Opinion ID: 162640
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Into a Class II disposal well in Oklahoma

Text: 60 (4) Without authority from the Oklahoma Corporation Commission The defendant must have wilfully agreed to commit each of the elements of the offense. [emphasis added] 61 Before addressing Attaluri's arguments, we note the standard of review. The argument on appeal was not raised below. Attaluri points to nothing in the record, nor have we found anything, indicating an objection by any defendant to the instruction given by the court. As for the proposed instruction, it does not suggest that the Oklahoma regulations are more permissive than the federal regulations. Nor have we been directed to, or found, any indication in the record that anyone so argued in district court. Therefore, we review for plain error. See United States v. Fabiano, 169 F.3d 1299, 1302-03 (10th Cir.1999) (failure to object to a given instruction, even when the defendant offers his own instruction, does not put the district court clearly on notice as to the asserted inadequacy, and thus plain-error review is appropriate). Following Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), we have held: 62 Under [the plain-error] standard, [the appellant] must show: (1) an error, (2) that is plain, which means clear or obvious under current law, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If these three requirements are met, then we may exercise discretion to correct the error if it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 63 Id. at 1303 (internal quotation marks, citation, and brackets in original omitted). 64 The district court's instruction defined the applicable underground injection control program as the prohibitions mandated in the EPA regulations, and it specifically incorporated the definition of a Class II well as expressing what could legally be injected into the wells at issue in this case. The given instruction informed the jury that Defendants violated the law if they injected into these wells anything but fluids ... [w]hich are brought to the surface in connection with natural gas storage operations, or conventional oil or natural gas production and may be commingled with wastewaters from gas plants which are an integral part of production operations, unless those waters are classified as a hazardous waste at the time of injection. Although it may have been preferable for the instruction to refer to the Oklahoma regulations, the instruction did not mislead the jury because, as we now explain, the substantive standard set forth in the instruction conforms to the Oklahoma regulations. 65 As previously stated, the Oklahoma regulation defines a disposal well as a well which injects, for purposes other than enhanced recovery, those fluids brought to the surface in connection with oil or natural gas production. OAC 165:10-5-1(2). Comparing this definition to the definition of a Class II well in the jury instruction, it is clear that nothing can be injected into a disposal well that cannot be injected into a Class II well. In fact, Class II is a broader category of wells than disposal wells. 66 We are not persuaded by Attaluri's claim that a different result must follow because the wells here are  commercial disposal wells. Attaluri fails to recognize that commercial disposal wells are a subclass of disposal wells. The actual definition of commercial disposal wells in the Oklahoma regulations (not the misquote in Attaluri's brief-in-chief) is: 67 Commercial disposal well means a disposal well which: (A) Is operated primarily for profit from the disposal of salt water and/or other deleterious substances for a fee; and (B) Disposes of salt water and/or other deleterious substances transported by truck to the facilities used in conjunction with said disposal well or is a disposal well for which none of its owners is an owner in any of the oil and gas wells which produce the salt water and/or other deleterious substances which will be disposed into said disposal well. 68 OAC 165:10-1-2 (emphasis added). (Attaluri's misquote replaced a disposal well by one, an alteration that could lead to the misconstruction that a commercial disposal well is not necessarily a disposal well.) 69 The reference to deleterious substances in the definition of commercial disposal well does not imply that such a well can accept all deleterious substances. Because the well is a disposal well, it can accept only those deleterious substances that can be accepted by disposal wells. A disposal well can accept fluids brought to the surface in connection with oil or natural gas production.... OAC 165:10-5-1(2). These fluids may well contain deleterious substances, as recognized by subpart (B) of the definition of commercial disposal well, which speaks of a disposal well for which none of its owners is an owner in any of the oil and gas wells which produce the salt water and/or other deleterious substances which will be disposed into said disposal well. OAC 165:10-1-2 (emphasis added). But only deleterious substances from oil or gas production are permitted to be injected. 70 Our construction of the Oklahoma regulations is based on the natural reading of the language. Moreover, we would be loath to adopt an interpretation of the Oklahoma regulations that, as with Attaluri's interpretation, would make them more permissive than the minimum requirements set by the EPA, which all state programs are obliged to satisfy. Thus, we find no plain error in the jury instruction setting forth what substances could be injected into the wells at issue. 71 Finally, we note that Attaluri devotes several pages of his brief-in-chief to a discussion of United States v. Lewis, No. CR-99-50-B, a case from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma. The defendant in Lewis was also prosecuted on a charge of improperly disposing of fluids down a commercial disposal well. The district court in that case dismissed the charge, apparently adopting the view Attaluri urges here regarding what substances are permitted to be injected into such wells in Oklahoma. Because this court is not bound by that decision, see Abeyta ex rel. Martinez v. Chama Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 19, 77 F.3d 1253, 1257 (10th Cir.1996), we have not reviewed the transcript of that trial (attached as part of the appendix to Attaluri's brief-in-chief) to determine whether the facts distinguish that case from this one. See also Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1549 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992) (court of appeals will not review documents not before the district court). To the extent that the reasoning of that court is persuasive, Attaluri was, of course, free to present that reasoning on this appeal. Otherwise, that decision has no bearing here. 72