Opinion ID: 517661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: lack of single conspiracy instruction

Text: 137 Grier and Harper both argue that the district court erred by instructing the jury concerning an overall conspiracy (a wheel conspiracy) without also instructing the jury concerning the possible existence of a number of multiple conspiracies between Pipito and each of the defendants. 138 The defendants premised their multiple conspiracy instruction argument, in part, on an alleged variance between the proof adduced at trial (which they contend at best could establish a number of multiple conspiracies) and the single conspiracy alleged in Count I of the indictment. They argue that the existence of the variance prejudiced their substantial rights and requires reversal. We disagree. A variance occurs at trial only when the terms of the indictment are unaltered but the evidence offered at trial proves facts materially different from those alleged in the indictment. United States v. Galiffa, 734 F.2d 306, 312 (7th Cir.1984) (quoted in United States v. Mosley, 786 F.2d 1330, 1335 (7th Cir.1986)). As the Ninth Circuit stated under similar circumstances in United States v. Perry, 550 F.2d 524, 531 (9th Cir.1977): 139 Because we have found, after a reading of the record in this case, that the jury could rationally conclude that there was one general conspiracy and that defendants were members of it, we find that there is no variance between the indictment and the proof adduced at trial which prejudiced defendants' rights. 140 (Citation omitted). On this record we have held earlier in this opinion that a rational factfinder could very properly find beyond a reasonable doubt that Harper and Grier were active participants in a single conspiracy. Thus, there was no variance between the proof adduced at trial and the single conspiracy alleged in the indictment. 141 This determination, however, does not end our inquiry into the necessity for a multiple conspiracy jury instruction, because Grier and Harper also contend that it was reversible error for the district court judge to deny a proposed jury instruction offering the jury the option to find a number of smaller conspiracies as an alternative to finding a single conspiracy. 142 Initially, we note that Grier proposed such a multiple conspiracy instruction, 28 the district court refused to accept the instruction, and Grier entered a timely objection on the record to the denial. Harper, however, did not propose a multiple conspiracy instruction nor did he object on the record to the denial of Grier's proposed instruction. This procedural background is important because it impacts on our standard of review. Grier's individual objection on the record to the court's failure to give his jury instruction and statement of the reasons for his objection properly preserved this issue for Grier's appeal. Therefore, our standard of review of the district court's refusal to give Grier's instruction is whether Grier was prejudiced by this refusal. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 134-35, 94 S.Ct. 2887, 2916, 41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974). However, because we hold that Harper did not preserve this issue, as he failed to propose jury instructions and object to the court's failure to give such instructions, we review his claim under the more stringent plain error standard. See United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317, 1320 (7th Cir.1987). 143 Turning to the substantive law applicable to review of the jury instructions given in both defendants' cases, in United States v. Douglas, 818 F.2d 1317, 1320-21 (7th Cir.1987), we held that 144 [a] defendant is entitled to an instruction on his or her theory of defense if: the defendant proposed a correct statement of the law; the defendant's theory is supported by the evidence; the defendant's theory of defense is not part of the charge; and the failure to include an instruction on the defendant's theory of defense in the jury charge would deny the defendant a fair trial. 145 (Emphasis added) (citations omitted). We have repeatedly emphasized that when reviewing instructions we consider them as a whole in determining whether or not a court erred in refusing to give a particular instruction. In United States v. Fournier, 861 F.2d 148, 150 (7th Cir.1988), we stated: 146  'It is axiomatic that in determining the propriety of instructions they are to be viewed as a whole. As long as the instructions treat the issues fairly and adequately, they will not be interfered with on appeal.'  147 (quoting United States v. Perlaza, 818 F.2d 1354, 1358 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 176, 98 L.Ed.2d 130 (1987) quoting, in turn, United States v. Patrick, 542 F.2d 381, 389 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 931, 97 S.Ct. 1551, 51 L.Ed.2d 775 (1977)). We further explained the importance of construing the instructions in light of the context of the overall trial in our recent decision in United States v. Bailey, 859 F.2d 1265, 1277 (7th Cir.1988): 148 When examining the sufficiency of jury instructions we must examine the jury charge as a whole, rather than focus on isolated passages. Moreover, because ' a judgment of conviction is commonly the culmination of a trial which includes testimony of witnesses, argument of counsel, receipt of exhibits in evidence and instruction of the jury by the judge, ' we review the instructions in the context of the overall trial and the arguments by counsel. See United States v. Piccolo, 835 F.2d 517, 519 (3d Cir.1987) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 [94 S.Ct. 396, 400, 38 L.Ed.2d 368] (1973)). 149 The thrust of the defendants' argument is that the conspiracy charge actually given the jury lumped all the defendants together. We disagree. When these instructions are viewed as a whole, they address the importance of determining the guilt of each defendant individually in clear and concise language. The instructions, a copy of which went with the jury for their deliberations, in relevant part, provided the following guidance to the jury in making their conspiracy determination: 150 41. In determining whether the alleged conspiracy existed, you may consider the actions and statements of all the alleged participants. The agreement may be inferred from all the circumstances and the conduct of all the alleged participants. 151 42. In determining whether a defendant became a member of the conspiracy, you may consider only the acts and statements of that particular defendant. 152 43. To be a member of the conspiracy, the defendant need not join at the beginning or know all the other members or the means by which the purpose was to be accomplished. However, the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, from the defendant's own acts and statements, that he was aware of the common purpose and was a willing participant. 153 The district court judge also instructed the jury: 154 If you find one or more isolated purchases of cocaine by a defendant for personal use, this does not by itself make that defendant a member of the conspiracy charged in Count I. In order to be a member of that conspiracy, a defendant must be aware of the general purpose of the conspiracy and have some interest in its success. In determining whether a particular buyer of cocaine had an interest in the success of the conspiracy, you may consider all the circumstances related to that particular buyer, including the number of purchases, the quantity purchased, and any evidence that the buyer expected to make additional purchases from the seller. 155 And, further, 156 Although the defendants are being tried jointly, you must give separate consideration to each defendant. In doing so, you must analyze what the evidence in the case shows with respect to each defendant, leaving out of consideration any evidence admitted solely against some other defendant or defendants. Each defendant is entitled to have his or her case decided on the evidence and the law applicable to him or her. 157 Our examination of these instructions, thus, leads us to only one logical conclusion, that the jury instructions, when viewed in their entirety, properly separate the individual defendants from one another and require the jury, the finder of fact, to individually determine whether each defendant was a member of a single conspiracy. Taking cognizance of the fact that the defense attorney participated in the jury selection process, we have specifically recognized that a properly instructed jury, like the one in this case, is able to properly separate evidence in a multi-defendant trial: 158 Williams contends that [he was] denied ... a fair trial because the jury was unable to compartmentalize the evidence as it applied to him. Juries, however, are presumed capable of sorting through the evidence and considering the cause of each defendant separately. And although this case involved multiple counts, several co-defendants, and several tape recordings admitted into evidence, we do not think that the case was of such a magnitude that the jury was unable to follow the court's instructions with respect to compartmentalizing the evidence as it related to each defendant. 159 United States v. Williams, 858 F.2d 1218, 1225 (7th Cir.1988). 160 Grier and Harper attempt to evade the conclusion that the jury instructions in this case fairly addressed the single or multiple conspiracy issue in their individual cases by citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), to support their argument that they were prejudiced by the district court's failure to instruct the jury regarding multiple conspiracies. Kotteakos involved the trial of 13 individuals accused of conspiring to obtain fraudulent loans from a single individual who induced lending institutions to make the loans on the basis of false and fraudulent information. In that case, unlike this one, the government did not assert that the evidence established a single conspiracy. Here, as noted previously, the jury could find that Grier and Harper knew or should have known that other individuals were involved in the conspiracy and that the benefits they received were probably dependent on the success of the single venture. Thus, the facts of this case point toward a single conspiracy finding. 161 While the district court could properly have instructed the jury on the possibility of multiple conspiracies, it was not required to do so, and after reading the record, we are convinced that under the facts and circumstances presented here, failure to do so did not prejudice Grier and Harper in a manner that denied them a fair trial. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly stated, 'the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one.'  Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579, 106 S.Ct. 3101, 3107, 92 L.Ed.2d 460 (1986) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)). In reaching the determination that no prejudice existed, we are mindful of the Supreme Court's mandate that: 162 In criminal causes ... [the] outcome is conviction. This is different, or may be, from guilt in fact. It is guilt in law, established by the judgment of laymen. And the question is, not were they right in their judgment, regardless of the error or its effect upon the verdict. It is rather what effect the error had or reasonably may be taken to have had upon the jury's decision ... [i]f, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand. 163 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1247, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946) (emphasis added). After reviewing the instructions in their entirety as given to the jury in the present case, our conviction is sure that ... [failure to give the multiple conspiracy instruction] did not influence the jury, or had but a very slight effect. Id. Viewed as a whole, the instructions treat the single conspiracy issue fairly and accurately. Thus, we are convinced that the failure to give the multiple conspiracy instruction did not prejudice Grier, because this failure had a very slight effect, if any, on the verdict. It necessarily follows that Harper's showing falls far short of establishing the more stringent requirement of plain error which is required for a reversal of Harper's conviction. Accordingly, for the reasons stated previously, neither defendant was improperly denied a multiple conspiracy instruction. 164