Opinion ID: 2265144
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Charge Regarding Aggravating Factor c(4)(f)

Text: Defendant argues that the trial court's instructions concerning aggravating factor c(4)(f) were so confusing and incomplete as to warrant reversal of his sentence. He asserts that the instructions contained two errors: (1) that the court incorrectly informed the jury that flight was an element of the factor, and (2) that the court failed adequately to admonish the jury not to double-count the evidence when it was considering the alleged aggravating factors. The court first instructed the jury that the State could not establish aggravating factors merely by showing that the murder had been committed knowingly and purposely. The jurors were also told that they had to determine whether the alleged aggravating factors existed independent of the other crimes for which defendant had been convicted. The court then charged the jury on the elements of factor c(4)(f) as follows: Aggravating factor [c(4)(f)], to find this aggravating factor you must be satisfied that the defendant, John Martini, Sr., while he was committing the murder, had in mind a purpose to avoid detection, arrest, trial or punishment, either for himself or for some other person with regard to either a prior crime or a contemporaneous crime committed before the murder, and that he was committing the murder to accomplish or to help in accomplishing that goal. The court correctly told the jurors that [a]ny evidence of actions taken by the defendant to conceal the murder itself cannot be used to prove this aggravating factor. However, the instructions then included the following passage concerning flight: Flight is one of the elements of aggravating factor [c(4)(f)] that I've gone over. Flight is the evading of the course of justice by voluntarily withdrawing one's self in order to avoid arrest or detection or the institution or the continuance of criminal proceedings regardless of whether one flees the jurisdiction. Defendant correctly argues that instructing the jury that flight is one of the elements of factor c(4)(f) was incorrect. We stated in Hightower, supra, that post-murder events are not relevant to the escaping detection aggravating factor. 120 N.J. at 422-23, 577 A. 2d 99. Flight is simply not relevant to a defendant's intent to kill in order to escape detection. The State concedes that much. However, the State also contends that the error was apparently inadvertent and mere surplusage that did not fatally infect the court's otherwise correct and adequate instructions. Defendant disagrees that the court's overall instructions cured the defect. According to defendant, the jury was presented with inherently contradictory instructions on the nature of the factor. He argues that we cannot accurately guess which of the two sets of contradictory instructions the jury followed. From defendant's point of view, the instruction did not create an additional element for the State to prove, but planted in the jurors' minds the idea that they could infer defendant's desire to escape detection from his post-murder flight. The State, however, contends that the mistake inured to defendant's benefit as it required the State to prove an unnecessary additional element. We reject that contention. `[A]ppropriate and proper charges to a jury are essential for a fair trial.' State v. Collier, supra, 90 N.J. at 122, 447 A. 2d 168 (1982) (quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287, 430 A. 2d 914 (1981)). As we previously stated, `portions of a charge alleged to be erroneous cannot be dealt with in isolation but the charge should be examined as a whole to determine its overall effect.' Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 135, 586 A. 2d 85 (quoting State v. Wilbely, 63 N.J. 420, 422, 307 A. 2d 608 (1973)). When the jury instructions in this case are considered as a whole, they clearly were adequate and not likely to confuse the jury. Apart from the challenged passage, the trial court's instructions accurately explained aggravating factor c(4)(f). Flight was probably inadvertently attributed to factor c(4)(f) instead of factor c(4)(g), the other aggravating factor charged, which includes murders committed during the flight from a kidnapping. The court did not dwell on the subject nor instruct the jury to consider post-murder acts in general. The jury was not presented with two sets of contradictory instructions. We reach a similar conclusion with respect to the court's instructions regarding the prohibition against the double-counting of evidence. The court's final instruction concerning the weighing of aggravating and mitigating factors was as follows: The weighing process, the balancing of aggravating and mitigating factors is not mechanical nor numerical in nature. You do not count factors. You consider them qualitatively. The answer depends on your exercise of careful and considered judgment. One aggravating factor may be found to outweigh beyond a reasonable doubt numerous mitigating factors. However, any aggravating factors may be found not to outweigh a single mitigating factor. Now, when as we have here the prosecutor is using the same evidence or some of the same evidence in seeking to prove multiple aggravating factors, if you find that such multiple aggravating factors have been proved by the same evidence, it's particularly important to remember that you may not simply compare the number of aggravating factors against the number of mitigating factors. You must weigh those factors. As I said, it's a weighing process. We have consistently held that the same evidence may be used to prove more than one aggravating factor. As we explained in Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 176, 548 A. 2d 887, the State may use the same evidence in seeking to prove multiple aggravating factors, provided the trial court advises the jury that it should not simply compare the number of aggravating factors against the number of mitigating factors, that it is considering the same facts more than once, and that it should be cognizant that the same facts are being used to prove more than one aggravating factor. If such a method is employed by the State, the jury must be told that it may not assign inordinate weight to the facts that support multiple factors. Rose, supra, 112 N.J. at 527, 548 A. 2d 1058. Thus, jurors should be informed of two obligations: (1) that the weighing process of aggravating and mitigating factors must be qualitative rather than quantitative; and (2) that they should not give inordinate weight to evidence that supports more than one factor. Defendant argues that the instructions in this case failed to inform the jurors of the latter duty. The Judges Bench Manual for Capital Cases includes a charge that accurately reflects both jury obligations. The trial court followed those instructions but omitted the following passage: it is particularly important to remember    that in such an instance you are considering the same facts more than once, that the same facts are being used to prove more than one aggravating factor. See Judges Bench Manual for Capital Cases, App. J(1)-22. Defendant argues that without that sentence, the instructions permitted the jury to double-count the evidence. We disagree. Although the model charges are extremely helpful, they do not represent the only method for correctly informing a jury. So long as the court properly informs the jury of its obligations, the instructions will be found to be adequate. There is no other way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instructions in this case than that he or she would be relying on some of the same facts to prove each of the two aggravating factors. The court told the jurors that the State intended to use the same evidence or some of the same evidence to prove more than one aggravating factor. Immediately following that remark the court informed the jury that its weighing process was to be a qualitative rather than quantitative one. We find that the instructions adequately informed the jurors of their role. In addition, this case presents less of a danger that one practical fact, instead of overlapping inter-related facts was doing double duty. See State v. McDougald, supra, 120 N.J. at 569, 577 A. 2d 419. The overall effect of the instructions in this case was to inform the jury that the same evidence could support more than one factor and that it should not be double-counted during the weighing process. In Rose, supra, the State sought to prove both factor c(4)(f) and factor c(4)(h), that the defendant murdered a public servant engaged in his official duties. The proof for the two factors was the same: that the defendant had killed a police officer in order to escape apprehension for illegal possession of a gun. 112 N.J. at 524-27, 548 A. 2d 1058. Ibid. Similarly in Bey II, supra, the State sought to establish both factor c(4)(g), that the murder had been committed during a felony, and factor c(4)(c), that the murder had included aggravated assault, torture, or depravity of mind. 112 N.J. at 174, 548 A. 2d 887. Both factors focused solely on the defendant's particularly-brutal sexual assault of his victim prior to her murder. Unlike the evidence in Rose and Bey II, the evidence proving the existence of the two factors was not identical. The trial court's instructions properly informed the jurors that the evidence they would consider with respect to aggravating factor c(4)(g) was different from and substantially more extensive than the evidence they would consider with respect to aggravating factor c(4)(f). The two factors do not rest on the same conduct. The felony-murder factor required proof of all of the elements of a kidnapping for ransom. Factor c(4)(f) was supported by the circumstantial evidence from which the jurors could infer defendant's motive for killing Mr. Flax, including the victim's knowledge of defendant's identity and his long exposure to him during the crime. The mere fact of the kidnapping was insufficient in itself to prove the existence of factor c(4)(f) and functionally served only as a triggering mechanism permitting the jury to consider that factor. We conclude that the trial court's instructions with respect to factor c(4)(f) did not constitute reversible error.