Opinion ID: 395139
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: georgia's capital sentencing review procedures

Text: 37 Smith's final complaint centers on the constitutional adequacy of Georgia's capital sentencing review procedures. On review of a case in which the death penalty is imposed, the Georgia Supreme Court is charged with determining: 38 (1) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor, and 39 (2) Whether ... the evidence supports the jury's ... finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance ..., and 40 (3) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. 41 Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2537(c) (1978). Georgia's statutory scheme for the imposition of the death penalty, including this provision for expedited appellate review by the Georgia Supreme Court, was held to be constitutional on its face by the United States Supreme Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell & Stevens, JJ.). Smith contends that the approval in Gregg was conditioned on the Court's assumption about the procedural protections afforded by appellate review and that this assumption has proven to be unfounded. In support of this claim, he relies on a study purporting to show that the methods used by the Georgia Supreme Court to evaluate excessiveness and disproportionality are scientifically unsound and have exaggerated, not reduced, the racial and geographic disparities present in capital sentencing. We cannot conclude, as the district court apparently could not, 34 on the basis of this evidence that the Georgia Supreme Court is incapable of performing its task adequately in all cases. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 224, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2949, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (White, J., concurring). Nor has Smith even attempted to establish that the Georgia Supreme Court failed properly to perform its task in this case. Id. (emphasis added). 42 To the contrary, the Georgia Supreme Court followed the statutory mandate imposed by § 27-2537(c). It determined that the sentence was not imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors and, after carefully reviewing the evidence, concluded that the evidence supported the jury's finding that Smith committed the murders for the purpose of receiving money or other things of monetary value, the statutory aggravating circumstance set forth in § 27-2534.1(b)(4). Smith v. State, 236 Ga. 12, 24, 222 S.E.2d 308, 317-18, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910, 96 S.Ct. 3224, 49 L.Ed.2d 1219 (1976). As part of its comparative sentence review, the court also found that the sentence of death in this case was not excessive or disproportionate to the penalties in similar cases, expressly noting the pattern it discerned in the imposition of the death penalty in multiple murder cases. Id. at 24-25, 222 S.E.2d at 318. We therefore reject Smith's contention that Georgia's appellate review procedure in capital cases is constitutionally defective and that it operated ineffectively in this case. 43 AFFIRMED.