Opinion ID: 1651662
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Protestants Have Standing.

Text: ¶ 21. The Developers argue that the circuit court should have granted their motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of standing by the individual Protestants, and their motion to dismiss the class-action and unincorporated-association aspects of the appeal. ¶ 22. The Developers argue that the individual Protestants lack standing because none of them owns the subject property, none of them owns land adjacent to or adjoining the subject property, and none of them owns land located within 160 feet of the subject property, the 160-foot distance being the distance mentioned in Mississippi Code Section 17-1-17. [5] Section 17-1-17 provides that, if the owners of twenty percent or more of the lots located within 160 feet of the subject property protest a proposed zoning change, such change shall become effective only upon the favorable vote of three-fifths of the members of the local governing authority who are not required to recuse themselves. Miss.Code. Ann. § 17-1-17 (Rev.2003). Section 17-1-17 is not applicable to the instant case, and it does not state that owners of lots located more than 160 feet away from the subject property lack standing. ¶ 23. `Standing' is a jurisdictional issue which may be raised by any party or the Court at any time. In the Matter of the Enlargement and Extension of the Municipal Boundaries of the City of Horn Lake, 822 So.2d 253, 255 (Miss.2002) (quoting City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So.2d 162, 166 (Miss.2000)). This Court reviews questions of standing de novo. Gartrell v. Gartrell, 27 So.3d 388, 391-92 (Miss.2009). ¶ 24. In recent cases such as Burgess v. City of Gulfport and Ball v. Mayor and Board of Aldermen of City of Natchez, this Court has set forth what is required for a party to have standing to bring a civil action: It is well settled that Mississippi's standing requirements are quite liberal. This Court has explained that while federal courts adhere to a stringent definition of standing, limited by Art. 3, § 2 of the United States Constitution to a review of actual cases and controversies, the Mississippi Constitution contains no such restrictive language. Therefore, this Court has been more permissive in granting standing to parties who seek review of governmental actions. In Mississippi, parties have standing to sue when they assert a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation[ [6] ] or experience an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant, or as otherwise provided by law. Burgess v. City of Gulfport, 814 So.2d 149, 152-53 (Miss.2002) (quoting State v. Quitman County, 807 So.2d 401, 405 (Miss. 2001)). See also Ball v. Mayor and Bd. of Aldermen of City of Natchez, 983 So.2d 295, 301 (Miss.2008) (citing Burgess, 814 So.2d at 150-53). Further, for a plaintiff to establish standing on grounds of experiencing an adverse effect from the conduct of the defendant/appellee, the adverse effect experienced must be different from the adverse effect experienced by the general public. Burgess, 814 So.2d at 153. See also City of Madison v. Bryan, 763 So.2d 162, 166 (Miss.2000). ¶ 25. In Burgess  a case in which City of Gulfport residents challenged the Gulfport City Council's decision to accept the recommendation of the Planning Commission to issue a tree-removal permit to condominium developers  this Court explained: We must determine whether the residents have asserted a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation or experienced an adverse effect different from the general public. They clearly do not own the property in question. Neither have they alleged that they own the land around the property in question, or that the land has been affected in an adverse manner. ... Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-75 [the statute pursuant to which the plaintiffs in Burgess and in the instant case appeal] outlines the proper procedure to appeal when someone is aggrieved by a decision of a municipality. It does not in any way confer standing. The residents do not have a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation. Neither have they experienced adverse effects different from the general public. Further, the mere fact that they reside in the City is not sufficient to confer standing. They, therefore, have no standing. Burgess, 814 So.2d at 150, 153. ¶ 26. Applying the same standing requirements to the facts in Ball  a case in which City of Natchez residents brought challenges regarding the City's sale of surplus land to a condominium developer  this Court found that the appellants did have standing. Ball, 983 So.2d at 297-98, 301. The Ball court reasoned that standing existed because: the appellants were property owners in the City; their property was located near the [subject property]; and they alleged that the [development] project would adversely impact their properties. Id. at 301. ¶ 27. The facts in the instant case are more similar to the facts in Ball than those in Burgess, in that the Protestants own property in the City of Ridgeland; their property is located near the subject property (200 Renaissance); and they allege that the 200 Renaissance development will adversely impact them, their properties, and their use and enjoyment of their properties. Further, the 200 Renaissance development will impact the Protestants and other residents who live near 200 Renaissance in a different manner than it will affect other Ridgeland residents and the general public. The Protestants claim that the 200 Renaissance Development constitutes an enormous use/enjoyment and aesthetic impediment to the [Protestants'] views from their home, as well as a material encroachment upon their residential privacy. They contend that the negative impact of the height and after-dark, light-pollution of the Cellular South building, located at 300 Renaissance (situated on property bordering the 200 Renaissance property to the southwest) will be materially worsened by 200 Renaissance at a height of 80.6 feet taller than 300 Renaissance. In addition to the alleged impact from the height of and light from 200 Renaissance, the Protestants contend that their means of ingress and egress to their homes will be impeded significantly by increased traffic to be associated with the 200 Renaissance Development alone. The Protestants also assert that the construction of the 200 Renaissance building will depreciate their homes' property values. Thus, as in Ball, the Protestants in the instant case own property near the subject property and allege that the development of the subject property would adversely impact their properties. See id. Therefore, the Protestants have a colorable interest in the subject matter of the litigation and standing to challenge the conditional use permit regarding the height of the building. ¶ 28. However, the Protestants do not have standing to challenge the variance for the setback requirement, as it is a minor variance, and it regards a part of the subject property bordering another property owned by an entity affiliated with the Developers. Such a variance will not have an adverse effect on the Protestants, and certainly not in a manner different or to a different degree than it will affect the general public. In support of this conclusion, the Developers argue that [t]he Variance provisions were designed to protect adjacent lots in traditional neighborhoods, not to dictate the internal dimensions of carefully designed master developments like Renaissance at Colony Park. Furthermore, at the hearing before the Mayor and Board of Aldermen, the Ridgeland City Attorney advised that the requested setback variance is one that, under the City's Ordinance, can even be granted administratively. Cf. Drews v. City of Hattiesburg, 904 So.2d 138, 141 (Miss.2005) (No conceptual problems arise when the variance is granted to authorize minor departures from the terms of the ordinance; e.g., to permit a landowner to place the structure on his lot nearer the lot line than is permitted by the set-back or side-yard requirements.). ¶ 29. The Developers also argue that the Protestants, by seeking to appeal for and on behalf of those similarly situated persons comprising Z.O.N.E., (Zoning Ordinances Need Enforcement), are seeking an appeal in a manner not authorized by Mississippi law in that Rule 23 of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure expressly omits class actions, and Rule 23.2 expressly omits actions related to unincorporated associations, like Z.O.N.E. Miss. R. Civ. P. 23, 23.2. ¶ 30. It is true that Mississippi law does not permit class-action claims ( see American Bankers Ins. Co. of Florida v. Booth, 830 So.2d 1205, 1212 (Miss.2002)); however, it was not error for the trial court not to dismiss what the Developers label the class action aspect of the appeal, because this Court previously has allowed organizations of homeowners to appeal in zoning disputes. See Woodland Hills Conservation Ass'n v. City of Jackson, 443 So.2d 1173, 1175, 1177 (Miss. 1983); Miss. Manufactured Hous. Ass'n v. Bd. of Aldermen of City of Canton, 870 So.2d 1189, 1192-94 (Miss.2004). While Protestants should have made Z.O.N.E. an appellant rather than suing for and on behalf of those similarly situated persons comprising Z.O.N.E., we agree with the Protestants' argument that [t]he associational aspect of this appeal does not violate class action principles so as to be inconsistent with the provisions of the Miss. R. Civ. P., nor does it do more than reiterate the [alleged] individually-established rights of each Appellant herein.