Opinion ID: 480957
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Board's Jurisdiction

Text: 13 The requirement of grievance arbitration through Boards of Adjustment in the airline industry, and judicial review thereof, are specifically addressed in the Railway Labor Act (RLA). 16 Under 45 U.S.C. Sec. 184 (1982), [t]he disputes between an employee ... and a carrier ... growing out of grievances, or out of the interpretation or application of agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, or working conditions ... may be referred by petition of the parties or by either party to an appropriate adjustment board. Moreover, [i]t shall be the duty of every carrier and of its employees ... to establish a board of adjustment to hear and resolve contract grievance disputes. Id. 14 The RLA provides further that Board awards shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute. 17 In reviewing an arbitration decision under the RLA, a district court may not ... set aside [an award] except for failure of the [Board] to comply with the requirements of [law], for failure of the order to conform, or confine itself, to matters within the scope of the [Board's] jurisdiction, or for fraud or corruption by a member of the [Board] making the order. 18 This standard has been described as amongst the narrowest known to the law. 19 And as the Supreme Court has put it:The dispositive question is whether the party's objections to the ... Board's decision fall within any of the three limited categories of review provided for in the Railway Labor Act.... We have time and again emphasized that this statutory language means just what it says. 20 15 The only point at issue in this case is whether the Board's decision falls within the scope of its jurisdiction. 16 Upon review of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, there can be no serious doubt regarding the Board's authority to review Morrison's discharge. Section 3.A.3. of the applicable Northwest-ALPA collective bargaining agreement states that a pilot may be discharged for just cause. 21 Under Section 19.B. of the parties' agreement, any pilot who is disciplined or dismissed by Northwest has the right to appeal to the 'Northwest Airlines Pilots' System Board of Adjustment,' as provided in Section 21, provided such appeal is made within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt by the pilot ... of the decision of the Company. 22 And, under Section 21.D., the Board has jurisdiction over disputes between any employee covered by the Pilots' Agreement and the Company growing out of grievances or out of interpretation or application of any of the terms of the Pilots' Agreement. 23 It is absolutely clear, from these explicit terms of the agreement, that an unresolved grievance claiming the absence of just cause with respect to a disciplinary action taken against a pilot is a dispute within the jurisdiction of the Board. It is also clear under Section 21.J. of the agreement that the decision of the Board with respect to such a dispute shall be final, binding and conclusive between the Company and the Association and anyone they may represent having an interest in the dispute. 24 17 In view of the foregoing provisions, the conclusion is inescapable that the Board acted within its authority in considering Morrison's claim that he had been fired without just cause. And in reviewing this grievance, it is equally plain that the Board was authorized to judge the legitimacy of the disciplinary penalty imposed in the light of mitigating circumstances. This is hardly surprising because [a]rbitral determination not only of the existence of misconduct but of the fitness of the punishment is routinely grist for the arbitral mill. 25 The fact that the arbitration touches on issues related to airline safety is irrelevant. There have been numerous arbitrations under the RLA involving grievances that implicate safety issues, and no court has ever ruled that an arbitral board lacked jurisdiction to consider such issues. 26 18 There is nothing in the parties' agreement that even suggests that a disciplinary action related to an alleged breach of a safety rule is excluded from arbitral review. Indeed, quite the contrary is true because all disciplinary actions taken pursuant to Section 19 are made subject to Board review under Section 21. There is no conceivable way to construe the parties' agreement as removing from the Board's jurisdiction disciplinary actions related to alleged breaches of the twenty-four-hour rule. Moreover, even if we could find some ambiguity in the parties' agreement, our decision would be the same. The Supreme Court has made it clear that, [b]ecause the authority of arbitrators is a subject of collective bargaining, just as any other contractual provision, the scope of the arbitrator's authority is itself a question of contract interpretation that the parties have delegated to the arbitrator. 27 So long as the arbitrator's decision draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, 28 it must be enforced. In the instant case, the Board considered a matter within its jurisdiction and the award was based solely upon the Board's construction of the collective bargaining agreement; therefore, because the award is not otherwise inconsistent with the law, it cannot be overturned by a reviewing court. 19 There is no support for the District Court's imposition of a presumption against arbitration of safety issues. Indeed, the precedent is to the contrary. The Supreme Court, most recently in AT & T Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers, 29 has clearly stated that doubts about the arbitrability of issues should be resolved in favor of coverage: 20 Finally, where it has been established that where the contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a presumption of arbitrability in the sense that [a]n order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. Such a presumption is particularly applicable where the clause is as broad as the one employed in this case, which provides for arbitration of any differences arising with respect to the interpretation of this contract or the performance of any obligation hereunder.... In such cases, [i]n the absence of any express provision excluding a particular grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evidence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail. 21 In this case, Northwest has not introduced anything to suggest that this issue was not subject to arbitration, let alone provided positive assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. In all critical respects, then, this case involves a straightforward application of well-established law concerning the limited role of the courts in reviewing labor arbitration awards: 22 The function of the court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract. Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of contract interpretation for the arbitrator. In these circumstances the moving party should not be deprived of the arbitrator's judgment, when it was his judgment and all that it connotes that was bargained for. 23 The courts, therefore, have no business weighing the merits of the grievance, considering whether there is equity in a particular claim, or determining whether there is particular language in the written instrument which will support the claim. The agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, not merely those which the court will deem meritorious. 30 B. Public Policy 24 Although it is clear that the Board acted within the scope of its authority and that its award draws its esssence from the agreement, Northwest suggests that the Board's decision is somehow contrary to public policy, and that, because of this, the Board's decision should not be enforced. This contention is meritless. 25 In American Postal Workers Union v. United States Postal Service, 31 we recently addressed the extent to which an arbitration award may be vacated on the ground of public policy. In Postal Workers, we explained the public policy exception as follows: 26 [I]t is well-understood that courts will not enforce an arbitration award if the award itself violates established law or seeks to compel some unlawful action. However, this rule, which is sometimes referred to as a public policy exception, is extremely narrow. In W.R. Grace, the Supreme Court has explained that, in order to provide the basis for an exception, the public policy in question must be well defined and dominant, and is to be ascertained 'by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.'  Obviously, the exception is designed to be narrow so as to limit potentially intrusive judicial review of arbitration awards under the guise of public policy. 27 ... [I]t is plain from the language in W.R. Grace itself that the Court meant to say only that an arbitration award may not be enforced if it transgresses well defined and dominant laws and legal precedents. It is also clear from the opinion in W.R. Grace that judges have no license to impose their own brand of justice in determining applicable public policy; thus, the exception applies only when the public policy emanates from clear statutory or case law, not from general considerations of supposed public interests. 32 28 Under this principle of public policy, there is no basis upon which to set aside the Board's award in this case. 29 The Board's decision merely required Northwest to reinstate Morrison if and when he was recertified by the FAA as fully fit and licensed to fly. The award plainly is not unlawful in its determination that Morrison's alcoholism was an illness that could not support a finding of just cause for dismissal in this case. Indeed, even Northwest has a policy of allowing reformed alcoholics to fly as pilots, and there is nothing in the law prohibiting such a result. 30 Furthermore, the Board's award was conditioned upon a finding by the FAA-- i.e., the authorized public agency responsible for licensing pilots--that Morrison was fit and qualified to fly. To suggest that the Board's award violates public policy is to contend that the FAA was derelict in its responsibilities in considering Morrison for recertification. Obviously, it would be patently absurd for us, under the guise of public policy, to reverse an arbitration award that is expressly limited by deference to the ultimate judgment of the agency that is charged with the enforcement of the public policy here at issue. Unless the FAA's decision to recertify Morrison is overturned pursuant to some lawful administrative or judicial proceeding designed to consider such matters, we must assume the legitimacy of Morrison's recertification. It would be the height of judicial chutzpah for us to second-guess the present judgment of the FAA recertifying Morrison for flight duty. At its core, Northwest's argument seeks just such a result, which would require this court to impose its own brand of justice in determining applicable public policy. We decline the invitation. 31 We understand that Northwest has an interest in applying reasonable safety rules to its pilots. However, it is not the role of the courts to alter the labor-management balance struck in the collective bargaining agreement. Northwest is free to negotiate with ALPA to remove the application of safety rules from the jurisdiction of the Board or to reduce the amount of discretion given to the Board on such matters. Alternatively, if Northwest believes the FAA's certification standards to be lax, it can lobby the FAA to change its standards or seek statutory relief from Congress. But, so long as the Board acts within its jurisdiction and its awards draw their essence from the collective bargaining agreement, and neither contravene established law nor require an unlawful act, Enterprise Wheel, W.R. Grace, Postal Workers and like precedent under the RLA compel that such awards be enforced. 33