Opinion ID: 78564
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Background and Gross

Text: The district court considered the Defendant's motion for summary judgment under the burden-shifting standard set out in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court set out a burden shifting procedure for mixed motive discrimination claims under Title VII. Briefly stated, under Price Waterhouse, once a plaintiff shows that race or sex discrimination was a motivating or substantial factor in an employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the employer to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer would have made the same decision in the absence of the discriminatory motive. See id. at 1795; see also Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir.2003). Defendant argued in district court that summary judgment was appropriate pursuant to this same decision affirmative defense. It contended that, given Plaintiff's poor work, more than a preponderance of evidence showed that Defendant would have fired her, regardless of a discriminatory motive. Plaintiff countered by contending that the burden of persuasion in a motion for summary judgment  that no reasonable juror could find in the nonmovant's favor  was inconsistent with the Price Waterhouse preponderance standard. The district court disagreed with Plaintiff and concluded that no reasonable juror would dispute that Defendant had met its affirmative defense burden. The district judge wrote that Defendant had demonstrated that Plaintiff's termination was inevitable, given the number and severity of her workplace problems. After Plaintiff appealed, the Supreme Court in Gross clarified the nature of ADEA claims. The Supreme Court concluded that ADEA claims are not subject to the burden-shifting protocol set forth for Title VII suits in Price Waterhouse. Gross, 129 S.Ct. at 2349 (This Court has never held that [ Price Waterhouse 's] burden-shifting framework applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now.). In addition, the Supreme Court ruled out the idea of a mixed motive ADEA claim, instead requiring plaintiffs to show that age was the but for cause of an employment action. Id. at 2350. The ADEA requires that age [be] the `reason' that the employer decided to act. Id. Because an ADEA plaintiff must establish but for causality, no same decision affirmative defense can exist: the employer either acted because of the plaintiff's age or it did not. Id. at 2352 (The burden of persuasion does not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision.). Because the Supreme Court has excluded the whole idea of a mixed motive ADEA claim  and the corresponding same decision defense  we need not consider the district court's analysis of Defendant's affirmative defense. Instead, we look at Defendant's motion for summary judgment in accord with the ordinary default rule that plaintiffs bear the risk of failing to prove their claims. Id. at 2351. Making all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, we look to determine whether a material factual question exists on this record about whether Defendant discriminated against her. We say Yes.