Opinion ID: 1133549
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: product liability claim

Text: Petitioner Bridgestone/Firestone contends the Court of Appeals erred in reinstating Respondent's product liability claim which the trial court dismissed as a matter of law under CR 50(a)(1) at the close of Respondent's case-in-chief. CR 50(a)(1) states: Judgment as a Matter of Law. (1) Nature and Effect of Motion. If, during a trial by jury, a party has been fully heard with respect to an issue and there is no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find or have found for that party with respect to that issue, the court may grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law against the party on any claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third party claim that cannot under the controlling law be maintained without a favorable finding on that issue.... Granting a motion for judgment as a matter of law is appropriate when, viewing the evidence most favorable to the nonmoving party, the court can say, as a matter of law, there is no substantial evidence or reasonable inference to sustain a verdict for the nonmoving party. [30] The substantial evidence must be such that it would convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind. [31] The claim of Respondent that her injuries were caused by Petitioner's failure to place warnings on its tires that installing studded snow tires only on the front wheels was unsafe constitutes a failure-to-warn claim under the PLA, specifically RCW 7.72.030(1) and (1)(b), which state: Liability of manufacturer. (1) A product manufacturer is subject to liability to a claimant if the claimant's harm was proximately caused by the negligence of the manufacturer in that the product was not reasonably safe as designed or not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided. .... (b) A product is not reasonably safe because adequate warnings or instructions were not provided with the product, if, at the time of manufacture, the likelihood that the product would cause the claimant's harm or similar harms, and the seriousness of those harms, rendered the warnings or instructions of the manufacturer inadequate and the manufacturer could have provided the warnings or instructions which the claimant alleges would have been adequate. Under RCW 7.72.030(1), Respondent must show that the absence of a warning of possible dangers from specific tire usage as applied was the proximate cause of her injuries. Proximate causation includes both cause in fact and legal causation. [32] Cause in fact refers to the `but for' consequences of an actthe physical connection between an act and an injury. [33] The Court of Appeals concluded that Respondent provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that, but for the absence of a warning on the tires themselves, Respondent's accident and injuries would not have occurred. [34] Specifically, the Court stated a warning imprinted on the tire would be the most efficacious method of informing anyone who actually mounts the tires. [35] The Court stated that while the Respondent may not have read the warning ... the person she hired to do the work for her might have. [36] The record does not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals on proximate cause. Both the Court of Appeals and Respondent Hiner rely upon Ayers v. Johnson & Johnson Baby Prods. Co. [37] in which parents of a 15-month-old baby brought a product liability action against the manufacturer of baby oil after the baby swallowed the oil and suffered brain damage from aspiration. [38] This Court concluded the parents had presented sufficient evidence of causation and inadequacy of warnings on the purchased bottle of baby oil to support the jury's verdict in their favor. [39] The evidence included testimony from the mother that she made a practice of reading labels on products [40] and shelved dangerous products high out of the reach of her 15-month-old twins. [41] The mother also testified that, besides placing dangerous products out of reach, she specifically told her teenage daughters to keep their purses away from the twins if their purses contained anything that could harm a baby. [42] This Court concluded in Ayers the jury was entitled to infer that, if the parents had known of the dangers of aspiration, they would have treated the baby oil with the same caution they used with other items they recognized as highly dangerous, and that had they done so, the accident would never have occurred, concluding that the evidence of causation presented to the jury was sufficient to sustain the jury's verdict. [43] In this case, Respondent testified she had not read the notice in her Hyundai owner's manual which stated Snow tires should be installed on all four wheels; otherwise, poor handling may result. [44] While Respondent is correct in asserting this statement does not refer specifically to studded snow tires, [45] it nevertheless does refer to snow tires. Respondent testified she looked at her owner's manual for some information, [46] but had not read the statement about snow tires in the five years she had the manual. She also testified she did not look for warnings on any of her tires, either the ones on the front wheels or those on the rear wheels, prior to the accident. [47] She acknowledged she had not completely read the owner's manual for her automobile. [48] Respondent's testimony does not support her bare assertion that she would not have placed the studded snow tires on the front wheels of her automobile even if warnings had been imprinted on them. She did not read her owner's manual about snow tires, and did not examine the snow tires for warnings. She contends the testimony of her surgeon regarding her cooperation in her recovery demonstrates she would have heeded warnings if there had been any. [49] However, the surgeon's testimony relates to her behavior after the accident and not to her behavior before the accident. It is not at all relevant to the issues in this case. The record also does not support the conclusion suggested by Respondent that if there had been warnings, the installer might have read them, [50] with the inference that the installer then would not have installed the studded snow tires on the front wheels only. This is mere speculation. Respondent did not call the installer as a witness. Consequently, there was not substantial evidence in the entire record upon which a reasonable jury could infer that, but for the absence of warnings, Respondent's accident and injuries would not have occurred. Because proximate causation requires that both cause in fact and legal causation be shown and Respondent has not provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate cause in fact, we need not reach the issue of legal causation. It is also not necessary to engage in the balancing test required under RCW 7.72.030(1)(b). [51]