Opinion ID: 1363132
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Incorrect Standard of Proof Challenge

Text: Fink argues that the district court improperly failed to hold the government to its burden of proving that the 2002 conviction was distinct from his 21 U.S.C. ß 846 violation under the reasonable doubt standard. He claims that the government was obligated to indict and put the question to a jury, which he alleges is required by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). He also avers that the government had to convince the district court of the 2002 conviction's distinctness beyond a reasonable doubt in an evidentiary hearing, which he alleges is required by 21 U.S.C. ß 851 (1999 & Supp.2007). It is clear that Fink's Apprendi argument has no merit. In United States v. Coplin, this court ruled that the Supreme Court's decision in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 118 S.Ct. 1219, 140 L.Ed.2d 350 (1998), made clear that a sentence enhancement may be grounded on prior criminal convictions not . . . proven to a jury. 463 F.3d 96, 104 (1st Cir.2006). Fink's argument that the government failed to prove the 2002 conviction's distinctness to the district court beyond a reasonable doubt in a ß 851 evidentiary hearing is similarly unavailing. The multitude of fragmented sentencing hearings held in this case by a learned and patient district judge who carefully looked at all angles to formulate a reasonable sentence fully complied with the ß 851 evidentiary hearing requirement. To argue that the sentencing hearings were not evidentiary hearings disregards what happens daily in federal district courts throughout the nation, where district judges hold hearings in the sentencing context to find facts and decide the applicable law. Here, we are satisfied that such required hearing took place, irrespective of the label placed to describe it.