Opinion ID: 2598224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standards of Admissibility of Expert Testimony Used by the Court of Appeals

Text: As discussed in more detail in the next part of this opinion, the Colorado Rules of Evidence currently govern the admissibility of expert testimony. People v. Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, 323 (Colo.2003) ( citing Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 988 (Colo.2002)). The Colorado Rules of Evidence were adopted by this court on October 23, 1979, and became effective January 1, 1980. Prior to the adoption of these rules, the admissibility of expert testimony was governed by common law. In its opinion, the court of appeals acknowledged that CRE 702 governs the admissibility of expert testimony. Slip op. at 2. The court also noted some of our recent cases interpreting the admissibility of expert testimony under the Colorado Rules of Evidence, namely Martinez, 74 P.3d 316, Masters, 58 P.3d 979, and Shreck, 22 P.3d 68. Id. at 2-3. However, in addition to noting these modern cases, the court of appeals heavily relied on cases involving admission standards that either (1) predate the Colorado Rules of Evidence, or (2) are based on sufficiency of evidence rather than admissibility of testimony. Reliance on these cases leads to a standard of admissibility less flexible than that used today under the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Specifically, the court of appeals noted that a medical opinion is admissible under Colorado law if founded on reasonable medical probability, citing Songer v. Bowman, 804 P.2d 261 (Colo.App.1990), aff'd, 820 P.2d 1110 (Colo.1991), and Daugaard v. People, 176 Colo. 38, 488 P.2d 1101 (1971), for this conclusion. Id. at 3. Although the court did not directly assert that Burns' testimony was inadmissible because it was not stated with reasonable medical probability, it appears to have used this standard to determine that Burns' testimony was inadmissible. The court found that Burns' testimony addresses only possibilities and amounts to not more than conjecture and speculation; it is not a competent basis for an expert opinion, which is almost exactly the same language that the Daugaard court used to describe testimony it found was not stated with a reasonable medical probability. [5] Id. at 6. Therefore, we trace the history of reasonable medical probability as used in Songer and Daugaard in order to determine the origin and definition of the phrase. In doing so, we find the phrase outdated and inappropriate for determining the admissibility of expert testimony. To the extent our earlier cases approve of this standard, they are overruled. In Songer, the court of appeals found that a deposition in a medical malpractice case should not have been admitted, as [a] medical opinion is only admissible if founded on reasonable medical probability, but it found the error harmless. 804 P.2d at 265 (emphasis added). Songer relied on Thirsk v. Ethicon, 687 P.2d 1315 (Colo.App.1983), for the proposition that reasonable medical probability was required for admissibility. In Thirsk, a product liability tort case, the court of appeals held the trial court erred in excluding expert testimony regarding other possible causes of the plaintiff's injury. 687 P.2d at 1318. The court stated that [a] medical opinion is admissible if founded on reasonable medical probability, citing Houser v. Eckhardt, 168 Colo. 226, 450 P.2d 664 (1969) for this rule. Id. Nonetheless, the Thirsk court found the trial court unduly limit[ed] defendant's expert testimony on the grounds that its experts must state with reasonable medical probability exactly which one of the sources caused the infection. . . . Id. We also note the Thirsk court did not say that a medical opinion is admissible only if founded on reasonable medical probability, as was stated in Songer. In Houser, we held a properly qualified medical expert who has examined a claimant solely for the purpose of evaluation and testimony in a tort case, rather than for treatment, should have been allowed by the trial court to testify to his opinion. 168 Colo. at 233, 450 P.2d at 668. We stated: We hold as a rule of evidence that a properly qualified medical expert who has examined a claimant for the purpose of evaluating the nature and extent of his injuries, and whose employment was for the purpose of testifying in court and not for the purposes of treatment, may testify to his opinion based upon reasonable medical probability as to the nature and extent of claimant's injuries and disabilities and to other related matters. . . . Id. at 233-34, 450 P.2d at 668 (emphasis added). We cited no case law in support of this portion of the opinion. [6] Two things become clear from tracing the case history of Songer. First, Houser predated the Colorado Rules of Evidence by more than ten years, and any standard it established for the admissibility of expert testimony was supplanted when the Rules of Evidence were adopted. Second, as the phrase was used in Thirsk, reasonable medical probability was a sufficient but not necessary condition for the admission of the testimony. The Thirsk court did not say that only testimony that reached this standard was admissible; in fact, it specifically admitted expert medical testimony that was not offered with reasonable medical probability. As a result, Songer relied on a standard from Houser that predated the Colorado Rules of Evidence, and transformed a sufficient condition from Thirsk into a necessary condition. The second case the court of appeals relied on for its statement that a medical opinion is admissible under Colorado law if founded on reasonable medical probability was Daugaard. 176 Colo. 38, 488 P.2d 1101. In Daugaard, a case involving termination of parental rights, we found that a psychologist's testimony did not support the trial court's conclusion of dependency and neglect because it was based on hearsay, and because of: the inherent lack of probative value of the opinion given. Nowhere did the witness predicate his opinion upon a [r]easonable medical certainty or probability that the condition of marasmus did in fact exist; rather, his opinion was essentially based upon possibilities that such existed. This amounts to no more than conjecture and speculation and is not a competent basis for opinion evidence. Nowhere did the expert testify that [p]robably the child was suffering from marasmus, as the court ultimately found. Assuming, arguendo, that the testimony was properly before the court, at most it suggests `preliminary signs' of marasmus, which can scarcely be equated with the disease of `marasmus, a serious syndrome caused by lack of physical attention and other proper care; and that this condition was caused by actions or omissions of respondent,' as found by the court. Id. at 43-44, 488 P.2d at 1103-04 (citing Md. Cas. Co. v. Kravig, 153 Colo. 282, 385 P.2d 669 (1963); Baeza v. Remington Arms Co., 122 Colo. 510, 224 P.2d 223 (1950)) (other non-Colorado citations omitted) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). Thus, the Daugaard court suggested that reasonable medical certainty or probability was the common law standard at that time for the admissibility of expert testimony. However, as is evident from the context, the court was primarily concerned that the evidence offered, i.e., the testimony of the psychologist, did not support the trial court's findings. This interpretation of the court's holding is supported by its citations to Kravig and Baeza. Kravig and Baeza, and all of the cases on which Kravig and Baeza rely, did not involve admissibility of testimony. Instead, Kravig, Baeza, and their precedents all involve situations where the court found the evidence did not support the judgment or a finding of fact necessary for the judgment. [7] Whether the evidence is sufficient to support a judgment is a separate question from whether the evidence should be admitted in the first place. None of the cases on which Daugaard relied state or imply that speculative testimony is inadmissible. Therefore, the suggestion in Daugaard that reasonable medical probability was the current common law standard for the admissibility of expert testimony was incorrect in that we relied on cases that involved sufficiency of evidence. Further, even assuming Daugaard established a new common law standard of admissibility, it did so prior to the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence and has thus been abrogated. In its analysis, the court of appeals relied on Roybal v. People, 178 Colo. 259, 496 P.2d 1019 (1972) and Stull v. People, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455 (1959), in addition to Songer and Daugaard, for its conclusion that Burns' testimony was no more than conjecture and speculation and was not a competent basis for an expert opinion. Again, the court of appeals' reliance on cases that predated the 1979 adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence, and that were concerned with sufficiency of evidence to support a conviction or judgment versus admissibility of expert testimony, was improper. In Roybal, an attempted burglary case, we found that [p]roof that stands no higher than the level of suspicion, surmise or conjecture has no substance and cannot form the basis of a conviction under our system of criminal justice, which requires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 178 Colo. at 262, 496 P.2d at 1021 ( citing Stull, 140 Colo. 278, 344 P.2d 455). Stull involved a prosecution for receiving stolen property. The Stull court used similar but broader language, determining that [p]roof that ascends no higher than the level of suspicion, surmise or conjecture has no substance in our system of jurisprudence, whether the problem considered be criminal or civil. 140 Colo. at 282, 344 P.2d at 457 ( citing the Colorado cases of Neal v. Wilson County Bank, 83 Colo. 118, 263 P. 18 (1927) and Thompson, 65 Colo. 4, 169 P. 539). Again, the danger of speculative evidence as discussed in Roybal, Stull, and Stull's precedents did not involve the standard for admissibility of expert testimony. Instead, those cases involved whether the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction or judgment. [8] In addition, both Roybal and Stull predated the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. In sum, insofar as language in our earlier decisions suggests that expert medical testimony may not be admitted unless such is rendered with reasonable medical probability or certainty, this standard has been abrogated by the adoption of the Colorado Rules of Evidence. Having confirmed that the Colorado Rules of Evidence govern the admissibility of expert testimony, we apply those standards to the case at hand.