Opinion ID: 4380617
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Order Denying Summary Judgment

Text: The petitioners assert that the circuit court erred by entering a summary judgment order, which was prepared by Inmate Delgado’s counsel32 and which they argue contains inaccurate factual findings33 and conclusions of law that were not set forth by the circuit court on the record during the hearing on their summary judgment motions. They further assert that Inmate Delgado did not attach any exhibits to his response to the summary 32 West Virginia Trial Court Rule 24 expressly provides for our trial courts to direct counsel to prepare orders. Moreover, this Court has ruled that when an order entered by a circuit court is one that has been prepared by a party, we will only disturb the order if the findings are clearly erroneous. Kalwar v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 203 W.Va. 2, 7, 506 S.E.2d 39, 44 (1998). Here, we do not find the circuit court’s findings to be clearly erroneous. 33 The petitioners’ argument in this regard is generalized and does not specifically set forth these alleged inaccuracies. 40 judgment motions to support what his counsel would later rely upon in drafting the summary judgment order that the circuit court entered. Labeling petitioners’ arguments as “perplexing,” Inmate Delgado asserts the circuit court’s seventeen-page order contains a lengthy recital of the evidence in the light most favorable to him, the nonmoving party, as well as the legal standard for qualified immunity and summary judgment before concluding there are genuine issues of material fact precluding the granting summary judgment at this stage. He further asserts that the petitioners complain only generally about the circuit court’s factual findings without identifying any specific facts that they contend are not in the record. We have previously addressed the sufficiency of circuit court orders in this context, holding that [a] circuit court’s order denying summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds on the basis of disputed issues of material fact must contain sufficient detail to permit meaningful appellate review. In particular, the court must identify those material facts which are disputed by competent evidence and must provide a description of the competing evidence or inferences therefrom giving rise to the dispute which preclude summary disposition. Payne, 231 W.Va. at 566, 746 S.E.2d at 556-57, syl. pt. 4. We find the circuit court’s order meets the Payne standard. 41 Further, and notwithstanding the petitioners’ arguments to the contrary, trial courts are not required to make their findings during a hearing.34 As we explained in Legg v. Felinton, 219 W.Va. 478, 637 S.E.2d 576 (2006), [i]t is a paramount principle of jurisprudence that a court speaks only through its orders. See State v. White, 188 W.Va. 534, 536 n.2, 425 S.E.2d 210, 212 n.2 (1992) (“[H]aving held that a court speaks through its orders, we are left to decide this case within the parameters of the circuit court’s order.” (citations omitted)); State ex rel. Erlewine v. Thompson, 156 W.Va. 714, 718, 207 S.E.2d 105, 107 (1973) (“A court of record speaks only through its orders[.]” (citations omitted)). Legg, 219 W.Va. at 483, 637 S.E.2d at 581. Moreover, the mere preparation of an order at a circuit court’s direction does not mean the court is obligated to enter it. It is clearly within the authority of a circuit court to alter or amend a proposed order in anyway it deems appropriate. Having reviewed the transcript of the hearing on the summary judgment motions, we find that the circuit court allowed the parties to fully address their varying positions on the facts and the law. In addition to the circuit court’s thorough order, it is equally clear that the court was fully prepared for the hearing and had reviewed all relevant materials and applicable law. Indeed, we are left with the firm conviction that the circuit 34 Although the petitioners assert that the circuit court did not specifically address the basis for its denial of qualified immunity during oral argument, we note the absence of any specific requests or objections in this regard by the petitioners during the motions hearing. 42 court understood the legal issues being raised, the parties conflicting factual allegations, and their respective positions on the issue of qualified immunity,35 all of which is adequately reflected in the circuit court’s lengthy order. Rather than being deficient or inaccurate, we find the circuit court’s well-reasoned order sufficiently addresses the parties’ disparate factual allegations and the legal standards upon which the court’s decision was based. Further criticizing the circuit court’s order, the petitioners assert that the order may only contain statements made during the motions hearing or can only be based on exhibits attached to Inmate Delgado’s responses in opposition to their motions for summary judgment. We find no merit in this argument. In fact, when ruling “‘[o]n a motion for summary judgment all papers of record and all matters submitted by both parties should be considered by the court.’ Syllabus Point 2, Aetna Cas. & Sur. v. Fed. Ins. Co. of New York, 148 W.Va. 160, 133 S.E.2d 770 (1963).” Syl. Pt. 3, Ford v. Dickerson, 222 W.Va. 61, 662 S.E.2d 503 (2008) (emphasis added). Similarly, West Virginia Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides, in part, that the “judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if 35 The hearing transcript reveals that the petitioners had a full opportunity to explain their qualified immunity arguments, which the circuit court then summarized during the hearing, asking: “[Y]ou’re arguing that your clients are entitled to qualified immunity, that these were discretionary actions, and that they did this in good faith, and that there’s no violation of clearly established laws as it relates to any actions that they took?” The petitioners’ counsel replied in the affirmative. 43 any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, we find no error to the extent the circuit court relied upon pleadings or any other “papers of record” in this action when rendering its decision. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 148 W.Va. at 170, 133 S.E.2d at 776. Lastly, in reviewing a motion for summary judgment based on a claim of qualified immunity, the factual allegations are to be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. The circuit court did precisely that, explaining on the first page of said order: The following findings of fact are set forth viewing the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, Mr. Delgado, as required for ruling on a motion for summary judgment. See, e.g., Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 377 (2007) (“[C]ourts are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party opposing the judgment motion. In qualified immunity cases, this usually means adopting . . . the plaintiff’s version of the facts.”). (Emphasis added). Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court’s factual recitation, particularly where the circuit court’s order also summarized the petitioners’ countervailing facts. 44