Opinion ID: 2551773
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Precedent

Text: ¶ 72 AGFA argues that Technicians' failure to prove exposure to toxic levels of chemicals is fatal to their case. The district court found that Technicians' inability to prove such exposure defeated the essential element of causation in an action for negligence. Other courts disagree, however, on the preciseness of proof of exposure necessary for a chemical injury recovery. The split is particularly pronounced between the lower state and federal courts and the courts of appeal. Like the district court here, many of the lower courts in other jurisdictions have avoided examination of the sometimes difficult and technical issues in chemical injury actions by excluding expert testimony and dismissing the case. However, several courts of appeal have reversed and remanded such cases. In view of this, and of the fact that such lower court decisions are neither binding nor particularly persuasive to us, we restrict our review to the courts of appeal opinions and our own previous decisions. ¶ 73 AGFA relies on the Eighth Circuit Court's observation in Wright v. Willamette Industries, Inc., 91 F.3d 1105 (8th Cir.1996), that a plaintiff in a toxic tort case must prove levels of exposure that are hazardous to human beings generally as well as the plaintiff's actual level of exposure to the defendant's toxic substance before he or she may recover. Id. at 1106. On the following page, however, the court softened that statement by holding: We do not require a mathematically precise table equating levels of exposure with levels of harm, but there must be evidence from which a reasonable person could conclude that a defendant's emission has probably caused a particular plaintiff the kind of harm of which he or she complains before there can be a recovery. Id. at 1107. In cases such as the one before us, reasonable person could conclude translates to reasonable medical certainty. Here Technicians' experts are prepared to testify to a reasonable medical certainty that exposure to toxic levels of x-ray processing chemicals caused Technicians' injuries. Furthermore, the Wright court's use of probably caused emphasizes that the burden of proof requires no more than a preponderance of the evidence. ¶ 74 AGFA further relies on Allen v. Pennsylvania Engineering Corp., 102 F.3d 194 (5th Cir.1996), wherein the court stated that [s]cientific knowledge of the harmful level of exposure to a chemical, plus knowledge that the plaintiff was exposed to such quantities, are minimal facts necessary to sustain the plaintiffs' burden in a toxic tort case. Id. at 199. In that case, the plaintiff developed brain cancer many years after poorly documented and intermittent exposure to ethylene oxide (EtO), which had been classified as a carcinogen by public health agencies. Id. at 195-96, 199. The Allen court observed that although occupational exposure to EtO has been studied for many years, not a single scientific study has revealed a link between human brain cancer and EtO exposure. Id. at 197. Furthermore, [t]he experts actually knew more about Allen's exposure to EtO through his smoking a pack of cigarettes a day than they did about his occupational exposure to the chemical. Id. at 198. ¶ 75 In contrast, the case before us involves an allegation of daily exposure during the period in which symptoms developed to substances documented as causative agents for the specific harm alleged. The list of literature reviewed by the University of Utah panel includes, inter alia, articles and monographs onreactions to chemical fumes in radiology departments [16] and mortality patterns among press photographers. [17] Twenty-seven of the sources reviewed specifically address the dangers of glutaraldehyde exposure. The titles of these articles alone list asthma, [18] proctitis, [19] tachycardia and palpitations, [20] proctocolitis, [21] allergy, [22] peripheral sensory irritation and hypersensitivity, [23] and epistaxis [24] as possible side effects of such exposure. One Chemical Caution note labels glutaraldehyde an effective but lethal sterilizer, [25] and another calls it a potential health risk to nurses. [26] Thirteen additional studies target the dangers of hydroquinone. These include a study on the mortality of technicians engaged in the manufacture and use of hydroquinone. [27] ¶ 76 Furthermore, subsequent to Allen, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Curtis v. M & S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661 (5th Cir.1999). In Curtis, the plaintiffs alleged injury from workplace exposure to benzene. Id. at 664. No definitive air quality tests were available. Id. at 671. The plaintiffs' expert witness relied on, inter alia, knowledge of the working environment and observation of the workers' symptoms to conclude that refinery workers were exposed to benzene at several hundred times the permissible level. Id. at 671-72. The court admitted the expert's testimony that in the existing circumstances, the workers' symptoms themselves indicated high levels of benzene exposure. Id. at 671. The Curtis court held that the law does not require plaintiffs to show the precise level of benzene to which they were exposed. Id. We find the closely analogous Curtis more persuasive than the earlier, more distinguishable Allen. ¶ 77 A number of other circuits have also admitted expert testimony without precise proof of toxic levels of exposure. In McCullock, 61 F.3d at 1040, proof of exposure consisted of testimony that the plaintiff worked within thirty feet of a hot glue pot and could smell the fumes. Nevertheless, the court admitted expert testimony that exposure to the fumes had caused plaintiff's throat polyps. Id. at 1043-44. ¶ 78 In Westberry, 178 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 1999), the court rejected defendant's challenge to plaintiff's expert medical testimony where accumulations of talc were evident in the environment although the level of airborne talc was never measured and plaintiff's tissue concentration of talc was never determined. Id. at 263-66. The court stated that it must be recognized that [o]nly rarely are humans exposed to chemicals in a manner that permits a quantitative determination of adverse outcomes.... Human exposure occurs most frequently in occupational settings where workers are exposed to industrial chemicals like lead or asbestos; however, even under these circumstances, it is usually difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the amount of exposure. Id. at 264 (quoting Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 187 (1994)). ¶ 79 In Kannankeril v. Terminix Int'l, Inc., 128 F.3d 802 (3d Cir.1997), the plaintiff, a medical doctor, developed debilitating symptoms and was forced to give up her hospital position after her residence was sprayed with pesticide. Id. at 805. The symptoms included cognitive impairment and general chemical sensitivities. Id. Air quality samples taken nine months after the final application of pesticide indicated nondetectable levels of pesticides. Id. The Third Circuit concluded that it is for the trier of fact to determine what weight to give the ambient air test results as an indication of exposure. Id. at 809. We agree. ¶ 80 AGFA recognizes the dose makes the poison as one of the central tenets of toxicology. It admits, and even cites authority for the proposition that all chemicals may be harmful if consumed in large quantities. In so doing, AGFA inadvertently concedes to the reasoning of McCullock and Kannankeril. Specifically, if all chemicals are harmful and the poison is in the dose, then wherever chemicals are part of the environment, victims' toxic symptoms are themselves evidence of harmful levels, at least as an issue of triable fact. ¶ 81 Furthermore, common law tort doctrine declares that one who injures another takes him as he is. Brunson v. Strong, 17 Utah 2d 364, 367, 412 P.2d 451, 453 (1966). If AGFA has not breached a duty of care to Technicians, then the level of airborne chemicals in the mammography suite becomes irrelevant here. If, however, AGFA has committed the tort of negligence in allowing the Curix machine to be operated in an environment where the ventilation did not meet its own safety standards, then toxic level becomes any level that is harmful to these specific plaintiffs. ¶ 82 The district court's declaration that plaintiffs are unable to prove exposure to any chemicals, let alone levels known to cause known toxic effects ignored substantial testimonial and circumstantial evidence of Technicians' prolonged exposure to x-ray processing chemicals. The court invoked summary judgment although Technicians' level of exposure and even the operating definition of toxic level are vigorously contested issues of fact. [28] In so doing, the court abused its discretion. The right of supplicants to prove that which they are able in court is a fundamental tenet of our jurisprudence. See Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 6, ¶ 66, 44 P.3d 663 (stating that by inappropriately dismissing claims, the district court unconstitutionally denied [the plaintiffs] the opportunity to have their day in court); Gitsch v. Wight, 61 Utah 175, 178-79, 211 P. 705, 706 (1922) (That every person has a right to his day in court and an opportunity to be heard before he can be deprived of a justiciable right is too elementary for discussion....). ¶ 83 Therefore, Technicians' claims cannot be dismissed on the basis that incomplete tests administered after remediation by AGFA's own expert do not show toxic levels of exposure under AGFA's own definition of toxic. To thus stifle the unresolved factual issues of chemical exposure under a cloak of premature summary judgment effectively denies Technicians their day in court. Consequently, we reverse summary judgment on the issue of exposure.