Opinion ID: 2555899
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Testimony About Effect of Sexual Assaults on Complainant

Text: It is well settled that a decision to pass a case and declare a mistrial are matters left to the sound discretion of the trial justice. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d at 1007 (quoting State v. Suero, 721 A.2d 426, 429 (R.I.1998)). The trial justice is in the best position to evaluate the effects of any prejudice on the jury, by virtue of his having a front row seat at the jury trial. Id. (citing State v. Tempest, 651 A.2d 1198, 1207 (R.I.1995)). Therefore, we accord great weight to the trial justice's ruling and we will not disturb it unless that ruling is clearly wrong. Id. (citing State v. Mello, 472 A.2d 302, 304 (R.I.1984)). Toward the end of the state's direct examination of complainant, he was asked whether, after he left defendant's employment, he ever thought of the sexual assaults, and if so, how those memories affected his personal life. Over defendant's objection, complainant answered that he would self-medicate with drinking, using different drugs, [and] marijuana[,] and that he had a hard time holding a job, staying focused, [and had] periods of depression. The defendant has argued that this testimony does not meet the basic relevancy requirements of the admissibility of evidence because [t]he timeframe for the purported emotional injuries was so far removed from the alleged incidents that it was not a reliable basis upon which to determine whether the sexual assaults actually occurred. Rule 401 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. We are satisfied that this testimony was relevant to explain why twenty years elapsed before complainant went to the police to report these assaults and therefore was probative on the crucial issue of complainant's credibility. The complainant also was asked how these offenses affected his personal life. Before the trial justice could rule on defendant's objection, complainant answered, [i]n regards to my relationship with my wife, ex-wife now, I was unable to have, I guess, what you would say a normal sex life. The trial justice sustained the objection and the testimony was stricken from the record. After defendant moved to pass the case, a sidebar ensued in which defendant argued that the state had violated Rule 16 because defendant never was notified that M.G. was going to testify about his opinion or about his personal sexual life following 1992. The state disputed the suggestion that there was a discovery violation in this case, noting that defendant was given a transcript of the recorded telephone conversation between complainant and defendant that included complainant's statements about problems in his marriage. The trial justice denied defendant's motion to pass the case, finding that the state had not violated Rule 16. On appeal, the defendant assigns error on grounds other than those raised at trial. He contends that, even though the trial justice sustained the defendant's objection and struck the answer, it was too late to unring the bell by presenting highly emotionally-charged testimony that was sure to appeal to the jurors' sympathies and prejudice the defendant, and therefore that the trial justice should have declared a mistrial. In ruling on a motion to pass a case, the trial justice must determine whether the evidence would cause the jurors to be so inflamed as to make them unable to decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented. State v. Shinn, 786 A.2d 1069, 1072 (R.I. 2002) (quoting State v. Luciano, 739 A.2d 222, 228 (R.I.1999)). If the evidence is so inflammatory, we will require a mistrial only if the cautionary instructions were untimely or ineffective. Id. (quoting State v. Kholi, 672 A.2d 429, 433 (R.I. 1996)). We fail to see how this one remark was so inflammatory or prejudicial that the jury would not have been able to decide the case on the evidence admitted at trial. Further, immediately after striking the testimony, the trial justice cautioned the jury to disregard it. We often have stated that we will presume that the jury was able to follow instructions from the trial justice. State v. Patel, 949 A.2d 401, 415 (R.I.2008) (citing State v. LaRoche, 683 A.2d 989, 1000 (R.I.1996)). Here, there is no suggestion that the jurors were unable to follow the instructions. The decision of the trial justice to deny the motion to pass the case was well within his sound discretion. Barkmeyer, 949 A.2d at 1007 (citing Suero, 721 A.2d at 429).