Opinion ID: 736912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction: State of Georgia v. Rachel

Text: 13 and City of Greenwood v. Peacock 14 The Civil Rights Removal Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1443, authorizes the removal of a state law action: 15 [a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof. 16 While the language of this section is opaque, the jurisprudence has made clear that Congress has crafted only a narrow exception to the rule that a state court action may be removed to a federal district court only if federal jurisdiction is evident on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint (which, of course, it is not in this state defamation action). 17 In State of Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 86 S.Ct. 1783, 16 L.Ed.2d 925 (1966), the Supreme Court articulated the precise circumstances required to sustain removal under § 1443(1), clarifying that removal requires satisfaction of a two-pronged test: a state court defendant must demonstrate both (1) that he is being deprived of rights guaranteed by a federal law providing for ... equal civil rights; and (2) that he is  'denied or cannot enforce' that right in the courts of the state. Id. at 788, 86 S.Ct. at 1788. In Rachel, twenty African-American individuals were prosecuted in state court for criminal trespass violations as a result of their attempts to obtain service at a privately owned restaurant in Atlanta, Georgia. In contrast, federal law required such a restaurant to serve persons of all races, thus immunizing the conduct for which they were being prosecuted. The arrested individuals sought to remove the state court prosecutions to federal court on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). In construing the first requirement, the Court determined that the phrase 'any law providing for ... equal civil rights' must be construed to mean any law providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of racial equality. Id. at 792, 86 S.Ct. at 1790. The Court concluded that the statute invoked by the removing defendants, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, was a statute providing for equal civil rights. 18 The Court then addressed the second statutory requirement--that the state court defendant be denied or cannot enforce his or her rights in state court. The Court noted that, in order for pre-trial removal to be sustained, denial of rights traditionally had been required to be so manifest in a formal expression of state law that it could be taken as suitable indication that all courts in that State would disregard the federal right of equality with which the state enactment was precisely in conflict. Id. at 804, 86 S.Ct. at 1796 (citing Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1879), and Commonwealth of Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1879)). The Court explained that, given the particular circumstances of that case, a firm prediction that a defendant would be denied federal rights in the state court might be made even in the absence of a discriminatory state enactment. 19 In creating a narrow exception to the traditional denied or cannot enforce interpretation, the Rachel Court recognized that § 203 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specifically prohibited any punishment or attempts to punish any person for exercising rights secured by other sections of the Act. Id. In fact, the Court noted that in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, 379 U.S. 306, 311, 85 S.Ct. 384, 389, 13 L.Ed.2d 300 (1964), it had interpreted § 203 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to prohibit on its face ... prosecution of any person for seeking service in a covered establishment, because of his race or color. Rachel, 384 U.S. at 785, 86 S.Ct. at 1786. Based on the prohibition against prosecution contained in § 203, the Court concluded that nonforcible attempts to gain admittance to or remain in establishments covered by the Act, are immunized from prosecution. Id. Accordingly, the Court opined that in the narrow circumstances of this case, any proceedings in the courts of the States will constitute a denial of the rights conferred by the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as construed in Hamm. Id. at 804, 86 S.Ct. at 1796 (emphasis added). 20 In City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 86 S.Ct. 1800, 16 L.Ed.2d 944 (1966), decided on the same day as Rachel, the Court highlighted the limited nature of the Rachel exception. In Peacock, twenty-nine people were prosecuted as a result of First Amendment petitioning activity. The Mississippi state court defendants sought removal under § 1443(1). The Peacock Court began its analysis of § 1443(1) removability by noting the unique circumstances present in Rachel: 21 the basic difference between this case and Rachel is thus immediately apparent. In Rachel, the defendants relied on the specific provisions of a pre-emptive federal civil rights law--ss 201(a) and 203(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... as construed in Hamm v. City of Rock Hill, supra--that ... specifically and uniquely conferred upon the defendants an absolute right to violate the explicit terms of the state criminal trespass law with ... impunity. 22 Id. at 826, 86 S.Ct. at 1811-12. Accordingly, the Court explained that two significant differences existed between Peacock and Rachel. First, no federal law confers an absolute right on private citizens ... to obstruct a public street, to contribute to the delinquency of a minor, to drive an automobile without a license, or to bite a policeman; and, second, no federal law confers immunity from state prosecution on such charges. Id. at 826-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1812. 23 Peacock should not be read to narrow the holding of Rachel. Instead, the Court merely reiterated the limited and unique circumstances under which removability could be sustained regardless of the presence of a facially discriminatory state statute. Thus, Peacock reaffirms that in the vast majority of cases: 24 [i]t is not enough to support removal under § 1443(1) to allege or show that the defendant's federal equal civil rights have been illegally and corruptly denied by state administrative officials in advance of trial, that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a fair trial in a particular state court. The motives of the officers bringing the charges may be corrupt, but that does not show that the state trial court will find the defendant guilty if he is innocent, or that in any other manner the defendant will be denied or cannot enforce in the courts of the State any right under a federal law providing for equal civil rights. The civil rights removal statute does not require and does not permit the judges of the federal courts to put their brethren of the state judiciary on trial. Under § 1443(1), the vindication of the defendant's federal rights is left to the state courts except in the rare situations where it can be clearly predicted by reason of the operation of a pervasive and explicit state or federal law that those rights will inevitably be denied by the very act of bringing the defendant to trial in the state court. 25 Id. at 827-28, 86 S.Ct. at 1812. As a result, the Court in Peacock refused to expand Rachel 's interpretation of § 1443(1), holding that its earlier decisions were correct in their basic conclusion that the provisions of § 1443(1) do not operate to work a wholesale dislocation of the historic relationship between the state and the federal courts in the administration of the ... law. Id. at 831, 86 S.Ct. at 1814.