Opinion ID: 1581660
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of a Letter Compiled by Out of Court Experts

Text: Finally, a letter relied upon by two experts for Kurth was admitted into evidence. The DOT objects to its admission as hearsay. This letter was signed by five local real estate experts, only one of whom testified at the trial. Gary Carlson, the realtor who testified, compiled the letter, signed it, and obtained the signatures approving its content from four other local realtors. The letter was first referenced when Kurth's value expert, Greg Winkel, relied on statements made in this letter to form his value estimate of the real estate. The DOT made no objection to this testimony. The letter was not offered into evidence at this time. Following Winkel's testimony, realtor Carlson also based his testimony on figures found in the letter with no objection. The letter was later offered into evidence. It was then that the DOT objected to it as hearsay. Kurth argues that this letter is admissible under Iowa Rule of Evidence 705. Rule 705 reads: The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the underlying facts or data on cross-examination. Iowa R. Evid. 705. This Rule specifically recognizes that an expert often relies on out-of-court statements or hearsay to form his opinion. Iowa Rule of Evidence 703 also acknowledges this point. The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the trial or hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence. Iowa R. Evid. 703. The value expert, Winkel, established that it is typical for him to rely on the recommendations of local realtors when arriving at a value estimate. Although Rules 703 and 705 are silent as to whether this hearsay evidence is admissible, we are persuaded by the federal committee notes relating to similar federal rules. We have recognized: According to the federal advisory committee, it was the intent of federal rule 705 to permit the introduction of `underlying facts or data' necessary to the expert's opinion. Brunner, 480 N.W.2d at 35 (emphasis added). [C]ourts and rule makers have yielded to the pressures of expediency so as to recognize a relaxation of the exclusion of otherwise inadmissible hearsay, to the extent that it may be considered as a part of the witness's legitimate cumulation of knowledge if the hearsay information is of that sort as is customarily relied upon by experts in the practice of their profession. The sanction of the general experience and reliability of the expert to sort out the acceptable information upon which he relies, from the unacceptable, is considered an adequate safeguard. Id. at 35-36 (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Accordingly, admission of this letter may be characterized as an indirect exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at 35 (citation omitted). As long as the expert can establish that this is the type of evidence reasonably relied upon by experts in his field, it should be admissible. As noted above, Winkel did testify that it is typical for him to consult local realtors' data. Further, there is another basis for admission of this letter. Because figures found in the letter came in without objection, admission of the letter was chiefly cumulative. See City of Dubuque, 590 N.W.2d at 496; see also State v. McKettrick, 480 N.W.2d 52, 60 (Iowa 1992) (holding prejudice will not be found where substantially the same evidence is in the record without objection). Given the legal support for admission of hearsay evidence in expert situations, introduction of this evidence was not an abuse of discretion. In summary, the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the hearsay letter into evidence. However, the district court allowed the jury to hear inadmissible evidence. This was an abuse of discretion, and the DOT was prejudiced by this abuse. Finally, the jury was not properly instructed on the law and was allowed to factor inadmissible evidence into its verdict. For these reasons, the jury's decision must be reversed. REVERSED AND REMANDED.