Opinion ID: 2166469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Automatic Denial v. Formal Order

Text: The RHC's second argument is that even if the motion for reconsideration was timely filed, Askin did not timely file his petition for review to this court following its denial. The Commission points to its Rule 3320.6, 14 DCMR 3320.6 (1983), which states that failure of the Commission to act within [15 days of receipt of the motion for reconsideration] shall constitute a denial of the motion for reconsideration. Since Askin filed the motion on July 31, 1984, RHC concludes, that fifteen-day period expired on August 21, 1984, fifteen business days thereafter. [12] D.C.App.R. 15(c), as it then read, provided that where a petition for reconsideration was timely filed with an agency, the full time for filing a petition for review as fixed by subdivision (b) of this Rule [fifteen calendar days] commences to run and is to be computed from the date of the order denying said petition. The Commission argues that since the denial of the motion is deemed to have occurred on August 21, 1984, and Askin didn't file his appeal until September 12, 1984, this court lacks jurisdiction over the matter, citing Totz v. District of Columbia Rental Housing Commission, 474 A.2d 827, 828-29 (D.C.1984). [13] Askin, however, points out that in fact, the Commission, by a document dated August 30, 1984, [14] entered a formal order denying the petition. The document on its face is in all respects a formal order of the RHC, in no way implying that it is merely confirming any previous automatic denial of the petition. It bears the signatures of the two commissioners in the majority and of the third commissioner dissenting without opinion. It appears likely that Askin received a copy of this order on or before September 5, 1984, [15] which would be the time limit under our rules, [16] using the automatic denial date of August 21 as a starting point. We think that under these circumstances, where a formal order arrives before the period to appeal the automatic denial has expired, the later order should be held to be the date of the order denying said petition within the meaning of our Rule 15(c). Because the ambiguity created by such a situation can lead a party to rely upon the latter order as the date from which to appeal, the Commission cannot say that the prior date of the automatic denial controls our appellate jurisdiction. [17] In situations where ambiguity exists regarding the date of an order or decision, this court has resolved the ambiguity in favor of the party seeking review. Very recently, in Donnelly Associates Limited Partnership v. District of Columbia Historic Preservation Review Board, 520 A.2d 270 (D.C.1987), we confronted a situation where an oral decision by an administrative body was followed by later written notice of the decision. In holding the later notice to constitute formal notice, we stated: If the decision is oral, there is no written recordation of its substance, and the losing party may be uncertain whether the result and the reasons for it will be the same when the written decision comes down. We should, if possible, minimize guesses by the parties on which decision is the proper one to be appealed. We likewise resolve the ambiguity, here created by the possibility that two orders exist denying the motion for reconsideration, by holding that the written order, at least when it arrives during the period when a petitioner can still appeal the automatic denial, fixes the time for the appeal period to run. We have stressed the importance of removing ambiguity from the notice context in other areas of administrative law. See, e.g., Ploufe v. D.C. Department of Employment Services, 497 A.2d 464 (D.C.1985) (notice of ten-day time period to appeal must specify whether calendar or working days); Bailey v. District of Columbia Department of Employment Services, 499 A.2d 1223 (D.C. 1985) (language regarding petition for review inadequate as a matter of law, because it incorrectly suggested that reason might be given which would excuse untimely filing). Consequently, Askin's petition was timely filed. We conclude, therefore, that we have jurisdiction and now turn our attention to the merits of petitioner's appeal.