Opinion ID: 750721
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the refusal to admit patnett's hearsay statement

Text: 27 The parties are in agreement that the standard of review of the District Court's evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of a hearsay statement under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) is for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Hilliard, 11 F.3d 618, 619 (6th Cir.1993) 28 As indicated above, during trial, Price sought to admit into evidence a post-arrest statement made by Desmond Patnett while in police custody. Defendant argued that the statement fell within the hearsay exception set forth in Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) as a statement against penal interest of an unavailable witness. In the statement, Patnett related that he was in Memphis to purchase fifteen kilograms of cocaine; that Price traveled with him to help him drive; that although he did not tell Price and the others traveling with him why he was going to Memphis, he assumed they knew; that he asked them to help him drive by making them some sweet offers; and that the money in the bag belonged only to him. 1 29 The District Court determined that Patnett's statement was not admissible under any theory, and specifically not under Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) because of lack of corroborating circumstances clearly indicating its trustworthiness. We hold that the District Court erred in concluding that there were insufficient corroborating circumstances to indicate the trustworthiness of the statement and consequently erred in excluding Patnett's hearsay statement. The error, however, was harmless. 30
Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(3) provides: 31 (b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a witness: 32 . . . . . 33 (3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far intended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 34 The Supreme Court has adopted a narrow definition of the word statement for the purposes of Rule 804(b)(3). In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), the Supreme Court held that each individual declaration or remark made by a declarant constitutes a statement and that only those declarations or remarks within the confession that are individually self-inculpatory are admissible under the rule. Collateral statements, even ones neutral as to interest, should be treated the same as other hearsay statements that are generally not admissible. Collateral statements may not be admissible based on their proximity to self-inculpatory ones. The Williamson Court held: 35 In our view, the most faithful reading of Rule 804(b)(3) is that it does not allow admission of non-self-inculpatory statements, even if they are made within a broader narrative that is generally self--inculpatory. The district court may not just assume for purposes of Rule 804(b)(3) that a statement is self-inculpatory because it is part of a fuller confession, and this is especially true when the statement implicates someone else. 36 Id. at 600-01, 114 S.Ct. at 2435. Whether an individual statement is admissible under Rule 804(b)(3), thus, is a question that can only be answered in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id. at 604, 114 S.Ct. at 2437. 37 The post-arrest statement made by Patnett to Detective Berryhill is written in a line-by-line question and answer format, resulting in what is, in effect, a series of individual statements under Williamson. Patnett's written statement could easily have been redacted so that those individual collateral statements that are not self-inculpatory could be excluded. In light of the Supreme Court's holding in Williamson, the District Court should have excluded any non-self-inculpatory assertions made by Patnett in his post-arrest statement because they do not meet the definition of statement as it applies to Rule 804(b)(3), but it should have admitted those portions which were self-inculpatory. 2 38 2. The Self-Inculpatory Assertions In Patnett's Statement Are Admissible Under Rule 804 Because Corroborating Circumstances Clearly Indicate The Trustworthiness Of The Statement. 39 This Court has determined that three conditions must be met before a district court may admit evidence under Rule 804(b)(3): 40
41 (2) The statement must subject the declarant to criminal liability in a real and tangible way; and 42 (3) Corroborating circumstances must clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. 43 Hilliard, supra, at 619, citing United States v. Arthur, 949 F.2d 211, 216 (6th Cir.1991). 44 The District Court denied the admission of Patnett's hearsay statement solely because of the insufficiency of corroborating circumstances. With respect to the other Hilliard factors, the parties agreed that Patnett was unavailable as a witness. 3 Both parties also agreed that at least parts of Patnett's statements tend to subject him to criminal liability. The District Court concluded, however, that Patnett's statements were inadmissible because there were no corroborating circumstances that clearly indicated the trustworthiness of the statement. The District Court, however, failed to appreciate that Rule 804(b)(3) does not require that the information within the statement be clearly corroborated; it requires only that there be corroborating circumstances which clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement, itself. As the Seventh Circuit observed in United States v. Garcia, 986 F.2d 1135 (7th Cir.1993), the corroboration requirement of this rule is a preliminary question as to the admissibility of the statement, not an ultimate determination as to the weight to be given to that statement. The Seventh Circuit held in Garcia that the trial court does not need to be completely convinced as a prerequisite to admission that the exculpatory statements are true. Rather, the trial court need only find that sufficient corroborating circumstances exist which indicate the statement's trustworthiness. The jury may then make the ultimate determination concerning the truth of the statements. Id. at 1141. 45 Rule 804 does not describe precisely what type of corroborating circumstances clearly indicate trustworthiness, but case law has identified three circumstances which are particularly relevant. In United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338, 1346 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 792, 83 L.Ed.2d 785 (1985), the court found that one important corroborating circumstance exists if the involved parties do not have a close relationship. Two additional factors were identified in United States v. Garcia, 897 F.2d 1413, 1421 (7th Cir.1990): (1) the statement was made after the declarant had been advised of his Miranda rights, and (2) there was no evidence that the declarant made the statement in an effort to curry favor with the authorities. 46 Applying the factors identified in Silverstein and Garcia to the facts in this case, it is clear that there are sufficient corroborating circumstances. There is no evidence that Patnett had any personal interest in exonerating Price. The two men had known each other for only three months and were not friends. Patnett's written statement was presented at trial, and it clearly indicated that he had made the statement voluntarily after having been advised of his Miranda rights. Further, there is no evidence that Patnett made the statement in an attempt to curry favor with the authorities. Based on these proofs, we find that there are sufficient corroborating circumstances that clearly indicate the trustworthiness of Patnett's hearsay statement. 47 Just as importantly, the evidence at trial did independently corroborate a number of parts of Patnett's statement. For example, his statement that he came to Memphis to purchase fifteen kilos of cocaine is corroborated by the testimony of Detective Gerold Blum who was the undercover police officer that had been tipped off by a confidential informant that a drug transaction was going to take place at the Motel 6. Blum testified at trial that he brought the suitcase with 15 kilos of cocaine in it to the motel for purchase by the defendants and that when he opened the suitcase to flash the drugs, Patnett said, Fifteen? to which Blum responded yes. 48 In addition, the price Patnett said he was going to pay for the cocaine, $10,000 per kilogram, matched almost exactly the amount of money Patnett and the others were found with--$151,000 in cash to pay for the 15 kilograms. 49 Evidentiary rulings on the admission of evidence under Fed.R.Evid. 804 are left to the discretion of the trial court. United States v. Garcia, supra, 986 F.2d 1135. However, the court abuses its discretion as to the trustworthiness of a statement under Rule 804(b)(3) when it refuses to allow into evidence statements that are corroborated by other substantial evidence. United States v. Hilliard, supra, 11 F.3d. at 616. The court in United States v. Garcia, specifically said that a trial court's determination of the trustworthiness of an out-of-court statement should be upheld unless the finding is clearly erroneous. 897 F.2d at 1421. 50 Based upon the foregoing discussion, we find, in this case, that the District Court's refusal to admit Patnett's statement for lack of corroborating circumstances of trustworthiness was clearly erroneous. The self-inculpatory portions of the statement should have been admitted. 51 3. The District Court's Error In Not Admitting Patnett's Hearsay Statement Is Harmless Error. 52 Although a district court abuses its discretion as to the trustworthiness of a statement pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3) when it refuses to allow into evidence statements that are corroborated by other substantial evidence, Hilliard, supra, the error in this case was harmless. A trial court's error is harmless only if this Court is convinced that the error did not influence the jury or had a very slight effect, and can say so with fair assurance. United States v. Nagib, 56 F.3d, 798, 805 (7th Cir.1995), quoting United States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 622 (7th Cir.1989). 53 In Hilliard, this Court held that while the district court abused its discretion in not admitting into evidence a hearsay statement pursuant to Rule 804(b)(3), the defendant's conviction would nevertheless be affirmed because the court's error was harmless: 54 Despite the district court's error in failing to consider the appropriate factors in ruling on the admission of [the 804(b)(3) statement made by Wade], Hilliard's conviction must stand. Hilliard was charged with and convicted of aiding and abetting the possession of cocaine. Wade's claim of ownership of the cocaine, which in no way exculpates Hilliard, is thus not material evidence. Given the extensive testimony at trial supporting Hilliard's guilt on the counts of conviction, this court finds that the district court's exclusion of the hearsay evidence was harmless error. 55 11 F.3d at 620. 56 This case is factually and analytically similar to Hilliard. Price and Patnett were indicted for aiding and abetting each other in the attempted possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Patnett's admissions against his penal interest in his hearsay statements in no way exculpate Price, especially in light of the decision in Williamson to exclude collateral statements that are not self-inculpatory in nature. Rather, they simply inculpate Patnett. For example, Patnett's admission in the hearsay statement that he was the one who was buying the cocaine does not exculpate Price--it merely inculpates Patnett. The fact that this does not help Price is made more evident by Patnett's indication later in the statement that Price was to assist in the driving to Memphis and that Patnett assumed Price knew what they were going to Memphis to do. In another part of the statement, Patnett said he asked Price and Fosten to help drive by making them some sweet offers. Clearly, these statements, if admitted, would not have been helpful to Price. 57 Beyond this, there was ample independent evidence to convict Price: Price carried the money from the minivan to the motel room; Price carried the money to the informant's room; Price was left to keep surveillance and wait for the seller when Patnett left the informant's room; Price, along with Patnett, nodded his head when asked if the cocaine should be tested. In short, irrespective of the improperly excluded statements, the evidence at trial clearly established that Price's involvement in the cocaine transaction was extensive. In light of this substantial evidence of Price's aiding and abetting the attempted drug transaction, the district court's error was harmless.