Opinion ID: 204324
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Was Southeast's offer rendered a nullity because it was a joint proposal? [6]

Text: Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.442(c)(3) states, A proposal may be made by or to any party or parties and by or to any combination of parties properly identified in the proposal. A joint proposal shall state the amount and terms attributable to each party. Joint proposals that do not state the terms attributable to each party are invalid and unenforceable. See, e.g., Attys' Title Ins. Fund, Inc. v. Gorka, 36 So.3d 646, 650-51 (Fla.2010) (per curiam); Graham v. Peter K. Yeskel 1996 Irrevocable Trust, 928 So.2d 371, 372 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Auto-Owners claims that the offer of judgment in question was a joint proposal from Southeast and co-defendant Alan Simpson that failed to identify the terms attributable to each party. The Florida Supreme Court has held that proposals are invalid when offered to multiple parties and conditioned upon acceptance by all. Gorka, 36 So.3d at 649, 651-52. Likewise, offers made by multiple parties that fail to attribute the terms applicable to each are not in compliance with Rule 1.442(c)(3). Willis Shaw, 849 So.2d at 278-79. In this case, Auto-Owners makes several arguments suggesting that Southeast's offer of judgment was an invalid joint proposal or was vague or ambiguous. We reject some such arguments outright, [7] and we certify one argument. The argument that we certify is Auto-Owners's contention that the offer of judgment was an invalid joint proposal because it required the resolution of and dismissal with prejudice of Auto-Owners's claim against a third party to the offer, Simpson, without stating the terms attributable to each party. It is true that the offer of judgment required the resolution of and the dismissal with prejudice of Auto-Owners's claims in this actionnot only its claims against Southeast, but also its claims against Simpson. However, the Florida Fourth District Court of Appeal has held that an offer of settlement made by one party to another party is not transformed into a joint proposal simply because it conditions acceptance on the dismissal of claims against a third party. See Alioto-Alexander v. Toll Bros. Inc., 12 So.3d 915, 917 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009). If Toll Bros, correctly reflects Florida law, it would control the resolution of this issue and mandate a rejection of Auto-Owners's argument that the instant offer of judgment is an invalid joint proposal. If we were not in any event certifying the issue discussed above in Part II.A., we would simply follow Toll Bros, and reject Auto-Owners's argument that the offer of judgment in this case was a joint proposal and therefore invalid. However, because Toll Bros. is a decision of an intermediate appellate court, and because we have found no pertinent case from the Florida Supreme Court, it is possible that the Florida Supreme Court may desire to review the rule of Toll Bros. Therefore, we certify the following question: DOES THE CONDITIONING OF AN OFFER OF JUDGMENT ON THE RESOLUTION AND DISMISSAL WITH PREJUDICE OF THE OFFEREE'S CLAIMS IN THE ACTION AGAINST A THIRD-PARTY RENDER THE OFFER OF JUDGMENT A JOINT PROPOSAL, AS THAT TERM IS USED IN FLORIDA RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1.442(c)(3)?