Opinion ID: 2103552
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Equal Availability

Text: Defendants argue that the trial and appellate courts erred in finding Dr. Hibbard not equally available to plaintiffs for four reasons: (1) Dr. Hibbard was physically available to plaintiffs, as they knew of her existence and address; (2) Supreme Court Rule 237 (compelled appearance of witness at trial) made her available to plaintiffs; (3) the doctor-patient relationship between Jennifer and Dr. Hibbard made her available to plaintiffs; and (4) if Dr. Hibbard was not considered equally available to plaintiffs, then virtually any of the defendant hospital's employees would have to be called to avoid the instruction. Dr. Hibbard, as defendant's employee, and as being potentially liable to plaintiffs herself, was not equally available to plaintiffs. The comment to IPI Civil 3d No. 5.01 provides: A witness is not `equally available' to a party if there is a likelihood that the witness would be biased against him, as for example    an employee of the other party. United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580, 584 (2d Cir.1946); [citation]; Kerns v. Lenox Mach. Co., 74 Ill.App.3d 194, 392 N.E.2d 688, 30 Ill.Dec. 33 (3d Dist.1979). (IPI Civil 3d No. 5.01, Comment.) Another treatise has noted on this matter: The failure of an employer to produce certain employees who have some knowledge of the matters at issue will justify such an inference. J. Lee & B. Lindahl, Modern Tort Law § 15.15, at 506, 509 (rev. ed. 1988), citing Peterson v. General Rug & Carpet Cleaners (1947), 333 Ill.App. 47, 77 N.E.2d 58. While defendants argue that availability is limited to physical availability, we disagree. Another leading treatise has noted: It is often said that if a witness is `equally available' to both parties, no inference springs from the failure of either to call the witness. This can hardly be accurate, as the inference may be allowed when the witness could easily be called or subpoenaed by either party. What is in fact meant is that when so far as appears the witness would be as likely to be favorable to one party as the other, there will be no inference. (E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 264, at 187 (4th ed. 1992).) This treatise also notes that two types of situations exist where the missing-witness instruction may be given: In the first, an adverse inference may be drawn against a party for failure to produce a witness reasonably assumed to be favorably disposed to the party. In the second, the inference may be drawn against a party who has exclusive control over a material witness but fails to produce him or her, without regard to any possible favorable disposition of the witness toward the party. Cases in the second group are increasingly less frequent due to the growth of discovery and other disclosure requirements. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 264, at 185 (4th ed. 1992). The situation here was that of the first example, and not the second. Thus, defendants' argument concerning physical availability as well as Rule 237 and modern discovery is unavailing. The likelihood exists that Dr. Hibbard would be biased against plaintiffs. Defendants' argument concerning the doctor-patient relationship is also unavailing. While a doctor and patient have a fiduciary relationship (see Witherell v. Weimer (1987), 118 Ill.2d 321, 331, 113 Ill.Dec. 259, 515 N.E.2d 68), Dr. Hibbard is also potentially liable to plaintiffs in this suit. Thus, while a fiduciary duty may have existed, the bias stemming from Dr. Hibbard's potential liability exists as well. We finally note that defendants' fear that virtually any employee would have to be called to testify is without merit. Such employee would also have to possess information relevant to the case so that a reasonable person would have called the employee. We conclude that the trial and appellate courts did not err in finding Dr. Hibbard not equally available to plaintiffs.