Opinion ID: 2630572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibilitv of the Allocution

Text: ¶ 42 We next turn to the question of whether the trial court erred in ruling admissible Maestas's allocution statement. Maestas contends admission of the statement violates his right to be placed in the same position on retrial under rule 24(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. We conclude that rule 24(d) requires exclusion of Maestas's allocution from the prosecution's case-in-chief in the retrial. [4] ¶ 43 Maestas contends that his allocution statements are inadmissible on retrial under rule 24(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. We briefly note the context of rule 24(d) before detailing the specifics of Maestas's argument. Rule 24(d) falls within a rule entitled, Motion for a new trial. After rules 24(a) through 24(c) detail the authority and procedures for a motion for a new trial, rule 24(d) provides that [i]f a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial has been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or argument. [5] ¶ 44 Citing the language of rule 24(d), Maestas argues that he would not be in the same position as if no trial had been held if his allocution statements were used at his new trial. Maestas allows for the possibility that rule 24(d) directly applies only to a new trial arising from a motion, and not to a new trial arising from his successful appeal, but contends that even if rule 24(d) is limited to a new trial arising from a motion, due process and equal protection require that a defendant receive the same protections when the new trial arises from an appeal. ¶ 45 We decline to decide whether rule 24(d) applies to new trials after appeal [6] because the parties have inadequately briefed this issue, and resolving it is unnecessary in this case. Instead, we rely on our supervisory powers to craft an analogous rule applicable here. As a matter of policy, we see no reason to treat the admissibility of evidence concerning a prior verdict differently depending on whether an accused receives a new trial through a motion or through an appeal. Accordingly, we use the language of rule 24(d) as a guide to the admissibility of Maestas's allocution statements.
¶ 46 At common law, allocution was the formal inquiry of one already convicted of a capital or treasonous offense before passing sentence; it was used to determine if a legal cause would prevent the sentence's execution. See Caren Myers, Note, Encouraging Allocution at Capital Sentencing: A Proposal for Use Immunity, 97 Colum. L.Rev. 787, 798-99 (1997). The standard question asked was, Do you know of any reason why judgment should not be pronounced upon you? See Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 Mo. L.Rev. 115, 115 (1944). As the practice of allocution developed, it took on a less formalistic character, becoming also a means for the defendant to request understanding and mercy. See 1 Joseph Chitty, A Practical Treatise on the Criminal Law 700 (photo. reprint 1978) (London, A.J. Valpy 1816). ¶ 47 Even prior to the writing and adoption of our state constitution, Utah territorial law required the physical presence of a convicted felon at sentencing. Compiled Laws of Utah, Code of Criminal Procedures, Title VII, § 5102 s 326 (1888). If a defendant did not appear for sentencing after being released on bail, and was subsequently brought to court pursuant to a bench warrant, defendant had to be asked whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him. Id. at § 5108 s 332. Subsequently, the Utah Constitution guaranteed a defendant the right to appear and defend in person.  Utah Const., art. I, § 12. Thus, from the beginning of the development of this state's criminal procedures, a high value was placed on a defendant's availability and opportunity to speak at trial and sentencing. ¶ 48 Allocution is an inseparable part of the right to appear and defend in person guaranteed by the Utah Constitution. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107, 1109-10 (Utah 1996). This court has previously addressed allocution, literally [a] speaking to [or] addressing[,] 1 Oxford English Dictionary, 236 (1961), under article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution in State v. Young, 853 P.2d 327, 358-59 (Utah 1993) (convicted person denied allocution before sentencing phase for aggravated murder where death penalty requested by the state). In Young, the court considered whether allocution is constitutionally guaranteed, but decided that it did not have to answer that question to resolve the claim raised. Three years later in Anderson, reviewing a convicted person's voluntary absence from his sentencing, we stated that under article I, section 12 of the Utah constitution: Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 22 implements the constitutional right [of allocution], providing: (a).... Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not be imposed. State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1109-10 (emphasis added) (quoting Utah R.Crim. P. 22(a)). While Anderson concluded that the defendant had voluntarily waived his right to be present, it nonetheless affirmed the existence of a right to allocution: The right to allocution is nowhere specifically granted in... the state . . . constitution. It is an inseparable part of the right to be present. Id. at 1111 (emphasis added). Thus, in Anderson, this court clearly and thoughtfully recognized a constitutionally guaranteed right to allocution. ¶ 49 The right to allocution would be meaningless if a convicted person's allocution statements could be used against him or her in a subsequent prosecution. Under such a rule, a competent attorney would almost always advise the client against allocuting, at least in any case in which an appeal is contemplated. See Myers at 789 n. 9. Trial judges would have to inform defendants at allocution that their statements could be used against them at any retrial. It is not likely that defendants would be willing to make any incriminating admissions after such a warning. ¶ 50 This case need not turn on constitutional questions, however, because the policy embodied in rule 24(d) is determinative. [7]
¶ 51 Rule 24(d) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either in evidence or in argument. [8] Utah R.Crim. P. 24 (emphasis added). ¶ 52 Our court has held that [w]hen interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince `the true intent and purpose of the Legislature.' Utah v. Tooele County, 2002 UT 8, ¶ 10, 44 P.3d 680 (citing Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). The plain language of the statute provides us with the road map to the statute's meaning, helping to clarify the intent and purpose behind its enactment. Id. (citations omitted). When reading the statutory language, our purpose is to render all parts [of the statute] relevant and meaningful, id. (emphasis added) (citing Millett v. Clark Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980)), and thus, we presume the legislature use[d] each term advisedly and ... according to its ordinary meaning. Id. (citing Nelson v. Salt Lake County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995)). As a result, we avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative. Id. (citing Hall v. Utah State Dep't of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958) (other citation omitted). ¶ 53 As is the case in construing statutes, this court's rules of practice and procedure require close attention to their exact language. It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.... No clause[,] sentence or word shall be construed as superfluous, void or insignificant if the construction can be found which will give force to and preserve all the words of the statute. Norman J. Singer, 2A Sutherland Statutory Construction § 46:06 (4th ed.1984). Therefore, our analysis of rule 24 should begin by giving meaning to the first part of the rule requiring that a party must be placed in the same position as if no trial had been held[,] after the vacation of a conviction. This language is critical; rule 24(d) is written in the conjunctive, thus making clear that it has two separate requirementsthe defendant must be placed in the same position and the prior verdict must not be mentioned. The language in no way indicates that specific mention of the verdict, the most obvious but clearly not the only item that the prosecution might want to admit as the direct result of the first trial, is the only thing that must be avoided at a new trial. Obviously, for example, other aspects of the first trial, including references to who testified, to objections made or waived, or to the judge's rulings, would be forbidden by the rule, even though such references would not mention the verdict. Generally, it will not be possible to allude in any way to the first trial without raising questions about the verdict. Thus, a problem exists regarding the context for use of allocution statements at the retrial. That context will likely raise some questions in at least some jurors' minds as to how the statements came to be made. ¶ 54 Another important rule regarding whole statute interpretation, also relevant to the construction of procedural rules, states: A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should be construed in connection with every other part or section so as to produce a harmonious whole. Singer, supra, § 96:05. Rule 24 permits a trial court to grant a new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial impact upon the rights of a party. Utah R.Crim. P. 24(a). Thus, the rule is an overall expression of the need to rectify any error in the trial process that significantly impacted a defendant's rights. In order to harmonize subpart (a) with subpart (d) of the rule, the phrasing of subpart (d) should be read to accomplish the overall goal of the rule as set out in subpart (a). Granting a defendant a new trial because of a significant denial of his or her rights during the first trial, but then penalizing the same defendant for the exercise of a constitutional and statutory right to allocution, violates the spirit and the letter of rule 24. See Harvey v. State, 835 P.2d 1074, 1135 (Wyo.1992) (Golden, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing in dissent that key goal of sentencing is basing punishment on humanitarian principles, with allocution playing role of allowing the convicted person to influence the sentence given. If the conviction and sentence are reversed on appeal and the defendant once again put in jeopardy, why should not the parties return to the level playing field, neither side having gained an unfair advantage as a result of the process?). ¶ 55 Allocution has long played an important role in sentencing following conviction, perhaps as much for psychological as for legal reasons. There are significant differences between the fact-finding and sentencing aspects of a trial. As Justice Powell has stated, The sentencer's function is not to discover a fact, but to mete out just deserts [sic] as he sees them. Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 450, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981) (Powell, J., dissenting) (capital case). The Hebrew High Holiday liturgy provides an apt example of the role allocution plays in judgment. After confession of individual and communal wrongs, the supplicants beseech God to deal with them compassionately, requesting mercy even though they have no worthy deeds to present to the judge. (Avinu Malkeinu, Mahzor for Rosh Hashana and Yom Kippur, the Rabbinical Assembly, United Synagogue of America, 750-52 (Rabbi Jules Harlow ed., 1997 printing)). That even the guilty may plead for mercy or compassion is fundamental to our legal system. As rule 24 recognizes, after a conviction is set aside, a defendant is entitled to be restored to the circumstances existing before the trial, including the right to remain silent and force the state to convict him on the facts it can establish independent of his admissions at sentencing. ¶ 56 We acknowledge the dilemma faced by the system here: Why should a defendant be able to seek the benefits of a confession at allocution, but avoid the costs at retrial? On the other hand, should the exercise of the right to plead for mercy deprive a defendant who has been unlawfully convicted of a clean slate at his or her retrial? On balance, we conclude that it is better to permit a defendant to freely exercise his right to petition for mercy, however much he might be tempted to shade the tenor or accuracy of his remarks, than to require his petition to be made in the shadow of a future prosecution. In fact, the competing values and motives operating at trial and at sentencing create some doubt that confessions obtained at the latter will be entirely reliable. Most defense counsel and many defendants are well aware that claims of innocence, after a trial has resulted in an adjudication of guilt, are not only likely to fall on deaf ears, but also may offend or disturb the sentencer, who must consider factors such as a defendant's acceptance of personal responsibility and willingness to be rehabilitated. Furthermore, a defendant's attitude toward the crime for which he has been convicted, as reflected in his statement to the court at allocution, may also affect the way he is viewed and treated by the Board of Pardons and Parole if he is imprisoned. Finally, in some cases, defendants convicted of certain crimes are not even eligible for probation and treatment programs at sentencing unless they confess guilt. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-406.5(1)(h) (2001) (providing that court's discretion, defendant may have sentence suspended and be released to a residential sexual abuse center if, among other conditions, he admits the offense of which he has been convicted.). It is not implausible that even an innocent person (and one, moreover, who has not received a fair trial and intends to challenge it on appeal) might falsely admit to a crime in order to obtain some advantage or leniency at sentencing. It seems fundamentally unfair to burden the right to plead for leniency at allocution with an automatic waiver of the right, on retrial, to require the state to prove guilt without the use of the contents of those pleadings. [9] Rule 24 was intended to preclude that result after a motion for a new trial, and we apply the same principle here.