Opinion ID: 1934919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: motion to suppress voluntariness

Text: Owen's first claim is that his confession to the Slattery murder, given in 1984, was involuntary and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motion to suppress his confession. Following Owen's first conviction and sentence of death for the Slattery murder, we addressed Owen's argument that his confession should have been suppressed because he asserted that he was coerced into making the inculpatory statements. See Owen, 560 So.2d at 210. There, we concluded: Owen's more serious argument is that he was psychologically coerced into confessing by extended interrogation sessions, feigned empathy, flattery, and lengthy discourse by the police. These interrogation sessions were videotaped and we have, as did the trial judge, the benefit of actually viewing and hearing them. It is clear from these tapes that the sessions were initiated by Owen, who was repeatedly advised of his rights to counsel and to remain silent. Moreover, he acknowledged on the tapes that he was completely familiar with his Miranda rights and knew them as well as the police officers. It is also clear that the sessions, which encompassed six days, were not individually lengthy and that Owen was given refreshments, food, and breaks during the sessions. The tapes show that the confession was entirely voluntary under the fifth amendment and that no improper coercion was employed. Id. (emphasis supplied). Clearly, when we were first presented with the review of the voluntariness of Owen's confession, we determined that the law enforcement officers who interviewed Owen did not employ improper means to obtain the confession. Despite that holding, Owen is once again before us arguing that his confession was coerced. We first note that the law of the case doctrine is controlling here. As we have explained: Generally, under the doctrine of the law of the case, all questions of law which have been decided by the highest appellate court become the law of the case which must be followed in subsequent proceedings, both in the lower and appellate courts. Brunner Enters., Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 452 So.2d 550, 552 (Fla.1984). However, the doctrine is not an absolute mandate, but rather a self-imposed restraint that courts abide by to promote finality and efficiency in the judicial process and prevent relitigation of the same issue in a case. This Court has the power to reconsider and correct erroneous rulings in exceptional circumstances and where reliance on the previous decision would result in manifest injustice, notwithstanding that such rulings have become the law of the case. Owen, 696 So.2d at 720 (citation omitted). As he did in 1990, Owen is continuing to argue that law enforcement officers improperly coerced him into confessing to the Slattery homicide. While it is clearly within our province to reevaluate our original 1990 holding as to the voluntariness of Owen's confession, Owen has not presented any new evidence to justify reviewing the issue again. He has failed to provide this Court with any exceptional circumstances to warrant a new review. It is clear that he is simply attempting to relitigate the same issue. The trial court's denial of Owen's motion to suppress would be proper even if the denial were based only upon this principle of law. However, we emphasize that even if the law of the case doctrine had no application here, Owen's confession would still be admissible as voluntary. The record is clear that the trial court did not simply rely upon our 1990 decision when it determined that Owen's confession was admissible. Instead, the trial judge conducted an extensive de novo hearing on Owen's motion to suppress, allowed Owen the opportunity to present any evidence he wished to support his claim, and then completely reevaluated all of the evidence prior to reaching his decision. At the conclusion of the lengthy hearing, the judge ruled, based upon all of the available evidence, that Owen's confession was voluntarily given. In his oral pronouncement denying Owen's motion to suppress the trial judge stated: The Court is going to rule as follows: First of all, procedurally, there's no question that the defendant in this case was Mirandized, procedurally, I think the testimony was fifteen times or something to that effect. The videos that I viewed, the twenty-two hours and the testimony in support of that shows extensive Mirandization of the defendant. The Court has listened to, I think the record is clear, to all of the videotaped statements, which ran twenty-one or twenty-two hours as did apparently the Florida Supreme Court. In reviewing those taped statements which apparently the Florida Supreme Court reviewed and found to be voluntary statements, the Court also is taking into consideration now those matters that are not specifically on the tapes themselves that were testified and argued about and looking at the case law and police techniques in obtaining confessions or statements, this Court will find that the statements by the defendant were, in fact, voluntarily given after proper procedurally [sic] Miranda rights were given. And I think the totality of the circumstances also supports that. Clearly, the trial judge did not rely solely upon our 1990 decision regarding the voluntariness of Owen's confession. The judge's ruling demonstrates that while he considered the impact of our ruling, he also personally viewed all of the videotapes, analyzed the relevant case law, and evaluated the extensive testimony presented during the hearing on the motion to suppress. Having considered the totality of the circumstances, and not just the law of the case, the judge determined Owen's confession was admissible as voluntary. The trial court's ruling was not in error. We have held that [i]n reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, appellate courts must accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court's determination of the historical facts, but must independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine the constitutional issues. Moody v. State, 842 So.2d 754, 758 (Fla.2003), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 181, 157 L.Ed.2d 252, 2003 WL 21490026 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2003); see also Connor v. State, 803 So.2d 598, 608 (Fla.2001). Additionally, we have stated: To render a confession voluntary and admissible as evidence, the mind of the accused should at the time be free to act, uninfluenced by fear or hope. To exclude it as testimony, it is not necessary that any direct promises or threats be made to the accused. It is sufficient, if the attending circumstances, or declarations of those present, be calculated to delude the prisoner as to his true position, and exert an improper and undue influence over his mind. Simon v. State, 5 Fla. 285, 296 (1853). The test thus is one of voluntariness, or free will, which is to be determined by an examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding the confession. Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 964 (Fla. 1992). A review of the totality of the circumstances here, namely the evidence and testimony presented during the motion to suppress hearing, confirms the propriety of the trial court's ruling. Owen was not threatened or coerced into confessing, nor did the officers questioning him make any promises in exchange for his confession, as Owen asserts. Owen's testimony during the motion to suppress hearing alone supports the conclusion that the officers did not employ improper methods to obtain a statement from him. On direct examination, Owen acknowledged that the officers had told him on several occasions they could not make any promises, yet he asserted that he subjectively believed they could help him. Further, on cross-examination, Owen stated that he was advised of his constitutional rights perhaps fifteen to twenty times over the course of the interrogations. He admitted that he never asserted his right to remain silent at the time he was read his rights, and never invoked his right to an attorney. In fact, when asked, And you wanted to talk to the detectives and that's why you never invoked your right to remain silent or for an attorney; isn't that true? Owen responded, Absolutely. Owen also testified that during the 1984 questioning, Officer Wood, one of the law enforcement officers conducting the interrogations, never promised Owen that he would help him locate a doctor if he confessed. Additionally, Owen conceded that he knew Wood did not have the authority to make any deals with him. Owen also acknowledged that the officers never promised him that if he confessed he would be able to see a doctor or go to a hospital, although he argued that he felt it was indirectly implied. Analysis of the transcripts of the interrogation videotapes provides additional support for the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress. Owen was read his constitutional rights numerous times, and each time he indicated that he understood them. Although Officer McCoy, another law enforcement officer who interviewed Owen, told Owen that he would be able to obtain medical help for his mental health issues through the court system, it was clear that Owen understood that McCoy could not make him any promises. Owen himself said to McCoy, But still, like I said, you can't guarantee me nothing. You can't make any promises. On several subsequent occasions, Owen was told by the officers conducting the interviews that no promises or guarantees could be made. At one point during questioning on June 7, 1984, Owen proposed a dealif McCoy arranged for a visit between Owen and his brother, Owen would tell McCoy everything he wanted to know (pertaining to the Worden murder). Later that same day, McCoy again brought up the subject of the Worden murder, but Owen deflected the questioning and said he wanted to wait because they had a bargain. McCoy quickly clarified that they did not have a bargain. The record reflects that McCoy did tell Owen that he would bring Owen's brother to see him the following day. However, it is important to note that a confession was not evoked at that time. The following day, on June 8, Owen's brother was brought to visit with him. Prior to the meeting between the brothers, Wood made reference to the bargain Owen had made the previous day when he said to Owen, Is that what your deal was? Later that day, McCoy also made reference to the agreement when he said to Owen, You made a deal yesterday. I kept my half of the bargain. You can keep yours. Owen maintains that these statements support his contention that the officers made promises in exchange for his confession. However, Owen ignores the fact that it was he who initially offered the bargain, and that he did not confess after his brother was brought to him on June 8. In fact, it was not until three weeks later on June 21 that Owen confessed to the Slattery murder, totally unrelated to any alleged bargain. Additionally, any inference of a deal between Owen and McCoy pertained to the Worden murder, not in any way to the Slattery murder. Finally, a thorough reading of the transcript reveals no instances of threats or improper coercion by the officers. Owen was made fully aware of his constitutional rights, and knowingly and voluntarily confessed to the Slattery homicide on June 21, 1984. Clearly, based upon the evidence presented during the motion to suppress hearing, and the entire record of this case, Owen's confession was unquestionably voluntary, and, therefore, the trial court properly denied Owen's motion to suppress based upon this issue.