Opinion ID: 741085
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Oscar Strain and Teresa Pankey

Text: 93 Theresa Pankey alleged and provided summary judgment evidence that Strain slammed the door when he came into her office, which made her feel uncomfortable; Strain stared at her before asking her to do a typing job that she felt she should not have to do; Strain told her that she might be his personal secretary, and when Pankey responded that she was not aware of such plans, Strain said, [l]et me tell you something. I get what I want around here, and I want you. On another occasion, Pankey was in the copy room when Strain came in, closed the door, and asked her why she was mad at him. Strain followed Pankey back to their office and was about to slam the door when Pankey received a phone call. Later that day, Strain came into her office and slammed the door so that Pankey and another female employee were alone with Strain. Pankey told Strain to open the door; another officer came in and Strain left. 94 Pankey alleged in her second amended complaint that Strain told her in a threatening, provocative manner she had to work with him and gave her unreasonable work assignments. According to Pankey, Strain's requests for typing were unreasonable work assignments, because Strain would ask her to drop her other work to type for him. In her deposition, Pankey testified that when she would inform Strain that she could not do the work immediately, Strain would ask if she could do it later. 95 Strain asserts that Pankey's allegations and evidence fail to raise a fact issue defeating qualified immunity, because Pankey has not shown that the acts she complains about were based on her sex, Ellert v. University of Texas, at Dallas, 52 F.3d 543, 545 (5th Cir.1995), or that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment. Farpella-Crosby v. Horizon Health Care, 97 F.3d 803, 806 (5th Cir.1996); DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Assn., 51 F.3d 591, 594 (5th Cir.1995), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 473, 133 L.Ed.2d 403 (1995). 96 Pankey admitted that her job required her to type documents for the ranking officers, and that Strain's door slamming and stares were directed toward men as well as women. Pankey's subjective interpretation of Strain's comments is insufficient to raise a fact issue as to sexual harassment. See Burns-Toole v. Byrne, 11 F.3d 1270, 1274 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 512 U.S. 1207, 114 S.Ct. 2680, 129 L.Ed.2d 814 (1994)([a plaintiff] cannot prevail [over the defense of qualified immunity] with mere conclusory statements evidencing only a personal belief that the defendants were motivated by an impermissible animus). Even assuming that Strain's comments and conduct were motivated by Pankey's sex, they were not so severe or pervasive as to constitute sexual harassment. DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 594. 97 Strain has qualified immunity as to Pankey's claims against him under section 1983 and section 1985(3). 30