Opinion ID: 14265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: This Court is without jurisdiction to hear this appeal.

Text: 12 Neither the statutory scheme applicable to judicial review of OTS enforcement proceedings nor the All Writs Statute provide this Court with jurisdiction to consider Henderson's appeal. Section 1818(h) of Title 12 of the United States Code does not provide this Court with jurisdiction to hear this case because no final agency order with respect to the Notice of Charges is at issue. Furthermore, we decline to invoke the All Writs Statute as a jurisdictional predicate because Henderson's claims are not ripe for judicial review and no extraordinary circumstances exist to justify application of the All Writs Statute in this case. 13
14 Section 1818(h)(2) provides in pertinent part: 15 Any party to any proceeding under paragraph (1) of this section may obtain review of any order served pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection ... by filing in the court of appeals of the United States for the circuit in which the home office of the depository institution is located.... 16 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2). In turn, § 1818(h)(1) provides: 17 After [any hearing provided for in this section], and within ninety days after the appropriate Federal banking agency ... has notified the parties that the case has been submitted to it for final decision, it shall render its decision ... and shall issue and serve upon each party to the proceeding an order or orders consistent with the provisions of this section. Judicial review of any such order shall be exclusively as provided in this subsection (h) of this section.... 18 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1). As such, jurisdiction under § 1818(h)(2) turns on whether the orders Henderson is appealing are the types of orders described in § 1818(h)(1), i.e., orders with respect to a post-hearing final decision. 19 Section 1818(h)(2) does not support jurisdiction in this case because the rulings appealed from do not represent a final decision after a hearing provided for by § 1818. The OTS issued the Notice of Charges against Henderson pursuant to § 1818(b), which authorizes cease and desist proceedings, and § 1818(e), which authorizes the OTS to prohibit an IAP's further participation in the conduct of the affairs of any insured depository institution. Both of these sections require a hearing to establish the grounds set forth in the Notice of Charges. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1818(b)(1), (e)(4). The administrative evidentiary hearing authorized by §§ 1818(b) and (e) on the Notice of Charges filed against Henderson is scheduled to commence on February 23, 1998. 20 Section 1818(h) authorizes review of orders issued after a hearing provided for by § 1818, which in this case will not occur until February, 1998; therefore, § 1818(h) cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court to review the rulings at issue. Section 1818(h)(2) authorizes review in the court of appeals of any order served pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection. 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(2) (emphasis added). Paragraph (1) of subsection 1818(h) deals with decisions rendered and orders issued and served within ninety days after the appropriate Federal banking agency ... has notified the parties that the case has been submitted to it for final decision, and after any hearing provided for in this section, such as those provided for in §§ 1818(b) and (e). 12 U.S.C. § 1818(h)(1). The orders that Henderson is appealing are interlocutory rulings, as opposed to final agency decisions resulting from the hearings provided for by §§ 1818(b) and (e); therefore, § 1818(h)(2) does not confer jurisdiction on this Court to review those orders. 21
22 The All Writs Statute provides that [t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law. 28 U.S.C. 1651(a). Henderson cites Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 273 F.Supp. 1 (E.D.Mo.1967), aff'd Osbourne v. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co., 389 U.S. 579, 88 S.Ct. 692, 19 L.Ed.2d 779 (1968), and Gregris v. Edberg, 645 F.Supp. 1153 (W.D.Pa.1986), for the proposition that: 23 It is well settled that the courts of the United States have the inherent and statutory (28 U.S.C.A. § 1651) power and authority to enter such orders as may be necessary to enforce and effectuate their lawful orders and judgments, and to prevent them from being thwarted and interfered with by force, guile, or otherwise. 24 Mississippi Valley Barge Line, 273 F.Supp. at 6; cf. Gregris, 645 F.Supp. at 1156. The United States Supreme Court stated, in United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 98 S.Ct. 364, 54 L.Ed.2d 376 (1977), that [t]his Court has repeatedly recognized the power of a federal court to issue such commands under the All Writs Act as may be necessary or appropriate to effectuate and prevent the frustration of orders it has previously issued in its exercise of jurisdiction otherwise obtained ... . 434 U.S. at 173, 98 S.Ct. at 372. 25 Nevertheless, courts rely upon the All Writs Statute infrequently, because writs are drastic remedies which a court should invoke only in extraordinary situations. See, e.g., Kerr v. United States District Court, 426 U.S. 394, 402, 96 S.Ct. 2119, 2123, 48 L.Ed.2d 725 (1976); see also Lewis v. Reagan, 660 F.2d 124, 128 (5th Cir.1981) (It is well established that courts should interrupt the orderly flow of administrative proceedings only under extraordinary circumstances....). In the context of an interlocutory administrative order, this rule is particularly consistent with the requirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies. It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the prescribed administrative remedies are exhausted. Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 463-464, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938). The exhaustion requirement avoids premature interruption of the administrative process and allows the administrative agency to utilize its discretion, apply its expertise, correct its own errors, and handle its business expeditiously. Lewis, 660 F.2d at 127. 26 Henderson's claims are not ripe for judicial review, which belies Henderson's argument that this is an extraordinary situation appropriate for review under the All Writs Statute. See Caprock Plains Fed. Bank Ass'n v. Farm Credit Admin., 843 F.2d 840, 844 (5th Cir.1988) (stating that factors relevant to the ripeness inquiry include whether challenged agency action constitutes final agency action). The interlocutory ruling by the OTS Director simply is not the OTS' final say in the enforcement proceeding and, therefore, is not final agency action for purposes of the ripeness inquiry. The logic of that proposition is evident because the administrative hearing on the Notice of Charges against Henderson has not even occurred yet. 27 Invoking the All Writs Statute at this point of the proceedings would fly in the face of the exhaustion requirement by preventing the OTS from utilizing its discretion, applying its expertise, correcting its own errors, and handling its business expeditiously. See Lewis, 660 F.2d at 127. In In re Willy, 831 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.1987), this Court noted that it is usually 'more efficient for the administrative process to go forward without interruption than it is to permit the parties to seek aid from the courts at various intermediate stages.'  831 F.2d at 549 (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194, 89 S.Ct. 1657, 1662, 23 L.Ed.2d 194 (1969)). Although the petitioner in In re Willy had not yet appealed the interlocutory ruling to the relevant agency's highest official, as Henderson did here, the Court nevertheless noted that [i]f the petitioner loses and appeals from the final administrative order, this court may consider the entire case at one time, thus avoiding piecemeal review. Id. Similarly, and in accordance with the policy of requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies, this case does not justify the drastic measure of invoking jurisdiction under the All Writs Statute.