Opinion ID: 2154995
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: associated's motion for summary judgment

Text: Associated moved for summary judgment against plaintiff upon the ground that plaintiff had failed to give timely notice of the breach of warranty. The trial court concluded that the record presented an issue of factthat it is for the jury to determine whether by its conduct Associated is estopped to assert the defense. The motion was denied. Associated appeals. According to Cohan he started feeding the food mixture on March 4, 1947, and discontinued its use on April 25, 1947. He sustained some loss of mink in April and May of 1947, some further losses in May and June of 1947, and heavy losses in July, August, and September, 1947. He states in an affidavit that in May or June he brought some dead mink to Associated and that then a Mr. Berenz, manager of Associated, inspected the carcasses. He says further in the affidavit that after his heavy losses in July, August, and September of 1947, he questioned Berenz as to whether the loss could be attributed to the feed mixture and Berenz said, It can't be the food for they [Associated] were not losing any of their mink. Berenz, at an adverse examination, testified that Cohan had never complained to him that his loss of mink had been caused by the use of food mixture, that Cohan made no claim of any kind against us in the year 1947. He testified further that in September, 1947, he (Berenz) knew Cohan was losing mink and that Cohan approached him and asked him whether Associated had lost mink and that he answered No, not in weeks. Berenz testified also that he had suggested to Cohan that he engage a veterinarian. On September 8, 1947, Cohan engaged a veterinarian, Dr. McDermid, and in his affidavit states that the veterinarian diagnosed the cause of the loss as salmonella and attributed it to the food. Berenz admitted that during the same month and after Dr. McDermid's report to plaintiff, the latter again spoke to him about his loss and that he told Cohan to get someone in that knew something about it. In his affidavit Cohan states that he had no independent knowledge as to the true cause of the loss and relied on Berenz's assurances and that he had no means of ascertaining the true cause of the losses until he gathered such knowledge by reading an article in a commercial publication in April, 1949, which apprised him of the fact. After reading the article and on April 19, 1949, plaintiff's attorneys wrote Associated that he had learned of certain facts from having read the magazine article which reported the result of an action by Associated against Armour; that he had lost some mink as a result of feeding the mixture and advising Associated that they had been instructed to prepare the necessary suit for recovery of the damages sustained and suggested a conference in an effort to settle. Sec. 121.49, Stats., provides:  Acceptance does not bar action for damages. In the absence of express or implied agreement of the parties, acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not discharge the seller from liability in damages or other legal remedy for breach of any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But, if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know, of such breach, the seller shall not be liable therefor. The requirement of notice is imposed as a condition precedent to the right of recovery, Simonz v. Brockman, 249 Wis. 50, 23 N. W. (2d) 464, 24 N. W. (2d) 409, Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. S. Morgan Smith Co. 251 Wis. 218, 28 N. W. (2d) 343. But there may be estoppel to set up want of notice. Olson v. Stella Cheese Co. 254 Wis. 62, 35 N. W. (2d) 220. Where one by statements made induced another to refrain from doing that which he would have done but for the action of the former he may be precluded from asserting the other's failure. Guile v. La Crosse Gas & Electric Co. 145 Wis. 157, 170, 130 N. W. 234. If the statements and answers made by Berenz in response to Cohan's complaints were such as to lull the former into inaction, and if such inaction resulted from reliance upon the conduct of Berenz, principles of equity should intervene to excuse Cohan's delay. We conclude that the evidence bearing upon this issue and which we have recited is such as to call for determination by a jury whether the doctrine of estoppel is applicable here. Plaintiff contends, also, that Associated should be held accountable for violation of sec. 94.72 (14) (b), Stats., quoted above. While it is obvious that the complaint was not drawn with that statute in mind, nevertheless it appears to us that plaintiff has pleaded such violation. He alleges that Associated bought the livers from Armour and mixed them with other ingredients for sale to plaintiff and alleges that the mixture was unwholesome, contaminated, and diseased. We can construe his allegation that as the result of the feeding he lost mink an averment that the mixture was injurious to the health of livestock. The answer of Associated sets up sufficient denials of the plaintiff's allegations to create an issue as to whether there had been a violation of the statute and also contains other denials and allegations which make issues of fact. For instance, it denies on information and belief that plaintiff used the mixture and fed it to his mink, that the mink died as a result of such feeding, and denies the extent to which plaintiff was damaged. It specifically denies that the mixture was contaminated as alleged in the complaint. It should be observed that there is a difference between the position of Armour and that of Associatedas against Armour it is not pleaded that there was a mixture as there is in the allegations against Associated. There are issues of fact. Summary judgment may not be granted. Prime Mfg. Co. v. A. F. Gallum & Sons Corp. 229 Wis. 348, 281 N. W. 697. The court properly denied Associated's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff.