Opinion ID: 3009621
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Heading: the relevant legal background

Text: Experience with the federal employment discrimination laws has culminated in the division of disparate treatment suits into three classes: pure discrimination, pretext, and mixedmotives cases.0 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973), as embellished by Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. Ct. 1089 (1981) and St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), establishes a flexible three-part model to allocate the shifting burdens of production in the first two classes of individual disparate treatment cases (pure discrimination and pretext). Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S. Ct. 0 We exercise plenary review over the district court's grant of summary judgment, and employ the same standard applicable in the district court. Davis v. Portline Transportes Maritime Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 536 (3d Cir. 1994). We affirm a grant of summary judgment if `there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' Id. at 536 n.3 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c)). The facts of this case transpired before the effective date of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (the 1991 Act), Pub. L. No. 101-166, 105 Stat. 1075 (1991). Hence, the substantive and remedial changes made by the 1991 Act do not apply to this case, see Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 114 S. Ct. 1483, 1505-06 (1994), but occasionally we will make references to them and the accompanying legislative history because that material is generally informative. 0 For purposes of this opinion, we ignore the disparate impact theory of employer liability. 9 1775 (1989) supplies the procedure for proving intentional discrimination in mixed-motives cases. Numerous opinions of this Court have explained the evidentiary regimes that the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine/Hicks line of cases and Price Waterhouse have established, but for the benefit of the untutored reader we summarize them in the margin.0 0 In a case of failure to hire or promote, the plaintiff first must carry the initial burden under the statute of establishing a prima facie case of [unlawful] discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he belongs to a [protected category]; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824. If the plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production transfers to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Id. In the unlikely event that the employer at this juncture remains silent, the case falls within the set of pure discrimination cases and the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254, 101 S. Ct. at 1094. If the defendant does introduce into evidence a legitimate reason for its actions, the case becomes a pretext case. In that event the employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually motivated its behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination rests at all times with the plaintiff. See id. at 253, 254, 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1093, 1094, 1095. Once the employer answers its relatively light burden by articulating a legitimate reason for the unfavorable employment decision, the burden of production rebounds to the plaintiff, who must now show by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer's explanation is pretextual. To accomplish this, the plaintiff must convince the factfinder both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752; see id. at 2754 (It is not 10 yenough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination. (emphasis in original)). In other words, since the plaintiff's making out a prima facie case only shifts the burden of production to the employer, the employer need only articulate some legitimate reason for its action to meet the plaintiff's serve. The factfinder's rejection of that proffered legitimate reason permits, but does not compel, a verdict for the plaintiff. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. To prevail, the plaintiff must ultimately prove not that the illegitimate factor was the sole reason for the decision, but that the illegitimate factor was a determinative factor of the employment decision, that is, that but for the protected characteristic, the plaintiff would have been, for example, hired or promoted. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993) (ADEA) (holding that a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's protected trait actually played a role in [the decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the outcome). In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court borrowed the mixed-motives standard applied originally in a mixed-motives constitutional tort case, Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S. Ct. 568 (1977), and adapted it for mixed-motives cases under Title VII. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 248-50, 109 S. Ct. at 1789-90 (plurality); id. at 258-59, 109 S. Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring); cf. id. at 277-78, 109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also East Tex. Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395, 404 n.9, 97 S. Ct. 1891, 1897 n.9 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 369 n.53, 97 S. Ct. 1843, 1872 n.53 (1977). A mixed-motives case is one in which both legitimate and illegitimate factors contribute to the employment decision. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 232, 109 S. Ct. at 1781 (plurality). Such a case differs from a pretext case in that the plaintiff must present evidence of illegal discrimination sufficiently strong to shift the burden of proof to the employer, meaning that the plaintiff must adduce direct evidence of discrimination (that is, more persuasive evidence than the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima facie case). See Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., No. 93-1333, Mem. op. at 22-23 (3d Cir. July ??, 1994); Miller, No. 93-1773, 1994 WL 283269, at  n.6; Hook v. Ernst & Young, No. 92-3724, 1994 WL 283266, at - (3d Cir. June 28, 1994); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277-78, 109 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring). To rebut a plaintiff's case-in-chief in a mixed-motives case (that is, once the plaintiff has met his or her burden of proving an illegitimate factor played a motivating [or substantial] part in an employment decision), the employer must prove that it would have made the same decision even if it had not allowed [the illegitimate factor] to play such a role. 11 B. Other Circuits' Approaches to After-Acquired Evidence The courts of appeals have grouped into two primary (albeit splintered) camps regarding the relevancy of afteracquired evidence of résumé and/or application fraud or employee misconduct on the job.0 1. Courts Finding After-Acquired Evidence May Bar Liability The Tenth Circuit formed the first camp with its seminal Summers decision. Summers held that after-acquired evidence, at least if material, bars all relief and hence effectively operates as a complete defense to liability. Based on after-acquired evidence of Summers' rampant on-the-job misconduct,0 State Farm moved for summary judgment to diminish Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45, 109 S. Ct. at 1787-88 (plurality); see id. at 242, 109 S. Ct. at 1786 (plurality). The employer's rebuttal is thus an affirmative defense. See id. at 246, 109 S. Ct. at 1708 (plurality); id. at 259-60, 109 S. Ct. at 1795 (White, J., concurring); id. at 261, 109 S. Ct. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring). We note, however, that to the extent that Price Waterhouse barred all liability when the employer can show it would have taken the same action even had it not had any illegitimate motives, the 1991 Act overturned it. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075-76 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e-2(m), 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (Supp. 1994)). 0 The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to resolve this split during its next Term. See McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994). At the time we heard oral argument, certiorari had not yet been granted in McKennon, and the parties asked the panel (and it agreed) to decide the case and not hold it in abeyance pending the probable grant of certiorari so that the case can proceed to a timely resolution. Cf. Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Tech. Univ., 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993) (dismissing the writ of certiorari in an after-acquired evidence case). 0 Summers, a claims adjuster for the defendant insurance company, had been reprimanded on several occasions for falsifying company records and had eventually been placed on probationary suspension 12 the relief Summers could recover were he to prevail at the liability phase of trial. See Summers, 864 F.2d at 702-03. The Tenth Circuit held that the after-acquired evidence of Summers' on-the-job misconduct would not only limit Summers' remedies, but, by precluding Summers from any relief, the evidence would effectively avert State Farm's liability. The court understood that technically McDonnell Douglas presupposed that a defendant could avert liability only with a legitimate, nondiscriminatory motive known to the employer at the instant of its actions. See id. at 705. Yet it reasoned -- apparently because State Farm would have fired him had it known of his transgressions -- that while . . . after-acquired evidence cannot be said to have been a `cause' for Summers' discharge in 1982, it is relevant to Summers' claim of `injury,' and does itself preclude the grant of any present relief or remedy to Summers. Id. at 708. The court likened the plaintiff's situation to a masquerading doctor, meaning one who was not really a doctor but who had pretended to be one, discharged for discriminatory reasons, who would be entitled to no relief. Id. Since Summers, courts have allowed after-acquired evidence to bar the employer's liability in two general categofor two weeks. About six months later, State Farm discharged him, not because of his falsification of records but because of his poor attitude, inability to get along with fellow employees and customers, and similar problems dealing with the public and co-workers. Four years later, during discovery, State Farm learned that on at least 150 occasions Summers had falsified company records, eighteen instances of which falsifications occurred after his return from suspended status. 13 ries of cases: résumé and/or application fraud cases, and misconduct on the job cases. In a case of résumé or application fraud, the employer typically asserts that, had it known of the plaintiff's misrepresentation(s), it would never have hired him or her. See Welch v. Liberty Machine Works, Inc., 23 F.3d 1403, ____ WL at ,  (8th Cir. 1994) (brought under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 1001-1461 (1985 & Supp. 1994), and the Missouri Human Rights Act, MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 213.010-.137 (Vernon 1986 & Supp. 1994)). The employer may alternatively argue that, had it at any time after the hiring found out about the misrepresentation(s), it would have promptly fired the plaintiff.0 See O'Driscoll v. Hercules, Inc., 12 F.3d 176, 177-78 (10th Cir. 1994) (expanding the Summers holding from misconduct to after-acquired résumé and application fraud cases), petition for cert. filed, 62 U.S.L.W. 3757 (Apr. 1, 1994) (No. 93-1728); Reed v. Amax Coal Co., 971 F.2d 1295, 1298 (7th Cir. 1992) (per curiam). In some cases employers advance both 0 Some courts distinguish between would not have hired and would have fired cases on the basis that an employer would be more hesitant to fire a competent, capable employee than to not hire the applicant in the first place. See, e.g., Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 254, 255 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992). In Washington, the Seventh Circuit held that in cases where the employee actually was employed for some time, the would not have hired inquiry is irrelevant because the temporal focus is on the time of the adverse employment decision. Id. at 256. As to the would have fired inquiry, however, the court somewhat inconsistently with its prior holding construed Price Waterhouse to allow the employer to defend its actions with after-acquired evidence, stating that in such situations the employer must show by a preponderance of the evidence that, if acting in a raceneutral manner, it would have made the same employment decision had it known of the after-acquired evidence. Id. at 255 (emphasis supplied). 14 arguments in the alternative. See Milligan-Jensen v. Michigan Technological University, 975 F.2d 302, 304 n.2 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 22 (1993); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. Honeywell Information Systems, Inc., 955 F.2d 409, 414-15 (6th Cir. 1992);0 cf. Dotson v. United States Postal Service, 977 F.2d 976, 978 (6th Cir.) (per curiam) (holding that the plaintiff's employment application misrepresentations rendered him unqualified for the job without addressing whether the employer would not have hired or would have fired him therefor), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 263 (1993). Obviously in job misconduct cases (like Summers), only a variant of the latter would have fired argument can be made. Cf. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co., 9 F.3d 539, 54243 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that the plaintiff's job misconduct precluded her claim of injury and that consequently she was not entitled to the grant of any relief or remedy), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2099 (1994). 2. Courts Finding After-Acquired Evidence May Not Bar Liability The opposing camp, exemplified by the Eleventh Circuit in Wallace v. Dunn Construction Co., 968 F.2d 1174 (1992) when it openly broke ranks with Summers,0 allows after-acquired evidence 0 Although Johnson involved a cause of action under Michigan's Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act, MICH. COMP. LAWS §§ 37.2101-.2804, the court construed it in the same manner as its federal counterpart. 955 F.2d at 415 n.1. 0 The first court of appeals after-acquired evidence case actually rejecting Summers was handed down by the Seventh Circuit in Smith v. General Scanning, Inc., 876 F.2d 1315 (1989), an ADEA suit. As the employer brought out during discovery, the plaintiff had 15 to come in only at the remedies stage to slim down the relief falsified his college credentials on his résumé. See id. at 1317. The district court had held that the plaintiff's misrepresentation precluded the plaintiff from making out a prima facie case because he could not show that he was qualified for the position. The court of appeals, cognizant of the Summers decision, rejected the district court's approach: By narrowly focusing on [the plaintiff's] initial burden, the district court was distracted from the real issue in this case. At issue is the lawfulness of Smith's termination. His resume fraud clearly had nothing to do with that; it surfaced only after [the plaintiff] was terminated and after this suit was commenced. Whether [the employer] discriminated against [the plaintiff] must be decided solely with respect to the reason given for his discharge . . . . His resume fraud is, for this purpose, irrelevant. Id. at 1319. The court noted in dicta that such evidence would be relevant at the remedies stage, however, because it would hardly make sense to order [the plaintiff] reinstated to a job which he lied to get and from which he properly could be discharged for that lie. Id. at 1319 n.2. But subsequent cases in the Seventh Circuit leave that courts' approach the most unsettled, as panel after panel seems at sea without seriously heeding what bearings have been set before. See Gilty v. Village of Oak Park, 919 F.2d 1247, 1251 (7th Cir. 1990) (not referencing Smith but holding that evidence of the plaintiff's fabrications exposed three years after the adverse employment decision would bar all liability); Washington v. Lake County, Ill., 969 F.2d 250, 253 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1992) (same, but noting that the plaintiff had not challenged the validity of the Summers rationale, and that he had not advanced the argument that he should at least, in accordance with the dicta in Smith, be accorded partial backpay); Reed, 971 F.2d at 1298 (approving Summers but giving it a restrained reading); Kristufek v. Hussmann Foodservice Co., 985 F.2d 364, 369, 370 (7th Cir. 1993) (departing from the reasoning of Washington and Reed without citing them, returning to Smith for the proposition that the only issue is the lawfulness of the termination for the reasons given, and holding that [a] discriminatory firing must be decided solely with respect to the known circumstances leading to the discharge). Thus, while not exactly clear, the Seventh Circuit, after bouncing back and forth between the two camps for a while, seems now to have settled alongside Wallace. See Kristufek, supra. 16 available to the plaintiff.0 The court, having had the benefit of the Supreme Court's exposition in Price Waterhouse (applying the Mt. Healthy framework to Title VII and clarifying the question of timing in mixed-motives cases, see supra at Error! Bookmark not defined. n.Error! Bookmark not defined.), criticized the Summers decision for misapplying Mt. Healthy, in that the Summers rule ignores the lapse of time between the employment decision and the discovery of a legitimate motive for that decision. Id. at 1179-80. In doing so, the court continued, the Summers rule clashes with the Mt. Healthy principle . . . that the plaintiff should be left in no worse a position than if she had not been a member of a protected class or engaged in protected opposition to an unlawful employment practice. Id. at 1179. The Eleventh Circuit was also persuaded that the Summers rule would result in underenforcement of the federal anti-employment discrimination laws and accordingly underdeter unlawful employment discrimination. See id. at 1179-80. Having resolved that after-acquired evidence does not preclude liability, the court concluded with a detailed exposition on the 0 In Wallace, the plaintiff (Neil) had filed numerous causes of action against the employer under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII for wrongful discharge. During her deposition, Neil admitted having falsified her employment application by omitting a conviction on drug charges. Soon thereafter, the employer Dunn filed a motion for summary judgment, partially grounded in the Summers defense. See id., 968 F.2d at 1176-77. 17 availability of the standard remedies in after-acquired evidence cases.0