Opinion ID: 1875202
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the court erred in granting defendant's instruction d-9

Text: Under this assignment of error, Copeland requests this Court to remove the assessment of comparative negligence and restore to him the original jury award of $350,000. Instruction D-9 reads as follows: The Court instructs you that if you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that Plaintiff was himself guilty of some negligence which proximately contributed to the accident in question and the injuries sustained by him, you must still return a verdict for Plaintiff if you also find that Defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately contributed to the accident in question and to Plaintiff's injury. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that both Plaintiff and Defendant were negligent and that their respective negligence, if any, proximately contributed to the accident in question and to Plaintiff's injury, then you must first determine the total amount of the damages to which Plaintiff is entitled and then reduce his damages by the percentage or amount of negligence attributable to Plaintiff, if any. As can be seen, instruction D-9 is a contributory negligence instruction, and Copeland objected to the inclusion of it. The basis of Copeland's argument is contained in the case of Trainer v. Gibson, 360 So.2d 1226 (Miss. 1978). In Trainer, which was an automobile personal injury case, the jury found both the plaintiff and defendant guilty of negligence and awarded the plaintiff $10,000 in damages, from which the plaintiff appealed, contending it was reversible error to grant a contributory negligence instruction without defining what facts would constitute such negligence. This Court, speaking through Justice Walker, affirmed the lower court on the question of the defendant's liability, but remanded the case for a new trial on the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff and damages. The basis of the Court's decision was that the instruction complained of failed to state the facts that the jury must have found in order to constitute negligence. The Court stated: We have stated on several occasions that an instruction charging negligence or contributory negligence must define those acts which would constitute such. Jones v. Craft, 218 So.2d 727 (Miss. 1969); Rayborn v. Freeman, 209 So.2d 193 (Miss. 1968); Gore v. Patrick, 246 Miss. 715, 150 So.2d 169 (1963). We have also held that even though failure to do so is error, it is harmless error where another instruction correctly informs the jury what facts constitute negligence. Gore v. Patrick, supra. 360 So.2d at 1228; see also Akin v. Cowie, 405 So.2d 903, 906-07 (Miss. 1981). In the case at bar, there are no instructions offered by Butler and the City which attempt to inform the jury of what facts constitute negligence. Butler and the City correctly note that there was ample evidence and testimony presented to support a finding of contributory negligence. However, as may be seen from Trainer v. Gibson, supra , and those cases following it, this is not conclusive. The jury must be instructed as to the facts constituting such negligence, and, if not, reversible error has been committed. It should be pointed out, however, that a jury has the duty and prerogative to make a decision as to contributory negligence and to reduce the award of damages, if any, in accordance with any contributory negligence. See Edwards by and through Edwards v. Patrick by and through Patrick, 469 So.2d 92 (Miss. 1985); Watkins v. Ross, 380 So.2d 1265 (Miss. 1980); Altom v. Wood, 298 So.2d 700 (Miss. 1974); Carr v. Cox, 255 So.2d 317 (Miss. 1971). Thus, a jury may reduce an award by taking into account any contributory negligence, but only in two situations. The first is when the jury is properly instructed as to those facts constituting contributory negligence, and the second is when the jury is not instructed on contributory negligence, but is justified under the evidence in finding contributory negligence. The case sub judice fits into neither of these categories. The evidence in the case at bar does not clearly establish negligence on one party only. The testimony of both Butler and Copeland, who were the only eyewitnesses called to testify, states that neither of them knew exactly what had happened. Thus, it is for the jury to determine which of the parties  indeed possibly both of them  were negligent and to what degree, if any. We do find, however, that the jury had the requisite amount of evidence to find Butler, and thus the City, negligent. Nevertheless, reversible error was committed since the jury was not presented with an instruction stating what facts would constitute negligence. Consequently, since it may not be said from a review of the record that Copeland was in no way contributorily negligent, it seems that the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Finally, in finding Copeland's first argument meritorious, we find no need to discuss the remaining errors assigned. For the reasons stated above, we affirm the lower court on the question of the City's and Butler's negligence, but reverse and remand this case for a new trial on the question of Copeland's negligence, if any, and damages. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED FOR A NEW TRIAL. PATTERSON, C.J., WALKER and ROY NOBLE LEE, P.JJ., and HAWKINS, DAN M. LEE, PRATHER, ROBERTSON and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.