Opinion ID: 6000
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: humphrey's sentence

Text: 23 In the appellate review of sentences, we examine factual findings subject to the clearly erroneous standard mandated by 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), and we accord great deference to the trial judge's application of the sentencing guidelines. United States v. Martin, 893 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir.1990); United States v. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir.), clarified, 868 F.2d 807, cert. denied, 492 U.S. 924, 109 S.Ct. 3257, 106 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989). However, a sentence  'imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines' must be reversed even if reasonable. Mejia-Orosco, 867 F.2d at 218; 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e)(1). 24 If a district court determines that an accused has committed perjury at trial, an enhancement is required under § 3C1.1. United States v. Dunnigan, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1111, 1119, 122 L.Ed.2d 445 (1993). Thus, the district court may not simply [choose] not to apply the enhancement. United States v. Friedman, 998 F.2d 53, 58 (2d Cir.1993). If the district court made an arbitrary decision not to enhance Humphrey's sentence, without considering whether Humphrey committed perjury, it has committed reversible error. The application of § 3C1.1 is not discretionary. 25 The difficulty facing this Court is that it is not clear whether the district court rejected the government's objection based on (1) an unstated finding that Humphrey did not commit perjury, or (2) an arbitrary decision not to apply § 3C1.1 of the sentencing guidelines. Humphrey contends that the district court need not make a finding on the perjury issue on the record, as such a finding may be presumed from the district court's rejection of the government's objection. We disagree. 26 In Dunnigan, supra, the Supreme Court held that where a defendant objects to the district court's imposition of an upward adjustment under § 3C1.1, the 27 district court must review the evidence and make independent findings necessary to establish a willful impediment to or obstruction of justice, or an attempt to do the same, under the perjury definition we have set out. See U.S.S.G. § 6A1.3 (Nov.1989); Fed.Rule Crim.Proc. 32(c)(3)(D). See also Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 2182, ----, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991). When doing so, it is preferable for a district court to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate and clear finding. The district court's determination that enhancement is required is sufficient, however, if as was the case here, the court makes a finding of an obstruction or impediment of justice that encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of perjury. See App. 29 (The court finds that the defendant was untruthful at trial with respect to material matters in this case. By virtue of her failure to give truthful testimony on material matters that were designed to substantially affect the outcome of the case, the court concludes that the false testimony at trial warrants an upward adjustment by two levels) (emphasis added). 28 --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1117. As the Court noted, this requirement is mandated by Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D), which provides that where a defendant alleges any factual inaccuracy in the presentence report, the district court must (i) make a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into account in sentencing. 29 This Court has often ordered district courts to make supplemental factual findings necessary to support the courts' rejections of defendants' objections to guideline determinations. See United States v. Buss, 928 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.1991) (remanded for finding of whether defendant used firearm solely for sport or recreation, which would entitle defendant to reduction under § 2K2.1(b)(2) of the Guidelines); United States v. Melton, 930 F.2d 1096 (5th Cir.1991) (remanded for finding of whether defendant was minor participant, which would entitle defendant to reduction under § 3B1.2); United States v. Hooten, 942 F.2d 878 (5th Cir.1991) (remanded for finding of whether defendant possessed firearm during the commission of drug offense, necessary to justify the court's enhancement of defendant's sentence under § 2D1.1(b)(1)). 30 Humphrey points out that Dunnigan and the aforementioned decisions of this Court involved challenges by defendants to guideline level determinations, and that Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(c)(3)(D) only applies to objections made by defendants. Humphrey contends that the government, unlike criminal defendants, is not entitled to have the district court make specific factual findings necessary to the resolution of its objections to sentencing decisions. 31 Although this result is not explicitly compelled by Dunnigan, Rule 32(c)(3)(D), or our prior decisions, we find that the district court did have an obligation to make a finding of whether Humphrey committed perjury in its consideration of the government's objection. We see little merit in Humphrey's contention that the district court is only required to make specific findings when addressing objections made by a defendant. Implicit in the government's right to object to guideline determinations, and our obligation to review those determinations, is the district court's obligation to make all factual findings necessary to establish the basis for its decisions. 32 We find persuasive the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Tracy, 989 F.2d 1279 (1st Cir.1993). In Tracy, as in this case, the district court rejected the government's objection to the court's failure to impose an enhanced sentence for obstruction of justice, under § 3C1.1, based on the defendant's perjury. Id. at 1289. The district court reasoned as follows: 33 [It] is a very close call. It is apparent to the Court that the jury rejected the credibility of this defendant and of his testimony at trial. This Court was present at that time and heard the testimony. This Court, too, disbelieved the accuracy of his testimony. 34 Nevertheless, there are many policy considerations that surround the question of enhancing a base offense level which increases potential punishment on the basis of the Court's conclusion that perjury has been committed. And the Court simply is not comfortable in its own mind in concluding that the conduct amounts to perjury of sufficient significance to justify such an enhancement. 35 Id. The First Circuit found itself unable to determine the basis of the district court's decision: 36 [I]t is not clear from the district court's discussion of obstruction of justice whether the court found that all of the elements of perjury were satisfied. While the district court expressly stated that it disbelieved the accuracy of [Tracy's] testimony, we are unable to determine whether the court also found that the testimony concerned a material matter, or that Tracy intentionally provided the false testimony. It is also possible to interpret the district court's statements as finding perjury, but requiring something more than basic perjury to justify an enhancement for obstruction of justice. 37 Id. at 1289-90. The appeals court determined that the proper resolution was to vacate the sentence and remand to the district court 'to make findings to support all the elements of a perjury violation,' or to articulate clearly the elements it believes have not been satisfied. Id. at 1290 (quoting Dunnigan, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 1118). 38 Also persuasive is United States v. Ferrin, 994 F.2d 658 (9th Cir.1993). In Ferrin, the defendant pleaded guilty to aiding and abetting the illegal disposal of hazardous waste. The district court denied the government's request for an upward adjustment based on § 2Q1.2(b)(1), which requires an upward adjustment if the offense resulted in an ongoing, continuous or repetitive discharge, release, or emission of a hazardous or toxic substance or pesticide into the environment. However, the district court failed to make a finding of whether the gas released into the air as a result of the defendant's conduct was hazardous. Id. at 664. The Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence, and remanded the case to the district court for a finding on that issue. Id. at 666. 39 Likewise, we find that the proper disposition of the government's appeal in this action is to vacate Humphrey's sentence, and remand the case to the district court for a specific finding of whether Humphrey committed perjury. If the district court finds that Humphrey did commit perjury, it must impose a two-level enhancement of his sentence. If the district court finds otherwise, Humphrey's sentence will not be changed. If appealed, we will review the district court's finding under the clearly erroneous standard of 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e).