Opinion ID: 2977546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enhancement for Brandishing a Firearm.

Text: We review the district court’s conclusions of law concerning the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Davidson, 409 F.3d 304, 310 (6th Cir. 2005); United States v. Tocco, 306 F.3d 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2002). Conner makes a number of arguments attacking the district court’s decision to increase his base offense level pursuant to USSG § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) because he brandished a firearm during the robbery charged in Count One. None of these arguments has any merit. Conner first argues that it was “unfair,” under Booker, for the district court to enhance his sentence based on a fact — that he brandished a weapon during the first robbery — not charged in the indictment and found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. This argument is clearly unavailing. See Rita v. United States, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 2465-66 (2007) (“This Court's Sixth Amendment cases do not automatically forbid a sentencing court to take account of factual matters not determined by a jury and to increase the sentence in consequence.”); United States v. Ferguson, 456 F.3d 660, 665 (6th Cir. 2006) (“[T]his court and others have repeatedly held since Booker that district judges can find the facts necessary to calculate the appropriate Guidelines range using the same preponderance-of-the-evidence standard that governed prior to Booker.”). Conner also argues that the district court’s application of the brandishing enhancement 5 amounted to impermissible double-counting in light of his conviction on Count Three for carrying a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). But “a brandishing enhancement and § 924(c) are not cumulative punishment when assessed for separate offenses.” United States v. Griffis, 282 F.3d 443, 447 (6th Cir. 2002). In this case, the brandishing enhancement was applied solely to Count One while the § 924(c) charge was based on the conduct charged in Count Two. Therefore, this argument is baseless. Finally, Conner argues that the presentence report erroneously relied on Application Note 4 to USSG § 2K2.4 to justify application of the brandishing enhancement. That note provides: If a sentence under this guideline is imposed in conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, do not apply any specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying offense. A sentence under this guideline accounts for any explosive or weapon enhancement for the underlying offense of conviction, including any such enhancement that would apply based on conduct for which the defendant is accountable under § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct). Do not apply any weapon enhancement in the guideline for the underlying offense, for example, if (A) a co-defendant, as part of the jointly undertaken criminal activity, possessed a firearm different from the one for which the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c); or (B) in an ongoing drug trafficking offense, the defendant possessed a firearm other than the one for which the defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). However, if a defendant is convicted of two armed bank robberies, but is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) in connection with only one of the robberies, a weapon enhancement would apply to the bank robbery which was not the basis for the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction. (Emphasis added.) The presentence report, responding to Conner’s double-counting objection, relied on the italicized sentence to justify applying the brandishing enhancement in this case. Conner argues that this reliance is misplaced, because the last sentence deals with situations where the defendant is convicted of “two armed bank robberies,” and Conner only was convicted of one armed bank robbery and one robbery of a bank by force and violence or by intimidation. But Conner 6 misunderstands § 2K2.4; that section applies in pertinent part to convictions under § 924(c), and Application Note 4 merely sets forth the rule that, if a defendant is convicted of an underlying offense (e.g., robbery) and of violating § 924(c) in relation to the same underlying offense, the sentencing court should “not apply any specific offense characteristic for possession, brandishing, use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm when determining the sentence for the underlying offense.” Conner’s sentence complies with this rule because the brandishing enhancement was applied only to the robbery charged in Count One, whereas his § 924(c) conviction related only to the robbery charged in Count Two. Moreover, the italicized portion of Note 4 simply provides an example of this general rule; it does not, as Conner contends, make being convicted of armed robbery a prerequisite to the application of a brandishing enhancement.