Opinion ID: 768166
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claimant's Work Activity

Text: 8 An individual is disabled under the Act if she is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(A). The burden of establishing a compensable disability under the Act is initially on the claimant. See Kerns v. Apfel, 160 F.3d 464, 466 (8th Cir. 1998); Riley, 18 F.3d at 621 (quoting Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5 (1987)). 9 In this case, Bergmann alleged a disability onset date of July 17, 1995. According to her employment history, she was employed until this alleged onset date, then was unemployed for a brief period before being employed again from April 22, 1996 until April 4, 1997. On April 4, just a month prior to the administrative hearing, Bergmann initiated a 90-day period of unpaid medical leave. At the administrative hearing, Bergmann testified to her intent to return to work: 10 Q: And now you're waiting for the doctor to either release you to go back to work or limit you from going back to work? 11 A: Well, Dr. Weaver said I have osterior (Phonetic) arthritis and I don't even know if I can deal with going back to work right now. I'm going to try. I'm going to see if Dr. Winslow will fill [the return to work forms] out for after I go for the MRI tomorrow and maybe return back to work Wednesday. 12 Q: Okay, so you want to try to return back to work? 13 A: That's right. 14 Considering Bergmann's work history, and more particularly, focusing on her testimonial intent to return to work, the ALJ found that there was no evidence that Bergmann was expected to remain off work for the requisite twelve months. 15 The district court summarized the situation presented to the ALJ: 16 [T]he ALJ was originally presented with a claimant who (although at the time on unpaid medical leave) had engaged in gainful employment in the recent past. In addition, Bergman [sic] testified that she intended to return to work in the future. Thus, at the time of his decision, the ALJ had not been presented with the possibility that Bergman [sic] would remain unemployed for the continuous period of twelve months or more necessary to establish a lack of substantial gainful activity. If these facts were the only basis for determining whether or not the ALJ's decision was based on substantial evidence, this Court would have little choice but to affirm. 17 Bergman v. Apfel, Civ. No. 98-5077, slip op. at 6 (D.S.D. Feb. 20, 1999) (internal citation omitted). Having read the transcript of the administrative hearing and reviewed all of the exhibits submitted at the hearing, this court finds the ALJ's initial determination of no disability to be supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. However, this is not the end of our inquiry. As the district court correctly pointed out, the submission of the additional evidence to the Appeals Council complicates the analysis; thus, this court now turns to that additional evidence. 18