Opinion ID: 1874840
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence of Nine Prior Felony Convictions

Text: The error in exposing the jury to this equivocal evidence was further compounded by allowing the introduction into evidence of Huggins' nine prior felony convictions after Huggins' counsel attempted to elicit testimony from a correctional officer that Huggins shaved his pubic region to avoid being infested with lice. First, it is not even clear from the testimony that the correctional officer's knowledge of Huggins' explanation for shaving came solely from what Huggins told him, which would be necessary for impeachment of Huggins as a hearsay declarant under section 90.806(1), Florida Statutes (2004). Second, assuming the explanation came solely from Huggins, this hearsay statement was ultimately elicited on cross-examination by the State and not (because of the State's hearsay objections) by Huggins, as required for impeachment of a hearsay declarant under the precedent relied upon by the majority. See majority op. at 756-57. Third, the issue of why Huggins shaved his pubic region was a collateral matter at best. Impeachment on a collateral matter is not proper. See Caruso v. State, 645 So.2d 389, 394 (Fla.1994) (reiterating well-established rule that if a witness is cross-examined concerning a collateral or irrelevant matter, the cross-examiner must `take' the answer, is bound by it, and may not subsequently impeach the witness by introducing extrinsic evidence to contradict the witness on that point). The wholly collateral character of the matter on which Huggins was impeached by the prior convictions distinguishes this case from the precedent cited by the majority for prior-record impeachment of a defendant's exculpatory hearsay statement. See majority op. at 756. In two of the decisions relied upon by the majority, the defense elicited hearsay statements indicating the defendant's innocence of the crime charged. See Kelly v. State, 857 So.2d 949, 950 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (holding defendant's felony record admissible to impeach credibility of defendant's statements elicited by defense to show that in its entirety, interrogation in which statements were made was exculpatory on crime charged); Werley v. State, 814 So.2d 1159, 1160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (holding defendant's felony record admissible to impeach credibility of defendant's statements to his wife introduced in attempt to show that he injured her accidentally). The third case cited by the majority for admission of a prior record to impeach a defendant's exculpatory hearsay statement, Llanos v. State, 770 So.2d 725 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000), concerned the defendant's probationary status rather than his prior record. In Llanos, the State was permitted to introduce evidence that the defendant was on probation at the time of a domestic battery to show that he wanted the victim to remain silent about the crime so he could avoid having his probation revoked, rather than because he was remorseful and wanted to resume the relationship, as stated in hearsay introduced by the defense. See id. at 726. In each of these cases, the hearsay directly concerned the alleged criminal conduct, and thus impeachment was not on a collateral matter. Here, however, the prior-record impeachment on a collateral matter took the jury far from the question of the defendant's guilt of the charged murder. Even when the impeachment does not go to a collateral matter, the impeachment evidence may be excluded under section 90.403, Florida Statutes (2004), which provides that evidence is inadmissible if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of issues, misleading the jury, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. See id. Indeed, the potential for unfair prejudice and confusion of issues would appear to be greater when the impeachment is accomplished solely through a credibility attack, as with prior convictions, rather than through contradictory evidence or inconsistent statements by the witness on a specific matter. Cf. Riechmann v. State, 581 So.2d 133, 140 (Fla.1991) (observing that the nature and remoteness of prior convictions may justify exclusion under section 90.403). In this case, the prior record created the danger, posed by all collateral-crime evidence, that [the] jury will take the bad character or propensity to crime thus demonstrated as evidence of guilt of the crime charged. Robertson v. State, 829 So.2d 901, 913-14 (Fla.2002). In this case it is likely that the jury would focus on Huggins' nine prior convictions as evidence of guilt rather than as a reason to disbelieve the innocent explanation for Huggins' act of shaving his pubic region. Weighed against the potential prejudice, the probative value of Huggins' prior felony record was slight. The prior record was relevant only on the narrow issue of the credibility of Huggins' statement as to why he shaved his pubic region. The State did not attempt to introduce the prior record under section 90.404, Florida Statutes (2004), which governs the admission of evidence of other crimes, demonstrating its irrelevance for any purpose but impeachment. Accordingly, the prior record should have been excluded under section 90.403. Even assuming that the testimony concerning Huggins' reason for shaving his pubic region opened the door for impeachment and that the prior record was not inadmissible under section 90.403, I nonetheless question whether the admission of Huggins' prior record is authorized by section 90.806. Section 90.806(1) provides that the credibility of a hearsay declarant may be attacked ... by any evidence that would be admissible for those purposes if the declarant had testified as a witness. A nontestifying hearsay declarant has not been given the opportunity to admit or deny the prior conviction, a prerequisite to introduction of the record of the conviction against a witness under section 90.610, Florida Statutes (2004). See, e.g., Gavins v. State, 587 So.2d 487, 489-90 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). See generally McArthur v. Cook, 99 So.2d 565, 567 (Fla.1957) ([T]he proper procedural approach is simply to ask the witness the straight-forward question as to whether he had ever been convicted of a crime.); § 90.610, Fla. Stat. Ann. (1999) (Law Revision Council Note  1976) ( McArthur ... sets forth the accepted procedure for using prior convictions to impeach.) Further, the rationale for prior-record impeachment is that the willingness to violate the law bears upon the witness's willingness to disregard the oath to tell the truth. See Charles W. Ehrhardt, Florida Evidence § 610.1, at 519 (2003 ed.). This rationale does not apply when the testimony being impeached is a hearsay statement not made under oath. Section 90.610(1) further provides that a party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, with the witness's prior criminal record. (Emphasis supplied.) However, section 90.806(1), which governs impeachment of hearsay declarants rather than witnesses, authorizes admission of [e]vidence of a statement or conduct by the declarant at any time inconsistent with the declarant's hearsay statement. A prior criminal record that is unrelated to the hearsay statement is not inconsistent with the statement.