Opinion ID: 4544572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: One-to-One Communications Can Satisfy the

Text: 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) “Notice” Requirement, and Sufficient Evidence Supported Cox’s § 2251(d)(1) Conviction. Cox challenges her conviction for violating 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A), that provides: (d)(1) Any person who . . . knowingly makes, prints, or publishes, or causes to be made, printed, or published, any notice or advertisement seeking or offering— UNITED STATES V. COX 7 (A) to receive, exchange, buy, produce, display, distribute, or reproduce, any visual depiction, if the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct and such visual depiction is of such conduct[] ... shall be punished as provided under subsection (e). 5 To prove this violation, the Government presented evidence that Cox sent Hennis a Kik message with a link to a Dropbox account that contained child pornography. Cox’s message with the link said, “[g]oodies for daddy.” On appeal, Cox argues that a one-to-one communication cannot be a “notice or advertisement” of child pornography under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1). She argues that the statute requires “something more than a one-on-one exchange.” Because her communication ran only to Hennis, she argues there was insufficient evidence for her § 2251(d)(1) conviction. “We review challenges to the sufficiency of evidence, including questions of statutory interpretation, de novo.” 6 “There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 5 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)(A). 6 United States v. Aldana, 878 F.3d 877, 880 (9th Cir. 2017). 8 UNITED STATES V. COX prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 7 As a preliminary matter, we agree with the Government that we only need consider whether the trial evidence supports a conviction under the statute’s “notice” prong. If the Government proves the “notice” prong, the Government does not need to prove the “advertisement” prong. Section 2251(d)(1) is disjunctive (i.e., the statute prohibits “notice or advertisement”). 8 The Government prosecuted Cox under the “notice” prong. Therefore, we consider only whether any rational juror could find that evidence of a one-to-one communication could be a “notice” under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1).
Before we consider the sufficiency of the evidence, we first examine the statute. Whether 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1)’s “notice” provision applies to one-to-one messages is an issue of first impression in this circuit. In statutory interpretation, “our starting point is the plain language of the statute.” 9 “[W]e examine not only the specific provision at issue, but also the structure of the 7 Id. (quoting United States v. Roach, 792 F.3d 1142, 1144 (9th Cir. 2015)). 8 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (emphasis added). 9 United States v. Williams, 659 F.3d 1223, 1225 (9th Cir. 2011). UNITED STATES V. COX 9 statute as a whole, including its object and policy.” 10 “If the plain meaning of the statute is unambiguous, that meaning is controlling . . . .” 11 We first look to the key word in our review: “notice.” 12 The statute does not define notice, so we construe the word pursuant to its ordinary meaning. 13 To determine ordinary meaning, we consider dictionary definitions. 14 Most standard English-language dictionary notice definitions do not define notice in relation to audience size. For example, Merriam-Webster.com gives the following definitions of “notice”: 1 a (1): warning or intimation of something : announcement (2): the announcement of a party’s intention to quit an agreement or relation at a specified time 10 Id. (quoting Children’s Hosp. & Health Ctr. v. Belshe, 188 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 1999)). 11 Id. 12 See United States v. Franklin, 785 F.3d 1365, 1367 (10th Cir. 2015) (considering whether 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) applies to a closed network). 13 See Sebelius v. Cloer, 569 U.S. 369, 376 (2013); see Animal Legal Def. Fund v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 933 F.3d 1088, 1093 (9th Cir. 2019) (“When a statute does not define a term, we typically give the phrase its ordinary meaning.” (quoting FCC v. AT&T Inc., 562 U.S. 397, 403 (2011))). 14 See Wisconsin Cent. Ltd. v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2067, 2070– 71 (2018); United States v. Ezeta, 752 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2014). 10 UNITED STATES V. COX (3): the condition of being warned or notified—usually used in the phrase on notice b: information, intelligence 2 a: attention, heed b: polite or favorable attention : civility 3: a written or printed announcement 4: a short critical account or review 15 None of these definitions implicate audience size. Relying on similar dictionary definitions, the Seventh and Tenth Circuits have reached similar conclusions when reviewing whether 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) prohibits communications to groups with limited membership. 16 In view of these dictionary definitions, the ordinary meaning of “notice” does not exclude one-to-one communications. We nonetheless continue our inquiry and consider the word modifying “notice.” Section 2251(d)(1) proscribes 15 Notice, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/notice (last visited May 20, 2020) (capitalization altered and examples omitted). 16 United States v. Gries, 877 F.3d 255, 260 (7th Cir. 2017) (reviewing two “notice” definitions and opining that “[i]n everyday parlance, the term is not limited to warnings or notifications disseminated to the general public”); Franklin, 785 F.3d at 1368 (reviewing 18 “notice” definitions and concluding that none have “a public component”) (citing Notice, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1544 (ed. Philip Babcock Gove 1993)). UNITED STATES V. COX 11 “any notice . . . seeking or offering” child pornography. 17 The Supreme Court has observed that, “[r]ead naturally, the word ‘any’ has an expansive meaning, that is, ‘one or some indiscriminately of whatever kind.’” 18 Thus, Congress’s use of “any” suggests Congress intended “notice” to cover any communication that could reasonably fall within that term. 19 Notably, the statute does not limit notices to those that are widely disseminated to the public at large or a large group of people. We also consider the verbs that precede “any notice.” Section 2251(d)(1) prohibits “[a]ny person [from] . . . mak[ing], print[ing], or publish[ing] . . . any notice.” 20 A review of these verbs’ dictionary definitions suggests that “publish” has a public dissemination component. 21 We can 17 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (emphasis added). 18 Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 219 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)); accord Olympic Forest Coal. v. Coast Seafoods Co., 884 F.3d 901, 906 (9th Cir. 2018) (collecting cases for the proposition that the “any” is “broad and all-encompassing”); Do Sung Uhm v. Humana, Inc., 620 F.3d 1134, 1153 (9th Cir. 2010) (“The word ‘any’ is generally used in the sense of ‘all’ or ‘every’ and its meaning is most comprehensive.”) (quoting Fleck v. KDI Sylvan Pools, Inc., 981 F.2d 107, 115 (3d Cir. 1992)). 19 See Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 588–89 (1980) (construing Section 307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act expansively in light of a 1977 amendment that added the word “any”). 20 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (emphasis added). 21 Merriam-Webster includes two representative definitions of “publish”: “to make public announcement of” and “to disseminate to the public.” Publish, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam12 UNITED STATES V. COX assume that “print” often could refer, and even more typically may refer, to a more public dissemination. But as we have explained, the phrase “make[] . . . any notice” is quite clearly not limited to public dissemination and can include one-to-one communications that are fairly characterized as “notices.” At least in the context of this case, which involves a defendant who is offering child pornography, we do not think the statute’s inclusion of the words “publish” and “print” requires us to adopt an unnaturally narrow interpretation of the phrase “make[] . . . any notice.” Once again, if Congress had intended to limit the statute in the way Cox suggests, we think it would have chosen different language than it did. At this stage of the inquiry, in view of the ordinary meaning of the statutory terms and § 2251(d)(1)’s proscription of “any notice,” the statute strongly suggests that “make[] . . . any notice” can reach one-to-one communications. 22 We also consider “the structure of the statute as a whole, including its object and policy,” 23 and “whether the proposed interpretation would frustrate or advance that purpose.” 24 With its child pornography legislation, Congress enacted a “comprehensive” regulatory scheme that webster.com/dictionary/publish (definitions 1b and 2a, respectively) (last visited June 6, 2020). 22 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1) (emphasis added). 23 Williams, 659 F.3d at 1225 (quoting Children’s Hosp. & Health Ctr., 188 F.3d at 1096). 24 See United States v. Mohrbacher, 182 F.3d 1041, 1049 (9th Cir. 1999). UNITED STATES V. COX 13 “seeks to regulate (more accurately, exterminate) the entire child pornography market.” 25 Construing “notice” to include one-to-one communications furthers this broad statutory objective. In summary, based upon the statute’s plain meaning, we hold that one-to-one communications can satisfy the “notice” requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1).
Applying our construction of § 2251(d)(1) to the instant case, we decide that a rational fact-finder could find that Cox made a notice offering child pornography when she sent a one-to-one electronic message with a Dropbox link and informed Hennis that it contained child pornography. As discussed above, the critical Kik messages conveyed Dropbox links and the message “[g]oodies for daddy.” Taken together and when viewed in the context of the overall conversation between Cox and Hennis, these Kik messages reflected an offer to provide child pornography and means for how to gain access to it. This is sufficient to constitute “mak[ing] . . . any notice . . . offering . . . to . . . exchange, . . . display, distribute, or reproduce” child pornography.” 26 The district court therefore did not err in denying Cox’s Rule 29 motion for a directed verdict as to the § 2251(d)(1)(A) count. 25 United States v. McCalla, 545 F.3d 750, 755 (9th Cir. 2008); accord United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210, 1217 n.7 (11th Cir. 2006). 26 18 U.S.C. § 2251(d)(1). 14 UNITED STATES V. COX
Considering our ruling, we do not reach Cox’s argument that § 2251(d)(1) notice is unconstitutionally vague (or whether this argument has been waived). We nonetheless observe that the Eleventh Circuit case Cox relies upon for her associated rule of lenity argument—United States v. Caniff 27—is distinguishable. Caniff is the only other case in which a court of appeals directly considered whether § 2251(d)(1) notice applies to one-to-one communications. 28 In Caniff, the 32-year-old defendant engaged in a text-message conversation with an FBI agent who posed as a 13-year-old girl. 29 In the text conversation, the defendant asked the purported 13-year-old girl for sexually explicit pictures of herself. 30 For this conduct, the defendant was charged and convicted of “mak[ing]” a “notice” “seeking” to “receive” child pornography in violation of § 2251(d)(1)(A). 31 (In contrast, Defendant Cox was charged with “mak[ing]” a “notice” “offering” to “display, distribute, or reproduce” child pornography. 32) 27