Opinion ID: 1347595
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Defendant's Peripheral Participation in Drug Hierarchy

Text: [8] Finally, we address the trial court's use of Alexander's peripheral participation in the drug hierarchy as a reason for downward departure from the standard sentence. [23] We conclude a defendant's status in the drug hierarchy does not constitute a substantial and compelling reason justifying departure from the standard range. First, by defining several different types of drug crimes under different statutory provisions, the Legislature has already considered different classes of drug crimes, punishing those with greater participation in the drug hierarchy more severely than those with less involvement in the hierarchy. [24] Therefore, permitting a defendant's peripheral participation in the drug hierarchy to constitute a substantial and compelling reason for downward departure under RCW 9.94A.120(2) would contravene the principle that factors already considered by the Legislature in establishing the definition of a crime and the standard sentence range for that crime will not be considered in determining whether a fact constitutes a substantial and compelling reason for departure from the standard sentence range. We do not reach the second element of the Grewe test since this reason fails the first step and therefore cannot be offered by a trial court as a substantial and compelling reason for departure. [25] We thus conclude peripheral participation in the drug hierarchy is not a substantial and compelling reason justifying departure, and reverse the trial court on this issue.