Opinion ID: 2226912
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is a Violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, a Felony?

Text: The court of appeals, relying on the legislative history of the penalty for a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, held that a violation of this law constituted a felony and the village has not specifically challenged this determination in this court. In the oral argument before this court, the village's counsel appeared to concede that the offenses for which Jessen was convicted were felonies, stating We acknowledge that the [sic] felony was committed. Our decision in State ex rel. McDonald v. Douglas County Circuit Court, 100 Wis.2d 569, 302 N.W.2d 462 (1981), dictates affirmance of the appellate court's conclusion that a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, constitutes a felony. In McDonald, this court held that a violation of a statute which does not specify the place of imprisonment, and is punishable by confinement for not more than one year is a felony. McDonald, supra, at 580. We reached this result upon an application of secs. 939.60 (definition of a felony) [10] and 973.02 (place of confinement where none is specified) [11] Stats., to the penalty provision at issue. We noted that an offense that fails to provide a place of confinement but which authorizes a prison sentence of one year is punishable with imprisonment in the state prisons, pursuant to sec. 973.02, Stats., and is, therefore, a felony as defined in sec. 939.60. Ibid. In McDonald, supra, at 577-581, we re-examined State ex rel. Gaynon v. Krueger, 31 Wis.2d 609, 143 N.W.2d 437 (1966), and its progeny, and held that it is no longer necessary to engage in the legislative history analysis set forth therein when dealing with the question of whether an offense punishable with confinement of not more than one year and which fails to proscribe the institution of confinement is a felony or misdemeanor. In reviewing secs. 939.60 and 973.02, Stats., and analyzing the case law applicable thereto, we determined that the legislature intended that crimes failing to prescribe the place of imprisonment and punishable with incarceration for no more than one year, or a year or more, should be classified as felonies under these statutes. The analysis of the felony versus misdemeanor conflict adopted in McDonald was espoused in a dissent to Gaynon authored by Chief Justice CURRIE who stated that the classification statutes (sec. 939.60 and sec. 973.02) and the penalty provision of the offense in question were clear and unambiguous and should be applied because the legislature must be presumed to have enacted the classification statutes with full knowledge of and with reference to existing law: `The language of the statute is plain and unambiguous. The cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy. As said in 82 C.J.S., Statutes, p. 794, sec. 362 All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the legislature with full knowledge of the existing condition of the law and with reference to it; ... they are therefore to be construed in connection with and in harmony with the existing law, and as part of a general and uniform system of jurisprudence, that is, they are to be construed with reference to the whole system of law of which they form a part. So the meaning and effect of statutes are to be determined in connection, not only with the common law, ... and the constitution, but also with reference to other statutes, ...' Id. at 625. [1] In arguing before the court of appeals, relying on Gaynon and its progeny, the village contended that a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, [12] was only a misdemeanor for it was punishable by a fine of not more than $500 or imprisonment for not more than one year with no place of imprisonment specified. This court rendered the McDonald decision some months after the date of oral argument in the appellate court. Thus, we hold that anyone convicted of a violation of sec. 946.12 (4), Stats. 1973, when read in conjunction with sec. 973.02, is punishable with confinement in the state prisons and, therefore, a violation of sec. 946.12(4), Stats. 1973, constitutes a felony. McDonald, supra; sec. 939.60.