Opinion ID: 1194929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: McMillian v. Monroe County

Text: Recently, in McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. 781, the United States Supreme Court provided an analytical framework for resolving the question of which entity a government official represents when performing a certain function. In particular, the court considered whether Alabama sheriffs represent the county or the state for purposes of section 1983 when they act in a law enforcement capacity. ( Id. at pp. ___-___ [117 S.Ct. at pp. 1736-1737].) In McMillian, the plaintiff spent six years in prison before his capital murder conviction was reversed on the ground that the state had suppressed exculpatory evidence. ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1736].) Following his release, he sued various parties, including the Monroe County Sheriff in his official capacity, on the ground that he had intimidated a witness into making false statements and suppressed exculpatory evidence. ( Ibid. ) The high court concluded, Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties, represent the State of Alabama, not their counties. ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1740].) In so doing, the high court considered a variety of factors. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at pp. ___-___ [117 S.Ct. at pp. 1737-1740].) First, it looked to the Alabama Constitution. ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1737].) It concluded that the constitutional provisions concerning sheriffs, the historical development of those provisions, and the interpretation given them by the Alabama Supreme Court strongly support Monroe County's contention that sheriffs represent the State, at least for some purposes. ( Id. at pp. ___-___ [117 S.Ct. at pp. 1737-1738].) In particular, since 1901, but not previously, the Alabama Constitution has provided that sheriffs are members of the state executive department. ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1738].) Such members have to take an oath of office, and are required to submit written reports to the governor on demand. ( Id. at p. ___, fn. 4 [117 S.Ct. at p. 1738].) Moreover, sheriffs are subject to the same impeachment procedures as state legal officers and lower state court judges.... ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1738].) Finally, [c]ritically for [the high court], the Alabama Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions and their historical background as evidence of `the framers' intent to ensure that sheriffs be considered executive officers of the state.' [Citation.] Based primarily on this understanding of the State Constitution, the court has held unequivocally that sheriffs are state officers, and that tort claims brought against sheriffs based on their official[] acts therefore constitute suits against the State, not suits against the sheriff's county. ( Id. at pp. ___-___ [117 S.Ct. at pp. 1738-1739].) Next, the high court examined the relevant provisions of the Alabama Code. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739].) It found these provisions are less compelling, but still support the conclusion [that sheriffs represent the state] to some extent. ( Ibid. ) First, judges, who are state officers, may order the sheriff to take certain actions, even if the judge sits in a distant county. ( Ibid. ) Second, the sheriff must give to the county treasurer a sworn written statement detailing the funds he has received for the county since his last statement, and must pay these funds to the treasurer. [Citation.] In contrast to the state judges, however, the county treasurer does not appear to have any statutory authority to direct the sheriff to take specific actions. ( Ibid. ) Third and most importantly, ... sheriffs are given complete authority to enforce the state criminal law in their counties. In contrast, the `powers and duties' of the counties themselves ... do not include any provision in the area of law enforcement. [Citation.] Thus, the `governing body' of the counties ... cannot instruct the sheriff how to ferret out crime, how to arrest a criminal, or how to secure evidence of a crime. And when the sheriff does secure such evidence, he has an obligation to share this information not with the county commission, but with the district attorney (a state official, see Hooks v. Hitt, 539 So.2d 157, 159 (Ala. 1988)). ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739].) While the county commission thus has no direct control over how the sheriff fulfills his law enforcement duty, the governor and the attorney general do have this kind of control. ( Ibid. ) These individuals can direct the sheriff to investigate `any alleged violation of law in their counties,' and submit a written report to the state official in charge of the investigation. ( Ibid. ) Finally, the high court noted that the salaries of all sheriffs are set by the state legislature, not by the county commissions. ( Ibid. ) The high court found four important provisions that cut in favor of the conclusion that sheriffs are county officials  the sheriff's salary was paid by the county, the county provided the sheriff with certain equipment, supplies, lodging, and reimbursement for expenses, the sheriff's jurisdiction was limited to the county borders, and the sheriff was elected locally by the county voters  insufficient to tip the balance in favor of the plaintiff. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1740].) The county's payment of the sheriff's salary did not translate into control over him, since the county neither has the authority to change his salary nor the discretion to refuse payment completely. ( Ibid. ) While the county commissions did have discretion to deny operational funds beyond what is `reasonably necessary,' ( ibid. ) at most, this discretion would allow the commission to exert an attenuated and indirect influence over the sheriff's operations. ( Ibid. ) In response to the last two factors, the court stated, plaintiff's contention that sheriffs are county officials because `state policymakers' typically make policy for the entire State (without limits on their jurisdiction) and are typically elected on a statewide (not local) basis, surely has some force. But district attorneys and state judges are often considered ... state officials, even though they too have limited jurisdictions and are elected locally. These characteristics are therefore consistent with an understanding of the 67 Alabama sheriffs as state officials who have been locally placed throughout the State, with an element of control granted to the officials and residents of the county which receives the sheriff's services. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1740], fn. omitted.) Finally, in response to the plaintiff's concern that state and local governments will manipulate the titles of local officials in a blatant effort to shield the local governments from liability, the court observed, there is certainly no evidence of such manipulation here; indeed, the Alabama provisions that cut most strongly against [plaintiff's] position predate our decision in Monell by some time. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1742].) Significantly, the high court did not state that the factors it considered were exclusive, or that they must always be applicable in order for a court to conclude that a particular official represents the state and not the county. Rather, it considered whether although there is some evidence in Alabama law that supports [plaintiff's] argument that sheriffs represent their counties, the weight of the evidence is strongly on the side of the conclusion that the sheriffs represent the state. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1740].) The essential thrust of McMillian is that a court must discern which entity a government official represents in a particular area, or on a particular issue by examining how the official's functions are defined by state law. ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1737].) While this law may give varying responses, we look to the weight of the evidence to reach a conclusion. ( Id. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1740].) 1. Preparing to Prosecute and Prosecuting Criminal Violations (7b) We now examine California law to determine whether for purposes of local government damages liability under section 1983, a district attorney represents the state or the county when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law. While the question of who is a local policymaker is decided by the trial judge, not a jury, it conceivably could in some cases involve the introduction of evidence. Here, however, as in McMillian, evidence other than the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions is not pertinent. First, as the high court did in McMillian, we consider which entity supervises the work of the district attorney. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739].) In California, each county district attorney is supervised by the Attorney General. Since 1966, article V, section 13 of the California Constitution [4] has provided in substance: Subject to the powers and duties of the Governor, the Attorney General shall be the chief law officer of the State. It shall be the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced. The Attorney General shall have direct supervision over every district attorney ... in all matters pertaining to the duties of their ... office[], and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the Attorney General may seem advisable. Whenever in the opinion of the Attorney General any law of the State is not being adequately enforced in any county, it shall be the duty of the Attorney General to prosecute any violations of law of which the superior court shall have jurisdiction, and in such cases the Attorney General shall have all the powers of a district attorney. When required by the public interest or directed by the Governor, the Attorney General shall assist any district attorney in the discharge of the duties of that office. (See People v. Honig (1996) 48 Cal. App.4th 289, 354-355 [55 Cal. Rptr.2d 555] [Article V, section 13 of the California Constitution confers broad discretion upon the Attorney General to determine when to step in and prosecute a criminal case.].) Since 1945, the Government Code has contained a similar provision. [5] In addition, Penal Code section 923, enacted in 1959, provides: Whenever the Attorney General considers the public interest requires, he may, with or without the concurrence of the district attorney, direct the grand jury to convene for the investigation and consideration of such matters of a criminal nature as he desires to submit to it. He may take full charge of the presentation of such matters to the grand jury, issue subpoenas, prepare indictments, and do all other things incident thereto to the same extent as the district attorney may do. Finally, since 1957, Government Code section 12524 has authorized the Attorney General to conference with the district attorneys to discuss their duties with the view of uniform and adequate enforcement of state law. [6] In contrast, the county board of supervisors is statutorily barred from obstructing the district attorney's investigative or prosecutorial function. While Government Code section 25303 generally provides that the board of supervisors shall supervise the official conduct of all county officers ..., it further states that [t]his section shall not be construed to affect the independent and constitutionally and statutorily designated investigative and prosecutorial functions of the ... district attorney of a county. The board of supervisors shall not obstruct the ... investigative and prosecutorial function of the district attorney of a county. (See Graham v. Municipal Court (1981) 123 Cal. App.3d 1018, 1022 [177 Cal. Rptr. 172] [A county district attorney prosecuting a criminal action within a county, acts as a state officer, exercising ultimately powers which may not be abridged by a county board of supervisors. (Original italics.)]; Hicks v. Board of Supervisors (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 228, 240 [138 Cal. Rptr. 101] [Except for the power of the electorate to remove him, district attorney's performance of prosecutions subject only to the supervision of the Attorney General.]; see also Dibb v. County of San Diego (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1200, 1209, fn. 4 [36 Cal. Rptr.2d 55, 884 P.2d 1003] [[B]oard of supervisors `does not have the power to perform the county officers' statutory duties for them or direct the manner in which the duties are performed.' [Citation.]].) Thus, as with the sheriffs in McMillian, California district attorneys are given complete authority to enforce the state criminal law in their counties. In contrast, the `powers and duties' of the counties themselves ... do not include any provision in the area of law enforcement.... Thus, the `governing body' of the counties ... cannot instruct the district attorney how to investigate or prosecute crime. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739]; Gov. Code, § 25303.) Moreover, [w]hile the [board of supervisors] thus has no direct control over how the [district attorney] fulfills his law enforcement duty, the ... attorney general do[es] have this kind of control. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739].) The Attorney General can direct the district attorney to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions, and, more importantly, initiate grand jury investigations and criminal prosecutions in the district attorney's county. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13; Gov. Code, § 12550; Pen. Code, § 923; see McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739] [Attorney General can direct the sheriff to investigate `any alleged violation of law in their counties,' and submit a written report to the state official in charge of the investigation.].) Moreover, a superior court judge may require a district attorney of an adjoining county to conduct certain proceedings. (Gov. Code, § 3073; McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739] [Judges, who are state officers, may order the sheriff to take certain actions, even if the judge sits in a distant county.].) In addition, when prosecuting criminal violations of state law, a district attorney acts in the name of the people of the state. In criminal prosecutions, [t]he style of all process shall be `The People of the State of California,' and all prosecutions shall be conducted in their name and by their authority. (Gov. Code, § 100, subd. (b); id., § 26500 [The district attorney is the public prosecutor.... [¶] ... and within his or her discretion shall initiate and conduct on behalf of the people all prosecutions for public offenses.]; Pen. Code, § 684 [A criminal action is prosecuted in the name of the people of the State of California, as a party, against the person charged with the offense.].) Indeed, over 100 years ago, we recognized, The district attorney in the discharge of the duties of his office performs two quite distinct functions. He is at once the law officer of the county and the public prosecutor. While in the former capacity he represents the county and is largely subordinate to, and under the control of, the board of supervisors, he is not so in the latter. In the prosecution of criminal cases he acts by the authority and in the name of the people of the state. ( County of Modoc v. Spencer (1894) 103 Cal. 498, 501 [37 P. 483].) This principle has been often repeated since Modoc. ( Nguyen v. Superior Court (1996) 49 Cal. App.4th 1781, 1787 [57 Cal. Rptr.2d 611] [District attorneys may act as either county or state officers and [they] act on behalf of the state when prosecuting crimes.]; People v. Kilborn (1996) 41 Cal. App.4th 1325, 1333 [49 Cal. Rptr.2d 152] [The district attorney acts as a state officer when prosecuting crimes.]; Sloane v. Hammond (1927) 81 Cal. App. 590, 599 [254 P. 648] [It may be conceded that for some purposes a district attorney is a county officer.... When, however, he conducts prosecutions for the punishment of crimes denounced by act of the legislature, he certainly discharges functions which pertain to the state and not to the county, whether or not, technically, he is to be deemed a state officer when he is engaged in the discharge of such functions. Under such circumstances he surely acts as an agent of the state.]; see also Shepherd v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d 107, 122 [130 Cal. Rptr. 257, 550 P.2d 161] [The district attorney is a public officer, under the direct supervision of the Attorney General [citation], who `represents the sovereign power of the people of the state, by whose authority and in whose name all prosecutions must be conducted.']; People v. Mendez (1991) 234 Cal. App.3d 1773, 1783 [286 Cal. Rptr. 216] [The People are ordinarily bound by their stipulations, concessions or representations regardless of whether counsel was the Attorney General or the district attorney.]; Bach v. County of Butte (1983) 147 Cal. App.3d 554, 570 [195 Cal. Rptr. 268] [acts of deputy district attorney do not represent official policy or custom sufficient to make county liable under section 1983]; but see Heffington v. County of Stanislaus (1983) 143 Cal. App.3d 838, 843-844 [192 Cal. Rptr. 202] [district attorney is a county policymaker under section 1983].) Thus, these provisions weigh in favor of concluding a district attorney is a state official when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine how a district attorney's enforcement of state law could be characterized as creating local policy. (See Pusey v. City of Youngstown (6th Cir.1993) 11 F.3d 652, 657 [Clearly, state criminal laws ... represent the policy of the state.].) Moreover, as in McMillian, the provisions that most significantly support the conclusion that the district attorney represents the state and not the county when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law predate Monell by some time. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1742].) [7] As in McMillian, however, there are provisions that weigh in favor of the opposite result. In California, a district attorney is elected by the county voters (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 1, subd. (b), 4, subd. (c)), is included in the list of officers of a county (Gov. Code, § 24000, subd. (a)), and is generally not eligible to hold office unless during certain relevant periods he or she is a registered voter of the county in which the duties of the office are to be exercised (Gov. Code, § 24001). However, the fact that the district attorney's authority is territorially limited is by no means dispositive. [D]istrict attorneys ... are often considered ... state officials, even though they ... have limited jurisdictions and are elected locally. These characteristics are therefore consistent with an understanding of [district attorneys] as state officials who have been locally placed throughout the State, with an element of control granted to the officials and residents of the county which receives the [district attorney's] services. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___, fn. omitted [117 S.Ct. at p. 1740].) In addition, in California, the county's board of supervisors, not the Legislature, prescribe[s] the compensation of its district attorney. (Gov. Code, § 25300; compare McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1739] [sheriff's salary set by state legislature, not local governing body].) Moreover, under Government Code section 25303, the board of supervisors shall supervise the district attorney's official conduct and in particular his or her use of public funds. However, as we have already observed, section 25303 further provides that [t]his section shall not be construed to affect the independent and constitutionally and statutorily designated investigative and prosecutorial functions of the ... district attorney of a county. The board of supervisors shall not obstruct the ... investigative and prosecutorial function of the district attorney of a county. Thus, as in McMillian, the county's payment of the district attorney's salary does not translate into control over him.... ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1740].) In addition, under Government Code section 29601, subdivision (b)(2), necessary expenses incurred by the district attorney in the prosecution of criminal cases are county charges. Even assuming this section grants a local governing board discretion to decline to pay what it perceives as unnecessary expenses, at most, this discretion would allow the [local governing body] to exert an attenuated and indirect influence over the [district attorney's] operations. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at p. 1740].) In sum, we conclude that when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law, a district attorney represents the state and is not a policymaker for the county. While this issue depends on an analysis of state law, and hence the conclusions of other jurisdictions are not conclusive, we note other jurisdictions have reached the same result. ( Pusey v. City of Youngstown, supra, 11 F.3d at pp. 654, 657-658 [in Ohio, a city prosecutor acts as a state agent when prosecuting state criminal charges]; Arnold v. McClain (10th Cir.1991) 926 F.2d 963, 964-966 [in Oklahoma, district attorney is a state official when offering police officer choice of resigning or facing perjury charges]; Owens v. Fulton County (11th Cir.1989) 877 F.2d 947, 950-952 [in Georgia, prosecutorial decisions of district attorney are on behalf of state; district attorney is not a county policymaker]; see Chrissy F. by Medley v. Mississippi DPW (5th Cir.1991) 925 F.2d 844, 846-847, 849 [in Mississippi, district attorney is a state official when allegedly violating court orders and failing to report, investigate, and effectively prosecute sexual abuse allegations; hence damages claim barred by Eleventh Amendment]; Rozek v. Topolnicki (10th Cir.1989) 865 F.2d 1154, 1155, 1158 [in Colorado, district attorney's office entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity].) [8] 2. Training and Supervising Staff As noted, plaintiffs contend that even if Jagels is not a policymaker for the County when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law, he does represent the County when he establishes policy or trains employees in these areas. Just as we have concluded that in California a district attorney represents the state when preparing to prosecute and when prosecuting criminal violations of state law, we further conclude it logically follows that he or she also represents the state, and not the county, when training and developing policy in these areas. No meaningful analytical distinction can be made between these two functions. Indeed, a contrary rule would require impossibly precise distinctions. The district attorney would represent the state when he or she personally prepared to prosecute and prosecuted criminal violations of state law, but the county when training others to do so, or when developing related policies. Moreover, anytime the district attorney relied on a formal policy to handle a particular aspect of a case, that decision would be attributable to the county, even though the prosecution itself would be a state function. Such a result would be nonsensical, and would impose local government liability under the most arbitrary of circumstances. Moreover, the constitutional and statutory supervisory power accorded the Attorney General is not reasonably susceptible to an interpretation that it is limited to oversight of a district attorney's actions when he or she is prosecuting a particular case. Rather, the Constitution provides that it is the duty of the Attorney General to see that the laws of the State are uniformly and adequately enforced, and that the Attorney General has direct supervision over every district attorney ... in all matters pertaining to the duties of their ... office [], and may require any of said officers to make reports concerning the investigation, detection, prosecution, and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions as to the Attorney General may seem advisable. (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13, italics added; Gov. Code, § 12550.) This is most reasonably interpreted to include oversight of policies formulated and training conducted in connection with the district attorney's preparation for and prosecution of state criminal violations. Our conclusion as to which entity the district attorney represents might differ were plaintiffs challenging a district attorney's alleged action or inaction related to hiring or firing an employee, workplace safety conditions, procuring office equipment, or some other administrative function arguably unrelated to the prosecution of state criminal law violations. Those considerations are not presented here. Plaintiffs assert no compelling basis on which to conclude a district attorney represents the county and not the state when training and developing policy regarding criminal prosecutions. Rather, they assert that [c]onducting a prosecution does not necessarily contemplate training of personnel or establishing policy or practice, and that the statutorily designated prosecutorial functions of the district attorney under state law do not include any management, administrative or training function. It is difficult to imagine, however, how criminal prosecutions could be conducted with any efficiency absent these functions. Moreover, we have already concluded that the broad provisions of the Constitution and the Government Code give the Attorney General oversight not only with respect to a district attorney's actions in a particular case, but also in the training and development of policy intended for use in every criminal case. Plaintiffs also assert that no state law prescribe[s] the policies of the district attorney's office, nor the manner of training his subordinates, or whether there should be any training at all. The functions are not intimately associated with the judicial process. They are County functions. However, the question of whether a function is intimately associated with the judicial process is relevant only in the context of whether a prosecutor enjoys absolute or qualified immunity for that particular function. (See ante, pp. 350-351.) Thus, plaintiffs' argument assumes that the functions for which a prosecutor may obtain absolute, as opposed to qualified, immunity parallel those for which a district attorney represents the state, as opposed to the county. As a comparison of the factors delineated in Imbler v. Pachtman, supra, 424 U.S. 409, and McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. 781, indicate, these are in fact separate inquiries. Indeed, which entity a public official represents in performing a particular function involves an interpretation of state law, and the answer may, as the high court acknowledged, vary from state to state. ( McMillian v. Monroe County, supra, 520 U.S. at p. ___ [117 S.Ct. at pp. 1741-1742].) The availability of immunity from liability under section 1983 is, however, governed by federal, not state, law and may not vary from state to state. ( Howlett v. Rose, supra, 496 U.S. at pp. 375, 383 [110 S.Ct. at pp. 2442, 2446-2447].) Plaintiffs' reliance on our definition of a public officer in Dibb v. County of San Diego, supra, 8 Cal.4th 1200, is also misplaced. Dibb involved a taxpayer's suit challenging San Diego County's formation of a citizen's law enforcement review board under the county charter. ( Id. at pp. 1204-1205.) The plaintiff contended that members of the board were not county officers within the meaning of the state Constitution. ( Id. at p. 1211.) We concluded they were. ( Id. at p. 1213.) Here, however, the County has never contended the district attorney is not a public or county officer for some purposes. Plaintiffs rely, with virtually no discussion, on three opinions from other jurisdictions which they assert have concluded a district attorney represents the local government and not the state when training or developing policy in the area of criminal prosecution. ( Walker v. City of New York (2d Cir.1992) 974 F.2d 293; Gobel v. Maricopa County (9th Cir.1989) 867 F.2d 1201; Crane v. State of Tex. (5th Cir.1985) 759 F.2d 412.) As we have already observed, given that the issue of who is a policymaker for a county is a question of state law, it is questionable how persuasive contrary conclusions from different jurisdictions should be. Moreover, all of these cases predate McMillian, and their analyses are in any event unconvincing. In Walker v. City of New York, supra, 974 F.2d 293, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that when a district attorney acts as the manager of the district attorney's office, the district attorney acts as a county policymaker. ( Id. at p. 301.) The court distinguished an earlier decision, Baez v. Hennessy (2d Cir.1988) 853 F.2d 73, which concluded a district attorney represents the state, on the ground that Baez had involved a challenge to the decision by an [assistant district attorney] to prosecute an individual and the district attorney's endorsement of that decision. Here, by contrast, [the plaintiff] is challenging the district attorney's management of the office  in particular the decision not to supervise or train [assistant district attorneys] on Brady and perjury issues. ( Walker v. City of New York, supra, 974 F.2d at p. 301.) Likewise, in Ying Jing Gan v. City of New York (2d Cir.1993) 996 F.2d 522, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit stated that if the plaintiff's complaint simply attacked the district attorney's decision not to prosecute a particular suspect (whose gang allegedly later killed the person who identified him), the district attorney represented the state. ( Id. at pp. 525, 535-536.) If, however, the plaintiff alleged that the District Attorney for New York County had promulgated a policy or custom regarding ... face-to-face identifications and the alleged failure to protect crime victims, the district attorney may be deemed to be a municipal policymaker for New York City. ( Id. at p. 536.) We have already explored the difficulties of adopting a distinction regarding which entity the district attorney represents that turns on whether the district attorney performs the act in only one case, or has a policy of performing the act in every case. For these reasons, we find the Second Circuit's analysis unpersuasive. In Gobel v. Maricopa County, supra, 867 F.2d 1201, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not conclude, as plaintiffs implicitly contend, that an Arizona district attorney is a policymaker for the county. Rather, it stated that in St. Louis v. Praprotnik (1988) 485 U.S. 112 [108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107], the high court was divided on whether the identification of policymakers is purely a question of state law or a question of fact. ( Gobel v. Maricopa County, supra, 867 F.2d at p. 1207, fn. 12.) Accordingly, it left to the district court to determine on remand how and whether the plaintiffs can prove that the county attorneys acted as policymakers for Maricopa County in the circumstances of this case. ( Ibid. ) As discussed above ( ante, pp. 352-353), the high court has since clarified that the issue of who is a county policymaker is one dependent on an analysis of state law. Finally, in Crane v. State of Tex., supra, 759 F.2d 412, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit rejected the lower court's conclusion that the district attorney's accused practices `were neither done for the county nor subject to its control.' ( Id. at p. 428.) It noted that in revising the challenged procedures, there is no hint of any perceived necessity by the District Attorney to consult with or invite the participation of any state official, for example, a member of the State Attorney General's Office. To the contrary, the record plainly shows that the District Attorney was alone responsible for the County system and could change it at will. ( Id. at p. 429.) Because the ultimate authority for determining the relevant procedures reposed in the district attorney, his decisions in that regard must be considered official policy attributable to the County. ( Id. at p. 430; cf. Mairena v. Foti (5th Cir.1987) 816 F.2d 1061, 1064, fn. 1 [relying on Crane to conclude that in Louisiana a district attorney is a local not a state official, and hence suit was not barred by Eleventh Amendment].) In contrast, district attorneys in California are supervised by the Attorney General, and this supervision most reasonably is construed to include the oversight of crime prosecution training and policy. In sum, we conclude a district attorney acts on behalf of the state when training personnel for and when developing policy regarding the preparation for prosecution and prosecution of criminal violations of state law. Accordingly, we need not reach the second issue in this case, i.e., whether the absolute immunity afforded the district attorney in this case under section 1983 derivatively immunizes the county in which the district attorney holds office.