Opinion ID: 2723940
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Construing the Receipt

Text: The Federal Arbitration Act directs a court to stay litigation and refer an issue to arbitration once it determines that there is (1) an “agreement in writing for such arbitration” and (2) that the issue in question “is referable to arbitration under such agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. The threshold question, then, is “whether the dispute is arbitrable, meaning that a valid agreement to arbitrate exists between the parties and that the specific dispute falls within the substantive scope of the agreement.” Mazera v. Varsity Ford Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 565 F.3d 997, 1001 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Landis v. Pinnacle Eye Care, LLC, 537 F.3d 559, 561 (6th Cir. 2008)). Both parts of this question—whether there was an “agreement” to arbitrate and whether an issue falls within the scope of that agreement (“is referable,” to use the Arbitration Act’s wording)—are primarily governed by state contract law. Hergenreder v. Bickford Senior Living -3- No. 13-1974 Kay v. The Minacs Group Grp., LLC, 656 F.3d 411, 416–17 (6th Cir. 2011). We say “primarily” because the Arbitration Act preempts any state law rule “singling out arbitration provisions for suspect status,” Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996), and thus requires courts to “place arbitration agreements on an equal footing with other contracts and enforce them according to their terms,” AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (citation omitted). But with that caveat thus made, whether Kay and Phoenix had an “agreement” to arbitrate is really a question of contract formation and whether Kay’s civil rights claims are within the scope of that agreement is a question of contract construction, both of which are governed by Michigan law. We assume for argument’s sake that Kay and Phoenix had agreed to arbitrate some disputes; the question is whether they had agreed to arbitrate this kind of dispute—a civil rights claim. The relevant portion of the Receipt provides: I also acknowledge that any and all controversies or claims arising out of, or relating to these Policies and Procedures shall be resolved by submitting the dispute to arbitration . . . . Note that “Policies and Procedures” are capitalized in this sentence, which indicates that the arbitration provision only applies to claims connected to the employee handbook titled “Policies and Procedures” rather than all of Phoenix’s policies and procedures. In other places, the Receipt mentions “policies and procedures” with no capitalization when referring to something other than the handbook itself. The Receipt, moreover, appears to be itself part of the Policies and Procedures handbook. Note the header to the Receipt: -4- No. 13-1974 Kay v. The Minacs Group On its face, then, the scope of the arbitration provision is easy to discern: Kay and Phoenix agreed to arbitrate only those disputes that arise from or relate to whatever is in the Policies and Procedures handbook. Minacs did not put the rest of the handbook into the record, so we have no way of knowing whether civil rights claims are covered by the handbook. Arbitration provisions, like any other provision, must be interpreted in the context of the whole contract. See Huffman v. Hilltop Cos., LLC, 747 F.3d 391, 397–98 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Heurtebise v. Reliable Bus. Computers, Inc., 550 N.W.2d 243, 246–47 (Mich. 1996). Given Minacs’s omission, we construe the provision literally and conclude that the arbitration provision does not cover Kay’s civil rights claims because there is no contract language indicating that his claims arise from or relate to the employee handbook. Further, Kay’s complaint does not allege a “policy or procedure,” it alleges age discrimination on the part of Kay’s immediate supervisor. The provision is certainly not “ambiguous” as we normally understand the word: “Contract language is ambiguous if it ‘is capable of more than one meaning when viewed objectively by a reasonably intelligent person who has examined the context of the entire integrated agreement . . . .’” Preferred RX, Inc. v. Am. Prescription Plan, Inc., 46 F.3d 535, 543 (6th Cir. 1995) (quoting Walk–In Medical Ctrs., Inc. v. Breuer Capital Corp., 818 F.2d 260, 263 (2d Cir. 1987)) (emphasis added). Rather, the provision is “ambiguous” because Minacs chose not to provide the court with the portion of the contract that would clear up the “ambiguity.” Remarkably, Minacs argues that the presumption of arbitrability compels the court to resolve this “ambiguity” in favor of arbitration. Presumptions and canons of construction do not relieve a party of its responsibility to provide the court with the entire contract at issue and do not supplant a lawyer’s duty of candor owed to the court. -5- No. 13-1974 Kay v. The Minacs Group