Opinion ID: 203886
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency Claim Is Unavailing

Text: Santiago maintains that no rational jury could have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and that he must be acquitted on grounds of insufficient evidence. He argues that from the evidence presented at trial a jury could not make out a reasonable inference that he had the requisite knowledge and intent to participate in the conspiracy charged in the indictment. Specifically, Santiago points to Canino's March 31, 2005 meeting with Bristol where Canino inquired about using another police officer in order to escort a cocaine shipment. Santiago argues that at no point in this meeting is his name suggested or even mentioned. Furthermore, Santiago argues that the jury could not draw a rational inference of his guilt from the events of April 6, 2005, when Canino met with Bristol and Santiago at the parking lot of the Wyndham Hotel. Santiago states that he was not formally introduced as the alleged corrupt cop and that he was not particularized in any way. He notes that he only said what's up? and that at no point was he paying attention to the conversation between Bristol and Canino. Santiago maintains that Canino was only instructing Bristol as to how the drugs were to be transported. Santiago further asserts that there is no evidence that he was paid $4,000 for his part in the conspiracy. Finally, with respect to the weapons charge in Count Ten, Santiago maintains that since the government did not meet its burden in showing Santiago had the requisite intent for the conspiracy and aiding and abetting charges in Counts One and Nine, respectively, the government likewise did not meet its burden on the firearms count. Santiago relies on the fact that he was merely present at the scene and that he carried a gun as a police officer. The record does not support Santiago's version of events and instead shows that the government met its burden at trial. Even if we were to disregard the March 31, 2005 planning meeting between Canino and Bristol, the events of April 6, 2005 provide sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer Santiago's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, at trial Canino testified that he gave Santiago and Bristol keys to a vehicle to use for the drug operation, instructed them on what to do, and told them that they were going to receive $4,000 each when they completed the trip. Canino also testified that Bristol and Santiago drove in a separate car to pick up the drugs from Canino's associate; that they drove to meet another one of Canino's associates and dropped off the drugs in that associate's vehicle; and finally, that Canino paid Bristol and Santiago $4,000 each and proceeded to discuss participating in a larger transaction. Canino further testified that Santiago was present during all conversations, during the loading and unloading of drugs, and during the discussion of the 300 kilogram transaction. Although Santiago maintains that he was merely present at the scene, a reasonable jury could credit Canino's testimony, as well as Jamill's corroborating testimony, which showed that Santiago was actively involved in the joint action. On appeal, we do not engage in credibility determinations. See Hernández, 218 F.3d at 66 n. 5 (It is not our role to assess the credibility of trial witnesses or to resolve conflicts in the evidence, instead we must resolve all such issues in favor of the verdict.). As detailed above, Canino's testimony implicates Santiago as an active participant in the drug operation who was rewarded for his involvement. This testimony, if believed, is sufficient to satisfy the elements of Counts One and Nine. With respect to the weapons charge in Count Ten, Santiago cannot escape conviction on this count simply because he was otherwise obligated to carry a gun as part of his job as a police officer. A jury could rationally infer that Santiago also possessed the gun to further the drug crime. For example, a jury could infer that one of the objectives of enlisting Santiago's participation in the activity ... was to prevent, by [his] presence, other drug dealers or other legitimately motivated police officers from interfering in and disrupting the transport of the drugs. United States v. Villafañe-Jiménez, 410 F.3d 74, 83 (1st Cir.2005). Furthermore, a jury could infer that the presence of the gun[ ], displayed in the open, by the Defendant[ ] as [an] active participant[ ] in the illegal activity, would have a tendency to discourage interruption of the transport by other persons. [3] Id. Thus, because a jury could infer that Santiago used his status as a police officer, which includes the fact that he carries a gun, in order to protect the drug transaction in which he engaged, Vázquez Guadalupe, 407 F.3d at 500 n. 4, we conclude that there existed an adequate nexus between [Santiago's] possession of the gun and the drug trafficking crime sufficient to support the charge. [4] Id.