Opinion ID: 1799510
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Heading: By its special appearance defendant subjects the amendments to section 617.3, Code, 1958, to close scrutiny under the spotlight of both our Federal and State Constitutions.

Text: This act as originally set forth in the 1958 Code, made provision for service of notice upon any corporation or person owning or operating a transportation, telegraph, telephone or express line, or any foreign corporation, having an agent in Iowa. It clearly complied with the due process mandate. Elk River Coal & Lumber Co. v. Funk, 222 Iowa 1222, 271 N.W. 204, 110 A.L.R. 1415 and Kalbach v. Service Station Equipment Co., 207 Iowa 1077, 224 N. W. 73. In 1961 the legislature by amendment, chapter 287, Laws of the Fifty-Ninth General Assembly, added to section 617.3 the following: `If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Iowa to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Iowa, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Iowa against a resident of Iowa, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Iowa by the foreign corporation for the purpose of service of process or original notice on such foreign corporation and shall be deemed to constitute the appointment by the foreign corporation of the secretary of state of the state of Iowa and his successors to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process or original notice in actions or proceedings against the foreign corporation arising from or growing out of such contract or tort. The making of the contract or the committing of the tort shall be deemed to be the agreement of the foreign corporation that any process or original notice against it which is so served upon the secretary of state shall be of the same legal force and effect as if served personally within the state of Iowa.' Defendant contends this last enactment was unconstitutional. Our conclusion in the case at hand does not require us to pass on this question. Without deciding the issue, we concede it is possible the 1961 act was defective in that no procedural requirement was provided making it reasonably probable a non-resident defendant would receive actual notice of pending litigation. Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13, 48 S.Ct. 259, 72 L.Ed. 446; Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865; 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 619, page 788; and 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, section 560, page 963. However, the legislature of this state, convened in 1963, expressly repealed the questionable act of 1961, and enacted in lieu thereof a new long-arm statute, chapter 325, Laws of the Sixtieth General Assembly, as an amendment to section 617.3 of the Code. The material portions of this act provide as follows: `If a foreign corporation makes a contract with a resident of Iowa to be performed in whole or in part by either party in Iowa, or if such foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Iowa against a resident of Iowa, such acts shall be deemed to be doing business in Iowa by such foreign corporation for the purpose of service of process or original notice on such foreign corporation under this Act, and, if the corporation does not have a registered agent or agents in the state of Iowa, shall be deemed to constitute the appointment of the secretary of state of the state of Iowa to be its true and lawful attorney upon whom may be served all lawful process or original notice in actions or proceedings arising from or growing out of such contract or tort.   ' (Emphasis supplied) Mandatory procedures are then prescribed by the Act which serve to provide probability a non-resident will receive timely notice of pending litigation in any of the trial courts of this state. The legislature specifically repealed only the amendment of 1961, leaving intact section 617.3 as it stood in the 1958 Code, then added to it what we find to be a constitutionally proper long arm provision, This our General Assembly had the unquestioned right to do. Bulova Watch Co. v. Robinson Wholesale Co., 252 Iowa 740, 746, 108 N.W.2d 365. Without question we are required to resolve all doubts in favor of its constitutionality. Town of Mechanicsville v. State Appeal Board, 253 Iowa 517, 527, 111 N.W.2d 317. We are satisfied this last legislative enactment meets the due process requirements of our Federal and State Constitutions. McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223; International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95; Deveny v. Rheem Manufacturing Company, 2 Cir., 319 F.2d 124; Andersen v. National Presto Industries, Inc., Iowa, 135 N.W.2d 639; Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc., Or., 405 P.2d 624; Beck v. Spindler, 256 Minn. 543, 99 N.W.2d 670; Atkins v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 258 Minn. 571, 104 N.W.2d 888; Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill.2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761; 16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 619, page 797; 16 Am.Jur.2d, Constitutional Law, section 560, page 963; and Annos. 78 A.L.R.2d 397. Under these circumstances there is no basis upon which to conclude other than that section 617.3, Code, 1958, as amended by the act of 1963 was a valid legislative enactment and in full force and effect on September 21, 1963. VIII. Defendant also challenges the jurisdiction of the court upon the premise the factual situation in this case does not serve to bring it within the operation of the tort provisions of section 617.3 as amended. We do not agree. The material portion of the statute with which we are here dealing says, if a foreign corporation commits a tort in whole or in part in Iowa against a resident of Iowa, it shall be deemed to be doing business in this state for purpose of process or service of notice. The real problem before us is as follows: When a foreign corporation which manufactures, produces or distributes a product and sells or causes it to be sold to Iowa residents for resale to the public, which product so resold to an Iowa resident proves to be defective, as a result of which damage or injury is caused to someone in this state, can a trial court of this state acquire jurisdiction in personam over such manufacturer, producer or distributor by virtue of process had under section 617.3 as amended by chapter 325, Laws of the Sixtieth General Assembly? There can be no question as to jurisdiction of our trial courts over the subject matter. Section 604.1, Code, 1962, and Groves v. Donohue, 254 Iowa 412, 418, 118 N.W.2d 65. And we are satisfied that where there has been strict compliance with the procedures prescribed by law, these same courts can acquire jurisdiction in personam over a foreign corporation as to a tort committed in whole or in part within this state. Our position on this subject was fully enunciated in Andersen v. National Presto Industries, Inc., Iowa, 135 N.W.2d 639, 642-643, when we said: It is clear that under section 617.3 the commission of one tort in whole or in part in Iowa is sufficient to give jurisdiction. Again, this does not necessarily determine whether the statute in all cases requires sufficient minimum contact to afford due process. International Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95, is the leading case upholding the authority of a state to secure jurisdiction over one not served with process within its borders. However, it leaves several questions unanswered, one of them being what contact is sufficient. We quote this language: `It is evident that the criteria by which we mark the boundary line between those activities which justify the subjection of a corporation to suit, and those which do not, cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative. The test is not merely, as has sometimes been suggested, whether the activity, which the corporation has seen fit to procure through its agents in another state, is a little more or a little less.' In Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corporation, supra, the Illinois Supreme Court was faced with a situation identical with the one found here. Only one actual contact was shown; but the Illinois court said: `We do not think, however, that doing a given volume of business is the only way in which a nonresident can form the required connection with this State. Since the International Shoe case was decided the requirements for jurisdiction have been further relaxed, so that at the present time it is sufficient if the act or transaction itself has a substantial connection with the State of the forum.' Loc. cit. 176 N.E.2d 764. In further discussion of the point the same court said: `In the case at bar defendant does not claim that the present use of its product in Illinois is an isolated instance. While the record does not disclose the volume of Titan's business    it is a reasonable inference that its commercial transactions, like those of other manufacturers, result in substantial use and consumption in this State.' In Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Manufacturing Corporation, supra (267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824), which likewise involved only one use of the product in the state of claimed jurisdiction, the Minnesota Supreme Court reached the same conclusion by substantially the same rationalization. It said: `We feel justified, in view of the record, in concluding that the product here involved was manufactured by appellant corporation for use by the general public. It is not contended that the area of foreseeable use of the product was so limited as to exclude the State of Minnesota. The affidavit filed in support of the motions to dismiss did not negate the reasonable inference that the Fireball boiler is a mass-production unit intended for nationwide use.' Loc. cit. 124 N.W.2d 827. In the case now before us defendant does not claim, and it would be less than logical to assume, the only solution sold or caused to be sold by it which came into the State of Iowa was that purchased by plaintiff's decedent alone. Here plaintiff alleges defendant manufactured, produced or distributed the solution for sale to the general public; that various quantities were purchased by Iowa residents for resale within this state; and plaintiff's decedent bought some of the solution which, due to negligence of defendant, exploded while being used causing her untimely death. Confining ourselves to the matter of pleading, this is sufficient to establish the minimum contact essential to due process. See also in this connection Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Hill-Dodge Banking Co., 255 Iowa 272, 122 N.W.2d 337; Hutchinson v. Boyd and Sons Press Sales, Inc., D.C., 188 F.Supp. 876; Ehlers v. United States Heating & Cooling Mfg. Corp., 267 Minn. 56, 124 N.W.2d 824; 48 Iowa L.Rev. 978; and 4 Drake L.Rev. 18. IX. Having determined the trial court obtained jurisdiction over defendant for purposes of plaintiff's claim of negligence, we turn now to defendant's assertion no jurisdiction was obtained over it as to plaintiff's claimed breach of warranty, express or implied. Defendant takes the position the contract provisions of section 617.3 as amended violate constitutional due process standards under the circumstances of the case at hand. We conclude defendant's stand is without merit. The basic element of this challenge was for the most part resolved against defendant in McGee v. International Life Insurance Company, 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223. There, under a related statute, the court held a foreign corporate insurance carrier was amenable to process in California even though the insurer had no agents or officers in that state. The court found the nonresident corporation had no vested right not to be sued on its insurance contract in the state of an insured's residence. In the case now before us defendant apparently contends, in part, plaintiff's petition fails to disclose the privity essential to an action ex contractu. In this he must assume warranty stands in contract. However, upon the basis of the presentation here made it is neither necessary nor do we propose to now resolve that question. It is to us evident Code section 617.3 does nothing more than provide a plaintiff claiming some right of action in contract or in tort with an Iowa forum for enforcement of an existing substantive right. First recognized in the field of unwholesome foods the principle of products liability has been extended to other materials which create a hazard to the public if defective. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 1295, 110 N.W.2d 449; Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 75 A.L.R.2d 1; and Simpson v. Powered Products of Mich., Inc., 24 Conn.Sup. 409, 192 A.2d 555. See also Annos. 80 A.L.R.2d at pages 476 and 590, and 78 A.L.R.2d 460. With this expanded doctrine of liability there has also developed a no-privity concept. We originally gave recognition to this humanitarian theory in Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 786-796, 176 N. W. 382, 17 A.L.R. 649. Then in State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc., 252 Iowa 1289, 1301, 110 N.W.2d 449, 456, we said: In Iowa the old rule of nonliability for negligence of a manufacturer of goods except to one in privity of contract has been repudiated. See discussion in Thompson v. Burke Engineering Sales Co., 252 Iowa 146, 153, 106 N.W.2d 351, 356 [84 A.L.R.2d 689], and citations. The same reasoning applies in warranty as in negligence cases. These conclusions were at least given limited expression in our recently enacted Uniform Commercial Code, chapter 413, Laws of the Sixty-First General Assembly. Section 2318 of that Act provides as follows: A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the operation of this section. Harper and James, The Law of Torts, section 28.16, states the rule as to warranty in the area of products liability in these terms:    where commodities are dangerous to life and health, society's interest transcends that of protecting reasonable business expectations. It extends to minimizing the danger to consumers and putting the burden of their losses on those who best can minimize the danger and distribute equitably the losses that do occur. And since the warranties involved in these cases do not represent the expressed or implied-in-fact intent of bargainers, but are warranties imposed by law as vehicles of social policy, the courts should extend them as far as the relevant social policy requires. The interest in consumer protection calls for warranties by the maker that do run with the goods, to reach all who are likely to be hurt by the use of the unfit commodity for a purpose ordinarily to be expected. When a manufacturer, distributor, producer or retailer markets a product with representations as to its condition there should most certainly be imposed a strict accountability where the ultimate consumer relies upon those representations and suffers injury because the product did not conform to them. The same is true as to an implied warranty that a product is reasonably safe, suitable and fit for its intended use. In this connection our remaining and determinative issue is whether the trial court was vested with requisite jurisdiction over the person of defendant as to plaintiff's claimed right of redress for breach of warranties. Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by service of process upon a defendant or by his consent. Stucker v. County of Muscatine, 249 Iowa 485, 490, 87 N.W.2d 452. Since consent is admittedly nonexistent in the case now before us, our question is whether jurisdiction was acquired by requisite process. As has already been determined the trial court obtained good and sufficient jurisdiction over defendant upon plaintiff's claim based upon alleged negligence. This brings us to the matter of different causes of action and one cause of action asserted upon multiple theories or concepts of the law. In Davis v. Mater, 248 Iowa 1, 2-3, 79 N.W.2d 400, we held in effect it is not only permissible but necessary for a party plaintiff to include all theories of recovery in his petition and that he may not divide a single cause of action into different actions. See also Berger v. Amana Society, 253 Iowa 378, 383, 111 N.W.2d 753. In the case at hand it is evident plaintiff does not assert two or more independent causes of action. He in fact alleges one cause premised upon different legal theories. See Page v. Koss Construction Co., 219 Iowa 1017, 257 N.W. 426. The mere fact plaintiff's petition contains several counts does not mean he asserts more than one basic cause of action. Baker v. Baker, 220 Iowa 1216, 264 N.W. 116, 103 A.L.R. 995. A cause of action may be single even though the petition asserts in separate counts different and even inconsistent legal theories. Rule 22, R.C.P.; Connell v. Hays, 255 Iowa 261, 271, 122 N.W.2d 341; Weaver Construction Co. v. Farmers National Bank, 253 Iowa 1280, 1291, 115 N.W.2d 804; and Blakeley v. Estate of Shortal, 236 Iowa 787, 790, 20 N.W.2d 28. Here we look to plaintiff's prayer for relief which discloses he seeks one remedy. In re Estate of Hoelscher, 249 Iowa 444, 449, 87 N.W.2d 446. We are satisfied jurisdiction as to one cause of action gives jurisdiction as to all theories or concepts of the law upon which a plaintiff may seek any one remedy. Stated otherwise, where as here the court has obtained jurisdiction over the defendant as to any cause of action, it has jurisdiction for all purposes related to that cause even though it be asserted under separate counts based upon different theories or concepts of the law. Plaintiff's petition asserts, in substance, defendant caused its product to be delivered into the hands of an Iowa retailer for sale to the general public. For our purpose this pleading is sufficient to disclose defendant was doing business in this state as the term is here employed. Section 617.3, Code, 1962; International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95; Cosper v. Smith & Wesson Arms Co., 53 Cal.2d 77, 346 P.2d 409; Parris v. H. G. Fischer & Co., 219 N.C. 292, 13 S.E.2d 540, 543-544; and Snipes v. Commercial & Industrial Bank, 225 Miss. 345, 83 So.2d 179, 183. To the extent required this, together with other allegations previously set forth, disclose the minimum requirements sufficient to subject defendant to process under our long-arm statute, clearly measuring up to any constitutional requirements of fair play and substantial justice. Confining ourselves to the matter of pleadings, we are satisfied the requisite jurisdiction was here obtained as to plaintiff's claimed right of action. We do not presume to here determine whether plaintiff's evidence will support any one or more of his theories. This can only be resolved according to the evidence presented in trial. We simply conclude the trial court has jurisdiction to entertain plaintiff's alleged cause of action in its entirety.