Opinion ID: 1478315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Cause of Most Human Illness.

Text: The following symptoms and ailments are almost invariably caused by Intestinal Toxemia. They can now be successfully treated. Appendicitis    Asthma Colitis Constipation Excessive Fatigue Foul Breath Headache Gall Bladder Complications High and Low Blood Pressure Indigestion Irregular Heart Kidney and Bladder Complications Liver Complications Lumbago Menopause Disturbances Muddy or Pimply Complexion [Migrain] Nervousness Pruritis Ani Rheumatism Sinus Trouble Run Down Condition Short of Breath Sleeplessness Ulcers of Stomach and Bowels Ulcerative Colitis. In this court petitioners have pressed their attack upon the findings, conclusion and order in briefs and oral arguments with serious earnestness, impressing the sincerity of their belief that their Detoxifier is an instrument of merit and that its use contributes to the alleviation of pain and sickness. Their testimony tended to show that it had been used upon many thousand sufferers, and there was no issue and no direct evidence was adduced that such use had in any instance inflicted injurious consequences. The two witnesses called by petitioners who had made very extensive use of the instrument were undoubtedly convinced as they testified that many patients had been greatly benefited. There was certainly no testimony that would have justified any injunctive order prohibiting the use of the Detoxifier by men or women possessing the qualifications required to practice the art of healing, and it does not appear to have been sold by petitioners to individuals for use upon themselves. But the Commission has in no way attempted to prevent the sale of the instrument in interstate commerce, or to restrict or limit its use for the purpose for which it is designed, and much of the argument before us is directed to matters which are not for our determination. The statute which is controlling here provides that The findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive, 52 Stat. 112, 113, 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(c), and it is not within our province to try the issues of fact de novo. The order of the Commission is confined entirely to prohibiting the use by petitioners of certain specified representations and nomenclature in their advertisements to induce the sale and use of their product, and on the fact issue our inquiry can extend only to the question whether the Commission's findings are supported by evidence. That the petitioners did disseminate and cause to be disseminated advertisements concerning their device to induce its sale and use, containing the statements and representations and conveying the implications found by the Commission, we determine to be amply sustained by the testimony. Aside from such of them as are descriptive of the mechanical operation of the device, the representations relate to the successful treatment of diseases, ailments and infirmities of the sick, and are, therefore, in a field of knowledge as to which it is universally recognized that laymen and the general public are not informed comparably with those who have devoted themselves to specialized studies. Accordingly, in these proceedings after petitioners' device had been introduced and its operation explained and the representations in advertisements established, three physicians were called by the Commission who testified as expert witnesses. Their studies and experience were disclosed at length and they were undoubtedly physicians of profound learning and wide experience in their profession. They gave evidence in support of each of the items of the cease and desist order which is here involved. In their opinion each of the statements which the order prohibits the petitioners from disseminating is false, the designation of the device Detoxifier is deceptive, and the advertised claim that the device accomplishes hydro-surgery is misleading and untrue. The petitioners, on their part, called two witnesses who were duly licensed to practice as chiropractors whose studies and experience were fully disclosed. They stated their opinions as to the capacity of the Detoxifier for successful treatment of the sick which in many respects were opposed to those of the three physicians. The Commission did not find, nor does this court, that they were not qualified expert witnesses. The petitioners also called several lay witnesses who had been sick and had been treated with the device and felt they had benefited. But the evidence as a whole presented for determination the issue of fact whether the representations were false, misleading or deceptive as charged. Such determination required consideration of the testimony of the experts and decision upon conflicts between them in a field where there are few absolutes readily demonstrable. But such difficulties suggest no reason to deny the Commission's power to resolve the fact issue. Alberty v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 Cir., 118 F.2d 669, 670, certiorari denied, 314 U.S. 630, 62 S.Ct. 62, 86 L.Ed. 506; Aronberg v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 132 F.2d 165, 170; Neff v. Federal Trade Commission, 4 Cir., 117 F.2d 495, 497; Dr. W. B. Caldwell, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 111 F.2d 889, 891; Justin Haynes & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 105 F.2d 988, 989, certiorari denied 308 U.S. 616, 60 S.Ct. 261, 84 L.Ed. 515; E. Griffiths Hughes, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 77 F.2d 886, 887, certiorari denied 296 U.S. 617, 56 S.Ct. 137, 80 L.Ed. 438: Federal Trade Commission v. Standard Education Society, 302 U.S. 112, 58 S.Ct. 113, 82 L.Ed. 141; Quality Bakers of America v. Federal Trade Commission, 1 Cir., 114 F.2d 393; Benton Announcements v. Federal Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 130 F.2d 254; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 3 Cir., 106 F.2d 667, certiorari denied 308 U.S. 625, 60 S.Ct. 380, 84 L.Ed. 521, rehearing denied, 309 U.S. 694, 60 S.Ct. 466, 84 L.Ed. 1035; Kidder Oil Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 117 F.2d 892; Keller v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 132 F.2d 59; Cf., Arkansas Wholesale Grocers' Association v. Federal Trade Commission, 8 Cir., 18 F.2d 866, 870, certiorari denied 275 U.S. 533, 48 S.Ct. 30, 72 L.Ed. 411. Petitioners contend that no weight should be given to the opinions expressed by the three physicians whom the Commission called, because none of them had seen or used the device or observed its results and the argument is made that they did not understand it. But the proof is clear that the physicians had read the descriptions of the device and its operation. There was a physical example of it in evidence, and a printed manual describing it and its operation with meticulous exactness, in addition to extensive description by witnesses, and nothing in the record suggests that it embodies any mysterious or unknown elements. The definition and description of it by the Commission in its findings (paragraphs five and six) appears to us accurate and sufficient as we have compared it with the device and the testimony, and we see no reason to doubt that the physicians fully understood its functioning and gave their opinions as to what it would not do in the field of therapeutics with full appreciation of what it is and how it works. The mere fact that none of the Commission's medical witnesses had actual experience with the Detoxifier or were possessed of data as to what could be expected from it on the basis of clinical observation, does not nullify the weight attached to their testimony as qualified physicians, based on their general knowledge of medicine, that the Detoxifier could not perform the cures claimed for it. Neff v. Federal Trade Commission, 4 Cir., 117 F.2d 495, 496, 497; Fulton Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 9 Cir., 130 F.2d 85, 86; Dr. W. B. Caldwell, Inc., v. Federal Trade Commission, supra; Justin Haynes & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra; Cf. Goodwin v. United States, 6 Cir., 2 F.2d 200, 201. As pointed out in Neff v. Federal Trade Commission, supra [117 F.2d 497]: The actual question now presented is whether the testimony of the six experts who testified for the Commission can be considered substantial evidence in view of their lack of actual experience in the use of the petitioner's preparation, as compared with the conflicting statements of doctors who had administered Glantex to their patients. We think that the evidence is sufficient to support the Commission's finding. All of the experts were well qualified to speak upon the subject; and their opinions, though based only upon their general medical and pharmacological knowledge, constituted substantial evidence tending to show that the representations of the petitioner were not justified. The injection of water into the body through the rectum is not a novel but an ancient practice, and the physicians disclosed their familiarity with the effects of such operations. They were unanimous and firm in the opinion that the benefits are narrowly limited, whereas the petitioners' advertisements would induce the purchaser of their device to build up a practice in the treatment of the listed diseases around the machine. The fundamental vice of inducing belief that benefits are absolute and general which in truth and fact are limited, uncertain, rare or nonexistent, pervades the whole body of petitioners' advertising, and the findings that the matter prohibited by the order is false are supported by the evidence of the physicians whose learning and experience entitle them to credence. Petitioners have complained of misconduct of the trial examiner in interrupting their examination and cross-examination of witnesses and in preventing the introduction of their competent testimony, and examination of the record convinces that his conduct of the hearing is deserving of criticism. There were needless interruptions and interferences by him which impeded the production of petitioners' evidence. But petitioners were represented by able counsel, and careful study of the whole proceeding has convinced that although improperly impeded in several instances, petitioners were not finally prevented from full and complete presentation of their case and all the evidence they relied on. The ruling of the trial examiner that an address made by Dr. Anthony Bassler before the 1936 session of the American Congress of Physical Therapy offered in evidence by petitioners was not competent, was not prejudicially erroneous. The doctor was not a witness subject to cross-examination, and his address, which has been included in the record and examined, lends no support to any conclusion contrary to that of the Commission. Petitioners' contention that their use of the name Detoxifier is permissible because it has been used as a trade-mark to designate their product, can not be sustained. A trade-mark is not a license to engage in unfair competition, Federal Trade Commission v. Real Products Corp., 2 Cir., 90 F.2d 617, 619, nor is it an unlimited sanction to use the product to deceive, Fluegelman & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 37 F.2d 59, 61. The test of petitioners' conduct is not Whether a trade-mark may have been registered, but whether the method of using it falls within the prohibition of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which forbids the use of misleading trade-marks. Fluegelman & Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, supra; Federal Trade Commission v. Real Products Corp., supra; Marietta Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 50 F.2d 641, 642; Federal Trade Commission v. Kay, 7 Cir., 35 F.2d 160, 162, certiorari denied 281 U.S. 764, 50 S.Ct. 463, 74 L.Ed. 1173. See also, Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494, 42 S.Ct. 384, 66 L.Ed. 729; Brougham v. Blanton Mfg. Co., 249 U.S. 495, 499, 39 S.Ct. 363, 63 L.Ed. 725. Nor do we find merit in petitioners' contention that the proceeding and order of the Commission were not to the interest of the public within 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b). Although some of petitioners' advertised statements were directed to members of the healing profession and the device is not sold to the lay public, the findings of the Commission of the manner in which petitioners disseminated them and caused them to be disseminated, and that their dissemination tended to and had the capacity to mislead and deceive a substantial portion of the public into buying and undergoing treatment with the device, are supported in the evidence. The existence of a public interest here rests on the deception practiced upon the public. Federal Trade Commission v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S. 212, 53 S.Ct. 335, 77 L.Ed. 706; See National Silver Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 2 Cir., 88 F.2d 425. The Commission found that petitioners also supply to purchasers of their machine, advertising to be distributed by such purchasers to the public, and thus the fact that the advertising representations of the petitioners as to the Detoxifier goes to doctors, mostly chiropractors, does not negate the existence of a specific and substantial public interest, for it is clear that the deception of patients who present themselves to purchasers of the machine and undergo treatment involving its use as a result of circulation by the purchasers of the deceptive and misleading literature furnished them, involves the public interest. The author of false, misleading and deceptive advertising may not furnish customers with the means of misleading the public and thereby insulate himself against responsibility for its deception. Cf. Federal Trade Commission v. Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 493, 42 S.Ct. 384, 66 L.Ed. 729; Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526, 530, 44 S.Ct. 615, 68 L.Ed. 1161; Chicago Silk Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 90 F.2d 689, 691, certiorari denied 302 U.S. 753, 58 S.Ct. 281, 82 L.Ed. 582; Masland, etc., Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 3 Cir., 34 F.2d 733, 736; Marietta Mfg. Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 7 Cir., 50 F.2d 641, 642; Federal Trade Commission v. F. A. Martoccio Co., 8 Cir., 87 F.2d 561, 564, certiorari denied 301 U.S. 691, 57 S.Ct. 794, 81 L.Ed. 1347. We find the proceedings by the Commission were to the interest of the public and its order supported by the evidence. We affirm it and direct issuance of order commanding obedience to its terms.