Opinion ID: 3050288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Defendant argues that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because there is no evidence that the charged offenses had the required nexus to interstate commerce. Because the jurisdictional question here is intertwined with the merits, we consider “whether, viewing the evidence in the 2 Defendant was found not guilty of threatening Global Crossing’s chairman. 13740 UNITED STATES v. SUTCLIFFE light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found that the government proved a sufficient connection to interstate commerce beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Morgan, 238 F.3d 1180, 1185-86 (9th Cir. 2001). [1] “The Internet is an international network of interconnected computers,” Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997), similar to—and often using—our national network of telephone lines, see Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). We have previously agreed that “[i]t can not be questioned that the nation’s vast network of telephone lines constitutes interstate commerce,” United States v. Holder, 302 F. Supp. 296, 298 (D. Mont. 1969), aff’d and adopted, 427 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam), and, a fortiori, it seems clear that use of the internet is intimately related to interstate commerce. As we have noted, “[t]he Internet engenders a medium of communication that enables information to be quickly, conveniently, and inexpensively disseminated to hundreds of millions of individuals worldwide.” United States v. Pirello, 255 F.3d 728, 729 (9th Cir. 2001). It is “comparable . . . to both a vast library including millions of readily available and indexed publications and a sprawling mall offering goods and services,” ACLU, 521 U.S. at 853, and is “a valuable tool in today’s commerce,” Pirello, 255 F.3d at 730. We are therefore in agreement with the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that “[a]s both the means to engage in commerce and the method by which transactions occur, ‘the Internet is an instrumentality and channel of interstate commerce.’ ” United States v. Trotter, 478 F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2007) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. MacEwan, 445 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Hornaday, 392 F.3d 1306, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004) (“Congress clearly has the power to regulate the internet, as it does other instrumentalities and channels of interstate commerce . . . .”). [2] Here, the government introduced evidence that Defendant was living in California at the time the website was first UNITED STATES v. SUTCLIFFE 13741 established and that in November 2001 he moved to New Hampshire, where he continued to post threats and social security numbers on the website. The government also presented evidence that, during the relevant time period, the website was uploaded to various servers located in Louisiana, North Carolina, and Virginia. Taken in the light most favorable to the prosecution, this evidence supports the conclusion that Defendant electronically sent threats and social security numbers to internet servers located across state lines. We hold that this interstate transfer of information by means of the internet satisfies the jurisdictional elements of the statutes under which Defendant was convicted. See 18 U.S.C. § 1028(c)(3) (2000) (providing that the prohibited production, transfer, possession, or use must be “in or affect[ing] interstate commerce”); id. § 875(c) (prohibiting transmission “in interstate or foreign commerce” of any communication containing a threat to kidnap or injure); see also United States v. Kammersell, 196 F.3d 1137, 1138-39 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that threat sent by instant message over interstate telephone lines “falls within the literal scope of [§ 875(c)] and gives rise to federal jurisdiction”).