Opinion ID: 797369
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review and summary of claims

Text: 24 Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, a federal court 25 may not grant a writ of habeas to a petitioner in state custody with respect to any claim adjudicated on the merits in state court unless (1) the state court's decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court . . . or (2) the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceedings. 26 Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 850 (6th Cir.2002) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). This standard requires the federal courts to give considerable deference to state-court decisions. Herbert v. Billy, 160 F.3d 1131, 1135 (6th Cir.1998) ([AEDPA] tells federal courts: Hands off, unless the judgment in place is based on an error grave enough to be called unreasonable.) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 27 The first line of analysis under AEDPA involves the consistency of the state-court decision with existing federal law. A state-court decision is considered contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law if it is diametrically different, opposite in character or nature, or mutually opposed. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (emphasis and quotation marks omitted). Alternatively, to be found an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, the state-court decision must be objectively unreasonable and not simply erroneous or incorrect. Id. at 409-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495. 28 The second line of analysis under AEDPA concerns findings of fact made by the state courts. AEDPA requires federal courts to accord a high degree of deference to such factual determinations. A federal court is to apply a presumption of correctness to state court findings of fact for habeas corpus purposes unless clear and convincing evidence is offered to rebut this presumption. The appeals court gives complete deference to the federal district court's and state court's findings of fact supported by the evidence. McAdoo v. Elo, 365 F.3d 487, 493-94 (6th Cir.2004) (citations omitted). 29 AEDPA, however, does not automatically govern our review of every one of Nields's habeas claims. Instead, as this court recently clarified, [t]he AEDPA standard of review applies only to `any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings.' Danner v. Motley, 448 F.3d 372, 376 (6th Cir.2006) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). We will therefore apply the de novo standard of review where the Ohio state courts have not ruled on the merits of a particular claim in Nields's petition. Id.
30 The five issues covered by the COA are as follows: (1) whether prosecutorial misconduct during the penalty phase violated Nields's constitutional rights, (2) whether Nields's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence, (3) whether Nields's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to retain an expert to testify to the causal relationship, if any, between Nields's alcoholism and his behavior on the night of the murder, (4) whether Nields's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to request a voir dire of the jurors after learning that several had seen Nields in handcuffs, and (5) whether Nields's counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to introduce evidence of Nields's remorse. 31 After carefully considering the record on appeal, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, and having had the benefit of oral argument, we find no error in the district court's denial of Nields's habeas corpus petition. Each of the five COA issues is discussed in detail below.