Opinion ID: 4199786
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: What It Means for a Claim to Rely On Johnson II

Text: The threshold question is whether Defendant’s claim relies on the rule announced in Johnson II such that he may bring that claim in a second or successive § 2255 motion. See United States v. Buenrostro, 638 F.3d 720, 721 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) ([T]he Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 precludes [a movant] from filing a ‘second or successive’ § 2255 motion unless he can show either that he relies on a new rule of constitutional law, 4 The question has cropped up somewhat frequently because [n]othing in the law requires a [court] to specify which clause of [the statute]—residual or elements clause—it relied upon in imposing a sentence. In re Chance, 831 F.3d 1335, 1340 (11th Cir. 2016). Thus, at many pre-Johnson II sentencings, the court did not specify under which clause it found the ACCA predicate offenses to qualify. 7 § 2255(h)(2), or ‘that no reasonable factfinder would have found [him] guilty of the offense,’ § 2255(h)(1). (alteration in original)).5 We hold that his claim does rely on Johnson II. The relevant exception to the bar on second or successive § 2255 motions requires a movant to show that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2) (emphasis added). A claim necessarily relies on a rule of constitutional law if the claim is that the movant was sentenced in violation of that constitutional rule. So, to show that a claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable, it is sufficient for a 5 Though we authorized Defendant to file a second or successive motion, that authorization required only a prima facie demonstration that Defendant’s claim relies on Johnson II, see 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(C); our authorization did not compel the district court to find that Defendant’s claim actually relies on Johnson II, nor does it bind us now. See Bible v. Schriro, 651 F.3d 1060, 1064 n.1 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (A prima facie showing is a sufficient showing of possible merit to warrant a fuller exploration by the district court, and we will grant an application for [a second or successive] petition if it appears reasonably likely that the application satisfies the stringent requirements for the filing of a second or successive petition. (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Villa-Gonzalez, 208 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) ([A] district court must conduct a thorough review of all allegations and evidence presented by the prisoner to determine whether the motion meets the statutory requirements for the filing of a second or successive motion.). 8 § 2255 movant to show that (1) he or she was sentenced in violation of the Constitution and that (2) the particular constitutional rule that was violated is new, was previously unavailable, and was made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court. Here, there is no doubt that the rule in Johnson II meets the latter requirements; the only question is whether Defendant also can show that he was sentenced in violation of the Constitution. To answer that question, we begin by noting that a court’s determination that a defendant qualifies for an ACCA enhancement is a finding. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 25 (2005). As with any finding that is necessary for a conviction—or a sentencing enhancement—it is made (or not made) based on the evidence introduced to the relevant factfinder, and it is generally improper to supplement that evidence on appeal. See Reina-Rodriguez v. United States, 655 F.3d 1182, 1193 (9th Cir. 2011) ([I]t is not within our province to sentence the defendant based on considerations outside the sentencing decision. Appellate courts are not sentencing courts.); see also United States v. Petite, 703 F.3d 1290, 1292 n.2 (11th Cir. 2013) (The government cannot offer for the first time on appeal a new predicate conviction in support of an enhanced ACCA sentence.), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson II. And, as with any other finding, a 9 finding that a defendant qualifies for an ACCA enhancement may be deemed to rest on a valid or an invalid legal theory. Had the sentencing court stated that the past convictions at issue were convictions for violent felonies only under the residual clause, it would have been, in effect, specifying the legal theory on which its ACCA determination rested. We would know that Defendant’s sentence was imposed under an invalid—indeed, unconstitutional—legal theory, and that Defendant was, therefore, sentenced in violation of the Constitution. As the Government concedes, a defendant who shows that a sentencing court relied solely on the residual clause in imposing an ACCA enhancement has a claim that relies on Johnson II. Conversely, had the sentencing court specified that a past conviction qualified as a violent felony only under the force clause, we would know that the sentence rested on a constitutionally valid legal theory. In that situation, the statute would preclude the filing of a second or successive petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h)(2). But when it is unclear from the record whether the sentencing court relied on the residual clause, it necessarily is unclear whether the court relied on a constitutionally valid or a constitutionally invalid legal theory. Defendant argues that this situation is analogous to that of a defendant who has been convicted, in a 10 general verdict, by a jury that was instructed on two theories of liability, one of which turns out to have been unconstitutional. The rule in such a situation is clear: [W]here a provision of the Constitution forbids conviction on a particular ground, the constitutional guarantee is violated by a general verdict that may have rested on that ground. Griffin v. United States, 502 U.S. 46, 53 (1991) (emphasis added). The case usually cited as the origin of that rule is Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), and the rule is sometimes referred to as the Stromberg principle. United States v. Washington, 861 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1988). We are persuaded that a rule analogous to the Stromberg principle should apply in the sentencing context. It is true that the fact of a prior conviction need not be proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt in order for a defendant to be exposed to an enhanced sentence because of that conviction. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 488–90 (2000). But it does not follow that, when a judge makes a finding that a defendant qualifies for an enhanced sentence, and that finding may rest on an unconstitutional ground, the finding should be treated any differently than a finding made by a jury for the purpose of conviction. Indeed, treating those findings differently because one involves sentencing and the other involves conviction would be contrary to the principle that any fact increasing either end of [a sentencing] range produces a new penalty and constitutes an 11 ingredient of the offense. Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 (2013). We therefore hold that, when it is unclear whether a sentencing court relied on the residual clause in finding that a defendant qualified as an armed career criminal, but it may have, the defendant’s § 2255 claim relies on the constitutional rule announced in Johnson II.6 We recognize that there are differences between a jury’s finding and the type of finding that a court makes when it rules that a defendant qualifies as an armed career criminal. The latter finding rests largely on legal conclusions—state offense X is categorically a violent felony, state offense Y is not, etc. For that reason, it may be possible to determine that a sentencing court did not rely on the residual clause—even when the sentencing record alone is unclear—by looking to the relevant background legal environment at the time of sentencing. If, for instance, binding circuit precedent at the time of sentencing was that crime Z qualified as a violent felony under the force clause, then a court’s failure to invoke the force clause expressly at sentencing, when there were three predicate convictions for crime Z, would not render unclear the ground on which the court’s ACCA 6 The Fourth Circuit recently came to a similar conclusion, holding that, when [a defendant’s] sentence may have been predicated on application of the now-void residual clause and, therefore, may be an unlawful sentence under the holding in Johnson II, the [defendant] has shown that he ‘relies on’ a new rule of constitutional law. United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677, 682 (4th Cir. 2017). 12 determination rested. Even under the traditional Stromberg analysis, a verdict need not be set aside where it is possible to conclusively determine the jury relied on a valid ground . . . . United States v. Holly, 488 F.3d 1298, 1306 n.5 (10th Cir. 2007). By analogy, a claim does not rely on Johnson II if it is possible to conclude, using both the record before the sentencing court and the relevant background legal environment at the time of sentencing, that the sentencing court’s ACCA determination did not rest on the residual clause. Here, however, we cannot draw such a conclusion. At the time Defendant was sentenced in 2007, neither this court nor the Supreme Court had held that either Florida robbery or armed robbery qualified as a violent felony. (We focus only on the Florida robbery convictions because, if none of those convictions was a conviction for a violent felony, then Defendant would not have at least three such convictions and would not qualify for an ACCA enhancement.) We had held (or suggested in dicta) that other states’ robbery statutes described violent felonies both under the force clause, United States v. Melton, 344 F.3d 1021, 1026 (9th Cir. 2003), and under the residual clause, United States v. McDougherty, 920 F.2d 569, 574 n.5 (9th Cir. 1990). The Eleventh Circuit had decided that Florida robbery qualified under the residual clause, United States v. Wilkerson, 286 F.3d 1324, 1325 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam), and that Florida armed robbery qualified under 13 the force clause, United States v. Dowd, 451 F.3d 1244, 1255 (11th Cir. 2006). Other courts had held that various states’ robbery statutes described violent felonies under one or both clauses. See, e.g., United States v. Tirrell, 120 F.3d 670, 680–81 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that Michigan unarmed robbery qualified under both clauses). Given that background legal environment and the sentencing record, it is unclear whether the district court relied on the residual clause in determining that the Florida robbery convictions qualified as violent felonies. Accordingly, Defendant’s claim relies on Johnson II.