Opinion ID: 2538150
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Prevention of Abusive Litigation

Text: Finally, defendant argues that interpreting section 51, subdivision (f) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act as a whole to permit a damages remedy for ADA accessibility violations that do not involve intentional discrimination would spur abuses in an already troubled legal arena. (See Gunther, supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at pp. 250-251 [reviewing federal court decisions noting a pattern of abusive litigation under the ADA and state law].) We recently addressed a similar argument that in order to suppress abusive litigation by serial plaintiffs or attorneys seeking only financial gain, often through extortion of settlements from small businesses, more should be required of Unruh Civil Rights Act plaintiffs. ( Angelucci v. Century Supper Club, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 178.) [11] Observing that we share[d] to some degree the[se] concerns, we nonetheless found they do not supply a justification for our inserting additional elements of proof into the cause of action defined by the statute. It is for the Legislature (or the People through the initiative process) to determine whether to alter the statutory elements of proof to afford business establishments protection against abusive private legal actions and settlement tactics. It is for the Legislature, too, to consider whether limitations on the current statutory private cause of action might unduly weaken enforcement of the Act or place unwarranted barriers in the way of those persons who suffer discrimination and whose interests were intended to be served by the Act. ( Angelucci, at p. 179.) Here, too, we are bound to interpret the Unruh Civil Rights Act in accordance with the legislative intent as we can best discern it, regardless of any policy views we may hold. In its most recent regular session, moreover, the Legislature tackled the challenge of improving compliance with access laws while protecting businesses from abusive access litigation. In chapter 549 of the 2008 Statutes (Sen. Bill No. 1608 (2007-2008 Reg. Sess.)), the Legislature enacted several provisions with this purpose, including (1) a requirement that any attorney serving a complaint or sending a demand for money for a construction-related accessibility claim [12] must include a notice informing the recipient, among other things, that he or she is not required to pay any money until found liable by a court and may have a right to have the action stayed pending an early evaluation conference (§ 55.3); (2) procedures for voluntary inspection of a property by a certified access specialist or CASp (§ 55.53); (3) procedures for staying actions raising construction-related accessibility claims for 90 days (extendable to 180 days), if the property has been inspected by a CASp, for the plaintiff to provide details of his or her claims, damages, and attorney fees incurred, and for the court to hold an early evaluation conference during the stay period in order to evaluate the site's current condition and progress toward correcting any alleged violations, settlement possibilities, and sharing of further information between the parties (§ 55.54); and (4) provisions for the court to consider written settlement offers made and rejected when determining the amount of reasonable attorney fees on a construction-related accessibility claim (§ 55.55). Most pertinent here, the new legislation (applicable to claims filed on or after Jan. 1, 2009 (§ 55.57)) restricts the availability of statutory damages under sections 52 and 54.3, permitting their recovery only if an accessibility violation actually denied the plaintiff full and equal access, that is, only if the plaintiff personally encountered the violation on a particular occasion, or the plaintiff was deterred from accessing a place of public accommodation on a particular occasion (§ 55.56, subd. (b)). It also limits statutory damages to one assessment per occasion of access denial, rather than being based on the number of accessibility standards violated. ( Id., subd. (e).) The 2008 Legislature was informedand may be presumed to have been awarethat damages under the Unruh Civil Rights Act might be awarded for denial of ADA-mandated access without proof of intentional discrimination. [13] Yet, although two other bills introduced in the same session would have required accessibility plaintiffs to give businesses prelitigation notice of any violation and an opportunity to cure, [14] the reform approach the Legislature ultimately chose did not include requiring such notice or other proof of intent to discriminate. Instead, the Legislature chose to impose limitations on damages and attorney fees, coupled with a scheme of accessibility inspections, stays of litigation, and mandatory evaluation conferences. Even if we agreed with defendant that adding an intent requirement to the Unruh Civil Rights Act would be warranted to curb abuse, we would not be free to substitute our own judgment for that of the Legislature.