Opinion ID: 2513015
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutor's Statements During Closing Arguments

Text: Defendant Gabriel enumerates a litany of statements made by the prosecutor during her closing arguments that he contends warrant a new trial because they unfairly prejudiced the jury, and were not overcome by instructions from the judge. He also argues that the government's case lacked the strength to overcome the prejudice caused by the prosecutor's individual and combined closing argument errors. Since Gabriel did not object to these statements during trial, our review is for plain error only. United States v. Henderson, 320 F.3d 92, 105 (1st Cir.2003). [Plain] error will not be recognized unless it caused a miscarriage of justice or seriously undermined the integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A prosecutor's remarks necessitate reversal of the verdict only if they so poisoned the well that the trial's outcome was likely affected. Id. at 107 (internal quotation marks omitted). Even if the remarks are improper, we affirm unless they prejudiced the defendant. United States v. García-Pastrana, 584 F.3d 351, 389 (1st Cir.2009). We look to the following factors in considering prejudice: (1) the severity of the prosecutory's misconduct, including whether it was deliberate or accidental; (2) the context in which the misconduct occurred; (3) whether the judge gave curative instructions and the likely effect of such instructions; and (4) the strength of the evidence against the defendants. Id. (quoting United States v. Nelson-Rodríguez, 319 F.3d 12, 38 (1st Cir.2003)). First, Gabriel challenges two of the prosecutor's statements which he contends reflected the prosecutor's own opinions regarding her witness's credibility. We have held that [a] prosecutor improperly vouches for a witness when she ... impart[s] her personal belief in a witness's veracity or impli[es] that the jury should credit the prosecution's evidence simply because the government can be trusted. United States v. Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.2003); United States v. Flores-De-Jesús, 569 F.3d 8, 18 (1st Cir.2009). Gabriel's challenge under this rubric is to the statement made by the prosecutor that José Figueroa-Cartagena comes into court and tells you under oath. We dispose of this challenge easily, as the statements that José testified under oath merely stated a fact and were neither a personal assurance, nor invoked the prestige of the government. See Pérez-Ruiz, 353 F.3d at 10 (finding no improper vouching since prosecutor neither expressed her personal opinion regarding the veracity of any witness nor implied that [the witness] should be trusted because of some connection to the government). We thus do not believe the district court committed plain error in allowing the jury to hear this statement. The next statements that Gabriel challenges referred to another of the prosecutor's witnesses and the victim's wife, Rosario. Gabriel quotes statements made by the prosecutor at closing argument and alleges that they impermissibly bolstered Rosario's credibility. We reproduce the challenged portion of the closing argument below. [15] And she made a mistake referencing the photo spreads, because she had two photo spreads before her at the time. But she clarified that, and I think her testimony was very clear that when she wrote these words, she's referring to the photograph of Félix Gabriel Castro-Davis. It looks familiar to me. To me, it is a young man who entered my house. I'm not sure, but the young man at that time was thinner. I've seen this kid in barrio San Antonio in Caguas. Compare that photograph of Félix Gabriel Castro-Davis to the photograph of Félix Gabriel Castro-Davis on August 10, 2006. What would that be? Like two to three-three to four weeks later. Here is Félix Gabriel on the photo spread that [Rosario] saw, and here is the photograph of Félix Gabriel on August 10th, 2006. It seems to me, and I submit to you, that [Rosario] is right on the money. Same guy, just thinner. We agree with Gabriel that the prosecutor's statements went too far in this case. The phrases I think and it seems to me, and the statement that the government witness was right on the money were improper. But see Henderson, 320 F.3d at 106 (noting that although it is the jury's job to draw the inferences, there is nothing improper in the Government's suggesting which inferences should be drawn) (quoting United States v. Mount, 896 F.2d 612, 625 (1st Cir.1990)). Nevertheless, given the weight of the evidence against Gabriel, we find that these statements were not sufficiently prejudicial as to constitute reversible error. Gabriel also challenges the following statement made by the prosecutor at closing: What an incredible, terrible coincidence for the defendant, that [Rosario's] physical description of him fits him perfectly. Rosario testified that the first intruder in her home was tall and skinny and stated that a photograph of Gabriel looked a lot like that individual who broke into her home, though she could not certainly state it was the intruder. There is no evidence on the record as to Gabriel's appearance from which to conclude whether tall and skinny fits well as a description of defendant. However, we do not find this statement to be significantly prejudicial given Rosario's testimony that Gabriel's photo looked a lot like that individual who invaded her home. Gabriel next argues that the prosecutor's statement that José did not know the victim was a bolitero until defendants told him so improperly commented on the character of José by implying that he was not aware of the victim's illegal activities, as he was of good character and was not familiar with the criminal world. As above, we do not believe this is the sort of credibility bolstering that amounts to plain error and would warrant a new trial. Gabriel also challenges a statement by the prosecutor that Pérez knew the streets. This is not the first time he encountered people like [Alberto] and [Gabriel]. Gabriel alleges that this statement portrayed the defendants as criminals and implied they were involved in illegal gambling. While we will not condone prosecutor statements that malign the character of defendants, without evidentiary support or in ways not related to the charges, we do not believe that this statement so poisoned the well that a new trial is required. This statement was also arguably accurate. There was testimony presented at trial that Pérez once lived two houses away from Gabriel and Alberto, and therefore literally knew each other from the streets. José also testified that the day after the murder, Gabriel told him that Pérez was a numbers runner. Gabriel also argues that the prosecutor's statement that José ... said to you that he saw Félix Gabriel Castro-Davis carrying a revolver was improper, because José only testified that he noticed that [Alberto] had pulled out a weapon and placed it on top of the car on the right side. While it was improper for the prosecutor to confuse Félix Alberto Castro-Davis with Félix Gabriel Castro-Davis, we do not think this lone statement amounted to clear error. Gabriel contends that the next error occurred when the prosecutor stated that there was not a single shred of evidence and not a single reason that José would lie, and also stated that defendants did not attempt to cross-examine José. This statement was not improper. The prosecutor was commenting on the lack of impeachment evidence against José, not giving his opinion as to José's credibility. Gabriel finally challenges the prosecutor's last statement to the jury: And you hold them accountable for what they did, all three of them. You hold them accountable. We agree with the government that this amounts to a request from the prosecutor to render a guilty verdict. The government points us to United States v. Flaherty, where we stated that [t]he prosecutor's statement that the Government would ask the jury to return guilty verdicts does not bring the Government's credibility to bear on the case. 668 F.2d 566, 597 (1st Cir.1981). However, after Flaherty, the Supreme Court decided United States v. Young, and held that a prosecutor was in error to try to exhort the jury to `do its job' [because] that kind of pressure, whether by the prosecutor or defense counsel, has no place in the administration of criminal justice. 470 U.S. 1, 18, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985); see also United States v. Mandelbaum, 803 F.2d 42, 44 (1st Cir.1986) (There should be no suggestion that a jury has a duty to decide one way or the other; such an appeal is designed to stir passion and can only distract a jury from its actual duty: impartiality.). We thus find that this statement was improper. However, given the weight of the evidence presented against Gabriel and the brevity of the statement, we find that it was not sufficiently prejudicial as to warrant a new trial. Even though some of the prosecutor's remarks were improper, we do not think they so poisoned the well as to require a new trial. United States v. Vázquez-Botet, 532 F.3d 37, 56 (1st Cir.2008). We take note, and register our concern, with the fact that there was no contemporaneous objection or request for curative instructions, thus depriving the district judge of the opportunity to provide special or additional instructions with regards to the closing statements, and consequently, failing to provide defendants of the type of diligent defense to which they are entitled. However, the court's general closing instructions did properly counsel the jury regarding what constituted evidence and the fact that they were the sole judges of credibility. The instructions specifically reminded jurors they were the sole judges of the credibility of the witnesses and that arguments and statements of counsel are not evidence. Given the evidence presented at trial from multiple witnesses, any potentially harmful effect from the prosecutor's closing was safeguarded by the district court's final jury instructions. See United States v. Mejía-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 274 (1st Cir.1987) (finding that the district judge's standard instruction was sufficient to overcome any prejudice).