Opinion ID: 2215587
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: c. xx-xx-xx-x.

Text: Defendant asserts that [t]he 180 day restriction commences when the request for final disposition made pursuant to I.C. § 35-2.1-2-4 [Burns Repl.1979], has been delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court having jurisdiction. [2] Scrivener v. State, 441 N.E.2d 954, 956 (Ind. 1982) (citing Holland v. State, 265 Ind. 216, 352 N.E.2d 752 (1976), and Pethtel v. State, 427 N.E.2d 891 (Ind.Ct.App.1981)). As there is no dispute that the notices of September 22, 1993 and October 14, 1993 were delivered to the prosecuting attorney and the court, the defendant argues that these notices triggered the 180 day speedy trial provision of the IAD, effective on the date of delivery. However, an inmate must do more than deliver notice in order to commence the 180 day period. Greenwood erroneously reads Scrivener, 441 N.E.2d at 956. Scrivener does in fact state that delivery of notice to the prosecuting attorney and the appropriate court commences the 180 day period. However, such notice must be made pursuant to the provisions of the IAD; Article 3(b) of which requires the defendant to deliver notice to custodial officials so that they can forward the notice along with appropriate certifications to prosecuting authorities. Steelman v. State, 486 N.E.2d 523, 524 (Ind. 1985); Ward v. State, 435 N.E.2d 578, 580 (Ind.Ct.App.1982). These procedures are not mere technicalities and we have long required strict compliance. E.g., Ward, 435 N.E.2d at 580. Validation of information from the official having custody is important to prosecuting officials in the receiving state. Id. Also necessary is waiver of extradition, which was lacking in both the September 22 and October 15 demands. (R. 1, 64). Greenwood argues that although Ward states that strict compliance is required, the defendant in Ward was not held to this standard. However, in Ward, the defendant did all that he was capable of in order to deliver notice to his warden. Ward's only communication link to prison administration was through his case manager, whom he notified and gave a copy of the notice. That court found that notice to the case manager was sufficient custodial notice, and that Ward should not be attributed with the prison officials' subsequent failure to comply with the IAD. Id. at 580-81. In the present case, there is no evidence in the record that Greenwood notified the custodial authorities of his September 22, 1993 nor his October 14, 1993 notices. Thus, he did not comply with the provisions of the IAD, and the 180 day period did not commence until receipt of the February 10, 1994 notice. Greenwood's May 9, 1994 motion for discharge was within this 180 day period, and it should have been denied.