Opinion ID: 2631069
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: THE EMPLOYEE BEARS THE BURDEN OF PROOF UNDER UTAH CODE SECTION 34A-2-413(1)(c)

Text: ¶ 40 The parties and the amicus disagree on the standard of review applicable to the Commission's ruling on the burden of proof issue, so we consider this threshold matter first.
¶ 41 Burden of proof questions typically present issues of law that an appellate court reviews for correctness. Beaver County v. State Tax Comm'n, 916 P.2d 344, 357 (Utah 1996). Amicus Workers' Compensation Fund (WCF), however, contends that we should defer to the Commission's conclusion regarding the burden of proof because the legislature impliedly granted the Commission discretion to decide the issue under Utah Code section 34A-2-413(1)(c). WCF reasons that where the legislature either expressly or implicitly grants [an] agency discretion to interpret or apply a statutory term, appellate courts should defer to the agency's interpretation unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Luckau v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n, 840 P.2d 811, 813 (Utah Ct.App.1992); accord Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Auditing Div. of State Tax Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 588-89 (Utah 1991) (superseded by Utah Code section 59-1-610(1)(b) for the specific instance of administrative decisions by the Utah State Tax Commission as stated in 49th St. Galleria v. Tax Comm'n, Auditing Div., 860 P.2d 996 (Utah Ct.App. 1993)). WCF contends that subsection (c) impliedly grants such discretion to the Commission because the listed requirements for a permanent total disability determination are prefaced with the clause the commission shall conclude. ¶ 42 We disagree and hold that the language of subsection (c) grants the Commission authority to determine only whether the facts presented meet the statute's requirements for a finding of permanent total disability. It does not bestow on the Commission the authority to allocate the burden of proof. ¶ 43 Our conclusion in this regard is consistent with the legislature's more general delegation of authority to the Commission found in Utah Code section 34A-1-301, which bestows on the Commission the duty and the full power, jurisdiction, and authority to determine the facts and apply the law in this chapter or any other title or chapter it administers. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (2005). We previously have held that section 34A-1-301 does not grant the Commission discretion for statutory interpretation. Esquivel v. Labor Comm'n, 2000 UT 66, ¶ 18, 7 P.3d 777. ¶ 44 It is also consistent with our case law on implied agency delegation. In Salt Lake City Corp. v. Department of Employment Security, 657 P.2d 1312, 1315-17 (Utah 1982), we acknowledged the Commission's latitude in affirming its award of unemployment benefits to a state employee who had voluntarily left her job. The statute at issue in that case provided that unemployment benefits were generally unavailable when employees voluntarily quit, but allowed the Commission to award benefits when required by equity and good conscience. Id. at 1317. We conclude that this language implicitly bespeak[s] a legislative intent to delegate . . . interpretation to the responsible agency. Morton, 814 P.2d at 588 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In contrast, however, subsection (c) only gives the Commission discretion to find the facts required to establish the elements of permanent total disability. ¶ 45 Our conclusion is also consistent with the principle that grants of discretion to administrative agencies should be limited to those issues on which the agencies have special experience or expertise placing [them] in a better position than the courts to construe the law. King v. Indus. Comm'n, 850 P.2d 1281, 1286 (Utah Ct.App.1993). Here, however, there is nothing to suggest that the Commission is in a better position than this court to construe the statutory allocation of the burden of proof. We consequently hold that the court of appeals appropriately applied a correctness standard when assessing which party bore the burden of proof under subsection (c).
¶ 46 We review the court of appeals' statutory interpretation of section 34A-2-413(1)(c) for correctness. See State v. Ireland, 2006 UT 82, ¶ 6, 150 P.3d 532. When interpreting statutes, we look first to the statute's plain language with the primary objective of giving effect to the legislature's intent. Savage v. Utah Youth Vill., 2004 UT 102, ¶ 18, 104 P.3d 1242. We presume that the legislature used each word advisedly and read each term according to its ordinary and accepted meaning. State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, ¶ 29, 127 P.3d 682 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Statutes should be read as a whole and their provisions interpreted in harmony with related provisions and statutes. Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592. ¶ 47 When the language of the statute is plain, other interpretive tools are not needed. Adams v. Swensen, 2005 UT 8, ¶ 8, 108 P.3d 725. However, if the language is ambiguous, the court may look beyond the statute to legislative history and public policy to ascertain the statute's intent. Utah Pub. Employees Ass'n v. State, 2006 UT 9, ¶ 59, 131 P.3d 208 (Parrish, J., concurring). When viewed holistically, a statute is ambiguous if duplicative, yet plausible meanings are not eliminated from possibility. Id. ¶ 60. ¶ 48 Having acknowledged these rules, we consider the plain language of section 34A-2-413(1) of the Act, which outlines the threshold requirements an employee must meet to receive compensation for permanent total disability. Subsection (b) states that the employee has the burden of proving three subparts: (i) that the employee was significantly impaired as a result of an industrial accident or occupational disease; (ii) that the employee is permanently totally disabled; and (iii) that the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent total disability. Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(1)(b)(i)-(iii) (2005). ¶ 49 We next turn to subsection (c), which states that [t]o find an employee permanently totally disabled, the commission shall reach four necessary conclusions: (i) the employee is not gainfully employed; (ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability to do basic work activities; (iii) the . . . impairments prevent the employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has been qualified until the time of the industrial accident . . . and (iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the employee's age; education; past work experience; medical capacity; and residual functional capacity. Id. § 34A-2-413(1)(c) (amended 2006). ¶ 50 Although subsection (c) does not explicitly allocate the burden of proof, a reading of the statute as a whole makes clear that it falls to the employee. Both subsections (b) and (c) include the same critical phrase: permanently totally disabled. Subsection (b)(ii) cursorily states that the employee has the burden of proof to show by a preponderance of evidence that he or she is permanently totally disabled. It is unclear, however, from the wording of subsection (b)(ii) what is required for the employee to prove permanent total disability. Subsection (c) simply enumerates those requirements. In short, subsection (c) imbues subsection (b)(ii) with meaning. ¶ 51 The court of appeals' interpretation, allocating subsection (c)'s burden of proof to the employer, renders meaningless the employee's responsibility to prove permanent total disability under (b)(ii). We avoid construing a particular provision of a statute so as to neutralize . . . other provisions if any other construction of the particular provision is at all tenable. Chris & Dick's Lumber & Hardware v. Tax Comm'n, 791 P.2d 511, 516 (Utah 1990) (Howe, J., dissenting). ¶ 52 The plain language of subsection (c) further bolsters our interpretation that the employee bears the burden of proof. In each of subsection (c)'s four subparts, the employee must be in a particular posture in order to be found permanently totally disabled. These elements of proof turn on intimate facts about the employee's circumstanceshis unemployment or how his medical capacity or age affects his ability to do reasonably available work, for example. The fact that the employee is in the best position to proffer evidence relevant to these factual determinations further supports our interpretation that the employee bears the burden of proof under subsection (c). ¶ 53 The court of appeals' interpretation, on the other hand, mandates that the employer disprove the elements of subsection (c), which would require judicially created additions to and subtractions from the statute's plain language. For example, subsection (c)(i) requires proof that the employee is not gainfully employed. Under the court of appeals' reading, the employer would have to prove that the employee is gainfully employed. See Martinez v. Media-Paymaster Plus, 2005 UT App 308, ¶ 9, 117 P.3d 1074. Although we concede that section 34A-2-413(1)(c) was not artfully drafted, we refrain from creating clarity by reading additional terms into the statute. ¶ 54 In conclusion, we reverse the court of appeals because we can find only one plausible reading of the statute based on its plain languagenamely, that the employee has the burden of proving the elements of subsection (c). [5]