Opinion ID: 1208111
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legal Bill Narratives

Text: In 2001, Wilson requested copies of the complete legal vendor files. She was given copies of the legal fees of the county's law firm summarized by fund. In 2003, Wilson was given a listing of general legal expenditures for the year 2002 through March 2003. Wilson requested again in November 2003 for the complete vendor files. In response to this request, the Administrator sent a memorandum to all members of the Council. In this memo, he stated that Wilson's request for copies of vendor files where legal expenditure questions are concerned is attorney-client privileged information with the County being the client. The Administrator informed the Council that only the Council, acting as a corporate body, can authorize the release of those records to anyone, acting as an individual. He stated that if Council authorized and directed the release, then Wilson could have the records; otherwise, the records would not be released. The next month, Wilson requested the legal expense files from 1997 to 2003. The Administrator responded and attached a summary of all of the County's law firm fees and expenses summarized by fiscal year. The amounts were categorized and she was also given a list of the check numbers and the dates. The Administrator emphasized that only the Council could authorize the release of narrative detail of those records. In 2004, Wilson made a Freedom of Information Act request for the legal expense vendor files, including a narrative of billable hours supporting each payment. The Administrator gave Wilson the legal expense vendor files, with the narratives redacted. At the October 5, 2004, Council meeting, Wilson moved that Council, as a body, instruct the Administrator to provide the legal expense vendor files. The motion died for lack of a second. At a subsequent Council meeting, the County's attorney made a presentation. He stated he is the legal adviser to the County and that the County is his client. The attorney stated the narrative descriptions at issue involved the County's legal strategy and that it is attorney-client privileged information. He stated only the Council acting for the County can release that information and the Administrator cannot waive that privilege. The Administrator stated that when a request for a document is made, he consults with the County's legal counsel and asks whether it is attorney-client privileged information. His determination is based on legal advice he receives from the County's attorney. In her deposition, Wilson agreed that the description of the legal work in the bills may reveal litigation strategy. Wilson admitted that if she was given the legal narratives and she saw something that was silly, she would release the information to the public. Initially, Wilson argues the lower court erred by not reviewing the legal bill narratives in camera when making its decision. However, Wilson did not request that they be reviewed in camera below and she did not raise this argument until on appeal. In any event, the trial court was not required to actually review the legal bill narratives to determine if the privilege existed. We have held that the trial court must determine the question of privilege without first requiring disclosure of the substance of the communication. State v. Doster, 276 S.C. 647, 284 S.E.2d 218 (1981). [3] See also Tucker v. Honda of South Carolina Mfg., Inc., 354 S.C. 574, 582 S.E.2d 405 (2003) (trial court should not require disclosure of attorney client communications to other parties without first determining whether the communications are privileged by inquiring into all the facts and circumstances of the communication; if necessary to determine the application of the privilege, the trial judge may consider, in camera, the material); State v. Love, 275 S.C. 55, 271 S.E.2d 110 (1980) [4] (whether a communication is privileged is for the trial judge to decide in the light of a preliminary inquiry into all of the facts and circumstances; and this determination is conclusive in the absence of an abuse of discretion). In the instant case, in light of the fact that Wilson never requested such an in camera review, the trial court did not abuse his discretion by determining the existence of the privilege without reviewing the narratives in the legal bills. The attorney-client privilege is based upon a public policy that the best interest of society is served by promoting a relationship between the attorney and the client whereby utmost confidence in the continuing secrecy of all confidential disclosures made by the client within the relationship is maintained. State v. Doster, supra . The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client and not the attorney, and may be waived only by the client. Tucker v. Honda of South Carolina Mfg., Inc., supra . In general, the burden of establishing the privilege rests upon the party asserting it. State v. Love, supra . Wilson argues the Administrator should not be making judgments about what is subject to the attorney-client privilege. However, when a request for a document is made, the Administrator consults with the County's attorney and asks whether it is attorney-client privileged information. The determination of what is privileged information is based on legal advice the Administrator receives from the County's attorney. Therefore, we find the Administrator is not making the determination but is relating the information he receives from the County's attorney to the Council when a request is made for possibly privileged documents. Wilson, as a council member, cannot independently review attorney-client privileged documents. The privilege belongs to the client County; and the Council, as a whole, is authorized to release that information and has to waive the privilege before an individual council member can review privileged documents. See S.C.Code Ann. § 30-4-40(a)(7) (2007) (a public body may but is not required to exempt from disclosure the following information: correspondence or work products of legal counsel for a public body and any other material that would violate attorney-client relationships). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding a writ of mandamus cannot issue against the Administrator to compel him to release information where the Council has not authorized such a release. See Redmond, supra (quasi-judicial duty requires discretion in determining how or whether the act shall be done or the course pursued); Charleston County Sch. Dist., supra (appellate court will not overturn decision not to issue a writ of mandamus unless the trial court abuses its discretion).