Opinion ID: 1106057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: mrta and statutory ways of necessity

Text: As in all cases of statutory construction, we first look to the language of the statute. See Woodham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc., 829 So.2d 891, 897 (Fla.2002). When the language of the statute is clear and unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to the rules of statutory interpretation and construction; the statute must be given its plain and obvious meaning. Modder v. American Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 688 So.2d 330, 333 (Fla.1997) (quoting Holly v. Auld, 450 So.2d 217, 219 (Fla.1984)). It is only if the statutory language is ambiguous that the Court must resort to traditional rules of statutory construction to determine legislative intent. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd. v. Harris, 772 So.2d 1273, 1282 (Fla.2000); see also Joshua v. City of Gainesville, 768 So.2d 432, 435 (Fla.2000) (stating that if the language of the statute is unclear, then rules of statutory construction control). Ambiguity suggests that reasonable persons can find different meanings in the same language. Forsythe v. Longboat Key Beach Erosion Control Dist., 604 So.2d 452, 455 (Fla.1992). Section 712.02 of MRTA provides that [a]ny person ... vested with any estate in land of record for 30 years or more, shall have a marketable record title ... free and clear of all claims  except those set forth as exceptions in section 712.03 (emphasis supplied). In H & F Land, we concluded that [b]ased upon the unambiguous language in MRTA referring to `all claims' and the clear policy underlying MRTA, MRTA encompassed claims to ways of necessity. 736 So.2d at 1172. This conclusion was premised on the fact that [a] way of necessity is an easement and that an easement is more than a mere personal privilege; it is an interest in land. Id. at 1171-72. However, because of the differences between statutory and common law ways of necessity explained below, this analysis applies only to common law ways of necessity. A common law way of necessity is an implied reservation or grant that arises when a single grantor conveys part of a parcel of land resulting in either the part conveyed or the part retained being cut off from access to a public road. See id. at 1172; Sapp v. Gen. Dev. Corp., 472 So.2d 544, 545 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Roy v. Euro-Holland Vastgoed, B.V., 404 So.2d 410, 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). [6] This implied reservation results from the application of the presumption that whenever a party conveys property he conveys whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of that property and retains whatever is necessary for the beneficial use of land he still possesses. Roy, 404 So.2d at 412 (quoting 25 Am Jur.2d, Easements and Licenses § 34, at 447-48). In other words, in a property conveyance the deed of the grantor as much creates the way of necessity as it does the way by grant, the only difference between the two being that one is granted in express words and the other only by implication.  Stein v. Darby, 126 So.2d 313, 318 (Fla. 1st DCA 1961). A common law way of necessity is an easement from its inception. However, a landowner who meets the requirements for a statutory way of necessity does not obtain an easement until an award ordered by the circuit court is paid. See § 704.04. Therefore, the right to a statutory way of necessity is more akin to a privilege than to an interest in land, unless and until an action in the circuit court results in the establishment of an easement. Although we recognize that the all claims language in MRTA is broad in scope and that MRTA does not contain an express exception for statutory ways of necessity in section 712.03, we note that the all claims language is limited by section 712.04. Specifically, section 712.04 limits the claims extinguished by MRTA to those that depend[ ] upon any act, title transaction, event or omission that occurred prior to the effective date of the root of title.  (Emphasis supplied.) Applying section 712.04 of MRTA to common law ways of necessity is straightforward. Because a common law way of necessity is created at the time of the title transaction that created the landlocked property, a claim to a common law way of necessity can be extinguished under section 712.04 if that title transaction occurred prior to the root of title. In contrast, as noted by the Real Property, Probate and Trust Law Section of the Florida Bar [7] in its amicus brief, applying MRTA and its thirty-year clock to section 704.01(2) does not work. Amicus Curiae Brief at 9. The difficulty arises because, prior to a judicial determination under section 701.04, there is no definitive act, title transaction, event or omission that gives rise to a claim to a statutory way of necessity for the purposes of applying MRTA. This is illustrated by two Second District decisions that reached different conclusions regarding when a claim to a statutory way of necessity arises. In Hunt v. Smith, 137 So.2d 232, 233-34 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), the Second District noted that the statutory way of necessity exists only when the lands are being used or desired to be used for the purposes specified in the statute. However, in Sapp, the Second District indicated that a claim to a statutory way of necessity always exists. See 472 So.2d at 546 (concluding that the portion of section 704.04 which provides that `[t]he easement shall date from the time the award is paid' refers only to the court-ordered easement rather than to the statutory way of necessity which existed all of the time). We conclude, giving MRTA's language its plain and obvious meaning, that MRTA's provisions cannot act to extinguish the right to a statutory way of necessity established by the Legislature in section 704.01(2). This conclusion is buttressed by the fact that MRTA's objectives would not be furthered by applying its provisions to statutory ways of necessity. As this Court explained in H & F Land, [a] core concern of MRTA [is] that there be no `hidden' interests in property that could be asserted without limitation against a record property owner. 736 So.2d at 1172. Further, MRTA's provisions contain a scheme to accomplish the ... objective of stabilizing property law by clearing old defects from land titles, limiting the period of record search, and clearly defining marketability by extinguishing old interests of record not specifically claimed or reserved. Id. at 1171. In H & F Land, we referred to our prior decision in Marshall v. Hollywood, Inc., 236 So.2d 114, 119 (Fla.1970), which held that MRTA operated to confer marketability to a recorded chain of title in land, even though the chain originated from a forged or wild deed. See 736 So.2d at 1172. Supporting our conclusion that MRTA applied to common law ways of necessity, we reasoned that [h]aving refused to look behind the recorded wild deed in Marshall to establish that it was based on a forgery or was otherwise invalid, it would make little sense for us to go behind the legitimate deed of the Airport District in this case to discover an unclaimed easement against the Airport District's property and except it from MRTA's recording requirements. Id. This reasoning illustrates a primary difference between a common law and statutory way of necessity. Because a common law way of necessity depends on the existence of unity of title, see § 704.01(1), a historical examination of the chain of title is required to determine whether a landlocked property owner has a valid claim. However, determining whether a landlocked owner has a valid claim to a statutory way of necessity requires only findings on the current status of the property  that the parcel is landlocked, that the parcel is outside a municipality, and that the parcel is being used or is desired to be used for one of the enunciated purposes. Thus, determining whether an owner of landlocked property has a valid claim to a statutory way of necessity does not require another property owner or a court to go behind a legitimate deed and conduct a historical evaluation of the chain of title. A statutory way of necessity is not a hidden interest in land. Moreover, because a claim for a statutory way of necessity does not rest on the chain of title, extinguishing claims to statutory ways of necessity will neither clear[ ] old defects from land titles, limit[ ] the period of the record search, [nor] clearly define[ ] marketablility. H & F Land, 736 So.2d at 1171. Although an unrecorded common law way of necessity burdens the parcel that it cuts across without clear notice and without compensation to the landowner, all landowners are on notice of statutory ways of necessity by virtue of section 704.01(2). In addition, a landowner whose parcel becomes burdened by a statutory way of necessity is entitled to a judicial determination of both the nearest practical route and the compensation due. Finally, we recognize that we concluded in H & F Land that the public policy concerns behind section 704.01 did not outweigh the importance for the overall stability of property law under MRTA that claimants assert their interests in property in a reasonable and timely manner. 736 So.2d at 1176. However, we reiterate that H & F Land concerned only common law ways of necessity codified in section 704.01(1). Our broad statements in H & F Land that statutory or common law ways of necessity are subject to the provisions of [MRTA], 736 So.2d at 1170, and that MRTA ... encompasses all claims to an interest in property, including ways of necessity, id. at 1172, are dicta. We recede from these statements to the extent they can be construed as holding that MRTA can act to extinguish a valid claim to a statutory way of necessity authorized under section 704.01(2). We further conclude in this case that public policy weighs in favor of holding that MRTA is inapplicable to statutory ways of necessity. In upholding the constitutionality of section 704.01(2) in 1977, the Court explained: Although state public policy may have altered with respect to the methods of land use since 1961, sensible utilization of land continues to be one of our most important goals.... Useful land becomes more scarce in proportion to population increase, and the problem in this state becomes greater as tourism, commerce and the need for housing and agricultural goods grow. By its application to shut-off lands to be used for housing, agriculture, timber production and stockraising, the statute is designed to fill these needs. There is then a clear public purpose in providing means of access to such lands so that they might be utilized in the enumerated ways. Deseret Ranches of Fla., Inc. v. Bowman, 349 So.2d 155, 156-57 (Fla.1977). The fact that the Legislature has chosen to retain this statutory remedy indicates that the Legislature continues to believe that those enumerated uses of land in the unincorporated areas of the state still serve an important public purpose. In this case, Blanton alleges that he owns a landlocked parcel and that he is entitled to access to that property under section 704.01(2). Blanton also alleges that he attempted to negotiate an easement over a portion of Mosk's property, valued at $18,100 for property tax purposes, and that he was quoted a price in excess of $1.1 million. Holding that MRTA operates to extinguish a claim to a statutory way of necessity would, contrary to legislative intent, render these landlocked parcels unusable, either because the landlocked owner is without a means of access to the parcel or is being asked to pay an exorbitant fee. To the extent that Blanton's allegations set forth a claim for a statutory way of necessity, he is entitled to prove that claim.