Opinion ID: 2275841
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ex post facto evidence.

Text: For his final argument regarding victim-impact evidence, the appellant asserts that the ex post facto clause of the United States and Arkansas constitutions precluded the use of victim-impact evidence at trial because Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-602(4) (Repl.1997) was enacted after Ms. Heath's murder but prior to the appellant's trial. However, appellant admittedly failed to object to the victim-impact testimony on this ground at trial; as such, this argument is, likewise, barred on appeal. See Ayers v. State, supra . Moreover, this Court previously rejected this argument by appellant in Johnson I; therefore, the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes further review. Johnson I, 326 Ark. at 450, 934 S.W.2d at 189. In Camargo v. State, 337 Ark. 105, 987 S.W.2d 680 (1999), this Court stated the following: The law-of-the-case doctrine ordinarily arises in the case of a second appeal and requires that matters decided in the first appeal be considered concluded. The doctrine is not inflexible and does not absolutely preclude correction of error, but it prevents an issue raised in a prior appeal from being raised in a subsequent appeal unless the evidence materially varies between the two appeals. 337 Ark. at 109-10, 987 S.W.2d at 683 (citations and quotations omitted). In Johnson I, we held that by expanding the scope of permissible evidence during the penalty phase, the General Assembly has not expanded the scope of punishment or added a new aggravating circumstance. Therefore, we held that permitting this testimony did not constitute an ex post facto law. Here, the appellant reasserts his ex post facto clause challenge to the admission of victim-impact evidence. Yet, there have been no substantive changes in the law nor material variances in the evidence between the appellant's first appeal and this appeal. Therefore, the law-of-the-case doctrine precludes review of this argument.