Opinion ID: 204206
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bowman's appellate waiver

Text: As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Bowman's written plea agreement precludes him from raising the arguments that he presents on appeal. Plea agreements are contractual in nature, so we use traditional contract law principles in interpreting and enforcing them. United States v. Harris, 473 F.3d 222, 225 (6th Cir.2006). But because plea agreements' constitutional and supervisory implications raise concerns over and above those present in the traditional contract context, in interpreting such agreements we `hold the government to a greater degree of responsibility than the defendant... for imprecisions or ambiguities in the plea agreements.' Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 979 F.2d 396, 399 (6th Cir.1992)). Ambiguities in a plea agreement are therefore construed against the government, especially because the government can take steps in drafting a plea agreement to avoid imprecision. United States v. Fitch, 282 F.3d 364, 367-68 (6th Cir.2002). Bowman's plea agreement states, in general terms, that he may not challenge on direct appeal any sentence which is at or below the maximum of the guideline range as determined by the Court. The issue here is whether this language covers a challenge under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) to the district court's imposition of a federal sentence that runs consecutively to an undischarged state sentence. (Section 5G1.3(c) gives the district court the discretion to impose a federal sentence either concurrently or consecutively to an undischarged sentence.) No reference is made to either the state sentence or to U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(c) in the plea agreement. The government could have avoided any imprecision on this issue by including language that would have precluded Bowman from challenging the district court's application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3, but it did not do so. Bowman thus has a strong argument that the plea agreement is ambiguous on this issue. In addition, the Second Circuit case of United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 44, 46 (2d Cir.2000), supports the conclusion that Bowman's challenge to the imposition of a consecutive sentence is outside the scope of his appellate waiver. The defendant in Brown waived his right to appeal any sentence within or below the stipulated Guidelines range. Despite Brown's sentence being within the stipulated Guidelines range, the Second Circuit held that the appellate waiver did not encompass his right to appeal the district court's application of U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3. Id. at 48; see also United States v. Stearns, 479 F.3d 175, 178 (2d Cir.2007) (construing an appellate waiver narrowly to hold that although Stearns explicitly waived his right to appeal the length of his sentence, he did not waive the right to appeal the decision to impose that sentence partially concurrently with his state sentence). We have found no published authority with comparable facts that holds to the contrary. Moreover, a result consistent with the current decision was reached in the unreported case of United States v. McCree, 299 Fed.Appx. 481, 482-83 (6th Cir.2008), where this court assumed without deciding that a challenge to the district court's imposition of a consecutive sentence was not barred by McCree's appellate waiver, the terms of which were essentially the same as those present here. Bowman also argues on appeal that the district court improperly considered rehabilitative goals in determining his sentence. He asserts that the district court's rationale for imposing a 120-month sentence, which would be served entirely within the federal system, was to ensure that Bowman benefitted from rehabilitative programs available to him in federal prison. If the court had imposed Bowman's sentence concurrently with his undischarged state sentence, the time that Bowman spent in federal prison would be reduced. Because this argument relates to the court's imposition of a consecutive federal sentence, it is also outside of Bowman's appellate waiver. We therefore hold that Bowman's challenge to the district court's imposition of a federal sentence consecutive to his state sentence is not barred by his plea agreement.