Opinion ID: 784086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Internet Contacts

Text: 18 Second, appellants assert that Prudential Securities' Web site should render it subject to general jurisdiction. Missouri courts have not yet addressed whether a Web site may provide sufficient minimum contacts to invoke personal jurisdiction. 9 Neither have we. However, many of our sister circuits have. Unfortunately, the majority of these cases address whether a Web site can provide sufficient contacts to invoke specific jurisdiction. E.g., Toys R Us, Inc. v. Step Two, S.A., 318 F.3d 446, (3d Cir.2003) (specific jurisdiction in trademark infringement case); ALS Scan, Inc. v. Digital Serv. Consult., Inc., 293 F.3d 707 (4th Cir.2002) (same); Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 126 F.3d 25 (2d Cir.1997) (same); Cybersell, Inc., v. Cybersell, Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir.1997) (same); CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.1996) (same); see also Young v. New Haven Advocate, 315 F.3d 256 (4th Cir.2002) (specific jurisdiction for defamation action). 19 The great majority of these cases have adopted the analytical framework of Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F.Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.Pa. 1997). In Zippo -also a case of specific jurisdiction-the court examined the few cases that had previously addressed the issue of whether a Web site could provide sufficient contacts for specific personal jurisdiction. It applied the results of these cases to the traditional personal jurisdiction analytical framework, noting that the likelihood that personal jurisdiction can be constitutionally exercised is directly proportionate to the nature and quality of the commercial activity that an entity conducts over the Internet. 952 F.Supp. at 1124. In order to measure the nature and quality of the commercial activity, the court created a sliding scale to measure the likelihood of personal jurisdiction. It noted: 20 At one end of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. At the opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of] personal jurisdiction. The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on the Web site. 21 Id. (citations omitted). 22 We agree with our sister circuits that the Zippo model is an appropriate approach in cases of specific jurisdiction-i.e., ones in which we need only find minimum contacts. However, we are presented with a case of general personal jurisdiction-i.e., one in which we must find substantial and continuous contacts. The circuits that have addressed which analytical model to apply to a case of general jurisdiction have split on whether to accept the Zippo sliding scale. Compare L.L. Bean, 341 F.3d at 1079 (applying Zippo and finding general jurisdiction); Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding Corp., 293 F.3d 506, 513 (D.C.Cir.2002) (same); Soma Med. Int'l v. Standard Chartered Bank, 196 F.3d 1292, 1296-97 (10th Cir.1999) (applying Zippo, but finding no general jurisdiction) with, Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 471 (5th Cir.2002) (noting that the Zippo sliding scale is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry); Bell v. Imperial Palace Hotel/Casino, Inc., 200 F.Supp.2d 1082, 1091 (E.D.Mo.2001) (noting that while the sliding scale suggested by the court in Zippo may be a relevant factor in assessing general jurisdiction, it is not alone determinative) (footnote omitted). 23 We agree with the courts that do not apply the sliding scale presumptively for cases of general jurisdiction. Certainly, we believe that a consideration of the nature and quality of a Web site and a determination of whether it is interactive, does business, or is merely passive is an important factor in our analysis. However, we have long held that the nature and quality of contacts is only one factor to consider. Instead, we consider a variety of factors-depending on the circumstance-in a personal jurisdiction analysis. Aftanase v. Econ. Baler Co., 343 F.2d 187, 197 (8th Cir.1965) (creating the five factors to consider for personal jurisdiction and applying them depending on their relevance to the case). 24 We first discussed the factors in Aftanase. In this 1965 case, Judge Harry Blackmun 10 analyzed and summarized the controlling United States Supreme Court cases on the subject of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 195-96 (summarizing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958); McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 78 S.Ct. 199, 2 L.Ed.2d 223 (1957); Perkins, 342 U.S. at 437, 72 S.Ct. 413; Travelers Health Ass'n v. Virginia ex rel. State Corp. Comm'n, 339 U.S. 643, 70 S.Ct. 927, 94 L.Ed. 1154 (1950); Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 310, 66 S.Ct. 154). Judge Blackmun then observed that each of these cases established general instead of precise guidelines, but that each of the cases had several factors, which the Supreme Court repeatedly identified. Id. at 197. Specifically, Judge Blackmun noted that: 25 [A]t one time or another in the opinions, three primary factors, namely, the quantity of the contacts, the nature and quality of the contacts, and the source and connection of the cause of action with those contacts, are stressed, and that two others, the interest of the forum state and convenience of the parties, receive mention. 26 Id. It is apparent that the primary factors relate to our consideration of a defendant's contacts. 11 At a minimum, in a specific jurisdiction case we will consider the last two of the primary factors-the nature and quality of the contacts, and [their] source and connection to the cause of action. In such a case, the Zippo test would function appropriately. However, in a general jurisdiction case, we do not consider the source and connection to the cause of action, but rather we consider the nature and quality of the contacts as well as the quantity of the contacts. Bell Paper Box, Inc. v. U.S. Kids, Inc., 22 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir.1994) (citations omitted) (distinguishing general jurisdiction from specific jurisdiction). This is precisely why the Zippo test alone is insufficient for the general jurisdiction setting. 27 Under the Zippo test, it is possible for a Web site to be very interactive, but to have no quantity of contacts. In other words, the contacts would be continuous, but not substantial. This is untenable in a general jurisdiction analysis. As one court has noted, the Zippo test is not well adapted to the general jurisdiction inquiry, because even repeated contacts with forum residents by a foreign defendant may not constitute the requisite substantial, continuous and systematic contacts required for a finding of general jurisdiction.... Revell, 317 F.3d at 471. As a result, we will first apply the Zippo test and then also look at the quantity of those contacts with Missouri residents. 28 Prudential Securities' Web sitewww.prudential.com/banking-falls under the middle category of Zippo -a sophisticated, interactive Web site in which a user can exchange information with the host computer. Not only can Missouri consumers review detailed company, service, and financial information about Prudential Savings, they can also exchange electronic mail; establish and access secure online accounts; and calculate home-mortgage rates. More importantly, Missouri consumers are also able to complete online applications for home-equity loans and lines of credit. The site states that it provides electronic responses to the inquiry within three to five business days. Through its Web site Prudential Savings could have continuous, significant contacts with Missouri residents. In fact, because its site is available twenty-four hours a day, it is possible for Prudential Securities to have contacts with the [State of Missouri] that are `continuous and systematic' to a degree that traditional foreign corporations can never even approach. Gorman, 293 F.3d at 513. 29 However, this is not sufficient for general jurisdiction. As noted, we must also consider the quantity of contacts that Prudential Securities'-through its Web site-has with Missouri residents. However, appellants were unable to conduct jurisdictional discovery prior to the district court's grant of Prudential Savings' motion to dismiss. As a result, the record contains no indication of: the number of times that Missouri consumers have accessed the Web site; the number of Missouri consumers that have requested further information about Prudential Savings' services; the number of Missouri consumers that have utilized the online loan-application services; the number of times that a Prudential Savings representative has responded to Missouri residents after they have applied for a loan; the number and amounts of home-equity or other loans that resulted from online-application submission by Missouri consumers, or which are secured by Missouri property. 30 Appellants did make such a motion. The district court, however, denied it. To not grant it was, in our view, an abuse of discretion. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Grossman, 991 F.2d 1376, 1388 (8th Cir.1993) (applying an abuse of discretion standard when reviewing the denial of a request for jurisdictional discovery); see also Carefirst of Md., Inc. v. Carefirst Pregnancy Ctrs., Inc., 334 F.3d 390, 402-03 (4th Cir.2003) (same standard of review in an Internet personal jurisdiction case); Harris Rutsky & Co. Ins. Servs., v. Bell & Clements, Ltd., 328 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir.2003) (same standard of review and remanding for further jurisdictional discovery); Toys R Us, Inc., 318 F.3d at 455-58 (same standard of review and remanding for further jurisdictional discovery in an Internet personal jurisdiction case); Gorman, 293 F.3d at 513 (affirming on a different issue, but noting that it would otherwise remand for jurisdictional discovery in an Internet personal jurisdiction case); Shouse, 10 S.W.3d at 194-95 (Missouri appellate court remanding for jurisdictional discovery). As a result, if appellants can meet the second factor-i.e., the due process inquiry-then remand to the district court for further jurisdictional discovery is the appropriate disposition for this case.