Opinion ID: 791939
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Prima Facie Eligibility for Asylum or Withholding

Text: 26 In order for a person to be eligible for asylum, he must demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account of one of five protected grounds. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1) and 1101(a)(42)(A). A well-founded fear must be subjectively and objectively reasonable. Mgoian v. INS, 184 F.3d 1029, 1035 (9th Cir.1999); Montecino v. INS, 915 F.2d 518, 521 (9th Cir.1990). The subjective prong is satisfied upon credible testimony that the applicant genuinely fears harm. Singh v. Moschorak, 53 F.3d 1031, 1034 (9th Cir.1995). The objective prong may be satisfied `in one of two ways: either by establishing that she has suffered persecution in the past or by showing that she has a good reason to fear future persecution.' Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 922, 924-925(9th Cir.2004) (quoting Mgoian, 184 F.3d at 1035). 27 A person who establishes that he or she was subjected to persecution in the past is entitled to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution. Popova v. INS, 273 F.3d 1251, 1259 (9th Cir.2001). Otherwise, an applicant must generally show an individualized, rather than a generalized, risk of persecution. Hoxha v. Ashcroft, 319 F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir.2003). This may be demonstrated in several ways, either by establishing a pattern or practice of persecution of persons similarly situated, or by showing membership in a disfavored group coupled with a showing that the individual is likely to be targeted for persecution as a member of that group. Sael, 386 F.3d at 925. 28 Next, the person seeking relief must also show that the feared persecution is being carried out on account of one of the five protected grounds enumerated in the statute, including membership in a particular social group. See INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481, 112 S.Ct. 812, 117 L.Ed.2d 38 (1992). This may be established by direct or circumstantial evidence. Sangha v. INS, 103 F.3d 1482, 1486-87 (9th Cir.1997). 29 We have recently reaffirmed that family membership may constitute membership in a `particular social group.' Thomas v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.2005) (en banc). Specifically, we held that white South African family members who were targeted on account of their shared, immutable, characteristic, namely, their familial relationship with a hated boss met 8 U.S.C. § 1101's requirement that the persecution be on account of one of the five protected grounds. Id. at 1189. 30 The standard for establishing eligibility for withholding of removal is more stringent. An applicant must demonstrate a clear probability of persecution if removed, meaning that it is more likely than not that persecution would occur. Al-Harbi v. INS, 242 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir.2001). 31
32 As explained above, the IJ already determined that Bhasin has established either past persecution (entitling her to a presumption of a well-founded fear of future persecution) or a well-founded fear of future persecution. The Board did not disturb this finding. We conclude that both findings are supported by substantial evidence. 33
34 In light of the evidence presented at the original hearing and the evidence submitted with the motion to reopen that would likely be proven if another hearing were granted, we conclude that Bhasin has established a prima facie case of persecution on account of membership in a particular social group. Bhasin testified at the original hearing that she was attacked, kidnaped, beaten until she passed out, and detained for four days tied to a cot because of the actions of her son. And although it is well-recognized that [p]ersecutors do not always take the time to tell their victims all the reasons they are being beaten or kidnaped or killed, Gafoor v. INS, 231 F.3d 645, 650 (9th Cir.2000), in this case they did. Bhasin's captors specifically told her that because Yogesh had arrested their leader, Shabir Shah, they were going to eliminate each member of [Bhasin's] family. When she was released, she discovered that her younger son had disappeared. Soon afterward, Yogesh himself went missing. Bhasin was again threatened a few months later; at that time her persecutors told her that they had taken her sons, and reiterated that her whole family would be eliminated. 35 Since the original hearing, Bhasin has learned that her daughters and son-in-law were threatened in a similar manner, receiving verbal threats, blood-stained blank letters, and blood-soaked rags delivered to the house. The verbal threats specifically referred to other members of the family disappearing, and reiterated that everyone in her family would soon disappear. In October 2002, Bhasin's two daughters and son-in-law disappeared, and have not been heard from since. We conclude that this is a strong prima facie case of persecution on account of membership in a familial social group. 36 Both the IJ and the Board originally denied relief on the merits because each said that the JKLF was not motivated by membership in a social group, but rather by a desire to locate Yogesh, or as a means of retribution against Yogesh. In support of this conclusion, the Board stated: 37 The respondent was victimized because the JKLF wanted to locate her son, or perhaps as a means of retribution against the son, but not on account of membership in a particular social group. Moreover, other close members of the respondent's family are living in India without difficulty. The JKLF has not persecuted the respondent's brother, two daughters, or one daughter-in-law, the wife of her missing eldest son. 38 In her declaration in support of her motion to reopen, however, Bhasin presented evidence that completely undermined this rationale for concluding that the on account of requirement had not been satisfied. Indeed, her affidavit established that three more relatives have disappeared, two of them the exact relatives that the Board referenced as not being targeted for persecution, and which at the time belied her social group claim. 3 See Cuadras v. United States, 910 F.2d 567, 571 (9th Cir.1990) (concluding that claims of family-based persecution were undercut by the fact that relatives still lived in home country). It is because of this direct relationship between the Board's justification for its initial denial and Bhasin's newly presented evidence, that we are somewhat perplexed by the Board's statement that the evidence presented in the affidavit is not highly probative in her case. 4 39 We address one additional point. The government argues that the Board's characterizations of Bhasin's affidavit as self-serving and unsupported by any documentation were not the reasons for the Board's denial of the motion to reopen. Rather, according to the government, the Board denied the motion because the Bhasin did not meet her heavy burden. This argument strains credulity. The Board clearly discredited Bhasin's affidavit because it found it was self-serving and unsupported, grounds that are not only contrary to this circuit's established case law, 5 but also completely inappropriate in this case, where Bhasin had already testified credibly and her testimony had been credited by the IJ. By labeling her testimony self-serving, the Board implicitly found Bhasin's testimony to be incredible because Bhasin had a motive to be untruthful. We have long held that credibility determinations on motions to reopen are inappropriate. See Ghadessi v. INS, 797 F.2d 804, 806 (9th Cir.1986) (As motions to reopen are decided without a factual hearing, the Board is unable to make credibility determinations at this stage of the proceedings.) Indeed, facts presented in affidavits supporting a motion to reopen must be accepted as true unless inherently unbelievable. Limsico v. INS, 951 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir.1991). We now reiterate that the self-serving nature of a declaration in support of a motion to reopen is not an appropriate basis for discrediting its content.