Opinion ID: 2600675
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of asserted victim-impact evidence at the guilt phase

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of victim Tracey Toovey's wife, Catherine. Defendant asserts that her testimony was irrelevant; substantially more prejudicial than probative, and thus inadmissible pursuant to Evidence Code section 352; that it amounted to victim impact evidence inadmissible at the guilt phase; and that its admission at that phase violated defendant's right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution. Prior to commencement of the guilt phase, the defense offered to stipulate to any facts to which Catherine Toovey might testify, because she had been extremely emotional in testifying at the preliminary hearing. The defense suggested the prosecutor intended to present her testimony, which would be cumulative of that provided by other witnesses, solely to inflame the jury. The prosecutor argued that Mrs. Toovey's testimony was necessary to identify her husband and describe his actions on the morning he was murdered. Following a colloquy between the trial court and the prosecutor regarding this potential testimony, the court indicated Mrs. Toovey's testimony was unnecessary to establish Toovey's identity. After the prosecutor reiterated that the testimony would establish the time of Toovey's departure and other relevant times, the court required the prosecutor to make an offer of proof prior to calling her to testify. In his subsequent offer of proof, the prosecutor explained Mrs. Toovey would identify this victim as her husband and further testify that he departed for work 10 minutes prior to 8:00 a.m. on the day of the murder, that his drive from their residence to Grand Cru Vineyard was approximately five minutes in duration, and that recently he had been leaving for work an hour earlier than in the pastwhich was relevant because, in his confession, defendant stated he knew Toovey had been going to work an hour earlier. The prosecutor stated that, because the trial court had denied his motion to introduce Toovey's autopsy photographs, Mrs. Toovey's testimony was necessary to identify her husband and his automobile as depicted in an aerial photograph of the crime scene. Defense counsel then offered to stipulate to those facts in order to avoid the possibility that Mrs. Toovey would break down on the witness stand (as she had at the earlier hearing), thereby creating undue sympathy for the victim's family and prejudicing the defense. The prosecutor then explained to the court that at the preliminary hearing, when he returned to counsel's table, he inadvertently had left an autopsy photograph in front of Mrs. Toovey on the witness stand, and the prosecutor did not intend to show the photograph to her at trial or expect her to have the same reaction. In response, defense counsel argued the testimony was extremely prejudicial victim-impact evidence. The trial court observed the testimony in question was cumulative and potentially highly prejudicial, and reserved its ruling pending the prosecution's presentation of other evidence on those issues. When the prosecutor approached the conclusion of his case-in-chief, he requested a ruling on the issue of Mrs. Toovey's intended testimony. Defense counsel objected on the grounds of undue prejudice under Evidence Code section 352 and violation of due process under the federal Constitution and repeated his offer to stipulate to the evidence in question. The prosecution reiterated its offer of proof and stated that, in addition, Mrs. Toovey would testify she was aware of the tension or difficulty that existed between her husband and defendant. The prosecutor represented that Mrs. Toovey would not break down and become emotional on the witness stand. The trial court then overruled the defense objection. Mrs. Toovey proceeded to testify concerning the time her husband departed for work, explaining that recently he had been reporting to work and departing from work an hour earlier than previously in order to pick up their daughter after school so that Mrs. Toovey would not have to drive during her pregnancy. Mrs. Toovey identified her husband in the aerial photograph. She testified she was aware of a conflict between her husband and defendant, and explained that defendant had some ability to speak English. She did not become emotional on the witness stand. Defendant contends this evidence was irrelevant and inadmissible in view of the circumstance that defendant offered to stipulate to the substance of Mrs. Toovey's testimony. That testimony, however, was relevant to the credibility and reliability of various witnesses and of defendant, whose account of events and of his state of mind were at issue. As indicated above, the prosecution is not required to accept a stipulation that would deprive its case of its effectiveness, or present its case in the manner preferred by the defense. ( Garceau, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 182; People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 959.) Defendant also asserts Mrs. Toovey's testimony recounting the last time she saw her husband alive likely would inflame the emotions of the jury, as would her demeanor, and thus was substantially more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352. The trial court properly determined her testimony did not create undue prejudice either in its substance or its presentation. The court deferred ruling on the admissibility of this testimony in order to consider whether it was necessary in light of other evidence, restricted the prosecutor's display of photographs relating to the evidence in question, and secured the prosecutor's promise the witness would not suffer an emotional breakdown during her testimony. Mrs. Toovey's account of her husband's departure and her identification of him in the aerial crime-scene photograph scarcely would evoke an exceptional emotional bias against defendant as an individual. ( Padilla, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 925; People v. Karis, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 638.) (15) Defendant also urges that introduction of this testimony amounted to victim-impact evidence that is inadmissible at the guilt phase. We have recognized that a prosecutor's argument to the jury that appeal[s] for sympathy for the victim is out of place during an objective determination of guilt. ( People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1057 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756]; see People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 137 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990].) Similarly, the prosecutor's introduction of victim-impact testimony is impermissible at the guilt phase of a capital trial. (See People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1171-1172 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937] ( Taylor) ; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 974-975 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183].) In the present case, however, Mrs. Toovey's testimony scarcely touched upon the victim's family life and did not relate the effect of defendant's acts upon family members. (See Taylor, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1171-1172, 1182 [at the guilt phase, physician's testimony regarding the extent of the victim's injuries was not victim-impact evidence; at the penalty phase, family members' testimony concerning the various ways they adversely were affected by loss of the victim's care and companionship was admissible victim-impact evidence]; cf. Thornton, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 406 [at the penalty phase, the mother of the victim testified the victim was her only daughter, whose murder left the victim's young son motherless].) (16) Defendant asserts, nonetheless, that the admission of this testimony infected the guilt and penalty phases of the trial in violation of defendant's federal constitutional rights. Defendant relies in part upon Booth v. Maryland (1987) 482 U.S. 496 [96 L.Ed.2d 440, 107 S.Ct. 2529] and South Carolina v. Gathers (1989) 490 U.S. 805 [104 L.Ed.2d 876, 109 S.Ct. 2207], prohibiting the admission of victim-impact evidence even during the penalty phase of a capital trial. In Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808 [115 L.Ed.2d 720, 111 S.Ct. 2597], the high court overruled those decisions, holding that a state is free to determine that victim-impact evidence demonstrating specific harm caused by the defendant's crimes is relevant to a jury's assessment of a defendant's moral culpability. ( Id. at p. 819; see People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 732 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289] [ex post facto principles are not violated by applying the Payne rule to cases in which the crimes precede that decision].) Under our law, evidence of specific harm, including the impact on the family of the victim caused by the defendant's acts, is a circumstance of the crime and is therefore admissible pursuant to section 190.3, factor (a). ( People v. Kelly (2007) 42 Cal.4th 763, 793 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 531, 171 P.3d 548]; People v. Edwards (1991) 54 Cal.3d 787, 833-836 [1 Cal.Rptr.2d 696, 819 P.2d 436]; 3 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Punishment, § 472, pp. 631-632.) In the event the jury at the penalty phase considered Mrs. Toovey's brief guilt phase testimony concerning her husband, the jurors were entitled to consider that and all other circumstances of the crimes.