Opinion ID: 172648
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Application of Regulations

Text: Assuming the validity of the regulations, which we have found, Rosillo-Puga argues alternatively that 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1) does not apply to those aliens who have already been removed. He relies upon the Ninth Circuit's decision in Lin v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 979 (9th Cir.2007), in support of this argument. The regulation states that a motion to reopen or reconsider shall not be made by or on behalf of a person who is the subject of removal, deportation, or exclusion proceedings. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). The Ninth Circuit held that the regulation is phrased in the present tense and so by its terms applies only to a person who departs the United States while he or she ` is the subject of removal . . . proceedings.' Lin, 473 F.3d at 982. Accordingly, [b]ecause petitioner's original removal proceedings were completed when he was removed. . ., he did not remain the subject of removal proceedings after that time. Id. The government urges us not to follow Lin, arguing that it misinterpreted the plain language of the regulations: A plain reading of both regulations[ [6] ]shows they aim to bring finality to the immigration process by preventing an alien from filing a motion to reopen after having departed the United States. The [Ninth Circuit] erred because while the regulations speak in terms of an alien who is the subject of removal proceedings, the regulations do not link the term is to the time of departure. Rather, is refers to an alien who at some point is in proceedings, regardless of whether he or she departs during or after those proceedings. Respondent's Br. at 21. The government finds reinforcement for that interpretation in the next sentence of the regulations, which states [a]ny departure from the United States, including the deportation or removal of a person who is the subject of exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings, occurring after the filing of a motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider, shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(d); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(1). The government argues [t]hat sentence also speaks in terms of an alien who `is the subject' of removal proceedings, but necessarily deals with departures after the completion of proceedings. Respondent's Br. at 22. We agree with the government that Lin 's interpretation of the regulation is problematic. Quite simply, it seems illogical to discuss motions to reopen filed by aliens in proceedings, as typically, a motion to reopen will be filed only by one whose proceedings are completed, and, thus, need to be reopened. By contrast, the regulation as a whole makes sense if it addresses motions to reopen filed by those aliens who have departed following the completion of their deportation/removal proceedings, and wish to reopen them. We therefore reject Rosillo-Puga's interpretation of the regulation. See Matter of Armendarez-Mendez, 24 I & N Dec. 646 (BIA 2008) (specifically rejecting the Lin court's interpretation of the regulation); see also Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 297-99 (rejecting identical argument). Rosillo-Puga also argues, alternatively, that the regulation is arbitrary and capricious as applied to him because it fails to account for the fact that his order of removal was premised on a characterization of his conviction that was subsequently overturned; that the IJ and BIA should have considered his motion sua sponte; and that the agency's application of the regulation violated his due process rights. We note that the Fifth Circuit has recently rejected the identical arguments, and we agree with that court's analysis. See Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 296-300. Rosillo-Puga argues that the IJ's removal order is invalid because it is based on an erroneous interpretation of the definition of a crime of violence. Pet'r's Br. at 27. While Rosillo-Puga cites some cases arguably supporting his position, as the government points out, there is ample authority to the contrary. For example, in Navarro-Miranda v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 672 (5th Cir.2003), a case very similar factually to this case, the petitioner had previously been deported based on a drunk driving conviction, and he argued, post-departure, that the BIA should have sua sponte reopened his proceedings because an intervening circuit court decision held that a drunk driving conviction was not a deportable offense. The BIA declined to invoke its sua sponte authority, noting that the more specific post-departure bar trumped the more general sua sponte authority provision. In denying the petition for review, the Fifth Circuit observed that [t]he Board's conclusion . . . is consistent with the well-established principle that `a final civil judgment entered under a given rule of law may withstand subsequent judicial change in that rule.' Id. at 676 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989)); see also Patel v. Atty. Gen., 334 F.3d 1259, 1262 (11th Cir.2003) (dismissing petition where petitioner's prior conviction was subsequently found by state court to not constitute a deportable defense, saying we perceive no theory under which the subsequent action of a state court could confer jurisdiction upon us that would not otherwise exist). Thus, we cannot say that the BIA's decision was arbitrary and capricious. See Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 296-98. Next, the IJ and BIA found that when there is an apparent conflict between a specific provision and a more general one, the more specific one governs. Memorandum & Dec. at 2, Admin. R. at 54; see also Order at 1, Admin. R. at 2. As we stated in Shawnee Tribe, [i]t is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, when there is an apparent conflict between a specific provision and a more general one, the more specific one governs. 423 F.3d at 1213 (further quotation omitted). That general rule has been specifically applied to the regulations at issue here. See Navarro-Miranda, 330 F.3d at 676 ([T]he BIA's reasoning that the prohibition on motions to reopen stated in § 3.2(d) [post-departure bar] overrides its § 3.2(a) power to reopen on its own motion is a reasonable interpretation of these two regulations.); see also Mansour v. Gonzales, 470 F.3d 1194, 1198 (6th Cir.2006). Furthermore, we have held that we do not have jurisdiction to consider petitioner's claim that the [Board] should have sua sponte reopened the proceedings under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) because there are no standards by which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. Infanzon v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 1359, 1361 (10th Cir.2004). Thus, we perceive no error in the BIA's decision that, notwithstanding its sua sponte authority to consider motions to reopen, it declined to reopen Rosillo-Puga's proceedings in this case. [7] See Ovalles, 577 F.3d at 295-98. Finally, Rosillo-Puga argues that the BIA's application of the regulatory bar to his case violated his due process rights. We disagree. It is well-established that aliens are entitled to due process in deportation proceedings. Pena-Muriel, 489 F.3d at 443. In this context, due process requires that the alien receive notice of the charges against him, and a fair opportunity to be heard before an executive or administrative tribunal. Id. Rosillo-Puga received due process in his deportation proceedings. At the time of his removal, he had been convicted of a crime that warranted his removal. He received all appropriate process before the immigration authorities, he did not seek relief from the removal order, and he waived his right to appeal the removal order. He made no attempt to alter the status of his conviction before he left the country. Now, Rosillo-Puga attempts to reopen proceedings that ended roughly five years ago, and five years following his departure. Due process does not require continuous opportunities to attack executed removal orders years beyond an alien's departure from the country. Indeed, there is a strong public interest in bringing finality to the deportation process. Id.