Opinion ID: 1404333
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The quantitatively greater risk test

Text: The Board rejected Sokolowski's claim, in part, because it determined that there was no special hazard. The Board reasoned that slipping on the icy street was a hazard to which the general public was exposed to in most places in Anchorage on January 21, 1989. We agree with the Board that slipping on an icy street in Anchorage in winter is a common hazard. [9] However, the Board, in our view has overlooked a crucial aspect of Sokolowski's injury  the fact that it occurred in the middle of 36th Avenue, at a location where the general public usually does not cross. It is not unreasonable to assume that the public does not generally cross 36th Avenue from the IRS lot to Golden Lion. When the general public goes to Golden Lion, it parks in Golden Lion's lot. Pedestrians usually walk on sidewalks and crosswalks. If jaywalking across 36th Avenue between the IRS lot and Golden Lion  the normal route taken by Golden Lion employees  is more dangerous than walking to the Golden Lion from Golden Lion's own parking lot or crossing at a typical controlled intersection, then this risk is quantitatively greater than that faced by the general public. [10] We emphasize that the act of crossing a street at an unsafe location, standing alone, would not necessarily create a special hazard. The Board must also consider whether there was any practical and safe alternative. There is widespread agreement in the case law that if the employee chooses to ignore a safe convenient route to work, and takes extra risks to save a few steps, an injury incurred on the risky route would be outside the scope of workers' compensation. [11] However, where there is no reasonably safe and convenient alternative, the special hazards of the route to work become part of the course of employment. [12] In our view, the Board on remand must decide the foregoing issues. [13]