Opinion ID: 2521384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutional Challenge to Section 1-11-203.5

Text: Cacioppo concedes that he did not comply with the contest procedure of section 1-11-203.5. Instead, Cacioppo challenges the constitutionality of the five-day limitation found in section 1-11-203.5. Specifically, he claims that the limitation violates article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution. He argues that because that provision imposes several requirements on those proposing ballot issues to the voters, any additional statutory limitations placed on constitutional challenges to ballot issues must be unconstitutional. We disagree. We note at the outset that statutes enacted by the General Assembly are presumed to be constitutional and are therefore entitled to deference by the courts. In re Great Outdoors Colo. Trust Fund, 913 P.2d 533, 540 (Colo.1996). Accordingly, a party asserting that a statute is unconstitutional has the burden of proving that assertion beyond a reasonable doubt. Zaner v. Brighton, 917 P.2d 280, 286 (Colo.1996). In the course of our review, we afford the language of constitutions and statutes their ordinary and common meaning [and] construe statutory and constitutional provisions as a whole, giving effect to every word and term contained therein, whenever possible. Bd. of County Comm'rs. v. Vail Assocs., Inc., 19 P.3d 1263, 1273 (Colo.2001) (internal citations omitted). We must also consider the object to be accomplished and the mischief to be avoided by the provision at issue. City of Aurora v. Acosta, 892 P.2d 264, 267 (Colo. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). We will deem a statute to be facially unconstitutional only if no conceivable set of circumstances exists under which it may be applied in a constitutionally permissible manner. People v. Vasquez, 84 P.3d 1019, 1021 (Colo.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution has always been a self-executing provision, it has never required implementing legislation. Zaner, 917 P.2d at 286. Nevertheless, implementing legislation is permissible as long as it does not directly or indirectly impair, limit, or destroy the rights that the self-executing constitutional provision provides. Id. We recognize that the purpose of section 1-11-203.5 was to give effect to requirements found in article X, section 20, while accommodating the duties and responsibilities of election officials. Cacioppo essentially argues that section 1-11-203.5 is unconstitutional because in addition to prohibiting form and content challenges beyond the five-day limit, it also restricts ballot title contests that are rooted in the constitution. That, he says, the statute cannot do. The only constitutional conflict that Cacioppo alleges, however, involves article X, section 20. He claims that each and every requirement that that constitutional provision imposes upon the setting of a ballot title may be raised at any time before or after the election and that section 1-11-203.5 conflicts with that alleged constitutional guarantee. Despite the constitutional nature of his argument, the only authority Cacioppo cites for this proposition is the legislative history of section 1-11-203.5. He explains that Senator Thiebaut, who sponsored the bill proposing the statute, testified that section 1-11-203.5 would not affect constitutional challenges to an election, but would affect only those challenges involving the form or content of the ballot title. While we agree that section 1-11-203.5 cannot and does not time-bar constitutional challenges to the substance of a ballot issue or ballot question, we conclude that section 1-11-203.5 permissibly limits those challenges based on the form or content of the ballot title. We reach this conclusion based on the plain language of section 1-11-203.5 and the absence of any conflict between its provisions and article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution. First, section 1-11-203.5 clearly contemplates challenges to ballot titles based on both statutory requirements as well as constitutional mandate. As noted above, section 1-11-203.5 addresses all election contests arising out of a ballot issue or ballot question concerning the order on the ballot or the form or content of any ballot title and states that any such contests shall be summarily adjudicated by the district court. 1-11-203.5(1). It requires that those contests be commenced by a verified petition that is to be filed and served to the contestee within five days after the ballot title is set. 1-11-203.5(2). The statute instructs the district court to adjudicate the contest on the basis of the requirements of the state constitution and statutes and directs the court to correct the ballot title accordingly in its order. 1-11-203.5(3). Thus, the statute clearly time-bars all contests to the form or content of the ballot title, whether the contest to the form or content is based on statute or the constitution. Article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution contains many requirements that govern the procedures of elections involving taxes and many that address the substantive limits of ballot issues, [10] but only a few of those govern the form or content of the ballot issue and even fewer govern the form or content of the ballot title itself, which, as noted above, refers only to the heading of the ballot issue and the question presented to the voters. Indeed, only two requirements in article X, section 20 relate to the ballot title. One relates to the order of the ballot title: clause 3(b) states that [t]itles shall have this order of preference: NOTICE OF ELECTION TO INCREASE TAXES/TO INCREASE DEBT/ON A CITIZEN PETITION/ON A REFERRED MEASURE. The other, found in clause 3(c), relates to syntax and diction: Ballot titles for tax or bonded debt increases shall begin, SHALL (DISTRICT) TAXES BE INCREASED (first, or if phased in, final, full, fiscal year dollar increase) ANNUALLY ... ? or SHALL (DISTRICT) DISTRICT DEBT BE INCREASED (principal amount), WITH A REPAYMENT COST OF (maximum total district cost), ... ? Because these two requirements address only the form or content of a ballot title governed by article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitutionand not what that constitutional provision will substantively permit voters to approvethey appear to be within the purview of section 1-11-203.5. Further, because article X, section 20 is a self-executing provision, it provides no specific mechanism by which a person would make a form or content objection to the ballot title based on these requirements. Section 1-11-203.5 is the exclusive procedure for all local ballot title contests and creates no exception to its procedure for claims based on Colorado Constitution article X, section 20. 1-11-203.5(5). Thus, there is no inherent conflict between that constitutional provision and section 1-11-203.5. City of Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial, 3 P.3d 427, 440 (Colo.2000) (To declare an act of the legislature unconstitutional is always a delicate duty, and one which courts do not feel authorized to perform, unless the conflict between the law and the constitution is clear and unmistakable.) (internal quotation marks omitted). [11] Indeed, the requirements of section 1-11-203.5, as noted above, were created specifically with the other requirements of Colorado Constitution, article X, section 20, in mind. For these reasons, we conclude that Cacioppo has failed to show how section 1-11-203.5 conflicts with the Colorado Constitution. Additionally, we hold that the five-day time limit imposed by section 1-11-203.5 is also not manifestly so limited as to amount to a denial of justice. Dove v. Delgado, 808 P.2d 1270, 1273 (Colo.1991) (quoting Oberst v. Mays, 148 Colo. 285, 292, 365 P.2d 902, 905 (1961)). Indeed, the legislature appears to have carefully considered all the time requirements imposed on election officials by various statutory and constitutional provisions and carefully balanced those responsibilities with the rights of voters to contest impending elections. Because the legislature is generally trusted with what timelines are reasonable for statutes of limitations, Mishek v. Stanton, 200 Colo. 514, 518, 616 P.2d 135, 138 (1980), and because Cacioppo has failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that those timelines are manifestly unreasonable, we defer to the legislature's wisdom in this instance. See State ex rel. Labedz v. Beermann, 229 Neb. 657, 428 N.W.2d 608, 615 (1988) (Although certainly short, the Legislature's specification of a 10-day limitation [on challenges to the secretary of state's denial of an initiative election] ... seems, upon reflection, neither foolish nor contrary to other procedures provided ... [;] the preparation of a general election ballot is a complicated, time-consuming process ... for which the law must allow ample time.). Because we uphold the constitutionality of section 1-11 203.5, we now proceed in greater detail to determine whether Cacioppo's claims relate to the ballot title's form or content.