Opinion ID: 3011680
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of FFE's Tariff

Text: Once a plaintiff has established a prima facie case under the Carmack Amendment, the burden shifts to the carrier to prove that it was free from negligence and that the damage was caused solely by (a) the act of God; (b) the public enemy; (c) the act of the shipper himself; (d) public authority; (e) or the inherent vice or natur e of the goods. Missouri Pacific R.R Co. v. Elmore & Stahl, 377 U.S. 134, 137 (1964) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found that no such proof was offered at trial. FFE does not directly challenge thatfinding, but in an apparent attempt to rebutt Beta Spawn's prima facie case and to recover its freight charges, argues that its tariff regulated the temperature at which the trailer was to be maintained. See City of New Orleans v. S. Scrap Material Co., 491 F. Supp. 46, 48 (E.D. La. 1980) (A tariff confers rights and imposes duties as a matter of law. Carriers, shippers, and consignees are bound by the pr ovisions of a tariff duly filed by the carrier.) (citations omitted). According to the record, FFE publishes a tariff that sets regulations for, inter alia, goods that are shipped with protective services. Section C of the tarif f provides that an LTL shipment, shipped cooler and so stated on the Bill of Lading by the shipper, must be maintained at an air temperature of between 35 and 60 degrees. The temperature inside the boxes of spawn when they reached Pennsylvania was between 48 and 58 degrees. Thus, FFE argued at trial that it provided the r equisite services in that the spawn arrived at a temperature that fell within the range prescribed by the tariff. The district court rejected this argument on the ground that FFE's tariff did not apply to the shipment. On appeal, FFE maintains that the inclusion of the word chill on the bill of lading meant that the parties agreed that the tariff provision regulating the transportation of LTL shipments of cooler commodities applied to the shipment of spawn. Yet, it is undisputed that the wor d chill is not found anywhere in FFE's tariff. FFE asserts that the word chill is synonymous with cooler because FFE's Claims Director, Raymond Flemming testified that to him, the word chill meant the same as cooler. Although Flemming's 11 testimony may prove that Flemming understood the word chill to signify cooler, it does not necessarily establish Peterson's understanding of the word. Accor dingly, we hold that the district court did not err by finding that FFE's tariff was not applicable to the shipment in this case. C. Agreement to Maintain Temperature at 34 Degrees FFE also argues that it was clearly err oneous for the district court to find that FFE had agreed to maintain its trailer at 34 degrees while transporting Beta Spawn's goods. The district court found that such agr eement existed based on (1) prior business dealings between FFE and Beta Spawn involving the transport of spawn; (2) a verbal agreement between FFE and Beta Spawn that FFE would transport the spawn at 34 degrees; (3) the pr esence of the words chill and 34 degrees noted on the bill of lading by Forbito; and (4) the temperature of FFE's trailer when it arrived in Chicago. FFE objects to this reliance on extrinsic evidence by the district court because the bill of lading, as prepared by Peterson, did not contain an agreement to maintain the trailer at 34 degrees. Under Pennsylvania law, [w]here the contract or agreement is unambiguous, parole evidence of prior inconsistent terms or negotiations is inadmissible to demonstrate intent of the parties. Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Morris, 19 F.3d 142, 148 (3rd Cir . 1994); see also Gianni v. Russell & Co., Inc., 126 A 791, 792 (Pa. 1924). 9 Likewise, in its role as contract of carriage, the ter ms and provisions of a bill of lading cannot be varied by extrinsic evidence, and all negotiations leading up to the written agr eement are presumed to be merged therein. See Internatio, Inc. v. M/V Yinka Folawiyo, 480 F. Supp. 1244, 1252 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also EF Operating Corp. v. American Bldgs, 993 F.2d 1046, 1050 (3rd. Cir. 1993) (As a contract, [a bill of lading] is subject to general rules of construction under contract law.) (citations omitted). Where a contract provision is ambiguous, however, extrinsic evidence may be properly admitted in an attempt to resolve the ambiguity. In re Herr's Estate, 161 A.2d 32, 34 (Pa. 1982). _________________________________________________________________ 9. As the parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law governs the interpretation of the agreement, we will apply Pennsylvania law. 12 A contract is ambiguous if it is reasonably or fairly susceptible of different constructions and is capable of being understood in more senses than one and is obscure in meaning through indefiniteness of expr ession or has a double meaning. State Highway and Bridge Auth. v. EJ Albrecht Co., 430 A.2d 328, 230 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981) (citation omitted). Upon examination of the bill of lading, we conclude that the words chill and T emp. 34 degrees written by Forbito render the agreement ambiguous.10 To begin with, the word chill gives no indication as to the exact temperature intended by the parties, and there is no explanation of its meaning on the bill of lading. The lack of clarity surrounding the word chill is demonstrated by the parties' differing interpretations of the word. FFE asserts that chill meant that the parties intended that the shipment be kept at the temperature requir ed under its tariff for cooler commodities. Y et Forbito testified that when he wrote down chill after asking Peterson for the proper temperature to ship the spawn, he believed chill meant 34 to 37 degrees. Likewise, it is unclear whether Temp. 34 degrees indicates the temperature inside the boxes at the time they were tendered to FFE or the _________________________________________________________________ 10. FFE argues that we should not look to the words chill and Temp. 34 degrees on the bill of lading because, as an independent contractor, Forbito had no authority to enter into agreements to bind FFE. The record reflects, however, that Forbito drove exclusively for FFE, was given authority by FFE to transport the shipment of spawn, specifically asked Peterson at what temperature the spawn was to be shipped, and was the only representative of FFE to sign the bill of lading. Thus, even assuming Forbito had no actual authority to add ter ms to the bill of lading regarding the proper temperature of the shipment, we believe there is sufficient evidence that he had apparent authority to do so. See Leidigh v. Reading Plaza Gen'l, Inc., 636 A.2d 666, 667-68 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) ([T]his court has found apparent authority to be established with a showing of (1) limited authority given to the agent by the principal; and (2) conduct of the agent which demonstrates to the third-party the agent's apparent authority to bind the principal.). FFE apparently recognizes such authority on the part of Forbito because it argues in its brief that we should rely on the wordchill, written by Forbito, as evidence that the parties intended for FFE's tarif f to apply. 13 11. Forbito testified that he took the temperature of some of the boxes at the time they were loaded onto his truck in California and found it to be 34 degrees. But, when asked on cross-examination, And when you write on here, chill, temperature 34, that's to keep the product at 34 degrees?, Forbito replied, At 34 degrees, right. temperature at which FFE agreed to transport the spawn. Forbito's testimony supports both interpretations.11 Because we perceive ambiguity in the wor ds chill and Temp. 34 degrees, we conclude that the district court properly considered extrinsic evidence in determining the existence of an agreement to maintain the trailer at 34 degrees. Accordingly, we agree with its findings that FFE did not provide the requisite services under the agreement and that FFE is not entitled to recover shipping charges.