Opinion ID: 2369380
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boundary Fence or Fence of Convenience

Text: [¶ 12] After Mr. Clark presented his prima facie case for adverse possession, the burden shifted to the Helms to explain Mr. Clark's possession of the disputed area. They attempted to show that his use of the property was permissive because the fence was located off the property line as a matter of convenience. The placement, type and purpose of a fence are important factors in adverse possession cases. A fence which is intended to be the boundary between properties supports a claim for adverse possession. On the other hand, a fence that is placed in a certain location in order to separate pastures or irrigated meadows from grazing land or because the terrain makes it easier to build the fence in that location rather than on the property line is a fence of convenience. When a fence is located off the property line as a matter of convenience, use by the neighbor is considered permissive and will defeat a claim for adverse possession. Braunstein, ¶ 18, 226 P.3d at 833-34; Cook, ¶¶ 9-10, 193 P.3d at 709; Hillard, 888 P.2d at 1259; Davis v. Chadwick, 2002 WY 157, ¶ 9, 55 P.3d 1267, 1270-71 (Wyo.2002). The determination of whether a fence establishes a property boundary or is one of convenience is a question of fact. Id. See also, Hovendick v. Ruby, 10 P.3d 1119, 1123 (Wyo.2000). [¶ 13] The district court rejected the Helms' argument that Mr. Clark's use was permissive and ruled the evidence supported a finding that the fence was a boundary fence rather than a fence of convenience: [T]he Clark-Helm fence . . . was [not] built as an interior fence. The land on either side of the fence is similar in nature requiring no separation due to the nature of the land. The fence runs from where it intersects with Section 7 [on the east] in a straight line west over a ridge. Once it goes over the ridge it runs through mixed aspen and evergreen timber where its course meanders somewhat and trees are occasionally used as fence posts. But it is substantial in that it consists of five barbed wires. It runs through serviceberry bushes in places and the wire is off the posts in places in the spring. Trees have fallen over the fence in places. This is the normal condition of a longstanding fence enclosing pasturelands that are located in standing timber and subject to heavy snows. The fences needed to be repaired in the spring as Mr. Clark testified. This does not convert a boundary fence into a fence of convenience. [T]he Court finds that the Clark-Helm fence was constructed in the 1920's on a line that ran more or less straight consistent with the fence line located in the south boundary of [the adjacent property to the east in Section 7]. . . . The nature of this fence is consistent with a boundary fence. It is of the same type, if not better, . . . as that fence [on the west side of the Helms' property] and a better fence than the Helms' southern boundary fence. It was assumed to be on the surveyed line until about 1968. It is typical of the boundary fences that the Helms and Clarks had even though it may not have been built to modern standards. From 1968 onward the Plaintiffs Helms were aware the Clarks were possessing their property on the other side of the fence yet they failed to take action to stop this possession. [¶ 14] The Helms challenge the district court's finding that the fence was a boundary fence, claiming that Mr. Clark and his predecessors admitted, in a related matter, that a different fence on the eastern boundary of the disputed area was one of convenience. During the trial, the Helms asked the district court to take judicial notice of the record in a case involving a property line dispute between Mr. Clark and his neighbors to the east in Section 7, Township 30 North, Range 118 West, 6th P.M., Lincoln County, Wyoming, Kenneth and Meleese Nebeker. Mr. Clark's father and uncle filed an affidavit in that case. They averred that the Clark/Nebeker fence was off the property line (it was located west of the actual property line so that part of Clark's property was fenced in with Nebekers' property); their father, Ernest L. Clark, had owned the lands on both sides of the fence in Sections 7 and 12; and the fence was originally put in as a fence of convenience between farm land and hill pasture. The Clark/Nebeker dispute was eventually settled and the fence was moved to the east in the late 1990s. [¶ 15] The district court addressed the Clark/Nebeker matter in its decision letter: The third evidentiary issue is the Plaintiffs' request for the Court to take judicial notice of an affidavit signed by Kenneth Clark [sic] claiming a north-south fence between Sections 7 and 12 was a fence of convenience because it was not on the surveyed line. This is offered by Plaintiffs as an admission by inference that the east-west Clark-Helm fence line is also a fence of convenience. This issue arose during trial and evidently was not disclosed in discovery. The affidavit originated in a case that was settled and there was no decision issued that made a factual finding that it was a fence of convenience so that it could collaterally estop Ken Clark from denying the north-south fence line was a fence of convenience. The Court will construe Mr. Clark's statement as an admission that the fence along that north-south section line was a fence of convenience. This is a reasonable assumption because Ernest L. Clark had [previously] owned the property on both sides of the line, i.e., [in both sections 7 and 12]. There was no need to have the fence on the exact boundary line because he owned both sides. It appears to separate his farm land from his pastureland. The admission goes no further than that and is not an admission that the Clark-Helm fence was a fence of convenience. The situations are entirely different and carry no weight in determining if the Clark-Helm fence is a fence of convenience. [¶ 16] The Helms assert the district court erroneously determined that the admission regarding the Clark/Nebeker fence was not relevant in this case. As the district court recognized, the two cases involved different fences. Mr. Clark's predecessor had once owned the two properties at issue in the Clark/Nebeker matter and the fence was built by a common owner to separate different types of land. The Clark/Helm fence was built to separate two landowners rather than different types of land. The district court's finding that the admission was not relevant to the present dispute was consistent with the evidence and was not clearly erroneous. [¶ 17] The Helms also assert the district court erred by not recognizing that the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited relitigation of the issue of whether the Clark/Helm fence was one of convenience or a boundary fence. The elements of collateral estoppel are: (1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical with the issue presented in the present action; (2) the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior adjudication; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Hutchins v. Payless Auto Sales, Inc., 2004 WY 22, ¶ 15, 85 P.3d 1010, 1013 (Wyo.2004), quoting Pokorny v. Salas, 2003 WY 159, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 171, 175 (Wyo.2003). We need not spend much time on the collateral estoppel analysis. It is clear that the issue presented in the Clark/Nebeker matter was different from the issue presented here. As we stated above, the two cases involved different fences and different situations. [6] The district court correctly ruled the Clarks' admission that the Clark/Nebeker fence was a fence of convenience did not have any preclusive effect in the present case.