Opinion ID: 2624988
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Was the evidence more prejudicial than probative?

Text: The superior court declined to inform the jury of Hess's prior acquittal partly because it reasoned that the jury would be confused. It was concerned about instructing the jury on the different proof standards. The A.R. jury applied the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in reaching its verdict, but the H.W. jury only had to apply the preponderance standard in deciding whether to accept A.R.'s prior-act testimony at the H.W. trial. The court noted that it expressed [its own] confusion there. The court also noted that if the acquittal were admitted into evidence, Hess's conviction of the lesser charge of sexual abuse of a minor would be admitted, creating more confusion. Hess argues that informing the jury of the acquittal would have been neither confusing nor misleading. He asserts that an acquittal is easily understood and has a clear meaning as a verdict of not guilty. Hess also argues that informing the jury of his acquittal would alleviate the extreme prejudice of the propensity evidence, and that therefore its probative value outweighs any potential confusion. The state responds that the acquittal has limited, if any, probative value, and that the superior court minimized any risk of unfair prejudice caused by A.R.'s testimony by instructing the jury that A.R.'s testimony was relevant only to the issue whether the defendant recklessly disregarded H.W.'s lack of consent. [38] Alaska Evidence Rule 403 permits a trial court to exclude relevant evidence if the danger of confusing the issues or misleading the jury outweighs its probative value. The admissibility of a prior acquittal has been held to be a matter within the trial court's discretion, and therefore a case-specific analysis is needed to compare the potential prejudice and probative value of the evidence. [39] Most jurisdictions, including Alaska before the legislature enacted Rule 404(b)(3), have considered propensity evidence to be so prejudicial that they exclude it by rule. [40] And prior acts of sexual assault were considered so prejudicial as evidence of propensity that they were previously absolutely precluded as evidence of a defendant's reckless disregard, despite their undoubted relevance. [41] The legislature's 1994 policy determination that this evidence can be offered to rebut a defense of consent [42] does not mean that its admission is no longer prejudicial. But the question is not whether A.R.'s testimony should have been excluded because it potentially prejudiced Hess. The question is whether any prejudice created by informing the jury of Hess's acquittal outweighs its probative value to Hess. The different verdicts in the A.R. trial make Hess's acquittal particularly probative. The A.R. jury acquitted Hess on the charge of first-degree sexual assault, [43] but convicted him on the lesser alternative charge of first-degree sexual abuse of a minor. [44] The guilty verdict meant that the jury found that Hess had sexually penetrated A.R. and that A.R. was less than sixteen years old. [45] A sexual assault conviction would have required the jury to find that Hess had knowingly sexually penetrated A.R. with reckless disregard for her lack of consent. [46] Although Hess denied penetrating A.R., the A.R. jury must have disbelieved his denial because it convicted him on the lesser alternative charge. Therefore, in acquitting him of first-degree sexual assault, the A.R. jury must have decided that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that Hess recklessly disregarded A.R.'s lack of consent or that A.R. did not consent to have sex with Hess. And it may have found that the state failed to prove both of those things. Thus, the peculiar circumstances here make the acquittal on the sexual assault charge potentially useful in deciding whether Hess had a propensity to recklessly disregard a companion's wishes. The acquittal was therefore potentially useful in deciding whether he recklessly disregarded H.W.'s lack of consent. Evidence of a prior acquittal may cause confusion if the jury takes it as proof that the defendant is innocent of the prior charge, rather than as evidence that reasonable doubt existed as to at least one element of the acquitted charge. [47] But a high risk of unfair prejudice may outweigh the risk of confusion, [48] and a jury instruction explaining the requisite levels of proof may minimize the risk of confusion. [49] Because we think that the acquittal had substantial probative value to Hess, that its exclusion hampered his ability to respond to A.R.'s propensity evidence testimony, and that any undue prejudice its admission would cause the state could be avoided or minimized by appropriate instructions, we conclude that it was error not to inform the jury of Hess's acquittal.