Opinion ID: 1170008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged improper general scope of cross-examination

Text: [1a] Setting aside for the moment the special rules pertaining to the admissibility of evidence of fruits of improper interrogation and of prior felony convictions, we find that general principles delimiting the scope of permissible cross-examination justified the prosecutor's inquiry. [2] We are not unmindful of a basic principle of criminal justice which makes the provision of former Penal Code section 1323 (now see Evid. Code, § 773, subd. (a)), limiting cross-examination of a defendant to those matters about which he was examined in chief, an indispensable ally of the federal and state constitutional rights guaranteeing that a person shall not be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 13; U.S. Const., 5th Amend.; see People v. Arrighini (1898) 122 Cal. 121, 126 [54 P. 591]; People v. Sims (1958) 165 Cal. App.2d 108, 113 [331 P.2d 799].) [3] We recognize, of course, with the United States Supreme Court, that the American system of criminal prosecution is accusatorial, not inquisitorial, and that the Fifth Amendment privilege is its essential mainstay.... Governments, state and federal, are thus constitutionally compelled to establish guilt by evidence independently and freely secured, and may not by coercion prove a charge against the accused out of his own mouth. ( Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1, 7-8 [12 L.Ed.2d 653, 658-659, 84 S.Ct. 1489].) The People must shoulder the entire load of their burden of proof in their case in chief, without assistance either from the defendant's silence or from his compelled testimony. ( Tehan v. Shott (1966) 382 U.S. 406, 415 [15 L.Ed.2d 453, 459, 86 S.Ct. 459]; Griffin v. California (1965) 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct. 1229]; Murphy v. Waterfront Com. (1964) 378 U.S. 52 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 84 S.Ct. 1594]; 8 Wigmore, Evidence (McNaughton rev. 1961) p. 317.) [4] Even when a defendant chooses to offer testimony on his own behalf, the privilege against self-incrimination serves to prevent the prosecution from questioning the defendant upon the case generally, and in effect making him its own witness. ( People v. Gallagher (1893) 100 Cal. 466, 475 [35 P. 80]; People v. O'Brien (1885) 66 Cal. 602 [6 P. 695]; People v. Sims, supra, 165 Cal. App.2d 108, 113.) Such general compelled cross-examination would not only post the same cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt recognized in Murphy v. Waterfront Com., supra, 378 U.S. 52, 55 [12 L.Ed.2d 678, 681, 84 S.Ct. 1594]; it would also penalize and thereby deter a defendant's assertion of his right to take the witness stand to explain or contradict a particular aspect of the case against him. [2] [5] None of these fundamental principles, however, imply that when a defendant voluntarily testifies in his own defense the People may not fully amplify his testimony by inquiring into the facts and circumstances surrounding his assertions, or by introducing evidence through cross-examination which explains or refutes his statements or the inferences which may necessarily be drawn from them. [6] The provision of former Penal Code section 1323 does not mean that the cross-examination must be confined to a mere categorial review of the matters, dates or times mentioned in the direct examination.... It may be directed to the eliciting of any matter which may tend to overcome or qualify the effect of the testimony given by him on direct examination. ( People v. Pike (1962) 58 Cal.2d 70, 90 [22 Cal. Rptr. 664, 372 P.2d 656]; People v. Zerillo (1950) 36 Cal.2d 222, 228 [223 P.2d 223].) [3] [1b] Defendant took the stand to meet the People's evidence which showed that he was present and armed during the robbery, that he fled immediately thereafter, and that he shot Officer McKnight. His testimony covered events and circumstances beginning with his conspiracy to commit a robbery with codefendant Turner, through his activities in casing the market, his alleged surprise when he discovered that Turner had decided to commit the robbery by himself then and there, and his apprehension in the parking lot by Officer McKnight, and beyond his struggle and killing of the police officer. Such complete direct testimony placed in issue his motives, intent and state of mind during the robbery. Cross-examination which revealed those motives, intent and state of mind was therefore not prohibited under general strictures limiting the scope of cross-examination. (See People v. Perez (1967) 65 Cal.2d 615, 621 [55 Cal. Rptr. 909, 422 P.2d 597], cert. granted (1968) 390 U.S. 942 [19 L.Ed.2d 1131, 88 S.Ct. 1055]; People v. Ing (1967) 65 Cal.2d 603, 611 [55 Cal. Rptr. 902, 422 P.2d 590].) Defendant contends alternatively that other, more specific rules render impermissible cross-examination upon the details of his prior conviction and upon the conditional sales contract. We deal first with the details of the prior conviction.