Opinion ID: 538915
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the search of corral's residence: the probable-cause controversy

Text: The legality of the search of Corral's residence, however, presents a separate question. Whether the district court properly suppressed the evidence obtained in the search of 110 Northstar Drive depends on whether the search warrant was supported by probable cause as required by the fourth amendment, or alternatively, whether the search was conducted by officers who in good faith believed that the warrant was valid under the fourth amendment. In 1813, Chief Justice Marshall defined the doctrine which is central to our decision: 1 [T]he term probable cause, according to its usual acceptation, means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.... It imports a seizure made under circumstances which warrant suspicion. 2 Locke v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 339, 347, 3 L.Ed. 364 (1813). 3 Nearly two hundred years later, the doctrine continues to spark judicial debate. In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the Supreme Court adopted a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to the common-sense, practical question of probable cause. Id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328. Noting that probable cause determinations involved practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act, the Court reiterated:  '[T]he evidence thus collected must be seen and weighed not in terms of library analysis by scholars, but as understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.'  Id. at 231-32, 103 S.Ct. at 2328-29 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 695, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). In so stating, the Court expressed a strong preference for searches authorized by warrant so as to encourage the use of the warrant process and lessen any intrusion upon protected interests: 4 [W]e have repeatedly said that after-the-fact scrutiny by courts of the sufficiency of an affidavit should not take the form of de novo review. A magistrate's determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts. A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; courts should not invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense, manner. 5 Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 237 n. 10, 103 S.Ct. at 2331 n. 10 (citations omitted); accord United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 850 (10th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 348, 107 L.Ed.2d 336 (1989) (magistrate's probable cause determination entitled to great deference); Kaiser v. Lief, 874 F.2d 732, 734 (10th Cir.1989) (magistrate is not constrained by limitations on his use of common sense). Accordingly, a judicial officer's decision to issue a search warrant is afforded great deference. United States v. Shomo, 786 F.2d 981, 983 (10th Cir.1986) ([W]e are more likely to affirm a law enforcement officer's determination of probable cause when it is backed by the authority of a search warrant.). 6 The Supreme Court reiterated its favor for search warrants in Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 expressing the view that  'in a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be sustainable where without one it would fall.'  Id. at 914, 104 S.Ct. at 3416 (quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106, 85 S.Ct. 741, 744, 13 L.Ed.2d 684 (1965)). The basis for the Court's view lies in the realization that [r]easonable minds frequently may differ on the question whether a particular affidavit establishes probable cause.... Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct. at 3416 (emphasis supplied). 7 This is such a case. Despite the above-referenced standards, all of which weigh in favor of the warrant procedure followed here, reasonable judges cannot agree on whether the search warrant affidavit in this case satisfies the probable cause requirement. The California state municipal judge found probable cause to exist. The Wyoming district court rejected this finding, reasoning that the circumstances surrounding the stop of Corral and the search of his vehicle did not sufficiently tie into 110 Northstar Drive and consequently did not support the state judge's finding of probable cause to search the premises. Even this panel, with the benefit of further hindsight, cannot agree on whether the affidavit in support of the warrant for Corral's residence satisfies the probable cause requirement. As a result, for purposes of this opinion, we assume, but do not hold, that the district court was correct in finding that the affidavit failed to establish probable cause. We engage in this assumption because we find common ground for reversing the district court on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. See United States v. Cook, 854 F.2d 371, 374 (10th Cir.1988) (applying good faith exception under assumption that affidavit failed to establish probable cause), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 788, 102 L.Ed.2d 779 (1989). 8