Opinion ID: 2353264
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mishe Miller Declaration

Text: Miller was Appellant's girlfriend at the time of the murder. She told police that Appellant and Teagle were at her house immediately following the robbery and described what happened. She stated that Teagle showed her a working gun and explained why he shot the security guard. Miller did not testify at trial. Appellant supplied the PCRA court with a December 3, 1999 declaration in which Miller asserts that although she gave police this statement, trial counsel did not contact her regarding her statement before trial. Appellant raises two arguments in regard to Miller's declaration. First, Appellant asserts that although she gave a statement to police, neither the police, the prosecutor, nor any other Commonwealth official disclosed this statement to the defense, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (the suppression by the prosecutor of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.). However, the Commonwealth asserts, and the record confirms, that the Commonwealth did, in fact, provide trial counsel with a copy of Miller's police statement, as evidenced by a cover letter dated December 15, 1993, purporting to forward, inter alia, Miller's statement. Second, Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Miller despite the fact that she was known to be Appellant's girlfriend and knew the other witnesses involved in the trial. Had trial counsel performed a reasonable and adequate independent investigation, Appellant asserts that he would have interviewed Miller and the jury would have heard her testimony regarding Teagle's confession. Appellant does not argue appellate counsel's ineffectiveness, that trial counsel lacked a reasonable basis for not interviewing or calling Miller as a witness, or that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure in this regard. To establish that counsel was ineffective for failing to call a witness, Appellant must demonstrate that: (1) the witness existed; (2) the witness was available to testify for the defense; (3) counsel knew of, or should have known of, the existence of the witness; (4) the witness was willing to testify for the defense; and (5) the absence of the testimony of the witness was so prejudicial as to have denied the defendant a fair trial. See Commonwealth v. Fletcher, 561 Pa. 266, 750 A.2d 261, 275 (2000). Failure to call a witness is not per se ineffective assistance of counsel, for such a decision implicates matters of trial strategy. Commonwealth v. Auker, 545 Pa. 521, 681 A.2d 1305, 1319 (1996). It is Appellant's burden to demonstrate that trial counsel had no reasonable basis for declining to call Miller as a witness. See Commonwealth v. Cross, 535 Pa. 38, 634 A.2d 173, 175 (1993). Appellant has not attempted to demonstrate that counsel had no reasonable basis for not interviewing and calling Miller as a witness. In fact, as the Commonwealth points out, a reasonable basis is apparent from the record. At trial, Appellant proceeded with a strategy of mistaken identity and denied any involvement whatsoever in the robbery. Miller's purported testimony that Appellant and Teagle were at the scene, but that Teagle is the one who shot the victim, would have implicated Appellant, and contradicted his defense theory. [13] Generally, where matters of strategy and tactics are concerned, counsel's assistance is deemed constitutionally effective if he chose a particular course that had some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client's interests. Commonwealth v. Miller, 572 Pa. 623, 819 A.2d 504, 517 (2002). A claim of ineffectiveness generally cannot succeed through comparing, in hindsight, the trial strategy employed with alternatives not pursued. Id. Accordingly, this claim fails.