Opinion ID: 653685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Facial Validity of the Warrant

Text: 4 Without further analysis, we think that the judge had sufficient credible information available to find probable cause for the issuance of the warrants. Beyond that, it is well settled that the statements of a reliable informant can provide, by themselves, a sufficient basis for the issuance of a warrant. United States v. Pressley, 978 F.2d 1026, 1027 (8th Cir.1992). When determining the sufficiency of an informant's statements as probable cause for issuing a warrant, the issuing court must consider the totality of the circumstances. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-34, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2328-30, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The basis of the informant's knowledge and the informant's credibility or reliability are highly relevant to a court's determination that probable cause exists. Id. at 230, 103 S.Ct. at 2328. 5 In the present situation, Deputy Clapp is, at least, the functional equivalent of a reliable informant. Deputy Clapp gave Deputy Wold a draft affidavit, detailing Deputy Clapp's personal knowledge of Mrs. Hyten's illegal activities. In this document, Deputy Clapp also stated his name, his place of employment, and that he was a police officer. Deputy Wold worked with Deputy Clapp on the investigation, and he read and discussed the affidavit with Deputy Clapp. When Deputy Wold swore to and signed the affidavit, he essentially stated under oath that Deputy Clapp was the person who the affidavit said he was and that Deputy Clapp had made the statement contained in the affidavit. Not only is the personal basis of Clapp's knowledge extensively set out in the affidavit, but so is Clapp's position in the community and, inferentially, his reputation for veracity. See Gates 462 U.S. at 233-34, 103 S.Ct. at 2329-30. Deputy Wold's failure to delete Deputy Clapp's name from the initial phrase of the affidavit and to insert his own in its place was undoubtedly an error, but we are convinced that it was an error of technical rather than constitutional magnitude. Hyten's argument that the Fourth Amendment was violated because there was no oath by the affiant totally ignores Deputy Wold's oath and adoption of the affidavit. The situation is no different than that of an affiant presenting information garnered from a named informant and we do not attach constitutional significance to either Wold's or the judge's oversight in failing to modify the initial phrase of the affidavit. 5 6 Assuming that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 is also relevant in determining the admissibility of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant issued under state law, as we did in United States v. Freeman, 897 F.2d 346, 348-49 (8th Cir.1990), that Rule affords Hyten no relief. Absent a constitutional infirmity, the exclusionary rule is applied only to violations of Federal Rule 41 that prejudice a defendant or show reckless disregard of proper procedure. Id. at 349. We have already determined that the error here was not of constitutional magnitude. To determine prejudice, we ask whether the search would have occurred had the rule been followed. If so, there is no prejudice to the defendant. Id. at 350. Had Deputy Clapp instead of Deputy Wold attested to the affidavit, there is no question the search would have occurred. Therefore, Hyten has not been prejudiced. Finally, our prior determination that both Deputies Wold and Clapp acted in good faith precludes any finding of reckless disregard of proper procedure on their part. 7