Opinion ID: 3183055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Attorneysʹ Fees Under CUTPA

Text: Steinerʹs claim for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA2 requires a separate analysis, for the question here is whether the language of the Offer unambiguously encompassed claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA. We think there is some ambiguity here. The Offer provided for the dismissal of ʺall claims that have been made or could have been made concerning the LiteTouch trademark, [or] winch handles sold under the LiteTouch trademark.ʺ Joint App. at 97. While the 2 Section 42‐110g(d) of Connecticut General Statutes provides in pertinent part: In any action brought by a person under [CUTPA], the court may award, to the plaintiff, in addition to the relief provided in this section, costs and reasonable attorneysʹ fees based on the work reasonably performed by an attorney and not on the amount of recovery. ‐15‐ substantive claims under CUTPA are encompassed by the language ʺall claimsʺ relating to the LiteTouch trademark or winch handles sold under that mark, it is unclear whether that language encompasses claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA. In contrast to the contractual claim for attorneysʹ fees, which derived its source of authority directly from the Agreement and thus clearly fell within the language of the Offer, the claim for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA arguably does not fall within the language of the Offer. The claim for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA arguably is not encompassed by the language ʺall claims . . . concerning the LiteTouch trademark, winch handles sold under the LiteTouch trademark, or the Agreement.ʺ Indeed, courts have held that statutory attorneysʹ fees claims are not unambiguously encompassed in a Rule 68 offer when the offer refers to substantive claims but does not explicitly refer to attorneysʹ fees. See Sanchez, 709 F.3d at 690‐91; Lima v. Newark Police Depʹt, 658 F.3d 324, 332 (3d Cir. 2011). In Lima, the Third Circuit held that an offer covering ʺall of Plaintiffʹs claims for reliefʺ did not explicitly encompass attorneysʹ fees under § 1988, as a request for attorneysʹ fees under § 1988 is ʺcollateral to the main cause of actionʺ and thus not a ʺclaimʺ included in the offer. 658 F.3d at 332. Similarly, in Sanchez, the Seventh Circuit determined that a Rule 68 offer including ʺall of Plaintiffʹs claims ‐16‐ for reliefʺ was ambiguous as to whether attorneysʹ fees were included because it failed to specify the claims in question. 709 F.3d at 692‐93. In so holding, the Seventh Circuit distinguished its prior decision in Nordby, where it had found that the term ʺjudgment in the amount of $56,003.00 plus $1000 in costs as one total sum as to all counts of the amended complaintʺ was sufficiently clear so as to include fees, where one of the ʺcountsʺ was a statutory claim for attorneysʹ fees. Id. at 693 (citing Nordby, 199 F.3d at 391‐92). Under ordinary contract principles, we would next look to the extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. As noted above, however, the Rule 68 context is different. The ambiguity must be resolved against the offeror, as Rule 68 offerees are at risk for costs if the ultimate award is less favorable than the offer. See id. at 694‐95; Fed. R. Civ. P. 68(d). A rule that requires defendants to clearly state whether attorneysʹ fees are included also complies with the policy underlying Rule 68, which is to encourage settlement and avoid protracted litigation. Marek, 473 U.S. at 6‐9. Here, because the Offer did not unambiguously encompass claims for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA, Steiner was not precluded from seeking attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA. ‐17‐ That holding does not end the inquiry, however, for an award of attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA is discretionary. Fabri v. United Techs. Intʹl, Inc., 387 F.3d 109, 128‐29 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Gargano v. Heyman, 203 Conn. 616, 622 (1987)). Whether attorneysʹ fees are appropriate under CUTPA ʺlie[s] within the discretion of the trial court, which is in the best position to evaluate the particular circumstances of a case.ʺ Heller v. D.W. Fish Realty Co., 93 Conn. App. 727, 734 (2006) (quoting LaMontagne, 61 Conn. App. at 63‐64). The exercise of discretion ʺwill not ordinarily be interfered with on appealʺ unless the ʺabuse is manifestʺ or ʺinjustice appears to have been done.ʺ Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 7 (1983). ʺThe salient inquiry is whether the court could have reasonably concluded as it did. . . . [T]he term abuse of discretion does not imply a bad motive or wrong purpose but merely means that the ruling appears to have been made on untenable grounds.ʺ Thames River Recycling, Inc. v. Gallo, 50 Conn. App. 767, 800 (1998). The district court denied Steiner attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA, concluding that: judgment was entered in this case by agreement of the parties pursuant to Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure without any findings having [been] made. The Court concludes that the particular circumstances ‐18‐ of this case do not warrant an award of attorneyʹs fees or costs under CUTPA. Joint App. at 108. We are unsure from this language whether the district judge denied attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA merely because judgment had been entered pursuant to Rule 68, or because it concluded, in the exercise of its discretion, that an award of attorneysʹ fees was not warranted in the circumstances of the case. If the district court did not consider the claim for fees on the merits but rejected it simply because it believed the Rule 68 judgment precluded a claim for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA, that would be an abuse of discretion. See Goodheart Clothing, 962 F.2d at 273 (holding that when district court is authorized to award attorneysʹ fees, it is an abuse of discretion not to consider whether it should do so). Accordingly, we remand for the district court (1) to clarify whether it considered the claim for attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA on the merits and, (2) if not, to do so. We express no view as to whether an award of attorneysʹ fees under CUTPA is warranted. ‐19‐