Opinion ID: 757585
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: standard of review

Text: 16 In determining whether or not to grant a preliminary injunction, a district court considers four factors: (1) the plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the plaintiff could suffer irreparable harm without the injunction; (3) whether granting the injunction will cause substantial harm to others; and (4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest. Golden v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 73 F.3d 648, 653 (6th Cir.1996), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 117 S.Ct. 49, 136 L.Ed.2d 13 (1996). None of these factors, standing alone, is a prerequisite to relief; rather, the court should balance them. Id. (citations omitted). 17 An appeals court reviews a challenge to a district court's ruling on a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Mutual of Ohio v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass'n, 110 F.3d 318, 322 (6th Cir.1997). The district court's determination will be disturbed only if the district court relied upon clearly erroneous findings of fact, improperly applied the governing law, or used an erroneous legal standard. Id. 18 When a party seeks a preliminary injunction on the basis of the potential violation of the First Amendment, the likelihood of success on the merits often will be the determinative factor. With regard to the factor of irreparable injury, for example, it is well-settled that loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (plurality); see also Newsom v. Norris, 888 F.2d 371, 378 (6th Cir.1989) (The Supreme Court has unequivocally admonished that even minimal infringement upon First Amendment values constitutes irreparable injury sufficient to justify injunctive relief.) (citing Elrod ). Thus, to the extent that Connection can establish a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of its First Amendment claim, it also has established the possibility of irreparable harm as a result of the deprivation of the claimed free speech rights. See Dayton Area Visually Impaired Persons, Inc. v. Fisher, 70 F.3d 1474, 1490 (6th Cir.1995). 19 Likewise, the determination of where the public interest lies also is dependent on a determination of the likelihood of success on the merits of the First Amendment challenge because it is always in the public interest to prevent the violation of a party's constitutional rights. G & V Lounge, Inc. v. Michigan Liquor Control Comm'n, 23 F.3d 1071, 1079 (6th Cir.1994); see also Dayton Area, 70 F.3d at 1490 (the public as a whole has a significant interest in ... protection of First Amendment liberties). Furthermore, although the government presumably would be substantially harmed if enforcement of a constitutional law aimed at fighting child pornography were enjoined, this determination, too, first requires a review of the merits of the claim. 20 Accordingly, because the questions of harm to the parties and the public interest generally cannot be addressed properly in the First Amendment context without first determining if there is a constitutional violation, the crucial inquiry often is, and will be in this case, whether the statute at issue is likely to be found constitutional. Cf. Congregation Lubavitch v. City of Cincinnati, 923 F.2d 458, 460 (6th Cir.1991) (noting, in its review of injunction requiring placement of menorah in public square, that because harm could be suffered by either party, and the public interest lies in the correct application of First Amendment principles, our decision must turn on the likelihood of success on the merits).