Opinion ID: 1797728
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court erroneously allowed testimony regarding defendant's gang affiliation as well as testimony by a gang expert.

Text: Defendant argues testimony by a gang expert regarding his gang affiliation rendered his sentencing hearing fundamentally unfair. He asserts much of the evidence introduced was irrelevant and highly prejudicial and injected an arbitrary factor into the sentencing proceedings. Officer Chad Zimmerman was qualified as an expert in gang violence with no objection by defense counsel. Zimmerman discussed the history of gangs in Shreveport, the types of illegal conduct that gang members are generally involved in, and the types of conduct necessary for one to become the Original Gangster or O.G. [8] He also stated that a gangster in his mid-thirties would definitely be an O.G. After concluding this introduction, Zimmerman was asked to interpret the letters sent by defendant to Charlene Henderson. He noted the letters were written in gang script, a particular style used to alert other gang members that the writer is also a gang member. Zimmerman interpreted one letter to mean that defendant had started a riot in prison and was threatening to harm his cellmate. [9] Zimmerman then read from letters to Charlene Henderson in which defendant explains he has just learned his girlfriend, Tina Henderson, had lied when she told him she was pregnant and that she turned him into the police. He threatens the sisters in very violent and graphic terms throughout these letters. [10] On cross-examination, Zimmerman explained that an O.G. need not come from Los Angeles and that a baby born into a gang family is also an O.G. because it came from two gang members. Age was not necessarily the determining factor, Zimmerman continued, but instead, O.G. status is determined primarily based on what violent crimes a gangster has committed. For example, killing and jack[ing] a car would allow only entrance into a gang, but killing gangsters from a rival gang in front of witnesses would confer O.G. status. On redirect, Zimmerman indicated that if he knew an individual had entered a gang at the age of thirty-two, as defendant apparently did, he would find it so unusual that he would start an investigation and see where he came from, what he's into, and what he's trying to take over. Defendant argues the introduction of portions of the letters combined with Zimmerman's testimony and the earlier admission at the guilt phase of the gang affiliation sheet and testimony which revealed defendant was a member of a gang injected an arbitrary factor in his sentencing hearing and demands reversal of his death penalty. We first note defense counsel did not object to the expert's testimony, but only objected to the admission of certain portions of the letters written to Charlene. However, we held in State v. Taylor, supra , that we will review errors occurring during the sentencing phase, whether objected to or not, because of our duty under Rule 28 and La. C.Cr.P. art. 905.9 to review every death sentence for excessiveness by examining the record for passion, prejudice or arbitrary factors which may have contributed to the death penalty recommendation. We emphasize, however, that the goal of the contemporaneous objection rule of La.C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) and La.Code Evid. art. 103, to promote judicial efficiency by preventing a defendant from gambling for a favorable verdict and then, upon conviction, resorting to appeal on errors which either could have been avoided or corrected at the time or should have put an immediate halt to the proceedings, Taylor, 669 So.2d at 368, are just as valid in the penalty phase as in the guilt phase. In any event, we must review the gang expert testimony to consider whether it injected arbitrary factors or prejudice into the death penalty phase. Arbitrary factors are those which are entirely irrelevant or so marginally relevant to the jury's function in the determination of sentence that the jury should not be exposed to these factors; otherwise, the death penalty may be imposed `wantonly or freakishly' or for discriminatory reasons. State v. Comeaux, 93-2729 (La.7/1/97), 699 So.2d 16, 21-22, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1169, 140 L.Ed.2d 179 (1998) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). If an arbitrary factor was introduced, we must determine whether there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the [sentence], and the court must be able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824,17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). In capital cases, the required focus of the penalty phase is on the circumstances of the offense, the character and propensities of the offender, and the aggravating and mitigating factors. Comeaux, supra at 26; La.C.Cr.P. arts. 905.2 A, 905.4 and 905.5. The character of the defendant is automatically at issue, whether the defendant has placed his character at issue or not. State v. Jackson, 608 So.2d 949, 953 (La. 1992); La.C.Cr.P. art. 905.2 The United State Supreme Court has held that evidence of a defendant's gang membership may be admissible at a capital sentencing hearing provided the evidence is relevant. Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 165, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 1097, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992), see also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984). In Dawson, the Court concluded the trial court erroneously allowed the admission of evidence of defendant's membership in a prison gang because the evidence, as it was presented to the jury, was irrelevant to the sentencing proceedings. The state and the defense had agreed to a stipulation which provided that: The Aryan Brotherhood refers to a white racist prison gang that began in the 1960's in California in response to other gangs of racial minorities. Separate gangs calling themselves the Aryan Brotherhood now exist in many state prisons including Delaware. Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. at 162, 112 S.Ct. at 1096. The prosecution also informed the jury that defendant had tattooed Aryan Brotherhood on his hand and had introduced himself as Abaddon which he said meant one of satan's disciples. Id. The Court held that the narrowness of the stipulation left the Aryan Brotherhood evidence totally without relevance to Dawson's sentencing proceeding, because the evidence was not tied in any way to the murder for which defendant was being sentenced. Id., 503 U.S. at 165, 112 S.Ct. at 1097. Further, because the prosecution did not introduce evidence that the Aryan Brotherhood had committed any unlawful or violent acts, or had even endorsed such acts, the evidence was not relevant to prove any of the aggravating circumstances advanced by the state. Id., 503 U.S. at 166, 112 S.Ct. at 1098. Significantly, for our purposes, the Court noted the prosecution's expert witness, who was not called to testify, would have testified that the Aryan Brotherhood was associated with drugs and violent escape attempts at prisons, and advocates the murder of fellow inmates. The Court observed that if such evidence had been presented, the Court would have had a much different case. Id., 503 U.S. at 165, 112 S.Ct. at 1097. The Court further explained that [i]n many cases, for example, associational evidence might serve a legitimate purpose in showing that a defendant represents a future danger to society. Id., 503 U.S. at 166,112 S.Ct. 1093. The case at bar is the much different case the Supreme Court described. The gang expert's testimony described violent and drug-related conduct that is engaged in and endorsed by Rollin' 60's gang members and which, given defendant's membership in the gang, is highly relevant to defendant's character and his future dangerousness. His testimony was also necessary and relevant to interpret the letters written by defendant in which he threatens his cellmate, Tina, and Charlene. Thus, the prosecution in the instant case escaped the trap illustrated in Dawson by introducing strong evidence to establish a relevant link between the defendant's character, his sentencing, and evidence of his gang involvement. Furthermore, contrary to defendant's assertions, the evidence of gang drug involvement does not constitute the type of nonviolent unadjudicated other crimes evidence prohibited by State v. Jackson, 608 So.2d 949 (La.1992) because no specific crimes were associated with the defendant. In addition, it is common knowledge that gang members engage in drug-related and violent crimes; thus, the expert testimony can hardly be characterized as arbitrary, prejudicial, or even surprising to the jury. The threats of violence or death to the Henderson sisters and the confession that defendant started a riot in prison, which were contained in the letters, involve violence and thus are admissible under Jackson. Moreover, although the state introduced no independent evidence of the riot, this court recently held that although an accused cannot be convicted of a crime based solely on his own uncorroborated confession without some independent proof that a crime has been committed, the confession-corroboration requirement is not necessary before a confession may be admitted at the penalty phase of a capital trial. State v. Connolly, 96-1680, p. 15 (La.7/1/97), 700 So.2d 810, 820. [I]f the admitted confession is reliable and trustworthy, then it alone may be sufficient to satisfy the clear and convincing evidentiary standard established in State v. Brooks, 541 So.2d 801 (La.1989). Connolly, 96-1680, p. 15, 700 So.2d at 821 (emphasis in original). Here, as in Connolly, [t]here is no evidence in the record to suggest defendant's confession [to the riot] was anything other than voluntary and the product of defendant's uncoerced free will. Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Dawson left open the possibility that the wrongful admission of gang evidence at sentencing could be characterized as harmless error. Dawson, supra, 503 U.S. at 169, 112 S.Ct. at 1099. Thus, even assuming the admission of part of the gang expert's testimony was erroneous, it is harmless error under Chapman unless there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of might have contributed to the [sentence], and the court [is] able to declare a belief that [the error] was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828,17 L.Ed.2d at 710-11. The state presented overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt in the instant case. Consequently, we conclude the conviction in the instant case surely was unattributable to the erroneous admission of evidence of defendant's gang affiliation during the guilt phase. Further, the gang expert's testimony at the penalty phase pales in comparison to the violence of the crime in question about which the jury had already heard in detail. It is also common knowledge that gang members are involved in violent activities. In addition, the content of the letters which Zimmerman read to the jury were so graphic and violent on their own that Zimmerman's interpretation of them did not add any arbitrary factor into the jury's deliberation. Thus, while we recognize that in the appropriate case the admission of gang expert testimony may constitute reversible error, we conclude that in this case, there is not a reasonable possibility that it contributed to the sentence, and its admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly, this assignment of error lacks merit.