Opinion ID: 778954
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of Dr. Wicks' Expert Testimony as Unreliable and Irrelevant

Text: 36 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert opinion testimony. The rule consists of three distinct but related requirements: (1) the subject matter at issue must be beyond the common knowledge of the average layman; (2) the witness must have sufficient expertise; and (3) the state of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge permits the assertion of a reasonable opinion. Morales, 108 F.3d at 1038. 37 Our Rule 702 analysis is guided by relevant Supreme Court precedent. See Benavidez-Benavidez, 217 F.3d at 724(explaining how the Daubert Court set out factors to be reviewed when applying Rule 702). In Daubert, the Supreme Court charged trial judges with the responsibility of acting as gate-keepers to ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable. 509 U.S. at 589. The Court articulated a two-step inquiry for determining whether scientific evidence or testimony is admissible. First, the trial court must make a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. Id. at 592-93. The Court cautioned that the trial court must focus on [the] principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate. Id. at 595. Second, the court must ensure that the proposed expert testimony is relevant and will serve to aid the trier of fact. Id. at 592-93. Expert testimony assists the trier of fact when it provides information beyond the common knowledge of the trier of fact. Id. at 591. The Court, in Kumho Tire, clarified that the district court's gatekeeper function applies to all expert testimony, not just testimony based in science. See 526 U.S. at 147. 38 The government does not contest that Dr. Wicks possesses the qualifications to testify as an expert under Rule 702. The district court acknowledged that Dr. Wicks qualifies as an expert in his field. The main issues of contention between the parties center on whether Dr. Wicks' methodology is reliable and whether his testimony will assist the jury. In resolving this issue we will rely on the pertinent Federal Rules of Evidence, Daubert, Kumho Tire, and this circuit's case law.
39 At the conclusion of the Daubert hearing, the district court made several observations about Dr. Wicks' reasoning and methodology. Initially, it concluded: 40 Dr. Wicks' methodology is itself nothing unusual. The methodology itself is the form that is used by medical doctors uniformly. He considers the history given by the patient, his observations clinically of the patient's behavior, and any psychological testing . . . . I have no doubt that his psychological tests are well established tests that are widely accepted in the medical and psychological community. 41 However after making these general observations, the court went on to identify what it considered to be several problems with the reliability of Dr. Wicks' opinion. The court seemed troubled by the fact that the psychological tests did not reveal a conclusive diagnosis. The court recognized that Dr. Wicks' diagnosis was not inconsistent with the psychological tests, but said, the results are not inconsistent with a lot of other things. The court also asserted that Dr. Wicks based his opinion on his belief that Finley was not faking or being deceptive: 42 When you strip his opinion down to what it really seems to be based on, Mr. McKeon is correct. It's based on the assumption that what he's saying in his history and what he tells to Dr. Wicks is true. It relies upon the assumption that he is being truthful when he says what his views are. 11 43 In its brief, the government extrapolates from the district court's position and argues that Dr. Wicks' opinion is not reliable because it depends entirely on the doctor's subjective assessment of Finley's truthfulness. (Appellee's Br. 12). The government also contends that Dr. Wicks' methodology is deficient under Rule 702 because he based his conclusions on facts that were merely commonsensical 12 or beyond the scope of his expertise. 13 44 It appears from the record before us that Dr. Wicks based his diagnosis on proper psychological methodology and reasoning. He relied on accepted psychological tests, from which he drew sound inferences, and he took a thorough patient history, including meeting with Finley's wife and observing Finley's behavior. Dr. Wicks did not base his conclusions solely on Finley's statements; rather, he used his many years of experience and training to diagnose Finley's mental condition. Finally, Dr. Wicks did not use any experimental techniques in his evaluation of Finley and he did not deviate in any way from his normal practice of conducting psychological evaluations. Thus, we reject the government's argument. 45 The government argues Dr. Wicks' diagnosis is unreliable because it is based on the fact that Dr. Wicks believed that Finley was not deceiving him. The government cites several out-of-circuit cases that it alleges support the argument that Dr. Wicks' opinion is founded on accepting Finley's truthfulness rather than on sound psychological methodology. See United States v. Charley, 189 F.3d 1251 (10th Cir.1999); United States v. Whitted, 11 F.3d 782, 785 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 604-05(7th Cir. 1991); and Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420 (5th Cir.1987). None of these cases is apposite. 46 Neither Charley nor Whitted supports the government's position because both cases involve a medical doctor's testimony about the truth of a child victim's report of sexual abuse. In both cases, the truth of the victim's report was the very substance of the doctor's testimony. The government acknowledges in its brief that Finley's truthfulness is not the substance of Dr. Wicks' opinion. (Appellee's Br. 13). The government instead contends that Dr. Wicks founded his opinion on Finley's truthfulness. Again, however, the facts of this case and the case law offered do not support the government's position. 47 In Charley and Whitted, medical doctors called as experts testified to their opinions that children were abused based primarily on the statements of the children that they were abused. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1267(describing opinions as based largely on witness statements); Whitted, 11 F.3d at 786 (describing opinions as based solely on witness statements). Thus, in each of those cases, the expert was merely reciting the allegation of the alleged victim in the guise of a medical opinion, Whitted, 11 F.3d at 785-86, which does nothing but vouch for the credibility of another witness ..., and therefore does not `assist the trier of fact' as required by Rule 702. Charley, 189 F.3d at 1267. In addition, each court noted that the fact of whether the alleged abuse occurred was for the jury to decide and therefore the expert's testimony was usurping the role of the jury as the ultimate fact finder. See Charley, 189 F.3d at 1270; Whitted, 11 F.3d at 787. 48 Unlike the experts in Charley and Whitted, Dr. Wicks did not merely recite Finley's statements to the jury in the guise of a medical opinion. Dr. Wicks did not base his diagnosis of Finley on Finley's own conclusion that he had a mental impairment the way the doctors in Charley and Whitted based their diagnosis of the existence of abuse on the witnesses' statements that they were abused. 49 Nor did Dr. Wicks' diagnosis of Finley usurp the role of the jury with regard to an ultimate issue of fact. The jury needed to decide whether Finley knew the financial instruments were fake, not whether he had a mental impairment that might inhibit him from reaching the conclusion that the instruments were fake. The jury could accept Dr. Wicks' diagnosis and still find that Finley knew the instruments to be fraudulent. Neither Whitted nor Charley stands for the proposition the government would have it support: that a psychologist cannot provide expert testimony about his diagnosis of a mental disorder based on a variety of factors, including the statements made by the defendant to the psychologist in the course of his examination. 50 Likewise, Benson, 941 F.2d 598, and Viterbo, 826 F.2d 420, do not support the government's argument and are inapplicable to the facts of this case. In Benson, the Seventh Circuit found an abuse of discretion where the trial court allowed the government to introduce the testimony of an Internal Revenue Service agent whose purpose was to summarize the government's case and give his expert opinion on whether the defendant was required to file income tax returns. The court concluded that much of the agent's testimony consisted of nothing more than drawing inferences from the evidence that he was no more qualified than the jury to draw and the agent relied on testimony from other witnesses whose credibility was vigorously attacked by the defendant. 941 F.2d at 604. Specifically, the court noted that the agent had no special skill or knowledge that would allow him to credit the truthfulness of the other witnesses. Id. As we have outlined, Dr. Wicks based his psychological analysis of Finley on more than a summary of Finley's statements, and he was eminently more qualified than a layperson on the jury to assess the significance of facts such as Finley's adamant refusal to accept, or even consider, the government's plea offer. 14 51 Viterbo also is distinguishable from the present case. In Viterbo, the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of the expert opinion of a medical doctor as lacking a reliable foundation because the doctor did not perform a proper medical history of the patient prior to developing his opinion. There, the medical expert sought to attribute the plaintiff's depression and other ailments to his exposure to a chemical based only on the plaintiff's statements that he experienced the symptoms and exposure to the chemical was the only possible cause. 826 F.2d at 424. The Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of that testimony because the doctor was not aware that Viterbo had a family history of depression and hypertension that could have explained the source of the symptoms. Id. at 423(concluding that the failure to take into account this history seriously weakens the reliability of the patient's oral history as a foundation for the doctor's expert opinion). It is not clear that Dr. Wicks made a similar error in diagnosing Finley. The trial record reveals that Dr. Wicks' opinion is based on more than simply crediting Finley's statements. Dr. Wicks administered psychological tests to rule out serious mental disorders, he took a case history and interviewed Finley's spouse to ascertain additional information, and he observed Finley's physical movements and conducted a physical exam to determine if there was a possible physiological problem. The government has not argued that Dr. Wicks' opinion is based on an inaccurate history or is lacking in any specific facts. 52 We also reject the government's argument because Dr. Wicks provided articulable reasons why he believed Finley was not being deceptive or faking. At the Daubert hearing, Dr. Wicks explained that there was no indication that he [Finley] was being deceitful on what probably amounted to four or five hours of testing. Dr. Wicks had previously explained how the psychological tests were specifically designed to detect someone who is trying to fake a mental illness. In addition, Dr. Wicks noted that Finley's responses were internally consistent, and Dr. Wicks had not identified any defensiveness in Finley or any indication that he was over-representing his symptoms. Based on his clinical experience and these facts, Dr. Wicks concluded that Finley was not faking or lying. 15 53 A belief, supported by sound reasoning, that the patient is not faking or lying is sufficient to support the reliability of a mental health diagnosis. In a different factual context, we have stated that the law does not require every expert who testifies to be an expert in detecting deceit. United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1031, 1039 (9th Cir.1997) (reversing a district court's exclusion of defendant's bookkeeping expert who the district court excluded because the defendant may have intentionally deceived the expert about her true knowledge of bookkeeping principles). Analogously, we refuse to require that mental health experts prove themselves infallible lie detectors before accepting their psychological diagnoses. 54 The government next seeks to convince us that Dr. Wicks' diagnosis is unreliable because he based his conclusions on matters beyond his expertise. The doctor was initially hesitant to apply the delusional disorder terminology of the DSM-IV based on his fear that using certain terms would cause the court to question Finley's legal competence. 16 55 In testimony before the jury prior to the government's objection, Dr. Wicks explained that a closed belief system, which distorts or rejects information that does not comport with certain beliefs, is called atypical belief system. This system can also be referred to by the term delusion. 17 Dr. Wicks then explained that there are three major categories of delusions: (1) bizarre delusions held by schizophrenics; (2) atypical delusions held by people who function very normally in everyday life unless you touch their delusions; and (3) shared delusional systems known as folie a deux. Dr. Wicks did not classify Finley in any of these categories. He was interrupted by the government's objection shortly after presenting these three categories. 56 At the Daubert hearing, Dr. Wicks elaborated on how he diagnosed Finley as having an atypical belief system. He admitted that it was an extremely gray diagnosis and he could have easily given him a diagnosis of a delusional disorder [but] that would have raised the question as to his competency in federal court when Dr. Wicks believed that Finley was capable of assisting his attorney and understanding the court proceedings. Dr. Wicks explained his choice of terminology by saying that an atypical belief system is a personality description, not a DSM-IV diagnosis. Nonetheless, Dr. Wicks believed that Finley's mental condition could fit the criteria for a delusional disorder under the DSM-IV. 57 We determine that Dr. Wicks' diagnosis should not be deemed unreliable based on his choice of terminology to describe the diagnosis. Dr. Wicks adequately explained his method of diagnosis to overcome any doubt that he was misdiagnosing Finley or intentionally misleading the government or the court. According to Dr. Wicks' testimony, the symptoms Finley exhibited could be described as either a delusional disorder or atypical belief system. Dr. Wicks simply chose the term, in his view, with the least potential for confusion. We have recognized that concepts of mental disorders are constantly-evolving conception[s] about which the psychological and psychiatric community is far from unanimous and a district court may not exclude proffered expert psychological testimony simply because the defendant's condition does not fit within the expert's — or the district court's own — concept of mental `disorder.' United States v. Rahm, 993 F.2d 1405, 1411 (9th Cir.1993) (reversing the district court's exclusion of expert testimony that the defendant had perceptual difficulties making it impossible for her to recognize counterfeit currency). 58 We conclude that the district court erred in assessing the reliability of Dr. Wicks' testimony. Dr. Wicks did not base his opinions solely on the truthfulness of Finley's statement nor does the record before us demonstrate that the diagnosis was reached through unsound methodology or reasoning. It appears from the record that Dr. Wicks' diagnosis incorporates testing, case history, interviews with the patient and family, medical factors and expert experience applying the information contained in the DSM-IV and other mental health publications. Dr. Wicks' experience with evaluating thousands of people should not be undervalued.
59 The district court concluded that Dr. Wicks' testimony was not relevant because (1) the jury could make its own determination about the sincerity and veracity of Finley's beliefs, (2) the jury could also make the same observations Dr. Wicks made, and, (3) the government could not effectively cross-examine the expert diagnosis. 18 The government makes a similar argument to this court, contending that Dr. Wicks' testimony does not assist the trier of fact because it does not exceed the common knowledge of the trier of fact and crediting Dr. Wicks' testimony precludes the jury from finding that Finley possessed the necessary mens rea for the crime. 19 60
61 We reject the government's first argument and hold that the district court abused its discretion when it found that Dr. Wicks' expert opinion did not exceed the common knowledge of the average layperson. 62 We must be cautious not to overstate the scope of the average juror's common understanding and knowledge. As the Seventh Circuit has recognized, it is precisely because juries are unlikely to know that social scientists and psychologists have identified [such a personality disorder] ... that the testimony would have assisted the jury in making its decision. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 1337, 1345(7th Cir.1996). 63 Jurors are unlikely to know that psychologists have identified a personality disorder that explains why a seemingly normal person could reject or distort certain overwhelmingly true information. Dr. Wicks' testimony would have offered an explanation as to how an otherwise normal man could believe that these financial instruments were valid and reject all evidence to the contrary. While Finley could and did testify about how and why he believed the instruments were valid, only a trained mental health expert could provide a counterweight to the government's allegations against Finley. On the basis of the record before us, Finley was entitled to present Dr. Wicks' testimony to support his defense theory. 64 Our case law recognizes the importance of expert testimony when an issue appears to be within the parameters of a layperson's common sense, but in actuality, is beyond their knowledge. In United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1019-20 (9th Cir.2001), we reversed a trial court's decision to exclude a school psychologist's testimony that special education students whose first language is not English have difficulties communicating in English in high pressure situations. Even though this testimony was seemingly based on common sense, we stated that the expert testimony was necessary to explain how the defendant and an interrogating officer could have very different perceptions of what occurred during the interrogation, yet could both be correct from a communications standpoint. 237 F.3d at 1019. In Vallejo, we relied on the logic of a First Circuit case in which the court explained: [T]he expert testimony was needed to explain why the defendant would make `false statements even though they were inconsistent with his apparent self-interest' when `[c]ommon understanding conforms to the notion that a person ordinarily does not make untruthful inculpatory statements.' Id. at 1020 (quoting United States v. Shay, 57 F.3d 126, 133(1st Cir. 1995)) (concluding that the defendant should have been allowed to present expert testimony that he suffered from a mental disorder which caused him to tell grandiose, self-incriminating lies). The First Circuit reformulated the proper Rule 702 inquiry to be: [w]hether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best degree, the particular issue without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject matter involved. Shay, 57 F.3d at 132 (citations omitted). In the instant case, the average layperson was not qualified to assess Finley's mental condition without the assistance of an expert's specialized understanding. 65 The district court also concluded that several factors in Dr. Wicks' diagnosis, including the elevated levels of narcissism and Dr. Wicks' observations of Finley's physical conduct, are the kinds of observations a jury is supposed to make. We reject the notion that the jury could make the same observations as Dr. Wicks about Finley's physical demeanor and his psychological test scores. First, we note the obvious distinction between a mental health professional examining a patient in private and a jury observing a defendant testifying on the witness stand. Second, while the jury members might have been able to visually identify Finley's demeanor, they were not trained to interpret and assess those observations. 20 The government describes these as commonsensical observations about Finley's demeanor, but Dr. Wicks was able to carefully detail his expert ability to recognize certain symptoms based on his training and years of experience. 21 We doubt the members of the jury possess such an ability. Finally, as Dr. Wicks explained, interpreting psychological testing scores requires years of experience and training. Providing the jury with this raw information would simply not have been enough. 66 The court also excluded Dr. Wicks' opinion because there's nothing that anybody can get their teeth into if you want to cross-examine him. Contrary to this position and as previously mentioned in note 18 of this opinion, all of the weaknesses the district court noted in Dr. Wicks' testimony, including the subjectivity of his conclusions and his reliance on the veracity of Finley's statements, can be properly addressed by the government on cross-examination. See e.g., Rahm, 993 F.2d at 1413(Any deficits in[the psychologist's] qualifications beyond her professional training go to the weight of her testimony rather than to its admissibility.). Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. We note that even with the short notice the government effectively cross-examined Dr. Wicks during the Daubert hearing. 67
68 Expert testimony that compels the jury to conclude that the defendant did or did not possess the requisite mens rea does not assist the trier of fact under Rule 702 because such testimony encroaches on the jury's vital and exclusive function to make credibility determinations. Specifically, Rule 704(b) limits the expert's testimony by prohibiting him from testifying as to whether the defendant had the mental state or condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged. Morales, 108 F.3d at 1035. The rationale for precluding ultimate opinion testimony applies ... `to any ultimate mental state of the defendant that is relevant to the legal conclusion sought to be proven.' United States v. Campos, 217 F.3d 707, 711 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting S. Rep. 98-225 at 231). However, Rule 704(b) allows expert testimony on a defendant's mental state so long as the expert does not draw the ultimate inference or conclusion for the jury. Morales, 108 F.3d at 1037-38. It is, therefore, essential that we distinguish between expert opinions that necessarily compel a conclusion about the defendant's mens rea and those that do not. 69 In Morales, we concluded that the district court erred in barring expert testimony under Rule 704(b) because the expert's testimony did not compel the conclusion that Morales lacked the mens rea of the crime. Morales, charged with willfully making false bookkeeping entries, wanted an accounting expert to testify that her understanding of accounting principles was weak. Id. at 1037. We stated: 70 Even if the jury believed [the] expert testimony that Morales had a weak grasp of bookkeeping knowledge (and there was evidence to the contrary), the jury would still have had to draw its own inference from that predicate testimony to answer the ultimate factual question — whether Morales willfully made false entries. Morales could have had a weak grasp of bookkeeping principles and still knowingly made false entries. 71 Id. at 1037. 72 In Morales, we also cited with approval United States v. Rahm, in which we reversed the district court's exclusion of a defense expert who was going to testify that Rahm had poor visual perception and consistently overlooked important visual details. Morales, 108 F.3d at 1038. In Rahm, we drew a distinction between the ultimate issue — whether Rahm knew the bills were counterfeit — and the proffered testimony of the defendant's poor vision, from which the jury could, but was not compelled, to infer that she did not know the bills were counterfeit. Id. (citing Rahm, 993 F.2d at 1411-12). 73 On the other hand, we have applied Rule 704(b) to prohibit certain testimony that does compel a conclusion about mens rea. In Campos, we upheld a district court's exclusion of a polygraph expert from testifying that the defendant was truthful when she stated she did not know she was transporting marijuana. 217 F.3d at 711. We determined that the testimony compelled the conclusion that the defendant did not possess the requisite knowledge to commit the crime because polygraph test results offer an implicit opinion about whether the accused is being deceptive about the very matters at issue in the trial. Id. at 712. 74 Dr. Wicks' expert diagnosis that Finley has an atypical belief system falls into the Morales / Rahm line of reasoning and can be distinguished from Campos. The jury could have accepted the atypical belief diagnosis and still concluded that Finley knowingly defrauded the banks. If credited, Dr. Wicks' testimony established only that Finley's beliefs were rigid and he would distort or disregard information that ran counter to those beliefs. Dr. Wicks did not, and would not be allowed to, testify about Finley's specific beliefs with regard to the financial instruments. The jury was free to conclude that Finley knew the notes were fraudulent, despite the rigidity of his belief system. Just as in Morales and Rahm, the defense was entitled to present evidence so that the jury could infer from the expert's testimony that the defendant lacked the necessary intent to defraud, but such a conclusion was not necessarily compelled by the diagnosis. A psychological diagnosis, unlike a lie detector test, does not automatically entail an opinion on the truth of a patient's statements. Furthermore, the psychological diagnosis can be limited such that it in no way touches upon the specific issues of fact to be resolved by the jury. 22 75 We also observe that a jury is free to reject Dr. Wicks' testimony. A jury might decide that Finley was untruthful with Dr. Wicks, as the government so strenuously argues in its brief to this court. See Vallejo, 237 F.3d at 1020 (allowing the expert testimony would not displace the role of the jury because, after hearing the expert testimony, the jury was free to decide that the reason for the discrepancy was Vallejo's lack of credibility — not his communications disorder). 76