Opinion ID: 2737443
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The adoption hearing and appeal

Text: On March 6, 2012, the superior court held an adoption hearing and granted the Smiths’ adoption petition.63 At that hearing the court noted that, since the placement hearing, “[n]o individual has come forward” and “[n]o names have been put forward of somebody who would be ICWA compliant under 1915(a) and the [Smiths] have been there for Dawn for . . . these several years and the child’s almost four.” The court concluded it was in Dawn’s best interest to be adopted that day by the Smiths, but cautioned that “the adoption [could] be reversed . . . anything could happen including removal of the child” from the Smiths’ care. Elise did not appear at the adoption hearing. 58 Id. 59 Id. 60 Id. 61 Id. at 439-40. 62 Id. at 440. 63 Id. -11- 6954 The Tribe appealed the adoption to our court. On November 29, 2012, we issued an order sua sponte staying the adoption appeal pending our decision in the related adoption placement appeal.64 3. Our decision in the placement appeal in Tununak I and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Baby Girl We issued our decision in the placement appeal on June 21, 2013.65 In that opinion we reversed and remanded the superior court’s adoptive placement decision.66 We concluded that ICWA requires a heightened clear and convincing evidence standard of proof be applied to the § 1915(a) good cause determination.67 Because the superior court’s placement decision was decided under a preponderance of the evidence standard, we remanded for the superior court to undertake a new good cause determination, consistent with a clear and convincing evidence standard, to decide whether deviation from the preferred placement preferences provided in ICWA § 1915(a) was appropriate.68 We issued an order along with our decision in Tununak I that requested the parties to brief their positions on whether our stay of Dawn’s adoption appeal should continue pending the superior court’s proceedings on remand following Tununak I.69 The United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl four days later; the Court held that ICWA “§ 1915(a)’s preferences are 64 Native Vill. of Tununak v. State, OCS, et al., No. S-14670 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, Nov. 29, 2012). 65 Tununak I, 303 P.3d at 431. 66 Id. at 453. 67 Id. 68 Id. at 452-53. 69 Native Vill. of Tununak v. State, OCS, et al., No. S-14670 (Alaska Supreme Court Order, June 21, 2013). -12- 6954 inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child. This is because there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward.”70 In Baby Girl, the child’s biological father (Biological Father) and biological mother (Birth Mother) broke off their engagement after Birth Mother became pregnant but would not accommodate Biological Father’s request to move up the wedding.71 Biological Father had no meaningful contact with Birth Mother following the couple’s separation and sent her a text message indicating that he wished to relinquish his parental rights.72 Birth Mother decided to give the child up for adoption and selected a nonNative adoptive couple (Adoptive Couple) through a private adoption agency.73 Approximately four months after Baby Girl’s birth, Adoptive Couple served Biological Father with notice of their pending adoption petition.74 Biological Father signed the paperwork, stating he was not contesting the adoption.75 He later testified that he assumed he was relinquishing parental rights to Birth Mother.76 Biological Father contacted a lawyer a day after signing the papers and subsequently requested a stay of the adoption proceedings.77 In those proceedings he sought custody of Baby Girl, took a paternity test, and participated in a four-day trial after which the 70 Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2552, 2564 (2013). 71 Id. at 2558. 72 Id. 73 Id. 74 Id. 75 Id. 76 Id. 77 Id. at 2558-59. -13- 6954 South Carolina Family Court ultimately awarded him custody and denied Adoptive Couple’s adoption petition.78 That decision was appealed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, and Biological Father participated in that appeal.79 The South Carolina Supreme Court characterized his appeal as a “legal campaign to obtain custody” and affirmed the family court order.80 The decision was appealed to the United States Supreme Court, and Biological Father again participated in that appeal.81 At no point did Biological Father file a petition to adopt Baby Girl.82 The United States Supreme Court ultimately reversed the South Carolina Supreme Court, holding in part that ICWA “§ 1915(a)’s preferences are inapplicable in cases where no alternative party has formally sought to adopt the child.”83 The Court reasoned: “This is because there simply is no ‘preference’ to apply if no alternative party that is eligible to be preferred under § 1915(a) has come forward.”84 Because the Supreme Court’s interpretation of ICWA § 1915(a) in Baby Girl called into doubt the application of § 1915(a)’s placement preferences on remand in Tununak I — as no one but the Smiths sought to formally adopt Dawn — we issued 78 Id. at 2559; Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 731 S.E.2d 550, 555-56 (S.C. 2012) (Adoptive Couple) (indicating that the trial took place from September 12-15, 2011, when Baby Girl was roughly two years old), reh’g denied, (Aug. 22, 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 831 (2013), and rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013). 79 Adoptive Couple, 731 S.E.2d at 552. 80 Id. at 552, 561. 81 Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. at 2556. 82 Id. at 2564. 83 Id. 84 Id. -14- 6954 an order directing the parties to brief the effect of Baby Girl on the present adoption appeal and granted oral argument in the matter.85