Opinion ID: 606199
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: c.d. johnson

Text: 9 C.D. challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress. He contends that the district court erred in concluding that although the affidavit given by Deputy Adamson failed to establish probable cause under the totality-of-the-circumstances test set forth in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), the evidence recovered in the search was not subject to suppression, based on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule announced in Leon, 468 U.S. at 913. The government has not challenged the district court's determination that the warrant was invalid. Therefore, we must decide whether the district court properly concluded that the evidence was not subject to suppression. Our review of the district court's determination that officers reasonably and in good faith relied on a search warrant as required by Leon is de novo. United States v. Bowling, 900 F.2d 926, 930 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 837 (1990). 10 In Leon, the Supreme Court held that where officers rely in an objectively reasonable fashion on a search warrant issued by a neutral magistrate which is subsequently found to be invalid, the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not require suppression of the fruits of the search. 468 U.S. at 905; Bowling, 900 F.2d at 931. This good faith inquiry is objective, being confined to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. In making this determination, all of the circumstances may be considered. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922-23 n. 23. However, by imposing this objective standard, Leon indicates that courts evaluating an officer's conduct must charge the officer with a certain minimum level of knowledge of the Fourth Amendment requirements. United States v. Savoca, 761 F.2d 292, 295 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 852 (1985). 11 In Leon, the Court identified four situations in which suppression nonetheless remains an appropriate remedy: (1) where the supporting affidavit contains a knowing or reckless falsehood, 468 U.S. at 923; (2) where the issuing magistrate abandons his or her judicial function, id.; (3) where the supporting affidavit is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable, id. (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2265-66, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975)); and (4) where the warrant itself is facially deficient, for example, in failing to describe with particularity the place to be searched or the objects to be seized, 468 U.S. at 923. 12 C.D. does not contend that the first situation--a knowing or reckless falsehood contained in the supporting affidavit--is applicable here. Nor does he contend that the warrant itself was facially deficient in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized. Rather, C.D. contends that the remaining two exceptions identified in Leon are applicable in this case: (1) lack of neutrality of the magistrate, and (2) the warrant was so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render the officer's belief in probable cause entirely unreasonable. 13 An issuing magistrate must meet two tests: (1) he must be neutral and detached, and (2) he must be capable of determining whether probable cause exists. Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350 (1972). Whatever else neutrality and detachment might entail, it is clear that they require severance and disengagement from activities of law enforcement. Id. The district court found that Commissioner Maxwell did not merely rubber stamp the warrant; instead, she independently reviewed Adamson's affidavit for probable cause. This conclusion is supported by Maxwell's testimony that she discussed probable cause with Deputy Adamson before issuing the warrant. C.D. nonetheless makes a combined attack on Maxwell's neutrality and capability, relying heavily on the fact that Maxwell had no legal training, other than her on-the-job experience in reviewing affidavits made by law enforcement officers for probable cause. According to C.D., this lack of formal legal training renders Maxwell nothing more than an adjunct law enforcement officer or rubber stamp, recognized as unacceptable in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964) and in Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979). 14 [I]t has never been held that only a lawyer or judge could grant a warrant, regardless of the court system or the type of warrant involved. Shadwick, 407 U.S. at 348. Indeed, as the Court noted in Gates, warrants have long been issued by persons who are neither lawyers nor judges, and who certainly do not remain abreast of each judicial refinement of the nature of 'probable cause.'  462 U.S. at 235. 1 Maxwell's lack of formal legal training, therefore, does not render her unable to perform her duties. Nor was there any evidence presented suggesting that Maxwell had any connection with law enforcement officers--other than that necessarily required for making probable cause determinations--which would prevent her from exercising independent judgment. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not err in concluding that the neutral and detached magistrate exception to Leon did not apply in this case. 15 We also reject C.D.'s contention that the fruits of the search should be suppressed because the warrant was based on an affidavit  'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable.'  Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown, 422 U.S. at 610-611). We note that anonymous tips--standing alone--will seldom be sufficient to support a search or arrest warrant, Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329, 110 S.Ct. 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 (1990); Gates, 462 U.S. at 237. We also believe that reasonably well-trained officers should be aware of this principle. However, we do not find this to be one of those rare cases in which the officer involved should have known that the search was illegal despite the magistrate's authorization. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n. 23. The officer's affidavit in this case did more than repeat an anonymous tip; it provided additional facts which could be viewed as corroboration, including a personal, albeit somewhat outdated observation of similar illegal activity on the Johnson premises. As the Court recognized in Gates, anonymous tips, particularly when supplemented by independent police investigation, frequently contribute to the solution of otherwise 'perfect crimes.'  462 U.S. at 237-238. Accordingly, we believe that the officer in this case was justified in relying on the magistrate to determine whether probable cause was established. 16 As the Court noted in Gates, the task of the issuing magistrate in making probable cause determinations is simply to make a practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit ... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. 462 U.S. at 238. While a bare bones affidavit which contains mere conclusory statements will not support a probable cause determination, as the district court in this case properly noted, the affidavit in this case does contain facts, not mere conclusions, and does provide some evidence or indicia that evidence of criminal activity would be found at the Johnson residence. 2 17 C.D. relies heavily on United States v. Baxter, 889 F.2d 731 (6th Cir.1989), in which this court declined to apply the Leon good faith exception where officers acted in reliance on information received by an anonymous tipster. However, in that case, the salient factor was that the officer had misrepresented the nature of the caller in his affidavit; he had falsely stated that the caller was a confidential informant when in fact the caller was anonymous. The court found this knowing misstatement about the nature of the informant to be critical. 889 F.2d at 734. 3 Because of the obvious applicability in Baxter of the first Leon exception--the affidavit contained a knowing or reckless falsity--we do not find Baxter to be controlling, despite the court's characterization of the affidavit in that case as a  'bare bones' affidavit within the meaning of footnote 24 in Leon[.] 889 F.2d at 734. Moreover, in that case, the officer had to realize that the source of the information against defendant was an unknown party who was unavailable and could not be demonstrated to be 'reliable,'  yet he represented otherwise to the magistrate. 889 F.2d at 734. In the instant case, however, the officer-affiant was entirely straightforward about the anonymity of the caller, and there is no suggestion that he failed to disclose other relevant information to the issuing magistrate. 18 In the ordinary case, an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. Leon, 468 U.S. at 921. As we noted in Baxter, suppression should be ordered only in  'those unusual cases in which exclusion will further the purposes of the exclusionary rule.'  889 F.2d at 734 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 918). We do not find this to be one of those unusual cases. Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly applied the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule, and we therefore also conclude that the district court did not err in denying C.D. Johnson's motion to suppress.