Opinion ID: 1165515
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Revision or Amendment

Text: The subject of Amending and Revising the Constitution is covered by article XVIII of our Constitution. Pursuant to its terms, the Legislature may propose an amendment or revision of the Constitution, while an initiative may be used to amend the Constitution. (Art. XVIII, §§ 1, 3; see also art. II, § 8, subd. (a) [The initiative is the power of the electors to propose statutes and amendments to the Constitution and to adopt or reject them].) [15] The courts have long been aware of the fundamental distinction between a constitutional revision and a constitutional amendment. (See Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 222; see also Livermore v. Waite (1894) 102 Cal. 113, 117-119 [36 P. 424].) Thus, it is firmly established that the initiative process may be used to amend our Constitution, but not to revise it. ( Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 221; McFaddeh v. Jordan, supra, 32 Cal.2d at pp. 331-334.) Although a precise line of demarcation between amendment and revision may be difficult to draw, this court outlined the distinction in general terms nearly 90 years ago. The very term `constitution' implies an instrument of a permanent and abiding nature, and the provisions contained therein for its revision indicate the will of the people that the underlying principles upon which it rests, as well as the substantial entirety of the instrument, shall be of a like permanent and abiding nature. On the other hand, the significance of the term `amendment' implies such an addition or change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was framed. ( Livermore, supra, 102 Cal. at pp. 118-119.) In 1948, this court struck down as a revision an initiative proposal that would have effected extensive alterations in the basic plan and substance of our present Constitution.... ( McFadden, supra, 32 Cal.2d at p. 347.) The initiative challenged in McFadden would have added 21,000 words to the Constitution and would have repealed or substantially altered 15 of its 25 articles. Included within the vast sweep of the measure were matters from gamblers to ministers; from mines to civic centers; from fish to oleomargarine; from state courts to city budgets; from liquor control to senate reapportionment ..., ( Id., at p. 349.) This court seemed most troubled by the initiative's creation of a new commission, whose virtually unfettered exercise of far-reaching powers would have placed it substantially beyond the system of checks and balances which heretofore has characterized our governmental plan. ( Id., at p. 348.) Recently, this court spoke to the issue as it applied to the enactment by initiative of article XIII A. ( Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208.) A dual test, quantitative and qualitative in nature, was applied. [A]n enactment which is so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the `substantial entirety' of the Constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous existing provisions may well constitute a revision thereof. However, even a relatively simple enactment may accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a revision also. In illustration, the parties herein appear to agree that an enactment which purported to vest all judicial power in the Legislature would amount to a revision without regard either to the length or complexity of the measure or the number of existing articles or sections affected by such change. ( Id., at p. 223.) Petitioners in Amador Valley challenged the initiative tax relief measure on the ground, inter alia, that it had the qualitative effect of impairing the established principle of home rule. (22 Cal.3d at p. 224.) This loss of home rule was claimed to be a consequence of (1) restrictions which article XIII A placed on local government's power to tax and (2) the resulting need to look to the state Legislature for a substantial portion of funds for local purposes. In rejecting this argument, the court found that the probable effects [of the initiative measure] are not as fundamentally disruptive as petitioners suggest and that the initiative would not necessarily and inevitably result in the loss of home rule. ( Id., at pp. 224, 226.) Under the particular theories advanced by the petitioners, it would appear that the Victims' Bill of Rights does not amount to a constitutional revision. Considering the measure's quantitative effect, it bears noting that less than half of the measure purports to change the content of the Constitution. The remainder of the proposition alters statutes, and by its very terms, the prohibition of revision by initiative applies to constitutional, not statutory, changes. Only sections 2 and 3 of the initiative purport to directly alter the Constitution itself. They repeal one section of article I and add another. The net effect is the addition of about 660 words to our Constitution. This may be more words than were added by Proposition 13 (400 words), but in purely quantitative terms, it cannot be said to be so substantial as to amount to a revision of a document that already contains 21 articles, 277 sections, and approximately 35,000 words. Petitioners' primary contention is that Proposition 8 fails the qualitative test of Amador Valley and McFadden. They argue that the measure accomplishes far reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan, by altering our court system and our system of public education. (See Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 223.) Sections of Proposition 8 do make significant substantive changes across an extensive range of subjects, but these changes relate primarily to matters which previously had been covered by statute and were not a part of the Constitution. For example, the so-called Truth-in-Evidence provision would appear to alter by implication many of this state's evidentiary rules. (See Prop. 8, § 3, subd. (d).) However, most of these rules are statutory or have been developed over the years in the common law. Since petitioners have not argued that Proposition 8's changes with respect to constitutionally based rules of evidence are a revision of the Constitution, that issue is not considered here. Petitioners contend that Proposition 8 will prevent the judiciary from processing civil cases, in violation of article VI, section 1. That section vests the judicial power of this State ... in the Supreme Court, courts of appeal, superior courts, municipal courts, and justice courts. The argument is advanced that Proposition 8 will create such an enormous backlog of criminal cases that for all practical purposes, ... the judiciary [will be precluded] from performing their [ sic ] constitutional obligation to decide ... civil matters. This backlog of criminal cases will be caused, it is said, by the enactment of the Penal Code provisions which (1) limit plea bargaining (Pen. Code, § 1192.7; Prop. 8, § 7), (2) require that victims have the opportunity to attend sentencing proceedings in misdemeanor cases (Pen. Code, § 1191.1; Prop. 8, § 6, subd. (a)), and (3) enable prosecutors to obtain longer sentences for defendants by bringing and trying charges separately (Pen. Code, § 667; Prop. 8, § 5). Petitioners also foresee serious consequences for our system of public education as a result of the provisions in Proposition 8 regarding the right to safe, secure and peaceful schools. (Art. I, § 28, subds. (a), (c); Prop. 8, § 3.) They argue that with budgets already trimmed, the schools will have little choice but to curtail instruction in order to comply with the newly imposed duty to provide safe, secure and peaceful campuses. This contraction of educational services would amount to a substantial impairment of the fundamental constitutional right to education, they contend. (See art. IX, § 1; Serrano v. Priest (1971) 5 Cal.3d 584, 608-609 [96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 487 P.2d 1241].) These predictions may well be accurate, but they do not justify the legal conclusion that Proposition 8 amounts to a constitutional revision, rather than an amendment, under the present state of the case law. (See Amador Valley, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 223-224.) Moreover, each argument is premised on assumptions concerning matters that are outside the four corners of the initiative measure itself, i.e., that there will be insufficient resources to cope with the changes mandated therein. No hard facts have been produced. This court has been and should continue to be reluctant to declare an initiative measure to be a revision based solely on speculation as to its fiscal effect. Initiative measures frequently have an impact on the public fisc, and hence on matters of constitutional concern. (Cf. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley (1976) 17 Cal.3d 129, 144 [130 Cal. Rptr. 465, 550 P.2d 1001].) If that reason alone were sufficient to deem a measure to be a revision  and forbidden by article XVIII  then the power to improve our laws through the initiative process would be stringently curtailed. There is, however, a serious problem presented by the manner in which the draftsmen of Proposition 8 attempted to alter the Constitution. Article XVIII sets forth the exclusive means by which the California Constitution may be amended or revised. The sine qua non of these provisions is that the voice of the citizens must be heard. Regardless of how the process is initiated, every constitutional amendment or revision must be submitted to a vote of the people. Proposition 8 created a new section of the Constitution which contains direct reference to a specific statutory provision of the Penal Code. Subdivision (e) of section 28 of article I forbids release on his or her own recognizance of any person charged with the commission of any serious felony, as defined in subdivision (g). In turn, subdivision (g) defines that term solely by reference to the list of serious felonies found in Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c). In this manner the contents of this statute are imported into the Constitution. Statutes, of course, may generally be amended by the Legislature without the necessity of referral to, and approval by, the people. However, the Constitution has established special rules for amending statutes (like § 1192.7) that are created by the initiative process. (See art. II, § 10, subd. (c).) When amending this type of statute, the Legislature must seek the people's approval unless the measure initially passed by the voters specifically authorized amendment without the need for such approval. That is precisely the situation in the present case. The draftsmen of Proposition 8 explicitly provided a mechanism by which the Legislature, by a two-thirds vote and without the people's participation, can amend section 1192.7 and its list of enumerated serious felonies (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (d)). Such an arrangement ostensibly may be in keeping with the requirements of subdivision (c) of section 10 of article II. However, due to the unusual manner in which the draftsmen have linked statute to Constitution, legislative amendments to section 1192.7 would affect far more than the statutory law of this state. They would alter the Constitution itself by changing the scope of the constitutional provisions into which they had previously been incorporated. The flaw in this scheme is evident. It deprives the people of this state of their paramount role in approving or rejecting changes in their Constitution. In effect, it revises the Constitution by creating a method by which that document may be altered without the participation of the electors. As such, it represents an attempt by the draftsmen to fundamentally reorder the distribution of power between the Legislature and the citizens of this state. It could be argued that if rules of statutory construction were applied to the context of the Constitution, the constitutionality of incorporating the specified Penal Code provision into section 28 might be upheld. It has been held that where a statute adopts by specific reference the provisions of another statute, regulation, or ordinance, such provisions are incorporated in the form in which they exist at the time of the reference and not as subsequently modified.... [Citations omitted.] ( Palermo v. Stockton Theatres, Inc. (1948) 32 Cal.2d 53, 58-59 [195 P.2d 1], italics added.) It might be argued that this statutory rule should apply to a constitutional amendment. (Cf. State School Bldg. Fin. Com. v. Betts (1963) 216 Cal. App.2d 685, 692 [31 Cal. Rptr. 258].) Subdivisions (e) and (g) of section 28 thus would be read as having incorporated the specified code provisions in the form in which they exist[ed] at the time of the passage of Proposition 8. Subsequent legislative modifications of these provisions would be ignored. As such, it would be contended that section 28 would not amount to a revision of the Constitution because future legislative amendment of Penal Code section 1192.7 would have no effect on subdivisions (e) and (g) of that provision. This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that the draftsmen of Proposition 8 created a scheme expressly authorizing the Legislature, acting alone, to alter the provisions of Penal Code section 1192.7. By incorporating the provisions of Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c) into the Constitution and by providing in subdivision (d) of that section a mechanism for legislative amendment of the provisions of subdivision (c), the draftsmen clearly intended to empower the Legislature to modify the Constitution without ever referring such action to the electorate for approval. In the face of such explicit evidence of the draftsmen's intent, the rule enunciated in Palermo is not applicable. Statutory construction is an effective means by which courts may resolve ambiguities created by the wording or grammatical construction of statutes. Here, however, there is no ambiguity. The rules of construction will not save a measure which is clearly and unambiguously unconstitutional, one which impermissibly reallocates power from the people of this state to the Legislature. The draftsmen of Proposition 8 created a mechanism by which the Legislature can transmute a statutory modification into a constitutional amendment. With one wave of the wand, this act of electoral alchemy revised the Constitution by devising a means of altering that document without the citizens' participation. Such a change, which strikes at the very essence of our form of government and the power of the people, violates article XVIII's prohibition against constitutional revision by initiative.