Opinion ID: 2031968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Right To Impartial Jury

Text: In the third-amended petition, defendant claimed a violation of the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury. (U.S. Const., amend. VI; Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 8.) Defendant claimed violation because: (1) the jurors had become aware soon after their selection that their names and addresses had been published in the local newspaper, and they were upset, and (2) the jurors had observed an outburst directed against defendant by the mother of the victim while she was on the witness stand during a sidebar. In support of the claim, defendant included the affidavits of two jurors, Charlene Joneson and Glenn Friant, Rose Marie Bell, the clerk of the circuit court, and Linda Meza, a social psychologist. Each affiant attested to facts which clearly did not exist within the record on direct appeal. We find that the claim was not waived and the trial court erred by dismissing it. Remand for an evidentiary hearing is unnecessary, however, because defendant has not demonstrated a substantial violation of constitutional rights. See Silagy, 116 Ill.2d at 365, 107 Ill.Dec. 677, 507 N.E.2d 830. Defendant alleged that by publication of the jurors' names in the Morris Daily Herald, the local newspaper, the protective shield which is intended to surround a jury was removed, which allowed them to be influenced by improper outside factors. (See People v. Gale (1971), 132 Ill.App.2d 986, 271 N.E.2d 94.) Defendant claims that with publication of their names, jurors acquired the incentive to convict defendant because of their fear of him and their desire to conform to prevailing community pressures. Joneson stated in her affidavit that jurors were displeased about publication of their names and two complained to the clerk because [a] person who might be a murderer would have their names and addresses if he were set free. Bell stated that the jury had contacted her as the clerk of the court and complained that their names and addresses had appeared in the local newspaper. Meza stated that with publication of the jurors' names, their privacy and anonymity, which ensures a neutral vote concerning guilt or innocence, was lost. Friant stated that while he was in the courtroom, he observed the victim's mother arise and shout and cry towards defendant. The record bears out Friant's statement. The record reveals that after the attorneys and the court returned to the courtroom from a conference, and while the victim's mother was still seated on the witness stand, the court admonished the jury to disregard any comments that could have been made by the witness. Defendant claims the outburst from a family-of-the-victim witness seated on the stand inflamed the jury's sympathies. Defendant maintains the trial court's admonishment was insufficient to undo any damage that was thereby caused. The vital question to be determined is whether the jurors had been influenced and prejudiced to such an extent that they would not, or could not, be fair and impartial. (See People v. Hryciuk (1954), 5 Ill.2d 176, 183, 125 N.E.2d 61.) This determination involves the court's consideration of all the facts and circumstances and conjecture regarding the effect that the incompetent information had upon the minds of the jurors, a determination incapable of absolute accuracy or a very high degree of reliability. Jurors themselves are incapable even of knowing the effect which prejudicial matters have upon their minds. The determination, therefore, must rest in sound judicial discretion to reach an inference, from the facts and circumstances, that a fair trial had or had not been interfered with. The most controlling fact or circumstance to create the inference is the character and nature of the allegedly prejudicial information. Each case must be determined upon its own facts and circumstances. See Hryciuk, 5 Ill.2d at 183-85, 125 N.E.2d 61. Also, it is accepted that a genuine emotional outburst by a witness does not require a mistrial. (See People v. Howard (1991), 147 Ill.2d 103, 167 Ill.Dec. 914, 588 N.E.2d 1044; People v. Hudson (1970), 46 Ill.2d 177, 263 N.E.2d 473; People v. Bradley (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 463, 2 Ill.Dec. 529, 357 N.E.2d 696.) It has even been held that a trial court's decision not to caution the jury against being influenced by a witness' weeping did not constitute prejudice to the defendant. People v. Hairston (1973), 10 Ill. App.3d 678, 686, 294 N.E.2d 748. Information that a juror's name and address has been published in a local newspaper during the course of a murder trial held in a small metropolitan area is bound to have impact. With that information, as evidenced by Joneson's affidavit, jurors become aware that they are publicly exposed. We cannot infer, however, on this basis that an honest juror would therefore give sway to his emotions and disregard the fundamental requirement of a fair trial and decide to convict a person in order to be absolutely secure. Neither can we find that the emotional outburst here resulted in prejudice. The incident was apparently brief, it was isolated, there was no attempt to obtain the jury's sympathy as a result of it, the court admonished the jury, and there is no indication in the record that it would have been unable to heed the admonition and disregard the incident during its deliberations. Simply put, mere speculation concerning prejudice to the defendant is not sufficient to warrant reversal. Cf. People v. Porter (1986), 111 Ill.2d 386, 405, 95 Ill.Dec. 465, 489 N.E.2d 1329 (mere suspicion of bias or prejudice is not sufficient). Defendant's supporting materials do not show that the jury was prejudiced. Defendant's right to an impartial jury was not violated. Dismissal of this claim from the third-amended petition was not error.