Opinion ID: 2976065
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Avoiding Disclosure of Private Matters

Text: Plaintiffs also base their privacy claim on the alleged disclosure of information to Children Services. In J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1091 (6th Cir. 1981), this Court rejected the idea there is a general constitutional right of nondisclosure of personal information. Rather,“any constitutional right to privacy must be restricted to those personal rights that can be deemed fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.” Kallstrom, 136 F.3d at 1062 (citing DeSanti, 653 F.2d at 1090) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Kallstrom, the Court identified a situation where nondisclosure of personal information was a constitutionally protected right: undercover police officers have a constitutionally protected privacy interest in some personal information contained in their personnel files under the substantive due process clause. 136 F.3d at 1059. The officers’ privacy interests in the personal information are of a constitutional dimension because they implicate a fundamental liberty interest, namely, their lives, their families’ lives, and their personal security. Id. at 1062. Their personal security was threatened because the release of that information created a “serious risk to the personal safety” of the officers and their families from a violent gang likely to seek revenge. Id. at 1063. This Court has also held that “information regarding private sexual matters warrants constitutional protection against public dissemination.” Bloch v. Ribar, 156 F.3d 673, 686 (6th Cir. 1998). Kallstrom “did not create a broad right protecting plaintiffs’ personal information.” Barber v. Overton, 496 F.3d 449, 456 (6th Cir. 2007) (release of correctional officers’ social security numbers was not sensitive enough to warrant constitutional protection despite threat of retaliation); Nos. 06-4550/4551 Jenkins, et al. v. Rock Hill Local School District, et al. Page 9 see also Bailey v. City of Port Huron, --- F.3d ----, No. 06-2375, 2007 WL 3196505 (6th Cir. Nov. 1, 2007) (criminal suspects have no constitutional right to privacy in their mug shots or in information contained in a police report); Overstreet v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2002) (no privacy interest in personal financial affairs); Doe v. Wigginton, 21 F.3d 733 (6th Cir. 1994) (disclosure of HIV infection not violation of constitutional right to privacy). Here, Plaintiffs lack a constitutional invasion of privacy claim because they were not put at a serious risk of losing a fundamental liberty interest. Although Jenkins did face a court complaint for child neglect, she was not separated from her child. The same is even more true for Mulkey; any harm to her from being interviewed by a Children Services investigator was at most de minimis. For the same reason that Plaintiffs were not deprived of a fundamental right, they were not victimized by the dissemination of information that is not of a constitutional magnitude. Because Plaintiffs’ privacy claims fail under either theory, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on those claims.