Opinion ID: 1666183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: entergy's prescription defense

Text: Entergy claims that La. R.S. 45:1198 sets forth a one year prescriptive period for customer complaints before the commission. Exxon argues that the statute should not be interpreted to apply to customer complaints unless the complaint is predicated on a particular order of the commission. A determination of whether Exxon's claims are prescribed under the one year period set forth in La. R.S. 45:1198 depends on our interpretation of the scope and application of the statute. In Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 95-2895 (La.5/20/97), 694 So.2d 184, we reviewed settled principles of statutory interpretation. Therein we noted that the starting point in interpreting any statute is the language of the statute itself. Where part of an act is to be interpreted, it should be read in conjunction with the rest of the act. In resolving any ambiguity, text is to be interpreted according to the generally prevailing meaning of the words employed. In many cases, the legislative history of an act and contemporaneous circumstances may be helpful guides in ascertaining legislative intent. With these principles in mind we turn our attention to the interpretation and application of La. R.S. 45:1198. La. R.S. 45:1198 is found within Chapter 9, Part 5 of Title 45 of the Louisiana Revised Statues dealing with Public Utilities. Chapter 9 has general application to all types of public utilities. Part 5 of Chapter 9 is comprised of particular rules for the composition, election, and activities of the Public Service Commission, which is a constitutional entity empowered by La. Const. art. IV § 21(B) with the authority to regulate all public utilities and to adopt and enforce reasonable rules, regulations, and procedures necessary for the discharge of its duties. Our examination of Part 5 makes it clear that La. R.S. 45:1198 must be read in conjunction with the two preceding sections, La. R.S. 45:1196 and La. R.S. 45:1197. These three sections of Part 5 originated as §§ 1-3 of La. Acts 1912, No. 175. Their language has remained virtually unchanged to the present date. When read in sequence, the three sections are clear and unambiguous and demonstrate that La. R.S. 45:1198 establishes a prescriptive period for customer complaints before the commission. The starting point is La. R.S. 45:1196, which provides in pertinent part: Any person ... complaining of anything done or omitted to be done ... by any person subject to regulation and control by the commission, in contravention of any order, rule, regulation, rate, or classification adopted or approved by the commission may apply to the commission by petition, briefly stating the facts ... (emphasis added). La. R.S. 45:1196 then provides that the commission must give the person against whom complaint is made a reasonable time to answer the charges. If no answer is timely made or there appears to be reasonable grounds for investigation, La. R.S. 45:1196 provides that: it shall be the duty of the commission to investigate the matters complained of as it deems proper. In the event that the commission holds hearings on a complaint made pursuant to La. R.S. 45:1196 and finds just cause for the complaint, the commission is authorized by La. R.S. 45:1197 to enter an order requiring the payment of damages. La. R.S. 45:1197 provides: If after a hearing on the complaint provided for in R.S. 45:1196 the commission determines that any party complainant is entitled to an award of damages for violation of any of the orders, rules, regulations, rates, or classifications adopted or approved by it, the commission shall make an order directing the persons mentioned in R.S. 45:1196 as subject to the control of the commission to pay to the complainant the sum to which he is entitled on or before a named day. Having set forth a statutory mechanism for the bringing of a customer complaint, providing authority for the commission to award damages to a customer, and directing the customer to the district court to enforce a commission award, the legislature then addressed in La. R.S. 45:1198 the period of limitations applicable to the actions contemplated by the two preceding sections. It established a period of limitations for the initiation of a customer complaint with the commission pursuant to La. R.S. 45:1196 and a period of limitations for enforcing an order issued based on such a complaint in court pursuant to La. R.S. 45:1197. The final and controlling sentence of La. R.S. 45:1198 provides: All complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with the commission within one year from the time the cause of action accrues, and a petition for the enforcement of an order for the payment of money shall be filed in the court within one year from the date of the order. (Emphasis added.) There can be no question that La. R.S. 45:1198 establishes periods of limitation both for customer complaints before the commission and for the subsequent enforcement of resulting orders in a district court. [5] We next address whether the period of limitations in La. R.S. 45:1198 applies to the type of customer complaint brought by Exxon in this case. Exxon argues that La. R.S. 45:1198 only applies when a customer complaint is predicated on a pre-existing order of the commission in favor of the customer. We do not agree. First, the plain language of the statute demonstrates that La. R.S. 45:1196 does not speak only to customer complaints based on a pre-existing order. Rather it gives an aggrieved customer the right to bring a customer complaint based on the alleged violation of any order, rule, regulation, rate, or classification. Here the gravamen of Exxon's complaint is that Entergy violated a commission rule, albeit an unwritten one, that imposes a continuing duty on utility providers to place customers in the most advantageous rate classification available, notwithstanding a prior contractual agreement stipulating a different rate. [6] In our view this type of complaint falls within the purview of La. R.S. 45:1196; it requires determinations regarding PSC rates and classifications that are peculiarly within the expertise of the PSC. Hence, the claims are governed by the period of limitations made applicable to such proceedings in La. R.S. 45:1198. Exxon also argues that our holding in Dixie Elec. Membership Coop. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 509 So.2d 1002 (La.1987) dictates a different result. Again we disagree. In Dixie we were not dealing with an appeal arising out of a customer complaint. Rather, the order at issue in Dixie emanated from a proceeding initiated and prosecuted by the PSC. We upheld the PSC determination that Dixie was not entitled to retain a rebate received from its wholesale supplier of energy and was required to pass this rebate on to its customers by crediting it against future billings. Any language in Dixie that could be construed as speaking to the applicability of La. R.S. 45:1198 to individual customer complaints was dicta, since no customer complaint was before us in Dixie. The position advanced by Exxon is that customer complaints for overcharges are not governed by any prescriptive period and are imprescriptible. Exxon has not called to our attention any authority for the proposition that where a utility code provides a period of limitations for customer complaints, that prescriptive period should be disregarded. To the contrary, our research reveals that where jurisdictions provide for a period of limitations on customer complaints against regulated utilities, they are routinely applied. [7] Indeed, in jurisdictions where the laws governing utilities do not provide for a specific period of limitations for customer complaints for overcharges and/or where customers are able to pursue such claims directly in a court of law, a search is often made of general principles to find an applicable prescriptive period. [8] Thus, there appears to be no compelling recognized public policy against enforcing a period of limitations on customer complaints before the PSC. Our review of the legislative history of La. R.S. 45:1198 and its source legislation reinforces our conclusion that it establishes a prescriptive period for customer complaints like the one at issue herein. The source of La. R.S. 45:1198 is La. Acts 1912, No. 175 § 3. The 1912 Act gave authority to the Railroad Commission of Louisiana, the precursor of the PSC, to hear customer complaints and make awards with respect thereto in favor of shippers and consignees. The preamble to the Act clearly referenced the establishment of a prescriptive period for the filing of claims with the commission as well as subsequent actions to enforce commission awards in court. It described the purpose of the Act to include an intent: to fix a period of prescription for the filing of such claims for damages before the Commission, and for the filing of suits for the collection of such damages, as may be awarded by the Commission ... (emphasis added). The main activity of the Railroad Commission was the regulation of railroads and motor carriers. The Interstate Commerce Commission exercised similar jurisdiction pursuant to federal law. The 1906 version of the Interstate Commerce Act embodied language remarkably similar to our statute enacted in 1912. The Hepburn Act of 1906 provided: All complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with the Commission within two years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after, and a petition for the enforcement of an order for the payment of money shall be filed in the circuit court within one year from the date of the order, and not after.... Because of the similarity of language and purpose between Act No. 175 and the Hepburn Act, decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting this 1906 version of the Hepburn Act are instructive. [9] Those decisions consistently interpreted the act as providing a limitations period for the filing of customer complaints against regulated companies before the Interstate Commerce Commission. See A.J. Phillips Co. v. Grand Trunk W. Ry. Co., 236 U.S. 662, 35 S.Ct. 444, 59 L.Ed. 774 (1915); United States ex rel. Louisville Cement Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 246 U.S. 638, 38 S.Ct. 408, 62 L.Ed. 914 (1918). As originally constituted, electric companies did not fall under the jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission. Thus when an early attempt was made to apply Act. No. 175 to claims against electric power providers, our court rejected the attempt, reasoning that the legislature had not intended the Act to cover such cases because it was passed with reference to the Railroad Commission, which did not have jurisdiction over electric companies. Morrison Cafeteria of Louisiana, Inc. v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 181 La. 932, 160 So. 634 (1935). Since the passage of La. Acts 1912, No. 175, however, the Railroad Commission has been replaced by the Public Service Commission, which was first created by Section 3 of Article 6 of the Constitution of 1921 and vested with the authority to regulate all public utilities, including electric service providers. City of Monroe v. Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 233 La. 478, 97 So.2d 56 (1956). When our statutes were revised and codified in 1950, essentially the same language originally found in Act 175 was retained. The broad language concerning complaints before the PSC against any company under PSC jurisdiction, together with the placement of La. R.S. 45:1196-1198 in Part 5 of Chapter 9, which applies to all public utilities, clearly indicates that the three sections which had their source in La. Acts 1912, No. 175, apply to all customer complaints regarding all public utilities under the jurisdiction of the PSC. A finding that customer complaints are subject to a statutory period of limitations does not mean that every customer complaint will necessarily be dismissed if a petition before the PSC is filed more than one year after the alleged wrongful act. In an appropriate case, contra non valentum might apply to prevent the running of prescription. [10] However in this case, it is clear from the record Exxon knew it was being charged a disadvantageous rate at least as early as March, 1983. Exxon was on notice of every fact underlying its claims by 1984 when the contracts were amended. Since Exxon was on notice of all of the salient facts, no actions on the part of Entergy can be said to justify the application of contra non valentum in this case. [11] We further note that the application of a statutory period of limitations to customer complaints does not necessarily provide an absolute shield to a utility company that has overcharged its customers. Our holding in Dixie suggests that La. R.S. 45:1198 does not apply to the commission's own actions. Under an appropriate set of circumstances, there may be no prohibition against the commission initiating its own proceedings and ordering any relief justified by the facts and the law, even though the same complaint by the customer would be time barred. [12] Our determination that La. R.S. 45:1198 applies to the customer complaint in this case and that Exxon knew of the grounds for its complaint more than one year before it filed its 1993 petition, mandates our conclusion that all claims for alleged overcharges between 1980 and 1984 are prescribed, including the claim that the lump sum paid in connection with contract renegotiations in 1984 constituted an overcharge entitling Exxon to a refund. Our resolution of these claims makes it unnecessary for us to reach Exxon's claim that the PCS's interest award was not computed properly. We likewise find it unnecessary to reach the issues of whether the PSC properly denied subject matter jurisdiction over the lump sum payment overcharge claim in Order No. U-20698 and whether that order should be considered final and non-reviewable.