Opinion ID: 1636599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: valid affirmative action plan.

Text: It is undisputed that the purpose in amending Regulation 7.2(3) was to substitute banding for the rule of three in order to end the manifest imbalance in the number of women and racial minorities in the ranks of sergeant, lieutenant and captain and to facilitate the promotion of these historically underrepresented classes. Thus, the amendment was clearly an affirmative action plan. That evidence triggered the third step in the McDonnell Douglas analysis and shifted the burden back to Zaring and Hord. An affirmative action plan is afforded a presumption of validity and the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish its invalidity. Johnson, supra, 480 U.S. at 626, 107 S.Ct. at 1449 (1987). Zaring and Hord do not claim that the concept of banding is either illegal or unconstitutional, presumably because banding has been consistently upheld in the face of every challenge to date. Chicago Firefighters Local 2 v. City of Chicago, 249 F.3d 649, 656 (7th Cir.2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 995, 122 S.Ct. 465, 151 L.Ed.2d 381 (2001); Officers for Justice v. Civil Serv. Comm'n of the City and County of San Francisco, 979 F.2d 721, 728 (9th Cir.1992); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. City of Bridgeport, 933 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir.1991). Nor do they advance any theory that the amendment of Regulation 7.2(3) was an invalid exercise of affirmative action. As in Steelworkers v. Weber , supra, at 208, 99 S.Ct. at 2730, (1) the reason for amending Regulation 7.2(3) to adopt banding was to break down the pattern of discrimination evidenced by the four-year record of 0 for 35 and to open employment opportunities for members of minority groups in areas that had been traditionally closed to them; and (2) Regulation 7.2(3) as amended did not trammel the interests of male Caucasian employees such as Zaring and Hord because it was aimed at a manifest racial imbalance and neither required their discharge and replacement by minority employees nor created an absolute bar to their advancement. It simply afforded equally qualified female and minority employees the same opportunity for advancement as Caucasian male employees. Absent any evidence to support a Weber finding that the amendment of Regulation 7.2(3) was an invalid affirmative action plan, Johnson v. Transportation Agency, supra , required entry of a judgment NOV in favor of the Fiscal Court. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals and reinstate the judgment NOV of the Jefferson Circuit Court. LAMBERT, C.J.; STUMBO, and GRAVES, JJ., concur. KELLER, J., concurs in result only by separate opinion. WINTERSHEIMER, J., concurs in result only without separate opinion. JOHNSTONE, J., dissents by separate opinion.