Opinion ID: 1985015
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Uncontested Dismissal of Direct Appeal.

Text: The first issue we consider is whether an applicant for postconviction relief who failed to object to the dismissal of a prior direct appeal as frivolous is precluded from pursuing claims for relief in a postconviction petition. The resolution of this issue hinges upon two rules. The first rule is Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 104. This rule permits counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant in an appeal to move to withdraw if convinced, after conscientious investigation, the appeal is frivolous. Iowa R.App.P. 104(a); Poulin v. State, 525 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Iowa 1994). Counsel must, however, advise the client in writing of the intent to file a motion to withdraw and provide the client with a copy of the motion and the required brief in support of the motion. Iowa R.App.P. 104(b); Poulin, 525 N.W.2d at 816-17. Counsel must also notify the client to advise the supreme court within thirty days of receiving counsel's letter whether the client desires to proceed with the appeal, and to raise any appropriate points in response to the motion if the client chooses to proceed with the appeal. Iowa R.App.P. 104(b), (d). A defendant who fails to communicate with the supreme court is deemed to agree with the decision of appellate counsel that the appeal is frivolous. Iowa R.App.P. 104(g). The second rule is found in Iowa Code section 822.8 (1997). It limits the grounds for a postconviction relief petition by providing, in relevant part: Any ground finally adjudicated or not raised, or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived ... in any other proceeding the applicant has taken to secure relief, may not be the basis for a subsequent application, unless the court finds a ground for relief asserted which for sufficient reason was not asserted... in the original, supplemental or amended application. We have interpreted section 822.8 to impose a burden upon a postconviction applicant to show sufficient reasons why any ground for relief asserted in a postconviction relief petition was not previously asserted on direct appeal. [2] Bledsoe v. State, 257 N.W.2d 32, 33-34 (Iowa 1977). If the burden is not met, the grounds may not be asserted in a postconviction relief petition. Id. We have also previously determined that when a direct appeal is dismissed as frivolous in response to a contested rule 104 motion, the burden described in Bledsoe does not apply. Stanford v. Iowa State Reformatory, 279 N.W.2d 28, 34 (Iowa 1979). Thus, the dismissal under these circumstances does not prevent issues which could have been presented upon direct appeal from being pursued on postconviction relief. Id. We reserved, however, the question whether the Bledsoe rule would apply when no resistance to the dismissal was filed. Id. Although this case is our first opportunity to consider the question reserved in Stanford, our court of appeals was given the opportunity in Ailes v. State, 574 N.W.2d 353 (Iowa App.1997). It concluded the applicant's failure to resist counsel's motion under rule 104 on direct appeal precluded postconviction relief. Ailes, 574 N.W.2d at 355. We agree with the court in Ailes that the failure to resist a dismissal under rule 104 can preclude subsequent postconviction relief. However, we think Ailes went too far. We believe section 822.8 permits a postconviction applicant to pursue grounds that could have been raised on direct appeal, but were not, by showing sufficient reasons for not raising such grounds in response to a rule 104 motion. We expressed two reasons in Stanford for not imposing the all-inclusive mandate of section 822.8 in postconviction relief proceedings instituted after a contested dismissal of a direct appeal pursuant to rule 104. Stanford, 279 N.W.2d at 34. First, a dismissal under the frivolous appeal rule is not an adjudication for the purposes of postconviction relief. Id.; State v. Boge, 252 N.W.2d 411, 413 (Iowa 1977). Second, the imposition of the Bledsoe burden to a contested dismissal would impermissibly permit counsel to waive the grounds for postconviction relief contrary to the desires of the client. Stanford, 279 N.W.2d at 34. In other words, counsel's failure to raise claims on direct appeal cannot be imputed to the applicant. This same reasoning, however, does not fully apply when an applicant fails to object to a prior rule 104 dismissal. Although the dismissal would still not be considered an adjudication for the purposes of postconviction relief, the failure to raise grounds for relief on direct appeal no longer rests with the actions of counsel. An unresisted rule 104 motion transforms counsel's decision not to raise any grounds on direct appeal into the decision of the applicant. See Iowa R.App.P. 104(g). The applicant is considered to have filed an appeal and elected not to raise any grounds despite the opportunity. Under section 822.8, this failure to raise grounds which could have been raised on direct appeal precludes asserting the grounds in a postconviction relief petition. Section 822.8, however, cannot be applied against an applicant to exclude postconviction relief for failing to raise grounds on direct appeal without also giving the applicant the corresponding opportunity to satisfy the burden provided under the statute. The Bledsoe burden was not pertinent in Stanford because the not raised language of the statute was never implicated. The case was dismissed over the applicant's objection before the issues were framed. We recognize the Bledsoe burden is not applicable under all circumstances defined by section 822.8. The general statutory mandate under section 822.8 applies to three situations: grounds finally adjudicated; grounds not raised; or any ground knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in any other proceeding. Rinehart v. State, 234 N.W.2d 649, 657 (Iowa 1975). Yet, the sufficient reason exception applies only to the second situation involving grounds not raised. Iowa Code § 822.8. Thus, the burden does not apply when the grounds were finally adjudicated or knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived in a proceeding to secure relief. Id. When grounds have been finally adjudicated or waived, they may not be asserted in a subsequent postconviction relief petition. [3] However, when it is claimed the postconviction relief applicant failed to raise claims in a prior proceeding, section 822.8 operates to permit the applicant to establish sufficient reasons for not raising the grounds. We therefore modify the holding in Ailes. All grounds which could have been raised in the direct appeal are precluded from postconviction relief only if the applicant fails to show sufficient reason why they were not raised on direct appeal.