Opinion ID: 1858836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: 3m's cross-appeal

Text: ¶ 29. In its cross-appeal 3M asserts that the chancellor abused his discretion by not awarding 3M prejudgment interest on the award of attorneys' fees. Likewise, on this issue, we apply Mississippi law inasmuch as the issue of prejudgment interest is procedural and not substantive. Zurich, 920 So.2d at 433. See also Sentinel, 743 So.2d at 960. A judge's decision on the issue of whether to grant prejudgment interest is discretionary and is thus reviewed by applying an abuse of discretion standard. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Freeman, 868 So.2d 327, 329 (Miss.2004). In Preferred Risk Mutual Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 730 So.2d 574 (Miss.1999), we held that prejudgment interest may be allowed in cases where the amount due is liquidated when the claim is originally made or when the denial of a claim is frivolous or in bad faith. Id. at 577 (citing Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Doleac Electric Co., 471 So.2d at 331) (emphasis added). Prejudgment interest has been denied where there is a bona fide dispute as to the amount of damages as well as the responsibility for the liability therefor. Grace v. Lititz Mut. Ins. Co., 257 So.2d 217, 225 (Miss.1972). For prejudgment interest to be awarded, the party must make a proper demand for the interest in the pleadings, including the date that it was allegedly due. Id.; see also Simpson v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 564 So.2d 1374, 1380 (Miss.1990). ¶ 30. The trial judge no doubt has discretion to award prejudgment interest if (1) the amount of damages is fixed and (2) liability is undisputed. However, 3M directs us to a case decided by the Court of Appeals, Estate of Baxter v. Shaw Associates, 797 So.2d 396, 403 (Miss.Ct. App.2001), and argues that prejudgment interest may be granted when damages are liquidated, even if they are disputed. The Court of Appeals in Baxter cited Simpson v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 564 So.2d 1374 (Miss.1990). In Simpson, this Court quoted from a Hurricane Camille case, which stated: We are of the opinion that where as in this case there is a justifiable dispute as to the amount of the loss, the insured is not entitled to interest until the amount of the claim has been made certain or liquidated. However, we can envision cases where, in the discretion of the trial court interest should be allowed although the amount of the loss is in dispute and for this reason we do not foreclose the allowance of interest in every case where the claim is unliquidated. Id. at 1381 (quoting Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Byrne, 248 So.2d 777, 783 (Miss.1971)). In Simpson, this Court found that the trial court erred in not awarding prejudgment interest because the insured premises was admittedly a total loss and there was no dispute as to the amount of insurance coverage available. 564 So.2d at 1381. In Byrne, a case involving a suit by the insureds against their insurer for damage sustained to their home as a result of Hurricane Camille, this Court held that since there was a justifiable dispute concerning the amount of the damages sustained, the trial court correctly denied prejudgment interest. 248 So.2d at 783. Admittedly, in Byrne, this Court did not foreclose the possibility of a trial court, in the exercise of discretion, properly allowing prejudgment interest even when the amount of the loss is in dispute. Id. ¶ 31. In Grace v. Lititz Mutual Ins. Co., 257 So.2d 217 (Miss.1972), this Court had before it another Hurricane Camille case involving damage sustained to an office building owned by two architects. The architects were insured under a policy of insurance which excluded loss due to flood, surface water, waves, tidal water, or tidal wave, overflow of streams or other bodies of water, or spray from any of the foregoing, all whether driven by wind or not. Id. at 219. At issue was whether the destruction of the architects' building was caused by the wind forces of Hurricane Camille or whether tidal water contributed to or aggravated the loss. Id. In Grace, this Court affirmed the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest and specifically distinguished the Byrne exception, finding that, unlike the possible exception envisioned in Byrne, there was a bona fide dispute as to the amount of damages as well as the responsibility for the liability therefor. Id. at 225. ¶ 32. In the end, we find that since Microtek hotly disputed not only the amount of attorneys' awarded, but also whether 3M was even entitled to an award of attorneys' fees, and since the award of prejudgment interest, even where otherwise appropriate, is in the sound discretion of the trial judge, the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying 3M's request for prejudgment interest on his award of attorneys' fees. [4] ¶ 33. However, our discussion concerning prejudgment interest does not end here, because 3M claims that the chancellor abused his discretion by not stating a reason in the order for denial of prejudgment interest. The order simply states, that [t]he Court exercises its discretion not to award prejudgment interest. In its brief, 3M directs us to Pace v. Owens, 511 So.2d 489, 491-92 (Miss.1987), in which we held: When a trial court makes no specific finding of fact, this Court often assumes that it resolved the fact issues in favor of Appellee. Bryant v. Cameron, 473 So.2d 174 (Miss.1985); Smith v. Todd, 464 So.2d 1155, 1157 (Miss.1985); Marascalco v. Marascalco, 445 So.2d at 1380, 1382 (Miss.1984); Cotton v. McConnell, 435 So.2d 683 (Miss.1983); Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139, 1143 (Miss.1983); Blakeney v. Blakeney, 244 So.2d 3, 4 (Miss.1971). Further, when there are no specific findings of fact, we sometimes assume the trial judge made determinations of fact sufficient to support the judgment. Rives v. Peterson, 493 So.2d 316, 317 (Miss.1986). In such circumstances this Court must look to the evidence and see what state of facts, if any, will justify the decree. Boatright v. Horton, 233 Miss. 444, 447, 102 So.2d 373, 374 (1958). 511 So.2d at 491-92. By 3M's own admission in its brief, a trial court does not abuse its discretion per se by not stating reasons for decisions that are within its discretion. Rather, this Court will look at the evidence to see if that evidence justifies the trial court's decision. In the case sub judice, we find that the chancellor did not abuse his discretion in denying prejudgment interest. Liability over attorneys' fees was in dispute, and this Court's precedent is to disallow prejudgment interest in that event. This Court can assume that the chancellor made determinations of fact sufficient to support the court's judgment entered in favor of 3M. Thus, we find that the chancellor's denial of prejudgment was not manifest error, and accordingly, we find 3M's issue raised on cross-appeal to be without merit.