Opinion ID: 2183753
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: harmless-error inquiry

Text: We have concluded that none of the evidence adduced against Ryder at trial resulted from or was tainted by the uncounseled lineup identification. Any error in permitting the lineup to be held in the absence of his lawyer was therefore harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, and his conviction must be affirmed. (See Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 87 S.Ct. 824.) With respect to Curtis a more detailed inquiry is required since, assuming that a sixth amendment violation occurred, the court improperly allowed Buckle to testify that he identified Curtis at the lineup. Excluding the lineup testimony, the principal evidence against Curtis consisted of the remaining identifications  Harris' identification from the lineup photograph and both witnesses' in-court identifications  and Kinnie's testimony that he, Curtis and Ryder executed the robbery. The in-court identifications of both witnesses were positive, and the record demonstrates that both witnesses had a sufficient opportunity to observe Curtis during the robbery. Several days before identifying Curtis from the lineup photograph, Harris saw a newspaper story concerning the robbery. The story included pictures of the defendants, but no claim has been made that the identification from the lineup photograph was thereby rendered impermissibly suggestive, and that identification was properly considered. Kinnie testified that he had known Ryder for at least 10 years and Curtis for about six. On Ryder's initiative, Kinnie and Ryder discussed robbing the liquor store in early July 1979. Sometime thereafter Kinnie and Ryder had a phone conversation in which Ryder advised Kinnie that Curtis would be involved in the robbery. On July 18, the day of the robbery, Ryder called Kinnie at the liquor store to inform Kinnie that he was coming over that day. At four o'clock Ryder entered the store, made a small purchase, and left. Kinnie followed him to the parking lot, and Ryder told him that it looked all right and that he would talk to Curtis. Several hours later Curtis appeared at the store, also bought something, and spoke with Kinnie in the parking lot. Apparently the only advance planning among the three was that the defendants would take Kinnie's gun and that the robbery would take place at closing time. The robbery occurred at approximately 10 p.m., and Kinnie's version of the incident was consistent in all relevant details with those given by Buckle and Harris. After talking with the police who came to investigate the robbery, Kinnie went directly to Curtis' house, where he split the money with the defendants. The record reflects that Kinnie's testimony as to Curtis' address was accurate. Of course, both Kinnie's integrity and his motive in testifying were open to question. Kinnie, already on Federal probation for a felony at the time of trial, testified in exchange for an agreement with the State on the armed-robbery charge as well as several other outstanding charges. He admitted to committing deceptive practices. Also, at the time Kinnie confessed to the police in February 1981, he knew that the fire department's internal affairs division, including Ryder, was investigating him for stealing money from dead persons in ambulances while working as an emergency medical technician. However, Kinnie's credibility need not be judged in a vacuum; his statements and the eyewitness accounts and identifications were mutually corroborative. In addition, Kinnie's testimony explains the peculiar fact mentioned by both witnesses that his gun was returned to him after Ryder removed the shells. Kinnie's story also explains why he was separated from the other employees while the robbery was in progress. In its harmless-error analysis, the appellate court noted that the State never called Greg Webb, who was the other witness to the robbery. His absence is not relevant since there is nothing to show that the defendants could not have called Webb had they desired to do so. This is not a case in which the prosecution has repeatedly emphasized an improper lineup identification rendering that evidence pivotal to the conviction. ( Cf. Frisco v. Blackburn (5th Cir.1986), 782 F.2d 1353, 1356.) That identification was only mentioned once during Buckle's direct examination and not at all in closing argument. Considering the other evidence against Curtis, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that he would have been convicted even absent the admission of Buckle's lineup identification. We are therefore persuaded that any error was harmless. The judgment of the appellate court is reversed, and the convictions of both defendants are affirmed. Appellate court reversed; circuit court affirmed.