Opinion ID: 462724
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alleged Reliance on Perjured Testimony

Text: 27 Appellant argues that the informant committed perjury when he denied having an agreement with law enforcement officials concerning his wife. A review of the record indicates apparent inconsistency or confusion as to statements by Winters concerning knowledge of the government about drug activities of his wife. Apparently Winters believed that the government was acquiescing in his wife's drug purchases. There is ample evidence in the record, however, to conclude that there was no agreement concerning Winters' wife. The trial court ruled that Winters had not committed perjury. We find no basis to hold that the trial court erred as a matter of law in finding that the testimony of Winters as to this issue was not perjury. 28 Even if the informant's testimony could be construed as perjury the test laid out in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and its progeny would not require reversal on these facts. Under Brady, the prosecution is required to turn over to the defendant evidence favorable or exculpatory to the defendant's case when such evidence is material as to guilt or punishment. In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), the Court articulated three situations where the Brady doctrine applies. First, where the prosecution knew or should have know that its case contained perjured testimony a conviction will be set aside if there is any reasonable likelihood that the false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury. Agurs at 103, 96 S.Ct. at 2397. Second, where the prosecution fails to respond to a specific request for information, a new trial should be granted if the withheld evidence might have affected the outcome of the trial. Agurs at 104, 96 S.Ct. at 2397. Finally, where the defendant generally requests exculpating evidence and such evidence is withheld, reversal is required only if the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Agurs at 112, 96 S.Ct. at 2401. 29 Under the first situation where the Brady doctrine applies the government could not possibly have relied on perjured testimony because the evidence in controversy here came out on cross examination elicited by appellant. The second situation does not apply because the appellant never specifically requested the information. This leaves the third situation in which it is contended that the United States failed to disclose the alleged agreement even though the appellant had made a general request for relevant information. But under the standard for reversal espoused in Agurs, we cannot say that this evidence would be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt that appellant sold Winters one-quarter ounce of heroin as charged. Appellant argues vigorously that if the jury had known about the alleged agreement concerning Winters' wife the credibility of Winters could have been challenged and this could have created a doubt as to Winters' reliability. But Winters had already testified that he was a convicted felon, that he had used drugs for more than ten years and that he continued to do so, and that he offered to work as a paid informant because of financial need and to help his wife, whom he testified was a heroin addict. The fact that the DEA may have allowed Winters' wife to make heroin purchases is hardly likely to have convinced the jury that Winters was not telling the truth about purchasing heroin from appellant. In all events, appellant failed to bear the required burden of demonstrating that (1) the prosecution suppressed the evidence, (2) the favorable character of the suppressed evidence; and (3) the materiality of the suppressed evidence. United States v. Warhop, 732 F.2d 775 (10th Cir.1984).