Opinion ID: 774796
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did Termination Hearings Deny Plaintiffs Due Process?

Text: 63 We ordinarily review a district court's summary judgment ruling de novo to determine whether the evidentiary submissions show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2000). On an interlocutory appeal from a qualified immunity ruling, our jurisdiction is limited to examining whether the immunity defense has been established as a matter of law based on stipulated facts, or on the facts that the plaintiff alleges are true, or on the facts favorable to the plaintiff that the trial judge concluded the jury might find. Salim, 93 F.3d at 90; see also McCullough, 187 F.3d at 279-80 (reviewing total absence of evidence as matter of law).
64 Plaintiffs' due process claim rests on the allegation that Police Commissioner Safir and Fire Commissioner Von Essen, both of whom possessed final authority to review plaintiffs' disciplinary adjudications, predetermined to fire plaintiffs from the outset, prior to any administrative hearings, at the direction of Mayor Giuliani. In support of this assertion, plaintiffs cite public remarks by defendants, particularly Mayor Giuliani, suggesting they had decided to terminate plaintiffs in advance of any adjudication. In addition, plaintiffs refer to a number of irregularities at the disciplinary hearings themselves that assertedly reflect how defendants' alleged bias infected the hearings. 1 Plaintiffs contend these defects could have been prevented, and a neutral adjudication assured, had defendants adopted appropriate recusal procedures. 65 As noted, the district court rejected defendants' qualified immunity defense to plaintiffs' claims, relying on what it perceived as irregularities surrounding the hearings, and further reasoning that it was clearly established that the government must provide an employee with a pre-termination hearing comporting with notions of due process. Locurto, 95 F. Supp. 2d at 168 n.4. Defendants challenge this ruling pointing out that New York law afforded plaintiffs the vehicle of an Article 78 proceeding, an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 66 Ordinarily, the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a state or local government afford persons some kind of a hearing prior to depriving them of a significant liberty or property interest. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 299 (1981); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 540 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). Defendants concede that Locurto, Steiner, and Walters possessed a constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure as public employees, terminable only for cause. See Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 928-29 (1997). When such a public employee is terminated, procedural due process is satisfied if the government provides notice and a limited opportunity to be heard prior to termination, so long as a full adversarial hearing is provided afterwards. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545-46 (1985); see also Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 929.
67 The Supreme Court distinguishes between deprivations of liberty or property occurring as a result of established governmental procedures, and those based on random, unauthorized acts by government officers. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541. Under the latter scenario, a deprivation effectuated through the random and unauthorized acts of government officials does not violate procedural due process so long as the government provides a meaningful remedy subsequent to the deprivation. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 531-32 (1984). The rationale for this principle is plain: because the challenged misconduct is random and unauthorized, it is impossible for the government to anticipate and prevent the wrongful loss of liberty or property in advance, and it has no realistic alternative other than to adopt remedies capable of righting the wrong after the deprivation. Id. at 532; Parratt, 494 U.S. at 541. 68 In this context, the parties dispute whether defendants' alleged misconduct was random and unauthorized for purposes of the due process analysis. On the one hand, defendants contend that any misconduct was random and unauthorized, given that New York law already prohibits bias in the context of administrative adjudications. See N.Y. A.P.A. Law § 303 (McKinney 1995) (presiding officers); 1616 Second Ave. Rest., Inc. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 75 N.Y.2d 158, 161 (1990) (due process); 12 Rules of the City of New York § 1-07(g) (1998) (OATH adjudicators). In defendants' view, due process is therefore satisfied because plaintiffs could have brought suit in New York Supreme Court to remedy such bias after the deprivation, under Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules. See 1616 Second Ave. Rest., 75 N.Y.2d at 161-66. Moreover, defendants cite several circuit decisions in support of their position. See Cronin v. Town of Amesbury, 81 F.3d 257, 260 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1996) (per curiam); McDaniels v. Flick, 59 F.3d 446, 458-61 (3d Cir. 1995); McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1562-63 (11th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Schaper v. City of Huntsville, 813 F.2d 709, 715-16 (5th Cir. 1987). 69 On the other hand, plaintiffs maintain that defendants' alleged misconduct was not random and unauthorized when seen through the lens of the Supreme Court's decision in Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990). Zinermon held that the plaintiff had stated a procedural due process violation by alleging his admission to a state mental institution on a purportedly voluntary basis was without procedural protections adequate to ensure his competency to consent. Id. at 121, 136-39. By analogy, plaintiffs argue defendants' misconduct was not truly random and unauthorized because defendants possessed, but failed to exercise, plenary authority to adopt a recusal procedure capable of preventing such biased misconduct. See New York, N.Y., City Charter § 434(a) (1998) (Police Commissioner's disciplinary authority); id. § 487(a) (Fire Commissioner's disciplinary authority); New York, N.Y., Admin. Code § 14-115 (1998) (Police Commissioner); id. § 15-113 (Fire Commissioner); see also New York, N.Y., City Charter § 6 (Mayor's authority to appoint and remove commissioners). 70 We ultimately need not resolve whether defendants' alleged misconduct was random and unauthorized, since even were we to resolve this dispute in plaintiffs' favor, we would still face the further question of what process is due. See Ezekwo v. New York City Health & Hosps. Corp., 940 F.2d 775, 783-84 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding defendants' misconduct was not random and unauthorized under Zinermon and then proceeding to ask what, if any, process was due). Because, as discussed below, we conclude that due process is satisfied so long as the government provides a neutral adjudicator at the post-termination hearing for a tenured public employee, the question of random and unauthorized conduct becomes moot, and we therefore need not address it. See 1A Martin A. Schwartz & John E. Kirklin, Section 1983 Litigation: Claims and Defenses § 3.22, at 376 (3d ed. 1997) (Even when the Parratt-Hudson doctrine is found inapplicable, a court may find that a post-deprivation remedy satisfies procedural due process.). 71 Two additional considerations support our refusal to address this issue. First, the Zinermon decision has generated considerable confusion among the courts of appeals, see id. § 3.22, at 375, and although our Circuit has spoken on the question of what constitutes random and unauthorized conduct under Zinermon, e.g., Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm. v. City of New York, 101 F.3d 877, 880-82 (2d Cir. 1996), we decline to foray further into this legal thicket absent some real need to address the question. Second, the state and municipal provisions that prohibit biased adjudications already appear to provide a mechanism by which an interested party may seek the recusal of a purportedly biased adjudicator. See N.Y. A.P.A. Law § 303 (Upon the filing in good faith by a party of a timely and sufficient affidavit of personal bias or disqualification of a presiding officer, the agency shall determine the matter as part of the record in the case, and its determination shall be a matter subject to judicial review at the conclusion of the adjudicatory proceeding.); 12 Rules of the City of New York § 1-07(g) (similar). Although plaintiffs suggest that an appropriate recusal mechanism would have allowed for transfer of their charges to adjudicators not subject to review by the Police and Fire Commissioners (indeed, Locurto asserts his request for such a transfer was rejected), they fail to indicate in any detail how the existing procedures were inadequate, and what additional recusal procedures would have cured these defects. 72 Given the uncertainty of this area of the law, the vagueness of plaintiffs' claim, and the irrelevance of this point to the resolution of the appeal, we decline to resolve whether defendants' alleged misconduct was random and unauthorized. Instead, we assume this point in plaintiffs' favor for purposes of this appeal and will proceed accordingly to consider what, if any, process was due plaintiffs.
73 The remaining question is what process was due. See Ezekwo, 940 F.2d at 784. As noted, plaintiffs believe due process required the adoption of a recusal mechanism to safeguard the neutrality of the decisionmaker at their pre-deprivation hearing. We cannot embrace that requirement. Although due process guarantees notice and a hearing prior to the termination of a tenured public employee, the requisite hearing is a minimal one. See Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 929 ([A] public employee dismissable only for cause [i]s entitled to a very limited hearing prior to his termination.) (emphasis added). Thus, as the Supreme Court explained in Loudermill, a pre-termination hearing does not purport to resolve the propriety of the discharge, but serves mainly as a check against a mistake being made by ensuring there are reasonable grounds to find the charges against an employee are true and would support his termination. 470 U.S. at 545-46. Requiring more than notice of the charges, an explanation of the nature of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity for the employee to respond would impede the government's interest in quickly removing from service an unsatisfactory employee. Id. at 546. In reaching this result, Loudermill relied heavily on the fact that the state had afforded the plaintiff a full adversarial hearing subsequent to termination. Id. (Our holding rests in part on the provisions in Ohio law for a full post-termination hearing.). 74 Since Loudermill we have not had occasion to decide squarely whether due process requires a neutral adjudicator at a pre-termination hearing of a tenured public employee. Concededly, the subject was discussed in Dwyer v. Regan, 777 F.2d 825, 833 (2d Cir. 1985), modified on other grounds, 793 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1986). The only question necessary to decide that case was whether due process entitled Dwyer to a pre- deprivation hearing upon request. See id. Because Dwyer had not alleged making such a request, the question whether due process further entitled him to a neutral adjudicator at that hearing was hypothetical and, as such, dicta. Cf. Marchi v. Bd. of Coop. Educ. Servs., 173 F.3d 469, 478 (2d Cir. 1999) (A hypothetical or abstract dispute does not present a case or controversy.). No subsequent decisions from our Circuit or other circuits have held that such a neutral adjudicator is a necessary component of due process at a pre-termination hearing. We hold that it is not. 75 We reach this conclusion for two reasons: First, such a requirement would run contrary to the letter and the spirit of Loudermill, which insisted only that the public employer give its employee notice of any charges and a chance to hear and respond to any evidence against him. See 470 U.S. at 545-46. We fully agree with the view that the costs to the state of additional pre-deprivation guarantees (in this case, a neutral adjudicator) outweigh possible benefits to the employee, given the availability of a full post-deprivation hearing. See id. Second, every circuit that has addressed this question has reached a conclusion similar to the one we reach. See Schacht v. Wis. Dep't of Corr., 175 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1999); Walker v. City of Berkeley, 951 F.2d 182, 184 (9th Cir. 1991); Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004, 1008 (6th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Garraghty v. Jordan, 830 F.2d 1295, 1302 (4th Cir. 1987); see also Cronin, 81 F.3d at 260 (1st Cir.) (adjudicator's bias was random and unauthorized, and hence full post-deprivation hearing satisfied due process); McDaniels, 59 F.3d at 459-60 (3d Cir.) (same); McKinney, 20 F.3d at 1562-63 (11th Cir.) (same); Schaper, 813 F.2d at 715-16 (5th Cir.) (same). 76 This holding is necessarily limited to the situation where the state affords plaintiff, subsequent to his termination, a full adversarial hearing before a neutral adjudicator. In the case at hand, plaintiffs do not dispute that New York afforded them such a hearing via an Article 78 proceeding in New York State Supreme Court. An Article 78 proceeding permits a petitioner to submit affidavits and other written evidence, and where a material issue of fact is raised, have a trial of the disputed issue, including constitutional claims. Gudema, 163 F.3d at 724. Petitioners proceeding under Article 78 may raise claims that the agency adjudicator was biased and prejudged the outcome, 1616 Second Ave. Rest., 75 N.Y.2d at 161-66; Hughes v. Suffolk County Dep't of Civil Serv., 74 N.Y.2d 833, 834, amended, 74 N.Y.2d 942550 N.Y.S.2d 274 (1989), that the determination was slanted by the adjudicator's refusal to recuse herself, Wood v. Cosgrove, 237 A.D.2d 616, 617 (2d Dep't 1997), or that ex parte communications with other officials may have infected the adjudicator's ruling, Miller v. McMahon, 240 A.D.2d 806, 808 (3d Dep't 1997). 77 An Article 78 proceeding therefore constitutes a wholly adequate post- deprivation hearing for due process purposes. E.g., Hellenic Am. Neighborhood Action Comm., 101 F.3d at 881. A distinction that some of the above cases typically involved random and unauthorized conduct, rather than conduct according to predetermined rules, is immaterial. See, e.g., Interboro Inst., Inc. v. Foley, 985 F.2d 90, 93-94 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that Article 78 petition presented sufficient post-deprivation process to challenge auditor's decision to disallow payments to junior college based on predetermined criteria); Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that Article 78 petition presented sufficient process to challenge medicaid reimbursement rates set by panel according to predetermined protocol). Moreover, plaintiffs point to no persuasive authority that states an administrative hearing with a neutral adjudicator rather than judicial review under Article 78 is needed to satisfy due process. No reason exists to depart from the general presumption that a judicial trial represents the epitome of full process. See Campo v. New York City Employees' Ret. Sys., 843 F.2d 96, 100-01, 103 (2d Cir. 1988) (Parratt teaches that a state may provide procedural due process in either an administrative or a judicial setting.). 78 Consequently, the allegations of plaintiffs' complaints fail to state a violation of due process at the administrative hearings and that claim must be dismissed in its entirety.