Opinion ID: 2497005
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: whether the trial court erred in failing to quash count i of the indictment.

Text: ¶ 33. Anderson argues that Count I of the indictment was flawed, because the time period was too uncertain or vague. Prior to trial, defense counsel filed a motion to quash Count I. At a pretrial hearing, the trial court denied the motion, but allowed defense counsel to raise the issue again depending on the information the State presented regarding the dates. ¶ 34. Count I of the indictment charged Anderson with statutory rape under Mississippi Code Section 97-3-65(1)(b) (Rev. 2006) and stated that: David Paul Anderson in the First Judicial District of Harrison County, Mississippi, on or about November, 2006 did feloniously and unlawfully have sexual intercourse with [Allison], a child under the age of fourteen (14) years and twenty-four (24) or more months younger than the said David Paul Anderson and not the spouse of the said David Paul Anderson at the time in question, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State of Mississippi. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 35. Uniform Circuit and County Court Rule 7.06 requires indictments to include the date of the alleged offense. It also states, however, that [f]ailure to state the correct date shall not render the indictment insufficient. URCCC 7.06. ¶ 36. With regard to child sexual-assault cases, this Court has held that specific dates in indictments are not required so long as the defendant is `fully and fairly advised of the charge against him.' Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852, 860 (Miss. 1995) (quoting Morris v. State, 595 So.2d 840, 842 (Miss.1991)). In Eakes, the indictment listed three time periods when the alleged assaults occurred on, about, or between: (1) December 1, 1990, and December 24, 1990; (2) February 1, 1991, and April 30, 1991; and (3) May 11 and 12, 1991. Id. At Eakes's trial, the victim testified that the assaults had occurred on December 26, 1990, January 26, 1991, and March 16, 1991. Id. This Court found that [t]he dates testified to are close to the dates charged in the indictment. Given that Eakes was fully and fairly advised of the charges against him, the lack of specific dates in the indictment is not fatal. Id. ¶ 37. Similar to Eakes, Count I of Anderson's indictment gave a range of dates when rape was alleged to have occurred. At trial, the victim testified that Anderson had intercourse with her both before and after Thanksgiving. These dates were similar to the ones charged in the indictment  on or about November, 2006. Accordingly, this Court finds that the lack of specific dates in Count I was not fatal and that the trial court did not err in denying Anderson's motion to quash.