Opinion ID: 3053963
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain Meaning vs. Ambiguity

Text: The first step in construing the meaning of a statute is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain meaning. “The preeminent canon of statutory interpretation requires us to ‘presume that [the] legislature says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’ Thus, our inquiry begins with the statutory text, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.” BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (internal citations omitted). It should not be “presum[ed] that ‘the legislature was ignorant of the meaning of the language it employed.’ ” Id. at 186-87. Section 309 contains five uses of the term “statute of limitations,” but no use of “statute of repose.” Sun argues that “statute of limitations” has a plain meaning which excludes statutes of repose from its ambit. Therefore, according to Sun, it would be improper for a court to graft the words “and repose” onto the already clear language of § 309. “[T]he proper inquiry focuses on the ordinary meaning of the [provision] at the time Congress enacted it,” and thus the appropriMCDONALD v. SUN OIL CO. 15517 ate question is whether “statute of limitations” was ambiguous when § 309 was passed. BedRoc Ltd., 541 U.S. at 184 (citing Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Tribe, 526 U.S. 865, 874 (1999)); see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979) (“A fundamental canon of statutory construction is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.”). In addition, it is the plain meaning or ambiguity of CERCLA, not the state statute involved, that this inquiry is concerned with.2 [3] The term “statute of limitations” was ambiguous regarding whether it included statutes of repose when § 309 was enacted in 1986. At that time, although some cases recognized the differences between statutes of limitation and repose, a number of cases confused the terms or used them interchangeably.3 In the legal context, ambiguity is defined as “[a]n 2 A The question of plain meaning or ambiguity refers to the meaning Congress considered when it passed § 309, and therefore Oregon’s opinion of the meaning of the term carries no more weight than does that of any other State. The McDonalds make much of the fact that the Supreme Court of Oregon referred to the statute of repose at issue in this case, Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.115, as a “statute of limitations.” See Joseph v. Burns, 491 P.2d 203, 207 (Or. 1971). This is relevant to the question of ambiguity merely as an example of a court using the two terms interchangeably, but the fact that it is an Oregon case addressing the statute of repose at issue here does not entitle it to any additional weight. The object of our inquiry is what the intent of Congress was when § 309 was adopted in 1986, not what Oregon courts may have said about Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.115(1) in 1971. 3 Compare City of Aurora v. Am. LaFrance Corp., No. 81-C-6638, 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20667,  (Dist. Ill. Jan 6, 1984); Chamberlain v. Shmutz Mfg. Co., 532 F. Supp. 588, 590 (D. Kan. 1982); Bauld v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fl. 1978); Tindol v. Boston Hous. Auth., 487 N.E.2d 488, 489-90 (Mass. 1986); James Ferrera & Sons Inc. v. Samuels, 586 N.E.2d 58, 60-61 (Mass. App. Ct. 1985); Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1985); City of Dover v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 514 A.2d 1086, 1089 (De. 1986), with United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979); Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, 230-31 (1953); Anderson v. Yungkau, 329 U.S. 482, 485 (1947); United States v. Oregon Lumber Co., 260 U.S. 290, 300 (1922); Gates Rubber Co. v. USM Corp., 508 F.2d 603, 611 (7th Cir. 1975); Bolick v. Am. Barmag Corp., 306 N.C. 364, 366 (1982). 15518 MCDONALD v. SUN OIL CO. uncertainty of meaning or intention.” Black’s Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Here, considerable uncertainty about the distinction existed in 1986.4 Because of this ambiguity it is evident that the term “statute of limitations” had no plain meaning with respect to whether it included statutes of repose when § 309 was adopted.5 It will therefore be necessary for the Court to examine the statute’s legislative history in order to determine Congress’s intent at the time of its adoption.