Opinion ID: 2640086
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Challenge for Cause/Pretrial Publicity

Text: Defendant claims the trial court abused its discretion by not excusing Prospective Juror J.D. for cause. He also asserts violations of his right to due process and to a representative jury, but does not state whether the federal or state Constitution is involved. In any event, the argument on appeal, as in the trial court, is that exposure to news stories about the crime biased J.D. against defendant on the issue of guilt. We disagree. [15] On the main questionnaire completed before general voir dire (i.e., the third phase of jury selection), question No. 35 asked, Before coming here today, did you have opinions or beliefs whatsoever about this case? Prospective Juror J.D. answered, From newspaper accounts at [the] time and due to details of story[,] I believed that both defendants were directly involved in murder for financial gain. Also, there had been a planned out plot for these murders. Finally, committing the murders on Mother's Day showed marked anger and hate directed to victims. In a related vein, question No. 36 asked for the nature and source of any pretrial information to which prospective jurors had been exposed. J.D. again mentioned news reports of a financially motivated double murder in a parking structure at Universal on Mother's Day. He also recollected that the victims were related to or associated with one of the defendants. On voir dire, the trial court asked J.D., a medical laboratory technician, whether his written answers reflected circumstances that he remembered hearing or seeing in the media, or whetheras suggested on his questionnairehe actually believed they were true. Without apparent hesitation, J.D. clarified his written answer to question No. 35, saying, I would have reworded that[;] rather than saying `I believe' is [ sic ] I recollect from the story. J.D. confirmed that he did not believe everything contained in media accounts, that such accounts were not evidence in the present case, that he would adjudicate the case no differently than if he had heard nothing about the crime, and that he would rely solely on the evidence presented at trial. J.D. insisted that he would be fair and impartial, and cited his need to be neutral at work in balancing the competing demands of others. Defendant moved to excuse J.D. for cause because he believes that the defendants are guilty based on pretrial publicity. The motion was denied. The trial court said it accepted J.D.'s assurances that news stories involved only allegations, not evidence. The court also credited J.D.'s explanation that he was imprecise in answering question No. 35, and that he should have written that he recalled news accounts about the crime, not that he believed their truth or accuracy. Defendant subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge against J.D., who did not serve on the jury. The foregoing events do not require reversal of the judgment. Preliminarily, defendant has not preserved his claim that Prospective Juror J.D. was biased and should have been excused for cause. Although he exercised a peremptory challenge to remove J.D., and exhausted all such challenges (and asked for more), defendant never expressed dissatisfaction with the jury as constituted. ( People v. Wilson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1, 14 [73 Cal.Rptr.3d 620, 178 P.3d 1113]; People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 121 & fn. 4 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887].) Such lapse results in forfeiture of the claim where, as here, the trial occurred in 1997, after Crittenden was decided. ( People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741-742 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145].) Otherwise, a defendant could challenge denial of a challenge for cause on appeal even if he was satisfied with the overall composition of the jury, and expressed no misgivings to the trial court. ( People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 911 [111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103].) (4) Moreover, under the principles invoked by defendant, a prospective juror is biased and disqualified to serve only if his state of mind will prevent him from acting impartially and without prejudice to any party. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 271-272 [99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193] ( Ayala ); see People v. Ledesma (2006) 39 Cal.4th 641, 668-669 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 326, 140 P.3d 657], citing Code Civ. Proc., § 225, subd. (b)(1).) If the prospective juror's statements are equivocal or conflicting, the trial court's determination of his state of mind is binding on appeal. ( Ayala, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 272, citing People v. Carpenter (1999) 21 Cal.4th 1016, 1035 [90 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 988 P.2d 531].) The trial court is in the best position to make this assessment, since it can observe demeanor and tone, and decide credibility firsthand. ( People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1175 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146].) Here, nothing J.D. said in court indicated that he was biased against defendant or disqualified to serve based on news stories about the capital crime. J.D. candidly disclosed that he remembered learning about allegations of multiple murder against defendant, and stated unequivocally that he did not accept them as true and had not prejudged guilt. As noted by the trial court, such answers arguably conflicted with one response J.D. provided on his written questionnaire before the oral examination. As noted, where assessment of the juror's state of mind depends upon the resolution of any conflicting or ambiguous statements and upon a credibility determination, we defer to the findings of the trial court. Here, the court explicitly credited J.D.'s in-person statements clarifying his written questionnaire and insisting that he remained open minded and fair about the case. We therefore conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in finding no bias on J.D.'s part, and in denying defendant's challenge for cause.