Opinion ID: 2166967
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sexually Dangerous Persons Act

Text: The question before us is whether the State is entitled to move for summary judgment under the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act (Act) (725 ILCS 205/0.01 et seq. (West 1998)). In order to answer that question, we must review the legislature's purpose and intent in creating the Act. A sexually dangerous person is defined, under the Act, as a person who suffers from a mental disorder coupled with propensities to the commission of sex offenses and has demonstrated propensities toward acts of sexual assault or acts of sexual molestation of children. 725 ILCS 205/1.01 (West 1998). The Act's purpose is twofold: (1) to protect the public by sequestering a sexually dangerous person until such a time as the individual is recovered and released, and (2) to subject sexually dangerous persons to treatment such that the individual may recover from the propensity to commit sexual offenses and be rehabilitated. People v. Cooper, 132 Ill.2d 347, 355, 138 Ill.Dec. 282, 547 N.E.2d 449 (1989). The Illinois legislature first created a civil commitment statute for sex offenders, known as the criminal sexual psychopathic persons act, in 1938. See Ill.Rev.Stat. 1939, ch. 38, par. 820. The 1938 Act was revised in 1955 and thereafter became the Sexually Dangerous Persons Act. Ill. Rev. Stat.1955, ch. 38, pars. 820.01 through 825e. The revised act further provided that the proceedings be civil in nature. Despite being civil in nature, however, an accused was provided with some of the same procedural rights guaranteed in a criminal proceeding, such as the right to a trial by jury and the right to counsel. Ill.Rev.Stat.1955, ch. 38, par. 822.01. In 1963 the Act was amended to include a provision that quashed all outstanding indictments that served as the basis for an offender's civil commitment proceeding. See Ill.Rev.Stat.1963, ch. 38, par. 105-9. This change altered the aim of the Act because it focused on the rehabilitative treatment of the offender rather than punishment. Nearly two decades later, in 1982, the Act was again amended. This time the amendment added a requisite burden of proof. The amendment designated that before one could be committed as a sexually dangerous person, the State must prove the same beyond a reasonable doubt. Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 38, par. 105-3.01. In creating and amending the Act, the Illinois legislature intended that, instead of being criminally punished for their criminal sexual offenses, sexually dangerous persons be committed to the Department for treatment until they are no longer considered sexually dangerous. People v. Cooper, 132 Ill.2d 347, 355, 138 Ill.Dec. 282, 547 N.E.2d 449 (1989). The legislature classified sexually dangerous persons as people who suffer from a mental illness and need specialized care and commitment. Cooper, 132 Ill.2d at 355, 138 Ill.Dec. 282, 547 N.E.2d 449. Thus, the Act does not promote traditional aims of punishment, such as retribution or deterrence. Rather, under the Act, the State has a statutory obligation to provide care and treatment for persons adjudged sexually dangerous. This care is designed to effect recovery in a facility set aside to provide psychiatric care. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 92 L.Ed.2d 296 (1986).