Opinion ID: 882780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Due Process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments

Text: Byers argues that the question of whether he has a mental disease or defect impacts more than the issue of whether he had the requisite mental state. According to Byers, the question is also whether he had the moral culpability for the particular offense. Byers argues that because the court refused to instruct the jury on the traditional insanity defense, his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process were violated. Byers' contention is that failure to so instruct contravenes a fundamental legal principle that criminal sanctions will only be imposed on persons who act with wrongful intent in the commission of an offense. The State argues that the current statutory scheme does not divest Byers of his right to due process under constitutional law. According to the State, this Court has already addressed the constitutional arguments put forth by Byers and determined that the current law is constitutional. Montana requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had the requisite state of mind. However, prior to the 1979 changes to the Criminal Code of this State, insanity was treated as an affirmative defense that the defendant had to establish by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Korell (1984), 213 Mont. 316, 690 P.2d 992. In contrast, today a defendant may submit evidence of mental disease or defect without a requirement that he establish the same by any particular evidentiary standard. As described in Korell, the defendant's alleged mental disease or defect is now evaluated at three different stages of the legal proceedings. Before trial, the defendant's state of mind is considered by analyzing whether he is able to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel in his own defense. Section 46-14-103, MCA. During trial, the defendant may present evidence that he suffers from a mental disease or defect and did not have the requisite mental state. Section 46-14-102, MCA. During sentencing, the sentencing judge may consider whether at the time of the commission of the offense the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect that rendered him unable to appreciate the criminality of his behavior or to conform his behavior to the requirements of the law. Section 46-14-311, MCA. The sentencing judge must then determine whether the mental disease or defect is such that defendant should be confined to a specialized institution. This third consideration is progressive in that it not only provides a defendant with a third consideration of his condition, but does so in a way that both he and the public are protected. The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended in part to protect certain fundamental rights long recognized under the common law. Korell, 213 Mont. at 327, 690 P.2d at 998. Byers argues that the insanity defense is firmly rooted in the common law and pleading the defense is a fundamental right protected under our national constitution. We have carefully considered this argument before and have stated that no constitutional right to plead insanity exists in the law. Korell, 213 Mont. at 334, 690 P.2d at 1002. We also note that the United States Supreme Court has determined that the Due Process Clause does not require the use of any particular insanity test. Leland v. Oregon (1952), 343 U.S. 790, 72 S.Ct. 1002, 96 L.Ed. 1302. While the Montana statutory scheme eliminates insanity as an affirmative defense, it provides a criminal defendant the opportunity to present evidence that he has a mental disease or defect and places no particular burden on defendant in presenting his evidence. Because it is up to the jury to consider and weigh the evidence presented to it, the defendant need only cast a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that he had the requisite mental state. Korell, 213 Mont. at 331, 690 P.2d 1000. The creation of such a doubt is far different than having to shoulder the burden of proof. Under the Montana scheme, the burden of proof never leaves the State. In accordance with our holding in Korell, we conclude the statutory scheme involving evidence of mental disease or defect is constitutional. We hold that Title 46, Chapter 14 of the MCA, does not violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of the defendant.