Opinion ID: 2790553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: blakely error

Text: Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), federal courts are precluded from granting habeas relief on claims that were previously adjudicated on the merits in state court unless the adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 4 Case: 13-13006 Date Filed: 04/01/2015 Page: 5 of 12 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. at 490. In Blakely, the Supreme Court applied the rule announced in Apprendi to hold a Washington state trial court violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights by sentencing the defendant to 90 months’ imprisonment—which reflected a 37-month upward departure from the standard guideline range of 49 to 53 months—based upon the trial court’s own finding that the crime involved “deliberate cruelty.” 542 U.S. at 299-304. Although the statute provided a statutory maximum of ten years’ imprisonment, the Court explained the “‘statutory maximum’ for Apprendi purposes is the maximum sentence a judge may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant.” Id. at 303. We have emphasized that Blakely was decided in the context of a mandatory guidelines system. United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1297-98 (11th Cir. 2005). As to the merits of Plasencia’s Blakely claim, this Court interprets the state habeas appellate court’s per curiam affirmance as a denial on the merits. See 5 Case: 13-13006 Date Filed: 04/01/2015 Page: 6 of 12 Shelton 691 F.3d at 1353 (11th Cir. 2012). The state court’s decision is therefore entitled to deference under § 2254(d). See id. Thus, in order to prevail on this claim, Plasencia must show that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Supreme Court’s decision in Blakely applies to Plasencia’s case because his conviction was not yet final when the Supreme Court issued Blakely. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351 (2004) (explaining when the Supreme Court issues a decision that “results in a ‘new rule,’ that rule applies to all criminal cases still pending on direct review”). The Florida Supreme Court has determined that a conviction is not final until the appellate court has issued the mandate. Hughes v. State, 901 So. 2d 837, 839 (Fla. 2005). The Supreme Court issued Blakely on June 24, 2004. 542 U.S. at 296. Although the state appellate court affirmed Plasencia’s conviction and sentence on June 23, 2004, the mandate did not issue until March 30, 2005. Because Plasencia’s case was pending on direct review, the rule announce in Blakely applied to his case. Because Blakely was decided in the context of a mandatory guideline system, Plasencia’s Blakely claim depends on whether the Florida guidelines under which he was sentenced were mandatory or advisory. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1297. Plasencia asserts he was sentenced under the mandatory 1994 sentencing 6 Case: 13-13006 Date Filed: 04/01/2015 Page: 7 of 12 guidelines because the commission date of his offense fell within the window of Heggs v. State, 759 So. 2d 620 (Fla. 2000). In Heggs, the Florida Supreme Court invalidated Florida’s 1995 sentencing guidelines. Id. at 630-31. Thus, individuals who committed crimes between October 1, 1995, and May 24, 1997, were resentenced under the 1994 sentencing guidelines. Trapp v. State, 760 So. 2d 924, 928 (Fla. 2000); cf. Poole v. State, 968 So. 2d 82, 83 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“Based upon the date of his offense, Poole fell within the Heggs window and was sentenced under the 1994 guidelines.” (footnote omitted)). Because Plasencia’s offense occurred in February 1996, his offense falls within the Heggs window. Indeed, his guidelines calculation score sheet was entitled “Heggs-Sentencing Guidelines Scoresheet.” Defendants sentenced pursuant to the 1994 Florida sentencing guidelines were sentenced under a determinate sentencing scheme. The 1994 sentencing guidelines provided “[s]entences imposed by trial court judges under the 1994 revised sentencing guidelines on or after January 1, 1994, must be within the 1994 guidelines unless there is a departure sentence with written findings.” Fla. Stat. § 921.001(5) (1994). Moreover, Florida courts have recognized that, for defendants sentenced under the guidelines sentencing scheme, which used several factors and discretion in calculating the maximum guideline range, Blakely could provide relief, even if the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum. See 7 Case: 13-13006 Date Filed: 04/01/2015 Page: 8 of 12 Plott v. State, 148 So. 3d 90, 95 (Fla. 2014) (quashing the appellate court’s denial of the defendant’s Rule 3.800 motion because the defendant’s four sentences of life imprisonment imposed upon resentencing pursuant to Heggs were unconstitutionally enhanced under Apprendi and Blakely where the trial court imposed an upward departure without empaneling a jury to make the necessary factual determination); Boardman v. State, 69 So. 3d 367, 369 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011) (stating that, if Blakely applied retroactively to cases on collateral review, it could apply to a defendant who was sentenced under the 1994 sentencing guidelines). The maximum sentence the state trial court could impose under Blakely without any additional fact findings was the top of Plasencia’s guideline range— 260 months’ imprisonment. The court imposed a 360-month sentence, which reflected a 100-month upward departure, based on its own factual findings. Because the state trial court imposed an upward departure based on facts that were not submitted to or proven to a jury, Plasencia’s sentence was imposed in violation of Blakely. Nevertheless, as will be discussed in the next section, a reasonable court could have determined that any Blakely error was harmless; thus, the state court’s decision was not unreasonable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).