Opinion ID: 2313631
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Schultz's Progeny

Text: Schultz has been cited in over 100 reported Maryland appellate decisions. Both sides in this litigation have sifted through this vast body of law and highlighted particular applications of parts of the relevant language in Schultz that, they contend, support their respective positions. Petitioners, for example, point to Lucas v. People's Counsel For Baltimore County, 147 Md.App. 209, 807 A.2d 1176 (2002). In Lucas, a horse farm owner in Baltimore County applied for a special exception to operate an airport on his property so that a part owner of a thoroughbred business located at the farm could commute to and from the property via airplane. A helicopter pad already was in operation on the property. The Board of Appeals denied the request for special exception, concluding that the proposed use constituted an airstrip, heliport, or helistop, which were not permitted by special exception in the zone. As an alternative holding, the Board of Appeals relied on its interpretation of the Schultz standard. In reaching that determination, the Board used the following standard: The question is one of whether or not the adverse effects are greater at the proposed site than they would be elsewhere in the County where they may be established, i.e., the other areas within the R.C. 2 zones. The Board noted that it believed that the appellant has the burden of establishing that the impact factor caused by the proposed use is not greater at the site than the same use elsewhere in the zone (R.C. 2 zone). Lucas, 147 Md.App. at 223, 807 A.2d at 1184. The Board of Appeals thus found that the impact upon the National Historic District would be greater in the Greenspring Valley than if located in other northern areas of the R.C. 2 zones. Relying considerably on the expertise of (expert witnesses) Messrs. Dillon, Solomon and Gerber, there are individual areas in the Northern part of the county that would be less impacted than at the present site. The Board concludes that it is not a matter of finding a better site for the proposed use in the R.C. 2 zone, but rather the question is one of total impact; and the Board concludes that the Appellants have not established that fact by the preponderance of the evidence to the Board's satisfaction. Acknowledging that airports and helicopter uses have inherent negative impacts, the detrimental effects upon the smaller Greenspring Valley district would clearly have a greater negative impact than if located elsewhere in the vast acreage constituting the R.C. 2 zone of Baltimore County. Lucas, 147 Md.App. at 223-24, 807 A.2d at 1184-85. The Circuit Court for Baltimore County affirmed the Board's actions with regard to the scope of the definition of an airport and the articulation of the Schultz standard. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of the Circuit Court with regard to the definition of airport. The intermediate appellate court acknowledged that, in light of its first holding, there remained issues that the court need not reach for the purposes of deciding this case. Lucas, 147 Md.App. at 235, 807 A.2d at 1192. The court nonetheless elected to address those issues for completeness. [29] Id. The Court of Special Appeals proceeded to write approvingly of the Board of Appeals's application of Schultz, noting that the question is not whether the proposed facility will have some adverse effect on the Green spring Valley area; it will because there are inherently detrimental effects associated with such facilities. The Board must determine whether the adverse effects of the special exceptions use in the particular location in which it is sought to be located would be greater or more detrimental than they would be generally at other locations within the R.C. 2 zone. Lucas, 147 Md.App. at 238-39, 807 A.2d at 1193-94 (emphasis added). The intermediate appellate court concluded that the Board determined that, at Helmore Farm, the adverse effects inherently associated with the proposed facility would be above and beyond the adverse effects associated with an airport elsewhere in the R.C. 2 zone. The record clearly indicates that there are other parcels within the R.C. 2 zone where an airport would provide a lesser adverse impact than at Helmore Farm, and the Board recognized that finding a better site was not the issue. We believe that the Board applied the appropriate standard. Lucas, 147 Md.App. at 240, 807 A.2d at 1194 (emphasis added). Petitioners also point to Board of County Commissioners for Cecil County v. Holbrook, 314 Md. 210, 212, 550 A.2d 664, 665 (1988). In Holbrook, a landowner sought a special exception to locate a mobile home in an area zoned for agricultural use. The Cecil County Board of Appeals denied the special exception request. We granted the Board's petition for a writ of certiorari to consider whether the intermediate appellate court's decision comported with the applicable zoning ordinance and with the standard for judicial review of a special exception set forth in Schultz v. Pritts, 291 Md. 1, 432 A.2d 1319 (1981). Holbrook, 314 Md. at 214, 550 A.2d at 667 (1988). The Court there summarized the Schultz standard: In summary, where the facts and circumstances indicate that the particular special exception use and location proposed would cause an adverse effect upon adjoining and surrounding properties unique and different, in kind or degree, than that inherently associated with such a use regardless of its location within the zone, the application should be denied. Furthermore, if the evidence makes the issue of harm fairly debatable, the matter is one for the Board's decision, and should not be second-guessed by an appellate court. Holbrook, 314 Md. at 217-18, 550 A.2d at 668. Applying that standard to the evidence before the Cecil County Board of Appeals, we concluded that [t]he evidence revealed that the Peters built their $147,000 house in a uniquely valuable, heavily forested, low-growth area. Moreover, photographs clearly depicted the direct and proximate view of the mobile home from the Peters's home. The Board found that this evidence vividly indicate[d] the dehabilitating (sic) effect of the mobile home on the value of [the Peters's] property, inferring thereby that the trailer's continued presence would create significantly greater adverse effects in this location than were it located in other areas in the zone. Holbrook, 314 Md. at 219-20, 550 A.2d at 669. In reaching that conclusion, however, the Court appeared to shift the focus from the particular adverse effects on the properties neighboring the proposed use to the availability of other areas where the mobile home would have less of an adverse effect. We find no cause to question the Board's conclusion that the mobile home, in this particular location, would impair neighboring property value to a greater extent than it would elsewhere in the zone. Countless locations exist within the zone, and indeed, within Holbrook's own property, where the presence of a mobile home would have no effect whatsoever upon adjoining property values. If, for example, trees or topography hid the mobile home from the view of the neighboring property owners, there would remain, as the Board's counsel conceded, absolutely no grounds for denying a special exception permit. The Court of Special Appeals failed to acknowledge these potential scenarios. Instead, the intermediate appellate court based its holding on the mistaken premise that, regardless of a mobile home's particular location within a zone, its negative impact on adjacent properties would remain the same. At any rate, in light of the mobile home's high degree of visibility in this particular location, its proximity to the Peters's home, and the markedly disparate values of the Holbrook and Peters residences, we hold that the Board reasonably concluded that the permanent presence of the Holbrook mobile home would create significantly greater adverse effects in this location than were it located elsewhere in the zone. Holbrook, 314 Md. at 220, 550 A.2d at 669. Petitioners argue that Holbrook, particularly the passage previously quoted, supports the proposition that Schultz compels a district-wide comparative geographic analysis of effects in each special exception. The most sympathetic statement to that effect in the Court's opinion in Holbrook is that [c]ountless locations exist within the zone, and indeed, within Holbrook's own property, where the presence of a mobile home would have no effect whatsoever upon adjoining property values. Holbrook, however, subsequently has been interpreted in a much different light than Petitioners argue here. There is not necessarily a comparative analysis requirement imbedded in Holbrook. In a bit of rhetorical flourish, the Court actually was dismissing the intermediate appellate court's mistaken premise that, regardless of a mobile home's particular location within a zone, its negative impact on adjacent properties would remain the same. Holbrook, 314 Md. at 220, 550 A.2d at 669. The Court did not compare the location of the proposed use to other locations within the zone, or require such an analysis in every case. Instead, it highlighted characteristics of the particular neighborhood that exacerbated the problems inherent to the placement of a mobile home there. See E. Outdoor Adver. Co., 146 Md.App. at 309, 807 A.2d at 64 (noting that in Holbrook the Court considered the deleterious impact of a mobile home on the value of adjacent properties in the `neighborhood'); Sharp v. Howard County Bd. of Appeals, 98 Md. App. 57, 83, 632 A.2d 248, 261 (1993) (discussing Holbrook and stating that the Court [in Holbrook ] construed the relative lack of vegetative screening between the two structures and the apparently level topography as sufficient localized circumstances that rendered the adverse property value impact, arguably always inherent in this particular use, uniquely adverse). Petitioners also point to the Court of Special Appeals's decision in Futoryan v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 150 Md.App. 157, 819 A.2d 1074 (2003). In Futoryan, a landowner appealed the denial of a special exception to operate an automobile service station in the B-3-2 zone. The subject property of the special exception application was the only property within the jurisdiction zoned B-2-3. The intermediate appellate court described the problem this situation presented with the application of its view of the Schultz standard. The B-3-2 zone in this case is a tiny island, measuring a mere 64' by 122.5' and completely surrounded by residential zoning. Futoryan's property is the entire zone. The conditional use here cannot, by definition, have a greater adverse impact at this location than it would have at some other location within the zone because there is no such thing as some other location within the zone. There can be no comparative degree, no greater adverse impact and no lesser adverse impact, when there is nothing with which to compare the location in question. Futoryan, 150 Md.App. at 178, 819 A.2d at 1086. To solve this perceived quandary, the Court of Special Appeals divided the Schultz test into what the court considered to be its elements, noting that [a]lthough in their articulation the tests are sometimes telescoped together into a single compound test, there are actually two tests inherent in the Schultz v. Pritts guidelines. Futoryan, 150 Md.App. at 178, 819 A.2d at 1086. The court continued that [t]he more prominent and high profile of the two is that which assumes an adverse impact from the conditional use and then compares the relative severity of the adverse impact at the location in question with its likely severity at other locations within the zone. Futoryan, 150 Md.App. at 178-79, 819 A.2d at 1086. The court, setting the stage for application of its view, concluded its analysis of the Schultz test, stating that [i]f ... the adverse effect were weightier than the beneficial purpose [of the proposed use], the assessment of the relative severity [of the adverse effect] at different locations would then be called for. Futoryan, 150 Md.App. at 180, 819 A.2d at 1087. It then held that where no other properties assigned to the particular zone are available for a comparative analysis, the zoning body should compare the adverse effect of the proposed use on the neighboring properties with the likely adverse influences [of the proposed use] at other locations in other similar zones. Futoryan, 150 Md.App. at 181, 819 A.2d at 1087. Petitioners also rely on Hayfields, Inc. v. Valleys Planning Council, Inc., 122 Md. App. 616, 716 A.2d 311 (1998). In Hayfields, a landowner sought a special exception to build a golf course in the R.C.2 zone in Baltimore County. Opponents of the golf course argued that the geological formation underlying the golf course, known as the Cockeysville Marble formation, would increase the adverse effects of contaminant runoff. The Board of Appeals rejected their concerns, noting that there were other areas in the R.C.2 zone that were part of the Cockeysville Marble formation. Therefore, the Board of Appeals found, there was insufficient evidence to conclude that the effects of the golf course would be greater at the proposed location than other areas within the R.C.2 zone. The Court of Special Appeals held that this finding does not comport with the test set forth in Schultz. Assuming that Cockeysville Marble is more susceptible to contamination, the mere fact that some of the land elsewhere in the R.C.2 zone is underlain with Cockeysville Marble does not mean that the effect would be no worse at this locality than elsewhere in the zone. Hayfields, 122 Md.App. at 653-54, 716 A.2d at 330. The Court of Special Appeals remanded the case to the Board of Appeals: If all or a substantial portion of the off-site R.C.2 land is underlain by Cockeysville Marble then it is at least possible that the Board could fairly conclude that the golf course, at its proposed site, would cause no more contamination to the aquifer than if it were located elsewhere in the R.C.2 zone. Conversely, if the Board finds that only a relatively small portion of the off-site R.C.2-zoned land is underlain with Cockeysville Marble, and if it also finds that the Cockeysville Marble formation makes the aquifer more susceptible to contamination, then it cannot be said that the golf course at the intended site would pose no greater danger to groundwater than if it were located elsewhere in the R.C.2 zone. Hayfields, 122 Md.App. at 654-55, 716 A.2d at 330 (footnote omitted). Petitioners contend that Hayfields required a comparison of the geology and hydrology of the site of the proposed special exception to other properties within the R.C.2 zone elsewhere in Baltimore County. Loyola's attempt to distinguish Hayfields is not persuasive. Loyola argues that, in the present case, there are no truly unique factors, such as a Cockeysville Marble formation, that would affect the Property. According to Loyola, all of the potential adverse effects of the proposed Retreat Center at issue (traffic impact, agricultural impact, and environmental impact) are adverse effects inherent from the operation of any school or college use. The Cockeysville Marble formation in Hayfields, however, is not an adverse effect. The adverse effect at issue in Hayfields was runoff from the operation and maintenance of the golf course, containing groundwater contaminants. Contaminated runoff is a potential adverse effect inherent in the operation of a golf course. The characteristics of the locality involved, notably the Cockeysville Marble geology, arguably increased or amplified those adverse effects or made the locality more sensitive to those adverse effects. This is similar to the evidence adduced by Petitioners in the present case of arguably narrow roads frequently used by automobiles, trucks, and farm equipment and an assertedly environmentally-sensitive trout stream near the Property. Petitioners here contended before the Board of Appeals that those characteristics of the local neighborhood increased the debatable adverse effects attributed to the proposed Retreat Center. Thus, if the reasoning in Hayfields is good law, Hayfields squarely supports Petitioners' contention here. Petitioners also point to Mossburg v. Montgomery County, 107 Md.App. 1, 8-9, 666 A.2d 1253, 1257 (1995). In Mossburg, the Montgomery County Board of Appeals denied a landowner's request for a special exception to operate a solid waste transfer station in an I-2 Industrial Zone. The Board denied the request for two reasons: traffic safety and the environment. With regard to the environment, the Board found that there would be adverse impact from runoff from the subject site into a tributary that ultimately drains into Rock Creek, the Potomac River, and the Chesapeake Bay. Mossburg, 107 Md. App. at 13, 666 A.2d at 1259. The intermediate appellate court rejected this rationale, noting that we know of no areas in Montgomery County where storm water runoff does not ultimately drain into the Chesapeake Bay. Mossburg, 107 Md. App. at 13, 666 A.2d at 1259. But even more important, as we indicated earlier, there is absolutely no evidence, in respect to environmental concerns, that the environmental impact of appellants' use at the subject site would be greater, or above and beyond, that impact elsewhere within the I-2 Zone in this industrial corridor or other I-2 Zones in that part of the regional district situated in Montgomery County. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that the impact would be the same anywhere within this I-2 industrial corridor; from the evidence, the entire area appears to be in the Southlawn Creek watershed. Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 24-25, 666 A.2d at 1265. The panel of the Court of Special Appeals described its view of the Schultz standard thusly: Moreover, it is not whether a use permitted by way of a special exception will have adverse effects (adverse effects are implied in the first instance by making such uses conditional uses or special exceptions rather than permitted uses), it is whether the adverse effects in a particular location would be greater than the adverse effects ordinarily associated with a particular use that is to be considered by the agency.... The question in the case sub judice, therefore, is not whether a solid waste transfer station has adverse effects. It inherently has them. The question is also not whether the solid waste transfer station at issue here will have adverse effects at this proposed location. Certainly, it will and those adverse effects are contemplated by the statute. The proper question is whether those adverse effects are above and beyond, i.e., greater here than they would generally be elsewhere within the areas of the County where they may be established, i.e., the other few I-2 Industrial Zones. In other words, if it must be shown, as it must be, that the adverse effects at the particular site are greater or above and beyond, then it must be asked, greater than what? Above and beyond what? Once an applicant presents sufficient evidence establishing that his proposed use meets the requirements of the statute, even including that it has attached to it some inherent adverse impact, an otherwise silent record does not establish that impact, however severe at a given location, is greater at that location than elsewhere. Mossburg, 107 Md.App. at 8-9, 666 A.2d at 1257. Petitioners contend that the environmental analysis discussed in Mossburg invites the type of comparative multiple site analysis demanded here. Loyola, on the other hand, argues that the holdings of Lucas, Holbrook, Futoryan, Hayfields, and Mossburg, to the extent that they endorse a comparative, multiple site analysis in special exception cases, are outliers. Loyola notes correctly that the majority of cases discussing Schultz do not address, much less imply, such a requirement. See, e.g., Singley v. County Comm'rs of Frederick County, 178 Md.App. 658, 679-80, 943 A.2d 636, 648-49 (2008); Handley v. Ocean Downs, LLC, 151 Md.App. 615, 646, 827 A.2d 961, 979 (2003); Evans v. Shore Commc'ns, Inc., 112 Md.App. 284, 303-05, 685 A.2d 454, 463-64 (1996), Moseman v. County Council of Prince George's County, 99 Md.App. 258, 266, 636 A.2d 499, 503 (1994); Sharp v. Howard County Bd. of Appeals, 98 Md. App. 57, 86-89, 632 A.2d 248, 263-64 (1993); People's Counsel for Baltimore County v. Mangione, 85 Md.App. 738, 751-52, 584 A.2d 1318, 1324-25 (1991) [30] ; Gotach Ctr. for Health v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Frederick County, 60 Md.App. 477, 486, 483 A.2d 786, 791 (1984).