Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Easley/Boyd Contentions

Text: (34a) At the penalty phase, the trial court directed the jury pursuant to section 190.3 to consider all of the evidence which has been received during any part of the trial and consider, take into account and be guided by 12 enumerated factors, including [t]he defendant's character and background and [a]ny other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, including evidence which arouses in you sympathy or compassion for the defendant. (See CALJIC No. 8.84.1 (1984 rev.).) Defendant challenges the instruction under People v. Easley (1983) 34 Cal.3d 858, 875-880 [196 Cal. Rptr. 309, 671 P.2d 813], and People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 775-776 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782], contending it somehow unbalanced the jury's assessment of the mitigating and aggravating evidence and unduly focused attention on the circumstances of the crime rather than on defendant's character. (See generally Lockett v. Ohio (1978) 438 U.S. 586 [57 L.Ed.2d 973, 98 S.Ct. 2954].) In People v. Easley, supra , one of the penalty phase instructions provided for consideration of, among other factors, `any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime.' (34 Cal.3d at p. 877.) We did not reach the question of whether under the Eighth Amendment this language was misleading or confusing in omitting specific reference to circumstances relating to the offender as well as the offense. We concluded more fundamentally that the trial court not only failed affirmatively to advise the jury that it could consider as a mitigating factor any aspect of the defendant's character or background, but it expressly  and inaccurately  informed the jury that it must not be influenced by sympathy or pity for the defendant. ( Id., at p. 878; see also People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 536-537 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440], revd. sub nom. California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538 [93 L.Ed.2d 934, 107 S.Ct. 837].) As a point of future reference, we noted that trial courts  in instructing on the factor embodied in section 190.3, [factor] (k)  should inform the jury that it may consider as a mitigating factor `any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime' and any other `aspect of [the] defendant's character or record ... that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death.' [Citation.] ( People v. Easley, supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 878, fn. 10.) (35) Based on statutory construction ( People v. Boyd, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 774), we have also concluded that [e]vidence of a defendant's character and background is admissible under factor (k) only to extenuate the gravity of the crime; it cannot be used as a factor in aggravation. [Citation.] The prosecutor may rebut evidence of good character or childhood deprivation or hardship with evidence relating directly to the particular incidents or character traits on which the defendant seeks to rely [citation], and may argue that this mitigating factor is inapplicable, but factor (k) evidence may not be used affirmatively as a circumstance in aggravation. ( People v. Edelbacher (1989) 47 Cal.3d 983, 1033 [254 Cal. Rptr. 586, 766 P.2d 1].) (34b) Addressing the merits of defendant's claim, we find the court avoided Easley error by specifically instructing the jury to take into consideration both defendant's character and background and any evidence which arouses in you sympathy or compassion for the defendant. While the enumeration of relevant factors listed character and background at the beginning and sympathy or compassion at the end, nothing in the instruction taken as a whole implied the jury should consider them mutually exclusive or otherwise unconnected. In addition, the court later instructed, You are free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value you deem appropriate to each and all of the various factors you are permitted to consider. Also, the prosecutor did not present evidence upon which he impermissibly predicated some theory defendant's bad character was relevant to the weighing process. (See People v. Edelbacher, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1033.) Moreover, in reading the record as a whole, we do not find a reasonable likelihood the jurors were misled or confused by the failure to juxtapose these two factors. (See People v. Ghent, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 777; see also Boyde v. California (1990) 494 U.S. 370,  [108 L.Ed.2d 316, 329-330, 110 S.Ct. 1190, 1198].) In his argument, the prosecutor delineated this issue in consonance with our direction in Easley (34 Cal.3d at p. 878, fn. 10; see also CALJIC No. 8.85 (1986 rev.)): [Factor] k, any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime, even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime, and any other aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers for the basis of a sentence less than death, including sympathy. (See Hitchcock v. Dugger (1987) 481 U.S. 393, 398 [95 L.Ed.2d 347, 352-353, 107 S.Ct. 1821].) Both sides argued the relative merits of defendant's childhood and other particulars of his background and character in fixing his sentence. (See People v. Caro (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1062-1063 [251 Cal. Rptr. 757, 761 P.2d 680]; see also People v. Murtishaw (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1001, 1032 [258 Cal. Rptr. 821, 773 P.2d 172].) Nor does the rejection of proffered defense instructions assist defendant's argument. While some may have clarified the matter, others were redundant or argumentative. More importantly, as we have explained, the court did not misdirect the jury; the argument of counsel as well dispelled any potential for ambiguity. A defendant is not entitled to have the jury instructed in any particular terms if the instruction given adequately conveys the correct rule of law. (See People v. Bowman (1966) 240 Cal. App.2d 358, 387 [49 Cal. Rptr. 772]; see also People v. Horowitz (1945) 70 Cal. App.2d 675, 701-702 [161 P.2d 833].) Since we find no reasonable likelihood the jury failed to comprehend the relevant legal principles under the instructions given, the court's rejection of defendant's proffered instructions does not enhance his position on appeal. (See People v. Brigham (1945) 72 Cal. App.2d 1, 7 [163 P.2d 891].)