Opinion ID: 185974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FOIA Claims

Text: 24 We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment, Johnson v. Executive Office for United States Attorneys, 310 F.3d 771, 774 (D.C.Cir.2002), and therefore consider anew each of the claims and defenses advanced before the district court. We turn first to the government's claims of exemption from disclosure under FOIA of the names of the detainees and their lawyers.
25 Public access to government documents is the fundamental principle that animates FOIA. John Doe Agency v. John Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146, 151, 110 S.Ct. 471, 475, 107 L.Ed.2d 462 (1989). Congress recognized, however, that public disclosure is not always in the public interest. CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 166-67, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 1886, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985). Accordingly, FOIA represents a balance struck by Congress between the public's right to know and the government's legitimate interest in keeping certain information confidential. John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152, 110 S.Ct. at 475. To that end, FOIA mandates disclosure of government records unless the requested information falls within one of nine enumerated exemptions, see 5 U.S.C. § 552(b). While these exemptions are to be narrowly construed, FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 630, 102 S.Ct. 2054, 2064, 72 L.Ed.2d 376 (1982), courts must not fail to give them a meaningful reach and application, John Doe Agency, 493 U.S. at 152, 110 S.Ct. at 475. The government bears the burden of proving that the withheld information falls within the exemptions it invokes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(b). 26 The government invokes four exemptions — 7(A), 7(C), 7(F), and 3 — to shield the names of detainees from disclosure. Upon review, we hold that Exemption 7(A) was properly invoked to withhold the names of the detainees and their lawyers. Finding the names protected under 7(A), we need not address the other exemptions invoked by the government and reserve judgment on whether they too would support withholding the names. 27 Exemption 7(A) allows an agency to withhold records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law enforcement records or information ... could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). In enacting this exemption, Congress recognized that law enforcement agencies had legitimate needs to keep certain records confidential, lest the agencies be hindered in their investigations. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 232, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 2322, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978). Exemption 7(A) does not require a presently pending enforcement proceeding. Rather, as the district court correctly noted, it is sufficient that the government's ongoing September 11 terrorism investigation is likely to lead to such proceedings. See CNSS, 215 F.Supp.2d at 101 n. 9 (citing Bevis v. Dep't of State, 801 F.2d 1386 (D.C.Cir.1986)). 28 The threshold question here is whether the names of detainees were compiled for law enforcement purposes. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7). Because the DOJ is an agency specializ[ing] in law enforcement, its claim of a law enforcement purpose is entitled to deference. Campbell v. Dep't of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 32 (D.C.Cir.1998); Quinon v. FBI, 86 F.3d 1222, 1228 (D.C.Cir.1996); Pratt v. Webster, 673 F.2d 408, 419 (D.C.Cir.1982). To establish a law enforcement purpose, DOJ's declarations must establish (1) a rational nexus between the investigation and one of the agency's law enforcement duties; and (2) a connection between an individual or incident and a possible security risk or violation of federal law. Campbell, 164 F.3d at 32 (citations and quotations omitted); see also Quinon, 86 F.3d at 1228. The government's proffer easily meets this standard. The terrorism investigation is one of DOJ's chief law enforcement duties at this time, see Reynolds Decl. ¶ 2, and the investigation concerns a heinous violation of federal law as well as a breach of this nation's security. Moreover, the names of the detainees and their connection to the investigation came to the government's attention as a result of that law enforcement investigation. Reynolds Decl. ¶ ¶ 2-5. 29 Nonetheless, plaintiffs contend that detainees' names fall outside Exemption 7 because the names are contained in arrest warrants, INS charging documents, and jail records. Since these documents have traditionally been public, plaintiffs contend, Exemption 7 should not be construed to allow withholding of the names. We disagree. Plaintiffs are seeking a comprehensive listing of individuals detained during the post-September 11 investigation. The names have been compiled for the law enforcement purpose of successfully prosecuting the terrorism investigation. As compiled, they constitute a comprehensive diagram of the law enforcement investigation after September 11. Clearly this is information compiled for law enforcement purposes. 30 Next, plaintiffs urge that Exemption 7(A) does not apply because disclosure is not reasonably likely to interfere with enforcement proceedings. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). We disagree. Under Exemption 7(A), the government has the burden of demonstrating a reasonable likelihood of interference with the terrorism investigation. The government's declarations, viewed in light of the appropriate deference to the executive on issues of national security, satisfy this burden. 31 It is well-established that a court may rely on government affidavits to support the withholding of documents under FOIA exemptions, King v. United States Dep't of Justice, 830 F.2d 210, 217 (D.C.Cir.1987), and that we review the government's justifications therein de novo, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); Summers v. Dep't of Justice, 140 F.3d 1077, 1080 (D.C.Cir.1998). It is equally well-established that the judiciary owes some measure of deference to the executive in cases implicating national security, a uniquely executive purview. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 696, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 2502, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (noting that terrorism or other special circumstances might warrant heightened deference to the judgments of the political branches); Dep't of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530, 108 S.Ct. 818, 825-26, 98 L.Ed.2d 918 (1988) (courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the executive in military and national security affairs). Indeed, both the Supreme Court and this Court have expressly recognized the propriety of deference to the executive in the context of FOIA claims which implicate national security. 32 In CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985), the Supreme Court examined the CIA's claims that the names and institutional affiliations of certain researchers in a government-sponsored behavior modification program were exempt from disclosure under FOIA Exemption 3, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Id. at 163-64, 105 S.Ct. at 1884-85. The agency claimed that the information was protected from disclosure by a statute charging the CIA to prevent unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(3). In accepting the CIA Director's judgment that disclosure would reveal intelligence sources and methods, the Court explained that [t]he decisions of the Director, who must of course be familiar with `the whole picture,' as judges are not, are worthy of great deference given the magnitude of the national security interests and potential risks at stake. Sims, 471 U.S. at 179, 105 S.Ct. at 1893. The Court further held that it is the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence, not that of the judiciary, to weigh the variety of subtle and complex factors in determining whether disclosure of information may lead to an unacceptable risk of compromising the Agency's intelligence-gathering process. Id. at 180, 105 S.Ct. at 1893-94. 33 The same is true of the Justice Department officials in charge of the present investigation. We have consistently reiterated the principle of deference to the executive in the FOIA context when national security concerns are implicated. In McGehee v. Casey, we examined the standard of review for FOIA requests of classified documents. 718 F.2d 1137, 1148 (D.C.Cir.1983). We observed: 34 [C]ourts are to accord substantial weight to an agency's affidavit concerning the details of the classified status of the disputed record because the Executive departments responsible for national defense and foreign policy matters have unique insights into what adverse affects [sic] might occur as a result of a particular classified record. 35 Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 1200, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 12, U.S.C.C.A.N. 1974, p. 6267 (1974) (Conference Report on the FOIA Amendments)). Moreover, in the FOIA context, we have consistently deferred to executive affidavits predicting harm to the national security, and have found it unwise to undertake searching judicial review. See, e.g., King, 830 F.2d at 217 (the court owes substantial weight to detailed agency explanations in the national security context); Gardels v. CIA, 689 F.2d 1100, 1104 (D.C.Cir.1982) (Once satisfied that proper procedures have been followed and that the information logically falls into the exemption claimed, the courts need not go further to test the expertise of the agency, or to question its veracity when nothing appears to raise the issue of good faith.); Halperin v. CIA, 629 F.2d 144, 148 (D.C.Cir.1980); Weissman v. CIA, 565 F.2d 692, 697-98 (D.C.Cir.1977). 36 Given this weight of authority counseling deference in national security matters, we owe deference to the government's judgments contained in its affidavits. Just as we have deferred to the executive when it invokes FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3, we owe the same deference under Exemption 7(A) in appropriate cases, such as this one. Id. Plaintiffs provide no valid reason why the general principle of deference to the executive on national security issues should apply under FOIA Exemption 3, as in Sims and Halperin, and Exemption 1, as in our earlier cases, but not under Exemption 7(A). Nor can we can conceive of any reason to limit deference to the executive in its area of expertise to certain FOIA exemptions so long as the government's declarations raise legitimate concerns that disclosure would impair national security. 37 The need for deference in this case is just as strong as in earlier cases. America faces an enemy just as real as its former Cold War foes, with capabilities beyond the capacity of the judiciary to explore. Exemption 7(A) explicitly requires a predictive judgment of the harm that will result from disclosure of information, permitting withholding when it could reasonably be expected that the harm will result. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(A). It is abundantly clear that the government's top counterterrorism officials are well-suited to make this predictive judgment. Conversely, the judiciary is in an extremely poor position to second-guess the executive's judgment in this area of national security. Cf. Krikorian v. Dep't of State, 984 F.2d 461, 464 (D.C.Cir.1993) (quoting Halperin, 629 F.2d at 148) (Judges ... lack the expertise necessary to second-guess such agency opinions in the typical national security FOIA case.). We therefore reject any attempt to artificially limit the long-recognized deference to the executive on national security issues. Judicial deference depends on the substance of the danger posed by disclosure — that is, harm to the national security — not the FOIA exemption invoked. 38 In light of the deference mandated by the separation of powers and Supreme Court precedent, we hold that the government's expectation that disclosure of the detainees' names would enable al Qaeda or other terrorist groups to map the course of the investigation and thus develop the means to impede it is reasonable. A complete list of names informing terrorists of every suspect detained by the government at any point during the September 11 investigation would give terrorist organizations a composite picture of the government investigation, and since these organizations would generally know the activities and locations of its members on or about September 11, disclosure would inform terrorists of both the substantive and geographic focus of the investigation. Moreover, disclosure would inform terrorists which of their members were compromised by the investigation, and which were not. This information could allow terrorists to better evade the ongoing investigation and more easily formulate or revise counter-efforts. In short, the records could reveal much about the focus and scope of the [agency's] investigation, and are thus precisely the sort of information exemption 7(A) allows an agency to keep secret. Swan v. SEC, 96 F.3d 498, 500 (D.C.Cir.1996). 39 As the district court noted, courts have relied on similar mosaic arguments in the context of national security. CNSS, 215 F.Supp.2d at 103 & n. 13. In Sims, for example, the Supreme Court cautioned that bits and pieces of data `may aid in piecing together bits of other information even when the individual piece is not of obvious importance in itself.' 471 U.S. at 178, 105 S.Ct. at 1892 (quoting Halperin, 629 F.2d at 150). Thus, [w]hat may seem trivial to the uninformed, may appear of great moment to one who has a broad view of the scene and may put the questioned item of information in its proper context. Id. (quotations omitted). Such a danger is present here. While the name of any individual detainee may appear innocuous or trivial, it could be of great use to al Qaeda in plotting future terrorist attacks or intimidating witnesses in the present investigation. Cf. United States v. Yunis, 867 F.2d 617, 623 (D.C.Cir.1989) ([t]hings that did not make sense to the District Judge would make all too much sense to a foreign counter-intelligence specialist who could learn much about this nation's intelligence-gathering capabilities from what these documents revealed about sources and methods.). Importantly, plaintiffs here do not request bits and pieces of information, but rather seek the names of every single individual detained in the course of the government's terrorism investigation. It is more than reasonable to expect that disclosing the name of every individual detained in the post-September 11 terrorism investigation would interfere with that investigation. 40 Similarly, the government's judgment that disclosure would deter or hinder cooperation by detainees is reasonable. The government reasonably predicts that if terrorists learn one of their members has been detained, they would attempt to deter any further cooperation by that member through intimidation, physical coercion, or by cutting off all contact with the detainee. A terrorist organization may even seek to hunt down detainees (or their families) who are not members of the organization, but who the terrorists know may have valuable information about the organization. 41 On numerous occasions, both the Supreme Court and this Court have found government declarations expressing the likelihood of witness intimidation and evidence tampering sufficient to justify withholding of witnesses' names under Exemption 7(A). See NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 239-42, 98 S.Ct. 2311, 2325-27, 57 L.Ed.2d 159 (1978) (allowing withholding pursuant to Exemption 7(A) based on the risk of witness intimidation that would attend releasing witness statements prior to NLRB proceedings); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 312-13 (D.C.Cir.1988) (upholding 7(A) claim based on government declaration that disclosure would enable corporation under investigation to intimidate or coerce informing employees); accord Mapother v. Dep't of Justice, 3 F.3d 1533, 1542-43 (D.C.Cir.1993) (recognizing that government affidavits predicting witness intimidation and evidence fabrication have achieved recognition in Exemption 7 case-law); Manna v. Dep't of Justice, 51 F.3d 1158, 1165 (3d Cir.1995) (allowing withholding of names of all interviewees, informants, [and] witnesses in criminal investigation based on fears of retaliation from organized crime). Most recently, we addressed in Swan a FOIA request that would have resulted in the disclosure of, inter alia, the identities of witnesses in an SEC investigation. 96 F.3d at 499. The SEC's declaration alleged that disclosure would risk allowing the subjects of the investigation to intimidate witnesses, manufacture favorable evidence, and conceal damaging evidence. Id. We accepted the SEC's declaration and allowed the documents to be withheld. Id. at 499, 500. The risks of witness intimidation and evidence tampering alleged here are at least as great as those in Swan and our other precedents. We see no reason to assume that terrorists are less likely to intimidate the detainees here than were the subjects of the SEC investigation in Swan. Consequently, we hold that disclosure of detainees' names could reasonably be expected to interfere with the ongoing terrorism investigation. 42 For several reasons, plaintiffs contend that we should reject the government's predictive judgments of the harms that would result from disclosure. First, they argue that terrorist organizations likely already know which of their members have been detained. We have no way of assessing that likelihood. Moreover, even if terrorist organizations know about some of their members who were detained, a complete list of detainees could still have great value in confirming the status of their members. Cf. Gardels, 689 F.2d at 1105 (rejecting a similar argument in the FOIA national security context and stating that [o]fficial acknowledgment ends all doubt and gives the foreign organization a firmer basis for its own strategic or tactical response.). For example, an organization may be unaware of a member who was detained briefly and then released, but remains subject to continuing government surveillance. Reynolds Supp. Decl. ¶ ¶ 3, 5. After disclosure, this detainee could be irreparably compromised as a source of information. 43 More importantly, some detainees may not be members of terrorist organizations, but may nonetheless have been detained on INS or material witness warrants as having information about terrorists. Terrorist organizations are less likely to be aware of such individuals' status as detainees. Such detainees could be acquaintances of the September 11 terrorists, or members of the same community groups or mosques. See Rachel L. Swarns, Oregon Muslims Protest Monthlong Detention Without a Charge, N.Y. TIMES, April 20, 2003, at A16 (describing material witness detainee who attended same mosque as indicted terrorism suspects). These detainees, fearing retribution or stigma, would be less likely to cooperate with the investigation if their names are disclosed. Moreover, tracking down the background and location of these detainees could give terrorists insights into the investigation they would otherwise be unlikely to have. After disclosure, terrorist organizations could attempt to intimidate these detainees or their families, or feed the detainees false or misleading information. It is important to remember that many of these detainees have been released at this time and are thus especially vulnerable to intimidation or coercion. While the detainees have been free to disclose their names to the press or public, it is telling that so few have come forward, perhaps for fear of this very intimidation. 44 We further note the impact disclosure could have on the government's investigation going forward. A potential witness or informant may be much less likely to come forward and cooperate with the investigation if he believes his name will be made public. Cf. Sims, 471 U.S. at 172, 105 S.Ct. at 1889 (noting Congress's concern that intelligence sources will close up like a clam unless the government maintains complete confidentiality); Manna, 51 F.3d at 1165 (disclosure ... could result in a chilling effect upon potential cooperators and witnesses). 45 Plaintiffs next argue that the government's predictive judgment is undermined by the government's disclosure of some of the detainees' names. The Supreme Court confronted a similar argument in Sims, in which respondents contended that because the Agency has already revealed the names of many of the institutions at which [behavior modification] research was performed, the Agency is somehow estopped from withholding the names of others. 471 U.S. at 180, 105 S.Ct. at 1893. In rejecting the argument, the Court stated that [t]his suggestion overlooks the political realities of intelligence operations in which, among other things, our Government may choose to release information deliberately to `send a message' to allies or adversaries. Id. We likewise reject the plaintiffs' version of this discredited argument. The disclosure of a few pieces of information in no way lessens the government's argument that complete disclosure would provide a composite picture of its investigation and have negative effects on the investigation. Furthermore, as the Sims Court recognized, strategic disclosures can be important weapons in the government's arsenal during a law enforcement investigation. Id. (The national interest sometimes makes it advisable, or even imperative, to disclose information that may lead to the identity of intelligence sources.). The court should not second-guess the executive's judgment in this area. [I]t is the responsibility of the [executive] not that of the judiciary to determine when to disclose information that may compromise intelligence sources and methods. Id. 46 Contrary to plaintiffs' claims, the government's submissions easily establish an adequate connection between both the material witness and the INS detainees and terrorism to warrant full application of the deference principle. First, all material witness detainees have been held on warrants issued by a federal judge pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3144. Reynolds Decl. ¶ 4. Under this statute, a federal judge may issue a material witness warrant based on an affidavit stating that the witness has information relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation. Consequently, material witness detainees have been found by a federal judge to have relevant knowledge about the terrorism investigation. It is therefore reasonable to assume that disclosure of their names could impede the government's use of these potentially valuable witnesses. 47 As to the INS detainees, the government states that they were 48 originally questioned because there were indications that they might have connections with, or possess information pertaining to, terrorist activity against the United States including particularly the September 11 attacks and/or the individuals and organizations who perpetrated them. For example, they may have been questioned because they were identified as having interacted with the hijackers, or were believed to have information relating to other aspects of the investigation. 49 Reynolds Decl. ¶ 10. Other INS detainees may have been questioned because of their association with an organization believed to be involved in providing material support to terrorist organizations. Watson Decl. ¶ 8. Moreover, [i]n the course of questioning them, law enforcement agents determined, often from the subjects themselves, that they were in violation of federal immigration laws, and, in some instances also determined that they had links to other facets of the investigation. Reynolds Decl. ¶ 10; Watson Decl. ¶ 8. Furthermore, the Watson Declaration speaks of the INS detainees being subject to public hearings involving evidence about terrorist links, ¶ 16, and states that concerns remain about links to terrorism, ¶ 19. The clear import of the declarations is that many of the detainees have links to terrorism. This comes as no surprise given that the detainees were apprehended during the course of a terrorism investigation, and given that several detainees have been charged with federal terrorism crimes or held as enemy combatants. Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence presented in the declarations is sufficient to show a rational link between disclosure and the harms alleged. 50 In support of this conclusion, we note that the Third Circuit confronted a similar issue involving the INS detainees when it considered the constitutionality of closed deportation hearings in North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir.2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2215, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2003). The court was faced with the same Watson Declaration in evidence here and the same government prediction that harm would result from the disclosure of information about the INS detainees. See id. at 218. That court acknowledged that the representations of the Watson Declaration are to some degree speculative. Id. at 219. But the court did not search for specific evidence that each of the INS detainees was involved in terrorism, nor did it embark on a probing analysis of whether the government's concerns were well-founded. Id. Rather, it was quite hesitant to conduct a judicial inquiry into the credibility of these security concerns, as national security is an area where courts have traditionally extended great deference to Executive expertise. Id. The court concluded: To the extent that the Attorney General's national security concerns seem credible, we will not lightly second-guess them. Id. We think the Third Circuit's approach was correct and we follow it here. Inasmuch as the concerns expressed in the government's declarations seem credible — and inasmuch as the declarations were made by counter-terrorism experts with far greater knowledge than this Court — we hold that the disclosure of the names of the detainees could reasonably be expected to interfere with the ongoing investigation. 51 In upholding the government's invocation of Exemption 7(A), we observe that we are in accord with several federal courts that have wisely respected the executive's judgment in prosecuting the national response to terrorism. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4th Cir.2003) (dismissing the habeas corpus petition of a United States citizen captured in Afghanistan challenging his military detention and designation as an enemy combatant); Global Relief Found. v. O'Neill, 315 F.3d 748 (7th Cir.2002) (upholding against constitutional challenge a portion of the USA PATRIOT Act, 50 U.S.C. § 1702(c), which authorizes the ex parte use of classified evidence in proceedings to freeze the assets of terrorist organizations); North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (holding that closure of special interest deportation hearings involving INS detainees with alleged connections to terrorism does not violate the First Amendment); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278 (4th Cir.2002) (reversing district court's order that allowed alleged enemy combatant unmonitored access to counsel). We realize that not all courts are in agreement. In Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681 (6th Cir.2002), the Sixth Circuit acknowledged the necessity of deferring to the executive on terrorism issues but held that the First Amendment prohibits a blanket closure of special interest deportation hearings. We do not find the Sixth Circuit's reasoning compelling, but join the Third, Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that the courts must defer to the executive on decisions of national security. In so deferring, we do not abdicate the role of the judiciary. Rather, in undertaking a deferential review we simply recognize the different roles underlying the constitutional separation of powers. It is within the role of the executive to acquire and exercise the expertise of protecting national security. It is not within the role of the courts to second-guess executive judgments made in furtherance of that branch's proper role. The judgment of the district court ordering the government to disclose the names of the detainees is reversed.
52 We next address whether the government properly withheld the names of the attorneys for INS and material witness detainees under Exemptions 7(A), 7(C), and 7(F). As with the identities of the detainees, we hold that their attorneys' names are also protected from disclosure by Exemption 7(A). 53 The government contends that a list of attorneys for the detainees would facilitate the easy compilation of a list of all detainees, and all of the dangers flowing therefrom. It is more than reasonable to assume that plaintiffs and amici press organizations would attempt to contact detainees' attorneys and compile a list of all detainees. As discussed above, if such a list fell into the hands of al Qaeda, the consequences could be disastrous. Having accepted the government's predictive judgments about the dangers of disclosing a comprehensive list of detainees, we also defer to its prediction that disclosure of attorneys' names involves the same danger. Cf. Sims, 471 U.S. at 179-80, 105 S.Ct. at 1893-94 (upholding under FOIA Exemption 3 the government's withholding of the institutional affiliations of researchers in a secret government program; deferring to government's judgment that disclosure would lead to identification of the researchers themselves and the consequent loss of confidential intelligence sources).
54 Having held that the government properly withheld the names of the detainees pursuant to Exemption 7(A), we easily affirm the portion of the district court's ruling that allowed withholding, under Exemption 7(A), of the more comprehensive detention information sought by plaintiffs. 55 As outlined above, supra at 922, plaintiffs sought the dates and locations of arrest, detention, and release for each of the detainees. Even more than disclosure of the identities of detainees, the information requested here would provide a complete roadmap of the government's investigation. Knowing when and where each individual was arrested would provide a chronological and geographical picture of the government investigation. Terrorists could learn from this information not only where the government focused its investigation but how that investigation progressed step by step. Armed with that knowledge, they could then reach such conclusions as, for example, which cells had been compromised, and which individuals had been cooperative with the United States. They might well be able to derive conclusions as to how more adequately secure their clandestine operations in future terrorist undertakings. Similarly, knowing where each individual is presently held could facilitate communication between terrorist organizations and detainees and the attendant intimidation of witnesses and fabrication of evidence. As explained in detail above, these impediments to an ongoing law enforcement investigation are precisely what Exemption 7(A) was enacted to preclude. Accordingly, we affirm the district court and hold that the government properly withheld information about the dates and locations of arrest, detention, and release for each detainee.