Opinion ID: 1245439
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the 1951 reimbursement amendment

Text: The legislative confrontation created by § 8 of Chapter 124, S.L. 1915, and the decisions in Hotelling and In re Byrne had the effect of bringing about an interpretation of the statute which held that tort defenses would no longer defeat the worker's claim even though such defenses were expressly authorized by the statute. This legislative-judicial incompatibility festered so long and became so untenable that in 1951 the legislature amended the act in an apparent effort to more comfortably comport the statutory law with the decisions of this court. Section 8 of Chapter 124, supra, was repealed and § 9 of Chapter 143, S.L. 1951, was substituted. Section 9, supra, contained the first enactment of the third-party refund concept and was carried into § 27-54, W.S. 1957  the statute in force when appellant was injured. The changes brought on in 1951 by § 9 of Chapter 143 were these: 1. Where before (under § 8, Chapter 124, S.L. 1915) the employer could defeat a worker's claim by asserting a third party's negligence  where there was no negligence in the employer  he could no longer urge such a defense to defeat the injured employee's claimed fund benefits. This had the effect of conforming the statute to the holdings in Zancanelli, Hotelling, and In re Byrne, supra . 2. Where before there was no refund provision relative to third-party recovery  even where a third party and the employer were negligent and the employee recovered from the fund and the third party  the new law provided for payment to the fund of part of every third-party recovery where the employee had also drawn accident-fund benefits. 3. The 1915 law was silent with respect to the employee's common-law right of third-party recovery. In 1951 the legislature expressed affirmative acknowledgement of the employee's right to third-party recovery, even though fund benefits had been paid. All of the problems were not solved by the 1951 enactment, however, and, as indicated by this appeal, new ones were spawned. While providing that third-party suits would not preclude claims against the fund, the 1951 amendment went on to provide that the employee ... may also pursue his remedy at law against such third person, provided that he shall not be entitled to a double recovery, and in the event that such employee recovers from such person, he shall be entitled to retain only the excess over any compensation paid to him, and must reimburse the Industrial Accident Fund for all moneys advanced to him for such injury, ... [Emphasis supplied] The statute then spells out a formula according to which third-party recovery monies will be deposited in the Industrial Accident Fund as a refund for compensation benefits paid. The legislature of 1951 granted no rights to the employee that had not previously been his under the constitution and the common law. Specifically, the proclaimed statutory right to bring suit against third persons was totally gratuitous and superfluous. The amendment to the constitution (Article 10, Section 4) only authorized the legislature to enact legislation giving the employee the right to participate in the fund in return for the forfeiture of his rights of action against his contributing employer. His common-law right to sue third persons was not in any way inhibited either by the Wyoming Constitution  the 1915 law  or any amendment prior to and including the act of 1951. I make this observation for the purpose of calling attention to the fact that the employee gained nothing when the legislature proclaimed  in 1951  that the injured employee who had claimed and received Industrial Accident Fund benefits could also pursue his remedies against any person other than the employer. This had always been his right. It was never any different!! We said in Markle v. Williamson, Wyo., 518 P.2d 621, 625, in considering whether immunity granted a contributing employer inured to the benefit of a co-employee of the injured worker: ... The amendment [to Article 10, Section 4, Wyoming Constitution] being in 1914 when industrial suits were quite infrequent, it would appear the situation with respect to co-workers was not dealt with. The result is that common-law rights (such as the right of a worker to sue a fellow employee) remained unchanged; and that right continues to this time.  [Bracketed matter and emphasis supplied] The history and background described heretofore is long  but it is necessarily long because it is only against this backdrop of the legislative and judicial treatment of the Worker's Compensation Act that the constitutional issue can be formulated and clearly viewed.