Opinion ID: 8980924
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Meiklejohn, Political Freedom: The Constitutional Powers of The People 27 (1948).

Text: See also Tinker v. Des Moines School District, 393 U. S. 503, 510-511 (1969); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U. S. 39, 47 (1966); Carlson v. California, 310 U. S. 106, 112 (1940); Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, 68 Cal. 2d 51, 434 P. 2d 982 (1967); Bynum v. Schiro, 219 F. Supp. 204 (ED La. 1963), aff’d, 375 U. S. 395 (1964); East Meadow Assn. v. Board of Education, 18 N. Y. 2d 129, 219 N. E. 2d 172 (1966); Matter of Madole v. Barnes, 20 N. Y. 2d 169, 229 N. E. 2d 20 (1967); United States v. Crowthers, 456 F. 2d 1074 (CA4 1972); and the litigation in Ellis v. Dixon, 349 U. S. 458 (1955). Cf. Flower v. United States, 407 U. S. 197 (1972). Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 29. Cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 536, 556 n. 14, where the Court noted that the exemption for labor picketing in a statute otherwise barring on its face all street assemblies and parades, “points up the fact that the statute reaches beyond mere traffic regulation to restrictions on expression.” The city notes in its brief, pp. 28-30: “Although the civil rights movement has understandably endeavored to press into its service the constitutional precedents developed in labor relations litigation, there are important differences between labor picketing and picketing by civil rights groups. . . . Labor picketing is now usually token picketing. ... It seldom leads to disruption of the public peace, hardly ever to window smashing, arson. Labor picketing can be carried on without interrupting classes or even distracting the students. ... As we all know, student demonstrations at schools — and even such demonstrations by parents and 'concerned citizens’ — are utterly different. Mass picketing, sit-ins, smashed windows have been the order of the day. The very purpose of such demonstrations often is to bring the educational process to a halt.” In a variety of contexts we have said that “even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved.” Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479, 488 (1960). This standard, of course, has been carefully applied when First Amendment interests are involved. E. g., Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 164 (1939); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U. S. 353, 364-365 (1937); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296, 307 (1940); NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 438 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 559, 562-564 (1965); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U. S. 367 (1968). Chicago argued below that the labor exemption in the ordinance was necessitated by federal pre-emption of the regulation of labor relations. The city now recognizes that the National Labor Relations Act specifically exempts States and subdivisions (and therefore cities and their public school boards) from the definition of “employer” within the Act. 29 U. S. C. § 152. Nevertheless, Chicago urges that the pre-emption argument still has “some merit.” It argues that “since observance by employees of private employers of picket lines of public employees can have repercussions in the federal sphere, the City was well advised to avoid this quagmire of labor law and labor relations by exempting labor picketing from the ordinance.” Reply Brief 12. This attenuated interest, at best a claim of small administrative convenience and perhaps merely a confession of legislative laziness, cannot justify the blanket permission given to labor picketing and the blanket prohibition applicable to others.