Opinion ID: 2599742
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The CMAA's Conflicting Provisions

Text: The content of marital agreements is controlled by section 14-2-304 of the CMAA, which lists those subjects to which parties may validly contract in a marital agreement. For example, the CMAA specifically provides that parties may contract to [t]he determination, modification, or elimination of spousal maintenance. § 14-2-304(1)(d), C.R.S. (2006). The CMAA does not, however, specifically mention attorney's fees. § 14-2-304; Ikeler, 148 P.3d at 354 (Davidson, C.J., specially concurring). The only statutory basis for parties to contractually waive an award of attorney's fees is therefore the catch-all provision, which allows parties to contract to [a]ny other matter, including the personal rights or obligations of either party, not in violation of public policy or any statute imposing a criminal penalty. § 14-2-304(1)(i), C.R.S. (2006) (emphasis added). Under this subsection, if a waiver of attorney's fees violates public policy it cannot be enforced by the court because it is not a valid contract term. When we turn to subsection 14-2-307(2), upon which the court of appeals relied, we find that the CMAA states that an otherwise enforceable marital agreement is nevertheless unenforceable insofar, but only insofar, as the provisions of such agreement . . . relate to the determination, modification, or elimination of spousal maintenance and such provisions are unconscionable at the time of enforcement of such provisions. § 14-2-307(2) (emphasis added). This subsection therefore purports to limit unconscionability review to maintenance provisions, seemingly to the exclusion of a waiver of attorney's fees. The conflict between this and subsection 14-2-304(1)(i), however, is apparent. Unconscionable contract provisions, particularly in the context of marital agreements, are unconscionable precisely because they violate public policy. See Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728, 734-36 (Colo.1982) (holding that maintenance provisions in a premarital agreement are reviewable for unconscionability at the time of the dissolution based on public policy principles); Richard A. Lord, 8 Williston on Contracts § 18:7 (4th ed. 1998) ([W]here there is a strong public policy against a particular practice, a contract or clause inimical to that policy will likely be declared unconscionable and unenforceable unless the policy is clearly outweighed by some legitimate interest in favor of the individual benefited by the provision.). We therefore find a conflict in the CMAA between subsection 14-2-307(2), which on its face only allows unconscionability review of marital agreement provisions that relate to maintenance, and subsection 14-2-304(1)(i), which prohibits the parties from contracting to terms that violate public policy. To ascertain the General Assembly's intent with regard to attorney's fees, therefore, we must look beyond the CMAA's language. [6] We consider such factors as legislative history, prior law, the consequences of a particular construction, and the goal of the statutory scheme in attempting to ascertain legislative intent. Luther, 58 P.3d at 1015; § 2-4-203, C.R.S. (2006). Our task is to choose a construction that gives effect to the legislature's intent and that serves the purpose of the overall statutory scheme. In re Marriage of Cargill and Rollins, 843 P.2d 1335, 1338 (Colo.1993); In re Marriage of Rose, 134 P.3d 559, 562 (Colo.App.2006).