Opinion ID: 1425029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fuller

Text: On appeal Fuller argues that the evidence at trial demonstrated only that he had a buyer-seller relationship with Bew, and that such evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy. Fuller also baldly asserts that the district court's determination that he is responsible for more than 500 grams of cocaine amounts to nothing more than nebulous eyeballing and unreliable guesswork. The arguments are without merit.
Fuller is waging an uphill battle in challenging the sufficiency of the evidence; to succeed, he is required to show that even when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Luster, 480 F.3d 551, 555 (7th Cir.2007). We will not second-guess the jury's credibility determinations and will overturn Fuller's conviction only if the record is devoid of evidence from which a reasonable jury could find him guilty of conspiracy. See United States v. Carrillo, 435 F.3d 767, 775 (7th Cir.2006). Fuller is correct that a buyer-seller relationship is insufficient to sustain a conspiracy conviction. See United States v. Lechuga, 994 F.2d 346, 350 (7th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (plurality). Instead, there must be evidence from which a rational jury could find that two or more people agreed to possess and distribute cocaine, and that Fuller knowingly and intentionally joined in this agreement. See Luster, 480 F.3d at 555. To determine whether a conspiracy was proved, we look for evidence of a prolonged and actively pursued course of sales coupled with the seller's knowledge of and a shared stake in the buyer's illegal venture. United States v. Contreras, 249 F.3d 595, 599 (7th Cir.2001) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Factors that weigh in favor of such a finding include the length of the affiliation, the established method of payment, standardized transactions, and a level of mutual trust. United States v. Hach, 162 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir.1998). If enough of these factors are present and point to a concrete, interlocking interest beyond individual buy-sell transactions, we will not disturb the fact-finders [sic] inference that at some point, the buyer-seller relationship developed into a cooperative venture. Id. Taken in the light most favorable to the government, we are convinced that the evidence at trial established that Fuller's relationship with Bew went beyond that of a buyer and seller. Fuller argues that their transactions were insufficiently standardized, but he bought cocaine from Bew on a steady basis over the course of their five-month affiliation. Although the amount of cocaine varied with each purchase, Fuller bought distribution amounts of cocaineranging from 3 to 127 grams every week or two. Fuller and Bew consistently used Bew's cellphone to communicate, and they used code words to discuss the types and amounts of drugs for each transaction. See Luster, 480 F.3d at 555 (identifying use of code words as indicator of conspiracy). Moreover, they had a standard method of payment; Bew testified that he gave Fuller drugs on full or partial credit the majority of the time. A jury could very reasonably infer from the fact that Bew fronted drugs to Fuller not just an established, on-going relationship, but that they shared a high level of trust. See United States v. Medina, 430 F.3d 869, 882 (7th Cir.2005); United States v. Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d 978, 982 (7th Cir.2000). The jury also could have inferred mutual trust from Bew's testimony that he alerted Fuller when he overpaid for the cocaine, and that Fuller instructed Bew to go to his hotel room on one occasion to pick up drugs. Most importantly, the evidence at trial reflected that Fuller had a shared stake in Bew's enterprise. Bew's fronting cocaine to Fuller showed they shared an interest in the success of Fuller's sales; unless Fuller sold the cocaine, Bew would not be paid. See Torres-Ramirez, 213 F.3d at 982. And on more than one occasion Fuller agreed to settle an outstanding debt so that Bew could purchase cocaine from his suppliers. At one point Fuller asked Bew for time to make a few drug sales to raise money that he owed to Bew so he could purchase more cocaine. At other times, Fuller would bolster Bew's cocaine supply, and on at least one occasion Bew brought a customer directly to Fuller when Bew was low on drugs. All of this evidence gives rise to an inference that Fuller and Bew cooperated in furtherance of a drug trafficking operation that went beyond Fuller's role as buyer and Bew's role as seller. See Luster, 480 F.3d at 555-56; United States v. Johnson, 437 F.3d 665, 675 (7th Cir.2006) (noting that evidence that coconspirators were on same side of drug transaction sufficient to establish conspiracy). Fuller argues that no reasonable jury could infer that he shared a stake in a larger drug trafficking conspiracy because Bew regularly duped him by selling him rerocked cocaine. But the only evidence that this scam had any effect on Fuller's sales is the recording of one phone call in which Fuller complained about a drought caused by bad drugs. There is no evidence that Fuller had trouble profiting from the rerocked cocaine on a regular basis. And the fact that Bew dishonestly tried to maximize his own profits by secretly diluting the cocaine used in his transactions with Fuller does not diminish the evidence showing that Bew relied on Fuller to sell the rerocked cocaine. Accordingly, Fuller has not met his heavy burden of showing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conspiracy conviction.
Fuller argues and speculates that we should remand for resentencing because in finding him accountable for more than 500 grams of cocaine, the district court erroneously relied on Bew's testimony that he sold Fuller between 750 grams and one kilogram in 2003. He argues that the wiretap transcripts contradict Bew's testimony because, according to Fuller, they show that only 73 grams of cocaine changed hands between him and Bew over a two-month period. We review the district court's calculation of drug quantity for clear error, meaning we will remand only if we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. United States v. Artley, 489 F.3d 813, 821 (7th Cir.2007) (citation omitted). Fuller's argument ignores the jury's special verdict finding that Fuller is accountable for at least 500 grams of cocaine. In light of the special verdict, it would have been both unnecessary and inappropriate for the judge to reexamine, and resolve in the defendant's favor, a factual issue that the jury has resolved in the prosecutor's favor beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Rivera, 411 F.3d 864, 866 (7th Cir.2005). The special verdict bound the court to a statutory minimum sentence of 5 years. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). But Fuller argues that the government should be judicially estopped from asserting that the special verdict is binding because it did not object when the court said at sentencing that it considered the special verdict to be advisory. But judicial estoppel is a doctrine of equity, see Cannon-Stokes v. Potter, 453 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir.2006), and Fuller has not explained why it would be unfair to find the special verdict binding for purposes of calculating a guidelines range where it is indisputably binding to determine the mandatory minimum sentence. See Rivera, 411 F.3d at 866. In any event, the transcripts do not contradict Bew's testimony that he sold Fuller at least 750 grams of cocaine. The transcript of the first call between Fuller and Bew reveals that Fuller owed Bew $3,500 for drugs he had fronted, an amount reflecting Bew's price for 126 grams of cocaine. That call corroborates Bew's testimony that he sold anywhere from 3 grams to 126 grams of cocaine to Fuller in each of their transactions. The frequency of the calls between Fuller and Bew corroborates Bew's testimony that he sold Fuller cocaine once a week or once every two. And more than one call shows that Bew was seeking payment for debts of $1,000, a price consistent with a sale of approximately two ounces of cocaine. At sentencing, the government was required to show the amount of drugs only by a preponderance of the evidence, see Artley, 489 F.3d at 821, and Fuller has not demonstrated that anything in the wiretaps shows that the court clearly erred in finding that the government met its burden.