Opinion ID: 867236
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Denial of Motion for a Continuance

Text: ¶ 48 Dixon was arraigned in January 2003; the State filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty in March of that year. In July 2003, defense counsel suggested that it might take longer than usual to compile mitigation evidence because Dixon spent his early life on the Navajo reservation. After counsel stated that the mitigation specialist would need a year, the judge set the trial date for June 15, 2004. ¶ 49 Over the next few years, the court repeatedly granted defense requests to continue the trial. In April 2004, the public defender estimated that if a new specialist were assigned, the mitigation investigation could be completed in five months. The court granted a defense motion for a continuance and vacated the June trial date. After the case was reassigned to a new specialist, the deadline for disclosure of mitigation evidence was accordingly extended to January 2005. That deadline was not met, and after Dixon was granted permission to represent himself in March 2006, the trial date was set for October 18, 2006. In September 2006, however, Dixon estimated that his mitigation evidence would not be ready for nine months or a year. The court continued the trial to June 25, 2007, a date certain. ¶ 50 In May 2007, however, Dixon told the court his mitigation was still not ready and sought another continuance. The trial was reset for August 2007. Two months later, Dixon requested another continuance. Although he expressed frustration, the judge reset the trial date for September 13, 2007. At a subsequent hearing, the trial date was moved back to November 13, 2007. ¶ 51 A week before trial was scheduled to begin, Dixon asked for a three-month continuance. The court denied the motion, noting in a minute entry that [t]he defense mitigation work-up in this case has been ongoing for well over four years. Dixon claims that the court erred in denying this last continuance request. ¶ 52 At all times relevant to this case, Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 8.2(a)(4) provided that capital cases shall be tried within eighteen months of arraignment. [4] Continuances are governed by Rule 8.5(b), which states, in pertinent part: A continuance of any trial date shall be granted only upon a showing that extraordinary circumstances exist and that delay is indispensable to the interests of justice. A continuance may be granted only for so long as is necessary to serve the interests of justice. In ruling on a motion for continuance, the court shall consider the rights of the defendant and any victim to a speedy disposition of the case. ¶ 53 We review denials of continuances for clear abuse of discretion, State v. Schackart, 190 Ariz. 238, 254, 947 P.2d 315, 331 (1997), as the trial judge is the only party in a position to determine whether there are `extraordinary circumstances' warranting a continuance and whether `delay is indispensable to the interests of justice,' State v. Hein, 138 Ariz. 360, 368, 674 P.2d 1358, 1366 (1983). ¶ 54 We find no abuse of discretion here. Dixon was given more than four years to develop mitigation. The trial court found that the particular circumstances of this case, including Dixon's decision to represent himself and request a new mitigation expert, justified repeatedly continuing the original trial date. Indeed, the judge granted continuances even after cautioning Dixon that he had set a date certain for trial. ¶ 55 Dixon's requests for continuances were premised on the alleged need to develop more mitigation evidence. However, in the penalty phase, Dixon presented virtually no evidence, even though advisory counsel advised the court that witnesses, both expert and percipient, were prepared to present substantial amounts of mitigation. In deciding to forego this available mitigation evidence, Dixon rejected the explicit advice of advisory counsel and the strong suggestions of the trial court. Instead, he chose to call only an expert to testify about his prison history. ¶ 56 In rejecting Dixon's final continuance request, the trial court appropriately considered not only Dixon's interests, but also the rights of Deana's parents, the crime victims. Rule 8.5(b) expressly directs the trial judge to consider the rights of victims, who, like the defendant, are entitled under our Constitution to a speedy disposition of criminal charges. See Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(10). Deana's parents repeatedly asserted that right and the superior court did not abuse its discretion, after granting numerous continuances, in finally honoring their request that the trial proceed.