Opinion ID: 161081
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Breathing

Text: 34 Whether Ms. Selenke presented evidence that she had a substantial impairment in the major life activity of breathing presents a much closer question. She alleged in her first amended complaint that, while employed at MIC, she suffered physical problems such as headaches, dizziness, fatigue, breathing difficulties, burning eyes and related symptoms of sinusitus and chemical exposure as a result of the chemicals and lack of proper ventilation. Aplts App. vol. I, at 13 (emphasis added). After giving her deposition and in response to MIC's motion for summary judgment, Ms. Selenke submitted an affidavit describing breathing problems that she had suffered since 1995. 5 35 Unlike the district court, we are not convinced that Ms. Selenke's failure to mention these problems at her deposition precludes consideration of her affidavit. Although an affidavit that contradicts earlier sworn testimony should be disregarded if it constitutes an attempt to create a sham fact issue, Franks v. Nimmo, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (10th Cir. 1986), that principle is not applicable when the deposition testimony is ambiguous and the affidavit assists in clarifying it. See id. (stating that the court should consider whether the earlier testimony reflects confusion which the affidavit attempts to explain); Videon Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 992 F.2d 482, 487 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that, in light of ambiguous deposition testimony, it was proper to consider an affidavit and noting that[t]o hold that such a semantic misstep from a witness untrained in the law effectively ends his case would only bring back the sporting theory of justice and open the door to sharp practices by counsel); Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (7th Cir. 1993) (noting that [a] subsequent affidavit may be used to clarify ambiguous or confusing deposition testimony). 36 On the issue of her breathing difficulties, Ms. Selenke's deposition testimony is somewhat unclear. At the deposition, MIC's attorneys asked her what activities in your life have been affected by your disability? Aplt's App. vol. III, at 586. When Ms. Selenke asked him if he was referring to social activities, the lawyer replied, It's your call, what kind of activities in your life. Id. Even though court decisions and administrative regulations group together as major life activities such disparate acts as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, sleeping, sitting, standing, lifting, reaching, and working, see Doyal, 213 F.3d at 495, it does not necessarily follow that a deponent such as Ms. Selenke would understand that the word activity included a basic physiological function such a breathing--particularly when she asked for clarification of the term and the attorney refused to provide it. Thus, in light of the ambiguity of her deposition testimony, it is questionable whether her affidavit should have been disregarded. 37 Moreover, as Ms. Selenke observes, several courts have concluded that breathing difficulties may constitute an impairment of a major life activity. See, e.g., Homeyer v. Stanley Tulchin Assocs., Inc., 91 F.3d 959, 962 (7th Cir. 1996) (concluding that there were factual questions as to whether the plaintiff's chronic allergic rhinitis and sinusitus substantially limited her ability to breath and work); Treadwell v. Dow-United Tech., 970 F. Supp. 962, 972 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (finding evidence sufficient to create a jury question as to whether her major life activity of breathing has been substantially impaired . . . by her alleged sensitivity to chemicals); Whillock v. Delta Air Lines, 926 F. Supp. 1555, 1561-63 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (concluding that evidence of plaintiff's hypersensitivity to certain chemicals created a factual question as to whether her breathing was substantially impaired). Ms. Selenke's contention that her breathing difficulties constitute a protected disability also finds some support in the Supreme Court's decision in Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998). There, the court held that an individual's HIV infection constituted a substantial impairment of the major life activity of reproduction, even though [c]onception and childbirth are not impossible for an HIV victim. Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 641. That holding followed from the significant health risks associated with such reproduction. See id. (stating that the ADA addresses substantial limitations on major life activities, not utter inabilities). Here, the record contains evidence that Ms. Selenke's sinusitus affected her breathing by causing her increased health risks upon exposure to certain conditions in the darkroom. 38 For all these reasons, we will assume, without deciding, that Ms. Selenke presented sufficient evidence that she suffered from a substantial impairment of the major life activity of breathing while employed by MIC. We now turn to the other elements of Ms. Selenke's claim for discriminatory discharge under the ADA.