Opinion ID: 2621619
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sixty-Day Time Limit for the OPC to File an Objection to a Petition for Readmission

Text: ¶ 20 Rule 25 requires that [t]he respondent shall serve a copy of the petition upon the OPC counsel and that [w]ithin sixty (60) days after receiving a respondent's petition for ... readmission, OPC counsel shall either: (1) ... stipulate to the respondent's... readmission; or (2) file a written objection to the petition. RLDD 25(c), (f). If the OPC files an objection, the district court must then schedule a hearing on the matter, but if not, the district court shall review the petition without a hearing and enter its findings and order. RLDD 25(g). ¶ 21 On June 29, 2001, Schwenke delivered his Petition to the Law and Justice Center, which houses the Utah State Bar and its admissions department, the OPC, and other Bar committees, in addition to other tenants, including the Judicial Conduct Commission, the Utah Trial Lawyers' Association, and Attorney's Title Guaranty Fund, Inc. The process server handed the Petition, along with a number of other papers, to the common-area receptionist and indicated that the papers were for admissions. The Petition was accordingly forwarded to Joni Seko, Deputy General Counsel in Charge of Admissions. Ms. Seko, after noticing the Petition among the delivered papers, sent a copy to the OPC, which arrived in the OPC office on July 2, 2001. The OPC filed its Opposition to the Petition on August 30, 2001; this was within sixty days of actually receiving the Petition, but approximately sixty-two days after the document was delivered to the receptionist at the Law and Justice Center. ¶ 22 Schwenke argues that service on the receptionist at the Law and Justice Center on June 29, 2001, was effective as to the OPC. He contends that requiring a litigant to actually serve a specific department of the Bar would create an unjustified burden and would allow the Bar to literally avoid service by simply asserting that the process was served upon the wrong department. Schwenke therefore asserts that the district court should not have accepted the OPC's Opposition but should have reviewed his Petition without a hearing as suggested under rule 25. The OPC counters that rule 25(c) requires a litigant to actually serve OPC counsel and that, under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, service upon a common-area receptionist is not effective. In addition, the OPC points out that at least one OPC counsel is usually present to accept service and that appointments to accept service can be made easily. ¶ 23 The RLDD announce that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in these rules, the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ... apply in formal discipline actions and disability actions. RLDD 17(a). Also, Service of any... papers or notices required by these rules [in addition to the initial formal complaint against the respondent] shall be made in accordance with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. RLDD 14(b). Rule 4(d)(1)(E) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that service [u]pon [a] corporation ... or upon an unincorporated association ... [shall be made] by delivering a copy of the summons and the complaint to an officer, a managing or general agent, or other agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process. ¶ 24 Cases from other jurisdictions, discussing state and federal corollaries to the Utah rule, have reached varying conclusions concerning whether service on a receptionist is effective for a corporation or unincorporated association. Generally, [p]roper service is not effected by serving the corporation's receptionist. 62B Am.Jur.2d Process § 269 (1990). See also O.J. Distrib., Inc. v. Hornell Brewing Co., 340 F.3d 345, 354 (6th Cir.2003) (finding insufficient service of process where unknown receptionist signed for overnight package); Grand Entm't Group, Ltd. v. Star Media Sales, Inc., 988 F.2d 476, 486 (3d Cir.1993) (holding receptionist at common entrance of office building was not a person in charge for purposes of the state service of process rule); In re Hunt's Pier Assocs., 156 B.R. 464, 471-72 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1993) (finding service on secretary at defendant's business not sufficient under the federal and state service requirements where no other means of service were attempted); Kovalesky v. A.M.C. Associated Merch. Corp., 551 F.Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.N.Y.1982) (holding service not effective where process server merely tossed papers in front of receptionist who was not authorized to accept service). ¶ 25 There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. Courts have often found service to be effective where the employee who received service had a significant amount of authority or apparent authority within the organization; where the employee played an integrated role within the organization such that he or she would know what to do with papers; or where there were other assurances that the documents would reach the intended recipient. See Direct Mail Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Techs., Inc., 840 F.2d 685, 688-89 (9th Cir.1988) (finding service on receptionist effective where corporation was comparatively small and the role played by receptionist was proportionally large, and receptionist was the only one in the office when the process server arrived, indicating that she possessed more than minimal responsibility); Koninklijke Luchtvaart Maat-Schappij N.V. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 17 F.R.D. 49, 51 (S.D.N.Y.1955) (holding face-to-face encounter with corporate officer not required to effect service where the officer's receptionist accepted service, promised to deliver the papers to the proper person, and did in fact deliver the papers). In general, [t]he rules are to be applied in a manner that will best effectuate their purpose of giving the defendant adequate notice, and the court will look at various factors to ensure that the service is fair in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Direct Mail, 840 F.2d at 688. ¶ 26 In this case, Schwenke's Petition was given to the common-area receptionist at the Law and Justice Center with a number of other documents and an instruction that the papers were for admissions. According to the receptionist's affidavit, she is not supervised or employed by the OPC, nor is she authorized to accept service on behalf of the OPC or any other tenant in the building. Although she notifies the OPC of any hand-delivered items, she does not deliver documents to the OPC. Moreover, the process server received no assurances that the Petition would be delivered to the OPC. Indeed, the receptionist was not even told that the Petition was intended for the OPC. While the process server may have believed that the delivered documents would make their way into the various offices of the Bar, he had no assurance that they would necessarily arrive at the OPC in a timely manner. ¶ 27 In cases arising under the Utah rule, proper service of process is generally necessary to give a defendant notice that he or she is being sued and to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. See Meyers v. Interwest Corp., 632 P.2d 879, 880 (Utah 1981) (It is axiomatic that a court acquires power to adjudicate by proper service of process which imparts notice that the defendant is being sued.... In that manner a court acquires jurisdiction to enter a judgment against a party.). Although the same jurisdictional issues are not at stake here, it is important that the OPC receives timely notice of an attorney's intent to seek readmittance to the Bar. This is especially true in light of the time-sensitive duties required of the OPC that are triggered by the service of the petition. Upon receiving a petition, the OPC must publish notice in the Utah Bar Journal and allow time for individuals to file their oppositions or concurrences with the district court. RLDD 25(d). Consequently, it would be difficult for the OPC to fulfill its obligations if the sixty-day time limit were to begin running before the petition actually reached the OPC. ¶ 28 Under the circumstances of this case, service of the Petition on the common-area receptionist at the Law and Justice Center did not constitute effective service of process, and such service was not sufficient to begin the sixty-day time limit for the OPC to file its objection imposed by rule 25. While the OPC's filing of its Opposition to the Petition may have waived the necessity for actual service, the Opposition itself cannot be considered untimely. Therefore, it was proper for the district court to consider the OPC's Opposition along with Schwenke's Petition and to schedule a hearing in accordance with rule 25.