Opinion ID: 587744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sentencing--Mr. Porter

Text: 32 Mr. Porter contends the district court erroneously added two levels to his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) 2 and refused to depart downward under U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 3 . As to each objection, Mr. Porter complains the district court promised to submit a written memorandum reflecting its reasoning but failed to do so. 33 Challenging the factual underpinning for the enhancement, Mr. Porter focuses on testimony at the hearing on sentencing offered by Agent Larry Melton, who stated he couldn't recall if Young ever said that Porter told him that Slater carried a gun. (V. III, 10). Mr. Porter insists he never carried a gun and reasonably did not foresee that Mr. Slater would use a gun in the course of their joint activity. Arguing that Mr. Slater's possession was not within the scope of their agreement, Mr. Porter contends the court erred in enhancing his sentence. In addition, defense counsel urges Mr. Porter's reduced mental capacity, manifest by his lack of judgment and serious deficiencies with recall and concentration, must be considered in making the factual determination Mr. Porter knew Mr. Slater possessed a gun. 34 There is, however, other evidence, including Mr. Young's uncontradicted statement at trial that he knew Brian to carry a gun. (R. V, 177). Mr. Young then clarified he had never seen Mr. Slater carrying a gun but was going by what Mr. Porter had told me, that he carried a gun. (R. V, 178). In the garden-variety drug case, we could perhaps assume joint actors are aware of the tools of their trade making it not improbable that the weapon was foreseen and connected with the offense. United States v. Goddard, 929 F.2d 546, 548 (10th Cir.1991); see also U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), comment. (n. 3). 35 However, we review specific facts and circumstances taken together, not generic conclusions, to decide whether the district court properly applied the § 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement. In this case, despite the objection of counsel, the district court enhanced Mr. Porter's sentence without any oral or written finding to support its decision. The district court did not make a generalized statement adopting the PSR or commenting on its accuracy. Instead, the court stated it would prepare a short written memorandum ruling on each of Mr. Porter's objections, (R. III, 59, 61), although it specifically addressed two objections based on Mr. Porter's role in the offense and his physical impairments. The court apparently did not prepare the written memorandum. 36 We have already stated in United States v. Underwood, 938 F.2d 1086, 1091-92 (10th Cir.1991), under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), the district court must make a generalized statement of its reasoning for imposing a particular sentence so that appellate review does not flounder in the zone of speculation. Id. (quoting United States v. Donaldson, 915 F.2d 612, 616 (10th Cir.1990)). For review, we do not need a highly detailed statement, Underwood, 938 F.2d at 1092, but we must be able to tie the court's sentencing decisions to a factual basis in the record to be assured that basis meets the proper legal standard underpinning the enhancement provision. The district court's statement accepting the PSR as corrected is insufficient. As we observed in Underwood, without a statement of the district court's reasoning, a reviewing court must rely wholly on the probation officer's awareness of the proper standard for a § 2D1.1(b)(1) firearm adjustment. Underwood, 938 F.2d at 1092. We are unwilling to do so here. We therefore remand the case for the court to state its reasoning attributing the weapon to Mr. Porter consistent with this opinion. 37 Similarly, we remand with some guidance on the court's conclusion that U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4 is limited to those cases in which a defendant's physical impairment is so extraordinary that only a non-custodial sentence is appropriate. In so finding, the court agreed with the government that Mr. Porter's physical condition is not so severe that prison officials would be unable to care for him within existing facilities. 38 Before the court was an extensive record documenting Mr. Porter's physical and mental disabilities. In addition to borderline mental retardation and chronic major depressive disorder, Mr. Porter suffered from spondylosis and scoliosis of the spine which were untreated until he was in his twenties. Mr. Porter's examining physician, Dr. William Logan, Director of the Department of Law and Psychiatry at the Menninger Clinic, documented the connections between Mr. Porter's disabling back pain and his inability to work, severe headaches, depression, and drug use. In 1990, the Social Security Administration judged Mr. Porter totally disabled based on these physical and emotional problems and awarded benefits retroactive to 1988. 39 In addition, as previously noted, the district court initially found Mr. Porter incompetent to stand trial based on Dr. Logan's psychiatric evaluation. Upon the advice of defense counsel and the government's agreement, the court ordered Mr. Porter to undergo ninety days of treatment on an outpatient basis at the Wyandotte Mental Health Center. Subsequently, the court accepted the Bureau of Prisons' final forensic report documenting Mr. Porter's competence to stand trial although he still suffered from a chronic depressive disorder for which he continued taking medications prescribed during treatment. 40 Given this medical and psychiatric history, Mr. Porter's counsel argued at the later hearing on sentencing that these conditions comprised an extraordinary physical impairment meriting a sentence below the applicable guideline range or other than imprisonment even. (R. III, 49). To support this contention, Mr. Porter relied on United States v. Ghannam, 899 F.2d 327 (4th Cir.1990). The government objected, believing § 5H1.4 was confined solely to non-custodial sentences in which defendant's physical impairment required hospitalization. The government relied on United States v. Greenwood, 928 F.2d 645 (4th Cir.1991). Rejecting the objection, the court observed, the Court does tend to agree with the Government that this probably meant--this guideline was probably meant to imply [sic] only in those extreme cases where physical impairment was so severe that the Bureau of Prisons could not reasonably handle the care required.... (R. III, 59). 41 Our review is premised on the district court's belief it was without authority under § 5H1.4 to depart from the guidelines, not its failure to depart. United States v. Belden, 957 F.2d 671, 676 (9th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). We review de novo the district court's legal conclusion that § 5H1.4 is not available in determining Mr. Porter's sentence. 42 Although specific offender characteristics are not ordinarily relevant to the departure decision, U.S.S.G., Pt. H, intro. comment., §§ 5H1.1-5H1.6 enumerate certain factors which in extraordinary circumstances may be considered to decide whether a sentence should be outside the applicable range and, in certain cases, to the determination of a sentence within the applicable guideline range. Id.; United States v. Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir.1991) (citation omitted). In contrast, the government argues § 5H1.4 is not a departure guideline and would confine § 5H1.4's extraordinary physical impairment language to either/or determinations: either the impairment can only be treated on a non-custodial basis; or, as a matter of law, it is not sufficiently extraordinary to be considered under this section. The government cites Greenwood, 928 F.2d at 645, and United States v. Sanchez, 933 F.2d 742 (9th Cir.1991) (drug dependence not proper basis for downward departure), to support its position. 43 In Greenwood, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to impose a sentence other than imprisonment because of defendant's extraordinary medical problem which required treatment at a Veterans Administration Hospital, and incarceration would jeopardize this treatment. 928 F.2d at 646. Defendant had lost both legs during his service in the Korean War. In Sanchez, the Ninth Circuit rejected the application of § 5H1.4 on the ground defendant's drug dependence was not an extraordinary physical condition. We do not disagree with either disposition, but neither speaks to the issue as presented here. In Greenwood, defendant's particular physical condition gave the court no other sentencing option. In Sanchez, the guidelines directly address the bearing of drug dependency on sentencing decisions. 44 The plain language of the Policy Statement of § 5H1.4 provides: [A]n extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence below the applicable guideline range; e.g., in the case of a seriously infirm defendant, home detention may be as efficient as, and less costly than, imprisonment. (emphasis added). While the example proffered illustrates the Policy Statement, it does not present the exclusive means of carrying it out. To so hold ignores the words below the applicable guideline range. 45 This reading finds support in United States v. Ghannam, 899 F.2d at 329, in which the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of defendant's similar argument that § 5H1.4 was intended to eliminate rather than reduce his sentence. The Fourth Circuit stated, Section 5H1.4 does not, however, contemplate that a defendant's physical condition is relevant only to the decision whether to impose imprisonment. Section 5H1.4 allows downward departures any time a sentencing court is presented with sufficient evidence of impairment. Id. at 329. The court reasoned the greater departure, no imprisonment, necessarily included the lesser departure, shorter imprisonment. Id. The First Circuit had the same interpretation of § 5H1.4, citing Ghannam. [A] sentencing court is not faced with an all-or-nothing choice between the GSR-range [Guideline Sentencing Range] imprisonment or no imprisonment, but may lawfully decide to impose a reduced prison sentence below the GSR. United States v. Hilton, 946 F.2d 955, 958 (1st Cir.1991). Of course, the extent of departure must be reasonable in light of the circumstances of the particular case. Id. 46 We agree with the analysis of the First and Fourth Circuits. The district court erred in failing to apply § 5H1.4 to decide whether Mr. Porter's showing of physical impairment met the guideline definition and, if so, to what extent a downward departure or alternative sentence was warranted. We therefore remand this case for the court to make the appropriate findings under § 5H1.4. 47 To do so, the district court should first make a factual finding to decide whether Mr. Porter's physical and mental disabilities constitute an extraordinary physical impairment. United States v. Carey, 895 F.2d 318, 324 (7th Cir.1990). If the court so finds, it should then consider whether that condition warrants a shorter term of imprisonment or an alternative to confinement. Id. The court should set forth its reasoning in support of its decision. Thus, we remand for resentencing on this issue.