Opinion ID: 2225738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Admissibility of Statement to Police

Text: Bane next objects to the admission of a statement that he made to police while in custody. Bane contends that while in police custody, during interrogation, he made an unequivocal request for an attorney. An attorney was not provided promptly, and the police continued to question him. The statement he gave to police during this questioning was admitted during trial. Relevant portions of the interrogation follow: Det. Whitlow: O.K. I believe the Officer's name you talked to upstairs was Officer Mike Crump. When you came in Officer Crump advised you of your rights, is that correct? Clayton: Not (inaudible) I think he did. Det. Whitlow: O.K. Well, I what I'm going to do is I'm going to advise you of your rights again. Clayton: O.K. Det. Whitlow: O.K. Just for the record. You have the right to remain silent, and anything you say can be used against you in court. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and you have the right to have him with you during questioning, and if you can not afford a lawyer one will be appointed uh for you before any questioning if you wish. And if you decide to answer any questions now without having a lawyer present you still have the right to stop at any time and you also have the right to stop at any time until you talk to a lawyer. O.K., Clayton are you do you understand what all that means? Clayton: Yes, I do. Det. Whitlow: O.K. Uh we talked briefly earlier and you said you understood your rights and you would be willing to give me a statement uh concerning your activities yesterday, is that correct? Clayton: Yeah. Det. Whitlow: O.K. That yesterday being July the Fourth nineteen ninety. Uh at this time you [sic] willing to give me a statement without having a attorney present concerning your activities yesterday? Clayton: Well I'll tell you what I did you know. Det. Whitlow: O.K. Clayton: I run around went drinkin. Det. Whitlow: O.K. Well let's let's [sic] if you're willing to do that let's uh it's my understanding you don't want to sign the rights form now is that right? Clayton: Not 'til you know? Det. Whitlow: O.K. Clayton: When I talk to my lawyer I'll. Det. Whitlow: O.K. But you don't want a lawyer at this time, is that correct? Clayton: I will get a lawyer. Det. Whitlow: O.K. But you don't want one now is what I'm saying. O.K.? Clayton: I'd like to have one but you know I it would be hard to get hold of one right now. Det. Whitlow: Well what I am asking you Clayton is do you wish to give me a statement at this time without having a lawyer present? Clayton: Well I can I can [sic] tell you what I did. Det. Whitlow: O.K. that's what, that's what [sic] I'm asking. Trial record at 2021-25. Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, the defendant has the right to the presence and advice of counsel during custodial interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. Once the right to counsel has been asserted by the defendant, the suspect cannot be subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available unless the suspect himself initiates further communication and, thereby, knowingly and intelligently waives the right previously invoked. See Edwards v. Arizona (1981), 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378. The defendant analogizes his situation to those found in Sleek v. State (1986), Ind., 499 N.E.2d 751, and Smith v. Illinois (1984), 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488. Unlike this case, however, in both Sleek and Smith, the defendants made a clear request for counsel. In Sleek, the defendant was advised orally of his Miranda rights. He responded that well, [I] feel like I ought to have an attorney around. Several minutes passed without verbal response to detectives continued questions regarding the facts of the case before the defendant finally nodded his head and signed a waiver form. In Smith, the defendant was informed, you have a right to consult with a lawyer and to have a lawyer present with you when you are being questioned. Do you understand that? The defendant responded, uh, yeah. I'd like to do that. Id. at 93, 105 S.Ct. at 491, 83 L.Ed.2d at 492. The Supreme Court held that the defendant's statement, yeah, I'd like to do that, represented a clear and unequivocal request for counsel. They note that lower courts were able to construe Smith's request for counsel as `ambiguous' only by looking to continued police questioning. Id. at 97, 105 S.Ct. at 494, 83 L.Ed.2d at 495. Where nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances leading up to the request would render it ambiguous, all questioning must cease. Id. at 98, 105 S.Ct. at 494, 83 L.Ed.2d at 495. The Smith holding informs us that we must consider each of Bane's statements separately, in light of preceding statements, but without considering subsequent ones. When conducting this analysis, we can find no clear and unequivocal request for an attorney. At several points, Bane suggests that he would like to have a lawyer eventually, but in the meantime is willing to give a statement to the police. We believe the facts of this case are more analogous to those found in our recent decision in Pasco v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 587. In Pasco, an officer repeated Miranda warnings to the defendants before the following exchange occurred: P: I don't know what to do ... I don't know if I should stop or if I should get a lawyer. W: Well, that's completely up to you Cephis. P: I don't know what the hell to do, I mean. This is the first time with the law or anything ... I want to help you. W: Okay. P: That's the kind of guy I am. I ... I try to help anybody that needs help. Id. at 591. We found the situation in Pasco also distinguishable from those facts discussed in Sleek and Smith. The fact that Pasco had been read his Miranda rights on numerous occasions, accompanied by the fact that the officer continued questioning designed to ascertain Pasco's true wishes with respect to obtaining counsel reflected that Pasco knew his rights, understood them, and voluntarily chose to forego his right to counsel and give a statement immediately. The defendant's statement in Pasco was held to be properly admitted. We hold that the statement in this case was properly admitted.