Opinion ID: 2373504
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Controversy over Martin's Privilege Against Self-Incrimination.

Text: During a discussion of preliminary matters following the denial of the motion to suppress, Harris' counsel disclosed that she proposed to call Martin as a defense witness at trial. The judge appointed an attorney to represent Martin and to counsel him with respect to his privilege against self-incrimination. [6] The attorney reported that she had been advised that [Martin] did answer a question this morning in a motions hearing, and that also that question was not preceded by advice of rights. I have not been advised that he has ever been advised of his right against self-incrimination. The judge responded that I don't think he has been (id.). Apparently recognizing that Martin might have incriminated himself already, the judge tried gallantly, and not without some success, to put the genie back in the bottle. He asked the prosecutor whether I am correct ... that in no way will anything that [Martin] said this morning be used against him? And nobody is going to argue that he has now waived his fifth amendment right because he testified this morning? The prosecutor agreed that he would not use Martin's testimony against him or argue that Martin had waived his Fifth Amendment privilege. Id. Defense counsel, however, stated that she had advised Mr. Martin of his Fifth Amendment rights when she interviewed him in preparation for trial, and the following exchange ensued: THE COURT: But I don't think anybody is going to argue that he's waived; is that correct, Ms. Holt? [7] You're not going to argue he's waived are you? COUNSEL FOR HARRIS: I'm not going to preclude myself under the case law in the District of Columbia. THE COURT: Well, ... I am going to rule that  right now, that because he testified this morning in the limited context in which he testified, does not in any fashion mean that he waived his  well, he waived his fifth amendment right. It was completely without counsel of his own choosing, and advice of somebody else's attorney is not the kind of advice that the Constitution talks about. After the trial began, Martin's counsel requested a proffer from the defense of what Martin's testimony would be. Harris' attorney proffered that Martin would testify that the officer got out of his vehicle with his gun drawn, and that the three men (Harris, Wright, and Martin), apparently not believing that Sergeant Neill was a police officer, asked bystanders to call the police. The prosecutor stated that he proposed to interrogate Martin on cross-examination about his role in the incident, and that he might inquire as to whether Martin had observed the transaction between Wright and Harris. In response to an inquiry from Martin's attorney, the prosecutor said that it was a distinct possibility that Martin would be prosecuted if he admitted presence but denied any knowledge of the transaction. The prosecutor subsequently added that if [Martin] was involved as a lookout or [in] any fashion in this particular transaction that occurred, then he would have a bias, and the Government should have the right to question him regarding his actions there at the time of this particular incident. Martin was called to the witness stand and indicated that, upon advice of counsel, he would decline to testify. There followed a lengthy discussion between court and counsel, in which the defense attorney's sole theme was that the scope of her inquiry would be narrow and that there was no real danger that Martin would be prosecuted. Martin's counsel then had the following exchange with the judge: COUNSEL FOR MARTIN: Given the proffer made in the Gerstein proffer by the Officer on the scene, as well as what I have been given to under[stand] his testimony was, about the role of the third person in this incident, that he was acting as lookout looking up and down the street, any statement by Mr. Martin that he was present in the location of that third person opens him up to possible prosecution. And it's not a fanciful or whimsical possibility. There is a very real possibility. He would be admitting that he was the person acting as an aider and abettor if there was a drug transaction. THE COURT: What if I went further and decided that I have to be able to allow the Government on grounds of bias to question him in regard to his relationship to the defendant at the time of the scene? COUNSEL FOR MARTIN: Again, those questions could be answered, hypothetically, in a way that would be incriminatory... if Mr. Martin were to say that he was an associate of either Mr. Harris or Mr. Wright and had any knowledge whatsoever of what was going on. I'm certainly not saying that's what he would say. THE COURT: I understand. COUNSEL FOR MARTIN: But the test is whether there is an answer that could incriminate him, and there is, definitely. THE COURT: All right. Following this exchange, the judge gave his ruling, which we reproduce in its entirety: All right. I understand the limited nature that Ms. Holt wants to use Mr. Martin's testimony for, and I understand that it is in some measure to impeach the credibility of Officer Neill. I heard this testimony  I heard Mr. Martin in the motions hearing, and, so I have the benefit of knowing what he would say in regard to one of these issues, and [that] is when Officer Neill had his gun drawn. And I can understand Ms. Holt's argument on the relevance of that. And it does appear that Miss Holt's need and desire to put Mr. Martin on the stand is very limited in nature. However, and, obviously, the defendant has a right which has to be maintained and enforced to put on witnesses who might help his cause, and so I'm not finding that the use which Miss Holt would put Mr. Martin's testimony to is not a good one. I am indeed finding that it would help the defendant to be able to put on Mr. Martin's testimony. And it's a very difficult balancing process I have to go through here. And in going through that process, in spite of the fact that I find Miss Holt's desire for Mr. Martin's testimony to be extremely limited, I find on balance that the issues that I would have to let the Government get into might very well lead to inculpatory statements beyond this [witness'] mere presence at the scene. However, I further agree with Mr. Martin's attorney that the defendant stated [defendant's statement?] under oath that he was the third person on the scene, does give, even on that issue, give the Government a little more than the Government had beforehand for the reason that the third person was let go. The third person in this scenario was let go. I can't tell what the government's position would be if they had on the record a positive identification of the third person on the scene, which is why I asked Mr. Willoughby [8] whether he was prepared to give any immunity at all, use or otherwise. That being so, even without getting into the bias issues that I believe I would have to let the Government get into, even without getting into those, I think his testimony could be, Mr. Martin's testimony would be inculpatory. And his risk is a real one that indeed he would be prosecuted. When I add the bias issues at a [minimum], I haven't really thought of the bias issues that the Government could get into even on this limited direct examination, [in] that event if I just add the bias questions, I increase that risk substantially, it seems to me. And again it's a risk because I can't know what this defendant is going to answer to those questions. And so I have to assess the risk. And the risk of incrimination is substantial. And I further conclude that the risk of prosecution is a real one and not fanciful. And it's a real one, particularly in light of the fact this third individual was let go on the scene. And the prosecuting authority, that is the U.S. Attorney's office, hasn't really had an opportunity to make a determination in regard to that third issue.       In any event, balancing it all  and I think I am going to have a difficulty with this rule, with these kinds of rulings every time they crop up, maybe someday somebody will tell me how to make this ruling easy. I don't think it's an easy ruling.... I will sustain the defendant's invocation of privilege and indicate that there is no point in calling him as a witness because he will raise his Fifth Amendment [rights] and I would sustain his use of the Fifth Amendment. (Emphasis added.) The italicized portions of the judge's oral decision indicate that he grounded his ruling in large part on the prospect that Martin might incriminate himself by acknowledging that he was the man with Wright and Harris. Martin had, however, already made this disclosure during the suppression hearing.