Opinion ID: 1774660
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Seizure of the Evidence

Text: On the proof before the trial court the evidence should have been suppressed for a second reason. The general rule is that a seizure of evidence without a warrant is, per se, unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967). Unless the warrantless seizure in this case fits into an exception the evidence seized must be suppressed. The facts determine whether this case fits into an exception. After the appellants were handcuffed and in the patrol car Deputy Swint opened the trunk of their car which was parked on the highway. He saw two bags in the trunk, a flowered-type one on the bottom and a black one on top. The flowered-type bag was zipped shut but the black one was partially unzipped and the deputy saw some silver inside. He stated that he could not identify it as the silver belonging to the Browns and he admitted that for all he knew it could have belonged to appellants. He closed the trunk and called Fulmer's Wrecker Service to tow the car to some type of sheriff's compound at Lonoke. Miles and perhaps hours later, at some type of sheriff's compound, a warrantless search of the car was conducted. Deputy Swint's testimony is emphatic that the car was not searched on the highway: Q. But your testimony is that you did not search the vehicle on the highway? A. No, sir. Q. Irrespective of how you wrote your report, Mr. Swint, did you search those suitcases on the highway? A. No, sir. Q. Were they searched at the Sheriff's office? A. They was inventoried at the Sheriff's office, yes, sir. MR. EDWARDS: That's all. THE COURT: Was anything removed from the automobile before it was returned to the Sheriff's office? A. Just the three people. THE COURT: Any property of any kind? A. No, sir. . . . . . Q. You had the vehicle under control, is that correct? You had the three men out of it? A. Yes, sir. Q. You had the keys to it? A. Yes, sir. Q. You had officers there guarding it? A. Yes, sir. Q. And it was returned to the Sheriff's office? A. Yes, sir. Q. And I assume once it got there, or wherever the Sheriff's office is located, that you had it under guard, or whatever it took to make it secure? A. Yes, sir. Those facts do not allow this case to fit into an exception to the general rule. The Supreme Court of the United States has set forth only one narrowly drawn exception where a seizure of evidence can be based on less than probable cause. It is the protective search doctrine set out in Terry v. Ohio, supra, and Adams v. Williams, supra. It authorizes a search of the clothing and that area which is immediately reachable by the arrested person. The basis of this exception is that the arresting officer has every right to assure himself that the person does not have within reach a weapon, although the weapon may be evidence. The rationale of this exception is applicable to an investigatory stop, an arrest, or any other seizure. This exception to the general rule against warrantless searches is not applicable because this was not a frisk for the officer's protection. There is another exception that is not as severely limited as the first exception. It is based on probable cause and is the search incident to arrest doctrine, but it is not applicable. Once an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place without a warrant, is simply not incident to arrest. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970), quoted in Jenkins v. State, 253 Ark. 249, 485 S.W.2d 541 (1972). The plain view exception, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), is not applicable as Deputy Swint did not have a plain view of the inside of the trunk of the car. The plurality opinion concedes that the most recent automobile exception case, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), is not applicable but argues that the 1925 automobile exception case of Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925) is applicable. The 1925 case states that a warrantless search is valid where it is not practical to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. In this case the car was in custody and could not be moved. The plurality opinion states: What is claimed, correctly we think, is that when Officer Swint learned the Brown residence had been burglarized, at that point he had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of the crime and, hence, a search of the vehicle was proper. The quoted statement is contrary to the law as announced by the Supreme Court of the United States and followed by the court in Jenkins v. State, supra, 253 Ark. at 252,485 S.W.2d 541, where we stated: It is true that there is language in the Chambers case suggesting that probable cause alone is sufficient to sustain a warrantless search of an automobile, but that point of view seems to have been rejected in the later case of Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 [91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564] (1971). There Justice Stewart speaking upon this point for a majority of the court, had this to say about a contrary position taken in Justice White's dissent in the Coolidge case: If we were to agree with Mr. Justice White that the police may, whenever they have probable cause, make a warrantless entry for the purpose of making an arrest, and that seizures and searches of automobiles are likewise per se reasonable given probable cause, then by the same logic any search or seizure could be carried out without a warrant, and we would simply have read the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution. The plurality could validly contend that the case of Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1, 101 S.Ct. 42, 66 L.Ed.2d 1 (per curiam 1980) stands for the proposition that when the police have probable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence of a crime a warrantless search is permissible even when the car has been moved to the police station. Perhaps that leaves Arkansas with a higher standard than the United States for our cases, which are directly in point, hold that a warrantless search of a vehicle is invalid unless there is both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Jenkins v. State, supra; Steel v. State, 248 Ark. 159, 450 S.W.2d 545 (1970). Arkansas cases directly in point should govern even if the plurality believe that our standard is a more stringent standard than the minimum required by the Constitution of the United States. We need not determine whether the rule is more restrictive than the principles to be distilled from various Supreme Court decisions, for, of course there is no constitutional objection to a rule of law which provides more protection to individual liberty than the minimum required by the Constitution of the United States. Meadows v. State, 269 Ark. 380, 602 S.W.2d 636 (1980). However, even if one discards all that has been written to this point as peripheral to the search of appellants' bags, the search of the bags still must fail. Both bags were completely closed, with the black one being zipped together completely and the flowered one being partially zipped. In the recent case of Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981), the California Highway Patrol officers stopped the petitioner's car because he was driving erratically. One of the officers asked petitioner for his license and registration, and when he opened the car door to get out the registration, the officers smelled marijuana smoke. One of the officers patted the petitioner down, and discovered a vial of liquid. The officers then searched the passenger compartment of the car and found marijuana as well as equipment for its use. After putting the petitioner in the patrol car, the officers opened the tailgate of the station wagon, uncovered a recessed luggage compartment, and found two oblong packages wrapped and sealed in green opaque plastic garbage bags. The officers unwrapped the packages and found 30 pounds of marijuana. Petitioner, who was charged with various drug offenses, filed a pretrial motion to suppress the marijuana found in the two packages. The motion was denied and petitioner was convicted. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment. Certiorari was granted and the case was remanded for further consideration in light of Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). On remand, the court of appeals again found the warrantless opening of the packages constitutionally permissible, since the trial court reasonably could have concluded that the contents of the packages could have been inferred from their outward appearance. The Court again granted certiorari because of the continuing uncertainty as to whether closed containers found during lawful warrantless automobile searches may be searched without a warrant. In a plurality decision written by Justice Stewart, the Court held that the contents of a closed container are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement, unless the container is such that its contents are in plain view. Relying on United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977) and Arkansas v. Sanders, supra, the Court rejected the contention that the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement justifies the warrantless search of closed containers found inside the automobile. Justice Stewart stated that Chadwick and Sanders make it clear that a closed piece of luggage found in a lawful search of a car, is constitutionally protected to the same extent as closed pieces of luggage found anywhere else. Respondent argued that the nature of the container may diminish the constitutional protection and that the Fourth Amendment protects only containers commonly used to transport personal effects. The Court rejected the argument for two reasons: (1) the Fourth Amendment protects people and their effects, whether the effects are personal or impersonal; and (2) it would be difficult if not impossible to perceive any objective criteria to determine what is commonly used to transport personal effects. Justice Stewart stated that the wrapped marijuana did not fall under the exceptions announced in a footnote in Arkansas v. Sanders, supra. The footnote states that containers whose contents can be inferred from their outward appearance, for example a kit of burglary tools or a gun case, and containers whose contents are open to plain view, do not require a search warrant under the Fourth Amendment. These exceptions refer to items in a container that is not closed, or to containers which so clearly announce their contents, whether by their distinctive configuration, their transparency, or otherwise, that their contents are obvious to an observer. Justice Stewart concluded that the vague testimony of the police officer who said that he had heard that contraband was wrapped in a particular way did not establish that marijuana is ordinarily packaged this way, and thus, did not cause the packages to fall within the exceptions announced in Sanders . In a footnote, the Court stated that the prosecution did not argue that the search of the packages was incident to a lawful custodial arrest or that the petitioner consented to the search of the packages. See New York v. Belton, supra. Robbins, supra, should not be ignored. A second ground given by the plurality opinion for validating the search is: ... Rule 14.1(a), A.R.Crim.P., gives an officer the right to make a warrantless search of a vehicle detained on a public way if he has reasonable cause to believe the vehicle contains evidence subject to seizure, and exigent circumstances require immediate action to prevent removal or destruction of such evidence. Rule 14.1(a) simply is not applicable. The vehicle was not detained on a public way when searched; rather it was locked in a sheriff's compound. There was no testimony of evidence subject to seizure. No witness testified that even one piece of the Browns' property was identifiable. There were no exigent circumstances as the car was locked up in a compound and the appellants were in jail. Perhaps, in this case, we have forgotten the proper role of the appellate court. It is nothing more and nothing less than to review the trial below and determine whether the appellants received a fair trial, not a perfect trial, but a fair trial. Precedent of this court as well as that of the Supreme Court of the United States hold that the evidence should have been suppressed. The trial court did not so hold and, as a consequence, the appellants did not receive a fair trial. I would grant appellants a new and fair trial. I dissent. I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice HOLT and Mr. Justice PURTLE join in this opinion.