Opinion ID: 464793
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Contributory Negligence under FELA

Text: 88 We next consider plaintiff's request for a jury instruction which would have eliminated contributory negligence if his injury was found to be the result of a violation of a safety statute by defendant. Under FELA, no such employee who may be injured or killed shall be held to have been guilty of contributory negligence in any case where the violation by such common carrier of any statute enacted for the safety of employees contributed to the injury or death of such employee. 45 U.S.C. Sec. 53 (1982). Plaintiff argues that the OSHA jack regulation was a safety statute under this provision and that he was, therefore, entitled to the requested instruction. Defendant relies upon Bertholf v. Burlington Northern Railroad, 402 F.Supp. 171 (E.D.Wash.1975), a FELA case which held that violations of OSHA regulations would not trigger this provision. Two alternative grounds were given: elimination of contributory negligence under this provision is limited to violations of the Safety Appliance Act and the Boiler Inspection Act and OSHA regulations are prevented from having this effect by Sec. 653(b)(4). We discuss each of these grounds. 89 Bertholf began its analysis by giving a narrow reading to Kernan v. American Dredging Co., 355 U.S. 426, 78 S.Ct. 394, 2 L.Ed.2d 382 (1958), which, as we have already seen, supra, held that violation of any safety statute would create absolute liability under Sec. 1 of FELA. The court felt that this broad reading of FELA should not be extended to Sec. 53 both because past decisions of the Supreme Court indicate that the provisio of ... Sec. 53 applies only to violations of the Safety Appliance Act ... and the Boiler Inspection Act and because a massive expansion of employer liability not contemplated by Kernan would result. 402 F.Supp. at 173. In fact, safety statutes other than the Safety Appliance Act and the Boiler Inspection Act have been found to be safety statutes under this provision. In Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Horton, 233 U.S. 492, 34 S.Ct. 635, 58 L.Ed. 1062 (1914), the Court said: By the phrase 'any statute enacted for the safety of employes,' Congress evidently intended Federal statutes, such as the Safety Appliance Acts ... and the Hours of Service Act.... Id. at 503, 34 S.Ct. at 639. Furthermore, the Boiler Inspection Act was enacted three years after the enactment of FELA, yet there is no question that a violation of the Boiler Inspection Act triggers Sec. 53. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 528, 45 S.Ct. 169, 172, 69 L.Ed. 619 (1925). Safety statutes under Sec. 53 are, therefore, not limited to particular statutes contemplated by Congress at the time FELA was enacted. Finally, there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended there to be any limitation on the safety statutes which would trigger the elimination of contributory negligence under Sec. 53. The proviso in section 3 is to the effect that contributory negligence shall not be charged to the employee if he is injured or killed by reason of the violation, by the employer, of any statute enacted for the safety of the employees. H.R.Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1908). Without a clear indication from the legislative history that Congress meant anything other than what the statute plainly says, i.e., that the violation of any safety statute shall have this effect, we see no reason to assume that the application of the proviso is in any way limited. 90 We also see no reason to read Kernan as narrowly as did the Bertholf court. While it may be true that the holding of Kernan is limited to the issue of liability under Sec. 51, one of the bases for the Court's holding was a determination that there is no special relationship between the FELA and the Safety Appliance and Boiler Inspection Acts. 355 U.S. at 436-38, 78 S.Ct. at 400-01. Underlying this was a recognition that, with FELA, Congress intended the creation of no static remedy, but one which would be developed and enlarged to meet changing conditions and changing concepts of industry's duty toward its workers. Id. at 432, 78 S.Ct. at 398. This is directly applicable to the question of whether violation of a new safety statute such as OSHA can be given the same effect under Sec. 53 as was given to earlier safety statutes. Under the view of FELA propounded in Kernan, Congress used general language such as any statute enacted for the safety of employees so that safety statutes enacted after FELA could be incorporated into it. It does not appear to us that extension of this view of FELA to the scope of Sec. 53 in any way creates an unexpected expansion of liability as feared by the Bertholf court. The entire point of Kernan was that remedies under the FELA were meant to evolve ... consistent with the changing realities of employment in the railroad industry. Id. at 437, 78 S.Ct. at 400. With the enactment of OSHA, new areas of railroad work have been statutorily recognized as posing dangers to the safety and health of railroad employees. If courts prevent these OSHA regulations from being treated as safety statutes under Sec. 53, they will be thwarting the intent of Congress. 91 We now turn to the second argument in Bertholf: Sec. 653(b)(4) prevents OSHA regulations from being used to eliminate contributory negligence as provided for in Sec. 53 of FELA. We have already discussed at great length the meaning and intent of Sec. 653(b)(4), see supra part IV. We believe that much the same reasoning applies here. The intent of Congress in enacting Sec. 653(b)(4) was to prevent the creation of new tort remedies where none had previously existed. The elimination of contributory negligence for violation of a safety statute was a basic facet of the remedy provided by FELA long before OSHA was enacted. In fact, the legislative history of Sec. 53 indicates that Congress considered this elimination of contributory negligence to be simply a reflection of the common law doctrine of negligence per se: The effect of the provision is to make a violation of such a statute negligence per se on the part of the employer. The courts of some states have held this as a principle of common law. Other states have enacted it into statute. H.R.Rep. No. 1386, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1908). As we found earlier, allowing OSHA regulations to be given effect in other statutory or common law actions is not the same as allowing the regulations, standing alone, to create new actions. We find Sec. 653(b)(4) no obstacle to treating OSHA regulations as safety statutes under Sec. 53 of FELA.