Opinion ID: 2974208
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of the Written Statements

Text: Shaw argues that he was arrested from the moment SA Ford frisked him, handcuffed him and placed him in the back of the MP car for transport to the CID building to undergo questioning. Shaw further argues that this arrest was without probable cause and, therefore, that his subsequent statements must be suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963). The Government contests each element of Shaw’s position.
This court has previously articulated a number of factors to be considered in determining whether a person is detained such that his Fourth Amendment rights are triggered, including “the transportation of the detainee to another location, significant restraints on the detainee’s freedom of movement involving physical confinement or other coercion preventing the detainee from leaving police custody, and the use of weapons or bodily force.” United States v. Richardson, 949 F.2d 851, 857 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that law enforcement officers had crossed the line from an investigative detention into an arrest when they placed the defendant in the back of a police car); see also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 816 (1985) (holding that a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are triggered “when the police, without probable cause or a warrant, forcibly remove a person from his home or other place in which he is entitled to be and transport him to the police station, where he is detained, although briefly, for investigative purposes” (citations omitted)). In addition, the determination of whether a defendant is in custody for Fourth Amendment purposes “depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned.” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 320 (1994) (per curiam); see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (“[T]he only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have No. 05-6110 United States v. Shaw Page 6 understood his situation.”). Given the facts before us, we conclude that a reasonable person in Shaw’s position would have believed himself to be under arrest at the time he was handcuffed and transported to the CID office. The Government’s argument that police had the right temporarily to detain Shaw without probable cause to quickly confirm or dispel their reasonable suspicions does not compel a different conclusion, primarily because the detention here was hardly “quick” and because it involved transporting Shaw to the CID office in handcuffs. The Government’s argument that there is no evidence that Shaw did not voluntarily accompany the police to CID for questioning, since he did not do or say anything to express his unwillingness to do so, is likewise without merit. Under the law of this circuit, “[c]onsent must be proved by clear and positive testimony and must be unequivocal, specific, and intelligently given, uncontaminated by any duress and coercion.” United States v. Williams, 754 F.2d 672, 674–75 (6th Cir. 1985), cited in United States v. Butler, 223 F.3d 368, 375 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that, once the defendant was positioned in the back of the police car, she was unable to leave voluntarily “even if inclined to do so”). In other words, the burden of proving consent is on the Government, and in this case, Shaw was not even permitted to go inside and put his shoes on before being frisked, handcuffed, and placed in the back of the police car. Although he did not express any resistance to going with SA Ford, neither was he given the option of choosing not to go. Cf. Knaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631–32 (2003) (finding that the defendant’s saying “Okay,” when told by a police officer that “we need to go and talk,” was not an indication of consent under the circumstances, nor was it significant that the defendant “did not resist the use of handcuffs or act in a manner consistent with anything other than full cooperation”). Under the circumstances, as in Knaupp, there is no reason to think Shaw’s acquiescence was anything more than “a mere submission to a claim of lawful authority.” Id. at 631 (citation omitted). The Government has simply failed to5 carry its burden of showing that Shaw voluntarily accompanied SA Ford to the CID office. The facts here are basically indistinguishable from those considered in Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), in which the State of New York also argued that the defendant voluntarily accompanied police to the station. The Supreme Court nonetheless held that the defendant was “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes, noting that “Petitioner was not questioned briefly where he was found. Instead, he was taken from a neighbor’s home to a police car, transported to a police station, and placed in an interrogation room. He was never informed that he was ‘free to go’; indeed, he would have been physically restrained if he had refused to accompany the officers or had tried to escape their custody.” Id. at 212; see also Knaupp, 538 U.S. at 632 (finding that a defendant who was awakened by police at 3 a.m., handcuffed and led out of the house into the patrol car while wearing nothing but boxer shorts and a t-shirt, and then taken to sheriff’s office was arrested for Fourth Amendment purposes). Accordingly, the district court did not err in concluding that Shaw was arrested on the early morning of June 22, 2004, when he was taken into custody by the MP on Fort Campbell and transported to the CID office.
Having concluded that Shaw was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes when he was taken into custody during the early morning of June 22, 2004, we must next consider whether such seizure was justified by probable cause. As already indicated, we find that it was not. 5 The Government also argues that the MP’s intent was simply to remove Shaw from the premises so Shaw’s cousin and family could come home without having to confront Shaw or further expose the children to his presence. The MP’s alleged intent was not explained to Shaw, however, and the standard, again, is what a reasonable person would have believed under the circumstances. Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 320. Agent Wolfington even admitted it was reasonable for Shaw to believe he was in custody when he was taken to CID. No. 05-6110 United States v. Shaw Page 7 The standard of probable cause does not require “indubitable or necessarily convincing evidence,” Easton v. City of Boulder, 776 F.2d 1441, 1450 (10th Cir. 1985), but only so much “reasonably trustworthy information” as “to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [arrestee has] committed or [is] committing an offense.” Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964). Probable cause requires “less than evidence which would justify condemnation”; moreover, “a finding of ‘probable cause’ may rest upon evidence which is not legally competent in a criminal trial.” United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107 (1965) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Consequently, hearsay may be sufficient to establish probable cause for purposes of issuing a warrant, “so long as a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay is presented.” Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 241–42 (1983). An eye witness’s statement that he or she saw a crime committed or was the victim of a crime is generally sufficient to establish probable cause. See United States v. Harness, 453 F.3d 752 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding that a warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause where police had spoken directly to the victim and “nothing about the allegation itself cast doubt on the victim’s reliability,” and another witnesses confirmed that there was a “window of time within which the alleged sexual assault could have occurred”); Ahlers v. Schebil, 188 F.3d 365, 370–71 (6th Cir. 1999) (concluding that an alleged victim’s accusation that she had been sexually assaulted, “standing alone, was sufficient to establish probable cause, especially when bolstered by Sheriff’s Department’s records which confirm that there was a window of time within which the alleged sexual assault could have occurred”). We are not aware, however, of any situation in which the uncorroborated hearsay statement of a child as young as three, standing alone, has been considered sufficient to establish probable cause. Thus, for example, in the case of Easton v. City of Boulder, a civil case for wrongful arrest for child molestation, the Tenth Circuit concluded that police officers had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff where the arrest was based on the allegations of two children, ages three and five. After the parents of one of the children contacted the Boulder Police Department to report that their child had been molested, a detective with training in interviewing juveniles spoke directly with both children and also conducted an investigation that turned up independent evidence corroborating the children’s statements. For instance, the children told the detective about being taken to a laundry room where the defendant made a tent out of a chair and a blanket and invited them to come inside, where he allegedly molested them. The detective had the children lead him to the laundry room where the children pointed out the blanket and chair they had previously described. As the court noted, “even if the testimony of [the children] was inadmissible in court, perhaps because of an inability to understand the oath, or for whatever reason, their statements could nonetheless be used as a basis for a probable cause determination to support the issuance of a warrant,” particularly given the other corroborating evidence and the officers’ own observations of the children’s demeanor and behavior. Easton, 776 F.2d at 1450.