Opinion ID: 874409
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The district court erred by denying Rebecca's motion for a new trial.

Text: Rebecca argued to the district court that she was entitled to a new trial pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59(a) because of irregularities in the Special Verdict, the jury's failure to award emotional distress damages, and the district court's denial of her motion in limine. The issue of irregularities in the jury verdict was properly raised before the jury was discharged. Crowley, 145 Idaho at 512, 181 P.3d at 438 (stating that [t]he time for challenging a verdict as inconsistent is when it is returned.) Rebecca pursues the same arguments on appeal. This Court will not address any alleged error in the denial of the motion in limine because it is discussed above. Due to inconsistencies in the verdict form, this Court reverses the district court's denial of Rebecca's motion for a new trial. A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues in an action for . . . [i]rregularities in the proceedings . . . [or][e]rror in law. I.R.C.P. 59(a)(1), 59(a)(7). This Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of discretion. Puckett, 144 Idaho at 168, 158 P.3d at 944. [A] jury verdict on issues of negligence and causation will not be disturbed on appeal unless it appears to the reviewing court that the verdict is either not supported by substantial competent evidence or is against the clear weight of the evidence. Burgess, 127 Idaho at 570, 903 P.2d at 735. Generally, this Court will not disturb a jury's factual determinations on appeal. Hei v. Holzer, 145 Idaho 563, 566, 181 P.3d 489, 492 (2008). It is axiomatic that a factual determination made by a jury will not be overturned if it is sustained by the evidence. This is particularly true in tort actions where the damages cannot be ascertained with mathematical precision. Hence, where such injuries are subjective and measurable with only an approximation of certainty, their award is primarily a question for the jury and an appellate court should interfere with such a verdict only in the most exceptional circumstances. Id. at 566-67, 181 P.3d at 492-93 (quoting Bentzinger v. McMurtrey, 100 Idaho 273, 274, 596 P.2d 785, 786 (1979)). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving every element in a negligence action, including damages. Id. at 567, 181 P.3d at 493. The issue of damages is a factual question. Id. The Special Verdict form answered the following relevant questions [6] : (1) [Proximate cause of Interpath]. (2) Do you find that K.C. Crowley, R.N. breached the standard of health care practice? [YES] (3) Do you find that Christin [sic] Slater, M.D. breached the standard of health care practice? [YES] (4) Do you find that the negligence of ICRM was a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's emotional distress as outlined in Instruction No. 33? [7] [NO] (5) If you answered some of the questions Yes, then set forth the percentage of negligence as to any Defendant that you answered Yes in Question No. 1 through Question No. 4. If you answered No as to a Defendant, leave the percentage (%) blank or place a N/A (Not Applicable) in the blank. Considering all of the negligence which proximately caused the Plaintiff's emotional distress, we find the negligence causing the Plaintiff's emotional distress in the following percentages: a. Defendant Interpath N/A% b. Defendant ICRM N/A% c. Defendant K.C. Crowley, R.N. 40% d. Defendant Christian [sic] Slater, M.D. 60% Total must equal 100% (6) What is the amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiff on her claims as to Interpath, ICRM, Dr. Slater and Nurse Crowley? a. Non-Economic Damages: $0 b. Economic Damages: $27,000 (7) Was Curt Cramer's death a suicide? [YES] (8) [Negligence of Dr. Swanson for wrongful death claim] (9) [Proximate cause of Dr. Swanson for wrongful death claim] (10) [Percentage of fault between Dr. Swanson and Curt for wrongful death claim] (11) [Damages against Dr. Swanson for wrongful death claim] (12) [Negligence and proximate cause of Dr. Swanson for emotional distress claim] (13) [Damages against Dr. Swanson for emotional distress claim] (14) Was the negligence of ICRM reckless as defined to you in Instruction No. 31? [YES] (15) [Recklessness of Interpath] (16) [Recklessness of Dr. Swanson] (17) Was the negligence of the Defendant Dr. Slater reckless as defined to you in Instruction No. 31? [NO] (18) Was the negligence of the Defendant Nurse Crowley reckless as defined to you in Instruction No. 31? [NO] Both parties cite to Instructions No. 21 and 22 which appear in the record as an attachment to an affidavit supporting the motion for new trial, however, the jury instructions do not otherwise appear in the record or transcript on appeal. [8] Accordingly, this Court denies review of the instructions as a whole and the issue of whether the jury was properly instructed. Without the jury instructions this Court is unable to make a determination of whether the jury was properly instructed. The Special Verdict form is unmistakably confusing. The district court found the jury's Special Verdict form was reconcilable. The court rationalized that the jury found Dr. Slater and Nurse Crowley negligent, but did not find ICRM vicariously liable for their negligence. However, according to instruction Nos. 21 and 22 the jury did not have a choice of whether to find ICRM vicariously liable. Respondents argue that the verdict is reconcilable by arguing that the jury found Dr. Slater and Nurse Crowley negligent and ICRM stipulated to their negligence; therefore, the only issue which pertained to ICRM was whether ICRM proximately caused the emotional distress experienced by Rebecca. The jury found that ICRM did not proximately cause Rebecca's injury. However, this fails to take into account any liability of ICRM based on vicarious liability for the negligence of Dr. Slater and Nurse Crowley. In essence, from questions 2, 3 and 5 it can be inferred that the jury found Dr. Slater and Nurse Crowley were negligent and proximately caused the injury. However, they also found that ICRM's negligence did not proximately cause the injury after being instructed that any negligence on the part of Dr. Slater or Nurse Crowley would be imputed to ICRM. This Court may determine that the jury verdict is reconcilable by interpreting the verdict to hold ICRM vicariously liable for Dr. Slater and Nurse Crowley's negligence, but that the jury did not find ICRM's actions in and of themselves were the proximate cause of Rebecca's emotional distress. That is, ICRM is liable for the percentage of fault attributable to each of the actors that it is vicariously liable for, Nurse Crowley and Dr. Slater, but ICRM does not have any liability for its own individual actions, though that conclusion ignores that ICRM can only act through its employees. This Court finds that the jury's verdict is inconsistent and beyond reasonable reconciliation. The jury contradicts itself throughout the findings. Rebecca properly objected when the verdict was returned and asked the court to have the jury reconcile the verdict. The court declined to do so and this Court cannot reasonably reconcile the verdict. This Court reverses the judgment and grants Rebecca's motion for a new trial. Rebecca contends that the jury erroneously failed to grant non-economic damages on her claim for emotional distress. She states that her emotional distress was uncontested at trial and reiterates the trauma she experienced as a result of the in vitro fertilization procedures and Curt's suicide. The jury's award of only economic damages is curious, troubling and potentially inconsistent. We cannot make a ruling on any matter regarding the jury instructions because the jury instructions are not contained in the record. Although it is permissible for a jury to find that the Plaintiff failed to meet the burden of proving non-economic damages, it is curious how a jury could find negligent infliction of emotional distress and then not compensate Rebecca for any of the emotional distress she suffered. A showing of emotional distress does not necessitate a finding of non-economic damages. As stated in Hei, damages in a tort claim cannot be ascertained with mathematical precision. Hei, 145 Idaho at 566-67, 181 P.3d at 492-93 (quoting Bentzinger, 100 Idaho at 274, 596 P.2d at 786). However, unlike in Hei, Rebecca's emotional distress and any non-economic damages stemming from the emotional distress were uncontested. In Hei there was testimony which supported a finding that her emotional distress could have been the result of several other factors. Id. at 568, 181 P.3d at 494 (finding one of the factors supporting the jury verdict was that conflicting expert testimony existed to support varying degrees and the root of Hei's psychological trauma). This Court holds that the inconsistencies in the verdict form and the jury's findings are irreconcilable and the motion for a new trial should have been granted. This Court need not address whether it was error to deny the new trial for any alleged error in admitting the toxicology report because that issue has been previously addressed.