Opinion ID: 1422239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Additional Grounds

Text: Additional grounds are raised to support the trial court's granting of summary judgment. Though we are not required to do so we address each in the interest of judicial economy. Our conclusions are based upon the facts before us and the parties are not precluded from further development of the issues we address.
DJJ contends the Family Court, not DJJ, is the proper party to this litigation. DJJ argues Dorsey was not acting on its behalf, but on behalf of the family court since the court retained authority over Fredrico. We disagree. The Tort Claims Act requires a plaintiff to sue only the agency ... for which the employee was acting. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-70(c) (Supp.2001). An agency is defined as the state entity which employs the employee whose act or omission gives rise to a claim. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-78-30(a) (Supp.2001). There is no disagreement Dorsey's actions gave rise to this claim. The question is whether Dorsey was acting on behalf of the family court or DJJ. As discussed above, this Court in Fleming, supra, determined whether a guardian ad litem was an employee under the Tort Claims Act. The Court held that while the guardian is appointed as a court representative to assist the court, it is not acting on `behalf of the court. Id. at 53, 483 S.E.2d at 753. The relationship between the Court and a guardian ad litem is not an agency relationship nor an employee-employer relationship. Id. Like a guardian ad litem, the juvenile probation officer is characterized as an agent of the court. [3] Like the guardian, the probation officer is not acting on behalf of the family court, but is there to assist the court. The probation officer is responsible for conducting investigations, providing relevant information to the court, and taking charge of a child if ordered by the court. See id. A probation officer is an employee of DJJ, not the family court. This Court in Chavis v. Watkins, 256 S.C. 30, 32, 180 S.E.2d 648, 649 (1971), there are four factors used to determine whether a person is an employee of a particular entity. The factors are: (1) who has the right to control the person; (2) who pays the person; (3) who furnishes the person with equipment; and (4) who has the right to fire the person. While a court may direct a probation officer to assist in aiding the court in its adjudication of a case, DJJ also has the right to control the actions of probation officers who are its employees. [4] DJJ does not deny it pays Dorsey, furnishes him with the equipment needed to perform his job, and has the ability to discharge him. DJJ argues, however, that since probation officers are agents of the court, they are controlled by it. While the family court has a right to direct a probation officer to perform certain tasks, this fact alone is not dispositive of whether Dorsey is an employee of the court. See Simmons v. Robinson, 305 S.C. 428, 409 S.E.2d 381 (1991). More important is the Fleming rule that the court agent is assisting the court, but is not acting as a true agent on its behalf. It is also important to look at the plain meaning of sections 15-78-70(c) and 15-78-30(a). In attempting to harmonize the two sections, we determine a plain reading to be that only the entity employing the employee whose act gives rise to the claim may be sued. DJJ's argument would lead to a cramped interpretation of the statute. If followed by this Court, DJJ's interpretation would immunize all officials whose duties bring them under some direction of a court. We conclude, based on the facts before us, DJJ is the properly named defendant.
DJJ argues its motion for summary judgment can be sustained on the ground it is entitled to discretionary immunity under the Tort Claims Act. We disagree. A governmental entity is not liable for losses resulting from an exercise of discretion by its employees. Section 15-78-60(5) of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act exempts governmental entities from liability for losses resulting from the exercise of discretion or judgment by the governmental entity or employee or the performance or failure to perform any act or service which is in the discretion or judgment of the governmental entity or employee. Discretionary immunity is an affirmative defense requiring DJJ to prove Dorsey evaluated competing alternatives and made a judgment call based on applicable professional standards. Foster v. South Carolina Dep't of Highways & Pub. Transp., 306 S.C. 519, 413 S.E.2d 31 (1992). In determining whether Dorsey's action was discretionary, it is helpful to compare the two classifications for the duties of public officials. The duties of public officials are generally classified as either ministerial or discretionary. Jensen v. Anderson County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 304 S.C. 195, 403 S.E.2d 615 (1991) The duty is ministerial when it is absolute, certain, and imperative, involving merely execution of a specific duty arising from fixed and designated facts. Id. at 203, 403 S.E.2d at 619. The duty is discretionary if the governmental entity proves it actually weighed competing considerations, faced with alternatives, and made a conscious decision based upon those considerations. Id. (citing Niver v. Dep't Highways & Pub. Transp., 302 S.C. 461, 395 S.E.2d 728 (Ct.App.1990)). In Jensen, this Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' finding that insufficient evidence was submitted to determine whether the Department of Social Services (DSS) made a discretionary decision. Id. In the case, a teacher reported a potential child abuse case to DSS. A DSS social worker interviewed the child, and noted the presence of bruises and the child's fear of the mother's boyfriend. However, the social worker failed to follow up on the interview and eventually closed the file. One month later, the child's brother was beaten to death in the home. The Court held that DSS had a duty to conduct a thorough investigation before deciding to close the file. The Court concluded that conducting the investigation was ministerial but closing the file was discretionary because it required applying facts discovered through investigation to reach a decision. Id. Despite the fact that closing the file is discretionary, the Court held that there was insufficient evidence to grant discretionary immunity, because the decision was due to failure to complete the investigation, an administrative function, rather than a weighing of competing considerations. Id. In the present case, DJJ claims Dorsey's decision to place Fredrico in his home after he was expelled from his foster home was a discretionary decision. Respondents claim Dorsey placed Fredrico in his family home because he thought no one else would take him. However, Respondents argue there was alternative placement available in the Greenville Group Home, which had agreed earlier to take Fredrico in an emergency. Therefore, Respondents claim if Dorsey had weighed competing alternatives, he would have placed Fredrico in the Greenville Group home. Based on our holding in Jensen and the evidence before us, DJJ is not entitled to discretionary immunity. In addition, even if we held Dorsey exercised discretion, the performance of discretionary duties does not give rise to immunity if the public official acted in a grossly negligent manner. See Jackson v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., 301 S.C. 125, 390 S.E.2d 467 (Ct.App.1989) affd, 302 S.C. 519, 397 S.E.2d 377 (1990). Gross negligence is the intentional, conscious failure to do something which is incumbent upon one to do or the doing of a thing intentionally that one ought not to do. Richardson v. Hambright, 296 S.C. 504, 506, 374 S.E.2d 296, 298 (1988). It is the failure to exercise even the slightest care. Hollins v. Richland County Sch. Dist. One, 310 S.C. 486, 427 S.E.2d 654 (1993). This Court has also defined it as a relative term that means the absence of care that is necessary under the circumstances. Hicks v. McCandlish, 221 S.C. 410, 415, 70 S.E.2d 629, 631 (1952). Gross negligence is ordinarily a mixed question of law and fact. See Clyburn v. Sumter County School District # 17, 317 S.C. 50, 451 S.E.2d 885 (1994). When the evidence supports but one reasonable inference, it is solely a question of law for the court, otherwise it is an issue best resolved by the jury. Id. In most cases, gross negligence is a factually controlled concept whose determination best rests with the jury. In Jackson, supra, a jury found the Department of Corrections grossly negligent for placing a prisoner with strong violent tendencies into a minimum security prison, where he killed a fellow inmate. The Court of Appeals found the Department of Corrections transferred the inmate even though they knew he had multiple disciplinary violations, including the killing of a fellow inmate. The Court of Appeals held the jury could view the transfer as gross negligence since it demonstrated a conscious indifference to the threat posed to the safety of other inmates. Jackson, 301 S.C. at 125, 390 S.E.2d at 468. In the instant case, Dorsey placed Fredrico into a home where DJJ workers noted there was no proper supervision. Furthermore, Dorsey knew of Fredrico's violent tendencies. He even wrote before the incident that he wouldn't give (Fredrico) two weeks with his mother before he would get into big trouble. Based on the facts before us, DJJ is not entitled to discretionary immunity as a matter of law. At a minimum, Faile has presented enough evidence to overcome DJJ's summary judgment motion on the matter.
DJJ argues it is entitled to summary judgment because it is granted immunity under the juvenile release exception to the Tort Claims Act. We disagree. Under Section 15-78-60(21), a governmental entity is not liable for the decision to or implementation of release, discharge, parole, or furlough of any person in the custody of any governmental entity, including but not limited to a prisoner, inmate, juvenile, patient, or client, or the escape of these persons. DJJ argues that the present case falls squarely within this exception based on Respondents' allegations that Fredrico was in the DJJ's custody and was negligently released from that custody. Despite the Respondents' factual allegations, however, it does not appear Fredrico was released from his relationship with the DJJ, whether it was a custodial relationship or not. Neither Respondents nor DJJ present any case law on this exemption. However, on its face, the exemption appears to apply to a narrower set of circumstances than those presented in this case. The language of the exemption indicates the custodial entity must make a conscious, if not formal, decision to terminate the relationship before this immunity is triggered. DJJ did not do so in this case. Dorsey placed Fredrico in his home temporarily and appears to have had the authority to remove him at any time. Without further evidence, we conclude the juvenile release exemption does not protect the DJJ from liability. Furthermore, although § 15-78-60(21) does not contain a gross negligence exception, this Court has recognized that when a governmental entity asserts various exceptions to the waiver of immunity ... [the court] must read exceptions that do not contain the gross negligence standard in light of exceptions that do contain the standard. Steinke v. South Carolina Dep't of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 395, 520 S.E.2d 142, 153 (1999). Therefore, even if Dorsey's actions fell within the release exception, a jury could find his actions were grossly negligent.
DJJ argues the trial court's grant of summary judgment is supported because DJJ owed no legal duty of care to the Respondents' son when he was assaulted by Fredrico. We disagree. In a negligence action, the court must determine, as a matter of law, whether the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiff. Steinke, supra . If there is no duty, then the defendant in a negligence action is entitled to a directed verdict. Steinke, 336 S.C. at 387, 520 S.E.2d at 148. Under South Carolina law, there is no general duty to control the conduct of another or to warn a third person or potential victim of danger. Rogers v. South Carolina Dep't of Parole & Cmty Corr., 320 S.C. 253, 464 S.E.2d 330 (1995); Rayfield v. South Carolina Dep't of Corr., 297 S.C. 95, 374 S.E.2d 910 (Ct.App.1988), cert. denied, 298 S.C. 204, 379 S.E.2d 133 (1989); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 (1965). We recognize five exceptions to this rule: 1) where the defendant has a special relationship to the victim; [5] 2) where the defendant has a special relationship to the injurer; [6] 3) where the defendant voluntarily undertakes a duty; [7] 4) where the defendant negligently or intentionally creates the risk; [8] and 5) where a statute imposes a duty on the defendant. [9] See generally, Hubbard & Felix, The South Carolina Law of Torts 57-72 (1990). The present case, based upon the facts before us, falls within the second category. The Restatement provides no duty exists to control the conduct of a third person as to prevent him from causing physical harm to another unless ... a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 315(a) (1965). Section 319 provides: One who takes charge of a third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bodily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such harm. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 319 (1965). Our courts have customarily applied § 315 and § 319 in conjunction with duty to warn cases. See Bishop, supra ; Rogers, supra ; Rayfield, supra . We have held a defendant has a duty to exercise reasonable care by issuing warnings after the third party has made specific threats to a specific individual. The rationale behind this line of cases is an individual does not have a duty to protect the public from speculative harm from a dangerous individual within his control. However, where the custodian knows of a specific, credible threat from a person in their care the injury is no longer speculative in nature. The application of § 319 is not limited to duty to warn cases. The use of the § 319 custodial duty of care in such cases is a slight misnomer. Duty to warn cases normally involve a defendant who has legally released a third party from direct custodial control or who releases the third party after medical evaluation. See Bishop, supra (defendant discharged third party mental patient from its care); Rogers, supra (defendant released third party to furlough program); Rayfield, supra (defendant released third party on parole). More importantly, those cases deal with claims of a defendant's duty to warn. Plaintiffs in none of these cases asserted a breach by the defendant of a common law duty to control a dangerous person in their custody. See Bishop, supra (plaintiff claimed defendant failed to warn victim of third party's release from a mental hospital); Rogers, supra (plaintiff argued defendant failed to warn victim of a dangerous third party's furlough); Rayfield, supra (plaintiff asserted defendant was liable for breaching its statutory duties in paroling third party). In the present case, Respondents do not assert DJJ had a duty to warn potential victims. Instead, Respondents assert a breach of the duty to supervise and control a dangerous juvenile by the custodial entity. Therefore, Respondents argue DJJ had a specific § 319 duty to control a dangerous person legally placed in its direct custodial care. While this Court has never explicitly recognized such a duty, at least two appellate decisions mention a similar duty in dicta. See Jackson, supra ; Rayfield, supra . In Jackson we addressed the issue of discretionary immunity and the standard for gross negligence. The Court of Appeal's decision, which we affirmed, seems to presume, without argument, that the Department of Corrections had a duty to control a knowingly violent inmate in its custody from harming another inmate. See, Jackson, 301 S.C. at 126, 390 S.E.2d at 468 (if the Department was grossly negligent in its duty to control ... [the attacker] and this negligence proximately caused [victim's] death, its immunity from liability under the Act is waived.). Rayfield addressed many issues including plaintiff's assertion that the Department of Corrections had a special relationship with the third party which gave rise to a duty to prevent the third party from injuring the plaintiff. The Court of Appeals quotes § 319 to support the assertion. See Rayfield, 297 S.C. at 109, 374 S.E.2d at 918. However, in denying a duty existed, the court wrote: We do not question this rule of law [§ 319]. When applied to the facts of this case, however, it affords no basis for the Rayfields' cause of action. The mere knowledge that Lucas was drug addicted and potentially violent did not create a special relationship. A special relationship arose, if at all, from the custody the Department of Corrections exercised over Lucas. While the Department had charge of Lucas, it arguably owed a duty of care to others to prevent foreseeable harm Lucas might do them. But once the Department's custody of Lucas ended, it no longer had charge of him, and the special relationship based on custody ended. Id., 297 S.C. at 109-10, 374 S.E.2d at 918. Though not controlling, the Court of Appeals clearly presumed a § 319 duty is a recognizable duty where a defendant has custodial care of a dangerous third party. The Fourth Circuit, in a case factually similar to the case sub judice, found an independent duty to control a dangerous individual under § 319. Semler v. Psychiatric Institute of Washington, D.C., 538 F.2d 121 (4th Cir.1976), cert. denied sub nom., Folliard v. Semler, 429 U.S. 827, 97 S.Ct. 83, 50 L.Ed.2d 90 (1976). Semler involved Steven Gilreath (Gilreath), a mental patient found guilty of murder. A state court judge suspended Gilreath's sentence on the condition he be confined to receive treatment at the Psychiatric Institute of Washington (Institute). Gilreath's probation officer requested weekend passes over the next few months, based on a doctor's recommendation. The judge granted the weekend passes. Eventually, the judge modified the order to give the probation officer discretion to issue Gilreath weekend passes. As Gilreath proceeded with treatment, his doctor and probation officer agreed to transfer him from twenty-four hour supervision to day care status at the Institute. The judge approved the transfer. Based on a doctor's recommendation, the probation officer gave Gilreath a three-day pass to investigate the possibility of moving to Ohio. Later, the probation officer gave Gilreath a fourteen-day pass to return to Ohio to prepare his transfer. The probation officer did not submit either pass for judicial approval. Anticipating Gilreath's transfer to Ohio, the Institute, contrary to the court order, discharged him. Although the Institute notified the probation officer, the court remained uninformed. When Ohio rejected Gilreath's parole transfer, the probation officer ordered his return to Virginia. The Institute re-admitted Gilreath to its program, but only on an out-patient basis, requiring him to meet in a group setting two nights a week. The change in status was contrary to the latest court order. Additionally, Gilreath no longer lived with his parents as he had when he was in day care status, but instead lived alone, unsupervised. The probation officer never informed the judge of the new arrangement. Two months after returning to Virginia, Gilreath murdered another individual. The Fourth Circuit, in upholding a civil verdict against the Institute and the probation officer, held each owed a duty to the victim. The court noted the judge ordered Gilreath to receive treatment at and remain confined in the Psychiatric Institute until released by the Court. Id., 538 F.2d at 124. The Institute and probation officer argued the order's purpose was to rehabilitate Gilreath, therefore it created a duty only to him and not to any third party victims. The court held the order's purpose was twofold: to provide care for Gilreath and to protect the public from Gilreath. The Fourth Circuit noted the trial court was particularly concerned that Gilreath, who had a known history of attacking young girls, presented a foreseeable risk to the public. Releasing Gilreath from the day care program violated the judgment of the court which determined confinement was in the best interest of the community. The special relationship created by the probation order, therefore, imposed a duty on [the Institute and probation officer] to protect the public from the reasonably foreseeable risk of harm at Gilreath's hands [which] the state judge had already recognized. Id., 538 F.2d at 125. The Fourth Circuit, construing § 319 of Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), ruled the order itself provided the boundaries of the custodian's duty. Id. The Institute and the probation officer were obligated by the court order to retain custody over Gilreath until the court released him. No lesser measure of care would suffice ... they could not substitute their judgment for the court's with respect to the propriety of releasing him from confinement. Id. In the present case, Judge Barrineau's April 1992 order placed Fredrico on probation for one year. The order suspended commitment to DJJ if Fredrico was placed in a therapeutic foster home. Fredrico's parents were ordered to undergo counseling. After his expulsion from the foster home, the probation counselor placed him in a group home for a night, then with his biological mother. Dorsey placed Fredrico into a home without proper supervision. Dorsey was aware of Fredrico's violent tendencies. More importantly, Dorsey returned Fredrico to his mother's home in direct contradiction to the court order. While Semler does not equate the § 319 duty with the custodial entity's duty to obey court orders, we find § 319 to be, as decided by the Fourth Circuit, close to the point. Id. This Court is reluctant to impose the duty to control unless there is an established authority relationship and a substantial risk of serious harm. See Hubbard & Felix, supra, at 64-65. Here, DJJ had custody of a known dangerous individual. It had an independent duty to control and supervise Fredrico to prevent him from harming others as long as it retained custody of him by court order.