Opinion ID: 1058454
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the foster care and general custody statutory schemes

Text: The LDSS argues that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the General Assembly has made the foster care plan statutes subordinate to the statutes under which the Cooks were awarded custody of their granddaughter, 50 Va.App. at 226, 648 S.E.2d at 332, a child subject to a foster care plan and who had been found to have been abused or neglected. The LDSS contends the Court of Appeals failed to harmonize the two statutory schemes, the foster care statutes and the general custody statutes, which the court saw as conflicting, and ignored the plain language of the more specific statutory scheme in unwarranted deference to statutes of general application. As a result of the Court of Appeals' opinion, the LDSS argues any person with a legitimate interest under Code § 20-124.1 entitled to file a petition for custody of a child subject to a foster care plan could effectively circumvent the foster care statutes by simply filing a petition for custody. Consequently, the LDSS contends the Court of Appeals' decision eliminates the statutory safeguards embedded in the foster care statutes intended to protect vulnerable children like BC. The LDSS concludes the General Assembly did not intend such far-reaching and deleterious consequences when it created the two statutory frameworks. We agree with the LDSS. The statutes governing foster care proceedings are detailed and require specific findings by the court at each stage of the process whether involving a child, like BC, found to be abused or neglected, or a child who is abandoned or otherwise within the statutory ambit. In emergency situations, an allegedly abused or neglected child may be removed upon an order entered after an ex parte emergency removal hearing. The petitioning party must prove that [t]he child would be subjected to an imminent threat to life or health to the extent that severe or irremediable injury would be likely to result without the removal and that [r]easonable efforts have been made to prevent removal... and there are no alternatives less drastic than removal ... which could reasonably protect the child's life or health pending a final hearing on the petition. Code § 16.1-251(A). A juvenile and domestic relations district court may also order the removal of an allegedly abused or neglected child by entering a preliminary removal order under Code § 16.1-252(A). The party petitioning for removal must prove the same facts as required for an emergency removal order. Code § 16.1-252(E). Following the preliminary removal hearing, the juvenile and domestic relations district court may place the child in the custody of a suitable agency or of a suitable person under the supervision of the local department of social services. Code § 16.1-252(F). The court must conduct a dispositional hearing within seventy-five days of the initial preliminary removal hearing. Code §§ 16.1-252(H), 16.1-278.2(A). As a result of the dispositional hearing, [i]f the child is found to be ... abused or neglected, the court may transfer custody subject to a foster care plan under Code § 16.1-281 [a]fter a finding that there is no less drastic alternative. Code § 16.1-278.2(A). This statute also requires that: Any order transferring custody of a child to a relative ... shall be entered only upon a finding, based upon a preponderance of the evidence, that the relative ... is one who, after an investigation as directed by the court, (i) is found by the court to be willing and qualified to receive and care for the child; (ii) is willing to have a positive, continuous relationship with the child; (iii) is committed to providing a permanent, suitable home for the child; and (iv) is willing and has the ability to protect the child from abuse and neglect; and the order shall so state. Code § 16.1-278.2(A1) (emphasis added). The juvenile and domestic relations district court must conduct a foster care plan hearing within seventy-five days of the dispositional hearing. Code § 16.1-281(C). While the court may revise the foster care plan,  [a]ny order transferring custody of the child to a relative other than the child's prior family shall be entered only upon a finding, based upon a preponderance of the evidence of the same facts required to be found under Code § 16.1-278.2(A1), and the order shall so state. Code § 16.1-281(C1) (emphasis added). Within six months of the foster care plan hearing, the court must conduct a foster care review hearing under Code § 16.1-282(A). However,  [a]ny order transferring custody of the child to a relative other than the child's prior family shall be entered only upon a finding, based upon a preponderance of the evidence of the same facts required to be found under Code §§ 16.1-278.2(A1) and 16.1-281(C1), and the order shall so state. Code § 16.1-282(D1) (emphasis added). The General Assembly has further mandated that the juvenile and domestic relations district court must conduct a permanency planning hearing within eleven months of the dispositional hearing to establish a permanent goal for the child and either to achieve the permanent goal or to defer such action through the approval of an interim plan for the child. Code § 16.1-282.1(A). Again,  [a]ny order transferring custody of the child to a relative other than the child's prior family shall be entered only upon a finding, based upon a preponderance of the evidence of the same facts required to be found under Code §§ 16.1-278.2(A1), 16.1-281(C1), and 16.1-282(D1), and the order shall so state. Code § 16.1-282.1(A1) (emphasis added). Thus, once the foster care statutory process has commenced, the juvenile and domestic relations district court may not transfer custody of a child to a relative, other than the child's prior family, without making the four specific findings of fact required by Code §§ 16.1-278.2(A1) and the foster care statutes. Those findings, under the plain terms of the statutes, must be stated in the order transferring custody. Neither the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court nor the circuit court did so in this case. By comparison, the statutes of general application governing custody of a child are much less specific than the foster care statutory scheme. For example, under Code § 16.1-278.15, titled Custody or visitation, child or spousal support generally, subsection F requires [i]n any case ... the court shall consider the best interests of the child and references Code §§ 20-124.1 et seq. Code § 20-124.2(B) also states that the court shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child and Code § 20-124.3 sets forth ten nonexclusive factors the court shall consider. However, in contrast to the findings required under Code § 16.1-278.2(A1) and the foster care statutes, there is no statutory requirement that a court's findings on the child's best interests under the general custody statutes be stated in the resulting custody order. See Code § 20-124.3 (In determining best interests of a child for purposes of determining custody... [a] judge shall communicate to the parties the basis of the decision either orally or in writing.). Statutory construction is a question of law which we review de novo on appeal. Parker v. Warren, 273 Va. 20, 23, 639 S.E.2d 179, 181 (2007) (citing Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925 (2006)). [C]ourts apply the plain language of a statute unless the terms are ambiguous. Boynton, 271 Va. at 227, 623 S.E.2d at 926 (citing Tiller v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 418, 420, 69 S.E.2d 441, 442 (1952)); see also Alliance to Save the Mattaponi v. Commonwealth, 270 Va. 423, 439, 621 S.E.2d 78, 86-87 (2005) (Courts are bound by the plain meaning of statutory language.). [I]f the language is plain, certain and unambiguous, so that no doubt arises from its own terms as to its meaning, then there is no room for interpretation. Boynton, 271 Va. at 228 n. 10, 623 S.E.2d at 926 n. 10 (quoting Golden Valley County v. Lundin, 52 N.D. 420, 203 N.W. 317, 319 (1925)). [W]henever `a given controversy involves a number of related statutes, they should be read and construed together in order to give full meaning, force, and effect to each.' Boynton, 271 Va. at 229, 623 S.E.2d at 927 (quoting Ainslie v. Inman, 265 Va. 347, 353, 577 S.E.2d 246, 249 (2003)); see also Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391, 395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998) ([W]hen two statutes seemingly conflict, they should be harmonized, if at all possible, to give effect to both.). A cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is that [w]hen one statute addresses a subject in a general manner and another addresses a part of the same subject in a more specific manner, the two statutes should be harmonized, if possible, and when they conflict, the more specific statute prevails. Alliance to Save the Mattaponi, 270 Va. at 439-40, 621 S.E.2d at 87. As illustrated above, the foster care statutes are much more specific and contain mandatory findings that must be made by the court when custody of a child is placed with a relative other than the child's prior family, such as the Grandparents. The Court of Appeals failed to apply the plain language of the more specific statutory requirements of the foster care statutes and give those provisions effect in a custody proceeding involving a child subject to a foster care plan. When the Court of Appeals concluded the foster care statutes were subordinate to the general custody statutes in that circumstance, it also erred by not reading those statutes in harmonious effect with the general custody statutes. The Court of Appeals mistakenly read certain language in Code §§ 16.1-241(A) and 16.1-278.15(B) as subordinating the foster care statutes to the general custody statutes. Both Code § 16.1-241(A) and 16.1-278.15(B) contain the following language: The authority of the juvenile court to consider a petition involving the custody of a child shall not be proscribed or limited where the child has previously been awarded to the custody of a local board of social services. The Court of Appeals read this statutory provision in conjunction with the Code § 16.1-278.15(A) provision that the court may make any order of disposition in a Code § 16.1-241(A)(3) custody case as eliminating any application of the foster care statutes to the custody determination of BC. However, the shall not be proscribed or limited language merely confirms the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court's authority to exercise its jurisdiction, granted by Code § 16.1-241, in a custody case involving a child subject to a foster care plan. Nothing in that language reflects any curtailment of the application of the foster care statutes. The en banc dissent succinctly described the interrelation of these statutory schemes, and why the Court of Appeals conclusion was erroneous, when it noted that the foster care statutes do not limit the trial court to considering just the foster care plan or the objectives set forth by DSS. In fact, Code § 16.1-241 makes it perfectly clear that the trial court has jurisdiction over custody matters.... [W]hen read in conjunction with the other pertinent statutes, Code § 16.1-281 simply requires that when the custody of an abused and neglected child is at issue, the trial court must make specific written findings of fact, designed to protect the child from the dangers for which he or she was removed from the home. See Code §§ 16.1-281, 16.1-282, 16.1-282.1. In other words, the trial court is free to decide the issue of custody as it sees fit, so long as it incorporates into the record a finding that [states the requirements of the foster care statutes]. 50 Va.App. at 235-36, 648 S.E.2d at 336 (Humphreys, J., dissenting). The requirement that the trial court make the findings mandated by the foster care statutes in no way proscribe[s] or limit[s] the authority of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court to exercise its subject matter jurisdiction over child custody cases. To the contrary, the statutory schemes of the foster care and general custody statutes are harmonized, and the plain meaning of the more specific foster care statutes is applied, when the trial court adjudicates a custody case involving a child subject to a foster care plan by making the required foster care statutory findings and stating those findings in its order. The Court of Appeals' reliance on the Code § 16.1-278.15(A) provision that the court may make any order as a form of plenary authority to ignore the foster care statutes is also misplaced. Code § 16.1-241(A) is the statutory grant of jurisdiction to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in custody cases. The Code § 16.1-278.15(A) language only applies in the Code § 16.1-241(A)(3) subset of custody cases which are of general application: of controversy or requires determination. The Code § 16.1-278.15(A) language merely provides that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court's authority in Code § 16.1-241(A)(3) custody cases is as extensive as that of the circuit court: it in no way applies any limitation on the applicability of the foster care statutes. Moreover, the jurisdictional basis in BC's case was more appropriately Code § 16.1-241(A)(1), which is the specific jurisdictional statute applicable to custody of a child who is alleged to be abused [or] neglected. As the en banc dissent noted, the Court of Appeals' expansive reading of Code § 16.1-241(A)(3) through Code § 16.1-278.15(A) renders Code § 16.1-241(A)(1) meaningless. 50 Va.App. at 233, 648 S.E.2d at 335. The only interpretation of the relevant provisions of Title 16.1 and Title 20 that gives effect to both statutory schemes, and the intent of the General Assembly, is that a trial court must make the specific factual findings required by the foster care statutes in a custody case involving a child subject to a foster care plan. The interpretation offered by the Court of Appeals would permit any [p]erson with a legitimate interest under Code § 20-124.1 entitled to file a petition for custody to circumvent a pending foster care proceeding. Such a general custody exception to the statutory provisions governing foster care proceedings would eviscerate the General Assembly's detailed framework intended to safeguard a child, like BC, who was subject to a foster care plan. Once a child has become subject to proceedings under the foster care statutes, a court may not transfer custody without the specific, written factual findings required by the foster care statutes. This statutory mandate holds true whether the custody order is entered upon a petition for custody, a petition for a foster care review hearing, or a petition for a permanency planning hearing. An award of custody without such findings, as in the case at bar, is error as a matter of law. Moreover, it is contrary to the clear and plain language of the foster care statutes to conclude those specific statutory findings are subsumed by findings under the best interests of the child standard. For example, each of the foster care statutes requires a finding that the child's relative seeking custody is willing and has the ability to protect the child from abuse and neglect. That distinct and required finding is not within any mandated parameter of the best interests of the child inquiry and such a finding was clearly not made in the case at bar. Allowing the best interests of the child standard to subsume these explicit statutory requirements would render those requirements meaningless and write out of the foster care statutes the mandatory directive that the order shall so state. We avoid such interpretations. The rules of statutory interpretation argue against reading any legislative enactment in a manner that will make a portion of it useless, repetitious, or absurd. On the contrary, it is well established that every act of the legislature should be read so as to give reasonable effect to every word.... Jones v. Conwell, 227 Va. 176, 181, 314 S.E.2d 61, 64 (1984). [E]very part of a statute is presumed to have some effect and no part will be considered meaningless unless absolutely necessary. Hubbard v. Henrico Ltd. P'ship, 255 Va. 335, 340, 497 S.E.2d 335, 338 (1998). For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the judgment of the circuit court which awarded custody of BC to the Grandparents.