Opinion ID: 782888
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was the allowance of the amendment proper?

Text: 61 Kanter's first argument concerns the Tax Court's allowance of an amendment of the pleadings to conform to the proof that the alleged deficiency relating to BRT applied to 1986 rather than to 1987. Kanter argues that it was error to allow this amendment at all, and that, once allowed, the Tax Court further erred by not treating this as a new matter under Tax Court Rule 142(a), which would have shifted the burden of proof on the issue to the Commissioner. 62 The decision to allow or deny an amendment of the pleadings under Tax Court Rule 41 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Estate of Ashman v. Comm'r, 231 F.3d 541, 542 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2000); LeFever v. Comm'r, 100 F.3d 778, 786 (10th Cir.1996); Braude v. Comm'r, 808 F.2d 1037, 1039 (4th Cir.1986). It was not an abuse of discretion for the Tax Court to allow the amendment of the Commissioner's pleadings to reallocate the BRT deficiency to 1986. Kanter was on notice as to the specific partnership income of BRT that was the subject of the assessed deficiency. (Tr. at 4483-86.) There was no prejudice to Kanter in the adjustment of the date, and he had a fair opportunity to defend with respect to the amended claim. In fact, it was Kanter, and not the government, who elicited the testimony (from Kanter's accountant, Gallenberger) that revealed the timing error and prompted the government's request for amendment. 16 The government apparently did not realize its error until Kanter pointed it out at trial. Further, Kanter points to no additional evidence that he was prevented from introducing by virtue of the late amendment. The amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evidence was proper. 63