Opinion ID: 2637930
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis of discipline

Text: The state of mind of the attorney, the degree of harm or potential harm resulting from the misconduct, the impact of the misconduct on the profession, the protection of the public and the mitigating and aggravating factors are the primary considerations evaluated in arriving at the appropriate sanction in this case. The misconduct in this case can be summarized as follows: an inexperienced attorney, dominated by an experienced but suspended attorney, (1) failed to utilize appropriate letterhead in correspondence identifying that the experienced attorney had been suspended, (2) failed to properly supervise the suspended attorney in connection with the handling of disputed funds and allowed the suspended attorney to withdraw and expend disputed funds during the period of dispute which were later determined to belong to the suspended attorney. The evidence presented established that the client was not misled by the letterhead, did not suffer nor was exposed to any potential injury as a consequence of the attorney's actions and the course of action undertaken by the attorney followed research, though faulty, of the applicable law. The ABA Standards for the Imposition of Lawyer Sanctions (1991 & Supp.1992) give guidance in arriving at the presumptive sanction in disciplinary proceedings. Gray's misconduct violated duties to the client and duties to the profession. ABA Standard 4.12, 4.13 and 4.14, which apply to violations of duties owed to the client, provide: 4.12 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knows or should know that he is dealing improperly with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 4.13 Reprimand (public censure) is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client. 4.14 Admonition (private admonition) is generally appropriate when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client. ABA Standards 4.62, 4.63 and 4.64 apply when an attorney lacks candor in communications with a client: 4.62 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly deceives a client, and causes injury or potential injury to the client. 4.63 Reprimand [public censure] is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently fails to provide a client with accurate or complete information, and causes injury or potential injury to the client. 4.64 Admonition [private admonition] is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in failing to provide a client with accurate information, and causes little or no actual injury to the client. ABA Standards applying to violations of duties to the profession, 7.2, 7.3 and 7.4 provide: 7.2 Suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer knowingly engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public or the legal system. 7.3 Reprimand [public censure] is generally appropriate when a lawyer negligently engages in conduct that is a violation of a duty owed to the profession, and causes injury or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. 7.4 Admonition [private admonition] is generally appropriate when a lawyer engages in an isolated instance of negligence in determining whether the lawyer's conduct violates a duty owed to the profession, and causes little or no actual or potential injury to a client, the public, or the legal system. In light of the fact that Gray's misconduct was negligent, involved only one client and caused little or no actual harm to either the client, the profession or the legal system, the ABA Standards suggest that the presumptive sanction is private admonition. A review of Colorado case law, however, suggests that the sanction for technical conversion of funds is misconduct of a more serious nature, even if negligent, and deviates from the ABA Standards' recommendation of private admonition. See People v. Shidler, 901 P.2d 477, 479 (Colo.1995)(public censure imposed on attorney for technical conversion of client funds where court considered as mitigation attorney's diagnosis of mental disorder which caused conduct); People v. Galindo, 884 P.2d 1109, 1112 (Colo.1994)(suspending the attorney for one year and one day where respondent's mishandling of funds was the result of neglect rather than dishonesty); People v. Wechsler, 854 P.2d 217, 223 (Colo.1993) (attorney suspended for one year and one day for technical conversion of client funds, failure to deposit funds in trust account and failure to return files upon request); cf. People v. O'Donnell, 955 P.2d 53, 59 (Colo.1998)(imposing public censure on attorney respondent pursuant to conditional admission of misconduct for, among other rule violations, failing to promptly refund unearned fees, holding that a public censure is generally warranted when a lawyer is negligent in dealing with client property and causes injury or potential injury to a client); People v. Pooley, 917 P.2d 712, 713 (Colo.1996)(public censure imposed on respondent attorney pursuant to conditional admission of misconduct for, among other rule violations, failing to refund unearned retainer upon demand, and issuing check drawn on insufficient funds in violation of Colo. RPC 1.15(a) (failure to keep client funds separate from the lawyer's own funds), and Colo. RPC 8.4(c) (engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation) and finding that public censure was warranted where there was no harm to third parties); People v. Mills 861 P.2d 708, 711 (Colo.1993)(imposing public censure on respondent attorney for improperly asserting a charging lien over client's share of estate proceeds and thereby violating prior rule DR1-102(A)(5), current Colo. RPC 8.4(d)(engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice) and dismissing charges of failing to promptly deliver funds to client in possession of lawyer or charges of dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation); People v. Smith, 830 P.2d 1003, (Colo.1992) (respondent attorney suspended for six months for, among other rule violations, filing improper lien against marital residence). Examination of aggravating and mitigating factors pursuant to 9.22 and 9.32 respectively may enhance or diminish the ultimate sanction. The People argued that Gray engaged in this conduct with a selfish or dishonest motive, see id. at 9.22(b), her actions reflect a pattern of misconduct, see id. at 9.22(c), and she engaged in multiple offenses, see id. at 9.22(d). The PDJ and Hearing Board find no evidence that Gray engaged in the misconduct with a selfish or dishonest motive. Her conduct arose out of a belief that American Banco owed the money to Field, that the Colorado attorney's lien statute authorized her action and that her conduct was in conformity with The Rules of Professional Conduct. Neither does her misconduct show a pattern of misconduct. The several violations supported by the evidence arose from dealings in a single dispute with a single client over a relative short period of time. Establishing a pattern of misconduct requires evidence of routine and course of conduct reflecting a willingness to repeatedly engage in similar misconduct. Because the People have proven several violations, however, they have established the single aggravating factor of multiple offenses pursuant to ABA Standards 9.22(d). By way of mitigation, Gray had no prior disciplinary record, see id. at 9.32(a), there is an absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, see id. at 9.32(b), there was full and free disclosure to the disciplinary authorities, see id. at 9.32(e), Gray was very inexperienced in the practice of law, having been admitted to the bar in 1996 and having no prior experience as a lawyer before the events at issue in this case, see id. at 9.32(f), there has been a delay in the disciplinary proceedings not due to Gray's actions, see id. at 9.32(i), and she expressed and displayed remorse for her actions see id. at 9.32( l ). The most significant factor in the PDJ and Hearing Board's arriving at this sanction decision is Gray's inexperience in the practice of law: she had virtually no experience at the time these events occurred. This, combined with the fact that although she freely acknowledged it was her responsibility to ensure compliance with The Rules of Professional Conduct, she was heavily influenced by Field, a seventeen year veteran of the practice of law, in interpreting the scope and applicability of the rules and the breadth of the attorney's lien statute. Although this decision does not excuse Gray's submission to Field's influence, it cannot and should not be ignored in evaluating the need to protect the public from further misconduct by Gray. Taking into account the ABA Standards' presumptive sanction, the more rigorous sanction derived from Colorado law, and the significant mitigating factors, it is the conclusion of the PDJ and Hearing Board that Gray should be assessed a public censure.