Opinion ID: 2614917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Retroactivity of This Decision

Text: In civil actions, Arizona law has always been `that unless otherwise stated, a court opinion operates retroactively as well as prospectively.' Brannigan v. Raybuck, 136 Ariz. 513, 520, 667 P.2d 213, 220 (1983) (quoting Chevron Chem. Co. v. Superior Court, 131 Ariz. 431, 435, 641 P.2d 1275, 1279 (1982)). We presume retroactive application, Chevron Chem. Co., 131 Ariz. at 436, 641 P.2d at 1280, but balance the following factors in determining whether an opinion should be given prospective application only: 1. Whether the decision establishes a new legal principle by overruling clear and reliable precedent or by deciding an issue whose resolution was not foreshadowed; 2. Whether retroactive application will further or retard operation of the new rule, considering the prior history, purpose, and effect of the new rule; 3. Whether retroactive application will produce substantially inequitable results. Fain Land & Cattle Co. v. Hassell, 163 Ariz. 587, 596, 790 P.2d 242, 251 (1990); see also Chevron Chem. Co., 131 Ariz. at 436, 641 P.2d at 1280 (applying Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07, 92 S.Ct. 349, 355, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)). [12] We have the discretion to decide whether our holding is applied completely or partially retroactively or only prospectively. See Fain Land & Cattle Co., 163 Ariz. at 596, 790 P.2d at 251. Applying the first of these factors, in light of Sanchez and Wesolowski, our holding overrules clear precedent. Although these cases had been criticized, they had not been questioned by this court. Thus, this factor weighs against retroactive application. The purpose of the rule set forth today is to advance the purposes of the Act and compensate claimants for injuries covered by the Act. Retroactive application would protect the interests of claimants who were injured in the past. Furthermore, our holding above does not attempt to alter past actions, a factual impossibility. Law v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 147, 161, 755 P.2d 1135, 1149 (1988) (supplemental opinion). Accordingly, the second factor weighs in favor of retroactive application. See Villareal v. State Dep't of Transp., 160 Ariz. 474, 480, 774 P.2d 213, 219 (1989). As to the third factor, to allow all claimants with concurrent dissimilar employment who were injured in the past thirty years to reopen their wage determination would result in substantial inequities. Numerous defendants would be subject to [additional] claims in cases they previously believed had been finalized. Villareal, 160 Ariz. at 480, 774 P.2d at 219. Thus, the third factor weighs against retroactive application. Balancing these factors, we hold that this decision should be applied prospectively. Specifically, our holding that concurrent dissimilar wages should be combined in determining the appropriate average monthly wage applies only to claims in which the award determining the average monthly wage has not become final, but it is inapplicable in cases where the award has become final and the time for appeal of that award has expired. Cf. Senor T's Restaurant, 131 Ariz. at 365, 641 P.2d at 853 (construing Scott, 122 Ariz. at 171, 593 P.2d at 921). For claims in which there has been a final and unappealed award determining the average monthly wage under the concurrent dissimilar employment rule, the Sanchez-Wesolowski rule continues to apply. DISPOSITION The portion of the court of appeals' decision affirming the Commission's average monthly wage determination is vacated. The Commission's award is set aside, and these cases are remanded to the Commission for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. MOELLER, V.C.J., and CORCORAN, ZLAKET and MARTONE, JJ., concur.