Opinion ID: 1027751
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instructions and Collins

Text: Because the Defendants did not object to the district court’s jury instruction, this Court reviews for plain error. United States v. Hastings, 134 F.3d 235, 239 (4th Cir. 1998). If plain error is shown the Court may correct the error if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Id. (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).
The Defendants were each charged with and convicted of conspiring to possess with intent to distribute more than fifty grams of cocaine base. While instructing the jury on this count, the court stated in relevant part: “you must then determine the quantity of cocaine base involved. You will be provided with a special verdict form that specifically addresses the drug and the quantity to be considered.” (JA 3702). The 11 relevant portion of the special verdict form for each individual defendant provided this inquiry for the jury to answer: “if guilty, was more than 50 grams of a mixture and substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base reasonably foreseeable to [individual defendant]?” (JA 3756, 3761, 3764).
The Defendants argue that the jury instructions given on the drug conspiracy count violate this Court’s holding in United States v. Collins, 415 F.3d 304 (4th Cir. 2005). They contend the district court erred by not charging the jury with determining the exact amount of drugs attributable to each individual defendant, rather than to the conspiracy as a whole. The issue in Collins was whether “an individual defendant . . . [should] be sentenced . . . by considering the amount of narcotics distributed by the entire conspiracy? Or should that defendant’s sentence be more individualized, subjecting him to punishment only for distribution of the amount of narcotics attributable to him?” Id. at 312. This Court held that “the most reasonable interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions requires a sentencing court to assess the quantity of narcotics attributable to each coconspirator.” Id. (quoting United States v. Irvin, 2 F.3d 72, 77 (4th Cir. 1993)). This Court held that the district court must instruct the jury to 12 “determine what amount of cocaine base was attributable to Collins using Pinkerton principles.” 2 Id. at 314. Thus, we must determine whether the court properly instructed the jury to make an individualized finding of reasonably foreseeable drug quantities as to each of the Defendants. See United States v. Brooks, 524 F.3d 549, 553 n.5 (4th Cir. 2008). In this case, the court’s bench instructions did not specifically instruct the jury that it must find the drug amounts attributable to each individual defendant. However, the special verdict form, referred to and incorporated by the jury instructions, did specifically require the jury to find whether more than fifty grams of the cocaine base was reasonably foreseeable to each defendant. We believe the Collins requirement is satisfied in this case by the special verdict form. The Ninth Circuit has held that “[v]erdict forms are, in essence, instructions to the jury.” United States v. Reed, 147 F.3d 1178, 1180 (9th Cir. 1998). The Ninth Circuit was “unwilling to conclude that the district court committed plain error in omitting this information from the formal jury 2 “Pinkerton principles” refers to the concept that a member of a conspiracy is guilty of his own overt acts, as well as acts by coconspirators that are reasonably foreseeable and a natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646-48 (1946). 13 instructions” when the information was included in the special verdict form. United States v. Alghazouli, 517 F.3d 1179, 1189 (9th Cir. 2008). The Second Circuit also concluded that “[t]he court’s special verdict questions must be read in conjunction with the judge’s charge to the jury.” Vichare v. AMBAC, Inc., 106 F.3d 457, 466 (2d Cir. 1996). The First Circuit has stated that “[w]e examine the court’s instructions to the jury and wording on the verdict form as a whole to determine whether the issues were fairly presented to the jury.” Sheek v. Asia Badger, Inc., 235 F.3d 687, 699 (1st Cir. 2000). As a general principle, “we must assume that the jury understood and followed the court’s instructions.” United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260, 271 (4th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. Hedgepeth, 434 F.3d 609, 614 n.4 (3d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted)). Based on these principles, taking the jury instructions and the special verdict form as a whole, it is reasonable to conclude the jury understood that it was to determine the amounts of cocaine base reasonably foreseeable to each individual defendant in the conspiracy. The jury ultimately received the message that drug amounts must be determined for each individual defendant. Further, the evidence that the quantity was attributable to each individual “was overwhelming and essentially uncontroverted,” so the error, if any existed, would not rise to the level of plain error. 14 United States v. Foster, 507 F.3d 233, 252 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating “that disturbing [the defendant’s] sentence on the drug conspiracy count . . . would seriously affect the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of judicial proceedings”). Accordingly, we find no error, much less plain error, in the district court’s jury instructions.