Opinion ID: 786794
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Ruling of Objective Reasonableness as a Matter of Law

Text: 81 Nor was it permissible for the district court to rule on remand as a matter of law that Crossan was entitled to qualified immunity on the basis that his conduct was objectively reasonable. Objective reasonableness is a mixed question of law and fact when, as here, material historical facts are in dispute. Thus, as discussed above, the district court's ruling that Crossan's conduct was objectively reasonable as a matter of law was foreclosed by Kerman II unless there was something new in the record on remand in the nature of an undisputed fact [that] conclusively required judgment in favor of Crossan, Wakefield v. Northern Telecom, Inc., 813 F.2d at 540. We see in the record of the second trial no evidence that was materially different from the evidence before us in Kerman II. 82 Preliminarily, we note that in granting judgment as a matter of law despite Kerman II 's reversal of summary judgment, the district court quoted language in Blissett v. Coughlin, 66 F.3d 531 (2d Cir.1995), that [w]here summary judgment is inappropriate, and the case proceeds to trial, the defense of qualified immunity may be presented to the jury or may be decided by the court in a motion for judgment as a matter of law. 66 F.3d at 538 (citing Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d at 649-50). See Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at . We take this opportunity to clarify the scope and context of the quoted Blissett statement. There are obviously common circumstances to which the Blissett statement is applicable, i.e., cases where summary judgment is inappropriate because the party opposing the motion has adduced evidence sufficient to show a genuine issue of material fact to be tried, but where that party's proof as presented at trial falls short of its pretrial promise. In such circumstances, JMOL could become appropriate though summary judgment was not. Blissett did not purport to address the situation in which (a) the court of appeals has decided, prior to trial, that the defendant's qualified immunity defense cannot be decided on summary judgment, and (b) the evidence at trial was substantially the same as that proffered in opposition to summary judgment. Moreover, the district court in Blissett in fact had not decided the merits of the qualified immunity defense at all, but instead had found the defense waived. This Court affirmed that ruling, noting that 83 because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, it is incumbent upon the defendant to plead, and adequately develop, a qualified immunity defense during pretrial proceedings so that the trial court can determine which claims, if any, may be disposed of by summary judgment, or, at least, which facts material to the qualified immunity defense must be presented to the jury to determine its applicability once the case has gone to trial. 84 66 F.3d at 538 (emphases added). In the same vein, in Oliveira v. Mayer, cited by Blissett for the proposition relied on in Kerman III, this Court reversed a grant of judgment as a matter of law, stating that 85 [t]he District Court should have let the jury (a) resolve the[] factual disputes and (b) based on its findings, decide whether it was objectively reasonable for the defendants to believe that they were acting within the bounds of the law when they detained the plaintiffs. 86 23 F.3d at 650. In short, neither Blissett nor Oliveira allows a district court to grant judgment as a matter of law on essentially the same record on which this Court has ruled that summary judgment is inappropriate because there exist factual issues that must be tried. 87 On this appeal, in an effort to bring the present case within the principle that a reversal of summary judgment in favor of a given party forecloses a grant of judgment as a matter of law to that party on remand unless on remand there is new evidence conclusively requiring judgment in that party's favor, Crossan argues that [t]he facts plaintiff offered at the second trial differed from his prior description of events and conditions (Crossan brief on appeal at 24) with respect to (a) the condition of Kerman's apartment and (b) the officers' obtaining information from Kerman's doctors. These arguments are not supported by the record. 88 As to the supposed difference in the evidence with respect to the condition of Kerman's apartment, Crossan argues that 89 [p]reviously, plaintiff contended that his apartment was, at worst, untidy. Kerman [ II ], 261 F.3d at 241. At the second trial, plaintiff's description of his apartment more closely matched that of the officers. At the second trial, plaintiff said his apartment was messy, very disorganized, with papers and lots of unopened mail all over the table, clothing on the backs of chairs, magazines and newspapers on the floor as well as a large bag of cans ([Tr.504]). This is in addition to there being kitty litter and cat feces all over the foyer ([Tr.122]). The foregoing description of plaintiff's apartment, offered by plaintiff at the most recent trial, does not comport with the descriptive untidy which plaintiff foisted upon this Court. 90 (Crossan brief on appeal at 24-25.) Although Crossan is correct that at the second trial Kerman's testimony included these details as to the condition of his apartment, this was not Kerman's entire testimony, and we cannot view his testimony as materially different from his prior description of the apartment as untidy. As set forth in Part I.D. above, Kerman testified at the second trial that his apartment was merely messy, but not dirty, stating, I kept the kitchen clean. And I kept the bathroom immaculate .... (Tr. 505) And any distinction between untidy and messy is at most a factual shading best left for evaluation by the jury; it surely is not a difference on which hinges the right to judgment as a matter of law. 91 As to Crossan's contention that the evidence at the second trial showed different facts as to the officers' attempts to obtain information from Kerman's doctors, Crossan states as follows: 92 [t]he record, as developed at the second trial, reflects that the officers attempted to reach the psychiatrist plaintiff identified as his doctor but that no one answered at the number plaintiff gave. The record also reflects that at plaintiff's request the officers called the number a second time and left a message ([Tr.127-28]). Later plaintiff gave the paramedic a different name and number of someone who plaintiff purported [ sic ] was his doctor. The paramedic called the number and held a conversation with the alleged doctor. Thereafter, the paramedic held the phone up to the plaintiff so he could speak to the person at the other end. Although, under plaintiff's version of the facts, defendant Crossan hung up the phone while plaintiff was speaking with this second doctor, this allegedly occurred after the trained medical professional conversed with the doctor. The paramedic was apparently satisfied with the information he received as he did not ... call the doctor back ([Tr.133-37]). Under the law existing at the time of the incident, any information the paramedic received can be imputed to defendant Crossan. 93 (Crossan brief on appeal at 25 (emphases added).) Although the district court appears to have credited an argument such as this, implying that Pontrelli received medical information from Dr. Malone, see Kerman III, 2003 WL 328297, at  (paramedic Pontrelli asked Plaintiff who his psychiatrist was, and spoke to Dr. Malone (citing Tr. 133-35)), the portions of the transcript referred to by the court and Crossan give no indication that Pontrelli had any conversation with Dr. Malone about Kerman's medical condition or history. Crossan has cited us to no evidence in the record sufficient to permit an inference that a conversation of that nature occurred, and our own review of the record persuades us that there is none to be found. According to Kerman, Pontrelli placed the call and, upon reaching Dr. Malone, said simply that Kerman was in custody and that no gun had been found. ( See Tr. 133-34.) Pontrelli then held the phone to Kerman's ear to allow Kerman to speak with Dr. Malone. ( See Tr. 134-35.) Before Kerman had finished speaking with Dr. Malone, Crossan grabbed the phone and hung up. ( See Tr. 136-37; see also id. at 485.) Dr. Malone similarly testified that the paramedic who called him stated that they were the paramedics, that everything was okay. There was no gun, and that Robert wanted to speak to me, and that the paramedic then allowed Kerman to speak to Dr. Malone. (Tr. 651.) Dr. Malone testified that the telephone was hung up in the middle of his ensuing conversation with Kerman. ( See Tr. 652.) Pontrelli himself did not testify that he had any substantive conversation with Dr. Malone. Indeed, Pontrelli did not recall even placing the call. ( See Tr. 579.) Thus, while Crossan argues that Pontrelli was apparently satisfied with the information he received and that the information the paramedic received can be imputed to defendant Crossan (Crossan brief on appeal at 25), there was no evidence that Pontrelli received any medical information whatever from any doctor, and hence no evidence of any such information that could have been relayed or imputed to Crossan. 94 Moreover, Crossan's suggestion that officer Hume's attempt to call Dr. Brozovsky was not known to this Court at the time of Kerman II is unsupportable. Although that fact was not mentioned in the opinion, it was argued in defendants' brief on that appeal. See Kerman v. City of New York, No. 00-9130, Appellees' Brief dated January 31, 2001, 2001 WL 34106425, at  ([Kerman] asked the officers why they did not call his psychiatrist, Dr. Brozovsky. An officer did so, leaving a message when the doctor did not answer the phone....). 95 In sum, the evidence of the officers' efforts — or lack thereof — to obtain information from Kerman's doctors was not significantly different in the second trial. Thus, the law-of-the-case doctrine precluded a ruling by the district court that Crossan's conduct was objectively reasonable as a matter of law. 96