Opinion ID: 45401
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: mr. mcclendon

Text: Mr. McClendon argues that the district court erred in not awarding him a minor role reduction under USSG § 3B1.2. We disagree. The district court held Mr. McClendon accountable only for the nine kilograms of cocaine that he agreed to sell, 18 and not for the entire shipment of 89 kilograms. This limitation of relevant conduct does not bar a minor role reduction as a matter of law, see § 3B1.2,comment. (n. 3(a)), but it is not irrelevant either, as explained in United States v. Boyd, 291 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2002), because the district court must measure a defendant’s conduct against the role of others in that relevant conduct. The district court did not clearly err in finding that Mr. McClendon was not a minor participant. Unlike some of the other conspirators, Mr. McClendon had an ownership interest in a portion of the cocaine shipment, and agreed to further distribute some of the cocaine; he was not “substantially less culpable than the average participant.” § 3B1.2, comment (n. 3(a)).4 Mr. McClendon further contends that, in calculating his criminal history, the district court erred in counting a Georgia misdemeanor conviction for obstruction of a police officer and a Georgia misdemeanor conviction for simple battery. Again, we disagree. Looking at the obstruction conviction first, Mr. McClendon was sentenced in 2000 to 10 days’ imprisonment and 12 months’ probation. See McClendon PSR ¶ 29. In relevant part, USSG § 4A1.2( c)(1)(A) provides that a misdemeanor conviction for 4 Mr. Garza sought to adopt the arguments made by his co-defendants, including the minor role argument asserted by Mr. McClendon. We do not address Mr. Garza’s entitlement to a minor role, as that matter is heavily dependent on the facts and those facts are not addressed by Mr. Garza in his brief. 19 an offense similar to “hindering or failure to obey a police officer” is counted if the “sentence was a term of probation of at least one year or a term of imprisonment of at least 30 days[.]” Mr. McClendon, citing to Billingsley v. State, 177 Ga. App. 775, 341 S.E. 2d 305 (Ga. App. 1997) (holding that “twelve months” is not equivalent to “one year” for purposes of a misdemeanor), argues that “Georgia law makes a critical distinction between sentences of ‘twelve months’ and sentences of ‘one year.’ A misdemeanor cannot be punished by a period of time exceeding twelve months, and Georgia law holds that one year is greater than twelve months.” McClendon Brief at 22. Like the other circuits which have addressed this argument, we reject it because Mr. McClendon has cited no authorities to support his contention that the Sentencing Guidelines – as opposed to Georgia law – view a probationary sentence of “twelve months” as different than a probationary sentence of “one year.” See United States v. Blevins, 29 Fed. Appx. 195, 197 (6th Cir. Dec. 28, 2001); United States v. Mattox, 1998 WL 808362,  (4th Cir. Nov. 23, 1998); United States v. Prosper, 1998 WL 767105, - (8th Cir. Nov. 2, 1998). See also United States v. McClendon, 195 F.3d 598, 602-03 (11th Cir. 1999) (rejecting similar argument on plain error review). With respect to the simple battery conviction, Mr. McClendon was sentenced in 1992 to 12 months’ probation and a $360 fine. Mr. McClendon asserts that a simple battery conviction is not counted under the Sentencing Guidelines, but the 20 language of § 4A1.2( c) does not support his argument. Under this provision, “sentences for misdemeanor and petty offenses are counted, except as follows . . . . ” Nothing following this language – i.e., nothing in subsections ( c)(1) or ( c)(2) – suggests that a simple battery conviction would be excluded. Battery is not like the other offenses excluded under § 4A1.2( c), see United States v. Dillon, 905 F.2d 1034, 1036 (7th Cir. 1990), and the cases we have been able to locate indicate that simple (i.e., misdemeanor) battery is properly counted. See United States v. Lee, 995 F.2d 887, 888-89 (9th Cir. 1993) (rejecting argument that such a conviction could not be counted because it was uncounseled); United States v. Reynolds, 31 Fed. Appx. 293, 294 (4th Cir. March 29, 2002) (same).