Opinion ID: 1967844
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admissibility of Evidence Challenges

Text: Jones makes two arguments related to the admissibility of evidence. We review a trial judge's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. [16] To the extent that the ruling pertains to an alleged constitutional violation, we review de novo. [17] When a defendant fails to make a timely objection to the evidence, however, we review only for plain error. [18]
Jones first contends that the trial judge erred by admitting § 3507 statements [19] Still made to the police during their investigation of Jones and his co-conspirator, Page. [20] Jones complains about two categories of statements made by Still during her interrogation. The first consists of her comments regarding what Page told her in the weeks leading up to the homicide, including his intent to enlist Jones to commit murder. The second category includes statements Page made to Still after the murders, which implied that Jones was da man for committing them. For both categories of statements, Jones argues that the statements Page allegedly made to Still are hearsay within hearsay without any exception, are unduly prejudicial within the meaning of D.R.E. 403(b), and violate his rights to confront Page under the Confrontation Clauses of the U.S. and Delaware constitutions. [21] Hearsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an exception to the hearsay rule. . . . [22] The outer layer of hearsay (Still's out-of-court statement to the police) was admissible under § 3507 because Still testified and was subject to cross examination at trial. The trial judge found that the inner layer of hearsay fell within specific hearsay exceptions. [23] The trial judge admitted the first category of statements under D.R.E. 803(3) as present-sense mental impressions, after considering the five factors outlined in Derrickson State. [24] She also considered the context of the statements and found that they were not backward-looking, memory-based statements that would be hearsay outside of Rule 803(3)'s exception. [25] We find no abuse of discretion. The trial judge found the second category of statements to be admissible as statements of a co-conspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy under D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). The court determined that the conspiracy was ongoing at the time the statements were made because the money taken from Reinford's home had not been divided. [26] Alternatively, the trial judge determined that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy because Still was told during the conversation to return the car to Delaware so the police would be unable to track them. [27] Generally, a conspiracy terminates upon accomplishment of the principal objective unless evidence is introduced indicating that the scope of the original agreement included acts taken to conceal the criminal activity. [28] This Court has stated that statements made after the robbery but before the proceeds were divided are made `in furtherance of the conspiracy.' [29] Thus, Page's statements to Still were admissible pursuant to D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). Moreover, the probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. [30] Although the statements were admissible under the Rules of Evidence, that does not necessarily dispose of Jones's argument under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which requires that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him. [31] In Crawford v. Washington [32] the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. [33] The U.S. Supreme Court held in Davis v. Washington [34] that statements are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. [35] Section 3507 statements may be testimonial under Davis. For an out-of-court statement to be admitted as affirmative evidence under § 3507, the witness must be present at trial and subject to cross-examination. [36] Still testified in this case and Jones's counsel cross-examined her. Accordingly, there was no violation of Jones's Sixth Amendment right to confront Still as a witness against him. [37] Jones argues, nevertheless, that his right to confrontation was violated because he could not confront Page and cross-examine him about the statements Page allegedly made to Still. Jones relies on Floudiotis [38] for the proposition that the admission of a non-testifying co-defendant's statement that tends to incriminate the defendant violates the Confrontation Clause. [39] Our opinion in Floudiotis also recognized, however, that Confrontation Clause issues . . . may not be applicable when a statement of a co-conspirator is admitted under D.R.E. 801(d)(2)(E). [40] Although Crawford [left] for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of `testimonial,' [41] Davis provides guidance on the distinction between testimonial and nontestimonial statements: Statements are nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution. [42] Thus, under Crawford and Davis, a statement is testimonial and implicates the Confrontation Clause where it is given in non-emergency circumstances and the declarant would recognize that his statements could be used against him in subsequent formal proceedings. [43] By contrast, a casual remark to an acquaintance is a nontestimonial statement. [44] Similarly, as the U.S. Supreme Court recognized in Crawford, statements made in furtherance of a conspiracy are nontestimonial. [45] Here, Page's statements were nontestimonial in nature because they were casual remarks made to his girlfriend (Still). Although Still revealed these statements in a testimonial setting, this did not change the nature of Page's statements to her. We find no merit to Jones's argument because neither Page's statements showing his state of mind, nor his statements in furtherance of the conspiracy, were testimonial within the meaning of Crawford and Davis. [46] Consistent with these cases, Page's nontestimonial statements to Still are subject only to our State's hearsay rules because they do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. [47] We have already concluded that the statements were properly admitted under our Rules of Evidence. Accordingly, Jones's arguments are without merit.
Next, Jones argues for the first time on appeal that the trial judge erred by allowing the State to introduce the actual video of Kim Still's § 3507 statement into evidence as a trial exhibit. Because Jones failed to object, we may reverse only if the plain error is so clearly prejudicial to substantial rights as to jeopardize the fairness and integrity of the trial process. [48] A panel of this Court recently addressed this identical claim in Page v. State: [49] As a general matter, recorded or written out-of-court § 3507 statements that are played or read during trial should not be admitted as separate trial exhibits that the jury can take into the jury room during deliberations when all other testimony including direct and cross-examination testimony of a § 3507 witness, out-of-court § 3507 statements presented by a witness other than the § 3507 declarant, and testimony presented by non § 3507 witnessesare generally not admitted as separate trial exhibits in transcript form after the witness testifies in court. . . . The trial judge does, however, have discretion to depart from this default rule when in his judgment the situation so warrants (e.g., where the jury asks to rehear a § 3507 statement during its deliberations or where the parties do not object to having the written or recorded statements go into the jury room as exhibits). [50] As in Page, there was no objection, and the trial judge here exercised her discretion to allow the statement into evidence. Jones's claim of plain error fails.