Opinion ID: 4282325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asset Classification

Text: ¶10. Tanya’s other points of error focused on property—its classification and distribution. She argued commingling had converted Hob’s separate property into marital assets subject 4 to distribution.2 Specifically, she claimed all of Hob’s investment accounts were marital property subject to distribution. And the joint account was not a “clearinghouse” but instead the funds deposited into the account were for familial use. She also asserted the chancellor erred when he did not classify the marital home, surrounding acreage, and contents of the marital home as marital property subject to equitable distribution. ¶11. Our opinion in Sanderson I only addressed Tanya’s commingling claim concerning the joint account. We reversed the chancellor’s finding that the account merely served as a “clearinghouse.” Id. at 437. Instead, we found “the money deposited in the joint account became a marital asset subject to equitable division because of its family use.” Id. (citing A&L, Inc. v. Grantham, 747 So. 2d 832, 838 (Miss. 1999)). Because Tanya had contributed in “disburs[ing] the funds for familial purposes,” under Mississippi’s law concerning marital property, “her contributions and the familial use to which the money in the joint account was put changed the legal nature of the money in the account from separate property subject to tracing to marital property.” Id. at 438. ¶12. We concluded that “Tanya and Hob[] could have drafted the prenuptial agreement to address funds for familial use, but they did not.” Id. (internal citations omitted). So we “reverse[d] the chancellor’s finding that the joint bank account funds were not commingled.” Id. ¶13. “After due consideration of the other issues raised,” we “discern[ed] no other errors.” Id. 2 She also argued the couple’s joint tax returns were further evidence of commingling. 5