Opinion ID: 5655
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Mere Presence Instruction

Text: Appellants argue that the trial court erred by failing to give the jury a mere presence chargeSQi.e., an instruction that one's presence in the area where drugs are found or association with the person actually in control of the drugs, is insufficient to support a finding of possession. Although such an instruction is abstractly an accurate statement of the law, see United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353, 1355 (5th Cir. 1973), it does not follow that the failure to so instruct was reversible error.12 Appellants rely upon United States v. Cordova-Larios, 907 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1990), in which we reversed a conviction for failure to submit a 12 At the charge conference defense counsel stated I want to make sure that the Court's definition of 'possession' includes the fact that the mere presence alone is not sufficient, that mere presence alone is not sufficient to convict the defendants. The court inquired if counsel were objecting to the definition of 'possession,' and counsel replied insofar as it does not include a statement as to the mere presence, it does not in itself prove up possession and would not enableSQenable the jury to convict the defendants just because they were present. The court responded I don't think the charge permits them to convict either defendant simply because they were present . . . . they have to find possession. 'Possession' is defined here. Later, defense counsel argued that the proper precautionary instruction that mere presence aloneSQby not placing it in there, you're lessening the government's burden of proof, and objected to the Court's failing to instruct the jury on 'mere presence' because we feel that the foundation of the case warrants it and that's the whole thrust of the case. By failing to include it, it amounts to a comment on the weight of the evidence by the Court and it denies the effective assistance of counsel because we will not be able to argue it effectively . . . . The defense never tenderedSQorally or in writingSQthe mere presence instruction they desired. We assume, arguendo, that the objections were adequate so that we may properly treat the case as if an instruction had been requested (and objection made to the refusal to give it) that mere presence in the area where the narcotic is discovered or mere association with the person who does control the drug or the property where it is located, is insufficient to support a finding of possession. Stephenson at 1355. 16 mere presence instruction. However, in the present case no reversible error is presented. First, it is well-established that the refusal to submit a requested jury instruction is not reversible error if the instruction was substantially covered in the charge as given.13 In this case, the trial court's instructions to the jury as to possession were sufficient to prevent a conviction (or a finding of possession) based upon mere presence.14 Therefore appellants' mere presence instruction was substantially reflected in the charge as given. In United States v. McKnight, 13 It is settled law that this Court will reverse the refusal to give a requested jury instruction only if that instruction (1) was substantially correct; (2) was not substantially covered in the charge delivered to the jury; and (3) concerned an important issue so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant's ability to present a given defense. United States v. Duncan, 919 F.2d 981, 990 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2036 (1991). 14 The trial court instructed the jury as follows: Possession, as that term is used in this case, may be of two kinds: actual possession and constructive possession. A person who knowingly has direct physical control over a thing, at a given time, is then in actual possession of it. A person who, although not in actual possession, knowingly has both the power and the intention, at a given time, to exercise dominion or control over a thing, either directly or through another person or persons, is then in constructive possession of it. Possession may be sole or joint. If one person alone has actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is sole. If two or more persons share actual or constructive possession of a thing, possession is joint. You may find that the element of possession, as that term is used in these instructions, is present if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had actual or constructive possession, either alone or jointly with others. (Emphasis added). 17 953 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 2975 (1992), defendants similarly complained of the trial court's refusal to submit a mere presence instruction. We held, however, that the court's constructive possession chargeSQwhich was identical to the charge delivered in this caseSQobviated the need for a separate mere presence charge. We relied in McKnight in part upon United States v. Erwin, 602 F.2d 1183, 1185 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1014 (1980), and United States v. Rojas, 537 F.2d 216, 200 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 97 S.Ct. 785 (1977), cases in which we had reached the same conclusion. There is no indication that a constructive possession charge was submitted to the jury in Cordova-Larios, a fact which McKnight observed. There is no conflict, therefore, between the holdings of Cordova-Larios and Rojas. McKnight, 953 F.2d at 904. McKnight also affords a second basis for rejecting appellants' assignment of error. McKnight's claim fails, we said, because this case, unlike Cordova-Larios, is, by its undisputed facts, not a 'mere presence' case. 953 F.2d at 903 (emphasis in original). In McKnight, drugs and firearms were discovered in McKnight's small, one-bedroom house where he lived with his 84-year-old mother and a boarder. McKnight's theory of defense was that though present he was unaware of the contraband. We stated that these circumstances did not lend themselves, as a legal matter, to a mere presence defense: The dominion and control associated with owning and living in a small, open house like McKnight's . . . is utterly inconsistent with the legal conclusion that McKnight was 'merely present' in a house full of guns and drugs in its common areas (and a gun in the dresser used 18 by McKnight). Id. at 903 (emphasis in original). By contrast, the facts of Cordova-Larios, which we recount in the margin, are far more amenable to such a defense than are the facts of McKnight.15 As we said, The record sufficiently supports the defensive theory of mere presence to entitle the defendant to the requested instruction. Cordova-Larios, 907 F.2d at 42. We believe that this case is closer to McKnight than to Cordova-Larios. There is no evidence that appellants were mere bystanders who happened to be at the scene of a crime, as in Cordova-Larios. Quite the contrary, as in McKnight, the drugs were indisputably discovered in a location the control over which cannot be fairly attributed to anyone but appellants. Accordingly, it was not error to refuse the mere presence instruction.