Opinion ID: 196676
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Kirkland Construction Co. v. James

Text: 3. Kirkland Construction Co. v. James One National points to Kirkland Construction Co. v. James, 658 N.E.2d 699 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995), the Appeals Court of Massachusetts' most recent decision addressing the foreseeable reliance exception to the no duty rule, as support for its -13- position. There, the court faced a challenge to a lower court's grant of a 12(b)(6) motion under the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure. Kirkland, a contractor, was asked to renovate a retail space for an office supply firm. He sought and received a letter from the firm's attorney, defendant James, assuring that his client could pay for the work. However, after Kirkland had performed under the contract, the office supply firm failed to pay. Kirkland sued James and the partners of his law firm for negligence, and the lower court granted the defendants' 12(b)(6) motion. Id. at 699-700. The court reversed, finding that Kirkland was entitled to seek relief from the attorneys under a theory of foreseeable reliance. Id. at 701. An examination of the factors the court weighed in Kirkland in comparison with the facts of the instant case reveals that the circumstances here are sufficiently different from those in Kirkland that we should affirm the court below. In its analysis, the Kirkland Court focused on who was intended to benefit from the letter: an independent duty will be more readily found where, as here, the service is intended to benefit the client as well as the third party. Id. (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts 552(2)(a) (1977)). Examining the letter, which was addressed to Kirkland, the court noted that it contained unqualified representations and that the typical hedging phrases were absent. Id. at 702; cf. Jurgens v. Abraham, 616 F. Supp. 1381, 1386 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that nonclient stated a claim where attorney told him he attached a sum of money -14- for nonclient's benefit). That is not true here: the certificate of title was not addressed to ONB, the representations were made in boilerplate language with standard exceptions listed, and there was an express disclaimer, in capital letters, on one of the two pages. The Kirkland court also listed a series of allegations in the plaintiff's complaint that, if proven, would be the stuff of liability. 658 N.E.2d at 701. First, both Kirkland and ONB allege that the representations were false. The fact that both plaintiffs make the same allegation, however, is somewhat of a red herring, because if there were no false representations, there would be no basis for suit. Second, Kirkland alleged that the letter stated that the office supply firm had made arrangements to ensure payment, and that the attorneys' objective was to induce Kirkland to enter into a contract. Id. We cannot say that Antonellis' objective was to induce ONB into a contract, since ONB was not a party to the transaction for which the certificate of title was performed.5 Third, the Kirkland complaint maintained that the attorneys knew and intended that Kirkland would rely on the representations, and that the reliance was reasonable. Id. Again, ONB was not a party. Even if we infer that Antonellis should have suspected that the 5 Nor can ONB argue that the purpose of Antonellis' work was to induce the Milanis into the mortgage, because by law it is unreasonable for a mortgagee to rely on mortgagor's counsel, as mortgagee and mortgagor are adverse parties. See Schlecht, 1994 WL 621594 at  5; Lamare, 636 N.E.2d at 218; Beecy v. Pucciarelli, 441 N.E.2d 1035, 1040 (Mass. 1982). -15- mortgage would be sold, however, the ties between the attorney and nonclient here are nowhere near as close as those in Kirkland, where the letter at issue was addressed to the plaintiff nonclient and expressly addressed its concerns. Finally, Kirkland alleged that it was seeking information, not legal advice, from the lawyers about their client. Id. Whether Antonellis' certificate of title is a legal opinion proves irrelevant, however, since the Kirkland court also stated that the likelihood of liability would not be greater if the letter were an opinion letter. Id. at 702 n.7. In the light of the potential conflict between Antonellis' duty to his client and his alleged duty to One National, and the differences between the factors that led to the court's reversal in Kirkland and the facts of the instant case, we find upon de novo review that as a matter of law One National's legal malpractice claim fails the foreseeable reliance test. As a consequence, we need not determine whether ONB can meet the foreseeability requirement. See DaRoza, 622 N.E.2d at 609.