Opinion ID: 894830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Has the Legislature Authorized the State to Sue Cities?

Text: We take as our starting point the premise that in Texas a governmental unit is immune from tort liability unless the Legislature has waived immunity. [3] Political subdivisions in Texas have long enjoyed immunity from suit when performing governmental functions like that involved here. [4] While this immunity can be waived, we have consistently deferred to the Legislature to do so; [5] indeed, we have said immunity from liability depends entirely upon statute. [6] For its part, the Legislature has mandated that no statute should be construed to waive immunity absent clear and unambiguous language. [7] The State asserts no such statute here. This high standard is especially true for home-rule cities like Galveston. Such cities derive their powers from the Texas Constitution, not the Legislature [8] They have all the powers of the state not inconsistent with the Constitution, the general laws, or the city's charter. [9] Among those powers is, again, immunity from suit for governmental functions. [10] The question thus is not whether any statute grants home-rule cities immunity from suit, but whether any statute limits their immunity from suit. [11] Such limits exist only when a statute speaks with unmistakable clarity. [12] Again, the State asserts no such statute here. This heavy presumption in favor of immunity arises not just from separation-of-powers principles but from practical concerns. In a world with increasingly complex webs of government units, the Legislature is better suited to make the distinctions, exceptions, and limitations that different situations require. The extent to which any particular city, county, port, municipal utility district, school district, or university should pay damages involves policy issues the Legislature is better able to balance. [13] For example, the Legislature's decision to waive immunity for the University of Texas at Tyler [14] but not for the University of Houston [15] is not the kind of line courts can easily draw. The Legislature can also enact damage caps that limit the impact of liability, [16] and create exceptions for particular activities. [17] Given the Legislature's recent efforts to channel government claims away from litigation, we have endeavored to avoid across-the-board rulings abrogating immunity. [18] The Legislature has waived cities' immunity from suit in a few general statutes. In 1969, the Texas Tort Claims Act waived immunity for certain torts. [19] More recently, immunity for local government entities was waived in suits based on written contracts. [20] These statutes are not blanket waivers: they apply only to specified claims, impose limits on damages, [21] differentiate among government entities, [22] and exempt a variety of activities from any waiver at all. [23] Although the State's claim here might have been asserted as either a tort or breach of contract, [24] the State has never argued or pleaded that it falls under either of these statutes. Nor does it assert that the Legislature has ever passed a general statute unambiguously and unmistakably authorizing the State to sue political subdivisions for money damages. Nor does any statute specifically authorize such suits by the Attorney General, who exercises only those powers authorized by the Constitution or statute. [25] This is not a question of power, but of authority. While the State has the power, for example, to impose a personal income tax, it has no authority to do so without a statewide vote. [26] Likewise, the State has the power to waive immunity from suit for cities, but no authority to do so without the Legislature's clear and unambiguous consent. There is no such authority here. The Attorney General or the Department of Transportation could have requested legislative consent to sue the City, but neither tried. And judging from the alarmed briefs filed in this case on behalf of hundreds of Texas counties, cities, school boards, mental health centers, and water districts, it is questionable whether they would have succeeded. Given the novelty of this suit, the political nature of all the parties, and the sensitivity of these intergovernmental issues, [t]he decision as to who should bear responsibility for governmental employees' misconduct should be made by the peoples' representatives. [27]