Opinion ID: 1689865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Psychological Mitigators

Text: Gonzalez next contends the trial court erred in rejecting the statutory mitigating factor that he committed the murder while he was under extreme mental or emotional disturbance. On the other hand, the State responds that the trial court examined all the evidence regarding this mitigator and simply found that it was not established by the evidence. Gonzalez's claim on this issue is refuted by the record. The trial court, in a detailed order, specifically addressed and evaluated the testimony of each witness who testified for Gonzalez regarding the psychological aspects of his character and, in the end, found little substantiation for Gonzalez's claim of mental distress during the commission of this crime. This Court has long held that a trial court in its written order must evaluate each mitigating circumstance offered by the defendant. In Campbell v. State, 571 So.2d 415, 419 (Fla.1990), we said, When addressing mitigating circumstances, the sentencing court must expressly evaluate in its written order each mitigating circumstance proposed by the defendant to determine whether it is supported by the evidence .... See also Zack v. State, 753 So.2d 9, 18 (Fla.2000). Furthermore, in order to be sustained, the court's findings must be supported by competent, substantial evidence in the record. See Brown v. Wainwright, 392 So.2d 1327, 1331 (Fla.1981). In Zack, the defendant complained the trial court failed to consider a list of mitigating circumstances. After reviewing the sentencing order, we determined the factors were in fact discussed and referenced in the order with each mitigating factor properly set forth. See 753 So.2d at 20. That finding is similarly applicable in this case. During resentencing, the testimony of three doctors, Dr. Wagschul, a neurologist, Dr. Fisher, a clinical forensic psychologist, and Dr. Eisenstein, a neuropsychologist, was presented. The work of another doctor, Dr. Nadich, was also discussed. The sentencing order references the evidence presented by each of these physicians. The trial court relied on Walls v. State, 641 So.2d 381 (Fla.1994), as a guidepost in evaluating the expert testimony of each of the experts, particularly Dr. Eisenstein, whose testimony was most favorable to Gonzalez. In Walls we said: [A] distinction exists between factual evidence or testimony, and opinion testimony. As a general rule, uncontroverted factual evidence cannot simply be rejected unless it is contrary to law, improbable, untrustworthy, unreasonable or contradictory. E.g., Brannen v. State, 94 Fla. 656, 114 So. 429 (1927). This rule applies equally to the penalty phase of a capital trial. Hardwick, 521 So.2d at 1076. Opinion testimony, on the other hand, is not subject to the same rule. Brannen. Certain kinds of opinion testimony clearly are admissibleand especially qualified expert opinion testimonybut they are not necessarily binding even if uncontroverted. Opinion testimony gains its greatest force to the degree it is supported by the facts at hand, and its weight diminishes to the degree such support is lacking. Walls, 641 So.2d at 390 (emphasis added). Dr. Eisenstein, a neuropsychologist, reviewed Gonzalez's school records, medical records, police reports, and confession. He also interviewed Gonzalez concerning his family history. In addition, Eisenstein gathered information concerning Gonzalez's motor functions, sensory perceptions, language ability, intelligence, and personality traits through a variety of tests. On most of these tests, Gonzalez scored in the normal range. However, personality tests did show that Gonzalez was nervous, shy, and introverted and that he possessed minimal socialization skills. Language tests indicated Gonzalez ranged from normal on the fluency tests to profoundly impaired on the naming test to mildly retarded on reading articulation. On the WAIS R test, Gonzalez's full range IQ was found to be 80, the lower average range. However, his school records indicated an IQ of 75 at age 12. Dr. Eisenstein stated Gonzalez responded to the stress of incarceration, his trial, and his marriage. Based on these results, Dr. Eisenstein concluded that Gonzalez acted impulsively in killing Officer Bauer. He also opined that Gonzalez was under extreme emotional and mental distress at the time of the crime due to his having been raised in both the United States and Puerto Rico, his language deficits, his learning disability, pressure from his wife to make more money, and his brain injury. According to the trial court, Dr. Eisenstein's findings were not supported by Gonzalez's own confession, which showed a lack of impulsivity. Gonzalez was aware the robbery was being planned several days in advance of its execution, and even drove early to the bank with the other codefendants to ensure they would be the first customers there. The planning and laying in wait contradict the doctor's opinion that impulsiveness caused Gonzalez to kill Officer Bauer. The fact that Gonzalez had his gun drawn as he approached the bank employees also belies the contention that his actions were impulsive. The trial court went on to find that despite Gonzalez's brain damage, which was proven by the MRI testing Dr. Nadich performed showing evidence of pugilistic encephalopathy, his learning disabilities, and life stresses, Gonzalez had managed to conform his life to the law each day until January 3, 1992. As the trial judge pointed out in his order, Dr. Eisenstein's testimony was further weakened by the testimony of Dr. Wagschul. The deposition of Dr. Wagschul was read at the resentencing. Dr. Wagschul, a neurologist, diagnosed Gonzalez as having pugilistic encephalopathy, a condition common in boxers characterized by the filling of brain cavities with spinal fluid. He stated this condition could cause sudden changes in mood and behavior, but acknowledged that the literature he had read did not show a link between that illness and the commission of robbery or murder. Furthermore, Dr. Wagschul testified that Gonzalez had not suffered neurological difficulty as a result of this brain injury. Wagschul opined that although Gonzalez's brain injury could lead to impulsiveness, it would not cause someone to rob a bank and kill a police officer. The trial court also noted that Gonzalez's attempts to establish that brain damage affected his conduct was further undermined by the testimony of another expert, Dr. Fisher. Dr. Fisher, a clinical forensic psychologist who had developed a system for predicting future dangerousness, also testified. He examined Gonzalez and found that he was not psychotic, had no major mental disturbance, was not retarded, and did not use drugs or alcohol. In the final analysis, the evidence presented did not show that Gonzalez had a mental impairment that caused him to behave in this manner. After closely analyzing the testimony of the witnesses Gonzalez presented, the trial court found that Gonzalez had not sufficiently established evidence of psychological problems that would have affected his behavior when the murders were committed. See Walls v. State . The written sentencing order shows that the trial judge adequately considered the evidence presented in mitigation. The testimony of Dr. Eisenstein that Gonzalez's pugilistic encephalopathy may have caused him to commit murder was refuted by the opinions of Dr. Wagschul and Dr. Fisher as well as evidence that Gonzalez had been law-abiding until the day of the crime. Given the detailed analysis provided by the trial court, this claim by Gonzalez is meritless. Although the trial court found the statutory mental mitigators had not been established by the evidence, the evidence was sufficient to establish nonstatutory mitigation. The trial judge said: Although the testimony of the defense witnesses did not establish the statutory mitigating circumstances, the court finds that the defendant's brain damage, learning disability and below average intelligence have been reasonably established and constitute a non-statutory mitigating circumstance. In addition, witnesses testified that the defendant has suffered migraine headaches since boyhood. Regardless of those physical problems, the defendant was able to work, marry, comply with the law, and contribute to society in spite of these deficiencies. Accordingly, the court gives this mitigating circumstance little weight. It is clear from the sentencing order that the trial court considered, evaluated and weighed all the mental health evidence submitted in mitigation. Error in failing to find the statutory mental mitigators has not been demonstrated.