Opinion ID: 2360294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: As an initial matter, appellee has challenged our jurisdiction to hear this appeal. The jurisdictional challenge stems from the specific sequence of events discussed above, where the trial judge suppressed the challenged statement and only moments later dismissed the charges against appellee for want of prosecution. Without making any further filings in the Superior Court, the government filed a notice of appeal challenging the trial judge's suppression of appellee's statement to Officer Minor. Government appeals in criminal cases, long disfavored, are possible only pursuant to express statutory authority. District of Columbia v. McConnell, 464 A.2d 126, 127 (D.C.1983). Under D.C.Code § 23-104(a)(1), the District of Columbia or the United States may appeal an order, entered before the trial of a person charged with a criminal offense, which directs the return of seized property, suppresses evidence, or otherwise denies the prosecutor the use of evidence at trial. The statute includes a procedural requirement that the United States Attorney or the [Attorney General for the District of Columbia] conducting the prosecution for such violation certif[y] to the judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge pending against the defendant. Id. The government's ability to appeal a pretrial order under § 23-104(a)(1) is conditioned on compliance with the terms of the statute. See McConnell, 464 A.2d at 128. Appellee seizes on the language of the last sentence of § 23-104(a)(1)  that there be a charge pending against the defendant  and premises his jurisdictional challenge on the notion that once the trial judge dismissed the charges, there was no charge pending at the time appeal was taken, and therefore this appeal falls outside the narrow scope of § 23-104(a)(1). Although appellee's argument finds support in the text of the statute, cases construing this provision hold that even though charges have been dismissed, the government may appeal the suppression of evidence if there is the possibility that the government will again seek to prosecute the accused if the evidence is held to be admissible. See United States v. Cefaratti, 91 U.S.App.D.C. 297, 202 F.2d 13 (1952). In Cefaratti, after the trial court held that some evidence that had been seized was inadmissible, the government sought dismissal of two of four charged counts, and, following the acquittal on the remaining two counts, appealed the suppression order. See id. at 14. The court held that the appeal is not moot because, if this [suppression] order is reversed before the statute of limitations runs, the government plans to reindict the appellee and try him. Id. We have relied on Cefaratti to allow government appeals where the charges against the defendant have been dismissed, but there still exists the possibility of charges being brought anew should the suppressed evidence be held to be admissible on appeal. See United States v. Hunter, 692 A.2d 1370, 1374 n. 3 (D.C.1997) (holding that even though the indictment had been dismissed the government proposes to seek a new indictment, ... and the case is not moot); United States v. Oliver, 297 A.2d 778, 780 (D.C.1972). The charges against appellee are subject to a three-year statute of limitations, see D.C.Code § 23-113, and therefore the government is free to re-charge the defendant at any point before April 2006. The government represents that it intends to do so if the statements at issue are admissible. Accordingly, under the Cefaratti line of cases, this court has jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that there currently are no charges pending against appellee. Appellee also argues that this court lacks jurisdiction because the government did not certif[y] to the judge who granted such motion that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and the evidence is a substantial proof of the charge pending against the defendant as required by § 23-104(a)(1). Specifically, appellee maintains that because this representation was made in the notice of appeal, and not in any filing to the trial judge, the government has not complied with the terms of the statute. [4] As appellee concedes, this requirement in the statute is not jurisdictional in nature. Indeed, this court has previously rejected arguments to strictly construe the certification requirement imposed by § 23-104(a)(1) against the government, United States v. Jackson, 441 A.2d 937, 939 (D.C.1982), and held that the certification is not subject to attack so as to defeat the appeal. Id. (holding that court had jurisdiction over government's appeal of pretrial suppression of evidence, even though United States Attorney did not make required certification); see also In re F.K., 768 A.2d 1018, 1020 n. 5 (D.C.2001) (holding that court had jurisdiction to consider merits of appeal, even though certification required by § 23-104(a)(1) was made in government's notice of appeal, and not to trial judge). Given that the suppressed evidence is substantial proof of the charge and that the government represents that it intends to charge appellant again if the evidence is held to be admissible, there has been substantial compliance with the certification requirement. Accordingly, this court has jurisdiction to consider the substantive issue in this appeal: whether appellee was in custody when questioned by the police officer. [5]