Opinion ID: 584065
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel for Failing to Present Voluntariness of Confession to Jury

Text: 33 Although Atkins argues in his initial brief to us that trial counsel failed to raise the question of involuntariness to the jury, he concedes in his reply brief that trial counsel did raise the argument to the jury; and we note that the trial judge instructed the jury on involuntariness and confessions. Atkins then attempts to argue that trial counsel was ineffective for presenting no expert testimony on involuntariness. But Atkins' arguments fail because he has not shown that this testimony would likely have changed the outcome of the case. 34 Although the mental condition of a defendant--on which Atkins' expert might have testified--can be a significant factor when discussing involuntariness, the mental condition alone never disposes of the inquiry into constitutional involuntariness. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164, 107 S.Ct. 515, 520, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Unless police or other state actors exerted coercive tactics, Atkins' confession was voluntary. See, e.g., id. 107 S.Ct. at 520-22. Because Atkins' confession was constitutionally voluntary--that is, because the record shows no improper or coercive state tactics--Atkins has failed to show that the omission of expert testimony prejudiced his case and has failed the second Strickland test. 35 c. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel for Failing to Present Expert Testimony to Negate Specific Intent 36 Atkins relies on his trial attorney's affidavit to argue that counsel ineffectively failed to present expert testimony about the effect alcohol and drugs would have had on Atkins: namely, that Atkins could not have formed intent to commit a crime. This affidavit, however, states only that trial counsel's failure to use an expert was neither a tactical nor strategic decision. And while the affidavit says that trial counsel believes he should have presented such testimony for its probable positive defensive effect, we see no constitutional ineffectiveness. 37 First, the affidavit alone establishes nothing. It admits no ineffective performance; and even if it did admit ineffectiveness, we would give the affidavit no substantial weight because ineffectiveness is a question which we must decide, [so] admissions of deficient performance by attorneys are not decisive. Harris v. Dugger, 874 F.2d 756, 761 n. 4 (11th Cir.1989). 38 Second, Atkins has failed to show that this omission prejudiced his defense. Trial counsel presented evidence to the jury throughout the trial trying to show Atkins' mental condition and the amount of drugs and alcohol Atkins allegedly consumed on the day Castillo was killed. As the district court noted, if the jury believed Atkins' level of consumption, they would have needed no expert to explain what effect it would have on Atkins. Also, the jury was presented with many witnesses testifying that Atkins was in complete control of his faculties during and after Castillo was killed. We conclude that, in the light of the evidence presented at trial, Atkins has failed to show a reasonable probability that the outcome of the case would have been different if an expert had testified. 39 d. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel for Failing to Combat Use of Sexual-Misconduct Evidence 40 Atkins argues that trial counsel was ineffective for allowing prosecutors to put into evidence Atkins' confession to sexual battery. 6 To the extent that Atkins refers to the confession to sexual battery with Antonio Castillo, counsel's conduct was reasonably effective because counsel, in fact, attempted to keep the confession out of evidence and because this evidence was admissible as part of the res gestae of the charged crime. See, e.g., Smith v. Wainwright, 741 F.2d 1248, 1258 (11th Cir.1984); Reese v. Wainwright, 600 F.2d 1085, 1090 (5th Cir.1979); see also Atkins III, 541 So.2d at 1168 (Grimes, J., specially concurring). 41 To the extent that Atkins refers to his confessed sexual relations with forty-five young men and boys, we also find no ineffectiveness. Defense counsel agreed to admitting this statement into evidence, stating that one of his tactics was to bring into play Atkins' sexual proclivities. See, e.g., Record at 1040. Because the use of this tactic in the guilt and penalty phases of the trial was (while not ultimately successful) a reasonable one from a constitutional point of view, we conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the admission of that part of the confession showing Atkins' sexual proclivities. 42 e. Ineffectiveness of Trial Counsel for Failing to Investigate and Present Mitigating Evidence 43 Atkins argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present mitigating evidence. We find this argument meritless because, after reviewing the entire penalty phase of Atkins' trial, virtually all of the mitigating evidence that Atkins argues should have been presented was presented. And while Atkins now offers some new testimonial evidence that might have been presented, [t]he mere fact that other witnesses might have been available or that other testimony might have been elicited from those who testified is not a sufficient ground to prove ineffectiveness of counsel. Foster v. Dugger, 823 F.2d 402, 406 (11th Cir.1987). Trial counsel did enough. A lawyer can almost always do something more in every case. But the Constitution requires a good deal less than maximum performance. Trial counsel's presentation of mitigating circumstances--both what was put in and what was left out--in no way undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process and, therefore, was constitutionally effective. 44 f. Ineffectiveness of Appellate Counsel for Failing to Appeal the Admission into Evidence of Atkins' Confession to Sexual Battery 45 Atkins argues that appellate counsel should have appealed the trial judge's admission into evidence of Atkins' confession to oral and anal sex with Castillo. We find this argument meritless. As we have already noted, however, even if state prosecutors had not pursued sexual-battery charges the confession would have been admissible into evidence as part of the res gestae of the crime. See supra § II.D.1.d. Appellate counsel's decision to forgo appeal of this issue was, under these circumstances, professionally reasonable. Atkins has failed to meet the first Strickland test. 46 g. Ineffectiveness of Appellate Counsel for Failing to Argue that Atkins' Murder Conviction was Unsupported by Sufficient Evidence 47 Without stating why the evidence was insufficient, Atkins argues that appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing that the evidence presented by prosecutors was insufficient to support a murder conviction. Because this is the first time Atkins raises this issue, we cannot review it. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573 (11th Cir.1984). 7