Opinion ID: 1160213
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Propriety of the Search

Text: We next address whether the motion to suppress the marijuana found in Minor's purse was properly denied. First, it is axiomatic that [m]inors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional rights. Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74, 96 S.Ct. 2831, 2843, 49 L.Ed.2d 788 (1976). Among these rights is the right to be free from unreasonable searches, seizures, and invasions of privacy found in article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution [2] and fourth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. [3] Second, it is equally well settled that the fourth amendment's protection, which only applies to governmental action, applies to searches conducted by public school officials who act as representatives of the state. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 336, 105 S.Ct. 733, 739-740, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985); In re William G., 40 Cal.3d 550, 557-58, 709 P.2d 1287, 1291, 221 Cal.Rptr. 118, 121-22 (1985). Mindful of these constitutional principles, we examine whether the search of Minor's purse was lawfully conducted under the fourth amendment and article I, section 7. Traditionally, [t]his court has always been mindful of its obligation to afford defendants the minimum protection required by federal interpretations of the ... Federal Constitution[.] State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai`i 17, 36, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (1994) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). However, as the ultimate judicial tribunal with final, unreviewable authority to interpret and enforce the Hawai`i Constitution, we are free to give broader protection under the Hawai`i Constitution than that given by the federal constitution, id. at 37-38, 881 P.2d at 523 when logic and a sound regard for the purposes of [the constitutional] protection ... so warrant. State v. Kaluna, 55 Haw. 361, 369, 520 P.2d 51, 58 (1974). In determining whether broader protection in the school context is warranted under article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution, we recognize, as the United States Supreme Court in T.L.O. noted that, [a]lthough the underlying command of the Fourth Amendment is always that searches and seizures be reasonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search [or seizure] takes place. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337, 105 S.Ct. at 740 (emphasis added). Moreover, the determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of searches [or seizures] requires balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which the search or seizure entails. Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). As Justice Powell has noted, [t]he primary duty of school officials and teachers ... is the education and training of young people, T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350, 105 S.Ct. at 747 (Powell, J., concurring), and that a [s]tate has a compelling interest in assuring that the schools meet this responsibility. Without first establishing discipline and maintaining order, teachers cannot begin to educate their students. Id. We further recognize, as also noted by the T.L.O. court, that disorder in schools has become unsettling; drug use and violent crime in schools have become major social problems. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 339, 105 S.Ct. at 741. Schools in Hawai`i have not been immune from these social problems which are responsible for a school environment in which students and school personnel alike are in fear for their safety. To say that such an environment is not conducive to learning would be a gross understatement. We perceive no sound or logical reason to afford our public school students greater constitutional protections than that afforded by the federal constitution. We therefore look to, and adopt, the minimum protection provided by the federal constitution as set out in the United States Supreme Court's seminal decision in T.L.O. In T.L.O., a teacher discovered a fourteen-year-old high school student (T.L.O.) [4] smoking in a lavatory, in violation of a school rule prohibiting such conduct. When questioned by the assistant vice-principal, T.L.O. denied the charge and claimed that she did not smoke at all. The assistant vice-principal then demanded to see T.L.O.'s purse. Upon opening the purse, he discovered a pack of cigarettes. As he removed the cigarettes from the purse, he noticed a package of cigarette rolling papers that are commonly associated with the use of marijuana. A thorough search of the purse further revealed a small quantity of marijuana, a pipe, several empty plastic bags, a substantial amount of cash in one-dollar bills, an index card listing students who apparently owed T.L.O. money, and two letters implicating T.L.O. in marijuana dealing. The assistant vice-principal turned over this evidence to the police, who instituted delinquency charges against T.L.O. Id. at 328-30, 105 S.Ct. at 735-36. During the delinquency hearing, T.L.O. moved to suppress the evidence, alleging that the search of her purse violated the fourth amendment. The juvenile court concluded that the search was reasonable, denied the motion to suppress, and adjudged T.L.O. delinquent. A divided Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court affirmed the juvenile court, finding that there had been no fourth amendment violation. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, reversed and ordered suppression of the evidence found in T.L.O.'s purse. Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court granted the State of New Jersey's petition for writ of certiorari. Id. at 330-31, 105 S.Ct. at 736-37. A sharply divided Supreme Court [5] held that the search of T.L.O. did not violate the fourth amendment. The Court decided several important issues affecting student searches in public schools. First, based on the premise that school children enjoy the constitutionally protected expectations of privacy, id. at 338-39, 105 S.Ct. at 741, the Court held that the fourth amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to searches conducted by public school officials. Id. at 334, 105 S.Ct. at 738-39. Rejecting the argument that these officials are exempt from fourth amendment restrictions because they act in loco parentis in their dealings with the students, the Court explained that public school officials act as representatives of the state in carrying out searches and other disciplinary functions, and therefore, must comply with the restrictions of the fourth amendment. Id. at 336, 105 S.Ct. at 740. Second, the Court dispensed with the search warrant requirement in the school setting because requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of school rules (or of the criminal law) would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools. Id. at 340, 105 S.Ct. at 742. Most importantly, balancing the [student's] legitimate expectations of privacy and the school's equally legitimate need to maintain an environment in which learning can take place[,] the Court explained that the school setting demands relaxing the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. Id. at 340, 105 S.Ct. at 742. Ordinarily, a search  even one that may permissibly be carried out without a warrant  must be based upon `probable cause' to believe that a violation of the law has occurred. Id. (citations omitted). However, the Court reasoned that the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the school setting dictated a modification of the level of suspicion of illicit activity needed to justify a search. Id. at 340-41, 105 S.Ct. at 742. Therefore, the Court concluded that the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all circumstances, of the search. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742. This reduced level of suspicion, commonly referred to as the reasonable suspicion test, was adopted from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), in which the Court recognized the legality of searches based on suspicions that, although reasonable, did not rise to the level of probable cause. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742. The reasonable suspicion test is two-prong: [F]irst, one must consider whether the ... action was justified at its inception, ... second, one must determine whether the search as actually conducted was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place[.] Under ordinary circumstances, a search of a student by a teacher or other school official will be justified at its inception when there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school. Such a search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Id. at 341-342, 105 S.Ct. at 742-743 (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnotes omitted). Applying the reasonable suspicion test, the Court concluded that the search of T.L.O. was constitutional. The Court found that the initial search for cigarettes was justified at its inception because the report that T.L.O. had been smoking in the lavatory gave the assistant vice-principal reasonable grounds for suspecting that T.L.O. was carrying cigarettes and her purse would be an obvious place to find them. Id. at 345-46, 105 S.Ct. at 744-45. The Court further found that the discovery of the cigarette rolling papers, which was observed when the assistant vice-principal removed the pack of cigarettes, gave rise to a reasonable suspicion that T.L.O. was carrying marijuana; this suspicion justified the further exploration which turned up more evidence of drug-related activities. Id. at 347, 105 S.Ct. at 745-46. Therefore, the Court concluded that the search resulting in the discovery of the evidence of marijuana dealings by T.L.O. was reasonable[.] Id. at 347, 105 S.Ct. at 746. We explicitly recognize that public schools are a unique social environment, and teachers and administrators in public schools have a legitimate and substantial interest in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds to create an environment where learning can take place. We further recognize that, as the Court in T.L.O. accurately notes, [m]aintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms. 469 U.S. at 339, 105 S.Ct. at 741. Drug use and violent crime are socially detrimental forms of behavior in general, but in light of the schools' legitimate need to maintain order in an environment where our youth may learn, their repugnance is exacerbated. We therefore explicitly adopt the T.L.O. standard [6] and hold that: (1) children in school have legitimate expectations of privacy that are protected by article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution and the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution; (2) public school officials act as representatives of government and, consequently, must comply with article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution and the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution; (3) because the warrant requirement is particularly unsuited to the school environment, in that requiring a teacher to obtain a warrant before searching a child suspected of an infraction of the school rules or of the criminal law would unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools, public school officials do not need search warrants or probable cause to search or seize evidence from students under their authority; (4) searches or seizures in the school context must be reasonable under all the circumstances and must be (a) justified at their inception and (b) reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Turning to the facts at bar, because the principal was not obligated to first obtain a warrant to search minor's purse, the first and foremost query is whether there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search of Minor's purse would turn up evidence of marijuana use; stated differently, the query is whether the search was justified at its inception. The following evidence is significant: (1) Minor was discovered during school hours in the Tunnel, an area in which students congregate to smoke cigarettes and marijuana; (2) the reputation of the Tunnel was common knowledge within the school community; (3) the school officials detected the odor of burning marijuana emanating from a Tunnel grate; (4) the school officials found no one else in the Tunnel except for the four students; and (5) Minor and another student were carrying purses, a likely storage place for marijuana. In view of such evidence, it is apparent that the principal had reasonable grounds to suspect that Minor may be concealing marijuana in her purse. Minor, however, maintains that the evidence of her marijuana use was too attenuated to warrant a search of her purse. She contends that school officials did not actually observe her smoking marijuana. She further contends that, although no one else was observed in the Tunnel at the time school officials arrived, there could have been other individuals in the culvert who had been smoking marijuana but departed immediately before the arrival of the school officials. Minor's contentions are purely speculative and without factual basis. The principal's suspicion that Minor's purse may contain evidence of marijuana use was not an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Id. at 346, 105 S.Ct. at 745 (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rather, it was based on his `commonsense conclusion about human behavior' upon which `practical people'  including government officials  are entitled to rely. Id. (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). He knew that the Tunnel was an area where truants congregated and smoked cigarettes and marijuana, a fact commonly known throughout the school community. Further, the security guard informed the principal that he had detected the odor of burning marijuana emanating from the Tunnel in which the four students, including Minor, had been found; no one else was observed. Indeed, the fact that other individuals may have been smoking marijuana in the Tunnel but who went undetected by the school officials is not beyond the realm of possibility. Admittedly, the school officials never actually observed the students smoking marijuana. However, the requirement of reasonable suspicion is not a requirement of absolute certainty: `sufficient probability,' not certainty, is the touchstone of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment[.] Id. at 346 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Considering the information available to the principal just prior to the search, his suspicion that Minor may have been carrying marijuana in her purse was reasonable because it was supported by sufficient factual probability. Hence, the search was justified at its inception. The second prong of the reasonable suspicion test requires that we determine whether the search was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 743 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). [A] search will be permissible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction. Id. at 342, 105 S.Ct. at 743. Based upon the suspicion that the students had been smoking marijuana, the principal asked Minor and the other student to empty their pockets and purses. Teenage girls often carry personal belongings in their pockets or purse, and it is the most probable place for concealing a plastic bag of marijuana and related paraphernalia. Therefore, the search of the purse was reasonably related to the objective, which was to find evidence of marijuana use. Once Minor emptied her purse and the small bag of marijuana was discovered, the search ceased. The search was neither unreasonable nor excessively intrusive in view of the particular circumstances at hand. We, therefore, hold that the search was both justified at its inception and reasonable in scope. Relying on Justice Brennan's dissent in T.L.O., Minor raises a more fundamental question. She contends that full-scale searches in a school setting must be accompanied by probable cause rather than the less exacting reasonable suspicion standard. Justice Brennan criticized the majority's decision to cast aside the constitutional probable-cause standard when assessing the constitutional validity of a schoolhouse search. Id. at 357, 105 S.Ct. at 751. Indeed, the Supreme Court has not hesitated to adopt a fourth amendment standard of reasonableness that stops short of probable cause after carefully balancing the competing governmental and private interests. Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742-43. Justice Brennan noted, however, that such balancing of interests has been and must continue to be limited to the context of minimally intrusive searches that serve[] crucial law enforcement interests. Id. at 360, 105 S.Ct. at 752. By way of example, he noted that the search in Terry was limited to the outer clothing. Id. In our opinion, Justice Brennan fails to fully acknowledge that the drug and crime situation in our public schools today is nothing short of a crisis. As stated by the majority, [m]aintaining order in the classroom has never been easy, but in recent years, school disorder has often taken particularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social problems. Id. at 339, 105 S.Ct. at 741. Students have the right of privacy and that right must be respected. Id. at 334, 105 S.Ct. at 738-39. However, [a]gainst the [student's] interest in privacy must be set the substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline in the classroom and on school grounds. Id. at 339, 105 S.Ct. at 741. Consequently, the school setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches by public authorities are ordinarily subject. Id. at 340, 105 S.Ct. at 742. In balancing the students' legitimate privacy interests with the government's equally legitimate need to provide an environment that is conducive to learning, we conclude that the public interest would best be served by the reasonable suspicion standard. We therefore join the majority of courts that have examined this issue in concluding that the accommodation of the privacy interests of school children with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause[.] Id. at 341, 105 S.Ct. at 742; see also In re William G., 40 Cal.3d 550, 565, 709 P.2d 1287, 1296, 221 Cal.Rptr. 118, 127 (1985). State and federal courts considering these questions have struggled to accommodate the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment and the interest of the States in providing a safe environment conducive to education in the public schools. Some courts have resolved the tension between these interests by giving full force to one or the other side of the balance.... [However,] [t]he majority of courts that have addressed the issue of the Fourth Amendment in the schools have ... reached a middle position: the Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by school authorities, but the special needs of the school environment require assessment of the legality of such searches against a standard less exacting than that of probable cause. These courts have, by and large, upheld warrantless searches by school authorities provided that they are supported by a reasonable suspicion that the search will uncover evidence of an infraction of school disciplinary rules or a violation of the law. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 331-34 n. 2, 105 S.Ct. at 737-38 n. 2 (citations omitted); see, e.g., In re William G., 40 Cal.3d 550, 709 P.2d 1287, 221 Cal.Rptr. 118 (1985); Matter of Gregory M., 82 N.Y.2d 588, 606 N.Y.S.2d 579, 627 N.E.2d 500 (1993) (We agree that for searches by school authorities of the persons and belongings of students, such as that conducted in New Jersey v. T.L.O. ... the reasonable suspicion standard adopted in that case for Fourth Amendment purposes is also appropriate under our State Constitution (N.Y. Const., art. I, § 12)); Comment, Students and the Fourth Amendment: The Torturable Class, 16 U.C.Davis L.Rev. 709, 723 (1983). We emphasize that the exception to the warrant requirement of article I, section 7 of the Hawai`i Constitution, and the relaxation of the probable cause standard to one of reasonable suspicion that we prescribe in the present case, are strictly limited to the school context and the unique balance of interests present therein.