Opinion ID: 579192
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Metro Case

Text: Mr. Lamprecht was understandably nervous when the Supreme Court agreed to hear the Metro case. He was so convinced, in fact, that his pending challenge to the FCC's gender preference would stand or fall on the Supreme Court's decision about the FCC's racial preferences, that he filed an amicus brief in Metro confessing his fears: The preferential treatment policy employed by the Commission to advance women is a component of its more comprehensive preference policy toward minority applicants. This Court's ruling with respect to the constitutionality of the FCC's minority preference policy in the case sub judice will necessarily affect, and may well prove determinative of, amicus's pending challenge to the Commission's female preference scheme. Brief of Amicus Curiae Jerome Thomas Lamprecht In Support of Petitioner at 2, Metro Broadcasting, 497 U.S. 547, 110 S.Ct. 2997, 111 L.Ed.2d 445 (1991) (emphasis added). Mr. Lamprecht had good reason to be apprehensive. The FCC's gender preference is far milder than its race preferences, and if the Supreme Court upheld the latter, it seemed unlikely that lower courts could strike down the former. The race policies reviewed in Metro include two separate programs--a distress sale policy that makes certain broadcast licenses available to minorities alone; and a preference policy that makes race a plus factor to be weighed with other factors in comparative hearings open to minorities and non-minorities. Metro, 110 S.Ct. at 3005. The gender policy is far less severe. There is nothing remotely like a set-aside--no distress sale for women that excludes men from consideration. There is only a preference that makes gender a plus factor to be weighed against other factors; and the Supreme Court has consistently approved affirmative action programs in which race or sex are one of many factors considered in open competition. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 641-42, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 1456-57, 94 L.Ed.2d 615 (1987); id. at 649, 656, 107 S.Ct. at 1461, 1464 (O'Connor, J., concurring). The plus factor awarded for gender, furthermore, is less valuable than the plus factor awarded for race. According to the FCC, the merit for female ownership and participation is warranted upon essentially the same basis as the merit given for black ownership, but ... it is a merit of lesser significance. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 69 F.C.C.2d 607, 652 (Rev.Bd.1978), set aside on other grounds, 87 F.C.C.2d 203 (1981) (emphasis added) (awarding a slight merit to female applicant while granting substantial merit to black applicant). Since the FCC's gender preference has far less bite than its racial preferences, Mr. Lamprecht was right to worry that a favorable decision in the Metro case would doom his own. The Metro decision, when it came, fulfilled Mr. Lamprecht's worst fears. A majority of the Court reaffirmed a position that had previously won only a plurality: that benign, race-conscious measures mandated by Congress should be reviewed under intermediate rather than strict scrutiny. 110 S.Ct. at 3008-09. The opinion repeatedly stressed the importance of deferring to Congress's conclusions about the connection between station ownership and programming diversity, as long as the conclusions were based on reasoned analysis rather than archaic stereotypes. In light of the fact that the Supreme Court has traditionally treated gender classifications much more permissively than racial classifications, it now seemed indisputable that Metro's approval of the FCC's racial preferences would compel appellate courts to uphold the FCC's gender preference. My colleagues, however, have reached the unexpected conclusion that Metro compels us to strike down the program. Ante at 391 (emphasis added). Their analysis is easily summarized. They agree that the program is subject to intermediate scrutiny--that it must be upheld if it is substantially related to an important governmental objective. They concede that encouraging diverse programming is an important goal for the government to pursue. But they conclude that the gender preference program is not substantially related to the goal of broadcast diversity because they are not convinced by some of the statistical evidence Congress had before it. In my view, they turn Metro on its head. Justice Brennan's opinion stresses the importance of deference to Congress so often the point is hard to miss. It is of overriding significance in these cases that the FCC's ... ownership programs have been specifically approved--indeed mandated--by Congress. Metro, 110 S.Ct. at 3008 (emphasis added). Once again: The FCC's conclusion that there is an empirical nexus between minority ownership and broadcasting diversity is a product of its expertise, and we accord its judgement deference. Id. at 3011 (emphasis added). And finally: [B]oth Congress and the Commission have concluded that the minority ownership programs are critical means of promoting broadcast diversity. We must give great weight to their joint determination. Id. at 3016 (emphasis added). Here is the central distinction (which my colleagues quote selectively, ante at 391-392): Although we do not  'defer' to the judgment of the Congress and the Commission on a constitutional question, ... we must pay close attention to the expertise of the Commission and the factfinding of Congress when analyzing the nexus between minority ownership and programming diversity. With respect to this complex empirical question, we are required to give great weight to the decisions of Congress and the experience of the Commission. Id. at 3011 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The holding of Metro, in other words, is that although courts should not defer to Congress on constitutional questions, we should defer--or give great weight--to Congress on empirical questions. I see no difference between great weight and deference, which the Supreme Court and this Court have consistently treated as synonyms. See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2651, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981); Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States Dep't of Energy, 877 F.2d 1042, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1989). This is the central point of Metro, and my colleagues do not acknowledge it. There is not even a pretense of deference to Congress anywhere in their opinion. On the contrary, they refuse to defer to Congress because they themselves are not convinced by one report of the Congressional Research Service. But Metro does not say that courts may reject Congress's factual conclusions if they themselves are not convinced by the statistical evidence. Nor does it say what my colleagues say it says: Any 'predictive judgements' concerning group behavior and the differences in behavior among different groups must at the very least be sustained by meaningful evidence. Ante at 393. Metro says that courts must defer to Congress's judgement that there is a link between ownership and broadcast diversity as long as the policies are ... a product of ' analysis ' rather than a ' stereotyped reaction ' based on ' [h]abit. '  Metro, 110 S.Ct. at 3018 (citation omitted).