Opinion ID: 2584087
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether Moses waived his physician-patient privilege is a factual question to be decided by the circuit court in an evidentiary hearing on remand.

Text: The prosecution contends that the ICA erred by holding that the record was inadequate to determine that Moses waived his physician-patient privilege. Moses, on the other hand, contends that this court should decline to consider whether he waived the privilege as the waiver argument was raised for the first time on appeal. We reject both contentions.
The prosecution asks this court to take judicial notice of two documents outside the record; the prosecution argues that these two documents clearly show that Moses voluntarily disclosed his toxicology report and thereby waived his physician-patient privilege. We decline to take judicial notice of these documents. HRE Rule 201 provides in relevant part that [a] judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. HRE Rule 201(b). As this court stated in In re Estate of Herbert, 90 Hawai'i 443, 466, 979 P.2d 39, 62 (1999), the purpose of the judicial notice rule, and it would appear to be a wholesome one, is to eliminate the necessity of taking the time of the court and jury to make formal proof of a fact which cannot be disputed (citations omitted) (block quote format omitted). The prosecution asks this court to take judicial notice of the following: (1) a letter, sent by the Public Defender's (Moses's counsel's) office to Queen's Medical Center and dated October 5, 1998, requesting all of Moses's medical records, including any records relating to any blood or urine samples taken and analyzed for the presence of alcohol or drugs, and (2) a letter sent by a secretary in the Public Defender's office to the deputy prosecuting attorney, dated October 20, 1998, which notes the enclosure of a copy of the medical records for the defendant in the above-mentioned case. The prosecution also points to one item in the record: a statement made by the deputy public defender in a circuit court discovery hearing on March 23, 1999 that [w]e have provided [the deputy prosecuting attorney] previously with the defendant's medical records so that those didn't have to be subpoenaed and compelled. The prosecution argues that this statement shows Moses's intent to disclose his toxicology report to the prosecution and that the letters show that the toxicology report was intentionally disclosed to the prosecution. Therefore, the prosecution argues, Moses waived the physician-patient privilege. We disagree and hold that judicial notice is inappropriate in this case. As the prosecution admits, neither letter sent by the Public Defender's office is contained in the record on appeal. This court cannot consider evidence outside the record: [e]very appeal shall be taken on the record and no new evidence shall be introduced in the supreme court. HRS § 641-2 (1993). Insofar as the prosecution argues that the ICA gravely erred by holding that the record was inadequate to hold Moses waived the physician-patient privilege, the prosecution's argument is without merit. We reject the prosecution's attempt to use the judicial notice doctrine to circumvent HRS § 641-2. HRE Rule 201 limits judicial notice to adjudicative facts not subject to reasonable dispute, meaning that the fact must be commonly known or easily verifiable. See, e.g., State v. Vliet, 95 Hawai`i 94, 112, 19 P.3d 42, 60 (2001) (taking judicial notice that Widmark's formula is widely viewed as reliable); State v. Puaoi, 78 Hawai'i 185, 190, 891 P.2d 272, 277 (1995) (noting that appellate courts may take judicial notice of venue, provided that the requirements of HRE 201(b) are met); Almeida v. Correa, 51 Haw. 594, 465 P.2d 564, 571-72 (1970) (taking judicial notice that an average pregnancy lasts approximately nine calendar months but that there are many individual variations in pregnancy length). See also 9 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2566, at 711 (Chadbourn rev.1981) (describing judicial notice as the acceptance of a matter as proved without requiring the party to offer evidence of it). A court should take judicial notice only in very limited circumstances: The scope of facts that may be noticed includes: (1) Matters which are actually so notorious to all that the production of evidence would be unnecessary; (2) Matters which the judicial function supposes the judge to be acquainted with, in theory at least; (3) Sundry matters ... capable of such instant and unquestionable demonstration... that no party would think of imposing a falsity on the tribunal in the face of an intelligent adversary. 9 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2571, at 732 (Chadbourn rev.1981). Judicial notice of the contents of communications between parties is inappropriate because such communications differ from case to case; these are not the types of facts that are generally known with certainty by all the reasonably intelligent people in the community [or] capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources of indisputable accuracy. 2 John W. Strong et al., McCormick on Evidence § 328, at 369 (5th ed.1999). Therefore, we decline the prosecution's request to take judicial notice of these additional documents. While the deputy public defender's statement to the circuit court is in the record, we affirm the ICA's conclusion that this statement, without more, is insufficient to hold that Moses voluntarily waived his physician-patient privilege. The statement does not satisfy the requirements of HRE Rule 511 [3] : it does not prove that the toxicology report was actually disclosed, nor does it prove that the disclosure was voluntary. We therefore find no grave error in the ICA's determination on this point.
Moses contends that this court should decline to consider the prosecution's waiver argument, inasmuch as it was raised for the first time on appeal in oral argument before the ICA. As a general rule, if a party does not raise an argument at trial, that argument will be deemed to have been waived on appeal; this rule applies in both criminal and civil cases. See State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. 573, 584, 827 P.2d 648, 655 (1992) (Our review of the record reveals that [the defendant] did not raise this argument at trial, and thus it is deemed to have been waived.); State v. Hoglund, 71 Haw. 147, 150, 785 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1990) (Generally, the failure to properly raise an issue at the trial level precludes a party from raising that issue on appeal.); Association of Apartment Owners of Wailea Elua v. Wailea Resort Co., Ltd., 100 Hawai'i 97, 107, 58 P.3d 608, 618 (2002) (Legal issues not raised in the trial court are ordinarily deemed waived on appeal.). However, this rule is not absolute. First, the prosecution is the appellee and therefore does not have the burden of proving that the trial court erred. See, e.g., Territory v. Kobayashi, 25 Haw. 762, 766 (1921) (We necessarily approach a case with the assumption that no error has been committed upon the trial and until this assumption has been overcome by a positive showing the prevailing party is entitled to an affirmance.). See also Hawai'i Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules 28(b)(7) and 28(c) (1998) (requiring that the appellant's opening brief provide a detailed outline of all arguments on appeal, but only requiring the appellee's answering brief to respond to those points from appellant's brief that are controverted on appeal). The general rule prohibiting new arguments on appeal prevents appellants from presenting new legal theories as to why they should have prevailed at trial. In this case, however, the party raising the new argument is the appellee; rather than making a new argument as to why it is entitled to relief, the prosecution is instead putting forth additional reasons why the circuit court's ruling was correct. Consideration of the appellee's argument in this situation is appropriate, even though not raised before the circuit court, because the appellee never had the need to raise such an argument before the circuit court: the prosecution never needed to argue that Moses had waived his physician-patient privilege because the circuit court rejected Moses's contention that the report was privileged. [4] Had the circuit court ruled that the report was privileged, and had the prosecution thereafter failed to argue waiver, this court would not allow the prosecution to raise this argument on appeal. However, because the prosecution had no need to raise this argument in the circuit court, this court will not bar the prosecution from raising the issue on appeal. Second, this court will consider new arguments on appeal where justice so requires. For example, in Fujioka v. Kam, 55 Haw. 7, 514 P.2d 568 (1973), this court agreed to consider an argument, not raised in the circuit court, that a statute was unconstitutional: It is the general rule that an appellate court should only reverse a judgment of a trial court on the legal theory presented by the appellant in the trial court .... However, we have also said that the rule is not inflexible and that an appellate court may deviate and hear new legal arguments when justice requires. We also stated that in the exercise of this discretion an appellate court should determine whether the consideration of the issue requires additional facts, whether the resolution of the question will affect the integrity of the findings of fact of the trial court; and whether the question is of great public import. 55 Haw. at 9, 514 P.2d at 570 (internal citations omitted). Fujioka was a civil case, but the analysis is the same in criminal cases. See State v. Ildefonso, 72 Haw. at 584-85, 827 P.2d at 655 (1992) (declining to hear a constitutional challenge not raised before the circuit court, but recognizing that this court has addressed issues raised for the first time on appeal where the constitutionality of the statute is of great public import and justice required that we consider the issue). Again, given that the prosecution had no need to raise this argument before the circuit court, this court will not bar the prosecution from raising the issue on appeal.