Opinion ID: 1316376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adjudicatory Sessions

Text: We find that this type of assemblage is excepted from the Act's operation by virtue of the exception contained in the meeting definition which excepts from the Act . . . any meeting for the purpose of making an adjudicatory decision in any quasi-judicial, administrative or court of claims proceeding . . . To determine the applicability of this exception, we first determine whether the Commission's proceedings in Case No. 9091 are of a quasi-judicial nature. Appellee contends that the proceedings are legislative proceedings. Appellee's argument fails because of the failure to distinguish between the type of proceeding and the type of power exercised by the agency conducting the proceeding. Appellee's numerous citations of authority are correct inasmuch as they indicate that the power exercised by the Commission is a legislatively delegated power. This, however, is not determinative of the nature of the proceedings conducted by the Commission in a particular case. In examining the character of the proceedings in Case No. 9091, we find that they involve notice, presentation of evidence, the making of a record, examination of witnesses under oath and the exercise of subpoena power. All of these matters are characteristics of proceedings which are essentially of a judicial nature. The early administrative law case of Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468, 56 S.Ct. 906, 80 L.Ed. 1288 (1936), provides us with guidance in this area. The case dealt with the Secretary of Agriculture's authority to fix rates of sale for livestock. This authority was conferred by Congress and allowed the Secretary to make rates in accordance with certain standards and limitations Congress prescribed. As a prerequisite to fixing rates the Secretary had to find existing rates unjust, unreasonable or discriminatory. If such a finding was made the Secretary could then fix a just and reasonable rate. Clearly the situation involved an administrative agency exercising a legislatively delegated power. The court found that the duty imposed by Congress carried with it certain fundamental procedural requirements; i. e., a full hearing, findings of fact, adequate evidence to support those findings, and a decision based only on material evidence on the record. The Court stated: A proceeding of this sort requiring the taking and weighing of evidence, determinations of fact based upon the consideration of the evidence, and the making of an order supported by such findings, has a quality resembling that of a judicial proceeding. Hence it is frequently described as a proceeding of a quasi judicial character. Supra, 298 U.S. at 480, 56 S.Ct. at 911. The Court found that these requirements amounted to a full hearing, and that this was true even though the evidence might be taken by an examiner and analyzed by subordinates. The Court's analysis was functional. The Court found the characteristics of the proceeding determinative, not the nature of the power exercised therein. The similarities to the Commission's proceedings are clear. The analogy is complete and definite. A functional analysis of the Commission's proceedings leads unerringly to the conclusion that they too are quasi judicial proceedings. Other leading cases formative of administrative law stand for the proposition that though a power is legislatively delegated to an administrative agency, constitutional requirements of a full hearing as a prerequisite to the exercise of that power will result in administrative proceedings of a quasi judicial nature. Arizona Grocery Company v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe Railway Company, 248 U.S. 370, 52 S.Ct. 183, 76 L.Ed. 348 (1932); Shields v. Utah Idaho Central Railroad Company, 305 U.S. 177, 59 S.Ct. 160, 83 L.Ed. 111 (1938); St. Joseph Stockyards Company v. United States of America, 298 U.S. 38, 56 S.Ct. 720, 80 L.Ed. 1033 (1936). In the case of Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 4 N.J. 99, 71 A.2d 624 (1950), the New Jersey Supreme Court considered the actions of a town civil service commission functioning as an administrative agency holding hearings on the dismissal of a covered employee. The Court determined that such hearings' observance of the traditional safeguards against arbitrary action resulted in a quasi judicial proceeding. The prefix `quasi' is descriptive of the judicial faculty assigned to administrative agencies and public officers not a part of the judiciary. Whether the proceeding in essence is legislative or judicial is determined by the nature of the final act and the character of the process and operation rather than by the general character of the authority itself. Id. at 104, 71 A.2d 626. The quality of the act rather than the character of the agency exercising the authority is determinative. . . Id. at 105, 71 A.2d 627. Where the administrative tribunal is under a duty to consider evidence and apply the law to the facts as found, thereby exercising a discretion or judgment judicial in nature on evidentiary facts, the function is ordinarily quasi-judicial . . . Id. at 105, 71 A.2d 627. The most basic definition of quasi judicial is judicial power exercised by an official not within the judicial branch of government. State v. Winne, 21 N.J.Super. 180, 91 A.2d 65. The prefix quasi means, inter alia, as if, as though, or in the manner of. Most simply, a quasi judicial proceeding is a proceeding conducted in the manner of a judicial proceeding. For further abundant authority in this regard, see 35A Words & Phrases, Quasi Judicial 463 (1963). In the case of Virginia Electric Power Company v. The Public Service Commission of West Virginia, supra , this Court held in syl. pt. 1 that W.Va. Const. Art. III § 10 contains an implied mandate of procedural due process with regard to Commission hearings. The foregoing and a legion of similar authority leaves no doubt that the characteristics of procedural due process as they relate to hearings are those very attributes which characterize the Commission's proceedings in Case No. 9091. The conclusion is inescapable that administrative proceedings such as those of the Public Service Commission in Case No. 9091 are quasi judicial proceedings. Having determined that the proceedings in Case No. 9091 are quasi judicial, it logically follows that any decision reached as a result of such proceedings is by definition an adjudicatory decision. Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed. defines adjudicate as to settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense. We believe that any decision which arises out of quasi judicial proceedings and is a final determination of the matters involved is an adjudicatory decision. W.Va.Code § 24-1-6 refers to the concurrent judgment of two commissioners. Certainly the Legislature used the word judgment with some precise purpose in mind. Its use is a clear indication that the final decisions of the Commission are adjudications. If the Legislature denominates final decisions in rate cases as judgments, they are certainly adjudicatory decisions. Appellee's brief demonstrates that it is possible to gather ample countervailing authority which defines adjudicatory decision in its strictest possible sense as a decision by a member of the judicial branch arising out of a case or a controversy involving adverse parties. Based upon the whole character of the proceedings considered here and based upon the use of the word judgment in W.Va.Code § 24-1-6, we find the application of such a strict and narrow definition to be inappropriate. Based upon the foregoing, we find that the adjudicatory session comes within the (a) exception of the meeting definition. We hold that the requirements of the Act are not applicable to adjudicatory sessions. [6] We grant appellants' motion to reverse, and remand the case to the trial court for modification of that court's judgment in accordance with this opinion. [7] Reversed and remanded.