Opinion ID: 1957633
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Did the trial court err by refusing instructions D-5, D-6, D-10, D-11, and D-12?

Text: ¶ 92. The Dealership argues that the trial court committed reversible error by refusing several of its requested jury instructions. However, the Dealership does not discuss how or why the denial of these instructions warrants reversal. Instead, it simply states that each is a correct statement of the law and therefore the denial was an error. The Dealership fails to cite any authority supporting its position regarding D-5, D-11, and D-12. The failure to cite relevant authority obviates this Court's obligation to review the issue. Williams v. State, 708 So.2d 1358, 1362-63 (Miss.1998); Grey v. Grey, 638 So.2d 488, 491 (Miss.1994). See also M.R.A.P.28(a)(1)(6). ¶ 93. The instructions at issue are as follows: D-5 The proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which is natural or continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces an injury, and without which the results would not have occurred. An element, or test, of proximate cause is that an ordinarily prudent man should reasonable have foreseen that some injury might probably occur as a result of his actions or inactions. It is not necessary to foresee the particular injury, the particular manner of the injury, or the extent of the injury. D-6 The Court instructs you that an agreement between two parties may include a condition precedent. In Mississippi law, a condition precedent is a duty or event which must be performed or fulfilled before an agreement between the parties becomes a binding contract. If you find, by a preponderance of the evidence in this case, that the agreement between the Plaintiffs and Kim's contained a condition precedentthat is, that Kim's was not obligated to complete the sale of the vehicle to the Plaintiffs unless and until a bank or finance company approved the terms of the proposed sale and agreed to purchase the retail installment contract from Kim's based on such terms; and, if you further find that the terms of the sales were not approved, and the finance companies declined to purchase the retail installment contract, then there was no binding contract of sale between the parties, and your verdict must be for Kim's. D-10 The Court instructs the jury that persons such as the Dorseys are under an obligation to read a contract before signing it, and Plaintiffs will not as a general rule be heard to complain of an oral misrepresentation or misstatement, the error of which would have been disclosed by reading the contract. Thus, if you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the Purchase Order agreement signed by Mrs. Dorsey Dorsey on March 7, 2000 stated that the sale was not complete until a finance company or bank agreed to purchase the retail installment contract; and, that this fact would have been made known to the Plaintiffs by reading the Purchase Order agreement, then you must return a verdict in this cause for Kim's. D-11 The Court instructs the jury that in order to satisfy their burden of proof on their claim for breach of contract, the Dorseys must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: a) the Plaintiffs and Kim's entered into a binding contract to sell the vehicle to the Plaintiffs on March 7, 2000; and b) Kim's breached that agreement; and c) Plaintiffs were damaged as a direct and proximate result of that breach, if any. The Court further instructs the jury that if you find that there was not a binding contract to sell the vehicle to the Plaintiffs on March 7, 2000; or that Kim's did not breach the agreement with the Plaintiffs; or if you find that Kim's did breach its contract with the Plaintiffs, but that the Plaintiffs suffered no damages as a direct and proximate result of said breach, if any, then you must return a verdict in favor of Kim's. D-12 The Court instruct (sic) the jury that if you find from the evidence, and under the instruction of this Court, that the Plaintiffs are not entitled to recover, then you must not consider the question of damages. The fact that the Court gives any instructions on the questions of damages, or that counsel may discuss such subject, is not to be taken by you as a suggestion by the Court, or an admission by counsel for Kim's is liable to the Plaintiffs in any amount whatsoever. ¶ 94. Proposed instruction D-5 provided an accurate description of the law of proximate cause. See Delahoussaye v. Mary Mahoney's, Inc., 783 So.2d 666, 671 (Miss.2001) (Proximate cause of an injury is that cause which in natural and continuous sequence unbroken by any efficient intervening cause produces the injury and without which the result would not have occurred.); Mauney v. Gulf Ref. Co., 193 Miss. 421, 9 So.2d 780, 780-81 (Miss. 1942)(In order for a person to be liable for an act which causes injury, the act must be of such character, and done in such a situation, that the person doing it should reasonably have anticipated that some injury to another will probably result therefrom). I note that the jury was not otherwise instructed on the issue of proximate cause. Thus, the trial judge's refusal to give instruction D-5 was error. However, because the Dealership failed to cite any authority or even discuss the issue, I believe the error was harmless. ¶ 95. The Dealership's argument as to D-6 and D-10 refers back to the alleged conditional nature of the contract. For the reasons already stated, I believe this argument is without merit. ¶ 96. The Dealership cited no authority supporting its argument as to D-11, which addresses breach of contract. Thus, I believe the issue is without merit. ¶ 97. Finally, failing to cite any authority concerning D-12, the Dealership simply states that D-12 is a correct statement of the law and therefore failure to give it constitutes reversible error. That is not enough to prevail on appeal.