Opinion ID: 6218071
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict. United States v. Dewberry, 790 F.3d 1022, 1028 (10th Cir. 2015). We will not weigh witness credibility or conflicting evidence as those are tasks left to the province of the jury. Id. Rather, we ask “only whether, taking the evidence—both direct and circumstantial, together with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom—in the light most favorable to the government, a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Baldridge, 559 F.3d 1126, 1134 (10th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). But even under this deferential standard, we will reverse “if the evidence does no more than raise a mere suspicion of guilt or requires piling inference upon inference to conclude the defendant is guilty.” Dewberry, 790 F.3d at 1028 (citation omitted). To establish that Cordova committed a VICAR murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), the government had to prove four elements: (1) SNM was an “enterprise” under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(b)(2); (2) SNM was engaged in “racketeering activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1); (3) Cordova murdered Dix; and (4) Cordova murdered Dix “as 9 Appellate Case: 20-2007 Document: 010110643560 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 10 consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering activity.” The jury instructions specified that for the fourth element, the government needed to prove “that the promise or agreement was made by an individual [here, Garcia] acting on behalf of the enterprise [here, SNM] and not acting solely in his personal capacity.” Supp. R. vol. 1 at 1655 (emphasis added). Cordova challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for only the fourth element. He does so in two distinct ways. First, he argues that the government failed to show an actual agreement between Cordova and Garcia to kill Dix. Second, he argues that even if an agreement existed, the government failed to show that Garcia made the agreement on behalf of SNM and paid Cordova on behalf of SNM, rather than as a personal vendetta against Dix for Dix’s shooting him in a dispute over a woman. Overall, Cordova argues that the government’s evidence in support of the fourth element failed to allow the jury to make its required reasonable inferences. Instead, Cordova contends, the jury was left to speculate and fill in the gaps by piling inference on inference. We disagree. The line between reasonable inferences and speculation may often be difficult to define, but not here. We begin with Cordova’s first challenge to the fourth element. The government presented sufficient circumstantial evidence at trial from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that Cordova had made an agreement with Garcia to murder Dix. That evidence included the following: 10 Appellate Case: 20-2007 Document: 010110643560 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 11  Four SNM members, including Montoya, testified that Garcia solicited them to murder Dix, offering them money, drugs, and debt forgiveness.  Montoya testified that “everyone” likely knew that Garcia wanted Dix dead.  Montoya testified that Cordova was Garcia’s “runner,” someone who would do what he, and by extension SNM, needed done.  Montoya testified that while he, Cordova, and Garcia were together, Garcia told him and Cordova to handle shooting Dix together.  Montoya testified that Garcia gave him and Cordova guns for the Dix murder.  Montoya testified that on the same night that Garcia paid Montoya for the murder of Dix, he saw Garcia give Cordova cash and drugs.  Montoya testified that Cordova told him that he got rid of the car they used to follow and murder Dix (allegedly Cordova’s girlfriend’s or wife’s car) so it couldn’t be used as evidence in the future. Garcia bought him a Suburban truck as a replacement vehicle.  An FBI Agent testified that one of Cordova’s recorded jail calls revealed that Cordova owned a Suburban.  A former SNM associate, Gallegos, testified that Cordova told him that Garcia had paid him with heroin for murdering Dix. Based on this circumstantial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a reasonable jury making reasonable inferences could find that Garcia made an agreement with Cordova to murder Dix in exchange for cash and drugs. This is so even absent evidence of an express agreement between Garcia and Cordova. See United States v. Whitney, 229 F.3d 1296, 1301 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that an “agreement may be informal and may be inferred entirely from circumstantial evidence”). Further, on appeal, we neither reweigh the evidence nor 11 Appellate Case: 20-2007 Document: 010110643560 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 12 redetermine the credibility of the witnesses. See United States v. Bowen, 527 F.3d 1065, 1076 (10th Cir. 2008). Next, we turn to Cordova’s second challenge to the fourth element. We similarly conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence from which a jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that in making the agreement with Cordova, Garcia acted on behalf of SNM. Among that evidence was the following:  An SNM member testified that SNM “greenlighted” the murder of Dix, first in 2001 for speaking against SNM, and again in 2004 for shooting Garcia.  Former and current SNM members described SNM’s retaliation policy—that to maintain respect from outsiders SNM members must retaliate when threatened, or else face discipline from SNM.  Garcia approached only SNM members, including Montoya, and a close SNM associate, Cordova, to murder Dix.  Montoya testified that Dix’s murder reflected Cordova’s loyalty to SNM. Based on this circumstantial evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the jury could reasonably infer that Garcia’s murder-for-hire agreement with Cordova was on SNM’s behalf. It doesn’t matter whether personal reasons may have also motivated Garcia to murder Dix. See United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984, 1008 (10th Cir. 2014). In sum, sufficient evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt the fourth element of a VICAR murder. Thus, the jury reasonably found Cordova guilty of a VICAR murder. This is not a case in which the evidence raised no more than a “mere suspicion of guilt” or required “piling inference upon inference to conclude” Cordova 12 Appellate Case: 20-2007 Document: 010110643560 Date Filed: 02/10/2022 Page: 13 is guilty. Dewberry, 790 F.3d at 1028 (citation omitted). We therefore reject Cordova’s sufficiency-of-evidence claim and conclude that the district court properly rejected his first motion for new trial on that ground.