Opinion ID: 78403
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Disrespectful Tone

Text: Finally, the bankruptcy court did not err in finding that Ginsberg's overzealous litigation tactics, use of factual inaccuracies, and disrespectful behavior demonstrate bad faith. Quoting Blackstone, the United States Supreme Court explained that the law will not suppose a possibility of bias or favour in a judge, who is already sworn to administer impartial justice, and whose authority greatly depends upon that presumption and idea. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 820, 106 S.Ct. 1580, 89 L.Ed.2d 823 (1986) (quoting 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries at ). That does not mean that a judge should never disqualify himself for personal bias or prejudice, but it should not be supposed. And as to counsel, as the Ohio Supreme Court has put it, [t]he law demands that all counsel foster respect and dignity for those who administer and enforce the law. Conduct that is degrading and disrespectful to judges and fellow attorneys is neither zealous advocacy nor a legitimate trial tactic. Lying to a tribunal and making false accusations against judges and fellow attorneys can never be condoned. Columbus Bar Assn. v. Vogel, 117 Ohio St.3d 108, 881 N.E.2d 1244, 1249 (2008). Yet, the record shows Ginsberg indulged in disrespectful statements without legal or factual foundation. Ginsberg ignored all facts indicating that the court did not direct or engage in ex parte communications, rely on extra judicial materials, or endorse Shuker's actions. Ginsberg knew about Judge Jenneman's order, yet Ginsberg did not even mention that Judge Jenneman had held that the ex parte hearing was not improper. Instead of engaging in a reasonable fact finding investigation before making allegations, Ginsberg supposed bias and favor in all of Judge Briskman's actions. For example, because the court did not denounce Shuker's 46-page FOFCOL, Ginsberg claimed the oversized filing was intentional: One can only reasonably conclude that neither the Court nor Mr. Shuker had any intention of Mr. Shuker being limited to filing the proposed findings within the page limit demanded of the Movants. (Recusal Mot. at 27) (emphasis added). Ginsberg also assumed the court relied on the 46-page FOFCOL even though there was evidence to the contrary. Further, the Recusal Motion compared Judge Briskman's conduct to criminal judicial misconduct even though Ginsberg had no actual, personal knowledge of the Complaint and no reason to believe that it alleged criminal misconduct. Indeed, Ginsberg did not speak directly to Hudson about the Complaint before calling it an investigation or try to contact any of the other people present at the relevant ATN proceeding. Ginsberg also testified that he was advised by his expert witness Justice Harding that he had an ethical obligation to see this through to convince the court that Ginsberg did not file the Recusal Motion for tactical purposes. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 90-91.) However, the record refutes this contention. The record shows that Harding did not advise Ginsberg to file the Recusal Motion, as Harding was not engaged by GrayRobinson until after the Recusal Motion was filed. Justice Harding was also not given all of the evidence to develop his expert opinion. For example, Justice Harding was never told that Evergreen filed a subsequent 15-page FOFCOL, he was not shown the emails between Shuker and Spradley discussing whether the court had considered the 46-page submission, nor was he given the 15-page FOFCOL to compare with the court's ultimate FOFCOL. (Sanctions Tr. Vol. I at 54-57.) Moreover, Ginsberg failed to re-evaluate his accusations after the evidentiary hearing on the Recusal Motion. Ginsberg repeated his claim of court-ordered ex parte filings even after the recusal hearing revealed no evidence of such a directive. Ginsberg continued to assert that Judge Briskman relied on the 46-page FOFCOL even though there were emails referencing the discussions of Spradley and Shuker with the court's staff that the 46-page submission was not considered and all of the information in the ultimate FOFCOL could be found elsewhere. Additionally, Ginsberg continued to allege that the Judicial Council had launched an investigation into Judge Briskman's conduct even after he learned that Hudson would have been notified if an investigation was initiated. Further, after Knight testified that he merely overheard Shuker's threats of imprisonment, Ginsberg still continued to assert that Shuker approached Knight and Huggins and threatened them with imprisonment. Similarly, even after Knight testified that Huggins was in the bathroom at the time of Shuker's alleged threat, Ginsberg contended that Shuker told Huggins he would die in jail. The evidence produced at the hearing was sufficient for Spradley and GrayRobinson to pull out of the Recusal Motion. Yet, even with mounting evidence to the contrary, Ginsberg continued to argue the Recusal Motion. Further, Ginsberg was extremely difficult to deal with and disrespectful to the court. He refused to answer the court's questions, treated the court as an adversary and continually made inflammatory statements. For example, Ginsberg exaggerated the implications of Judge Briskman's actions, alleging that his conduct relates directly to the judicial processes, namely the integrity of trial transcripts, and a party's due process rights and liberty. (Recusal Mot. at 19.) Ginsberg opened the Recusal Hearing by claiming: Your honor has compromised my health, your Honor has compromised my immune system. (Recusal Tr. Vol. I at 5.) Ginsberg also used accusatory, unsupported language in the three petitions for writ of mandamus; asserted that Judge Briskman faced potential career ending punishment; and accused him of trying to surreptitiously brush the matter under the carpet so he could retain authority over these very important issues of judicial and professional conduct. (Response Br. at 16.) Ginsberg also purposefully pursued recusal very publicly. After learning of Hudson's Complaint, Ginsberg did not first request a private hearing with Judge Briskman and all counsel in these cases to address his concerns, nor did he file the Recusal Motion under seal (ignoring the preference for confidentiality inherent in the Judicial Council Rules discussed below). Instead, the first time Ginsberg raised the Complaint was in a 31-page accusatory motion which used the term investigation twelve times and referenced adverse rulings fifty-four times. Ginsberg also immediately brought the Recusal Motion to the attention of the district court. He filed three petitions for a writ of mandamus with the district court while the Recusal Motion was still pending. [21] In our view, Ginsberg's dogged pursuit of a frivolous claim indicates bad faith.