Opinion ID: 2432996
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: AMI 901(b)Danger Ahead

Text: The trial court instructed the jury in accordance with AMI 901(b): When the driver sees danger ahead, then he is required to use ordinary care to have his vehicle under control as to be able to check its speed or stop it, if necessary, to avoid damage to himself or others. And the trial court gave AMI 614: A person who is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with danger to himself or others not caused by his own negligence is not required to use the same judgment that is required of him in calmer and more deliberate moments. He is required to use only the care that a reasonably careful person would use in the same situation. ETMF submits AMI 901(b) should not be given when a driver is confronted without warning to an emergency situation. Home Insurance Co. v. Harwell, 267 Ark. 884, 568 S.W.2d 17 (1978). We believe both instructions were appropriate to the proof. It is evident the drivers could see smoke crossing the highway from some distance away. That circumstance was enough to alert approaching motorists of a potential danger and to justify the jury being told the requirements of the law in response to those conditions. Appellants argue that Noble McCreary had no reason to expect the smoke to be so thick he could not see. But that was for the jury to determine, as we know of no rule that permits a motorist, on seeing smoke ahead, to assume it will be so lacking in density that vision will not be impaired. The emergency instruction was appropriate to the conditions which were shown to have existed when the smoke screen was actually entered and blockage of the highway encountered. The trial court was right to give both instructions. AMI 902Superior Right of the Forward Vehicle ETMF objects to the giving of AMI 902: When two vehicles are traveling in the same direction, the vehicle in front has the superior right to the use of the highway for the purpose of stopping to avoid vehicles ahead, and the driver behind must use ordinary care to operate his vehicle in recognition of this superior right. This does not relieve the driver of the forward vehicle of the duty to use ordinary care and to obey the rules of the road. It contends this instruction applies only to vehicles that are traveling, and here the forward vehicle was stopped. Appellees point out that the instruction obviously contemplates the situation presented by this case, as it mentions the right of the forward driver to stop, to avoid vehicles ahead, which is exactly what Mrs. Freeman did. We agree. Obviously this instruction is not intended to apply in every situation where one vehicle strikes another from behind. For example, in Harlan v. Curbo, 250 Ark. 610, 466 S.W.2d 459 (1971), it was held inapplicable where one vehicle struck another just as the forward vehicle had pulled out of a driveway. And in Saliba v. Allison, 192 Ark. 1021, 96 S.W.2d 443 (1936) where a truck, after turning across the highway, continued onward or stopped partially on the highway. We said: The only error in this contention is that Saliba had ended his forward trip on highway No 61, had stopped on the roadside, then had turned sharply to his left and had driven upon the highway. No kind of watchfulness could have anticipated this action. But the instruction has a wider application than when two vehicles are moving in tandem along the highway. In Cohen v. Ramey, 201 Ark. 713, 147 S.W.2d 338 (1941) the forward car slowed down and signaled a left turn. While signalling the driver moved slightly to the right to permit cars behind her to pass, continued signalling and was struck as she turned onto an adjoining road. The trial court gave an earlier version of 902 and we affirmed: The short or temporary stop that Flora Ramey made to allow two cars close to her to pass did not in any sense amount to a parking or stopping on the roadside. It was a momentary or temporary stopping and a thing she had to do before she could continue the turn to the east side of the road she was making ... The momentary stopping of her car did not relieve appellant who was travelling behind her of taking notice of the movement of her car or of the signals being given by her. While there is no testimony as to the distance between the Freeman car and the ETMF truck prior to the impact, it is clear the two vehicles were traveling north in close proximity, as the truck struck the car momentarily after the car stopped to avoid other vehicles. That is a sufficient basis for the instruction. Smith v. Alexander, 245 Ark. 567, 433 S.W.2d 157 (1968).