Opinion ID: 2346971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fee or Tax?

Text: Plaintiffs argue that the jury fee is in reality a general revenue tax imposed by the judiciary in violation of the principle of separation of powers contained in the Maine Constitution. [3] We reject their argument. Because both a fee and a tax raise monies for governmental use, the distinction between the two is one of purpose and of degree of particularity. In the case of licensing fees, for example, we have recognized that fees are part of a regulatory scheme and are intended to cover costs of administering such a program under the police power of the government. Strater v. Town of York, 541 A.2d 938, 938 (Me.1988). Other features that may distinguish fees from more general revenue raising devices are that fees are paid in exchange for exclusive benefits not received by the general public and are voluntary in the sense that an individual may avoid the charge by choosing not to utilize the service. Emerson College v. City of Boston, 391 Mass. 415, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1105 (1984). In addition, the amount of the fee is usually a fair approximation of the cost to the government and the benefit to the individual of the services provided. See United States v. Maine, 524 F.Supp. 1056, 1059 (D.Me.1981). [4] There is no question that the civil jury fee, instituted by the Court to partially defray the cost of providing civil jury trials, is voluntary. Each litigant voluntarily decides whether to demand a jury trial and thus incur the fee. Furthermore, the figures offered in this case support the defendants' contention that revenues anticipated from the fee are proportionate to the expense of operating the civil jury trial system. The plaintiffs argue, however, that an individual litigant may not, and frequently does not, incur $300 of expense to the system because most litigants do not actually utilize a jury trial. The plaintiffs concede that a litigant's civil jury demand imposes some expense to the system even though the litigant may not actually go to trial. Once a litigant has paid the $300, the litigant is entitled to a civil jury of whatever length is necessary to resolve the dispute. It would be impractical to require that each litigant gain exactly $300 of benefit. Joslin v. Regan, 63 A.D.2d 466, 406 N.Y.S.2d 938, 942 (1978), aff'd, 48 N.Y.2d 746, 422 N.Y.S.2d 662, 397 N.E.2d 1329 (1979). If a litigant actually utilizes the services of the jury requested, that litigant cannot be heard to complain that the actual cost to the system for the service exceeds the $300 fee. That litigants do not receive a refund when they choose not to present their cases to a jury does not make the fee a tax.