Opinion ID: 1210508
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: State constitutional and statutory claims

Text: Defendant further contends that by retrying him for Naumoff's murder, the state also violated the prohibitions against double jeopardy contained in the state Constitution and statutory provisions. As he points out, article I, section 15 of the state Constitution provides, Persons may not twice be put in jeopardy for the same offense. The California Penal Code contains similar provisions. (See §§ 687 [No person can be subjected to a second prosecution for a public offense for which he has once been prosecuted and convicted or acquitted.]; 1023 [When the defendant is convicted or acquitted or has been once placed in jeopardy upon an accusatory pleading, the conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged in such accusatory pleading....].) As discussed earlier, when, as in this CclSG, 3, defendant has entered an invalid guilty plea, the federal Constitution does not bar a second prosecution. We see no reason why a similar rule should not apply to the double jeopardy prohibitions contained in the state's Penal Code and Constitution. As a leading treatise on California law has pointed out: Where a guilty plea is properly vacated, whether on the defendant's motion or otherwise, the double jeopardy prohibition does not prevent a trial on the offense charged. (1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law (2d ed. 1988) Defenses, § 302, p. 348, italics added; see also People v. Clark (1968) 264 Cal.App.2d 44, 47, 70 Cal.Rptr. 324 [In our view double jeopardy no more follows the vacation of an erroneously accepted plea than it does an instance of mistaken identity, incompetency, corruption, or mistrial.].)