Opinion ID: 797292
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failures To Implement the IEP

Text: 24 We therefore turn to Van Duyn's principal contention — that the District in fact failed to implement portions of his IEP. In addressing his argument, we hold that the ALJ did not erroneously allocate the burden of proof at the administrative hearing, that state contract law does not apply to the interpretation of an IEP and that only material failures to implement an IEP constitute violations of the IDEA. Applying this standard, we conclude that none of the implementation failures that Van Duyn alleges was material.
25 Van Duyn argues that the ALJ erroneously placed the burden of proof on him to establish that the District failed to implement the IEP. Although the ALJ never specified which party bore the burden, even if she did place the burden on Van Duyn, doing so was proper under Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 126 S.Ct. 528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387 (2005). The Supreme Court held in Schaffer that [t]he burden of proof in an administrative hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party seeking relief. Id. at 537, 126 S.Ct. 528. Van Duyn, as the party objecting to the IEP's implementation, thus bore the burden of proof at the administrative hearing. 26 Van Duyn contends that Schaffer is inapplicable because it dealt with a challenge to the content rather than the implementation of an IEP, but that is a distinction without a difference. Nothing in Schaffer hinged on the kind of challenge being made to the IEP. Rather, the Court cited the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims, holding that [a]bsent some reason to believe that Congress intended otherwise, . . . we will conclude that the burden of persuasion lies where it usually falls, upon the party seeking relief. Id. at 535; see also Stringer v. St. James R-1 Sch. Dist., 446 F.3d 799, 803 (8th Cir.2006) (following Schaffer in context of claim that IEP was not being implemented). Neither Schaffer nor the text of the IDEA supports imposing a different burden in IEP implementation cases than in formulation cases. Accordingly, we hold that if the ALJ placed the burden of proof on Van Duyn, that allocation was correct. 2
27 Van Duyn next argues that contested terms in the IEP should be interpreted under Oregon contract law, in particular the principle that ambiguities must be resolved in Van Duyn's favor because the document was drafted by the District for his benefit. This argument, raised for the first time on appeal, is meritless. First, the IEP is entirely a federal statutory creation, and courts have rejected efforts to frame challenges to IEPs as breach-of-contract claims. See, e.g., Ms. K. v. City of South Portland, 407 F.Supp.2d 290, 301 (D.Me.2006) ([A]n IEP is not a legally binding contract.). Van Duyn offers no example of a court treating an IEP as a contract, nor have we been able to locate any. 28 Second, even if the principle that ambiguous terms are interpreted against the drafting party applied, it would not help Van Duyn. His parents played a central role in the drafting of the IEP, so it is unclear who the IEP's author is for contract law purposes. In addition, the terms Van Duyn cites as ambiguous simply do not mean what he claims, even taking the favorable contract law principle into account. In our view, Van Duyn's real objection is not to the ambiguity of the IEP's terms but rather to its omission of additional requirements for the District. This is not a problem we can solve. An IEP is not a contract — but even if it were, we could not read into it additional terms the parties did not agree to include.
29 The core of Van Duyn's case is his allegation that the District failed to implement his IEP. Because most IDEA cases involve the formulation rather than the implementation of an IEP, our court has not yet articulated the standard for assessing an IEP's implementation. To determine this standard, we look to both the statutory text and decisions of other courts. 30 The IDEA defines a free appropriate public education as special education and related services that . . . are provided in conformity with the [child's] individualized education program. § 1401(9). The statute also allows a party to challenge an IEP because of procedural flaws in the IEP's formulation as well as on substantive grounds based on a determination of whether the child received a free appropriate public education. § 1415(f)(3)(E)(i). This language surely indicates that a failure to implement an IEP may deny a child a free appropriate public education and thereby give rise to a claim under the statute. The language also counsels against making minor implementation failures actionable given that special education and related services need only be provided  in conformity with  the IEP. There is no statutory requirement of perfect adherence to the IEP, nor any reason rooted in the statutory text to view minor implementation failures as denials of a free appropriate public education. 31 As noted earlier, the Supreme Court in Rowley was faced with a challenge to an IEP's content. Nevertheless, the Court's approach is instructive in the IEP implementation context as well. In particular, it is significant that, according to the Court, procedural flaws in an IEP's formulation do not automatically violate the IDEA, but rather do so only when the resulting IEP is not reasonably calculated to enable the child to receive educational benefits. 458 U.S. at 207, 102 S.Ct. 3034. This suggests that minor failures in implementing an IEP, just like minor failures in following the IDEA's procedural requirements, should not automatically be treated as violations of the statute. The Court's description of the IDEA's purpose as providing a basic floor of opportunity to disabled students rather than a potential-maximizing education also supports granting some flexibility to school districts charged with implementing IEPs. Id. at 197 n. 21, 201, 102 S.Ct. 3034. 32 The two circuits to have explicitly addressed IEP implementation failures both did so in a manner consistent with our reading of the statutory text and Rowley. In Bobby R., the Fifth Circuit considered a disabled child whose IEP had not been perfectly implemented and whose academic performance had improved in some areas and declined in others. The court held that to prevail on a claim under the IDEA, a party challenging the implementation of an IEP must show more than a de minimis failure to implement all elements of that IEP, and, instead, must demonstrate that the school board or other authorities failed to implement substantial or significant provisions of the IEP. 200 F.3d at 349. Employing this standard, the court concluded that conceded implementation failures did not violate the IDEA because the significant provisions of [the child's] IEP were followed, and, as a result, he received an educational benefit. Id. 3 33 Similarly, the Eighth Circuit held in Clark that the IDEA is violated if there is evidence that the school actually failed to implement an essential element of the IEP that was necessary for the child to receive an educational benefit. 315 F.3d at 1027 n. 3. To determine if the fact that no cohesive plan was in place to meet [the child's] behavioral needs gave rise to a statutory violation, the court considered both the shortfall in services provided and evidence regarding the child's progress in several areas. Id. at 1029. The court concluded that the IDEA was indeed violated because the actions taken by the school did not appropriately address [the child's] behavior problem, id. at 1028, and any slight benefit obtained was lost due to behavior problems that went unchecked and interfered with [the child's] ability to obtain a benefit from his education. Id. 34 In accordance with the IDEA itself, the Court's decision in Rowley and the decisions of our sister circuits, we hold that a material failure to implement an IEP violates the IDEA. A material failure occurs when the services a school provides to a disabled child fall significantly short of the services required by the child's IEP. Minor discrepancies between the services provided and the services called for by the IEP do not give rise to an IDEA violation. 35 Because the parties debate whether Van Duyn's skills and behavior improved or deteriorated during the 2001-02 school year, we clarify that the materiality standard does not require that the child suffer demonstrable educational harm in order to prevail. However, the child's educational progress, or lack of it, may be probative of whether there has been a significant shortfall in the services provided. For instance, if the child is not provided the reading instruction called for and there is a shortfall in the child's reading achievement, that would certainly tend to show that the failure to implement the IEP was material. On the other hand, if the child performed at or above the anticipated level, that would tend to show that the shortfall in instruction was not material. 4
36 Applying the standard for evaluating alleged IEP implementation failures here, we turn to the various areas in which Van Duyn asserts that the District failed to implement his IEP. Because both the ALJ and the district court have already considered at length Van Duyn's alleged implementation failures — and because we largely agree with their analyses — we focus on what we understand to be Van Duyn's weightiest claims: that he did not receive sufficient math instruction, that his behavior management plan was not implemented properly, that work was not presented at his level and that he was not placed in a self-contained classroom. 5 37 First, Van Duyn's IEP required 8-10 hours of math instruction per week. The ALJ found that he was not being provided with sufficient instruction and therefore ordered that he receive the five hours per week of instruction in math that he has not been receiving. We agree that the initial five-hour shortfall was a material implementation failure. Van Duyn now claims that only 100 minutes of math instruction per week were added in response to the ALJ's order and that the District was thus still not in compliance with the IEP. However, he makes no effort to rebut the testimony to the contrary by Ms. Walker, who taught three of Van Duyn's eight classes, and Ms. Irby, his other main teacher. Ms. Walker testified that Van Duyn worked on math in two red day classes, one white day class and his advisory time, and therefore received the requisite math instruction. Similarly, Ms. Irby testified that Van Duyn used math computer programs in her classes for roughly 100 minutes per week. We therefore hold that after the District's corrective actions, there was no material failure to provide Van Duyn with the required amount of weekly math instruction. 6 38 Second, Van Duyn is correct that several elements of his behavior management plan were not implemented in the same way at the middle school as at the elementary school. The daily behavior card was not used as strictly as it was before. Social stories were never employed in Ms. Walker's three classes and were improperly used by Ms. Baxter and Ms. Irby. And Van Duyn was not told to go to the quiet room after all incidents of misbehavior, nor was the room adequately equipped until just before the administrative hearing. 39 Although we do not condone these failures to implement the behavior management plan, we conclude that they were not material for several reasons. First, the IEP did not clearly describe how the daily behavior card, social stories and quiet room were used at the elementary school, nor did it require that they be used in the same way at the middle school. It is undisputed that the behavior management plan was not implemented identically at the two schools, but the IEP did not say that it had to be. Second, the middle school did employ many of the techniques outlined in the behavior management plan, even if not quite as Van Duyn envisioned. Third, there is evidence that the elementary school behavior management plan was inappropriate for the middle school context. Van Duyn's former aide testified that [i]t looks to me like the system that we used at South Baker doesn't work at the middle school, and so it's not being used the same. Finally, Van Duyn's behavior appears to have improved in 2001-02. The school speech therapist stated that while in the previous [reports] it's mentioned that Chris doesn't notice others in his environment, [t]he following year we see that Chris does notice others in his environment and is engaging more. The school psychologist added that Van Duyn was being sent to the quiet room only about once per month at the middle school, a much lower rate than at the elementary school. 40 Next, there is some ambiguity in the record about whether, as required by the IEP, work was presented at Van Duyn's level. On the one hand, Ms. Baxter testified that what Van Duyn would learn about on any given day depended on what the class was taught that day. On the other hand, his two main teachers, Ms. Walker and Ms. Irby, testified that he was never subjected to lecture-style teaching and generally received one-on-one instruction. Ms. Walker described filter[ing] around to the students while Ms. Irby stated that Van Duyn's instruction was largely one-on-one with her or the assistant. On this conflicting record, we cannot conclude that the District materially failed to present work at Van Duyn's level. We also note that there is no evidence that his educational progress was hindered as a result of exposure to materials that were too advanced for him. 41 Finally, the parties dispute the meaning of self-contained sp[ecial] ed[ucation] room and whether Van Duyn was provided with such placement. He contends that his IEP required a learning environment like the one he enjoyed at the elementary school, with a single classroom where highly disabled students receive instruction individually or in small groups and there is complete flexibility as to the timing and content of instruction. See Ash v. Lake Oswego Sch. Dist. No. 7J, 766 F.Supp. 852, 856 (D.Or.1991) (self-contained classroom contains 8-12 students with one teacher and two aides). The District, however, asserts that a self-contained classroom is a service rather than a placement, and exists whenever a student spends more than 60 percent of his time in a special education classroom. 42 Even under Van Duyn's definition, which appears nowhere in the IEP and is at odds with Oregon practice as well as the testimony of one of his own witnesses, we hold that the District did not materially fail to provide him with a self-contained classroom. His class sizes varied from 7 to 15 students (a range with an almost identical midpoint to the 8-12 range cited in Ash ), and there were always one teacher and one aide present (comparable to the one teacher and two aides in Ash ). Whereas the student-teacher/aide ratio was somewhat higher in the middle school than in Ash, it is significant that Ms. Baxter was Van Duyn's personal full-time aide. There is no indication that the two aides in Ash were specifically designated for individual students. 43 Furthermore, there was substantial flexibility in the instruction that Van Duyn received at the middle school. While he was on a block schedule with set times for classes, he could take breaks whenever they were necessary, he received constant attention from Ms. Baxter and frequent one-on-one instruction from Ms. Walker and Ms. Irby and the projects he worked on were typically unrelated to his classes' nominal subject matter. This may not have been quite as beneficial a learning environment as the elementary school, but we cannot conclude that it constituted a material failure to provide Van Duyn with a self-contained classroom. 44 We therefore hold that the District did not materially fail to implement any provisions in Van Duyn's IEP (with the exception of the math instruction requirement, which we hold was satisfied after the ALJ's order).