Opinion ID: 2561909
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Superior Court Correctly Construed the Medical Payments Coverage Section of the Progressive Policy To Provide Coverage for Joseph's Accident.

Text: The Medical Payments Coverage section of the Progressive policy covers expenses associated with the bodily injury of an insured person. This part of the policy defines insured person as including a relative whileoccupying a covered vehicle or non-owned vehicle, as well as you or any relative when struck by a motor vehicle or trailer while notoccupying a motor vehicle. (Boldface type in original; underlined emphasis added.) Thus, as a relative, Joseph's claim for medical payments coverage proceeds under two discrete theories. Under the first theory, he claims that he is covered as a relative while occupying a ... non-owned vehicle. But our previous holding makes clear that the Nageaks' ATV does not qualify as a vehicle under the policy. [22] The second theory applies if the Nageaks' ATV does not qualify as a vehicle. Under this theory, the policy would cover Joseph as a relative when struck by a motor vehicle or trailer while not occupying a motor vehicle. Progressive denied medical payments coverage for Joseph under this theory on the basis of a distinction between the term vehicle, which is set out in boldface type in the policy, and the term motor vehicle. We agree with Progressive that Joseph was not occupying a vehicle at the time of the accident. But Progressive also takes the position that Joseph cannot recover under the second theory that the accident occurred while Joseph was not occupying a motor vehicle. According to Progressive, although the Nageaks' ATV does not qualify as a vehicle, it does qualify as a motor vehicle. Therefore, according to Progressive, Joseph was occupying a motor vehicle, even though he was not occupying a vehicle. Progressive argues that because the policy does not define the term motor vehicle for purposes of medical payments coverage, an insured must rely on the common usage meaning of the term. The company contends that an objectively reasonable lay person should understand that an ATV qualifies as a motor vehicle but not as a vehicle. We cannot agree with Progressive's tortured reading of its policy. The General Definitions section of the Progressive policy explains that [e]xcept as otherwise defined in this policy, terms appearing in boldface will have the following meaning[.] The policy fails to mention that the same terms, when not appearing in boldface, will depart from those meanings. In the superior court's words, vehicle must be read as `vehicle in boldface' to convey the policy meaning rather than the ordinary meaning as understood by lay persons. The court noted that there are at least 56 instances of `vehicle' or `motor vehicle'  non-boldface throughout Mrs. Skin's policy and concluded that a reasonable insured may question whether the appearance of `vehicle,' non-boldface, is intentional or a typographical error. We agree with the superior court that the distinction between the terms motor vehicle and vehicle would be difficult for a policyholder to understand. A reasonable lay person could not be expected to understand that he could simultaneously be denied coverage under one policy provision because he was not occupying a vehicle while also being denied coverage under another provision because he was occupying a vehicle. Accordingly, we hold that this ambiguous policy language entitles Skin to attach the policy definition of vehicle to that term wherever it appears in the policy, regardless of its typeface or whether the word motor precedes it. Because that definition excludes ATVs, we hold that Progressive must extend medical payments coverage under the policy to Joseph. We are not alone in arriving at the conclusion that Progressive's practice of attaching two definitions to the same policy term is obscure at best. The Court of Appeals of Washington has similarly determined that Progressive clouds its policy with ambiguity by employing multiple definitions for the term vehicle. [23] In Getz v. Progressive Specialty Insurance Co., a longshoreman sued Progressive for UIM coverage after an underinsured, unauthorized driver on the dock collided with him as he operated a piece of equipment known as a hustler. [24] Progressive declared that the hustler fell within the statutory definition of motor vehicle and therefore denied Getz's claim under the terms of its UIM coverage. [25] But Getz's policy, like Skin's, defined vehicle narrowly, although it used capital letters rather than boldface type to denote that meaning. [26] The Washington Court of Appeals held in favor of Getz, reasoning that Progressive's effort to avoid the consequences of its own definition fails. [27] A New York court has similarly held that Progressive's definition of vehicle should carry over through the rest of its policy, but its holding operated to exclude coverage. [28] In re Progressive Insurance Cos. ( Nemitz ) involved a Progressive customer who sought UIM payments for injuries that she suffered while riding as a passenger on an uninsured ATV. [29] The policy in Nemitz employed a definition of vehicle nearly identical to that of Skin's. [30] And like Skin's policy, it defined uninsured motor vehicle as a motor vehicle that, through its ownership, maintenance or use, results in bodily injury to the insured. [31] The brief opinion of the New York Supreme Court omits any mention of boldface type. The court nonetheless held that the definition of an `uninsured motor vehicle' in the [UIM] section of the policy [] references the phrase `motor vehicle,' which, as we previously noted, is already unambiguously defined in the policy in a manner that excludes ATVs. [32] The New York court apparently saw no reason to distinguish between the specific wording of the UIM provision's reference to motor vehicle and the general definitions section's reference to vehicle. [33] These cases further persuade us that Progressive's position relies on an ambiguous and confusing convention that varies material terms of Progressive's policy depending on the typeface. Progressive maintains that it intentionally makes use of this convention to deliberately provide additional coverage to the policy holder. [34] But the typeface convention in Skin's policy has operated only to deny her coverage. And despite what Progressive may have intended, its policy lends itself to competing interpretations. We conclude that a reasonable insured is entitled to rely on Progressive's policy-defined terms, including the term vehicle, to carry a uniform meaning throughout the policy, regardless of typeface. [35] We therefore affirm the superior court on the issue of medical payments coverage.