Opinion ID: 2788233
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Approving a Verdict as Thirteenth Juror

Text: Tennessee Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(d) provides that a “trial court may grant a new trial following a verdict of guilty if it disagrees with the jury about the weight of the evidence.” This procedural rule has been described as “the modern equivalent to the ‘thirteenth juror rule,’ whereby the trial court must weigh the evidence and grant a new trial if the evidence preponderates against the weight of the verdict.” State v. Blanton, 926 S.W.2d 953, 958 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1996). The rationale behind the thirteenth juror rule is that “[i]mmediately after the trial, the trial court judge is in the same position as the jury to evaluate the credibility of witnesses and assess the weight of the evidence, based upon the live trial proceedings.” State v. Moats, 906 S.W.2d 431, 434 (Tenn. 1995). Although trial judges have a “mandatory duty to serve as the thirteenth juror in every criminal case,” a judge is not required to provide a specific statement on the record to indicate his or her approval of the jury’s verdict. State v. Carter, 896 S.W.2d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1995). In rare cases, a successor judge may be appointed after a verdict of guilt has been rendered by a jury but before the original trial judge has had an opportunity to issue a ruling -22- as the thirteenth juror.3 When this occurs, the successor judge, unlike the original trial judge, is not in the same position as the jury and did not have the advantage of evaluating the credibility of witnesses and assessing the weight of the evidence based upon live trial proceedings. See State v. Brown, 53 S.W.3d 264, 275 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000) (“[I]t is difficult to see how a trial judge who has not heard the evidence and who has not seen the witnesses can act as the thirteenth juror when weight and credibility are issues.”). In these circumstances, our Court of Criminal Appeals has held that the successor judge’s consideration of whether he or she is able to perform the duties of the original trial judge “must include an assessment of his or her ability to act as a thirteenth juror, including witness credibility.” State v. Nail, 963 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997). This assessment requires the successor judge “to determine the extent to which witness credibility was a factor in the case and the extent to which he [or she] ha[s] sufficient knowledge or records . . . in order to decide whether the credible evidence . . . adequately supported the verdict.” Id. at 766. More recently, in State v. Ellis, this Court elaborated upon the standards for evaluating witness credibility. No. E2011-02017-SC-R11-CD, 2015 WL 154209 (Tenn. Jan. 13, 2015). Recognizing that “the cold record of a trial generally will reflect all but one of the components that comprise” witness credibility, id. at , we adopted a rebuttable presumption in favor of the successor judge ruling as thirteenth juror and held that “[o]nly if the record indicates that weighing the evidence would require an assessment of witness demeanor should the successor judge decline to act as the thirteenth juror,” id. at . In this instance, the Defendant contends that Judge Blackwood abused his discretion by determining that he could act as the thirteenth juror. The Defendant points out that Judge Blackwood, as the successor judge, did not hear the evidence or see the witnesses, and, therefore, could not make the necessary credibility determinations before deciding whether the original jury verdicts were supported by the evidence. Notably, the Defendant has not argued that Judge Wallace, as the original trial judge, failed to rule as thirteenth juror or otherwise erred in this regard. In our view, it was unnecessary for Judge Blackwood to act as the thirteenth juror at the time of the delayed appeal because that function had previously been performed by Judge Wallace immediately following the original trial. While Judge Wallace may not have specifically stated that he acted as the thirteenth juror, he was not required to do so. Moreover, it is clear from the record that Judge Wallace approved the verdicts rendered by the jury. Indeed, after Judge Blackwood stated that he was performing the court’s duties as thirteenth juror, he observed “that Judge Wallace also previously ruled as thirteenth juror in 3 Because the thirteenth juror rule contemplates that the trial judge will evaluate the evidence immediately after the jury has rendered its verdict, trial judges should act expeditiously in ruling as the thirteenth juror and should not delay this ruling until the hearing on a motion for new trial. -23- these cases.” In addition to his denial of the original motion for new trial, Judge Wallace approved the verdicts and sentences in the Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 12 report that was filed following the trial in this matter. Because the function of the thirteenth juror was performed by Judge Wallace after the trial, Judge Blackwood was not required to assess the evidence as thirteenth juror in this delayed appeal. Indeed, when this Court entered its October 30, 2009 “Corrected Order” granting the delayed appeal, we directed the Defendant to file a motion for new trial with the assistance of newly appointed appellate counsel; we did not give any indication that the trial court would also need to make a new thirteenth juror determination. In consequence, we will not disturb the thirteenth juror ruling made by Judge Wallace immediately following the trial, and, therefore, we need not determine whether Judge Blackwood was in a proper position to reconsider the thirteenth juror ruling in this delayed appeal.4