Opinion ID: 3064442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allegation of Jurisdictional Element

Text: The first issue we consider is whether the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) was alleged appropriately in the indictment. Generally, the adequacy of an indictment is reviewed de novo. United States v. Rodriguez-Rodriguez, 364 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2004), amended and superseded on other grounds, 393 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2005). The Indictment states: On or about October 11, 2003, within the Southern District of California, defendant MANUEL TISCARENO-RENTERIA did maliciously damage, by means of fire, the building and real property known as Congregation Beth Am Synagogue, 5050 Del Mar Heights Road, San Diego, California, which was used in interstate and foreign com- merce, and in an activity affecting interstate and foreign commerce; in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 844(i). (Emphasis added.) UNITED STATES v. RENTERIA 2025 The relevant language of § 844(i) provides: (I) Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage or destroy, by means of fire or an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other real or personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce shall be imprisoned . . . . 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (emphasis added). Renteria argues the allegation in the indictment, “used in interstate and foreign commerce, and in an activity affecting interstate and foreign commerce,” does not adequately allege federal jurisdiction. He contends (1) the phrase “used . . . in an activity affecting interstate and foreign commerce” is insufficient because it leaves out the modifier “substantially” and (2) the phrase “used in interstate and foreign commerce” is insufficient because more allegations are required to explain how the synagogue could have an impact on interstate commerce.
[1] The “law of the case” doctrine provides that “one panel of an appellate court will not as a general rule reconsider questions which another panel has decided on a prior appeal in the same case.” United States v. Scrivner, 189 F.3d 825, 827 (9th Cir. 1999), (quoting Merritt v. Mackey, 932 F.2d 1317, 1320 (9th Cir. 1991)). We will not apply “law of the case” however if (1) the first decision was clearly erroneous; (2) there has been an intervening change in the law; (3) the evidence on remand is substantially different; (4) other changed circumstances exist; or (5) a manifest injustice would otherwise result. United States v. Alexander, 106 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997). Outside of one of these circumstances, the failure to apply the doctrine is an abuse of discretion. Id. 2026 UNITED STATES v. RENTERIA Renteria argues the indictment is defective because it failed to allege the synagogue had a “substantial” effect on interstate commerce. Renteria challenged the indictment on this same ground in his first appeal, and we rejected his argument stating: Renteria argues that the indictment itself was defective because it did not allege that his conduct had a “substantial” effect on commerce. The requirement that the effect on commerce be “substantial” is not in the text of § 844(i), but is a judicial gloss upon the statutory language. United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522, 527 (9th Cir. 1995). The indictment tracked the language of the statute, and adequately informed Renteria of the charge he had to meet. An indictment that follows the statutory language, and otherwise puts the accused on fair notice of all the implied elements of the charge, is not also required to incorporate judicial decisions that have interpreted that language. United States v. Godinez-Rabadan, 289 F.3d 630, 634 (9th Cir. 2002). The indictment was not required to allege that the impact on com- merce was “substantial.” Renteria, 187 F. App’x. at 706. [2] In Renteria’s first appeal, we rejected the same argument he makes in this present appeal. Because none of the exceptions to the “law of the case” doctrine exist, we will not consider Renteria’s renewed argument that the indictment should have alleged that the synagogue “substantially” affected interstate or foreign commerce. 2. Allegations of Effect on Interstate or Foreign Commerce [3] In Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848, 854 (2000), the Supreme Court held that Congress never intended to exercise UNITED STATES v. RENTERIA 2027 its full power under the Commerce Clause in 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) because it contains the phrase “used in” to qualify a commerce-affecting activity. Upon an analysis of § 844(i), the Court determined that “[t]he proper inquiry . . . is into the function of the building itself, and then a determination of whether that function affects interstate commerce.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). The Court then concluded that the owner-occupied private residence involved in that case was not used in any commercial activity, and arson of such a building was outside the reach of 18 U.S.C. § 844(i). Id. at 859. Renteria argues the indictment in his case is defective because it does not allege facts showing how ancillary functions of the synagogue affected interstate or foreign commerce. It is Renteria’s position that, because a house of worship is not normally used for commercial purposes, the indictment must include language specifying how the building’s use affects commerce. We disagree. In United States v. Lamont, 330 F.3d 1249 (9th Cir. 2003),1 the issue was whether 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) applied to arson of a church. We followed the two-step process set out in Jones for determining whether arson of a church building could be prosecuted under § 844(i). Id. at 1252. First, we examined the function of the building. Then, we determined whether that function affected interstate commerce. Id. There were no additional pleading requirements because the building on which arson was committed happened to be a church. Id. [4] Renteria’s contention for a heightened requirement for allegations in an indictment when the alleged violation of 1 Renteria cites to Lamont for the proposition that a house of worship is not normally used for commercial purposes, but cites to no authority in support of his claim that specific connections to interstate or foreign commerce must be included in the indictment if the violation of § 844(i) involves a house of worship. 2028 UNITED STATES v. RENTERIA § 844(i) involves a house of worship has no support in the statute or elsewhere. Such heightened allegations are not necessary.