Opinion ID: 1270085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: misstatement of fact before the grand jury

Text: Keith asserts that he was denied the rights to due process of law [3] and an impartial grand jury [4] guaranteed by the Alaska Constitution. Specifically, Keith alleged that there was a material misrepresentation of fact and a failure to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. Both claims are based on the inaccurate testimony of a police officer as to the time at which swab samples for detecting the presence of certain materials found in gunshot residue, barium and antimony, were taken from the hands of Keith, Nelson, and Krivitsky. The swabs were sent to a chemical laboratory for analysis and an analyst from the laboratory testified at the grand jury proceeding as to the results of his tests. He concluded that neither Krivitsky nor Nelson had handled or fired a gun during the period in which the shooting occurred but that Keith had. The negative results on Krivitsky's swab tests were significant because the grand jury had before it statements of Keith that Krivitsky had handled both guns and that the fatal shot had occurred during a struggle over the .44 magnum. Accuracy of swab test results is dependent on the time at which the swabs were collected since the swab test is unreliable after a certain period of time. Trooper Sumey testified to the grand jury that he ordered another trooper to take the swab test of Krivitsky at the Kenai morgue. Although he was not present for the test, Sumey told the grand jury that the test occurred at 7 p.m. on April 23, approximately four and one-half hours after the shooting. The laboratory analyst testified to the grand jury that there is generally a six-hour maximum for positive test results if the subject is alive and moving about, but that the time period for positive results is much longer, up to a few days, if the subject is dead and the body is not exposed to rain or humidity. Later, it was discovered that the victim's hands had not been swabbed until sometime between 10:30 and 11:30 p.m., eight or nine hours after Krivitsky's death. Keith's trial attorney discovered the error in the transcript the evening before the omnibus hearing. This matter was brought to the superior court's attention at the omnibus hearing when Keith's counsel moved for dismissal of the indictment. Officer Sumey testified that he only later learned through checking police radio logs that the officers were not at the morgue until approximately four hours later than he had told the grand jury. The superior court denied the motion, stating: [U]nder the testimony given by the expert witness, Mr. Green, a delay of four hours in conducting the swab tests on a corpse would have little or no significance. Therefore, the misrepresentation which appears to have been inadvertent does not have sufficient materiality to merit dismissal. [citation omitted] From this ruling Keith appeals, claiming the superior court erred in not finding this to be a material misstatement to the grand jury and a failure on the part of the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence. An attack on an indictment has not previously come before this court in exactly this form. However, in Taggard v. State, 500 P.2d 238 (Alaska 1972), we considered the related problem of hearsay evidence of questionable reliability presented to a grand jury. The general standards and concerns in evaluating attacks on an indictment, as set forth in Taggard, are also appropriate in situations such as the case at bar. The indictment is the foundation underlying a criminal prosecution. If the indictment is seriously flawed, the conviction cannot stand. A mere formal defect does not require dismissal of an indictment after the guilt of the defendant has been established at a fair trial. But courts do not hesitate to dismiss an indictment, even after a conviction, when the defect in the indictment is substantial. The conviction must be overturned when an indictment is invalid and the error was properly preserved by a timely objection prior to trial. [5] The giving of an inaccurate time regarding the collection of data for the swab test was clearly an error. Since the error was properly preserved at trial, we must next determine whether the defect was substantial. The falsehood in this case seems to have been unintentional. Alaska Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(q) provides in part: The grand jury shall find an indictment when all the evidence taken together, if unexplained or uncontradicted, would warrant a conviction... . Therefore, if the unintentional misstatement goes to a nonmaterial fact that would not substantially affect the grand jury's conclusion, it would not be reversible error. When one grand juror specifically asked the expert analyst of the swabs about the six-hour maximum for positive tests results in relation to the deceased, the expert answered as follows: Six hours is on an individual that is allowed to move around at his own freedom. An individual or a corpse, there is much, much longer time because obviously they're not putting their hands in their pocket, they're not rubbing their hands together, they're not washing their hands or anything. You have much, much longer time even days on a corpse  it just doesn't fly away, it's  there's  unless rain or something washes it, if  he's exposed to environment where there is a large amount of  of humidity or rain of this sort, then you would have a obvious shorter length of time. [6] There was testimony by one of the investigating state troopers that it did not rain at all between the time Krivitsky died and his body was taken to the morgue. Thus, it does not appear from the four-hour difference between the time the grand jury was told the swab tests were taken and the actual time of the tests would have significantly affected the grand jury's assessment of the actions of the deceased in handling the guns as described in Keith's statement. Keith did not claim that Krivitsky had fired either of the guns at any time. Thus, we conclude that there was no material misrepresentation to the grand jury. [7] As to Keith's other grand jury claim that the prosecutor violated his duty to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, [8] we find no possible basis for such a claim under the facts of this case. There was no separate exculpatory evidence, and the prosecutor was not shown to have known that the questioned evidence presented to the grand jury was false.