Opinion ID: 161568
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Interstate Commerce Issues

Text: 40 Defendant challenges the constitutionality of all three of the statutes under which he was convicted and also asserts that the government failed to meet its burden of proof with respect to the firearms charges. Constitutional challenges to a statute are reviewed de novo. See United States v. Morris, 247 F.3d 1080, 1085 (10th Cir. 2001). [I]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, this court must review the record de novo and ask only whether taking the evidence--both direct and circumstantial, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom--in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Voss, 82 F.3d 1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir.1996) (quotations omitted).
41 Section 922(g) makes it a crime for a person convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. 922(g). There was testimony at trial that the two weapons found in the possession of Defendant were manufactured outside of Oklahoma. A reasonable jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that this testimony established the effect on interstate commerce required for a conviction under 922(g); Defendant's sufficiency of the evidence challenge is therefore rejected.
42 Defendant also challenges the constitutionality of all three statutes under which he was convicted, arguing that they exceed Congress' ability to regulate interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has identified three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995). First, Congress can regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. Second, Congress can regulate the instrumentalities of interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce. Finally, Congress can regulate those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. See id. at 558-59. 43 In United States v. Wacker this court rejected a constitutional challenge to 841(a)(1) and 846. See 72 F.3d 1453, 1475 & n.18 (10th Cir. 1996). In Wacker we noted that the conduct regulated by [ 841(a)(1) and 846] clearly implicates interstate commerce, and Congress made explicit findings explaining the conduct's substantial and direct effect upon interstate commerce. Id. at 1475 (quotation omitted). Defendant argues that Wacker must be reexamined in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). In Morrison, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not have power under the Commerce Clause to enact 42 U.S.C. 13981, which provided a federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence. See id. at 601-02, 617-19. In both Morrison and Lopez, which involved a statute making it a federal crime to knowingly possess a firearm in a school zone, the Supreme Court struck down laws which criminalized non-economic behavior. See id. at 610-11 (discussing non-economic nature of the criminal statute struck down in Lopez); id. at 613 (discussing how gender-motivated violence is not an economic activity). In contrast, 841(a)(1) makes it illegal to manufacturer, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacturer, distribute, or dispense a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). 2 These activities are, by their nature, economic in character. See United States v. Meienberg, No. 00-1390, 2001 WL 967841, at  (10th Cir. Aug. 27, 2001). Because Morrison involved the regulation of non-economic activities, while 841(a)(1) deals with the regulation of economic activities, Morrison does not require a different conclusion than the one reached in Wacker. Thus, 841(a)(1) and 846 are within Congress' power to regulate interstate commerce. 44 Section 843(b) makes it a crime to knowingly or intentionally [] use any communication facility in committing or in causing or facilitating the commission of any act or acts constituting a felony under any provision of this subchapter. 21 U.S.C. 843(b). When, as in this case, a defendant violates 843(b) by using a communication facility to facilitate a violation of 841(a)(1), the substantial affect on interstate commerce is obvious. As previously explained, violations of 841(a)(1) substantially effect interstate commerce. See Wacker, 72 F.3d at 1475. Thus, the use of a communication facility in connection with a violation of 841(a)(1) also substantially affects interstate commerce. See United States v. Tisor, 96 F.3d 370, 373-75 (9th Cir. 1996). Defendant's constitutional challenge to his convictions under 843(b) is rejected. 45 Finally, this court has repeatedly affirmed the constitutionality of 922(g). See e.g. United States v. Dorris, 236 F.3d 582, 584-86 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396, 400 (10th Cir. 1995). Thus, the constitutionality of 922(g) is controlled by circuit precedent, and Defendant's argument is without merit.