Opinion ID: 2998143
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecution’s Rebuttal Argument

Text: Washington next challenges the propriety of the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument. According to Washington, the prosecutor’s rebuttal was profoundly unprofessional and prejudicial in that it was directed at defense counsel personally and accused her (inaccurately) of completely misrepresenting No. 04-2015 9 the evidence to the jury. Washington insists that the improper argument rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Because Washington did not object to the prosecutor’s rebuttal at trial, we review under the deferential plain error standard. Claims of prosecutorial misconduct are analyzed under the framework established by the Supreme Court in Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168 (1986). Under Darden, we first consider whether the prosecutor’s comments were improper. Id. at 180-81. If the comments were improper, we must decide whether they prejudiced the defendant. Id. Six factors guide the prejudice inquiry: “(1) whether the prosecutor misstated the evidence, (2) whether the remarks implicate specific rights of the accused, (3) whether the defense invited the response, (4) the trial court’s instructions, (5) the weight of the evidence against the defendant, and (6) the defendant’s opportunity to rebut.” Howard v. Gramley, 225 F.3d 784, 793 (7th Cir. 2000). The Darden Court emphasized that it “is not enough that the prosecutors’ remarks were undesirable or even universally condemned. The relevant question is whether the prosecutors’ comments so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Darden, 477 U.S. at 181 (internal quotations and citations omitted). With this deferential standard in mind, we turn to the specifics of the claim in the instant case. This was a hard-hitting rebuttal argument by the prosecutor, full of harsh criticism of the defendant’s theory of the case. The prosecutor started with this comment: Ladies and gentlemen, I don’t intend to respond to much of that nonsense. You’ve heard enough from the lawyers, and it’s time for this defendant to be judged; but there were so many misrepresentations of the evidence that some response is necessary. 10 No. 04-2015 Tr. 666-67. The prosecutor went on to characterize the majority of the defense arguments as “made up,” “absolutely false,” “ridiculous,” or “ludicrous.” For example, the prosecutor argued in closing that the April 9 videotape showed Daryle making a controlled buy from Washington. In her summation, defense counsel suggested that the videotape of the first buy showed Meechie retrieving drugs from his mouth for Daryle. In rebuttal, the prosecutor called this theory “just absolutely ludicrous.” Tr. 668. With regard to the second buy, defense counsel argued that Daryle got the drugs from a man who was seen on the videotape sitting on the steps in Washington’s apartment complex as Daryle walked up to Washington’s apartment. That argument, according to the prosecutor, was “just completely made up.” Tr. 669. Similar remarks were made throughout the rebuttal. We think that the rebuttal could have been more artful and that some of the comments pushed the bounds of zealous advocacy. While it was surely appropriate for the prosecutor to emphatically rebut defense counsel’s arguments, the overall tone of the rebuttal was probably overly strident. Nonetheless, contrary to Washington’s contention, the prosecutor’s arguments were largely focused on the lameness of the defense rather than defense counsel personally. In addition, a review of the record, including the videotape recordings, illustrates that the theory of the defense was rather weak. The jury apparently did not buy the defense, and the district judge was also unimpressed— in a post-trial ruling, he called the defense “a very creative version of the facts with little support in the evidence.” None of this, of course, is a reflection on defense counsel; “counsel represent many people with lame defenses,” United States v. Sblendorio, 830 F.2d 1382, 1395 (7th Cir. 1987), and it is an attorney’s duty to zealously advocate for her client even in the face of difficult facts. Though the defense No. 04-2015 11 theory may not have been the most likely course of events, we think that the defense attorney did a fine job with the hand she was dealt. The prosecutor had legitimate grounds for some of his comments, and a more questionable basis for others. One argument made by the prosecutor was that Daryle walked right past the man on the stairs on April 17 and had no opportunity to get drugs from him. In her closing, defense counsel submitted that the videotapes were not in real time so that what looked like a few seconds on the video may actually have been longer. This argument was a stretch with little evidentiary support and the prosecutor probably did not overstate it in saying that the representation was “plainly false.” On the other hand, the prosecutor called defense counsel’s representation that Daryle was getting paid over $1,000 for his work “just absolutely false” because he was being paid $200. Actually, the representation was not false because the lawyers appear to have been talking about different things: the defense attorney was referencing the total amount Daryle was paid for his assistance with various cases while the prosecutor focused on the amount Daryle was paid for his work on Cedric Washington’s case. It was also questionable for the prosecutor to assert during rebuttal that Dysart and Daryle would not risk their positions as informants and their freedom by committing perjury to convict Washington. Cf. United States v. Johnson-Dix, 54 F.3d 1295, 1304-05 (7th Cir. 1995) (noting that it is improper for prosecutor to vouch for government agent by speculating that he would not risk his career by testifying falsely). But even accepting that some of the prosecutor’s comments were improper, the prosecutorial misconduct claim fails at the prejudice stage. Though Washington did not have a chance to rebut and that weighs in his favor, the remaining factors all weigh heavily against him. The prosecutor did not misstate the evidence or implicate specific 12 No. 04-2015 rights of the accused. Moreover, the trial court instructed the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence, which mitigates the potential that the jury relied on improper argument by counsel. United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 675 (7th Cir. 2000). Finally, like most prosecutorial misconduct claims, Washington’s claim founders in the face of the strong evidence of his guilt. Tape recordings, whether video or audio, are powerful evidence of guilt, and the government introduced videotapes of the two drug transactions described in the indictment. The tapes were corroborated by the testimony of Daryle and the testimony of the government agents that conducted the sting. Fullerton and Dysart confirmed that Washington was a crack dealer in Champaign. Washington, who was the only defense witness, took the stand, admitted that it was him on the tape, that he was familiar with crack, and that the videotape showed drug transactions, but denied actually selling crack to Daryle. His improbable story was that Meechie retrieved crack cocaine from his mouth to sell to Daryle on one occasion, and that Daryle actually sold crack to him on the other occasion. Both scenarios are difficult to square with the videotape recording and the testimony of the other witnesses. The jury returned with a conviction on both counts after only 34 minutes of deliberation. The overwhelming evidence of guilt in this case eliminates any lingering doubt that improper comments by the prosecutor prejudiced Washington.