Opinion ID: 2716182
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Bellard’s claim of racial discrimination

Text: In order to establish a prima facie claim of racial discrimination under Title VII, a plaintiff must show he “(1) is a member of a protected group; (2) was qualified for the position at issue; (3) was discharged or suffered some adverse employment action by the employer; and (4) . . . was treated less favorably than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group.” McCoy v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007). If a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. at 557. The plaintiff then “bears the ultimate burden of proving that the employer’s proffered reason . . . is a pretext . . . .” Id. 13 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 The first three elements of Bellard’s prima facie case are not in dispute — Bellard is African American, was qualified to work as an electrician, and was terminated by Schmidt. At issue is whether Bellard established he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees who were outside his protected group. “[A]n employee who proffers a fellow employee as a comparator [must] demonstrate that the employment actions at issue were taken ‘under nearly identical circumstances.’” Lee v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009). The employees being compared must have “held the same job or responsibilities, shared the same supervisor or had their employment status determined by the same person, and have essentially comparable violation histories.” Id. (citations omitted). If a difference between the plaintiff’s conduct and that of the allegedly similarly situated employee accounts for the difference in treatment, the employees are not similarly situated for the purposes of the employment discrimination analysis. Wallace v. Methodist Hosp. Sys., 271 F.3d 212, 221 (5th Cir. 2001). Bellard’s deposition testimony identified three Caucasian employees — Ed Albinese, John Heineken, and Robert Riley — who he alleges received three-day suspensions or were transferred to other job sites for similar safety infractions. His testimony, however, provides no evidence that those individuals’ infractions occurred after implementation of the zero-tolerance policy for ladder safety violations, that they held the same job or had the same responsibilities, shared the same supervisor, or had comparable violation histories. Bellard provided no information other than Albinese’s race and name. He stated Riley was his supervisor and that Heineken had an apprentice, indicating they did not, in fact, hold the same position or share the same supervisor. Finally, there was undisputed evidence that Vaughn Construction insisted Bellard be removed from the site because a three-day 14 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282 suspension would not be sufficient. There is no such evidence regarding the other three employees. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Bellard cannot establish a prima facie claim of race discrimination. Moreover, the district court identified that even if Bellard could make out a prima facie case, Schmidt met its burden of articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating Bellard which Bellard had not demonstrated was pretext. Schmidt identified two legitimate reasons for terminating Bellard, that he knowingly violated a zero-tolerance safety policy and that Vaughn Construction asked Bellard be removed from the site based on his conduct following the safety infraction. Frank stated that Schmidt terminated Bellard based on the circumstances of his safety violation, namely, Bellard’s comments to the Vaughn Construction safety officer indicating his disregard for safety and causing Vaughn to request Bellard be removed from the site. Bellard argued that other employees were disciplined less harshly for similar safety infractions, and he denied that he made the disrespectful comments or that he at least does not remember making them. This does not establish, however, that Schmidt’s reasons for terminating Bellard were pretext or that Schmidt fired Bellard with discriminatory motive. “Simply disputing the underlying facts of an employer’s decision is not sufficient to create an issue of pretext.” LeMaire v. Louisiana Dept. of Transp. & Dev., 480 F.3d 383, 391 (5th Cir. 2007). Bellard does not establish pretext by arguing other employees were treated less harshly. According to Frank, Bellard was terminated not just because of his safety infraction but because of his comments to the safety officer indicating his disregard for safety. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment for Schmidt on Bellard’s claim of racial discrimination. The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED. 15 Case: 13-20282 Document: 00512722328 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/05/2014 No. 13-20282