Opinion ID: 853768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Intervening Causes

Text: Wooley argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain the murder conviction because of two intervening and superseding causes. Wooley's theory at trial was that both Dalton's attack on Strow after Wooley stabbed Strow and the emergency room doctor's grossly negligent care of Strow were intervening causes sufficient to relieve him of criminal liability. In reviewing a sufficiency of evidence claim, we do not reweigh the evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. Gant v. State, 668 N.E.2d 254, 255 (Ind.1996). Wooley's conviction will be affirmed if the probative evidence and reasonable inferences drawn could have allowed a reasonable jury to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Anderson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 257, 261 (Ind.1998); Wooden v. State, 657 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind. 1995). Wooley does not deny that he stabbed Strow in the neck. Instead, he argues that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's rejection of his asserted intervening causes implicit in its guilty verdict. An intervening cause is an independent force that breaks the causal connection between the actions of the defendant and the injury. Spencer v. State, 660 N.E.2d 359 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). In order for an intervening cause to break the chain of criminal responsibility, it must be so extraordinary that it would be unfair to hold the appellant responsible for the actual result. Sims v. State, 466 N.E.2d 24, 26 (Ind.1984). In all other cases, [a]n individual who inflicts injury upon another is deemed by law to be guilty of homicide if the injury contributed mediately or immediately to the death of that person. Id. at 25. Wooley contends that the mason jar and telephone receiver with Strow's blood are evidence that Dalton beat Strow with each after Wooley stabbed Strow. However, the physician who performed the autopsy testified that Strow died from blood loss from the stab wound on his neck. Whether or not Dalton struck Strow with the mason jar and the telephone receiver, these blows were not the cause of death and do not relieve Wooley of responsibility. Wooley also speculates that Dalton stabbed Strow after he did. He offers the fact that a knife with Strow's blood on it was in her back pocket when the EMTs arrived. The autopsy physician testified that the v-shaped stab wound was caused by a single knife inserted at one angle and removed at a second. On cross examination, the physician testified that it was theoretically possible that the wound was made by two very carefully inserted blades but that it was highly unlikely that Strow would have held still while a second incision was made. Dalton denied that she either hit or knifed Strow. Next, Wooley contends that if Strow had not received grossly negligent medical care, he would not have died. He points to no evidence in support of this contention. The autopsy physician testified that Strow died from the stab wound, not from the care he received in the emergency room. In other cases we have held a defendant responsible even where the cause of death was not the initial injury but a result of medical care received after the injury. In Sims, we affirmed the defendant's conviction for murder where the defendant beat the victim, the victim required surgery and later died of pneumonia resulting from a surgical infection. Id. Because the surgery was necessitated by the injury inflicted by defendant, the intervening cause of surgery was not extraordinary and thus it was not unfair to hold defendant responsible. Id. at 26; see also Pittman v. State, 528 N.E.2d 67 (Ind.1988) (defendant's homicide conviction affirmed where victim died of surgical complications); Gibson v. State, 515 N.E.2d 492 (Ind.1987) (defendant responsible for child's death where defendant beat child necessitating brain surgery and child died of staph infection which resulted from her surgery and hospitalization); Thomas v. State, 436 N.E.2d 1109 (Ind.1982) (defendant's murder conviction affirmed where victim died of heart attack following robbery). In this case, the injury inflicted by Wooley was certainly a mediate or immediate cause of death. Even if we accept Wooley's argument that Strow received inadequate medical care, Strow's treatment was necessitated by the injury inflicted by Wooley and thus was not so extraordinary as to relieve Wooley of responsibility. At best, Wooley offers speculation and weak circumstantial evidence as to Dalton's actions and the emergency room doctor's treatment. The jury was entitled to credit this evidence or not. There was certainly no showing of overwhelming evidence of extraordinary intervening causes sufficient to break the chain of criminal responsibility. See Sims, 466 N.E.2d at 25. Accordingly, the jury's rejection of Wooley's intervening cause theory is supported by the evidence.