Opinion ID: 2142984
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Benefits Awarded Under Section 8(a)Necessary and Reasonable Expenses

Text: In awarding Carson benefits for his home computer system and for his automobile insurance premium, the Commission made factual determinations that each was a necessary and reasonable medical expense. As noted above, such factual determinations will not be overturned unless they are against the manifest weight of the evidence. We first address the Commission's award of computer-related expenses. Beelman argues that although voice-activated computers and similar devices have been awarded in other cases, the devices in those cases were used for assisting the employee in returning to work or as rehabilitative tools. Beelman suggests that because Carson uses his computer primarily for interacting with friends and family and not to aid a job search or participate in vocational rehabilitation, the award is contrary to law. Section 8(a) of the Act provides that an employer shall pay for medical, surgical and hospital services thereafter incurred, limited, however, to that which is reasonably required to cure or relieve from the effects of the accidental injury. That section continues, indicating that the employer shall also pay for treatment, instruction, and training necessary for the physical, mental and vocational rehabilitation of the employee, including all maintenance costs and expenses incidental thereto. The arbitrator here in part relied on evidence from Carson's primary physician, which indicated the computer system would be set up for therapeutic purposes. According to the arbitrator, the physician emphasized the importance of this device as it relates to [Carson's] mental health and general wellbeing. Thus, the arbitrator concluded that [Carson] has lost almost complete use of his body and is totally dependent on others for all movement and activity. The computer system provides his only vestige of autonomy. When so much is taken away, the psychological value of any remaining independence is obviously magnified. Based on this record, we cannot say that the Commission's factual determination, that the computer-related expenses are necessary and reasonable medical expenses, is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we confirm that part of the Commission's order awarding expenses for Carson's home computer system. Next, regarding the van's insurance premium, Beelman urges that this court consider this question as a matter of law and as a question of first impression in Illinois. Beelman cites Iowa and Missouri as jurisdictions that have considered the issue and held that the insurance costs of a handicap modified vehicle are to be borne by the injured worker. Beelman asks this court to adopt a similar rule. In Manpower Temporary Services v. Sioson, 529 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 1995), a worker was injured, as in this case, to the point where she required the use of an electric wheelchair. The court concluded that the worker's need for the wheelchair also necessitated the use of a modified van for transportation. According to the court, to hold otherwise would have rendered her, more than need be, a prisoner of her severe paralysis. Sioson, 529 N.W.2d at 264. The court therefore affirmed the commissioner's decision to award the expense of the vehicle. The court held, however, that the cost of the van's repair, fuel, title, license and insurance, were properly disallowed by the commissioner. The court reasoned that it is exclusively up to [the worker] to set the extent of these purchases. Sioson, 529 N.W.2d at 264. With respect to insurance, the court concluded that the worker will also control, for the most part, the extent of insurance coverage to be purchased. Sioson, 529 N.W.2d at 264. The second case Beelman presents is a decision by a Missouri appellate court, which relies on Sioson. Like Sioson, in Mickey v. City Wide Maintenance, 996 S.W.2d 144 (Mo.App.1999), the court was asked to determine whether the cost of a handicap modified van was compensable. The court concluded that the employer was responsible, in part, for the purchase of and modifications to the van. Mickey, 996 S.W.2d at 152-53. The Mickey court also adopted the reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court in denying compensation for the van's fuel, repair, title and insurance costs. Mickey, 996 S.W.2d at 153. The Sioson and Mickey decisions cited by Beelman are distinguishable from the present case. The rationale for disallowing insurance, expressed in Sioson and adopted by the Missouri court in Mickey, was that the worker was responsible for determining to what extent the vehicle was insured. Neither court considered in any detail the issue raised in this case. Here the Commission upheld the arbitrator's factual determination that the insurance premium was an expense identifiably related to [Carson's] injury, as opposed to vehicle costs common to the general public. The arbitrator based her decision in part on the following exchange at the arbitration hearing: [Carson's Attorney, Mr. Glass] Q. Themany years ago the respondent provided a handicap modified van for you? [Carson] A. Yes. Q. And recently that had to be replaced with a newer model with different modifications to accommodate the current wheelchair technology and size, correct? A. Yes. Q. You pay the insurance on the vehicle? A. Yes. Q. And    part of the insurance premium, is that part of the premium that is specifically the add-on for the handicap modifications as opposed to the regular vehicle coverage? A. Yes. THE ARBITRATOR: Just so that I'm clear, petitioner is looking for reimbursement only for the difference between what a regular car insurance would cost MR. GLASS: Right, just the premium that's attributable to the injury.    THE ARBITRATOR: Rather than the whole premium? MR. GLASS: Yes. The record reflects that unlike the workers in Sioson and Mickey, Carson did not seek expenses for fuel, repair, or title of the vehicle. Nor did Carson seek an award which covered the entirety of his van's insurance premium. Instead, Carson sought only the difference between what an owner of an unmodified van would pay and what the insurance company charged for insuring the modifications to Carson's van that his disability requires. Based on the record, we cannot say that the Commission's factual determination that the insurance premium is a necessary and reasonable medical expense is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we confirm that part of the Commission's order awarding expenses for Carson's partial automobile insurance premium.