Opinion ID: 1258566
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the absence of competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of fact

Text: This Court will only consider a trial court's findings of fact conclusive on appeal when they are supported by competent evidence found in the record. State v. Peterson, 361 N.C. 587, 600, 652 S.E.2d 216, 226 (2007) (citing State v. Cummings, 361 N.C. 438, 471-72, 648 S.E.2d 788, 808 (2007), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1682, 170 L.Ed.2d 377 (2008)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 1682, 170 L.Ed.2d 377 (2008). Here, there is absolutely no evidence (much less competent evidence) to support the trial court's finding of fact [t]hat on February 28th in the early morning hours Officer Jones ... observed a vehicle being operated by the defendant immediately in front of him. [5] (Emphasis added). The only testimony given by Officer Jones with regard to his location in relation to defendant's vehicle is [u]pon getting behind the vehicle in question, the defendant had changed lanes and failed to signal. The record is devoid of support for the trial court's finding. Yet solely on the basis of a sixteen-word, confusing, and confounding sentence contained in Officer Jones's testimony, the majority has constructed a favorable record for the State out of whole cloth. The trial court's findings of fact were also insufficient to support its conclusion of law that Officer Jones had probable cause to stop defendant for a violation of N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a), which provides in pertinent part: The driver of any vehicle upon a highway or public vehicular area before starting, stopping or turning from a direct line shall first see that such movement can be made in safety, and if any pedestrian may be affected by such movement shall give a clearly audible signal by sounding the horn, and whenever the operation of any other vehicle may be affected by such movement, shall give a signal as required in this section, plainly visible to the driver of such other vehicle, of the intention to make such movement. N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a) (2007) (emphasis added). The trial court made no finding of fact whether any vehicle, including Officer Jones's patrol vehicle, may have been affected by defendant's changing lanes. The mere finding by the trial court that Officer Jones's vehicle was immediately behind defendant is not identical to the required finding that Officer Jones's patrol vehicle might have been affected by the movement of defendant's vehicle. The trial court concluded as a matter of law that the stop by the officer was an investigatory stop in regards to a moving violation that he observed committed in his presence. As noted above, the idea that the officer would have needed to stop defendant in order to make reasonable inquiries whether defendant violated N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a) borders upon the farcical. Either defendant violated the statute in the presence of the officer or he did not. No amount of further investigation was necessary to allow the officer to revisit what he had just observed. In Ivey, this Court noted that there was no indication in the record that another vehicle or any pedestrian might have been affected by the defendant's turn at a T-intersection that only permitted a right turn. 360 N.C. at 565, 633 S.E.2d at 461-62. The only distinction between the instant case and Ivey is one without a difference. The fact that the defendant in Ivey made a right turn without signaling when only a right turn was available was not dispositive of the case. Rather, the total lack of any evidence that the defendant's actions violated N.C.G.S. § 20-154(a) controlled the case's disposition. Similarly, in this case, there is no such competent evidence. Ivey controls the instant case, and at the very least this case should be remanded to the trial court with instructions to hold another hearing to make a proper determination whether Officer Jones's vehicle was or might have been affected by defendant's movement. If not, evidence seized by Officer Jones should have been suppressed by the trial court. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (The exclusionary prohibition extends as well to the indirect as the direct products of such invasions.); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-55, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961) (applying the exclusionary rule to the states, thereby barring admission of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment in state criminal trials).