Opinion ID: 792261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantive Adequacy of the IEP

Text: 33 Under Rowley, a school district complies with IDEA's substantive requirements if a student's IEP is reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefit[s]. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034. A school district is not, however, required to furnish every special service necessary to maximize each handicapped child's potential. Id. at 199, 102 S.Ct. 3034; see Carlisle Area Sch. v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 534 (3d Cir.1995) (school districts need not provide the optimal level of services, or even a level that would confer additional benefits, since the IEP required by IDEA represents only a `basic floor of opportunity') (quoting Rowley, 458 U.S. at 201, 102 S.Ct. 3034), cited in Walczak, 142 F.3d at 132. Rather, a school district fulfills its substantive obligations under the IDEA if it provides an IEP that is likely to produce progress, not regression, and if the IEP affords the student with an opportunity greater than mere trivial advancement. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130 (quotations omitted). 34 In order to avoid `impermissibly meddling in state educational methodology,' a district court must examine the record for any `objective evidence' indicating whether the child is likely to make progress or regress under the proposed plan. Id. (quoting Mrs. B., 103 F.3d at 1121). Because administrative agencies have special expertise in making judgments concerning student progress, deference is particularly important when assessing an IEP's substantive adequacy. See, e.g., M.S., 231 F.3d at 105 (An assessment of educational progress is a type of judgment for which the district court should defer to the SRO's educational experience, particularly where ... the district court's decision was based solely on the record that was before the SRO.). We have not hesitated to vacate district court opinions where the district court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the agency experts and the hearing officer. Briggs v. Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 688, 693 (2d Cir.1989); see also Grim v. Rhinebeck Cent. Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 377, 383 (2d Cir.2003) ([I]n violation of Rowley, the District Court impermissibly chose between the views of conflicting experts on a controversial issue of educational policy — effective methods of educating dyslexic students — in direct contradiction of the opinions of state administrative officers who had heard the same evidence.); M.S., 231 F.3d at 105 (We believe the district court thus inappropriately substituted its own subjective judgment about what are appropriate measures for educational progress.). 35 Here, the district court cited three reasons why it believed the proposed 2002-03 IEP was not likely to produce progress nor confer any meaningful benefit upon Kathryn. First, the court noted that the IEP did not provide for one-on-one instruction, even though one of Kathryn's teachers had indicated the importance of and the likelihood of success when tutoring Kathryn one on one as compared to group tutoring. Second, the court expressed doubt that Kathryn's passing grades were evidence that she had actually mastered the material she was taught because her grades were also based on class participation and homework completion. Third, the district court observed that the 2002-03 IEP failed to provide Kathryn with any counseling sessions, even though Mrs. Cerra had informed the District that Kathryn felt stressed and overwhelmed. 36 The District argues that the district court erred in substituting its judgment for that of the SRO, which specifically addressed the three issues cited by the district court. The SRO was satisfied that small group instruction two periods per day — which took the place of one-on-one sessions in the 2002-03 IEP — was designed to support content area subjects, and would have provided skills training as well as support and instruction in compensatory strategies. The SRO also determined that there was evidence in the record that Kathryn had made progress in 2001-02, despite the fact that her 2001-02 IEP was not fully implemented since her attendance was sporadic. The SRO cited not just her passing grades, but also [p]rogress reports, teacher testimony, and formal evaluation reports that showed she had made progress. Finally, the SRO found that the proposed IEP adequately accounted for Kathryn's emotional and psychological needs even though it discontinued counseling because (1) [t]he record indicate[d] that the student's reported anxiety and emotional distress were not observed in school, (2) petitioners did not advise respondent that their daughter was receiving counseling for anxiety or depression, and (3) any counseling that had been provided in the 2001-02 IEP was being provided to address her organizational and cognitive deficits rather than social and emotional concerns. 37 We agree with the District that the district court failed to give due weight to the SRO's lengthy, reasoned opinion. Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034. As a preliminary matter, [d]eference is particularly appropriate when, as here, the state hearing officers' review has been thorough and careful. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 129. Furthermore, the district court's determination that Kathryn was unlikely to make progress under the proposed IEP is precisely the kind of educational policy decision a district court may not make absent objective evidence in the record suggesting that the SRO has reached an erroneous conclusion. See M.S., 231 F.3d at 105. Although the district court minimized the significance of Kathryn's passing grades, we have expressly held that when a learning-disabled child is in a mainstream class, the attainment of passing grades and regular advancement from grade to grade will generally constitute evidence of satisfactory progress. Walczak, 142 F.3d at 130. Furthermore, the SRO's finding that Kathryn could make progress under the proposed IEP was based on more than simply her low but passing grades. The SRO noted, for example, that Kathryn's inconsistent use of the services provided to her under the 2001-02 IEP might have affected her performance and that she could make more progress in the future with regular attendance. The district court, by contrast, failed to take into account the shared belief among Kathryn's teachers and other professionals that her poor performance was due largely to her inconsistency in accessing special education services. 38 The district court's other conclusions are also not supported by sufficient evidence to justify rejecting the SRO's reasoned findings. The district court emphasized the importance of one-on-one tutoring because it found that [d]uring the May 17, 2002 meeting, Kathryn's teacher indicated the importance of and the likelihood of success when tutoring Kathryn one on one as compared to group tutoring. Even if it were appropriate for the district court to focus on a single comment in a voluminous record, Mrs. Schreiber's remarks, read in context, do not support the district court's conclusion. Rather than comparing the benefits of one-on-one work to group tutoring generally, Mrs. Schreiber was simply observing that Kathryn did well on her Math Regents after receiving one-on-one tutoring over the summer. In fact, Mrs. Schreiber made clear that she thought a reading program with no more than five students was adequate. 39 The district court also concluded that the proposed IEP was deficient because it failed to provide counseling services even though Dr. Facchini had concluded that Kathryn should be engaged in psychotherapy to aid her emotional development. However, the SRO was justified in finding that the record suggests otherwise. Kathryn's teachers uniformly testified at the hearing that she came across as a bubbly, social, and relaxed teenager, and Mrs. Arnhold, the school psychologist, testified that she knew of nothing to support the fact that [Kathryn] had any type of a serious mental problem or disorder at that time. Moreover, school officials testified that the Cerras had not told the school that she was being treated for anxiety or depression. Accordingly, we see no reason for the district court to have substituted its judgment for that of the SRO.