Opinion ID: 2308293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Tape Recording of the 911 Telephone Call

Text: The defendant argues that the trial justice erred by allowing a tape recording of Mr. Matheson's telephone call to the 911 operator into evidence because the statements contained therein constituted hearsay evidence. The defendant makes the same argument about the statements Mr. Matheson made to Det. Barry. The defendant maintains that both sets of statements were hearsay [1] not falling within any exception to the rule against hearsay. Rule 802 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence. In the alternative, defendant asserts that the trial justice abused his discretion by allowing the statements into evidence because the evidence was needlessly cumulative and unfairly prejudicial under Rule 403 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence [2] in light of Mr. Matheson's testimony in court. It is well established that [t]he admission of a statement under an exception to the hearsay rule is within the sound discretion of the trial justice and shall not be overturned unless clearly erroneous. State v. Ruffner, 911 A.2d 680, 689 (R.I. 2006) (quoting State v. Lynch, 854 A.2d 1022, 1038 (R.I.2004)). See State v. Torres, 787 A.2d 1214, 1222 (R.I.2002) (admissibility of an excited utterance is clearly within the trial justice's discretion and will not be overturned unless there is an abuse of discretion); Estate of Sweeney v. Charpentier, 675 A.2d 824, 827 (R.I.1996) (admissibility of the residual exception to the hearsay rule is clearly within the discretion of the trial justice and will not be overturned unless there was an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice). Two exceptions to the rule against hearsay are the excited utterance exception and the present sense impression exception. Rule 803(1) of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence provides that a present sense impression is [a] statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter[,] and Rule 803(2) describes an excited utterance as a statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition. The rationale for exceptions to the rule against hearsay is that some statements, notwithstanding their nature as hearsay, possess sufficient circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness so as to justify admission of the statement even though the declarant is available and could be called to testify. Rule 803 Advisory Committee's Notes. An excited utterance contains such guarantees of trustworthiness because a startling event may produce an effect that temporarily stills the declarant's capacity of reflection and produces statements free of conscious fabrication. State v. Krakue, 726 A.2d 458, 462 (R.I.1999) (quoting Rule 803(2) Advisory Committee's Notes). [A] statement made in response to a traumatic or startling event is a spontaneous utterance so long as it was made while the declarant `was still laboring under the stress of [the]    experience.' Torres, 787 A.2d at 1222 (quoting Krakue, 726 A.2d at 462). Similarly, a present sense impression contains guarantees of trustworthiness because when a statement is made contemporaneously with the event, there is no time for reflection or deception and no question about the accuracy of the declarant's memory. State v. Momplaisir, 815 A.2d 65, 70 (R.I.2003). A present sense impression is a statement that is made simultaneously or with only a slight lapse of time from the event about which the statement relates. Id. The rationale for the exception    is that the contemporaneity of the event and statement `negative the likelihood of deliberate or conscious misrepresentation.' State v. Wright, 817 A.2d 600, 605 (R.I.2003) (quoting Rule 803(1) Advisory Committee's Notes). The gravamen of defendant's appellate argument is that the available evidence leads to the conclusion that [Mr.] Matheson's statements were the product of reflection and fabrication, and lacked the indicia of reliability which is the lynchpin for admission under the present sense [impression] or excited utterance exception[s]. To support this thesis, defendant points only to the fact the screen was not seized as evidence and his contention that the photographs of the screen did not corroborate Mr. Matheson's testimony that defendant jumped through the screen in his flight from the apartment. We are satisfied that, on the contrary, Mr. Matheson's statements to the 911 operator were correctly characterized by the trial justice as both present sense impressions and excited utterances. The trial justice overruled defendant's objection to the 911 tape on the basis of the excited utterance exception to the rule against hearsay, but added the State's further argument [present sense impression] gives support for the Court overruling that objection[.] We are satisfied that the trial justice's rulings were well within the scope of his ample discretion in evidentiary matters. He specifically found that Mr. Matheson was laboring under a condition of stress or excitement caused by the event which [he] claimed to have witnessed. The evidence clearly supports the trial justice's ruling. Mr. Matheson testified he had observed his friend and neighbor performing an unspeakable act of sexual molestation upon his toddler daughter. His anger and agitation is unmistakable in the tape recorded conversation with the 911 operator that occurred immediately after he perceived this horrific event. At one point he can be heard to intone: I need an officer now, before I kill this mother fucker. Significantly, the tape recording captures Mr. Matheson's statements to defendant when the latter came out of the bathroom, begged Mr. Matheson to hang up the telephone, and then attempted to flee. Mr. Matheson can be heard describing defendant's actions as they occur. At this point he is describing an ongoing crime contemporaneously with its commission, specifically, defendant's efforts to cover up the molestation and then his efforts to flee the scene. Clearly, Mr. Matheson had no time for reflection or fabrication. Further, the fact that Mr. Matheson was laboring under the excitement of a startling event during his telephone call with the 911 operator is corroborated by the testimony of Det. Barry who subsequently arrived at the scene. Even at that time, according to Det. Barry, Mr. Matheson appeared to be [e]motionally traumatized, breathing quickly, at times crying and repeating the same words over and over again[.] It is clear to us that the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in admitting the tape recording of the 911 telephone call as both an excited utterance and a present sense impression. Nor do we consider it unduly prejudicial or needlessly cumulative. It was no doubt damaging to defendant's cause; nevertheless it was highly relevant and a permissible means for the state to attempt to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, defendant did not raise a Rule 403 argument at trial and it is therefore waived. [3] See State v. Merced, 933 A.2d 172, 174 (R.I.2007).