Opinion ID: 63289
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Martin’s Speedy Trial Act Claim

Text: We first address Martin’s claim that his conviction should be vacated due to a violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1990). Whether a district court has complied with the Speedy Trial Act is a matter of law subject to de novo review. United States v. Jackson, 30 F.3d 572, 575 n.2 (5th Cir. 1994). 4 No. 05-40720 The Speedy Trial Act requires that a defendant be tried within seventy non-excludable days from the date he appears before a judicial officer of the court in which the charge is pending. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1), (h). However, a defendant’s failure to move for dismissal prior to trial constitutes a waiver of the right to dismissal. See 18 U.S.C. § 3162(a)(2) (1975). Here, Martin acquiesced to the district court’s grant of a co-defendant’s motion to continue, and did not object to the court’s finding of excludable time under an “ends of justice” analysis. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(A).2 Martin entirely failed to assert a speedy trial violation until after his guilty verdict and subsequent sentencing. Accordingly, any violation of the Speedy Trial Act was waived. See United States v. Hernandez, 457 F.3d 416, 420 (5th Cir. 2006) (because of failure to assert speedy trial rights until after the verdict, section 3162 “manifestly provides that Appellants have waived the right to dismissal.”).