Opinion ID: 1929990
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the commission err in reversing the administrative judge's dismissal of the claim since the claimant allegedly failed to make out a prima facie case of compensability?

Text: In workers' compensation cases, the claimant has the burden of proving that he sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course and scope of his employment and that the injury caused the disability for which he is claiming benefits. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-3(b). See Pearson v. Dixie Electric Power Ass'n, 219 Miss. 884, 70 So.2d 6, 10 (1954); T.H. Mastin & Co. v. Mangum, 215 Miss. 454, 61 So.2d 298, 300 (1942). In all cases in which the causal connection would not be obvious to the untrained layman, the claimant must prove the causal connection between the alleged injury and the alleged disability by competent medical proof. Miss. Code Ann. § 71-3-3 (1972). See Cole v. Superior Coach Corp., 234 Miss. 287, 106 So.2d 71, 72 (1958) (in all but the simple and routine cases ..., it is necessary to establish medical causation by expert testimony). In this case the claimant alleged that exposure to toxic chemicals at work precipitated his lung cancer and his ultimate death. In an attempt to prove the causal connection between his alleged disability and employment the claimant presented the testimony of his wife and himself and a certified original death certificate stating that the cause of death was bronchio-alveolar-carcinoma. The claimant further presented the testimony of Dr. Anthony J. Verlangieri, a toxicologist, who stated that in his opinion based on scientific research knowledge in the field and investigation into the cause of death of Mr. Freels, the claimant died as a result of exposure to chemicals containing pentachlorophenol. From the circuit judge's order this Court quotes: Dr. Anthony J. Verlangieri is an associate professor of Pharmacology and Toxicology at the University of Mississippi, and he has a Ph.D. in biochemistry. Dr. Verlangieri testified on behalf of the claimants before the Administrative Judge after being qualified as an expert in the field of toxicology. His testimony was allowed under Procedural Rule 8 of the Mississippi Workmen's Compensation commission. The appellants assert that the Administrative Judge and the Workmen's Compensation Commission [sic] correctly rejected as incompetent the testimony and reports of Professor Verlangieri relating to his opinions as to medical causation. As the Commission held, Dr. Verlangieri's expert testimony, as to that testimony he gave within the area of his expertise, should have been admitted by the Administrative Judge for whatever probative value it may have to the resolution of the issues raised in this cause. The appellees cite V. Dunn, Mississippi Workmen's Compensation, Section 278, page 346 (3d Ed. 1982), with regard as to what is required of an expert witness. As earlier stated, the Commission held that Dr. Verlangieri's testimony given within his area of expertise should have been admitted. This is in line with Section 278 supra, and we agree. However, as to Dr. Verlangieri's testimony as to his opinions as to the medical causation between the decedent's employment and his fatal condition, we believe that the Administrative Judge and the Commission correctly rejected as incompetent that testimony. Dr. Verlangieri has a Ph.D. in biochemistry. He did not examine the claimant or treat him at any time. He is not a medical doctor, nor a licensed physician as contemplated by Miss. Code Ann. Section 73-25-1, et seq. (1972). The definition in that code section must be considered in determining the intent of the Workmen's Compensation Law relating to competent medical testimony, and Dr. Verlangieri's testimony fails as far as his competency to testify as a medical expert to prove medical causation between the decedent's employment and his fatal condition. This Court, however, disagrees. Dr. Verlangieri was qualified as an expert to give an opinion regarding the causal relationship between the decedent's employment and his fatal condition. Dr. Verlangieri is and was accepted as an expert in toxicology. Toxicology is a science that deals with poisons and their effect on living organisms, with substances otherwise harmless that prove toxic under particular conditions, and with the clinical, industrial, legal or other problems involved. Websters Third New International Dictionary (1961). Verlangieri's credentials in the general field of biochemistry have been recited above. Without doubt, Verlangieri is one who by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education is qualified as an expert. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So.2d 856 (Miss. 1983) at 873-874. House v. State, 445 So.2d 815 (Miss. 1984) at 822. The key point in reaching this conclusion is the recognition that medical causation is no more than causation in fact. As discussed in Prosser § 41, Law of Torts (4th Ed. 1971) at page 241: Causation is a fact. It is a matter of what has in fact occurred. A cause is a necessary antecedent: in a very real and practical sense, the term embraces all things which have so far contributed to the result that without them it would not have occurred. ... . The plaintiff must introduce evidence which affords a reasonable basis for the conclusion that it is more likely than not that the [exposure to the chemical] was a substantial factor in bringing about the result.... Where the conclusion is not one within the common knowledge of laymen, expert testimony may provide a sufficient basis for it. Id. Dr. Verlangieri's expert testimony provides a reasonable basis to conclude that the exposure to chemicals at his work place was a substantial factor in bringing about Freels' death. It is this Court's opinion that Dr. Verlangieri is qualified to give an opinion regarding such cause in fact and should not be disqualified from testifying because his degree is a Ph.D. instead of an M.D. The Commission's inquiry should be whether the witness is in fact qualified  by knowledge, skill, experience, training or education  not by what degree he holds. It is certain and probable that Ph.D. biochemists and toxicologists are at least equally competent to testify as to the cause and effect of chemicals in our environment as medical doctors. Further, appellants object that Dr. Verlangieri, in forming his opinion, relied upon medical reports and pathology reports inadmissible under the authority of Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. McLaurin, 370 So.2d 1359, 1360-61 (Miss. 1979) (unsworn medical records not admissible). However, upon close review of the record, this Court can find no objection by the employer insurer as to the authenticity or reliability of the medical reports. The only objection voiced by the employer/insured is that the records upon which Dr. Verlangieri based his opinion were not in evidence. Procedural Rule 8 of the Mississippi Workers' Compensation Law provides: In compensation hearings the general rules of evidence shall be relaxed so as to permit the introduction of any relevant and competent evidence pertaining to the issue that will throw light on the matter in controversy. There shall be excluded from the record, however, by motion of either party or by the direction of the hearing officer, any matters which are libelous or of a personal nature which do not in the opinion of the hearing officer, have a direct bearing on the case at hand. All other matters sought to be introduced, and which are accepted by the hearing officer over objection of either party, shall become a part of the record with the objection properly shown. This Court therefore concludes that this objection of appellant is without merit under M.W.C. Procedural Rule 8. Additionally, the law is clear that the entire testimony given at the hearing before the administrative judge, both medical and lay, admitted in its entirety, must receive a liberal interpretation in order to carry out the spirit of the act. V. Dunn, supra, § 281. L.B. Priester & Son, Inc. v. Dependents of Bynum, 244 Miss. 185, 141 So.2d 246, 142 So.2d 30 (1962). This decision is in line with that of the Alabama Supreme Court. The Alabama Supreme Court in Police & Fireman's Insurance Association v. Mullins, 69 So.2d 261 (Ala. 1954), involved a toxicologist who testified as an expert. In that case, although the toxicologist's testimony was corroborated by that of a medical physician, the Alabama Court stated: It is well recognized that the science of toxicology, among other things, treats of poisons and their effects and their treatment and recognition. The witness was shown to have had extensive training and wide experience in this field. His testimony disclosed he was fully conversant with the subject and was therefore properly admitted. It is not the law that only a medical doctor may testify as to physical symptoms on the human being. If the witness is shown to have special qualification in that particular field and knowledge of the subject beyond that of the average laymen so as to give reliable testimony, he is not disqualified. Blakeney v. Alabama Power Co., 222 Ala. 394, 133 So. 16; Hicks v. State, 247 Ala. 439, 25 So.2d 139. Id. at 266. See also Backes v. Valspar Corp., 783 F.2d 77 (7th Cir.1986) (chemist competent to testify that plaintiff's medical problems caused by chemically contaminated water); Dawsey v. Olin Corp., 782 F.2d 1254 (5th.Cir.1986) (biochemist competent to testify regarding effect of chemical called phosgene on humans); Nicholas v. City of Alton, 107 Ill. App.3d 404, 63 Ill. Dec. 108, 437 N.E.2d 757 (1982) (toxicologist testified exposure to tear gas could have caused decedent's death); Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 644 (D.C. Cir.1962). In cases requiring expert proof of causal connection of death, testimony of a medical doctor or treating physician is not mandatory. In his treatise, V. Dunn states that medical proof is usually required to carry the affirmative of the issue (causal connection of death) when the connection is not readily apparent. V. Dunn, supra, § 282. It has been held that the claimant has the burden of proof on the question of causal connection and generally that the proof must rise above mere speculation, conjecture, or possibility, as where the medical testimony is that it could have been one way just as well as the other. On the other hand, it is said that the burden may be carried by circumstantial evidence and, from the medical standpoint, upon reasonable probabilities.