Opinion ID: 2198299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is a Trifurcated Trial Required?

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court should have divided the proceedings into three phases: (1) the guilt/innocence determination on the attempted murder, auto theft, and handgun possession charges; (2) the determination of whether the auto theft and handgun possession convictions should be elevated to higher class felonies; and (3) the determination of whether Shelton was a habitual offender pursuant to Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-8. This Court has never considered the issue of whether trifurcated proceedings are required when a defendant is charged with a felony and the State relies on the defendant's prior convictions to obtain both elevation of the predicate felony and a determination the defendant is an habitual offender. We have held, however, that bifurcated proceedings are required when the State seeks an habitual offender determination. Lawrence v. State (1972), 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830. In Lawrence, this Court imposed a bifurcation requirement on trials in which an habitual offender count accompanies a felony charge. The habitual offender statute was therefore amended to reflect this bifurcation requirement. Shepler v. State (1980), 274 Ind. 331, 340, 412 N.E.2d 62, 69. Under the statute, a jury is not presented with an habitual offender charge until after it has determined the defendant's guilt or innocence on the underlying felony charge. If the jury finds the defendant guilty, the jury ... reconvene[s] for the sentencing hearing on the habitual offender count. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-8(c). The bifurcation requirement of Lawrence was adopted to ensure that in habitual offender cases the consideration of a defendant's prior convictions is removed from the jury's guilt/innocence determination on the felony charge. 259 Ind. 306, 286 N.E.2d 830. Evidence of prior convictions is generally inadmissible in a criminal case, because it has no tendency to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused but, if effective at all, could serve only to prejudice or mislead or excite the minds and inflame the passions of the jury. Id. at 310, 286 N.E.2d at 832. In Lawrence we concluded that any state interest in having the prior conviction evidence heard in the same phase as evidence of the felony is outweighed by the injustice to a defendant from a jury determining his guilt or innocence with knowledge of his prior conviction. See id. at 312, 286 N.E.2d at 834. In Shepler, 412 N.E.2d at 69, we explained the rationale underlying the bifurcation requirement: The purpose of ... bifurcated proceeding[s] is to prevent the jury from being tainted by knowledge of the defendant's prior felony convictions, in determining his guilt or innocence of the charge before them. By separating the consideration of prior convictions from the jury's initial guilt/innocence determination, the defendant is provided a fair and impartial jury to determine his guilt or innocence on the underlying felony charge. In Turpin v. State (1982), Ind., 435 N.E.2d 1, 3, this Court explained: It is clearly established that our habitual offender statute ... seeks to provide a fair procedure by which an individual convicted of a felony may receive an enhanced sentence. The bifurcated nature of the proceeding has been determined to be necessary by this Court in order to guarantee the accused's right to a fair trial on the underlying felony charge. In Sweet v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 1144, this Court extended the Lawrence bifurcation requirement to a situation in which a prior drug conviction was used to obtain enhancement of a drug conviction. The statute involved in Sweet, Ind. Code Ann. § 35-48-4-10(iii), [2] provided for elevation of a drug charge from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony when the person charged had been previously convicted of an offense involving marijuana or hashish. Noting the similarity between that charge elevation provision and the habitual offender statute, id. at 1146, we applied the Lawrence bifurcation requirement to charges which allege that a person has been previously convicted of an offense involving marijuana or hashish. Id. at 1147. The Court explained, a bifurcated trial is required as it is the best procedure to insure that the jury remains uninformed about a defendant's prior convictions until the appropriate time. Id. The Court of Appeals has applied Sweet to other situations in which the State seeks elevation of a criminal charge based upon a prior conviction. For example, in Smith v. State (1983), Ind. App., 451 N.E.2d 57, the Court of Appeals held that the Lawrence bifurcation requirement applied when the State sought elevation of intoxicated driver charges convictions. Id. at 62. The court reasoned that the statutory provisions involved in the two cases were virtually indistinguishable in that both provide for enhancement from a class A misdemeanor to a class D felony upon proof of a previous similar conviction. Id. In this case, we hold that the trial court did not err in holding bifurcated, rather than trifurcated, proceedings. The jury was not provided evidence of the defendant's prior auto theft convictions until after it had heard evidence and determined the defendant's guilt on the attempted murder, auto theft, and handgun possession charges. Therefore, the jury which determined Shelton's guilt was not tainted by knowledge of his prior felony convictions. Holding the charge enhancement and habitual offender determinations in the same phase of a trial does not offend any interest of the defendant in a fair trial. Indeed, trifurcated proceedings do not provide defendants any additional protections beyond those which bifurcated proceedings afford. In making the charge enhancement and habitual offender determinations a jury is not required to find defendant guilty of another charge, but merely to find facts which would enhance defendant's sentence. Wise v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 498, 503, 400 N.E.2d 114, 118. In a charge enhancement or habitual offender proceeding, the jury need only find that the defendant had the requisite prior convictions. Proof of a conviction ... carries with it the assurance that the facts underlying that conviction have already been fully established to an untainted, unbiased jury in a forum in which the full protections of the Constitution were afforded to the defendant. State v. McCormick (1979), 272 Ind. 272, 279, 397 N.E.2d 276, 281. The dicta of Sowell v. State (1992), Ind. App., 590 N.E.2d 1123, 1124, trans. denied, on which appellant rests his entire argument on the trifurcation issue, is in error in relying upon the opinions of this Court for the proposition that trifurcated proceedings are required when the State seeks both a charge elevation and an habitual offender determination. [3] Sowell was incorrect in concluding that the interests of a defendant in a fair and impartial guilt/innocence determination are offended when a jury hears charge enhancement and habitual offender counts together in the second phase of a bifurcated trial. Such interests are not offended by bifurcated proceedings. The trial court was not required to conduct a trifurcated proceeding. It did not err in proceeding as it did.