Opinion ID: 1122718
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Additional Defendant

Text: We agree with the superior court that the Shooshanians' motion to add Thermal Efficiency as a party defendant was properly denied. Alaska Civil Rule 15(a) requires that a party, who wishes to amend his complaint after a responsive pleading has been filed, seek leave of the court. The trial court has broad discretion to decide whether to grant leave to amend, Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d 490, 495 (Alaska 1979), and the supreme court will interfere with the exercise of that discretion only when it has been abused. Merrill v. Faltin, 430 P.2d 913, 915 (Alaska 1967). The Shooshanians had an opportunity to join Thermal Efficiency in May 1981 when they submitted their first amended complaint. Thermal Efficiency argues that, in fact, the Shooshanians had the opportunity to amend their complaint at any time from March 1979, when Thermal Efficiency answered Borden's third-party complaint, to January 6, 1982, the final date set by the trial court for any motions to amend the pleadings to be filed. During this period of approximately thirty-two months, the Shooshanians did not take any action to discover whether they had a claim against Thermal Efficiency. Thermal Efficiency argues that, because of the Shooshanians' undue delay in moving to amend, joinder at such an advanced point in the proceedings would be prejudicial to them. The Shooshanians do not reply to these contentions. If a party would be prejudiced by a proposed amendment, the court must apply a balancing test to decide whether the amendment should be granted, weighing the degree of prejudice to the opposing party against the hardship to the movant if the amendment is denied. Wright v. Vickaryous, 598 P.2d at 495 n. 13; Merrill v. Faltin, 430 P.2d at 915. Among the factors to be considered in evaluating prejudice to the opposing party are the added expense if the motion is granted and whether trial will be significantly more burdensome or lengthy. Estate of Thompson v. Mercedes-Benz, Inc., 514 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Alaska 1973). It is a long established maxim of equity jurisprudence that parties may not sleep upon their rights. See, e.g., Baxter v. Redevco, Inc., 279 Or. 117, 566 P.2d 501, 503 (1977); Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). The Shooshanians had ample opportunity to join Thermal Efficiency as a defendant yet did not attempt to do so until their complaint against Borden was dismissed. Although it had notice of the subject matter of the suit against Borden, Thermal Efficiency had prepared to defend as a third party and not as a principal defendant. Prior to trial, Thermal Efficiency settled its differences with Borden and thus did not intend to litigate the case. To allow joinder at this point would require additional delays and substantial expense on the part of Thermal Efficiency. This outweighs the hardship imposed on the Shooshanians by denying their dilatory motion. We find, therefore, that the superior court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant the Shooshanians leave to amend their complaint.