Opinion ID: 2366296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hampton

Text: In State v. Hampton, supra, 61 N.J. 250, 294 A. 2d 23, the defendant was convicted of several crimes stemming from the kidnapping and shooting of Mrs. Mary Rayborn. The defendant broke into Rayborn's apartment and forced her at gunpoint to drive him out of town. At one point during the hour-long ordeal the car stopped and Mrs. Rayborn attempted to escape. When she exited the car, the defendant shot her. The victim was, however, able to escape. Id. at 255-56, 294 A. 2d 23. Following the defendant's arrest, he gave a statement to the police in which he corroborated the victim's version of the facts, adding only that when she exited the car, he jumped up and the gun fired. Id. at 259-60, 294 A. 2d 23. He implied that the shooting was accidental. Id. at 260, 294 A. 2d 23. The defendant received his Miranda warnings both after he was arrested and again before he made his statement to the police. Ibid. During the defendant's trial, the issue of the voluntariness of his statement was raised and a hearing was subsequently held outside the presence of the jury. Ibid. The defendant testified during the hearing. Ibid. His testimony raised no substantial conflict with respect to the Miranda warnings, his execution of the waiver, or his willingness to give a statement. The trial court ruled the statement admissible. Id. at 261, 294 A. 2d 23. Hampton's trial continued in the presence of the jury and the State offered the defendant's statement into evidence. Ibid. Defense counsel objected, noting that defendant was not going to testify on the subject. Ibid. The trial court, cognizant of the rule that the court could not inform the jury of an earlier ruling that the confession was voluntary, found the statement admissible and informed the jury that the court would not decide the voluntariness of the statement. Ibid. Instead, the trial court instructed the jury that the decision whether the statement was voluntary or not was for the jury. Ibid. The court further instructed the jury that if it found that the statement was not voluntary it should disregard it. Ibid. Addressing defendant's claim that the jury charge was prejudicial, we agreed with the Appellate Division and held that the charge as a whole was not prejudicial. Id. at 263, 294 A. 2d 23. Allowing the jury to address the voluntariness of the confession as if there were a factual dispute as to whether the Miranda rule had been complied with, and whether defendant's rights thereunder had been waived ... benefitted rather than prejudiced [defendant]. Id. at 263-64, 294 A. 2d 23. We concluded that there is no constitutional obligation to submit to the jury for determination the issue of whether the Miranda warnings were given to a defendant and the rights described thereby waived by him before he confessed. Since the question involves the competency of evidence, decision thereon traditionally rests with the trial judge. Id. at 267, 294 A. 2d 23. In the future, however, we required that the trial court alone shall determine (1) whether the Miranda warnings were given to the accused and his rights thereunder waived by him before the confession was given; and that if it finds the warnings were not given, or if given the rights not waived, the confession must be excluded, and (2) if those conditions were satisfied, whether in light of all those circumstances attending the confession it was given voluntarily. If these questions are resolved in favor of the State, then, without being advised of the court's decision, the jury shall be instructed that they should decide whether in view of all the same circumstances the defendant's confession is true. If they find that it is not true, then they must treat it as inadmissible and disregard it for purposes of discharging their function as fact finders on the ultimate issue of guilt or innocence. [ Id. at 272, 294 A. 2d 23.] See also State v. Thomas, 76 N.J. 344, 366, 387 A. 2d 1187 (1978) (reaffirming Hampton principle that trial court is sole arbiter of voluntariness of defendant's statements and rejecting defendant's invitation to overrule decision); State v. Bowman, 165 N.J. Super. 531, 537-39, 398 A. 2d 908 (App.Div. 1979) (holding prosecutor's statement to jury on summation that trial court had previously found defendant's two confessions voluntary constituted reversible error even though trial court gave Hampton charge, because it failed to instruct jury to disregard prosecutor's statement). The New Jersey Rules of Evidence codified the holding in Hampton and state: Where by virtue of any rule of law a judge is required in a criminal action to make a preliminary determination as to the admissibility of a statement by the defendant, the judge shall hear and determine the question of its admissibility out of the presence of the jury. In such a hearing the rules of evidence shall apply and the burden of persuasion as to the admissibility of the statement is on the prosecution. If the judge admits the statement the jury shall not be informed of the finding that the statement is admissible but shall be instructed to disregard the statement if it finds that it is not credible. If the judge subsequently determines from all of the evidence that the statement is not admissible, the judge shall take appropriate action. [ N.J.R.E. 104(c) (emphasis added).] The comment following N.J.R.E. 104(c) notes that in 1976 the 1967 New Jersey Rule was amended in response to State v. Hampton . N.J.R.E. 104(c) cmt. The comment also explains that the rule's application is limited to defendant's statements alone, and it does not purport to deal with the admissibility of other evidence such as identification evidence. Ibid. [1]