Opinion ID: 1111296
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Divided Custody as a Material Change of Circumstances

Text: Michael contends that the trial court erred in not considering as a material change of circumstances the fact that as of January 1995 he had primary physical custody of two of the four children. Michael also argues that the fact of divided custody entitles him to a recalculation of his child support obligation under the divided custody formula outlined in Rule 90.3, Commentary VI.B.3. Stephanie argues that [f]or there to be a `substantial change of circumstance,' something must occur which was not contemplated by the parties at the time they had entered into their initial agreement. We agree. The parties here expressly contemplated possible changes in primary physical custody when they entered into their agreement, and they calibrated the child support provisions accordingly. The Wyoming Supreme Court faced a similar issue in Kidd v. Kidd, 832 P.2d 566 (Wyo. 1992), and found that the clear and unambiguous child support provisions of a comprehensive divorce settlement agreement could only be modified upon a showing by the obligor of a substantial change in circumstances not anticipated at the time of the Agreement. Id. at 570. For the same reason, the occurrence of the anticipated event of divided custody is not in itself a basis for recalculation using the divided custody formula suggested in the Rule 90.3 commentary.