Opinion ID: 2387024
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denigration of defense counsel

Text: When the prosecutor began his opening argument, he stated that Nothing I say this morning or ever in this trial is meant to reflect poorly on the defense attorneys. He added that he had to be willing to get in there and hit hard, I cannot be namby-pamby and do my job, but I won't be critical of them. He further explained that I will be critical of defense position. I'll be critical of [defendant's] conduct, but nothing I say is meant to reflect on [defense counsel]. [¶] I want to get that straight from the start but they know, they are both big boys and they know I'll hit them hard and I expect them to hit me hard. [¶] We know these type of cases, murder cases, death penalty cases are going to be very hotly contested so I expect them to let me have it. I want them to give me their best shot. That's what makes the system work. [¶] They are here to be diligent advocates. I appreciate that and I'm here to do the same thing. No hard feelings. After this we shake hands and go on to our next cases. (13) Defendant did not object to the prosecutor's statements, and therefore has forfeited his challenge to these comments. His claim also fails on the merits. Defendant asserts that [t]his argument made fun of defense counsel and denigrated their roles as advocates. A prosecutor commits misconduct if he or she attacks the integrity of defense counsel, or casts aspersions on defense counsel. [Citations.] ( Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 832.) Nothing in the prosecutor's comments, however, may be understood to be an attack on the integrity of counsel or to cast aspersions on counsel. Defendant also perceives denigration in comments by the prosecutor concerning discrepancies between defense counsel's statements and the evidence. The prosecutor asserted that statements by counsel concerning the events were speculation, such speculation was intended to aid their client, and the jury should consider the source of any inferences it drew, in order to ensure that the inferences were based upon evidence rather than upon impermissible speculation. [22] The trial court properly overruled defendant's objection to these comments. [T]he prosecutor has wide latitude in describing the deficiencies in opposing counsel's tactics and factual account. [Citations.] ( People v. Bemore (2000) 22 Cal.4th 809, 846 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 840, 996 P.2d 1152] ( Bemore ).) For example, we concluded in People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694 [47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2] that it was unobjectionable for the prosecutor to state that `any experienced defense attorney can twist a little, poke a little, try to draw some speculation, try to get you to buy something ....' ( Id. at p. 759.) Similarly, the prosecutor's comments in the present case concerning defense counsel's speculation [did] not amount to a personal attack on counsel's integrity. [Citations.] ( Ibid. ) In addition, these comments focused the jury upon the evidence rather than distracting it from its task. (Cf. Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846 [attacks on counsel risk focusing the jury's attention on irrelevant matters ...].) Defendant again perceives denigration of his counsel in the prosecutor's comments regarding defense counsel's discussion of the meaning of beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor stated, the easy thing to do would be to read to you from the instructions, like I did. I wrote the instructions out word for word. [¶] But [defense counsel] didn't do that. He decided to create his own chart. Something from his mind. The judge is not going to give you a chart like this. Defense counsel objected and ask[ed] that counsel be restricted to the scope of my argument and the facts and the law. The court overruled the objection. The prosecutor then commented that the chart, with a line representing the preponderance of the evidence standard at 51 percent and a line twice as far up, implied that the People were required to prove their case beyond a hundred percent. Even if we assume counsel's objection encompassed the claim now asserted by defendant, we find this claim lacking in merit. The prosecutor's comments fell well within the latitude allowed in commenting upon deficiencies in opposing counsel's tactics. (See Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846; see also People v. Taylor (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1155, 1166-1167 [113 Cal.Rptr.2d 827, 34 P.3d 937] [prosecutor's references to defense tricks or moves was not misconduct].) There was nothing deceptive or reprehensible in the prosecutor's comments; rather, they reflected an attempt to clarify the People's burden of proof. After referencing Officer King's testimony concerning her efforts to locate defendant and his vehicle at his apartment immediately after the shooting at Vons market, the prosecutor noted that defense counsel had asked King about how tough it was to be a police officer, and whether she was afraid when she was in her patrol car alone. The prosecutor then stated, Why was he asking those questions? Does anybody have any idea? What does that have to do with whether or not his client committed attempted murder that night. What was that about? What is the purpose of patronizing her. Why are you sitting there. The defense object[ed] to that remark as being improper, patronizing an officer. The court overruled the objection, and the prosecutor stated, Well, call it what you like. If that offends [defense counsel], I'm sorry, I take it back. What is the point of those questions. Again, these statements fell well within the latitude allowed for comment upon deficiencies in opposing counsel's tactics. (See Bemore, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 846.) In addition, in context, the prosecutor's comments were intended to persuade the jury to reject any implication that King's testimony should be discounted because of emotions she might have felt while being placed in a dangerous situation, and there is no reasonable likelihood that jurors would view the remark as a personal attack on counsel. (See People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1192 [24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105 P.3d 487] [a review of the entire argument persuaded the court that the prosecutor's comments describing defense counsel's discussion of the law as unintelligible gibberish and garbage were not misconduct; the prosecutor was merely determined to correct defense counsel's erroneous description of the law, and [t]here [was] no reasonable likelihood that the jury would interpret this remark as a personal attack on the integrity of counsel].) In reviewing the testimony of Paul Diersing, the prosecutor stated that defense counsel had asked Diersing the question that I found very curious. He asked him, well, is it company policy to just give [a robber] what he wants. [¶] And I started thinking about that because it bothered me that he asked that question and I guess the inference to that question is somehow Mr. McVeigh got what he deserved for trying to help his friend. Defendant objected; the court overruled the objection, and defendant requested a sidebar conference. At that conference, defense counsel asserted that the prosecutor exceeded the latitude allowable in permissible argument when he attributes comments to [defense counsel], some attempt to blame a victim. Defense counsel acknowledged that the prosecutor was entitled to argue that such an inference would be false and misplaced.... But it's his reference to the state of mind of the attorneys that's inappropriate. The prosecutor responded, I don't think I said it that way, but the question which was asked of the witness by the defense is was he following company policy. I don't know what was the relevance of that question, what the purpose of the question was other than Mr. McVeigh did something wrong and got shot because of it. The court responded that defense counsel's concerns are well taken, and suggested that the prosecutor refrain from doing that. The court also stated that it would not admonish the jury at this stage, but would consider doing so at the conclusion of all the arguments. Nonetheless, immediately following the sidebar conference, the court explained to the jury that the court gave wide latitude to counsel, but the jury should focus upon the evidence and the law, and the conduct and thoughts of counsel is not something for you to be looking at and focusing on. Following these comments, the prosecutor stated: I'm not criticizing [defense counsel]. It's the evidence they are eliciting, the question which was asked of that witness Mr. Diersing[,] was he following company policy. [¶] Well, that question, what is that to lead us to believe, that somehow Timothy McVeigh did something wrong, and because he did something wrong he was killed. That is ludicrous. Not only did the court admonish the jury immediately following the sidebar conference, it also addressed this point at the conclusion of the prosecutor's opening argument, stating that [t]he district attorney is allowed to comment on the questions of witnesses that have testified before you and those questions were put to the witness by counsel for defendant. He's entitled to comment on those answers. I think that was the thrust of his comments. [¶] However, I have to be careful to caution you that the thought processes of the attorneys, whatever those are, the intent of the attorneys, I don't want you speculating about that. That's just something that is not within the ambit of the evidence for your consideration. In addition, in his argument, defense counsel explained what he believed to be the relevance of Alpha Beta's policy that employees comply with a robber's demands and thereby enhance the safety of employees. Counsel stated: Did [McVeigh] run up and grab a gunman, seeing a gun? No, that's not what happened. He's been trained, he knows the store policy. If he'd seen the gun, he wouldn't have done that. That's what this testimony was about. There is no merit in defendant's claim that the prosecutor's comments concerning the question posed to Diersing had the effect of denigrating counsel. The prosecutor's comments focused upon the inference to be drawn from the question, not upon defense counsel's state of mind or intent. A prosecutor is not prohibited from challenging an inference raised by a question merely because defense counsel thereby may be cast in a poor light for having posed the question. The prosecutor's statement that it bothered me that he asked that question did not add anything to the prosecutor's commentary upon the evidence that was not implicit in his observation that defense counsel's question seemed to raise an unfair inference. [23] In addition, even if a juror initially might have construed the comments as critical of defense counsel, the court's admonitions clarified that the prosecutor's statements were relevant only as commentary upon the evidence, and that the jurors were not to speculate concerning counsel's thought process or intentions. (See People v. Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 31 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 211 P.3d 520] ( Friend ) [the court's admonitions insured that the jury understood that [the prosecutor's] comments were irrelevant to its consideration of the case].)