Opinion ID: 75763
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: tom conner

Text: 21 Tom Conner was the Orlando Field Claim Office Manager when the Fort Lauderdale office closed. As manager, he was responsible for the operation of the Orlando office and the management of employees. He shared the ultimate authority on hiring decisions with the Human Resources Department. 22 When the Orlando Claims Representative positions were not filled as expected, Conner transferred Meuse, a licensed Claims Representative, to an available Claims Representative position. This transfer opened the Orlando Dispatcher position. Since there were no other trained Dispatchers in Orlando, Conner sent a PROFS note to Adell Jones, informing her that he needed a Dispatcher. Conner testified that the Human Resources Department handled the hiring from that point. However, it is clear from Conner's PROFS note that he inquired specifically about Hyland for the Dispatcher position. 23 This case presents an ordinary failure-to-hire issue. 3 The standards for a prima facie case of failure-to-hire are thoroughly established. The burden is on the plaintiff to show that she is a member of a protected class, that she applied for and was qualified for an available position, that she was rejected, and that the defendant filled the position with a person outside of the protected class. See Walker v. Mortham, 158 F.3d 1177, 1192 (11th Cir.1998) (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2378, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989)). 24 Walker and Golub have not established a prima facie case of discrimination if Conner was the decision-maker. 4 It is clear that Walker and Golub were members of the protected class and that the Dispatcher position was filled by a person outside of the protected class. However, it is also clear that Walker and Golub never applied for the Dispatcher position and, thus, were never explicitly denied it. 25 The prima facie case creates a presumption of discrimination. The application requirement is important to establishing this presumption because it shows that the decision-maker knew about the plaintiff and the plaintiff's interest in the position. See Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir.1984). If a decision-maker is unaware of the plaintiff's existence, then he is simply unable to discriminate against her, and any presumption of discrimination is unfounded. See Pressley v. Haeger, 977 F.2d 295, 297 (7th Cir.1992) (An empty head means no discrimination.), quoted in Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir.2001). When he made the decision, Conner knew Walker by name only and did not know Golub at all. Nor was he familiar with their performance as employees. Therefore, we cannot presume that Conner discriminated against Walker and Golub specifically. 26 However, a broader form of discrimination may arise where a decision-maker disseminates information about available positions through informal channels. We have said that when an employer uses such informal methods it has a duty to consider all those who might reasonably be interested in the available position. Carmichael, 738 F.2d at 1133. When other employees are not aware of the position's availability, it is legally insufficient and illegitimate for the employer to assume that they are not interested in it. Harris v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 712 F.2d 1377, 1383 (11th Cir.1983). 27 Although the position in this case was filled by rather informal means, this case is unlike Carmichael and Harris in every other way. While those cases involved promotions within the same city, this case involves similar positions in cities that are over two hundred miles apart. Prudential had already been unable to persuade some of its Fort Lauderdale claims representatives to move to Orlando, forcing Conner to reallocate some of his Orlando personnel. Since the Orlando Dispatcher position required a substantial move that many employees had been reluctant to make, Conner had no reason to believe that other Fort Lauderdale employees would be interested in it, and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise. 28 The vicissitudes of relocating, then, made Conner's decision an easy one. Todd Hyland had already told Conner that he was willing to move to Orlando and had offered to pay his own expenses. Since Hyland was the Senior Dispatcher in Fort Lauderdale, he had experience and training as a Dispatcher and could serve as Dispatcher in Orlando with minimal transitional problems. Furthermore, time was of the essence, since the Fort Lauderdale office was closing in less than a month. In these circumstances, Conner had no duty to consider Walker and Golub for the available position. 29 Under Carmichael, an employee may be excused from the application requirement of a prima facie case as long as he establishes that the company had some reason or duty to consider him for the post. Carmichael, 738 F.2d at 1133. In this case, Prudential had no duty to consider Fort Lauderdale employees for the Orlando position. Therefore, we hold that, if Conner was indeed the decision-maker, Walker and Golub have not made out a prima facie case of discrimination and, thus, have not shifted the burden to Prudential under McDonnell Douglas.