Opinion ID: 2354428
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Heading: Can Rite Aid Be Held Liable for Breach of Express Warranty

Text: The threshold issue that we must address is Rite Aid's argument that the sale of pharmaceuticals is qualitatively different from the sale of other goods, such that pharmacies cannot be held liable for breach of express warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code. Although courts in our sister jurisdictions consistently have declined to impose the Uniform Commercial Code implied warranties of fitness [4] and merchantability [5] because they have determined that the prescribing of medication is an aspect of the delivery of medical services, see Elsroth v. Johnson & Johnson, 700 F.Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Coyle v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 526 Pa. 208, 584 A.2d 1383 (1991); Murphy v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 40 Cal.3d 672, 221 Cal.Rptr. 447, 710 P.2d 247 (1985), Rite Aid has failed to produce a single case that stands for the proposition that pharmaceuticals may not be the subject of an express warranty. What differentiates [a] promise implied by law[, i.e., an implied warranty,] . . . and an express warranty is that the `standard of performance is set by the defendants' promises, rather than imposed by law.' Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Cape Cod v. Weston & Sampson Engrs., Inc., 45 Mass.App.Ct. 120, 695 N.E.2d 688, 694 (1998) quoting Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. Crandall Dry Dock Engrs., Inc., 396 Mass. 818, 489 N.E.2d 172, 175 (1986); see also Housing Authority of Portland v. Ash Nat'l, 36 Or.App. 391, 584 P.2d 776, 778 (1978) (stating that an implied warranty is a `curious hybrid' between tort and contract law and differs from express warranties based on contract); Md.Code (1975, 2002 Repl.Vol.), § 2-313, official cmt. 1 (Express warranties rest on `dickered' aspects of the individual bargain, and go so clearly to the essence of that bargain that words of disclaimer in a form are repugnant to the basic dickered terms. `Implied' warranties rest so clearly on a common factual situation or set of conditions that no particular language or action is necessary to evidence them and they will arise in such a situation unless unmistakably negated.). A prescription drug satisfies the definition of goods as explicated in Maryland Code (1975, 2002 Repl.Vol.), Section 2-105 of the Commercial Law Article, which provides in pertinent part: (1) Goods means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, investment securities (Title 8) and things in action. Prescription drugs are movable at the time of identification to the contract for sale. Moreover, there is no reasonable basis upon which to distinguish between prescription drugs and other goods under the Uniform Commercial Code with respect to express warranties. Thus, because drugs are goods subject to sale, they may potentially be the subject of an express warranty. See, e.g., Batiste v. American Home Prods. Corp., 32 N.C.App. 1, 231 S.E.2d 269 (1977) (holding that a drug manufacturer's sale of drugs to a plaintiff would fall within the purview of the UCC). Therefore, in light of the absolute lack of authority for distinguishing between prescription drugs and other goods for express warranty purposes, we conclude that we are not precluded as a matter of law from affirming the jury's verdict against Rite Aid on the basis of breach of express warranty. Rite Aid, nevertheless, primarily relies on Basko v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 416 F.2d 417 (2d Cir.1969), in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the trial court's refusal to submit a breach of express warranty claim to the jury because the plaintiff did not adduce evidence that the defendant represent[ed] either (1) that its drugs were free from all harmful side effects or (2) that its drugs were absolutely harmless. Id. at 428. See also In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liability Litigation, 328 F.Supp.2d 791, 818 (N.D.Ohio 2004) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendants because the general statement that product is safe and effective does not give rise to an express warranty); Rohrbough v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 719 F.Supp. 470, 477-78 (N.D.W.V.1989) (granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and holding that statement that side effects are exceedingly rare is not an express warranty); Whittington v. Eli Lilly and Co., 333 F.Supp. 98 (S.D.W.V.1971) (granting manufacturer's motion for summary judgment and finding no express warranty as to the absolute effectiveness of the drug); Butler v. The Travelers Ins. Co., 202 So.2d 354, 356 (La.App.1967) (upholding trial court's rendering of summary judgment on behalf of manufacturer and declining to find breach of express warranty where there was no representation that the tetanus vaccine would absolutely prevent tetanus). These cases involved a determination based on the idiosyncratic facts of each case and do not support the proposition that there can never be an express warranty with respect to prescription drugs.