Opinion ID: 883723
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Was Riley's conviction supported by sufficient evidence?

Text: The standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' Arlington, 875 P.2d at 318 (quoting State v. Cyr (1987), 229 Mont. 337, 339, 746 P.2d 120, 122). Riley was charged with the crime of felony incest. Section 45-5-507(1), MCA, provides that: A person commits the offense of incest if he knowingly marries, cohabits with, has sexual intercourse with, or has sexual contact as defined in 45-2-101 with an ancestor, a descendent, a brother or sister of the whole or halfblood, or any stepson or stepdaughter. The relationships referred to herein include blood relationships without regard to legitimacy, relationship of parent and child by adoption, and relationships involving a stepson or stepdaughter. (Emphasis added.) Section 45-2-101(60), MCA, defines sexual contact as any touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of the person of another for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of either party. The District Court instructed the jury that sexual or intimate parts include the genitalia, breasts, buttocks, hips, belly or chest of a girl. In this case, B.F. testified that Riley touched intimate parts of her body, including her breasts and her pubic area. B.F. also testified that the defendant appeared to be aroused during these incidents. Riley argues that there was not substantial evidence in the record to infer that he touched B.F. with intent to arouse or gratify his sexual desires. However, the record indicated otherwise. B.F. testified that [h]e would press his penis area up against my body and say, see what you can do to an old man whenever he would get hard. Testimony of a more explicit or graphic nature was unnecessary. We have held that [i]ntent is a fact question for the jury, and it is well-settled that the jury may infer intent from defendant's acts. State v. Kestner (1986), 220 Mont. 41, 46, 713 P.2d 537, 540 (citing State v. Jackson (1979), 180 Mont. 195, 205, 589 P.2d 1009, 1015). Based upon the previous testimony, the jury could reasonably infer that Riley's acts were done for the purpose of sexual gratification. We hold that there was sufficient evidence to support Riley's conviction for incest. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and GRAY, HUNT, NELSON, WEBER and LEAPHART, JJ., concur.