Opinion ID: 185665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: APA Issues

Text: 9 The FAA issued the Whitlow Letter without formal notice and comment procedures. In so doing, ATA claims, the FAA violated the APA because the Whitlow Letter (1) is a substantive, not an interpretative, rule and (2) materially changes the FAA's earlier interpretations of the required rest regulation. We disagree. The interpretation contained in the Whitlow Letter is fairly encompassed within the regulation it purports to construe and, therefore, under our circuit precedent is an interpretative rule exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking. Moreover, none of the FAA's earlier interpretations of FAR 121.471 addresses precisely the issues addressed in the Whitlow Letter. Accordingly, the Whitlow Letter does not mark a departure from the past.
10 The APA requires federal agencies to publish [g]eneral notice of proposed rulemaking in the Federal Register, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), and give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule making through submission of written data, views, or arguments, 5 U.S.C. 553(c). Section 553, however, exempts interpretative rules and general statements of policy from notice and comment procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A). Nonetheless, it is well established that an agency may not label a substantive change to a rule an interpretation simply to avoid the notice and comment requirements. See Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1024 (D.C.Cir.2000). 11 The distinction between a substantive rule and an interpretive rule can be less than clear-cut. See Syncor Int'l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 93-94 (D.C.Cir.1997) (listing cases); General Motors Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 742 F.2d 1561, 1565 (D.C.Cir.1984) (en banc) (describing distinction as enshrouded in considerable smog) (citation omitted). One factor we consider in distinguishing between the two is whether the interpretation itself carries the force and effect of law, ... or rather whether it spells out a duty fairly encompassed within the regulation that the interpretation purports to construe. Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 588 (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). The Whitlow Letter's interpretation of FAR 121.471, we believe, is fairly encompassed within the required rest regulation and is, therefore, exempt from notice-and-comment rulemaking. The FAA reasonably interpreted the required rest regulation itself to require a carrier to recalculate past rest periods in light of actual flight times, including those scheduled flight times required to be rescheduled by existing flight conditions. We cannot say that in the absence of the [Whitlow Letter] there would not be an adequate legislative basis to ... ensure the performance of duties. American Mining Congress v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C.Cir.1993). The provisions of FAR 121.471 incorporate both the statutory requirement that the FAA establish flight time limitations and required rest regulations in the interest of safety and the phrase scheduled completion of any flight segment, which is reasonably understood to include a completion re-scheduled because of actual flight conditions. FAR 121.471 itself, then, provides the FAA with sufficient authority to impose the recalculation duty. The Whitlow Letter does not impose new rights or duties, Orengo Caraballo v. Reich, 11 F.3d 186, 195 (D.C.Cir.1993), and therefore does not require notice-and-comment rulemaking. 9
12 Even if the Whitlow Letter is an interpretative rule, ATA further contends, notice-and-comment rulemaking is nonetheless required because the Letter is inconsistent with earlier FAA interpretations of FAR 121.471. Rulemaking, as defined in the APA, includes not only the agency's formulation, but also its modification, of a rule. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(5) (rule making includes agency process for formulating, amending, or repealing a rule); see also Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586 (Under the APA, agencies are obligated to engage in notice and comment before formulating regulations, which applies as well to `repeals' or `amendments.'  (emphasis in original)). As the United States Supreme Court has noted, APA rulemaking is required if an interpretation adopt[s] a new position inconsistent with... existing regulations. Shalala v. Guernsey Mem'l Hosp., 514 U.S. 87, 100, 115 S.Ct. 1232, 131 L.Ed.2d 106 (1995). In Alaska Prof'l Hunters Ass'n v. FAA, 177 F.3d 1030 (D.C.Cir.1999), we held that [w]hen an agency has given its regulation a definitive interpretation, and later significantly revises that interpretation, the agency has in effect amended its rule, which requires notice and comment. Id. at 1034 (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Paralyzed Veterans, 117 F.3d at 586 (agency violates APA if it makes a fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation without notice and comment). In Alaska Hunters, Alaskan guides who transport their customers to hunting and fishing sites by airplane challenged the FAA's requirement (imposed via a Notice to Operators) that they comply with FAA regulations applicable to commercial pilots. Id. at 1033. The Notice, promulgated without notice and comment, reversed the FAA's thirty-year interpretation that had exempted the guides. Id. The longstanding advice, we held, had become an authoritative departmental interpretation, an administrative common law applicable to Alaskan guide pilots; hence, the Notice changing that interpretation had to comply with notice-and-comment rulemaking. Id. at 1035. 13 ATA claims the Whitlow Letter changed fifteen years of [i]nterpretations because recalculation of past rest periods [h]as never [been] required, even though the opportunity to impose such a mandate was presented. Reply Br. at 17. Of the prior interpretations ATA relies on, only one merits discussion. Interpretation 1992-24, like the Whitlow Letter, represents the FAA's response to a request for an interpretation of FAR 121.471. The request asked if a flight delay not caused by the air carrier meant that looking back 24 hours from the actual completion time of the last flight, you will not be able to find the applicable rest period required under FAR 121.471(b) and (c). Interpretation 1992-24 at I-235 (JA 252). Pointing to the prospective language in FAR 121.471, 10 the FAA declared that deviations encountered in the operation of an otherwise legitimately scheduled flight are permitted so long as the schedule otherwise met the flight time limitations and rest requirements. Id. Interpretation 1992-24 did not, according to ATA, require recalculation of past rest based on actual expected arrival time, [nor] ... mandate that a normal, completed paragraph-(b) rest be turned, after the fact, into a paragraph-(c) reduced rest. Reply Br. at 22. The FAA insists that Interpretation 1992-24 speaks only to a short delay that would still allow a carrier to give crewmembers compensatory rest immediately following the extended flight, relying on the following caveat contained in Interpretation 1992-24: It is important to note[,] however, that the delay cannot infringe on the next required rest period. In the FAA's view, then, Interpretation 1992-24 addresses only an alteration in the scheduled flight time short enough to nonetheless provide for compensatory rest following the reduced rest in accordance with subsection (c). In contrast, the Whitlow Letter addresses a delay that makes compliance with either subsection (b) or (c) impossible in light of actual flight conditions. Although Interpretation 1992-24 was not expressly limited to short delays, it nevertheless does not provide a definitive interpretation inconsistent with that of the Whitlow Letter. The FAA did not define the phrase operation of an otherwise legitimately scheduled flight in Interpretation 1992-24; if operation refers only to the in-flight segment of a flight schedule, Interpretation 1992-24 is simply a restatement of the FAA's longstanding enforcement policy not to charge a rest violation for a delay that occurs after take-off. See also Interpretation 1998-7 at I-207. Because Interpretation 1992-24 can reasonably be interpreted in this way, 11 we do not believe the Whitlow Letter significantly revises a previous definitive interpretation of FAR 121.471. See Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1034. 14 Other prior interpretations of FAR 121.471 buttress our conclusion that the Whitlow Letter, in clarifying a carrier's duty to recalculate previously computed rest periods based on actual flight schedules, addresses only a theretofore unresolved aspect of the rest requirement. In a letter dated July 22, 1994 the FAA construed FAR 121.471 to require that a rest period must occur `... during the 24 hours preceding the scheduled completion of any flight segment' rather than following the flight segment. See Interpretation dated July 22, 1994 (emphasis in original) (quoting FAR 121.471(b)). While ATA is correct that the July 22, 1994 letter does not specifically require recalculation of a rest period caused by an unforeseen delay, it does nonetheless indicate that the FAA, in 1994, required a carrier to provide a compensatory rest period of ten hours at the end of day one despite the fact that the crewmembers had received an extended rest period (more than 24 hours) preceding the scheduled completion of flight segment. More significantly, in Interpretation 1998-7, the FAA declared that both the carrier and its crewmembers would violate FAR 121.471 if they knew prior to departure that due to a ground hold for weather the scheduled arrival time of the last flight segment would force the crew to begin its compensatory rest period later than 24 hours after the commencement of the reduced rest period. Interpretation 1998-7. The FAA's conclusion was based on the actual expected arrival time calculated prior to departure and is therefore consistent with its approach in the Whitlow Letter. 15 No prior FAA interpretation of FAR 121.471 approaches the definitive interpretation that mandated notice-and-comment rulemaking in Alaska Hunters. No prior interpretation reflects an administrative common law that FAR 121.471 prohibits recalculation of past rest periods based on actual expected flight time. Alaska Hunters, 177 F.3d at 1035; see also Hudson v. FAA, 192 F.3d 1031, 1036 (D.C.Cir.1999) (FAA interpretation did not require notice and comment because it was simply application of the regulation to a changed situation which calls for a different policy). Accordingly, the Whitlow Letter does not alter a definitive prior FAA interpretation of FAR 121.471. 16 For the foregoing reasons, the consolidated petitions for review are denied. 17 So ordered.