Opinion ID: 75949
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Whether SeFPC's Motion to Intervene Was Timely

Text: 66 As a final matter, Georgia argues that SeFPC's motion to intervene should be denied because it was untimely filed. In determining whether a motion to intervene was timely, we consider (1) the length of time during which the proposed intervenor knew or reasonably should have known of the interest in the case before moving to intervene; (2) the extent of prejudice to the existing parties as a result of the proposed intervenor's failure to move for intervention as soon as it knew or reasonably should have known of its interest; (3) the extent of prejudice to the proposed intervenor if the motion is denied; and (4) the existence of unusual circumstances militating either for or against a determination that their motion was timely. Chiles, 865 F.2d at 1213. However, we must also keep in mind that [t]imeliness is not a word of exactitude or of precisely measurable dimensions. The requirement of timeliness must have accommodating flexibility toward both the court and the litigants if it is to be successfully employed to regulate intervention in the interest of justice. Id. (quoting McDonald v. E.J. Lavino Co., 430 F.2d 1065, 1074 (5th Cir.1970)). 67 Georgia contends that SeFPC's motion is untimely because SeFPC knew of the litigation and had copies of the papers in the case since February 2001, and did not move to intervene until August 2001, after discovery was largely complete and the parties had agreed upon a schedule for the briefing of the case. We do not believe that a delay of six months in itself constitutes untimeliness. See id. (finding motion timely when filed seven months after the case was filed). Although in Chiles we observed discovery had not yet begun, in this case SeFPC's intervention did not delay the proceedings and the court had yet to take significant action. Therefore, we do not believe that the existing parties will be prejudiced by SeFPC's intervention, and SeFPC would be prejudiced if its motion is denied. See id. Accordingly, we find that its motion to intervene was timely. 68 Because we find that SeFPC was entitled to intervene as of right, we need not decide whether the district court abused its discretion in denying SeFPC's motion for permissive intervention pursuant to Rule 24(b)(2). 12