Opinion ID: 620466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did The Deprivation Constitute Harmless Error?

Text: We turn to the issue of prejudice. Because of the delicate nature of jury deliberations, even seemingly innocuous ex parte communications between the court and the jury can amount to reversible error. See, e.g., Mejia, 356 F.3d at 473, 478 (court received note expressing deadlock and revealing vote count; court responded that jury should not reveal vote count, but did not provide further instruction); Krische, 662 F.2d at 178 (jury reported deadlock; court dispatched court officer to the jury room, who advised the jury to continue deliberations because it's not soon enough). Where, as here, the ex parte communication involves a supplemental instruction to a single juror in a minority position, the potential for prejudice is particularly acute. See United States v. Zabriskie, 415 F.3d 1139, 1148 (10th Cir.2005) (reversible error where court delivered private Allen charge to holdout juror); United States v. Brown, 426 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir.2005) (discussing potential for prejudice if court were to single out one juror for questioning). We cannot say, with fair assurance, that the district court's errors in this case did not substantially affect the verdict. The court singled out a dissenting juror, and emphasized to him the importance of reaching a verdict. We cannot ignore the possibility that Juror 4 walked out of the ex parte conference with the impression that he should not stand in the way of a prompt resolution of the case. Had the court initially shared the Note with counsel and solicited counsel's input before responding, any mistaken impressions might have been avoided. See Krische, 662 F.2d at 180 (counsel's input could have substantially affected the content of the message to the jurors); Ronder, 639 F.2d at 934-35 (Had the first note been discussed with counsel, the [unbalanced] phrases in the response ... might well have been avoided....). Defense counsel might have requested that they be present during the interview, or at least urged the court to narrowly tailor its ex parte inquiry into the alleged misconduct and provide any additional instructions in open court to the entire jury. The government implies that any supplemental instruction given to Juror 4 was balanced and non-prejudicial. It points out that the court specifically reminded Juror 4, you don't have to vote with anybody. (Tr. 5415). This reminder, however, was an insufficient substitute for the more comprehensive cautions that usually accompany supplemental instructions. See Ronder, 639 F.2d at 933 (telling jury, You have a right ... to stand on your own independent conviction, not sufficient to balance out supplementary instruction on importance of reaching verdict); see also United States v. Ruggiero, 928 F.2d 1289, 1299 (2d Cir.1991). [3] Furthermore, the district court's apparent failure to acknowledge Juror 4's complaints of harassment exacerbated the potential for prejudice in this case. In the course of the ex parte interview, Juror 4 expressed fear in light of Juror 9's threat to have her husband take care of him, and frustration at the repeated insults he was enduring from other jurors. He also conveyed to the court his belief that there was a concerted effort by the other jurors to remove him because he did not agree with the foreman's views. In response, the court simply urged Juror 4 to support the foreman who, in the court's words, was trying to do a good job. (Tr. 5415-16). After the interview, the court made no inquiry into the alleged behavior of the other jurors and specifically refused defense counsel's request that it also interview Juror 9. By ignoring Juror 4's complaints and refusing to conduct a broader inquiry, the court might have given Juror 4 the impression that it was taking sides against him. Furthermore, it might have sent a signal to the rest of the jurors that the court condoned their behavior towards Juror 4. The government argues that the district court's actions here were virtually identical to the district court's actions in United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547 (2d Cir.1988), where we found no reversible error. We disagree. Chang An-Lo is similar to this case in that the trial judge did not disclose the contents of a note alleging jury misconduct before conducting ex parte interviews with two jurors. Id. at 558. In that case, however, the trial judge limited the interviews to a factual inquiry, asked counsel afterwards if they had further suggestions, and offered counsel the opportunity to interview the jurors themselves. Id.; see also United States v. Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 523-24, 105 S.Ct. 1482, 84 L.Ed.2d 486 (1985) (interview with juror narrowly tailored to address misconduct and juror's ability to be impartial; counsel present and permitted to question juror). Finally, the government argues that Collins could not have been prejudiced by the district court's errors because the jury deliberated for a full day after the ex parte conference before it reached a verdict. (Gov't Br. at 114-15) (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 545 F.2d 829, 830-31 (2d Cir.1976)). It points out that this Court's finding of prejudice in Mejia and Krische largely rested on the short time between the impermissible instruction and the verdict. See 356 F.3d at 477 (fifty minutes); 662 F.2d at 179-80 (one hour and twenty minutes). We do not think the fact that the jury deliberated for one full day after the ex parte conference requires us to find harmless error. See Gypsum, 438 U.S. at 433, 469, 98 S.Ct. 2864 (improper colloquy at 12PM, jury returned verdict the next morning); United States v. Peters, 349 F.3d 842, 845, 849 (5th Cir.2003) (reversible error where jury returned verdict day after improper ex parte communication with foreman); Smalls, 191 F.3d at 281 (length of deliberation did not diminish coerciveness of supplemental charge). First, in measuring the risk of prejudice, we look at the circumstances as a whole, not just the extent of deliberation after the error. As discussed above, there was a heightened risk of prejudice in this case because the court conducted an extensive colloquy with a single jurorfacts that make it readily distinguishable from Mejia, Krische, and Rodriguez, where the court merely made a terse statement to the entire jury. Second, in the context of a highly complex fraud case involving fourteen counts, [4] one day of deliberations is not a significant amount of time. It is possible that the mere administration of voting on all fourteen counts took up a significant portion of that one-day period. Third, that the foreman sent a note on July 10 reporting that deliberations had been productive does not support the conclusion that Juror 4 was not prejudiced. Indeed, the foreman had no insight into whether Juror 4 had come to agree with the other jurors independently, or whether he had been improperly influenced by his ex parte conversation with the court.