Opinion ID: 677327
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The FTCA Claim Against the United States

Text: 27 With respect to tort claims as to which the United States has waived its sovereign immunity, the FTCA requires the court to apply the substantive law of the place where the event occurred. The statute allows 28 claims against the United States, for money damages, ... for injury or loss of property, or personal injury ... caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred. 29 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1346(b) (emphasis added); see also 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2674 (United States is liable with respect to claims allowable under FTCA to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances); Guttridge v. United States, 927 F.2d 730, 731-34 (2d Cir.1991); Caban v. United States, 728 F.2d 68, 73-75 (2d Cir.1984); Proud v. United States, 723 F.2d 705, 706 (9th Cir.) (federal government's tort liability is co-extensive with that of a private individual under state law), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252, 104 S.Ct. 3536, 82 L.Ed.2d 841 (1984). 30 In the present case, in seeking to apply the substantive law of New York, the district court looked to Kolko v. City of Rochester, 93 A.D.2d 977, 461 N.Y.S.2d 650, a case that did not deal with private person[s] but rather dealt with public officials. Kolko concerned the limited immunity that police officers enjoy when carrying out their official duties in good faith. It did not deal with the liability to which a private individual would be subject if he broke into the home of another and caused personal injury or property damage. Whatever other immunities the relevant state law may confer upon a private individual, see, e.g., Guttridge v. United States, 927 F.2d at 731-34 (landowner immunity from liability for negligent maintenance of land on which public is allowed for recreation), it is clear that private individuals do not possess the immunities of government officials. See Wyatt v. Cole, --- U.S. ----, ---- - ----, 112 S.Ct. 1827, 1831-34, 118 L.Ed.2d 504 (1992). 31 In a suit against the United States under the FTCA, the United States is not entitled to defend on the basis of any official immunity that its executive employees individually might possess. See Rivera v. United states, 928 F.2d at 608-09. To the contrary, the United States may be held liable to the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2674. In this case, those circumstances included whatever authority was vested in the defendants by the applicable law with respect to their assistance in the narcotics raid that led to this lawsuit. See Caban v. United States, 728 F.2d at 74 (where immigration officers performing border-control function committed allegedly tortious acts, liability of United States assessed in light of the liability that New York would impose upon one having a privilege to detain a would-be entrant who did not satisfactorily establish his right to enter); although qualified immunity will not immunize the United States from liability, that liability must be assessed in light of the liability that New York would impose upon a person having legal authority to participate in the narcotics raid at issue in this case. 32 Castro alleged in her complaint that the entry resulted from defendants' negligent and wrongful conduct, and there are questions of fact as to the reasonableness of the defendants' conduct during that search. Thus, Castro must be allowed to pursue her common-law tort claims against the United States. 33