Opinion ID: 1952817
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the claim of john rogers against raphael g. urciolo and joseph j. urciolo

Text: The following language of Judge Childs in the opinion of the lower court aptly describes the machinations of Raphael Urciolo with regard to his representation of Mr. Rogers: The shepherd [in this instance Father O'Neill] having in good faith entrusted his sheep unto the hands of Raphael G. Urciolo, the latter carried out his trust by attempting to fleece Rogers. As illustrative of this point the brothers Urciolo unauthorizedly and illegally charged Rogers $12,425 for his part of the overall transaction and still retain the entire balance of proceeds from the sale. [4] And, as the trier of facts, the chancellor further stated: Mr. Raphael Urciolo admitted in open court on the third day of testimony that he, being unlicensed in Maryland, was not entitled to attorney's fees. Nor is his real estate firm licensed in Maryland, yet the Urciolos have received some $29,000 in commissions on two Rogers' sales. The court has yet to receive a satisfactory explanation as to why a straw man named in a deed is entitled to claim a `trustee's commission' nor of the basis for the commission charge. It seems clear to the court that this charge was a mere sham and guise whereby an unsuspecting and trusting old man was further deprived of the product of his life's labors. Added to this circumstance was the fact that Raphael Urciolo at the sale of the property was representing both buyers and sellers without divulging his dual role to either. Even were this not so, and even had the Urciolos been licensed brokers and attorneys in Maryland, transactions arising out of an attorney-client relationship when challenged are prima facie void, and the attorney has the burden of proving understanding on the part of his client and fairness and absence of undue influence and deception. Lopez v. Lopez, 250 Md. 491. The chancellor further found that both Raphael and Joseph Urciolo had attempted (and up to the date of the decree had done so successfully) to deprive Rogers of his portion of the $24,000 down payment on the property made to Joseph Urciolo in May of 1965, when the property was conveyed to the Arban-Urciolo combine. Rogers emphatically testified that he did not employ the Urciolo Realty Company as a broker nor appoint Joseph Urciolo as a trustee. The trust agreement of September 17, 1964, whereby Clarke and the Rogerses conveyed in trust their interest in the property to Chance and Joseph Urciolo, did not provide for any trustees' commissions. The testimony of Joseph Urciolo, who is also a practicing attorney in the District of Columbia, would be disarming if one were to believe him to be as naive as his characterization of his role in this transaction would indicate. He states: Answer: He's [meaning Raphael] an older brother. He was handling the thing from the beginning and I didn't know anything about it. I didn't know what was going on   . Question: Mr. Urciolo you have no personal interest   Answer: None. Question: In any funds? Answer: None, whatsoever. Question: Mr. Urciolo, what is the Urciolo Realty Company? Answer: It's a real trade name for a duly licensed brokership in Washington, D.C. and it is the trade name of Raphael G. Urciolo. Against such a factual background, the chancellor correctly held that, in addition to his interest in the purchase money mortgage, Rogers should have received from the $24,000 deposit, the sum of $7,191.62 (being equal to the amount received by Chance) and the improperly charged real estate commissions of $9,460 (Chance, at the time of the decree, having assigned all of his interest to Rogers), less the $500 fee which Winson Gott, Esq. received. Raphael Urciolo, as settlement attorney, should have paid Rogers $16,151.62 or held this amount in trust for him. To have held otherwise would have been to overlook the age-old principle applicable to fiduciary relationships that, unless there is a full disclosure by the agent, trustee, or attorney of his activity and interest in the transaction to the party he represents and the obtaining of the consent of the party represented, the party serving in the fiduciary capacity cannot receive any profit or emolument from the transaction. This is true even when the transaction benefits the principal or client, which does not readily appear to be the case in this transaction. Maryland Credit v. Hagerty, 216 Md. 83, 90-92, 139 A.2d 230 (1958). In Gerson v. Gerson, 179 Md. 171, 177, 20 A.2d 567 (1941), the Court, quoting from Chase v. Grey, 134 Md. 619, 623, said: `   Courts of equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular instances of fiduciary relations in such a manner that other and perhaps new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an overwhelming weight of authority that the principle extends to every possible case in which a confidential relation exists as a fact in which there is a confidence reposed on one side, and the resulting superiority and influence on the other. The relation and duties involved in it need not be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or merely personal.'    `No part of the jurisdiction of the court is more useful than that which it exercises in watching and controlling transactions between persons standing in the relation of confidence to each other   . The jurisdiction is founded on the principle of correcting abuses of confidence, and I shall have no hesitation in saying it ought to be applied whatever be the nature of the confidence reposed, or the relation of the parties between whom it has subsisted.' Certainly the factual pattern of the case at bar may be cast in such a mold, insofar as the relationship between Raphael Urciolo and Rogers is concerned.