Opinion ID: 2590536
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Phillip Moses

Text: Apart from the general objection to jury questioning addressed above, Moses does not challenge any of the trial court's rulings with respect to particular juror questions which were asked by the trial court. Rather, he argues that the jury may have overheard the first bench conference where defense counsel objected to one of the juror's questions causing prejudice to the defendant. At the second bench conference defense counsel notified the court that Moses heard the first bench conference from his seat in the courtroom. There is no indication that the jury had in fact heard this first bench conference or any other bench conference during the trial. The trial court is in the best position to judge the effect of any improper influence on the jury. People v. Raehal, 971 P.2d 256, 260 (Colo.App.1998) (giving deference to trial court's finding that comments made by prosecutor about defendant's prior criminal record during bench conference were not heard by the jury) (cert. denied Feb. 16, 1999). And, the mere possibility of prejudice to the defendant is not sufficient to warrant reversal. People v. Gladney, 194 Colo. 68, 74, 570 P.2d 231, 235 (1977). Moses concedes that the jury did not hear any other bench conference after the judge advised counsel to keep their voices down and he turned down the volume to his headphones at this second conference. At the first bench conference, which may have been overheard by the jury, the court and counsel discussed the admissibility of the juror's questions. Four questions were submitted of which defense counsel objected to one based on relevance and lack of foundation and the prosecutor agreed. The court sustained the objection. The following conversation appears in the record. THE COURT: For our record, we have four questions proposed to [the witness]. And by agreement, questions 1, 3, and 4 are being given without objection. Though, I want to give [defense counsel] an opportunity to make a general objection, and then  specifically, he's objecting to question number 2. So let's start with the general objection. [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: My objection is generally to this procedure. I understand the Supreme Court authorized this procedure, but I'm objecting to the jury being allowed to ask questions whatsoever. My client's constitutional  affective [sic] assistance of  and the Colorado Constitution? THE COURT: Thank you, sir. Then the question, number 2, for [the witness] is: The dents were made as a result of the knife stick  I would change that to night stick  would have  they been smaller or larger? You object, sir? [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Object, calls for speculation on the part of the officer. Also lacking foundation that he's a qualified expert in this area. I think it calls for speculation  foundation. THE COURT: Do you wish to make any record? [PROSECUTION]: Briefly. Your Honor, the evidence has been that the officer tapped on the hood which he obviously observed. I think he can testify to that  but it calls for something that he, at the time, he may or may not know the answer. THE COURT: Thank you. After reflection, I agree it calls for speculation. Therefore deny the question. During this conference neither party criticizes the juror asking the question or makes statements about the question other than it calls for speculation. [18] No statements about testimony not already admitted into evidence were made. Furthermore, the defense and prosecution both agreed that the question called for speculation on behalf of the officer. Thus, we decline to find an error simply because the jury may have overheard a bench conference where no prejudicial statements were made. [19]