Opinion ID: 1973885
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Duty to Warn and the Experienced User Exception

Text: Under either theory, the threshold question to be decided is whether the manufacturer or seller owed the user any duty to warn. Payne, supra, 486 A.2d at 721; Russell, supra, 422 A.2d at 992; Hull v. Eaton, 263 U.S.App.D.C. 311, 317, 825 F.2d 448, 454 (1987) (per curiam) (applying District of Columbia law). Generally, the existence of a risk of harm reasonably foreseeable to the product supplier gives rise to a duty to warn of the danger, and to advise of means of ameliorating it. In Russell, this court concluded that a duty to warn exists when the evidence shows that the defendant knew or should have known of a danger sufficiently serious to require a warning. 422 A.2d at 992. See also McNeal v. Hi-lo Powered Scaffolding, 266 U.S.App.D.C. 473, 477, 836 F.2d 637, 641 (1988) (applying District of Columbia law); Hull, supra, 263 U.S.App.D.C. at 317-18, 825 F.2d at 454-55. Appellants assert that they had no duty to warn Pineda of the hazards that attended handling their battery. Pineda counters by citing testimony from witnesses for the defendants that they were aware that: (1) charging and jump-starting of batteries by persons of varying levels of skill and experience is commonplace, and (2) these activities present extreme hazards. He argues that the jury could properly find that the dangers associated with charging a battery are pronounced enough to warrant specific warnings as to the significance of the odor of gas, a battery warm to the touch, and the dangers associated with any action that might cause a spark under these conditions, and that these risks were reasonably foreseeable to the appellants. Appellants, while conceding that a duty to warn exists generally, base their first argument upon an exception to the general rule: because Pineda was an experienced and sophisticated user of batteries, and well-acquainted with the particular risks ( i.e., ignition of explosive gas) associated with them, they had no duty to warn him of these dangers. And since no duty existed as a matter of law, the court erred in denying their motion j.n.o.v. In Burch v. Amsterdam Corp., supra , the progenitor of failure to warn decisions in this jurisdiction, we rejected the defendant's argument that the adequacy of a warning label could be resolved as a matter of law in circumstances where the plaintiff was not an experienced user of a highly volatile flooring adhesive. 366 A.2d at 1088 n. 25. We distinguished cases from other jurisdictions in which courts had held a label adequate as a matter of law based on two principles: contributory negligence as a matter of law by the plaintiff, see Moschkau v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 282 F.2d 878 (7th Cir.1960), and the rule that there is no duty to warn against a danger which is already known to the plaintiff, Burch, supra, 366 A.2d at 1088 n. 25, citing Borowicz v. Chicago Mastic Co., 367 F.2d 751, 758 (7th Cir.1966) (no one needs notice of what he already knows). [6] The experienced user exception stems from the view enunciated in the Restatement (Second) of Torts that the supplier of chattels has a duty to warn of inherently dangerous conditions if, but only if, he has no reason to expect that those for whose use the chattel is supplied will discover its condition and realize the danger involved. It is not necessary for the supplier to inform those for whose use the chattel is supplied of a condition that a mere casual looking over will disclose, unless the circumstances... are such that even so casual an inspection will not be made. However, the condition, although readily observable, may be one which only persons of special experience would realize to be dangerous. In such case, if the supplier, having such special experience, knows that the condition involves danger and has no reason to believe that those who will use it will have such special experience as will enable them to perceive the danger, he is required to inform them of the risk.... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra, § 338 comment k (emphasis added). Thus the experienced user exception to the duty to warn is properly viewed as a form of the knowledge of danger rule. See American Mutual Liability Ins. Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 799 F.2d 993, 994 (5th Cir.1986), citing West v. Hydro-Test, Inc., 196 So.2d 598, 606 (La.Ct. App.1967) (exception applies when plaintiff, due to experience, knows or should have known of danger). In circumstances where the danger is less than obvious, the user of a product may rely on the supplier's superior knowledge of latent dangers, unless his own special experience enables him to perceive those hidden dangers himself. An experienced professional, employed for the very purpose of handling the dangerous instrumentality in question, is more likely than an ordinary consumer to have the requisite knowledge of the specific risks. [7] The test is whether the user, by virtue of his profession and experience, knew or should have known of the latent danger. American Mutual Liability, supra, 799 F.2d at 995; Strong v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682, 687 (8th Cir. 1981).