Opinion ID: 413383
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Action on Summary Judgment

Text: 54 The MM & P also appeals from the district court's decision to adjudicate this case on a motion for summary judgment. 28 The MM & P asserts that material facts are in dispute on two issues: (1) whether government agency practice evidences any administrative discretion under Sec. 5348 to ignore applicable industry wage rates, MM & P's Brief at 43; and (2) whether defendants are estopped to impose a 'pay cap' under Sec. 5373, id. at 46. The government treats both these allegations as attempts to fit this case into the mold of equitable estoppel. It then counters the MM & P by arguing that estoppel is not a viable claim in this case, Government's Brief at 17, and that in any event the MM & P failed either to document facts to counter the government's proof or to file an affidavit stating why it could not present by affidavit facts essential to justify [its] opposition, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(f). 29 Indeed, the MM & P relied on a Statement of Material Facts in Controversy, J.A. at 110-11, supported only by a note that explained why its preparation of affidavits had been hampered and that referred to the government's exhibits. 30 The MM & P did not seek to use Rule 56(f) to gain an opportunity to present us with material facts. And we have no evidence that the MM & P provided supplementary affidavits in the ten months between the filing of its Statement and the issuance of the district court's orders. Therefore, we must decide this issue on the basis of the parties' statements and the exhibits in the record. After examining this evidence, we agree with the district court that the MM & P did not present any genuine issue of material fact. District Court Opinion at 1 n. ; J.A. at 114. 55 We look first at the MM & P's contention that there are facts demonstrating that pay under Sec. 5348 is not set as a matter of administrative discretion, but as a matter of statutory mandate. MM & P's Brief at 44. We conclude that the question of whether pay-setting under Sec. 5348 involves the type of administrative action that Congress limited with the pay cap of Sec. 5373 is ultimately one of law, not fact. Our earlier analysis examined cases on the legal issue of the extent of administrative discretion under Sec. 5348, and then drew a legal conclusion about whether this discretion represented the type of administrative action covered by Sec. 5373. Moreover, to the extent that resolution of this legal question turns on agency practice, 31 we note that the MM & P has not pointed out any material facts in dispute about those practices. Both parties agree that the Defense Department and the Office of Personnel Management initially believed that the Sec. 5373 cap did not apply to the mariners, that the NOAA disagreed, and that the Comptroller General, the official with legal authority to resolve the executive branch dispute, concluded that the cap applied to the mariners. See J.A. at 28-50, 73-74. The record even includes memoranda from the various agencies providing their legal analyses. Id. The undisputed fact that different agencies disagreed about a legal question does not in itself present any disputed material fact. 56 This case is certainly distinguishable from L'Enfant Plaza Properties, Inc. v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 564 F.2d 515 (D.C.Cir.1977), upon which the MM & P relies. In that case we dealt with a statute ambiguous on its face and with legislative history that did not resolve the issue of [the statute's] interpretation. Id. at 522 n. 11. This lack of authority had led the district court to rely on constitutional and practical considerations in interpreting the statute, id. at 518, a course of action we believed it took too hastily. We held that summary judgment was inappropriate because the record left unresolved the material issue of fact of the [single responsible agency's] early interpretation of the statute. Id. at 522. Since the district court's decision had been based in part on practical considerations, we also wanted to resolve the factual issue of whether the agency's supposed earlier definition of the statute had been workable. Id. at 521-22. 57 In the case before us, in contrast, we know the conclusions and even the reasoning of the various agencies that have interpreted the statutes in question. Moreover, the statutes and legislative history in this case provide us more guidance on the relationship between Sec. 5348 and Sec. 5373 than the court had on the statutory question in L'Enfant Plaza Properties. And since the issues of administrative practicality and standardless delegation of legislative power have not arisen in this case, we of course find no need to explore factual disagreements on those points. 58 We also reject the MM & P's second argument that there are material facts in dispute on the issue of whether the government is estopped to impose the pay cap on the mariners. To establish an estoppel claim against the government, the MM & P would have to prove the traditional elements--false representation, a purpose to invite action by the party to whom the representation was made, ignorance of the true facts by that party, and reliance, as well as establish a showing of an injustice ... and lack of undue damage to the public interest. Hoeber v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 483 F.Supp. 1356, 1365-66 (D.D.C.1980), aff'd mem., 672 F.2d 894 (D.C.Cir.1981); see United States v. Lazy F.C. Ranch, 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir.1973). 59 These standards set a difficult course for the MM & P to navigate. 32 As we stated in L'Enfant Plaza Properties, the general rule is that governments may not be estopped by their past conduct absent an alteration in action that would result in egregious injustice. 564 F.2d at 524 (citations omitted). And only recently the Supreme Court, in an estoppel action dealing with Social Security benefits, reemphasized the duty of all courts to observe the conditions defined by Congress for charging the public treasury. Schweiker v. Hansen, 450 U.S. 785, 788, 101 S.Ct. 1468, 1471, 67 L.Ed.2d 685 (1981) (per curiam) (quoting Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 385, 68 S.Ct. 1, 3, 92 L.Ed. 10 (1947)). 60 Of course, to avoid summary judgment the MM & P only has to establish material facts in dispute on the estoppel issue. But this is exactly what the MM & P has failed to do. It has not given us any evidence of a false representation by the government designed to invite action by an ignorant MM & P. It is especially obvious that the MM & P was not ignorant of the pay-setting process. Both the government and the MM & P were aware that the government set the mariners' pay pursuant to Sec. 5348, not by bargaining, and that courts had found that this statute involved some discretion. At a minimum, the MM & P has known of the real possibility that the government might apply a pay cap to the mariners since the NOAA raised the issue in 1975. All subsequent contract negotiations and individual decisions to remain in government service had to be premised on that possibility. Furthermore, the MM & P has been aware for the past four fiscal years that the government has imposed, as discussed above, other types of restraints on all mariners' pay, either directly by statute or through administrative action in the public interest. 61 In addition to the MM & P's substantial knowledge about the pay-setting process, it has not provided us any evidence of a government misrepresentation designed to invite action by the MM & P. The fact that the Navy paid some mariners more than the GS-18 pay ceiling certainly does not meet this test absent other evidence. The MM & P also has not given us any facts showing reliance to its detriment. Since the MM & P could not bargain over wages, it cannot assert that the government traded (and now reneges on) an uncapped pay level to reduce some other employee benefit. Presumably, the MM & P bargained as hard as it could for non-wage benefits regardless of wages, since the MM & P could not influence pay-setting. In sum, the MM & P has not even set forth facts establishing a basic estoppel claim, 33 much less one against the government. We surely find no facts on which we could base a finding of egregious injustice. To the contrary, we lack any evidence of what the MM & P would have done differently if it had definitely known earlier that the pay cap applied to its members.