Opinion ID: 161263
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: mr. barber's cross -

Text: APPEAL, NO. 00-5033 35 During the proceedings below, the magistrate judge awarded costs not only to Mr. Barber but also to Williamson. On cross-appeal, Mr. Barber argues that the magistrate judge erred in giving Williamson costs because he, and not Williamson, was the prevailing party. We review for an abuse of discretion. See Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1075 (10th Cir. 1998). 36 In a Title VII case, a trial court has the power to award costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). See Kline v. City of Kansas City, 245 F.3d 707, 709 (8th Cir. 2001) (applying Rule 54(d)(1) in a Title VII case); see also Byers v. Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 430 (5th Cir. 2000) (same); Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1999) (same); cf. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1505, 1517 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Rule 54(d)(1) with respect to a 42 U.S.C. 1988 case). Rule 54(d)(1) provides: Except when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs . . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). 37 As is apparent from the language of Rule 54(d)(1), the determination of who qualifies as a prevailing party is central to deciding whether costs are available. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure 2667. In general, the litigant who is the prevailing party for purposes of attorney's fees is also the prevailing party for purposes of costs. See 10 Moore's Federal Practice 54.101[3] (3d ed. 2000) (noting that the prevailing party requirement for purposes of costs is generally, but not completely, synonymous with the prevailing party requirement in the attorney's fee context); see also Tunison v. Continental Airlines Corp., Inc., 162 F.3d 1187, 1189-90 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that the 'prevailing party' determination is generally the same in the two contexts i.e., Rule 54(d)(1) and 42 U.S.C. 1988). Under this standard, Mr. Barber was the prevailing party, having been awarded nominal damages. See Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112 (holding that a plaintiff who wins nominal damages is a prevailing party under [the attorney's fee statute] 1988). 38 In addition, [u]sually the litigant in whose favor judgment is rendered is the prevailing party for purposes of Rule 54(d)[(1)]. Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure, 2667; see also Head v. Medford, 62 F.3d 351, 354 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Cases from this and other circuits consistently support shifting costs if the prevailing party obtains judgment on even a fraction of the claims advanced.) (internal quotation marks omitted). Under this standard, Mr. Barber was once again the prevailing party because the district court entered judgment in his favor. See Aplt's App. at 42 (judgment, filed Sept. 23, 1999) (Pursuant to the unanimous verdict of the jury, the Court hereby enters judgment for the Plaintiff in the amount of $1.00 . . . .); see also Farrar, 506 U.S. at 112 (When a court awards nominal damages [to plaintiff], it [does not] enter[] judgment for defendant on the merits . . . .). 39 In his opinion, the magistrate judge never stated explicitly whom he considered the prevailing party for purposes of Rule 54(d)(1). However, by noting that Mr. Barber had succeeded on one claim and that Williamson had succeeded on two, by describing a Tenth Circuit case as one in which both parties were prevailing parties, Aplt's App. at 94 (district court order, filed Jan. 21, 2000), and by subsequently stating that Mr. Barber and Williamson alike were entitled to costs, the magistrate judge implicitly believed both to be prevailing parties under Rule 54(d)(1). To the extent that the magistrate judge found both Mr. Barber and Williamson to be prevailing parties under Rule 54(d)(1), he clearly erred. For the reasons stated above, Mr. Barber, and not Williamson, was the prevailing party for purposes of costs. 40 Having clarified the prevailing party status of the respective parties, we vacate the award of costs and remand so that the magistrate judge (or the district court) may reconsider the issue of costs in light of this opinion. We note that, while costs presumptively are awarded to the prevailing party, see Klein v. Grynberg, 44 F.3d 1497, 1506 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Zeran v. Diamond Broadcasting, 203 F.3d 714, 722 (10th Cir. 2000) (noting that a trial court must provide a valid reason for not awarding costs to the prevailing party), a trial court still has the discretion to act under Rule 54(d)(1). See Roberts v. Madigan, 921 F.2d 1047, 1058 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting the broad discretion had under Rule 54(d)(1)). For example, in cases in which the prevailing party has been only partially successful, some courts have chosen to apportion costs among the parties or to reduce the size of the prevailing party's award to reflect the partial success. See Wright & Miller, supra, 2667. Or, in cases in which neither side entirely prevailed, or when both sides prevailed, or when the litigation was thought to be the result of fault on the part of both parties, some courts have denied costs to both sides. Id. 2668. See, e.g., Amarel v. Connell, 102 F.3d 1494, 1523 (9th Cir. 1997) (In the event of a mixed judgment, however, it is within the discretion of a district court to require each party to bear its own costs.); Testa v. Village of Mundelein, 89 F.3d 443, 447 (7th Cir. 1996) (Considering the mixed outcome of the civil rights and malicious prosecution claims, the decision requiring each party to bear its own costs is within that discretion.). [W]here the court exercises its discretion[,] the identification of the prevailing party may [in the end] become so unimportant as to be almost immaterial. Roberts, 921 F.2d at 1058 (internal quotation marks omitted). 7