Opinion ID: 2630185
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Aider and Abettor to Felony Murder

Text: (11) Principals include those who aid and abet in the commission of a crime. (ง 31.) Aider and abettor liability is premised on the combined acts of all the principals, but on the aider and abettor's own mens rea. ( People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111, 1120 [108 Cal.Rptr.2d 188, 24 P.3d 1210].) We have defined the required mental states and acts for aiding and abetting as: (a) the direct perpetrator's actus reusโa crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor's mens reaโknowledge of the direct perpetrator's unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor's actus reusโconduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime. ( People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 423, 113 P.3d 100].) Under the felony-murder rule, an accomplice is liable for killings occurring while the killer was acting in furtherance of a criminal purpose common to himself and the accomplice, or while the killer and the accomplice were jointly engaged in the felonious enterprise. ( People v. Pulido (1997) 15 Cal.4th 713, 719 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 625, 936 P.2d 1235].) In order to support defendant's conviction as an aider and abettor, therefore, the record must contain substantial evidence that (a) Mercurio committed the robbery (the perpetrator's actus reus), (b) defendant knew Mercurio's intent to rob and intended to assist in the robbery (the aider and abettor's mens rea), and (c) defendant engaged in acts that assisted the robbery (the aider and abettor's actus reus). As discussed above, the condition of Gitmed's body supports the inference a robbery took place. Mercurio's testimony stands as direct evidence that defendant committed the robbery, but it also provides circumstantial evidence that Mercurio could have committed the robbery, because it establishes that Mercurio was with Gitmed and defendant when Gitmed was robbed and killed. (See 1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (4th ed. 2000) Circumstantial Evidence, ง 2, p. 322 [testimony may be direct evidence of one fact, but also circumstantial evidence of another fact].) In his testimony, Mercurio cast himself in the best possible light, stating he was completely ignorant of defendant's plan to rob and kill and was shocked when it happened. But other evidence at trial supports the inference that Mercurio was an accomplice in the robbery and shooting. In their testimony, Danny Dalton and Charlene Triplett described Mercurio as an all-too-willing and apparently equal participant with defendant in obtaining and disposing of Gitmed's property after the shooting. Although their testimony does not speak to whether Mercurio was the shooter, it is consistent with the conclusion that Mercurio was more involved in the crime than he testified and that he may have been an accomplice with defendant in the robbery and murder. Defendant contends there is no such thing as aiding and abetting each other and, therefore, absent direct evidence Mercurio shot Gitmed, the evidence is insufficient to convict defendant as an aider and abettor. Defendant argues that even assuming Mercurio was the actual shooter, no evidence supports the conclusions that defendant knew Mercurio was going to rob Gitmed, that defendant himself harbored the intent to deprive Gitmed of his property, or that defendant did anything to aid Mercurio in accomplishing the robbery. We disagree. As we have stated, a sharp line does not always exist between the direct perpetrator and the aider and abettor: It is often an oversimplification to describe one person as the actual perpetrator and the other as the aider and abettor. When two or more persons commit a crime together, both may act in part as the actual perpetrator and in part as the aider and abettor of the other, who also acts in part as an actual perpetrator. . . . [O]ne person might lure the victim into a trap while another fires the gun; in a stabbing case, one person might restrain the victim while the other does the stabbing. In either case, both participants would be direct perpetrators as well as aiders and abettors of the other. The aider and abettor doctrine merely makes aiders and abettors liable for their accomplices' actions as well as their own. It obviates the necessity to decide who was the aider and abettor and who the direct perpetrator or to what extent each played which role. ( People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1120.) The same evidence discussed above as supporting the conclusion that defendant premeditated the robbery and killing also supports the conclusion that defendant and Mercurio were coperpetrators in the robbery and killing. The evidence reasonably supports the inference that, after defendant brought Gitmed to the compound, Mercurio and defendant jointly maneuvered to bring him to an isolated spot at Canyon Lake where both participated in the robbery and murder. Regardless of whether one concludes the actual shooter was defendant or Mercurio, the evidence supports the conclusion the two were coperpetrators in the crimes. (See People v. McCoy, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1120.) And regardless of who was the actual shooter, the evidence reasonably supports the inference that defendant assisted the robbery and murder by providing the gun; as Eric Arias testified, defendant had said he was going to bring a gun and, as Charlene Triplett testified, defendant was cleaning a gun the day after the shooting.