Opinion ID: 6108017
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Wieland's Arguments to the Jury

Text: Owner-Operator's two remaining and preserved points on appeal both relate to Wieland's arguments to the jury. In its second point, Owner-Operator argues the circuit court erred in allowing Wieland to argue to the jury that Owner-Operator was negligent in failing to take precautions before Lovelace entered the parking lot because this misstated the law as instructed in the verdict director. A party may not, in arguing to the jury, misstate the law as submitted in the court's instructions . State ex rel. Mo. Highway and Transp. Comm'n v. Our Savior Lutheran Church , 922 S.W.2d 816 , 819 (Mo. App. E.D. 1996) (emphasis added). In this case, the law as submitted in the court's instructions was the language used in the verdict director. As noted, on appeal, Owner-Operator does not argue the verdict director misstated the law. For this reason, Owner-Operator is mistaken in arguing this Court should compare Wieland's trial argument to the substantive law of the first exception. The only question before this Court is whether Wieland's trial argument misstated the law as it was stated in the verdict director . See Barlett v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co. , 854 S.W.2d 396 , 400 (Mo. banc 1993). The relevant language in the verdict director simply stated that defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have known that Alan Lovelace was in its parking lot. This express language of the verdict director was not so narrow as to specify Owner-Operator had no duty of care until after Lovelace entered the parking lot. Nor did this language clearly instruct the jury not to consider Owner-Operator's failure to take precautions that could have led to the discovery of Lovelace in the parking lot. As such, Wieland's trial argument-that the jury should consider precautions Owner-Operator did not undertake pursuant to its protocol before Lovelace entered the parking lot-did not misstate the law as it was stated in the verdict director. Whether the verdict director misstated the substantive law or otherwise misled the jury is a separate and distinct issue not raised by Owner-Operator on appeal. Point II is denied. Similarly, in its third point on appeal, Owner-Operator argues the circuit  court erred in allowing Wieland to argue to the jury that Owner-Operator breached a duty of care by failing to take precautions because this misstated the law as instructed in the verdict director in that the verdict director specified only one duty of care that Owner-Operator could have breached, a duty to notify law enforcement authorities. As with Owner-Operator's second point, because it does not challenge on appeal the instructional language, the only question is whether Wieland's trial argument misstated the law as it was stated in the verdict director. See id. Again, the relevant language in the verdict director stated that defendant knew or by using ordinary care could have known that Alan Lovelace was in its parking lot (emphasis added). The phrase by using ordinary care could have known necessarily imposed a duty of care on Owner-Operator to discover Lovelace's presence. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12 cmt. a. Otherwise, it would be irrelevant whether Owner-Operator could have discovered Lovelace's presence by using ordinary care because Owner-Operator would not be tasked with using ordinary care absent a duty of care being imposed. See id. Because the verdict director imposed this additional duty to use ordinary care to discover Lovelace's presence (and without specifying whether that duty arose before or after Lovelace entered the parking lot), Wieland's trial argument did not misstate the law as it was stated in the verdict director. And, as with Owner-Operator's second point, whether the verdict director misstated the substantive law in imposing this additional duty is a separate and distinct issue not raised by Owner-Operator on appeal. Point III is denied.