Opinion ID: 1767064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Denial of Strong's Objection to Admission of Evidence of Attempted Drug Overdoses

Text: Strong's counsel objected on the basis of relevance when counsel for the State inquired as to how many times Strong had attempted to overdose on drugs since the time he was made aware of K.M.'s allegations against him. The circuit court allowed the questioning as tending to show knowledge of guilt. A ruling on the relevancy of evidence is discretionary and will not be reversed unless the trial court abused its discretion. Clay v. State, 318 Ark. 122, 883 S.W.2d 822 (1994). It is well settled that the acts, conduct, and declarations of an accused before or after the crime may furnish necessary corroboration. MacKool v. State, 365 Ark. 416, 231 S.W.3d 676 (2006). We have held that flight following the commission of an offense is a factor that may be considered with other evidence in determining probable guilt and may be considered as corroboration of evidence tending to establish guilt. Chapman v. State, 343 Ark. 643, 38 S.W.3d 305 (2001). We have also held that evidence of an accused's refusal to submit to a chemical test can be properly admitted as circumstantial evidence showing a knowledge or consciousness of guilt. Medlock v. State, 332 Ark. 106, 964 S.W.2d 196 (1998). Finally, we have held that an escape from incarceration is similarly admissible as circumstantial evidence of guilt. Clay v. State, supra . This court, however, has never directly addressed the question of whether evidence of suicide attempts is admissible to show guilt or consciousness of guilt. In MacKool v. State, supra , the appellant argued that evidence that he had cut his wrists after giving a statement could not be considered as corroborative of his guilt, because there was another reasonable explanation as to why he cut his wrists. Yet, the appellant did not argue that the evidence was inadmissible. Id. This court held that, once it was admitted, the evidence and the significance to be attached to it were matters exclusively within the province of the jury. Id. We noted in the MacKool case that many jurisdictions have held that evidence of an accused's attempted suicide is admissible as probative of consciousness of guilt. Id. Examples include California and Delaware, which both adhere to a broad rule allowing for the admissibility of evidence of any conduct of a defendant subsequent to the commission of the crime and tending to show consciousness of guilt. People v. Butler, 12 Cal.App.3d 189, 90 Cal.Rptr. 497 (1970); McKinney v. State, 466 A.2d 356 (Del.1983). In People v. Butler, supra , the California court noted that there is no requirement for the admissibility of evidence of a suicide attempt that consciousness of guilt be the only logical explanation. Florida courts have upheld jury instructions stating that a defendant's attempted suicide may be considered as an indication of a desire to evade prosecution and as an inference of guilt. Walker v. State, 483 So.2d 791 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1986). See also Aldridge v. State, 229 Ga.App. 544, 494 S.E.2d 368 (1997); State v. Hargraves, 62 Idaho 8, 107 P.2d 854 (1940); People v. Campbell, 126 Ill.App.3d 1028, 82 Ill.Dec. 39, 467 N.E.2d 1112 (1984); State v. Mitchell, 450 N.W.2d 828 (Iowa 1990); Commonwealth v. Sheriff, 425 Mass. 186, 680 N.E.2d 75 (1997); State v. Painter, 329 Mo. 314, 44 S.W.2d 79 (1931); State v. Campbell, 146 Mont. 251, 405 P.2d 978 (1965); State v. Plunkett, 62 Nev. 258, 149 P.2d 101 (1944); State v. Brown, 128 N.H. 606, 517 A.2d 831 (1986); State v. Mann, 132 N.J. 410, 625 A.2d 1102 (1993); State v. Blancett, 24 N.M. 433, 174 P. 207 (1918); State v. Hunt, 305 N.C. 238, 287 S.E.2d 818 (1982); Commonwealth v. Giacobbe, 341 Pa. 187, 19 A.2d 71 (1941); State v. White, 649 S.W.2d 598 (Tenn.Crim.App.1982); State v. Onorato, 171 Vt. 577, 762 A.2d 858 (2000). Although we have not yet adopted a similar rule, we cannot say that the circuit court erred in permitting testimony regarding Strong's overdose attempts. In light of the case law from other jurisdictions, as well as our holdings regarding flight, refusal to submit to testing, and escape from incarceration, we cannot say that the circuit court abused its discretion. We now turn to the seventeen pro se points for reversal articulated by Strong. They are as follows: 1. The circuit court erred in allowing counsel for the State, during closing arguments of the sentencing phase, to discuss the low cure rates of sex offenders. 2. Life sentences may not be ordered to run consecutively. 3. The Arkansas child hearsay exception regarding sexual offenses, abuse, or incest is unconstitutional. 4. The circuit court erred in prohibiting certain evidence pursuant to the rape-shield statute. 5. Strong's attorney failed to give prior notice of defense witnesses. 6. The circuit court should have suppressed Strong's statement made to police. 7. Evidentiary questions (a list of case citations only) 8. The representation provided to Strong by his attorney was ineffective. 9. Strong was denied his constitutional right to counsel because the jury was not instructed that he could not be found guilty unless all elements of the charged offense were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 10. The circuit court should have taken judicial notice of the textbooks authored by Kathy Young. 11. Luminol testing should have been performed to prove that the blood found on the bedsheet originated from one of Bertie's pets. 12. Strong's attorney failed to preserve issues for appeal. 13. Impeachment of witnesses (citation only) 14. The circuit court erred in allowing counsel for the State, during closing arguments of the sentencing phase, to discuss consecutive sentences. 15. Strong's statement should have been suppressed because he was medicated at the time it was given. 16. The fact that Rose Strong was contradicted by other evidence did not constitute an attack upon her character for truthfulness. 17. Orders of prior commitments (citations only) It is well settled that an appellant must raise and make an argument at trial in order to preserve it for appeal. Raymond v. State, 354 Ark. 157, 118 S.W.3d 567 (2003). This is true even when the issue raised is constitutional in nature. Id. If a particular theory was not presented at trial, the theory will not be reached on appeal. Id. Moreover, an appellant must obtain a ruling on his or her argument to preserve the matter for this court's review. Id. The burden of providing a record sufficient to demonstrate error is upon the appellant. Id. None of Strong's seventeen points is properly preserved for our review. His counsel objected to the State's playing the tape of his statement, but that objection was on the basis of improper procedure, as the State had not attempted to introduce the statement during its case in chief and instead sought to introduce it through a rebuttal witness. Also, after the State played the tape for impeachment purposes, Strong's counsel moved that it be admitted into evidence. Therefore, Strong's arguments on this point, as well as all other arguments, are not preserved. Furthermore, most of Strong's arguments are unsupported by explanation and citation to authority. We will not consider an argument, even a constitutional one, when the appellant presents no citation to authority or convincing argument in its support and it is not apparent without further research that the argument is well taken. Weatherford v. State, 352 Ark. 324, 101 S.W.3d 227 (2003). For these reasons, we must decline to address Strong's pro se arguments in support of the reversal of his convictions.