Opinion ID: 2369159
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Existence of Substantial and Compelling Reasons for Dispositional Departure from Guidelines

Text: The dispositional departure from a guidelines prison sentence to probation would not have been possible had Judge Dowd not first granted the departure from Jessica's Law. Because we decide, as discussed below, that the new sentencing judge on remand may re-evaluate the evidence and decide anew whether to depart from Jessica's Law and dispositionally, we proceed to analysis of this issue because of the possibility it may arise again. Before Judge Dowd, in view of its agreement to stand silent at sentencing, the State did not raise the argument that any mitigators supporting the dispositional departure were not substantial and compelling. Because Spencer does not object, we nevertheless reach the merits. Our analysis is again limited to the four mitigators mentioned initially by Judge Dowd; again, he did not differentiate between the mitigators that supported the departure from Jessica's Law and those that supported the dispositional departure. The State's first argument is that nonstatutory mitigators should be reviewed with stricter scrutiny than statutory mitigators. The defense points out correctly that we no longer give analytical weight to such a distinction. See State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 735, 747, 175 P.3d 832 (2008). It does not appear, however, that Martin eradicated the customary corollary that nonstatutory factors must be consistent with the intent and purposes of the sentencing guidelines. See State v. Tiffany, 267 Kan. 495, 506, 986 P.2d 1064 (1999). Age of defendant. On this issue, the State argues that only immaturity can be considered by a sentencing court, not maturity. It cites the Court of Appeals decisions in State v. Haney, 34 Kan.App.2d 232, 241-42, 116 P.3d 747, rev. denied 280 Kan. 987 (2005), and State v. Ussery, 34 Kan.App.2d 250, 258-59, 116 P.3d 735, rev. denied 280 Kan. 991 (2005). Both of these opinions, nearly word-for-word identical, involved adult male codefendants who perpetrated sex crimes against an intoxicated 13-year-old girl in Lawrence. The defense argued that the age of these young adult codefendants should have exerted downward pressure on sentence length, because a juvenile male codefendant was punished less severely, despite his role as an instigator. This argument left the panel cold. See, e.g., Ussery, 34 Kan.App.2d at 257-58, 116 P.3d 735. Yet neither case stands for the proposition that advanced age can never be considered as a mitigating factor; indeed, they imply that any age can be a factor when it is demonstrated to have affected a defendant's judgment. The defense brief has no response on this issue other than to state Spencer's age. As on the departure from Jessica's Law, the State's argument on this factor is far more persuasive. There is no evidence in the record that Spencer's age of 76 had any negative effect on his judgment, which is the logical point of any age mitigator. No reasonable person would have relied upon Spencer's age without such evidence to support the dispositional departure. Lack of criminal record. The State cites our opinion in Murphy, 270 Kan. at 807, 19 P.3d 80, for the proposition that a lack of criminal history, by itself, is not sufficient to justify a departure from a guideline sentence but can be considered in the overall picture. This seems to be an argument attuned to an abuse of discretion standard of review. The State also cites the Court of Appeals opinion in State v. Richardson, 20 Kan.App.2d 932, Syl. ¶ 2, 901 P.2d 1 (1995), for the idea that a defendant's criminal history is (implicitly) never a proper departure factor, because the sentencing guidelines have already taken criminal history into account in setting presumptive sentence ranges. This is a legal argument appropriate for our de novo review. The defense response to these arguments is virtually nonexistent. We agree with the State that no reasonable person would have used Spencer's lack of a criminal record to support a dispositional departure from a guidelines sentence to probation. As noted above, the only evidence in the record is that his molestation of one of the victims was a longstanding practice; the fact that his crimes had never previously come to light is not a point in his favor. In this case, we need not go the extra step to rule on whether the absence of criminal history is ever a proper mitigator to reduce a guidelines sentence. Support of Family and Friends. The parties' arguments on this factor for the dispositional departure do not differ meaningfully from their arguments on this factor for the departure from Jessica's Law. Our response is therefore identical. Under an abuse of discretion standard, there is at least limited room to approve Judge Dowd's reliance on this factor as a substantial and compelling reason for the dispositional departure. However, the full record's exposure of the family divide over Spencer's conduct amply supports the opposite outcome. Degree of Harm. The State expands beyond its previous Jessica's Law departure argument on this factor, and it brings our substantial competent evidence standard of review into play. The State asserts that this mitigator, despite its listing in K.S.A. 21-4716(c)(1)(E), was an improper basis for Judge Dowd's dispositional departure in this case, because there was no proof of how much harm would be typical for the type of offense and no showing of how the facts in the case made the harm less significant. Again, the defense does not make a particularized counterargument. In our opinion in Minor, 268 Kan. 292, 997 P.2d 648, Justice Edward Larson noted that nothing in the record showed that the degree of harm or loss attributed to the current crime was significantly less than what would be typical: We have no statements or evidence as to what is `typical for such an offense' and no showing as to how the facts in this case make the `degree of harm or loss. . . significantly less.' To the extent this factor was relied upon by the trial court, it is specifically disapproved. Minor, 268 Kan. at 312, 997 P.2d 648. The Court of Appeals relied on Minor in the Haney and Ussery cases. See Haney, 34 Kan.App.2d at 243, 116 P.3d 747; Ussery, 34 Kan.App.2d at 260-61, 116 P.3d 735. In the record on appeal before us, the only proof that the degree of harm caused by Spencer's offense could have been less than might ordinarily be expected is the victim impact statement from his granddaughter, speaking for her daughter, his great-granddaughter. It indicated that the great-granddaughter was back to her old self, as no one talked about the crimes. This ultraslim reed cannot support the substantial competent evidence label that it must. Conclusion. Our overall assessment of the four factors Judge Dowd originally articulated for the dispositional departure, whether considered individually or as a group, is the same as our assessment of the four factors when used as support for the departure from Jessica's Law. Under the circumstances before us, Judge Dowd abused his discretion in granting the dispositional departure.