Opinion ID: 2453230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deference of the Review Judge to the ALJ

Text: ¶ 34 When reviewing the factual findings and conclusions of an ALJ, The reviewing officer shall exercise all the decision-making power that the reviewing officer would have had to decide and enter the final order had the reviewing officer presided over the hearing,.... In reviewing findings of fact by presiding officers, the reviewing officers shall give due regard to the presiding officer's opportunity to observe the witnesses. Tapper, 122 Wash.2d at 404, 858 P.2d 494 (emphasis omitted) (quoting RCW 34.05.464(4)); see also WAC XXX-XX-XXXX (providing the Department's own definition of the review judge's authority). Regardless of whether [i]t would perhaps be more consistent with traditional modes of review for courts to defer to factual findings made by an officer who actually presided over a hearing, the legislature chose otherwise. Tapper, 122 Wash.2d at 405, 858 P.2d 494. [I]t is not our role to substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature. Id. at 406, 858 P.2d 494. The findings of fact relevant on appeal are the reviewing officer's findings of facteven those that replace the ALJ's. Id. Here, the review judge meticulously reviewed the evidence, as well as the ALJ's factual findings, and appropriately substituted her own findings when warranted. [11] ¶ 35 Hardee argues that the review judge inappropriately replaced the ALJ's factual findings. According to Hardee, allowing the review judge to replace the ALJ's factual findings renders the ALJ superfluous. She urges us to adopt the reasoning in Costanich v. Department of Social & Health Services, 138 Wash.App. 547, 554-56, 156 P.3d 232 (2007), rev'd on other grounds, 164 Wash.2d 925, 194 P.3d 988 (2008). ¶ 36 Hardee's arguments are not persuasive. First, the statute and our case law do not render the ALJ superfluous. Even where the review judge replaces the ALJ's factual findings, the ALJ still plays a crucial role in affording the licensee an opportunity to be heard, providing notice of the evidence against the licensee, and making a record of the proceedings. Second, Costanich is both nonbinding authority and distinguishable. Costanich involved interpretation of an administrative regulation distinct from the statutory provision at issue in the case at bar. See Costanich, 138 Wash.App. at 554-55, 156 P.3d 232. Lastly, the legislature empowered the review judge with the lawful authority to replace the ALJ's factual findings. Even if we agreed with Hardee's reasoning, it is not our role to substitute our judgment for that of the Legislature. Tapper, 122 Wash.2d at 406, 858 P.2d 494. We hold that the review judge gave the ALJ's findings of fact appropriate deference. ¶ 37 Further, we hold that substantial evidence supports the review judge's factual findings. The review judge concluded that the Department proved that Hardee violated the terms of her 2003 safety agreement and 2004 waiver by allowing William to have unsupervised access to a child under her care and that she lacked the personal characteristics an individual needs to provide child care. Substantial evidence supports these conclusions. Parental declarations and testimonial evidence from the hearing supported the review judge's determination that William had unsupervised access to young children in violation of the 2003 safety agreement and subsequent waiver. Although the review judge relied on some hearsay evidence, reliance on hearsay is permissible. RCW 34.05.452(1). ¶ 38 The review judge determined that Hardee lacked the personal characteristics to provide child care. She based this determination on Hardee's poor judgment in allowing William unsupervised access to child care children and Hardee's decision to allow other adults to have access to the children during child care hours. [12] Ample evidence supported these determinations.