Opinion ID: 2168838
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Legislative Action and the Delegation Doctrine

Text: This Court is not hard pressed to find an example of a case in which a separation of powers challenge was launched in response to a rule promulgated by the executive branch. The question today focuses on whether JCAR review of agency rules violates the separation of powers doctrine because the Legislature is legislating. In the past, the debate generally examined whether the exercise of rulemaking authority by the executive branch constituted the usurpation of a legislative function. Osius, supra at 698, 75 N.W.2d 25. The focus was on whether the executive branch violated the separation of powers doctrine by legislating. Cases that addressed yesterday's question are useful today. This Court's decision in Osius is a good starting place for examining the state of modern law. Although Osius was decided before the ratification of Michigan's Constitution of 1963, the principles enunciated in Osius have been consistently referred to in post-1963 constitutional jurisprudence. See, e.g., Dep't of Natural Resources v. Seaman, 396 Mich. 299, 309, 240 N.W.2d 206 (1976); Turmon, supra . Osius examined the validity of legislative delegation in a zoning context. It has subsequently been relied upon as the landmark case establishing the standards test as the law of delegation in Michigan. Westervelt, supra at 434, 263 N.W.2d 564. The Osius standards test provides that the Legislature may delegate certain legislative functions to another body as long as it prescribes guidance standards that are as reasonably precise as the subject matter requires or permits. Osius, supra at 698, 75 N.W.2d 25. In Westervelt, this Court examined the continuing validity of Osius. The Westervelt Court adhered to the Osius standard, and explained how the delegation doctrine related both to the separation of powers doctrine and to due process. Westervelt, supra at 437-438, 263 N.W.2d 564. At the end of the day, Westervelt held that, while lawmaking power cannot be delegated, the Legislature can delegate power to an administrative agency as long as certain guidelines are observed. Id. at 441. Westervelt used Osius as a starting point, concluding that when Osius standards were met, legislative authorization and limitation had occurred. Id. According to the Court, the act of delegation provided rules within which the delegate was required to operate and confined the scope of the delegate's power. Id. Further, rulemaking did not constitute legislation because the delegate executive agency was required to act within limits. Id. Westervelt 's rule was then strengthened in Michigan Farm Bureau, supra . There, the Court probed the definition of a rule under the APA and concluded that an administrative rule could only be valid if it was (1) within the scope of granted power, (2) issued pursuant to the proper procedures, and (3) was reasonable. Michigan Farm Bureau, supra at 149, 289 N.W.2d 699. By implication, a rule failing to satisfy these requirements would be invalid. In Turmon, supra, this Court examined the definition of sufficient guidelines in the context of constraining and directing delegation. Turmon held that, when an agency appropriately exerts legislatively delegated power, the delegation fits within Michigan's constitutional framework because the Legislature retains policy-making control. Turmon, supra at 647, 340 N.W.2d 620. The Court specifically noted that inclusion of the APA provision as mandatory procedure to be followed in the board's rulemaking further insures against possible abuse of delegated power.... Id. at 648, 340 N.W.2d 620. Finally, Clonlara, discussed the effect of the APA more directly. There, the Court specifically stated that if an agency attempts to adopt a rule without following the procedure outlined by the APA, then the rule will not have the force and effect of law. Id. at 239, 501 N.W.2d 88. Legislatively delegated power can only be validly exercised pursuant to proper procedure. Id. From these cases, it becomes clear that rulemaking pursuant to appropriate statutory procedure, though legislative in character, is not legislation. Yet, executive agencies have rulemaking power only to the extent that they act within the bounds of power conferred upon them by the Legislature. Thus, the following three rules apply: (1) if the delegation of authority is sufficiently specific, then the delegation of power will be valid, but the executive agency must nonetheless act within prescribed boundaries; (2) if the delegation is not sufficiently specific for the subject matter, then the delegation will be constitutionally invalid; and (3) if the delegation is valid, but the executive branch steps outside its bounds, then the executive use of power will be invalid. Clearly, the DOC director's authority to promulgate rules was at least partially derived from the enabling statute, found at M.C.L. § 791.206; MSA 28.2276. That statute expressly provides, [t]he director may promulgate rules pursuant to the administrative procedures act.... MCL 791.206(1); MSA 28.2276(1). Therefore, the delegation of authority under the enabling act is necessarily linked to the delegation of authority under the APA. [8] Michigan cases have repeatedly recognized that JCAR review is relevant to the delegation process. See, e.g., Clonlara, Turmon, and Michigan Farm Bureau, supra . By declaring §§ 45 and 46 unconstitutional and then severing those sections from the APA, the lead opinion fails to recognize fully the relationship between the APA and the enabling statute. It simply is not logical to conclude that an agency is not legislating when it creates legislative rules outside procedural boundaries and beyond its scope of authority, but that the Legislature is legislating by reviewing those same rules within procedural boundaries. Even though this Court has concluded that an agency does not violate the separation of powers doctrine when it promulgates rules in compliance with the APA, this Court's decisions also state that a rule will be invalid if APA procedures are not followed. Today, the Court steps blindly forward when it upholds the DOC rules and declares §§ 45 and 46 unconstitutional without even considering key Michigan cases. I would hold that the exertion of the JCAR's veto power does not constitute legislation. Michigan case law provides that an agency meeting the Osius standard need not comply with enactment and presentment procedures during the rulemaking process because the agency is not legislating. See, e.g., Seaman, supra at 309, 240 N.W.2d 206. The process does not magically evolve into legislation simply because the rules pass from the desk of an executive officer to a legislator. [9] The Legislature performs some functions that do not constitute legislation, and I believe that JCAR review is one such function. The JCAR does not have the power to speak without limitation. Instead, JCAR review is merely one part of an intricate procedural system. Further, as stated above, JCAR review does not fall within Westervelt `s definition of legislation.