Opinion ID: 837953
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: retroactivity under state law

Text: The conclusion that Halbert is not retroactive under federal law does not end our analysis, however. A state may accord broader effect to a new rule of criminal procedure than federal retroactivity jurisprudence accords. Danforth v. Minnesota, ___ U.S. ____, 128 S.Ct. 1029, 1045, 169 L.Ed.2d 859 (2008). [3] Accordingly, we turn to the question of whether Halbert should be deemed retroactive under state law. Michigan law has regularly declined to apply new rules of criminal procedure to cases in which a defendant's conviction has become final. See Sexton, supra (requirement that the police inform a suspect when retained counsel is available for consultation); People v. Stevenson, 416 Mich. 383, 331 N.W.2d 143 (1982) (abrogation of common-law year and a day rule); People v. Young, 410 Mich. 363, 301 N.W.2d 803 (1981) (preconviction filing of habitual offender notice); People v. Smith, 405 Mich. 418, 433, 275 N.W.2d 466 (1979) (repeal of criminal sexual psychopath statute barring criminal action against those adjudicated criminal sexual psychopaths); People v. Markham, 397 Mich. 530, 245 N.W.2d 41 (1976) (double jeopardy same transaction test); People v. Rich, 397 Mich. 399, 245 N.W.2d 24 (1976) (erroneous capacity standard jury instruction); People v. Butler, 387 Mich. 1, 195 N.W.2d 268 (1972) (waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights in taking a guilty plea); Jensen v. Menominee Circuit Judge, 382 Mich. 535, 170 N.W.2d 836 (1969) (constitutional right to appeal in criminal cases); People v. Woods, 382 Mich. 128, 169 N.W.2d 473 (1969) (custodial interrogation procedures); People v. Fordyce, 378 Mich. 208, 144 N.W.2d 340 (1966) (custodial interrogation procedures). In Sexton, we considered the following three factors to determine whether a new rule of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively: (1) the purpose of the new rules; (2) the general reliance on the old rule[;] and (3) the effect of retroactive application of the new rule on the administration of justice. [ Sexton, supra at 60-61, 580 N.W.2d 404, citing People v. Hampton, 384 Mich. 669, 674, 187 N.W.2d 404 (1971).] Under the purpose prong, a law may be applied retroactively when it `concerns the ascertainment of guilt or innocence;' however, `a new rule of procedure ... which does not affect the integrity of the fact-finding process should be given prospective effect.' Id. at 63, 580 N.W.2d 404, quoting Young, supra at 367, 301 N.W.2d 803. By pleading guilty, defendants are not contesting their guilt, but admitting it freely. Thus, the appointment of counsel on appeal does not concern the ascertainment of guilt or innocence. See Goeke, supra at 120, 115 S.Ct. 1275. Rather, an appeal from a guilty plea concerns only the procedures of the plea process; the defendant has already admitted substantive guilt while represented by counsel. It is hard to imagine a more dispositive process by which guilt can be accurately determined, and in which the appellate process becomes less central to an accurate determination of guilt, than that in which a full admission to criminal conduct has come from the mouth of the defendant himself under oath, [4] and in an environment in which the defendant has been accorded every protection against a coerced or mistaken confession. Consequently, the first Sexton prong counsels against retroactivity. The second Sexton prong, which concerns the general reliance on the old rule, does not, in our judgment, strongly counsel either way in this case. When considering reliance, a court examines whether individual persons or entities have been adversely positioned ... in reliance on the old rule. Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd. Comm., 477 Mich. 197, 221, 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007). The dissent implies that defendants who pleaded guilty between 1994 and 2005, as a class, were penalized by the general reliance on the old rule. [5] Post at 831-32. We disagree. To be considered to have detrimentally relied on the old rule, a defendant must have relied on the rule in not pursuing an appeal and have suffered harm as a result of that reliance. We recognize that ascertaining the precise number of defendants who meet this standard is impossible, but clearly all defendants who pleaded guilty between 1994 and 2005 do not meet this standard. Indeed, appeals of guilty pleas before the old rule indicate that it is likely that very few do. First, only a very small percentage of defendants who pleaded guilty before the old rule became effective actually appealed their pleas. Before the old rule was implemented in 1994, an estimated 89% to 94% of defendants who pleaded guilty did not appeal their pleas. [6] During this period, indigent defendants were appointed appellate counsel if they chose to pursue an appeal. Yet, fewer than one in ten of all defendants who pleaded guilty actually decided to appeal their pleas. The large number of defendants who pleaded guilty but did not seek appeal can be explained by a variety of factors, most important of which are the lack of an appealable issue after the plea and the risk inherent in appealing a guilty plea. [7] Therefore, it can be assumed that most defendants who pleaded guilty between 1994 and 2005 and did not appeal, rather than not appealing because of reliance on the old rule, did not appeal because of factors unrelated to, and existing before, the old rule. Second, a defendant who relied on the old rule in not filing an appeal must also have suffered actual harm from that reliance in order to have detrimentally relied on the old rule. That is, the old rule would have had to preclude defendant from filing an appeal that would have resulted in some form of relief. Out of that small number of defendants who pleaded guilty before the old rule and subsequently appealed the plea, only a very limited number received relief on appeal. In 1994, before the old rule was adopted, the Court of Appeals estimated that only three to four percent of guilty plea cases that came before it resulted in some form of relief. [8] The State Appellate Defender Office (SADO), however, estimates that approximately 27% of pleading indigent defendants whom it represented received some measure of relief. [9] Accordingly, the number of pleading defendants who could be said to have detrimentally relied on the old rule would range somewhere between 0.18% (6% x 3%) and 2.97% (11% x 27%), combining the lowest and highest Court of Appeals/House Legislative Analysis and SADO figures. Thus, there is no reason why it should not be assumed that, at a minimum, 97% to 99% of the defendants who pleaded guilty under the old rule would not have received relief under the new rule. [10] While it cannot be disputed that some number of defendants would receive relief if Halbert were made retroactive, [11] this would be true of extending any new rule retroactively, yet this is not generally done. Instead, we must consider, as best as possible, the extent of the detrimental reliance on the old rule, and then balance this against the other Sexton factors, as well as against the fact that each defendant who pleaded guilty has received all the rights under the law to which he or she was entitled at the time. Here, we conclude that the extent of the detrimental reliance is remarkably minimal and, as explained above and below, does not outweigh the other Sexton factors that clearly counsel against retroactive application. Finally, affording appointed counsel to defendants whose appeals became final before Halbert would have a markedly adverse effect on the administration of justice, the third Sexton prong. The state's strong interest in finality of the criminal justice process would be undermined as presumably significant numbers of the incarcerated population would be entitled to avail themselves of appointed counsel and new appeals, despite having knowingly and intelligently pleaded guilty to criminal conduct while represented by counsel. [F]inality of state convictions is a state interest ... that States should be free to evaluate, and weigh the importance of, when prisoners held in state custody are seeking a remedy for a violation of federal rights by their lower courts. Danforth, supra at 1041 (emphasis in original). The principle of finality is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Teague, supra at 309, 109 S.Ct. 1060. The state's interest in finality discourages the advent of new rules from continually forc[ing] the State[ ] to marshal resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals conformed to then-existing constitutional standards, id. at 310, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (emphasis omitted), and also serves the State's goal of rehabilitating those who commit crimes because `[rehabilitation] demands that the convicted defendant realize that he is justly subject to sanction, that he stands in need of rehabilitation.' Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 453, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986), quoting Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 n. 32, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1982) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, applying Halbert retroactively to cases in which a conviction has become final would have a markedly adverse effect on the administration of justice. Thus, although retroactive application of Halbert would potentially provide a small number of defendants with some form of relief, this does not outweigh the certainty that by applying Halbert retroactively, many guilty-pleading defendants whose convictions have become final would inundate the appellate process with new appeals. In light of the limited judicial resources of the state, it is our judgment that those resources would be better preserved for defendants currently charged  some of whom may be innocent or otherwise entitled to relief  than for defendants who have knowingly pleaded guilty and presumably accepted the consequences of their decisions. Thus, the third prong weighs far more heavily against retroactive application than the second prong weighs for retroactive application. Considered together, all of the Sexton factors, therefore, strongly counsel against applying Halbert retroactively under state law to cases in which a defendant's conviction has become final.