Opinion ID: 1057924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: De Facto Government

Text: A government de jure has been defined as one legally established and functional. Black's Law Dictionary 716 (8th ed.2004). A de facto government is one existing in fact, having effect even without a formal or legal basis. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 448, 6 S.Ct. 1121, 30 L.Ed. 178 (1886). While the de facto doctrine has not been applied in this state to a charter for a local governmental entity, this Court has applied the principle to public officials and, in particular, to judicial officers. In Bankston v. State, 908 S.W.2d 194, 196-97 (Tenn.1995), for example, we recognized that a judge acting under color of law and with the acquiescence of the litigants and the public qualifies as a judge in fact, whose rulings control regardless of whether his authority to act violated the constitution. Id. at 196. In that case, this Court disqualified a municipal judge from exercising concurrent jurisdiction over state criminal cases and from holding office because he was not elected in accordance with article VI, section 4 of the Tennessee Constitution. Id. at 198. We afforded legitimacy to his judgments, however, because the defendant had failed to challenge his authority to act in either the municipal court or on direct appeal. Id. Our Court specifically approved the language of the United States Supreme Court in Norton : The doctrine which gives validity to acts of officers de facto, whatever defects there may be in the legality of their appointment or election, is founded upon considerations of policy or necessity, for the protection of the public and individuals whose interests may be affected thereby. Offices are created for the benefit of the public. . . . For the good order and peace of society their authority is to be respected and obeyed until in some regular mode prescribed by law their title is investigated and determined. It is manifest that endless confusion would result if in every proceeding before such officers their title could be called in question. Id. at 196-97 (quoting Norton, 118 U.S. at 441-42, 6 S.Ct. 1121) (emphasis added). The doctrine of de facto officers had become a part of Tennessee jurisprudence by 1848. In Bates v. Dyer, 28 Tenn. (9 Hum.) 162 (1848), this Court made the following observations about the actions of a sheriff who lacked eligibility to serve: At the time the deed was executed . . . Newman was the acting sheriff of the county under an election made in due form; and although he was, at the time of his election, ineligible on account of his defalcation, yet this does not avoid his acts done as sheriff before his election was annulled by the proper authority; previous to that event, though he was not sheriff de jure, yet he was de facto; and, from public necessity, the acts of a public officer, exercising his office de facto, though not de jure, are valid as to third persons, and cannot be controverted in a collateral issue such as this. Id. at 163; see also Att'y Gen. v. Leaf, 28 Tenn. (9 Hum.) 753, 755-56 (1849); C.D. Venable & Co. v. Curd, 39 Tenn. (2 Head) 582, 585-86 (1859); Blackburn v. State, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 690, 691 (1859). In City of Nashville v. Thompson, this Court again invoked the de facto doctrine: A person inducted into an office according to the forms of law is an officer de facto, although incompetent by the provisions of the Constitution to hold the office, and his competency cannot be [i]nquired into by the parties affected by his acts. . . . [H]is official acts [are] valid and binding, until he is removed in the manner prescribed by law. 80 Tenn. 344, 347-50 (1883). In Beaver v. Hall, 142 Tenn. 416, 217 S.W. 649 (1920), this Court applied the de facto concept to uphold the rulings of a court despite a subsequent declaration of invalidity: We believe that the same consideration of public policy that led the courts to adopt the de facto doctrine as a means of protecting the rights of the public who deal with officers acting under color of authority should be invoked in this case to protect the acts of a tribunal organized under an act of the Legislature, apparently valid, until there has been a judicial determination of the invalidity of such a court. Id. at 654. In Shoup Voting Mach. Corp. v. Hamilton County, 178 Tenn. 14, 152 S.W.2d 1029 (1941), this Court, relying on its decision in State ex rel. Roberts v. Hart, 106 Tenn. 269, 61 S.W. 780 (1901), a case in which a school board was held to be a de facto organization whose acts were not subject to collateral challenge, found that the mere participation of an ineligible member on the quarterly county court could not deprive the agency of the status of a de facto body. 152 S.W.2d at 1031. The following observation is particularly instructive: A county is a corporation . . . the people being likened to the stockholders, and the justices of the peace to the directors or managing officers of a private corporation. In case of private corporations, the law has been thus stated:  Persons who hold office as directors . . . with the consent of the corporation, and under color of an election or appointment, are de facto officers, although their election or appointment may have been illegal and their acts as such, in so far as third person are concerned, are just as valid and binding upon the corporation as if they were officers de jure.  Id. (quoting 3 Clark and Marshall on Corporations, 2035 (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). This Court held that while [a] public corporation like a county is not to be dealt with as a private corporation in all respects[,] there was no reason to rule that a public corporation [like Hamilton County] should be held to have made a contract which those, recognized by it as its lawful agents, declined to adopt. Id. at 1032. In consequence, the third party's collateral challenge to the validity of the legislative body was dismissed. Id. In Kidd v. McCanless, 200 Tenn. 273, 292 S.W.2d 40 (1956), this Court considered whether the de facto doctrine could be applied to maintain members of the General Assembly in office in view of the invalidity of the apportionment statute. The Court held that there can be a de facto body or office . . . until there has been a judicial determination of the invalidity of same. Id. at 43. As recently as 1995, this Court addressed the de facto doctrine in State ex rel. Newsom v. Biggers, 911 S.W.2d 715, 716 (1995), upholding a sentence imposed by a municipal court judge who had been elected to a term shorter than that mandated by article VI, section 4 of our constitution. The Court quoted with approval the language in Martin v. Dowling, 204 Tenn. 34, 315 S.W.2d 397 (1958): The judicial acts of one in possession of a judicial office created and in existence by law, under color of right, assuming and exercising the functions of such office with a good-faith belief in his right to exercise his authority, invoked and acquiesced in by the parties, the bar, court officials and the public, are those of a de facto officer. Biggers, 911 S.W.2d at 718 (quoting Martin, 315 S.W.2d at 399). Other states have specifically applied the de facto doctrine in circumstances involving local governments. For example, in Bowman v. City of Moorhead, 228 Minn. 35, 36 N.W.2d 7 (1949), the Supreme Court of Minnesota determined that the home rule charter of a city had several irregularities, including the failure of publication in accordance with the state constitution. Id. at 8. That court determined that a public corporation exists as a de facto body when there is (1) Some law under which a corporation with powers assumed might lawfully have been created; (2) A colorable and bona fide attempt to perfect an organization under such a law; (3) User of the rights claimed to have been conferred by the law. 36 N.W.2d at 9. This rule, which was applicable to private corporations, was applied equally to a public corporation. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court stressed the importance of stability and certainty in local governmental matters and emphasized the need to avoid the severe consequences which might follow, such as the issuance of governmental bonds, absent the application of the doctrine. Id. Several states have followed the course of Minnesota in the recognition of a de facto public corporation. See Cherry v. City of Hayti Heights, 563 S.W.2d 72 (Mo. 1978) [8] ; Fox v. Personnel Appeal Bd. of City of Cranston, 99 R.I. 566, 209 A.2d 447 (1965); Stroiney v. Crescent Lake Tax Dist., 205 Conn. 290, 533 A.2d 208 (1987); City of Bethany v. Mason, 202 Okla. 66, 210 P.2d 353 (1949); Smith v. City of Emporia, 168 Kan. 187, 211 P.2d 101 (1949); Clemens v. Pinehurst Water Dist., 81 Idaho 213, 339 P.2d 665 (1959). Even in quo warranto actions where a state, because of the defects in the incorporation process, has challenged a local governmental entity, courts have typically refused to nullify governmental actions based upon the rationale that whatever the legislative body had the power to do, it could ratify based upon a period of recognition of the improperly organized entity. State ex rel. Young v. Village of Harris, Chisago County, 102 Minn. 340, 113 N.W. 887, 888 (1907). Ergo, the state, after a period of acquiescence and recognition of a local governmental entity, may be precluded from challenging the lawful existence of that entity. The equitable principle of estoppel is often warranted by these circumstances. City of Winter Haven v. State ex rel. Landis, 125 Fla. 392, 170 So. 100, 108 (1936); see also State ex rel. Dawson, Att'y Gen. v. City of Harper, 94 Kan. 478, 146 P. 1169 (1915); and People ex rel. Kidd v. Crowley, 250 Ill. 282, 95 N.E. 192 (1911). Since 1990, the county executive/mayor and the Knox County Commission, acting pursuant to the charter adopted by referendum in 1988, have conducted the affairs of the community. The county commission has enacted numerous ordinances and resolutions relating to the county pension plan, purchasing and procurement, personnel policies and procedures, air quality management, codes administration, zoning, a special fire district, and a myriad of other matters. In 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006, the voters of Knox County cast ballots not only for the executive or the mayor and commissioners but also for the offices of trustee, sheriff, register of deeds, and county clerk. They voted for a property assessor in 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004. Without specific precedent in the law, it was not unreasonable for the voters to assume that all of these offices existed as part of their county government. As the result of their election, the constitutional officers have exercised the traditional duties of their offices by, among other things, collecting taxes, assessing property values for tax purposes, keeping records, issuing business and marriage licenses, registering and licensing motor vehicles, depositing revenue, preserving the peace, keeping the jail, securing the courthouse, serving warrants, and registering deeds. Under the circumstances, while we agree with the chancellor that Knox County's failure to comply with the enabling legislation for the charter rendered the charter invalid, we find it sufficient that there was a colorable and bona fide attempt to perfect an organization under [the applicable enabling legislation]. Bowman, 36 N.W.2d at 9. We therefore hold that the Knox County charter established a de facto form of government, effective September 1, 1990. Under this equitable doctrine, the Knox County government has had a valid existence. Moreover, its elected officials, as de facto officers, have exercised the traditional duties of their offices. See Country Clubs, Inc. v. City of Knoxville, 217 Tenn. 104, 395 S.W.2d 789, 793 (1965). The county executive/mayor and commission, expressly addressed in the charter, have been duly elected and have served in an official capacity without challenge for years. Although not specifically retained by the language of the alternate form charter, other elected officials, identified in the state constitution or otherwise prescribed by statute, have served without challenge for as many as sixteen years. The public has acquiesced in the acts of the officers for such a length of time as to establish the presumption of colorable right to the offices. Ridout v. State, 161 Tenn. 248, 30 S.W.2d 255, 257 (1930). The county officials identified in our state constitution have been elected and re-elected by the people; they have served in the traditional roles of their respective offices; and the services they have performed qualify as essential to the Knox County government.