Opinion ID: 1692554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: brown's incriminating statements

Text: We first address Brown's assignment of error concerning the district court's failure to suppress Brown's statements made to Investigator Scott. In determining the correctness of a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, the Supreme Court will uphold a trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are clearly incorrect. State v. Copple, 224 Neb. 672, 401 N.W.2d 141 (1987); State v. Dixon, 222 Neb. 787, 387 N.W.2d 682 (1986). Because Investigator Scott did not inform Brown concerning the right to remain silent and the right to a lawyer, Brown did not receive the admonition required by the Miranda warning. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). As we expressed in State v. Norfolk, 221 Neb. 810, 814-15, 381 N.W.2d 120, 125 (1986): Before a defendant's custodial statement is admissible as evidence, the absolute and indispensable prerequisites of the Miranda warning must have been satisfied preceding the interrogation producing such statement, namely, law enforcement personnel must (1) inform the defendant of the right to remain silent, (2) explain that anything said can and will be used against the defendant in court, and (3) inform the defendant of the right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present during interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, supra . If a defendant to be interrogated is indigent, the defendant must also be informed that a lawyer will be appointed to represent the defendant. Miranda v. Arizona, supra . In State v. Bodtke, supra, 219 Neb. at 508-09, 363 N.W.2d at 921 (1986), we noted: Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), formulated prerequisites for admissibility of a suspect's in-custody statement(s) obtained in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements, id. at 445 [86 S.Ct. at 1612], and sought to minimize the psychological advantage frequently inherent in an exercise of governmental authority as a tool for coercion, that is, the potentiality for compulsion. Id. at 457 [86 S.Ct. at 1618]. Custodial interrogation has been characterized by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda as questioning instigated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Id. at 444, 86 S.Ct. at 1612. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S.Ct. 711, 713, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977) ( Miranda warnings are required only when there has been a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him `in custody' ). See, also, State v. Bowersmith, 224 Neb. 6, 9, 395 N.W.2d 527, 529 (1986) ([T]he ultimate inquiry regarding the custodial status of a suspect `is simply whether there is a `formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest.'). Whether a person is in custody, in a constitutional sense, is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court. State v. Bowersmith, supra . For suppression of his incriminating statements, Brown suggests that the Miranda warning was required, since the investigation into the victim's accusations was no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but had begun to focus on Brown as a suspect. In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). agents of the Internal Revenue Service called on Beckwith at his home to investigate a possible criminal violation of laws governing federal income taxation. After the callers had identified themselves as Internal Revenue agents, Beckwith invited the investigators into the dining room of his residence, where the agents presented their credentials and told Beckwith they were investigating the possibility of fraud regarding Beckwith's tax liability. The agents informed Beckwith of his right to a lawyer before answering questions and admonished Beckwith that anything which you say and any information which you submit may be used against you in any criminal proceeding. 425 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 1614. Although Beckwith sought suppression of his statements to agents, the U.S. Supreme Court found that the statements were made in a noncustodial setting and stated: Although the focus of an investigation may indeed have been on Beckwith at the time of the interview in the sense that it was his tax liability which was under scrutiny, he hardly found himself in the custodial situation described by the Miranda Court as the basis for its holding. Miranda implicitly defined focus, for its purposes, as questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [Citation omitted.] (Emphasis omitted.) 425 U.S. at 347, 96 S.Ct. at 1616. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 431, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1144, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984) (The mere fact that an investigation has focused on a suspect does not trigger the need for Miranda warnings in noncustodial settings). Regarding suppression of Brown's incriminating statements, the crucial question is whether Brown was in custody at the time he made those statements to Investigator Scott. Some factors used to distinguish custodial from noncustodial statements were examined in United States v. Jones, 630 F.2d 613 (8th Cir.1980). In Jones, two FBI agents interviewed Jones in her home concerning her possible role in an embezzlement. Before questioning Jones, the FBI agents identified themselves, informed Jones that she was not under arrest, and told Jones she was free to refuse to answer any questions. In finding that Jones was not in custody and that the Miranda warning was, therefore, not required, the court pointed to several features of a noncustodial setting: The place where an interrogation takes place does not conclusively establish the presence or absence of custody. A deprivation of freedom may take place at one's home as well as at the police station. Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 89 S.Ct. 1095, 22 L.Ed.2d 311 (1969). By the same token, an interrogation at the police station may be noncustodial. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977); Iverson v. North Dakota, 480 F.2d 414, 423 n. 10 (8th Cir.1973). Determining if there has been a deprivation of freedom entails something more than simply identifying the place of interrogation. .... ... [I]t becomes apparent that the interrogation of Jones was not custodial. We start with the fact that prior to any questioning Jones was informed that she was not under arrest and that she need not answer any questions.... The absence of a formal arrest and the advice of freedom to decline to answer, while not conclusive, are indicative of noncustodial interrogation. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 493, 97 S.Ct. at 713; Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. at 343, 96 S.Ct. at 1614; [citations omitted]. It should not be understood, however, that the absence of a formal arrest and informing the suspect that she need not answer any questions automatically render an interrogation noncustodial. Other acts by those conducting the interrogation may establish custody. The record, however, is devoid of evidence exhibiting conduct on the part of the interrogating agents which would lead to the conclusion that Jones was in custody. No strong arm tactics were used. The defendant had not previously been subjected to a police escort nor given commands by the interrogating agents intended to dictate the course of conduct followed by the defendant.... .... ... [Jones] was in her own home and under no physical restraint. She was free to depart, free to refuse to answer any questions, and free to request the interrogating officers to leave. Jones was not compelled to be subjected to the presence of the interrogating officers. In short, she suffered no such restriction on her personal freedom as to render her in custody. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495, 97 S.Ct. at 714. 630 F.2d at 615-16. See, also, United States v. Phillips, 688 F.2d 52 (8th Cir. 1982). At the hearing on Brown's motion to suppress, evidence does not show that Brown was in custody at the time he made the incriminating statements to Investigator Scott. Regarding the interview at Brown's trailer, nothing indicates that Brown was ever placed under arrest, `taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.' Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 347, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1616, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). At the time of the interview, Scott stated that Brown was not under arrest and neither uttered words nor demonstrated any conduct which dictated or restricted a course of action by Brown. During the interview, Brown was never physically restrained and was free to depart from the trailer house as well as from the presence of Investigator Scott, or otherwise free to request Scott to leave the premises. We can only characterize the entire setting at Brown's trailer as noncustodial and conclude that Investigator Scott was not required to give Brown the Miranda warning. Evidence at the suppression hearing raised no question about the voluntariness of Brown's statements made to Investigator Scott. Therefore, the district court was correct in overruling Brown's motion to suppress the incriminating statements.