Opinion ID: 2169848
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fifth Amendment Right Against Self-Incrimination

Text: Finally, we address the State's argument that the circuit court did not violate Eugene's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination when the court relied on Eugene's failure to complete sex offender counseling as a reason for finding Eugene unfit. The State contends the appellate court erroneously concluded that the circuit court required Eugene to admit to committing a sex offense when the circuit court never imposed such a requirement. Eugene argues he was unsuccessfully discharged from sex offender counseling because he would not admit past sexual offenses. Eugene claims he was deprived of custody of the child in this case as a sanction for exercising his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The standard of review for determining whether an individual's constitutional rights have been violated is de novo.  In re Robert S., 213 Ill.2d 30, 45, 289 Ill.Dec. 648, 820 N.E.2d 424 (2004). The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution provides that no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S. Const., amend. V. This provision applies to the states through the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV). Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368, 106 S.Ct. 2988, 2991, 92 L.Ed.2d 296, 303 (1986). The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination gives a person the right to refuse to testify against himself or herself when the person is a defendant in a criminal trial, or any other civil or criminal proceeding when the testimony may incriminate the person in future criminal proceedings. Allen, 478 U.S. at 368, 106 S.Ct. at 2991, 92 L.Ed.2d at 303-04. [W]hen a State compels testimony by threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment   . Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805, 97 S.Ct. 2132, 2135, 53 L.Ed.2d 1, 7 (1977). The appellate court here relied on In re L.F., 306 Ill.App.3d 748, 239 Ill.Dec. 780, 714 N.E.2d 1077 (1999). In that case, the State petitioned to have the respondent mother's minor children adjudicated neglected based on the death of the mother's foster child. The trial court in In re L.F. changed the permanency goal to substitute care pending termination of parental rights of the mother's biological children when she would not admit responsibility for maltreatment that caused the foster child's death. The mother argued her fifth amendment right against self-incrimination was violated. The appellate court in In re L.F. reviewed case law from other state courts that have found it constitutionally impermissible to order a parent to choose between losing parental rights or waiving the right against self-incrimination. In re L.F., 306 Ill.App.3d at 753, 239 Ill.Dec. 780, 714 N.E.2d 1077 (citing In re Clifford M., 6 Neb.App. 754, 765, 577 N.W.2d 547, 554 (1998), Mullin v. Phelps, 162 Vt. 250, 268, 647 A.2d 714, 724-25 (1994), In re Welfare of J.G.W., 433 N.W.2d 885, 886 (Minn.1989), and In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn.1987)). The appellate court recognized: there is a very fine but important distinction between taking steps to terminate a parent's rights based specifically on a refusal to waive a right against self-incrimination and doing so based upon a parent's failure to comply with an order for meaningful therapy. In re L.F., 306 Ill.App.3d at 753, 239 Ill.Dec. 780, 714 N.E.2d 1077. The appellate court rejected the trial judge's ruling that the fifth amendment was not implicated because the juvenile permanency review hearing was civil in nature. In re L.F., 306 Ill.App.3d at 754, 239 Ill.Dec. 780, 714 N.E.2d 1077. The appellate court held the trial court violated the mother's right against self-incrimination by asking her to admit to a crime that could be used against her in a subsequent criminal proceeding and changing the permanency goal when she exercised her right. In re L.F., 306 Ill.App.3d at 754, 239 Ill.Dec. 780, 714 N.E.2d 1077. In the instant case, the appellate court relied on In re L.F. in finding a violation of Eugene's fifth amendment right. The appellate court concluded Eugene was forced to make the same choice as the respondent in L.F.: he had to admit to having committed a sex offense in order to complete the last task or risk losing his child. 373 Ill.App.3d at 579, 311 Ill.Dec. 400, 868 N.E.2d 400. We agree with the rationale of In re L.F., that the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination applies to juvenile proceedings. See Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 805, 97 S.Ct. at 2135, 53 L.Ed.2d at 7 (holding that the fifth amendment is violated when the State compels a surrender of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination by threatening potent sanctions). We agree with those courts that have held a juvenile court may not compel a parent to admit to a crime that could be used against him or her in a subsequent criminal proceeding by threatening the loss of parental rights. See In re Clifford M., 6 Neb.App. at 765, 577 N.W.2d at 554; Mullin, 162 Vt. at 268, 647 A.2d at 724-25; In re Welfare of J.G.W., 433 N.W.2d at 886; In re Welfare of J.W., 415 N.W.2d at 883. Such an action would clearly violate the fifth amendment protection against self-incrimination. Accordingly, a trial court may order a service plan that requires a parent to engage in effective counseling or therapy, but may not compel counseling or therapy requiring the parent to admit to committing a crime. See In re L.F., 306 Ill.App.3d at 754, 239 Ill.Dec. 780, 714 N.E.2d 1077. Nevertheless, we find this case distinguishable from In re L.F. As the State points out, it is undisputed that the circuit court did not specifically require Eugene to admit any wrongdoing. The circuit court did not order Eugene to complete a specific program requiring him to admit abuse. We have examined the Iowa Supreme Court case of In re E.H., 578 N.W.2d 243 (Iowa 1998), and find its reasoning persuasive. In that case, the court reviewed a father's claim that a court order requiring him to undergo sex offender therapy effectively required him to incriminate himself because any sex offender treatment program requires an admission of sexual abuse. The court rejected his claim for a failure of proof. In re E.H., 578 N.W.2d at 250. The court reasoned: The juvenile court did not require a particular type of program, nor did it specify where [the father] should obtain treatment.    Finally, there is no evidence in the record, other than the assertions of [the father] that all treatment programs would require an admission of sexual abuse   . The existence of such a universal requirement is not a matter appropriate for judicial notice. [Citation.] Therefore, the father's failure of proof is fatal to his constitutional claim. In re E.H., 578 N.W.2d at 250. The Iowa Supreme Court reached a similar result in In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144 (Iowa 2002). There, the court found no evidence the State required the father to complete any particular sex offender treatment program or that the State did not approve of his participation in a program that would not require admission of guilt. The court stated: The permanency plan merely required treatment.    Under such facts, we find [the father] failed to prove the State's case permanency plan effectively constituted a requirement that [the father] must incriminate himself. In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 150. Additionally, a federal court has rejected a similar claim in Doe v. Sauer, 186 F.3d 903 (8th Cir.1999). In Doe, a prisoner argued he was denied parole based on his refusal to enter a sex offender treatment program that he alleged would require him to admit to sexual offenses other than the offense of his conviction. The court found there was no evidence in the record to support the prisoner's allegation. Doe, 186 F.3d at 905. Here, Eugene presented no evidence that there are no other treatment programs available offering sex offender counseling without requiring an admission of sexual abuse. Moreover, the record in this case fails to support the appellate court's conclusion that the circuit court's order had the effect of requiring Eugene to incriminate himself. Additionally, the record contains no evidence that Eugene informed the circuit court in the sibling's case that he was having difficulty with the sex offender counseling, or that he asked the court to assist him in locating alternative counseling. Eugene's caseworker urged him to return to sex offender counseling to see if progress was possible without making any admission of past abuse. Yet Eugene refused to do so. Instead, Eugene waited until the dispositional hearing in this case to argue the circuit court should disregard his failure to comply with the sex offender counseling requirement. As the Iowa Supreme Court held in In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 148, voicing complaints regarding the adequacy of services to a social worker is not sufficient. A parent must inform the juvenile court of such challenge. Under the facts of this case, we find Eugene failed to prove a violation of his constitutional rights. Further, the record fails to support the appellate court's holding that the circuit court order required Eugene to incriminate himself. We hold the circuit court did not violate Eugene's fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. We therefore reverse the appellate court's contrary holding.