Opinion ID: 1433861
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 25

Heading: Vague and ambiguous standard for imposing death sentence

Text: In explaining the nature of the penalty phase deliberative process, the trial court instructed: To return a judgment of death, each of you must be persuaded that the aggravating factors are so substantial in comparison with the mitigating factors, that it warrants death instead of life without parole. Defendant now argues the so substantial and warrants phrasing is impermissibly vague and does not adequately guide the decision to impose death. As in the past, we find no constitutional infirmity. (See, e.g., People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315-316, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585.) Prior to this instruction, the court explained, In the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, it does not mean a mere mechanical counting of the factors on each side of an imaginary scale or the arbitrary assignment of weights to any of them. You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. [ถ] In weighing the various circumstances, you determine under the relevant evidence which penalty is justified and appropriate by considering the totality of the aggravating circumstances with the totality of the mitigating circumstances. Assessed in this context, the so substantial instruction clearly admonishes the jury to determine whether the balance of aggravation and mitigation makes death the appropriate penalty. [Citations.] ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 171, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980.) We also find the instructions considered as a whole sufficient to guide the jury's deliberative process and inform the jurors they must find death is the appropriate penalty if that is their verdict.