Opinion ID: 1866978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Due Process Claims

Text: ¶ 50. In addition to arguing that due process requires the circuit court to consider alternatives to revoking his supervised release, Burris asserts that his due process rights have been violated because his revocation proceedings were, in his words, arbitrary and fundamentally unfair. Burris's perception appears to originate in large part from his belief that he was entitled to a due process right to have the court consider and reject alternatives to revocation. However, he weaves in other concerns that require discussion. He raises issues related to (1) the alleged vagueness of Rule 1 of his supervised release conditions; (2) the alleged inadequate notice of the alcohol violation; and (3) the circuit court's alleged improper reliance on uncharged halfway house rules violations. We address each of his arguments in turn. ¶ 51. First, Burris asserts that Rule 1 of his supervised release, which states, [y]ou shall avoid all conduct that is a violation of federal or state statute, municipal or county ordinances or that is not in the best interest of the public's welfare or your rehabilitation, is unconstitutionally vague. Burris argues that Rule 1 is vague and all encompassing, that any ordinary human would have a few minor rule violations, and that the rule provides little in the way of guidance but a lot in the way of snares. Burris concludes that he was set up to fail. ¶ 52. The court of appeals declined to address the breadth of the rule because [Burris's] behavior so plainly falls within the language of the rule. The court reasoned that, in light of Burris's history of serious sex offenses, an ordinary person would have been cognizant that obtaining a prescription for a sexual-performance-enhancing drug would not be in the public's or in Burris's best interest. Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶ 6. ¶ 53. Like a probation condition, a rule regulating the conduct of a sexually violent person on supervised release satisfies the procedural due process requirement of adequate notice if it is sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what conduct is required or prohibited. State v. Lo, 228 Wis. 2d 531, 535, 599 N.W.2d 659 (Ct. App. 1999). In the context of criminal statutes, we have stated that when the alleged conduct of a defendant plainly falls in the prohibited zone, the defendant may not base a constitutional vagueness challenge on hypothetical facts. State v. Pittman, 174 Wis. 2d 255, 277, 496 N.W.2d 74 (1993) (citing State v. Courtney, 74 Wis. 2d 705, 713, 247 N.W.2d 714 (1976)). We find the logic of this principle to apply with equal force in a challenge to the rules and conditions of supervised release under Wis. Stat. ch. 980. ¶ 54. Burris does not allege that he was unaware that his actions were prohibited. Judge Welker found that it was Burris's deceptive actions, and not the Viagra prescription per se, that violated Rule 1. Burris obtained the prescription without discussing the matter with his supervising agent or anyone else in authority. He became angry when he found out that his couriera woman he had been warned not to contactgave the prescription to a halfway house staff member instead of to him. When the staff member attempted to pass the prescription on, he refused to accept it. After the incident, he refused to discuss the matter and refused to cooperate with his supervising agent. ¶ 55. It was clear to the court of appeals that a reasonable person would know that a sexually violent person in the custody of DHFS should avoid surreptitiously obtaining a prescription for a drug designed to enhance one's ability to have sexual intercourse. Although Burris asserts that it is difficult to see why the court [of appeals] believed Burris'[s] conduct so plainly violated Rule 1, Judge Welker's factual findings indicate that Burris himself realized the impropriety of obtaining the Viagra prescription. His secretive actions before and during the incident, as well as his uncooperative reaction when his actions were discovered, show that he knew his conduct was not permitted. ¶ 56. We agree with the court of appeals that Burris's conduct fell squarely within the prohibited zone of Rule 1. Burris cannot complain that Rule 1 is vague by arguing that he did not know what was prohibited because his own actions and reactions point to a contrary conclusion. Burris is therefore prohibited from challenging the rule on vagueness grounds because he himself was aware that, as a sexually violent person, his secretive conduct regarding his sex life was conduct not in the best interest of the public welfare or his rehabilitation. ¶ 57. Second, Burris asserts that he did not receive the second amended complaint that contained the alcohol violation until the day before his revocation hearing. This contention is not supported by the record. Burris filed a motion on January 7, 2000, stating: On December 30, 1999, the Department filed a Second Amended Statement of Probable Cause for Detention and Petition for Revocation of Supervised Release, asserting the alcohol violation. There was no allegation in that motion that the amended complaint had not been timely received. On January 8, 2000, during the revocation hearing, Burris's attorney stated: I think it was December 30th that the department filed another amended statement of probable cause and the second or third event of statement of probable cause is the one alleging that Mr. Burris consumed alcoholic beverages while at Rock Valley. At a hearing on January 9, 2001, Burris's appellate attorney grilled Burris's trial attorney: Q Okay. Now, at the time that you drafted Attachment C [dated January 3, 2000], were you aware of the allegation that Ervin Burris had been drinking on the grounds of the halfway house? A I don't think so. Or, wait, well, let me just see here. Well, I'm not sure, to tell you the truth. I'm looking at  part of my file indicates that the drinking allegation was received on December 30th, so it's possible that I was aware. ¶ 58. We find the claim that Burris did not receive notice until the day prior to the hearing has no factual basis. He received notice nine days before the hearing and he fails to specify how that notice prevented him from mounting a defense. Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶ 13. ¶ 59. Third, Burris contends that he did not receive notice that the State intended to introduce evidence that he violated the rules of the halfway house and that the circuit court erroneously relied on this information. In his brief, Burris argues that the court of appeals failed to come to terms with how the circuit court made much to do over Burris'[s] alleged violations of the half-way house rules, and how these violations supposedly proved that neither Burris nor anyone else could be adequately supervised by the half-way house. In that Burris'[s] alleged violations of the half-way house rules appeared to go to the crux of the circuit court's determinations, the `harmless error' analysis was cursory and erroneously utilized by the court of appeals. ¶ 60. Burris offers mere conclusions that the court of appeals did not realize the extent to which the circuit court relied on the halfway house rules and that its harmless error analysis was cursory and erroneous. However, Burris has not referenced the record as to how the circuit court made much to do of the halfway house violations, nor has he pointed to any flaw in the court of appeals harmless error analysis. ¶ 61. As the court of appeals noted, the State introduced evidence that Burris violated the halfway house rules in order to prove the allegations contained in its revocation petition. Burris, 258 Wis. 2d 454, ¶ 14. For instance, the State introduced evidence that Burris deviated from the conditions of a pass he received when he went to a motel to have sex with a married woman. Whether Burris violated halfway house rules by violating the terms of the pass is only incidental to the more critical fact that Burris used the pass for an unauthorized sexual liaison. In another instance, the State presented evidence that Burris had been found in the parking lot of the halfway house with alcohol. The court of appeals indicated that this demonstrated that the halfway house staff could not always monitor whether Burris had been drinking or been having unauthorized intimate relations. Id. ¶ 62. While Burris may be correct that conduct violating the rules of the halfway house was at the heart of the reasons for revocation, Judge Welker relied upon Burris's conduct itself, not the halfway house rules, to make his decision to revoke. The rules of a regulated community placement facility are likely to overlap the rules and conditions of supervised release. It was a minor indiscretion at most for the State to present evidence, without prior notice, that conduct charged in the revocation petition violated two sets of rules instead of only one. ¶ 63. Burris states no legal reason why he believes the court of appeals harmless error analysis was cursory and erroneous. Although the court of appeals, in the interest of being thorough, undertook a harmless error analysis to support its determination, the harmless error analysis was not the sole basis for its rejection of Burris's claim. The court of appeals indicated that even if the circuit court used the halfway house rules in its decision, that reliance would not have mattered. Burris does not allege that the court of appeals used an improper legal standard, or misapplied that legal standard. We see no reason to disturb the court of appeals harmless error analysis inasmuch as it was not vital to the court of appeals' holding.