Opinion ID: 531209
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Keds registration

Text: 29 Keds has used the blue label continually since 1925. The mark was registered in 1959 and became incontestable within the meaning of the Lanham Act in 1964. In general, registration creates a presumption in favor of the registrant. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park and Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 196, 105 S.Ct. 658, 662-63, 83 L.Ed.2d 582 (1985). An incontestible mark is conclusive evidence of the registrant's exclusive right to use the registered mark in commerce on or in connection with the goods specified. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1115(b). The holder of a registered mark may rely on incontestability to enjoin infringement and such an action cannot be defended on the grounds that the mark is merely descriptive. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 205, 105 S.Ct. at 667. 30 The Act allows only certain limited defenses to incontestability such as fraud, abandonment, prior registration and anti-trust violations. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1115(b)(1-7); see also, 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1064(c), (e) (cancellation); 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1065(1-4) (limitations on incontestability); Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 373 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 830, 97 S.Ct. 91, 50 L.Ed.2d 94 (1976). 31 Renee argues that the Keds blue label is merely functional and thus not registerable. Although functionality is not one of the exceptions to the incontestability provisions of the Act, Renee argues that functionality is similar to a name becoming generic so that by analogy, it should also be a defense to an infringement claim. The Act allows marks that have become generic (the common descriptive name of an article) to be cancelled at any time. 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1064(c); Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 194, 105 S.Ct. at 661-62. Conversely, it is well settled that an incontestable mark may not be challenged as merely descriptive of the product. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 196, 105 S.Ct. at 662-63. 32 We agree with the district court that in this case the functionality argument has no merit. The district court ruled that the Keds mark was not generic or functional within the meaning of the Act. Because we decide that functionality is not applicable here, we decline to determine whether functionality can ever be a defense to an infringement claim. 33 Renee has fashioned its functionality argument from language in two of our previous cases. Fisher Stoves Inc. v. All Nighter Stove Works, Inc., 626 F.2d 193, 195 (1st Cir.1980); Keebler Co. v. Rovira Biscuit Corp., 624 F.2d 366, 378 (1st Cir.1980). These cases stand for the proposition that, absent other factors, functional shapes are not subject to appropriation by manufacturers. Fisher, 626 F.2d at 195 (absent valid trademark); Keebler, 624 F.2d at 378 (absent secondary meaning). Keds relies on these other factors. Keds has at least a valid incontestable trademark in the blue label. Keds also has argued that the blue label has secondary meaning. 34 The primary function that Renee claims for the labels is that the kickers identify the product. That is precisely the purpose of a trademark; thus, that function cannot be a valid grounds for attacking a trademark. 35 The functionality argument has two prongs: not only does Renee argue that the label is functional but also that the color blue for sneaker kickers is needed ... to compete effectively in the sneaker industry. Appellants Br. at 31. But the argument proves too much. What Renee seems to be claiming is that it must be able to produce shoes that look like Keds shoes in order to compete effectively. Rather than supporting any of Renee's claims, that argument supports the district court's finding that Keds shoes['s] ... commercial success and ... recent surge in popularity ... is attributable [at least in part] to consumer recognition of Keds as the source of footwear with the blue label. Slip op. at 10. 36 Finally, Renee argues that the blue label is not registerable because of technical problems with the mark. For example, Renee trots out the old color depletion theory that because primary colors are limited, no one may trademark a color. This theory has been criticized under the Lanham Act. See, e.g., In re Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed.Cir.1985). But in this case we need not decide whether color alone can be trademarked because color is used in connection with a non-functional shape in the blue label, and the shape has secondary meaning (or at least the presumption of it because of the incontestable trademark). Although a company may not be able to trademark a color, color in combination with a distinctive design or shape may be trademarked if it develops a secondary meaning. Quabaug Rubber Co. v. Fabiano Shoe Co., 567 F.2d 154, 161 (1st Cir.1977) (citing Mishawaka Rubber and Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Panther-Panco Rubber Co., 153 F.2d 662 (1st Cir.1946)). In addition, the color only issue was certainly before the PTO, and the PTO decided that there was secondary meaning. There is no evidence that either the PTO or the district court were wrong. 37 Renee also argues that the Keds trademark on the blue label is invalid because the blue label is always used in connection with the word Keds. This argument runs afoul of precedent. It has already been settled by this court that two trademarks can always be used together without invalidating either mark. See, e.g., Quabaug Rubber, 567 F.2d at 161 & n. 12; See also General Foods Corp. v. Ito Yakado Co., 219 U.S.P.Q. 822, 821-25 (T.T.A.B.1983). 38 Renee alleges that the Keds blue label registration might have been obtained fraudulently either because Keds did not disclose the functional nature of the kicker to the PTO or because the information on consumers' confusion was incorrect. These arguments are unsupported by any evidence. In addition, no negative inference can be drawn from the many appearances that Keds made before the PTO. Park 'N Fly, 469 U.S. at 202, 105 S.Ct. at 665-66. In fact, those appearances show the careful scrutiny that was given to the Keds application. Id.