Opinion ID: 896129
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: second demand

Text: [¶ 15] Moe also asserts he fully complied with the IAD when he served his second request for speedy disposition of detainers on the proper Colorado official on July 24, 1996. He asserts the Colorado official's failure to forward the request with the required certificate to North Dakota authorities should not affect his right to be tried within 180 days of that date. [¶ 16] The United States Supreme Court answered this question in Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 113 S.Ct. 1085, 122 L.Ed.2d 406 (1993). The Court held the 180-day period under the IAD commences when the request is actually delivered to officials of the state where charges are pending, not when the prisoner delivers them to the warden, and if the warden does not forward the documents the 180-day period never begins to run. Fex, 507 U.S. at 47-48, 52, 113 S.Ct. at 1088-89, 1090-91, 122 L.Ed.2d at 412-13, 415; see also Segroves v. State, 629 So.2d 967, 968 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1993); State v. Nearhood, 2 Neb.App. 915, 518 N.W.2d 165, 170 (1994). [¶ 17] It is undisputed Moe's second request was never forwarded to North Dakota officials by Colorado officials, and the Burleigh County state's attorney first learned of this request after Moe was returned to North Dakota. Under these circumstances, Fex controls and the 180-day period under the IAD never commenced.