Opinion ID: 172013
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: First Conviction

Text: Scoville's 1993 breaking and entering conviction, a violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2911.13(A), qualifies as a generic burglary and is thus a violent felony. Ohio law provides: (A) no person by force, stealth, or deception, shall trespass in an unoccupied structure, with purpose to commit therein any theft offense ... or any felony. (B) No person shall trespass on the land or premises of another, with purpose to commit a felony. (C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of breaking and entering, a felony of the fourth degree. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2911.13 (emphasis added). The term structure, as defined in Ohio Revised Code § 2911.13(A), covers a broad array of places, including any house, building, outbuilding, watercraft, aircraft, railroad car, trailer, or tent. Cf. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2909.01 (effective in 1993) (defining occupied structure); see State v. Carroll, 62 Ohio St.2d 313, 405 N.E.2d 305, 306-07 (1980) (defining unoccupied structure in Ohio Revised Code § 2911.13); State v. Chambers, No. 468564, 2006 WL 2692594 (Ohio App. Sept. 21, 2006) (same). Given the breadth of the definition of the term structure in Ohio Revised Code § 2911.13(A), it does not constitute generic burglary as set forth in Taylor. 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143. Under Taylor, a conviction under § 2911.13(A) would constitute generic burglary only if the unoccupied structure at issue were a building or similar structure. But Ohio law proscribes trespassing in structures beyond generic burglary, such as watercraft and tents. See Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (citing, as an example of a non-generic statute, Missouri's second-degree burglary statute which included breaking and entering any booth or tent, any boat or vessel, or railroad car); see also Shepard, 544 U.S. at 15-16, 125 S.Ct. 1254 (The Act makes burglary a violent felony only if committed in a building or enclosed space (`generic burglary'), not in a boat or motor vehicle.). Therefore, because § 2911.13(A) proscribes conduct broader than generic burglary, it does not categorically constitute generic burglary. [2] We thus turn to the modified categorical approach. Under the modified categorical approach, when determining whether a prior conviction resulting from a guilty plea is a violent felony for purposes of [§ 924], a court is limited to an examination of the language of the statute of conviction, `the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant ... or to some comparable judicial record of this information.' United States v. Gonzales, 558 F.3d 1193, 1197 (10th Cir.2009) (quoting United States v. Taylor, 413 F.3d 1146, 1157 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting Shepard, 544 U.S. at 20, 125 S.Ct. 1254)). Here, an examination of the documents underlying Scoville's first conviction reveals it constitutes a violent felony. The indictment concerning Scoville's 1993 breaking and entering conviction states: Scoville, did, by force, stealth or deception, trespass in an unoccupied structure, to wit: 4706 Corduroy Rd., Custom Care Laundromat, with purpose to commit therein, any theft offense, as defined in Section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or any felony. R., Vol. 1, Doc. 18 (emphasis added). Scoville pleaded guilty to this charge, which establishes all of the elements of generic burglary: (1) unlawful entry; (2) into a buildinga laundromat; (3) with intent to commit a crime. Scoville's 1993 conviction is therefore a violent felony for § 924 purposes. [3]