Opinion ID: 772253
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Classroom Language

Text: 69 Finally, we turn to Plaintiff's classroom language which gave rise to the sexual harassment complaint and the disciplinary measures. The content of Plaintiff's language at issue is what the College terms profanity not germane to course content. 10 See, e.g., March 4, 1998 Memorandum from MacQueen to Plaintiff entitled Obscene and vulgar speech (cautioning Plaintiff that [u]nless germane to discussion of appropriate course materials and thus a constitutionally protected act of academic freedom, your utterance in the classroom of such words as 'fuck,' cunt,' and 'pussy' may serve as a reasonable basis for concluding as a matter of law that you are fostering a learning environment hostile to women, a form of sexual harassment). In other words, it was not the content of Plaintiff's speech itself which led to the disciplinary action; rather, it was the context and form in which Plaintiff used the speech -- i.e., in the course of his teaching where the language was not germane to the course content -- that the College found to be in violation of its sexual harassment policy. 70 The context in which a message is delivered is often the pivotal factor when determining whether the speech will be protected. As the Supreme Court recently opined: [T]he protection afforded to offensive messages does not always embrace offensive speech that is so intrusive that the unwilling audience cannot avoid it. Indeed, it may not be the content of the speech, as much as the deliberate verbal or visual assault, that justifies proscription. Even in a public forum, one of the reasons we tolerate a protestor's right to wear a jacket expressing his opposition to government policy in vulgar language is because offended viewers can effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes. 71 Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 2489 (2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Nearly a century before Hill was decided, Justice Holmes likewise opined that the character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it was done. The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic. It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering words that have all the effect of force. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (citations omitted). 72 The degree of protection afforded to a college professor's speech in the context of the classroom was addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583, 584-85 (5th Cir. 1995). There, the plaintiff was discharged from his teaching position at a college for his incessant use of profanity in the classroom. Id. In finding that the speech was not protected, the Fifth Circuit took into account the unique context in which a college professor speaks such that his students are a captive audience who may find themselves intimidated by the person who has the ability to pass upon them a poor grade. Specifically, in Martin the plaintiff teacher denigrated his students with profanity such as bullshit, hell, damn, God damn, and sucks, allegedly because the students had a poor attitude. The plaintiff brought a § 1983 claim against the college for violation of his First Amendment rights; the district court held that the plaintiff did not have a constitutionally protected right to use profanity in the classroom; and the Fifth Circuit agreed. See id. at 585. The Court held that the teacher's speech did not touch upon a matter of public concern because the profanity served only to reflect the teacher's attitude toward his students. Id. In connection with its holding, the Court recognized that the students were a captive audience, and that they paid to be taught and not vilified in indecent terms .... Id. at 586. In short, the Court held that the teacher's language is unprotected . . . because, taken in context, it constituted a deliberate, superfluous attack on a 'captive audience' with no academic purpose or justification. Id. 73 In Dambrot v. Central Michigan University, we relied upon the Fifth Circuit's decision in Martin when we held that the coach of a state university basketball team did not engage in protected speech when he used the word nigger during a locker room session allegedly to motivate his basketball players. See 55 F.3d 1177, 1180 (6th Cir. 1995) ([Y]ou know we need to have more niggers on our team . . . . Coach McDowell is a nigger, . . . . Sand[er] Scott who's an academic All-American, a Caucasian, I said Sand[er] Scott is a nigger. He's hard nose, [sic] he's tough, et cetera.). The coach was discharged by the university for this speech and he filed suit alleging that his discharge violated the First Amendment. The district court granted the university's motion for summary judgment and this Court affirmed. Relying upon Martin, the Court concluded as follows: The First Amendment protects the right of any person to espouse the view that a nigger is someone who is aggressive in nature, tough, loud, abrasive, hard-nosed and intimidating; someone at home on the [basketball] court but out of place in a classroom setting where discipline, focus, intelligence and interest are required. This same view has been and is held about African Americans by many who view the success of Black athletes as a result of natural athletic ability and the success of Black executives as the result of affirmative action. What the First Amendment does not do, however, is require the government as employer or the university as educator to accept this view as a valid means of motivating players. An instructor's choice of teaching methods does not rise to the level of protected expression. . . . The University has a right to disapprove of the use of the word nigger as a motivational tool just as the college in Martin was not forced to tolerate profanity. 74 55 F.3d at 1190-91 (citation omitted; emphasis added). 75 The Dambrot Court also rejected the coach's argument that his speech was protected under the realm of academic freedom. 55 F.3d at 1188. The analysis of what constitutes a matter of public concern and what raises academic freedom concerns is of essentially the same character. Id. (citing Swank v. Smart, 898 F.2d 1247, 1250 (7th Cir. 1990)). The Court then noted that the linchpin of the inquiry is, thus, for both public concern and academic freedom, the extent to which the speech advances an idea transcending personal interest or opinion which impacts our social and/or political lives. To this end, the Court concluded that, unlike the case of Levin v. Harleston, 966 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1992), and Jeffries v. Harleston,21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded, 513 U.S. 996 (1994), rev'd 52 F.3d 9 (2d Cir. 1995) - where the speech of college professors who made derogatory comments about persons of certain racial or ethnic groups was found to serve the purpose of advancing viewpoints, however repugnant, which had as their purpose influencing or informing public debate - the coach's speech did not have such a purpose. Id. at 1189. 76 Turning to the matter at hand, just as a university coach may have the constitutional right to use the word nigger, but does not have the constitutional right to use the word in the context of motivating his basketball players, see 55 F.3d at 1190; so too, Plaintiff may have a constitutional right to use words such as pussy, cunt, and fuck, but he does not have a constitutional right to use them in a classroom setting where they are not germane to the subject matter, in contravention of the College's sexual harassment policy. See id.; see also FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978) (finding speech that is 'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and 'shocking' ... is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection under all circumstances). This is particularly so when one considers the unique context in which the speech is conveyed -- a classroom where a college professor is speaking to a captive audience of students, see Martin, 805 F.2d at 586, who cannot effectively avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their [ears]. Hill, 120 S. Ct. at 2489. Although we do not wish to chill speech in the classroom setting, especially in the unique milieu of a college or university where debate and the clash of viewpoints are encouraged - if not necessary -- to spur intellectual growth, it has long been held that despite the sanctity of the First Amendment, speech that is vulgar or profane is not entitled to absolute constitutional protection. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 747. 77 To summarize, although we find Plaintiff's classroom profanity that was not germane to the subject matter to be unprotected speech, we are also of the belief that Plaintiff's acts of expression in circulating the Complaint and the Apologywere protected as addressing matters of public concern. Because parts of Plaintiff's speech for which he was disciplined addressed a matter of public concern, we are required to conduct a balancing of the parties' respective interests as set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 149; Rahn, 31 F.3d at 411. 78 b.Was Plaintiff's Interest as a Citizen in Speaking on a Matter of Public Concern Greater than the College's Interest in Promoting the Efficiency of the Service that it Performs through its Employees? 79 In Pickering, the Supreme Court developed a balancing test which weighed the interests of the [public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The district court failed to properly apply Pickering because the court never balanced the parties' respective interests; instead, the court appears to have assessed whether Plaintiff actually violated the College's sexual harassment policy by retaliating against the complaining student. Indeed, nowhere in the district court's opinion does it balance the interests involved; the court simply concludes that[t]he issue is whether the First Amendment protects the publication of [Plaintiff's] Yes, Virginiamemorandum attached to a copy of the sexual harassment complaint filed against him that redacts the name of the complainant and her class. The Court holds that it does. Based on content, form, and context of the distribution, [Plaintiff's] speech relates to matters of a public concern, and was not done in retaliation for a complaint of sexual harassment. (J.A. at 150.) 80 The district court misses the mark in its analysis and erroneously applies the relevant legal standard, which could possibly account for its erroneous decision to grant the preliminary injunction in this case. Specifically, the court failed to conduct a meaningful balancing of the interests involved in order to determine whether the College's interests in enforcing its policy outweighed Plaintiff's interests in speaking. 81 i. Interests of the Parties Involved 82 Plaintiff claims that his interests in free speech and academic freedom outweigh the College's stated interests in regulating Plaintiff's speech. Defendants contend that their interests in 1) disciplining Plaintiff for conduct that threatened the College's eligibility for receiving federal funding under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g et seq., which forbids the release of educational records and the release of personally identifiable information absent prior written authorization; 2) prohibiting retaliation against students who file sexual harassment complaints, as expressly prohibited by the College's sexual harassment policy; 3) maintaining the confidentiality of a student complaint, as provided by Article VII.A.7. of the CBA between the College and Plaintiff's union, MCCFO; and 4) maintaining a learning environment free of faculty disruption, outweigh Plaintiff's interests which Defendants claim are negligible. 83 A college's or university's interest in maintaining a hostile-free learning environment, particularly as it relates to its Title IX funding, is well recognized. However, the interests of allowing persons to speak freely in the college and university setting are equally as well-established such that the balancing of these interests is not an easy one where even the most revered universities struggle with creating a sexual harassment policy that preserves this delicate balance. See, e.g., 18 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. at 306-19 (noting the sexual harassment policies of various institutions including Stanford University and Harvard Law School). Organizations such as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the American Association of University Professors (AAUP) recognize that limitations must exist on college professors' speech in order to provide a learning environment free of harassment; however, such organizations maintain that the limitations must be narrowly drawn so as not to compromise the professors' rights to academic freedom. See id. at 296-97. For example, the ACLU has opined that [a] sexual harassment policy . . . in an academic setting must be drawn very narrowly . . . [where it is] limited to situations where a practice of . . . sexually derogatory comments is . . . so pervasive and abusive as to demonstrably hinder the learning experience. Id. 84 Although it is true that the complaining student in the case at hand filed her sexual harassment Complaint against Plaintiff with the College and not under Title IX, the College nonetheless took disciplinary action against Plaintiff in light of the College's policy against sexual harassment, and the same concerns thereby apply. Indeed, the inquiry and the concerns are the same whether the sexual harassment claim is brought pursuant to Title IX or pursuant to an internal sexual harassment policy. See Richard H. Hiers, Academic Freedom in Public Colleges and Universities: O Say, Does that Star-Spangled First Amendment Banner Yet Wave?, 40 Wayne L. Rev. 1, 48 (1993) (recognizing that teachers sanctioned for exercising what they believe to be constitutionally protected speech face the same legal hurdles of Connick, Pickering,and Mt. Healthy). This, along with the College's interests in maintaining the confidentiality of a student complaint as set forth in the CBA, protecting a complaining student from retaliation, and continuing its public funding are all interests which we find to be significant in promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the discharge of [the College's] official duties .... Connick, 461 U.S. at 150-51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 85 Plaintiff claims that his interest in free speech under the First Amendment and his interest in academic freedom outweigh Defendants' purported interests. Academic freedom is a special concern of the First Amendment, which does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960); Sweezy v. N.H., 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (plurality opinion). Although academic freedom is not an independent First Amendment right, see Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1075 (11th Cir. 1991), the Supreme Court has long recognized the significance of academic freedom: The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universities is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth. To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new discoveries cannot yet be made. . . . Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will stagnate and die. 86 Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. However, the Supreme Court has also recognized that [a]cademic freedom thrives not only on the independent and uninhibited exchange of ideas among teachers and students, but also, and somewhat inconsistently, on autonomous decisionmaking by the academy itself. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214, 226 n.12 (1985) (citations omitted); Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 263 (Frankfurter, J. concurring) ([The university atmosphere] is an atmosphere in which there prevail the four essential freedoms of a university -- to determine for itself on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be admitted to study.) (internal quotation marks omitted). 87 Similarly, this Court has recognized that the term academic freedom 'is used to denote both the freedom of the academy to pursue its end without interference from the government ... and the freedom of the individual teacher . . . to pursue his ends without interference from the academy; and these two freedoms are in conflict.' See Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 826 (6th Cir. 1989) (quoting Piarowski v. Ill. Comm. College Dist. 515, 759 F.2d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 1985)). Although the College is not claiming an interest in academic freedom per se in support of its position in the matter at hand, it is important to bear in mind that a professor's right to academic freedom is not absolute, and the autonomous decisionmaking of the College must be considered when balancing the parties' respective interests. See Ewing, 474 U.S. at 226 n.12. 88 ii. Balancing of the Interests 89 The balancing of interests between a faculty member's right to free speech and a college's or university's right in preserving its interests has recently been described as follows: Free speech rights stemming from the First Amendment apply to both students and faculty members on public colleges and university campuses.... [H]owever, those rights are not absolute. The objectives that underscore the First Amendment also reflect and reinforce the educational mission of colleges and universities. These objectives include advancement of a representative democracy and self-government; the pursuit of truth in the marketplace of ideas; and the promotion of individual self-expression and development. Constitutional protection is afforded to the open and robust expression and communication of ideas, opinions, and information to further each of these objectives. This protection parallels a central mission of higher education: to nurture and preserve a learning environment that is characterized by competing ideas, openly discussed and debated. 90 Arthur L. Coleman & Jonathan R. Alger, Beyond Speech Codes: Harmonizing Rights of Free Speech and Freedom from Discrimination on University Campuses, 23 J.C. & U.L. 91, 98-99 (1996) (footnotes omitted). 91 In the matter before us, we believe that Defendants' purported interests, including maintaining the confidentiality of student sexual harassment complaints, disciplining teachers who retaliate against students who file sexual harassment claims, and creating an atmosphere free of faculty disruption, outweigh Plaintiff's purported interests. As noted by the several commentaries cited above, colleges and universities are legally required to maintain a hostile-free learning environment and must strive to create policies which serve that purpose. While a professor's rights to academic freedom and freedom of expression are paramount in the academic setting, they are not absolute to the point of compromising a student's right to learn in a hostile-free environment. To hold otherwise under these circumstances would send a message that the First Amendment may be used as a shield by teachers who choose to use their unique and superior position to sexually harass students secure in the knowledge that whatever they say or do will be protected. Such a result is one that a state college or university is legally obligated to prevent, and such a result would fail to consider the countervailing interests. See 18 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. at 320 ([The First Amendment and] [a]cademic freedom must not be used to shield the abuse of a captive audience by racially or sexually derogatory epithets.). 92 Speech that rises to the level of harassment -- whether based on sex, race, ethnicity, or other invidious premise -- and which creates a hostile learning environment that ultimately thwarts the academic process, is speech that a learning institution has a strong interest in preventing. The line drawn as to whether a professor's speech rises to this level is to be decided on a case by case basis, and in the instant case Plaintiff is not challenging the constitutionality of the College's sexual harassment policy. Our task today is to balance the parties' respective interests under the facts of this case and, in doing so, we believe that the College's interest in preserving a learning environment free of sexual harassment, among others, outweighs Plaintiff's claimed free speech and academic freedom interests. As we acknowledged at the outset of this opinion, although this balance is a delicate one, we believe that the College's interests prevail under the facts and circumstances presented here. 93 c. Summary 94 The district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff demonstrated a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his First Amendment claim; although Plaintiff's speech addressed a matter of public concern, Plaintiff failed to show that his interests in speaking outweighed the College's interests in enforcing its policies. 95 It should be noted that Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity provides another basis as to why Plaintiff's claim may fail. It is well-established that the defense of qualified immunity grants government officials engaged in discretionary activities immunity from individual liability for civil damages unless their conduct violates clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The Court applies a two-part test to determine whether a government official is entitled to the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. See Summar v. Bennett, 157 F.3d 1054, 1057 (6th Cir. 1998). The first inquiry is whether the Plaintiff has shown a violation of a constitutionally protected right; and the second inquiry is whether that right was clearly established at the time such that a reasonable official would have understood that his behavior violated that right. See id. at 1058. 96 To determine whether a right was clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity, we look first to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this court and other courts within our circuit, and finally to decisions of other circuits. Chappel, 131 F.3d at 579. No decisions from the Supreme Court, our circuit, or any other court, clearly establish that Plaintiff's speech in the instant case was constitutionally protected so that Defendants would have understood that their disciplinary action violated Plaintiff's rights. Thus, Defendants may be entitled to qualified immunity, and this could provide yet another basis for concluding that Plaintiff has not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his claim. See Cohen v. San Bernadino Valley Coll., 92 F.3d 968, 972-73 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the defendant community college board of trustees was immune from the plaintiff-teacher's § 1983 suit for violation of his First Amendment rights in relation to the discipline that the teacher received for responding to a student's sexual harassment claim because the defendants could not have reasonably known that the discipline violated an established right). 97 Having found that Plaintiff has failed to show a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits of his First Amendment claim, this preliminary injunction factor is thus dispositive of the issue, and we need not address the remaining three factors. See In re DeLorean Co., 755 F.2d at 1228. However, because the district court made specific findings on the remaining factors, we shall do the same. 98