Opinion ID: 2615014
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Counts 6-8: Abril's Claims Against Lewis

Text: Counts 6, 7, and 8 of the bar complaint alleged that respondent's institution and maintenance of the suit, appeal, and petition for review of Abril's claims against attorney M. Byron Lewis violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4. The original complaint filed in the Abril v. Harris litigation asserted a cause of action against Lewis based upon a theory of strict liability for unauthorized representation, and sought damages of $1,300,000. As previously indicated, the sole involvement of Lewis in the Globe appeal was to ascertain that he could not undertake the offered appellate assistance because of a conflict of interest in his firm. [11] On May 31, 1985, respondent phoned Lewis and advised him that Lewis had been named as a defendant in Abril's suit, and would soon be served with process. Lewis informed respondent of the above facts regarding his limited involvement, and respondent advised him that he would look into the matter and would probably be dismissing the lawsuit as to Lewis. On June 3, 1985, Lewis wrote to respondent, memorializing their phone conversation; he also indicated that no fees were generated to either Harris or Abril as a result of his receipt of the materials from Harris. Lewis' letter concluded: Based on this information, it is my understanding that you will have me dismissed as a defendant from this lawsuit. Due to the fact that I currently have some financing pending with First Federal for some remodeling work I am having done to my home, I would appreciate it if you would make arrangements for immediate dismissal of this lawsuit as to me. Otherwise, it may show up as a contingent liability on a credit check which could hinder the First Federal financing. Respondent testified that when Abril read the letter from Lewis indicating Lewis had a conflict of interest, that kind of just caused [Abril] again to go up the wall, because that was the basis of his complaint against Harris regarding the Piatt fee agreement, and Abril would not let respondent dismiss Lewis from the suit. Lewis called respondent 18 or 19 days after the complaint was filed, and respondent advised that he was not going to dismiss Lewis from the suit. Abril testified that he believed that Lewis had files in his possession that were essential to the case, that would cause him to lose the Globe appeal. On July 23, 1985, Lewis moved for summary judgment and requested an award of costs and fees, arguing that, even if a cause of action for unauthorized representation existed, the undisputed facts established that he never represented Abril, having declined representation after performing a conflicts check. He also argued that, because respondent knew of this limited involvement, he should be assessed attorney's fees under A.R.S. § 12-341.01(C) and Rule 11 for a frivolous, vexatious, bad faith claim. Respondent responded that plaintiff is agreeable to a dismissal provided that said dismissal is without the imposition of attorney's fees and costs upon either the plaintiff or plaintiff's counsel, but argued that Lewis was liable under the theory of unauthorized representation set forth in Journal-Miner Publishing Co. v. Curley, 31 Ariz. 280, 252 P. 187 (1927). In granting summary judgment in Lewis' favor, the trial court found the claim against Lewis was known by the plaintiff and his counsel to be groundless after a telephone conversation with Lewis on May 31, 1985, and after receipt of a letter from Lewis dated June 3, 1985. The court concluded that Abril had failed to support his legal theory of strict liability for unauthorized representation. The court granted fees after finding that the suit against Lewis was frivolous, that respondent had shown no facts from which he could surmise Lewis held confidential information, and that the suit constituted harassment. Respondent then filed a Motion for a New Trial, as well as a Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for a New Trial Regarding Award of Attorney's Fees, challenging the court's finding of bad faith and the award of fees; all of these motions were denied. The trial court awarded $3,455.50 in fees to Lewis against Abril. Respondent appealed only from the award of fees. His appeal was based only on the claim that his suit against Lewis was not frivolous or groundless. The court of appeals affirmed, and awarded attorney's fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(C) and § 12-349. Abril v. Lewis, 2 CA-CV 87-0023 (Ariz. App. mem. dec. filed May 12, 1987). The court awarded Lewis attorney's fees of $7,373.75 and costs, and $1,500 in damages against respondent personally. Respondent then filed a petition for review with this court, which was denied, with an additional award of fees to Lewis of $3,907.50. In finding the claim against Lewis to violate E.R. 3.1 and 4.4, the committee remarked: [F]rom the outset the incredible number of motions, papers, the appeal and the petition were generated solely to avoid the sanction of fees and costs. Lewis' law firm was compelled to pay approximately $13,000 in fees to Lewis' lawyer to successfully defend what the Committee finds to be a wholly frivolous and groundless action.... Respondent relies on Journal-Miner Publishing Company v. Curley, 31 Ariz. 280, 252 P. 187 (1927) as support for naming Lewis in the lawsuit.... The Committee's reading of Journal-Miner finds that an employed attorney does have the authority to hire associate counsel but without ratification of such hiring by the client the associate counsel can only look to the hiring lawyer for compensation, not to the client. See 31 Ariz. at 283 [252 P. at 188]. Respondent's reading of the case is not supported by the language of the case itself. The commission adopted the findings of the committee, further noting: The Commission finds Respondent's conduct, with respect to Byron Lewis, especially egregious.... Mr. Lewis conducted himself properly throughout his brief involvement in this matter. Still, Respondent sued him.... Respondent cannot demonstrate an unauthorized representation by Mr. Lewis, even if a cause of action for unauthorized representation exists or could exist under an extension of existing law. On appeal, respondent argues that the committee and commission erred in considering that respondent's motive in continuing with the claim against Lewis was avoidance of the fees, because the only conduct charged in count 6 is the act of filing the complaint in the first instance. This statement is factually incorrect: the complaint clearly charges respondent with instituting and maintaining the claim against Lewis in the trial court, on appeal and on review. Respondent's actions during the entire litigation could therefore be considered. We agree with the findings of the committee and commission regarding counts 6, 7, and 8. Respondent's institution of the claim against Lewis was not objectively reasonable under the theory of Journal-Miner, which involved the issue of a client's obligation for payment of fees to an unauthorized associate counsel, nor was it reasonable given the facts of Lewis' limited involvement with Abril's appeal. Lewis was harassed for over two years by this unfounded and unreasonable claim, during which time respondent was made aware consistently, by every court that considered the matter, of the groundless nature of this claim. The record contains clear and convincing evidence that respondent violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4 as charged in counts 6, 7, and 8 of the bar complaint.