Opinion ID: 1712087
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in denying jury instruction d-7.

Text: ¶ 18. Sanders argues that the trial court erred in denying his definition of heat of passion. He argues that the denial of the instruction contributed to the confusing and misleading nature of the jury charges as a whole. Sanders contends that the jury instructions taken as a whole were confusing and led to a verdict not based on the evidence. ¶ 19. The jury was instructed on deliberate design murder, depraved heart murder, heat of passion manslaughter, and self-dense. However, the jury was obviously confused as evidenced by its request for further instructions on those terms. Specifically, the jury asked the court for the legal definition of malice, depraved heart, and being engaged in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others. The court declined to give further instructions. ¶ 20. When reviewing challenges to jury instructions, whether given or refused by the trial court, we apply the following standard: Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one instruction taken out of context. A defendant is entitled to have jury instructions given which present his theory of the case, however, this entitlement is limited in that the court may refuse an instruction which incorrectly states the law, is covered fairly elsewhere in the instructions, or is without foundation in the evidence. Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835, 842 (Miss. 1991). ¶ 21. The State argues that the proffered instruction was an incomplete and inaccurate statement of the law and, therefore, was properly refused. Sanders argues that the instruction contained the definition of heat of passion as set out by this Court in Underwood v. State . We defined heat of passion as: In criminal law, a state of violent and uncontrollable rage engendered by a blow or certain other provocation given, which will reduce a homicide from the grade or murder to that of manslaughter. Passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. The term includes an emotional state of mind characterized by anger, rage, hatred, furious resentment or terror. Underwood v. State, 708 So.2d 18, 36 (Miss.1998). However, Sanders's proffered jury instruction defining heat of passion did not include the language passion or anger suddenly aroused at the time by some immediate and reasonable provocation, by words or acts of one at the time. An incorrect statement of the law is properly refused. Watts v. State, 733 So.2d 214, 237 (Miss.1999). For the foregoing reason, we affirm the trial court on this issue.