Opinion ID: 43815
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Florida Retaliation Claim

Text: Posada argues on appeal that the temporal proximity between his request for worker’s compensation benefits and the alleged termination of his employment established a prima facie case. He argues that the district court improperly applied FS § 440.205, and that Tobchi’s and his testimony adequately supported his claim to overcome a grant of summary judgment. Florida Statute § 440.205 provides that: “No employer shall discharge, threaten to discharge, intimidate, or coerce any employee by reason of such employee's valid claim for compensation or attempt to claim compensation under 5 the Workers' Compensation Law.” F.S.A. § 440.25. The express terms of the statute provide that claiming or attempting to claim worker’s compensation benefits constitutes a protected activity. F.S.A.§ 440.25; see Clover v. Total System Services, Inc., 176 F.3d 1346 (11th Cir. 1999). In an retaliatory discharge context, a plaintiff may use a showing of “close” temporal proximity between the protected expression and the adverse employment action to establish causation. Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004)(reviewing temporal proximity in the context of a retaliation claim brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, § 503(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 12203(a)). We have held that a period of as much as one month between the protected expression and the adverse action is not too protracted to establish a prima facie claim of retaliation. Higdon, 393 F.3d. at 1220. Posada presented testimony that, while employed by Cello, he requested worker’s compensation benefits for an on-the-job injury that occurred on or about September 16, 2002. He also presented testimony that his employment was terminated in late September or early October 2002 after he requested worker’s compensation benefits. This testimony was a basis upon which a jury might find that Cello was aware of his injury, and that it discharged him based, in whole or in part, upon his request for worker’s compensation benefits. The record reflects 6 other contradictory facts: that Cello later denied employing Posada after May 2002; that it paid him cash upon notification of his injury but otherwise declined to provide him with the name of its worker’s compensation physician; and that one of its employees (Tobchi) suggested that Posada misrepresent the nature of his injury to medical authorities, ostensibly for reasons related to Posada’s inaccurate social security number. Upon review of the record, we find dispute as to the circumstances of Posada’s termination such that summary judgment on this claim was inappropriate. Accordingly, we vacate and remand the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to the retaliation claim. VACATED AND REMANDED.2 2 Cello’s request for sanctions is denied. Posada’s request for oral argument is denied. 7