Opinion ID: 889300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Discovery/Suppression Issue, Act II; New Counsel; Further Investigation; and Four New Trial Settings (Oct. 27, 2005, to July 17, 2006; 263 days)

Text: ¶ 24 The same day that the District Court issued its order suppressing [t]he evidence obtained from the May 17, 2004 search warrant and application, the prosecutor filed a motion for clarification, asserting that the court's order does not specify what evidence is suppressed and leaves the State unable to evaluate the impact of the suppression order on its case. The prosecutor also raised this issue at the omnibus hearing, stating that at this point I have no idea what evidence has been suppressed. The court ordered the parties to brief the issue and set a hearing on the matter for November 3. In addition, the court ordered the State to file the return on the missing May 17, 2004 search warrant. See § 46-5-301(1), MCA. However, the return had also been lost. So, the prosecutor instead filed an Evidence Log, which listed various items including those seized in the May 17 search. ¶ 25 Meanwhile, Dupuis was charged criminally in an unrelated matter and thus could not represent Couture any longer. The District Court apprised Couture of the situation at the November 3 hearing and, with the specific intent of minimizing any further delay, appointed two attorneys, Ben Anciaux and John Putikka, to take over Couture's defense. The court continued the clarification matter for a week to allow Anciaux and Putikka to get up to speed with the case, and set a status conference for November 10. Three further continuances followed (November 10 to November 17 to December 1 to December 8) due to the fact that Dupuis had not yet turned over to Anciaux and Putikka her complete file on Couture. The court issued an order directing her to deliver the file. ¶ 26 On December 8, Anciaux reported that he now had the complete file but that the January 9 trial date was unfeasible. He stated that Couture had agreed to file a speedy trial waiver for the purpose of Mr. Putikka and myself getting up to speed and replying to the prosecutor's motion for clarification, and he noted that this suppression-related issue needed to be resolved before the case could go to trial. The court agreed to a continuance and set a scheduling conference for December 15. Furthermore, despite Anciaux's apparent readiness to waive his client's right to a speedy trial, the court stated that it would not require a waiver in this instance because the delay at issue had not been created by Couture, but rather by actions of Dupuis over which Couture had no control. ¶ 27 Pursuant to discussions at the December 15 scheduling conference, the District Court set January 19, 2006, as the deadline for the defense's response to the prosecutor's motion for clarification. The court also set an omnibus hearing for January 19 so that Anciaux and Putikka could review the original Omnibus Order (adopted during Dupuis' representation) and make amendments to it if necessary. Finally, the court set a motions hearing for January 31 and trial for February 27 (the second trial setting). ¶ 28 On January 19, however, Anciaux advised the court that he, Putikka, and Couture had come to the conclusion that there's a number of things that we need to investigate before we will be adequately prepared to negotiate pleas, go through and decide whether an omnibus is complete in the file, what additional motions are necessary, and basically just be prepared to move forward in this case. To that end, Anciaux requested a private investigator at State expense, and he asked the court to bump all scheduled hearings back one month and to vacate the February 27 trial date. He acknowledged that Couture was reluctant to agree to a continuance, but he explained that he and Putikka don't believe that we can be adequately prepared to represent him on that date. Anciaux noted that Couture would provide a speedy trial waiver, but the court stated that it would not require a waiver on this occasion because it was his previous counsel the Court had appointed that created some of the delay in this matter. The court observed that it wanted to get the case to trial as rapidly as possible but also wanted to make sure that the parties have sufficient time to come up to speed and to evaluate where we are in this case given the background of this matter. Thus, the court continued the matter for four weeks (to February 16) and set February 21 as the deadline for filing motions, March 20 as the motions hearing, and April 24 as the next trial date (the third trial setting). ¶ 29 But at the February 16 status conference, Anciaux and Putikka advised the court that it was doubtful they could be ready for trial by April 24. For one thing, Putikka had a murder trial scheduled from March 7 through March 17 and thus would be unable to do any work on Couture's case during that period. The court, however, pointed out that it had appointed two attorneys to take over Couture's defense for this very reason and that it expected there to be some division of labor between them. Putikka also stated, though, that the defense investigator needed more time to review the discovery materials and that he (Putikka) could not be prepared to file motions by the February 21 deadline because he had just received the transcripts of the prior proceedings on the suppression issue. He did not explain, however, when he had provided the discovery materials to the investigator, why the investigator needed more time, or why he had not obtained the transcripts sooner. In any event, Putikka asked the court to extend the deadline for filing motions at least another two to three weeks. The court agreed to move the deadline to March 20 but refused to vacate the trial date, stating that it intended to keep the case on track for an April 24 trial. The court noted that it was concerned about the length of time which Couture had been incarcerated and that, although Anciaux and Putikka had been brought in at a late date, it did not want the case to get further behind. ¶ 30 On March 20, Anciaux filed a motion to suppress any and all evidence seized pursuant to [the] search warrants issued in this matter and any and all statements made by the Defendant. [1] At a status conference on March 23, the court indicated that it intended to stick to the April 24 trial date; however, Anciaux again suggested that this date would not be feasible because [w]e've just recently had the private investigator come on board full time. He has reviewed the file. It's my understanding that he is prepared to go do interviews and collect[ ] some other evidence. Anciaux thus advised the court that he might be filing a motion to continue, and he in fact did so on April 10 on the grounds that additional investigation is required in this matter. The prosecution did not object, and the court granted the motion. It set the motions hearing for April 28 and trial for June 12 (the fourth trial setting). ¶ 31 On April 14, the prosecutor filed his response to Couture's motion to suppress. Among other things, he raised the doctrine of inevitable discovery, i.e., that the evidence in question would inevitably have been discovered through lawful means. See generally State v. Ellis, 2009 MT 192, ¶¶ 48-59, 351 Mont. 95, 210 P.3d 144. ¶ 32 On April 27, Anciaux filed a motion to continue the April 28 motions hearing to May 25 on the grounds that additional investigation is required in this matter, though he did not provide an explanation for why additional investigation was required. The prosecution did not object, and the court reset the hearing for May 26. But on May 25, Anciaux and Putikka requested another continuance of the hearing and also advised the court that the June 12 trial date was almost certainly unworkable. For one thing, Putikka stated that he was going to be out of town training for a new job, which he had recently taken with the Office of the State Public Defender. Moreover, Anciaux explained that because I don't know the facts well enough to respond to the prosecutor's inevitable discovery argument, he had made arrangements to interview various persons including all of the officers, the girlfriend, [and] the person that Mr. Couture is supposed to have given the gun to. The court agreed to continue the hearing for one week but directed counsel to notify the court within 24 hours whether they were going to utilize the June 12 trial date. The court noted that it was concerned about Couture's right to a speedy trial; and while it had not been requiring speedy trial waivers for the last several continuances, the court observed that it would have more of a reason to impose some of the delay more recently on the defendant because we're getting further and further away from the reasons that you gentlemen were appointed originally. Later that same day (May 25), Anciaux filed a motion to continue the trial on the grounds that additional investigation is required in this matter. The State did not object, and the court reset it for August 7 (the fifth trial setting). The court also reset the motions hearing for June 30. ¶ 33 The hearing on the prosecutor's October 26, 2005 motion for clarification and on Couture's March 20, 2006 motion to suppress finally occurred on June 30. The State called three witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, Anciaux requested that he be given time to brief some issues that had arisen during the hearing. The court granted this request and set a deadline of July 7 (four working days after the hearing). The judge acknowledged that this would put the parties under some pressure, but she explained that her intention was to maintain the August 7 trial date, noting that we have certainly delayed [the trial] long enough that that causes me significant concerns. On July 17, the court entered its Facts, Conclusions of Law, and Order. In short, the court ruled that all of the evidence obtained from the May 17, 2004 search plus, as fruit of the poisonous tree, all of the ensuing evidence (including Couture's statements to detectives and the evidence obtained from the May 18, 2004 search warrants) had to be suppressed, except for the evidence that was discovered from an independent source, and except for the evidence that would have been inevitably discovered. The court specified the items of evidence that fell into these two categories. The case, now in its 791st day, was on course for trial on August 7.