Opinion ID: 2399207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Excluding the Expert's Proffered Testimony

Text: A trial justice's ruling on the admissibility of an expert witness's proffered testimony will be sustained and provide the discretion has been soundly and judicially exercised, that is, if it has been exercised in the light of reason applied to all the facts and with a view to the rights of all the parties to the action,    and not arbitrarily or willfully, but with just regard to what is right and equitable under the circumstances and the law. Morra v. Harrop, 791 A.2d 472, 476-77 (R.I.2002) (quoting DeBartolo v. DiBattista, 117 R.I. 349, 353, 367, A.2d 701, 703 (1976)). The purpose of expert testimony is to aid in the search for the truth. It need not be conclusive and has no special status in the evidentiary framework of a trial. Morra, 791 A.2d at 477. [A] jury is free to accept or to reject expert testimony in whole or in part or to accord it what probative value the jury deems appropriate. Id. Rule 702 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence addresses the testimony of experts and states that [i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of fact or opinion. In addition, G.L.1956 § 9-19-41  entitled Expert witnesses in malpractice cases  provides: In any legal action    for personal injury or wrongful death filed against a licensed physician [or] hospital    based on professional negligence, only those persons who by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education qualify as experts in the filed of the alleged malpractice shall be permitted to give expert testimony as to the alleged malpractice. In DiPetrillo v. Dow Chemical Co., 729 A.2d 677, 686 (R.I.1999), this Court discussed the standard for admitting expert scientific testimony that should govern the trial court's decision about whether to allow the jury to hear this type of evidence. Although we declined to expressly adopt the standards outlined in the United State Supreme Court decision of Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), we drew guidance from the principles of that case. DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 686. When a party seeks to introduce, through expert testimony, novel scientific or complex technical evidence, it is proper for the trial justice to exercise a gate keeping function. Id. at 685. This is because novel scientific or complex technical evidence can be difficult to understand and evaluate and, therefore, it runs the risk of being `both powerful and quite misleading.' Id. at 688. Because expert witnesses are permitted to testify by giving their opinions  despite their frequent lack of any first-hand knowledge or observations of the factual circumstances at issue  their testimony lacks the conventional personal knowledge that is generally required of lay witnesses. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592. The primary function of the trial justice's gate-keeping role is to assure that the proposed expert testimony, presented as a scientifically valid theory, is not mere junk science. See Gallucci v. Humbyrd, 709 A.2d 1059, 1064 (R.I.1998). As a result, the trial justice must ensure that the parties present to the trier of fact only expert testimony that is based on ostensibly reliable scientific reasoning and methodology. DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 690; see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93. If a party seeks to introduce novel or highly complex scientific or technical expert testimony, the trial justice must control the gateway    by conducting pursuant to Rule 104 an early, preliminary assessment of the evidence. DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 686. In such a case, the trial justice may admit the expert testimony only if the expert proposes to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact. Id. at 687. Helpfulness to the trier of fact is the most critical consideration for the trial justice in determining whether to admit proposed expert testimony. State v. Wheeler, 496 A.2d 1382, 1388 (R.I.1985). The first part of the inquiry, often referred to as the reliability test, is the focus of the parties' dispute here. [3] Four non-exclusive factors can be helpful in determining if expert testimony about novel or technically complex theories or procedures possesses scientific validity. They are: (1) whether the proffered knowledge has been or can be tested; (2) whether the theory or technique has been the subject of peer review and publication; (3) whether there is a known or potential rate of error; and (4) whether the theory or technique has gained general acceptance in the scientific community. DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 689 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. 2786). Satisfaction of one or more of these factors may be sufficient to admit the evidence and each factor need not be given equal weight in the analysis. DiPetrillo, 729 A2d at 689. The court may also consider the qualifications of the expert in determining whether the underlying methods are reliable. Id. But, importantly, especially when the proffered knowledge is neither novel nor highly technical, satisfaction of one or more of these factors is not a necessary condition precedent to allowing the expert to testify. See id. Trial justices are not required to become scientific experts to apply these factors. DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 689. And courts should not exclude highly technical or novel scientific expert testimony simply because they disagree with the conclusions of the expert. See id. at 690 (citing Kennedy v. Collagen Corp., 161 F.3d 1226, 1230 (9th Cir.1998)). The proponent of the evidence need only show that the expert arrived at his or her conclusion in what appears to be a scientifically sound and methodologically reliable manner. Id Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596. Once proffered expert evidence is determined to possess apparent reliability, the trial justice should submit the expert's testimony to the trier of fact to determine how much weight to accord such evidence. DiPetrillo, 729 A.2d at 690.