Opinion ID: 782174
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Jenkins' petition properly filed?

Text: 14 In Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 121 S.Ct. 361, 148 L.Ed.2d 213 (2000), the United States Supreme Court considered whether a petition for state post-conviction relief containing claims that were procedurally barred under state law could ever be considered properly filed within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). The Court concluded that such a claim could be considered properly filed under certain circumstances. Specifically, the Court rejected the argument that an application is not properly filed unless it complies with all mandatory procedural requirements that would bar review of the merits of the petition. Bennett, 531 U.S. at 8, 121 S.Ct. 361. 15 Bennett noted that a petition is technically filed when it is delivered to, and accepted by, the appropriate court officer for placement into the official record. Id. The court determined that such a petition is properly filed for § 2244(d)(2) purposes: 16 when its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and rules governing filings. These usually prescribe, for example, the form of the document, the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be lodged, and the requisite filing fee. 17 Id. The Court expressly distinguished between statutes that place a condition on filing, as opposed to statutes that impose a condition to obtaining relief. Id. at 11, 121 S.Ct. 361. As the Court noted, the question whether an application has been `properly filed' is quite separate from the question whether the claims contained in the application are meritorious and free of procedural bar. Id. at 9, 121 S.Ct. 361 (emphasis in original). 18 Although the Bennett Court clarified that the § 2244(d)(2) inquiry should center on whether any state procedural bar aims specifically at preventing a petition's filing, the Court explicitly expressed no view on the question of whether the existence of certain exceptions to a timely filing requirement can prevent a late application from being considered improperly filed. Id. at 9 n. 2, 121 S.Ct. 361. 19 Following the Court's decision in Bennett, this court withdrew Dictado I and replaced it with Dictado v. Ducharme, 244 F.3d 724 (9th Cir.2001) ( Dictado II ). In Dictado II, a case not unlike this one, we considered the timely filing question that the Court declined to reach in Bennett: whether a petition could be considered properly filed when it had been dismissed by the state supreme court as both untimely and repetitive. We looked to the Fifth Circuit's decision in Smith v. Ward, 209 F.3d 383 (5th Cir.2000), which held that a time limitation is not a filing requirement as long as it contains exceptions. According to Smith, if a statute requires the state court to look at the petition to consider whether certain exceptions might apply, then it is not an absolute bar to filing, but merely a limitation on a court's ability to grant relief. Id. at 385. 20 Dictado II followed Smith. We held that if a state's rule governing timely commencement of post-conviction relief proceedings contains exceptions that require the state courts to examine the merits of the petition before dismissing, the petition, even if it is ultimately found to be untimely, should be regarded as properly filed since the state statute does not impose an absolute bar to filing. Dictado II, 244 F.3d at 727-28. 21 Applying the rule in Dictado II, we determined that Washington state statutes governing successive petitions imposed a condition to obtaining relief under Bennett, rather than a condition to filing. Id. at 727. We based our conclusion on the fact that the statute disfavors successive petitions, but allows a state court to consider a successive petition under certain circumstances. Id. Because Washington's statute included an escape clause permitting successive petitions upon a showing of good cause, we concluded that the successive petition bar simply prescribes a rule of decision. Id. 3 22 In its motion to dismiss Jenkins' fourth amended petition for post-conviction relief, the state argued that the petition was barred under Oregon's statutes governing both timeliness and successive petitions. The post-conviction court dismissed the petition without identifying the basis for its ruling. Consistent with Bennett and Dictado II, we must determine whether Oregon's statute governing the timeliness of post-conviction petition filings imposes a condition to filing. The relevant portions of ORS § 138.510 in effect at the time Jenkins filed his petition read: 23 (2) A petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 [Oregon's Post-Conviction Hearing Act] must be filed within two years of the following, unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition: 24 (a) If no appeal is taken, the date the judgment or order on the conviction was entered in the register. 25 (b) If an appeal is taken, the date the appeal is final in the Oregon appellate courts. 26 (3) A one-year filing period shall apply retroactively to petitions filed by persons whose convictions and appeals became final before August 5, 1989, and any such petitions must be filed within one year after November 4, 1993. A person whose post-conviction petition was dismissed prior to November 4, 1993, cannot file another post-conviction petition involving the same case. 27 Jenkins' conviction became final in 1981. 4 The plain language of subsection (3), which contains no escape clause or list of exceptions, seems to suggest that Jenkins' fourth amended petition, filed in 1996, was untimely; under Dictado II, then, it would not have been properly filed for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). Jenkins, however, points to subsection (2) of ORS § 138.510, which contains an escape clause for cases in which a court finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition. Because this escape clause would require a court to assess the merits of a petitioner's claim before dismissing a petition for untimeliness, under Dictado II, ORS § 138.510(2) does not impose a condition to filing. Accordingly, a petition subsequently dismissed pursuant to that section is nonetheless to be considered properly filed within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). 28 The state counters that the statute's terms make clear that Jenkins falls under ORS § 138.510(3), rather than subsection (2). Jenkins, however, argues that, prior to the Oregon Court of Appeals' decision in Wallis v. Baldwin, 152 Or.App. 295, 954 P.2d 192 (1998), (Or. App.), review denied, 327 Or. 174, 966 P.2d 218 (1998), it was not clear (Or. 1998), that the escape clause contained in subsection (2) did not also apply to subsection (3). In Wallis, the Oregon Court of Appeals considered a state constitutional challenge to ORS § 138.510(3). The plaintiff in that case argued that the limitation period imposed under subsection (3) was unreasonably short under a previous decision, Bartz v. State, 314 Or. 353, 839 P.2d 217 (Or. 1992). Bartz considered an earlier version of the statute, which imposed a 120-day limit on post-conviction relief filings but also included the exception present in the current statute where a court finds grounds for relief asserted which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition. Id. at 219. The Bartz court concluded: 29 [t]he 120-day limit, when combined with the exception, provides a reasonable opportunity to seek post-conviction relief. We do not hold that any time limit, no matter how short, would be permissible in this context, but we do hold that the 120-day period of limitation in ORS 138.510(2), which incorporates an exception in certain circumstances, does not prevent the available procedure from being reasonable for persons who seek redress. 30 Id. at 225 (emphasis in original). 31 The plaintiff in Wallis read Bartz to say that a statutory limitation period was unconstitutional unless it provided an escape clause allowing later petitions on a showing of good cause. Wallis, 954 P.2d at 193-94. Seeking to avoid a finding that the lack of such an escape clause in ORS § 138.510(3) rendered the subsection unconstitutional, 5 the state itself argued in Wallis that the escape clause contained in subsection (2) was implicitly incorporated into subsection (3), making the subsection reasonable under Bartz. Id. at 195 n. 1. 32 Although the Wallis court rejected the state's claim that the escape clause contained in subsection (2) applied to petitions governed by subsection (3) and concluded that the absence of the escape clause to the one-year limitation period in subsection (3) was not fatal, id. at 195, the fact that the court did not make this clear until 1998 — two years after the state post-conviction court dismissed Jenkins' petition — coupled with the fact that the state itself believed that the subsection (2) escape clause applied to petitions filed pursuant to subsection (3) supports Jenkins' claim that there was no absolute bar on filings like his in 1996. 33 After Wallis it is now clear that subsection (3) would apply to Jenkins without the benefit of the subsection (2) escape clause, and under Bennett and Dictado II, subsection (3), as understood post- Wallis, therefore imposes a bar to filing whose violation would render a petition improperly filed for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) purposes. In light of the state's own apparent confusion in Wallis, however, we hold that the inapplicability of the escape clause was not Oregon law at the time of Jenkins' filing. Cf. Martinez v. Klauser, 266 F.3d 1091, 1093-94 (9th Cir.2001) (Idaho state court's dismissal of habeas petition as untimely not adequate basis to bar federal review where prior state authority does not support the decision and later authority indicates that the decision may have been contrary to state law). 34 We now turn to Oregon's successive petition statute, ORS § 138.550(3). As explained above, the state post-conviction court did not indicate the grounds upon which it based its dismissal of Jenkins' claim. Because the state argued that the petition was barred as both untimely and successive, the successive petition bar could apply even though the untimeliness bar fails. 35 ORS § 138.550(3) provides, in relevant part: 36 All grounds for relief claimed by petitioner in a petition pursuant to ORS 138.510 to 138.680 must be asserted in the original or amended petition, and any grounds not so asserted are deemed waived unless the court on hearing a subsequent petition finds grounds for relief asserted therein which could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended petition. 37 (Emphasis added.) The statute includes an exception requiring a court to consider whether a petition asserts permissible grounds for relief before the court dismisses on procedural grounds. Thus, under Bennett and Dictado II, ORS § 138.550(3) does not impose an absolute bar to filing, and a petition subsequently dismissed as successive under that statute is nonetheless properly filed for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) purposes. 38 Therefore, because ORS § 138.510(3) was not an adequate state ground of decision for procedural bar purposes prior to Wallis, and because ORS § 138.550(3) does not impose an absolute bar to filing but instead only a condition to obtaining relief, Jenkins' fourth amended petition was properly filed. The next step of the analysis is to determine whether that petition was pending for 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) purposes for a sufficient period to render Jenkins' federal petition timely. 39