Opinion ID: 1126936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the Council's Treatment of Facts Arbitrary and Capricious

Text: With these various rules in mind, we now give attention to the trial record of the Witnesses' case in the circuit court. Appellant asserts that the court erred because, as it claims: The admitted facts and the undisputed evidence show that the plaintiff had a clear legal right to have issued a permit to build and use the church in the residential area and that there was a plain legal duty on the part of the defendants to issue the permit and that the denial of it was arbitrary and capricious. This proposition is addressed to the administrative action of the Council and its methods and motives in arriving at its final determination, irrespective of the legal validity of the ordinance. This is tantamount to a declaration that the Council in denying the petition of the Witnesses ignored the factual presentation made at the hearing and reached its conclusions without any adequate factual foundation or controlling principle. Appellant's presiding minister, Mr. Hughart, although personally present at the Council hearing, did not testify in the circuit court to one matter that occurred at that hearing, except to say that the Council was shown a scale model of the proposed church building, a picture of which is one of the exhibits here. From Mr. Hughart, we obtain nothing that remotely indicates that the Council acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. This witness also outlined the number of regular meetings or services, the time consumed and the usual number attending, the capacity of the planned off-street parking space, as well as the seating capacity of the church. If these matters were brought to the attention of the council, the record does not tell us. All of the relevant testimony concerning what transpired at the hearing comes from Councilman Klein. From him, we learn that among the reasons advanced in opposition and which apparently persuaded the vote of Mr. Klein and the other members of the Council were the traffic hazards, the condition of noise and fumes and lights, and its enusing effect    on the value of property in the immediate vicinity if the application was granted. The foregoing reasons assigned by Mr. Klein find their counterpart in the minimal requirements established by Section 3, supra, of the zoning ordinance. 12. The terms arbitrary and capricious action, when used in a matter like the instant one, must mean willful and unreasoning action, without consideration and in disregard of the facts and circumstances of the case. On the other hand, where there is room for two opinions, action is not arbitrary or capricious when exercised honestly and upon due consideration, even though it may be believed that an erroneous conclusion had been reached. In re Buffelen Lbr. & Mfg. Co., 32 Wash2d 205, 201 P2d 194, 196 (1948); Lillions v. Gibbs, 47 Wash2d 629, 289 P2d 203 (1955); State Board of Tax Com'rs. v. Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R. Co., 121 Ind App 302, 96 NE2d 279 (1951). The presumption favorable to the reasonableness and validity of the action of the board, says McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, supra, at p 805, must be given great weight especially by a higher court after the lower court has sustained the administrative decision. Accordingly, the decision of a zoning board as to a permit, certificate of approval, special use, variance, exception or the like must stand, unless it clearly and plainly is shown that the decision is against the weight of the evidence or erroneous, unreasonable, or arbitrary, or unless it is shown that the board acted arbitrarily or capriciously, that it arrived at its determination in an unfair manner, that its action was illegal, that it abused its discretion, or that it acted under an unreasonable ordinance. Also see Rexon v. Board of Adjustment, 10 NJ 1, 89 A2d 233, 234-5 (1952) (decision by Brennan, J., now of U.S. Supreme Court); Sweck v. Zoning Board of Review, 77 RI 8, 72 A2d 679 (1950); O'Neill v. Philadelphia Zoning Board of Adjustment, 384 Pa 379, 120 A2d 901, 904-5 (1956).