Opinion ID: 1276694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Majority Opinion Imposes an Unnecessary Burden on Trial Courts

Text: In this proceeding the majority opinion found fault with the trial court's discovery order because it did not set out findings regarding the presence or absence of exceptional circumstances to permit disclosure of information from experts and/or consultants. As a consequence of this alleged deficiency the majority opinion crafted Syllabus point 4, which states: A circuit court is required, pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(B) of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, to make specific findings regarding the existence of exceptional circumstances justifying the discovery of facts known or opinions held by an expert or consultant who has been retained or specially employed by a party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial before the circuit court may compel such discovery over a party's objection. This ruling by the majority opinion is misguided and inappropriate. To begin, the majority opinion failed to understand that this case was brought as a challenge to a non-appealable interlocutory discovery order. This Court has recognized that, as a general rule, a trial court is under no duty to make findings on an interlocutory order[.] State ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Gaughan, 203 W.Va. 358, 367, 508 S.E.2d 75, 84 (1998). In fact, Rule 52(a) of our Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provides that [f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on . . . any . . . motion except as provided in subdivision (c) of this rule. [21] This Court recognized in Gaughan that Rule 52(a) posed problems when litigants filed petitions for writs of prohibition to challenge a trial court's interlocutory order. That problem involved the lack of a record which provided the basis for a trial court's ruling. Gaughan set out a workable solution to the problem in syllabus point 6 of the opinion: A party seeking to petition this Court for an extraordinary writ based upon a non-appealable interlocutory decision of a trial court, must request the trial court set out in an order findings of fact and conclusions of law that support and form the basis of its decision. In making the request to the trial court, counsel must inform the trial court specifically that the request is being made because counsel intends to seek an extraordinary writ to challenge the court's ruling. When such a request is made, trial courts are obligated to enter an order containing findings of fact and conclusions of law. Absent a request by the complaining party, a trial court is under no duty to set out findings of fact and conclusions of law in non-appealable interlocutory orders. 203 W.Va. 358, 508 S.E.2d 75. The underlying policy concern that was implicit in Gaughan is that trial court's should not be forced to routinely set out detailed findings in interlocutory orders. Such a requirement would be unduly burdensome and a waste of valuable judicial time. To avoid imposing this burden on trial courts, Gaughan crafted a solution that would require interlocutory orders set out detailed findings only when a party intended to challenge that order by filing a petition with this Court for an extraordinary writ. More importantly, Gaughan required that a party inform the trial court that a detailed order was needed because a challenge was going to be made. The decision in Gaughan emphasized that [a]bsent a request by the complaining party, a trial court is under no duty to set out findings of fact and conclusions of law in non-appealable interlocutory orders. To the extent that the majority opinion believed that the interlocutory order in this case was deficient, one of two courses were available. If the record showed that DOH did not inform the trial court that it was filing a petition for a writ with this Court and therefore needed a detailed interlocutory order, DOH failed to carry out its burden under Gaughan and the writ should be denied because of an inadequate record. Or, if DOH did in fact comply with Gaughan but the trial court failed to do so, then the case should have been held in abeyance, and this Court should have ordered the trial court to issue and submit to this Court a detailed order. While I do not believe that either course was necessary, for the reasons stated previously in this dissent, I emphatically reject the course taken by the majority opinion because it is inconsistent with Gaughan and the policy considerations underlying Gaughan. For the numerous reasons set out above, I respectfully dissent.