Opinion ID: 778327
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Liberty Interest/Reputation

Text: 28 Med Corp. next alleges that the proposed suspension would deprive it of its liberty interest in pursuing its chosen occupation. Med Corp. claims that the suspension would damage its business reputation and impair its ability to obtain business in the future. The district court rejected this claim on the grounds that Med Corp. had not shown that either the City's decision or its reasons were disclosed to any third parties, or that the suspension would impair future business opportunities. 29 The Supreme Court has suggested that a protected liberty interest may be implicated by certain injuries to a person's reputation or good name which threaten to restrain the individual's freedom to pursue business or employment opportunities. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437, 91 S.Ct. 507, 27 L.Ed.2d 515 (1971). The situations in which such injuries to reputation will give rise to a Fourteenth Amendment claim are limited, however. The Fourteenth Amendment does not transform all tort-law defamation claims against the state into constitutional violations. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976). 30 We have held that an injury to one's reputation, good name, honor, or integrity constitutes a deprivation of a liberty interest only when five elements are satisfied. Ludwig v. Bd. of Trustees of Ferris State Univ., 123 F.3d 404, 410 (6th Cir.1997) (reviewing Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit precedent). First, the allegedly stigmatizing statements must be made in connection with the loss of a governmental right, benefit, or entitlement. Mertik v. Blalock, 983 F.2d 1353, 1363 (6th Cir. 1993); see also Paul, 424 U.S. at 711, 96 S.Ct. 1155. There is no constitutional liberty interest in one's reputation standing alone. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233, 111 S.Ct. 1789, 114 L.Ed.2d 277 (1991). Second, a plaintiff alleging an injury to a liberty interest must show that the defendant made defamatory statements that [would] foreclose[] his freedom to take advantage of other employment opportunities. Ludwig, 123 F.3d at 410 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 573, 92 S.Ct. 2701). Third, the stigmatizing statements or charges must be made public. Id; see also Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976). Fourth, the plaintiff must claim that the charges made against him were false. Ludwig, 123 F.3d at 410. And [l]astly, the public dissemination must have been voluntary. Id. 31 Even if we assume that Med Corp. has made the necessary threshold showing that its injury to reputation occurred in connection with the loss of a governmental right or benefit, Mertik, 983 F.2d at 1363, the City would still be entitled to summary judgment. First, Med Corp. has failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the alleged injury to its reputation would foreclose its ability to seek future business opportunities in the ambulance service industry. A charge that merely makes a plaintiff less attractive to other employers but leaves open a definite range of opportunity does not constitute a liberty deprivation. Ludwig, 123 F.3d at 410 (quotation omitted); see also Wedges/Ledges, 24 F.3d at 65 (finding no liberty interest because City's decision to ban temporarily one type of amusement game operated by the plaintiff did not foreclose pursuing livelihood in the amusement game industry). Med Corp. has not shown that it will lose any business opportunities other than the opportunity to respond to 911 calls during the suspension. The mere denial of a business or employment opportunity, without more, does not deprive a person of a liberty interest, for the ability to obtain future business or employment opportunities is not jeopardized. Bannum, Inc. v. Town of Ashland, 922 F.2d 197, 201 (4th Cir.1990) (holding operator of a halfway house did not show deprivation of liberty interest where town withdrew approval for particular location). There is no evidence in the record to suggest that Med Corp.'s other clients will cease using its services as a result of the stigma from the proposed suspension. Moreover, the record indicates that the City itself will resume use of Med Corp.'s services after the one-week suspension. 32 Furthermore, Med Corp. has failed to present any evidence, beyond the mere assertions contained in its briefs, to show that the City disclosed its complaints about Med Corp.'s services to the public. Such a showing is an essential element of any Fourteenth Amendment liberty claim based upon injury to reputation. Ludwig, 123 F.3d at 410; see also Bishop, 426 U.S. at 348, 96 S.Ct. 2074. Med Corp.'s verified complaint does not allege that the City disclosed its decision, or the reasons underlying its decision, to any third party. Nor has Med Corp. pointed to any other evidence in the record suggesting that the City's allegations have been or will be publicly disclosed. 2 33 Finally, Med Corp. does not contend that the charges against it are false. Although Med Corp. maintains that it responded within the acceptable time limits in each incident cited by the City, it does not dispute the events described in the Fire Chief's report suggesting that Med Corp. employees were unfamiliar with the City and unable to locate particular addresses on a number of occasions. 34 In sum, Med Corp. has failed to allege facts to support several essential elements of a due process claim based upon injury to its reputation. We therefore conclude that the district court properly awarded summary judgment to the City as to Med Corp.'s asserted liberty interest claim.