Opinion ID: 1665133
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Objections

Text: Appellant argues that Officer Straka's testimony violated Crawford and was inadmissible hearsay. Specifically, appellant argues that Straka repeated statements contained on an interview card prepared by another Strike Force member for an interview of Charles Yang to support Straka's statement that appellant was a member of the MOD. Similarly, Straka repeated statements made by other individuals to prove that they were MOD members. Under the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause, a criminal defendant has the right to confront the witnesses against him. In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars the admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. The threshold question for a Crawford analysis is whether the statements at issue are testimonial. In Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, 126 S.Ct. 2266, 165 L.Ed.2d 224 (2006), the Supreme Court revisited Crawford and established guidelines for determining when statements made to police are testimonial. The Court explained: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. Id. The State asks us to assume without deciding that the disputed testimony violated Crawford and argues that the admission of these statements was harmless. As a result, we consider whether the error was harmless under our constitutional standard and examine whether the verdict was surely unattributable to the disputed evidence. State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 79-80 (Minn.2005). In determining whether a jury verdict was surely unattributable to an erroneous admission of evidence, we consider (1) the manner in which the evidence was presented, (2) whether it was highly persuasive, (3) whether it was used in closing argument, (4) whether it was effectively countered by the defendant, and (5) whether other evidence of guilt was overwhelming. State v. Al-Naseer, 690 N.W.2d 744, 748 (Minn. 2005). Appellant argues that because the evidence was presented by a police officer, it was highly persuasive to the jury and therefore was prejudicial. We agree that the testimony of a police expert on its face could be persuasive. But the jury was instructed to give the testimony of an expert no greater weight than that of a lay witness. We assume that the jury followed the court's instructions and properly considered the evidence. State v. Ferguson, 581 N.W.2d 824, 833 (Minn.1998). Further, the State did not rely on Straka's disputed testimony during closing arguments to argue that appellant was associated with the MOD. More importantly, the other evidence presented by the State that appellant was a member of the MOD was overwhelming. Specifically, Helene Yang and Bau Yang testified that appellant was a member of the MOD, and appellant told Officer Straka that lots of gangs hate us, the MOD, which implicitly connects appellant to the MOD. [6] Further, the physical evidence seized from appellant's house connected him to the MOD. Additionally, the evidence that supports appellant's convictions is overwhelming. The State presented testimony that appellant was at a St. Paul motel and Lue Vang's barbeque, that appellant was at Jimmy's when the fight erupted with the Tibetans, that appellant participated in chasing the Tibetans into the alley, and that appellant shot and killed Bunsean Lieng. We conclude that the jury verdict was surely unattributable to Straka's testimony in which he repeated out-of-court statements by nonwitnesses that appellant was a member of the MOD, and therefore admission of this testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Appellant argues that even if these statements did not violate Crawford, the statements were inadmissible hearsay and should have been excluded. We agree that Straka's testimony was offered to prove appellant's association with the MOD and therefore was hearsay. Because the erroneously admitted evidence does not involve a constitutional issue, our standard of review focuses on whether the erroneously admitted evidence substantially influenced the jury verdict. Given our previous conclusion that the admission of the statements was not harmful under the stricter harmless beyond a reasonable doubt standard, it necessarily follows that the evidentiary error is also harmless under the alternative standard.