Opinion ID: 2994497
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionality of the Felon in

Text: Possession Statute Wesela first argues that one of the statutes under which he was convicted, 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(g), is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress’s powers under the Commerce Clause. We have already rejected this with respect to sec. 922(g). See United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1128 (7th Cir. 1997). Williams distinguished sec. 922(g) from the statute the Supreme Court considered in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), on the ground that sec. 922(g), unlike the Lopez statute (18 U.S.C. sec. 922(q)), specifically requires that the possession must be in or affecting interstate commerce. 128 F.3d at 1133-34. Nothing in United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000), or in Jones v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 1904 (2000), causes us to think that a different result is now required for sec. 922(g). In Morrison, the Court struck down the Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. sec. 13981, on the ground that it exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause, but the Court was careful to note that the Act did not contain a jurisdictional element. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. at 1751. In Jones, the Court held that the arson statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 844(i), covered only arson of property that itself was currently used in interstate commerce or in an activity affecting commerce. Nothing in either case casts doubt on the validity of sec. 922(g), which is a law that specifically requires a link to interstate commerce.