Opinion ID: 6325455
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Satisfying Brady’s second prong

Text: {¶ 26} Although the state concedes that the holding just stated is correct, it also argues that Bethel failed to satisfy Brady’s second prong (i.e., suppression by the state), because he has not shown that he did not know about the evidence contained in Summary 86 at the time of his trial. The state cites United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), in which the court stated that Brady claims involve the discovery of information that “had been known to the prosecution but unknown to the defense.” (Emphasis added.) The state contends that Bethel’s claim fails because he “failed to provide evidentiary documentation indicating [his] actual unawareness” of the evidence he is relying on. {¶ 27} The state exaggerates Bethel’s burden. Two of Bethel’s former attorneys provided affidavits stating that Bethel and his legal team did not know about Summary 86 before Bethel’s trial. The state provides no support for its claim that these affidavits were insufficient or that Bethel needed additional evidence to prove that he was unaware of the report before trial. {¶ 28} The state’s argument also is problematic because it misconstrues the evidence at issue. The state argues that Bethel himself necessarily knew the extent of Langbein’s involvement, because Bethel’s own alibi placed Bethel with Chavis at the time of the murders and the information from Shannon Williams would have made Bethel the getaway driver. But Bethel’s knowledge of Langbein’s involvement is not the question; the question is whether Bethel knew about Withers’s statement concerning what Chavis allegedly had said while in jail. {¶ 29} In sum, the state argues that the prosecution did not suppress the Withers information, because Bethel “could have learned of the information through other means.” The state contends that the “defense knew something, and the defense was not limited to being a passive receptor of whatever discovery was provided by the prosecution.” (Emphasis sic.) This is the state’s reasonable-diligence 10 January Term, 2022 requirement dressed in different clothing. We reject the state’s arguments for the reasons discussed above. {¶ 30} We conclude that the documents Bethel submitted with his successive postconviction petition establish a prima facie claim that the prosecution suppressed Summary 86. 3. No reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty or eligible for the death sentence but for the constitutional error at trial {¶ 31} Bethel’s postconviction petition faces an additional jurisdictional hurdle: under R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b), he must show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty or eligible for the death sentence but for constitutional error at trial. This question goes to the heart of Brady’s third prong, which requires Bethel to show that “ ‘there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different.’ ” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490, quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481. {¶ 32} The Brady standard does not require Bethel to show that disclosure of the Withers information would have resulted in his acquittal. See Kyles at 434. Nor does it require him to show that “after discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, there would not have been [sufficient evidence] left to convict,” id. at 434-435. Rather, Bethel must prove that “in the context of the entire record,” Agurs, 427 U.S. at 112, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, suppression of the Withers information “ ‘undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial,’ ” Kyles at 434, quoting Bagley at 678. {¶ 33} The trial court found that Bethel was not prejudiced by his lack of access to the Withers information prior to trial. The court characterized Summary 86 as a “cryptic double hearsay statement” that Bethel could not have used directly at trial under the Rules of Evidence. The court concluded that “Summary 86 would not have changed anything,” because Bethel had confessed to killing Reynolds and 11 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO Hawk. The court of appeals agreed that the Withers information is immaterial for Brady purposes. 2020-Ohio-1343 at ¶ 26-28. That court suggested that the theory Summary 86 supports—that Chavis and Langbein murdered Reynolds and Hawk— is untenable in view of Bethel’s own inconsistent statements (a confession and an alibi), both of which placed Bethel with Chavis at the time of the murders. Id. at ¶ 27. {¶ 34} Suppressed evidence must be “considered collectively, not item by item.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 436, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490. And the materiality of suppressed evidence must be viewed “in the context of the entire record.” Agurs at 112. Therefore, in examining the materiality of the Withers information, we also must consider the pretrial statement that Shannon Williams made to investigators, which the prosecution also allegedly suppressed. The question is whether we can have confidence in the jury’s verdict even assuming that the prosecution suppressed the information Williams and Withers had provided to investigators. See Kyles at 434. To answer that question, we must examine how Bethel might have benefited from that information at trial. {¶ 35} To start, Bethel could not have used the Withers information as direct evidence that Langbein (and not Bethel) murdered Reynolds and Hawk. The statements in Summary 86, which report what Withers had said to investigators, are double hearsay. And although Withers affirmed his statements in an affidavit and could have testified at trial, the statements are still hearsay because Withers merely repeated what Chavis had allegedly told him. Bethel argues that the Withers information would have undermined the state’s case against him, but he does not identify any hearsay exception that would have allowed Chavis’s purported statements to Withers to be introduced for the truth of the matter asserted. See Evid.R. 801, 803, 804. And Summary 86 could not have been used to impeach Langbein, because it does not involve a prior statement made by Langbein. 12 January Term, 2022 {¶ 36} Bethel nevertheless argues that he could have used the Withers information in his cross-examination of one of the investigators to attack the thoroughness of the investigation. But Bethel has not shown that such questioning would have “ ‘seriously undermine[d],’ ” Eakes v. Sexton, 592 Fed.Appx. 422, 427428 (6th Cir.2014), quoting United States v. Weintraub, 871 F.2d 1257, 1262 (5th Cir.1989), any investigator’s credibility in view of the strong evidence that corroborated the conclusion reached during the investigation that the evidence— most significantly, Bethel’s confession—showed that Bethel had committed the murders. {¶ 37} Nor has Bethel shown that the information from Williams would have bolstered the significance of the Withers information or detracted from the clear evidence of Bethel’s guilt. Even if Bethel had called Williams to testify in an effort to impeach Langbein, Williams would not have said that Langbein had confessed to killing Reynolds and Hawk. It was not clear in the report relaying Williams’s statement that Langbein was talking to Williams about the murders of Reynolds and Hawk. Bethel’s confession, in contrast, included details about the types of firearms that were used, which were consistent with the autopsies of Reynolds and Hawk. And Bethel did not talk only to Langbein and investigators about the fact that he had killed Reynolds and Hawk; he also confessed to Campbell. {¶ 38} Bethel argues that if he had possessed the information from Withers and Williams before his trial, he would not have proffered the confession. He contends that he falsely confessed to murdering Reynolds and Hawk to avoid the death penalty only because he had no viable defense on the eve of trial. This argument invites us to stray from the main question of Brady’s third prong—i.e., whether Bethel received a fair trial. See Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342. Bethel is not arguing here that the Withers and Williams information would have been useful to his defense. Instead, he is arguing that his ignorance of 13 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO the information induced him to lie about committing the murders. This tenuous theory does not support Bethel’s claim that he did not receive a fair trial. {¶ 39} Finally, Bethel argues that we must separately analyze whether the suppression of the Withers and Williams information undermines the decision sentencing him to death. Such an inquiry is appropriate. See R.C. 2953.23(A)(1)(b) (requiring a petitioner to show that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty at trial or eligible for the death sentence but for constitutional error at the sentencing hearing). But Bethel fails to demonstrate how he could have used the Withers and Williams information during the sentencing phase of his trial. To the extent that he is arguing that the information would have created residual doubt about his guilt, that purpose would not have been proper under Ohio law. See State v. McGuire, 80 Ohio St.3d 390, 686 N.E.2d 1112 (1997), syllabus. {¶ 40} At bottom, the Withers and Williams information has limited probative value in the context of the entire record, and Bethel’s opportunities to use that information would have been limited. Bethel, again, was convicted on the weight of his own proffered confession, Langbein’s testimony, and Campbell’s testimony. 110 Ohio St.3d 416, 2006-Ohio-4853, 854 N.E.2d 150, at ¶ 101. We hold that Bethel has not shown by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-finder would have found him guilty or eligible for the death sentence but for constitutional error at trial. Therefore, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to entertain Bethel’s successive postconviction petition.