Opinion ID: 1915019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Standing under Federal Election Commission v. Akins

Text: [¶ 18] Lindemann's argument that he has standing as an ordinary citizen according to Akins is also unavailing. In Akins, the United States Supreme Court discussed its standing requirements in light of the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA), 2 U.S.C.S. §§ 431-457 (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2008), an Act that imposes extensive recordkeeping and disclosure requirements on political action committees. 524 U.S. at 15, 118 S.Ct. 1777. Plaintiffs were voters who filed a complaint with the Federal Election Commission asking the FEC to find that the American Israel Public Affairs Committee had violated FECA in failing to abide by FECA's disclosure requirements. Id. at 15-16, 118 S.Ct. 1777. The FEC dismissed the complaint, finding that AIPAC was not a political action committee and therefore, not subject to the disclosure requirements. Id. at 17, 118 S.Ct. 1777. [¶ 19] On appeal, the United States Supreme Court found standing because the injury asserted by the plaintiff arguably [fell] within the zone of interest to be protected or regulated by the statute. Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 118 S.Ct. 1777 (citation omitted). In reaching this conclusion, the Court evaluated the language of the statute and the nature of the plaintiffs' injury, stating that Congress, intending to protect voters ... from suffering the kind of injury at issue, intended to authorize this kind of suit. Id. The plaintiffs' prudential standing in Akins was therefore a result of the language of the [FECA] statute and the nature of the injury. Id. (emphasis added). Both factors are absent in Lindemann's case. [¶ 20] First, unlike FECA, Maine's campaign statutes do not expressly provide a right to judicial review. [10] MAPA governs any right to judicial review. While there is an express provision in MAPA allowing for the judicial review of agency decisions, MAPA limits standing to petition for judicial review to those who are aggrieved. As we have explained, Lindemann is not aggrieved, and thus has no right of judicial review under MAPA. [¶ 21] Second, while Lindemann alleges an informational injury identical to that of the plaintiffs in Akins, he fails to demonstrate that he was deprived of useful political information. In Akins, plaintiffs were denied all access to information concerning contributions to and expenditures by AIPAC. Lindemann, on the other hand, has received information on MHPC's financial involvement with TABOR. Through the filing of a section 1056-B report, Lindemann gained information on MHPC's expenditures made for the purpose of initiating, promoting, or influencing TABOR. Any informational injury as it pertained to MHPC's financial involvement with TABOR ceased to exist when this information was disclosed pursuant to section 1056-B. See Alliance For Democracy v. Fed. Election Comm'n 335 F.Supp.2d 39, 48 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding no injury when plaintiffs already possess the information they claim to lack); see also Alliance for Democracy v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 362 F.Supp.2d 138, 147 (D.D.C.2005) (stating no informational injury has been sustained here because the information required to be disclosed by the statute has already been disclosed). [¶ 22] Because MAPA requires that those seeking judicial review of administrative decisions be aggrieved, and because Lindemann has failed to demonstrate a cognizable injury, Akins does not apply. [11]