Opinion ID: 622538
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Accidental Bodily Injury

Text: In holding that Mr. Figueroa‟s death was not the result of an “accidental bodily injury,” the District Court relied on this Court‟s observation in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Mehlman, 589 F.3d 105 (3d Cir. 2009), that “„[q]ualification of a particular incident as an accident seems to depend on two criteria: 1. the degree of foreseeability, and 2. the state of mind of the actor in intending or not intending the result.‟” 1 Id. at 111 (quoting Black‟s Law Dictionary 16 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting John F. Dobbyn, Insurance Law in a Nutshell 129 (3d ed. 1996)). The District Court stated that because it was unable to conclude that Mr. Figueroa‟s death was unforeseeable, it could not conclude that Ms. Figueroa had met her initial burden of showing that the death was 1 Liberty Life has argued that Mr. Figueroa did not suffer from an “accidental bodily injury,” without specifically arguing that Mr. Figueroa did not suffer from a “bodily injury.” We attribute the absence of any argument on the issue of whether Mr. Figueroa‟s anaphylactic reaction constituted a “bodily injury” to the parties‟ recognition that it was, without question, such an injury. See Beckham v. Travelers Ins. Co., 225 A.2d 532 (Pa. 1967) (holding that an insured‟s unintended fatal drug overdose constituted a “bodily injury . . . effected . . . through accidental means” within the terms of his life insurance policy). 4 the result of an “accidental bodily injury.” In the District Court‟s view, Mr. Figueroa‟s death was foreseeable because it was a possible, albeit remote, consequence of being injected with contrast dye. “Foreseeable,” however, often means more than that which is merely “possible.” Indeed, the term is defined in the dictionary as “being such as may be reasonably anticipated.” Webster‟s Third New International Dictionary 890 (1993). Under that definition, to the extent Mr. Figueroa‟s death was not “reasonably anticipated,” it was not foreseeable. While we think a better view of “foreseeability” in this context would be the degree to which an event is reasonably anticipated or expected, we will refrain from analyzing the “foreseeability” of Mr. Figueroa‟s death because the “foreseeability” of an event does not control whether it qualifies as an accident under Pennsylvania law.2 In Kvaerner Metals Division of Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., 908 A.2d 888 (Pa. 2006), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, relying on the dictionary definition of “accident” as “[a]n unexpected and undesirable event,” or “something that occurs unexpectedly or unintentionally,” stated that “[t]he key term in the ordinary definition of „accident‟ is „unexpected,‟” which, the Court explained, “implies a degree of fortuity.” Id. at 897-98 (citing Webster‟s II New College Dictionary 2 It bears noting that notwithstanding our reference in Mehlman to foreseeability, the holding in Mehlman that an insured‟s conduct in attempting to shoot another was not “accidental” under Pennsylvania law did not at all turn on foreseeability, but rather on our determination that the insured, despite his intoxication, had intended his actions. See Mehlman, 589 F.3d at 111-14. Moreover, we explicitly stated that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court “has emphasized that the fortuity of the events in question is the key factor to consider in making [the] determination [of whether there has been an accident].” Id. at 111 (emphasis added). 5 6 (2001)). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has further explained that “„the test of whether injury is a result of an accident is to be determined from the viewpoint of the insured and not from the viewpoint of the one that committed the act causing the injury.‟” Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Baumhammers, 938 A.2d 286, 292 (Pa. 2007) (quoting Mohn v. Am. Cas. Co. of Reading, 326 A.2d 346, 348 (Pa. 1974)). Thus, under Pennsylvania precedent, “we are required to determine whether, from the perspective of the insured, the claim[] asserted by [Ms. Figueroa] present[s] the degree of fortuity contemplated by the ordinary definition of „accident.‟” Id. at 293. We believe that from Mr. Figueroa‟s perspective, the fatal anaphylactic reaction was an exceedingly unexpected consequence of receiving the contrast dye injection. 3 Consequently, we hold that under Pennsylvania law, Mr. Figueroa‟s death was the result of an “accidental bodily injury” within the meaning of the policy.