Opinion ID: 1972394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: hicks' claim of instructional error

Text: Hicks' attorney requested that the trial judge include in his charge to the jury the standard cautionary Redbook Instruction on the testimony of a child witness in effect at the time of the trial. See Criminal Jury Instructions for the District of Columbia, No. 2.21 (3d ed. 1978). The trial judge declined to do so in light of the fact that my core instructions already ask [the jurors] to examine the testimony of each witness and ask themselves questions [and] to be critical regarding the testimony of each witness. Hicks claims that this refusal was reversible error. We do not agree. R.Y. was thirteen years of age at the time of trial. According to the Comment to Instruction No. 2.21 in the 1978 Redbook, [t]he Committee was in agreement with the suggestion received from one trial judge that [i]nstruction [2.21] should be used only in cases where children appear to be impressionable by reason of their youth; the instruction may be inappropriate in the case of many children above the age of puberty. This court has recognized that children's testimony is not inherently suspect, and that no special corroboration is required: Today, we leave it to the jury to consider a child's testimony along with all the other evidence. As is true with any witness, a child's testimony at times may be inconsistent or confused; and just as with any witness, such confusion or inconsistency will weigh in the jury's determination of credibility. Barrera v. United States, 599 A.2d 1119, 1125 (D.C.1991). The prevailing view ... is that a trial judge retains discretion to determine whether the jury should receive a special instruction with respect to the credibility of a young witness, and, if so, the nature of that instruction. State v. James, 211 Conn. 555, 560 A.2d 426, 434 (1989) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Guam v. McGravey, 14 F.3d 1344, 1349 (9th Cir. 1994). We agree with this prevailing view. Barnes v. United States, 600 A.2d 821 (D.C.1991), relied on by Hicks, is not to the contrary. There, the issue was whether a specific modification of Redbook Instruction 2.21 was permissible, [5] and neither the parties nor the court addressed the entirely different question whether a cautionary instruction must be given whenever a minor child testifies. In Barnes, the judicial mind was not asked to focus upon, and the opinion did not address, the point at issue here. See Murphy v. McCloud, 650 A.2d 202, 205 (D.C. 1994). That decision therefore lends no support to Hicks' position. In the present case, the judge instructed the jury extensively with respect to the factors to be considered in evaluating the credibility of a witness. In the absence of some unusual circumstance necessitating a special instruction, a general credibility instruction is ordinarily sufficient. See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 379 A.2d 951, 955 (D.C.1977). If the instructions given correctly cover the case, no error is committed regardless of the fact that other refused instructions may also contain proper statements of the law. EDWARD J. DEVITT, et al., FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE & INSTRUCTIONS § 7.05, at 236-37 (4th ed.1992); see also authorities cited id. at 237 n. 6. Given R.Y.'s age, the jury's ability to observe him, and the judge's general instruction as to credibility, Hicks has not shown that the judge abused his discretion by declining to give the requested instruction. In addition, we perceive no appreciable possibility that Hicks was prejudiced. [6]