Opinion ID: 2336670
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: additional considerations affecting admissibility of the september 8 recording.

Text: Some questions have been raised as to the admissibility in general of sound recordings. In the early case of State v. Simon, 113 N.J.L. 521 ( Sup. Ct. 1934), affirmed 115 N.J.L. 207 ( E. & A. 1935), a phonograph record of a conversation with the State's principal witness, offered for purposes of impeachment, was rejected, one reason being that there can be no cross-examination of the record to determine if the whole conversation was recorded. The opinion was questioned seriously by the Appellate Division in Barnhart v. United Automobile, etc., Local 669, 12 N.J. Super. 147, 157 ( App. Div. 1951), and certification was denied by this court, 7 N.J. 136 (1951). At the present time the great weight of authority throughout the country sanctions the use of sound recordings where the matter contained therein is competent and relevant. See Annotation, 58 A.L.R. 2 d 1024 (1958). We adopt that view. As a condition to admissibility, however, the speakers should be identified and it should be shown that (1) the device was capable of taking the conversation or statement, (2) its operator was competent, (3) the recording is authentic and correct, (4) no changes, additions or deletions have been made, and (5) in instances of alleged confessions, that the statements were elicited voluntarily and without any inducement. Annotation, supra, at pp. 1027, 1032-36; as to confessions, see the many cases cited at pp. 1046-47. A wire recorder which catches the actual voice of an accused and of his questioner, may be an invaluable aid to a court and jury where the issue of voluntariness of a confession is raised. See Williams v. State, 93 Okl. Cr. 260, 226 P. 2 d 989 ( Crim. Ct. App. 1951). In fact, the recording may be more satisfactory and persuasive evidence than the written and signed document. In all situations, however, the trial judge should listen to the recording out of the presence of the jury before allowing it to be used. In this way he can decide whether it is sufficiently audible, intelligible, not obviously fragmented, and, also of considerable importance, whether it contains any improper and prejudicial matter which ought to be deleted. See Leeth v. State, 94 Okl. Cr. 61, 230 P. 2 d 942 ( Crim. Ct. App. 1951). In the matter now before us, therefore, the tape recording was not inadmissible per se, so long as its capacity to record accurately, and the other conditions precedent were established. But even if the involuntary character of the recording did not bar it, in our view it should have been excluded. It was garbled, full of static and other foreign sounds; it was unintelligible and inaudible for the most part, and a fair exercise of discretion required the entire tape to be withheld from the jury. In this connection, we note the comment of the trial judge as he listened to it: If you can't hear it, you can't hear it. Inaudible. He did not specify further. Basic fairness demanded its exclusion. Compare, People v. Stephens, 117 Cal. App. 2 d 653, 256 P. 2 d 1033 ( D. Ct. App. 1953). See also, Hammers v. State, 337 P. 2 d 1097, 1109 ( Okl. Cr. App. 1959).