Opinion ID: 1977406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review for Motions to Recuse or Disqualify

Text: A trial judge must undertake a two-step analysis on the record when confronted with a motion to recuse or disqualify himself or herself. The first step requires the judge to be subjectively satisfied that he or she can proceed to hear the cause free of bias or prejudice concerning that party. Even if the judge is satisfied that he or she can proceed to hear the matter free of bias or prejudice, the second step requires the judge to examine objectively whether the circumstances require recusal because of an appearance of bias sufficient to cause doubt as to the judge's impartiality. If a judge's demeanor or actions would lead an objective observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely, the judge should recuse himself or herself. On appeal, we review the trial judge's analysis of the subjective test for abuse of discretion. Because a claim of appearance of impropriety implicates a view of how others perceive the conduct of the trial judge, we review the objective determination on its merits de novo to determine whether an objective observer would entertain reasonable questions about the judge's impartiality, thus warranting recusal. In addressing whether a trial judge's actions in an unrelated case involving the same attorney may raise objective questions of bias, federal courts have recognized that bias in favor of or against an attorney can certainly result in bias toward the party. [40] We have previously decided in Jones that the current trial judge did not abuse her discretion in denying a motion to disqualify where the same defense attorney argued that she was biased against him. [41] In this subsequent, unrelated case, that same defense attorney now argues that the current trial judge has carried a bias against him originating from that case, to the postconviction motion Gattis brings here. A finding of no bias in one case does not, as Gattis's attorney correctly argues, preclude us from determining that the current trial judge should have disqualified herself here. Nevertheless, it is but one factor to be considered in the calculus of our objective determination. Gattis argues that the current trial judge remained upset with his counsel, as evidenced by her reference to Jones in denying this postconviction motion. In particular, the current trial judge cited her post-trial opinion in Jones and noted: Unfortunately, this defense attorney has begun to develop a disturbing pattern of personally attacking the trial judge whenever he finds himself on the losing end of a capital case. [42] Gattis also relies upon the denial of his counsel's motion to extend the time period on his briefing schedule as well as the page limitations. Thus, we must determine whether these circumstances would lead an objective observer to conclude that a fair and impartial hearing is unlikely. Judicial rulings alone, such as the denial of a motion to recuse or disqualify or of a request to increase the time limitation on the briefing schedule or the length of the briefs, are insufficient bases for recusal. [43] To an objective observer, these particular rulings would carry little or no weight. Likewise, the fact that similar issues have been raised in and disposed of in an unrelated proceeding does not require disqualification. Although an objective observer's interest may be piqued where a trial judge makes reference in her ruling to an unrelated case involving the same counsel, we do not find that an objective observer would consider this reference (in dicta) as an indication of demeanor sufficient to imply that the trial judge is unable to conduct a fair and impartial hearing. Because an objective observer would not entertain reasonable questions about the current trial judge's impartiality, Gattis's argument that she erred in denying his motion to disqualify is without merit.