Opinion ID: 2612290
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: effect of an order terminating parental rights

Text: Appellants' central argument is that the Legislature was aware of the difference between rights on the one hand and responsibilities or obligations on the other, and the absence of the latter terms from NRS 128.110 [1] indicates the Legislature's intention that parental responsibilities such as child support should continue despite a termination of parental rights. Appellants note that NRS 127.160 expressly provides that entry of a final decree of adoption relieves the natural parents of all parental responsibilities for, as well as rights over, the adopted child. [2] They also point out that while NRS 128.015 defines parent and child relationship to include both rights and obligations, [3] NRS 128.110 does not state that an order terminating parental rights shall sever the parent and child relationship. Appellants conclude that only a final decree of adoption operates to terminate both the rights and responsibilities of a parent. We must disagree. In Roelfs v. Sam P. Wallingford, Inc., 207 Kan. 804, 486 P.2d 1371 (Kan. 1971), the Kansas Supreme Court construed a statute much like NRS 128.110. The statute provided that when the court adjudged a parent or parents to be unfit, it could make an order permanently depriving such parents, or parent, of parental rights and commit the child to an appropriate person or institution. On the basis of the strong language of the statute, the general tenor and purpose of the act, and the reciprocal nature of the rights and duties arising from the parent-child relationship, the court determined that an order terminating parental rights under the statute also cut off all parental obligations, including the obligation of support. See In Interest of Ingold, 4 Kan. App.2d 692, 610 P.2d 130 (Kan. App. 1980); In Interest of Wheeler, 3 Kan. App.2d 701, 601 P.2d 15 (Kan. App. 1979). We find the reasoning in Roelfs persuasive. This Court has already stated its awareness of the seriousness and of the terrible finality of a decree terminating parental rights. Carson v. Lowe, 76 Nev. 446, 451, 357 P.2d 591, 594 (1960). See Chapman v. Chapman, 96 Nev. 290, 295, 607 P.2d 1141, 1145 (1980) (termination of parental rights is drastic measure; evidence in case does not clearly show that severance of all ties with natural parent will serve child's best interests). We note that in 1981 the Legislature enacted NRS 128.120, [4] demonstrating the legislative intention to make termination orders binding and irrevocable as to both child and parents. The general purpose of Chapter 128 is to provide a method for ending the parent-child relationship, where doing so is necessary to further the best interests of the child. See NRS 128.005(2)(c); NRS 128.090. In NRS 128.005(2)(a), the Legislature found and declared that [s]everance of the parent and child relationship is a matter of such importance in order to safeguard the rights of parent and child as to require judicial determination. As noted above, NRS 128.015 defines parent and child relationship to include obligations as well as rights. Moreover, NRS 424.080 refers to the termination of both parental rights and duties by order of a court of competent jurisdiction. [5] We believe that these various statutory provisions adequately demonstrate the legislative intention to have an order terminating parental rights completely sever the parent-child relationship, terminating all rights and obligations of both parent and child. Complete severance of the relationship removes all connections which may otherwise engender feelings of continuing attachment or right, and gives the child an unrestrained opportunity to prepare for a new home environment. We therefore adopt the position of the court in Anguis v. Superior Court, 6 Ariz. App. 68, 429 P.2d 702 (Ariz. App. 1967), as follows: [W]e construe the term parental rights in the broader term as the sum total of the rights of the parent or parents in and to the child as well as the rights of the child in and to the parent or parents. In other words, we construe parental rights to include both parental rights and parental obligations. Id. 429 P.2d at 705. See Sernaker v. Ehrlich, 86 Nev. 277, 281, 468 P.2d 5, 7 (1970) (dicta) (within parental `rights' there are parental `duties', few of which [the father] performed... .). The purpose of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (RURESA) is to improve and extend the enforcement of existing duties of support against persons presently legally liable for such support. Moffat v. Moffat, 27 Cal.3d 645, 165 Cal. Rptr. 877, 612 P.2d 967, 975 (Cal. 1980). See State ex rel. Welfare Div. v. Hudson, 97 Nev. 386, 389, 632 P.2d 1148, 1149 (1981). See also NRS 130.030; NRS 425.360(1). Because the 1975 order terminating John Vine's parental rights under NRS 128.110 also completely extinguished all of his legal duties and responsibilities with respect to his daughter, the State has no basis for its RURESA action against him. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court dismissing the State's RURESA petition in Case No. 13727. As the order terminating parental rights also terminated John Vine's parental duties, the nunc pro tunc amendment of the 1975 order, while superfluous, was not erroneous. Moreover, the district judge specifically found that the court and the parties had intended the order, at the time it was entered, to eliminate all of John Vine's parental rights and obligations, including the obligation of child support. Hence, the nunc pro tunc amendment may be considered correction of a clerical rather than judicial omission, as the omission cannot reasonably be attributed to the exercise of judicial consideration or discretion. Channel 13 of Las Vegas v. Ettlinger, 94 Nev. 578, 580, 583 P.2d 1085, 1086 (1978), quoting Marble v. Wright, 77 Nev. 244, 248, 362 P.2d 265, 267 (1961). See Smith v. Epperson, 72 Nev. 66, 69-70, 294 P.2d 362, 363-64 (1956); Wallace v. Wallace, 214 Kan. 344, 520 P.2d 1221, 1224-25 (Kan. 1974). We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court denying the State's motion to intervene in Case No. 14264. We have considered the other contentions raised by the appellants and found them to be without merit. We affirm the judgments in both appeals. MANOUKIAN, C.J., and SPRINGER, STEFFEN and GUNDERSON, JJ., concur.