Opinion ID: 185049
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cross-Reference Provisions

Text: 12 Under the Guidelines, the sentence for a violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g) is calculated by reference to section 2K2.1, entitled Unlawful Receipt, Possession, or Transportation of Firearms or Ammunition. Section 2K2.1 is divided into three subsections: subsection (a) assigns the base offense level for firearms offenses; subsection (b) lists specific offense characteristics to increase or decrease the base offense level; and subsection (c) is a cross-reference provision, which, as an alternative to subsections (a) and (b), assigns a potentially higher base offense level to a defendant who uses or possesses a firearm in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another crime. Section 2K2.1 provides in relevant part: 13 (a) Base Offense Level (Apply the Greatest):.... 14 (6) 14, if the defendant ... is a prohibited person;.... 15 (b) Specific Offense Characteristics.... 16 (4) If any firearm was stolen, or had an altered or obliterated serial number, increase by 2 levels. 4 (5) If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense..., increase by 4 levels..... 17 (c) Cross Reference(1) If the defendant used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with the commission or at-tempted commission of another offense ..., apply-- 18 (A) 2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy)in respect to that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined above. Section 2X1.1 in turn provides: 19 (a) Base Offense Level: The base offense level from the guideline for the substantive offense, plus any adjustments from such guideline for any intended offense conduct that can be established with reasonable certainty 5 . 20 ....(c) Cross Reference(1) When an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy is expressly covered by another offense guideline section, apply that guideline section. 21 Under section 2K2.1(c), the cross-reference provision, a defendant who uses a firearm to commit or attempt to commit another crime is assigned the offense level that corresponds to that other offense, if the resulting offense level is greater than that determined under subsections (a) and (b). Specifically, section 2K2.1(c) provides that the defendant's offense level should be determined under section 2X1.1. Section 2X1.1, in turn, provides that the base offense level for a crime involving attempt, solicitation or conspiracy should be calculated either by reference to the offense level of the substantive offense, see U.S.S.G. 2X1.1(a), or [w]hen an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy is expressly covered by another offense guideline section, apply that guideline section, id. 2X1.1(c). 22 Drew argues that the district court erred in applying the cross-reference provisions of sections 2K2.1 and 2X1.1 to sentence him under the attempted murder guideline. See Drew, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 43-44. Drew contends that he should have been sentenced under section 2K2.1(a) & (b)(5) and that the sentence imposed by the district court violated his right to due process.
23 The district court's interpretation of sections 2K2.1 and 2X1.1 involves a question of law that we review de novo. See Becraft, 117 F.3d at 1451. We must first determine which subsection of 2K2.1 to apply. Drew argues that under subsections (a) and (b), his total offense level should be 17 and his sentencing range should be 30 to 37 months. 6 Subsection (c) of section 2K2.1, however, is the applicable provision because: (1) Drew used or possessed [the] firearm or ammunition in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense namely, attempted first degree murder, and (2) the resulting base offense level under subsection (c) would be greater than 17. Section 2K2.1(c) then refers the sentencing court to section 2X1.1. 24 Section 2X1.1(c) instructs the court to apply the guideline, if any, that expressly cover[s] an attempt to commit another offense as used in section 2K2.1(c). The government argues that, as the district court determined, Drew attempted to commit first degree murder because he had the requisite state of mind, and took sufficiently premeditated actions to constitute attempted first degree murder. Drew, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 44. As discussed supra, we conclude that the district court did not clearly err in determining that Drew's relevant conduct constituted attempted first degree murder. Referring to the guideline for Assault With Intent to Commit Murder; Attempted Murder, U.S.S.G. 2A2.1, 7 the court applied the base offense level (28) for attempted first degree murder. After the two-level increase for restraint of victim and the three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Drew's total offense level is 27 and his sentencing range is 70 to 87 months. See Drew, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 44. 25 Drew further argues, however, that even if section 2K2.1(c) is applicable, the sentencing court erred in interpreting section 2K2.1(c)'s cross reference to section 2X1.1 because section 2X1.1(a) uses the offense level for the substantive offense. Application Note 2 of section 2X1.1 defines substantive offense as the offense that the defendant was convicted of ... attempting ... to commit. Therefore, in Drew's view, the sentencing court should have applied the base offense level for the offense of conviction only--possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Instead, the sentencing court, applying section 2X1.1(c), used the base offense level for attempted first degree murder. Drew's argument rests upon the applicability of substantive offense. But substantive offense relates only to section 2X1.1(a) and (b); substantive offense is not mentioned in section 2X1.1(c). Application Note 2, which defines substantive offense, applies only if section 2X1.1 is applied directly, rather than as a cross-reference from section 2K2.1. United States v. Branch, 91 F.3d 699, 743 (5th Cir. 1996) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Fleming, 8 F.3d 1264, 1266 (8th Cir. 1993). Therefore, section 2X1.1(c) requires the court to apply the offense level for attempted first degree murder prescribed in section 2A2.1.
26 Drew next argues that his sentence violates his right to due process because the district court [i]n effect ... convicted appellant of attempted murder, and then sentenced him to the far greater offense, see Petitioner's Br. 26, and relied upon hearsay evidence in doing so. Drew concedes that he never raised his due process claim below but argues that his general challenge to the applicability of the cross-reference provisions preserved the issue. See id. 25. Nevertheless, because the district court lacked the opportunity to rule on the issue, we review Drew's challenge for plain error only. See United States v. Broxton, 926 F.2d 1180, 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1991). In the sentencing context, we have held that error is plain where it is obvious under settled law and would result in grave prejudice or a miscarriage of justice if not corrected on appeal. United States v. Watson, 57 F.3d 1093, 1097 & n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Drew's challenge falls substantially short of this standard. 27 First, the United States Supreme Court has held that a sentencing court may consider a defendant's conduct apart from his offense conduct without violating due process. See United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 151-53 (1997); Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 395 (1995) (consideration of relevant conduct under Guidelines bears on character of offense of conviction and does not punish for different offense); Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 747 (1994) (reaffirming propriety of sentencing court's consideration of a defendant's past criminal behavior, even if no conviction resulted from that behavior); see also 18 U.S.C. 3661 (No limitation shall be placed on the information concerning the background, character, and conduct of a person convicted of an offense which a court of the United States may receive and consider for the purpose of imposing an appropriate sentence.). 28 Second, the district court indeed relied in part on Szala's hearsay testimony. His testimony corroborated Mrs. Drew's testimony regarding Drew's actions. The Supreme Court has specifically held that the rules of evidence do not restrict the evidence a sentencing court may consider. See Nichols, 511 U.S. at 747 (As a general proposition, a sentencing judge may appropriately conduct an inquiry broad in scope, largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come.). The sentencing court did not consider any prohibited evidence in sentencing Drew and, accordingly, we reject his due process claim.