Opinion ID: 450662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Remedy for Consent Judgment Violation

Text: 24 Having found that defendants violated the consent judgment, the special master ordered defendants to promote Little to a vacant supervisory position with back pay. The Secretary contends that this remedy is not authorized by the consent judgment. 25 The consent judgment provides, In the event that the Special Master determines that a violation of the Judgment has occurred, he shall be authorized to order all appropriate relief therefor.... We hold that this provision fully authorized the special master's award of promotion and back pay in this case. The special master found that defendants had violated the good faith provisions of the consent judgment, and the relief he ordered was entirely appropriate for the violation. 26 The Secretary argues, however, that the remedies available to the special master are limited by the general provision in the consent judgment that In interpreting the provisions of this Judgment which may become disputed among the parties, the law as set forth by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as construed by the courts, shall apply. The Secretary contends that Title VII authorizes the remedies of promotion and back pay only for actual victims of discrimination and, hence, these remedies should be reserved for victims of discrimination under the consent decree. We see no merit in this argument. The consent judgment specifically provides for all appropriate relief to be given for consent judgment violations. Nothing in Title VII addresses the question of what relief is appropriate for such violations because Title VII deals with discrimination, not with violations of consent judgments. Title VII's remedy provisions are therefore of no assistance in determining what relief is appropriate for the Secretary's violation of the consent judgment, and the special master correctly relied upon a careful assessment of the nature of the violation in this case in deciding what relief was appropriate. 27 The Secretary also contends that the special master could not order back pay and promotion in the absence of a specific finding that but for the consent judgment violation, Little would have been promoted. The Secretary's argument is based on analogy to the principle under Title VII that even when discrimination has been proven, the plaintiff is not entitled to relief if the defendants prove by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff would not have been hired even in the absence of discrimination. Lewis v. Smith, 731 F.2d 1535, 1538 (11th Cir.1984). The Secretary's analogy is faulty, however, because relief here is being granted not for violation of Title VII, but for violation of the consent judgment. The consent judgment authorizes the special master to order appropriate relief when he determines that the consent judgment has been violated. No but for finding is required. 28 We hold, therefore, that the relief ordered by the special master was authorized by the consent judgment.