Opinion ID: 1367717
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Alleged Violation of Defendant's Right to Due Process of Law

Text: A separate felony complaint (amended on Mar. 19, 1985) was filed charging defendant with unlawfully taking Inez Blanco's automobile. (Veh. Code, ง 10851, subd. (a).) This complaint was joined, for the purpose of the preliminary hearing, with the complaint in the present case charging defendant with murder. At the preliminary hearing, which began on September 3, 1985, Blanco testified that her automobile was stolen on the morning the murder occurred, and that she had not given defendant (or anyone else) permission to take the vehicle. As explained above, Blanco went on to testify concerning other matters, testimony which ultimately was introduced at trial. Defendant was held to answer on the charge of unlawfully taking an automobile and, on September 17, 1985, an information charging that offense was filed. On November 14, 1985, the prosecution filed a motion to consolidate the information charging the unlawful taking of an automobile with the information in the present case. The trial court granted that motion on December 2, 1985. On September 17, 1986, the charge of unlawfully taking an automobile was dismissed on the People's motion, which was premised on the following ground: the People no longer believe that the defendant actually took or used the vehicle without the owner's permission and therefore lack suffi[cient] evidence to convict. During a motion to recuse the Office of the District Attorney for the County of Santa Barbara, Deputy District Attorney Eugene Martinez, the prosecutor at the preliminary hearing, testified that at the time of this hearing, he assumed Inez Blanco had induced defendant to commit the murder and thought there was a good possibility that she was lying about defendant's having taken her automobile without her permission, believing, however, the remainder of her testimony to be truthful. (25) Defendant contends he was denied due process of law because the prosecutor, for the purpose of inducing Inez Blanco to testify at the preliminary hearing, filed and maintained against defendant the charge of unlawfully taking a vehicle, knowing that that charge was based upon false testimony and that at trial Blanco would exercise her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to testify. We need not, and do not, determine whether the record before us establishes the first factual premise of this contention (that the prosecution improperly filed and maintained a charge against defendant, knowing it was based upon false testimony), because it is clear the record before us does not establish the remaining premises of this contention: that the prosecutor's purpose in filing and maintaining the alleged Vehicle Code violation was to induce Blanco to testify, that the filing of this charge in fact induced Blanco to testify at the preliminary hearing, and that the prosecution knew Blanco would refuse to testify at trial. The trial court found the prosecutor did not have an improper purpose in introducing Inez Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony that she did not give defendant permission to take her automobile. Nothing in the record before us compels us to reject that finding. In addition, defendant does not explain why filing the Vehicle Code section 10851 charge against defendant would have induced Inez Blanco to testify at the preliminary hearing. In light of the special circumstance allegation that defendant committed the murder for hire or for financial gain, the filing of the unlawful-taking-of-a-vehicle charge hardly could have convinced Blanco that the prosecution did not at least suspect she was an accomplice to the murder. The evidence available to the prosecution suggests it logically would have believed that the person who hired defendant was Inez Blanco. Finally, nothing in the record would support a finding that the prosecution, knowing Inez Blanco would refuse to testify at trial, induced her to testify at the preliminary hearing. Defendant relies upon the observation in People v. Trevino (1985) 39 Cal.3d 667, 681 [217 Cal. Rptr. 652, 704 P.2d 719], that the prosecutor may not bring criminal charges against an individual unless supported by probable cause, and the holding in White v. Ragen (1945) 324 U.S. 760, 764 [89 L.Ed. 1348, 1352, 65 S.Ct. 978], that a conviction, secured by the use of perjured testimony known to be such by the prosecuting attorney, is a denial of due process. [Citations.] Neither of these decisions provides a basis for reversal of the judgment in the present case. We need not, and do not, determine whether the record establishes (1) that Inez Blanco committed perjury by testifying at the preliminary hearing that she did not give defendant permission to take her automobile, and, if so, (2) that the prosecutor knew this testimony was perjured. The charge of unlawfully taking a vehicle was dismissed prior to trial, and the disputed portion of Blanco's preliminary hearing testimony was not admitted into evidence at trial. Nothing suggests that the remaining portions of Blanco's testimony (which were received at trial) were perjured. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that perjured testimony was admitted at the trial or was used in some indirect manner to secure his conviction.