Opinion ID: 2581048
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: First Defamation Claim Against Hart Crowser

Text: Kinzel brought defamation claims against Hart Crowser based on two different statements made by Craig Martin. One of the claims was dismissed on summary judgment, while the other claim was tried and the jury found in favor of Hart Crowser. We discuss here the summary judgment decision as to the first claim. We review grants of summary judgment de novo and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. [40] Summary judgment is upheld if the evidence presents no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [41] The party opposing summary judgment need not establish that it will ultimately prevail at trial, but only that there exists a genuine issue of fact to be litigated. [42] Kinzel claims as error the superior court's grant of summary judgment for Hart Crowser on Kinzel's first defamation claim. Kinzel asserts that Hart Crowser's Martin made defamatory statements about Kinzel in an e-mail to Kyle Brown. The e-mail read: In light of the issues that we have had to deal with during the 8 Car Header installation, I think that it would be better if you didn't have Jeff up here. The air sparge line issue (not installing the black iron pipe) was apparently done during the last few days that he was here and I wonder if it was deliberate. Like to hear your thoughts on the subject. (Emphasis added.) In ruling, the superior court did not give reasons for granting Hart Crowser's motion for summary judgment. Kinzel speculates that the basis of the ruling was that the statement was protected `opinion' speech, and argues that a fact-opinion dichotomy is misguided. Hart Crowser argues that there are two legitimate bases upon which the court could have ruled: (1) the statement was incapable of being proven false, or (2) the statement was privileged. Kinzel argues that a statement is defamatory if it implies underlying factual knowledge, even if it is allegedly expressed as an opinion. Kinzel thus anticipates Hart Crowser's defense that expressions of opinion are always protected speech. In dealing with the fact/opinion distinction, we are guided by the United States Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. [43] and our own opinion in Sands v. Living Word Fellowship. [44] In Milkovich, the United States Supreme Court was concerned with a common misinterpretation of dicta in one of its earlier cases, Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. [45] Some courts asserted that Gertz stood for the proposition that opinion could never qualify as defamation. [46] But as Milkovich explained: we do not think this passage from Gertz was intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled opinion. Not only would such an interpretation be contrary to the tenor and context of the passage, but it would also ignore the fact that expressions of opinion may often imply an assertion of objective fact.[ [47] ] In Sands we acknowledged Milkovich and Gertz and determined that the real distinction is not between opinions and facts, but between statements represented as expressions of ideas and statements purporting to represent facts: The First Amendment bars actions for defamation where the allegedly defamatory statements are expressions of ideas and cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an individual. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S.Ct. 2695; see Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339, 94 S.Ct. 2997. If the context demonstrates to the audience that the speaker is not purporting to state or imply actual, known facts, then the speech is protected by the First Amendment.[ [48] ] This interpretation is supported by the Restatement of Torts [49] and Keeton. [50] The Seventh Circuit has stated, if it is plain that the speaker is expressing a subjective view, an interpretation, a theory, conjecture, or surmise, rather than claiming to be in possession of objectively verifiable facts, the statement is not actionable. [51] The First Circuit has further explained that some statements are protected opinion speech not because [they are] vague or judgmental but because [they are] speculative: The test, admittedly a very crude one, is whether the statement is properly understood as purely speculation or, alternatively, implies that the speaker or writer has concrete facts that confirm or underpin the truth of the speculation. Levin v. McPhee, 119 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir.1997); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566, comment (c) at 173. The former is protected as opinion; the latter is taken as an indirect assertion of truth. [[[ [52] ] In Lyons v. Globe Newspaper Co. the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered whether a newspaper report on picketing outside a political convention defamed the picketers' union when it recounted a suspicion that the picketers were attempting to disrupt the convention in order to subvert rules which threatened the candidacy of a politician they supported. [53] The court detailed its process in distinguishing between fact and opinion: The court must examine the statement in its totality in the context in which it was uttered or published. The court must consider all the words used, not merely a particular phrase or sentence. In addition, the court must give weight to cautionary terms used by the person publishing the statement. Finally, the court must consider all of the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the medium by which the statement is disseminated and the audience to which it is published.[ [54] ] The court concluded that the article was not defamatory. [55] It found that the word suspicion ... plainly cautioned the reader that the article referred to a theory rather than to facts. [56] It also noted that the suspicion was but one of three alternative explanations for the picketers' motives, thereby confirming that the writer was engaging in speculation. [57] Here, Martin's language could be interpreted as signaling that he was simply theorizing when he said I wonder. He also revealed that he did not consider his theory anything more than a suspicion when he queried Brown for his own thoughts on the subject. In its totality, Martin's e-mail can reasonably be construed as nothing more than conjecture. Under this interpretation, Martin's language would not be read as a statement of fact and did not imply that Martin had actual facts that form the basis for the conjecture. For these reasons the statement could reasonably be determined as not defamatory. On the other hand, in reviewing a summary judgment ruling we view the record in its entirety, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. [58] An alternative and also reasonable interpretation would be to view Martin's June 24 e-mail as insinuating that Kinzel was responsible for sabotaging the worksite. Given Martin's supervisory position, he was in a better position than Brown to know the factual details of the Car Header installation and air sparge line issue. For this reason, Martin's wonder could reasonably be understood as having a factual underpinning and thus make the e-mail susceptible to a defamation claim. Since one might reasonably interpret the facts here in favor of Kinzel's defamation claim, we must conclude that the superior court erred in dismissing Kinzel's claim on summary judgment and remand the case for further proceedings on this issue.