Opinion ID: 1095949
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motion for New Trial/Weight of Evidence

Text: Burrell claims the verdict of the jury was against the overwhelming weight of the evidence and a product of bias, passion, and prejudice. He suggests the ear and eyewitness testimony elicited from Katie Sutton, who was stabbed seven times and strangled by her assailant, and from Marnita Lynn Walker, who observed portions of the assault from the window of her ground floor apartment, was not credible. Put another way, the defendant's claim of bias, passion or prejudice rests solely on the fact the jury chose to disbelieve the defendant's alibi which was corroborated by his parents. First, jury instruction C-1 told the jury in plain English that it should not be influenced by bias, sympathy or prejudice[; rather, y]our verdict should be based on the evidence and not upon speculation, guesswork or conjecture. This Court has consistently held that when a trial court instructs the jury, it is presumed the jurors follow its direction. Crenshaw v. State, 520 So.2d 131 (Miss. 1988); McFee v. State, 511 So.2d 130 (Miss. 1987); Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985). Second, both Katie Sutton and Marnita Walker made positive and unequivocal in-court identifications of Burrell as the early morning assailant. The defendant, on the other hand, asserted an alibi defense which was corroborated by his parents. Obviously, a material testimonial conflict is present. Our system of jurisprudence has a method of resolving such conflicts. We leave to the jury the task of determining the facts from the evidence and applying the law to those facts. Thus, the posture of Burrell's evidentiary complaint can be summarized in only three words, namely: classic jury issue. In Maiben v. State, 405 So.2d 87, 88 (Miss. 1981), this Court announced that we will not set aside a guilty verdict, absent other error, unless it is clearly a result of prejudice, bias or fraud, or is manifestly against the weight of credible evidence. Id. (emphasis added). The following observations made in Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983), are also worth repeating here: We will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Pearson v. State, 428 So.2d 1361, 1364 (Miss. 1983). Any less stringent rule would denigrate the constitutional power and responsibility of the jury in our criminal justice system. (emphasis added) See also Benson v. State, 551 So.2d 188 (Miss. 1989); Wash v. State, 521 So.2d 890 (Miss. 1988); Jackson v. State, 551 So.2d 132, 148 (Miss. 1989) [The Circuit Court should not order a new trial unless it is convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the weight of the evidence that to allow it to stand would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice.] Katie Sutton saw as well as heard the brutal events of the evening. She testified that after her mother cracked open the door she heard her mother say, Bennie, please leave. In addition to this, Katie, for what must have seemed an eternity, had a full and unobstructed view of her stepfather as he stabbed her mother repeatedly and then stabbed her. In addition to the two eyewitness identifications, Burrell's fingerprint was found on a bloody telephone inside the living room of Lori's apartment, and two witnesses had recently observed the defendant with a knife. Although both of the elder Burrells testified that Bennie did not own a single edge, lock-blade knife similar to the murder weapon, Sam Burnley testified he had sold the defendant such a knife in December of 1989. Ben Stahl and Peggy Burnley, who worked with Bennie Burrell at Ben Stahl's place of business in the McAdams Community, testified they had seen Bennie with a similar but, according to Stahl, a smaller knife. Peggy Burnley's observation was made the day before the murder when she saw Burrell using a whetstone to sharpen the knife. Finally, it is well settled the jury is under no obligation to accept an alibi defense asserted by the accused and his witnesses. Lee v. State, 457 So.2d 920 (Miss. 1984); Ruffin v. State, 447 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1984). Rather, an alibi simply raises an issue of fact to be resolved by the jury. Gray v. State, 549 So.2d 1316 (Miss. 1989). It is elemental that the State does not have to prove an alibi to be untrue. Forrest v. State, 352 So.2d 1328, 1330 (Miss. 1977). Its burden is simply to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was present at the time and place testified about and that he murdered and assaulted the victims. Id. The jury, we note, was generously instructed via instruction D-3 with respect to Burrell's alibi defense. The case of Gray, 549 So.2d 1316, 1319, involved a scenario where the defendant's parents presented alibi testimony. We stated: Secondly, Gray contends that his alibi testimony by his parents is fatal to the state's case. This argument misses the mark. An alibi defense simply raises an issue of fact to be resolved by the jurors, who are under no obligation to accept the defense. Lee v. State, 457 So.2d 920, 924 (Miss. 1984) (citing Tubbs v. State, 402 So.2d 830, 834-835 [Miss. 1981]). See also Goss v. State, 413 So.2d 1033, 1036 (Miss. 1982) (Jury verdict was not against weight of evidence even though the defendant's alibi was corroborated by his mother and his sister.) The Burrells testified their son slept through several telephone calls notifying the family of these horrible events. The senior Burrells claimed that the reason they did not awaken Bennie after learning that his wife had been murdered and his stepdaughter seriously injured was because Bennie had to go to work the next morning. The power of persuasion on this point is questionable at best. In deciding who to believe, the jury was certainly entitled to take into consideration the motives and interests of the testifying witnesses. It is enough to say that the jury, and not the reviewing court, judges the credibility of the witnesses as well as the weight and worth of their conflicting testimony. Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276 (Miss. 1980). The jury is the sole judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Byrd v. State, 522 So.2d 756, 760 (Miss. 1988) (emphasis added). Affirmation of this case will not sanction an unconscionable injustice nor can it be said the jury's verdict was a product of prejudice, bias, or fraud. The physical evidence, as well as the eyewitness identifications, supports Burrell's convictions of murder and aggravated assault. Accordingly, the denial of Burrell's motion for a new trial was hardly an abuse of judicial discretion.