Opinion ID: 4537991
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The burden on the asserted constitutional

Text: rights. The nature of the constitutional rights asserted by Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates “is evident.” 44 As discussed above, they wish to appear on the ballot of New York’s Democratic presidential primary and they wish to vote in the primary election. That interest “to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas” 45 and “to cast their votes effectively” 46 falls squarely within the ambit of the protection afforded by the First Amendment. That interest is “an 43 See Yang, 2020 WL 2129597, at . 44 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214. 45 Id. (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460). 46 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). 20 inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,” which is applicable to the States. 47 It is settled that “[t]he right to associate with the political party of one’s choice is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom [of association],” 48 which in turn “necessarily presupposes” the party’s right to define its internal structure and “the freedom to identify the people who constitute the association.” 49 Parties exercise that freedom in a number of ways, including through elections to choose their nominees for public office. And although States have a “broad power to regulate the time, place, and manner of [such] elections,” they have a “‘responsibility to observe the limits established by the First Amendment rights of the State’s citizens.’” 50 The State’s power cannot be used, for example, to create barriers that unduly burden a person’s right to participate in a state-mandated presidential primary. 51 Indeed, “[a]ny interference with the freedom of a party” to determine how it will choose its delegates “is 47 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 214 (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460); see ante note 2. 48 Id. (quoting Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 57 (1973)). 49Id. at 214–15 (quoting Democratic Party of U. S. v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107, 122 (1981)). 50Eu v. S.F. Cty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 222, (1989) (quoting Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 217). See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 204 (2008) (“We 51 have indeed acknowledged an individual’s associational right to vote in a party primary without undue state-imposed impediment.”). 21 simultaneously an interference with the freedom of its adherents.” 52 The question thus becomes: what exactly is the burden imposed by the Board, in adopting by action of two of its members the April 27 Resolution, on the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates?
Yang wants an opportunity to compete for delegates. And so does Sanders, who filed an amicus brief before this Court in support of the claims of Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates. By the same token, the Yang and Sanders delegates also want to compete for an opportunity to attend the Democratic National Convention. These are not trivial interests. Those familiar with the internal structure of the Democratic Party and the history of its National Convention will have no difficulty appreciating their significance. At the Democratic National Convention, delegates have many important responsibilities, some with long-term consequences. In addition to participating in the selection of the presidential nominee, they vote on the procedural rules of the Convention; the National Democratic Party electoral platform; issues of party governance; and 52 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 215 (quoting Democratic Party, 450 U.S. at 122). 22 not insignificantly, the selection of the vice-presidential nominee. 53 Furthermore, the power of the elected delegates extends beyond the quadrennial national convention. The delegates of the National Convention remain “the highest authority [and governing body] of the Democratic Party” until new delegates are selected. 54 Accordingly, the programs and policies adopted at the Democratic National Convention will continue to influence state party rules or actions of the Democratic National Committee. 55 See, e.g., Rockefeller v. Powers, 74 F.3d 1367, 1380 (2d Cir. 1995); Yang, 2020 53 WL 2129597, at  (collecting citations to the record); Joint App’x at 300, 305–06. 54 THE CHARTER & THE BYLAWS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES (“CHARTER & BYLAWS”), Charter art. II, §§ 2, 4 and Bylaws art. I, § 1 (as amended August 25, 2018), available at https://democrats.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/DNC-Charter-Bylaws-8.25.18-with-Amendments.pdf (last visited May 22, 2020); see also Br. for Amici Curiae Senator Bernie Sanders and Bernie 2020 Inc. at 4–5 (describing the role of delegates and the National Convention under the Democratic Party’s Charter & Bylaws) (citing, e.g., CHARTER & BYLAWS, Charter art. III, § 1; id., art. IV, § 1; id., art. V, § 1). 55The Democratic Party is familiar with how unsuccessful presidential candidates have influenced the party’s governance and shaped the party’s rules in a way that has transformed the internal structure and politics of the Democratic Party moving forward. For example, after an unsuccessful run to obtain the Democratic nomination for President in the midst of the tumultuous 1968 Democratic National Convention, Senator George McGovern led an effort to reform the Party’s internal structure and nominating procedures. See Democratic Party of U.S., 450 U.S. at 116–17. The effort concluded in the adoption of “guidelines to eliminate state party practices that limited the access of rank-and-file Democrats to the candidate selection procedures, as well as those that tended to dilute the influence of each Democrat who took advantage of expanded opportunities to participate”—which are commonly known as the “McGovern Rules,” and which were formally “incorporated into the Call to the 1972 Convention, which set forth 23 The process for determining the number of pledged delegates per candidate is complex, but it is indisputable that, under the current rules of the National and New York Democratic Party, the only way for a candidate for delegate to compete for the opportunity to participate in the work of the Democratic National Convention is if the name of that delegate’s presidential candidate appears on the ballot. Put another way: the Board’s cancellation of the presidential primary has deprived Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates not only of their right to cast a ballot in the presidential primary, but also of their right to seek an entitlement to attend the Democratic National Convention as delegates. This is a substantial burden on the rights of speech and association of Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates. As the District Court explained: the formal requirements of the delegate selection and nominating processes for the Convention.” Id. at 116–17 & nn. 15–16; see also Eli Segal, Delegate Selection Standards: The Democratic Party’s Experience, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 873, 880–881 (1970), cited in Democratic Party of U.S., 450 U.S. at 116 n.15. See generally BYRON E. SHAFER, QUIET REVOLUTION: STRUGGLE FOR THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY & THE SHAPING OF POSTREFORM POLITICS (1983). More recently, after an unsuccessful run for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2016, “Senator Sanders and his delegation actively participated in the Convention and its Committees, securing important reforms to the Democratic Party’s platform, rules and bylaws,” which included the promulgation of new rules that substantially limited the voting power assigned to the so-called “superdelegates” at the National Convention—rules that have been adopted in the “Call for the 2020 Convention.” Br. for Amici Curiae Senator Bernie Sanders and Bernie 2020 Inc. at 1. 24 [T]he removal of presidential contenders from the primary ballot not only deprived those candidates of the chance to garner votes for the Democratic Party’s nomination, but also deprived their pledged delegates of the opportunity to run for a position where they could influence the party platform, vote on party governance issues, pressure the eventual nominee on matters of personnel or policy, and react to unexpected developments at the Convention. And it deprived Democratic voters of the opportunity to elect delegates who could push their point of view in that forum. 56 The character and magnitude of this burden becomes more apparent as we consider the circumstances in which the April 27 Resolution came into being. New York election law has long provided—since at least 1976—that uncontested elections can be resolved “without balloting.” 57 It is not disputed that an election under New York law is “uncontested” if there is only one candidate on the ballot for a particular office—either because that candidate was the only one who qualified to be on the ballot, or because the other candidates who had qualified expressly asked to be removed through a notarized request sent to the Board. 58 56 Yang, 2020 WL 2129597, at . 57 N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-160(2). 58 Joint App’x at 183–84 (describing the qualifying requirements for a presidential primary to appear on the ballot and explaining that a qualified candidate “shall appear as such a Candidate on the Primary ballot throughout the State unless, that individual files a declination of candidacy with the State Board”); 25 Therefore, absent “declination” or other circumstances not present here (e.g., a challenge to the validity of the signatures submitted by the candidate), it had long been understood that once a candidate qualifies to participate in the primary, the candidate is entitled to appear on the ballot. It was based on this understanding that, for example, Yang suspended his campaign in February 2020. When § 2-122-a(13) was enacted on April 3, 2020, to authorize the removal from the ballot of those candidates who had publicly announced that they were suspending their campaigns or no longer seeking the nomination, the State changed the longstanding rules governing the New York Democratic Party’s primary process. It did so, notably, at the eleventh hour. As a result, when the Board exercised its newly enacted, discretionary authority under § 2-122-a(13) to adopt the April 27 Resolution, the Board “upended the candidates’ settled expectation that they would stay on the ballot; after all, when Yang and [most of] the other contenders suspended their campaigns, there was no threat that doing so would bar them from competing for delegates.” 59
see also Sanders Delegates’ Br. at 39 (“Within New York’s Election Law, it is all but impossible to get off the ballot, ‘however reasonable [the reason for removal] might appear.’” (quoting Matter of Biamonte v Savinetti, 87 A.D.3d 950, 954 (2d Dept. 2011)). 59 Yang, 2020 WL 2129597, at . 26 The Board argues that “both Yang and Senator Sanders had an opportunity to prevent the Board from removing their names from the ballot and thus to prevent the cancellation of the presidential primary.” 60 The Board emphasizes the fact that “Sanders suspended his campaign [on April 8] after the Legislature enacted Election Law § 2-122-a(13), and [that] Yang could have reactivated his campaign before the Board issued its determination.” 61 We are not persuaded. As a threshold matter, nothing in the text of § 2-122-a(13) suggests that candidates who “reactivate” their campaigns may restore their eligibility to remain on the ballot. That omission is significant in light of the fact that § 2-122-a(13) was enacted as part of an omnibus budget bill—without much, if any, public discussion and without a traceable legislative history. In light of the text of the new statute and the absence of contemporaneous guidance accompanying its enactment, the Board’s argument that the candidates “could have reactivated” their campaigns between April 3 and April 27 carries little weight. Significantly, on April 20, when the two Democratic commissioners of the Board announced their intention to vote on whether to exercise their new authority under § 2-122-a(13), Yang and Sanders vigorously objected to the Board’s proposal and made it clear to the Democratic commissioners that they wished to remain on the 60 Appellants’ Br. at 20. 61 Id. 27 ballot. Indeed, Sanders, through his counsel, sent a detailed letter to the Board to that effect. 62 In the circumstances presented here, the Board’s insistence on the candidates’ formal reactivation of their campaign appears to put form over substance, as it should have been clear by April 27 that Yang and Sanders wished to remain on the ballot and compete for delegates. By removing candidates who qualified to be, and clearly intended to remain, on the ballot, the Board, through its two Democratic commissioners, effectively manufactured an “uncontested” election within the meaning of New York election law and thereby canceled the primary by operation of law. 63 It did so without apparent regard to the burden that its decision would impose on the Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates under the existing delegate-selection plan.
The Board next argues that the April 27 Resolution does not preclude “the associational activity that” Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates seek because the Democratic National Committee and the presidential candidates (specifically, Biden and Sanders) can “provide alternate means for selecting delegates to the convention.” 64 Because the Democratic National Committee or the presidential candidates could in theory reach an agreement that renders the presidential delegate-selection primary unnecessary, we are invited to draw the 62 See Joint App’x at 99–100. 63 See N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 6-160(2). 64 Appellants’ Br. at 35. 28 conclusion that the Board’s actions, as they currently stand, are constitutional. We decline this invitation to “overlook an [alleged] unconstitutional restriction upon some First Amendment activity simply because it leaves other First Amendment activity unimpaired.” 65 And we decline to reserve our judgment on a constitutional claim based on what could happen in an imagined universe, especially when that universe includes major third-party actors (e.g., the Democratic National Committee and Vice President Biden) not present before us. With this analysis in mind, we turn to the interests asserted by the Board to justify the burden that the April 27 Resolution placed on the constitutional rights of Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates. ii. The justifications for the April 27 Resolution. The Board contends that the April 27 Resolution is justified to further the State’s compelling interests in: (1) protecting the public from the health risks posed by COVID-19 by, for example, minimizing social contacts and interactions; and (2) utilizing the Board’s limited resources to make sure that other (contested) elections can be conducted safely and efficiently during the current pandemic. We examine each justification in turn and consider whether they “make it 65 Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 581 (2000). 29 necessary to burden the [constitutional] rights” of Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates. 66 As explained below, upon closer examination, the Board overstates the strength of its justifications in an effort to sustain the considerable limitations that it has placed on the constitutional rights asserted by Yang and the Sanders delegates. a. With respect to the first justification, the Board explains that approximately “eighteen of New York’s sixty-two counties contain subdivisions, such as cities, towns, or election districts, that will not need to conduct any election at all absent the Democratic presidential primary,” and that in approximately “seven of these counties” no election would need to be held. 67 According to the Board, “[n]ot holding an election in these counties, municipalities, and districts will significantly reduce the number of voters, poll sites, and poll workers who will have to be physically present, thereby decreasing the risk of the virus spreading in the community.” 68 This justification is overstated for at least two reasons. First, Governor Cuomo has authorized every voter in the State to request an absentee ballot and has ordered that absentee ballot applications be 66 Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789. 67 Appellants’ Br. at 27 (citing Joint App’x at 118). 68 Id. 30 mailed to all voters. 69 We agree with the District Court that, in light of these measures and the circumstances they are designed to address, “in-person turnout is likely to be dramatically lower, allowing the state to safely accommodate those voters who need to vote at a polling location.” 70 Those who do choose to vote in person may cast their votes by practicing “social distancing,” as recommended by the guidelines of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 71 or through innovative methods, such as secure drop-off boxes (if available). 72 Second, primaries for other races will be held on June 23 in the vast majority of counties in the State. Approximately, “90% or more of New York’s Democratic Party electorate will be voting in other primaries” on June 23, “ranging from Congressional seats, State Senate and Assembly seats, State Democratic Committee, judgeships, and many other positions.” 73 And the counties that will be conducting elections include “Kings, Queens, New York, Suffolk, Bronx, and Nassau Counties, each of which has a population exceeding one 69 See Joint App’x at 286. 70 Yang, 2020 WL 2129597, at . 71 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Recommendations for Election Polling Locations: Interim Guidance to Prevent Spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) (updated March 27, 2020), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/election-polling-locations.html (last visited May 22, 2020). 72 Yang, 2020 WL 2129597, at  n.4. 73 Joint App’x at 288. 31 million,” 74 and each of which is among the counties of New York (and the country) most afflicted by the pandemic. These facts stand in stark contrast to those counties where no election would need to be conducted absent the Democratic presidential primary, 75 which, as counsel for the Board conceded at oral argument, are all located in upstate New York in areas that are not heavily populated. And, notwithstanding the fact that the pandemic has left the whole country at a standstill, as counsel for the Board also confirmed at oral argument, New York is the only State or Territory of the United States that has canceled the Democratic presidential primary. b. The second justification—the Board’s assertedly limited resources—warrants little discussion. The Board explains that its limited resources will need “to be diverted from the task of preparing for and conducting the remaining contested primaries and elections on June 23” to conduct the presidential primary and potentially accommodate “a surge in absentee balloting.” 76 This assertion is simply too conclusory and vague to support the cancellation of the presidential primary and, in any event, does not warrant the burden imposed on Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates. 74 Yang, 2020 WL 2129597, at . 75 See Joint App’x at 118. 76 Appellants’ Br. at 30–31. 32 As the Supreme Court teaches, in a related context, “[e]ven assuming the factual accuracy of these contentions . . . the possibility of future increases in the cost of administering the election system is not a sufficient basis here for infringing [Plaintiffs’ and the Sanders delegates’] First Amendment rights.” 77 If limited resources need to be diverted from other elections or budgetary sources to conduct the presidential primary as scheduled, it is only because the Board effectively canceled the primary in the first instance, notwithstanding the numerous objections to the contrary. In these circumstances, the Board’s cost-saving justification does little to advance its position. 2. The Balance of the Equities and the Public Interest Under the last injunction factor, we must “balance the competing claims of injury and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the requested relief,” 78 as well as “the public consequences in employing the extraordinary remedy of injunction.” 79 Our analysis of the competing interests under the AndersonBurdick framework demonstrates that the balance of equities tips in favor of Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates, and in favor of upholding the preliminary injunction entered by the District Court. It bears 77 Tashjian, 479 U.S. at 218. 78 Winter, 555 U.S. at 24 (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Village of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)). 79 Id. (quoting Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982)). 33 recalling that, under the current rules of the Democratic Party and its New York delegate-selection plan, a presidential primary must take place in order for the Yang and Sanders delegates to be able to participate in the deliberations of the Democratic National Convention. And in light of the importance of the right to political participation in a primary election and the pivotal role that delegates play within the structure of the Democratic Party, Plaintiffs and the Sanders delegates have shown that, absent injunctive relief, their First Amendment rights likely would be forever extinguished. That is surely a “significant” hardship that the Board has not adequately justified. 80 We are mindful that the cost of the preliminary injunction on the Board may not be trivial. But as the District Court aptly stated, it is a cost that the State of New York chose to bear “when it assumed the responsibility of regulating and holding the [Democratic Party’s] primary election,” and that it was required “to shoulder . . . before the adoption of the April 27 Resolution.” 81 We agree that the balance struck by the District Court between the various competing interests promotes, rather than undermines, the public interest. 82 80 New York Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Yang, 2020 WL 2129597, at  (collecting cases). 81 Yang, 2020 WL 2129597, at . 82 See id. 34