Opinion ID: 2815840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Proportionality of Sentence of Death

Text: Although Smith does not raise proportionality on appeal, this Court has an independent obligation to review the proportionality of a sentence of death, - 35 - regardless of whether it is raised by a party. See England v. State, 940 So. 2d 389, 407 (Fla. 2006); see also Fla. R. App. P. 9.142(a)(5). Because the death penalty is reserved for only those cases where the most aggravating and least mitigating circumstances exist, this Court must undertake a proportionality review “in order to determine whether the crime falls within the category of both the most aggravated and the least mitigated of murders, thereby assuring uniformity in the application of the sentence.” Anderson v. State, 841 So. 2d 390, 407-08 (Fla. 2003) (citation omitted). In performing this review, this Court considers the totality of the circumstances and compares the case with other similar capital cases. Duest v. State, 855 So. 2d 33, 47 (Fla. 2003). This Court does not simply compare the number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, but rather performs a qualitative review of the underlying basis for each aggravator and mitigator. See McCoy v. State, 132 So. 3d 756, 771 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 90 (2014); Urbin v. State, 714 So. 2d 411, 416 (Fla. 1998). In this case, the jury unanimously recommended that Smith be sentenced to death. The trial court found five aggravators and assigned each the following weight: (1) Smith was on felony probation (moderate weight); (2) Smith had prior violent felony convictions (great weight as to the 1991 state robbery conviction and the 1995 federal armed bank robbery convictions); (3) the murder was committed in the course of a burglary (moderate weight); (4) the murder was - 36 - committed for pecuniary gain (merged with the committed-in-the-course-of-a- burglary aggravator); and (5) the murder was HAC (great weight). Against these aggravators, the trial court rejected Smith’s proposed statutory mitigation and found and weighed five nonstatutory mitigating factors: (1) intermittent explosive disorder (moderate weight); (2) a loving relationship with nieces (little weight); (3) physical, emotional, and sexual abuse as a child (little weight); (4) acute academic failure and attention deficit disorder (significant weight); and (5) good conduct while in custody (moderate weight). Given the extremely significant aggravation, including Smith’s history of violent crime and the fact that he was on felony probation at the time of the murder, together with the facts and circumstances of this crime, we conclude that death is a proportionate sentence. This is neither the least aggravated nor most mitigated of death cases. A review of other cases establishes that death is a proportionate punishment in this case. For example, in King v. State, 130 So. 3d 676, 686-87 (Fla. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1323 (2014), we held the sentence of death to be proportionate based on a murder in which the defendant bludgeoned the victim to death during a burglary. The trial court found two aggravators— committed during a burglary (merged with pecuniary gain) and HAC—and weighed those against sixteen nonstatutory mitigators, including the lack of a - 37 - violent history, and determined that death was a proportionate punishment. Id. Here, instead of a nonviolent criminal history, Smith had a violent criminal history. We have also considered Banks v. State, 46 So. 3d 989, 1000-01 (Fla. 2010), where we concluded that the death sentence was proportionate after the defendant stabbed the victim to death and then took her car. In that case, the trial court found three aggravators—prior violent felony convictions; HAC; and cold, calculated, and premeditated—which were weighed against low IQ, brain deficits, antisocial personality traits, and difficult youth. Id.; see also Gosciminski, 132 So. 3d at 71617 (holding that the death sentence was proportionate where the defendant fatally stabbed and bludgeoned the victim during a burglary; the trial court found three aggravators—CCP, HAC, and committed during a robbery or burglary—and then weighed those aggravators against the statutory mitigator of no significant history of criminal activity and thirteen nonstatutory mitigators, which were given little to moderate weight); Miller v. State, 42 So. 3d 204, 229-30 (Fla. 2010) (holding that the death sentence was proportionate where the defendant fatally stabbed a seventy-two-year-old victim; the trial court found five aggravators—prior violent felony conviction, HAC, committed while on parole, committed during a burglary, and victim was particularly vulnerable—which were weighed against six nonstatutory mitigating circumstances). - 38 - Examining the facts of this case, including the aggravators and mitigators found, and comparing it to other similar cases where this Court has upheld the death sentence as a proportionate penalty, we conclude that Smith’s death sentence is proportionate.