Opinion ID: 547455
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: public official under the bribery statutete

Text: 56 The bribery statute defines a public official as an 57 officer or employee or person acting for or on behalf of the United States, or any department, agency or branch of Government thereof ..., in any official function, under or by authority of any such department, agency, or branch of Government. 58 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(a)(1). The appellants challenge their bribery convictions on the ground that the court improperly instructed the jury, as a matter of law, that a VA fee appraiser is a public official, thus denying them their right to have the jury resolve every question of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. They also argue that, pursuant to the rule of lenity, we should interpret the assertedly ambiguous language of the statute to mean that a VA fee appraiser is not a public official. We agree with the district court, however, that a VA fee appraiser is a public official under the bribery statute, as a matter of law.
59 In Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 484, 104 S.Ct. 1172, 1173, 79 L.Ed.2d 458 (1984), the Supreme Court held that, for purposes of the federal bribery statute, the officers of a private, nonprofit corporation administering and expending federal community development block grants are 'public officials.'  The appellants assert that, because the district court in Dixson had submitted this issue to the jury, it must be a question of fact and not of law. 60 Nothing in the Supreme Court's decision in Dixson remotely supports this reasoning. The Court did not address the procedure used by the district court, and it never referred to the jury's determination or suggested that it was reviewing the evidence for the proposition that the defendants were public officials. On the contrary, the Court reached its conclusion through an exercise in statutory interpretation, which conclusively shows that this is not a question for the jury. For example, it considered the nature of the defendants' positions in relation to Congress's intent, as evidenced by the legislative history of the federal bribery statute. Id. at 496-98, 104 S.Ct. at 1179-80. Therefore, we hold that whether an individual is a public official within the meaning of the statute is a question of law, and as such, a matter for judicial resolution, see Caldwell v. United States, 218 F.2d 370, 372 (D.C.Cir.1954).
61 In Dixson the Supreme Court interpreted the term public official to mean a person who occupies a position of public trust with official federal responsibilities. 465 U.S. at 496, 104 S.Ct. at 1180. The Court made clear, however, that employment by the United States or some other similarly formal contractual or agency bond is not a prerequisite to an individual's being a public official. Id. at 498, 104 S.Ct. at 1181. 62 A VA fee appraiser falls within both the plain language, and the Supreme Court's interpretation, of the bribery statute. In the Court's terms, he has official federal responsibilities: it is upon his recommendation, subject to minimal review, that the Government guarantees a loan. And his is a position of public trust: a fee appraiser must certify that he knows the applicable regulations and must promise not to accept any assignment for which he has a conflict of interest or to take any payment other than the appraiser's fee set by the Government. Jakey Madeoy, as a VA fee appraiser, was therefore a person acting for or on behalf of [an] agency ... in [an] official function, under or by authority of any such ... agency, i.e., a public official. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 201(a)(1). 63 The regulation to which the appellants refer us, which says that a fee appraiser is not an agent of the Government, 38 C.F.R. Sec. 36.4301, has no bearing upon our decision; no one is trying to attribute to the Government an act of Jakey Madeoy as its agent. In any event, the Supreme Court's conclusion that a person does not have to be in a contractual or agency relationship with the Government in order to be a public official, Dixson, 465 U.S. at 498, 104 S.Ct. at 1180, makes the regulation irrelevant to our interpretation of the bribery statute. 64 Finally, the decision that we reach today does not implicate the rule of lenity. The appellants have presented no reason, and we see none, why the statute is any more ambiguous with respect to a VA fee appraiser than with respect to the corporate officers in Dixson, where the Supreme Court expressly found that because Congress's intent was sufficiently clear, there was no need to resort to the rule of lenity. Id. at 500 n. 19, 104 S.Ct. at 1182 n. 19. Accordingly, we conclude that the statute brings a VA fee appraiser within the definition of public official clearly enough that the rule of lenity does not apply.