Opinion ID: 2197226
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Timeliness of Morgan's appeal

Text: ¶ 42 The majority opinion parses Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8), which provides in relevant part: If a party appeals a decision of the court under sub. (7),. . . [a]n appeal shall be taken within the time period specified in s. 808.04(1m). ¶ 43 The majority opinion also parses Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1m), which provides: An appeal by a record subject under s. 19.356 shall be initiated within 20 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from. The majority opinion applies the 20-day limitation of § 808.04(1m) to Morgan. In so doing, the majority opinion reads the words, record subject, out of § 808.04(1m). This is contrary to basic statutory construction principles that statutes are to be interpreted to avoid surplusage. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46. The majority opinion also includes Morgan as a party under § 19.356(8). In so doing, it creates a way to deny Morgan her right to appeal, and it contravenes the stated purpose for which the Public Records Law was enactedcomplete access to public records. Wis. Stat. § 19.31. ¶ 44 I conclude that the majority errs by eliminating the term, record subject, from Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1m). I also conclude that a reading of the term party in § 19.356(8) to include only the record subject is consistent with both the stated purpose of the Public Records Law and the procedural pathway a record subject must use when he attempts to enjoin the release of public records. ¶ 45 This is so because when a record subject files an action to enjoin release of public records, the statutes provide for two parties: the authority (custodian) and the record subject. Wis. Stat. § 19.356(4). When § 19.356 is the procedural pathway through which the open records request is proceeding, the custodian will not be appealing the circuit court decision. By contrast, when the custodian denies release of the records, the appeal proceeds under Wis. Stat. § 19.37(1), not under § 19.356. See Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Wis. Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 79, ¶ 5 & 7, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __. ¶ 46 A party in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) refers to the record subject because it is the record subject who would appeal from a circuit court decision to release the records. If the circuit court decides not to release the records, as occurred here, the custodian has no interest in appealing because the custodian is in the same position as it was before the open records request was made. And finally, the requester may choose not to intervene at all, because intervention is not mandatory. § 19.356(4). Or, the requester may do so several weeks after entry of the circuit court decision, as occurred here, or even after the record subject appeals. See City of Madison v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm'n, 2000 WI 39, ¶1, 234 Wis. 2d 550, 610 N.W.2d 94. ¶ 47 The majority opinion interprets procedural statutes, which at the very least, are ambiguous in regard to whom the term party applies. When interpreting ambiguous procedural statutes, we do so in a manner that will permit a decision on the merits. Sorenson, 234 Wis. 2d 648, ¶28. As we explained in DOT v. Peterson, 226 Wis. 2d 623, 594 N.W.2d 765 (1999), where a property owner served the State of Wisconsin rather than the Department of Transportation, if a statute can reasonably be interpreted so as to permit review, we do so. Id. at 625. The majority errs in contravening this basic rule of statutory construction. ¶ 48 In addition, the majority opinion's interpretation of Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) is contrary to the express directive of the legislature in regard to construction of Wis. Stat. §§ 19.32 to 19.37 because the majority opinion thwarts access to the public records that Morgan sought by shutting down Morgan's appeal rights. See Wis. Stat. § 19.31. ¶ 49 Furthermore, the majority opinion defies a common sense reading of the statutes. Let me explain. Morgan filed a notice of intervention on November 9, 2007. Therefore, when the circuit court issued its October 1, 2007, decision, Morgan was not a party. Morgan also was not a party during any part of the 20-day time period in which the majority opinion concludes she was required to appeal in order for her appeal to be timely. Under the majority opinion's statutory interpretation, Morgan lost her appeal rights as a party before she was a party. This internal inconsistency in the majority opinion demonstrates the ambiguity in Wis. Stat. § 19.356(8) that the majority opinion chooses to ignore. [17] A procedural ambiguity should be interpreted in favor of permitting the resolution of this controversy on the merits. Sorenson, 234 Wis. 2d 648, ¶22. ¶ 50 In my view, the court of appeals got it right when it concluded that Wis. Stat. § 808.04(1) set the time limit for Morgan's notice of appeal. Zellner v. Herrick, No. 2007AP2584, interim order (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2007). The court of appeals' conclusion is consistent with what Morgan's appeal rights would have been if she had been required to filed a mandamus action due to an adverse decision by Cedarburg. The court of appeals' conclusion is also consistent with Wis. Stat. § 19.31, in that it interprets the Public Records Law to promote an opportunity for complete access to government workings by permitting Morgan's appeal to go forward.