Opinion ID: 774507
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Discrimination or Incidental Effects

Text: 51 Once a court determines that a state regulation affects interstate commerce, it must next determine whether the regulation discriminates against interstate commerce or regulates even-handedly with incidental effects on interstate commerce. Id. at 390 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also Gary D. Peake Excavating v. Town Bd. of Hancock, 93 F.3d 68, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (The Supreme Court has established a two-step approach to determine whether a state or municipal law violates the dormant Commerce Clause.). 52 A local law is discriminatory if it provides for differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter. USA Recycling v. Town of Babylon, 66 F.3d 1272, 1281 (2d Cir. 1995) (quotation marks omitted); see also Sal Tinnerello & Sons, 141 F.3d at 55. Where a plaintiff shows that a regulation is discriminatory, the burden shifts to the state or local government to demonstrate that the local benefits outweigh the discriminatoryeffects and that no nondiscriminatory alternative exists to effectuate the local goals. USA Recycling, 66 F.3d at 1281-82. A discriminatory state or local regulation is virtually per se unconstitutional because of the virtual certainty that such laws, at least in their discriminatory aspect, serve no legitimate, non-protectionist purpose. Carbone, 511 U.S. at 422 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Gary D. Peake Excavating, 93 F.3d at 74. In the rare case where a court finds the local interest compelling and the alternatives non-existent, it must uphold the challenged regulation. See, e.g., Taylor, 477 U.S. at 151 (Maine's ban on the importation of live baitfish serves legitimate purposes that could not adequately be served by available nondiscriminatory alternatives.). 53 On the other hand, [w]here the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142; Or. Waste Sys. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994). Because this burden is far less demanding than the burden under Maine v. Taylor, the critical inquiry is often whether [the local law] is basically a protectionist measure, or whether it can fairly be viewed as a law directed to legitimate local concerns. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978). 54 The district court held that the Counties' flow control laws discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of the Authority's designated facilities and that, in light of Carbone, the Counties could not, as a matter of law, demonstrate that no alternatives existed. The district court relied on its belief that [c]ourts have considered it almost a foregone conclusion that flow control laws violate the dormant commerce clause. (citing Sal Tinnerello & Sons, 141 F.3d at 56; Inc. Vill. of Rockville Ctr., 196 F.3d at 397). Accordingly, the district court did not reach the second line of inquiry, i.e. whether the burden imposed [by the regulations] on [interstate] commerce [was] clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142. We review the district court's determination on summary judgment de novo, applying the same legal standard as that used by the district court. See Slattery v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 248 F.3d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 2001). We disagree with the district court on several grounds. 55 First, the district court erroneously attributed to the Supreme Court a per se prohibition against flow control laws. See Harvey & Harvey, 68 F.3d at 798 (That [an] ordinance requires the use of [a] selected facility, thus prohibiting the use of non-designated facilities (which may be out of state), does not itself establish a Commerce Clause violation.); Houlton Citizens' Coalition v. Town of Houlton, 175 F.3d 178, 188 (1st Cir. 1999) (We do not interpret Clarkstown as explicating a broad-based ban on every flow-control ordinance that happens to be coupled with an exclusive contractual arrangement in favor of an in-state operator.). Unfortunately, the district court's misconception led it to deny the Counties' discovery and essentially grant summary judgment without reference to the unique facts of this case. 3 TheCounties' flow control laws, like any other challenged ordinance, must be analyzed under the principles articulated in Carbone according to their unique facts. Second, and more importantly, the district court erred in its Commerce Clause analysis by failing to recognize the distinction between private and public ownership of the favored facility. 56 The following discussion focuses on the latter of these errors and concludes that a municipal flow control law does not discriminate against out-of-state interests in violation of the Commerce Clause when it directs all waste to publicly owned facilities. As such, the district court should have analyzed the Counties' flow control laws under the Pike test to determine whether the laws' effects on interstate commerce substantially outweigh the local benefits.