Opinion ID: 887695
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The District Court's Ruling and Jury Instruction

Text: ¶ 24 As noted above, the District Judge heard arguments from Price and the State (outside the jury's presence) on the merits of his objection. Defense counsel advanced two arguments against the exclusion of testimony concerning Fouse's character: (1) we're contending that Mr. Fouse is the person that actually did the assault. So, I would argue that his propensity for violence, or not violence, would be admissible; and (2) the prosecution opened the door. Counsel also provided an offer of proof: witness Francell would testify that Fouse used to brag that he was a trained killer; that Fouse, on one or more occasions, attacked [Francell] when his back was turned and therefore [Francell] . . . knew never to have his back to Fouse; and that Fouse would get crazy when he drank. ¶ 25 The judge ruled that counsel could ask [Francell] what [Fouse is] like when he's drinking, since the State opened the door to that [issue], but nothing more. In response to counsel's inquiries concerning the precise scope of this ruling, the judge clarified that counsel could not let Francell provide examples of things Fouse had done when he was drinking, that counsel could not inquire further about the incident in which Fouse armed himself with a butcher knife in anticipation of an altercation with Price, and that Francell could not testify that Fouse used to brag that he was a trained killer. ¶ 26 Price claims that imposing these restrictions on the scope of Francell's testimony was an abuse of discretion. First, he argues that [t]he State's direct examination of Moore and Fouse opened the door for [defense counsel] to explore Fouse's propensity for violence as well as to call Francell and elicit testimony regarding Fouse' [sic] habit of becoming violent. Yet, the District Judge instructed the jury that the testimony yesterday about the propensity for nonviolence, or violence, of a witness named Frank Fousethe evidence to which the State had opened the dooris not relevant testimony and should not be considered by [you], in any manner, when arriving at a decision in this case. Consequently, given that the court had ruled this testimony irrelevant and so instructed the jury, there was no need for Price to rebut the State's evidence with further testimony on this subject. To be sure, when a party places a matter at issue on direct examination, fairness mandates that the opposing party be permitted to offer contradictory evidence. However, one does not need to refute testimony that the court has declared irrelevant and that the jury has been instructed not to consider in its deliberations. ¶ 27 In any event, the limitation imposed by the court on the scope of Francell's testimony was proportionate to the issue to which the State had opened the doorspecifically, how Fouse behaves when he drinks. Francell, in fact, testified that when Fouse drinks, he gets [i]gnorant, stupid, wild. He's a pretty violent guy. This testimony was probative of whether Fouse was the actual perpetrator of the assault on Yocom. Indeed, defense counsel echoed Francell's characterization of Fouse during his closing argument, and he reminded the jury that while Fouse had been behaving violently on the evening of the assaultthe play wrestling with Yocom, Yocom's broken rib, the raspberries on Fouse's facePrice, by contrast, had been just sitting there calmly. Thus, the judge's ruling did not prevent Price from countering the evidence presented by the State on the issue of whether Fouse behaves violently when he drinks. ¶ 28 Besides his State opened the door argument, Price submits two additional grounds for the admission of Francell's testimony. First, he contends that the testimony had substantive valuei.e., it supported his theory that Fouse assaulted Yocom-and that, by excluding the testimony, the District Judge precluded him from presenting his theory of the case. Second, he contends that the testimony was admissible for its impeachment value: Fouse testified he does not get violent when he drinks. Fouse's ex-girlfriend also testified that Fouse never got mean or violent when he was drinking. That testimony was untruthful. Francell's testimony would have established that both Fouse and Ms. Moore lied to the trial jury when they testified about Fouse's habits and character. Demonstrating that they were liars could have convinced the jury Price's version of events on the night of the assault was more credible. Thus, Price suggests that the District Judge precluded him from fully impeaching two of the State's witnesses. ¶ 29 With respect to the proffered testimony that Fouse would get crazy when he drank, we have already determined that Price was not prevented from presenting the jury with this evidence. Furthermore, Francell's testimony that Fouse gets [i]gnorant, stupid, wild when he drinks and that Fouse is a pretty violent guy supported Price's theory that Fouse had committed the assault, and it forced the jury to decide whether Fouse, Moore, and Fruin had lied when they testified the previous day about Fouse's habits and character. As such, Francell's testimony served the substantive and impeachment purposes sought by Price. ¶ 30 With respect to the proffered testimony that Fouse bragged of being a trained killer and that Fouse attacked Francell on one or more occasions when Francell's back was turned, we conclude that the exclusion of this evidence did not preclude Price from presenting his theory of the case or from impeaching Fouse and Moore. Even assuming, arguendo, that there is some merit to the dubious proposition that specific instances of Fouse's propensity for violence were admissible as evidence of his habit of behaving violently after he drinks and/or for the purpose of attacking Fouse's and Moore's credibility, such evidence was cumulative. As stated above, defense counsel elicited testimony from Francell that Fouse gets [i]gnorant, stupid, wild when he drinks and that Fouse is a pretty violent guy. Moreover, during his closing argument, counsel highlighted the fact that Fouse had been violently wrestling with Yocom that night, and he argued to the jury that Fouse may have got[ten] mad and slit [Yocom's] throat in anger. Thus, the judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding the remaining portions of Francell's proposed testimony.