499 (9th Cir.1978) (contract case); Pollard Oil Co. v. Christensen, 103 Idaho 110, 115, 645 P.2d 344, 349 (1982) (contract case). On the other hand, interpretation of an unambiguous document presents a question of law. Cf. Suchan v. Suchan, 106 Idaho 654, 660, 682 P.2d 607, 613 (1984) (contract case); Beal v. Mars Larsen Ranch Corp., Inc., 99 Idaho 662, 668, 586 P.2d 1378, 1384 (1978). Determination of whether a document is ambiguous is itself a question of law. Cf. Pocatello Industrial Park, Co. v. Steel West, Inc., 101 Idaho 783, 789, 621 P.2d 399, 405 (1980) (contract case). We now turn to those provisions of the partition order awarding to George Carmen's one-half community real property interest to determine whether they are ambiguous. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980) (contract case). Carmen strenuously argues the conveyance of Carmen's interest to George was subject to, or conditioned upon, George's payment of the initial $100,000, and his execution of a promissory note for $273,739.40 and a mortgage interest in all the real property awarded to George by the partition order. Carmen cites the following language of the order: The Defendant [George] is awarded as his sole and separate property the following real estate subject to the payment of all outstanding encumbrances thereon, and the payment and security provisions hereinafter required to be made by him for and on behalf of Plaintiff. (Emphasis added.) The order goes on to identify the security provisions referred to above: DEFENDANT IS ORDERED TO PAY PLAINTIFF: the sum of $100,000.00 cash within forty-five (45) days of the date of this order. The balance of the Plaintiff's community interest in the sum of $273,739.40 shall be paid to the Plaintiff [Carmen] by the Defendant [George] in twenty (20) annual installments... . The balance shall be reduced to a promissory note to be secured by a real estate mortgage on all the real property awarded to the Defendant [George].... (Emphasis added.) Carmen asserts the order unambiguously makes George's receipt of Carmen's interest in the real property subject to (i.e., conditioned upon) George's first making the $100,000 payment and executing the note and mortgage. However, the first provision quoted above also makes the award of Carmen's interest to George subject to the payment of all outstanding encumbrances thereon... . These outstanding encumbrances consisted primarily of mortgages totaling over $100,000. The parties do not contend, and the record nowhere suggests, that George's payment in full of these outstanding encumbrances was a condition to his receiving Carmen's real property interest. In light of this, the subject to language conditions George's retention, rather than his receipt, of Carmen's interest upon George's payment of the outstanding encumbrances on the property. Since the subject to language also applies to George's execution of the mortgage, and since the magistrate likely intended subject to to have a single meaning, the order can reasonably be interpreted as conditioning George's retention, rather than his receipt, of Carmen's community interest upon George's execution of the mortgage at some appropriate time in the future (such as after the initial $100,000 payment). Other language in the order suggests the issuing court intended the order to convey Carmen's interest to George immediately, and therefore prior to George's execution of the note and mortgage: IT IS ORDERED that the undivided one-half (½) interest of Plaintiff [Carmen] and Defendant [George] in the community property of the parties hereto, as decreed in the judgment and decree of divorce filed on the 23rd day of March, 1982, be, and the same is partitioned and distributed to the parties hereto subject to the conditions and terms as set out and required herein. ... . The Defendant [George] ... has received under the provisions of this partition, all of the farm real estate... . (Emphasis added.) This language allows the reasonable interpretation that the order immediately conveyed Carmen's one-half community real property interest to George, though George had not yet executed a note and mortgage in favor of Carmen. Additional language of the order, by negative implication, suggests the order did not condition George's receipt of Carmen's community real property interest upon George's execution of a note and mortgage: IT IS ORDERED that the down payment of the $100,000.00, hereinabove ordered, shall include the $30,000.00 for the home awarded to the Plaintiff [Carmen] as and for the community lien thereon. The Plaintiff [Carmen] shall, accordingly, execute and deliver a quitclaim deed conveying the separate property upon which the home is situated to the Defendant [George], upon the receipt of the down payment and delivery of the executed note and mortgage and related sales documents. (Emphasis added.) This provision expressly conditions George's receipt of any interest Carmen might have had in George's separate real property upon George's execution of the note and mortgage. Nowhere does the order expressly condition George's receipt of Carmen's interest in the community real property upon George's execution of the note and mortgage. This suggests the drafter intended to omit the execution of the note and mortgage as a condition to George's receipt of Carmen's community real property interest. The foregoing discussion shows one could reasonably interpret the partition order as requiring George to execute a note and mortgage in favor of Carmen as either a condition to George's receipt of Carmen's community real property interest, or merely as a condition to George's retention of that interest, after the order had immediately conveyed it to him. The order, being reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations, is ambiguous. Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292, 293, 612 P.2d 135, 136 (1980) (contract case). On review we must therefore accept the magistrate court's interpretation unless clearly erroneous, particularly where he is interpreting his own order. I.R.C.P. 52(a); Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 77, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982); Javernick v. Smith, 101 Idaho 104, 106, 609 P.2d 171, 173 (1980). The order's language provides substantial, though conflicting, evidence that the magistrate court intended the order to immediately transfer Carmen's community real property interest to George. Carmen directs our attention to nothing in the record making that interpretation clearly erroneous. Moreover, the magistrate interpreted the order consistently with the general rule that written documents, if ambiguous, should be construed against the drafter. Cf. Morgan v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 68 Idaho 506, 519, 201 P.2d 976 (1948) (contract case). Carmen's attorney drafted the partition order. In light of this factor and the preceding analysis of the order's language, we affirm the magistrate court's interpretation of the order as immediately vesting Carmen's interest in the farm in George. In Supreme Court No. 15512, Carmen argues the district court improperly invoked res judicata and collateral estoppel to bar her from litigating the issue of whether the partition order immediately conveyed her community real property interest to George. The district court said the same issue had been fully and finally litigated by the same parties in the magistrate court. The magistrate court's opinion is discussed above. The magistrate court in its opinion dated February 4, 1983, held the order of partition conveyed and vested in George all of Carmen's interest in real property. Since we have found this conclusion supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the district court's decision from which the appeal designated Supreme Court No. 15512 arises.
Carmen's attorney announced prior to the execution sale of each parcel of real property that it was being sold subject to Carmen's continuing lien. Carmen certainly had a judgment lien in the property prior to the execution sale because her lien provided the very basis for the execution sale itself. See I.C. §§ 10-1110; 11-101; 11-104; 11-201; 11-301. However, the Idaho Code entitled Carmen to a judgment lien in the property of only the judgment debtor, George. See I.C. § 10-1110. Since judgment liens are creatures of statute, Carmen's rights must be adjudicated within the statutory framework. Messenger v. Burns, 86 Idaho 26, 29, 382 P.2d 913, 914-15 (1963). Once George's property was sold at execution and the certificate of sale was delivered to the execution purchaser conveying legal title to him, then Carmen lost her judgment lien against the property sold. See I.C. § 10-1110; Petty v. Petty, 70 Idaho 473, 478-79, 223 P.2d 158, 160-61 (1950). Furthermore, Carmen levied execution on George's property for satisfaction of his matured debt of $100,000 plus interest. By her failure to bid the $100,000 plus interest, Carmen did not preserve her judgment lien for this amount. Therefore, she retained no lien in the property sold at execution. It should also be noted that George's remaining debt of $273,739.40 had not matured at the time of the execution sale. (The partition order contained no acceleration clause.) Hence, the remaining debt could not have been the basis of a judgment lien in favor of Carmen at the time of execution. Furthermore, by the time the initial installments of the $273,739.40 debt became due, George, the judgment debtor, had no interest in the land previously sold at execution. Carmen could not have had a lien in property no longer owned by the judgment debtor. See I.C. § 10-1110.