Opinion ID: 2562233
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: S.A. 60-456(b)

Text: Colt also challenges Rosenberg's reliance on records regarding his criminal history based on K.S.A. 60-456(b) and our decision in State v. Gonzalez, 282 Kan. 73, 145 P.3d 18 (2006). Because an expert may base an opinion only on facts or data perceived by or personally known or made known to the witness at the hearing, K.S.A. 60-456(b), and because Colt's prior convictions were admitted into evidence solely because they undergirded Rosenberg's opinion, the statute was, in Colt's view, violated. The State responds that the parties stipulated to the foundation for the criminal history records and that K.S.A. 60-460(r) provides a hearsay exception for judgments of previous convictions. In this case, the records on Colt's criminal history were authenticated when the parties stipulated to their foundation. That does not end our inquiry under 60-456(b), however, as our Gonzalez decision explained regarding certain California records on which expert Carolyn Huddleston relied to form her psychological opinion for a competency hearing: K.S.A. 60-456(b) ... precludes an expert witness in Kansas from giving an opinion based on facts or data not `perceived by or personally known or made known' to the expert at trial or, as in this case, at a competency hearing. [Huddleston's] opinion regarding defendant's competency, insofar as it depended on the California records, was not based on `facts or data perceived by or personally made known' to [Huddleston] because her awareness of those facts or data was not attained through her own senses. Further, the phrase `at the hearing' refers to facts put in evidence. State v. Strauch, 239 Kan. 203, Syl. ¶ 4, 718 P.2d 613 (1986); Casey v. Phillips Pipeline Co., 199 Kan. 538, 546, 431 P.2d 518 (1967). In this case, defense counsel never offered the California records for admission under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, and those records were never admitted except as an appellate exhibit by the trial court. The letter from the custodian of the records was properly rejected by the trial court because neither the records nor the letter was properly authenticated. Because the California records were never admitted into evidence at the competency hearing, that portion of Dr. Huddleston's opinion which was based on the California records was not based on facts or data personally made known to the witness `at the hearing.' K.S.A. 60-456(b) differs from its federal counterpart, Rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.... As noted in 4 Vernon's Kansas C. Civ. Proc. § 60-456(b), Author's Comments (2005 Supp.): `The rationale of the Federal Rule is that judicial practice should be brought in line with the practice of experts themselves when not in court, who, in the case of physicians, may make life and death decisions on the basis of hearsay statements.' Under the federal rule, ... if it is the customary practice in the expert's specialty to consider reports from nontestifying third parties in formulating an opinion, the expert's testimony may be based on such reports. Under such circumstances, however, evidence of the report is not admitted as substantive proof of the report's truth but for the limited purpose of showing the basis of the expert's opinion. Consequently, upon request, the opposing party is entitled to a limiting instruction by the trial judge. See Imwinkelried, Evidentiary Foundations § 9.03(4)(c) (6th ed.2005). In contrast to the federal rule, Kansas has adopted the traditional approach to the question whether an expert may rely on reports from third parties, such as other experts, if the reports do not fall within any hearsay exception. Under the Kansas rule, experts' opinions based upon hearsay are not admissible in any court proceedings. See In re Care & Treatment of Foster, 280 Kan. 845, Syl. ¶ 9, 127 P.3d 277 (2006). Because the California records were not qualified and admitted under one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, the records themselves remained inadmissible hearsay upon which Dr. Huddleston could not base her opinion that defendant was incompetent to stand trial. State v. Gonzalez, 282 Kan. at 87-88, 145 P.3d 18. The State urges us to overcome any hearsay problem with the records Rosenberg relied upon by looking to K.S.A. 60-460(r), an exception allowing admission of final judgments adjudging a person guilty of a felony. We do not have the records themselves before us, but we need not follow the path the State suggests. Our review reveals that the parties not only stipulated to their foundation but also agreed that the records' admission was unnecessary, as concerns about their content could be appropriately addressed simply by asking [Rosenberg] to refer specifically to a specific record if he has testified about something that he claims is from the record. Admission of unreliable statements by out-of-court declarants to prove the truth of the matter asserted is exactly what the hearsay rule is designed to prevent; this agreement appears to have eliminated any useful purpose our enforcement of the rule might serve; waived any initial objection to the Rosenberg's reliance on and reference to the records; and, to the extent admission of his opinion was error, invited it. See State v. Murray, 285 Kan. 503, 522, 174 P.3d 407 (2008) (invited error no basis for relief on appeal).