Opinion ID: 1367567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Predicate Conviction

Text: At the outset, we must determine whether petitioner may now challenge the constitutional validity of his 1976 manslaughter conviction, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in an unpublished opinion filed August 3, 1978. The Court of Appeals in its opinion in the case now before us said that State v. Swindell [33] and State v. Gore [34] permit a collateral attack on the prior conviction, but that these holdings are fact specific and do not support a collateral challenge in the present case. [35] That is not an accurate interpretation of Swindell and Gore. A challenge to the constitutional validity of a predicate conviction which serves as an essential element of a charge for violation of the Uniform Firearms Act is not a collateral attack on the prior conviction. As stated in Swindell, such a challenge is not an attempt to invalidate the previous judgment, as would be the case in a direct appeal or personal restraint petition. Rather, defendant seeks to foreclose the prior conviction's present use to establish an essential element of RCW 9.41.040, i.e., a constitutionally valid conviction for a `crime of violence'. [36] This court concluded that petitioner Swindell could challenge a constitutionally invalid guilty plea used to support the State's allegation of conviction of a previous crime of violence. In Swindell, the petitioner was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon and was subsequently charged with violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction. This court affirmed the Court of Appeals. Petitioner Swindell argued that his assault conviction could not be used to support a conviction under RCW 9.41.040 upon his plea of guilty because that plea was made involuntarily. The State argued that the defendant could not challenge the 1969 conviction, he having failed to do so either by direct appeal or by a petition for postconviction relief. The challenge raised two issues: first, on a charge alleging violation of RCW 9.41.040, whether a defendant can challenge the present use of a prior conviction of a crime of violence on the ground that the underlying guilty plea was allegedly made involuntarily; and second, if such a challenge is permissible, who has the burden of proving the constitutional validity or invalidity of the guilty plea. The court observed that Swindell was indistinguishable from the case of State v. Holsworth, [37] noting that: In Holsworth, we ... held that once a defendant charged under RCW 9.92.090 calls attention to the alleged unconstitutionality of a prior felony conviction used by the State to support a habitual criminal charge, the State must thereafter prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the prior conviction was constitutionally valid. The considerations determinative of one's right to challenge prior guilty pleas in the habitual criminal context are also present in the instant case. The existence of a constitutionally valid conviction for a `crime of violence' is an element the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt under RCW 9.41.040.... Accordingly, we hold that once a defendant calls attention to the alleged unconstitutionality of a plea of guilty to a prior `crime of violence' sought to be used by the State to support a charge under RCW 9.41.040, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the plea was made voluntarily.[ [38] ] In State v. Gore, [39] the petitioner, previously convicted of second degree burglary, was charged with possession of a pistol. The burglary conviction was then on appeal and was later reversed. Petitioner was convicted in the trial court, but reserved the right to appeal if the burglary conviction was reversed on appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the later reversal of the burglary conviction did not affect the culpability of the possession and affirmed the judgment. This court reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that reversal of the underlying burglary conviction invalidated the possession conviction. [1] Swindell and Gore are factually distinguishable from the case now before us. Swindell was based on a plea of guilty and Gore was based on a conviction later reversed on appeal. In contrast, Petitioner Summers' 1976 conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in 1978 and he did not seek further review. Nevertheless, these differences in the posture of the predicate convictions are immaterial to a determination of Petitioner Summers' right to challenge his manslaughter conviction. Swindell and Gore establish two rules that apply in any prosecution for violation of the Uniform Firearms Act. First, a defendant may raise a defense to such a prosecution by alleging the constitutional invalidity of a predicate conviction, and second, upon doing so, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the predicate conviction is constitutionally sound. [40] In raising this defense, the defendant bears the initial burden of offering a colorable, fact-specific argument supporting the claim of constitutional error in the prior conviction. Only after the defendant has made this initial showing does the State's burden arise. We hold that petitioner may challenge his 1976 predicate conviction for manslaughter even though that conviction was upon a jury verdict and was affirmed on appeal. Original appellate review will normally satisfy a defendant's challenge to constitutional infirmities. But where, as here, a question is raised concerning the retroactive effect of a new rule of constitutional magnitude, prior appellate review should not stand as an absolute bar to the challenge. It follows, then, that this court must now consider whether the original appellate review of petitioner's 1976 manslaughter conviction and the 1978 decision constitute proof of the constitutional validity of that conviction beyond a reasonable doubt. This requires an evaluation of the issues raised in that appeal and the law as it existed at the time of the appellate review, and of any subsequent changes in the constitutional requirements for criminal prosecutions which are alleged by the petitioner to have retroactive effect on the validity of the predicate conviction. In its 1978 unpublished opinion affirming petitioner's manslaughter conviction, the Court of Appeals identified the issue on appeal as whether the requirements of Anders v. California and State v. Theobald [, 78 Wn.2d 184, 470 P.2d 188 (1970)] [have] been met so as to require affirmance and allow the withdrawal of counsel on appeal. [41] The opinion briefly discussed the question whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on self-defense and in refusing [Mr. Summers'] requested instructions. [42] The court rejected this argument, finding that a thorough reading of the trial court's instructions reveals that every aspect of the defendant's proposed instructions was covered in the court's charge to the jury. [43] Actually, the record indicates that Mr. Summers did not request an instruction on the burden of proof in a claim of self-defense. State v. Roberts [44] had not yet been decided. The issue of burden of proof was not before the Court of Appeals when it considered the adequacy of the instructions given at trial. It also appears that the Court of Appeals did not consider retroactive application of the then newly announced rule in Roberts to the jury instructions in that case. We conclude that the issue of proper allocation of the burden of proof for a claim of self-defense was not considered by the Court of Appeals in 1978. Petitioner Summers may therefore now raise this issue in challenging the constitutionality of his 1976 conviction for manslaughter as a predicate conviction in his 1989 prosecution for violation of the Uniform Firearms Act.