Opinion ID: 789765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: exceptions to eleventh amendment immunity

Text: 14 There are two fundamental exceptions to the general rule that bars an action in federal court filed by an individual against a state. First, a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated when Congress acts under § 5, the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12 Second, a state may consent to suit in federal court. 13 15
16 Congress can single-handedly strip the states of their Eleventh Amendment immunity and thereby authorize federal court suits by individuals against the states. When Congress does this, it is exercising its power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. In Reickenbacker v. Foster, 14 we examined the Supreme Court's cases concerning congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and derived the following test for determining whether a federal statute is a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment and, consequently, whether the statute abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity: (1) The statute must contain an unequivocal statement of congressional intent to abrogate; (2) Congress must have identified a history and pattern of unconstitutional action by the states; and (3) the rights and remedies created by the statute must be congruent and proportional to the constitutional violation(s) Congress sought to remedy or prevent. 15 If these three requirements are satisfied, states are subject to federal jurisdiction in suits under the statute adopted pursuant to § 5, regardless of any absence of consent.
17 Either in the absence of § 5 abrogation or in addition to it, a state always has the prerogative of foregoing its protection from federal court jurisdiction under the Eleventh Amendment. 16 A state's consent to suit must be both knowing and voluntary. That consent must always be knowing and voluntary follows from College Savings Bank, in which the Supreme Court cited Johnson v. Zerbst, to define what constitutes effective waiver. 17 Waiver is effective when it is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege. 18 The first part, intentional relinquishment, captures the principle of voluntariness; and the second part, known right or privilege, captures the element of knowingness. 18 When Congress conditions the availability of federal funds on a state's waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, we employ a five-prong test derived from the Supreme Court's definitive spending power case, South Dakota v. Dole, 19 to ascertain the validity of the waiver. In Dole, South Dakota challenged a congressional statute that conditions the states' receipt of federal highway funds on their adoption of the minimum drinking age of twenty-one. South Dakota argued that the statute exceeded Congress's spending power and violated the Twenty-First Amendment. 20 The Court rejected this argument, noting that even though Congress is prohibited by the Twenty-First Amendment from directly regulating the distribution of alcoholic beverages, the Spending Clause authorizes it indirectly to entice states to raise their drinking age by dangling the proverbial carrot of federal dollars. 21 19 Dole embodies an expansive interpretation of Congress's spending authority. Indirect persuasion is constitutional, reasoned the Court, because the spending power is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution. 22 Congress can, therefore, validly use its spending power to legislate conditions on the disbursement of federal funds even though those conditions would be unconstitutional if enacted as direct prohibitions. 23 It goes without saying that, because states have the independent power to lay and collect taxes, they retain the ability to avoid the imposition of unwanted federal regulation simply by rejecting federal funds. 20 Nevertheless, Congress's power to effect policy through the exercise of its spending power is not unlimited. Dole announced the restrictions that control such exercise: (1) Federal expenditures must benefit the general welfare; (2) The conditions imposed on the recipients must be unambiguous; (3) The conditions must be reasonably related to the purpose of the expenditure; and (4) No condition may violate any independent constitutional prohibition. 24 In addition, the Dole Court recognized a fifth requirement that the condition not be coercive: [I]n some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which `pressure turns into compulsion.' 25 21 Thus, Dole makes clear that, as long as its framework is employed, congressional spending programs that are enacted in pursuit of the general welfare and unambiguously condition a state's acceptance of federal funds on reasonably related requirements are constitutional unless they are either (1) independently prohibited or (2) coercive. When the condition requires a state to waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity, Dole 's requirement of an unambiguous statement of the condition and its proscription on coercive inducements serve a dual role because they ensure compliance with College Savings Bank 's requirement that waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity must be (a) knowing and (b) voluntary.
22 In Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 26 the Court analyzed Congress's power to impose conditions on a state's receipt of federal funds and pronounced: 23 There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously.... By insisting that Congress speak with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation. 27 24 Thus, we know that this stringent clear-statement rule ensures that when a state foregoes its Eleventh Amendment immunity in exchange for federal funds, it does so knowingly. 28 In our reading of Pennhurst, the only knowledge that the Court is concerned about is a state's knowledge that a Spending Clause condition requires waiver of immunity, not a state's knowledge that it has immunity that it could assert. At bottom, we conclude that if Congress satisfies the clear-statement rule, the knowledge prong of the Spending Clause waiver analysis is fulfilled.
25 If the clear-statement rule is satisfied, a state's actual acceptance of clearly conditioned funds is generally voluntary. The only exception to this presumption arises if the spending program itself is deemed coercive, for then a state's waiver is, by definition, no longer voluntary. 26 In summary, the Supreme Court has articulated two ways that a state can be subject to an individual's suit in federal court, regardless of the Eleventh Amendment. First, Congress may abrogate state immunity. Second, the state may waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity by consent. If waiver results from participation in a Spending Clause program, the program must be a valid exercise of Congress's spending power; the waiver condition must satisfy the clear-statement rule (thereby ensuring that the state's waiver is knowing); and the program must be non-coercive (automatically establishing that the waiver is voluntary). 27