Opinion ID: 387945
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: proof of sex discrimination

Text: In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 1854-1855 n.15, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) the Court discussed the difference between Title VII impact cases and treatment cases. In a disparate impact case, a plaintiff must show that some facially neutral employment practice has a substantially disproportionate impact upon a group protected by Title VII. Examples of such outwardly neutral employment practices include height and weight requirements, see Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 97 S.Ct. 2720, 53 L.Ed.2d 786 (1977), or certain types of employment tests adversely affecting those of certain cultural backgrounds, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 91 S.Ct. 849, 28 L.Ed.2d 158 (1971). Once plaintiffs have shown the existence and impact of such a practice, which constitutes a prima facie case, the employer will be held liable unless the practice can be justified by business necessity. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329, 97 S.Ct. at 2727; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 430, 91 S.Ct. at 853. A treatment case involves a situation where an employer treats an individual protected by Title VII differently simply because of the person's minority status, religion or sex. In a treatment case, unlike an impact case, it is necessary to show an employer's intent to discriminate, but intent can be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15, 97 S.Ct. at 1854-1855 n.15. Once a plaintiff has introduced evidence from which it appears more likely than not that the defendant had an intent to discriminate, a prima facie treatment case is established. An employer will be liable unless it can articulate reasons which justify disparate treatment. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973); Golden v. Local 55 of the International Association of Firefighters, 633 F.2d 817 at 821 (9th Cir. 1980). If an employer does articulate legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for disparate treatment, the employee can then show that these reasons were a pretext to hide bias. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. at 1825-1826 A plaintiff in a Title VII case can plead both theories. Although the disparate impact theory is ordinarily asserted in class actions, an individual claimant may seek relief under such a theory as well. Wright v. National Archives & Records Service, 609 F.2d 702, 711-12 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Heagney alleges that categorizing certain employees as exempt is a neutral employment practice which the statistics indicate has a disproportionate impact upon the salaries of female employees. She reasons that she is a member of the class of persons which has been disadvantaged by this practice, therefore the University should be liable It is apparent, however, that the creation of jobs that are exempt from the Washington personnel law cannot be equated with such well-defined objective employment practices as personnel tests or minimal physical requirements. Classification of certain jobs as exempt only meant that the University had wider discretion to establish the employee salaries. Subjective employment decisions may result in discrimination, but the use of subjective criteria is not per se illegal. Ward v. Westland Plastics, Inc., No. 78-1666, slip op. at 4193 (9th Cir. Apr. 25, 1980). The gravamen of Heagney's complaint is that the lack of well-defined employment criteria allowed a pattern or practice of discrimination to exist. We therefore conclude that impact analysis is inappropriate and that Heagney was required to prove disparate treatment. The magistrate and trial judge were both of the opinion that generalized statistical evidence including all exempt employees was of little relevance to Heagney's individual case. Generalized statistics are, however, undoubtedly relevant in cases alleging disparate treatment. In Teamsters, the government brought an action against a union and trucking company alleging that the defendants had engaged in purposeful discrimination against Negroes and Spanish-surnamed individuals. The government sought a general injunction and individual relief for those minority individuals who had been denied line-driver jobs. In proving its case, the government relied heavily upon statistical evidence showing that the company employed few Negro or Spanish-surnamed individuals as line drivers, and that those minorities the company did employ were paid less. The Court concluded that such statistics could serve to support a prima facie case of disparate treatment. 431 U.S. at 337-342, 97 S.Ct. at 1858. After liability was established, the union and company argued at the remedial stage that the Court could not award individual relief to all persons who had sought line-driver jobs. In the defendants' view, relief could only be granted where some evidence of discrimination had been introduced regarding a particular claimant. The Court disagreed. Instead, the Court concluded that once the government had shown that the defendants had engaged in discrimination, that conclusion supported an inference that every individual member of the class had been the victim of discrimination, even if no evidence had been introduced in support of a particular individual's claim. 431 U.S. at 362-71, 97 S.Ct. at 1868-1873. Thus every individual member of the class harmed received the benefit of the general statistical showing, and the burden shifted to the employer to rebut that inference by offering some legitimate non-discriminatory reason. The logical conclusion from the Supreme Court's opinion in Teamsters is that generalized statistics are relevant to an individual action under Title VII. If Heagney could demonstrate that the University regularly discriminated against its female exempt employees, such a showing, even if it were inadequate by itself to support a prima facie case, certainly would increase the probability that Heagney's own case was also part of this pattern or practice. This would be true even if her job were unique. Several circuits, including our own, have relied on general statistical evidence to support an individual's prima facie case of sex discrimination. See Davis v. Califano, 613 F.2d 957, 962-63 (D.C.Cir.1979); Sweeney v. Board of Trustees of Keene State College, 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 439 U.S. 24, 99 S.Ct. 295, 58 L.Ed.2d 216 (1978); Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical & Stage Employees, 525 F.2d 1354, 1358 (9th Cir. 1975). 5 In Heagney's case the EEOC and Office of Civil Rights statistics which she introduced into evidence do not adequately indicate the nature of the work performed, or whether females were denied promotions or pay raises they were entitled to receive. No meaningful comparison of female and male salaries is possible from these statistics. 6 See Hagans v. Andrus, No. 79-4424, (9th Cir. Feb. 5, 1981); Pack v. Energy Research & Development Administration, 566 F.2d 1111, 1113 (9th Cir. 1977). Without more, the judge's ultimate conclusion that Heagney failed to prove sex discrimination is supported by the evidence. The Hayes study, however, apparently adjusts for deficiencies in these earlier statistics by establishing a standardized basis for comparing job content with pay even though the job may be unique. The issues before this court, then, are whether the trial court erred by failing to admit the study, and if so, whether the error was harmless. The magistrate excluded the Hayes study because it dealt with January 1975 data, not data from before March 15, 1973, when Heagney resigned. Under the circumstances, it is extremely unlikely that the approximately twenty-two month delay between Heagney's resignation and the salary data collected by Hayes had any significant impact on the probative force of the study as to the existence of conditions when Heagney was an employee. For example, the fact that a piece of property was in a certain physical condition either sometime before or after a particular event will support an inference that the same condition existed at the time the event occurred. See Conner v. Union Pacific Railroad, 219 F.2d 799, 802 (9th Cir. 1955), Annot., 7 A.L.R.3d 1302 (1966). While conditions subject to human decisions may be prone to more variations, the same inference would apply in the absence of a contrary explanation. In this case, testimony by the University indicates that the Hayes study was undertaken because preliminary statistics, gathered in 1972-73 when Heagney was still a University employee, raised concerns about possible sex discrimination. In part, the purpose of the Hayes study was to confirm or deny any inferences raised by the statistics. Title VII became applicable to the University in March 1972. Equal Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub.L.No.92-261, § 2(1), 86 Stat. 103. It seems likely that the University would have become more conscious of possible liability for sex discrimination rather than less so, especially because the University was then under investigation by the federal Office of Civil Rights. Although a witness from the Office of Civil Rights testified that the problems they were concerned about at the University continued past 1973, there is little likelihood that discrimination would increase during the post-1973 period. This foundation was adequate to demonstrate that the Hayes data was probative as to the existence of conditions prior to the time when the study was prepared. See Kinsey v. First Regional Securities, Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 839 (D.C.Cir.1977). Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence defines relevant evidence as that which has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. The Hayes report had a tendency to make it more probable that Heagney was discriminated against and as such was admissible. See Fed.R.Evid. 402. We conclude that it was error to exclude the Hayes study. Finally, the evidence in this case is too close to conclude that the error in failing to admit the Hayes study was harmless. The Hayes study indicates that more female than male exempt employees were underpaid. The evidence from Heagney's individual case indicates that she may have been one of the women who were underpaid. This evidence included the salary comparison with male exempt employees, considering their educational attainments and experience, and at least three internal memoranda prepared by her supervisors, specifically noting that Heagney's salary was not only low for a chemist, but low in relation to other University employees and exempt staff members. The EEOC found that there was probable cause to believe that there was sex discrimination involved in establishing Heagney's salary. The Office of Civil Rights also concluded that it appeared that sex discrimination was occurring. Against this background, the exclusion of the Hayes study was not harmless error and the case must be remanded to determine whether Heagney was underpaid because of her sex. On remand the University may wish to submit evidence challenging the results of the Hayes study. The court must then determine whether the evidence, including the Hayes study, establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. If so, the burden will be on the University to offer some legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the disparate treatment. 7