Opinion ID: 714835
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Use of the Mills Statement in Closing Argument

Text: 39 The defendants, other than Mr. Mills, challenge the prosecution's use of the Mills statement during its closing argument. They submit that the prosecution wrongly used the evidence for substantive purposes against all of the defendants in a manner that exceeded the limited purpose for which it was admitted. Despite the limiting instruction given by the judge--that the evidence was admissible only against Mr. Mills--the defendants argue that the prosecution's closing argument implicated them. Because the statement of a nontestifying codefendant was used as evidence against them, they submit that the prosecution's argument violated the Confrontation Clause. 40 The right of an accused to be confronted with the witnesses against him includes the right to cross-examine witnesses. Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206, 107 S.Ct. 1702, 1706-07, 95 L.Ed.2d 176 (1987) (citing U.S. Const. amend. VI). When defendants are tried together, the pre-trial confession of one cannot be admitted against the other unless the confessing defendant takes the stand. Id. A defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his nontestifying codefendant's confession naming him as a participant in the crime is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession only against the codefendant. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). However, as the Supreme Court subsequently explained, its holding in Bruton was a narrow exception to the general principle that jurors follow their instructions. Richardson, 481 U.S. at 206-07, 107 S.Ct. at 1706-07 (citing Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 324 n. 9, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1976 n. 9, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985)). The Court, explaining its earlier holding in Bruton, held that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider the confession only against the codefendant. Id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 1707. The case before the Court in Richardson presented a significantly different situation, one in which the confession was not incriminating on its face, but became so only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial. Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1707. When the jury would have to link the facially nonincriminating statement with other evidence in order for the statement to become incriminating, the court reasoned that it is a less valid generalization that the jury will not likely obey the instruction to disregard the evidence. Id. 41 In this case, we note first that the jury was instructed by the court, at the time that the Mills statement was introduced through Officer Grapenthien's testimony, to consider it as evidence only against Mr. Mills. The prosecution subsequently made reference to Grapenthien's testimony twice, once in its closing argument and once in rebuttal; at both references, the government specifically noted that the Mills statement was to be used against Mr. Mills alone. Then, during the court's instructions, the jury was once again admonished to consider the statement made by Mr. Mills only against him. These instructions and admonishments give rise to the general presumption described in Richardson that a jury will follow its instructions. 42 The prosecution's first reference was made in the context of discussing Mr. Mills' involvement within the conspiracy. As an illustration of Mr. Mills' activities, the prosecutor used Mr. Mills' post-arrest statement to describe how Mr. Mills collected and delivered money and supervised sales. 9 According to the defendants, these statements, particularly the references to how they were dealing crack in 35 packs and how this organization worked, necessarily implicate them. However, these nonspecific references to other, nameless actors do not present the type of facially incriminating references that the Supreme Court found in Bruton to warrant a departure from the general presumption that juries follow their limiting instructions. Simply put, there is no Bruton problem when the substitution ... does not identify the nonconfessing codefendant by race, age, size, or any other means.... United States v. Kreiser, 15 F.3d 635, 639 (7th Cir.1994) (redacted statement referred to a drug source; no Confrontation Clause violation although only two co-conspirators at joint trial); see also United States v. Chrismon, 965 F.2d 1465, 1471-72 (7th Cir.1992) (no Bruton violation where statement includes only a reference to a collective and thus incriminates a member of the group only when linked with other evidence). 43 During the closing argument, the prosecutor also argued that the jury could rely upon Mr. Mills' statement that he had tossed a half kilogram of crack cocaine out the window of his car during a car chase on May 11. To support his argument that the incriminating statement was reliable, the prosecutor made reference to a phone call made by Mr. Banks on the day that Mr. Mills was arrested. In the phone call, Mr. Banks discussed with Ms. Boguille and Mr. Shipp the fate of the gym bag full of crack cocaine that Mr. Mills had with him. 10 The second prosecutor in this case also made reference to the phone conversation. He argued that the discussion of whether Mr. Mills had the candy verified Officer Grapenthien's testimony concerning Mr. Mills' post-arrest interview. 44 The defendants submit that the prosecution used the Mills statement in conjunction with the May 11 phone call as evidence against the other defendants. We disagree with this characterization of the prosecution's argument. It is clear that the confession was used in a discussion of whether Mr. Mills was carrying cocaine with him when he was arrested in 1993. Rather than using the confession to implicate the other defendants, the prosecution was using the phone call to support the reliability of Mr. Mills' confession. See Tr. 1014 (This call shows unequivocally that on that instance we know 'Big O' was involved in delivering cocaine, just as he had told Officer Grapenthien.). Because the statements made by the prosecution were not used as evidence against the codefendants, there is no violation of the Confrontation Clause. Even if we were to agree that the phone conversation and the Mills statement together established a contextual link that implicated the defendants, we cannot hold that it compels the conclusion that the jury did not follow the limiting instructions that it was given. See Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 1707-08.