Opinion ID: 765518
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the plaintiff retained public-figure status at the time of the alleged defamation.

Text: 122 See Reuber v. Food Chemical News, Inc., 925 F.2d 703, 708-10 (4th Cir. 1991) (en banc). In Foretich, we added an additional consideration to the limited-purpose public figure inquiry when we held that if the content of a defamatory statement touches upon an area that state law has traditionally considered to be defamatory per se, then the plaintiff cannot be categorized as a limited-purpose public figure solely because he makes reasonable public replies to the statement. See 37 F.3d at 1558. In evaluating an individual's limited-purpose public figure status we look at the nature and extent of an individual's participation in the particular controversy giving rise to the defamation. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351. 123 In order to prevail on his assertion that Wells's participation in the Watergate controversy merits her classification as a limited-purpose public figure Liddy must establish each of the five elements recited above. See Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1556 (noting that the defendant bears the burden on all five elements). According to Liddy, Wells's voluntary injection into the Watergate controversy, an event of unprecedented historical interest and importance, is sufficient to satisfy the five-part test because she was interviewed by the FBI, mentioned in the newspaper, subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury, and called before the Senate in the early 1970s. Additionally, Liddy points to several media exposures Wells has had since the prostitution-oriented theory of the Watergate break-in emerged in 1984. Specifically, Liddy points out that Wells published a letter to the editor in the New York Times in 1985, spoke to a reporter on the twentieth anniversary of the Watergate break-in for an article that appeared in the Washington Post in 1992, spoke to the BBC in 1993, was named in an Arts & Entertainment Network broadcast entitledThe Key to Watergate and a Geraldo Rivera documentary Now it Can be Told, and spoke to historian James Rosen. Although Liddy has amply demonstrated that Wells has access to channels of effective communication, we conclude that Liddy has failed to show that Wells has voluntarily assumed [a role] of special prominence in the . . . public controversy. 24 Id. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Wells is a limited-purpose public figure. 124 Gertz, Firestone, and Wolston each have touched upon the characteristics that must be proven to demonstrate that a plaintiff has voluntarily assumed a role of special prominence in a public controversy. Reuber, 925 F.2d at 709. The Supreme Court stated in Gertz that the class of limited-purpose public figures included those individuals who thrust[ed] themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved, 418 U.S. at 345, or who voluntarily inject[ed] [themselves] . . . into a particular public controversy . . . [and] assume[d] special prominence in the resolution of public questions, id. at 351. Although Gertz, an attorney, had taken on a case that was related to a public controversy and likely to generate media exposure, the Court held that Gertz's actions were insufficient to characterize him as a public figure: 125 [Gertz's] participation related solely to his representation of a private client. He took no part in the criminal prosecution . . . . Moreover, he never discussed either the criminal or civil litigation with the press and was never quoted as having done so. He plainly did not thrust himself into the vortex of this public issue, nor did he engage the public's attention in an attempt to influence its outcome. 126 Id. at 352. 127 In Firestone, the Court stated that the Firestones' divorce was a private matter, not a public controversy, but even if it had been a public controversy, Mary Alice Firestone did not thrust herself to the forefront of [that] controversy in order to influence the resolution of the issues involved in it. 424 U.S. at 453. Thus, the Court held that Mary Alice Firestone was not a limited-purpose public figure. Then-Justice Rehnquist amplified the Court's holding, noting that Mary Alice Firestone: 128 [had not] freely cho[sen] to publicize issues as to the propriety of her married life. She was compelled to go to court by the State in order to obtain legal release from the bonds of matrimony. . . . [I]n such an instance resort to the judicial process . . . is no more voluntary in a realistic sense than that of the defendant called upon to defend his interests in court. Id. at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted). 129 The Court went on to observe that litigants in general have not voluntarily stepped before the public eye, but rather are drawn into a public forum largely against their will in order to attempt to obtain the only redress available to them or to defend themselves against actions brought by the State or by others. Id. at 457. 130 In Wolston, the Court built upon its holding in Firestone regarding the public figure status of those involved in litigation. Its holding extended the view that persons involved in litigation have not voluntarily sought prominence in a public controversy merely by being the subject of a subpoena to appear as a witness in a government investigation. In addressing whether Wolston had voluntarily injected himself into the controversy surrounding Soviet espionage in the 1950s, the Court stated: 131 It would be more accurate to say that [Wolston] was dragged unwillingly into the controversy. The Government pursued him in its investigation. [He] did fail to respond to a grand jury subpoena, and this failure, as well as his subsequent citation for contempt, did attract media attention. But the mere fact that [he] voluntarily chose not to appear before the grand jury, knowing that his action might be attended by publicity, is not decisive on the question of public figure status. . . . [Wolston] never discussed this matter with the press and limited his involvement to that necessary to defend himself against the contempt charge. It is clear that[he] played only a minor role in whatever public controversy there may have been concerning the investigation of Soviet espionage. 443 U.S. at 166-67. 132 Further, the Court observed that Wolston assumed no `special prominence in the resolution of public questions,' id. at 168 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 351), because [h]is failure to respond to the grand jury's subpoena was in no way calculated to draw attention to himself in order to invite public comment or influence the public with respect to any issue. He did not in any way seek to arouse public sentiment in his favor and against the investigation. Id. 133 In light of the foregoing, viewing Wells's public exposures during and after the Watergate break-in collectively, we conclude that Wells has not voluntarily assumed [a role] of special prominence in the . . . public controversy. Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1556. Gertz, Firestone, and Wolston establish conclusively that Wells was not a public figure during the immediate aftermath of the Watergate break-in in the 1970s. Like Wolston, Wells's involvement in the Watergate investigation was wholly involuntarily; she was dragged unwillingly into the controversy, Wolston, 443 U.S. at 166, initially by the commission of a crime at her workplace and later by the governmental investigation that ensued. Wells's discussions with the FBI, response to the grand jury subpoena, and appearance before the Senate committee simply were not voluntary actions but rather were compelled by the force of law. See id. Even if we assume arguendo that Wells was involved in criminal activity during her employment at the DNC, 25 precedent counsels that activity likely to engender publicity, even criminal activity, does not equate to taking on a role of special prominence in a public controversy. See Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168 (reject[ing] the further contention . . . that any person who engages in criminal conduct automatically becomes a public figure for purposes of comment on a limited range of issues relating to his conviction.); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (holding that an attorney who took on a case linked to a public controversy but who did not speak to the press was not a public figure). 134 The question then arises whether Wells voluntarily has attained special prominence in the Watergate controversy as a result of the revelation of the prostitution-related theory of the break-in. For the most part, Wells's reported role in Watergate has remained unchanged after Secret Agenda and Silent Coup -Wells is named as Spencer Oliver's secretary and a woman whose phone calls were overheard on illegal wire taps. To the extent that Wells's role has expanded, it has done so because Secret Agenda and Silent Coup revealed that Watergate burglar Martinez possessed a key to her desk, exposed prostitution activities that purportedly were occurring at the DNC, and implied that Wells may have had some connection to those illicit activities. There is no proof that any of these disclosures were the result of Wells's voluntary interaction with the authors. Instead, it is clear, as the district court concluded, that the story was divulged by a sole source, Bailley. See Wells, 1 F. Supp.2d at 543. Because the disclosures of Secret Agenda and Silent Coup cannot be fairly attributed to Wells's voluntary participation, we cannot conclude that she sought a prominent role in the Watergate controversy as a result of being named therein. 135 Therefore, the question of whether Wells has voluntarily assumed [a role] of special prominence in the . . . public controversy, Foretich, 37 F.3d at 1556, ultimately, on this record, revolves around four media contacts: (1) her letter-to-the-editor of the New York Times, published in 1985; (2) her 1992 interview with a Washington Post reporter on the twentieth anniversary of the Watergate break-in; (3) her interview with the BBC in 1993; and (4) her discussions with historian James Rosen. The letter-to-the-editor, made in response to a book review of Secret Agenda that named her as a figure involved in arranging dates with prostitutes, clearly falls within the category of self-help and reasonable response to reputation-injuring statements of the type that we approved in Foretich. See 37 F.3d at 1558. Therefore, Wells's letter-to-the-editor should not contribute to the public figure analysis. 136 Regarding Wells's three other media contacts, Firestone makes clear that voluntary discussion of events with the press does not per se indicate that a defamation plaintiff has thrust herself to the forefront of [a public] controversy. 424 U.S. at 454 n.3. Rather, when an individual has had contact with the press, the proper questions are whether he has attempted to influence the merits of a controversy, see id., or has draw[n] attention to himself in order to invite public comment, Wolston, 443 U.S. at 168, or invited that degree of public attention and comment . . . essential to meet the public figure level, Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 135 (1979). In this case, there is no proof that Wells spoke to the press in any role other than as a witness to history in response to their repeated requests. Wells, as a DNC worker at the time of Watergate, has a story to tell about the facts of the break-in and the circumstances surrounding the investigation that has independent value. Telling that story, however, is simply giving an eye-witness account of events that are no longer controversial. For example, whether the Watergate break-in occurred on June 17, 1972 is not generally regarded as an open question. How Wells felt as an individual caught up in the investigation is a strictly personal observation. Responding to requests from inquiring reporters about these matters does not convert Wells into a public figure when her statements cannot be interpreted to have an impact upon the merits of the ongoing Watergate controversy. See Firestone, 424 U.S. at 454 n.3 (stating that holding press conferences does not create public figure status when held in response to reporter inquiries and in a situation when it is not possible to influence the merits). 137 Twenty-seven years after the event, the still-controversial aspects of Watergate revolve around bigger issues such as why the break-in occurred, who was responsible, whether our Constitutional checks and balances are adequate, whether the American populace lost confidence in politicians as a result of the scandal, etc. Liddy has failed to point to evidence demonstrating that Wells has made any attempt to become a spokesperson on any of these types of matters. Therefore, we cannot conclude that Wells has voluntarily undertaken a position at the forefront of the Watergate controversy. The record establishes that Wells has conducted only a handful of interviews over the course of twenty-seven years and each one has been in response to inquiries from reporters requesting her eye-witness account. As a result, we conclude that Liddy has not met his burden of proving each of the five elements of this circuit's limited-purpose public figure test, and we must determine that Wells is not a limited-purpose public figure under our jurisprudence.