Opinion ID: 2598779
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Testimony of defendant's first attorney

Text: Barbara F., defendant's first attorney, testified for the defense without objection about the jail incident in which defendant threw a chair at her. Additionally, defendant sought to have her testify on two other points: (1) that she believed the death penalty was not appropriate in this case; and (2) that, with defendant's authorization, she sought to settle the case by a guilty plea in return for a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. He also sought to admit a letter, dated July 5, 1990, Barbara F. wrote to the district attorney arguing against the death penalty. The district attorney did not object to evidence that defendant sought to settle the case by a guilty plea, and the court admitted it as showing remorse on defendant's part. [10] However, he objected to the letter as hearsay. After reading the letter, the court sustained the objection. In response to defendant's argument that the letter contained information the jury should consider in making the penalty determination, the court stated that the issues that you're addressing ... are issues which are proper in terms of summation or other evidence that can properly be introduced. The district attorney also objected to Barbara F.'s expressing her opinion whether defendant should receive the death penalty. After reviewing our then recent decision of People v. Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d 140, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290, and the earlier decision of People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d 147, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629, the court admitted the evidence. It also indicated it would permit the prosecutor to impeach the witness with cross-examination about other acts of violence, assuming that that issue is opened by examination of this witness. It did not, however, permit the witness to state the reasons for her opinion. Barbara F. testified about the jail incident and explained that defendant felt betrayed and became angry when she told him that she had to withdraw from the case. She also testified that, with defendant's agreement, she attempted to settle the case for a disposition of life in prison without the possibility of parole, and that she wrote a letter to the district attorney arguing that that was the appropriate disposition. In her opinion, which she felt very strongly, defendant should receive a sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole. The court did not permit her to state the reasons for this opinion. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked her about her knowledge of other rapes defendant had committed and other jail incidents. Defendant contends the court erred in refusing to permit Barbara F. to testify about why she believed defendant should receive a life sentence. [11] We disagree and, indeed, doubt that her opinion regarding the proper disposition should have been admitted at all. As we have discussed (134 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 34, 68 P.3d at p. 329, ante ), testimony that defendant deserves to live, provided by someone who had a significant relationship with him, is admissible, not because that opinion is itself important but because the testimony provides indirect evidence of the defendant's character. (E.g., People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 102, 91 Cal. Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506.) It is questionable whether an attorney-client relationship is the sort of relationship that can result in such indirect evidence of the defendant's character, but we need not decide the question, for the court admitted the opinion. But defendant made no offer to prove that Barbara F.'s reasoning provided any insight into defendant's character. Indeed, defense counsel expressly told the court that the proffered testimony is not character testimony, but only Barbara F.'s opinion regarding the appropriateness of the death penalty ... given the crime.... The penalty decision, however, was for the jury to make and is not the proper subject of expert testimony. People v. Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 196, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290.) Defendant was entitled to present mitigating evidence and to argue to the jury that a life sentence was appropriate, as he did. However, the opinion of a witness, expert or otherwise, that a life sentence is appropriate is not relevant except to the extent it might provide insight into the defendant's character. The court did not prevent Barbara F. from providing whatever testimony she had to give about her personal experiences with and knowledge of defendant's character, but her opinion whether the crime warranted the death penalty, and, important here, her supporting reasoning, were irrelevant. Defendant also contends the rulings were erroneous given the prosecutor's cross-examination into her knowledge of other acts of misbehavior. Defendant does not appear to argue directly that permitting this cross-examination was error. He could not do so, for he did not object to it at trial. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1185, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) The cross-examination appears to have been appropriate impeachment. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1173, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950.) Moreover, it might have been permissible to rebut the implication in Barbara F.'s testimony that the chair incident was an isolated act of anger caused by her withdrawal from the case. Defendant argues that, in light of this impeachment, Barbara F. should have been permitted to explain her reasons for believing a life verdict was nonetheless proper. But he did not renew his request that Barbara F. be permitted to state her reasoning after this cross-examination. Because he did not urge admission of her reasons as rehabilitation of her opinion, he may not now argue on that basis that its exclusion was error. (Evid. Code, ง 354.) Moreover, defendant suffered no prejudice from the court's not allowing Barbara F. to state the reasons for her opinion. Those reasons were essentially arguments. They were not based on any information or perception that only Barbara F. could give. Indeed, defense counsel made clear that her testimony was not character evidence. But defense counsel could make those arguments to the jury as well as she could. No reason appears for the jury to have given Barbara F.'s reasons more weight than the same reasons argued by defense counsel. To the extent the jury might have been impressed by Barbara F.'s belief that he should not receive the death penalty despite being one of his victims, it heard that belief.