Opinion ID: 3176573
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Second Prong: Adaptive Behavior

Text: “Adaptive behavior is the collection of conceptual, social, and practical skills that have been learned and are performed by people in their everyday lives.” Green Book, supra, at 43; see also Red Book, supra, at 73. Under the AAIDD’s definition, 28 a diagnosis of intellectual disability requires that an individual have significant limitations in at least one of the three domains of adaptive skills—conceptual, social, and practical skills. 29 Red Book, supra, at 14. The district court found that Brumfield showed significant limitations in the conceptual domain but not in the social or practical domains. Brumfield II, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 396–403. The first deficit the court found in the conceptual domain was Brumfield’s writing abilities, as Brumfield could not write in a straight line without an aid, took an “inordinate amount of time to write a simple, one-page letter,” and relied on the assistance of other inmates when writing letters. Id. at 396. In coming to this conclusion, the district court relied on Weinstein’s 28 The district court correctly noted that, as with the intellectual functioning prong, the AAIDD prefers that practitioners employ standardized testing to evaluate adaptive functioning. See Red Book, supra, at 76. However, utilizing standardized testing, such as the ABAS questionnaires administered by Weinstein, is difficult in situations requiring a retrospective diagnosis. In these situations, the district court correctly explained that the User’s Guide, supra, at 17–22, calls for additional inquiry into the subject’s past and interviews alongside the types of questionnaires used in situations of contemporaneous diagnosis. That additional inquiry and those interviews were conducted by two of Brumfield’s experts in this case. 29 Neither the State nor Brumfield contests the use of the “three domain” test on remand. The State structures its argument that Brumfield has no deficits in adaptive skills around this test. 33 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 34 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 testimony, and in concluding that the State’s reliance on the “quality of his expressions in his prison correspondence is misplaced,” the court credited the testimony of Swanson. Id. The court next found that Brumfield’s reading skills were deficient. Id. The court explained that after listening to Brumfield read some of his letters, Swanson concluded he read at approximately a fourth grade level. Id. Finally, the district court found that “Brumfield has a dismal record of academic accomplishments.” Id. The court relied on the testimony of Weinstein, who stated that Brumfield was always behind in school because of developmental delays, and Swanson, who noted that Brumfield “reached a plateau somewhere between fourth and sixth grade, which is where mildly [intellectually disabled] individuals generally fall.” Id. In reaching its conclusion that Brumfield demonstrated significant limitations in the conceptual skills domain, the district court carefully explained its reasoning, identified the specific evidence it relied upon, and specifically credited the testimony of certain experts. Because nothing in the district court’s reasoning suggests its conclusion “is implausible in the light of the record considered as a whole,” Rivera, 505 F.3d at 361 (quoting St. Aubin, 470 F.3d at 1101), and because this court must give “due regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses,” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)), we hold that the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous. Brumfield was only required to demonstrate significant limitations in one of the three domains of adaptive behavior to satisfy the legal and clinical tests for intellectual disability. Thus, the district court’s finding that Brumfield met “the AAIDD’s definition of [intellectual disability] with respect to the conceptual domain of adaptive behavior,” Brumfield II, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 401, was sufficient for the district court to conclude that Brumfield had satisfied the second prong of the intellectual disability test. 34 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 35 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 In challenging the district court’s conclusion, the State argues that Brumfield’s academic problems, which led to his being placed in special education classes, stemmed primarily from his behavior problems and conduct disorder, not an intellectual disability. However, the district court credited the testimony of Swanson, who explained that, at the time Brumfield attended school, school systems were urged to substitute diagnoses of conduct disorder for intellectual disability essentially for political reasons. 30 Id. at 397. Moreover, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he diagnostic criteria for [intellectual disability] do not include an exclusion criterion; therefore, the diagnosis should be made . . . regardless of and in addition to the presence of another disorder.” Brumfield (S. Ct.), 135 S. Ct. at 2280 (quoting DSM-IV-TR, supra, at 47). Both the State and Brumfield tell “coherent and facially plausible stor[ies],” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 575, as either behavioral problems or an intellectual disability could explain all or some of Brumfield’s poor academic record. “When ‘the district court is faced with testimony that may lead to more than one conclusion, its factual determinations will stand so long as they are plausible—even if we would have weighed the evidence otherwise.’” Heck v. Triche, 775 F.3d 265, 284 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Nielsen v. United States, 976 F.2d 951, 956 (5th Cir. 1992)); see also Anderson, 470 U.S. at 574 30 The district court explained that: Swanson [gave] the Court a compelling reason to not draw a negative inference due to the lack of childhood [intellectual disability] diagnosis. She points out that during Brumfield’s school years in the late 1970s, African–Americans males were b[e]ing disproportionately diagnosed with [intellectual disabilities]. School officials, psychologists, and appraisal teams were accordingly cautious not to over-represent black males as being [intellectually disabled] and were instead urged to consider other alternatives that would avoid placing the [intellectually disabled] label on them. Swanson confirmed that East Baton Rouge Parish schools, which Brumfield attended, had received this admonition. Id. at 404. 35 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 36 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 (“Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). The State also points to elements of Brumfield’s past that it argues demonstrate adaptive functioning. For example, Blanche testified that Brumfield “owned” a car, engaged in cash transactions by renting motel rooms, and helped his girlfriend financially. Although the district court acknowledged these activities, among others, it explained that “[m]ildly [intellectually disabled] people generally have mental ages ranging from seven to eleven,” and “[i]t is not inconceivable for someone around the age of ten to have the mental capacity” to engage in these types of activities. Brumfield II, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 398. The State also argues that Brumfield’s activities while in prison belie any intellectual disability, as he wrote letters, possessed books (including two dictionaries), and explained complex tasks to people over the phone. With respect to Brumfield’s writing letters, the district court credited the testimony of Weinstein and Swanson that “Brumfield requires assistance from other death row inmates to write his letters, . . . and thus the reliance by the States’ experts on the quality of his expressions in his prison correspondence is misplaced.” Id. at 396. The court further found that, based on Swanson’s testimony, “[t]he reading materials in his prison cell are targeted to middle school audiences and are consistent with someone who has [an intellectual disability].” Id. Finally, with respect to Brumfield’s phone calls, the district court found that they were “simply not sufficient to show adaptive strength in communication abilities,” and that “one or two instances of him exhibiting oral communication skills expected of adults could hardly be said to outweigh the other documented adaptive weaknesses in the conceptual domain,” as “strengths can coexist alongside weaknesses.” Id. at 399. Although the evidence emphasized by the State tends to undermine the district court’s 36 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 37 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 conclusion that Brumfield had significant limitations in adaptive functioning, we are “not entitle[d to]. . . reverse the finding of the trier of fact” even if we “would have weighed the evidence differently.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74. Because nothing the State emphasizes establishes that the district court’s account of the evidence is implausible, we hold that the district court’s finding—that Brumfield’s poor academic performance and his deficiencies in reading and writing constitute deficits in adaptive behavior—is not clearly erroneous. See id. at 573–74 (“If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.”). Furthermore, we note that the district court’s finding is not clearly erroneous because it has more evidentiary support than prior cases in which this court upheld a district court’s intellectual disability determination. In Wiley v. Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 219–22 (5th Cir. 2010), this court found no clear error when a district court held that petitioner Wiley had an intellectual disability based on deficits in functional academic skills, communication, and self-direction. In that case, Wiley was evaluated four separate times with conflicting results. Id. at 219–21. Based on these results and evidence that he struggled academically while in the military, the district court found that he was deficient in the area of functional academic skills. Id. at 221. This court refused to reverse the district court because doing so would essentially substitute the opinion of the State’s expert for Wiley’s experts. Id. at 218. As the district court was in a better position to judge the credibility of the experts, this court declined to reverse the district court. Id. In Rivera, the district court found that Rivera had “adaptive limitations,” including “consistent[] . . . academic problems.” 505 F.3d at 362. After remarking that the district court “is in a better position than this court to judge and weigh the credibility of the 37 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 38 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 witnesses who testified,” this court declined to find a clear error. Id. at 363. However, neither Wiley nor Rivera involved Louisiana law. Dunn III, on the other hand, did involve Louisiana law, and this court noted previously that, based on this case, it would likely determine that the district court erred in finding Brumfield intellectually disabled, 31 Brumfield (5th Cir.), 744 F.3d at 927 n.8. In that case, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reviewed a trial court’s determination that Dunn was not intellectually disabled following an Atkins hearing. Dunn III, 41 So. 3d at 455–56. Dunn had reported IQ scores of 70, 78, and 78. Id. at 462–63. Multiple experts administered ABAS scales, but like this case, the evidence on Dunn’s adaptive behavior conflicted. Id. at 463–70. After reviewing that evidence, the court noted that “[i]t is also important to consider the defendant’s behavior during the planning and commission of the instant crime as it relates to his adaptive skills functioning.” Id. at 471. In evaluating Dunn’s crime, the court found that “the evidence at trial established defendant engaged in the leadership and planning of a major bank robbery” and held that the defendant’s planning “with its premeditative aspects, clearly lacks the impulsiveness and non- 31 The State argues that the district court failed to consider other Louisiana cases addressing the question of how to factor criminal behavior into an evaluation of an individual’s adaptive functioning. However, the court recognized the “propensity of Louisiana courts to take such maladaptive criminal behavior into account when discussing the adaptive skills prong of the [intellectual disability] test.” Brumfield II, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 394. Addressing this propensity, the district court identified five cases where the Supreme Court of Louisiana “affirmed on direct appeal a jury’s assessment of death in the penalty phase of the trial where the [intellectual disability] issue was actually litigated.” Id.; see generally Williams, 22 So. 3d 867; State v. Anderson, 996 So. 2d 973 (La. 2008); State v. Lee, 976 So. 2d 109 (La. 2008); State v. Scott, 921 So. 2d 904 (La. 2006); State v. Brown, 907 So. 2d 1 (La. 2005). However, the district court found these cases distinguishable because the Supreme Court of Louisiana was required under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), to apply a different standard of review than the standard that applies to Atkins hearings. Brumfield II, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 394. The court found that Dunn III “[was] the only Louisiana Supreme Court case on point.” We agree and find no error with the manner in which the district court factored Brumfield’s criminal behavior into its analysis of his adaptive functioning. 38 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 39 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 leadership interactions associated with [intellectually disabled] persons” based on “the firmly established facts of this case.” Id. at 471–72. The district court carefully considered this case and concluded that it could consider “evidence of the criminal action in the overall assessment if ‘firmly established facts’ show[ed] clear instances of premeditation and leadership.” Brumfield II, 854 F. Supp. 2d at 395. In considering the evidence of Brumfield’s criminal activity, the district court concluded that it was not sufficient to demonstrate an absence of deficits in the conceptual skills domain, id. at 398–401, and that nothing in the record suggested Brumfield “‘led’ this terrible scheme.” Id. at 400. The district court further reasoned that even if the crime involved planning and premeditation by Brumfield, “this particular instance [should not be] sufficient to overwhelm the other demonstrated showings of adaptive deficits in conceptual skills.” Id. Beyond the facts of Smothers’ murder, the State argues that other aspects of Brumfield’s criminal history demonstrate that he does not have significant limitations in adaptive functioning. First, the State contends that Brumfield’s two confession videos show his composure under pressure, ability to lie, and think quickly. However, the district court credited Swanson’s testimony that, in the first tape, Brumfield responded to cues from police and that, in the second tape, Brumfield spoke more quickly because he was more familiar with the topic at that point. Id. Second, the State argues that Brumfield’s history of drug dealing and other criminal behavior demonstrates his ability to plan, his ability to handle complex transactions, and his adaptive functioning generally. 32 Although the State is correct that Brumfield dealt drugs in the past, the court noted that “[t]he record is barren of any testimony 32The State notes that Brumfield demonstrated an ability to choose weak and vulnerable victims for his past crimes. We see nothing in the record concerning this ability that demonstrates clear error on the part of the district court. 39 Case: 12-30256 Document: 00513375522 Page: 40 Date Filed: 02/10/2016 No. 12-30256 regarding his efficacy in drug transactions,” id. at 398, and both Greenspan and Weinstein testified that Brumfield’s drug dealing was not inconsistent with an intellectual disability diagnosis. Third, the State argues that Brumfield’s ability to avoid the police after his crime demonstrates adaptive functioning, but the district court found that “[w]hile evading police and avoiding capture can exhibit raw physical skills, at other times those acts are just as consistent with primal survival instincts as they are with callous, coldblooded calculation.” Id. at 399. Overall, the district court considered the facts surrounding Smothers’ murder as well as Brumfield’s other criminal activities. Thus, while the district court considered similar evidence as the trial court in Dunn III, it simply reached a different conclusion. Although this difference in findings based on relatively similar evidence certainly weighs against the conclusion that Brumfield is intellectually disabled, it does not necessarily demonstrate that the district court clearly erred based on the record before it. The Dunn III court recognized that trial courts are called on “to make exceedingly fine distinctions” between those who are mildly intellectually disabled and those who are not. Dunn III, 41 So. 3d at 469. We agree with the Dunn III court on this point. Accordingly, we decline to disturb the “exceedingly fine distinctions,” id., the district court made in this “intensively factual inquiry,” Williams, 22 So. 3d at 887. Even if we were to disagree about how to weigh the evidence in this case, the clear error standard “plainly does not entitle a reviewing court to reverse the finding of the trier of fact simply because it is convinced that it would have decided the case differently.” Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573.