Opinion ID: 171245
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Preliminary Injunction (07-7100)

Text: At the same time he filed his complaint, Choate filed a motion for a preliminary injunction seeking a stay of the city’s abatement order. He argued that disturbing the site of his former building would frustrate the criminal investigation of the arson and prevent him from calculating his own losses. The district court held a hearing on the motion on August 8, 2007. On September 4, a magistrate judge issued a Report and Recommendation addressing each of the preliminary injunction factors and recommending that Choate’s motion be denied. 2 First, he concluded that Choate had failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success as to any of his constitutional claims. With respect to any First Amendment claim that could be inferred from the complaint, the magistrate found nothing to indicate that any of the defendants’ actions were 2 “To obtain a preliminary injunction, the movant must show: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm to the movant if the injunction is denied; (3) the threatened injury outweighs the harm that the preliminary injunction may cause the opposing party; and (4) the injunction, if issued, will not adversely affect the public interest.” General Motors, 500 F.3d 1222, 1226 (10th Cir. 2007). -4- motivated by religious animus. 3 He concluded that Choate’s Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process claim would likely fail because it was clear that Choate had availed himself of significant process in resisting the abatement order. The magistrate also concluded that Choate was unlikely to prevail on his substantive due process claim because there was nothing to indicate that the relevant nuisance laws had been applied in a deliberately arbitrary manner. Finally, he concluded that the city’s enforcement of its nuisance laws did not give rise to a claim under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. At the irreparable harm prong of the analysis the magistrate found there had been no showing that monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate Choate for his alleged injuries. He further held that Choate had been given ample time to do whatever he wished with the property and that it was unnecessary to preserve the debris because the arson investigation was complete. Finally, he held that in addition to the above factors, public safety concerns tipped in favor of the city’s right to enforce the abatement order. On October 17, over Choate’s objections, the district court issued an order affirming and adopting the Report and Recommendation and denying injunctive relief. Choate’s appeal of that order is case no. 07-7100. 4 3 The complaint included a number of vague references to Choate’s use of the building for religious purposes. 4 The district court’s denial of preliminary injunctive relief was an (continued...) -5- ii. Dismissal of Lemmings, Baker, and Saxon (07-7099) On November 8, 2007, the district court issued an order granting motions to dismiss filed by Lemmings, Baker, and Saxon on the grounds of qualified immunity. 5 After discussing the requirements of a qualified immunity defense, the court concluded that Lemmings and Baker exercised discretion in determining that Choate’s building posed a danger to the public and had to be demolished. Likewise, it found that Saxon exercised discretion in declaring the site a public nuisance and issuing the abatement order. And it concluded that those actions did not deprive Choate of his property without due process. The court acknowledged that “‘due process ordinarily requires an opportunity for “some kind of hearing” prior to the deprivation of a significant property interest.’” Aplt. App., doc. 20 at 5 (quoting Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining and Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 299 4 (...continued) appealable interlocutory order under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). It was not briefed as such, however, because the district court promptly resolved all claims against all parties. Therefore, we treat this part of the appeal as though it were from a denial of a permanent injunction. 5 Earlier, on October 17, the court had granted separate motions filed by Doner and the State of Oklahoma. Choate did not file notices of appeal as to those orders, as was his practice with the other defendants. Nonetheless, we will treat his docketing statement, which lists 10/17/07 among the dates of the orders appealed from, as the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal concerning the dismissals of Doner and the State. See B. Willis, C.P.A., Inc. v. BNSF Ry. Corp., 531 F.3d 1282, 1296 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that we may, in limited circumstances, treat a pro se litigant’s docketing statement as a notice of appeal). We affirm the district court’s grant of the State’s motion for substantially the same reasons articulated in its order dated October 17, 2007 (district court doc. 83). And we affirm its dismissal of Doner for reasons explained below. -6- (1981)). But it pointed out that a pre-deprivation hearing is not always required, particularly “where the state is confronted with an emergency.” Id. (citing Hodel, 452 U.S. at 299-300). The district court thus concluded, [b]ecause clear precedent exists allowing the deprivation of property interests without a hearing in emergency situations, it is impossible to say that Baker, Lemmings, and Saxon were objectively unreasonable in believing that their actions were not in violation of any clearly established constitutional rights. Id. The court’s decision to grant qualified immunity to the city officials is the subject of Choate’s appeal in case no. 07-7099. iii. Dismissal of OCE and DeGraffenreid (08-7010) On January 14, 2008, the district court issued orders granting motions to dismiss filed by the two remaining defendants, OCE and DeGraffenreid. It held that Choate failed to state a claim against OCE, explaining that under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978), a § 1983 claim against a municipal entity cannot be predicated upon respondeat superior liability. The court explained that to prevail over OCE, Choate would have to “show ‘that the unconstitutional actions of an employee were representative of an official policy or custom of the municipal institution, or were carried out by an official with final policy-making authority with respect to the challenged action.’” Id., doc. 30 at 3 (quoting Camfield v. Oklahoma City, 248 F.3d 1214, 1229 (10th Cir. 2001)). In the district court’s view, Choate’s complaint challenged the actions of individual OCE employees rather than any action taken by OCE as a municipal -7- entity. Furthermore, it found his complaint was devoid of any allegations that those employees acted either pursuant to an official policy or with final policy-making authority. Thus, it concluded Choate had no § 1983 claim. The court rejected Choate’s § 1983 claim against DeGraffenreid because it concluded that he failed to allege any state action on her part. Choate’s contention is that because OG&E’s refusal to provide him with service was motivated by unwillingness on OG&E’s part to break the law, OG&E’s refusal . . . amounts to state action. Under Choate’s theory of the law, any person choosing to comply with the law–rather tha[n] break it–is a state actor for purposes of § 1983. That is simply not the case. Aplt. App., doc. 29 at 3. Choate appeals the dismissals of DeGraffenreid and OCE in case no. 08-7010.