Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guilt Phase Instructional Errors

Text: Defendant contends that guilt phase instructional errors require reversal of his conviction. Specifically, defendant complains the trial court: (1) failed to give appropriate cautionary instructions regarding accomplice testimony, (2) erroneously delivered CALJIC No. 2.11.5, [5] (3) erred in refusing to give heat of passion manslaughter instructions, and (4) failed to give appropriate cautionary instructions regarding informant credibility. 1. Cautionary Accomplice Instructions (33) The trial court did not err in failing to read cautionary accomplice instructions (nor was trial counsel ineffective for failing to request such). True, [w]hen the prosecution calls an accomplice as a witness, the trial court must instruct the jury that the witness's testimony should be viewed with distrust. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 461 [6 Cal. Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388].) We agree with the People, however, that the record contains insufficient evidence to suggest that either Mark Williams or John Gardner was defendant's accomplice in the murder of Jerome Dunn. Neither Williams nor Gardner was actually seen at the scene of Dunn's murder, nor was there any evidence either acted with the intent or purpose of encouraging or facilitating the murder. As the People point out, Patricia Lewis's testimony placed Mark Williams in the van with defendant, not when Dunn was shot, but after Lewis and her companion in the station wagon had departed the crime scene, had driven to Lewis's nearby home and were chatting curbside. By Lewis's estimate, she saw Mark Williams in the van three or more minutes after the shooting. In any event, Lewis provided no evidence Mark Williams intended to facilitate the shooting. Although Gardner was present at a gang meeting (led in part by defendant) prior to the shooting, there was no evidence Gardner encouraged Dunn's killing or was present when Dunn was shot. Thus, as to neither Mark Williams nor Gardner has defendant demonstrated an intent to facilitate the crimes  an essential element of accomplice liability. ( People v. Stankewitz (1990) 51 Cal.3d 72, 91 [270 Cal. Rptr. 817, 793 P.2d 23].) Cautionary instructions as to Gardner and Mark Williams were not, in any event, compelled by the evidence defendant cites to suggest they were defendant's accomplices. No instruction was required as to Gardner because the evidence defendant suggests connects Gardner to the killing was Gardner's own testimony, such that the usual reasons for distrusting accomplice testimony are not present. No instruction was required as to Mark Williams because his trial testimony did not inculpate defendant. Moreover, even assuming the trial court erred in failing to instruct on accomplice testimony, defendant has not demonstrated prejudice. A trial court's failure to instruct the jury that it should view an accomplice's testimony with distrust does not prejudice the defendant when the record contains sufficient corroborating evidence. ( People v. Arias (1996) 13 Cal.4th 92, 143 [51 Cal. Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980].) Mark Williams's and Gardner's testimony was amply corroborated by Patricia Lewis's eyewitness testimony and the testimony of Arthur Cox. [6] 2. CALJIC No. 2.11.5 (34) Defendant correctly observes CALJIC No. 2.11.5 [see fn. 5, ante ] should not be given when a nonprosecuted participant testifies because the jury is entitled to consider the lack of prosecution in assessing the witness's credibility. ( People v. Rankin (1992) 9 Cal. App.4th 430, 437 [11 Cal. Rptr.2d 735]; see also People v. Hardy (1992) 2 Cal.4th 86, 189 [5 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 825 P.2d 781]; People v. Carrera (1989) 49 Cal.3d 291, 312, fn. 9 [261 Cal. Rptr. 348, 777 P.2d 121].) Defendant contends the trial court erred in using CALJIC No. 2.11.5 because Mark Williams and John Gardner, both of whom testified against defendant, were, according to defendant, unprosecuted coparticipants in the crime for which defendant was tried. As discussed in the preceding section, the record does not indicate that either Mark Williams or Gardner was defendant's accomplice in the murder of Jerome Dunn. As our previous pronouncements make plain, however, the question whether either Williams or Gardner was or may have been involved in the crime for the purposes of CALJIC No. 2.11.5 is a separate issue ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 667) from the question whether either was an accomplice. Indeed, [o]ne purpose of the instruction is to focus the jury's attention on an individualized evaluation of the evidence against the person on trial without extraneous concern for the fate of other participants irrespective of their culpability. ( Id. at p. 668, italics added.) The People suggest the trial court's use of CALJIC No. 2.11.5 was clearly intended to refer to Junior Bridges and Tommy Bridges. We agree with defendant the record contains no satisfactory basis for concluding the jury must have understood the instruction as being so limited. Thus, the trial court erred in instructing the jury with CALJIC No. 2.11.5 without first modifying it to make clear that it did not apply to Gardner and Williams. Defendant, however, fails to demonstrate he was prejudiced by use of CALJIC No. 2.11.5 in its unmodified form. On the one hand, even if the jury believed CALJIC No. 2.11.5 referred to Gardner and Williams, it was not without compass in determining the credibility of these two witnesses. The jury was instructed in the words of CALJIC No. 2.20 on evaluating the credibility of witnesses generally, including the existence or nonexistence of a bias, interest or other motive for testimony. On the other hand, even if the trial court had modified CALJIC No. 2.11.5 to ensure the jury would not apply the instruction to Gardner and Williams, it is unlikely the jury would have reached a different verdict. Gardner and Williams were not the mainstays of the prosecution case, which depended, in the first instance, on eyewitness testimony by Patricia Lewis and Kenneth Hayes. On balance, then, we conclude that the trial court's unmodified use of CALJIC No. 2.11.5 did not prejudice defendant. 3. Manslaughter (35) Defendant complains the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury regarding heat of passion manslaughter. A trial court must instruct on a lesser included offense only if there is substantial evidence to support a jury's determination that the defendant was in fact only guilty of the lesser offense. ( People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 582 [180 Cal. Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908], reversed on other grounds sub nom. California v. Ramos (1983) 463 U.S. 992 [103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171].) We agree with the People there was no such evidence here. Defendant, without citation to the record, argues that Dunn's sudden shooting following three to five minutes of high-spirited conversation [with the occupants of the van] could be reasonably interpreted to have resulted from a sudden quarrel, which dramatically changed the nature of their preceding conversation and caused [defendant] to act upon heat of passion. Defendant mischaracterizes the record. There was no evidence of highspirited conversation, of any sudden quarrel or of any dramatic change in the nature of Dunn's conversation with the occupants of the van. Kenneth Hayes gave the only testimony regarding the interaction Jerome Dunn had with occupants of the van before he was killed. Hayes testified he could not hear what Dunn was saying, but that Dunn appeared to be involved in a friendly-type conversation. In fact, Hayes told an investigating officer that he had not heard any angry words exchanged. We discern no substantial evidence of provocation or heat of passion. Unlike People v. Wynn (1968) 257 Cal. App.2d 664, 674 [65 Cal. Rptr. 210], on which defendant relies, the record in this case contains no evidence from which the fact finder could infer a quarrel from testimony which revealed the victim's curt reply to the defendant. Moreover, in Wynn, actual words spoken, heard and testified to formed the basis for a voluntary manslaughter instruction. ( Ibid. ) By contrast, Kenneth Hayes testified only that he observed a conversation taking place; he could not make out any of the words. The court did not err in declining to instruct on heat of passion manslaughter. 4. Cautionary Informant Instructions Defendant complains the trial court failed to give appropriate cautionary instructions regarding informant Arthur Cox's testimony. Defendant concedes that, under current law ( People v. Turner (1994) 8 Cal.4th 137, 202 [32 Cal. Rptr.2d 762, 878 P.2d 521]), the trial court had no duty to instruct the jury on the possible unreliability of Cox's testimony, but urges us to reconsider the issue. Defendant refers to section 1127a, subdivision (b), enacted in 1989, after his 1986 conviction. Under that statute, however, a cautionary informant instruction is required only upon the request of a party. (§ 1127a, subd. (b).) Defendant made no such request. Defendant offers no compelling reason for us to revisit this issue, let alone change our established rule. There was no error. In light of recent high court action, defendant in his reply brief withdraws his contention the trial court committed reversible error in reading CALJIC No. 2.90 (5th ed. 1988 bound vol.), which contains the terms moral certainty and moral evidence. (See, generally, Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1 [114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583].) Defendant also abandons his claim the trial court prejudicially erred in failing to instruct the jury with CALJIC No. 17.48 (juror's use of notes) immediately prior to deliberation, conceding the jury was so instructed prior to trial. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the trial court committed no reversible error when instructing the jury in the guilt phase of defendant's trial.