Opinion ID: 2071440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Compliance With Statutory Time Requirements for Civil Service Appeals.

Text: A. The commission's arguments. The commission contends that the officers' hearings were originally scheduled within the statutory time period prior to the earlier appeal to this court. Following our remand order, it is the position of the commission that resumption of the civil service hearings had to await further orders by the district court as this court had directed. B. The officers' arguments. The officers argue that, because the commission at no time filed a motion to stay proceedings, it did not meet the timing requirements of section 400.23. It predicates this claim on the time the appointing authority's specifications were filed and allows for no interruption as a result of the consideration of their prior certiorari actions in both the district court and this court. C. Analysis. Iowa Code section 400.23 provides: Within ten days after such specifications are filed, the commission shall fix the time, which shall not be less than five nor more than twenty days thereafter, and place for hearing the appeal and shall notify the parties in writing of the time and place so fixed, and the notice shall contain a copy of the specifications so filed. Prior to the first appeal to this court, Venditte filed his appeal to the commission on January 11, 2000. The specifications of charges were filed by the appointing authority on January 25, 2000. On February 3, 2000, the commission set Venditte's appeal hearing for February 9, 2000. Kennedy filed his appeal on February 21, 2000. The specifications of charges against Kennedy were filed by the city on February 29, 2000. On March 2, 2000, the commission set Kennedy's hearing for March 15, 2000. The timing of these hearings was in compliance with the requirements of section 400.23 with respect to both the time at which the hearings were set and the time for which the hearings were scheduled. In Venditte's case, the commission met nine days after the specifications of charges were filed and fixed the time for hearing six days after the meeting. In Kennedy's case, the commission met three days after the specifications of charges were filed and fixed the time for his hearing thirteen days after the meeting. On June 25, 2003, following the first appeal to this court, the district court complied with the remand order by sustaining the officers' writs of certiorari and sending the case back to the commission for new hearings. The commission set the time for new hearings on the officers' appeals for July 8, 2003 (Kennedy), and July 9, 2003 (Venditte). This action was taken by the commission on July 1, 2003. Based on these dates, the commission was in compliance with the time requirements of section 400.23 if the time is measured from the earliest date that its jurisdiction was restored. Our decision up to this point disposes of the timeliness issue. To the extent that the district court also relied on a theory of failure to prosecute, we also reject that analysis. Neither the commission nor the City of Council Bluffs was tasked with the responsibility for prosecuting its employees' appeals. The employees were the parties that were obligated to do that. To enable them to do this, the commission was required to comply with the applicable statutes concerning the time of setting hearings. As we have noted, however, it did comply with those statutes both prior to the first appeal to this court and thereafter. The delays that have occurred in the civil service appeal process for these officers have resulted entirely from their challenges to the original hearing process. That hearing process had been timely pursued. No new process could commence until the litigation initiated by the officers had been completed and the exclusive jurisdiction of the commission in this personnel matter had been restored. See VanBaale v. City of Des Moines, 550 N.W.2d 153, 155 (Iowa 1996) (civil service commission appeal is exclusive remedy for challenging discipline by employees subject to the act). Such delay provides no basis for disturbing the discipline imposed by the appointing authority in a manner other than a resumption of the civil service appeal process. We have considered all issues presented and conclude that the judgments of the district court should be reversed in each of the officer's certiorari actions. The case is remanded to the district court for an order directing the civil service commission to reschedule the statutory appeal hearings for each officer. REVERSED AND REMANDED.