Opinion ID: 2995520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The McNairs were a risk to

Text: Officer Coffey and the general public On the night of December 20, 1997, Officer Sean Coffey had been a law enforcement officer for approximately 2 years. He was routinely assigned to the Allied-Dunns Marsh neighborhood in the community of Fitchburg, Wis., which is neither a village, town nor city, but, rather, is an unincorporated area of 18,000 people adjoining the city of Madison, Wis. Even the McNairs concede that Coffey correctly perceived that the area around Rosenberry Road and Thurston Lane in Fitchburg is an undesirable area, with a crime rate that is higher than normal, that has been the site of armed robberies, burglaries, damage to property, person crimes, batteries, assaults, and a lot of drug activity. (Tr. 2- 140.) Indeed, in the plaintiffs’ own words, [d]rug dealing and other criminal activity is known to have occurred in the neighborhood. (Appellants’ Br. at 6.) This troubling situation occurred between 5 and 5:30 p.m. in the dark of winter. The streetlights were activated and the black shadows of night had long past set. Coffey was parked in an empty parking lot across the street from the location where he first sighted the people later identified as the McNair brothers, Victor and Tre. As he was looking out onto Thurston Lane, observing the traffic and keeping tabs on the activity in the area, he noticed a Mitsubishi Galant vehicle parked at the curb. Coffey, while seated as the sole occupant in his squad car, observed at least five young people standing on the sidewalk, apparently looking at this automobile. Coffey decided to investigate the scene and then drove alongside the people and the automobile. As he did so, at least two or three individuals standing on the sidewalk departed the area and proceeded towards an apartment known to be a site of illegal drug activity on the corner of Thurston and Rosenberry. Coffey stated that he believed he saw the McNair brothers and a third person enter the Mitsubishi and proceed to drive off in the opposite direction of the squad car. Coffey stated that the congregation of people on a street corner in this crime-prone area of Fitchburg, accompanied by the almost immediate dispersal of several men towards the apartment after they had in all probability sighted his squad car, made him suspicious as to whether there was possible illegal drug activity afoot. (Tr. 2-50, 2-89; Appellee’s Br. at 2-3.) Coffey decided to pursue the McNair car. He radioed the Fitchburg police headquarters and asked the dispatcher for an owner and license plate I.D., to ascertain whether the legal owner resided in the immediate area, and if he had any outstanding warrants or a prior police record. As the vehicle continued to travel for several hundred feet along the frontage road towards an on-ramp for the Madison Beltline expressway, there was but one vehicle between the Mitsubishi and Coffey’s police vehicle. The dispatcher responded and advised that the vehicle belonged to a Victor McNair and that its state motor vehicle registration was suspended for unpaid traffic citations. At this point, after receiving this information, Coffey had probable cause to stop the vehicle. See Wis. Stat. sec. 346.04(1). Once the car made its way to the top of the on- ramp, and was rapidly approaching the expressway, Coffey maneuvered his squad car so that he was immediately behind the McNair vehicle. At this time, Coffey activated his emergency lights, hoping to direct the McNairs to pull over, and also activated the video camera positioned on top of his police car. The McNairs refused to comply with the officer’s signal and instead continued driving for an unspecified distance at about 55 mph, keeping up with the flow of traffic. After another five or six seconds while the suspects’ refused to obey a lawful command by a police officer, Coffey turned on his emergency siren. The traffic was normal, and Officer Coffey was close enough behind the vehicle to allow him to form the opinion, based on his knowledge, experience, and perceptions at the time, that the McNairs could readily hear his siren and see the flashing, colored overhead lights. Indeed, as the videotape of the chase reflects, at least one vehicle can be observed pulling over to the side of the road, with its blinkers on, pursuant to law. Moreover, while on the Beltline, other cars traveling in the same direction were observed moving over to the traffic lane furthest from Officer Coffey’s squad car, thus suggesting that other vehicles in the immediate area also heard and saw the police sirens and lights. Under this escalating and evolving scenario, I am convinced that Coffey must have been reasonably concerned for his safety and what lie ahead of him as he proceeded to make a valid arrest of a fleeing suspect. Coffey testified that he thought he saw three people enter the Mitsubishi when it was parked on Thurston and Rosenberry, but from his observation of the occupants of the car during this pursuit, he was able to observe the silhouettes of only two individuals. He testified that he believed the third person might have crouched down below the rear window vision line, attempting either to obtain a weapon or possibly secrete drugs or drug paraphernalia. I believe that Coffey’s fears were well-founded: the police are trained to assume that a person who conceals himself from view may well be doing so to establish an advantage in an attempt to overpower or ambush an approaching officer. (Tr. 2-153 to -154.) The situation with the fleeing suspects continued to deteriorate, as the McNairs persisted for almost another mile along the Beltline highway in their attempted flight from the officer, despite the squad car’s flashing lights and blaring sirens directing them to pull over, before they finally exited onto an off- ramp. Because the McNairs refused to stop in a timely fashion, it was reasonable for the officer to assume that they were fleeing in an attempt to avoid arrest. In addition, Coffey gave undisputed testimony that, while an individual apprehended on the highway is somewhat constrained by speeding traffic and concrete barriers, a suspect who pulls over in a residential area is able to flee on foot much more easily, should he be so inclined. (Id.) For these reasons, I believe it is, at best, improper to state, as plaintiffs’ naive counsel does, that Officer Coffey was effectuating a routine traffic stop and could not have reasonably believed the McNairs . . . were trying to evade or elude him. (Appellants’ Br. at 20.) As the Supreme Court explained in California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), we know from proverbial common sense that the ordinary law-abiding citizen yields upon a policeman’s lawful order to halt. Id. at 623 n.1; see also Mays v. City of E. St. Louis, 123 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1997) (if police are forbidden to pursue, then many more suspects will flee--and successful flights not only reduce the number of crimes solved but also create their own risks for passengers and bystanders.) After leaving the expressway, the McNair car proceeded along the frontage road. Since the operator of the vehicle failed to stop within a reasonable distance, Coffey radioed his Fitchburg headquarters and advised that he was switching over to the Dane County police network to request additional officer support from other nearby municipalities. Fitchburg is an unincorporated area with a very small police force, suffering from financial problems and insufficient law enforcement personnel to handle a possibly dangerous and violent situation of this nature. There is no evidence in this record to suggest that Coffey knew how many officers from nearby municipalities would hear his call for assistance, much less respond to it. If the officers were preoccupied on other assigned police duties within their respective jurisdictions, or off-call during the relevant time period, they would not be able to respond to a request for help. Coffey, who was working alone, without a partner, radioed for a 10-80 when the McNairs pulled off the Beltline and began traveling down the off-ramp. A 10-80 is a police procedure referred to as a high-risk vehicle contact. In other words, it means the requesting officer believes that he is involved in a dangerous situation that requires backup assistance. The record reflects that Coffey has called for 10-80 assistance only in dire situations. Indeed, Coffey testified that, while he has handled hundreds of traffic stops in the past, he has radioed for 10-80 assistance no more than four times in his entire career. (Tr. 2- 152.) The McNair vehicle continued along the frontage road for several tenths of a mile, approaching a Citgo gas station soon after Coffey made his request for backup assistance. Shortly thereafter, the auto decelerated and signaled the driver’s intention to turn into the station. The McNairs entered the station’s small lot, which was occupied by other vehicles and customers. The McNairs pulled up adjacent to one of the gas pumps, immediately adjacent to others pumping gas. Coffey testified that he pulled in directly behind the McNair vehicle. There was reason to be concerned about the safety of the bystanders in the congested lot and the nearby residential neighborhood, because if the suspects attempted to escape, misdirected gun shots might strike innocent civilians or possibly ignite any flammable liquids in the vicinity. I share Officer Coffey’s concerns about police and public safety. I am convinced that Coffey, on single assignment without a partner, had more than sufficient information, knowledge, and experience (2 years on the force) to be concerned and believe that the McNairs posed an immediate threat to his own safety as well as the general public. To review, from Coffey’s perspective, the McNairs behaved somewhat suspiciously on Thurston Lane when they were first observed mulling around with a crowd of people in a high-crime area after dark, with a known drug apartment a mere stone’s throw away; they exhibited behavior consistent with illegal drug activity; they were operating a motor vehicle on a public highway in violation of state law; they disobeyed lawful directions, thus requiring the officer to pursue them for over a mile in his squad car with its emergency lights on and the siren blasting away; there was possibly a third passenger hiding somewhere in the vehicle with them, outside Coffey’s line of vision; and when the fleeing suspects finally did pull over, they drove into a crowded gas station adjoining a residential area, where unsuspecting, law-abiding customers and homeowners could be harmed and definitely placed in a lethal situation if the suspects persisted in their attempt to flee and violence erupted. It is important to note that between 1990 and 1999, a total of 6,048 law enforcement officers were assaulted, and 94 were killed, at the scene of a traffic stop or during a traffic pursuit. FBI Uniform Crime Reports, Law Enforcement Personnel, tbls. 18, 38 (2000). We have previously stated that proper respect for these statistics underscore[s] our reluctance to second-guess an officer’s split-second judgment when faced with potentially explosive situations. Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 807 n.2 (en banc). In the same vein, we have described it as beyond dispute that drug traffickers are often armed and dangerous and that they sometimes shoot policemen. United States v. Ocampo, 890 F.2d 1363, 1369 (7th Cir. 1989). Such precedent, coupled with the aforementioned facts, justifies Officer Coffey’s testimony that the McNairs and another person may have been involved in drug activity and may very well have been armed and dangerous. It is irrelevant, of course, that Coffey’s beliefs ultimately proved to be in error; the reasonableness of Coffey’s decision to call for additional backup assistance must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. Moreover, even were I to accept Plaintiffs’ argument that the jury concluded that Coffey had no reason to suspect that the McNairs were trafficking narcotics, and also discredited Coffey’s testimony about his belief that a third individual was hiding in their vehicle, two crucial undisputed facts remain. First, from his position alone in the squad car, Coffey saw the McNairs in the dark of a winter night talking to a group of people in a high-crime area in the immediate vicinity of a known drug house. Within seconds after seeing Coffey in his police vehicle, the McNairs departed the scene and several of the remaining bystanders retreated towards the house. Under these circumstances, such unprovoked flight upon noticing the police produces reasonable suspicion that some type of criminal activity involving the McNairs may have been afoot. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000). Second, the McNairs’ subsequent, prolonged, and unabated flight in the face of the existence of probable cause raises alarm in and of itself. It is of no consequence that the McNairs claim to have been driving away from Coffey because they wanted to pull over in a well-lighted area; Coffey had no way to know the McNairs’ intentions./9 (Tr. 2-57 to -58.) Moreover, law-abiding, responsible motorists do not disregard signals from police vehicles unless they are trying to avoid apprehension, and, should they choose to do so, no right is guaranteed by federal law that one will be free from circumstances where he will be endangered by the misinterpretation of his acts. Sherrod, 856 F.2d at 805 (en banc).