Opinion ID: 1133738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The district court's injunction order sets forth in sufficient detail the specific reasons for its issuance and describes in reasonable detail the act or acts to be restrained.

Text: In a related argument, Dangberg Holdings contends that the district court's preliminary injunction must be vacated because it fails to set forth the specific reasons for its issuance and fails to describe in reasonable detail the acts to be restrained. We disagree. In Maheu v. Hughes Tool Co., 88 Nev. 592, 598, 503 P.2d 4, 8 (1972) (quoting Brumby Metals, Inc. v. Bargen, 275 F.2d 46, 50 (7th Cir.1960)), we explained that `[a]n injunctive order is an extraordinary writ subject to contempt for failure to comply and thus must be set out in specific terms.' Similarly, in Las Vegas Novelty v. Fernandez, 106 Nev. 113, 119, 787 P.2d 772, 775-76 (1990), we reiterated that an injunctive order would be nullified wherever the reasons for the injunction are not readily apparent elsewhere in the record, or appellate review is otherwise significantly impeded due to lack of a statement of reasons. In the instant case, the district court indicated that the reason underlying its grant of temporary injunctive relief was to prevent the finalization of an agreement that would possibly foreclose the State of Nevada from having a park that has always been intended [and that] maybe ... they should have. Because the rationale underlying the district court's grant of temporary injunctive reliefto temporarily prevent Dangberg Holdings and Douglas County from finalizing their settlement agreementis readily apparent from the record, we conclude that the specificity requirement pursuant to Las Vegas Novelty has been satisfied. Additionally, the district court's order described in reasonable detail the act or acts to be restrained. At the conclusion of the May 9, 1997, hearing, the district court ordered that any further action on the purported settlement agreement between Dangberg Holdings, LLC, and Douglas County is stayed until further order of the Court. This language clearly apprised Dangberg Holdings and Douglas County that they were to be restrained from taking any further action in consummating their settlement agreement. Accordingly, because the district court clearly specified the reason for its grant of temporary injunctive relief, and set forth in sufficient detail the act or acts to be restrained, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting temporary injunctive relief on this basis.