Opinion ID: 1784402
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Davis's Contemporaneous Robbery Conviction

Text: Davis asserts that the trial court improperly found that his contemporaneous conviction for robbery was sufficient to satisfy the prior violent felony aggravator and that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to present this issue on direct appeal. In its sentencing order, the lower court addressed the robbery conviction as follows: 1. That the aggravating circumstances found by the Court to be present ... are as follows: .... (b) That the Defendant, MARK A. DAVIS, has been previously convicted of another capital offense or felony involving the use or threat of violence to some person. (i) This Court specifically finds, based upon the evidence, that the Defendant has been convicted of the crime of Attempted Armed Robbery. The Attempted Armed Robbery was a felony involving the use or threatened use of violence to another person and that although the Defendant was 16 years of age at that time, he was not adjudicated delinquent, but rather convicted of the crime and sentenced to the Department of Corrections as an adult. Additionally, Defendant was found guilty of Robbery by the Jury herein which found him guilty of Murder in the First Degree. (d) That the capital felony was committed while the Defendant was engaged in the commission of the crime of Robbery. (f) That the capital felony was committed for pecuniary gain. SPECIAL NOTE: This Court does find that aggravating factors, Florida Statute 921.141(5)(b), (d), and (f) exist in this case. However, the Court consider[s] these three factors as constituting only a single aggravating circumstance. (Emphasis supplied.) Contemporaneous convictions prior to sentencing can qualify as previous convictions of violent felony and may be used as aggravating factors. Wasko v. State, 505 So.2d 1314, 1317 (Fla.1987). However, this Court has previously stated that when the felony at issue is a contemporaneous felony perpetrated against the murder victim, the prior violent felony aggravator does not apply. See id.; see also Bruno v. State, 574 So.2d 76, 81 (Fla.1991) (concluding that the aggravating circumstance of a prior violent felony was inapplicable because the felony in question was the contemporaneous conviction of the robbery of the victim); Schafer v. State, 537 So.2d 988, 991 (Fla.1989) (same). Therefore, the trial court did err in finding that the contemporaneous robbery conviction was sufficient to support the prior violent felony aggravator. However, the sentencing order indicates that the trial court merged the prior violent felony aggravator, the during the commission of a robbery aggravator, and the pecuniary gain aggravator, and considered them as constituting only a single aggravating circumstance. We therefore conclude that appellate counsel was not deficient for failing to present this issue on appeal because the trial court merged this invalid prior violent felony aggravator with two valid aggravators during the course of a robbery and pecuniary gainand considered all three as only a single aggravating circumstance, thereby rendering any error on the trial court's part harmless. Therefore, appellate counsel should not be deemed deficient for failing to raise this meritless issue on appeal. See State v. Duncan, 894 So.2d 817, 831 (Fla.2004) (holding appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim); Johnson, 695 So.2d at 267 (same). Based on the foregoing, Davis's ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim is denied.