Opinion ID: 59430
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparate Treatment Class Certification

Text: Plaintiffs contend that the district court erred in denying class certification of their 42 U.S.C. § 1981 disparate-treatment claim seeking declaratory, injunctive, and equitable back pay. [8] See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415-16 (5th Cir.1998) (equitable monetary relief, i.e., back pay, available in (b)(2) class actions). The district court declined to certify the class under Rule 23(b)(2) because individual claims for monetary relief would have predominated, and it concluded that the class representatives would be inadequate if they dropped the class members' demand for compensatory and punitive damages in order to protect the predominance of nonmonetary claims. See FED.R.CIV.P. 23(b)(2). This court reviews the district court's class-certification decision for abuse of discretion. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 408. Whether the court applied the correct legal standard in reaching its decision is reviewed de novo. Id. The district court did not abuse its discretion. See Pegues v. Miss. State Employment Serv., 699 F.2d 760, 763 (5th Cir.1983) (Implicit in this deferential standard of review is the recognition of the essential factual nature of the certification inquiry and the district court's inherent power to manage and control pending litigation.). Motivated by Zachery v. Texaco Exploration & Production, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D.Tex.1999), the district court expressed concern about the plaintiffs' disavowal of monetary damages. In Zachery, the putative class representatives also dropped their demand for compensatory and punitive damages in order to achieve Rule 23(b)(2) certification. Id. at 233. As a result, class members would not have had the right to opt out of the class and might be barred from bringing individual damage claims. Id. at 243 (citing Cooper v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, 467 U.S. 867, 104 S.Ct. 2794, 81 L.Ed.2d 718 (1984)). Noting this serious conflict of interest, the court refused to impose upon the class members the decision by named plaintiffs to forfeit the compensatory and punitive damages claim. Id. at 244-45. We agree with Zachery and with the district court's conclusion here that if the price of a Rule 23(b)(2) disparate treatment class both limits individual opt outs and sacrifices class members' rights to avail themselves of significant legal remedies, it is too high a price to impose. There was no error, much less abuse of discretion, in this certification denial.