Opinion ID: 2804712
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sovereign Immunity and Duty

Text: Traditionally, the doctrine of sovereign immunity shielded states from both suit and liability. (Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1006, 1012; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Torts, § 203, p. 344.) Under the doctrine, a state is immune except to the extent it consents to suit. (See Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 131, p. 1033.) In Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist. (1961) 55 Cal.2d 211, 221, this court abolished the rule of government immunity from tort liability. The Legislature responded by temporarily reinstating former law, then replacing it in 1963 with the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.), which sets out a comprehensive scheme of governmental liability and immunity statutes. (Thomas v. City of Richmond (1995) 9 Cal.4th 1154, 1157; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 216, p. 366.) Under the act, a public entity is not liable ―[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute.‖ (Gov. Code, § 815; see Hoff v. Vacaville Unified School Dist. (1998) 19 Cal.4th 925, 932.) One such statute is Government Code section 815.6, which provides, ―Where a public entity is under a mandatory duty imposed by an enactment that is designed to protect against the risk of a particular kind of injury, the public entity is liable for an 7 injury of that kind proximately caused by its failure to discharge the duty unless the public entity establishes that it exercised reasonable diligence to discharge the duty.‖ (Gov. Code, § 815.6.) Thus, the government may be liable when (1) a mandatory duty is imposed by enactment, (2) the duty was designed to protect against the kind of injury allegedly suffered, and (3) breach of the duty proximately caused injury. Even when a duty exists, California has enacted specific immunity statutes that, if applicable, prevail over liability provisions. (Creason v. Department of Health Services (1998) 18 Cal.4th 623, 635 (Creason); 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 226, p. 375.) However, the first question is whether the plaintiff has alleged the breach of a mandatory duty. (Creason, at p. 630.) If there is no actionable duty, the question of immunity does not arise. (Ibid.; Caldwell v. Montoya (1995) 10 Cal.4th 972, 985; 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law, supra, Torts, § 225, p. 374.) Courts have delineated what is necessary to establish a mandatory duty. ―First and foremost, . . . the enactment at issue [must] be obligatory, rather than merely discretionary or permissive, in its directions to the public entity; it must require, rather than merely authorize or permit, that a particular action be taken or not taken.‖ (Haggis v. City of Los Angeles (2000) 22 Cal.4th 490, 498 (Haggis).) ―It is not enough, moreover, that the public entity or officer have been under an obligation to perform a function if the function itself involves the exercise of discretion.‖ (Ibid., italics added.) Moreover, ―[c]ourts have . . . [found] a mandatory duty only if the enactment ‗affirmatively imposes the duty and provides implementing guidelines.‘ ‖ (Guzman v. County of Monterey (2009) 46 Cal.4th 887, 898 (Guzman).) ― ‗ ―[T]he mandatory nature of the duty must be phrased in explicit and forceful language.‖ [Citation.] ―It is not enough that some statute contains mandatory language. In order to recover plaintiffs have to show 8 that there is some specific statutory mandate that was violated by the [public entity].‖ ‘ [Citations.]‖ (Id. at pp. 910-911.) Whether an enactment imposes ―a mandatory duty, rather than a mere obligation to perform a discretionary function, is a question of statutory interpretation for the courts.‖ (Creason, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 631.) The enactment‘s ―language ‗is, of course, a most important guide in determining legislative intent, [but] there are unquestionably instances in which other factors will indicate that apparent obligatory language was not intended to foreclose a governmental entity‘s or officer‘s exercise of discretion.‘ ‖ (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 499.) For example, the word ―shall‖ is ―mandatory‖ for purposes of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (§ 15; see Gov. Code, § 14 [same].) ―However, as we have emphasized, this term‘s inclusion in an enactment does not necessarily create a mandatory duty‖ within the meaning of Government Code section 815.6. (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 899.) We have recognized that while the ―exercise of discretion may often mark the dividing line between a duty that is mandatory and one that is not [citation], that line is sometimes difficult to draw.‖ (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 899.) ―[I]n cases not involving a public entity‘s ‗ ―quasi-legislative policy-making‖ ‘ [citation], the inquiry should focus on whether the entity must ‗render a considered decision‘ [citation], one requiring its expertise and judgment [citations].‖ (Ibid.) Creason is illustrative. Sierra Creason and her parents sued the Department of Health Services (DHS) after neonatal testing failed to disclose that Sierra was born without a functioning thyroid gland. (Creason, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 626-627.) The complaint alleged that the test DHS designated was deficient, resulting in failure to diagnose Sierra‘s congenital hypothyroidism, which in turn led to a significant delay in treatment and irreversible injury. (Id. at p. 627.) 9 The applicable statutory scheme, the Hereditary Disorders Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 124975 et seq.), provided: ―[DHS] shall establish a genetic disease unit,‖ and ―[t]he unit shall promote a statewide program of . . . testing . . . and shall have the responsibility of designating tests and regulations to be used in executing this program. [¶] The . . . tests . . . shall be in accordance with accepted medical practices and shall be administered to each child born in California once the department has established appropriate regulations and testing methods.‖ (Id., § 125000, subd. (a).) DHS thus had a mandatory duty to establish a neonatal testing program. However, the particular standards for testing and the protocol for reporting were left to its discretion and judgment. Had DHS taken no action at all, it would have failed to discharge its mandatory duty to designate the tests to be used. But DHS discharged that duty, and the plaintiffs did not allege otherwise. Instead, they argued that the way DHS exercised its judgment in designating tests and implementing procedures caused Sierra‘s injury. (Creason, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 627-628.) The Creason court concluded that a demurrer was properly granted. Although DHS‘s duty to designate tests was mandatory, its formulation of those tests and related reporting standards was discretionary and could not give rise to liability. (Id. at pp. 629, 635.) Creason and similar cases illustrate the following distinction. A mandatory duty is created only when an enactment requires an act that is clearly defined and not left to the public entity‘s discretion or judgment. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 543, 550-551 (Faten).) Such an act is mandated only to the extent of the enactment‘s precise formulation. When the enactment leaves implementation to an exercise of discretion, ―lend[ing] itself to a normative or qualitative debate over whether [the duty] was adequately fulfilled,‖ 10 an alleged failure in implementation will not give rise to liability. (de Villers v. County of San Diego (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 238, 260.) Applying these principles here, we hold that the complaint sufficiently alleges a breach of DMH‘s mandatory duty to conduct an evaluation with two evaluators. The SVPA specifies that an inmate referred by DOC ―shall be evaluated by two practicing psychiatrists or psychologists, or one practicing psychiatrist and one practicing psychologist, designated by the Director of Mental Health.‖ (Former § 6601, subd. (d), italics added.) This language is clear, conferring no discretion as to the number of evaluators. (Haggis, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 502; Faten, supra, 209 Cal.App.4th at p. 551.) Moreover, the use of two evaluators is critical to the SVPA process. A petition for commitment cannot be requested unless both evaluators agree that a person meets the criteria for SVP status. (§ 6601, subd. (d).) If they disagree, the Director of Mental Health must arrange for two independent evaluators to conduct a further examination. Both must concur that the inmate meets the criteria before a commitment petition can be requested. (§ 6601, subds. (e) & (f).) In sum, the enactment‘s language, taken together with the design of the SVPA process, makes it clear that the Legislature ― ‗intended to foreclose . . . [the] exercise of discretion‘ ‖ with regard to how many evaluators must be designated to assess persons referred by DOC. (Haggis, at p. 499.) Defendants concede they are obliged to ―designate two mental health professionals to conduct the ‗full evaluation.‘ ‖ Citing the discretion woven throughout the SVPA process, however, they argue that the obligation does not amount to a mandatory duty. Defendants note, for example, that the Director of Corrections first has discretion to determine whether someone might be an SVP, that DOC‘s subsequent screening is discretionary, and that the evaluators designated by DMH have discretion to determine whether a person meets the SVP 11 criteria. Defendants conclude from this that the entire SVPA screening process, including their duty to designate two evaluators, should be considered discretionary. The argument fails. Whatever discretion may be afforded by other provisions, the statute requiring the Director of Mental Health to designate two evaluators affords none. The only other mandatory duty identified in the complaint is an alleged obligation on the part of DMH to conduct in-person examinations of all referred inmates. The Court of Appeal properly rejected this claim. The SVPA states that after an inmate is referred for a full evaluation, DMH ―shall evaluate the person in accordance with a standardized assessment protocol‖ including specific risk factors. (§ 6601, subd. (c), italics added.) However, nowhere does the statute impose a specific requirement for in-person examination of referred inmates. As Guzman explained, a mandatory duty must be based on an enactment phrased in explicit and forceful language. (Guzman, supra, 46 Cal.4th at pp. 910-911.) Noncodified details of the SVP evaluation protocol are left to DMH‘s judgment and discretion.8 (§ 6601, subd. (c).) Without any specific statutory command, DMH is not subject to a mandatory duty to conduct in-person evaluations of all referred inmates. (Guzman, at p. 910.)9 8 Plaintiff contends that permitting DMH to merely review available records would duplicate the DOC screening mandated by section 6601, subdivision (b). Not so. Unlike the DOC screening, DMH‘s evaluation must be conducted by practicing psychologists and/or psychiatrists and must consider the factors identified in section 6601, subdivision (c). 9 The complaint relies on an uncodified statute enacted in 2008, in which the Legislature stated, ―The [SVP] civil commitment program requires clinical evaluations of potential [SVPs] for possible commitment . . . .‖ (Stats. 2008, ch. 601, § 1, subd. (b), pp. 4293-4294, italics added.) Even assuming that a mandatory duty could arise from an uncodified legislative declaration, and even if the 2008 legislation were relevant to our construction of the 2007 version of the (footnote continued on next page) 12 As to the second element of Government Code section 815.6, there is no dispute that harm to the public caused by an SVP‘s release is the kind of risk the SVPA was designed to forestall.10 The particular mandatory duty at issue here requires the designation of two evaluators. This element of redundancy built into the review process serves the interest of the inmate as well as the governmental interest in protecting public safety. However, the potential dual benefit does not (footnote continued from previous page) SVPA, the reference to ―clinical evaluations‖ is ambiguous. It is not clear whether the phrase refers to in-person assessments, or merely evaluations by practicing clinicians. 10 An uncodified statement accompanying the SVPA‘s enactment in 1996 declared: ―The Legislature finds and declares that a small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders can be identified while they are incarcerated. These persons are not safe to be at large and if released represent a danger to the health and safety of others in that they are likely to engage in acts of sexual violence. The Legislature further finds and declares that it is in the interest of society to identify these individuals prior to the expiration of their terms of imprisonment. It is the intent of the Legislature that once identified, these individuals, if found to be likely to commit acts of sexually violent criminal behavior beyond a reasonable doubt, be confined and treated until such time that it can be determined that they no longer present a threat to society. ―The Legislature further finds and declares that while these individuals have been duly punished for their criminal acts, they are, if adjudicated sexually violent predators, a continuing threat to society. The continuing danger posed by these individuals and the continuing basis for their judicial commitment is a currently diagnosed mental disorder which predisposes them to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. It is the intent of the Legislature that these individuals be committed and treated for their disorders only as long as the disorders persist and not for any punitive purposes.‖ (Stats. 1995, ch. 763, § 1, p. 5921; see Hubbart v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1138, 1144, fn. 5.) The 2006 SVPA amendments reflect enhanced concern with protection of the public from sexually violent predators. (See McKee, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1186.) 13 defeat plaintiff‘s showing. We have recognized that public safety is a particularly powerful purpose of the SVPA evaluation process. (Moore v. Superior Court (2010) 50 Cal.4th 802, 825; People v. Superior Court (Ghilotti) (2002) 27 Cal.4th 888, 912.) It is clear that the requirement of two evaluators was designed, in part, to guard against the risk that an SVP might be released.