Opinion ID: 1057653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parolees: Samson v. California

Text: On the continuum of possible punishments and reductions in freedoms, parolees occupy a place between incarcerated prisoners and probationers. Tennessee's statutory scheme defines parole as the release of a [previously incarcerated] prisoner to the community ... prior to the expiration of the prisoner's term subject to conditions.... Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-28-102(5). Release on parole is a privilege and not a right.... Id. § 40-35-503(b) (2006); see also id. § 40-28-117(a) (2006). Under Tennessee's statutory scheme, persons released outside of prison walls on parole remain in the legal custody of the warden (or relevant penal supervisor) and are subject to all of the provisions upon which their parole is conditioned. Id. § 40-28-117(a); Doyle v. Hampton, 207 Tenn. 399, 340 S.W.2d 891, 893 (1960). Parolees remain under the confinement of their sentences while on parole. Doyle, 340 S.W.2d at 893. Knights did not address the question whether parolees have any reasonable expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment; that question was recently addressed by the Supreme Court in Samson . Donald Curtis Samson was a California parolee. As a condition of his release on parole under a California statute, Samson had agreed in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause. Samson, 547 U.S. at 846, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (quoting Cal.Penal Code Ann. § 3067(a) (West 2000)). San Bruno Police Officer Alex Rohleder knew that Samson was on parole and believed Samson had an outstanding at-large warrant. Upon seeing Samson out walking one day, Officer Rohleder stopped him and inquired about the warrant. Samson replied that there was no outstanding warrant and that he was in good standing with his parole officer. Officer Rohleder confirmed this information by radio. Officer Rohleder nevertheless conducted a search of Samson, based solely on [Samson's] status as a parolee, id. at 846-47, 126 S.Ct. 2193, and found methamphetamine on his person. After he was charged with possession, Samson filed a motion to suppress, which the trial court denied. The Supreme Court upheld the search against a Fourth Amendment challenge. Id. at 847, 126 S.Ct. 2193. Returning to the balancing test it had used in Knights , [5] the Court first reasoned that parolees have fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, because parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to imprisonment.  Id. at 850, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (emphasis added). Second, Samson was unambiguously aware of the search condition of his parole. Id. at 852, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587). Thus, [e]xamining the totality of the circumstances pertaining to [Samson's] status as a parolee, an established variation on imprisonment, including the plain terms of the parole search condition, the Court concluded that Samson did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). On the other side of the scale, the Court reasoned that [t]he State's interests, by contrast, are substantial. This Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State has an overwhelming interest in supervising parolees because parolees ... are more likely to commit future criminal offenses. Similarly, this Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State's interests in reducing recidivism and thereby promoting reintegration and positive citizenship among probationers and parolees warrant privacy intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 853, 126 S.Ct. 2193 (quoting Pa. Bd. of Prob. and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998)). The Court recognized that [t]he California Legislature has concluded that, given the number of inmates the State paroles and its high recidivism rate, a requirement that searches be based on individualized suspicion would undermine the State's ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect the public from criminal acts by reoffenders, and agreed that [t]his conclusion makes eminent sense. Id. at 854, 126 S.Ct. 2193. The Court reasoned that [i]mposing a reasonable suspicion requirement ... would give parolees greater opportunity to anticipate searches and conceal criminality. Id. Hence, the search of parolee Samson passed Fourth Amendment muster even though it was not supported by any reasonable or individualized suspicion. Id. at 857, 126 S.Ct. 2193. The Court's holding that a parolee could be searched without any particularized suspicion has resulted in some criticism. See, e.g., 5 LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 10.10 at 432-82 (4th ed. 2004) and Supp. 2008-09 at 27-44. In our view, however, Samson does not present a significant departure from the Court's earlier Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. [6] The Skinner Court reiterated in 1989 that, although some quantum of individualized suspicion was usually necessary for a search to be reasonable, 489 U.S. at 624, 109 S.Ct. 1402 (emphasis added), the rule was not a hard and fast one: a showing of individualized suspicion is not a constitutional floor, below which a search must be presumed unreasonable. In limited circumstances, where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal, and where an important governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion, a search may be reasonable despite the absence of such suspicion. Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103 L.Ed.2d 685 (1989) (emphasizing the longstanding principle that neither a warrant nor probable cause, nor, indeed, any measure of individualized suspicion, is an indispensable component of reasonableness in every circumstance). The majority in Samson simply crafted a narrow exception to the usual rule: an exception which is hardly misguided given the minimal privacy interests retained by parolees and the government's overwhelming interest in ensuring that a parolee complies with the conditions of her parole. As noted by the Colorado Supreme Court even before Samson was decided, [r]equiring individualized suspicion would eliminate a powerful deterrent to parole violations and, consequently, would place in jeopardy the State's overwhelming interest in ensuring that a parolee complies with the conditions of his parole. People v. McCullough, 6 P.3d 774, 781 (Colo.2000) (En Banc).