Opinion ID: 254512
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Rate Per Barrel as Used in Petitioner's Reconstructions Is Proper.

Text: 13 In the aforementioned computations, Petitioner used as the rate per barrel of oil transported, the normal rate reached at the close of 1940, the actual average rate over the base period, the average rate over the base period excluding shipments to the Lawrenceville refinery while the Toledo refinery was closed due to a strike, and the average rate during the base period on oil transported for the account of the Pure Oil Company. Petitoner believes that one of these rates should be used by the Court in computing the CABPNI of Wabash, but that in any event the undisputed facts upon which the Court could find another rate are contained in the record. Petitioner submits that it is error for the Court to refuse to consider Petitioner's computations because of the rates which it has used. 14 The contested issues, as framed by petitioner's counsel, are as follows: 15 (1) Whether Petitioner is entitled as a matter of law to compute its constructive average base period net income (CABPNI) by adding the CABPNI of Wabash Pipe Line Company to its own actual average base period net income (ABPNI). 16 (2) Whether Petitioner qualifies under section 722 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 for a reconstruction of its ABPNI. 17 (3) Whether Petitioner has established that its excess profits tax computed without the benefit of section 722, is excessive and discriminatory and has established a fair and just amount representing normal base period earnings to be used as a CABPNI. 18 Respondent has filed a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the petition for review filed in this court by petitioner. 19 26 U.S.C.A. 732(c), Internal Revenue Code of 1939, provides: 20 '(c) Finality of determination. If in the determination of the tax liability under this subchapter the determination of any question is necessary solely by reason of section 711(b)(1)(H), (I), (J), or (K), section 721, or section 722, the determination of such question shall not be reviewed or redetermined by any court or agency except the Tax Court.' 21 The 1954 Code has not disturbed the continuing effectiveness of Section 732(c). 22 This proceeding was commenced in June, 1952 (before the enactment of the 1954 Code) and is not to be affected by the general repeal of the 1939 Code by the 1954 Code. See Section 7851(b)(1) of the 1954 Code, 26 U.S.C.A. 7851(b)(1); cf. Section 7851(a)(6)(C) and (a)(7) of the 1954 Code. 23 It has been held that Section 732(c) of the 1939 Code is still (after the effective date of the 1954 Code) applicable with respect to reviews sought on 'abnormalities' or 'relief' questions under the Second World War Excess Profits Tax Law of the 1939 Code, and that Section 732(c) had been neither expressly nor impliedly repealed by the 1954 Code. Brown Paper Mill Co. v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 255 F.2d 77, certiorari denied 358 U.S. 906, 79 S.Ct. 229, 3 L.Ed.2d 227, rehearing denied 358 U.S. 942, 79 S.Ct. 344, 3 L.Ed.2d 350; Patent Button Co. of Tennessee v. Commissioner, 6 Cir., 256 F.2d 726; Crowell-Collier Pub. Co. v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 259 F.2d 860, certiorari denied 358 U.S. 928, 79 S.Ct. 314, 3 L.Ed.2d 302; and, Hewitt-Robins, Inc. v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 282 F.2d 868. See also Helms Bakeries v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 263 F.2d 642, certiorari denied 360 U.S. 903, 79 S.Ct. 1285, 3 L.Ed.2d 1255, rehearing denied 361 U.S. 857, 80 S.Ct. 44, 4 L.Ed.2d 96; Standard Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 Cir., 249 F.2d 469; L.E. Carpenter & Co. v. Commissioner, 3 Cir., 264 F.2d 230; United States Rubber Co. v. Commissioner, 2 Cir., 274 F.2d 307, certiorari denied 363 U.S. 827, 80 S.Ct. 1596, 4 L.Ed.2d 1522; Puget Sound Pulp & Timber Co. v. Commissioner, 9 Cir., 277 F.2d 803, certiorari denied 364 U.S. 831, 81 S.Ct. 71, 5 L.Ed.2d 58. 24 Inasmuch as, in the determination of petitioner's tax liability under the subchapter dealing with excess profits tax in the 1939 Code, it is necessary to determine a question solely by reason of 722, the determination of such a question cannot be reviewed or redetermined by any court or agency except the Tax Court; hence this court has no jurisdiction of this appeal. Accordingly the pending appeal is dismissed at petitioner's costs. 25 Appeal dismissed.