Opinion ID: 1315995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Political Accountability

Text: As discussed above, after the City Council has created a permanent panel of at least three arbitrators, if an impasse in negotiations during a collective bargaining session occurs, the parties engage in an alternating strike process, whereby each party removes one name from the list until either one or two names remain. If one name remains, that person is selected to be the arbitrator for the dispute. If two names remain, [8] the Mayor selects the arbitrator from the two names remaining. [9] As we have stated in our prior decisions, the prohibition against delegation of legislative power in article XXI, section 4 requires that an arbitrator empowered to make binding decisions on a public collective bargaining agreement must be politically accountable to an elected official. [10] By requiring the City Council to create the permanent panel of arbitrators, and by allowing the City Council to remove persons from the arbitration panel at any time other than while actively hearing a case, we find that the charter amendment provides for the necessary political accountability we require under article XXI, section 4. We observe that the arbitration system in the instant case contains important differences from the arbitration systems we invalidated in both Greeley Police Union and Aurora Firefighters'. The key distinction between these arbitration systems lies in the fact that the charter amendment in the instant case requires the City Council, composed of elective officials, to create the permanent panel of arbitrators who can hear a dispute. In contrast, the arbitration systems in both Greeley Police Union and Aurora Firefighters' required the American Arbitration Association, an independent organization with no political accountability, to create the list of potential arbitrators that may be selected, and then also to select the arbitrator(s) from the names remaining after the parties finished the striking process. The Greeley Police Union and Aurora Firefighters' procedures resulted in the selection of an arbitrator with no connection to any elected officials and, consequently, a complete lack of political accountability. The arbitrator's lack of political accountability compelled our holdings in those cases declaring the binding arbitration provisions to be unconstitutional. In this case, by contrast, the arbitrator is directly politically accountable to the elective officials comprising the City Council of Commerce City. Any arbitrator selected to hear a case first will have been appointed to the permanent panel by the City Council. The City Council, therefore, has exclusive control over which arbitrators may hear a case. [11] Moreover, the City Council may modify this arbitration panel as they see fit by either removing arbitrators or adding arbitrators, provided the panel always has at least three members. The continuing exercise of control over the arbitrators by the elective officials of the City Council provides the political accountability we require under article XXI, section 4 and distinguishes this arbitration system from the systems we struck down in Greeley Police Union and Aurora Firefighters'. Additionally, an examination of the language of article XXI, section 4 supports our conclusion that an arbitrator selected by the provisions of the charter amendment to hear a case is not prohibited from exercising legislative power. As noted above, article XXI, section 4 provides, Every person having authority to exercise or exercising any public or governmental duty, power or function, shall be an elective officer, or one appointed, drawn, or designated in accordance with law by an elective officer or officers .... (Emphasis added.) In this case, the arbitrator is designated (appointed by the City Council and then selected through the process described above) in accordance with law (the Charter of the City of Commerce City) by elective officers (the City Council). As such, the plain mandates of article XXI, section 4 are met and there is no constitutional violation of the prohibition against delegation of legislative power. For these reasons, we conclude that the charter amendment's binding arbitration procedures provide for the selection of an arbitrator with political accountability in compliance with article XXI, section 4.