Opinion ID: 2220457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issue v strict liability claim

Text: With regard to this claim, Plaintiff, in his Statement Of The Issues Presented For Review, assigns: Whether the Trial Court erred in not allowing into evidence, violations of federal safety statutes. In his Summary of the Argument, Plaintiff charges not that evidence of violations was rejected but rather that the trial court did not allow him to present the federal safety standard [relative to the presence of] acrylonitrile in the workplace into evidence  a charge differing from the one set forth in the statement of issues. In his argument, Plaintiff launches into a syllogism that the OSHA standards were for the protection of workers in the workplace, including him, that the violation of such regulations was negligence per se under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, and that the trial court erred in directing a verdict upon that issue. This was the thesis of the Court of Appeals; thus, although it appears to us that because of procedural deficiencies, namely that we cannot determine from Plaintiff's brief, or the record, the provisions of the regulations that Defendant allegedly violated, the issue is not before us. Apparently, the Court of Appeals took the burden of making this determination upon itself  an admirable effort to do justice but perhaps one it can ill afford to extend and certainly one beyond the call of its duty. Transfer is now granted under Appellate Rule 11(B)(2)(b) inasmuch as the Court of Appeals erroneously decided a new question of law in holding that a violation of Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) regulations was admissible as evidence of negligence per se, thus imposing strict or absolute liability in FELA actions, [1] and said decision and opinion of the Court of Appeals is ordered vacated. The decision herein, upon this issue, is controlled by the following quoted provision of the Act under which the regulation allegedly violated was adopted:  Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (Emphasis added.) The legislative history accompanying OSHA also reflects the proscriptions set forth above.  The bill does not affect any Federal or state workmen's compensation laws, or the rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under them. In addition, it does not modify other Federal laws prescribing safety and health standards. The bill does not authorize the Secretary of Labor to assert authority under this bill over particular working conditions regarding which another Federal agency exercises statutory authority to prescribe or enforce standards affecting occupational safety and health. (1970 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, 5177, 5199) (Emphasis added.) This issue was addressed in Wendland v. Ridgefield Const. Services, Inc., (1981) 184 Ct. 173, 439 A.2d 954, 956, as follows: We proceed, then, to determine whether the plaintiff, having established a violation of a regulation, was entitled to a jury instruction on negligence per se. Neither party has briefed this issue. Nevertheless, we must address it because to ignore it would be to ignore a clear, plain statutory directive. General Statutes § 31-369(b) provides that `[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workers' compensation law or to enlarge, diminish or affect in any manner common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers or employees, under any law with respect to injuries, diseases or death of employees arising out of and in the course of employment.' Federal law contains a similar provision. 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4). [Footnote omitted]. Both statutes refer to the Occupational Safety and Health Act, which is the enabling legislation for the safety regulations at issue in this case. Thus we must decide whether the negligence per se instruction given to the jury in this case is legally correct when measured against these limiting statutes.       A negligence per se instruction transforms the character of the factfinder's inquiry. The applicable standard of care is affected by such an instruction. Because the standard of care is the key factor in determining liability, we conclude that the application of a negligence per se instruction affects common law rights, duties and liabilities of employers and employees with respect to injuries of employees arising out of and in the course of employment as those terms are used in 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) and General Statutes § 31-369(b). Thus, the negligence per se instruction was erroneous. In Bertholf v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 402 F. Supp. 171 (E.D.Wash. 1975), a FELA action, the employee sought summary judgment where a defect in a hoist was the proximate cause of the accident, and violation of an OSHA regulation requiring regular inspections of such equipment was charged. The court held: Further, plaintiff's argument would fail for the additional reason that section 4(b)(4) of OSHA, 29 U.S.C. § 653, upon which plaintiff relies to find an employer violation of a safety statute, expressly limits the operation of OSHA regulations to render them inapplicable to FELA cases: `Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to supersede or in any manner affect any workmen's compensation law or to enlarge or diminish or affect in any other manner the common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law with respect to injuries, diseases, or death of employees arising out of, or in the course of, employment.' 402 F. Supp. at 173. Another holding is National Marine Service, Inc. v. Gulf Oil Co., 433 F. Supp. 913, (E.D.La. 1977) aff'd., 608 F.2d 522 (5th Cir.1979). An action brought under the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688, rendering FELA applicable to seamen. An issue was whether OSHA regulations were applicable to crew members, and it was held that the specific wording of the Jones Act excluded them. The court continued, Even if there was a violation of OSHA regulations, that violation may not be used to create civil liability, 29 U.S.C.A. § 653(b)(4), although the regulations may be used as guides for the determination of standards of care[.] (Citations omitted.) 433 F. Supp. at 919. Hebel relies upon Kernan v. American Dredging Co., (1958) 355 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 for his proposition that under FELA the violation of a safety regulation gave rise to absolute liability in the employer for injuries to the employee proximately caused thereby. Kernan appears to be analogous to the case before us only in that it arose under the Jones Act and the injury resulted from the violation of a Coast Guard Regulation. There, the similarities end. The issue was whether strict liability would arise from the violation of a regulation designed for a purpose other than to protect against injuries of the nature of the resultant one. The regulation required navigational lights on ships to be at a minimum height of eight feet above the water. Its purpose was to maximize visibility by others, as a guard against collision. A seaman lost his life on a tugboat when an open-flame kerosene lamp on board a scow being towed ignited inflammable vapors lying above an accumulation of petroleum spread over the surface of the water. The lamp was approximately three feet above the water's surface rather than at the height established by the Coast Guard Regulation. Following a line of FELA cases, wherein strict liability had been imposed for violation of the Safety Appliance Act and the Boiler Inspection Act, notwithstanding that the injuries had not been of the type the regulations had been intended to prevent, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, held, upon an evolving public policy of shifting the human overhead of the inevitable deaths and injuries of industrial employment from workers to industry, that the purpose of the regulation was not relevant. Clearly the distinguishing factor in Kernan is the absence of the OSHA provision, above quoted, proscribing any construction to enlarge or diminish or affect ... common law or statutory rights, duties, or liabilities of employers and employees under any law. We have found no case where absolute liability has been imposed for violation of an OSHA regulation against a claim that the express language of OSHA prohibits the creation of liability.