Opinion ID: 2604731
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the abuse-of-discretion issue

Text: The current sentencing statutes in Wyoming vest broad discretionary authority in the district court judges, without substantial guidance or review from either the legislature or the Wyoming Supreme Court. A system which is charged with such consequential decision-making power, yet burdened with so little formal structure, produces inequitable treatment almost by design. Roberts, The Changing Structure of Criminal Sentencing, 18 Land and Water Law Review 591, 637 (1983). In this case, at the trial-court level, the district judge sentenced Grant Alan Wright to the state penitentiary for from two to four years, with these remarks: Well, Mr. Wright, the Court is impressed with your background and I'm very encouraged with the fact that you are doing well in school and we will take that of course into consideration. The crime of which you stand convicted is a very serious one even though it was for the delivery of a small amount. It was nonetheless a delivery and therefore under our statutes a felony. Considering all the factors in the case, the Court determines that you are not a fit subject for probation, but that because of all the circumstances, a minimum sentence is going to be imposed and that will be a period from two to four years in the Wyoming State Penitentiary. The presentence summary which was presented to the district judge by the department of probation and parole said: The Defendant [Wright] is a twenty year old male in sound physical and mental health. He comes from a very solid and close family background. He exhibits no serious drug or alcohol problem and appears to have used these substances sparingly. The Defendant denies selling drugs with the exception of the present offense, which appears to have some extenuating circumstances. The Subject has maintained regular employment and is currently furthering his education at Sheridan College, where he hopes to graduate from the welding program in 1983. He is an excellent student. The Defendant has presented no problems with his family nor the community at large. His prior offenses are relatively minor and demonstrate no criminal inclinations. This is his first felony conviction. The presentence investigation went on to conclude: The Defendant appears to be a good risk for probation. Incarceration for this Defendant does not appear to be the appropriate route.  (Emphasis added.) As I have noted above, in the sentencing hearing, the trial court said he considered all the factors in this case and, without saying what they were, found that Grant Wright was not a fit subject for probation. In Sanchez v. State, Wyo., 592 P.2d 1130 (1979), we directed that the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Probation, be given consideration where probation is contemplated as an alternative to incarceration. We also said that in non-capital cases and in those cases where the sentence was not life imprisonment,    the only right which an applicant for probation possesses is that his petition should be considered by the court. 592 P.2d at 1137. In Daniel v. State, Wyo., 644 P.2d 172, 180 (1982), we said: We strongly recommend that the trial judges explain their reasons for denying probation and indicate the factors they considered in imposing sentence. While it might be argued that the trial judge, in the matter at bar, considered probation in compliance with Sanchez, he did not make known the factors which led him to refuse probation as required by Daniel. This leaves this court in a position where  even if it were conceded that we have retained the authority to examine the exercise of the trial court's discretion  we would not have available to our inquiry a record of the factors which led to the judge's denial of probation. This leaves us with a very meager record upon which to exercise our appellate obligation of review. In Daniel v. State, supra, we quoted Justice Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, when, in Commonwealth v. Riggins, 474 Pa. 115, 377 A.2d 140, 147 (1977), he wrote about the reason for requiring a record of purposes and factors in the sentencing process, and I would reiterate here that Justice Roberts' reasons and the rule of Sanchez should be sufficient to cause all trial judges to furnish the record with this information. It was not done here, however, and therefore we are at a loss to know why, when the defendant's record was so clean and the probation report so affirmative, the trial judge sentenced Grant Wright to prison instead of placing him on probation. This case was bound, one day, to come to haunt and threaten this court's bizarre policy of saying that we retain the right to review the criminal sentence for abuse of discretion even though within statutory parameters, while we in fact refuse to interfere with a district court's sentence no matter what kind of unbelievable abuse of sentencing discretion has been exercised. Here we have a young man, 20 years old, with an exemplary home, school and societal record. He works hard at his job, is an honor student at Sheridan College, and his only prior violations of law are a speeding ticket and running a red light. He was charged and found guilty of an unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, marijuana, in violation of § 35-7-1031(a)(ii), W.S. 1977. This statute provides in relevant part: (a) Except as authorized by this act [§§ 35-7-1001 to XX-X-XXXX], it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance. Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:       (ii) Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II or III, is guilty of a crime and upon conviction may be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, fined not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000.00) or both   . The circumstances which surround Grant Wright's apprehension and sentence to prison for two to four years are frightening. Justice Cardine, in his dissenting opinion, has described the transaction which led to Mr. Wright's arrest, and I have little to add except to say that there is, when the State is given the benefit of all doubt, barely enough evidence to sustain a verdict of guilty when the evidence most favorable to the State is pitted against the defense of entrapment. During their trip to Story  when all four were in the car: Wright, Jones and the two undercover agents  the officers were the ones who introduced the subject of drugs into the conversation. They then testified that they were addressing their particular inquiry to Wright's companion, Jones, when Wright mentioned during the conversation [with Jones] that he had some marijuana in his car at Story, that it was his own and that he would  give  (emphasis added) the undercover agent half of it. The agent took Wright home to Story, and, in gratitude for the ride, Wright handed the officer a small quantity of marijuana. He had not originally intended to deliver or sell it. It was his purpose to just give it to someone who had been kind to him. It was the agent who brought up the issue of money and then handed Wright $20.00. Wright was not a marijuana dealer and was not even possessed of marijuana until the undercover agents talked him into going to Story to get some out of his car that night. He was not in the drug business, was not on the officer's target list, and the officer's subsequent investigation did not reveal that he had in any way been associated with drugs. In Janski v. State, Wyo., 538 P.2d 271, (1975), I said in my dissent at p. 282: This court has worried in other cases about criminal prosecutions that have been laid out by the police. Justice McClintock spoke for the court in LaFleur v. The State of Wyoming, Wyo., 533 P.2d 309, 312-313, decided April 1, 1975, when he said: `Condemnation of prosecution of crimes which have been arranged by law enforcement officers is of long standing. Thus, in Saunders v. People, 38 Mich. 218, 222 (1878) Mr. Justice Marston said in his concurring opinion that courts    have not yet gone so far, and I trust never will, as to lend aid or encouragement to officers who may, under a mistaken sense of duty, encourage and assist parties to commit crime, in order that they may arrest and have them punished for so doing. `The cited federal decisions are equally strong in their condemnation of manufacturing cases, the summation on that appearing in United States v. Russell, supra note 8, 411 U.S. [423] at 434, 93 S.Ct. [1637] at 1644, [36 L.Ed.2d 366] where Mr. Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the majority, states: `   We are content to leave the matter where it was left by the Court in Sherman [cited infra]: `The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not include the manufacturing of crime.'' The two-pronged test for entrapment was set out by the United States Supreme Court in Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 78 S.Ct. 819, 2 L.Ed.2d 848 (1958), according to which the jury is directed to consider: (1) the conduct of the agent  i.e., whether the crime was the result of creative activity of the police; and (2) the conduct and predisposition of the accused to commit the crime. Apparently the jury believed that Wright was predisposed to commit the crime even if the agents initiated the solicitation of marijuana. Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, I therefore would concede that the jury's failure to find entrapment in this case does not amount to plain error even though that issue weighs guilt-ridden and delicately balanced upon the scales of justice. But it is not  in this appeal  the trial and its outcome that troubles me. The damage that was done in that phase of the proceeding is beyond repair. I am concerned here about the sentencing of this young man to the Wyoming state penitentiary for two to four years for a mistake which, it could be argued, was induced by the State's agents. I recoil in revulsion when I think what this experience is likely to do to his life. Only the most naive would pretend to be unaware of the cruel and evil things that befall young men when they are forced into penitentiary life and, no matter what scarring experiences await Grant Wright in the penitentiary, it will also be his lot to carry, throughout his life, the stigma of ex-convict. The unjust result that has been reached in this litigation comes about as a result of this court's abdication of its appellate obligations in the sentencing arena. The majority take the position that we have retained authority to review sentencing discretion even when the sentence falls within the limitations set by statute. Justice Thomas says that as a matter of law we have abandoned the authority to examine the trial court's sentencing discretion. Apodaca v. State, Wyo., 571 P.2d 603, 605 (1977). I hold that we have retained the authority  as a legal proposition  but have abandoned this authority as a factual proposition. It was one thing for this court to  in point of fact  forsake our statutory obligation to review sentencing discretion when exercised within the parameters of the statute when Alvah R. Daniel, Jr. was before the courts. (See Daniel v. State, supra, 644 P.2d 172.) Daniel killed a woman, was charged with first degree murder, found guilty of involuntary manslaughter, and sentenced to from 19 to 20 years in the state penitentiary. It is different than the situation with which we were confronted when we again said we retained but, in a factual sense, abdicated our appellate review prerogatives when we considered the sentencing complaints of Sharron Scheikofsky ( Scheikofsky v. State, Wyo., 636 P.2d 1107 (1981)). Ms. Scheikofsky was charged with second degree murder of her husband and found guilty of manslaughter. She was sentenced to 10 to 15 years in prison. Grant Wright's problem is different than the problem that confronted this court when we refused to disturb the sentence in Jones v. State, Wyo., 602 P.2d 378 (1979), where the defendant was charged, tried and found guilty of arson. He had a previous record of convictions for assault with intent to kill and auto theft. Grant Wright is not like Daellenbach, in Daellenbach v. State, Wyo., 562 P.2d 679 (1977), where, after conviction for armed robbery, the question of our interfering with the sentencing judge's discretion was again at hand. This case is not like Smith v. State, Wyo., 564 P.2d 1194 (1977), where Smith was found guilty of second degree murder and complained that the sentence was too harsh and constituted an abuse of discretion. We said we would not disturb the trial judge's sentence so long as it was within the statutory sentencing parameters. Grant Wright's case is to be distinguished from those set out above for many reasons, one of which is that these prior cases involved crimes of violence, while the crime with which Wright was charged is not. In many of the appeals mentioned, and other similar cases decided by this court, there was a background of criminality or alcoholism or other good and sufficient reasons why the defendant did not appear  at least to the sentencing judge  to be a good candidate for probation. In these circumstances, this court adopted the position that we would not interfere with the sentencing judge's exercise of discretion so long as the sentence was within the statutory parameters and probation had been considered, [1] even though we said we had retained the authority to exercise the prerogative of reviewing the possibility of abuse of discretion in the sentencing arena.