Opinion ID: 153055
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assertion of Right to a Speedy Trial

Text: We next consider whether the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial. See Barker, 407 U.S. at 528, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (rejecting the rule that a defendant waives his speedy trial rights by failing to demand a speedy trial and incorporating the defendant's assertion of or failure to assert his right to a speedy trial [as] one of the factors to be considered in the balancing test). A defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right is often entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining whether a defendant is being deprived of the right. Id. at 531-32, 92 S.Ct. 2182. This is so because a timely demand for a speedy trial often supports an inference that the defendant was not at fault for the delay and that the delay prejudiced the defendant. See id. at 531, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (The strength of [the defendant's] efforts will be affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not always readily identifiable, that he experiences.). But the weight attached to a defendant's assertion of his speedy trial right will differ with the circumstances of the defendant's demand. See id. at 528-29, 92 S.Ct. 2182 (explaining that a court may attach a different weight to different circumstances, such as frequent and forceful demands as compared to a purely pro forma objection). However, a ... defendant's failure to make a demand can hardly be counted against the defendant during those periods when he was unaware that charges had been lodged against him. 5 LaFave, Criminal Procedure, § 18.2(d); see also Doggett, 505 U.S. at 653-54, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (finding that the defendant is not to be taxed for invoking his speedy trial right only after his arrest if he was unaware that he was under indictment or that the police had come looking for him); Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1338 (weighing this factor heavily against the Government where the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial soon after learning of the indictment and arrest warrant, but had failed to do so beforehand); United States v. Taylor, 306 Fed.Appx. 492, 493 (11th Cir.2009) (unpublished) (Where the defendant did not know of the indictment until his arrest, however, he may promptly assert his right to a speedy trial after arrest, and it weighs heavily against the government.) (citing Ingram, 446 F.3d at 1340). Here, Villarreal claims he timely and forcefully asserted his right to a speedy trial once arrested. He argues he should not be taxed for his failure to assert the right before that time because he was unaware of the charges pending against him. The district court, however, rejected Villarreal's construction of the facts; it found that Villarreal knew, a short time after his July 1998 indictment, that the government was seeking to arrest and prosecute him for charges stemming from the Florida drug bust on his tractor-trailer. It further found that Villarreal failed to assert his right to a speedy trial until after his arrest in 2008. On appeal, Villarreal challenges only the district court's finding with respect to his knowledge of the charges pending against him. However, we cannot conclude that the district court clearly erred with respect to that finding. As the district court noted, much of the previous discussion regarding the reason for the delay applies with equal force to determining whether Villarreal knew of the charges pending against him. As discussed, we cannot find clear error in the district court's findings that Villarreal took steps to evade detection by law enforcement officials following the drug bust on his seized tractor-trailer and his subsequent indictment. Villarreal's efforts to evade law enforcement undermine his claim that he was unaware of the charges pending against him and provide an adequate basis for the district court to infer Villarreal knew of the charges pending against him around the time the indictment issued. [8] Because we cannot conclude the district court clearly erred in finding Villarreal knew of the charges against him but failed to demand a speedy trial during the nearly ten-year delay from his indictment to his arrest, this factor weighs heavily against Villarreal. Villarreal's failure to assert his right in any manner until after his arrest will make it difficult for [him] to prove that he was denied a speedy trial. Barker, 407 U.S. at 532, 92 S.Ct. 2182.