Opinion ID: 2593693
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: a two-year-and-one day suspension is an appropriate sanction for respondent's professional misconduct

Text: ¶ 19 With a view to safeguarding the public, the court and the legal profession's interests the Court's duty is to inquire into a lawyer's continued fitness to practice law not to punish him/her. In this context the circumstances of a lawyer's alleged professional misconduct are important in searching for solutions that would accord with the law's imperative of protecting the public from substandard lawyers. ¶ 20 Jenkins has been charged with (1) neglecting his clients by not expediting litigation consistently with their interests, (2) not keeping his clients informed, (3) charging unreasonable fees in light of the legal work he performed, and (4) misrepresenting facts to a federal court. It is a lawyer's mandatory obligation to act promptly and timely in pending matters and in communicating with a client. [9] Jenkins' professional conduct evinces a serious departure from these standards. ¶ 21 In mitigation of respondent's acts, he adduced evidence demonstrating that for the last four years he has suffered from depression and on two occasions sought medical intervention for the same. In October 2000 Jenkins once again sought treatment for depression and has since that time remained under medical care. Respondent agrees to continue with counseling to address the life issues which face him. ¶ 22 The admitted facts reflected in the agreed stipulations when considered in light of the PRT's findings sufficiently evidence that respondent's conduct is below the standard of legal representation which is the public's due. We find that the five counts of the Bar's complaint are supported by clear and convincing proof. Accordingly, the PRT's recommendation that Jenkins be suspended from the practice of law for two years and one day is approved. Jenkins shall pay the costs incurred in these proceedings in the amount of $333.02. ¶ 23 Respondent stands suspended from the practice of law for two years and one day from the date this opinion becomes final. It is a precondition (among others) to his reinstatement that he pay the costs incident to this disciplinary prosecution. ¶ 24 HARGRAVE, C.J., HODGES, OPALA, KAUGER, SUMMERS, BOUDREAU and WINCHESTER, JJ., concur. ¶ 25 WATT, V.C.J., dissenting. ¶ 1 I would disbar the respondent from the practice of law.