Opinion ID: 2974121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the party responsible

Text: The first of these arguments is that Johnson was not the party responsible for any statutory violations that Rasputin may have committed. Section 3(a) of the SCA, 41 U.S.C. § 352(a), imposes liability on “the party responsible” for violations of the Act. The regulation interpreting that term clarifies that it covers more than just the corporate officers “who actively direct[] and supervise[] the contract performance.” 29 C.F.R. § 4.187(e)(1). Rather, “the party responsible” can be any “person[], irrespective of proprietary interest, who exercise[s] control, supervision, or management over the performance of the contract, including the labor policy or employment conditions regarding -2- No. 05-4355 Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Labor the employees engaged in contract performance, and who, by action or inaction, cause[s] or permit[s] a contract to be breached.” Id. § 4.187(e)(4). Johnson insists that he exercised no control over the operations or labor policy of Rasputin until becoming president in August of 1996, and therefore argues that he played no role in the SCA violations. As the district court correctly noted, however, “the ALJ was tasked with determining whether the testimony of Wayne Stewart or William Johnson was more credible.” Johnson, 2005 WL 1970742, at . Stewart, who was the operations manager for Rasputin’s security contract and had worked with Johnson over many years on other government contracts, testified that Johnson (1) decided the wage rate at which employees would be paid, (2) made other payroll decisions, (3) had final authority on all equipment, (4) made employment decisions (including hiring Stewart and firing project manager Lee Holman), and (5) held himself out as the president of Rasputin both during the bidding process and during the DOL investigation in 1996. Although Johnson conceded his role in securing the contract and getting operations up and running, he testified that he had nothing to do with the day-to-day operations of the company from the Fall of 1995 until he assumed the presidency of the company in August of 1996. Johnson instead deflected blame onto his brother Wallace, the person to whom Stewart allegedly reported. Outside of helping to secure the contract, lending Rasputin money at the outset, and giving initial advice on personnel matters, Johnson claims that he did not control Rasputin’s operations until taking over as president. Stated simply, the accounts given by Stewart and Johnson are irreconcilable. The determination of whether Johnson was “the party responsible” therefore turns on which one of the -3- No. 05-4355 Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Labor two men was found more credible. This court, in reviewing administrative decisions both in and outside of the labor context, has consistently accorded substantial deference to the credibility determinations of the ALJ. See, e.g., NLRB v. Taylor Mach. Prods., Inc., 136 F.3d 507, 514 (6th Cir.1998) (“We afford even more deference to Board determinations of credibility and will not normally set aside the Board’s choice between conflicting testimony.”); Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004) (according “great deference” to an ALJ’s credibility determination in assessing whether an applicant’s claim of subjective pain was believable); see also Dantran, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 171 F.3d 58, 72 (1st Cir. 1999) (recognizing “a hearing officer’s latitude in making credibility calls”). ALJs, after all, are the only judicial officers to see and hear the witnesses and to observe their overall demeanor during their testimony. See NLRB v. Gen. Fabrications Corp., 222 F.3d 218, 225 (6th Cir. 2000) (reciting the rule that this court “ordinarily will not disturb credibility evaluations by an ALJ who observed the witnesses’ demeanor,” especially “where the record is fraught with conflicting testimony and essential credibility determinations have been made”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The record in the present case is indeed “fraught with conflicting testimony.” See id. Johnson argues that this conflict should be resolved in his favor because Stewart had an interest in casting blame on Johnson in order to avoid debarment himself. The ALJ, ARB, and the district court all rejected this argument, reasoning that Stewart’s self-interest was merely speculative because he had not been charged by the DOL, that Johnson did not specifically refute certain instances of supervisory control cited by Stewart, and that, had Stewart simply wanted to implicate someone else, he could have pointed to Wallace Johnson, with whom he did not have as extensive a relationship -4- No. 05-4355 Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Labor as he had with William Johnson. Given the ALJ’s ability to assess the credibility of Johnson and Stewart, we see no basis for overturning either the legal conclusion that Johnson was “the party responsible” or the ALJ’s factual findings underlying that determination. Evidence that Johnson points to as corroborating his version of events does not alter our conclusion. Specifically, Johnson relies on the testimony of Darlene Ford, as well as on the asserted absence of testimony backing up Stewart’s account, to argue that his version of events is more accurate. Ford was the manager of Rasputin’s Ohio office and also worked for Plum Run, a company owned and operated by Johnson. She testified that she worked directly for Stewart, that Stewart signed the payroll checks, and that she knew of only two officers of the company, neither of whom was Johnson. According to Johnson, Ford is an independent source who refutes Stewart’s description of Johnson’s responsibilities at Rasputin. We agree with the district court, however, that the ALJ and the ARB did not clearly err in refusing to credit Ford’s testimony. For one thing, Ford may not have been “completely independent.” She worked directly for Plum Run, a separate company owned by Johnson and operated out of an office adjacent to that of Rasputin. Ford thus had an interest in casting Johnson’s actions in the light most favorable to him. In addition, Ford’s testimony is inconsistent with other evidence in the record. As the district court ably explained, Ford testified that Stewart handled all matters having to do with payroll, workers compensation, and conflicts with the DOL. This would mean that Stewart acted unilaterally on the most important legal and financial questions affecting Rasputin, despite Ford’s acknowledgment that Stewart was not an officer of the company. That -5- No. 05-4355 Johnson v. U.S. Dept. of Labor Rasputin would structure itself in this way strains credulity and provides ample reason for the ALJ to have discounted the credibility of Ford’s testimony.