Opinion ID: 71503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the natural and probable effect of disclosing the grand jury information.

Text: 19 Brenson argues that the evidence presented in his case failed to meet the nexus requirement of § 1503 previously defined by this court in United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir.1990), and adopted by the United States Supreme Court in the Aguilar decision: 20 The action taken by the accused must be with an intent to influence judicial or grand jury proceedings; it is not enough that there be an intent to influence some ancillary proceeding, such as an investigation independent of the Court's or grand jury's authority. United States v. Brown, 688 F.2d 596, 598 (9th Cir.1982) (citing cases). Some courts have phrased this showing as a nexus requirement--that the act must have a relationship in time, causation or logic with the judicial proceedings. United States v. Wood, 6 F.3d 692, 696 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Walasek, 527 F.2d 676, 679, and n. 12 (3d Cir.1975). In other words, the endeavor must have the  'natural and probable effect'  of interfering with the due administration of justice. Wood, supra, at 695; United States v. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651 (11th Cir.1990); Walasek, supra, at 679 ... [I]f the defendant lacks knowledge that his actions are likely to affect the judicial proceeding, he lacks the requisite intent to obstruct. 21 United States v. Aguilar, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 2357, 2362, 132 L.Ed.2d 520 (1995). According to Brenson, there was insufficient evidence at trial to establish that he could have or wanted to affect the grand jury deliberations during the week before the indictment was signed by giving information to DeMaria. 22 The government is not required to prove that the action taken would directly and immediately obstruct justice in order to violate § 1503, but rather that Brenson's conduct has a probable effect of obstructing justice. Thomas, 916 F.2d 647, 651-52. The government is not required to prove ... that the defendant harbored the specific purpose of obstructing the due administration of justice; all the government has to establish is that the defendant should have reasonably foreseen that the natural and probable consequence of the success of his scheme would achieve precisely that result. Silverman, 745 F.2d at 1393. In other words, the government is not required to prove that a defendant had the specific purpose of obstructing justice, but it must establish that the conduct was motivated at least in part, by a 'corrupt motive.'  United States v. Saget, 991 F.2d 702, 713 (11th Cir.) cert. denied, 510 U.S. 950, 114 S.Ct. 396, 126 L.Ed.2d 344 (1993). 23 In United States v. Saget, this court determined that when the defendants met with a grand juror, questioned the grand juror about the investigation and asked the grand juror to keep them informed of developments, the disclosure of secret information by a grand jury, which otherwise would not have been revealed, was a reasonably foreseeable result of such a meeting, thereby concluding that defendants' actions had the natural and probable effect of impeding the due administration of justice. 991 F.2d at 713. It directly follows that when Brenson meet with DeMaria and Fernandez, provided details about the investigation and answered questions along with agreeing to keep them informed of later events, it was reasonably foreseeable that such actions would have the probable effect of obstructing the due administration of justice. 24