Opinion ID: 2117678
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Early Precedents

Text: In early judicial decisions, comments concerning the agricultural exemption from state workmen's compensation acts inferred that the nexus between the classification and state objectives was obvious. In New York Central R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 208, 37 S.Ct. 247, 254, 61 L.Ed. 667 (1917), although it was not an issue, the United States Supreme Court offered the gratuitous advice that: The objection under the `equal protection' clause is not pressed. The only apparent basis for it is in the exclusion of farm laborers and domestic servants from the scheme. But, manifestly, this cannot be judicially declared to be an arbitrary classification, since it reasonably may be considered that the risks inherent in these occupations are exceptionally patent, simple and familiar.  [Emphasis supplied.] Another of the early declarations, relying in great part upon New York Central R. Co. v. White, supra , also inferred that farm work is not hazardous and not likely to produce injuries. See Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co., 249 U.S. 152, 157, 39 S.Ct. 227, 229, 63 L.Ed. 527 (1919), which stated: However, we are clear that the classification cannot be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Texas in sustaining it said (108 Tex. 96, 110, 111, 185 S.W. 556): `Employes of railroads, those of employers having less than five employes, domestic servants, farm laborers and gin laborers are excluded from the operation of the act, but this was doubtless for reasons that the Legislature deemed sufficient. The nature of these several employments, the existence of other laws governing liability for injuries to railroad employes, known experience as to the hazards and extent of accidental injuries to farm hands, gin hands and domestic servants, were all matters no doubt considered by the Legislature in exempting them from the operation of the act. Distinctions in these and other respects between them and employes engaged in other industrial pursuits may, we think, be readily suggested. We are not justified in saying that the classification was purely arbitrary.' [Emphasis supplied.] The North Dakota case of State v. Hagan, 44 N.D. 306, 175 N.W. 372 (1919), has been interpreted as holding that the Workmen's Compensation Act does not violate the provisions of the Constitution involving due process or equal protection. In that opinion, as published, Syllabus ¶ 5 says, in part: It is held that these provisions in the act are not deemed so arbitrary and unreasonable as a matter of law as to be violative of relator's constitutional rights, either under the due process clause, the equal privileges and immunities clause, or the clause concerning the impairment of the obligation of contracts of either the federal or state Constitution. [Emphasis in the original.] Although two of the Justices, Bronson and Grace, said . . . it is deemed proper to consider the merits of the issues raised concerning the constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Act, . . ., the majority did not agree. Justice Birdzell said: . . . a majority of the court does not adopt any opinion as expressing the views of the court . . . . Chief Justice Christianson concurred specially in only a dismissal of the petition and Justice Robinson, in dissenting, expressed the view that the definition of hazardous employment, with the exceptions, is absurd and violates both Sections 61 and 11 of the North Dakota Constitution. It appears that the opinion of Justices Bronson and Grace rested, for the most part, on the question whether the classification of book-keeper-clerk-typist was, as a matter of law, nonhazardous. The proceedings were original in the Supreme Court and there was no testimony or affidavits supporting a conclusion on the hazardousness of that classification. The opinion, authored by Justice Bronson and concurred in by Justice Grace, at 175 N.W. at 379, stated: The fact that the act excludes from its operation domestic and agricultural employes, as well as railroad employes, does not give rise to the constitutional objection of unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination as a matter of law. The fact that the entire field subject to regulation has not been covered is not fatal. What trades and occupations may be regulated is ordinarily a matter for the Legislature, in the absence of a distinctive showing of an unreasonable and arbitrary discrimination or classification. Similar exclusions in other Compensation Acts have been upheld. [Cites omitted.] [Emphasis supplied.] We cannot escape the conclusion that this court, in Hagan, failed to decide the constitutionality of any part of the Workmen's Compensation Act and, specifically, failed to decide the validity of the agricultural exclusion. Even if it was contended that the constitutional issue was decided in State v. Hagan, supra , we would not be thereby prohibited from again examining the issue in this case. See Melland v. Johanneson, 160 N.W.2d 107, 112 (N.D.1968). As we said in Johnson v. Hassett, 217 N.W.2d 771, 779 (N.D.1974): In constitutional law, as in other matters, times change and doctrines change with the times. We also stated in that opinion, at 777: Even when a statute has been in effect for a long time, our duty to consider its constitutionality, when the matter comes before us, continues, and this duty has been performed even in the face of prior holdings of constitutionality.