Opinion ID: 715658
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: anderson's motion for a kastigar hearing

Text: 14 Anderson contends that the district court erred in failing to grant his motion for a Kastigar hearing; he argues that, because his testimony in the state proceeding was either immunized or compelled over his fifth amendment objections, the government was required to demonstrate that the evidence it intended to introduce at trial was not tainted by exposure to his prior testimony and production of documents. The government, on the other hand, claims that Anderson failed to meet his initial burden of showing that his testimony was compelled by a grant of immunity or otherwise. Rather, the government contends that Anderson explicitly waived his fifth amendment rights in the letter his counsel sent on June 1, 1987. For the following reasons, we hold that (1) Anderson waived his fifth amendment privilege and (2) this waiver was not compelled by a grant of immunity or by the threat of contempt. 15 To begin our discussion, we note that Anderson premises his alleged entitlement to a Kastigar hearing on two distinct fifth amendment claims. First, he argues that his prior testimony and production were immunized by state statute, and thus under Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 92 S.Ct. 1653, 32 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) and Murphy v. Waterfront Commission, 378 U.S. 52, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 12 L.Ed.2d 678 (1964), could not be used either directly or derivatively in his subsequent prosecution. 5 In order to obtain a Kastigar hearing based upon a claim that prior testimony was immunized, a defendant simply must demonstrate that his or her prior testimony was compelled by a grant of immunity. Dudden, 65 F.3d at 1468-69. 6 Once the defendant has testified under a grant of statutory immunity, the government has the burden to prove that any evidence it intends to use against the defendant is derived from a legitimate source independent of the immunized statements. Id. 16 Second, Anderson contends that, absent immunity, his waiver (and therefore his testimony and production) were compelled by a threat of contempt, thus violating his fifth amendment privilege and, again, entitling him to a Kastigar hearing. The fifth amendment protects against the use of compelled statements as well as guarantees the right to remain silent absent immunity. Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 653, 96 S.Ct. 1178, 1182, 47 L.Ed.2d 370 (1976). Accordingly, where a state compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 2135, 53 L.Ed.2d 1 (1977); see also Camp, 72 F.3d at 761 ( '[C]ertain cruel choices, and choices made in highly coercive circumstances, are proscribed by the fifth amendment even though the state, strictly speaking, does not compel an incriminating statement.' ); United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1431 (9th Cir.1994) (police officers who invoked their fifth amendment privilege but subsequently made statements under threat of removal from office were compelled to make the statements in violation of the fifth amendment), cert. granted in part on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 39, 132 L.Ed.2d 920 (1995). 17 Thus, whether or not the defendant waived or failed to assert his or her fifth amendment privilege does not necessarily end the inquiry into an asserted fifth amendment violation. See Garner, 424 U.S. at 653, 96 S.Ct. at 1182 ([T]he inquiry in a Fifth Amendment case is not ended when an incriminating statement is made in lieu of a claim of privilege.). The test is whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne. United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1819, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977); see also Camp, 72 F.3d at 761 (accord). If a defendant's statements were compelled in violation of the fifth amendment, he is entitled to a Kastigar hearing, in which the government must demonstrate that the evidence it intends to introduce in a subsequent criminal proceeding is not tainted by exposure to the compelled statements. Koon, 34 F.3d at 1431. 18 With this framework in mind, we turn now to the parties' arguments. 19
20 To begin, the government argues that the June 1, 1987 letter from Anderson's counsel waived Anderson's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. The fifth amendment privilege is not ordinarily self-executing and must be affirmatively claimed by a person whenever self-incrimination is threatened. United States v. Jenkins, 785 F.2d 1387, 1393 (9th Cir.1986) (citing Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429, 104 S.Ct. 1136, 1143, 79 L.Ed.2d 409 (1984)); see also United States v. Unruh, 855 F.2d 1363, 1374 (9th Cir.1987) (The defendant's failure to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination waives a later claim of privilege.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 974, 109 S.Ct. 513, 102 L.Ed.2d 548 (1988). Moreover, [a]n individual may lose the benefit of the privilege inadvertently, without a knowing and intelligent waiver. Jenkins, 785 F.2d at 1393 (citing Garner, 424 U.S. at 654 n. 9, 96 S.Ct. at 1182 n. 9); see also United States v. Wagner, 834 F.2d 1474, 1483 (9th Cir.1987) (trial judge has no duty to inquire whether waiver was knowing and voluntary). 21 Here, Anderson did not simply fail to assert his privilege; he explicitly stated through counsel that he waived the assertion of his fifth amendment rights. After initially claiming his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination in response to the document subpoenas and most questions at his deposition, the June 1, 1987 letter from Anderson's counsel stated: 22 Specifically, this is to confirm that after considering all of the various implications of doing so, Mr. Anderson has agreed to waive his fifth amendment privilege with respect to testimony and production of documents in the above-referenced matter. He is, therefore, willing to produce documents and to submit to his deposition in this matter without asserting the fifth amendment privilege. 23