Opinion ID: 160243
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violation of extradition rights–

Text: Mr. Pullen asserts that his transport from Kansas to Illinois to assist in the controlled delivery was in violation of his rights under the Extradition Act. 3 The Extradition Act “establishes procedures for the interstate transfer of persons against whom criminal charges are outstanding.” Cuyler v. Adams , 449 U.S. 433, 435 n.1 (1981). These rights are guaranteed in Article IV, § 2, cl.2, of the United States Constitution 4 and 18 U.S.C. § 3182. 5 “A prisoner transferred under the 3 The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act is codified in Kansas as Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 22-2701 to 22-2730, and codified in Illinois as 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 225/1 to 225/32. 4 Article IV, § 2, cl.2, provides: A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime. 5 18 U.S.C. § 3182 provides: (continued...) -6- Extradition Act is explicitly granted a right to a pretransfer ‘hearing’ at which he is informed of the receiving State’s request for custody, his right to counsel, and his right to apply for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the custody request.” Cuyler , 449 U.S. at 443. Insofar as Mr. Pullen is arguing that he was not afforded these rights prior to being transported from Kansas to Illinois, his argument fails for several reasons. First, although it is not entirely clear from the record, it appears that Mr. Pullen was extradited from Illinois to Missouri after the controlled delivery plan was abandoned. It was at that time that he should have been afforded his pretransfer rights or challenged the extradition procedure if he was denied these rights. See Gee v. State of Kansas , 912 F.2d 414, 416 (10th Cir. 1990) (“Before 5 (...continued) Whenever the executive authority of any State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive authority of any State, District or Territory to which such person has fled, and produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled, the executive authority of the State, District, or Territory to which such person has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest, the prisoner may be discharged. -7- a fugitive in custody is extradited to the demanding state, he may challenge the authority of the asylum state by seeking a federal writ of habeas corpus.”) (citing Michigan v. Doran , 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978)). Once Mr. Pullen was extradited to Missouri, however, the writ of habeas corpus was no longer available to challenge the extradition procedures of the asylum state. See Gee , 912 F.2d at 416. Second, we have held that “the constitutional dimension of extradition exists only when demand is made by one jurisdiction for the surrender of a person in another jurisdiction.” Ortega v. City of Kansas City , 875 F.2d 1497, 1499 (10th Cir. 1989). There was no evidence that either Missouri or Illinois made a demand on Kansas for Mr. Pullen’s extradition. To the contrary, Sergeant Keesling testified that the issuing agent in Missouri was notified of Mr. Pullen’s arrest and subsequently gave the DEA agent permission to proceed with the controlled delivery in Illinois. We have no record indicating what procedures took place in Illinois before Mr. Pullen was returned to Missouri. What we do know is that, under the circumstances here, Mr. Pullen’s argument that Kansas had a duty to provide him with Extradition Act pretransfer rights prior to transporting him to Illinois is without merit. See Ortega , 875 F.2d at 1500 (“[T]he Uniform Criminal -8- Extradition Act does not establish an exclusive procedure by which law enforcement officials may arrest non-residents.”).