Opinion ID: 2445256
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: required rights advice prior to accepting guilty pleas

Text: Since the release of this Court's opinion in State v. Mackey, supra , the lower courts of this State have struggled to comprehend the exact requirements of that case and to determine how those requirements should be applied. In this opinion we seek to give additional direction to guide the actions and decisions of trial and appellate courts in addressing Mackey issues. Here, the Court of Criminal Appeals followed the language of Rounsaville, supra , which opinion seems to require strict compliance with the advice litany. However, in State v. Frazier, 784 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1990), this court held that Boykin violations are subject to substantial compliance and harmless error scrutiny; citing State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d 34 (Tenn. 1989), wherein we held that any deviations from Mackey are subject to harmless error review on direct appeal from the entry of a guilty plea. In Rounsaville, supra , decided in 1987, relief was sought in a post-conviction proceeding from nine guilty plea judgments entered upon the same occasion. The accused had signed a petition to be allowed to plead guilty wherein he represented that he had been advised of various constitutional rights, and his attorney signed a certificate to the petition indicating his belief that the statements in the petition were true and accurate. The petition contained no reference to the constitutional right against self-incrimination, nor did it contain the Mackey mandated information that evidence of prior convictions could be admitted for consideration by the judge in determining punishment. The trial judge conducted a brief interrogation of the defendant wherein he established that Rounsaville was 23 years old, had a 12th grade education, was a cement mason, could read and write, and had read the petition that he had signed. The court asked if he wanted to give up a jury trial and if he was guilty and wanted to plead guilty, and if he was satisfied with the work of his appointed attorney. After receiving affirmative responses, the pleas were accepted. This court held that the trial judge's failure to address defendant personally in open court and inform him of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and ascertain that he fully understood the significance of his waiver of that right was an error of constitutional proportion and required that the guilty pleas and convictions thereon be set aside as void. In Rounsaville this court did not directly address the concept of harmless constitutional error. The Court of Criminal Appeals had, in upholding the judgments of conviction, noted that the defendant was no stranger to criminal proceedings, implying that Rounsaville knew of his constitutional right against self-incrimination. Whether he did or not was apparently not directly developed. In the case at bar we depart from the strict holding of Rounsaville . We do not depart from the requirement of the full litany of information that is required to be communicated. Failure to do so, however, merely renders the related judgment voidable rather than void; and in such a case, the appropriate harmless error test shall be applied. If we were deciding Rounsaville today, we would agree that error of constitutional dimension had occurred; but rather than declaring the judgments to be void, we would remand the case for a determination of whether or not the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We wish to emphasize the importance and mandatory status of the advice to be given to the defendant prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea. The prescribed litany has its origin in part in federal constitutional law as pronounced by the federal Supreme Court, in part in state constitutional law as stated by this court, in part in the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure (Rule 11), and in part by the pronouncements of this court in exercising this court's supervisory authority. The common and compelling purpose behind all of these rules is to seek to insulate guilty pleas from coercion and relevant defendant ignorance. They are designed to insure that guilty pleas are voluntary and knowing. No comparable litany of advice is required to be given to a defendant pleading not guilty and standing trial. Any judgment of conviction resulting from such a trial is not void or voidable because of the absence of the litany of advice. By focusing upon this, we bring into proper perspective the purposes behind the requirements of the advice. The defendant is tentatively offering to plead guilty. For the plea to be acceptable it must be voluntary. That does not mean that the defendant would want to plead guilty if he or she had the option available to go free. The option available is to go to trial, with its uncertainties, or to plead guilty. The knowledge that is most relevant to this decision of the accused pertains to the rights that are available to him or her upon a trial that are given up by pleading guilty. While the origin of many of these mandates regarding advice are not the direct product of constitutional rights interpretations, unlike the Boykin rule hereinafter set out, and may simply owe their genesis to a rule of criminal procedure (Rule 11, Tenn.R.Crim.P.) or a supervisory pronouncement of this court, all should be treated with the respect due constitutional rights because any rule of criminal procedure can take on the status of a constitutional right if the denial of its protection results in the denial of the Fourteenth Amendment rights of equal protection or due process. For example, the right to the assistance of competent counsel is a due process constitutional right with its genesis in the Sixth Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Failure of defense counsel to insist upon a defendant's receiving the advice required by Rule 11 could in some cases be a deprivation of the constitutional due process right to effective assistance of counsel. While we have said that a violation of the advice litany not required by Boykin does not have the status of a constitutional rights violation, State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846 (Tenn. 1989), this applies only where the allegation is not linked to the alleged denial of a specified constitutional right. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), holds that if a defendant's guilty plea is not voluntary and knowing, it has been obtained in violation of due process and is therefore void. The court said that it could not presume a waiver of three important federal constitutional rights from a silent record, to wit: 1. The privilege against compulsory self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. 2. The right to trial by jury. 3. The right to confront one's accusers. This court, in State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977), in the exercise of its supervisory power, expressly expanded the advice requirements of Boykin . A considerable part of this advice is constitutionally rooted. This court mandated the following procedure: A. Before accepting a plea of guilty, the court must address the defendant personally in open court and inform him of, and determine that he understands, the following: (1) The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, and the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law; and, if applicable, that a different or additional punishment may result by reason of his prior convictions or other factors which may be established in the present action after the entry of his plea; and (2) If the defendant is not represented by an attorney, that he has a right to be represented by an attorney at every stage of the proceeding against him, and if necessary, one will be appointed to represent him; and (3) That he has a right to plead not guilty or to persist in that plea if it has already been made, and, that he has the right to be tried by a jury and at that trial has the right to the assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, and the right not to be compelled to incriminate himself; and (4) That if he pleads guilty, there will not be a further trial of any kind except to determine the sentence so that by pleading guilty he waives the right to a trial; and (5) That if he pleads guilty, the court or the state may ask him questions about the offense to which he has pleaded, and if he answers these questions under oath, on the record, and in the presence of counsel, his answers may later be used against him in a prosecution for perjury or false statement, and, further, that, upon the sentencing hearing, evidence of any prior convictions may be presented to the judge or jury for their consideration in determining punishment. B. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty results from prior discussions between the District Attorney General and the defendant or his attorney. C. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court shall not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. D. A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is a plea of guilty, the record shall include, without limitation, (a) the court's advice to the defendant, (b) the inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea including any plea agreement and into the defendant's understanding of the consequences of his entering a plea of guilty, and (c) the inquiry into the accuracy of a guilty plea. In State v. McClintock, 732 S.W.2d 268, 273 (Tenn. 1987), this court pronounced the additional advice requirement that it must be made clear to the guilty-pleading defendant that the resulting judgment of conviction may be used in a subsequent proceeding to enhance the punishment for subsequent offenses. See also State v. Prince, 781 S.W.2d 846, 852 (Tenn. 1989); State v. Newsome, 778 S.W.2d 34, 37 (Tenn. 1989). This additional guilty plea requirement first enunciated in McClintock assists the courts in ensuring that the defendant is aware of all consequences of a guilty plea and that the plea is, therefore, intelligently and voluntarily entered. This requirement had not been pronounced at the time of Neal's guilty plea in this case. The McClintock advice requirement was particularly appropriate in 1987 when it was first mandated, because at that time, and for many years before, a felon could be incarcerated for life, without possibility of parole, if he or she had as many as three prior designated felonies, under the Habitual Criminal Act. T.C.A. Sections 39-1-801, 39-1-806; repealed Acts 1989, ch. 591, Section 1. The present sentencing law is not nearly so severe. See T.C.A. Sections 40-35-105, 40-35-107, 40-35-108. Most people would assume that the punishment for a subsequent offense would be enhanced by a prior criminal record. The pertinent parts of Rule 11, Tenn.R. Crim.P. are as follows: (d) Insuring That the Plea is Voluntary. The court shall not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere without first, by addressing the defendant personally in open court, determining that the plea is voluntary and not the result of force or threats or of promises apart from a plea agreement. The court shall also inquire as to whether the defendant's willingness to plead guilty or nolo contendere results from prior discussions between the district attorney general and the defendant or his attorney.       (e)(3) Acceptance of a Plea Agreement. If the court accepts the plea agreement, the court shall inform the defendant that it will embody in the judgment and sentence the disposition provided for in the plea agreement.       (f) Determining Accuracy of Plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. (g) Record of Proceedings. A verbatim record of the proceedings at which the defendant enters a plea shall be made and, if there is a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the record shall include, without limitation, the court's advice to the defendant, the inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea including any plea agreement, and the inquiry into the accuracy of a guilty plea. (The effective date of the rules of Criminal Procedure is July 13, 1978; which is over a year subsequent to the entry of Neal's plea in this case.) We have reviewed and compiled into this opinion the current requirements regarding required advice to defendants offering to plead guilty. We urge trial courts to follow these mandates, as it is their clear duty to do. See Rounsaville v. Evatt, 733 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tenn. 1987). See also, Canon 3 A(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as contained in Rule 10, Supreme Court Rules.