Opinion ID: 2207851
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Remarks by Prosecution

Text: Sullivan contends that the State deprived him of a fair penalty hearing by making improper statements in its closing and rebuttal arguments before the jury. Sullivan's claims of error are based upon the prejudice he attributes to four categories of remarks. Once again, these are contentions which Sullivan did not present to the Superior Court. Therefore, Sullivan must demonstrate plain error. See Walls v. State, Del.Supr., 560 A.2d 1038, 1049 (1989); Michael v. State, Del.Supr., 529 A.2d 752, 762 (1987). Sullivan contends that the prosecutor encouraged the jury to minimize the consequences of its sentencing recommendation by advising the jury that the trial judge would ultimately decide the appropriate penalty. [4] The United States Supreme Court has held that the prosecution may not mislead a jury about its role in the sentencing process so as to minimize the jury's sense of responsibility for determining the appropriateness of death. Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 341, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 2646, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). In Caldwell, the Court stated: [I]t is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination by a sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. . . . . . In the capital sentencing context there are specific reasons to fear substantial unreliability as well as bias in favor of death sentences when there are state-induced suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate court. Id. at 328-30, 105 S.Ct. at 2639-40, quoted in Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 496 A.2d 997, 1025 (1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3339, 92 L.Ed.2d 743 (1986). The Mississippi death penalty statute at issue in Caldwell provided that [i]f the jury does not make the findings requiring the death sentence, or [i]f the jury cannot, within a reasonable time, agree as to punishment, the trial court was obligated to impose a sentence of life imprisonment. Id. 472 U.S. at 332 n. 3, 105 S.Ct. at 2641 n. 3 (quoting Miss.Code Ann. §§ 99-19-101(3)(c), 99-19-103). Thus, the decision made by the jury was binding on the Mississippi trial court to the extent it failed to reach agreement on a death sentence. Conversely, if the jury recommended a sentence of death, the Mississippi trial court was required to enter such a sentence subject only to appellate review for errors of law. See id. [5] Caldwell is distinguishable from the facts of the case sub judice, because [i]n no sense may it reasonably be said that the prosecutor was either misstating the law, misleading the jury as to its role, or minimizing its sentencing responsibility. Riley v. State, 496 A.2d at 1025. Unlike Caldwell, in the present case the State's remarks in closing and rebuttal accurately characterized the role of the jury under the applicable law. Pursuant to the present Delaware death penalty statute, the ultimate decision concerning the imposition of a sentence of death is now vested in the trial judge after considering the recommendation of the jury. 11 Del.C. § 4209(d)(1). The jury is an advisor to the trial court. Consequently, after a careful review of the record, we have concluded that the prosecutor's remarks concerning the judge's ultimate decision on a sentence of death did not constitute plain error. The second remark on which Sullivan bases his plain error claim was made by the prosecution during its rebuttal: [Defense counsel] told you he was degrading himself. He was begging, begging you to spare his client's life. Unfortunately, ladies and gentlemen, Maurice Dodd didn't have an activist like [defense counsel] to plead for his life on December 27th of last year. . . . . . No one can beg for Maurice Dodd's life today. It is an impossibility. He has been dead for almost a year. All we can do today, ladies and gentlemen, is impose a just sentence on Willie Sullivan. Sullivan contends that the foregoing statements by the prosecutor were an impermissible golden rule argument. The golden rule doctrine precludes an attorney from asking the jurors to put themselves in the place of a victim. See Delaware Olds, Inc. v. Dixon, Del.Supr., 367 A.2d 178, 179 (1976). In support of his argument, Sullivan cites Bertolotti v. State, Fla. Supr., 476 So.2d 130 (1985). In Bertolotti, the prosecutor urged the jurors to imagine the victim's final torment during the murder committed by the defendant. Id. at 133. The prohibition against golden rule arguments was not implicated by the prosecutor's statements which are challenged by Sullivan in this case. The prosecutor did not ask the jury to put themselves in the place of the victim, Dodd. Therefore, those comments by the prosecutor did not constitute plain error. Third, Sullivan argues that the prosecutor improperly interjected his own personal experience and opinion into its rebuttal. In attempting to refute the arguments made by defense counsel concerning Sullivan's mental retardation, the prosecutor recounted testimony by Sullivan's witnesses about his ability to repair appliances and then stated: Ladies and gentlemen, I can't even set the time on my VCR. It is still blinking 12:00 o'clock. I can't set my VCR to record a program tomorrow or next week or whatever  (emphasis added). Shortly thereafter, the prosecutor prefaced an observation about the testimony of Sullivan's expert witness, Irwin G. Weintraub, Ph.D. (Dr. Weintraub), concerning Sullivan's mental retardation with the phrase [t]he thing that got to me  (emphasis added). The prosecutor concluded the observation by remarking [c]ome on, ladies and gentlemen. Sullivan contends that these latter comments constituted improper expressions of personal opinion regarding the credibility of the defense expert's testimony and the creditworthiness of the defense arguments based upon that testimony. See Brokenbrough v. State, Del.Supr., 522 A.2d 851, 859 (1987). It is well-established that arguments based upon an attorney's personal beliefs or knowledge are impermissible. Id. The State acknowledges on appeal that the personal arguments by the prosecutor were improper. To establish plain error, however, Sullivan has the burden of showing that the improper arguments by the prosecutor not only created the possibility of prejudice, but that the errors worked to his actual substantial disadvantage. Saunders v. State, Del. Supr., 602 A.2d 623, 625 (1984). After a careful review of the record of the penalty hearing, we have determined that Sullivan was not substantially disadvantaged, given the centrality of the issues, the nature of the prosecutor's comments, and the strength of the contrary evidence presented by Sullivan. See Hughes v. State, Del.Supr., 437 A.2d 559, 571-72 (1981). The usages of the first-person pronouns were isolated. Those which were made regarding Dr. Weintraub did not imply that the prosecutor possessed superior knowledge concerning Dr. Weintraub's credibility beyond that which was logically inferable from the evidence. See Saunders v. State, 602 A.2d at 624. Finally, Sullivan argues that the prosecution engaged in improper argument in rebuttal when it asserted that [t]his is a capital case because it deserves to be a capital case. The State contends that this statement was merely a reply to allegations by Sullivan's counsel during his closing argument to the effect that Sullivan is the person that the State wants to execute. That's the person the State wants you to be the instrumentality for executing ... (emphasis added). These statements, the State contends, amounted to accusations of selective and subjective application of the death penalty by the State, which called for a response. It is well-established that during closing arguments although a prosecutor may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935). Accord Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d at 567. Therefore, an improper response by a prosecutor cannot be excused as invited by argument from defense counsel. Michael v. State, 529 A.2d at 764. The proper response to an improper argument is a timely objection. Id. Once again, Sullivan has not demonstrated that the prosecutor's comments constituted plain error. It is improper for the prosecution to imply that the State has already made a careful decision that a particular defendant deserves the death penalty. Compare Brokenbrough v. State, 522 A.2d at 857; Hughes v. State, 437 A.2d at 573. See Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1383, 1410 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1022, 106 S.Ct. 3337, 92 L.Ed.2d 742 (1986). However, just as the argument by Sullivan's attorney was proper, so too was the prosecutor's argument that the evidence of Dodd's murder satisfied the statutory definition of an appropriate capital case. The record also reflects that, in other contexts, the prosecution reminded the jury that it was charged with the obligation to decide for itself whether to recommend a sentence of death for Sullivan. See Brooks v. Kemp, 762 F.2d at 1414. Consequently, Sullivan has not demonstrated that the prosecutor's comments constituted plain error.