Opinion ID: 2092330
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: it is hereby ordered:

Text: 1. That JANET B. PAGANO having been advised of her right to a full and complete hearing with respect to her attorneys' fees under section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, and having knowingly waived her right to said hearing, agrees that she shall pay to RINELLA AND RINELLA, LTD. the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND ($20,000.00) DOLLARS as and for additional fees she has already paid said law firm. 2. That Judgment is hereby awarded RINELLA AND RINELLA LTD., against JANET B. PAGANO for said sum and said Judgment shall be a lien against her interest in the residence located at 7 South 441 Donwood Drive, Naperville, Illinois until paid in full. Mrs. Pagano signed the proposed agreed order and the court entered it on June 2, 1986. At that time, Rinella's time sheets showed that $15,000 in attorney fees had accrued. Almost a year later, on May 14, 1987, Richard Rinella and an associate, Steven Russo, met Mrs. Pagano in the courthouse cafeteria just prior to the start of dissolution proceedings. Before leaving for the proceedings, Richard Rinella presented Mrs. Pagano with a second proposed agreed order. This proposed agreed order was similar to the first but was handwritten, indicated the sum of $30,000 instead of $20,000, and again waived Mrs. Pagano's right to a section 508 hearing. The second proposed order stated that Mrs. Pagano's waiver was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily and that the waiver was made without coercion or duress. It did not purport to modify or rescind the previous agreed order, nor did it refer to the first agreed order in any way. Similar to the first agreed order, however, it indicated that judgment was hereby entered in favor of Rinella and that such judgment created a lien on her residence. Mrs. Pagano signed the second proposed agreed order and it was entered four days later. On September 14, 1987, after the dissolution proceedings had concluded, Rinella was allowed to withdraw as Mrs. Pagano's attorney. A week later, Rinella sought additional security for its fees by filing a petition for $36,334.15 against both Mrs. Pagano and Mr. Pagano. On December 2, 1987, the court considered this petition in the presence of counsel representing both Mr. and Mrs. Pagano. Rinella attempted to stand on its petition which included the $30,000 agreed order and supporting time sheets. The court held that Rinella's petition was insufficient to award attorney fees against Mr. Pagano, and ordered that `the order entered on May 18, 1987, awarding Rinella & Rinella fees of THIRTY THOUSAND ($30,000) DOLLARS shall be the total fees awarded to Rinella & Rinella on this cause.' See Pagano, 181 Ill.App.3d at 552-53, 130 Ill.Dec. 331, 537 N.E.2d 398. Mrs. Pagano subsequently sought post-judgment relief by filing a section 2-1401 petition with the circuit court (Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 110, par. 2-1401). ( Pagano, 181 Ill.App.3d at 553, 130 Ill.Dec. 331, 537 N.E.2d 398.) The circuit court denied this motion. Although the record is clear that the Rinella firm did not seek to use the $20,000 agreed order against either Mr. or Mrs. Pagano at the December 2, 1987, proceedings, the appellate court, in Pagano I, found that Rinella's conduct in having Mrs. Pagano sign the $30,000 order, was improper: two agreed orders were entered in the present case for a total of $50,000 even though Rinella's own petition for fees indicated that only $37,034.15 had been earned. While it may have been the intent of Rinella to have the second agreed order supersede the first, that is not clear from the second order. Consequently, we find that both orders must be vacated since the two combined were excessive. The appellate court also reversed the December 2, 1987, order and remanded the cause for a hearing pursuant to section 508 of the Act. ( Pagano, 181 Ill.App.3d at 563, 130 Ill.Dec. 331, 537 N.E.2d 398.) Finally, the appellate court determined that the circuit court committed procedural error in not having before it a petition for attorneys fees and an itemization of the billing including the hourly cost, the time spent on the case, and an itemization of the tasks performed before it entered both the $20,000 and $30,000 agreed orders, although the court did not reverse on this particular point. Pagano, 181 Ill.App.3d at 555, 130 Ill.Dec. 331, 537 N.E.2d 398.