Opinion ID: 169762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Court's Acceptance of the Plea Agreement

Text: Ms. Smith argues that the District Court constructively rejected the plea agreement when it imposed the two-level upward adjustment for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 because the plea agreement did not provide notice that she may be subject to the adjustment. Consequently, she argues, the court was required to give her an opportunity to withdraw the plea before sentencing; because the court did not, the plea agreement is unenforceable. Ms. Smith's argument is inapposite. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure draw a distinction between those plea agreements that state that a specific sentence or sentencing range is appropriate or that certain provisions of the Guidelines will or will not apply, and those agreements that do not. Specifically, a statement in a plea agreement that a particular provision of the Sentencing Guidelines . . . does or does not apply binds the court once it accepts the plea agreement. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(C). In contrast, a plea agreement that does not so specify does not bind the district court to any particular sentencing range or recommendation. United States v. Herula, 464 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2006) (citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(B)). The plea agreement here does not specify a particular sentencing range, nor does it specify that certain Guidelines adjustments are or are not applicable. In fact, the plea agreement specifically recognizes that the sentence to be imposed will be determined solely by the United States District Judge and that [t]he defendant understands that if the court accepts this plea agreement but imposes a sentence with which the defendant does not agree, the defendant will not be permitted to withdraw this plea of guilty. As such, the District Court's application of the obstruction of justice adjustment does not operate as a rejection of the plea agreement, nor was the court required to give Ms. Smith an opportunity to withdraw her guilty plea because it applied an adjustment not specifically contemplated by the plea agreement. [3] Moreover, Ms. Smith's argument assumes the plea agreement must provide notice of every potential sentencing outcome before it can be enforceable. But we have explicitly rejected the notion that a defendant must know with specificity what result he forfeits before his waiver is valid. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1326-27 (citing United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629-30, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 153 L.Ed.2d 586 (2002)); see also United States v. Montano, 472 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir.2007) (citing cases and expressly declining to adopt a rule that an appeal waiver is unenforceable when defendant did not know at the time she entered the plea agreement what her sentencing range would be and that the resulting sentence was greater than anticipated).