Opinion ID: 1193965
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Heading: Conflict Between Charter Amendment's Eviction Provisions and General Laws

Text: The charter amendment imposes two kinds of restraint upon eviction proceedings: It limits the grounds upon which a landlord may bring an action to repossess a rent-controlled unit (§ 7, subd. (a)) and it requires that a landlord obtain a certificate of eviction from the rent control board before seeking such repossession (§ 7, subds. (b)-(g)). These two types of restriction will be considered in order. The permitted grounds for eviction can be grouped into three categories. One category consists of breaches of the tenant's duties to the landlord: failure to pay rent or to perform an obligation of the tenancy after notice, commission of a nuisance on or of substantial damage to the rented premises, conviction of using the premises for an illegal purpose, refusal of reasonable landlord access for repairs, inspection, or showing to a prospective purchaser, or transferring possession to an unauthorized subtenant. (§ 7, subds. (a)(1)-(4), (6)-(7).) A second category consists of the landlord's good faith intention to withdraw the unit from the rental housing market for occupancy by the landlord or specified relatives of the landlord (§ 7, subd. (a)(8)), or for demolition or conversion to nonhousing use (§ 7, subd. (a)(9)). The remaining category is the refusal of the tenant holding at the expiration of a lease (rental housing agreement) to execute a written renewal or extension for the same duration as the original lease and on terms that are materially the same. (§ 7, subd. (a)(5).) [16] These permitted grounds for eviction appear to cover most if not all of the grounds that would otherwise be available except that of termination of the tenancy. No other omitted grounds have been called to our attention and we assume for present purposes that the effect of the provision is simply to prohibit the eviction of a tenant who is in good standing at the expiration of the tenancy unless the premises are to be withdrawn from the rental housing market or the landlord's offer of a renewal lease has been refused. [17] (8) This prohibition is a reasonable means of enforcing rent ceilings by preventing landlords from putting out tenants because of their unwillingness to pay illegal amounts of rent or their opposition to applications for increases in rent ceilings. (See Block v. Hirsh (1921) 256 U.S. 135, 157-158 [65 L.Ed. 865, 871-872, 41 S.Ct. 458, 16 A.L.R. 165]; Heubeck v. City of Baltimore, supra, 205 Md. 203, 212.) Plaintiffs contend that any regulation of the grounds for eviction is preempted by general state law. Code of Civil Procedure section 1161, subdivision 1, makes the continuation of a tenant's possession after expiration of the term a form of unlawful detainer for which the landlord may recover possession in summary proceedings under Code of Civil Procedure section 1164 et seq. However, these statutory provisions are not necessarily in conflict with the charter amendment's provision forbidding landlords to recover possession upon expiration of a tenancy if the purpose of the statutes is sufficiently distinct from that of the charter amendment. (See Galvan v. Superior Court, supra, 70 Cal.2d 851, 859; People v. Mueller, supra, 8 Cal. App.3d 949, 954.) The purpose of the unlawful detainer statutes is procedural. The statutes implement the landlord's property rights by permitting him to recover possession once the consensual basis for the tenant's occupancy is at an end. In contrast the charter amendment's elimination of particular grounds for eviction is a limitation upon the landlord's property rights under the police power, giving rise to a substantive ground of defense in unlawful detainer proceedings. The mere fact that a city's exercise of the police power creates such a defense does not bring it into conflict with the state's statutory scheme. Thus, a landlord's violations of a city's housing code may be the basis for the defense of breach of warranty of habitability in a summary proceeding instituted by the landlord to recover possession for nonpayment of rent. ( Green v. Superior Court, supra, 10 Cal.3d 616, 637-638; Hinson v. Delis, supra, 26 Cal. App.3d 62.) (9) Similarly, the statutory remedies for recovery of possession and of unpaid rent (see Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1159-1179a; Civ. Code, § 1951 et seq.) do not preclude a defense based on municipal rent control legislation enacted pursuant to the police power imposing rent ceilings and limiting the grounds for eviction for the purpose of enforcing those rent ceilings. ( Inganamort v. Borough of Fort Lee, supra, 62 N.J. 521, 537; [18] Warren v. City of Philadelphia, supra, 382 Pa. 380, 385.) [19] In addition to limiting the substantive grounds for eviction the charter amendment prescribes procedures that a landlord must undergo as a prerequisite to seeking repossession of a rent-controlled unit. Before commencing unlawful detainer proceedings (Code Civ. Proc., § 1164 et seq.) the landlord is required to obtain a certificate of eviction from the rent control board. (§ 7, subds. (b), (g).) The Board must give notice of the application for the certificate to the tenant or tenants who then have five days in which to request a full hearing conducted under the rules governing hearings for adjustments in maximum rents. (§ 7, subds. (c), (e).) The hearing must be scheduled within seven days after it is requested (§ 7, subd. (d)) and the Board must grant or deny the certificate within five days after the hearing is held (§ 7, subd. (f)). However, no limit is stated for the time within which the Board must give the tenants notice of the application after it is filed or must act on the application if no hearing is requested following such notice. Moreover, there is an express provision that either party may seek judicial review of a decision of the Board to grant or deny a certificate. (§ 7, subd. (g); § 9.) To be granted a certificate the landlord must carry the burden of showing not only the existence of permissible grounds for eviction and that the tenancy has been properly terminated by notice but also that there are no outstanding Code violations on the premises other than those substantially caused by the present tenants. (§ 7, subds. (b), (e).) Moreover, the Board is forbidden to issue a certificate if it finds that the eviction is in retaliation for reporting Code violations or violations of this Article [the charter amendment], or for organizing other tenants, or for enforcing rights under this Charter Amendment. (§ 7, subd. (e).) A finding adverse to the landlord on the existence of code violations on the premises or on the issues of retaliation precludes issuance of the certificate regardless of the existence of any of the grounds for eviction permitted by subdivision (a) of section 7. [20] As already stated, the charter amendment is invalid to the extent that it purports to regulate a field that is fully occupied by general state law. ( Healy v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1953) 41 Cal.2d 118, 122 [258 P.2d 1]; fn. 10, ante. ) (10) Plaintiffs urge and the trial court found that to require a landlord to obtain a certificate of eviction before seeking to recover possession of a rent-controlled unit invalidly conflicts with sections 1159 through 1179a of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provide landlords with a summary procedure for exercising their rights of repossession against tenants. We agree. Unlike the limitations imposed by the charter amendment upon chargeable rents and upon the grounds for eviction, which can affect summary repossession proceedings only by making substantive defenses available to the tenant, the requirement of a certificate of eviction raises procedural barriers between the landlord and the judicial proceeding. [21] Thus if a tenant were permitted to raise as a defense in a summary proceeding that the landlord had failed to obtain a certificate of eviction, the terms of the charter amendment would not permit the landlord to meet the defense by showing that he could have qualified for the certificate had he applied for it but would preclude him from relief simply because he had never gone through the proper procedures before the rent control board. [22] The summary repossession procedure (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1159-1179a) is intended to be a relatively simple and speedy remedy that obviates any need for self-help by landlords. ( Kassan v. Stout (1973) 9 Cal.3d 39, 43-44 [106 Cal. Rptr. 783, 507 P.2d 87]; Jordan v. Talbot (1961) 55 Cal.2d 597, 604-605 [12 Cal. Rptr. 488, 361 P.2d 20, 6 A.L.R.3d 161]; see Lindsey v. Normet (1972) 405 U.S. 56, 71-73 [31 L.Ed.2d 36, 49-50, 92 S.Ct. 862].) To require landlords to fulfill the elaborate prerequisites for the issuance of a certificate of eviction by the rent control board before they commence the statutory proceeding would nullify the intended summary nature of the remedy. City charter provisions purporting to impose far less burdensome prerequisites upon the exercise of statutory remedies have been held to be invalid invasions of the field fully occupied by the statute. In Eastlick v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 29 Cal.2d 661, damages for personal injuries resulting from a fall on a broken sidewalk were recovered from the defendant city by a plaintiff who had filed a timely claim in full compliance with the applicable state statute prior to commencing the suit. The city contended that the claim was insufficient as filed because it did not include the more detailed information prescribed by the city charter, arguing that its charter provision as to itemization of damages is merely supplementary to the general law  an additional, not a contrary requirement  and therefore is valid. (29 Cal.2d at p. 666.) We held that the statute had occupied the field of filing such claims against municipalities and that the city could not impose more onerous conditions with respect to the required contents of a claim. We rejected the city's contention that its auditing procedures required more detailed information, pointing out that the statute was intended to provide completely for the city's needs for information about claims in advance of suit. (29 Cal.2d at p. 667.) Similarly in Wilson v. Beville (1957) 47 Cal.2d 852 [306 P.2d 789], we held that an inverse condemnation suit against a city could not be conditioned upon compliance with the claim-filing requirements of the city's charter. The state statutes fully occupy the field of assessing compensation for condemned property and therefore a city charter cannot make the recovery of such compensation more onerous. Thus we conclude that the present charter amendment's requirement that landlords obtain certificates of eviction before seeking repossession of rent-controlled units cannot stand in the face of state statutes that fully occupy the field of landlord's possessory remedies. Insofar as the charter amendment simply prohibits eviction of tenants who are in good standing except for the expiration of their tenancies, it is a reasonable means of assuring compliance with maximum rent limits and does not conflict with statutory repossession proceedings even though making available a substantive defense to eviction. However, we have concluded for reasons to be explained that the charter amendment's provisions for fixing maximum rents are constitutionally defective. Hence the limitation on the grounds for eviction cannot stand as it has no legislative purpose in the absence of limits on rent. (See F.T.B. Realty Corp. v. Goodman (1949) 300 N.Y. 140, 148 [89 N.E.2d 865].) Although the charter amendment contains a severability clause (§ 12), such a clause does not require that we salvage provisions which even though valid are not intended to be independently operative. ( Santa Barbara Sch. Dist. v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 315, 331 [118 Cal. Rptr. 637, 530 P.2d 605].)