Opinion ID: 1186151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The motion to suppress the sample of defendant's blood.

Text: Defendant then filed a motion to suppress that evidence, supported, among other things, by an affidavit by Judge Hodges that he would not have authorized the search warrant had he been told of the hearing then pending before Judge Beckett. At the hearing on the motion to suppress the deputy district attorney stated that the reason for pursuing the Search Warrant was simply one of time; that he then felt that there was a pressing need    to pursue the obtaining of the blood sample promptly, so as not to delay the trial of the case (then set for November 28), and that he considered the search warrant to be an alternative remedy. No other explanation was offered at that time for not informing Judge Hodges of the hearing then pending before Judge Beckett, from what appears in the record as transmitted to this court. That motion to suppress, heard before Judge Allen, was denied with the statement that:    The troublesome thing in this case of course is the prior Order which was in question at that time and the obtaining of a subsequent Search Warrant. In my opinion this doesn't raise any legal issue, it raises an issue which may be presented to another form [sic] but doesn't raise a legal issue that the defendant has any standing. We agree with the trial court in its holding to the effect that any misconduct by the deputy district attorney in the securing of the warrant for the taking of a sample of defendant's blood did not violate any constitutional rights of the defendant. As held in State v. Stover, 271 Or. 132, 147 n. 10, 531 P.2d 258: In cases other than driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor constitutional search and seizure standards will govern the admissibility of the results of chemical tests for alcohol. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966); State v. Osburn, 13 Or. App. 92, 95, 508 P.2d 837 (1973). (Emphasis theirs) The same is true, in our opinion, with respect to the taking of blood samples to determine blood type, as in this case. The state was entitled to either an order or a warrant for a sample of defendant's blood insofar as defendant's constitutional rights were concerned, as held by a majority of the courts which have considered that question. See Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000, 1013 (1956), and 163 A.L.R. 939, 947 (1946), and cases cited therein. We do not agree with defendant's contention that the blood sample should be suppressed because it was taken in jail, rather than in a medical environment, and was taken under circumstances so brutal, shocking and offensive so as to come within the rule of Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 72 S.Ct. 205, 96 L.Ed. 183 (1952), in which the police pumped defendant's stomach to retrieve drugs swallowed by him on arrest. In this case the blood sample was taken by a registered nurse and the fact that defendant resisted the taking of the sample, resulting in its being taken by force, is immaterial to the question of the validity of the warrant. Cf. Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957), and Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). If this were the only error assigned by the defendant, we would not be inclined to reverse the judgment of the conviction. Because, however, we must remand the case for a new trial for other reasons we believe it proper to give further consideration to the problem, not as one involving defendant's constitutional rights, but as a matter of legal ethics and the proper administration of criminal justice. We believe that the conduct of the deputy district attorney in securing the warrant for the blood sample from a district court without informing that court that a hearing was then pending in circuit court on substantially the same matter was contrary to the standard of legal ethics to which all attorneys should conform, in the absence of some proper explanation which does not appear from the record in this case. Cf. State v. Robinson, 3 Or. App. 200, 208, 473 P.2d 152 (1970). We also believe that when such a breach of legal ethics is called to the attention of the trial court, it has a duty to consider whether contempt proceedings should be brought against such an attorney. [2] For these reasons, we believe that a proper disposition of this question under the circumstances of this case is to suppress the blood sample obtained by the search warrant, but without prejudice to the right of the state to apply for a further order or warrant for another blood sample in preparation for a new trial in this case.