Opinion ID: 1689961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Construction of Will.

Text: We turn now to the issues relating to the construction of the will. Clause 1 of the will revoked all prior wills. Clause 2 directed payment of expenses of last illness and funeral expenses as soon as is practical. Clause 3 was entitled, Bequests to Wife, and provided as follows: 3 (a). I hereby give, devise and bequeath one-third (1/3) of my entire estate to my wife, Ruth Seliger (nee Glogau), who presently resides at 2021 East Marion Street, Milwaukee 11, Wisconsin. 3 (b). In computing this one-third devise, my Executors shall take into account and deduct from this devise the clear market value at my death, of any property, either real or personal, passing to my wife, Ruth Seliger, by right of joint tenancy, survivorship, operation of law or any other manner other than by the terms of this Will. 3(c). In computing this one-third devise, my Executors shall further take into account and deduct the amount of any life insurance proceeds which my wife shall receive by reason of my death, from any life insurance policies which I owned during my lifetime. 3 (d). The specific property to pass under this devise shall be determined by my Executors, and their decision as to such property shall be final and binding upon all parties having a beneficial interest under this Will. 3 (e). The market value determinations provided for in this Paragraph shall be in accordance with the determination of values by the Court appointed appraisers in my estate or by independent professional appraisal, in the absolute discretion of my Executors. The cost of any appraisal so made shall be paid for out of my residual estate. 3 (f). I further give, devise and bequeath unto my wife, in addition to the devise provided for above, the automobile which I shall own at the time of my death, upon the express condition precedent that if said automobile shall not be fully paid for, that my wife shall assume the obligation of paying any installment payments or balance owed on said automobile. 3 (g). If my wife, Ruth Seliger, predeceases me, the devises made in this Paragraph shall be inoperative, and said devises shall become a part of and be disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust hereinafter created as my residual estate. The first problem that arises is with respect to interpretation of the words entire estate. Do they mean gross estate before any deductions for debts, expenses of last illness, funeral expenses, administration expenses and amount paid as widow's allowance, or do they mean net estate after deducting these items? The county court interpreted entire estate to be the equivalent of gross estate before making any deductions. No evidence extraneous to the will was adduced which throws any light upon the intention of the testator in using this phrase entire estate. The learned trial court in its memorandum decision pointed out that there was no case law which was helpful in arriving at a solution. The trial court, therefore, turned to Webster's Third New International Dictionary definition of the word entire as meaning whole, undiminished, unimpaired. We likewise have received little assistance from the case law with the single exception of the New Jersey case of Smith v. Terry (1888), 43 N. J. Eq. 659, 12 Atl. 204. In that case testatrix included the following bequest in her will, I give to my . . . daughter . . . the interest of the equal undivided one-sixth interest, part or portion of my whole estate . . . The court construed whole estate to mean the property in the estate which was left after payment of debts and administration expenses. In its opinion the court stated (at p. 666): The question is whether the one-sixth interest is the proportion of the entire amount of the property of the testatrix without any deduction for debts, or is that part of the property of the testatrix after such deduction. The expression, `my whole estate,' without any other words in the will modifying its meaning, I think, would signify the property which would be left for distribution after the payment of the debts of the decedent and the expenses of administration. Unless words or phrases used in a will have a legal signification arising from judicial or legislative construction, they should receive that interpretation which they would impart to the ordinary mind. A man's estate means what he is worth in property, and that is the value of his property over and above his liabilities. When a man is spoken of as leaving an estate of a particular amount, that is the sense in which it is meant. We do not believe that the ordinary person who provides in his will that a legatee receive a fraction of his estate contemplates that such computation is to be made before deduction of liabilities. We do not consider that a different result is intended by employing such phrases as entire estate and whole estate. We conclude, therefore, that respondent widow's one-third share is to be computed upon the net estate after deduction of all liabilities and expenses. Whether the $3,750 widow's allowance is also to be deducted is dependent on whether her one third is to be exclusive or inclusive of that amount. Testator at time of death had no life insurance payable to his widow and owned no property in joint tenancy with her. If there had been any such life insurance or property held in joint tenancy with her, the value of the same would have had to have been added to the net estate in making this computation in view of the wording of paragraphs 3 (b) and 3 (c) of the will. While the amount of the widow's allowance would be deductible in arriving at the net estate to be distributed, it would have to be added back in to compute the widow's one-third bequest, if the amount thereof is chargeable to the widow as part of her bequest. Whether respondent widow's one-third bequest is inclusive or exclusive of the $3,750 widow's allowance is dependent upon whether such allowance is property . . . passing to my wife, Ruth Seliger, by . . . operation of law or any other manner other than by the terms of this will under the wording of paragraph 3 (b) of the will. In Deller v. Deller (1910), 141 Wis. 255, 124 N. W. 278, a widow had entered into an antenuptial agreement with the deceased testator whereby she agreed to accept $5,000 out of his estate in lieu of all right, title, and interest which she would have by law in the said estate. This court held that this language was sufficient to bar the widow from any statutory widow's allowance and in its opinion stated (at p. 264): When she asks that a very considerable sum of money be paid her [for widow's allowance], which can only be paid by turning over a portion of the estate, or of the proceeds derived from the sale thereof, a claim is necessarily made to a share of the estate. A majority of the court consisting of Mr. Justice GORDON, Mr. Justice BEILFUSS, Mr. Justice HEFFERNAN and the writer of this opinion conclude under this holding that payment of a widow's allowance in the instant case constitutes payment of a portion of the personal property of the estate within the meaning of paragraph 3 (b). Estate of Beat (1964), 25 Wis. (2d) 315, 130 N. W. (2d) 739, is distinguishable because there the widow under the postnuptial agreement did not release all her right to her husband's estate, but only as to property owned by Roy Beat at the time of their marriage. The majority further deem it immaterial whether a widow's allowance is technically received by operation of law. If not so qualifying because it is not usually granted except on a petition by or in behalf of the widow, it is property received by her other than by terms of the will. We attach no significance to the phrase clear market value appearing in paragraph 3 (b). While it may be argued that this phrase has reference to particular identifiable property, we think it was used because of the reference to possible property held in joint tenancy by the deceased and respondent. Thus the majority concludes that the $3,750 of widow's allowance is to be included in computing the widow's bequest, and, therefore, such bequest is not exclusive of the allowance. Mr. Justice FAIRCHILD, Mr. Justice HALLOWS, and Mr. Justice WILKIE would hold that the widow's allowance does not constitute property within the meaning of paragraph 3 (b). Therefore, they would compute the respondent widow's one-third bequest upon the net estate after having deducted the widow's allowance, which bequest she would receive in addition to her widow's allowance. By the Court. Order reversed, and cause remanded for the entry of a proper order construing Clause 3 of the will which is consistent with this opinion.