Opinion ID: 201308
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure and Timeliness of Expert Opinions

Text: 9 In considering the Estate's motions to strike and exclude, the Magistrate Judge meticulously reviewed each paragraph the plaintiff identified as containing newly disclosed expert opinions and granted the plaintiff's motion for certain paragraphs and denied the motion for others. See Plaintiff's Motion to Exclude Various Opinions of Defendant's Experts, Minott v. Smith, No. 03-10-P-H, 2003 WL 22078070 (D.Me. Sep.05, 2003) (No. 13) (Motion to Exclude); Plaintiff's Motion to Strike Portions of Defendant's Affidavits in Support of His Cross Motion for Summary Judgment, Minott, 2003 WL 22078070 (No. 19) (Motion to Strike). The appellant now claims that the Magistrate Judge erred by failing to strike or exclude the remaining objected-to paragraphs. 10 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a) provides that a party shall disclose to other parties the identity of any person who may be used at trial to present [expert opinion evidence] and submit a detailed report including the expert's qualifications and a complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis and reasons therefor. Fed.R.Civ.P. 26(a)(2)(A)-(B). This Court has held these directives to be mandatory since the adoption of Rule 37(c)(1), which clearly contemplates stricter adherence to discovery requirements, and harsher sanctions for breaches of this rule. Klonoski, M.D. v. Mahlab, M.D., 156 F.3d 255, 269 (1st Cir. 1998). [T]he required sanction in the ordinary case is mandatory preclusion. Id. 11 Rule 37(c)(1) enforces Rule 26(a) by providing that [a] party that without substantial justification fails to disclose information required by Rule 26(a) ... is not, unless such failure is harmless, permitted to use as evidence ... any witness or information not so disclosed. Fed. R.Civ.P. 37(c)(1). Although Rule 37(c)(1) is traditionally invoked to preclude expert testimony at trial, it can also be applied to motions for summary judgment. See Lohnes v. Level 3 Communications, Inc., 272 F.3d 49, 60 (1st Cir.2001) (citing Trost v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 162 F.3d 1004, 1007-09 (8th Cir.1998) (finding that a products liability defendant, whose summary judgment motion relied partially on the plaintiff's lack of expert testimony, would have been significantly prejudiced by plaintiff's untimely expert disclosure)). However, as we have previously noted, Rule 37(c)(1) allows the court to admit belatedly proffered expert evidence if the proponent's failure to reveal it was either substantially justified or harmless. Lohnes, 272 F.3d at 60. 12 The purpose of the expert disclosure rules is to facilitate a `fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practical extent.' Id. (quoting Thibeault v. Square D. Co., 960 F.2d 239, 244 (1st Cir.1992)). Thus Rules 26(a) and 37(c)(1) seek to prevent the unfair tactical advantage that can be gained by failing to unveil an expert in a timely fashion, and thereby potentially deprive a plaintiff of the opportunity to depose the proposed expert, challenge his credentials, solicit expert opinions of his own, or conduct expert-related discovery. Id. 13 Here, the Magistrate Judge focused on determining whether the expert opinions in the affidavits had been disclosed during the discovery period in accordance with Rule 26(a). Unlike the situation in Lohnes or Trost, Smith actually disclosed the identity of his experts and provided the Estate and court with expert designations that included the opinions the experts would express in accordance with the court's deadline for expert designations. The issue here is not that the experts' affidavits were entirely new and unannounced, but rather whether any new information was included in the expert affidavits that was not included in the complete statement of all opinions to be expressed, as required by Rule 26(a). 14 In ruling on the affidavits, the Magistrate Judge clearly evaluated each segment of the affidavits individually. In some paragraphs, the court found that the May 15, 2003 designation of experts adequately encompassed the opinions in the affidavits. In paragraphs where the district court found the expert opinion to be beyond the scope of expert designation, the Estate's motion to strike was granted. In so doing, the Magistrate Judge ensured that consideration of any remaining information in the affidavits would be harmless to the plaintiff. For example, the Magistrate Judge granted in part Plaintiff's Motion to Strike with regard to Paragraph 23 of Leavitt's affidavit where Leavitt opines that the Vessel was rammed because the Judge found it was not fairly disclosed in Smith's expert designation. Minott v. Smith, No. 03-10-P-H, 2003 WL 22078070, at  (D.Me. Sep.05, 2003). However, the Judge denied the motion as to the second sentence in Paragraph 23 because he determined that the contents of the sentence should come as no surprise in view of Smith's disclosure in his expert designation. Id. For these reasons, we find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion to strike with respect to the remaining paragraphs. 15