Opinion ID: 1218473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: District Court's refusal to grant continuance prior to sentencing

Text: Finally, Olfano's third contention is that the District Court abused its discretion in refusing to grant him a continuance so that he could better prepare for the sentencing hearing. Olfano also includes with this argument an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, primarily regarding counsel's failure to endorse his client's continuance request. We review the trial court's refusal to grant a continuance for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 305 (3d Cir.2003) (citing United States v. Kikumura, 947 F.2d 72, 78 (3d Cir.1991)). Because there is no mechanical test [] to determine where there exists a violation of due process, courts must examine the particular circumstances of each case. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). When presented with a motion for continuance, a court should consider the following factors: the efficient administration of criminal justice, the accused's rights, and the rights of other defendants whose trials may be delayed as a result of the continuance. United States v. Fischbach & Moore, Inc., 750 F.2d 1183 (3d Cir.1984). Although this Court has not further elaborated on the abuse of discretion standard, others have held that a court will only vacate a sentence based on a refusal to continue a sentencing hearing where the denial was arbitrary and it substantially impaired the defendant's opportunity to receive a fair sentence. United States v. Garcia, 78 F.3d 1457, 1467 (10th Cir.1996); United States v. Speed, 53 F.3d 643, 644-645 (4th Cir.1995); United States v. Booth, 996 F.2d 1395, 1397-98 (2d Cir.1993) (affirming denial of a continuance request despite finding that the arguments in favor of the continuance were not frivolous). Olfano argues that, in light of the open dispute between him and his counsel regarding the need for a continuance, the District Court should have allowed the continuance, or at least given him and his counsel an opportunity to confer. At the sentencing hearing, counsel informed the District Court that Olfano doesn't feel prepared for this sentencing here today, because his mother is not present, and he was hoping to get a letter, perhaps, from the family as well as a past employer. App. at 101. Counsel then told the judge that he thought that we're prepared, but I know Mr. Olfano has asked me to advise the Court[.] Id. Counsel then explained to the court that Olfano hoped that the letters would lead to a lower sentence by providing evidence of Olfano's rehabilitative needs and other sentencing factors. However, counsel added his opinion that, because the offense involved family, he didn't know how persuasive [the letters] would be. . . . I don't know if it is appropriate to submit a type of letter that he's suggesting. So I don't know. App. at 102. After hearing this explanation, the District Judge noted that Olfano had plenty of time  two weeks  to contact his family regarding the hearing, and saw no reason whatsoever to delay the hearing, especially with the Court's calendar and our schedule. Id. Because this decision to refuse the continuance was neither arbitrary nor prejudicial, we will not disturb the District Court's ruling. Even if the sentencing judge did act arbitrarily, there is nothing in the record to show that any person had actually agreed to submit a letter on Olfano's behalf. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that these letters, if written, would have helped Olfano at sentencing. We see no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance request.