Opinion ID: 1690077
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether warren was tried in the case sub judice in violation of his constitutional right against double jeopardy as guaranteed by the fifth amendment to the united states constitution.

Text: ¶ 33. The Double Jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment reads as follows, nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. CONST. amend. V. This proscription has been applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and this application must be made retroactively. McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145, 1149 (5th Cir.1973) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951, 94 S.Ct. 1476, 39 L.Ed.2d 567 (1974). ¶ 34. Double jeopardy protection further applies to successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). The Supreme Court has also held that: In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, this Court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the same-elements test, the double jeopardy bar applies... . The same elements test, sometimes referred to as the  Blockburger  test, inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the same offence and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696, 113 S.Ct. at 2856 (citations omitted). Most recently, the Court recognized that in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), it had adopted an additional test that a subsequent prosecution must satisfy a `same-conduct' test to avoid the double jeopardy bar. Id. at 697, 113 S.Ct. at 2856. However, the Court concluded that  Grady must be overruled... . The `same conduct' rule it announced is wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704, 113 S.Ct. at 2860. Thus, as the Supreme Court has articulated, the rule is again the Blockburger or same-elements test. ¶ 35. In the case sub judice, Warren was first indicted on one count of voyeurism occurring on or about February 20, 1992. This count was nolle prosequi by an Order dated June 10, 1992. Subsequently, Warren was again indicted by the grand jury. This time it was for two counts of voyeurism, one occurring on or about February 11th, 1992, and the other occurring on or about February 20th, 1992. The second count was dismissed at the second trial upon a motion of double jeopardy by the defense. The question now becomes whether the first count charging voyeurism on February 11th should also be dismissed due to the double jeopardy issues raised by Warren. ¶ 36. Applying the Blockburger test, it is evident that the two offenses have the same elements. The first indictment read in pertinent part as follows: Patrick N. Warren late of the County and Judicial District aforesaid, on or about the 20th day of February, in the year of our Lord, 1992, in the County, Judicial District and State aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously enter upon the real property of Katray James and did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously pry or peep through a window of the Katray James' dwelling house for the lewd, licentious and indecent purpose of spying on the occupants thereof. The indictment was labeled at the top VOYEURISM  MCA § 97-29-61. The second indictment was labeled as a multi-count indictment pursuant to Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-2 and the statutory label at the top was identical to the first indictment and read VOYEURISM MCA § 97-29-61. Furthermore, Count I of the second indictment reads as follows: Patrick N. Warren, late of the County and Judicial District aforesaid, on or about the 11th day of February, in the year of our Lord, 1992, in the County, Judicial District and State aforesaid, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, did unlawfully, wilfully and feloniously enter upon the real property of Katray James and did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously pry or peep through a window of the Katray James' dwelling house for the lewd, licentious and indecent purpose of spying on the occupants thereof. Count II, which was dismissed due to double jeopardy, also read verbatim except the date was the 20th of February. It is evident that the elements in the first indictment and the elements in the second indictment are the same. The two indictments read verbatim except the second indictment added a second count and charged Warren with the crime on two separate occasions. Therefore, the State must prove exactly the same elements it was required to prove at the first trial. However, as the Eleventh Circuit has noted, this does not mean that a person cannot be tried twice if he commits two offenses under the same statute. United States v. Maza, 983 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir.1993). The court succinctly summed up the problem with this situation. Whatever else these words [same offense] may proscribe, they surely were not intended to suggest that a person could not be twice put in jeopardy for the same offence if he commits the same offense twice. Whether a defendant has committed the same offense twice is a factual question. Therefore, for purposes of successive prosecutions, the question of whether a defendant is being put in jeopardy for the same offence cannot be determined solely with reference to the statutory elements of the offenses charged. Rather, there must also be some determination that the underlying facts that gave rise to the first prosecution are, or are not the sole basis for the second. The Supreme Court, however, has resisted acknowledging the factual element of the double jeopardy inquiry, even though many of its opinions clearly rely, for their applicability to successive prosecutions, on an assumption about the facts. Maza, 983 F.2d at 1011(emphasis added). The question becomes, then, whether or not the defendant committed two offenses of the same crime or merely one offense spread over two separate nights. In the case at bar, the underlying facts that gave rise to the first prosecution are the sole basis for the second prosecution. At this point it is helpful to look at the underlying facts of both prosecutions. ¶ 37. The first prosecution was based upon the acts occurring on or about February 20, 1992. However, Katray James had previously complained of someone peeping in her window and making lewd comments, and threatening her children prior to the incident on the 20th. These allegations were based upon events occurring on the night of February 11, 1992. On a Thursday night, February 20, 1992, the person returned and started beating on James' window. The person threatened James by saying, Bitch, if you don't do what I tell you to do, I am going to kill you and your kids. James' testified that it was the same voice as the one from February 11, 1992. James tried to see the face of the person making the threats. She was able to see him this time and testified that he had on a tan coat with a hood. During the second trial, James' identified Warren as the person outside her house that night. James grabbed her children, fled the house, and went to her neighbor's to call the police. ¶ 38. During the first trial, the State attempted to offer evidence from the night of February 11th to show the licentious desire element of voyeurism. When Warren's counsel objected, the attorneys and judge had a conference back in chambers. At this time the court and the parties thoroughly discussed what was wrong with the State's position in this particular trial. The defense attorney, in attempting to keep the testimony about the night of the 11th excluded, pointed out the deficiencies in the prosecution's case. During this discussion, the judge stated that [i]f [Warren] was charged with licentious desire at that time [February 11th], [the State] could come back and show this night [February 20th] for identity. This is exactly what the State did in the second trial. It indicted Warren for the events of February 11th and then attempted to introduce evidence of the 20th for identity purposes. The deficiencies in the trial strategy of the prosecution having been shown in the first trial, it violates the basic principles of double jeopardy to allow the State to try the defendant on the same offense again. The prosecution cannot be allowed the opportunity to hon[e] its trial strategies and perfect[] its evidence through successive attempts at conviction. Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 2218, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982). The two counts are for the same offense and cannot be retried once jeopardy has attached. ¶ 39. The only crime committed by Warren was on the night of February 11th. On February 11, 1992, James returned to her home at 1015 East Parkway, in Cleveland, from a trip to Wal-Mart between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. James and her two sons went to bed shortly thereafter. Between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. James heard someone beating on her door. When she went to the door, no one was there. She went back to bed and again heard the beating on her door. James went to check and again saw no one at her door. As she turned to go back down the hall, she heard a voice coming from her living room window. The person told her not to go back down the hall to the bedroom. Ignoring this admonition, she turned around to go down the hall again and the person again told her not to go down the hall. At this time James turned around and went back and stood where she didn't think the person could see her. She had not seen anyone, but continued to talk with this voyeur. He continued to talk to her, telling her not to go down the hall. She asked him who he was and he said she didn't know him. James asked him why he was messing with her and he answered because she wouldn't give him the time of day. The voyeur told James that if she did not do what he said then he would kill her and her children. ¶ 40. James then testified that the person told her to go in her room, pull her curtains back, take off all her clothes. The person then gave her sexual instructions. James and the person kept talking and he told her she was wasting his time and again threatened her if she did not do what he requested. James then went to her bedroom where there was a light on and pulled back her window curtains. She testified that she did not see who it was, but did see a shadow move toward the window. At this time, the voyeur again threatened James. Then someone knocked on James' door. As she turned to answer the door the person again screamed at her and threatened to kill her and her sons if she answered the door. At first James did not move, but then realized she had to do something or this would go on all night. She went to the door and found a friend of hers coming to check on her. Finally James went to a neighbor's home and used the telephone to summon the police. ¶ 41. This evidence and the facts support a conviction of voyeurism because the lewd and licentious element is present. When Warren told James to take off all her clothes, etc., then the crime had been completed. However, no such crime occurred on February 20th. In the first trial for the 20th, the prosecution essentially had the wrong date. Instead of amending the indictment, they chose to nolle prosequi the indictment and start over. The record reflects that the prosecution began going into incidents that occurred on February 11th when the indictment was only for February 20th. The state realized that it could not make its case upon the events of one night and attempted to re-indict on the events of both nights to again try and convict Warren of the one crime of voyeurism he committed. When a prosecutor fails to convict on the first try he does not get a second chance. ¶ 42. If the prosecution had two separate indictments, one for the 11th and one for the 20th, then the outcome may be different. However, this Court is not faced with that situation and must determine the outcome of this case on the facts presented to us. Warren was charged with two counts in one indictment. In allowing multi-count indictments this Court has said that: the offenses must be based on the same act or transaction, or be based on two or more acts or transactions, connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan... . We have been, and remain, unwilling to allow separate and distinct offenses to be tried in the same criminal proceeding. Corley v. State, 584 So.2d 769, 772 (Miss. 1991)(emphasis added) (citations omitted). Thus, under our ruling in Corley regarding multi-count indictments, in order for the prosecution to properly join two counts in one indictment, the two counts must be one offense. If it was a separate and distinct offense, then it would have to be tried in a different criminal proceeding. Thus, Warren was twice placed in jeopardy and the judgment of conviction should be reversed and the defendant discharged.