Opinion ID: 1386274
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Give a Requested Instruction on the Meaning of Life Imprisonment Without Possibility of Parole

Text: Defendant requested the trial court to give Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 23: A sentence of life without the possibility of parole means that the defendant will remain in state prison for the rest of his life and will not be paroled at any time. In support, counsel stated: I think it's an area that the court covered with every juror in voir dire, and I think that it's concise enough that  and not confusing enough that they should  it's a proper instruction. The prosecutor objected. The court refused: I think this is a matter with respect to imprisonment, what it means, and what death penalty means, and commutation and all that, what all of that means. I think it would run afoul of the Ramos decision. We will confront that situation if and when it occurs, if requested by the jury. (Italics added, paragraphing omitted.) (43) Defendant contends that the trial court erred by refusing the requested instruction. Not so. A court may not give an instruction that is incorrect. (See, e.g., People v. Gordon, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1275.) And it is incorrect to declare that the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole will inexorably be carried out. ( People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 130.) The instruction here would effectively have made just such a declaration. Defendant argues that the requested instruction was in fact correct in its entirety. He says that it would have done no more than explain and clarify the meaning of the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. It would have done much more. It would have stated all but expressly that the penalty would inexorably be carried out. Defendant then argues that the requested instruction was correct at least in part: A sentence of life without the possibility of parole means that the defendant ... will not be paroled at any time. The quoted language is arguably ambiguous. To determine its meaning, as noted above, we must determine how a hypothetical reasonable juror would have, or at least could have, understood its words. Such a juror apparently would have  and certainly could have  taken the language to mean that the penalty would inexorably be carried out. Finally, defendant may be understood to argue that because he requested the trial court to instruct on the meaning of the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole, the court was obligated to give an instruction of that kind. Before today, we have never held that such a request triggers such an obligation. And we decline to so hold now. We recognize that in People v. Thompson, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 131, we implied in dictum that if the defendant tenders an instruction that correctly inform[s] the jury that whether or not there [are] circumstances that might preclude either the death penalty or life without possibility of parole from being carried out, they should assume it would be carried out for purposes of determining the appropriate sentence for this defendant, such instruction should [be] given. Defendant did not tender an instruction of this kind here. Defendant goes on to claim that the trial court erred by failing to instruct sua sponte on the meaning of the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. In People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 698 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217], we concluded that a similar omission was not erroneous. We come to the same conclusion here. In our view, the court was under no obligation to give an instruction on life imprisonment without possibility of parole on its own motion. Its failure to do so, therefore, was not error. (See People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 799 [implying that it is not error for a court to fail or refuse to give an instruction it is not required to give].) Defendant argues to the contrary. In so doing, he relies on People v. Bonin, supra, 46 Cal.3d 659. He reads our opinion to stand for the proposition that if the jurors share a `common and widespread misconception' that the sentence of `confinement in the state prison for life without possibility of parole' does not actually mean confinement for life without possibility of parole, they should be instructed on the court's own motion that `without possibility of parole' means `without possibility of parole.' ( Id. at p. 698, italics in original.) He proceeds to interpret the record to reveal that the jurors here shared just such a common and widespread misconception. We are not persuaded. Defendant's reading of Bonin is not supported. Our opinion simply does not stand for the proposition referred to. Rather, it addresses and rejects an argument in which the defendant urged us  unsuccessfully  to adopt that rule. Similarly unsupported is defendant's interpretation of the record here. Recall that at individual sequestered voir dire, the trial court and/or defense counsel and/or the prosecutor generally instructed the prospective jurors  including, specifically, all who were subsequently sworn to serve as jurors or alternates  that the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole meant life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Also recall that in so doing, they sometimes suggested  favorably to defendant, but inaccurately  that the penalty would inexorably be carried out. We acknowledge, as noted above, that as a group the prospective jurors did not enter or leave voir dire with a technical knowledge of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. But as also noted, the record shows that they obtained an understanding adequate for their purposes. We cannot conclude that the jurors here shared the common and widespread misconception defendant asserts they did. [23]