Opinion ID: 1636082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment Sua Sponte

Text: Defendants contend that the trial court exceeded its authority because it granted a summary judgment on its own motion on the day of trial without notice to the parties. In support of that contention, defendants rely on McAllister v. Independent School Dist. No. 306, 276 Minn. 549, 149 N.W.2d 81 (1967). We did hold in McAllister, as defendants contend, that under Rule 56.03, Rules of Civil Procedure, [2] the stated time of 10 days' formal notice is mandatory, absent a clear waiver by the adversary. The aggrieved party there vigorously opposed the motion for summary judgment by defendants on two grounds: (1) Notice was 5 days short, and (2) plaintiffs had other evidence to submit. The circumstances which are presented here distinguish McAllister v. Independent School Dist. No. 306, supra . Significant are the following facts: (1) The pretrial conference was held on December 27, 1973, at which time the trial court raised the issue of the statute of frauds relative to defendants' counterclaim and incorporated the issue in its pretrial order of January 2, 1974, in effect affording written notice of the issue to both parties; (2) by the same order, trial by jury was set for January 22, 1974, in effect affording defendants a 20-day opportunity to prepare to meet the issue raised; (3) on the day set for trial, at a conference in chambers between court and counsel preliminary to selection of a jury, the court reviewed its pretrial order, reiterated its opinion that the defendants could not pursue their counterclaim because of the statute of frauds, secured agreement of counsel as to the amount of plaintiff's claim, and then afforded defendants an opportunity to make their offer of proof; (4) defendants availed themselves of that opportunity by attempting to show genuine fact issues as to the provisions of the oral agreement and facts relating to estoppel and were fully heard as to all the questions involved; (5) the trial judge thereupon ruled that the statute of frauds precluded defendants' counterclaim and denied estoppel; (6) at the time defendants voiced no objection on the record to the procedure employed by the court; and (7) no prejudice was shown by defendants by reason of the absence of a formal motion. Neither the summary judgment rule nor any other procedural rule gives the trial court express authority to enter a summary judgment on its own motion. The authority is derived from the inherent power of the trial court to dispose summarily of litigation when there remains no genuine issue as to any material fact and judgment must be ordered for one of the parties as a matter of law. The same conditions must exist as would justify a summary judgment on motion of a party. Green v. Kaesler-Allen Lumber Co., 197 Kan. 788, 420 P.2d 1019; Sheild v. Welch, 4 N.J. 563, 73 A.2d 536; Roberts v. Braynon, 90 So.2d 623 (Fla. 1956); Buffington v. Continental Cas. Co., 69 N.M. 365, 367 P.2d 539 (1961). See, also, Rule 16(6), Rules of Civil Procedure. Concededly, there were genuine fact issues involved in the instant case. But as their resolution would in no way affect the application of the rules of law which we adopt herein, the trial court properly denied defendants a jury trial on those issues. In Niazi v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 265 Minn. 222, 121 N.W.2d 349 (1963), we considered facts analogous to those in this case. There, plaintiffs had brought an action under the medical pay and uninsured motorist provisions of an automobile insurance policy. The policy provisions required that such disputes be arbitrated in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association. At the pretrial conference, the trial court, either on its own motion or upon oral motion of the attorney for the insurer, ordered the proceedings stayed until plaintiffs submitted the dispute to arbitration pursuant to the policy. No formal application for stay and order for arbitration had been made by defense counsel. Plaintiffs sought a writ of mandamus from this court alleging that the trial court had in effect granted a summary judgment on its own motion in a manner not in compliance with the rules. In denying the application for the writ, we reasoned as follows:    [T]he trial judge does have power under Rule 56.04 to grant summary judgment with respect to all or some of the issues raised by the pleadings. [Citations omitted.] `Unless the objecting party can show prejudice arising from the lack of notice   , exercising [summary judgment] power at pre-trial is sound. Seldom should lack of notice prejudice a party, as each party should be fully prepared on the facts applicable to the case in order to participate in the pre-trial. To compel a 10 day delay solely to comply with the notice requirements of Rule 56.03 would seem ill-advised.' [Citations omitted.] 265 Minn. 227, 121 N.W.2d 353. We hold that under the circumstances of this case the trial court properly exercised its power in granting summary judgment sua sponte.