Opinion ID: 669656
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Timeliness of the Title VII Claims Arising in 1986

Text: 70 DFY, Albrecht, Yeres, and Maffia, pointing out that Cornwell received a rightto-sue letter from EEOC in 1987 for her Title VII claims of discrimination with respect to her 1986 tour of duty at MacCormick, contend that those claims are time-barred because Cornwell made no motion to file an amended complaint asserting those claims until 1989, i.e., more than 90 days after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter. Cornwell contends, supported by EEOC as amicus curiae, that because the new allegations of discrimination were reasonably related to the original allegations of discrimination, she was not required to obtain a new right-to-sue letter and hence the receipt of such a letter did not impose a new time constraint on her. We agree. 71 A Title VII claimant may file suit in federal court only if she has filed a timely complaint with EEOC and obtained a right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. Secs. 2000e-5(e) and (f). Such a suit must be commenced not more than 90 days after receipt of the right-to-sue letter. See 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e-5(f)(1). In an action in which these procedural requirements have been satisfied, the plaintiff may raise any claim that is reasonably related to those asserted in the EEOC filing, even if that claim was not expressly addressed by EEOC. See, e.g., Owens v. New York City Housing Authority, 934 F.2d 405, 410-11 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 431, 116 L.Ed.2d 451 (1991); Almendral v. New York State Office of Mental Health, 743 F.2d 963, 967 (2d Cir.1984). 72 We have concluded in Part II.A.1. above that the challenged conduct that occurred in 1986 was part of a continuing course of discriminatory conduct initiated during Cornwell's 1981-1983 tour of duty. A fortiori, the 1986 conduct was reasonably related to the earlier conduct. Accordingly, Cornwell could have amended her original complaint to assert the claims of 1986 wrongdoing even if she had not filed additional charges with EEOC. Since this is so, we can see no basis in Title VII or in reason for concluding that the agency's response to her unnecessary administrative claim imposed on her time constraints to which she would not have been subject had she not filed the unnecessary claim. A contrary, technical reading of a remedial statute such as Title VII would be particularly inappropriate in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers, initiate the process. Brown v. Continental Can Co., 765 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir.1985) (internal quotes omitted). 73