Opinion ID: 2515839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Tainted fruit claim.

Text: Finally, defendant urges that the testimony of Cornwell and John Kennedy, and the admission into evidence of the knife, Levi's, and wallet, are tainted fruit of the illegal police conduct toward defendant himself, and are therefore subject to suppression. In Boyer I, we concluded, based on the record then before us, that regardless of the police illegality, the evidence there challenged (which did not include Cornwell's testimony) was nonetheless admissible because it would inevitably have been discovered by lawful means. As previously noted, defendant complains that the instant trial court erroneously invoked the law of the case to foreclose full litigation of the issue of taint, and to insulate the People from proving the evidence was not tainted. In any event, he urges, the existing record does not support a conclusion that the challenged evidence is untainted. The record does not show, he insists, that at every step, the police investigation was proceeding on a lawful track which would inevitably have procured the evidence at issue, or that the means by which such evidence was obtained was otherwise attenuated from the original illegality. We nonetheless confirm our prior conclusion that the evidence under scrutiny was properly admissible. Evidence need not be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, though actually procured as the result of a Fourth Amendment violation against the defendant, if it inevitably would have been obtained by lawful means in any event. ( Nix v. Williams (1984) 467 U.S. 431, 441-448, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 ( Nix ).) Moreover, suppression is not necessarily required even if the evidence would not have come to light but for an infringement of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. ( Wong Sun v. United States (1963) 371 U.S. 471, 487-488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 ( Wong Sun ).) Rejecting a strict but for test, the United States Supreme Court has admonished that in such cases, the more apt question ... is `whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' [Citation.] ( Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407.) Under Wong Sun, evidence is not to be excluded merely because it would not have been obtained but for the illegal police activity. [Citation.] The question is whether the evidence was obtained by the government's exploitation of the illegality or whether the illegality has become attenuated so as to dissipate the taint. [Citation.] ( People v. Caratti (1980) 103 Cal.App.3d 847, 851, 163 Cal.Rptr. 265.) Relevant factors in this attenuation analysis include the temporal proximity of the Fourth Amendment violation to the procurement of the challenged evidence, the presence of intervening circumstances, and the flagrancy of the official misconduct. ( Brown v. Illinois (1975) 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 ( Brown ).) Where the testimony of live witnesses is at issue, the test focuses primarily on the effect of the illegality on the witness's willingness to testify, and less on whether illegal conduct led to discovery of the witness's identity. ( United States v. Ceccolini (1978) 435 U.S. 268, 276-277, 98 S.Ct. 1054, 55 L.Ed.2d 268.) Granting, as we do, the prosecution's burden of proof on issues of attenuation, including inevitable discovery (See, e.g., Nix, supra, 467 U.S. 431, 447, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377; Dunaway v. New York (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 204, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824), we may nonetheless resolve such issues on appeal, even if not explicitly litigated below, if their factual bases are fully set forth in the record. (E.g., People v. Robles (2000) 23 Cal.4th 789, 801, fn. 7, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311; People v. Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 950, 993, fn. 19, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 ( Clark ); Green v. Superior Court (1985) 40 Cal.3d 126, 137-138, 219 Cal.Rptr. 186, 707 P.2d 248 (lead opn. of Kaus, J.).) We conclude that such is the case here. Defendant first contends there is no proof the police, lacking hard evidence of defendant's involvement in the Harbitz murders, would inevitably have sought Cynthia Cornwell's cooperation, including her consent to search the El Monte house. For a contrary inference, defendant stresses Detective Lewis's testimony that, on December 14, 1982, if defendant had not been home and if Cornwell had proven uncooperative, Lewis would simply have gone away. However, as we noted in Boyer I, [l]acking a ready suspect for two brutal homicides, the police were pursuing a broad-based investigation of every person who might possibly be involved. ( Boyer I, 48 Cal.3d 247, 278, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610; see also People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1040, 90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531 [noting sheer size and scope of the investigation as factor bearing on inevitability that evidence would be discovered].) Information received from William Harbitz had focused particular suspicion on defendant. The police evidenced this suspicion, and their intent to pursue it, in numerous ways. Detectives learned where, and with whom, defendant lived. They surrounded his El Monte home, detained him, and asked him to accompany them to the Fullerton police station for an interview. When they departed with defendant, they left officers behind in El Monte, poised to commence a search of the house if the opportunity presented itself. Then, before defendant had said anything incriminating that might further isolate him as a suspect, the police asked for his consent to search the El Monte house. [22] When defendant said it was up to Cornwell, they immediately pursued that avenue by dispatching the officers who were standing by in El Monte to request Cornwell's permission. Under these circumstances, the record sufficiently establishes that, aside from their illegal detention and interrogation of defendant, the police meant to search the house, and to do so with the permission of an authorized consenter if possible. Defendant next urges the evidence fails to show that, absent the illegal police conduct against defendant, Cornwell would inevitably have consented to the search. We need not resolve this question directly because, even if Cornwell's consent was not inevitablei.e., even if, in the strictest sense, it might not have been obtained but for the illegal conductit was nonetheless sufficiently attenuated from the primary illegality to purge any taint. ( Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. 471, 477-488, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441.) When the accused claims a consent to search is tainted by a prior Fourth Amendment violation, mere voluntariness of the consent is not enough to dissipate the taint. (E.g., United States v. Bautista (9th Cir.2004) 362 F.3d 584, 592; People v. Richard (5th Cir.1993) 994 F.2d 244, 252 ( Richard ).) In such cases, we must additionally examine the attenuation factors set forth in Brown, supra, 422 U.S. 590, 95 S.Ct. 2254, to determine whether, on the particular facts, the twin purposes of the poisonous fruit ruleto deter the exploitation of official misconduct and to promote judicial integrityare outweighed by the cost of excluding the challenged evidence. We first consider temporal proximity. The request for Cornwell's permission to search occurred several hours after defendant was taken to the Fullerton police station. In the meantime, Cornwell was left alone. The substantial lapse of time between the Fourth Amendment violation and the challenged consent weighs in favor of a finding that any taint had dissipated. Moreover, significant intervening events separated the Fourth Amendment violation against defendant from Cornwell's later voluntary consent to search. For one thing, discussions with Cornwell about obtaining her permission for the search occurred at a location remote from where defendant was being detained illegally. (Compare, e.g., Richard, supra, 994 F.2d 244, 252 [finding, as a significant intervening circumstance, that consent provided, in noncoercive circumstances, by defendant's girlfriend was remote in time and place from invalid consent given by defendant himself; taint deemed purged even though girlfriend was told that defendant had given consent].) Moreover, Cornwell was permitted to consult not only with defendant, [23] but with an attorney, before deciding whether to allow the search. Cases have stressed that the opportunity for legal consultation is critically important in determining whether a consent to search was purged of the primary taint of a prior Fourth Amendment violation. Closely on point in this regard is United States v. Wellins (9th Cir.1981) 654 F.2d 550. There, police illegally entered the defendant's hotel suite, illegally conducted a sweep search of the premises, and illegally arrested him. He then consented to a more complete search after he was allowed, in the officers' presence, to speak with his attorney by telephone. On appeal, the court deemed this factor dispositive in determining that the consent was sufficiently attenuated by intervening events from the prior illegal conduct, and therefore valid. ( Id. at p. 555.) Similar reasoning applies here. [24] Finally, the police erred seriously by subjecting defendant to an illegal custodial interrogation without a warrant or probable cause for his arrest. As a consequence, all resulting statements obtained from defendant have been suppressed. ( Boyer I, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 275, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610.) Nonetheless, we do not deem the misconduct against defendant so flagrant as to require suppression of evidence obtained as a result of Cornwell's later voluntary consent to search. It does not appear the one had any strong bearing on the other. Cornwell did not suggest her consent was influenced by the fact of defendant's illegal arrest, and her consent was obtained by means essentially independent of the specific illegalities committed against defendant. Accordingly, we conclude the consent was not `come at by exploitation of [the primary] illegality, [but] by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.' ( Wong Sun, supra, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S.Ct. 407.) That being so, the cost of excluding the highly relevant evidence thereby obtained outweighs the deterrent value of suppressing it. [25] We remain persuaded, as in Boyer I, that once Cornwell did validly consent to the search of the El Monte house, the challenged testimony and physical evidence would inevitably have been procured. When alerted that defendant had indicated where to find the Levi's and knife, officers were already searching the bedroom in which these articles were located. Because both items contained blood, no competent officer would have overlooked them in any event. ( Boyer I, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 277, fn. 18, 256 Cal. Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610.) The subsequent forensic analyses would have confirmed their evidentiary significance to the case. As defendant observes, he also told police he had worn the blue jacket on the night of the Harbitz murders, and this led the searching officers to ask Cornwell about it. However, they inevitably would have come upon the jacket evidence anyway. A thorough and competent search of the El Monte house could hardly have missed the unusual spectacle, in plain view, of a hibachi containing scraps of recently burned clothing, sitting atop the kitchen stove. Cornwell testified in the prior trial that `little pieces of [the] jacket' were still `flying around' `in the kitchen.' ( Boyer I, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 278, fn. 20, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610, italics omitted.) Furthermore, even without defendant's confession or the details supplied by him, the police would have grasped the potential criminal significance of the obvious fact that Cornwell had burned this item. Common sense did not readily disclose an innocent reason for doing so. Accordingly, competent officers would have inquired, as they did. Cornwell's implausible explanation, that she burned the jacket, without informing defendant, because she intended to buy him a new one, would only have increased police suspicion. Moreover, officers already had, or shortly would have, found the bloody Levi's and defendant's knife containing traces of human blood. These incriminating items tightened the evidentiary net around defendant and cast further doubt on the innocent nature of Cornwell's action. In addition, the police knew she had burned the jacket immediately after he was taken from the El Monte house to the Fullerton police station. The timing of her act enhanced the compelling inference that she was destroying evidence. [26] Under these circumstances, the police undoubtedly would have pressed the issue by explaining to Cornwell her vulnerability as an accessory. Most likely they would have arrested her at that time, as they did. But even if not, they certainly would have taken such action as soon as forensic analysis revealed that the Levi's recovered from the El Monte house contained blood consistent with that of the murder victims. Cornwell conceded that her arrest and the legitimate threat of prosecution as an accessory to murder were the prime factors leading to her cooperation and eventual testimony. [27] Finally, defendant insists there is no proof Kennedy would inevitably have been found, or his testimony procured. However, it appears manifest that once Cornwell agreed to cooperate, police would inevitably have learned of Kennedy's involvement and obtained his cooperation. As she testified in both trials, Cornwell knew Kennedy had left and returned with defendant on the night of the murders. She undoubtedly would so have informed the police. Kennedy's telephone number was written down at the El Monte house. His address was traced from the telephone number. ( Boyer I, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 277, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610.) Defendant asserts that Kennedy's cooperation cannot be deemed automatic, especially in light of the fact that he lied to the police when they first spoke with him. But the record belies defendant's argument in several respects. At the prior trial, there was evidence that as soon as the police told Kennedy they suspected his involvement, he `became visibly shaken and stated that he didn't want to go to jail on that type of thing.' ( Boyer I, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 277, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610.) At the 1992 retrial, Kennedy did testify that when detectives first contacted him, they simply told him defendant claimed to have borrowed a car belonging to Kennedy's mother, and Kennedy did not contradict them. However, Kennedy insisted, he later contacted the police on his own initiative and asked them to return for another interview, because he wanted to tell them the truth. As a result of this second interview, in which Kennedy admitted he was with defendant on the night of the murders, Kennedy was arrested, and he gave the statements leading to his immunized testimony at trial. In sum, the record, as augmented by the retrial suppression hearing, demonstrates that the physical and testimonial evidence introduced against defendant was not the product of improper coercion, and would inevitably have been obtained, or was otherwise procured by means sufficiently attenuated from the Fourth Amendment violation committed against defendant. Hence, we affirm our conclusion in Boyer I, supra, 48 Cal.3d 247, 256 Cal.Rptr. 96, 768 P.2d 610, that this evidence was not suppressible.