Opinion ID: 158416
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Breach of Contract/Promissory Estoppel

Text: 39 Lastly, Ms. Bullington claims the district court erred in granting summary judgment on her breach of contract or promissory estoppel claims. Ms. Bullington contends the United representative who initially interviewed her for the position of academic instructor told her United loved to hire from within and after one year's work, she would be almost guaranteed a job. In addition, Ms. Bullington claims the second United representative who interviewed her for the flight instructor position told her it will take you a year and they'll hire you as a pilot, and the United Vice President for Flight Standards and Training told all academic instructors on many occasions United employees could and usually did work their way up. Ms. Bullington argues these statements amount to a promise[] of preferential treatment and a virtual guarantee of employment as a flight officer.Under Colorado law, an implied contract can arise out of a company's personnel policies and procedures. See Vasey v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1460, 1464 (10th Cir. 1994). To establish such a contract, an employee must show that the employer's actions manifested an intent to be bound. Id. To establish an employer's binding intent, the terms of the offer must be sufficiently definite and detailed to enable the court to determine whether a contract has been performed. Id. at 1465. Terms which are nothing more than vague assurances by the employer will not suffice. Id. If the employee fails to show an implied contract, she may nevertheless attempt to enforce her employer's policies under a theory of promissory estoppel. Id. at 1466. To succeed under that theory, the employee must demonstrate that the employer should have reasonably expected the employee to consider the policy as a commitment from the employer, that the employee reasonably relied on the statements to her detriment, and that injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the policy. Orback v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 97 F.3d 429, 433 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1241 (1997). 40 After a thorough review of the record, we conclude that no reasonable juror could find that the statements Ms. Bullington allegedly relied on amount to an enforceable contract or promise. The statements, at most, constitute vague assurances about career advancement opportunities and a general preference for promoting from within. See Vasey, 29 F.3d at 1465. They do not manifest an intent to contract and any reliance upon them as creating a contract or promise was unwarranted. See id. at 1466; Orback, 97 F.3d at 433; see also Dobbs v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 39 F.3d 1064, 1069 (10th Cir. 1994) (applying similar state law to conclude vague oral statements by employer did not amount to contract for continued employment). Accordingly, we agree with the district court that, as a matter of law, the statements are not sufficiently definite to be legally enforceable representations. Summary judgment was therefore appropriate. 41 The district court's partial dismissal of Ms. Bullington's claims on statute of limitations grounds and its grant of summary judgment in favor of United on the disparate treatment, retaliation, and breach of contract/promissory estoppel claims is AFFIRMED. The district court's grant of summary judgment on the disparate impact claim is REVERSED and that claim is REMANDED for further proceedings.