Opinion ID: 2518358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Did the Trial Court Err in Admitting the Hearsay Statements of Deceased Witness Reece?

Text: Kesselring's next argument is that the trial court erred in admitting the hearsay statements of Reece, deceased. Kesselring cites to a number of places in the record where various witnesses testified about Reece's statements. However, in most cases, no objection to the evidence was lodged. Kesselring asserts that specific objections were not made because he had a continuing objection to the hearsay. However, the record indicates otherwise. After considering Kesselring's pretrial motion in limine, the trial court refused to make a blanket ruling that any statement made by Reece was inadmissible hearsay and informed defense counsel, I will need to hear the questions and rule at the time the questions are asked, so make your objections then during the trial, please. Where a defendant fails to timely object at trial to alleged hearsay statements, he is precluded from challenging the admission of those statements on appeal. State v. Mays, 277 Kan. 359, 384, 85 P.3d 1208 (2004). Thus, only those hearsay statements to which defense counsel objected need be discussed. Our standard of review begins with the general rule that unless otherwise provided by statute, constitutional prohibition, or court decision, all relevant evidence is admissible. K.S.A. 60-407(f). State v. Marsh, 278 Kan. 520, 530, 102 P.3d 445 (2004). Hearsay evidence is not admissible unless it falls within an exception recognized in K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-460. If a trial court errs in the admission or exclusion of evidence, the harmless error rule of K.S.A. 60-261 applies. Under that rule, an error in the admission or exclusion of evidence is not grounds for granting a new trial or setting aside a verdict unless refusal to take such action appears inconsistent with substantial justice. We must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties. State v. Morris, 255 Kan. 964, 983, 880 P.2d 1244 (1994). Our review of the record revealed only seven hearsay objections which were made during trial, one by the prosecutor and six by defense counsel. Almost every time an objection was made, the trial court either limited the answer to a yes or no, required the attorney to restate the question so it did not call for hearsay, or did not allow the question. We, therefore, need not discuss these questions and objections because, ultimately, no hearsay was admitted. There were only two exceptions. First, during the prosecutor's examination of Heather regarding a confrontation she had with Reece on the day after the murder, the following exchange took place: Q: Ms. Reece, I believe when we left off you had just left your father's house after confronting him, you and Mike got into a confrontation. A: Yeah. Q: What happened next? A: I got home and I asked him why. Q: You asked who, Mike Reece? A: Yeah, I asked Mike Reece why, why everything happened, why he had to  why things took place the way they did. Why did he involve my dad and just, you know, just asked him why, basically why. Q: What happened then? A: You know, he made the usual accusations that I said before about me and Dale and he wouldn't be surprised if I was involved with him and just stuff like that and  At this point, defense counsel objected on the grounds that anything further would be hearsay. The prosecutor agreed, and the trial court asked the prosecutor to clarify his question. The prosecutor asked Heather to describe only what happened and not to talk about what Reece had said. Defense counsel did not ask that Heather's response be stricken as hearsay, and Heather did not attempt to further describe her conversation with Reece. These few words of hearsay were harmless. Second, the prosecutor asked Callarman to describe the conversation Callarman heard between Kesselring, Holmes, and Reece on the morning after the murder. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that anything Reece said was hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony under the hearsay exception for statements of coconspirators. Callarman then testified that Reece asked where the body was and said that if the body was not buried and the shell casings not picked up then the job was not done right and had to be finished. The court then reconsidered its ruling and determined that neither the coconspirator exception of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-460(i)(2) nor the vicarious admissions exception of K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-460(i)(1) applied because the prerequisites for those exceptions had not been met. Specifically, the trial court found that, in order to be admissible, the statement must have been made by a third party and Callarman was himself a coconspirator, not a third party. Furthermore, to be admissible, the statement must have been made outside the presence of the accused, but, in this case, the statement was made while Kesselring was present. Although the court concluded it had erred in admitting the hearsay evidence, the court found that Callarman's testimony about Reece's statement was not prejudicial to Kesselring. Kesselring does not specifically mention this one statement that was admitted over his objection, nor does he specifically challenge the trial court's ruling with regard to that statement. Likewise the State has little to say, merely arguing that the court took appropriate steps to ensure the situation was dealt with appropriately and did not act arbitrarily, fancifully, or unreasonably; thus, the court did not abuse its discretion. Because Kesselring has not briefed the issue of whether the trial court erred in finding Callarman's testimony about Reece's hearsay statement was admissible and then reversing its prior ruling and finding the evidence should not have been admitted but was not prejudicial, that issue is deemed abandoned. See State v. Martis, 277 Kan. 267, 295, 83 P.3d 1216 (2004) (issue not briefed is deemed abandoned). In any event, the trial court correctly ruled that any error in the admission of this single statement by Reece was harmless. See State v. Flynn, 274 Kan. 473, 513, 55 P.3d 324 (2002) (improper admission of hearsay evidence found to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt). Additionally, this statement was not testimonial and, therefore, we need not engage in a constitutional harmless error analysis. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004); State v. Meeks, 277 Kan. 609, 613, 88 P.3d 789 (2004). In addition to complaining about admission of Reece's hearsay statements, Kesselring also argues the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of Agent Hupp regarding his interviews with various witnesses who testified at trial. All of that testimony was clearly admissible since the witnesses interviewed by Hupp were present at trial and available for cross-examination. See K.S.A. 2004 Supp. 60-460(a). The only time a hearsay problem arose was where Agent Hupp testified about what the witness told him Reece said. Kesselring accurately contends such evidence was double hearsay; however, Kesselring never objected to any of Agent Hupp's testimony on hearsay grounds. His failure to make a contemporaneous objection requires us to reject his argument.