Opinion ID: 76557
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Indemnification Provision

Text: 74 The protest ordinance contains a provision calling for an applicant to execute an indemnification and hold-harmless agreement in favor of Defendants in a form satisfactory to the city attorney. Augusta-Richmond County Code § 3-4-11(a)(3). Plaintiffs contend that the sample agreement handed to applicants is not narrowly tailored because it broadly requires an applicant to indemnify Defendants against all losses regardless of who causes the damage. Alternatively, Plaintiffs contend the provision grants unfettered discretion to the city attorney. Defendants counter that the ordinance does not in practice require the submission of an indemnification agreement as broad as the sample agreement. Additionally, the Sheriff has provided corroborated testimony that he has never denied a permit due to the failure of the applicant to provide an indemnification agreement. (Doc. No. 11.) It is uncontroverted that five of the eight applicants, including Plaintiffs, either failed to submit an indemnification agreement or modified the sample agreement. (Defendants' Exs. 1-12, April 2 Hearing.) 75 In evaluating a facial challenge, the Court must consider the county's authoritative constructions of the ordinance, including its own implementation and interpretation of it. Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395. Because it is clear that the Sheriff has never denied a permit due to the form or the absence of an indemnification agreement, I cannot construe the provision to be facially invalid. Moreover, the Court is unwilling to simply presume, without evidence to the contrary, that the city attorney would approve or disapprove of an indemnification agreement because of the message of any protest or demonstration. See NLRB v. Bibb Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 825, 827 (5th Cir.1951) 2 (Duly appointed public officers, such as members of the police department of a municipality, are presumed to discharge their duties impartially according to the law, and this presumption must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary); Dudley v. United States, 320 F.Supp. 456, 458 (N.D.Ga.1970) ([T]here is a strong presumption of the correctness and legality of acts done in the discharge of official duties unless and until the contrary is made to appear.) 76 Finally, it is noted that the language employed by the Supreme Court in its only mention of the indemnification provision of the Chicago Park District ordinance was not so strict as Plaintiffs' argument would require. The unanimous Court observed that one of the objects of the Chicago Park ordinance was to assure financial accountability for damage caused by the event.  Thomas, 122 S.Ct. at 780 (emphasis added). Accordingly, even if the Sheriff had not so liberally construed the indemnification provision to applicants, the protest ordinance might still pass constitutional muster in the winnowing process of this Court's further consideration of the matter.