Opinion ID: 2264839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The History of Allocution and its Development under Modern Criminal Procedure

Text: Allocution is a historic common-law right of a defendant in a capital case. [103] At common law, allocution consisted of the court's asking the defendant if he [had] anything to offer why judgment [of death] should not be awarded against him. [104] Allocution provided the accused with the only opportunity to present one of four strictly defined reasons why he should not be executed: (1) he was not the person convicted; (2) he had the benefit of clergy or pardon; (3) he was insane; or (4) if a woman, she was pregnant. [105] At common law, allocution was essential because the accused was neither permitted to have counsel at trial nor to testify on his or her own behalf. [106] Furthermore, the judge possessed little sentencing discretion because the mandatory punishment for almost all felonies was death. [107] Thus, the defendant's response to the tribunal's invitation to speak had little to do with pleading for leniency but was the defendant's only opportunity to present one of the specific legal defenses which might arrest the proceedings. [108] Allocution had another purpose at common law. Not only were convicted defendants put to death, they also were placed in a state of attainder. [109] This meant their property was forfeited to the crown and their descendants declared of corrupt blood. [110] Before land or title were taken from descendants, the court afforded them allocution to give reason why their ancestor should not have been condemned. [111] Accordingly, the failure to provide allocution in capital cases constituted reversible error. [112] With the development of modern criminal procedure, such as the right to counsel and the accused's right to testify, the need for common law allocution diminished. Today, it is argued, any defense, including those recognized at common law, can be properly brought up by counsel during the trial. [113] As the trial courts have been granted greater discretion in sentencing, allocution has evolved into a mechanism in which a defendant in a criminal case may express remorse for his crime and plead for leniency. [114] In the words of Justice Frankfurter: We are not unmindful of the relevant major changes that have evolved in criminal procedure since the seventeenth century  the sharp decrease in the number of crimes which were punishable by death, the right of the defendant to testify on his own behalf, and the right to counsel. But we see no reason why a procedural rule should be limited to the circumstances under which it arose if reasons for the right it protects remain. None of these modern innovations lessens the need for the defendant, personally, to have the opportunity to present to the court his plea in mitigation. The most persuasive counsel may not be able to speak for a defendant as the defendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for himself. [115] Presently, allocution serves two purposes: First, it reflects our commonly-held belief that our civilization should afford every defendant an opportunity to ask for mercy. Second, it permits a defendant to impress a jury with his or her feelings of remorse. [116] Put another way, allocution is necessary because it affords an opportunity for the jury to learn about the `whole person' [117] and it bespeaks our common humanity that a defendant not be sentenced to death by a jury `which never heard the sound of his voice.' [118] Modern treatment of the right to allocution has varied significantly. In fact, we are surprised by the lack of uniformity among the federal courts and the state jurisdictions that provide a right to allocution. On the one hand, several jurisdictions hold that the common-law right of allocution encompasses the right of the defendant to make unsworn statements to the jury that are not subject to cross-examination. [119] Moreover, some states have determined that allocution is a right protected by their state constitutions. [120] Some jurisdictions have interpreted the right of allocution broadly, and allow a defendant to explain in his or her own words the circumstances of the crime and his or her feelings regarding his or her conduct, culpability, and sentencing. [121] A minority of jurisdictions adheres strictly to the common-law right of allocution, in that the court will ask the accused only whether any legal cause exists to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him or her. [122] On the other hand, several jurisdictions have held that there is no common-law right to allocution. [123] Moreover, the majority of federal courts and state jurisdictions hold that the United States Constitution does not protect the right to allocution. [124] The federal courts of appeals are split on whether the right of allocution expressly provided by Rule 32(c)(3)(C) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is a right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. [125] To date, the United States Supreme Court has not addressed squarely the issue of whether the United States Constitution protects the right of a capital defendant to make before the jury an unsworn statement that is not subject to cross-examination. [126] Because of its deep roots in the common law, the Federal Rules have not abolished the right to allocution. [127] Justifications for the federal courts' continued use of allocution include assuring the sentencing court that the person before it is the one adjudged guilty, providing an opportunity for the defendant to contest any disputed factual basis for the sentence, and attempting to persuade the judge to impose a favorable sentence. Thus, the federal rule grants the convicted person a right not allowed at common law  the right to plead for leniency or to show mitigating circumstances. [128] In Lockett v. Ohio , the Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the trial court in a capital case not be precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death. [129] In Lockett, the Supreme Court mandated that the accused be permitted to present any evidence in mitigating of a death sentence, including the circumstances of the crime, so long as that evidence is relevant. [130] Lockett, however, did not involve allocution not subject to cross-examination. [131] It is essential to understand and apply properly this fundamental distinction between the unrestricted right to present relevant evidence and speaking in allocution without being subject to cross-examination. Notwithstanding the multitude of cases interpreting the right of an accused to present evidence in mitigation of a death sentence, the law surrounding the right to allocution, even in death penalty cases, remains unclear. Indeed, it is unclear under Delaware law. Thus, the issues presented here are of first impression. With regard to the United States Constitution, we decline to decide whether the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments provide a right of a capital defendant to make before the jury an unsworn statement that is not subject to cross-examination. Instead, we hold that the common law right of the defendant to speak in connection with a sentencing is based on Delaware Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(a)(1)(C) [132] and the Delaware death penalty statute, 11 Del. C. § 4209. [133] Moreover, Delaware decisional law has confirmed the right of a defendant to speak in allocution. [134] Although in a different procedural context, we have stated that [a]ny failure of a trial court to adhere to the right [of allocution] is `an error which is neither jurisdictional nor constitutional [and] not a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice' so as to constitute a denial of a fair trial. [135] It is desirable that we be clear that the basis for our decision in this matter rests solely on state law as an adequate and independent ground. That is, our conclusion that the defendant has a right to allocution as defined and limited here is not a right granted by either the federal or state constitutions. It is a right that is grounded solely on the Superior Court Criminal Rule, the Delaware death penalty statute and Delaware decisional law. No federal constitutional, statutory or decisional law is implicated, and federal decisional law is referred to only for the purpose of guidance. [136] A principal purpose of allocution is to afford the accused an opportunity to ask for mercy and to impress a jury with his or her feelings of remorse. [137] Accordingly, during allocution, the accused may make acceptable expressions of remorse, pleas for leniency, and plans of hopes for the future. [138] Some cases hold that the defendant may not rebut any facts in evidence, ... deny his guilt, or indeed ... voice an expression of remorse that contradicts evidentiary facts. [139] It has been held that the United States Constitution in no way mandates reconsideration by capital juries, in the sentencing phase, of their `residual doubts' over a defendant's guilt, [140] and that permitting a defendant to present such self-serving remarks would be unfair to the State and could have the effect of misleading the jury. [141] This is not our view, however. Our view is that there is no blanket rule that would preclude a defendant who wished to do so from discussing or arguing in allocution facts already in evidence either in the guilt phase or the penalty phase. Under Superior Court Criminal Rule 32(a)(1)(C) and 11 Del. C. § 4209(c)(2), the defendant also may have the right in certain cases to present at the penalty phase new evidence relating to the circumstances of the crime through his own statement, but that statement of new evidence must be sworn and subject to cross-examination. Thus, if one were to view in isolation the trial judge's limitation here that Shelton cannot discuss the events of January 11 and 12, 1992, such a blanket preclusion is overbroad and could be erroneous in a given case if it denied a defendant who wanted to do so the right to discuss or argue facts already in evidence. But that is not this case.