Opinion ID: 194844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: facts

Text: The Union represents certain employees of Girardi Distributors, Inc., (the Company), a liquor distributor that operates several distribution facilities in northwestern Massachusetts. Over the years, the employees and the Company entered into collective bargaining agreements, the most recent of which covered from 1986 to May 19, 1989. In April of 1989, the Union and the Company began negotiations for a new agreement. The negotiations did not progress well. On May 19, 1989, the Union filed its first unfair labor practice charge -2- (case 1-CA-26394), alleging violation of 8(a)(1), (3), & (5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), (3), & (5).1 The General Counsel of the Board dismissed the charge through the Office of the Regional Director on July 19, 1989. Addressing the main thrust of the charge, the Regional Director refused to bring a complaint because, in its view, the investigation did not reveal sufficient evidence of bad faith bargaining. Negotiations between the Company and the Union continued during the Regional Director's investigation. As a result of the investigation, the charges were dismissed and the Union did not appeal the dismissal. The Union remained dissatisfied with the negotiations and felt certain that the Company sought to bust the Union. In June, the Company made its last, best, and final offer, which significantly undercut the wages and benefits received by the members of the bargaining unit under the 1986-89 labor agreement. Despite the final offer the parties continued to hold bargaining sessions. The Union filed its second charge (case 1-CA-26561) on 1 Section 8(a)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of their section 7 rights to engage in concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. 29 U.S.C. 157, 158(a)(1). Section 8(a)(3) makes it an unfair labor practice for an employer to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure. Id. 158(a)(3). Section 8(a)(5) requires that an employer bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees and to do so in good faith. See id. 158(a)(5); NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 498 (1960). -3- August 4, 1989, alleging the same statutory violations but providing more factual support for the bad faith bargaining claim. The Regional Director again dismissed the charges and the General Counsel's National Office of Appeal upheld the dismissal. On September 8, 1989, the Union filed its third charge (case 1-CA-26660, which was amended several times) on the same general grounds with further factual support. Certain statements made by management, which were held improper under 8(a)(1), were the subject of an informal settlement agreement,2 while the other charges were dismissed. The Union unsuccessfully appealed the dismissal of the other charges. By the end of 1989, despite numerous negotiation sessions, the Union and the Company had not reached an agreement. After the Union lost its appeal on the third set of charges, the Company withdrew its final offer. On April 14, 1990, the Company purportedly subcontracted the bargaining unit work to Suburban Contract Carriers, Inc. (Suburban), terminated its union employees, and withdrew its recognition of the Union as the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the bargaining unit. 2 The Regional Director approved the unilateral informal settlement on February 22, 1990. The Company complied with the settlement's posting requirement. The case, however, was never closed because of the pendency of a fourth set of charges (case 1-CA-27243) filed in April of 1990. The Regional Director vacated and set aside the settlement agreement when it issued the Consolidated Complaint that sought to reinstate the three charges dismissed in 1989. The Union's second basis for avoiding the statute of limitations pertains to this settlement agreement and is discussed infra. -4- On April 16, 1990, the Union filed a fourth set of charges (case 1-CA-27243), alleging the Company violated 8(a)(1) & (5) by refusing to supply the name of the subcontractor to the Union, and by unilaterally subcontracting the bargaining unit work. Finally, the General Counsel filed a complaint and set the hearing date for November 19, 1990. On the morning of the hearing, the General Counsel received new testimony from the principals of Suburban, David Murphy and Peter DeVito. The proceedings were adjourned with the consent of the parties. Based on the testimony of Murphy and DeVito, the Regional Director further investigated the Union's charges and procured testimony from Kenneth White, the Company's former operations manager, and Daniel Maroni, another employee close to management, which was damaging to the Company. In March of 1991, the Regional Director issued a Consolidated Complaint, which revived the three charges dismissed in 1989 (cases 1-CA-26394, 1-CA-26561, 1-CA-26660), and an Amended Complaint, which amended case 1-CA-27243. The Consolidated Complaint alleged that the Company had engaged in bad faith bargaining from April through September of 1989 and had unlawfully implemented its final offer. The Amended Complaint charged that failure to provide the name of the subcontractor and withdrawal of recognition of the Union violated sections 8(a)(1) & (5), and that subcontracting the bargaining unit's work to a subcontractor that was the alter ego of the Company and discharging the Union employees violated sections 8(a)(1) & (3). -5- With respect to the Amended Complaint, the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found that the Company had violated the NLRA and ordered the Company to cease and desist from subcontracting the bargaining unit work anew, to recognize the Union, and to restore the status quo in existence before the false subcontractor was engaged. With respect to the Consolidated Complaint, the ALJ found that the General Counsel had stated a prima facie case that the Company had bargained in bad faith, that impasse had not been reached, and that implementation of the final offer was unlawful. Nevertheless, the ALJ dismissed the Consolidated Complaint because under 10(b) the charges dismissed in 1989 could not be reinstated more than six months after the acts underlying those charges had occurred. The ALJ found that the General Counsel did not satisfy the fraudulent concealment exception to the statute of limitations because it failed to demonstrate that facts had been fraudulently concealed, and because the Union and the General Counsel did not exercise due diligence in discovering the factual basis for the charges. The Board affirmed and adopted the decision and order of the ALJ. The Union appeals the dismissal of the Consolidated Complaint. The dismissed charges warrant reinstatement, according to the Union, because the Company fraudulently concealed the operative facts supporting the charges through affirmative acts of concealment and by a self-concealing scheme, and because the Union and the General Counsel exercised -6- due diligence to uncover the evidence. Alternatively, the Union asserts that the dismissed 8(a)(3) and (5) allegations were closely related to the 8(a)(1) charges in the informal settlement agreement reached in case 1-CA-26660. As the agreement was later set aside by the Regional Director, the 8(a)(3) and 8(a)(5) charges in the Consolidated Complaint may be reinstated by amendment to the now timely 8(a)(1) charge.