Opinion ID: 444114
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Scope of Judicial Review of ICC Decisions Under Section 11501(c)

Text: 55 The ICC decision in this case reviews an established pre-existing rate, rather than a proposed rate, and also determined the appropriate rate. In the latter respect, the ICC states that it did not prescribe a rate, but rather merely reversed the prescription [of the Utah Commission], allowing a return to the status quo ante. ICC Brief at 32-33. Here, the Commission's argument continues, 56 the Commission merely reversed a [Utah Commission] decision that had found the [Rio Grande-Salt Lake] rate unreasonably high, allowing a return to the presumptively reasonable rate that had prevailed beforehand. But the ICC did not mandate that the present rate be charged until the Commission rules otherwise. That would have been a prescription. 57 Id. at 33 (initial emphasis added). This distinction between an appropriate rate under section 11501(c) and a prescribed rate calls into play the difference between judicial and legislative action as articulated in Arizona Grocery Co. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway, 284 U.S. 370, 52 S.Ct. 183, 76 L.Ed. 348 (1932). The rate here had been agreed to and applied by the railroads and Utah Power for almost two years following the order of the Utah Commission. Section 11501(c), supra, directs the ICC to determine and authorize the carrier to establish the appropriate rate. The ICC made an effort to comply with that statutory requirement when, after study of the rate base, it ruled: we determine that the appropriate rate ... is ... $5.97 per ton. ICC Decision at 10 (JA 593) (emphasis added). In this respect, we note the ICC's statement in its brief that the Commission has not yet interpreted the relationship, if any, between the 'appropriate rate' to be authorized under Section 11501(c) and 'reasonable rates' as used elsewhere in the statute. ICC Brief at 34. 58 Courts reviewing ICC decision must approach every case that involves ratemaking with an attitude of deference towards the Commission's expertise in the area. The Supreme Court has observed: 59 The process of rate making is essentially empiric. The stuff of the process is fluid and changing--the resultant of factors that must be valued as well as weighed. Congress has therefore delegated the enforcement of transportation policy to a permanent expert body [the ICC] and has charged it with the duty of being responsive to the dynamic character of transportation problems. 60 Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway v. Wichita Board of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 806, 93 S.Ct. 2367, 2374, 37 L.Ed.2d 350 (1973) (quoting Board of Trade v. United States, 314 U.S. 534, 546, 62 S.Ct. 366, 372, 86 L.Ed. 432 (1942)); see American Trucking Association, Inc. v. United States, 642 F.2d 916, 920 (5th Cir.1981). We have thus traditionally approached the ICC's conclusions aware of our tripartite obligation to scrutinize the Commission's action for evidence of compliance with the law, for support in the record, and for reasoned decision making. See, e.g., Consolidated Rail Corp. v. ICC, 646 F.2d 642, 647 & n. 12 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1047, 102 S.Ct. 587, 70 L.Ed.2d 488 (1981). 61 The scope of our review of the ICC's decisions under its Staggers Act section 11501(c) jurisdiction is defined by the above-stated standards. Congress envisioned section 11051(c) as providing both for federal review of state decisions, and for an ICC rate-determination function. See supra. Traditionally, since the Supreme Court's decision three decades ago in North Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507, 65 S.Ct. 1260, 89 L.Ed. 1760 (1945), the rule has been that ICC preemption of state authority must be strictly scrutinized. That pre-Staggers Act standard, however, is no longer controlling, because Congress has now explicitly granted the Commission authority over intrastate rates. Congress has preempted state regulation to the extent prescribed by the Staggers Act. The old North Carolina standard is obsolete, and the proper standard is one deferential to the economic expertise of the ICC. See Kentucky Utilities Co. v. ICC, 721 F.2d 537, 542-43 (6th Cir.1983); cf. Indianapolis Power & Light Co. v. ICC, 687 F.2d 1098, 1100 (7th Cir.1982). 19 We therefore approach this ICC decision with some deference, and review it only for its consistency with the Staggers Act, support in the record, and articulation of reasoned decision making.