Opinion ID: 2826697
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Remaining Three Winter Factors

Text: To warrant a preliminary injunction, Plaintiffs must demonstrate not only a likelihood of success but also AFDI V. KING COUNTY 15 irreparable harm, a favorable balance of equities, and a finding that an injunction is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Both before the district court and before us, Plaintiffs have argued only that those three requirements are met because, in their view, they have shown a likelihood of success on the merits. Because we concluded above that Plaintiffs have not demonstrated a likelihood of success, their argument necessarily fails. But even if Plaintiffs had demonstrated some likelihood of success, they nevertheless would not be entitled to a preliminary injunction. We recently reiterated that, “although a First Amendment claim certainly raises the specter of irreparable harm and public interest considerations, proving the likelihood of such a claim is not enough to satisfy Winter.” Vivid Entm’t, LLC v. Fielding, 774 F.3d 566, 577 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Plaintiffs cannot satisfy Winter, even if they had shown a likelihood of success. Plaintiffs seek to alter the status quo ante by obtaining an order requiring Metro to publish an ad previously unpublished. Accordingly, they seek a “mandatory injunction.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 878–79 (9th Cir. 2009). Mandatory injunctions are “particularly disfavored.” Id. at 879 (internal quotation marks omitted). “In general, mandatory injunctions are not granted unless extreme or very serious damage will result and are not issued in doubtful cases . . . .” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs cannot meet that high bar, because the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction constrains Plaintiffs’ speech in only a small way: They cannot express 16 AFDI V. KING COUNTY their message on the sides of Metro’s buses while this case is pending. Nothing in the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction prevents Plaintiffs from displaying the same ad in many alternative fora, for example, on Seattle billboards, in Seattle newspapers, on Seattle television stations, on Seattle buses run by companies other than Metro, or in many venues in other cities. The availability of alternative fora for Plaintiffs’ speech weighs against the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Cf. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 809 (“The First Amendment does not demand unrestricted access to a nonpublic forum merely because use of that forum may be the most efficient means of delivering the speaker’s message.”); Cogswell v. City of Seattle, 347 F.3d 809, 818 (9th Cir. 2003) (“Cogswell and other candidates have not been unreasonably censored because they have other forums for campaigning where they are able to communicate material limited by the restriction on this forum.”). In sum, even if Plaintiffs had demonstrated some likelihood of success on the merits, they still would not have been entitled to a preliminary injunction because they have not shown that “extreme or very serious damage will result” from the denial of a preliminary injunction. Marlyn Nutraceuticals, 571 F.3d at 879. AFFIRMED.