Opinion ID: 848860
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: blackstone

Text: In contending that the common law supports its view, the majority makes much of the quotation from Blackstone that if one privately steals sixpence from the person of another, and afterwards keeps it by putting him in fear, this is no robbery, for the fear is subsequent.... 4 Blackstone, Commentaries, Wrongs, ch. 17, p. 242. However, as pointed out by Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed.),p. 348 this quotation has been misapplied: If the two transactions are essentially distinct-if subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from retaking his property by force or violence  the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not robbery. But if the violence or intimidation is part of the res gestae of the larceny the offense is generally held to be elevated to the category of robbery.... [ Id. at 349.] The majority attempts to distinguish this quotation from Perkins in three ways, all of which are unavailing. First, the majority states that the dissent fails to set forth the full quotation from Perkins and therefore misunderstands the point that Perkins was making. Op. at 542, n. 9, 648 N.W.2d at 170, n. 9. To demonstrate that the transactional view is not only consistent with the statute and Michigan case-law, but also consistent with the common law as reflected by Blackstone, we set forth the language from Perkins in full. Following the disputed quotation from Blackstone, Perkins writes: Occasionally this has been misapplied. For example, during a chance meeting D suggested he might be interested in buying the gun X was carrying and asked permission to examine it, which was granted. Finding the gun loaded D then pointed it at X and told him to run for his life. As X backed away, D ran off with the weapon. A conviction of robbery was reversed on the theory that the resort to intimidation was after the acquisition of the gun. [20] This completely overlooks the distinction between possession and custody. When D received the gun to examine momentarily in the presence of X, D had custody only. Had he run off with the gun without violence or intimidation he would have been guilty of larceny because this would have been a trespassory taking and carrying away with all the elements of that offense. And since he actually did this under a threat to kill he clearly committed robbery, as the same court had held earlier under an equivalent set of facts. And a motorist whose tank had been filled with gas at his request, after which he held off the attendant at gunpoint, under threat to shoot while he drove away without making payment, was properly convicted of robbery. Furthermore, if one snatches property from the hand of another and uses force or intimidation to prevent an immediate retaking by the other, this is all one transaction and constitutes robbery. If the two transactions are essentially distinct, if subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from retaking his property by force or violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not robbery. But if the violence or intimidation is part of the res gestae of the larceny the offense is generally held to be elevated to the category of robbery, although there is still some authority for the earlier view that force or intimidation used to retain possession of property taken without it, is not sufficient. [Perkins, supra at 348-349.] The majority concedes that, in the first example given by Perkins, the thief initially had mere custody of the weapon, but his possession of the weapon was secured by threat of force. Op. at 542, n.9, 648 N.W.2d at 170, n. 9. In this case, defendant, likewise, had mere custody of the items, and the attempt to gain complete possession of the items, that is, to remove the items from the presence of the security guards, was secured by the use of force. As explained elsewhere, the successful escape with the property, or the complete removal of the property from the presence of the victim, is not a necessary element of robbery. Rather, escape and such removal merely indicate the end point of the transaction. [21] Second, the majority states that Perkins' use of the words `res gestae' ... does not suggest an expansive `transactional' view of robbery. Rather it narrowly refers to the events occurring contemporaneously with the taking-precisely the time frame in which the application of force must occur. Op. at 542, n. 9, 648 N.W.2d at 170, n. 9. However, res gestae in terms of the law, and in the context in which Perkins used it, simply means [t]he whole of the transaction under investigation and every part of it. It means things or things happened. Indeed, a res gestae witness is defined as [a]n eyewitness to some event in the continuum of the criminal transaction and one whose testimony will aid in developing a full disclosure of the facts surrounding the alleged commission of the charged offense. Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed.). Thus, that the use of force against the owner of property occurs after the latter observes the wrongful acts of the perpetrator would seem not to be particularly relevant to analyzing whether a robbery occurs because the conduct of the perpetrator occurs as part of an unbroken sequence of events. The concept of res gestae, in the context in which it is used by Perkins, is wholly consistent with the view that the perpetrator's use of force before, contemporaneously with, or immediately after he is observed taking property in the presence of the victim provides the requisite force required to convict the perpetrator of robbery. Third, the majority states that the quotation from Perkins supports, rather than contradicts, the interpretation of Blackstone's quotation. Op. at 542, n. 9, 648 N.W.2d at 170, n. 9. We do not disagree that Perkins' quotation supports Blackstone's concept of robbery. As Perkins notes, the quotation has been misapplied. And as explained in this dissent, it has been misapplied in the same manner that the majority seeks to apply it in their opinion. The quotation has been misapplied to mean that force used at any time after an initial seizure of property from the person or from his presence by the perpetrator cannot constitute the crime of robbery. However, a closer analysis of the common-law crime of robbery explains the misunderstanding. Blackstone's quotation contemplates a private stealing, one which is not discovered until the perpetrator and the property have left the presence of the victim. Use of the words private stealing is significant, because it specifies what, at common law, was a theft by stealth, or a theft completed without the victim's knowledge. Blackstone explicitly contemplates that force used by one after he privately steals is not considered a robbery. The quotation from Perkins likewise contemplates the distinction between a private stealing, and the use of force during the time that the property is being taken. Perkins states: If the two transactions are essentially distinct,  if subsequent to the larceny the owner should come upon the thief and be prevented from retaking his property by force or violence, the thief would be guilty of larceny and assault, but not robbery. Id. at 349. Blackstone's use of the phrase private stealing is perhaps better understood by the definition of the common-law crime of robbery given by Sir Edward Coke, the preeminent chief justice of England, and author of the comprehensive Institutes of the Laws of England. In defining the crime of robbery, Coke stated: Robbery is a felony by the common law, committed by a violent assault, upon the person of another, by putting him in fear, and taking from his person his money or other goods of any value whatsoever. [Coke, Institutes (1797), pt. 3, p. 68.] Coke explains the difference between the private stealing and the use of force by the robber by distinguishing between the cutpurse [22] and the robber. In this regard, he states that: both take [property] from the person, [23] but [the cutpurse] takes it clam et secrete, [24] without assault or putting in fear, and the robber by violent assault, and putting in fear. [ Id. at 68.] Next, in defining the term taking, Coke describes the situation in which the cutpurse cuts the strings of the victim's purse and the purse then falls to the ground. In this situation, there is no robbery because the perpetrator never has possession. Id. However, if the perpetrator picks up the purse, and then, in striving... let[s] it fall and never [takes] it again, [25] this, according to Coke, is a taking within the meaning of common-law robbery, because he had it in his possession; the continuance of his possession is not required by the law and after it was secretly in his possession, the use of force occurred. Id. It is evident from this explanation by Coke, that the distinction between one who successfully privately steals, as referenced by Blackstone, and the one who, attempting to privately steal, is discovered in the process, and uses force in order to complete the taking, is the distinction between the cutpurse and the robber. It is also evident, from Coke's description, that force used after the initial taking of the property may still give rise to the crime of robbery. The common-law description of the crime of robbery is, as the dissent demonstrates, consistent with the above quotation from Perkins, and consistent with M.C.L. § 750.530. Clearly, the common-law description of robbery also supports a conviction in the present case. The defendant, like the cutpurse, first took the property in an attempt to secretly steal it. However, here there was no private stealing. After being observed taking the property and upon being confronted by the security guards, defendant assaulted them in an effort to remove the property from their presence. In striving with the guards, the property fell to the ground. [26] The perpetrator took possession of the property while it remained in the presence of the security guards, and there is no necessity that he used force to initially take the property, but only that he strove to keep it, however unsuccessfully. [27] Thus, both at common law, and consistent with the statute, there is no necessity that the force element of robbery occur before or contemporaneously with the initial taking. Force used after the initial taking, where the latter occurs under the observation of the victim, and while the property can be said to remain in the victim's presence, is sufficient to constitute the crime of robbery. Finally, I would point out that the transactional approach to robbery has the added practical advantage of being defined by a fixed beginning and end. Where does the majority draw this line? Can one never be convicted of robbery if he uses force to retain property or to escape simply because such force occurs after he has initially taken the property? When does the majority believe that a taking is completed? If a perpetrator does not use force at the moment he physically removes property from the shelf of a market and conceals it, would it be sufficient if he uses force when he is prevented from leaving the proximity of that shelf; when attempting to leave the particular aisle or department; when passing through the checkout area; or when attempting to leave the store itself? Is the fact that one purports to conceal the property beneath his clothes sufficient to find that he could not thereafter commit a robbery? In contrast to the lack of the majority's definition of contemporaneous, the transactional approach to robbery recognizes that the use of force that occurs at any time before the perpetrator of a larceny has reached a place of temporary safety transforms such larceny into a robbery. [28] Quite in addition to the fact that it is wrong in its understanding of the law of robbery in Michigan, the practical consequence of the majority's opinion is as follows: in every instance in which a person who has stolen property from a store in an amount less than $200, [29] as in this case, and who, before escaping with such property is confronted by and engages in violence against the victim, such person will be guilty merely of third-degree retail fraud and assault, rather than the greater crime of robbery. Instead of being subject to a potential 15-year sentence for robbery, M.C.L. § 750.530, the perpetrator will be subject to punishment of no more than 93 days in jail for the third degree retail fraud, M.C.L. § 750.356(5) and M.C.L. § 750.356d(4)(b), and no more than one year in jail if the subsequent assault is a serious assault under M.C.L. § 750.81 and M.C.L. § 750.81a. Further, the majority fails to take into account M.C.L. § 750.356d(5), which expressly prohibits prosecution under M.C.L. § 750.360, larceny from a building, where a person commits third-degree retail fraud. [30] See also People v. Ramsey, 218 Mich.App. 191, 195, 553 N.W.2d 360 (1996). If, as the majority holds, there can be no robbery under these circumstances, and there can be no independent prosecution of defendant for larceny from a building where the perpetrator commits second or third degree retail fraud as in the instant case, then the disparity in penalties between robbery and what the defendant here can be charged with is quite substantial. [31] We do not criticize the majority on account of this disparity, because it is their obligation to faithfully interpret the law as they see it, and they have done that here. It is not their obligation to correct what they might (or might not) view as inexplicable disparities in criminal punishments. We do suggest, however, that such a substantial disparity in punishments, based upon whether the violence occurred contemporaneously with the taking, or immediately thereafter as part of the same transaction, could never reasonably have been contemplated by the Legislature.