Opinion ID: 749842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: dismissal of ms. bauchman's original complaint

Text: 23 The district court dismissed Ms. Bauchman's original complaint inter alia because the complaint and supplemental pleading, construed in a light most favorable to Ms. Bauchman, failed to allege sufficient facts to support her Establishment, Free Exercise and Free Speech claims. On appeal, Ms. Bauchman argues her original complaint satisfied liberal federal pleading requirements and adequately stated a cause of action under the federal constitution. 24
25 It is well established the sufficiency of a complaint to withstand a motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law we review de novo. 7 Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 490 (10th Cir.1995). In conducting such review, we must accept all the well-pleaded facts of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.; Ramirez v. Oklahoma Dep't of Mental Health, 41 F.3d 584, 586 (10th Cir.1994). Dismissal is appropriate only if the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim entitling her to relief. Ramirez, 41 F.3d at 586. However, counsel may not overcome pleading deficiencies with arguments that extend beyond the allegations contained in the complaint. The complaint itself must show Ms. Bauchman is entitled to relief under each claim raised. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). 26
First Amendment Claims 27
28 The gravamen of Ms. Bauchman's complaint is her claim the defendants' policies and actions violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. The First Amendment states the government shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion. This prohibition extends to state government, including the Utah public schools, by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 29 Determining whether Ms. Bauchman has alleged facts sufficient to support her claim that defendants have violated this prohibition is not an easy task, as there is no bright line standard we can apply. The United States Supreme Court repeatedly has recognized there can be no precise Establishment Clause test capable of ready application, and therefore has resisted confining such sensitive analyses to any single test or criterion. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678-79, 104 S.Ct. 1355, 1362, 79 L.Ed.2d 604 (1984). Moreover, the Supreme Court has never specifically addressed circumstances like those presented here, i.e., the constitutionality of a public school teacher's conduct in selecting course materials with religious content as part of a broader, secular curriculum. To the extent the Supreme Court has attempted to prescribe a general analytic framework within which to evaluate Establishment Clause claims, its efforts have proven ineffective. Indeed, many believe the Court's modern Establishment Clause jurisprudence is in hopeless disarray, Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 861, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2532, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (Thomas, J. concurring), and in need of [s]ubstantial revision. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 656, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3134-35, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part). 30 Our attempt to glean an appropriate standard for this case from existing, muddled Establishment Clause precedent begins with Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971), which is recognized as the benchmark case for Establishment Clause analysis. Applying Lemon, government action does not violate the Establishment Clause so long as it (1) has a secular purpose, (2) does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) does not foster an excessive entanglement. 403 U.S. at 612-13, 91 S.Ct. at 2111-12. 31 Beginning in the 1980s, however, the Lemon analysis came under vigorous attack by Justices and commentators alike. See, e.g., County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655, 109 S.Ct. at 3134 (Kennedy, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (does not advocate or adopt Lemon test as primary guide for resolving difficult Establishment Clause issues); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 33, 109 S.Ct. 890, 909, 103 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (use of Lemon to deny tax exemption not founded on Constitution, precedent, or history); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 639-40, 107 S.Ct. 2573, 2606-07, 96 L.Ed.2d 510 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criticizing inconsistent application of Lemon test); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 419, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3241-42, 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Lemon test too formalistic); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2518-19, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (Lemon test blurred and indistinct); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679, 104 S.Ct. at 1362 (Lemon test not overriding criteria); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3066-67, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983) (Lemon test nothing but helpful signpost); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792-95, 103 S.Ct. 3330, 3336-38, 77 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1983) (Court ignored Lemon in favor of historical argument); see also, Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., Is Lemon a Lemon? Crosscurrents in Contemporary Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 22 St. Mary's L.J. 129 (1990) (the Court should clarify its [Establishment Clause] analysis by abandoning Lemon and adopting a test that more accurately reflects the framers' original understanding of the word 'establishment' ). Acknowledging Lemon's weaknesses, Justice O'Connor seized the opportunity in Lynch v. Donnelly to draft a concurring opinion encouraging the Court to refine the Lemon analysis to focus more on whether the government is endorsing religion. 465 U.S. at 687-94, 104 S.Ct. at 1366-70. 32 Applying Justice O'Connor's refined analysis, the government impermissibly endorses religion if its conduct has either (1) the purpose or (2) the effect of conveying a message that religion or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred. County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592-93, 109 S.Ct. at 3101; see also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 763, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 2447, 132 L.Ed.2d 650 (1995) (plurality); Lynch 465 U.S. at 687-94, 104 S.Ct. at 1366-70 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Recent cases suggest the purpose component of the endorsement test should evaluate whether the government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion (i.e., did the government intend to endorse or disapprove of religion); Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585, 107 S.Ct. at 2578; Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56, 105 S.Ct. at 2489-90 (adopting Justice O'Connor's revision of the purpose component from Lynch v. Donnelly ). The effect component, on the other hand, should evaluate whether a reasonable observer, aware of the history and context of the community in which the conduct occurs, would view the practice as communicating a message of government endorsement or disapproval. Capitol Square, 515 U.S. at 779-81, 115 S.Ct. at 2455 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 33 Justice O'Connor's endorsement test is now widely accepted as the controlling analytical framework for evaluating Establishment Clause claims. See James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement Test as the Establishment Clause Standard, 65 Notre Dame L.Rev. 671 (1990). It would be wrong, however, to suggest the Court is unanimous in its adoption of the endorsement test. Moreover, even the Justices who have adopted the endorsement test do not agree on how it should be applied. Id. at 687-88. 34 For example, although the Court has indicated a failure to satisfy the purpose component of the endorsement test alone is sufficient to invalidate government action, Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585, 107 S.Ct. at 2578; cf., id. at 610, 107 S.Ct. at 2591-92 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (questioning the premise that government action can be invalidated on the basis of motivation alone, without regard to the effect), the Court rarely has decided cases based solely on the purpose component. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 75, 105 S.Ct. at 2499-500 (O'Connor, J. concurring). When it has, the overriding religious purpose of the government action has been obvious, leaving little need to elaborate on the appropriate scope of the purpose inquiry. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 613, 107 S.Ct. at 2593 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 1362-63 (citations omitted). To the extent the Court has delved into the government's subjective intent in its evaluation of the actual purpose, such approach has been openly condemned by two members of the present Court--Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia. Edwards, 482 U.S. at 610, 107 S.Ct. at 2591-92 (Rehnquist, C.J, and Scalia, J., dissenting). According to Justice Scalia, who has proposed eliminating the purpose component altogether, discerning the government's subjective intent is almost always an impossible task ... [t]o look for the sole purpose of even a single legislator is probably to look for something that does not exist. Id. at 636-37, 107 S.Ct. at 2605-06 (emphasis in original). Consequently, despite Sisyphean efforts, application of this component yields unprincipled results. Id. at 636, 107 S.Ct. at 2605; Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 112, 105 S.Ct. at 2518-19 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 35 Having struggled to meaningfully apply the purpose component of the endorsement test to the alleged Establishment Clause violation in this case, we agree it is an unworkable standard that offers no useful guidance to courts, legislators or other government actors who must assess whether government conduct goes against the grain of religious liberty the Establishment Clause is intended to protect. Nevertheless, the uncertainty surrounding the present Court's position regarding the appropriate scope of the endorsement test and the appropriate Establishment Clause analysis, in general, cautions us to apply both the purpose and effect components of the refined endorsement test, together with the entanglement criterion imposed by Lemon, when evaluating Ms. Bauchman's Establishment Clause claim. 8 To survive a motion to dismiss, Ms. Bauchman must allege facts which, accepted as true, suggest a violation of any part of this analysis. 36 Ms. Bauchman's factual allegations concerning violation of her Establishment Clause rights fall into three categories: the performance of religious music, the performance at religious sites, and the public ridicule and harassment she experienced as a result of the defendants' collective response to her objections. More precisely, Ms. Bauchman first claims she was repeatedly required to practice and publicly perform Christian devotional music with lyrics that sing praise to Jesus Christ our savior and Jesus Christ our Lord, and that include other devotional references to God. She alleges a preponderance of the religious songs represented the works of contemporary Christian songwriters. Second, Ms. Bauchman claims Mr. Torgerson selected explicitly Christian religious sites such as the Church of the Madeleine, the First Presbyterian Church and Temple Square for Choir performances. She alleges these sites are dominated by crosses and other religious images. Finally, Ms. Bauchman alleges when she and her parents expressed their opposition to Mr. Torgerson's selection of songs and performance venues, Mr. Torgerson (1) criticized Ms. Bauchman in front of her classmates, specifically and by inference; (2) blamed Ms. Bauchman and her parents for the cancellation of the Choir's spring tour and rebuffed Ms. Bauchman's inquiry regarding the Covert Tour organized for Christian Choir members under the guise of creating a Boy Scout Explorer Post; (3) directed the Choir class's attention to the fact that plaintiff is a Jew in such a way as to emphasize that her beliefs deviated from those of the Christian majority's; (4) shared a letter he had received from Mr. Bauchman with the father of another Choir member with the expectation and desire that [the Choir member's father] would distribute the letter to other parents of students in the Choir Class so as to incite those parents and their children to punish [Ms. Bauchman] and her parents by means of public ridicule and vilification; and (5) stated he would not change his conduct. Ms. Bauchman alleges Mr. Torgerson intended to promote hostility toward and ridicule of [Ms. Bauchman] by her fellow students as punishment for her assertion of her constitutional rights or in an attempt to pressure her to abandon those rights, and as a result of Mr. Torgerson's actions, she was subjected to public ridicule and humiliation, manifesting itself, in part, in racial and religious epithets from her fellow students. 37 We first consider whether allegations regarding the singing of religious songs at religious sites, alone, state a claim under the criteria we have set forth. Notably, in her original complaint, Ms. Bauchman alleges no facts to expressly indicate the purpose for selecting a majority of religious songs to be sung at religious venues or that the Choir curriculum has the effect on a reasonable observer of advancing or endorsing religious beliefs. Nor does she allege she was required to sing religious songs as part of a religious exercise per se. Rather, Ms. Bauchman simply alleges Mr. Torgerson selected and required her to perform a preponderance of Christian devotional songs in places dominated by crosses and other religious symbols. We will not infer an impermissible purpose or effect in the absence of any supporting factual allegations. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 1362-63 (district court erroneously inferred from religious nature of creche that city had no secular purpose for display); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3066-67, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (1983) (Court is reluctant to attribute unconstitutional motives to the states). However, we will evaluate whether Ms. Bauchman's allegations concerning the selection and performance of songs alone suggest religious endorsement or the school's excessive entanglement with religion. Endorsement Vis a Vis Purpose 38 Notwithstanding existing uncertainty regarding the propriety or scope of this component of the endorsement test, certain principles governing our inquiry into the government's actual purpose are beyond dispute. Namely, the Constitution does not require that the purpose of every government-sanctioned activity be unrelated to religion. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 64, 105 S.Ct. at 2493-94; City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415, 428 (10th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 410, 139 L.Ed.2d 314 (1997). Courts have long recognized the historical, social and cultural significance of religion in our lives and in the world, generally. Courts also have recognized that a variety of motives and purposes are implicated by government activity in a pluralistic society. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 1363. Accordingly, there is a legitimate time, manner and place for the discussion of religion in the public classroom. School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1573, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963); Florey v. Sioux Falls Sch. Dist. 49-5, 619 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (8th Cir.1980). 39 To sustain her Establishment Clause claim, Ms. Bauchman therefore must allege facts indicating the defendants have no clearly secular purpose for selecting songs with religious content and requiring the choir to perform in religious venues. See Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56, 105 S.Ct. at 2489 (conduct violates the Establishment Clause if it is entirely motivated by a purpose to advance religion). In the alternative, Ms. Bauchman can allege facts showing that in spite of the existence of a legitimate secular purpose(s), the defendants' actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 592, 109 S.Ct. at 3100; Edwards, 482 U.S. at 585, 107 S.Ct. at 2578; Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 56, 105 S.Ct. at 2489-90; Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 1368 (O'Connor, J. concurring). Notably, however, we cannot allow Ms. Bauchman to support her claim with allegations focused solely on the religious component of classroom activity, since such approach would inevitably lead to invalidation of the activity under the Establishment Clause. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 680, 104 S.Ct. at 1362. At the same time, our inquiry into the government's purpose should be deferential and limited. Jaffree. 472 U.S. at 74, 105 S.Ct. at 2499 (O'Connor, J., concurring) We should resist attributing unconstitutional motives to the government, particularly where we can discern a plausible secular purpose. See id. at 74-75, 105 S.Ct. at 2499-500; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95, 103 S.Ct. at 3066-67 (1983). 40 Here, we discern a number of plausible secular purposes for the defendants' conduct. 9 For example, it is recognized that a significant percentage of serious choral music is based on religious themes or text. See, e.g., Doe v. Duncanville Indep. Sch. Dist., 70 F.3d 402, 407-08 (5th Cir.1995). Any choral curriculum designed to expose students to the full array of vocal music culture therefore can be expected to reflect a significant number of religious songs. Moreover, a vocal music instructor would be expected to select any particular piece of sacred choral music, like any particular piece of secular choral music, in part for its unique qualities useful to teach a variety of vocal music skills (i.e., sight reading, intonation, harmonization, expression). Plausible secular reasons also exist for performing school choir concerts in churches and other venues associated with religious institutions. Such venues often are acoustically superior to high school auditoriums or gymnasiums, yet still provide adequate seating capacity. Moreover, by performing in such venues, an instructor can showcase his choir to the general public in an atmosphere conducive to the performance of serious choral music. 41 Ms. Bauchman does not allege in her complaint that defendants lacked a secular purpose. Ms. Bauchman further fails to allege any facts indicating (1) West High School's vocal music curriculum was out of step with traditional public high school vocal music curricula, (2) the acoustics and/or seating at the selected performance venues were unsuitable for the performance and public enjoyment of serious vocal music, or (3) the defendants' actual purpose was otherwise inconsistent with the prevalent secular objectives noted above. Ms. Bauchman's allegations instead focus solely on (1) the religious component of the Choir's activities--she was required to practice and perform songs with religious lyrics at sites dominated by crosses and other religious images, and (2) the defendants' conduct, not in selecting such songs and venues (the challenged activity), but in response to her objections--she was ridiculed for objecting to such songs and performance sites, and defendants inadequately and inappropriately responded to her objections. These allegations are insufficient to support her Establishment Clause claim given the obvious secular purposes for defendants' conduct. We see no reason to conclude that defendants' selection of religious songs and religious performance venues serves an impermissible purpose simply because some of those songs and venues, which undisputedly represent only part of the Choir's repertoire and performance venues, may coincide with religious beliefs different from those of Ms. Bauchman. See Edwards, 482 U.S. at 605, 107 S.Ct. at 2589 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasizing that a decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply because the material to be taught happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions) (quotations omitted); Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 604 n. 8, 108 S.Ct. 2562, 2571 n. 8, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988). Accordingly, Ms. Bauchman's complaint fails to state an Establishment Clause claim under the purpose component of the endorsement test. Vis a Vis Effect 42 To state a claim under this component of the endorsement test, Ms. Bauchman must allege facts indicating the Choir curriculum or Choir activities have a principle or primary effect of advancing or endorsing religion. United States Supreme Court precedent plainly contemplate[s] that on occasion some advancement of religion will result from governmental action. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 683, 104 S.Ct. at 1364. However, not every governmental activity that confers a remote, incidental or indirect benefit upon religion is constitutionally invalid. Id. Thus, as noted above, the Constitution does not forbid all mention of religion in public schools. The Establishment Clause prohibits only those school activities which, in the eyes of a reasonable observer, advance or promote religion or a particular religious belief. This is an objective inquiry, not an inquiry into whether particular individuals might be offended by the content or location of the Choir's performance, or consider such performances to endorse religion. Gaylor, 74 F.3d at 217. 43 We believe a reasonable observer aware of the purpose, context and history of public education in Salt Lake City, including the historical tension between the government and the Mormon Church, and the traditional and ubiquitous presence of religious themes in vocal music, would perceive the following with respect to Ms. Bauchman's factual allegations concerning the Choir curriculum and performance venues: the Choir represents one of Salt Lake City's public high schools and is comprised of a diverse group of students; many of the Choir's songs have religious content--content predominately representative of Judeo-Christian beliefs; in contrast to a church choir, this Choir also performs a variety of secular songs; the Choir's talent is displayed in the diverse array of songs performed and in a number of different public (religious and nonreligious) settings, all of which reflect the community's culture and heritage. Certainly, any given observer will give more or less meaning to the lyrics of a particular song sung in a particular venue based on that observer's individual experiences and spiritual beliefs. However, the natural consequences of the Choir's alleged activities, viewed in context and in their entirety by a reasonable observer, would not be the advancement or endorsement of religion. Ms. Bauchman's complaint therefore fails to support a claim that the Choir curriculum or Choir activities have a principle or primary effect of endorsing religion. Entanglement 44 The entanglement analysis typically is applied to circumstances in which the state is involving itself with a recognized religious activity or institution. See Florey, 619 F.2d at 1318. For the reasons discussed above, we have rejected the notion that Ms. Bauchman's allegations regarding the Choir's singing of religious songs in religious venues alone support a claim that defendants' conduct endorses religion. Instead, we believe a reasonable observer would conclude the selection of religious songs from a body of choral music predominated by songs with religious themes and text, and the selection of public performance venues affiliated with religious institutions, without more, amount to religiously neutral educational choices. 10 Consequently, we perceive no state involvement with recognized religious activity. 45 To the extent Ms. Bauchman suggests her allegations regarding past Spring Choir tours and a covert 1995 Spring tour are sufficient to support a claim of impermissible entanglement, we disagree. Ms. Bauchman fails to allege she participated in any past Spring tours and thus cannot be heard to claim her constitutional rights were violated as a result of any alleged Choir participation in religious services which may have occurred during those tours. Ms. Bauchman's allegation Mr. Torgerson covertly organized a new Choir Class tour ... on public school property under the pretense of creating a Boy Scout 'Explorer Post'  lacks any facts to indicate such tour was conducted or actions were taken to involve the Choir in religious activity. In sum, we find no basis in Ms. Bauchman's complaint to suggest Defendants' alleged conduct amounts to unconstitutional entanglement. Extraneous Allegations 46 Having determined Ms. Bauchman's allegations concerning the singing of religious songs at religious sites do not implicate the Establishment Clause, we must next address the relevance, if any, of her remaining allegations that she was subjected to public ridicule and harassment as a result of defendants' conduct. Certainly, Ms. Bauchman's allegations she was criticized and retaliated against for opposing the religious content of the Choir curriculum, taken as true, evidence a lack of sensitivity, crudeness and poor judgment unbefitting of high school students, their parents, and especially, public school teachers and administrators. However, such claims do not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Nor can they be used to breathe constitutional life into otherwise unactionable conduct. The fact that the defendants did not change their behavior in accordance with Ms. Bauchman's demands and reacted negatively and/or offensively to those demands simply cannot be viewed as support for her claim that the Choir's performance of religious music at religious venues furthered a religious purpose, advanced or favored religion or a particular religious belief, or otherwise entangled the public school with religion. We reject this backdoor attempt to substantiate an otherwise flawed constitutional claim and conclude the district court properly dismissed Ms. Bauchman's Establishment Clause claim. 47
48 Ms. Bauchman claims defendants violated the Free Exercise Clause by compelling her to participate in religious exercises in a public school setting, against her expressed desires and religious convictions. Her factual allegations in support of this contention can be summarized as follows: Mr. Torgerson repeatedly required Ms. Bauchman, a Jewish student, to practice and publicly perform Christian devotional music containing lyrics referencing praise to Jesus Christ and God at religious sites dominated by crosses and other religious images, as part of the regular, graded, required Choir activities. Ms. Bauchman further alleges when she opposed such activity in the context of the Choir's Christmas concert series, Mr. Torgerson gave her the choice of not participating in the singing of songs she found offensive and told her that her nonparticipation would not adversely affect her Choir grade. 11 Relying largely on Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 112 S.Ct. 2649, 120 L.Ed.2d 467 (1992), Ms. Bauchman's counsel nevertheless concludes that such a choice is constitutionally infirm, and proclaims that Ms. Bauchman's allegations therefore establish a Free Exercise violation. 49 To state a claim for relief under the Free Exercise Clause, Ms. Bauchman must allege something more than the fact the song lyrics and performance sites offended her personal religious beliefs. She must allege facts demonstrating the challenged action created a burden on the exercise of her religion. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 256-57, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1054-55, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982). A plaintiff states a claim her exercise of religion is burdened if the challenged action is coercive or compulsory in nature. See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n., 485 U.S. 439, 448-51, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1324-27, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988); School Dist. of Abington, 374 U.S. at 222, 83 S.Ct. at 1571-72; Messiah Baptist Church v. Jefferson County, 859 F.2d 820, 824 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1005, 109 S.Ct. 1638, 104 L.Ed.2d 154 (1989). Therefore, to state a Free Exercise claim, Ms. Bauchman must allege facts showing she was coerced into singing songs contrary to her religious beliefs. Messiah Baptist Church, 859 F.2d at 824. This she has failed to do. 50 On its face, Ms. Bauchman's complaint states the songs and performances were a required, graded component of Choir participation, but she was given the option of not participating to the extent such participation conflicted with her religious beliefs. Moreover, she was assured her Choir grade would not be affected by any limited participation. We conclude the fact Ms. Bauchman had a choice whether or not to sing songs she believed infringed upon her exercise of religious freedom, with no adverse impact on her academic record, negates the element of coercion and therefore defeats her Free Exercise claim. See Grove v. Mead School Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1533 (9th Cir.) (court held no Free Exercise violation where student was given permission to avoid classroom discussion of book The Learning Tree ), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826, 106 S.Ct. 85, 88 L.Ed.2d 70 (1985); Florey, 619 F.2d at 1318 (court held no Free Exercise violation where school board expressly provided students may be excused from activities permitted under rules outlining the bounds of permissible school activities on religious holidays), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 987, 101 S.Ct. 409, 66 L.Ed.2d 251 (1980). 51 The district court correctly concluded Lee v. Weisman fails to support Ms. Bauchman's Free Exercise claim. In Lee, the Supreme Court rejected the notion that providing a student an option whether to participate in graduation was sufficient to avoid the Establishment Clause problem with graduation prayer. 505 U.S. at 594-95, 112 S.Ct. at 2659-60. The Lee Court did not address state coercion in the Free Exercise context. For Ms. Bauchman to argue it is impermissible to excuse her from participation, but rather she must be allowed to participate in a Choir that only performs songs of the nature she demands, appears to be an attempt to bootstrap her Free Exercise claim with her Establishment Clause argument. Courts have long recognized that absent an Establishment Clause violation, the existence of a conflict between an individual student's or her parents' religious beliefs and a school activity does not necessarily require the prohibition of a school activity. Such conflicts are inevitable. Florey, 619 F.2d at 1318. In other words, while the Free Exercise clause protects, to a degree, an individual's right to practice her religion within the dictates of her conscience, it does not convene on an individual the right to dictate a school's curricula to conform to her religion. 52  '[T]he Free Exercise clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.'  Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 451, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 1326, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (Douglas, J. concurring)). Accordingly, public schools are not required to delete from the curriculum all materials that may offend any religious sensibility. Florey, 619 F.2d at 1318. Having concluded the State of Utah is not coercing Ms. Bauchman to violate her religious beliefs, we reject any invitation to obscure the appropriate scope of her Free Exercise claim by addressing issues of curriculum content. We leave those issues to our analysis of Ms. Bauchman's Establishment Clause claim, and uphold the district court's conclusion she failed to state a Free Exercise claim. 53
54 Ms. Bauchman relies on the same allegations she asserted in her Free Exercise claim to support her Free Speech claim. In essence, she argues the practice and performance of Christian devotional music at religious sites as part of the regular, graded, Choir curriculum have deprived her of her constitutional right to refrain from speaking. 55 The First Amendment certainly prohibits the government from compelling speech. See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 1435, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977). Here again, however, a threshold element of Ms. Bauchman's claim is coercion or compulsion. See id. at 714-15, 97 S.Ct. at 1435-36; Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Costle, 630 F.2d 754, 769-70 (10th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1050, 101 S.Ct. 1770, 68 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981). For the same reasons discussed in the context of Ms. Bauchman's Free Exercise claim, we conclude her complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to show she was coerced or compelled to engage in any Choir activities (practicing or performing songs she found offensive in venues she found offensive) against her will. The district court properly dismissed Ms. Bauchman's Free Speech claim for having failed to establish a necessary element of the alleged violation.