Opinion ID: 554583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant Ellis

Text: 30 Ellis claims the district court clearly erred in finding that Ellis was a manager of criminal activity within the meaning of the sentencing guidelines and that he did not accept responsibility within the meaning of the guidelines. 31
32 The standards we follow in reviewing a district court's fact-finding that a defendant was a manager or supervisor of criminal activity are set out above. Information indicating that Ellis was a manager of criminal activity is summarized in Ellis's pre-sentencing report: 33 Robert Lee and Ellis were indirect business partners in a Marion County used auto lot to assist in supplying automobiles and farm equipment as needed to the Lee farms. Also, Ellis recruited his stepdaughter, Rita Kachriman, and her husband, Ali Kachriman, to become resident managers of one of the Lee farms. The stepdaughter had approached Ellis for financial assistance and Ellis proposed this position for the husband and wife team. The Kachrimans faced state charges in Missouri and are currently on probation in that state. They are not codefendants in the instant offense. Mr. Ellis had paid the expenses of the Kachrimans while they resided on the farm, through money received from the Lee brothers. 34 Mr. Ellis also recruited Joseph Overstreet (a young man who had worked for Ellis as a mechanic at Ellis' auto dealership) to travel to Missouri to help tend the marijuana crop. Ellis paid the travel expenses of Mr. Overstreet on at least two occasions (trips lasting 3 to 4 days) in Missouri. Defendant Ellis was to receive a percentage (in payment for his work) of the marijuana crop proceeds. He states he was never paid any percentage amount, but only travel expenses, which came from Robert E. Lee. 35 At Ellis's sentencing hearing, the court concluded: 36 He has made a number of trips back and forth to Missouri. He has carried money up there. He has carried people up there. It seems to me he is a manager. He may not be the organizer and may not be the kingpin. He certainly had a managerial role in that he was taking people and money from Kentucky into Missouri. I think the three level increase is appropriate. 37 We hold that the district court's finding that Ellis was a manager is not clearly erroneous. 38
39 responsibility for his crime. 40 The guidelines allow the district court to make a 2-level reduction in the offense level where the defendant clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1(a) (1989). The clearly erroneous standard applies to the district court's determination that Ellis failed to take personal responsibility for his criminal activity. United States v. Wilson, 878 F.2d 921, 924 (6th Cir.1989). Under the guidelines, The sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility. For this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great deference on review and should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.1, comment. (n. 5) (1989); Wilson, 878 F.2d at 923; United States v. Barrett, 890 F.2d 855, 868 (6th Cir.1989). 41 In determining whether a defendant qualifies for this provision, the sentencing court considers, among other things: 42
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44 (c) voluntary and truthful admission to authorities of involvement in the offense and related conduct; 45 (d) voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commission of the offense; 46 (e) voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the offense; 47 (f) voluntary resignation from the office or position held during the commission of the offense; and 48 (g) the timeliness of the defendant's conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility. 49 U.S.S.G. Sec. 3D1.1, comment. (n. 1). 50 Defendants requesting sentence reductions bear the burden of proving facts leading to such reduction by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Rodriguez, 896 F.2d 1031, 1032 (6th Cir.1990). We note that a guilty plea does not automatically warrant an acceptance of responsibility sentence reduction as a matter of right, although it may provide some evidence of acceptance of responsibility. U.S.S.G. Sec. 3E1.1(c) (1989); Carroll, 893 F.2d at 1512; Barrett, 890 F.2d at 868. According to his probation officer: 51 Mr. Ellis, while discussing his reported short-term involvement in the operation, has not clearly demonstrated a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct. Mr. Ellis' reported actions compared to what the government is ready to prove are quite different in that Ellis was more important to the conspiracy than he purports. His guilty plea is some evidence of acceptance, but not itself reason for the reduction. 52 The district court stated, I'm unable to see any justification for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility.... [Ellis] attempted to withdraw from the conspiracy, but he certainly did nothing thereafter until he was arrested. So any adjustment for acceptance of responsibility is inappropriate. 53 We hold that in view of this information, it was not clearly erroneous for the district court to find that Ellis had not proven facts showing acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal activity.