Opinion ID: 714835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Ambiguity in Verdict

Text: 45 Count I of the superseding indictment charged all of the defendants with participation in a multi-object conspiracy. Specifically, the indictment alleged that the defendants conspired 46 to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute in excess of 50 grams of mixtures containing cocaine base and multi-kilogram quantities of mixtures containing cocaine, Schedule II Narcotic Drug Controlled Substances, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 841(a)(1); and knowingly and intentionally to use and cause to be used communication facilities, namely, telephones, in committing, causing and facilitating the commission of offenses in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841(a)(1) and 846, namely, the unlawful possession with intent to distribute and the unlawful distribution of cocaine base and cocaine, and attempting and conspiring to commit those offenses, which are felonies, in violation of Title 21, United States Code, Section 843(b). 47 R.84. The jury returned a general verdict of guilty on this count, convicting all of the defendants. The defendants submit that the language of the indictment, when combined with the general verdict, results in an ambiguity with respect to the objects of the conspiracy. 11 Without a special verdict, the defendants argue, the district court could not have known upon which object of the conspiracy the jury convicted the defendants. Without such knowledge, the district court erred in assuming that the jury found a conspiracy to distribute cocaine base--the most serious of the potential conspiratorial objectives--and thus erred in sentencing the defendants on the basis of that assumption. 12 48 Our review of the case law that has addressed this issue reveals that the form of the indictment often determines how a multi-object indictment may be utilized in sentencing. When an indictment is phrased in the disjunctive, as when a defendant is charged with conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine or amphetamine, it is generally held that a general verdict based upon the indictment is ambiguous. In United States v. Owens, 904 F.2d 411 (8th Cir.1990), for example, our colleagues in the Eighth Circuit considered an indictment that charged the defendant with conspiring to distribute methamphetamine/amphetamine. The district court, following a general verdict from the jury, sentenced the defendant on the basis of methamphetamine--the drug with the more severe penalty. The Eighth Circuit determined that the use of the / symbol meant that the defendant had been charged and convicted of conspiracy to distribute either methamphetamine or amphetamine. This construction, held the court, rendered the jury's general verdict ambiguous; the jury was able to reach its verdict by finding the defendant guilty of conspiring to distribute either drug. Id. at 414. With this ambiguity, the court concluded, the district court could not know which of the two objects the jury found. Thus, the sentence based upon the methamphetamine was vacated. The court determined that it would withhold judgment on the defendant's conspiracy conviction for thirty days, giving the government the option of consenting to a new sentence based upon the amphetamine charge. If the government did not consent, the court held that the defendant's conviction would be vacated and it would remand the matter for a new trial. Id. at 415. This same result has been reached by other circuits that have considered an indictment phrased in the disjunctive. See, e.g., United States v. Bush, 70 F.3d 557 (10th Cir.1995) (defendant's indictment for distribution of cocaine (powder) and/or cocaine base (crack) held to be ambiguous), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 795, 133 L.Ed.2d 743 (1996); United States v. Garcia, 37 F.3d 1359, 1370 (9th Cir.1994) (Garcia's jury was charged with determining whether he was guilty of conspiring to commit the narcotics charges or whether he was guilty of conspiring to use communications facilities to facilitate the commission of drug offenses.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 1699, 131 L.Ed.2d 562 (1995); United States v. Baker, 16 F.3d 854 (8th Cir.1994) (verdict convicting defendant of violating 21 U.S.C. § 856 by making house available for the purpose of distributing or using a controlled substance held to be ambiguous and could not serve as basis for career offender sentencing); United States v. Pace, 981 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir.1992) (first object of conspiracy, possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine/amphetamine, held to be ambiguous; sentence based on methamphetamine vacated for new trial or for resentencing based on amphetamine); United States v. Quicksey, 525 F.2d 337 (4th Cir.1975) (jury allowed to convict for either a general conspiracy or a narcotics conspiracy and not required to return a special verdict; sentenced based upon narcotics conspiracy vacated). 49 Other courts, such as the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bounds, 985 F.2d 188 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 135, 126 L.Ed.2d 98 (1993), have been faced with a slightly different situation, in which the indictment was phrased in the conjunctive, yet a subsequent instruction presented to the jury the possibility of finding only one object necessary for a conviction. In Bounds, the indictment charged the defendant with conspiracy to manufacture amphetamine and phenylacetone, but the jury was subsequently instructed that the conspiracy involved phenylacetone or amphetamine. Under that circumstance, the Fifth Circuit determined that the jury instruction rendered the general verdict ambiguous. Thus, the defendant's sentence based upon the more serious of the two drugs could not stand. Cf. United States v. Cooper, 966 F.2d 936 (5th Cir.) (indictment alleged two objects of conspiracy in the conjunctive, but jury was instructed that only one object was necessary for a guilty verdict), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 980, 113 S.Ct. 481, 121 L.Ed.2d 386 (1992). 50 When the indictment is phrased in the conjunctive, however, courts generally have concluded that a general verdict does not result in ambiguity such as that found in Owens and the other cases discussed above. For example, in United States v. Watts, 950 F.2d 508 (8th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 911, 112 S.Ct. 1276, 117 L.Ed.2d 502 (1992), the jury returned a general verdict convicting the defendants of conspiring to distribute heroin, ... cocaine and cocaine base. Id. at 510. At the sentencing phase, the district court calculated the quantity of drugs attributable to each of the defendants by converting certain assets into an equivalent quantity of drugs, using as its conversion ratio $100 of assets for one gram of crack. The defendants pointed out that the indictment charged them with a conspiracy to distribute three different drugs and argued that the assumption that crack was involved in the conspiracy was unwarranted, given the jury's general verdict. 51 The Watts panel noted that, in Owens, it was presented with an indictment phrased in the disjunctive. In contrast, [i]n the present case the indictment was an 'and,' not an 'or,' indictment. The jury did not need to decide between the different drugs. Id. at 515. Concluding that the evidence at trial supported the district court's use of crack cocaine in the asset conversion, the court held that, unlike in Owens, the court in this case did not elicit an ambiguous or unclear verdict from the jury. Id. Other circuits addressing an indictment phrased in the conjunctive have arrived at the same conclusion as did the Eighth Circuit in Watts. See, e.g., United States v. Linn, 31 F.3d 987, 994 (10th Cir.1994) (defendant convicted of multiple-object conspiracy, including conspiracy to commit arson, but acquitted of substantive arson count; sentence based on arson conspiracy upheld given the conjunctive nature of the conspiracy count); United States v. Peters, 617 F.2d 503, 506 (7th Cir.1980) (per curiam) (holding that because the conspiracy count does not refer to the five substantive offenses in the disjunctive, and since the jury convicted defendant of the offenses ... that were the objects of the alleged conspiracy, it is reasonable to conclude that the jury found defendant guilty of a conspiracy to commit all five of the substantive offenses). But see Newman v. United States, 817 F.2d 635 (10th Cir.1987). 13 52 The indictment in this case does not present the ambiguity found in Owens and the other cases discussed above. Rather, this indictment was phrased in the conjunctive, as was the indictment in Watts: The defendants were charged with a conspiracy to violate § 841(a)(1) (possession with intent to distribute and distribution of controlled substances) and § 843(b) (use of a communication facility) and, within the first of these two conspiratorial objects, the defendants were charged with possession with intent to distribute and distribution of cocaine base and cocaine. This construction clearly required the jury to find that both objectives and both drugs were involved in the conspiracy. 53 Furthermore, the court's instructions to the jury reiterated the conjunctive nature of the indictment. The court stated: Count 1 of the indictment charges each of the defendants with conspiracy to knowingly and intentionally possess with the intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base, and knowingly and intentionally using the telephone to facilitate the commission of the offenses involving trafficking in cocaine and cocaine base.... Tr. 1214-15 (emphasis added). The jury is presumed to follow its instructions, United States v. Anderson, 61 F.3d 1290, 1300 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 543, 133 L.Ed.2d 446 (1995), and we do not find a reason to depart from that presumption in this case. The jury could convict the defendants on the Count I conspiracy charge only by finding them guilty of the conspiracy that was described; as the instructions made clear, that conspiracy involved two objects and two drugs. The jury was never presented with the option of convicting the defendants of some other conspiracy involving different objectives. 54 Additionally, a review of the evidence presented in this case reveals that there was adequate evidence from which a jury could find that there existed a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine, and the defendants do not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on this point. 14 See Bush, 70 F.3d at 562-63 (concluding indictment's use of cocaine (powder) and/or cocaine base (crack) ambiguous, yet holding that the evidence supported a finding that cocaine base was object of conspiracy); United States v. Dennis, 786 F.2d 1029 (11th Cir.1986) (defendants convicted of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances, including heroin, cocaine, marijuana, and talwin; although instruction might permit the jury to return ambiguous verdict, evidence supported the conclusion that jury found a conspiracy to distribute cocaine or heroin). 55 To accept the defendants' argument, we would have to assume that the jury disregarded its instructions as well as the form of the indictment and chose instead to convict the defendants of membership in a conspiracy that was not charged, involving perhaps only one objective or only one drug. We cannot accept that assumption. Neither the form of the indictment nor the court's instructions created ambiguity in the general verdict returned by the jury. The district court did not err in using a conviction for conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine in its sentencing determinations.