Opinion ID: 599011
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Testimony of Informant

Text: 42 Rodriguez contends that the trial court erred in permitting Huaro's testimony. Huaro testified that he had worked as an informant on several occasions and had previously been paid when he did a good job. He also indicated that although he did not discuss compensation with any agent in the instant case, he ultimately received $2000. Rodriguez asserts that Huaro's compensation was contingent upon his trial testimony and that he therefore should not have been permitted to testify. 43 We hold that Huaro's compensation was not based on an impermissible fee arrangement when, as here, Huaro was compensated the day following Rodriguez' arrest. [I]t does not appear that [a mere] offering of a governmental reward for activities leading to the arrest of [an] appellant is, in itself, violative of Fifth Amendment due process. (citation omitted) While a different result might obtain where a contingent fee is offered for activities leading to the conviction of a defendant.... United States v. Ladley, 517 F.2d 1190, 1193 (5th Cir.1975). As Huaro's financial arrangements were not contingent upon his trial testimony, the court did not err in permitting him to testify. 44 Counsel elicited from Huaro that, in exchange for his appearance in court in the instant case, the government paid for Huaro's expenses such as his accommodations and airfare. It has been held that payment of expenses is not a contingent fee arrangement.... United States v. Carcaise, 763 F.2d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir.1985). We agree. Huaro's receipt of payment affects the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony, and Rodriguez was afforded the benefit of an appropriate jury instruction to this effect. 5 See United States v. Avila-Macias, 577 F.2d 1384, 1389 (9th Cir.1978).