Opinion ID: 1043976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Guilty Plea Proceeding as a Trial

Text: The precise question presented in this case is whether the writ, as codified in Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b), may be used to challenge a conviction based upon a guilty plea,15 rather than a bench trial or a trial by jury. As stated, the statute does not define the term “trial.” In 1998, the Court of Criminal Appeals interpreted the statute in a manner consistent with common-law, permitting use of the writ to present newly discovered evidence as a means of demonstrating that a guilty plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered. Newsome v. State, 995 S.W.2d 129, 133-34 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998).16 In Newsome, the defendant filed a writ of error coram nobis challenging his guilty plea based on newly discovered evidence. Id. at 132. The alleged new evidence was that the true perpetrator of the crime had confessed. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that a coram nobis claim would allow Newsome to “present newly discovered evidence which would show that his plea was not voluntarily or knowingly entered.” Id. at 134. The court explicitly “acknowledge[d] that should ‘newly discovered evidence’ [a]ffect the voluntariness of a guilty plea, a writ [of error coram nobis] may properly lie.” Id. at n.6 (emphasis in original). More recently, however, in a few of its unpublished opinions, the Court of Criminal Appeals has questioned the correctness of the interpretation of Tennessee 14 See, e.g., Wood v. State, 750 So. 2d 592 (Fla.1999); Reponte v. State, 556 P.2d 577 (Haw. 1976); People v. Andrus, 244 N.E.2d 161, 162 (Ill. 1969); State v. Hawkins, 51 P.2d 914, 914 (Kan. 1935); Dwyer v. State, 120 A.2d 276, 284 (Me. 1956); Baker v. State, 358 So. 2d 401 (Miss. 1978); State v. LeMay, 396 P.2d 83 (Mont. 1964); Hall v. Langlois, 276 A.2d 768, 770, 772 (R.I. 1971); State v. Plum, 378 P.2d 671, 673 (Utah 1963); State v. Schill, 286 N.W.2d 836, 842-45 (Wis. 1980); Duncan v. State, 169 So. 2d 439, 441 (Ala. Ct. App. 1964); People v. Chaklader, 29 Cal. Rptr. 2d 344, 345 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Arnold v. State, 552 S.W.2d 286, 291 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); State v. Lee, 252 S.E.2d 225, 227-30 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979). 15 Although the concurring opinion suggests that our holding makes the writ available to challenge a guilty plea on any ground, the issue we address here is whether the alleged new evidence affected the voluntary and knowing nature of the plea. 16 See also Grant v. State, No. E2009-00311-CCA-R3-PC, 2010 WL 987123, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2010); Blanton v. State, No. M2001-02421-CCA-R3-PC, 2003 WL 21766251, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. July 30, 2003); Demonbreun v. State, No. 01C01-9711-CR-00539, 1999 WL 632303, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 1999). -11- Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b) in Newsome. See, e.g., Stamey v. State, No. E200900996-CCA-R3-CD, 2010 WL 481198, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Feb. 11, 2010); see also Ledford v. State, E2010-01773-CCA-R3-PC, 2011 WL 1678069, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. May 4, 2011); Ivy v. State, No. W2010-00152-R3-CO, 2010 WL 3895404, at  (Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 5, 2010).17 In our effort to resolve this inconsistency, we begin our analysis by reviewing the text of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b), which limits the writ “to matters that were not or could not have been litigated on the trial of the case.” (Emphasis added). Similarly, in circumstances where the inmate demonstrates that he or she was without fault for failing to present evidence at the proper time, the statute permits the inmate to bring forward “evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial.” (Emphasis added). Finally, the statute directs courts to decline the grant of relief based on the newly discovered evidence unless “such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.” (Emphasis added). These references to the term “trial” require us to address the question of what constitutes a “trial” for the purposes of Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b). While Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-26-105(b) makes numerous references to the term “trial,” the statute neither defines nor articulates what constitutes a trial for purposes of the statute. Thus, what is intended by the use of the word trial is not clear and unambiguous. Because the language of the statute does not provide specific guidance, other sources may be used to assist in the statute’s interpretation. Parks, 974 S.W.2d at 679. Numerous authorities interpret the term trial broadly. American Jurisprudence explains that trial is the “judicial investigation and determination of the issues between the parties to an action before a competent tribunal.” 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 1 (West 2011). Another noted authority describes trial as the judicial examination and determination, in accordance with the law of the land, before a competent tribunal . . . of the issues between the parties to an action, whether they are issues of law or fact. The term “trial” includes all the steps taken in the case from its submission to the court or jury to the rendition of judgment. 17 Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals Rule 19(c) provides that “[a]n opinion of the Court that meets one or more of the standards in subsection (a), and that is not otherwise barred from publication by any of the criteria in subsection (b), shall be published only if a majority of the Court votes affirmatively in favor of publication.” -12- 88 C.J.S. Trial § 1 (West 2011) (footnotes omitted). Black’s Law Dictionary defines trial as a “formal judicial examination of evidence and determination of legal claims in an adversary proceeding.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1543 (8th ed. 2004). Various jurisdictions’ interpretation of trial is similarly expansive. See, e.g., Erickson v. Starling, 71 S.E.2d 384, 392 (N.C. 1952) (describing trial as the examination of the issues between the parties, for the purpose of determining such issues); Smith v. Mitchell, 148 P.3d 1151, 1155 n.2 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (stating that a trial is the judicial examination of the issues between the parties); In re Conservatorship of Joseph W., 131 Cal. Rptr. 3d 896, 905 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (acknowledging that the meaning of the term trial can vary); Schiappa v. Ferrero, 767 A.2d 785, 789 (Conn. Ct. App. 2001) (explaining that the trial includes all steps taken in a case from its submission to the court to the rendering of judgment ); State v. Gonzalez, 493 N.W.2d 410, 412 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (defining trial as the “judicial examination of the issues between the parties”). Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, adopted in 1978, governs the guilty plea process and lays out the detailed procedure by which trial courts conduct the plea process.18 Part of the procedure of Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(3) requires that “[b]efore entering judgment on a guilty plea, the court shall determine that there is a factual basis for the plea.” A valid best interest plea requires a factual basis. Alford, 400 U.S. at 37, 38 n.10; Dortch, 705 S.W.2d at 689. The significance of the procedural details of a guilty plea proceeding in Tennessee was made apparent in State v. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d 337 (Tenn. 1977), a case in which the trial court failed to ask the defendant a single question concerning his plea. Recognizing the magnitude of these proceedings, this Court, quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969), asserted that “a plea of guilty is more than an admission of conduct; it is a conviction.” Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 339. Because of the serious implications of a plea of guilt, the Court in Mackey held that prior to accepting a guilty plea, trial courts must confront the defendant in open court and not only inform him of the effects of his guilty plea, but also make determinations regarding the defendant’s understanding and voluntariness of the plea. Id. at 341.19 Failure to adhere to these strict requirements will result in the setting aside of a conviction based on such a plea. See Rounsaville v. Evatt, 733 S.W.2d 506, 509 (Tenn. 1987). 18 While the 1978 version of Rule 11 of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure is formatted somewhat differently than the current form, the substance of the rule is largely unchanged. 19 Shortly after Mackey, the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted. David Raybin, Tennessee Practice: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 22.90 (1985). Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 is “substantially the same as the federal rule.” Tenn. R. Crim. P. 11, Advisory Comm’n Comments. -13- The precise nature of the proceedings surrounding guilty pleas required by Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 11, as well as our rulings in Mackey and its progeny, demonstrate that trial courts should carefully address factual and legal issues before entering a judgment of conviction. As explained in Mackey, during these proceedings, trial courts may inquire about the evidence to be submitted. Mackey, 553 S.W.2d at 341. While these proceedings may not include some of the components traditionally associated with litigation, they fall within the broad interpretations of “trial” outlined above. This Court’s holding in State v. Todd, 654 S.W.2d 379 (Tenn. 1983), while in the context of double jeopardy, further indicates that a guilty plea proceeding qualifies as a trial. In Todd, the state offered the defendant a plea bargain, allowing him to plead to voluntary manslaughter; however, the trial judge rejected the agreement and refused to accept the plea. Id. at 380-81. The defendant was ordered to stand trial and was found guilty of second degree murder. Id. The defendant then challenged his conviction based on double jeopardy principles. Id. This Court, explaining that jeopardy only attaches when a defendant is put to trial, classified the issue in Todd as whether the defendant “was placed on trial in a plea hearing prior to the court’s acceptance of the plea.” Id. at 381-82 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, this Court concluded that because the plea agreement was not accepted by the trial court, no trial had occurred, and, in consequence, jeopardy had not attached. Id. at 382-83. Thus, our opinion suggested that the approval of the proposed agreement and the acceptance of the plea would have met the definition of a trial. Because “the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights is implicated when an accused enters a plea of guilty,” Blankenship v. State, 858 S.W.2d 897, 904 (Tenn. 1993), it is inappropriate, in our view, to trivialize a guilty plea proceeding by holding that it does not constitute a “trial.” Statutes should be “construed as near to the rule and reason of the common law as may be.” Snyder v. McEwen, 256 S.W. 434, 436 (Tenn. 1923). If this Court were to say that a guilty plea proceeding is not a trial and thus, not subject to the writ of error coram nobis, we would be the first to so hold, brushing aside centuries of tried and tested jurisprudence.