Opinion ID: 76622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Government's Conduct at Sentencing Hearing

Text: 44 Levy also argues that the government breached the plea agreement through its conduct at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, Levy contends that the government's grudging and apologetic references to the plea agreement, along with its assertions that our hands are tied and that its sentencing recommendation was given with a heavy heart, communicated the government's true position of recommending a sentence longer than 120 months. We disagree. 45 Levy cites United States v. Canada, 960 F.2d 263 (1st Cir.1992), in support of his contention that the government's comments during sentencing breached the plea agreement. In Canada, the plea agreement bound the government to recommend a sentence of thirty-six months' imprisonment. Id. at 265. At sentencing, however, the prosecutor noted the existence of the plea agreement's sentencing recommendation, but she never herself affirmatively recommended a 36 month sentence and her comments seemed to undercut such a recommendation. Id. at 268. The prosecutor asserted: The government feels a substantial period of incarceration in this case, for the reasons that the Court has already indicated.... It is important, the government feels, that a very strong message be sent by the Court. Id. at 269 (emphasis omitted). 46 In concluding that the Canada prosecutor breached the plea agreement, this Court noted that the prosecutor's references to the agreement were grudging and apologetic and that her urging of a `lengthy period of incarceration' sounded like encouragement for a sentence greater than 36 months. Id. This Court asserted that the government would have met its plea agreement obligations if it had recommended the thirty-six month sentence and refrained from conspicuously undermining its agreed position, but that the prosecutor breached the agreement by urging the court to impose a lengthy sentence within a context suggesting that she had in mind something greater than the agreed 36 months. Id. at 270. 47 This case is also markedly different from Canada. Unlike the Canada prosecutor who not only failed to advocate the 36-month sentence in the plea agreement but argued for a higher sentence, the prosecutor in this case affirmatively argued for a concurrent sentence and against any enhancements that would raise the sentence above the 120-month length. Specifically, in the context of Levy receiving a three-level, rather than a four-level, enhancement for his role in the offense, the prosecutor remarked: 48 I think based on my long-term involvement with this case that despite the fact that that benefits the Defendant, that is the truth, this scheme did not start with Raphael Levy, he joined it after the ground work had been laid.... And the trail of money that was ultimately received by [two codefendants] was in fact greater than that received by Mr. Levy, although what Mr. Levy received was a tremendous amount of money. 49 In response to these remarks, Levy's counsel stated, Well, we agree with the Government. I want to thank the prosecutor for fulfilling his role to seek justice, and I want to say that I agree with him. 50 This Court's decision in United States v. Johnson, 132 F.3d 628 (11th Cir.1998), is also illustrative in examining whether the prosecutor's conduct at sentencing violated the plea agreement. In Johnson, a plea agreement bound the government to represent that an amount of marijuana not greater than 100 pounds should be attributed to this defendant. Id. at 630. The PSI, however, recommended that the defendant be held accountable for 1400 pounds of marijuana. When the sentencing court inquired into the difference in amounts, the prosecutor explained that a co-conspirator had not been interviewed until the day after the plea agreement was made and that the co-conspirator's testimony substantially and drastically changed the amount of marijuana involved. Id. The prosecutor also made other comments that further undermined the agreed-upon provision in the plea agreement, such as vouching for the co-conspirator's credibility. Id. at 630-31. 51 The Johnson Court determined that the prosecutor violated the plea agreement when he failed to represent that the defendant was responsible for only 100 pounds of marijuana and instead became an enthusiastic advocate for a `fact' at odds with the `fact' to which he had stipulated. Id. at 631. In reaching this conclusion, the Johnson Court emphasized that the prosecutor's comments — each of which undercut the stipulation on the weight of the marijuana — were not demanded from an AUSA by a zealous judge. Id. 52 In contrast to the Johnson prosecutor's behavior, the prosecutor in this case remained firm in adhering to the plea agreement, even when the sentencing court solicited input from him on sentencing enhancements. The prosecutor repeatedly declined to offer any evidence on the vulnerable victim enhancement. Unlike in Johnson, the prosecutor in this case did not endorse the PSI. Rather, he stated that although I might have the ability to present such evidence that would support a vulnerable victim adjustment, I believe as an officer of the Court I cannot do that. Furthermore, when the victims spoke about their losses from the investment scheme, the prosecutor did not vouch for their credibility, and instead asserted that [t]his is not evidence that the Government is offering. The prosecutor also joined Levy's counsel in strongly advocating a three-level role enhancement, instead of the four-level role enhancement recommended in the PSI. 53 By refusing to present or endorse any evidence about the victims, by recommending only a three-level role enhancement, and by recommending concurrent sentences, the government clearly did not violate Levy's plea agreement.