Opinion ID: 1637538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Effect of the 1980 Amendment to SURA.

Text: The federal class-action plaintiffs assert that, even though the provisions of section 614.24 in existence on July 4, 1966, would bar their reversionary interests from now being asserted, that circumstance was changed retroactively by a 1980 amendment to that statute. The language of that amendment was as follows: The provisions of this section [§ 614.24] requiring the filing of a verified claim shall not apply to the reversion of railroad property if the reversion is caused by the property being abandoned for railway purposes and the abandonment occurs after [July 1, 1980]. The holder of such a reversionary interest may bring an action based upon the interest regardless of whether a verified claim has been filed under this section at any time after July 4, 1965. 1980 Iowa Acts ch. 1115, § 6. The class-action plaintiffs assert that this amendment abrogated the application of section 614.24 with regard to reversionary interests in railroad property triggered by railroad abandonments occurring after July 1, 1980. In the pending federal class-action litigation, it is alleged that the abandonment occurred in 1995. We believe that it was the intent of this legislation that persons holding reversionary interests in railway property that were not barred on the date the amendment became effective were no longer required to file a verified claim with the county recorder in order to thereafter assert their interest in a legal action. It was not intended to revive property interests previously extinguished by SURA prior to the effective date of the amendment. To interpret the 1980 amendment as reviving inchoate property interests that had been extinguished under the 1965 version of section 614.24 would have the disquieting effect of disturbing real estate ownership established more than thirty years ago. It was clearly the intent of the 1965 legislation to include interests of the type involved in the present case when the law was enacted in 1965. See City of Osage, 176 N.W.2d at 791-92. For the reasons that we identified in our answer to the second certified question, the effect of the 1965 legislation was to extinguish the inchoate property interests now sought to be asserted by the federal class-action plaintiffs. Our interpretation of the 1980 amendment to section 614.24 is consistent with our decisions in Frideres, 540 N.W.2d at 267 (Iowa 1995); In re Estate of Weidman, 476 N.W.2d 357, 364 (Iowa 1991); and Secrest v. Galloway Co., 239 Iowa 168, 172, 30 N.W.2d 793, 796 (1948). Typical of our holdings in those cases is the following statement from the Weidman case: A general rule with respect to statutes of limitations is that the period of limitation in effect at the time suit is brought governs in an action even though it may lengthen or shorten an earlier period of limitation.... However, another general rule ... is that if plaintiff's suit was barred by the running of the statute of limitations prior to the extension of the limitation period, the subsequent statute cannot revive defendant's liability. Weidman, 476 N.W.2d at 363-64 (emphasis added). The answer to the third certified question is that the 1980 amendment to SURA did not operate to revive the reversionary interests at issue here.