Opinion ID: 755762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Exclusion of Alfredsdottir's Statement

Text: 68 Plaintiffs also contend that if we find the evidence insufficient we should remand for a new trial on the ground that the district court erred in not allowing them to introduce an out-of-court statement by Icelandair flight attendant Katrin Alfredsdottir. Alfredsdottir's statement was proffered through Rhonda Schwartz, a television news producer whose deposition testimony described a conversation she had with Alfredsdottir on an Icelandair flight in 1993 when Alfredsdottir observed her reading newspaper clippings about Erna and the girls. Schwartz testified that Alfredsdottir commented, 69 You know we helped sneak--snuck or smuggled, I really don't recall precisely--them out the back way or service entrance at Dulles Airport. 70 And I asked her Oh, were you involved in that? Do you know about this yourself? 71 And she said No, no, this is just a story that I have heard, and then she left. 72 Icelandair admitted that Alfredsdottir was an Icelandair flight attendant on Schwartz's 1993 flight and was a member of the crew on the flight that took Erna and Elizabeth to Iceland on May 1, 1992, and plaintiffs contend that Alfredsdottir's statement was a vicarious admission that should have been deemed nonhearsay under Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(D). For several reasons we see no error in its exclusion. 73 First, since the Schwartz deposition testimony was that Alfredsdottir stated she was repeating a story she had heard from someone else, double-hearsay analysis is required. The first level of inquiry is whether Schwartz's testimony as to what Alfredsdottir said is hearsay, and plaintiffs' vicarious-admission theory deals only with that first level. Even if Schwartz's testimony were deemed nonhearsay on the theory that statements by Alfredsdottir were attributable to Icelandair, however, the content of Alfredsdottir's statement was itself hearsay because, as  'a story that I have heard,'  it purported to describe statements made to her by others. No basis having been shown for classifying the statement attributed to the unidentified source of Alfredsdottir's statement either as nonhearsay or as an exception to the hearsay rule, the statement attributed to Alfredsdottir was properly excludable on the ground that it contained hearsay. See, e.g., Zaken v. Boerer, 964 F.2d 1319, 1324 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 467, 121 L.Ed.2d 375 (1992); Carden v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 850 F.2d 996, 1002-03 (3d Cir.1988). 74 Second, even if Alfredsdottir's statement neither was nor contained hearsay (and if by  'Dulles Airport'  she meant JFK Airport), its exclusion would provide no basis for a new trial, for it did not indicate that Icelandair knew that the reason for Erna's furtive flight was violation of a court order. Given the admitted evidence that Icelandair behaved in unorthodox fashion, from which it could easily be inferred that it knew Erna's flight was surreptitious, Alfredsdottir's reference to  'sneak[ing]'  Erna and the girls out would have added little. As discussed in Part II.A.3. above, evidence of surreptitious intent was insufficient since Icelandair had not received legally sufficient notice of the court order. Admission of Alfredsdottir's statement could not have cured that defect.