Opinion ID: 2791274
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Reasonableness Requirement

Text: ¶ 34. For the above reasons, the critical issue in this case is the reasonableness of father’s refusal to accept his daughters’ college choices. Father challenges the magistrate’s conclusion on this point, arguing that Indie’s tuition should be capped by the tuition at UVM; that he should not be obligated to pay any tuition costs for Indie’s education at UMSON because Indie transferred from GMU to UMSON and unreasonably gave up significant grant and scholarship funds; and that his obligation to pay Francesca’s tuition should be limited to the costs of a two-year dental-hygiene degree at VTC. He further argues that the magistrate erred in crediting scholarships and grants to the daughters’ non-tuition costs first, rather than applying them to reduce father’s tuition obligation. ¶ 35. In determining whether college expenses are reasonable, courts have considered a host of factors, including “the financial resources of both parents, . . . the financial resources of the child, the cost of the school, the programs offered at the school , the child’s scholastic aptitude, how the school meets the child’s goals, and the benefits the child will receive from attending the school. Also relevant . . . is the extent to which a party unjustifiably may have been excluded from the college decision-making process.” Mandel v. Mandel , 906 N.E.2d 1016, 1022 (Mass. Ct. App. 2009) (quotations and alterations omitted); see also Hathaway , 98 S.W.3d at 680 (noting that the “majority view” is that court must “determin[e] whether the child’s choice of college is reasonable,” considering child’s needs, parent’s ability to pay, and cost of tuition). ¶ 36. The magistrate’s findings concerning these factors were supported by the evidence, and the magistrate’s conclusions were supported by the findings and were within the magistrate’s discretion. Father took the position that any tuition amount above $10,000 per year per daughter is per se unacceptable. We recognize that cost is a valid and often compelling consideration, and that in other circumstances approval might reasonably be withheld on this basis. See, e.g., Mazurek , 96 A.3d at 375-82 (crediting evidence on costliness of institution, among other factors, in determining that father reasonably withheld approval); Hathaway , 98 S.W.3d at 680 (noting that because college-tuition provision is subject to implied condition of reasonableness, parent is not obligated to pay for child to “attend any college, regardless of cost” (quotation omitted)). However, under the circumstances of this case, the magistrate did not abuse her discretion in concluding that father’s $10,000 cap is unreasonable. The evidence supported the magistrate’s findings that father has quite substantial income, in the range of $350,000 to $400,000 per year. He incurred annual losses from his thoroughbred-horse farm of $35,000 to $40,000, and paid more in monthly veterinary bills for the horses than he was willing to pay for each daughter’s college tuition. The evidence supported the magistrate’s findings that the daughters are progressing reasonably in pursuit of degrees that are reasonably necessary for their chosen careers, and that both daughters are mature young women who have chosen practical educations that will enable them to be employed immediately upon graduation. The evidence also showed that $10,000—father’s suggested cap on his obligation—would not be sufficient to pay even in-state tuition at UVM, which was $12,888 for the 2011-12 year. ¶ 37. In connection with this reasonableness analysis, we reject father’s arguments that his obligations should be reduced because daughters could have made less-expensive choices. First, we note that the magistrate did adjust the amount owed by father so that for Indie’s junior year at UMSON father is obligated to pay only the tuition that Indie would have incurred had she remained at GMU. More importantly, the magistrate’s conclusion that the daughters’ college choices, and by extension the costs associated with them, were reasonable, given their reasonable educational and career aspirations and father’s very substantial resources, was not an abuse of discretion. ¶ 38. Father’s arguments on these points are similar to the claims raised in the Pennsylvania case of Pharoah v. Lapes , 571 A.2d 1070 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990). In Pharoah , the settlement agreement provided that the parties would contribute to their children’s college educations commensurate with their ability to pay. The parties’ son (a class valedictorian) was admitted to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (with a small scholarship) and the Georgia Institute of Technology (with a full-tuition scholarship). He chose to attend MIT. The father objected to paying the additional costs of tuition at MIT because Georgia Tech had offered the son a tuition-free education. Id . at 1072 & n.2. The Pennsylvania Superior Court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s order obligating appellant to pay the additional costs of tuition at MIT, because the son “had testified to his educational accomplishments and aspirations and the reasons behind his decision to attend” MIT, and “gave a detailed accounting and explanation of his living expenses.” Id . at 1072-75; see also Spitzer v. Tucker , 591 A.2d 723, 724-25 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (affirming trial court’s order requiring father to pay child’s tuition at Syracuse University even though child could have attended Penn State). As in these Pennsylvania cases, we conclude that the evidence of the reasonableness of the daughters’ choices under the circumstances supports the magistrate’s conclusions in this case. ¶ 39. We likewise reject father’s argument that the magistrate erred in deciding to credit scholarship and grant funds received by the daughters toward their non-tuition costs before applying any excess to tuition, reducing the amount payable by father. Father argues that this decision “is wholly unsupported by the express language of the agreement.” ¶ 40. The agreement is silent on the application of scholarship and grant funds. Courts have varied in their approach to allocating grant and scholarship funds in the absence of express guidance in the agreement and order. Some have held that scholarship or grant funds should be applied to reduce the parents’ obligation, even if such funds would have otherwise gone to pay non-tuition costs of attendance incurred by the student. A leading case is Norrell v. Norrell , 225 S.E.2d 305 (Ga. 1976). There, a provision required the father to “pay tuition” for his son, but the son received a significant scholarship. Id . at 305-06. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the scholarship should be credited against the father’s obligation, so he was responsible only for the “net tuition,” notwithstanding the fact that the son had non-tuition costs of attendance to which the scholarship may have applied. Id . [6] ¶ 41. Other courts , however, have applied scholarship and grant funds to non-tuition expenses first. See Weber v. Weber , 1998 WL 78669,  (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 11, 1998) (noting that court will “subtract the amount by which any grant or scholarship amount exceeds non-tuition expenses,” and that such a “formula will allow [father] to benefit from . . . any amount of financial aid in excess of his remaining tuition liability”). In favor of this interpretation is the “public policy strongly favor[ing] parental contributions to a child’s education,” which necessarily “militates against any reading of this stipulation which would obviate the agreed-upon parental obligation and transfer costs unnecessarily to the student.” S.B. v. J.R. , 977 N.Y.S.2d 591, 597 (Sup. Ct. 2013). ¶ 42. Pennsylvania courts have not addressed the question, and the agreement itself does not provide any guidance. Moreover, the record lacks extrinsic evidence that clarifies the parties’ intentions in entering into the agreement. In the absence of such information, we conclude that the daughters should receive the benefit of grants and scholarships which they earned before the excess of those funds is applied as a credit to father’s obligation. Affirmed . FOR THE COURT: