Opinion ID: 1766558
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Taylor's Appearance in Handcuffs

Text: In point eleven, Taylor argues that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling Taylor's request for mistrial when he was handcuffed and removed from the courtroom after the guilty verdicts were announced.
Prior to trial, Taylor filed a motion to appear in his own clothing and without restraints at court appearances and when transported to and from court. The trial court sustained the motion, but stated that the ruling would change if the defendant would himself do something that would cause me to feel that as a security measure that I have to reverse my original order. [14] After the guilty phase verdict was read, Taylor was handcuffed and removed from the courtroom. Taylor's counsel immediately requested a mistrial because Taylor was handcuffed in front of the jury. The trial court denied the request because Taylor had just been convicted of four counts of murder in the first degree. At the sentencing hearing, the State made the following comment: ... From the State's perspective I just wanted to include a couple of things for the record. Throughout the trial the Department of Justice Services had informed the State that defendant had an intention to act out, that there may be a problem in the trial. I know that I did conveyed [sic] that to the Court. From our perspective, from what we were aware of. I think also there was no prejudice to the defendant, in the first phase of the trial it was made very clear from both parties the defendant was confined throughout the trial. The State in its case in chief played a tape of a telephone call he made from the jail to his brother Perry Taylor. So there was no prejudice to him in any event because the jury was clearly aware of the fact he was in custody the entire time.
The trial court has discretion to grant a mistrial, which is a drastic remedy and should be employed only in the most extraordinary circumstances. State v. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d 479, 491 (Mo. banc 1997). A defendant cannot routinely be visually shackled in the guilt or penalty phase of a criminal trial unless that use is `justified by an essential state interest' such as the interest of courtroom securityspecific to the defendant on trial. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624, 125 S.Ct. 2007, 161 L.Ed.2d 953 (2005). Although shackling in the presence of the jury should be avoided if possible, not every incident in which a jury observes the defendant in shackles requires a mistrial. Brooks, 960 S.W.2d at 491 (internal citations omitted). In fact, brief, inadvertent exposure of the jury of a handcuffed defendant while he is being taken from one place to another does not deprive defendant of a fair trial. State v. McMillian, 779 S.W.2d 670, 672 (Mo.App.1989), citing State v. Crawford, 539 S.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Mo.App.1976). In Brooks, the defendant was handcuffed when the guilty verdicts were read. 960 S.W.2d at 491. This Court found that a mistrial was not warranted because the defendant's appearance in handcuffs was brief, occurred only at the end of the guilt phase, and the defendant was not otherwise restrained during the trial. Id. at 491-92. The only time Taylor was visually handcuffed in front of the jury was when he was escorted out of the courtroom after the guilty verdicts were read. The jury had just found Taylor guilty of four counts of first degree murder. Taylor was not prejudiced, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the mistrial request. Point eleven is denied.