Opinion ID: 2092371
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: constitutionality of mbe provisions

Text: Defendants Weiland and Gateway contend on appeal that the Authority's minority set-aside program is unconstitutional under the Supreme Court's decision in City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. (1989), 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706, 102 L.Ed.2d 854. In City of Richmond the Supreme Court held that States and municipalities may only enforce minority set-aside programs if there has been specific findings of past discrimination. City of Richmond did not establish a per se rule of invalidity. Rather, that case requires each minority set-aside program to be evaluated based on the evidence of past discrimination peculiar to the governmental entity enacting the program. Weiland and Gateway argue that there has been no finding of past discrimination by the Authority and, therefore, the MBE provisions are unconstitutional. The appellate court refused to consider the merits of this argument because resolution of the issue would require consideration of facts not contained on the face of the complaint. (218 Ill.App.3d at 49, 160 Ill.Dec. 691, 577 N.E.2d 1262.) We agree with the appellate court that consideration of this issue is beyond the scope of defendants' section 2-615 motion.