Opinion ID: 3019329
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Lack of protective, supportive resources.

Text: 10. Lack of opportunity to benefit from recommended psychotherapeutic intervention. 11. Gaps in the existing community resources to identify and intercede in abusive domestic situations, and to insure early preventative mental health to its young victims. 12. Delayed identification by school system, of specialized learning needs. 13. Early on-set substance abuse problems. 14. Impaired personality organization, stemming from childhood experiences. Id. at . In a 143-page supplemental report, Taylor further elaborated on these same findings. Id. at -74. 3. Analysis Shelton argues that “[c]omparing defendant’s background as revealed in Taylor’s report, against the minimal 27 evidence presented at the penalty phase hearing, leads to the ineluctable conclusion that trial counsel was ineffective.” Appellant’s Br. at 27. We do not agree. Shelton’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by the familiar two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the result would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 694. In this case, we find that neither requirement is satisfied. Under Strickland, “a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel’s conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel’s conduct.” Id. at 690. As the Court in Strickland explained: [S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any ineffectiveness case, a particular decision not to investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments. Id. at 690-91. Moreover, “[t]he reasonableness of counsel’s actions may be determined or substantially influenced by defendants own 28 statements or actions.” Id. at 691.8 8 In Strickland, the Court stated that “[p]revailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like . . . are guides to determining what is reasonable, but they are only guides.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. In this case, the ABA guidelines concerning investigations in capital cases applicable in 1993 provide, in relevant part: A. Counsel should conduct independent investigations relating to the guilt/innocence phase and to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Both investigations should begin immediately upon counsel’s entry into the case and should be pursued expeditiously. .... C. The investigation for preparation of the sentencing phase should be conducted regardless of any initial assertion by the client that mitigation is not to be offered. This investigation should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor. American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 11.4.1 (1989). The ABA guidelines were amended in 2003. The commentary to current Guideline 10.7 states: This Guideline is based on portions of Guideline 11.4.1 of the original edition. Changes in this Guideline [not applicable to trial counsel’s performance in this case] clarify that counsel should conduct thorough and independent investigations relating to both guilt and penalty issues regardless of overwhelming evidence of 29 In this case, it was Shelton, not his attorney, who decided to limit the scope of the investigation and the presentation of mitigating evidence to the jury. Counsel had submitted to the court a letter listing forty-three mitigating factors that could be presented on Shelton’s behalf. Despite counsel’s investigation and his recommendation that Shelton present this evidence, Shelton decided that the evidence should not be presented. Indeed, Shelton’s initial request to proceed pro se at the penalty phase stemmed, at least in part, from his disagreement with counsel’s insistence that Shelton present mitigating evidence. Shelton II, 1997 WL 855718, at . The extensive discussions Shelton and his counsel had with the trial court demonstrate that Shelton decided several months prior to the verdict that, if the jury were to find him guilty, he would not want to “plea for mercy” or “put in any mitigating circumstances whatsoever.” Id. at . Shelton’s decision was based in part on his desire to spare his family the trauma of testifying, and he also believed it might be an effective strategy. However unwise that decision may have turned out to be, it was ultimately Shelton’s decision and not counsel’s. Nonetheless, as will be discussed, evidence in mitigation was, in fact, presented and counsel’s reliance on Shelton’s deliberate and strategic determination that he ought not present mitigating evidence does not rise to the level of unreasonableness under Strickland. Moreover, we believe that even if Shelton could show that counsel’s performance was deficient, he is unable to satisfy the prejudice requirement of the Strickland test. In order to show prejudice, Shelton must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine guilt, client statements concerning the facts of the alleged crime, or client statements that counsel should refrain from collecting or presenting evidence bearing upon guilt or penalty. American Bar Association Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases 10.7 (2003). 30 confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In challenging a death sentence, “the question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695. Here, almost all of Pamela Taylor’s proposed mitigating factors were presented to the jury during the penalty phase through the testimony of Shelton’s siblings. For example, Shelton’s siblings described how he was physically and emotionally abused by their alcoholic parents. They spoke of their stressful home environment, including the crowded home and their father’s disabilities. They discussed the racial tension in the neighborhood, Shelton’s troubles at school, and the fact that his siblings were removed from the family home because of his parents’ abuse. Taylor’s report, as well as the reports of Dr. Janofsky and Dr. Schretlen, simply discuss these very issues in greater detail and, arguably, with greater credibility. But, they would not have altered, in the end, the total mix of information upon which the jury and the trial court based their decisions to impose the death penalty. Moreover, any additional mitigating evidence or analysis presented by the expert reports must be considered in light of the aggravating circumstances presented by the State, including testimony concerning Shelton’s prior rape and assault convictions, his arrests for robbery and assault and, perhaps most importantly, the victim’s age and the brutal nature of his murder. In light of this aggravating evidence, the state court’s determination that Shelton was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficiencies was a reasonable application of Strickland.