Opinion ID: 790576
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Computer-Use Enhancement

Text: 39 Weisser also argues that even if § 2G2.2 is the appropriate Guideline, the subsection providing for a computer-use enhancement does not apply. He contends that the enhancement — which applies if a computer was used for the transmission of the material, U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) — is inapplicable to him because the act of transporting for which he was convicted was physically carrying the CD from California to New York, an act that concededly did not involve the use of a computer. 40 Although we have not previously confronted this question, the Third Circuit, applying reasoning that we find persuasive, recently addressed precisely this issue. In United States v. Harrison, 357 F.3d 314 (3d Cir.2004), vacated on other grounds, Harrison v. United States, 543 U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1027, 160 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2005), the defendant had received pornographic images by computer and had then mailed disks containing those images. Rejecting Harrison's attempt to distinguish between the downloading (which involved use of a computer) and the mailing (which was the offense of conviction and which did not involve use of a computer), the court held that the district court had properly applied § 2G2.2(b)(5). Id. at 317. It emphasized that the material had, at some point, been downloaded using [a] computer, id. at 319 n. 1, and found that the language of the Guideline supported imposition of the enhancement in such cases: 41 [T]he language of § 2G2.2(b)(5) is specifically targeted toward the material and not the offense, as are other portions of § 2G2.2. The application of the enhancement, therefore, does not hinge on whether the defendant used a computer to commit the offense for which he was convicted. Instead, the enhancement hinges on the material implicated in the offense, and whether this material had at some point been transmitted using a computer. There is no dispute that the material in this case had been so transmitted, and as a result, § 2G2.2(b)(5) is applicable. 42 Id. at 319 (emphasis added). 43 In addition to this linguistic analysis, policy reasons militate strongly in favor of application of the enhancement. The use of computers, and particularly the internet, in the child pornography context deserves special attention. See id. at 321 (The guidelines recognize the enhanced threat posed by the Internet, which greatly increases the ease with which child pornography may be traded.); Richardson, 238 F.3d at 842 (Use of the Internet enhances the dangers that child pornography poses, because it is a more discreet and efficient method of distribution.); see also United States v. Dotson, 324 F.3d 256, 260 (4th Cir.2003) (agreeing with Richardson court that the very nature of the Internet provides an `ominous method' for anonymous predatory criminal conduct). Application of the enhancement where a computer was used in transmitting the pornographic materials underlying the offense thus serves to punish more severely what has been recognized as more dangerous behavior. 44 Accordingly, the district court properly applied § 2G2.2(b)(5) to the act of transporting a CD whose manner of creation — downloading — involved the use of a computer. Moreover, this aspect of his sentence does not appear to have involved a Sixth Amendment error, since the facts upon which the district court relied — Weisser's use of a computer in downloading the images and his transporting the images across the country — were, respectively, admitted by Weisser and necessarily found by the jury when it convicted him under 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(1) of transporting child pornography in interstate commerce.