Opinion ID: 352530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Dismissal of Summa's Counterclaim.

Text: 139 During trial, the court granted Maheu's motion to strike Summa's counterclaim for $2,120,000 based on losses allegedly caused by Maheu's mismanagement of its assets. The amount claimed was the aggregate paid Maheu in retainer fees for 1967-1970 based on Summa's argument that where serious intentional fiduciary breaches have occurred, an agent forfeits all compensation. J. C. Peacock, Inc. v. Hasko, 1961, 196 C.A.2d 353, 357-61, 16 Cal.Rptr. 518, 521-24. Rest. (2d) of Agency § 469 (1957). The trial court's ruling was based upon Summa's earlier stipulation to restrict this counterclaim to liquidated damages in return for Maheu's agreement to a bifurcated trial. 140 The trial judge concluded that Summa had failed to present evidence indicating either the reasonable value of the services Maheu did perform or the exact time period during which the breach of fiduciary duties occurred. Thus Summa's claim was unliquidated because no legal criteria could be applied to the facts that would produce a definite or certain sum to which Summa would be entitled. Summa's subsequent motions to amend its counterclaim were denied in part because Maheu would have been prejudiced by his lack of discovery and depositions concerning the compartmentalizing of Maheu's retainer fees which Summa sought to achieve in its proposed amendment. 141 Summa responds by arguing that the sum to which it was entitled was readily calculable and, therefore, liquidated. It says that because Maheu was paid a yearly retainer rather than fees for individual services, any single act constituting a wilful and deliberate breach of his fiduciary duty would result in his forfeiture of all compensation for that year. The trial court disagreed that a year was the proper time period. 142 Because we agree with the trial court that Maheu's compensation was apportionable, and because Summa failed to establish the exact time period during which the alleged breach occurred, we agree that the damages were not liquidated and the motion to strike the counterclaim was properly granted. See Wilshire Oil Co. v. Riffe, 10 Cir., 1969, 406 F.2d 1061, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 843, 90 S.Ct. 105, 24 L.Ed.2d 92.X. Proper Rate of Interest. 143 Finally, Summa claims that the trial court (1) erroneously refused to grant Summa's motion for a directed verdict on Summa's counterclaim for interest on the $74,166.62 of TAA rental monies that Maheu used for approximately nine months; (2) erroneously failed to instruct the jury that it must figure interest at the legal rate of 7% Under Cal.Civ.Code § 3336; and (3) erroneously denied Summa's motion for an order amending the judgment to reflect the proper interest rate. 144 Maheu responds that the verdict on the counterclaim does not establish a conversion, thus Cal.Civ.Code § 3336 is not applicable. We agree. Because the characterization of Maheu's use of this money was an area of factual dispute, the issue of whether Maheu owed interest and, if so, how much was a question for the jury. Directed verdict would not have been proper. No amendment to the judgment is required. We find no error. 5A Moore's Federal Practice P 50.02(1) (2d ed. 1975). 145