Opinion ID: 769759
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Power of the District Court to Expand the Record in Costs Cases

Text: 37 In pressing their costs award defense before the District Court, the Plaintiffs submitted, inter alia, that they could not afford to pay the costs in question. To demonstrate their lack of ability to pay, the Plaintiffs submitted materials, including numerous affidavits, which are summarized in the margin, that describe many of the Plaintiffs' limited financial means. 3 However, none of these affidavits had been submitted to the Clerk of Court, though the Plaintiffs had provided the Clerk with a similar affidavit signed by a paralegal to one of their attorneys. The paralegal's affidavit attested to the fact that several of the Plaintiffs were in dire financial straits, were deceased, or were in frail health. See App. at 280-81. 38 The Defendants objected to the introduction of Plaintiffs' affidavits because they were not part of the record before the Clerk of Court. They argued that it was improper for the District Court to consider such evidence in reviewing the Clerk's award of costs. The District Court accepted this argument, reasoning that 39 [w]hile the court has the discretion to consider the losing party's inability to pay when reviewing the taxation of costs, the party asserting the lack of funds must demonstrate his indigence. That Plaintiffs failed to present the above affidavits to the Clerk to support their purported financial status leaves this Court with no suitable basis for reducing the costs sought by Defendants. Cf. Samar Fashions, Inc. v. Private Line, Inc., 116 B.R. 417, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (district court's review of bankruptcy appeal is limited to the record before the bankruptcy court). 40 In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., No. 86-2229 et al., 1999 WL 569435, at  (E.D. Pa. Aug. 2, 1999) (citation and footnote omitted). The District Court further opined that the Plaintiffs belated affidavits were sketchy. Id. at 4 n.5. The District Court apparently did not consider the paralegal's affidavit at all.
41 The Plaintiffs challenge the District Court's interpretation of its own review power under Rule 54(d)(1), which the Court interpreted as precluding it from hearing evidence beyond that presented to the Clerk of Court. Our standard of review in addressing the merits of this interpretation is plenary because it involves a construction of a Federal Rule. See Kleissler v. United States Forest Serv., 183 F.3d 196, 198 (3d Cir. 1999). The Defendants assert that the District Court understood the bounds of its power and exercised its discretion to ignore the Plaintiffs' belated and sketchy affidavits. If this were the case, our standard of review would be for abuse of discretion. 42 The Defendants' argument, however, is too facile. The District Court stated that, because the Plaintiffs failed to present their affidavits to the Clerk of Court, the Court had no suitable basis on which to reduce the costs award based on the Plaintiffs' indigency or modest means. In re Paoli, 1999 WL 569435, at . But if the Court were to have credited the Plaintiffs' statements in their affidavits about their inability to pay a $154,129.30 costs award, the Court could have reduced the award under our precedent and that of other courts of appeals. See infra Section V.B. Therefore, from our reading of the District Court's opinion, it was the Plaintiffs' failure timely to perfect the evidentiary record before the Clerk of Court rather than the inadequacy of their evidence that the District Court understood to bind its hands. 43 The District Court's reasoning and invocation of precedent bears out this conclusion. In opining that there was no suitable basis on which to assess the Plaintiffs' respective financial statuses, the District Court analogized its power to hear evidence that was not before the Clerk of Court to that of a district court reviewing the decision of a bankruptcy court. The Court cited Samar Fashions, Inc. v. Private Line, Inc., 116 B.R. 417, 420 (E.D. Pa. 1990), as defining the district court's power to expand the record in a bankruptcy case. Samar Fashions holds that a district court's review of a bankruptcy decision is limited to the record before the bankruptcy court. See id. If the rule in Samar Fashions were to apply in the Rule 54(d)(1) context, a losing party could never expand the record before the District Court, no matter how thorough or compelling their new affidavits might be. 44 Accordingly, we are forced to conclude that the District Court was interpreting the limits of its discretion under Rule 54(d)(1) in refusing to consider the Plaintiffs' affidavits, not exercising its discretion not to do so. As such, our review of that decision is plenary. See Kleissler, 183 F.3d at 198.
45 The District Court's legal conclusion that it could not hear evidence that was not first presented to the Clerk of Court is unsound for several reasons. Under the well- established Rule 54(d)(1) case law, the district court is charged with making a de novo review of the clerk's determination of the costs issue. See 10 M OORE'S, supra, S 54.100[3], at 54-145 (citing Farmer v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 379 U.S. 227, 233 (1964)). In Farmer, 379 U.S. at 233, the Supreme Court acknowledged that conducting a de novo review in a costs award case properly involved reviewing new evidence and circumstances that militated in favor of reducing the earlier imposed costs award. 46 The District Court's analogies to the appellate review and bankruptcy cases that it cited were thus inapposite. In Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon (New York), 807 F.2d 1150, 1165 (3d Cir.1986), we explained that the proper function of an appellate court is to review decisions on the basis of the record before the district court. But as Farmer makes clear, 379 U.S. at 232-34, the rules governing de novo review--not appellate review or bankruptcy review, which is a variation thereof, see In re Columbia Gas Sys., Inc., 997 F.2d 1039, 1059 (3d Cir. 1993)--govern Rule 54(d)(1) challenges. As this court has held in similar cases involving courts reviewing decisions of non-judicial officials,  `De novo means here, as it ordinarily does,[that] . . . the court's inquiry is not limited to or constricted by the . . . record, nor is any deference due the . . . conclusion [under review].'  Luby v. Teamsters Health, Welfare, & Pension Trust Funds, 944 F.2d 1176, 1184 (3d Cir. 1991) (emphasis and alteration in original); see id. at 1184-85 (holding that, in an ERISA case, a district court conducting a de novo review of a plan administrator's findings of fact could expand the factual record) (citing cases involving a similar interpretation of the de novo review standard when a district court reviews the decisions of administrative agencies). 47 There is a cognate basis why the District Court's legal conclusion--i.e., that it could not expand the record before the Clerk of Court--is incorrect. The clerk of court's role in taxing costs awards, while quasi-judicial, is essentially ministerial. This fact not only explains why certain evidence might not be presented to the clerk of court, but underscores why it is important that district courts retain the discretion to assess independently the factual record, whether the record consists of new evidence or old. The Clerk in this case acknowledged in his written order that he lacked the discretion to consider certain equities in taxing cost against the Plaintiffs. The Plaintiffs would therefore have had no reason then to submit evidence supporting their equitable arguments--e.g., their indigency argument or their argument that it would be unfair to award joint and several liability--until they sought review by the District Court. Moreover, in fulfilling its responsibility to insure that a costs award is not inequitable, Friedman v. Ganassi, 853 F.2d 207, 211 (3d Cir. 1988), the district court not only can, but should, consider evidence that completes the factual record or sheds light on the equities in a given case. Doing so may involve expanding the evidentiary record. 48 Another reason for our conclusion is that costs may be taxed by the clerk on one day's notice, FED . R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1), and without adversarial proceedings. This short time frame and the attending limited opportunity to develop a factual record calls for careful supervision by district courts of costs awards. Recognizing this important distinction, several district courts have permitted parties challenging costs awards to introduce or rely upon evidence not presented before the clerk of court. See, e.g., Burks v. City of Philadelphia, No. Civ. A. 95-1636, 1999 WL 163636, at  (E.D. Pa. Mar. 22, 1999) (considering copies of [the plaintiffs'] personal financial statements, bills and other information which they claim[ed] demonstrate[d] their inability to pay the assessed costs, even though such records were presented for the first time in the plaintiffs' motion to reconsider the clerk's award). 49 For these reasons, we hold that District Court erred as a matter of law in ruling that it did not have the power under Rule 54(d)(1) to consider the Plaintiffs' affidavits not filed with the Clerk of Court. Because courts [t]ypically . . . will accept the allegations concerning the applicant's financial circumstances [when their indigency is in question] at face value, 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra , S 2673, at 307, the District Court also should not have ignored the affidavit filed by the paralegal with the Clerk of Court. That is not to say, however, that the Court could not have discredited the representations made in these affidavits or ultimately refused to reduce the costs award that it imposed in this case. Moreover, even though district courts have the power to expand the record in Rule 54(d)(1) cases, they retain the discretion not to do so. Therefore, counsel for losing parties would be well advised, when it is feasible, to submit to the clerk of court all relevant evidence bearing on a potential costs award before the clerk proceeds to tax costs. 50 V. What Factors a District Court May Consider in Weighing the Equities of a Costs Award A. 51 Rule 54(d)(1) provides in pertinent part that [e]xcept when express provision therefor is made either in a statute of the United States or in these rules, costs other than attorneys' fees shall be allowed as of course to the prevailing party unless the court otherwise directs . . . . FED. R. CIV. P. 54(d)(1). By mandating that, subject to court intervention, costs be allowed to a prevailing party as of course, the rule creates the strong presumption that costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party. 10 MOORE'S, supra, S 54.101, at 54-149 (collecting cases); see also Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Secretary of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 926 (3d Cir. 1985). To overcome the presumption favoring the prevailing party and to deny that party costs, a district court must  `support[ ] that determination with an explanation.'  Institutionalized Juveniles, 758 F.2d at 926 (quoting Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh , 538 F.2d 991, 999 (3d Cir. 1976)). Moreover, the losing party bears the burden of making the showing that an award is inequitable under the circumstances. See 10 MOORE'S, supra, S 54.101, at 54-151 & n.7 (collecting cases). 52 Reported cases have discussed a number of equitable factors, most advanced by the parties herein, that a district court may consider in determining a costs award. The parties, as well as Amicus--the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyer's Association--have advanced a number of factors as candidates for reviewing a costs award imposed by the clerk of court. These factors include: (1) the unclean hands, or bad faith or dilatory tactics, of the prevailing party; (2) the good faith of the losing party and the closeness and difficulty of the issues they raised; (3) the relative disparity of wealth between the parties; and (4) the indigence or inability to pay a costs award by a losing party. 53 While the first of these factors is not implicated in this case, the propriety of a court considering each of the remaining factors is in dispute. The unclean hands factor is not in dispute because the Plaintiffs do not assert that the named Defendants engaged in any acts that would implicate this factor. We reaffirm, however, that in an appropriate case, the unclean hands factor is a relevant one for district courts to consider. See Smith v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 47 F.3d 97, 99 (3d Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (recognizing this factor). 4 We turn to the remaining factors. B. 54 The most important of these factors is the losing party's indigency or inability to pay the full measure of a costs award against it. Smith, 47 F.3d at 99. Several courts of appeals have held that indigency, or modest means, is a factor that a district court may consider in awarding costs. See, e.g., Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp. , 186 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999) (evaluating whether a non-indigent losing plaintiff had the effective ability to satisfy[the defendant's] bill of costs or was of such modest means that it would be unjust or inequitable to enforce Rule 54(d)(1) against her); Weeks v. Samsung Heavy Indus. Co., Ltd., 126 F.3d 926, 945 (7th Cir. 1997) ([T]he losing party's inability to pay will suffice to justify denying costs.). Other courts that have adopted this approach also caution that a losing party's indigency or an inability to pay costs does not automatically mean that a costs award levied against that party is inequitable. See, e.g., Weaver v. Toombs, 948 F.2d 1004, 1008 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that indigency may be a shield to imposition of costs, but that it is not an absolute shield). This case-by-case approach to the indigency factor has also been expressly or implicitly endorsed by noted commentators on the subject. See, e.g., 10 MOORE'S, supra, SS 54.101[1][b], at 54-153, 54.104[1][a]-[c], at 54-198 to 54-201; 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra , S 2673, at 305-09. 55 We note too that we have suggested the same. In Smith v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 47 F.3d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1995) (per curiam), we held that the disparity in the parties' financial resources seems to us to be irrelevant for purposes of Rule 54(d), but we also stated that 56 [i]f the losing party cannot afford to pay[costs], that party is not automatically exempted from the taxation of costs. On the contrary, 28 U.S.C. S 1915(e) and cases decided thereunder make clear that costs may be taxed against a party who is permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. See, e.g., Washington v. Patlis, 916 F.2d 1036, 1039 (5th Cir. 1990); Harris v. Forsyth, 742 F.2d 1277, 1278 (11th Cir. 1984); Flint v. Haynes, 651 F.2d 970, 973 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1151 (1982). While these cases recognize that a district court may consider a losing party's indigency in applying Rule 54(d), the losing party in this case does not claim to be indigent, and the record does not establish that she is unable to pay the full measure of costs. 57 Id. The negative pregnant contained in this statement is that a party may be exempted from costs if he is in fact indigent, if he has adduced evidence that he is indigent, and if the district court sees fit to reduce the costs award imposed for reasons of equity. 58 Policy considerations underpinning the American costs rule support the consideration of the indigency or inability to pay factor. As Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane have observed, Rule 54(d)(1) is founded on the egalitarian concept of providing relatively easy access to the courts to all citizens and reducing the threat of liability for litigation expenses as an obstacle to the commencement of a lawsuit or the assertion of a defense that might have some merit. 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra, S 2665, at 202. 59 Persuaded by the authority from other circuits and these policy considerations, we hold that the District Court could have considered this factor, given the affidavits that the Plaintiffs presented regarding their indigency. Therefore, the District Court's order imposing costs must be set aside. Stating our position more precisely, we hold that if a losing party is indigent or unable to pay the full measure of costs, a district court may, but need not automatically, exempt the losing party from paying costs. 60 Such an approach is somewhat at odds with the traditional rule at law that the prevailing party was automatically entitled to its costs, but it is consistent with the rule at equity that the district court exercise its discretion to insure that the award be equitable. See supra Section II.A. Allowing for the indigency factor in certain cases is also in keeping with the American tradition of not providing total reimbursement. See id. As was noted above, see id., the types of costs recoverable under Rule 54(d)(1) are quite circumscribed. These costs do not include such litigation expenses as attorney's fees and expert witness fees in excess of the standard daily witness fee, Friedman v. Ganassi, 853 F.2d 207, 209 (3d Cir. 1988), and as a result, while a prevailing party is awarded its Rule 54(d)(1) costs, those costs often fall well short of the party's actual litigation expenses, see 10 WRIGHT ET AL ., supra, S 2666, at 202-04; see also 10 MOORE'S, supra, S 54.103, at 54-174 to 54-197. 61 The plaintiffs have introduced evidence that they are indigent or unable to pay the large costs award imposed in this case. See supra Part IV. We will therefore reverse the order of the District Court on this point. On remand, the District Court should consider this evidence and the indigency or inability to pay factor. 5
62 The next disputed factor is the good faith of the losing party (here the Plaintiffs) and the closeness and difficulty of the issues that they raised. We have no doubt that the Plaintiffs acted in good faith, and our prior opinions in this matter reflect the seriousness, closeness, and difficulty of the many issues that they raised. This was a classic close case, brought in good faith by the Plaintiffs. This court, in fact, expressed the sentiment that some may have been surprised by the fact that the Plaintiffs had lost at trial. See In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 113 F.3d 444, 464 (3d Cir. 1997). However, despite the fervent advocacy of the Plaintiffs' counsel, we do not consider these factors, in and of themselves, to be appropriate criteria in determining whether a costs award is equitable. 6 63 Amicus argues for the applicability of the good faith and closeness or complexity factors based on a complicated reading of our case law and this court's statements, which are quoted in block form in footnote 4 above, in Smith v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority , 47 F.3d 97 (3d Cir. 1995) (per curiam). In Smith , we referenced our previous opinion in ADM Corp. v. Speedmaster Packaging Corp., 525 F.2d 662 (3d Cir. 1975), which quoted the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals's opinion in Chicago Sugar Co. v. American Sugar Refining Co., 176 F.2d 1, 11 (7th Cir. 1949), for the proposition that a district court may consider certain equitable factors in arriving at a costs award. See Smith, 47 F.3d at 99. Both Smith and ADM, however, quoted only one equitable factor enumerated in Chicago Sugar--that relating to the prevailing party's bad faith. See supra note 4. Chicago Sugar also held that where it is clear that the action was brought in good faith, [and] involv[ed] issues as to which the law is in doubt, the court may in its discretion require each party to bear its own costs although the decision is adverse to the prevailing party. Chicago Sugar, 176 F.2d at 11. Amicus argues that we must apply this latter set of factors, even though they were not referenced in Smith or ADM. To do so, Amicus must first explain why Smith and ADM quoted Chicago Sugar so selectively. 64 Amicus first argues that the reason Smith did not follow Chicago Sugar fully is that perhaps the Smith court did not have to read Chicago Sugar when it rescribed the quote from ADM. Amicus Br. at 13. The conduct of the losing party factor was before the court in Smith, however, and this court's failure to recognize that factor, when certain other courts have done so (as detailed in the margin 7 ), seems strong evidence that Smith's failure to quote the second set of Chicago Sugar factors was not merely an errant omission, but purposeful. The district court in Smith had taken into account the fact that the  `[p]laintiff pursued a legitimate claim in good faith and raised a serious legal issue'  when reducing the defendant's costs award. Smith, 47 F.3d at 99 (quoting District Ct. Op. at 3). In reversing this reduction for an abuse of discretion, we held that any denial of costs is a penalty and that only the prevailing party's conduct should be taken into account in weighing the equities. See id. Though not explicitly rejecting the good-faith or the complexity-of-the-issues factors mentioned in Chicago Sugar, we seem to have been faced with at least the good faith exception and implicitly to have rejected it. 8 65 Smith's rejection of the good faith exception in Chicago Sugar makes sense when one considers the rationale undergirding Smith. Smith stated plainly that any denial of costs penalizes the prevailing party. See 47 F.3d at 99. Therefore, good citizen or not, the losing party's strong or justified belief that her claim had merit would not support levying a penalty against the opposing party who acted in good faith and prevailed in defending itself. The only possible exception to this rule that Smith noted was when the losing party was indigent. See id. at 99-100. 66 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has squarely addressed both the good faith and the complexity of the issues factors mentioned in Chicago Sugar , and flatly rejected them. See National Info. Serv. v. TRW, Inc., 51 F.3d 1470, 1472-73 (9th Cir. 1995). In doing so, the court reasoned: 67 We specifically reject Plaintiffs' argument that their good faith in prosecuting the underlying antitrust action should defeat the presumption in favor of awarding costs. All parties to a federal action have an obligation to act in good faith and with proper purpose. It follows that noble intentions alone do not relieve an unsuccessful litigant of the obligation under Rule 54(d) to compensate his opponent for reasonable costs. If the awarding of costs could be thwarted every time the unsuccessful party is a normal, average party and not a knave, Rule 54(d)(1) would have little substance remaining. . . . 68 Plaintiffs offer an alternative basis on which to let the district court order stand. They ask us to affirm the denial of costs on the ground that their antitrust action raised close and difficult legal issues. . . .[W]e hold that difficulty alone does not justify penalizing the prevailing parties. As we explained, the district court generally must award costs unless equity demands otherwise due to some impropriety on the part of the prevailing party during the course of the litigation. Generally speaking, neither side bears responsibility for the length or complexity of a particular case. Moreover, the difficulty of a case hardly constitutes an impropriety that calls out for punishment. 69 Id. (citations and internal quote marks omitted). 70 Though some courts hold to the contrary, see 10 WRIGHT ET AL., supra, S 2668, at 238-39 & n.19 (collecting cases), we agree with the Ninth Circuit and the majority of courts that have rejected the losing party's good faith as a relevant factor, see 10 MOORE'S, supra, S 54.101[b], at 54-151 to 54- 152 (collecting cases). The only time the losing party's conduct should be at issue is if the losing party acted in bad faith during the course of litigation and then requested a costs award reduction. In such a circumstance, we agree with the courts that hold that a district court may deny a losing party's request to reduce costs if the losing party acted in bad faith. See, e.g., Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 447 (4th Cir. 1999) (recognizing that the losing party's good faith is is a prerequisite for her claim to relief from the presumptive application on Rule 54(d)(1)) (emphasis in original). 71 Moreover, though some courts of appeals permit district courts to consider the complexity or closeness of the legal issues involved in a case when imposing a costs award, see supra note 7 (collecting cases), we hold that this factor is not an appropriate one for district courts to consider, see Klein v. Grynberg, 44 F.3d 1497, 1507 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding similarly). Rather, we believe that to deny a prevailing party costs because it was successful in prosecuting or defending against a complex legal theory unduly punishes that party. Effecting such a penalty, absent punishable conduct on the part of the prevailing party, is contrary to this court's long line of precedent interpreting Rule 54(d)(1). See Smith, 47 F.3d at 99; see also MOORE'S, supra, S 54.101[b], at 54-151 to 54-152 ([T]he fact that the losing party's position had merit and that the case presented close and difficult issues is not a sufficient ground to deny costs to the prevailing party.) (footnote and citations omitted). 72 In reaching this conclusion, however, we reiterate that a district court may reduce a costs award, on equitable grounds, if the prevailing party, through bad faith or dilatory tactics, has turned a relatively simple case into a complex morass. This analysis, however, should be done pursuant to the unclean hands factor discussed above, see supra Section V.A, or in assessing which costs are actually recoverable under the statute, see 28 U.S.C. S 1920. Complexity, in and of itself, however, may not be considered as a relevant equitable factor. This is what we take the Ninth Circuit to mean when it writes: 73 [W]e hold that difficulty alone does not justify penalizing the prevailing parties. . . . [T]he district court generally must award costs unless equity demands otherwise due to some impropriety on the part of the prevailing party . . . . Generally speaking, neither side bears responsibility for the length or complexity of a particular case. 74 National Info. Serv., 51 F.3d at 1473 (citations omitted). Similarly, when the Fourth Circuit speaks of the excessiveness of a costs award as a relevant factor for denying the prevailing party its costs or reducing them, we understand the court to be referring to the possibility that a prevailing party's bad conduct may be responsible for excessive costs; not that the sheer size of a costs award is a relevant factor in and of itself. Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 446 (4th Cir. 1999). If district courts in this circuit are to cognize this factor, they should do so under the rubric of their unclean hands analysis. However, for the reasons noted above--i.e., that there are no allegations of bad faith on the part of the Defendants in this case, see supra Section V.A--the unclean hands factor, as described in this Section and above, should be not considered on remand.
75 The last Rule 54(d)(1) equity factor potentially implicated in this case is the relative wealth of the parties. The Plaintiffs and Amicus maintain that while many of the Plaintiffs were disabled, poor individuals living on fixed incomes with little or no assets, the Defendants--General Electric, Monsanto, and Westinghouse (CBS)--were billion dollar corporations that are among the largest and wealthiest in the world. Appellants' Br. at 11. The Plaintiffs and Amicus therefore contend that the District Court should have considered the parties' relative ability to bear the Defendants' costs in weighing the equities in this case. In Smith, 47 F.3d at 99-100, we rejected this potential Rule 54(d)(1) factor; so too have the clear majority of courts and commentators, see, e.g., Cherry v. Champion Int'l Corp., 186 F.3d 442, 448 (4th Cir. 1999); Reed v. International Union of United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers, Local Union No. 663, 945 F.2d 198, 204 (7th Cir. 1991); MOORE'S, supra,S 54.101[b], at 54-153. Thus, the District Court rightly declined to accept the Plaintiffs' invitation to consider this factor.
76 In sum, we hold that a district court may consider the following factors in reviewing a clerk of court's costs award: (1) the prevailing party's unclean hands, bad faith, dilatory tactics, or failures to comply with process during the course of the instant litigation or the costs award proceedings; and (2) each of the losing parties' potential indigency or inability to pay the full measure of a costs award levied against them. In contrast, a district court may not consider (1) the losing parties' good faith in pursuing the instant litigation (although a finding of bad faith on their part would be a reason not to reduce costs); (2) the complexity or closeness of the issues--in and of themselves--in the underlying litigation; or (3) the relative disparities in wealth between the parties. Again, the presumption is that costs, as defined by the relevant statutes and case law, will be awarded in full measure. Only if the losing party can introduce evidence, and the district court can articulate reasons within the bounds of its equitable power, should costs be reduced or denied to the prevailing party. For the reasons set forth above, we reverse and remand so that the District Court can reconsider the indigency factor described herein. 77