Opinion ID: 835608
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Oregon Evidence Code

Text: As noted, defendant claims at the outset that the statements of Gregory and Lewis were inadmissible hearsay under the Oregon Evidence Code. `Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. OEC 801(3). The statements that Gregory and Lewis made to the police were offered for their truth, i.e., they were offered to prove that defendant did not act in defense of Gregory when he shot the victims because defendant previously had discussed shooting someone. [4] Therefore, the statements were hearsay. Hearsay statements are not admissible as evidence in Oregon courts in the face of a timely objection to their admission, unless the statements fit within one of the exceptions provided by the Oregon Evidence Code or provided by another source of law. OEC 802. OEC 804(3)(c) sets forth the against penal interest exception to the hearsay rule. That exception provides that a hearsay statement is admissible if the declarant is unavailable as a witness (OEC 804(3)) and if the statement at the time of its making    so far tended to subject the declarant to    criminal liability    that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless the person believed it to be true. OEC 804(3)(c). This court applies a two-part standard of review to a trial court evidentiary ruling that a statement fits within an exception to the hearsay rule. State v. Cunningham, 337 Or. 528, 538-39, 99 P.3d 271 (2004). The court will uphold the trial court's preliminary factual determinations if any evidence in the record supports them. Id. at 537, 99 P.3d 271. However, the court reviews the trial court's ultimate legal conclusion, as to whether the hearsay statement is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule, to determine if the trial court made an error of law. Id. at 538, 99 P.3d 271. Returning to the present case, we first must determine whether Gregory and Lewis were unavailable for the purposes of OEC 804. A declarant is unavailable as a witness if, inter alia, the declarant [i]s exempted by ruling of the court on the grounds of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of a statement[.] OEC 804(1)(a). As noted, at defendant's pretrial evidentiary hearing, both Gregory and Lewis invoked their Fifth Amendment rights. They also stated that they would assert their Fifth Amendment rights at defendant's trial if they were called as witnesses. Under those circumstances, the trial court correctly held that Gregory and Lewis were unavailable. [5] See State v. Rawls, 252 Or. 556, 558-63, 451 P.2d 127 (1969) (holding that assertion of privilege to be free from compelled self-incrimination makes declarant unavailable). Next, we turn to the second criterion for admissibility under OEC 804(3)(c), that is, whether the declarant's statement tends to subject him to criminal liability. Gregory admitted to shooting one of the victims in the head and admitted that, earlier in the day, he had spoken with the defendant and Lewis about shooting someone. Lewis admitted to shooting one of the victims twice in the back and admitted that he had been part of the earlier discussion about shooting someone. Those statements potentially subjected Gregory and Lewis to criminal liability. Defendant claims that some parts of the statements made by Gregory and Lewis were not self-inculpatory in that they only inculpated the defendant. Defendant appears to ask us to parse a declarant's statement into single sentences or phrases and to examine each sentence or phrase wholly independent of its context. This court previously has rejected such an approach, and defendant has offered nothing in his arguments that persuades us to alter that view. See State v. Wilson, 323 Or. 498, 512 n. 9, 918 P.2d 826 (1996) (refusing to follow United States Supreme Court's interpretation of FRE 804(3)(c) that noninculpatory parts of broader narrative are not admissible under against-penal-interest hearsay exception). In fact, this court has held that, under OEC 804(3)(c), a declarant's hearsay statements that were against the declarant's penal interest and that also inculpated a criminal defendant were admissible in the defendant's criminal trial. Wilson, 323 Or. at 512, 918 P.2d 826 (citing Nielsen, 316 Or. at 620-21, 853 P.2d 256). The statements of Gregory and Lewis were both self-inculpatory and inculpated defendant. Therefore, the trial court correctly held that the second requirement for admissibility under OEC 804(3)(c) was satisfied. Finally, we examine the third requirement for admissibility under OEC 804(3)(c), that is, whether a reasonable person in declarant's position would not have made the statement unless he or she believed that it was true, by considering the circumstances under which the statement was made. See Nielsen, 316 Or. at 620-21, 853 P.2d 256 (evaluating surrounding circumstances at time of statement). In carrying out our analysis, we consider whether the declarant made the statement while in custody; whether the police conducted a lengthy interrogation and gave the declarant Miranda warnings; whether the statement was detailed and made soon after the crime; whether the declarant described his role in the crime or tried to shift blame to the defendant; and whether the declarant exposed himself to the same level of criminal liability as the defendant. Nielsen, 316 Or. at 620-21, 853 P.2d 256; Wilson, 323 Or. at 513, 918 P.2d 826. Although Gregory and Lewis made their statements while in police custody and under police interrogation, other surrounding circumstances support the trial court's conclusion that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statements unless he believed that they were true. See Nielsen, 316 Or. at 620, 853 P.2d 256 (discussing concern for statements made while in custody but still finding them admissible). This court previously has stated, We decline to adopt a per se rule invalidating all hearsay `confessions' made in custody   . Nielsen, 316 Or. at 624, 853 P.2d 256. Gregory and Lewis made their formal statements after receiving Miranda warnings, and both knew that their statements could be used against them. Gregory and Lewis were not offered leniency for their statements. Both of their statements were detailed and were made within hours after the crime. Gregory and Lewis exposed themselves to the same degree of criminal liability as defendant by describing their roles in the crime; Gregory admitted to shooting one of the victims in the head, and Lewis admitted to shooting one of the victims twice in the back. Furthermore, Gregory was not evasive or defensive; he actually initiated contact with the police by calling them on the telephone the night of the murders. Similarly, Lewis was not evasive or defensive; he freely answered the police officers' questions. Finally, Lewis was aware of the consequences of his statement, as he acknowledged that he likely would be charged with murder. Those circumstances support the trial court's conclusion that a reasonable person in either declarant's position would not have made the statements that each made unless he believed that they were true. We therefore conclude that, under OEC 804(3)(c), the statements of Gregory and Lewis were admissible as statements against penal interest.