Opinion ID: 703200
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Intervention Pursuant To Statutory Right

Text: 30 Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a) provides for intervention as of right, in the first instance, when a statute of the United States confers an unconditional right to intervene. Although the non-settling PRPs assert that they had a statutory right to intervene pursuant to CERCLA Sec. 113(i), the court does not understand the non-settling PRPs to be arguing that their motion for intervention falls within Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(1). Indeed, the parallels between the language of the statute and Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2) provide a convincing argument that the intervention the statute authorizes is not of the unconditional variety contemplated by Rule 24(a)(1). 3 Instead, Sec. 113(i) provides for intervention on the same conditions (except for the burden of proof on adequate representation by existing parties) as does Rule 24(a)(2). The court need not reach the question of whether Sec. 113(i) provides an unconditional right to intervene, however, because no party has expressly asserted here that it does, and because the court finds that intervention should be allowed under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2). See United States ex rel. McGough v. Covington Technologies Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 n. 3 (9th Cir.1992) (holding that court need not decide if 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3730(c)(3) of the False Claims Act conferred upon the United States an unconditional right to intervene in its language authorizing the court to permit the government to intervene at a later date [after the initial 60-day period for intervention has expired] upon a showing of good cause, because the court permitted intervention under Fed.R.Civ.P. 24(a)(2)); United States v. Stringfellow, 783 F.2d 821, 825 (9th Cir.1985) (Because we reverse the district court's denial of intervention under Rule 24(a)(2), we do not rule on appellant's statutory right of intervention claim.). 31