Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusion of Impeachment Evidence Against Jerre Brown

Text: Jerre Brown testified for the prosecution on October 11, 1995. He told the jury that in the fall of 1976, when he was 16 years old, he, his cousin Beverly Manning, and defendant committed a burglary at Kelly's Truck Stop in Shreveport, Louisiana, during which they stole a television set and later sold it to Brown's mother for $90. Thereafter, defendant and Manning drove to California. Defendant and Manning returned to Shreveport, Louisiana, one month later, and defendant admitted to Brown that while in California, he and Manning had beaten and robbed Ruth Story. In December 1976, Brown, defendant, and Manning were in jail in Shreveport, Louisiana, under arrest for the burglary. Defendant asked Brown and Manning, who were both juveniles at the time of the burglary, to take full responsibility for the burglary in order to exonerate him. Brown instead testified to the truth about the burglary and gave testimony unfavorable to defendant. While in a holding cell with 40 other inmates awaiting transportation to the courthouse from the jail, defendant attempted to stab Brown in the head with a pen, requiring the guards to spray Mace on both of them. Later, at the courthouse, defendant hit Brown in the face with his fist, knocking him against the wall. Brown told the jurors in the penalty retrial that he had been convicted of felony theft and two crimes against nature in Louisiana in 1977 when he was 17, but had not been convicted of any other felonies since then. The crimes against nature of which he had been convicted were, in fact,  aggravated crimes against nature. [25] Defendant then asked Brown if he had ever been convicted of aggravated rape, a much more serious crime, [26] to which Brown truthfully answered he had not. Out of the presence of the jury, defendant argued that a crime against nature by definition was aggravated rape and he should have been allowed to so argue to the jury. The court refused to allow defendant to ask Brown any details about the crimes against nature for which he was convicted or to introduce documents regarding Brown's convictions, ruling that such evidence was not relevant to impeachment. Thus, the jury was not informed of the exact definition of a crime against nature, or of the fact that Brown was convicted of aggravated crimes against nature. Defendant filed a motion on October 18, 1995, a week after Brown testified, to introduce the documents pertaining to Brown's convictions, arguing that the record was unclear and therefore misleading, thereby allowing the prosecution to present a sanitized picture of Brown that did not reveal he had committed acts involving force and violence inherent in an aggravated crime. Nearly two months later, on December 6, 1995, the court held a hearing on the motion and acknowledged that the record did not satisfactorily establish that Brown had suffered a conviction for an aggravated crime and that the crimes for which he was convicted were referred to in rather antiquated language that might not be commonly understood by a California jury. The court denied the motion, however, under Evidence Code section 352, ruling that because of the lapse of time since Brown's testimony, defendant could not raise the issue again without confusing the jury and prejudicing the prosecution. The court also concluded that defendant erred in the first instance in not asking Brown questions that would have established that his convictions were for aggravated crimes, and that Brown's credibility nevertheless had been impeached with evidence showing that he was no angel, but a man who assisted defendant in a burglary and thereafter suffered convictions for three other serious felonies. (32) Defendant now argues the court erred in denying the motion. We disagree. The trial court has broad discretion to exclude impeachment evidence under Evidence Code section 352. ( People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 296 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 841 P.2d 938].) Although wide latitude should be given to cross-examination designed to test the credibility of a prosecution witness, [t]he statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues. ( Ibid. ) The record reveals that during the course of Brown's testimony, both court and counsel were less than clear in their understanding of the details of Louisiana's laws regarding crimes against nature. In light of other evidence admitted to challenge Brown's credibility, we see no abuse of discretion in the trial court's determination that any further attempts to clarify Louisiana's laws regarding the crimes against nature would have been confusing.