Opinion ID: 2463945
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimonial Evidence (Clayton's points 4 and 5)

Text: Clayton contends that the trial court plainly erred in allowing witnesses to testify that Martha Ball was afraid of Clayton and that Clayton disliked law enforcement officials. These points are not preserved for appeal and review is for plain error. Rule 30.20.
Clayton contends that the trial court plainly erred by allowing the testimony of Martha Ball, Vicky Deeter, and Carolyn Leonard that Martha Ball was afraid of Clayton on the night of November 27, 1996. Clayton contends that the testimony suggested that he had a propensity to do things that were bad, violent, or fearsome and may have suggested to the jury that Clayton was involved in other crimes. Martha Ball testified, I was scared; he pushed me one time, and he had been drinking, so I didn't want to go with him. She also stated that she did not want to go back to her mother's home because I was afraid. Vicky Deeter testified that when Martha arrived at her home on the evening of November 27 she was very shook up, white as a sheet and scared. She was pretty scared. She also stated that Martha was shaking from head to toe. She had to sit down for a while before I could get her to talk. Like I said, she was just as pale as you could get. Lastly, Carolyn Leonard testified that Martha was scared and she knew that Martha was scared because she told me she couldn't come home. The evidence presented through Ball, Deeter, and Leonard cannot be characterized as clear evidence associating [Clayton] with other crimes. State v. Hornbuckle, 769 S.W.2d 89, 96 (Mo. banc 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 860, 110 S.Ct. 171, 107 L.Ed.2d 128 (1989). Rather, this testimony provided a complete and coherent picture of the crime charged. See Harris, 870 S.W.2d at 810; State v. Basile, 942 S.W.2d 342, 356 (Mo. banc 1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 213, 139 L.Ed.2d 148 (1997). The testimony in question also cannot be held to have had a decisive effect on the jury, especially when coupled with Ball's testimony that she still loves Clayton and has been to visit him since his arrest. See Basile, 942 S.W.2d at 356. Clayton has not established that manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice resulted from the admission of this evidence. Point 4 is denied.
Clayton contends that the trial court plainly erred by allowing the testimony of his jail-mates, William Rogers and Robert Compton, regarding Clayton's statements to them about the offense and about shooting the jail guards. He contends that their testimony provides evidence of other crimes and bad acts. William Rogers testified that Clayton talked about his inability to obtain bond, that he wanted to get out, escape, and that he talked with Rogers about escaping. Rogers also testified that Clayton had told him about shooting the officer, that [Clayton] walked right up to the door of the police car and shot him and that [Clayton] took his .38 and walked right up to the car and shot him before the other guy had a chance. Robert Compton also testified that Clayton had talked with him about the shooting. Compton testified that He had told me he had shot the Barry County Officer.    He told me he had shot him through the window of his police car.    He told me it was either him or the officer, he believed that the officer was going to shoot him, and he said the officer pulled up and he had to make a choice then. He had a pistol behind his back and he said that he just shot the cop before the cop would shoot him, and then he just made gestures, you know, acting like he had a gun in his hand.    He didn't tell me whether he knew him or not. He told me that the officer deserved it, that he had been harassing a lot of people, and he said somebody should have shot him before that. Compton also testified about Clayton's dislike of the other officers and jail guards. Did the defendant ever say anything about any other officers? Uh, just the officers that arrested him. His first thought was to shoot them too and go ahead and get out of state at that time. And the officers at Lawrence County Jail. Compton testified that Clayton wanted to escape and had attempted to unlock the turnkey with a piece of metal, that he wanted Compton's assistance in getting out of the country, and that Clayton stated that the jail guards deserved to, you know, have it done to them too. Clayton's statements concerning Deputy Castetter are admissions of the crime and admissible without question. These statements have nothing to do with other crimes or uncharged bad acts. The evidence regarding talk of escape was relevant in that it tended to show a consciousness of guilt. See State v. Driscoll, 711 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Mo. banc 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922, 107 S.Ct. 329, 93 L.Ed.2d 301 (1986). Likewise, evidence regarding Clayton's dislike of the jail guards and law enforcement officers does not necessarily constitute evidence of another crime. See Hornbuckle, 769 S.W.2d at 96. This testimonial evidence was relevant to establish Clayton's motive in shooting Officer Castetter. The state's theory of motive was that Clayton had a problem with law enforcement officers in general and that he shot Officer Castetter to avoid arrest and the revocation of his probation. See State v. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d 527, 534 (Mo. banc 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 933, 108 S.Ct. 309, 98 L.Ed.2d 267 (1987). Wide latitude is generally allowed in the development of evidence of motive. Mallett, 732 S.W.2d at 533. Lastly, Clayton contends that his jail-mates' testimony about the shooting provided evidence of the element of deliberation that was otherwise nonexistent. Direct proof of a required mental state is seldom available. See Simmons, 955 S.W.2d at 739; State v. Turner, 623 S.W.2d 4, 7 (Mo. banc 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 931, 102 S.Ct. 1982, 72 L.Ed.2d 448 (1982). A mental state may be proved by indirect evidence and inferences reasonably drawn from circumstances surrounding the slaying. Turner, 623 S.W.2d at 7; Simmons, 955 S.W.2d at 739. Clayton has not established that admission of this evidence resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Point 5 is denied.