Opinion ID: 1189835
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Diversity Rationale

Text: The real crux of plaintiffs' argument is that defendants refused to explore alternatives or conduct a validity study because they had already decided that they did not like the inevitable promotional results if the process continued to its expected conclusion, [8] and that their diversity rationale is prohibited as reverse discrimination under Title VII. In Hayden v. County of Nassau, 180 F.3d 42 (2d Cir.1999), the Second Circuit held that race-conscious configuration of an entry-level police department exam did not violate Title VII or the Equal Protection Clause. In that case, the Nassau County Police Department was operating under several consent decrees prohibiting it from engaging in discrimination in its selection of police officers, and particularly from utilizing examinations with disparate impact on minority applicants. Following development of a test by the county and Department of Justice advisors, a validity analysis was conducted to determine which configuration of the test was sufficiently job-related yet minimized the adverse impact on minority applicants. Of the twenty-five sections administered to the applicants, the [technical report] recommended that Nassau County use nine sections as the ... test. Id. at 47. A class of White and Latino officers challenged use of the adjusted test under Title VII and the Fourteenth Amendment, inter alia, contending that the deliberate design of the test to reduce adverse impact on African-American candidates necessarily discriminated against them on the basis of race. The Court of Appeals rejected the plaintiffs' contentions, finding plaintiffs were mistaken in treating racial motive as a synonym for a constitutional violation and observing that [e]very antidiscrimination statute aimed at racial discrimination, and every enforcement measure taken under such a statute, reflect a concern with race. That does not make such enactments or actions unlawful or automatically suspect.... Id. at 48-49 (quoting Raso v. Lago, 135 F.3d 11, 16 (1st Cir.)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Hayden court further held that the construction of the Nassau County test for the purpose of minimizing adverse impact on minorities was not intentional reverse discrimination against whites because the same nine test sections were used for all applicants, so it was simply not analogous to a quota system or a minority set-aside where candidates, on the basis of their race, are not treated uniformly. Id. at 50. Rejecting plaintiffs' argument that the design of the test reflected impermissible discriminatory intent, the Second Circuit wrote that nothing in our jurisprudence precludes the use of race-neutral means to improve racial and gender representation.... [T]he intent to remedy the disparate impact of the prior exams is not equivalent to an intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants. Id. at 51. In Kirkland v. New York State Department of Correctional Services, 711 F.2d 1117 (2d Cir.1983), the Court of Appeals, affirmed the district court's approval of a settlement that determined promotional order, based partly on exam results and partly on race-normed adjustments to the exam, after minority employees made a prima facie showing that the test had an adverse impact on minorities. The Court of Appeals noted that voluntary compliance is a preferred means of achieving Title VII's goal of eliminating employment discrimination, id. at 1128, and that requiring a full hearing on the test's job-validity before approving a settlement would seriously undermine Title VII's preference for voluntary compliance and is not warranted, id. at 1130. Thus, a showing of a prima facie case of employment discrimination through a statistical demonstration of disproportionate racial impact constitutes a sufficiently serious claim of discrimination to serve as a predicate for a voluntary compromise containing race-conscious remedies. Id. at 1130. The Second Circuit expanded Kirkland in Bushey v. New York State Civil Service Commission, 733 F.2d 220 (2d Cir.1984). There, the civil service commission had administered a promotional examination that had a significant adverse impact, with non-minority applicants passing at almost twice the rate of minority applicants. The defendants race-normed the scores for each group, increasing the pass rate of the minority group to the equivalent of the non-minority group, and effectively making an additional 8 minority individuals eligible for promotion, without taking any non-minorities off the list. The Court of Appeals held that the initial results, particularly the score distributions of minority and nonminority candidates, were sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of adverse impact, id. at 225, and, consistent with Kirkland, a showing of a prima facie case of employment discrimination through a statistical demonstration of disproportional racial impact constitutes a sufficiently serious claim of discrimination to serve as a predicate for employer-initiated, voluntary race-conscious remedies, id. at 228. In other words, a prima facie case is one way that a race-conscious remedy is justified, but it is not required: all that is required is a sufficiently serious claim of discrimination to warrant such a remedy. Id. at 228; see also id. at 226 n. 7. In this case, the parties agree that the adverse impact ratios for African-American and Hispanic test-takers on both the Lieutenant and Captain exams were too low to pass muster under the EEOC's four-fifths rule. As Kirkland and Bushey held, a statistical showing of discrimination, and particularly a pass rate below the four-fifths rule, is sufficient to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, and therefore sufficient to justify voluntary race-conscious remedies. [9] Here, defendants' remedy is race conscious at most because their actions reflected their intent not to implement a promotional process based on testing results that had an adverse impact on African-Americans and Hispanics. The remedy chosen here was decidedly less race conscious than the remedies in Kirkland and Bushey, because New Haven did not race-norm the scores, they simply decided to start over, to develop some new assessment mechanism with less disparate impact. Thus, while the evidence shows that race was taken into account in the decision not to certify the test results, the result was race-neutral: all the test results were discarded, no one was promoted, and firefighters of every race will have to participate in another selection process to be considered for promotion. Indeed, there is a total absence of any evidence of discriminatory animus towards plaintiffs  under the reasoning of Hayden, 180 F.3d at 51, nothing in our jurisprudence precludes the use of race-neutral means to improve racial and gender representation.... [T]he intent to remedy the disparate impact of the prior exams is not equivalent to an intent to discriminate against non-minority applicants. [10] Plaintiffs contend that Hayden is distinguishable by the fact that the remedy approved there was pursuant to previous consent decrees; they do not explain why they view this distinction as significant. As Bushey held, it would contravene the remedial purpose of Title VII if an employer were required to await a lawsuit before voluntarily implementing measures with less discriminatory impact. Bushey, 733 F.2d at 227 (rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the remedial measures in Kirkland were only permissible as part of a settlement in that case, because that would create an anomalous situation. It would require an employer ... to issue a presumptively discriminatory eligibility list, wait to be sued by minority candidates, and only then seek a settlement.... Such an approach would serve no purpose other than to impede the process of voluntary compliance with Title VII and cause the proliferation of litigation in all such cases....). Plaintiffs also attempt to distinguish Hayden on the grounds that the challengers to that test, which was constructed from the nine most job-related sections with the least disparate impact, were not injured or disadvantaged, whereas the instant plaintiffs have been both injured, as they were deprived of promotions, and disadvantaged as they will now be forced to compete once again. Pl. Mem. of Law at 58. Plaintiffs take this language from Hayden out of context. In holding that the Hayden plaintiffs did not prove disparate impact on nonminority applicants, the Court of Appeals held that because appellants continued to score higher than black, candidates, on average, the exam did not impair or disadvantage these appellants in favor of African-American applicants. Thus, appellants are unable to set forth a claim that they endured any disparate impact as a result of the design and administration of the ... examination. Hayden, 180 F.3d at 52. Here, plaintiffs, allege disparate treatment, not disparate impact. Nor do they have a viable claim of disparate impact because the decision to disregard the test results affected all applicants equally, regardless of race  all applicants will have to participate in a new test or selection procedure. [11] Furthermore, plaintiffs were not deprived of promotions. As the parties agree, under New Haven's civil service rules, no applicant is entitled to promotion unless and until the CSB certifies the results. Even then, application of the Rule of Three would give top scorers an opportunity for promotion, depending on the number of vacancies, but no guarantee of promotion; it is even conceivable that the applicant with the highest score never would be promoted. See United States v. City of Chicago, 869 F.2d 1033, 1038 (7th Cir. 1989) (where state law permitted promotion from among five highest-ranked individuals on eligibility list, challenger had no property right to promotion: a roster ranking may create an expectation of promotion, but an officer has no entitlement to a particular roster position or to promotion.); Bridgeport Firebird Society v. City of Bridgeport, 686 F.Supp. 53, 58 (At best, the provisions of the City Charter [mandating a Rule of One for promotions] provide the firefighters ranked on the ... eligibility list only with a mere expectation of promotion, which does not rise to the level of a legally protected interest, especially in the face of `presumptively discriminatory employment practices.') (quoting Kirkland, 711 F.2d at 1126). Thus, while the facts of Hayden were slightly different than those here, the Court finds the holding quite relevant and instructive. Defendants' motivation to avoid making promotions based on a test with a racially disparate impact, even in a political context, [12] does not, as a matter of law, constitute discriminatory intent, and therefore such evidence is insufficient for plaintiffs to prevail on their Title VII claim. Accordingly, the Court will grant defendants' motion and deny plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on this claim.