Opinion ID: 1628307
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Traffic Stop and Seizure

Text: It is undisputed than an individual's constitutional protections from unreasonable searches and seizures are triggered during an investigative traffic stop. United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 682, 105 S.Ct. 1568, 1573, 84 L.Ed.2d 605 (1985). The law provides the stopping of a vehicle and its occupants constitute a seizure under the law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). In determining the legality of a traffic stop, a reviewing court must decide whether the officer's action was justified at its inception, and whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). For a traffic stop to be justified at its inception, an officer must have an objectively reasonable suspicion that some sort of illegal activity occurred or is about to occur, before stopping the vehicle. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 1585, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989); State v. Kalie, 96-2650, p. 3 (La.9/19/97), 699 So.2d 879, 881. When an officer observes what he objectively believes is a traffic offense, the decision to stop the vehicle is reasonable, regardless of the officer's subjective motivation. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 1772, 1774, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); State v. Waters, 00-0356, p. 4 (La.3/12/01), 780 So.2d 1053, 1056; State v. Landry, 98-0188, p. 2 (La.01/20/99), 729 So.2d 1019, 1020. After reviewing the record in its entirety, we conclude Officer Himel did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights by virtue of the traffic stop. At the inception of the stop, Officer Himel had a reasonable suspicion that the tint on the windows on the defendant's vehicle was in violation of the statutory limitations set forth in Louisiana Revised Statute 32:361.1(C)(1). The officer testified that, while he believed the tint on each window violated the law, he only measured the light transmission of the front side windows, the darkest windows, and determined they did not comply with the statutory guidelines. His testimony relative to the violation is corroborated by documentary evidence, namely, the traffic citation issued to the defendant for the illegal tint, as well as by the fact that the defendant does not contest the tinting did not comply with the legal limitations. After validly stopping the defendant's vehicle, Officer Himel discovered the defendant was not wearing his seatbelt. This violation of Louisiana Revised Statute 32:295.1 is also uncontested by the defendant and substantiated by the issuance of a traffic citation. While the violation was not immediately apparent at the time the defendant's car was pulled over, the law is clear that a driver's failure to wear a seatbelt constitutes reasonable cause for an investigatory traffic stop. Id. As to the propriety of the search, the defendant's removal from the vehicle, which ultimately led to the discovery of the weapon, was authorized by virtue of the traffic stop. Both the United States Supreme Court and this Court have recognized that, for the safety of the officer making a traffic stop, the occupants may be ordered out of a vehicle pending completion of the stop. Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 117 S.Ct. 882, 886, 137 L.Ed.2d 41 (1997); State v. Benoit, 01-2712, p. 6, (La.5/14/02), 817 So.2d 11, 15. The defendant's exit from his car was further justified given the time of day, coupled with the officer's lack of a full range of visibility into the vehicle. Moreover, Officer Himel's use of a flashlight to conduct the warrantless search, which allowed him to observe the butt of the gun sticking out from underneath the driver's seat, did not violate the defendant's protections afforded under the Fourth Amendment. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 740, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 1542, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983) ([T]he use of artificial means to illuminate a darkened area simply does not constitute a search, and thus triggers no Fourth Amendment protection.). Whatever is discovered by shining a flashlight into a vehicle is considered to be in plain view, if there is prior justification for the intrusion and it is immediately apparent that the discovery is contraband. State v. Edsall, 385 So.2d 207, 210 (La.1980). Officer Himel testified he shined his flashlight toward the floorboard because it was the area the defendant had made the movements which concerned him. However, the illumination would have been proper in the absence of the defendant's actions by virtue of the validity of the traffic stop and the defendant's removal from his vehicle. Therefore, once the defendant's vehicle was lawfully stopped for the traffic violation and the defendant removed from the vehicle, the weapon was in plain view upon illumination. After the officer observed the NOPD markings on the gun, probable cause existed to arrest the defendant for the possession of the stolen firearm pursuant to Louisiana Revised Statute 14:69.1. Accordingly, Officer Himel's actions were objectively reasonable under the law. See Kelley, 05-1905 at 5, 934 So.2d at 54. This finding, coupled with the fact the trial court's credibility determination has no bearing on the validity of the admissibility of the evidence, we conclude the trial court erred in suppressing the weapon found in the defendant's vehicle prior to his arrest.