Opinion ID: 2219989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: [2, 3] Before reaching the legal issues presented for review, it is the duty of an appellate court to settle jurisdictional issues presented by a case. [2] Where a district court has statutory authority to review an action of an administrative agency, the district court may acquire jurisdiction only if the review is sought in the mode and manner and within the time provided by statute. [3] [4] The jurisdictional requirements for obtaining judicial review of a final administrative decision under the Administrative Procedure Act are set forth in § 84-917(2)(a). This section provides, in relevant part, that [p]roceedings for review shall be instituted by filing a petition in the district court of the county where the action is taken within thirty days after the service of the final decision by the agency. [4] We have repeatedly interpreted the phrase `county where the action is taken' to mean `the site of the first adjudicated hearing of a disputed claim.' [5] [5] Weekley argues that the mini hearing held in Lancaster County was the first adjudicated hearing and that therefore, under § 84-917(2)(a), DHHS' petition for further review should have been filed in the district court for Lancaster County. Weekley contends that DHHS incorrectly filed its petition for further review in Dodge County, and as a result, the district court for Dodge County did not have jurisdiction over this appeal. DHHS argues that its petition for further review was properly filed in the district court for Dodge County because the mini hearing held in Lancaster County did not constitute an adjudicated hearing. In support of this argument, DHHS points to the procedures governing the grievance processin particular, the informal nature in which mini hearings are conducted. DHHS notes that in a mini hearing, the rules of evidence do not apply, neither party may be represented by anyone licensed to practice law, and the written decision issued at the conclusion of the mini hearing does not become a part of the appeal record. Notwithstanding the procedural limitations and the informal nature of the mini hearing, we are not persuaded by DHHS' argument that the mini hearing was not an adjudicated hearing. Neither § 84-917(2)(a) nor any of our previous decisions addressing this issue require that to qualify as the first adjudicated hearing, the hearing must apply the formal rules of evidence, allow representation of counsel, or create a transcript that is part of the record on appeal. Instead, given the record before us, we conclude that the mini hearing in Lancaster County was the first adjudicated hearing. In so finding, we note that the procedures governing the mini hearing in this case are very similar to those used in small claims court. Proceedings in small claims court are conducted on a very informal basis with a minimum of procedural requirements. [6] Parties are not represented by counsel [7] ; matters are tried without a jury [8] ; the hearing and disposition of all matters shall be informal [9] ; the formal rules of evidence do not apply [10] ; and, on appeal, all cases are tried by the district court de novo. [11] Yet, in spite of the informal nature of these proceedings, we would not say that a decision issued by a small claims court is anything less than an adjudication. The decision of the small claims court is a judgment, and when the time for appeal has run, the prevailing party can obtain execution on that judgment as in any other case in county court. [12] Likewise, we cannot say that the mini hearing in the present case, which shares much of the same procedural informality, is anything other than an adjudication. Here, the mini hearing was held in the presence of the appointed designee who sat as a decisionmaker. Prior to the mini hearing, both DHHS and Weekley were given the opportunity to submit exhibits and briefs to the appointed designee. And at the mini hearing, the parties were allowed to present witnesses, offer exhibits, and present oral arguments. Moreover, following the mini hearing, the appointed designee issued a written decision that, if not appealed, would have become the final and binding decision. In other words, an agency-appointed decisionmaker issued a ruling based on evidentiary submissions, that in the absence of an appeal, would have been a legally binding determination of the dispute. A hearing was held, however informal, and the appointed designee adjudicated the dispute based on that hearing. DHHS also claims that the decision rendered by the appointed designee following the mini hearing was not an `adjudication,' because it was not `the determination by the highest or ultimate authority of an agency. ' [13] DHHS asserts that the highest authority in this case was the State Personnel Board hearing officer who was appointed, conducted a hearing in Dodge County, and issued a decision. We rejected a similar argument in Essman v. Nebraska Law Enforcement Training Ctr. [14] In Essman, we were urged to create an exception to the first adjudicated hearing rule by holding that where the agency conducts a subsequent hearing and has the power to receive additional evidence before issuing its final order, the site of the last hearing should be `the county where the action is taken' for purposes of § 84-917(2)(a). [15] We declined to create such an exception. We explained that our construction of the statute provides a party with a clear statement of where to file a petition seeking judicial review of an administrative action, and there is no reason to complicate compliance with the rule by grafting unnecessary exceptions upon it. [16] As in Essman, we conclude here that conducting a subsequent hearing, where new or additional evidence may be received, does not change the character of the first adjudicated hearing. And in the present case, for the reasons explained above, the first adjudicated hearing was in Lancaster County. Therefore, we agree with Weekley that the Dodge County District Court lacked jurisdiction to overrule the State Personnel Board and affirm DHHS' termination of Weekley's employment. Having so determined, we need not consider Weekley's remaining assignments of error. We recognize that DHHS, unfortunately, faced a difficult choice in deciding where to prosecute its appeal. And parties should not be discouraged from pursuing alternative means of resolving their disputes. However, confusion could have been avoided in this case had the labor contract been drafted to more expressly elect between mediation and a binding hearing on the merits. Nonetheless, the negotiated contract set the rules and we are called upon to judge the proceedings accordingly.