Opinion ID: 1195240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: partial forfeiture is an administratively recognized concept which is in accord with the assumption made in idaho case law.

Text: If it is necessary for the Court to construe a statute, then it will attempt to ascertain legislative intent. Kootenai Elec. Co-op., 127 Idaho at 435, 901 P.2d at 1336; Sweitzer v. Dean, 118 Idaho 568, 571, 798 P.2d 27, 30 (1990). In construing a statute this Court may examine the language used, the reasonableness of the proposed interpretations, and the policy behind the statute. Sweitzer, 118 Idaho at 571-72, 798 P.2d at 30-31; Umphrey v. Sprinkel, 106 Idaho 700, 706, 682 P.2d 1247, 1253 (1983).
A basic rule of statutory construction is that the application of a statute is an aid to construction, especially where the public relies on that application over a long period of time. SUTHERLAND STAT. CONST. (5th ed.1992). As Sutherland explains: Statutes are documents having practical effects. It is therefore improper to construe them in the abstract, without taking into consideration the historical framework in which they exist.... Correlatively, such information is also relevant when deciding what the statute means to others because it is important to know how people affected by an act understand it. SUTHERLAND, § 49.01 (footnotes omitted). [W]here contemporaneous and practical interpretation has stood unchallenged for a considerable length of time it will be regarded as very important in arriving at the proper construction of a statute. Id. § 49.07. In fact, [o]ne of the soundest reasons sustaining contemporaneous interpretations of long standing is the fact that the public has relied on the interpretation[]. Id. This Court has and continues to adhere to those tenets. In J.R. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991), the Court established a four-part test for when agency construction of a statute should be accorded deference. This Court summarized this test as follows: This four prong test states that an agency's construction of a statute will be given great weight if: (1) the agency has been entrusted with the responsibility to administer the statute at issue; (2) the agency's construction of the statute is reasonable; (3) the statutory language at issue does not expressly treat the precise question at issue; and (4) any of the rationales underlying the rule of deference are present. Garner v. Horkley Oil, 123 Idaho 831, 833, 853 P.2d 576, 578 (1993) (citing Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219). There is no question that IDWR is entrusted with the responsibility to administer water resources in the state. I.C. §§ 42-1701-1778; §§ 42-1801-1806. Moreover, the statutory language does not expressly treat the precise question at issue. As noted above, past cases from this Court indicate that partial forfeiture has been a recognized practice in Idaho. See Crow v. Carlson, 107 Idaho 461, 690 P.2d 916 (1984); Idaho Power Co. v. State, 104 Idaho 575, 661 P.2d 741 (1983); Olson v. Bedke, 97 Idaho 825, 555 P.2d 156 (1976); Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 552 P.2d 1220 (1976); Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Co., 40 Idaho 49, 231 P. 418 (1924). The case of Dovel v. Dobson, 122 Idaho 59, 831 P.2d 527 (1992), establishes that the practice of partial forfeiture has also been followed by the IDWR. The Director's finding in that case was that the consumptive use appurtenant to the third field had been forfeited by nonuse.... Id. at 61, 831 P.2d at 529. Dovel indicates that the IDWR has made factual findings of partial forfeiture in the past. IDWR's practice of interpreting I.C. § 42-222(2) as allowing for a partial forfeiture is also apparent from its forms. The IDWR Application for Transfer of a Water Right asks applicants: 10. To your knowledge, has any portion of this water right undergone a period of five or more consecutive years of non-use? Moreover, the record shows that some of those now opposing partial forfeiture advocated its use in their objections to the Director's report in the SRBA proceedings. A Hagerman water right owner filed an objection to a water right on the basis that the water right had been partially forfeited, stating: The recommendation is for a greater quantity of water than has been beneficially used since at least before 1970. Thus, the right to anything more than 3.5 cfs does not exist. It has been forfeited or abandoned and/or the claimant is estopped from claiming the unused portion pursuant to agreement between the claimant and this objector. (Emphasis added). Case law and the record in this case show that the general public did indeed understand and depend upon the prior IDWR interpretation, policy and practice that partial forfeiture is a recognized concept in Idaho. That I.C. § 42-222(2) allows for partial forfeiture is a reasonable interpretation and otherwise meets the standards for according this interpretation deference. Simplot, 120 Idaho at 862, 820 P.2d at 1219. The Court declines to unsettle[] the repose of all those who have detrimentally relied on ... agency interpretations, id. at 857, 820 P.2d at 1214, and will accord IDWR's interpretation deference in this case.

If this Court were to find that I.C. § 42-222(2) does not authorize partial forfeiture of a water right, once the amount element of a water right is decreed, a water user could hold the water against all subsequent appropriators by using only a part of the water. Such a scheme is inconsistent with Idaho water law, which provides that if a water right is abandoned or forfeited it reverts to the state, following which third parties may perfect an interest therein. IDAHO CONST., art. 15, § 3; I.C. § 42-222(2); Idaho Power Co., 104 Idaho at 589, 661 P.2d at 755; Jenkins v. State Dep't of Water Resources, 103 Idaho 384, 387-88, 647 P.2d 1256; Sears v. Berryman, 101 Idaho 843, 848 623 P.2d 455, 460 (1981); Gilbert, 97 Idaho at 738, 552 P.2d at 1223 (1976). The governmental function in enacting ... the entire water distribution system under Title 42 of the Idaho Code is to further the state policy of securing the maximum use and benefit of its water resources. Nettleton v. Higginson, 98 Idaho 87, 91, 558 P.2d 1048, 1052 (1977). See IDAHO CONST., art. XV, § 7. In Kunz v. Utah Power & Light Co., 117 Idaho 901, 792 P.2d 926 (1990), the Court commented: The water of this arid state is an important resource. Not only farmers, but industry and residential users depend upon it. Because Idaho receives little annual precipitation, Idahoans must make the most efficient use of this limited resource. The policy of the law of this [s]tate is to secure the maximum use and benefit, and least wasteful use, of its water resources. Id. at 904, 792 P.2d at 929 (quotations and citations omitted). Integral to the goal of securing maximum use and benefit of our natural water resources is that water be put to beneficial use. This is a continuing obligation. See Washington County Irrigation Dist. v. Talboy, 55 Idaho 382, 390, 43 P.2d 943, 946 (1935); Glavin v. Salmon River Canal Co., 44 Idaho 583, 589-90, 258 P. 532, 534 (1927). Partial forfeiture makes possible allocation of water consistent with beneficial use concepts.
Contrary to the water users' claims, the Court's decision does not promote uneconomical use of water in order to avoid forfeiture. A water user is not entitled to waste water. Glavin, 44 Idaho at 589-90, 258 P. at 534; Coulson v. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co., 39 Idaho 320, 324, 227 P. 29, 30 (1924); Vineyard Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water Co., 245 F. 30, 33, 35 (9th Cir.1917); Washington State Sugar Co. v. Goodrich, 27 Idaho 26, 44, 147 P. 1073, 1079 (1915). It follows that a water right holder cannot avoid a partial forfeiture by wasting that portion of his or her water right that cannot be put to beneficial use during any part of the statutory period. If a water user cannot apply a portion of a water right to beneficial use during any part of the statutory period, but must waste the water in order to divert the full amount of the water right, a forfeiture has taken place.