Opinion ID: 171015
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ms. Carney's Statistical Evidence

Text: In attempting to establish the existence of a custom of racial discrimination in the City's police department, Ms. Carney relies solely on statistical evidence. This statistical evidence is contained in Ms. Carney's own affidavit and states as follows: During work I did on temporary assignment in the Denver Police Department's Research and Development Unit, I was asked to undertake research regarding minority representation in the Department. Through my review of the Department's data, I determined that African-American females like me account for well under one percent of the [D]epartment's roughly 1,550 officers, a figure well below the presence of African-American females in the general population of Denver. Further, I determined that on the Department's roughly 35-person command staff, there was only one African-American female commander (there are now two). I also determined that the statistics for African-American women in the rank of Lieutenant and Sergeant was [sic] very low, basically a handful of each in groups of roughly 85 Lieutenants and 175 Sergeants. In relying on this statistical evidence, Ms. Carney cites to Hazelwood School District v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08, 97 S.Ct. 2736, 53 L.Ed.2d 768 (1977), for the proposition that [w]here gross statistical disparities can be shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of discrimination. We do not need to decide whether the disparities Ms. Carney asserts are sufficiently gross to constitute prima facie proof of a custom of discrimination because, in any event, numerous problems pervade Ms. Carney's statistics which fatally impair their probative value. First, Ms. Carney's statistical sample is mistakenly limited to black females. Accordingly, one cannot discern from Ms. Carney's statistics whether blacks in generalmale and femaleare less represented in the City's police department than they are represented in the City's population as a whole. This is important, as Ms. Carney did not allege she was discriminated against because she is a black female, rather, she alleged she was discriminated against only because she is black. Because Ms. Carney's statistical sample is limited to black females, it has little probative value in establishing a custom of generalized race discrimination against all blacks in the City's police department. [3] Second, Ms. Carney's statistical evidence is not limited to a qualified applicant pool. This makes it impossible to discern whether any discrimination has in fact occurred. For example, if black females constituted less than 1% of the qualified applicant pool, then Ms. Carney's testimony would show that, rather than being discriminated against, black females have in fact been over selected. This is why the proper comparison [is] between the racial composition of [the City's police department] and the racial composition of the qualified [applicant pool] in the relevant labor market. Hazelwood, 433 U.S. at 308, 97 S.Ct. 2736. Accordingly, statistics based on an applicant pool containing individuals lacking minimal qualifications for the job [are] of little probative value. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 996, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 101 L.Ed.2d 827 (1988). Third, Ms. Carney's statistical evidence, if anything, addresses the hiring and promotion practices of the City's police department. Ms. Carney's claims, however, are not based on an alleged failure to hire or promote, thus again rendering her statistics of little probative value. Ms. Carney's evidence does not speak to whether the City also had a custom of discriminating against black police officers in the daily operation of the police department. Fourth, even if this court were to ignore the numerous problems already noted, Ms. Carney offers no indication whether the statistical disparities she cites are statistically significant. Furthermore, Ms. Carney performed no statistical analysis on the datasuch as a multiple regression analysisthat may establish whether nondiscriminatory explanationsi.e., the possibility that few applications were received from black females, the possibility that the black females who did apply were not as qualified as other applicants, the possibility that few black females sought promotions, and so forthexist for the disparities she cites. As this court has previously stated, [i]n order for statistical evidence to create an inference of discrimination, the statistics must ... eliminate nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparity. In other words, a plaintiff's statistical evidence must focus on eliminating nondiscriminatory explanations for the disparate treatment by showing disparate treatment between comparable individuals. Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450, 1456 (10th Cir.1994). Ms. Carney's statistical evidence does no such thing. Accordingly, the record provides no basis on which a rational fact finder could conclude that racial discrimination against black police officers was so widespread in the City's police department so as to constitute a custom. Although [o]ur summary judgment standard requires us to view the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party[,] it does not require us to make unreasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Starr v. Downs, 117 Fed.Appx. 64, 69 (10th Cir. 2004) (unpublished). Thus, we agree with the district court that the City was entitled to summary judgment on Ms. Carney's racial discrimination claim. In agreeing with the district court, we are by no means passing judgment on whether Ms. Carney was in fact discriminated against. Ms. Carney's allegations are no doubt serious and unfortunate. Nevertheless, our opinion is predicated on the fact that Ms. Carney has failed to produce evidence suggesting that any such discrimination was the result of a policy or custom of the City's police department. Such evidence is necessary to sustain a claim for municipal liability.