Opinion ID: 1057663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Equality and Uniformity of Taxation in Area 42

Text: The Plaintiffs insist that the terms of the consent judgment permit the City to impose a scheme of taxation in direction violation of Jones. They base their claim on the following language in section 6-51-103(d): Should the court find the ordinance to be unreasonable, or to have been done by exercise of powers not conferred by law, an order shall be issued vacating the ordinance and the municipality shall be prohibited from annexing, pursuant to the authority of § 6-51-102, any part of the territory proposed for annexation by such vacated ordinance for a period of at least twenty-four (24) months following the date of such order. In the absence of such finding, an order shall be issued sustaining the validity of such ordinance, which shall then become operative thirty-one (31) days after judgment is entered unless an abrogating appeal has been taken therefrom. Tenn. Code Ann. § 6-51-103(d) (emphasis added). While acknowledging that the language in the consent judgment provides otherwise, the Plaintiffs contend that both Areas A and B became part of the City thirty-one days after the entry of that judgment, because, by the terms of this statute, the entire ordinance had become “operative.” Because both areas have been annexed by the terms of the legislation, but only Area B is subject to city taxes, the Plaintiffs argue that an unequal taxing scheme is the result. This argument rests on a faulty assumption that there is no difference between the effective date of the ordinance and the effective date of the annexation. In our view, although the entire ordinance became operative thirty-one days after the entry of the consent judgment, the very terms of that judgment also properly delay the annexation of Area B until a later date. See Bastnagel, 457 S.W.2d at 534-35 (holding that the date on which an annexation ordinance becomes operative is not necessarily “the actual date of annexation”). The actual date of annexation for Area B has been merely postponed by a term contained within the judgment approved by the trial court as reasonable under the circumstances.9 As stated, the Plaintiffs may not contest this portion of the consent judgment as an impermissible modification of the Ordinance. Because Area B is not part of the City, there has been no violation of the equality and uniformity provisions of article II, section 28. 9 The Plaintiffs make a significant point of arguing that “operative” and “effective” are synonymous. The issue in this case, however, is not whether there is a difference between an ordinance being operative and the ordinance being effective. The issue is whether there is a difference between an ordinance being operative and a portion of the annexation described in the ordinance being effective. -16- Moreover, our ruling on this issue does not create the risks identified by the Court in Jones: The logical result of the contrary holding as to taxation would be that, in every city, taxes might be different in different wards, and on different streets; in every county, taxes might be different in every civil district; in the state, taxes might be different in every county, and in each division,—all clearly in violation of the constitution and our whole theory of equal and uniform taxation. So, also, it cannot be maintained that a section of territory may be brought within the city limits, and made part of the city, and yet be excluded by express enactment from the benefits extended to other portions of the city. 47 S.W. at 139. In this instance, we are not dealing with territory “brought within the city limits, and made part of the city.” To uphold the system of taxation within the City in no way approves of the establishment of different levels of taxation “in different wards, and on different streets” of a municipality.