Opinion ID: 2634399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Whether the trial court prejudicially erred in instructing the jury to view defendant's confession and admissions with caution

Text: As noted above, the prosecution introduced two tape-recorded statements made by defendant to Fresno Police Department Detective Tom Sanchez shortly after defendant was arrested. Although defendant initially denied or attempted to minimize his involvement in the crimes that occurred on February 17-18, 1991, he eventually acknowledged participating in all of them except for the murder of Miguel Gonzalez and the alleged rapes of Rosanna Beckham. The tapes were played for the jury. At the conclusion of the guilt phase, the trial court instructed the jury that [e]vidence of an oral confession or an oral admission of the defendant should be viewed with caution. Defendant contends the trial court erred in instructing the jury to view his oral confession and admissions with caution, because reasonable jurors would have interpreted the instruction as directing them to view defendant's version of the relevant events with skepticism, notwithstanding the circumstance that defendant's statements included both inculpatory admissions, exculpatory statements, and admissions of culpability that mitigated the extent of [defendant's] involvement in the crime. He relies upon our determination that such an instruction should not be given when the defendant's statements were tape-recorded and the tape recording was played for the jury. (See People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1200, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) He claims a violation of his right to due process of law, a fair trial, and a reliable penalty determination. When evidence is admitted establishing that the defendant made' oral admissions, the trial court ordinarily has a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury that such evidence must be viewed with caution. [Citation.] We have explained, however, that `the purpose of the cautionary instruction is to assist the jury in determining if the statement was in fact made. [Citation.]' [Citation.] Accordingly, we also have held that this cautionary instruction should not be given if the oral admission was tape-recorded and the tape recording was played for the jury. ( People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1200, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) Although defendant is correct that the trial court should not have so instructed the jury for the reasons he has asserted, the error was harmless. Defendant's contention that he was prejudiced because the jury would have understood the instruction as a basis for discounting the exculpatory elements of his statements is unavailing. As we have explained under similar circumstances: To the extent that defendant's admissions were inculpatory, it is clear that defendant could not have been prejudiced by the giving of an instruction that the jury should view this evidence with caution. Defendant contends, however, that he suffered prejudice because there is a reasonable likelihood, that the instruction caused the jury to view with suspicion the exculpatory portions of defendant's statements. The instruction, however, defined an admission as an out-of-court statement by defendant `which tends to prove guilt.' `In light of the definition of admission, if the jury determines a statement does not tend to prove guilt when considered with the other evidence, it is not an admission. The cautionary language instructs the jury to view evidence of an admission with caution. By its terms, the language applies only to statements which tend to prove guilt and not to statements which do not.' [Citation.] `Juries understand that this instruction by its terms applies only to statements tending to prove guilt, not to exculpatory ones. To the extent a statement is exculpatory it is not an admission to be viewed with caution. [Citation.]' { People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1200, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) Defendant contends our holding in People v: Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262, is distinguishable because the defendant's statements in that case primarily were exculpatory. Defendant claims his own statements comprised a mosaic of inculpatory, exculpatory, and explanatory material. We reject his argument. Neither our reasoning nor our conclusion in the Slaughter decision turned on the proportion of the defendant's statements that was exculpatory. As in the Slaughter case, defendant's statements to Detective Sanchez included both inculpatory and exculpatory aspects and, as in our Slaughter decision, we are confident the jury understood the instruction did not apply to the exculpatory aspects of defendant's statements. Defendant could not have been prejudiced by the erroneous giving of the instruction to view his admissions with caution. Nor are we persuaded that the trial court's instruction to the jury to view defendant's oral confession and admissions with caution constituted improper comment upon the evidence. Defendant relies upon Quercia v. United States (1933) 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321, in which the high court found reversible error because the trial court gave its opinion of the defendant's testimony based upon the court's personal experience. The trial court stated that the defendant wiped his hands during his testimony, advising the jury that it had been established as fact that such conduct almost always [is] an indication of lying. ( Id. at p. 468, 53 S.Ct. 698.) The high court concluded the trial court's remarks did not constitute a review of the evidence that would assist the jury in its task, but rather constituted a statement that broadly denounced the defendant's testimony as a lie. By contrast, the court in the present case did not offer its opinion concerning the evidence or rely on its personal experience to undermine the credibility of the defense case. The court merely instructed the jury with a pattern instruction, and did not embellish that instruction with the sort of improper, gratuitous remarks found objectionable in the Quercia decision. As we also concluded in People v. Slaughter, supra, 27 Cal.4th 1187, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262, the trial court's error in instructing the [guilt phase] jury to view with caution defendant's tape-recorded admissions was harmless. It is not reasonably probable the guilt phase jury would have reached a result more favorable to defendant had the instruction not been given [citation], and there is no reasonable possibility that the ... penalty phase jury would have rendered a different verdict in the absence of the error[.j [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 1201, 120 Cal. Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262.) Defendant advances no persuasive reason for this court to reach a different result in the present case, nor does his reference to his right to due process of law or a fair trial aid his position. Defendant contends also that his right to a reliable penalty determination was impaired because the instruction did not permit full consideration of mitigating evidence but, as explained, the instruction did not impede the jury's consideration of the exculpatory portions of the statements.