Opinion ID: 1634989
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The January 16, 2002 Amended Judgment and Commitment Order

Text: The first point on appeal challenges the jurisdiction of the circuit court to revoke Mr. Harness's suspended sentence for an action occurring prior to the commencement of the suspension period. This court has stated that without another statutory provision conferring jurisdiction, `the jurisdictional statements contained in §§ 41-1208 and 41-1209 [now §§ 5-4-309 and 5-4-310] control [revocation of probation].' Carter v. State, 350 Ark. 229, 233, 85 S.W.3d 914, 916-17 (2002) (quoting Gill v. State, 290 Ark. 1, 3, 716 S.W.2d 746, 747 (1986)). Therefore, resolution of Mr. Harness's point on appeal involves an issue of statutory interpretation. We construe criminal statutes strictly, resolving any doubts in favor of the defendant. Short v. State, 349 Ark. 492, 79 S.W.3d 313 (2002). We construe a statute just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language, and if the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion to resort to rules of statutory interpretation. Id. In construing any statute, we place it beside other statutes relevant to the subject matter in question and ascribe meaning and effect derived from the whole. Id. However, we will not interpret a statute, even a criminal one, so as to reach an absurd conclusion that is contrary to legislative intent. Windsor v. State, 338 Ark. 649, 1 S.W.3d 20 (1999). Mr. Harness argues that a plain reading of the statutes limits a circuit court's power to revoke to the time during the period of suspension or probation and that to interpret the statutes to allow revocation prior to the commencement of the suspension period leads to absurd results. He acknowledges an opinion to the contrary by the Arkansas Court of Appeals, and asks this court to overrule Venable v. State, 27 Ark.App. 289, 770 S.W.2d 170 (1989). On the other hand, the State contends that the statutes permit a circuit court to revoke a suspended sentence at any time prior to the expiration of the period of suspension, not just during the period of suspension. When asked to specify the reason for revoking Mr. Harness's suspended sentence, the circuit court replied that rather than surrendering to the ADC as ordered by the court, Mr. Harness fled to Utah under an alias specifically for the purpose of avoiding the penalty here in Arkansas and the sentence here in Arkansas.... Our analysis begins with one of the statutory provisions that confers jurisdiction on the circuit court to revoke a suspended sentence. Section 5-4-309 provides in pertinent part: If the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has inexcusably failed to comply with a condition of his suspension or probation, it may revoke the suspension or probation at any time prior to the expiration of the period of suspension or probation. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-309(d) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added). While this section clearly refers to the end of the period in which a circuit court can revoke a defendant's suspension, it does not specify when the period of suspension begins. In order to make that determination, we must read section 5-4-309 in harmony with other sections dealing with the same subject matter. Short v. State, supra . When a circuit court considers whether to order a suspended sentence, it must first decide whether [t]here is undue risk that during the period of suspension ... the defendant will commit another offense.... Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-301(b)(1) (Supp.2001) (emphasis added). A circuit court's power to impose terms and conditions of suspension is established in Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-303 (Supp.2001). Although the court is directed to attach such conditions as are reasonably necessary to assist the defendant in leading a law-abiding life, Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-303(a), it is required to provide as an express condition of every suspension that the defendant not commit an offense punishable by imprisonment during the period of suspension .... Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-303(b) (emphasis added). Thus, both the purpose and the mandatory conditions of suspension contemplate that the conditions are imposed during the period of suspension. The permissive conditions also contemplate that the conditions be imposed during the period of suspension. For example, a circuit court may require, as a condition of suspension, that the defendant support dependents, work faithfully, participate in community-based rehabilitation programs, refrain from consorting with designated persons, make restitution, post bond, or the court may require other conditions not unduly restrictive of [the defendant's] liberty[.] Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-303(c). The alternatives available to the court after revocation of suspension also assume that the revocation takes place during the period of suspension. The circuit court may continue the period of suspension, impose a period of confinement, direct the defendant to report to the court, require the defendant to remain within the jurisdiction of the court, and notify the court of any change of address or employment. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-303(d). Section 5-4-306 requires that the suspension shall be for a definite period of time.... Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-306(a) (Supp.2001). Section 5-4-307 explains that the period of suspension commences to run on the day it is imposed, except where the suspension follows a term of imprisonment and then the period of suspension commences to run on the day the defendant is lawfully set at liberty from the imprisonment. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-307 (Repl.1997). Our review of section 5-4-309 along with the other sections that are relevant to the subject matter of suspended sentences leads us to conclude that a circuit court is statutorily authorized to revoke a period of suspension for a violation of the terms or conditions of suspension that occurs during the period of suspension. In any event, the interpretation suggested by the State would lead to absurd results because certain terms and conditions of suspension only make sense if imposed during the period of suspension. For example, as a condition of suspension, Mr. Harness was ordered not to associate with persons who have been convicted of felonies. He was required to be gainfully employed or a student, to pay household expenses, and to support his dependents. He was also ordered to remain within the state. If a defendant can violate the conditions of suspension before the commencement of the suspension period, then imprisonment itself would result in a violation. Upon imprisonment, the defendant necessarily associates with persons who have been convicted of feloniesa suspension violation. Moreover, incarceration prohibits the defendant from being gainfully employed to support his or her family and dependents, and it makes remaining within the state a meaningless condition. Thus, terms and conditions of suspension in this case only make sense if imposed during the period of suspension. Any other interpretation leads to an absurd result. Nonetheless, the State relies on Venable v. State, supra , in which an equally divided court of appeals panel affirmed a trial court's revocation of a suspended sentence based on circumstances similar to those in this case. In revoking Mr. Harness's suspended sentence, the circuit court relied on an unpublished decision of court of appeals, that in turn relied on Venable v. State, supra . The Venable plurality based its reasoning primarily on policy considerations drawn from the decisions of federal courts and the courts of some, but not all, of our sister states. However, those decisions provide little guidance in the resolution of the issue before us because sentencing in Arkansas is strictly a matter of Arkansas statutes, and a trial court may only impose a sentence authorized by statute. Ark.Code Ann. § 5-4-104(a); Bunch v. State, supra . Because none of the cases from other state and federal jurisdictions are based on statutes containing the same language as the Arkansas statutes, we must rely on our own criminal code and case law. Construing the statutes authorizing a suspended sentence as a whole and resolving all doubts in favor of the accused, as we must do, we hold that the statutes did not empower the circuit court to revoke Mr. Harness's suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the period of suspension. Because a sentence is void when the trial court lacks the authority to impose it, we reverse the January 16, 2002 amended judgment and commitment order. We reinstate the March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order as modified herein. Having concluded that the circuit court does not have the power to revoke a suspended sentence prior to the commencement of the suspension period, we overrule Venable v. State, 27 Ark.App. 289, 770 S.W.2d 170 (1989), and all other court of appeals decisions in conflict with this holding. Because we reverse based on Mr. Harness's first point on appeal, we need not address his due-process argument. The January 16, 2002 amended judgment and commitment order is reversed, and the March 30, 2001 amended judgment and commitment order is reinstated as modified. Affirmed as modified. CORBIN, J., not participating.