Opinion ID: 2569983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The district court erred by admitting the preliminary hearing transcript without requiring the State to make further efforts to compel Grijalva's attendance

Text: Hernandez asserts that the State's actions were unreasonable for two reasons: because the State did not subpoena Grijalva or attempt to use the Uniform Act To Secure the Attendance of Witnesses From Without a State in Criminal Proceedings [30] (Uniform Act) to compel Grijalva's attendance before trial, and because it did not make further attempts to procure Grijalva's attendance after her failure to arrive on the morning of the trial. His contentions require an examination of two separate time periods to determine whether the State's actions were reasonable: first, in its initial efforts to procure Grijalva's attendance and, second, in its efforts after she failed to appear on the morning of trial. [31] As to both time periods, the State maintains that it did all it could to procure Grijalva's attendance. What constitutes reasonable efforts to procure a witness's attendance must be determined upon considering the totality of the circumstances. [32] In the analogous circumstance of determining whether a prosecutor has good cause for continuing a preliminary hearing due to the absence of witnesses, this court rejected a bright-line rule requiring a service of a subpoena on an out-of-state witness, noting [t]here may be circumstances where a prosecutor can demonstrate `good cause' for a continuance based upon an absent witness even though it did not subpoena the witness. Conversely, there may be circumstances where a prosecutor has subpoenaed witnesses, yet cannot demonstrate `good cause' for their absence. [33] In determining whether the proponent of preliminary hearing testimony has met its burden of proving that a witness is constitutionally unavailable, the touchstone of the analysis is the reasonableness of the efforts. [34] The United States Supreme Court, in discussing the reasonableness of a prosecutor's actions, noted: The law does not require the doing of a futile act. Thus, if no possibility of procuring the witness exists (as, for example, the witness'[s] intervening death), good faith demands nothing of the prosecution. But if there is a possibility, albeit remote, that affirmative measures might produce the declarant, the obligation of good faith may demand their effectuation. [35] This court also has stated that a prosecutor's efforts were reasonable where it [was] unlikely that the additional efforts suggested by [the defendant] would have led to the witnesses' production at trial. [36] Where only minimal efforts are made to procure a witness's attendance, and those minimal efforts are unreasonable, it is error to admit preliminary hearing testimony. [37] Looking to the facts of this case, we must determine whether the State used reasonable efforts before trial to procure Grijalva's attendance and whether it used reasonable efforts after she failed to arrive as scheduled. Regarding diligence pretrial, the State has offered no evidence that Grijalva was subpoenaed. [38] The State knew Grijalva's out-of-state residence, had her phone number, and could have served her with a subpoena or used the Uniform Act to compel her attendance. However, any action to compel her attendance in that instance may not have been more successful than obtaining her oral promise and making travel arrangements for her because the alleged reason she failed to arrive in Las Vegas was a family emergency. Family emergencies may often create situations in which witnesses do not comply with orders to appear. We conclude that the State's pretrial actions were reasonable. The State's actions after Grijalva failed to appear, however, were not reasonable. The State offered no evidence regarding its attempts to obtain Grijalva's attendance after her failure to appear. Instead, the State explained that it attempted to call Grijalva once and spoke to a young girl who stated that there had been an unspecified family emergency. These minimal efforts do not justify the district court's conclusion that no other means existed to procure Grijalva's attendance. The State failed to communicate with an adult in Grijalva's household, provided no information that an actual family emergency existed, and failed to advise the district court concerning the length of Grijalva's absence or when she would return. We also note that the State failed to seek a continuance of the trial to obtain any of this information or secure Grijalva's attendance. Although this court has held that the State need not exercise all options that appear reasonable in hindsight, [39] in this case, the district court's conclusion that there was no possibility of obtaining Grijalva's attendance cannot be supported by a single call to a young girl representing herself as Grijalva's niece. Therefore, the district court erred when it granted the State's motion and admitted Grijalva's preliminary hearing testimony.