Opinion ID: 2599508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: union discrimination

Text: FedEx contends that an adverse employment action does not constitute actionable union discrimination pursuant to RCW 49.32.020 unless the employer based such action upon the employee's participation in activities the statute specifically protects. FedEx's Pet. for Review at 13. Although FedEx concedes that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, prohibits an employer from discriminating in the terms or conditions of employment for the purpose of discouraging union membership, it contends that RCW 49.32.020 is not parallel to the NLRA and, thus, does not protect against discrimination based on union membership alone. Pulcino claims that this court should not consider FedEx's argument because this issue was not developed at the trial level. In the alternative, Pulcino claims that she engaged in statutorily protected activities by voting to retain the union in defiance of FedEx's threat that such action would subject the attendants to layoff. Pulcino's Answer to Pet. for Review at 18-19. Although an appellate court may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court, RAP 2.5(a), this rule `does not apply when the question raised affects the right to maintain the action.' Jones v. Stebbins, 122 Wash.2d 471, 479, 860 P.2d 1009 (1993) (quoting New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 102 Wash.2d 495, 498, 687 P.2d 212 (1984)). Furthermore, RAP 2.5(a) is permissive in nature and does not automatically preclude the introduction of an issue at the appellate level. Because FedEx's issue affects Pulcino's right to maintain her claim, we address the issue. In Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash.2d 827, 846, 400 P.2d 72 (1965), this court first recognized that RCW 49.32.020 [4] confers actionable substantive rights including the right to be free from coercion, interference and restraint from and by their employers in organizing or joining a labor union and in designating such union as their agent for collective bargaining. (Emphasis added.) Much more recently, this court concluded that interference, restraint, or coercion has a broader meaning than discharge and, thus, RCW 49.32.060 prohibits not only wrongful terminations but a wide range of other adverse employment actions as well. Bravo v. Dolsen Cos., 125 Wash.2d 745, 756, 888 P.2d 147 (1995). Consequently, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the trial court improperly limited Pulcino's union discrimination claim to a wrongful discharge theory. FedEx, however, urges a different basis to affirm the trial court's directed verdict. It claims that Pulcino's union membership alone was not sufficient to satisfy a statutory requirement that actionable discriminatory employment action be based upon the employee's participation in concerted activities. We disagree. Although the Bravo court did not decide this precise issue, it did interpret the language concerted activities to mean activities that employees undertake in concert togetherfor the purpose of improving their working conditions. 125 Wash.2d at 752, 888 P.2d 147. The Bravo court thus concluded that RCW 49.32.020 extends to nonunion employees stating: if employees' right to act in concert to improve their working conditions existed only after they formed a union, employees would enjoy no protection to enable unionization. That could not have been the legislative intent, given its recognition that the unorganized worker is at an enormous disadvantage in seeking to obtain acceptable terms of employment. 125 Wash.2d at 754, 888 P.2d 147 (citing RCW 49.32.020). We find that the act of joining, belonging to, or voting against decertification of a labor union constitutes an activity undertaken together for the purpose of improving working conditions, i.e., a concerted activity. Similar to the reasoning in Bravo, the Legislature could not have intended to prohibit interference, restraint, or coercion that is based upon an employee's active participation in labor organizing or union activity, while leaving union members unprotected after they attain their collective bargaining goals. Furthermore, our broad interpretation of the concerted activities requirement is consistent with federal case law. [5] Contrary to FedEx's suggestion, the language of the NLRA is very similar to the language here, [6] and this court considers persuasive the federal cases interpreting it. Bravo, 125 Wash.2d at 755, 888 P.2d 147.