Opinion ID: 1106817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: on appellants' motion to discharge the $5,000 appeal bond

Text: The appellants, Mrs. V.R. Dodd and R.H. Elliott, to perfect their appeal to this Court, tendered to the chancery clerk separate bonds in the sum of $500 each, with  good and sufficient sureties, conditioned to pay all costs if the decree should be affirmed. But, because it was estimated that the costs would amount to more than $4,000, the clerk, at the instance of the chancellor, disapproved the same and required a bond or bonds in the sum of $5,000. The tendered bonds were left in the file, and the appellants then complied with the requirements by tendering a third bond in the sum of $5,000. The appellants contend that the statutes, for an appeal in this kind of case, do not require a bond in that amount; that it is void; and that it should be discharged and the sureties released. Section 3374-14, Code of 1942, Rec., provides as follows: If the municipality or any other interested person who was a party to the proceedings in the chancery court be aggrieved by the decree of the chancellor, then such municipality or other person may prosecute an appeal therefrom within the time and in the manner and with like effect as is provided above in the case of appeals from the decree of the chancellor with regard to the creation of a municipal corporation. Now an appeal from a decree with regard to the creation of a municipal corporation is governed by Section 3374-08, Code of 1942, Rec., which is as follows: Any person interested in or aggrieved by the decree of the chancellor, and who was a party to the proceedings in the chancery court, may prosecute an appeal therefrom to the supreme court within ten (10) days from the date of such decree by furnishing an appeal bond in the sum of five hundred dollars ($500.00) with two good and sufficient sureties, conditioned to pay all costs of the appeal in event the decree is affirmed. Such appeal bond shall be subject to the approval of the chancery clerk and shall operate as a supersedeas. If the decree of the chancellor be affirmed by the supreme court, then such decree shall go into effect after the passage of ten (10) days from the date of the final judgment thereon, and the party or  parties prosecuting such appeal and the sureties on their appeal bond shall be adjudged to pay all costs of such appeal. (Emphasis supplied.) Obviously the two bonds, in the sum of $500 each, are insufficient to assure the payment of accrued costs in this appeal. But the appeal, as allowed by Section 3374-14, supra, is perfected under Section 3374-08, supra, by furnishing bond in the sum of $500, and it is further provided therein that such bond shall operate as a supersedeas. The chancellor was evidently acting under the provisions of Section 1162, Code of 1942, Rec., the applicable part of which is as follows:    but in cases where supersedeas is not desired and the cost of transcript shall not be prepaid, if the clerk of the court or any party to the suit shall apprehend that the costs of the transcript of the record and of the appeal will exceed five hundred dollars, such clerk or party may apply to the court in which such suit shall have been decided, or to the judge or chancellor in vacation, and an order may be made by the court, judge, or chancellor, fixing the amount of such bond for costs of appeal. But that statute does not seem to have any application because it has reference to cases where supersedeas is not desired. Neither does Section 1163, Code of 1942, Rec., being the amount of bond required for supersedeas, have any application. (Hn 9) It may be that the legislature deemed that proceedings of this kind are matters of such public importance that great liberality should be extended in appeals in such cases. It can be seen that rank injustice might occur in the arbitrary inclusion of the property of a small taxpayer, and that he would be deterred from an appeal out of fear that he would lose all of his property on account of a large cost bill. It may be that the legislature did not foresee that costs might soar to such astronomical figures. Be that as it may, the statutes give an interested party the right to appeal on his furnishing a good  bond in the sum of $500, and to have such bond operate as a supersedeas. This Court cannot, by judicial construction, repeal them. The chancellor had no authority to require bonds in excess of $500. In Redus v. Gamble, 85 Miss. 165, 37 So. 1010, this Court said of the action of a justice of the peace that a party cannot be deprived of his right of appeal by the trial judge arbitrarily or ignorantly demanding an appeal bond in a greater penalty than that authorized by the statute and refusing to approve a proper bond tendered in due time. In 4A C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 561, page 277, it is said: The refusal of the lower court to approve the appeal bond or undertaking is subject to appellate review. (Hn 10) The next question is whether the obligors on the $5,000 bond should be held liable on their contract, voluntarily undertaken when they bound themselves to pay the costs in the event that the decree should be affirmed. Now 5B C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Section 2034, page 671 says: Usually a bond containing provisions or conditions more onerous than the statute requires is without consideration and void as to such more onerous provisions or conditions. Since the two $500 bonds conformed to the statutes, they were sufficient to perfect the appeal; and the $5,000 bond must therefore be treated as surplusage and must be discharged, thereby releasing the sureties therefrom. While the two bonds for $500 each are not sufficient to pay all costs, they stand good to the extent of $1,000; and under Section 3374-16, Code of 1942, Rec., The costs incurred in the appeal shall be taxed against the appellant if the decree be affirmed.  The motion is therefore sustained, and the $5,000 appeal bond is discharged. Motion sustained. All Justices concur except Roberds, J., who took no part.