Opinion ID: 772959
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury Instructions and Specific Intent

Text: 118 Holder argues that jury instructions No. 15 and No. 19 failed to require a finding by the jury that Holder had a specific intent, or mens rea, to kill, and therefore each of his convictions is invalid. We apply the same standard of review to Holder's instructional error claims as we just applied to Allen's death penalty selection instruction error claim. See Phelps, 168 F.3d at 1057 (citing Casas, 999 F.2d at 1230). 119 We turn first to Holder's conviction for bank robbery in which a killing occurs. 15 We agree with the Sixth Circuit that the plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) is sufficient to reject Holder's challenge. Because the plain language of [18 U.S.C. § 2113(e)] says simply 'kills,' and not 'intentionally kills' or 'murders,' the settled principles of construction direct us to conclude that [Congress] did not intend to add an additional scienter requirement to the killing component of the crime. United States v. Poindexter, 44 F.3d 406, 409 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1132 (1995). Thus, a conviction under § 2113(e) for armed robbery in which a killing occurs does not require an additional finding of specific intent to kill. Instead, the statute is like common law felony murder, and we find no error in the district court's instructions to the jury. 16 120 Holder's reliance on this court's decision in United States v. Delay, 500 F.2d 1360 (8th Cir. 1974), is misplaced. In Delay, the defendant argued that his conviction under § 2113(e) was invalid because the government had failed to prove specific intent to kill in order to avoid apprehension for bank robbery, but the court found that there was sufficient evidence of that intent. See id. at 1362-64. The real issue presented in Delay was whether there was sufficient evidence to show that the killing was done after committing the bank robbery in order to avoid being apprehended, which was an element of the offense. Although the court assumed for purposes of that appeal that specific intent to kill was actually an element of the crime under § 2113(e), the issue was not before the court and was never actually decided. In any event, Delay does not control the outcome in this case because Holder was convicted of killing while committing the offense, not in an attempt to avoid apprehension. Thus, Delay does not bar us from holding, in accordance with the plain language of the statute and the Sixth Circuit's ruling in Poindexter, that specific intent to kill is not a separate element of the offense under § 2113(e). As in common law felony murder, the intent to kill is supplied by the fact that the killing occurred during the violent commission of the robbery offense itself. See Schad v. United States, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991) (noting that intent to kill and the intent to commit a felony were alternative aspects of the single concept of 'malice aforethought' at common law). 121 Next, we turn to Holder's conviction for using a firearm to cause another person's death during a crime of violence. 17 Holder argues that a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) requires a jury finding of specific intent to kill. The statute uses the term murder, rather than killing, and specifically refers to § 1111 for the definition of murder, which states that [m]urder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Thus, a conviction under § 924(j) requires a finding of malice aforethought by the jury. The district court's instruction to the jury required a finding of malice aforethought, 18 but Holder argues that the district court's definition was inadequate. For several reasons, we reject Holder's challenge to the § 924(j) instruction. 122 First and foremost, the requirement of malice aforethought has been satisfied. We agree with the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of § 1111(a) in a case such as this one that [f]irst degree murder is defined as including any murder which is either premeditated or committed in the perpetration of any of the listed felonies, which include robbery. See United States v. Sides, 944 F.2d 1554, 1557 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 989 (1991). Thus, a conviction under § 924(j), pursuant to § 1111(a), is valid under well-established felony murder principles by a finding that the defendant intended to commit the robbery and that a killing occurred in the course of that robbery. See, e.g., United States v. Pearson, 159 F.3d 480, 485 (10th Cir. 1998) ([M]alice aforethought is a term of art which has several definitions, including, in the felony murder context, proof of commission of the specified felony.... In the typical case of felony murder, there is no malice in fact with respect to the homicide; the malice is supplied by the law.) (internal quotations and citations omitted); United States v. Nguyen, 155 F.3d 1219, 1229 (10th Cir. 1998)(The statute [§ 1111(a)] does not require any proof of intent other than that [d]efendant intended to commit the underlying felony and that the killing was committed in the course of that felony.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1167 (1999); United States v. Chischilly, 30 F.3d 1144, 1159-60 (9th Cir. 1994) (noting that a conviction for felony murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 requires the commission of an enumerated felony with the requisite mens rea for the underlying offense... under a felony murder charge the commission of the underlying offense substitutes for malice aforethought), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1132 (1995). 123 Even assuming the felony murder rationale is inadequate by itself to support a conviction under § 924(j), we think the requirement in the instructions that the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that Holder was aware of a serious risk of death attending the armed robbery is sufficient to uphold the conviction. We have addressed the issue as follows: 124 Malice does not require proof of a subjective intent to kill. Malice may be established by evidence of conduct which is reckless and wanton, and a gross deviation from a reasonable standard of care, of such a nature that a jury is warranted in inferring that defendant was aware of a serious risk of death or serious bodily harm. 125 United States v. Black Elk, 579 F.2d 49, 51 (8th Cir. 1978) (internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 126 Finally, assuming specific intent is required for a conviction under either § 2113(e) or § 924(j) or both, we find that any error in the district court's instructions was harmless. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8-15 (1999) (holding that failure to submit an element of the offense to the jury is subject to harmless error analysis); id. at 35 (The failure of the court to instruct the jury properly--whether by omitting an element of the offense or by so misdescribing it that it is effectively removed from the jury's consideration--can be harmless, if the elements of guilt that the jury did find necessarily embraced the one omitted or misdescribed.) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). We find any error to be harmless because the court's aiding and abetting instructions on each count of conviction supply the necessary specific intent as a matter of law, and in any case the instructions require an explicit finding of specific intent. 19 127 Under the aiding and abetting rationale, in other words, Allen's actions necessarily embraced the specific intent element. See Nguyen, 155 F.3d at 1226 (finding sufficient evidence to convict defendant of aiding and abetting murder under § 924(j) based solely on the fact that the defendant intended to commit the underlying felony, the victim was killed during the commission of that felony, and the defendant aided and abetted that killing). In the alternative, specific intent can be supplied by a finding that Holder was aware of a serious risk of death attending his conduct. (Instruction Nos. 16 and 20, supra, n.19.) 128 Thus, even if, as Holder argues, the aiding and abetting instructions improperly failed to require a finding that Holder intended to aid and abet each element of the offense, including the fact that a killing took place, we find that the aiding and abetting instructions were adequate. See Nguyen, 155 F.3d at 1226 (The government did not need to show that [d]efendant had any specific intent to kill... the government also presented sufficient evidence that [d]efendant aided and abetted the killing....). We acknowledge the fact that some courts require a showing that a defendant knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the commission of the aggravating element of the offense. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held the following: 129 To be convicted as an aider and abettor, the defendant must have knowingly and intentionally aided and abetted the principals in each essential element of the crime.... To sustain a § 2113(d) conviction for an aider and abettor in this circuit, the government must show that the defendant aided and abetted the principal both in the act of bank robbery and in the principal's use of a dangerous weapon or device during the act. 130 United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1196, 1197 (9th Cir. 1994) (internal quotations omitted). This test would require proof of an intention to kill on the part of an aider and abettor accused of a § 2113(e) violation. Even under the more stringent test adopted by the Ninth Circuit, however, we think the instructions here were adequate because they required a finding that Holder was aware of a serious risk of death attending his conduct, and as explained below, there is more than sufficient evidence to support this finding.