Opinion ID: 2603725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the merits of petitioner's claims

Text: (2a) Petitioner's jurisdictional argument rests on his claim that because the arbitrator allegedly lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the fee dispute, the State Bar and this court have no jurisdiction to impose discipline in a proceeding that is, in effect, merely a means of enforcing the arbitrator's fee award to Ms. Hester. The argument fundamentally misapprehends the source and objective of this court's disciplinary jurisdiction over members of the State Bar. (3) The basic objectives of attorney discipline are the protection of the public, the preservation of confidence in the legal profession, and the rehabilitation of errant attorneys where appropriate. ( Sorenson v. State Bar, ante, 1036, at p. 1044 [272 Cal. Rptr. 858, 804 P.2d 44]; Phillips v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 944, 952 [264 Cal. Rptr. 346, 782 P.2d 587].) Ordering restitution in cases of financial injury is a rehabilitative measure designed to further the state's disciplinary objectives by forcing the attorney to `confront, in concrete terms, the harm his actions has caused.' [Citation.] ( Brookman v. State Bar (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1004, 1009 [251 Cal. Rptr. 495, 760 P.2d 1023].) (2b) This court does not sit in disciplinary matters as a collection board for clients aggrieved over fee matters; nor is our jurisdiction derivative of fee arbitration proceedings. The administration of attorney discipline, including such remedial orders as restitution, is independent of any remedy that an aggrieved client may pursue. We reject as frivolous petitioner's argument to the contrary.
(4) Petitioner contends that the evidence before the referee was insufficient to sustain the findings with respect to his conduct in the Hester dissolution, claiming that Ms. Hester lacked credibility. We disagree. As is our practice in disciplinary matters, we have weighed the evidence before the referee and independently conclude that it was more than sufficient to sustain each of the referee's findings with respect to the Hester matter. Petitioner's case is not aided by his insistence on rearguing his version of events or by asking us to overturn credibility determinations. ( Van Sloten v. State Bar (1989) 48 Cal.3d 921, 931 [258 Cal. Rptr. 235, 771 P.2d 1323]; Gary v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 820, 826 [244 Cal. Rptr. 482, 749 P.2d 1336].) His briefing fails to carry his burden of demonstrating that the referee's findings are not supported by substantial evidence. ( Chefsky v. State Bar (1984) 36 Cal.3d 116, 121 [202 Cal. Rptr. 349, 680 P.2d 82]; Dixon v. State Bar (1982) 32 Cal.3d 728, 736 [187 Cal. Rptr. 30, 653 P.2d 321].) (5) Petitioner also contends that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the referee's findings with respect to the second count, that he failed to cooperate with the State Bar's investigation of Ms. Hester's complaint, thereby breaching a duty imposed by section 6068, subdivision (i). His precise claim with respect to this charge is that it permitted a finding of noncooperation in this case in circumstances where the State Bar already had obtained the desired client information from other sources. We need not consider the legal merit of such a defense here, however, because the record fails to furnish factual support for it. The predicate for petitioner's argument is the assertion that he had previously advised a State Bar investigator by telephone of the existence of the Hester arbitration, referring the investigator to the declaration filed in that proceeding for information about the pending disciplinary matter. [6] The charge of noncooperation, however, arose from petitioner's failure to respond to two successive letters of inquiry mailed well after the alleged telephone call. The letters advised petitioner that a complaint had been filed by Ms. Hester, summarized its nature, requested a response within three weeks, and invited petitioner's attention to section 6068, subdivision (i). Neither letter having been returned and no reply from petitioner having been received, in the absence of a credible alternative account of the matter, the referee was entitled to conclude from the evidence that petitioner had ignored the two requests and thus breached his duty to cooperate in the disciplinary investigation. ( Bowles v. State Bar (1989) 48 Cal.3d 100, 105 & fn. 7 [255 Cal. Rptr. 846, 768 P.2d 65]; Chang v. State Bar (1989) 49 Cal.3d 114, 128 [260 Cal. Rptr. 280, 775 P.2d 1049].) Under these circumstances, petitioner's efforts to portray the State Bar as itself uncooperative in failing to follow up on petitioner's telephonic leads are unconvincing.
(6) Finally, petitioner contends that the recommended discipline is excessive in light of his record of no prior discipline, other factors in mitigation, and published disciplinary guidelines. He relies on the definition of mitigating circumstance in standard 1.2(e) of the Standards for Attorney Sanctions for Professional Misconduct, Rules of Procedure of the State Bar, division V (hereafter the standards) [7] and suggests that a private admonition is the appropriate sanction, assuming any culpability at all. Although arising out of a single case of client neglect, petitioner's difficulties have multiplied apparently as a result of a persistent lack of insight into the deficiencies of his professional behavior. He has denied any responsibility for the inordinate delay and substantial cost, anxiety, and inconvenience imposed on Ms. Hester by his nonperformance, refused to participate in mandatory fee arbitration proceedings on essentially specious grounds, and declined to respond to successive requests from the State Bar for information concerning the matter although reminded of his duty to do so. Despite this record, petitioner invokes our discretion over discipline by suggesting that the following factors in mitigation itemized under standard 1.2(e) of the standards are present in his case: that his conduct was not deemed serious (std. 1.2(e)(i)); that he acted in good faith (std. 1.2(e)(ii)); that the record shows a lack of harm to the client (std. 1.2(e)(iii)); that he displayed spontaneous candor and cooperation during the investigation and disciplinary proceedings (std. 1.2(e)(v)); and that these proceedings were excessively delayed without his fault and to his prejudice (std. 1.2(e)(ix)). We find none of these factors presented by this record. Moreover, the attitude toward discipline betrayed by petitioner's feckless suggestion that these factors are present strengthens the case for a period of actual suspension, however brief, followed by supervised probation. [8] ( Alberton v. State Bar (1984) 37 Cal.3d 1, 16 [206 Cal. Rptr. 373, 686 P.2d 1177]; Bowles v. State Bar, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 110.) Our independent review of the record and exercise of our own judgment confirms the appropriateness of the recommendation of the review department. ( Carter v. State Bar (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1091, 1099-1102 [245 Cal. Rptr. 628, 751 P.2d 894].) We adopt it as our own.