Opinion ID: 1124343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of Statements and Derivative Evidence

Text: Prior to trial, Defendant filed three motions to suppress evidence that collectively sought to suppress: (1) the statements Defendant made to the Japanese police on March 4 and 5, 1994; (2) the statements Defendant made at his extradition proceedings on June 17 and July 1, 1994; and (3) any other derivative evidence obtained as a result of the statements. Defendant argued that the statements were inadmissible because they had been obtained through coercion and because he had not been informed of his Miranda [9] rights. The trial court denied all three motions on the grounds that the Prosecution had agreed not to use the statements at trial for any purposes and that Defendant had failed to specify any other derivative evidence. Defendant argues on appeal that the motions should have been granted. He argues that the burden was on the Prosecution to show that subsequently obtained evidence was from an independent source or that the taint was otherwise dissipated. Defendant argues that the trial court essentially shifted the burden to the defense to prove the evidence was tainted by the illegally obtained statement. Even assuming arguendo that Defendant's statements were improperly obtained, the issue of whether the trial court should have suppressed the statements is moot. It is well-settled that the mootness doctrine encompasses the circumstances that destroy the justiciability of a case previously suitable for determination. A case is moot where the question to be determined is abstract and does not rest on existing facts or rights. Thus, the mootness doctrine is properly invoked where events have so affected relations between the parties that the two conditions for justiciability relevant on appealadverse interest and effective remedyhave been compromised. AIG Hawai`i Ins. Co., Inc. v. Bateman, 82 Hawai`i 453, 458-59, 923 P.2d 395, 400-01 (1996) (quoting In re Application of J.T. Thomas, 73 Haw. 223, 225-26, 832 P.2d 253, 254 (1992)). The remedy for an unlawfully obtained statement is the suppression of that statement as evidence. However, Defendant's statements made on March 4, March 5, June 17, and July 1, 1994 were never introduced at trial. Because Defendant's statements were never introduced, he has essentially received the requested remedy already. Thus, the suppression of the statements is moot. As for the suppression of derivative evidence, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine prohibits the use of evidence at trial which comes to light as a result of the exploitation of a previous illegal act of the police. State v. Medeiros, 4 Haw.App. 248, 251 n. 4, 665 P.2d 181, 184 n. 4 (1983) (citing Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319 (1920)). However, not all derivative evidence is inadmissible: Admissibility is determined by ascertaining whether the evidence objected to as being the `fruit' was discovered or became known by the exploitation of the prior illegality or by other means sufficiently distinguished as to purge the later evidence of the initial taint. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). Where the government proves that the evidence was discovered through information from an independent source or where the connection between the illegal acts and the discovery of the evidence is so attenuated that the taint has been dissipated, the evidence is not a fruit and, therefore, is admissible. Wong Sun v. United States, supra . Id. See also State v. Lopez, 78 Hawai`i 433, 447, 896 P.2d 889, 903 (1995); State v. Pau`u, 72 Haw. 505, 509-10, 824 P.2d 833, 836 (1992). In the present case, Defendant failed to specify what items of derivative evidence he sought to suppress. In other words, he failed to describe the fruit to which the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine would be applied. As Medeiros suggests, evidence must first be objected to as being the `fruit' before the government can be expected to prove that it was discovered through an independent source. Medeiros, 4 Haw.App. at 251 n. 4, 665 P.2d at 184 n. 4. While the prosecution has the ultimate burden of persuasion to show that its evidence is untainted, the defendant must go forward with specific evidence demonstrating taint. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 183, 89 S.Ct. 961, 972, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969) (emphasis added). Furthermore, from a practical point of view, if the defendant does not identify specific items of derivative evidence, the trial court cannot know which items to include within the suppression order. Insofar as the defendant in the present case failed to satisfy his initial burden of identifying the evidence to be suppressed, the trial court committed no error. [10]