Opinion ID: 3163909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Title VII Discrimination Claim

Text: We turn now to Dooley’s claim that JetBlue discriminated against her on the basis of her sex, in violation of Title VII. Like Dooley’s Title VII retaliation claim, her Title VII discrimination claim is governed by McDonnell Douglas. See Ya-Chen Chen v. City Univ. of N.Y., 805 F.3d 59, 73–74 (2d Cir. 2015). “Under the McDonnell Douglas framework, [the plaintiff] bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) [s]he belonged to a protected class; (2) [s]he was qualified for the position [s]he held; (3) [s]he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that the adverse employment action occurred under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.” Tolbert v. Smith, 790 F.3d 427, 435 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “a plaintiff is not required to plead a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, at least as the test was originally formulated, to defeat a motion to dismiss.” Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, as concerns the fourth prong, “a plaintiff need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “a discrimination complaint . . . must [still] at a minimum assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to nudge its claims across the line from conceivable to plausible to proceed.” EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, “the elements of a prima facie case may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim.” Littlejohn, 795 F.3d at 311 n.9 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Vega, 801 F.3d at 84 n.7 (same). Dooley argues that the District Court erred in dismissing her Title VII discrimination claim because she adequately pleaded disparate treatment, which “is a recognized method of raising an inference of discrimination for purposes of making out a prima facie case,” and “requires the plaintiff to show that the employer treated . . . her less favorably than a similarly situated employee outside of the protected group.” Raspardo v. Carlone, 770 F.3d 97, 126 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, Dooley argues that she “showed that she and [two male] comparators (a) worked in the same job title and capacity . . . , (b) were injured on the job, (c) missed a lot of work because of their injuries, [and] (d) were returned to work by the company, [but the two male comparators] (e) were not disciplined let alone fired. These were the ‘material’ parallels that mattered.” Pl.’s Br. 41. The problem with Dooley’s argument is that JetBlue’s stated reason for firing her was not that she “missed a lot of work because of [her] injur[y]”—it was that she missed a lot of work before she was injured. See A-36 (stating that Dooley was injured on or about May 29, 2013); A-38 (describing Dooley’s “absences for the period of January 5–12, February 17–20 and 23–25, 2013”). “In the 4 context of employee discipline, . . . the plaintiff and the similarly situated employee must have engaged in comparable conduct, that is, conduct of comparable seriousness.” Raspardo, 770 F.3d at 126 (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, it simply cannot be said that the absences of the two male comparators, which were caused by job-related injuries, are comparable to Dooley’s absences, which were not. See A-39 (alleging that Dooley missed work “because of an auto accident” and “because her daughter suffered an anaphylactic reaction”). As such, the District Court properly dismissed Dooley’s Title VII discrimination claim.