Opinion ID: 844227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Davis Standard in the Instant Case

Text: Consistent with Davis, the standard of reviewlike the standard applicable in the trial courtfocuses on whether, in light of the circumstances, a reasonable officer would have understood a defendant's reference to an attorney [or other individual] to be an unequivocal and unambiguous request for counsel, without regard to the defendant's subjective ability or capacity to articulate his or her desire for counsel, and with no further requirement imposed upon the officers to ask clarifying questions of the defendant. ( Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1125; accord, Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 460-462; People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at pp. 947-949 [right to silence].) As a reviewing court, we `accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if supported by substantial evidence.' ( Gonzalez, at p. 1125; see Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1169; People v. Martinez, at p. 949.) Although we review the record and independently decide whether the challenged statements were obtained in violation of Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, we may `give great weight to the considered conclusions' of the trial court. ( People v. Jennings (1988) 46 Cal.3d 963, 979 [251 Cal.Rptr. 278, 760 P.2d 475]; see People v. Musselwhite (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1216, 1239 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 212, 954 P.2d 475].) Here, investigators Salcedo and Sutton questioned defendant for over five hours, and the entire interrogation was both recorded and transcribed. At the hearing on the motion in limine, the trial court stated it had reviewed the videotape and considered what transpired at the interrogation. The court also received testimony from Salcedo and Sutton, as well as from defendant himself. Defendant acknowledged he had understood the Miranda rights that were read to him at the start of the interrogation, and admitted there were no threats, no weapons, no handcuffs, and no promises from the investigators during the investigation. Defendant said he knew what an attorney was, because he had been represented by an attorney in juvenile court. Defendant had agreed to speak with the investigators, because he felt it would seem funny if he did not do so. He explained that, as the hours went on, he was sort of being worn down and getting tired and stressed as the investigators got tougher in their questioning. Defendant also admitted having lied to the investigators during the interrogation. The recording of the interview showed that defendant was deceptive throughout the five-hour session and admitted to wrongdoing only when confronted with evidence or caught in a lie. In announcing its ruling, the trial court made an explicit finding that, based on its reading of the transcripts, listening to testimony, and viewing the recorded interview, defendant had zero credibility. Then, after determining that defendant had made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of his Miranda rights at the outset of the interrogation, the court addressed the issue at the heart of this matter. Summarizing the details of the interrogation and viewing defendant's statements in context, the court found that, whenever defendant requested to speak to his mother, he did so because he wanted to tell his mother what was going on and to ask her what he should do. The court further found that, even if defendant subjectively desired attorney assistance, his statements were objectively ambiguous because they were limited to the issue whether or not he should take the polygraph test. [5] That is, although defendant indicated reluctance to take the test without speaking to his mother or a lawyer, he continued to consent to voluntarily talk to the authorities on other topics. The court also observed that, even though in his own mind he thought his mother was [only] ten minutes away, defendant went ahead and signed a written confession without waiting for her arrival. Relying on Davis, supra, 512 U.S. 452, the court found that defendant did not invoke his Miranda rights, and that even if there was a request for an attorney, it was ambiguous and did not require cessation of the interview. As we shall explain, the trial court's conclusions are both legally and factually supported. (7) As a legal matter, we have already recognized in the waiver context that a juvenile's request to speak with a parent is neither a per se nor a presumptive invocation of Fifth Amendment rights. ( Lessie, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 1168.) [6] There is an obvious reason for this: the parental role does not equate with the attorney's role in an interrogation by police. ( People v. Maestas (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1499, 1510, fn. 9 [240 Cal.Rptr. 360].) Where, as here, a juvenile has made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights and has agreed to questioning, a postwaiver request for a parent is insufficient to halt questioning unless the circumstances are such that a reasonable officer would understand that the juvenile is actually invokingas opposed to might be invokingthe right to counsel or silence. (See Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 458-459.) (8) Our review of the transcribed and videotaped interview finds ample support for the trial court's resolution of the conflicting inferences that may be gleaned from defendant's various requests and statements. ( Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1125.) After waiving his Miranda rights, defendant was open and responsive to questioning on any topic. Defendant, who was 15 years old, appeared confident and mature. About three and a half hours into the interview, the investigators asked why defendant hurt Thompson and whether he was willing to take a polygraph test. Defendant responded by asking to call his mother, and, when asked the reason for the call, he offered no indication that he wanted an attorney or that he did not want to talk further. Instead, he specifically stated he wanted to let his mother know what's happening and to ask her what he should do because he was being accused of murder. On this record, the trial court properly concluded that a reasonable officer in the circumstances would not have viewed defendant's request to call his mother as a clear and unequivocal invocation of the Miranda rights. (See People v. Maestas, supra, 194 Cal.App.3d at p. 1509.) As the interrogation proceeded, defendant asked several more times to call his mother when the investigators again asked about a polygraph test, or why he hurt Thompson. The investigators generally did not inquire into the reasons for the subsequent requests, but defendant clarified a second time that he wanted to let his mother know what's going on right now and where he was. Given the circumstances surrounding each of defendant's requests, a reasonable officer would not have understood any of them as an unambiguous assertion of Miranda rights. Although defendant became increasingly upset during the interview, and quieter toward the end, the questioning properly continued because defendant never communicated an intent to stop the interview altogether. (See Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at pp. ___-___ [130 S.Ct. at pp. 2262-2263].) (9) Defendant also informed the investigators that his grandmother and brother told him not to take a polygraph test until my mom or a lawyer is here, and that those family members don't want me to do anything until a lawyer or my mom is here. Taken in context, these statements did not convey an unambiguous request to halt all questioning, or a clear unwillingness to continue the interview without a lawyer. Rather, as the trial court observed, a reasonable officer could have understood defendant's statements as conveying a reluctance to take a polygraph test without first speaking to an attorney or his mother. Where, as here, the suspect makes a conditional invocation of counsel limited to the administration of a polygraph test, officers need not terminate the entire interrogation. ( People v. Martinez, 47 Cal.4th at p. 952; see also Gonzalez, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1126-1127 [defendant conditionally wanted a lawyer if he was going to be charged]; People v. Clark (1992) 3 Cal.4th 41, 122-123 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 554, 833 P.2d 561] [defendant would not talk about an unrelated killing without an attorney present].) Furthermore, questioning need not halt simply because a suspect refuses, either conditionally or outright, to take a polygraph test. (E.g., People v. Martinez, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 952; People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 824-825 [176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186] [16-year-old suspect's unwillingness to speak to polygraph administrator was not a general assertion of his right to remain silent].) (10) Likewise, defendant did not unambiguously assert his right to silence when he told the investigators at one point that he did not care who might be caught for Thompson's murder, as long as you guys leave me alone. A reasonable officer in the circumstances could view that statement as an expression of frustration with the investigators' repeated refusal to accept his denial of guilt for the murder. (See Williams, supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 433 [mere `expressions of passing frustration or animosity' toward officers do not invoke the right to silence]; People v. Jennings, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 977-978 [`I'm not going to talk,' and `That's it. I shut up,' reflected only momentary frustration and animosity toward the questioning officer].) Nor did defendant make a clear invocation when, toward the end of the interview, he asked the investigators for a few minutes to myself and for time to be alone until my family gets here. Notably, defendant clarified, when asked, that he simply wanted time to be alone and to think about stuff before writing out a statement about what happened to Thompson. In neither of these instances did defendant indicate, clearly or otherwise, that he was asserting his right to remain silent. On this record, we conclude the trial court did not err in denying defendant's in limine motion. A reasonable officer in the circumstances would not have understood defendant's requests to call his mother, or any of his other statements, to be unambiguous and unequivocal invocations of his Miranda rights. [7] ( Davis, supra, 512 U.S. at pp. 460-462; Berghuis v. Thompkins, supra, 560 U.S. at p. ___ [130 S.Ct. at p. 2260].) Accordingly, investigators Salcedo and Sutton were not required to stop their questioning, and defendant's custodial statements were properly admitted at trial.