Opinion ID: 795898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Village

Text: 49 Unlike the First Amendment count discussed above, we do not believe that Swint precludes us from examining the district court's judgment denying the Village summary judgment on the Equal Protection count. On the plaintiffs' theory of the case, the only way the Village can be liable is due to the conduct of the Board, the final policymaker in the area of police supervision and discipline. The Board, however, cannot be held liable on an Equal Protection theory as the complaint stands. Therefore, it is not possible for the Village to be held liable on the Equal Protection claim either. On remand, the district court would, as a matter of logic, be required to dismiss it. 50 We see no reason not to take that step ourselves. As we have previously said, pendent appellate jurisdiction is appropriate where [t]here is sufficient overlap between the qualified immunity issue and the issue raised by the remaining [defendants] ... because no additional inquiry or analysis is necessary. Munafo, 285 F.3d at 215; see Rein, 162 F.3d at 758. There is no reason not to examine a matter pendent to our proper jurisdiction when the jurisdictionally proper elements of our decision have necessarily decided the pendent matter. Thus, where a court grants summary judgment to the individual defendants based on their qualified immunity on the grounds that the defendants did not violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, and that ruling necessarily forecloses a finding of municipal liability, a court may exercise its pendent appellate jurisdiction and reverse the denial of the municipality's summary judgment motion, as well. See Clubside v. Valentin, 463 F.3d 199, 218 (2d Cir.2006); McCullough, 187 F.3d at 282. This is such a case: our decision that plaintiffs' claim against the Board cannot proceed necessarily disposes of the claim against the Village. [N]o additional inquiry or analysis is necessary to resolve this issue. McCullough, 187 F.3d at 282. Our jurisdiction is therefore proper, and we dismiss the Equal Protection claim against the Village.