Opinion ID: 1136091
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: at the close of all the evidence:

Text: DEFENSE COUNSEL I: Your Honor, if they are resting, we would like to make our motion for directed verdict on behalf of Trooper Breland. And the basis of our motion would be that under the evidence presented in this case, the only testimony being by Mr. Ford [the plaintiff] that he was shot in the back is contradicted by evidence from Dr. Cox, evidence from Mr. Harden, evidence from Roscoe Howell ... that no reasonable jury, under the evidence as presented to the court could find that the plaintiff in this case was, in fact, shot in the back by Trooper Breland and that a directed verdict should be entered in his favor. THE COURT: Okay. It's denied. Now (R. 240.) The majority emphasizes portions of the colloquy that it says supports its view, and then it states: These emphasized excerpts clearly demonstrate that the only ground ever assigned for Breland's directed verdict motions was that Ford had failed to present substantial evidence, as required by Ala. Code 1975, § 12-21-12, of any misfeasance. In other words, the basis for Breland's motion `simply ... that [the] plaintiff has failed to prove [his] cause of action (emphasis added [in the majority opinion])'stands in stark contrast to the bases for the co-defendants' motions. ... Because Breland's motion clearly failed to direct the court's attention to the issue of immunity either before or after he presented his evidence that issue was not preserved for review. The trial court, therefore, properly denied a judgment not withstanding the verdict on that ground. [Emphasis added.] I believe that a fair reading of the full colloquy shows that the issue of Breland's immunity was called to the attention of the trial court at the proper times. Furthermore, the majority's statement that the attention of the trial court was not called to the immunity issue either before or after Breland presented his evidence seems to be incorrect. (R. 90-91.) The record shows: (1) that the defendants called the defense of immunity to the attention of the court in their answer (R. 26); and (2) that the plaintiff then amended his complaint in order to counter (R. 31). Quoted above are the defendant's motions for directed verdict, one made after the close of the plaintiff's evidence, and one made at the close of all the evidence as required under Rule 50(b), Ala.R.Civ.P. In addition, at the close of the plaintiff's case, the trial judge treated the motion of counsel for the Department of Public Safety (referred to in those portions of the record quoted above as DEFENSE COUNSEL I), and the motion of counsel for Trooper Breland (referred to in those portions of the record quoted above as DEFENSE COUNSEL II), as one motion, stating: Okay. Your motion is granted except as to the defendant Breland. (Emphasis added.) Under Alabama law, [a] specific ground is not required and a general objection will suffice if the ground `is so manifest that the court and counsel cannot fail to understand it.' Rule 46, Ala.R.Civ.P.; Holt v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 507 So.2d 388 (Ala.1986). Based on the foregoing, I cannot agree with the majority that Breland did not raise the issue of substantive immunity. Taylor v. Shoemaker, 605 So.2d 828 (Ala.1992); Barnes v. Dale, 530 So.2d 770 (Ala.1988) (a defense of qualified immunity made by a motion for summary judgment preserved the issue for appellate review, even if a motion for directed verdict was not made at the close of all the evidence).