Opinion ID: 675243
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the plaintiffs' standing

Text: 7  '[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.'  Sims v. Florida Dep't of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 862 F.2d 1449, 1458 (11th Cir.) (en banc) (alteration in original) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 815, 110 S.Ct. 64, 107 L.Ed.2d 31 (1989). To establish standing, a plaintiff must have suffered an injury-in-fact that would be corrected by [a] favorable decision in the lawsuit. Cheffer v. McGregor, 6 F.3d 705, 708 (11th Cir.1993). Absent a redressable injury, a judicial determination of a plaintiff's claim would amount to an advisory opinion prohibited by Article III's case and controversy requirement. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464, 471-72, 102 S.Ct. 752, 757-58, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). As the Supreme Court has explained: 8 [A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant, and that the injury fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. 9 Id. at 472, 102 S.Ct. at 758 (citations omitted). 10 In addition to these constitutional requirements, the federal courts have also imposed three prudential limitations on their exercise of jurisdiction. These self-imposed restraints include: 11 [ (1) ] the principle that federal courts should avoid deciding generalized grievances that present abstract questions of wide public significance, [ (2) ] the requirement that the plaintiff's complaint be within the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional guarantee at issue, and [ (3) ] the requirement that a plaintiff ... assert his own legal rights and interests, not the rights of third parties. 12 Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1203 n. 43 (11th Cir.) (internal quotations and citations omitted), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 942, 111 S.Ct. 2238, 114 L.Ed.2d 479 (1991). 13 [S]tanding in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal.... Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). Nonetheless, standing requirements are not mere pleading requirements but rather [are] an indispensable part of the plaintiff's case. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 2136, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). Therefore, each element of standing must be supported with the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation. Id. For example, when lack of standing is raised in a motion to dismiss, the issue is properly resolved by reference to the allegations of the complaint. Id. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2137. When standing is challenged in a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff must 'set forth' by affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts'  demonstrating standing, which are taken as true for summary judgment purposes. Id. (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). Ultimately, to prevail, the standing facts (if controverted) must be supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial. Id. (internal quotation omitted). As a preliminary matter, then, we must determine the degree of evidence by which the plaintiffs must have established their standing at this point in the litigation. 14 The precise issue this case presents is not the degree of evidence by which plaintiffs ordinarily must establish standing in order to obtain a preliminary injunction but, instead, how much evidence a plaintiff must present to obtain a preliminary injunction when the defendant raises no standing issue. In the district court, the City did not question plaintiff's standing. Because standing is jurisdictional, the City's failure to raise the issue does not bar our consideration of it here. See FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 607, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) ([S]tanding 'is perhaps the most important of [the jurisdictional] doctrines.'  (second alteration in original) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984)); Glickstein v. Sun Bank/Miami, N.A., 922 F.2d 666, 672 n. 12 (11th Cir.1991) (holding that jurisdictional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal). However, as a matter of fairness, the City's failure to question the plaintiffs' standing in the district court does affect the standard to which we will hold plaintiffs at this stage of the proceedings. It is not unfair to require every plaintiff to file a complaint which contains sufficient allegations of standing and to prove standing at trial. It might well be unfair, however, to impose a standing burden beyond the sufficiency of the allegations of the pleadings on a plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction, unless the defendant puts the plaintiff on notice that standing is contested. That is especially true in cases, such as this one, where the plaintiffs had only a few hours of hearing time to present their preliminary injunction case and were thereby forced to limit their evidence to what they reasonably understood to be the contested issues. In these particular circumstances, and for present purposes only, we think that the plaintiffs' standing should be judged on the sufficiency of the allegations of the complaint, with any preliminary hearing evidence favorable to the plaintiffs on standing treated as additional allegations of the complaint. Cf. Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1206 n. 50 (11th Cir.) (If, when it addresses the standing issue, the court ... considers facts not disclosed in the complaint, the court, in effect, treats the complaint as having been amended to conform to the evidence. (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 942, 111 S.Ct. 2238, 114 L.Ed.2d 479 (1991). 1 A. THE PLAINTIFFS' STANDING TO SEEK TO ENJOIN THE CITY 15 FROM ARRESTING, HARASSING, OR REMOVING THE PLAINTIFFS 16 The first two parts of the preliminary injunction bar the City from harassing or removing the plaintiffs from the City because of their homeless status. The City contends that the plaintiffs lack standing to seek such injunctive relief because they have not alleged or proven a sufficient likelihood that they will suffer in the future from the actions sought to be enjoined. The City maintains that, under City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983), to have standing the plaintiffs must allege, and ultimately prove, either that the police unlawfully arrest and detain every homeless person with whom they come into contact, or that the City has ordered or authorized its officers to do so. According to the City, the plaintiffs fail the Lyons test because they have neither alleged nor established a real and immediate threat that any homeless person (much less all) would be illegally arrested in the future. 17 Because injunctions regulate future conduct, a party has standing to seek injunctive relief only if the party alleges, and ultimately proves, a real and immediate--as opposed to a merely conjectural or hypothetical--threat of future injury. Id. at 102, 103 S.Ct. at 1665. Logically, a prospective remedy will provide no relief for an injury that is, and likely will remain, entirely in the past. American Postal Workers Union v. Frank, 968 F.2d 1373, 1376 (1st Cir.1992). Although past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 676, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), [p]ast exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present case or controversy regarding injunctive relief ... if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 102, 103 S.Ct. at 1665 (alterations in original) (quoting O'Shea, 414 U.S. at 496, 94 S.Ct. at 676). 18 In Lyons, police officers had stopped Lyons for a traffic violation. Id. at 97, 103 S.Ct. at 1663. Although he offered no resistance or provocation, the officers applied a chokehold that rendered him unconscious and seriously injured him. Id. at 99, 103 S.Ct. at 1664. Lyons sued for damages and an injunction to bar future police use of chokeholds absent an immediate threat of deadly force. Id. at 98, 103 S.Ct. at 1663. The district court granted a preliminary injunction, the court of appeals affirmed, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 99-100, 103 S.Ct. at 1664. The Supreme Court reasoned that Lyons' standing rested on the mere speculation that the police might stop him again and that, if stopped, the arresting officers might apply an unconstitutional chokehold. The Court concluded: 19 In order to establish an actual controversy in this case, Lyons would have had not only to allege that he would have another encounter with the police but also to make the incredible assertion either (1) that all police officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation, or for questioning, or (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act in such a manner. 20 Id. at 105-06, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. According to the Court, there was no real and immediate threat that either of the causes of Lyons' past injury--his illegal conduct that led the police to stop his vehicle and the ensuing police conduct--would recur in the future. Lyons' standing to seek damages for his past injuries, while not questioned by the Court, simply did not establish that he faced a realistic threat from the future application of the City's policy. Id. at 106 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 1668 n. 7. 21 The situation in this case differs materially from that in Lyons, because the plaintiffs here are far more likely to have future encounters with the police than was Lyons. It is true that the federal courts are generally ... unwilling to assume that the party seeking relief will repeat the type of misconduct that would once again place him or her at risk of that injury. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 320, 108 S.Ct. 592, 602, 98 L.Ed.2d 686 (1988) (collecting cases). Thus, in Lyons, the Supreme Court refused to assume that the plaintiff would again violate the traffic laws, prompting the police to stop him. However, the Supreme Court has held that such reluctance is not warranted when, for reasons beyond the plaintiff's control, he or she is unable to avoid repeating the conduct that led to the original injury at the hands of the defendant. Id., 108 S.Ct. at 602. 22 In Honig, public school officials unilaterally removed an emotionally disturbed adolescent from the classroom for misconduct, and they did so without observing the procedural requirements of the Education of the Handicapped Act (the EHA), 20 U.S.C. Secs. 1400 et seq. On the facts before it, the Supreme Court concluded that it was reasonable to assume that the adolescent would return to the classroom. Given his prior history of behavior problems, the Court found it certainly reasonable to believe that he would again engage in classroom misconduct. Id. The Court also found it equally probable that school officials would again attempt to remove the adolescent from the classroom without complying with the EHA. Id. at 321, 108 S.Ct. at 603. Accordingly, the Court held that the adolescent could seek to enjoin school officials from unilaterally removing students in violation of the EHA. 2 Id. at 323, 108 S.Ct. at 604. 23 Similarly, in Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1456-57 & nn. 6-7 (11th Cir.1984), citing Lyons, we held that a mentally ill plaintiff had standing to seek an injunction against Alabama's practice of detaining individuals in county jails pending civil commitment hearings. Even though the plaintiff was no longer incarcerated when he was added as a named plaintiff, we reasoned that his mental problems were likely to recur and that [t]here [was] every indication that [he] could continue to be the subject of [future] involuntary commitment petitions. Id. at 1456. We observed that the plaintiff was at risk of being detained in jail not because of volitional acts on his part but because his mental condition would prompt his family, as it [had] done on two previous occasions, to petition for involuntary commitment. Id. at 1457 n. 7. 24 This case, at least on the face of the complaint, is closer to Honig and Lynch than to Lyons. The plaintiffs allege that they are homeless because: (1) they are mentally disabled from employment ...; (2) they are physically disabled from employment; (3) they are seeking but are currently unable to find employment; or (4) they are employed, but at such a low rate of pay that they are unable to secure shelter. The plaintiffs further allege that [f]orces beyond [their] control, such as illness, unemployment, penury, and [lack of public shelters] ... have compelled [them] to live and sleep in public. The tenor of the plaintiffs' complaint, as well as of their evidentiary presentation at the preliminary injunction hearing, is that they are homeless involuntarily. Because of the allegedly involuntary nature of their condition, the plaintiffs cannot avoid future exposure to the challenged course of conduct in which the City allegedly engages. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497, 94 S.Ct. 669, 677, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). 25 The likelihood that City officials will continue to respond to the plaintiffs' conduct in ways similar to those described in the plaintiffs' complaint is also greater here than in Lyons. The Lyons Court concluded that, even if the police stopped Lyons again, there was no reason to believe that they would illegally choke him into unconsciousness without any provocation. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105, 103 S.Ct. at 1667. Lyons alleged that municipal policy authoriz[ed] the use of chokeholds in situations where [the officers] are threatened by far less than deadly force. Id. at 106 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 1667 n. 7 (internal quotation omitted). However, that allegation was insufficient to confer standing on Lyons, because it did not necessarily follow that the City either orders or authorizes application of the chokeholds when there is no resistance or other provocation--which is what had happened to Lyons. Id. Instead, the evidence showed that police officers were instructed to use chokeholds only when lesser degrees of force do not suffice and then only to gain control of a suspect who is violently resisting the officer or trying to escape. Id. at 110, 103 S.Ct. at 1669 (internal quotation omitted). Because Lyons had not resisted police--and there was no indication he would do so if stopped again in the future--he had no basis to challenge a policy that only authorized use of chokeholds against suspects who resist arrest. Id. at 111, 103 S.Ct. at 1670 (Absent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar way, Lyons is no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional.). 26 In this case, the plaintiffs allege that municipal policy authorizes the constitutional deprivations that they claim to have suffered at the hands of City officials. They allege a City custom, practice and policy of arresting, harassing and otherwise interfering with homeless people for engaging in the ordinary and essential activities of daily life in the public places where Plaintiffs are forced to live. Plaintiffs and the class have been and continue to be arrested and charged. They further allege that the City does not and will not arrest non-homeless people who engage in precisely these activities for which the Plaintiffs have been in the past arrested and reasonably expect in the future to be arrested, namely sleeping, eating, bathing, standing on the sidewalks, [and] associating with family and friends. According to the plaintiffs, these actions by the City violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable seizures, the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, and the Equal Protection Clause. The plaintiffs also allege a City custom, practice, and policy of seizing and destroying the personal property of the Plaintiffs including identification, clothing, medication, food and bedding materials before, during and after ... encounters with the Plaintiffs. According to the plaintiffs, these seizures violate the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. Finally, the plaintiffs allege that the City has adopted a well organized and coordinated campaign to drive the poor, mentally disabled and homeless out of the City. In furtherance of that plan, it is alleged that in early June 1993 the City evicted the homeless (including at least one of the named plaintiffs) from under the bridges and overpasses in the City, and that the City has made efforts to remove the homeless from different locations targeted by the City. The plaintiffs have alleged that it is the custom, practice, and policy of the City to commit the constitutional deprivations of which they complain. 27 This case is therefore distinguishable from Lyons, where the alleged policy did not necessarily authorize the constitutional deprivation Lyons suffered. If true, the plaintiffs' allegations in this case would establish a substantial likelihood that, absent an injunction, the City will continue to act in a similar manner toward them in the future. Therefore, the plaintiffs have standing to seek the injunctive relief contained in the first two parts of the preliminary injunction, which enjoin the City from arresting, harassing, or removing the plaintiffs because of their homeless status. Whether the plaintiffs have established a right to that injunctive relief on the merits is a matter we discuss in part II.B, below at pages 1342-46. 28 B. THE PLAINTIFFS' STANDING TO SEEK INJUNCTIVE RELIEF AGAINST THE CITY'S ENFORCEMENT OF ITS BUILDING CODE AND ZONING ORDINANCE 29 The district court found that the City had discriminated against homeless shelters in its enforcement of its building code and zoning ordinance in order to discourage the establishment and continued operation of homeless shelters in residential areas of the City. On appeal, the City argues that the named plaintiffs have not satisfied Article III's redressability requirement: 30 Any injunctive relief pertaining to homeless shelters would be of no benefit to the named plaintiffs, however, because they do not desire to live in Huntsville's homeless shelters. As a result, they have no standing to pursue any claim with respect to the effect on homeless shelters of City enforcement actions. 31 Although the City's assertion that none of the named plaintiffs desire to live in shelters is not accurate, we agree with the City that the named plaintiffs lack standing to enjoin enforcement of the building code and zoning ordinance. We have held that: 32 Individual standing requirements must be met by anyone attempting to represent his own interest or those of a class. If the named plaintiff seeking to represent a class fails to establish the requisite case or controversy, he may not seek relief on his behalf or on that of the class. 33 Lynch v. Baxley, 744 F.2d 1452, 1456 (11th Cir.1984) (citing O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494, 94 S.Ct. 669, 675, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974)). Thus, unless the plaintiffs have alleged that one of the named plaintiffs is in real and immediate danger of being personally injured by the City's enforcement of its building code and zoning ordinance, the plaintiff class lacks standing to challenge the alleged City practice,  'even if the persons described in the class definition would have standing themselves to sue.'  Griffin v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 1476, 1483 (11th Cir.1987) (quoting Brown v. Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 771 (5th Cir. Unit A July 1981)), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 1729, 100 L.Ed.2d 193 (1988). 34 The complaint does not allege that any named plaintiff has lost shelter in the past as a result of the City's enforcement of its building code or zoning ordinance. Nor is there any allegation in the complaint that any of the four named plaintiffs currently resides at a shelter that is threatened with an enforcement action; instead, the complaint alleges that the four named plaintiffs have no home or shelter. For the reasons discussed above on page 1336, we now look to the record of the preliminary injunction hearing to determine whether any facts established there rectify this omission from the complaint. 35 The evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing does nothing to bolster the named plaintiffs' standing. Only two of the named plaintiffs, Frank Chisom and Michael Dooly, testified at the preliminary injunction hearing. Chisom testified that he had been staying in the Alpine Street address that was closed, and that he was there, right before they closed it. The Alpine Street address was a private home on Alpine Street that homeless advocates had converted into a temporary shelter. Because it was in a neighborhood zoned for one and two family residences only, the Alpine facility was closed after City authorities cited it for noncompliance with the City zoning ordinance. When asked why he had agreed to be a named plaintiff in this lawsuit, Chisom replied, I know our rights was violated. See, I was doing a lot better at that house. Chisom's testimony, although not unambiguous, suggests that his stay at the Alpine Street facility was ended by the City's enforcement action, and thus, that the enforcement of the zoning ordinance against the Alpine Street facility injured him. 36 However, at the time of the hearing, Chisom was a resident at a temporary shelter established by the Downtown Rescue Mission (the Rescue Mission). 3 The Rescue Mission has never been the subject of a building code enforcement action, and there is no allegation or evidence that any such action is imminent. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the Rescue Mission has been or is currently in violation of the City's zoning ordinance or any part of the building code. Therefore, there is no reasonable likelihood that Chisom will lose his current shelter due to the City's future enforcement of its building code or zoning ordinance. Honig, 484 U.S. at 318, 108 S.Ct. at 601. Chisom lacks standing to seek the relief provided by the third part of the preliminary injunction, because he has not credibly allege[d] that he face[s] a realistic threat from the future application of the City's policy. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 1668 n. 7. 37 Even if we were to characterize Chisom's alleged injury, not as loss of shelter per se, but instead as his loss of shelter at the Alpine Street residence, he would still lack standing. There is no allegation (or evidence) that the cessation of the City's enforcement activities is reasonably likely to lead to the reopening of the Alpine facility. Moreover, the plaintiffs have alleged that there are approximately 700 homeless persons in the City, and the record evidence indicates that the Alpine facility housed, at most, 32 persons. Given these facts, and the fact that Chisom did have other shelter at the time of the hearing, it requires too much speculation and conjecture to conclude that enjoining the City from enforcing its building code and zoning ordinance against homeless shelters will remedy Chisom's alleged injury. Thus, Chisom fails to satisfy the Article III redressability requirement. 38 Named plaintiff Dooly testified that he also had stayed at the Alpine Street facility on occasion[ ]. However, there is nothing in his testimony, just as there is nothing in the complaint, to indicate that Dooly lost his shelter because the City enforced the zoning ordinance against the facility. Therefore, he has not adequately alleged that he has been injured by the actions he seeks to enjoin. Dooly testified that at the time of the hearing, he was residing under a bridge. He expressed no desire to be housed in a shelter. To the contrary, he testified that he choose[s] not to stay at one of the presently available shelters because he had more rights in jail than [he] did there. There is no reasonable likelihood that Dooly will lose his current shelter due to the City's enforcement of its building code or zoning ordinance. Like Chisom, Dooly has not credibly allege[d] that he face[s] a realistic threat from the future application of the City's policy. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106 n. 7, 103 S.Ct. at 1668 n. 7. 39 The plaintiffs allege that members of the City Council have voiced an intention to rezone parts of the City in order to close existing homeless shelters. However, the plaintiffs do not allege that any such change is imminent. Nor does the record of the preliminary injunction hearing provide any evidence that we might construe as such an allegation. Additionally, the plaintiffs do not allege that any zoning change would necessarily affect the Rescue Mission, the only shelter at which any of the named plaintiffs have been shown (or alleged) to reside. Taking all the allegations and record evidence together, there is nothing to indicate that any named plaintiff faces a real and immediate danger of losing his current shelter because of the City's enforcement of its building code or zoning ordinance. The named plaintiffs are therefore without standing to seek an injunction against such enforcement. That portion of the preliminary injunction that enjoins the City's use of its building code or zoning ordinances to close facilities used or intended to be used as shelters for the homeless is therefore due to be vacated for lack of standing. 40