Opinion ID: 2817691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: standard of review

Text: Whether the district court had jurisdiction to consider the merits of Petitioner’s § 2241 petition is a question of law that we review de novo. Williams v. Warden, Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 713 F.3d 1332, 1337 (11th Cir. 2013). The jurisdictional question is a threshold issue, and we cannot reach the merits of Petitioner’s petition unless the district court had jurisdiction to entertain it. Id. at 1338 (holding that § 2255(e) imposes a jurisdictional limit on § 2241 petitions). B. Availability of Habeas Relief under §§ 2241 and 2255 Ordinarily, a federal prisoner may only collaterally attack his final conviction and sentence through a § 2255 habeas petition. Bryant v. Warden, FCC Coleman-Medium, 738 F.3d 1253, 1256 (11th Cir. 2013). Petitioner seeks relief on the ground that his sentence is unconstitutional in light of Alleyne. His habeas claim is thus expressly covered by and generally must be asserted under § 2255(a), which authorizes a motion to “vacate, set aside or correct” a sentence that a federal prisoner claims is unconstitutional or illegal. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a). See also Antonelli v. Warden, U.S.P. Atlanta, 542 F.3d 1348, 1352 n. 1 (11th Cir. 2008) (“A prisoner in custody pursuant to a federal court judgment may proceed under § 2241 only when he raises claims outside the scope of § 2255(a).”) 5 Case: 14-14900 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 6 of 8 As noted, Petitioner has previously filed an unsuccessful § 2255 petition. The district court may only consider a second or successive § 2255 petition by Petitioner if the petition has been certified by this Court to contain: (1) newly discovered evidence sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found Petitioner guilty, or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). We have not certified this case as appropriate for review under either prong of § 2255(h). Relief under § 2255(a) is thus unavailable here. See Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1311 (11th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“The statutory bar against second or successive motions is one of the most important AEDPA safeguards for finality of judgment.”). Petitioner argues that habeas relief is nevertheless available to him via a § 2241 petition that falls within the “savings clause” of § 2255(e). The savings clause permits a prisoner to file a § 2241 petition where the remedy provided by § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [the prisoner’s] detention.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see also Bryant, 738 F.3d at 1256. As applied to sentencing claims such as Petitioner’s, this Court has interpreted the “inadequate or ineffective” language to permit a § 2241 petition when: (1) throughout sentencing, direct appeal, and the first § 2255 proceeding, Circuit precedent specifically 6 Case: 14-14900 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 7 of 8 addressed and squarely foreclosed the claim raised in the § 2241 petition; (2) subsequent to the first § 2255 proceeding, a Supreme Court decision overturned the Circuit precedent that had squarely foreclosed the claim; (3) the new rule announced by the Supreme Court applies retroactively on collateral review; (4) as a result of the new rule being retroactive, the petitioner’s current sentence exceeds the statutory maximum authorized by Congress; and (5) the savings clause of § 2255(e) reaches the petitioner’s claim. Id. at 1274. By application of binding Circuit authority, Petitioner’s claim does not meet the third requirement set forth above. See Jeanty v. Warden, FCI-Miami, 757 F.3d 1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 2014). In Jeanty, this Court held that the new rule announced in Alleyne does not apply retroactively on collateral review. Id. As we explained in Jeanty: First, neither Alleyne itself nor any later Supreme Court decision holds that Alleyne is retroactive. Second, the Alleyne Court explained that its holding was an application of the rule established in Apprendi v. New Jersey, and we have repeatedly held that Apprendi’s rule does not apply retroactively on collateral review. If Apprendi’s rule is not retroactive on collateral review, then neither is a decision applying its rule. Finally, every one of our sister circuits to consider the issue in a published decision has concluded that Alleyne is not retroactively applicable on collateral review. Id. at 1285-86 (internal citations omitted). Because Alleyne does not apply retroactively, Petitioner does not meet the criteria for seeking relief under § 2241 via the savings clause of § 2255(e). The 7 Case: 14-14900 Date Filed: 07/16/2015 Page: 8 of 8 district court thus properly construed Petitioner’s motion for relief under § 2241 as an unauthorized, successive § 2255 petition, and correctly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested in the petition.