Opinion ID: 171317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Oilind urges us to go further than merely setting aside the verdict. It argues that it is entitled to entry of judgment in its favor on the ADA claim because there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict even on the theories of relief for which the instructions were correct. It contends that the evidence was insufficient to support two propositions necessary for the verdict: (1) that Ms. Kellogg was a person with a disability and (2) that she was a qualified individual. Oilind moved on these grounds for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) and (b); and the district court denied the motions. We review this denial de novo. Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 674 (10th Cir.2005). [A JMOL] is warranted only if the evidence points but one way and is susceptible to no reasonable inferences supporting the party opposing the motion. We do not weigh the evidence, pass on the credibility of the witnesses, or substitute our conclusions for those of the jury. However, we must enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the moving party if there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis with respect to a claim or defense under the controlling law. We must view the evidence and any inferences to be drawn therefrom most favorably to the non-moving party. McInnis v. Fairfield Communities, Inc., 458 F.3d 1129, 1136 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). For the reasons that follow, we agree with the district court on these issues.
Oilind argues that Ms. Kellogg did not establish that she is a person with a disability as defined by the ADA because she did not show that she had an impairment that substantially limited her in the major life activities of working or caring for herself. Establishing the existence of such an impairment, however, is only one of three ways to prove a disability under the ADA. A plaintiff may also show that she had a record of such an impairment, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B), or that she was regarded as having such an impairment, id. § 12102(2)(C). Ms. Kellogg pursued at trial the theory that Oilind regarded her as having an impairment that substantially limited at least one of her major life activities. Yet Oilind has not addressed on appeal that potential ground for finding Ms. Kellogg disabled. Because Oilind has not argued, much less demonstrated, that the evidence at trial would not support a jury finding that Oilind regarded Ms. Kellogg as having an impairment that substantially limited one of her major life activities, we may assume that the evidence did support such a finding, so denial of JMOL was correct. See Lindstrom v. United States, 510 F.3d 1191, 1196 (10th Cir.2007) (arguments not raised in appellant's brief are waived).
The second element of an ADA discrimination claim is proving that the plaintiff is a qualified individual with a disability. See Zwygart, 483 F.3d at 1090. As we explained in Tate v. Farmland Industries, Inc., 268 F.3d 989 (10th Cir.2001): The ADA defines a qualified individual with a disability as an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). As a condition to performing the essential functions of an employment position, however, an individual must first satisfy the requisite skill, experience, education and other job-related requirements of the employment position. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). If a plaintiff fails to establish that he has met either step of this analysis, he is not a qualified individual within the meaning of § 12111(8). Id. at 992-93 (footnote omitted). There is no dispute that Ms. Kellogg was qualified to do her job before she was diagnosed with epilepsy. At trial Oilind claimed that there were two job requirements that Ms. Kellogg could no longer meet after her diagnosis: (1) she could not drive, and (2) she could not meet the standards in DOT pipeline regulations to perform safety-sensitive work in the shop. Aplt.App., Vol. IV at 709. In Tate we discussed when an employer's stated requirement for a job should be considered an essential function of the job: The question of whether a job requirement is a necessary requisite to employment initially focuses on whether an employer actually requires all employees in the particular position to satisfy the alleged job-related requirement. Cf. Milton v. Scrivner, Inc., 53 F.3d 1118, 1124 (10th Cir.1995) (holding under the ADA that an essential function of a job must be actually required of all employees in the particular position). This inquiry is not intended to second guess the employer or to require the employer to lower company standards. Id.; see also H. Rep. No. 101-485(II), at 55 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 337 (The ADA does not undermine an employer's ability to choose and maintain qualified workers.). Provided that any necessary job specification is job-related, uniformly-enforced, and consistent with business necessity, the employer has the right to establish what a job is and what is required to perform it. 268 F.3d at 993. Applying these tests, we conclude that the jury could properly have found that neither of Oilind's claimed job requirements was an essential function of Ms. Kellogg's job. As to the first, the jury could find that driving was not an essential function of the job, because there was testimony that at least twice in the past, the Worland office had allowed safety supervisors who had lost their driving privileges after driving-under-the-influence infractions to work in the shop until their licenses were restored. As to the second, the jury could find that the ability to meet DOT pipeline regulationswhich allegedly prohibited anyone on a medication from working in a safety-sensitive positionwas not a requirement of the job, given that these regulations were never produced for the jury and no witness from the company was able to give more than a vague description of them. Chamberlain, the district manager, said that he had been unaware of any regulations prohibiting Ms. Kellogg from working in the shop until the corporate office told him so. When the company's president was asked about the pipeline regulations, he testified that he was familiar with the ones applicable to Oilind, but he did not identify any of them. He claimed that the medical restrictions for safety-sensitive positions were also contained in the company's policies-and-procedures manual, but he likewise could not identify where in the manual such restrictions appeared. Oilind cites some pipeline regulations in its reply brief to this court; we do not consider them, however, because they were never presented at trial. See Boone v. Carlsbad Bancorporation, Inc., 972 F.2d 1545, 1549 n. 1 (10th Cir.1992).