Opinion ID: 524294
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Provide Adequate Warnings

Text: 26 Through the Cigarette Labeling Act, Congress has prescribed the exact warning to be placed on every package of cigarettes sold in the United States since January 1, 1966. See supra, Section II.B. Mrs. Pennington contends that the tobacco companies did not warn her husband adequately of the dangers of cigarette smoking, despite their compliance with the Act. Relying on decisions of the First, Third, and Eleventh Circuits, the district court found that the Act precluded Mrs. Pennington's inadequate warning claim. We join our sister circuits in holding that this claim is preempted. See Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 235; Palmer, 825 F.2d at 629; Stephen, 825 F.2d at 313; Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187. 27 Preemption under the federal law is not limited to state warning statutes. State tort law liability can have a regulatory effect that may conflict with a federal statute or frustrate congressional objectives, and thus can trigger federal preemption. See Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Association v. De la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 156-59, 102 S.Ct. 3014, 3024-25, 73 L.Ed.2d 664 (1982); Chicago and North Western Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 324-26, 101 S.Ct. 1124, 1133-34, 67 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246-47, 79 S.Ct. 773, 780-81, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). 28 The Labeling Act clearly indicates Congress' intent to supplant state regulation of any warnings to accompany the distribution of cigarettes. Congress determined that no statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required by Sec. 1333 of this Title, shall be required on any cigarette package. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1334(a). Under this provision, a state legislature cannot require warnings on cigarettes sold within its borders that differ from the congressionally-mandated warnings. Indeed, an express purpose of the Act is to ensure that the national economy is not impeded by diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. 29 We find that Mrs. Pennington's claim that the existing warnings are inadequate under Louisiana law, if successful, conflict with the statutory requirement of uniform national warnings. Our colleague, Judge Brown, writing for the First Circuit, succintly explained this point: 30 If a manufacturer's warning that complies with the Act is found inadequate under a state tort theory, the damages awarded and verdict rendered against it can be viewed as state regulation: the decision effectively compels the manufacturer to alter its warnings to conform to different state law requirements as 'promulgated' by a jury's findings.... This challenge to the federal warning label's sufficiency--and the confusion it would engender--surely contravenes the Act's policy of uniform labeling. 31 Palmer, 825 F.2d at 627. 32 The Labeling Act reflects a delicate political balance between two important goals: warning the public of the hazards of cigarette smoking and protecting the national economy. Palmer, 825 F.2d at 626; Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187. This balance is reflected in the policy statement of the Act. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1331. A state court jury verdict concluding that the warnings selected by Congress do not sufficiently protect the citizens of a state from the risks of smoking would clearly upset this carefully balanced federal scheme. Cf. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39, 93 S.Ct. 1854, 1862, 36 L.Ed.2d 547 (1973). 33 In summary, the claim that the cigarette companies did not provide adequate warning under Louisiana law conflicts with Congress' clear intent to impose uniform warning and labeling regulations throughout the country. It also upsets the congressional balance between warning the public of the risks of cigarettes and protecting the national economy. For these reasons, we hold that Mrs. Pennington's claim that the tobacco companies failed to provide adequate warnings to her husband of the dangers of smoking after January 1, 1966, is preempted by the Cigarette Labeling Act. Our holding encompasses all variations of Mrs. Pennington's post-1965 failure to warn claim, 8 including the contention that the tobacco companies failed to warn of the specific dangers involved when smoking is combined with alcohol consumption and exposure to industrial chemicals. Cf. Roysdon, 849 F.2d at 232 (claim that tobacco company failed to provide specific warning about the risk of vascular disease, which ultimately required leg amputation, is preempted). Our ruling also applies to Mrs. Pennington's claim that the tobacco companies failed to educate the public about the risk of smoking in order to counterbalance their promotional activities. 9