Opinion ID: 1907203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: From Furman to Pulley

Text: Proportionality review arose in response to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed. 2d 346 (1972), wherein the Court held that a Georgia statute permitting defendants to be sentenced to death at the unfettered discretion of the judge or jury violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 239-40, 92 S.Ct. at 2727, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 350; see also U.S. Const. amend. VIII (Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted). Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, described legal systems that permit ... [the death] penalty to be so wantonly and so freakishly imposed as cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightening is cruel and unusual. Furman, supra, 408 U.S. at 309-10, 92 S.Ct. at 2762-63, 33 L.Ed. 2d at 390 (Stewart, J., concurring). Four years later, the United States Supreme Court upheld statutes passed in response to Furman by Georgia, Texas and Florida, finding that the procedural safeguards provided by those statutes would prevent the death penalty from being imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2935, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 886-87 (1976); see also Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 49 L.Ed. 2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 49 L.Ed. 2d 913 (1976). The Georgia statute sustained by the Court in Gregg bifurcated capital proceedings into separate guilt-phase and penalty-phase trials, and provided that during the penalty phase the judge or jury would hear evidence of mitigating and aggravating factors. 428 U.S. at 163-64, 96 S.Ct. at 2920-21, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 869-70. The defendant could be sentenced to death only if the judge or jury found that at least one of the statutory aggravating factors was present and outweighed the mitigating factors. Id. at 165-66, 96 S.Ct. at 2921-22, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 870. The Georgia statute also provided for direct appeal to the state supreme court which, among other things, was to conduct a proportionality review to determine `[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant'. Id. at 166-67, 96 S.Ct. at 2922, 49 L.Ed. 2d at 871 (quoting Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2537 (Supp.1975)). States seeking to enact constitutional death penalty statutes followed the statute upheld in Gregg like a recipe, careful to include provisions for appellate proportionality review. See infra at 268, 724 A. 2d at 136. Six years later, however, in Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 104 S.Ct. 871, 79 L.Ed. 2d 29 (1984), the United States Supreme Court held that proportionality review was not indispensable to a constitutionally acceptable capital punishment statute. Id. at 45, 104 S.Ct. at 876, 79 L.Ed. 2d at 37.