Opinion ID: 1366491
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent Review of the Death Sentences

Text: In every capital case, we independently review the record to determine the existence of both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. A.R.S. § 13-4035; State v. Stevens, 158 Ariz. 595, 598, 764 P.2d 724, 727 (1988); State v. Richmond, 114 Ariz. 186, 196, 560 P.2d 41, 51 (1976). Additionally, this court must measure the weight accorded to each circumstance in determining whether the trial court properly imposed the death sentence. State v. Lavers, 168 Ariz. 376, 391, 814 P.2d 333, 348 (1991). We now undertake this review.
The death penalty may be imposed only if the state has proved the existence of at least one aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. See A.R.S. 13-703(E); State v. Jordan, 126 Ariz. 283, 286, 614 P.2d 825, 828 (1980). Here, the trial court found that the state had proved 3 aggravating circumstances: (1) that defendant was previously convicted of a violent felony in the United States, (2) that defendant committed the offense in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner, and (3) that defendant committed multiple homicides during the commission of the offense. The court considered this last aggravating circumstance to support the death sentence on either Count I or Count II. Cruel, Heinous, or Depraved Manner. Defendant contends that the trial court erred in finding that each murder was committed in an especially cruel, heinous, or depraved manner. He specifically argues that several findings of fact relating to the court's determination that the murder was committed in an especially heinous or depraved manner were not supported by evidence in the record. The terms especially cruel, heinous, or depraved are considered in the disjunctive; therefore, the presence of any one factor is sufficient to establish the aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(6). State v. Correll, 148 Ariz. 468, 480, 715 P.2d 721, 733 (1986). In its special verdict, the trial court also found that the victims had been murdered in an especially cruel manner. Our independent review of the grisly facts of this case confirms that finding. We therefore need not address defendant's argument relating to whether sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding of heinousness and depravity. Cruelty refers to the pain and suffering that the victim experiences before death. State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. 152, 177, 800 P.2d 1260, 1285 (1990). Cruelty can be established by evidence of a prolonged, bloody struggle and the victim's defensive wounds. See Amaya-Ruiz, 166 Ariz. at 178, 800 P.2d at 1286; State v. Lopez, 163 Ariz. 108, 115, 786 P.2d 959, 966 (1990). Cruelty can also be established by evidence of the victim's awareness of suffering inflicted on a loved one. State v. McCall, 139 Ariz. 147, 161, 677 P.2d 920, 934 (1983). The victim's suffering must have been foreseeable to the defendant. State v. Hinchey, 165 Ariz. 432, 438, 799 P.2d 352, 358 (1990). The victims in this case endured great pain and suffering over a prolonged period of time. The neighbors testified to the banging, screaming, cries for help, and running noises that alerted them to the homicides and that continued for 20 to 30 minutes. When the police arrived, they found evidence of great violence; they discovered blood and murder weapons throughout the apartment. Expert testimony as well as the physical evidence established that both victims were conscious during the time that defendant repeatedly stabbed each of them 15-20 times. Each was obviously aware of the other's suffering. Both sustained numerous other cuts and bruises. Mrs. G suffered defensive wounds while fighting unsuccessfully to save her life. The victims' sufferings were inescapably foreseeable to defendant. We believe the record in this case amply demonstrates that these murders were especially cruel. Thus, the (F)(6) aggravating factor applies here on both counts. Defendant did not challenge the trial judge's finding of aggravating factors under §§ 13-703(F)(2) and (F)(8), nor did he raise the issue on appeal. The existence of these factors is obvious to the court, but for the sake of avoiding a later challenge, we review these findings as well. Prior Felony Convictions. The trial court found that the state proved the existence of an aggravating circumstance provided by § 13-703(F)(2). [6] Specifically, the trial court held that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had been previously convicted of two felonies in the United States involving the use or threat of violence on another person. In reaching its conclusion, the trial court reviewed defendant's October 23, 1981 conviction for aggravated assault under §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and -1204(A)(2), and his August 13, 1979 conviction for robbery under § 13-1902. The court concluded that either conviction would be sufficient to meet the requirements of § 13-703(F)(2). We agree with the trial court's findings. On October 23, 1981, defendant was convicted of aggravated assault, in violation of §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and -1204(A)(2). Section 13-1203(A)(2) provides: A. A person commits assault by: .... 2. Intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury; .... Section 13-1204(A)(2) provides: A. A person commits aggravated assault if such person commits assault as defined in § 13-1203 under any of the following circumstances: .... 2. If such person uses a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. Reading the two statutes together, defendant was convicted of intentionally placing another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent physical harm by using a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument. [T]o constitute an aggravating circumstance under A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(2), the prior conviction must be for a felony which by its statutory definition involves violence or the threat of violence on another person. State v. Romanosky, 162 Ariz. 217, 228, 782 P.2d 693, 704 (1989), citing Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 511, 662 P.2d at 1018. Accordingly, [i]f, under the statutory definition, the defendant could have committed and been convicted of the crime without using or threatening violence, the prior conviction may not qualify as a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2). Romanosky, 162 Ariz. at 228, 782 P.2d at 704; see State v. Fierro, 166 Ariz. 539, 549, 804 P.2d 72, 82 (1990). In Fierro, this court held that a conviction for aggravated assault under §§ 13-1203 and -1204 did not qualify as an aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2) because it was possible to commit aggravated assault under these two statutes without the use or threat of violence. 166 Ariz. at 550, 804 P.2d at 83. However, in this case, by specifying and proving the specific subsections under which defendant was convicted, the state avoided the result in Fierro. By their very terms, a conviction under §§ 13-1203(A)(2) and -1204(A)(2) necessarily involves violence or the threat of violence on another person, thus qualifying as a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2). See Romanosky, 162 Ariz. at 228, 782 P.2d at 704, citing Gillies, 135 Ariz. at 511, 662 P.2d at 1018. Defendant's conviction for aggravated assault, standing alone, is sufficient to support the court's finding of an aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2). Moreover, as the trial court found, defendant's August 13, 1979 robbery conviction also supports the court's finding of an aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2). On August 13, 1979, defendant was convicted of robbery in violation of § 13-1902. That section defines robbery as follows: A. A person commits robbery if in the course of taking any property of another from his person or immediate presence and against his will, such person threatens or uses force against any person.... By its terms, a person commits robbery by either threatening to use force or using force against any person. Because a robbery conviction under § 13-1902 involves violence or the threat of violence on another person, defendant's conviction can be used to prove a statutory aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2). See, e.g., State v. Watson, 120 Ariz. 441, 448, 586 P.2d 1253, 1260 (1978). Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's finding that the state proved the existence of an aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(2). Multiple Homicides. The trial court found that the state had proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant [had] been convicted of one or more other homicides ... which were committed during the commission of the offense. See A.R.S. § 13-703(F)(8). And, in its special verdict, the trial court stated that the finding of multiple homicides is an aggravating circumstance that supports the imposition of a death sentence on either Count I or Count II. We analyze `the temporal, spatial, and motivational relationships between the capital homicide and the collateral [homicide], as well as ... the nature of that [homicide] and the identity of its victim' in determining whether the evidence supports a finding that a murder was committed during the commission of another murder. Lavers, 168 Ariz. at 393, 814 P.2d at 350, quoting Annotation, Sufficiency of Evidence, for Death Penalty Purposes, To Establish Statutory Aggravating Circumstance That Murder Was Committed in Course of Committing, Attempting, Or Fleeing From Other Offense, and the Like  Post-Gregg Cases, 67 A.L.R. 4th 887, 892, 894 (1989). Defendant was convicted of two counts of premeditated first-degree murder. The murders occurred in the same place and resulted from the same disturbance. Moreover, both murders were committed by appellant in a relatively short period of time in what can be fairly viewed as one continuous course of criminal conduct. Romine v. State, 251 Ga. 208, 305 S.E.2d 93, 99 (1983). The record supports a finding that each murder was committed during the commission of the other murder. Accordingly, we agree with the trial court's finding of the existence of an aggravating circumstance under § 13-703(F)(8). We note, however, that once proved, this aggravating factor applies to each first-degree murder conviction. See State v. Greenway, 170 Ariz. 155, 167-68, 823 P.2d 22, 34-35 (1991).
Defendant must prove the existence of any mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C); Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 551, 804 P.2d at 84. The trial court found that defendant proved the existence of one statutory mitigating circumstance and 7 non-statutory mitigating circumstances. Capacity. The trial court found that defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution. A.R.S. § 13-703(G)(1). Mickey McMahon, Ph.D., the psychologist who performed defendant's diagnostic evaluation, concluded: I can state with reasonable psychological certainty that the defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was significantly diminished. The cause of such diminished capacity is at least a combination of the defendant's psychological makeup, ... and the alcohol/cocaine intoxicated state he appears to have been in at the time of the offense. In addition, that intoxicated state was also affected by the more than 2 months of alcohol and cocaine abuse he underwent prior to the offense. Because the record contains no evidence contradicting Dr. McMahon's findings, we agree with the trial court that defendant has proved the existence of the § 13-703(G)(1) circumstance. Non-Statutory Mitigating. In addition to the mitigating circumstances specifically described in § 13-703(G), the sentencing judge must consider any aspect of the defendant's character or record and any circumstance of the offense relevant to determining whether the death penalty is appropriate. McCall, 139 Ariz. at 162, 677 P.2d at 935; see § 13-703(G). Accordingly, the trial court considered various factors that defendant presented in his sentencing memorandum. Among the matters offered by defendant to show that leniency was warranted in his case were: (1) his unstable family background, (2) his poor educational experience, (3) that he was the victim of sexual abuse while he was young, (4) his gang affiliation, (5) his excellent work record while in prison, (6) his remorse, (7) his chronic substance abuse, (8) his psychological history, and (9) his love of family. With the exception of defendant's remorse and excellent work record while in prison, the trial court treated all of the above-mentioned factors, including defendant's prior gang affiliation, as non-statutory mitigating factors. Because the trial court considered defendant's gang affiliation as a mitigating factor, we assume, without deciding, that the trial court correctly found and considered this a nonstatutory mitigating factor, and we adopt that finding. We remind the courts, however, that although they must consider all evidence offered in mitigation, they are not bound to accept such evidence as mitigating. The trial court must make two determinations. First, did the defendant prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the fact or circumstance  i.e., that he had been affiliated with a gang. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C); Fierro, 166 Ariz. at 551, 804 P.2d at 84. Second, once the existence of the offered fact or circumstance has been established, the court must consider whether this fact or circumstance in some way is mitigating. State v. McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. 93, 102, 664 P.2d 637, 646 (1983). If the court finds that the fact or circumstance is mitigating, the court then should consider each mitigating circumstance individually and all mitigating circumstances cumulatively when weighing the mitigating and aggravating factors. See State v. Gallegos, 178 Ariz. 1, 870 P.2d 1097 (1994). Again, we refer the courts to State v. Leslie, 147 Ariz. 38, 50, 708 P.2d 719, 731 (1985), in which this court attempted to provide more precise guidance on this issue. In Leslie, we stated that the better practice is for the trial court to place, on the record, a list of all factors offered by a defendant in mitigation and then [provide] reasons for accepting or rejecting them. 147 Ariz. at 50, 708 P.2d at 731. As we said in Gallegos, [t]his advice remains valid today, and moreover, it applies equally to both statutory and non-statutory mitigating circumstances. 178 Ariz. at 23, 870 P.2d at 1119. Using the two-prong test discussed above to analyze the two factors that the trial court rejected, we agree with the trial court's rejection of defendant's remorse and excellent prison work record as mitigating factors. The trial court concluded that defendant failed to prove remorse by a preponderance of the evidence because the trial court found that defendant has never admitted harming either victim and has shown no remorse for their deaths. Similarly, the trial court rejected defendant's offer of his excellent prison work record as mitigating because the court concluded that [defendant's] overall performance as an inmate has been poor, as is evidenced by his escape conviction in CR-128529 and his going AWOL and being written up on several occasions, .... Thus, defendant failed to meet the first of the two-prong test described above: he failed to prove that he was remorseful over the victims' deaths and that he had an excellent prison record. Having concluded that defendant failed to prove the fact or circumstance offered in mitigation, we do not reach the question of whether the fact or circumstance suggests that defendant should be treated with leniency. See McMurtrey, 136 Ariz. at 102, 664 P.2d at 646. Finally, defendant argues for the first time on appeal that the state's failure to perform DNA testing should preclude the imposition of the death sentence. The state did not perform DNA tests on either the droplets of blood on Mrs. G's body, which appeared to have fallen straight down from their origin at a 90° angle, or on blood found on the wall outside the victims' apartment. Defendant argues that these tests could have conclusively proven whether defendant had in fact committed the murders. Therefore, according to defendant, the state's failure to provide this testing should mitigate against the death sentence. Defendant is effectively claiming that there is some residual doubt as to his guilt, and argues that because the state could have resolved all question of defendant's guilt had it performed DNA tests, this court should reduce his sentence to life. We reject defendant's claim. We begin by noting that the state do[es] not have a constitutional duty to perform any particular tests. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59, 109 S.Ct. 333, 338, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). Moreover, after having reviewed the record in this case, we find no residual doubt about defendant's guilt. Thus, we find no merit in defendant's residual doubt argument.