Opinion ID: 4540186
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of Mendoza's Statements

Text: Mendoza argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the verbal and written statements that he gave to Agent Pérez and Agent del Valle because they were obtained in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution and, thus, should have been suppressed. Specifically, Mendoza argues that he invoked his right to remain silent, but the agents did not honor it because Agent Pérez's last chance admonishment that Colón would be prosecuted if he did not take responsibility for the items seized forced him to make involuntary statements. In response to Mendoza's contention, the Government presses that such argument was brought too late and is not properly before us because Mendoza did not raise it in his motion to suppress or at the suppression hearing but rather in his objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation. Thus, the Government asks that we deem the argument waived. We agree with the Government's position. Mendoza's motion to suppress the statements was originally grounded on a theory of coercion. Seeing that the theory was unsuccessful (the magistrate judge's report and recommendation rejected the argument and denied the motion), he asserted a new claim in his objections to the report and recommendation that his right to remain silent was violated based on the alleged coercion -- an untimely claim -28- that was not asserted in the motion below nor addressed by the district court. He presses this right-to-silence argument on appeal and does not attempt to show or address good cause for its untimeliness. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of this claim. See United States v. Rosado-Cancel, 917 F.3d 66, 69 (1st Cir. 2019) (finding waiver where defendant fail[ed] to raise [the argument] before the magistrate judge [and] instead advanc[ed] it for the first time in his objections to the magistrate's Report and Recommendation (citing Paterson-Leitch Co. v. Mass. Mun. Wholesale Elec. Co., 840 F.2d 985, 990-91 (1st Cir. 1988))); see also United States v. Galindo-Serrano, 925 F.3d 40, 47-48 (1st Cir. 2019) ([A]n untimely motion to suppress is deemed waived unless the party seeking to suppress can show good cause as to the delay. (quoting United States v. Sweeney, 887 F.3d 529, 534 (1st -29- Cir. 2018))). 19 We therefore find no error in the denial of Mendoza's request to suppress his statements.20