Opinion ID: 1383579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: striking impeachment witness' testimony

Text: The Appellant contends that the trial court erred in cutting short, then striking, a defense witness' testimony which was offered to impeach the testimony of a prosecution witness. According to the Appellant, after the defense rested and the Appellee did not put on a rebuttal case, the trial court granted him leave to put his investigator, John Casey, on the stand, over the Appellee's objection. The trial court allowed Mr. Casey to testify that the Appellee's witness, Shane Ransom, had told him prior to trial that just before the victim was shot, Mr. Ransom saw the victim advance on the Appellant brandishing and shaking a broken section of the pool cue. This statement differed from Mr. Ransom's testimony during trial, where he testified that the victim had thrown the pool stick down before the final encounter. Second, Mr. Casey was allowed by the trial court to describe a short visit he and the Appellant had made to the home of the defense witness Jamie Wilson, in order to rebut the implication of the prosecution's cross-examination of Mr. Wilson to the effect that the Appellant and Mr. Wilson were friends, or that they had perhaps discussed or planned his testimony on that occasion, or that the witness was biased in the Appellant's favor. The Appellee maintains that the trial court did not err in stopping Mr. Casey's testimony and striking it from the record. The Appellee asserts that the witness failed to confine himself to the limited scope of testimony permitted by the trial court. Rather, the witness launched into a blatant hearsay reiteration of the Appellant's theory of the case and, therefore, violated the trial court's ruling. The circuit court's decision with regard to permitting this witness to testify and the subsequent termination of the testimony should be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. As this Court has previously noted: Under Rule 611(a) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence [1985], the trial judge has discretion to `exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses in presenting evidence ....'; and in doing so, he must balance the fairness to both parties. Syl. Pt. 2, Gable v. Kroger Co., 186 W.Va. 62, 410 S.E.2d 701 (1991). The circuit court, in allowing Mr. Casey to testify, specifically limited the brief inquiry to two area: 1) a prior inconsistent statement made to the Appellant's investigator; and 2) a description of a visit to a defense witness' home. During Mr. Casey's testimony regarding the prior inconsistent statement, the trial court admonished the defense counsel stating: Mr. McIntyre [the Appellant's trial counsel], this question is not intended for him to elaborate in all the matters. I'm not real happy with the questions and answer we're having now .... After this admonition by the lower court, the Appellant's attorney acknowledges on the record that the witness had exceeded the scope of examination permitted by the lower court. The Appellant's counsel also admonished the witness, who again proceeded to testify outside the scope. The trial court, after an in camera conference, noted that Mr. Casey has been withdrawn as a witness. His last answer in its entirety and the questioning of him will be entirely disregarded by this jury and it will not factor into the decision of this case. [14] Based upon our review of the record in this case, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion with regard to John Casey's testimony. Both the trial court and defense counsel admonished Mr. Casey to focus his answers on the two narrow lines of inquiry allowed by the trial court. Mr. Casey failed to heed the admonishments given and, accordingly, his testimony was appropriately stopped and stricken from the record by the trial court.