Opinion ID: 1952440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Harris' Hearsay Objections

Text: The third issue that Harris raises on appeal concerns two statements that, over objection, were admitted under Delaware Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E). [20] First, during the testimony of Jonathan Brodie, the State asked Brodie whether there was any conversation in his van from the time he left Southbridge until the gunfire started. Brodie answered affirmatively and said that Kenny Davis [21] had said that he was going to hurt somebody. Defense counsel promptly objected on hearsay grounds. The trial judge overruled the objection  holding that the statement was admissible under D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) as a statement by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy and that it was not offered for the truth of the matter. Second, during the testimony of Marvin Harrigan, the State asked Harrigan about what was said during a conversation that he had with Harris and Oliver Cephas after Glasco was shot. Harrigan testified that during the conversation either Harris or Cephas said we got that boy. Again defense counsel objected on hearsay grounds. Again the trial judge overruled the objection  holding that the statement was admissible under D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) as a statement by a co-conspirator in furtherance of a conspiracy and, in the alternative, that the statement was not hearsay because it was not offered for the truth of the matter. On appeal, Harris alleges that neither statement was admissible under D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E) because the foundational requirements of the rule were never met. Under D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E), a statement that normally would be considered hearsay and therefore would not be admissible, may be admitted under an exception if the statement is offered against a party and is made by the party's co-conspirator during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. [22] A statement qualifies as an exception if the offering party can show by a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) a conspiracy existed; 2) the co-conspirator and the defendant against whom the statement is offered were members of the conspiracy; and 3) the statement was made during and to further the conspiracy. [23] Harris argues that the trial court failed to determine that a conspiracy actually existed. Even if the trial court had enunciated an incomplete standard or failed to articulate all three elements of the co-conspirator exception, the record indicates that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its evidentiary ruling. The evidence clearly established that: 1) a conspiracy existed; [24] 2) Harris, Brodie, Davis, Harrigan, and Cephas were members of the conspiracy; and 3) Brodie's and Harrigan's statements were made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. [25] Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the statements into evidence. [26]