Opinion ID: 601844
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Previous Case Instruction

Text: 29 The district court was concerned that trial testimony about the previous case would confuse the jury. Therefore, the court gave a Previous Case Instruction before the commencement of the trial. This instruction was intended to explain the court's prior holding and to cure any uncertainty the jury might have regarding what was and was not decided in the previous case. Transcript Vol. 1, pp. 9-20. The Previous Case Instruction stated: 30 During the course of this trial you may hear about another case involving the defendant, Morrison-Quirk Grain Corporation, and the United States of America. In that case I determined as a matter of law that at the time Morrison-Quirk Grain Corporation owned the Far-Mar-Co site, which is the site involved in this present case, a hazardous substance, namely Max-Kill 10, was released; that that release caused the United States to incur response costs; and that Morrison-Quirk was a person responsible for the response costs incurred by the United States. 31 I did not decide in that case that Morrison-Quirk caused any contamination at the Far-Mar-Co site, either while the site was owned by Morrison-Quirk or while it has been owned by Farmland Industries, Inc. I made no decision as to whether Farmland is or is not a person responsible for any response costs or for any contamination. 32 It will be for you to decide in this case whether the actions of Farmland or Morrison-Quirk caused contamination at the site and who is responsible for any response costs incurred by Farmland or Morrison-Quirk. 33 Appellee's Addendum at 12 (emphasis added). In this instruction, the court properly defined the issue before the jury as the causation of the contamination at the subsite. 34 This instruction told the jury that as a matter of law Morrison was the owner of the site at the time a hazardous substance was released, that this release caused the United States to incur response costs, and that Morrison was a person responsible for response costs incurred by the United States. 5 35 The district court, as indicated, instructed the jury that it was to determine causation: 36 It will be for you to decide in this case whether the actions of Farmland or Morrison-Quirk caused contamination at the site and who is responsible for any response costs incurred by Farmland or Morrison-Quirk. 37 Appellee's Addendum at 12. This instruction correctly framed the issue for the jury in terms of causation of the contamination at the subsite. However, the instructions on Morrison's counterclaim, given at the close of the evidence, defined the elements of Morrison's claim in terms of causation of response costs. Morrison correctly objected to the proposed instructions on the grounds that the issue for the jury should have been which party caused the contamination at the subsite, and therefore under the equitable principles of section 9613 should pay the costs of clean-up. Morrison argued that the proper instruction must be in terms of causation of the contamination. 38 We think there must be a linkage between the contamination that's out there and Farmland incurring response cost. [sic] As long as tha's [sic] the case they are entitled to get their money. But they're not entitled to get money just because a release occurred on the site. 39 I don't want to belabor this but, ... if Morrison spilled a cup on to the soil in 1959 and it all evaporated that's a release. But that didn't cause present day contamination, that didn't cause anyone to incur response cost.... 40 Transcript vol. IX at 1809. 41 The district court overruled Morrison's objections, and, on Morrison's counterclaim, instructed the jury that: 42 In your verdict you must find in favor of Morrison-Quirk on its counterclaim against Farmland, if all of the following elements have been proved by the greater weight of the evidence: 43 First, Farmland was an owner or operator of the FAR-MAR-CO subsite at the time of a release of Max-Kill 10, a liquid grain fumigant containing the hazardous wastes ethylene dibromide (EDB) and carbon tetrachloride (CCL sub4 ); and 44 Second, the release of Max-Kill 10 while Farmland owned or operated the FAR-MAR-CO subsite was the sole cause of the incurrence of response costs by Morrison-Quirk; and 45 Third, the amount of these response costs that were caused by the release during the Farmland ownership of the subsite and that were necessary costs of response. 46 Appellee's Addendum at 14 (emphasis added). In evaluating the adequacy of the jury instructions given in this case, we must read this instruction in conjunction with the Previous Case Instruction, which informed the jury that Morrison was liable to the government for response costs because there was a Max-Kill 10 release at the time Morrison owned the subsite. As stated previously, the district court did not inform the jury that this previous case had been brought under a theory of strict liability and was not a fault-based determination. 47 Reading these instructions together, we are forced to conclude that the district court's instructions were, at least, incomplete. The second paragraph of this counterclaim instruction, read in conjunction with the previous case instruction made it difficult, if not impossible, for the jury to find for Morrison. The court had already told the jury that as a matter of law Morrison caused the United States to incur response costs, and that Morrison was a person responsible for those costs. Therefore, without further explanation of the CERCLA statutory scheme, the jury may have had difficulty concluding that Farmland was the sole cause of the incurrence of response costs by Morrison-Quirk. 6 Had the district court given more detailed instructions on the various facets of CERCLA liability, or had it explained the difference between the standards for liability to the government under section 9607 and for liability to a third party under section 9613, these instructions might have been a harmless error. In the absence of further direction, these instructions tended to be confusing, and, therefore, could have resulted in prejudice to Morrison. We are left with substantial and ineradicable doubt whether the jury has been properly guided in its deliberations, Horton v. Buhrke, Div. of Klein Tools, Inc., 926 F.2d 456, 460 (5th Cir.1991), and cannot conclude that the charge, taken as a whole ... fairly and adequately submits the issues in the case to the jury. Federal Enter., 786 F.2d at 820.