Opinion ID: 2541631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Indigent Defendant's Liability For Court Costs

Text: Having carefully considered the applicable statutes, we conclude that the trial court was authorized under Kentucky law to impose court costs despite Maynes's status as an indigent defendant entitled to the services of a public defender. While the directive in KRS 31.110(1) that the court shall waive all costs for such defendants seems mandatory at first blush, a full reading of the 1972 legislation and the current DPA Act belies that conclusion. From its inception through the present, the DPA Act has allowed for imposition of costs against those DPA-represented defendants who can afford to pay. Moreover, a person may qualify as needy under KRS 31.110 because he cannot afford the services of an attorney yet not be poor under KRS 23A.205 as it has existed since 2002 unless he is also unable to pay court costs without depriving himself or his dependents of the necessities of life, including food, shelter or clothing. Finally, the KRS 23A.205 directive to consider not only the defendant's present ability to pay court costs but also his ability in the foreseeable future cannot be overlooked. The trial court's determination here that Maynes would be able to earn enough within the six months following his sentencing to afford the costs required by KRS 23A.205 is not clearly erroneous and, thus, the Court of Appeals correctly upheld the portion of Maynes's sentence imposing those costs. Against this conclusion, Maynes refers us to Edmonson v. Commonwealth, 725 S.W.2d 595 (Ky.1987). In that off-cited opinion, this Court reversed an order imposing KRS 23A.205 costs and held that because KRS 31.110 addresses specifically the rights of indigent defendants accused of serious crimes, its provisions regarding the waiver of costs take precedence over KRS 23A.205's more general provision imposing costs. Edmonson was decided fifteen years before the court costs statute, KRS 23A.205, was amended to adopt the poor person standard for determining whether a defendant should be relieved, in whole or in part, of court costs. So, at the time Edmonson was decided, KRS Chapter 31 regarding DPA representation of indigent defendants did contain the more specific legislation on the subject of indigent defendants' liability for court costs. That premise disappeared, however, with the 2002 adoption of the poor person standard in KRS 23A.205. Even so, it is apparent that the Edmonson Court did not address the then-existing provisions in KRS Chapter 31 that allowed for recoupment of court costs, namely former KRS 31.120(3). Nor has this Court addressed the present statutes' interplay in several recent cases where we have applied Edmonson and reversed orders imposing the statutory costs upon defendants-found to be needy for purposes of KRS Chapter 31. Wiley v. Commonwealth, 348 S.W.3d 570 (Ky.2010); Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456 (Ky.2010); Ladriere v. Commonwealth, 329 S.W.3d 278 (Ky.2010); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 2009 WL 3526653 (Ky. Oct. 29, 2009). We need not tarry over whether those cases raised the specific statutory construction issue now before us because their factual distinctions from the present case support the conclusion that their outcomes would not have changed under a more searching analysis of the relevant statutes. In all of these cases, including Edmonson, the indigent defendant was sentenced to at least twenty years in prison. Thus, in none of those cases was the defendant's ability to pay made an issue, nor in any of them was the recoupment statute invoked. Without some reasonable basis for believing that the defendant can or will soon be able to pay, the imposition of court costs is indeed improper. Here, by contrast Maynes was to be released from custody pursuant to his diversion agreement, and so, unlike the defendants in the cases just referred to, he could reasonably be expected in the near future to acquire the means to pay the relatively modest court costs of $130.00. Maynes advances an alternative rationale for his asserted immunity from KRS 23A.205 court costs. As we understand it, his argument may be summarized as follows: The court costs referred to in the recoupment statute, KRS 31.211 do not include the court costs imposed by KRS 23A.205, and thus, contrary to the Court of Appeals conclusion, the latter are not subject to recoupment. Rather, Maynes's liability for the KRS 23A.205 costs hinges on the interplay of that statute and KRS 31.110 which requires waiver of court costs for needy persons entitled to representation under KRS Chapter 31. Edmonson holds that KRS 31.110 is the more specific statute and therefore he is immune from the KRS 23A.205 costs. We reject this argument for several reasons. As already noted, Edmonson dealt with the pre-2002 version of KRS 23A.205 when the statute simply allowed the court to exercise discretion in suspending or probating court costs. As of August 1, 2002, that statute mandates imposing court costs unless the defendant is a poor person as defined and does not have the ability to pay presently or in the foreseeable future. Consequently, Edmonson can no longer be the basis for resolving the conflict between the cost waiver directive in KRS 31.110(1) and the current court costs statute. Indeed, KRS 23A.205 is now the more recently enacted statute so under general principles of statutory construction it controls. Bowling v. Ky. Dept. of Corrections, 301 S.W.3d 478, 491 n. 4 (Ky.2010) (citing Troxell v. Trammell, 730 S.W.2d 525, 528 (Ky.1987) (Our rule [ ] of statutory construction [is] that ... a later statute is given effect over an earlier statute.)) KRS 23A.205 is also the more specific statute in its post-2002 form because it now refers to the imposition of court costs upon conviction in a case. This is the time frame when court costs are logically imposed and it is distinct from the time frames set forth in the KRS 31.110(1) cost waiver directive, i.e., when the defendant is detained on suspicion of having committed, is under formal charge for or is being detained under a conviction of a serious crime. The first two references are to pre-indictment and pre-conviction stages while the third time frame is post-conviction, e.g., a convicted defendant who is being detained pending a probation revocation proceeding. Only KRS 23A.205 addresses court costs upon conviction and sentencing. The more specific of two conflicting statutes controls the more general. Commonwealth, Dept. of Corrections v. Engle, 302 S.W.3d 60, 65 (Ky.2010). Thus, whether viewed in terms of the more specific statute or the more recent statute, KRS 23A.205 controls as to the imposition of court costs upon conviction. Although the statutory conflict can be resolved without resort to the recoupment statute we are compelled to address Maynes's argument that the General Assembly meant to exclude the court costs imposed by KRS 23A.205 from the court costs referred to in KRS 31.211. [3] As noted above, KRS 31.211(1), the first subsection of the recoupment statute, provides that at each stage of the proceeding the court shall consider the defendant's means and, if appropriate, shall order the defendant to pay a partial fee for legal representation, the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs. In support of his assertion that court costs here cannot refer to the KRS 23A.205 court costs, Maynes points to KRS 31.211(3) and (4), which, as noted, provide that [a]ll monies received [or collected] by the public advocate from indigent defendants pursuant to subsection (1) of this section shall be credited to the county's public advocate fund or the Department of Public Advocacy's trust and agency account depending on the county's choice of advocacy system. Since the court costs imposed by KRS 23A.205 are paid to the circuit court clerk and are distributed pursuant to KRS 42.320, Maynes argues that they cannot be included among the court costs subsections (3) and (4) earmark for the DPA. We do not agree, however, that subsections (3) and (4) earmark the court costs referred to in subsection (1) of KRS 31.211 for the DPA. Rather, when those subsections refer to all the monies received [or collected] by the public advocate, they mean monies paid for legal representation [and/or] the other necessary services and facilities of representation. i.e., the monies a private lawyer could expect to receive from a client. Court costs are not received or collected by the DPA. They are received by the court. Subsections (3) and (4), therefore, do not require the strained distinction Maynes would draw between court costs in the different statutes. This conclusion is not altered by KRS 31.211(8), which, as Maynes notes, provides that [a]ll moneys collected under this section shall be placed in a special trust and agency account for the Department of Public Advocacy, and the funds shall not lapse. Again, Maynes contends that all moneys collected under this section includes the court costs referred to in subsection (1), and so cannot be referring to the court costs imposed by KRS 23A.205. Again, we disagree. On a first reading, subsection (8)'s reference to all moneys collected under this section seems odd, since subsections (3) and (4) have already accounted for all moneys collected under subsection (1), the subsection addressing fee and cost assessments against indigent defendants in the original proceeding. Given our duty to harmonize statutes when we can and to avoid constructions that lead to absurd results, we believe that subsection (8) should not be understood as overriding subsections (3) and (4), but rather as referring to monies the Department of Public Advocacy collects pursuant to subsection (5). That subsection authorizes the DPA to bring a subsequent suit on behalf of the Commonwealth against former clients who were or have since become able to pay for representation. As we read the statute, under subsection (8), all monies collected in such suits are to be placed in the DPA's trust and agency account. If this reading does not comport with its intent, we trust that the General Assembly will clarify the statute for us. Also, since subsection (5) contemplates the DPA's collection of representation fees and expenses, not court costs, subsection (8)'s reference to all such monies collected again does not entail the conflict with KRS 23A.205 that Maynes supposes. Finally, our conclusion that liability for KRS 23A.205 court costs at the time of conviction is controlled by the terms of that statute is not inconsistent with our conclusion that the court costs in KRS Chapter 31 include KRS 23A.205 court costs. The statutes themselves substantiate this point. KRS 31.211(1) begins with a directive to the trial court to determine at arraignment whether a defendant has the ability to pay a partial fee for legal representation, the other necessary services and facilities of representation, and court costs. This initial determination is not set in stone because the closing sentence of subsection (1) states that [t]his partial fee determination shall be made at each stage of the proceedings. This fee language can be construed as a `reference back to the very same assessment required at arraignment and thus would include consideration of the fees for representation, services and facilities as well as court costs. In KRS 23A.205 the General Assembly has said precisely how court costs are to be handled at that stage of the proceedings, i.e., upon conviction. So when the court addresses recoupment at the time of sentencing, as to court costs KRS 23A.205 controls. To the extent the partial fee determination is read as limited to literally the fees for DPA's legal representation and necessary services and facilities, this construction would lend some credence to Maynes's argument that the recoupment provision in KRS 31.211 does not include court costs. Assuming that is the intended meaning, the statutory construction issue becomes reconciling the directive in KRS 31.110 that courts shall waive all costs for needy persons entitled to KRS Chapter 31 representation with the mandatory language in KRS 23A.205. As we have concluded, the latter is the later enacted and the more specific statute and is thus clearly controlling. In short, even if the recoupment statute could be read to not include court costs, the result is the same. Maynes was subject to the imposition of court costs upon conviction under KRS 23A.205 and the trial court did not err in so ruling.