Opinion ID: 755554
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Evidence of Age Discrimination

Text: 45 A plaintiff may prove that his discharge was because of his age, 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), by showing that his age played a motivating role in, or contributed to, the employer's decision. Renz v. Grey Advertising, Inc., 135 F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir.1997); see, e.g., Stratton v. Department for the Aging for the City of New York, 132 F.3d 869, 878 (2d Cir.1997); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies, 968 F.2d 171, 180 (2d Cir.1992). He may prove that the forbidden animus 'was a motivating factor' through the presentation of either 'direct' or 'circumstantial' evidence. Id. at 181-82 (quoting Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1186 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 826, 113 S.Ct. 82, 121 L.Ed.2d 46 (1992)). 46 Where the plaintiff has presented evidence sufficient to support an inference of impermissible discrimination and the employer has presented evidence sufficient to permit the inference of a permissible motive, the jury should be instructed that, if it finds that a discriminatory motivation was present, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that the same action would have been taken for the permissible reason alone, and hence was not taken because of the unlawful animus, see, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 244-45, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (plurality opinion); id. at 259-60, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (White, J., concurring); Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies, 968 F.2d at 182. 47 In Ostrowski, we noted that if the plaintiff seeks this Price Waterhouse burden-shifting instruction and his proof as to the employer's discriminatory animus is purely circumstantial, 48 that circumstantial evidence must be tied directly to the alleged discriminatory animus. For example, purely statistical evidence would not warrant such a charge; nor would evidence merely of the plaintiff's qualification for and the availability of a given position; nor would stray remarks in the workplace by persons who are not involved in the pertinent decisionmaking process.... If, however, the plaintiff's nonstatistical evidence is directly tied to the forbidden animus, for example policy documents or statements of a person involved in the decisionmaking process that reflect a discriminatory or retaliatory animus of the type complained of in the suit, that plaintiff is entitled to a burden-shifting instruction. 49 Id. at 182. In Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., for example, we cited the proof that younger employees had received favorable treatment while the plaintiff had not, that the company had an approved category of employees called the  'Young Tiger' classification, and that company appraisals specifically referred to  'youth' in a positive manner as among the evidence that warranted a burden-shifting charge. 958 F.2d at 1179, 1187. In sum, the plaintiff is entitled to the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting instruction where the evidence is sufficient to allow a trier to find both forbidden and permissible motives. Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies, 968 F.2d at 181. 50 Defendants in the present case contend that Kirsch did not present sufficient evidence to permit an inference of discrimination because he presented only proof of stray remarks. The record does not support this contention. First, the statements directly mentioning the youth or anticipated youth of the company's sales force were not made by random coworkers who were uninvolved in the decisionmaking process. Rather, they were made by Steven Haber, who was a sales manager, officer, and director of the company. At least one of the statements was made at the behest of Manny Haber, the company's president, and there was ample evidence that Steven himself was one of the company's decisionmakers. For example, Manny Haber's testimony indicated that in 1990, when the company changed the form of Kirsch's compensation from commissions to the $60,000 salary, the decision was made by Manny, Alan, and Steven. 51 Moreover, the context in which Steven's statements were made suggested that they could not be considered stray. His statement to Kirsch, You better watch your ass. If you look around, you see all young people (First Tr. 94), was made at a sales meeting and directly indicated that age was, and would likely continue to be, a factor in the company's determination of the makeup of its sales force. Further, that statement could reasonably be viewed as revealing an ingredient in the company's 1987 decision to discharge six road reps, all of whom were over the age of 50, shortly after Steven became sales manager. Plainly, the warning by Steven, a decisionmaker, to Kirsch, a man in his 60's, to watch your ass .... you see all young people may permissibly be construed as a company threat that Kirsch was vulnerable to being replaced by a younger person because of his age, rather than as a stray remark. 52 In this appeal, defendants also argue that that statement was made by Steven in 1987 and was too remote from the time of Kirsch's discharge to be relevant. The record does not support their assertion that Steven (who, though apparently in attendance at the trial, did not testify) made the statement in 1987 rather than closer to the time of Kirsch's discharge. The trial transcript indicates that when Kirsch described the incident, defendants and the trial judge viewed him as stating that Steven made the statement at the age of 19, which would place the incident in 1987. The testimony, however, suggests that the statement was made later than 1987, for Kirsch testified that in response to Steven's statement, Kirsch looked around, saw that he was indeed the only person who was not young, and remembered the 1987 terminations of all of the other road reps who were over the age of 50 (First Tr. 94). And when the court, later in the trial, asked just when the watch your ass .... you see all young people statement by Steven was made, defense counsel responded, The testimony is unclear. At some point in '87, '88, or '89. (First Tr. 809.) Further, another Fleet Street employee testified that, based on its occurrence in a facility not occupied by the company before 1989, he recalled Steven's reference to the youth of the sales force as having occurred in 1989 or later. The record thus does not require the conclusion that Steven's first statement was too remote from the time Kirsch was discharged to be relevant. 53 Moreover, Steven's additional statement that the company was interested in new younger vision, new younger blood (First Tr. 728) was made during the company's interviews of Kedrus in the spring of 1991, close to the time of Kirsch's discharge. Indeed, during the same interviews Manny revealed that he expected Kirsch to leave the company before Kedrus arrived. Further, in expressing this younger blood interest, Steven was the designated company spokesman, for when Kedrus inquired about Fleet Street's personnel and strategies, Manny referred the question to Steven. Given this background, Steven's response that the company wanted younger blood plainly was not a stray remark but represented the official company position. 54 In sum, the evidence supporting Kirsch's claim that his age was a factor in his discharge, taken in the light most favorable to Kirsch as the party against whom judgment as a matter of law was sought, included the 1987 firings of six road sales representatives all of whom were over the age of 50; the statement by company officer Steven Haber to Kirsch, in 1989 or later, to watch your ass. If you look around, you see all young people; the statement by Steven at the behest of Manny Haber, the company's president, just weeks prior to Kirsch's discharge, that the company was interested in having younger blood; and the statement by Manny Haber in the course of the same interviews, indicating that Kirsch would soon no longer be with the company. A rational juror could permissibly infer from this evidence that age was a factor in Kirsch's discharge and that, but for his age, Kirsch would not have been discharged. 55 Defendants' efforts to suggest alternative, nondiscriminatory interpretations of Steven's references to the youth of the sales staff and to company goals of younger vision and younger blood are arguments more properly addressed to the jury than to this Court. The jury was free to reject defendants' suggested interpretations, and we may not overturn the jury's own reasonable interpretations or its credibility assessments. The district court properly ruled that the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational juror to infer that Kirsch was the victim of discrimination on the basis of his age. 56