Opinion ID: 2210240
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether emry was using vehicle

Text: The next issue is whether Emry was using the vehicle under the terms of the liability portion of the policy. Again, this is a question of law, in connection with which we have an obligation to reach conclusions independent of the determination made by the court below. See American Family Ins. Group v. Hemenway, 254 Neb. 134, 575 N.W.2d 143 (1998). Also, whether an insurance contract is ambiguous and, therefore, in need of construction is a question of law. Moller v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 252 Neb. 722, 566 N.W.2d 382 (1997). In previous cases, we have generally held that a causal relationship or connection must exist between an accident or injury and the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle in order for an incident to fall within the meaning of the phrase arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a vehicle. See Farmers Union Co-op. Ins. Co. v. Allied Prop. & Cas., 253 Neb. 177, 569 N.W.2d 436 (1997). In Farmers Union Co-op Ins. Co. v. Allied Prop. & Cas., we held that a passenger's injury from a dog bite while in the insured's vehicle did not fall under the insurance policy's limitation that the injury arise out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of the automobile. We stated that we have defined the words arising out of the use as very broad, general, and comprehensive terms that are ordinarily understood to mean originating from, growing out of, or flowing from and that but for causation was required. We concluded that there was no causal connection between the vehicle itself or its permanent attachments and the dog bite, requiring that something peculiar to the vehicle itself causally contribute to the accident. Heretofore, we have not addressed whether a person who has witnessed a traffic accident and has stopped and exited a vehicle in order to assist victims of the accident is using the vehicle for purposes of a policy of automobile insurance. In Rau v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., supra , a truckdriver was struck by an uninsured motorist after he briefly left his truck to inquire about directions. The driver parked the truck at the curb of the southbound lanes, crossed four lanes of traffic on foot to ask for directions from another truckdriver, and in returning was struck by an uninsured motorist. The court concluded that the truckdriver was using the vehicle at the time he was struck, explaining it was common sense that the parties contemplated the driver of a delivery truck on his route might have occasion to leave the truck to ask for directions. The court in Rau discussed what it means to use a vehicle within the contemplation of an uninsured motorist endorsement. Citing Hartford Accident, etc., Co. v. Booker, 140 Ga.App. 3, 230 S.E.2d 70 (1976), the court pointed out that the use of a vehicle depends upon the factual context of each case. The term does not imply remoteness but does extend beyond physical contact at least to the point where control over the vehicle is easily or reasonably at hand and, particularly, when it is still being utilized. The court described that among other factors to be considered in determining whether a person is using a vehicle is whether the person is `vehicle oriented' at the time of the injury. Rau v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Wash.App. 326, 334, 585 P.2d 157, 162 (1978). In Monroe Guar. Ins. Co. v. Campos, 582 N.E.2d 865 (Ind.App.1991), an employee of a tow-truck company had driven his tow truck to a parking lot to confer with a police officer about towing a vehicle. The employee waited in the police cruiser for the results of a Breathalyzer test to determine whether the vehicle would need to be towed. After being informed that he was to tow the vehicle, the employee exited the police cruiser with the intention of proceeding to the vehicle to be towed to determine how it could safely be removed from the roadway. As he was exiting the police cruiser, the employee was struck and injured by an uninsured motorist. The court determined that the tow-truck employee was using the tow truck at the time he was struck. The court explained that reasonable persons would expect that a tow-truck company employee must engage in activities during the towing process which require that the employee exit the tow truck. The court concluded that the employee was using the tow truck in a manner contemplated by the parties to the insurance contract. In Harris v. Magee, 573 So.2d 646 (Miss. 1990), the crew of a construction company was dispatched to a jobsite. A slow-moving crane departed first, followed by the job foreman in a company truck and two other employees in company vehicles. The vehicles encountered the crane on the side of the road after it had mechanical difficulties. The foreman parked his vehicle approximately 75 feet from the crane, exited the vehicle, and attempted to repair the crane. While crawling from beneath the crane, he was struck and killed by an uninsured motorist. The court held that the foreman was using the company truck when he was struck and concluded that stopping to repair the crane was a necessary aspect of the truck's operation. Similarly, in Federated Mutual Implement & Hardware Ins. Co. v. Gupton, 241 F.Supp. 509 (E.D.S.C.1965), the court held that an employee of a gas station was using the company vehicle while pouring gasoline into another vehicle stranded on the shoulder of a roadway. The court explained that the exact definition of the term use was elusive and not capable of a definition which would leave everyone comfortable. Whether or not an injury arises from the use of a motor vehicle within a liability policy or statute depends upon the factual context of each case. The court considered whether the injury to the gas station employee was a reasonable consequence of the use of the company vehicle and concluded it was obvious that it was within the contemplation of the parties that the vehicle would be used as a service station truck and that the operation of delivering gasoline on the highways was a necessary and incidental adjunct. The court in Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Booker, 140 Ga.App. 3, 230 S.E.2d 70 (1976), held that a sanitation service employee was using a garbage truck when he was struck approximately 30 feet from the truck. The court explained that in defining the word use, one must look to the contemplation of the parties entering into the insurance contract. The court concluded that common sense dictated that the parties contemplated the truck would be loaded and unloaded and that it would be necessary for the driver to walk down the side of the road near his truck in order to collect garbage. In Stevens v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 345 So.2d 1041 (Miss.1977), the court held that a wrecker operator's injuries arose out of the use of the wrecker when he was struck after having exited the wrecker and begun to sweep away debris from the vehicle he was going to tow. The court noted it was obvious that the wrecker would be used for removing disabled vehicles from the highway and that removing debris from the highway was a necessary part of that operation. The court explained that the operator's temporary absence from the wrecker did not amount to abandonment of the use of the wrecker. Id. at 1044. In Great American Ins. Co. v. Cassell, 239 Va. 421, 389 S.E.2d 476 (1990), a firefighter was struck by an uninsured motorist while standing in an intersection completing a required fire report after a fire had been extinguished. The firefighter was 20 to 25 feet away from the firetruck, but the court held that the firefighter's death arose out of the use of the truck. The court noted that the report was part of the firefighter's mission and that the mission had not been completed when the accident occurred. In Falls v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 114 N.C.App. 203, 441 S.E.2d 583 (1994), the court held that the driver was using the insured vehicle when he was hit by an underinsured motorist while walking along the road in search of mechanical assistance after the vehicle had broken down. Although the driver was approximately one-half mile from the vehicle at the time he was injured, the court concluded that there was a causal connection between the driver's injury and his use of the vehicle. The court stated: But for the vehicle becoming disabled, the journey would not have been abandoned. Id. at 208, 441 S.E.2d at 585. See, also, Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. McMichael, 906 P.2d 92 (Colo. 1995); Randall v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 255 Va. 62, 496 S.E.2d 54 (1998); Oberkramer v. Reliance Ins. Co., 650 S.W.2d 300 (Mo.App. 1983); Maring v. Hartford Casualty Ins. Co., 126 N.C.App. 201, 484 S.E.2d 417 (1997); Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co. v. Davis, 118 N.C.App. 494, 455 S.E.2d 892 (1995). From the above cases, we conclude that whether a person is using a vehicle depends upon the factual context of each case and upon the contemplation of the parties to the contract. One factor in determining use is whether the activity can reasonably be expected to occur in relation to the operation of the vehicle. Another factor is whether the person is still vehicle oriented at the time of the occurrence. See Rau v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 21 Wash.App. 326, 585 P.2d 157 (1978). Under the facts presented, we conclude that Emry was using the company vehicle at the time he was struck and killed by the underinsured motorist. Emry's journey home was suddenly and unexpectedly interrupted by an accident in the intersection he was about to cross. Emry exited the vehicle temporarily to see whether anyone was hurt. He had not completed his intended journey and would have soon continued to drive home had he not been struck. Such an activity could reasonably be expected to occur in relation to Emry's use of the vehicle. As part of the operation of the insured vehicle, a driver could reasonably be expected to temporarily exit the vehicle in order to assist victims of a traffic accident which the driver had just witnessed and which occurred in the driver's intended path. Thus, Emry's actions were part of the reasonably expected use of the vehicle as contemplated by the parties.