Opinion ID: 2367601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: The jury's improper deliberations were cured

Text: Finally, Wyeth challenges the punitive damages awards based on a purported procedural due process violation. Wyeth argues that the jury's verdict should be reversed and remanded to the district court for further proceedings because the jury improperly deliberated and awarded punitive damages without receiving proper instructions. Respondents argue that while the jury improperly considered punitive damages, the problem was corrected when the district court required the jury to deliberate the compensatory damages a second time. During the settling of the jury instructions, the district court informed the parties that it was going to instruct the jury that should it find that malice or fraud existed, a second proceeding would take place. Respondents objected, as it would have a prejudicial effect on the jury if it knew that it would have to return for another proceeding. Thus, respondents urged the district court to remove the instruction, and Wyeth did not object. [13] The jury was given an instruction regarding whether Wyeth acted with malice or fraud. The jury was not instructed to deliberate and consider awarding any punitive damages. By statute, Nevada requires that the liability determination for punitive damages against a defendant be bifurcated from the assessment of the amount of punitive damages, if any, to be awarded. NRS 42.005(3); see generally Smith's Food & Drug Cntrs. v. Bellegarde, 114 Nev. 602, 606, 958 P.2d 1208, 1211 (1998), overruled on other grounds by Countrywide Home Loans v. Thitchener, 124 Nev. 725, 192 P.3d 243 (2008). This court has recognized a strong public policy in favor of the district court correcting verdicts before discharging a jury. See Lehrer McGovern Bovis v. Bullock Insulation, 124 Nev. 1102, 1111, 197 P.3d 1032, 1038 (2008); Eberhard Mfg. Co. v. Baldwin, 97 Nev. 271, 273, 628 P.2d 681, 682 (1981). The efficient administration of justice requires that any doubts concerning a verdict's consistency with Nevada law be addressed before the court dismisses the jury. Cramer v. Peavy, 116 Nev. 575, 582, 3 P.3d 665, 670 (2000). A jury's verdict should be salvaged, when possible, to avoid a new trial. Id. at 583, 3 P.3d at 670. Here, the district court properly bifurcated the underlying proceedings. The jury was instructed on liability and compensatory damages, and asked to determine if Wyeth could be held liable for punitive damages. Neither the instructions nor the verdict form requested that the jury award an amount for punitive damages, even if it found that Wyeth acted with malice or fraud. When the district court learned that the jury awarded punitive damages in the trial's first phase, the court reinstructed the jury and sent them back to deliberate compensatory damages a second time. The district court properly attempted to salvage the jury's verdict so as to avoid a new trial. The district court later recognized, however, that the premature jury deliberations on punitive damages had significantly tainted the jury's verdicts as being the result of passion and prejudice. This is evident from the fact that in the first initial deliberations, the jury returned verdicts totaling $134.5 million, which improperly included an award for punitive damages. After being reinstructed on compensatory damages, the jury returned three verdicts totaling $35.1 million. Thereafter, the jury awarded punitive damages that totaled $99 million. Combined, the two awards amount to $134.1 million, only $500,000 less than their original award. Because the awards were still tainted by the jury's passion and prejudice, the district court granted Wyeth's motion to reduce the awards. The district court reduced the jury's punitive damage verdict from $35 to $13 million for Ms. Forrester, from $31 to $10 million for Ms. Rowatt, and from $33 to $12 million for Ms. Scofield. Thus, while the jury's improper deliberations may not have been salvaged in light of the subsequent punitive damages awards, the verdicts were spared when the district court granted the remittitur and reduced the awards. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in reinstructing the jury and then denying Wyeth's new trial motion because it salvaged the verdicts by granting the remittitur. See Lehrer, 124 Nev. at 1110, 197 P.3d at 1037-38 (reviewing a district court's decision regarding a jury verdict for an abuse of discretion). [14]