Opinion ID: 537575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The First Amendment and Privacy Act Claims

Text: 7 Appellant also alleged violations of his first amendment and Privacy Act rights that, he asserted, entitle him to reinstatement. The district court dismissed these claims as well, in orders dated, respectively, February 1, 1989, and July 29, 1988. Our review of Appellant's first amendment and Privacy Act claims is required by Hohri v. United States, 482 U.S. 64 (1987), because the Supreme Court said that a mixed case, presenting both a nontax Little Tucker Act claim and an FTCA claim, may be appealed only to the Federal Circuit. Id. at 75-76. Clearly, that means that our court is also to decide the non-Tucker Act claims. 8 To prevail on appeal from dismissal of these claims Appellant must show his first amendment rights have been violated. To do so, he would have the burden to show, from the record evidence, either that he acted not in his official capacity, but as a private citizen, or if he did act in his official capacity, his speech interest outweighs the government's interest in uniformity, esprit de corps and discipline. See Banks v. Garrett, Civil No. 86-0923-A, slip op. at 14 (E.D.Va. Feb. 1, 1989). In effect, we would have to hold unconstitutional Article 1149 of Chapter 11 of the Navy Regulations, which prohibits persons in naval service from writing Congress in their official capacity without permission of the Secretary (which Captain Banks decidedly lacked). See Navy Regs. (1973), Article 1149. This we decline to do as the provision clearly passes constitutional muster. See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). There are adequate alternative avenues of communication because a corollary provision, Article 1148, unconditionally permits an officer to write Congress in his private capacity, and Article 1149 allows him to write letters in an official capacity if reasonable conditions are met. The trial court properly balanced the first amendment interest of Banks, as a public employee, against the government employer's interest, and correctly held that the Naval regulations are valid and not a violation of the First Amendment. Banks, slip op. at 15. 9 That Captain Banks did act in his official capacity is clear. The trial court found that Appellant used official Navy letterhead, wrote his letter as the Commander [of the squadron], and signed the letter in his official capacity as Commander. Id. at 11; see Banks v. Garrett, No. 89-1485, Joint App. 121-22 (letter). It found he acted in his official capacity. Banks, slip op. at 15. We cannot disagree. Thus, the first amendment claim and the derivative Privacy Act claim were properly dismissed. See Boyd v. Secretary of Navy, 709 F.2d 684, 687 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1043 (1984) (The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 552a(e)(7), is not violated unless a document implicate[s] an individual's first amendment rights.). 10 We have also considered Appellant's additional arguments relating to the first amendment and Privacy Act claims and determine that they neither have merit nor merit discussion.