Opinion ID: 1348648
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excessive Interrogation

Text: Barradas's final argument is that the IJ violated his due process rights by going well beyond his role as factfinder to become the de facto co-counsel for DHS. Barradas asserts that the IJ's excessive questioning and continued interruption of his testimony denied him the fair hearing to which he was entitled. Immigration judges have the power to interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien and any witnesses. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1). They are permitted to use their statutory authority to focus the proceedings and exclude irrelevant evidence, though they may not bar[ ] complete chunks of oral testimony that would support the applicant's claim. Kerciku v. INS, 314 F.3d 913, 918 (7th Cir.2003) (per curiam). Essentially, IJs' `broad discretion to control the manner of interrogation in order to ascertain the truth,' Apouviepseakoda, 475 F.3d at 885 (quoting Iliev v. INS, 127 F.3d 638, 643 (7th Cir.1997)), is bounded only by the due process requirement that an alien be afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard, see Rodriguez Galicia v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 529, 538 (7th Cir.2005). In the end, we must determine whether, given the totality of the circumstances, [Barradas] had a full and fair opportunity to put on [his] case. Id. The circumstances here indicate that Barradas had a full and fair opportunity to present his case. The IJ considered Barradas's evidentiary objections before ruling on them. He interjected his own questions into the hearing just for... clarification on a line of testimony Barradas gave, namely about the birth certificates and how Anyyensy and Eduardo came to travel with Barradas, and only asked Barradas an extended series of questions after the government concluded its examination of him. The IJ did not interrupt Barradas to ask irrelevant or inappropriate questions, see Castilho de Oliveira v. Holder, 564 F.3d 892, 899-900 (7th Cir.2009), nor did the IJ's questioning rise to the level of being so pervasive that it was often difficult to determine who was representing the federal government with more fervorthe IJ or the government's attorney, Torres, 551 F.3d at 627. Further, the IJ did not bar any evidence that Barradas sought to introduce. To the contrary, Barradas's counsel declined to examine him or present any witnesses on his behalf. Barradas also contends that the IJ's failure to demand production of the supposed conviction for alien smuggling also supports his claim of a due process violation. We fail to see how that contention can be reconciled with Barradas's simultaneous allegations that the IJ inappropriately acted on behalf of the government. If the IJ instructed the government as to what evidence to produce and in what form to produce it, as Barradas maintains he should have, that would be more akin to becoming de facto co-counsel than any other instance of the IJ's conduct to which Barradas objects.