Opinion ID: 164228
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Other Arguments Presented by the Defendant

Text: 193 The defendant vehemently resists the application of strict scrutiny to S.B. 03-176 and professes three additional or alternative reasons to apply rational basis examination: (1) Colorado's need to protect its fiscal integrity; (2) S.B. 03-176 reallocates federal, not state benefits; and (3) PRWORA actually authorized the enactment of S.B. 03-176. None of these arguments is persuasive.
194 First, the defendant cites Colorado's vital economic interest in promulgating S.B. 03-176, arguing that the measure is necessary to balance the $850 million budget deficit. The State estimates that it will save $5.9 million (or 0.67% of the total $869 million in the State's budget deficit) annually by eliminating medical coverage to legal aliens. 195 In applying a rational basis test to the pro-alien statute at issue in Doe, the Massachusetts Supreme Court clearly considered the purpose and the clearly noninvidious intent behind [the program's] promulgation when it applied the rational basis test. See Maj. op. at 1254 (quoting Doe, 773 N.E.2d at 414) (emphasis supplied). Here, we only have the self-professed state interest of fiscal integrity, which has been squarely rejected by the United States Supreme Court: 196 [A] State has a valid interest in preserving the fiscal integrity of its programs. It may legitimately attempt to limit its expenditures, whether for public assistance, public education, or any other program. But a State may not accomplish such a purpose by invidious distinctions between classes of its citizens. The saving of welfare costs cannot justify an otherwise invidious classification. 197 Graham, 403 U.S. at 374-75, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis supplied). The impact upon the State is not very significant in comparison to the irreparable harm that would be caused to those denied coverage. Kansas Hosp. Ass'n v. Whiteman, 835 F.Supp. 1548, 1553 (D.Kan.1993). Furthermore, [t]he state is in a much better position to absorb the budgetary impact of delayed implementation of the amendment as compared to individual plaintiffs. Id. 3 Colorado's suggestion that the preservation of its fiscal integrity, through a projected savings of $5.9 million, warrants the upholding of S.B. 03-176 is not sustainable. 198
199 Second, the defendant's argument that S.B. 03-176 is essentially a reallocation of federal, not state, benefits does not insulate its discriminatory program from strict scrutiny review. The defendant emphasizes Congress's reading of Graham's holding as one curtailing the states from deny[ing] legal permanent residents State-funded assistance. Aple's Br. at 14 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 104-725 (1996), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1996 p. 2105) (emphasis supplied). In addition, the district court denied a preliminary injunction largely because [t]he program at issue here is not a state-only funded program as in Graham and Aliessa.  257 F.Supp.2d at 1326. S.B. 03-176 impacts a jointly funded component of Medicaid. Id. 200 However, Graham's strict scrutiny analysis was in no way limited to state-funded programs. See Graham, 403 U.S. at 367, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (noting that the Arizona state program was supported in part by federal grants-in-aid and administered by the States under federal guidelines); id. at 368, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (noting that Pennsylvania's general assistance program was not federally supported); id. at 376, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (striking down both statutes for failure to satisfy strict scrutiny); see also Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 3 n. 2, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (applying strict scrutiny to loan program in question which was largely subsidized by the Federal Government). Thus, the defendant's reliance on the statute's misreading of Supreme Court case law is unpersuasive. 201 In a similar vein, the defendant maintains that Congress has devolved its plenary powers to determine alien eligibility for welfare benefits, by allowing states to choose to extend benefits to other subgroups [of aliens] when administering federal programs. Aple's Br. at 14. As noted above, plaintiffs concede that PRWORA grants the states the power to act under § 1612(b). As such, this analysis only applies to Part III of Graham, not to Graham's strict scrutiny analysis in Part II of the opinion. 202 The authority to control immigration — to admit or exclude aliens — is vested solely in the Federal government. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 42, 36 S.Ct. 7, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915); see also The Federalist No. 32, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cook, ed., 1961) (noting that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction where the Constitution granted Congress the power to make uniform laws, and [t]his must necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to prescribe a DISTINCT rule, there could be no UNIFORM rule). To permit a comprehensive Congressional devolution of its exclusive powers would be tantamount to saying that those lawfully admitted to the country under the authority of the acts of Congress, instead of enjoying in a substantial sense and in their full scope the privileges conferred by the admission, would be segregated in such of the states as chose to offer hospitality. Truax, 239 U.S. at 42, 36 S.Ct. 7. To allow such divergence and discrimination in the welfare rights arena would be to ignore the crucial role ... such benefits play in providing the poor with `means to obtain essential food, clothing, housing, and medical care.' Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 13, 97 S.Ct. 2120 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); id. (Welfare benefits [are] essential to sustain life for aliens [eligible for such benefits.])). See also Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n. 19, 102 S.Ct. 2382 ([I]f the Federal Government has by uniform rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction.) (citing DeCanas, 424 U.S. 351, 96 S.Ct. 933, 47 L.Ed.2d 43) (preemption case focusing on supremacy clause and the INA)). 203 As the New York Court of Appeals noted, [i]f the rule were uniform, each State would carry out the same policy under the mandate of Congress. Aliessa, 730 N.Y.S.2d 1, 754 N.E.2d at 1098 (emphasis supplied); see Wendy Zimmermann and Karen C. Tumlin, Patchwork Policies: State Assistance for Immigrants Under Welfare Reform (The Urban Institute 1999), available at http://www.urban.org/url.cfm?ID=309007. To apply PRWORA as the defendants interpret it, Congress is advocating potentially wide variation based on localized or idiosyncratic concepts of largesse, economics and politics, which only exacerbates the lack of uniformity. Aliessa, 730 N.Y.S.2d 1, 754 N.E.2d at 1098. Moreover, the United States concedes that PRWORA promotes such variations noting that it represents a compromise on a difficult public policy question because it enables some States to be relatively generous without imposing an unacceptably heavy burden on other States. U.S. Br. at 17 (emphasis supplied). To allow a patchwork of state policies to prop up this admitted compromise does not support Colorado's construction of PRWORA. Indeed, the government's candid and proper admission that Congress could not decide on a federal policy but achieved a compromise clearly reveals no uniform policy was adopted. 204
205 Third, the defendant argues that Title IV of PRWORA authorized Colorado's enactment of S.B. 03-176. To apply separate standards of review to states that act pursuant to PRWORA would lead to an absurd construction of PRWORA. Aple's Br. at 11. The benefits Congress delineated as optional become mandatory. Id. 206 The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument put forth by Arizona in Graham. In Part IV of its opinion, the Court considered, and rejected, Arizona's argument that the durational requirement was actually authorized by federal law. The Court stated that [o]n its face, the statute does not affirmatively authorize, much less command, the States to adopt durational residency requirements or other eligibility restrictions applicable to aliens. 403 U.S. at 381, 91 S.Ct. 1848. 207 Under this theory, there would be few if any limits to a state's ability to discriminate against legal immigrants once given the option. In Graham, the Court considered the legislative history of the Congressional acts at issue, and rejected this theory. The Court noted that to the extent Congress sought to authorize discriminatory treatment of aliens at the option of the States ... serious constitutional questions are presented.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 382, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (emphasis supplied). 208 In addition, Congress itself anticipated that state laws that alter legal aliens' eligibility for jointly funded benefit programs enacted pursuant to § 1607 would be subject to strict scrutiny. Section 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) states: 209 With respect to the State authority to make determinations concerning the eligibility of qualified aliens for public benefits in this chapter, a State that chooses to follow the Federal classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens for public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national immigration policy. 210 Id. Congress clearly anticipated that state statutes would be challenged, and hoped that in explaining Graham and enunciating that such state policies would satisfy Graham's strict scrutiny, the state programs might survive strict scrutiny. 4 See H.R.REP. No. 104-651, at 1445-46. But in our constitutional structure it is for the courts to say what the law is, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803), and, [a]lthough the Federal Government admittedly has broad constitutional power to determine what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they remain, and the terms and conditions of their naturalization, Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.  Graham, 403 U.S. at 382, 91 S.Ct. 1848 (emphasis supplied). As a result, S.B. 03-176 would be still subject to strict scrutiny.