Opinion ID: 654620
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Extent of Governmental Regulation.

Text: 40 Because the cross burnings involved expressive conduct, we need to consider whether the government's regulation of that conduct was related to the suppression of free expression. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403, 109 S.Ct. at 2538. If so, we apply a heightened standard of review. Id. If not, we apply the less stringent test announced in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). Id. 41 The purpose of section 3631(b) is to protect the right of an individual to associate freely in his home with anyone, regardless of race. To achieve that end, the statute prohibits acts of willful intimidation against people based on race. The statute, then, is aimed at curtailing wrongful conduct in the form of threats or intimidation, and not toward curtailing any particular form of speech. SeeWisconsin v. Mitchell, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 2200-01, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993). Consequently, because section 3631(b) is content-neutral, it does not directly regulate speech. As such, rather than a heightened standard of review, we employ the lesser standard enunciated in O'Brien: 42 a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. 43 O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377, 88 S.Ct. at 1679. Under O'Brien, section 3631(b) qualifies as a sufficiently justified regulation. 44 Because section 3631(b) is part of the Fair Housing Act, its enactment was a proper exercise of the government's power under the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate all incidents and badges of slavery. 10 Williams v. Matthews Co., 499 F.2d 819, 825 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1021, 95 S.Ct. 495, 42 L.Ed.2d 294, and cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1027, 95 S.Ct. 507, 42 L.Ed.2d 302 (1974); seeNorwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 470 & n. 10, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 2813 & n. 10, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973). Also, section 3631(b) advances an important and substantial governmental interest by protecting a person's right to occupy a dwelling without fearing threats or intimidation based on race. We conclude that the statute is narrowly tailored to achieve that result. In this case, the statute did not proscribe cross burning as a form of expressive conduct. Cf.R.A.V., --- U.S. at ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2541, 2547 (finding unconstitutional a statute that specifically proscribed cross burning, among other things); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 414, 109 S.Ct. at 2544 (noting that the bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment ... is that the Government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable). Section 3631(b) prohibited the defendants' cross burnings because they willfully intended to threaten and intimidate those in the Jones household for entertaining black people in their home. SeeUnited States v. Gilbert, 813 F.2d 1523, 1529 (9th Cir.) (explaining that the requirement in section 3631 of intent to intimidate serves to insulate the statute from unconstitutional application to protected speech), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 860, 108 S.Ct. 173, 98 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987). The government's interest, then, in this case is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 45 Finally, even though expressive speech may be involved in the proscribed conduct, that is insufficient to make section 3631(b) unconstitutional. As the Supreme Court stated in R.A.V., 46 since words can in some circumstances violate laws directed not against speech but against conduct (a law against treason, for example, is violated by telling the enemy the nation's defense secrets), a particular content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct rather than speech. Thus, for example, sexually derogatory fighting words, among other words, may produce a violation of Title VII's general prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment practices. Where the government does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy. 47 R.A.V., --- U.S. at ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2546-47 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see alsoGilbert, 813 F.2d at 1529 (An illegal course of conduct is not protected by the first amendment merely because the conduct was in part carried out by language in contrast to direct action. If conduct contains both speech and non-speech elements, and if Congress has the authority to regulate the non-speech conduct, incidental restrictions on freedom of speech are not constitutionally invalid.) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we determine that any incidental restrictions on the alleged First Amendment rights in this case are no greater than is necessary to further the government's valid interest of protecting the rights of those in the Jones household to associate freely with whomever they choose. 48