Opinion ID: 1226260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: imposition of fee after a given date

Text: JKC contends that even if the new account fee is classified as a charge, the trial court erred in ruling that Authority may impose it on individuals connecting to the sewer system after the magical date of November 1, 1995. The fee violates Article X, Section 12 of the state constitution and a statute requires any charges to be imposed upon all those to whom service is rendered, not just new customers, JKC argues. Article X, Section 12 states: No law shall be enacted permitting the incurring of bonded indebtedness by any county for sewage disposal or treatment, fire protection, street lighting, garbage collection and disposal, water service or any other service or facility benefitting only a particular geographical section of the county unless a special assessment, tax or service charge in an amount designed to provide debt service on bonded indebtedness or revenue bonds incurred for such purposes shall be imposed upon the area or persons receiving the benefit therefrom (emphasis added). When construing the constitution, the Court applies rules similar to those relating to the construction of statutes. McKenzie v. McLeod, 251 S.C. 226, 161 S.E.2d 659 (1968). In construing a statutory or constitutional provision, the Court must give clear and unambiguous terms their plain and ordinary meaning without resorting to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the provision's operation. See Gilstrap v. South Carolina Budget and Control Bd., 310 S.C. 210, 423 S.E.2d 101 (1992). This Court is bound to presume that the framers of the constitution had some purpose in inserting every clause and every word contained in the document. It is never to be supposed that a single word was inserted in the law of this state without the intention of thereby conveying some meaning. Davenport v. City of Rock Hill, 315 S.C. 114, 117, 432 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1993). JKC urges the Court to read Article X, Section 12 to include special purpose districts. We agree with Authority that the provision is inapplicable because it explicitly applies only to counties, not to special purpose districts or other political subdivisions. JKC next asserts that S.C.Code Ann. § 6-15-60 (Supp. 1998) requires Authority to impose the new account fee on everyone in the district, not just on new customers who join the system after November 1, 1995. JKC relies upon the following emphasized language of Section 6-15-60: The General Assembly confirms the right of any governmental entity [1] to impose upon all those to whom sewer service is rendered, (a) a sewer service charge therefor, which may, in the discretion of its governing body, be sufficient to provide for all or any part of the cost of operating and maintaining the sewer facilities and to provide debt service on bonds or other obligations of the governmental entity issued to provide any type of sewer collection, disposal, or treatment service, and (b) a sewer connection charge, or connection fee or tapping fee designed to adequately reimburse the governing body for effecting the connection to provide sewer service. We find JKC's argument unconvincing. As discussed above, the new account fee is a uniform charge that applies to every individual in the district who connects to the system or upgrades to a larger water line. Anything newwhether it is a fee, a tax, or any of a thousand other things imposed by governmentmust take effect on some date. The fact some individuals may have avoided the new account fee due to astute planning or serendipity is no reason to invalidate an otherwise legitimate fee. Cf. State v. Rush, 305 S.C. 113, 406 S.E.2d 355 (1991) (explaining the logical conclusion of arguing that a change in a criminal statute creates two classes of offenders in violation of equal protection would be that, once Legislature had enacted a statute, it could never amend or repeal it without running afoul of the equal protection clauses). [2]