Opinion ID: 1921288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Neither can we hold defendant was denied equal protection of the laws.

Text: The Equal Protection Clause requires more of a state law than nondiscriminatory application within the class it establishes. (Authority). It also imposes a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out. To be sure, the constitutional demand is not a demand that a statute necessarily apply equally to all persons. `The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact    to be treated in law as though they were the same.' Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147, 60 S.Ct. 879, 882, 84 L.Ed. 1124, 1128, 130 A.L.R. 1321. Hence, legislation may impose special burdens upon defined classes in order to achieve permissible ends. But the Equal Protection Clause does require that, in defining a class subject to legislation, the distinctions that are drawn have `some relevance to the purpose for which the the classification is made.' (Authorities). Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 308, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1500, 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580. See also Lunday v. Vogelmann, 213 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1973). We believe there is a rational basis for classifying appellants in accordance with whether their claim previously has been fully considered and adjudicated. Defendant's claim he was denied equal protection of the laws is without merit. III. In addition to his claim his constitutional rights were violated defendant asks us to apply the rule of State v. Hawkins, supra, retroactively. Judicial pronouncements in recent years have altered a vast variety of rules, especially in the field of criminal law. These changes have occasioned the application of principles governing whether a rule change should be applied retroactively or prospectively. Defendant argues (t)he normal rule in Iowa and elsewhere is that court decisions, unless otherwise specifically indicated, are to be applied retroactively. (Citations). This rule has been applied in criminal cases as well. Thus in State v. Johnson, 257 Iowa 1052, 135 N.W.2d 518 (1965) this court retroactively applied (the) United States Supreme Court's decision in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 to a case which had been tried before the decision in the Griffin case.   . We do not agree the normal rule either here or elsewhere demands such generous retroactivity. Both parties cite and rely on Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 89 S.Ct. 1030, 22 L.Ed.2d 248. That opinion rejected a call for retroactive application of a rule relating to evidence of electronic eavesdropping. The following test was adopted: Ever since Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629, 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1737, 14 L. Ed.2d 601, 608, established that `the Constitution neither prohibits nor requires retrospective effect' for decisions expounding new constitutional rules affecting criminal trials, the Court has viewed the retroactivity or nonretroactivity of such decisions as a function of three considerations.   . `The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.' Desist v. United States, supra, 394 U.S. at 248-249, 89 S.Ct. at 1033, 22 L.Ed.2d at 254-255. See also 16 Am. Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, section 553, page 955. Defendant relies on our retroactive application in State v. Johnson, supra, of the rule proscribing comment on defendant's failure to testify under Griffin v. California, supra. The same question was later considered by the United States Supreme Court in Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 86 S.Ct. 459, 15 L.Ed.2d 453. It held the rule was not applicable to cases which had become final prior to April 28, 1965. Upon application of the three tests specified in Linkletter v. Walker, supra, we see no reason to apply State v. Hawkins retroactively. We note especially the subject of the changed rule. It was not a constitutional or fundamental right. This is illustrated by two of our prior holdings. Where a defendant has been convicted as charged of a major offense he cannot complain because a lesser offense was improperly submitted. State v. Miller, 124 Iowa 429, 100 N.W. 334. Neither can a defendant, after conviction of a major offense, complain of the failure to submit an included offense if another included offense greater than the one omitted was submitted. State v. Franklin, 163 N.W.2d 437 (Iowa 1968). While defendant's position has a certain attraction we do not believe it is strengthened by reason of his unsuccessful first appeal. His case is no different from that of any person who would wish for the advantage of a later change in a court rule relating to criminal trials. Our change in this rule occurred after he had taken full advantage of his appellate rights under the law as it then existed. To give him the advantage of another trial under the changed rule would give him more than is appropriate under either the constitution or the cases. We do not imply a change would necessarily be applied retroactively if it pertained to a constitutional or fundamental right. Neither do we suggest a change affecting a lesser right could never draw retroactive application. We merely hold the change announced in State v. Hawkins does not justify impugning final judgments previously entered. Affirmed. All Justices concur, except REYNOLDSON, J., who concurs specially.