Opinion ID: 2313014
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Time Between the Crime and the Identification

Text: In each case the showup identifications were made within hours of the witnesses' encounters with defendant. Thus the witnesses' memories were fresh and at the peak of their reliability. Therefore, even though both witnesses only had a limited time to view defendant, the good conditions under which the views were made, the accuracy of the descriptions, and the short time between the crimes and the identifications all support the proposition that these identifications were reliable. Furthermore, from the record we do not believe that the police contributed any additional suggestiveness through their conduct of the showups. Given the totality of the circumstances as established by these factors, we find that the showup identifications made by these witnesses were sufficiently reliable and safe from the danger of misidentification as to be admissible as evidence. Next defendant argues that the trial justice erred in refusing to pass the case and in refusing to give a cautionary instruction after some allegedly improper remarks by the prosecutor during closing arguments. Although we find the prosecutor's remarks improper, we also find the trial justice's failure to pass the case or to give a cautionary instruction do not warrant a new trial. During his closing arguments the prosecutor referred to the Saunders breaking and entering and the absence of Mrs. Saunders's husband as a witness at the trial, saying: Where is Mr. Saunders? Why didn't we hear from Mr. Saunders?    That's what I thought the last time, every time we have come into that room [the courtroom], that door has been open. That door has been open. The State doesn't have a lock on that door. The fact that we didn't hear from Mr. Saunders, does that help you decide anything? Why should you speculate that he might have said he was in the store or he wasn't in the store? Why should you speculate what Mr. Saunders might have said? Mrs. Saunders said he was downstairs and he saw the guy running out the door. What would Mr. Saunders have told you? Why should you even speculate? Does that help you decide anything? Rhode Island case law has long condemned statements or actions by prosecutors that give even the appearance of alluding to a defendant's failure to take the stand, call witnesses, or produce evidence. Because the state, not the defense, has the burden of proof in a criminal case, a defendant may properly comment on the prosecution's failure to call witnesses to show that the state has failed to meet its burden to prove a defendant guilty. State v. LaPointe, 525 A.2d 913, 914 (R.I. 1987) (citing State v. White, 512 A.2d 1370, 1374 (R.I. 1986)). The prosecution, however, may not respond in kind. Id. Therefore, although the prosecution may properly comment on the evidence that the defense has brought into the record, State v. Summerour, 107 R.I. 42, 46, 264 A.2d 329, 331 (1970), any time a prosecutor stresses the defense's failure to present testimony, he is engaging in a type of brinkmanship that could cause a reversal and a retrial. State v. Jefferson, 116 R.I. 124, 137, 353 A.2d 190, 198 (1976). When an improper comment is made by the prosecution, upon request, the defense is entitled to a cautionary instruction. Id. at 140, 353 A.2d at 199. Such an instruction, if timely and adequate, is considered an effective correction to an improper reference to the empty chair. State v. Taylor, 425 A.2d 1231, 1235 (R.I. 1981). However, a failure immediately to request a cautionary instruction at trial will be fatal to defendant on appeal. LaPointe, 525 A.2d at 914-15. In this case, defense counsel signaled her objection to the trial justice when the objectionable comments were made; however, she withheld voicing her objection until after the prosecutor had completed his closing argument. After the prosecutor's closing argument, it being late on a Friday afternoon, the trial justice dismissed the jury before asking for defense counsel's objection. Counsel then stated her objection and requested that the trial justice pass the case  or at least give a cautionary instruction. The trial justice refused to pass the case but withheld his ruling on a cautionary instruction until Monday even though his initial reaction was that the comments were not so improper as to warrant reraising them with a cautionary instruction. The trial justice never ruled on the cautionary instruction, nor was any further action on the motion requested by defendant. The state makes three primary arguments against defendant's appeal on this issue. First, the prosecutor's language was not improper; second, defendant's objection at the end of the prosecutor's closing was not timely; and finally, defendant's failure to reraise her objection on Monday was fatal to the appeal. We disagree. The prosecutor's statements inquiring why Mr. Saunders did not testify were improper. His comments to the jurors about the state's not having a lock on the courtroom door and about whether Mr. Saunders's absence helped them to decide anything clearly imply that the state was not preventing the defense from putting Mr. Saunders on the witness stand and that the jury might be able to infer something from his absence. Such statements are an unacceptable infringement on any defendant's right not to present evidence or witnesses and normally would warrant a new trial unless an adequate and timely cautionary instruction is given. Defense counsel's delay in voicing her objection is not fatal for its lack of timeliness or immediacy. See LaPointe, 525 A.2d at 914-15; White, 512 A.2d at 1374; Taylor, 425 A.2d at 1235. We find that counsel's trial etiquette, in waiting for the prosecutor to complete his argument, was proper. We shall not punish counsel for her politeness. Her vocal objection was made at the first available opportunity and was sufficiently timely to preserve her objection for appeal. Similarly, defense counsel's failure to restate her request for a cautionary instruction is not fatal to defendant's appeal. Counsel made and argued her objection to the best of her ability. The trial justice denied her motion to pass the case and only reluctantly took her request for a cautionary instruction under advisement. In these circumstances we see no reason to require counsel to repeat her objection and request for a cautionary instruction in a situation in which it would apparently be futile to do so. State v. Mead, 544 A.2d 1146, 1150 (R.I. 1988). However, although the prosecutor's comments were improper and the defendant's objections were properly preserved for appeal, we find that the trial justice's error in not giving a proper cautionary instruction was harmless in light of the defendant's acquittal on the Saunders charge. Id. (improper comments are subject to the harmless-error rule). The prosecutor's improper comments were not such that they would have prejudiced the jury's judgment regarding the remaining two charges. Accordingly, the defendant's appeal is denied and dismissed. The judgments of conviction are affirmed, and the papers of the case are remanded to the Superior Court.