Opinion ID: 64708
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of Firearm Conviction

Text: To support Salazar-Ramirez's firearm conviction, the government must have provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that (1) the defendant committed a drug trafficking crime; (2) he knowingly used or carried the firearm; and (3) he did so during and in relation to the crime. [6] Salazar-Ramirez contests the sufficiency of the evidence as to the second and third elements. As to the third element, Salazar-Ramirez notes that he did not take the weapon into the house with him when he entered to complete the drug transaction. But this is not required by the relevant statute. He carried a gun under the driver's seat when he drove to complete the transaction, and the fact that he did not retain immediate access to it throughout the time of the transaction cannot avail him. [7] It was natural to want additional protection when he was carrying, concealed on his person, a large amount of cash; and the mere fact that he did not carry the gun into his co-conspirator's house does not mean he could not be convicted of carrying the gun in the course of the unlawful drug activities. [8] (Salazar-Ramirez's brief on this point cites language from a Sixth Circuit decision on this element; [9] but that decision has been overruled by later Supreme Court precedent, as that court has itself recognized. [10] ) As to the second element, [t]he `carrying' requirement of Section 924(c) is met where a defendant operates a vehicle knowing the firearm is in the car. [11] Salazar-Ramirez claims that insufficient evidence exists for a reasonable juror to infer that he knowingly carried the weapon. He cites cases in which possession of the gun was otherwise admitted or demonstrated in meeting this element; [12] he notes that such further evidence is missing here. But in supporting his argument that the knowing element can be used to overcome a conviction, Salazar-Ramirez relies on cases in which drugs were well concealed hidden compartment drug cases. [13] In such cases the courts may require more than mere presence of contraband in a car to support a conviction that included a knowledge element. These cases are not directly analogous, as this gun was not particularly concealed, and as there is no argument that Salazar-Ramirez was possibly acting as an innocent, ignorant courier. The hidden compartment cases support the use of circumstantial evidence as to knowledge, and such evidence is ample here. The police officer who found the gun testified that, when Salazar-Ramirez was in the vehicle, [a]ll he would have to do was reach under the seat and he would have had immediate access to the gun. No evidence suggests that Salazar-Ramirez shared access to the car; indeed, he was apparently seen driving the same red Dodge truck earlier on the day in question, picking up the drugs for which he later in the day brought payment. And he was, of course, engaged in the dangerous business of large-scale contraband and currency transportation, a business in which guns are all but necessary tools of the trade. We recognize that most drivers or even owners of vehicles do not regularly check below the driver's seat, but again, we are not dealing with a potentially unwitting criminal. As Salazar-Ramirez ran his important and clearly criminal errands, a juror could reasonably infer that he was aware of the firearm conveniently close to hand. We do not establish a per se rule that a gun under a driver's seat will in all circumstances support an inference of knowledge, but under these circumstances, a reasonable juror could conclude that he was knowingly carrying the gun.