Opinion ID: 2022184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Death Penalty and Plea Agreement Statutes

Text: Amicus counsel argue that Indiana's death penalty [1] and plea agreement [2] statutes, read together, do not permit negotiated plea agreements for the death penalty. The portions of the plea agreement statute relevant to this argument state, If the plea agreement is not accepted, the court shall reject it before the case may be disposed of by trial or by guilty plea, and If the court accepts a plea agreement, it shall be bound by its terms. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-3-3(b), (e). The relevant portions of the death penalty statute state: The state may seek either a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for murder by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b). In the sentencing hearing after a person is convicted of murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances alleged.... .... If the defendant was convicted of murder in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene for a sentencing hearing. If the trial was to the court, or the judgment was entered on a guilty plea, the court alone shall conduct the sentencing hearing. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(a), (d) (emphasis added). Amicus counsel read these provisions of the death penalty statute as requiring entry of a judgment of guilt before a sentencing hearing can occur. They also read the phrase before the case may be disposed of in the plea agreement statute as meaning entrance of a judgment of guilt. Thus, argue amicus, when the two statutes are read together, a peculiar catch-22 occurs. If a judgment of guilt is first entered by the acceptance of the plea agreement, the plea agreement statute prevents the court from deviating from the agreement. Therefore, the sentencing hearing is meaningless, since the court has already legally committed itself to the death sentence. On the other hand, if the court, in order to determine whether to accept the plea agreement, conducts a sentencing hearing to assess the propriety of the death penalty before entering a judgment of guilt, it violates the part of the death penalty statute providing that a sentencing hearing only occurs after a person is convicted of murder. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(a). This argument constitutes a colorable claim, but it is ultimately unpersuasive. This Court has long held that [w]e should, if possible, so construe the two acts before us as to harmonize the same and give full force and effect to each. Ross v. Chambers, 214 Ind. 223, 226, 14 N.E.2d 1012, 1013 (1938). Finding no indication in either statute of legislative intent to proscribe negotiated plea agreements for the death penalty, [3] we will abide by this principle of statutory interpretation. Construing the phrase before the case may be disposed of in the plea agreement statute to mean before the case may be brought to final conclusion allows a trial court to conduct the inquiry required by subsection (k) [4] of the death penalty statute before accepting the plea agreement and imposing sentence according to it. Should the court find the statutory requirements for the death penalty are not met, the agreement and the plea would be rejected, a presumptive plea of not guilty entered, and the matter set for trial. Such an interpretation also complements subsection (a) of the plea agreement statute, which states that once a felony plea agreement has been filed, the court must order a presentence report and may hear evidence on the plea agreement. Ind.Code Ann. § 35-35-3-3(a) (West Supp. 1996). This subsection calls upon the trial court to perform some level of review in felony plea agreement cases before accepting such agreements and sentencing defendants according to them. We think that to approve an agreement calling for death, the trial court must make the findings specified in the death penalty statute. See Ind.Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(k) (West Supp.1996). Our review of the careful and extensive procedure employed in Smith's case indicates, for the most part, a proper harmonizing of the two statutes. Once the plea agreement was filed, the court ordered a presentence report and scheduled a bifurcated hearing. At the first hearing, after the court determined a second time that Smith had the capacity to enter into the agreement and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, the State showed incontrovertible evidence of guilt, and Smith again confessed to the crime. The court determined that the State had made a prima facie showing [5] of guilt, and scheduled a sentencing hearing. At this second hearing, the State showed beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a statutory aggravating factor, that Smith was incarcerated at the time of the murder. Smith declined to offer any evidence of mitigation, and the presentence investigation report revealed none. Accordingly, the court determined that the aggravating factor outweighed any mitigators, determined the death penalty appropriate, accepted the plea agreement, and sentenced Smith to death. Nothing in this procedure warrants reversal of Smith's sentence.