Opinion ID: 1198898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether a Husband and Wife Can Serve on the Same Jury

Text: During jury selection, it was revealed that two jurors, Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson, were married to each other. Defense counsel asked the trial court its policy on husbands and wives serving on the same jury. The trial court refused to allow a challenge for cause because, as long as spouses can follow the jury instructions, it's just like any body else. A fair trial by an impartial jury is guaranteed to the criminally accused by both the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, § 14 of the Hawaii Constitution. State v. Samonte, 83 Hawai`i 507, 523, 928 P.2d 1, 17 (1996) (quoting State v. Okumura, 78 Hawai`i 383, 393, 894 P.2d 80, 90 (1995)). We review the trial court's decision to pass a juror for cause under the abuse of discretion standard. State v. Kauhi, 86 Hawai`i 195, 197, 948 P.2d 1036, 1038 (1997) (citing State v. Baron, 80 Hawai`i 107, 114, 905 P.2d 613, 620, reconsideration granted in part, 80 Hawai`i 187, 907 P.2d 773 (1995)). Richie argues on appeal that there is a bias inherent in the [marital] relationship when it comes to an important decision, such as in a criminal case where a defendant is facing imprisonment.... Marriage is a partnership with bias and deep feeling towards each other. The marriage between Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson created marital bias in the instant case. The marriage relationship is too close for comfort in a situation involving a person's guilt or innocence. We disagree with Richie's assertion that jurors who are married to each other must be disqualified from jury service. Both Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson expressly stated during voir dire that they would each make their own decisions and would not automatically go along with the other person. Thus, there was no evidence that either Mr. or Mrs. Ferguson was incapable of fulfilling his or her responsibilities as a juror. Richie cannot demonstrate actual impairment of the Fergusons' ability to serve as jurors. This court, however, held in Kauhi, supra, that implied bias can provide a basis for challenging jurors for cause. In Kauhi, we quoted a concurring opinion by Justice O'Connor for the proposition that there are some extreme situations that would justify a finding of implied bias. Id. at 200, 948 P.2d at 1041 (quoting Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 222, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)) (emphasis altered). We held that where a prospective juror is a prosecutor currently employed by the same office as the prosecutor trying the defendant, the court shall imply bias as a matter of law and dismiss the prospective juror for cause. Id. We believe that the present case is distinguishable from Kauhi. The present case did not involve an extreme situation equivalent to a prospective juror working as a prosecutor in the same office as the prosecutor trying the case. Neither did this case involve a juror related to the defendant, the attorneys, or the witnesses. The term extreme situations in Kauhi and Smith refers to situations in which there is an uncomfortably close relationship between a juror and either a party, counsel, or a witness on one side of the case. Here, there was no such relationship between Mr. or Mrs. Ferguson, on the one hand, and a person associated with the prosecution or the defense, on the other. Rather, the challenged relationship was between two jurors. In contrast to the Kauhi /Smith situation, the present situation does not create a danger that a juror will be biased or will be perceived to be biased in favor of one side or the other. Thus, there is no appearance of impropriety and no need to imply bias as a matter of law. The only possible danger when two jurors are spouses is that one juror might automatically vote along with the other. In this day and age, in which marriage is regarded as an equal partnership, see Gussin v. Gussin, 73 Haw. 470, 492, 836 P.2d 484, 495 (1992) (recognizing the partnership model of marriage), the danger of one spouse dictating a decision in a jury trial to the other spouse should be regarded as minimal. Nevertheless, any conceivable danger can easily be dispelled by asking both jurors, on voir dire, whether they would make their own decisions independently. Inasmuch as Mr. and Mrs. Ferguson both assured the court that they would each make their own decisions, Richie's right to an impartial jury was not violated. On this particular record before us, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to excuse Mr. or Mrs. Ferguson for cause.