Opinion ID: 1814564
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Preservation of Error on Constitutional Issues.

Text: Before we consider Milner's constitutional claims on the merits, we must first deal with the State's contention Milner failed to preserve error on these claims because they were raised in an allegedly tardy pretrial motion to dismiss. The State relies on Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 10(4), which provides, in part, that pretrial motions under rule 10(2) shall be filed when the grounds therefor reasonably appear but no later than 40 days after arraignment. Milner's motion was filed fifty-five days after his arraignment. We begin our analysis with an examination of rule 10(2): Any defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion. The following must be raised prior to trial: [The rule then lists seven categories of defenses, objections, motions and requests.] Iowa R.Crim. P. 10(2) (emphasis added). The matters included in the must-be-raised list do not include claims that the statute under which the defendant was charged is unconstitutional. We interpret rule 10(2) as creating two categories of defenses and objections that are the subject of pretrial motions to dismiss: (1) those that may be raised by pretrial motion, and (2) those that must be raised by pretrial motion. To hold that a defendant must raise all objections and defenses no later than forty days after arraignment would render the list following the second sentence of section 10(2) meaningless. See id. (naming only seven categories of defenses, objections, motions and requests that must be raised prior to trial); see also State v. Ahitow, 544 N.W.2d 270, 273 (Iowa 1996) (We do not interpret statutes in a way that makes portions of them irrelevant or redundant.). If the legislature had intended this result, it simply would have said that [a]ny defense, objection, or request which is capable of determination without the trial of the general issue [ must ] be raised before trial by motion. Because it did not do so, we think the forty-day restriction on the filing of pretrial motions logically applies only to those grounds that must be raised by pretrial motion. This interpretation is also consistent with rule 10(3) which provides that defenses or objections which must be made prior to trial under this rule are waived if not timely made. (Emphasis added.) Our conclusion that the forty-day limitation of rule 10(4) does not apply here is not the end of our inquiry, however. We have held that a pretrial motion under rule 10(2) is the proper vehicle to use when challenging the constitutionality of a statute, and that such a challenge must be raised at the earliest opportunity in the progress of the case. State v. Munz, 355 N.W.2d 576, 584 (Iowa 1984). The purpose of such an error-preservation rule is to give notice to the court and opposing counsel at a time when corrective action is still possible. State v. Johnson, 476 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa 1991). We now examine whether Milner raised his constitutional objections to section 712.8 at the earliest opportunity and at a time when correction of any problem was still possible. Milner filed his motion to dismiss challenging the validity of section 712.8 twenty-four days after the completion of discovery and twenty-four weeks before trial. He contends depositions of the State's witnesses were necessary to formulate and support his argument that section 712.8 was unconstitutional as applied in this case. (We note the minutes of testimony filed with the trial information were nonspecific as to the statements Milner allegedly made and the minutes simply incorporated any matters made known to the defendant through discovery and/or depositions in this case.) We conclude Milner's motion to dismiss adequately preserved his constitutional claims. Under the circumstances of this case, Milner, in filing his motion twenty-four days after the completion of discovery, raised the constitutional issues at the earliest available opportunity. We also note the objectives of our error-preservation rules were accomplished; opposing counsel had adequate time to respond and the trial court had ample opportunity to rule before the trial twenty-four weeks later. Because Milner preserved error on his claim that section 712.8 is constitutionally infirm, we now address the merits of that claim.