Opinion ID: 2280223
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Probate Court's Jurisdiction to Impose a Constructive Trust

Text: Mrs. Staples argues that the Probate Court has equity jurisdiction of all controversies involving trusts created by written instrument. In Mrs. Staples' view, her complaint invoked the Probate Court's jurisdiction because in it she challenged a written trust and, in Count II, sought the purely equitable remedy of a constructive trust against the defendants. In contrast, the defendants characterize Mrs. Staples' complaint as seeking the legal remedy of a declaratory judgment. Citing this Court's opinion in Cyr v. Cote, Me., 396 A.2d 1013 (1979), the defendants further contend that because a probate court has no power to create a will that was omitted by fraud, it also lacks power to create a constructive trust in place of an express trust. Finally, the defendants contend that because Mrs. Staples' claims raised factual issues that could be resolved by a jury, and because jury trial is not provided in probate court, that court had no power to adjudicate the case. We find the defendants' arguments unpersuasive. Under 4 M.R.S.A. § 252 (1979), the Probate Court is granted jurisdiction in equity, concurrent with the Superior Court, of all cases and matters relating to the administration of the estates of deceased persons, to wills and to trusts which are created by will or other written instrument. Hence, the relevant inquiries in determining whether the Probate Court has subject-matter jurisdiction of an action are, first, whether the case relates to an estate, will, or a trust; and second, whether the relief sought is equitable rather than legal. It is immaterial whether the action may present factual as well as legal questions, for the probate judge is fully competent to serve as a finder of facts. See 4 M.R.S.A. § 304 (1979); 18-A M.R.S.A. § 1-302 (1981). Unquestionably Mrs. Staples' action related to a trust created by written instrument. Therefore, the only question is whether the Probate Court, sitting as a court of equity, had the power to grant the relief that Mrs. Staples requested. Mrs. Staples' complaint was not framed as a petition for declaratory judgment, as is permitted under 14 M.R.S.A. § 5956 (1980). Even had the complaint been so framed, it could have been addressed to the Probate Court's equity jurisdiction. See In re Estate of Cassidy, Me., 313 A.2d 435, 437 (1973). Furthermore, Mrs. Staples petitioned the Probate Court for an equitable order voiding her husband's trusts and imposing a constructive trust on the defendants who had received the trust property. Nothing on the face of the complaint suggests that Mrs. Staples' claims were legal rather than equitable. We are aware that certain language in our opinion in Cyr v. Cote, Me., 396 A.2d 1013, 1017 (1979), may be understood to imply that in cases where a will or trust is held invalid, the Probate Court has the power only to strike the offending portions of the instrument and cannot impose a constructive trust on parties who have already received property under the stricken provisions. That discussion was limited to the traditional powers of the Probate Court, and did not purport to describe the Probate Court's powers under the specific grant of equity jurisdiction contained in 4 M.R.S.A. § 252. Although the traditional Probate Court may have lacked jurisdiction to grant equitable relief in a proceeding challenging a will or trust, the modern Probate Court, endowed with equity jurisdiction in all matters relating to the administration of decedents' estates, has no such limitation on its adjudicatory powers. Accordingly, the probate judge erred in concluding that the court lacked jurisdiction to impose a constructive trust upon the defendants. The entry is: Appeal sustained. Judgment of dismissal entered by Probate Court vacated; case remanded to the Probate Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. All concurring.