Opinion ID: 1133414
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial court's refusal to order Dennis Morgan to undergo a blood test

Text: Near the close of the defense case, defense counsel reminded the trial court of Dennis Morgan's testimony that a medical examination in jail had evaluated him to be HIV-negative. From this testimony, defense counsel presumed that the jail had a sample of Morgan's blood that could be tested for blood type. Counsel mentioned that he had subpoenaed Morgan's jail medical records, but also asked the court to order the jail medical division to determine Morgan's blood type. The trial court stated that it would issue the order if the jail had a sample of Morgan's blood available for typing or if Morgan consented to have blood drawn. The trial court refused to order that blood be taken from Morgan against his will, citing People v. Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 738, 244 Cal.Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741. In Melton, we held that [a] defendant's constitutional right to confront a witness does not entitle him to obtain court-ordered evidence in violation of the witness's constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. ( Ibid. ) Defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing to order that blood be drawn from Dennis Morgan for use in a blood test. He argues that his own testimony that Morgan was present at the time Amanda suffered her fatal injuries provided the court with probable cause to order Morgan to give a blood sample. Because defendant did not make this argument in the trial court, he may not now raise the issue. It is both unfair and inefficient to permit a claim of error on appeal that, if timely brought to the attention of the trial court, could have been easily corrected or avoided. ( People v. Vera (1997) 15 Cal.4th 269, 276, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 754, 934 P.2d 1279; see also People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1035, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388 [claim that ruling violated constitutional right was not preserved for appeal because of failure to object on that ground at trial].) Even if properly before us, the claim lacks merit. Before a court can order an instrusion[ ] beneath the body's surface, it must find the existence of probable cause to believe the intrusion will uncover material evidence, and it must then weigh the degree of intrusion against the likelihood and importance of recovering the evidence. ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 738, 244 Cal. Rptr. 867, 750 P.2d 741; People v. Scott (1978) 21 Cal.3d 284, 293, 145 Cal.Rptr. 876, 578 P.2d 123.) We evaluate the existence of probable cause by considering the totality of circumstances. (See People v. Camarella (1991) 54 Cal.3d 592, 600-601, 286 Cal.Rptr. 780, 818 P.2d 63 [setting out the totality of circumstances considered in evaluating probable cause supporting a search warrant].) Here, the totality of circumstances fails to establish probable cause to believe that testing Morgan's blood would uncover material evidence. The blood type evidence in this case, as testified to during the defense case by Sheriffs Department criminalist Douglas Ridolfi, was that the bloodstains recovered at the crime scene were consistent with the blood of about half of the general population. Thus testing of Morgan's blood, at most, could have established that he did or did not fall within that half. The possibility of uncovering such inconclusive evidence provided insufficient cause for the trial court to order Morgan to submit to a blood test.