Opinion ID: 76299
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standard of Review for This Case

Text: 43 Williams asks us to review the district court's grouping of his offenses. Since this question clearly involves the application of the guidelines to Williams's case, § 3742 requires us to review this question with due deference to the district court's ruling. See United States v. Bradford, 277 F.3d 1311, 1312 (11th Cir.2002) ([T]his Court views the district court's refusal to group multiple counts under § 3D1.2 with due deference.); accord United States v. Tillmon, 195 F.3d 640, 642 (11th Cir.1999); United States v. McIntosh, 216 F.3d 1251, 1253 (11th Cir.2000); United States v. Bonner, 85 F.3d 522, 525 (11th Cir.1996). Notwithstanding the implication of these cases — that due deference is either a substantive standard in its own right, or a sort of modification on de novo review — the preceding discussion makes clear that due deference requires us to assess the type of question we are reviewing in order to determine the degree of respect to accord the district court's findings. 44 Applying our Malgoza standard, the question of whether charges should have been grouped differently seems primarily one of law rather than of fact. We need not rely on the district court's fact-finding, because the charges of which the defendant was convicted are clearly set forth in the indictment. To resolve this issue, we merely must interpret and apply § 3D1.2's standards to these charges. Moreover, unlike Buford, this case does not involve an overly complex or unique fact pattern that will render our decision of little value in future cases. Thus, we need not afford the district court's ruling any special deference, and we review its ruling de novo.