Opinion ID: 1403244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Clear and Convincing Burden of Persuasion

Text: The majority asserts that, as a matter of law, plaintiff failed to present clear and convincing evidence in support of his claim for punitive damages. In so concluding, the majority conflates the burden of production with the burden of persuasion. Determining whether a plaintiff has met the burden of persuasion by producing clear and convincing evidence is the exclusive province of the fact finder. See, e.g., In re Will of McCauley, 356 N.C. 91, 102, 565 S.E.2d 88, 95 (2002) (Whether the evidence on these questions is clear, strong, and convincing is for the jury to decide.); Speas, 188 N.C. at 530, 125 S.E. at 401. This principle is well established. As this Court admonished in Lehew v. Hewett, 130 N.C. 22, 22-23, 40 S.E. 769, 770 (1902): The evidence was sufficient to be submitted to the jury, with the instruction that it must be clear, strong and convincing to warrant a verdict for the plaintiff, but whether it was or was not strong, clear and convincing was to be determined by the jury and not by the court; otherwise, the jury would be useless. The [j]udge has no more right, when the testimony[,] if believed[,] is sufficient to be submitted to the jury, to determine in the trial of civil actions what is strong, clear and convincing proof[,] tha[n] he has in the trial of a criminal action to express an opinion as to whether guilt has been shown beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. (quoting Cobb v. Edwards, 117 N.C. 241, 245, 23 S.E. 241, 244 (1895) (alterations in original)); see also Lefkowitz v. Silver, 182 N.C. 339, 350, 109 S.E. 56, 61 (1921) (noting that it is the role of the jurors to decide if evidence is strong, cogent and convincing, just as they decide in ordinary civil cases whether the proof of plaintiff preponderates, or in criminal cases whether the State has established the crime beyond a reasonable doubt). Section 1D-15 of the North Carolina General Statutes, like so many statutes, sets forth both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion. To be awarded punitive damages, the plaintiff must meet his burden of production by producing evidence of (1) fraud, (2) malice, or (3) willful or wanton conduct. N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(a). The plaintiff's burden of persuasion is to produce clear and convincing evidence of one of these aggravating factors. Id. § 1D-15(b). The clear and convincing burden of persuasion required by N.C.G.S. § 1D-15(b) is neither novel nor unique in our statutory scheme and case law. Our statutes require varying burdens of persuasionfrom preponderance of the evidence, to clear and convincing, to beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g., N.C.G.S. §§ 7B-805 (2007) (requiring clear and convincing evidence); 7B-2409 (2007) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt); 42-30 (2007) (requiring preponderance of the evidence). The majority concludes that because the burden of persuasion set forth in N.C.G.S. § 1D-15 is clear and convincing, the trial court must, upon a motion for directed verdict or judgment notwithstanding the verdict, review and determine whether the evidence is clear and convincing. Yet as explained above, the burden of persuasion lies within the province of the jury. See Martin v. Underhill, 265 N.C. 669, 675, 144 S.E.2d 872, 876 (1965) (stating that when the required burden of persuasion is clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, whether the evidence has that convincing quality is a question for the jury upon proper instructions from the court but the rule as to the sufficiency of the proof to withstand a motion for judgment of nonsuit [is] the same as in other cases (citations omitted)). I do not believe, and the majority offers no compelling argument otherwise, that the General Assembly intended to overturn this settled principle of law by merely requiring a heightened burden of persuasion in order to recover punitive damages under N.C.G.S. § 1D-15.