Opinion ID: 751665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Outrageous Government Conduct Toward Topete.

Text: 46 Topete contends that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the indictment for outrageous government conduct. Topete asserts that, in light of the informant's repeated and deliberate attempts to lure him into crime by exploiting his financial difficulties, the government's conduct in this case was coercive and outrageous. 47 Topete's contention is without merit. We have previously held that [t]he due process channel for the defense of outrageous government conduct is most narrow, United States v. Stenberg, 803 F.2d 422, 429 (9th Cir.1986), and is available only where the government is so involved in the criminal endeavor that it shocks our sense of justice. United States v. So, 755 F.2d 1350, 1353 (9th Cir.1985). In general, that standard is met only when the police completely fabricate the crime solely to secure the defendant's conviction. United States v. Emmert, 829 F.2d 805, 813 (9th Cir.1987). No such conduct occurred here. 48 The evidence in the record suggests that Topete was involved in drug trafficking prior to his meeting with Garcia. Topete's coconspirators referred to Topete when they gave Garcia the first sample of methamphetamine, well before Garcia first met Topete. When they did meet, Topete told Garcia that he had access to 1-2 tons of cocaine and 100-200 pounds of methamphetamine and marijuana. Later, Topete's actions with regard to the sale of methamphetamine to Garcia demonstrated his experience with drug trafficking: he possessed firearms, pagers, and cellphones; never handled the methamphetamine himself; told Garcia that he did not want to talk on the phone; and had drug-related forfeiture documents in his Lexus. That evidence of independent, continuing criminal activity is itself sufficient to dispense of Topete's contention that the government's conduct was outrageous. See United States v. Wiley, 794 F.2d 514, 516 (9th Cir.1986) (no outrageous conduct where government merely activated scheme already in existence). Finally, the government did not create the criminal activity; although Garcia supplied ephedrine to the conspirators, he did not do so until after the conspirators had already produced methamphetamine. See Emmert, 829 F.2d at 813.III. Prosecutorial Misconduct Toward Topete. 49 We also reject Topete's contention that his conviction must be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct. The prosecutor's introduction of a letter the prosecutor wrote to a judge about the informant was stimulated by the use of the letter by the defense; it did not constitute improper vouching. Evidence relating to Topete's ownership of unsuppressed weapons (and to his lack of need for them in regard to his cockfighting business) was relevant to his alleged drug activity. See United States v. Tarazon, 989 F.2d 1045, 1053 (9th Cir.1993). References to Topete's unexplained wealth were similarly relevant. See United States v. Miguel, 952 F.2d 285, 289 (9th Cir.1991). We find no merit in Topete's other claims of improper prosecutorial conduct. 50