Opinion ID: 766509
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defense of qualified immunity

Text: 26 Having concluded that Jackson's First Amendment freedom of speech claim states a cause of action, we must now consider the City's defense of qualified immunity. This court has held that qualified immunity can constitute a proper basis for dismissal based on the plaintiff's failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. See Levin v. Childers, 101 F.3d 44, 48 (6th Cir. 1996). To overcome this defense, the plaintiff must allege a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, and that a reasonable official would have known that his or her conduct violated this right. See Jackson v. Leighton, 168 F.3d 903, 909 (6th Cir. 1999). 27 There is no doubt that the right allegedly violated in this case, based on the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment, is one of our most fundamental and established constitutional rights. Whether a reasonable official should have known that imposing a gag order on a high-ranking public official would violate this right in connection with an investigation about issues relating to public corruption by that official is not obvious as a matter of law. Because no discovery has yet taken place and the defense of qualified immunity is not clear cut, we find it inappropriate to resolve this issue at the present stage of the case. See Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 76 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that the defense of qualified immunity is not always appropriately decided as a matter of law); Sutton v. United States, 819 F.2d 1289, 1299 (5th Cir. 1987) (Trial courts ought not try to deal with [the defense of qualified immunity] on motions under F.R.Civ.P. 12(b), when the proper disposition of the case requires some factual development by the parties.); 2 JAMES MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, § 12.34[4][b] & n.56 (3d ed. 1998) (Defenses that require a factual review to be established (as ordinarily occurs with qualified immunity, for example) should not support a dismissal for failure to state a claim.). 28 In sum, we conclude that Jackson has alleged a set of facts that could entitle him to relief for the violation of his First Amendment right to freedom of speech. The district court's dismissal of this claim is therefore reversed and the issue remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Whether Jackson's claim will survive summary judgment or a trial is for the district court to determine on remand. See Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 687 (6th Cir. 1998) (This is not to say that the [plaintiffs] will necessarily prevail at trial or that summary judgment will not be appropriate after discovery is completed. We are convinced, however, that the [plaintiffs] have the right to proceed to the next stage of the litigation.).