Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Asserted Trial Court Errors Involving Accomplice Testimony and Related Instructions

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the testimony of codefendant Richard Avila required corroboration under section 1111 [40] and should be viewed with caution, and further erred in forbidding counsel to refer to Richard as an accomplice during argument. He claims these errors violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to due process, and to present a defense, as protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and to a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. During a conference on jury instructions, defendant questioned whether, by virtue of Richard's status as a codefendant, his testimony could be considered independent evidence to corroborate other accomplices' testimony. He argued the court should instruct the jury to determine whether Richard was an accomplice, and the court agreed. When defendant requested that Richard's name be inserted into the instruction on whether a witness is an accomplice (CALJIC No. 3.19), Richard objected. The prosecutor suggested a separate instruction be formulated so as not to confuse the jury about the burden of proof necessary to find Richard guilty. Defendant agreed, and the court asked him to draft the instruction. [41] Richard objected, arguing that a cautionary instruction telling the jury to view his testimony with distrust would be highly prejudicial to him. The trial court wondered whether, if an accomplice instruction identifying a testifying codefendant were not given, the other two codefendants (defendant and Spradlin) nevertheless would get the benefit of a general accomplice instruction that precluded the prosecution from obtaining a conviction based on the uncorroborated testimony of a testifying codefendant. The prosecutor responded that Richard's testimony should be viewed like that of any other witness as against himself, but by the rules of accomplice testimony as against his codefendants. After further discussion, the court concluded that the law precluded an accomplice instruction in this case, and that Richard's credibility should be judged by the same standards as that of any other witness. Shortly before the start of closing arguments, the trial court instructed all counsel to refrain from referring to Richard Avila as an accomplice, but permitted counsel to refer to Richard's involvement in the crimes based on the evidence. It concluded: So I'm instructing all counsel not to refer to Richard Avila as an accomplice and not to make any argument which infers or argues that his testimony because he is an accomplice must be corroborated under the law, because I have ruled that it does not have to be corroborated. We have discussed in several cases the issue of how the jury should be instructed to view the testimony of an accomplice who is also one of multiple defendants in a single criminal trial. In People v. Hill (1967) 66 Cal.2d 536, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908, where a confessing codefendant was an accomplice as a matter of law, we held the trial court did not err in leaving to the jury the determination of his role as an accomplice, thus avoiding imputations of guilt of the other two codefendants which might have flowed from the court's direction that the confessing codefendant was an accomplice as a matter of law. ( Id. at p. 556, 58 Cal.Rptr. 340, 426 P.2d 908.) In People v. Terry (1970) 2 Cal.3d 362, 85 Cal.Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961 ( Terry ), overruled on another point in People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 381-382, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708, we held that, generally, instructions on accomplice testimony must be given on the court's own motion only when the accomplice witness is called by the prosecution or when a defendant, in testifying, implicates his codefendant while confessing his own guilt. But where a defendant testifies in his own behalf and denies guilt while incriminating a codefendant, it is at most for the discretion of the trial judge whether to give accomplice testimony instructions on his own motion. ( Terry, at p. 399, 85 Cal. Rptr. 409, 466 P.2d 961.) After the trial in this case, we decided Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th 155, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365. There, we held the trial court did not err in giving accomplice instructions, where two codefendants each testified in his or her own behalf, denied guilt, and incriminated the other to some extent. We explained that the testimony of an accomplice who testifies against a defendant deserves close scrutiny because he has the motive, opportunity, and means to attempt to help himself at the other's expense, and that this rationale remains true when the accomplice who testifies against a defendant is himself a defendant. ( Id. at p. 218, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Similarly, in People v. Box, supra, 23 Cal.4th 1153, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130 ( Box ), we held the trial court should have instructed the jury that codefendant Flores's testimony should be viewed with care and caution to the extent it tended to incriminate the defendant. Just as in the case of an accomplice who testifies for the prosecution, Flores's testimony in his own defense was subject to the taint of an improper motive  promoting his own interest by inculpating the defendant. Accordingly, we held there was no persuasive reason not to require an instruction that an accomplice's testimony should be viewed with care and caution when requested by a defendant in a case where the codefendant testified. ( Id. at p. 1209, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) Thus, decisional law existing at the time of trial recognized it was within the trial court's discretion not to give accomplice instructions with respect to Richard's testimony. But Alvarez and Box make clear that a trial court should instruct the jury that, to the extent a codefendant's testimony tends to incriminate a defendant, it should be viewed with care and caution and is subject to the corroboration requirement. We need not decide, however, whether the court erred because any error in this regard was nonprejudicial. A trial court's failure to instruct on accomplice liability under section 1111 is harmless if there is sufficient corroborating evidence in the record. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 370, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) To corroborate the testimony of an accomplice, the prosecution must present independent evidence, that is, evidence that tends to connect the defendant with the crime charged without aid or assistance from the accomplice's testimony. ( People v. Perry (1972) 7 Cal.3d 756, 769, 103 Cal. Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129.) Corroborating evidence is sufficient if it tends to implicate the defendant and thus relates to some act or fact that is an element of the crime. ( Ibid.; accord, People v. Lewis, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 370, 110 Cal. Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) `[T]he corroborative evidence may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone.' [Citation.] ( People v. Perry, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 769, 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129.) Here, Richard Avila's testimony was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence. When defendant was interviewed after his arrest, he initially denied being at a party, denied knowing anyone living on North Hayes, denied knowing Medina or Jeffrey Spradlin, and claimed he had not seen his cousin, Richard Avila, in years. Defendant's initial attempt to conceal from the police his involvement in the activities culminating in the murders implied consciousness of guilt constituting corroborating evidence. (See People v. Perry, supra, 7 Cal.3d at p. 772, 103 Cal.Rptr. 161, 499 P.2d 129 [attempts of an accused to conceal his identity or his whereabouts may warrant an inference of consciousness of guilt and may corroborate an accomplice's testimony]; see also, e.g., People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 773, 254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419 [evidence of flight supports an inference of consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission which may properly be considered as corroborative of an accomplice's testimony].) Defendant eventually admitted he brought Medina and Sanchez to the party. He also admitted that he might have been inside the car in which the victims were taken to their deaths and that his saliva might be found on Sanchez. Michael Ramirez also implied that defendant was present during the discussion of what was to be done with Medina and Sanchez shortly before they were taken away from the property. [42] (See, e.g. People v. Hathcock (1973) 8 Cal.3d 599, 618, 105 Cal.Rptr. 540, 504 P.2d 476 [corroborating evidence included testimony that defendant was in the presence of the two victims shortly before their deaths].) In sum, the evidence adduced at trial sufficiently corroborated Richard's testimony. Even if there were insufficient corroboration, reversal would not be required unless it is reasonably probable a result more favorable to the defendant would have been reached. [Citation.] The purpose of an instruction pursuant to section 1111 is to compel the jury to view accomplice testimony with distrust and suspicion. [Citation.] ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 101, 241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127.) Here, the jury had before it ample information suggesting that Richard's testimony might not have been trustworthy. The jury knew that Richard was on trial and thus had every motive to deny his own participation in the murder and implicate a codefendant. Indeed, the gist of Richard's testimony  that he did not furnish any of the weapons present on the North Hayes property and had little or no control over the activities occurring there  was inconsistent with evidence that the purpose of the gathering that night was to assist him, at his request, in protecting the property from a drive-by shooting. Indeed, by all accounts, the victims eventually were taken away from the property at Richard's insistence. Moreover, defendant attacked Richard's credibility at length during closing argument. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached had the jury been instructed on accomplice liability as to Richard Avila, or had argument referring to him as an accomplice not been limited. For the same reasons, any error was also harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
During a conference outside the presence of the jury on the applicability of accomplice instructions, defendant argued that Ray Juarez, Frank Rodriguez, and Michael Rojas were all accomplices as a matter of law. The prosecutor argued that only Juarez was an accomplice as a matter of law. The trial court ruled that Juarez was an accomplice as a matter of law but that the jury should determine whether Rodriguez and Rojas were accomplices. The court gave the following instructions relevant to accomplice testimony: CALJIC No. 3.10 (accomplice defined); CALJIC No. 3.11 (testimony of accomplice must be corroborated); CALJIC No. 3.12 (sufficiency of evidence to corroborate an accomplice); CALJIC No. 3.13 (one accomplice may not corroborate another); CALJIC No. 3.14 (criminal intent necessary to make one an accomplice); CALJIC No. 3.18 (testimony of accomplice to be viewed with distrust); and CALJIC No. 3.19 (burden to prove corroborating witness is an accomplice). Defendant contends the trial court erred in not ruling that Rodriguez and Rojas were accomplices as a matter of law and in failing so to instruct the jury, in violation of section 1111 and his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to due process, and to present a defense protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. An accomplice is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. (§ 1111.) To be so chargeable, the witness must be a principal under section 31. That section defines principals as [a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether ... they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission.... (§ 31.) An aider and abettor is one who acts with both knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and the intent of encouraging or facilitating commission of the offense. Like a conspirator, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the offense he intended to encourage or facilitate, but also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the perpetrator he aids and abets. ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645, fns. 19 & 20.) Whether a person is an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 is a factual question for the jury to determine in all cases unless `there is no dispute as to either the facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom.' [Citation.] ( People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Thus, a trial court can determine as a matter of law whether a witness is or is not an accomplice only when the facts regarding the witness's criminal culpability are `clear and undisputed.' [Citations.] ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 679, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) As we explain below, the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury that Rodriguez and Rojas were accomplices. There was no evidence that Rodriguez actually shot and killed either Medina or Sanchez. And although it was undisputed that he rode in the car with the victims to the canal bank, there was evidence he did not do so voluntarily. [43] Thus, Rodriguez's status as an accomplice turns on whether, as a conspirator or an aider or abettor, he was aware that Medina and Sanchez were to be killed or was engaged in any other crime the foreseeable result of which might be murder. (See, e.g., People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Circumstantial evidence showed that Rodriguez was an accomplice to the murders. For example, as stated, Juarez testified that Rodriguez was armed when he got in the car with Medina and Sanchez. And Rodriguez himself testified that he thought the women might be killed. Such evidence, however, does not compel the conclusion that he was an accomplice. Because the record does not dictate the conclusion that Rodriguez aided defendant and Spradlin knowing their homicidal intent, the court did not err in determining that he was not an accomplice as a matter of law. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues Rodriguez was an accomplice in the murders because he was engaged, as a conspirator or an aider and abettor, in kidnapping Medina and Sanchez, and the foreseeable result of the kidnapping was murder. The prosecution, however, did not contend that Medina and Sanchez were kidnapped, much less that the foreseeable result of the kidnapping was murder. [44] In any event, given the evidence that Rodriguez did not have the intent to encourage or facilitate the commission of any particular offense when he got in the car with Medina and Sanchez, the record does not compel such a conclusion. As for Michael Rojas, strong circumstantial evidence suggested he was an accomplice to both Medina's rape and the murders. Juarez, Rodriguez, and Ramirez all testified they saw Rojas assault Medina while she was being gang-raped in the Wilderness trailer and later overheard him say that Medina and Sanchez must be taken care of or killed because they knew too much. Richard also testified that he saw Rojas assault Medina in the Wilderness trailer and saw him in the car that took Medina and Sanchez away from the North Hayes property to their deaths. Rojas himself, however, denied any involvement in Medina's rape and in the murders. Defendant claims Rojas was an accomplice as a matter of law because his testimony contradicted that of prosecution and defense witnesses and was inherently unbelievable. In particular, defendant notes Rojas denied raping Spring, contrary to other witnesses' testimony. Arguing it would be impossible to believe that someone who took a leading role in Spring's rape did not likewise take such a role in a similar rape of Medina, defendant contends Rojas must have lied about his involvement in Spring's rape (for which he was given immunity from prosecution on the condition that he testify truthfully in the present case) so that he could deny involvement in Medina's rape (for which he was not given immunity from prosecution). But such a contention is speculative. Further, citing People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, defendant concludes that the trial court erred in ruling that Rojas's accomplice status was a jury question because his self-serving testimony did not amount to evidence that was reasonable, credible, or of solid value. But we have found no case that has applied the reasoning of Johnson, which involved the standard of review of a claim of sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, to a case involving asserted trial court error in failing to declare a witness an accomplice as a matter of law. It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. ( People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 302, 95 P.3d 523.) Thus, although circumstantial evidence indicated Rojas was an accomplice in Medina's rape and in the murders, such evidence did not compel a conclusion that he was an accomplice, in light of his denial of involvement in those crimes. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ruling that Rojas's accomplice status was a jury question.
Assuming that the accomplice status of Frank Rodriguez and Michael Rojas was for the jury, defendant contends the instructions on this issue were incomplete. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, that Rodriguez could be considered an accomplice to murder if it found he aided and abetted a kidnapping, based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and that Rojas likewise could be considered an accomplice if it found he aided and abetted a rape, also based on that doctrine. Defendant contends the court's errors lightened the prosecution's burden of proof in violation of his federal constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reliable judgment under the Eighth Amendment. A trial court must instruct sua sponte on general principles of law that are closely and openly connected with the facts presented at trial. ( People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 90, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) When the evidence at trial would warrant the jury's concluding that a particular witness was a defendant's accomplice in the crime or crimes for which the defendant is on trial, the court must instruct the jury to determine whether the witness was an accomplice. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 1270-1271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) At common law, a person who encouraged or facilitated the commission of a crime could be held criminally liable for the crime he encouraged or facilitated, as well as for any other offense that was a `natural and probable consequence' of the crime aided and abetted. ( People v. Prettyman (1996) 14 Cal.4th 248, 260, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013.) The natural and probable consequences doctrine is based on the recognition that those who aid and abet should be responsible for the harm they have naturally, probably, and foreseeably put in motion. ( Ibid. ) When the prosecution relies on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to hold a defendant liable as an aider and abettor, the trial court has a sua sponte duty to identify and describe any potential target offense or offenses allegedly aided and abetted by the defendant, because such instructions are `general principles of law that are commonly or closely and openly connected to the facts before the court and that are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.' ( Id. at p. 264, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013.) Although the holding in People v. Prettyman, supra, 14 Cal.4th 248, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013 was limited to reliance on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to hold a defendant liable as an aider and abettor, its reasoning actually applies with greater force here. In this case, the prosecution did not charge defendant with kidnapping, and neither the prosecution nor the defense claimed at trial that any of the defendants or potential accomplices were involved in a kidnapping. Under these circumstances, Rodriguez's potential liability for murder for aiding and abetting a kidnapping based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine was not a general principle of law that was closely or openly connected with the facts presented at trial, on which the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct, for there was no risk that the jury, generally unversed in the intricacies of criminal law, [would] `indulge in unguided speculation' [citation] when it applied the law to the evidence adduced at trial. ( Id. at p. 267, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013.) To hold otherwise would be tantamount to requiring the trial court `to anticipate every possible theory that may fit the facts of the case before it and instruct the jury accordingly.' ( Id. at p. 269, 58 Cal. Rptr.2d 827, 926 P.2d 1013.) Similarly, although the prosecution argued that the defendants on trial could be liable for murder under a theory of felony-murder rape, neither the prosecution nor the defense argued that any of the potential accomplices were liable for murder, under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, because he aided and abetted a rape. Under these circumstances, Rojas's potential liability for murder on such a theory was not a general principle of law that was closely or openly connected with the facts presented at trial, on which the court had a sua sponte duty to instruct. In any event, the lack of an instruction on the natural and probable consequences doctrine as it might relate to Rodriguez and Rojas did not prejudice defendant in any way because their testimony, like the testimony of Richard, was sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence of defendant's guilt. As stated, defendant initially attempted to conceal from the police his involvement in the activities culminating in the murders, implying a consciousness of guilt. But he eventually admitted that he brought Medina and Sanchez to the party and might have been inside the car in which the victims were taken to their deaths. Michael Ramirez's testimony that defendant was present during the discussion of what was to be done with Medina and Sanchez also corroborated Rodriguez's and Rojas's testimony that defendant participated in that discussion. (See ante, pt. III.A.1.) Physical evidence also corroborated this evidence of defendant's guilt: evidence that the victims were shot by a .25-caliber gun and that .25-caliber shell casings were found on the ground near them corroborated Rojas's testimony that he saw defendant with a .25-caliber gun, and evidence at the scene indicating that Sanchez attempted to flee up the embankment corroborated Rodriguez's testimony that at the canal he saw a woman attempting to crawl away from defendant. Even if there were insufficient corroboration, reversal would not be required because the jury had before it ample information suggesting that Rodriguez's and Rojas's testimony might not have been trustworthy. For example, both were given immunity from prosecution in exchange for their testimony in this case. Rodriguez testified that he did not remember some portions of the night in question because he suffered a blackout from excessive alcohol consumption. And, the prosecution also presented evidence that Rojas was involved in the rapes of Spring and Medina, and had committed other crimes in the past. Under these circumstances, the error, if any, in failing to instruct the jury on a natural and probable consequences doctrine of accomplice liability was harmless by any applicable standard.
Defendant contends that his conviction must be reversed because (1) there was insufficient independent evidence to corroborate the testimony of Juarez, Rodriguez, and Rojas, (2) whether the jury found Rodriguez and Rojas to be accomplices is uncertain, and (3) if the jury found them to be accomplices, it may have relied on evidence that could not properly be used to corroborate their testimony. He further contends that insufficient evidence to corroborate the testimony of the accomplices in this case contributed to the violation of his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to due process, and to present a defense protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Assuming arguendo that Rodriguez and Rojas were accomplices, sufficient independent evidence corroborated their testimony, as discussed earlier. ( Ante, pt. III.A.3.) Likewise, there was sufficient independent evidence corroborating Juarez's testimony. For example, both Ramirez and Juarez testified that defendant was present during the discussion of what was to be done with Medina and Sanchez. Moreover, .25-caliber and nine-millimeter bullet fragments recovered from the victims and bullet casings found at the scene of the crime corroborated Juarez's testimony that he saw defendant with .25-caliber and nine-millimeter guns on the night in question. Accordingly, we reject defendant's related claim that the trial court should have granted his motion for acquittal under section 1118.1 [45] on the murder counts for insufficiency of the evidence of corroboration.
Defendant contends that the witness-killing special-circumstance finding, like the murder conviction, must be reversed because it was based on insufficient evidence of corroboration of the accomplices in this case, namely Juarez, Rodriguez, Rojas, and codefendant Richard Avila. But because we have concluded that there is sufficient independent evidence to corroborate the testimony of Juarez, Rodriguez, Rojas, and Richard, assuming they were all accomplices, defendant's argument that the witness-killing special circumstance must be reversed on this issue fails at the threshold. Alternatively, defendant contends that the witness-killing special-circumstance finding must be reversed nevertheless because the trial court failed to instruct the jury sua sponte that the witness-killing special circumstance could not be based on the testimony of an accomplice unless it was corroborated by evidence tending to connect defendant with that special circumstance. Defendant's contention is without merit. When a special circumstance requires proof of a crime other than the charged murder, that crime cannot be proved by the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice. But when it requires only proof of the motive for the murder for which [the] defendant has already been convicted, the corroboration requirement of section 1111 does not apply. ( People v. Hamilton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1142, 1177, 259 Cal.Rptr. 701, 774 P.2d 730; see also People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 632, fn. 9, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160.) Here, the trial court informed the jury that it must determine the truth of any charged special circumstance only if it found that defendant was guilty of first degree murder. (See CALJIC No. 8.80.1 (1993 rev.) (5th ed.1988).) Further, the witness-killing special circumstance did not require proof of a crime other than the charged murder; rather, it required that [t]he victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal ... proceeding .... (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(10).) Accordingly, the requirement of section 1111 did not apply to the witness-killing special circumstance, and no instructional error occurred.
Defendant contends the cumulative error involving accomplice testimony and related instructions deprived him of his federal constitutional rights to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, a fair trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a meaningful defense under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reliable judgment under the Eighth Amendment. We disagree. We have assumed the trial court erred in only one instance  in failing to instruct the jury on accomplice liability as to Richard Avila  and we concluded the error was harmless.