Opinion ID: 1891715
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Absence of Express Application to Delinquency Proceedings

Text: The majority next claims that, unlike certain instances where the Legislature has expressly provided for the taxation of costs and surcharges against juveniles, sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not specify that they apply to delinquency proceedings. See majority op. at 1278. In particular, the majority relies on Judge Sharp's discussion of section 938.03, Florida Statutes (2003). See id. at 1279, 1282 (citing V.K.E., 902 So.2d at 345, 347 (Sharp, J., concurring specially)). Section 938.03 states in relevant part: Crimes Compensation Trust Fund. (1) Any person pleading guilty or nolo contendere to, or being convicted of or adjudicated delinquent for, any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense under the laws of this state or the violation of any municipal or county ordinance which adopts by reference any misdemeanor under state law, shall pay as an additional cost in the case, in addition and prior to any other cost required to be imposed by law, the sum of $50. Any person whose adjudication is withheld shall also be assessed such cost. (Emphasis added.) According to the majority, had the Legislature wanted the surcharges in sections 938.08 and 938.085 to apply to juveniles, it would have explicitly said so. See majority op. at 1278. This argument alludes to a principle of statutory construction known as  expressio unius est exclusio alterius the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another. Rotemi Realty, Inc. v. Act Realty Co., 911 So.2d 1181, 1187 (Fla.2005) (citing Grenitz v. Tomlian, 858 So.2d 999, 1002 (Fla.2003)). The Second District has concluded that the principle does not apply in this context. See State v. J.C., 916 So.2d 847, 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (rejecting the juveniles' argument that, because the Legislature did not expressly include juveniles in the surcharge statutes, it meant to exclude them). I agree. We use principles of statutory construction to interpret statutes only when they are ambiguous. [T]he rules of statutory construction are the means by which courts seek to determine legislative intent only when that intent is not plain and obvious enough to be conclusive. Knowles, 898 So.2d at 10 (emphasis added). If the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, the legislative intent must be derived from the words used without involving rules of construction or speculating as to what the legislature intended. Zuckerman, 615 So.2d at 663. As I have noted above, the language of sections 938.08 and 938.085 is clear and unambiguous, and its plain meaning controls. Even if we were free to use the canons of statutory construction, the principle of expressio unius applies to the mention of things within the same statute, and usually within the same sentence. It does not apply where something is mentioned in one statute but not in another. One cannot infer from the Legislature's explicit application of section 938.03 to juvenile proceedings that the absence of such language in sections 938.08 and 938.085 reflects an intent not to apply those statutes to juvenile proceedings. Section 938.03 applies to certain specified areas: any felony, misdemeanor, delinquent act, or criminal traffic offense. The principle of expressio unius permits the inference that it does not apply to categories not mentioned in that sentence. On the other hand, the language of sections 938.08 and 938.085 does not indicate that the statutes apply only to adults, or only in specified proceedings. Nor does either one specify that, for purposes of the statute, only adults can violate any of the enumerated provisions. Instead, they require, without special language, the imposition of these surcharges for a violation of or when a person pleads guilty or nolo contendere to, or is found guilty of . . . a violation of any of the enumerated offenses. See §§ 938.08, 938.085. This broad language contains no references to adults that would permit the inference that juveniles were intended to be excluded. Justice Pariente argues that the majority and Judge Sharp are not applying the principle of expressio unius, but are instead applying an `in pari materia' construction by construing these related statutory provisions in harmony with one another. Specially concurring op. at 1283. But as I noted above, we use canons of statutory construction only when statutes are ambiguous. See Knowles, 898 So.2d at 10; Zuckerman, 615 So.2d at 663. The language of sections 938.08 and 938.085 is clear. Justice Pariente uses the principle of in pari materia not to resolve an ambiguity, but to create one. See Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 586, 115 S.Ct. 1061, 131 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority's application of the maxim noscitur a sociis to section 2(10) of the Securities Act of 1933 creates doubt, instead of reducing it, and arguing that the canon applies only in cases of ambiguity). As the argument goes, because section 938.03 refers to juveniles and sections 938.08 and 938.085 do not, it is now unclear (although it was not before) whether these statutes apply to juveniles. Then, by applying an in pari materia construction (or, as the majority does, the principle of expressio unius ), this newly created ambiguity is resolved by using the same language that created it. I do not agree that the canons of construction can be used in the same breath to first create, and then resolve, an ambiguity.