Opinion ID: 1715028
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Collateral Estoppel Argument

Text: Although Saad Construction could not have asserted its tort claims against the appellees before the director, collateral estoppel might still apply to prevent Saad Construction from relitigating factual issues common to its claims against the appellees that have already been determined by the director if the elements of collateral estoppel are satisfied. Abramson v. Pennwood Inv. Corp., 392 F.2d 759, 762 (2d Cir.1968); Cream Top Creamery v. Dean Milk Co., 383 F.2d 358, 362-63 (6th Cir. 1967); Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 26, Reporter's Note to comment c(1). [6] After holding that the doctrine of res judicata did not bar federal claims over which the state court in the prior action lacked jurisdiction, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Abramson further held: Of course, where both the state and federal suits are based on the same transactions, collateral estoppel would apply with regard to the facts determined in the state action. 392 F.2d at 762. Thus, although the prior adjudication in the arbitral forum would not, under the doctrine of res judicata, bar Saad Construction's claims against the appellees, the doctrine of collateral estoppel might nonetheless apply if the requirements for that doctrine are satisfied. For the doctrine of collateral estoppel to apply, the following elements must be established: `(1) that an issue in a prior action was identical to the issue litigated in the present action; (2) that the issue was actually litigated in the prior action; (3) that resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment; and (4) that the same parties are involved in the two actions.'  Smith v. Union Bank & Trust Co., 653 So.2d 933, 934 (Ala.1995). `Where these elements are present, the parties are barred from relitigating issues actually litigated in a prior [action].' Smith, 653 So.2d at 934 (quoting Lott v. Toomey, 477 So.2d 316, 319 (Ala.1985)). Biles v. Sullivan, 793 So.2d 708, 712 (Ala. 2000). Only issues actually decided in a former action are subject to collateral estoppel. Leverette ex rel. Gilmore v. Leverette, 479 So.2d 1229, 1237 (Ala.1985) (emphasis added). The burden is on the party asserting collateral estoppel to prove that the issue it is seeking to bar was determined in the prior adjudication. See Adams v. Sanders, 811 So.2d 542, 545 (Ala.Civ.App.2001) (Because we have no transcript of the trial in the district court, the burden is on Sanders to show that the district court determined that he was not negligent.). See also United States v. Cala, 521 F.2d 605, 608 (2d Cir.1975) (The burden ... is on [the one asserting collateral estoppel] to establish that the issue he seeks to foreclose from litigation in the present prosecution was necessarily decided in his favor by the prior verdict.). The appellees have not satisfied their burdens of proof as to their affirmative defense of collateral estoppel. As previously noted, one who claims the defense of collateral estoppel must prove, among other things, that the issue was actually decided, Leverette, 479 So.2d at 1237, and that resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment, Biles, 793 So.2d at 712. Moreover, because we are reviewing a summary judgment, we must review the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant and must resolve all reasonable doubts against the movant. Hobson, supra, 690 So.2d at 344. The director did not explain the rationale for his arbitration decisions, and he made no specific findings of fact. Instead, he merely entered the words Award or No Award next to each of the claims made by Saad Construction and the Board. The mere entries of No Award on Saad Construction's claims against the Board, which included allegations of misconduct by the appellees, does not necessitate a finding that the arbitrator resolved against Saad Construction its arguments concerning the appellees' alleged misconduct. The appellees have not met their burden of proving that the arbitrator actually decided that the appellees were not responsible for Saad Construction's damage or that resolution of the issue was necessary to the prior judgment. Biles, 793 So.2d at 712. Because we hold that the appellees did not satisfy their burden of proving that the director actually decided that the appellees did not commit the wrongful acts Saad Construction alleged, we need not consider whether the appellees satisfied their burdens of proof as to the other elements of collateral estoppel.