Opinion ID: 4523191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶11] Hansen first argues that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions on the two counts of unlawful sexual contact (Class B). Hansen was also ordered to pay $70 to the Victims’ Compensation Fund. 5 M.R.S. § 3360-I 1 (2018). 5 [¶12] “When a defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State to determine whether the fact-finder could rationally find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Ouellette, 2019 ME 75, ¶ 11, 208 A.3d 399 (quotation marks omitted). The jury is free to draw all reasonable inferences from the evidence presented, and “we will vacate a judgment only where no trier of fact rationally could find proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). [¶13] The crime of unlawful sexual contact (Class B), 17-A M.R.S. § 255-A(1)(E-1), occurs when a person “intentionally subjects another person to any sexual contact and . . . [t]he other person, not the actor’s spouse, is in fact less than 12 years of age and the actor is at least 3 years older.” “Sexual contact” is defined as “any touching of the genitals or anus, directly or through clothing, other than as would constitute a sexual act, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire or for the purpose of causing bodily injury or offensive physical contact.” 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(D) (2018). [¶14] On this record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the evidence was sufficient for the jury rationally to find that the State proved each element of the charged offenses of unlawful sexual contact 6 (Class B) beyond a reasonable doubt. The parties stipulated at trial that the victim was not Hansen’s spouse. See United States v. Tkhilaishvili, 926 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2019) (observing that when a defendant “affirmatively agree[s] to not put the government to its proof of an element of a crime,” he “relinquishe[s] all other defenses, factual and legal, pertaining to the stipulated element” (quotation marks omitted)); State v. Brann, 292 A.2d 173, 185 (Me. 1972). The victim testified that she was seven years old at the time of trial, and the victim’s mother testified that the last time the victim had been alone at Hansen’s house was in the summer of 2017, at which time the victim was six years old. There is no dispute that Hansen, who was born in December 1977, is at least three years older than the victim. The victim’s testimony that she felt something “hard and soft” touch her while she was alone with Hansen in his bedroom and blindfolded with her pants down was sufficient for a jury to rationally find that Hansen subjected the victim to sexual contact. 17-A M.R.S. § 251(1)(D). Finally, based on the victim’s testimony, the jury could have reasonably inferred that when Hansen sexually touched the victim, he did so “for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire or for the purpose of causing . . . offensive physical contact.” Id.; see also State v. Pozzuoli, 1997 ME 91, ¶ 7, 693 A.2d 745 (holding that a jury may consider, in determining whether a defendant committed 7 offensive physical contact, “what a reasonable person might perceive to be offensive as well as the victim’s subjective interpretation of the contact”). [¶15] We conclude that there is sufficient evidence in the record for the jury to have rationally found every element of the offense of unlawful sexual contact (Class B) beyond a reasonable doubt.