Opinion ID: 2041031
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Heading: Principles for Determing Whether a Search is Reasonable

Text: When the police stop motorists at a roadblock to check their license or registration and for any signs of intoxication, a seizure subject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment occurs. The salient inquiry is the reasonableness of this seizure. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. The reasonableness of the seizure is judged by balancing the intrusion on individual liberty against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests. This standard requires, at a minimum, that the facts which support an intrusion are capable of measurement against an objective standard, whether this be probable cause or a less stringent test. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 654, 99 S.Ct. at 1395, 1396. To determine whether the Fourth Amendment will tolerate seizure in the absence of articulable suspicion or probable cause, American courts engage in a balancing of several considerations: (1) the gravity of the public concern served by the seizure, (2) the severity of interference with individual liberty, and (3) the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest. Brown, 443 U.S. at 50, 51, 99 S.Ct. at 2640, 2641.
In the cases noted above, only one seizure involved a public interest of sufficient gravity to justify dispensing with reasonable suspicion. In Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found that the substantial national interest in the effective control of aliens illegally crossing the Mexico-United States border outweighed the limited intrusion on the right to free travel; it cited language in Carroll v. U.S., 267 U.S. 132, 154, 45 S.Ct. 280, 285, 69 L.Ed. 543, 551 (1925), distinguishing seizures of American motorists from those whose objective was national self-protection. None of the public interests advanced in the other cases proved adequate to justify a stop on less than reasonable suspicion: Brignoni-Ponce (the valid interest in economic and social problems created by illegal immigration), Prouse (the legitimate interest in promoting safety on the highways), and Brown (crime prevention, a weighty social objective). In these cases, the interference with the lawful motoring public and the tendency of the designated problem to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators were the crucial criteria which convinced the Court that reasonable suspicion must be demonstrated.
The intrusions involved in most of these cases, a momentary stop and brief questioning, can be objectively regarded as modest. However, even the most limited seizure is constitutionally cognizable. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 661, 99 S.Ct. at 1400. Even though the stop in Brignoni-Ponce was similar to the one in Martinez-Fuerte, the Court found that the permanent checkpoint in the latter case was likely to be regarded by motorists as less intrusive. Roving patrols frequently operate at night, and their approach may frighten motorists, noted Justice Powell. However, the subjective intrusion at permanent checkpoints is minimal because motorists can see other vehicles stopped and visible signs of officers' authority. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 558, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. As for the degree of interference imposed upon the lawful motoring public, the Brignoni-Ponce Court found that dispensing with reasonable suspicion would subject every resident to potentially unlimited interference with their use of the highways... . 422 U.S. at 882, 95 S.Ct. at 2581. However, the Martinez-Fuerte Court found that the permanent checkpoint did not intrude similarly on lawful motorists because they ... know or may obtain knowledge of, the location of the checkpoints and will not be stopped elsewhere, and the checkpoints involve less discretionary enforcement. 428 U.S. at 559, 96 S.Ct. at 3083.
A seizure is not reasonable unless it is well calculated to effectuate its purpose. Moreover, to justify a seizure on less than articulable suspicion or probable cause, the government must demonstrate that the method chosen is necessary and effective, and more effective than alternative mechanisms. In Martinez-Fuerte, substantial evidence demonstrated the checkpoint's effectiveness in detecting illegal aliens. The requirement of reasonable suspicion was impractical because the heavy flow of traffic (1,176 cars per hour) precluded the ... particularized study of a given car that would enable it to be identified as a possible carrier of illegal aliens. 428 U.S. at 557, 96 S.Ct. at 3083. The record substantiated the effectiveness of the checkpoint and it appeared that the law enforcement need in question could be met without reliance on routine checkpoint stops. 428 U.S. at 556-557 n. 12, 96 S.Ct. at 3082 n. 12. The necessity for even a minimal degree of interference had not been demonstrated in Prouse and Brown. In Prouse, the Court recognized that keeping dangerous automobiles and drunk drivers off the highway was a legitimate public interest, but concluded that roving patrols were not a sufficiently productive mechanism because of their incremental contribution to highway safety. The low productivity of the roving patrol stop was similarly cited in Brown, 443 U.S. at 52, 99 S.Ct. at 2641. Finally, I think the Court has made it clear that when a given crime is one which can be frequently detected through observation (like driving offenses), it is unlikely that stops on less than reasonable suspicion are constitutional. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 882, 883 n. 8, 95 S.Ct. at 2581 n. 8; Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659, 99 S.Ct. at 1399.