Opinion ID: 107439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: right to counsel.

Text: Appellants charge that the Juvenile Court proceedings were fatally defective because the court did not advise Gerald or his parents of their right to counsel, and proceeded with the hearing, the adjudication of delinquency and the order of commitment in the absence of counsel for the child and his parents or an express waiver of the right thereto. The Supreme Court of Arizona pointed out that [t]here is disagreement [among the various jurisdictions] as to whether the court must advise the infant that he has a right to counsel. [55] It noted its own decision in Arizona State Dept. of Public Welfare v. Barlow, 80 Ariz. 249, 296 P. 2d 298 (1956), to the effect that the parents of an infant in a juvenile proceeding cannot be denied representation by counsel of their choosing. (Emphasis added.) It referred to a provision of the Juvenile Code which it characterized as requiring that the probation officer shall look after the interests of neglected, delinquent and dependent children, including representing their interests in court. [56] The court argued that The parent and the probation officer may be relied upon to protect the infant's interests. Accordingly it rejected the proposition that due process requires that an infant have a right to counsel. It said that juvenile courts have the discretion, but not the duty, to allow such representation; it referred specifically to the situation in which the Juvenile Court discerns conflict between the child and his parents as an instance in which this discretion might be exercised. We do not agree. Probation officers, in the Arizona scheme, are also arresting officers. They initiate proceedings and file petitions which they verify, as here, alleging the delinquency of the child; and they testify, as here, against the child. And here the probation officer was also superintendent of the Detention Home. The probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child. His role in the adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as arresting officer and witness against the child. Nor can the judge represent the child. There is no material difference in this respect between adult and juvenile proceedings of the sort here involved. In adult proceedings, this contention has been foreclosed by decisions of this Court. [57] A proceeding where the issue is whether the child will be found to be delinquent and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seriousness to a felony prosecution. The juvenile needs the assistance of counsel to cope with problems of law, [58] to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it. The child requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. [59] Just as in Kent v. United States, supra, at 561-562, we indicated our agreement with the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit that the assistance of counsel is essential for purposes of waiver proceedings, so we hold now that it is equally essential for the determination of delinquency, carrying with it the awesome prospect of incarceration in a state institution until the juvenile reaches the age of 21. [60] During the last decade, court decisions, [61] experts, [62] and legislatures [63] have demonstrated increasing recognition of this view. In at least one-third of the States, statutes now provide for the right of representation by retained counsel in juvenile delinquency proceedings, notice of the right, or assignment of counsel, or a combination of these. In other States, court rules have similar provisions. [64] The President's Crime Commission has recently recommended that in order to assure procedural justice for the child, it is necessary that Counsel . . . be appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive action is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent. [65] As stated by the authoritative Standards for Juvenile and Family Courts, published by the Children's Bureau of the United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: As a component part of a fair hearing required by due process guaranteed under the 14th amendment, notice of the right to counsel should be required at all hearings and counsel provided upon request when the family is financially unable to employ counsel. Standards, p. 57. This statement was reviewed by the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges at its 1965 Convention and they found no fault with it. [66] The New York Family Court Act contains the following statement: This act declares that minors have a right to the assistance of counsel of their own choosing or of law guardians [67] in neglect proceedings under article three and in proceedings to determine juvenile delinquency and whether a person is in need of supervision under article seven. This declaration is based on a finding that counsel is often indispensable to a practical realization of due process of law and may be helpful in making reasoned determinations of fact and proper orders of disposition. [68] The Act provides that At the commencement of any hearing under the delinquency article of the statute, the juvenile and his parent shall be advised of the juvenile's right to be represented by counsel chosen by him or his parent . . . or by a law guardian assigned by the court . . . . [69] The California Act (1961) also requires appointment of counsel. [70] We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child. At the habeas corpus proceeding, Mrs. Gault testified that she knew that she could have appeared with counsel at the juvenile hearing. This knowledge is not a waiver of the right to counsel which she and her juvenile son had, as we have defined it. They had a right expressly to be advised that they might retain counsel and to be confronted with the need for specific consideration of whether they did or did not choose to waive the right. If they were unable to afford to employ counsel, they were entitled in view of the seriousness of the charge and the potential commitment, to appointed counsel, unless they chose waiver. Mrs. Gault's knowledge that she could employ counsel was not an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a fully known right. [71]