Opinion ID: 2298184
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Compiled for Law Enforcement Purposes

Text: We first consider whether the undisclosed records were compiled for law enforcement purposes. Below and on appeal, both parties have primarily focused upon whether the FMO is a law enforcement agency. Similarly, the trial court based its determination that the records were compiled for law enforcement purposes on the fact that the Fire Marshal is indeed a law enforcement officer. However, the exemption does not apply exclusively to law enforcement officers or agencies, but rather applies to all records and information compiled, by any type of agency, for law enforcement purposes. See Montenegro, 162 N.H. at 645-46, 34 A.3d 717; Murray, 154 N.H. at 582, 913 A.2d 737. Because we have never before addressed how to determine whether records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, we begin by reviewing relevant federal law. In assessing whether records were compiled for law enforcement purposes, federal courts follow several overarching principles. Tax Analysts v. I.R.S., 294 F.3d 71, 76-77 (D.C.Cir.2002). First, the phrase law enforcement purposes includes both civil and criminal matters. Id. at 77. Second, determining whether this requirement is satisfied demands careful analysis of the authorized activities of the agency involved. Kay v. F.C.C., 867 F.Supp. 11, 17 (D.D.C.1994). Third, although the exemption makes no distinction between agencies whose principal function is criminal law enforcement and agencies with both law enforcement and administrative functions, federal courts apply a different standard depending on the type of agency seeking to avoid disclosure. Tax Analysts, 294 F.3d at 77. Where the agency claiming the exemption is primarily a law enforcement agency, federal courts have applied a less demanding standard. Several circuits have adopted a per se rule, under which all records compiled by law enforcement agencies inherently qualify as records compiled for law enforcement purposes. See, e.g., Jones v. F.B.I., 41 F.3d 238, 245-46 (6th Cir.1994); Williams v. F.B.I., 730 F.2d 882, 883-86 (2d Cir.1984); Irons v. Bell, 596 F.2d 468, 472-76 (1st Cir.1979). Other circuits employ a rational nexus test, which requires agencies to meet a higher burden than does the per se rule, but which nonetheless gives deference to agencies whose primary function is law enforcement. See Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 413-21 (D.C.Cir.1982); Abdelfattah v. United States Dept. of Homeland Sec., 488 F.3d 178, 184-86 (3d Cir.2007); Church of Scientology of California, Etc. v. United States Dept., 611 F.2d 738, 748 (9th Cir.1979). The rational nexus test requires law enforcement agencies to establish a rational nexus between the records they seek to withhold and their authority to enforce a statute or regulation. See Church of Scientology of California, 611 F.2d at 748. While courts applying the rational nexus test do consider the type of agency involved, ultimately it is the purpose of the record, not the role of the agency, that is determinative. Allnutt v. United States Dept. of Justice, 99 F.Supp.2d 673, 680 (D.Md.2000). Both the per se approach and the rational nexus approach also permit agencies with mixed functions, encompassing both administrative and law enforcement duties, to claim the exemption. See Jordan v. United States Dept. of Justice, 668 F.3d 1188, 1197 n. 5 (10th Cir.2011) (The per se rule [also] permits agencies whose primary function is not law enforcement to rely on [the exemption].); Irons, 596 F.2d at 473 (At best, we glean that the requirement of a law enforcement purpose serves as a condition on [the exemption] when an agency has both administrative and enforcement functions.). Under either approach, where the agency involved is a mixed-function agency, the entity seeking to avoid disclosure must satisfy a higher burden to establish that the requested materials were compiled for law enforcement purposes. Generally, a mixed-function agency must demonstrate that it had a purpose falling within its sphere of enforcement authority in compiling the particular document[s]. Church of Scientology of California, 611 F.2d at 748; cf. Jordan, 668 F.3d at 1197 n. 5 (explaining that under the per se rule, mixed-function agencies can claim the exemption, but they will not benefit from the [presumption granted to law enforcement agencies under the] per se rule; court declined, however, to advance any theory as to what burden such agencies bear in establishing that records or information were compiled for law enforcement purposes). We have never addressed whether we follow the per se approach or the rational nexus approach under the Murray exemption. Before determining which approach to follow in this case, however, we must first consider whether the FMO is primarily a law enforcement agency or a mixed-function agency. There appears to be no defined test for determining whether an agency is primarily a law enforcement agency. Jordan, 668 F.3d at 1194; accord Birch v. United States Postal Service, 803 F.2d 1206, 1210 (D.C.Cir.1986) ([T]he Postal Service obviously is a mixed-function agency....); Luzaich v. United States, 435 F.Supp. 31, 34 (D.Minn.1977) (stating that the I.R.S. clearly is a law enforcement agency). However, courts appear to examine an agency's statutory duties to make the determination. See Church of Scientology Intern. v. United States I.R.S., 995 F.2d 916, 919 (9th Cir.1993) (holding that the Exempt Organization division of the Internal Revenue Service performs a law enforcement function by enforcing the provisions of the federal tax code that relate to qualification for tax exempt status); cf. Center for Nat. Pol. Rev. on Race & Urb. Is. v. Weinberger, 502 F.2d 370, 373 (D.C.Cir.1974) (holding that the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare exercises a law enforcement function when it makes administrative determinations of ineligibility for governmental benefits). The Fire Marshal's powers and duties, and the existence of the FMO, are designated by statute. See RSA 153:4-a (2002) (describing the Fire Marshal's powers and duties); RSA 153:8 (2002) (There shall be appointed to the office of the state fire marshal such deputy state fire marshals as the state fire marshal shall request....). The Fire Marshal is responsible for supervising and enforcing all laws of the state relative to the protection of life and property from fire, fire hazards and related matters. RSA 153:4-a, I. All fires must be reported in writing to the Fire Marshal, and the report must include: a statement of facts relating to the cause and origin of the fire to the extent possible, the extent of damage to the property, and the insurance upon the property. RSA 153:11 (2002). The Fire Marshal then has the option and authority to submit his findings of facts [regarding a particular fire] to the state police, county attorney or local authorities who may assist him in the matter in arrest or prosecution. Id. (emphasis added). The Fire Marshal is also required to [supervise] and [enforce] local laws, bylaws, and ordinances where existent, relative to the prevention of fires and other fire safety matters. RSA 153:4-a, I. The Fire Marshal is also responsible for [coordinating] the activities of his office[,] ... [and assisting]... the officials responsible ... for the organization and efficient operation of fire departments. RSA 153:4-a, II. The petitioner first argues that the Murray exemption was adopted for police and, therefore, does not apply to non-police entities. This assertion is not supported by our case law or case law from other jurisdictions. That we originally adopted the exemption when the records were sought from the police does not mean that other entities cannot also invoke the exemption. Further, federal courts routinely apply exemption 7 from the FOIA to non-police entities. See, e.g., Miller v. United States Dept. of Agriculture, 13 F.3d 260, 263 (8th Cir.1993) (U.S. Department of Agriculture); Birch, 803 F.2d at 1209-11 (D.C.Cir.1986) (U.S. Postal Service). The petitioner next argues that the FMO is not a law enforcement agency because the Fire Marshal is not a law enforcement officer since he does not have the power of arrest, and, therefore, the records were not compiled for law enforcement purposes. This argument is misplaced. The relevant issue is not whether the Fire Marshal is a law enforcement officer, but whether the FMO is primarily a law enforcement agency, a mixed-function agency with some law enforcement functions, or neither. See Church of Scientology Intern., 995 F.2d at 919; Heggestad v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 182 F.Supp.2d 1, 13 (D.D.C.2000). We acknowledge that the FMO cannot be characterized as primarily a law enforcement agency. However, contrary to the petitioner's arguments, the fact that the FMO is not a law enforcement agency does not necessarily mean that the records were not compiled for law enforcement purposes. While the characterization of the agency guides the determination, it alone is not dispositive. Although the FMO is not primarily a law enforcement agency, it clearly has some law enforcement functions and is, therefore, a mixed-function agency. For example, the Fire Marshal not only receives reports on all fires, but also has the authority to further investigate or cause to be investigated, the cause, circumstances, and origin of any fire. RSA 153:18 (2002). Upon suspecting or finding criminal violations, the Fire Marshal may submit his findings to the state police, county attorney, or local authorities for [assistance] in the matter in arrest or prosecution. RSA 153:11. We adopt the approach taken by most federal courts, under which, as the head of a mixed-function agency, the Fire Marshal can satisfy the threshold requirement by showing that the pertinent records were compiled pursuant to the agency's law enforcement functions, as opposed to administrative functions. Accordingly, we need not decide what test we would apply to an agency whose primary function is law enforcement. In this case, the trial court made no findings regarding the purpose for which the withheld records were compiled. Even so, it is clear from the record and the trial court's other findings that the requested records were compiled during an investigation into potential criminal wrongdoing pursuant to the Fire Marshal's law enforcement duties and, therefore, were compiled for law enforcement purposes. First, the trial court implicitly determined that the Fire Marshal was acting pursuant to law enforcement duties when it credited an affidavit from Fire Investigator William Clark in which he stated that he has ... `reasonable belief that this investigation will lead to criminal charges.' Next, in determining whether an in camera review, or a Vaughn index, was required, the trial court explained that the Fire Marshal precisely define[d] the nature of the documents, [and] explain[ed] how disclosure of such documents could interfere with the investigation. These findings, in combination with the record before us, compel the conclusion that the records were compiled pursuant to the Fire Marshal's law enforcement functions and were, accordingly, compiled for law enforcement purposes.