Opinion ID: 1495473
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appellant's Waiver

Text: In the case sub judice, both parties discussed at oral argument in this Court whether there were certain statements of the trial court judge made in a conversation in chambers held prior to the commencement of appellant's trial. Whatever statements, if any, made by the trial judge in chambers, were never placed in the record of the trial. The fact that the trial judge's comment after he had been notified that appellant was waiving his right to a jury trial and the reasons for such a waiver, that appellant certainly will make a better decision, I think, as far as sentencing is concerned, if he is found guilty by the Court than if he is found guilty by a jury, does not establish that there had been a prior conversation outside of the courtroom wherein appellant's counsel, the prosecutor and the trial judge might have bargained, as appellant suggests, for the minimum possible sentence if appellant agreed to waive a jury trial for a court trial. Given the state of this record, to accept that the judge's participation, if any, was as appellant's counsel suggests, would be pure speculation. We emphasize that we can only consider the information on the record. Therefore, this appeal turns on whether the record discloses that appellant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to a jury trial. The facts and circumstances of this particular case, as set out in the record before us, are sufficient to warrant a conclusion that the waiver was knowing and voluntary. In the case at bar, the record reflects that the factors regarding appellant's agreeing to a bargain in his case were presented to him prior to his trial and the agreement, a part of which involved the State's recommendation of a sentence cap to the trial judge in exchange for appellant waiving his right to a jury trial, was hammered out by defense counsel and the prosecutor prior to trial. [13] There is no indication that what the trial judge later said on the record in the case sub judice influenced appellant's prior decision to waive his right to a jury trial. Prior to waiving his right to a jury trial, appellant and his attorney negotiated a deal with the prosecutor in which the prosecutor was going to drop all but one (or two) of the five charges pending against appellant, [14] recommend to the trial judge that appellant receive no more than the mandatory minimum 10-year sentence and seek that a different judge, Judge Boone, agree to impose a concurrent term of three years for a pending violation of probation case. On the record, appellant's attorney explained the terms of the agreement to him: And you understand that you are giving up the right to a jury trial. And in exchange for giving up your jury trial right and proceeding with a bench trial, meaning a trial in front of Judge Wright, you are getting essentially a cap of 10 years, period, not executed/unexecuted. It doesn't matter because it's a mandatory 10. If you are convicted you are getting 10 years. Judge Wright has agreed not to go over that and Judge Boone has agreed, because you're not wasting a jury, that you will get your three years running at the same time as any sentence you would get in front of Judge Wright. You understand that? Appellant than answered Yes. From the record, it is clear that the parties had been negotiating an agreement, part of which involved the State's recommendation for a ten-year cap on the sentence that was agreed to between the parties before it was presented to the trial judge and accepted. It cannot be gleaned that the trial judge's cursory ambiguous statement made after he was informed of the agreement and appellant's decision to proceed, for the reasons stated, and waive a jury trial, influenced the bargain itself. To the extent that the record appears to suggest some particular sentencing practice on the part of the trial judge, it is apparently primarily conjecture based upon defense counsel's general belief as to the sentencing practices in this particular jurisdiction. On this record, there is little evidence that raises the issue beyond speculation. Moreover, by the time the trial judge learned of the agreement and later commented on the record that he thought appellant was making the best choice, the choice effectively had already been made. The record does not reflect that there was, prior to appellant's notification to the court that My client's agreement to waive jury trial and proceed in this matter was premised upon the cap of 10 and of course 10 is the minimum in the case he has here, any transcript reference reflecting that the trial judge directly or indirectly through defense counsel or the prosecutor told appellant that he would impose a more severe sentence if appellant wasted court time with a jury trial. While the sentencing issue may have been part of the conversation between the State, appellant's attorney and appellant, the record does not adequately confirm that the trial judge was a party to that prior discussion. If there was a practice in that jurisdiction of penalizing defendants for choosing to be tried by jury, i.e., by imposing more severe sentencing, such a practice would clearly be unconstitutional. But, the only thing the record in this case reflects is that appellant's attorney might have formed that opinion. At oral argument, appellee's counsel noted that in order to find such an improper practice to exist in this court you would have to look outside the record to find that. If such an improper coercion had arisen in chambers because of anything the trial judge stated, then counsel had the right or a duty to insist that the alleged inappropriate conversation in chambers be placed on the record. Likewise, if appellant's counsel felt that any of the trial judge's comments had compromised, induced or influenced appellant's right to trial by jury, counsel should have voiced objection immediately or advised appellant to withdraw his jury trial waiver. Appellant's counsel did not do so. We presume therefore, as we must, given the state of the record before us, that no improper coercion occurred. Additionally, the record of the proceedings below does not support appellant's main contention in this appeal, that the trial judge's post-waiver notification comment chilled his right to a trial by jury and rendered his waiver ineffective. Appellant's choice to proceed with a court trial was apparently motivated by favorable sentencing recommendations which the trial judge accepted, favorable sentencing recommendations which the judge hearing his violation of probation case accepted and the prosecutor's agreement to proceed with only two of the five charges pending against appellant, not by the ... I think ... post-waiver notification statement of the trial judge. Appellant asserts that at the outset of the proceedings he indicated to the court that he would waive a trial by jury in return for a maximum sentence of ten years without parole, actually the minimum sentence appellant, as a subsequent offender, could receive in this case. Appellant contends that the trial judge's comments such as I'm willing to be a part of a case that's waived jury and proceed to court trial and if he wishes to waive a trial by jury and proceed to elect trial by court, we go, made it abundantly clear he did not wish to preside over a jury trial. Appellant's counsel then commented I will admit [appellant] has really wanted a trial by jury but he's agreed in exchange for receiving certain considerations from the Court ... he would proceed in this manner. (alteration added). To which the trial court judge replied Well he certainly will make a better decision, I think, as far as sentencing is concerned, if he is found guilty by the Court than if he is found guilty by a jury. (emphasis added). Appellant argues in his brief that: The implications of this pronouncement were not lost on Appellant, whose counsel replied, `[a]nd I have absolutely advised him of that. He knows that your Honor. And I think that is the reason we intend to proceed in this manner.' Quite clearly, the comments of the trial judge chilled Appellant's right to a jury trial and rendered his subsequent waiver of that constitutional right involuntary. Based upon the same statement of the trial judge, appellant also phrases his argument in a different way and reiterates that [his] waiver ... was improper where the trial judge prior to appellant's waiver, unequivocally stated he would impose a harsher sentence if appellant were found guilty after a jury trial, as opposed to a court trial. (alteration added) (emphasis added). We hold that appellant is incorrect in his assertions because, most importantly, what the trial judge said was said after appellant, through counsel, had already informed the trial court that he was waiving his right to a jury trial. The trial judge's after-the-fact statement on the record could not have influenced appellant's prior decision to waive his right to a jury trial. [15] We hold that on this record, appellant was well aware of the constitutional right he was waiving and that his decision to waive the right was not improperly influenced by the trial court. Appellant's waiver was knowing and voluntary and the trial court judge was correct to accept [appellant's] election of trial by court as being an intelligent and knowing decision. (alteration added). We reject appellant's argument that the trial judge's statement affected the decision that appellant had already made. Additionally, as appellee states in its brief: Where the primary aspects of the sentence bargain involved the prosecution dropping four of five charges and agreeing to a sentence cap of 10 years without parole, and where [appellant] also negotiated for a concurrent sentence in a pending violation of probation case, the trial court's suggestion that he would benefit from choosing a court trial cannot be isolated as the only reason why [appellant] waived his right to trial by jury. [Alterations added.] This appeal, at its core, is a waiver issue. We have reviewed appellant's waiver and deemed that it was knowing and voluntary and that, based upon the record, the trial judge's statements did not render this waiver involuntary. However, we shall address the issue further for guidance. To support his argument, appellant focused upon case law questioning whether the waiver of a jury trial may properly be the subject of a barter. Specifically, appellant relies upon the case of Epps v. State, 52 Md.App. 308, 313, 450 A.2d 913, 915-16 (1982), where the Court of Special Appeals stated: More importantly, bargaining over the waiver of a jury trial is not now addressed by any procedural rule in this State. The fundamental right to a jury trial may be waived under Md. Rule 735 [now Md. Rule 4-246]; if it is to be subject to barter between a defendant and the State, the trial judge should be apprised fully of the nature and extent of the bargain. (Whether it may properly be the subject of barter, a question we do not resolve, should be carefully considered by the bench and bar.) [Alteration added.] The Epps case relied upon by appellant is distinguishable. In Epps, the defendant waived his right to trial by jury. On appeal, he claimed that his waiver was based on the prosecutor's promise that he would get only one life sentence and also claimed that the trial judge agreed to be bound by the recommendation. After sentencing, Epps sought a new trial because he was sentenced to three concurrent life sentences for three counts of first degree murder and two 30 years concurrent terms for arson. If in fact the trial court had agreed to accept a plea agreement limiting the total sentence to one life term, the agreement would have been violated. That was the relevant issue in Epps -whether the trial judge had agreed to be bound by the agreement. In Epps, the Court of Special Appeals scrutinized the record and held that Epps was corrected on the record by the trial judge of what the bargain consisted of, i.e., the trial judge merely restated the State's recommendation, but that the trial judge had not agreed to impose only one life sentence. In that case the intermediate appellate court also recognized the difference between bargaining as to pleas, which is clearly permissible, and bargaining for a defendant's waiver of his or her constitutional right to a jury trial in exchange for a reduction of certain charges or a guilty plea. However, in Epps, the Court of Special Appeals noted that Epps chose to be tried by the court to avoid the potential of an emotional reaction to the nature of the arson and murder crimes. We note that, generally, in this jurisdiction there are two types of plea bargainscharge bargains and sentencing bargains. A charge bargain is where the prosecution agrees to drop certain charges in return for the defendant either pleading guilty or agreeing to proceed on an agreed statement of facts (whether before a jury or a judgealthough normally before a judge). In a sentence bargain the prosecution either agrees to submit a binding agreement as to the sentence to a judge who either accepts it, or if he or she rejects it, affords an opportunity to a defendant to be tried before another judge, or the prosecution agrees to recommend to the judge a particular sentence, or sentencing range, but the judge may reject the sentence and remain in the case. [16] In most cases (although not all cases) the bargaining as to pleas involves the waiver of a jury trial. Accordingly, the waiving of jury trials in the context of plea bargaining is not at all unusual. The slight difference in the present case is that what ultimately resulted was not bargaining as to a plea, but a simple bargain that appellant would, in return for prosecutorial and sentencing considerations received from the State and accepted by the court, waive his right to proceed in a jury trial even though he professed, through counsel, that, absent the agreement, he would have preferred to be tried by a jury. The questions he raised in this respect, go to the heart of the plea bargaining process. As we perceive the issue there is really no difference at all. A defendant, generally, may waive constitutional rights so long as he or she freely, knowingly and voluntarily does so. That is apparent from our cases that we refer to supra and infra. Other jurisdictions have also found that proper waivers of constitutional rights are permissible. We include cases involving bargains as to pleas only, in that the conditions on acceptance of such bargains (absent a rule) are essentially the same and moreover, usually encourage waivers of the right to trial by jury. United States v. Frontero, 452 F.2d 406, 411-12 (5th Cir.1971) [17] , involved a guilty plea waiver, but the Fifth Circuit's comments are also relevant in a waiver of jury trial context. That court noted: The defendant, however, must have reasonable grounds for assuming that the bargain would be consummated. He cannot, in the ordinary case, rely on the promise of the prosecutor who has no authority to make sentencing promises, or on the inaccurate representations of an overzealous attorney. There must be some basis in the record for an appellate court to find that a `bargain' has been made which acted as an inducement and destroyed voluntariness. Often such `deals' are made privately and rarely if ever is a record kept. Therefore, all that an appellate court has is the word of the defendant or defense counsel against the word of the trial judge. At the very least, in such a situation, the defense attorney must assert the existence of the bargain and the events leading to its alleged formation. Without at least some indication, even if that indication is only in the form of the insistence of defense counsel at a hearing on a motion to withdraw the guilty plea, that a `bargain' was made and that there was a reasonable basis for reliance on the bargain and that the `bargain' destroyed voluntariness, this Court would have to be clairvoyant to find involuntariness from a silent record. All that this record contains to support Lagana's claims of a `deal' are conclusory statements by the defendant. The trial judge conducted a full detailed inquiry into the voluntariness of Lagana's plea. This Court has repeatedly held that, when a defendant tells the trial judge that no `deal' has been made, he cannot later claim inducement based on a `deal.' [Citations omitted.] [Footnote omitted.] [Emphasis added.] In Dube v. State, 257 Ind. 398, 402, 275 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1971), the Indiana Supreme Court stated: We recognize that so-called plea bargaining is a wide-spread practice in our criminal courts and that it often proves beneficial for both parties.... For the defendant, it clearly increases the likelihood of a lighter sentence than he might otherwise receive.... However, with these benefits there are accompanying dangers inherent in the practice. This procedure must not be used as a coercive force to obtain pleas of guilty but must be the result of an agreement which both sides find mutually beneficial.... Several very important constitutional rights are waved by a defendant when he pleads guilty, including the right against self-incrimination and the right to a trial by a jury of his peers. When a waiver of these important rights occurs we must scrutinize the situation closely to make certain the that the waiver was freely, knowingly, and voluntarily made with full knowledge of the consequences. Clearly, the mere expectation of receipt of a lesser sentence would not be sufficient to make the plea involuntary. [Emphasis added.] An Indiana intermediate appellate court considered alleged statutorily required inducements in a jury trial waiver case where the statute required a defendant to waive his right to a jury trial in order to avail himself of an alternate drug treatment program. In Perry v. State, 401 N.E.2d 705, 707-08 (Ind.App.1980), that court stated: Perry, in his brief, concedes that he waived his right to jury trial as required by statute. Perry's sole contention on this issue is that his waiver was not voluntary since it was induced by the speculation that he would be accepted and successfully complete the drug abuse treatment program, and, thus, earn dismissal of the criminal charge....