Opinion ID: 1039731
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Motion to Continue

Text: [¶13] This Court reviews the grant or denial of a motion to continue as follows: We have consistently held that the grant or denial of a motion for continuance is a discretionary ruling of the district court and, unless a clear showing of an abuse of discretion resulting in manifest injustice has been shown by the challenging party, we will not disturb that ruling. Sincock v. State, 2003 WY 115, ¶ 25, 76 P.3d 323, 333-34 (Wyo. 2003); Clearwater v. State, 2 P.3d 548, 553 (Wyo. 2000). The determination of whether the district court abused its 4 discretion in refusing to grant a continuance is highly dependent upon the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Sincock, ¶ 25, 76 P.3d at 333. On review, our primary consideration is the reasonableness of the district court’s decision. Id. Grady v. State, 2008 WY 144, ¶ 18, 197 P.3d 722, 729 (Wyo. 2008). [¶14] Secrest argues for a different standard of review, contending that because his constitutional right to counsel is at issue, our review should be de novo. The issue more precisely stated, however, is whether the district court should have granted Secrest’s motion to continue in order to allow his newly retained attorney additional time to prepare for trial. On this question, whether a continuance should have been granted to allow counsel additional time to prepare for trial, we have consistently adhered to our abuse of discretion standard of review. See Shipman v. State, 2001 WY 11, ¶ 19, 17 P.3d 34, 38 (Wyo. 2001); Irvin v. State, 584 P.2d 1068, 1073 (Wyo. 1978); Adger v. State, 584 P.2d 1056, 1058 (Wyo. 1978); Ash v. State, 555 P.2d 221, 225 (Wyo. 1976); see also United States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1016 (10th Cir. 1992) (“Because the factors influencing a particular case often vary, the district court enjoys broad discretion on matters of continuances, even when the parties implicate Sixth Amendment issues.”). [¶15] Secrest argues on appeal that the district court impermissibly interfered with Secrest’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice by denying his motion to continue. We disagree. [¶16] A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel does include the right to be represented by an attorney of the defendant’s own choice. Irvin, 584 P.2d at 1070 (citing Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3, 75 S.Ct. 1, 99 L.Ed. 4 (1954)). That right is not, however, without limits. The United States Supreme Court has recognized “a trial court’s wide latitude in balancing the right to counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and against the demands of its calendar.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 152, 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2565-66, 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (citations omitted). We agree with the following factors enumerated by the Tenth Circuit for balancing a defendant’s right to retain counsel of choice against the needs of fairness and a court’s