Opinion ID: 2408460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Officers Ohm and Boyd, Jr.

Text: Ms. Wofford correctly states in her brief that, as Officers Ohm and Boyd, Jr., entered her residence without a warrant, their entry must be viewed as illegal unless the State established the availability of an exception to the warrant requirement. Williams v. State, 327 Ark. 213, 939 S.W.2d 264 (1997); Willett v. State, 298 Ark. 588, 769 S.W.2d 744 (1989). Ms. Wofford maintains the State failed to satisfy its burden and that the Trial court erred by finding that the officers had consent to enter her home and that their entry was justified by exigent circumstances. In her view, therefore, the evidence obtained by the police as a result of the officers' initial entry into her home should be suppressed as the fruits of an entry made in violation of the Fourth Amendment. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). When we review a ruling on a motion to suppress, we make an independent determination based on the totality of the circumstances, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. We reverse only if the ruling is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence. Norman v. State, 326 Ark. 210, 931 S.W.2d 96 (1996). Applying this standard, we affirm the Trial Court's ruling that the officers' initial entry was justified by exigent circumstances. Given the testimony adduced at the suppression hearing, that ruling was correct under Ark. R.Crim. P. 14.3, which establishes the emergency exception to the warrant requirement and provides in part as follows: An officer who has reasonable cause to believe that premises or a vehicle contain: (a) individuals in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm ...       may, without a search warrant, enter and search such premises and vehicles, and the persons therein, to the extent reasonably necessary for the prevention of such death, bodily harm, or destruction. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the emergency exception in its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 105 S.Ct. 409, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). In the Mincey case, the Court said that it does not question the right of the police to respond to emergency situations. Numerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises. Cf. Michigan v. Tyler, [436 U.S. 499, 509-10, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) ]. The need to protect or preserve life or avoid serious injury is justification for what would be otherwise illegal absent an exigency or emergency. Wayne v. United States, 115 U.S.App. D.C. 234, 241, 318 F.2d 205, 212 (opinion of Burger, J.). And the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Michigan v. Tyler, supra, at 509-510 [98 S.Ct. at 1949-50]; Coolidge v. New Hampshire, [403 U.S. 443, 465-66, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2037-38, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) ]. But a warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation, Terry v. Ohio, [392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968)].... Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392-93, 98 S.Ct. at 2413 (footnotes omitted). See generally 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.6(a), at pp. 390-403 (3d ed.1996). It is true that Officer Ohm entered Ms. Wofford's bedroom in search of Mark Wofford despite Mr. McMurtery's statement that he believed the child was already dead. This aspect of the search was nonetheless consistent with Rule 14.3(a) because Mr. McMurtery's assessment of the child's condition could well have been incorrect. Frequently, the report of a death proves inaccurate and a spark of life remains, sufficient to respond to emergency police aid. Patrick v. State, 227 A.2d 486, 489 (Del.1967). In short, the officer's entry into the bedroom was clearly related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion into the residence. See generally LAFAVE, supra, at p. 393-94 and n. 19-23. As the Supreme Court of Wisconsin has noted, the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement is satisfied in the case of an emergency entry into a home by the compelling need to render immediate assistance to the victim of a crime, or insure the safety of the occupants of a house when the police reasonably believe them to be in distress and in need of protection. State v. Kraimer, 99 Wis.2d 306, 298 N.W.2d 568, 572 (1980). [T]he purpose of assisting the victim if still alive supplie[s] a compelling reason for immediate entry, quite apart from the purpose of prosecuting for crime. State v. Hoyt, 21 Wis.2d 284, 128 N.W.2d 645, 651 (1964). Thus, under the emergency exception, a warrantless entry into a home may be upheld if the State shows that the intruding officer had reasonable cause to believe that someone inside the home was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm. Ark. R.Crim. P. 14.3(a). Any search that follows the emergency entry may be upheld under this rule only if the search was reasonably necessary for the prevention of such death, bodily harm, or destruction, id., and is strictly circumscribed by the exigencies that necessitated the emergency entry in the first place. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. at 25-26, 88 S.Ct. at 1882. See People v. Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, 249, 347 N.E.2d 607, 610 (1976)(There must be a direct relationship between the area to be searched and the emergency.). However, as the Supreme Court noted in the Mincey case, the police may seize evidence that they observe in plain view while conducting legitimate emergency activities. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. We applied the exception in Combs v. State, 270 Ark. 496, 606 S.W.2d 61 (1980). The record does not indicate that the entry of Officers Ohm and Boyd, Jr., exceeded the scope of the emergency that justified it. Moreover, it is clear that they did not seize any evidence in the home, although they could have done so had they observed the evidence in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. We note Ms. Wofford's suggestion that Rule 14.3(a) cannot apply to the case at bar because Officer Ohm and Boyd, Jr., at the time of entering her home, lacked probable cause to believe that a crime had been, or was being, committed. In support of her suggestion, she cites Mitchell v. State, 294 Ark. 264, 742 S.W.2d 895 (1988). In the Mitchell case, we held the officer's warrantless entry into the appellant's home was illegal because the officer lacked probable cause to believe a crime had been, or was being, committed and because there were no exigent circumstances. Thus, the entry was not covered by the exception to the warrant requirement discussed in Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 100 S.Ct. 1371, 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980). We also said that the officer's entry was not justified by the need to render emergency aid. We did not suggest, however, that the exigent-circumstances exception contained in Rule 14.3(a) requires an officer to have probable cause to believe a crime has been, or is being, committed on the premises. Probable cause is, of course, the basis upon which a warrant to search may be granted. See Ark. R.Crim. P. 13.1(d); Century Theaters, Inc., v. State, 274 Ark. 484, 625 S.W.2d 511 (1981). Finally, in light of our agreement with the conclusion that Officers Ohm and Boyd, Jr. were justified by exigent circumstances in entering Ms. Wofford's home, we do not resolve the question of whether the officers had consent to enter the residence. The officers conceded at the hearing that they lacked consent to enter the residence.