Opinion ID: 149122
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Weight of the Evidence Against Defendants

Text: This factor goes to the weight of the evidence of dangerousness, not the weight of the evidence of the defendant's guilt. See Hazime, 762 F.2d at 37 (noting that the weight of evidence against the person deals with the factors to be considered in determining whether there are conditions which will assure the appearance of the accused and safety of the community); see also United States v. Gebro, 948 F.2d 1118, 1121 (9th Cir.1991) (Section 3142(g) neither requires nor permits a pretrial determination of guilt). At the bail hearings before the magistrate and before the district court, the government introduced evidence in the form of transcripts of conversations among defendants before the undercover FBI agent, lists of the items seized at defendants' homes (including weapons, [8] bomb-making implements, and military rations), and proffer of what the undercover FBI agent would testify to at trial. When the district court ordered that the government present a witness who could be cross-examined, the government brought forth an FBI agent with little or no firsthand knowledge of the events. However, conducting a bail hearing by proffer is acceptable under the law and at the discretion of the district court. See United States v. Webb, 238 F.3d 426 (table), 2000 WL 1721060, at  (6th Cir. 2000) ([T]the government may proceed in a detention hearing by proffer or hearsay.); see also United States v. Smith, 79 F.3d 1208, 1210 (D.C.Cir.1996) (Every circuit to have considered the matter ... [has] permitted the Government to proceed by way of proffer.). Thus, we will examine the evidence before the district court to determine how convincing the government's evidence of dangerousness is.
When Stone's home was searched, the FBI found at least 37 firearms, ammunition for the seized weapons, and military gear and uniforms. The FBI also found components for IEDs, including threaded pipes, shrapnel, electronic matches, cannon fuse, and explosive powder. He led seventeen training sessions and events for the Hutaree, as its leader, between September 2008 and March 2010, including those at which explosive devices were demonstrated. When making plans for the real op, David Stone stated that any member of the team who encountered a civilian while on the mission was to handle it as a hostile situation. That means you put them on the ground. Either putting bullets in them, or if they just willingly get down on the ground, and let you leave the area peacefully, great. (R. 157.) He went on to note that Putting bullets through bodies ain't an easy thing, but hey you do it a couple of times it don't bother ya. ( Id. ) He also instructed the Hutaree to wipe down all bullets and casings that they were bringing on the mission. This evidence weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.
After Joshua Stone heard that his eight co-defendants had been arrested, he sought weapons, sought cash, sought vehicles, [and] sought to arm himself and other Hutaree members who rallied around him[.] (R. 85 at 67.) He then engaged in an armed stand-off with federal agents for two days. He ultimately surrendered without incident, but only after his wife and step-mother made a video asking him to come out peacefully. ( Id. at 72.) Aside from surrender, his actions were consistent with the Hutaree's 10-step protocol for resisting the government; Joshua Stone simply failed to execute the last step, known as Point of No Return. (R. 157 at 23.) Joshua Stone also demonstrated his dangerousness through his role as second-in-command of the Hutaree. In planning the real op, Joshua Stone told his patrol squad, don't be afraid to pull the trigger on anybody, if we have to, and welcome to ... being in the business of shooting people. (Gov't App'x at 57.) This evidence weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.
When Meeks' home was searched, the FBI found 16 long guns and thousands of rounds of ammunition, in addition to substantial food stockpiles and gas masks. He had been tasked to get component materials for IEDs, though no explosive devices were found in his home. He has spoken frequently about different ways to kill police officers, owns five semi-automatic weapons and has stated that he has a thousand tracer rounds for his AR-15 that he would be doling [ ] out to the Hutaree. He voiced plans to die by copicide, which he has explained means killing a law enforcement officer while dying at the hands of another officer. On a single day in June 2009, Meeks suggested blowing up a local bridge when the enemy came; he discussed capping a member of law enforcement and seizing that person's weapons; and he stated that members of Congress think they're different but [w]ait until they found out that they bleed exactly the same. (R. 87 at 8.) Meeks also declared: We got to start over man. We got to get rid of the judicial system, everybody. They need to die. ( Id. ) In February 2010, another Hutaree member suggested killing a judge, and Meeks chimed in: I'm lookin' at enough people right here to take out virtually anybody. And I mean virtually anybody. You just got to be motivated enough to go do it. (Gov't App'x at 52.) This evidence weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.
When Piatek's home was searched, the government seized, among other things, 46 firearms, 13,000 rounds of ammunition, smoke grenades, a ballistic vest and helmet, a cross-bow, and a CD regarding explosives. (R. 91 at 29-35.) During a trip with several Hutaree members to a Kentucky militia conference, after David Stone guaranteed that he would pop a police officer, Piatek then expressed his own hatred for law enforcement. ( Id. at 25); see United States v. Gomez-Fernandez, 198 F.3d 259 (table), 1999 WL 992985, at  (10th Cir.1999) (a single threat to a police officer is sufficient to show a danger to the community). This evidence weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.
The government has proffered that Clough knows how to construct trip-wire detection systems, and he was likely responsible for one used during the Hutaree's training. (R. 157 at 10-11, R. 85 at 80.) Moreover, Clough's own statements reflect a desire to kill federal officials. Upon seeing a list of federal judges, elected officials, business leaders and educational leaders, Clough remarked that it looked like a ready-made hit list for the Hutaree. (R. 85 at 27-28.) Clough also posted, on a militia website, a message promoting violence against ATF agents: ATF Agents were at our local [firearms dealer] today looking for all paperwork specifically relating to our commander.... We have and will return fire. The question is, will you? Hutaree.com. ( Id. at 13.) This evidence weighs strongly in favor of dangerousness.