Opinion ID: 210220
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The User Limitation

Text: The district court construed the term user to mean a person, a person using a computer, a computer, or computers. Supplemental Claim Construction Opinion at 3. Microsoft had attempted to limit users to persons, thereby excluding a computer or computers, while z4 advocated for the broad interpretation adopted by the district court. Id. at 1. Under its definition, Microsoft argues that the asserted claims require the authorization of a particular user, regardless of what particular computer they are using, while the accused products authorize a particular computer, regardless of who is using it. Microsoft thus asserts that there can be no infringement because its products do not recognize unauthorized users, but rather unauthorized computers. In its reply brief, however, Microsoft concedes a construction of user as including both a person and a person using a computer. Reply Br. at 4 (Properly construed, a `user' is a person or a person using a computer. . . . It is only the district court's elimination of the person altogether, in allowing a computer by itself to be a `user,' that we ask this Court to overrule as an error of law.). In construing a disputed claim term, we begin with the language of the claims. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2005) (en banc). Claims of the '825 patent include the limitations enabling the software on a computer for use by a user, and comparing previously stored registration information . . . to at least one of the software, the user, and the computer. In these recitations, the user and the computer are distinct entities. To construe the term user to mean a computer would result in the claim being interpreted to recite, for example, enabling the software on a computer for use by a [computer]. The language of the claims does not reasonably or logically permit such a construction. Likewise, the written description makes clear that the terms users and computers are distinct and used to describe different things. E.g., '471 patent col.1 ll.48-51 (discussing users who may have a legitimate need to . . . transfer a copy to a new computer); id. col.7 ll.7-9 ([T]he user installs . . . the software in his computer or computer network.). Because a construction that would equate a user with a computer or computers conflicts with both the plain language of the claims and the teachings of the specification, Neo-Magic Corp. v. Trident Microsystems, Inc., 287 F.3d 1062, 1070 (Fed.Cir.2002), the district court's inclusion of computer or computers in its claim construction cannot be sustained. Because we agree with Microsoft that the district court erred in construing user to include a computer or computers apart from a person, we modify the district court's claim construction and hold that a user is properly construed as a person or a person using a computer. [2] This construction applies to all of the asserted claims. See Omega Eng'g, Inc., v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed.Cir.2003) ([W]e presume, unless otherwise compelled, that the same claim term in the same patent or related patents carries the same construed meaning.). Notwithstanding our modification of the district court's claim construction, however, we find Microsoft's contention that the asserted claims require the authorization of a particular user, regardless of what particular computer they are using to be artificial and inconsequential. Although the claims recite software including instructions to reduce use of the software by unauthorized users, '471 patent claim 32, and determin[ing] if the user is an authorized or an unauthorized user, '825 patent claims 44, 131, both the claims and specification describe methods of making this determination based on computer-specific information, among other things. This conclusion is based on relevant language that appears in the claims and not on any particular construction of the term user. Specifically, the claims recite that the software representative may identify authorized users based on a comparison of registration information provided by the user, with previously stored registration information related to at least one of the software, the user, and the computer. Id. Because the [u]se of the phrase `at least one' means that there could be only one or more than one of the listed types of previously stored registration information, Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345 (Fed.Cir.1999), the identification called for by the claims may be accomplished by comparing the registration information with previously-stored information related: (a) to the software installed by a person on the computer; (b) to the person using the computer; or (c) to the computer hardware. Microsoft's argument that the asserted claims require the authorization of a particular user, regardless of what particular computer they are using ignores the language of the claims which, as noted above, permits the identification of authorized users based on, inter alia, previously stored registration information related [only] to . . . the computer. Our construction of the term user to mean a person or a person using a computer does not foreclose or in any way affect such a conclusion nor does it preclude a determination that the accused Microsoft products infringe. Thus, Microsoft's argument, while correct as to the construction of the claim term user, is not determinative of the question of infringement. With respect to infringement, substantial evidence supports the jury verdict, even under our modified construction. Because the claims explicitly contemplate tracking authorized users through, inter alia, the identity of the computers on which they install the software as discussed, supra, and because Microsoft admits that it makes Product Activation determinations based on registration information related to user's computers, see Reply Br. at 2, a reasonable juror could find that Microsoft infringed the asserted claims notwithstanding our modification of the district court's construction of the term user. See Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1328 (Fed.Cir.2002) (noting that when we determine that the district court has misinterpreted a patent claim, we independently construe the claim to determine its correct meaning, and that [w]e may affirm the jury's findings on infringement . . . if substantial evidence appears in the record supporting the jury's verdict and if correction of the errors in a jury instruction on claim construction would not have changed the result, given the evidence presented).