Opinion ID: 3163887
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Photograph of the Defendant

Text: At trial, the State sought to introduce a photograph of the defendant that depicted him smoking a cigarette, wearing a closely-fitted knit cap, and wearing a t-shirt displaying a picture of a sword and a skull, and the word “Redemption.” The photograph also showed tattoos on the defendant’s arms. The defendant objected, arguing that the photograph was not relevant and was unfairly prejudicial. The State asserted that the photograph was necessary to its explanation of why the victim did not call the police immediately following the assaults. The State maintained that the victim was afraid of the defendant and, thus, wanted to use the photograph to show the jury that the defendant was “a big scary guy.” The court ruled that the photograph was inadmissible because the victim never testified that the defendant’s “style” scared her, the jury could see that the defendant was a “big guy” without the photograph, and the t-shirt the defendant was wearing in the photograph was prejudicial. Subsequently, however, the court allowed the State to introduce a redacted copy of the photograph with the defendant’s t-shirt and arm tattoos blacked out. The State showed the redacted photograph to D.L. during his direct examination and appears to have referenced the photograph in its closing argument. The defendant argues that the redacted photograph had no probative value and was unfairly prejudicial. The State argues that this issue was not preserved for our review because although the defendant objected to admission of the photograph before its redaction, he did not specifically object to the admission of the redacted photograph. It also asserts that admission of the redacted photograph was not error, but, even if it was error, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the purposes of this appeal, we assume, without deciding, that the defendant has preserved this issue for our review. We need not decide whether admission of the redacted photograph was erroneous because we agree with the State that any error was harmless. See State v. Ramsey, 166 N.H. 45, 47-48 (2014) (applying harmless error review to admission of evidence assumed to be in violation of the New Hampshire Rules of Evidence and State and Federal Confrontation Clauses). “An error is harmless only if it is determined, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the verdict was not affected by the error.” State v. Wells, 166 N.H. 73, 82 (2014) (quotation omitted). The State bears the burden of proving that an error 10 is harmless. Id. “An error may be harmless if the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt is of an overwhelming nature, quantity or weight and if the inadmissible evidence is merely cumulative or inconsequential in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt.” Id. (quotation omitted). “In determining whether an error was harmless, we consider the alternative evidence presented at trial as well as the character of the inadmissible evidence.” Id. (quotation omitted). Here, for the jury to convict the defendant of the aggravated felonious sexual assault charge, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he “knowingly engaged in sexual penetration of [the victim] through concealment or by the element of surprise by digital penetration of her genital opening before she had an adequate chance to flee or resist because she was asleep in bed at the time.” See RSA 632-A:2, I(i). The alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt on this charge included the victim’s testimony describing the sexual assault and her husband’s corroborating testimony. It also included the defendant’s own statements in which he sought a “pass” and apologized for his behavior. See People v. Grathler, 858 N.E.2d 937, 943 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006) (a defendant’s apologies to victim could be construed as demonstrating his consciousness of guilt). The alternative evidence also included the Facebook messages stating: “I almost did the landlord’s wife. Her husband walked in”; “she’s trying to play hard to get, Bro, I’m gonna get mines”; and “He came home from work and walked right in.” As to the simple assault charges, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant “did knowingly cause unprivileged physical contact to [the victim] by grabbing her buttocks” and “by grabbing her breasts.” See RSA 631:2-a. With respect to these charges, the alternative evidence included the victim’s testimony describing the assaults. It also included D.L.’s testimony that he saw the defendant, who was rubbing the victim’s neck, go “from the [victim’s] neck down [her] arms to her chest down to her butt.” D.L. further testified that while this was occurring, the victim “was telling [the defendant] . . . stop, don’t touch me.” Finally, for the jury to convict the defendant of the criminal trespass charge, the State had to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he “knowingly entered and remained in a bedroom in a residence . . . an occupied structure adapted for the overnight accommodation of persons therein in defiance of an order to leave which was personally communicated to him by [the victim] the owner or other authorized person.” See RSA 635:2. With regard to this charge, the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt included the victim’s testimony that she told the defendant to leave the bedroom after he “demanded the iPad.” She also testified that she told him to “[g]et out” after he “popped the lock” on the bedroom door and asked for the telephone. She stated that, over the course of the evening she told the defendant to get out of her bedroom “between . . . eight and eleven times,” and that after the last time she did not 11 invite him to come in. Both the victim and her husband testified that the defendant returned to the bedroom around 2:00 a.m. on February 4. Given the overwhelming nature of the alternative evidence of the defendant’s guilt, and the cumulative and inconsequential nature of the redacted photograph in relation to the strength of the State’s evidence of guilt, we conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the photograph did not affect the verdict. Thus, any error was harmless. Affirmed. DALIANIS, C.J., and HICKS, LYNN, and BASSETT, JJ., concurred. 12