Opinion ID: 2208589
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: New Hearing

Text: Gallothom's final argument is that the Board's decision should be reversed because of the Board's failure to issue its final decision in a timely manner. The Board has 120 days after the close of the record [2] to issue its written decision accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. See D.C.Code § 25-106(c)(6) (1996). [3] In this case, the record was closed on June 8, 1999 and the proposed decision was issued on October 6, 1999-120 days following the closing of the record. The final decision was issued on March 8, 2000. Gallothom contends that since the final decision was not issued within the 120 days, the Board's decision must be reversed. After reviewing the relevant statutes, we disagree. In this case, D.C.Code § 25-106(c)(6) has a 120-day limitation for the issuance of a written order. Statutory provisions concerning the performance of duties by public officers generally are considered directory so that the interests of private parties and the public might not suffer due to the official's failure to act promptly. Vann v. District of Columbia Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 441 A.2d 246, 248 (D.C.1982) (citing JBG Properties, Inc. v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 364 A.2d 1183 (D.C.1976)) (further citations omitted). When determining whether the 120-day time requirement is mandatory or directory, we must balance whether any prejudice to a party caused by agency delay is outweighed by the interests of another party or the public in allowing the agency to act after the statutory time period has elapsed. [4] Id. We can think of no reason, nor has the petitioner clearly articulated a reason, why it is prejudiced by the delay. Based on the lack of prejudice to the petitioner and the public interest in ensuring the safety of the neighborhood, we must conclude that the 120-day time limit is directory, thus the Board's decision is valid. Accordingly, the judgment on appeal is Affirmed.