Opinion ID: 168361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Kansas Long-Arm Statute

Text: 25 In the absence of federal authorization for nationwide service, the district court turned to state law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k) (listing, as an alternative to nationwide service under a federal statute, service under a state's long-arm statute). The court first presumed that the Kansas long-arm statute, Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-308(b), authorized service, and then proceeded directly to the due-process inquiry. We do the same. 26 Because sovereignty defines the scope of the due process test, Busch v. Buchman, Buchman & O'Brien, Law Firm, 11 F.3d 1255, 1258 (5th Cir.1994), the Fourteenth Amendment governs application of a state's long-arm statute, Ten Mile Indus. Park v. W. Plains Serv. Corp., 810 F.2d 1518, 1524 (10th Cir.1987). The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause protects an individual's liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful contacts, ties, or relations. OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Canada, 149 F.3d 1086, 1090 (10th Cir.1998) (quotations omitted). Thus, a nonresident defendant is subject to a court's personal jurisdiction only if there are minimum contacts between the defendant and the forum state. Id. (quotations omitted). This standard is satisfied if the nonresident defendant has purposefully directed his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from alleged injuries that arise out of or relate to those activities. Id. at 1090-91 (quotations omitted). Otherwise, the nonresident defendant must have continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum state. Id. at 1091 (quotations omitted). 27 The district court first observed that, instead of offering any evidence or argument concerning SFC's direct contacts with Kansas, Cory claimed that Midwest Steel Span acted as SFC's agent in Kansas. The district court rejected that claim for lack of evidence, stating that Cory failed to show that SFC had any ownership interest in Midwest Steel or any control over Midwest Steel's business affairs. On appeal, Cory makes no agency argument. Consequently, our consideration of the matter ends. See Fed. R.App. P. 28(a)(9)(A) (stating that an appellant's argument must contain contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies). 28 Regarding the Davises' and Bonacci's contacts with Kansas, the district court observed that Cory only offered evidence that Bonacci had responded to an inquiry from the Kansas Attorney General about Cory's claims. The district court ruled that this limited contact was insufficient to confer jurisdiction. On appeal, Cory does not argue otherwise, and we do not consider the matter further. See id. 29 We conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing SFC, the Davises, and Bonacci for lack of personal jurisdiction.