Opinion ID: 200471
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District Court History

Text: 12 On December 20, 1999, Guilford filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts. Guilford's complaint alleged that the STB was granted exclusive jurisdiction over the construction and operation of railroad facilities under 49 U.S.C. § 10501(b) (2000), and that the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act (ICCTA), 49 U.S.C. §§ 701-727, 10101-16105, preempted the Board of Health's designation of the new facility as a noisome trade. It also alleged that the local permitting conditions violated the dormant Commerce Clause and thus the Supremacy Clause. The complaint sought declaratory and injunctive relief and attorneys' fees. 13 In October 2000 the district court referred the matter to the STB, stating that the expertise of the Board in evaluating the right of the defendants, if any, to regulate the plaintiffs' proposed development off Willow Road in the Town of Ayer, Massachusetts would assist this Court in determining the rights, duties, and obligations of the parties. On May 1, 2001, the STB issued its decision. The defendants filed a petition for reconsideration on May 21, which the STB denied on October 5, 2001. 5 14 And there the case largely ended. For procedural reasons, the district court itself never reached the preemption or Commerce Clause issues raised in Guilford's complaint. The STB gave its views to the district court as to whether federal law preempted some of the conditions imposed by the town. When the district court granted summary judgment for Guilford on March 20, 2002, it declined to evaluate whether some or all of the conditions were indeed preempted. Instead, it ruled for Guilford because Ayer had failed to request judicial review within ninety days of the STB's order, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1336(c) (2000). 6 The status of the thirty-six conditions was left, to some degree, unresolved. 15 Guilford then moved for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court allowed the motion on June 10, 2002, and on August 20 the court awarded $286,839.49.