Opinion ID: 106968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the breach-of-peace conviction.

Text: I agree with that part of the Court's opinion holding that the Louisiana breach-of-the-peace statute [1] on its face and as construed by the State Supreme Court is so broad as to be unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Winters v. New York, 333 U. S. 507, 509-510. The statute does not itself define the conditions upon which people who want to express views may be allowed to use the public streets and highways, but leaves this to be defined by law enforcement officers. The statute therefore neither forbids all crowds to congregate and picket on streets, nor is it narrowly drawn to prohibit congregating or patrolling under certain clearly defined conditions while preserving the freedom to speak of those who are using the streets as streets in the ordinary way that the State permits. A state statute of either of the two types just mentioned, regulating conduct patrolling and marchingas distinguished from speech, would in my judgment be constitutional, subject only to the condition that if such a law had the effect of indirectly impinging on freedom of speech, press, or religion, it would be unconstitutional if under the circumstances it appeared that the State's interest in suppressing the conduct was not sufficient to outweigh the individual's interest in engaging in conduct closely involving his First Amendment freedoms. As this Court held in Schneider v. State, 308 U. S. 147, 161: Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic institutions. And so, as cases arise, the delicate and difficult task falls upon the courts to weigh the circumstances and to appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation of the free enjoyment of the rights. See also, e. g., Brotherhood of R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U. S. 1; NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415; NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296; Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U. S. 444; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233. As I discussed at length in my dissenting opinion in Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109, 141-142, when passing on the validity of a regulation of conduct, which may indirectly infringe on free speech, this Court does, and I agree that it should, weigh the circumstances in order to protect, not to destroy, freedom of speech, press, and religion. The First and Fourteenth Amendments, I think, take away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict freedom of speech, press, and assembly where people have a right to be for such purposes. This does not mean, however, that these amendments also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of picketing or patrolling, whether on publicly owned streets or on privately owned property. See Labor Board v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 377 U. S. 58, 76 (concurring opinion). Were the law otherwise, people on the streets, in their homes and anywhere else could be compelled to listen against their will to speakers they did not want to hear. Picketing, though it may be utilized to communicate ideas, is not speech, and therefore is not of itself protected by the First Amendment. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 464-466; Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U. S. 490; Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers v. Wohl, 315 U. S. 769, 775-777 (DOUGLAS, J., concurring). However, because Louisiana's breach-of-peace statute is not narrowly drawn to assure nondiscriminatory application, I think it is constitutionally invalid under our holding in Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U. S. 229. See also Musser v. Utah, 333 U. S. 95, 96-97. Edwards, however, as I understand it, did not hold that either private property owners or the States are constitutionally required to supply a place for people to exercise freedom of speech or assembly. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U. S. 226, 344-346 (dissenting opinion). What Edwards as I read it did hold, and correctly I think, was not that the Federal Constitution prohibited South Carolina from making it unlawful for people to congregate, picket, and parade on or near that State's capitol grounds, but rather that in the absence of a clear, narrowly drawn, nondiscriminatory statute prohibiting such gatherings and picketing, South Carolina could not punish people for assembling at the capitol to petition for redress of grievances. In the case before us Louisiana has by a broad, vague statute given policemen an unlimited power to order people off the streets, not to enforce a specific, nondiscriminatory state statute forbidding patrolling and picketing, but rather whenever a policeman makes a decision on his own personal judgment that views being expressed on the street are provoking or might provoke a breach of the peace. Such a statute does not provide for government by clearly defined laws, but rather for government by the moment-to-moment opinions of a policeman on his beat. Compare Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369-370. This kind of statute provides a perfect device to arrest people whose views do not suit the policeman or his superiors, while leaving free to talk anyone with whose views the police agree. See Feiner v. New York, 340 U. S. 315, 321 (dissenting opinion); cf. Peters v. Hobby, 349 U. S. 331, 349-350 (concurring opinion); Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442, 463-464 (dissenting opinion); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 217-218 (dissenting opinion); Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, 173 (dissenting opinion). In this situation I think Edwards v. South Carolina and other such cases invalidating statutes for vagueness are controlling. Moreover, because the statute makes an exception for labor organizations and therefore tries to limit access to the streets to some views but not others, I believe it is unconstitutional for the reasons discussed in Part II of this opinion, dealing with the street-obstruction statute, infra. For all the reasons stated I concur in reversing the conviction based on the breach-of-peace statute.