Opinion ID: 1625212
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Commissioner Thigpen and Members of the Parole Board

Text: Law, like man's other inventions intended to make our society better, is infected with contradiction and ambiguity, as all judges are painfully aware. Legitimate interests cry for vindication such that none could deny except that equally worthy interests are trampled in the process. The last thing our poorly paid and heavily burdened correctional and parole officials need is more lawsuits. Yet the system they administer will inevitably produce great injury. Judge Learned Hand once agonized over the tensions inherent in judicial resolution of such contradictory forces. It does indeed go without saying that an official, who is in fact guilty of using his powers to vent his spleen upon others, or for any other personal motive not connected with the public good, should not escape liability for the injuries he may so cause; and, if it were possible in practice to confine such complaints to the guilty, it would be monstrous to deny recovery. The justification for doing so is that it is impossible to know whether the claim is well founded until the case has been tried, and that to submit all officials, the innocent as well as the guilty, to the burden of a trial and to the inevitable danger of its outcome, would dampen the ardor of all but the most resolute, or the most irresponsible, in the unflinching discharge of their duties. Again and again the public interest calls for action which may turn out to be founded on a mistake, in the face of which an official may later find himself hard put to it to satisfy a jury of his good faith. There must indeed be means of punishing public officers who have been truant to their duties; but that is quite another matter from exposing such as have been honestly mistaken to suit by anyone who has suffered from their errors. As is so often the case, the answer must be found in a balance between the evils inevitable in either alternative. In this instance it has been thought in the end better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. Judged as res nova, we should not hesitate to follow the path laid down in the books. Gregorie v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949). The last two decades have seen considerable litigation regarding our prison officials' immunity vel non when faced with civil actions and claims of damage caused by acts or omissions within the performance of their official responsibilities. Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 412-15 (5th Cir.1978) correctly saw that Mississippi law afforded such officials a qualified immunity to suit. We addressed the subject in Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1982), wherein this Court stated: ... It is our opinion that abolishment of sovereign immunity does not apply to legislative, judicial and executive acts by individuals acting in their official capacity, or to similar situations of individuals acting in similar capacities in local governments, either county or municipal. Pruett, 421 So.2d at 1052. Pruett, therefore, left intact the immunity granted to the legislature, judiciary and executive office and to those public officers who are vested with discretionary authority. Pruett, 421 So.2d at 1052. The matter of qualified official immunity was before the Court in Poyner v. Gilmore, 171 Miss. 859, 158 So. 922 (1935). In distinguishing between ministerial duties, which the officer neglects at his peril, and qualifiedly protected discretionary public functions, the Poyner Court stated: `The most important criterion, perhaps, is that (if) the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and its performance required at a time and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the conditions specified not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion,' the act and discharge thereof is ministerial. Poyner, 171 Miss. at 865, 158 So. at 923. See also Hudson v. Rausa, 462 So.2d 689, 694 (Miss. 1984). Davis v. Little, 362 So.2d 642 (Miss. 1978), was a tort action in which plaintiff charged a supervisor with negligence while driving a county owned pickup truck. Davis further explained the underlying rationale of qualified public official immunity. The immunity of public officials, on the other hand, is a more limited principle, since its purpose is not directly to protect the sovereign, but rather to do so only collaterally, by protecting the public official in the performance of his governmental function. Given the more limited function, courts have generally extended less than absolute immunity. The most commonly recognized limitation is the distinction between discretionary acts as opposed to ministerial acts. Under this distinction the official is immune only where that which he does in the performance of his lawful duties requires personal deliberation, decision and judgment. See Prosser, Law of Torts, § 132 (4th ed. 1971). Davis, 362 So.2d at 643; see also Hudson, 462 So.2d at 694-95. Hudson summed the matter up. The public officials of this state, elected or appointed, enjoy a qualified immunity to a civil action for damages when acting in the performance of official functions discretionary in nature. They lose that immunity only when they substantially exceed their authority and commit wrongs under color of office. They have no immunity where they commit wilful wrongs or malicious acts. [citations omitted] Hudson, 462 So.2d at 696. Our law thus directs that a governmental official has no immunity to a civil action for damages if his breach of a legal duty causes injury and (1) that duty is ministerial in nature, or (2) that duty involves the use of discretion and the governmental actor greatly or substantially exceeds his authority and in the course thereof causes harm, or (3) the governmental actor commits an intentional tort. Beyond that, a government official has no immunity when sued upon a tort that has nothing to do with his official position or decision-making function and has been committed outside the course and scope of his office.
The Commissioner of Corrections is vested with substantial discretionary authority. Cf. Morgan v. Cook, 236 So.2d 749, 750 (Miss. 1970) (referring to superintendent under former administration structure); Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 412-13 (Miss. 1978) (same). The Commissioner has no authority, however, to grant or deny parole, nor does our law impose upon him any duty to recommend for or against parole. The only duty imposed on the Commissioner of Corrections, as Commissioner of Corrections, relative to parole matters is a general one found in Miss. Code Ann. § 47-5-28(d) (Supp. 1987). That section provides that the Commissioner has the duty, upon request, [to] provide the Parole Board with adequate staff and support resources necessary to conducting Parole Board business under the guidance of the administrative assistant for parole matters. Readily we see that this has nothing to do with Grantham's complaint. Grantham argues that Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-19 (Supp. 1987) imposes a duty on the commissioner to furnish information to the Parole Board. Section 47-7-19 provides: It shall be the duty of all correctional system officials ... to furnish to the board such reports as the board shall require concerning the conduct and character of any offender in the department of corrections' custody and any other facts deemed by the board pertinent in determining whether such offender shall be paroled. If this be all, Grantham's complaint doesn't even come close to stating a claim against former Commissioner Thigpen. Her only allegation is that he failed to provide information, any duty to furnish which is negated by her subsequent allegation that the Parole Board never requested any information or report regarding Jimpson. The notion that there might be some legally sufficient causal connection between Commissioner Thigpen's failure, if any, to provide information and Grantham's injuries seems tenuous at best. In the end, we do not regard Section 47-7-19 as imposing upon the Commissioner a discretion-free informational duty. The statute seems directory, not mandatory. Affording Grantham's complaint the elasticity required in the present procedural context, we find nothing to suggest that she might be able to prove that former Commissioner Thigpen committed any intentional tort or acted substantially at variance with his authority. The Circuit Court's judgment dismissing Grantham's claim against Thigpen is affirmed.
The complaint against the five parole board members sued personally in their individual and official capacities presents another matter, for these are the people who in law and in fact set Jimpson free. The decisions whether one in custody should be granted parole is attended with broad discretion, Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-17 (1972), as parole is more a matter of grace than of right. Williams v. State, 445 So.2d 798, 813 (Miss. 1984); Davis v. State, 429 So.2d 262, 263 (Miss. 1983). Indeed, exercise of that discretionary authority is one of the toughest judgment calls any state official may be called upon to make. On the one hand, the offer and somewhat regular grant of parole is an essential ingredient of any rational correctional policy. On the other hand, experience teaches that not even the most careful screening may eliminate all recidivism. In the best run system there will be some parolees who will commit new offenses while on parole. Our task today is narrow and procedural. Looking to the amended complaint we find that Grantham has charged that the members of the Parole Board paroled Jimpson with reckless disregard for her safety. She charges that, prior to their parole decision, these board members did not review all pertinent information, the circumstances of Jimpson's offense [murder in the course of a robbery], nor his previous social history and criminal record. Continuing, Grantham's amended complaint charges that these Defendants failed to consider the twenty-two (22) years Jimpson had spent in prison; the five (5) armed robbery charges and a murder dropped after his conviction in December of 1972; and his previous escape from the State Penitentiary at Parchman... . The Defendants failed to inquire about Jimpson's conduct, employment and attitude while in the custody of the Department, and they failed to ascertain whether or not any physical or mental examinations had been made. These actions, Grantham charges, were substantial departures from the duties imposed upon the members of the Parole Board by Section 47-7-17. There are other charges alluded to at the outset, but which need not be here detailed. What is said above is enough. Grantham has charged that Defendants Ruth, Sykes, Kaelin, Figgs and Carter have been guilty of gross neglect of their duties under Section 47-7-17. Though we reject the notion that those duties be classed ministerial, Grantham's amended complaint seems sufficient to pierce the shield of these officials' qualified immunity to suit as outlined above. We certainly may not say with confidence that she can, consistent with her allegations, prove no set of facts which would entitle her to relief. The judgment of the Circuit Court dismissing Grantham's amended complaint against Defendants Ruth, Sykes, Kaelin, Figgs and Carter is reversed and this case is remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, as though the motion to dismiss had been denied. Breland v. Smith-Johnson, Inc., 501 So.2d 389, 393 (Miss. 1987); Whitten v. Commercial Dispatch Publishing Company, Inc., 487 So.2d 843, 846 (Miss. 1986); McCain v. Northwestern National Insurance Co., 484 So.2d 1001, 1002 (Miss. 1986). We intend that not the slightest hint be perceived how this case ought ultimately be decided. Certainly, we in no way intimate that Grantham ought recover, or, for that matter that her claim ought survive summary judgment. Suffice to say that many obstacles loom large before her, not the least of which is causation. See Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S.Ct. 553, 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 481, 489 (1980). What  and all  we hold this day is that Grantham's amended complaint has, as to these five Defendants, stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS, P.J., and PRATHER, SULLIVAN, ANDERSON, GRIFFIN and ZUCCARO, JJ., concur. DAN M. LEE, P.J., concurs in part and dissents in part.