Opinion ID: 1173567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jury's consideration of unadmitted evidence

Text: Although the jury was permitted to hear the May 16th taped jailhouse conversation between appellant and his wife, one portion was excluded by the trial court on the motion of the defense. That portion concerned appellant's unwillingness to take a lie detector test and his wife's comment that appellant would not get out of jail unless he took one: CAROLYN HOGAN: Why don't you tell them to give you a lie detector test? CARL HOGAN: I want [or possibly I won't] ... I don't want to take one. CAROLYN HOGAN: Why? CARL HOGAN: Because my word is good, and what if the machine messed up and what if [then, hesitation] they just  you know, there you are. There is too many ifs in one of them. I told them I'd take one, did you realize that? CAROLYN HOGAN: I realize your chances are slim of getting out of here without one. When the tape of appellant's May 16th conversation with his wife was played for the jury during the prosecution's case, the district attorney skipped over this portion because the trial court had ruled that the passage was unduly prejudicial. However, during the first day of deliberation, the jury at 3:20 p.m. requested to hear the tape. The court, without notifying counsel, [11] sent the entire tape into the jury room. Later in the afternoon, just before the jury was excused for the day, the trial judge told counsel that the tape had been sent to the jury. After defense counsel reminded him about the inadmissible portion of the tape, the trial judge called in the jury. He found that they had already listened to the tape and excused them at 4:30 p.m. The next morning, the jury commenced their deliberations at 9:30 a.m. After the court had a colloquy with counsel and sometime before 10:50 a.m., the jury was admonished to disregard that portion of the tape which had previously been excluded. [12] (6) It is contended by appellant and conceded by respondent that the jury's receipt of evidence which was not admitted is error which creates a presumption of prejudice to the appellant. ( People v. Boyd (1979) 95 Cal. App.3d 577, 586 [157 Cal. Rptr. 293]; People v. Kitt (1978) 83 Cal. App.3d 834, 849-851 [148 Cal. Rptr. 447].) This presumption of prejudice may be rebutted only by proof that no prejudice actually resulted. [Citation.] ( People v. Honeycutt (1977) 20 Cal.3d 150, 156 [141 Cal. Rptr. 698, 570 P.2d 1050].) Unless the presumption of prejudice is rebutted, the accused is entitled to a new trial regardless of the probability that a more favorable verdict would have resulted absent the error. ( People v. Pierce (1979) 24 Cal.3d 199, 206-207 [155 Cal. Rptr. 657, 595 P.2d 91].) [13] Therefore, the determinative issue is whether there is evidence which rebuts the presumption that a new trial is necessary. Respondent asserts that the content of the statement, together with the admonition by the trial court, rebuts the presumption of prejudice. The content of the inadmissible statement is asserted not to be of a nature to affect the jury's impartiality. At one point appellant told the police he was willing to take a lie detector test. Respondent contends that this serves to offset his expressed reluctance to take the test which was based on his specific doubts about the reliability of the polygraph. While various inferences as to appellant's state of mind may be argued from his comments to his wife regarding the lie detector test, the general tenor of the statement is reluctance to submit to such an examination. In People v. Carter (1957) 48 Cal.2d 737, 752 [312 P.2d 665], this court held that the admission of testimony from which the accused's refusal to take a lie detector test could be implied was error, even in the absence of an objection. (See People v. Schiers (1971) 19 Cal. App.3d 102, 109 [96 Cal. Rptr. 330].) Other courts have recognized the horrendous capacity for prejudice posed by the introduction of evidence of an individual's refusal to take a lie detector test. ( State v. Driver (1962) 38 N.J. 255 [183 A.2d 655, 659].) In terms of degree of prejudice, the average jury, unfamiliar with the present scientific uncertainty of the tests, might very well be even more affected by proof of a defendant's refusal to take the test than by the evidence of results adverse to him coupled with proof of its scientific imperfection. ( State v. Driver, supra, 183 A.2d at p. 658; quoted with approval in Sheppard v. Maxwell (S.D.Ohio 1964) 231 F. Supp. 37, 68-69 (affd. on other grounds (1966) 384 U.S. 333 [16 L.Ed.2d 600, 86 S.Ct. 1507]); accord, State v. Kolander (1952) 236 Minn. 209 [52 N.W.2d 458]; Mills v. People (1959) 139 Colo. 397 [339 P.2d 998].) Far from rebutting the presumption of prejudice, the content of the inadmissible evidence reinforces the presumption. While some cases have found the presumption of prejudice to be rebutted by the inherently nonprejudicial value of the evidence so considered, these cases are clearly factually inapplicable to the instant case. (See People v. Martinez, supra, 82 Cal. App.3d at p. 25 [jury's consideration of maps which duplicated evidence already before jury]; People v. Reyes (1974) 12 Cal.3d 486, 506-507 [116 Cal. Rptr. 217, 526 P.2d 225] [jury's receipt of victim's clothing, to which defense objection was overruled, but which were not moved into evidence by prosecutor].) Since the unadmitted evidence received by the jury was not inherently nonprejudicial, the issue remains whether the trial court's admonition is sufficient to prove that no prejudice resulted. For several reasons, the admonition given in this case does not by itself rebut the presumption of prejudice. First, the nature of the improperly considered evidence is so prejudicial that many courts have held it incurable by admonition alone. ( Bowen v. Eyman (D.Ariz. 1970) 324 F. Supp. 339, 342; State v. Green (1963) 254 Iowa 1379 [121 N.W.2d 89, 95 A.L.R.2d 810]; State v. Britt (1959) 235 S.C. 395 [111 S.E.2d 669].) Second, the admonition here cannot be deemed a prompt one for it followed by some 16 hours both the jury's receipt of the evidence and the trial judge's discovery of the error. Third, the admonition was somewhat one-sided. The admonition to disregard singled out appellant's statement that he would take a lie detector test, while failing to state specifically the need to disregard the portion in which appellant expressed reluctance to take the test. Finally, although the order for a new trial would be compelled in a noncapital case under the circumstances presented here, the presumption of prejudice from jury contact with inadmissible evidence is even stronger in the context of a capital case. It is vital in capital cases that the jury should pass upon the case free from external causes tending to disturb the exercise of deliberate and unbiased judgment. Nor can any ground of suspicion that the administration of justice has been interfered with be tolerated. ( Mattox v. United States (1892) 146 U.S. 140, 149 [36 L.Ed. 917, 921, 13 S.Ct. 50]; accord, State v. Britt, supra [reversing conviction and death sentence in favorem vitae where jury learned of defendant's refusal to take a lie detector test].)