Opinion ID: 162537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting Framework

Text: 45 Next, Mr. Rakity argues requiring him to present evidence King Soopers regarded him as disabled in establishing his prima facie case amount[s] to an improper collapse of the McDonnell Douglas order of proof model. Mr. Rakity explains evidence of `regarded as' disability [should] be properly treated at the pretext stage of the analysis where the issue of the employer's intent is appropriately addressed. We disagree. 46 In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), the Supreme Court set out an analytical framework for allocating the burden of proof in Title VII employment discrimination cases. We subsequently adapted this framework to Americans with Disabilities Act disability discrimination cases. Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir.1997). In the context of summary judgment, the McDonnell Douglas framework requires a plaintiff to raise a genuine issue of material fact on each element of the prima facie case, as modified to relate to differing factual situations. Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323 (citations omitted). To establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, Mr. Rakity is required to show (1) he has a disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act; (2) he was qualified, with or without reasonable accommodation, to perform the essential job functions of the position he sought; and (3) his employer refused the promotion under circumstances which give rise to an inference the decision was based on his disability. Id. 47 After establishment of a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to offer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision. If the employer comes forward with a non-discriminatory reason for its actions, the burden then reverts to the plaintiff to show that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the employer's proffered reason for the challenged action is pretextual — i.e., unworthy of belief. Demonstrating pretext gets plaintiff over the hurdle of summary judgment. 48 Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). 49 The McDonnell Douglas framework was originally developed to determine the existence of intentional discrimination in violation of Title VII. Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 450 (10th Cir.1995). The purpose of the framework is to allow an inference of discriminatory animus from the simple showing of pretext. Id. at 451. Where an inference of discrimination is not at issue, such as where the the employer admits that the disability played a prominent part in the decision, ... the burden-shifting framework may be unnecessary and inappropriate. Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323 n. 3 (citations omitted). 50 Requiring Mr. Rakity to present triable evidence that King Soopers regarded him as disabled in establishing his initial prima facie case is consistent with the purpose and function of both the McDonnell Douglas framework and the Americans with Disabilities Act. Whether King Soopers regarded Mr. Rakity as disabled and whether King Soopers discriminated on the basis of that disability are separate legal questions. The McDonnell Douglas framework was designed to address the difficulties of proving the existence of discrimination, not the existence of a disability or a perceived disability. The framework is only necessary where a defendant claims the adverse employment action was made for reasons other than the plaintiffs membership in a protected class. White v. York Int'l Corp., 45 F.3d 357, 361 n. 6 (10th Cir.1995). In this case, King Soopers freely admits the decision not to promote Mr. Rakity was made because of Mr. Rakity's lifting restriction. Thus, it is undisputed King Soopers is discriminating on the basis of Mr. Rakity's impairment. The Supreme Court has explained this is permissible so long as Mr. Rakity's impairment is not severe enough to constitute a protected disability. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490, 119 S.Ct. 2139. Here, the McDonnell Douglas method of inferring discrimination is inappropriate since the relevant inference is undisputed. 51 Mr. Rakity's reliance on Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.2001), is misplaced. In that case, the Sixth Circuit held evidence showing an employer's proffered reason for an adverse employment decision is pretextual may also tend to show the employer regarded the employee as disabled. Id. at 708. Mr. Rakity interprets Ross to mean the issue of pretextually concealed discrimination and the issue of regarded as disabled should be treated as one and the same. This proposed modification of the McDonnell Douglas framework would open the protected class to individuals who neither have an actual disability nor can even present triable evidence their employer believed they have a disability. We do not think the Sixth Circuit intended such an interpretation, and if it did, we decline to follow it. 52 The facts Mr. Rakity refers to as pretext evidence do not amount to a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether King Soopers regarded Mr. Rakity as disabled. For instance, Mr. Rakity presents evidence showing King Soopers disregarded the doctors who opined Mr. Rakity is physically capable of performing all purpose clerk duties. If anything, this evidence would tend to show King Soopers did not regard Mr. Rakity as disabled, since Mr. Rakity's own physicians disabused King Soopers of this notion. Mr. Rakity also asserts the physical job requirements which exceeded Dr. Primack's lifting restriction were not essential job functions and were therefore amenable to reasonable accommodation. Even if we assume King Soopers disingenuously portrayed the all purpose clerk position as more physically demanding than it actually was, it does not follow King Soopers believed Mr. Rakity was disabled. At best, these facts only show King Soopers' explanation for refusing a promotion — namely, that Mr. Rakity was unqualified — was mere pretext. Just because King Soopers may have known Mr. Rakity is actually qualified, it does not follow King Soopers believed Mr. Rakity was also disabled. Accordingly, we are unpersuaded the district court's granting of King Soopers' summary judgment motion collapse[d] the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. 4 53 In conclusion, Mr. Rakity has not presented triable evidence of either a record of substantial limitation under § 12102(2)(B), or of having been regarded as suffering from substantial limitation under § 12102(2)(C). 5 Moreover, summary judgment on behalf of King Soopers is consistent with the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. For these reasons, the district court's order granting summary judgment is AFFIRMED.