Opinion ID: 2644969
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mary Green Wilson’s Statement

Text: For his fourth point on appeal, Billy asserts that the circuit court erred by not granting a mistrial with regard to three statements made by Mary regarding her conversations with law enforcement during their investigation of the Elliott murders. We will address each of Mary’s statements individually. First, on direct examination, Mary testified that law enforcement came to her work and met with her regarding the Elliott murders. She testified as follows: It wasn’t twenty or thirty minutes after I got out of that meeting with them that Billy called me at work. And he said, “I heard you had some company.” Billy argues that this testimony was inadmissible as it goes to demonstrate Billy’s control over Mary. However, the record demonstrates that Billy did not object to this statement at trial. Failure to object at the first opportunity waives any right to raise the point on appeal. Gibson v. State, 316 Ark. 705, 875 S.W.2d 58 (1994). Because he did not make a timely objection below, this court cannot reach the issue. Second, during cross-examination, Mary testified that she initially did not tell the police the truth when they came to visit her at work. The following colloquy occurred: DEFENSE ATTORNEY: So you lied to the police? MARY: I guess I did. I evaded the truth because I was not free to tell the truth. Defense counsel then moved for a mistrial, stating, That is a mistrial. She – it goes right back to the statement she testified before. It goes to the control issue. The Supreme Court specifically said they can’t testify to Billy’s control. And her testimony was, ‘I wasn’t free to tell the truth.’ 29 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497 The circuit court overruled the objection, denied the motion for mistrial, struck Mary’s answer, and instructed the jury to not consider it. Billy asserts that Mary’s statement was highly prejudicial and goes to Billy’s control over Mary, which was inadmissible per Green I. We hold that any error regarding this statement constitutes invited error. Under the doctrine of invited error, one cannot be heard to complain of that error for which he was responsible. McGhee v. State, 330 Ark. 38, 954 S.W.2d 206 (1997). Here, although Billy’s counsel did not intend for Mary to make such a statement, it nevertheless was made in response to his questioning. Where a witness’s answer was a legitimate response to a question posed by defense counsel, such testimony was invited by the appellant and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial. See Woods v. State, 342 Ark. 89, 27 S.W.3d 367 (2000); Hogan v. State, 281 Ark. 250, 663 S.W.2d 726 (1984). As a result, Billy cannot complain of any error that may have resulted from his counsel’s questioning of Mary. Further, the circuit court instructed the jury to not consider the testimony, and we presume that a jury follows the circuit court’s instructions in deciding the case. Hall v. State, 315 Ark. 385, 391–92, 868 S.W.2d 453, 456–57 (1993). We do not find error with regard to Mary’s second statement. Third, Billy asserts that Mary’s statement on redirect was also prejudicial error. Prior to redirect, Billy and the State had conferenced with the judge at the bench concerning this line of questioning. Billy objected to the questioning and said it went to Billy’s control or influence and objected to the questions. The circuit court overruled the objection and 30 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497 allowed the question. On redirect the following colloquy occurred: PROSECUTOR: With regard to all of the statements . . . to the police officers . . . from you early on in this investigation of the case; before you gave any of those statements, who was the only person who ever told you what to tell the police in case they ask. MARY: Billy Green Billy asserts that it was error for the circuit court to allow this questioning and the testimony was error because it served only to reiterate that she was not free to tell the truth because of Billy’s influence. Billy argues that Mary’s testimony implicated the issue of Billy’s “control” over her. This court reviews evidentiary rulings using an abuse-of-discretion standard; trial courts are afforded wide discretion in evidentiary rulings. See Hawkins v. State, 348 Ark. 384, 72 S.W.3d 493 (2002). In issues relating to the admission of evidence a trial court’s ruling is entitled to great weight and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. Cook v. State, 345 Ark. 264, 45 S.W.3d 820 (2001); Gaines v. State, 340 Ark. 99, 8 S.W.3d 547 (2000). Although Billy asserts that the circuit abused its discretion, we disagree. Mary testified that Billy told her to lie to the police, which is evidence that he was creating a false alibi to cover up his involvement. In reviewing all of Mary’s statements with our standard of review for mistrials, we find no error. A mistrial is a drastic remedy that should be granted only when justice cannot be served by continuing the trial. Taylor v. State, 2010 Ark. 372, 372 S.W.3d 769. The trial court has the sound discretion to decide whether to grant a mistrial, and this decision will not 31 Cite as 2013 Ark. 497 be overturned absent a showing of abuse or upon manifest prejudice to the complaining party. Green I, 365 Ark. 478, 231 S.W.3d 638; Jones v. State, 340 Ark. 390, 10 S.W.3d 449 (2000). Additionally, even where a remark is improper, the trial court may deny the mistrial motion and cure any prejudice by admonishing the jury to disregard the remark. Smith v. State, 351 Ark. 468, 95 S.W.3d 801 (2003); Dandridge v. State, 292 Ark. 40, 727 S.W.2d 851 (1987). We find no error and affirm the circuit court’s rulings regarding Mary’s testimony.