Opinion ID: 1285723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Waiver of Right to Direct Appeal

Text: Gill argues the PCR judge erred by denying his PCR application because his attorney mistakenly advised him he could face the death penalty if he prevailed on appeal and was retried. According to Gill, this advice caused him to involuntarily withdraw his appeal. We disagree.
In a PCR proceeding, the burden of proof is on the applicant to prove the allegations in his application. Brown v. State, 340 S.C. 590, 533 S.E.2d 308 (2000); Rule 71.1(e), SCRCP. For an applicant to be granted PCR as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, he must demonstrate: (1) his counsel failed to render reasonably effective assistance under prevailing professional norms; and (2) he was prejudiced by his counsel's ineffectiveness. Id. (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). In order to prove prejudice, an applicant must demonstrate that but for counsel's errors, there is a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different. Johnson v. State, 325 S.C. 182, 480 S.E.2d 733 (1997). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. This Court must affirm the PCR court's decision when its findings are supported by any evidence of probative value. Cherry v. State, 300 S.C. 115, 386 S.E.2d 624 (1989). Likewise, a PCR judge's findings should not be upheld if there is no probative evidence to support them. Holland v. State, 322 S.C. 111, 470 S.E.2d 378 (1996). At the June 3, 1997, PCR hearing, Gill argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney advised him to withdraw his appeal. Specifically, Gill claims his attorney advised him the State could seek the death penalty if he was retried. The PCR judge found Gill's allegation meritless. According to the PCR judge, Gill's testimony was not credible, and Gill did not demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice. Defense counsel testified at the PCR hearing he could not recall discussing the appeals process with Gill and could not recall whether an appeal was filed, but he had a vague recollection co-counsel filed a notice of appeal just to do it. While he did not recall specifically, defense counsel testified it was highly likely he informed Gill that if his conviction was overturned on appeal, he may face the death penalty again. This advice was a correct statement of the law as discussed infra.
This Court has never addressed whether a mistrial during the sentencing phase of a capital trial precludes the State from seeking the death penalty in the event of a new trial. As a general rule, a court cannot retry a defendant for an offense greater than and including the offense for which he was previously convicted. Conviction for a lesser included offense is an implied acquittal of any greater charges. Therefore, a prosecution on retrial for a greater offense than that for which the defendant was first convicted would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 90 S.Ct. 1757, 26 L.Ed.2d 300 (1970); see also Bozeman v. State, 307 S.C. 172, 414 S.E.2d 144 (1992) (finding trial counsel ineffective for falsely informing defendant he could be convicted of murder on retrial if he appealed and succeeded in vacating his manslaughter conviction). However, in certain circumstances, the sentence imposed at the first trial does not prevent the State from seeking a greater sentence upon retrial. For example, the general rule in capital punishment cases is that when a defendant's conviction is reversed on appeal, the original conviction is nullified and the slate is wiped clean. [2] If the defendant is convicted again on retrial, the death penalty may be validly imposed. This doctrine is known as the clean slate rule and was enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 16 S.Ct. 1192, 41 L.Ed. 300 (1896) and North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969). In Ball, the United States Supreme Court held the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy imposes no limitations upon the power to retry a defendant who has succeeded in getting his first conviction set aside. In Pearce, the question arose as to whether that same constitutional guarantee precluded the imposition of a harsher sentence after conviction upon retrial. The United States Supreme Court held, because the original conviction was nullified at the defendant's request, the slate was wiped clean and the sentencing court could impose any legally authorized sentence, whether or not it was greater than the sentence imposed following the first trial. In Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), the United States Supreme Court recognized a limited exception to the clean slate rulewhen a jury or appellate court finds the prosecution has failed to prove its case for the death penalty, and a life sentence is imposed, the clean slate rule does not apply, and the State cannot seek a harsher sentence upon retrial. In Bullington, the jury found the petitioner guilty of murder. The trial court then conducted a sentencing hearing before the same jury, and the parties presented additional evidence in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment. The jury returned a unanimous verdict of life imprisonment. When the petitioner was granted a new trial on appeal, the State notified him of its intention to seek the death penalty. The petitioner appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and they granted certiorari to review the Double Jeopardy issue. The United States Supreme Court held that, where the first jury returns a unanimous verdict of life imprisonment, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment bars the imposition of the death penalty on retrial. The first jury, by choosing life, impliedly decides the prosecution has not proved its case for death, and impliedly acquits the defendant of the death penalty. According to the United States Supreme Court, the clean slate rule is inapplicable whenever a jury agrees or an appellate court decides the prosecution has not proved its case. Id. at 443-445, 101 S.Ct. at 1860-61; see also Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (holding that once the trial judge rejected the death penalty and sentenced defendant to life, there could be no further attempt to have the death penalty imposed); Pennsylvania v. Martorano, 535 Pa. 178, 634 A.2d 1063 (1993). But see Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 106 S.Ct. 1749, 90 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986) (holding the Double Jeopardy Clause does not forbid a second capital sentencing hearing where either the sentencer or the reviewing court finds evidence sufficient to justify imposition of the death penalty and, therefore, does not impliedly acquit the defendant on the merits). In Riddle v. State, 314 S.C. 1, 443 S.E.2d 557 (1994), this Court found the Double Jeopardy Clause did not preclude the imposition of the death sentence on remand in a capital case. Relying on Poland, supra, the Court held that a defendant may not be retried if he obtains reversal of his first conviction on the ground the evidence was insufficient to convict. In Riddle, the petitioner appealed a third jury's recommendation that a sentence of death be imposed for his previous convictions of murder, armed robbery, and burglary. The petitioner asserted on appeal that this Court's prior decision precluded consideration of the death penalty because the concurring opinion stated that no evidence was submitted to the jury to support the aggravating circumstance. Id. at 4, 443 S.E.2d at 559. However, we found the relevant question in Riddle was whether the prior decision was based on the sufficiency of the evidence or a trial error in the admission of evidence. If the evidence was simply erroneously admitted, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar a retrial for sentencing. Id. at 5, 443 S.E.2d at 560. Because the error in Riddle was the admission of indictments and verdict forms from the first trial as proof of aggravating circumstances, the error was one of admission of evidence, rather than insufficiency of evidence. Therefore, we held the trial judge properly denied the defendant's motion to quash the notice of death penalty on Double Jeopardy grounds. Id. The instant case does not involve a decision by the trial judge or jury that the prosecution had not proved its case because the jury was deadlocked during the penalty phase. Other jurisdictions have found the Double Jeopardy Clause does not bar the prosecution from seeking the death penalty on retrial for murder where a life sentence was imposed during the penalty phase following the first trial by operation of law due to jury deadlock. In Martorano, supra, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found where a jury is deadlocked during the sentencing phase of a capital trial, there is no implied acquittal because the jury did not make a decision. Furthermore, the imposition of a life sentence by a trial judge does not operate as an implied acquittal because, under Pennsylvania's sentencing scheme, the judge has no discretion to fashion a sentence once he finds the jury is deadlocked. Martorano, 634 A.2d at 1070; see also Pennsylvania v. Sattazahn, 563 Pa. 533, 763 A.2d 359 (2000) (upholding the Martorano decision concerning jury deadlock and finding this decision did not have a chilling effect so as to constitute a de facto denial of defendant's right to appeal); Kentucky v. Eldred, 973 S.W.2d 43 (Ky.1998) (finding Double Jeopardy did not bar capital prosecution on retrial where a jury in the first trial found the presence of aggravating circumstances, but recommended life). Gill argues the Bullington exception applies in this case and, therefore, his trial counsel was ineffective because he advised Gill he could be sentenced to death upon retrial. First, Bullington was decided in 1981 and the order dismissing Gill's appeal is dated February 15, 1980. Therefore, Gill's trial counsel did not provide incorrect legal advice because the Bullington exception was not available at that time. [3] Second, the Bullington exception is not applicable because the jury was deadlocked in this case and was unable to decide whether the death penalty was appropriate. The life sentence in this case did not amount to an implied acquittal of the death penalty as was the case in Bullington. Here, the jury deadlocked on the existence of aggravating circumstances. The trial judge imposed a life sentence pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C) (Supp.2000), which states, If members of the jury after a reasonable deliberation cannot agree on a recommendation as to whether or not the death sentence should be imposed on a defendant found guilty of murder, the trial judge shall dismiss such jury and shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (A). In the event of a jury deadlock, the trial judge exercises no discretion and merely imposes the sentence mandated by section 16-3-20(C). Therefore, the PCR judge's decision is affirmed because defense counsel adequately advised Gill of the consequences of appealing his life sentence, and Gill has not demonstrated either ineffective assistance of counsel or prejudice.