Opinion ID: 2314684
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Missing Witness Comment

Text: Before counsel may make a missing witness argument, inviting the jury to infer that, if the witness had been produced, his or her testimony would have been unfavorable to the other party, counsel must seek permission from the court, and the court must determine that the witness in question (1) is peculiarly available to the other party and (2) would give testimony elucidating the transaction at issue. Simmons v. United States, D.C.App., 444 A.2d 962, 964 (1982); Dent v. United States, D.C. App., 404 A.2d 165, 169-70 (1979); see Givens v. United States, D.C.App., 385 A.2d 24, 26 (1978). If both criteria are met, the court may give leave to make the argument. See Dent, supra at 169-70; Givens, supra at 26. See also Cooper v. United States, D.C.App., 415 A.2d 528, 532-35 (1980) (trial court may give instruction allowing adverse inference only if same criteria are satisfied); Coombs v. United States, D.C.App., 399 A.2d 1313, 1316 (1979) (same). [46] The prosecutor's failure to seek court permission for a missing witness argument here, however, did not constitute grave misconduct since he commented on Rositta Ross's absence but did not directly urge the jury to draw from the fact [of absence] an inference adverse to appellant. Fletcher v. United States, D.C.App., 335 A.2d 248, 250 (1975) (per curiam) (citations omitted). [47] Counsel sometimes are granted leave to make incomplete missing witness arguments, ( i.e., merely to comment on the absence of a witness) if they agree not to ask the jury to infer that the missing witness testimony would have been adverse to the party failing to call that witness. See Burgess v. United States, 142 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 207, 440 F.2d 226, 235 (1970) (Counsel should not be precluded from all comment [on a witness' absence], though he is not authorized to go so far as to argue that the testimony would be unfavorable). [48] Even when viewed as questionable, moreover, such arguments generally have been held not to constitute prejudicial error. Harvey v. United States, D.C.App., 395 A.2d 92, 98 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936, 99 S.Ct. 2061, 60 L.Ed.2d 665 (1979); see Fleming v. United States, D.C.App., 310 A.2d 214, 220 (1973); Conyers v. United States, D.C.App., 309 A.2d 309, 313 (1973). In any event, repetition is an important factor in determining the gravity of such misconduct, compare Dent, supra at 172 (misconduct prejudicial where argument was repeated) with Young, supra, 150 U.S.App.D.C. at 104, 463 F.2d at 940 (misconduct not prejudicial where there was no repetition causing harm to cumulate). The statement at issue here was the prosecutor's only reference to a missing witness. The missing witness argument, moreover, did not bear directly on the issue of appellants' guilt. The argument went to the credibility of the eyewitness, Mary Bedney. [49] Although credibility of identification testimony is an important issue, cases of reversible error based on a missing witness argument or instruction typically have concerned the defendant's own credibility. See Simmons, supra (in gun possession case, missing witness allegedly was with defendant in car where gun was found); Dent, supra at 172 (missing alibi witnesses); Coombs, supra at 1315, 1316 n. 7 (same); Givens v. United States, supra at 28 (missing eyewitness to crime). [50] Finally, the trial court's instruction to the jury at the end of the missing witness argument mitigated the adverse inference to be drawn from the prosecutor's rhetorical question: Why didn't Rositta get on the stand? The prosecutor ended his missing witness comments by stating that Mary Bedney didn't lie but that the witnesses put up by [defense counsel] lied. The court interrupted to tell the jury: [Y]ou will disregard counsel's characterization of who was telling the truth and who was not. It's for you to make that determination. There was, moreover, no missing witness instruction given by the trial court to compound the effect of the prosecutor's comments, Conyers, supra at 314, by lending them the weight of law. Young, supra, 150 U.S.App.D.C. at 107, 463 F.2d at 943; see Burgess v. United States, 142 U.S.App. D.C. 198, 207, 440 F.2d 226, 235 (1970). Compare Givens, supra at 28 (trial court's overruling of defense objection inevitably had the effect of enhancing the government's position and weakening that of the defense). [51] As we have noted, the evidence against appellants was strong. Moreover, in denying appellant's motion for a mistrial, the trial court noted that the missing witness argument made up only a few minutes in a week-long trial, see Bates, supra at 1163, and that the case was vigorously defended. See Jenkins, supra at 585 (according significance to trial court's finding that both counsel fought the case hard and that the jury, having heard both sides of the case, would be able to render a fair verdict); Smith, supra at 167 (noting that during the trial [an identification witness'] credibility and powers of recollection were fully tested throughout lengthy direct and cross-examination and therefore that the evidence, if believed, was strong). The trial court's judgment on this issue should be given significant weight. See Jenkins, supra at 585; Smith, supra at 167. For all these reasons, we can say with confidence that neither the relay race analogy nor the missing witness argument substantially swayed the jury's verdict. Kotteakos, supra, 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. at 1248. Since we have concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error in any other respect, appellants' convictions are affirmed. Affirmed.