Opinion ID: 2538288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sentencing entrapment

Text: Four federal circuit courts of appeals  the First, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth  appear to accept the doctrine of sentencing entrapment. ( United States v. Woods (1st Cir. 2000) 210 F.3d 70, 75 ( Woods ); United States v. Gutierrez-Herrera (7th Cir.2002) 293 F.3d 373, 377 ( Gutierrez-Herrera ); United States v. Searcy (8th Cir.2000) 233 F.3d 1096, 1099 ( Searcy ); Staufer, supra, 38 F.3d at p. 1106 [9th Cir.].) [2] The United States Courts of Appeals of the District of Columbia and the Eleventh Circuit, and possibly also the Tenth Circuit, reject it. ( United States v. Walls (D.C.Cir.1995) 70 F.3d 1323, 1328-1330 ( Walls ) [one who agrees to commit a murder for hire deserves the sentence for that crime, even if he initially offered only to beat the victim up]; United States v. Sanchez (11th Cir.1998) 138 F.3d 1410, 1414 ( Sanchez ) [Eleventh Circuit has rejected sentencing entrapment as a viable defense]; Lacey, supra, 86 F.3d at p. 963, fn. 5 [Tenth Circuit finds the analogy to entrapment at the sentencing phase is misplaced, for once a defendant crosses the reasonably bright line between innocence and guilt, his criminal inclination has been established, and the extent of the crime is more likely to be a matter of opportunity than of scruple].) In the remaining federal circuits, the status of the doctrine is unclear. (See United States v. Gomez (2d Cir.1997) 103 F.3d 249, 256 [validity of concept of sentencing entrapment not yet determined in Second Circuit]; United States v. Raven (3d Cir.1994) 39 F.3d 428, 438 ( Raven ) [Third Circuit has not yet had occasion to address theory of sentencing entrapment]; United States v. Jones (4th Cir.1994) 18 F.3d 1145, 1154 ( Jones ) [Fourth Circuit has never addressed legal viability of sentencing entrapment theory]; United States v. Snow (5th Cir.2002) 309 F.3d 294, 295 [Fifth Circuit has yet to determine whether sentencing entrapment is a cognizable defense to a sentence]; United States v. Jones (6th Cir.1996) 102 F.3d 804, 809 [Sixth Circuit has never acknowledged validity of sentencing entrapment].) We reject the doctrine of sentencing entrapment because, as the Court of Appeal below observed, the concept simply does not fit with California's criminal law. (Accord, People v. Graves (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1179, fn. 5, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 708 ( Graves ).) The federal doctrine of sentencing entrapment, like the federal doctrine of entrapment generally, focuses on the intent of the defendant and is subjective. (See Woods, supra, 210 F.3d at p. 75; Searcy, supra, 233 F.3d at p. 1099; Gutierrez-Herrera, supra, 293 F.3d at p. 377; Staufer, supra, 38 F.3d at p. 1106.) The California test of entrapment, by contrast, focuses on the police conduct and is objective. ( People v. Watson (2000) 22 Cal.4th 220, 223, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 990 P.2d 1031 ( Watson ).) Under the California test, such matters as the character of the suspect, his predisposition to commit the offense, and his subjective intent are irrelevant. ( Barraza, supra, 23 Cal.3d at pp. 690-691, 153 Cal.Rptr. 459, 591 P.2d 947, fn. omitted.) Another reason for rejecting the doctrine of sentencing entrapment, relied upon by the Court of Appeal in Graves, as well as by the Court of Appeal in this case, is that California courts do not follow the same rigid sentencing guidelines as federal courts, so the need for a specific basis for departure from a guideline is not present. ( Graves, supra, 93 Cal.App.4th at p. 1179, 113 Cal.Rptr.2d 708.) Defendants here received 25-year quantity enhancements pursuant to section 11370.4(a)(6). Subdivision (e) of section 11370.4 provides: Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the court may strike the additional punishment for the enhancements provided in this section if it determines there are circumstances in mitigation of the additional punishment and states on the record its reasons for striking the additional punishment. Rule 4.428(a) of the California Rules of Court provides in pertinent part: If the judge has statutory discretion to strike the additional term for an enhancement, the court may consider and apply any of the circumstances in mitigation enumerated in these rules.... The circumstances in mitigation enumerated in the rules include the fact that the defendant, with no apparent predisposition to do so, was induced by others to participate in the crime. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.423(a)(5).)