Opinion ID: 415604
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the probativeness of felony convictions

Text: 34 In deciding whether the district court must inquire into the facts and circumstances underlying a conviction, a threshold question is whether, under Rule 609(a)(1), all felony convictions less than 10 years old have some probative value on the issue of credibility. The question is one of congressional intent, and we therefore look to the language and legislative history of the Rule for guidance. 35 We preface our analysis by considering what difference the answer makes. If a prior conviction for some crimes may not be probative of credibility at all, then for those crimes, the district court must inquire into the background facts and circumstances to determine whether a particular conviction has probative value. If, on the other hand, all felony convictions less than ten years old have some probative value on the issue of credibility, then in cases where there is minimal prejudice to the defendant (e.g., impeachment of a witness who has no connection to the defendant), a prior conviction will almost always be admitted, and there is no need for a detailed inquiry into probativeness. Where the prior felony conviction would be prejudicial to the defendant to some degree, however, a threshold conclusion that the conviction is also probative to some degree does not help the district court determine whether, in a particular case, probativeness outweighs prejudice. Nor does it resolve the question of when the court should inquire into the background facts to determine how much probative value a prior conviction has.
36 Rule 609, on its face, strongly implies that a prior conviction is per se probative of credibility for certain kinds of crimes. The language of the Rule also weakly suggests that all felony convictions less than 10 years old have at least some probative value. 37 Under Rule 609(a)(2), a prior conviction shall be admitted without any balancing of probativeness against prejudice, and regardless of the punishment, if the crime involved dishonesty or false statement. 28 Drawing the line between crimes that involve dishonesty or false statement and crimes that do not is not easy, as numerous cases in this 29 and other circuits 30 attest. It is implausible that Congress believed that crimes falling on one side of the line are so probative of credibility that they should be admitted regardless of prejudice but that crimes falling just on the other side of the line may in some cases not be probative at all. More likely, Congress anticipated that crimes of stealth (e.g., smuggling, burglary), while not quite crimes of dishonesty or false statement, do reflect lack of credibility and should be admitted unless significantly prejudicial. Indeed, this court, in construing Rule 609(a)(2), has implicitly recognized as much by distinguishing between crimes that bear directly upon the accused's propensity to testify truthfully 31 and offenses which, while they have some bearing on an individual's credibility, 32 should not be automatically admitted into evidence. 38 The harder question, on which our prior cases point in different directions, is whether Rule 609(a)(1) incorporates a congressional belief that all felony convictions less than 10 years old are somewhat probative of credibility, even crimes of impulse (e.g., assault, purse-snatching, perhaps shoplifting). In Crawford, the district court ruled that a prior shoplifting conviction was admissible based only on the name and date of the crime. We found this information insufficient; without a factual inquiry, the district court simply could not determine how probative (if at all) Crawford's shoplifting conviction may have been on her propensity to tell the truth. 613 F.2d at 1052. 33 In Jackson, however, we affirmed the district court's decision to admit a prior manslaughter conviction without suggesting that an inquiry into the background facts and circumstances of the crime was necessary. We recognized that manslaughter is not particularly a veracity-related crime, but relied on the congressional determination that such a crime, as a felony, may be admissible under Rule 609(a)(1). 627 F.2d at 1210. 34 Similarly, in Lewis, 626 F.2d at 949 n. 12, we found that the name and date of a prior narcotics conviction was sufficient basis for the district court's ruling that probativeness outweighed prejudice in a trial on a new narcotics charge. 35 39 The language of Rule 609(a)(1) gives two small clues. Under the Rule, felony convictions less than 10 years old 40 shall be admitted if [properly introduced] during cross-examination but only if the crime (1) was [a felony] and the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 41 (Emphasis added.) The phrasing shall be admitted ... but only if, plus the phrase the probative value, suggests that all prior convictions meet a threshold relevance requirement, but must nevertheless be evaluated for their prejudicial effect to the defendant. This linguistic inference would accord with the pre-Rule 609 understanding that all felony convictions were somewhat probative of credibility. 36 It would also be consistent with Congress' understanding that the prior felony conviction of a prosecution witness may always be used [because] [t]here can be no prejudicial effect to the defendant. 37 42 The inference is hardly compelling, however. Had Congress used the phrasing shall be admitted ... only if, one could not infer that all prior convictions are relevant. The use of but in shall be admitted ... but only if does not, as a matter of strict logic, alter the meaning of the phrase, but does create a slight pause after shall be admitted. One must assume that this pause has substantive content for any inference of admissibility to arise. Similarly, one must read the phrase the probative value as implying conscious rejection of the alternate phrasing the probative value, if any. For further guidance, we turn to the legislative history.
43 The legislative history of Rule 609, although not conclusive, supports the view that all felony convictions are probative of credibility to some degree. 38 It begins with Luck v. United States, 348 F.2d 763, 768 (D.C.Cir.1965), where we interpreted a D.C. Code provision that prior convictions may be given in evidence (emphasis added) to permit the trial judge to exclude a prior conviction where the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility. This approach became the dominant one under federal common law as well. 39 In 1970, however, Congress expressly rejected Luck for the District of Columbia, amending the D.C.Code to provide that evidence of a prior conviction, if less than 10 years old, 44 shall be admitted ... but only if the criminal offense (A) was [a felony] or (B) involved dishonesty or false statement (regardless of punishment). 40 45 The new rule gave the trial judge no discretion either to exclude felony convictions less than 10 years old or to admit convictions more than 10 years old. 46 The Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, in an early draft of the Rules, essentially adopted the Luck discretionary approach: 47 [A prior conviction] is admissible but only if the crime (1) was [a felony] or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment, unless (3), in either case, the judge determines that the probative value of the evidence of the crime is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 41 48 In this version, the phrasing is admissible ... unless and the probative value strongly suggests that all felonies have some probative value. The Advisory Committee finally decided to make all felonies and crimes of dishonesty or false statement automatically admissible to accord with the Congressional policy manifested in the 1970 legislation [rejecting Luck for the District of Columbia]. 42 49 The House subcommittee that considered the proposed Rules of Evidence decided, however, that judges should have discretion to exclude prior convictions not involving dishonesty or false statement. The subcommittee's version roughly paralleled the Advisory Committee's earlier draft: 50 [A prior conviction] is admissible only if the crime (1) was [a felony] unless the court determines that the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence of the conviction, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement. 51 H.R.Rep. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7075, 7084 (H.R.Rep.). This version was in turn rejected by the House Judiciary Committee, which decided to permit impeachment only if the prior crime involved dishonesty or false statement. Id. 52 The House adopted the Judiciary Committee version. The House debate does not suggest a consensus on whether all felonies have some probative value. Supporters of automatic admissibility argued, of course, that all felonies were probative of credibility because, e.g.,  'they entail substantial injury to and disregard of the rights of other persons.'  43 And Representative Smith, the chairman of the House subcommittee and the principal spokesman for the subcommittee version giving discretion to the trial judge, explained that the subcommittee had no doubt that there is probative value in the evidence of previous felonies, but was concerned about prejudice to the defendant if all prior felonies were admitted into evidence. 44 However, Representative Dennis, the principal proponent of limiting impeachment to crimes of dishonesty or false statement, argued that many other felonies had no connection to [the witness'] credibility at all. 45 53 The Senate Judiciary Committee agreed with the House that the defendant himself should be impeached only by a prior conviction for a crime of dishonesty or false statement. However, it amended Rule 609(a) to permit impeachment of other witnesses by any felony if the probative value of such evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect against the party offering that witness. S.Rep. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7051, 7061 (S.Rep.). The Committee also changed the House phrase is admissible to may be elicited, although this change was not explained in the committee report. Thus, the Senate Judiciary Committee version read: 54 [A prior conviction] may be elicited from [a witness] ... but only if the crime (1) involved dishonesty or false statement or (2) in the case of witnesses other than the accused, was [a felony], but only if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. 55 H.R. 5463 (Senate Judiciary Committee version), Sec. 609(a) (1974). On the Senate floor, this provision was again debated, and rejected by a narrow margin in favor of the automatic admission rule of the D.C.Code: 56 [A prior conviction] shall be admitted if elicited from [a witness] ... but only if the crime (1) was [a felony] or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. 57 120 Cong.Rec. 37,076 (1974) (statement of Sen. McClellan). 58 The Senate debate suggests substantial support for the view that all felonies are probative of credibility to some degree. A minority believed that a prior conviction may sometimes have no bearing on credibility. 46 6] But as in the House, supporters of automatic admissibility (who were a majority of the Senate) necessarily believed that all felonies were probative. 47 In addition, Senator Hart explained that the Judiciary Committee had chosen to exclude prior felony convictions because of prejudice to the defendant, not because such crimes were irrelevant to the question of credibility: 59 The Committee recognized that ... prior conviction[s] for ... serious crimes are not totally irrelevant as to whether the witness is telling the truth, since they do reflect his attitude toward the rules of the game. 60 Id. at 37,078 (prepared statement of Sen. Hart) (emphasis in original). 48 61 The Conference Committee report suggests that the Committee accepted the Senate understanding that all prior felonies are probative of credibility to some degree. First, the Committee took the Senate version as its starting point; it adopt[ed] the Senate amendment with an amendment. H.R.Rep. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974) reprinted in 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 7098, 7102 (Conf.Rep.). Second, the Committee explained its rule not as permitting the trial judge to exclude prior felony convictions because they may not be probative, but rather as removing judicial discretion over prior convictions involving dishonesty or false statement because [s]uch convictions are peculiarly probative of credibility. Id., 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 7103 (emphasis added). Third, the Committee determined that only the prejudicial effect to the defendant  was to be weighed against probative value. Id. (emphasis in original). For other witnesses the danger of prejudice ... [was] outweighed by the need for the trier of fact to have as much relevant evidence on the issue of credibility as possible. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the Committee must have assumed that prior felony convictions are indeed relevant evidence. 49 62 This history is not wholly satisfying. Congress never focused on the narrow question whether all felonies have at least some probative value on the issue of credibility. Also, the Conference Committee, with a variety of earlier drafts to choose from, chose the ambiguous final text (prior convictions shall be admitted ... but only if ... the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect) over the clearer language of the House subcommittee and Advisory Committee drafts (a prior conviction is admissible ... unless ... the danger of unfair prejudice outweighs the probative value) and the clearer negative language of Rule 609(b) (a conviction over 10 years old is not admissible ... unless ...). 63 Moreover--and an important caveat--we have deliberately used the phrases somewhat probative or probative to some degree for no stronger statement could be made. Congress recognized, and it is obvious, that some prior convictions have little relationship to credibility while others are highly probative. For example, Rule 609(b) reflects Congress' belief that convictions over ten years old generally do not have much probative value. S.Rep. at 15, 1974 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News at 7061. 50 This implies that many 9-year-old convictions are only slightly probative; probativeness does not suddenly vanish when the 10-year mark is reached. Similarly, the line between felonies and misdemeanors (which are admissible only if they involve dishonesty or false statement) will not always be sharp. A felony conviction could conceivably be based on conduct which would be a misdemeanor in another jurisdiction. Presumably, such a conviction would be only slightly probative of credibility. 51 64 Nevertheless, on the available evidence, and subject to the caveat in the last paragraph, we must conclude that Congress believed that all felonies have some probative value on the issue of credibility. Accord NLRB v. Jacob E. Decker & Sons, 569 F.2d 357, 363 (5th Cir.1978) (When Congress adopted [Rule 609(a) ] it determined that felonies ... did bear on the credibility of witnesses.). 65