Opinion ID: 2284287
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mother's conduct prior to October 5, 2007

Text: The fundamental legal prerequisite underlying the judgment was the finding that the mother willfully and continuously abandoned her son for 60 days prior to October 5, 2007. The circuit court found that when the mother was incarcerated, she made no provision for her son and simply assumed that her brother would care for him. This finding, however, is not supported directly by the facts in the record or any reasonable inference from them. Even though the record consists almost exclusively of evidence introduced by the adoptive parents, there is no evidence that the mother had an opportunity to call her family to make arrangements for her son upon her arrest or that she had a better alternative than to leave him with her brother. Instead, the primary evidence presented with respect to the mother's understanding of the situation during the spring and summer of 2007 was Ms. Davenport's hearsay testimony relaying the mother's September 2007 statement that she was surprised her son was not still in her brother's care. This statement shows the mother had arranged for her family to care for her son. These facts refute the trial court's finding that the mother operated solely on an assumption and had made no arrangements for her son's care. Rather than relying on direct evidence in the record, the circuit court's finding as to this point infers abandonment from the fact that the child was being cared for by the brother. This inference is problematic because it implies that the mother instead should have entrusted her son to a non-family member. Even if the mother had the opportunity to make arrangements but did not, it would not be unreasonable for her to assume that her family would continue to care for her son. It is common knowledge that, in difficult situations, children often are raised with extensive help from grandparents, siblings and other family members. In re A.S.W., 137 S.W.3d 448, 453 (Mo. banc 2004). Accordingly, the more reasonable inference to draw from the mother's supposed assumption is that she made the perfectly reasonable decision that the best place for her son was to continue staying with close family members rather than be placed with strangers in a foreign country. Therefore, even had the mother simply assumed her family would care for her son, it does not follow that her assumption is evidence of abandonment. The circuit court also found that the mother made no attempt to contact her son all the way back to May 22, 2007, a period of over four months and over double the time necessary to establish abandonment. Once again, it must be noted that there is no evidence that the mother had the opportunity to contact her family to inquire about her son. This is not a trivial concern, for the fact is that the mother was incarcerated in a foreign country and immersed in a language she did not speak. If the mother had no reasonable opportunity to get into contact with her family, she cannot be faulted for failing to do so. Under the circumstances of this case, any lack of evidence demonstrating the mother's efforts to contact her son does not prove that she in fact did not undertake such efforts. It is simply a gap in the record that reflects nothing more than the fact that the adoptive parents introduced no evidence tending to disprove the allegations in their own petition. In fact, however, there was record evidence before the circuit court showing the mother did attempt to communicate with her son as soon as she was told that he was no longer with family and that an attempt was being made to adopt him. Specifically, in her October 28, 2007 letter, the mother informed the adoptive parents' attorney that she did not want her son adopted and that she wanted visitation with her son while in prison. The circuit court transcript references only the mother's desire that her son not be adopted and makes no mention even of the English translation of her letter, which says, I would like to have visitation with my son. Even this is not a complete translation, however. The Spanish portion states, quiero que me veuga a visitor todo el tiempo que este aqui en la carcel. This is not simply a request by mother for visitation, but also a request to visit with her son all the time that I am here in jail (todo el tiempo que este aqui en la carcel). This is a request to communicate with her son. No attempt was made by the court or any party to provide an official translation, nor was an attempt made to give her any access to her son; to the contrary, even the circuit court's judgment a year later simply ignores her request for visitation and makes a finding of lack of attempt to communicate that clearly is refuted by the attempt that is in the court's own record. Finally, the circuit court also found that the Velascos began caring for the child only a few days after his mother was arrested. This finding is crucial because the cases hold that a transfer of custody for any reason may ripen into abandonment if the absent parent foregoes the performance of the functions of a parent that demonstrate the continued intent to exercise the rights and duties of a parent. In re Adoption of Baby Boy W., 701 S.W.2d 534, 543 (Mo.App.1985). Consequently, the court's conclusion that the Velascos assumed care of the child shortly after his mother's arrest is the basis of the inference that the mother abandoned her son by making no effort to arrange for his care, thereby forcing her family to give the child to the Velascos. [6] The record, however, does not support the finding that the Velascos began caring for the child only a few days after the mother was arrested. Neither the Velascos nor anyone from the mother's family testified. The only evidence supporting this finding was the adoptive mother's testimony that the sister turned the child over to the Velascos within days of the mother's arrest. However, the adoptive mother made it clear that she first met the child September 24, 2007, fewer than two weeks before the petition for adoption was filed. Therefore, the adoptive mother's testimony that the sister placed the child with the Velascos within days of his mother's arrest five months earlier is simply the repetition of hearsay. Equally importantly, the adoptive mother's hearsay testimony flatly is contradicted by Ms. Davenport's testimony. Ms. Davenport had personal knowledge of where the child was living from the time of his mother's arrest in May 2007 until sometime in July 2007. Ms. Davenport saw the child while he was under the sister's care and recommended that the sister rely on the Velascos for child-care assistance. Ms. Davenport testified that the child lived with the sister and that the Velascos simply provided normal workday child care until at least mid-September 2007. This evidence contradicts the circuit court's finding that the child was living with the Velascos just days after his mother's arrest in May 2007. Conversely, the overwhelming weight of the evidence in this case indicates that the child still was living with the sister at least until sometime in September 2007, just days before the adoptive parents filed their petition. The conclusion that the child was under the sister's care until at least September 2007 is confirmed by other evidence that was before the circuit court but not mentioned in the findings of fact drafted by the adoptive parents and adopted by the circuit court or in the principal opinion of this Court. For instance, the record reflects that a neighbor, Mr. Walter, went to see the mother while she was in jail. Mr. Walter filed documents with the court November 9, 2007, nearly 11 months before the termination and adoption hearing. In those documents, Mr. Walter explained that the sister had asked him to help them obtain a passport for the child so they could send him to live with another sister in Guatemala. The record shows that Mr. Walter filed for that passport September 27, 2007, a week before the adoption petition was filed and well within the alleged 60-day period of abandonment. The record further showed that when the sister went to pick up the child from the Velascos on October 3, the first night that he stayed with the adoptive parents, the Velascos simply told her they didn't have the baby. This evidence is entirely consistent with the mother's assertion that she wished to take her son home with her after her release and further undermines the court's conclusion that the mother had abandoned her son. The principal opinion supports ignoring this evidence by stating: The trial court `is not required to leaf through a file to determine what should be used as evidence.'.... Because this document was not in evidence, it will not be considered. Principal Op. at 814 n.16 (citation omitted). This is not a contract or tort case, however. This is a case in which a child and parent's fundamental right to be a family is at issue. Under our statutes, the birth family is required to be kept together whenever possible and the constitutional rights of the child and parent are to be respected. Indeed: The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a natural parent's `desire for and right to the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children is an interest far more precious than any property right.' Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-759, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). It is an interest that `undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection.' Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 27, 101 S.Ct. 2153, 68 L.Ed.2d 640 (1981). Cannon v. Cannon, 280 S.W.3d 79, 86 (Mo.2009). See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972) (It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children `come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements.' (citation omitted)). The evidence that this Court says the circuit court acted properly in refusing to consider was the mother's heartfelt plea for visitation with her child and her refusal to consent to his adoption. The record also contains evidence that she did contact her family about her son after her arrest and that she was arranging for him to go home to Guatemala so that he could be cared for there, even arranging for a passport application for him, before the adoption petition was filed. While the principal opinion acknowledges the passport application, it fails to acknowledge how the information about the application came to the circuit court's notice. It also credits inferences drawn by the adoptive parents' counsel in his proposed findings that the mother did not even know where her child was (based on a single statement that she was surprised her brother did not want to care for her son). Yet the opinion ignores contrary evidence that the mother's family did not abandon the child to the Velascos but rather the Velascos, without notice to the child's birth family, placed him with the adoptive parents, and then simply left a note telling the sister of this fact and washing their hands of the matter. While a court may not always have a duty to look at the record for evidence not brought to its attention by counsel, simply to ignore that evidence is inconsistent with this Court's duty to look closely at the findings of fact and consider whether the finding of clear, cogent and convincing evidence of abandonment is against the weight of the evidence. The lack of a showing that the circuit court independently considered the proposed findings simply adds to this duty. [7]