Opinion ID: 561304
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Convictions for Possession with Intent to Distribute

Text: 141 of Rafael Izquierdo, Angel Amejeiras, Luis Gonzalez and Vicente Chao 142 Izquierdo, Amejeiras and Luis Gonzalez challenge their convictions of aiding and abetting Pena's and Tobon's possession of cocaine with intent to distribute as well as Chao's possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. Vicente Chao challenges his conviction for aiding and abetting Pena's and Tobon's possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. 17 143 In this case the jury received the following instruction on the theory of vicarious liability established in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946): 144 A conspirator is responsible for offenses committed by his fellow conspirators if he was a member of the conspiracy when the offense was committed and if the offense was committed in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy. Therefore, if you find a defendant guilty of the conspiracy charge in Count I of the indictment, and if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that while he was a member of the conspiracy, his fellow conspirators committed the offenses charged in Counts II and III of the indictment [possession of cocaine with intent to distribute] in furtherance or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy, then you should find the defendant guilty as charged in Counts II and III of the indictment. 145 We approved a very similar Pinkerton instruction in United States v. Troop, 890 F.2d 1393, 1399 (7th Cir.1989). 18 As we observed in Troop, 890 F.2d at 1399: 146 Under the Pinkerton doctrine established in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), a conspirator can be found guilty for a co-conspirator's crimes but the jury must be instructed on this theory of guilt. The doctrine is based on the idea that conspirators are agents of each other and just as a principal is bound by the acts of his agents within the scope of the agency, so is a conspirator bound by the acts of his co-conspirators. 147 (Citations omitted). 148 As demonstrated in Section XI-B, supra, the evidence was sufficient to support Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Luis Gonzalez and Chao's convictions on the conspiracy count. As noted in the language of the Pinkerton instruction, a conspirator is responsible for offenses committed by his fellow conspirators if he was a member of the conspiracy when the offense was committed and if the offense was committed in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy. A jury after convicting Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Luis Gonzales and Chao on the conspiracy count could find each of these four conspirators guilty of the substantive counts of possession with intent to distribute cocaine committed by their co-conspirators if they found beyond a reasonable doubt that the substantive counts were committed in furtherance of or as a natural consequence of the conspiracy. Thus, the defendants were properly found guilty under a Pinkerton vicarious liability theory. 149 We now turn to the question of whether the actions of Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Luis Gonzalez and Chao also could be found to constitute possession of cocaine with intent to distribute under an aiding and abetting theory. In United States v. Valencia, 907 F.2d 671, 677 (7th Cir.1990), we set forth our standard for determining whether a defendant is guilty of aiding and abetting another defendant's possession of drugs with intent to distribute: 150 In defining the elements of aiding and abetting liability, this court has adopted Judge Learned Hand's well-known formulation in United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 492 (2d Cir.1938). In order for Mr. Martinez to be convicted for aiding and abetting Mr. Valencia's attempted possession with intent to distribute cocaine, all the evidence need show is that Mr. Martinez ' in some sort associate[d] himself with the venture, that he participate[d] in it as in something he wishe[d] to bring about, [and] that he s[ought] by his action to make it succeed. ' [United States v. Pino-Perez, 870 F.2d 1230, 1235 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, [--- U.S. ----,] 110 S.Ct. 260 [107 L.Ed.2d 209] (1989) ] (quoting Peoni, 100 F.2d at 402). As this court stated in United States v. Beck, 615 F.2d 441, 448 (7th Cir.1980), the aiding and abetting standard has two prongs--association and participation. To prove association, the state must prove that the defendant had the state of mind required for the statutory offense; to prove participation, '[a] high level of activity need not be shown.... Instead, there must be evidence to establish that the defendant engaged in some affirmative conduct; that is, there must be evidence that [the] defendant committed an overt act designed to aid in the success of the venture. ' Id. at 449 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir.1978)).... 151 We initially examine whether Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Luis Gonzalez and Chao satisfied the participation prong of the aiding and abetting test. As demonstrated in the previous discussion of their respective activities in the conspiracy, they all played an important role in facilitating the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute crimes that took place on July 29, 1987. Izquierdo's activity in keeping Hernandez away from the premises permitted the drugs to be loaded on the truck and removed from the Celi-Mar warehouse without Hernandez becoming aware of the shipment. The importance of Izquierdo's conduct in the conspiracy and the knowledge he had of the conspiracy is confirmed in the problems Vicente Chao noted in his statement to Pena and Tobon concerning the possibility of Celi-Mar's owner returning before the drug shipment was transferred out of the Celi-Mar warehouse. As observed above, Amejeiras assisted in the hiring of the truck driver who transported the cocaine to each of the principals who possessed the cocaine with intent to distribute and maintained telephone contact with Tellechea who was monitoring the delivery from Miami to New York and on to Chicago. Luis Gonzalez traveled with Tellechea, surveilling the transfer of the cocaine shipment, as pointed out earlier, directed the truck driver in New York to deliver the cocaine to Chao in Chicago, and conducted a personal flashlight inspection of the cocaine in the truck. Finally, Vicente Chao delivered the cocaine to Tobon and Pena at the Celi-Mar warehouse, explained to Pena and Tobon how to locate the boxes containing cocaine and further assisted in the unloading and loading of the trucks containing the drugs. Thus, Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Chao, and Luis Gonzales clearly participated in efforts to aid in the success of the venture. Beck, 615 F.2d at 449. 152 With respect to the question of association, there must be a demonstration that Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Chao, and Luis Gonzalez either knowingly or intentionally aided or abetted ... the possession of cocaine with the intent that the cocaine be distributed. Valencia, 907 F.2d at 680 (emphasis in original). Knowledge and intent in narcotics cases often must be proved largely by circumstantial evidence. The intent to distribute drugs has been inferred from the possession of a vast quantity of drugs larger than needed for personal use.... Id. at 678 (citations omitted). Based upon the participation of Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Chao, and Luis Gonzalez in the conspiracy and the activities of each of them contributing to the success of the large July 1987 cocaine delivery detailed in the preceding paragraph, it can reasonably be inferred that Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Luis Gonzalez and Chao, through their individual and collective conduct, knowingly and intentionally aided each of the principals' possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. Izquierdo, Amejeiras, Luis Gonzalez and Chao's participation in facilitating the cocaine shipment that resulted in Chao, Pena and Tobon possessing over two thousand kilograms of cocaine with intent to distribute supports their conviction under an aiding and abetting theory. Thus, we conclude that under either a Pinkerton vicarious liability theory or under an aiding and abetting theory, Izquierdo, Amejeiras and Luis Gonzalez' convictions of the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute of Chao, Tobon and Pena were proper and that Chao was appropriately convicted of the possession of cocaine with intent to distribute of Pena and Tobon.