Opinion ID: 2754957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Julian Okeayainneh

Text: Okeayainneh appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on Count 1, conspiracy to commit bank fraud. We review de novo the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal, and our standard of review is the same standard we apply to a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. United States v. Cook, 603 F.3d 434, 437 (8th Cir. 2010). On review, “we will affirm if the record, viewed most favorably to the government, contains substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict, which means evidence sufficient to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Lopez, 443 F.3d 1026, 1030 (8th Cir. 2006) (en banc). “To convict a defendant of conspiracy, the government must prove that there was an agreement to achieve an illegal purpose, that the defendant knew of the agreement, and that the defendant knowingly became part of that agreement.” United States v. Morris, 723 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). Okeayainneh asserts there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud because the government failed to show he knew about the conspiracy or voluntarily and intentionally joined it. The evidence against Okeayainneh included the testimony of Angela Grigsby, Bernard Thomas, and Jamie Bryntensen who all testified that Coker recruited them in May 2010 to fly to California to open fraudulent bank accounts, which they did under the direction of Okeayainneh. When the three arrived in California, Okeayainneh picked them up at the airport and gave them their counterfeit identification cards, as well as personal information about the identities they were to assume and additional documents they needed to open business accounts. Okeayainneh took them to a hotel and instructed them to memorize the information he had provided. Although Thomas was unable to open an account with his documentation, Grigsby and Bryntensen both opened accounts and withdrew money from them; they gave the money to Okeayainneh. -9- Because Thomas had not opened any accounts, Okeayainneh did not pay for his return trip to Minnesota; he did, however, pay for the return flights of Grigsby and Bryntensen. Grisby and Bryntensen flew to California a second time, where they again engaged in similar fraudulent conduct with Okeayainneh. Grigsby continued to open fraudulent bank accounts in Minnesota under the direction of both Okeayainneh and Coker. One of the accounts she opened was a business bank account at Associated Bank using the stolen identity of J.B. Okeayainneh admitted sending a stolen check for $107,018.71 to Minnesota for deposit into this fraudulent account. After Thomas returned to Minnesota, he agreed to deposit a counterfeit check from Okeayainneh into his own bank account on two occasions. After the checks cleared, Thomas withdrew the entire sum in a series of cash withdrawals. He gave the money to Coker. The evidence found inside Okeayainneh’s storage locker—including passport photos of both Adeniran and Grigsby—also strongly supports the jury’s finding that Okeayainneh knew about, and intentionally joined, the conspiracy to commit bank fraud and that he did not simply commit “isolated acts” of fraud. Numerous counterfeit identifications and stolen and counterfeit checks were located in the storage locker, linking him to the aspect of the bank fraud that involved opening fraudulent accounts. Also in the storage locker were approximately 500 credit cards in the names of other people and hundreds of stolen credit-card mailers (offers for new credit cards mailed directly to customers), as well as equipment for manufacturing counterfeit credit cards. This evidence linked Okeayainneh to the aspect of the bank fraud that involved using stolen credit cards. Okeayainneh’s storage locker also contained handwritten notes with background information about the people whose identities and credit cards had been stolen. Okeayainneh admitted the notes found in the locker were in his handwriting, and he admitted agreeing with Coker and Grigsby to deposit stolen checks into fraudulent bank accounts and withdraw the proceeds. The evidence presented at trial was more than sufficient to support Okeayainneh’s conviction for conspiracy to commit bank fraud. -10-
Throughout Okeayainneh’s trial, the government repeatedly referenced Exhibit 222: an organizational chart depicting the names and photographs of 20 people involved in the criminal activity at issue, including Okeayainneh and his co-defendants. The photographs were labeled with the roles each member purportedly played in the crime: “Foot Soldier,” “Bank Insider,” “Manager/Facilitator.” Okeayainneh’s photo was labeled “Leader/Organizer.” At the top of the chart appeared the word “Conspiracy” in capital letters. Exhibit 222 was introduced through the government’s first witness, Detective Louis Beauchane, one of the principal investigators in the case. Detective Beauchane identified individual photographs of the people depicted in the chart and testified about their purported roles in the conspiracy, and the government moved to admit Exhibit 222. After it was admitted and published to the jury, Okeayainneh’s trial counsel objected to the exhibit on the basis that it drew legal conclusions. The court ruled counsel’s objection was late, and the exhibit remained in evidence. Okeayainneh argues that the district court erred in admitting Exhibit 222 into evidence over his objection. The government responds that he did not preserve this issue for review because his objection at trial was untimely. To preserve an evidentiary issue for appellate review, a timely objection must be made. Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1). “The rule is well settled in this circuit that for an objection to be timely it must be made at the earliest possible opportunity after the ground of objection becomes apparent, or it will be considered waived.” Terrell v. Poland, 744 F.2d 637, 638–39 (8th Cir. 1984). In Terrell, we agreed that a motion to strike made after the close of all evidence was untimely. Id. at 639. Similarly, in McKnight ex. rel. Ludwig v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1407–08 (8th Cir. 1994), we held that the Federal Rules of Evidence require objections to be -11- “contemporaneous” and ruled that an objection made at the close of a witness’s testimony did not meet that requirement. In the case at hand, however, defense counsel did not wait until the end of Detective Beauchane’s testimony, nor until the close of all evidence. Instead, it appears from the record that counsel raised her objection mere moments after Exhibit 222 was introduced. There was still ample opportunity for the judge to prevent further potential damage. We conclude that Okeayainneh preserved this issue for appeal and that our review is for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Beal, 279 F.3d 567, 570 (8th Cir. 2002). “The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “The danger of permitting presentation of a summary of some of the evidence in a criminal case is plain. The jury might rely upon the alleged facts in the summary as if these facts had already been proved[.]” United States v. Scales, 594 F.2d 558, 564 (6th Cir. 1979). Such evidence is proper, however, when it “assist[s] the jury in understanding the testimony already introduced” and “fairly summarizes” trial evidence. United States v. Boesen, 541 F.3d 838, 848 (8th Cir. 2008). In addition, “summaries may include assumptions and conclusions so long as they are based upon evidence in the record,” United States v. Spires, 628 F.3d 1049, 1053 (8th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted), but may be rejected if they are too conclusory or inaccurate, see United States v. Crockett, 49 F.3d 1357, 1361 (8th Cir. 1995). The chart at issue in this case was presented before any of the evidence the government claims it was meant to summarize and was referenced repeatedly throughout the remainder of the trial. The government concedes the chart was first introduced at the start of trial, and thereafter, “[w]hen a witness would refer to a defendant by name or nickname, Exhibit 222 would be displayed and the witness would be asked if the person’s picture appeared on the exhibit.” The government -12- argues that the chart was merely used “for the purpose of having witnesses put a face to a name.” But this purpose could easily have been accomplished without the offending captions. In addition to being used as a tool in closing argument, the chart was presented to the jury as substantive evidence and taken into the jury room to be considered during deliberation. Cf. Crockett, 49 F.3d at 1362 (emphasizing concern with the prosecution’s use of summary charts in closing argument and warning against visual aids in which “summary comes wrapped in improper argument”). We conclude that the district court’s decision to admit Exhibit 222 as substantive evidence was an abuse of discretion because it was unfairly prejudicial and conclusory to present a photo of the defendant with a caption labeling him the leader of the conspiracy, when no witness had yet testified to that fact. An erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless, however, if it did not have a substantial influence on the jury’s verdict. United States v. Samuels, 611 F.3d 914, 919 (8th Cir. 2010). The investigator who testified about the contents of Exhibit 222 had been involved in the investigation since it began in 2009, had knowledge of the people depicted, and could testify as to what his investigation showed their roles to be. The investigator was subject to cross examination about the chart, and Okeayainneh’s counsel specifically elicited from the investigator the concession that the chart was created by the government and simply depicted “what the government thinks is going on.” Okeayainneh’s counsel made the same point in closing argument: “[j]ust because they have a chart with my client’s head at the top doesn’t mean he’s the kingpin of this operation.” In addition, we note that two of the defendants on the chart, identified as “bank insiders”—Sarnor-David and Osei-Tutu—were acquitted of all charges. Thus, the jury’s verdicts reflected an individual assessment of each defendant and the evidence against him or her, not an unthinking acceptance of the government’s views as depicted on the chart. Multiple witnesses testified as to Okeayainneh’s guilt. The government also presented Okeayainneh’s own admissions. When, as here, the government’s evidence of a defendant’s guilt is so overwhelming, any error related to the admission of a summary chart is harmless. Spires, 628 F.3d at 1053. -13-
Okeayainneh next argues that the district court erred in granting the government’s motion in limine to admit statements he made during a January 18, 2011 proffer session with the government. After he was arrested, Okeayainneh and his defense counsel met with federal agents and a federal prosecutor for a proffer session. Prior to the session, Okeayainneh reviewed a proffer letter, which included the requirement that he “respond truthfully and completely to any and all questions or inquiries that might be put to [him] at the meeting.” The letter warned Okeayainneh that “any statements made or other information provided by [him] during the meeting” could be used against him for any purpose if the government concluded he “knowingly withheld material information from the government or otherwise [had] not been completely truthful and candid.” Okeayainneh reviewed the proffer letter with his counsel, and the prosecutor also reviewed the terms of the agreement with Okeayainneh. Okeayainneh signed the letter, agreeing to its terms. While preparing for trial, the government obtained audiotapes of telephone calls that Okeayainneh made while incarcerated, which they had translated and transcribed. The telephone calls—made on January 14 and 15, 2011, just days before Okeayainneh signed the proffer letter—revealed that Okeayainneh had decided to give false information to investigators, and withhold relevant information from them during the session. In its motion in limine seeking permission to introduce Okeayainneh’s proffer statements at trial, the government asserted that Okeayainneh had breached the express terms of the agreement by providing material false information during the proffer session. After reviewing the translated transcripts, the district court allowed the use of Okeayainneh’s proffer statements, finding that he had “explicitly agreed to” the “clear and unambiguous” terms of the agreement, which entitled the government to use his statements “against him for any purpose,” if it was found he was “not truthful and/or knowingly withheld material information.” The decision of -14- the district court enforced the agreement under principles of contract law, consistent with our precedent. See United States v. Hyles, 521 F.3d 946, 952 (8th Cir. 2008). On appeal, Okeayainneh does not directly contest that he breached the proffer agreement. Instead, he argues that he did not knowingly waive his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination when he entered into the agreement due to “a strained relationship with counsel” and an incomplete understanding of the proffer process. While Okeayainneh presented a variation of this argument in a filing with the district court, he offered no evidence to support it. Argument is not evidence, see United States v. Fetlow, 21 F.3d 243, 248 (8th Cir. 1994), and without any evidence to support this claim, the district court did not err in admitting the statements at trial. See also United States v. McFarlane, 309 F.3d 510, 514 (8th Cir. 2002) (explaining that by entering into an informal immunity agreement, “the defendant essentially gives up his right to later assert his Fifth Amendment privilege” as to the information he provided under the terms of the agreement).
Okeayainneh challenges the district court’s imposition of four sentencing enhancements. Specifically, he argues the evidence did not support a 24-level increase for loss in excess of $50 million, a 6-level increase because the offense involved at least 250 victims, a 4-level increase for his role in the offense, or a 2-level increase for obstruction of justice. “We review interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and a district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts for clear error.” United States v. Rutherford, 599 F.3d 817, 820 (8th Cir. 2010). “[S]entencing judges are required to find sentence-enhancing facts only by a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Scott, 448 F.3d 1040, 1043–44 (8th Cir. 2006). According to Okeayainneh’s presentence report (PSR), the actual loss of the conspiracy was $7,155,763.53, and the intended loss was at least $54,870,388.62. -15- Included within the intended-loss estimate were the checks found in Okeayainneh’s storage locker, which had a total face value of over $18 million. Okeayainneh concedes that intended loss, because it is the greater value, is the proper measure for Guidelines purposes. See USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A). He asserts, however, that because many of the checks found in the storage locker were photocopies, they had no real value. Thus, he concludes, the district court’s loss calculation impermissibly included “checks or account numbers that could not possibly be used to cause a loss” and is too high. He asserts the proper intended loss estimate was under $50 million. Because it is often difficult to calculate the precise amount of loss in a fraud case, district courts “need only make a reasonable estimate of the loss,” USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C), and may base the estimate on only a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Parish, 565 F.3d 528, 534 (8th Cir. 2009). We greatly defer to the sentencing judge’s loss determination because he “‘is in a unique position to assess the evidence and estimate the loss based upon that evidence.’” Id. (quoting USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C)). Accordingly, we review the district court’s loss calculation for clear error. Id. As defined in the Guidelines, intended loss includes “pecuniary harm that was intended to result from the offense,” even if that pecuniary harm “would have been impossible or unlikely to occur.” USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A)(ii). So even if some of the checks found in Okeayainneh’s storage locker were expired or “could not possibly be used to cause a loss,” the district court was permitted to include them in the total amount of intended loss. Cf. United States v. Jordan, 544 F.3d 656, 672 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding intended-loss calculation including full $811,000 value of checks mailed to lock-box even though the lock-box account had been frozen before funds could be withdrawn); United States v. Ravelo, 370 F.3d 266, 273 (2d Cir. 2004) (upholding district court’s intended-loss calculation that included attempted cash advances drawn in excess of cash-advance limit on stolen credit cards). Nor was it unreasonable for the court to use the full face value of the checks in its loss calculation: When a defendant obtains access to a credit line, whether by fraudulently -16- applying for credit cards, see United States v. Grant, 431 F.3d 760, 764 (11th Cir. 2005), or by writing counterfeit checks, see United States v. Santos, 527 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008), the district court may infer that the defendant would seek the full value of that line of credit. Because Okeayainneh presented no contrary evidence that he did not intend to use the full face value of the checks, the court permissibly calculated the loss using the full amount. Okeayainneh does not contest the total dollar amount of the checks found in the storage locker and has not otherwise pointed to anything in the record to suggest that the district court’s estimation of loss is unreasonable. We cannot conclude that the court’s estimate is clearly erroneous. Okeayainneh next argues that the evidence does not support a 6-level increase for the number of victims involved, which the district court concluded was well over 250. Okeayainneh acknowledges that the government found 8700 “purported” identities in the storage locker; but, he asserts, the government did not show that each of those identities belonged to separate, verifiable individuals and that none were duplicative. Okeayainneh concedes that at least 50 victims were verified but argues that the government did not prove that he used the means of identification of at least 250 individuals. Thus, he concludes, he should have received, at most, a 4-level increase in his Guidelines range. Section 2B1.1(b)(2) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a 6-level increase if the offense involves at least 250 victims and a 4-level increase if the offense involves at least 50 victims. The application notes to USSG § 2B1.1 define two categories of a “victim” for fraud offenses involving identity theft: (1) “any person who sustained any part of the actual loss . . . [or] bodily injury as a result of the offense,” whether or not their identifying information actually was used; and (2) “any individual whose means of identification was used unlawfully or without -17- authority,” even if they suffered no loss or bodily injury.5 USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 & 4(E). A person does not become a victim, however, merely because a defendant possessed her identifying information; it is only when that information is “actively employed to further the purpose of the conspiracy or scheme” that she becomes a victim. United States v. Rabiu, 721 F.3d 467, 472–74 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing United States v. Hall, 704 F.3d 1317, 1322–23 (11th Cir. 2013)). Thus, we agree with Okeayainneh that the conspiracy did not involve 8700 “victims” under USSG § 2B1.1. But as the government points out, over 500 victims were in fact identified, and evidence at trial showed that those persons’ identifying information had been used to create fraudulent driver’s licenses, open fraudulent bank accounts, or withdraw funds from those accounts. The number is even higher when the number of defrauded banks is added. See USSG § 2B1.1 cmt. n.1 (defining “[p]erson,” for purposes of a “victim,” to include “individuals, corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies”). The district court agreed that the evidence supported a finding that Okeayainneh’s offense involved more than 500 victims, which is well over the 250 victims required for the 6-level enhancement. Given the evidence presented, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in making this finding. Okeayainneh next argues the evidence did not support a 4-level increase for role in the offense. Section 3B1.1(a) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides “[i]f the defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five or more participants or was otherwise extensive, increase by 4 levels.” In determining whether the enhancement applies, we consider 5 Application Note 1 to USSG § 2B1.1 advises that “means of identification” has the meaning set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 1028(d)(7) and encompasses only actual persons, not fictitious persons. The definition in § 1028(d)(7) includes any “name, social security number, date of birth, official State or government issued driver’s license or identification number, alien registration number, government passport number, employer or taxpayer identification number.” -18- the exercise of decision making authority, the nature of participation in the commission of the offense, the recruitment of accomplices, the claimed right to a larger share of the fruits of the crime, the degree of participation in planning or organizing the offense, the nature and scope of the illegal activity, and the degree of control and authority exercised over others. There can, of course, be more than one person who qualifies as a leader or organizer of a criminal association or conspiracy. This adjustment does not apply to a defendant who merely suggests committing the offense. USSG § 3B1.1 cmt. n.4. Okeayainneh asserts his co-defendant Coker was the true leader of the conspiracy, whereas he oversaw only a “few participants who traveled to California to open accounts.” At sentencing, the court “strongly reject[ed]” Okeayainneh’s argument. The district court noted that multiple witnesses at trial testified that Okeayainneh provided them with counterfeit identities and checks, instructed them how to commit the fraud, and took them to particular target banks to engage in the fraudulent transactions. Okeayainneh collected the proceeds from the participants recruited to cash the checks, paying them only a percentage of the total amount obtained. It was Okeayainneh’s storage locker, which he frequently accessed, that contained the numerous documents and materials used in the overall conspiracy. The district court did not clearly err in applying the 4-level enhancement for Okeayainneh’s leadership role. Okeayainneh last challenges a 2-level increase in his offense level imposed because the district court found he had intentionally lied to investigators during his proffer session. Section 3C1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a 2-level enhancement if “the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.” Here, the district court imposed the enhancement after it concluded that Okeayainneh had “provid[ed] a materially false statement to a law enforcement officer that significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.” USSG § 3C1.1, cmt. n.4(G). As we have previously held, “th[is] enhancement applies only -19- when the materially false statement ‘significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.’” United States v. McKanry, 628 F.3d 1010, 1021 (8th Cir. 2011) (quoting USSG § 3C1.1 cmt. n.4(G)); see also United States v. Williams, 288 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2002) (rejecting enhancement because government failed to provide any evidence of extent to which defendant’s dishonesty impeded its investigation). Okeayainneh asserts that the government failed to offer any evidence to support the finding that his false statements during the proffer session “significantly obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense.” We agree. The government chose not to offer any evidence on this issue at sentencing. Instead, the government argues on appeal that the district court was entitled to rely upon the representation of the Assistant United States Attorney that, “[w]e wasted time, resources on all of those things.” It is the government’s burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the enhancement pursuant to § 3C1.1 applies. United States v. Bledsoe, 445 F.3d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir. 2006). The prosecutor’s statement to the court was not evidence. See Fetlow, 21 F.3d at 248. The government’s argument that the enhancement should apply because Okeayainneh attempted to obstruct justice also fails. While an attempt may be sufficient for other types of obstructive conduct listed in application note 4 to USSG § 3C1.1, the conduct for which Okeayainneh received the enhancement requires that an investigation actually be impeded in some way. See McKanry, 628 F.3d at 1021. The cases the government cites involve different forms of obstruction and are inapposite to the issue before us. See United States v. Smith, 665 F.3d 951, 955–57 (8th Cir. 2011) (Application Note 4(A): attempt to retaliate against a witness); United States v. Jones, 612 F.3d 1040, 1046 (8th Cir. 2010) (Application Note 4(A) and (B): attempt to establish a false alibi and suborning perjury); United States v. Brown, 560 F.3d 754, 772 (8th Cir. 2009) (Application Note 4(D): attempt to destroy evidence). Without any evidence to support the finding that the false statements substantially -20- obstructed or impeded the official investigation or prosecution of the instant offense, it was clear error to impose the 2-level enhancement for obstruction of justice.