Opinion ID: 2086451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Relating to Defendant's Right to Confront Accusers Against Him

Text: Defendant argues that he was denied his constitutional right to confront his accusers because the trial court erroneously (1) admitted hearsay statements made by a codefendant in regard to the murder plans under the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule; (2) admitted out-of-court statements by police officers that defendant's daughter had run away from home following the murder; and (3) admitted testimony by a codefendant who stated that he fled Chicago after learning from his sister that defendant was arrested. We shall examine each alleged error in turn. Defendant objects to the testimony of Ann Walters, Daniel Egan, and Wayne Walters. Ann Walters was allowed to testify about two major conversations she had with Bean following the murder, during which Bean told her specific details concerning its commission. Similarly, Egan was allowed to testify that Bean informed him of the details of the home invasion and murder. Wayne Walters was also allowed to testify as to the conversations he had with Bean following the murder. The general rule is that a statement of one co-conspirator is admissible against the others as an admission only if the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. ( People v. Davis (1970), 46 Ill.2d 554, 264 N.E.2d 140.) A statement which is merely a narrative of past occurrences will not fall within the co-conspirator exception if it does not further any objective of the conspiracy. People v. Miller (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 574, 585, 83 Ill.Dec. 802, 470 N.E.2d 1222. Defendant first complains that the statements admitted were not made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. This assertion might be compelling if the conspiracy ended with Dorothy Polulach's death. However, it did not. The ultimate goal of the conspiracy was for defendant, Bean, and Egan to obtain money from Ann and Wayne Walters as payment for the murder of Dorothy Polulach. The conversations which Bean had with the Walterses and Egan following the murder were coolly calculated to further these financial interests. Bean had to convincingly and irrefutably demonstrate to the Walterses that he had succeeded in his task and he did so by relating what occurred during the murder. These recitations were inextricably intertwined with his continued requests for money. Therefore, the trial judge did not err in admitting testimony concerning these conversations. Defendant also objects to the admittance of Egan's testimony which recounted his conversation with Bean during their return from O'Hare airport. He argues that Egan did not conspire to kill Polulach for the proceeds from her estate, and therefore Bean was merely narrating past events. In support of his argument, defendant cites People v. Parmly (1987), 117 Ill.2d 386, 111 Ill.Dec. 576, 512 N.E.2d 1213, in which this court held that when the primary goal of the conspiracy is completed, any subsequent goal, such as concealment, could not serve as a basis to admit the statements. Parmly is inapplicable to the case at bar because the statements the court found inadmissible in that case occurred the day after the object of the conspiracythe robberywas completed. It is irrelevant whether, as defendant suggests, Egan did not have knowledge of the continuing conspiracy to extract money from the Walterses for the murder. The only way that these statements could be rendered inadmissible is if we were to agree with defendant that he was unaware of Bean's scheme with respect to the Walterses. Defendant insists that no evidence was admitted which suggested he was privy to this aspect of the conspiracy. This assertion will not bear scrutiny. Neither defendant nor Bean testified during the jury trial, and we will never know the substance of their private conversations or mental impressions around the time of the murder. Similarly, we do not have Dorothy Polulach available to testify that it was indeed defendant and Bean who killed her. We do know, however, that Ann and Wayne Walters testified that they entered into an agreement with Bean whereby Bean agreed to kill Dorothy Polulach for a fee. Egan's testimony linked defendant to the conspiracy; he testified to the events the night of the murder. Moreover, Egan testified to his conversation with Bean and defendant on their return from O'Hare airport, in which Bean told him the details of the murder and of the monetary reward he would receive for his participation in it. Egan's testimony was not improbable; he told a credible story of a well-planned conspiracy. The trial judge was convinced that the totality of the witness testimony establishing the relationship between Bean and defendant and their cooperation in carrying out the crime revealed that defendant was well aware of the entire monetary scheme. No other reasonable conclusion could have been reached. Defendant next attacks the admission of the officers' testimony in reference to defendant's daughter. Early in the trial, Ann Walters testified that Bean told her that one of his partners was off the wall because the police had been around that partner's home asking questions about his daughter, who had run away. Seeking to enhance Ann Walters' credibility and directly tie defendant to the murder, the prosecution called two police officers who also testified about the missing daughter. Officer John McCarthy testified that on February 26, 1981, he was dispatched to defendant's residence to investigate a missing-person report. He was further allowed to testify that when he arrived, defendant's wife told him that their daughter, Margaret, had run away. Detective Thomas Ptak testified that, following the arrest of the Walterses, he returned to Chicago and began searching through police missing-person reports. He testified that he found a missing-person report on Margaret Byron. Defendant asserts the trial judge erred in admitting the officers' testimony because it was hearsay. Our review of the record indicates that defendant's challenge to the testimony of Officer McCarthy and Detective Ptak has been waived. It is well settled that both a trial objection and a written post-trial motion raising the issue are required to preserve an alleged error for review. ( People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Although defendant concedes that Officer McCarthy is not specifically mentioned in defendant's post-trial motion, he nonetheless argues that the motion specifically objects to the same evidence introduced through the testimony of Detective Ptak. The motion states: The court erred by allowing Detective Ptak to testify that, sometime after the incident, he was looking for Robert Byron. This testimony suggested that Byron had been implicated by someone. The testimony amounted to the introduction of a hearsay statement by a third-party. Although this paragraph mentions Detective Ptak's name and hearsay, it lacks specificity and, thus, does not preserve defendant's challenge to the testimony concerning defendant's daughter. Nor will we consider defendant's objection to this testimony under the plain error doctrine. The plain error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider a trial error not properly preserved when (1) the evidence in a criminal case is closely balanced or (2) where the error is so fundamental and of such magnitude that the accused was denied a right to a fair trial. ( People v. Herrett (1990), 137 Ill.2d 195, 209-10, 148 Ill.Dec. 695, 561 N.E.2d 1; 134 Ill.2d R. 615(a).) Neither circumstance exists here. Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by allowing Egan to testify that on April 6, 1981, his sister, Karen, the defendant's wife, phoned to inform him that the police had arrested defendant. Egan further testified that he, Bean, and Bean's girlfriend, Debbie Youngbrandt, fled Chicago following defendant's arrest. During closing argument, the prosecutor used this information to argue that the flight of Egan and Bean indicated that they were accomplices of defendant and thus defendant was guilty. We find that defendant has waived any objection to the admission of this testimony by failing to properly preserve the issue for review. Defendant asserts that he objected to this testimony in his post-trial motion, which states: The court erred by allowing Detective Ptak to testify that, sometime after the incident, he was looking for Robert Byron. This testimony suggested that Byron had been implicated by someone. The testimony amounted to the introduction of a hearsay statement by a third-party. This paragraph is not even tangentially related to Egan's testimony concerning his flight after defendant's arrest. As noted in People v. Enoch (1988), 122 Ill.2d 176, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124: `Failure to raise issues in the trial court denies that court the opportunity to grant a new trial, if warranted. This casts a needless burden of preparing and processing appeals upon appellate counsel for the defense, the prosecution, and upon the court of review. Without a post-trial motion limiting the consideration to errors considered significant, the appeal is open-ended. Appellate counsel may comb the record for every semblance of error and raise issues on appeal whether or not trial counsel considered them of any importance.' ( Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 186, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124, quoting People v. Caballero (1984), 102 Ill.2d 23, 31-32, 79 Ill.Dec. 625, 464 N.E.2d 223.) This court went on to observe: [O]ur constitutional obligation to review death penalty cases does not require us to review every issue raised on appeal when the issues are not properly preserved by an objection in the trial court and a written post-trial motion. Enoch, 122 Ill.2d at 190, 119 Ill.Dec. 265, 522 N.E.2d 1124.) Frequently, defendant's trial and appellate counsel are different. Equally competent counsel may differ in their approach to each case. A court of review should not give deference to defendant's challenges premised on nothing other than appellate counsel's different viewpoint regarding trial counsel's strategic performance. Where an alleged error has been waived, the threshold inquiry must rise to the level of plain error or ineffective assistance of counsel. Neither circumstance exists here.