Opinion ID: 2286083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Collateral Attacks

Text: On March 18, 1996, Thomas filed a D.C.Code § 23-110 motion to vacate his sentence. He maintained that he was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel because his counsel: (1) failed to introduce a toxicology report into evidence or call an expert witness on intoxication; (2) failed to give an opening statement; and (3) failed to elicit damaging hearsay evidence from Mr. Roberts on cross-examination. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the trial court denied the motion. On August 26, 1996, Thomas filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied on October 11, 1996. Thomas noticed a timely appeal. Thomas lodged a second § 23-110 motion on March 19, 1999, alleging trial counsel failed to: (1) hire an expert to interpret blood-alcohol concentrations; (2) prepare adequately for trial; (3) impeach witnesses with inconsistent statements; (4) object to hearsay; and (5) object to the use of his CPWL conviction as a CDW conviction. The trial court denied this motion on August 12, 1999, essentially because [n]one of the allegedly new issues . . . warrant[ed] consideration . . . . and Thomas failed to show cause for the failure to raise the new issues in his first § 23-110 motion or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), we see no merit to Thomas's § 23-110 claims, see also Brown v. United States, 726 A.2d 149 (D.C.1999); nor are we persuaded by his assertion that the trial court improperly denied without a hearing [his] second post-conviction motion. [2] Strickland, supra, requires Thomas to show that counsel's performance was deficient ..., [and] that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. Id. at 687. Under the second Strickland prong, Thomas cannot show prejudice with regard to his first § 23-110 motion. Mr. Roberts described and specifically identified Thomas as his attacker on three occasions, and testified that he was certain Thomas was his attacker. Mr. Roberts had an opportunity to see Thomas during the assault, and recognized him as a member of the local community surrounding Georgia Avenue. He stated that he would never forget Thomas's face. In addition, Thomas was unable to present any witnesses to corroborate his alibi that he was working at a beauty parlor at the time of Mr. Roberts' assault. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thomas's first § 23-110 motion. With regard to Thomas's second § 23-110 motion, we have said that when a defendant `has failed to raise an available challenge to his conviction on direct appeal, he may not raise that issue on collateral attack unless he shows both cause for his failure to do so and prejudice as a result of his failure.' Matos v. United States, 631 A.2d 28, 30 (D.C.1993) (quoting Head v. United States, 489 A.2d 450, 451 (D.C.1985) (citation omitted)). [3] Indeed, the abuse of writ doctrine precludes consideration of claims not raised, and thus defaulted, in the first [collateral] proceeding, McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 490, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991); and § 23-110(e) states that, the court shall not be required to entertain a second or successive motion for similar relief on behalf of the same prisoner. Thomas provided no affidavit or other credible proffer to support his allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus, was not entitled to a hearing on his second collateral attack motion. Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 235 (D.C.1993); see also Lane, supra, 737 A.2d at 552. Furthermore, we agree with the trial court's conclusion that he has not sustained his burden to show cause and prejudice. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. So ordered. RUIZ, Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in affirming the trial court's denial of the first 23-110 motion without a hearing, but not, as the majority does, based on lack of Strickland prejudice. With respect to the second 23-110 motion, which was filed during the pendency of the direct appeal, I disagree that the trial court need not have considered it on the merits on the ground that it was a second or successive motion for similar relief. D.C.Code § 23-110(e) (1996 Repl.) (permitting trial court not to entertain such a motion). Therefore, I would remand for the trial court's consideration of the merits of the second 23-110 motion.