Opinion ID: 2219951
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Prosecutorial Comments

Text: Defendant contends that other comments of the prosecutor were improper and denied him a fair sentencing hearing. Specifically, defendant argues that the prosecutor acted improperly when he (1) emphasized that the jurors had taken an oath and promised to follow the law, and then argued that the evidence in aggravation required them under oath to impose a death sentence; (2) invoked the integrity of his office as a justification for seeking the death penalty; and (3) inflamed the passions of the jurors by referring to the families of the victims left behind and speculating about how many children and grandchildren will not be born because of the actions of the defendant. Defendant's first claim of error is based upon two remarks of the prosecutor that appear 90 pages apart in the record of proceedings. In the early portion of his closing argument, the prosecutor told the jurors: [Y]ou were all selected to serve in this serious case based on those promises that you made to the attorneys during jury selection. Now on behalf of the People of the State of Illinois and the People of the County of Livingston, I'm asking you to keep those promises that you made under oath several weeks ago. Much later, the prosecutor stated: Is he really worthy of your mercy? Ask yourselves with all he did, is he really worthy of your mercy? I hate to admit it, but we've really become a nation of excuse makers. There's always an excuse. Nothing is ever our fault. There must be something in this person's past that made him do things. Well, we can't take responsibility. Allowing Andrew Urdiales to receive a natural life sentence rather than the death penalty diminishes the importance of Cassie Corum's life and doesn't serve the ends of justice. Defendant actually argues that these two passages are related and that the jurors would have so perceived them: Collectively, these comments lectured the jury that imposing any penalty short of a death sentence would be irresponsible, and would constitute a violation of the jury's oath. Obviously, the prosecutor never told the jurors that their oath required them to impose the death penalty. The construction defendant places upon these remarks is simply preposterous. The quoted comments do not support defendant's claim of error even when they are taken out of context and placed in artificial tandem for argumentative exposition. This allegation of error deserves no further comment. We also reject defendant's contention that he was denied a fair sentencing hearing because the prosecutor, during closing argument, improperly invoked the integrity of his office as a justification for seeking the death penalty. We note, initially, that defendant did not object to the remarks in question; therefore, he has forfeited this issue. See People v. Franklin, 135 Ill.2d 78, 111, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743 (1990). As in Franklin, we find that the remarks did not constitute error in any event. Defendant cites the following remarks in support of his argument: The decision to seek a death penalty is not a decision that is lightly made by any prosecutor. A lot of things go into consideration as to whether or not a person such as myself would decide to seek the death penalty. I think a lot of people think that every time there's a murder committed that a prosecutor gets to decide whether or not he's going to seek the death penalty. That's simply not true. The law of the State of Illinois only provides for the death penalty under certain circumstances; and when those certain circumstances exist, it is only then that the prosecutor has the discretion to make the decision of whether or not to seek the death penalty. Careful consideration has to be given and justice must be done, and careful consideration has been given in this case as to whether or not to seek the death penalty. Now we're seeking that justice be done in this case. Although not referenced in defendant's brief, the prosecutor made other pertinent comments thereafter, remarks that we believe have a bearing upon the disposition of this issue. For example, soon after he made the foregoing statements, the prosecutor made clear to the jurors that the decision to impose the death penalty was theirs, and theirs alone: You've seen and heard all the evidence that's going to be introduced in this case, and now the decision is yours. It's your decision to decide whether or not this Defendant, Andrew Urdiales, in this case if it's appropriate to impose the death penalty. That's your decision. The prosecutor later spoke to the jurors about the procedures for determining whether defendant would receive a death sentence. He correctly informed them that they would consider factors in aggravation and mitigation in arriving at the appropriate sentence, that unanimity would be required for a death sentence, and that defendant would be sentenced to life in prison, without the possibility of release, if they were unable to find unanimously that death was the appropriate sentence. The prosecutor made clear that his role in the adversarial process, his job, was to talk to the jury about aggravating evidence. He observed: My job is not to mitigate here.    [Y]ou'll hear mitigating evidence when the defense gets to argue. But at this point in time, I'm going to give you the reasons, the evidence that support [ sic ] the Defendant should receive the death penalty from you folks when you go in and deliberate. The prosecutor then discussed, at length, the aggravating evidence, and urged the jury find that death was the appropriate sentence. As he concluded the initial portion of his closing argument, the prosecutor's remarks again served to remind the jurors that he, as the prosecutor, was part of an adversarial process: I'm sure that Mr. Skelton will have the opportunity now to address you; and he'll make a detailed argument as to why these eight murders and rape don't justify a verdict on you folks' part in favor of the death penalty. Following defense counsel's closing argument, wherein he discussed the evidence in mitigation, the prosecutor made an abbreviated rebuttal argument, and the jury was then instructed in the applicable law. It is in this context that we consider the defendant's claim of error. As we observed in People v. Jamison, 197 Ill.2d 135, 161, 258 Ill.Dec. 514, 756 N.E.2d 788 (2001), this court has long recognized that the State's Attorney is endowed with the exclusive discretion to decide which of several charges shall be brought, or whether to prosecute at all. A prosecutor's discretion extends to the decision about whether or not the death penalty should be sought. Jamison, 197 Ill.2d at 162, 258 Ill.Dec. 514, 756 N.E.2d 788. In this case, the prosecutor correctly explained to the jurors the procedure for seeking the death penalty, and advised them of his role in the capital process, as well as theirs. He obviously believed it was appropriate to seek the death penalty, or he would not have done so. In that respect, his comments did not tell the jurors anything they had not already deduced. To suggest that those comments could have improperly swayed the jury is, in our opinion, to discredit the common sense and intelligence of those who served on the jury. In his argument, the prosecutor left no doubt that his role was that of an advocate in an adversarial process, and he clearly and repeatedly advised the jurors that the decision whether or not to impose the death penalty was theirs alone. In that respect, the prosecutor's argument was very different from those found objectionable in other cases. For example, in People v. Yates, 98 Ill.2d 502, 536-38, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369 (1983), the prosecutor, in effect, told the jury that he would assume responsibility for imposition of the death penalty. As this court noted, the assistant State's Attorney in that case also suggested that his previous experience was somehow relevant to whether [the] defendant should be sentenced to death. Yates, 98 Ill.2d at 539, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369. This court ordered a new sentencing hearing, concluding that both remarks were improper: the former, because it obviously served to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility and mitigate the serious consequences of its decision; the latter, because it served to inject an improper and irrelevant consideration into the jury's deliberations. Yates, 98 Ill.2d at 538-39, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369. In this capital case, as in others, a principal concern in our review is that comments of the prosecutor in closing argument do not diminish the sentencing jury's sense of responsibility. See People v. Flores, 153 Ill.2d 264, 288, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078 (1992); People v. Franklin, 135 Ill.2d 78, 111, 142 Ill.Dec. 152, 552 N.E.2d 743 (1990). A capital sentencing jury bears the sole responsibility for determining whether a defendant is sentenced to death, and it may not be informed either directly or by implication that this responsibility is shared or rests elsewhere, either with the court (see Flores, 153 Ill.2d at 288, 180 Ill.Dec. 1, 606 N.E.2d 1078) or with the prosecutor (see Yates, 98 Ill.2d at 537-38, 75 Ill.Dec. 188, 456 N.E.2d 1369). In this case, the prosecutor advised the jury that it was his decision to seek the death penalty, and it was for them to decide whether to impose it. That is a correct statement of law and procedure. His comments further made clear that he was not an impartial arbiter on the question of whether the death penalty should be imposed, but was in fact an advocate for a position in an adversarial process. Common sense would indicate that his opinion was reflected in the discretionary actions he tookas is the case with any prosecutor. The comments in question did not undermine or diminish the jury's sense of responsibility. Considering the complained-of remarks in the context of the entire closing argument, we find no error. We finally consider defendant's contention that the prosecutor improperly inflamed the passions of the jury by referring to the families the victims left behind and speculating about `how many children and grandchildren will not be born because of the actions of the defendant.' During closing argument to the sentencing jury, the prosecutor stated: J.A. is the only one to get away with her life. The others weren't so lucky. How many children and grandchildren will not be born because of the actions of the defendant? Each of these girls had a family. Each one of them had their lives in front of them. Each one of them would have been able to have kids probably I assume at some point in their lives. Those were all taken away by the acts of this one man. In People v. Emerson, 189 Ill.2d 436, 508-10, 245 Ill.Dec. 49, 727 N.E.2d 302 (2000), this court held that similar remarks constituted an improper appeal to the emotions of the jurors. In Emerson, the prosecution argued: `Her name was Delinda Byrd. Delinda Byrd, a victim in this case. She had a life. She had hopes. She had dreams. They were taken away from her by Dennis Emerson. They were taken away from her only because he cared about nothing. Nothing, but himself. The last moments of her life were spent struggling for breath while 90 percent of her skin was being burned. Imagine her terror. Imagine her fear.       This is the defendant that did that to her, that turned her into a corpse, who took away all her hopes and dreams and took away all of what she could contribute to society and to the community, and all of what she could contribute to everyone that knew her and enriched their lives.' Emerson, 189 Ill.2d at 508-09, 245 Ill.Dec. 49, 727 N.E.2d 302. Although we found the foregoing remarks improper, we nonetheless concluded that the comments, in and of themselves, were not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing. Emerson, 189 Ill.2d at 510, 245 Ill.Dec. 49, 727 N.E.2d 302. Similarly, in People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill.2d 235, 285, 138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202 (1989), the prosecutor commented on the victims' rights to get married, have a family, have children, and spend time with their families. Though this court found that the prosecutor's argument was improper, the court concluded that the remarks did not affect the overall fairness of the sentencing hearing. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill.2d at 285, 138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202. We so find in this case. The jury heard the details of defendant's eight murders and the graphic testimony of his one surviving victim. The prosecutor's brief and isolated comments, while improper, were not so prejudicial as to deprive the defendant of a fair sentencing hearing or change the outcome of the proceeding.