Opinion ID: 2588569
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: criminal history classification

Text: Vandervort contends that, despite acknowledging that it had jurisdiction under K.S.A. 21-4721(e) to consider the issue, the Court of Appeals refused to consider the issue of whether the district court appropriately classified his prior Virginia conviction in his criminal history. Resolution of a criminal history sentencing issue involves the interpretation of various provisions of the sentencing guidelines. The interpretation of statutes is a question of law, and, thus, the scope of review is unlimited. State v. Taylor, 262 Kan. 471, Syl. ¶ 4, 939 P.2d 904 (1997). The general rule is that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. The rule of strict construction, however, is subordinate to the rule that judicial interpretation must be reasonable and sensible to effect legislative design and intent. Under the fundamental rule of statutory construction, the intent of the legislature governs when that intent can be ascertained from the statute. Taylor, 262 Kan. 471, Syl. ¶ 5.
Vandervort contends the Court of Appeals erred in not reaching the merits of his criminal history appeal, finding instead that he stipulated to his criminal history and could not, therefore, claim his sentence was illegal. Vandervort would distinguish his case from other cases claiming the sentence imposed was illegal. In addition, Vandervort claims the Court of Appeals further erred by basing its analysis of his September 21, 2001, sentence on the 2002 amendments to K.S.A. 21-4715(c), which did not go into force and effect until July 1, 2002. The Court of Appeals wrote: Pursuant to K.S.A. 21-4721(e), we have jurisdiction in any appeal to consider whether the sentencing court erred in determining the appropriate classification of a prior conviction. However, this court has repeatedly held that a sentence within the wrong sentencing grid block under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act, K.S.A. 21-4701 et seq., is not an illegal sentence when the criminal history category was stipulated to by the parties. [Citations omitted.] The justification behind this rule is that one who invites error by his or her own acts cannot then complain or take advantage of it on appeal. Neal, 25 Kan. App. 2d at 706. K.S.A. 21-4715(c) requires an offender to provide written notice to the district attorney and the court of the specific nature of the error in an offender's criminal history. See L. 2002, ch. 163, § 3. Vandervort failed to provide written notice of the errors with his criminal history now claimed on appeal. Further, he stipulated to the correctness of his criminal history at the sentencing hearing. We hold Vandervort waived any argument that his criminal history was incorrect. The July 1, 1993, version of K.S.A. 21-4715 applies to Vandervort, not the 2002 amendment, which did not go into effect until July 1, 2002. The earlier version of the statute contains a requirement of written notice of any errors in the criminal history worksheet, nonetheless, in subparagraph (c): (a) The offender's criminal history shall be admitted in open court by the offender or determined by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing hearing by the sentencing judge. (b) Except to the extent disputed in accordance with subsection (c), the summary of the offender's criminal history prepared for the court by the state shall satisfy the state's burden of proof regarding an offender's criminal history. (c) Upon receipt of the criminal history worksheet prepared for the court, the offender shall immediately notify the district attorney and the court with written notice of any error in the proposed criminal history worksheet. The state shall have the burden of producing further evidence to satisfy its burden of proof regarding any disputed part, or parts, of the criminal history and the sentencing judge shall allow the state reasonable time to produce such evidence to establish the disputed portion of the criminal history by a preponderance of the evidence. (Emphasis added.) While Vandervort was not required to specify the exact nature of the alleged error in the criminal history worksheet under the version of the statute in effect at the time of his sentencing, the statute required that he immediately notify the court and the district attorney with written notice of any error. Compare K.S.A. 21-4715(c) and K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-4715(c). See also State v. White, 23 Kan. App. 2d 363, Syl. ¶ 2, 931 P.2d 1250 (1997) (Where a defendant generally objects to his or her proposed criminal history in writing and raises specific objections at the hearing to determine criminal history, such objections are sufficient under K.S.A. 21-4715[c] to require the State to prove its allegations of criminal history.). The Court of Appeals correctly determined that Vandervort failed to provide written notice of claimed errors within his criminal history worksheet in contravention of the requirements of K.S.A. 21-4715(c). The Court of Appeals, however, treated the remarks of defense counsel at the sentencing hearing as Vandervort's admission in open court to the correctness of his criminal history. Prior case law interpreting K.S.A. 21-4715 holds that [i]t is not defense counsel's place to admit to his or her client's prior offenses. State v. Hankins, 19 Kan. App. 2d 1036, 1047, 880 P.2d 271 (1994). In addition, [a] defendant is entitled to review a proposed criminal history worksheet. Hankins, 19 Kan. App. 2d at 1047. At the sentencing hearing, the following discussion took place on the record: THE COURT: . . . Have both attorneys had an opportunity to review the proposed PSI? [PROSECUTOR]: Yes, Your Honor. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Your Honor. THE COURT: Any additions or corrections? [PROSECUTOR]: Judge, I believe the correctionsome corrections were made and amended one was presented to the court today. I don't think there were any additional corrections. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Judge, I have just been handed amended one and I think that's fine. [PROSECUTOR]: Bob, the changes are highlighted. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right, I was told that. No other comments appear on the record in regard to the presentence investigation sheet or Vandervort's criminal history. The record on appeal does not show that the trial court personally addressed Vandervort regarding his criminal history, or that Vandervort was afforded the opportunity to review the amended criminal history worksheet. The general rule regarding review of an illegal sentence is that [a] defendant who invites error by stipulating to his or her criminal history cannot request a correction of sentence under K.S.A. 22-3504 after pronouncement of sentence. State v. McBride, 23 Kan. App. 2d 302, Syl. ¶ 3, 930 P.2d 618 (1996). Vandervort acknowledges that his trial counsel failed to object to the criminal history at the sentencing hearing, but argues that, [g]iven that counsel was handed the amended PSI at the sentencing hearing, no reasonable person would expect that he must provide a written notice of any error. Counsel should have further reviewed the PSI, but his failure should not be viewed as a stipulation by Vandervort. Despite the lack of an objection by defense counsel at the sentencing hearing, Vandervort contends that, under K.S.A. 21-4721(e), appellate courts have jurisdiction to consider a defendant's claim that the sentencing court erred in determining the appropriate classification of a prior conviction for purposes of criminal history. That statute provides, in pertinent part: (e) In any appeal, the appellate court may review a claim that: (1) A sentence that departs from the presumptive sentence resulted from partiality, prejudice, oppression or corrupt motive; (2) the sentencing court erred in either including or excluding recognition of a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication for criminal history scoring purposes; or (3) the sentencing court erred in ranking the crime severity level of the current crime or in determining the appropriate classification of a prior conviction or juvenile adjudication for criminal history purposes.  (Emphasis added.) Vandervort further argues that this court should review the merits of his case under the exceptions set forth in Pierce v. Board of County Commissioners, 200 Kan. 74, Syl. ¶ 3, 434 P.2d 858 (1967). Those exceptions apply to appellate review of constitutional claims asserted for the first time on appeal. State v. Gould, 271 Kan. 394, 404, 23 P.3d 801 (2001); Pierce, 200 Kan. at 80-81; State v. Boswell, 30 Kan. App. 2d 9, 11, 37 P.3d 40 (2001). Vandervort's assertions of error do not include constitutional claims, but further research uncovered two cases relevant to our consideration of Vandervort's claim. In State v. Pope, 23 Kan. App. 2d 69, 927 P.2d 503 (1996), the Court of Appeals reviewed the merits of the defendant's claim that her prior Missouri juvenile adjudications should not have been included in her criminal history under the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act despite defense counsel's failure to object at the sentencing hearing. Both the defendant and her attorney agreed at the hearing that the criminal history shown in the presentence investigation (PSI) report was accurate. On appeal, defendant conceded that she did not object before the sentencing court to the use of the Missouri juvenile adjudications. Citing K.S.A. 21-4721(e)(3), the Pope court found: This court has jurisdiction to consider this issue notwithstanding Pope's failure to object to her criminal history at sentencing. Pope, 23 Kan. App. 2d at 79. In State v. Mosley, 25 Kan. App. 2d 519, 965 P.2d 848 (1998), the defendant contended that the sentencing court erred in accepting his PSI report and finding he had admitted his criminal history after he stated on the record that he did not have a chance to talk to his attorney or review his proposed criminal history. Mosley argued on appeal that it was improper for his counsel to admit to his criminal history after he had initially objected to it. Finding the procedure employed by the sentencing court inappropriate, the Court of Appeals wrote: The PSI report should have been available prior to April 9, 1 day before sentencing. Also, Mosley's attorney should have had the opportunity to discuss the proposed criminal history with Mosley prior to the sentencing hearing. Nonetheless, during sentencing, Mosley did admit to his criminal history, specifically, his three prior person felonies. K.S.A. 21-4715 provides that if Mosley admitted his criminal history in court, the criminal history as summarized in the PSI report shall satisfy the State's burden of proof. 25 Kan. App. 2d at 527. Noting that Mosley did not maintain on appeal that his criminal history was incorrect, the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence. In K.S.A. 21-4721(e), the legislature established appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the sentencing court erred in determining the appropriate classification of a prior conviction. Case law establishes precedent for granting appellate review of criminal history errors despite a stipulation or lack of an objection below under limited circumstances. In the present case, where there was no oral stipulation by Vandervort in open court and no opportunity for him or counsel to review the amended criminal history worksheet prior to the hearing, we will proceed to the merits of his argument.
Vandervort maintains that the PSI report relied upon by the district court erroneously listed both of his 1980 Virginia convictions as person felonies rather than as nonperson felonies, resulting in a criminal history score of B when it should have been C. He asks this court to remand the matter for resentencing with instructions to amend his criminal history to C. The sentencing guidelines are based on two controlling factors: crime severity and criminal history of the defendant. In scoring criminal history, a distinction is made between person crimes and nonperson crimes. Generally, person crimes are weighed more heavily than nonperson crimes. [Citation omitted.] Designation of a crime as person or nonperson depends upon the nature of the offense. Crimes which inflict, or could inflict, physical or emotional harm to another are generally designated as person crimes. Crimes which inflict, or could inflict, damage to property are generally designated as nonperson crimes. [Citation omitted.] State v. Fifer, 20 Kan. App. 2d 12, 15, 881 P.2d 589 (1994), rev. denied 256 Kan. 996 (1994). The PSI report lists two prior adult felony convictions for Vandervort on September 10, 1980: indecent liberties and exposure. The State asserts that both offenses were properly classified as person crimes, while Vandervort argues that the exposure conviction should have been classified as a nonperson crime. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-4711(e) provides: Out-of-state convictions and juvenile adjudications will be used in classifying the offender's criminal history. An out-of-state crime will be classified as either a felony or a misdemeanor according to the convicting jurisdiction. If a crime is a felony in another state, it will be counted as a felony in Kansas. The state of Kansas shall classify the crime as person or nonperson. In designating a crime as person or nonperson comparable offenses shall be referred to. If the state of Kansas does not have a comparable offense, the out-of-state conviction shall be classified as a non-person crime. Convictions or adjudications occurring within the federal system, other state systems, the District of Columbia, foreign, tribal or military court are considered out-of-state convictions or adjudications. The facts required to classify out-of-state adult convictions and juvenile adjudications must be established by the state by a preponderance of the evidence. (Emphasis added.) Vandervort first claims that his prior conviction for exposure pursuant to Virginia Code § 18.2-370 is not comparable to K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3508 since the Kansas statute includes the element of who has not consented thereto while the Virginia Code does not. We note, however, that Vandervort concedes on appeal that K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3508 is the closest approximation of Kansas statutes to Virginia Code § 18.2-370. The Court of Appeals has stated: In determining criminal history, the sentencing court looks to the state in which the conviction occurred to determine if the crime is classified as a felony or misdemeanor. The court looks to the most comparable Kansas offense to determine whether the conviction is classified as a person or nonperson crime. K.S.A. 21-4711(e). State v. Hernandez, 24 Kan. App. 2d 285, 287, 944 P.2d 188 (1997). Vandervort confuses the term comparable with the concept of identical elements of the crime. For purposes of determining criminal history, the offenses need only be comparable, not identical. K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 21-4711(e). Since K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3508 is the closest approximation to Virginia Code § 18.2-370, it constitutes the comparable offense. Alternatively, Vandervort argues that if this court finds that Virginia Code § 18-2-370 is comparable to K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3508, his prior conviction for exposure should be scored as a nonperson felony. Vandervort asserts that since it is unclear when the acts occurred giving rise to his convictions in this case, the jury could have convicted him for acts that occurred at any time during the period between November 6, 1996, and September 17, 2000, reflected in the charging documents. Vandervort argues that since K.S.A. 2002 Supp. 21-3508 was classified as a nonperson misdemeanor prior to July 1, 1998, and since the penalty imposed must agree with the provisions in effect at the time the offense was committed, he should be sentenced under the lower criminal history. In support of his argument, Vandervort cites State v. Jackson, 239 Kan. 463, 721 P.2d 232 (1986). In Jackson, the court addressed an issue in which the crime of aggravated indecent liberties was amended to include sodomy during the charged time period provided to the jury. This amendment made the elements of sodomy and aggravated indecent liberties identical. The defendant argued that because the two offenses were identical, he could be convicted of only the lesser of the two offenses. The Jackson court pointed out that the defendant's argument failed to take into consideration the effective date of the latter statute. If the act of sodomy with a child occurred prior to July 1, 1984, the offense committed would be aggravated criminal sodomy; if, under the evidence, the jury were to conclude that the act occurred on or after July 1 and on or prior to the final charging date, the offense committed would be that of indecent liberties with a child. 239 Kan. at 471. Jackson's conviction was reversed and remanded on other grounds. The court held that if, in a new trial, the jury finds that the act occurred during the alleged time period, and if the jury is uncertain as to whether the act was committed before or after the effective date of the amendment, then defendant could be convicted of the lesser offense only. 239 Kan. at 472. In this case, it is uncertain when the acts occurred which the jury relied upon to convict Vandervort. Without that determination, Vandervort may have been convicted for acts which occurred prior to July 1, 1998. The State charged Vandervort with acts that occurred during a period between November 1, 1996, and September 17, 2000. The jury was instructed to consider this expansive period. With this uncertainty as to when each act relied upon by the jury occurred, Vandervort must be sentenced with the lower criminal history. As this court has noted in previous cases: Our rule that the penalty parameters for an offense are fixed as of the date of the commission of the offense is fair, logical and easy to apply. Neither the State nor a defendant may maneuver a sentencing date to take advantage of or avoid a change in a statute. State v. Sylva, 248 Kan. 118, 121, 804 P.2d 967 (1991). Vandervort's correct criminal history is C. Judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. Judgment of the District Court is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the sentence is vacated and remanded for resentencing pursuant to the direction of the Court of Appeals and based on a criminal history of C. ABBOTT and GERNON, JJ., not participating. LARSON, S.J., and BRAZIL, S.J., assigned. [1]