Opinion ID: 2601704
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Two Recognized Approaches to Proving Apportionment

Text: ¶ 26 The first approach to indivisible enhanced injuries, which the Egberts urge us to adopt and which the Restatement follows, is known as the Fox-Mitchell approach. See Fox, 575 F.2d 774; Mitchell, 669 F.2d 1199. The Egberts assert that if we adopt this approach, Utah will join a majority of courts. [7] ¶ 27 Under the Fox-Mitchell approach, as outlined in the Restatement, where an indivisible injury exists in an enhanced-injury case, a plaintiff need only show that the product defect was a substantial factor in increasing the plaintiff's harm beyond that which would have resulted from other causes. If the defect is found to be a substantial factor and the fact-finder cannot apportion liability for the indivisible injury, then the product seller [8] is jointly and severally liable with the other tortfeasors who caused the injury. See Mitchell, 669 F.2d at 1206; Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 16(a)-(d) (1998). Consequently, once the plaintiff has established that the defect was a substantial factor, if the product seller seeks to avoid joint and several liability, it bears the burden of proving that the injury can be apportioned. See Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability § 16 cmt. d (1998). ¶ 28 Proponents compare the Fox-Mitchell approach to a situation where two parties cooperate in the production of an injury. Fox, 575 F.2d at 787; accord Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433B (1965). For them the injury flows from one impact caused by concurrent or contemporaneous tortfeasors. See Fox, 575 F.2d at 787. They also favor the approach for its public policy ramifications. Without the Fox-Mitchell approach, a proven wrongdoer [would] escape liability when the harm [could not] be apportioned, and a contrary rule would allow a [product seller] to escape liability even when a plaintiff had shown that the [product seller] had sold a defective product. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d 1209, 1219 (Alaska 1998). It also might impair the promotion of `safer products' design[ed] by manufacturers. Lee v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1288 (Okla.1984). Further, because the product seller has extensive knowledge of the product and its technical resources, it is in the best position to perform ... apportionment. Farnsworth, 965 P.2d at 1219. ¶ 29 The Fox-Mitchell approach has its critics. They prefer instead the Huddell-Caiazzo approach, followed by a minority of states. [9] See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir.1976); Caiazzo v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 647 F.2d 241 (2d Cir.1981). The Huddell-Caiazzo approach, which Nissan urges us to adopt, reasons that a product seller is liable only for the enhanced injuries attributable to the defective product. Huddell, 537 F.2d at 738. Because this is the essence of liability, the burden cannot properly shift to the defendant product seller to prove part of the plaintiff's case, nor can the failure to prove apportionment convert what was limited liability for the enhancement of an injury into plenary liability for the entire consequences of an accident which the [product seller] played no part in precipitating. Id. at 738-39. This approach views the enhanced-injury case not as an injury arising from one single impact caused by contemporaneous tortfeasors; rather it separates the injury and the circumstances surrounding it into distinct, disparate events. See id. at 738; see also D'Amario v. Ford Motor Co., 806 So.2d 424, 437 (Fla.2001) ([C]rashworthiness cases involve separate and distinct injuriesthose caused by the initial collision, and those subsequently caused by a second collision arising from a defective product.). ¶ 30 Hence, under the Huddell-Caiazzo approach, for a plaintiff to recover against a product seller for an enhanced injury, the plaintiff must establish the extent of enhanced injuries attributable to the defective design. Caiazzo, 647 F.2d at 246. When an indivisible injury exists, a plaintiff must demonstrate with specificity what might have happened in the collision under different circumstances. Id. at 245. Although a shifting burden of proof would corner[] the [product seller] into offering evidence of a plethora of hypothetical and speculative possibilities, id. at 246, the Huddell-Caiazzo approach recognizes that a plaintiff's burden of offering evidence of what injuries would have resulted absent the alleged defect will be heavy in some instances and perhaps impossible in others. Id. at 251. Where the task is impossible, the approach reasons that the plaintiff has merely failed to establish his prima facie case of an enhanced injury. Id.