Opinion ID: 1253518
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Peremptory Strike of Prospective Juror Thornton.

Text: The reasons given by the State for the strike of Thornton from the jury pool was that she had a disabled child at home for whom she was the primary caregiver and that she had fallen asleep during voir dire. Although Thornton indicated that she could make arrangements for the care of her child during the trial, the State believed that she might be preoccupied or concerned with the child's welfare and that this might impact her ability to properly weigh the evidence. There is no indication of racial discrimination apparent in this reason. Additionally, this Court has concluded that sleeping during voir dire constitutes a race-neutral explanation supporting a peremptory strike of a prospective juror. See, e.g., Trigger, supra; Foster v. State, 272 Ga. 69, 71, 525 S.E.2d 78 (2000). Because the trial court did not err in concluding that defendant failed to carry his burden of persuasion regarding a racially discriminatory intent in making the jury strikes, we affirm the trial court's ruling on this issue. 4. Defendant's final enumeration was that the State was allowed to present testimony by a witness in violation of the rule of sequestration, OCGA § 24-9-61. Alicia Martin was interning with the Dougherty County District Attorney's office and assisted the State during the prosecution of defendant's case. Martin sat at counsel table during the proceedings. Martin testified during the State's case in chief as to the brand name of a piece of clothing which had been burned behind the home of defendant's girlfriend. Prior to allowing the testimony, the trial court permitted defense counsel to interview Martin. With the jury present, Martin testified that she had been assisting in the investigation of defendant's case and had been present during the entire trial. The rule of sequestration is meant to ensure that the testimony of a witness who has yet to testify is not influenced by the testimony of another witness; its violation generally does not affect the admissibility of the testimony, but may impact the offending witness' credibility. Quijano v. State, 271 Ga. 181, 183, 516 S.E.2d 81 (1999); Childress v. State, 266 Ga. 425, 431, 467 S.E.2d 865 (1996). The decision of whether to allow a witness to testify in violation of the rule of sequestration is within the discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless such discretion is abused. Pearley v. State, 235 Ga. 276, 277, 219 S.E.2d 404 (1975); Kelly v. State, 118 Ga. 329, 330, 45 S.E. 413 (1903). In this case, the testimony was limited to an identification of the brand name of the burned clothing and there was no indication that Martin's testimony was in any way influenced by the testimony of previous witnesses. Defense counsel conducted a cross-examination that tended to cast doubt upon Martin's ability to correctly identify the material and the fact that Martin had been present during previous testimony was known by the jury. The jury was thus able to gauge Martin's credibility and make a determination as to the weight to afford her testimony. Based on the record, there is no indication that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting Martin to testify in violation of the rule of sequestration. Judgment affirmed.