Opinion ID: 1735436
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts IV and VI

Text: In Count IV, labeled Fraud, Bethel alleges fraudulent acts that he says occurred after the formation of the contract to purchase the engine and transmission; in Count VI, also labeled Fraud, Bethel alleges fraudulent acts that he says occurred after the formation of the contract to purchase the three generators. Specifically, in Count IV, Bethel alleges: After the contract for the purchase of the engine and transmission was finalized, and after [Bethel] fully performed his obligations thereto by prepaying the entire purchase price, the Defendants repeatedly and expressly misrepresented to the Plaintiff that they were capable of fully performing their obligations under the contracts, and that the delivery of the engine and transmission would be forthcoming and timely. In addition, the Defendants misrepresented that the engine and transmission had been shipped to [Bethel]. In Count VI, Bethel alleges: After the contract for the purchase of the generators was finalized, and after [Bethel] fully performed his obligations thereto by prepaying the entire purchase price, the Defendants repeatedly and expressly misrepresented to [Bethel] that they were capable of fully performing their obligations under the contracts, and that delivery of all three generators would be forthcoming and timely. In each count, Bethel alleges that these representations were false; and that the Defendants made them knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, and with the intent to defraud and injure [Bethel] and to prevent [him] from making alternative contractual arrangements, and from seeking immediate legal relief on the contract. Bethel refers to these counts as stating fraudulent-misrepresentation claims, [3] but because the alleged misrepresentations concern the performance of promises, that is, because they concern Thorn and Diesel's ability to perform the contracts and the promised act of timely delivery of the engine, transmission, and generators, [4] we construe these allegations as attempts to state claims of promissory fraud. See Spring Hill Lighting & Supply Co. v. Square D Co., 662 So.2d 1141, 1149 (Ala.1995) (In promissory fraud, the material existing fact that is misrepresented is the defendant's state of mind, when the defendant represents that he intends to perform some act although he does not in fact intend to perform it.). However, they are insufficient. Bethel does not allege in either count that at the time Thorn and Diesel allegedly made these repeated promises to timely deliver the engine, transmission, and generators they intended not to perform the acts promised, but intended instead to deceive Bethel. In order for fraud to be predicated upon a promise, it is essential that the promisor intended not to perform at the time of making the promise. Robinson v. All-state Ins. Co., 399 So.2d at 290; see also Washington, 719 So.2d at 776 ([T]o support a claim of promissory fraud, the plaintiff must show that at the time of the alleged misrepresentation (that is, the promise), the defendant intended not to do the act or acts promised, but intended to deceive the plaintiff.); Russellville Prod. Credit Ass'n. v. Frost, 484 So.2d 1084, 1086 (Ala.1986) (The failure to perform a promised act is not in itself evidence of intent to deceive at the time a promise is made. If it were, the mere breach of a contract would be tantamount to fraud.) (citing P & S Business, Inc. v. South Central Bell Telephone Co., 466 So.2d 928 (Ala.1985)). In Robinson, this Court held that the plaintiff's complaint failed to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation because it failed to state either the time [or] location of the alleged misrepresentation, failed to identify the individual who actually is alleged to have misrepresented the fact, and fail[ed] to allege any intent by [the defendant] not to perform. 399 So.2d at 290. Similarly, Bethel has failed to allege that Thorn, at the time he allegedly made the promises, intended not to do the acts promised; therefore, the allegations in Counts IV and VI are insufficient to state claims of promissory fraud upon which relief can be granted against Thorn. Although Bethel's allegations in Counts IV and VI for the most part concern the performance of promised acts, Bethel does allege in the last sentence of Paragraph 33 of Count IV that [Thorn and Diesel] misrepresented that the engine and transmission had been shipped to [him]. This alleged misrepresentation, unlike the other alleged misrepresentations in Counts IV and VI, does not concern the performance of a promise, but, rather, concerns a representation of something already performedshipment of the engine and transmission. With respect to this allegation, we do find that Count IV is sufficient to state a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation against Thorn. Bethel has alleged that Thorn misrepresented that the engine and transmission had been shipped, that Bethel reasonably relied on that misrepresentation, and that Bethel suffered damage as a direct and proximate result of his reliance on that misrepresentation. In summary, in Counts IV and VI Bethel has failed to state claims of promissory fraud upon which relief can be granted against Thorn. With respect to the alleged misrepresentation concerning shipment of the engine and transmission, Bethel has stated in Count IV a claim of fraudulent misrepresentation as to that alleged misrepresentation, a claim upon which relief can be granted against Thorn.