Opinion ID: 1956237
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coverage Arguments Under the Primary Policy.

Text: The Huebners propose a two-step analysis to support a finding that Monte Huebner is protected under the MSI insurance policy. The first step is to find that Larry Huebner is named in some manner under the policy. Once this has been shown, the second step is to show Larry Huebner qualifies as you under the policy; thus, Monte Huebner should also be covered as a family member. In countering plaintiffs' suggestion concerning the you or any family member language, MSI refers to the definition of you or your in the policy. This definition states that you means the person or organization named on the declaration page as named insured. MSI then points out that the named insured on the declarations page is ALCECO. Since neither Larry Huebner nor Monte Huebner are identified as the named insured, MSI argues that neither of them qualifies as you under the underinsured endorsement. MSI goes on to state that, since ALCECO has no family members because they are a corporation, the only party covered under you or any family member can be ALCECO. Support for MSI's contentions on this interpretation issue is found in Rodriguez v. Continental Casualty Co., 551 So.2d 45 (La. App. 1st Cir.1989), and Meyer v. American Economy Insurance Co., 103 Or.App. 160, 796 P.2d 1223, rev. denied, 310 Or. 547, 800 P.2d 789 (1990). Both cases involved very similar definitions of who is insured, and both had a category of you or any family member. Both cases defined you as the named insured in the declarations, and both courts found that you referred only to the named insured/employer. Both courts stated that there was no ambiguity under which the employees could recover uninsured benefits. Plaintiffs claim support for their interpretation of the you or any family member language is found in Decker v. CNA Insurance Co., 66 Ohio App.3d 576, 585 N.E.2d 884 (1990), and Carrington v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance, 169 Wis.2d 211, 485 N.W.2d 267 (1992). In Decker, the facts were very similar to the Huebners' case, except it was the employee, not the employee's son, who was hit by a car. The court had a difficult time construing the language you or any family member. It stated that, since a corporation could not have family members, a nonsensical result occurs when the named insured is a corporation. Decker, 66 Ohio App.3d at 579, 585 N.E.2d at 886. So, the court found that, in the business entity context, you or any family member was very ambiguous. The court went on to state that, since every word in an insurance policy is presumed to be included for a purpose, each word must be given meaning. Thus, the employee should be covered under the policy. Id., at 582, 585 N.E.2d at 888. In Carrington, residents of a youth home were injured in an accident and claimed benefits under the home's policy. The court substituted the youth home, which was a corporation, for you in you or a member of your family. The policy definition of family member stated in part that a ward or foster child who lives with you qualified as a family member. The court found the following ambiguity present. In this case, while it is reasonable to conclude that a corporation cannot have a family, it is also reasonable to conclude that an insurance contract may define the term family member such that an individual is a member of a corporate family for insurance purposes. Carrington, 485 N.W.2d at 270. The court found the policy sufficiently ambiguous to allow the children to be covered as wards/family members living with the corporation, Sunburst Youth Homes. In reviewing all of the arguments presented, we are unable to extend underinsured motorist coverage to Monte by reason of the primary policy clauses. Persons insured (as to any coverage for which a premium has been paid) are limited to (1) the named insured, (2) anyone occupying a covered vehicle, or (3) a consortium claimant as a result of injury to another insured. Clearly, Monte was not a person occupying a covered auto at the time of his injury. He was a pedestrian walking alongside the road. Nor is he a consortium claimant for injuries to another insured. Finally, he is not aided by the words you or any family member, as used in the primary policy because you is limited to a person described as a named insured on the declaration page of the policy. Only ALCECO qualifies as such with respect to the present policy. The coverage extended to a family member is limited to a person related to the named insured (here, ALCECO) by blood, marriage, or adoption who is a resident of the named insured's household, including a ward or foster child. We are not persuaded that the result should be otherwise by the reasons expressed in the Decker or Carrington decisions. Those cases found, improperly we believe, that a latent ambiguity is generated from using family member language in policies issued to corporations. We believe that the only thing that this marketing practice suggests is that MSI's business auto policies were written so as to be marketable to either individual proprietorships or to corporations. Assuming that individual proprietorships received certain coverages that corporations did not, that is so only because the contract specifies that it is so. It does not provide a basis for extending coverage where none exists. The important consideration in resolving this issue is that it does not appear that any premium charge was made for coverages that were not provided. In order to extend any of the coverages of the policy even to Larry Huebner, it was necessary to execute a special endorsement denoting those coverages and pay a special premium therefor. The coverages of the primary policy were not altered in that process other than expressly provided in the endorsement.