Opinion ID: 464614
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liability of County and Sheriff

Text: 40 Turning to the more difficult question on this appeal, we now address the requirements for holding an employer liable pursuant to Title VII, once a sufficiently deleterious atmosphere of racial harassment between co-workers has been established. 41 Citing the district court's language, defendants have ignored or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent these abuses, 611 F.Supp. at 522 (emphasis added), appellants claim the trial judge imposed a standard approaching strict liability. 11 Fearing such a heavy responsibility will transform Sec. 1983 and Title VII into general federal tort statutes, appellants urge us to adopt a standard pursuant to which an employer must have actively participated in the discrimination, or condoned it to such a degree, that a pattern and practice was created. 12 42 As stated by the First Circuit, an employer may not stand by and allow an employee to be subjected to a course of racial harassment by co-workers. DeGrace v. Rumsfeld, 614 F.2d 796, 803 (1st Cir.1980). In DeGrace, the First Circuit held the good intentions of an employee's direct supervisor cannot insulate [other supervisory personnel] from [the] failure to correct the racially offensive conduct. Id. 43 The court elaborated on the difficulties encountered in this most sensitive area: 44 It may not always be within the employer's power to guarantee an environment free from all bigotry. He cannot change the personal beliefs of his employees; he can let it be known, however, that racial harassment will not be tolerated, and he can take all reasonable measures to enforce this policy.... But once an employer has in good faith taken those measures which are both feasible and reasonable under the circumstances to combat the offensive conduct we do not think he can be charged with discriminating on the basis of race. 45 Id. at 805. 46 We find the analysis of the First Circuit persuasive. This standard places a reasonable duty on an employer who is aware of a racially discriminatory atmosphere adversely affecting the emotional well-being and productivity of its employees to take reasonable steps to remedy it. Whether an employer has fulfilled his responsibility in this regard is to be determined upon the facts in each case. Factors that may be considered are the gravity of the harm, see id. at 805, the nature of the work environment, see Vaughn, supra, 683 F.2d at 925, and the resources available to the employer. Accordingly, we hold today that once an employer has knowledge of a racially combative atmosphere in the workplace, he has a duty to take reasonable steps to eliminate it. 47 Applying this standard to the facts of this case, we cannot say Suffolk County and its Sheriff's Department were sufficiently forceful in quieting the atmosphere of racial harassment existing at the Suffolk County Correctional Facility. Although we by no means charge appellants with intentionally fostering such an environment--and recognizing the harsh and sometimes brutal nature of jail life--we agree with the district court that inadequate measures were taken to avoid the proliferation of racial slurs and literature. 48 Appellants strenuously argue, however, that they took all reasonable steps to promote and preserve a good working environment. In support, they refer us to a single announcement posted throughout the facility stating that the use of racial slurs are prohibited by the operating manual and would result in disciplinary action. Moreover, they allege that virtually every instance of racial harassment that was brought to the attention of the Sheriff's Department was ultimately referred to and investigated by their Internal Affairs division and appropriate disciplinary action taken. While these measures are commendable, they certainly did not exhaust the field of reasonable and feasible actions appellants might have taken. 49 Indeed, the Sheriff did not adequately let it be known that racial slurs and the posting of derogatory materials would not be tolerated. DeGrace, supra, 614 F.2d at 805. Clearly, the County investigated the complaints of Officers Ramos, Pressley, and Richardson, and took disciplinary action where it was deemed appropriate. But these incidents constitute only a fraction of the instances of racial harassment most of which went uninvestigated. 13 Moreover, each person whose complaint was investigated testified he or she was never officially notified of the result. 50 Additionally, Sheriff Finnerty testified that he was aware of the EEOC filings and professed to maintain an open door policy for all employees to bring their grievances directly to him. Yet this policy was never publicized in any way. In light of the totality of the circumstances, the one official declaration regarding the prohibition against racial epithets clearly was not sufficient. 51 Finally, evidence adduced at trial indicated that although the appointment of an Affirmative Action Officer was mandated by Suffolk County regulations, none who testified was ever informed of that officer's identity. It appears that Chief of Staff Antoncic, who several times had tried to persuade complainants that the incidents of racial harassment never occurred, occupied that position. In light of these facts, it is not surprising that several officers were forced to seek redress from sources outside the institution. 52 Although the Sheriff and Warden acted, a pall of silence hung over their efforts, muffling their efficacy. Accordingly, the district court, in fashioning appropriate relief, attempted to open channels of communication that had been sorely underused by correction authorities. We note with approval that Judge Weinstein's order relies on available resources and does not unduly burden Suffolk County.