Opinion ID: 793983
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Custom of Overly Suggestive Show-ups

Text: 135 Plaintiff also alleges that the City had a custom of using overly suggestive show-ups and that the City failed to train its officers in proper identification techniques. The district court dismissed this claim, finding that Plaintiff had failed to make a showing of other complaints about the City's use of show-ups. In so holding, the district court overlooked both facts in this case and a significant prong of this Court's jurisprudence. First, Plaintiff need not present evidence of a pattern of complaints consistent with his own if he presents evidence of a written policy unconstitutional on its face. Monell, 436 U.S. at 692-94, 98 S.Ct. 2018. The facts of this case show that the City's written line-up waiver form is direct evidence of a custom or practice, obviating the need for circumstantial evidence a court might otherwise seek. See id. Second, Plaintiff need not present evidence of other complaints if he can show that the City failed to train its officers in proper identification techniques, and that such failure to train had the obvious consequences of leading to constitutional violations of the sort experienced by Plaintiff. See Cherrington, 344 F.3d at 646. 136 One-on-one show-ups are inherently suggestive. Cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967; see also Webb v. Havener, 549 F.2d 1081, 1086-87 (6th Cir. 1977); Haynes v. Bell, No. 96-6443, 1998 WL 246386 at , 1998 U.S.App. LEXIS 9377, at -10 (6th Cir. May 6, 1998) (unpublished opinion). Yet the primary evil to be avoided with identification procedures is any substantial likelihood that an irreparable misidentification will take place. See Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375. Therefore the Supreme Court has refused to find show-ups per se unconstitutional. Rather, the Supreme Court has directed us to look to the totality of the circumstances to understand whether an identification made during a one-on-one show up is otherwise reliable. Id. The Supreme Court has directed us to look to 1) the opportunity of the witness to observe the perpetrator during the crime, 2) the witness' degree of attention, 3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the perpetrator, 4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification, and 5) the length of time between the crime and the confrontation. Id. We note that the Supreme Court's directions to the courts can also be stated in the inverse: show-ups are never per se constitutional. 137 The Supreme Court's teaching makes it clear that a failure to consider the totality of the circumstances, and the indiscriminate use of one-on-one show-ups, would have the obvious consequences of constitutional violations. The practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967. This condemnation exists because show-ups exacerbate weaknesses already existing in eye-witness identification. See Marshall v. Rose, 499 F.2d 1163, 1165 (6th Cir.1974) ([T]he danger inherent in eyewitness identification has long been a subject of grave concern.) By presenting only a single suspect to a witness, police convey an implicit message that this is the guy. See Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 442-43, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969). In Foster, the Supreme Court vacated the petitioner's conviction after finding that an identification which resulted only after the petitioner had been presented to a witness through a line-up, a subsequent one-on-one show-up, and then another line-up, was so suggestive that it made it all but inevitable that [the witness] would identify petitioner whether or not he was in fact `the man.' Id. 138 Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever found a show-up identification made after a witness failed to pick a suspect out of a line-up or photo array to be otherwise reliable and admissible into evidence. In fact, the jurisprudence from this Circuit and the Supreme Court teaches just the opposite. In Foster, the witness failed to make an identification at an initial line-up, despite a certain level of suggestiveness even in the line-up. 394 U.S. at 443, 89 S.Ct. 1127. It was only after the witness saw the suspect again at a one-on-one show-up, at which the witness made a tentative identification, and finally at another line-up, did the witness make a firm identification. Id. The Supreme Court found the process so suggestive as to deny the suspect due process of law. Id. Likewise, this Circuit has found that a witness' repeated exposure to a suspect prior to identification so taints the identification that a substantial likelihood of misidentification exists. See Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 897 (6th Cir.1986); see also United States v. McFarland, 746 F.2d 1480, 1480 (6th Cir.1984) (holding that the use of a coconspirator's photo identification violated due process when the witness and suspect had been arraigned together on a prior date and circumstances did not otherwise indicate that the identification was reliable). 139 Similarly, this Court has never found that an identification arising from a suggestive format was anything but unreliable when the witness' prior description of the suspect was significantly inconsistent with the suspect's actual appearance. See id.; see also Webb, 549 F.2d at 1086 (finding identification unreliable when prior description noted assailant had long sideburns, and identified suspect sported a mustache, but no sideburns, during the timeframe in question); Marshall, 499 F.2d at 1167 (finding that witness' description of suspect did not match actual physical appearance in a crucial respect). 140 A custom or practice of using one-on-one show-ups indiscriminately is akin to conducting a search or seizure without an assessment of probable cause. While circumstances do exist which may justify the use of a show-up, just like circumstances do exist which justify a search without a warrant, a practice of going through with a show-up without consideration of the circumstances has the highly predictable consequences of resulting in constitutional violations. See Brown, 520 U.S. at 409, 117 S.Ct. 1382. Eyewitness identifications are recurring situations in criminal investigations. Officers conducting a show-up must consider the circumstances and make a reasoned determination of whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the show-up would be so suggestive that there exists a substantial likelihood that an irreparable misidentification will take place. See Neil, 409 U.S. at 199-200, 93 S.Ct. 375. This Court has in the past held that a municipal practice of bypassing consideration of the circumstances in which the exercise of a city power is constitutional or not can lead to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 municipal liability. See Sell, 47 Fed.Appx. at 695 (If Columbus failed to instruct or train the officers responsible for emergency evictions about their constitutional responsibility to provide a hearing in all but `extraordinary situations' . . . that shortcoming is one that is so likely to lead [to] a violation of the constitutional right to due process as to be deliberate indifference to citizens' constitutional rights, and give rise to municipal liability under § 1983.) Not all eyewitness identification opportunities — or even the vast majority — will pass the totality of the circumstances test such that a show-up would not lead to a due process violation. 12 A municipality with a custom or practice of conducting show-ups without consideration of the circumstances therefore opens itself up to § 1983 liability. 141 The remaining question for this Court is whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, is such that a reasonable jury could conclude that the City had a custom or practice of using show-ups without consideration of the circumstances, and that pursuant to this custom, Tarter employed a show-up with Plaintiff without consideration of Plaintiff's due process rights. Plaintiff puts forth evidence that the City had a custom of using show-ups in lieu of line-ups in non-exigent circumstances. Plaintiff's evidence includes affidavits from two police practice experts who opined that there existed systematic deficiencies in police officer training; that supervising LDP officers found it perfectly acceptable to conduct non-exigent show-ups days after a crime if an officer could get a suspect to sign a waiver; and that it was established practice to ask suspects in for a line-up, fail to take affirmative actions to constitute a line-up, and request consent to a show-up. (J.A. at 2330, 2332, 2334, 2208, 2236-38, 2241-42, 2247-50, 2275.) Plaintiff presents further evidence that using such show-ups was expressly approved through the existence of pre-printed waiver forms. 13 Such forms are evidence of established practice. See Sell, 47 Fed.Appx. at 692. Given this evidence, we cannot say that a reasonable jury could not conclude that the City had a custom or practice of conducting show-ups without consideration of the constitutional implications of such show-ups, and thus that the City was deliberately indifferent to the due process rights of its citizens. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's grant of summary judgment to the City. 142