Opinion ID: 731749
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Defendant's Motion in Limine

Text: 16 Defendant next challenges the denial of its motion in limine. Defendant argues that admission of certain evidence was so prejudicial as to warrant reversal of the trial court's order denying a new trial. Prior to trial defendant filed a motion in limine seeking, in pertinent part, to exclude evidence of isolated and ambiguous comments made by persons who had no direct role in determining whether plaintiff was discharged. (App. at 247.) Specifically, defendant sought to exclude evidence that during a conversation regarding ethnic harassment against Cheng by her students, Cheng's former supervisor, Sondra McCurry, asked her how old she was and asked if she had ever considered early retirement. (Id. at 247-48.) Defendant argued that such comments are irrelevant and too prejudicial to submit to the jury. The district court rejected defendant's argument and allowed the remarks, ruling [i]t goes to the weight that the jury may want to give it, and it goes to whatever interpretation the jury may want to give this statement. (Id. at 568.) 17 Except where an error of law is involved, we review a district court's admission of evidence under an abuse of discretion standard. Schrand v. Federal Pac. Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 156-57 (6th Cir.1988). Plaintiff argues that defendant has failed to preserve any objection to the court's determination by not renewing its objection at trial. See, e.g., Polk v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 876 F.2d 527, 532 (6th Cir.1989). Defendant disputes plaintiff's contention. The relevant transcript excerpt from the trial provides as follows: 18 Q. Did you ever bring to the attention of Sondra McCurry the type of verbal abuse that we have talked about here today, the racial abuse addressed towards you? 19 A. Yes, I talked to her before she left. And she-- 20 Q. Ms. Cheng, what did Ms. McCurry say to you in response to your complaints regarding the verbal abuse? 21 A. She said-- 22 THE COURT: I am going to allow the answer under ruling 611(c). 23 (App. at 547-48.) Defendant claims that its counsel had risen to object and therefore the court interjected as it did. Plaintiff does not dispute this contention. Although the court referenced the wrong section of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 1 under the circumstances, we conclude defendant did preserve its objection on the motion in limine issue. Even assuming defendant has preserved this issue for appeal, no abuse of discretion has been shown. Defendant relies on this court's decision in Gagne v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 881 F.2d 309 (6th Cir.1989). In Gagne, we affirmed summary judgment for the employer in a discriminatory discharge action based on age. The only evidence offered to create a genuine issue of material fact was the employee's supervisor's solitary remark that he needed younger blood. Id. at 314. In addition, Gagne testified that the remark was uttered at a meeting attended by a number of employees, and indicated that the statement was not directed at any particular individual. We find Gagne to be distinguishable. Gagne did not involve an evidentiary ruling. The court found plaintiff's proofs inadequate, not inadmissible. Unlike the setting in Gagne, McCurry made her remarks to Cheng in a private conversation between the two of them. Moreover, the record established that the comments coupled with other relevant evidence were not sufficiently isolated to be irrelevant or more prejudicial than probative. For example, Cheng showed that Gary Samarin, a white male in his mid-40s had been repeatedly criticized for his classroom management. Despite these criticisms, Pervis made no attempt to terminate him. 24 C. Defendant's Motions for Judgment as a Matter of Law and in the Alternative for a New Trial 25 Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying its motions for judgment as a matter of law at the conclusion of plaintiff's case and at the conclusion of all of the evidence. See FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a). Additionally, defendant argues that the court erred in denying its renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law following judgment on the verdict in favor of plaintiff. See id. at Rule 50(b). Defendant also moved in the alternative for a new trial. See FED.R.CIV.P. 59(a). 26 We review the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of law under the same standard used by the district court. See, e.g., Tuck v. HCA Health Servs., Inc., 7 F.3d 465, 469 (6th Cir.1993). A district court considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences. Id. We review denial of a motion for a new trial under an abuse of discretion standard. This court finds an abuse of discretion when it has  'a definite and firm conviction that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.'  Engebretser v. Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 21 F.3d 721, 728 (6th Cir.1994) (quoting Logan v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 865 F.2d 789, 790 (6th Cir.1989)). In considering appeals in employment discrimination cases, it is now firmly established in this circuit that when a case has been tried on the merits, a reviewing appellate court need not address the sufficiency of plaintiff's prima facie case, and may instead proceed directly to the ultimate question whether plaintiff has established discrimination. Brownlow v. Edgecomb Metals Co., 867 F.2d 960, 963 (6th Cir.1989). Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the burden of production shifts to the employer to assert a legitimate, nondiscriminatory justification for its action. E.g., Gagne, 881 F.2d at 313. Once the employer articulates a legitimate reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to establish that the employer's proffered explanation is a mere pretext for unlawful discrimination. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 510-11 (1993). 27 Pretext may be shown by a preponderance of the evidence either that the employee's proffered reason for the adverse action either (1) had no basis in fact, (2) did not actually motivate the employer to take the action, or (3) was insufficient to motivate the action. See, e.g., Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chem. Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir.1994). The factfinder's disbelief of the employer's reasons may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suffice to show intentional discrimination. 509 U.S. at 511. 28 In this regard the record reflects that while younger teachers with similar classroom management problems were not terminated, Cheng was singled out for discharge. For example, as referenced earlier, Gary Samarin was found deficient in classroom management in the same evaluation periods as Cheng. 2 Cheng's discharge, moreover, was preceded by an unprecedented scrutiny of her daily routine accompanied by a flurry of paper documentation by Pervis noting any and all perceived infractions, including such matters as not turning in her daily attendance sheet on time. 29 Furthermore, the jury heard evidence of age-related comments. In addition to the early retirement remarks by Cheng's immediate supervisor, the jury also heard testimony that the center's deputy director during the probationary period repeatedly remarked in staff meetings that you can't teach old dogs new tricks. (App. at 507.) The deputy director, who was Pervis's supervisor, was in the chain-of-command authorizing Cheng's discharge. 30 In addition, there was ample evidence that Cheng possessed outstanding academic teaching skills. She produced results. For example, the jury heard testimony from the center's registrar and others how Cheng had a high rate of phase outs--students that completed the center's various programs, including the G.E.D. examination. 31 Although admittedly this is a close case, we conclude that the jury, upon weighing the evidence, could properly have concluded that Cheng's classroom management difficulties did not actually motivate or were insufficient to motivate her discharge and properly inferred illegal discrimination based on age. We further conclude that the jury's verdict was supported by sufficient evidence and not against the clear weight of the evidence. Therefore the motions for judgment as a matter of law were properly denied and the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a new trial. 32 AFFIRMED.