Opinion ID: 163683
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act

Text: Before trial, the Board moved the district court to dismiss (in relevant part) Messrs. Walker and Salazar’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court denied the motion. The Board argues on appeal the district court should have dismissed the claims because it is “immune from liability for tort-based claims under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act.” We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1). See Ashley Creek Phosphate Co. v. 1 The Board also argues in a footnote the district court “erred by awarding Mr. Walker consequential damages. Insufficient evidence existed in the record to support Mr. Walker’s alleged consequential damages due to Mr. Walker’s continuous discovery abuses.” The Board does not elaborate on this argument or cite to the record or any law in support of this argument; in any event, after reviewing the record, we conclude the district court did not err in awarding Mr. Walker consequential damages. -6- Chevron USA, Inc., 315 F.3d 1245, 1267 (10th Cir. 2003), petition for cert. filed, 71 U.S.L.W. 3760 (U.S. Apr. 21, 2003) (No. 02-1758); Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). We review for clear error the district court’s findings of jurisdictional facts. See Holt, 46 F.3d at 1003. Under the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act, “[n]o public entity shall be liable for [actions which lie in tort or could lie in tort] except as provided in this article.” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-105 (2001). The Act defines a “public entity” as “the state, county, city and county, municipality, school district, special improvement district, and every other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof organized pursuant to law and any separate entity created by intergovernmental contract or cooperation only between or among [public entities].” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-103(5) (2001) (amended 2002). The Act also grants immunity to public employees “for injuries arising out of an act or omission occurring during the performance of his duties and within the scope of his employment, unless such act or omission was willful and wanton.” Id. § 24-10-105. In relevant part, the Act defines a public employee as “an officer, employee, servant, or authorized volunteer of the public entity.” Id. § 24-10-103(4)(a). Since the Act is “in derogation of the common law,” we must -7- strictly construe it. See Bertrand v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 872 P.2d 223, 225 (Colo. 1994). Under the definition above, the Board does not qualify as a “public entity.” It is not a “state, county, city and county, municipality, school district, special improvement district, [or any] other kind of district, agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision.” See Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-103(5). Nor was it “created by intergovernmental contract or cooperation between or among [public entities].” Id. (emphasis added). The Board was created through a collective bargaining agreement between the Regional Transportation District (a public entity), see Brock v. Nyland, 955 P.2d 1037, 1040 (Colo. 1998), and the Union (a non-public entity). The Board argues it is an “instrumentality” of the Regional Transportation District and therefore “entitled to immunity” under the Act. Although the District may appoint some Board members, the pension plan specifically states “the Board and not the [District] shall have the responsibility for and the authority to manage the operation and administration of the Plan.” Furthermore, Board members are obligated to act only in the interest of the plan and not the District. As a result of these considerations, we conclude the Board is not an “instrumentality” of the -8- District. The Board also argues Board members are “public employees.” Since the Board is not a public entity, however, its members cannot be public employees in their capacity as Board members. Without record support, the Board argues some of the Board members are public employees because they also work for the Regional Transportation District. Even assuming some of the Board members also work for the District, their conduct as Board members does not “occur[] during the performance of [their] duties and within the scope of [their] employment” for the District. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 24-10-105. Their duties as Board members are distinct from whatever duties they may have as employees of the District. Furthermore, they are being sued for their conduct as Board members and not for their conduct as employees of the District. Board members therefore are not “public employees” within the meaning of the Act’s immunity provisions. Under the circumstances of this case, we conclude the Board is not a “public entity” and Board members are not “public employees” within the meaning of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act; as a result, we conclude the district court correctly held they are not “entitled to immunity under the -9- [Act].” 2