Opinion ID: 1793858
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: application of habitual criminal statute

Text: Subject to certain exceptions not applicable in the present case, Nebraska's habitual criminal statute, § 29-2221, provides: (1) Whoever has been twice convicted of a crime, sentenced,and committed to prison, in this or any other state or by the United States or once in this state and once at least in any other state or by the United States, for terms of not less than one year each shall, upon conviction of a felony committed in this state, be deemed to be an habitual criminal and shall be punished by imprisonment... for a mandatory minimum term of ten years and a maximum term of not more than sixty years.... Section 29-2221 further provides: (2) When punishment of an accused as an habitual criminal is sought, the facts with reference thereto shall be charged in the indictment or information which contains the charge of the felony upon which the accused is prosecuted, but the fact that the accused is charged with being an habitual criminal shall not be an issue upon the trial of the felony charge and shall not in any manner be disclosed to the jury. If the accused is convicted of a felony, before sentence is imposed a hearing shall be had before the court alone as to whether such person has been previously convicted of prior felonies. The court shall fix a time for the hearing and notice thereof shall be given to the accused at least three days prior thereto. At the hearing, if the court finds from the evidence submitted that the accused has been convicted two or more times of felonies and sentences imposed therefor by the courts of this or any other state or by the United States, the court shall sentence such person so convicted as an habitual criminal. Although Hittle challenges his sentencing under the habitual criminal statute on several grounds, his principal argument is that the application of the statute results in a double enhancement which is contrary to our holding in State v. Chapman, 205 Neb. 368, 287 N.W.2d 697 (1980). Chapman was convicted of third-offense driving while under the influence of alcoholic liquor (DUI), a felony, and was sentenced as a habitual criminal based upon previous felony convictions for third-offense DUI and malicious destruction of property. Expressing a reluctance to apply an expansive reading to the Habitual Criminal Act, we held that offenses which are felonies because the defendant has been previously convicted of the same crime do not constitute `felonies' within the meaning of prior felonies that enhance penalties under the habitual criminal statute. Id. at 370, 287 N.W.2d at 698. In examining the question whether the most recent felony DUI conviction could trigger the application of the habitual criminal statute, we noted in Chapman that the weight of authority is against double penalty enhancement through application of both a specific subsequent offense statute and a habitual criminal statute. Id. at 370, 287 N.W.2d at 699. We further recognized the decisions of other courts holding that penalty enhancement provisions set forth for subsequent offenses of specific crimes must be used when applicable instead of enhancement under a habitual criminal statute, thus avoiding double penalty enhancement. Id. at 371, 287 N.W.2d at 699. We concluded that the specific penalty for third and subsequent offenses as set forth in the DUI statute exempts offenders such as Chapman from the operation of the habitual criminal provision. Id. In Nebraska, the felony offense of driving under a suspended license is included in the DUI statute at § 60-6,19(6), which at the time of Hittle's offenses provided: Any person operating a motor vehicle on the highways or streets of this state while his or her operator's license has been revoked pursuant to subdivision (2)(c) [two previous DUI convictions] of this section shall be guilty of a Class IV felony. In 1998, subsequent to the operative facts of this case, § 60-6,196(6) was amended by the addition of the following sentence: If such person has had a conviction under this subsection prior to the date of the current conviction under this subsection, such person shall be guilty of a Class III felony. 1998 Neb. Laws, L.B. 309. Under other circumstances, driving under a suspended license is a misdemeanor. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-4,186 (Reissue 1998). Hittle was twice convicted of driving under a suspended license, in violation of § 60-6,196(6). His second conviction, from which this appeal arises, was utilized as one of the convictions which triggered the application of the habitual criminal statute, while his first conviction was considered as one of the two prior convictions justifying the enhanced penalty specified therein. It is true, as the State argues, that these facts do not fit squarely within our holding in Chapman because a violation of § 60-6,196(6) is a felony regardless of whether or not the defendant was previously convicted of the same offense. However, we regard the holding in State v. Chapman, 205 Neb. 368, 287 N.W.2d 697 (1980), as resting upon two general principles: (1) A defendant should not be subjected to double penalty enhancement through application of both a specific subsequent offense statute and a habitual criminal statute and (2) the specific enhancement mechanism contained in Nebraska's DUI statutes precludes application of the general enhancement provisions set forth in the habitual criminal statute. The felony offense of driving under a suspended license is not included within our general criminal code but exists solely by virtue of a violation of § 60-6,196(6), which is a part of the statutory scheme designed by the Legislature to criminalize the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic liquor or drugs. See State v. Louthan, 257 Neb. 174, 595 N.W.2d 917 (1999). One can become a felon for driving under a suspended license only by having first committed multiple DUI offenses, at least some of which are misdemeanors, for which the license suspension was imposed. Thus, in a real sense, the penalty for this particular act has been enhanced by virtue of the defendant's prior violations of other provisions within the same statute. Therefore, we hold that a felony conviction for driving under a suspended license in violation of § 60-6,196(6) may not be used either to trigger application of the habitual criminal statute or as a prior offense for purposes of penalty enhancement pursuant thereto. In order to warrant enhancement of the penalty under the habitual criminal statute, prior convictions, except the first conviction, must be for offenses committed after each preceding conviction. State v. Ellis, 214 Neb. 172, 333 N.W.2d 391 (1983). Hittle's 1995 convictions for possession of a stolen firearm and possession of a controlled substance were based upon an information in which both offenses were alleged to have been committed on the same date and sentence was imposed on each conviction on the same date. Therefore, only one of these convictions may be considered for purposes of the habitual criminal statute. Thus, because of our holding that Hittle's 1995 conviction for felony driving on a suspended license cannot be considered for this purpose, the trial court erred in sentencing him as a habitual criminal and the sentences are hereby vacated, and the cause remanded for resentencing. Accordingly, we do not reach Hittle's assertion that he received inadequate notice under the habitual criminal statute or his separate assignment of error asserting excessive sentences.