Opinion ID: 2604731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the writ-of-certiorari issue

Text: The writ of certiorari is a common-law writ, and under the power conferred   by the Constitution    it must be held that the court has authority to issue it    subject to the conditions and limitations controlling the writ at common law.  (Emphasis added.) City of Sheridan v. Cadle, 24 Wyo. 293, 157 P. 892, 894-895 (1916). Justice Thomas would review Grant Wright's sentence in response to a petition for a writ of certiorari. I do not believe that the sentence of the district court is reviewable by that method. A consideration of the traditional role of the writ of certiorari compels the conclusion that the writ is not available for the purpose of reviewing the imposition of a sentence by the trial judge. As has been noted, in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra, this court recognized its authority to issue the writ of certiorari, subject, however, to the conditions and limitations controlling the writ at common law. (Emphasis added.) 157 P. at 895. The common-law writ of certiorari is a remedy narrow in scope in that it extends only to questions affecting the jurisdiction of the subordinate tribunal. State ex rel. Nelson v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist., 107 Mont. 167, 81 P.2d 699 (1938). The writ is neither broad nor flexible, since the court is limited to quashing or refusing to quash action taken by a court in excess of or without jurisdiction. State v. Davis, Mo. App., 488 S.W.2d 305 (1972). The writ is not available to correct errors made in the exercise of valid, existing jurisdiction or to determine the merits of a controversy. State v. Davis, supra, 488 S.W.2d at 308. Petition of Kelly, 146 Mont. 484, 408 P.2d 478 (1965). City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra, 157 P. at 895. It follows that the common-law writ of certiorari is not the appropriate means for correcting a sentence which, although within statutory limits, is harsh and unjust under the circumstances of the case. In his special concurrence, Justice Thomas holds that a petition for a writ of certiorari is the appropriate means by which Grant Wright should seek review of his sentence, since it is his view  contrary to the position of the majority and contrary to the position which I hold  that appellate review is not available where the sentence falls within the statutory parameters and that therefore justice cannot be accomplished, given the extraordinary circumstances of this case. I would hold that under the applicable rules which concern certiorari (and even though my deepest convictions say that Grant Wright should not go to prison) this court does not possess the authority to review the sentence by certiorari, since an exclusive, adequate and complete appellate-review procedure is available for that purpose, the utilization of which would not result in a failure of justice. Call v. Town of Afton, 73 Wyo. 271, 278 P.2d 270 (1954), discussed infra. The power of this court to engage in appellate review and to issue writs of certiorari is conferred by Art. 5 of the Wyoming Constitution, the relevant sections of which provide: § 2. Supreme court generally; appellate jurisdiction. The supreme court shall have general appellate jurisdiction, co-extensive with the state, in both civil and criminal causes, and shall have a general superintending control over all inferior courts, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law. § 3. Same; original jurisdiction. The supreme court shall have original jurisdiction in quo warranto and mandamus as to all state officers, and in habeas corpus. The supreme court shall also have power to issue writs of mandamus, review, prohibition, habeas corpus, certiorari, and other writs necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. Under Art. 5, § 3, the availability of all of the identified writs, including certiorari, is limited to situations where it is    necessary and proper to the complete exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction.  (Emphasis added.) In other words, a writ of certiorari should not issue unless that writ is necessary to aid the court in the exercise of its appellate and revisory jurisdiction. For me, it then follows that the writ is not intended to replace the appellate process where that process is in place  as it is when the district court's sentencing discretion is in issue. We have said the writ will not be granted where other adequate remedies are open to the petitioner, in City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra, and Call v. Town of Afton, supra. At 14 Am.Jur.2d, Certiorari § 11, p. 787, the text says: Under the prevailing practice, a writ of certiorari will not issue if there is another adequate remedy, such as an appeal or writ of error, an action at law or in equity, or intervention with the right of appeal secured. It is only in cases of unusual hardship and in the furtherance of justice that the use of a writ of certiorari is permitted to supplement the method of review expressly provided by statute. We said in Call v. Town of Afton, supra, 278 P.2d at 273:    We have two statutory methods of reviewing judgments of the district court, one by proceeding in error and one by direct appeal. Counsel for petitioners asks us to disregard them despite the ordinary rule that the writ of certiorari will not ordinarily issue in those cases in which there is a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by appeal. 14 C.J.S., Certiorari, § 39, p. 185, 10 Am.Jur. 531, § 7. We then took note of the fact that the legislature had abolished the writ of certiorari (in civil cases), [10] but observed that the writ was provided for in the Constitution and that    [p]erhaps neither the statute nor the Constitution should be entirely disregarded, and that effect might be given to both the Constitution and the statute    by keeping the provisions of the Constitution within its proper limits.  (Emphasis added.) When we said within its proper limits, the court meant, in my opinion at least, within the limits of the common law. City of Sheridan v. Cadle, supra. Where certiorari is authorized by the statute and/or constitution but there is no provision for its utilization in a particular type of proceeding, the common-law writ is available and the rules pertaining thereto apply. 14 Am.Jur.2d, Certiorari § 6, Availability and use of common-law writ, p. 782. The encyclopedia cites Morris v. Apodaca, 66 N.M. 421, 349 P.2d 335, 336 (1960), where it is said: We have no constitutional or statutory definition of `certiorari' as it applies to this type of proceeding, although, generally, by the constitution and statute, the district and supreme courts are authorized to issue writs of certiorari. Therefore, it would follow that what is known as the common law writ of certiorari would apply. This being true, it can generally be stated that certiorari will lie in two classes of cases, (1) whenever it is shown that the inferior court or tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction; (2) whenever it is shown that the inferior court or tribunal has proceeded illegally, and no appeal is allowed or other mode provided for reviewing its proceedings. 10 Am.Jur. 527, Certiorari, § 5. The class of cases in which the common-law writ of certiorari will lie is set out at 14 Am.Jur.2d, Certiorari § 6, pp. 782-783, as follows: Availability and use of common-law writ. Though generally the courts are authorized by the constitution and statute to issue writs of certiorari, where there is no constitutional or statutory provision for certiorari as to a particular type of proceeding, what is known as the common-law writ of certiorari would be available. Primarily there are two classes of cases in which a common-law writ of certiorari will lie: (1) wherever it is shown that the inferior court or tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction; (2) wherever it is shown that the inferior court or tribunal has proceeded illegally and no appeal is allowed or other mode provided for reviewing its proceedings. The petitioner must generally establish either that the proceedings are infected with some fatal irregularity rendering them absolutely void, that the jurisdiction of the cause did not belong to the tribunal which assumed it but to a different tribunal, or that the cause is one not within the limits of judicial power. In other words, the inquiry contemplated is in reference to the power of the court, not the irregularity or correctness of its action. Certiorari does not lie in any case unless petitioner can satisfy the court that there is involved a question of jurisdiction of the inferior court or tribunal which is raised originally by his petition, that he has no other adequate remedy, or that review by certiorari is necessary to avoid great injury or unusual hardship which would result from the delay involved in pursuing another remedy. In observing that Wisconsin has a constitutional provision like ours, the opinion in Call v. Town of Afton, supra, 278 P.2d at 273-274, then went on to quote Wardsworth v. Sibley, 38 Wis. 484, 486, where the Wisconsin Supreme Court said: `The constitution refers to the writ as it was used and applied in practice when the constitution was adopted, and did not intend to give it a scope or object different from its original and appropriate function.    But we think it would be contrary to all practice and all precedent to make it a substitute for a writ of error or appeal, to bring up for review the final judgments of courts of record proceeding according to the course of the common law.' The court also stated: `The general rule as laid down in the books is, that a common law certiorari will not issue where a party has another adequate remedy; and it is certainly a novel application of such a writ to make it perform the office of a writ of error to bring up for review a final judgment of a court of record.' It seems that the state of Massachusetts has a statute similar to our constitutional provision above mentioned. Inhabitants of Mendon v. County Commissioners of Worcester, 2 Allen, Mass., 463. In Re Cooke, 15 Pick., Mass., 234, 237, the court discussed the common-law rules relating to certiorari. The court stated in part: `The question is, what is the legal and proper remedy or process, for the purpose of correcting any error in the proceedings, after final judgment rendered, or the final decision of the cause; and it seems to be well settled, by the English authorities, that after final judgment in a court of record, proceeding according to the course of the common law, the only remedy is by writ of error. But where the court below is not a court of record, or does not proceed according to the course of the common law, no writ of error will lie, and the proper remedy is by certiorari.' This court, in Call v. Town of Afton, supra, 278 P.2d at 274, then went on to reject the concept which says that even though there is an adequate appellate remedy,    `An exception has frequently been made    when necessary to prevent a failure of justice.' [Quoting from Rapid Ry. Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, 225 Mich. 425, 196 N.W. 518, 519. (See 14 C.J.S., Certiorari, § 37, pp. 181, 182]. Justice Blume, in formulating our rejection, says:    To carry that rule to its logical conclusion would seem to mean that every time we should dismiss an appeal because of non-compliance with the statutory rules relating to petition in error or direct appeal, or because of non-compliance with the rules of this court, we might nevertheless, in our discretion, issue a writ of certiorari in the same case, since injustice in the broad sense might result in such cases by the dismissal. That would, of course, upset and to a large extent nullify our statutory provisions on appeal and the decisions of this court relating thereto. 278 P.2d at 274. The Justice, speaking for the court, then approves the rule which holds: `   [I]n a proper case a party entitled to appeal or to pursue some other remedy, who has lost the right through inadvertence, accident, or mistake, may have a remedy by certiorari, provided there is a showing of probable merits and freedom from fault.' [Quoting from 14 C.J.S., Certiorari, § 40, p. 189] (See also 10 Am.Jur. 531, 532, § 7). (Emphasis added) 278 P.2d at 275, and resigns the court to deciding the case before it    under the so-called rule last stated and the rule that ordinarily a writ of certiorari is not granted if there is another plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and in the light of the fact that no question of jurisdiction or excess thereof is involved herein. 278 P.2d at 275. The scope of the appellate jurisdiction of this court is set out in Art. 5, § 2 of the Wyoming Constitution, supra. That section limits the scope of the general appellate jurisdiction conferred upon this court to that authorized under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by law. The legislature by statute and this court by rule have spoken extensively in this area, detailing those situations in which the appellate jurisdiction may be exercised and prescribing the manner in which one must proceed. This body of law delineates the scope of appellate review in this state, and if certiorari is to be invoked, it must be under the rules identified by the common law, [11] one of which is that certiorari will not be granted where there is otherwise an adequate remedy by way of appeal. Call v. Town of Afton, supra. Rule 1.04 of the Wyoming Rules of Appellate Procedure provides to criminal defendants a plain, speedy and adequate remedy by way of appeal for the correction of errors made by the court of first instance in arriving at a judgment: A judgment rendered or final order made by a district court may be reversed in whole or in part, vacated or modified by the Supreme Court for errors appearing on the record. In application of these propositions to the case at bar, I agree with the majority of the justices when they hold that this court has retained the power of appellate review under circumstances such as those with which we are here concerned. At p. 1092 of the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rooney, writing for the court, says: As long ago as 1927, we indicated that we would modify a legal sentence if the trial court abused its discretion in imposing it. State v. Sorrentino, 36 Wyo. 111, 253 P. 14, 16 (1927). Since then, we have repeatedly set forth the fact that a sentence will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Cavanagh v. State, Wyo., 505 P.2d 311 (1973); Peterson v. State, Wyo., 586 P.2d 144 (1978); Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130 (1979); Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 (1979); Buck v. State, Wyo., 603 P.2d 878 (1979); Sorenson v. State, Wyo., 604 P.2d 1031 (1979); Kenney v. State, Wyo., 605 P.2d 811 (1980); Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981); Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172 (1982); Taylor v. State, Wyo., 658 P.2d 1297 (1983); and Eaton v. State, Wyo., 660 P.2d 803 (1983). In Scheikofsky v. State, supra, 636 P.2d 1107 at 1112-1113, we said: `This court has stated its approach to sentence review many times. If a trial court's determination of the terms of imprisonment is within the statutory limits, it will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.' Hanson v. State, Wyo., 590 P.2d 832, 835 (1979); Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378, 380 (1979); Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194, 1202 (1977); Daellenbach v. State, supra, at 683 [562 P.2d 679 (1977)]. A sentence will not be disturbed because of sentencing procedures unless the defendant can show an abuse of discretion, procedural conduct prejudicial to him, and circumstances which manifest inherent unfairness and injustice, or conduct which offends the public sense of fair play. Hicklin v. State, Wyo., 535 P.2d 743, 751, 79 A.L.R.3d 1050 (1975). That is a nebulous standard, but it is as precise as we care to make it. We have an abiding reluctance to review a trial judge's determination of sentence. The determination is a burdensome decision which no trial judge could lightly make and which we will not lightly overturn. The opinions from this court cited by the majority stand for the proposition that a legal sentence may be modified if the trial court abused its discretion in imposing it. Until today, however, this court had never adopted standards by which we could determine whether a sentence within statutory limits constituted an abuse of the trial judge's discretion. As a result of our failure to adopt such standards, there was small possibility that this court would upset a legal sentence, and, as Justice Thomas points out, we have, as a matter of practice, followed the common-law rule when reviewing sentences. With the development of standards against which to review trial judges' sentences for abuse of discretion, we are now free to abandon the common-law position  even if that is the rule of this court on the subject as Justice Thomas contends. In so doing, we would be following the lead of the highest courts of numerous other states [12] that have recognized their appellate obligation to insure that sentencing fairly conforms to the lawful purposes of incarceration. This leads to the conclusion that there is a speedy and adequate review procedure available to Grant Wright which would preclude his utilizing certiorari.