Opinion ID: 2750493
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Factors Bearing on Adjudicatory Comity

Text: Beyond the question of true conflict, courts have struggled to apply a consistent set of factors in their comity analyses. As one commentator has observed, because there is “no clear analytical framework for its exercise, . . . courts have been left to cobble together their own approach to [international comity].” Childress III, supra, at 51. The district court in this case followed a three-part framework articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Ungaro-Benages for the prospective application of international comity. See Mujica I, 381 F. Supp. 2d at 1160 (citing Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238)).19 Under Ungaro-Benages’ approach, a court 19 The Ungaro-Benages court articulated different standards for “retrospective” and “prospective” claims of adjudicatory comity. “When applied retrospectively, federal courts evaluate three factors: (1) whether the foreign court was competent and used ‘proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence,’ (2) whether the judgment was rendered by fraud, and (3) whether the foreign judgment was prejudicial because it violated American public policy notions of what is decent and just.” 379 F.3d at 48 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN “evaluate[s] several factors, including [1] the strength of the United States’ interest in using a foreign forum, [2] the strength of the foreign governments’ interests, and [3] the adequacy of the alternative forum.” Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1238 (citations omitted). The Ungaro-Benages framework is a useful starting point for analyzing comity claims, but the case offers no substantive standards for assessing its three factors. UngaroBenages tells us to consider the respective interests of the United States and the foreign country, but it does not tell us what interests count or what makes a foreign forum adequate or inadequate. See id. at 1238–39. For those considerations, we may draw on our oft-cited opinion in Timberlane I. We note that the criteria we considered in that antitrust case20—which also influenced § 403, “Limitations on Jurisdiction to Prescribe” of the Restatement (Third) of 1238 (citation omitted). We find it unnecessary to draw a distinction between retrospective and prospective comity in this case. 20 Timberlane I articulated seven elements courts should weigh: [1] the degree of conflict with foreign law or policy, [2] the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principal places of businesses or corporations, [3] the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance, [4] the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, [5] the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, [6] the foreseeability of such effect, and [7] the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad. 549 F.2d at 614. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 49 Foreign Relations Law,21 see Koh, supra, at 66—are better adapted to the commercial context. Nevertheless, these factors help provide us with a general list of indicia to which we may look when weighing U.S. and foreign interests and the adequacy of the alternative forum.
The (nonexclusive) factors we should consider when assessing U.S. interests include (1) the location of the conduct in question, (2) the nationality of the parties, (3) the character 21 The Restatement lists a number of considerations for determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is “unreasonable,” including:
regulating state, i.e., the extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substantial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory; (b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity, between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; (c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activities, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally accepted[;] (d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; (e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or economic system; (f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the international system; (g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the activity; and (h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state. Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2) (1987). 50 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN of the conduct in question, (4) the foreign policy interests of the United States, and (5) any public policy interests. When some or all of a plaintiff’s claims arise under state law, the state’s interests, if any, should be considered as well. The doctrine of comity is particularly concerned with “sovereign interests,” Childress III, supra, at 61–62, and the sovereign whose interests are relevant when a federal court is hearing state-law claims is as much the individual state—whose law the federal court must faithfully apply—as the United States.22 Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938). See generally Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law § 403(2)(c) (courts considering whether jurisdiction is reasonable should assess “the importance of regulation to the regulating state” (emphasis added)). We caution, however, that in cases of this kind there is always a 22 It bears mentioning that a state’s interest will not necessarily be in the application of its own law to a case. Here, for example, although Plaintiffs pled California causes of action, if the case were to proceed to litigation, the district court would follow California’s conflict-of-laws methodology, which calls for a governmental-interest analysis. See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). That analysis could favor the application of Colombia’s law rather than California’s. See, e.g., Arno v. Club Med, Inc., 22 F.3d 1464, 1468 (9th Cir. 1994) (under California’s governmental-interest analysis, French law, rather than California law, applied to plaintiff’s tort claims against former employer and supervisor); McGhee v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 871 F.2d 1412, 1422–26 (9th Cir. 1989) (Saudi law, rather than California law, applied to plaintiffs’ state-law claims against employer); Tucci v. Club Mediterranee, S.A., 89 Cal. App. 4th 180, 194 (Ct. App. 2001) (Dominican Republic law, rather than California law, applied to tort and worker’s compensation claims); Hernandez v. Burger, 102 Cal. App. 3d 795, 804 (Ct. App. 1980) (Mexican law, rather than California law, applied to personal-injury claims arising out of auto accident in Mexico). Thus, in stating that a court sitting in diversity should consider the state’s interests, we mean to refer primarily to the state’s interest, if any, in providing a forum or remedy for particular claims. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 51 risk that “our foreign relations could be impaired by the application of state laws, which do not necessarily reflect national interests.” Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1232–33. Out of regard for that risk, we should be careful not to give undue weight to states’ prerogatives. We will discuss each of the foregoing factors in turn. First, comity is most closely tied to the question of territoriality. We should consider where the conduct in question took place. This is a critical question in determining the extraterritorial reach of U.S. statutes, see Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663–65; Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248, and it is a relevant consideration in adjudicatory comity as well. The general presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law recognizes that “United States law governs domestically but does not rule the world.” Microsoft, 550 U.S. at 454. Comity similarly rests on respect for the legal systems of members of the international legal community—a kind of international federalism—and thus “serves to protect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in international discord.” Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248. Not surprisingly, U.S. courts have afforded far less weight, for comity purposes, to U.S. or state interests when the activity at issue occurred abroad. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 965 F. Supp. 899, 909 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (dismissing action under comity where the “activity and the alleged harm occurred entirely in Peru [and] Plaintiffs are all residents of Peru”), aff’d, 113 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 1997); Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 61, 63 (S.D. Tex. 1994) (declining jurisdiction under comity where challenged activity occurred entirely in Ecuador); see also Chowdhury v. 52 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN Worldtel Bangl. Holding, Ltd., 746 F.3d 42, 49 (2d Cir. 2014) (reversing lower court and foreclosing jurisdiction over ATS claims filed by Bangladeshi plaintiff allegedly detained and tortured by Bangladeshi authorities in Bangladesh). See generally Koh, supra, at 18–19, 51–57 (describing courts’ aversion to adjudicating extraterritorially as rooted in principle of national sovereignty). Second, we should take account of whether any of the parties are United States citizens or nationals, and also whether they are citizens of the relevant state. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 155 (2d Cir. 1998) (vacating dismissal, on forum non conveniens, comity, and failure to join indispensable party grounds, of action by Ecuadorians against American oil company for injuries that allegedly resulted from action in Ecuador); Reebok Int’l, Ltd. v. Marnatech Enters., Inc., 970 F.2d 552, 556–57 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that U.S. courts have jurisdiction where some parties were U.S. corporations and U.S. persons and other non-nationals had substantial contacts with the United States). As we previously discussed in the context of the ATS, even if the presence of U.S. nationals as defendants does not establish jurisdiction in this country on its own, it can, as we have noted, contribute to a finding that there is a “nexus” between the United States and the parties and claims in a case. See supra; see also, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto PLC (“Sarei III”), 650 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1016 (C.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013) and aff’d, 722 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). Kiobel and the lower-court decisions that have followed in its wake confirm the importance of these first two factors MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 53 to courts’ jurisdictional analyses in cases involving international events. While Kiobel and its progeny specifically address the interpretation of a statute—the ATS—and not the prudential international comity doctrine, the guiding principle of those cases applies equally in the context of adjudicatory comity: the weaker the nexus between the challenged conduct and U.S. territory or U.S. parties, the weaker the justification for adjudicating the matter in U.S. courts and applying U.S. federal or state law. The third factor we should consider bearing on U.S. interests is the nature of the conduct in question. We should ask whether the action is civil or criminal; whether it sounds in tort, contract, or property; and whether the conduct is a regulatory violation or is a violation of international norms against torture, war crimes, or slavery. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731–33 (2004); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). These inquiries may inform our judgment of the importance of the issue to the United States or to an individual state. The closer the connection between the conduct and core prerogatives of the sovereign, the stronger that sovereign’s interest. For example, in Timberlane I, which was an antitrust case, we considered “the relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere, the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce, . . . and the relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as compared with conduct abroad.” Timberlane I, 549 F.2d at 614. Fourth, we must take cognizance of the foreign policy interests of the United States. As we do when applying the political question, act of state, and foreign affairs doctrines, we must respect the Constitution’s commitment of the foreign 54 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN affairs authority to the political branches. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations”); art. II, § 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties . . . and he . . . shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls); art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers”). See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 413–15; Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964); Baker, 369 U.S. at 211. Courts have found that U.S. interests weigh against hearing cases where doing so would be harmful to U.S. foreign policy. See Hwang Geum Joo v. Japan, 413 F.3d 45, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (dismissing as nonjusticiable ATS claims brought by Korean women in light of U.S government’s argument that “adjudication by a domestic court not only would undo a settled foreign policy of state-to-state negotiation with Japan, but also could disrupt Japan’s delicate relations with China and Korea, thereby creating serious implications for stability in the region” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Ungaro-Benages, 379 F.3d at 1239 (abstaining in light of strong foreign policy interest in promoting settlement of Nazi-era claims through government-backed forum); O.N.E. Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 830 F.2d 449, 451 (2d Cir. 1987) (affirming dismissal where district court concluded that U.S.-Colombian relations would likely suffer if U.S. litigation proceeded in light of foreign state’s “strong interest” in relevant protectionist legislation and ownership interest in defendant). This deference is rooted, in part, in separation of power concerns. See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 417 (2002) (dismissing claim by Guatemalan widow alleging MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 55 federal officers concealed information about her husband’s fate and holding that “if there is to be judicial enquiry, it will raise concerns for the separation of powers in trenching on matters committed to the other branches”). Fifth, we may also weigh U.S. public policy interests, and those of the relevant state to a lesser extent, for “courts will not extend comity to foreign proceedings when doing so would be contrary to the policies . . . of the United States.” Pravin, 109 F.3d at 854. For example, we have held that there is a strong U.S. interest justifying U.S. jurisdiction in “preventing trademark violations,” Reebok Int’l, 970 F.2d at 556, and we have spoken of the strong U.S. policy favoring enforcement of arbitration and forum selection clauses. See Dependable Highway Exp. v. Navigators Ins. Co., 489 F.3d 1059, 1068–69 (9th Cir. 2007). The Second Circuit has also refused to extend international comity to a foreign state’s debt negotiations as contrary to American policy because the United States “encourages participation in, and advocates success of” such debt resolution procedures, and the United States “has a strong interest in ensuring the enforceability of valid debts . . . owed to United States lenders.” Pravin, 109 F.3d at 855. We have treated differences in legal approach cautiously, however. Even when foreign practices may differ from American ones, we will respect those differences so long as the variance does not violate strongly-held state or federal public policy. See Belize Telecom, Ltd. v. Gov’t of Belize, 528 F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that decision allowing Government of Belize to remove directors of telecom company did not “violate[] American public policy” where decision “merely g[ave] effect to the plain language” 56 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN of corporate articles of incorporation, which were interpreted under Belizean law).
The proper analysis of foreign interests essentially mirrors the consideration of U.S. interests. Foreign states, no less than the United States, have legitimate interests in regulating conduct that occurs within their borders, involves their nationals, impacts their public and foreign policies, and implicates universal norms. See Mich. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 309 F.3d 348, 356 (6th Cir. 2002). Accordingly, courts have considered the territoriality of the questioned activity, its effects, the nationality of the parties, and the interests of the foreign state when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction. See Jota, 157 F.3d at 160 (holding that deference to foreign state’s position on matters that took place within its territory is “inherent in the concept of comity”); see also Sequihua, 847 F. Supp. at 62 (declining jurisdiction in part because of Ecuador’s “official[]” protest that the litigation “will do ‘violence’ to the international legal system”). To illustrate, in Bi, the Second Circuit held that individual victims of the Bhopal gas leak disaster in India, which harmed almost exclusively Indians, did not have standing to challenge a settlement reached between India and the company responsible for the tort in light of an Indian law granting the Indian government exclusive standing to represent victims of the disaster. 984 F.2d at 586 (declining “to pass judgment on the validity of India’s response to a disaster that occurred within its borders” because doing so “would disrupt our relations with that country and frustrate MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 57 the efforts of the international community to develop methods to deal with problems of this magnitude in the future”); see also, e.g., Freund, 592 F. Supp. at 578 (declining jurisdiction where “Plaintiffs’ claims [we]re inextricably connected to France”).
The interests of the United States and the foreign government must be evaluated in light of the adequacy of the foreign forum. When it comes to the adequacy of the forum, courts consider decisions rendered by the alternative forum and ask “‘(1) whether the judgment was rendered via fraud; (2) whether the judgment was rendered by a competent court utilizing proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence; and (3) whether the foreign judgment is prejudicial [and] . . . repugnant to fundamental principles of what is decent and just.’” Belize Telecom, 528 F.3d at 1306 (quoting Turner Entm’t Co. v. Degeto Film GmbH, 25 F.3d 1512, 1519 (11th Cir. 1994)). Typically, courts ask whether one side has presented specific evidence that the judgment of the alternative forum was significantly inadequate. See id. (“In this case, neither party has argued that the Belizean judgments were rendered via fraud or that the Belizean proceedings lacked any element of civilized jurisprudence.”). The Second Circuit, for example, has held that deference to the judgment of a “foreign court is appropriate so long as the foreign proceedings are procedurally fair and . . . do not contravene the laws or public policy of the United States.” JP Morgan Chase Bank, 412 F.3d at 424. In that case, the court deferred to the jurisdiction of the Mexican courts even though there was a six-year delay in resolving the litigation, since such a delay did not result in “manifest injustice” or violate 58 MUJICA V. AIRSCAN “fundamental standards of procedural fairness.” Id. at 428 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jota, 157 F.3d at 160 (“When a court dismisses on the ground of comity, it should normally consider whether an adequate forum exists in the objecting nation and whether the defendant sought to be sued in the United States forum is subject to or has consented to the assertion of jurisdiction . . . in the foreign forum.”); U.S. ex rel. Saroop v. Garcia, 109 F.3d 165, 170 (3d Cir. 1997) (invoking comity to defer to foreign court on validity of extradition treaty absent assertion that foreign state failed to follow regular judicial proceedings, engaged in prejudicial or fraudulent practices, or refused to extend deference to United States’ judicial findings).23 We are justly proud of our legal system. But we recognize that there are other legal systems that have effected, in different ways, our constitutional values of separation of powers, due process of law, and the equal protection of the law. Comity, as the “golden rule among nations,” compels us to “give the respect to the laws, policies and interests of others that [we] would have others give to [our] own in the same or similar circumstances.” Mich. Cmty. Servs., Inc., 309 F.3d at 356 (internal quotation marks omitted). 23 Our decision in the context of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction is not contrary to these principles. In Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000 (9th Cir. 2009), we held that a Greek court’s decision that a child’s mother had not wrongly retained a child was not entitled to comity because the Greek court clearly misapplied the provisions of the Hague Convention, completely failed to determine the child’s habitual residence, as required by the Hague analysis, and made no factual findings to support its determination that the father had failed to exercise custody rights. Id. at 1016–17. MUJICA V. AIRSCAN 59 Accordingly, we proceed under the Ungaro-Benages framework as we have elaborated it from the case law, mindful that comity is circumstance-dependent and not susceptible to mechanical application. “Since comity varies according to the factual circumstances surrounding each claim for its recognition, the absolute boundaries of the duties it imposes are inherently uncertain.” Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 937.