Opinion ID: 767001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparate treatment claims under Title VII, section 1981, and the PHRA

Text: 29 The parties do not dispute that Jones's disparate treatment race discrimination claims under Title VII, section 1981, and the PHRA require application of the familiar burden-shifting framework the Supreme Court articulated in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824 (1973). While Jones's brief refers to what he considers to be direct evidence of Hoban's discriminatory intent, it does not appear that he is attempting to proceed under a mixed motive theory and, in any event, such an analysis would not be appropriate in this case. Briefly summarized, the McDonnell Douglas analysis proceeds in three stages. First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination. If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. Id. Finally, should the defendant carry this burden, the plaintiff then must have an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the defendant were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-53, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1093 (1981) (citations omitted). While the burden of production may shift, [t]he ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff. Id. Our experience is that most cases turn on the third stage, i.e., can the plaintiff establish pretext. 30 The parties raise several issues pertaining to the proper analysis of Jones's prima facie case of discrimination, as well as the sufficiency of his evidence of pretext. The district court dismissed Jones's disparate treatment claims on two separate bases: (1) he failed to satisfy the third element of his prima facie case; and (2) there was insufficient evidence calling into question the legitimacy of the school district's proffered reasons for its adverse employment decisions.
31 Citing our decisions in Sheridan v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Co., 100 F.3d 1061 (3d Cir. 1996) (en banc), and Waldron v. S.L. Industries, Inc., 56 F.3d 491 (3d Cir. 1995), the district court stated that a prima facie case is established when a plaintiff shows the following: (1) that he is a member of a protected class; (2) that he is qualified for the position; (3) that he was either not hired or fired from that position; (4) under circumstances that give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination such as might occur when the position is filled by a person not of the protected class. Jones, 19 F. Supp.2d at 418 (emphasis added). The district court stated that elements one, two and four arguably were satisfied, but that element three was not because the record reflected that Jones resigned and thus was not fired. Id. at 418-19. From that conclusion, the district court stated that it was required to determine whether or not [Jones's] resignation amounted to a constructive discharge, and proceeded to an analysis of that point, holding that it did not. Id. at 419-20 (internal quotation marks omitted). 32 The court then went on to hold that even assuming arguendo, that [Jones] has made out a prima facie case, he has produced no evidence to rebut or show that the reasons articulated by the School District for his termination are a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 420. Consequently, the court determined that on this ground as well as Jones's failure to make a prima facie case, the school district was entitled to summary judgment. 33 Jones asserts that the district court's analysis oversimplified the matter, as the court did not recognize that his complaint asserted claims against the school district based on adverse employment decisions during his employment rather than merely on his termination. Jones contends that these claims are distinct from his claim of constructive discharge in 1995. 34 We agree with Jones's position on this point, as the complaint clearly delineated the factual basis for his Title VII and PHRA claims, and a review of that pleading confirms that he did not predicate his claims solely on the alleged constructive discharge. Indeed, Jones pleaded the constructive discharge claim only under 42 U.S.C. S 1981. In fact, Jones's complaint challenged not only the purported constructive discharge, but also the transfers and the denial of the assignment to him of the physics roster at GWHS. 35 The district court's error seems to have stemmed from its borrowing of language from cases which recited the necessary elements of a prima facie case where the challenged employment decision is a termination. See Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066 n.5 (noting elements which are required to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge); Waldron, 56 F.3d at 494 (same). Rather than considering the possibility that the constructive discharge claim was but one of Jones's claims arising out of his employment relationship with the school district, the court turned its attention to the constructive discharge analysis because Jones admittedly had not been terminated directly so as to satisfy the third element of a prima facie case as articulated in Sheridan and Waldron. Compare Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1063, 1072-75 (count I of plaintiff 's complaint alleged a failure to promote claim under Title VII and count III alleged a claim of constructive discharge; court considered sufficiency of evidence presented on each claim separately). 36 We often have remarked that the elements of a prima facie case depend on the facts of the particular case. See, e.g., Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys. Inc., 191 F.3d 344, 352 (3d Cir. 1999); Torre v. Casio, Inc., 42 F.3d 825, 830 (3d Cir. 1994). Thus, a prima facie case cannot be established on a one-size-fits-all basis. In fact, the relevant question with respect to Jones's Title VII and PHRA claims is whether he suffered some form of adverse employment action sufficient to evoke the protection of Title VII and the PHRA. See Connors v. Chrysler Fin. Corp., 160 F.3d 971, 974 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that third element of prima facie case in disparate treatment ADEA case is that plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action); Deane, 142 F.3d at 142 (same under ADA); Simpson v. Kay Jewelers, 142 F.3d 639, 644 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) (same under ADEA); Lawrence v. National Westminster Bank, 98 F.3d 61, 66 (3d Cir. 1996) (same). Obviously, something less than a discharge could be an adverse employment action. 37 We have held that employment decisions such as transfers and demotions may suffice to establish the third element of a plaintiff 's prima facie case. See, e.g., Torre, 42 F.3d at 831 n.7 (recognizing that a job transfer, even without loss of pay or benefits, may, in some circumstances, constitute an adverse job action); see also McGrenaghan v. St. Denis Sch., 979 F. Supp. 323, 326 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (same). Here, Jones challenges both administrative transfers and the denial of the physics roster. As a result of the first transfer, he lost his opportunity to teach physics, which clearly was the subject he sought most to teach. After Jones chose to remain at GWHS because of the possibility that he would be awarded the physics roster, he learned that he was passed over for that position. Instead, the administration assigned Jones to teach what he regarded as less desirable science classes. 38 Moreover, the transfer from GWHS to Edison landed Jones in a placement which had a reputation of being a difficult school. Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Jones, they suffice to demonstrate that Jones was subjected to sufficient adverse employment actions such that his Title VII and PHRA claims should have survived the initial stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis. See Torre, 42 F.3d at 831 n.7 (plaintiff 's transfer to dead- end job was sufficient to support plaintiff 's prima facie case); see also DiIenno v. Goodwill Indus., 162 F.3d 235, 236 (3d Cir. 1998) (holding in context of retaliation claim that transfer could constitute adverse employment action as viewed from plaintiff 's perspective). 39 Finally, we conclude that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the school district on Jones's constructive discharge claim under section 1981 on its theory that he failed to establish a prima facie case. In Goss v. Exxon Office Systems Co., 747 F.2d 885 (3d Cir. 1984), we recognized that an involuntary transfer to a less desirable position could support a claim of constructive discharge, especially where the surrounding circumstances indicate a pattern of discriminatory treatment. Id. at 888- 89. Thus, we affirmed the trial court's findings that the plaintiff had been constructively discharged where she presented evidence that she was involuntarily transferred after her supervisor questioned her ability to combine a career with motherhood. At the prima facie case stage of the analysis, we merely determine whether a plaintiff has presented sufficient evidence so that we should consider a defendant's proffered reasons for its decision and, if the defendant has presented reasons, the plaintiff 's evidence of pretext. Viewed under that lens and in the light most favorable to Jones, he should have withstood summary judgment on that aspect of his constructive discharge claim, because his involuntary transfer to two schools and the second school's failure to assign him the physics roster despite his qualifications, was sufficient to establish a prima facie case under section 1981.
40 We turn now to the second and third steps of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite framework. The second stage requires the defendant to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action at issue. Keller v. Orix Credit Alliance, Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1108 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc). Jones does not appear to contest that the school district satisfied its burden of production in this regard and plainly it did. 41 Once the defendant has satisfied its burden of production at the second stage of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite framework, a court's analysis turns to the third and final aspect of the inquiry which, as we have indicated, is usually the determinative stage of the case. At this point, the court focuses on whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the purported reasons for defendant's adverse employment actions were in actuality a pretext for intentional race discrimination. At trial, the plaintiff must convince the finder of fact both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2752 (1993) (emphasis in original). The fact finder's rejection of the employer's proffered reason allows, but does not compel, judgment for the plaintiff. Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1066-67. 42 On numerous occasions, we have explained the plaintiff 's burden at summary judgment on this aspect of the McDonnell Douglas tripartite framework. Specifically, in Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994), and later in Sheridan, we stated that a plaintiff may defeat a motion for summary judgment (or judgment as a matter of law) by pointing to some evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a fact finder would reasonably either: (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the employer's action. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764; Sheridan, 100 F.3d at 1067. 43 We recently characterized this final aspect of the McDonnell Douglas analysis as comprised of two alternatives as articulated by Fuentes and Sheridan . See Keller, 130 F.3d at 1108. In Keller, we explained that to satisfy the first prong of the Fuentes/Sheridan standard, 44 the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent or competent. Rather, the nonmoving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its actions that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unworthy of credence. 45 Id. at 1108-09. Then we indicated that a plaintiff may satisfy this standard by demonstrating, through admissible evidence, that the employer's articulated reason was not merely wrong, but that it was so plainly wrong that it cannot have been the employer's real reason. Id. at 1109. 46 Under the Fuentes/Sheridan inquiry, the plaintiff also may survive summary judgment by pointing to evidence in the record which allows the fact finder to infer that discrimination was more likely than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse employment action. Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 764. In Simpson, we provided the following explanation of this prong: For example, the plaintiff may show that the employer has previously discriminated against [the plaintiff], that the employer has previously discriminated against other persons within the plaintiff 's protected class, or that the employer has treated more favorably similarly situated persons not within the protected class. Simpson, 142 F.3d at 645 (citing Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765). 47 The district court in its determination that even if Jones had established a prima facie case of discrimination in his termination, stated that he produced no evidence aside from his own testimony that the actions directed against him by the school district were racially motivated. Jones, 19 F. Supp.2d at 420. Jones challenges that ruling, arguing that the court erred in dismissing his disparate treatment claims by ignoring circumstantial evidence favorable to this claim and failing to recognize that he raised many factual issues that would allow a jury to find that the school district's proffered reasons for transferring plaintiff twice and denying him the physics roster were unworthy of credence. 48 Jones's brief focuses principally upon his employment at NEHS and his transfer from that school. Nevertheless, he also addresses the other adverse employment actions he has suffered, claiming that each constitutes a violation of Title VII and the PHRA. Consequently, we have made a complete study of the record of this case to determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the school district's purported reasons for its adverse employment actions were a pretext for discrimination. While we do not set forth all of the evidence and explain our analysis of it, we have concluded that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim of pretext. In this regard, we point out that Jones makes numerous allegations in his affidavit which he predicates on nothing more than his beliefs without having actual knowledge of them. In fact, a careful analysis of the record demonstrates that many of his allegations simply are not supported. Moreover, Jones minimizes the baseball bat matter as merely a minor classroom incident. Br. at 3. We think it clear that a school district hardly can tolerate comments from a teacher even to disruptive students that he will use a baseball bat on them. 49 Overall, the circumstances of this case which we already have described in detail reflect a situation in which the employer should have been able to take adverse employment actions against the employee without fear of being embroiled in an expensive law suit. While Jones may quarrel with the school district's conclusions regarding particular controversies, the bona fides of its determinations simply cannot be doubted. Thus, though we view Jones's claims as broader than the district court recognized, we are in complete agreement with its conclusion that he presented no evidence from which a jury could conclude that the school district's articulated reasons for its adverse employment actions were a pretext for discrimination. See Jones, 19 F. Supp.2d at 420. Consequently, we will affirm the summary judgment against Jones on his disparate treatment race discrimination claims under Title VII and the PHRA. 50 As we have indicated, in addition to bringing Title VII and PHRA race discrimination claims, Jones has brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. S 1981 premised upon his eventual decision to resign from his employment with the school district. In particular, his complaint states that his involuntary resignation was the result of the discriminatory and retaliatory treatment he experienced at Edison, including being threatened with removal for allegedly striking a student while another employee in a similar incident was not disciplined in any manner. Jones alleges that the ultimatum amounted to a constructive discharge, and further that the evidence shows that the proffered reasons for the ultimatum are unworthy of credence. 51 The school district's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for giving Jones the ultimatum of resigning or facing termination was primarily that Jones was involved in a physical altercation with one of his students in which he struck and injured the student without provocation. Edison principal Raul Torres stated that he also recommended Jones's discharge based upon his prior record of using profanity in addressing students in the classroom as well has having made implied threats to use physical harm to students at GWHS. 52 The school district first maintains that the district court properly dismissed the section 1981 claim because the Supreme Court in Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 735, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723 (1989), held that the exclusive federal damages remedy against a state actor for violation of that section is under 42 U.S.C. S 1983. The school district contends that because Jones brought his constructive discharge claim under the wrong statute, the district court properly dismissed his claim. This argument implicates an issue regarding the amendment of section 1981 by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, S 101(c), 105 Stat. 1071, 1072 (1991), i.e., did the 1991 act overturn the Jett ruling that the exclusive federal damages remedy against a state actor for a section 1981 violation is under section 1983. See Federation of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Hopp v. City of Pittsburgh, 194 F.3d 434, 439 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 1999); see, however, Dennis v. County of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 n.1 (4th Cir. 1995). 53 The school district next argues that assuming arguendo that we would overlook Jones's failure to present the section 1981 claim under section 1983, dismissal was appropriate nonetheless because the standards governing Jones's Title VII and PHRA claims control his constructive discharge claim, and there is insufficient evidence demonstrating that its proffered reasons for demanding his resignation were a pretext for illegal race discrimination. Finally, the school district claims that to the extent that Jones predicates his section 1981 claim upon a theory of racial harassment, his proofs fail to satisfy the five-part test set for in our opinion in Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990). 54 We find it unnecessary to consider the Jett issue as we are satisfied that a review of the evidence proffered in connection with Jones's section 1981 claim demonstrates that it is insufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the decision to request plaintiff 's resignation was motivated by racial bias. Therefore, we will affirm the district court's order for summary judgment on this claim as well. 55