Opinion ID: 187240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Altmann

Text: Despite this Court's holding in Trout IV that section 114(2) of the 1991 Act does not apply to conduct that preceded its enactment, the Trout class argues that Altmann constitutes an intervening change in law that requires reversal of Trout IV. Altmann concerned a suit filed sometime after 1998 against the state of Austria for conduct that occurred for the most part in 1948. 541 U.S. at 681-84, 124 S.Ct. 2240. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1602 et seq., grants foreign states immunity from suits in the United States subject to certain exemptions. The question for the Court was whether the FSIA, and therefore the exemptions thereunder, applied to claims based on conduct that occurred before the FSIA's enactment. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 686-87, 124 S.Ct. 2240. As discussed in more detail below, the Court held that the FSIA does apply to pre-enactment conduct. Id. at 697, 124 S.Ct. 2240. Attempting to analogize its case to Altmann, the Trout class argues that Altmann now controls statutes that concern waivers of sovereign immunity, and consequently under Altmann, section 114(2) of the 1991 Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d), applies to conduct that preceded its enactment. The Trout class therefore claims that it is entitled to interest on backpay and attorneys' fees incurred prior to November 21, 1991. We disagree. In Altmann the plaintiff sued Austria for expropriating, before and after World War II, paintings owned by her family. Austria asserted the defense of sovereign immunity. As noted above, the question addressed by the Court was whether the FSIA applied to conduct that occurred prior to the FSIA's enactment in 1976. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 686-87, 124 S.Ct. 2240. In answering this question the Court first looked to the default rule of no retroactive effect of congressional enactments announced in Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 263, 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483. Altmann, 541 U.S. at 692-94, 124 S.Ct. 2240. The Court noted that under Landgraf there is a presumption against retroactivity if Congress has not expressly stated that the statute is to have retroactive effect and the statute affects rights, liabilities, or duties with respect to past conduct. Id. at 693-94, 124 S.Ct. 2240 (citing Landgraf, 511 U.S. at 280, 114 S.Ct. 1483). On the other hand, the Court noted that the application of a statute to future as well as pending cases would be sanctioned if the statute merely confers or ousts jurisdiction. Id. at 693, 114 S.Ct. 1878. The Court noted that although these principles seemed comprehensive, they did not provide a clear answer in the case before it because the FSIA could not be categorized as exclusively affecting either substantive rights or procedural matters. Id. at 694, 114 S.Ct. 1878. The Court then noted that the purpose of the antiretroactivity presumption is to avoid unnecessary post hoc changes to legal rules on which parties relied in shaping their primary conduct, and that this had never been the purpose of foreign sovereign immunity. Id. at 696, 114 S.Ct. 1878. Rather, stated the Court, foreign sovereign immunity aims to protect foreign states `from the inconvenience of suit as a gesture of comity.' Id. (quoting Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468, 479, 123 S.Ct. 1655, 155 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003)). The Court consequently looked to the FSIA and the circumstances surrounding its enactment for any suggestion that it should not apply to the 1948 conduct at issue. Id. at 697, 114 S.Ct. 1878. In holding that the FSIA applies to all pending cases regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred, the Court relied on [t]he FSIA's overall structure as well as two of the Act's principal purposes: clarifying the rules that judges should apply in resolving sovereign immunity claims and eliminating political participation in the resolution of such claims. Id. at 698-99, 114 S.Ct. 1878. Additionally, the Court looked to Congress's understanding of the FSIA as noted in its preamble, which provides that [c]laims of foreign states to immunity should henceforth be decided by courts of the United States and of the States . . . with the principles set forth in the Act. Id. at 697, 114 S.Ct. 1878 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602) (emphasis omitted). The Court noted that pursuant to this language [i]mmunity `claims'not actions protected by immunity, but assertions of immunity to suits arising from those actionsare the relevant conduct regulated by the Act. Id. The Trout class argues that in applying the FSIA retroactively Altmann held that the default rule against retroactivity announced in Landgraf does not apply to statutory waivers of sovereign immunity. In support of this argument the Trout class contends that the Supreme Court in Altmann adopted Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Landgraf, see id. at 697-98, 114 S.Ct. 1878; the class argues that consequently whether a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity may be applied retroactively should not be determined by the dates of the discriminatory conduct proven during the liability phase, but by the date of the assertion of a waiver of sovereign immunity. In other words, according to the Trout class, the relevant conduct for the purpose of retroactivity analysis in Altmann was not the expropriation, which predated the FSIA, but rather Austria's invocation of sovereign immunity at the time of the suit. Quoting from Altmann that assertions of immunity to suits . . . are the relevant conduct regulated by the [FSIA], 541 U.S. at 697, 124 S.Ct. 2240, the Trout class contends that the same interest provision of section 114(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d), logically can apply only to cases in which judgment on the merits is entered after enactment, because where there is no judgment, there can be no judgment interest, and hence no assertion of a defense of sovereign immunity against the payment of prejudgment interest. The Trout class concludes that consequently section 114(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d), applies to all judgments entered after the effective date of the Act, and therefore it is entitled to interest on backpay and attorneys' fees incurred prior to November 21, 1991. In Trout IV we held that section 114(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(d), does not apply to conduct that preceded its enactment on November 21, 1991. 317 F.3d at 292. In doing so we relied on Brown which in turn relied on Landgraf and its default rule against retroactivity. We find nothing in Altmann that alters the rule under Landgraf. Altmann expresses no disagreement with the decision in Landgraf. Instead, the Court in Altmann stated that the retroactivity inquiry set forth in Landgraf does not provide a clear answer in this case because the FSIA defies such categorization. 541 U.S. at 694, 124 S.Ct. 2240. Resolution of the question before the Court turned on an analysis of the FSIA itself. In holding that the FSIA applies to all pending cases regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred, the Court relied specifically on the history of foreign sovereign immunity, Congress's understanding of the FSIA as noted in its preamble, [t]he FSIA's overall structure as well as two of the Act's principal purposes. Id. at 696-99, 124 S.Ct. 2240. It is clear, then, that the Court's decision in Altmann was specific to the statute in that case. The Court itself reinforced this conclusion by stating that its analysis encompassed a  sui generis context. 541 U.S. at 696, 124 S.Ct. 2240. And in Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30, 126 S.Ct. 2422, 165 L.Ed.2d 323 (2006), the Supreme Court noted that its conclusion in [ Altmann ], that Landgraf was to be avoided, turned on the peculiarities of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. Id. at 38 n. 6, 126 S.Ct. 2422. Just as in Fernandez-Vargas, [t]hose peculiarities are absent here, and we thus advert to Landgraf, as we ordinarily do. Id. In sum, Altmann has no effect upon the holding in Landgraf and consequently this Court's decision in Trout IV stands.