Opinion ID: 3006955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Officer Camp

Text: We first consider LaFleur’s claims alleging the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights by Officer Camp. He contends that Officer Camp somehow lacked probable cause to arrest him because she, herself, engaged in illegal activity by carrying out the reverse-sting operation. No authority is cited for this meritless argument. It is clear that it was not unreasonable for Officer Camp to assume probable cause for solicitation of prostitution by LaFleur. LaFleur actively involved himself in every aspect of the crime, i.e., greeting, negotiating, and agreeing to the terms, of the solicitation. In short, his conversation and agreement provided ample information to establish probable cause for solicitation of prostitution. Additionally, LaFleur raises a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim, arguing that Officer Camp, in starting their conversation, engaged in illegal activity in order to manufacture a case against him and that such conduct somehow violated relevant Texas solicitation law. LaFleur further argues that this alleged violation of Texas state law, and the reversesting operation that ended in his arrest, violated his substantive due process rights. LaFleur, however, cites no authority for this proposition, and for good 3 Case: 15-20195 Document: 00513217063 Page: 4 Date Filed: 10/02/2015 No. 15-20195 reason, because there is none. This argument is at best a veiled entrapment defense, a defense which LaFleur has disavowed at every turn. This type of non-coercive undercover investigation has never been recognized by this Court as the kind of conscience-shocking, egregious, and extreme conduct necessary to constitute a substantive due process violation. Additionally, LaFleur ignores that this Court has upheld reverse-sting operations that were based on probable cause substantiated under Texas Penal Code § 43.02 for similar, and even less expressive sexual propositions than those made by LaFleur. See, e.g., Crow v. Relken, 2007 WL 87662, at -2 (S.D. Tex. 2007), aff’d, Crow v. Relkin, 264 F. App'x 421, 422 (5th Cir. 2008). Because probable cause was established, Officer Camp is entitled to qualified immunity on all Fourth Amendment claims. Additionally, to the extent he tries to frame a substantive due process claim on these allegations, LaFleur’s Fourteenth Amendment claims are also unsupported. Thus, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment with respect to all claims against Officer Camp.