Opinion ID: 2638769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Right Without a Remedy

Text: ¶ 17 Rivas argued upon appeal that limiting his recovery to a total of 100% PPD compensation violated Art. 2, § 6 of the Oklahoma Constitution and effectively denied him a remedy for his permanent compensable injury. [5] Art. 2, § 6 provides: The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice. [6] The specially concurring Court of Civil Appeals opinion agreed with Rivas that the legislature's amendment impermissibly denied him an award for his quantified loss. ¶ 18 We disagree. In interpreting our constitutional remedy guarantee, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that it does not impose any substantive limitation on the legislature. Adams, 162 P. at 942. In Adams v. Iten Biscuit , this Court held that the right to remedy guarantee afforded by Art. 2, § 6 is a mandate to the judiciary and is not intended to be a limitation on the authority of the legislature. Id. The constitutional guarantee mandates that the courts should be open and afford a remedy for those wrongs that are recognized by the law of the land. [7] ¶ 19 The formulation of the particular elements and details of the Workers' Compensation Act clearly falls within the legislature's province. Okla. Const. Art. 5, § 36; Adams, 162 P. at 942. The legislature can limit the amount of PPD an injured worker receives. It is within the legislature's authority to set that limit at 100%. ¶ 20 Rivas invokes the remedy guarantee to attack this substantive legislative policy choice. However, this Court has already determined Art. 2, § 6 was not intended to preserve a particular remedy for given causes of action in any certain court of the state, nor was it intended to deprive the Legislature of the power to abolish remedies for future accruing causes of action . . . , or to create new remedies for other wrongs as in its wisdom it might determine. Adams, 162 P. at 942. Accordingly, this Court cannot grant Rivas the relief he seeks under Art. 2, § 6, because the legislature is under no obligation to preserve a certain remedy for Rivas and the courts are, in turn, not able to provide a remedy where the legislature has not provided one. ¶ 21 The remedy clause does not constrain the legislature, but rather compels the judiciary to be open to all persons with actionable causes. In Oklahoma, Art. 2, § 6 does not provide an avenue for Rivas to attack the actions of the legislature. Because it is the legislature and not the judiciary that limited Rivas' PPD compensation, this proposition must fail.