Opinion ID: 161014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Admission of Irrelevant and Prejudicial Evidence/Exclusion of Exculpatory Evidence

Text: 105 Dillard's also sought a new trial arguing that the cumulative effect of the district court's erroneous evidentiary rulings merits a reversal. We review evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. See Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995). The store's argument centers around the contention that Ms. Hampton's § 1981 claim was exceedingly narrow and therefore the admission of testimony regarding surveillance tactics and loss prevention practices was prejudicial and confusing to the jury. 106 Dillard's relies upon a continuing objection to opinion testimony about racism by the officer witnesses. The record does not indicate that Dillard's objected to all of the challenged testimony at trial. A party must make a timely and proper objection to preserve an alleged error for appeal. See United States v. Herndon, 982 F.2d 1411, 1414 (10th Cir. 1992). Failure to so object constitutes waiver of the issue unless there is plain error resulting in manifest injustice. Id. at 1414-15. Whether under an abuse of discretion or plain error review, we conclude that there was no error. 107 Dillard's focuses on several areas of allegedly prejudicial testimony: (1) testimony that Officer Wilson's supervisor used racial epithets in his previous position as director of security for another employer, (2) testimony by former Dillard's security officers as to training they received regarding treatment of minority shoppers; (3) testimony regarding the racial makeup of Dillard's shoppers and shift logs and arrest reports; (4) lay opinion testimony about Dillard's security officers; and (5) testimony that dated back approximately twenty years as to Officer Wilson's disciplinary proceeding and suspension. In addition, Dillard's contends that the court erred when it excluded Ms. Hampton's handwritten complaint that she filed with the customer service department after the incident. 108 The first three alleged evidentiary errors, taken separately or in the aggregate, do not warrant reversal. The use of racial epithets by Mr. Wilson's former supervisor, training practices of the store, its shift incident logs and arrest reports may be viewed as indirect evidence of discriminatory animus. As previously stated, a § 1981 plaintiff alleging racial discrimination may prove intentional discrimination through either direct or circumstantial evidence. Tyler, 232 F.3d at 812. Dillard's had every opportunity to rebut all of the above admitted evidence but instead relied upon its continuing objection to all opinion testimony not rationally based on personal knowledge. Aplt's. App. vol. 3, at 713. We hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion. 109 As to the testimony regarding Officer Wilson's suspension from the Kansas Highway Patrol for falsifying a report in 1977, the district court determined that although the event was remote in time, because it was probative of Mr. Wilson's character for truthfulness, and because Mr. Wilson was able to explain the incident, the court would allow the questioning. The district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing this line of questioning and in allowing the jury to give it appropriate weight. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) provides: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness... may,... in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness.... Fed. R. Evid. 608(b). One key aspect of this rule is that its application is explicitly within the discretion of the district court. The court did not abuse its discretion. 110 Finally, Dillard's contends that the district court erred when it excluded Ms. Hampton's written complaint to the store, made immediately after her interaction with Mr. Wilson. Dillard's alleges that the report was an admission against Ms. Hampton's interest, it closely tracked Mr. Wilson's story, and made no intimation of racial discrimination. The record indicates that Dillard's counsel planned to offer specific facts that were admissions against interest in the report. In fact, Dillard's counsel was able to cross-examine Ms. Hampton thoroughly about the written complaint. Furthermore, Ms. Hampton testified that nothing in the complaint suggested that she believed the interference with her redemption of the coupon was racially motivated. See Aplt's App. vol. 3, at 837 (testimony of Ms. Hampton). We hold that Dillard's was not prejudiced by the exclusion of the complaint. 111 Dillard's also contends the cumulative effect of the errors they appeal unduly prejudiced their case. As we have found no error, there can be no compound effect.