Opinion ID: 2374243
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Strict Liability Claim Against Marlette

Text: Section 221 would apply to Marlette since it is alleged to have manufactured and sold a product in a defective condition to Schiavi. The statute permits recovery by injured persons who have not purchased the product or have not entered into any contractual relation with the seller. Although the dismissal of the strict liability claim against Marlette was error, Marlette argues that the error was harmless because negligence and strict liability theories when applied to design defect cases are essentially the same. According to the defendant, all the elements of the strict liability claim were presented to the jury. [8] Currently, there is a split of opinion as to whether a distinction exists between negligence and strict liability theories of recovery when applied to cases based upon design defects. Some courts have stated that in actions involving design defects the theories are essentially the same. See Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 351 (6th Cir.1974); Balido v. Improved Machinery, Inc., 29 Cal.App.3d 633, 639, 105 Cal.Rptr. 890, 895 (1973); Jones v. Hutchinson Manufacturing Co., 502 S.W.2d 66, 69-70 (Ky. 1973). Distinguishing negligence actions, other courts state that strict liability is imposed regardless of the manufacturer's exercise of reasonable care. Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1199 (8th Cir.1973); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 199, 447 A.2d 539, 544 (1982); Roach v. Kononen, 269 Or. 457, 464, 525 P.2d 125, 129 (1974); Boatland of Houston, Inc. v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 749 (Tex.1980); see also Haugen v. Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co., 15 Wash. App. 379, 387-88, 550 P.2d 71, 76 (1976). Without addressing this conflict of opinion, we hold that under the facts of this case any error in dismissing the strict liability count against Marlette was harmless. M.R. Civ.P. 61. In actions based upon defects in design, negligence and strict liability theories overlap in that under both theories the plaintiff must prove that the product was defectively designed thereby exposing the user to an unreasonable risk of harm. See Phillips, A Synopsis of Developing Law of Products Liability, 28 Drake L.Rev. 317, 322 (1978); compare Restatement (Second) of Torts § 398, at  (1965) (chattel made under dangerous design) with 14 M.R.S.A. § 221 (plaintiff must prove element that product was in defective condition unreasonably dangerous). Such proof will involve an examination of the utility of its design, the risk of the design and the feasibility of safer alternatives. Boatland of Houston, 609 S.W.2d at 749. The specific design of which Stanley complains serves only an aesthetic purpose. The design presents the risk of not perceiving the step to which the user is exposed. Avoidance of the risk involves either eliminating the step design or installing a carpet with contrasting colors or patterns. Neither solution involves a loss of utility, marketability, or production that warrants exposing users to the risk of harm. It follows, therefore, that when the jury decided Marlette was not at all negligent, it of necessity found that the design created no unusual risk of harm to the user. That finding has rational support in the evidence. We hold, therefore, under the facts of this case and upon a jury finding of no negligence, any error in the dismissal of the strict liability claim was harmless. Moreover, even if we were to find a distinction between the two theories, upon the particular facts of this case, the jury instructions as to the claim against Marlette were consistent with a strict liability theory. The court charged the jury that a manufacturer who designs a product that is dangerous for use is liable for the physical harm caused by its failure to exercise reasonable care. The court, therefore, instructed the jury that a manufacturer of a dangerously designed product which causes physical harm is negligent. In contrast with those instructions are the instructions as to the negligence claim against Schiavi in which the court discussed the necessity of showing Schiavi's knowledge or constructive knowledge. The court made no mention of Marlette's knowledge or constructive knowledge of that danger. See Hoppe, 485 F.2d at 1199; Haugen, 15 Wash.App. at 387-88, 550 P.2d at 76; see also Robbins v. Farmer's Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 794-95 n. 15 (8th Cir.1977) (knowledge element not part of strict liability action). Under these circumstances, any error was indeed harmless.