Opinion ID: 1814635
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A. Scope of Restitution under the Crime Victim's Rights Act

Text: The prosecutor argues that the Court of Appeals erred in vacating the sentencing court's restitution order. He argues that the plain language of the Crime Victim's Rights Act, specifically M.C.L. § 780.766(2); M.S.A. § 28.1287(766)(2), authorizes the sentencing court to order criminal defendants to pay restitution to all victims, even if those specific losses were not the factual predicate for the conviction. We agree. It is the primary rule of statutory construction that the plain language of the statute be enforced. Lorencz v. Ford Motor Co., 439 Mich. 370, 376, 483 N.W.2d 844 (1992), criticized on other grounds in Gross v. General Motors Corp., 448 Mich. 147, 164, 528 N.W.2d 707 (1995), City of Lansing v. Lansing Twp., 356 Mich. 641, 648-650, 97 N.W.2d 804 (1959). M.C.L. § 780.766(2); M.S.A. § 28.1287(766)(2), in effect at the time of defendant's sentencing, provided: The court, when sentencing a defendant convicted of a crime, may[ [6] ] order, in addition to or in lieu of any other penalty authorized by law or in addition to any other penalty required by law, that the defendant make restitution to any victim[ [7] ] of the defendant's course of conduct which gives rise to the conviction.... As is apparent, the statute clearly states restitution may be ordered with respect to any victim. The remaining question is whether course of conduct should be given a broad or narrow construction. The history of that phrase as it came to be used in the Crime Victim's Rights Act demonstrates that it should be given a broad construction to encompass the restitution order at issue here. [8] Initially, this phrase appeared in cases addressing the proper scope of restitution ordered as a condition of probation pursuant to M.C.L. § 771.3(2); M.S.A. § 28.1133(2). That statute provided [9] : As a condition of probation, the court may require the probationer to do 1 or more of the following: ... Pay restitution to the victim.... Cases arose under this statute where trial courts ordered criminal defendants to pay restitution that exceeded the losses attributable to the specific charges that resulted in the defendant's conviction. As in the present case, these defendants claimed the restitution orders were improper. Our courts determined that such restitution orders were appropriate because principles of justice required that the defendant pay back the entire amount obtained by his course of criminal conduct. People v. Seda-Ruiz, 87 Mich.App. 100, 103, 273 N.W.2d 602 (1978). See also People v. Nawrocki, 8 Mich.App. 225, 154 N.W.2d 45 (1967); People v. Gallagher, 55 Mich.App. 613, 223 N.W.2d 92 (1974); People v. Pettit, 88 Mich.App. 203, 276 N.W.2d 878 (1979). With this historical background, and aware of the construction of M.C.L. § 771.3; M.S.A. § 28.1133 the Legislature enacted the Crime Victim's Rights Act [10] and incorporated the term course of conduct in defining the scope of a proper restitution order. This phrase having acquired a unique meaning at common law, the meaning is carried over to the interpretation of the subsequent statute dealing with the same subject matter absent any direction to the contrary by the Legislature. People v. Reeves, 448 Mich. 1, 8, 528 N.W.2d 160 (1995); Nation v. WDE Electric Co., 454 Mich. 489, 494-495, 563 N.W.2d 233 (1997). Because there was no indication from the Legislature that the common-law meaning was not being incorporated, this phrase course of conduct should be given the broad meaning the courts had earlier stated. Thus, the defendant should compensate for all the losses attributable to the illegal scheme that culminated in his conviction, even though some of the losses were not the factual foundation of the charge that resulted in conviction. Under the Crime Victim's Rights Act the trial court's restitution order was proper. Defendant repeatedly told his customers that their cars or trailers sold for less than the true amount of the sale, and kept the difference for himself. This repeated scheme to defraud his customers in the same or similar manner falls within the broad meaning of course of conduct contained in the statute. Pursuant to M.C.L. § 780.766(2); M.S.A. § 28.1287(766)(2), the court had the statutory authority to order restitution to compensate any victim of defendant's illegal scheme. [11]