Opinion ID: 554955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The chief of police (Cochran) and the city manager (Hoffman)

Text: 18 The district court did not reach the merits of Brown's Sec. 1983 claims against Cochran and Hoffman because it found that both are entitled to qualified immunity from liability. 6 Government officials may be shielded from liability for damages in a Sec. 1983 action if, at the time they acted, the statutory or constitutional right allegedly violated was not clearly established. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he or she did violated that right. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 640, 107 S.Ct. at 3039. 19 It is beyond doubt that the principal right allegedly violated by the defendants--the equal protection right to be free from intentional racial discrimination--was clearly established at the time Cochran and Hoffman fired Brown. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-41, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2047-48, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). 7 If the defendants terminated Brown based on a poor performance record that they knew was compiled unfairly because of his race, or that would not have resulted in the discharge of a white officer they unquestionably would not be immune from civil liability. 8 At this stage of the proceedings, we cannot say as a matter of law that Brown has failed to show such racial discrimination. 20 The complaint lists numerous specific instances of allegedly discriminatory conduct that Brown claims led to the decision to terminate him. Indeed, the district court originally refused to dismiss the Sec. 1981 claim against Cochran because Brown's allegations presented an issue whether the discharge was based on racial discrimination rather than poor performance. The complaint and documents attached to it, many of which presumably came from his personnel file, permit the inference that Cochran had knowledge of the racial implications of the various incidents cited by Brown, and also acted with racial animus himself. We note in particular Brown's report on the incident in which Mastrangelo directed him to enter a bar for the asserted purpose of eliciting racial epithets, and the resulting counseling slip reprimanding Brown. In addition, an obvious conflict existed between departmental ratings citing him for poor expression and the writing instructor's report that she found no particular problems in his work. Also significant is the chief's refusal, without explanation, to permit Brown to delay attendance at the improvement course, and the allegation that white officers routinely are excused from work for medical reasons. 21 Another document that presumably would have been brought to the chief's attention is a March 5, 1986 letter, written on Brown's behalf by an attorney, and addressed to the president of the police union. The letter alleged racial motivation for Brown's recent poor performance ratings as well as a consistent pattern in practice of prejudicial conduct towards him over the past several years. This letter further supports the inference that Cochran knew that Brown's poor performance record was affected by racial animus, and that the decision to terminate him was an intentional act of unconstitutional discrimination. We therefore conclude that Brown's complaint, as the district court recognized, alleges sufficient facts to foreclose a finding of immunity for Cochran at this juncture. 22 The allegations concerning what city manager Hoffman knew or should have known about the discriminatory treatment of Brown by the police department are, though expressed in very few words, sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. In the words of the city manager herself, in her letter of July 3, she had reviewed the circumstances surrounding this matter. While this language might be read as meaning only that she had read and concurred with the reasons outlined in Chief Cochran's letter of dismissal (and that her role was simply as a rubber stamp), it can also be read without any strain to indicate that she had looked into Brown's file and was aware of the data and documents we have described that point to discriminatory acts. If indeed she had such knowledge of a discrimination-riddled department when she dismissed Brown, she might well be found to have acted unconstitutionally. Whether or not such reading can be eventually supported by evidence, the averment survives dismissal at the pleading stage. 23 Accordingly, we reverse the district court's dismissal of the Sec. 1983 claims against both Cochran and Hoffman, and remand those claims to the district court for further proceedings.