Opinion ID: 1196411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: 1990 Ricard Confession

Text: The Inspectors argue that they are entitled to both absolute and qualified immunity with respect to the 1990 Ricard confession. The Inspectors argue that they are entitled to absolute immunity because they were not engaged in police-type investigative work but were acting in an advocacy role. Preliminarily, we have some doubt that investigative law enforcement officers would ever be entitled to absolute immunity. Because, however, of the Supreme Court's teaching that in determining [absolute] immunity, we examine `the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it,' Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 127, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997) (quoting Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 229, 108 S.Ct. 538, 98 L.Ed.2d 555 (1988)), we nonetheless analyze this contention on the assumption that the application of absolute immunity is not barred as a matter of law. First, the Inspectors are not officers of the court, as are lawyers acting as prosecutors. Because they were not acting as prosecutors, or even directly assisting Butterworth in the presentation of evidence, they were not performing the traditional functions of an advocate. Id. at 131, 118 S.Ct. 502. Because the purpose of absolute immunity is to protect the judicial process, rather than any actor in the process, [t]o qualify as advocacy, an act must be `intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' Genzler, 410 F.3d at 637 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). Here, with respect to the Inspectors' actions and duties, there is no evidence in the record that the Inspectors ever engaged in conduct `intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.' Id. Their claim of absolute immunity accordingly is rejected. Even if the Ricard confession was obtained by Lewis and Gittens, rather than Sanders and Hendrix, this does not transform the Inspectors' role into that of an advocate, rather than that of an investigator. The Inspectors also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity. The threshold question in determining whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity is whether the alleged facts, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, show that the conduct violated a constitutional right. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). [7] If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity. On the other hand, if a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the parties' submissions, the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established.... The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted. Id. at 201-02, 121 S.Ct. 2151; see also Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). There is no question that a constitutional right has been violated if a prosecutor fails to disclose exculpatory evidence to a defendant during the course of the prosecution. See Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (stating that the Brady rule requires the prosecutor to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial); Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 742 (9th Cir.2006) (The animating purpose of Brady is to preserve the fairness of criminal trials.), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1125, 127 S.Ct. 957, 166 L.Ed.2d 727 (2007). The Inspectors argue that there was no Brady violation because the tape eventually was disclosed. They further argue that the failure to disclose the tape was not prejudicial because Tennison received the tape in time to use it at the hearing on his motion for a new trial. The district court rejected this argument, adopting the reasoning in its August 2003 order granting Tennison's habeas petition, which carefully explained why the delay in disclosing the Ricard confession was prejudicial to Tennison's motion for a new trial. The court pointed out that the focus of the new trial motion was the unauthenticated and therefore inadmissible videotape of a hooded, unidentified person confessing to the shooting, and that, at the time of the evidentiary hearing on the motion, the prosecution had not disclosed to Tennison Smith's statements to the police and Sanders' reliance on her information in the Blue interview. Tennison v. Henry, No. CV 98-3842 (N.D.Cal. Aug. 26, 2003) (Order Granting Tennison's Habeas Pet., at 100). The court reasoned that the judge who denied the new trial motion found that Ricard's testimony was inconsistent and uncorroborated, but the judge did not know that Ricard's testimony in fact was corroborated. Id. at 100-01. The district court reasoned that Goff was prejudiced by the delay in the disclosure of the Ricard confession because he could have made use of it in his state appeals and habeas petitions. It is true that a Brady violation may be cured ... by belated disclosure of evidence, so long as the disclosure occurs `at a time when disclosure would be of value to the accused.' United States v. Gamez-Orduno, 235 F.3d 453, 461 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Span, 970 F.2d 573, 583 (9th Cir.1992)). However, Tennison did not learn about the tape until the second to the last day of the hearing on his motion for a new trial, much too late for the disclosure to be of value to him. We agree with the district court's sound reasoning that Tennison was prejudiced by the delay in the disclosure of the confession. Similar to their argument regarding Smith's statement, the Inspectors argue that there was no Brady violation in their failure to disclose the Ricard confession because Tennison and Goff knew that Ricard had bragged about his involvement in the shooting. Goff's overhearing Ricard bragging in the neighborhood, however, is not comparable to Ricard's Mirandized confession to police. Further, similar to Smith, Ricard was hesitant to become involved in the case, for obvious reasons. The Inspectors argue that, even if a constitutional right was violated, such a constitutional right was not clearly established in 1990. The Inspectors, however, define the right too narrowly. They argue that they did not have a duty to disclose a confession that was made after a guilty verdict was rendered, that was inherently unbelievable, and that was given by someone who earlier had denied involvement in the murder. For a legal principle to be clearly established, it is not necessary that `the very action in question has previously been held unlawful.' Fogel v. Collins, 531 F.3d 824, 833 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987)). Rather, [t]he dispositive inquiry is `whether it would be clear to a reasonable [official] that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted.' CarePartners, LLC v. Lashway, 545 F.3d 867, 883 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202, 121 S.Ct. 2151) (second brackets in the original), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 2382, 173 L.Ed.2d 1294 (2009). The Inspectors received a Mirandized confession by someone who had been named by a reliable witness, known to the officers, who recounted events surrounding the murder in detail, and whose account contradicted that of the prosecution's witnesses. The evidence certainly undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial. Benn v. Lambert, 283 F.3d 1040, 1053 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that such material should have been disclosed to the defense. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1095 (9th Cir.2005) (It is well settled that evidence impeaching the testimony of a government witness falls within the Brady rule. ...). Moreover, we reject the Inspectors' attempt to dismiss their Brady duty by downplaying the importance of the evidence. [I]f there were questions about the reliability of the exculpatory information, it was the prerogative of the defendant and his counsel Äî and not of the prosecution Äî to exercise judgment in determining whether the defendant should make use of it, because [t]o allow otherwise would be to appoint the fox as henhouse guard. DiSimone v. Phillips, 461 F.3d 181, 195 (2d Cir.2006). The fact that the Inspectors received the tape of the confession after the guilty verdict was rendered is immaterial because the record discloses that they received the tape while they were still involved in the new trial and post-conviction proceedings for both Tennison and Goff. See Broam v. Bogan, 320 F.3d 1023, 1030 (9th Cir.2003) (A prosecutor's decision not to preserve or turn over exculpatory material before trial, during trial, or after conviction is a violation of due process under [ Brady ].); Leka v. Portuondo, 257 F.3d 89, 100 (2d Cir.2001) (stating that  Brady requires disclosure of information that the prosecution acquires during the trial itself, or even afterward); Smith v. Roberts, 115 F.3d 818, 820 (10th Cir.1997) (agreeing with the State's concession that the Brady duty to disclose is ongoing and extends to all stages of the judicial process, where the evidence arose after trial but during direct appeal). The inconsistencies and contradictory statements in Hendrix's and Sanders' 2001 and 2005 declarations and depositions, especially seen in light of the declarations of Butterworth and Melton, establish that genuine issues of material fact remain as to this claim. [8] The district court did not err in denying the Inspectors' motion for summary judgment with respect to the Ricard confession.