Opinion ID: 2086451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Claims Relating to the Failure to Prove the Conspiracy

Text: Defendant asserts that the prosecution failed to prove that he committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding. Section 9-1(b)(5) of the Criminal Code of 1961, under which the trial court sentenced the defendant to death, states that a defendant is eligible for the death penalty if: The defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(5).) Defendant contends that there was no evidence that he knew he was involved in a murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding. At the most, the defendant argues, the State proved that he shared in the proceeds of a residential burglary which was committed in conjunction with the murder. We reject defendant's contentions. Defendant intimates that because the prosecution failed to introduce direct testimony establishing defendant's knowledge of the contract, it has not sustained its burden of proof. This intimation is baseless. The testimony of Daniel Egan, Ann Walters and Wayne Walters was sufficient to show that defendant joined the conspiracy long before the murder was committed, and agreed to assist Bean in the murder, with the understanding that all of the participants would share the proceeds of any goods recovered from the victim's home and any money obtained from Ann and Wayne directly and through the victim's estate. Defendant further contends that even if the State established that he was well aware of the contract prior to Dorothy's murder, the plain language of section 9-1(b)(5) requires the State to prove that the defendant himself entered into the contract and actually committed the murder. Stated differently, defendant argues that the legislature intended only for the principal contract killer to be eligible for the death penalty, and not his accomplice. In support of this argument, defendant points out that where the legislature intended to allow principles of accountability or conspiracy to make an individual eligible for the death penalty, it specifically states so in the relevant section. For instance, section 9-1(b)(6)(a), the felony-murder death eligibility section, provides: (6) the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if: (a) the murdered individual: (i) was actually killed by the defendant, or (ii) received physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 38, par. 9-1(b)(6)(a).) Defendant further cites People v. Chandler (1989), 129 Ill.2d 233, 135 Ill.Dec. 543, 543 N.E.2d 1290, for the proposition that penal statutes should be strictly construed in favor of the accused, and argues that a strict construction of section 9-1(b)(5) should thus preclude the imposition of the death penalty. Defendant concedes that his argument is undermined by this court's decision in People v. Ruiz (1982), 94 Ill.2d 245, 68 Ill.Dec. 890, 447 N.E.2d 148, but he asks us to overturn the decision in that case. In Ruiz, defendant was sentenced to death under section 9-1(b)(6), the multiple-murder eligibility provision. Defendant argued that since there was no evidence that he actually took the knife and committed the killings, he could not be sentenced to death, because the Illinois statute providing for the death sentence was not intended to be applied to those persons found guilty of murder under the theory of accountability. This court rejected defendant's argument. It noted that section 9-1(c)(5) lists, as a mitigating factor, the defendant was not personally present during the commission of the act or acts causing death. This court reasoned that if the death penalty was not intended to apply to defendant's conviction by accountability, this absence of presence mitigating factor would be rendered superfluous. Notably, the Ruiz defendant made the same argument as defendant in the present case concerning legislative intent and the felony-murder statute. ( Ruiz, 94 Ill.2d at 260, 68 Ill.Dec. 890, 447 N.E.2d 148.) In response, the Ruiz court stated that the legislature drafted the felony-murder statute so as to avoid the possibility of a person's being put to death without having possessed even the general intent for the crime of murder. Ruiz, 94 Ill.2d at 261, 68 Ill.Dec. 890, 447 N.E.2d 148. We continue to adhere to the rule established in Ruiz and hold that accountability is not incompatible with the death penalty in cases other than felony murders. We also decline defendant's invitation to hold that, because section 9-1(b)(5) states committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement, or understanding (emphasis added), principles of strict construction require us to find that only the person who pulled the trigger can be sentenced to death. Such a holding would take strict construction to new heights of absurdity.