Opinion ID: 863607
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 56

Heading: whether this court must remand for a new capital sentencing proceeding because there is at least one invalid aggravating circumstance in the case sub judice; moreover, whether capital punishment is a disproportionate penalty under the facts of this case?

Text: ś 158. Edwards argues in this assignment of error that there was insufficient evidence for at least one of the aggravating factors, if not for all three. Thus, he contends that the aggravating circumstances found by the jury are invalid. The three aggravating circumstances found by the jury were: The capital offense was committed while the Defendant was engaged in the crime of Robbery or was an accomplice to the Robbery; The capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding arrest; The capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel. ś 159. Appellate courts assume that juries follow the instructions. Payne v. State, 462 So.2d 902, 904 (Miss.1984). This Court has previously refused to re-weigh aggravating and mitigating circumstances on appeal. See, e.g., Clemons v. State, 593 So.2d 1004, 1006 (Miss.1992). In the instant case, this Court finds no reason to question the jury's finding as to the aggravating and mitigating factors. ś 160. Edwards first asserts that there was insufficient evidence to support the aggravating circumstance of HAC. However, the HAC instruction was properly limited. In addition, there was sufficient evidence in the record to warrant the instruction. Tony was shot in the head which blew out his eye socket. However, he did not die from this first shot, but began to severely bleed from his wound. He left the car and was forcibly walked a short distance from the road. He was then stuffed into the trunk of his car, only to be dumped out and shot through his temple, this being the fatal shot. He was dragged into the woods. Edwards and Jordan next forcibly led Codera, a two year old child, into the woods and shot him once in the head as he leaned over his father. These facts clearly depict the heinousness of this crime. For these reasons, Edwards' contention regarding the impropriety of the especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator is without merit. Crawford v. State, 716 So.2d 1028, 1047-48 (Miss.1998). ś 161. Edwards also claims that the State adduced no evidence to support the proposition that the murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing the detection and lawful arrest of the defendant. However, statements by Edwards show he shot the victim in an effort to avoid getting caught. There is also the compelling evidence that Edwards and Jordan burned the vehicle stolen from Tony. Each case must be decided on its on peculiar fact situation. If there is evidence from which it may be reasonably inferred that a substantial reason for the killing was to conceal the identity of the killer or killers or to cover their tracks so as to avoid apprehension and eventual arrest by authorities, then it is proper for the court to allow the jury to consider this aggravating circumstance. Walker v. State, 671 So.2d 581, 611 (Miss.1995) ( citing Leatherwood v. State, 435 So.2d 645, 651 (Miss.1983)). From the evidence adduced at trial, there is ample ground for the jury to have determined that the crime committed was committed in order for Edwards to avoid arrest. Walker, 671 So.2d at 611-12. ś 162. Lastly, there was plenty of evidence that these murders were committed while Edwards was in the commission of a robbery. When the victims were found, Tony's pockets were turned insideout and were empty. There were also several items removed from Tony's vehicle, including stereo equipment, car-care products and a gun, not to mention the vehicle itself. There is no doubt that robbery took place. Therefore, there is no merit to this assignment of error. ś 163. Edwards also contends in this issue that his sentence of death is a disproportionate penalty under the facts of this case. In accordance with the mandate of Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105(3)(c), this Court shall determine whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Where the sentence is found to be disproportionate, this Court may set the sentence aside and remand the case for modification of the sentence to imprisonment for life. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-19-105(5)(b). ś 164. The case of Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643 (Miss.1996), provides sufficiently similar facts upon which a comparison of sentences may be made. Davis confessed to killing Linda Hamilton in her trailer after she refused to give him money to buy drugs. He first shot Linda from behind, but the bullet did not kill her. After fifteen to twenty minutes, Davis stabbed Linda to death because she had begun to scream. Linda was left lying on the bed in the trailer. On the following day, Davis called the police and confessed to the murder. ś 165. This scenario is not unlike that in which Edwards was involved. Both cases involve murders committed in the course of a robbery. Also, both involved innocent victims, but the present case involve a second most innocent and helpless of victimsâ a two year old child. The child's father, like Linda, did not die from the first shot. He left the car and told Edwards and Jordan they could have the car. Edwards and Jordan could have taken the car and left the scene at that point. However, Jordan and Edwards again shot Tony, and later dragged him into the woods. Edwards next led Codera into the woods and shot him once in the back of the head, instantly killing him. They were given the opportunity to steal the car while sparing the lives of Tony and Codera, but that is not what they chose to do. ś 166. Having given individualized consideration to the defendant and the crime sub judice, this Court concludes that there is nothing about this defendant or this crime that would make the death penalty excessive or disproportionate in this case. Blue v. State, 674 So.2d 1184, 1234-35 (Miss.1996) (death sentence proportionate where defendant abused drugs and alcohol at an early age, came from dysfunctional family, and had no positive role models at home); Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1304 (Miss.1994) (death sentence proportionate where young defendant had a low I.Q.); Lanier v. State, 533 So.2d 473, 492 (Miss.1988) (death sentence was proportionate where defendant had been institutionalized twice for alcoholism and drug abuse); Neal v. State, 451 So.2d 743, 761 (Miss.1984) (death sentence affirmed where defendant had been institutionalized at young age, had learning and family difficulties, and was not loved or supervised at home). See also Cabello v. State, 471 So.2d 332, 350 (Miss.1985) (death sentence was proportionate where defendant strangled and robbed victim); Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 739 (Miss.1982) (death sentence was proportionate where defendant robbed and shot victim). Therefore, the death sentence in this case is neither disproportionate nor excessive.