Opinion ID: 1706506
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: failure to explain

Text: An accused has a constitutional right not to take the stand in his own behalf. He is presumed innocent until proof is offered to the contrary. But, there is not a thing in the world wrong with a rule of law which says that when certain facts are proved, which only the defendant can explain, it is up to him to offer some explanation. Otherwise, the jury has the right to find him guilty. We do that in murder prosecutions. A and B go into a room together. A shot is fired, and A is seen walking out with a smoking pistol. B is dead, a bullet through his head. The law presumes A murdered B unless he offers some rational explanation. Malice is presumed from a killing with a deadly weapon. Blanks v. State, 547 So.2d 29, 33 (Miss. 1989); Russel v. State, 497 So.2d 75, 76 (Miss. 1986); Stokes v. State, 240 Miss. 453, 477, 128 So.2d 341, 350 (Miss. 1961); Hughes v. State, 207 Miss. 594, 42 So.2d 805, 807 (1949); Smith v. State, 205 Miss. 283, 294, 38 So.2d 725, 726 (1949); see cases cited Homicide, West Key No. 146. In Tuttle v. State, 252 Miss. 733, 737, 174 So.2d 345, 346-47 (1965), this Court stated: Besides, the appellant did not even testify, nor did he offer evidence in conflict with the state's evidence. The prohibition against adverse comment and inference does not protect a defendant from the probative force of the evidence against him. Dealing with the failure of a defendant to testify, 1 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, sec. 146 at page 277 (12th ed. 1955), well says: If a defendant does not attempt to rebut incriminating facts he cannot, merely by remaining silent, escape the natural and reasonable inference deducible from such facts. For instance, if in a case of larceny the theft and unexplained or unsatisfactorily explained recent possession of the stolen property of the accused are shown, he cannot avoid the natural inference, deducible from such facts, that he is the thief, by failure or refusal to testify. See also: McGilvery v. State, 497 So.2d 67, 68 (Miss. 1986); Rush v. State, 301 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1974). In U.S. v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450, 452 (1st Cir.1970), the First Circuit Court of Appeals held: The defendant argues that if he had taken the stand he might have testified that he himself had asked Mitchell for permission, and that it was refused, and that for the jury to deny him the benefit of that assumption in effect would violate his Fifth Amendment right. This is a total misconception of the amendment. The Fifth Amendment prevents the drawing of unfavorable inferences from the failure to testify; it does not prevent the drawing of affirmative inferences, or serve to rebut inferences that arise independently from other circumstances, unconnected with the defendant's failure to testify. [Emphasis added] In U.S. v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430, 437 (2nd Cir.1974), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated: As we recently stated in United States v. Frank, 494 F.2d 145, 153 (2 Cir.1974): [T]he defendants were not required to testify or to present any case at all, and the jury could not permissibly draw an adverse inference simply from their failure to take the stand. But the self incrimination clause does not elevate a defendant's silence ... to the level of convincing refutation. When a defendant has offered no [credible explanation], it may be reasonable for a jury to draw inferences from the prosecution's evidence which would be impermissible if the defendant had supplied a credible exculpatory version. [Emphasis added] In People v. McClindon, 54 Ill.2d 546, 301 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1973), cert. denied, McClindon v. Illinois, 415 U.S. 992, 94 S.Ct. 1593 (1974), the Supreme Court of Illinois held: The defendants had an opportunity during the trial to explain their conduct just as any defendant has an opportunity to explain, rebut or contradict any evidence presented against him. In the absence of such an explanation, rebuttal or contradiction, the evidence stands unchallenged before the jury. This court has stated concerning conduct similar to that involved in this case: In the absence of explanation, such conduct is not consistent with that of an innocent person similarly situated... . The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in U.S. v. Clark, 776 F.2d 623, 627 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, Clark v. United States, 470 U.S. 1006, 105 S.Ct. 1363, 84 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985), stated: But, the privilege of self-incrimination does not preclude the trier of the facts from drawing an adverse inference if justified by the facts. Also, Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1232, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965): What the jury may infer, given no help from the court, is one thing. (And entirely different from the court or prosecution commenting upon it.) It is equally clear that an accused cannot avoid the natural and reasonable inferences deducible from proved facts merely by remaining silent or by declining to become a witness. 22 A C.J.S. Criminal Laws, § 593, p. 355. In Moore v. U.S., 271 F.2d 564, 568 (4th Cir.1959), the Court held: In a criminal case the accused is protected, at every stage of the trial, with a presumption of innocence and until he is proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt by proper and competent evidence. No inference of guilt can be drawn from the mere fact that the accused did not testify in his own behalf. These are fundamental principles which require no citation of authority. But other principles have not been overlooked or disregarded in reaching our decision. Circumstantial evidence may support a verdict of guilty, though it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. Holland v. United States, 1954, 348 U.S. 121, 75 S.Ct. 127, 99 L.Ed. 150. If it be sufficient to support an inference of guilt and the defendant fails to offer a reasonable explanation consistent with innocence, such failure may be considered by the trier of fact. Wilson v. United States, 1896, 162 U.S. 613, 16 S.Ct. 895, 40 L.Ed. 1090; Jenkins v. United States, 4 Cir., 1932, 58 F.2d 556. It is not necessary, in appraising the sufficiency of the evidence, that this court be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. Bell v. United States, 4 Cir., 1950, 185 F.2d 302. The question is whether the evidence, construed most favorably for the prosecution, is such that a jury (or trial judge) might find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Bell v. United States, supra; United States v. Brown, 2 Cir., 1956, 236 F.2d 403; Stoppelli v. United States, 9 Cir., 1950, 183 F.2d 391. Also, State v. Clay, 29 Ohio App.2d 206, 280 N.E.2d 385, 388 (1972): Where the prosecution makes a probable case on an issue as to which a defendant has a peculiar knowledge of the facts and may easily prove them, an inference arises that the truth is with the prosecution. Williams v. United States, 170 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.1948), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 909, 69 S.Ct. 412, 93 L.Ed. 442. In United States v. Ragland, 306 F.2d 732, 736 (4th Cir.1962), cert. denied, Ragland v. United States, 371 U.S. 949, 83 S.Ct. 504, 9 L.Ed.2d 498 (1963), the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in citing and quoting from Moore, observed: It is noteworthy in this case that neither defendant testified, nor offered any evidence at all, to explain their possession of this large quantity of sugar.       Nevertheless, protection of those fundamental rights (Fifth Amendment rights not to testify) does not mean that the failure of the defendant in a criminal case to explain highly suspicious circumstances, must be entirely disregarded by the trier of fact. In Walker v. United States, 301 F.2d 94, 97 (5th Cir.1962), the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, citing Acuna v. United States, 74 F.2d 359, 360 (5th Cir.1934), with approval, noted that a presumption merely places the burden upon him (the defendant) as to matters peculiarly within his knowledge. [Emphasis added] [3]