Opinion ID: 2036519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: False Information in Affidavit

Text: Defendant also argues that the search warrant affidavit contained numerous falsehoods and omitted statements which misled the judge into finding probable cause to issue both the October 22 and October 28 search warrants. Defendant suggests that if an affidavit with the correct information had been submitted, the judge would not have found probable cause. We have reviewed the corrected version of the warrant affidavit submitted by defendant, and note that some of defendant's additions to the affidavit include information the police first obtained during their trip to Montana. For example, defendant has added language indicating that the Texas Steer brand boots, which were among defendant's possessions in Montana, were a different style and the imprints did not match the boot imprint found at the crime scene. Defendant also added language stating that the rear light configuration on defendant's vehicle, which was first viewed in Montana, was different from the rear lights observed by witness Simmons on July 1, 1987. Thus, defendant's argument that the corrected version of the affidavit would not have supported a probable cause finding for the issuance of a search warrant can only apply to the October 28 warrant obtained after police returned from Montana and not the earlier warrant. With this limitation, we consider defendant's argument. The purported corrections that defendant has made to the affidavit do not necessarily involve evidence that was not available at the time of the earlier suppression hearing. Only newly discovered evidence will justify a departure from the collateral estoppel doctrine. Gilliam, 172 Ill.2d at 506, 218 Ill.Dec. 884, 670 N.E.2d 606. This aside, we find defendant's present claim is moot. The warrant issued on October 28, 1987, authorized a search only of the vehicle, not defendant's person. As already noted, however, defendant's ability to challenge the search of the vehicle is dependent on whether he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle at the time of the search. The trial court determined this issue adversely to defendant and defendant never sought review of that ruling. In summation, we find that the issues raised in defendant's four motions to suppress that were filed on remand raised issues previously litigated in defendant's motion to suppress filed prior to his first trial; defendant failed to appeal the earlier denial of his motion to suppress; and defendant has failed to identify special circumstances or newly discovered evidence that would warrant relitigation of the trial court's earlier pretrial ruling. Thus, the trial court on remand did not err in applying the collateral estoppel doctrine and declining to hold an evidentiary hearing on defendant's suppression motions.
In addition to the four suppression motions defendant filed on remand, he also filed a motion seeking an evidentiary hearing, pursuant to Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), to challenge the two search warrants. Defendant alleged that Officer Anthis knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, made several false statements and omitted information from the warrant affidavit. Defendant also filed an amended motion for a Franks hearing, alleging that the judge who issued the search warrants was not neutral and detached, and that no officer could have reasonably believed that the October 22, 1987, search warrant was valid in Montana. The trial court, relying on its earlier ruling denying defendant's four suppression motions, determined that a Franks hearing was not warranted. Defendant argues that the trial court erred, requiring reversal of his convictions or, in the alternative, a new trial. The State responds that the issues raised in the Franks motions were already litigated at the original suppression motion hearing and defendant, therefore, is collaterally estopped from relitigating those issues. Alternatively, the State argues that the allegations in defendant's motions did not warrant a Franks hearing. Although we agree with the State that some overlap exists between the issues raised in defendant's earlier suppression motion and the issues raised in his Franks motions, the issues are not identical. We therefore decline the State's invitation to apply estoppel principles with a broad brush to the issues raised in defendant's Franks motions and will consider the issues on the merits. In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court recognized a limited right to challenge the veracity of the affidavit supporting a search warrant. In order to overcome the presumption of validity that attaches to a warrant affidavit and obtain a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit and that the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d at 672. A substantial preliminary showing is made where the defendant offers proof that is somewhere between mere denials on the one hand and proof by a preponderance on the other. People v. Lucente, 116 Ill.2d 133, 152, 107 Ill.Dec. 214, 506 N.E.2d 1269 (1987). If, after the alleged untruths in the warrant affidavit are set aside, the remaining statements in the affidavit are sufficient to establish probable cause, no hearing is required. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171-72, 98 S.Ct. at 2684, 57 L.Ed.2d at 682. The principles underlying the Franks decision also apply where information, necessary to a determination of probable cause, is intentionally or recklessly omitted from the affidavit. People v. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d 22, 43, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840 (1984). In such cases, [t]he defendant must show that the information omitted was material to the determination of probable cause and that it was omitted for the purpose of misleading the magistrate. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 44, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840. Omitted information is material where it is of such a character that had it been included in the affidavit, it would have defeated probable cause. People v. Hickey, 178 Ill.2d 256, 282, 227 Ill.Dec. 428, 687 N.E.2d 910 (1997). Affidavits must be viewed in a commonsense, not a hypertechnical, manner. People v. Thomas, 62 Ill.2d 375, 380, 342 N.E.2d 383 (1975), quoting United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746, 13 L.Ed.2d 684, 689 (1965); accord Hickey, 178 Ill.2d at 285, 227 Ill. Dec. 428, 687 N.E.2d 910. Our function as the reviewing court is not to substitute our judgment for that of the issuing magistrate but, rather, to ensure that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed. Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 49, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840, quoting Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 732-33, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2088, 80 L.Ed.2d 721, 727 (1984); accord Hickey, 178 Ill.2d at 285, 227 Ill.Dec. 428, 687 N.E.2d 910. Probable cause for a search warrant exists where `given all the circumstances set forth in the affidavit    there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' Hickey, 178 Ill.2d at 285, 227 Ill.Dec. 428, 687 N.E.2d 910, quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2332, 76 L.Ed.2d 527, 548 (1983). With these principles in mind, we consider defendant's claim that the trial court erred by denying him a Franks hearing. Defendant argues, in line with his first motion for a Franks hearing, that Officer Anthis made several misrepresentations in the warrant affidavit. The first alleged misrepresentation involves the tire print found at the crime scene. Defendant asserts that the police investigation revealed that the tire print at the scene could have been made by a Falls Persuader or Dean Polaris tire, and that the affidavit should have listed both possibilities. Based on our review of the record, we agree that the warrant affidavit should have referenced both types of tires. Inclusion of this additional information in the affidavit would not, however, defeat probable cause. Analysis of the tire print disclosed two possible tires as the source. The tire on defendant's vehicle satisfied one of them. Defendant next asserts that the location of the tire print was over 100 feet away from where the body was found and thus was not near the body as set forth in the affidavit. According to the crime-scene technician, automobile tire impressions were found within 17 feet of the body. Those impressions were traced backward  over 100 feet  toward the entrance to the oil lease road where the body was found. Although the plaster casts made by the crime-scene technician may have been made from tire impressions closer to the entrance of the oil-lease road, those impressions were part of the same tracks found within 17 feet of the body. Accordingly, use of the word near in the affidavit was not false or misleading. Defendant also asserts that, contrary to the affidavit, the tire print was never determined to be from the right side of the vehicle suspected of transporting Amy Schulz. According to David Brundage's trial testimony, the plaster casts indicated an alignment problem with the vehicle and, in his opinion, the print was made by a tire on the front of the car. The affidavit should have so stated. Nonetheless, this misstatement in the affidavit does not affect the trial court's finding of probable cause. Both descriptions were equally limiting. That is, whether the tire was on the front or right side of the vehicle, the location of the tire that left the print at the scene was limited to two of four possible locations on a vehicle. The subject tire on defendant's vehicle, which was on the right front, fit either description. The next alleged misrepresentation concerns the boot print found at the crime scene. The affidavit states that the print was identified as coming from a Texas Steer brand boot, and that among defendant's possessions were    Texas Steer brand boots. Defendant states that the affidavit was misleading because the Texas Steer brand boots he owned could not have made the print at the scene. Defendant is correct that the Texas Steer boots found among his possessions in Montana could not have left the print at the scene. When Anthis completed the warrant affidavit on October 22, 1987, however, this fact was not known to him. Only after Anthis went to Montana and compared defendant's boots with the boot print from the crime scene did he learn that defendant's boots could not have left the print. Defendant also asserts that Officer Anthis should have faxed a photocopy of the boot print to authorities in Montana for comparison prior to seeking a search warrant. Defendant's assertion as to what he believes would have been the better police practice or investigative technique in this case does not provide a basis for a Franks hearing. A defendant is required to make a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit. Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56, 98 S.Ct. at 2676, 57 L.Ed.2d at 672. Anthis' statement in the affidavit regarding the boots was not false or misleading. Defendant further argues that when Officer Anthis applied for the second search warrant on October 28, 1987, he should have stricken the reference to the Texas Steer boots. We agree that once Anthis inspected defendant's Texas Steer boots in Montana and determined that they could not have left the print at the scene, the reference to the boots should have been stricken from the warrant affidavit. Nonetheless, we decline to consider what effect this would have had on the existence of probable cause to issue the October 28 search warrant. Underlying defendant's argument is his assumption that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle at the time of the October 28, 1987, search. As noted earlier in this opinion, the trial court, prior to defendant's first trial, ruled that defendant abandoned the vehicle and therefore had no legitimate expectation of privacy. Defendant did not appeal that ruling. Accordingly, defendant's claim that the October 28 warrant was not supported by probable cause is moot. Defendant also asserts that the October 22, 1987, warrant affidavit was misleading by improperly implying that a nexus existed between the tan vehicle seen by witness Cathy Simmons on July 1, 1987, and defendant's tan vehicle. Defendant notes that the affidavit omitted Simmons' description of the taillight configuration of the tan vehicle she saw on July 1, and that the taillight configuration on defendant's vehicle was not a match. According to defendant, police should have contacted Montana authorities to determine whether the taillight assembly on defendant's vehicle matched Simmons' description. We disagree with defendant that the foregoing assertions are sufficient to warrant a Franks hearing. Officer Anthis testified at defendant's first trial that he did not put much faith in the description of the taillight configuration provided by Simmons, who was 16 years old at the time of Amy's murder. Anthis explained: I had talked to the police artist that had done the diagram [of the taillight assembly based on Simmons' description]. He's done several of these and he is also trained in which to observe the person he's getting the information from to see if they're trying to be too helpful and it was his personal feeling that the person was in such a high pressure situation they were trying to come up with things. And he even felt that possibly she was superimposing a tail light assembly from a Chevrolet Impala that her parents owned in order to help us because of the type of case it was. Officer Anthis also testified at defendant's second trial that he was not confident in Simmons' description of the taillight assembly. Franks does not impose upon police a duty to include information in a warrant affidavit they reasonably conclude is unreliable. See Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 46-47, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840. The fact that Officer Anthis included Simmons' description of the color of the vehicle does not make his omission of the taillight description suspect. According to Anthis, Simmons' description of the color of the vehicle was supported by other witnesses who reported seeing a vehicle of varying shades of tan or brown in the area the night of July 1, 1987. Defendant also argues that upon their return from Montana, police intentionally failed to show Simmons photographs of defendant's vehicle because they knew Simmons would have told police that defendant's car was not the car she saw on July 1, 1987. Although defendant's argument is not entirely clear, we assume that defendant is arguing that police should have disclosed, when applying for the October 28, 1987, search warrant, that defendant's vehicle did not match the description provided by Simmons and that this disclosure would have defeated probable cause for that warrant. As we have already concluded, however, any claim that the October 28 warrant was not supported by probable cause is moot, in light of defendant's failure to appeal the trial court's earlier determination that defendant abandoned the vehicle and thus had no legitimate expectation of privacy in it. The next alleged misrepresentation in the warrant affidavit concerns the following statement: Hairs were found on the victim's body and the laboratory determined them to belong to a white male. Defendant contends that, according to the State's expert witnesses, sex cannot be determined from a hair, and the hairs found on the victim could only be classified as Caucasian, not Caucasian male. Defendant notes that the victim was also Caucasian and argues that Officer Anthis deliberately misrepresented the evidence in his affidavit to exclude the possibility that the hairs could have come from a female, possibly from the victim herself. We agree that no evidence was offered by the State that the hairs found on the victim were determined to have originated from a male and that Anthis' statement in the affidavit suggesting otherwise was incorrect. We disagree, however, with defendant's assertion that Anthis deliberately misrepresented the evidence. [A] mere assertion does not give rise to an inference of improper conduct   . Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 47, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840. Moreover, the record discloses that, contrary to defendant's argument, the two pubic hairs found on the victim's buttocks could not have originated from the victim because the victim was prepubertal. In addition, the autopsy disclosed that the victim had been anally assaulted. Based on this evidence, coupled with the laboratory finding that the pubic hair came from a Caucasian individual, police could have reasonably concluded that the assailant was a white male. The final misrepresentation claimed by defendant relates to defendant's residence. The affidavit states that defendant's mother confirmed that defendant was living in Kell, Illinois, at the time of the murder. Defendant, in fact, lived in Dix, Illinois, in neighboring Jefferson County. Defendant argues that this fabrication was to mislead the judge reviewing the warrant affidavit by implying that Amy might know and accept a ride from defendant since both lived in the same small village. We agree that defendant's residence was misstated in the affidavit. Assuming, arguendo, that this misstatement was deliberate, the finding of probable cause would not have been adversely affected had the affidavit correctly reported defendant's residence in Dix. The proximity of the two communities would have placed defendant in the general vicinity of the murder on July 1, 1987. We conclude, as to defendant's first Franks motion, that defendant failed to make the substantial preliminary showing required for a Franks hearing. That is, had the warrant affidavit correctly reported that the tire print found at the crime could have come from a Falls Persuader or Dean Polaris tire; the tire print was made by a tire on the front of the vehicle; the hairs found on the victim were from a Caucasian individual; and defendant lived in Dix, Illinois, the trial court's finding of probable cause would not be altered. In reaching this conclusion we are aware that no single piece of evidence to which the affidavit referred was conclusive. Nonetheless, the affidavit, viewed in its entirety, supports the determination of probable cause. See Stewart, 105 Ill.2d at 49, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840. Turning to defendant's amended motion for a Franks hearing, defendant asserted two additional grounds: the judge who issued the warrant was not detached and neutral, and the officers' reliance on the validity of the October 22, 1987, search warrant was objectively unreasonable. We find no error in the trial court's denial of a hearing on these matters. As explained above, a Franks hearing is intended to allow a defendant a limited opportunity to challenge the truthfulness of the affidavit used by police to obtain a search warrant. Hickey, 178 Ill.2d at 281, 227 Ill.Dec. 428, 687 N.E.2d 910. The new grounds defendant asserted in support of a Franks hearing do not challenge the truthfulness of the warrant affidavit. In addition, although the new grounds defendant asserts are cloaked in terms of the judge's neutrality and the officer's objective good faith, defendant's argument, at bottom, is that the October 22, 1987, warrant was invalid outside of Illinois. This issue, however, was already litigated at the suppression motion hearing prior to defendant's first trial. The trial court ruled that the warrant was valid in Montana. In addition, the trial court ruled that the police officers acted in good faith in their application and execution of the warrant. Defendant did not challenge these rulings in his direct appeal following his first trial or in his postconviction petition. Accordingly, the trial court on remand did not err in applying estoppel principles and declining to relitigate these issues.
Before considering defendant's next error on appeal, we respond to certain statements by defense counsel regarding the two search warrants. Counsel forcefully argues that the Jefferson County judge had no authority to issue a warrant for a search in Montana and that he was acting merely as a rubber stamp for the Jefferson County police, or an adjunct law enforcement officer. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 914, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 3416, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, 693 (1984). Counsel makes an equally forceful argument concerning the Illinois warrant, contending that the judge signed the `second' search warrant for the Sutherland car in an effort to correct or erase the invalidity of the first search warrant signed by him just six days earlier. This was a transparent attempt to hide the constitutional violations in serving an Illinois warrant in Montana. Counsel asserts that [o]ver 200 years of legal jurisprudence will be wiped out with the stroke of a pen if the [judge's] two search warrants are deemed to be valid, and that defendant will be denied his most basic of constitutional and human rights. By rejecting defendant's arguments regarding his suppression motions and his motions for a Franks hearing, we do not hold that the two search warrants were valid. Rejecting defendant's arguments also does not signal a departure from 200 years of legal jurisprudence. We acknowledge our concern that a circuit court judge in this state would issue a warrant purporting to authorize local police officers to execute a search in Montana. The authority of an Illinois judge clearly does not extend to Montana. See 48A C.J.S. Judges § 71, at 658 (1981) (a judge deriving his authority from the sovereign power of the state has no power to exercise his judicial functions outside the territorial limits of the state); see also 68 Am. Jur.2d Searches & Seizures § 289, at 842 (2000) ([o]fficers ordinarily may not execute a search warrant at a place which lies outside of their jurisdiction); People v. Lahr, 147 Ill.2d 379, 168 Ill.Dec. 139, 589 N.E.2d 539 (1992) (discussing territorial limitations of police officers). The question of whether to exclude evidence, however, is a separate question from whether the search is legal. People v. Turnage, 162 Ill.2d 299, 307, 205 Ill.Dec. 118, 642 N.E.2d 1235 (1994), citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 906, 104 S.Ct. at 3412, 82 L.Ed.2d at 687-88. Accordingly, whether the Jefferson County judge and Jefferson County police exceeded the territorial limits of their offices, or whether the warrant affidavits were defective, is not dispositive of whether the evidence should have been excluded. Under the exclusionary rule, on which defendant relies, courts are precluded from admitting evidence that is gathered by government officers in violation of the fourth amendment. People v. Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d 231, 241, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d 91 (2003), citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 649, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1688, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1086 (1961). The exclusionary rule has no constitutional footing ( People v. Willis, 215 Ill.2d 517, 531, 294 Ill.Dec. 581, 831 N.E.2d 531 (2005)), and is not designed to redress the search victim's invasion of privacy ( Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d at 241, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d 91). Nor is it designed `to punish the errors of judges or magistrates.' Turnage, 162 Ill.2d at 307, 205 Ill.Dec. 118, 642 N.E.2d 1235, quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 916, 104 S.Ct. at 3417, 82 L.Ed.2d at 694. Rather, it is a judicially created remedy that prospectively protects fourth amendment rights by deterring future police misconduct. Willis, 215 Ill.2d at 531, 294 Ill.Dec. 581, 831 N.E.2d 531, citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 620, 38 L.Ed.2d 561, 571 (1974). The exclusionary rule is not without its exceptions. Relevant here is the inevitable-discovery exception. This exception permits evidence, that would otherwise be inadmissible at trial, to be admitted where the State can show that such evidence would inevitably have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2511, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 390 (1984); accord People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d 312, 342, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254 (2000). As the State notes, in the judge's oral ruling upholding the validity of the two search warrants, he alluded to the applicability of the inevitable-discovery exception. The judge indicated that even if defendant did not provide the hair samples voluntarily, it wouldn't matter because the State would have gotten the samples later on anyway because the search of the vehicle was valid. We understand the judge's remarks to mean that even if the seizure of defendant's hair was tainted, its lawful seizure was inevitable. We agree with the judge's assessment. The record indicates that the vehicle search yielded hair and fiber evidence linking defendant to the crime. Specifically, 19 fibers were recovered from the front passenger seat and carpeting in defendant's vehicle which were consistent with the clothing Amy Schulz wore on July 1, 1987. In addition, numerous animal hairs found in defendant's vehicle were consistent with hairs found on Amy's clothing, all of which were consistent with hair from defendant's dog. Further, 28 gold fibers and one gold tuft found on Amy's clothing were consistent with the carpeting in defendant's vehicle, and one gold fiber found on Amy's clothing was consistent with the seat fabric in defendant's vehicle. Little doubt can exist that such evidence would have provided the probable cause necessary to support the issuance of a warrant for a search of defendant's person and possessions. [3] A search of defendant's person, in turn, would have yielded the hair samples from defendant that were central to the State's case. If, as the trial court determined, defendant had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle, and thus could claim no fourth amendment protection, the seizure of defendant's hair was inevitable. Although defendant forfeited review of this issue by failing to raise it in his first appeal or in his postconviction petition, we choose to address the matter now and lay to rest defense counsel's claim that defendant was denied his most basic of constitutional and human rights. See People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill.2d 426, 432, 274 Ill.Dec. 397, 791 N.E.2d 489 (2003) ([t]his court has long recognized that we may, in appropriate cases, reach issues notwithstanding their waiver); Hoskins, 101 Ill.2d at 219, 78 Ill.Dec. 107, 461 N.E.2d 941 (party who waived the question is bound by his waiver, but the court, which has the responsibility of reaching a just decision, understandably is not). In defendant's motions to suppress evidence seized from the search of his vehicle, defendant invoked the protections of both the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amend. IV), as well as the comparable provision of the Illinois Constitution (see Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 6). Defendant does not argue that our state constitution provides broader protection than the federal constitution in this situation. We therefore confine our analysis to fourth amendment jurisprudence. See People v. Caballes, 221 Ill.2d 282, 303 Ill.Dec. 128, 851 N.E.2d 26 (2006); Lampitok, 207 Ill.2d at 240-41, 278 Ill.Dec. 244, 798 N.E.2d 91. Preliminarily, we note that although the State framed the issue as one of standing to challenge the vehicle search, this court, in line with United States Supreme Court precedent, has dispensed with the rubric of standing when analyzing fourth amendment claims. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 521, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93, citing Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 87-88, 119 S.Ct. 469, 472, 142 L.Ed.2d 373, 379 (1998); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40, 99 S.Ct. 421, 427-29, 58 L.Ed.2d 387, 398-99 (1978). Instead, the relevant inquiry is whether the person claiming the protections of the fourth amendment had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched. Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 514, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93; People v. Kidd, 178 Ill.2d 92, 135, 227 Ill.Dec. 463, 687 N.E.2d 945 (1997), citing Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 401. Factors relevant in determining whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists include the individual's ownership or possessory interest in the property; prior use of the property; ability to control or exclude others' use of the property; and subjective expectation of privacy. People v. Johnson, 114 Ill.2d 170, 191-92, 102 Ill.Dec. 342, 499 N.E.2d 1355 (1986). When an individual abandons property, the right of privacy in the property is terminated. Hoskins, 101 Ill.2d at 220, 78 Ill.Dec. 107, 461 N.E.2d 941; accord Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 519-20, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93. Abandoned property may be seized and searched without probable cause. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 241, 80 S.Ct. 683, 698, 4 L.Ed.2d 668, 688 (1960); Hoskins, 101 Ill.2d at 220, 78 Ill.Dec. 107, 461 N.E.2d 941; People v. Jones, 38 Ill.2d 427, 432, 231 N.E.2d 580 (1967). Whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle at the time Jefferson County police seized and searched it, or whether he had already abandoned the vehicle, as the trial court ruled, is based on the totality of the circumstances present in this case. See Johnson, 114 Ill.2d at 192, 102 Ill.Dec. 342, 499 N.E.2d 1355. We will pay particular attention, however, `to explicit denials of ownership and to any physical relinquishment of the property.' Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 520, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93, quoting Basinski, 226 F.3d at 837. Defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he left Illinois around the first of October 1987 and drove to Montana. On October 10, 1987, after spending one night in Glacier National Park, his car ran out of gas. Defendant locked the vehicle and left the keys inside with a note that clearly stated, Will not be back for car. Defendant signed the title over to his parents and left the telephone numbers of his parents and a brother. The note stated: let them deside [ sic ] what to do with the car and what's left inside. Defendant testified that he had no further use for the vehicle; it belonged to his parents. During the 12-day period between the date defendant left the vehicle and his arrest by federal authorities, defendant did not return to the car. Based on this testimony, we agree with the trial court that defendant abandoned his vehicle. See Jones, 38 Ill.2d at 432, 231 N.E.2d 580 (holding that car was abandoned where driver jumped from vehicle and ran to avoid capture by police following store burglary); People v. Arnett, 217 Ill.App.3d 626, 632, 160 Ill.Dec. 448, 577 N.E.2d 773 (1991) (holding that the defendant, by leaving his car on a secluded gravel road, unlicensed, unregistered, and along the railroad tracks, had no expectation of privacy). Defendant makes several arguments as to why the car should not be considered abandoned. Defendant first argues that the circumstances here do not come within the Illinois statutory definition of abandoned vehicle. The statutory provision on which defendant relies, however, has been repealed. See Pub. Act 90-89, eff. January 1, 1998 (repealing 625 ILCS 5/4-100 (West 1996)). Defendant next argues that, pursuant to federal regulations governing the national park service, the park rangers failed to follow the procedures in place for the disposition of impounded property. See 36 C.F.R. § 2.22 (1987). Whether the park rangers followed the appropriate procedures is irrelevant to whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Defendant further argues that he attempted to make a gift of the vehicle to his parents. According to defendant, he had the requisite donative intent, but the gift was not completed because acceptance and delivery did not occur. Defendant contends that because the gift was defeated, the ownership and privacy rights in the vehicle remained with him. In the alternative, defendant argues that even if the gift was accepted, under Montana law the gift could be invalidated if there was undue influence, such as the circumstances of being broke, out of gas and unable to move his car. We assume defendant means to argue that if the gift was invalidated, the ownership and privacy rights remained with him. Whether a legitimate expectation of privacy exists is not controlled by arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law between guests, licensees, invitees, and the like. Rakas, 439 U.S. at 143, 99 S.Ct. at 430, 58 L.Ed.2d at 400-01, citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266, 80 S.Ct. 725, 733-34, 4 L.Ed.2d 697, 705 (1960). Similarly, whether defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in his vehicle is not controlled by fine distinctions developed under Montana gift law. Finally, defendant argues that when a person abandons property, forsaking all reasonable expectations of privacy, he abandons it to the whole world. He does not `abandon' it to his parents. This argument is without merit. Abandonment, for fourth amendment purposes, may occur where control of a vehicle is transferred permanently to another person. See 1 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 2.5(a), at 649-50 (4th ed.2004). We conclude that where, as here, an individual has left his vehicle unattended in a public place, transferred title to another person, expressed in writing his intention not to return for the vehicle, and later confirms that he had no further use for the vehicle, that vehicle has been abandoned. Fourth amendment protections do not extend to abandoned property. Abel, 362 U.S. at 241, 80 S.Ct. at 698, 4 L.Ed.2d at 687-88; accord Pitman, 211 Ill.2d at 519, 286 Ill.Dec. 36, 813 N.E.2d 93; Hoskins, 101 Ill.2d at 220, 78 Ill.Dec. 107, 461 N.E.2d 941. Accordingly, an abandoned vehicle may be seized by the police without a warrant and examined with no limitations on the scope, intensity, or objectives of the examination. It and its contents may be retained for use as evidence otherwise admissible against the one who abandoned it. Duncan v. Maryland, 281 Md. 247, 263, 378 A.2d 1108, 1118 (1977). The hair and fiber evidence recovered from the vehicle were admissible at trial against defendant. Moreover, the hair and fiber evidence recovered from the vehicle would have provided the probable cause necessary to secure a warrant authorizing a search of defendant's person in Montana, and the hair samples recovered from defendant would have been discovered inevitably through lawful means. Therefore, even if we accept defendant's argument that the search of his person in Montana ran afoul of his fourth amendment rights, the evidence seized was admissible at trial pursuant to the inevitable-discovery exception to the exclusionary rule.
Defendant next argues that the State violated his due process rights, as well as this court's discovery rules, when it failed to produce the vehicle seized in Montana pursuant to defendant's discovery requests. On March 14, 2001, prior to defendant's second trial, defendant filed a general discovery request seeking, inter alia, any tangible objects which were obtained from or belonged to defendant. Defendant followed that discovery request with a motion on May 21, 2001, expressly seeking production of the vehicle. At the hearing on this motion, the State indicated that although the evidence taken from the vehicle had been preserved and made available to defendant, the vehicle itself could not be located. Based on its investigation, the State surmised that the vehicle was transferred to the Jefferson County highway department in the early 1990s and that someone later disposed of the vehicle, probably after defendant's direct appeal, which was decided in 1992. The trial court directed the State to make available to the defense any information that may come to light concerning the location or disposal of the vehicle. The vehicle was never produced, and the State never learned the exact date and method of the car's disposal. On May 17, 2002, defendant filed a motion to dismiss the indictments or, in the alternative, to bar testimony about items taken from the car, tests done on those items, any results of tests or comparisons, along with any testimony about the car itself. Defendant argued that the State's failure to produce the car effected a violation of his federal due process rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), as well as a violation of Supreme Court Rule 412, governing disclosures to the accused (188 Ill.2d R. 412). The State responded, in relevant part, that suppression of the evidence recovered from the vehicle was not warranted because what remained of the vehicle after processing by the State was simply a shell, and that the vehicle was not outcome determinative. See People v. Newberry, 166 Ill.2d 310, 209 Ill.Dec. 748, 652 N.E.2d 288 (1995). The State also responded that the evidentiary value of the remaining vehicle was merely potentially useful and, in the absence of bad faith, suppression was not warranted. See Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 109 S.Ct. 333, 102 L.Ed.2d 281 (1988). The trial court agreed with the State and denied defendant's motion. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the indictments or suppress the evidence seized from the vehicle and requests this court reverse his convictions outright or, alternatively, grant him a new trial. We review the trial court's ruling for an abuse of discretion. See People v. Hood, 213 Ill.2d 244, 256, 290 Ill.Dec. 207, 821 N.E.2d 258 (2004); Newberry, 166 Ill.2d at 318, 209 Ill.Dec. 748, 652 N.E.2d 288; People v. Walker, 257 Ill.App.3d 332, 336, 195 Ill. Dec. 507, 628 N.E.2d 971 (1993); People v. Williams, 137 Ill.App.3d 736, 740, 92 Ill. Dec. 336, 484 N.E.2d 1191 (1985).