Opinion ID: 2394956
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Wife's Cross-appeal: Termination of Alimony on Remarriage or Cohabitation

Text: By the Superior Court's order, alimony will terminate if Mrs. Jacobs remarries or cohabits. On her cross-appeal she contends that the cohabitation condition for alimony termination is invalid and impermissible as the reflection of moral disapproval of a life style, rather than the recognition of a relevant change in the wife's circumstances. We reject her contention, which is based upon a misreading of the decree. There is no possible question as to the validity of a divorce decree terminating alimony upon remarriage of the payee spouse. See Bubar v. Plant, 141 Me. 407, 410-11, 44 A.2d 732, 734 (1945). The Superior Court justice in joining cohabitation with remarriage as a condition for the end of alimony was concerned with protecting the integrity and assuring the practical enforceability of his termination order. In the context of the whole phrase remarries or cohabits in this alimony decree, the term cohabits takes on the meaning of maintaining a relationship with another person that is the practical equivalent of marriage. Indeed, such is the dictionary definition of cohabit; namely, To live together as husband and wife. The mutual assumption of those marital rights, duties and obligations which are usually manifested by married people.... Black's Law Dictionary 236 (5th ed. 1979). It is apparent that the Superior Court justice was not willing to require Dr. Jacobs to continue paying alimony to his former wife if she and another man should live together as husband and wife, in the sense of their mutually assuming those marital rights, duties, and obligations that are usually manifested by married people. The justice recognized the practical fact that a remarriage condition for termination, standing alone, can be readily circumvented. To prevent that circumvention, his decree ordered alimony to stop when the former wife either is legally remarried or maintains a living arrangement that is a marriage except for the ceremonial formality. Cf. Northrup v. Northrup, 43 N.Y.2d 566, 571, 373 N.E.2d 1221, 1224, 402 N.Y.S.2d 997, 999 (1978) (rationale behind statute giving the court discretion to terminate alimony where ex-husband proves that the ex-wife is (1) habitually living with another man and (2) holding herself out as his wife although not married to that man, is to prevent a woman from circumventing the loss of alimony by tailoring her conduct); see also Citron v. Citron, 91 Misc.2d 785, 398 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1977). The trial justice acted well within the range of allowable discretion in ordering the termination of alimony upon either remarriage or cohabitation. The crafting and enforcement of a divorce decree are guided by equitable principles. The statute that empowers a divorce court to set alimony, 19 M.R.S.A. § 721, expressly declares: This section shall not limit the court, by full or partial agreement of the parties or otherwise, from ... limiting or conditioning the alimony award in any manner on terms that the court deems just. See Harmon v. Emerson, 425 A.2d at 983-85; cf. H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations § 14.10, at 470 (1968) (alimony decrees are sufficiently equitable in character to warrant applying equitable principles [such as laches] to problems of enforcement). In specifying the terms of Dr. Jacobs' obligation to pay alimony, the divorce court was appropriately applying equitable principles of flexibility and adaptability to circumstances. Cf. Robinson v. Clark, 76 Me. 493, 495 (1884) (Equitable remedies are distinguished by their flexibility [and] their adaptability to circumstances). Mrs. Jacobs has not demonstrated any positive rule of law that the alimony decree violates, nor has she persuaded us that the result is plainly and unmistakably an injustice. Capron v. Capron, 403 A.2d at 1218. Contrary to Mrs. Jacobs' argument, our decision in Mitchell v. Mitchell, 418 A.2d 1140 (Me.1980), does not require a different result. The Mitchell case arose on the divorced husband's motion to terminate or reduce alimony on the ground that his former wife was living with another man. The motion court in Mitchell denied the husband's motionand we affirmedsimply because the husband failed to prove any change in his former wife's circumstances that justified terminating or reducing alimony. Mitchell did not involve the issue that is here critical: May a divorce court condition termination of alimony upon cohabitation, as well as upon remarriage, in order to prevent circumvention of the admittedly valid remarriage condition? When cohabitation is defined to involve the mutual assumption of marriage-like rights, duties, and obligations, as it must be in the context of this alimony decree, we can find nothing legally erroneous in prescribing cohabitation, jointly with remarriage, as a condition for the termination of alimony. We leave to be decided in a concrete fact situation whether the remarriage or cohabitation condition in the decree has the effect of later shifting to the alimony payee the burden of proving, or coming forward with evidence, that the payee and a live-in partner have not in fact mutually assumed the rights, duties, and obligations usually manifested by married people. [5] The entry is: Judgment affirmed. All concurring.