Opinion ID: 1717140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the lower court err in failing to enter a mistrial because of the prosecutor's comments on the failure of appellants to testify and in failing to instruct the jury concerning same?

Text: During cross-examination of the State's first witness, Jacob phrased questions in such manner that the court told him he would be allowed to testify and present witnesses later. The prosecuting attorney objected to cross-examination of the witness and said: Your Honor, I object to this testimony now. I believe he will have an opportunity to do that [testify]. The court cautioned Jacob on his manner of questioning the witness, and told him that the appropriate time for him to refer to those matters was before the jury or in closing argument. During Jacob's closing argument the district attorney objected to a part of it, stating, Your Honor, I object to him testifying  if he wants to take the stand. On this appeal the above comments are assigned as error. Appellants neither requested a cautionary instruction to the jury nor did they ask the court to tell the jury to disregard the statement. Consequently, the point is not properly preserved. Even so, the appellants presented and argued their cases in person and the court studiously tried to preserve their constitutional rights. In Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983 (Miss. 1980), the Court said: The Mississippi Constitution gives the accused the right to be heard by himself or counsel, or both. However, it does not exempt a defendant who argues pro se from following the rules of court procedure. We do note, however, that the trial court should allow him some leeway in arguing his case, each case necessarily resting on its own facts and circumstances. 381 So.2d at 993-994. and, further: But, in those instances where a defendant, arguing pro se, clearly goes beyond the evidence in the record on a material point, as he did in this case, he must accept as a consequence the prosecution's comment on his failure to swear to the testimony. The defendant's remarks in this case cannot be dismissed as a failure to grasp `legal niceties.' They are unsworn testimony, and as such, constitute a partial waiver of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination and the prohibition against a district attorney from commenting on his not taking the stand. We do not say that every defendant who argues pro se loses the privilege against prosecutorial comment on his failure to testify. Only when the defendant's remarks go beyond the evidence does he waive this privilege. 381 So.2d at 994.