Opinion ID: 2044356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Proof of Proximate Cause

Text: [14] The record clearly demonstrates that the Yoders did not provide sufficient evidence of proximate cause to survive summary judgment. Our law is clear that a self-supporting affidavit from a defendant physician suffices to make a prima facie case that the defendant did not commit malpractice. [35] Cotton affirmatively alleged that he did not breach the standard of care of a physician, that nothing he did harmed Yoder, and that his actions were not the proximate cause of Yoder's injury. [15] In a medical malpractice case, expert testimony is almost always required to prove causation. [36] Although an exception exists for matters where a layperson can infer negligence when causation is plain, such is not the case here. The Yoders allege that Cotton's actions tore the labrum in Yoder's right shoulder. Yoder had previously injured his shoulder and had undergone multiple surgeries when Cotton examined him, and it is not at all clear that Cotton's actions caused Yoder's current problems. Furthermore, there is insufficient evidence in the record that Cotton's examination could have caused Yoder's injury, as was noted by the only expert the Yoders deposed. Dr. Daniel P. Slawski, the expert deposed, stated that he would not provide expert testimony at trial. When asked his opinion on what caused the tear in Yoder's labrum, Slawski stated that [i]t would be extremely difficult to determine exactly the cause. Especially when we see patients after surgery or two surgeries and episodes, we have to go strictly by the patient's history. Slawski stated that he could not determine from his examination whether Yoder's injury was caused by a one-time trauma or repetitive movements over a long period of time. Slawski went on to say that he could not determine whether the labrum was torn prior to the IME, because that part of the joint was never visualized before surgery, nor was it operated on during the surgery. [16] In essence, the only evidence that the Yoders offered regarding causation was Yoder's own statement that his shoulder did not hurt prior to the examination and that it did hurt following the examination. The Yoders' only other evidence regarding causation was Slawski's equivocal statement that he could not rule out the possibility that Cotton had caused the injury. Such was insufficient to rebut Cotton's affidavit stating that his actions were not the cause of Yoder's injury. For that reason, we find that the district court did not err when it granted summary judgment on the Yoders' negligence claim, because there was no genuine issue of material fact.