Opinion ID: 2571564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Penalty Phase Retrial Claims

Text: Bonilla contends the trial court erred by refusing to strike for cause two prospective jurors, James B. and Robert F., who he contends indicated they would automatically vote for death if first degree murder were proven. The state and federal constitutional guarantees of a trial by an impartial jury include the right in a capital case to a jury whose members will not automatically impose the death penalty for all murders, but will instead consider and weigh the mitigating evidence in determining the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 910, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; accord, People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 120-121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) However, a juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views concerning capital punishment only if those views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( Crittenden, at p. 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) `Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. [Citation.] The trial court must determine whether the prospective juror will be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case. [Citation.] A juror will often give conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror's responses in deciding whether to remove the juror for cause. The trial court's resolution of these factual matters is binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] [W]here equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective juror's ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court's determination as to his true state of mind is binding on an appellate court. [Citations.] [Citation.]' ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 416, 127 Cal. Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; accord, People v. Moon (2005) 37 Cal.4th 1, 14, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 894,117 P.3d 591.) To preserve an objection to the trial court's failure to excuse a juror for cause, a defendant must (1) exercise a peremptory challenge against the juror in question, (2) exhaust all peremptories, and (3) express dissatisfaction with the jury as finally empanelled. ( People v, Ramirez (2006) 39 Cal.4th 398, 448, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 677, 139 P.3d 64; People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 539, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1,133 P.3d 1076; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) It is undisputed Bonilla exercised peremptories against both James B. and Robert F. and eventually exhausted both his individual and joint peremptories, but the People contend Bonilla forfeited his claim by failing to adequately express dissatisfaction. The record is ambiguous. After the jury was selected, counsel for Nichols reiterated that various challenges for cause had been denied; that he had sought additional peremptories; and that, had he had additional peremptories, he would have used them on one or more jurors who were ultimately empanelled. He concluded: So the record should reflect I object to the panel as chosen, and I made every attempt to obtain additional challenges when I exhausted my individual and joint challenges. Counsel for Bonilla added only the following: For the record, we used two challenges. One on Mr. [F.] and one on Mr. [G.] They are the ones I called to the Court's attention, both of whom have [vacations] that [conflict] with our trials. We need not decide whether this ambiguous statement was intended to piggyback on Nichols's counsel's objections and express similar dissatisfaction with the final composition of the jury. Even if it were not, and Bonilla's claims consequently might be subject to a procedural bar, we have acknowledged that the law on the need to express dissatisfaction was in a state of flux until late 1994, after Bonilla's mid-1994 penalty retrial jury selection. (See People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 416, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 911, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103.) On that basis, we declined to enforce a procedural bar in Boyette and Weaver, and we do so again here. On the merits, the People do not defend the trial court's failure to excuse Prospective Jurors James B. and Robert F., arguing instead that this case is analogous to People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pages 417-419, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391, in which we found error in the trial court's refusal to excuse a juror for cause, but ultimately found the error harmless. Without deciding whether there was error, we agree Bonilla has failed to demonstrate prejudice from the refusal to excuse James B. and Robert F. Because Nichols and Bonilla exercised joint peremptory challenges against James B. and Robert F., they did not sit on the jury. The harm from any theoretical error was thus confined to the loss of additional peremptory challenges. (See People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 540, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076; People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 114, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) [T]he loss of a peremptory challenge in this manner `provides grounds for reversal only if the defendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an incompetent juror is forced upon him.' (Yeoman, at p. 114, 2 Cal. Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166.) Bonilla contends he was subjected to just this harm because Juror Dario L. was seated after Bonilla had exhausted all his peremptories. But while Bonilla asserts he challenged Dario L. for cause, the record reflects no such challenge. [10] Thus, as in Yeoman, Bonilla was not forced to accept a juror incompetent under Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, and can show no prejudice. Accordingly, we reject his argument that the refusal to excuse jurors for cause violated his constitutional rights.
During jury selection at the penalty phase retrial, Bonilla objected to the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges to excuse women, Hispanics, and African-Americans. The trial court considered and rejected these motions, concluding Bonilla had failed to make out a prima facie case that the prosecution was engaged in impermissible discrimination. The jury as seated included no African-Americans, one Hispanic, and five women. [11] Bonilla renews these claims on appeal. We find no error. Both the state and federal Constitutions prohibit the use of peremptory challenges to exclude prospective jurors based on race or gender. ( People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 276-277, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748; Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 97, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B. (1994) 511 U.S. 127, 130-131, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89.) Such a use of peremptories by the prosecution violates the right of a criminal defendant to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community under article I, section 16 of the California Constitution. [Citations.] Such a practice also violates the defendant's right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 541, 43 Cal. Rptr.3d 1,133 P.3d 1076.) There is a rebuttable presumption that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible discrimination. ( Purkett v. Elem (1995) 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115 S.Ct. 1769, 131 L.Ed.2d 834; People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 536, 554, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; People v. Johnson (2003) 30 ' Cal.4th 1302,1309,1 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 71 P.3d 270, overruled on other grounds in Johnson v. California (2005) 545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129.) To do so, a defendant must first make out a prima facie case `by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.' [Citation.] Second, once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the `burden shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial [or gender] exclusion' by offering permissible race-neutral [or gender-neutral] justifications for the strikes. [Citations.] Third, `[i]f a race-neutral [or gender-neutral] justification is tendered, the trial court must then decide ... whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful ... discrimination.' [Citation.] ( Johnson v. California , at p. 168, 125 S.Ct. 2410, fn. omitted.) The same three-step procedure applies to state constitutional claims. ( People v. Bell (2007) 40 Cal.4th 582, 596, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292.) Ordinarily, we review the trial court's denial of a Wheeler/Batson motion deferentially, considering only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. ( People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 541, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) However, the United States Supreme Court recently concluded that California courts had been applying too rigorous a standard in deciding whether defendants had made out a prima facie case of discrimination. (See Johnson v. California, supra, 545 U.S. at pp. 166-168, 125 S.Ct. 2410 [holding the requirement a defendant show a strong likelihood, rather than a reasonable inference, of discrimination was inconsistent with Batson and the federal Constitution].) In cases where the trial court found no prima facie case had been established, but whether it applied the correct reasonable inference standard rather than the strong likelihood standard is unclear, we review the record independently to `apply the high court's standard and resolve the legal question whether the record supports an inference that the prosecutor excused a juror' on a prohibited discriminatory basis. ( People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 597, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292; accord, People v. Williams (2006) 40 Cal.4th 287, 310, 52 Cal.Rptr.3d 268, 148 P.3d 47; see People v. Avila, supra, 38 Cal.4th at pp. 553-554, 43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076.) In deciding whether a prima facie case was stated, we consider the entire record before the trial court (e.g., People v. Yeoman, supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 116, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166), but certain types of evidence may be especially relevant: [T]he party may show that his opponent has struck most or all of the members of the identified group from the venire, or has used a disproportionate number of his peremptories against the group. He may also demonstrate that the jurors in question share only this one characteristicโtheir membership in the groupโand that in all other respects they are as heterogeneous as the community as a whole. Next, the showing may be supplemented when appropriate by such circumstances as the failure of his opponent to engage these same jurors in more than desultory voir dire, or indeed to ask them any questions at all. Lastly, ... the defendant need not be a member of the excluded group in order to complain of a violation of the representative cross-section rule; yet if he is, and especially if in addition his alleged victim is a member of the group to which the majority of the remaining jurors belong, these facts may also be called to the court's attention. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-281, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748, fn. omitted.)
There were two African-Americans, Rosalind H. and David L., in the 78person juror pool; the prosecution struck them both. Nichols made a Batson/Wheeler motion objecting to the removal of African-Americans, which Bonilla joined. The trial court denied the motion, finding no systematic exclusion of Blacks. We agree with the trial court that Bonilla made no prima facie showing that the two prospective African-American jurors were challenged because of their race. Bonilla relies principally on the fact that all African-Americansโtwo of twoโwere `struck from the juror pool. It is true the prosecution used peremptories to challenge both African-Americans in the pool, but the small absolute size of this sample makes drawing an inference of discrimination from this fact alone impossible. `[E]ven the exclusion of a single prospective juror may be the product of an improper group bias. As a practical matter, however, the challenge of one or two jurors can rarely suggest a pattern of impermissible exclusion.' ( People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 598, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292, quoting People v. Harvey (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 90, 111, 208 Cal.Rptr. 910; see also People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 167-168, 32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521.) [12] Bonilla does not contend the prosecution's questioning of Rosalind H. and David L. was cursory or materially different from the questioning of non-African-American jurors. Nor is Bonilla African-American. Moreover, the information elicited in voir dire showed race-neutral reasons for excusing both prospective jurors. Defense counsel freely conceded, With respect to Miss [H.] and Mr. [L.], Miss [H.] represents a close case, given the fact her husband suffered a previous [felony] conviction and her father had been convicted of killing his brother. (See People v. Garceau (1993) 6 Cal.4th 140, 172, 24 Cal. Rptr.2d 664, 862 P.2d 664 [recognizing peremptory may be used to excuse juror whose relatives have had negative criminal justice system experiences].) The prosecutor relied on this, as well as the fact Rosalind H. felt the death penalty was randomly imposed. As for David L., the prosecutor cited questionnaire and voir dire answers that suggested hesitation about the death penalty, as well as his perception that David L. failed to respond when the court asked the prospective jurors whether they could follow the law. The trial court correctly concluded no prima facie case of group bias against African-Americans had been established. [13]
There were eight Hispanics in the juror pool. The prosecution struck three Hispanic women, Gavina D., Carla G., and Nellie D. The defense struck four Hispanic men. One Hispanic man served on the final jury. Nichols made a Batson/Wheeler motion, objecting to the use of strikes against Hispanics, and Bonilla joined the motion. The trial court denied it, concluding: On this record, I make a finding there was no attempt to discriminate or excuse Hispanics from this jury. Bonilla resumes this argument on appeal, contending that statistical evidenceโthe prosecution's exclusion of all three Hispanic womenโalone establishes a prima facie case. We disagree. Preliminarily, the statistical frequency with which the prosecution struck Hispanics from the juror pool provides no basis at all to infer discrimination. Hispanics comprised approximately 10 percent of the pool (eight of 78), the prosecution used 10 percent of its challenges on Hispanics (three of 30), and the final jury was roughly 10 percent Hispanic (one of 12). Bonilla of course is a Hispanic male, but the prosecution used not a single strike against any Hispanic male, and a Hispanic man sat on the jury. Perhaps because of this, Bonilla at various points frames his objection as one against the exclusion of Hispanic women. Whether or not Hispanic women constitute a separate cognizable group for Wheeler/Batson purposes, distinct from both women generally and Hispanics generally, [14] on these facts this shifting approach smacks of data dredging. That is, given numerous (increasingly small) subcategories and cross-categories of individuals, one is increasingly likely to find, somewhere, a particular category for which one side or the other happens to have stricken most or all of the (few) members of the groupโnot for reasons of discrimination, but as a simple consequence of the laws of probability. In such circumstances, the force of any corresponding inference of discrimination will necessarily be weakened. Moreover, while it so happens the prosecution's use of peremptories resulted in the exclusion of all three Hispanic women, defining the relevant category in this way means Bonilla is no longer a member of the relevant group and no longer benefits from whatever force his group membership would otherwise have had in supporting an inference of discrimination. The record further indicates that for one of the three Hispanic women, Nellie D., the prosecutor did not realize she was Hispanic. Where a prosecutor is unaware of a prospective juror's group status, it logically follows he cannot have discriminated on the basis of that status. (See People v. Barber (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 378, 389, 394, 245 Cal.Rptr. 895.) Bonilla offers no reason, beyond the ratio of Hispanics struck to those in the juror pool, to conclude the prosecutor discriminated against Hispanics or Hispanic women in his use of peremptories, and the record amply supports the trial court's conclusion that he failed to make out a prima facie case of group bias against Hispanics.
The juror pool included 48 men and 30 women. The prosecution used 20 strikes on women (and 10 on men), while the defense used five strikes on women (and 25 on men). As a result, the final jury included seven men and five women. Nichols made numerous Wheeler challenges to the prosecution's striking of women, and midway through jury selection Bonilla indicated he joined in Nichols's Wheeler motions. The trial court denied the motions without seeking further explanation from the prosecution for its strikes, implicitly concluding the defense had not made out a prima facie case of group bias against women. The People argue Bonilla failed to preserve objections to all but eight of the women the prosecution struck. We disagree. As the People acknowledge, during a recess in jury selection to address Wheeler/Batson issues, Bonilla joined in Nichols's pending Wheeler/Batson motions (which then included challenges to the use of eight strikes on women). The prosecution sought to preclude any further interruption of jury selection, not wanting defense counsel to engage in speaking motions that would highlight for the jurors their concerns the prosecution was discriminating, and offered to stipulate that all Wheeler/Batson objections would be deemed preserved and could be taken up at the close of jury selection. The trial court was unsatisfied with this approach, which would make it more difficult for it to track and evaluate defense objections, and eventually directed Nichols's counsel to simply interject the single word motion after any strike challenged on Wheeler/Batson grounds. It is unclear from the record whether the parties understood Nichols's interjection would suffice for both defendants, just as in exercising the two defendants' joint peremptory challenges during jury selection one counsel would frequently speak for both parties. It is similarly unclear whether Bonilla's counsel intended his joinder in Nichols's Wheeler/Batson motions to cover only those then pending or those going forward as well. Given these ambiguities, we decline to find a forfeiture of additional Wheeler/Batson claims based on Bonilla's counsel's failure to echo Nichols's counsel's interjection of the word motion during the remainder of jury selection. Turning to the merits, Bonilla again rests his claim solely on a statistical analysis of the prosecution's strikes. While the juror pool contained 38 percent women (30/78), the prosecution used 67 percent of its strikes on women (20/30). Closer analysis, however, reveals this apparent disparity is not all it appears. First, the ultimate composition of the jury (42 percent women) mirrored that of the juror pool (38 percent women). (See People v. Ward, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 203, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 114 P.3d 717 [ultimate composition of the jury is a factor to be considered in evaluating a Wheeler/Batson motion]; People v. Turner, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 168, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521 [same].) Indeed, after the prosecution expended its final peremptory, the jury stood at six men and six women; only Bonilla's subsequent use of his final individual strikes reduced the jury to five women. The defense challenged the prosecution's use of peremptories against prospective jurors in seats 1, 3, 5, 6, and 9 as gender-biased, but near the end of jury selection the prosecution passed, accepting the jury, despite the fact women held every one of those seats. By the time the prosecution used its final peremptory strikeโto remove a man from the juryโ four of those five contested seats were held by women. [15] Thus, the prosecution's pattern of peremptories does not suggest it attempted to, nor did it in fact, deprive Bonilla of a jury containing a fair cross-section of men and women. Second, looking only at the overall juror pool exaggerates any discrepancy between the prosecutor's use of strikes and the juror pool composition. Two male jurors were excused, four male jurors were never called or failed to appear, four male jurors were called and seated after the prosecution had exhausted its challenges, and seven male jurors (and two female jurors) were challenged by the defense immediately on seating, before the prosecution had any opportunity to act. Thus, the pool the prosecution had the opportunity to challenge was actually 47 percent female (28/59). Third, the record discloses gender-neutral reasons for the strikes Bonilla objected to under Wheeler. Rosalind H. was the first challenged woman to draw a Wheeler/Batson motion; her husband had a prior conviction, and her father had been convicted of killing his brother. Moreover, the record establishes the defense challenged the use of a strike against her, not because she was a woman, but because she was African-American. As noted above, Bonilla failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination against African-Americans. The defense next challenged the use of a strike against Carla G. The prosecutor explained that he struck Carla G. because she would not directly answer his questions, leaving him uncertain whether he could trust that he knew where she really stood. The record supports this. Carla G. gave a series of equivocal answers about whether she could impose the death penalty, described her feelings about the death penalty as mixed in her juror questionnaire, and gave no answer to questions about her thoughts on life without the possibility of parole. She further indicated she believed the death penalty was imposed randomly and that it should be reserved for heinous crimes such as mass murderers or children killers. [16] Next, the defense challenged the use of strikes against Shirley C, Laura M., Joanne M., and Ramona T. Shirley C. indicated in her questionnaire that she had served on a jury on three previous occasions, two of which had resulted in a hung jury. Her initial reaction to being put in the position of making a life-or-death decision was that she would be kind of uncomfortable, although hopefully she would be strong enough to make the right decision. Laura M., like Rosalind H., had a close relative (her brother) who was serving time for a felony conviction. She described herself as moderately in favor of the death penalty but strongly in favor of life in prison without possibility of parole, and identified the circumstances warranting the death penalty in her mind as mass murders, child murders. Joanne M. described herself as liberal. She believed the death penalty was imposed randomly. She noted she was a Catholic and the Catholic Church stands against the death penalty, but she indicated this would not affect her ability to choose either life or death. She believed the death penalty was appropriate for the most heinous crimes where victims were made to suffer or died an especially violent death, as well as especially brutal [crimes] ... that caused the victim intense suffering before he/she died, while life without possibility of parole should apply to murders that did not satisfy these criteria. In addition, she was newly pregnant and expressed extreme uncertainty over how this might affect her service or her ability to decide that another person should die. Asked again whether she could go through with sentencing someone to death, she indicated: I think I would balk a little bit. I don't even know if it is because of my emotional state right now, but it kind of gives me theโI don't know. I would feel bad, I think, if it came down to that. In each of these three cases, the juror's responses would give reason enough for a prosecutor to consider a peremptory, without regard to the juror's sex. Ramona T.'s questionnaire was virtually blank with respect to her view about the criminal justice system and the death penalty; it gave essentially no insight into her views other than that she had given them little thought. Asked how important the fact someone had been killed would weigh in her life-or-death calculus, she replied opaquely, If I feel that is fair, then, no, it is not important. Asked whether the fact that money is involved or financial gain in your own personal value system, is that something important to you as to make any difference between the death penalty or life without possibility of parole should apply?, she replied, No. Asked whether her view that life or death might be appropriate in any case would extend to a situation where the defendant murdered more than 10 people, or blew up an airplane and killed 80 people, she indicated again that either life or death might be appropriate. Finally, she described herself as a very strong person emotionally and I will develop my own opinion. The difficulty from a prosecution or defense perspective is that it was virtually impossible to glean from her voir dire or questionnaire any clue as to what those opinions might be. Ramona T. thus presented a wild card, even more so than Carla G. Given her indication that murder for financial gain was not a factor she considered important, the prosecutor could reasonably have used a peremptory for reasons unconnected to Ramona T.'s sex. After a short conference to address Nichols's (and Bonilla's) first six Wheeler/Batson motions, jury selection continued, and the defense challenged the use of peremptories against five additional prospective female jurors: Anne E., Candice M., Carol L., Barbara B., and Victoria D. Again, the record discloses gender-neutral reasons why a prosecutor might consider these prospective jurors less than ideal and elect to use one of his 30 peremptories to remove them from a penalty phase jury. Anne E. described herself in her questionnaire as a political liberal. She described the death penalty as acceptable in principle, but [t]he circumstance[s] must be of such a nature that the sentence is the only one at which to arrive. While she was neutral toward the death penalty, she was strongly in favor of life in prison without possibility of parole. She described some methods of execution as criminal as to suffering of the executed and medieval. She identified the best arguments for or against the death penalty as innocence of crimeโinhumane techniques. Candice M. indicated she did not believe the death penalty should be used often and instead should be reserved [o]nly for the most heinous of crimes. She identified those deserving death as mass murderers [and] people who torture their victims. While strongly in favor of life without possibility of parole, she was less strongly in favor of the death penalty. During voir dire, she indicated, But just [as to the] scale between death and life imprisonment, I would have to say that my scale might be a little uneven towards life imprisonment, and confirmed in response to a follow-up question that, indeed, her personal scales had a small but clear preexisting tilt towards life in prison rather than death. Carol L. gave little or no written responses in her questionnaire, checking yes or no boxes without elaboration and leaving most questions blank or responding No or None when asked her views and attitudes. Her rare elaborations were semiliterate (e.g., Q: What are your general feelings concerning the death penalty? [ถ] A: Some one was murdered, and the a [sic] person was sentencedโ yes.) Voir dire shed only minimal additional light. Barbara B. described herself as a liberal. She expressed concern about news reports indicating executions are not painless and on the death penalty described herself as confused and uncertainโon one hand it makes sense that it is the correct punishment for a crime, on the other hand killing someone seems wrong. Asked how she would vote if whether to have the death penalty were on the ballot, she indicated she was unsure; asked what she thought the best argument for or against the death penalty was, she replied, The best argument against [the death penalty] is that it is wrong to kill another person under any circumstances. Asked whether she thought the death penalty should apply to most premeditated murders, or only the most heinous crimes, she replied, Heinous crimes. Finally, Victoria D. indicated that, like Shirley C, she had prior jury experience, and the previous jury she had served on, in a drug case, had deadlocked without reaching a verdict. Asked about this experience, she emphasized the defendant was not found with any drugs on him, just money and a pager; she later reported the jury was 6-6, she was fine with her decision, and if she served again, she again would adhere to her views and have no problem sitting on a hung jury. One might reasonably speculate from these comments there was a fair chance she was among the six jurors who held out for acquittal. In other questionnaire responses, Victoria D. indicated she believed the death penalty was imposed randomly and was unsure whether she would vote to retain it because she was unsure whether it was fairly handed out. Nor was she sure what circumstances should warrant the death penalty or life without possibility of parole. In sum, for each strike the defense challenged under Wheeler/Batson, the record reflects reasonable gender-neutral bases for use of a peremptory challenge. The trial court did not err in concluding no prima facie case of group bias against women had been made out.
For the first time on appeal, Bonilla identifies in his reply brief five jurors who ultimately sat on the jury who he contends are materially indistinguishable from the jurors the prosecution struck. By waiting until his reply brief to argue that the prosecution's use of strikes should be subjected to a comparative juror analysis, Bonilla has forfeited the issue. (E.g., People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 1017, fn. 26, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 243, 978 P.2d 1171.) In any event, this is a first-stage Wheeler/Batson case, in that the trial court denied Bonilla's motions after concluding he had failed to make out a prima facie case, not a third-stage case, in which a trial court concludes a prima facie case has been made, solicits an explanation of the peremptory challenges from the prosecutor, and only then determines whether defendant has carried his burden of demonstrating group bias. We have concluded that Miller-El v. Dretke (2005) 545 U.S. 231, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 does not mandate comparative juror analysis in these circumstances ( People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 601, 54 Cal.Rptr.3d 453, 151 P.3d 292), and thus we are not compelled to conduct a comparative analysis here. Whatever use comparative juror analysis might have in a third-stage case for determining whether a prosecutor's proffered justifications for his strikes are pretextual, it has little or no use where the analysis does not hinge on the prosecution's actual proffered rationales, and we thus decline to engage in a comparative analysis here.
Bonilla contends he was deprived of his constitutional right to a fair trial and due process by the trial court's alleged failure to adequately investigate and act on allegations that two jurors were sleeping during the penalty phase. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.; Cal. Const., art. I, งง 7, 15, 16.) We discern no abuse of discretion; to the contrary, the trial court promptly and fully investigated, and granted the only motion for discharge supported by the evidence. The trial court has the authority to discharge jurors for good cause, including sleeping during trial. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 1348-1349, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; ง 1089.) When the trial court receives notice that such cause may exist, it has an affirmative obligation to investigate. ( Bradford, at p. 1348, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259; People v. Burgener (1986) 41 Cal.3d 505, 520-521, 224 Cal.Rptr. 112, 714 P.2d 1251.) Both the scope of any investigation and the ultimate decision whether to discharge a given juror are committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. ( Bradford, at p. 1348, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259.) Here, the court received a written note from Juror No. 12, filed October 17, 1994, which advised the court that due to an extended night shift work schedule, he had drifted off to sleep a couple of times this past week. The juror requested a note reprimanding him for falling asleep during the trial, in the hope that his employer, presented with the note, would accommodate him with a more manageable night work schedule. The trial court held a hearing the next day, October 18, to address both Juror No. 12 and another juror, Juror No. 6, who Nichols's counsel believed had also been sleeping. Beginning with Juror No. 12, the court and counsel inquired into the extent of his sleeping and its impact on his functioning as a juror: THE COURT: First of all, I did not notice [you sleeping]. I talked to the court reporter and she said she didn't notice it. So, you are telling us that you did drift off to sleep? [JUROR NO. 12]: Yeah, a couple times last week. [ถ] See, my company went through a down-sizing and as of last Monday I had normally worked between four and six hours at night. THE COURT: That part we have in the letter, but are you saying that you missed a portion of the trial? [JUROR NO. 12]: Well, not necessarily missed it. I mean, I just nodded ... off and came back up. THE COURT: So you didn't miss anything? [JUROR NO. 12]: No, I don't think so. [ถ] ... [ถ] THE COURT: Anybody else have any questions to him? [BONILLA'S COUNSEL]: I guess I have just one for my record.... [W]hen you say you don't think so, I mean, my reaction is once I'm asleep I can't tell how long I have been asleep except by external things, so are you [JUROR NO. 12]: Wellโ [BONILLA'S COUNSEL]: What are you saying, I guess is what I'm asking? [JUROR NO. 12]: It is kind of hard to explain. It was just the fact that I would feel my head go down and then I came back up. [BONILLA'S COUNSEL]: Okay. THE COURT: So you didn't miss anything? [JUROR NO. 12]: I don't think so. THE COURT: You were listening to all the witnesses and what have you. [JUROR NO. 12]: Right (Italics added.) The inquiry thus established that, insofar as could be determined, Juror No. 12 had caught himself nodding off and promptly alerted the court, but had not yet missed any of the trial; neither the trial judge, nor the court reporter, nor apparently counsel had ever noticed him sleeping. After further inquiry into Juror No. 6's sleeping, Bonilla and Nichols moved for a mistrial and in the alternative moved that both jurors be excused. The trial court declined to immediately dismiss the jurors, but invited defense counsel to follow up with a written motion supported by additional evidence. Thus, if in fact the problem was greater than this inquiry showed, defense counsel could submit declarations from other courtroom observers establishing that fact. Nichols, joined by Bonilla, filed a motion with supporting declarations seeking a mistrial or in the alternative the dismissal of Juror Nos. 6 and 12. Notably, the declarations contained statements from witnesses that Juror No. 6 had been sleeping, but no additional evidence that Juror No. 12 had been sleeping. The trial court held a further hearing on October 31, at which each side submitted live testimony and cross-examined witnesses. Asked whether they had seen any jurors sleeping, each of the defense witnesses identified only Juror No. 6; defense counsel elicited no additional evidence suggesting Juror No. 12 had been sleeping in trial or that there was an ongoing problem. The next day, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss Juror No. 6. The trial court's handling of concerns about Juror No. 12's sleeping was well within the scope of its discretion. It held an immediate hearing at which it allowed both sides to question Juror No. 12, it satisfied itself regarding the extent of any problem, and it afforded counsel the opportunity to present additional evidence if they were dissatisfied and concerned that the scope of any sleeping problem might affect their clients' rights. Given that opportunity, defense counsel presented no additional evidence that might cause the trial court to revisit its original denial of requests for a mistrial and for dismissal of Juror No. 12. Bonilla contends the trial court erred in failing to further inquire into Juror No. 12's sleeping after October 18. To the contrary; if the trial court was satisfied with Juror No. 12's answers, as it reasonably could have been, there was no need to inquire further absent additional evidence suggesting an ongoing problem. Bonilla's and Nichols's witnesses, courtroom observers, offered no testimony indicating they ever witnessed Juror No. 12 sleeping. Nor was this omission the result of the trial court in any way limiting further inquiry; [17] if counsel had additional evidence that might have raised concerns about Juror No.12, they could have presented it by declaration or at the October 31 hearing. In the absence of additional evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in either conducting no further independent inquiry or in refusing to dismiss Juror No. 12.
During the guilt phase, the prosecution submitted a dozen photographs of the grave site and Harris's mummified remains. The trial court ultimately admitted eight photographs and excluded four as cumulative. At the penalty phase, Bonilla objected to readmission of these eight photographs, arguing they were irrelevant, unduly prejudicial (because of their allegedly inflammatory nature), and cumulative. The trial court overruled the objections. Bonilla contends their admission was state law error and also deprived him of his right to a fair trial and a reliable capital sentencing determination. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) [18] The admission of allegedly gruesome photographs is basically a question of relevance over which the trial court has broad discretion. ( People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 713, 27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289; accord, People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 624, 123 Cal. Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) The further decision whether to nevertheless exclude relevant photographs as unduly prejudicial is similarly committed to the trial court's discretion: A trial court's decision to admit photographs under Evidence Code section 352 will be upheld on appeal unless the prejudicial effect of such photographs clearly outweighs their probative value. ( Gurule, at p. 624, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224; accord, People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 34, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591.) Notably, however, the discretion to exclude photographs under Evidence Code section 352 is much narrower at the penalty phase than at the guilt phase. This is so because the prosecution has the right to establish the circumstances of the crime, including its gruesome consequences (ง 190.3, factor (a)), and because the risk of an improper guilt finding based on visceral reactions is no longer present. ( Moon, at p. 35, 32 Cal. Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 591-592, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347.) The photographs were relevant. They show the circumstances of the crime, which include what happened to Harris's body as a consequence of Bonilla's and his coconspirators' actions. They corroborate Keyes's testimony about the use of duct tape in the killing (one of the photographs shows duct tape still attached to Harris's skull), and the details of the burial. Keyes's credibility was central to the penalty phase trial. Finally, several of the photographs were used by a pathologist to assist the jury in understanding his testimony. The admitted photographs also were not cumulative; the trial court appropriately limited admission, excluding four of the 12 photographs as cumulative. Nor were the photographs substantially more prejudicial than probative. ``[M]urder is seldom pretty, and pictures, testimony and physical evidence, in such a case are always unpleasant.'' ( People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 35, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591.) Likewise here. But as unpleasant as these photographs are, they demonstrate the real-life consequences of Bonilla's actions. The prosecution was entitled to have the jury consider those consequences. The trial court's exercise of discretion to admit them was neither statutory nor constitutional error.
Bonilla contends the trial court erroneously permitted inadmissible hearsay to remain in the record during the penalty phase and this error rendered his trial fundamentally unfair in violation of his federal due process rights. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends.) The error was harmless and did not render his trial fundamentally unfair. Shelton McDaniels, Bonilla's coconspirator, testified extensively about the plot to kidnap Susan Harris and extort money from her, money that would then be used to pay for killing Keyes. During that testimony, McDaniels described the growing frustration another conspirator, Michael Greenwood (Mut), had with Bonilla's failure to come up with additional money to pay for kidnapping Susan Harris. He testified, Well, Mut felt like Steve [Bonilla] was lying to him about not being able to come up with the money because he had told him that his mom's [sic ] had money tied up in ... CD's and something else that the money was tied up in, but he couldn't access it because she was the only one that could get it or something like this. And she was reluctant as it was to give him the money. But Mut was ready to put the pressure on him and the plan he came up with was going and kidnapping Steve's sister. (Italics added.) Bonilla objected, arguing the statement was inadmissible hearsay outside the scope of the coconspirator exception because it related to matters outside the scope of the conspiracy. (See Evid.Code, ง 1223.) The trial court sustained Bonilla's objection at an in-chambers conference but, once back on the record before the jury, did not advise the jury the objection had been sustained, strike the testimony, or direct the jury to disregard it. The People do not defend either the admissibility of the testimony or the trial court's failure to cure its admission. However, the error was manifestly harmless. There is no reasonable probability exclusion of the testimony about a third party's inchoate criminal designs would have made a difference. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836, 299 P.2d 243.) The real issue at the penalty phase was how to weigh the circumstances of the crime, its impact on the victims, and Bonilla's pattern of conspiring to kill those with whom he disagreed against his family's pleas for mercy and compassion. It is inconceivable this one statement on a tangential matter in a four-month trial tipped the balance. Indeed, Bonilla essentially concedes as much, acknowledging that standing alone, erroneous admission of evidence of the plot to kidnap Bonilla's sister and to extort money from his mother may not have tipped the balance in favor of death. Bonilla argues this state law error violated his federal due process rights. Contrary to the People's contention, the argument was preserved by Bonilla's trial objection on state law grounds. ( People v. Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 435-437, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) However, it is meritless. In the context of the entire penalty phase, this one line of hearsay was inconsequential and did not render Bonilla's trial fundamentally unfair. (See id. at p. 439, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765 [the admission of evidence, even if erroneous under state law, results in a due process violation only if it makes the trial fundamentally unfair]. )
At various points during closing argument, the prosecutor made reference to Bonilla's apparent lack of remorse. Bonilla argues these remarks constituted misconduct and deprived him of his right to a fair trial and a reliable capital sentencing determination. (U.S. Const., 5th, 6th, 8th & 14th Amends.) These claims are partially forfeited. The first time the prosecutor referenced the absence of remorse, Bonilla objected, and the court offered Bonilla additional instruction to the jury on what it could and could not consider. On a later occasion the prosecutor referenced the absence of remorse in connection with mitigation, Bonilla objected, and the court reminded the jury that it would instruct them on the correct law as it related to consideration of mitigation. Otherwise, Bonilla failed to object. As there is no indication objection would have been futile, Bonilla's remaining claims of misconduct are forfeited. ( People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 835-836, 38 Cal.Rptr.3d 98, 126 P.3d 938; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 462, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 672, 107 P.3d 790.) Moreover, we conclude there was no misconduct. We have long recognized that `[r]emorse is universally deemed a factor relevant to penalty. The jury, applying its common sense and life experience, is likely to consider that issue in the exercise of its broad constitutional sentencing discretion no matter what it is told.' ( People v. Combs (2004) 34 Cal.4th 821, 866, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 61, 101 P.3d 1007.) Prosecutors are allowed to focus on a defendant's lack of remorse in two ways. First, [c]onduct or statements at the scene of the crime demonstrating lack of remorse may be considered] in aggravation as a circumstance of the capital crime under section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Pollock (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1153, 1184, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353; accord, People v. Harris (2005) 37 Cal.4th 310, 361, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 509, 118 P.3d 545; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 448-449, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) Second, [a] prosecutor may properly comment on a defendant's lack of remorse, as relevant to the question of whether remorse is present as a mitigating circumstance, so long as the prosecutor does not suggest that lack of remorse is an aggravating factor. ( People v. Mendoza (2000) 24 Cal.4th 130, 187, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 485, 6 P.3d 150; accord, People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 141, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400.) In contrast, when a prosecutor does argue absence of remorse as an aggravating factor, it is misconduct. ( People v. Sims, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 465, 20 Cal. Rptr.2d 537, 853 P.2d 992; People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 510, 250 Cal.Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081.) The prosecutor's comments on Bonilla's lack of remorse fell within these guidelines. He did not argue absence of remorse as an aggravating factor; instead, he contended the jury should consider the absence of remorse when it evaluated the mitigating circumstances: One of the principles that I think is very significant in terms of this concept of mitigating evidence is this issue of remorse. In their case, there has been a total lack of remorse shown by the evidence by either of these two defendants, and before you consider any mitigating evidence, the fact that there has been no remorse shown whatsoever should weigh very heavily against even considering any of that in mitigation. Later: Again, it is this effort to get you off the real issues, whether there is any mitigation that is sufficient to allow you to give [them] less than what the evidence shows they deserve. [ถ] And again, before you can get to that point where the mitigation is something you should even consider, they ought to be able to, they ought to express some remorse before they are entitled to any mitigation. Finally: And then the horror of the discovery and knowing what had become of [Harris], chewed up by the animals. That is what we talk about when we talk about the circumstances of the crime, those things you ought to consider and that remorse, that lack of remorse before you are, you ever, ever, consider any mitigation. Because what we're talking about is responsibility Neither of these two men are taking any responsibility, and it doesn't appear they ever will. How could sympathy or mercy be applicable to them? The gist of the prosecutor's argument throughout, as most clearly reflected in these final remarks, was that because Bonilla had shown no remorse, the jury should take his mitigating evidence, which amounted to a plea for mercy from his family, with a grain of salt, and should be less inclined to grant him mercy. We have consistently approved similar arguments. (See People v. Jurado, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 141, 41 Cal.Rptr.3d 319, 131 P.3d 400 [argument permissible where reasonable jury would have understood prosecutor to be arguing lack of remorse showed the defendant was not entitled to the jury's sympathy]; People v. Pollock, supra, 32 Cal.4th at p. 1184, 13 Cal.Rptr.3d 34, 89 P.3d 353 [allowing argument that You can consider his lack of remorse later on as just tending to show there isn't any mitigation or the mitigation is not worthy of your consideration]; People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 146, 148-149, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887 [allowing argument that jury should ask to see at least some evidence of remorse by the defendant before extending him sympathy and considering life without the possibility of parole].) There was no misconduct.
Bonilla requested that the jury be specifically instructed it could consider any lingering doubt about his guilt as a factor in mitigation. [19] The trial court refused, explaining that it thought the proposed instruction unnecessary and confusing. Bonilla contends that refusal denied him due process and violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. As Bonilla concedes, we have repeatedly rejected the argument that a specific instruction on lingering doubt as a mitigating factor is constitutionally required. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 42, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 231-232, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Lawley (2002) 27 Cal.4th 102, 166, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 614, 38 P.3d 461.) He asks us to disregard settled precedent because, he contends, many of our previous cases rely, directly or indirectly, on Franklin v. Lynaugh (1988) 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155, where no lingering doubt instruction was required in part because the defendant failed to argue lingering doubt during the penalty phase. ( Id. at p. 175, fn. 7, 108 S.Ct. 2320.) Here, in contrast, Bonilla argued lingering doubt extensively. This argument misconstrues our precedents. Even in cases where the defendant argues lingering doubt, we have consistently rejected any constitutional requirement that a specific instruction be given, because instructions that the jury may consider the circumstances of the crime and any other extenuating circumstances (CALJIC No. 8.85; ง 190.3, factors (a), (k)) adequately inform the jury that it may consider any lingering doubts. ( People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 42, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 232, 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 903-904, 85 Cal. Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) These instructions were given here. The trial court did not err in concluding Bonilla's additional proposed instruction was superfluous.
Bonilla raises a series of challenges to the constitutionality of California's death penalty. We have rejected each challenge before. As Bonilla offers no compelling arguments in favor of reconsidering any of these rulings, we do so again. California homicide law and the special circumstances listed in section 190.2 adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty. ( People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229.) While Bonilla contends the ballot arguments in favor of Proposition 7 (approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 7, 1978)), which became the current death penalty law, reflect an intent to expose every murderer to the death penalty, we have rejected that assertion as a misconstruction of the ballot arguments. ( People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237, fn. 23, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496.) Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, does not license the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( Tuilaepa v. California (1994) 512 U.S. 967, 975-976, 114 S.Ct. 2630, 129 L.Ed.2d 750; People v. Smith (2005) 35 Cal.4th 334, 373, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 554,107 P.3d 229.) Nothing in the state or federal Constitution requires that the penalty jury (1) issue written findings, (2) unanimously agree on any particular aggravating circumstances, or (3) find true any particular aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 40, 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Snow (2003) 30 Cal.4th 43, 126, 132 Cal. Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1217, 99 Cal. Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130.) While Bonilla argues we should reconsider these conclusions in light of Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, which impose procedural constraints on fact finding in criminal trials, that argument rests on a misconception concerning the nature of California's capital sentencing scheme. [T]he ultimate determination of the appropriateness of the penalty and the subordinate determination of the balance of evidence of aggravation and mitigation do not entail the finding of facts that can increase the punishment for murder of the first degree beyond the maximum otherwise prescribed. Moreover, those determinations do not amount to the finding of facts, but rather constitute a single fundamentally normative assessment [citations] that is outside the scope of Ring and Apprendi. ( People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 595, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; accord, Snow, at p. 126, fn. 32, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) The trial court is not constitutionally required to instruct the jury on a burden of proof; in California, at the penalty phase there is no burden of proof, only a normative judgment for the jury. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 40, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Moon, supra, 37 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 894, 117 P.3d 591; People v. Stitely (2005) 35 Cal.4th 514, 573, 26 Cal.Rptr.3d 1,108 P.3d 182.) Comparative proportionality review, also known as intercase proportionality review, is not required to render California's sentencing scheme constitutional. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 44, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 237, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1042, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) Likewise, consideration by the jury of unadjudicated criminal conduct at the penalty phase does not violate the state or federal Constitution. (E.g., People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 43, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229; People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 236, 33 Cal.Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496.) Nor do Ring v. Arizona, supra, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556, and Apprendi v. New Jersey, supra, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435, require the jury to unanimously agree beyond a reasonable doubt on any prior criminal conduct before considering it; as previously discussed, these decisions are inapplicable to California's capital sentencing scheme. ( People v. Griffin, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 595, 15 Cal.Rptr.3d 743, 93 P.3d 344; People v. Snow, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 126, fn. 32,132 Cal.Rptr.2d 271, 65 P.3d 749.) The inclusion of the adjectives extreme and substantial in the list of mitigating factors (ง 190.3, factors (d) & (g)) does not impermissibly constrict consideration of mitigating evidence and is consistent with the state and federal Constitutions. ( People v. Smith (2003) 30 Cal.4th 581, 642, 134 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 68 P.3d 302.) The trial court was not constitutionally required to instruct the jury that section 190.3's mitigating factors could be considered only as mitigating factors and that the absence of evidence supporting any one of them should not be viewed as an aggravating factor. (E.g., People v. Gray, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 236, 33 Cal. Rptr.3d 451, 118 P.3d 496; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 465-466, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391; People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 341-342, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) The equal protection clause does not require that California include in its capital sentencing scheme the same disparate sentence review previously provided noncapital convicts under the Determinate Sentencing Act. ( People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 466, fn. 22, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 544, 58 P.3d 391.) Bonilla's argument that the use of capital punishment `as regular punishment for substantial numbers of crimes' violates international norms of human decency and hence the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution fails, at the outset, because California does not employ capital punishment in such a manner. The death penalty is available only for the crime of first degree murder, and only when a special circumstance is found true; furthermore, administration of the penalty is governed by constitutional and statutory provisions different from those applying to `regular punishment' for felonies. (E.g., Cal. Const., art. VI, ง 11; งง 190.1-190.9, 1239, subd. (b).) ( People v. Demetrulias, supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 43-44, 45 Cal.Rptr.3d 407, 137 P.3d 229.)