Opinion ID: 1210171
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Instructions on Specific Intent

Text: Defendant next contends that the trial court should have instructed the jury regarding the effect of circumstantial evidence upon proof of specific intent. In essence, the proposed instruction [10] would have permitted the jury to infer a specific intent to commit robbery from circumstantial evidence only if such evidence were irreconcilable with any other rational conclusion. As pointed out in People v. Gomez, 223 Cal. App.2d 572, 574 [35 Cal. Rptr. 823], the intent to steal is an element of the crime of robbery, and accordingly such an instruction must be given whenever the case against defendant rests wholly or substantially upon circumstantial evidence. (See also People v. Bender, 27 Cal.2d 164, 174-175 [163 P.2d 8].) However, the court's error in failing to instruct the jury on this issue was not prejudicial under the circumstances in this case. As stated in People v. Green, 228 Cal. App.2d 437, 440 [39 Cal. Rptr. 612], The instruction [on circumstantial evidence] could benefit appellant only if there were room for some `rational conclusion' that he entered the homes with some intent other than to steal. Neither the evidence nor the argument to the jury remotely suggests any purpose except theft for the entry of the two houses.... The charge was defended and argued to the jury solely on the issue of identity. It was implicitly assumed that the intruder entered for the purpose of stealing.... The conclusion is inescapable that the jury, however fully instructed, could and would have found no motivation save theft for appellant's entries. We see no way in which the omitted instruction could have benefited appellant with the jury. (Accord, People v. Gomez, supra, 223 Cal. App.2d 572, 574-575.) (5) Similarly, in the instant case, the issue of identity was defendant's sole defense; no attempt was made to show that the person who robbed Kersey at gunpoint acted without the requisite specific intent to steal. Accordingly, any error in failing to instruct the jury regarding specific intent was harmless.