Opinion ID: 795401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motions for New Trial

Text: 65 We review a district court's denial of a motion for new trial for abuse of discretion. 263 Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: 66 (a) Defendant's Motion. Upon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires. If the case was tried without a jury, the court may take additional testimony and enter a new judgment. 67 (b) Time to File. 68 (1) Newly Discovered Evidence. Any motion for a new trial grounded on newly discovered evidence must be filed within 3 years after the verdict or finding of guilty. If an appeal is pending, the court may not grant a motion for a new trial until the appellate court remands the case. 69 (2) Other Grounds. Any motion for a new trial grounded on any reason other than newly discovered evidence must be filed within 7 days after the verdict or finding of guilty. 264 70 Thus, there are two grounds upon which a court may grant a motion for new trial: one based on newly discovered evidence, which must be filed within three years of the verdict pursuant to Rule 33(b)(1); and the other based on any other reason, typically the interest of justice, which must be filed within seven days of the verdict, pursuant to Rule 33(b)(2). 265 71 Motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are highly disfavored in the Eleventh Circuit and should be granted only with great caution. Indeed, the defendant bears the burden of justifying a new trial. 266 Newly discovered evidence need not relate directly to the issue of guilt or innocence to justify a new trial, but may be probative of another issue of law. 267 For instance, the existence of a Brady violation, as well as questions regarding the fairness or impartiality of a jury, may be grounds for a new trial. 268 72 The defendants are not entitled to a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence under Rule 33(b)(1) because the government's decision to move for a change of venue in Ramirez does not constitute newly discovered evidence of prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the government's earlier opposition to the defendants' motions for change of venue in this case. Ramirez was entirely different from this case in that it was a Title VII employment discrimination case arising out of the INS's role in the removal of Elian Gonzalez from his uncle's home, whereas this case involved agents of the government of Cuba operating unlawfully in the United States and conspiring to commit espionage and murder. 269 Moreover, Ramirez's conduct in procuring and exploiting partisan media coverage of the evidence and the issues in his case distinguished Ramirez from the instant case. On the day Ramirez filed his lawsuit, he held a press conference on the steps of the courthouse, during which he displayed one of the items featured in his complaint, an example of a cup holder with a picture of the Cuban flag and the international no symbol. 270 The Miami Herald quoted Ramirez saying that the INS was the most corrupt agency in the country with a deep hatred toward Hispanics. 271 He appeared on several radio and television shows, local rallies, and protests, and his photograph appeared on banners carried by protestors demonstrating outside of the INS building. 272 On one television show, Ramirez disclosed a document produced during a videotaped deposition taken during discovery and caused the deposition itself to be broadcast on the show, in violation of Local Rule 77.2. 273 73 The defendants' argument that the government's subsequent legal position in the Ramirez case constituted prosecutorial misconduct that warrants a new trial is essentially a claim of judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel bars a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is inconsistent with its position in a previous, related proceeding. 274 It is designed to prevent parties from making a mockery of justice by inconsistent pleadings. 275 Courts consider two factors in determining whether to apply the doctrine: whether the allegedly inconsistent positions were made under oath in a prior proceeding and whether such inconsistencies were calculated to make a mockery of the judicial system. 276 Judicial estoppel is not applicable here because Ramirez was not a related proceeding, but rather an employment discrimination lawsuit. Moreover, the position that the government took in Ramirez occurred subsequent to—not before —its position in this case. The government filed its motion for change of venue in Ramirez on June 25, 2002, more than one year after the defendants were convicted. 277 Therefore, the defendants' argument that the government should have been estopped from opposing its change of venue motions in a prior proceeding is chronologically unsound, and the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. 74 Nor are the defendants entitled to a new trial in the interests of justice under Rule 33(b)(2). The defendants timely filed their initial motion by the court-extended August 1, 2001, deadline 278 for filing post-trial motions, arguing that a new trial was warranted in the interests of justice due to the prejudice inured to them from the venue and the prosecution's misconduct at trial. 279 The district court denied the motion, citing the numerous curative measures it implemented to guarantee the defendants' right to a fair trial. 280 The record reflects that any potential for prejudice against the defendants was cured by the court's methodical pursuit of a fair trial. Basulto's comment that Hernandez's counsel was a spy for Cuba did not prejudice the defendants because it was merely a single remark during a seven-month trial by the defense's own witness, which the court struck and instructed the jury to disregard. 281 Moreover, the prosecution's closing arguments did not prejudice the defendants because the court granted the defendants' objections and specifically instructed the jury to disregard the improper statements. 282 These alleged incidents of government misconduct were so minor that they could not possibly have affected the outcome of the trial. 283 75 Thereafter, in November 2002, the defendants filed a renewed motion for new trial on both newly discovered evidence and interest of justice grounds. 284 The defendants based their renewed motion almost entirely on the interests of justice argument, devoting 20 of the 32 pages of the motion and 7 of the 12 supporting exhibits to that issue. 285 The defendants filed an affidavit and a survey from two new experts, an additional affidavit from Professor Moran defending his survey, and additional news articles and reports by the Human Rights Watch. 286 None of these materials were presented to the district court for consideration with the initial new trial motions. The district court declined to consider the defendants' renewed interests of justice argument and supporting materials, ruling that because the seven-day period . . . expired more than nineteen months ago, it lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion on that basis. 287 76 The district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the defendants' renewed motion based on the interests of justice. A court may not consider motions for new trial based on any other argument than newly discovered evidence outside the 7-day period. 288 This deadline is rigid . . . . [C]ourts `may not extend the time to take any action under [Rule 33], except as stated' in Rule 33 itself. 289 Nor does a district court have the power to regard an untimely motion for new trial as a supplement to a timely motion. 290 The time for the defendants to present the entirety of their interests of justice argument was when they initially filed it in July and August of 2001, within the court-extended August 1st deadline. The defendants' renewed motion for new trial based on the interests of justice was essentially the defendants' attempt to relitigate the merits of the venue issue that the court had previously considered four times. The defendants could have commissioned Drs. Brennan and Perez to provide affidavits in support of their position during any one of those times when the court previously considered the issue. We will not permit, nor does Rule 33 permit, the defendants to take a second —or fifth—bite at the apple. 291 Because the defendants' renewed interest of justice motion was filed outside the extended time period during which a court may consider new trial motions, and because the government preserved its argument that the claim was untimely, 292 the court did not abuse its discretion in declining to consider the issue. 77 Accordingly, because neither newly discovered evidence nor the interests of justice warrant a new trial, we affirm the court's decision to deny the defendants' motions for new trial.