Opinion ID: 764672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Plan Violations

Text: 31 Concourse reasserts on appeal its argument that the manner in which the Department conducted its audits of the May 1995 Patient Reviews violated the State Medicaid plan. Appellant complains that in reclassifying patients to maintenance therapy, the auditors failed both to give the requisite deference to the diagnoses made by Concourse's licensed therapists and to limit review of the patients' medical documentation to the 28-day snap shot period on which Patient Reviews originally were based. It contends, in addition, that the auditors violated State procedural requirements when they allegedly prevented Concourse from presenting proof at the exit conferences, which followed the audits, that its patients met the restorative therapy standard. 32 As we repeatedly have explained, the failure of a State authority to comply with State regulations cannot alone give rise to a § 1983 cause of action. See Concourse Rehabilitation & Nursing Ctr. Inc. v. Wing, 150 F.3d 185, 187-89 (2d Cir.1998) (Wing); Kostok v. Thomas, 105 F.3d 65, 68 (2d Cir.1997). To state a federal cause of action, a plaintiff must allege a specific conflict between a state plan or practice on the one hand and a federal mandate on the other. Oberlander v. Perales, 740 F.2d 116, 119 (2d Cir.1984). The fact that federal law conditions State participation in the Medicaid program on the State's adoption of a Medicaid plan does not thereby transform provisions of a State's plan into federal law. The reason is plain. Were it otherwise, federal jurisdiction could be invoked to review each claimed error in a State's administration of its Medicaid plan, which would needlessly undermine State sovereignty, contrary to settled precedent. See id. at 119. 33 In this light, we look in vain to find any specific federal provision that appellant cites as conflicting with the State audit practices described above. To the extent we understand Concourse to be alleging a conflict with constitutional Due Process, plaintiff has adduced nothing to suggest that the review provided under Article 78 of New York's Civil Practice Law & Rules is an inadequate postdeprivation remedy. Whether negligent or intentional, the deprivation of property through the random and unauthorized acts of a State or federal employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural requirements of due process if a meaningful postdeprivation remedy for the loss is available. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984). 34 To the extent that appellant alleges a conflict with federal Medicaid regulations requiring that State plans provide for prompt administrative review, see, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 447.253(e) (1997), the New York State Medicaid plan provides for on-site exit conferences following audits, see N.Y. Comp.Codes R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 86-2.30(e)(5). Because the New York plan was reviewed and approved by the Health Financing Agency, Concourse must show that such plan provisions are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law before we will find them substantively invalid. Pinnacle Nursing Home, 928 F.2d at 1313 (quoting Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). This Concourse has failed to do. 35 In the end, appellant's argument reduces to the contention that the Department has failed to comply with the New York State Medicaid plan and that this failure somehow violates either constitutional Due Process or the federal Medicaid regulations. But, as explained above, absent the assertion of a specific conflict between the State plan or practices and federal law, such allegations fail to give rise to a federal cause of action. Because Concourse's allegations fail to assert such a specific conflict, and because the Eleventh Amendment bars our consideration of purely State law claims, see Wing, 150 F.3d at 189, we lack jurisdiction to decide appellant's claim.