Opinion ID: 2369925
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 22

Heading: Closing Argument to the Jury

Text: In closing argument, plaintiff's counsel said: [S]omething happened to Harry Barman in the morning or early afternoon hours of January 28th, when he was incarcerated at South 3, the mental health unit, the maximum care type facility in the District Jail. Something happened to him. He either got gang raped, sodomized either voluntarily or involuntarily, if you believe Mr. Stroman one way or the other. He was sprayed with some deep gloss, or he may have suffered some other sort of trauma, something perhaps that arose out of his condition. But, something happened to the man. At around 3 o'clock, he was locked down in his cell, Cell 29 at the D.C. Jail, where between 3 o'clock and 6:05 p.m., he went through a lot of distress. He must have traveled around the cell several times, and there came a point when he died, and he died of one or two things, perhaps, depending on who[m] you believe. But, he died in such a way that he did not die quickly. He must have flopped around for twenty minutes or a half hour at a minimum, no matter who you believe, based on the physical evidence. And then he died and he stayed in this kneeling position for some period of time until finally he was discovered at 6:05 p.m. by the correctional officers who were there to take care of him. [Tr. 1026-27]       The importance is, they hadhad they intervened, had they been doing what they were supposed to do during the time Mr. Barman was dying, they could have intervened. [Tr. 1033]       If you will recall, Dr. Smilac [Smialek], who is the chief medical examiner of Baltimore, and a very experienced person, testified. He testified in a clear and uncontradicted, unshaken by cross examination, in a clear, uncontradicted manner, that Mr. Barman, through his observations of the scene and, importantly, the slides which he had reflected on, had died of an acute bronchospasm. And what is this acute bronchospasm? It is an onsetan acute onset of this underlying condition, albeit unreported, of asthma that Mr. Barman suffered from. And, that it was triggered by one of the causes I suggested to you earlier. [Tr. 1034]       But, you must assess the impact on Mr. Barman and the extreme distress and discomfort that was caused by his thrashing around for a period of time in that cell while these people were supposed to be taking care of him. And, I would submit to you that there is a significant compensation due Mr. Barman's estate because of this pain and suffering suffered by Mr. Barman during his death struggle at the D.C. Jail. [Tr. 1045] The government lawyer, in closing argument, said: If the District of Columbia did anythinganything at all, or failed to do something that killed Mr. Barman, the District, like anybody else, must pay. That's the law. That's the law. [Tr. 1051]       Well, it's up to you. If you believe that the District did something wrong to Mr. Barman, if you believe that Mr. Barman thrashed around his cell for forty-five minutes to an hour before he died, if you believe that these correctional officers were negligent in letting Mr. Barman die, then you should find for the plaintiff, and you should award them a sum of money that would adequately compensate for the loss of Mr. Barman. [Tr. 1055] WAGNER, Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I concur in the result reached by the majority affirming the order of the trial court for a new trial; however, I cannot join in all of its reasons for doing so. I dissent from that portion of the decision which holds that the jury summation made by appellant's counsel provides support for its decision. On the contrary, I agree with the dissenting opinion of Judge Ferren that such a rationale for rejecting the jury's verdict is improper and legally unsupportable. However, unlike my dissenting colleagues, I conclude that there is firm support in the record for sustaining the trial court's grant of a new trial on all claims except the claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the Wrongful Death Act, D.C.Code § 16-2701 (1989). As to that claim, contrary to the positions of all of my colleagues, I conclude that the trial court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be affirmed. For these reasons, I am compelled to state separately the reasons for my dissent from portions of the majority opinion and my rationale for joining in the majority's affirmance of the order for a new trial on all except one claim and for concluding that judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be affirmed on the claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress under the Wrongful Death Act.