Opinion ID: 1111213
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Intent to Kill and Multiple-murder Special Circumstance

Text: (13) Defendant argues that because the prosecution charged him with the multiple-murder special circumstance, the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that it had to find he had the intent to kill both victims in order to find the special circumstance true. However, defendant's argument would require us to extend the now-overruled decisions in Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862] ( Carlos ), and People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302 [208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669] ( Turner ). Defendant's attempt to have us develop further the mistaken premises of Carlos and Turner must fail. (See People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 1143, 1149 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306] ( Anderson ).) In December 1983, Carlos held that intent to kill was an essential element of the felony-murder special circumstance. ( Carlos, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 134-135.) Eleven months later, on October 31, 1984, defendant committed his crimes against Doreen and her fetus. The following month, on November 21, 1984, we held that two first degree felony-murder convictions, neither of which was supported by jury instructions on the element of intent to kill, could not satisfy the multiple-murder special circumstance. ( Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 328-329.) Three years later, we overruled both Carlos and Turner and held that, when the defendant is the actual killer, intent to kill is not an element of either the felony-murder special circumstance or the multiple-murder special circumstance. ( Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d at pp. 1138-1147, 1149-1150.) Since that time, we have said that, when a felony-murder special circumstance is alleged to have occurred in the window period after Carlos and before Anderson, the intent-to-kill requirement must be applied to satisfy due process and ex post facto principles. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 44-45 [23 Cal. Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673]; People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302]; People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 981 [2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214].) The reason for this last rule is that retroactive application of Anderson in those circumstances would deprive the defendant of a defense against the death penalty that the law would have permitted at the time of the crime. ( People v. Fierro, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 227.) We note first that defendant was not tried on a felony-murder theory or a felony-murder special-circumstance allegation. Thus, Carlos 's holding does not apply to the circumstances of his crimes. The intent-to-kill requirement established in Carlos, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pages 134-135, was extended to multiple-murder special-circumstance cases only after defendant killed Doreen and her fetus, when we decided Turner. Even then, Turner 's development of Carlos resulted from the prosecution's reliance on two felony murders to support a multiple-murder special-circumstance finding, although neither felony-murder conviction could satisfy Carlos. ( Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 328-329.) We have never held that the multiple-murder special circumstance requires a jury to find the defendant intended to kill every victim. We also have never held that the intent to kill one victim and the implied malice murder of a second victim is insufficient to establish a multiple-murder special circumstance. Consequently, applying Anderson, supra, 43 Cal.3d 1104, to defendant's crimes poses no due process or ex post facto problems. (See People v. Kaurish, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 696-697; People v. Poggi (1988) 45 Cal.3d 306, 326-327 [246 Cal. Rptr. 886, 753 P.2d 1082].) Indeed, we have observed before that no intent to kill was required to prove the multiple-murder special circumstance when the offenses transpired before Turner was decided. ( People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 852, fn. 10 [55 Cal. Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280].) Moreover, Turner is inapplicable when, as here, a defendant is tried and convicted on a theory of deliberate, premeditated murder, not felony murder. (See Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1241; People v. Dyer (1988) 45 Cal.3d 26, 68 [246 Cal. Rptr. 209, 753 P.2d 1].) [10] None of Turner 's concerns about imposing the death penalty for an unintentional killing is involved in sentencing defendant to death for his first degree murder of Doreen. (See Turner, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 329.)