Opinion ID: 1456764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: In his first assignment of error, Gunter challenges the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized from his home. Gunter asserts that the affidavit in support of the search warrant was insufficient to establish probable cause because: (1) the hearsay information in the affidavit is not reliable evidence; (2) the affidavit provides no nexus of any alleged illegal activity to Gunter's residence; and (3) the lack of probable cause was not cured by the officers' good faith reliance on the warrant. His argument fails on each of these points.
First, Gunter argues that the information that linked Gunter to illegal activities was so unreliable that it did not support a finding of probable cause. The Fourth Amendment of the Constitution states that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. U.S. Const. amend. IV. To determine whether probable cause for a search exists, a judge issuing a warrant must make a practical, commonsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, including the `veracity' and `basis of knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). The duty of a reviewing court is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Id. It is well established that a magistrate may rely on hearsay evidence in making his probable cause determination. United States v. Helton, 314 F.3d 812, 819 (6th Cir.2003). When confronted with hearsay information from a confidential informant or an anonymous tipster, the court should consider three factors in connection with the totality of the circumstances inquiry: the (1) veracity; (2) reliability; and (3) basis of knowledge of the tipster or informant. See id. These three factors should not be applied rigidly as a test, but should be considered in weighing all of the circumstances. United States v. Allen, 211 F.3d 970, 975 (6th Cir.2000). Here, the issuing judge had Williams' affidavit before him. Gunter argues that the affidavit is insufficient to support a finding of probable cause because: (1) it relies almost entirely on unreliable hearsay where an informant spoke to Banks about Banks' alleged conversations with Gunter; (2) it provides no evidence that the informant or law enforcement spoke with Gunter directly or observed Gunter engage in illegal activity; and (3) it provides no information about the reliability of Banks, who is the primary source of the statements that incriminated Gunter. The government asserts that the affidavit provided probable cause of ongoing drug trafficking and emphasizes that Williams, who listened to thirty-eight recorded conversations between the informant and Banks, had years of experience in drug investigations and was able to independently assess that Banks was being truthful. First, we note that the government's argument assigns too much weight to Williams' conclusions. The Supreme Court has held that a warrant application must provide sufficient information to allow an issuing judge to independently determine probable cause; his action cannot be a mere ratification of the conclusions of others. Gates, 462 U.S. at 239, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Here, however, the affidavit does support an independent determination of probable cause. In the affidavit, Williams indicated that the informant had provided accurate and reliable information each time he was used in the past. The informant provided detailed information about ongoing drug transactions between Grooms and Banks, which had been corroborated by independent police investigations, including surveillance of meetings and review of telephone records. Under these circumstances, the affidavit contains enough information to establish the informant's reliability. See United States v. Weaver, 99 F.3d 1372, 1379 (6th Cir.1996) (information obtained from an informant may be bolstered if the authorities undertook probative efforts to corroborate an informant's claims through independent investigations); Helton, 314 F.3d at 820 (if the prior track record of an informant adequately substantiates his credibility, other indicia of reliability are not necessarily required.). The issue then becomes the veracity, reliability and basis of knowledge of Banks. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-239, 103 S.Ct. 2317. Banks' purported basis of knowledge was his first-hand interactions and conversations with Gunter. Banks discussed multiple conversations that he had with Gunter regarding past and potential future drug sales, which included details regarding the price and the quantity to be sold. The informant stated that on January 5, 2006, Banks told him that he had sold three kilograms of cocaine to Gunter, and that Banks repeatedly stated that Gunter would front him the purchase money to buy two to four kilograms of cocaine. The affidavit also indicated that during a meeting with the informant at Banks' garage, Banks received a phone call from Gunter, in which Gunter indicated that he would buy the two kilograms of cocaine for $22,000 per kilogram. The magistrate judge reasoned that Banks was reliable because unlike a witness presented at trial, who might have something to gain by his testimony, Banks had nothing to gain by implicating Gunter in the context of a drug deal that was surreptitiously recorded and that implicated Banks as well. This inference is reasonable. The record does not provide any indication that Banks suspected that the conversations were being recorded or that he had a motive to lie. See Stuart v. Wilson, 442 F.3d 506, 524 (6th Cir.2006) (the lack of motive to fabricate statements supports a conclusion that the statements are reliable). Moreover, the affidavit indicates that after a meeting between the informant and Banks, surveillance officers observed Banks proceed directly to meet with an individual matching Gunter's description. This independent police investigation corroborates the statements of Banks and enhances his reliability. See Weaver, 99 F.3d at 1379. In sum, based on all of the information provided in the affidavit, including details that corroborate the reliability of the informant and multiple recorded conversations where Banks directly implicated Gunter, the issuing judge had a substantial basis to conclude that Gunter was engaged in ongoing drug trafficking.
Relying on United States v. Carpenter, 360 F.3d 591 (6th Cir.2004) (en banc) and United States v. Laughton, 409 F.3d 744 (6th Cir.2005), Gunter also argues that the affidavit fails to establish a proper nexus between his residence and the criminal activity at issue, as required by this Court. Gunter stresses that the affidavit does not contain any facts indicating that Gunter was dealing drugs from his residence, and that the affidavit only mentions his residence in one short paragraph where Williams alleges that a surveillance agent followed a white pickup to the residence. This argument is misguided. As discussed above, the affidavit contains evidence that Gunter was engaged in repeated purchases of cocaine in the one to four kilogram range. Because the quantity of drugs and the repeated nature of the transactions make it reasonable to conclude that Gunter was engaged in ongoing drug trafficking, it was reasonable to infer that evidence of illegal activity would be found at Gunter's residence. See United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 974-75 (6th Cir.1998) (probable cause to search residence existed where defendant engaged in two recorded transactions outside of his residence because [i]n the case of drug dealers, evidence is likely to be found where the drug dealers live). Gunter also argues that the nexus between any alleged drug activity and his residence is substantiated by false information that should be struck from the affidavit. Under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), and United States v. Elkins, 300 F.3d 638, 649 (6th Cir.2002), a reviewing court must strike from the affidavit statements made at least with recklessness as to their truth. Gunter challenged the following statements: Law enforcement agents, conducting surveillance in the area of [a] meeting [on January 19, 2006 between the informant and defendant Banks] observed BANKS meeting with a w/f in a minivan displaying a TN autodealer's tag that was registered to GUNTER's home address.... After meeting with the w/f, agents observed BANKS travel a short distance down the road, where he met with an individual matching MIKE GUNTER's physical description operating a white pick-up truck. After BANKS and this individual separated, the white pick-up truck was observed traveling to GUNTER's residence at the above location. (J.A. 86.) Gunter argues that this statement is false because, at trial, Williams testified that the minivan's tag was not registered to Gunter, and a surveillance officer testified that the white truck headed toward Gunter's residence. It is debatable whether these statements rise to the level of recklessness, but we need not reach that issue. The nexus to Gunter's residence in no way depended on a finding that the minivan or the truck were linked to Gunter's home. As discussed above, a sufficient nexus was provided by the inference that evidence of drug trafficking would be found at the residence of one who is engaged in ongoing drug trafficking. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the issuing magistrate had a substantial basis to conclude that there was probable cause that evidence of criminal activity would be found in Gunter's residence. Based on this conclusion, it is not necessary to address the applicability of the good faith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). See United States v. Miller, 314 F.3d 265, 271 (6th Cir.2002) (good faith exception not applicable when court finds warrant was based on probable cause). We therefore find that the district court did not err in denying Gunter's motion to suppress.