Opinion ID: 2629007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Were the Children in Need of Aid in Part Because of Lacey's Neglect?

Text: Lacey argues that the superior court erred in concluding that her children were in need of aid based on her neglect. She contends that she did everything that OCS required of her by completing parenting classes, attending counseling sessions, and recognizing that Neal could not be around her or the children until he resolved his drug problem. [10] The superior court may find a child to be a child in need of aid if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the child has been subjected to conduct by or conditions created by the parent, guardian, or custodian [that] have subjected the child or another child in the same household to neglect. [11] The court may find neglect if the parent fails to provide the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, medical attention, or other care and control necessary for the child's physical and mental health and development, though financially able to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so.[ [12] ] The superior court found clear and convincing evidence that Lacey and Neal's children were in need of aid based in part on conditions created by Lacey and Neal that had subjected the children to neglect. The court based this finding on evidence that: (1) Edward and Elliot missed almost eighty days of school during the 2005-2006 school year, reportedly because the parents overslept; (2) on August 18, 2006, Neal tested positive for cocaine after an OCS social worker found six to seven unknown adults smoking something other than cigarettes in the apartment while the children were home; (3) the parents missed visits with the children after OCS assumed custody; and (4) Edward, Elliot, and Eve suffered from significant delays in speech and verbal skills and required dental care when they entered state custody in 2006. Lacey does not argue that these findings were clearly erroneous, and each is amply supported by the evidence discussed in Part II, above. Moreover, evidence discussed in Part II concerning the August 18, 2006 family-home incident raises grave doubts about Lacey's ability to provide the care and control needed for her children's physical and mental health and development. In Audrey H. v. State, Office of Children's Services, we stated that the superior court, when determining whether the child has suffered from neglect, may consider a child's exposure to drug use. [13] We held that the superior court did not err by concluding that the mother had failed to provide her children with the care and control necessary for their mental health and development, in part because she exposed her children to illegal drug use and open sexual activity. [14] The August 18, 2006 incident similarly demonstrates that Lacey failed, on at least one occasion, to provide the care and control necessary for her children's health and development. Lacey may not have invited the individuals into her home to engage in what was likely illicit drug use, but she seemed unable (or unwilling) to prevent the occurrence from happening. Lacey's arguments that she complied with her case plan and admitted that Neal had a drug abuse problem have little bearing on the children-in-need-of-aid finding. We conclude, as OCS argues, that there was more than sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Lacey and Neal's children were children in need of aid based on neglect, that the evidence demonstrates that Lacey failed to provide the children with adequate education, medical attention, or other care and control necessary for their physical and mental health and development, and that the superior court correctly concluded that Lacey's inability or unwillingness to prevent Neal from being around the children amounted to neglect. The record contains ample evidence supporting the superior court's finding by clear and convincing evidence that all six children were in need of aid based in part on Lacey's neglect. Lacey also challenges particular evidence bearing on the court's child-in-need-of-aid finding. She argues that Dr. Glass improperly based her opinion of Lacey's parenting ability on Lacey's decision to leave Pilot Point and return to Anchorage without her children. Dr. Glass testified that Lacey's decision to leave her children in Pilot Point demonstrated that, despite her stated willingness to do anything to get her children back, Lacey had not historically done what it would take to regain custody. On cross-examination, Dr. Glass acknowledged that Lacey claimed she left Pilot Point to obtain counseling services that she could not get in the village. But Dr. Glass then testified that, even if Lacey was faced with competing case plan requirements, she should have discussed with OCS which requirement was to have priority. Lacey asserts that she left Pilot Point only because she could not obtain counseling services there. She argues, at least implicitly, that she moved back to Anchorage to complete her case plan requirements. She contends that it is not fair to place her in a Catch 22 situation, in which her attempts to comply with OCS's requirements help support the termination of her parental rights. She accordingly asks that the termination be reversed and that on remand her decision to return to Anchorage not be used to support terminating her parental rights. The superior court did not expressly mention Lacey's decision to leave Pilot Point in 2007 when it determined that the children were still in need of aid. But it seems to have considered this fact in its active efforts analysis, and noted that OCS had attempted to create a physical separation between Lacey and Neal by relocating Lacey and her children to Pilot Point. It then found that Lacey chose to return to Anchorage in October 2007 rather than reside near the children. It was not error to allow OCS to elicit evidence that Lacey left Pilot Point to return to Anchorage in 2007, and it appears OCS is correct in arguing that Lacey did not object to Dr. Glass's testimony in this regard. Even assuming Lacey relocated to get OCS-mandated counseling, there was a valid dispute whether, as Dr. Glass also testified, Lacey should have sought clarification from OCS before moving back to Anchorage. Moreover, there was conflicting evidence about why Lacey returned to Anchorage. She claimed she left to complete a counseling requirement that could not be satisfied in Pilot Point, but there was evidence permitting a contrary finding. An OCS social worker testified that she referred Lacey to a family service worker in Pilot Point who was willing to meet with Lacey for counseling. Lacey testified in mid-July that she met with the family service worker and was told that her counseling would begin after the family service worker returned from a two-week vacation. And when she was asked at a placement review hearing why she moved back to Anchorage, Lacey testified: Because I have no housing down there and I was looking for housing down here. She later told Dr. Glass that she left Pilot Point because she needed an ultrasound and because they have brown water sometimes I went without electricity and water in the house, sometimes no propane. This conflicting evidence raised credibility disputes to be resolved by the superior court. The court appears to have weighed Lacey's decision to relocate from Pilot Point against her. The record provides support for the implicit finding that Lacey's decision to leave Pilot Point was inappropriate.