Opinion ID: 2588259
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Voir Dire on Prior Murders

Text: The trial court conducted death qualification voir dire of each prospective juror individually and out of the presence of other prospective jurors (see Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301), followed immediately by general voir dire of that juror. Voir dire of each prospective juror proceeded in three steps: The court asked death-qualifying questions, attorneys for each side posed death-qualifying questions, and finally each side posed questions on general voir dire. After each step, the court entertained challenges for cause. All prospective jurors not excused for cause during this process were directed to return at a later date. When the prospective jurors remaining after voir dire assembled on that date, they were called into the jury box according to randomly assigned numbers, the court entertained the parties' peremptory challenges, and in this manner the final selection of the jury and the alternates was concluded. On the second day of voir dire, when defense counsel attempted to ask a prospective juror whether there were any particular crimes or any facts that would cause that juror automatically to vote for the death penalty, the trial court ruled the questions improper because we're restricted to this case. Later, when no prospective juror was present, defense counsel asked the court to reconsider the restriction. Counsel explained that the defense wanted to determine whether prospective jurors could return a verdict of life without parole for a defendant who had killed more than one person, without revealing that defendant had killed his grandparents. The trial court replied that because the prior murders were not expressly alleged in the charging document, it would not permit any such questions: You cannot ask anything about the facts that are not charged in the Information, period. You can't raise one mitigating factor, nor can [the prosecutor] raise one aggravating [factor] that is not charged in the Information.... You cannot go past the Information. The defense then prepared and filed a written motion seeking permission to ask prospective jurors whether there are any aggravating circumstances which would cause a prospective juror to automatically vote for the death penalty, without considering the alternative of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The trial court denied the motion with this comment: I am not permitting you to ask them about any specific acts of mitigation or aggravation, as that would in my opinion have them prejudge the evidence. The trial court enforced this ruling during the remainder of the voir dire, prohibiting any defense questioning about uncharged facts or circumstances that would cause a prospective juror to vote automatically for the death penalty. Defendant contends that by preventing all voir dire on the issue of prior murders, the court denied him his rights under our federal and state Constitutions to an impartial penalty jury. We agree. Prospective jurors may be excused for cause when their views on capital punishment would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) The real question is ``whether the juror's views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the juror's ability to return a verdict of death in the case before the juror. '' ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 431, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78, quoting People v. Bradford (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1229, 1318, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259, quoting in turn People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1003, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 839 P.2d 984.) Because the qualification standard operates in the same manner whether a prospective juror's views are for or against the death penalty ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 726-728, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492), it is equally true that the real question is whether the juror's views about capital punishment would prevent or impair the juror's ability to return a verdict of life without parole in the case before the juror. A challenge for cause may be based on the juror's response when informed of facts or circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried. ( People v. Kirkpatrick (1994) 7 Cal.4th 988, 1005, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) In Kirkpatrick, the defendant was charged with the execution-style killings of a teenage employee and a former supervisor against whom he bore a grudge. ( Id. at pp. 999-1000, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) The prosecution's case in aggravation included two uncharged assaults by the defendant on teenage boys, and an incident in which the defendant had threatened to harm the daughter and the pet dogs of a woman with whom he had a dispute over a calculator. ( Id. at pp. 1001-1002, 30 Cal. Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248.) The trial court permitted the defendant to ask jurors if they would automatically vote for or against death in cases involving any generalized facts, whether pleaded or not, that were likely to be shown by the evidence ( id. at p. 1004, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248, italics added). But the court ruled that the parties could use this voir dire only as a basis for peremptory challenges, not to establish grounds to challenge a prospective juror for cause. We concluded the trial court erred by not permitting such questions to support a challenge for cause. We held: A prospective juror who would invariably vote either for or against the death penalty because of one or more circumstances likely to be present in the case being tried, without regard to the strength of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, is therefore subject to challenge for cause, whether or not the circumstance that would be determinative for that juror has been alleged in the charging document. ( People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248, italics added; accord, People v. Ervin (2000) 22 Cal.4th 48, 70, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 853, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15.) Thus, we affirmed the principle that either party is entitled to ask prospective jurors questions that are specific enough to determine if those jurors harbor bias, as to some fact or circumstance shown by the trial evidence, that would cause them not to follow an instruction directing them to determine penalty after considering aggravating and mitigating evidence. (See CALJIC No. 8.85 (2000 rev.) (6th ed.1996).) We have endorsed such particularized death-qualifying voir dire in a variety of situations. A prosecutor may properly inquire whether a prospective juror could impose the death penalty on a defendant in a felony-murder case ( People v. Pinholster (1992) 1 Cal.4th 865, 916-917, 4 Cal. Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571), on a defendant who did not personally kill the victim ( People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 431, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78; People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 70-71, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506), on a young defendant or one who lacked a prior murder conviction ( People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 772-773, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297), or only in particularly extreme cases unlike the case being tried ( People v. Bradford, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1320, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145, 939 P.2d 259). Here, the trial court's ruling prohibited defendant's trial attorney from inquiring during voir dire whether prospective jurors would automatically vote for the death penalty if the defendant had previously committed another murder. Because in this case defendant's guilt of a prior murder (specifically, the prior murders of his grandparents) was a general fact or circumstance that was present in the case and that could cause some jurors invariably to vote for the death penalty, regardless of the strength of the mitigating circumstances, the defense should have been permitted to probe the prospective jurors' attitudes as to that fact or circumstance. In prohibiting voir dire on prior murder, a fact likely to be of great significance to prospective jurors, the trial court erred. In fairness to the trial court, we note that most of our decisions clarifying the law on this point were announced after the trial in this case. Arguing that the trial court did not err in restricting voir dire to facts and circumstances alleged in the information, the Attorney General relies on language in some of our prior decisions to the effect that death-qualification voir dire `seeks to determine only the views of the prospective jurors about capital punishment in the abstract' and `without regard to the evidence produced at trial.' ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 746, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2; People v. Clark (1990) 50 Cal.3d 583, 596-597, 268 Cal. Rptr. 399, 789 P.2d 127.) Our decisions have explained that death-qualification voir dire must avoid two extremes. On the one hand, it must not be so abstract that it fails to identify those jurors whose death penalty views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in the case being tried. On the other hand, it must not be so specific that it requires the prospective jurors to prejudge the penalty issue based on a summary of the mitigating and aggravating evidence likely to be presented. (See People v. Jenkins (2000) 22 Cal.4th 900, 990-991, 95 Cal.Rptr.2d 377, 997 P.2d 1044 [not error to refuse to allow counsel to ask juror given detailed account of the facts in the case if she would impose death penalty].) In deciding where to strike the balance in a particular case, trial courts have considerable discretion. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 908, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93; People v. Pinholster, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 918, 4 Cal.Rptr.2d 765, 824 P.2d 571.) They may not, however, as the trial court did here, strike the balance by precluding mention of any general fact or circumstance not expressly pleaded in the information. ( People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 70, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Earp, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 853, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Kirkpatrick, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1005, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 818, 874 P.2d 248; see also People v. Livaditis, supra, 2 Cal.4th at pp. 772-773, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297.) In Medina, on which the Attorney General particularly relies, the trial court initially declined to permit voir dire on whether prospective jurors could vote for life imprisonment if the defendant had committed multiple murders, but later the trial court changed its ruling and allowed such questioning. Despite dictum expressing doubt that the court's initial ruling was incorrect, we held that the initial ruling did not prejudice the defendant because after the trial court clarified its position with respect to the multiple murder question, defendant failed to ask to reexamine any juror on this topic. ( People v. Medina, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 746, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Here, by contrast, the trial court never altered its erroneous ruling, and defendant had no opportunity to reexamine any juror with respect to the prior murder question. Error in restricting death-qualification voir dire does not invariably require reversal of a judgment of death. ( People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 974, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) In particular, we have suggested that such error may be deemed harmless if the defense was permitted to use the general voir dire to explore further the prospective jurors' responses to the facts and circumstances of the case or if the record otherwise establishes that none of the jurors had a view about the circumstances of the case that would disqualify that juror. ( Ibid. ) Here, however, the general voir dire of each prospective juror immediately followed the death-qualification voir dire, and it seems clear from the record that the trial court's ruling extended to both portions of the voir dire. The Attorney General does not contend otherwise. As a result, defendant was unable to use the general voir dire to cure the prejudice resulting from the trial court's erroneous limitation on the scope of voir dire. A defendant who establishes that any juror who eventually served was biased against him is entitled to reversal. ( People v. Cunningham, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 975, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519; People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 413, 53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000.) Here, defendant cannot identify a particular biased juror, but that is because he was denied an adequate voir dire about prior murder, a possibly determinative fact for a juror. By absolutely barring any voir dire beyond facts alleged on the face of the charging document, the trial court created a risk that a juror who would automatically vote to impose the death penalty on a defendant who had previously committed murder was empanelled and acted on those views, thereby violating defendant's due process right to an impartial jury. (See Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 739, 112 S.Ct. 2222.) The trial court's restriction of voir dire leads us to doubt that defendant was sentenced to death by a jury empanelled in compliance with the Fourteenth Amendment. ( Ibid. ) Because the trial court's error makes it impossible for us to determine from the record whether any of the individuals who were ultimately seated as jurors held the disqualifying view that the death penalty should be imposed invariably and automatically on any defendant who had committed one or more murders other than the murder charged in this case, it cannot be dismissed as harmless. Thus, we must reverse defendant's judgment of death. ( Morgan v. Illinois, supra, 504 U.S. at p. 739, 112 S.Ct. 2222.)