Opinion ID: 2407465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: submissible negligence of driver of chevrolet?

Text: In further support of the trial court's action in sustaining her motion for directed verdict at the close of the plaintiff's case, Administratrix Judkins next makes the point that the record is devoid of any evidence in support of plaintiff's allegation of negligence against defendant Judkins, decedent. Plaintiff's petition alleged negligence on the part of decedent James Albert Judkins in that he drove at a high, fast and dangerous rate of speed at the time, that he failed to keep a careful and proper lookout for other motor vehicles on the highways aforementioned, that he failed to yield the right of way to the tractor trailer rig being driven by defendant Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. at the time and that he was grossly and wantonly careless in each of the above specifications. In the instant case the jury could well have found from the truck driver's statement, admitted in evidence without objection, that Watkins' truck had made a stop on the crossover at the stop sign before entering upon the concrete part of northbound 71 and that the truck then started up from a stop and proceeded east in an attempt to cross such 26 foot lane, and thereafter the collision occurred between the Watkins truck and the Chevrolet which was northbound on Highway 71. Before going into further detail regarding the movements of the two vehicles we believe that in order to more fully understand the facts of this case, many of which must be gleaned from photographs, we should undertake to describe the Watkins truck. In the very first paragraph of her brief defendant Judkins argued that the weight of the tractor trailer unit owned by defendant Watkins was not in evidence and before the Court at the time the Court directed a verdict for defendant Judkins. While it is true that at the close of plaintiff's case the exact weight was not in evidence, the trooper had testified that the tractor was eight or nine feet high by nine or ten feet long, and that the trailer was about 12½ feet high by 40 feet in length. From a careful study of the photographs in evidence the jury could reasonably find that the Watkins rig consisted of a modern cab-over-engine diesel tractor and a refrigerated trailer about 40 feet long, eight feet wide and over twelve feet high; that the front of the trailer was supported by a disc-type mechanism commonly referred to as a fifth wheel supported by two sets of dual tired drive wheels on each side of the tractor so that the tractor rode on ten tires including those of the two front wheels. The rear of the trailer was supported by two sets of dual tired wheels on each side of the trailer. The whole eighteen tire combination is of the type commonly seen en route on the major highways and near truck terminals and warehouses in cities all over the nation. In a nutshell, it is in the class of the largest, heaviest, single-trailer motor vehicles using our highways during the past decade. In the following discussion of this case, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, we will include the facts that the jury, if permitted, might have found or reasonably inferred from the photographs received in evidence, as well as the admissions and oral testimony adduced. Immediately prior to the collision and at about 8:20 p. m. January 8, 1965, one Chastain was driving the large Watkins tractor-trailer rig southwardly on southbound Highway 71; the truck headlights and at least three lights on each side of that trailer were burning. When Chastain reached the crossover leading to I-29 he turned to his left or eastward into such crossover and that in so doing the tractor headlights necessarily turned in a quarter circle from a southerly projection to an easterly direction, and in the course of such turn the Watkins headlights would sweep across the line of vision of the driver of any automobile proceeding northwardly on northbound 71 and within three-tenths of a mile (1584 feet) of the crossover. From the statement made by Chastain to the highway trooper, and admitted in evidence without objection, the jury could find that Chastain stopped said tractor-trailer on such crossover at the stop sign prohibiting motor vehicles moving east on the crossover from entering northbound 71 before coming to a complete stop. Such stop sign, as shown in the photographs, was approximately six feet west of the west edge of the traveled part of northbound Highway 71. From that stop sign to and beyond the point of impact, the right or south side of the Watkins tractor-trailer combination was also illuminated by at least one of the bright mercury vapor overhead lights which was located close to and south of the crossover. The right or south side of the Watkins trailer was light in color by comparison with the word WATKINS spelled out in dark, contrasting letters approximately two feet high by twenty feet long on the side of the trailer. The Watkins rig with all such lights still burning started up from a stop at such stop sign and proceeded eastwardly on the crossover leading to the ramp going into the southwest lane of I-29. While the Watkins truck was moving in a general easterly direction it was struck by the northbound Chevrolet. By piecing together all the data gleaned from the photographs, statement of Chastain, statements regarding skid marks and other testimony, we are of the opinion that there was sufficient evidence adduced in plaintiff's case in chief to have warranted a finding by the jury that at the moment of impact, approximately four or five feet of the front part of the Watkins tractor had gone beyond, or east of the skid mark caused by the left wheels of the northbound Chevrolet. Thus it follows that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that the Watkins truck traveled in a general eastwardly direction approximately 28 to 29 feet from the stop sign until the moment it was struck by the northbound Chevrolet. (Six feet from stop sign to west edge of Highway 71, plus thirteen feet to center of northbound roadway, plus five feet from center line thereof to Chevrolet skid mark, plus four or five feet of tractor that went east of skid mark before tractor was struck by Chevrolet.) As previously indicated the Chevrolet was literally demolished. The photographs clearly show that the thrust of the impact, centered about the left front wheel, was almost directly from the front to the rear of the Chevrolet. We could not adequately describe all the extensive damage so shown, but the pictures were before the court and jury. The foremost thought that saturates the mind on viewing such pictures is terrific speed at impact. The impact damage to the truck is clearly shown in the pictures to be from a crushing blow from the right side of the front of the tractor toward its left. On careful examination of all the photographs we could not find any indication of thrust of force toward the rear of the tractor. This is most vividly noted in the damage to the front bumper which appeared to be of heavy channel shaped steel. Approximately the right two feet of this bumper was smashed in accordion-like manner into almost a ball of metal shortening the right to left dimension of the bumper from about eight to about six feet. The direct impact damage to the tractor was confined to its right front four or five feet, several holes being punched through the front part of the right door which was located over the right front wheel. The axle and front end assembly were crushed to such an extent that the right wheel rested at about a 30 degree angle to the ground and the left at about a 45 degree angle. The roadway beneath the tractor appeared to be covered with a dark, shiny, oily substance. On viewing the pictures of the two vehicles, with the information that the northbound Chevrolet struck the eastbound tractor, the over-all impression gained is that of terrific speed of the Chevrolet at the moment of impact. It is only after due consideration of the damage to the vehicles that the full import of the Highway Patrol Trooper's testimony regarding the skid marks left by the tractor drive wheels can be appreciated. Trooper Matthews testified without objection: Q What caused this mark on the pavement, if you know? A When the truck which had been heading east was moved to the north by the impact, the wheels drug in a semicircle leaving tire marks on the pavement. Q So that when the car struck the right side of the tractor it moved the tractor in a northerly direction a complete 90°, didn't it? A Yes, sir. Q And with this tractor moving like this, it drug the right wheels around, so leaving those marks, is that correct? A Yes. There was also evidence from which the jury could find that after such impact the Chevrolet was still traveling at such a speed as to leave its skid marks, veering to the right, going on the concrete roadway toward the east shoulder for a distance of 27 feet and then off in a northeasterly direction for 40 feet to the point where the Chevrolet struck the large upright steel highway post which was northeast of the intersection (adopted statement) with sufficient violence to catapult Leonard Judkins clear of the wreckage and bend that post from an upright position to an angle of about 45° and then overturn. In the recent case of Housman v. Fiddyment (Mo.Sup. En Banc) 421 S.W.2d 284, 292, this court said: In these modern days nearly all jurors are experienced motorists. Marks and debris on highway at the scenes of collisions, examples of the damage done when automobiles collide and the result of the interaction of vehicles colliding are matters of common observation. As a result the modern-day juror in the average case is `just as capable of reasoning backward from the evidence and making a correct analysis of what happened as is the expert.' Jurors are often called upon to determine questions of the speeds of motor vehicles involved in collisions. They are probably more familiar with estimating the speed of slow moving vehicles such as those starting from a stopped position and the probable rate of acceleration for the first thirty or forty feet than for vehicles traveling in excess of fifty miles per hour. As pedestrians as well as when operating automobiles, modern day jurors are often required to estimate the relative speeds and acceleration of small, fast getaway cars as well as large trucks in order to determine whether it is safe to cross a street, on foot or by car, at variable distances from different kinds of motor vehicles starting from a stopped position. From the fact that the photographs further showed that the trailer came to a stop headed almost due east with its front end still about three feet west of the east edge of U. S. 71, the jurors could have found that despite its weight and eastward momentum the trailer had to be moving at a very slow date of speed to have stopped in such a short distance of approximately six to eight feet. This court has stated that It is common knowledge that when a motortruck is just started it goes at a very slow rate of speed. McMillan v. Israel, Mo.App., 30 S.W.2d 626, 628. From those parts of the statement made by Chastain, driver of the Watkins truck,    I seen he was going to get me anyway and I didn't know what to do.    I even tried to back up. there was further evidence from which the jury could have found that the average speed of the tractor trailer, after leaving the stop sign was very low. From such statements the jury could have found that after the Watkins truck got onto the highway the truck driver had to stop the truck again in order to have tried to back it up. The jurors could have found, even without such intermediate stop, that in order to attain an average speed of as much as five miles per hour in the short distance traveled by the rig from the stop sign it would have had to accelerate to a speed of about ten miles per hour then decelerate to a stop before the front of the trailer reached a point three feet west of the east edge of the highway. The jury could have found this to have been a difficult if not impossible feat. Jurors are often required to determine questions of the speeds of vehicles involved in collisions. Under the evidence in this case counsel, if permitted to do so, could have argued and the jury could have inferred and found from the evidence and their experience that the average speed of the truck from the time it started from the stop sign until the moment of impact was about three miles per hour. The jurors could have exercised their capabilities of reasoning backward from the evidence and making a correct analysis of what happened (Housman, supra) and found that the 70 miles per hour maximum speed permitted by law on northbound 71 was 231/3 times the three mile per hour speed of the Watkins truck. The jurors could have found that a northbound automobile moving at 70 miles per hour, without reducing its speed a whit, would travel 231/3 times the 28 or 29 foot distance traveled by the Watkins rig during the time it took the Watkins tractor to move from the stop sign to the point of impact, or approximately 653 feet. From these calculations the jurors could have reasoned that if the driver of the northbound automobile was moving at 70 miles per hour and was exercising the highest degree of care in keeping a lookout ahead along this three-tenths of a mile of unobstructed view highway, he could have seen the truck begin its eastward movement from the stop sign when the northbound car was about 650 feet south of the crossover. The jurors could have found, if permitted, that on seeing that Watkins truck start eastwardly from the stop sign, the driver of the northbound Chevrolet had the duty of adjusting his speed accordingly. Regardless of the maximum posted speed limits on public highways, drivers of automobiles have the primary duty of complying with the very first part of Section 304.010, V.A.M.S., reading: 1. Every person operating a motor vehicle on the highways of this state shall drive the same in a careful and prudent manner, and shall exercise the highest degree of care, and at a rate of speed so as not to endanger the property of another or the life or limb of any person. These primary duties of motorists have been discussed and applied by our courts times without number to practically all situations and conditions that have contributed to highway collisions. In the recent case of Wolfe v. Harms, Mo., 413 S.W.2d 204, 210 this court said: However, excessive speed is a relative matter, and whether speed is excessive ordinarily depends upon the condition of the highway and surrounding circumstances. In the instant case one of the conditions of Highway 71 was that the area about its intersection with the crossover was brightly illuminated by a number of mercury vapor lights which, in recent years, have been placed about open highways at potentially dangerous intersections. One of the circumstances in the instant case was that the southbound truck had made a left turn and, as the jury could have found from the evidence, had made a stop in an illuminated area and in a position to cross northbound Highway 71. In discussing the duty of an approaching motorist upon seeing a truck stopped at the side of a road, in a position to start across, Judge Bennick wrote, in the case of Bramblett v. Harlow (Mo.App.) 75 S.W.2d 626, 630: In other words, the degree of care which one is to be required to exercise at a given moment in the operation of his automobile is to be measured by the obligations of the situation which confronts him, and thus a speed which would be free from the imputation of negligence under some circumstances might easily be regarded as a very negligent and unsafe speed under other and different circumstances. Here Mrs. Harlow, under her own admissions, saw plaintiff's truck sitting by the roadside, in a position to go across, as soon as she came over the crest of the hill. She was thereupon charged with the necessity of taking cognizance of the probabilities of the situation, and to have her car under such control that she could reasonably avert an accident if the truck was started across the pavement, and not to wait until the actual moment of peril should arise until she should choose to act according to the dictates of due care. But instead she continued onward at what must have been a high speed under the inferences fairly deducible from plaintiff's own evidence, and thus at best contributed to bring about a situation which ultimately resulted in the collision. In considering tire marks and the ultimate resting places of the respective vehicles with reference to the issue of excessive speed, this court said in Wolfe v. Harms, supra, 413 S.W.2d 204, l. c. 210: Thus, the additional circumstances of 119 feet of tire marks leading south from the truck are available for the jury's consideration. Also available is the evidence of the ultimate resting place of the vehicles, the truck against an embankment and the Dodge to the right and forward of the truck. A jury could properly consider all these facts, and they were sufficient to make a submissible case on the issue of whether defendant negligently drove at an excessive speed and whether that was a proximate cause of the collision and resulting injures. Bramblett v. Harlow, supra, 75 S.W.2d l. c. 630 (7-9). From all the facts adduced, including the Chevrolet skid marks prior to the impact, the fact that the comparatively light Chevrolet literally knocked the heavy tractor out of its path causing 22 feet of sideways skid marks of the multiple tractor tires, the tremendous damage to both vehicles, the additional Chevrolet skid marks in excess of 60 feet after such impact, the striking of the steel highway post with sufficient force to bend it, the subsequent overturn of the Chevrolet and the other conditions and circumstances heretofore discussed, we are of the opinion that plaintiff's evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, was sufficient to make a submissible case on the issue of whether the driver of the Chevrolet negligently drove at an excessive speed and whether that was the proximate cause of the collision and resultant death of plaintiff's son, Raymond Hughes. We conclude that the trial court erred in taking the drastic action of sustaining the motion of defendant Hazel K. Judkins, Administratrix of the Estate of James Albert Judkins, deceased, and that a new trial should be granted to plaintiff against said defendant.