Opinion ID: 1518536
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Hearing Delay Reasonable

Text: Weston's first argument on appeal is that he was prejudiced and reversible error occurred when the Superior Court delayed the probation violation hearing for an hour and a half in order to allow time for State witnesses to arrive. According to Weston, the State's use of a four corner stall to get probation and police officers to the hearing interfered with the Superior Court's schedule and created an unreasonable delay. Weston acknowledges that [r]equests for continuances `are left to the discretion of a trial judge whose ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless that ruling is clearly unreasonable or capricious.' [1] The record reflects that the violation of probation hearing began at approximately 9:45 a.m. on March 4, 2003. The Superior Court indicated that it would handle another case while waiting for the prosecutor to locate the State's witnesses. Thus, there was no inconvenience to the court at that time. When the court's other business finished an hour later, the State's witnesses still had not arrived. The prosecutor assured the court that they were en route. The prosecutor explained that the officers had not received their subpoenas. The proceedings recessed again, and then resumed one-half hour later when the State indicated it could proceed with the alleged curfew violations because probation officer Amber Esham was present. The total delay in the Superior Court proceedings, therefore, was only one and one-half hours. After Weston appeared in the courtroom, his defense counsel moved to dismiss the violation of probation charges that were not supported by a probation officer present in the courtroom. The Superior Court did not rule on Weston's motion. After the prosecutor assured the Superior Court that subpoenas for the officers had, in fact, been issued, the hearing began at 11:15 a.m. with Esham's testimony. The other officers arrived in the courtroom a short time later. The Superior Court judge permitted them to testify after Esham. The State did not explicitly request a continuance in this case. Nevertheless, the standards for a continuance that were enunciated by this Court in Secrest v. State, [2] are instructive in analyzing Weston's argument: First, the party seeking the continuance has the burden of establishing a clear record of the relevant facts relating to the criteria for a continuance, including the length of the requested continuance. Second, the party seeking the continuance must show: (a) that it was diligent in preparing for the presentation of the testimony; (b) that the continuance will be likely to satisfy the need to present the testimony; and (c) that the inconvenience to the Court, opposing parties, witnesses and jurors is insubstantial in relation to the likely prejudice which would result from the denial of the continuance. [3] The record reflects that the State was diligent in preparing for the presentation of the testimony. The hearing was originally scheduled for February 4th and rescheduled for a contested hearing on February 18th. The State had subpoenas issued for its witnesses on February 11, but the February 18 hearing was cancelled because of snow. The State then had subpoenas issued on February 20 for the rescheduled hearing on March 4. The police officers, however, did not receive the subpoenas. The Superior Court noted on the record that this was the second time in recent weeks that the Delaware State Police had reported that they did not receive subpoenas. Without these police officers, the State would not have been able to present any testimony. Thus, a one and one-half hour delay was necessary to prosecute the violation hearing, which had already been rescheduled twice. There was no inconvenience to the Superior Court because the judge was able to conduct other business during the delay. Only Weston and his defense attorney were inconvenienced by the delay. Weston's defense counsel was scheduled to be in the Family Court at 1 p.m. that afternoon. The violation of probation hearing concluded at 12:30 p.m., which was in time for defense counsel to attend the Family Court proceeding. The record reflects it was not an abuse of discretion for the Superior Court to delay the violation of probation proceedings one and one-half hours in order for the State's witnesses to arrive. [4]