Opinion ID: 2457285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The trial court properly dismissed the recall petition's charges as factually and legally insufficient

Text: ¶ 17 In recall proceedings, questions of factual and legal sufficiency are reviewed de novo. Teaford v. Howard, 104 Wash.2d 580, 590, 707 P.2d 1327 (1985). Elected officials may be recalled for malfeasance, misfeasance, and violation of their oath of office. CONST. art. I, §§ 33-34; RCW 29A.56.110. Courts ensure that charges are factually and legally sufficient before the charges are placed before the voters, but courts do not evaluate the truthfulness of the charges. RCW 29A.56.140; In re Recall of Kast, 144 Wash.2d 807, 813, 815, 31 P.3d 677 (2001). [T]he courts serve as gatekeepers to ensure that public officials are not subject to `frivolous or unsubstantiated charges.' In re Recall of Robinson, 156 Wash.2d 704, 707, 132 P.3d 124 (2006) (quoting Kast, 144 Wash.2d at 813, 31 P.3d 677). ¶ 18 Factual sufficiency requires that the charge state each act of misfeasance, malfeasance, or breach of the oath of office in concise language, and provide a detailed description, including the approximate date, location, and nature of each act. In re Recall of Lee, 122 Wash.2d 613, 616, 859 P.2d 1244 (1993). The charge must demonstrate that the petitioner knows of identifiable facts that support the charge. In re Recall of Reed, 156 Wash.2d 53, 58, 124 P.3d 279 (2005). Where an unlawful act is alleged, the petitioner must show facts indicating the official had knowledge of and intent to commit an unlawful act. In re Recall of Telford, 166 Wash.2d 148, 158, 206 P.3d 1248 (2009). ¶ 19 To be legally sufficient, the petition must state with specificity `substantial conduct clearly amounting to misfeasance, malfeasance or violation of the oath of office.' In re Recall of Wade, 115 Wash.2d 544, 549, 799 P.2d 1179 (1990) (quoting Teaford, 104 Wash.2d at 584, 707 P.2d 1327). [A] legally cognizable justification for an official's conduct renders a recall petition insufficient. Id. [A]n elected official cannot be recalled for appropriately exercising the discretion granted him or her by law. Reed, 156 Wash.2d at 59, 124 P.3d 279. Officials cannot be recalled for exercising their discretion unless that discretion was exercised in a manifestly unreasonable manner. Id. An attack on the official's judgment in exercising discretion is not a proper basis for recall. Jewett v. Hawkins, 123 Wash.2d 446, 450-51, 868 P.2d 146 (1994).
¶ 20 Charge one alleges that Lindquist committed misfeasance, malfeasance, or violated his oath of office by failing to investigate and prosecute Madsen. A prosecuting attorney is dependent upon law enforcement agencies to conduct the necessary factual investigation which must precede the decision to prosecute. RCW 9.94A.411(2)(b)(i). A prosecuting attorney may decline to prosecute... in situations where prosecution would serve no public purpose, would defeat the underlying purpose of the law in question or would result in decreased respect for the law. RCW 9.94A.411(1). Prosecutors enjoy wide discretion to file charges or refuse to charge for reasons other than the mere ability to establish guilt. [The prosecutor] may consider a wide range of factors in addition to the strength of the State's case in deciding whether prosecution would be in the public interest. State v. Rowe, 93 Wash.2d 277, 287, 609 P.2d 1348 (1980). ¶ 21 Petitioners argue that Lindquist breached his statutory duty to [i]nstitute and prosecute proceedings before magistrates for the arrest of persons charged with or reasonably suspected of felonies when the prosecuting attorney has information that any such offense has been committed. RCW 36.27.020(6). Lindquist contends that the prosecuting attorney does not perform investigations, and that any duty to prosecute arises only after receiving a law enforcement agency's investigation. In response to the argument that prosecutors do not conduct investigations, petitioners concede that Lindquist's argument is technically accurate but falls far too short in terms of representing the full scope of the [prosecutor's] inherent responsibilities. Pet'rs' Opening Br. at 24. Petitioners offer several general statements about a prosecutor's inherent responsibilities, but cite no authority to determine when failing to investigate or declining to prosecute would constitute misfeasance, malfeasance, or breach of oath of office. ¶ 22 Charge one is factually and legally insufficient because Lindquist had no duty to investigate. He had no law enforcement investigation presented to him upon which to base a decision to prosecute. Even with a law enforcement investigation, Lindquist has discretion to decide whether to prosecute. Given his predecessor's refusal to prosecute, the audit committee's determination that taxpayers were not harmed, and the prior court ruling that Madsen had a legally cognizable justification for his actions, Lindquist acted well within his discretion not to prosecute. As Lindquist concludes, [I]t is indisputably within the Prosecutor's discretion to decide that the prior determination by the judge will render obtaining a conviction problematic at best, and the very bringing of such a prosecution a misuse of prosecutorial discretion. Resp't's Br. at 25.