Opinion ID: 2519950
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Persuasive Authority from Other Jurisdictions

Text: ¶ 30 The State argues that allowing a conviction for attempted murder to stand on a knowing mens rea would be consistent with the decisions of other states. See Free v. State, 455 So.2d 137, 147 (Ala.Ct.App.1984); State v. Nunez, 159 Ariz. 594, 769 P.2d 1040, 1042-43 (Ct.App.1989); People v. Gonzales, 926 P.2d 153, 155 (Colo.Ct.App.1996); State v. Feliciano, 62 Haw. 637, 618 P.2d 306, 308 (1980), superseded by statute as stated in State v. Rumbawa, 94 Hawai'i 513, 17 P.3d 862, 866 (Ct.App.2001); Bartlett v. State, 711 N.E.2d 497, 499 (Ind.1999); and Gentry v. State, 881 S.W.2d 35, 40 (Tex.Ct.App.1994). We do not find any of these cases cited by the State persuasive. Most of them only indirectly address the culpability required for attempt crimes. See Gentry, 881 S.W.2d at 40 (concerning double jeopardy issues); Free, 455 So.2d at 147 (disallowing multiple indictments stemming from a single action); and Bartlett, 711 N.E.2d at 499, and Gonzales, 926 P.2d at 155 (focusing mainly on issues unrelated to attempt). The few cases that directly address whether an attempted murder conviction may be obtained when a defendant acts knowingly are distinguishable. ¶ 31 In Nunez, the Court of Appeals of Arizona concluded that attempted first degree murder can be knowingly committed. 769 P.2d at 1043. The court reached this conclusion by looking to the language of Arizona statutes, the court's prior case law, the commentary to the Model Penal Code, and the commentary to the Arizona Criminal Code Commission. See id. at 1042-43. Because the court looked to sources specific to Arizona law and because the Arizona statute closely mirrors the M.P.C., this case is not particularly persuasive to us. ¶ 32 In another case, the Texas Court of Appeals upheld a woman's conviction for attempted capital murder of a police officer. Gelabert v. State, 712 S.W.2d 813, 817-18 (Tex.Ct.App.1986). That court held that [b]ecause `knowing' is a sufficient mental state for attempted capital murder, the State was not required to prove additionally that the appellant shot at [police] officers with the `intent to kill.' Id. at 817. The persuasiveness of this case is, however, also limited because it expressly distinguished its holding regarding attempted capital murder from an earlier Texas case regarding attempted murder because of the language contained in Texas's capital murder statute. In the earlier case, interpreting a Texas murder statute nearly identical to Utah's, the Texas Criminal Appellate Court held that attempted murder can only be committed by a person who has the intent to commit or complete the offense of murder, viz., the intent to kill. Flanagan v. State, 675 S.W.2d 734, 742 (Tex.Crim.App.1984). Because Flanagan is directly on point, we are not persuaded by the Gelabert case. Thus, no authority from other states convinces us that attempted murder in Utah can be committed knowingly.
¶ 33 On the other hand, we are persuaded by the reasoning of the numerous jurisdictions that hold a person cannot be convicted of attempted murder with only a knowing mens rea. The Maine Supreme Court, in a case similar to the instant case, held that [b]efore a person can be convicted of attempted murder, he must act with the intent to cause the death of another human being. State v. Huff, 469 A.2d 1251, 1253 (Me.1984). Thus, the court concluded that in a prosecution for criminal attempt, where alternative culpable mental states will satisfy the target offense, but only one is compatible with the attempt statute, the incompatible element must be omitted from the jury instructions. Id. ¶ 34 Examining a conviction for attempted murder under a definition of murder that allowed either an intentional or a knowing mens rea, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the difference between intent and knowledge should not be treated as a metaphysical distinction which can be ignored. Knowledge is not intent as defined by our statutes, and the jury instructions should reflect this distinction. People v. Kraft, 133 Ill.App.3d 294, 88 Ill.Dec. 546, 478 N.E.2d 1154, 1160 (1985); see also Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind.1991) (holding that a jury could not be instructed that attempted murder can be committed knowingly). ¶ 35 In sum, though the State cites several cases to support its argument that attempt crimes may be committed knowingly, we find them unpersuasive. However, several cases from other jurisdictions that directly address the attempt issue support our conclusion to disallow convictions for attempted murder based on the mens rea of knowledge alone.