Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Vicinage as to Counts 4, 5 and 6

Text: Defendant was charged in count 4 of the information with burglarizing the Piirisilds' Crestline cabin, in count 5 with theft of telephone services for calls made from the cabin, and in count 6 with concealing, selling, and withholding stolen property, to wit, a radio telephone taken from the cabin. Because the cabin is located in San Bernardino County, defendant objected to being tried before a jury drawn from Los Angeles County, arguing such a trial violated his Sixth Amendment vicinage right to be tried before a jury drawn from the judicial district where the alleged crime was committed. The trial court ruled both venue and vicinage were properly in Los Angeles County under sections 502.7 and 786. [8] Defendant is correct that vicinage is a concept distinct from venue, that the cited statutes, on their face, establish only venue, and that trial in a statutorily proper venue with a jury drawn from that jurisdiction, might, under some circumstances, violate a defendant's constitutional vicinage rights. (See Hernandez v. Municipal Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 713, 716, fn. 1, 263 Cal.Rptr. 513, 781 P.2d 547.) We conclude, however, that in the present case the same facts making venue proper in Los Angeles County also established the charged crimes were committed in that county for vicinage purposes. By bringing the radio telephone into Los Angeles County, as alleged in count 6 of the information, defendant clearly violated section 496 in Los Angeles County by concealing, selling or withholding the property in that county. By making telephone calls without authorization of the subscriber, Avo Piirisild, whose bill was sent to him for payment at his Los Angeles County residence, as charged in count 5, defendant stole services in both San Bernardino and Los Angeles Counties. Finally, by bringing property taken in the burglary into Los Angeles County, as charged in count 4, defendant extended his commission of that crime into Los Angeles County, at least under the broad concept of commission courts have applied for purposes of determining proper vicinage. (See People v. Martin (1995) 38 Cal. App.4th 883, 888-889, 45 Cal.Rptr.2d 502 [where killing was performed in Ventura County, but defendant disposed of body in Santa Barbara County, vicinage as well as venue over murder charge was proper in latter county]; People v. Tamble (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 815, 820, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 446 [burglary of motor home located in San Luis Obispo County may be tried in Santa Barbara County, without obtaining waiver of vicinage rights, because burglars brought loot into that county; provision of § 786 allowing prosecution in jurisdictional district into which stolen property is carried provides, in the broad sense, for prosecution where the crime was committed]; People v. Campbell (1991) 230 Cal. App.3d 1432, 1447, 281 Cal.Rptr. 870 [trial under § 786 accords with vicinage requirements because the statute require[s] at least some act within a county ... requisite to the offense charged before jurisdiction will attach]; State v. Howell (1985) 40 Wash.App. 49, 696 P.2d 1253, 1255 [theft of livestock may be prosecuted in county into which defendant allegedly took the cattle and tried to sell them: `[W]here the cause occurs in one county and the result in another,' vicinage is proper in either].) Trial of counts 4, 5 and 6 in Los Angeles County did not violate defendant's vicinage rights.