Opinion ID: 68902
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Filing of Taylor’s Claims

Text: The district court granted Seton’s motion for summary judgment on Taylors’s Title VII claims on the grounds that his complaint was not filed within ninety days from the date he received his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 3 No. 08-51283 Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f), suit must be filed within ninety days of receipt of a right-to-sue letter. See Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 381 (5th Cir. 1982). A person who fails to file a complaint within the ninety-day period forfeits the right to pursue the claim. Espinoza v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 754 F.2d 1247, 1251 (5th Cir. 1985). The ninety-day filing period acts as a statute of limitations, unless a plaintiff failed to receive the letter through no fault of his own or if he presents some other reason for equitable tolling. Id. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter to Taylor on May 31, 2006. Taylor is uncertain about the date he received the letter, but asserts that he received the letter “some time around the middle of June” because it was erroneously delivered to his neighbor, who failed to forward it to him immediately. He asserts that the letter arrived between June 12, 2006, and June 18, 2006. Taylor filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis on September 14, 2006, and filed his complaint on September 21, 2006. When the date on which a right-to-sue letter was received is either unknown or disputed, this court has held that courts may presume “various receipt dates ranging from three to seven days after the letter was mailed.” Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d at 379. Applying this precedent, the district court presumed that Taylor received the right-to-sue letter on June 7, 2006. This would have required Taylor to file suit by September 5, 2006. Taylor argues that the ninety-day period should be tolled until his actual receipt of the letter, since the delayed receipt of the letter was through no fault of his own. He cannot, however, pinpoint the date upon which he actually received the letter. The district court originally allowed Taylor to proceed with the lawsuit pending further discovery. At the time the district court granted Seton’s motion for summary judgment, the only evidence on record pertaining to the date of filing outside of the actual filing dates was Taylor’s sworn statement that he received the right-to-sue letter in the middle of June. Because the district court’s grant 4 No. 08-51283 of summary judgment can be affirmed on the merits of the claims, we decline to decide whether the claim was barred as late.