Opinion ID: 373899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Executive Privilege For Communications Relating To

Text: Governmental Deliberations 15 Exemption 5 incorporates at least two 8 types of privileges traditionally available to the Government in civil litigation (i) the attorney-client and attorney work-product privileges 9 and (ii) the executive privilege for information relating to governmental deliberations. NLRB v. Sears Roebuck & Co., supra, 421 U.S. at 149-54; 95 S.Ct. at 1515-1518, 44 L.Ed.2d at 46-49. 16 The executive privilege grew out of a need to protect the governmental decision-making process by assuring those persons, both inside and outside the decision-making agency, who offer information and opinions to the Government that their communications will be kept in confidence. NLRB v. Sears, supra, 421 U.S. at 151-52, 95 S.Ct. 1516-1517, 44 L.Ed.2d 47-48. See Mead Data Central, Inc. v. United States Department of Air Force, 184 U.S.App.D.C. 213, 225-226, n. 28, 566 F.2d 242, 254-55, n. 28 (D.C. Cir. 1977). For this reason, the Supreme Court has distinguished between pre-decisional communications which are exempt from disclosure and post-decisional communications which are not. NLRB v. Sears, 421 U.S. at 152-53, 95 S.Ct. at 1517, 44 L.Ed.2d at 48-49; Renegotiation Board v. Grumman Aircraft Engineering Corp., 421 U.S. 168, 184, 95 S.Ct. 1491, 1500; 44 L.Ed.2d 57, 71 (1975). See Audio Technical Service v. Army, supra. Disclosure of pre-decisional communications presents more danger that governmental sources of information and advice will be inhibited. Besides, there is less public concern for this information, whereas the public is vitally interested in learning an agency's reasons for a final decision which has the effect of law. NLRB v. Sears, supra, 421 U.S. at 151-52, 95 S.Ct. at 1516-1517, 44 L.Ed.2d at 47-48. 17 In Sears, the Supreme Court emphasized that this distinction is supported by FOIA itself 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)(A) 10 which requires the disclosure of all final agency opinions. 421 U.S. at 153, 95 S.Ct. at 1517, 44 L.Ed.2d at 49. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that if an advisory opinion of an agency staff member is expressly incorporated into a final agency decision, the policy considerations supporting the nondisclosure of this type of pre-decisional communication are no longer operable. Once the agency adopts its employee's advice as its own, the agency will defend its employee and he need no longer be concerned with adverse consequences if his communication becomes a matter of public record. Moreover, his advice, as part of a final agency opinion, has now become a matter of more profound public interest. 421 U.S. at 161, 95 U.S. at 1521, 44 L.Ed.2d at 53. Thus, in effect, what was once a pre-decisional communication becomes post-decisional and is no longer exempt from disclosure under Exemption 5. 18 Grumman, supra, 421 U.S. at 184, 95 S.Ct. at 1500, 44 L.Ed.2d at 71, lists the criteria for identifying a post-decisional communication: (i) The decision must, of course, be final. (ii) The agency of which the information is demanded must possess the power to make the final decision into which the pre-decisional information is incorporated. (iii) Finally, the information must be adopted as part of the agency's reasoning for its decision. Because the Grumman decision relied on Sears, its companion case, we believe these criteria also should apply to the Sears hybrid, the pre-decisional communication turned post-decisional. With respect to the third criterion, Sears goes even further then Grumman and holds that the hybrid, to become a post-decisional communication, must be expressly adopt(ed) or incorporate(d) by reference into the final opinion. 421 U.S. at 161, 95 S.Ct. at 1521-1522, 44 L.Ed.2d at 53. 19 In holding that the three legal memoranda submitted to the GAO by the Air Force did not fall within Exemption 5, the District Court followed Sears but then held that these once pre-decisional memoranda, by being submitted to the GAO in connection with the Shermco protest, were incorporated into the Air Force's final decision to award the contract to Tayko, and therefore had become post-decisional. 20 In the leap from Sears to this case we find this conclusion unacceptable for two reasons. First, as we stated earlier in this opinion, the proposed award of the contract to Tayko was not the final opinion of the Air Force. 11 Because the decision was not yet final, all the considerations which support the nondisclosure of pre-decisional communications were still in effect, as was Exemption 5. Second, even if it were a final decision, these memoranda were not expressly incorporated by reference into the opinion. They had been used by the Air Force internally in reaching their initial conclusion that Tayko was the lowest bidder, and they were produced to the GAO in aid of their defense against Shermco's protest, but they were never attached to any formal written decision by the Air Force. 21