Opinion ID: 1625752
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Ownership Rights in Willard & Rafert.

Text: Prior to trial, the parties agreed that the declaratory judgment on the ownership rights in Willard & Rafert was not to be submitted to the jury but should be resolved by the court, after the jury's verdict, without further evidence. That is what was done. Cook and Webster's cross-appeal asserts that the district court erred in ruling that Pundzak was entitled to a continuing twenty-five percent share of all of the rights in Willard & Rafert, especially in view of the jury's finding that Pundzak had no partnership right in Willard & Rafert. The parties disagree about the scope of review, but the declaratory judgment action was tried at law, and our review is therefore on error. If there is substantial evidence to support the court's findings, we will affirm. Trademarks are signs or symbols used to identify goods (referred to as trademarks) or services (referred to as service marks). Under our law, trademark rights do not have to be registered in order to be recognized. Iowa has recognized common-law rights in trademarks for many years. See Shaver v. Shaver, 54 Iowa 208, 209, 6 N.W. 188 (1880). In the present case, Cook and Webster claim both the common-law right and the registration rights under Iowa Code chapter 548 in Willard & Rafert. They claim that common-law rights are involved with regard to the trademark Willard & Rafert as used on goods such as record albums, T-shirts, and promotional materials. They also claim the common-law service mark of Willard & Rafert for entertainment and advertising services. The ownership of a mark is in the legal entity who is in fact using the mark as a symbol of origin. 1 J. McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 16:13, at 747 (2d ed. 1984). Cook and Webster claim that they not only conceived Willard & Rafert, but they are the users of the mark for ownership purposes because they performed as Willard & Rafert. While users might also include clients for whom the commercials are performed, such use is permissive only, they claim. Further, any use by Pundzak on behalf of Cook and Webster would be only that as used in connection with his performance under the agency agreement. Pundzak was authorized by the parties' agreement to seek work for Cook and Webster, but this did not give him an ownership right through an independent use of the mark. There was no evidence that Pundzak created the persona of Willard & Rafert, although he provided suggestions on ways to capitalize on it. The nature of the relative ownership rights in Willard & Rafert, we believe, is well summarized in the agreement itself, which provided in part that Cook and Webster are individuals who have developed media characters known as `Willard & Rafert.' There was evidence that Cook and Webster were given ideas for commercials and ran with them. There was no evidence that Pundzak was the user of the Willard & Rafert format as required for ownership, only that as specifically authorized under the parties' agency agreement. All of the intellectual property, which embodied the Willard & Rafert concept, was fixed in a tangible medium, sound tapes. As such, they became subject to the copyright laws. 17 U.S.C. § 101. All of the subject matter is copyrightable. 17 U.S.C. § 102. Under § 102, the initial ownership of a copyright in works protected under the federal act is in the author of the work. 17 U.S.C. § 201. The evidence is clear in this case that the authors of the work were Cook and Webster, not Pundzak. We conclude there was no substantial evidence to support the district court's conclusion that Pundzak should be a twenty-five percent owner of the Willard & Rafert rights, and we therefore reverse on the declaratory judgment.