Opinion ID: 1271240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Nevada Long-Arm Statute

Text: The lower court quashed service of process on respondents Eckersley, Rickard, and Thain in case number 13048. Summa, in its complaint, had alleged that the said respondent-defendants had conspired out of the state of Nevada to cause injury to Summa's property located in Nevada. The court based its ruling on its conclusion that Nevada's long-arm statute, NRS 14.065, did not apply under the alleged facts. [3] We do not agree. In Certain-Teed Prods. v. District Court, 87 Nev. 18, 23, 479 P.2d 781, 784 (1971), we held: The broad language used in the statute discloses a legislative intention to reach the outer limits of federal constitutional due process. Such phrases as `transacting any business within this state,' `negotiating any commercial paper within the state,' `committing a tortious act within the state,' are almost without restriction or limitation. The California long-arm statute shows a similar broad intent by permitting jurisdiction to attach when predicated on any ground not inconsistent with federal due process. C.C.P. § 410.10. The California Judicial Council's annual report construing this section concludes that A state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who causes effects in the state by an omission or act done elsewhere with respect to causes of action arising from these effects. Quattrone v. Superior Court for County of Los Angeles, 44 Cal. App.3d 296, 118 Cal. Rptr. 548, 552 (1975). We conclude that it is reasonable and constitutionally permissible to require the respondent-defendants to appear and defend their activities in Nevada where the alleged injuries occurred. As the High Court recently reiterated in World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292, 100 S.Ct. 559, 564, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980): The protection against inconvenient litigation is typically described in terms of `reasonableness' or `fairness.' We have said that the defendant's contacts with the forum State must be such that maintenance of the suit `does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' International Shoe Co. v. Washington, supra, [326 U.S. 310] at 316, [66 S.Ct. 154, at 158, 90 L.Ed. 95], quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, [61 S.Ct. 339, 342, 85 L.Ed. 278] (1940). The relationship between the defendant and the forum must be such that is is `reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there.' 326 U.S., at 317, [66 S.Ct. at 158]. Implicit in this emphasis on reasonableness is the understanding that the burden on the defendant, while always a primary concern, will in an appropriate case be considered in light of other relevant factors, including the forum State's interest in adjudicating the dispute, see McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223, [78 S.Ct. 199, 201, 2 L.Ed.2d 223] (1957); the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra, at 92, [436 U.S. 84, 98 S.Ct. 1690, at 1697, 56 L.Ed.2d 132 (1978)] at least when that interest is not adequately protected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum, cf. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 211, n. 37, [97 S.Ct. 2569, 2583, n. 37, 53 L.Ed.2d 683] (1977); the interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies; and the shared interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social policies, see Kulko v. California Superior Court, supra, [436 U.S.], at 93, 98, [98 S.Ct., at 1697, 1700]. (Citation added.) The court below erred in granting the motion to quash the service of process. For these reasons we deny the petitions in numbers 12808 and 13012, and we grant the petition in 13048. GUNDERSON, C.J., and MANOUKIAN, BATJER and SPRINGER, JJ., concur.