Opinion ID: 800766
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DISCUSSION a) Good Cause for Admitting Hearsay

Text: Revocation proceedings are not deemed part of a criminal prosecution, and, therefore, defendants in such proceedings are not entitled to the full panoply of rights that criminal defendants generally enjoy. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The Confrontation Clause prohibitions against hearsay evidence do not strictly apply, see, e.g., Williams, 443 F.3d at 45; United States v. Aspinall, 389 F.3d 332, 342-43 (2d Cir.2004), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United States v. Fleming, 397 F.3d 95, 99 n. 5 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Chin, 224 F.3d 121, 124 (2d Cir.2000), and at a VOSR hearing, the alleged violation of supervised-release need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a reasonable doubt, see United States v. McNeil, 415 F.3d 273, 277 (2d Cir.2005). In a VOSR hearing, a defendant has the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the [court] specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation). Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593; see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 32.1(b)(2)(C) (defendants must have an opportunity to question adverse witnesses unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear). A proffered hearsay statement that falls within an established exception is of course admissible in a VOSR hearing. For statements that would be inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a determination of good cause requires the court to balance the defendant's interest in confronting the declarant[] against[]... the government's reasons for not producing the witness and the reliability of the proffered hearsay. Williams, 443 F.3d at 45. The defendant's interest is entitled to little weight if the defendant caused the declarant's absence by way of intimidation. Id. We review a district court's balancing of the Rule 32.1 factors for abuse of discretion. Id. at 46. [A] district court `abuses' or `exceeds' the discretion accorded to it when (1) its decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision ... cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions. United States v. Jones, 299 F.3d 103, 112 (2d Cir.2002) (quoting Zervos v. Verizon N.Y., Inc., 252 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir.2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in original)). In balancing the various interests under Rule 32.1, the district court acknowledged appellant's strong interest in confronting Marquita. However, the court also concluded that the government's reason for not calling her was reasonable in that she repeatedly refused to testify. Finally, the district court found that the hearsay evidence was reliable as a whole. We conclude that the finding of good cause for the admission of the hearsay statements was amply supported. For purposes of analysis, the reasonableness of the government's not calling Marquita at the VOSR hearing turns in large part on weighing the reliability of her earlier statements regarding domestic abuse against her desire not to testify as expressed just prior to the hearing. The earlier statements bore significant indicia of reliability. Zavatsky had conducted six interviews with Marquita, as well as interviews with Booker and Nancy. Their stories corroborated each other. Zavatsky observed a scar on Marquita's right hand consistent with the wound Marquita had described in her account of the events of February 26, 2010, in which appellant stabbed her right hand with a scissor blade. The district court found additional corroborating evidence in the NYPD Domestic Incident Report, Marquita's Family Offense Petition, the temporary and permanent orders of protection, and the fact that Marquita sought protection from appellant at a shelter for victims of domestic violence. The hearsay portions of this evidence were detailed, credible, and sometimes under oath. They were not idle chit-chat. They were also corroborated by other evidence, including a court order that was admissible as an official record, see Fed. R.Evid. 803(8) (public records exception); the scar that was personally observed by Zavatsky; and Marquita's report to the shelter that was not hearsay under Fed. R.Evid. 801(a) because it was not intended as an assertion. Also, Marquita's expressed desire not to testify was not an unusual reaction by a victim of domestic abuse. And, while she sought at that time not to testify and to minimize the extent of that abuse, she actually confirmed the truth of her earlier statements in saying that she should have just taken the ass whipping. We have held that good cause justifying the absence of a declarant exists when a defendant has a history of violent conduct [that] ma[kes] reprisal against [the declarant] a possibility. Jones, 299 F.3d at 113. In United States v. Jackson, 347 Fed. Appx. 701, 703 (2d Cir.2009), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1544, 176 L.Ed.2d 152 (2010), we found good cause not to call an assault victim to testify after she had recanted her original accusations because she had previously offered a sworn and recorded account of her assault, and additional independent evidence corroborated her original statements. Id. ; see also United States v. Hall, 419 F.3d 980, 988 n. 6 (9th Cir.2005) (noting well recognized difficulty of securing cooperation of domestic violence victims and that most common reason for dismissal of domestic violence crimes is non-cooperation of victims); United States v. Martin, 382 F.3d 840, 846 (8th Cir.2004) (holding hearsay statements of rape victim admissible where she refused to testify and statements were corroborated by other evidence). Finally, as in Jones, appellant has a history of violence. Appellant was previously arrested for a number of charges related to violence against the mother of his two oldest children. Prior to that, appellant had been convicted of misdemeanor assault on a female and misdemeanor simple assault. Regarding the failure to call Booker and Nancy, the government asserts that it expected Nancy to refuse to testify because she would align with her daughter out of loyalty. Moreover, the government believed her testimony to be of less importance than Marquita's because the only pertinent event of which she had first-hand knowledge was the incident on March 15, 2010, which was already detailed in the NYPD report. The government further argues that it believed Booker to be in Delaware, which, it argued, was enough for a finding of good cause. Although it would have been preferable to ask Booker or Nancy to testify, the failure to pursue them does not fatally undermine the finding of good cause given the strength of the record viewed as a whole. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in balancing the interests under Rule 32.1. Accordingly, appellant was not deprived of his constitutional right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.