Opinion ID: 783580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hernandez's Retaliation Claims

Text: 23 Title VII protects the right to be free from certain types of forbidden discrimination, as well as the right to speak out against such discrimination. It also protects against retaliation for the exercise of the right to speak out against discrimination. To establish a prima facie case for a retaliation claim under Title VII, Hernandez must show: (1) that he engaged in a protected activity, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) that there is a causal link between the two. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir.1994). There is no dispute that Hernandez satisfies the first two elements. He has shown that he (1) reported Pray's sexual harassment of Sam to human resources manager Lasher and (2) was terminated. 24 The district court, however, held that Hernandez failed to establish the third element because he failed to show that Pray was aware that Hernandez had engaged in protected activity. In the district court's view, this eviscerate[d] Hernandez's retaliation claim because it prevented a finding of a causal connection between the protected activity and the termination. We disagree. In our view, Hernandez provided sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer both that Pray either knew or suspected that Hernandez had reported the alleged harassment to Lasher, and that there was a causal connection between this knowledge or suspicion and Hernandez's termination. See Passantino v. Johnson & Johnson Consumer Prods., Inc., 212 F.3d 493, 507 (9th Cir.2000); Cohen v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 686 F.2d 793, 796 (9th Cir. 1982). 25 Spacelabs concedes that Pray knew, prior to Hernandez's termination, that allegations of his harassment had been brought to Lasher's attention. Indeed, it is uncontested that at the time of Hernandez's termination Lasher had confronted Pray with such allegations, and Pray knew that the allegations dealt with his alleged harassment of Sam. Spacelabs contends, however, that Pray had no knowledge that Hernandez was the one who reported the alleged harassment, and that Pray's action in terminating Hernandez therefore could not have been retaliation. Spacelabs points out that Pray testified that Lasher did not tell him who had made the sexual harassment allegation, and that Lasher testified that she did not reveal Hernandez's identity as the complainant to Pray. Spacelabs further points out that Reeves testified that he was unaware of Hernandez's complaint against Pray at the time Hernandez was terminated. 26 What-did-he-know-and-when-did-he-know-it questions are often difficult to answer, and for that reason are often inappropriate for resolution on summary judgment. It is frequently impossible for a plaintiff in Hernandez's position to discover direct evidence contradicting someone's contention that he did not know something, and Hernandez has no such evidence. But Hernandez has introduced substantial circumstantial evidence. A reasonable jury could infer from Hernandez's evidence both that Pray believed that Hernandez and Sam had discussed Pray's conduct toward Sam, and that Pray was upset about the fact that Hernandez knew about his conduct. A reasonable jury could also infer that once Pray learned that someone had made a harassment complaint to Lasher, he knew or suspected that this person was Hernandez and decided to retaliate against him. Hernandez's co-workers — including Lee, who was extremely close to Pray, and Flores, a supervisor who also reported to Pray — knew that Hernandez had reported the harassment. A jury could believe Pray's version of events rather than Hernandez's, but Hernandez's burden at this stage simply is one of production. He has produced sufficient evidence which, if credited by the jury, would satisfy his burden of establishing a prima facie case. No more is required. 27 Spacelabs argues that even if a causal link may be inferred, Hernandez's prima facie case is deficient because the involvement of Reeves and Lasher in Hernandez's termination was sufficient to break the chain of causation and remove any taint of Pray's retaliatory intent. See Sherrod v. American Airlines, 132 F.3d 1112, 1122 (5th Cir.1998) (The causal link... can be severed if there is evidence that the ultimate decision maker did not merely `rubber stamp' the recommendation of the employee with knowledge of the protected activity....). The parties do not dispute that Pray instigated the termination. Nor do they dispute that Lasher and Reeves both subsequently played roles in the process. They only dispute the significance of their respective roles. 28 Reeves testified that the final termination decision was made by Lasher, two other human resources employees, Holly Borden and Jim DeGroodt, 1 and himself. But nothing in the record indicates that their involvement amounted to a substantive review of the basis for the termination. Reeves stated he had reviewed the basis for the termination, but there is nothing in his testimony to indicate that this means anything more than that he reviewed the list of alleged violations provided by Pray. Nor does Lasher's involvement in the termination appear to be sufficient, on summary judgment, to absolve Pray. Reeves testified that it was the practice at Spacelabs that HR always prepares the final letter from the manager, from the supervisor and that he assume[d] it was Cathy Lasher who put [the allegations] together in one letter in a chronological order. Pray himself testified that Lasher did not conduct an independent review of the facts underlying the termination. Even if she had, Pray explained, she was not qualified to determine whether a piece of equipment had been properly repaired. She was a human resource employee, not a technician, Pray explained, she wouldn't have a clue what she was looking at. Considering the facts in the light most favorable to Hernandez, as we must, we conclude that Spacelabs simply has not proffered sufficient evidence to compel a conclusion that the chain of causation was broken by the involvement of any other Spacelabs decisionmaker.
29 Because Hernandez has met his burden with respect to the prima facie case, we move to the next stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis and consider Spacelabs's proffered reasons for Hernandez's termination. Spacelabs asserts that it terminated Hernandez because of the alleged performance deficiencies recounted in the termination letter. This assertion satisfies Spacelabs's burden of producing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse employment action.
30 Because Spacelabs has proffered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, Hernandez must introduce evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that Spacelabs did not fire him for those reasons, but rather fired him in retaliation for reporting Pray's alleged sexual harassment of Sam. Hernandez can demonstrate that Spacelabs's proffered reasons for firing him are pretextual either directly by persuading the court that [the retaliatory] reason [for the decision] more likely motivated [Spacelabs] or indirectly by showing that [Spacelabs's] proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256, 101 S.Ct. 1089. Hernandez has sufficiently demonstrated pretext through both routes. 31 First, Hernandez has proffered evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer that the real reason was retaliation. He has proffered evidence about the suspicious timing of his termination, about Pray's knowledge or suspicion that Hernandez had told Lasher of Pray's alleged harassment of Sam, about Pray's hostility toward Hernandez, and about Flores's statement that Hernandez was in trouble when he revealed that he had brought the alleged harassment to Lasher's attention. 32 Second, Hernandez has proffered evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Spacelabs's proffered reasons, even considered by themselves, are unsupported and pretextual. He has proffered evidence that, if credited, shows that he did not commit the alleged errors recounted in the termination letter. Spacelabs contends that whether Hernandez actually did fail to repair the units is irrelevant so long as Spacelabs's decisionmakers actually believed that he had failed to repair them. Gill v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-6, 32 F.3d 376, 379 (8th Cir.1994) (We are not concerned with the correctness or wisdom of the reason given for the [adverse employment] decision, but only with whether [the proffered reason] was the real reason for [plaintiff's] termination and not a pretext for [retaliation]. (internal quotation marks omitted)). Spacelabs's contention is valid as far as it goes. But Hernandez also has produced evidence that, if credited, shows that even if he did commit the errors recounted in the termination letter, they do not amount to infractions that would lead to termination. 33 We therefore conclude that Hernandez's retaliation claims survive Spacelabs's motion for summary judgment.