Opinion ID: 2159529
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Assessment for 1981.

Text: Following the board's decision on Superior's 1981 assessment, Superior filed a petition for appeal in the Mahaska County District Court. Its notice of appeal named Superior as the plaintiff-appellant and the Board of Review of the City of Oskaloosa, Iowa, and Mahaska County, Iowa, as the defendant-appellee. The notice was addressed To Robert DeCook, Chairman, Board of Review, Oskaloosa, Iowa: Mahaska County, Iowa: The chairman of the board, Robert DeCook, was out of town at the time the notice was to be served, so the sheriff served the board's clerk, Gary Rozenboom. In moving to dismiss the appeal, the board argued that the service of notice on Rozenboom was improper because section 441.38's requirement of service on the chairperson or presiding officer of the board cannot be interpreted to allow service on the board's clerk. The district court agreed, holding that, at least in the absence of an attempt to serve the board's vice chairman, service on the clerk was not proper. Following the language of section 441.38, our cases have established three basic requirements for a valid notice of appeal from the board of review: (1) written notice of the appeal, (2) served as an original notice, (3) on the chairman or presiding officer. See Cowles Communications, Inc. v. Board of Review, 266 N.W.2d 626, 631 (Iowa 1978); Stampfer Bldg. Co. v. Board of Review, 195 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Iowa 1972). The issue in the 1981 appeal is whether the clerk of the board may be considered to be a presiding officer for purposes of the notice of appeal. Iowa Code chapter 441, which establishes the board of review and the procedures for its operation, does not define a presiding officer. In fact, the only time that term appears is in section 441.38, the appeal section. Chapter 441 is also silent as to a vice chairman for the board. Besides the chairman, the clerk is the only other officer mentioned in the statute. See Iowa Code § 441.33. As a result of the lack of guidance from the statute as to what officer could be served in the absence of the chairman, an appellant might reasonably conclude that the next in line, as the presiding officer, would be the clerk. In an earlier case, we noted the problem of determining who was a presiding officer, in the absence of a definition of that term in the statute. We said: It should not be necessary for a taxpayer who desires to appeal from the action of a local board [of review] to hire a detective agency to ascertain who is the presiding officer. Service upon the mayor should be held good when it appears by verified allegation that he in fact presided over the board. Fuller v. Board of Review, 231 Iowa 1015, 1018, 2 N.W.2d 758, 760 (1942). In the present case, there was no evidence that the clerk had actually presided over a board meeting, but he understood that he would be the presiding officer in the absence of both the chairman and vice chairman. We have held that, in appeals under section 441.38, substantial compliance with the notice requirements is sufficient. See Cowles, 266 N.W.2d at 631; Economy Forms Corp. v. Potts, 259 N.W.2d 787, 788 (Iowa 1977); Resthaven Cemetary Ass'n v. Board of Review, 249 N.W.2d 618, 621 (Iowa 1977); Stampfer Bldg. Co., 195 N.W.2d at 394. Substantial compliance is said to be compliance in respect to essential matters necessary to assure the reasonable objectives of the statute. See Rogers v. Roberts, 300 Or. 687, 691, 717 P.2d 620, 622 (1986); City of Lenexa v. City of Olathe, 233 Kan. 159, 164, 660 P.2d 1368, 1373 (1983); Otero v. Zouhar, 102 N.M. 493, 497, 697 P.2d 493, 497 (App.1984); In re Santore, 28 Wash.App. 319, 327, 623 P.2d 702, 707 (1981). We believe that service of a notice of appeal on the clerk of the board of review assures compliance with the reasonable objectives of the appeal statute. What more appropriate recipient could be found to receive the notice of appeal than the person charged by statute to handle the board's paperwork. Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 56.1(m), while not controlling here, reflects that philosophy by providing that service of a notice on a public corporation may be made on its presiding officer, clerk, or secretary. In view of the lack of statutory guidance to the contrary under section 441.38, and because it is consistent with the objectives of the notice statute to do so, we hold that service of a notice of appeal on the clerk of the board of review constitutes substantial compliance with the service requirements of section 441.38. We reverse the court's dismissal of the 1981 appeal.