Opinion ID: 163696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: ALJ’s Step Four Analysis

Text: Mr. Gibson challenges the ALJ’s conclusion that he retained the RFC to perform his past jobs as a production assembler and resident aide. He claims the ALJ failed to (1) identify sufficient medical evidence to support his conclusion, (2) compare Mr. Gibson’s subjective complaints to the medical evidence, and (3) make findings regarding the physical and mental demands of Mr. Gibson’s -3- past relevant work. He asserts that these failures require reversal under Winfrey v. Chater , 92 F.3d 1017 (10th Cir. 1996). In Winfrey , this court articulated three phases an ALJ must address in making a determination at step four. The first phase requires an evaluation of the claimant’s RFC. Id. at 1023. The second phase entails an examination of the demands of the claimant’s past relevant work. Id. In the third phase, “the ALJ determines whether the claimant has the ability to meet the job demands found in phase two despite the mental and/or physical limitations found in phase one.” Id. Specific findings are required at all phases. Id. (A) Phase one challenge – medical evidence Mr. Gibson argues that in evaluating his RFC, the ALJ improperly relied on the reports by Drs. Smith and Livingston to find that he had the RFC to perform his past “light” jobs as a production assembler and resident aide. He maintains that because both doctors stated that he could not return to his work, the ALJ’s conclusion is unsupported. This argument is specious. The work to which the doctors stated Mr. Gibson could not return was his job as a shipping and receiving clerk. Aplt. App., tab 3 at 158, 176. The ALJ did not find that Mr. Gibson could return to this job, classified as “medium.” See id. at 66-67 (testimony of vocational expert). -4- Mr. Gibson also charges that the ALJ failed to point to medical evidence in support of his finding that Mr. Gibson could perform “light” work. On the contrary, the ALJ pointed to the reports of at least six medical providers to support his finding. Id. at 27-29 (concluding that medical records provided “ample support” for determination that Mr. Gibson could perform “light” work; reviewing medical reports). We find it unnecessary to summarize the medical evidence as was done by both the ALJ and the magistrate judge. Our review of the record reveals that substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Mr. Gibson could perform his past “light” jobs. (B) Phase one challenge – subjective complaints We turn to Mr. Gibson’s second challenge to the phase one determination. He complains that the ALJ did not compare his subjective complaints to the medical evidence and did not analyze how his activities affected his credibility. We construe this argument as challenging the ALJ’s credibility findings on the ground that they did not satisfy the requirement that they “be closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995) (quotation omitted). “Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial -5- evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). “‘ Kepler does not require a formalistic factor-by-factor recitation of the evidence. So long as the ALJ sets forth the specific evidence he relies on in evaluating the claimant’s credibility, the dictates of Kepler are satisfied.’” White v. Barnhart , 287 F.3d 903, 909 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Qualls v. Apfel , 206 F.3d 1368, 1372 (10th Cir. 2000)). In this case, the ALJ explained his reasons for discounting Mr. Gibson’s testimony that his pain was disabling. Mr. Gibson testified that he needed to lie down for four hours each day, yet no physician indicated that he needed to do so. Aplt. App., tab 3 at 31. Similarly, Mr. Gibson’s testimony that his medications made him drowsy was not a complaint mentioned in the medical reports. Id. The ALJ found that Mr. Gibson’s description of his physical limitations was at odds with the medical evidence that at least two physicians believed that he could work. Id. Although Mr. Gibson testified he could sit for no longer than fifteen minutes, he also stated that he had driven himself nonstop thirty-five miles to the hearing that day–contradictory evidence the ALJ found undermined Mr. Gibson’s credibility. Id. The ALJ also noted the neurologist’s observation that Mr. Gibson exhibited “significant symptom magnification.” Id. The ALJ remarked that the medical evidence showed that Mr. Gibson sought relatively infrequent treatment and that the treatment provided was very conservative. Id. He found this “inconsistent with allegations of disability.” Id. -6- Based on our independent review of the record, we conclude that the ALJ adequately supported his credibility determination. It “was linked to specific findings of fact, findings we are compelled to accept because they are fairly derived from the record.” White , 287 F.3d at 910. (C) Phase two challenge – past relevant work Mr. Gibson next argues that the ALJ failed to make the findings necessary at phase two regarding the demands of Mr. Gibson’s past relevant work. He maintains that the ALJ abdicated his duty to make findings by relying on the vocational expert’s testimony. The ALJ noted with approval the portion of the vocational expert’s testimony relating to “light” jobs and concluded that those jobs “precisely match[ed] the claimant’s residual functional capacity.” Aplt. App., tab 3 at 33. He incorporated that testimony into his findings. “The ALJ did not delegate the analysis to the vocational expert; instead, he quoted the VE’s testimony approvingly, in support of his own findings. . . . There was nothing improper about this.” Doyal v. Barnhart , 331 F.3d 758, 761 (10th Cir. 2003).