Opinion ID: 2630631
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: admissibility of evidence seized following an illegal detention

Text: ¶ 47 While the Constitution prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures, it does not expressly preclude using evidence obtained in violation of its commands. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). When police illegally detain an individual, evidence obtained during a subsequent search may nevertheless be admitted if the person gave valid consent to the search. State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993) (citing State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990)). Hence, even though we have concluded Hansen was illegally seized, evidence obtained during the subsequent search of Hansen and his vehicle may be admitted if Hansen gave valid consent to the search. A consent is valid only if (1) [t]he consent was given voluntarily, and (2) the consent was not obtained by police exploitation of the prior illegality. Id. We turn now to the first prong of the test.

¶ 48 Before a court addresses whether consent was voluntary, it must first determine that there was consent. Consent is a factual finding that should be made based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Durand, 569 P.2d 1107, 1108-09 (Utah 1977). Since a district court is in a unique position to assess the credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271 (citing State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah Ct.App.1991)), the court of appeals may not substitute its judgment as to a factual question unless the district court's finding is clearly erroneous. Id. Here, the district court entered a finding of fact that Hansen had consented to the search, which the court of appeals held was clearly erroneous. See State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, ¶¶ 21, 25, 17 P.3d 1135. We therefore review whether the court of appeals properly substituted its judgment for that of the district court. ¶ 49 Officer Huntington asked Hansen if he had any alcohol, drugs, or weapons in the vehicle. Hansen responded, No. Officer Huntington then asked, Do you mind if I check? Hansen responded, Yes. Officer Huntington clarified during the suppression hearing that Hansen's response meant Yes, I could have consent to search. Hansen did not take the stand to challenge this statement. [4] ¶ 50 Hansen's response of, Yes, was ambiguous. But, the only evidence before the court regarding its meaning was Officer Huntington's statement. The fact that Hansen chose not to challenge the officer's statement has some significance in this instance. Based on these facts, we cannot conclude the district court's finding was clearly erroneous, and therefore, we reverse the court of appeals' decision on this issue. We emphasize, however, that the evidence in support of this conclusion, while adequate, was far from ideal. We now address whether Hansen's consent was voluntary.
¶ 51 While consent is a factual finding, voluntariness is a legal conclusion, which is reviewed for correctness. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271. When the State attempts to prove that there was voluntary consent after an illegal detention, it `has a much heavier burden to satisfy than when' consent is given after a permissible detention. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687-88 (quoting United States v. Melendez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir.1984)). ¶ 52 Although the burden of proving voluntary consent is heavier after an illegal detention, the standard used by the court of appeals to determine voluntariness imposed too heavy a burden on the State. To prove voluntariness, the court of appeals required the State to show by clear, positive, and unequivocal testimony that Hansen's consent was freely and intelligently given. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353 at ¶ 13, 17 P.3d 1135. Additionally, it indulged every reasonable presumption against waiver of Hansen's constitutional rights. Id. at ¶ 25. This standard is incorrect. Since there has been some confusion concerning the appropriate standard for determining voluntariness, we now clarify the appropriate standard. [5]
¶ 53 In its analysis, the court of appeals employed the following three-prong test for determining whether a person voluntarily consented to a search: (1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was unequivocal and specific and freely and intelligently given; (2) the government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived. Id. at ¶ 18 (alteration in the original) (quoting State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah Ct. App.1996) (citations omitted)). ¶ 54 The first prong of the Ham test provides that consent must be intelligently given. Id. at ¶ 22 (citing Ham, 910 P.2d at 439). To the extent this implies a person must have knowledge of the right to refuse consent, the test is incorrect. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 249, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), the United States Supreme Court held that a person's knowledge of [the] right to refuse [consent] is a factor to be taken into account, [but] the prosecution is not required to demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to establishing a voluntary consent. See generally Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39-40, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (rejecting requirement that police officers must inform detainees that they are free to go before a consent to search may be deemed voluntary). We follow this pronouncement. ¶ 55 The third prong of the Ham test, employing a presumption against waiver, is also incorrect. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has stated as follows: it cannot be said every reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment of the right to refuse consent. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 243, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Later, the Tenth Circuit reiterated that application of the presumption against waiver [is] improper. United States v. Price, 925 F.2d 1268, 1271 (10th Cir.1991). Hence, the court of appeals erred in indulging every reasonable presumption against waiver.
¶ 56 The appropriate standard to determine voluntariness is the totality of the circumstances test, and the burden of proof is by preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974). Under the totality of the circumstances test, a court should carefully scrutinize both the details of the detention, and the characteristics of the defendant. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226, 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041. ¶ 57 The totality of the circumstances must show consent was given without duress or coercion. Id. at 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041; United States v. Zubia-Melendez, 263 F.3d 1155, 1162 (10th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. McRae, 81 F.3d 1528, 1537 (10th Cir.1996)). In other words, a person's will cannot be overborne, nor may his capacity for self-determination [be] critically impaired. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041 (citation omitted); United States v. Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d 1046, 1053 n. 4 (10th Cir.1994). With respect to a defendant, evidence of minimal schooling, low intelligence, and the lack of any effective warnings [about] his rights should be considered. Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 248, 93 S.Ct. 2041. Further, we have stated that [f]actors which may show a lack of duress or coercion include: 1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the owner of the vehicle; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer. State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980).
¶ 58 Applying the law to the facts of this case, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Hansen's consent was involuntary. The following facts of this case tend to show that Hansen consented voluntarily to the search. Officer Huntington did not claim any authority to search the vehicle. Rather, he asked a permissive questionDo you mind if I search? No threat accompanied the request. Nor did the officer employ deception to garner consent, such as trying to deceive Hansen into thinking he could get a search warrant. Officer Huntington's tone of voice was even, rather than demanding. The length of the detention, while illegal, was brief, and the questioning was neither repeated nor prolonged. Finally, Hansen cooperated in the search. ¶ 59 On the other hand, the timing of Officer Huntington's request, as well as the timing of the second officer's arrival, may have implied Hansen could not refuse consent. Additionally, Hansen was never told he could refuse to consent. [6] ¶ 60 Weighing each of these factors under the totality of the circumstances test, it does not appear that Hansen's will was overborne, or that his capacity for self-determination was critically impaired. Thus, we conclude Hansen's consent was voluntary and reverse the court of appeals on this issue. We now turn to the second prong of the test used to determine whether a consent was valid.
¶ 61 The second prong of the test for determining valid consent involves an exploitation analysis. Whether a person's consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is ultimately a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1271-72. Because the court of appeals concluded Hansen's consent was involuntary, it did not address the second prong of the test. Likewise, the district court did not address this prong because it concluded Hansen's detainment was lawful and that Hansen had voluntarily consented to the search. Although the district court did not make specific findings of fact regarding the issue of exploitation, remand is not necessary because the record is sufficient for us to conclude consent was obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality, the unlawful detention.
¶ 62 Evidence obtained by police exploitation of a prior illegality is tainted by the violation of a person's constitutional rights. See State ex rel. A.R. v. C.R., 1999 UT 43, ¶ 15, 982 P.2d 73 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). When conducting an exploitation analysis, a court evaluates the relationship between official misconduct and subsequently discovered evidence to determine if excluding the evidence will effectively deter future illegalities. State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 292 (Utah 1995). Thus, the purpose behind excluding evidence obtained by police exploitation is `to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available wayby removing the incentive to disregard it.' Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 599-600, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960)). ¶ 63 When conducting the exploitation analysis, we always keep in mind this deterrence purpose. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263 (citing Brown, 422 U.S. at 612, 95 S.Ct. 2254 (Powell, J., concurring)). Moreover, we recognize the need for deterrence is strongest where criminal sanctions against the defendant may result. State ex rel. A.R., 1999 UT 43 at ¶ 16, 982 P.2d 73 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974)). With these principles in mind, we now turn to the facts of this case.
¶ 64 An exploitation analysis requires looking at the facts of each case. The United States Supreme Court has noted three factors that have particular relevance in reviewing the facts: (1) the purpose and flagrancy of the illegal conduct, (2) the presence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and consent. Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S.Ct. 2254. ¶ 65 The `purpose and flagrancy' factor directly relates to the deterrent value of suppression. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1263. Where the purpose of the illegal conduct is to obtain consent, suppressing evidence derived from the illegal conduct clearly will have a deterrent effect. Id. at 1264. ¶ 66 Here, Officer Huntington testified, It's my practice to ask them for consent by stating, Do you have any alcohol, weapons or drugs in the vehicle? And if they say no, I say, Well, do you mind if I check. Officer Huntington employed this practice with Hansen, even though he had no reasonable suspicion of a further illegality. Seeking consent under such circumstances shows the purpose of the illegal detention was to exploit the opportunity to ask for consent. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 294. It also shows there was a direct connection between Officer Huntington's misconduct and Hansen's consent. ¶ 67 The incentive present in this case to violate constitutional guarantees . . . is precisely the type of incentive that must be removed .... Id. Since there was a direct connection between the purpose of the misconduct and Hansen's consent, suppressing the evidence derived from this misconduct should have a deterrent effect. ¶ 68 Next, we consider whether there were any intervening factors between Officer Huntington's misconduct and Hansen's consent that may have mitigated the illegality. Intervening circumstances may include such events as an officer telling a person he or she has the right to refuse consent or to consult with an attorney. United States v. McKines, 933 F.2d 1412, 1430 (8th Cir.1991) (citing United States v. Berry, 670 F.2d 583, 605 (5th Cir.1982)). In this case, the record reveals no intervening circumstances, no clean break in the chain of events between the misconduct and the... consent. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1274. Thus, the illegality of Officer Huntington's conduct was not mitigated. ¶ 69 Finally, we address the temporal proximity between the illegal detention and consent. A brief time lapse between a Fourth Amendment violation and consent often indicates exploitation because the effects of the misconduct have not had time to dissipate. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d at 293 (citing Melendez-Garcia, 28 F.3d at 1055). Here, the lapse of time was negligible. The illegal detention began when Officer Huntington asked Hansen if he had any contraband in his vehicle. Directly after Hansen answered, No, Officer Huntington requested and received permission to search Hansen's vehicle. Thus, no appreciable time passed between the illegal detention and the consent that would have allowed the taint of the misconduct to dissipate. ¶ 70 Based on the purpose behind Officer Huntington's misconduct, the lack of intervening circumstances, and the temporal proximity between the illegal conduct and Hansen's consent, we conclude that Hansen's consent resulted from exploitation of the prior police illegality. We also conclude that the deterrent effect of suppressing evidence obtained from this type of search and seizure justifies its cost. We therefore affirm the court of appeals' decision that the district court erred in denying Hansen's motion to suppress.