Opinion ID: 598512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arthur Lee Harris

Text: 4 First, Harris asserts that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction on any of the charges he faced. Review for sufficiency of the evidence is limited to determining whether the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the government, is sufficient for the reasonable trier of fact to find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Townsend, 796 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir.1986). This standard applies not only to Harris's claims, but also to the sufficiency attacks by the other Defendants. 5 Conviction under Count One required proof of an agreement to violate the drug laws and that each conspirator knew of, intended to join, and participated in the conspiracy. United States v. Sanchez, 928 F.2d 1450, 1457 (6th Cir.1991). Harris asserts that the Government did not demonstrate the requisite elements, arguing: 1) that no witness testified to a tacit or express agreement; 2) that the testifying coconspirators all were addicts who only had used, not conspired to distribute, drugs with Harris; and 3) that even if a conspiracy existed between some of the coconspirators, Harris was not shown to be a participant. 6 Harris also argues that the Government did not adequately support the offenses in Counts Four (possession of heroin with intent to distribute), Five (felon in possession of a firearm), or Six (firearm use during a drug offense). Each of the charges centers on an October 25, 1990, arrest of Harris. At the site of that arrest, authorities found a .38 caliber pistol and a plate containing heroin residue. Harris argues that he never possessed either, noting, among other things: 1) that his fingerprints did not appear on the plate; 2) that Brenda Cousins, a testifying coconspirator, did not connect Harris with the gun; 3) that the weapon forming the basis for the firearm charges does not comport with witness descriptions of a gun at the scene; and 4) that he recanted his admission of ownership of the suspect weapon soon after making it. 7 Despite Harris's assertions, sufficient evidence supports conviction on all of the charges against him. As for the conspiracy charge, direct testimony showed Harris to be the owner or lessor of many raided locations of drug activity. Further, evidence portrayed Harris as having directed drug activities engaged in by other coconspirators, sold drugs to operational middlemen, and purchased drugs in forms indicative of distribution. Though the evidence may not have shown a formal agreement, there is ample circumstantial proof that Harris participated in the conspiracy. 8 The convictions on Counts Four, Five, and Six also were supported by sufficient evidence. Harris was linked to the gun by Deborah Young, a testifying coconspirator, who had seen him with a gun on numerous occasions and had seen John Harris give the suspect gun to Harris. She also described seeing Harris with the .38 handgun prior to the search where he was arrested. Even Harris, on the day following his arrest, effectively admitted ownership of the weapon. Though the witnesses did not exactly describe the gun in evidence, such inconsistency would not prevent a reasonable juror from concluding either that the gun described was the same firearm as the gun seized, despite the incongruity, or that Harris possessed more than one firearm. 9 The evidence also tied Harris sufficiently to the heroin seized on October 25, 1991. Not only was he present, but his jacket, bearing identification, was in the room with the plate containing heroin residue. Given the other evidence linking Harris to drug activity, including heroin distribution, a reasonable juror could have found him guilty on Count Four.
10 Harris also complains that the district court erred in failing to consider whether it could have imposed on him a sentence of home detention rather than incarcerating him in prison. However, as the Government notes, the offenses for which Harris was convicted carried statutory minimum sentences of imprisonment. The Guidelines provide that a court may substitute home detention for imprisonment, only as a condition of probation or supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 5F1.2. This makes it clear that home detention is not equivalent to imprisonment for the purposes of initial incarceration. Because imposing home detention would represent a downward departure, and because departure below a statutory minimum may occur only under the limited authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (upon motion by the Government), which here is inapplicable, the district court correctly held that it had no authority to consider home detention for Harris.
11 Harris argues finally that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to try him for crimes that, because they occurred wholly intrastate, should be cognizable only by the state of Michigan. Such a construction, which ignores the virtually illimitable federal regulatory power emanating from the Commerce Clause, is rejected.