Opinion ID: 3134239
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ill 2d 1; Heerey v. Berke, 188 Ill. App. 3d 527, 532 (1989);

Text: Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 2d 154, 158-60 (1966). The defendants raise three arguments in support of the trial court's dismissal of the defamation per se counts. They first claim that the statements do not fall within any of the limited categories of statements that are considered actionable per se. Second, they argue that the statements may not be considered actionable per se because they are reasonably susceptible to an innocent construction. Finally, the defendants claim that, even if the statements may be considered actionable per se, they are nevertheless expressions of opinion, protected under the first amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. I. We consider each of these arguments in turn.
We first consider whether the disputed statements may be considered actionable per se. The plaintiff alleges that the article is actionable per se because it referred to her as a slut and implied that she was an unchaste individual. Under our common law, four categories of statements are considered actionable per se and give rise to a cause of action for defamation without a showing of special damages. They are: (1) words that impute the commission of a criminal offense; (2) words that impute infection with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute an inability to perform or want of integrity in the discharge of duties of office or employment; or (4) words that prejudice a party, or impute lack of ability, in his or her trade, profession or business. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 10-11. These common law categories continue to exist except where changed by statute. The Slander and Libel Act (740 ILCS 145/1 et seq. (West 1992)) has enlarged the classifications enumerated above by providing that false accusations of fornication and adultery are actionable as a matter of law. See Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273, 277-78 (1986); Fried v. Jacobson, 99 Ill. 2d 24, 27 (1983). Specifically, section 1 of that statute provides: If any person shall falsely use, utter or publish words, which in their common acceptance, shall amount to charge any person with having been guilty of fornication or adultery, such words so spoken shall be deemed actionable, and he shall be deemed guilty of slander. 740 ILCS 145/1 (West 1992). The defendants initially claim that this statute has no application here because it applies only to words that are spoken and not in circumstances, such as those here, where the words are written. We reject the defendants' attempt to so limit the statute. We note initially that the defendant's argument relies upon a distinction between spoken and written defamation (slander and libel) that existed at common law, but was abandoned long ago by our courts. At common law, libel and slander were analyzed under different sets of standards, with libel recognized as the more serious wrong. Illinois law evolved, however, and rejected this bifurcated approach in favor of a single set of rules for slander and libel. Libel and slander are now treated alike and the same rules apply to a defamatory statement regardless of whether the statement is written or oral. Mitchell v. Peoria Journal-Star, Inc., 76 Ill. App. 2d 154, 159-60 (1966); Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Phillips, 154 Ill. App. 3d 574, 579 (1987); Irving v. J.L. Marsh, Inc., 46 Ill. App. 3d 162, 165 (1977). Given the merger of libel and slander, we reject the defendants' claim that the statute providing for an action where false accusations of fornication are made is not applicable here simply because the alleged defamation was in writing. Further, after considering the plaintiff's allegations, as stated in the complaint, we find that they fall within this statute's category of statements that are actionable per se. As previously stated, the statute applies when persons use, utter or publish words which amount to a charge of fornication or adultery. Here, the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the defendants, by using the word slut, implied that she was unchaste. The complaint thus alleged, in effect, that the defendants published words that falsely accused the plaintiff of fornication. The defendants' statements fall within this statutorily created category of statements that are considered actionable per se.
Even if a statement falls into one of the recognized categories of words that are actionable per se, it will not be found actionable per se if it is reasonably capable of an innocent construction. The innocent construction rule requires courts to consider a written or oral statement in context, giving the words, and their implications, their natural and obvious meaning. If, so construed, a statement may reasonably be innocently interpreted or reasonably be interpreted as referring to someone other than the plaintiff, it cannot be actionable per se. Chapski v. Copely Press, 92 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (1982); see also Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 11. Only reasonable innocent constructions will remove an allegedly defamatory statement from the per se category. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 11; Costello v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 125 Ill. 2d 402 (1988). Whether a statement is reasonably susceptible to an innocent interpretation is a question of law for the court to decide. Kolegas, 154 Ill. 2d at 11; Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352. The defendants offer two arguments in support of their position that the statement alleged to be actionable per se is reasonably susceptible to an innocent construction. Before addressing these two arguments, however, we briefly discuss a procedural point.
As stated, the defendants' motion to dismiss was ostensibly brought under section 2--615. In ruling upon a 2--615 motion, a trial court may consider only the allegations of the complaint (Curtis Casket Co. v. D.A. Brown & Co., 259 Ill. App. 3d 800 (1994)) and may not consider other supporting material (Oravek v. Community School District 146, 264 Ill. App. 3d 895 (1994)). Here, however, the defendants and the trial and appellate courts considered matters outside the complaint in addressing that portion of the motion which sought dismissal of the defamation per se counts under the innocent construction rule. The plaintiff's complaint simply alleged that she was defamed by an article entitled Bryson that appeared in Seventeen magazine, because the article referred to her as a slut and implied that she was unchaste. The plaintiff did not attach a copy of the article to her complaint as an exhibit, nor did she recite the article within the complaint. The defendants' motion to dismiss the per se counts under the innocent construction rule, however, was not limited to an analysis of the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint. Instead, the motion examined portions of the allegedly defamatory article which were not part of the plaintiff's complaint. The defendants' motion argued that, when the allegations of the complaint were considered in light of the article itself, it was evident that the allegedly defamatory statement was susceptible to an innocent construction, and that the per se counts must therefore be dismissed. Mittleman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220 (1989) (innocent construction rule is applicable only to per se actions, and not to per quod actions). Because these portions of the article did not appear in the complaint, the defendants attached a copy of the article as an exhibit to their motion to dismiss. The trial and appellate courts relied upon the defamatory article, in addition to the allegations in the plaintiff's complaint, in dismissing the per se counts under the innocent construction rule. By presenting and relying upon affirmative matters outside the pleadings, the defendants and the lower courts disregarded the proper use of a section 2--615 motion. We therefore conclude that the portion of the defendants' motion that seeks the dismissal of the per se counts under the innocent construction rule cannot properly be considered a section 2--615 motion. Rather, we will consider that part of the motion as having been filed and decided under section 2--619 (735 ILCS 5/2--619(a)(9) (West 1992)). Perkaus v. Chicago Catholic High School Athletic League, 140 Ill. App. 3d 127, 134 (1986) (where plaintiff failed to attach league bylaws as an exhibit to his complaint, defendants properly submitted the documents in support of a section 2--619(a)(9) motion to dismiss); Cartwright v. Garrison, 113 Ill. App. 3d 536, 540 (1983) (in a defamation action, the question of whether the allegedly defamatory language is rendered nonactionable per se by reason of the innocent construction rule may properly be considered in a section 2--619 motion to dismiss); Kilbane v. Sabonjian, 38 Ill. App. 3d 172 (1976) (same); see also 4 R. Michael, Illinois Practice §41.7, at 332 (1989). Having addressed this procedural irregularity, we next consider the defendants' two arguments that the per se counts were properly dismissed because the allegedly defamatory statement is reasonably susceptible to an innocent construction.
The defendants first claim that the assertion that Bryson is a slut is not actionable per se because the word slut may reasonably be innocently construed as describing Bryson as a bully. They note that the American Heritage Dictionary includes a number of different definitions for the word slut, including a slovenly, dirty woman, a woman of loose morals, prostitute, a bold, brazen girl, or a female dog. American Heritage Dictionary 1153 (2d Coll. ed. 1985). They argue that, because a bold, brazen girl may be considered synonymous with bully, the court must innocently construe the word slut. The defendants apparently believe that the innocent construction rule applies whenever a word has more than one dictionary definition, one of which is not defamatory. The innocent construction rule does not apply, however, simply because allegedly defamatory words are capable of an innocent construction. See Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 351-52 (modifying the innocent construction rule announced in John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442 (1962)). In applying the innocent construction rule, courts must give the allegedly defamatory words their natural and obvious meaning. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 351-52; 33A Ill. L. & Prac. Slander & Libel §12 (1970). Courts must therefore interpret the allegedly defamatory words as they appeared to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the reasonable reader. 33A Ill. L. & Prac. Slander & Libel §12, at 25 (1970). When a defamatory meaning was clearly intended and conveyed, this court will not strain to interpret allegedly defamatory words in their mildest and most inoffensive sense in order to hold them nonlibellous under the innocent construction rule. Here, we need not determine whether the word slut always implies unchastity or is always defamatory. When we consider the allegedly defamatory language in context, and give the words and implications their natural and obvious meaning, it is evident that the word slut was intended to describe Bryson's sexual proclivities. Immediately preceding the sentence in which Bryson is called a slut, the author describes an incident that occurred two months earlier. The author states that Bryson appeared at a bonfire with two guys that nobody knew. One had a tattoo, and they were all drinking. Lots. Who knows what guys like that made Bryson do. The sexual implication underlying the use of slut is intensified with the commentary who knows what guys like that made Bryson do. The defendants suggest that this latter statement did not necessarily have sexual undertones, since the author could have been implying that the two men made Bryson engage in conduct of a nonsexual nature, such as shop-lifting. The defendant basically asks this court to construe the words used, not in the plain and popular sense in which they are naturally understood, but in their best possible sense. The innocent construction rule, however, does not require courts to strain to find an unnatural but possibly innocent meaning for words where the defamatory meaning is far more reasonable. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 350-51. Nor does it require this court to espouse a naïveté unwarranted under the circumstances. Reading the words in the context presented, and giving the words their natural and obvious meaning, it is obvious that the word slut was used to describe Bryson's sexual proclivities. See Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 281 Ala. 102, 106, 199 So. 2d 645, 648 (1967) (statement that the plaintiff had two affairs could not be innocently construed as referring to platonic associations; statement charged the plaintiff with unchastity and was libelous per se); Jordan v. Lewis, 20 A.D.2d 773, 774, 247 N.Y.S.2d 650, 653 (1964) (stating that the plaintiff slept with his secretary is not susceptible of an innocent construction and, as ordinarily used, charges the plaintiff with sexual promiscuity). Accordingly, we reject the defendant's contention that the defamatory language at issue must be innocently construed as a matter of law. The defendants finally note that our appellate court has held that it is not defamatory per se to call a woman a slut. Roby v. Murphy, 27 Ill. App. 394 (1888). We note initially that Roby is an 1888 appellate court decision. Appellate court decisions issued prior to 1935 had no binding authority. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Vance, 175 Ill. App. 3d 600, 606 (1988). We also conclude that Roby is not persuasive for another reason as well. Roby was decided more than 100 years ago. It is evident that neither the law of defamation nor our use of language has remained stagnant for the last century. Terms that had innocuous or only nondefamatory meanings in 1888 may be considered defamatory today. See, e.g., Moricoli v. Schwartz, 46 Ill. App. 3d 481 (1977) (rejecting the defendant's claim that the term fag should be innocently construed, because the dictionary definitions for that term included cigarette and to become weary; stating that the plaintiff is a fag amounted to a charge that the plaintiff was homosexual); Manale v. City of New Orleans, 673 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1982) (referring to the plaintiff, a fellow police officer, as a little fruit and gay falsely charged the plaintiff with homosexuality and was defamatory per se); Tonsmeire v. Tonsmeire, 281 Ala. 102, 199 So. 2d 645 (1967) (affair is commonly understood to mean unchastity rather than a platonic association). At the time Roby was decided, Webster's dictionary defined the term slut as an untidy woman, a slattern or a female dog, and stated that the term was the same as bitch.'  Roby, 27 Ill. App. at 398. Apparently, when Roby was decided, none of the dictionary definitions of slut implied sexual promiscuity. Moreover, the Roby court found that, even in its common acceptance, the term slut did not amount to a charge of unchastity. Roby, 27 Ill. App. at 398. We cannot simply assume that the term slut means the same thing today as it did a century ago. Many modern dictionaries include the definitions of the term slut cited in Roby, but add new definitions that imply sexual promiscuity. See, e.g., Webster's New World Dictionary (2d Coll. ed. 1975) (a sexually immoral woman); American Heritage Dictionary 1153 (2d Coll. ed. 1985) ([a] woman of loose morals prostitute). Moreover, in the present age, the term slut is commonly used and understood to refer to sexual promiscuity. See Smith v. Atkins, 622 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 1993) (law professor called a female student a slut in class; appellate court found that term was libelous per se). Thus, for this additional reason, we find Roby to be of no value here.
The defendants next argue that the innocent construction rule must apply in this case because the article may reasonably be construed as referring to someone other than the plaintiff. The defendants note that the complaint does not allege any facts to demonstrate that third persons would reasonably conclude that the character Bryson is the plaintiff, Kimberly Bryson. The defendants argue that, under Illinois law, where an allegedly defamatory statement does not mention the plaintiff by name, the plaintiff must plead extrinsic facts to demonstrate that third persons believed that the libelous statement referred to the plaintiff. Barry Harlem Corp. v. Kraff, 273 Ill. App. 3d 388 (1995); Homerin v. Mid-Illinois Newspapers, 245 Ill. App. 3d 402 (1993); Moore v. Streit, 181 Ill. App. 3d 587, 597-98 (1989); Voris v. Street & Smith Publications, 330 Ill. App. 409 (1947). We agree with the general proposition that, where a libelous article does not name the plaintiff, it should appear on the face of the complaint that persons other than the plaintiff and the defendant must have reasonably understood that the article was about the plaintiff and that the allegedly libelous expression related to her. See 33A Ill. L. & Prac. Slander & Libel §§93, 13, at 97, 28-29 (1970); Coffey v. MacKay, 2 Ill. App. 3d 802, 807 (1972). Neither this principle nor the cases upon which the defendants rely, however, apply here. The article at issue did, of course, use the plaintiff's last name. The name Bryson is not so common that we must find, as a matter of law, that no reasonable person would believe that the article was about the plaintiff. The cases that the defendants cite all involve circumstances in which the allegedly libelous article or statement did not use the plaintiff's name. In Voris, the defamatory article referred only to a person named Snapper Charlie. Voris, 330 Ill. App. 409. Homerin involved a political cartoon that supposedly depicted the plaintiff's likeness, but did not identify him by name. Homerin, 245 Ill. App. 3d 402. Barry Harlem Corp. likewise involved an article that did not mention the plaintiff by name. Barry Harlem Corp., 273 Ill. App. 3d 388. Under the present facts, we reject the defendants' claim that the story must be innocently construed as referring to someone other than the plaintiff. The defendants also argue that the article may be construed as not referring to the plaintiff simply because the story is labeled fiction and, therefore, does not purport to describe any real person. We are not persuaded by this contention. In her complaint, plaintiff Bryson claims that she is the character Bryson depicted in the defamatory story. The fact that the author used the plaintiff's actual name makes it reasonable that third persons would interpret the story as referring to the plaintiff, despite the fictional label. In addition, the setting of the story, the events described therein, and the identification of the writer as a native of southern Illinois all lead to a reasonable conclusion that third persons familiar with both the plaintiff and the defendant would understand the story as referring to the plaintiff. In this regard, we note that, when addressing the defendant's section 2--619 motion to dismiss the per se counts under the innocent construction rule, the trial court should have considered the plaintiff's responses to interrogatories, which were contained in the record. Section 2--619(c) provides that, if the party opposing a section 2--619 motion to dismiss presents affidavits or other proof  establishing facts obviating the grounds of defect, the court may consider the same in granting or denying the motion. 735 ILCS 5/2--619(c) (West 1992). An interrogatory answer is considered equivalent to an affidavit for purposes of a section 2--619 motion to dismiss. See 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 213(f), 212(a)(4). The facts stated in the plaintiff's answers to the defendant's interrogatories were therefore before the trial court for its consideration when it ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss. Sierens v. Clausen, 60 Ill. 2d 585, 588 (1975). One of the interrogatories propounded by the defendants asked the plaintiff to identify why she believed that she was the character described in the story. The plaintiff's response identified more than 25 alleged similarities between herself and the physical attributes, locations and events attributed to the character Bryson in the story. Had the trial court considered this interrogatory answer, it certainly would have rejected the defendants' claim that the article must be innocently construed as referring to someone other than the plaintiff. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the plaintiff should be allowed the opportunity to prove that, despite the fictional label, the character Bryson bears such a close resemblance to the plaintiff that reasonable persons would understand that the character was actually intended to portray the plaintiff. Whether the article was actually understood by third parties to be about the plaintiff is, of course, a question of fact for the jury. Chapski, 92 Ill. 2d at 352.
The defendants finally claim that, even if the statements may be considered actionable per se and are not susceptible to an innocent construction, they are nevertheless expressions of opinion, protected under the first amendment to the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., amend. I. Prior to 1990, this court and others perceived a fundamental distinction between statements of fact and statements of opinion for first amendment purposes. Statements of opinion were held to be protected by the first amendment and not actionable in a defamation action. Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273 (1986); Mittleman v. Witous, 135 Ill. 2d 220 (1989). This rule was grounded primarily on dictum contained in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789, 805, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 3006-07 (1974): Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. Recently, however, the United States Supreme Court reexamined the law of defamation within the context of the first amendment and rejected what it called the creation of an artificial dichotomy between `opinion' and fact. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 19, 111 L. Ed. 2d 1, 18, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2706 (1990). The Court explained that the dictum in Gertz had been interpreted too broadly and was not intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled `opinion.'  Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 17, 110 S. Ct. at 2705. The Court held that there is no separate first amendment privilege for statements of opinion and that a false assertion of fact can be libelous even though couched in terms of an opinion. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 18, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 17-18, 110 S. Ct. at 2706 (simply couching the statement Jones is a liar in terms of opinion--In my opinion Jones is a liar--does not dispel the factual implications contained in the statement). Thus, the test to determine whether a defamatory statement is constitutionally protected is a restrictive one. Under Milkovich, a statement is constitutionally protected under the first amendment only if it cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 19, 110 S. Ct. at 2706; see, e.g., Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 57, 99 L. Ed. 2d 41, 48, 53, 108 S. Ct. 876, 879, 883 (1988) (parody); Old Dominion Branch No. 496 v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284- 86, 41 L. Ed. 2d 745, 761-63, 94 S. Ct. 2770, 2781-82 (1974) (hyperbole and imaginative expression); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 13-14, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6, 14- 15, 90 S. Ct. 1537, 1541-42 (1970) (hyperbole and imaginative expression). In applying this test we first consider whether a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the allegedly defamatory statement,
Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 19, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. We answer this question in the affirmative. The clear impact of the statement was that Bryson was, in fact, sexually promiscuous. This was not the sort of loose, figurative or hyperbolic language that would negate the impression that the writer was seriously maintaining that the character depicted in the story was unchaste. The assertion is sufficiently factual to be susceptible to being proven true or false. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 19, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. Whether the statement was actually true or false is a question of fact for the jury. We simply hold, as a matter of law, that the allegation of sexual promiscuity in this case contains a provably false factual assertion. Thus, we do not find that the allegedly defamatory statement here was constitutionally protected under the first amendment. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 111 L. Ed. 2d at 19, 110 S. Ct. at 2706. The defendants argue, however, that the defamatory statement cannot be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts about the plaintiff because the story was clearly labeled fiction. The test is not whether the story is or is not characterized as fiction, or humor, but whether the charged portions, in context, could be reasonably understood as describing actual facts about the plaintiff or actual events in which she participated. Kolegas, 154