Opinion ID: 796898
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The employee-defendants' immunity under the statute

Text: 62 Section 2744.03 grants immunity to employees of political subdivisions acting within the scope of their employment, but provides that this immunity is subject to specific exceptions. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2744.03(A)(6). Two listed exceptions are relevant to the present appeals. First, § 2744.03(A)(6)(a) provides that an employee is not immune if his or her acts or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of the employee's employment or official responsibilities. The other applicable exception is § 2744.03(A)(6)(b), which states that individual employee immunity does not apply if [t]he employee's acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. 63 Chapter 2744 does not further define the type of employee acts that fall manifestly outside the scope of employment under § 2744.03(A)(6)(a). The Ohio state courts, however, have generally drawn from agency-law principles to hold that [c]onduct is within the scope of employment if it is initiated, in part, to further or promote the master's business. Martin v. Cent. Ohio Transit Auth., 70 Ohio App.3d 83, 590 N.E.2d 411, 417 (1990). But [a]n employee's wrongful act, even if it is unnecessary, unjustified, excessive or improper, does not automatically take the act manifestly outside the scope of employment. Jackson v. McDonald, 144 Ohio App.3d 301, 760 N.E.2d 24, 28 (2001). The court in Jackson held that it is only where the acts of the state employees are motivated by actual malice or other situations giving rise to punitive damages that their conduct may be outside the scope of their state employment. Id. (brackets omitted). 64 Section 2744.03(A)(6)(b) differs from subpart (a) in that it explicitly focuses on the employee's state of mind rather than the employee-employer relationship. Most relevant for the purposes of this appeal is the exception for acts or omissions that were committed in a wanton or reckless manner. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Under Ohio law, wanton and reckless conduct is defined as 65 perversely disregarding a known risk, or acting or intentionally failing to act in contravention of a duty, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable person to realize such conduct creates an unreasonable risk of harm substantially greater than the risk necessary to make the conduct negligent. 66 Webb v. Edwards, 165 Ohio App.3d 158, 845 N.E.2d 530, 536 (2005). 67 Ohio's immunity statute draws no distinction between suits against an individual government employee in his official as opposed to his personal capacity. The Ohio Court of Appeals has held that an action against an officer in his official capacity is simply another way of pleading an action against the governmental entity itself. Norwell v. City of Cincinnati, 133 Ohio App.3d 790, 729 N.E.2d 1223, 1232 (1999) (citing Monell v. New York Dep't Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). If official-capacity claims are nothing more than claims against the county, then it would be appropriate to dismiss the official capacity claims against the employee defendants if such claims have been dismissed against the county. See J & J Schlaegel, Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Union Twp., Nos.2005-CA-31/2005-CA-34, 2006 WL 1575036, at  (Ohio Ct.App. June 9, 2006); Kammeyer v. City of Sharonville, 311 F.Supp.2d 653, 661 (S.D.Ohio 2003). Whether the defendants are liable as individuals thus turns on the availability of statutory immunity as defined in Chapter 2744. For each employee defendant, we must determine whether any of the immunity exceptions under § 2744.03(A)(6) apply.