Opinion ID: 1690126
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: did the special prosecutor in this case have authority to act on behalf of the state, and were any of jordan's rights affected by his prosecution by the special prosecutor?

Text: ś 69. Jordan charges the trial court erred in failing to disqualify Joe Sam Owen as the special prosecutor on three bases: First, Jordan contends that the State failed to show a need for appointment of a special prosecutor, and should have that appointment approved by the court. Jordan relies on a 1984 Attorney General's opinion from then Attorney General Edwin Lloyd Pittman. 1984 Miss. A.G. Lexis 145, at 5 (Oct.1984). In that opinion, the Attorney General suggested that Mississippi should follow the common law rule of allowing appointment of a special prosecutor, but that the appointment should be approved by the trial judge. Included in the record is a copy of a 1983 order appointing Owen to be a special prosecutor as well as an Oath by Owen signed by Judge Vlahos in 1989. ś 70. Secondly, Jordan complains that Owen exceeded his authority because he acted without the supervision and consent of the district attorney. Jordan believes Owen lacked objectivity and placed his personal interest in obtaining a conviction over society's interest in justice and the defendant's right to a fair trial. Specifically, Jordan points to a statement by Owen: [3] When [Mr. Sumrall] first mentioned [a plea agreement] I told him that I would be glad to entertain it only as a courtesy to Tom, but I did let him know that I was not inclined to do that. I had some very strong feelings about this case. We've been down this road.... We've spent a lot of time preparing for trial, at least my office has. ś 71. Jordan alleges that the District Attorney gave Owen unfettered discretion involving plea agreements. ś 72. Third, Jordan alleges that his due process rights were violated because the State cannot prove that it had significant interests that outweighed Jordan's liberty interest in this case. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976). ś 73. The State contends that it does not need to demonstrate a need to appoint a special prosecutor in this case, as it has inherent statutory authority to do that. Owen was appointed by the Attorney General, and the Attorney General has unlimited discretion to appoint a special prosecutor under Miss.Code Ann. §§ 7-5-5 & -7 (1991). The State also points out that either the District Attorney or one of his assistants was present with Owen at most of the pre-trial and trial proceedings. ś 74. While Jordan presents a compelling argument about the conflicts that can arise in having an attorney who takes a personal interest in the case prosecute a criminal action, there is no limit on an Attorney General's ability to appoint same. Owen therefore acted with proper authority. ś 75. The Fifth Circuit has ruled that, where special prosecutors are appointed, district attorneys must retain control of the prosecution. Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515, 517 (5th Cir.1996). In Faulder, Hill, a special prosecutor, had participated in the defendant's first trial as an assistant district attorney. The other special prosecutor, Burleson, was a former prosecutor and a well known criminal defense attorney. When the resulting conviction was overturned due to the erroneous admission of the defendant's confession, Burleson was hired by the victim's family to determine whether a second prosecution was possible without the use of the confession. The district attorney assigned an assistant with two years of experience to help Hill and Burleson during the trial. The defendant complained that the use of special prosecutors violated his constitutional rights. The Fifth Circuit held that, because of Hill's prior relationship with the district attorney's office, the frequent communication between counsel and clear understanding of the district attorney's final decision-making authority, the district attorney controlled the defendant's prosecution. ś 76. We find that Jordan's claim must fail because he has not any proof or argument that the Harrison County District Attorney's Office did not retain control of the prosecution. As stated above, either the District Attorney himself or one of his assistants were present with Owen during most of the pre-trial hearings and at trial. There is absolutely nothing in the record on which to make an inference that Owen's prosecutorial actions were not authorized by or under the control of the District Attorney.