Opinion ID: 1236100
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lower Court Ruling and Limiting Instruction

Text: In evaluating the State's motion in limine regarding introduction of the other crime evidence, the lower court in the present case specifically engaged in a Rule 403 [5] balancing evaluation, finding that the other crimes evidence is probative of a material issue other than character. The lower court further identified that the evidence tends to establish a common scheme or plan on the part of the Defendant and the Defendant's lustful disposition toward teenage girls who are his students. The lower court concluded as follows: Second, the other crime evidence is similar enough in nature to the matters in issue. Review of each of the instances reported by the six (6) witnesses reveals a striking similarity in the circumstances of each incident. Furthermore, the Court finds that the evidence submitted by the State is close enough in time to the matter in issue, even thought the other bad acts occurred over a period of one (1) to thirteen (13) years. The lower court explained that it had carefully considered the cases cited by both parties and found: Consideration of that authority in light of the facts and circumstances of this case convinces the Court that the evidence submitted by the State is admissible primarily due to the continuing nature of the defendant's conduct. [T]aken together, these incidents would appear to show a rather consistent pattern of conduct on the part of the Defendant toward teenage women in his charge as a teacher. The lower court also provided the jury with a limiting instruction, drafted by the Appellant, informing the jury that it could not consider the other evidence as proof of the current charge, but only for the limited purpose of showing scheme or design or a lustful disposition toward teenage girls. Although there was no objection to the limiting instruction at trial and the instruction as given was actually submitted by the Appellant, the Appellant contends on appeal that the limiting instruction he tendered to the court contained an obvious shortcoming. Specifically, the Appellant maintains: [B]y its inclusion of the term `lustful disposition,' it expressly allowed the jury to find the defendant had the propensity to engage in sexual misconduct. Also, the instruction failed in specific language to admonish the jury that the sexual misconduct may not be considered as a basis for an inference that the defendant acted in conformity with the individual's extrinsic conduct or with the indicated character. In syllabus points one and two of McGinnis, as discussed above, this Court explained that a lower court should instruct the jury on the limited and specific purpose for which evidence has been admitted pursuant to Rule 404(b). We explained that [w]e deem the giving of a limiting instruction and its effectiveness significant not only in deciding whether to admit evidence under Rule 404(b), but the absence of an effective limiting instruction will be considered by us on appeal in weighing the prejudice ensuing from the erroneous admission of Rule 404(b) evidence. McGinnis, 193 W.Va. at 156-57, 455 S.E.2d at 525-26. The limiting instruction in the present case, given as each Rule 404(b) witness was presented, provided as follows: Ladies and gentlemen, I'm going to once again read the limiting instruction that I read earlier with regard to this testimony. You have heard testimony concerning alleged conduct or other acts of the defendant which are not charged in this indictment in the testimony of this witness. You are instructed that this testimony is not admitted as proof of the defendant's current charge. The testimony is admitted for a limited purpose only, and it may be considered by you in only deciding whether a given issue or element relevant to the present charge has been proven. In this instant [sic], the testimony of the other sexual misconduct of the defendant may be considered only as it relates to the issues of the State establishing a common scheme or plan on the part of the defendant or the defendant's lustful disposition towards teenage girls. Accordingly, this testimony may be considered by you only for the limited purpose just identified for which it is admitted. You may not use this testimony in consideration of whether the State has established the crimes charged in the indictment. This instruction was drafted and submitted by the Appellant and filed on October 5, 1998. The instruction was given to the jury, verbatim, in the final charge to the jury and was read by the lower court after the presentation of each Rule 404(b) witness. The Appellant presented no objection to his own instruction; the trial court was not alerted to any perceived infirmity or lack of clarity in the instruction. Failure to object to this instruction at the lower level effectively waived any right the Appellant may have had to alleged deficiency in his own instruction. As we found in State v. Miller, 194 W.Va. 3, 459 S.E.2d 114 (1995), [o]ur survey of cases in this esoteric procedural corner of the law convinces us that the defendant waived any issues she might have had regarding an improper or insufficient jury charge. Id. at 19, 459 S.E.2d at 130. In United States v. Lakich, 23 F.3d 1203 (7th Cir.1994), trial counsel had been provided the opportunity to review the issue of appropriate jury instructions regarding entrapment. The court elicited comments from counsel and read its proposed instruction to them; both counsel thereafter explicitly agreed to the court's instruction. The Lakich court determined that the defendant had waived any objections to the instruction. Id. In syllabus point two of State v. Mullins, 171 W.Va. 542, 301 S.E.2d 173 (1982), we held: `The general rule is that a party may not assign as error the giving of an instruction unless he objects, stating distinctly the matters to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.' Syllabus Point 3, State v. Gangwer, [169] W.Va. [177], 286 S.E.2d 389 (1982). In syllabus point one of Maples v. West Virginia Dept. of Commerce, Div. of Parks and Recreation 197 W.Va. 318, 475 S.E.2d 410 (1996), we succinctly stated: A litigant may not silently acquiesce to an alleged error, or actively contribute to such error, and then raise that error as a reason for reversal on appeal. We fail to discern any constitutional deficiency in the instruction as proposed by the Appellant and given by the lower court. While it did not specifically address the impermissible inference stated in Finley, we find that the instruction as presented adequately protected the Appellant's rights and satisfied the requirement that a limiting instruction inform the jury of the limited purpose for which the testimony may be considered pursuant to Rule 404(b). Moreover, we find that the Appellant waived any objection to the instruction given in the proceedings below.