Opinion ID: 2190684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Application of the Seibert Plurality Test in this Case

Text: The first factor of the five-factor Seibert plurality test to determine whether the two-step question-first interrogation used in the instant case passes constitutional muster is the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation. 542 U.S. at 615, 124 S.Ct. 2601. In this case, Det. Roland and Sgt. Postiglione obtained a complete and detailed confession from the Defendant before administering the Miranda warnings. The officers' questioning was pointed and executed with psychological skill. In response to their questions and claims of incriminating evidence, the Defendant told them where he picked up the victim, where they went, why they argued, how he killed her, what he did in an attempt to hide that he strangled her, and what he did with her body. Were the Defendant's initial confession admissible, it would have been sufficient to support the Defendant's conviction of second degree murder. [7] See Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-210 (2003). This factor weighs heavily against the efficacy of the tardy Miranda warnings. The second Seibert plurality factor is the overlapping content of the two statements. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 615, 124 S.Ct. 2601. In this case, the overlap was considerable. Only minor details were elicited in the second statement that were not also obtained in the first. This factor, too, weighs heavily against the effectiveness of the late Miranda warnings. The third factor is the timing and setting of the first and the second interrogations. Id. In this case, the second interrogation took place mere minutes after the first interrogation, with no break in time. The second interrogation took place in the same place as did the first: a small interrogation room in a secured area of the police station. The second interrogation was conducted by the same two police officers who conducted the first interrogation, the fourth Seibert factor. Both of these factors weigh against the effectiveness of the eventual Miranda warnings. The fifth and final factor looks to the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second round as continuous with the first. Id. In this case, Det. Roland and Sgt. Postiglione treated the two rounds of questioning as two portions of the same whole: the second being merely the official portion. At no time did either of them inform the Defendant that his initial statement could not be used against him. Cf. id. at 616, 124 S.Ct. 2601. Nothing was said or done to dispel the oddity of warning about legal rights to silence and counsel right after the police had led [him] through a systematic interrogation. Id. Moreover, during the second round of questioning, Det. Roland referred, albeit briefly and only twice, to the Defendant's initial statement. Cf. id. As in Seibert , [i]t would have been reasonable to regard the two sessions as parts of a continuum, in which it would have been unnatural to refuse to repeat at the second stage what had been said before. Id. at 616-17, 124 S.Ct. 2601. Indeed, we are confident that a reasonable person in the Defendant's shoes would have considered his second statement to be a forgone conclusion, a nicety that simply gave him another opportunity to demonstrate his cooperativeness in the hopes of something less than a first degree murder charge. In this case, all five of the Seibert plurality factors weigh against the effectiveness of the tardy Miranda warnings. This case is therefore distinguishable from Northern in which we determined that only one of the five factors (the continuity of police personnel) posed a threat to the effectiveness of the late warnings. See Northern, 262 S.W.3d at 761-63. We emphasize that, unlike the defendant in Northern , the Defendant in this case was not warned of his right to remain silent until after he had already confessed in response to specific, targeted questions. Uninformed about the inadmissibility of his first statement, the Defendant had no way to know that a postwarning refusal to incriminate himself would be in any way effective. We find, therefore, that a reasonable person in the Defendant's shoes would not have understood the eventual Miranda warnings given in this case to have convey[ed] a message that [he] retained a choice about continuing to talk. Seibert, 542 U.S. at 617, 124 S.Ct. 2601. Accordingly, the tardy Miranda warnings in this case were not effective to apprise the Defendant that he had a real, consequential opportunity to choose to remain silent at that point.