Opinion ID: 2515784
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Frank Rodriguez and Michael Rojas

Text: During a conference outside the presence of the jury on the applicability of accomplice instructions, defendant argued that Ray Juarez, Frank Rodriguez, and Michael Rojas were all accomplices as a matter of law. The prosecutor argued that only Juarez was an accomplice as a matter of law. The trial court ruled that Juarez was an accomplice as a matter of law but that the jury should determine whether Rodriguez and Rojas were accomplices. The court gave the following instructions relevant to accomplice testimony: CALJIC No. 3.10 (accomplice defined); CALJIC No. 3.11 (testimony of accomplice must be corroborated); CALJIC No. 3.12 (sufficiency of evidence to corroborate an accomplice); CALJIC No. 3.13 (one accomplice may not corroborate another); CALJIC No. 3.14 (criminal intent necessary to make one an accomplice); CALJIC No. 3.18 (testimony of accomplice to be viewed with distrust); and CALJIC No. 3.19 (burden to prove corroborating witness is an accomplice). Defendant contends the trial court erred in not ruling that Rodriguez and Rojas were accomplices as a matter of law and in failing so to instruct the jury, in violation of section 1111 and his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, to due process, and to present a defense protected by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reliable judgment under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. An accomplice is one who is liable to prosecution for the identical offense charged against the defendant on trial in the cause in which the testimony of the accomplice is given. (§ 1111.) To be so chargeable, the witness must be a principal under section 31. That section defines principals as [a]ll persons concerned in the commission of a crime, whether ... they directly commit the act constituting the offense, or aid and abet in its commission.... (§ 31.) An aider and abettor is one who acts with both knowledge of the perpetrator's criminal purpose and the intent of encouraging or facilitating commission of the offense. Like a conspirator, an aider and abettor is guilty not only of the offense he intended to encourage or facilitate, but also of any reasonably foreseeable offense committed by the perpetrator he aids and abets. ( People v. Hayes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1211, 1271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645, fns. 19 & 20.) Whether a person is an accomplice within the meaning of section 1111 is a factual question for the jury to determine in all cases unless `there is no dispute as to either the facts or the inferences to be drawn therefrom.' [Citation.] ( People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Thus, a trial court can determine as a matter of law whether a witness is or is not an accomplice only when the facts regarding the witness's criminal culpability are `clear and undisputed.' [Citations.] ( People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 679, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752.) As we explain below, the trial court correctly declined to instruct the jury that Rodriguez and Rojas were accomplices. There was no evidence that Rodriguez actually shot and killed either Medina or Sanchez. And although it was undisputed that he rode in the car with the victims to the canal bank, there was evidence he did not do so voluntarily. [43] Thus, Rodriguez's status as an accomplice turns on whether, as a conspirator or an aider or abettor, he was aware that Medina and Sanchez were to be killed or was engaged in any other crime the foreseeable result of which might be murder. (See, e.g., People v. Hayes, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 1271, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 211, 989 P.2d 645.) Circumstantial evidence showed that Rodriguez was an accomplice to the murders. For example, as stated, Juarez testified that Rodriguez was armed when he got in the car with Medina and Sanchez. And Rodriguez himself testified that he thought the women might be killed. Such evidence, however, does not compel the conclusion that he was an accomplice. Because the record does not dictate the conclusion that Rodriguez aided defendant and Spradlin knowing their homicidal intent, the court did not err in determining that he was not an accomplice as a matter of law. For the first time on appeal, defendant argues Rodriguez was an accomplice in the murders because he was engaged, as a conspirator or an aider and abettor, in kidnapping Medina and Sanchez, and the foreseeable result of the kidnapping was murder. The prosecution, however, did not contend that Medina and Sanchez were kidnapped, much less that the foreseeable result of the kidnapping was murder. [44] In any event, given the evidence that Rodriguez did not have the intent to encourage or facilitate the commission of any particular offense when he got in the car with Medina and Sanchez, the record does not compel such a conclusion. As for Michael Rojas, strong circumstantial evidence suggested he was an accomplice to both Medina's rape and the murders. Juarez, Rodriguez, and Ramirez all testified they saw Rojas assault Medina while she was being gang-raped in the Wilderness trailer and later overheard him say that Medina and Sanchez must be taken care of or killed because they knew too much. Richard also testified that he saw Rojas assault Medina in the Wilderness trailer and saw him in the car that took Medina and Sanchez away from the North Hayes property to their deaths. Rojas himself, however, denied any involvement in Medina's rape and in the murders. Defendant claims Rojas was an accomplice as a matter of law because his testimony contradicted that of prosecution and defense witnesses and was inherently unbelievable. In particular, defendant notes Rojas denied raping Spring, contrary to other witnesses' testimony. Arguing it would be impossible to believe that someone who took a leading role in Spring's rape did not likewise take such a role in a similar rape of Medina, defendant contends Rojas must have lied about his involvement in Spring's rape (for which he was given immunity from prosecution on the condition that he testify truthfully in the present case) so that he could deny involvement in Medina's rape (for which he was not given immunity from prosecution). But such a contention is speculative. Further, citing People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738, defendant concludes that the trial court erred in ruling that Rojas's accomplice status was a jury question because his self-serving testimony did not amount to evidence that was reasonable, credible, or of solid value. But we have found no case that has applied the reasoning of Johnson, which involved the standard of review of a claim of sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, to a case involving asserted trial court error in failing to declare a witness an accomplice as a matter of law. It is axiomatic that cases are not authority for propositions not considered. ( People v. Ault (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1250, 1268, fn. 10, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 302, 95 P.3d 523.) Thus, although circumstantial evidence indicated Rojas was an accomplice in Medina's rape and in the murders, such evidence did not compel a conclusion that he was an accomplice, in light of his denial of involvement in those crimes. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in ruling that Rojas's accomplice status was a jury question.