Opinion ID: 1658206
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Erickson Appeal

Text: The Ericksons contend that the trial court erred in allowing Great Plains to take Jerstad's post-trial deposition. Great Plains was notified that the Ericksons had subpoenaed Jerstad for trial. However, Great Plains apparently was not notified when the Ericksons subsequently released Jerstad from that subpoena. The Ericksons assert that, rather than relying on their subpoena, Great Plains should have subpoenaed Jerstad for trial. Generally, if a witness does not show up for trial, a party asserting the deprivation of the right to examine that witness may not rely on the fact that the opposing party subpoenaed the witness. See Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co. of Wisconsin v. Industrial Comm'n, 15 Ariz.App. 590, 490 P.2d 35 (1971); Hosner v. Brown, 40 Mich.App. 515, 199 N.W.2d 295 (1972). However, the issue in this case is not whether Great Plains could rely on the subpoena issued by the Ericksons, but whether the trial court erred in permitting Great Plains to take Jerstad's deposition. A trial court is afforded great latitude and discretion in conducting a trial and, absent an abuse of discretion, its decision on matters relating to the conduct of a trial will not be set aside on appeal. E.g., Ward v. Shipp, 340 N.W.2d 14 (N.D.1983). Thus, a trial court has broad discretion to allow additional time for the arrival of a witness [ Ward v. Shipp, supra ]; to permit the reopening of a case for clarification of the record [ Leno v. Ehli, 339 N.W.2d 92 (N.D.1983)]; and to sua sponte order a supplemental hearing for the taking of further evidence. Tom Beuchler Const. v. City of Williston, 392 N.W.2d 403 (N.D.1986). A trial court's discretion must be exercised in a manner which comports with substantial justice because a trial is a search for the truth. Ward v. Shipp, supra . A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable manner. Wall v. Pennsylvania Life Insurance Co., 274 N.W.2d 208 (N.D.1979). After carefully reviewing the record in light of the circumstances involved in this case, we conclude that the trial court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in permitting Great Plains to take Jerstad's deposition and therefore did not abuse its discretion. The Ericksons contend that the trial court erred in refusing to admit into evidence an exhibit tending to establish a mistake of fact regarding the amount due on the open account when the notes and mortgages were executed in 1982 and 1983. The Ericksons assert that the exhibit tends to establish that, on several occasions, Great Plains had claimed that different amounts were due on the account. The exhibit consisted of letters dated July 7, 1984, and October 18, 1984, in which Great Plains' representatives sought to settle the account for less than the amount due. The trial court ruled that these letters constituted an offer of compromise and, as such, were inadmissible under Rule 408, N.D.R.Evid. No offer of proof was made relating those 1984 letters to an alleged mistake of fact regarding the amount due on the open account when the notes and mortgages were executed in 1982 and 1983. In the absence of a showing of that nexus by an offer of proof we are unable to conclude that the trial court erred in refusing to allow the exhibit into evidence. The Ericksons contend that the trial court erred in treating their counterclaim as an affirmative defense thereby denying their right to a jury trial. In their counterclaim the Ericksons alleged that Great Plains fraudulently misrepresented the amount due on their account and that this misrepresentation induced them to execute the note and mortgage. Before trial, the district court determined that the Ericksons' counterclaim was actually an affirmative defense and denied their demand and motion for a jury trial. In Ask, Inc. v. Wegerle, 286 N.W.2d 290, 295 (N.D.1979), we said that a party raising a legal defense in an equitable action is not entitled to have a jury trial on those issues, but that a party raising legal issues in a counterclaim is entitled to a jury trial on those issues. Thus we must consider whether the issues raised by the Ericksons are a defense or a counterclaim. In Zeman v. Mikolasek, 75 N.D. 41, 25 N.W.2d 272 (1946), we said that in order to constitute a counterclaim the allegations must establish an independent cause of action, and facts that merely serve to defeat a plaintiff's cause of action are not a counterclaim but a defense. In the instant case we believe the facts alleged in the counterclaim do not present an independent cause of action but negate the existence of a valid note and mortgage, thereby controverting the allegations in Great Plains' complaint. Pursuant to Rule 8(c), N.D.R.Civ.P., [w]hen a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so requires, shall treat the pleading as if there had been a proper designation. We conclude that the court did not err in treating the counterclaim as a defense and denying the Ericksons a jury trial on those issues. The Ericksons also contend that the trial court's findings of fact that Great Plains did not mislead or make misrepresentations to them are contrary to the evidence. The Ericksons assert that Great Plains' misrepresentation prevented their free and mutual consent to the note and mortgage. In essence, they assert that they presented unrebutted evidence to the trial court that Great Plains' employees falsely represented to them that unless their account was paid, or notes and mortgages on their homes were executed, Great Plains would commence a collection action resulting in the sale of their home. The Ericksons contend that, but for the misrepresentations by Great Plains, they would not have consented to the note and mortgage. The trial court made the following findings of fact: The Plaintiff did not misrepresent the amount due from the Defendants on open account at the time the Mortgage was executed. The Plaintiff did not misrepresent or mislead the Defendants concerning their legal rights regarding the Mortgage prior to its execution. These findings of fact are subject to the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a), N.D.R.Civ.P. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when, although there is some evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. In re Estate of Elmer, 210 N.W.2d 815 (N.D.1973). After a careful review of the record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, and we conclude that the trial court's findings of fact are not clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the district court judgment against the Ericksons.