Opinion ID: 1936088
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: evidence of taylor's prior murder conviction.

Text: Taylor was indicted under the statute that provides that [t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the ... case... [of] [m]urder which is perpetrated by a person who is under sentence of life imprisonment[.] Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(b) (Supp. 1991). He moved, prior to trial, to prohibit evidence of his prior life sentence from going to the jury and for a Rule 6.04 hearing. He argued at the pre-trial hearing that the jury should not be told during the guilt phase that he had a prior conviction, but should be instructed on capital murder without that element, that is, that the court should determine whether there was a prior life sentence which elevated the killing of Mildred Spires to capital murder. The State countered that the life sentence being served by Taylor was an element of the crime of capital murder which the State was required to prove to the jury, that is, that the conditions which elevate murder to capital murder are issues of fact for the jury. The trial court, expressing concern that admission of Taylor's prior murder conviction might be so prejudicial as to create a problem, deferred ruling on Taylor's motion to exclude the prior conviction. The court later overruled the motion to exclude evidence of the prior murder conviction. Taylor contends on appeal that the admission of evidence of his prior conviction requires reversal on four grounds. He alleges that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove the prior conviction; (2) the prejudicial nature of the evidence denied him a fundamentally fair trial; (3) he was not serving a life sentence as required by the statute; and (4) the trial court improperly denied the jury instruction regarding proof of the conviction. To prove that Taylor was under a sentence of life at the time of the murder for which he was charged, the State offered a certified copy of the order of the prior conviction and life sentence and the testimony of Dick Bowie, Mississippi Department of Corrections Supervisor of Probation and Parole Services in Hinds County, testified that Taylor was on parole from a life sentence on July 11, 1987. That evidence was sufficient to prove that Taylor was under a life sentence at the time of the murder of Mildred Spires. Taylor contends that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's motion to exclude evidence of the prior life sentence and for a Rule 6.04 hearing. [2] Taylor argues that the admission of evidence of a prior life sentence was so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial and that the trial court should have held a separate hearing to determine the validity of the prior conviction. The United States Supreme Court has declined to find a violation of due process rights when prejudicial evidence of prior crimes has been adduced at trial for purposes of sentence enhancement. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967). We hold that when, as here, the evidence of a prior crime is a necessary element of the State's case, introduction of such evidence will not require reversal. Once the trial court ruled the evidence admissible, no limiting instruction was sought and none was given. In the future, the very least the trial court should do to limit the prejudicial effect of such evidence is to admonish the jury that such evidence may not be considered as evidence of the defendant's guilt of the charge for which he is being tried. An even better procedure would be that adopted by statute in Oregon which provides that the defendant may, prior to trial, stipulate with the prosecution to the prior conviction and sentence. Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.103 (1993). If the defendant does so stipulate, the court is required to accept the stipulation whether the prosecution agrees or not and the stipulation is made a part of the record, but does not go before the jury. The defendant has a clear choice of stipulating to the existence of his prior conviction or of having evidence of that conviction admitted into evidence. State v. Earp, 69 Or. App. 365, 368-70, 686 P.2d 437, 439-40 (1984). We suggest the use of this procedure when the State seeks a capital murder conviction based on the fact that the murder was committed by one under a sentence of life imprisonment. Taylor contends that he was not serving a life sentence when he allegedly committed the murder of Mildred Spires and that he was therefore not under life sentence as contemplated by the statute. Neither Taylor nor the State cites any authority for an interpretation of § 97-3-19(2)(b). The State, however, argues persuasively that this Court's interpretation of essentially the same language in another portion of the death penalty statutory scheme is applicable here. In Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988), the defendant argued that a person on probation was not under sentence of imprisonment as contemplated by the statute setting forth aggravating circumstances in capital cases. The Court held that a person whose sentence has been suspended or who is on probation is deemed to remain under the sentence. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d at 1337, citing, Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 742 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 2111, 77 L.Ed.2d 314 (1983). Since parole, like probation, is a matter of grace, Grantham v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 226 (Miss. 1988), and can be revoked upon violation of the conditions of parole, Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-27 (Supp. 1991), and since the legislature in § 97-3-19(2)(b) did not specify that the defendant must be serving a life term, we read the language of § 97-3-19(2)(b) to apply not only to persons serving a life term but also to those who are on parole from a life term. In Taylor's final challenge concerning evidence of his prior crime, he contends that the trial court improperly denied his requested instruction D-18, which would have required the State to prove that his prior conviction was valid. The language of § 97-3-19(2)(b) requires only proof that Taylor was under a sentence of life. The evidence of Taylor's conviction and sentence was properly admitted without this instruction.