Opinion ID: 6495289
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Compassionate Release

Text: We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c). United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2021). Once eligibility is established, we review the denial of a defendant’s § 3582(c) motion under the abuse of discretion standard. See id. “A district court abuses its discretion if it applies an incorrect legal standard, follows improper procedures in making the determination, or makes findings of fact that are clearly erroneous.” United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cordoba v. DIRECTV, LLC, 942 F.3d 1259, 1267 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted)). The abuse of discretion standard allows the district court a “range of choice” that we will not reverse “just because we might have come to a USCA11 Case: 21-11270 Date Filed: 06/27/2022 Page: 12 of 18 12 Opinion of the Court 21-11270 different conclusion had it been our call to make.” See id. at 912 (quotation marks omitted).
As amended by the First Step Act, and as relevant here, § 3582(c) authorizes the district court to reduce a defendant’s sentence if the court finds that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” and the reduction is consistent with the sentencing factors of § 3553(a) and the “applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The applicable policy statement, found in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, echoes the statutory requirements, stating that a district court may reduce a defendant’s sentence “if, after considering the factors set forth in . . . § 3553(a),” the court determines that (1) “[e]xtraordinary and compelling reasons warrant the reduction” and (2) “[t]the [d]efendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g).” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. See also United States v. Bryant, 996 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that “1B1.13 is an applicable policy statement for all [§ 3582(c)(1)(A)] motions” and that district courts do not have discretion “to develop other reasons that might justify a reduction in a defendant’s sentence” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2021) (listing three necessary conditions for a sentence reduction under § 3582(c): support in the § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and adherence to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13’s policy statement). USCA11 Case: 21-11270 Date Filed: 06/27/2022 Page: 13 of 18 21-11270 Opinion of the Court 13 The district court denied Defendant’s § 3582(c) motion for two reasons. First, the court found that Defendant had failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for his release. Alternatively, the court determined that the § 3553(a) sentencing factors weighed against Defendant’s release and that Defendant continued to pose a danger to the community. Either ground is adequate to support the district court’s decision to deny Defendant’s § 3582(c) motion. As to the first ground, we agree with the district court that Defendant did not provide adequate support for the claim that his medical condition satisfies the extraordinary and compelling reason standard. 4 Pursuant to the applicable guidelines policy statement, a medical condition can qualify as an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction if the defendant: (1) has a terminal illness such as cancer, ALS, or end-stage organ disease, or (2) suffers from a serious physical or mental condition that “substantially diminishes” his ability “to provide self-care” in prison and from which he is not expected to recover. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). Defendant did not claim to suffer from a terminal illness, and he provided no evidence to show that his PTSD—which is the 4 Pursuant to the applicable guidelines policy statement, a defendant can establish an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release based on a qualifying medical condition, age, and qualifying family circumstances. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1. Here, Defendant’s only potentially viable option is to show a qualifying medical condition because the age and family circumstances provisions clearly do not apply. See id. USCA11 Case: 21-11270 Date Filed: 06/27/2022 Page: 14 of 18 14 Opinion of the Court 21-11270 only medical condition that could otherwise potentially satisfy § 1B1.13—“substantially diminishes” his ability to care for himself in prison. On the contrary, the medical records produced by Defendant—including the psychological report by Dr. Samuels—do not indicate that Defendant was unable to provide self-care, and the Government’s medical records show that Defendant scored the highest possible number of points on a self-maintenance scale. In addition, Defendant self-reported that he can engage in regular physical activity, including both practicing and teaching yoga, and that he “is sufficiently cognitive to run a small law practice” in the prison. The district court thus correctly determined that Defendant did not meet the standard for early release set out in the applicable policy statement of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 5 Defendant’s failure to demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling reason for his early release is enough, in and of itself, to foreclose a sentence reduction under § 3582(c). See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1347 (“When denying a request for compassionate release, a district court need not analyze the § 3553(a) factors if it finds either that no extraordinary and compelling reason exists or that the defendant is a danger to the public.”). But the district court also held, in the alternative, that Defendant’s release was not consistent with 5 Defendant argues that the district court erred by relying on U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 in applying the “extraordinary and compelling” reason standard, but that argument is foreclosed by this Court’s binding precedent in Bryant holding that § 1B1.13 applies to all § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions. See Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1247–48. USCA11 Case: 21-11270 Date Filed: 06/27/2022 Page: 15 of 18 21-11270 Opinion of the Court 15 the § 3553(a) factors. In support of its alternative holding, the court emphasized that Defendant was convicted of threatening to kidnap, rape, and murder Florida state officials and their family members, with the goal of extorting the officials to dismiss state charges against members of a white supremacist organization. In connection with the threats, Defendants published photos and identifying information about the State Attorney and the judge handling a case involving the organization, among other state officials. The district court noted that it had considered the above facts, in addition to Defendant’s lengthy and violent criminal history, in determining a reasonable sentence in this case. According to the court, Defendant did not present any information in his motion that would alter the § 3553(a) analysis. On the contrary, even in the submissions filed in support of his motion, Defendant continued to use hate speech. In addition, Defendant “had disciplinary problems in prison.” The district court was thus within its discretion to find that the § 3553 sentencing factors weighed against Defendant’s release pursuant to § 3582(c). See United States v. Riley, 995 F.3d 1272, 1279 (11th Cir. 2021) (noting that “discretion in weighing sentencing factors is particularly pronounced when it comes to weighing criminal history”).6 6 Contrary to Defendant’s argument, the court was not required to discuss or “exhaustively analyze” each of the § 3553 factors or explicitly state that it considered each of the factors. United States v. Kuhlman, 711 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2013). USCA11 Case: 21-11270 Date Filed: 06/27/2022 Page: 16 of 18 16 Opinion of the Court 21-11270