Opinion ID: 2174563
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Gefroh's second issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by dismissing his motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29(a), N.D.R.Crim.P. [5] We hold that the trial court did not err, and affirm it on this issue. The standard of review for testing the sufficiency of the evidence requires us to draw all inferences in favor of the verdict. To successfully challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, a defendant must convince us that the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, permits no reasonable inference of guilt. State v. Raulston, 475 N.W.2d 127, 128 (N.D.1991). The tasks of weighing the evidence and judging the credibility of witnesses belong to the jury. State v. Lovejoy, 464 N.W.2d 386, 388 (N.D.1990). On appeal, this court must assume that the jury believed the evidence which supports the verdict and disbelieved any contrary evidence. State v. Manke, 328 N.W.2d 799, 806 (N.D.1982). State v. Purdy, 491 N.W.2d 402, 410 (N.D.1992). See also State v. Morstad, 493 N.W.2d 645 (N.D.1992). A verdict for conviction rests upon insufficient evidence only when no rational fact finder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt after drawing all inferences in favor of the verdict and viewing all evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution. State v. Schill, 406 N.W.2d 660, 660 (N.D.1987). Gefroh contends that the phrase or not wake up at all is not sufficiently definite to constitute the threat of a crime of violence or act dangerous to human life, as Section 12.1-17-04, N.D.C.C., requires. We disagree. In his appellate brief, Gefroh has cited several cases from other states and the federal system wherein the threats amounting to terrorizing graphically and specifically described the dangerous acts or violent crimes. In light of these cases, Gefroh concludes that his words were not specific enough to form the basis for a terrorizing conviction. By making this argument, Gefroh ignores precedent of this Court in which we stated that threats do not need to be detailed and specific in order to establish an actionable offense. No precise words are necessary to convey a threat. It may be bluntly spoken, or done by innuendo or suggestion. In re Burke, 9 O.C.D. 350, 17 Cr.Ct.R., N.S., 315 (1899). A threat often takes its meaning from the circumstances in which it is spoken and words that are innocuous in themselves may take on a sinister meaning in the context in which they are recited. State v. Howe, 247 N.W.2d 647, 654 (N.D.1976). See also State v. Zeno, 490 N.W.2d 707, 710 (N.D.1992); State v. Haugen, 392 N.W.2d 799, 805 (N.D.1986); State v. Hass, 268 N.W.2d 456, 463 (N.D.1978); State v. Weippert, 237 N.W.2d 1, 4 (N.D.1975). When viewing the State's evidence under our standard of review, we find the elements of terrorizing clearly present in this case. The circumstances surrounding the statement are significant and must be considered. First, Gefroh had a history of harming Kim. Next, approximately one hour before the statement was made, Gefroh claimed he beheaded one kitten and then he brutally mutilated another. He did these things not only before Kim, but also in the presence of his five-year-old son, who was obviously experiencing distress during the episodes. Finally, after being told by authorities to cease further menacing contact with Kim and their sons, Gefroh telephoned Kim, threatened property damage to her car, and then threatened that she would not wake up at all. Uttered in the context of Gefroh's prior actions, and viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, those words constituted a threat of a violent crime or dangerous act.