Opinion ID: 3038665
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deficient Conduct

Text: Reynoso claims that his trial counsel’s failure to investigate the issue of the reward — including the failure to interview the two eyewitnesses, Terrones and Mendoza, about their knowledge of the offer and their expectation of receiving a substantial payment if their testimony helped convict him — constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Similarly, he contends that he was denied effective representation when his counsel failed to cross-examine the two witnesses about the reward, and their expectations of receiving it, for the purposes of impeachment and demonstrating bias.10 It is unclear from the record whether Reynoso’s trial counsel, Rose Reglos, knew at the time of trial that Mendoza and Terrones were aware of and had inquired about the reward. At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecutor insisted that the reward was “common knowledge” and that she and Reglos “discussed the fact that all three witnesses knew about the reward.” “[Reglos] knew the witnesses knew,” the prosecutor 10 Counsel also failed to cross-examine the third of the four witnesses, Hinojosa, about the reward and its possible effect on his ultimately retracted testimony inculpating Reynoso. Counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing that the prosecutor had told her that Hinojosa knew about the reward. Nevertheless, at trial, the prosecutor elicited testimony from Hinojosa denying knowledge of the reward and Reynoso’s counsel failed to challenge the denial on cross-examination. This omission was not insignificant; despite Hinojosa’s disavowal of his accusations, the State continued to rely on them and urged the jury to disregard the disavowal. 10700 REYNOSO v. GIURBINO asserted — “I knew the witnesses knew; the witnesses knew. It wasn’t any kind of issue at the time.” At the same time, the prosecutor could not recall whether she had told Reglos specifically about Mendoza and Terrones’s knowledge of the reward, let alone their interest in it. She testified that she had “no memory” of telling Reglos that Terrones had discussed the reward with a detective before trial and explained that maybe she “just forgot to tell [Reglos] or figured that it was in the report” that she had turned over to the defense. Similarly, she had no “recollection, one way or another,” whether she had told Reglos that she had personally discussed the reward with Mendoza. At no point did she contend that she had informed Reglos that either of the two eyewitnesses had expressed an interest in receiving the proceeds of the reward. Defense counsel testified that before and during trial she was unaware that all of the State’s witnesses knew about the reward. Specifically, she insisted that she was never informed that Mendoza and Terrones knew about the reward and was ignorant of the fact that they had both inquired about their eligibility for it. She testified that knowing that Mendoza and Terrones had knowledge of the reward — information she could have obtained by interviewing them prior to trial — would have put “a whole different spin on things in [her] investigation, in preparation, and just strategically what [she] would have been doing.” She further testified that she could not have made a tactical decision regarding whether to crossexamine Mendoza and Terrones about the reward because she did not know that they were aware of it. In view of the testimony at the evidentiary hearing, the most likely explanation of what transpired is that the prosecutor and defense counsel had some discussion about the reward, but for whatever reason — perhaps because the conversation lacked sufficient specificity — Reglos either failed to receive or failed to understand the full message; in short, whether the prosecutor or defense counsel was at fault, and it may have been both, Reglos did not comprehend that MenREYNOSO v. GIURBINO 10701 doza and Terrones had acknowledged their awareness of the reward, and she had no knowledge that they had expressed an interest in receiving it. This explanation also appears to be most consistent with the magistrate judge’s findings. Magis- trate Judge Lum found the prosecutor to be a “particularly credible witness.” At the same time, throughout her analysis of the issue, the magistrate judge accepted as true defense counsel’s testimony that she was unaware of Mendoza and Terrones’s knowledge of and interest in the reward. Ultimately, the factual misunderstanding or disagreement makes no difference here, and we need not resolve it — or, as the dissent suggests, remand to the district court to resolve it — “as a predicate to our legal analysis,” dis. op. at 10717. While some of the facts may not be entirely clear, the law is. As we explain, counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective regardless of the extent of her knowledge of Mendoza and Terrones’s awareness of the reward, and of their financial motivations, as a result of her conversation with the prosecutor. Whether she had direct or specific knowledge of their awareness of the reward, or whether she knew only in the most general sense of such a possibility, her failure to investigate the matter more fully, given the information she possessed, rendered her performance deficient. In addition, her failure at trial to question Mendoza and Terrones about the reward cannot under any theory be deemed a “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)) (internal quotation mark omitted). [2] Defense counsel “has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Id. at 691. “A lawyer who fails adequately to investigate, and to introduce into evidence, [information] that demonstrates his client’s factual innocence, or that raises sufficient doubts as to that question to undermine confidence in the verdict, renders deficient performance.” Lord v. Wood, 184 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999) 10702 REYNOSO v. GIURBINO (quoting Hart v. Gomez, 174 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted and second alteration in original). In particular, if counsel’s failure to investigate possible methods of impeachment is part of the explanation for counsel’s impeachment strategy (or a lack thereof), the failure to investigate may in itself constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 444 (4th Cir. 2003) (“Trial counsel have an obligation to investigate possible methods for impeaching a prosecution witness, and failure to do so may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”). [3] Although trial counsel is typically afforded leeway in making tactical decisions regarding trial strategy, counsel cannot be said to have made a tactical decision without first procuring the information necessary to make such a decision. See Riley v. Payne, 352 F.3d 1313, 1324 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that, under clearly established Supreme Court law, when defense counsel failed to contact a potential witness, counsel could not “be presumed to have made an informed tactical decision” not to call that person as a witness); see also Williams v. Washington, 59 F.3d 673, 681 (7th Cir. 1995) (“Because investigation [of the witnesses] might have revealed evidence bearing upon credibility (which counsel believed was the sole issue in the case), the failure to investigate was not objectively reasonable.”); United States v. Tucker, 716 F.2d 576, 583 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that the failure to interview or to attempt to interview key prosecution witnesses constitutes deficient performance);11 Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 580 (9th Cir. 1982) (“We have clearly held that defense counsel’s failure to interview witnesses that the prosecution intends to call during trial may constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.”); cf. Sanders v. Ratelle, 21 F.3d 1446, 1457 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Ineffectiveness 11 In Tucker, this court found that defense counsel’s “ability to crossexamine the government’s witnesses effectively was seriously compromised by his failure to interview them, since he would have little idea as to the specific areas of testimony which could be challenged.” Id. at 583. REYNOSO v. GIURBINO 10703 is generally clear in the context of complete failure to investigate because counsel can hardly be said to have made a strategic choice when s/he [sic] has not yet obtained the facts on which such a decision could be made.” (citations, emphasis, and internal quotation marks omitted)). The duty to investigate is especially pressing where, as here, the witnesses and their credibility are crucial to the State’s case. See Huffington v. Nuth, 140 F.3d 572, 580 (4th Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). Moreover, although matters such as counsel’s approach to impeachment are often viewed as tactical decisions, and such decisions do not constitute deficient conduct simply because there are better options, a poor tactical decision may constitute deficient conduct if “the defendant [can] overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action [or lack of action] ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’ ” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel, 350 U.S. at 101). [4] If, as she testified, Reynoso’s trial counsel was ignorant of the fact that Mendoza and Terrones knew and had inquired about obtaining the reward, counsel’s failure to investigate the issue was not objectively reasonable. It is undisputed that counsel knew prior to trial that a reward had been offered, and that she possessed police interview transcripts in which the reward was discussed. Counsel also knew that the State intended to call both Mendoza and Terrones as witnesses. Further, she testified that the prosecutor had told her that both Lopez and Hinojosa sought rewards. As the magistrate judge concluded, “[a]rmed with knowledge of the reward and the fact that two other witnesses knew of the reward, defense counsel should have, at a minimum, determined if the only two eyewitnesses to the robbery also knew about the reward.” Unlike other impeachment evidence presented at trial — for example, evidence attacking the witnesses’ general credibility or demonstrating the inconsistency in their statements — such information would have provided the jury with a reason why the witnesses may have had a motive to lie, especially as they had inquired as to their ability to collect the reward. See Ste10704 REYNOSO v. GIURBINO phens v. Hall, 294 F.3d 210, 224 (1st Cir. 2002) (“A colorable showing of bias can be important because, unlike evidence of prior inconsistent statements — which might indicate that the witness is lying — evidence of bias suggests why the witness might be lying.”). Such cross-examination, as Reglos herself ultimately conceded, at least with respect to Mendoza, would not have been inconsistent with her defense strategy and would have exposed a strong motive for witness bias on the part of the State’s only two eyewitnesses. For these reasons, if counsel had no more than general information about the existence of the reward, her failure to investigate the issue with respect to Mendoza and Terrones rendered her performance deficient under Strickland. The same is true even if Reglos did have some direct knowledge that Mendoza and Terrones knew about the reward. Such a limited understanding would not have relieved Reglos of her duty to investigate; it would have heightened that duty. Just as, according to the magistrate judge, counsel’s knowledge of the existence of the reward and Lopez and Hinojosa’s interest in it made it more unreasonable for her to fail to determine whether Mendoza and Terrones had a similar financial interest, knowledge that Mendoza and Terrones were aware of the reward would have made it all the more important for Reglos to determine whether they had actively sought it and whether they believed that their ability to obtain the financial compensation depended upon their testimony inculpating or convicting Reynoso. [5] Given the inadequacy of Reglos’s investigation into Mendoza and Terrones’s motives for testifying against Reynoso, her failure at trial to cross-examine Mendoza and Terrones about the reward further rendered her performance deficient. The State argues that counsel’s decision to pursue a theory of mistaken identification, and not one of deliberately false identification, was a strategic decision that cannot constitute deficient conduct. The dissent echoes this argument, concluding that “it is manifestly and demonstrably probable REYNOSO v. GIURBINO 10705 that defense counsel made a reasonable strategic choice to focus on fertile ground, and not dilute her attack by opening up another front.” Dis. op. at 10723. We reject this argument for two reasons. First, the record directly refutes the contention that Reglos made a strategic decision. Indeed, Reglos testified to the contrary at the evidentiary hearing, stating quite clearly that she did not make a strategic decision not to question Mendoza and Terrones about the reward.12 Second, any such decision would in any event have been completely unsupportable and, under the circumstances, could not have been considered a “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel, 350 U.S. at 101) (internal quotation mark omitted). “[S]trategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Id. at 690-91. As we explained, Reglos’s inadequate investigation, as a result of which she failed to uncover the financial motives of the State’s only two purported eyewitnesses, fell outside “the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. Any decision not to obtain this information at trial through cross-examination following so deficient an inquiry was, as a matter of law, equally unreasonable. Moreover, during the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel was unable to suggest a credible reason for failing to question 12 Reglos’s testimony on this point was unequivocal: Q: [Y]ou didn’t know about [Mendoza’s] knowledge of the reward — A: Right. Q: — so you couldn’t have made a strategic decision at the time not to question him about that; is that right? A: That’s correct. Q: And that’s the same for Mr. Terrones, as well? A: Right. 10706 REYNOSO v. GIURBINO Mendoza and Terrones about the reward. She admitted that cross-examination about the reward would have been entirely consistent with her decision to cross-examine another similarly situated witness, Lopez, about the subject and would not have been “mutually exclusive” with her strategy of attacking Mendoza and Terrones’s credibility. The magistrate judge agreed with that assessment, finding that “further questioning [of] Terrones and Mendoza would not have diluted or negatively impacted her attempt to discredit them.” Reglos also conceded that such questioning likely would have weakened Mendoza’s credibility substantially. The inconsistent statements in counsel’s earlier declaration that cross-examining Terrones and Mendoza about the award would have “diluted” her other, stronger impeachment evidence, are plainly without merit. Not only did counsel acknowledge that fact at the hearing, at least with respect to Mendoza, but any claim of inconsistency is clearly undermined by the fact that, at trial, counsel cross-examined the two witnesses on relatively minor points, such as their appearance on the day of the shooting. That is, the “fertile ground” for cross-examination to which the dissent refers, dis. op. at 10723, was actually quite barren. In addition, counsel managed to cross-examine Lopez about the reward even while attacking his credibility on other grounds. Most important, the questioning in which counsel engaged and the questioning in which she failed to engage are entirely compatible, and the latter could only have helped explain, to her client’s benefit, the reasons for the weakness in the witnesses’ answers to the former. We reject as well the State’s argument that eliciting information about the reward would have served no purpose because some of Mendoza and Terrones’s statements that were not helpful to the prosecution tended to support their credibility — for example, Mendoza’s testimony about his use of drugs and alcohol on the day of the alleged identification and Terrones’s admissions of his own uncertainty about the identification. The State suggests that Mendoza and Terrones’s candor about these potentially damaging facts was REYNOSO v. GIURBINO 10707 logically inconsistent with any theory of deliberate misidentification; that is, if the two witnesses were identifying Reynoso only in order to obtain the reward, they would have had no reason to sound anything less than sure of themselves on the stand because they were making it all up anyway. Contrary to the State’s argument, Mendoza and Terrones’s financial motivations actually would have helped to explain why they would testify against Reynoso despite the shaky foundations for their testimony. It twists logic to conclude that the (quite possibly truthful) weaknesses in their testimony precluded the jury from finding that their identifications of Reynoso were incredible in part because the testimony was financially motivated. Finally, the State argues that it “would be a phenomenal coincidence for four independent witnesses to falsely identify the same person from photographic lineups,” and thus, the State suggests, it was entirely reasonable for Reynoso’s counsel not to question the veracity of Mendoza and Terrones’s identifications. The States overlooks two important points. First, the witnesses were, at various times, unable to identify Reynoso or identified individuals other than Reynoso as the perpetrator. Second, it would be much more of a “coincidence” for all four to have eventually identified Reynoso as the perpetrator had there not been general knowledge of the reward and, at least in some instances, public identification of Reynoso as the primary suspect, including in a press photograph. Also, either one or two of the witnesses had known Reynoso previously. [6] In short, counsel’s investigation and preparation for trial were objectively unreasonable in light of her knowledge about the reward and the absence of any explanation for her failure to interview the two crucial eyewitnesses on that subject. Counsel’s ensuing failure to cross-examine the witnesses about their motivation for testifying as they did was, accordingly, equally unreasonable and cannot be considered “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel, 10708 REYNOSO v. GIURBINO 350 U.S. at 101) (internal quotation mark omitted). Moreover, such cross-examination would not have been inconsistent with the defense strategy counsel followed and would have provided a strong motive for witness bias on the part of the only two eyewitnesses. For these reasons, counsel’s conduct was deficient under Strickland.