Opinion ID: 852101
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Breach of Duty and Inability to Perform

Text: With respect to Recker's first contention, that she did not breach a duty owed to her employer because her inability to perform a required task was not willful or intentional, she asserts that the duty owed her employer was merely to perform to the best of her abilities. Appellant's Br. at 5. Conceding that [i]t is true that [she] knew she would be discharged if she were unable to complete the test, Recker asserts [t]here is, however, a fundamental difference between knowingly violating a duty owed to an employer and simply being unable to perform despite all good faith efforts to the contrary. Id. at 9. This argument, however, conflates the question of whether Recker breached a duty to her employer with the separate question of whether she is at fault for the breach. Under Giovanoni v. Review Bd. of Ind. Dep't of Workforce Dev., breach and fault are separate inquiries. [6] See 927 N.E.2d 906, 908-12 (Ind.2010). Under the Unemployment Compensation System established by the General Assembly, an individual is disqualified from receiving benefits if discharged for just cause by the most recent employer. Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(a). The statute delineates nine non-exclusive scenarios that can amount to discharge for just cause. Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d). Many, but not all, of these include an express or implied requirement for the employee's conduct to have been willful (e.g., falsification of an employment application to obtain employment through subterfuge, knowing violation of certain employer rules, damaging the employer's property through willful negligence, and refusing to obey instructions). Id. In the present case, Recker was denied benefits because she was discharged for just cause for a breach of duty in connection with work which is reasonably owed an employer by an employee. Ind.Code § 22-4-15-1(d)(9). This basis for a just cause discharge does not explicitly condition a claimant's ineligibility on a requirement that the breach of duty must have been knowing, willful, or intentional. Thus, deferring for a moment any application of the at fault factor under Giovanoni, we first determine whether the Board's conclusion of ultimate factthat Recker breached a duty reasonably owed to [FedEx]was reasonable. As the principal source for understanding the breach of duty ground for just cause discharge, the parties point to Hehr v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 534 N.E.2d 1122 (Ind.Ct.App.1989), trans. not sought. There the court cautions that the `breach of duty' ground for just [cause] discharge is an amorphous one, without clearly ascertainable limits or definition, and with few rules governing its utilization. Id. at 1126. The court in Hehr explained: In considering whether an employer may utilize this provision as a basis for justifying its action, the Board should consider whether the conduct which is said to have been a breach of a duty reasonably owed to the employer is of such a nature that a reasonable employee of the employer would understand that the conduct in question was a violation of a duty owed the employer and that he would be subject to discharge for engaging in the activity or behavior. Id. We agree. We note, as a preliminary matter, that this is not a case that requires us to articulate the outer limits of the breach of duty ground for just cause discharge. Recker commenced her employment with FedEx fully informed that she would be subject to discharge if she did not successfully complete the mandatory training program. The offer letter expressly stated that the offer of employment was contingent upon successful completion of ... all necessary training. Appellee's Supp. App'x at 42. These facts demonstrate that Recker had notice that failure to pass the driving test would be a violation of a duty owed to FedEx and would subject her to discharge. In addition, the ability to back up a truck is an intrinsic part of the work responsibilities of a courier for a parcel delivery company such as FedEx. Indeed, Recker acknowledges as much in her petition to transfer. Appellant's Trans. Br. at 4 ([Recker] does not dispute that it was reasonable for [FedEx] to expect her to pass their driving test or that [FedEx] had a right to fire her for failing to do so.). As the Court of Appeals has observed, a claimant should reasonably expect a duty fundamental to the claimant's job. Byrd v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 469 N.E.2d 463, 465 (Ind.Ct.App. 1984), trans. not sought. Actual driving competence, not just mere good faith, was an integral component of Recker's employment duties. The Board's finding that she breached a duty reasonably owed to the employer is reasonable.