Opinion ID: 2597756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Do the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions require the State to prove a willful violation of community custody conditions before revoking a suspended sentence?

Text: ¶ 15 Relying on Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 76 L.Ed.2d 221 (1983), McCormick argues the due process clauses of the state and federal constitutions require the State to prove a willful violation of community custody conditions before revoking a suspended sentence. [3] The State argues Bearden specifically rejected McCormick's argument. ¶ 16 In analyzing challenges under the state and federal due process clauses, we have held Washington's due process clause does not afford broader protection than that given by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re Pers. Restraint of Dyer, 143 Wash.2d 384, 394, 20 P.3d 907 (2001). Nonetheless, there is some established case law from this court examining the scope of the due process right in the context of revocation of probation or a suspended sentence. See State v. Dahl, 139 Wash.2d 678, 990 P.2d 396 (1999); State v. Abd-Rahmaan, 154 Wash.2d 280, 111 P.3d 1157 (2005). ¶ 17 The revocation of a suspended sentence is not a criminal proceeding, but rather an extension of the original criminal conviction. State ex rel. Woodhouse v. Dore, 69 Wash.2d 64, 416 P.2d 670 (1966). Accordingly, an offender facing a revocation of a suspended sentence has only minimal due process rights because the trial has already occurred and the offender was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Dahl, 139 Wash.2d at 683, 990 P.2d 396 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Boone, 103 Wash.2d 224, 230, 691 P.2d 964 (1984); State v. Nelson, 103 Wash.2d 760, 763, 697 P.2d 579 (1985)). In Dahl, we observed the United States Supreme Court's holding that minimal due process entails (a) written notice of the claimed violations; (b) disclosure to the parolee of the evidence against him; (c) the opportunity to be heard; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses (unless there is good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a neutral and detached hearing body; and (f) a statement by the court as to the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revocation. Id. at 683, 990 P.2d 396 (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)). ¶ 18 The Supreme Court has extended some due process protections when probation is revoked for the failure to pay fines or fees. In Bearden, the Court explained how courts should analyze what procedural safeguards should be afforded when the State seeks to revoke an offender's probation or suspended sentence. 461 U.S. at 666, 103 S.Ct. 2064. The Court held, the issue cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans or pigeonhole analysis, but rather requires a careful inquiry into such factors as the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between the legislative means and purpose, [and] the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose. . . . Williams v. Illinois, [399 U.S. 235, 260, 90 S.Ct. 2018, 26 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970)] (Harlan, J., concurring). Id. at 666-67, 103 S.Ct. 2064 (alterations in original). ¶ 19 In Bearden, the Court held fundamental fairness required the State to prove an offender willfully failed to pay a fine or fee imposed by the court in order to punish the probationer's violation. Id. at 666-69, 103 S.Ct. 2064. The Court reasoned that to punish an offender who made bona fide efforts to pay a fine or fee essentially amounted to punishment for being indigent and the lack of fault provided a `substantial reason[n] which justifie[s] or mitigate[s] the violation and make[s] revocation inappropriate.' Id. at 669, 103 S.Ct. 2064 (alterations in original) (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973)). In a footnote, the Court explained the limitations of its holding: We do not suggest that, in other contexts, the probationer's lack of fault in violating a term of probation would necessarily prevent a court from revoking probation. For instance, it may indeed be reckless for a court to permit a person convicted of driving while intoxicated to remain on probation once it becomes evident that efforts at controlling his chronic drunken driving have failed. Cf. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514[, 88 S.Ct. 2145, 20 L.Ed.2d 1254] (1968); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660[, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758] (1962). Ultimately, it must be remembered that the sentence was not imposed for a circumstance beyond the probationer's control but because he had committed a crime. Williams, 399 U.S., at 242, 90 S.Ct. at 2022. In contrast to a condition like chronic drunken driving, however, the condition at issue here  indigency  is itself no threat to the safety or welfare of society. Id. at 668 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 2064. ¶ 20 In Bearden, the Court held due process only required the State to prove an offender willfully failed to pay a fine or fee imposed by the court in order to revoke the probationer's probation. The Bearden court did not address whether a finding of willfulness was required in other settings and, if anything, it indicated a finding of willfulness would not be required if the condition is a threat to the safety or welfare of society. [4] Id. Thus, we must conduct a careful inquiry into such factors as the nature of the individual interest affected, the extent to which it is affected, the rationality of the connection between the legislative means and purposes, and the existence of alternative means for effectuating the purpose. Id. at 666-67, 103 S.Ct. 2064. ¶ 21 Here, the condition at issue prohibits McCormick from frequent[ing] areas where minor children are known to congregate. DCP at 46. He argues his due process rights were violated because the State did not prove he was willfully frequent[ing] areas where minors are known to congregate. Id. ¶ 22 Examining McCormick's interest, the interest alleged is essentially that McCormick can be punished only when he acted willfully in violating the terms of his probation. The interest comes from the idea that a person is punished only for the acts within his or her control. [5] That interest is affected if the State does not have to prove McCormick acted willfully. ¶ 23 Examining the State's interests, the government has an important interest in protecting society, particularly minors, from a person convicted of raping a child. That interest is rationally served by imposing stringent conditions related to the crime McCormick committed. The condition forbidding McCormick from frequenting areas where minors congregate serves as a way to prevent McCormick from being in a situation where he would have an opportunity to again harm a child. ¶ 24 Also, McCormick's rights are already diminished significantly as he was convicted of a sex crime and, only by the grace of the trial court, allowed to live in the community subject to stringent conditions. Those conditions, like the one at issue, serve an important societal purpose in that they are limitations on McCormick's rights that relate to the crimes he committed. See former RCW 9.94A.120(5)(1998), recodified as RCW 9.94A.670(5)(a); Riles, 135 Wash.2d at 349-51, 957 P.2d 655 (holding that special conditions on a probationer must be crime-related). Given the strength of that interest and McCormick's diminished rights as someone on a suspended sentence, the balance tips heavily in favor of not requiring a finding of willfulness. ¶ 25 Looking at the hypothetical scenario where the State is required to prove McCormick acted willfully, it becomes more apparent that due process does not require a finding of willfulness. Regardless of McCormick's intent, if he frequents areas where minor children are known to congregate, he would pose a danger to those minors. [6] Otherwise, McCormick, a person convicted of committing a sex crime against a minor, would be allowed to be repeatedly in close proximity to minors and face no punishment because he did not know minors congregated there, even if it is reasonably obvious to everyone else that this is a place where minors congregate. Given the State's strong interest in protecting the public, McCormick's diminished interest because of his status as a convicted sex offender serving a SSOSA sentence, and that McCormick's proposed scenario leads to dangerous situations where McCormick can frequent places where minors are known to congregate, due process does not require the State to prove that McCormick willfully violated the condition. ¶ 26 Such a holding fits within the confines of Bearden. In explaining the boundaries of its decision, the Bearden Court went as far as to say it would be reckless for a court to permit a person convicted of driving while intoxicated to remain on probation once it is evident efforts at controlling the drunken driving have failed. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 668 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 2064. Similarly, here, it would be concerning to allow a convicted sex offender to frequent a food bank located in a church elementary school, where there is an opportunity to harm a minor. The State's interest is sufficiently strong to not require a finding of willfulness. ¶ 27 McCormick cites several cases from other jurisdictions to support his argument. Those cases are unhelpful to McCormick. First, McCormick's citations to People v. Zaring, 8 Cal.App.4th 362, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 263 (1992); Van Wagner v. State, 677 So.2d 314 (1996); and State v. Williamson, 61 N.C.App. 531, 301 S.E.2d 423 (1983), are unhelpful because in none of those cases was the court analyzing whether the federal due process clause required the finding of willfulness. Second, Messer v. State, 2006 WY 141, 145 P.3d 457 relies exclusively on Kupec v. State, 835 P.2d 359 (Wyo.1992), another case cited by McCormick. Kupec, if anything, cuts against McCormick because it specifically held: `[I]n order to revoke probation for the violation of a condition of probation not involving the payment of money, the violation must be willful, or, if not willful, must presently threaten the safety of society.' 835 P.2d at 362 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah App. 1990)). The Kupec court added that a court cannot be prevented from revoking probation in situations where the probationer's conduct is beyond his control and such conduct creates a threat to society. Id. Similarly, here, McCormick's presence at a food bank located in a church elementary school creates a threat to the safety of society because he was convicted for a sex crime with a minor. Also, as the trial court said, it did not know if IQ or learning difficulties precluded McCormick from following the requirements or if he simply chose not to follow the requirements. ¶ 28 If anything, other jurisdictions analyzing the issue have held the State does not need to prove willfulness. In State v. Hill, 256 Conn. 412, 773 A.2d 931 (2001), the court held Bearden and the cases that relied on it were not applicable when an offender violated a probation condition that he attend periodic meetings. The court held, if a defendant is unable to comply strictly with the conditions of probation, even for reasons beyond his control, the legislative policies underlying conditional probation should not automatically require that compliance should be excused as a matter of law. Id. at 424, 773 A.2d 931. As mentioned above, Kupec also provides an exception to the willfulness requirement when the violation presents a threat to the safety of society. [7] Kupec, 835 P.2d at 362. Examining the case law from other jurisdictions supports holding that due process does not require the finding of a willful violation of a condition of a suspended sentence. ¶ 29 After reviewing the interests, the purpose of the condition and its scope, the results of McCormick's proposed scenario, and the case law from other states, we hold the state and federal constitutions do not require the State to prove McCormick willfully violated a condition of his SSOSA sentence.