Opinion ID: 2514054
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to reduce the first-degree felony

Text: ¶ 9 McGee argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a reduction of the first degree felony to a second degree felony. In this case, rather than reviewing McGee's request during the evidentiary hearing for said motion, the court held a new sentencing hearing pursuant to the stipulation between McGee and the State. In accord with the stipulation, a presentence report was prepared and reviewed by the district court, and McGee was allowed to present argument supporting reduction of the degree of his offense at the hearing on January 14, 1998. At the conclusion of the hearing the court took the matter under advisement. ¶ 10 On January 29, 1998, the court issued a memorandum decision denying McGee's request. In its ruling the court noted McGee's good behavior . . . [and] his clear understanding of the nature of his drug abuse and its contribution to this offense. . . . The court even acknowledged that McGee's statements during the resentencing hearing show[ed] a remarkably refreshing insight into his situation. Nevertheless, the court held that the conduct engaged in by the defendant in his drug-induced paranoia does not justify the reduction in the severity of the offense. Therefore, McGee was again sentenced to serve a term of five years to life on the first degree felony offense. In its order, however, the court included a recommendation that McGee be considered for parole after serving fifteen years. ¶ 11 On appeal, McGee argues that given [his] history and character . . . such as his good work history and relatively clean record up to a two year period immediately prior to the incident . . . it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being for that degree of offense established by statute. Furthermore, he contends the court's conclusions of law in the resentencing orderspecifically the recommendation that he serve fifteen years and then be paroledis inconsistent with the court's ruling. We are not persuaded that the court's favorable remarks about McGee, nor its recommendation with respect to parole, are inconsistencies that establish an abuse of discretion in the final sentence. The final sentence imposed on McGee `reflects the personal judgment of the court.' Woodland, 945 P.2d at 671 (quoting State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978)). We do not find the final sentence inherently unfair or clearly excessive in light of the facts underlying McGee's conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.