Opinion ID: 1057584
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Victim Impact Witnesses

Text: Defendant raises two complaints about the victim impact testimony in this case. First, he asserts that Renee Dawson should not have been allowed to testify about the impact of David Gordon's death because she was his fiancee rather than a family member. Second, he asserts that an excessive number of witnesses testified about the impact of David Gordon's murder. In addition to Ms. Dawson, the victim's older brother and his eldest son testified, for a total of three victim impact witnesses. The State disagrees that any error was committed in this regard. Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-204(c) provides in pertinent part that the trial court shall permit a member or members, or a representative or representatives of the victim's family to testify at the sentencing hearing about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the family of the victim and other relevant persons. Such evidence may be considered by the jury in determining which sentence to impose. Tenn.Code Ann. § 39-13-204(c). The statute does not place any restriction on the number of witnesses who may testify about the murder's impact. This Court has recognized, however, that the admissibility of victim impact evidence is subject to limits. State v. Nesbit, 978 S.W.2d 872, 891 (Tenn.1998). Thus, victim impact evidence should be excluded if it threatens to render the trial fundamentally unfair or [if it] poses a danger of unfair prejudice. Id. (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 836, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991)). Moreover, within these parameters, victim impact evidence should be limited to information designed to show those unique characteristics which provide a brief glimpse into the life of the individual who has been killed, the contemporaneous and prospective circumstances surrounding the individual's death, and how those circumstances financially, emotionally, psychologically or physically impacted upon members of the victim's immediate family. Id. (footnote omitted). We reject Defendant's assertion that Renee Dawson should not have been allowed to testify because of her status as the victim's fiancee. Defendant contends that there is no provision in the [capital sentencing] statute for a friend of the victim to testify. We do not read the statute so narrowly, however. First, even before passage of the language at issue, we recognized in Nesbit that victim impact evidence was permissible under both the federal and state constitutions. Id. at 888-90. Accordingly, as we stated in State v. McKinney, the capital sentencing statute does not expressly restrict or limit the introduction of other types of victim impact evidence authorized by law developed in our prior cases. 74 S.W.3d 291, 309 (Tenn.2002). Rather, the limits on such evidence are qualitative rather than based on genetic or institutional relationships. Second, the statute expressly allows for a representative of the victim's family to testify. A blood or marital relationship is not a prerequisite for such status. Third, we think that there is a valid distinction to be made between a friend and a fiancee with whom the victim had purchased a house and with whom the victim was residing at the time of his murder. [13] Cf. State v. Young, 196 S.W.3d 85, 109-11 (Tenn. 2006) (holding error to admit testimony by victim's professor about the debilitating effects of the murder on an academic department and testimony by the victim's mother about the impact of the murder on victim's army of friends). Finally, as did the Court of Criminal Appeals, we note that the Victim's Bill of Rights contemplates that a person residing with a deceased victim may exercise the victim's rights. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-38-302(4)(A)(iii)(b) (2003). Accordingly, we hold that it was not error for the trial court to permit Ms. Dawson to testify solely on the basis of her status as the victim's fiancee. See Thomas v. Commonwealth, 263 Va. 216, 559 S.E.2d 652, 661-663 (2002) (statute defining victim as spouse, parent, sibling or legal guardian did not preclude fiancee from giving victim impact testimony at capital trial). Having held that the trial court did not err in permitting Ms. Dawson to testify, we also hold that the combination of her testimony with that of Mr. Gordon's brother and son, whose testimony was brief and limited to appropriate topics, was not cumulative or unduly prejudicial, and that its probative value was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. Defendant is not entitled to relief on this issue.