Opinion ID: 3019948
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: L. Blades, 121 F.3d at 870.

Text: We agree with the District Court that the citizens-only provision of Delaware’s Freedom of Information Act burdens noncitizens’ right to “engage in the political process with regard to matters of national political and economic importance.” Although in some cases the State’s asserted objective of “defining its political community” might justify a discriminatory practice, in this case, there is an insufficient nexus between the State’s policy of excluding noncitizens from receiving FOIA benefits and that objective. For that reason, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. A. The first prong of the Supreme Court’s test requires us to determine whether the right asserted by the plaintiff is protected 9 by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. The contours of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, however, have not been “precisely shaped by the process and wear of constant litigation and judicial interpretation,” and the reach of the Clause is not “well developed.” See Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm’n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 379-80 (1978). Consequently, in deciding whether a given right is protected under Article IV, section 2, we have limited guidance. Despite the relative paucity of judicial pronouncements regarding the reach of the Privileges and Immunities Clause, there are basic principles that we can distill from the existing case law. On one hand, it is clear that a state need not apply all its laws or extend all its services equally to citizens and noncitizens. Id. at 383. The Clause does not prohibit, for example, the use of citizenship as a basis for suffrage rights or qualification for elective office. Id. (citations omitted). On the other hand, it is equally clear that a state may not deprive noncitizens of the ability to “engage in an essential activity or exercise a basic right.” Id. at 387. Such rights and activities include those that are “‘fundamental’ to the promotion of interstate harmony,” “‘bear[] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity,’” United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 218 (1984) (quoting Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388), and are “important to the ‘maintenance of the Union.’” Piper, 470 U.S. at 281 (quoting Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 388)). Along those lines, the Supreme Court has held that the pursuit of a common calling, the ownership or disposition of privately held property, and access to the courts are protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 383 (citing Ward v. Maryland, 12 Wall. 418 (1871); Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239 (1898); Canadian Northern R. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920)); but 10 cf. id. at 388 (rejecting challenge to Montana law which imposed a higher fee for elk hunting licenses on nonresidents than on residents and explaining that elk hunting is “a recreation and a sport” and that “[e]quality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance and well-being of the Union”).
In this case, Lee alleges that the citizens-only provision of Delaware’s FOIA burdens two fundamental rights: (1) his right to pursue his “common calling” as a journalist and (2) his right to “engage in the political process with regard to matters of political and economic importance.” See Appellee’s Br. at 14-15. The District Court concluded that both of these rights were protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause. On appeal, the State concedes–as it must3–that the right to pursue 3 See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor & Council of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219 (1984) (holding that Privileges and Immunities Clause protected right of noncitizen to engage in construction work and noting that “the pursuit of a common calling is one of the most fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause”); see also Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (holding that New Hampshire policy which restricted practice of law by out-of-state residents violated Privileges and Immunities Clause); Toomer, 334 U.S. 385 (concluding that South Carolina statute which imposed higher licensing fee on nonresident shrimp fisherman was unconstitutional); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952) (holding that licensing fee for nonresident commercial fishermen constituted discriminatory tax in violation of Privileges and Immunities Clause); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418 (1871) (striking down Maryland state licensing scheme that imposed higher financial burden on noncitizens who sought to trade in goods manufactured outside 11 one’s “common calling” is one that is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. It argues, however, that (1) Lee has failed to establish that his “common calling” is journalism and (2) the citizens-only provision does not impose a sufficiently substantial burden on Lee’s right to pursue his journalistic activities to render its Freedom of Information Act constitutionally infirm. Because we conclude that the second right asserted by Lee–the right to “engage in the political process with regard to matters of national political and economic importance”–is protected under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, we need not address these arguments.
In the proceeding below, the District Court concluded that the “citizenship requirement impacts [Lee’s] ability to engage in the political process with regard to matters of both national political and economic importance.” App. at 20. It explained: “As the ‘corporate home’ for thousands of corporations in the United States, Delaware’s regulations have nation-wide political and economic impact, and therefore, it seems reasonable that noncitizens should have the same access to public records as Delaware citizens.” Id. at 20-21. On appeal, Delaware argues that the District Court erred in holding, as a matter of law, that the right of noncitizens to access public records is protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. We disagree. of Maryland); but cf. Salem Blue Collar Workers Ass’n v. City of Salem, 33 F.3d 265, 270 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1152 (1995) (holding that direct public employment is not a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause). 12 Although the most common types of challenges under the Privileges and Immunities Clause involve “economic discrimination,” the Supreme Court noted in Piper that it “has never held that the Privileges and Immunities Clause protects only economic interests.” Piper, 470 U.S. at 281 n.11 (1985) (citing Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (concluding that a Georgia statute which permitted only residents to secure abortions violated the Clause)). In fact, in Piper, the Supreme Court explained that the right to practice law was a protected right not only because of the legal profession’s role in the national economy, but also because of lawyers’ “noncommercial role” in “rais[ing] unpopular federal claims” and “champion[ing] unpopular causes.” Id. at 281. No state is an island–at least in the figurative sense–and some events which take place in an individual state may be relevant to and have an impact upon policies of not only the national government but also of the states. Accordingly, political advocacy regarding matters of national interest or interests common between the states plays an important role in furthering a “vital national economy” and “vindicat[ing] individual and societal rights.” See Tolchin v. Supreme Court of the State of New Jersey, 111 F.3d 1099, 1111 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Piper, 470 U.S. at 280-81). Effective advocacy and participation in the political process, however, require access to information. In the words of the District Court, access to records is “the hallmark of effective participation in democracy.” App. at 20. The very purpose of a freedom of information law “is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society . . . .” See, e.g., John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 152 (1989) (construing the federal Freedom of 13 Information Act); see also 29 Del. Code Ann. § 10001 (acknowledging that “[i]t is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed in an open and public manner . . . .”). Because political advocacy is an “essential activity” which “bear[s] upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity,” Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387, 383, and because access to public records is necessary to the ability to engage in that activity, we conclude that access to public records is a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Noncitizens’ access to public records–and the political advocacy enabled by such access–is undoubtedly burdened by § 10003. Delaware’s FOIA is facially discriminatory insofar as it limits access to information to those individuals who are citizens of the State. Moreover, the burden on noncitizens’ access to information–and, accordingly, on noncitizens’ ability to engage in political advocacy regarding topics upon which that information touches–is not merely incidental. See Tolchin, 111 F.3d at 1111-12 (noting that it is necessary to “distinguish between incidental discrimination against nonresidents and discrimination that imposes too heavy a burden on their privileges”) (citations omitted). Because noncitizens are precluded from obtaining any FOIA information, at any time, for any reason, the burden is substantial.4 4 The State contends that the burden is insubstantial insofar as a noncitizen can obtain records by engaging a citizen to file a FOIA request on his or her behalf. We find this argument unpersuasive. Although some noncitizens may have contacts in Delaware who are willing to submit a request for them, others will be forced to expend considerable effort and money to obtain the assistance of a citizen. Moreover, a requirement which necessitates reliance on the citizen of another 14