Opinion ID: 2575840
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Possible Violations of the HRPC

Text: In light of the fact that the instant request seeks an excessive amount of fees and because DFS paid these charges in full[,] I agree with the majority's referral of this case to ODC for an investigation as to whether the Hawai`i Rules of Professional Conduct were violated. See Bateman, 82 Hawai`i at 460, 923 P.2d at 402, as amended, (1996) ([W]e are compelled to refer the record of this case to the ODC for its review and appropriate action.); Bettencourt, 80 Hawai`i at 227, 909 P.2d at 555 ([W]e are referring the supreme court record of this case to the [ODC] to determine whether the lack of professionalism demonstrated by appellant's counsel in this case violates the [HRPC].). Once ODC receives an ethics complaint, it conducts an investigation to see whether there is evidence that an attorney licensed to practice law in this State ... has violated, by act or omission, any provision of the [HRPC]. Akinaka, 91 Hawai`i at 56, 979 P.2d at 1082 (citations and footnote omitted). In the instant case, the Stubenberg firm charged DFS an unreasonable amount of fees, and Stubenberg  as the majority points out  represented to this court in his declaration that such fees were reasonably incurred. The majority, however, neglects to mention that, in submitting the fee request on behalf of the Stubenberg firm, the Alston Hunt Floyd & Ing law firm, which had assumed representation of DFS after Paiea filed its reply brief, also represented to this court that the attorneys' fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred. [8] However, as explained in sections I.A. and I.B., a substantial portion of the fees requested were clearly unreasonable and unnecessary. I, therefore, find it perplexing that the Alston firm  assuming it reviewed the file and the Stubenberg firm's billings in preparation of filing DFS' request for attorneys' fees  believed it appropriate to represent to this court that the fees being requested were reasonable and necessary. Even a cursory review would have indicated that the prudent approach was to avoid any misrepresentation to this court that the fees charged were reasonable by acknowledging that some fees might be unreasonable and leaving the task of arriving at a reasonable fee to the court. Alternatively, inasmuch as none of the requested fees were incurred by the Alston firm, it could have avoided making any representation as to reasonableness and necessity by simply referring the court to Stubenberg's declaration and leaving the issue of reasonableness and necessity to this court to decide. Accordingly, based on the foregoing discussion, I agree with the majority's referral of this case to ODC inasmuch as it appears that the actions of counsel in this case may not comport with the precepts embodied in the HRPC. See HRPC Rules 1.1, [9] 1.5, [10] 3.1, [11] 3.3, [12] 8.3, [13] and 8.4 [14] (1994).