Opinion ID: 465031
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the liability of the united states

Text: 21 The district court determined that the United States breached no duty of care owed to Terrell. Terrell argues that the United States should not be exempted from liability because it owned and controlled the property on which the injury occurred and knew of the dangerous condition. 22 The United States contends that it is exempt from liability for three reasons. First, the status of the United States as the owner of the property does not, absent negligence, impose liability on the United States. See Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 44-45, 73 S.Ct. 956, 972, 97 L.Ed. 1427 (1953). Second, the district court determined that the United States did not control the property surrounding the old bridge. This finding, as well as the conclusion that the United States was not negligent, must remain undisturbed unless clearly erroneous. 23 It is true that the hazard was on property that was part of the Tyndall Air Force Base owned by the United States. Even though the United States erected a barrier approximately fifty to sixty feet from the hole about six weeks prior to Terrell's accident, and graded the area near the bridge on several occasions, the district court concluded that all the actions taken by the U.S.A. prior to the accident were limited to that area within Tyndall's own control, and did not extend closer to the bridge than the fifty to sixty feet at which the barrier was erected. The court further noted that the barrier erected by the United States was not negligently built and that there was no evidence to indicate that the United States' activities near the bridge proximately caused Terrell's accident. The district court further found that the conduct of the United States prior to the accident revealed a general recognition that the old bridge was in the 'possession' and control of another party. Given that the United States had granted an easement to the DOT to construct the original bridge and that the DOT had transferred responsibility to maintain the old bridge to either Bay County or the City of Parker, we conclude that the determination that the United States was neither negligent nor in control of the property surrounding the old bridge is not clearly erroneous. 24 The United States further claims immunity from liability under the limitation on liability provisions of Florida's Outdoor Recreation and Conservation Act of 1963, Fla.Stat.Ann. Sec. 375.251 (West 1974). Section 375.251 exempts from tort liability landowners who gratuitously provide the public with outdoor recreational areas. The district court found that the statute did not apply here because the City of Parker and Bay County, not the United States, provided the old bridge as a recreational area. The United States argues that Kleer v. United States, 761 F.2d 1492 (11th Cir.1985) should control. In Kleer, we held that section 375.251 barred a suit brought against the United States by a plaintiff who was injured in a section of the Ocala National Forest that had not been developed for recreational use, but was nonetheless available to the public for recreation. Kleer, however, is inapplicable to this case. Kleer involved a recreational area provided by the United States. Here the United States provided neither the recreational fishing pier nor the approach to the pier. We therefore affirm the district court's rejection of the United States' claim that section 375.251 shields it from liability in this case.