Opinion ID: 793892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Mental Examination and Failure to Employ a Mental Health Expert

Text: 40 Carter claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by waiving a mental examination and not employing a mental health expert. 41 Carter's waiver claim is wholly without merit. The waiver in question was trial counsel's waiver of a mental examination offered by the trial court prior to sentencing. This does not demonstrate that trial counsel unreasonably investigated Carter's mental state, because, by that point in the proceedings, trial counsel had already retained the services of a psychologist, Dr. Kenneth Manges. Carter conceded as much in his post-conviction petition and in his brief to this Court. (Petr.'s Br. 30 n. 1. (stating that Carter noted in his postconviction petition that correspondence in his trial attorney's file indicated that [trial] counsel had contacted a Dr. Manges).) Thus, Carter's only avenue for success on this claim is to show that trial counsel's decision to retain Dr. Manges was somehow objectively unreasonable, because, according to Carter, Dr. Manges, [a vocational psychologist,] was not qualified to be a mitigating expert in a capital case. However, as the government points out, Dr. Manges has received an advanced certification in forensic psychology from the University of Virginia 3 and has testified as a mental health expert in the Ohio state courts. See, e.g., State v. Mackey, No. CA99-06-065, 2000 WL 190033, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Feb. 14, 2000) (noting Dr. Manges's opinion that the defendant was mentally unable to assist in her own defense). Therefore, we cannot say that the state court erred in concluding that trial counsel did not render ineffective assistance by hiring Dr. Manges. 42 While the Supreme Court has held that a criminal defendant is entitled to the assistance of a competent psychiatrist if the defendant can demonstrate that his sanity will be a significant issue at trial, Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985), the Court has never stated as a per se rule that a particular type of mental health expert is required in death penalty cases. Further, although this court has extended Ake to require an independent psychiatrist rather than a neutral, court-appointed psychiatrist when a defendant's mental health is in issue, see Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 392 (6th Cir.2003), we also have never held that a defendant is entitled to a particular type of expert. Cf. Lundgren v. Mitchell, 440 F.3d 754, 772 (6th Cir.2006) (A licensed practitioner is generally held to be competent, unless counsel has good reason to believe to the contrary.). 43 Ake and Powell are inapposite nonetheless. As the Ake Court was careful to note, [a] defendant's mental condition is not necessarily at issue in every criminal proceeding, . . . and it is unlikely that psychiatric assistance of the kind we have described would be of probable value in cases where it is not. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82, 105 S.Ct. 1087. In Ake, the defendant's mental health was at issue because his sole defense was insanity, his behavior was so strange that the trial court had him examined for competency, a state psychiatrist found him incompetent to stand trial and recommended that he be committed, Ake was competent only when sedated, the state psychiatrists described a severe mental illness that may have existed for years, and the prosecutor submitted evidence of Ake's future dangerousness through the testimony of the state's own psychiatrists. Id. at 86, 105 S.Ct. 1087. Quite simply, none of those circumstances was present in Carter's trial. 44 As for Powell, we first note that it was a pre-AEDPA decision whose holding has never been adopted by the Supreme Court. Thus, Powell can have no legal effect on post-AEDPA habeas cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (defining clearly established Federal law for purposes of the AEDPA analysis as the law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States). In any event, Powell is also distinguishable on the facts. The trial court in that case granted a defense motion for appointment of a psychiatrist because the court recognized that Powell's mental competency had been placed in issue before trial, Powell, 332 F.3d at 382, and the court-appointed psychiatrist testified that neither she nor any other staff member at the court's psychiatric clinic were qualified to conduct the type of testing and evaluation that was required to diagnose [the defendant] with organic brain damage, id. at 395. Carter, by contrast, has not shown that his mental health was (or should have been) in issue, nor presented evidence that Dr. Manges was unqualified to conduct the type of testing that Carter claims was necessary. Most importantly, trial counsel hired Dr. Manges as an independent mental health expert, which would satisfy Powell and Ake. 45 Counsel does not perform unreasonably merely by not ruling out every possible psychological mitigator through specialized evaluations. Cf. Lundgren, 440 F.3d at 772 (stating that the question before the court is not whether all mental health experts would agree on whether the defense was viable, but whether counsel's decision not to pursue the defense was a reasonable strategic choice); Lorraine v. Coyle, 291 F.3d 416, 436 (6th Cir.2002) (It simply cannot be said that trial counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland simply because the leads [of possible organic brain damage] led to nowhere.); Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 813 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by not seeking a psychiatric evaluation where there was no evidence of mental instability); Sidebottom v. Delo, 46 F.3d 744, 753 (8th Cir.1995) (finding that defense counsel did not render ineffective assistance by not seeking a second opinion where counsel reasonably relied on the results of a psychological examination); Poyner v. Murray, 964 F.2d 1404, 1419 (4th Cir.1992) (The mere fact that . . . counsel did not shop around for a psychiatrist willing to testify to the presence of more elaborate or grave psychological disorders simply does not constitute ineffective assistance.). Rather, decisions as to which, if any, expert a particular defendant requires are fact sensitive and necessarily vary from case to case. Some death penalty defendants need a neuropsychologist, others a forensic psychologist. Still others need a social psychologist, psychopharmacologist, or mitigation specialist. For this reason, there is not and should not be a per se rule that trial counsel is ineffective at mitigation unless a particular type of expert is retained. On the other hand, to establish ineffective assistance of counsel at mitigation in federal habeas proceedings, there must always be some record evidence presented at the state post-conviction stage (unless cause and prejudice is shown) establishing that an expert should have been, but was not, obtained. Therefore, we again reject the argument that counsel's decision to retain only a vocational or industrial psychologist was per se unreasonable, under any standard of review.