Opinion ID: 2995635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ill App.3d at 169 (citing Hart v. Lyons,

Text: 106 Ill.App.3d 803, 805 (2d Dist. 1982)). A party that fails to perform its contractual duties is liable for breach of contract, and a material breach of the terms of the contract will serve to excuse the other party from its duty of counterperformance. Finch v. Illinois Cmty. Coll. Bd., 315 Ill.App.3d 831, 836 (5th Dist. 2000); Circle Sec. Agency Inc. v. Ross, 107 Ill.App.3d 195, 202-03 (1st Dist. 1982). In determining whether a breach is material, some Illinois courts have stated that the question is whether performance of the disputed provision was the sine qua non of the agreement, i.e., of such a nature and such importance that the contract would not have been made without it. Arrow Master Inc. v. Unique Forming Ltd., 12 F.3d 709, 715 (7th Cir. 1993); Dragon Constr. Inc. v. Parkway Bank & Trust, 287 Ill.App.3d 29, 33 (1st Dist. 1997); Newton v. Aitken, 260 Ill.App.3d 717, 719 (2d Dist. 1994). Other courts have stated that the question of whether a breach is material, thereby discharging the other party’s duty to perform, is based on the inherent justice of the matter. Kel-Keef Enters. Inc. v. Quality Components Corp., 316 Ill.App.3d 998, 1016 (1st Dist. 2000); Francorp Inc. v. Siebert, 126 F. Supp.2d 543, 547 (N.D. Ill. 2000); Rogers v. Balsley, 240 Ill.App.3d 1005, 1011 (2d Dist. 1993). We are convinced that these cases demonstrate that, under Illinois law, the materiality inquiry focuses on two interrelated issues: (1) the intent of the parties with respect to the disputed provision; and (2) the equitable factors and circumstances surrounding the breach of the provision. See, e.g., Maywood Proviso, 252 Ill.App.3d at 169 (citing Cantrell v. Kruck, 25 Ill.App.3d 1060, 1064 (2d Dist. 1975)); Krentz v. Johnson, 36 Ill.App.3d 142, 144-46 (2d Dist. 1976). When analyzing the materiality of a time-essence clause, the factfinder initially must ask whether performance by a particular date was truly of such significance that the contract would not have been made if the provision had not been included. A negative answer to this initial question means that the clause did not meet the materiality test and that the breach was minor, provided that the party has completed performance within a reasonable period of time. Intervisual Communications Inc. v. Volkert, 975 F. Supp. 1092, 1101 n.17 (N.D. Ill. 1997); Omni Partners v. Down, 246 Ill.App.3d 57, 63 (2d Dist. 1993). On the other hand, an affirmative answer to the first question does not end the materiality inquiry. As we stated in our seminal case of Sahadi v. Continental Illinois National Bank, even where the parties clearly intended to regard a specific payment date as crucial, ’equity will refuse to enforce such a provision when to do so would be unconscionable or would give one party an unfair advantage over the other.’ 706 F.2d 193, 197 (7th Cir. 1983) (quoting Janssen Bros. Inc. v. Northbrook Trust & Sav. Bank, 12