Opinion ID: 1881821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Available Uses

Text: In addition to the claims regarding the closures' defined duration, the cities contend that the property owners were not deprived all economically beneficial or productive uses of the property because they had other uses available to them under the terms of the closure orders. We disagree. The orders closing the properties in question rendered the properties economically idle, which impact is all the more onerous with regards to property that has already been dedicated to a particular use: Owner Gihwala and his family reside on the premises, in four of the rooms. The City's suggestion that this alone is an economically viable use of a 57-unit motel defies the logic of finance. The City's further suggestion that the zoning code allows some 60 uses other than as a motel ignores the fact that the structure on the property was designed and built as a motel. Transforming it into some other use (a shopping mall? a gasoline station?) for the six-month-closure period lacks any basis in reason. Keshbro, 717 So.2d at 604 n. 7. [18] Our conclusion that the closure orders issued by the respective NABs deprived Gihwala and Kablinger of all economically beneficial or productive use of their properties does not end our inquiry. Under Lucas, the cities can resist compensation only if they can identify background principles of nuisance and property law that the prohibit the uses proscribed by the orders. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031, 112 S.Ct. 2886. A regulation so restricting the use of property can do no more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courtsby adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise. Id. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. 2886. The difficulty posed by the action of the NABs emanates from the breadth of the respective orders closing the subject properties. The orders proscribed all uses of the respective properties, both legal and illegal. Cf. Bowen, 675 So.2d at 631 (emphasizing that the NAB's closure order of the apartment complex proscribed all uses of the property, leaving no uses available). [19] Under Lucas, our inquiry must therefore focus on whether the closure orders mirror the relief which could have been achieved in the courtsby adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1029, 112 S.Ct. 2886. It is well settled in this State that injunctions issued to abate public nuisances must be specifically tailored to abate the objectionable conduct, without unnecessarily infringing upon the conduct of a lawful enterprise. See, e.g., Brower v. Hubbard, 643 So.2d 28, 30 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (Injunctions must be specifically tailored to each case; they should not infringe upon conduct that does not produce the harm sought to be avoided); 4245 Corp. v. City of Oakland Park, 473 So.2d 12, 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985) (The injunction totally putting the corporation out of business was too drastic and its terms overbroad. The trial court should have limited the injunction to the illegal acts of lewdness and given the corporation an opportunity to function as a legitimate enterprise); Health Clubs, Inc. v. State ex rel. Eagan, 377 So.2d 28, 29-30 (Fla. 5th DCA 1979) (Where illegal conduct which has been decreed to constitute a public nuisance is separable from legal conduct within a business enterprise, only the illegal conduct may be enjoined.). In the case of the Stardust, however, the Third District concluded that the operation of the Stardust had become inextricably intertwined with the drug and prostitution activity sought to be enjoined: [T]he record reflects that the motel was, in reality, not a motel, but rather a brothel and drug house which the owners, for whatever reason, failed to stop operating on their property. The record shows that the prostitution and drugrelated activities were inextricably intertwined with the motel. In order to preclude these proscribed activities, it was necessary to bar access to the base of operations, which, the Board concluded, could only be done by completely closing the Stardust Motel. Keshbro, 717 So.2d at 604 (footnote omitted). We agree. The record demonstrates that the City of Miami NAB acted patiently in attempting to eradicate the drug and prostitution problem at the Stardust. Their efforts, however, met with failure. As emphasized by the Third District, the drug and prostitution activity had become part and parcel of the operation of the Stardust. On this record of extensive and persistent drug and nuisance activity which had become inextricably intertwined with the Stardust's operation, we conclude that the City of Miami's NAB acted reasonably in ordering the temporary closure of the Stardust. [20] The same, however, cannot be said of the NAB's action in Kablinger. No similar record of persistent drug activity precipitated the apartment's closure; rather, the St. Petersburg NAB closed the apartment complex solely on a finding that the apartment had been the site of cocaine sales on more than two occasions. Unlike the Stardust, there was no extensive record indicating that the drug activity had become an inseparable part of the operation of the apartment complex. Absent such a record, we are unable to conclude that the NAB's action in closing Kablinger's apartment complex for one year was specifically tailored to abate the drug nuisance found to exist at the property. Based on the foregoing, we approve the decisions reached in Keshbro and Kablinger. It is so ordered. WELLS, C.J., and HARDING, ANSTEAD, PARIENTE, and LEWIS, JJ., concur. QUINCE, J., recused.