Opinion ID: 2573774
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: introduction

Text: ¶ 1 In December 2003, when she was ten years old, Taylor M. first accused her stepfather, Ryan Brett Robbins, of touch[ing] her in an area where nobody has tried to touch her. The only evidence of the alleged incident was Taylor's testimony, and many factors suggested that the allegations of abuse were motivated by animus between Taylor's father and Robbins. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1 (2003). Robbins was charged with one count of aggravated sexual abuse of Taylor. He was also charged with three counts of aggravated sexual abuse of Taylor's older sister, Whitney, who came forward with her own allegations against Robbins after hearing Taylor's. The jury convicted Robbins of abusing Taylor but acquitted him of three counts of abusing Whitney. The trial judge later expressed that he was rather surprised with the verdict and that there was more to [the allegations] than just he said/she said. He queried what do I do in a situation where ... all kinds of collateral issues ... suggest that [Taylor's] testimony may not be credible? Nonetheless, he denied Robbins' Motion to Arrest Judgment. ¶ 2 Robbins appealed his conviction to the court of appeals, which affirmed. It held that Taylor's testimony provided sufficient evidence for the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Robbins intended to gratify his sexual desires and that the trial court could not disregard her testimony as inherently improbable. State v. Robbins, 2006 UT App 324, ¶¶ 11, 19, 142 P.3d 589. We granted certiorari to review whether the court of appeals misconstrued the scope of the inherent improbability doctrine. We hold that it did and accordingly reverse.