Opinion ID: 2545785
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecution's Cross-examination Regarding Feigned Mental Illness

Text: As previously mentioned, Dr. Harvey Dondershine testified that PTSD is a recognized form of mental illness, and he described its characteristics. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked him whether he was familiar with the Rosenhan study, which showed that psychiatrists can mistakenly diagnose a patient as mentally ill. Dondershine said he knew of the study, and the prosecutor then elicited from him how it had been conducted: eight medical students feigned mental illness to obtain admission to hospital psychiatric wards, but the day after admission each no longer pretended to be mentally ill. Nevertheless, they were incorrectly diagnosed as mentally ill. Defendant asserts the prosecutor's questions were not permissible cross-examination. He relies on Evidence Code section 721, subdivision (b), which, at the time of defendant's trial, provided that an expert could not be cross-examined regarding the content or tenor of any ... technical ... publication unless: [¶] (1) The witness referred to, considered, or relied upon such publication in arriving at or forming his opinion; or [¶] (2) Such publication has been admitted in evidence. (Stats.1965, ch. 299, § 2, p. 1312.) He contends that here Dr. Dondershine did not rely on the Rosenhan study in forming his opinion and the study was not admitted into evidence. Because defendant did not object to the challenged cross-examination, he has not preserved the issue for appeal. ( People v. Price (1991) 1 Cal.4th 324, 457, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 821 P.2d 610.) Anticipating this conclusion, defendant accuses his counsel of incompetence for not making such an objection. Assuming for the sake of argument that an objection would have been meritorious, defense counsel's decision not to object may have been motivated by legitimate tactical considerations. (See generally People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859 [if counsel's omissions resulted from an informed tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence, the conviction must be affirmed].) Counsel knew the prosecutor intended to call Dr. Jay Ziskin to testify that psychological diagnoses are not valid or reliable, and he could reasonably assume that Dr. Ziskin would rely on the Rosenhan study in support of this conclusion. Counsel may have decided that it would be better for the defense if the jury learned of the Rosenhan study from defense witness Dr. Dondershine rather than from prosecution witness Dr. Ziskin.