Opinion ID: 1191457
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: expenditures following separation

Text: The parties separated in August of 1983. During the time the parties were separated, David continued to withdraw monies from Hybarger and Son Drywall. Wilma contends that, since these funds belonged to the community, she is entitled to attorneys' fees and costs in order to offset David's post-separation expenditures. [5] The testimony cited by Wilma reveals that the monies in question were used for (1) improvements to David's place of residence, which he did not own; (2) groceries and household expenses; and (3) payments on the Fallon ranch, a community property asset. The district court could have found these expenditures to be of a community nature, since they either contributed to the housing and other living expenses of the husband (who had previously resided in the separate property residence of the wife), or constituted contributions to a community asset. Nothing in the record suggests an absolute entitlement on the part of the wife to any portion of those funds. The district court apparently took into account the post-separation earnings and expenses of both spouses in determining that neither party was entitled to reimbursement for expenditures during that period. Further, it is well established that the decision whether to award attorneys' fees to either party lies within the sound discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., Levy v. Levy, 96 Nev. 902, 620 P.2d 860 (1980). The court's decision, based on the fact that each of the parties held substantial separate property, was clearly a proper exercise of its discretion.