Opinion ID: 2680570
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: analysis

Text: Sergeant Lynch contends that the ALJ found that she unintentionally left her firearm in the bathroom because she was distracted, and consequently, the ALJ erred by using an unintentional act as the basis for finding gross misconduct. She maintains that gross misconduct (as well as simple misconduct) requires employee actions that are ―intentional, deliberate, and willful.‖ She further argues that a ―failure to notice‖ that she left her firearm in the bathroom does not constitute ―conscious disregard‖ or a ―conscious choice of a course of action.‖ Sergeant Lynch also contends that the ALJ erred by ―treat[ing] Sergeant Lynch‘s decision to go to work while knowing she was distracted as if it were disqualifying conduct,‖ even though that was not Masters Security‘s stated reason for terminating her employment. Masters Security urges us to affirm the ALJ‘s determination, and asserts that the ALJ ―made a finding of fact (which Sergeant Lynch unquestionably admits) that Ms. Lynch intentionally came to work distracted,‖ and that ―it would defy logic for her to argue that she ‗unintentionally‘ reported to work.‖ Masters Security further argues that Sergeant Lynch‘s ―conduct violated [its] security interests in building security (and threatened the public at large),‖ and that 11 although the ALJ ―found that the employer did not prove a violation of company rules,‖ nevertheless, as this court declared in another case, ―gross misconduct may still be found when rules exist and the employee‘s conduct ‗disregards standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect of an employee.‘‖ Masters Security insists that ―[Sergeant] Lynch intentionally came to work in such a clouded mental state that she abandoned her loaded firearm in a publicly accessible bathroom for 15 minutes,‖ that the ―ALJ‘s findings are not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, and they are supported by substantial evidence on the record.‖3 Sergeant Lynch responds, in her reply brief, by reiterating the basic arguments in her main brief. However, she emphasizes her contention regarding 3 Masters Security also argues that Sergeant Lynch violated the company‘s rules regarding firearms. However, the ALJ specifically noted in the Final Order that Masters Security ―presented no credible evidence of any policy that would have required [Sergeant Lynch] to place her gun elsewhere than the stall shelf while she used the toilet.‖ Masters Security points to a number of documents that articulate policies for the safekeeping of firearms. However, none of these documents were admitted at the hearing and we may not consider them in support of Masters Security‘s contention here. See Mack v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 651 A.2d 804, 806 (D.C. 1994) (―[I]n reviewing the final decision of an agency, we are limited to the record on appeal and cannot consider issues or evidence not presented to the agency.‖). The burden was upon Masters Security to prove a rule violation at the hearing, 7 DCMR §§ 312.7, 312.8 (1994), and the company has presented nothing on appeal to challenge the ALJ‘s determination that it failed to meet that burden. 12 the ALJ‘s reliance on a reason for her termination that was not stated by Masters Security; she asserts, ―it is settled law that the denial of unemployment compensation cannot be based on conduct that was not the actual basis of the employee‘s termination.‖ ―Our review of OAH decisions is limited, and we must affirm unless the decisions of the OAH are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.‖ Savage-Bey v. La Petite Acad., 50 A.3d 1055, 1060 (D.C. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In addition, as we have said previously: we review OAH decisions solely to determine whether (1) [the ALJ] made findings of fact on each materially contested issue of fact, (2) substantial evidence supports each finding, and (3) [the ALJ‘s] conclusions flow rationally from its findings of fact. . . . We defer to the ALJ‘s factual findings as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. . . . Substantial evidence is relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. . . . However, we review the ALJ‘s legal conclusions of whether a terminated employee‘s actions constitute gross or simple misconduct de novo. Badawi v. Hawk One Sec., Inc., 21 A.3d 607, 613 (D.C. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 13 Our analysis of the issues presented in this case is guided by the following legal principles, statutory and regulatory provisions. An employee is disqualified from immediate unemployment benefits if that person is discharged for either gross misconduct or ―other than gross misconduct.‖ D.C. Code § 51-110 (b) (2012 Repl.).4 ―An employer seeking to prevent the payment of unemployment compensation bears the burden of proving that the employee engaged in misconduct (gross or otherwise).‖ Gilmore v. Atlantic Servs. Grp., 17 A.3d 558, 563 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Morris v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 975 A.2d 176, 181-82 (D.C. 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted). ―Gross misconduct‖ is defined in the District‘s Municipal Regulations as any ―act which deliberately or willfully violates the employer‘s rules, deliberately or willfully threatens or violates the employer‘s interests, shows repeated disregard for the employee‘s obligation to the employer, or disregards standards of behavior which an employer has a right to expect of its employee.‖ 7 DCMR § 312.3. ―Other than gross misconduct‖ is defined as any ―act or omission by an employee 4 The two-tiered nature of this statutory regime provides a more severe restriction on the benefits of employees discharged for gross misconduct than for employees discharged for simple misconduct. Compare D.C. Code § 51-110 (b)(1) (gross misconduct precludes eligibility for benefits until the employee ―has been employed in each of 10 successive weeks‖), with § 51-110 (b)(2) (simple misconduct precludes eligibility for benefits ―for the first 8 weeks‖ in which they are otherwise payable). 14 which constitutes a breach of the employee‘s duties or obligations to the employer, a breach of the employment agreement or contract, or which adversely affects a material employer interest.‖ 7 DCMR § 312.5. This type of ―simple misconduct‖—as we have often referred to it—includes ―acts where the severity, degree, or other mitigating circumstances do not support a finding of gross misconduct.‖ Id. ―[I]mplicit in [the] definition of ‗misconduct‘ is that the employee intentionally disregarded the employer‘s expectations for performance.‖ BowmanCook v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 16 A.3d 130, 135 (D.C. 2011) (quoting Washington Times v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 724 A.2d 1212, 1217-18 (D.C. 1999)). We have ―clarified that ‗intentionality or its equivalent . . . is an element‘ of simple misconduct‖ as well as gross misconduct. Scott v. Behavioral Research Assocs., 43 A.3d 925, 931 (D.C. 2012) (quoting Hamilton v. Hojeij Branded Food, Inc., 41 A.3d 464, 476 (D.C. 2012)). Thus, ―[w]ithout more, proof of ordinary negligence cannot establish gross misconduct within the meaning of [the District‘s] unemployment compensation statute, because decisions of this court make it abundantly clear that an employee‘s actions must be intentional, deliberate, or willful to amount to gross misconduct.‖ Capitol Entm’t Servs. v. McCormick, 25 A.3d 19, 23-24 (D.C. 2011). Furthermore, ―[r]ead 15 literally, the definition of [other than gross misconduct] . . . encompass[es] acts and omissions that result from ordinary negligence,‖ but ―the definition of simple misconduct cannot be read so broadly, and . . . ordinary negligence without more cannot constitute simple misconduct disqualifying a dismissed employee from receiving unemployment compensation benefits.‖ Id. at 24-25. To establish that ―more‖ is involved than ordinary negligence, and hence, that misconduct has been established, we have required ―negligence in such degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or [the] show[ing] [of] an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer‘s interest or of the employee‘s duties and obligations to the employer.‖ Id. at 28 (quoting Hickenbottom v. District of Columbia Unemployment Comp. Bd., 273 A.2d 475, 477-78 (D.C. 1971)). This type of negligence, referred to as ―gross negligence or reckless disregard of the consequences, . . . is typified by highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.‖ Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This court also has declared that ―[t]he term gross negligence requires such an extreme deviation from the ordinary standard of care as to support a finding of wanton, willful and reckless disregard or conscious indifference for the 16 rights and safety of others.‖ Id. n.36 (quoting District of Columbia v. Walker, 689 A.2d 40, 44-45 (D.C. 1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Not only does the employer bear the burden of proving that the employee is disqualified from eligibility for benefits due to gross or simple misconduct, but an ALJ‘s denial of benefits ―must be based fundamentally on reasons specified by the employer for the discharge.‖ Smithsonian Inst. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Emp’t Servs., 514 A.2d 1191, 1194 (D.C. 1986); see also Brown v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 942 A.2d 1122, 1124 (D.C. 2008). An ALJ cannot ―reject the employer‘s rationale and yet deny benefits on another misconduct theory independent of the employer‘s own determination.‖ Jones v. District of Columbia Unemployment Comp. Bd., 395 A.2d 392, 395 (D.C. 1978); see also American Univ. v. District of Columbia Dep’t of Labor, 429 A.2d 1374, 1375 (D.C. 1981) (―[T]he employer‘s reason for discharging the employee must be scrupulously examined in all levels of the appeal process.‖); Green v. District of Columbia Unemployment Comp. Bd., 346 A.2d 252, 257 (D.C. 1975) (―The existence of grounds upon which the employee might have been discharged is immaterial if they were not in fact the grounds of discharge.‖). Therefore, ―we must overturn a denial of benefits erroneously based on conduct substantially different from that 17 which is specified as the reason for initial discharge.‖ American Univ., supra, 429
The record here is clear that Masters Security terminated Sergeant Lynch because she left her loaded firearm in the restroom. Captain Nelson testified that she ―left a weapon in the bathroom stall, which is [a] termination offense, according to the employee handbook of Masters Security.‖ But he also testified that Major Battle informed him that the reason Sergeant Lynch‘s employment was terminated was because she left her loaded weapon in the bathroom.5 The ALJ concluded that Masters Security had not proven a violation of its rules. Instead of continuing her final order by addressing whether Sergeant Lynch‘s act of leaving her loaded gun in the bathroom, standing alone, nevertheless constituted gross negligence, the ALJ fashioned her own theory of termination, the ―distraction theory.‖ That theory was based on Captain Nelson‘s answer to the ALJ‘s question about whether Captain Nelson had spoken to Sergeant Lynch ―to find out why she had left the gun in the bathroom.‖ In 5 There was no testimony at the hearing that Masters Security‘s reason for releasing Sergeant Lynch from employment was because she chose to come into work while in a distracted state of mind. 18 response, Captain Nelson asserted that he believed Sergeant Lynch ―has a sick person in her family, and her mental state wasn‘t right at the time.‖ Upon hearing Captain Nelson‘s response, the ALJ said, ―So, she was distracted?‖ Captain Nelson replied, ―Yes, Ma‘am.‖ From this exchange, the ALJ declared that Sergeant Lynch ―knew that she was distracted, but [she] went to work anyway,‖ and ―although she knew she was distracted by worry about her mother, [she] failed for 15 minutes to notice that she did not have possession of her gun.‖ Thus, concluded the ALJ, Sergeant Lynch‘s ―actions were reckless, and constitute misconduct,‖ and further, ―those who are armed security personnel must also monitor themselves to ensure that they are not too impaired, either by drowsiness, distraction, or medication, to safeguard their weapons.‖ The ALJ‘s final order and order denying reconsideration reflect a finding of gross misconduct, not because of the employer‘s stated reason for termination (given by Major Battle after his consultation with Vice President Nichols) – that Sergeant Lynch left her loaded weapon in the bathroom – but because Sergeant Lynch went to work knowing ―she was distracted by worry about her mother,‖ and consequently, she failed ―to notice that she did not have possession of her gun,‖ and that she had left her ―loaded weapon in a[] publicly-accessible place.‖ Masters Security appears to concede that this was the basis of the ALJ‘s finding of gross 19 misconduct; in its brief the company states that Sergeant Lynch‘s ―abandonment of the loaded firearm was the direct result of her gross misconduct in reporting to work in a distracted state, not the act the ALJ relied on to find gross misconduct.‖ In specifying one of the reasons why Sergeant Lynch‘s conduct constituted gross misconduct, Masters Security again maintained that ―she deliberately and willfully reported to work distracted, causing her to abandon her loaded firearm in a publicly accessible bathroom.‖ But, deliberately and willfully reporting to work in a distracted state was not Masters Security‘s articulated reason for terminating Sergeant Lynch, and this court‘s case law makes clear that an ALJ‘s denial of unemployment compensation benefits ―must be based fundamentally on reasons specified by the employer for the discharge.‖ Smithsonian Inst., supra, 514 A.2d at 1194. Here, the ALJ‘s finding of gross misconduct is grounded, impermissibly, ―on another misconduct theory independent of [Masters Security‘s] own determination.‖ Jones, supra, 395 A.2d at 395. Consequently, because it is ―not in accordance with the law,‖ Savage-Bey, supra, 50 A.3d at 1060, we are constrained to reverse OAH‘s decision. However, we remand this case to OAH, with instructions that the ALJ consider whether the existing record reveals that Masters Security proved by a preponderance of the evidence that Sergeant Lynch‘s act of leaving her weapon in 20 a publicly accessible place – standing alone and regardless if doing so violated her employer‘s stated rule – is the kind of gross negligence that we have equated with intentionality due to the serious harm that could ensue, that is, whether the stated act constitutes ―highly unreasonable conduct, involving an extreme departure from ordinary care, in a situation where a high degree of danger is apparent.‖6 Capitol Entm’t Servs., supra, 25 A.3d at 28; see also Bowman-Cook, supra, 16 A.3d at 135. So ordered. FISHER, Associate Judge, concurring: I join Judge Reid‘s opinion, agreeing that we cannot uphold the ALJ‘s finding of gross misconduct because it is based on different reasons than those given by the employer for its decision to terminate Sergeant Lynch. Moreover, Masters Security failed to prove that Sergeant Lynch had violated its rules about the safeguarding of weapons. This is regrettable because Sergeant Lynch created a very dangerous situation by leaving her loaded weapon behind in a restroom accessible to the public. Where there is such a high 6 The remand findings and conclusions should be based on the existing record because, as we said in Smithsonian Inst., supra, ―We see no need to reopen the hearing, thereby giving the employer a second bite at the proverbial apple; rather the [ALJ] on remand shall make the necessary finding based on the existing record.‖ 514 A.2d at 1195. 21 risk of serious injury, ordinary negligence should be sufficient to support a finding of misconduct. If the current statutes and regulations do not permit that conclusion, they should be amended to do so.