Opinion ID: 1852436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Payton's proposed evidence regarding juror confusion [17]

Text: ¶ 136. Payton argues that the jurors concluded from the judge's instructions that he would only accept a unanimous verdict. Payton argues that the juror testimony was necessary for the court to determine whether its jury instructions were clear enough not to have confused the jury or were in the juror's mind contradictory to other instructions which were previously given .... [t]hese jurors compromised their honest beliefs of whether Payton was guilty or not to reach a unanimous verdict. ¶ 137. Payton points to the affidavits of Jurors Rushing and Langdon. In their affidavits, these jurors said that they do not believe the State proved Payton guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. They aver that they voted guilty only because they believed that they had to return a unanimous verdict on each count. They point to an inquiry the jury made to the judge after being deadlocked. They asked the judge if they had to return a unanimous verdict on all counts. The judge responded as follows: You are required, before the Court can accept a verdict, it must be agreed to by all twelve jurors, whether that verdict is guilty or not guilty. There are three charges in the indictment, and you must make separate unanimous verdicts regarding all three counts. You are [18] required to find the Defendant guilty or not guilty in all three counts, but you must make a separate finding on each count. Refer to Instruction S-2. Continue with your deliberations. (emphasis added). Instruction S-2 read as follows: The Court instructs the Jury that the Defendant, Henry C. Payton, has been charged in a Three Count Indictment and in your deliberations you should deliberate on each count separately and return separate verdicts for each count. Payton argued that the trial judge put too much emphasis on the requirement of unanimity and should also have instructed the jury to let the court know if they were deadlocked. Payton urges the same argument here. ¶ 138. The guideline to follow when a jury has a question about a case on which it is deliberating is enunciated in Girton v. State, 446 So.2d 570, 572 (Miss.1984). Our first recommendation is that the circuit judge determine whether it is necessary to give any further instruction. Unless it is necessary to give another instruction for clarity or to cover an omission, it is necessary that no further instruction be given. Of course, a circuit judge may realize such a necessity even in the absence of an inquiry from the jury, and under such circumstances quite properly may give the jury additional written instructions. Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 139. Rule 3.10 of the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice states in pertinent part, as follows: If the jury, after they retire for deliberations, desires to be informed of any point of law, the court shall instruct the jury to reduce its question to writing and the court in its discretion, after affording the parties an opportunity to state their objections or assent, may grant additional written instructions in response to the jury's request. If it appears to the court that the jury has been unable to agree, the court may require the jury to continue their deliberations and may give an appropriate instruction. URCCC 3.10. It is obvious that, for whatever reason, the jury in the case at bar was confused about the voting process. Likewise obvious is that this confusion was not alleviated by reference to the initial jury instructions. Therefore, based upon the plain language of Rule 3.10 and the precedent cited above, there is no doubt that the trial court had the authority to give supplemental instructions to the jury. The question then remains whether the instructions given by the trial court in this case were proper. ¶ 140. In determining whether error lies in the granting or refusal of various instructions, the instructions actually given must be read as a whole. Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d at 782. If the instructions, when so read, fairly announce the law of the case and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found. Id. We presume that the jury follows the instructions of the trial court. McCollum v. State, 785 So.2d 279, 283-84 (Miss.2001) (citing Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1142 (Miss.1985)). This Court sees no reason to conclude that the jury did otherwise in this case. ¶ 141. The jury was fairly and fully appraised of the applicable law, both through the judge's instructions and through Payton's counsel's admonitions to them during voir dire and closing argument. During voir dire, counsel for Payton asked the potential venire if they knew that in order to bring back a verdict it would have to be unanimous. He also asked them if they understood they had to vote their conscience. He stated that it did not matter if it took the next two years. He told them that they did not have to change their minds, opinions, or votes because of what someone else wanted them to do or just for the purpose of reaching a verdict. Payton's counsel asked the jurors if they understood that if they could not reach a verdict because they could not agree they could send a letter to the judge telling him that. Additionally, three instructions informed the jury that they were not to surrender their honest convictions and beliefs merely, inter alia, to save time or to prevent a mistrial. ¶ 142. Where, as here, the jury was apparently at a loss as to how it should proceed, this Court sees no reason why we should discourage trial judges from providing supplementary guidance. Although the trial judge's instruction to the jury in this case was perhaps erroneous, it was harmless because the jury had been fully apprised of the correct law on several prior occasions. In addition, the jurors' misconceptions regarding the voting process is a matter personal to those jurors and therefore improper evidence to impeach their verdict. See Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So.2d at 419 (holding juror testimony only admissible as to objective facts bearing on extraneous influences on the deliberation process). ¶ 143. Considering the public policy in favor of unanimity and against mistrials, and also considering that the jury was polled following their verdict and none of them stated that they only voted guilty so they could go home, this Court concludes that any error in the judge's supplemental instruction is insufficient to warrant reversal.