Opinion ID: 2981242
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Higginbotham Letters

Text: Beauchamp asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce the letters at trial. The Michigan Court of Appeals held that the letters would not have been admissible at trial even if Beauchamp’s attorneys had attempted to introduce them, for two reasons. Beauchamp, 2006 WL 657068, at . First, the court found the letters were inadmissible because they were not properly authenticated. This reasoning is circular, as the letters were not authenticated because trial counsel did not seek to introduce them. Presumably, if trial counsel had sought to introduce the letters, they would have at least attempted to authenticate them. However, the Michigan Court of Appeals also found that the critical exculpatory statement in the March letter was inadmissable hearsay. As the court explained: The only possible use of them would have been to admit the statement in the second letter, “I know that you had nothing to do with these murders,” for the truth of the matter asserted therein. Thus, it constitutes hearsay, MRE 801, and it is not within any exception that would make it admissible. Although, impeachment is not a hearsay use, MRE 801(c), the statement nevertheless could not have been brought in through the “back door” without again presenting that statement for the truth of the matter asserted. Id. In other words, the court seems to conclude that a hearsay statement may not be offered for impeachment purposes if the statement could also be construed as being offered for the truth of the matter. This is not the normal rule. See Fed.R.Evid. 806; United States v. Arnold, 486 F.3d 177, 193 (6th Cir. 2007) (en banc) (“Rule 806 of the Federal Rules of Evidence permit[s] the introduction of [hearsay statements], not for the truth of the matter asserted, but for impeachment purposes . . . .”) Nevertheless, as the district court noted, we are bound by the Michigan Court of Appeal’s -7- No. 10-1347 Beauchamp v. McKee interpretation of Michigan evidentiary law, and thus we must accept for purposes of habeas review that the letters would have been inadmissible. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 68 (1991). Beauchamp argues, notwithstanding this evidentiary ruling, that he has a constitutional right to have the letters introduced. We have held in the past that the application of an otherwise-valid evidentiary rule may deprive a defendant of the right to present a full defense. See Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 420-21 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that the exclusion of a complaining witness’s diary excerpts under the Ohio rape shield law deprived the defendant of the opportunity to fully cross-examine the complainant). Thus, if Beauchamp can show a right to have the letters introduced, he may be able to establish that the failure to attempt to get the letters introduced constitutes deficient performance. It is axiomatic that habeas relief is not available to a petitioner whose only claim of error is the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence under state evidentiary standards. Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. We note, however, that errors in excluding relevant evidence may rise to the level of a constitutional deprivation, even if such evidentiary determinations comport with state law. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 296 (1973). In this case, a prior written statement made by Beauchamp’s sole accuser wholly at variance with his trial testimony, which was that Beauchamp paid him to murder two individuals, would seemingly be highly relevant and otherwise admissible under both state evidentiary standards and the Constitution. Here, however, the trial counsel for the petitioner determined that offering one of the letters would result in the admissibility of a second letter in which the same witness suggests that the petitioner had not paid him for the shooting. A -8- No. 10-1347 Beauchamp v. McKee tactical decision to avoid admission of both letters is well within the range of effective assistance of counsel. Beauchamp also relies on Higgins v. Renico, 470 F.3d 624 (6th Cir. 2006), and Blackburn v. Foltz, 828 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1987), for the proposition that counsel is deficient when he or she fails to impeach a key prosecution witness. Higgins, in particular, is similar to the facts of this case, in that the prosecution’s entire case rested on the credibility and motivations of a single witness. See Higgins, 470 F.3d at 633 (“The district court correctly stressed that Young was not only the sole witness that directly implicated Higgins as the shooter, but he was also a suspect whose interest in avoiding criminal culpability was tied firmly to convincing the police and the jury that Higgins—and not Young himself—shot Ramsey.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, in Higgins, trial counsel made no effort at all to cross-examine the key witness. See id. at 628 (“[Trial counsel] declined to do any cross-examination at all. . . .Thus, the only person who directly implicated Higgins as Ramsey’s killer was never cross-examined in front of the jury.”) Here, Beauchamp’s attorney extensively cross-examined Higginbotham. Indeed, Beauchamp’s entire defense was based on showing that Higginbotham was lying about Beauchamp’s role in the killings. Thus, even construing the letters to be unambiguously helpful to Beauchamp’s case, they would at best buttress the argument that Beauchamp’s counsel was already making. As the Supreme Court has emphasized, a defendant has the right to “an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish.” Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20 (1985). Beauchamp and his -9- No. 10-1347 Beauchamp v. McKee counsel had a full opportunity to cross-examine Higginbotham, and thus Beauchamp had no constitutional right to introduce the letters. Without a constitutional violation on which to hang his hat, Beauchamp is left with the claim that his trial counsel was ineffective for not attempting to admit inadmissible evidence. The Michigan Court of Appeals found that there can be no prejudice to Beauchamp for his counsel failing to take an ultimately futile action. Beauchamp, 2006 WL 657068, at . We agree, and therefore we affirm the district court’s denial of Beauchamp’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.1