Opinion ID: 657180
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Extent of a Federal Court's Authority to Enter a Writ of Habeas Corpus

Text: 26 The State also claims that the district court was without the power to use the writ to compel a state court to modify its sentence, citing to Duhamel v. Collins, 955 F.2d 962 (5th Cir.1992), in support of this contention. 11 In Duhamel, this court vacated a similar order from the District Court for the Southern District of Texas which attempted to commute a death sentence into life imprisonment, holding that this action was beyond the authority of a federal court. 955 F.2d at 968. The State also cites to Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430-31, 83 S.Ct. 822, 844, 9 L.Ed.2d 837 (1963)--quoted in Duhamel--for the proposition that a federal court cannot revise the state court judgment; it can only act on the body of the petitioner. 27 Smith responds that our opinion in Welch v. Beto, 355 F.2d 1016, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 839, 87 S.Ct. 88, 17 L.Ed.2d 72 (1966), and the district court's opinion in Jones v. Smith, 685 F.Supp. 604 (S.D.Miss.1988), control this outcome and that a federal court may use the habeas writ to prohibit the State permanently from executing a prisoner. In Welch, this court, upon finding a violation of the petitioner's federal rights, remanded the case and ordered the district court to take such action as necessary to allow the state an opportunity to accord the petitioner a post-conviction hearing in accordance with the opinion within a reasonable time. 355 F.2d at 1020. This court further mandated that [i]n default thereof, the petitioner shall not be executed. Id. In Jones, another judge in the Southern District of Mississippi issued an order virtually identical to the one issued in the instant case. See 685 F.Supp. at 606-07. The Jones court relied upon a line of authority allowing a federal court to employ its broad discretionary powers to grant various forms of equitable relief (without which it is obvious that similar orders would be issued in vain). Id. at 606. On the basis of the foregoing authorities, Smith concludes that it is appropriate for a federal court to use its habeas powers to impose conditionally [a] prohibition against the re-imposition of the death penalty unless the State avails itself of the opportunity to correct the constitutional error. 28 We agree with the State that the district court did not have the authority under federal law to compel Mississippi to impose upon [Smith] a sentence of life imprisonment. In Fay v. Noia, the Supreme Court recounted the historical use of the writ of habeas corpus and the federal reluctance to extend the writ to interfere with state court proceedings. 372 U.S. at 403, 83 S.Ct. at 829. 12 The Court recognized that the root principle of the habeas writ is that in a civilized society, government must always be accountable to the judiciary for a man's imprisonment: if the imprisonment cannot be shown to conform with the fundamental requirements of law, the individual is entitled to his immediate release. 372 U.S. at 402, 83 S.Ct. at 829 (emphasis added). Thus, the focus of the writ is an inquiry into the legality of the prisoner's detention. Id. at 418, 83 S.Ct. at 837. 13 29 We have found no indication that the Supreme Court has somehow changed its position and extended the use of habeas corpus in the context presented--i.e., to revise a state criminal defendant's sentence without requiring his release. It would thus appear that the writ has but one remedy--to direct the liberation of a state prisoner whose confinement violates federal law. Habeas lies to enforce the right of personal liberty; when that right is denied and a person confined, the federal court has the power to release him. Indeed, it has no other power.... Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. at 430-31, 83 S.Ct. at 844. It would be a serious departure from prior precedent to hold that the writ can vacate the defective sentence only to allow the federal court to resentence the state defendant on its own accord. 30 The Supreme Court has recognized the conditional use of the writ to require constitutional compliance. See, e.g., Richmond v. Lewis, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 528, 537, 121 L.Ed.2d 411 (1992). In Richmond, the Court issued the following mandate: 31 We reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to return the case to the District Court to enter an order granting the petition for a writ of habeas corpus unless the State of Arizona within a reasonable period of time either corrects the constitutional error in petitioner's death sentence or vacates the sentence and imposes a lesser sentence consistent with law. 32 Id. As with our mandate in the instant case, the Court's direction to the district court is to grant the writ unless the State takes action to remedy the infirmity in the death sentence. 14 See, e.g., Smith, 970 F.2d at 1389; Wiley v. Puckett, 969 F.2d 86, 94, 106 (5th Cir.1992). However, the conditional issuance of a habeas writ is decidedly different from a conditional resentencing, such as in Jones or the instant case. 15 In the conditional writ cases, the federal court has determined that it has the authority to order immediate release of the prisoner as a result of the federal law violation; the court chooses, however, to delay the writ to allow the state to correct the problem as best it can. Although the federal court, in doing so, may certainly suggest a corrective procedure in broad terms, the real thrust of the order is to alert the state court to the constitutional problem and notify it that the infirmity must be remedied. By contrast, a conditional resentencing--in which the federal court threatens to alter the state court's sentence or impose its own sentence if the State fails to take action--crosses the line into impermissible interference with the state court's autonomy in applying its own criminal procedures. See Dixon v. Beto, 472 F.2d 598, 599 (5th Cir.1973) (The federal courts are not empowered to order the state courts to make remedies available nor are they authorized to dictate the type of hearing which is to be conducted by the state courts.). Thus, both Richmond and our directive in Smith are consistent with the analysis in Fay v. Noia. 33 Smith's interpretation of Welch, however, does not comport with Fay v. Noia or with this court's opinion in Duhamel. Smith understands Welch to allow a federal court indirectly to commute a death sentence into life imprisonment by prohibiting execution of the death sentence. Thus, he concludes, it is proper for a federal court to grant habeas relief to a state defendant sentenced to death in the form of a life sentence. As noted previously, in Welch, this court ordered relief in a habeas proceeding conditioned upon the state's affording the petitioner an appropriate post-conviction proceeding. This court further mandated that [i]n default thereof, the petitioner shall not be executed. 355 F.2d at 1020. 34 Smith misreads our opinion in Welch. In that case, we held only that the state's default in compliance with our mandate would result in its inability to execute upon the defective sentence. Nothing in our opinion in that case can be read to have precluded the state from subsequently seeking a constitutionally valid death sentence. 35 In summary, we find that the portion of the July 9 Order directing Smith to be resentenced to life imprisonment amounts to an impermissible alteration of Smith's sentence.