Opinion ID: 432297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291

Text: 10 Harper first asserts that this court has jurisdiction over his appeals under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 (1982), which gives the Court of Appeals jurisdiction to review all final decisions of the district courts, both civil and criminal. The Supreme Court has recognized that section 1291 authorizes review of some types of interlocutory orders. See Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949) (collateral order exception to the final judgment rule). Harper argues that his appeals fall within the exception to the final-judgment rule articulated in Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977). 11 Abney involved an appeal from a pretrial order denying a motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds. The Court in Abney noted the firm congressional policy against interlocutory or 'piecemeal' appeals, id. at 656, 97 S.Ct. at 2038, and pointed out that [a]dherence to this rule of finality has been particularly stringent in criminal prosecutions. Id. at 657, 97 S.Ct. at 2039. The Court found, however, that the order at issue was within the  'small class of cases' ... beyond the confines of the final-judgment rule. Id. at 659, 97 S.Ct. at 2040. 12 In arriving at its holding, the Court discussed three aspects of the type of order at issue. First, it noted that the order constitute[s] a complete, formal, and, in the trial court, final rejection of the claim the order addresses. Id. at 659, 97 S.Ct. at 2040. Second, it said that the very nature of [the claim] is such that it is collateral to, and separable from the principal issue at the accused's impending criminal trial, i.e., whether or not the accused is guilty of the offense charged. Id. Finally, the order involved rights ... [that] would be significantly undermined if appellate review ... were postponed until after conviction and sentence. Id. at 660, 97 S.Ct. at 2040. In subsequent cases, the Court has made it clear that a pretrial order is not appealable if it does not share all three of those characteristics. See United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978); United States v. Hollywood Motor Car Co., Inc., 458 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 3081, 73 L.Ed.2d 754 (1982); Flanagan v. United States, --- U.S. ---, ---, 104 S.Ct. 1051, 1055, 79 L.Ed.2d 288 (1984). 13 The instant order clearly satisfies the first two requirements. It constitutes a complete, formal, and, in the trial court, final rejection of the defendant's claim that this is not a death penalty case because section 794's death penalty provision is unconstitutional. And the very nature of the claim that the death penalty provision is unconstitutional is such that it is collateral to, and separable from the principal issue at [Harper's] impending trial, i.e., whether or not Harper is guilty of espionage. 14 It is the third requirement, however, that precludes an interlocutory appeal here. In Abney, the Court said that the rights involved in that case would be significantly undermined if review were postponed until final judgment because the double jeopardy clause protects individuals from being twice put to trial for the same offense. 431 U.S. at 661, 97 S.Ct. at 2041 (emphasis in original). Consequently, the Court stated, if a criminal defendant is to avoid exposure to double jeopardy and thereby enjoy the full protection of the Clause, his double jeopardy challenge to the indictment must be reviewable before that subsequent exposure occurs. 431 U.S. at 662, 97 S.Ct. at 2041 (emphasis in original). Similarly, the right guaranteed by the Speech or Debate Clause, which the Court has held may also be vindicated through an interlocutory appeal, see Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500, 99 S.Ct. 2445, 61 L.Ed.2d 30 (1979), is a right not to be tried at all. The Court has said that the Double Jeopardy and Speech or Debate rights are sui generis in this regard. See Flanagan, --- U.S. at ---, 104 S.Ct. at 1055. 5 15 The only other criminal case in which the Court has thus far recognized a right to an interlocutory appeal involved the right to be released on bail pending appeal. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 1 (1951). The crucial characteristic of an order denying bail, the Court has observed, is that any challenge to it would become moot if review awaited conviction and sentence. See Flanagan, --- U.S. at ---, 104 S.Ct. at 1055. In its most recent discussion of the availability of an interlocutory appeal in a criminal case, the Supreme Court noted that all three of the foregoing cases involved a right that would be irretrievably lost if review were postponed until trial is completed. Id. 16 Harper does not argue that the rights he asserts are rights that, like those asserted by Abney, Helstoski, and Stack, would be irretrievably lost if review were postponed until after trial. He maintains that section 794's death penalty provision is unconstitutional under the eighth amendment. The eighth amendment protects individuals from the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Harper does not argue that the amendment protects him from having to endure a trial for a crime carrying a penalty that may be cruel and unusual. Rather, he asserts that the erroneous order will cause him to undergo much hardship that cannot be corrected on appeal. The Supreme Court precedents require us to focus on the nature of the right asserted by the defendant, not the hardships caused by the order. Thus, we believe that this case falls outside the narrow class of criminal cases in which interlocutory appeals are available.