Opinion ID: 3012909
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reciprocal Disciplinary Proceedings

Text: The starting point for our review of federal district court disciplinary proceedings is the recognition that individual district courts, “like all federal courts, ha[ve] the power both to prescribe requirements for admission to practice before that court and to discipline attorneys” who appear before 5. Surrick is presently living in Florida and not practicing law, but, as his attorney stated at oral argument, he may some day decide to return to Pennsylvania and to resume his law practice. 9 them. Abrams, 521 F.2d at 1099; see also In re Kramer, 193 F.3d 1131, 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing cases for the proposition that “[t]here is little question but that district courts have the authority to supervise and discipline the conduct of attorneys who appear before them.”). “This includes the inherent authority to suspend or disbar lawyers,” provided such power is “exercised within the parameters of due process.” Kramer, 193 F.3d at 1132 (citations and internal quotations omitted). A reciprocal disciplinary proceeding such as the one at issue here, in which a federal court initiates action against a member of its bar based on the outcome of a state disciplinary proceeding against that attorney, requires federal courts to conduct an independent review of the state disciplinary proceeding prior to imposing punishment. Indeed, it is well-settled that, although state bar membership is required of those seeking admission to practice before the federal district courts of a given state, “disbarment by the [s]tate does not result in automatic disbarment by the federal court.” In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 547 (1968). Rather, although the decisions of state courts in such matters are “entitled to respect,” they are “not conclusively binding on the federal courts.” Id. However, “[i]n striking the appropriate balance . . . district courts must not operate in a vacuum. If the disciplinary proceedings derive from state court action, federal courts are not totally free to ignore the original state proceedings.” Abrams, 521 F.2d at 1099-1100 (citing Theard v. United States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957)). Instead, they must “examine the state proceeding for consistency with the requirements of due process, adequacy of proof and absence of any indication that imposing discipline would result in grave injustice.” In re Jacobs, 44 F.3d 84, 88 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46, 51 (1917)). More specifically, as the Supreme Court has held, federal courts should impose reciprocal discipline unless “an intrinsic consideration of the state record” indicates one of the following infirmities:
opportunity to be heard, was wanting in due process; 2, that there was such an infirmity of proof as to facts 10 found to have established the want of fair private and professional character as to give rise to a clear conviction on [the part of the federal court] that [it] could not, consistent[ ] with [its] duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 3, that some other grave reason exist[s] which should convince [the federal court] that to allow the natural consequences of the judgment to have their effect would conflict with the duty which rests upon [the court] not to disbar except upon the conviction that, under the principles of right and justice, [it is] constrained so to do. Selling, 243 U.S. at 51; see also Theard, 354 U.S. at 282. RAC II(D), which governed the proceedings below, was enacted on the basis of this ruling. See In re Pawlak, No. 94-211, 1995 WL 723177 at  (E.D. Pa. Dec. 1, 1995).6 Moreover, attorneys subject to reciprocal discipline in federal court bear the burden of demonstrating, “by clear and convincing evidence, that one of the Selling elements 6. RAC II(D) provides as follows: D. Upon the expiration of 30 days from service of the notice issued pursuant to the provisions of (B) above and after an opportunity for any attorney contesting the imposition of the identical discipline or prohibition to be heard by one or more judges designated by the Chief Judge, this court shall impose the identical discipline unless the respondent-attorney demonstrates, or this court finds, that upon the face of the record upon which the discipline or prohibition in another jurisdiction is predicated it clearly appears: 1. that the procedure was so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to constitute a deprivation of due process; or 2. that there was such an infirmity of proof as to give rise to the clear conviction that this court could not, consistent with its duty, accept as final the conclusion on that subject; or 3. that the imposition of the same discipline or prohibition by this court would result in grave injustice; or 4. that the misconduct or other basis established for the discipline or prohibition is deemed by this court to warrant substantially different action. Where this court determines that any of said elements exist, it shall enter such other order as it deems appropriate. 11 precludes reciprocal discipline.” In re Kramer, 282 F.3d 721, 724-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing cases). Thus, there is no entitlement to a de novo trial before the District Court. See In re Alker, 307 F.2d 880, 881 (3d Cir. 1962); see also Calvo, 88 F.3d at 967. Rather, the District Court need only “determine whether the record underlying the predicate state disbarment reveals the kind of infirmities identified in Selling.” Calvo, 88 F.3d at 967 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Finally, as we noted in Abrams, “we perceive our role in reviewing the district court’s action to be extremely limited.” 521 F.2d at 1101. In particular, it consists of the following:
unfettered power of the district court to admit and to discipline members of its bar independently of and separately from admission and disciplinary procedures of (a) the state courts and (b) this court.