Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issues related to the penalty retrial

Text: The trial court instructed the jury: Each individual juror may consider, as a mitigating circumstance, any residual or lingering doubt in the mind of that juror, as to whether the defendant murdered Leroy Robinson and Betty Thompson. You may not relitigate or reconsider matters which were resolved in the guilt phase, but you may consider such residual or lingering doubt, if it exists in your mind, as a circumstance in mitigation. [¶] ... [¶] A lingering or residual doubt is defined as that state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt. Defendant argues that the portion of this instruction prohibiting the jury from relitigating or reconsidering matters resolved in the guilt phase conflicted with the portion permitting it to consider lingering doubt as a circumstance in mitigation, thereby violating his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. In resolving the issue of penalty, a capital jury may consider lingering doubts about a defendant's guilt. ( People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1272, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) A trial court is not required as a matter of state or federal law, however, to instruct a penalty jury to consider lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation. (See Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 173-174, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155; see also People v. Valdez, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 129, fn. 28, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296; People v. Musselwhite, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1272, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475.) Defendant argues that to properly consider lingering doubt, the penalty phase jury must, by definition, reconsider matters which were resolved in the guilt phase, that is, whether defendant had committed the murders, and that the court erred in instructing otherwise. We disagree. The guilt phase jury determined defendant's guilt and the truth of the special circumstance allegation beyond a reasonable doubt. As a matter of law, the penalty phase jury must conclusively accept these findings. (See People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 66, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224; People v. DeSantis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1198, 1238, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 628, 831 P.2d 1210.) Defendant criticizes as vague the trial court's definition of lingering doubt as a state of mind between beyond a reasonable doubt and beyond all possible doubt. We have in the past upheld the adequacy of an identically worded instruction on lingering doubt. ( People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 125, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) Defendant notes that, during voir dire of prospective jurors at the penalty phase retrial, several of those jurors, including one who was selected as a juror for the retrial, were confused on the concept of lingering doubt. But any confusion by prospective jurors who ultimately were not seated as jurors could not possibly have affected the penalty phase retrial. As for the one sitting juror who purportedly was confused on the concept of lingering doubt during voir dire, even assuming she was confused, we find no prejudice to defendant. The jury instructions at the end of the penalty phase retrial included an instruction on the definition of lingering doubt, and defendant does not argue that after hearing this instruction the juror in question or any other juror was confused about the concept of lingering doubt. The instruction at issue, moreover, did not purport to limit the evidence the jury could consider on the issue of lingering doubt. Indeed, in closing argument defense counsel asked the jury to objectively evaluate the evidence ... [before] deciding whether or not there is a lingering doubt. We conclude that the instruction given adequately convey[ed] the concept of lingering doubt and its proper relevance to the penalty decision. ( People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 125, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.)
Citing five areas of alleged misconduct by the prosecutor during his penalty phase retrial closing argument, defendant contends the cumulative impact deprived him of a fair penalty phase trial. We disagree. In part III.F of the discussion, ante, we set forth the constitutional standards governing prosecutorial misconduct. (See also People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 855, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.) Here, as we explain below, defendant fails to show that the prosecutor's conduct infected the trial with such unfairness as to make the conviction a denial of due process, or that, in violation of state law, the prosecutor used deceptive or reprehensible methods to persuade the jury. Nor has defendant shown a reasonable likelihood that the jury construed or applied any of the complained-of remarks in an objectionable fashion. ( People v. Morales, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 44, 104 Cal. Rptr.2d 582, 18 P.3d 11.)
During his closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to reject any argument by the defense that the jury should have compassion and sympathy for defendant, contending that defendant's conduct demonstrated a sense of very strong arrogance. Asserting that defendant acted as the judge, jury, and executioner of Thompson and Robinson, and that he tried to do the same to Olin Davis, the prosecutor said: When he makes up his mind that a person must go, that person is through, `you're through Olin and that's all there is to it.' But I'll tell you, ladies and gentlemen, he had no right to do it. This is a man who should be on his knees apologizing for what he did to his poor victims.  (Italics added.) When defendant objected, the trial court reminded the jury that the prosecutor's statements were not evidence and advised him to move forward into another area. Defendant later unsuccessfully moved for a mistrial, claiming the prosecutor's statement that defendant should be on his knees apologizing was the functional equivalent of a comment on his failure to testify, in violation of Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106. Pursuant to Griffin, it is error for a prosecutor to state that certain evidence is uncontradicted or unrefuted when that evidence could not be contradicted or refuted by anyone other than the defendant testifying on his or her own behalf. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 371, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432.) We also have said it is error for the prosecution to refer to the absence of evidence that only the defendant's testimony could provide. ( Id. at p. 372, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432, citing People v. Murtishaw (1981) 29 Cal.3d 733, 757 & fn. 19, 175 Cal.Rptr. 738, 631 P.2d 446.) Griffin's prohibition against `direct or indirect comment upon the failure of the defendant to take the witness stand,' however, `does not extend to comments on the state of the evidence or on the failure of the defense to introduce material evidence or to call logical witnesses.' ( People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 572, 244 Cal.Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776, quoting People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 304, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149.) Here, the prosecutor's remark that defendant should be on his knees apologizing was not a reference to defendant's failure to testify, but rather an assertion that defendant was proud of the murders when he ought to be ashamed of them. The prosecutor's argument to the jury after defense counsel's objection demonstrates his purpose in making the remark: He pointed out that defendant had bragged about the murders to Olin Davis, and he argued that defendant cut out a newspaper clipping that mentioned the murders because he was proud as a peacock that he had committed them. This argument did not violate Griffin v. California, supra, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106. (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 455, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 147, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.)
During closing argument, the prosecutor discussed the events leading to defendant's attempted murder of Davis and argued that defendant intended to kill Davis to eliminate him as a witness. The prosecutor continued: Ladies and gentlemen, the murder of a witness in the State of California is a special circumstance, itself, in and of itself makes someone eligible for the death penalty, in addition to the multiple murder special circumstance. He was going to kill a witness to a crime within a week of executing two people. (Italics added.) Defendant objected to the italicized portion of the argument, and the trial court sustained the objection. The court told the jury that the special circumstance the prosecutor referred to was not and is not alleged in this case and that the jury should disregard it. Defendant contends the italicized statement provided the jury with a perfect independent rationale for a verdict of death. We disagree. In the context of the prosecutor's discussion of defendant's attempted murder of Davis, the statement was merely an attempt to convey to the jury the seriousness of the crime against Davis. In any event, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury construed or applied the challenged remark in an objectionable fashion, given that defendant did not kill Davis, the prosecutor did not argue defendant killed Davis, and the jury was told that the special circumstance of murdering a witness was not alleged in this case and that it should disregard the remark.
Near the beginning of his closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor commented: When we picked the jury and we went through that process, ... I looked at this case and I said I can hardly wait to get up to argument and tell this jury what a rotten, nasty, S.O.B. and M.F. this man is. Later, the prosecutor also referred to defendant as a punk[ ]. The trial court noted defense counsel's objection to name calling and admonished the jury that the statements of counsel were not evidence. Defendant asserts that both comments were improper. Although epithets are not necessarily misconduct when they are reasonably warranted by the evidence ( People v. McDermott (2002) 28 Cal.4th 946, 1002, 123 Cal. Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874), we do not condone the use of profanity in arguments to the jury. Here, however, defendant did not object to the initial remark or request an admonition, so he cannot challenge it on appeal. ( Id. at p. 1003, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) In any event, these brief references would not have had such an impact `as to make it likely the jury's decision was rooted in passion rather than evidence.' [Citation.] ( Ibid. )
In his closing argument, the prosecutor said: I believe that if you embrace a man and hold him, you can feel him. . . . And then when you hold that man and shoot that man, you can feel that man die. You can feel his life pass from his spirit through your body and gone to the beyond and it's that singular feeling of being close and being near to sense and feel and smell the fear ... that gives life to [defendant] needing to feel that life forcing through him and pass on and then drop the carcass to the ground. Death is invigorating to him.... That's why he shoots these people in the head. Defendant argues there was no evidence to support this ghoulish depiction. Because he did not object to the remarks or request an admonition at trial, he may not now challenge them. Moreover, the remarks were reasonable commentary on the evidence that defendant was holding Robinson when he fatally shot him in the head and that he was holding Olin Davis when he tried to kill him by shooting him in the head. In any event, these brief comments in a very long closing argument were harmless under any standard. Defendant also complains about the prosecutor's comment in closing argument that defendant was sponging off his mom. Defendant objected that there was no such evidence, whereupon the trial court reminded the jury that the statements of counsel were not evidence in the case. Even assuming the remark was improper, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury applied it in an objectionable fashion.
During his discussion of section 190.3, factor (k) (Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime), the prosecutor stated: [N]obody came up here from [defendant's] family. I haven't seen any employers. I haven't seen any school teachers. I haven't seen anybody from the college. . . . I haven't seen anyone come into this courtroom and say anything on his behalf, nothing whatsoever, and if it existed, I guess he would be here by now. [¶] [This instruction] is the vehicle ... upon which you most reasonably would base a verdict of life. And all of this, all of this that's available to him, all of that which the law requires, all of that gives him a possible basis for life, he can answer none of this.... This instruction is useless to him because he can't fill any of the blanks. Defendant contends the prosecutor improperly argued to the jury that the absence of mitigating factors was evidence in aggravation, in violation of People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 288-290, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861. Defendant forfeited this argument by failing to object. (See People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 657-658, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) In any event, the point lacks merit. Although the prosecutor noted the absence of evidence of mitigation, he did not argue that this absence transformed the mitigating factors into aggravating factors. ( People v. McDermott, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1003, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874.) His statements fell within the range of proper prosecutorial argument. (See id. at pp. 1003-1004, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 654, 51 P.3d 874; see also People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 1030, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099.)
There is no merit to the claims of prosecutorial misconduct, and thus there is no improper cumulative effect.
Defendant challenges various aspects of California's death penalty law as violating the federal Constitution. We have previously rejected these challenges, and we decline to reconsider them here. A summary of the pertinent holdings follows. The special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murder for which the death penalty may be imposed. ( People v. Crew, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 860, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820; People v. Burgener (2003) 29 Cal.4th 833, 884 & fn. 7, 129 Cal.Rptr.2d 747, 62 P.3d 1; People v. Bolden, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 566, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the capital crime as an aggravating factor, is not unconstitutionally vague. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 973, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Bolden, supra, at p. 566, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931; People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 192, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Identification of sentencing factors as aggravating or mitigating is not constitutionally required. ( People v. Crew, supra, at p. 860, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820.) The prosecution need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors, and the jury need not find beyond a reasonable doubt that death is the appropriate punishment. ( Ibid. ) The jury need not be instructed on the burden of proof on the issue of penalty. ( People v. Mendoza, supra, at p. 191, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150.) Written jury findings or unanimity as to aggravating circumstances are not constitutionally required. ( People v. Crew, supra, at p. 860, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820; People v. Bolden, supra, at p. 566, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) Intercase proportionality review is not required. ( Ibid. )