Opinion ID: 1293474
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: An Alternate Approach.

Text: The fundamental difficulty with the majority opinion is its focus on the second paragraph of the first subsection of the exception statute, ORS 161.105. [8] That statute, in subsections (1)(b) and (2), provides two different approaches for ascertaining whether a statute outside the criminal code is a strict liability statute. [9] The message I receive from the first two subsections of ORS 161.105 is, in simplified terms, in dealing with statutes outside the Oregon Criminal Code: (a) For statutes in existence on January 1, 1972 (the effective date of the Oregon Criminal Code), a culpable mental state may be dispensed with if the legislative intent to do so is clearly indicated. ORS 161.105(1)(b). (b) For statutes enacted after January 1, 1972, an offense that requires no culpable mental state constitutes a violation, unless the statute otherwise provides. ORS 161.105(2). Thus, if the statute was in existence on January 1, 1972, ORS 161.105(1) applies; if the statute was enacted after January 1, 1972, ORS 161.105(2) applies. Because the statute at issue specifically falls into the category established by subsection (2) (and not subsection (1), as discussed by the majority), the test is not clearly indicates an intent to dispense but otherwise provides. [10] Subsection (2) says to me that in statutes enacted outside the criminal code after January 1, 1972, wherein no culpable mental state is required (and none is mentioned in ORS 813.010), the offense is a violation, unless the legislature otherwise provides. Were I writing on the proverbial clean slate, I would assert that the legislature, by establishing that violation of the DUII statute is a Class A misdemeanor, has otherwise provided; that is, the exception referent is to constituting a violation, not to the presence or absence of a culpable mental state requirement. Thus, under ORS 161.105(2)  which is the applicable provision  DUII is a strict liability crime because (a) the statute requires no culpable mental state, and (b) the legislature has otherwise provided that DUII is a Class A misdemeanor. Under this approach, the legislature has done all it must do to make a post-1971 statute outside the criminal code a strict liability crime. Unfortunately, however, I am not writing on a clean slate and that conclusion is precluded by our decision in State v. Cho, supra , applying a two-part analysis. Cho held that a statute enacted after January 1, 1972, must both provide that the offense is not a violation and clearly indicate a legislative intent to dispense with the culpable mental state requirements. State v. Cho, supra, 297 Or. at 200, 681 P.2d 1152. [11] The effect is to combine the separate statutory requirements of ORS 161.105(1)(b) with 161.105(2). The primary rationale stated was that ORS 161.105(2) does not address whether a culpable mental state is required, and, consequently, does not provide an exception to ORS 161.095(2) or 161.115(2). However, if I am correct in my assertion of the independent status of ORS 161.105(2), then the two general policy statements in ORS 161.095(2) and 161.115(2) are not to be applied because each subsection specifically acknowledges the overriding vitality of ORS 161.105 by announcing that both subsections operate [e]xcept as provided in ORS 161.105. Stated another way, the two subsections at issue speak to two different time frames: (1) pre-1972 (ORS 161.105(1)(b)) and (2) post-1971 (ORS 161.105(2)). Effect should be given to each, independent of the other. Because of our decision in Cho, we are bound  short of overruling Cho  by its two-part analysis.