Opinion ID: 4533546
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wiretap Claims

Text: The district court concluded that Mr. Banks failed to plead a plausible federal or state wiretap claim because the defendants relied in good faith on Judge Platt’s orders regarding both electronic (text messages) and extra-territorial communications. We resolve these claims as follows: As to the law enforcement defendants: (1) We affirm dismissal of the text messages claim because the district court’s determination in the criminal case that investigators acted in good faith precludes Mr. Banks from contesting a good faith affirmative defense in this case;7 and (2) We reverse dismissal of the extra-territorial communications claim because the district court erred in holding that the disposition in the criminal case precluded Mr. Banks from contesting a good faith defense here. Collateral estoppel does not apply because the district court in the criminal case excluded the extraterritorial evidence rather than rely on investigators’ good faith to admit it. As to Sprint: We reverse dismissal of the text messages claim because the collateral estoppel applicable to the law enforcement defendants does not extend to Sprint. 7 To the extent the district court in this case suggested that Mr. Banks’s statutory wiretap claims failed without his alleging lack of good faith, we note that a plaintiff is not required to anticipatorily plead against an affirmative defense. See Fernandez v. Clean House, LLC, 883 F.3d 1296, 1299 (10th Cir. 2018). 8 Legal Background Title I of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–2522, provides that “any person whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or intentionally used in violation of this chapter may in a civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(a). Kansas law provides a nearly identical remedy. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2518(1). Both the federal and state statutes provide “a complete defense” for “good faith reliance” on “a court warrant or order.” 18 U.S.C. § 2520(d); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-2518(2). The statutory good faith defense is akin to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule for Fourth Amendment violations. See United States v. Moore, 41 F.3d 370, 376 (8th Cir. 1994) (observing that the federal wiretap statute’s “legislative history expresses a clear intent to adopt suppression principles developed in Fourth Amendment cases”); see, e.g., Reed v. Labbe, No. CV 10–8315–SVW (OP), 2012 WL 5267726, at  (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2012) (relying on findings in the plaintiff’s underlying criminal case to conclude that § 2520(d) provided a complete defense to plaintiff’s claims under the ECPA and required dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6)); Marino v. Hegarty, No. 86 C 6759, 1987 WL 9582, at  (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10, 1987) (“Good faith reliance on a court order is a defense both to fourth amendment claims and to the claims under [the ECPA].”). To invoke the good faith defense, an “officer’s reliance on [a] defective warrant still must be objectively reasonable.” United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017); see also Davis v. Gracey, 111 F.3d 1472, 1484 (10th Cir. 1997) (stating 9 that the good-faith defense to an 18 U.S.C. § 2707 civil claim under Title II of the ECPA for unauthorized access to stored electronic communications requires, like the Fourth Amendment, objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant). “The test is an objective one that asks ‘whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate’s authorization.’” United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23). “In addition, application of the ‘good faith’ exception assumes ‘that the officers properly executed the warrant and searched only those places and for those objects that it was reasonable to believe were covered by the warrant.’” United States v. Leary, 846 F.2d 592, 607 n.27 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 918 n.19)). 2. District Attorney Opat, Chief Brown, and Agent Virden