Opinion ID: 1177055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Statutory Terms

Text: The Commentary to the possession statute provides that [m]any different tools and articles would be included within the definition of `burglar tool'  items such as wire cutters, crow-bars, picklocks, dynamite and other explosives  which could be used for a legitimate purpose. Commentary to Proposed Oregon Criminal Code 146 (1970). This makes it clear that an alternative legitimate use does not eliminate an object from the category of potential burglar's tools. However, the Commentary contains no discussion of the meaning of adapted, designed or commonly used for forcible entries or theft. We turn to the meaning of these terms. No one asserts that this signpost was designed for committing or facilitating forcible entries. The class of objects designed for this purpose is not large. Presumably, professional locksmith tools would fall into this category. The state refers to the signpost both as a commonly used burglar's tool and as an instrument that can be adapted to facilitate a forcible entry. In support of its first position, the state relies on testimony to the effect that a pry bar is a commonly used burglar's tool. A pry bar was defined as [a]nything that you can pry against something else with   . The witness, a Lane County Deputy Sheriff, testified that it [c]ould be anything from a tire jack handle to, as in this particular situation, a fence post. There was no testimony, however, that signposts themselves are commonly used for forcible entries. The state seeks to expand the scope of articles commonly used for these purposes to include articles similar to those commonly used. This stretches the statute beyond its meaning and must be rejected. [7] The state also asserts that the signpost was adapted for use as a pry bar. The state points to the fact that defendant removed the sign from the side of the road, carried it to the barn and used it to pry the lock off. It is important to realize that an object's actual use by defendant is irrelevant to the inquiry. For purposes of first degree burglary, a burglar need only be armed with a burglar's tool in the course of the burglary or in flight therefrom. The statute distinguishes between being armed with explosives or a deadly weapon, ORS 164.225(1)(a), and using or attempting to use a dangerous weapon, ORS 164.225(1)(c). Had defendant not used the signpost at all but merely had it in his possession when he was arrested at the scene of the crime, our inquiry would be the same. The Court of Appeals rejected a similar argument by the state in State v. Reid, 36 Or. App. 417, 585 P.2d 411 (1978), the case upon which the court relied below. In Reid the Court of Appeals stated: If, as the state argues, any item actually used to make a forcible entry is a burglar's tool, there is little left of the crime of second degree burglary. A person would be guilty of second degree burglary only if his entry was not forcible or if he unlawfully remained on the premises or employed a naked part of his body to effect the entry.    [The state's interpretation] would, in essence, amend the statute to read that a burglar's tool is `any item which has been used to effect entry.' Had the legislature intended the enhanced penalty of 15 years to apply when any item was used to effect the entry it presumably would have clearly said so. 36 Or. App. at 424, 585 P.2d 411. If an article has been adapted for committing forced entries or thefts, this must be apparent from examination of the object alone, without regard to its use. State v. Reid deserves further comment because the state has relied on Reid to develop its interpretation of the statutory term adapted. At oral argument before this court the state suggested that an adapted object was anything possessing inherent qualities which rendered it capable of facilitating a forced entry. State v. Reid equated adaptation for a particular use with capability of use in a particular way. The court's position is best illustrated by the court's analysis of a hammer as a burglar's tool: By way of illustration, a hammer is reasonably adapted to pounding and can be, by that characteristic, reasonably adapted to forcibly breaking through the outer limits of a building. 36 Or. App. at 428, 585 P.2d 411. A hammer is not adapted to pounding. It is, in fact, designed for this purpose. When the court suggests that the hammer is reasonably adapted to forcibly breaking through the outer limits of a building it can mean only that a hammer is reasonably capable of such use. [8] Indeed, this was the Court of Appeals' interpretation in the instant case. The court stated: We adhere to the Reid analysis here. To classify an item as a burglar tool on the basis that it is adapted for effecting forcible entry requires that the inherent qualities of the item render it reasonably suitable for effecting such entry. 67 Or. App. at 255, 677 P.2d 733. (Emphasis supplied.) This definition, however, does not square with the statutory language. The statute defining a burglar's tool may be divided into two discrete sections separated by a comma. The first lists a series of burning devices by name and also includes any other similar device capable of burning through steel, concrete or other solid material. ORS 164.235(2). (Emphasis supplied.) With burning devices, capability becomes an issue. The second half of the statute specifies three explosives, followed by the language: or any other explosive, tool, instrument or other article adapted, designed or commonly used for committing or facilitating a forcible entry into premises or theft by a physical taking. An instrument's capability to facilitate a forced entry or theft is not included in this operative definition. Prior to 1975, Arkansas had a statutory proscription against possession of any implement or other mechanical device whatsoever, adapted, designed or commonly used for breaking into enumerated vehicles and structures. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 41-1006 (1947). The Arkansas Supreme Court interpreted this statute to require more than that a tool may be capable of aiding a forced entry. In Gossett v. State, 242 Ark. 593, 595, 414 S.W.2d 631, 632 (1967), the Supreme Court rejected the state's claim that a tire tool, two screwdrivers, a lug wrench and a bar used to remove tires from car wheels were burglar's tools, stating: It is true, as shown by the testimony, that any one of the above mentioned tools could be used to pry open a door or break into a house, but so could a pocket knife. Such a showing is not sufficient for a felony conviction under the statute previously quoted. The burden was on the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that at least one of these `tools' was designed or commonly used in committing burglary. New York cases interpreting the statute from which ours derives have examined when an article becomes adapted for a prohibited purpose. In two cases, People v. Baer, 96 A.D.2d 717, 465 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1983), and People v. Alvarez, 86 Misc.2d 654, 382 N.Y.S.2d 952 (NY Crim Ct 1976), the courts found that keys used to break into a residence were not burglar's tools. Both opinions reasoned that even though the keys were used to gain unlawful entry, there was no adaptation of the keys. In People v. Gustiaburo, 23 A.D.2d 891, 260 N.Y.S.2d 250 (1965) (memorandum opinion), by contrast, a cardboard box with a hinged bottom to facilitate shoplifting was found to be adapted for the commission of larceny, as proscribed by New York law. These cases illustrate that adaptation means a modification of an object's original design, which modification furthers the proscribed purpose. Adaptation is not a variation or a potential variation on an object's usual, legitimate use. To summarize, neither an object's actual use nor its capability to be used in the manner proscribed by statute is relevant to the determination whether an instrument is adapted. The object must actually be modified in some way to serve the unlawful endeavor. This interpretation comports with the legislature's intent to punish more severely the professional burglar. The legislature may have assumed that altering tools or implements in advance of a burglary reveals a greater commitment to the illicit undertaking deserving of correspondingly more severe punishment.