Opinion ID: 782629
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Absolute Immunity for Shaw

Text: 11 Shaw contends that the district court erred in denying his claim to absolute immunity. He argues that, even assuming he knowingly made false statements to the judge, he is nevertheless entitled to absolute immunity for functioning as an official who performs a critical role in the judicial process. Alternatively, Shaw asserts that he is entitled to absolute immunity for testifying as a witness. We disagree. 12 This court has previously held that where an investigator testifies to the factual basis of a criminal complaint before a judicial officer, he is entitled to qualified immunity only. In Ireland v. Tunis, we declined to extend absolute immunity to an investigator who swore out an arrest warrant and explicitly rejected the argument that the officer's actions were analogous to those of a prosecutor and thus warranted complete immunity from suit. 113 F.3d 1435, 1448 (6th Cir.1997) (rejecting the Tenth Circuit's reasoning in Roberts v. Kling, 104 F.3d 316 (10th Cir.1997), which held that an investigator was absolutely immune from suit for swearing out a criminal complaint before a judge on grounds that his actions were analogous to those of a prosecutor). We reasoned that, for immunity purposes, the action of an `officer applying for a warrant ... while a vital part of the administration of criminal justice, is further removed from the judicial phase of criminal proceedings than the act of a prosecutor in seeking an indictment.' Id. at 1447 (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-43, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986)). Thus, Shaw is not entitled to absolute immunity for his role in the issuance of the arrest warrant. 13 Nor is Shaw entitled to absolute immunity as a testifying witness. In Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1982), the Supreme Court extended absolute immunity, normally accorded testifying witnesses, to a police officer who gave perjured testimony at a criminal trial. The underlying rationale of the decision was that the officer functioned as an ordinary witness subject to the adversary process inherent in a trial. In this case, however, Shaw testified at an ex parte proceeding where his actions were that of a complaining witness rather than a testifying witness. Because a complaining witness is not protected by absolute immunity, neither is Shaw. See Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 129-31, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997); Ireland, 113 F.3d at 1440. Accordingly, we hold that the district court did not err in denying Shaw's claim to absolute immunity from damages.