Opinion ID: 2628052
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Board Applied the Appropriate Standard of Proof.

Text: Jurgens argues that the board should have been required to make its findings using a clear and convincing evidence standard instead of a preponderance of the evidence standard. North Pole argues that Jurgens waived this argument, and that the preponderance of the evidence standard is appropriate here.
Jurgens preserved his argument regarding the appropriate standard of proof. During Jurgens's closing argument to the board, he argued that in a serious case like this of termination the standard of proof should be more than just by the greater weight or majority of the evidence. The city interrupted, and objected that Jurgens's argument was an improper statement of the law. Jurgens also submitted to the board an excerpt from a book entitled The Rights of Law Enforcement Officers, in which the author states that some courts and arbitrators have applied a clear and convincing evidence standard in police officer termination cases. And Jurgens argued the point in his opening brief to the superior court. Jurgens therefore preserved this issue for appeal by arguing it to the board and the superior court. [26]
We have previously decided that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof applies to public employee termination proceedings. [27] In Romulus v. Anchorage School District, we considered whether the Anchorage School Board erred when, in the context of a disciplinary proceeding, it used a preponderance of the evidence standard to decide whether Romulus, an ROTC instructor, sexually abused two high school students. [28] We held that the board had not erred and that the preponderance of evidence standard applies to disciplinary proceedings involving a government employee. [29] In so deciding, we relied on case law from other jurisdictions in which courts had held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was the correct standard to use in termination proceedings for teachers, police officers, and hospital workers. [30] Jurgens argues that Romulus is distinguishable because unlike Romulus, Jurgens will lose his police certificate and his livelihood. Jurgens also argues that the cases involving police officers relied upon by Romulus are distinguishable. Jurgens's arguments are without merit. Like Jurgens's case, Romulus involved serious allegations of misconduct against a public employee. [31] Like Jurgens, Romulus was terminated. [32] Moreover, although Romulus technically may have been able to pursue another teaching position, it is unlikely that any school would have hired him after he was fired for sexually abusing two female students. Thus, like Jurgens, Romulus faced loss of his ability to continue his chosen profession. Jurgens also argues that some of the cases we relied upon in Romulus are distinguishable from his case. In Romulus, we relied in part on Clark v. Board of Fire & Police Commissioners of Bradley, in which the Illinois Court of Appeals held that a preponderance of the evidence standard adequately protected a police officer's professional interests in a termination proceeding, in part because the discharged police officer was not barred from obtaining employment with another police force. [33] We also relied on Meyers v. Montgomery County Police Department. [34] In that case, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals approved the use of a preponderance of the evidence standard, in part because the reprimanded officer had not shown that he possessed a protected property right in his continued employment. [35] Jurgens is correct that those cases are not factually identical to his, but that does not mean that Romulus itself is distinguishable. And Jurgens does not persuade us that Romulus should somehow be limited or narrowed to the facts in Clark or Meyers. Jurgens's argument regarding Clark is of limited value because, as mentioned, Romulus itself involved a situation in which the terminated employee would have great difficulty obtaining another teaching position. And Jurgens's argument regarding Meyers is not persuasive because in a subsequent case, the Maryland Court of Appeals expanded the Meyers holding. [36] In Coleman v. Anne Arundel County Police Department, the high court of Maryland held that the preponderance of the evidence standard was the correct evidentiary standard for law enforcement disciplinary proceedings, even assuming the terminated employee had a protected property or liberty interest in his continued employment. [37] Coleman is instructive here. In that case, the Maryland Court of Appeals considered whether an administrative hearing board was required to apply a clear and convincing evidence standard of proof to theft-related charges against a police officer. In a lengthy analysis, the court first considered whether Maryland case law required the heightened standard. [38] The court overruled an earlier case in which it had, on common law grounds, required the Maryland Public Service Commission to use a clear and convincing evidence standard when adjudicating charges of fraud against a customer. [39] The Coleman court explained that the preponderance of the evidence standard was the appropriate disciplinary proceeding standard for law enforcement officers, even when allegations of criminal misconduct were made, because [t]his standard makes for more efficient and understandable [police disciplinary] proceedings and provides for uniformity in law enforcement disciplinary matters. [40] The Coleman court then considered Coleman's argument that applying a preponderance of the evidence standard was unconstitutional under the due process clauses of the federal and Maryland constitutions. [41] Applying the three-part Mathews v. Eldridge test, [42] the court assumed that the terminated officer had demonstrated a cognizable property or liberty interest in his continued employment, but held that the government had at least as strong an interest in the internal discipline of the police department. [43] The court noted that the officer was afforded a panoply of procedural rights including notice, a hearing, the right to present evidence and argument, and the right to cross-examine witnesses. [44] And the court noted that a higher evidentiary standard would not likely reduce the risk of erroneous fact-finding: Candor requires that we acknowledge the difficulty a lay panel may encounter in perceiving the subtle distinctions and nuances between these two abstract standards when called upon to apply it. [45] The court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence standard strikes the appropriate balance between protecting the private interests of an officer accused of misconduct and a law enforcement agency's interest in maintaining internal discipline. [46] We agree with the Coleman court and hold that using the preponderance of the evidence standard in public employee disciplinary proceedings satisfies the due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and article I, section 7 of the Alaska Constitution. We too have adopted the Mathews v. Eldridge three-part balancing test to determine whether administrative proceedings satisfy due process. [47] This test takes into account the following: [f]irst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the [probable] value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. [48] Applying the Mathews v. Eldridge test here, we agree with Jurgens that, because he can only be terminated for just cause, [49] he has a protected property interest in his employment. [50] But we do not agree that he has a protected liberty interest based on the stigmatizing effect of a dismissal for sexual harassment. As we explained in DeNuptiis v. Unocal Corp ., a worker's reputational interest is not so fundamental that it must be protected by a heightened standard. [51] That said, the potential stigmatizing effect of a dismissal for sexual harassment and the fact that the dismissal will preclude Jurgens from obtaining other law enforcement positions in Alaska, and probably other states as well, strengthens Jurgens's interest. The government also has a strong interest in cases of police disciplinary proceedings. As Jurgens concedes, North Pole has an interest in eliminating sexual harassment from the workplace and in disciplining employees who engage in sexual harassment. [52] And as North Pole argues, it also has an interest in protecting the public at large from employees who engage in sexual misconduct. Although we assume here that North Pole would not incur any greater fiscal or administrative burdens if required to apply a heightened standard, we agree with the Coleman court that we must weigh heavily in [North Pole's favor North Pole's] interest in the internal discipline of the police department. [53] In terms of the second Mathews factor, Jurgens suggests that North Pole should have analyzed or considered the value of a clear and convincing evidence standard. But Jurgens does not explain how he is at risk of an erroneous deprivation of his private interests or how a clear and convincing standard would limit that risk. We assume that a higher standard of proof would reduce the risk of wrongful discipline. [54] But due process does not require a higher standard here. Although Jurgens has a strong interest in his position as a police officer, the government has an equally strong interest in eliminating sexual harassment from the workplace and in protecting the public from officers who violate the law. The preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate standard when the possible harm to each party is roughly equal. [55] We conclude that under Romulus, the board did not err when it applied the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. And like the Coleman court, we conclude that North Pole's current procedural safeguards, including its use of the preponderance of the evidence standard, are adequate to protect officers from erroneous deprivation of their protected interests in their employment as well as their reputational and financial interests. [56] Because due process is satisfied by use of the preponderance of the evidence standard, Jurgens is not entitled to a heightened proof standard. [57]