Opinion ID: 2061712
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion to Strike Testimony

Text: The State called two witnesses, Paul E. Lessard and Charles Williams, both of whom testified that they were truck drivers employed by the Defendant's firm. Mr. Lessard said he had been directed by the Defendant two or three times to deliver sealed envelopes with a criss-cross partly on the flap and partly on the envelope to Mr. Therrien at the Cue Stick Lounge. There was no writing on any of the envelopes, nor had he ever made a return delivery of envelopes from Mr. Therrien to the Defendant. He testified that he had done a similar errand for the Defendant once or twice to Edgar [Morin] in Sanford. Although his employment required the delivery of shoe boxes to various customers, he had never delivered such boxes to the Cue Stick Lounge. Mr. Williams described his routine for delivery of shoe cartons to various customers of Arlen Box Company which involved either getting a signed receipt, or payment, for the orders. In addition, he testified to making maybe 25 deliveries of sealed envelopes just marked Edgar to one Edgar Morin. He stated that he had picked up one envelope from a fruit store in Biddeford at the direction of the Defendant and delivered it to him personally. In considering the admissibility of this evidence, we must have in mind that the indictment charged a conspiracy to engage in bookmaking and we feel that the gambling proclivities of the persons involved are relevant to the issue. The circumstances described by these witnesses could allow the Jury to draw the inference that these envelopes contained either pay off or wagering money and might be considered as some corroboration of Mr. Therrien's previous testimony. We conclude the evidence was properly before the Jury. `Necessity of Direct Evidence.    Conspiracies need not be established by direct evidence of the acts charged, but may and generally must be proved by a number of indefinite acts, conditions and circumstances which vary according to the purposes to be accomplished. The very existence of a conspiracy is generally a matter of inference deduced from certain acts of the persons accused, done in pursuance of an apparently criminal or unlawful purpose in common between them. The existence of the agreement or joint assent of the minds need not be proved directly. It may be inferred by the jury from other facts proved. It is not necessary to prove that the defendants came together and actually agreed in terms to have the unlawful purpose, and to pursue it by common means. If it be proved that the defendants pursued by their acts the same object, often by the same means, one performing one part and another another part of the same so as to complete it, with a view to the attainment of that same object, the jury will be justified in the conclusion that they were engaged in a conspiracy to effect that object. If, therefore, one concurs in a conspiracy, no proof of agreement to concur is necessary in order to make him guilty. His participation in the conspiracy may be established without showing his name or giving his description.' We cite this section in full, as every statement therein made is fully verified by decisions from a wide range of jurisdictions. In Commonwealth v. Smith, 163 Mass. 411, 40 N.E. 189, the court makes this statement: `A conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence, and this is the usual mode of proving it, since it is not often that direct evidence can be had. The acts of different persons who are shown to have known each other, or to have been in communication with each other, directed towards the accomplishment of the same object especially if by the same means or in the same manner, may be satisfactory proof of a conspiracy.   ' State v. Trocchio (1922), 121 Me. 368, 376, 117 A. 460. [2]