Opinion ID: 146367
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause

Text: I disagree that the relatively thin justification for probable cause in the affidavit contains enough to support a finding of probable cause, Majority Op. at 308, because I believe that the affidavit does not contain a totality of facts to provide a reasonable basis for the belief that evidence of a marijuana grow operation, or any continuing marijuana sales, would be found at the Taz Hyde property. Even assuming that the affidavit contains enough information to support the confidential informant's veracity and reliability for providing drug-related informationa point on which the majority and I disagreethe majority opinion dodges the difficult question of how the issuing magistrate could independently determine that the confidential informant is tied to the marijuana community to be able to make a reliable statement regarding Thomas's reputation or that the information the confidential informant provided constituted specific evidence of a grow operation rather than just vague, isolated sales. Although significant corroboration could bolster the confidential informant's tip, I cannot agree that the police corroborated significant parts of the informant's story, Majority Op. at 307, especially given the rather simple nature of the tipthe direct observation of three discrete sales outside the home, without more (including timing, frequency, quantity, or type), and the bald assertion that Thomas had a reputation as a grower. The affidavit gives no indication of how the confidential informant came to know of Thomas as a grower rather than just a sellerAgent Hardcastle's knowledge of the confidential informant's connections in the Nashville marijuana community was not provided in the affidavit. [1] Aside from the vague electrical-usage records, the majority opinion relies on very weak corroboration-the mere fact that Thomas lived at the address the informant provided does not indicate that any sales had occurred there or that any other activities had happened there that bolstered the tip. See United States v. Higgins, 557 F.3d 381, 390 (6th Cir.) ([N]or did the police corroborate any of the informant's statements beyond the innocent fact that Higgins lived at the stated location and the irrelevant (to the determination of whether Higgins's house contained evidence of a present-day crime) fact that Higgins had a criminal record.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 817, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009). Thus, the only remaining piece of corroboration for the tip is the electrical-usage records, which this court has held cannot form the sole basis of probable cause. See United States v. Zimmer, 14 F.3d 286, 287-89 (6th Cir.1994) (holding that the thermal imager, the electric bills, the unrelated officer's visit [to the house at which time he smelled marijuana], etc. were enough to establish probable cause even without the questionable confidential informant's statements); United States v. Thomas, Nos. 92-6207, 92-6208, 1993 WL 337553, at  (6th Cir. Aug.31, 1993) (unpublished opinion) (looking to the unusual pattern of high and steady electrical usage with little seasonal variation, the highly specific and largely corroborated informant tips that a grow operation was present, and evidence of activity consistent with a marijuana growing operation, including the purchase of the growing supplies and the ventilator rotating in calm air), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1004, 114 S.Ct. 1370, 128 L.Ed.2d 47 (1994). The confidential informant's simple tip here combined with only the electrical-usage records does not compare with what this court has previously required, and I disagree with the majority's assertion that reliance on the electrical-usage records as the [m]ore important[] piece of corroboration, Majority Op. at 308, compensates for what is otherwise weak evidence tying a marijuana grow operation to Thomas's residence. Indeed, without more to tie Thomas's residence to a marijuana grow operation, the staleness analysis is flawedalthough the majority opinion notes that evidence of a grow operation is not subject to becoming stale based on the nature of the crime, Majority Op. at 309-10, it does not wrestle with the problem that the confidential informant did not actually provide information about a grow other than the reputation statement. The staleness analysis is based entirely on the electrical-usage records, but the sole information that the electrical-usage records could refresh would be the reputation statement, which was the singular statement that could actually tie Thomas to a growing operation rather than merely a sale. Of the two electrical-usage cases on which the majority opinion relies for its staleness analysis, neither Zimmer nor Thomas rely on electrical usage to refresh otherwise stale information rather than merely to corroborate. Even assuming the electrical-usage records refreshed the reputation statement, under the staleness cases on which the majority opinion relies the reputation statement here is not sufficient to support probable cause. See United States v. Greany, 929 F.2d 523, 525 (9th Cir.1991) (When the evidence sought is of an ongoing criminal business of a necessarily long-term nature, such as marijuana growing, rather than that of a completed act, greater lapses of time are permitted if the evidence in the affidavit shows the probable existence of the activity at an earlier time.  (emphasis added)). In Greany, a named informant provided information, included in the affidavit, that he personally had been involved in setting up a grow operation at the defendant's home one and one-half to two years earlier, and the informant had just been found to have grow equipment in his own home that had not been used for three years. Id. at 524-25. In Thomas, an unpublished opinion, this court relied on a similarly highly specific, largely corroborated tip about a marijuana grow operation. Thomas, 1993 WL 337553, at . I cannot agree that five months of electrical-usage records can sufficiently refresh and corroborate a vague, eight-month-old tip. Therefore, I conclude that the evidence presented in the affidavit when viewed together and in its totality is insufficient to support a reasonable belief that probable cause existed and that the affidavit is invalid on its face because the readily apparent holes in the information provided cannot provide a totality of facts that support probable cause. [2] See United States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765, 771-72 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that informant's five-month-old tip that dope was actually present on defendant's property was not stale because the crime of drug trafficking is ongoing, the defendant's location is established, the drugs were likely to be there for an indefinite period of time, and the place to be searched constituted a secure operational base, but that the informant's tip was vague, not obviously reliable, and entirely unsupported by any independent investigation on the part of the police, making it insufficient to establish probable cause on its own); United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265, 271 (6th Cir.2002) (Moore, J., concurring) (noting that affidavit with named informant who personally observed marijuana grow operation within twenty-four hours of warrant issuance and who drove by residence with officer after providing tip presented under precedent a close case where police corroborated only wholly innocent facts), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 908, 123 S.Ct. 2261, 156 L.Ed.2d 121 (2003); United States v. Ferguson, 252 Fed.Appx. 714, 720-21 & n. 4 (6th Cir. 2007) (unpublished opinion) (upholding, under precedent, probable cause determination with general informant tip corroborated by innocent facts based in part on significant level of prior and accurate assistance in the past).