Opinion ID: 2463966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Paternity Code

Text: Although it is not briefed by OCSE and seemingly was not relied on by the chancery court, we feel constrained to address Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-115(d) (Supp. 1995), which addresses modification of a child-support order when it is determined in a paternity suit that a man is not the biological father of a child. [2] See, e.g., Littles v. Flemings, 333 Ark. 476, 970 S.W.2d 259 (1998). In Littles , this court relied on § 9-10-115(d) and held that a man who had been adjudicated the father of a child in a paternity suit was entitled to relief from future child-support obligations, after scientific testing proved that he was not the child's biological father. We said: [T]he statute mandates that an adjudicated father in Mr. Littles's position receive prospective relief from a child-support judgment. Littles, 333 Ark. at 481, 970 S.W.2d at 262. Section 9-10-115, however, is part of the Paternity Code and was intended to apply only to judicial findings of paternity or to acknowledgments of paternity by both parents under Ark.Code Ann. § 9-10-120 (Supp.1995). There is nothing in § 9-10-115 to even suggest that its applicability extended to divorce decrees. Furthermore, we view an adjudication of paternity in a paternity suit, as well as an acknowledgment of paternity by both parents under the Paternity Code as being vastly different from an adjudication of paternity in a divorce decree. In the latter situation, there has been a marriage and in most situations, the children have known the husbands as their fathers. A parental relationship has, thus, been established with the child or children. In a paternity suit, the parent-child relationship has not been forged, and the stability of the family unit is not an issue. This distinction lies at the heart of the disparate treatment accorded scientific testing after a finding of paternity under the Paternity Code and scientific testing which occurs after a divorce decree under our caselaw. Accordingly, because paternity was adjudicated in a divorce decree in the instant case, we hold that McCormac v. McCormac, supra , controls and res judicata bars the appellee from reopening the paternity issue following the divorce decree. Reversed and remanded.