Opinion ID: 1127477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 28

Heading: Time of Impalement

Text: Defendant asserts that the prosecutor improperly argued that the time at which Lingle was impaled by the stake was irrelevant. Defendant waived this argument by failing to object. ( People v. Berryman, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1072.) It is also meritless. The prosecutor stated: [A]ssume for argument that you possess a lingering doubt, whether or not the stake is pre- or post-death, do you think that mitigates the crime in any way? Do you think that all of a sudden you say gee, I think the defendant should receive the gift of life because that stake was two minutes before or two minutes after death? Is that what you really feel? Is that what you think the law is designed for? Isn't it everything that has occurred here? Defendant asserts that the prosecutor misstated the law and committed misconduct because the time of the insertion of the stake had nothing to do with mitigation. It had everything to do with whether the prosecution had proven the special circumstance of torture beyond a reasonable doubt. If the stake was inserted after death, there was no capital crime, and the jury did not even have discretion to impose the death penalty. Defendant's argument fails to grasp the fundamental distinction between the guilt and penalty phase. (25) While the penalty jury may consider any lingering doubt, it has no cause to deliberate further on whether any of them harbor reasonable doubt as to guilt or truth of the special circumstances. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 66.) (24b) The prosecutor properly argued that even if the jurors had a lingering doubt whether Lingle was alive when impaled by the stake, this factor in mitigation, when considered with all of the other penalty evidence, did not ineluctably lead to the conclusion that defendant warranted a penalty of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole rather than death. Defendant further contends that the prosecutor's argument was improper because it placed the burden of proof with respect to the entire penalty phase on the defense, by characterizing life as a `gift' which defendant might `receive' if he could prove that the stake was inserted into the body after death, and that it was misconduct to shift the burden of proof onto the defense. Once again, defendant fails to grasp the fundamental differences between the guilt and penalty phases of a capital trial. (26) In fact, aside from unadjudicated criminal activity, which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, neither party bears the burden of proof at the penalty phase. ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 643 [276 Cal. Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376].) Finally, defendant claims that this statement improperly invited the jury to make their own judgment about the public policy considerations underlying the death penalty, and rewrite the law in accordance with their personal judgment.... [and] act on their personal feelings, rather than the law. We perceive no such implication in the prosecutor's remarks, and believe there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed them as such.
Defendant contends California's capital sentencing statute, Penal Code section 190.2, is facially unconstitutional because it fails to adequately narrow the class of murders eligible for the death penalty. Because this appeal concerns only the penalty retrial, and not the validity of the special circumstance finding, which was upheld in Davenport I, this issue is not properly before us. In any event, we have consistently rejected similar claims, and defendant asserts no compelling reason to revisit our conclusion. (See, e.g., People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 154-156; People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 467 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 808, 862 P.2d 808].) Defendant further contends that even if the special circumstance of torture could, theoretically, distinguish death-eligible murders from other murders, section 190.2 is unconstitutional as applied in this case. Defendant first contends that the absence of a requirement of the victim's subjective pain makes the torture-murder special circumstance unconstitutional. Once again, the issue of the validity of the special circumstance finding is not before us. Moreover, we thoroughly discussed and rejected defendant's similar claim in Davenport I, and he states no compelling reason to revisit that conclusion. ( Davenport I, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 263-271.) Defendant further contends that [c]ompounding the prejudice arising from the unreliable torture special circumstance finding, the prosecutor's theory of torture at the penalty retrial  relying on different evidence and far broader criteria  deprived Davenport of a reliable sentencing procedure when the new torture theory was pressed as aggravation. The prosecutor argued that if the jury had a lingering doubt as to whether Lingle was impaled by the stake ante mortem, it could consider other evidence of ante mortem torture, such as knife wounds, biting, and bruising. Defendant contends these events cannot constitutionally be used to support a finding of torture, because there was no evidence they caused Lingle unusual pain. As we have already observed, however, there is no requirement that the victim subjectively experience pain. ( Davenport I, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 263-271.)

Defendant contends that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury concerning the definition of torture. Specifically, he argues that the instruction, which states that awareness of pain is not an element of torture, is erroneous. He further argues that the instruction fails to sufficiently narrow the concept of torture murder, so as to meaningfully distinguish torture murder from non-death-eligible murders. We thoroughly discussed and rejected defendant's similar claims in Davenport I, and he states no compelling reason to revisit these conclusions. ( Davenport I, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 263-271.)
(27) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in rejecting certain proffered instructions in violation of his right to a lingering doubt instruction and his rights to due process, equal protection, a fair trial, and a reliable and nonarbitrary penalty determination under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. These claims are meritless. Defendant first contends the trial court erred in rejecting his proffered lingering doubt instruction that explicitly informed the jurors that they could consider lingering doubt as to `whether John Davenport was the person who murdered the decedent,' in reaching a verdict. [7] We have held, however, that defendant has no federal or state constitutional right to have the penalty phase jury instructed to consider any residual doubt about defendant's guilt. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1187 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1].) In any event, defendant abandoned this theory. During discussion of the jury instructions, the trial judge said, Can I inquire, are you going to argue from the defense standpoint that there's a lingering doubt about his guilt of the murder or just the special circumstance of torture? Defense counsel replied: No, I  My withdrawal of those portions of the instructions regarding the perpetrator means that I'm not going to argue who the perpetrator was.... At this point ... we're basically going to tell the jury that we accept the first jury's verdict on who did it. The court said, So you're not going to argue that the murder wasn't intentional, either, then? No. So it's just the element of torture which is going to be the subject of the lingering doubt argument. Defense counsel said, Correct. Defendant also asserts that the trial court erroneously rejected a modification of CALJIC No. 2.01, which linked the cautionary instruction concerning circumstantial evidence to Davenport's lingering doubt defense, by stating: `John Davenport has argued that he was not the perpetrator of the crime and that the crime was not committed while engaged in torture....' [8] The trial court refused to give the instruction on the ground that the proposed instruction suggested that the jury should redecide whether or not the crime involved torture, not merely consider as a mitigating factor whether they had a lingering doubt. The trial court acted within its discretion in so concluding.
Defendant contends that the trial court's reading of a modified version of CALJIC No. 2.90 was erroneous because it failed to inform the jury of the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's burden of proof. The instruction was proper. [9] As we have recently explained, A court has no duty under statutory or constitutional law to instruct sua sponte on the presumption of innocence and the prosecutorial burden at the penalty phase. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 1190-1191.) It makes no difference that defendant in this case requested such instructions and was refused. When, as here, the jury is effectively instructed that evidence of unadjudicated offenses is subject to the reasonable doubt standard, no more is required. ( Id. at p. 1191; People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 809-810 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330].)
In instructing the jury concerning factors to be considered in determining a penalty, the trial court rejected defendant's proffered modification of CALJIC No. 8.85, and instead used its own modification. The trial court utilized a standard version of CALJIC No. 8.85, with the last sentence deleted, and the following language inserted immediately after the section 190.3, factor (k) language: You are further instructed that you may consider only those potential factors I have just read to you from the law which you find to be present and applicable in this particular case. The absence of any potential mitigating factor from the list may not be treated by you as an aggravating factor. Defendant contends that this language was constitutionally deficient in several respects warranting reversal. None of these claims have merit. Defendant first contends that CALJIC No. 8.85 erroneously encouraged the double counting of aggravating factors, because it encouraged the jury to consider [defendant's] prior assault on a woman, both as criminal activity under factor (b), and as a prior felony conviction under factor (c). According to defendant, the trial court erred in failing to clarify the distinct applications of the two factors, and the double counting artificially inflated the statutory factors favoring a death penalty. As a result, the jury instructions failed adequately to guide and narrow the jury's discretion to impose the death sentence, precluded a reliable penalty determination in violation of the Eighth Amendment, and thereby prejudiced [defendant's] chances for a life verdict. We have repeatedly rejected this claim. ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 230.) Defendant next asserts that the trial court's failure to specify which factors are aggravating and which are mitigating violated the Eighth Amendment proscription against arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. In particular, he argues that this failure rendered meaningless and incomprehensible the trial court's warning that the absence of any potential mitigating factor from the list may not be treated by you as an aggravating factor, and provided the jury with no specific guidance as to how to evaluate the factors. In a related argument, defendant asserts that the trial court erred in rejecting defendant's proffered version of CALJIC No. 8.85, which identified specific mitigating factors that the defense contended were applicable. (28) We have repeatedly held that trial courts are not required to identify particular sentencing factors as aggravating or mitigating and that the 1978 death penalty law is constitutional despite the absence of such a requirement. ( People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1196; People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 973 [4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571].) Indeed, the high court recently upheld section 190.3, stating, A capital sentencer need not be instructed how to weigh any particular fact in the capital sentencing decision. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) ___ U.S. ___, ___ [129 L.Ed.2d 750, 764, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 2638].) (29) Defendant next challenges the trial court's statement, You are further instructed that you may consider only those potential factors I have just read to you from the law which you find to be present and applicable in this particular case. The absence of any potential mitigating factor from the list may not be treated by you as an aggravating factor. This statement followed the court's reading of instructions given in the language of section 190.3, factors (a) through (k). Defendant contends that the statement, You are further instructed that you may consider only those potential factors I have just read to you from the law which you find to be present and applicable in this particular case, negated the trial court's instruction given in the language of section 190.3, factor (k). [10] Defendant contends that this statement may well have left the jurors with the impression that the preceding list of specific factors (a) through (j) was an exclusive list of the factors they were permitted to consider. While we discourage such a modification of CALJIC No. 8.85, we conclude that because the factor (k) language preceded the objected-to sentence, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed this instruction to mean that factor (k) was not included in the list of the potentially applicable factors. ( People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 663, fn. 8; People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525-526, fn. 7 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, is there any reasonable likelihood that the court's statement, The absence of any potential mitigating factor from the list may not be treated by you as an aggravating factor, would be understood to mean that the jurors were only permitted to consider factors (a) through (j), and not factor (k) evidence. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in failing to delete inapplicable mitigating factors. This argument has been repeatedly rejected by this court. ( People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 207-208; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 169 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561].) Contrary to defendant's assertion, such failure did not reasonably leave jurors with the impression that the absence of evidence of mitigation could properly be considered in aggravation. Indeed, as noted above, the jurors were expressly instructed that they could not consider the absence of mitigating evidence as a factor in aggravation. We presume that the jury followed the court's instructions. ( People v. Delgado, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 331; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 689, fn. 17.) Nor did the failure deprive defendant of his right to a fair trial and reliable penalty determination under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (30) Defendant further asserts that the inclusion in the list of potential mitigating factors of the adjective extreme in the instruction given in the language of section 190.3, factor (d), acted as a barrier to mitigation and rendered the factor vague in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However, an instruction in the language of section 190.3, factor (d), which allows the jury to consider whether the crime was committed while defendant suffered extreme mental or emotional disturbance, does not unconstitutionally preclude the jury from considering mental or emotional disturbances that are not extreme. Rather, the catchall provisions in section 190.3, factor (k), referring to `Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime,' allow[] consideration of nonextreme mental or emotional conditions. ( People v. Clark, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 163; People v. Morales (1989) 48 Cal.3d 527, 567-568 [257 Cal. Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244].)
(31) Defendant contends that the trial court improperly instructed the jury in its concluding instruction because it did not adequately apprise the jury that unless they found that the factors in aggravation outweighed the factors in mitigation, they could not impose a sentence of death. Not so. The trial court instructed the jury: To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating circumstances are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warrants death instead of life without parole. This is sufficient. ( People v. Wader (1993) 5 Cal.4th 610, 662-663 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 788, 854 P.2d 80].) Defendant also argues that the trial court failed to inform the jury that if it found the factors in mitigation outweighed the factors in aggravation, it was required to impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Not so. The instruction clearly stated that the death penalty could be imposed only if the jury found that the aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating. There was no need to additionally advise the jury of the converse (i.e., that if mitigating circumstances outweighed aggravating, then life [imprisonment] without [the possibility of] parole was the appropriate penalty). ( People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 978 [281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131].) Thus, contrary to defendant's assertion, he was not arbitrarily deprived of a state created liberty interest in violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, or his right to a reliable penalty determination under the Eighth Amendment. Finally, defendant asserts that the `so substantial' standard for comparing aggravating and mitigating factors was both impermissibly vague and conducive to arbitrary and capricious decision making in violation of the Eighth Amendment. It was not. (See Tuilaepa v. California, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [129 L.Ed.2d at p. 764, 114 S.Ct. at pp. 2638-2639]; People v. Wader, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 662.)
Defendant contends that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to draw no adverse inference from his failure to testify. This claim is meritless. As a preliminary matter, defendant did testify. To the extent he asserts that the trial court had a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury to draw no adverse inference from his failure to testify more fully, we reject this claim. Defendant concedes that we have held a trial court has no such sua sponte duty, but argues that the circumstances of this case compel a different result; he cites no persuasive reason to support his assertion that the circumstances of this case require a departure from the general rule. ( People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 758 [244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741].)
(32) Defendant contends that the trial court erred both in failing to require written findings by the jury concerning aggravation, and in rejecting his proposed verdict forms, and that these errors deprived him of his right to due process, and his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment right to meaningful appellate review. He further contends the failure to require written findings rendered his death sentence arbitrary and unreliable. As defendant acknowledges, we have repeatedly held that written findings disclosing the reasons for the jury's penalty determination are not required. ( People v. Fauber (1992) 2 Cal.4th 792, 859 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 24, 831 P.2d 249]; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 209 [failure to require written findings by jury does not deprive defendant of his due process and Eighth Amendment rights to meaningful appellate review].) Nor does the lack of such a requirement render defendant's death sentence arbitrary or unreliable. Defendant asserts no persuasive reason to revisit these conclusions. Nor did the trial court err in rejecting defendant's proposed verdict forms. [11] During discussion, defense counsel conceded that not all of the forms were necessary, and appeared to agree to the language that appeared in the forms given the jury. [12] In any event, the trial court properly rejected the other forms as unnecessary and potentially confusing.
Defendant contends the trial court committed various errors in ruling on defendant's section 190.4, subdivision (e), automatic motion for sentence modification. None of these claims have merit.
(33a) Defendant contends that the trial court misunderstood its duty to independently review the evidence. Not so. (34) Under section 190.4, subdivision (e), the court must independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and then determine whether, in the court's independent judgment, the weight of the evidence supports the jury verdict. It must set forth its reasons with sufficient particularity to allow effective appellate review. ( People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 846.) The record reveals the trial court understood and fully executed its responsibilities. ( Ibid. ) (33b) In denying the motion, the court considered such mitigating factors as defendant's value to his family, remorse for the Tewes assault, and artistic ability, but found such evidence was clearly outweighe[d] by the horrible manner in which Lingle was killed and by defendant's other violent crimes. Defendant contends, however, that the trial court erred in giving weight to the guilt and penalty phase jury verdicts. The trial judge stated, And if I had any doubt about the defendant's guilt, about the crime I would say so. But I don't. And certainly the two juries have not either. They have found beyond a reasonable doubt that he did commit the crime and that the special circumstance of torture is true. Nothing in this passing statement indicates that the trial judge abdicat[ed] his duty to weigh the evidence independently, or that he relied on any jury finding. Rather, his awareness of this duty is replete throughout the record of the hearing. (See People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 467 [20 Cal. Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992].) Nor do we agree with defendant that the trial court's misstatement that both the guilt and penalty juries had found that defendant had committed the crime beyond a reasonable doubt indicates that the trial judge relied on jury findings which did not even exist. No such reliance is apparent. Defendant also contends that the trial court improperly considered a proposed commitment, or evidence not presented to the jury, in ruling on the motion to modify. Several days prior to the hearing on the motion to modify, the court and counsel discussed the wording of a commitment proposed by the prosecution. After this discussion, the trial court inquired of defense counsel, Anything in the proposed commitment that you see as inaccurate except for the matters obviously that haven't been heard yet. Because to a certain extent it anticipates the result of this hearing. Defense counsel ultimately said, No, your honor. The court then said, All right. We will just defer that for the time being then, ... and see what actually occurs on the date of the hearing. At the hearing on the automatic motion to modify, the court made no reference to the proposed commitment in stating its reasons for denying the motion. Accordingly, the record reveals no basis for concluding the court improperly relied on matters not presented to the jury in ruling on the motion.
Defendant contends that the motion for modification should have been granted because evidence adduced at the penalty phase retrial was insufficient to sustain the special circumstance of torture-murder. As we have already discussed, no such finding was made at the penalty phase.
Defendant contends that the trial court should have granted defendant's automatic motion for modification on the ground that the judgment of death was disproportionate to his crime. In particular, defendant contends that there was no evidence of torture, and that the trial court was required to consider defendant's youth. As discussed earlier, the validity of the torture-murder special circumstance was not an issue at the penalty retrial. Moreover, defendant was not particularly youthful; he was 25 years old at the time of the offense, and had been incarcerated for over 4 years for a remarkably similar crime. In any event, defendant's age at the time he committed his crimes does not automatically render his death sentence disproportionate; rather, defendant's repeated commission of such violent acts by the time he was 25 equally indicates that he was a seasoned criminal, not a naive youth. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's automatic motion for modification on this ground. Defendant requests that we conduct our own proportionality review of his sentence. We interpret this as a claim that defendant's punishment is disproportionate to his individual culpability. ( People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 536 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779].) Defendant murdered a young woman by both brutally impaling a long, nail-embedded stake into her rectum, through various organs, and up to her armpit, and by severing her carotid artery. In the process of killing her he beat her, bit her breasts, and inflicted numerous stab wounds to her neck and hands. His criminal history is equally vicious. He smiled as he attacked Susan Tewes while she slept in her home, stabbing her 23 times in the eye, breast, lung, stomach, arm, hand, and throat, severing her jugular vein and leaving her near death. In less than a year after his release for that offense he murdered Gayle Lingle in the manner described above. After his arrest, defendant forcibly sodomized a fellow inmate and forced the inmate to orally copulate him. Given the extraordinarily heinous nature of defendant's crimes, the death sentence is certainly not so disproportionate that it shocks the conscience [or] offends fundamental notions of human dignity. ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 786 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297].)
Defendant contends that he was denied effective assistance of counsel on numerous occasions by both trial counsel. None of these claims have merit. (35) Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel. [Citations.] The ultimate purpose of this right is to protect the defendant's fundamental right to a trial that is both fair in its conduct and reliable in its result. [Citations.] [¶] Construed in light of its purpose, the right entitles the defendant not to some bare assistance but rather to effective assistance. ( People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839], italics in original.) A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must first establish that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052].) He must then establish prejudice: It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.... [¶].... [¶].... [¶].... The defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. ( Id. at pp. 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-698]; People v. Clair, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 653, fn. 2; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 215-218.) In analyzing the contentions, we must keep in mind the strong presumption that counsel's actions fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. We also evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time of the acts or omissions complained of. ( People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 513.)
Defendant summarily contends that trial counsel's failure to file a motion to quash the jury venire, independent of the Ramos and Cinco cases, was ineffective assistance of counsel. However, we have no evidence in the record on which to determine whether such a motion, if made, would have been successful. (Cf. People v. Mattson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 826, 842-844 [268 Cal. Rptr. 802, 789 P.2d 983].) Hence, even assuming counsel's failure fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different.
(36) Defendant contends that trial counsel were ineffective because they failed to object to 1) the admission of 43 photographs of the victim's body, the victim's clothing, including her peach colored blouse and torn underwear, and the presence of defendant's motorcycle in the courtroom throughout the trial; 2) the vast majority of highly leading and improper questions which the prosecutor posed to prospective jurors and witnesses, or much of the prosecutor's misconduct in his opening statement and closing argument; and 3) portions of the jury instructions. As discussed above, there was no error in admitting the photographs or clothing, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct, and the jury instructions were proper. Accordingly, defendant fails to establish that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 688 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 693]; People v. Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 215-218.) Defendant further contends that even when counsel did object, they did so in a hang-dog fashion, which guaranteed that the objection would be overruled, and would actually have a negative impact on the jury. Defendant cites as an example the following statement by defense counsel: I apologize to [the prosecutor], but just to preserve what we earlier discussed, obviously I object to the use of the existence or nonexistence of a mitigating factor and the way in which Mr. Robinson is arguing it to the jury. I know the court is going to overrule it but I think I need to preserve that. This objection was made in the course of closing argument. Presumably, counsel apologized to the prosecutor because he was interrupting his closing argument. Moreover, counsel's acknowledgment that the court had previously ruled adversely on similar objections effectively preserved the objection for his client while not antagonizing the court. Counsel's remarks appear courteous, not despondent as defendant suggests. In the alternative, counsel may have tactically wanted the jury to get the impression that he thought the judge was always, and hence by implication unfairly, ruling against him. Nothing inherent in either approach would automatically have a negative impact on the jury, or fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
(37) Defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective because he deferred his opening statement until the beginning of defendant's case. Not so. The decision whether to reserve opening statement is a matter of trial tactics and strategy that a reviewing court generally may not second-guess. (See People v. Mitcham (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1027, 1059 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 230, 824 P.2d 1277].) Reasonably competent counsel could have decided to wait to hear the prosecution's case before addressing the jury. ( Ibid. ) Defendant further contends that defense counsel made the spontaneous and unauthorized concession that John Davenport had killed Gayle Lingle. Counsel stated, As far as the crime itself, it is not my intention to present evidence on that. We accept that verdict. He was found guilty of having killed Gayle Lingle and we accept the verdict. Contrary to defendant's assertion, there was no unauthorized concession of guilt. Counsel simply stated that defendant accepted the verdict of the guilt phase jury. In any event, Recognizing the importance of maintaining credibility before the jury, we have repeatedly rejected claims that counsel was ineffective in conceding various degrees of guilt. ( People v. Freeman, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 498, and cases cited therein.) Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective because his opening statement did not mention Dr. Kornblum, or refer to particular evidence in mitigation of defendant's crime. Counsel stated that he was going to start with evidence ... that the stake was inserted after Gayle Lingle was already dead. But basically, for the most part, you are going to hear a very simple case. You are going to hear who this person is now. Reasonably competent counsel could have decided that focusing the jury's attention on the two central defense themes  lingering doubt as to the torture-murder special circumstance and the value of defendant's life  would best be accomplished by not delivering a recitation of the names and anticipated testimony of each witness. Such a decision is a matter of trial tactics and strategy that a reviewing court generally may not second-guess. ( People v. Mitcham, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1059.)
(38) Defendant contends that trial counsel was ineffective during closing argument because he stated that he was nervous and observed that his voice was quivering. Reasonably competent counsel could have decided to impress upon the jury the gravity of their duty in determining the appropriate penalty by demonstrating to them his own emotional concern, and that the depth and breadth of such concerns were such that it left him nervous and with a quivering voice. Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective when he stated, If all that was required to impose the death penalty was that John Davenport committed a murder with torture, you wouldn't be here. The penalty would be automatic. Such a statement effectively reminded the jury that they had a choice in penalty, that selection of the appropriate penalty was a difficult and meaningful task, and that they should carefully consider and weigh the evidence. It does not demonstrate representation below an objective standard of reasonableness, or as defendant contends, effectively undermin[e] any lingering doubt, or obscur[e] the nature of the task with which the jury was faced. Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective when he stated: If this is a crime of passion, how do you ever prevent a future crime by imposing a death penalty here? Take it one step further. [The prosecutor] suggested to you this morning that John Davenport didn't learn anything from the first offense. Well, if going to prison for the five years didn't prevent Gayle Lingle's death, what benefit will we get today if we impose death on John Davenport? Defendant contends this argument suggested strongly that the only way to prevent defendant from killing again would be to execute him. However inartfully worded, it appears that defense counsel was attempting to argue that the death penalty would have had no deterrent value in this case. Even assuming this statement fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, however, defendant has failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional error, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective when, after noting that [t]he Legislature obviously believed there were some murder tortures that are clearly not death penalty cases, he said, How do you decide where this one fits? You've only seen one case. The one that's here. And this case probably scares you. And you wonder about the facts because [the prosecutor] was incredibly eloquent, understated, he laid them out very well, but you've only seen one case. And yet we're going to tell you that the appropriate result in this case is LWOP, life without possibility of parole. Well, you say to yourselves, that sounds absurd because I heard the facts of this case. Well, then think about this. We all know about the Hillside Strangler. We all read about it in the newspapers, Kenneth Bianchi and Angelo Buono. The jury in the Buono case came back after 13 homicides with life without possibility of parole in an hour. On the compendium as they saw Angelo Buono, they thought death was not the appropriate verdict. And if that doesn't tell you that your task doesn't end at the crime, there's nothing I can say to you. You still have an obligation to go through the process of deciding whether death is appropriate. Contrary to defendant's assertion, defense counsel's reference to the prosecutor's eloquence did not wrongfully suggest[] an acquiescence in the prosecutor's view of the law and of the case. Rather, defense counsel clearly indicated he thought life imprisonment without the possibility of parole was the appropriate penalty, and that despite the prosecutor's eloquence the jurors should recognize that juries in what defense counsel implied were more egregious cases had sentenced the defendants to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Contrary to defendant's further assertion, such an approach does not on the face of the transcript appear to be floundering, or fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective in limiting his argument regarding lingering doubt to the torture-murder special circumstance, and for stating that defendant accepted the verdict regarding guilt. We reject this claim for the reasons we rejected defendant's similar claim regarding defense counsel's opening statement. We further reject defendant's contention that defense counsel was ineffective because he failed to logically and forcefully muster the evidence showing that there was no torture because Lingle was dead when the stake was inserted. Defense counsel referred to evidence that the stake had no blood on it as indicating Lingle was deceased when the stake entered her body. He further characterized the prosecutor as backpedaling during closing argument in light of this evidence, referring to the prosecutor's argument that the jury could consider any lingering doubt of torture based on not only the stake, but the stabbing and beating as well. Nothing in defense counsel's argument falls below an objective standard of reasonableness. Defendant next summarily contends that certain comments by defense counsel clearly discount[ed] the awesome seriousness of the proceedings. We have reviewed the challenged comments and conclude they fall far short demonstrating incompetence. Defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective when he stated: I'm not going to ask you for sympathy or pity or any of those things because I agree with [the prosecutor]. Give him what he's earned. Give him what he's earned. And what I think he's earned is life without the possibility of parole. Okay. Let's talk about that right off the bat, okay? Give him what he's earned, life without the possibility of parole. One thing he has earned is to be severely punished. He has to be punished. We all have families, we all have  are interested in society being protected. I'm the same way. I'm interested in that. I've got a family. I don't want my family killed. I don't want my family hurt. People who do what John did have to be punished. Do they have to get the death penalty? No, they don't. But they have to be severely punished. And life without possibility of parole is a very, very severe punishment. Contrary to defendant's assertion, counsel did not explicitly align[] himself with the prosecution, breach[] his fiduciary duty to his client, or argu[e] against defendant's interests. Reasonably competent counsel could have concluded that an effective approach would be to acknowledge any punitive desire or fear on the part of the jury, and argue that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole satisfied both of those concerns. Nor, contrary to defendant's assertion, did counsel trivialize this argument by describing the limitations of prison life. No incompetence is demonstrated. Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective when he noted defendant had expressed remorse for the Tewes stabbing, and stated: Those are the only actual words from John Davenport we have heard in this trial about his remorse. But I'll suggest to you something about his life that just cries out `I'm sorry.' The way he lives his life, okay? ... [The prosecutor] talked to you about why somebody can't say they did this  and he used the word  because maybe it's just such an atrocious crime that you just can't bring yourself to admit it. I don't know why he cannot say he did this. But [the prosecutor] may very well be right. I mean that makes sense to me. If you look at it in terms of the rest of John's life ... he's got to feel so badly about this. This crime is probably so atrocious to this person that he cannot admit it and still feel that he has anything left of ... what's important to him. And what is important to him? His family. He's probably terrified that he would lose his family. Defendant does not elaborate on why he contends this statement demonstrates ineffective assistance of counsel. In fact, reasonably competent counsel could have decided in light of the prosecutor's argument that the crime was not mitigated by direct evidence of remorse, that the jury might be persuaded to infer such remorse from the defendant's close relationship with and strong emotional support of his family. Finally, defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective when he stated at the end of his closing argument: All I'm saying is don't worry about sympathy for him, don't worry about pity for him, give him what he's earned. I tell you, if you think he's earned the death penalty and in your heart of hearts you think he's earned it, vote for it. But think long and hard about the value that he can be, the value that he has demonstrated he can have to his family and hopefully to a lot more people. And I ask you to, based on that value, to vote for life without the possibility of parole. Like I say, long time I have been working to save his life, and now I'm asking you people to take over that task. Contrary to defendant's assertion, this statement, when read in context, does not resemble an impassioned plea for death. Rather, the opposite is true. Counsel's argument did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Defendant summarily contends that defense counsel was ineffective at the automatic motion for modification because he made no motion for a new trial and offered no written submission in support of the motion for modification, notwithstanding the strong evidence that the torture special circumstance conviction was obtained by false evidence. Defendant does not explain how he was prejudiced by either omission, or what evidence he is relying on for the contention that the special circumstance was supported by false evidence. Hence, even assuming counsel's failure fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, defendant fails to demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Defendant next contends that defense counsel was ineffective when he stated: The jury has found that he committed this terrible crime. He has admitted that he did the other things. So we know he has committed three terrible crimes in his life. But he has tried hard. He has tried especially hard in these last eight years to make up for those things. Contrary to defendant's assertion, this statement did not undercut the effectiveness of defendant's written statement, which counsel read to the court, improperly concede guilt of all three crimes on defendant's behalf, or fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Finally, defendant contends that defense counsel was ineffective because the trial court stated: Your argument of course at the time of trial was somewhat unusual in the sense that it did not pinpoint or focus on a number of mitigating factors as would ordinarily be the case. I think it falls under factor (k) ... meaning factor (k) of the Penal Code, 190.3. The trial judge then delineated his recollection of the mitigating evidence presented at trial, as well as certain mitigating evidence counsel raised during his argument on the motion for modification that had not been before the jury, and inquired of counsel, Is there anything that you feel that I have overlooked in the way of mitigating evidence or anything  any of the factors under Penal Code section 190.3 or anything else under factor (k) evidence which you feel I have not referred to? Contrary to defendant's assertion, these statements indicate diligence on the part of the trial court, not that the court found defense counsel's argument at the motion for modification peculiar, or inadequate. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that counsel's presentation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.