Opinion ID: 1115370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Character and Extent of Injury to Protected Rights

Text: (11) Two important rights are affected by Proposition 140, namely, the incumbent's right to run for public office, and the voters' right to reelect the incumbent to that office. Consequently, the injury to those rights resulting from the application of Proposition 140 is also twofold, namely, lifetime exclusion of the incumbent from the office previously held, and a corresponding permanent inability of the voters to return the incumbent to that office.
As previously explained, Proposition 140 imposes a lifetime ban on legislators once they have completed the maximum number of terms. Petitioners argue, In the long run, the term limitations permanently ban those who are arguably the most qualified candidates  incumbents with the experience and expertise in the legislative process necessary to the most effective representation of their constituencies. According to petitioners, qualified incumbents will be purged solely to seat massive numbers of inexperienced newcomers. Petitioners predict that only a few qualified persons will be attracted to short term public office. Respondents, of course, dispute petitioners' premise that long-term legislators are inevitably better qualified than other candidates, and they believe that term limitations will encourage, rather than inhibit, new qualified candidates seeking short term public service. They characterize the term limitations of Proposition 140 as additional candidacy requirements, akin to age, integrity, training or residency, which have generally been upheld. (See, e.g., Zeilenga v. Nelson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 716, 721 [94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578]; 25 Am.Jur.2d, Elections, § 175, pp. 870-871, and cases cited; Note, Developments in the Law: Elections (1975) 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1217 et seq.) Respondents also stress three features of Proposition 140 that assertedly serve to mitigate the severity of its lifetime ban: First, the affected incumbent is not barred from seeking any other public office, including a seat in another legislative house or a statewide constitutional office. A former Senator may seek a seat in the Assembly, and vice versa. Second, the term limitations arise only after the incumbent already has had the opportunity to serve a significant period in office (i.e., eight years for a Senator, and six years for a member of the Assembly). Finally, the term limitations are generally applicable to persons elected or appointed on or after November 6, 1990. Except for some incumbent Senators, past terms served do not count in calculating the limitation. Thus, by the time the term limitations of Proposition 140 come into play, the incumbent will have already served, and indeed may continue to serve, several terms in public office.
Petitioners also stress the impact on the voters who are prevented from casting their ballots for the particular candidate of their choice. Just as incumbent legislators are permanently barred from running for another term once they have served the prescribed numbers of terms, the voters are permanently barred from voting for such persons, at least for the legislative office they once held. According to petitioners, the voters thus will be denied the right to vote for those persons who arguably possess the best qualifications. Additionally, petitioners note that because Proposition 140 was adopted on a statewide basis, the disability [on candidates and voters] is imposed not by those who have the right to vote for the candidate, but rather by those outside the district. Petitioners thus suggest the resulting impact on or injury to the voters is aggravated or enhanced by reason of the ability of voters residing outside a particular voting district to essentially veto particular candidates within that district. Respondents reply by citing federal court cases (e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, supra, 927 F.2d 469, 473-474) stating that voters have no constitutional right to vote for particular candidates. Additionally, respondents observe that the challenged measure does not fall into any of the categories of prior cases in which the right to vote was found impermissibly infringed. No identifiable groups of voters are excluded from voting or otherwise unduly burdened in the exercise of their franchise. Characterizing the term limitations of Proposition 140 as additional candidacy qualifications akin to age or residency, respondents submit that Proposition 140 does not truly impair the franchise, for the voters retain the basic fundamental right to cast their ballots for the qualified candidate of their choice. Moreover, respondents observe that neither voter choice nor candidate eligibility is restricted based on the content of protected expression, political affiliation, or inherently arbitrary factors such as race, religion or sex. The only criterion used is incumbency. Voters retain the ability to vote for any qualified candidate holding the beliefs or possessing the attributes they may desire in a public officeholder. Under these circumstances, First Amendment protection of political expression and promotion of the marketplace for ideas continue unabated. Respondents further note that petitioners have cited no case supporting their theory that a voting restriction on local offices would be invalid if imposed by voters on a statewide basis. Indeed, such a rule would seemingly call in question any statewide legislation affecting the qualification of candidates for local elections, such as age or residency requirements. Finally, respondents suggest that because Proposition 140 was an initiative measure adopted by the people at a statewide election, any resulting injury to the exercise of the franchise should be deemed self-inflicted, and thus not constitutionally protected.
In sum, although Proposition 140 does affect the rights of voters and candidates to a degree, there are several mitigating aspects, including the voters' continued right to vote for any qualified candidates, as well as the candidates' ability to run for other public offices, their entitlement to a significant period of service in office before the term limitations apply, and the prospective application of the limitation provision. Additionally, we should bear in mind that it is presently unclear under federal law whether and to what extent voters retain a constitutional right to vote for particular candidates such as the incumbent legislators affected by the challenged measure. Thus, the legal impact of Proposition 140 on the voters remains uncertain. Having discussed the extent of the asserted injury to the rights protected ( Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 789 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 558]), we next analyze the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule ( ibid. ).