Opinion ID: 456012
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Shift Kit as a Trademark

Text: 50 In response to special interrogatories, the jury found that Shift Kit was not a generic name, but was a descriptive term whose primary significance was to identify Transgo as the exclusive manufacturing source of the goods to which the name is applied. The jury also determined that the name Shift Kit when first used by [Transgo] was arbitrary and identified [Transgo] as an exclusive manufacturing source. Finally, the jury concluded that Shift Kit was Transgo's trademark. 51 Appellants argue that Shift Kit was a common descriptive term which was used generically prior to Transgo's first use. 52 The threshold issue in any action for trademark infringement is whether the words used by a manufacturer in connection with his product are entitled to protection. A potential trademark may be classified as (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) suggestive, or (4) arbitrary. Park 'N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 718 F.2d 327, 329 (9th Cir.1983), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1438, 79 L.Ed.2d 760 (1984). 53 We analyze genericness by asking whether a term has come to be understood as referring to the genus of which the particular product is a species. Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 611 F.2d 296, 302 (9th Cir.1979). Generic terms can never attain trademark protection. Park 'N Fly, at 329. See also 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1052(f). A descriptive term identifies a characteristic or ingredient of an article or service. Id. Descriptive terms ordinarily are not protectable as trademarks. See 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1052(e)(1). They may become valid marks, however, by acquiring a secondary meaning in the minds of the consuming public. Park 'N Fly, at 329; 15 U.S.C. Sec. 1052(f). 54
55 To establish that a descriptive term has secondary meaning, the plaintiff must show that the primary significance of the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the producer. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118, 59 S.Ct. 109, 113, 83 L.Ed. 73 (1938). 56 Secondary meaning is achieved by an association between a name and a source. When this mental recognition occurs among purchasers, the name becomes legally protectable as an identification symbol. American Scientific Chemical, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 690 F.2d 791, 792 (9th Cir.1982). Secondary meaning has been defined as association, nothing more. Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 434 F.2d 794, 802 (9th Cir.1970). The test of secondary meaning is the effectiveness of the effort to create it, and the chief inquiry is directed towards the consumer's attitude about the mark in question: does it denote to him 'a single thing coming from a single source?'  Id. (citations omitted). 57 Whether a symbol or device has acquired a secondary meaning is a question of fact. American Scientific Chemical, Inc., supra. Since all factual questions on this issue were resolved by the jury, we must determine whether there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the jury's verdict. We cannot disturb a jury's verdict unless no reasonable person would accept the evidence presented to establish a fact essential to prove liability. Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR Corp., 684 F.2d 658, 660 (9th Cir.1982). Factors considered in determining whether a secondary meaning has been achieved include: (1) whether actual purchases of the product bearing the claimed trademark associate the trademark with the producer, (2) the degree and manner of advertising under the claimed trademark, (3) the length and manner of use of the claimed trademark and, (4) whether use of the claimed trademark has been exclusive. See 1 Gilson, Trademark Protection & Practice, Sec. 2.09. 58 The record is replete with evidence supporting the jury's finding that the relevant market, the rebuilders who used valve body kits, associate the name Shift Kit with Transgo. While there was evidence that other manufacturers used the name shift kit to describe valve body components that were manufactured for high performance vehicles used by hot rodders, drag racers and car enthusiasts, it is clear that these products were sold in a separate market. 59 Furthermore, the parties agreed before the trial that the relevant market consisted of transmission rebuilders. Indeed, on the first day of trial, Fairbanks was successful in preventing the introduction of evidence that Fairbanks had used Transgo's trademark Reprogramming Kit. 60 Our review of the record satisfies us that a reasonable juror could conclude that there was substantial evidence that the primary significance of Shift Kit to rebuilders at all relevant times was to identify Transgo and not the product. 61
62 Secondary meaning can also be established by evidence of likelihood of confusion. See Norm Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 448 F.2d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir.1971) (supporting use of confusion by Oregon Supreme Court as indicium of secondary meaning). Secondary meaning and likelihood of buyer confusion are separate but related determinations, the relationship rising from the same evidentiary findings. Id. Facts which play a role in the determination of likelihood of confusion in a trademark infringement case include: visual, verbal and intellective similarity; the class of goods in question; evidence of actual confusion; the intent of the defendant; and the strength or weakness of the mark. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 434 F.2d at 800. 63 The products in question here are identical, and the class of goods in question is the same. Furthermore, even if the mark is weak (a meaningful word in common usage), that is only one factor to be considered along with the others to determine likelihood of confusion. New West Corp. v. NYM Co. of California, Inc., 595 F.2d 1194, 1201-02 (9th Cir.1979). We thus direct our inquiry to the questions of actual confusion and intent of the defendant. 64
65 In making its determination that Shift Kit had acquired a secondary meaning, the jury could have relied on the confusing similarity of the kits, which caused customers to believe that Fairbanks' faulty kits were those of Transgo. 66 Instances of actual confusion in the mind of the relevant market concerning the Fairbanks product were stacked high in the record. See North American Aircoach Systems, Inc. v. North American Aviation, Inc., 231 F.2d 205, 213 (9th Cir.1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 920, 76 S.Ct. 709, 100 L.Ed. 1452 (1956). 67
68 Proof of exact copying, without any opposing proof, can be sufficient to establish a secondary meaning. Audio Fidelity, Inc. v. High Fidelity Recordings, Inc., 283 F.2d 551, 557 (9th Cir.1960). There is no logical reason for the precise copying save an attempt to realize upon a secondary meaning that is in existence. Id. at 558. In another case, we noted that: 69 It is well settled that plaintiffs were not obliged in order to make a case against the defendants to prove a wrongful intent .... But when the evidence does show or require the inference that another's name was adopted deliberately with a view to obtain some advantage from the good will, good name, and good trade which another has built up, then the inference of likelihood of confusion is readily drawn, for the very act of the adopter has indicated that he expects confusion and resultant profit. 70 Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 314 F.2d 149, 157-58 (9th Cir.1963) (citations omitted). 71 There is no question but that Fairbanks copied the name Shift Kit. In fact, the record indicates that Fairbanks copied virtually everything with regard to that product. It is clear that Fairbanks attempted to capitalize on the secondary meaning of Shift Kit in order to obtain an advantage from the good will built up by Transgo. 72 The other factors indicating secondary meaning considered by the jury were Transgo sales, its duration of exclusive use, and the promotional efforts of Mr. Younger. Transgo sales of products under the Shift Kit label were significant; they exceeded $5 million through 1978, see 1 McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition Sec. 15:10 (1973) (evidence may include number of sales). Prior to Fairbanks' entry into the market in 1976, Transgo exclusively had used the name Shift Kit for its products directed to the normal passenger car market for some thirteen years. See American Scientific Chemical, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp., 690 F.2d 791, 793 (9th Cir.1982) (American Scientific's use of its name for over thirteen years was relevant to discussion of secondary meaning). Younger's lectures, shop visits, educational seminars, and the assistance given directly to rebuilders caused them to associate the name Shift Kit with Younger and Transgo. As we noted in American Scientific, reliance upon such personal contact, especially in a market that is specialized, limited and close-knit, is an important element in establishing secondary meaning for a descriptive term. Id.; see also 3 R. Callmann, The Law of Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Monopolies, Sec. 19.27 (4th ed. 1983). 73 There is substantial evidence to support the jury's finding of secondary meaning in this case.