Opinion ID: 515767
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Vouching for a Government Witness

Text: 14 Keskey also argues that the government improperly vouched for the credibility of government witness Sheryl Muth Wilke by introducing into evidence a letter that the Assistant United States Attorney sent to Wilke's attorney. The letter outlined an agreement between the government and Wilke that the government would not prosecute Wilke if she cooperated with the government in its investigation and gave truthful testimony. Keskey objects to the following portion of the letter: 15 In her statement your client admitted to facts which establish some criminal culpability on her part; however, her statement was consistent with other evidence already acquired which indicates that her culpability was relatively minimal. The information she provided appeared to be truthful, and she is apparently willing to cooperate with the investigation and possible prosecution in this matter. 16 Tr. at 559-60. 17 Keskey did not object to the letter at trial. Therefore, the admission of this letter can justify reversal only if it was plain error. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We recognize plain error if to do otherwise would result in a 'miscarriage of justice.'  United States v. Manos, 848 F.2d 1427, 1433 (7th Cir.1988) (quoting United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 n. 14, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 1592 n. 14, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982)). We must view the alleged error in the context of the entire trial. Manos, at 1433; United States v. Fakhoury, 819 F.2d 1415, 1423 (7th Cir.1987), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 108 S.Ct. 749, 98 L.Ed.2d 762 (1988). 18 Keskey recognizes that the government may elicit testimony on direct examination regarding a witness's plea or immunity agreement. See United States v. Mealy, 851 F.2d 890, 898-899 (7th Cir.1988) (collecting cases). Nevertheless, [i]n introducing evidence of plea agreements, the prosecutor may not imply that he possessed information not heard by the jury on the issue of the immunized witness's veracity. Nor can the prosecutor express or imply his personal opinion that a witness is telling the truth. Id. at 900 (citations omitted). 19 Keskey argues that the portion of the letter stating that her statement was consistent with other evidence already acquired which indicates that her culpability was relatively minimal was an assertion by the government that other undisclosed evidence corroborated Wilke's story. We disagree. As we read the letter, the Assistant United States Attorney merely stated that other evidence indicated that Wilke's degree of culpability was slight, which appears to have been a factor in the government's decision not to prosecute Wilke. The letter does not say that the government believed Wilke because all of her statements were consistent with other undisclosed evidence. 20 In addition, Keskey argues that the statement that [t]he information she provided appeared to be truthful indicated the prosecutor's personal opinion that Wilke was telling the truth. Keskey argues that the jury could infer that the government believed that Wilke was telling the truth because her statement was consistent with other evidence not before the jury. As we explained above, however, the reference in the letter to other evidence already acquired related only to Wilke's culpability. Thus, unlike most of the cases that Keskey has cited, we do not believe that the Assistant United States Attorney implied that his personal opinion was based on evidence not before the jury. See United States v. Berry, 627 F.2d 193, 198 (9th Cir.1980) (prosecutor's argument that government had kept its witnesses separated to ensure the truthfulness of their testimony was improper), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1113, 101 S.Ct. 925, 66 L.Ed.2d 843 (1981); United States v. Roberts, 618 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir.1980) (prosecutor improperly stated during closing argument that officer who had been present throughout the trial was monitoring the witness's testimony to ensure that the witness kept his agreement to provide truthful testimony) cert. denied, 452 U.S. 942, 101 S.Ct. 3088, 69 L.Ed.2d 957 (1981); United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779, 784-85 (7th Cir.1977) (statement in plea agreement that immunized witness was willing to take a polygraph test improperly insinuated that the government had a means of verifying the truth of the witness's testimony other than scrutiny of the witness's testimony at trial); Gradsky v. United States, 373 F.2d 706, 710 (5th Cir.1967) (prosecutor not only expressed his personal opinion as to the witnesses' veracity, he implied that he had reached this conclusion because he had had the opportunity to check out the witnesses' credibility). See also Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S. 339, 359-60 n. 15, 78 S.Ct. 311, 319 n. 15, 2 L.Ed.2d 321 (1958). 21 Nevertheless, the letter does appear to express the personal opinion of the Assistant United States Attorney that Wilke was telling the truth. While it was error to read that statement to the jury, we do not believe it rises to the level of plain error. Although Wilke read the letter aloud before the jury, the Assistant United States Attorney did not elaborate on it during direct examination, 7 nor was it mentioned during cross-examination. Neither attorney discussed the letter during closing argument. That lack of emphasis makes it less likely that it influenced the jury. Furthermore, Wilke's testimony, while important, was not as directly incriminating to Keskey as some of the other witnesses' testimony. Finally, at the end of the trial, the court instructed the jury to consider Wilke's testimony with caution and great care. Record Item 21 at 4. See Mealy, at 900-01 (similar instruction to the jury was sufficient to dispel prejudicial effect of improper vouching by the government). Viewing the improper vouching by the government in the context of the entire trial, we find that the risk that Keskey's substantial rights were affected is slight; thus, any error that occurred was harmless. Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). See United States v. Jackson, 485 F.2d 300, 303-04 (7th Cir.1973); United States v. Grooms, 454 F.2d 1308, 1312-13 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 858, 93 S.Ct. 141, 34 L.Ed.2d 103 (1972).