Opinion ID: 1690710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the trial court erred in excusing jurors lumas and moore for cause in violation of mississippi law and the united states and mississippi constitutions.

Text: ś 45. Next, Doss contends that the trial judge erred in excusing veniremen Lumas and Moore for cause. The following is what transpired creating the alleged violation by the trial judge. BY THE COURT: ... . Mr. Lumas, is that your position, then? That no amount of evidence, makes no difference if the law authorizes it, you would not be able to vote for that. BY JUROR LUMAS: I'm not sure, Your Honor. BY THE COURT: All right. Then you're uncertain as to whether or not if you were a juror how you might be affected by that. Is that correct? BY JUROR LUMAS: That is correct. BY THE COURT: All right, thank you very much... . All right, the next row, starting with Mrs. Eva Moore. Yes, Ms. Moore? BY JUROR MOORE: I'm not sure. BY THE COURT: You are unsure as to whether or not you could do that is that correct? BY JUROR MOORE: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: Both of you would â is â your position, Ms. Moore, is like the gentlemen before you there, that is, you are unsure as to whether or not, once you were a juror, you could abide by my instructions, even though the law authorized it and the evidence warranted it, is that correct? BY JUROR MOORE: Yes, sir. BY THE COURT: All right, thank you very much. ś 46. The record is a little unclear about what transpired once counsel for both parties and the judge convened in chambers. Doss alleges that the trial judge excused jurors Lumas and Moore for cause sue sponte without first receiving a request by either party as purportedly required by Rule 5.06 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court, now Rule 10.01, Jury Selection, of the Uniform Circuit and County Court Rules. After reading the record in its entirety, it appears that the judge proceeded with the State's submitted list followed by the defendant's list. The following is the transcript of the in-chamber jury selection proceedings. BY THE COURT: Gentlemen, these are the ones I have marked off for cause ... BY MR. EVANS: You skipped 3, Judge. BY THE COURT: ... . # 51, Lumas; ... . # 63, Moore; # 64, Moore; # 65, Moore; ... . Any more for cause from the State? ... . BY THE COURT: All right, from the defendant for cause? BY MR. BAILEY: Let's see, judge. ś 47. As the record reflects, and as pointed out by the State, Doss never made a contemporaneous objection to either Lumas or Moore on this basis. [19] Accordingly, there is a procedural bar against Doss on this issue. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1301 (Miss. 1994). ś 48. The procedural bar aside, the merits of the issue are argued as follows. [20] Doss asserts that the judge's sue sponte actions amounted to error by unilaterally announcing that the jurors were being excluded in violation of Rule 5.06 of the Mississippi Uniform Criminal Rules of Circuit Court. [21] However, it appears that the State first submitted a list followed by the defense and that the trial judge was not acting sue sponte, although the record is a little vague. [22] ś 49. Doss asserts that the uncertainty displayed by jurors Lumas and Moore was not sufficient to arise to the level required for cause under Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 731-32, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2231, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992) and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). The State counters by pointing to Fuselier v. State, 468 So.2d 45, 53-55 (Miss. 1985), wherein this Court adopted the proper test under Wainwright, and more recently reiterated it in Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 128 (Miss. 1991). Hansen, in discussing the substantive parameters of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968), noted that [in discussing the removal of venire members] exclusion is permissible though the juror's opposition is less than unequivocal, her vote against death less than automatic. The Court may exclude the juror where it is left with the definite impression that a prospective juror would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424-25, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852-53, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985); Pinkney v. State, 538 So.2d at 345. Hansen, 592 So.2d at 128. ś 50. The State therefore contends that the trial judge in this case was left with the definite impression that a prospective juror [jurors Lumas and Moore] would be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law. The Court notes that the record reflects the absence of a contemporaneous objection which is required by Cannaday v. State, 455 So.2d 713, 718-19 (Miss. 1984) for preservation of a Wainwright or Witt issue for appeal. ś 51. In sum, Doss is procedurally barred. Foster v. State, 639 So.2d 1263, 1301 (Miss. 1994). Furthermore however, the merits of the claim must be denied based upon Hansen.