Opinion ID: 852836
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Blakely Applies Retroactively to Cases on Direct Review

Text: Of course, as the State points out, the application of Blakely to any case pending on direct review remains subject to the standard rules governing appellate procedure such as waiver and forfeiture. [13] To receive the benefit of a new rule of law, a claimant must preserve the issue for appeal. In Pirnat v. State, 607 N.E.2d 973 (Ind.1993), for example, we considered the retroactive applicability of our decision about the admissibility of depraved sexual instinct evidence to cases pending on appeal at the time Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334 (Ind.1992) was decided. We declared that Pirnat and others whose cases properly preserved the issue and whose cases were pending on direct appeal at the time Lannan was decided receive the benefit of review under the new rule. Pirnat, 607 N.E.2d at 974 (emphasis added). [14] Pirnat had previously challenged the admission of the depraved sexual instinct evidence at trial and on appeal. Pirnat v. State, 596 N.E.2d 259 (Ind.Ct.App.1992). We reached the same conclusion in Coleman v. State, 558 N.E.2d 1059 (Ind.1990), when we considered the retroactive applicability of the constitutional rule announced in Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987) and South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. 805, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 104 L.Ed.2d 876 (1989) to cases pending on direct appeal at the time those rules were announced. [15] Although we concluded that Booth and Gathers applied retroactively to cases pending on direct appeal, we made clear that we considered the rule to apply to the direct appeal of a trial occurring before those cases were decided so long as the appellant has preserved [the issue for appeal] by objecting at trial.  Coleman, 558 N.E.2d at 1061 (emphasis added). We have utilized this same approach in other cases. See, e.g., Ried v. State, 615 N.E.2d 893 (Ind.1993); Daniels v. State, 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind.1990). On this principle of appellate law, Indiana jurisprudence is rather ordinary. In United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002), for example, the Supreme Court applied the plain error test to a case pending on appeal when the new rule in Apprendi was announced. In so doing, the Court noted that Cotton's claim was forfeited because of his failure to object to alleged error at trial. Id. at 629, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781. Similarly, in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997), the Court considered the retroactive application of the rule announced in United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310, 132 L.Ed.2d 444 (1995), to a case pending on appeal at the time of that decision. In considering Johnson's claim, the Court noted that [b]ecause petitioner is still on direct review, Griffith requires that we apply Gaudin retroactively. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467, 117 S.Ct. 1544. The Court, however, still applied plain error review because of Johnson's failure to object at trial and preserve the error for appeal. Id. Unsurprisingly, a number of federal circuit cases reflect the same practice. [16] Given this backdrop of precedent we believe that our approach regulating the retroactive application of a new rule to cases pending on direct appeal through the application of the rules governing appellate procedure is entirely consistent with the dictates of Griffith. As such, we agree with the State that it is entirely possible for defendants to have waived or forfeited their ability to appeal their sentence on Blakely grounds.