Opinion ID: 1868309
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: county liability.

Text: A county government is cloaked with sovereign immunity. Franklin County v. Malone, Ky., 957 S.W.2d 195, 203 (1997), overruled on other grounds by Commonwealth v. Harris, Ky., 59 S.W.3d 896, 900 (2001) (as to whether claim against a county can be brought in Board of Claims), and on other grounds by Yanero v. Davis, supra note 1, at 523 (as to whether public employee performing ministerial function is cloaked with official immunity); Cullinan v. Jefferson County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 407, 408 (1967), overruled on other grounds by Yanero, supra note 1 at 527 (as to whether a local board of education is a government); Moores v. Fayette County, Ky., 418 S.W.2d 412, 413 (1967); cf. Yanero, supra note 1, at 526. Nor can a county, absent a legislative waiver of immunity, see Reyes v. Hardin Memorial Hospital, Ky., 55 S.W.3d 337, 338-39 (2001), be held vicariously liable in a judicial court for the ministerial acts of its agents, servants, and employees. Cf. Yanero, supra note 1, at 528; Malone, supra, at 199-200; Moores, supra, at 414. If damages could be recovered against a county on the basis of respondeat superior, the concept of sovereign immunity would be largely nullified because state and county governments perform their ministerial functions by and through their agents, servants, and employees. That brings us to Appellants' primary contention with respect to their claims against Meade County, i.e., that KRS 65.200, et seq., the so-called Claims Against Local Governments Act (CALGA), constitutes a waiver by the General Assembly of a county's immunity from vicarious liability for damages arising from the tortious performance of ministerial acts by its employees. For the reasons explained infra, we conclude that the legislative intent was not to waive any immunity enjoyed by any local government but to specify what damages could be obtained against local governments that are subject to common law judgments and what obligation a local government has to provide a defense for and pay judgments rendered against its employees for the tortious performance of their ministerial duties. Any attempt to discern the legislative intent of the 1988 enactment of CALGA, 1988 Ky. Acts, ch. 224, §§ 15-21, necessarily begins with an examination of the legal climate existing at the time with respect to immunities. As of 1988, this Court had recently reaffirmed that municipal immunity extended only to legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions. Gas Serv. Co., Inc. v. City of London, Ky., 687 S.W.2d 144, 149 (1985) (quoting Haney v. City of Lexington, Ky., 386 S.W.2d 738, 742 (1964)). We also had recently used the terms sovereign immunity and governmental immunity interchangeably, Dunlap v. Univ. of Ky., Ky., 716 S.W.2d 219, 219, 222 (1986), an interchange of terminology not uncommon at the time. See Yanero, supra note 1, at 519. And we were then considering whether to affirm a recent Court of Appeals' decision holding that employees of immune entities did not enjoy the same immunity as their employers. That holding was, in fact, subsequently affirmed in University of Louisville v. O'Bannon, Ky., 770 S.W.2d 215, 217 (1989). KRS 65.2001 is titled Application and construction of KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006. Subsection (1) of KRS 65.2001 provides: (1) Every action in tort against any local government in this Commonwealth for death, personal injury or property damages proximately caused by: (a) Any defect or hazardous condition in public lands, buildings or other public property, including personalty; (b) Any act or omission of any employee, while acting within the scope of his employment or duties; or (c) Any act or omission of a person other than an employee for which the local government is or may be liable shall be subject to the provisions of KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006. (Emphasis added.) Nothing in subsection (1) purports to waive the existing immune status of any local government. It simply provides that all subsequent sections of the Act apply, inter alia, to actions in tort brought against any local government because of a defect or hazardous condition existing on public property or an act or omission of any employee. KRS 65.200 defines action in tort, employee, and local government as follows: (1) Action in tort means any claim for money damages based upon negligence, medical malpractice, intentional tort, nuisance, products liability and strict liability, and also includes any wrongful death or survival-type action. (2) Employee means any elected or appointed officer of a local government, or any paid or unpaid employee or agent of a local government, provided that no independent contractor nor employee nor agent of an independent contractor shall be deemed to be an employee of a local government. (3) Local government means any city incorporated under the law of this Commonwealth, the offices and agencies thereof, any county government or fiscal court, any special district or special taxing district created or controlled by a local government. Per KRS 65.200(3), CALGA applies not only to counties but also to municipalities and taxing districts. Counties and municipalities are afforded different degrees of immunity from tort liability. Whereas a county enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be held vicariously liable for the torts of its employees, a municipality is immune only for torts committed in the performance of legislative or judicial or quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial functions, Gas Service Co., supra, and can otherwise be held vicariously liable for the torts of its employees. 57 Am.Jur.2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability § 147 (West 2001); e.g., City of Louisville v. Chapman, Ky., 413 S.W.2d 74, 76-77 (1967). Subsection (2) of KRS 65.2001(2) expressly disclaims any legislative intent (except as otherwise specifically provided) to modify the existing immune status of any local government: (2) Except as otherwise specifically provided in KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006, all enacted and case-made law, substantive or procedural, concerning actions in tort against local governments shall continue in force. No provision of KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006 shall in any way be construed to expand the existing common law concerning municipal tort liability as of July 15, 1988, nor eliminate or abrogate the defense of governmental immunity for county governments. (Emphasis added.) Appellants assert that the last clause of this subsection reflects a legislative intent to waive sovereign immunity as to county governments and, instead, cloak them with governmental immunity. If so, a county would remain immune for the tortious performance of a governmental function but not the tortious performance of a proprietary function. Yanero, supra note 1, at 519-21. That interpretation, however, would render the second sentence of subsection (2) inconsistent with the first sentence, which expresses a clear intent to maintain the status quo with respect to tort actions against local governments, except as otherwise specifically provided in KRS 65.2002 to 65.2006 ( i.e., not in KRS 65.2001). It is a familiar rule of statutory construction that inconsistent statutory provisions must be harmonized if possible and where two constructions of a statute are possible, by one of which the entire act may be made harmonious while the other will create discord between different provisions, the former should be adopted. Bischoff v. Hennessy, Ky., 251 S.W.2d 582, 583 (1952) (quotation omitted). Applying this rule, we conclude that the 1988 General Assembly did not intend to change the immunity status of counties but, like this Court in Dunlap, supra , merely treated sovereign immunity and governmental immunity as interchangeable concepts. Furthermore, the emphasized language neither expressly waives a county's sovereign immunity nor by such overwhelming implications from the text ... leave[s] no room for any other reasonable construction, thus does not satisfy the so-called  Withers test for waiver of immunity. Withers v. Univ. of Ky., Ky., 939 S.W.2d 340, 346 (1997) (quotation omitted). For the same reason, KRS 65.2002, titled Amount of damages recoverable against local governments, is not an implied waiver of immunity: The amount of damages recoverable against a local government for death, personal injury or property damages arising out of a single accident or occurrence, or sequence of accidents or occurrences, shall not exceed the total damages suffered by plaintiff, reduced by the percentage of fault including contributory fault, attributed by the trier of fact to other parties, if any. This statute is an apparent attempt to limit the damages awardable against a local government for its non-immune tortious acts, e.g., a municipality's tortious performance of a function that is not legislative, judicial, quasi-legislative, or quasi-judicial in nature, and to limit the damages that a local government is required to pay on behalf of its employees pursuant to KRS 65.2005(1), infra. Appellants further assert that certain provisions in KRS 65.2003, KRS 65.2004, and KRS 65.2005 expressly or impliedly waive a county's immunity from vicarious liability. KRS 65.2003 provides: Notwithstanding KRS 65.2001, a local government shall not be liable for injuries or losses resulting from: (1) Any claim by an employee of the local government which is covered by the Kentucky workers' compensation law; (2) Any claim in connection with the assessment or collection of taxes; (3) Any claim arising from the exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or quasi-legislative authority or others, [sic] exercise of judgment or discretion vested in the local government, which shall include by example, but not be limited to: (a) The adoption or failure to adopt any ordinance, resolution, order, regulation, or rule; (b) The failure to enforce any law; (c) The issuance, denial, suspension, revocation of, or failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend or revoke any permit, license, certificate, approval, order or similar authorization; (d) The exercise of discretion when in the face of competing demands, the local government determines whether and how to utilize or apply existing resources; or (e) Failure to make an inspection. Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to exempt a local government from liability for negligence arising out of acts or omissions of its employees in carrying out their ministerial duties. (Emphasis added.) Appellants interpret the last sentence of KRS 65.2001 as an express waiver of a county's sovereign immunity from vicarious liability for the tortious performance of ministerial duties by its employees. We disagree. This statute is entitled Claims disallowed and was enacted as section 18 of chapter 224 of the 1988 Kentucky Acts. The language of subsection (3) obviously pertains to claims disallowed against municipalities because it adopts almost verbatim the exclusions from liability recited in Gas Service Co. v. City of London and Haney v. City of Lexington, supra , and the last sentence pertains only to subsection (3) because it is self-limited to this subsection. Compare e.g., KRS 65.2004(1) which refers to subsection (2) of this section and KRS 65.2005(1) which refers at one point to subsection (2) of this section and at another point to subsection (3) of this section. Obviously, the General Assembly knew the difference between a section and a subsection and intended the last sentence of KRS 65.2003 (section 18 of the Act) to pertain only to subsection (3), which pertains only to municipalities which, as noted supra, are not immune from vicarious liability for the tortious performance of ministerial duties by its employees. [2] Nor can the following language of KRS 65.2004 be construed as an implied waiver of a county's sovereign immunity: (1) Upon motion of a local government against which final judgment has been rendered for a claim within the scope of KRS 65.200 to 65.2006, the court, in accordance with subsection (2) of this section, may include in such judgment a requirement that the judgment be paid in whole or in part by periodic payments.... The provision does not purport to be a waiver of immunity by either express language or overwhelming implication. Withers, supra, at 346. It obviously pertains not to counties but to other local governments against which judgments can be rendered, e.g., municipalities. The section of CALGA that does apply to all local governments, including counties, is KRS 65.2005 which requires a local government to provide a legal defense for and pay any judgment obtained against an employee for the tortious performance of a ministerial act, subject to certain exceptions. KRS 65.2005. Defense of employee by local governmentLiability of employee. (1) A local government shall provide for the defense of any employee by an attorney chosen by the local government in any action in tort arising out of an act or omission occurring within the scope of his employment of which it has been given notice pursuant to subsection (2) of this section. The local government shall pay any judgment based thereon or any compromise or settlement of the action except as provided in subsection (3) of this section and except that a local government's responsibility under this section to indemnify an employee shall be subject to the limitations contained in KRS 65.2002. (2) Upon receiving service of a summons and complaint in any action in tort brought against him, an employee shall, within ten (10) days of receipt of service, give written notice of such action in tort to the executive authority of the local government. (3) A local government may refuse to pay a judgment or settlement in any action against an employee, or if a local government pays any claim or judgment against any employee pursuant to subsection (1) of this section, it may recover from such employee the amount of such payment and the costs to defend if: (a) The employee acted or failed to act because of fraud, malice, or corruption; (b) The action was outside the actual or apparent scope of his employment; (c) The employee willfully failed or refused to assist the defense of the cause of action, including the failure to give notice to the executive authority of the local government pursuant to subsection (2) of this section; (d) The employee compromised or settled the claim without the approval of the governing body of the local government; or (e) The employee obtained private counsel without the consent of the local government in, which case, the local government may also refuse to pay any legal fees incurred by the employee. Nothing in this section purports to waive a county government's immunity from suit or from a judgment against itself premised upon vicarious liability. However, it does require a county government, subject to the limitations contained in KRS 65.2002 and the exceptions enumerated in KRS 65.2005(3), to provide a defense for and pay any judgment rendered against a county employee for damages arising out of the performance of a ministerial act. In this case, the original complaint did not seek a judgment against any county employee but only sought to hold the county vicariously liable for the negligence of its unnamed agents, servants, or employees. Thus, KRS 65.2005 has no application to the damages sought in the original complaint. And even if Meade County could have been required to pay a judgment rendered against its employees, no judgment could be entered against the county, itself; thus, the complaints against it were properly dismissed.