Opinion ID: 2461057
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal and Factual Sufficiency

Text: ¶ 9 Though the Washington Constitution guarantees to voters the right to recall elected officials, a recall must be for cause. Wash. Const. art. I, § 33; RCW 29A.56.110; Chandler v. Otto, 103 Wash.2d 268, 274, 693 P.2d 71 (1984). Specifically, the recall petition must allege that the official committed an act of misfeasance or malfeasance or violated the oath of office. RCW 29A.56.110. Courts perform a limited gatekeeping function in the recall process, determining only whether the charges are both legally and factually sufficient. In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 141 Wash.2d 756, 764, 10 P.3d 1034 (2000) ( Pearsall-Stipek III ). ¶ 10 In order to be legally sufficient, the court must conclude that the actions alleged make out a prima facie case of malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of the oath of office. In re Recall of Reed, 156 Wash.2d 53, 59, 124 P.3d 279 (2005). Malfeasance in office is defined as either (1) wrongful conduct that affects, interrupts, or interferes with the performance of official duty or (2) the commission of an unlawful act. RCW 29A.56.110(1)(b); Pearsall-Stipek III, 141 Wash.2d at 768, 10 P.3d 1034 (holding that these prongs are distinct statutory definitions). ¶ 11 To be factually sufficient, a petition must state in detail the acts complained of, and the petitioners must have knowledge of identifiable facts which support the charges. In re Recall of Sandhaus, 134 Wash.2d 662, 668, 953 P.2d 82 (1998). Where the petition alleges that the official committed an unlawful act, factual sufficiency also requires that the petition contain a factual basis for both the proposition that the official intended to commit the act and that the official intended to act unlawfully. In re Recall of Pearsall-Stipek, 136 Wash.2d 255, 263, 961 P.2d 343 (1998). ¶ 12 We reject one of Mayor Heiberg's arguments at the outset. Though a petition for recall must allege that the official has committed an act or acts of malfeasance, or an act or acts of misfeasance while in office, or has violated the oath of office, RCW 29A.56.110, this does not require that recall petitioners use the specific terms misfeasance, malfeasance, or violation of the oath of office in the petition. Insistence on talismanic invocation of such terms would be contrary to our well-established principle that [t]echnical violations of the governing statutes are not fatal so long as the charges, read as a whole, give the elected official enough information to respond to the charges and the voters enough information to evaluate them. West I, 155 Wash.2d at 663, 121 P.3d 1190. Recall petitioners must include in the petition a description of the action that constitutes malfeasance, misfeasance, or violation of the oath of office, but need not employ technical legal terms in doing so.
¶ 13 Charge One, which alleges that Mayor Heiberg violated the law by purchasing a pickup truck for the city without calling for bids or obtaining the approval of the town council, is factually insufficient to justify a recall petition. As set forth above, where a recall petition is based on violation of the law, factual sufficiency requires a factual basis for the proposition that the elected official intended to violate the law. Such a factual basis is absent here. ¶ 14 Intent to violate the law may be inferred from the circumstances. The inference must not, however, be too conjectural. In re Recall of Ackerson, 143 Wash.2d 366, 373, 20 P.3d 930 (2001). In Sandhaus, specific warnings that additional spending would exceed the office budget in violation of state law were held to be sufficient to establish the requisite intent to violate the law. 134 Wash.2d at 665, 671, 953 P.2d 82. ¶ 15 At the time that Mayor Heiberg purchased the truck, he had only held the office for approximately eight months. In making the purchase, he relied on his understanding, albeit an incorrect understanding, that the entire $15,155.87 balance in the town's equipment reserve fund was available to purchase the truck. Further, upon discovering that his actions had been improper, Mayor Heiberg promptly set out to cure his error, first by seeking ratification by the town council and, failing that, by fully reimbursing the town. In light of these facts, the mayor's improper purchase of the truck bears all the hallmarks of a simple mistake, not an intent to violate the law. Though Pearce and Schwartz adduced evidence that Heiberg had attended a training program for elected officials prior to taking office in January 2010, the record contains no indication that the training included instruction on purchasing policies. Nor does his prior service on the town's planning board provide factual support for the charge that Mayor Heiberg intended to violate the law. ¶ 16 Because there is no factual basis for the charge that Mayor Heiberg intended to violate the law when he purchased the truck for the city, Charge One is factually insufficient to support the recall petition.
¶ 17 Charge Five alleges that Mayor Heiberg authorized the destruction of a resolution introduced at a town council meeting that called for a vote of no confidence in him. As with Charge One, Charge Five is factually insufficient. ¶ 18 Schwartz and Pearce have provided no factual basis for the proposition that Mayor Heiberg either destroyed or authorized the destruction of the resolution. The facts alleged merely establish that the mayor received a copy of the petition and that, sometime thereafter, the resolution was not included in response to a public records request filed with the city clerk for the council packet. There is no factual basis for the claim that the record was destroyed, much less that Mayor Heiberg destroyed it. Schwartz and Pearce contend that the mayor would be responsible for destruction by the city clerk by virtue of his supervisory capacity. However, this court has noted that there is `no authority for the proposition that a public official may be recalled for the act of a subordinate done without the official's knowledge or direction.' Reed, 156 Wash.2d at 58, 124 P.3d 279 (quoting In re Recall of Morrisette, 110 Wash.2d 933, 936, 756 P.2d 1318 (1988)). Schwartz and Pearce fail to allege knowledge of any facts supporting the charge that Mayor Heiberg has destroyed or authorized the destruction of the resolution. As such, this charge is not factually sufficient. Sandhaus, 134 Wash.2d at 668, 953 P.2d 82.