Opinion ID: 797989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Petitioners' Procedural History

Text: 3 Leroy Blake entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1987. Five years later he pleaded guilty in New York state court to first degree sexual abuse of a minor. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.65(3). He was sentenced to five years of probation. 4 In August 1999, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) served Blake with a notice to appear in immigration court. 1 The notice asserted his deportability for commission of an aggravated felony after admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), to wit, murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor, id. § 1101(a)(43)(A). The Immigration Judge (IJ) found sufficient proof of Blake's conviction and held him ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver, under the supposition that Congress retroactively repealed the statute. Blake appealed to the BIA, who ordered a remand after INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 121 S.Ct. 2271, 150 L.Ed.2d 347 (2001), where the Supreme Court held Congress did not intend a retroactive repeal of § 212(c), id. at 326, 121 S.Ct. 2271. 5 Considering the merits of Blake's claim on remand, the IJ granted him a § 212(c) waiver of deportation. The INS appealed to the BIA. The BIA, agreeing with the INS, issued a published decision holding Blake ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver for lack of a counterpart ground of exclusion. See In re Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722, 729 (B.I.A.2005). Blake sought reconsideration, claiming the BIA failed to apply the rule of lenity to § 212(c). The BIA denied his motion in July 2005. Review before this Court followed.
6 Ho Yoon Chong entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1979. Some time between 1993 and 1994, he pleaded guilty to one count of federal racketeering. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York sentenced him to five years of probation and other conditions not relevant here. 7 In July 1998, the INS served Ho Yoon Chong with a notice to appear in immigration court. The notice asserted his deportability for commission of an aggravated felony after admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because his offense related to racketeering, id. § 1101(a)(43)(J). The IJ found sufficient evidence of his conviction and held him ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver, believing the statute had been repealed retroactively. The BIA remanded the matter after St. Cyr. 8 On remand, the IJ held Ho Yoon Chong ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver because his ground of deportation lacked a comparable ground of exclusion. Ho Yoon Chong appealed to the BIA in October 2002. The BIA summarily affirmed the IJ's decision in December 2004. Ho Yoon Chong timely sought review with this Court.
9 Errol Foster entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1981. In September 1990, he entered a guilty plea in New York state court to first degree manslaughter, see N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20(1), and was sentenced to a term of six to eighteen years in prison. 10 In May 2000, the INS served Foster with a notice to appear in immigration court. The notice charged him with deportation as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony after admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because he committed a crime of violence, id. § 1101(a)(43)(F). The IJ held Foster ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver because he had served more than five years of his sentence. Foster appealed to the BIA. The BIA, relying on Buitrago-Cuesta v. INS, 7 F.3d 291 (2d Cir. 1993), affirmed the IJ's decision in March 2001. 2 On appeal, we dismissed Foster's appeal for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.2004). 11 While our decision in that case was pending, Foster filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. He also filed a motion to reopen with the BIA under the DHS's newly promulgated regulations. See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3. In July 2005, the BIA denied Foster's motion to reopen, finding him ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver because his ground of deportation lacked a counterpart ground of exclusion. See id. § 1212.3(f)(5). Foster's petition for habeas corpus and his petition seeking review of the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen were consolidated before this Court.
12 Aundre Singh entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident in 1979. Seven years later he entered a guilty plea in New York state court to murder in the second degree. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25. The court sentenced him to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of no less than 20 years. 13 The INS served Singh with a notice to appear in immigration court in November 1997. The notice charged his deportability as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony after admission, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), because he had a murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor conviction, id. § 1101(a)(43)(A). The IJ held Singh ineligible for a § 212(c) waiver under the supposition that Congress retroactively repealed § 212(c). Singh appealed to the BIA, arguing his murder conviction predated the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 (ADAA), Pub.L. No. 100-690, 102 Stat. 4181 (1988), and thus could not form the basis of his deportation. 3 The BIA was not persuaded. 14 Singh filed a motion to reopen with the BIA in September 2003, arguing for a § 212(c) waiver under St. Cyr. The BIA denied his motion, finding it time-barred and choosing not to reopen his petition sua sponte. Singh filed another motion for reconsideration, which the BIA denied because Singh served more than five years in prison. Singh again filed a motion to reopen, which was again rejected by the BIA, this time for exceeding the time and numerical limitations on motions to reopen, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). Undeterred, he filed another motion to reopen in January 2005, arguing that the DHS regulations promulgated after St. Cyr rendered him eligible for a § 212(c) waiver. See 8 C.F.R. § 1212.3(f). In April 2005, the BIA denied his motion, citing Blake, 23 I. & N. Dec. 722. Singh filed one more motion to reconsider with the BIA, which was denied. 15 In May 2005, Singh filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, which was transferred to this Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5). He also filed a petition for review of the BIA's April 2005 decision with this Court. The two were consolidated for review in this Court. 16