Opinion ID: 1014470
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Against Duke Power

Text: The district court dismissed Freeman’s claims against Duke Power for breach of contract and wrongful discharge for failing to state a § 301 claim because both claims were brought outside of the applicable statute of limitations, borrowing the six-month limitation period contained in § 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2000). If a federal statute is silent as to the applica10 FREEMAN v. DUKE POWER CO. ble statute of limitations, we generally borrow the most analogous state limitations period. See DelCostello v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158 (1983). To avoid frustrating federal policy, however, courts should borrow a limitations period from an analogous federal statute if that statute clearly provides a closer analogy than available state statutes. Id. at 172. The NLRA proscribes unfair labor practices and provides a sixmonth period within which to bring an unfair labor practices claim. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b). The six-month period takes into account the national interests in stable bargaining relationships and finality of private settlements, and an employee’s interest in setting aside what he views as an unjust settlement under the collective-bargaining system. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171 (internal marks omitted). In this case, Freeman twice settled grievances filed on his behalf by the Union with Duke Power. The settlements provided that Duke Power could terminate Freeman for engaging in electrical contracting, and that Duke Power’s decision to do so shall be final. (J.A. at 12.) Freeman’s claims for breach of contract and wrongful discharge challenge Duke Power’s decision to terminate his employment despite his agreement in the settlement negotiations that Duke Power’s decision would be final. Allowing Freeman to use the three-year statute of limitation provided under North Carolina law for breach of contract claims would undermine the NLRA’s delicate balance between the competing interests of promoting the finality of private settlements and avoiding unjust settlements. See DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171. The district court appropriately borrowed the NLRA’s six-month statute of limitation and properly dismissed the breach of contract and wrongful discharge claims as being brought outside of that period.
Freeman asserted in the third count of his complaint that Duke Power’s actions in limiting his ability to moonlight violated the North Carolina constitutional provision recognizing the inalienable right of all persons to the enjoyment of the fruits of their own labor. N.C. Const. art. I, § 1. North Carolina’s courts do not recognize a cause of action based on article I, section 1 of the state constitution to remedy private employment disputes. See Teleflex Info. Sys., Inc. v. Arnold, FREEMAN v. DUKE POWER CO. 11 513 S.E.2d 85, 88 (N.C. Ct. App. 1999) (affirming summary judgment for employer in suit brought by at-will employee claiming that his firing violated article I, section 1 of the state constitution). Rather, the provision limits the state’s ability to regulate an individual’s livelihood. Id. ([T]he declaration of rights in [the North Carolina] State Constitution was inserted ‘chiefly to protect the individual from the State.’ (quoting North Carolina v. Ballance, 51 S.E.2d 731, 734 (1949))). Thus, the district court properly dismissed Freeman’s state constitutional claim. Likewise, Freeman’s direct cause of action under article I, section 19 of the state constitution, providing that no person shall be deprived of his property but by the law of the land, also fails. Article I, section 19 is the North Carolina state constitution’s equivalent of the federal Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment due process clause. Both provisions protect individuals only against governmental action. Thus, Freeman has no cognizable action based on the state constitution against his wholly private employer. See N.C. Nat’l Bank v. Burnette, 256 S.E.2d 388, 394 (N.C. 1979) (This constitutional [due process] shield does not protect citizens from the actions or activities of other private individuals.); Weston v. Carolina Medicorp, Inc., 402 S.E.2d 653, 656-57 (N.C. Ct. App. 1991) (‘[S]tate action’ is required to trigger the protections of the ‘synonymous’ due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 19 of the North Carolina Constitution.). The district court properly dismissed Freeman’s third count.
Freeman argues that North Carolina courts are undecided as to whether a bad faith discharge claim is separately cognizable in North Carolina. The Supreme Court of North Carolina, however, unequivocally stated, in disagreeing with two of the federal district court cases relied upon by Freeman, that it did not recognize a separate claim for wrongful discharge in bad faith in a prior case. Amos v. Oakdale Knitting Co., 416 S.E.2d 166, 173 (N.C. 1992). The district court properly dismissed Freeman’s fourth count against Duke Power. 12 FREEMAN v. DUKE POWER CO.