Opinion ID: 3045905
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commission of Offense While on Escape Status

Text: Section 2P1.1(a)(1) of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides for a base offense level of 13 for the crime of escape from custody or confinement if that custody or confinement results from a conviction. Section 2P1.1(b)(3) provides for a four-level reduction from that base offense level “[i]f the defendant escaped from the non-secure custody of a community corrections center, community treatment center, ‘halfway house,’ or similar facility” and failed to return voluntarily within ninety-six hours. Nevertheless, it provides that “this reduction shall not apply if the defendant, while away from the facility, committed any federal, state, or local offense punishable by a term of imprisonment of one year or more. ” U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(3). In its Presentence Report, the Probation Officer determined that Royal was not entitled to the four-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(3), citing the pending state charges of identity theft and access device fraud, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4106(a)(1), because those charges reflected Royal’s commission of a state offense punishable for more than one year. Royal objected to the denial of this reduction at the March 25, 2008 sentencing hearing, arguing that no probable cause hearing on the state charges had been conducted. The District Court continued the sentencing hearing after pointing out that, in order to establish that the four-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 2P1.1(b)(3) did not apply, the Government had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Royal actually 10 committed the charged offense.1 At the continuation of the sentencing hearing on April 16, 2008, the Government presented testimony of Craig Moritz, the salesperson at the store where Royal allegedly committed the charged offenses, and Brian Finn, the Pennsylvania state police officer who arrested Royal at the store. Moritz testified that Royal engaged in a scheme to use a credit card belonging to another individual to purchase merchandise from the supply store where he worked. Moritz further testified that he alerted the police to Royal’s scheme after learning that his purchases were fraudulent, and he identified the credit card receipts from the purchases, which were signed by Royal. Finn testified that he arrested Royal at the supply store after being tipped off about his fraudulent scheme. Finn stated that Royal was charged with identity theft, conspiracy to commit identity theft, and several counts of access device fraud. Based on this testimony, the District Court determined that the government established by a preponderance of the evidence that Royal had committed access device, a Pennsylvania state offense punishable by one year or more 2 while on escape status. Royal 1 The Supreme Court has determined that, in general, “facts relevant to sentencing [should] be proved by a preponderance of the evidence” and that “application of the preponderance standard at sentencing generally satisfies due process.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997); United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 280 (3d Cir. 2009). 2 The District Court observed that the loss associated with the transactions triggered a first-degree misdemeanor classification. See 18 Pa. C.S. § 4106(c)(1)(ii). The maximum term of imprisonment for a first-degree misdemeanor in Pennsylvania is five 11 argues that the District Court abused its discretion in making this finding. He contends that, pursuant to 18 Pa. C.S. § 4106(a)(1), the “use” of an access device to obtain property is a required element of the offense charged, and he argues that testimony in the sentencing hearing did not show that he “used” another’s access device to obtain property or services. The District Court properly assessed the evidence proffered by the government and concluded that the evidence sufficed to prove by a preponderance that, at a minimum, Royal committed the offense of access device fraud in violation of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4106. Pennsylvania law 3 makes it unlawful to “use an access device to obtain or in an attempt to obtain property or services with knowledge that (i) the access device is counterfeit, altered or incomplete; (ii) the access device was issued to another person who has not authorized its use; (iii) the access device has been revoked or canceled; or (iv) for any other reason his use of the access device is unauthorized by the issuer or the device holder.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 4106(a)(1). Royal’s argument that he did not “use” the credit card involved in purchases at the Fastenal store fails. The Government’s evidence from the years. 18 Pa. C.S. § 106(b)(6). 3 As the Government’s brief notes, § 4106(a)(2) further proscribes “aid[ing] or abet[ting] any other person to use an access device knowing that the access device is counterfeit, altered or incomplete, belongs to another person who has not authorized its use, has been revoked or canceled or for any reason is unauthorized by the issuer or the device holder.” Because Royal “used” the access device for purposes of 18 Pa. C.S. § 4106, we need not consider the Government’s subsidiary argument that, at a minimum, Royal “aid[ed] or abet[ted]” another individual in the fraudulent use of an access device. 12 store salesperson and the arresting officer demonstrates that, after placing orders at the store, Royal (or someone else) called the store with a credit card number belonging to some other individual. When Royal returned to the store to pick up the merchandise, he signed the credit card receipts using an alias. By retrieving the merchandise purchased with a credit card not his own and by signing the credit card receipts for those purchases, Royal “used” the credit card to “obtain . . . property or services.” 18 Pa. C.S. § 4106(a)(1). The District Court did not err in concluding by a preponderance of the evidence that Royal committed access device fraud, an offense punishable by more than one year under Pennsylvania law, while on escape status. Based on the foregoing, we will affirm the District Court’s sentence. 13