Opinion ID: 457137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Congressional Intent to Include Indians

Text: 21 We now decide whether Congress intended the Lacey Act prohibitions against trafficking in fish obtained in violation of Indian tribal law to apply to Indians. First, we note that the Lacey Act prohibitions refer to any person, which would normally include Indians. See United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d at 1286. Defendants contend, however, that Congress meant to include only non-Indians within the prohibition. 22 Congressional reports provide the following explanations for the incorporation of Indian tribal law. 23 Because of the resource management responsibilities of Indian tribes, the legislation proposes that ... the provisions of the Act apply to fish and wildlife taken in violation of Indian tribal law or regulations. 24 S.Rep. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1981, pp. 1748, 1751. 25 Resource management responsibilities of Indian tribes on Indian tribal lands indicate the need to expand the application of the current law to fish and wildlife taken in violation of Indian tribal laws or regulations. Any such changes would not constitute a broadening of their authority under the Act but would merely allow support for the full range of laws that protect wildlife. 26 H.R.Rep. No. 276, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1981). 27 The Lacey Act prohibitions extend beyond Indian tribal law by incorporating federal and state regulations as well. Indeed, the overall purpose in subjecting persons who traffic in illegally obtained fish to the stiffer Lacey Act penalties was to allow the Federal Government to provide more adequate support for the full range of ... laws that protect wildlife. S.Rep. No. 123, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1981), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, 1981, p. 1751. 28 Indians who traffic in illegal wildlife harm the Lacey Act's goal of wildlife preservation just as much as non-Indian traffickers. The stiff Lacey Act penalties are necessary to deter[ ] those violators who can net $100,000 per year by trafficking illegally caught salmon. H.R.Rep. No. 276, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1981). To exempt Indians from these penalties would impede attainment of Congress' goal. 29 Defendants argue that Congress' intent in incorporating Indian tribal law was merely to provide a mechanism for enforcement of tribal law against non-Indians, because it is generally recognized that Indian tribes do not have inherent jurisdiction to try and to punish non-Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 1022, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978). Nothing in the legislative history, however, directly supports this theory. 30 Moreover, even if there were evidence of such a purpose, that would not necessarily mean that Congress wished to exempt Indians from the Act's prohibitions. After all, the Lacey Act prescribed stiffer penalties which would not otherwise be imposed upon Indian offenders were the tribes to be the sole enforcers of their regulations against fellow Indians. Furthermore, the Lacey Act did not merely incorporate tribal law, but created new offenses by prohibiting trafficking in fish obtained in violation of tribal law. 31 In sum, even if Congress sought to extend tribal law to non-Indians, it could also have desired that the Lacey Act prohibitions and penalties apply to Indians as well. Given Congress' goal of preserving wildlife, it is only reasonable to assume that Congress intended the Lacey Act to encompass everyone, including Indians. 32 Defendants rely upon United States v. Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir.1979), which held that Congress intended the term whoever, in a federal statute prohibiting going upon Indian land without lawful authority for the purpose of hunting, to encompass only non-Indians. The court noted that the legislative history indicated that the statute was enacted to provide a means of enforcing tribal trespass law against non-Indians who would otherwise be exempt under the Oliphant doctrine. However, there is no comparable legislative history behind the Lacey Act. In Jackson, we noted Congress' concern for the fact that Indian property owners could not keep non-Indian trespassers off their lands since tribal law was unenforceable against non-Indians. 600 F.2d at 1287. There was no need to make the statute applicable to Indian offenders. The Lacey Act, on the contrary, should apply to Indian offenders, too, in order to fully effectuate Congress' goal of protecting wildlife. 33 Furthermore, the defendants' asserted congressional rationale does not hold up when one remembers that the Lacey Act makes it unlawful for any person to traffic not only in fish obtained in violation of tribal law, but also in fish obtained in violation of federal and state law as well. See 16 U.S.C. Sec. 3372(a). Consequently, if defendants are correct in their view that any person refers only to non-Indians, then Indians would also be exempt from the prohibitions against trafficking in fish obtained in violation of federal or state law. There is no justification for such an exemption, one which would severely hinder Congress' efforts at eliminating the illegal wildlife trade. 34 Finally, the claim that Congress was merely extending tribal law to cover non-Indians becomes even less plausible when one notes that the incorporation of tribal law was done in the same breath as the incorporation of federal and state regulations, yet there was no need to extend federal and state regulations to non-Indians as non-Indians were always subject to those laws. For all of the above reasons, we conclude that Congress intended the Lacey Act to apply to Indians as well as non-Indians. 35