Opinion ID: 2221521
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Death Penalty Hearing

Text: Williams claims the trial court improperly instructed the jury during the death penalty hearing. After specifying the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court instructed the jury: If the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one (1) aggravating circumstance, or if you find that any mitigating circumstances outweigh the aggravating circumstances, you should not recommend the death penalty. If the State did prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one (1) aggravating circumstance, and you further find that such aggravating circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances, you should recommend that the death penalty be imposed. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(e)(2) provides that the jury may recommend the death penalty only if it finds [t]hat any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances. The instruction given in this case provides that the jury should recommend the death penalty under such circumstances. Williams claims that the use of the word should, instead of may, constitutes reversible error. While acknowledging that the instruction was incorrect, the post-conviction court ruled that it constituted harmless error. The court reasoned that the word should did not appreciably change the nature of the jury's duty under the statute and that, in any case, the trial judge was not required to follow the recommendation of the jury regarding the death penalty. Clearly, the instruction was erroneous, and it compromised the reliability of the jury's recommendation. By holding such error harmless, the post-conviction court in effect determined that the jury's recommendation would have had little or no effect on the trial court's deliberations regarding the death penalty. That assumption is incorrect. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(d) requires that the jury hear evidence concerning the death penalty. The statute requires that the trial court consider the jury's findings when deciding whether to impose the death penalty. The jury's conclusion is a recommendation which the trial court is not required to follow. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(e). It seems unlikely, however, that the legislature would specifically require the trial court to consider the jury's recommendation if that consideration amounted only to an order book entry noting the recommendation. This Court regards the practical effect of the jury's recommendation in a death penalty case as significant: Notwithstanding that the sentence determination by the jury is not binding upon the judge, we do not regard it as a mere formality having no substantive value. If we did, error if any, in such regard could not be other than harmless. On the contrary, the recommendation of the jury is a very valuable contribution to the process, in that it comes from a group representative of the defendant's peers, who are likely to reflect, collectively, the standards of the community. Brewer v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 338, 417 N.E.2d 889, 909, cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1122, 102 S.Ct. 3510, 73 L.Ed.2d 1384. This case presents a variation on the question confronted in Burris v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 171, cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132, 105 S.Ct. 816, 83 L.Ed.2d 809. The instruction in Burris told the jury it may recommend death if the State met its burden. It also informed the jury that it may recommend against the death penalty if the State failed to meet its burden. While the first directive was a correct statement of the law, the second was not. It should have informed the jury that it shall recommend against the death penalty if the State failed to meet its burden. This Court held the error harmless. In Burris, the jury recommended death. The jury must have found that the State proved the aggravating factors and that the aggravating factors outweighed any mitigating circumstances. The directive in the instruction guiding the jury in this respect was correct. The error in the second part of the instruction was harmless because the jury's recommendation in favor of death would not have been affected by an erroneous instruction concerning how they should proceed in the event they concluded the State had not met its burden. The same is not true of the erroneous instruction given at William's trial. The instruction could have misled the jury into incorrectly recommending the death penalty. The error related to an instruction in favor of the death penalty and not against it as in Burris. The instruction directed the jury to return a recommendation of death even if the jury felt the sentence was inappropriate. The jury is not required to return a recommendation for the death penalty even if the State proves that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(e). While the jury may recommend the death penalty, it does not have to do so. The import of the principle in Burris is that the erroneous instruction requires a new sentencing hearing. The judgment of the post-conviction court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The habitual offender determination and enhancement are reversed. The findings and order imposing the death penalty are vacated. The judgment of the trial court imposing consecutive sentences of thirty years for conspiracy and thirty years for armed robbery are affirmed. This cause is remanded to the trial court for a new death penalty hearing and imposition of a new sentence. DeBRULER, GIVAN and DICKSON, JJ., concur. PIVARNIK, J., concurs except in the finding by the majority that a new death penalty hearing is required. He would affirm the trial court on this issue. Even though the word should was improper, the trial court was capable of weighing all factors and he imposed the sentence.