Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issues Pertaining to Guilt Phase

Text: Defendant contends his trial was marred by a series of errors involving section 29, [6] errors that eviscerated his mental state defense and deprived him of a fair trial. Specifically, defendant urges that the prosecutor improperly asked a defense witness, Forensic Psychiatrist William Vicary, whether he believed there was sufficient evidence to support a psychiatric defense, elicitingover defense objectionVicary's opinion that although defendant was psychotic and paranoid at the time of the offenses, no evidence supporting a psychiatric defense existed. Defendant further contends the trial court compounded this error by refusing a defense request for a curative instruction, modeled after section 29, that would have informed the jury that it alone was to decide whether he harbored the requisite mental states and that it could not consider expert testimony purporting to answer that question. These asserted errors, defendant contends, violated several of his rights under the federal Constitution, as well as state law. [7] As noted, section 29 provides: In the guilt phase of a criminal action, any expert testifying about a defendant's mental illness, mental disorder, or mental defect shall not testify as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states, which include, but are not limited to, purpose, intent, knowledge, or malice aforethought, for the crimes charged. The question as to whether the defendant had or did not have the required mental states shall be decided by the trier of fact. Thus, neither side may elicit from an expert that a defendant acted with, or lacked, a particular mental state. ( People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 961, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) Defendant contends that while Dr. Vicary did not expressly state that defendant shot the victims with malice aforethought and after premeditation and deliberation, the jury would have understood his testimony that there were no psychiatric defenses in this case as the functional equivalent of such an express statement. Even assuming without deciding, as the concurring and dissenting opinion argues, that Dr. Vicary's testimony on cross-examination violated section 29, we find no prejudice. It is not reasonably probable that the result would have been more favorable to defendant in the absence of the error. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 837, 299 P.2d 243.) Indeed, we would find any error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705.) Elsewhere in his testimony Dr. Vicary repeatedly emphasized that the decision whether defendant was guilty of murder or manslaughter was not a medical or psychiatric one, but properly belonged to the jurors, who would know more about the case than he did. Moreover, Dr. Vicary's opinion to the effect that defendant's primary reason for the shootings was his psychotic mental state, specifically his paranoia, was significantly and repeatedly undercut on cross-examination by evidence of which Dr. Vicary conceded he was unaware. For example, Dr. Vicary relied on the fact that a month or two before the murders, defendant woke up screaming, telling his wife to call the police because someone was coming to kill him and his family. Dr. Vicary was unaware defendant had borrowed large sums of money from Wendell West that he was unable to repay. After reviewing loan agreements reflecting an exorbitant interest rate and other financial documents pertaining to the transactions between West and defendant, documents that defense counsel had not provided to Dr. Vicary before his testimony on direct examination, Vicary agreed that the transactions smack[ed] of loan sharking, and he acknowledged that if a person were indebted to another and unable to repay the money, he might legitimately have nightmares and feel someone was out to get him and his family. [8] Dr. Vicary also relied on defendant's attempt to extort money from the owner of Hammett Vacuum Service in exchange for not reporting him for dumping toxic waste. Dr. Vicary had either not noticed or not known that two other individuals in their statements had acknowledged the company in fact had previously been cited for dumping toxic waste. After considering this evidence, he acknowledged he had a totally different outlook [9] on the extortion scheme. Dr. Vicary also relied on an alleged March 9, 1985, incident in which defendant drew a gun and demanded two individuals return property they purportedly had stolen or he would blow [their] fucking head[s] off. Dr. Vicary acknowledged that the police report concerning this incident, dated after the capital crimes occurred, revealed that defendant told the police he believed the individuals had stolen property from him. Dr. Vicary agreed that the credibility issues surrounding the incident did not translate into a conclusion that one side of [the] dispute [was] paranoid; rather, the incident was simply one to be measured against all the other circumstances, although in the absence of hard and fast evidence of actual theft (which, given defendant's admitted failure to keep an inventory of his property, would have been difficult to produce) and the individuals' expressions of fear and bewilderment at the incident, Vicary adhered to his belief it reflected paranoia on defendant's part. In sum, this powerful cross-examination seems far more significant than the one-sentence opinion in Dr. Vicary's 1985 report. We note, too, that both an instruction (CALJIC No. 2.80) and Dr. Vicary's testimony informed jurors that it was their decision alone, not the expert's, whether defendant had the required mental states; the prosecutor echoed the point (Sir, I have no question with the fact that 12 jurors make the ultimate decision ...). Another instruction (CALJIC No. 3.36), moreover, told jurors they could consider, on this question, evidence that defendant had a mental disorder and was intoxicated. In light of all these circumstances, the assumed error was harmless. For the same reason, although the trial court would not have erred in instructing the jury in the language of section 29, its refusal to do so did not prejudice defendant.

After the prosecutor, in cross-examination of forensic psychiatrist Dr. Vicary, elicited the witness's opinion that the evidence in defendant's case did not support any psychiatric defenses, including a defense of insanity (see pt. II.B.1., ante ), defense counsel in redirect examination sought to explore Dr. Vicary's understanding of the legal standard for insanity. The trial court sustained the prosecutor's objection to the line of questioning. Defendant contends the trial court violated state evidentiary law (by allowing the introduction of irrelevant and prejudicial evidence during the prosecutor's cross-examination), as well as defendant's federal constitutional rights (by inconsistently and arbitrarily restricting his counsel's redirect examination of Dr. Vicary when it had just permitted the prosecutor to cross-examine him on the same subject). The Attorney General contends the cross-examination was relevant and that, by failing to object on constitutional grounds to the court's ruling concerning the scope of redirect examination, defendant has forfeited any constitutional claim for purposes of this appeal. Citing People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at pages 117-118, 132-133, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166, defendant contends that by calling the trial court's attention to the irrelevancy of the prosecutor's line of questioning, he preserved the constitutional claim he now makes. Assuming for argument's sake defendant preserved the issue, we conclude the trial court did not err under state or federal law. The issue arose in the following context: During cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Dr. Vicary whether the report he had prepared for defendant's trial counsel addressed issues other than those relevant to the guilt phase. Eventually the prosecutor elicited the fact Dr. Vicary had considered and rejected a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. At sidebar, defense counsel asserted that whether Dr. Vicary thought defendant was insane was irrelevant and inadmissible, and asked what parameters the court would set on such questioning. The court stated the prosecutor had already covered insanity and inquired whether he intended to do more than that. The prosecutor responded he did not. Cross-examination of Dr. Vicary resumed. Defendant complains that despite the colloquy between court and counsel, the prosecutor continued to question Dr. Vicary about the defense of insanity, again eliciting that this case involved no insanity plea. Defendant contends the prosecutor's questioning was irrelevant because he never entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and the issue of a defendant's legal insanity is bifurcated and tried separately from that of guilt in any event. But as the Attorney General reasons, the prosecutor engaged in the line of questioning that defendant now challenges not in order to demonstrate that Dr. Vicary did not believe defendant was legally insane, but to impeach Dr. Vicary's testimony on cross-examination that defense counsel would be incompetent if he did not present a psychiatric defense in the guilt phase, even though Dr. Vicary believed the facts did not support a psychiatric defense to the charges, and to put in perspective the fact Dr. Vicary similarly felt the facts did not support a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. In other words, the prosecutor explored the inconsistency between the defense's presentation of a psychiatric defense and its nonpresentation of an insanity defense, despite Dr. Vicary's disavowal of the validity of both defenses on the facts of this case. The trial court acted within its discretion in precluding defense counsel from questioning Dr. Vicary on redirect examination concerning his understanding of the legal definition of insanity, due to the risk of undue consumption of time and confusion of the issues. (Evid.Code, § 352.) Nevertheless, we note the court permitted defense counsel to suggest to the jury a possible distinction between the psychiatric defense actually presented and the insanity defense not presented, by eliciting Dr. Vicary's acknowledgment, on redirect examination, that when a defendant proffers an insanity defense, he bears the burden of persuading the jury he is insane. Defense counsel also elicited from Dr. Vicary testimony reinforcing the principle that the determination whether defendant had the mental state required for the charged offenses was to be made by the jury, not the forensic psychiatrist. We see no possibility that the decision not to allow defense counsel to explore Dr. Vicary's understanding of the legal definition of insanity, coupled with the admission of Dr. Vicary's opinion regarding the viability of an insanity defense, would have misled the jury to conclude Dr. Vicary was asserting defendant suffered from no mental disease or disorder, or otherwise prejudiced defendant. We conclude the trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional rights by imposing asymmetrical evidentiary standards on the parties.
Defendant argues the trial court erred under state evidentiary law by arbitrarily preventing his trial counsel from asking a defense expert witness, Toxicologist Ernest Lykissa, Ph.D., a hypothetical question that assertedly was not supported by the evidence, while permitting the prosecutor (over defense objection) to ask the same witness a different hypothetical question that was similarly unsupported by the evidence. The Attorney General argues this contention was not preserved by a sufficiently specific objection below. Although defendant did not cite any specific ground for his objection to the prosecutor's hypothetical, his objection clearly related back to the earlier discussion the parties had about the propriety of the hypothetical questions the defense had tried to ask Dr. Lykissa, and we are satisfied defendant has preserved the state evidentiary claim for appeal. Defendant's argument, however, lacks merit, for the prosecutor's question, unlike defense counsel's, did not assume a fact not in evidence. The defense called Dr. Lykissa, chief toxicologist at Long Beach Memorial Medical Center, to testify about the effect of alcohol consumption on blood-alcohol levels and behavior, in order to suggest that defendant had committed the charged offenses with a diminished mental state. Dr. Lykissa testified that at 7:40 p.m. the night of the shootings, defendant gave a blood sample that contained .154 percent alcohol. Based on a theoretical model male weighing 150 pounds, Lykissa testified it would take in excess of seven drinks consumed over a two-hour period before testing for the model male to register .154 percent. Defense counsel asked Dr. Lykissa: Let's say we are talking about a male in his mid-forties who weighs approximatelybetween 180 and 190 pounds in weight, do you have any opinion asin assuming that he hadhe had his last drink approximately an hour and a half to two hours before a test was run on him, would you have any opinion as to the blood level at that point? The prosecutor then objected on the ground that no evidence supported the hypothetical. At a sidebar conference, the court said: The part that bothers me is unless [defendant] testifiesI don't know how you are going to get into the record when he had his last drink. [¶] That's a part of your hypothetical. Defense counsel responded that he would be presenting circumstantial evidence of when defendant had his last drink and that defendant had had nothing to drink from about 10 minutes to 7:00 p.m. until the time his blood was tested at 7:40 p.m. The prosecutor objected that no such evidence had yet been presented, adding: In fact, there is not necessarily any reason to believe there was any drinking until after the first two killings. [¶] ... He could have had everything after the killings, but before he shot Layton, and ... unless we get some evidence in this record, this hypothetical is unwarranted. The court ruled: You [defense counsel] can always bring him [Lykissa] back, if necessary, but I'll sustain the objection at this time to the hypothetical. Defendant acknowledges he failed to recall Dr. Lykissa to the stand. This circumstance suffices to defeat his claim of evidentiary error. Defendant argues, to the contrary, that recalling Dr. Lykissa would not have alleviated the harm the trial court had already caused by allowing the prosecutor to pose to the expert a hypothetical question that was not supported by the evidence, even after all the evidence had been presented. As will appear, the premise underlying this argument is flawed, as the prosecutor's hypothetical question, unlike defense counsel's, was based on facts shown by the evidence. (See People v. Ward (2005) 36 Cal.4th 186, 209, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717 [expert may render opinion testimony based on facts given in hypothetical questions, but such questions must be rooted in facts shown by the evidence].) To return to the examination of Dr. Lykissa: After the expert testified that defendant's blood-alcohol level was .154 percent at 7:40 p.m., the prosecutor asked: What, if anything, can you think of [that] is inconsistent with the following hypothesis? [¶] That the individual whose blood alcohol reading was .154 at 7:40 did not have anything to drink until after 6:15 or 18:15? The court overruled a defense objection, and Dr. Lykissa, after making some calculations on paper, responded: Nothing. As the Attorney General reasons, the prosecutor's question embraced facts already in evidence (the time of defendant's blood test and his blood-alcohol level) and simply asked Dr. Lykissa if those known facts were inconsistent with the possibility (or hypothesis) that the individual in question had nothing to drink until after 6:15 p.m. In contrast, the defense question to which the court sustained the prosecutor's objection asked Dr. Lykissa to assume a fact not yet in evidence, i.e., that defendant had nothing to drink after 10 minutes to 7:00 p.m. Therefore, the trial court properly excluded defendant's hypothetical and allowed the prosecutor's; hence, no differential treatment appears. Defendant further argues the restriction on his counsel's direct examination of Dr. Lykissa violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to present a defense and to due process, as well as the Eighth Amendment's requirement of a reliable determination of penalty. The Attorney General contends defendant forfeited these constitutional issues for purposes of this appeal by failing to articulate these grounds at trial. We concluded above that defendant preserved his related claim of state evidentiary error, but because the constitutional claims defendant now asserts do not simply restate his evidentiary claim on alternative legal principles, but instead require consideration of different circumstancesnamely, the court's assertedly asymmetrical treatment of the parties' use of hypothetical questionshe has forfeited the constitutional arguments for appeal. (See ante, fn. 7.) In any event, for the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not err in its rulings concerning the scope of the parties' examination of Dr. Lykissa.

Defendant contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder. (See People v. Ochoa (1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 422, 79 Cal. Rptr.2d 408, 966 P.2d 442.) A trial court must instruct the jury on a lesser included offense, whether or not the defendant so requests, [10] whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty of only the lesser offense is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury. ( People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154-155, 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Substantial evidence in this context is that which a reasonable jury could find persuasive. ( Id. at p. 162, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094.) Section 192, subdivision (b) defines involuntary manslaughter as the unlawful killing of a human being without malice during the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection. As defendant observes, if, in a murder case, evidence of mental illness or intoxication raises a reasonable doubt the defendant premeditated or deliberated, but establishes he did harbor malice aforethought, then he is guilty of second degree murder; if such evidence negates malice aforethought, the only supportable verdict is involuntary manslaughter or acquittal. ( People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1117, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) Defendant contends he presented substantial evidence that he was mentally ill and intoxicated at the time of the shootings, which could have led a reasonable jury to conclude he lacked malice aforethought. He points to the evidence, recited above, of his deteriorating mental state prior to the crimes and his consumption of alcohol on the day of the offenses, and argues the trial court therefore was required to instruct on involuntary manslaughter. Contrary to defendant's contention, the evidenceincluding defendant's own testimony that he intentionally killed the victims and the manner in which they were shotabundantly established that he intended to kill Ferguson and Perez, and nothing in the record suggested that intoxication or mental illness negated that intent. Nor was there any evidence that defendant was committing only a misdemeanor, or that he was committing a lawful act in an unlawful manner or without due caution. Moreover, in closing argument the defense essentially conceded the element of malice. Consequently, the court did not err in failing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury, pursuant to CALJIC No. 3.36, that it could consider defendant's evidence of mental illness and voluntary intoxication in deciding whether he had formed any mental state or intent required by the charged offenses. [11] He argues that, having failed to instruct on involuntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder, apparently because it had determined that defendant's evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant had acted with malice (see pt. II.B.3.a., ante ), the trial court should have modified the instruction to make clear that the defense evidence of intoxication and mental disorder was relevant to whether he premeditated and deliberated the killings, but not to whether he acted with express or implied malice, and that the failure to do so rendered the instructions confusing and contradictory. Defendant argues the prosecutor prejudicially exploited this asserted error in his closing argument by suggesting to the jury there was no reason why the evidence would affect defendant's ability to premeditate and deliberate, yet not affect his ability to form malice. Defendant asserts the instruction, exacerbated by the prosecutor's closing argument, violated the federal Constitution, as well as state law, because it so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violated due process ( Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385) and deprived him of a reliable guilt phase verdict as a proper basis for the imposition of the death sentence. The Attorney General first contends that by expressly assenting to the giving of the instruction and failing to request clarification, defendant failed to preserve the claimed error. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 380, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34.) Defendant asserts the record does not demonstrate that his counsel acquiesced in the instruction, and even if it did, the trial court nevertheless had a duty to instruct the jury correctly (see People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1015, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 648, 945 P.2d 1197), a duty that could be negated only if counsel invited the error, which he did not do here. Assuming for the sake of argument the claim of instructional error is preserved for appeal, it nevertheless lacks merit. The essence of defendant's argument is not so much that the instruction itself was erroneous, but that, in view of the trial court's refusal to instruct on voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, the instruction might have confused the jury. We see no such potential for confusion. The modified instruction clearly did not preclude the jury from considering defendant's evidence of mental disorder and intoxication on the question whether he acted with premeditation and deliberation, the mental states, in the language of the instruction, to which the defense had directed its presentation of such evidence. Nor did it prevent defense counsel from arguing the jury should consider such evidence only on that question (in closing argument defense counsel did tie the evidence to the issue of premeditation and deliberation, while essentially conceding malice), or from responding to the prosecutor's argument that the evidence logically would have the same effect on malice aforethought as on premeditation and deliberation. And, as the Attorney General further contends, by failing to object to the prosecutor's argument and request an admonition, defendant forfeited any claim the argument was misleading. In sum, the instruction violated neither state law nor the federal Constitution.
Defendant contends the trial court erred in refusing his request for instructions on unconsciousness as a complete defense to all charges. [12] Unconsciousness, if not induced by voluntary intoxication, is a complete defense to a criminal charge. (§ 26, subd. Four; People v. Coogler (1969) 71 Cal.2d 153, 170, 77 Cal.Rptr. 790, 454 P.2d 686; People v. Newton (1970) 8 Cal.App.3d 359, 376, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394; see also § 20 [to constitute a crime there must exist a joint operation of act and intent].) To constitute' a defense, unconsciousness need not rise to the level of coma or inability to walk or perform manual movements; it can exist where the subject physically acts but is not, at the time, conscious of acting. ( Newton, at p. 376, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394.) If the defense presents substantial evidence of unconsciousness, the trial court errs in refusing to instruct on its effect as a complete defense. ( Id. at p. 377, 87 Cal.Rptr. 394, citing People v. Wilson (1967) 66 Cal.2d 749, 764, 59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820.) In support of his contention that the evidence warranted the giving of instructions on unconsciousness, defendant relies on Dr. Vicary's testimony that, at the time of the offenses, defendant suffered from bipolar disorder, with symptoms including psychosis and agitation, exacerbated by intoxication, as well as his own testimony that immediately before the shootings he experienced strange sensations, which he asserts were suggestive of an altered state of consciousness. Defendant also points to his testimony that he did not consciously or intentionally pull the trigger in shooting Alcala, as well as to certain inaccuracies and internal contradictions in his testimony and gaps in his knowledge of events. Specifically, defendant cites his testimony professing unawareness as to why he drove from the Alcala scene to the Hammett Vacuum Services location, why he shot Ferguson and Perez, what route he took from the Hammett location to Eugene Layton's house, and his lack of memory of what Ferguson and Perez said to him before he shot them. Defendant also relies on certain contradictions between his own testimony and that of Alcala and Layton, contradictions that he now asserts did not serve his legal interests. Defendant argues his testimony raised the question of whether he actually recalled the shootings or whether he instead had filled gaps in his memory with information gleaned from other sources, and that the jury may have concluded [defendant] was truthful with Dr. Vicary prior to trial when he told the doctor that he had no recollection of the homicides, and that his testimony to the contrary was a confabulation. The trial court properly refused the requested instructions. Defendant's own testimony makes clear that he did not lack awareness of his actions during the course of the offenses. The complicated and purposive nature of his conduct in driving from place to place, aiming at his victims, and shooting them in vital areas of the body suggests the same. That he did not, by the time of trial, accurately recall certain details of the shootings does not support an inference he was unconscious when he committed them. The cases on which defendant relies are distinguishable: In People v. Wilson, supra, 66 Cal.2d at page 762, 59 Cal.Rptr. 156, 427 P.2d 820, the defendant testified he did not recall shooting the victims, which was consistent with his statement to police at the time of his arrest. In People v. Bridgehouse (1956) 47 Cal.2d 406, 410, 303 P.2d 1018, likewise, the defendant testified his recollection of speaking with the victim just before the shooting was very hazy, he had a very vague memory of the victim springing from the couch, and the next thing he remembered was pulling the trigger of his gun on empty cartridges; he characterized his action as distorted by a haze of mental void. He had made similar statements to the police when he was arrested. ( Ibid. ) Thus, in both Wilson and Bridgehouse, the defendants testified to a mental state consistent with unconsciousness and with prior statements to police. In contrast, defendant in this case testified in sharp detail regarding the shootings. That he earlier had told Dr. Vicary he did not remember them does not, without more, suggest his testimony about the crimes was mere confabulation. In sum, because defendant presented no substantial evidence he was unconscious when he committed the offenses, the trial court did not err in refusing the instructions on unconsciousness as a complete defense. (See People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 551, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 108 P.3d 182 [trial court need not give instructions absent substantial evidence to support them].) Even if the trial court acted properly in denying his request for an instruction that unconsciousness is a complete defense, defendant further argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte on involuntary manslaughter based on unconsciousness. (CALJIC No. 8.47; see § 22; People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 155, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 316-317, 78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153.) Such an instruction is required when there is evidence deserving of consideration that the defendant was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication. Defendant rehearses at length the evidence that around the time of the offenses, he daily and habitually drank to excess with resultant memory losses, and that on the day of the shootings he spent the afternoon drinking at the Anchor Inn bar, producing a blood-alcohol level that measured .154 percent at the time of his arrest some two hours after the shootings (and might, according to the testimony of Dr. Lykissa, have approached .20 percent at the time of the shootings). As discussed above, the record is lacking in substantial evidence that defendant was not conscious of his criminal actions within the meaning of section 26, subdivision Four. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing to instruct on involuntary manslaughter on a theory of unconsciousness due to voluntary intoxication.
Defendant contends the evidence in this case does not support the jury's findings that the Ferguson and Perez homicides were committed with premeditation and deliberation, and that his first degree murder convictions therefore violate section 189 and his state and federal constitutional rights and must be reversed. For the reasons set forth below, we disagree. In reviewing a criminal conviction challenged as lacking evidentiary support,'the court must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidencethat is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuesuch that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]' ( People v. Hillhouse (2002) 27 Cal.4th 469, 496[, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754].) ( People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 849, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007; see Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560.) An appellate court must accept logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the evidence even if the court would have concluded otherwise. ( People v. Rodriguez (1999) 20 Cal.4th 1, 11[, 82 Cal.Rptr.2d 413, 971 P.2d 618].) ( Combs, at p. 849, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61,101 P.3d 1007.) A verdict of deliberate and premeditated first degree murder requires more than a showing of intent to kill. [Citation.] `Deliberation' refers to careful weighing of considerations in forming a course of action; `premeditation' means thought over in advance. [Citations.] 'The process of premeditation does not require any extended period of time. The true test is not the duration of time as much as it is the extent of the reflection. Thoughts may follow each other with great rapidity and cold, calculated judgment may be arrived at quickly.... [Citations.]' ( People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1080, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335.) In People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26-27, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942, this court reviewed earlier decisions and developed guidelines to aid reviewing courts in assessing the sufficiency of evidence to sustain findings of premeditation and deliberation. ( People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1183, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487.) We described three categories of evidence recurring in those cases: planning, motive, and manner of killing. ( People v. Perez (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1117, 1125, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159; Anderson, at p. 27, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942.) The Anderson decision stated: Analysis of the cases will show that this court sustains verdicts of first degree murder typically when there is evidence of all three types and otherwise requires at least extremely strong evidence of [planning] or evidence of [motive] in conjunction with [evidence of] either [planning] or [manner of killing]. ( Anderson, at p. 27, 73 Cal. Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942; see Perez, at p. 1125, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159.) Since Anderson, we have emphasized that its guidelines are descriptive and neither normative nor exhaustive, and that reviewing courts need not accord them any particular weight. ( Young, at p. 1183, 24 Cal. Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487; Perez, at p. 1125, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 577, 831 P.2d 1159.) Defendant contends there was no evidence he planned to kill Ferguson and Perez or that he had any motive to do so. He argues the killings were the product of his mental illness, intoxication, and unconsidered impulse rather than of a deliberate judgment or plan carried out according to a preconceived design. Defendant first asserts he did not know that either Ferguson or Perez, or anyone else, would be in the area of the Hammett Vacuum Service at McDonough and I Streets when he arrived there, outside business hours, on the evening of Sunday, March 31, 1985, at a time for which he had previously made dinner plans with his wife and another couple. The record, he notes, suggests the killings occurred less than 10 minutes after he shot Benjamin Alcala; impliedly, he claims the interval was too short for him to have planned the fatal shootings. The Ferguson brothers were about 30 to 40 feet from the intersection where defendant stopped his truck, and the evidence stood in conflict on the question whether defendant called out to Calvin Ferguson, or whether Ferguson walked over to defendant of his own accord; in any event, defendant shot Ferguson within seconds of his approaching defendant's truck. Apparently without significant delay, defendant then drove ahead some 50 to 70 feet and stopped his truck in front of Vernon Lovelace's gate on McDonough Street. Lovelace testified that Perez's car, coming from the opposite direction, pulled alongside defendant's truck. Perez's driver's side window was rolled halfway up. Defendant testified Perez said something to him, although he could not remember what; defendant then stuck his hand out of the window of his truck and fired the gun at Perez. This sequence of events, defendant urges, fails to support an inference of any planning activity and instead suggests he did not plan to kill either victim. Other evidence, defendant asserts, showed that he had no motive for killing Perez or Ferguson. Delton Ferguson testified he knew of no bad blood between his brother and defendant and that to his knowledge they had never even met. Defendant testified he previously had seen Perez in the area, but did not know him. He testified he did not know why he shot Ferguson and Perez. Nothing in these circumstances, defendant argues, supports an inference that he had a motive to kill the victims. Defendant also contends that nothing about the manner in which he killed each victima single gunshot, without reloading his gun or taking any further steps to ensure either victim had been killed shows he had a preconceived design to take their lives. Finally, defendant relies on Dr. Vicary's testimony he was psychotic, paranoid, agitated, and acting impulsively at the time of the shootings, and Dr. Lykissa's testimony that the level of intoxication defendant was experiencing at that time would impair his thought processes and alter his social judgment, in support of his argument that the evidence was insufficient to support the first degree murder verdicts. We conclude the evidence supports the jury's finding of premeditation and deliberation. Defendant's purposive actions in driving to seek out various persons and then killing them, viewed in a light favorable to the judgment, indicate defendant had some motive for his killingsa method to his madnessand that is enough. The record suggests the motive may have been related to defendant's feelings about his desperate financial state, as each of the locations where defendant committed the shootingsthe yard outside the home of defendant's business associate, Roberto Martinez, where defendant shot Benjamin Alcala; the street near the premises of the Hammett Vacuum Service, from whose owner defendant had attempted to extort money, where defendant killed Calvin Ferguson and Vincent Perez; and the home of Eugene Layton, with whom defendant had engaged in business dealings and whom he tried to kill thereconceivably had some connection, in defendant's mind, to his financial troubles. With respect to the murders, neither Ferguson nor Perez in any way provoked the shooting or struggled with defendant, whose demeanor at the time was described as cold. (See People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 232, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222 [calm, cool, and focused manner of shooting supported finding of premeditation and deliberation].) The jury was free to accept Delton Ferguson's testimony that defendant hollered from the intersection, which suggested defendant had some purpose in drawing Calvin Ferguson toward him, and within moments fatally shot him. In any event, as the Attorney General observes, this court has `never required the prosecution to prove a specific motive before affirming a judgment, even one of first degree murder. A senseless, random, but premeditated, killing supports a verdict of first degree murder.' [Citation.] ( People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 519, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101.) The evidence of defendant's planning activity and evident deliberation in the Layton shooting could support an inference that his mental illness did not interfere with his ability to deliberate less than an hour earlier, when he killed Ferguson and Perez. Moreover, Ferguson and Perez were shot in the head or neck from within a few feet, a method of killing sufficiently `particular and exacting' to permit an inference that defendant was acting according to a preconceived design ( People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1050, 251 Cal.Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680; see also People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 23, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843), and defendant's testimony showed he was well aware that shooting a person in the face or neck would kill him. We conclude the jury's verdict of first degree murder is supported by sufficient evidence.
Defendant contends the cumulative effect of the errors assertedly committed during the guilt phase of his trial rendered the trial fundamentally unfair and the first degree murder verdicts constitutionally unreliable. (See generally Donnelly v. DeChristoforo (1974) 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431; Beck v. Alabama (1980) 447 U.S. 625, 637-638, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392.) But we have found no error in this phase of the trial, and as to the assumed error in the admission of Dr. Vicary's opinion concerning defendant's mental state, we concluded any possible error did not affect the verdict. Hence, defendant's contention must fail.
Defendant correctly notes that two multiple-murder special-circumstance allegations were erroneously charged and found true in this case. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 425, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 787, 230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113; People v. Harris (1984) 36 Cal.3d 36, 67, 201 Cal.Rptr. 782, 679 P.2d 433.) In numerous cases involving the same kind of error, we have stricken the superfluous finding and concluded the defendant suffered no prejudice. (See, e.g., Avena, at p. 425, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1149, 282 Cal.Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757.) We do so again here. (See also Brown v. Sanders (2006) 546 U.S. 212, 220-221, 126 S.Ct. 884, 892, 163 L.Ed.2d 723, 733 [invalidated special circumstance produces constitutional error only when the jury could not have given aggravating weight to the same facts and circumstances under the rubric of some other, valid sentencing factor].)