Opinion ID: 414336
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bruton Claim

Text: 84 When Kuhn admitted to his complicity in the point shaving scheme, he also implicated appellants Tony Perla, Rocco Perla and Paul Mazzei. At trial, FBI Agent Byron testified to the substance of Kuhn's inculpatory statements, but omitted any specific reference to the co-defendants. 10 The appellants contend on appeal that even though Agent Byron did not specifically identify them when recounting Kuhn's statements, the jury could readily infer from his testimony that Kuhn was referring to them when confessing to complicity in the scandal. The Perlas and Mazzei argue that their Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated by the court's decision to permit Agent Byron to testify to the redacted confession. They contend that Kuhn's statements, as recounted by witness Byron, referred to them by implication and thus should have been excised because Kuhn never testified at trial. 85 In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Court held that the admission of a non-testifying defendant's statement which implicated a co-defendant violated the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause. The Bruton rule has been fully explored by this Court. A redacted statement of a non-testifying defendant is admissible if not clearly inculpatory as to a co-defendant or vitally important to the government's case against the co-defendant, and if the court provides cautionary instructions limiting use of the statement against its maker. See United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d 309, 313 (2d Cir.1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1074, 96 S.Ct. 858, 47 L.Ed.2d 84 (1976). To be clearly inculpatory, the redacted statement, standing alone, must connect a co-defendant with the crime. Thus, where the redacted statement does not mention a co-defendant's name or provide a physical description, its admission would not violate Bruton. See United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986, 99 S.Ct. 581, 58 L.Ed.2d 659 (1978). However, a redacted statement is clearly inculpatory where the jury is aware that names have been redacted and, in light of other evidence, could infer that the omitted names may have included a co-defendant's. See United States v. Danzey, 594 F.2d 905, 917-18 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951, 99 S.Ct. 2179, 60 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1979). 86 This Circuit has consistently dismissed Bruton claims in situations where, as here, the inculpatory statement of a co-defendant does not independently implicate the appellant. See United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d at 313; United States v. Wingate, 520 F.2d at 314. In United States ex rel. Nelson v. Follette, 430 F.2d 1055 (2d Cir.1970), the co-defendant confessed that he and Oliver had been involved in a robbery and murder. Nelson objected to the admissibility of his co-defendant's confession at their joint trial on the ground that the jury could infer from independently introduced evidence that he was Oliver. The Court rejected this Bruton claim, holding that the contested admission was not clearly inculpatory to Nelson because it alone did not serve to connect him with the crime. Id. at 1058. 87 In this action, the court properly limited Agent Byron's testimony to exclude all specific references to Mazzei or the Perla brothers. The court correctly instructed the jury that the Byron testimony could be used as evidence only against Kuhn. Moreover, the jury was not aware that Agent Byron edited Kuhn's statements to exclude specific reference to co-conspirators identified by Kuhn. Cf. United States v. Danzey, 594 F.2d at 917 (jury aware that names redacted). Nor was Agent Byron's testimony such that the jury could infer with confidence, based upon Kuhn's admissions standing alone, that Kuhn was identifying a particular appellant when he related his story to Agent Byron. We reject this claim as well. 88 The judgment of the district court is affirmed.