Opinion ID: 182421
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Investigator Chris Bryant

Text: Chris Bryant, an investigator with the narcotics unit of the Knox County Sheriff's Office, testified predominantly regarding the controlled buys and the execution of the search warrant. He also explained to the jury that items such as scales and plastic sandwich bags are used in the drug trade just as they are in the average household: to weigh and to package things. Defendant argues that the district court erred by allowing Bryant's transformation from a fact witness to an opinion witness. (Appellant's Br. 12.) Defendant did not object to Bryant's passing comments about these few items of evidence at trial. We review for plain error. Although testimony concerning drug dealing is specialized knowledge not within the experience of the average juror, United States v. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d 724, 742 (6th Cir.2006), we are hard-pressed to declare ourselves convinced that Bryant's testimony concerning plastic baggies and scales constitutes expert testimony that must comply with the well-known admissibility requirements. But, for the sake of discussion, we will address it as if it did. The admission of this expert testimony presents two issues; neither warrants reversal. First, in its Rule 16 disclosure, the Government did not provide Defendant with notice that Bryant would comment about plastic baggies and scales. Nonetheless, Defendant was in no way prejudiced by this absence. The Government's Rule 16 disclosure notified Defendant that expert testimony concerning the general practices of drug dealers would be introduced at trial. Defendant thus did not suffer any surprise, a point underscored by his attorney's silence as Bryant's brief testimony on these points was heard. United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 407 (6th Cir.2007) (quoting United States v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 515 (6th Cir. 2002)). More fundamentally, he has failed to show how the outcome of the case would have been different had he received notice. Id. Second, when a witness gives both fact and expert testimony, the district court must give a `cautionary jury instruction regarding the [witness's] dual witness roles' or there must be `a clear demarcation between [the witness's] fact testimony and expert opinion testimony.' United States v. Smith, 601 F.3d 530, 540 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 745). The district court did not give a dual-witness instruction and there was not a clear demarcation between the fact and expert testimony. Even so, Defendant cannot show that this error affected substantial rights and seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. at 541 (quoting United States v. Jones, 108 F.3d 668, 670 (6th Cir.1997)). The district court's instruction, which told the jurors that they could reject the opinions given and that they should consider how the witnesses reached their conclusions, was adequate to guard against the risk of confusion inherent when a law enforcement agent testifies as both a fact witness and as an expert witness. Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 744. Moreover, there were no other evidentiary errors in this case. See United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 470-71 (6th Cir.2009) (noting that we have declined to extend the holding in Lopez-Medina to circumstances in which there were no other evidentiary errors). And in light of the other substantial evidence of Defendant's guilt in this case, particularly the distribution quantities of crack cocaine discovered at Defendant's feet in the closet, Investigator Bryant's dual testimony here is insufficient to `show [] an actual effect on the outcome of the case.' United States v. Martin, 520 F.3d 656, 660 (6th Cir.2008) (quoting Lopez-Medina, 461 F.3d at 745) (alteration in original). Defendant has not shown that he is entitled to a reversal of his conviction.