Opinion ID: 1203248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issues Affecting the Trial of Guilt

Text: (24) Defendant claims the trial court erred in refusing to sever count VI, the Croutch robbery, in violation of state and federal guarantees of due process and equal protection. We apply the law applicable before the adoption of Proposition 115, the Crime Victims Justice Reform Act, at the June 5, 1990, election. ( People v. Sully (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1195, 1221-1222 [283 Cal. Rptr. 144, 812 P.2d 163].) Here it is undisputed that the statutory requirements for joinder were met. (ง 954.) The People contend that defendant waived the issue. Because of defendant's claim that the record is inadequate to permit our review of this claim, we must examine the record in detail. On January 5, 1984, five days before the commencement of jury selection, the court reopened codefendant Brown's demurrer to the complaint on the ground that it failed to allege that the special circumstances required proof of intent to kill. The court was considering amending the information to obviate the difficulty, but no decision was reached. As counsel were reviewing the information, counsel for defendant said: Among the motions that we will make, and this will be an oral motion, at the time, we will consider a motion to sever, which I believe the court has been advised that Mr. Sussman and I are both going to make orally. Among those motions will be a motion to excise Count VI from the complaint, and I just wanted to โ so it wouldn't come as any shock, and the basis will be Count VI, which was isolated from the other counts in Count V, bias and prejudice, but I wanted to advise at this time, at least, the court and the district attorney, that we will be making that motion at the proper time. Then codefendant Brown made a motion to sever his trial from that of defendant. Defendant responded, because of the fact we late announced that we were going to sever Count VI from the complaint, and from something Mr. Dettmar kindly reminded me of, I would respectfully move the court to allow us to make our motion to sever Mr. Pinholster from Mr. Brown as well as sever count VI until a later time, presumably Monday morning. [ถ] We want to look into it, and it's something that later occurred to my esteemed associate.... The court responded: Fine. I have no problem with that. I would withhold a ruling on the argument currently pending before this court made by [codefendant] and will allow counsel to address more fully and completely the motion to sever on Monday. On Monday, the matter was continued to Tuesday, January 10, when codefendant renewed his motion to sever his case from defendant's, or at least empanel two juries. Defendant argued against the empanelment of two juries, and referred tangentially to his desire to sever his case from the codefendant's. He said nothing about severing count VI. The court denied the motion for severance and for separate juries, and then indicated that they would go off the record for a moment. The record discloses no further discussion of or ruling on any motion to sever counts. We agree with respondent that the above record discloses a failure formally to move for severance of the count and to press for a ruling on the issue, a failure that constitutes a waiver of the issue on appeal. ( People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 77-78 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) Defendant claims it is highly likely he renewed his motion at the unreported sidebar conference noted above, though there was no settled statement regarding this sidebar discussion. We see no basis for this optimism, but conclude that even if the issue were properly preserved, any error in the court's failure to sever count VI was clearly harmless. There was overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt on the other charges. Corona was present at the scene and his testimony described defendant's homicides in detail; his testimony was corroborated by the discovery of defendant's palm print in the house and of the bloodstained items in defendant's apartment, and also by the testimony of several witnesses regarding defendant's conduct before and after the crimes. There was ample evidence of defendant's intent to rob Kumar from the testimony of Lisa Tapar and Charles Kempf, as well as from defendant's own testimony. Nor was the evidence of the Croutch robbery inflammatory compared to the evidence of the double homicide. Rather, defendant himself used the Croutch robbery in his defense, claiming to be a frank robber who used a handgun rather than a burglar who would kill people. This was not a case where joinder bolstered a weaker case with strong evidence of guilt in another case. It is not reasonably probable that a result more favorable to defendant would have been reached if the Croutch robbery had been severed. ( People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [299 P.2d 243]; see also People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 940 [251 Cal. Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996]; People v. Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 78.)
(25a) Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion and violated his right to due process when it denied his motion to sever his trial from that of codefendant Brown. At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel was not precise in arguing that joint trial would be prejudicial. He said: But at the beginning when I first got into the case, I was anxious to make a motion to sever because Mr. Pinholster has enough to encounter in this case without hearing the other evidence that might come in with regard to Mr. Brown that might not be present in an independent trial. [ถ] I don't know exactly what I am talking about there because I don't know what the defenses would be, but it's a principle that we have to be conscious of. He also argued that the district attorney's decision to seek the death penalty against him but not against Brown would prejudice him. (26) There is a statutory preference for joint trial of jointly charged defendants. (ง 1098.) A `classic' case for joint trial is presented when defendants are charged with common crimes involving common events and victims. ( People v. Keenan (1988) 46 Cal.3d 478, 499-500 [250 Cal. Rptr. 550, 758 P.2d 1081].) (27a) Though severance is in the sound discretion of the trial court, severance should generally be granted `in the face of an incriminating confession [by a codefendant], prejudicial association with codefendants, likely confusion resulting from evidence on multiple counts, conflicting defenses, or the possibility that at a separate trial a codefendant would give exonerating testimony.' ( Id. at p. 500, quoting People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 312; People v. Massie (1967) 66 Cal.2d 899, 917 [54 Cal. Rptr. 733, 428 P.2d 869].) Whether it is an abuse of discretion to deny severance depends on the facts as they appear at the time of the hearing on the motion. ( People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 232 [250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25], overruled on another point sub nom. Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 361].) (25b) No facts before the trial court indicated that any of the above grounds for severance existed in this case. There was no evidence of sharply antagonistic defenses, and no indication that Brown would testify against defendant or that he had made incriminating statements that would prejudice defendant. Separate trials would have consumed a great amount of scarce judicial resources, and defendant did not demonstrate the kind of substantial prejudice that would justify such an expenditure. Defendant contends evidence that Brown's association with the Aryan Brotherhood would be prejudicial. However, defendant points to voir dire questions and evidence at trial to substantiate this claim, and obviously the trial court could not have considered this at the time of the hearing. There was preliminary hearing testimony, though certainly no one argued this to the court, that Corona was afraid to go to the police because of Brown's Aryan Brotherhood connection. This evidence would tend to make Brown appear to be the more violent of the two men, and arguably the ringleader. Because this evidence might be more useful than prejudicial to defendant, it would not compel the severance of the two men's trials. Defendant also refers to voir dire questions and statements of Brown's counsel in arguments to the jury suggesting that Brown would concede defendant's guilt. Again, the statements relied on were not before the court at the time of the motion; even regarding the threat of such statements as inevitable at the time of the hearing, we have made it clear that a defendant's natural tendency to shift blame onto a codefendant is not in itself a sufficient ground for severance. ( People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 312-313.) (27b) After trial, of course, the reviewing court may nevertheless reverse a conviction where, because of the consolidation, a gross unfairness has occurred such as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial or due process of law. ( People v. Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 313.) (28) Defendant's references to the evidence relating to the Aryan Brotherhood and to codefendant's arguments to the jury may be understood to raise such a claim. As we have said, the efforts of codefendants to shift blame onto each other are not inherently prejudicial. Here, codefendant Brown's argument simply was that while there was ample evidence of defendant's guilt, the evidence was shakier as to Brown's guilt. This argument barely emerged in Brown's opening argument. It was raised in Brown's closing argument, but the argument was technical. Brown's counsel suggested that Art Corona's statement had been corroborated as it implicated defendant, but not as it implicated Brown. Defendant's complaint that Brown urged the admission of the Corona statement to the police cannot be counted a gross unfairness, since, as we have seen, defendant himself did not object to the admission of the evidence. Further, any suggestion that Brown was innocent even if defendant were found guilty came from arguments of counsel, rather than from testimony or out-of-court statements of Brown. This reduced the prejudicial impact of Brown's attempt to shift blame onto defendant. (Compare People v. Massie, supra, 66 Cal.2d at p. 919 [codefendant's confession implicates defendant].) Finally, the two codefendants did not have completely inconsistent defenses; both claimed alibis depending in part on the same evidence of a party at defendant's apartment complex, and Brown simply claimed that the reasonable doubt of his guilt was greater than the reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt. As for the claim that evidence of Brown's Aryan Brotherhood connection prejudiced defendant, the theory that the jury would be convinced of defendant's guilt because of tangential evidence that his codefendant was associated with the Aryan Brotherhood is untenable under the state of the evidence in this case.

The court permitted to be played to the jury a tape recording of prosecution witness Corona's interview with the police. In this interview, Corona recounted the events that culminated in the two murders with which defendant was charged. In passing, Corona alluded to defendant's prior robberies and drug activities, mentioned that defendant knew people in the Aryan Brotherhood, and said that he had heard that defendant was involved in an incident in which two people died. (29a) Defendant contends this inadmissible hearsay prejudiced him and its admission into evidence requires reversal of the judgment because it violated his state and federal constitutional rights to confront witnesses, to a fair trial, and to a reliable sentencing determination. Defendant concedes that there is no objection on the record to the admission of this evidence, but contends that an objection must be presumed, in part because of the trial court's refusal to order that all sidebar conferences be reported. However, we have examined the reporter's transcript and the parties' settled record regarding the untranscribed sidebar discussions, and see absolutely no indication that defense counsel objected to the admission of this evidence. As we have already noted, the court directed counsel that although it would not order the transcription of all sidebar conferences, counsel would be permitted to make all their objections on the record. We agree with respondent that not only did defense counsel not object, the record shows that they desired the evidence to be presented. Counsel collaborated with the prosecutor in drafting a transcript of the recording, and did not demur when the prosecutor said that she presumed they all wanted the tape played. Most significantly, at the conclusion of Corona's testimony, when the prosecutor moved to play the tape, the court asked: Is it the intention of all parties that we should play this tape? Counsel for defendant responded: No objection. There was some discussion of errors in the transcription, but no suggestion whatever that defense counsel had moved to edit any prejudicial material out of the transcript or that they objected in any way to the playing of the tape. The jury was told to use the transcript of the recording, which defense counsel had helped prepare, as an aid. Counsel did not object to supplying the jury with the transcript during deliberations, and the following exchange gives an indication that the trial court understood that there were tactical reasons for the decision to allow the tape to be played: The Court: ... I think at the time we discussed that, at the time it was received into evidence, it was my understanding that neither side objected, and as a matter of fact there was material in there that the defense believed was important to them, and everyone, at that point in time, at least agreed that the transcript was a joint effort, transcribing those notes by the prosecution and defense, was advantageous to both sides and it was received in evidence without objection. [ถ] Mr. Dettmar [defendant's counsel]: I have just had a chance to discuss with Mr. Brainard [cocounsel], and it was his recollection, too, so apparently there will be no objection as to Mr. Pinholster. Finally, at the close of the prosecutor's case, when she formally moved all the items marked for identification into evidence, counsel for the defendants were directed to note their objections to any items, with the assumption that any items not mentioned by the defense shall be admitted without objection.... There was no objection to the tape or the transcript and therefore it was admitted. Counsel also did not object to the replaying of the tape to the jury during deliberations. (30) It is, of course, `the general rule that questions relating to the admissibility of evidence will not be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a specific and timely objection in the trial court on the ground sought to be urged on appeal.' ( People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 331 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082], quoting People v. Rogers (1978) 21 Cal.3d 542, 548 [146 Cal. Rptr. 732, 579 P.2d 1048].) (29b) Defendant counters that any failure to object necessarily was ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of state and federal constitutional guaranties. (31) Defendant's burden is to show that counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced him. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-689 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693-694, 104 S.Ct. 2052]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216, 217 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839].) `Reviewing courts will reverse on the ground of inadequate counsel only if the record on appeal affirmatively discloses that counsel had no rational tactical purpose for his act or omission.' ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 659 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351], quoting People v. Fosselman (1983) 33 Cal.3d 572, 581 [189 Cal. Rptr. 855, 659 P.2d 1144].) (29c) Here, a rational tactical reason appears for counsel's choice; the defense theory, and indeed defendant's testimony, was that he was a professional and accomplished robber of drug dealers who always used a firearm, not a bungler who would use a knife and associate with a knife-wielding burglar like Corona. (Compare People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 660 [tactical reason for defense counsel to elicit evidence of defendant's gang activity].) He needed to create an impression of candor to carry his testimony that he had broken into the Kumar house on the night of the murder, but had stolen the drugs and left before Corona arrived and stabbed the murder victims. Accordingly, his own testimony recounted his violent criminal past; the Corona tape, in its passing comments on defendant's exploits, simply confirmed what defendant was willing to say about himself. The reference to defendant's knowledge of people involved in the Aryan Brotherhood was clearly innocuous, since Corona testified that it was Paul Brown who was affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood and that it was Brown, not Pinholster, that Corona feared. Further, the tape contained statements inconsistent with Corona's trial testimony, showed Corona's eagerness to cooperate with the police, and contained some reference to Corona's contact with one Butch, who defendant claimed was Corona's actual accomplice. All these factors made the playing of the tape advantageous to defendant. In fact, defense counsel made use of it in closing argument. On this record, we find no ineffective assistance of counsel.
Gian Norelli, a defense witness, testified that he was present when the abortive plan to rob Kumar was discussed, and that Kempf, not defendant, was the ringleader. The prosecutor attempted to impeach Norelli with his inconsistent statement to Detective Quartararo, and Norelli repeatedly claimed that he could not remember what he had told the detective. In particular he was asked whether he had told Quartararo that he thought defendant guilty, that defendant had asked him to lie, and that he had overheard defendant admitting the killing to a third party. Norelli testified that he remembered talking to the officer, but that he could not remember making these statements. Detective Quartararo was permitted to testify as a rebuttal witness that Norelli had told him all about the abortive plan to rob Kumar. In addition, Quartararo said that Norelli said that he thought defendant had done the murders, that he had overheard defendant say he had knifed two people in Tarzana, and that defendant had asked Norelli to lie for him about defendant's involvement in the Kempf incident. When asked why Norelli would testify that he did not remember these statements, the detective was permitted to testify as to his opinion that Norelli was afraid of defendant. (32) Defendant contends that Quartararo's testimony was inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence, and that its admission violated Evidence Code section 352, and his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and their parallel provisions in the California Constitution. Respondent argues that any objection beyond the hearsay objection was not preserved for appeal. The trial court stated for the record that there was an objection to the testimony of the officer, as well as reference to the document [the detective's notes of the interview.] The court referred to a sidebar conference on the matter that was unreported. The settled statement indicates that the subject of the unreported conference was defendant's hearsay objection, and that beyond this, counsel were unable to add to the information provided in the reporter's transcript. Because it was the court's ruling on reporting sidebar conferences that created some deficiency in the record on this point, we will assume that counsel properly preserved objections to the evidence on the grounds raised here. We find Norelli's statements that defendant told Norelli to lie for defendant, that Norelli had overheard defendant tell Steven Crane defendant had stabbed two people at Kumar's house, and that Norelli thought defendant was guilty, were admissible as prior inconsistent statements. On cross-examination, Norelli had claimed he was unable to remember making these statements to Quartararo. Given Norelli's pattern of deliberate evasions on cross-examination, the prosecutor was entitled to prove that the statements were made through a prior inconsistent statement. ( People v. Green (1971) 3 Cal.3d 981, 988-989 [92 Cal. Rptr. 494, 479 P.2d 998]; Evid. Code, งง 770, 1235.) Our review of the record persuades us that Norelli was deliberately evasive; a prior ruling on the record to that effect by the trial court is not a condition precedent to our holding that the statements were admissible as a prior inconsistent statement. (See, e.g., People v. Plasencia (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 546, 551 [223 Cal. Rptr. 786]; People v. Burciago (1978) 81 Cal. App.3d 151, 165 [146 Cal. Rptr. 236].) Further, defendant's right of confrontation was not impaired; the declarant was subject to examination at trial and admitted making a statement to the detective. The jury could evaluate Norelli's demeanor, and defendant had the opportunity to examine him fully regarding his statements to the detective. (See California v. Green (1970) 399 U.S. 149 [26 L.Ed.2d 489, 90 S.Ct. 1930]; People v. Green, supra, 3 Cal.3d at pp. 989-990.) Nor can we agree with defendant's conclusory claims that the evidence was more prejudicial than probative under Evidence Code section 352, or that its admission violated the laundry list of constitutional provisions defendant notes in passing. (33a) Respondent concedes it was error to admit the testimony that Quartararo was of the opinion that Norelli was afraid of defendant. We agree with respondent, however, that any error was not prejudicial. Norelli was not the only one who was afraid of defendant, as the evidence that defendant had threatened to blow up Corona reveals.
(34) Defendant contends the terms of the prosecutor's plea bargain with Art Corona were coercive, so that Corona's testimony should have been excluded as unreliable. (See People v. Garrison (1989) 47 Cal.3d 746, 767 [254 Cal. Rptr. 257, 765 P.2d 419]; People v. Medina (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 438 [116 Cal. Rptr. 133].) He claims a violation of state and federal due process guaranties. He argues that given the history of Corona's cooperation with the police, the agreement should be understood to have impermissibly required Corona to adhere to his prior statements without regard for their truthfulness, and to testify in such a way as to assure defendant's conviction. The complaint in this case named Corona as well as defendant and Brown in each count except the Croutch robbery. Just before the preliminary hearing, Corona's case was severed. He waived preliminary hearing and testified against defendant and Brown, denying then and at trial that he had been offered or promised leniency in return for his preliminary hearing testimony. His attorney was called as a witness at the preliminary hearing and testified that he and the prosecutor had discussed what might happen if Corona testified. However, the attorney successfully invoked the attorney-client privilege with respect to the content of those discussions. Seven days later, the prosecutor wrote to Corona's counsel, setting forth the offer defendant now complains of as coercive: It is my belief that Mr. Corona will testify completely and truthfully at any and all trials in this matter. At the conclusion of all such trials the People agree to dismiss Counts I, II, IV, and V as to Mr. Corona and to amend the information to allege a violation by him of Penal Code section 32. He would then plead guilty to this charge as well as to Count III, the burglary. [ถ] The reasons the murder and robbery charges against Mr. Corona will be dropped are twofold: First and foremost, the evidence clearly shows that he did not participate or aid and abet in the killing or robbery of the victims. Secondly, realistically, I believe we need Mr. Corona's testimony to ensure the successful prosecution of the two actual murderers and, even though Mr. Corona has already testified at their preliminary hearing without any `deals' or promises having been made to him, the fact that he did so and is willing to do so in the future โ at a very substantial risk and danger of death to himself and his wife โ merits considerable consideration. [ถ] I trust you and Mr. Corona will be agreeable to this arrangement. During voir dire, defendant moved for discovery of any prosecution agreements with Corona. The court granted the motion. Defense counsel stated that with regard to Corona in reading the preliminary hearing transcript, you get the feeling that there is a deal, but Mr. Corona may not have been fully informed of it by his attorney, although I'm sure [Corona's counsel] had discussed the matter with the district attorney. The prosecutor responded: I represent to the court, as an officer of the court, with respect to Mr. Corona, the only discussions are those that are contained in the letter which was sent to his attorney.... The claim that the prosecutor's offer to Corona was coercive is specious. We have said that a condition that the accomplice testify truthfully is not coercive. ( People v. Andrews (1989) 49 Cal.3d 200, 231 [260 Cal. Rptr. 583, 776 P.2d 285]; People v. Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 769-770.) The agreement clearly was not conditioned on defendant's conviction. While the prosecutor's letter explained why the prosecution needed Corona's testimony, it imposed no condition on that testimony. The explanation was probably aimed at allaying Corona's counsel's fear that a trial court might reject the bargain being offered to his client. Defendant claims that Corona's police interrogator told him that if he changed his story, he would be hung out, and that only his statement to the police would mean anything. He claims that Corona therefore must have understood that the bargain offered by the prosecutor was conditional on his not changing his story. But the prosecutor's offer itself simply does not bear such a construction, and the context of the interrogation does not support the claim that any kind of bargain was struck at that time.
(35) The prosecutor has a duty, founded on due process, to disclose substantial material evidence favorable to the accused, including matters relating to the credibility of witnesses and inducements made to secure their testimony. ( People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1271-1272.) Under the federal Constitution, `the conviction must be reversed, only if the evidence is material in the sense that its suppression undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.' ( Id. at p. 1272, quoting United States v. Bagley (1985) 473 U.S. 667, 678 [87 L.Ed.2d 481, 491, 105 S.Ct. 3375].) (36) Defendant claims the prosecutor's failure to disclose certain elements of the plea bargain offered Corona was a violation of due process that requires reversal. He points to indications that the prosecution and the police had conversations with Corona before the preliminary hearing, arguing that this controverts the prosecutor's statement that the first discussion of a plea with Corona's counsel was her letter offering the deal. Though the record does show, as defendant claims, that Corona had contact with the police and the prosecutor before the preliminary hearing, defendant can point to no evidence that any leniency or inducements to testify were offered then. Corona's attorney stated at the preliminary hearing that he had discussed what might happen to Corona with the prosecutor before the hearing, but there was no indication that any agreement was reached or that any inducement was conveyed to Corona โ quite the opposite. Defendant claims that the prosecutor failed to disclose that the police offered protection for Corona's wife, and that when Corona consented to have his house searched in connection with the murder, the police reassured him he would not be prosecuted for any dope found there. Neither of these are in any way substantial inducements to testify, and in any case, they were contained in the tape and transcript of Corona's interview with the police, a document defendant had in advance of Corona's testimony. Art Corona's request for protection for his wife came out at the preliminary hearing, as well. Neither does Casey Corona's trial testimony that the prosecutor helped her get into a drug treatment program show any connection with Corona's plea bargain, and in any event, defendant could have recalled Corona for further cross-examination when the evidence came to light. In sum, defendant provides no evidence on this record that the prosecutor failed to disclose inducements offered to Corona for his testimony. (37a), (38a) Defendant also claims the prosecutor breached her duty in failing to disclose the identity of five witnesses in a timely manner, and he also may be understood to claim the prosecutor failed to comply with the discovery order in the case. (37b) The claim is meritless. The prosecutor resisted discovery of the identity of three informants, but when the court ordered disclosure, she complied, providing their identities and her notes of their statements to her investigator, as well as the investigator's report on the conversations. None of the informants testified for the prosecution. One of them, Gian Norelli, testified for defendant. Defendant claims that he would have profited by earlier disclosure of Norelli's statements, but in fact, the disclosure was timely and defendant had ample time to investigate Norelli's statement before deciding to call him as a witness. After all, jury selection did not begin until about a month after compliance, and the evidentiary portion of the trial began almost two months later. (38b) Two other witnesses were not disclosed to defendant until the middle of trial. Each was to be called to testify to Art Corona's prior consistent statements in an effort to rebut defendant's suggestion that Corona's testimony was a fabrication. Thus, it is almost impossible to argue that they could have provided evidence favorable to the accused. In any case, one, Connie Pangburn, was never called to testify. The prosecutor asserted that she only learned a few days earlier that Art Corona had made consistent statements to Pangburn, since the witness earlier had resolutely refused to become involved. The court offered counsel a reasonable amount of time to investigate the new evidence. It is inconceivable that any delay in disclosing her identity could have affected defendant, since Pangburn did not testify. The other late-disclosed witness was Caesar Corona, Art Corona's brother. He did testify against defendant, and corroborated Art Corona's testimony with evidence of a prior consistent statement. The prosecutor claimed she did not disclose Caesar Corona's identity and statement because it was never considered it would be relevant. While we may share defendant's skepticism at this statement, again, we fail to see how any delay in disclosing this witness harmed defendant. The court gave defendant ample time to investigate once the witness and his proposed testimony were disclosed. The court said: I'll give you as much time as you want. You name it, you've got it. Investigate it fully, research it fully. The defense requested no continuance. (39) It is defendant's burden to show that the failure to timely comply with any discovery order is prejudicial, and that a continuance would not have cured the harm. ( People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 502 [116 Cal. Rptr. 217].) (38c) There is no suggestion that the defense would have been different had defendant been aware of Caesar Corona's testimony before trial. As a matter of due process there was no suppression of material evidence favorable to the accused, and any failure to timely disclose the witness was harmless and did not undermine the reliability of the proceedings. (See People v. Pensinger, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1273-1274.)
Defendant charges the prosecutor with multiple acts of misconduct. (40) We begin our discussion with the observation that: It is, of course, the general rule that a defendant cannot complain on appeal of misconduct by a prosecutor at trial unless in a timely fashion he made an assignment of misconduct and requested that the jury be admonished to disregard the impropriety.... It is true that the rule does not apply when the harm could not have been cured. ( People v. Benson (1990) 52 Cal.3d 754, 794 [276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330]; see also People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 27-34 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].) [11]
(41) Defendant complains that the prosecutor suggested, through improper voir dire, opening statement, questions to witnesses, and closing argument, that he was a member of a prison gang, the Aryan Brotherhood. Absent some connection between the prison gang and proof of the charged offenses, of course, a prosecutor's reference to prison gangs is irrelevant and prejudicial. ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 660; People v. Malone (1988) 47 Cal.3d 1, 30 [252 Cal. Rptr. 525, 762 P.2d 1249].) The prosecutor disclaimed any intent to introduce the prison gang theme into her case and, indeed, the trial court announced that it would not permit her to introduce such evidence without a showing of its relevance. We agree with respondent that it was defense counsel who introduced the theme in voir dire. The defense had requested that questions on this sensitive topic be permitted, in response to the obvious potential that some evidence of Nazi symbols or the Aryan Brotherhood would be introduced at trial. It was in response to defense questions about the Aryan Brotherhood that the prosecutor asked whether jurors had heard of that group. She asked one juror, after defense questioning on the point, whether she would favor the defense if the evidence showed that the defendants were associated with the swastika or the initials S.S. She asked another juror, who told defense counsel he could not be fair in light of any involvement in a Nazi gang, whether he could be fair if the Nazi symbols had nothing to do with the murders. The juror was excused for cause. Further, in none of these instances was there any defense objection or request for admonition. Contrary to defendant's claim, there was no reference to prison gangs in the prosecutor's opening statement; her statement that defendant scratched a swastika on a car after an altercation with its owner carried no such message and was a proper statement of the evidence to be adduced. In any case, there was no objection to the comment, and so the claim is waived. (42) Defendant complains also of various questions posed by the prosecutor to witnesses, invoking the rule that it is misconduct for a prosecutor to `intentionally elicit inadmissible testimony.' ( People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 689 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) Prosecution witness Kempf recounted his involvement in defendant's unconsummated plan to commit a robbery at the Kumar home. On cross-examination, Kempf revealed that he had testified against the brother of another participant in the plan, one Bob Crane. On redirect examination, the prosecutor asked questions intended to rebut defense questioning suggesting that Kempf was a professional informant. She asked whether he knew that Bob Crane was the head of the Aryan Brotherhood. We see no prejudice, since the defense objection was sustained, the court directed that there be no further references to the Aryan Brotherhood, Kempf did not answer the question, and the jury was instructed to disregard the question. (See People v. Warren (1988) 45 Cal.3d 471, 482-483 [247 Cal. Rptr. 172, 754 P.2d 218].) (43) Defendant charges that the prosecutor improperly questioned her own witness, Charlie Kempf, by asking whether he knew both defendant and Bobby Crane. There was no objection, and we fail to see how this could possibly have suggested to the jury that defendant was involved with a prison gang. Defendant himself volunteered that he didn't like Kempf because he had testified against Bobby Crane. Defendant complains the prosecutor suggested his affiliation with prison gangs when she asked him on cross-examination whether he knew what Bobby Crane was incarcerated for and asked: He is head โ he's a pretty powerful person in San Quentin, is he not, sir? But defendant's objection to this line of questioning was sustained, so we see no possibility of harm to defendant. (44) Defendant also complains that the prosecutor purposely elicited reference to prison gangs when she asked Art Corona what he talked to codefendant Brown about when they first met, and Corona said: I remember some conversation about different guys that were in prison affiliated with A.B., Nazis, whatever. There was neither an objection to this question nor a request for admonition, nor do we see any indication that the prosecutor asked the question for the purpose of eliciting an improper answer (see People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 689-690; People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 482-483). Defendant also objects to the prosecutor's attempt to rehabilitate Corona on redirect examination. The defense had pointed out inconsistencies in Corona's statement to the police and his trial testimony, including his failure to tell the police what Brown had said about stabbing one of the victims. On redirect examination the prosecutor showed that Corona failed to tell the police what codefendant Brown had said because he was afraid of Brown, believing that Brown was affiliated with the Aryan Brotherhood. This was arguably proper evidence rebutting a claim that the witness was fabricating his testimony. ( People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 237.) In any event, there was neither an objection on the grounds of misconduct nor a request for admonition, and the evidence did not suggest that defendant was a member of any gang. (45) In a related claim, defendant argues it was misconduct for the prosecutor to elicit evidence that defendant had scratched Nazi insignia on a witness's car. He fails to establish that the evidence was inadmissible. As we have seen, the prosecutor called Lisa Tapar, who testified that defendant arrived at her house after midnight on the night of the murders, and that when she denied him admission, he stabbed her front door and vandalized her car with a knife. The evidence was relevant to show his possession and use of a knife at a relevant time, as well as to corroborate Corona's statement regarding the time of the visit and his report of defendant's vandalism of Tapar's car. Tapar did not see defendant scratching symbols on her car, so it was necessary for the prosecutor to establish that defendant had done so circumstantially, by asking what marks Tapar had discovered on her car and whether they had been there before defendant's nocturnal visit: What kind of marks were there on your car? A: Swastika, S.S.B. and S.S. or lightning bolts. Q: Lightning bolts? Now what are lightning bolts? A: I think it has something to do with the Nazis. Not only was the evidence relevant, there was neither any objection to its admission, nor any unreported sidebar discussion at or near the time of these questions. The issue, such as it is, is waived. (46) Defendant also complains of questions the prosecutor asked him. Defendant admitted his visit to Lisa Tapar. He explained that he visited to give her some money and to tell her of the death of his friend, Shotgun, and not to ask her about Kumar's address. Attempting to impeach this story, the prosecutor asked: Why did you go over and scratch Lisa's car? A: I do that quite often. She asked him what he had scratched on the car, and he said he had written his nickname and the initials S.F.V., which meant San Fernando Valley. She pursued the subject: What else did you scratch on that car, sir? A: Probably a swastika. Q: What do you mean, probably? A: I commonly do that. Q: Why do you commonly scratch swastikas on things? A: Symbolizing white power. Q: Are you an advocate of white power, sir? A: Yes. Q: Do you belong to a group that advocates white power? A: No, I do not. Q: So you would scratch a swastika. What else did you scratch on there, sir? A. To the best of my recollection, I think that's all I put there. She showed him a photograph, and asked what else it showed. He answered, Two sets of lightning bolts. Q: What are those lightning bolts, sir? The court interrupted, called the noon recess, and put on the record its concern that the questions would lead to evidence of prison gang affiliation, as to which there had been an objection. The court questioned the relevance of the evidence. The prosecutor explained that she did not expect to elicit evidence of gang affiliation, but of defendant's belief in White power. The court concluded: As I say, at this point in time, I don't believe that any potential or alleged prison gang or outside-of-prison gang affiliation is relevant. The court effectively precluded the prosecutor from pursuing questioning that would elicit evidence of gang membership, and we see no possibility of prejudice from the questions that were asked. The prosecutor never claimed that defendant was not a credible witness because he believed in White power, or that his prejudices were probative of his guilt. The issue was simply irrelevant. (47) Finally, we conclude that to the extent the jury would have understood any of the evidence or questions complained of here as alluding to prison gang membership, there could not have been any prejudice to defendant. Even assuming that in each instance the issue was properly preserved for appeal, and assuming the jury understood the evidence as being relevant to defendant's activities, as opposed to Brown's, we see no prejudice. Evidence of gang membership is considered prejudicial because it tends to establish criminal disposition. ( People v. Cardenas (1982) 31 Cal.3d 897, 905 [184 Cal. Rptr. 165, 647 P.2d 569].) Here, defendant himself made his criminal disposition clear. In fact, he gloried in it.
(48) Defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct in eliciting testimony from Todd Croutch that he had received a threatening phone call from defendant, who said that if Croutch testified, he would be killed. The claim is untenable; such evidence is clearly admissible to show consciousness of guilt. ( People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588, 599-600 [138 Cal. Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203]; People v. Slocum (1975) 52 Cal. App.3d 867, 887 [125 Cal. Rptr. 442].) Questions regarding the reliability of Croutch's identification of the voice as defendant's went to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence. Similarly, the prosecutor was entitled to probe defendant about the threats, and to ask Casey Corona whether she had received threats from either of the defendants. The jury was admonished to disregard her nonresponsive answer that she had received a threat from defendant's brother. Given the form of the prosecutor's question, we see no evidence the prosecutor intended to elicit inadmissible evidence. (See People v. Warren, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 482-483.) She later readily complied with the court's warning that she should not ask any questions along these lines unless she knew the answer was admissible, choosing to abandon the line of questioning. (33b) With regard to questions of Detective Quartararo whether he had an opinion as to why Gian Norelli did not remember his conversation with Quartararo, the questions called for improper opinion testimony, as respondent would agree. The officer replied that I believe he is afraid of Mr. Pinholster. The court overruled defendant's evidentiary objection, but any error, whether characterized as evidentiary or as prosecutorial misconduct, is clearly harmless. The jury was already aware of defendant's violent threats against Corona. For the same reason, any error in asking Quartararo why he had moved Corona around from jail to jail, eliciting the answer that Corona had received some threats at the county jail, was harmless.
(49) Defendant argues the prosecutor improperly brought before the jury evidence of defendant's prior uncharged violent acts. Of course, such evidence would be subject to exclusion under Evidence Code sections 1101 and 352; no objection on those grounds appears. Defendant fails even to argue that the evidence complained of was inadmissible. He also fails to show that the prosecutor anticipated the witness's answers and purposefully elicited them. (See People v. Bell (1989) 49 Cal.3d 502, 532 [262 Cal. Rptr. 1, 778 P.2d 129]; People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 689.) Taking the points separately, he objects to a question posed to Art Corona on redirect examination, asking why he had said in his statement to the police that he thought that if defendant were not arrested, he, Corona, would be held solely responsible. Corona answered: Well, it was one time before this happened, Scott had told me about a shootout he had gotten into in the valley over a dope ripoff โ  The court interruped: I think that goes beyond the question. Be a little more specific. The prosecutor asked: What were you referring to? and the witness answered: Just that Scott had gotten away with something like this before. The prosecutor responded, I don't think you understand the question, Mr. Corona. The court admonished the jury to disregard the testimony as unresponsive and irrelevant. At a sidebar conference, Brown's counsel argued that Corona's answer to the question was so unresponsive to the question that it reflected on his credibility and ability to recall. The court refused to allow Brown's counsel to pursue the issue in his examination of Corona. The suggestion that it was misconduct to ask the question is meritless; it is obvious the prosecutor did not anticipate the answer given and was frustrated with her witness's obtuseness. In any event, Corona's statement itself was admitted into evidence without objection, and it contained references to some of defendant's other activities. That evidence being properly before the jury, this line of questioning cannot have harmed defendant, even if we were to assume, which we do not, that the jury failed to follow the court's admonition. (50) Defendant also refers to the examination of Charles Kempf regarding why he had backed out of an earlier plan to rob Kumar. Kempf explained that the vibes were not good and further that defendant had said, brandishing a knife, that he would get the drugs out of Kumar one way or another. Defendant does not explain in what way these questions were objectionable. When the prosecutor asked whether the witness thought defendant would use the knife, a defense objection was sustained. Defendant does not complain of or even mention the witness's next statement that he became afraid of defendant when defendant said that in an earlier robbery, he had stabbed the victim in the rectum. In this context, we see no prosecutorial misconduct.
(51) In her opening statement at the guilt phase, the prosecutor read the letter she had written to propose a plea bargain for Art Corona in exchange for his testimony. The letter stated the prosecutor's belief that Mr. Corona will testify completely and truthfully at any and all trials in this matter. Defendant argues the prosecutor thus improperly personally vouched for the credibility of her star witness. (See e.g., People v. Sully, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1235; People v. Gates (1983) 43 Cal.3d 1168, 1187 [240 Cal. Rptr. 666, 743 P.2d 301].) As he admitted on the record three days later, defendant did not object to this statement at the time it was made and did not request an admonition. Though he eventually objected to the evidence itself during the direct examination of Art Corona, his failure to object to the prosecutor's statement in a timely manner on the grounds sought to be raised on appeal bars the claim. This is not a situation in which an admonition could not have cured the harm. In any case, we do not think the jury would understand the remark as suggesting they should rely on the prosecutor's evaluation. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 793 [reviewing court must determine how reasonable juror would understand remarks].) As counsel said later in objecting to the evidence of the letter itself, the comment in the opening statement went by so fast that even he missed it at that time. In any event, any misconduct was not prejudicial; the court and the prosecutor told the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence, and the matter of Corona's credibility was fully explored without any suggestion the jury should rely on the prosecutor's evaluation of his credibility. (52) In closing argument at the guilt phase, defendant claims the prosecutor committed misconduct in referring to defense witness Maxwell as a weasel, in suggesting Norelli was a perjurer, in saying that defendant's witness Granara had referred to a police report that had not been produced and that he was not following the script, in saying that defendant got caught in some lies, some doozies, and in saying that his witnesses were not strangers to the police department. These claims are meritless. The prosecutor is permitted to urge, in colorful terms, that defense witnesses are not entitled to credence, to comment on failure to produce logical evidence, to argue on the basis of inference from the evidence that a defense is fabricated, and to comment on the evidence of prior convictions attributable to defense witnesses. (See, e.g., People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 34 [171 Cal. Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213]. People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at 237; People v. Terry (1962) 57 Cal.2d 538, 561-562 [21 Cal. Rptr. 185, 370 P.2d 985].) (53) Defendant claims the prosecutor referred in argument to matter outside the record, a practice that clearly is misconduct. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 794-795.) Her suggestion, that because jurors saw Darell Dorn and Terry Pinholster in the hallway together during trial they should assume that Pinholster told Dorn to correct a misstatement in his testimony, was improper. But the inference that the alibi defense was fabricated arose naturally from the inconsistencies between the witnesses' earlier statements and their trial testimony, and from their relationships with the defendants, so we see no possibility of prejudice. (54) The prosecutor argued the alibi was incredible because none of the witnesses who gave evidence in support of it had attempted to exonerate defendant with the police or prosecutor before the trial, despite their familiarity with the police department and the prosecution. Defendant claims the reference to the familiarity of the witnesses with the police department was a reference to matter outside the record, namely, that the witnesses all had criminal records. Defendant failed to object, and in any event we do not think the comment would be understood this way. The trial testimony showed that seven of the ten alibi witnesses had been in contact with the police before trial but failed to mention the alibi. The argument, that the trial testimony of a witness other than the defendant is less credible for being offered for the first time at trial, is a permissible comment on the state of the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Szeto, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 34.) At worst, the argument used the underworld milieu of the witnesses to argue, somewhat unpersuasively in our opinion, that the witnesses' familiarity with the police department would lead them to present themselves to the police at the first possible moment to exonerate their arrested friend. (55) With respect to defendant's complaint about the prosecutor's argument accusing Brown's attorney of bad faith in claiming the prosecutor had coached Corona to say that Brown had plunged his knife into his victim up to the hilt, we see no possibility that this comment could have affected the jury with respect to defendant's case. (56) Defense counsel argued that if defendant had gotten to the police station first, he would have gotten the deal and Corona would have been prosecuted. The prosecutor rebutted this claim with the statement that this was wishful thinking and that the jury had heard why it was that Corona had gotten the deal. We see no impropriety in this rebuttal, based as it was on the record. Nor do we see impropriety in her rebuttal of the defendant's claim that there was a secret prosecutorial deal with Corona. The prosecutor was entitled to argue that if the defense thought there was such a deal, they could have called her, a logical witness, to the stand to examine her about it. (See People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 539 [proper to comment on failure to call logical witness].) (57) Defendant also complains of the following: Codefendant Brown's counsel, in closing argument, attacked Corona's credibility and emphasized the accomplice-corroboration rule. He told the jury if it ignored the instructions you are really no better than Scott Pinholster, you have no more regard for the law or rights of anybody else or for our system than Scott Pinholster. Defendant did not object. The prosecutor repeated Brown's argument, and said, To even mention your names in the same breath I find utterly an insult. There was no objection or request for admonition. In any case, we do not view the argument as an appeal to passion and prejudice, but as within the range of forceful language warranted by the evidence. (See, e.g., People v. Thornton (1974) 11 Cal.3d 738, 762-763 [114 Cal. Rptr. 467, 523 P.2d 267]; People v. Terry, supra, 57 Cal.2d at pp. 561-562.) (58) Near the end of her rebuttal, the prosecutor argued that only in America are defendants accorded trials even in the face of overwhelming evidence. She said: I've had rape trials where a man's been caught on top of a woman raping her and we are still in a trial. [ถ] And you've all heard about trials where someone confessed, but that confession was beaten out of them. [ถ] They are entitled to their trial and they have had it. It's time to put an end to this farce, ladies and gentlemen. It really, really is. Brown's counsel objected, and the objection was overruled. The sidebar conference was not reported, but at the conclusion of argument counsel repeated his objection and moved for a mistrial, and defendant's counsel joined. Brown's counsel argued that the prosecutor had made an improper appeal to passion and prejudice, had relied on matters outside the record in discussing other trials, and had suggested that the defendants did not deserve to have a trial. Any suggestion that when there is overwhelming evidence of guilt, it is a farce to provide a trial is obviously improper. It may be that the jury understood the comment, as respondent claims, only as referring to the alibi and diminished capacity defenses as farcical in light of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. In any event, it is inconceivable that the improper comment was prejudicial. It must have been clear to the jury that the court, the prosecutor and all defense counsel litigated the matter very carefully, that in no sense was the proceeding a farce or sham, that the jurors were expected to take their responsibilities carefully, and that all parties anticipated that the jurors would apply the law to the facts in arriving at their verdict. In addition, the jurors were specifically instructed that the statements of counsel were not evidence, and that they were not to be swayed by passion or prejudice. They were instructed that all parties had a right to expect that you will conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, and that you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may be. We find no prejudicial misconduct.
(59) Defendant claims misconduct in the prosecutor's efforts to prevent his marriage to Cathy Smith. While the prosecutor did seek to delay the marriage until after trial in order to prevent the assertion of the marital privilege, she frankly admitted she had no authority to do so and her efforts were unsuccessful. Several months before trial the two were married. Smith testified against defendant nonetheless. We see no theory upon which defendant can argue prejudicial misconduct.
(60) We have identified no misconduct which, taken singly or together, convinces us that defendant was prejudiced, or, as defendant claims, subjected to an unfair trial in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process and a reliable determination of penalty. (See People v. Bell, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 533-534; People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1083-1084 [255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619].)

(61) Defendant claims that an instruction that the jury should assume that he was of sound mind at the time of his alleged conduct (former CALJIC No. 3.34) amounted to a conclusive presumption that lightened the prosecutor's burden of proof on the element of specific intent applicable, he claims, to most of the charges against him, in violation of the due process clauses of the state and federal Constitutions. [12] He claims that the instruction interfered with the jury's consideration of his claim that because of drug and alcohol intoxication, he did not form the necessary specific intent. He argues that the instruction may have caused the jury to shift the burden of proof to him, and that it may have caused the jury to fail to consider the evidence at all, even in deciding whether there was any reasonable doubt on the element of intent. Given the full spectrum of instruction on the issues of intent and voluntary intoxication, we find, as we have before, that it is not reasonably likely the jury would have discerned in the presumption of mental soundness a presumption of sobriety. ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 671 [286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84]; see also People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525-526 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385].) A sound mind does not convey to us, or to the reasonable juror, we think, the concept of sobriety. Rather, it conveys the absence of mental illness (see People v. Gorshen (1959) 51 Cal.2d 716, 729 [336 P.2d 492]; former ง 21, as enacted in 1872; see also People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 670.) Reading the instructions as a whole, as we must ( Francis v. Franklin (1985) 471 U.S. 307, 315 [85 L.Ed.2d 344, 354, 105 S.Ct. 1965]; Cupp v. Naughten (1973) 414 U.S. 141, 147 [38 L.Ed.2d 368, 373-374, 94 S.Ct. 396]), we think it is reasonably likely the jury would understand that the People had the burden of proving defendant's specific intent, and that while defendant's sanity for the purpose of proving specific intent was generally presumed, evidence of intoxication and abnormal physical condition was nonetheless relevant to raise a reasonable doubt whether specific intent had been proven.
(62a) Defendant claims the court erred in instructing the jury pursuant to CALJIC No. 17.10 (1982 rev.), because, he claims, the instruction told the jury that it could not consider the possibility that defendant committed only a lesser included offense until it unanimously decided that he was not guilty of the greater offense of murder in the first degree. Respondent claims invited error, since defendant requested the instruction, but there is little indication of a deliberate tactical purpose to focus the jury on reaching a verdict on the first degree charges before they considered the lesser offenses. (Compare People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 353.) (63) Of course, a jury may consider the lesser offenses before returning a verdict on the greater offense, though it may not return a verdict on the lesser offense until it has agreed that defendant is not guilty of the greater offense. ( People v. Kurtzman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 322, 329 [250 Cal. Rptr. 244, 758 P.2d 572].) Nonetheless, we have rejected defendant's argument in the context of CALJIC No. 8.75, finding that the jury would not be misled by the instruction. ( People v. Nicolaus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 551, 580 [286 Cal. Rptr. 628, 817 P.2d 893]; People v. Hunter (1989) 49 Cal.3d 957, 975-976 [264 Cal. Rptr. 367, 782 P.2d 608]; People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 241-242; People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at pp. 352-353.) (62b) CALJIC No. 17.10, even in its 1982 form, [13] is even less likely to mislead, since it does not refer the jury to a series of deliberative decisions and verdict forms. (See People v. Kurtzman, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 330-331, see also People v. Adcox, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 242.) We find nothing in the instruction or the record of the jury's deliberations to suggest the jury believed it must return a verdict on the greater offense before it could even discuss the lesser offenses. Accordingly we reject the claim that the giving of the instruction violated the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
(64) Both the trial court and the prosecutor commented to the jury on the length and complexity of the jury instructions. Defendant complains these comments produced basic misapprehensions about the importance of the jury instructions, in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to due process, fundamental fairness, an unbiased jury, and a reliable determination of penalty. Defendant's brief quotation takes the court's comment out of context and distorts it. The court said as it began to instruct the jury in the guilt phase of trial: This is the time in the trial of the guilt phase of this matter for the court to read you the instructions. I am required by law to read these to you. It is not one of the real interesting and exciting ways to spend a morning, but it is of utmost importance. [ถ] As I say, it is also required by law. [ถ] You will find these instructions somewhat complex. Let me tell you in advance that I am going to give these instructions to you prior to your going into the jury room to deliberate. So when you do go into the jury room to deliberate, you will have the exact copy from which I have read. So you might want to consider the possibility of not taking notes during these readings because you will have the exact instructions in there. [ถ] If it helps you to remember and focus on what we are doing here to take notes, obviously you are free to do that. [ถ] In my 16 years of dealing with criminal law in one part of it or another, I have never encountered a situation where it was necessary to give this many instructions. The most instructions that I have ever given ... is probably half this many. We have 110 pages of instructions. [ถ] It is the process of working these instructions out that has occupied counsel and I during this relatively lengthy break between the taking of testimony and today. [ถ] It is necessary under the law to give you these instructions. They address themselves and try to explain to you and define for you some pretty esoteric legal concepts. [ถ] I will try to read them in a manner that will allow you to get some of the flavor and some of the feeling of what we are doing. [ถ] I think the best thing to do, as I say, is just to try to listen and try to feel the flow of it and follow it in your mind and understand that you will have them present before you, and you will be able to study them at whatever length is necessary for your deliberations. There is absolutely no merit to defendant's complaint that the italicized language inevitably suggested that defendant's criminality here was twice as bad as any [the judge] had seen, or suggested that the jury was not expected to bother to understand or follow the instructions, in violation of his rights to due process, fundamental fairness and an unbiased jury. It is patently clear the court was soliciting the jury's patience and assiduity in trying to understand the volume of instructions. Defendant also claims the prosecutor added to the court's error by telling the jurors not to be concerned if they did not understand all the instructions. She said: You have all sat here today and listened to a bunch of instructions, I think the court at various points called esoteric or difficult. [ถ] I sat there listening and I had [them] in front of me, and even having heard them before they are confusing. They are. Not only to lay people, but people within the criminal justice system as well. Don't feel concerned if you don't understand any of them or only a few of them. Any suggestion that the jurors could proceed to judgment without ever understanding the instructions would be a gross misstatement of law, but, of course, the jurors were instructed to follow the law as stated by the judge, who had emphasized so carefully the importance of the instructions. The prosecutor herself, far from suggesting to the jury that the instructions could be ignored, spent a large proportion of her time in closing argument meticulously explaining the instructions and applying them one after the other to the evidence produced at trial. We see no error or possibility of harm to defendant.