Opinion ID: 1711324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: removal of death-scrupled jurors

Text: Roberts maintains that the trial court erred in striking for cause venirepersons Walsh, Sutterfield, Jeffries, Laramie, Hanks, and Benson. [3] According to Roberts, all of these venirepersons could have considered the death penalty and followed the law and, therefore, should not have been stricken for cause. Venirepersons may not be excluded simply because of general objections to the death penalty or conscientious or religious scruples against it. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 657, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2050-51, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). Venirepersons may be excluded only where it appears that their views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with the instructions and their oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). Because the trial court is in the best position to evaluate venirepersons' responses, it has broad discretion in determining qualifications of prospective jurors. State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d 854, 866 (Mo. banc 1996). We will not disturb the trial court's ruling unless it is clearly against the evidence and constitutes a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 324 (Mo. banc 1996). The trial court struck Venireperson Walsh because she asserted that, as an employee of the Special School District, she did not feel she could be fair and impartial in the case because Roberts had at one time been involved with the Special School District. We have reviewed her statements during voir dire. They support the trial court's decision. Venireperson Sutterfield said, I don't want the blood on my hands for somebody having the death penalty. It's not my place to take somebody else's life for killing someone else. She said that she could not consider both punishments and could not be fair and impartial under the law. While she told defense counsel that she could consider either punishment, she later said in response to the state's question that she could not opt for the death penalty in any case. The qualifications of a prospective juror are not determined by a single response, but are based on the entire voir dire examination. State v. Kreutzer, 928 S.W.2d at 866. Where there is conflicting testimony regarding a prospective juror's ability to consider the death penalty, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by giving more weight to one response than the other and in finding that the venireperson could not properly consider the death penalty. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d at 324-25. On this record, the trial court reasonably could have concluded that Sutterfield's views would substantially impair her ability to follow the law and perform her duties as a juror. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing Sutterfield for cause. Venireperson Jeffries equivocated as to whether he could consider the death penalty. He repeatedly said that he was not sure if he could consider the death penalty. He felt that his views that there should be another option other than death or life without parole might prevent him from imposing the death sentence. While at one point he said he could consider it, at other points, he said that he could not. In direct response to the trial court's question, Jeffries said, I don't think that I could consider the death penalty. He said that he would follow the court's instructions to the best of his ability, but he was not sure that he could. Whether he could consider the death penalty appeared to hinge on how one defined consider. Ultimately, the state moved to strike Jeffries for cause. The court, on considering the entire examination, decided to strike him for cause. On reviewing the record, we do not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion. Venireperson Laramie said he might have a problem with imposing the death penalty. As part of his coursework at college, he had corresponded with an inmate on death row. Ultimately, he said that he would not be able legitimately to consider imposing the death penalty. On questioning by defense counsel, Laramie again stated he could not consider imposing the death penalty. The trial court clearly did not err in striking Laramie for cause. While venireperson Hanks said he could consider the death penalty, he also said that there could not be one doubt in his mind as to the guilt of the murderer. After a lengthy harangue between Hanks, the prosecutor, and the court regarding the difference between a reasonable doubt and no doubt, Hanks indicated that he could follow the court's instructions. The state moved to strike him for cause on the grounds that he would hold the state to a higher standard of proof. The record indicates considerable confusion on the part of Hanks as to what a reasonable doubt is and what would be necessary for the state to prove in order for him to consider the death penalty. Based on the entire examination and the trial court's more favorable position to interpret Mr. Hanks's demeanor and responses, we do not find that the trial court's decision to strike Hanks for cause was not an abuse of discretion. Venireperson Benson initially said that he could consider the death penalty. However, further questioning revealed that he could not consider it in this case. Benson stated that he could not impose the death penalty on anyone who claimed to be innocent, whether they had been through a trial or not. He said he could consider the death penalty for cases involving child molestation, but since this was not that type of case, he could not consider the death penalty in this case. The trial court did not err in striking Benson for cause.