Opinion ID: 798236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the state court's assumption of implied acquittal

Text: 30 In deciding Brazzel's double jeopardy claim the Washington Court of Appeals treated the jury's silence as essentially an acquittal. Addressing Brazzel's claim that he had been acquitted of murder in the first trial, the court stated: If his claim is valid, we should dismiss the charge of first degree murder. Yet that has already been done because he has essentially been acquitted of that charge. The jury's silence following the first trial was identical to that following the second, indicating that the Washington Court of Appeals understood the earlier jury's silence as essentially an acquittal as well. The court of appeals assumed, in effect, that the jury's silence on the attempted murder charge was not evidence that the jury hung; had their silence resulted in a hung jury, then there unquestionably would have been no legitimate double jeopardy claim and no need to consider the prejudicial effect of the jury's silence. 31 Under AEDPA, we ordinarily defer to the state court's determination of a mixed question of law and fact such as this unless it is contrary to or an unreasonable application of Supreme Court law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). We apply a less stringent standard of review when the state court reaches a decision on the merits but does not supply reasoning for its decision. Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. Under such circumstances, we review the record to determine if there was clear error. Id. If the state court has not addressed a constitutional issue at all, then our review is de novo. Id. ; accord Menendez v. Terhune, 422 F.3d 1012, 1026 (9th Cir.2005). 32 The Washington Court of Appeals reached the constitutional issue presented by Brazzel's double jeopardy challenge and treated the jury's silence following Brazzel's first trial as an implied acquittal, but held it was moot due to the subsequent implied acquittal. Because the state court did not provide any reasons for its determination, our review is for clear error. See Pirtle, 313 F.3d at 1167. We note, however, that if we treat the state court finding with complete AEDPA deference, the result is the same. 33 The state court did not clearly err when it treated the first jury's silence as an implied acquittal. Although the Washington Court of Appeals cited no state precedent directly on point, under then-governing Washington law, Brazzel's retrial for the greater offense following conviction only on the lesser alternative offense was probably impermissible. See, e.g., State v. Brown, 127 Wash.2d 749, 903 P.2d 459, 463 (1995) (holding that following the jury's inability to agree on a greater charge, [d]ue to double jeopardy concerns, the defendant cannot be retried on charges greater than the charge for which he was convicted.) (citations omitted). 1 The Washington Supreme Court has identified avoidance of hung juries as one of the purposes of the unable to agree instruction, suggesting that a conviction for the lesser charged offense pursuant to such instruction does not render the inability to agree on the greater charge jury hanging. See State v. Labanowski, 117 Wash.2d 405, 816 P.2d 26, 34 (1991) (noting that unable to agree instructions serve a variety of purposes, among them reducing the incidence of hung juries). 34 No Supreme Court case addresses precisely such an unable to agree jury instruction, so the state court's treatment of the jury's silence cannot be characterized as contrary to federal law. Under federal law, the Washington Court of Appeals' determination was also not unreasonable. Consistent with Supreme Court precedent, the state court could reasonably conclude that the inability of Brazzel's first jury, as instructed, to reach [a] unanimous decision after full and careful deliberation on the charge of attempted murder in the first degree did not by itself result in a hung jury and mistrial by manifest necessity on the attempted murder charge, but rather was an implied acquittal. Assuming, as we must, that the jury followed the instructions, we know the jury did not actually acquit Brazzel on the attempted murder charge because it did not fill in the box with a not guilty notation. Instead, the jury [could] not agree on that charge, remained silent, and convicted of a lesser alternative offense. Under Green and Price, petitioner's jeopardy on the greater charge had ended when the first jury `was given a full opportunity to return a verdict' on that charge and instead reached a verdict on the lesser charge. Price, 398 U.S. at 329, 90 S.Ct. 1757 (quoting Green, 355 U.S. at 191, 78 S.Ct. 221). 35 Following Brazzel's first trial, the judge polled the jury asking two questions: Is this your verdict, is this the way you individually, personally voted and Is this the verdict of the jury, meaning is this the verdict of all twelve of you? Each juror responded in turn, Yes or Yes, it is. 36 No inquiry was made to determine whether the jury had genuinely deadlocked or simply moved to the lesser alternative assault charge as a compromise. Notably as well, after Brazzel's first trial, the government did not construe the jury's silence as hanging or seek a retrial as to that count, even though the state now argues the blank form should be construed as a hopeless deadlock. 37 Under federal law, an inability to agree with the option of compromise on a lesser alternate offense does not satisfy the high threshold of disagreement required for a hung jury and mistrial to be declared. See, e.g., Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 509, 98 S.Ct. 824. The Supreme Court has characterized disagreement sufficient to warrant a mistrial as hopeless or genuine deadlock. Id. ([T]he trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second trial.). Genuine deadlock is fundamentally different from a situation in which jurors are instructed that if they cannot agree, they may compromise by convicting of a lesser alternative crime, and they then elect to do so without reporting any splits or divisions when asked about their unanimity. 38 In contrast, in Ervin, where similar unable to agree instructions were used, the jury deliberated for five weeks, reporting repeatedly in notes to the court that it was unable to reach a unanimous verdict: 39 The jury has continued to deliberate according to the court's direction. We are still unable to reach a unanimous verdict on any of the three charges . . . . Since our last inquiry to the court, there has been no movement toward a unanimous verdict on any of the counts. We believe that additional deliberation would not result in a unanimous verdict on any of the three counts. We have stopped deliberations and asked for the court's direction. 40 147 P.3d at 568. Ultimately, the jury in Ervin left two verdict forms blank pursuant to the unable to agree instructions and the Washington Supreme Court held that the blank verdict forms did not prohibit retrial. See id. at 572. 41 In Salvador, 740 F.2d at 754 (9th Cir. 1984), after deliberating for approximately nine hours, on the second day of deliberations, the jury sent the judge a note stating: The jury is not able to reach a decision on either defendant. We are deadlocked. The judge instructed the jury to continue deliberating and after an additional four hours and overnight recess the jury foreman sent a second note: 42 We are unable to reach a decision. The problem is a reliance on an answer arrived at through religious inspiration, and an unwillingness to move from that decision and base a decision on the evidence. The evidence has been thoroughly examined. Those basing their decision on the evidence are unwilling to change. 43 Id. After reading this second note, the court discharged the jury and declared a mistrial, over the defendants' objections. Id. This court held that a mistrial was warranted and that the requisite `manifest necessity' exist[ed] to declare a mistrial. Id. at 755. 44 The Eighth Circuit addressed a similar circumstance in United States v. Bordeaux, 121 F.3d 1187 (8th Cir.1997). The jury that was given an unable to agree instruction wrote on that instruction [a]fter all reasonable efforts, we, the jury, were unable to reach a verdict on the charge `Attempted Aggravated Sexual Abuse.' Id. at 1192. The trial judge declared a mistrial and retrial on that charge was upheld as permissible. See id. at 1193. 45 As compared to the evidence of jury deadlock in Ervin, Salvador, and Bordeaux, nothing in the record of Brazzel's case indicates the jury's inability to agree was hopeless or irreconcilable—a manifest necessity permitting a retrial for attempted murder. In contrast, following Brazzel's first trial, the jury offered no indication of any inability to reach a verdict beyond what may be deduced from the jury instruction itself and the trial judge did not declare a mistrial. [T]here are degrees of necessity and we require a `high degree' before concluding that a mistrial is appropriate. Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. at 506, 98 S.Ct. 824. 46 The purpose of the rule permitting retrial if a jury hangs is to accord recognition to society's interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws. Id. at 509, 98 S.Ct. 824. Here, the prosecution was given one complete opportunity to convict Brazzel of attempted first degree murder. The jury declined to do so. In Green, the Supreme Court rejected the proposition that in order to secure the reversal of an erroneous conviction of one offense, a defendant must surrender his valid defense of former jeopardy not only on that offense but also on a different offense for which he was not convicted and which was not involved in his appeal. 355 U.S. at 193, 78 S.Ct. 221. The state court's treatment of the jury's silence following Brazzel's first trial as an implied acquittal is a permissible application of governing law.