Opinion ID: 3013361
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Violation of Right to Compulsory Process

Text: Zemba also argues that his Sixth Amendment right was violated when the District Court refused to grant a continuance to allow him to locate a missing witness who, he alleged, would testify that Waldron had admitted to having a sexual encounter with Beaken in February of 1999. This, he argues, constitutes a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his favor. The Compulsory Process clause “protects the presentation of the defendant’s case from unwarranted interference by the government, be it in the form of an unnecessary evidentiary rule, a prosecutor’s misconduct, or an arbitrary ruling from the trial judge.” Government of Virgin Islands v. Mills, 956 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1992).6 We reject Zemba’s argument because the ruling of the District Court was not arbitrary. In order for Zemba to establish that his right to compulsory process was violated, he must show: “[f]irst, that he was deprived of the opportunity to present evidence in his favor; second, that the excluded testimony would have been material and favorable to his defense; and third, that the deprivation was arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate evidentiary or procedural purpose.” Mills, 956 F.2d at 446. Even 6 Zemba also argues that the District Court’s ruling denied him due process of law. We have previously noted that some courts analyze the issue discussed above under the Due Process Clause rather than the Compulsory Process Clause, and concluded that there is little, if any, difference in the way the issue is analyzed under the two clauses. Id. at 445 n.4. We shall, therefore, analyze Zemba’s claim under the Compulsory Process Clause. 14 assuming that Zemba was denied the right to present evidence in his favor and that the excluded testimony would have been material and favorable to his defense, the District Court’s decision was not “arbitrary or disproportionate to any legitimate evidentiary or procedural purpose.” Id. The Court refused to postpone Zemba’s trial because it concluded that the proffered evidence of Officer Zdobinski--testimony contradicting Waldron’s prior statement denying the sexual relationship--was inadmissible. Zemba had not, as required by Fed. R. Evid. 613(b), cross-examined Waldron about his statement to Zdobinski. See United States v. DiNapoli, 557 F.2d 962, 965 (2d Cir. 1977). Further, to the extent the evidence was admissible to show bias, it was, the District Court held, irrelevant under Fed. R. Evid. 403(b). Because the District Court’s decision to deny the continuance was based on an evidentiary ruling that was not arbitrary, Zemba’s Sixth Amendment compulsory process right was not violated.