Opinion ID: 58529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Timeliness of Mathis’s Discrimination Claims

Text: The district court was correct to dismiss Mathis’s race discrimination claim under Title VII, his age discrimination claim, and his disability discrimination claim because Mathis failed to exhaust administrative remedies prior to filing suit. These claims only surfaced in an untimely EEOC charge and do not relate back to the initial timely filing.2 Mathis’s amendments did not “spell[] out in greater detail facts tending to demonstrate” the discrimination he alleged in his initial charge. Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 465 (5th Cir. 1970). Therefore Mathis has not exhausted his administrative remedies prior to filing suit for discrimination on account of race under Title VII, age, or disability. See Manning v. Chevron Chemical Co., 332 F.3d 874, 878 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Generally, amendments that raise a new legal theory do not ‘relate back’ to an original charge of discrimination.”). Nor are these claims within the scope of Mathis’s timely filed EEOC charge. See Gregory v. Ga. Dept. of Human Resources, 355 F.3d 1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2003). Mathis’s claim of race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 2 In his original charge, Mathis only checked the box for discrimination on the basis of “sex.” His factual statement recounted that he was terminated for excessive absenteeism despite possessing doctor’s excuses for the absences. He also stated that he had suffered sexual harassment at the hands of his supervisor, McGahey, had complained about her behavior, but had been told that he did not have sufficient evidence against her. His amended charge included allegations of retaliation for having filed the sexual harassment complaint and that he was terminated because of his sex, race, and perceived disability. He checked the boxes for sex, race, retaliation, age, and disability in the later filed amended charge. 5 1981 survives despite Mathis’s untimely Title VII race discrimination charge because § 1981 actions are not subject to the administrative exhaustion requirement. We will assume arguendo that Mathis’s retaliation claim relates back to his original charge.