Opinion ID: 586834
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ehrnschwender

Text: 17 Unlike the Wrights, Ehrnschwender received service of process after the transfer to the Northern District of New York. The acknowledgment form that was enclosed with the summons and complaint, signed by Buggs' counsel on June 25, 1991, stated that the papers are served pursuant to Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. However, service under that rule was ineffective for the same reasons that the original service from the Eastern District of Pennsylvania failed: (1) service by mail, as authorized by Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), is limited to in-state defendants by Rule 4(f); and (2) the acknowledgment form was never returned, necessitating personal service that was never effectuated. 18 Because there has not been compliance with Rule 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), we address whether the post-transfer service on Ehrnschwender was effective under New York law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(e) (service upon party not inhabitant of or found within state may be effected according to forum state laws). New York's long-arm statute, C.P.L.R. § 302(a)(2) (McKinney 1990), authorizes personal jurisdiction over a person who commits a tortious act within the state. However, the statutory procedures must be strictly followed for service to be effective. See Markoff v. South Nassau Community Hosp., 61 N.Y.2d 283, 288, 473 N.Y.S.2d 766, 461 N.E.2d 1253 (1984) (Actual notice alone will not sustain the service or subject a person to the court's jurisdiction when there has not been compliance with prescribed conditions of service.); Miron Lumber Co., Inc. v. Phylco Realty Dev. Co., 151 Misc.2d 139, 572 N.Y.S.2d 992, 995 (N.Y.City Civ.Ct.1991) ([S]ervice of process which does not strictly comply with specifically authorized statutory methods will not be upheld even if defendant subsequently receives the improperly served process and thereby learns that an action is pending against it.). 19 In the instant matter, Buggs did not follow the statutory methods of service on out-of-state residents outlined in N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 312-a. New York law allows for service of process by first-class mail against out-of-state defendants as an alternative to personal service of process, see N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 312-a(a), 2 with service of process complete on the date the signed acknowledgement of receipt is mailed or delivered to the sender. N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 312-a(b)(1). 3 There are two defects in Buggs' attempted post-transfer service on Ehrnschwender. First, and perhaps surprisingly, there is New York caselaw stating that the use of certified instead of first class mail voids the service. See Miron Lumber, 572 N.Y.S.2d at 995 (fact that summons and complaint were sent certified mail instead of by first-class mail fatal to court's jurisdiction under N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 312-a). Second, Ehrnschwender did not return the acknowledgment of service, which Section 312-a(b) explicitly requires for service to be complete. See also Shenko Elec., Inc. v. Hartnett, 161 A.D.2d 1212, 558 N.Y.S.2d 859 (1990) (Service is complete only when the acknowledgment of receipt ... is mailed or returned to the sender.). Failure of service under Section 312-a obliged Buggs to resort to other methods of service under Article 3 of N.Y.C.P.L.R., which he failed to do. 4 20 Affirmed.