Opinion ID: 3009935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretext and Mixed-Motives

Text: Before submitting the case to the jury, the district court determined that Starceski provided sufficient direct evidence to support a claim of age-based disparate treatment requiring a Price Waterhouse, or so-called mixed-motives instruction, rather than a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) and 450 U.S. 248 (1981), pretext instruction.4 Westinghouse contends that the decision of the district court to charge the jury on mixed-motives was not in accord with the law and, because of its timing, substantially prejudiced Westinghouse. We disagree. 4 . The difference between the burden-shifting framework of a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine pretext case and a Price Waterhouse mixed-motives employment discrimination case has been the subject of much comment since St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993) (itself a pretext case) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, which codified Price Waterhouse's mixed-motives standard at 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(m) (West 1994). See Mardell v. Harleysville Life Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1221, 1224-25 (3d Cir. 1994). We review the problem briefly. An employment discrimination case may be advanced on either a pretext or mixed-motives theory. In a pretext case, once the employee has made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the burden of going forward shifts to the employer who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment decision. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. If the employer does produce evidence showing a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge, the burden of production shifts back to the employee who must show that the employer's proffered explanation is incredible. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55; Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768, 778 (3d Cir. 1994); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802). At all times the burden of proof or risk of non-persuasion, including the burden of proving but for causation or causation in fact, remains on the employee. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253; Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. In a mixed-motives or Price Waterhouse case, the employee must produce direct evidence of discrimination, i.e., more direct evidence than is required for the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine prima facie case. Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1225 n.6; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 778. If the employee does produce direct evidence of discriminatory animus, the employer must then produce evidence sufficient to show that it would have made the same decision if illegal bias had played no role in the employment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45; Mardell, 31 F.3d at 1225 n.6. In short, direct proof of discriminatory animus leaves the employer only an affirmative defense on the question of but for cause or cause in fact. In Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 470 (3d Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 186 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., No. 93-1773, 1995 WL 21907 (3d Cir. 1995) (in banc), we stated that a charge on a mixed-motives theory of employment discrimination requires conduct or statements by persons involved in the decisionmaking process that may be viewed as directly reflecting the alleged discriminatory attitude.5 See also Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 522 (3d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993). More recently, in Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1994), we made the following observations concerning the difference between a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine pretext case and a Price Waterhouse mixed-motives case: [I]n a [mixed-motives] case unaffected by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the evidence the plaintiff produces is so revealing of discriminatory animus that it is not necessary to rely on any presumption from the prima facie case [as is necessary in a pretext action] to shift the burden of production. Both the burden of production and the risk of non-persuasion are shifted to the defendant who . . . must persuade the factfinder that[,] even if discrimination was a motivating factor in the adverse employment decision, it would have made the same employment decision regardless of its discriminatory animus. 5 . In Miller, supra, we rejected the statement in Griffiths that an employee advancing a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine pretext theory must show that invidious discrimination is the sole cause of his employer's adverse action. Miller, 1995 WL 21907, at  n.8. However, we relied upon Griffiths's description of the type of evidence that is needed to show a Price Waterhouse mixed-motives case. Miller, 1995 WL 21907, at  n.9. Id. at 778 (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-46 and Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 469-70 and n.12) (emphasis added). See also Miller, 1995 WL 21907, at . In her concurrence in Price Waterhouse, Justice O'Connor offered guidance on the type of evidence needed to make out a mixed-motives case. She reasoned: [S]tray remarks in the workplace, while perhaps probative of [a discriminatory animus], cannot justify requiring the employer to prove that its [employment] decisions were based on legitimate criteria. Nor can statements by nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers unrelated to the decisional process itself, suffice to satisfy the plaintiff's burden in this regard; . . . What is required is . . . direct evidence that decisionmakers placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching their decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added) (internal citation omitted); Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 778. In applying this standard to Starceski's case, we are drawn at once to the testimony of Saul, who was once Starceski's first-level manager at Westinghouse. Saul testified that Jaafar, a second-level manager responsible for the layoff decision affecting Starceski, gave orders to him and other supervisors under himin preparation for a work force reduction directed by higher managementto consider age in the assignment of work. Saul specifically testified that Jaafar, at a meeting concerning the impending reduction, told the first-level managers to transfer work from older to younger employees. Saul also testified that he discussed Jaafar's comments with other managers after the meeting and they took Jaafar's statements as an order to set up older employees for termination in the impending work force reduction. Saul said it was actually a fact that the older engineers or the senior people [were] going to be let go in '89. Joint Appendix (App.) at 446. Saul also testified that Jaafar instructed him to doctor Starceski's performance appraisals so that they would reflect poor performance. These directives from Jaafar to Saul and other first-level managers are precisely the kind of evidence that is needed to indicate that [the] decisionmakers [involved here] placed substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion [i.e., age] in reaching their [termination] decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Hook v. Ernst & Young, 28 F.3d 366, 375 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1186-87 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 82 (1992)).6 In Hook, we quoted with approval the following passage from the Second Circuit's opinion in Ostrowski v. Atlantic Mutual Insurance Companies: 6 . To be sure, the jury was faced with conflicting testimony as to whether Jaafar gave these directives. We are obliged, however, to view the evidence and review the record in the light most favorable to Starceski, the verdict winner. We must therefore assume that Jaafar gave these orders. See Radabaugh v. Zip Feed Mills, Inc., 997 F.2d 444, 450 (8th Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). [P]urely statistical evidence would not warrant [a Price Waterhouse 'mixed-motives'] charge; nor would evidence merely of the plaintiff's qualification for and availability of a given position; nor would 'stray' remarks in the workplace by persons who are not involved in the pertinent decisionmaking process. . . . If however, the plaintiff's nonstatistical evidence is directly tied to the forbidden animus, for example[,] policy documents or statements of a person involved in the decisionmaking process that reflect a discriminatory or retaliatory animus of the type complained of in the suit, that plaintiff is entitled to a burden-shifting instruction. 28 F.2d at 374 (quoting Ostrowski, 968 F.2d 171, 182 (2d Cir. 1992)); see also Glover v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 981 F.2d 388, 394 (8th Cir. 1992) (statements demonstrating that a work force reduction was designed, in part, to eliminate older employees, entitled plaintiff to a mixed-motives charge), vacated on other grounds, 114 S. Ct. 42 (1993). Because Starceski introduced evidence of this type, the district court did not err in giving the jury a mixed-motives instruction. Cf. Hook, 28 F.3d at 375 (finding sexual comments by plaintiff's supervisor insufficient for a mixed-motives charge because they had nothing to do with plaintiff's job performance and were unrelated to the adverse decision process challenged in the case). We disagree, however, with the sweeping statement of the court of appeals in Glover that: [a]s a general rule, we [sh]ould expect that all successfully prosecuted age discrimination cases involving a reduction in force would involve mixed-motives because the plaintiff would be alleging the employer had both a legitimate reason (the economic need to reduce the workforce) and an illegitimate reason (to terminate an employee based on his or her age). Glover, 981 F.2d at 394. This statement, which could force every case into the Price Waterhouse framework, strikes us as an unfortunate consequence of the use of the phrase mixed-motives to capture the Price Waterhouse rationale. We believe, on the other hand, that the distinction between a Price Waterhouse and a McDonnell Douglas/Burdine case lies in the kind of proof the employee produces on the issue of bias. In the former, direct evidence of discriminatory animus leads not only to a ready logical inference of bias, but also to a rational presumption that the person expressing bias acted on it. As Chief Justice Vinson put it in, Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 562 (1953), he who has a mind to discriminate is likely to do so. A pretext case is different. It depends on circumstantial evidence allowing the factfinder to infer that the falsity of the employer's explanation shows bias. The inference from Saul's testimony that bias against older employees played a substantial part in the selection of those employees who would be discharged is direct and inescapable. The district court did not err when it gave the jury a Price Waterhouse instruction. Westinghouse, however, contends that, even if there was sufficient evidence to warrant a Price Waterhouse instruction, it should not have been given here because the district court abused its discretion when it allowed Starceski, after all the evidence was in, to change his theory of recovery from pretext under McDonnell Douglas/Burdine to mixed-motives under Price Waterhouse. Westinghouse argues that the district court should have made a decision or forced an election on pretext or mixed-motives at the beginning of the case and that its failure to do so was so prejudicial that Westinghouse is entitled to a new trial. This contention lacks merit.7 In Armbruster we said: an employee [need not] elect to proceed on either a pretext or a Price Waterhouse theory at trial. Rather, we think that an employee may present his case under both theories and the district court must then decide whether one or both theories properly apply at some point in the proceedings prior to instructing the jury. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n. 12, 109 S.Ct. at 1788 n. 12; id. at 278, 109 S.Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 472; see also Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 185. 32 F.3d at 782 n.17 (emphasis added). See also Radabaugh, 994 F.2d at 448 (Whether a case is a pretext case or mixed-motives case is a question for the court once all the evidence has been received.); Ostrowski, 968 F.2d at 186 (jury [should] be instructed on the law, including the possibility of burden-shifting, before it begins its factfinding).8 Accordingly, we hold that the district court's decision to give the jury a mixed-motives instruction, made shortly 7 . Starceski contends that Westinghouse waived this objection. We reject that argument. We believe Westinghouse's objection to the charge was sufficient to preserve this issue. 8 . As a practical matter, the proofs required to defend this case under either a pretext or mixed-motives theory differed little. The effect is a shift in the burden, not the substance of the proofs. See supra n.4. before the case went to the jury, does not entitle Westinghouse to a new trial. B. Westinghouse's Price Waterhouse Affirmative Defense Having found that age played a role in Westinghouse's decision to discharge Starceski, Price Waterhouse then required the jury to decide whether Westinghouse sustained its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have terminated Starceski even if it had not discriminated. Hook, 28 F.3d at 368. In other words, the risk of non-persuasion, as well as the burden of production, was now on Westinghouse to prove that it would have fired Starceski anyway, without regard to his age. Westinghouse stipulated that Starceski was not terminated because of poor job performance, the usual defense in this kind of a case, but argued instead that there was no work at Westinghouse which Starceski could do. Starceski, however, had produced evidence tending to show Westinghouse still had work he could do when it terminated him. The jury believed Starceski. It found that Westinghouse did not meet its burden of proving that the company would have discharged Starceski even if it had not considered his age. After reviewing the evidence presented at trial, we cannot say that it does not rationally support this finding. Evidence will support a jury verdict if reasonable persons could differ as to the conclusions to be drawn from it. Gilkerson v. Toastmaster, Inc., 770 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted).9 Westinghouse, therefore, is not entitled to either judgment as a matter of law or a new trial on the issue of unlawful age discrimination.