Opinion ID: 2122030
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Aggravation and Mitigation Phase

Text: Defendant contends that he was also denied his right to a fair sentencing hearing by numerous instances of error and prosecutorial misconduct during the aggravation and mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing. Defendant cites as error the introduction of certain aggravation evidence and the preclusion of certain mitigation evidence and argument. He also argues that the prosecutor's argument misstated the evidence and the law and was improper and inflammatory. Defendant maintains that these errors and arguments were so prejudicial as to require that he be given a new sentencing hearing. Defendant alleges three instances of erroneously admitted testimony in aggravation concerning acts of criminality and misconduct by defendant prior to the instant offense. Initially, we note that the Illinois death penalty statute permits the introduction at the second phase of the sentencing hearing of evidence which ordinarily would not be admissible during the guilt phase of trial. (Ill. Rev.Stat.1987, ch. 38, par. 9-1(e); People v. Tenner (1993), 157 Ill.2d 341, 380-81, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138.) This is so because, in determining the appropriate penalty, the sentencer must possess the fullest information possible concerning defendant's life, character, and criminal record. ( People v. Brisbon (1989), 129 Ill.2d 200, 218-19, 135 Ill.Dec. 801, 544 N.E.2d 297.) Evidence is admissible if it is relevant and reliable, the evaluation of which lies within the discretion of the trial court. Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 380-81, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138. Defendant first complains of the testimony of Chicago Police Officer Brian Lyons that, in 1978, he responded to a call of a battery at defendant's residence. A woman named Bridget Williams told Lyons that defendant had struck her in the face with his fist several times. Defendant was arrested but Lyons could not recall whether he had ever gone to court regarding the matter. Defendant argues that Lyons' testimony is insufficient proof of any wrongdoing because it was uncorroborated, the case was stricken with leave to reinstate, and no prosecution or conviction resulted. We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting Lyons' testimony. Officer Lyons personally spoke to the complainant in that incident and, as a result, placed defendant under arrest. During cross-examination of Lyons, defendant did not challenge Lyons' testimony as to the occurrence of the incident, but rather sought to imply through counsel's questions that it was a minor domestic dispute. Further, the jury was made aware that defendant received no criminal penalty in connection with this incident. The evidence was sufficiently relevant and reliable and its hearsay nature did not bar its admission. See Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 380-81, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138. Similarly, we find no error in the admission of the testimony of Officer George Hardison. Hardison testified that in November of 1981, he responded to a call of a battery on South Albany Avenue in Chicago. Upon his arrival there, he met with James Fortner. Fortner was visibly injured: his left eye was swollen and almost shut, his nose was bleeding and he had bruises on the side of his jaw. Fortner reported that during a verbal altercation, his stepson, Kiwanis Moore, and defendant began to beat him about the face. In self-defense, he picked up a hammer and struck out at them. Fortner believed he may have struck defendant with the hammer. Sometime later, Hardison received a call of a battery victim at Mt. Sinai Hospital. When he arrived, a nurse told him that a patient named Eddie Williams reported to her that he had been struck with a hammer. Hardison met with defendant, advised him of his Miranda rights and asked about the cause of his injury. Defendant told Hardison that he hurt his head in an accident. Following defendant's treatment and release from the hospital, Hardison transported defendant and Moore, who had been in the hospital's waiting room, back to the Albany Avenue address. There, Fortner identified defendant and Moore as the individuals who had beaten him. Defendant was arrested, but the case was later stricken with leave to reinstate; no prosecution or conviction resulted. Defendant argues that Hardison's testimony was hearsay and failed to establish that he was the aggressor and wrongdoer, rather than the victim, in the altercation with Fortner. The evidence at issue contrasts with that in People v. Adams (1985), 109 Ill.2d 102, 92 Ill.Dec. 528, 485 N.E.2d 339, where the defendant was arrested near the scene of a robbery but was neither identified by the victim nor otherwise shown to be involved in the robbery. In the present case, Hardison spoke with Fortner and observed his injuries. Fortner attributed them to defendant and Moore, and advised Hardison that in the course of attempting to defend himself he may have struck defendant with the hammer. Although defendant now claims that under the facts related by Hardison, it is just as possible that Fortner was the aggressor and/or that defendant was injured while intervening between Fortner and Moore, when questioned by Hardison at the hospital, defendant stated that he hurt his head in an accident. Further, when Hardison transported defendant and Moore back to Fortner's residence, Fortner identified Moore and defendant as the assailants. Hardison's testimony, like that of Officer Lyons, was relevant, as it reflected upon defendant's penchant for violent behavior, and, since Hardison had the opportunity to interview and observe the parties to the battery reported by Fortner, we believe it was sufficiently reliable to be admissible. (See Tenner, 157 Ill.2d at 381, 193 Ill.Dec. 105, 626 N.E.2d 138.) That neither incident resulted in prosecution or conviction was made known to the jury and does not render the evidence inadmissible. (See People v. Simms (1991), 143 Ill.2d 154, 178-79, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947.) We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing this evidence. Defendant also argues that the State improperly elicited opinion testimony from a prison records officer on the gravity of a disciplinary violation by defendant while he was in prison. In testifying to defendant's disciplinary record, Officer Cameron Forbes was asked by the prosecutor whether an incident in which defendant refused to submit to a shakedown of his person and property was a serious situation. Without objection by defense counsel, Forbes answered, Yes, sir, it is. At any time inmates or staff are subject to shakedown so we maintain control of the institution. Small amounts of drugs, [and] weapons are easily secreted upon the person, and refusal to be shaken down is a very serious offense. Forbes described the sanctions defendant received as a result of the incident: the revocation of five days' good conduct credits, a 30-day C-grade demotion, which resulted in his transfer from the low-medium facility where the incident occurred to a maximum security facility, and a 15-day segregation placement. Defendant maintains that this was improper opinion testimony because Forbes had no personal knowledge of the incident, and that the effect of this testimony was to improperly enhance the aggravating evidence concerning his infractions of prison rules. Defendant argues that despite the lack of objection to the prosecutor's question, Forbes' response to it resulted in prejudicial error. We note that this court has held that prison records are admissible as being reliable and as being relevant to show defendant's character, record and rehabilitative potential. ( People v. Ward (1992), 154 Ill.2d 272, 329, 181 Ill.Dec. 884, 609 N.E.2d 252.) As the records office supervisor, Forbes certainly would know what prison rule violations were serious. Although the prosecutor's question called for Forbes' opinion, considering Forbes' other testimony regarding the punishment defendant received following this incident, which included defendant's transfer from a low-medium facility to a maximum security prison and 15 days of segregation, it was apparent, even without Forbes' assessment, that the refusal to be shaken down is a serious violation of prison rules. Therefore, we cannot agree with defendant that Forbes' testimony constituted plain and reversible error. Defendant also contends that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing by the prosecutor's use of an unnecessary, misleading and inflammatory eight-foot poster to display a list of his prior wrongdoings, arrests and convictions. A photograph of the poster is included in the record. In addition to the matters discussed above, defendant's criminal background included convictions of retail theft, criminal trespass to a vehicle and burglary. Defendant argues that the chart had no legitimate evidentiary purpose but, rather, served to unfairly and prejudicially memorialize the clear and easily understood testimony of the aggravation stage witnesses. (See People v. Kinion (1982), 105 Ill.App.3d 1069, 1076-77, 61 Ill.Dec. 836, 435 N.E.2d 533.) He also argues that the chart was misleading in that it portrayed incidents in his background which did not result in criminal convictions in an identical manner, and as if they were of the same significance, as offenses for which he was convicted. Defendant maintains that the State's sole motivation in its preparation and use of the chart was to inflame the jury against him, as is evinced by the prosecutor's remarks, Look at that chart. That chart is outrageous. It's eight feet tall, during his argument regarding defendant's criminal history. Defendant claims that the prejudice was compounded when Officer Philip Mannion, one of the arresting officers and a principal State witness, was allowed to assist the prosecution in the presentation of the chart. The State does not dispute that the poster was cumulative, but argues that the allowance of a demonstrative aid, even if it is cumulative of other evidence, is a matter within the discretion of the trial court (see Simmons v. City of Chicago (1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 676, 684-85, 74 Ill.Dec. 202, 455 N.E.2d 232), and that in this case the court did not abuse its discretion in overruling defendant's objection to the chart. The State maintains that the information on the chart was neither inaccurate nor misleading, and that the chart was offered to make the testimonial evidence more understandable as well as to illustrate the State's theory that defendant's criminal career escalated from property crimes to violent crimes and that he failed to take advantage of numerous opportunities to rehabilitate himself. With regard to Officer Mannion's participation, the State merely opines that due to the large size of the exhibit, two persons were needed to set it up and that no prejudice could have resulted from Mannion's assistance. Certain demonstrative aids, such as those which illustrate and thus assist the jury in understanding testimonial evidence, may be allowed at trial. ( E.g., People v. Hamilton (1980), 80 Ill.App.3d 794, 36 Ill. Dec. 179, 400 N.E.2d 599 (a blackboard on which witnesses drew certain routes they travelled).) However, an exhibit which merely summarizes clearly understandable testimony and thereby serves only to memorialize particular evidence should be disallowed. See Kinion, 105 Ill.App.3d at 1076-77, 61 Ill.Dec. 836, 435 N.E.2d 533 (allowance of a chart summarizing the opinion testimony of an expert witness was an abuse of discretion); Simmons, 118 Ill.App.3d at 684-85, 74 Ill.Dec. 202, 455 N.E.2d 232 (disallowance of the use of overhead slides to accompany a defense witness' testimony was a proper exercise of the court's discretion). In the present case, evidence of defendant's criminal history was presented through certified copies of convictions and through a series of witnesses, all of whose testimony was succinct and clearly understandable. There was no legitimate need for the in-court construction of an eight-foot chart of defendant's criminal background by the taping of placards onto the chart after each witness testified. The placards restated each witnesses' testimony as to the date of each offense, the nature of each crime, each case number, the name of each victim, and the sentence, if any, imposed. The chart unfairly memorialized and unduly emphasized the evidence in aggravation. In contrast to the United States v. Howard (7th Cir.1985), 774 F.2d 838, 843-44, cited by the State, in which a chart summarizing and supplementing testimony concerning forged ballot applications was ruled allowable in a prosecution for vote fraud, the chart at issue was presented at a hearing to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death and as support for the State's position that he should. We cannot say that the jury's decision to impose the death sentence was not influenced by this improper exhibit and by the State's argument regarding its outrageous size. We therefore hold that the presentation and use of the chart constituted prejudicial error. We also believe that it was improper of the State to enlist the assistance of Officer Mannion in the taping of the placards onto the chart. The United States Supreme Court has ruled it to be a constitutional violation in certain circumstances for a government witness to serve in a dual role by assisting at the trial. ( Turner v. Louisiana (1965), 379 U.S. 466, 85 S.Ct. 546, 13 L.Ed.2d 424.) In Turner, two deputy sheriffs served as both principal prosecution witnesses and jury custodians. The Court reversed the conviction without a showing of actual prejudice on the basis that the witnesses' roles as officers of the court was so likely to cause the jury to give particular credence to their testimony that the defendant was deprived of his right to a fair weighing of the evidence ( Turner, 379 U.S. at 473, 85 S.Ct. at 550, 13 L.Ed.2d at 429). Inherent prejudice was also found in Gonzalez v. Beto (1972), 405 U.S. 1052, 92 S.Ct. 1503, 31 L.Ed.2d 787, where the county sheriff served both as a key prosecution witness and as a bailiff. The factual situation before us differs from the situations in Turner and Gonzalez because although Officer Mannion testified at length at the guilt phase he did not testify at the sentencing hearing, and his assistance at the hearing appears to have been minimal. Nevertheless, we do not condone the State's conduct in enlisting the aid of a police officer who was one of its key trial witnesses in the presentation of a prosecution exhibit. Defendant also contends that the trial court unconstitutionally restricted his right to present mitigation evidence by precluding his mitigation witnesses from testifying that they believed he should be spared the death penalty. He argues that he was entitled to offer any evidence as a reason not to impose the death penalty. This court has held that a witness' opinion that a defendant should not be sentenced to death is not admissible at a death penalty proceeding. ( People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, 67, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840.) The decision of whether to impose the death penalty rests with the sentencing authority. Thus, while the testimony of witnesses concerning matters relating to the record and character of the defendant and the nature and circumstances of the offense are relevant to that decision, the opinions of witnesses regarding what sentence should be imposed are not. ( People v. Howard (1991), 147 Ill.2d 103, 162, 167 Ill. Dec. 914, 588 N.E.2d 1044.) Such opinions are not evidence and therefore are irrelevant and inadmissible. The case of Payne v. Tennessee (1991), 501 U.S. 808, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720, involved a dissimilar issue, and does not, as defendant asserts, offer support for his position. We decline to depart from this court's earlier decisions that the opinions of witnesses as to whether the defendant should receive the death penalty are inadmissible. Defendant also contends that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing when the trial court sustained the State's objections to his counsel's argument that natural life imprisonment was a possible alternative to a death sentence. He argues that because jury was denied the same information that would be known to a sentencing judge if he had waived his right to have a jury as the sentencer, his rights to due process and equal protection were violated. In People v. Bean (1990), 137 Ill.2d 65, 116-18, 147 Ill.Dec. 891, 560 N.E.2d 258, and People v. Simms (1991), 143 Ill.2d 154, 180-82, 157 Ill.Dec. 483, 572 N.E.2d 947, this court considered and rejected arguments that the jury in a case involving a single murder should be informed of the range of possible prison sentences to which the defendant might be sentenced if he were not sentenced to death. In a multiple-murder case, the trial court should instruct the jury that if it finds mitigating factors sufficient to preclude imposition of the death penalty, the defendant will be sentenced to natural life imprisonment and that no person serving a natural life term can be paroled or released, except through executive clemency. ( People v. Gacho (1988), 122 Ill.2d 221, 261, 119 Ill. Dec. 287, 522 N.E.2d 1146.) However, in single-murder cases, the jury would have to be informed of all the sentencing alternatives possible under the determinative sentencing system in Illinois. Such information would serve to divert the jury's attention from the character of the defendant and the circumstances of the offense, and invites the jury to speculate on possibilities that may or may not occur. The court in Bean held that giving the jury such information would be error. ( Bean, 137 Ill.2d at 118, 147 Ill.Dec. 891, 560 N.E.2d 258.) It logically follows that it was improper for defense counsel in the case at bar to attempt to impart this information to the jury in his argument. The final issue we address is defendant's contention that the prosecution's rebuttal closing argument was replete with erroneous and improper arguments which violated his right to a fair sentencing hearing. Defendant argues that the prosecutor misstated the evidence and asserted facts not in evidence, referred the jury to inapplicable legal principles and made improper and inflammatory appeals to the jurors. Defendant's first series of complaints concern the prosecutor's remarks regarding defendant's prior conviction for the voluntary manslaughter of James Fortner. With respect to that conviction, evidence was introduced at defendant's sentencing hearing that defendant made a post-arrest statement in which he related that Fortner was the step-father of Kiwanis and LaMar Moore. Following a fight among the Moores and Fortner on May 5, 1982, defendant accompanied the Moores into Fortner's bedroom and held one of Fortner's arms while LaMar beat Fortner on the chest. LaMar subsequently choked Fortner with his hands, an electrical cord and a belt as Fortner was being held down by defendant and Kiwanis. Defendant heard Fortner gasping for air, threw him onto the floor and checked for signs of life. LaMar then picked up a pipe and hit Fortner with it to ensure that Fortner was dead. In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor first recalled the incident involving the earlier battery by defendant and Kiwanis Moore upon James Fortner and then argued: [Prosecutor]: But more than that, eight months later, he kills this guy. And these are not separate instances. You know that on this date, when James Fortner had hit Eddie on the head, and his companion, Kiwanis Moore, who's with him. You know what was happening for eight months? Eight months of simmering. You know Eddie Williams is ticked off this guy hit him on the head. You know for eight months he's ticked off he had to spend time in jail. The fact he was arrested. Those are not individuals [ sic ] acts. [Defense Counsel]: Objection. There's no evidence. [The Court]: The jury heard the evidence. [Prosecutor]: They are together. This is a conspiracy to commit murder, I suggest to you, between James [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. [The Court]: Sustained. [Prosecutor]: Between Eddie Williams, Kiwanis Moore. [The Court]: There's no evidence of that, Mr. [prosecutor]. [Defense Counsel]: Ask the jury to disregard it. [The Court]: Jury will disregard that. [Prosecutor]: Between those two, they killed James Fortner. And the voluntary manslaughter, that's not spontaneous. That doesn't arise out of a fight. That doesn't arise out of a drunken stupor. You heard what happened. The fact that LaMar Moore said, let's kill that guy. And they crept into his room, and he was sleeping at the time, and that's when Eddie Williams held down the arm while LaMar Moore choked him, used a belt, used a cord. And what was Eddie Williams doing all that time? He was right there. [Defense counsel] makes a very interesting argument. She says, oh well, he was just, he was just there. He wasn't part of that killing. But on the other hand she says he pled guilty. Of course he pled guilty. He pled guilty to killing a person. That means he was part and parcel of the killing of that person, and you learned the accountability argument instructions before. Remember those instructions? He aided and abetted. He held down those arms. [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. That doesn't apply to this sentencing. [The Court]: Sustained. [Defense Counsel]: Ask the jury be instructed to disregard about the accountability argument. [The Court]: Jury will disregard the accountability argument. [Prosecutor]: Darn right he pled guilty, and you know why? It was coldblooded murder, and our system broke down and gave him a break. They gave him ten years. He would be a fool not to take ten years. You heard those facts. How much more coldblooded is that? He's no fool. He took ten years when he could. He should be doing 120 for that crime. [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. [The Court]: Sustained. [Prosecutor]: And this theme of property. Yes, that graduated from property to violence, and look where it ended up with. Valerie McDonald. That's the final victim. Let that be the final victim, ladies and gentlemen. The defendant is guilty of murder and he's guilty of a number of aggravating things. And one of those is Eddie Williams likes to be right there when it all happens. He likes to be there, right there in the muck of the violence. Now, what do I mean? Right there for voluntary manslaughter. He goes right there, holding that arm. He was right there when James Fortner was gasping and falling to unconsciousness. He was right there when LaMar Moore was choking him with a belt, a cord, and his hands. He was right there. [Defense Counsel]: Object to all this harping on the voluntary manslaughter. We're not here for that. [The Court]: It's argument, counsel. [Prosecutor]: I bet he was sitting there when blood splattered all over. [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge. [The Court]: Sustained. [Prosecutor]: He was right there with Valerie. He snuck up behind her. I bet you he could smell her perfume when he took the gun and shot her right behind the ear. He's not directing this by remote control. He's right in there. He probably gets a vicarious thrill. [Defense counsel]: Objection. [Prosecutor]: Let's be there, let's kill. Right there.       [Prosecutor]: They ask you to give him a break. I guess that means they want you to let him try to rehabilitate himself. I think looking at that chart, its quite apparent that our society, our justice system, and a number of citizens that he victimized tried to give him a break. And he ignored them all. Didn't mean a thing. Yes, a number of people didn't come in.    They didn't come in for whatever reason. They gave him a break. Did that ever stop his crimewave? Never. How about Mr. Fortner? He didn't come in. What did that get him? Got him killed. [Defense Counsel]: Objection, Judge, There's no testimony. [The Court]: Fair inference. [Prosecutor]: James Fortner didn't come. And you know why he couldn't come today? He's dead, thanks to Eddie. This system has given him probation, supervision, one day in jail, light jail sentences. Breaks again and again and again, and Eddie just ignores it. It takes a coldblooded murder, he gets a reducer to voluntary manslaughter. Only ten years. [Defense Counsel]: Objection to coldblooded murder. [The Court]: Sustained. [Prosecutor]: That's the break of the century. My God, he even goes to the penitentiary and they give him a break. Killing someone, he goes to a minimum penitentiary. And even then he has to go to maximum because he breaks their rules. He blew another break. Defendant maintains that nearly the whole of the prosecutor's argument was improper and inflammatory. Most particularly, defendant objects to the prosecutor's characterizations of and references to the voluntary manslaughter as murder and cold blooded murder. He argues that he was not convicted of murder in the Fortner case and that the prosecutor's remarks were therefore factually and legally erroneous and highly prejudicial. Defendant also argues that the prosecutor falsely told the jurors that he had also committed conspiracy to commit murder, a statement which, too, was highly prejudicial because the jurors knew from the charges at defendant's trial that conspiracy to commit murder is a crime separate and distinct from murder. Defendant claims that the prosecutor's suggestion that defendant was guilty of Fortner's murder under the law of accountability was another improper characterization of the voluntary manslaughter as murder. Defendant further argues that the prosecutor improperly invited the jury to recall the accountability instructions it heard at trial for the purpose of determining that defendant was actually guilty of murder in the Fortner case. Defendant also submits that the prosecutor's personal opinions that the system had broken down when he was allowed to plead guilty to voluntary manslaughter and that he should have received a sentence of 120 years instead of 10 were irrelevant and particularly prejudicial and reprehensible because it was the prosecutor's office which had determined that a plea of guilty to voluntary manslaughter and a 10-year sentence were acceptable. Defendant argues that other remarks of the prosecutor were also improper as being unsupported by the evidence. Those remarks include the prosecutor's statements that defendant had been dealing drugs, that defendant had been simmering and ticked off at Fortner for the eight months following the altercation in which Fortner struck him with a hammer, and that Fortner's failure to go to court on that incident got him killed. As to the last remark, defendant claims that the error was compounded by the trial court's incorrect ruling that it was a fair inference. Defendant also notes that although many of his objections were sustained, the prosecutor ignored the rulings and continued on with the very line of argument the trial court had ruled improper. Thus, defendant maintains, neither the sustaining of objections, the admonishments to disregard the improper comments, nor the instruction that arguments are not evidence could ameliorate the prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's remarks. The State agrees that it was bound by the terms of the plea agreement in the Fortner case and concedes that the comment that defendant should have received a 120-year sentence was improper. The State also acknowledges that the prosecutor's references to cold blooded murder were improper. It is the State's position, however, that the prosecutor's argument was justified because defense counsel had grossly minimized defendant's responsibility for Fortner's death which, the State continues to assert, was in fact a vicious, brutal, textbook murder, defendant's plea to voluntary manslaughter notwithstanding. The State argues that the prosecutor's remarks were invited by defense counsel's misleading argument that defendant's action in restraining Fortner amounted to no more than voluntary manslaughter. According to the State, because there was no dispute as to defendant's degree of participation in the Fortner killing, only as to the label to attach to it, the jury could not have been affected by any inaccuracies in the remarks of either counsel as to the degree of defendant's responsibility for Fortner's killing. In the same vein, the State argues defense counsel's remarks were a blatant misrepresentation of the law and the facts because had the case been prosecuted as charged, defendant could have been convicted of murder on a theory of accountability, and that while the prosecutor's remarks were admittedly improper, they were undoubtedly motivated by his justifiable outrage at defense counsel's misrepresentations of the facts and law. The State also denies that prosecutor asked the jury to apply the law of accountability to conclude that defendant committed murder. Rather, the State asserts, the prosecutor simply asked the jury to recall the definition of accountability, i.e., aiding and abetting, in assessing defendant's responsibility for Fortner's killing. The State maintains that the other comments about which defendant complains, such as that defendant received breaks from the system, that the previous altercation with Fortner gave defendant a motive to kill him and that defendant conspired to kill Fortner, were reasonable inferences from the evidence. The State also argues that because the jury was instructed that arguments are not evidence, and because the evidence was not closely balanced, even those of the remarks which were improper could not have resulted in substantial prejudice such that they had an effect on the jury's decision. It is of vital importance to society and to the defendant that any decision to impose the death penalty is, and appears to be, based upon reason rather than emotion. ( People v. Holman (1984), 103 Ill.2d 133, 163, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119.) Because of the qualitative difference between a sentence of death and other forms of punishment, a high standard of procedural accuracy is required in a hearing to determine whether the death penalty will be imposed ( People v. Davis (1983), 97 Ill.2d 1, 26-27, 72 Ill.Dec. 272, 452 N.E.2d 525). The focus in death penalty hearings must be on the particular nature of and the circumstances surrounding the offense, and the individual character and record of the defendant. ( People v. Szabo (1983), 94 Ill.2d 327, 366, 68 Ill.Dec. 935, 447 N.E.2d 193.) It is axiomatic that parties in closing argument may not go beyond the scope of the evidence presented and facts fairly inferable therefrom ( Holman, 103 Ill.2d at 163, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119), misstate the law ( Holman, 103 Ill.2d at 170, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119), or express their personal opinions on the evidence ( Holman, 103 Ill.2d at 172-73, 82 Ill.Dec. 585, 469 N.E.2d 119) or on defendant's guilt ( People v. Yates (1983), 98 Ill.2d 502, 539, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369). Further, arguments which are calculated to play upon the jurors' emotions are clearly improper. A penalty of death that may have been imposed under the influence or passion or prejudice cannot stand. Szabo, 94 Ill.2d at 367, 68 Ill.Dec. 935, 447 N.E.2d 193. Initially, we note that those of the prosecutor's comments quoted above constituted almost the entirety of the State's rebuttal argument. The State's initial closing argument was considerably shorter, its focus being on defendant's progression from property crimes to Fortner's manslaughter and finally to Valerie McDonald's murder. Thus, it cannot be said that any improper remarks were merely isolated comments made in the course of a lengthy and otherwise proper argument. It is a fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that a conviction of a lesser offense operates as an acquittal of a greater offense. ( People ex rel. Daley v. Limperis (1981), 86 Ill.2d 459, 466, 56 Ill.Dec. 666, 427 N.E.2d 1212.) Whatever the prosecutor's personal opinion on the nature of defendant's participation in the Fortner killing, the fact remains that defendant was not convicted of murder or conspiracy to commit murder. The prosecutor's statement that defendant participated in a conspiracy to commit murder and that his conduct amounted to cold blooded murder were misrepresentations of the evidence and the law. The remarks were also an improper expression of the prosecutor's opinion, and an invitation to the jury to join him in his opinion, that the final adjudication in the Fortner case was incorrect and should be reevaluated. Indeed, the prosecutor appealed to the jurors to retry defendant for that offense by directing them to recall the instructions on murder by accountability and by stating that defendant had aided and abetted in Fortner's murder. The State's argument that the prosecutor simply asked the jury to recall the definition of accountability in assessing defendant's responsibility for Fortner's killing suggests a continuing, erroneous belief in the appropriateness of such a retrial. The State's assertion on appeal that the only dispute regarding defendant's participation in the Fortner homicide was merely the label to attach to it ignores the clear legal differentiation between adjudications of guilt of voluntary manslaughter and murder. It also demonstrates the same disregard shown by the prosecutor of the mandate that there be a high degree of accuracy in a proceeding to determine whether a defendant should be put to death. The label attached to defendant's criminal conduct in the final adjudication of the Fortner case was voluntary manslaughter, not murder. We are also not persuaded by the State's argument that defense counsel both invited the prosecutor's improper remarks and incited his justifiable outrage by her misleading argument and blatant misrepresentations of fact and law regarding defendant's culpability in Fortner's killing. The record reveals that in response to the State's initial closing argument concerning the evidence that defendant restrained Fortner while LaMar Moore beat and strangled him, defense counsel pointed out that Fortner did not die at defendant's hands. Defense counsel acknowledged that defendant was there, knew what was happening and did not stop it. Defense counsel then accurately stated that defendant pleaded guilty to a lesser crime than murder, that being voluntary manslaughter, for which he received a sentence of 10 years. Defense counsel's brief remarks were neither misleading nor blatant mispresentations of the evidence or law which would justify the prosecutor's embarkation into a protracted, opinionated commentary regarding defendant's murderous intent and conduct in the Fortner homicide. Furthermore, as an officer of the court whose primary responsibility is to ensure that justice is served, a prosecutor is not permitted the indulgence of expressing his personal outrage concerning arguments with which he disagrees. Similarly, the prosecutor's personal opinions concerning the plea agreement reached in the Fortner case were improper. The prosecutor clearly intended to inflame the jury by arguing that the 10-year sentence defendant received was less than one-tenth of what defendant deserved. As defendant argues, this argument was especially unfair and egregious in light of the fact that members of the office which the prosecutor represented had themselves determined the sentence to be reasonable and acceptable punishment for defendant's participation in Fortner's homicide. It was highly improper and inflammatory for the prosecutor to argue that a plea agreement which was entered into by the State and accepted by a court constituted a breakdown of the criminal justice system. We also agree with defendant that there was no evidentiary basis for the prosecutor's arguments that defendant had been dealing drugs, that he was simmering throughout the eight months after Fortner struck him with a hammer, and that Fortner's failure to pursue a prosecution against defendant in that matter got him killed. There was also no basis for the trial court's ruling that the last remark was a fair inference from the evidence. Beginning with the construction of an eight-foot chart highlighting defendant's past crimes and misconduct, followed by the improper appeal to do justice in the eligibility phase, and culminating in the erroneous, improper, inflammatory remarks in rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutors' conduct appears to have been a calculated course of action to play upon and incite the emotions and prejudices of the jury. Moreover, the prosecutor in rebuttal argument ignored several rulings of the trial court sustaining defendant's objections to his argument and persisted in making improper and inflammatory remarks. We cannot say that the prosecutors' misconduct did not divert the jurors attention from the issues, including the nature of the offense for which defendant was on trial, defendant's overall character, record and his rehabilitative potential. We are unable to conclude that the misconduct of the prosecutors did not serve to increase the likelihood that the jury's verdict was based on emotion rather than reason. Consequently, a new sentencing hearing is required. As a result of this holding, we do not consider whether the death sentence constitutes excessive punishment in this case.