Opinion ID: 1435062
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Out-of-Court Statement Made In Furtherance of the Conspiracy

Text: A statement is `in furtherance of' a conspiracy if it is intended to promote the objectives of the conspiracy. The statement need not actually advance the conspiracy to be admissible. Additionally, statements which identify the participants and their roles in the conspiracy are made `in furtherance' of a conspiracy. Id. at 1342 (internal citations omitted). However, out-of-court statements made after the conclusion of the conspiracy are not made in furtherance of the conspiracy, and are thus not admissible under the co-conspirator exception. See United States v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 327 (6th Cir.2005); United States v. Payne, 437 F.3d 540, 546 n. 4 (6th Cir.2006) ([i]t is crucial that the conspiracy be ongoing . . .). Additionally, mere idle chatter or casual conversation about past events is not considered a statement in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Darwich, 337 F.3d 645, 657 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). Seay's out-of-court statement to Maness that he gave [Betty] money for [ ] using her basement because her husband was disabled, identified her as a willing participant in the conspiracy and allayed any fears Maness may have had regarding her loyalty to Seay. Thus, the substance of Seay's statement appears to meet the requirement that it be made in furtherance of the conspiracy. See Martinez, 430 F.3d at 327 (statements are made in furtherance of a conspiracy when the statements are made to apprise a coconspirator of the progress of the conspiracy, to induce his continued participation, or to allay his fears.). The district court, however, did not make a determination as to when this statement occurred, nor did the government offer any evidence regarding the context in which Seay's out-of-court statement to Maness was made. For all this Court knows, Seay's statement could have been made after he was arrested and the conspiracy had ended or was mere idle chatter. Accordingly, we find the district court erred in failing to make the requisite findings regarding the context and timing of Seay's out-of-court statement before admitting Maness's testimony. We do not believe such error was harmless. Maness's testimony provided independent corroboration of Agent Woodham's testimony that Betty knew what was going on and was allowing her house to be used for drug transactions in exchange for some benefit. Maness's testimony also helped explain the $14,000 cash found in a cookie tin in the closet. Without his independent corroboration, this case reduces to Woodham's word against Betty's, and the jury may have decided to believe her story over his. Without Maness's testimony, it cannot be said with any confidence that the same verdict would have resulted. See Beck v. Haik, 377 F.3d 624, 634-35 (6th Cir.2004) ([I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, . . . that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected.) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)).