Opinion ID: 294888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: steinberg's cross-appeal

Text: 18 Since we have determined that the District Court correctly decided the issues raised by Neifeld's appeal, we must now consider whether it was also correct in disposing of the issue raised by Steinberg's cross-appeal. In Steinberg's motion to dissolve the Writ of Foreign Attachment for failure of the Sheriff to manually seize the shares in the hands of the Philadelphia brokerage firm, Steinberg also requested that the court direct the Garnishee to deliver promptly to Defendant his securities now in Ganishee's possession, and in the interim to restrain Plaintiff from instituting any legal action designed to attach said securities in Garnishee's possession. On September 23, 1969, the District Court denied Steinberg's request. On September 24, 1969, Neifeld filed a new Writ of Foreign Attachment and a new complaint in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas. 18 19 Steinberg contends in his cross-appeal that since the Sheriff in making the original attachment failed to seize the securities in accordance with 12A P.S. § 8-317 of the Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Neifeld should be forever barred from further attempts to attach the identical res for the identical cause of action. 20 Neifeld has suggested that the issue raised by the cross-appeal has become moot since he has already instituted a new legal action and the securities have already been seized by the Sheriff. We find it unnecessary to decide this question for the cross-appeal is, in any event, lacking in merit. 21 Steinberg's argument is that the District Court should have effectuated its judgment under 28 U.S.C. § 2283 20 by ordering the stockbroker to deliver Steinberg's securities to him and by enjoining Neifeld from further attempts to bring another Writ of Foreign Attachment by levying upon the same securities. The judgment entered by the District Court was that the Writ of Foreign Attachment was invalid by reason of the Sheriff's failure to seize the securities and that Neifeld lacked personal or in rem jurisdiction over Steinberg. This was not an adjudication upon the merits (Rule 41(b)) and Neifeld was at liberty to sue again on the identical cause of action without fear that Steinberg could successfully raise the defense of res judicata. See LeJeune v. Leiblich, 19 Schulykill L.R. 74 (1922). Since Neifeld would not be barred by res judicata in maintaining the second suit filed by him against Steinberg, it would be anomalous if Steinberg could nonetheless enjoin Neifeld from bringing the second suit 22 Furthermore, Steinberg's reliance upon 28 U.S.C. § 2283 is misplaced for it only applies to a stay of a suit already instituted in a state court. It does not apply to injunctions against the institution of state court proceedings which is the type of relief Steinberg requested from the District Court. Dombroski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 484 n. 2, 85 S.Ct. 1116, 14 L.Ed.2d 22 (1965); United Steelworkers of America v. Bagwell, 383 F.2d 492, 495 (4 Cir. 1967). 23 Finally, Steinberg ascribes a purpose to 12A P.S. § 8-317 which is manifestly unfair. He asserts that the mere procedural error of a sheriff in failing to seize securities prevents a plaintiff from correcting the error and suing again. Non-compliance with 12A P.S. § 8-317 should not cause such a harsh result. The reason why 12A P.S. § 8-317 requires a party to manually seize securities in order to effect a valid attachment is to foreclose all possibility of the security finding its way into a transferee's hands after an attempted attachment has been made. This policy has already been vindicated for we take judicial notice that the Sheriff manually seized the securities on September 24, 1969. 24 The order of the District Court denying Steinberg's request for injunctive relief will also be affirmed.