Opinion ID: 1209716
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Lieutenant Nash's Testimony

Text: Finding the case authority on the issue before us conflicting and inconclusive, we turn to the record in the present case to determine whether, as the trial court concluded, the prosecution established the reliability of the voiceprint technique. In so doing, we bear in mind the admonition of People v. Law, supra, 40 Cal. App.3d 69, 85, that It is our duty ..., where the life or liberty of a defendant is at stake, to be particularly careful that there is not only substantial evidence to support the implied finding of [defendant's] identity but that the finding is based upon admissible and nonprejudicial evidence. As indicated, Lieutenant Nash was the sole witness testifying on the reliability issue. The record discloses that Nash has been associated with the voiceprint technique since 1967, having been trained in voiceprint analysis by Kersta, the pioneer in this field. At the time of trial, Nash was employed by the Michigan State Police as head of its voice identification unit. Nash studied audiology and speech sciences at Michigan State University, and completed courses in anatomy and the physiology of speech. Although Nash had received approximately 50 hours of college credit in these subjects, he had not attained a formal degree. Lieutenant Nash testified that since 1967 he has prepared or reviewed 180,000 voice spectrograms. As noted above, he worked with Dr. Tosi in preparing the design for the 1968-1970 Michigan State University study which Dr. Tosi conducted, and he assisted Tosi in drafting the final report of the study. According to Nash, the Tosi study demonstrated a high degree of reliability. It was a controlled experimental situation based on examination and identification of the voices of students and other nonsupect persons, rather than a forensic, in-the-field, study of the reliability of voiceprint analysis in identifying criminals. Lieutenant Nash stated that among members of the scientific community involved in voiceprint analysis there is general acceptance of the technique as extremely reliable. Nash admitted, however, that those persons who are actually involved in voiceprint work are primarily voiceprint examiners connected with a government agency of some kind, i.e., law enforcement officers such as Nash himself. (7a) Our analysis of Nash's testimony discloses at least three infirmities which, in combination, are fatal to the People's claim that they established that voiceprint analysis is generally accepted as reliable by the scientific community. First, we think it questionable whether the testimony of a single witness alone is ever sufficient to represent, or attest to, the views of an entire scientific community regarding the reliability of a new technique. Ideally, resolution of the general acceptance issue would require consideration of the views of a typical cross-section of the scientific community, including representatives, if there are such, of those who oppose or question the new technique. Several courts have thus concluded that, before evidence based upon a new scientific method may be introduced, ` something more than the bare opinion of one man, however qualified, is required. ' ( People v. King, supra, 266 Cal. App.2d at p. 453, quoting from another voiceprint case, State v. Cary (1967) 49 N.J. 343 [230 A.2d 384, 389]; italics added by King. ) In King, for example, the trial court heard the views of three prosecution experts and seven defense experts on the issue of general acceptance. (See also Huntingdon v. Crowley, supra, 64 Cal.2d 647, 654, wherein the trial court had considered the opinions of two opposing experts on the issue of blood test reliability, as well as numerous articles from relevant literature on the subject.) One commentator has suggested that in an appropriate case trial courts should take affirmative steps to assure that an accurate description of the views of the scientific community is placed before the court. After deciding which are the relevant fields, the court must see that the appropriate experts testify. Where only proponents of a technique appear, the court should sua sponte take the responsibility of inquiring not just whether the experts believe the scientific community is generally in agreement, but whether they are in fact aware of any opposing sentiment in the relevant scientific community. The court should then make an effort to ascertain the extent of any opposition so identified, calling its spokesmen as court-appointed experts if necessary.  (Comment, supra, 35 Md.L.Rev. 267, at p. 293; fn. omitted, italics added.) In California, the trial court's authority to appoint an expert is set forth in Evidence Code section 730. As the scientific literature referred to above makes clear, in the area of voiceprint analysis there exist several persons whose qualifications would enable them to testify knowledgeably, and critically. We are troubled by a second feature of the evidentiary record before us. In addition to the trial court's reliance solely upon Nash's testimony to the exclusion of other, possibly adverse, expert witnesses, a serious question existed regarding Nash's ability fairly and impartially to assess the position of the scientific community. Nash has had a long association with the development and promotion of voiceprint analysis. His qualifications in this somewhat limited area cannot be doubted. In addition to his work with Dr. Tosi, Nash was the chief of the Michigan State Police Voice Identification Unit, a position which led him to testify as a voiceprint expert in numerous cases throughout the country. Further, Nash is either a founder or member of four other organizations which promote the use of voiceprint analysis. Nash's background thus discloses that he is one of the leading proponents of voiceprint analysis; he has virtually built his career on the reliability of the technique. This situation is closely akin to that in People v. King, supra, 266 Cal. App.2d 437, in which Kersta, a pioneer in the field, was the chief prosecution witness supporting the admissibility of voiceprint evidence. The court in King rejected Kersta's testimony regarding the scientific basis of voiceprint analysis and warned that [b]efore a technique or process is generally accepted in the scientific community, self-serving opinions should not be received which invade the province of the trier of fact. ( Id., at p. 458.) Likewise, Nash, a strong advocate of the voiceprint technique, may be too closely identified with the endorsement of voiceprint analysis to assess fairly and impartially the nature and extent of any opposing scientific views. A more detached and neutral observer might more fairly do so. In the absence of additional and impartial evidence regarding general acceptance, the trial court was in a similar position to that presented in King, in which a court could only receive Kersta's opinion on faith. ( People v. King, supra, 266 Cal. App.2d at p. 456.) A third objection to Nash's testimony pertains to his qualifications as an expert in the field of voiceprint analysis. Substantial doubt exists whether Nash possessed the necessary academic qualifications which would have enabled him to express a competent opinion on the issue of the general acceptance of the voiceprint technique in the scientific community. A person is qualified to testify as an expert if he has special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education sufficient to qualify him as an expert on the subject to which his testimony relates. (Evid. Code, § 720, subd. (a).) (8) The trial court is given considerable latitude in determining the qualifications of an expert and its ruling will not be disturbed on appeal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown. ( Pfingsten v. Westenhaver (1952) 39 Cal.2d 12, 20 [244 P.2d 395]; Huffman v. Lindquist (1951) 37 Cal.2d 465, 476 [234 P.2d 34, 29 A.L.R.2d 485]; People v. King, supra, 266 Cal. App.2d at p. 443; Witkin, Cal. Evidence (1966) § 1175, p. 1088.) (9) However, whether a person qualifies as an expert in a particular case depends upon the facts of that case and the witness' qualifications. ( People v. Davis (1965) 62 Cal.2d 791, 801 [44 Cal. Rptr. 454, 402 P.2d 142].) The competency of an expert is relative to the topic and fields of knowledge about which the person is asked to make a statement. In considering whether a person qualifies as an expert, the field of expertise must be carefully distinguished and limited. ( People v. King, supra, 266 Cal. App.2d at p. 445.) (7b) The record in the instant case reveals that Nash has an impressive list of credentials in the field of voiceprint analysis. However, these qualifications are those of a technician and law enforcement officer, not a scientist. Neither his training under Kersta, his association with the Tosi study, his limited college study in certain speech sciences, his membership in organizations promoting the use of voiceprints, nor his former position as head of the Michigan State Police Voice Identification Unit, necessarily qualifies Nash to express an informed opinion on the view of the scientific community toward voiceprint analysis. This area may be one in which only another scientist, in regular communication with other colleagues in the field, is competent to express such an opinion. Nash was allowed to testify in a dual role, both as a technician and a scientist, in order to show both that the voiceprint technique is reliable and that it has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. From the demonstrably wide technical experience of Nash, it does not necessarily follow that academic and scientific knowledge are present as well. As expressed in King : Kersta's engineering abilities must not be confused with or made a substitute for learning and training in the fields of anatomy, medicine, physiology, psychology, phonetics or linguistics. ( People v. King, supra, 266 Cal. App.2d at p. 458.) In considering the position of the scientific community, a court is bound to let scientists speak for themselves. Nash's undoubted qualifications as a technician, like Kersta's, do not necessarily qualify him as a scientist to express an opinion on the question of general scientific acceptance. Indeed, it is both noteworthy and commendable that Nash was careful and fair in not claiming that he represented the views of the general scientific community on the subject of the reliability of the voiceprint technique. Instead, he expressed the opinion of those persons engaged in the actual use of the spectrogram, persons who were primarily engaged in law enforcement activities. Although the Frye test may be satisfied by a showing of general acceptance by those scientists who are most familiar with the use of a new technique ( People v. Williams (1958) 164 Cal. App.2d Supp. 858, 862 [331 P.2d 251]; Commonwealth v. Lykus, supra, at pp. 677-678), such a showing, ordinarily, should be presented by those who are engaged in the scientific fields.