Opinion ID: 161098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Impermissible Factors

Text: 11 Appellant first contends that the district court used an impermissible factor as a basis for its upward departure. The court noted that the Commission had made the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor a specific offense characteristic for trafficking in child pornography, but not for child pornography possession. This, the court held, was an oversight by the Commission. Tr. at 60. The court then departed from the child pornography possession guideline, using the exploitation offense characteristic. Appellant disputes the district court's conclusion, reasoning that it was incorrect to assume that the Commission failed to consider exploitation as an offense characteristic for child pornography possession since the two guidelines were listed consecutively and directed to the same general topic. 12 Appellant's contention is reasonable. This court has declared on a number of occasions that sentencing guidelines are to be interpreted as if they were a statute or court rule. United States v. Gay, 240 F.3d 1222, 1230 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. Checora, 175 F.3d 782, 790 (10th Cir. 1999)). Under normal statutory construction, we would not assume that the failure to include some item in a statute is an oversight that the court may correct. In fact, in light of the Commission's inclusion of the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor in the guideline immediately prior to the applicable guideline in this case, we could as easily assume the opposite--that the Commission specifically considered the same offense characteristic for both and intentionally excluded it from the child pornography possession guideline. See True Oil Co. v. C.I.R., 170 F.3d 1294, 1300 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting that when courts interpret statutory language, they look not only at the specific statute at issue but also examine the statute in context with related statutes); ABC Rentals of San Antonio, Inc. v. C.I.R., 142 F.3d 1200, 1207 (10th Cir. 1998) (same). However, Congress and the Commission have articulated a decidedly different method for determining when the Commission has failed to consider a factor in a particular guideline, and thus when a district court may depart from it. 13 Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, as amended, 18 U.S.C. 3551 et seq., 28 U.S.C. 991-98, Congress authorized district courts to depart from the Guidelines if the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. 18 U.S.C. 3553(b). In ascertaining whether a particular circumstance was not adequately taken into consideration, courts must consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission. Id. The Commission, in turn, declares that except for certain forbidden factors, 3 it does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b). 14 The Commission does, however, provide two separate lists of what courts have labeled discouraged and encouraged factors. Discouraged factors, 4 located in subpart 5H1 of the Guidelines, are specific factors that the Commission determined were not ordinarily relevant to the determination of whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range. U.S.S.G. ch. 5, pt. H, introductory cmt. Encouraged factors, 5 listed in Part 5K, are specific factors provided by the Commission to aid the court by identifying some of the factors that the Commission has not been able to take into account fully in formulating the guidelines. U.S.S.G. 5K2.0. Courts have also referred to factors that are unmentioned in the Guidelines. Koon, 518 U.S. at 96. 15 Based on these four types of factors--forbidden, discouraged, encouraged, and unmentioned--the Supreme Court in Koon provided a series of questions to assist courts in determining whether a sentencing factor is legally permissible: 16 If the special factor is a forbidden factor, the sentencing court cannot use it as a basis for departure. If the special factor is an encouraged factor, the court is authorized to depart if the applicable Guideline does not already take it into account. If the special factor is a discouraged factor, or an encouraged factor already taken into account by the applicable Guideline, the court should depart only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case where the factor is present. If a factor is unmentioned in the Guidelines, the court must, after considering the structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines taken as a whole, decide whether it is sufficient to take the case out of the Guideline's heartland. 17 Koon at 95-96 (emphasis added); see also Collins, 122 F.3d at 1302. 18 The Court's formulation contemplates the majority of potential departure factors; however, it fails to take into account the question posed to us in this case: how do courts treat those factors that are neither forbidden, discouraged, encouraged, nor unmentioned in the Guidelines? In other words, how should courts evaluate the legal permissibility of factors that have not been designated as forbidden, encouraged, or discouraged, yet are found in separate guidelines, policy statements, and commentary? This is the focus of our inquiry, since Appellant challenges the district court's use of a specific offense characteristic from a separate guideline as a departure factor. It is also an inquiry we are obliged to undertake, as the Guidelines' Application Instructions charge us to examine other parts of the Guidelines for direction in sentencing: Refer to Parts H and K of Chapter Five, Specific Offender Characteristics and Departures [which contain the forbidden, discouraged, and encouraged factors], and to any other policy statements or commentary in the guidelines that might warrant consideration in imposing sentence. U.S.S.G. 1B1.1(i) 6 (emphasis added). As instructed, we look to other policy statements and commentary in the Guidelines for further guidance. 19 Initially, the Introduction to the Guidelines Manual notes that many of the guidelines specifically direct the court to other guidelines in sentencing. The Commission describes guided departures as involv[ing] instances in which the guidelines provide specific guidance for departure by analogy. U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. More pertinent to our inquiry, however, is the Commission's policy statement in subpart 5K2.0, entitled Grounds for Departure: 20 [A] factor may be listed as a specific offense characteristic under one guideline but not under all guidelines. Simply because it was not listed does not mean that there may not be circumstances when that factor would be relevant to sentencing. For example, the use of a weapon has been listed as a specific offense characteristic under many guidelines, but not under other guidelines. Therefore, if a weapon is a relevant factor to sentencing under one of these other guidelines, the court may depart for this reason. 21 U.S.S.G. 5K2.0. Thus, the Commission has unequivocally approved the district courts' use of specific offense characteristics of other guidelines as bases for departure from the applicable guideline at sentencing. These factors are in one sense encouraged by the Commission, since the Commission has approved them for use in other guidelines. However, they are distinct from the category of factors that courts have called encouraged, in that they are not specifically enumerated by the Commission in Part 5K. 7 These factors are also neither forbidden, discouraged, nor unmentioned in the Guidelines. Instead, they are identifiable in policy statements, commentary, specific offense characteristics, base offense levels, and other areas of the Guidelines. Aligning ourselves with the language used by the Commission, we refer to these departure factors as analogous factors. See U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. (discussing departure by analogy). 22 In cases predating Koon, this Circuit sanctioned the use of analogous factors as bases for departure. In so doing, we have allowed district courts to borrow from other guidelines both offense characteristics and base offense levels. In United States v. Baker, 914 F.2d 208, 211 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1099 (1991), we held the use of a firearm to be a valid factor for an upward departure for receiving explosives in interstate commerce under 2K1.6, even though that factor was only listed as a specific offense characteristic in 2B3.1(b). In United States v. Davis, 912 F.2d 1210 (10th Cir. 1990), we held that the quantity of drugs involved, a base offense level under 2D1.1, was a valid basis for an upward departure in sentencing the defendant under 2D1.8--Renting or Managing a Drug Establishment. See also United States v. Sardin, 921 F.2d 1064, 1066 (10th Cir. 1990) (reiterating our holding in Davis for one of Davis's co-defendants). In United States v. Keys, 899 F.2d 983 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 858 (1990), this court approved the use of the Appellant's prison disciplinary record, a base offense level under 2P1.2, as the basis for an upward departure on the charge of weapons possession while in prison. We there held: The mere fact that a factor is mentioned for one offense does not mean that it cannot be applied to other offenses. Keys, 899 F.2d at 990. In all four of these cases, we cited to the Commission's statement (quoted above) regarding analogous factors. See U.S.S.G. 5K2.0. 23 In addition, we have repeatedly held that analogizing to other guidelines is a primary method by which district courts may justify the reasonableness of their departure. See, e.g., United States v. Bartsma, 198 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir. 1999) (In Collins, we clearly reaffirmed our existing case law requiring a district court to 'specifically articulate reasons for the degree of departure' using any 'reasonable methodology hitched to the Sentencing Guidelines,' including 'extrapolation from or analogy to the Guidelines.); United States v. Whiteskunk, 162 F.3d 1244, 1253 (10th Cir. 1998) (reaffirming that Koon did not affect our pre-Koon approach requiring the district court to state with particularity and with reference or analogy to the Guidelines the basis for its degree of departure.). We find an even clearer basis in the Guidelines for allowing the use of analogous factors as actual departure factors. Thus, we hold that analogous factors are legally permissible bases for sentencing departures. 24 Although none of our sister circuits have discussed the use of analogous factors in relation to the Koon formulation, our holding today is in accord with those circuits that have examined whether analogous factors may be permissible departure factors. A number of courts have held pre-Koon that drug quantity, a base offense level under 2D1.1, was a proper basis for departure under other guidelines. See United States v. Cullens, 67 F.3d 123, 125 (6th Cir. 1995); United States v. Williams, 895 F.2d 435, 438 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Crawford, 883 F.2d 963, 966 (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 607-08 (3d Cir. 1989); United States v. Correa-Vargas, 860 F.2d 35, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit has also approved the analogous use of role in the offense under 3B1.2, United States v. Bierley, 922 F.2d 1061, 1069 (3d Cir. 1990), and obstruction of justice under 3C1.1, United States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1009-10 (3d Cir. 1993). In discussing whether single acts of aberrant behavior may be analogously used, the Ninth Circuit noted: Section 5K2.0 also suggests that courts should reason by analogy from one guideline to the next. United States v. Fairless, 975 F.2d 664, 668 n.2 (9th Cir. 1992). 25 Recently, the First Circuit confronted a factual situation and sentencing departure nearly identical to the instant action. See United States v. Amirault, 224 F.3d 9 (1st Cir. 2000). In Amirault, the Appellant pleaded guilty and was sentenced under 2G2.4 for the possession of child pornography. The district court departed based on Appellant's alleged sexual assaults on two minor females, using 2G2.2(b)(4) as an analogous factor. The First Circuit stated: 26 This approach was sound. A sentencing court is free to make suitable comparisons and draw plausible analogies in considering whether to depart from the guideline sentencing range. So it was here: although the guideline applicable to the offense of conviction was section 2G2.4 (the possession guideline), not section 2G2.2 (the trafficking guideline) . . . the district court was entitled to examine factors set out in section 2G2.2(b) in order to evaluate the appropriateness of a departure. Simply because a specific offense characteristic is listed explicitly in one guideline but not another does not mean that the factor may not be relevant to the departure calculus in respect to an offense under the latter guideline. 27 Id. at 12 (citing U.S.S.G. 5K2.0). 28 We agree with the reasoning of the First Circuit. Applying this analysis to the instant action, Appellant disputes the district court's use of an analogous factor in his sentence. The applicable guideline, 2G2.4, contains no reference to child molestation. Child molestation is not a forbidden, discouraged, or a listed encouraged factor. It is also not unmentioned in the guidelines, since it is a specific offense characteristic--the sexual exploitation of a minor--in 2G2.2, the child pornography trafficking guideline. In this situation, the Commission has acknowledged that the exploitation offense characteristic in the trafficking guideline may be used analogously as a basis for departure from the possession guideline. Thus, we hold that the sexual abuse of a minor was not an impermissible factor in supporting the district court's upward departure.