Opinion ID: 1895338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: did the trial court commit error in dismissing venireman cunningham for cause?

Text: During voir dire when asked, Are any of you related by blood or marriage to the Defendant, Willie Rome Johnson? Mr. Cunningham raised his hand and told the court his wife was Johnson's second cousin. Further questions were asked: Q. Okay, does Mr. Johnson come over to your house and visit with you some? A. Well, it's been  been a while ago. He used to live right next door to me. Q. But you are related through your wife? A. Right. Later, the court excused Mr. Cunningham for cause over the objection of Johnson's counsel. Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-79 (1972) provides as follows: Any person, otherwise competent, who will make oath that he is impartial in the case, shall be competent as a juror in any criminal case, notwithstanding the fact that he has an impression or an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if it appear to the satisfaction of the court that he has no bias or feeling or prejudice in the case, and no desire to reach any result in it, except to that which the evidence may conduct. Any juror shall be excluded, however, if the court be of opinion that he cannot try the case impartially, and the exclusion shall not be assignable for error. Johnson's contention is that the court must make an inquiry into a juror's bias or prejudice prior to excusing that juror. The statute only requires that the court be of the opinion that the person cannot try the case impartially and does not specify any procedure. The trial court stated that it was of the opinion that Cunningham's relationship to Johnson would affect his ability to sit on the case. Caselaw supports a literal interpretation of Section 13-5-79 that if the court is of the opinion a juror cannot try a case impartially, the juror will be excluded and that exclusion shall not be assignable as error. Gilliard v. State, 428 So.2d 576, 580-581 (Miss. 1983), and cases cited therein. This Court has also stated that a defendant does not have a vested right to any particular juror but only the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury. Id. at 581. In Gilliard, the prospective juror was also a second cousin by marriage of the defendant and this Court found no error in excluding the juror. This assignment of error is without merit.