Opinion ID: 1442022
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Jury Requests for Clarification.

Text: On the third day of deliberations the court, after consultation with counsel, summoned the jury and responded to three written jury questions as follows: Question Number One: `Is the defendant convicted of premeditated murder?' [Answer:] The defendant was convicted of two premeditated and deliberated murders. Question Number Two: `What happens if we have a split jury?' [Answer:] A mistrial would be declared, and the jury dismissed. Question Number Three: `Do we have to have expert testimony as to mental or emotional disturbance to consider it as a mitigating circumstance?' [Answer:] Mental or emotional disturbance is not always necessarily proved by the testimony of an expert such as a psychiatrist. It may be proved by any other testimonial evidence but not by speculation. When a juror stated that, as to one of the questions, the judge had answered it, but I don't think it answers it, the court agreed to reread the answers and suggested that the jury submit additional written inquiry and pinpoint the unanswered problem. The jury then resumed deliberations. Two hours later, the jury was back with two further questions. The court indicated that it did not have the answer to the first question and would respond on the following day. [2] The second question was in two parts: Do a majority of the jurors have the right to examine and cross-examine the minority as to their reasons for a decision? Do all jurors have an obligation to continue to discuss the matter if we have not reached a decision? To this question the court reread two instructions previously given [3] and added: The jury has an obligation to discuss the matter until it arrives at a verdict or it's hopelessly deadlocked. There were no further deliberations on that day. On the following morning, the fourth day of deliberations, the foreman reported to the bailiff that the jurors were having a little confrontation and that things were getting out of hand. The bailiff in turn reported to the court that he had told the foreman to address the court in writing. Later on the same morning, with defendant, counsel, and the jury present, the court stated: Mr. Foreman, you sent to the court a note which in effect indicates that the jury is hopelessly deadlocked. If the court were to ask you to continue deliberations, do you think there is any reasonable probability that you might ever arrive at a verdict? [The Foreman:] No, your honor. I don't think at this time that we could. But when asked if there is anything at all that the court could do further to assist the jury in arriving at any kind of a verdict, the foreman responded, yes. The court directed the foreman to put in writing whatever it was the court might do to assist the jury. That afternoon, in chambers with counsel, the court discussed a note from the jury which asked a number of questions and also stated that there was an unwillingness among some of the jurors to discuss the case and to go by the evidence. The court dealt first with the allegation that some of the jurors were not acting properly. [4] After discussion, the court denied a prosecution motion to conduct a hearing regarding the jurors who were allegedly acting improperly, i.e., not following the law. The court then dealt with the questions contained in the note. The judge summoned the jury into the courtroom and answered the first three questions in the negative: Should a decision be based entirely on the fact that this would be a deterrent? Should we take into consideration that there might be a jail break as part of the reason for making a decision? Should we base our decision entirely on the size of the stab wounds? To a fourth question, Is it the duty of the fellow jurors to persuade by verbal force questions and accusations to obtain a common decision?, the court again reread the instructions on the jurors' tasks, the need for individual opinion, and the duty to deliberate. (See fn. 3, ante, p. 225.) The court added: `Verbal force,' and `accusations,' as used in question four have no place in your deliberations. The next question read: There was to be a question asked of the judge, whether we could consider insanity based on the act of repeated stabbings of the victim. The court answered: The defendant is presumed to be sane. The jurors cannot consider insanity as a mitigating factor. The final question of the afternoon was described as a collective question: All twelve jurors need to be further clarified on their obligations as jurors. The instructions as read so far are not considered by the majority to be sufficient. We need to have clarified whether we may use something as a mitigating factor if it has not been proven or substantiated by evidence presented. Can we ignore testimony of witnesses if there is substantial corroborating evidence of that witness's testimony? The court answered that question as follows: It is the duty of the jurors to discuss the evidence and not speculate on evidence not presented. Each juror should decide the case for him or herself after a discussion of the evidence and instructions with the other jurors. You may consider pity, sympathy, and mercy in deciding the appropriate penalty. However, you must not be governed by mere conjecture, prejudice or public opinion. At the jury's request, the court sent the reporter to the jury room to reread the questions and answers. There were no further questions from the jury. On Friday, the fifth day of deliberations, the jury requested a reread of the testimony of Gwendolyn R. And on the following Monday, the jury informed the court that one juror refused to discuss the case and disregarded the court's instructions: We have one juror who continues to use insanity or mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance even though you, the judge, have said we can't use it. He refuses to discuss the case any more. Is there anything you can do, being he is disregarding your ruling completely? Over objection of defense counsel, the court then summoned one of the jurors and conducted the hearing which gave rise to the claim of coercion of verdict, discussed in the following section. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court informed the jury that there has been no failure on the part of any juror to follow the court's instructions, and I will ask you to continue your deliberations. On the afternoon of the following day, the jury reached its verdict of death. (1a) Defendant asserts that the court's responses to the jury's inquiries withdrew from its deliberation all facts and factors relating to mental or emotional disturbance as mitigation and told the jury that, as a matter of law, it could not consider either insanity or mental or emotional disturbance as a factor in mitigation. We disagree. (2) It is well settled that a capital jury may not be precluded `from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' ... [T]he sentencer may not refuse to consider or be precluded from considering `any relevant mitigating evidence.' ( Skipper v. South Carolina (1985) 476 U.S. 1, 4 [90 L.Ed.2d 1, 6, 106 S.Ct. 1669], citations omitted, italics in original.) (See also Mills v. Maryland (1988) 486 U.S. 367 [100 L.Ed.2d 384, 108 S.Ct. 1860]; and McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433 [108 L.Ed.2d 369, 110 S.Ct. 1227] [a jury may not be precluded, by the requirement of unanimity, from considering any mitigating factor].) Skipper was based on the court's earlier decisions in Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954] and Eddings v. Oklahoma (1982) 455 U.S. 104 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 102 S.Ct. 869]. Lockett invalidated an Ohio statute which limited mitigating factors to three and did not include consideration of any mitigating aspects of a defendant's character and background. ( Lockett v. Ohio, supra, 438 U.S. at pp. 597-605 [57 L.Ed.2d at pp. 985-990]; see also Bell v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 637 [57 L.Ed.2d 1010, 98 S.Ct. 2977] [same statute, which limited consideration of mental state to psychosis or mental deficiency (not amounting to insanity) and precluded consideration of mental deficiency because of low intelligence and use of drugs].) Eddings, interpreting an Oklahoma statute which provided that in the sentencing proceedings evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances, held that a sentencer could determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence, but could not, as a matter of law, exclude the evidence from consideration. ( Eddings v. Oklahoma, supra, 455 U.S. at pp. 114-115 [71 L.Ed.2d at p. 11].) (1b) We conclude hereafter that the trial judge in the instant case did not violate the dictates of Lockett and its progeny  the trial judge did not withdraw from the jury's consideration any factor which was supported by the record or preclude the jury from considering any evidence which had been presented at the trial. Prior to commencing its deliberations, the jury was advised to consider all of the evidence that had been received during any part of the trial. The jury was then instructed to consider, take into account and be guided by the following factors, if applicable: ... [¶] (A) The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceedings and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true; [¶] ... [¶] (D) Whether or not the offense was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; [¶] ... [¶] (H) Whether or not, at the time of the offense, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law, was impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or the effects of intoxication; [¶] ... [¶] (K) Any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death. At defendant's request, the jury was also instructed: You may consider pity, sympathy and mercy in deciding the appropriate penalty. However, you must not be governed by mere conjecture, prejudice or public opinion and You may consider as a mitigating factor any possible doubt as to the defendant's guilt. A possible doubt may arise after a consideration of all the facts and evidence you may have heard. It is conceded that defendant proffered no evidence of diminished mental capacity or any impaired mental state. Further, it is undisputed that defense counsel did not proffer the evidence of the repeated stabbings as a basis for a sentence less than death; nor did counsel suggest that any inferences should be drawn therefrom as an indication of extreme mental or emotional disturbance or any other state of mind. The closing argument of defense counsel underscored and stressed the evidence of alibi and attacked the credibility of Mrs. Gwendolyn R., pressing for lingering doubt of guilt and asking the jury to show mercy. (3) (See fn. 5.), (1c) From the chronology of the jury's questions related above, we can surmise that the only possible evidence the jury was considering as relating to defendant's mental state was the number of wounds and the manner in which they were inflicted on the victims. [5] Assuming, then, for the purpose of argument that the jury can consider the wounds and manner inflicted as relating to defendant's mental state, we address defendant's first contention  that the trial court's answers to the jury questions improperly removed his mental or emotional state from their consideration. The court's initial instructions relating to defendant's mental or emotional state were given in the statutory language. [6] Only two of the jury's later requests for clarification concerned mental or emotional disturbance. The mid-deliberation question concerning whether it was necessary to have expert testimony to prove mental or emotional disturbance was correctly answered by the judge. Moreover, the question demonstrated that the jury was evaluating that mitigating factor. The follow-up question regarding the nature of the crimes as evidence of mental disturbance (see ante, p. 225, fn. 2) was not resubmitted. And finally the jury's question whether it could use something as a mitigating factor if it was not proven or substantiated by evidence graphically illustrates that the jury was making the correct distinction between its right to consider a factor in mitigation with its duty to find the factor inapplicable if there was a lack of evidence to support it. In Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370 [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 110 S.Ct. 1190], the court addressed a constitutional challenge to an instruction which purportedly violated the Eighth Amendment requirement that the jury be able to consider and give effect to all relevant mitigating evidence offered by a defendant. At issue was factor (k) of CALJIC, former No. 8.84.1 which, though not an erroneous instruction, was claimed to be ambiguous and subject to erroneous interpretation. The court stated, the proper inquiry in such a case is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury has applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. (494 U.S. at p. ___ [108 L.Ed.2d at p. 329, 110 S.Ct. at p. 1198].) The high court found no reasonable likelihood that Boyde's jurors interpreted the instruction in a constitutionally restricted manner, but added: Even were the language of the instruction less clear than we think, the context of the proceedings would have led reasonable jurors to believe that evidence of petitioner's background and character could be considered in mitigation. Other factors listed in CALJIC No. 8.84.1 allow for consideration of mitigating evidence not associated with the crime itself.... (494 U.S. at p. ___ [108 L.Ed.2d at p. 331, 110 S.Ct. at p. 1199].) Applying the Boyde v. California standard to these proceedings, we think there is not a reasonable likelihood that the jurors interpreted the court's instructions to prevent consideration of the stabbings, the wounds, or the nature of the crime in mitigation of penalty. The instruction on mental and emotional disturbance as a mitigating circumstance, like the instruction in Boyde v. California, supra, 494 U.S. ___, is not concededly erroneous. Though it is claimed that the jury misinterpreted it, defendant can point to no instruction or response by the trial court as to that circumstance which could have prompted the note from the jury on the sixth day of deliberations that one juror was using insanity or mental disturbance as a mitigating circumstance even though you have said we can't use this. Of course, the court had instructed the jury (correctly, we conclude hereafter) that the defendant was presumed sane and that they could not consider insanity as a mitigating circumstance. [7] The jury was instructed to consider all of the evidence received during the trial  evidence of the stab wounds and the manner of killing (testimony and photographs) had been introduced. The jury was instructed on extreme mental and emotional disturbance as a mitigating factor and was told that the evidence of mental or emotional disturbance did not have to be proved by expert testimony. It is inconceivable that the jury would have believed that it could not consider that factor. (See People v. Boyde (1988) 46 Cal.3d 212, 251 [250 Cal. Rptr. 83, 758 P.2d 25].) Nothing in the court's comments, quoted in their entirety above, could have misled the jury to believe they could not consider defendant's emotional or mental state in the deliberation of penalty if the jury found relevant evidence to support that particular mitigating factor. The jurors clearly were in disagreement on whether there was sufficient relevant evidence to find that mitigating factor to be present. And insofar as we cannot determine the precise nature of the conflict among the jurors because of the court's reluctance to inject itself in the dispute over the evidence, we should defer to the court's analysis of the jury's requests as indicating that the jurors were at odds as to whether the evidence warranted application of the mental disturbance factor. The trial court, after all, is in a better position than an appellate court to interpret the tone and nuances of the problems in the jury room. Having presided over the trial, the judge appreciates the full context in which the jury's questions are posed. (4a) We also reject defendant's contention that the court's instruction that the defendant was presumed sane and that the jury could not consider insanity as a mitigating factor removed extreme mental or emotional disturbance from the jury's consideration. In this regard, defendant raises two points  (1) the presumption of sanity applies only to the guilt phase and the court erred in instructing thereon in the penalty trial, and (2) the jury was not using the term insanity in its legal sense but as a term of art for a lesser mental state, i.e., mental or emotional disturbance, which the jury could properly consider. Defendant cites no authority  and we have found none  for the proposition that the presumption of sanity ends at conviction and has no application at the sentencing phase of a criminal trial. In California, insanity cannot be proved at the trial on the issue of guilt. The defense is raised by a separate plea and decided in a separate trial. (See § 1026, subd. (a).) Defendant did not place his sanity at issue; as a result, at the guilt trial he was conclusively presumed sane, and evidence tending to prove insanity was inadmissible. ( People v. Wells (1949) 33 Cal.2d 330, 350 [202 P.2d 53].) Although California's statute enumerating potential mitigating factors in capital cases includes one that permits consideration of evidence of impairment due to mental disease or defect (the trial court's factor (H) in the case at bar; see ante, pp. 228-229), that factor clearly contemplates a mental state less than insanity. (5) Under the American Law Institute test, adopted in People v. Drew (1978) 22 Cal.3d 333 [149 Cal. Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318], a person is insane and not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. (Italics added.) The statutorily enumerated mitigating factor which deals with impairment due to mental disease or defect is not the Drew definition of insanity, missing an important word, substantial, and obviously contemplating a lesser impairment of ability to appreciate criminality of conduct. [8] As noted, no evidence of mental disease or defect was proffered by defendant; the trial court's factor (H) is simply not at issue in the case at bar and defendant does not contend otherwise. The essence of defendant's argument is that the jury was using the term insanity not in its legal sense but as a synonym for mental disturbance. However, our review of the record convinces us that the jury was not confusing the two concepts, although, as will appear, the foreman, at least, may have confused the terminology. (4b) First, as we illustrated above, there was no error in the instructions which clearly preserved, if applicable, the factor of extreme mental or emotional disturbance as mitigating. Our chronology further reveals that the jurors did have differing opinions as to whether there was any evidence to support an inference of emotional or mental disturbance. This is reflected in the final question asked by the jury concerning their obligations as jurors: We need to have clarified whether we may use something as a mitigating factor if it has not been proven or substantiated by evidence presented.... The jury was told to discuss the evidence and not speculate on evidence not presented. Defense counsel, and the dissent, make much of two instances in which the phrase insanity or mental disturbance was used. [9] (Italics added.) There are other comments, by the jurors, however, which indicate that they, singly and collectively, were not confusing insanity and mental or emotional disturbance. [10] In context and viewing the record as a whole, we are not persuaded that the jury was confused as to the distinctions between the concepts of (1) insanity, which the jury was correctly told not to consider, and (2) a lesser mental state, i.e., extreme mental or emotional disturbance, which they could and did consider. It is evident that what divided the jurors was not whether they could consider defendant's mental state as a mitigating factor but rather whether there was any evidence in the record to support that mitigating factor. It was obvious from the third day of deliberations, when the jury asked if expert testimony was necessary to establish mental state, that the issue troubling them was whether there was any evidence to support that mitigating factor. The trial judge was keenly aware of the need to remain neutral in the dispute as to whether a particular factor in mitigation was applicable, i.e., whether there was evidence to support application of the factor. The court's comments to counsel indicate that it was alert to the danger that whatever it said could be seen as an interpretation of the evidence and that it was also alert to the requirement that a trial court should not evaluate or assess the mitigating nature of particular items that concern the jury, for fear of unduly coercing the deliberations. (See People v. McDowell, supra, 46 Cal.3d 551, 578.) In McDowell the jury could not agree as to whether certain items of evidence were mitigating. We concluded that the court acted properly in directing the jury to the applicable instructions. (1d) Here, too, the court did not err. The trial judge did not tell the jury that evidence from which mental or emotional disturbance might be inferred was irrelevant to the sentencing decision. The trial judge did not, as did the judge in Eddings v. Oklahoma refuse to consider proffered mitigating evidence. (455 U.S. 104, 112-113 [71 L.Ed.2d 1, 9-10].) Nor was the court and jury encumbered, as was the sentencer in Lockett v. Ohio , by a statute limiting what might be considered in mitigation. (438 U.S. 586, 607-608 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 991-992].) The trial judge did not instruct the jury to disregard or not consider one of the circumstances of the crime  the repeated stabbings  if it found that circumstance applicable to the mental state factor. The trial judge merely stated, and correctly, that the jury had no discretion to conclude that defendant was insane. Accordingly, we find no violation of the dictates of Lockett, Eddings, and Skipper. Even if, as the dissent asserts, the jury's note to the court on the sixth day of deliberations may have indicated a misunderstanding of the instructions given regarding the mental disturbance factor, other factors listed in CALJIC, former No. 8.84.1, i.e., the catchall (factor (k)) as well as the circumstances of the crime (factor (a)), would allow for consideration of the evidence of the stabbings and the wounds. (6) As did the court in Boyde v. California , we follow the familiar rule stated in Cupp v. Naughten (1973) 414 U.S. 141, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973): `... that a single instruction to a jury may not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge' (494 U.S. at p. ___ [108 L.Ed.2d at p. 327, 110 S.Ct. at p. 1196]). We conclude that there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury believed it could not consider any and all of the evidence introduced at the penalty phase in mitigation of penalty. (7) As a corollary issue, defendant also urges that the instruction on presumed sanity had the effect of eliminating from the jury's deliberations, as a mitigating factor, any possible lingering doubt as to defendant's sanity and ability to premeditate. He relies on People v. Terry (1964) 61 Cal.2d 137, 145-147 [37 Cal. Rptr. 605, 390 P.2d 381]. Terry is not apposite. In that case, which was also a retrial of the penalty issue only, the trial court did not permit the jury to take into consideration the defendant's theory of the events, i.e., evidence tending to show his possible innocence of the crimes involved in the proceedings. Here, however, defendant does not charge that the court excluded any proffered evidence. A number of witnesses testified to his alibi, and no claim is made that any specific evidence was offered and rejected. We have determined in the prior discussion that the court did not err in its instructions on the presumption of sanity and the removal of sanity as a factor in mitigation. Inasmuch as sanity was not at issue in this case, at either the guilt or the penalty phase, the court's instruction on the presumption of sanity could not have affected the entirely separate question of whether the jury had any lingering doubt as to defendant's guilt.