Opinion ID: 4547376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: Before we review the lower court’s decision to grant summary judgment based on the discretionary function exception, we comment briefly on the order in which a court should address multiple grounds for dismissal. In cases such as this one, where the political subdivision seeks summary judgment on a number of different grounds, courts should address as a threshold matter any grounds which are jurisdictional. [4-6] Whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold issue that should be resolved prior to an examination of the merits. 7 In cases under the PSTCA, if the discretionary function exception applies, the political subdivision is immune from suit 8 and the proper remedy is to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 9 Because 4 Williamson v. Bellevue Med. Ctr., 304 Neb. 312, 934 N.W.2d 186 (2019). 5 Id. 6 See Lemke v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 243 Neb. 633, 502 N.W.2d 80 (1993). 7 Hawley v. Skradski, 304 Neb. 488, 935 N.W.2d 212 (2019). 8 See McGauley v. Washington County, 297 Neb. 134, 897 N.W.2d 851 (2017). 9 Reiber v. County of Gage, 303 Neb. 325, 341, 928 N.W.2d 916, 928 (2019) (“[a] suit that is barred by sovereign immunity is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction”). - 199 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports LAMBERT v. LINCOLN PUBLIC SCHOOLS Cite as 306 Neb. 192 it presents a jurisdictional question, courts should determine the applicability of a statutory exception under either the PSTCA or the State Tort Claims Act (STCA) 10 before considering nonjurisdictional grounds for summary judgment. 1. Applicable Legal Standards The discretionary function exception is codified at § 13-910(2) and provides the PSTCA shall not apply to “[a]ny claim based upon the exercise or performance of or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the political subdivision or an employee of the political subdivision, whether or not the discretion is abused.” A similar provision is contained in the STCA, and we have held that cases construing the STCA’s discretionary function exception are equally applicable to cases under the PSTCA. 11 [7] The purpose of the discretionary function exception of the STCA and the PSTCA is to prevent judicial “secondguessing” of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of action in tort. 12 It does not extend to the exercise of discretionary acts at an operational level, where there is no room for policy judgment. 13 It is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the discretionary function applies in a given case. 14 [8] A two-part analysis determines whether the discretionary function exception applies. 15 First, the court must consider whether the action is a matter of choice for the acting political subdivision or employee. 16 Second, if the court concludes 10 Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 81-8,209 to 81-8,235 (Reissue 2014). 11 See Shipley v. Department of Roads, 283 Neb. 832, 813 N.W.2d 455 (2012). 12 Id. 13 Holloway v. State, 293 Neb. 12, 875 N.W.2d 435 (2016). 14 Id. 15 See McGauley, supra note 8. 16 See id. - 200 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports LAMBERT v. LINCOLN PUBLIC SCHOOLS Cite as 306 Neb. 192 that the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, it must then determine whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. 17 Examples of discretionary functions include the initiation of programs and activities, establishment of plans and schedules, and judgmental decisions within a broad regulatory framework lacking specific standards. 18 2. Lamberts’ Arguments In arguing that the district court erred in applying the discretionary function exception, the Lamberts present two arguments. First, they argue there is a genuine factual dispute about whether Sheridan’s “no dogs” policy actually extended beyond school hours. Second, and primarily, they argue the failure of LPS employees to enforce Sheridan’s “no dogs” policy was an operational judgment, and not the kind of judgment the discretionary function exception was meant to shield. 19 As we explain below, neither argument has merit. (a) No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Regarding Scope of Sheridan’s “No Dogs” Policy We find no support in the record for the Lamberts’ suggestion that there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Sheridan’s “no dogs” policy extended beyond the hours students were in school. The Lamberts cite to deposition testimony from a Sheridan teacher who also taught after-school clubs pursuant to an agreement with Sheridan’s parent-teacher organization. This teacher testified that when students were dismissed from the after-school clubs, she, or another person paid by the parent-teacher organization, would stay with the students until they were picked up by a parent. Even construing this testimony in the light most favorable to the Lamberts and giving them every reasonable inference, this 17 Id. 18 Kimminau v. City of Hastings, 291 Neb. 133, 864 N.W.2d 399 (2015). 19 See McGauley, supra note 8. - 201 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports LAMBERT v. LINCOLN PUBLIC SCHOOLS Cite as 306 Neb. 192 testimony had nothing to do with LPS employees monitoring the playground area or enforcing the “no dogs” policy after hours. There is nothing about this testimony that creates a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Sheridan’s “no dogs” policy extended beyond regular school hours. To the contrary, we agree with the district court that the undisputed evidence in the record demonstrates that Sheridan’s “no dogs” policy applied, and was enforced, only during regular school hours, but not after students were dismissed for the day. (b) Discretionary Function Exception Correctly Applied The Lamberts concede that the decision of Sheridan administrators to adopt a “no dogs” policy was a discretionary function, but they argue that the failure to enforce that policy after school hours was a “failure on the operational level by the employees to enforce the policy Sheridan had decided to put in place.” 20 Their argument in this regard is premised on the assumption that Sheridan’s “no dogs” policy applied after school hours and therefore should have been enforced after school hours. But this assumption finds no support in the evidence. As already stated, the evidence was undisputed that Sheridan’s policy was not to allow dogs on the school grounds during school hours, even on leashes, but that the “no dogs” policy did not apply after regular school hours. And to the extent the Lamberts can be understood to argue that Sheridan negligently adopted a policy prohibiting dogs on school grounds only during school hours, or that Sheridan negligently decided not to supervise the playground after students were dismissed for the day, we find such conduct falls squarely within the discretionary function exception. On this record, both steps of the discretionary function analysis are met. Sheridan’s decision to enforce its “no dogs” 20 Brief for appellant at 21. - 202 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 306 Nebraska Reports LAMBERT v. LINCOLN PUBLIC SCHOOLS Cite as 306 Neb. 192 policy only during school hours, and its decision not to supervise the playground area at all after school hours, involved the exercise of judgment. 21 And it was precisely the kind of judgment the discretionary function exception is designed to shield. 22 LPS policies give individual school administrators broad discretion as to what restrictions to place on the use of school buildings and grounds and how to utilize staff to supervise activities on school grounds. The record shows Sheridan administrators, in the exercise of this discretion, decided to establish and enforce a “no dogs” policy only during school hours and decided not to supervise the school playground area at all after students have been dismissed for the day. How to utilize staff and budget to supervise school grounds and regulate activities thereon are administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy, and they fall within the discretionary function exception. 23