Opinion ID: 248931
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Conduct of the Prosecuting Attorney

Text: 20 A feature of the trial, not objected to below or stressed in the brief but vigorously criticized in oral argument before us, was the prosecuting attorney's disclosing to the jury the fact that certain of his witnesses had been interviewed and made statements to the F.B.I. The contention is that this was the prosecutor's way of bolstering the witness' testimony by indicating to the jury that consistent declarations had been made to the investigators. Repeatedly the U.S. Attorney, upon calling a witness to the stand, proceeded first to establish that a statement had been given to the F.B.I. and then handed it to defense counsel, in the presence of the jury. 3 21 Where a cross-examiner has endeavored to discredit a witness by prior inconsistent statements, it is sometimes permissible to offset the damage by showing prior consistent utterances. 4 Wigmore 1132, 6 Wigmore 1792 (3rd Ed. 1940). It is not proper, however, in chief to seek corroborative support of a witness by showing that after the event under inquiry and before the trial he made statements to the same effect. See 4 Wigmore 1124 (3rd Ed. 1940). 22 The tactic of the government attorney must be condemned, yet in appraising its effect we must regard the record as an entirety. Reviewing the transcript of the proceedings which lasted eleven days, and considering the atmosphere of the trial, we are left with the firm conviction that no actual injury has been done to the defendant's substantial rights. We would be obligated to reverse for such irregularity, even though it was not objected to at the trial, if we had reason to think that prejudice resulted. The evidence of Schoppel's guilt is overwhelming. Several eye witnesses said that he held the victim while Gomez inflicted the wounds. Of the fifteen witnesses called and examined by the court at the instance of the defendants nearly all said they did not see the melee or could not determine what Schoppel was doing. Only one or two feebly supported his version that he was trying to assist the victim, and one confirmed the Government's account of the attack. We do not believe that the jury might have acquitted but for the irregularity of which the appellant now complains. On the contrary, the jury might well have returned a verdict of murder in the first degree. It was moved to convict for the lesser offense, apparently crediting to some extent the testimony as to drunkenness. The harmless error rule, rule 52, F.R.Cr.Proc., properly applies.