Opinion ID: 673431
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: ANALYSIS OF Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)

Text: 16 The issue presented is whether the district court properly determined that under FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(3) and (d)(13)(D), the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action seeking rescission of the insurance policies in question. Furthermore, we must determine whether the district court correctly determined that under FIRREA, National Union and Gulf are barred from raising rescission as an affirmative defense to the RTC's counterclaim. The issue of whether the district court correctly interpreted Sec. 1821(d)(3) and (d)(13)(D) of FIRREA concerning subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question over which we exercise plenary review. Cf. Federal Ins. Co. v. Richard I. Rubin & Co., 12 F.3d 1270, 1282 (3d Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2101, 128 L.Ed.2d 663 (1994). 17 Section 1821(d)(13)(D) of FIRREA contains a jurisdictional bar which is central to this appeal. That section provides: 18 Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction over-- 19 (i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed receiver, including assets which the Corporation may acquire from itself as such receiver; or 20 (ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the Corporation as receiver. 21 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D). The [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subsection language quoted above refers to subsection (d) of Sec. 1821. E.g., Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1153 & n. 5 (1st Cir.1992). Subsection (d) ... provides for de novo district court jurisdiction only after the filing of a claim with, and the initial processing of that claim by, RTC pursuant to Sec. 1821(d)(5) and (6)(A). Rosa v. RTC, 938 F.2d 383, 391-92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 582, 116 L.Ed.2d 608 (1991). 5 Thus, we have characterized the jurisdictional restriction contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) as a statutory exhaustion requirement: in order to obtain jurisdiction to bring a claim in federal court, one must exhaust administrative remedies by submitting the claim to the receiver in accordance with the administrative scheme for adjudicating claims detailed in Sec. 1821(d). Rosa, 938 F.2d at 391. 6 22 When the RTC is appointed as receiver of a failed thrift institution, the RTC must promptly publish a notice to the institution's creditors to present their claims and proof by a specified date, which may not be less than 90 days after publication. 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(3)(B)(i).... In addition, the RTC must mail a similar notice to any creditor shown on the institution's books. 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(3)(C). Althouse v. RTC, 969 F.2d 1544, 1545 (3d Cir.1992). 23 The RTC provided such notice to National Union. On December 8, 1989, the RTC mailed to National Union and Gulf a letter of notification of the appointment of the RTC as Receiver. The RTC also notified National Union that it was required to submit to the RTC all claims by March 17, 1990. 7 National Union and Gulf did not submit by March 17, 1990 any claim or assertion to the RTC that they had a right to rescind the insurance policies in question. Accordingly, we conclude that neither National Union nor Gulf exhausted the administrative remedies provided for under FIRREA. Thus, unless the jurisdictional bar contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) is inapplicable, the district court lacked jurisdiction over National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action for rescission and their affirmative defenses of rescission. 24 We must carefully examine the jurisdictional bar contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) to determine whether it deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action for rescission and their affirmative defenses of rescission. In so doing, we keep in mind cardinal rules of statutory interpretation: The starting point for interpretation of a statute is the language of the statute itself. Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1575, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (internal quotations and citation omitted). The plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the rare cases in which the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters. United States v. Ron Pair Enter. Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1031, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (internal quotations, brackets and citation omitted). 25
26 As a preliminary matter, we consider whether the insurance policies issued by National Union and Gulf to CityFed and its subsidiaries are assets of City Savings as that term is used in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i). Section 1821(d)(13)(D) provides that no court shall have jurisdiction over--(i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed receiver.... Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i) (emphasis added). If the insurance policies are not assets of the bank, then National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action for and affirmative defenses of rescission of those insurance policies would not be barred under Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i). 27 FIRREA does not provide a definition of assets as that term is used specifically in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i). In the absence of a specific definition, we refer to the definition of the term assets in common legal usage: 28 Property of all kinds, real and personal, tangible and intangible.... The entire property of a person, association, corporation, or estate that is applicable or subject to the payment of his or her or its debts. 29 Black's Law Dictionary 117 (6th ed. 1990). Insurance policies which a bank has purchased and under which it is an insured fall neatly within this definition of assets. Insurance policies obviously are important property interests of individuals and economic entities. Furthermore, we believe that business people consider an insurance policy to be an asset of the named insured, as the term asset is commonly used in the business world. Finally, reported court decisions have assumed that insurance policies are assets of institutions which are holders of the policies. See, e.g., FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 947 F.2d 196, 199 (6th Cir.1991); A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994, 1001-02 & n. 10 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 876, 107 S.Ct. 251, 93 L.Ed.2d 177 (1986); FDIC v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 737 F.2d 1513, 1514-20 (11th Cir.1984); Samuels v. Acme Market, 845 F.Supp. 292, 294 (E.D.Pa.1994); Holloway v. New Jersey, 237 N.J.Super. 71, 566 A.2d 1177, 1180 (Law Div.1989). 30 Whether City Savings will ultimately be entitled to collect under the insurance policies is not relevant to the threshold question of whether the insurance policies issued to CityFed and its subsidiaries are assets of the banks. An insurance policy is of value to the owner and named insured of the policy, even though it is possible that the owner and named insured will ultimately be found not to be entitled to a particular recovery under the policy. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that the plain meaning of the term assets contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i) includes the insurance policies issued by National Union and Gulf to CityFed and its subsidiaries. 31 Having concluded that the insurance policies are assets of City Savings, we must examine the jurisdictional bar contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) to determine whether it deprived the district court of jurisdiction to hear (1) National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action for rescission of the insurance policies and (2) their affirmative defenses of rescission of the insurance policies. 32
33 We first address the jurisdictional bar as it applies to the declaratory judgment action. The language of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) appears to include a bar to declaratory judgment actions: [N]o court shall have jurisdiction over--(i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed receiver.... Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the emphasized words quoted immediately above includes declaratory judgment actions: a declaratory judgment action is an action seeking a determination of rights. Black's Law Dictionary defines declaratory judgment, in relevant part, as follows: 34 Statutory ... remedy for the determination of a justiciable controversy where the plaintiff is in doubt as to his [or her] legal rights. A binding adjudication of the rights and status of litigants even though no consequential relief is awarded. 35 Black's Law Dictionary 409 (6th ed. 1990). The same dictionary defines action, in part, as a lawsuit brought in a court; a formal complaint within the jurisdiction of a court of law. Id. at 28. When one initiates a declaratory judgment, one brings a lawsuit in court and files a complaint. National Union and Gulf did exactly that in this case. An action for declaratory judgment is plainly an action. No reasonable argument can be offered that the plain meaning of the any action seeking a determination of rights language of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) does not include complaints requesting declaratory relief. Therefore, unless it appears that interpreting Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) would produce a result demonstrably at odds with the general purpose of FIRREA, Ron Pair Enter., 489 U.S. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 1031, we will conclude that declaratory judgment actions are barred by Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D). 36 An argument can be made that interpreting Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) to include a bar to National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action produces an odd result when Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) is not viewed in isolation, but with reference to the administrative claims procedure of FIRREA set out in Sec. 1821(d)(3), (d)(5) and (d)(6). This argument begins by pointing out that National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action is not a creditor's claim. Since National Union and Gulf will owe the RTC money if it is determined that the RTC may collect under the insurance policies, they are potential debtors, and their action seeking a declaration that the insurance policies are rescinded is therefore a potential debtor's claim, not a creditor's claim. The argument continues as follows: Section 1821(d)(13)(D) acts as a jurisdictional bar to claims, but there is an exception to this jurisdictional bar in that claims which have been properly submitted through the administrative claims procedure may be tried de novo in federal court. Sec. 1821(d)(6)(A); Rosa, 938 F.2d at 391-92. Therefore, it is contended that since the jurisdictional bar of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) contains an exception for claims submitted through the administrative claims procedure, Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) must be read and interpreted with reference to the administrative claims procedure contained in Sec. 1821(d)(3), (d)(5) and (d)(6). Under 1821(d)'s administrative claims procedure, creditors, not debtors, are given notice to file claims with the receiver. Sec. 1821(d)(3)(B), (C). After a determination has been made with regard to a claim that has been submitted, the claimant may request administrative review of the claim or file suit in federal court. Sec. 1821(d)(6)(A). Since under Sec. 1821(d)(3)(B), (C), only creditors are given notice to submit claims to the RTC, the argument goes, the jurisdictional bar contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) could not have been intended to deprive jurisdiction for actions brought by non-creditors. In other words, the argument concludes, only holders of creditors' claims, for whom the statute provides notice and who may present their claims in the administrative claims procedure, are meant to be jurisdictionally barred by Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) if the claimant has not in fact exhausted the administrative remedies. 37 That Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)'s ouster of jurisdiction should be limited to suits otherwise governed by the administrative claims procedure set out in Sec. 1821(d) is a position that has been advanced, or at least suggested, by several courts. 8 National Union and Gulf advocate a version of that position in this appeal. They accurately point out that their declaratory judgment action is not a creditor's claim and therefore they argue their action is not the type of claim for which FIRREA's administrative claims procedure was established. Furthermore, Gulf was never put on notice that it had to submit claims to the RTC by the March 17, 1990 bar date. Therefore, Gulf contends that it especially cannot be held to have been bound by the requirement to exhaust the administrative claims procedure as a prerequisite to federal court jurisdiction. Assuming that exhaustion of the administrative claims procedure was not applicable to their action for declaratory judgment, National Union and Gulf conclude that the jurisdictional bar cannot apply. 38 However, we reject the suggestion that the broad bar to jurisdiction indicated by the plain language of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) should be strained and limited by referring to the administrative claims procedure of Sec. 1821(d)(3), (d)(5) and (d)(6). Although there is surely an interrelationship between the jurisdictional bar contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) and the administrative claims procedure, this does not mean that the class of actions addressed by the jurisdictional bar is necessarily identical to the class of actions addressed by the administrative claims procedure. As explained below, even assuming that Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)'s ouster of jurisdiction affects actions not otherwise governed by the administrative claims procedure, such a regime would not be at odds with the intentions of Congress in passing FIRREA. 39 The language barring jurisdiction over any action seeking a determination of rights contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) would appear to cover a larger class of actions than does the language contained in Sec. 1821(d)(3), (d)(5), and (d)(6), concerning the administrative claims procedure. For example, in the administrative claims procedure portion of FIRREA, Sec. 1821(d)(3)(B) and (C) require notice to be given only to claims of creditors, and Sec. 1821(d)(5) and (d)(6) refer only to any claim; in contrast, the jurisdictional bar of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) refers to any action seeking a determination of rights, and does not limit such actions to actions concerning creditors' claims. In making this comparison, a definition of claim and creditor would be useful. Unfortunately, neither the text of FIRREA nor its legislative history provide an explicit definition of the term claim or creditor as they are used in FIRREA. 9 In light of FIRREA's lack of definitions of these terms, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has suggested that the Bankruptcy Code is a promising source to turn to in defining claim and creditor as those terms are used in FIRREA. Office & Professional Employees Int'l Union, Local 2 v. FDIC, 962 F.2d 63, 68 (D.C.Cir.1992). Because the administrative claims procedure of FIRREA contained in Sec. 1821(d)(3), (d)(5) and (d)(6) addresses a debtor-creditor relationship, we agree with the D.C. Circuit in this regard. For the sake of argument, and in the absence of more specific legislative authority, in interpreting FIRREA we will apply the definition of claim and creditor contained in the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(5), (10)(A). 10 The Bankruptcy Code defines claim as follows: 40 claim means-- 41 (A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured, or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise to a right to payment, whether or not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or unsecured[.] 42 11 U.S.C. Sec. 101(5) (emphasis added). The term creditor is defined in relevant part as an entity that has a claim against the debtor. Sec. 101(10)(A). Hence a claim or a creditor's claim is essentially an action asserting a right to payment. In contrast, the phrase any action 11 does not contain any limitations, and plainly denotes any affirmative action taken by a party to commence any suit in any court, whether or not such an action asserts a right to payment, and whether or not such an action is brought by a creditor or a debtor. 43 With these definitions in mind, and for the purposes of argument, we will assume that the terms claims and creditors['] ... claims as used in Sec. 1821(d)(3) denote a smaller class of actions than does the any action seeking a determination of rights language of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i). 12 For instance, under these definitions, National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action for rescission of insurance policies which they issued would not be a claim addressed in the administrative claims procedure, but would be an action jurisdictionally barred by Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D). Yet we do not see why a jurisdictional bar which might cover a larger class of actions than would be addressed by the administrative claims procedure would be inconsistent with the general goals of Congress in passing FIRREA. One of the important goals of FIRREA is to enable the receiver to efficiently determine creditors' claims and preserve assets of the failed institution without being burdened by complex and costly litigation. 13 With this goal in mind, it would be perfectly consistent for Congress to provide a scheme wherein a holder of a claim for payment from the assets of the failed institution would be provided an administrative remedy and de novo court review, while the holder of a claim not asserting a right of payment and who wanted only a declaration of rights against the failed bank would be provided no administrative remedy or court access. 44 The rationale for this treatment of actions which do not seek payment from the assets of the failed institution would be that if the RTC leaves the party wishing to bring an action not seeking payment alone, that party should also leave the RTC alone. Accordingly, a party wishing to bring an action not seeking payment cannot summon the RTC into court to adjudicate a declaration of rights against the RTC. Rather, the party wishing to bring an action not for payment must instead wait and see if the RTC will sue her. If it does, then she will be able to defend herself against the RTC's action at that time. According to this rationale, the crisis facing failed banks is so extreme that the receiver is to focus on preserving the failed bank's assets, without the distraction and substantial cost of defending itself in court against declaratory judgment actions which do not seek a right to payment from the failed institution's assets. Indeed, since the RTC might never choose to sue the party wishing to obtain a declaratory judgment that it is not liable to the RTC, it may turn out that such declaratory judgment relief will be unnecessary. 45 It may be objected that such a scheme would be unfair to a party wishing to obtain a declaration of rights vis-a-vis the RTC. By stripping the party of its right to obtain a declaratory judgment, the party must live indefinitely with the threat that litigation might at any time be commenced against it by the RTC. But FIRREA was in fact passed to give the receiver extraordinary powers. We acknowledge that the ability to obtain a declaratory judgment is a valuable right in that it enables a party to ascertain its rights and obligations sooner than would be possible if the party were forced to await a lawsuit by an opposing party. However, simply because the right to bring a declaratory judgment action is valuable does not mean that Congress cannot take it away consistent with due process. Congress apparently has determined that the societal benefits resulting from the right to bring actions for a determination of rights, including declaratory judgments, are outweighed by the societal benefits resulting from the RTC being able to avoid costly and perhaps unnecessary litigation. 14 If the crisis facing failed institutions is so severe that Congress decides that it does not want the RTC spending limited time and resources processing declaratory judgment actions in its administrative claims procedure or defending declaratory judgment actions in court, it has the power to act accordingly. We believe that the broad jurisdictional bar contained in the plain language of Sec. 1821(d)(D)(13) reveals that Congress did in fact make this determination. 46 Congress could easily have limited Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)'s jurisdictional bar to claims, thereby limiting the jurisdictional bar to the same class of actions dealt with in the administrative claims procedure. But it did not. The jurisdictional bar goes further and, in addition to barring any claim ... for payment, Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)(i), it contains a bar against any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to [ ] the assets of any depository institution for which the Corporation has been appointed receiver, id. In construing a statute we are obliged to give effect, if possible, to every word Congress used, Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339, 99 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 60 L.Ed.2d 931 (1979), and without good reason, we will not assume that a portion of a statute is superfluous, void or insignificant, see 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction Sec. 46.06, at 119-20 (5th ed. 1992). 47 We therefore assume Congress meant what it said when it included a jurisdictional bar to any action. The term any action includes actions by debtors as well as creditors, and is not limited to actions asserting a right to payment. Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [the statutory] language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980). Because a jurisdictional bar to declaratory judgment actions is consistent with Congress' intention in passing FIRREA, we give effect to the plain language of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) and hold that it bars National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action, regardless of whether National Union and Gulf are characterized as creditors or debtors, and despite the fact that National Union and Gulf do not assert a right to payment. 48 It could be argued that if Congress did in fact intend that actions seeking a determination of rights but which do not seek a right to payment, such as National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action for rescission, would be jurisdictionally barred from both administrative proceedings and courts of law, that this complete bar to administrative and court access would result in an unconstitutional deprivation of due process under the Fifth Amendment. If this objection were valid, we might eschew interpreting the any action seeking a determination of rights language of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) so as to cover a larger class of actions than might be covered under the administrative claims procedure of Sec. 1821(d)(3), (d)(5) and (d)(6). This is because where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the [c]ourt will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). 49 However, we do not believe that barring jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions not seeking a right to payment in both administrative proceedings and courts of law would violate the Due Process Clause. This is because it appears that whatever rights a party wishes to have announced in a declaratory judgment action may later be adjudicated in the administrative claims procedure or in an action with the RTC. Thus, the party stripped of her right to bring a declaratory judgment action gets her chance for a hearing--her opportunity to be heard 15 --even though her hearing may be delayed. For instance, if the inability to have a court declare rights in advance leads to the RTC violating a party's rights causing actual damages, then that party will have a claim--a right to payment--which may be submitted in the administrative claims procedure. 16 That this delay in obtaining relief does not violate the Due Process Clause is made clear from the teaching of the Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 94 S.Ct. 2038, 40 L.Ed.2d 496 (1974). 50 In Bob Jones University, the Supreme Court addressed a due process challenge to the Anti-Injunction Act of the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. Sec. 7421(a). The Anti-Injunction Act provides in part that no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court. Id. The Supreme Court held that Sec. 7421(a) barred suit by Bob Jones University to enjoin the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from revoking a favorable ruling letter concerning tax-deductible contributions which the IRS had previously issued. 416 U.S. at 727-50, 94 S.Ct. 2041-52. The University argued that by barring suit for injunctive relief, it would either be forced to await assessment of taxes before being able to challenge the assessed taxes in administrative proceedings, or else it would have to pay income taxes and commence a refund proceeding. Id. at 746-48, 94 S.Ct. at 2050-51. This delay in adjudicating whether the ruling letter should be revoked or not would allegedly have caused serious financial harm to the University because revocation of the ruling letter would result in the loss of many donations from contributors who depended on tax deductible status when making those contributions. The University contended that such serious financial hardship resulting from the jurisdictional bar resulted in a deprivation of due process. 51 The Supreme Court rejected the due process challenge: 52 This is not a case in which an aggrieved party has no access at all to judicial review. Were that true, our conclusion might well be different.... [Petitioner] may ... petition the Tax Court to review the assessment of income taxes. Alternatively, petitioner may pay income taxes, ... exhaust the Service's internal refund procedures, and then bring suit for a refund. These review procedures offer petitioner a full, albeit delayed, opportunity to litigate the legality of the Service's revocation of tax-exempt status.... 53 We do not say that these avenues of review are the best that can be devised. They present serious problems of delay, during which the flow of donations to an organization will be impaired and in some cases perhaps even terminated.... [A]lthough the congressional restriction to postenforcement review may place an organization claiming tax-exempt status in a precarious financial position, the problems presented do not rise to the level of constitutional infirmities, in light of the powerful governmental interests in protecting the administration of the tax system from premature judicial interference. 54 Id. (emphasis added). Thus, even assuming that the jurisdictional bar contained in the Anti-Injunction Act would have caused the University to suffer a delay in bringing its action, which delay in itself would have resulted in substantial economic injury, the Supreme Court rejected the due process challenge to the limitation on court jurisdiction. 55 The holding in Bob Jones University indicates that no viable due process challenge can be made to the jurisdictional limitation contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) as applied to National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action. Because National Union and Gulf, as explained below, will have an opportunity to raise their right to rescission as an affirmative defense to the RTC's counterclaim, they too will have a full, although delayed, opportunity to litigate the rescission issue. 17 In light of the important government interests in addressing the crisis of insolvent thrift institutions, even if declaratory judgment actions not asserting a right to payment were completely jurisdictionally barred from the administrative claims procedure and courts of law, this would not present a due process violation. In contrast, where an action is not merely declaratory in nature, but rather asserts a right to payment, a complete bar to such a right-to-payment action in administrative proceedings and in courts of law would appear to constitute an unconstitutional deprivation of due process, since the holder of the right to payment would never have an opportunity to be heard concerning property already allegedly owed her. See, e.g., id.; see also Coit Independence Joint Venture v. FSLIC, 489 U.S. 561, 583-87, 109 S.Ct. 1361, 1374-76, 103 L.Ed.2d 602 (1989); Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 429-30, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1154, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-49, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901-10, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976); supra note 16. Cf. Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 Harv.L.Rev. 17, 68-74 (1981). 56 Finally, we note that if a complete jurisdictional bar to actions not seeking a right to payment were deemed a violation of the Due Process Clause, then it must follow that litigants have a constitutional right to declaratory judgments. This conclusion is not feasible. Far from being constitutionally required, for some years the Supreme Court had raised serious doubts about whether an action for a declaratory judgment was [permitted as] a 'case or controversy' within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, Charles Alan Wright, The Law of Federal Courts Sec. 100, at 670 (4th ed. 1983), and [a]ctions for declaratory judgments represent a comparatively recent development in American jurisprudence, id. 57 Although it is possible to find elements of the declaratory judgment in ancient procedures, the remedy as it is now known has been recognized in the United States only since 1919 when legislatures began to adopt statutes similar to those still in effect authorizing the declaratory judgment.... 58 Constitutional doubts deterred adoption of a federal statute authorizing declaratory judgments but when these were quieted by the Supreme Court in 1933, Congress responded promptly by passing the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act in 1934. 59 Charles Alan Wright et al., 10A Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 2752, at 571-72 (2d ed. 1983) (footnotes omitted). In light of the history of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 18 it seems that the right to bring a declaratory judgment action is not a constitutional right, but rather a remedy provided as a matter of grace by the legislature; accordingly, the legislature has the power to abolish that form of remedy. 19 60 Since a complete bar of jurisdiction in the administrative claims procedure and courts of law over declaratory judgment actions not asserting a right to payment would comport with due process, National Union and Gulf's argument that they did not receive proper notice from the RTC concerning the submission of claims pursuant to the administrative claims procedure is irrelevant. That is, Congress need not have provided an administrative remedy as an alternative to its barring jurisdiction in courts of law over declaratory judgment actions not asserting a right to payment, so notice of any administrative remedies a fortiori is not required. 61 In holding that Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)'s ouster of jurisdiction is not necessarily limited to suits otherwise governed by the administrative claims procedure set out in Sec. 1821(d)(3), (d)(5) and (d)(6), 20 we acknowledge that it is possible that in some factual settings the broad bar to jurisdiction contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) could raise constitutional concerns. Such a situation could arise if the holder of an action asserting a right to payment were not provided reasonable notice and an opportunity to be heard in the administrative claims procedure. In such a setting, application of the broad jurisdictional bar, as stated above, would appear to be unconstitutional. But simply because Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)'s application in imaginary future cases would be unconstitutional is not a good reason to interpret its jurisdictional bar narrowly, as some courts have suggested. 21 Rather, if and when the RTC seeks to use Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) unconstitutionally, it would seem that the courts should deem application of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) unconstitutional as applied in that case, and take jurisdiction over the case. 22 62 We conclude that Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) bars jurisdiction in any court over National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action, regardless of whether the declaratory judgment action could have been submitted to the RTC pursuant to the administrative claims procedure. We do not reach the issue of whether National Union and Gulf's action could have qualified for the exception to the jurisdictional bar for claims that have been submitted through the administrative claims process had they filed a timely administrative claim. We hold that the language contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) barring any action seeking a determination of rights is not limited in its application to actions brought by creditors; it applies to debtors as well, and applies regardless of whether the action is asserting a right to payment. It is therefore irrelevant that National Union and Gulf claim to be potential debtors of the RTC. Accordingly, we will affirm the district court's holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear National Union and Gulf's declaratory judgment action. 23 63
64 We now turn to consider whether the district court correctly determined that National Union and Gulf are jurisdictionally barred under Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) from raising an affirmative defense of rescission to the RTC's counterclaim. We believe that the plain meaning of the language contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) indicates that the statute does not create a jurisdictional bar to defenses or affirmative defenses which a party seeks to raise in defending against a claim. 65 Section 1821(d)(13)(D) limits jurisdiction as follows: 66 Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction over-- 67 (i) any claim or action for payment from, or any action seeking a determination of rights with respect to, the assets of any depository institution for which the [RTC] has been appointed receiver, including assets which the [RTC] may acquire from itself as such receiver; or 68 (ii) any claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the [RTC] as receiver. 69 12 U.S.C. Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D). The above language bars jurisdiction over four categories of actions: (1) claims for payment from assets of any depository institution for which the RTC has been appointed receiver; (2) actions for payment from assets of such depository institution; (3) actions seeking a determination of rights with respect to assets of such depository institution; and (4) a claim relating to any act or omission of such institution or the RTC as receiver. The issue is whether defenses or affirmative defenses to claims can be said to fall under any of the above four categories. 70 We think it is plain enough that a defense or an affirmative defense is neither an action nor a claim, but rather is a response to an action or a claim, and that therefore defenses and affirmative defenses do not fall under any of the above four categories of actions. In the interest of clarity, we explain our position in detail. 71 Black's Law Dictionary defines defense, in relevant part, as follows: 72 That which is offered and alleged by the party proceeded against in an action or suit, as a reason in law or fact why the plaintiff should not recover or establish what he seeks. That which is put forward to diminish plaintiff's cause of action or defeat recovery.... 73 . . . . . 74 A response to the claims of the other party, setting forth reasons why the claims should not be granted. The defense may be as simple as a flat denial of the other party's factual allegations or may involve entirely new factual allegations. In the latter situation, the defense is an affirmative defense. 75 Black's Law Dictionary 419 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). Affirmative defense is defined in more detail as follows: 76 In pleading, matter asserted by defendant which, assuming the complaint to be true, constitutes a defense to it. A response to a plaintiff's claim which attacks the plaintiff's [legal] right to bring an action, as opposed to attacking the truth of claim. Under the Fed.Rules of Civil Procedure, and also under most state Rules, all affirmative defenses must be raised in the responsive pleading (answer).... 77 Id. at 60 (emphasis added). We have stated above that an action means a lawsuit brought in a court. Id. at 28. In the above discussion we also stated, borrowing from the Bankruptcy Code, that as used in Sec. 1821(d) the term claim essentially means an action asserting a right to payment. 78 With the aid of these definitions, it is clear that a defense or affirmative defense is not properly called an action or a claim but is rather a response to an action or a claim. When a lawyer files a responsive pleading to an action or claim, she does not say that she is bringing an action or filing a claim; instead, she says that she is answering, responding to, or defending against an action. The jurisdictional bar contained in Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) therefore does not apply to defenses or affirmative defenses. 24 79 Of course, if in addition to raising defenses or affirmative defenses to an action or a claim, a party also raises counterclaims, such counterclaims would fall under Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D)'s jurisdictional bar, because a counterclaim is a claim. Black's Law Dictionary defines counterclaim as [a] claim presented by a defendant in opposition to or deduction from the claim of the plaintiff. Black's Law Dictionary 349 (6th ed. 1990). Therefore, unless counterclaims were properly submitted to the administrative claims procedure of FIRREA, they would be subject to the jurisdictional bar of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D). 25 80 Whether an assertion is truly a defense, an affirmative defense, or a counterclaim is a question courts are competent to answer. As discussed above, a claim (or a counterclaim) is essentially an action which asserts a right to payment. Courts should not allow parties to avoid the procedural bar of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) by simply labelling what is actually a counterclaim as a defense or affirmative defense. 81 We will assume that under the state and/or federal law which ultimately will govern this case, a defense of rescission is an affirmative defense. 26 The district court has characterized rescission as an affirmative defense, and we accept that characterization. National Union and Gulf are therefore not barred by Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) from raising rescission as an affirmative defense to the RTC's counterclaim. 82 Our interpretation of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) is based on the plain meaning of the language of that section. However, we point out that even if it could be argued that the jurisdictional bar of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) could be fairly interpreted to bar jurisdiction over defenses or affirmative defenses, we would not adopt this position. This is because interpreting the jurisdictional bar in such a manner would, in a substantial number of cases, and in this case in particular, result in an unconstitutional deprivation of due process. Property which one stands to lose as a result of a lawsuit is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause, Logan, 455 U.S. at 428-30, 102 S.Ct. at 1154, and the Due Process Clause ... prevent[s] ... denying potential litigants use of established adjudicatory procedures, when such an action would be 'the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be heard upon their claimed right[s],'  id. at 429-30, 102 S.Ct. at 1154. If parties were barred from presenting defenses and affirmative defenses to claims which have been filed against them, they would not only be unconstitutionally deprived of their opportunity to be heard, but they would invariably lose on the merits of the claims brought against them. Such a serious deprivation of property without due process of law cannot be countenanced in our constitutional system. 27 [W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the [c]ourt will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988). Especially in light of the serious due process concerns which would unavoidably arise were we to interpret the jurisdictional bar of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) as applying to defenses and affirmative defenses, we reject such an interpretation. 83 It may be argued that barring defenses and affirmative defenses in court would not be unconstitutional because under FIRREA parties could always file potential defenses and affirmative defenses in the administrative claims procedure provided for in Sec. 1821(d)(3), (d)(5) and (d)(6). But this suggestion is not tenable. For one thing, many of the parties who would be raising defenses to RTC-initiated lawsuits would not be creditors of the thrift institution in receivership and so would not receive notice of the time within which they would be required to present information to the administrative claims procedure, as provided for in Sec. 1821(d)(3). Again, this would raise due process concerns. Moreover, even if parties received notice that they must submit potential defenses or affirmative defenses to the administrative claims procedure, such parties would often find it difficult if not impossible to do so. Since a party cannot know what her defense is until she hears the claim leveled against her, it seems that it would be nearly impossible for a party to submit future hypothetical defenses to the administrative claims procedure--defenses to lawsuits which may not yet have brought against her or which may never be brought at all. We agree with the court in RTC v. Conner, 817 F.Supp. 98 (W.D.Okla.1993), that even if the plain language of Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) were read or understood to include affirmative defenses, an exception to the plain meaning rule of statutory construction would apply because such a literal application of the statute ... would lead to the patently absurd consequence of requiring presentment and proof to the RTC of all potential affirmative defenses that might be asserted in response to unknown and unasserted claims or actions by the RTC, id. at 102 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 84 For the above reasons, we conclude that Sec. 1821(d)(13)(D) does not bar National Union or Gulf from raising any defense or affirmative defense to the RTC's counterclaim. We will therefore reverse the district court's holding that National Union and Gulf were jurisdictionally barred from raising rescission as an affirmative defense.