Opinion ID: 1531839
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: opinion on petition to rehear filed on behalf of appellees-contestants

Text: The appellees-contestants question the following statement made by us in the original opinion. This statement is: Of course, holding thus simply means that the incumbents in these offices at the time this election was held voil will hold over until their successors are elected and qualified by law. Conger v. Roy, 151 Tenn. 30, 267 S.W. 122. The General Election in Polk County of August 2, 1962, was held void as to the above named parties. Prior to the suit, wherein this election was contested by the appellees-contestants, all of these parties were certified as the elected officials for the various offices and were duly inducted into office on September 1, 1962. They then assumed their respective offices to which they had been elected and were so serving at the time this election was held void. One of these parties, to-wit, Austin P. McClary, was, at the time of the election in 1962, the Sheriff of Polk County; and in the election of August, 1962, he was reelected to that office. As to McClary, we held in our original opinion that he was entitled to hold over until his successor was elected and qualified by law and we cited as authority for this holding the case of Conger v. Roy, supra. There is really no argument on this feature of these lawsuits in the present petition to rehear. The respondent-contestee, McClary, is thus distinguished from the other respondents-contestees who were elected for the first time in the August 2nd General Election and assumed their offices on September 1, 1962, prior to the election being held void. The Conger case covers McClary in every particular. It is contended though that the Conger case, which was decided in 1924, has been overruled by the subsequent cases of Hagan v. Henry, 168 Tenn. 223, 76 S.W.2d 994, and Shumate v. Claiborne County, 183 Tenn. 182, 191 S.W.2d 441. After a careful consideration of Hagan and Shumate, we feel confident that neither of these cases in any way purports to overrule the Conger case. All that the Hagan case held was that a person who receives a certificate of election has prima facie title to the office pending an election contest. The Shumate case, if in any way similar to the present case, in effect is authority for the statement made above as quoted from our original opinion here. The Shumate case was a contest by three incumbents who had not sought reelection in the General Election that was subsequently declared void as to these particular offices. Thus none of them were elected in the voided election and none of them were in the position of hold overs at the time the election was voided. In the Shumate case the parties who had been elected in this void election had been issued certificates of election and had been sworn in to office, and this Court held that they were holding these offices to such an extent that there was no vacancy in them. In other words, they were at least de facto officers and thus the offices were not vacant to such an extent as allowed one who was neither a de jure nor a de facto officer to contest this question. The Conger case (and it has not been disturbed in this State so far as we can discover by careful investigation) is express authority for the proposition that an incumbent holds over in office after his election is declared void until his successor is elected and qualified. The question then presented is whether or not these people, who were first elected in August, 1962, and assumed these offices on September 1, 1962, under a certificate of election and prior to this election being held void, are incumbents. The definition of the word, incumbent, as contained in Webster's New International Dictionary, 2nd Ed., is, One who is in present possession of a benefice or of any office. This same definition has in effect been used by the courts. In Vol. 20-A, Words & Phrases, p. 403, it is said: An `incumbent' is one who is in the present possession of an office. (citing authorities)    An `incumbent' of an office is one who is legally authorized to discharge the duties of that office. (Citing authority). We must conclude that all of these respondents to this petition to rehear are in present possession of the offices which they occupy and are, under these definitions, clearly incumbents. What we have just said is supported by the Shumate case, where Mr. Justice Chambliss, in analyzing the case of Hagan v. Henry, said: it was held that upon issuance to one of the contestants for an elective office of a certificate of election by the Board of Election Commissioners and his induction, he acquires prima facie title to the office, and upon induction becomes the lawful occupant thereof. Counsel in this petition to rehear relies upon Section 2-1924, T.C.A., as authority for his contention that there is a vacancy in the office. This Court in the Conger case considered and quoted in full this same statute, which was then Section 1332, Shannon's Code, and said this: We think this section applies only where there is a vacancy; in other words, where there is no one to hold the office. It does not and cannot apply where there is an incumbent who may hold over until his successor is elected and qualified, as provided by the Constitution. The constitutional provision must control. In the present case, McClary is a de jure incumbent (he having been Sheriff prior to this election and holding office at the time of the election), and the other respondents to the present petition are de facto incumbents for the reasons above expressed. Thus it seems to us that all of these respondents are entitled to hold over on the basis of both the Shumate case and the Conger case. Where an election has been held void and the office is occupied by either a de jure officer or a de facto officer the courts have no power to call a special election. This question was specifically and directly passed upon in the Conger case (it has not been weakened or overruled since, and seems to us logical), where it was said: We are of the opinion that there was no law which authorized the county judge, in the case of G.C. Puckett v. J.E. Conger, to order a special election to be held October 14, 1922, to elect Conger's successor, and that election was void, of no effect, and did not add anything to the right of complainant Conger to continue in said office. Conger, who was the incumbent at the time the regular election was held in August, 1922, and at the time that election was adjudged void on September 12, 1922, in the case of G.C. Puckett v. J.E. Conger, was entitled to hold said office until his successor was duly elected and qualified according to law. And further in the Conger case, the Court said: The Constitution does not provide for a special election to elect the hold over's successor, but we think it clearly implies that it shall be done at the next regular biennial election at which any of the county officers are to be elected. We think this holding is in accord with the true intent and meaning of our constitution. The term or word vacant in the statute, Section 2-1924, T.C.A., when applied to an office means without and incumbent regardless of when or how it became vacant. Conger v. Roy, supra. Therefore after careful thought, investigation and study we are satisfied with our original opinion on this question and the petition to rehear by the present petitioners, appellees-contestants, is denied.