Opinion ID: 2631230
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Claims under Section 1983

Text: {8} Section 1983 provides a cause of action for money damages against a state official in his or her individual capacity for the deprivation of federal constitutional or statutory rights. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (holding that Section 1983 does not extend to actions against States or state officials in their official capacity); see also Kennedy v. Dexter Consol. Sch., 2000 NMSC 025, ¶ 9, 129 N.M. 436, 10 P.3d 115. Under Section 1983, a state official's individual liability is limited by qualified immunity. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813-19 & n. 30, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity shield[s] [government officials performing discretionary functions] from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727. Qualified immunity is necessary to protect public officers from undue interference with their duties and from potentially disabling threats of liability. Id. at 806, 102 S.Ct. 2727. {9} The United States Supreme Court has established the proper procedure in assessing a claim of qualified immunity. A court evaluating a claim of qualified immunity must first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609, 119 S.Ct. 1692, 143 L.Ed.2d 818 (1999) (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). Applying this analytical guideline, we separately address Garcia-Montoya's Section 1983 claims, determining first whether there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Montoya and Andermann violated Garcia-Montoya's actual constitutional rights and second whether those rights, if violated, were clearly established at the time. Deciding the constitutional question before addressing the qualified immunity question ... promotes clarity in the legal standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public. Id. For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that, although there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the violation of Garcia-Montoya's constitutional rights, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.
{10} In Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), the United States Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the practice of political patronage in the context of the First Amendment. A plurality of the Court explained that political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment. Id. at 356, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (plurality opinion). Patronage, therefore, to the extent it compels or restrains belief and association, is inimical to the process which undergirds our system of government and is at war with the deeper traditions of democracy embodied in the First Amendment. Id. at 357, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (quotation marks and quoted authority omitted). {11} Despite the interference with the freedom of association, however, the plurality opined that political patronage would be permissible for appropriate reasons. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360, 96 S.Ct. 2673. Specifically, under the standard of an exacting scrutiny, the governmental official accused of engaging in political patronage must show an interest of vital importance and must demonstrate that the means chosen to advance the vitally important interest are the least restrictive of the freedom of political belief and association. Id. at 362-63, 96 S.Ct. 2673. In the context of the present case, the vitally important end of political loyalty of employees may be achieved by patronage dismissals of policymaking positions but may not extend to nonpolicymaking employees. Id. at 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673. No clear line can be drawn between policymaking and nonpolicymaking positions. While nonpolicymaking individuals usually have limited responsibility, that is not to say that one with a number of responsibilities is necessarily in a policymaking position. The nature of the responsibilities is critical. Id. at 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673. The Court subsequently emphasized that the ultimate inquiry is not whether the label `policymaker' or `confidential' fits a particular position; rather, the question is whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). Because there is a presumptive prohibition on infringement of the First Amendment freedoms of political belief and association, Elrod, 427 U.S. at 360, 96 S.Ct. 2673, the burden of demonstrating that a position is subject to political patronage rests with the hiring authority, and cases of doubt [are] resolved in favor of an employee who is dismissed for political reasons. Id. at 368, 96 S.Ct. 2673. {12} Garcia-Montoya contends that Montoya and Andermann transferred her due to her support of their political opponent and ultimately replaced her with a political ally. The Supreme Court has provided that promotions, transfers, and recalls after layoffs based on political affiliation or support are an impermissible infringement on the First Amendment rights of public employees. Rutan v. Republican Party, 497 U.S. 62, 75, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990). Resolving all reasonable inferences in favor of the opponent of summary judgment, we believe Garcia-Montoya adequately raised a presumption of an impermissible infringement of her First Amendment rights, and the burden falls on Montoya and Andermann to demonstrate that the position of director of administrative services is subject to political patronage. See Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1392 (10th Cir.1990) (stating that a plaintiff satisfies the burden under Elrod-Branti by raising a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [the] exercise of protected First Amendment activity was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action), overruled on other grounds by Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302-03, 113 S.Ct. 2625, 125 L.Ed.2d 239 (1993). Montoya and Andermann claim that the political loyalty exception to the prohibition against political patronage applies to Garcia-Montoya's former position at the STO. {13} In evaluating whether a particular position is subject to employment action, such as a transfer, based on political patronage, we examine the inherent duties of the position. See Sanders v. Montoya, 1999 NMCA 079, ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 465, 982 P.2d 1064. Nonetheless, a plaintiff's actual duties, as well as the duties performed by the plaintiff's replacement, may be considered as evidence of the inherent duties of the position as it is conceived by the public official accused of engaging in impermissible political patronage. E.g., Feeney v. Shipley, 164 F.3d 311, 320 (6th Cir.1999) (noting that actual duties accurately reflected the inherent duties of the position); Faughender v. City of North Olmsted, 927 F.2d 909, 913 (6th Cir.1991) (considering both the inherent duties of the position and the planned duties of the new holder of the position); Dickeson v. Quarberg, 844 F.2d 1435, 1442 (10th Cir.1988) (focusing on the inherent duties of the position as well as the actual duties performed), applied in Jantzen v. Hawkins, 188 F.3d 1247, 1253 & n. 1 (10th Cir.1999). {14} The inquiry under Elrod-Branti is necessarily fact specific. Even though the test of appropriateness for effective performance identified in Branti is somewhat vague and difficult to apply, courts have articulated a number of factors that are useful in determining whether a particular position is subject to political patronage: the extent to which duties are clearly defined and nondiscretionary as opposed to vague and broad, relative pay, the need for technical expertise in carrying out the duties of the position, the extent of power to control others, the authority to speak with the public, other entities, or elected officials on behalf of policymakers, the relative influence on important programs, the preparation of budgets, and the ability to hire and fire other employees. See Assaf v. Fields, 178 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 951, 120 S.Ct. 374, 145 L.Ed.2d 292 (1999); Fazio v. City of San Francisco, 125 F.3d 1328, 1334 n. 5 (9th Cir.1997); see also Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1256 (discussing whether employees were such important communicators or were privy to confidential information to such an extent that political loyalty would be an appropriate job requirement). Courts have also restated Branti's test as a determination of whether the position permits meaningful input into issues for which there is room for principled disagreement on the nature and scope of policy goals. See, e.g., Boyle v. County of Allegheny Pa., 139 F.3d 386, 396-97 (3d Cir.1998). As explained below, we conclude, based on these factors and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Garcia-Montoya, that Defendants have failed to demonstrate that Garcia-Montoya's former position is subject to political patronage. However, we believe that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity because a reasonable official in 1995 could have believed that the political loyalty exception applied to Garcia-Montoya's position.
{15} In her affidavit, Garcia-Montoya averred that she never had any authority to establish any policy decisions concerning personnel, budget or budget allocations, for the State Treasurer's Office. During her deposition, she described her duties generally as overseeing the budget area, personnel, telecommunications, [and] information systems. Garcia-Montoya indicated that she formulated a budget under the Treasurer's direction, and she explained that her work on the budget included analyzing the reasonableness of the Treasurer's proposals and making recommendations based on applicable rules and regulations. Garcia-Montoya accepted defense counsel's characterization of the work as basically see[ing] that the office budget stayed on track. Garcia-Montoya's work in the areas of telecommunications and information systems essentially consisted of the purchasing of supplies. {16} Regarding her responsibilities in the area of personnel, Garcia-Montoya handled the paperwork for personnel actions. Although Garcia-Montoya indicated that she questioned certain personnel decisions made by Montoya and Andermann based on her familiarity with personnel rules, she did not indicate whether advice on personnel matters formed one of the inherent duties of her position. She stated that she was not asked directly whether a termination was appropriate under the personnel rules, but she said, That's the kind of thing I should have been involved in. Garcia-Montoya was involved in only one interview of applicants for a position at the STO under David King, and she was not involved in any interviews as director of administrative services under Montoya. On one occasion, Andermann requested that Garcia-Montoya participate in a panel interview of applicants for a position, but she refused due to her belief that the applicants had been pre-selected contrary to personnel rules. Finally, she advised Montoya concerning the addition of positions that she believed would benefit the office. Garcia-Montoya was classified as a financial manager I, a classification which applies to a group of positions and which is defined as assisting or directing agency fiscal and budget analysis activities. {17} Montoya and Andermann did not provide a detailed list of inherent duties for the position of director of administrative services. According to Andermann, the duties included advising the Treasurer on personnel issues and ensuring that the budget complies with all legal and procedural requirements. For the most part, Montoya and Andermann relied on Garcia-Montoya's description of her duties in claiming that her position is subject to political patronage. {18} Garcia-Montoya's job title is not dispositive. See, e.g., Milazzo v. O'Connell, 108 F.3d 129, 133 n. 1 (7th Cir.1997) (stating that merely being a supervisor/administrator is not sufficient to create an exception to the prohibition against political patronage dismissals). Further, it is clear from Garcia-Montoya's description of her position that her duties in relation to the areas of telecommunications and information systems were merely ministerial in nature. The purchasing of supplies does not implicate partisan issues. We more closely scrutinize Garcia-Montoya's responsibilities in the areas of personnel and the budget, however, because these duties, if sufficiently broad and discretionary, can result in a need for political affiliation for effective performance. See, e.g., Peters v. Del. River Port Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1358 (3d Cir.1994) ([P]reparing budgets and promoting projects are duties which count in favor of finding that the exception to Branti-Elrod applies.); Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1998) (mentioning the relevance of important personnel functions). {19} Some of the facts highlighted by Montoya and Andermann indicate a substantial role in the areas of personnel and the budget. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 368, 96 S.Ct. 2673 (plurality opinion) (stating that consideration should also be given to whether the employee acts as an adviser). These facts tend to support the view that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for Garcia-Montoya's position. See Feeney, 164 F.3d at 321 (stating that the expenditure of significant tax revenues is one of the most important policymaking decisions in government); Bicanic v. McDermott, 867 F.2d 391, 394 (7th Cir.1989) (stating that public officials must be able to count on the support of those who prepare budgets, negotiate and sign contracts, and generally run the show at a substantial component of the government). {20} However, other facts alleged by Garcia-Montoya support a contrary inference. Garcia-Montoya stated that she basically tried to keep the budget on track. As a result, it is unclear whether her use of the term formulation actually referred to the implementation of a budget that was formulated by the Treasurer. See Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1255 n. 3 (distinguishing policy implementation from policy formulation for purposes of a political loyalty inquiry). Additionally, according to Garcia-Montoya, she filled out the paperwork for personnel actions, did not participate in interviews, was not consulted about personnel decisions, and had no power to hire or fire other employees. This description is supported by Montoya's deposition testimony that Garcia-Montoya's job consisted of paying the bills and filing personnel matters and adding up the hours for everybody to get them their paycheck. Further, Andermann described the position as involving internal support. Cf. Assaf, 178 F.3d at 178 (distinguishing positions relat[ing] to the government's activity vis-a-vis the public from those involving a largely endogenous function of the state government and as such serve[ ] an internal and practical purpose). {21} We also believe it is significant that Garcia-Montoya received an excellent performance evaluation after Montoya had been in office for approximately six months, despite the fact that she questioned several of his personnel decisions during that period. The relevant inquiry under Branti-Elrod is the effective performance of the duties of the public office, and we believe that a favorable performance evaluation completed after a significant period of time under the new administration severely undermine[s][the] summary judgment argument that political affiliation and loyalty are as a matter of law indisputably valid justifications for employment action based on political patronage. Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1253-54 (relying on actual performance based on ample proof that [the employees] did effectively perform their jobs despite political differences). Finally, we note that there is no evidence that Garcia-Montoya was authorized to speak or act on behalf of Defendants, a compelling, though not necessarily critical, factor in determining the applicability of the political loyalty exception. See, e.g., Sanders, 1999 NMCA 079, ¶ 15, 127 N.M. 465, 982 P.2d 1064; Gordon v. County of Rockland, 110 F.3d 886, 890 (2d Cir.1997) (stating that acting or speaking on behalf of a policymaker is of primary importance in that circuit); Peters, 16 F.3d at 1358 ([P]arty affiliation is unquestionably significant to the ... duties of maintaining good public relations and acting as a liaison with public officials.). {22} These facts could be interpreted as placing some of the duties of the position highlighted by Montoya and Andermann, such as acting as an advisor, in context. As a result, we believe these facts could support Garcia-Montoya's contention that the director of administrative services does not have meaningful input into the substantive policy decisions of the Treasurer, does not serve as an important communicator on behalf of the STO, and is not privy to confidential information to such an extent as to require political loyalty. Cf. Assaf, 178 F.3d at 176-79 (concluding that summary judgment in favor of the public official was not appropriate in relation to a position that did not have significant input into a major governmental program and did not involve significant contact with the public because the generic duties of participating in meetings and controlling others could just as well apply to any public employee with a measure of supervisory responsibility); Milazzo, 108 F.3d at 130-33 (concluding that a human resources administrator who implemented hiring policies, worked on budget and payroll issues, provided information on job applicants, and administered a summer program was not, as a matter of law, subject to political patronage dismissal under Branti because the position was not autonomous or discretionary, did not include the power to hire or fire, and did not include the formulation of personnel policy). But cf. Feeney, 164 F.3d at 321 (discussing an employee with extensive discretion over how the public fisc would be used to achieve the aims of [the] department). {23} Based on the standard of review applicable at summary judgment, we must draw every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant. Additionally, we must bear in mind the Supreme Court's admonition that cases involving doubt must be resolved in favor of the First Amendment protection against political patronage. Montoya and Andermann have failed to provide a detailed list of inherent duties, or the duties of Garcia Montoya's replacement, that would illuminate the extent of Garcia-Montoya's involvement in personnel and budgetary matters. Thus, viewing the facts in a light most favorable to a trial on the merits, we believe that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of Garcia-Montoya's former position. Branti, 445 U.S. at 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287. Defendants have therefore failed to demonstrate a vitally important interest sufficient to justify infringement on Garcia-Montoya's freedom of political belief.
{24} As articulated above, a public official is entitled to qualified immunity in the performance of a discretionary function if the constitutional or statutory right alleged to have been violated was not clearly established at the time of the official's conduct. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638-39, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). The Supreme Court has explained that, in order to be clearly established, it is not necessary that the very action in question has previously been held unlawful. Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. In order to allow officials to know that they will not be held personally liable as long as their actions are reasonable in light of current American law, id. at 646, 107 S.Ct. 3034, the Court has defined a clearly established right as one that has sufficiently clear [contours] that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right. Id. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034. [I]n the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness [of the governmental official's action] must be apparent. Id. {25} At the time that Montoya and Andermann allegedly transferred Garcia-Montoya based on political affiliation in 1995, it was clearly established under Branti that the First Amendment prohibits political patronage unless political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Further, by 1995, numerous courts had the opportunity to interpret, clarify, and apply Branti in the context of a number of different public offices. See Roldan-Plumey v. Cerezo Suarez, 115 F.3d 58, 66 (1st Cir.1997) (stating that the law concerning political patronage grew much clearer in the late 1980s and early 1990s). As a result, examining the right involved in this case, we believe that the contours of the right are generally well-defined and that reasonable officials in the majority of cases will be aware of a violation of the freedom of political belief. [2] {26} Nonetheless, with respect to the position involved in this case, we believe that the contours of the right are not sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] is doing violates that right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034; see Roldan-Plumey, 115 F.3d at 66 (To be sure, the law may still be blurred around the edges.). In Elrod, the plurality referred to the importance of political affiliation with respect to advisors, and several courts have listed involvement in personnel and budgetary matters as an important factor in determining the applicability of the Branti-Elrod exception to political patronage. In this case, it is clear that Garcia-Montoya had some significant level of involvement in these areas. But cf. Assaf, 178 F.3d at 179 (concluding that summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity was inappropriate [i]n light of [the employee's] lack of any significant contact with the public and the undisputed fact that [the employee's] level of responsibility did not touch on politically sensitive issues, which would raise the likelihood of serious political embarrassment (emphasis added)). Although we believe that ambiguities in the scope of these responsibilities prevent a conclusion of law that political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for effective performance, our determination on this issue has been largely informed by cases decided after 1995 distinguishing between policy formulation and policy implementation and between internal functions of a governmental agency and the agency's relations with the public and other governmental entities. See, e.g., Assaf, 178 F.3d at 176-79; Milazzo, 108 F.3d at 130-33. Thus, while we believe there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the advice required of Garcia-Montoya's position concerned matters of policy or, instead, related solely to the internal workings of the STO and whether Garcia-Montoya's position entails meaningful input into a major governmental program, we also believe that a reasonable official in Montoya's or Andermann's position in 1995 could have concluded from case law and from the facts that her position was subject to the political loyalty exception of Branti-Elrod. In essence, we believe that the facts on summary judgment, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Garcia-Montoya, reveal a position that is marginal under Branti. The unlawfulness in transferring Garcia-Montoya due to political affiliation, assuming it to be unlawful, would not have been apparent in 1995. Under these limited circumstances, we believe Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. We therefore affirm the district court's grant of Defendants' motion for summary judgment on this claim.
{27} Garcia-Montoya claims that Montoya and Andermann violated her First Amendment right to freedom of speech by transferring her based on the expression of her belief that several of Montoya's personnel actions were politically motivated. It is well established that a government employer may not discharge an employee for reasons that infringe his or her free-speech interests. Martinez v. City of Grants, 1996 NMSC 061, ¶ 15, 122 N.M. 507, 927 P.2d 1045. In this context, we apply a four-part test derived from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) and Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142-43, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) to determine whether a public employer has unconstitutionally abridged an employee's freedom of speech: (1) whether the speech forming the basis of the employment action involves a matter of public concern; (2) if so, whether the interests of the employee in speaking on the matter outweigh the interests of the employer in maintaining and promoting efficiency in the performance of its responsibilities to the public; (3) if so, whether the employee is able to show that the speech was a substantial factor in the employment decision; and (4) if so, whether the employer is able to rebut the employee's evidence by showing that it would have instituted the employment action regardless of the protected speech. See Martinez, 1996 NMSC 061, ¶ 20, 122 N.M. 507, 927 P.2d 1045; Barker v. City of Del City, 215 F.3d 1134, 1138-39 (10th Cir.2000). The former two factors are questions of law to be decided by the court, while the latter two are issues of fact for the jury. Martinez, 1996 NMSC 061, ¶ 20, 122 N.M. 507, 927 P.2d 1045. Applying the first two factors, we believe that Garcia-Montoya's speech involves a matter of public concern and that Defendants have not demonstrated that the balance in this case tips in favor of the employer to restrict the speech. However, as with Garcia-Montoya's political affiliation claim, we conclude that a reasonable official in 1995 could have believed that Garcia Montoya could be transferred on the basis of her speech, and Defendants are therefore entitled to qualified immunity.
{28} In determining whether an employee's speech involves a matter of public concern, we evaluate the content, form, and context of the speech to determine whether it can be fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the community. Connick, 461 U.S. at 146-48, 103 S.Ct. 1684. In this case, we do not believe there is any serious doubt that Garcia-Montoya's speech involved a matter of public concern. {29} Montoya and Andermann claim that Garcia-Montoya's speech did not involve a matter of public concern because her comments were made in private, because the speech involved internal personnel matters for which Garcia-Montoya was responsible in the STO, and because Garcia-Montoya indicated that she spoke out about the personnel decisions as an employee and not to express herself politically. Defendants claim these facts indicate that Garcia-Montoya was not assisting the public in its analysis of the performance of the office. {30} As Defendants point out, it is not determinative in this case that Garcia-Montoya privately communicated her concerns to Montoya and Andermann rather than making her concerns public. In Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School District, 439 U.S. 410, 411-13, 99 S.Ct. 693, 58 L.Ed.2d 619 (1979), a teacher met privately with the school principal on two occasions to express her belief that the school's employment policies and practices were racially discriminatory. The employer contended that the teacher's remarks were not protected by the First Amendment because they were made in private. The Supreme Court held that [n]either the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that [the freedom of speech] is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his [or her] employer rather than to spread his [or her] views before the public. Id. at 415-16, 99 S.Ct. 693. Additionally, [t]he fact that the employee statements were made as a part of the employee's official functions [is] only one of the relevant factors in the First Amendment analysis. Koch v. City of Hutchinson, 847 F.2d 1436, 1442 (10th Cir. 1988). {31} In Connick, an assistant district attorney who was dissatisfied with her employer's plan to transfer her circulated a questionnaire to fellow employees asking their opinion about the office transfer policy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervisors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. Connick, 461 U.S. at 141, 103 S.Ct. 1684. The Supreme Court elaborated on the proper focus of an inquiry into whether speech involves matters of public concern. We view [most of] the questions ... as mere extensions of [the employee's] dispute over her transfer to another section.... [W]e do not believe these questions are of public import in evaluating the performance of the District Attorney as an elected official.... While discipline and morale in the workplace are related to an agency's efficient performance of its duties, the focus of [the] questions is not to evaluate the performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of controversy with her superiors. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. 1684. {32} In this case, it is true that Garcia-Montoya's statements involved matters that could be characterized as part of her official duties relating to personnel. If her statements had only concerned routine matters of personnel, we believe, based on Connick, that this case would present a close question. For example, Garcia-Montoya objected to the firing of two employees based on her interpretation of personnel rules without expressing her belief that the terminations were politically motivated. These statements could be interpreted as merely indicating a routine disagreement with personnel action and are therefore similar to the majority of questions posed of coworkers in Connick in that, if made public, they would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single employee is upset with the status quo. Connick, 461 U.S. at 148, 103 S.Ct. 1684; cf. Koch, 847 F.2d at 1447 (concluding that a matter of public concern was not involved in a written report [that] was simply one of many routine official reports which are processed through the City's local governmental agencies on a daily basis). While as a matter of good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. Thus, if these were the only statements made by Garcia-Montoya, it would be necessary to examine more closely whether Garcia-Montoya's speech implicated the efficiency and effectiveness of the STO during Montoya's term of office. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 & n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1684; Powell v. Basham, 921 F.2d 165, 167 (8th Cir.1990) (stating that an employee's criticism of [the employer's] promotion system and practices went beyond his own dissatisfaction and involved concerns expressed by other department employees and concluding that speech which informs superiors of the adverse impact the department's promotion practices could have on its operations and on the efficiency of the office involves matters of public concern). {33} However, we need not engage in such an analysis because Garcia-Montoya's statements to Montoya and Andermann went well beyond routine personnel matters. Garcia-Montoya expressed her belief to Andermann that he had fired a different employee for political reasons, told Montoya on more than one occasion that she disagreed with the political nature in which he filled various positions, and refused Andermann's request to interview individuals on the ground that she believed they were illegally pre-selected. In Connick, while the Court determined that most of the questions posed to the plaintiff's coworkers did not involve matters of public concern, the Court reached a different conclusion with respect to the question of whether the coworkers felt pressured to work on political campaigns for members of the office. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. The Court determined that the political campaign question implicated a coercion of belief in violation of fundamental constitutional rights. Id. [T]here is a demonstrated interest in this country that government service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service. Id. Like the political campaign question in Connick, Garcia-Montoya's speech constituted an expression of belief that Montoya improperly based his personnel decisions on political affiliation instead of meritorious performance. In effect, Garcia-Montoya was asserting a violation of the First Amendment rights of others and voicing an objection to what she believed was unconstitutional and illegal action by an elected official. Garcia-Montoya therefore sought to bring to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust. Id. at 148, 103 S.Ct. 1684. This type of speech is analogous to the complaints about sexual harassment and discrimination in Martinez and about racial discrimination in Givhan because it involves a matter inherently of public concern, Connick, 461 U.S. at 148 n. 8, 103 S.Ct. 1684. See Martinez, 1996 NMSC 061, ¶ 27, 122 N.M. 507, 927 P.2d 1045 (Through ... legislation society has voiced its concern with and condemnation of sexual discrimination and favoritism in the workplace.); Connick, 461 U.S. at 146, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (Although the subject matter of [the plaintiff's] statements were not the issue before the Court [in Givhan ], it is clear that her statements concerning the School District's allegedly racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of public concern.). The Supreme Court clearly considers it apparent that this type of information is a matter of interest to the community upon which it is essential that public employees be able to speak out freely without fear of retaliatory dismissal. Connick, 461 U.S. at 149, 103 S.Ct. 1684. As a result, we again find it unnecessary to decide ... the degree of deference that must be accorded to the employer when the terminated employee's speech addresses only matters of internal office policy. Martinez, 1996 NMSC 061, ¶ 31, 122 N.M. 507, 927 P.2d 1045. We conclude that Garcia-Montoya's speech involves matters of public concern. {34} With respect to the second factor in the four-part test, courts must attempt to arrive at a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731. See generally Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 672-75, 114 S.Ct. 1878, 128 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994) (plurality opinion). There are a number of factors to consider in performing the Pickering balancing, including whether the statement impairs discipline by superiors or harmony among co-workers, has a detrimental impact on close working relationships for which personal loyalty and confidence are necessary, or impedes the performance of the speaker's duties or interferes with the regular operation of the enterprise. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987). The State bears a burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds, Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, and the State's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression. Connick, 461 U.S. at 150, 103 S.Ct. 1684. The focus is on the effective functioning of the public employer's enterprise. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891. Thus, Montoya and Andermann must produce evidence of an actual disruption in public services, Martinez, 1996 NMSC 061, ¶ 29, 122 N.M. 507, 927 P.2d 1045, or evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the speech would disrupt the department, undermine their authority, or destroy close working relationships in the STO, see Connick, 461 U.S. at 154, 103 S.Ct. 1684. See generally id. at 152, 103 S.Ct. 1684 ([W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest before taking action.). {35} Because this case involves both the freedom of political belief and the freedom of speech, we note as an initial matter that at least one federal Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the determination that an individual serves in a position subject to political patronage dismissal under Elrod-Branti renders the Pickering balancing test inapplicable to a Section 1983 claim based on freedom of speech. See Biggs v. Best, Best & Krieger, 189 F.3d 989, 994-95 (9th Cir.1999). We do not agree with this approach. The political patronage inquiry under Elrod-Branti can involve many of the same considerations that inform the Pickering balancing test. Both analyses take into account the need for loyalty and confidence from a public employee and the extent to which activity protected by the First Amendment affects the performance of a public office. However, the United States Supreme Court has indicated in discussing Elrod-Branti that the Court's cases call for a different, though related, inquiry where a government employer takes adverse action on account of an employee or service provider's right of free speech. There, we apply the balancing test from [ Pickering ].... [T]he inquiry is whether the affiliation requirement is a reasonable one, so it is inevitable that some case-by-case adjudication will be required even where political affiliation is the test the government has imposed. A reasonableness analysis will also accommodate those many cases ... where specific instances of the employee's speech or expression, which require balancing in the Pickering context, are intermixed with a political affiliation requirement. In those cases, the balancing Pickering mandates will be inevitable. O'Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 719, 116 S.Ct. 2353, 135 L.Ed.2d 874 (1996). {36} We believe that the distinction between an Elrod-Branti analysis and a Pickering balancing lies in the focus of the potential interference with performance; whereas the Elrod-Branti analysis focuses generally on the potential detrimental impact of an opposing political affiliation, Pickering focuses more specifically on the content, form, place, and manner of the speech at issue and requires a balancing of the importance of the speech with the functioning of the public office. Presumably, even employees holding policymaking positions should be entitled to speak out freely on matters of fundamental social and political importance, such as unlawful discrimination in a public workplace, as long as the manner, time, and place in which the speech is made does not unduly disrupt the functioning of the governmental entity. See Barker, 215 F.3d at 1139-40 (reversing the grant of summary judgment in favor of the employer on a claim of infringement of free speech, despite the employee's status as a policymaker, because, under Pickering, no actual evidence indicates that the City experienced any disruption, that any such disruption was reasonably predicted, or that the City itself had any particular interest in limiting [the] speech). As a result, we conclude that in cases involving a claim by a public employee of adverse employment action based on both the freedom of political belief and the freedom of speech we must separately address the Elrod-Branti analysis and the Pickering balancing test. Barker, 215 F.3d at 1139 (stating that the two different analyses remain distinct and separate and citing other cases following this approach). {37} In this case, Montoya and Andermann do not contend at this stage that Garcia-Montoya's statements disrupted the office or undermined their authority. Garcia-Montoya made the statements privately to Andermann and Montoya, and there is no indication that the statements affected other employees in the office. Cf. Rankin, 483 U.S. at 388-89 & n. 13, 107 S.Ct. 2891 ([A] purely private statement on a matter of public concern will rarely, if ever, justify discharge of a public employee.). Additionally, similar to our political affiliation analysis in this case, we believe that Montoya and Andermann have failed to demonstrate sufficient facts to support a close working relationship requiring personal loyalty and confidence, and in any event, they have failed to show that Garcia-Montoya's speech would seriously undermine the effectiveness of the working relationship between them. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n. 3, 88 S.Ct. 1731. Indeed, Garcia-Montoya alleged that Andermann agreed with her on one occasion that a particular personnel decision was politically motivated but lamented that he was carrying out Montoya's instructions. Garcia-Montoya also alleged that Montoya listened to her criticisms, accepted the information, and took whatever course of action he deemed appropriate. There is some evidence in the record that Garcia-Montoya's speech affected her ability to perform the duties of her position. For example, Garcia-Montoya declined to participate in interviews of applicants she believed were pre-selected on the basis of political affiliation. However, based on the limited facts provided by Montoya and Andermann and the important interests implicated by Garcia-Montoya's speech, we are unable to conclude as a matter of law that Defendants have carried their burden of justifying the employment action on legitimate grounds. Cf. Connick, 461 U.S. at 152, 103 S.Ct. 1684 (We caution that a stronger showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially involved matters of public concern.); Martinez, 1996 NMSC 061, ¶ 31, 122 N.M. 507, 927 P.2d 1045 (noting that speech touching upon matters of public concern critical of a supervisor or other members of an office will invariably cause some disruption and that the relevant inquiry in the Pickering balance is the degree of disruption in relation to the importance of the speech). Viewing the facts on summary judgment in a light most favorable to the nonmovant, we conclude that the Pickering balance weighs in favor of Garcia-Montoya.
{38} We believe the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on the ground of qualified immunity for reasons similar to our decision that Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the alleged violation of Garcia-Montoya's freedom of political belief. In this opinion, we have rejected the proposition that the determination that a position is subject to political patronage dismissals obviates the need to apply the Pickering balancing test. However, this interpretation of Pickering and Elrod-Branti was not clearly established in 1995. McEvoy v. Spencer, 124 F.3d 92, 105 (2d Cir.1997). Thus, a reasonable official in Montoya's or Andermann's position could have concluded that an employee's policymaking status automatically immunized an employer's adverse action even in a pure Pickering case. Id. Because we have determined that a reasonable official acting in 1995 could have believed that Garcia-Montoya's position was subject to adverse action based on political patronage, we further determine that a reasonable official acting in 1995 could have believed that adverse employment action against the holder of that position could constitutionally stem from either political affiliation or instances of speech involving matters of public concern. Cf. id. (concluding that officials did not violate a clearly established right of [the employee] when, reasonably believing that he was a policymaker, they demoted him ... because of speech activities). As a result, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Montoya and Andermann on this claim.