Opinion ID: 2607623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: liability under as 04.21.020.

Text: The Estate asserts both common-law and statutory causes of action against Oaken Keg. The common-law claims are no longer viable. [10] We therefore focus upon the relevant statutes, AS 04.21.020 and AS 04.16.030. The current text of AS 04.21.020 is as follows: A person who provides alcoholic beverages to another person may not be held civilly liable for injuries resulting from the intoxication of that person unless the person who provides the alcoholic beverages holds a license authorized under AS 04.11.080  04.11.220, or is an agent or employee of such a licensee and (1) the alcoholic beverages are provided to a person under the age of 21 years in violation of AS 04.16.051, unless the licensee, agent, or employee secures in good faith from the person a signed statement, liquor identification card, or driver's license meeting the requirements of AS 04.21.050(a) and (b), that indicates that the person is 21 years of age or older; or (2) the alcoholic beverages are provided to a drunken person in violation of AS 04.16.030. (Emphasis added.) Alaska Statute 04.16.030 states in relevant part: A licensee, an agent, or employee may not with criminal negligence (1) sell, give, or barter alcoholic beverages to a drunken person... . Oaken Keg interprets the word provides in AS 04.21.020 narrowly, arguing that a vendor provides alcohol only to the person who actually purchases it. The Estate argues that under the facts of this case Oaken Keg had provided alcohol both to the actual purchaser, Isaac, and to Tomaganuk. In interpreting a statute we must first look to its language. The word provide is commonly used to mean to make available; supply; afford ... to furnish with. Webster's New World Dictionary 1144 (2d college ed. 1972). We conclude that a vendor may provide alcohol even unwittingly to third parties. The protection of AS 04.21.020 lies in its further requirement that the vendor first, with criminal negligence sell, give or barter that alcohol to a drunken person in violation of AS 04.16.030. The intent of the legislature in enacting AS 04.21.020 was to limit vendor liability in cases where the vendor has provided alcohol in a statutorily permissible manner. We hold that AS 04.21.020 does not immunize vendors who violate AS 04.16.030. [11] We remand to determine whether Oaken Keg sold vodka to Isaac with criminal negligence [12] in violation of AS 04.16.030, and if so, whether Tomaganuk's injuries resulted either from his own intoxication or that of his nephew. The appropriate standard of proximate causation is described in Kavorkian v. Tommy's Elbow Room, 711 P.2d 521 (Alaska 1985). Specifically, the plaintiff need not prove that Gilbert's death resulted from intoxication induced by the specific bottle of vodka Oaken Keg provided to Gilbert and Isaac. See id. at 523; see also W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton & D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 41 (5th ed. 1984). However, plaintiff must establish all other elements of proximate cause, including the necessary assertion that the chain of events leading from Oaken Keg's alleged negligence to Tomaganuk's death was not, in retrospect, highly extraordinary. See Osborne v. Russell, 669 P.2d 550, 556 (Alaska 1983) [t]his is the case `where after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm' (quoting Sharp, 569 P.2d at 182); see also Restatement § 435 comments a and d. [13] The superior court's order of summary judgment in favor of Oaken Keg is REVERSED, and this case REMANDED for proceedings consistent with this opinion. [14]