Opinion ID: 2690214
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: R.C. 4921.25 as a General Law

Text: {¶ 7} Article XVIII, Section 3 of the Ohio Constitution states, “Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local selfgovernment and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with general laws.” {¶ 8} A state statute takes precedence over a local ordinance when “(1) the ordinance is an exercise of the police power, rather than of local selfgovernment, (2) the statute is a general law, and (3) the ordinance is in conflict with the statute.” Mendenhall v. Akron, 117 Ohio St.3d 33, 2008-Ohio-270, 881 N.E.2d 255, ¶ 17. No one disputes that any city ordinance regulating towing entities would be a matter of police power or safety rather than an exercise of self- 4 January Term, 2014 government. Thus, any city ordinance of this type must yield if it conflicts with a general state law. {¶ 9} We set forth a four-part test for evaluating whether a statute is a general law in Canton v. State, 95 Ohio St.3d 149, 2002-Ohio-2005, 766 N.E.2d 963: “To constitute a general law for purposes of home-rule analysis, a statute must (1) be part of a statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment, (2) apply to all parts of the state alike and operate uniformly throughout the state, (3) set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, rather than purport only to grant or limit legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and (4) prescribe a rule of conduct upon citizens generally.” Id. at syllabus. We agree with the reasoning of the appellate panel’s dissenting judge in this case to hold that R.C. 4921.25 meets all four parts of the general-law test. 1. Statewide and Comprehensive Legislative Enactment {¶ 10} The court of appeals concluded that there is no comprehensive statutory scheme that covered tow-truck companies and that it could not infer an intent to preempt local legislation based upon broad regulatory enactment in this field. With respect to the court’s conclusion that the statute violates part one of the test because the General Assembly did not enact a separate statutory scheme for towing entities but merely redefined “for-hire motor carriers” to include towing companies, we do not agree that the General Assembly was required to do more. R.C. 4921.25 is part of the statewide and comprehensive statutory scheme for regulating for-hire motor carriers. {¶ 11} R.C. 4921.25 specifically classifies towing entities as for-hire motor carriers subject to PUCO regulation. The PUCO is accordingly tasked with a number of duties relating to these entities: supervising and regulating them, regulating their safe operation, adopting reasonable rules for highway transportation of property in interstate and intrastate commerce, and requiring the 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO filing of reports and other data. R.C. 4905.81. Clearly, by subjecting towing enterprises to the PUCO’s regulations, the General Assembly has made R.C. 4921.25 a part of statewide and comprehensive legislative enactment. The statute satisfies the first prong of the Canton test. 2. Uniform Operation Throughout the State {¶ 12} The second prong of the Canton test asks whether the statute applies and operates uniformly throughout the state. There can be no question that R.C. 4921.25 applies and operates uniformly throughout Ohio, and the determination by the court of appeals that an exception exists for “private motor carriers” is inapposite. R.C. 4921.25 applies to “[a]ny person, firm, copartnership, voluntary association, joint-stock association, company, or corporation, wherever organized or incorporated, that is engaged in the towing of motor vehicles.” Thus the statute’s scope is statewide, and there are no limitations upon the statute’s operation. The statute applies uniformly to all towing entities and thus satisfies the second prong of the Canton test. 3. Establishment of Police Regulations {¶ 13} In holding that R.C. 4921.25 fails to satisfy the third prong of the Canton test, the court of appeals concluded that by enacting this statute, the legislature did not establish police regulations but instead merely limited municipal legislative power. Just as with the first prong, however, an in pari materia reading of the statute indicates otherwise. By placing towing companies under the regulation of the PUCO—including but not limited to the PUCO’s traffic regulations governing for-hire motor carriers—R.C. 4921.25 is an exercise of the state’s police power. The statute as a whole does not merely limit the legislative power of a municipal corporation to set forth police, sanitary, or similar regulations, and so satisfies the third prong of the Canton test. 6 January Term, 2014 4. Establishment of Rule of Conduct upon Citizens Generally {¶ 14} The court of appeals relies upon its determination that the statute is not part of a system of uniform statewide regulation in finding that R.C. 4921.25 fails to meet the fourth prong of the Canton test. As discussed above, the statute applies to all entities engaged in towing operations throughout the state, without exception. We accordingly hold that R.C. 4921.25 meets the fourth Canton prong and is a general law for the purposes of home-rule analysis.