Opinion ID: 679519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Permissible Evidence and Burdens of Proof

Text: 21 In Croson, a plurality of the Court concluded that state and local governments have a compelling interest in remedying identified past and present discrimination within their borders. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492, 509, 109 S.Ct. at 721, 730. The plurality explained that the Fourteenth Amendment permits race-conscious programs that seek both to eradicate discrimination by the governmental entity itself and to prevent the public entity from acting as a  'passive participant' in a system of racial exclusion practiced by elements of the local construction industry by allowing tax dollars to finance the evil of private prejudice. Id. at 492, 109 S.Ct. at 721. 7 22 Before assessing whether Denver's factual support for its program satisfies the particularized showing of discrimination required by Croson, however, we address the parties' dispute over the geographical scope and the type of the statistical and anecdotal evidence that informs our analysis. Additionally, we set forth the burdens of production and proof.
23 Concrete Works contends that Croson precludes us from considering empirical evidence of discrimination in the six-county Denver Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA). Instead, it would allow Denver only to use data describing discrimination within the City and County of Denver. 24 A majority in Croson observed that because discrimination varies across market areas, state and local governments cannot rely on national statistics of discrimination in the construction industry to draw conclusions about prevailing market conditions in their own regions. Id. at 504, 109 S.Ct. at 727. The relevant area in which to measure discrimination, then, is the local construction market, but that is not necessarily confined by jurisdictional boundaries. 25 The Denver MSA is defined by the United States Office of Management and Budget according to the existence of a population nucleus and the high degree of economic and social integration in the region. Aplt.App. at 495. Croson supports our consideration of data from the Denver MSA because this data is sufficiently geographically targeted to the relevant market area. The record reveals that over 80 percent of Denver Department of Public Works (DPW) construction and design contracts are awarded to firms located within the Denver MSA. 26 To confine the permissible data to a governmental body's strict geographical boundaries would ignore the economic reality that contracts are often awarded to firms situated in adjacent areas. It is important that the pertinent data closely relate to the jurisdictional area of the municipality whose program we scrutinize, but here Denver's contracting activity, insofar as construction work is concerned, is closely related to the Denver MSA. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1003-09 (considering data from the Philadelphia MSA). The Denver MSA is thus an excellent proxy for the local construction market. Therefore, we hold that data from the Denver MSA is adequately particularized for strict scrutiny purposes.
27 Concrete Works next argues that the district court committed reversible error by considering such non-empirical evidence of discrimination as testimony from minority and women-owned firms delivered during public hearings, affidavits from MBEs and WBEs, summaries of telephone interviews that Denver officials conducted with MBEs and WBEs, and reports generated during Office of Affirmative Action compliance investigations. 28 The selective anecdotal evidence about minority contractors' experiences, without more, would not provide a strong basis in evidence to demonstrate public or private discrimination in Denver's construction industry sufficient to pass constitutional muster under Croson. Personal accounts of actual discrimination or the effects of discriminatory practices may, however, vividly complement empirical evidence. Moreover, anecdotal evidence of a municipality's institutional practices that exacerbate discriminatory market conditions are often particularly probative. Therefore, the government may include anecdotal evidence in its evidentiary mosaic of past or present discrimination. See Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1002-03 (weighing Philadelphia's anecdotal evidence); Coral Constr. Co. v. King County, 941 F.2d 910, 919 (9th Cir.1991) ([T]he combination of convincing anecdotal and statistical evidence is potent.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 875, 116 L.Ed.2d 780 (1992); Cone Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 908 F.2d 908, 916 (11th Cir.) (supplementing Hillsborough County's statistical evidence with testimony from MBEs who filed complaints to the County about prime contractors' discriminatory practices), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 983, 111 S.Ct. 516, 112 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990). Concrete Works cites no case, and we have found none, eschewing the consideration of anecdotal evidence. 29 In the context of employment discrimination suits arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Supreme Court has stated that anecdotal evidence may bring cold numbers convincingly to life. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 339, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1856, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977). In fact, the majority in Croson impliedly endorsed the inclusion of personal accounts of discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 480, 109 S.Ct. at 714-15 (noting as a weakness in the City's case that the Richmond City Council heard no direct evidence of race discrimination on the part of the city in letting contracts or any evidence that the city's prime contractors had discriminated against minority-owned subcontractors). 30 Accordingly, we deem anecdotal evidence of public and private race and gender discrimination appropriate supplementary evidence in our strict scrutiny calculus.
31 Concrete Works lastly admonishes us to consider only evidence of discrimination that existed prior to Denver's enactment of the Ordinance. In other words, Concrete Works contends that any reports or studies that were published after September 4, 1990, the date the Ordinance was enacted, are devoid of probative value in assessing the constitutionality of the Ordinance. 32 In Croson, the Court underscored that a municipality must identify [the] discrimination ... with some specificity before [it] may use race-conscious relief. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504, 109 S.Ct. at 727 (emphasis added). Absent any pre-enactment evidence of discrimination, a municipality would be unable to satisfy Croson. However, we do not read Croson 's evidentiary requirement as foreclosing the consideration of post-enactment evidence. Indeed, post-enactment evidence, if carefully scrutinized for its accuracy, will often prove quite useful in evaluating the remedial effects or shortcomings of the race-conscious program. This is especially true in the instant case, where Denver first implemented a limited affirmative action program in 1983 and has since modified and expanded its scope. 33 The strong weight of authority endorses the admissibility of post-enactment evidence to determine whether an affirmative action contract program complies with Croson. See, e.g., Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1003-04; Harrison & Burrowes Bridge Constructors, Inc. v. Cuomo, 981 F.2d 50, 60 (2d Cir.1992); Coral Constr., 941 F.2d at 921. In Contractors Association, as here, the challenger sought prospective relief in the form of a permanent injunction. The Third Circuit sensibly reasoned that [c]onsideration of post-enactment evidence is especially appropriate ... where the principal relief sought ... was an injunction, because it makes sense to consider all available evidence when contemplating prospective relief. Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1004 (emphasis added). 34 We agree that post-enactment evidence may prove useful for a court's determination of whether an ordinance's deviation from the norm of equal treatment is necessary. Thus, evidence of discrimination existing subsequent to enactment of the 1990 Ordinance is properly before us.
35 The Court in Croson struck down the City of Richmond's minority set-aside program because the City failed to provide an adequate evidentiary showing of past or present discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 498-506, 109 S.Ct. at 723-28. Because the Fourteenth Amendment only tolerates race-conscious programs that narrowly seek to remedy identified discrimination, the Court in Croson explained that state and local governments must identify that discrimination ... with some specificity before they may use race-conscious relief. Id. at 504, 109 S.Ct. at 727. The Court's benchmark for judging the adequacy of the government's factual predicate for affirmative action legislation was whether there exists a strong basis in evidence for [the government's] conclusion that remedial action was necessary. Id. at 500, 109 S.Ct. at 725 (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277, 106 S.Ct. 1842, 1849, 90 L.Ed.2d 260 (1986) (plurality opinion)) (emphasis added). 8 36 Although Croson places the burden of production on the municipality to demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that its race- and gender-conscious contract program aims to remedy specifically identified past or present discrimination, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require a court to make an ultimate judicial finding of discrimination before a municipality may take affirmative steps to eradicate discrimination. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 292, 106 S.Ct. at 1856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). An affirmative action response to discrimination is sustainable against an equal protection challenge so long as it is predicated upon strong evidence of discrimination. Croson, 488 U.S. at 504, 109 S.Ct. at 727. 37 An inference of discrimination may be made with empirical evidence that demonstrates a significant statistical disparity between the number of qualified minority contractors ... and the number of such contractors actually engaged by the locality or the locality's prime contractors. Id. at 509, 109 S.Ct. at 730 (plurality). We do not read Croson to require, nor do we embrace, an attempt to craft a precise mathematical formula to assess the quantum of evidence that rises to the Croson strong basis in evidence benchmark. That must be evaluated on a case-by-case basis. 38 Further, the adequacy of a municipality's showing of discrimination must be evaluated in the context of the breadth of the remedial program advanced by the municipality. Id. at 498, 109 S.Ct. at 724. Ultimately, whether a strong basis in evidence of past or present discrimination exists, thereby establishing a compelling interest for the municipality to enact a race-conscious ordinance, is a question of law. Associated Gen. Contractors v. New Haven, 791 F.Supp. 941, 944 (D.Conn.1992). Underlying that legal conclusion, however, are factual determinations about the accuracy and validity of a municipality's evidentiary support for its program. 39 Notwithstanding the burden of initial production that rests with the municipality, [t]he ultimate burden [of proof] remains with [the challenging party] to demonstrate the unconstitutionality of an affirmative-action program. Wygant, 476 U.S. at 277-78, 106 S.Ct. at 1849 (plurality); see also Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626-27, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1449, 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987) (noting in the Title VII context that [i]f [an affirmative action] plan is articulated as the basis for the employer's decision [to take race or gender into account in an employment decision], the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's justification is pretextual and the plan is invalid.); Contractors Ass'n, 6 F.3d at 1005 (explaining that the Contractors, not the City, bear the burden of proof). As Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Wygant explained, when the governmental entity 40 introduces its statistical proof as evidence of its remedial purpose, thereby supplying the court with the means for determining that the [entity] had a firm basis for concluding that remedial action was appropriate, it is incumbent upon the nonminority [challengers] to prove their case; they continue to bear the ultimate burden of persuading the court that the [entity's] evidence did not support an inference of prior discrimination and thus a remedial purpose, or that the plan instituted on the basis of this evidence was not sufficiently narrowly tailored. 41 Wygant, 476 U.S. at 293, 106 S.Ct. at 1857 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). Thus, once Denver presented adequate statistical evidence of precisely defined discrimination in the Denver area construction market, it became incumbent upon Concrete Works either to establish that Denver's evidence did not constitute strong evidence of such discrimination or that the remedial statute was not narrowly drawn. Absent such a showing by Concrete Works, summary judgment upholding Denver's Ordinance would be appropriate. 42 It is through the prism of these evidentiary burdens, Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513, that we evaluate the record in Concrete Works' appeal from the district court's summary judgment ruling. 43