Opinion ID: 171981
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alleged Bias by the District Court

Text: Defendants contend that the district court's bias requires reversal of their convictions. The district court rejected the claim, ruling that its comments during trial had been aimed at courtroom administration and did not suggest a belief in the Defendants' guilt. Defendants appear to be presenting two types of bias claims: (1) the judge deprived Defendants of a fair trial by conveying to the jury that he favored the prosecution, and (2) the judge should have recused himself because his impartiality might reasonably [have] be[en] questioned, 28 U.S.C. § 455. See United States v. Donato, 99 F.3d 426, 434 (D.C.Cir.1996) (per curiam) (distinguishing statutory case[s], where the claim [i]s that the trial judge should have recused himself under § 455, from cases in which the defendant claims that the district court judge displayed such bias against her and her attorney that she did not receive a fair trial.). It is often unclear in Defendants' appellate briefs which claim is being argued when a particular event or ruling is discussed. We need not decide precisely what claims are being raised, however, because we find no reversible error even if we apply both theories to all the relevant conduct complained of. We begin with the claim that the trial judge conveyed to the jury that he favored the prosecution. When presented with such a claim, our task is not to determine whether the trial judge's conduct left something to be desired, or even whether some comments would have been better left unsaid, but rather to determine whether the judge's behavior was so prejudicial that it denied [the defendant] a fair, as opposed to perfect, trial. Thus we examine the record to determine if jurors have been impressed with the trial judge's partiality to one side to the point that this became a factor in their determination. United States v. Deters, 184 F.3d 1253, 1256 (10th Cir.1999) (citation, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Pisani, 773 F.2d 397, 402 (2d Cir.1985) (defining the inquiry as whether the trial judge's conduct has improperly tipped the balance of the trial against the defendant.). We are unpersuaded that any statements by the trial judge in the jury's presence would have suggested to the jury that the judge favored the prosecution. We review the statements individually, but even considered cumulatively they display no favoritism and did not deprive Defendants of a fair trial. First, Defendants complain of the following question asked of the jury panel at voir dire: If you were to serve as a juror in this case, would you be affected in any way if evidence is presented during the course of this trial that showed that these defendants were investigated for other possible crimes or criminal activity but that no indictments were returned regarding such crimes or criminal activity? Specifically would such evidence of other matters being investigated lead you to believe that because they were investigated for crimes not alleged in the indictment, that they were guilty of the crimes alleged in the indictment or that they are not guilty of the crimes alleged in the indictment because they were not indicted for other crimes investigated? R. Vol. VII Doc. 190 at 92-93. This question strikes us as perfectly neutral. It hardly suggests that the judge believed that Defendants were more likely to be guilty because they had been investigated. Defendants' second complaint concerns the judge's scolding of Ms. Erickson's attorney for speaking too fast during closing argument. At one point the judge said [S]low down. If I have to tell you again, I am going to put a finger in front of you and go like this and let you speak to it. Id. Vol. XI Doc. 194 at 615. But the judge made clear that his motive was not hostility toward counsel but concern that the court reporter could not take down everything that was being said. And Defendants do not dispute that counsel was in fact speaking too fast. Indeed, after being chastised the first time by the judge, counsel responded: I'll try and slow down. That's always been a problem for me. I had a high school teacher yell at me that if I wanted to be a lawyer, I better learn to slow down. I never did listen to him. Id. at 597. We have no doubt that the jury would not have perceived the judge's warnings as showing any bias against Defendants. Third, Defendants complain of occasions during closing argument when the judge sustained objections to defense counsels' statements on the ground that they were asserting facts not supported by the evidence at trial. Defendants do not challenge the propriety of sustaining the objections and, in any event, such a challenge would fail. Rather, they focus on what the judge said in making the rulings. One comment to the jury that they challenge was: [M]y view of the evidence and Mr. Weiss's view of the evidence is not what counts, it is your view of the evidence. R. Vol. XI Doc. 194 at 629. They fault the statement for saying that only the views of the judge and Mr. Weiss (counsel for Mr. Mitchell) did not countomitting any reference to the prosecutor's view and thereby indicating that what the prosecutor said did count, Erickson Aplt. Br. at 46. We doubt that a juror would so interpret the remark. Surely Defendants would not suggest that the judge was implying that the views of Ms. Erickson's attorney (who, like the prosecutor, was not explicitly mentioned by the judge) counted. A second challenge has more substance. In sustaining the prosecutor's objection to a statement by Mr. Mitchell's attorney, the court said to the jury: Ladies and gentlemen, disregard what Mr. Weiss has just said. There is no evidence. Very inappropriate, Mr. Weiss. R. Vol. XI Doc. 194 at 637. Perhaps this language suggested anger, or at least impatience, with Mr. Weiss; but we can presume that jurors are capable of distinguishing between a judge's view of particular behavior by counsel and the judge's view of the merits of the case. See United States v. DiTommaso, 817 F.2d 201, 220 (2d Cir. 1987), ([R]eversal is not mandated where... rebukes of defense counsel reflected not upon the merits of the case but rather on the way it was being handled.). Moreover, the judge's chastising of counsel during trial was not one-sided. On three occasions during the prosecutor's examination of witnesses (twice without prompting by a defense objection), the court instructed the prosecutor not to testify when asking questions. R. Vol. IX Doc. 192 at 163, 266; Id. Vol. XI Doc. 194 at 520. And during the prosecutor's closing argument the court sustained a defense objection that the prosecutor had mischaracterized an argument made by Mr. Mitchell's counsel, saying, The point Mr. Weiss is making, however, is ... you just represented something he said. I agree, he did not say what you just represented. Id. at 648. Finally, Defendants complain of comments by the judge regarding their opening the door by asking certain questions. On the first occasion, after defense counsel had elicited from CPA Foley that his audit of USSD for 1999 had not uncovered irregularities, the prosecutor said: Your Honor, it's going to be our position now that the door has been opened into the other areas, and the judge responded I would agree. Id. Vol. X Doc. 193 at 419-20. On the second occasion, after Wendy Lewis, defense counsel for Ms. Erickson, asked USSD attorney Reading whether he had had conversations ... regarding whether or not Mr. Mitchell or Ms. Erickson were targets of the grand jury investigation, the prosecutor said, Your Honor, I object, and the judge responded, Ms. Lewis, if you prevail in this question you will be opening a door that will be swung far wider than you want. Id. at 470. We fail to see how the judge's statement on the first occasion would convey to the jury any bias in favor of the prosecution. As for the second statement, Defendants argue that the judge's comment suggested that they had something to hide and were trying to conceal evidence from the jury. Although we doubt that the judge's comment conveyed to the jury that he favored the government, Defendants' complaint has some force and we address on the merits whether the comment denied them a fair trial. In our view, it would have been better practice if the judge had saved the comment for a bench conference. But there was nothing extraordinary here that would require a new trial. Whenever an attorney objects to evidence, the jury could infer that the attorney has something to hide. Without disregarding the potential impact of the judge's comment, we note that in this instance it was the prosecutor who objected, which signaled to the jury that he did not want the question answeredthat is, he was trying to hide something. Because the risk of improper jury inferences from objections by counsel and rulings by the court is inherent in any trial, it is customary for the court to instruct the jury on the matter at the outset of trial. The district court did so here, saying: Certain things are not evidence and must not be considered by you. I will list them now. First, statements, arguments and questions by lawyers are not evidence. Second, objections to questions are not evidence. Lawyers have an obligation to their clients to make an objection when they believe evidence being offered is improper under the rules of evidence. You should not be influenced by the objection or the Court's ruling on it. If the objection is sustained, ignore the question. If it is overruled, treat the answer like any other. If you are instructed that some item of evidence is received for a limited purpose only, you must follow that instruction. Id. Vol. VII Doc. 190 at 128. At the close of evidence, the judge again instructed the jury on these points: The Court did not by any words uttered during the trial, and the Court does not by these instructions give or intimate, or wish to be understood by you as giving or intimating, any opinions as to what has or has not been proven in this case, nor as to what are or are not the facts in this case. ... It is the duty of the attorney on each side of the case to object when the other side offers testimony or other evidence which the attorney believes is not properly admissible. You should not show prejudice against an attorney or his client because the attorney has made objections. Upon allowing testimony or other evidence to be introduced over the objection of any attorney, the Court does not, unless expressly stated, indicate any opinion as to the weight or effect of any such evidence. As stated before, the jurors are the sole judges of the credibility of all witnesses and the weight and effect of all evidence. When the Court has sustained an objection to a question addressed to a witness, the jury must disregard the question entirely, and may draw no inference from the wording of it or speculate as to what the witness might have said if he or she had been permitted to answer the question. ... Your verdict must be based solely upon the evidence received in the case. Nothing you have seen or read outside of court may be considered. Nothing that I have said or done during the course of this trial is intended in any way to somehow suggest to you what I think your verdict should be. Nothing said in these instructions and nothing in any form of verdict prepared for your convenience is to suggest or convey to you in any way or manner any intimation as to what verdict I think you should return. What the verdict shall be is the exclusive duty and responsibility of the jury. As I have told you many times, you are the sole judges of the facts. Id. Vol. II Doc. 109 at 11-12, 44, 46-47. In light of these instructionswhich juries are presumed to follow, see United States v. Meridyth, 364 F.3d 1181, 1184 (10th Cir.2004)we hold that the judge's comments in the jury's presence did not deny Defendants a fair trial. See United States v. Harrison, 296 F.3d 994, 1007 (10th Cir. 2002) (rejecting judicial-misconduct claim in part because judge instructed jury that it should not infer from his conduct that he had any opinion on the issues before the jury). We now turn to Defendants' claim that the trial judge's bias required recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455. The issue before us is whether sufficient factual grounds exist to cause a reasonable, objective person, knowing all the relevant facts, to question the judge's impartiality. United States v. Pearson, 203 F.3d 1243, 1277 (10th Cir.2000). The factual grounds relied upon by Defendants all concern the conduct of the trial itself. Such evidence ordinarily will not suffice to establish bias warranting recusal. As the Supreme Court has stated: [J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.... [They] can only in the rarest circumstances evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required for recusal. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994). And [a] judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administrationeven a stern and short-tempered judge's ordinary efforts at courtroom administrationremain immune. Id. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147. [E]xpressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display do not support a bias challenge unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Id. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147. Our examination of the matters raised in Defendants' briefs (including statements by the judge outside the jury's presence) reveals that the district judge's conduct fell far short of the sort of impropriety that would support reversal for failure to recuse under § 455. The district court did not err in denying Defendants' motion for a new trial on the ground of bias.