Opinion ID: 787818
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiff's Gradual Return to Work

Text: 64 Plaintiff cross-appeals the district court's conclusion that she was not entitled to damages on her FMLA claim associated with her gradual return to work. The district court rejected Plaintiff's argument that she was not fully restored to an equivalent position until the end of her gradual return to work policy. It noted that the GRTW program was approved by Hoge's family physician and that it was undisputed that Plaintiff did not object to the gradual program notwithstanding Honda's policy which permitted her to terminate the program and return to full-time employment with physician's approval at any time. The district court found no evidence that Plaintiff made any [attempt to end the GRTW program] in this case. Thus, the Court [could not] conclude that the simple fact that Plaintiff was placed on a gradual return to work schedule was a violation of the restoration provisions of the FMLA. 65 We agree. Plaintiff's family physician, Dr. Joseph Ottaviano, approved the GRTW program. Further, Plaintiff agreed to her gradual return and failed to object. The undisputed evidence reveals that Plaintiff could have elected to terminate the GRTW program at any time with her physician's approval, and that she failed to do so, even after obtaining a lawyer. Plaintiff argues that Honda did not return her to an equivalent position because she did not receive her regular full-time pay and benefits. Plaintiff complains that she was not returned to a job with the same hours and pay, but understates the importance of the option she always possessed to resume working full time under the GRTW program. By providing Plaintiff with the option to return to full-time work (with her own physician's approval), Honda placed the key in Plaintiff's hand, and thus provided Plaintiff with an equivalent position under 29 C.F.R. § 825.215(a). 66 Plaintiff also relies on 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d) to support her argument that Honda induced her to waive her FMLA rights. Section 825.220(d) provides: 67 Employees cannot waive, nor may employers induce employees to waive, their rights under FMLA. For example, employees (or their collective bargaining representatives) cannot trade off the right to take FMLA leave against some other benefit offered by the employer. This does not prevent an employee's voluntary and uncoerced acceptance (not as a condition of employment) of a light duty assignment while recovering from a serious health condition (see § 825.702(d)). 68 29 C.F.R. § 825.220(d). 69 Plaintiff claims that she did not request the GRTW program and that she was directed to sign the GRTW form before returning to work. Plaintiff stated: I was told I needed to sign the form before I could start my shift. (Pl.'s Aff. at 2; JA 272.) This evidence, however, is not sufficient to establish that Honda induced or coerced Plaintiff into waiving her FMLA rights. Plaintiff's acceptance of the GRTW program under these circumstances does not constitute a waiver of rights. This is especially true because she agreed to a restoration program that permitted her to end the gradual component of her return to work at any time. Because Plaintiff had the undisputed ability to return to work full time on the engine line any time after being restored, Honda did not induce her to waive her right to restoration to an equivalent position under the FMLA.