Opinion ID: 866146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Uncharged Conduct

Text: Ralph argues that the district court, applying Rule 404(b), improperly admitted evidence related to his involvement in two real estate transactions that were not the basis of his indictment. In general, [e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character, i.e., as propensity evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Evidence of other acts may be admissible, however, if it has special relevance, United States v. Rodríguez-Berríos, 573 F.3d 55, 64 (1st Cir. 2009), such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident, Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). Our circuit employs a two-part test in evaluating the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b). First, we determine whether the proffered evidence truly possesses special relevance. Rodríguez-Berríos, 573 F.3d at 64. If it does, we then apply Rule 403 to ascertain whether the evidence's probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Id.; see also Fed. R. Evid. 403 (permitting court to exclude relevant evidence if there is danger of, inter alia, unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, [or] misleading the jury). We review the district court's -19- determination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Luna, 649 F.3d 91, 103 (1st Cir. 2011).6 The evidence at issue concerned Ralph's participation in the purchase of two properties located at 99 Wayland Street and 25 Nelson Street. The Wayland Street and Nelson Street transactions were markedly similar to those that formed the basis of the indictment, in terms of both how the transactions were conducted and the roles of the assorted players. The transactions both involved the use of two different purchase prices, falsified information on loan applications, Ralph's involvement as the loan originator, Levine or Lindley's involvement in the real estate closing, and Ralph's receipt of commissions after the closing. This evidence is highly probative for multiple reasons, including to show Ralph's intent to engage in the conspiracy, to demonstrate his knowledge of the conspiracy's mechanics, and to eradicate any doubt that his participation was somehow unintentional. See United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 581 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that evidence of [defendant's] involvement with the same 6 The government argues that the evidence of uncharged conduct is admissible for an independent reason, which is that it provides proof of the conspirators' modus operandi. We perceive little, if any, distinction between this argument and the government's Rule 404(b) argument, since both rely on the marked similarities between the charged conduct and the uncharged conduct. Indeed, our cases have explicitly noted that such similarities may give the evidence special relevance for Rule 404(b) purposes. See United States v. Wyatt, 561 F.3d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 2009). Thus, we believe it more appropriate to analyze the evidence of uncharged conduct in this case under the rubric of Rule 404(b). -20- people in past arson and fraud schemes is especially probative of [] whether he was an innocent 'tool' of others or a knowing participant in the conspiracy). The uncharged transactions also took place within the same general timeframe as the charged ones, further supporting the notion that they were part and parcel of the same scheme. Any minimal variation in certain aspects of the transactions' execution does not render the uncharged conduct irrelevant. See Wyatt, 561 F.3d at 53 (holding that even though evidence of other transaction was not identical to allegedly criminal transaction at issue, the transactions bore enough indicia of similarity to support admissibility); United States v. Landrau-López, 444 F.3d 19, 24 (1st Cir. 2006) (The other bad act need not be identical to the crime charged so long as it is sufficiently similar to allow a juror to draw a reasonable inference probative of knowledge or intent.). Consequently, the district court did not err in deciding that this evidence was relevant conduct for the purposes for Rule 404(b). The evidence survives Rule 403's balancing analysis for related reasons. We have observed that while there is always some danger that the jury will use other bad acts evidence to infer criminal propensity, Rule 403 demands the exclusion of such evidence only when its probative value is substantially outweighed by its potential unfairly to prejudice the defendant. LandrauLopez, 444 F.3d at 24; Fed. R. Evid. 403. The only specific -21- prejudice Ralph identifies comes from the testimony of the Wayland Street property's ostensible owner, Rose Charles. Charles was the best friend of Ralph's mother, and testified in some detail about her interactions with Ralph during the course of the Wayland Street transaction. Although Ralph contends that her testimony was unnecessarily inflammatory, the trial record reveals that it was largely devoted to explaining her participation in the transaction. Her testimony also addressed the disparity between her beliefs regarding the nature of the deal and Ralph's representations to the lender. Charles did testify at several points about the personal impact the transaction had on her, as well as a subsequent conversation where she forgave Ralph for his misdeeds. Despite the emotional nature of this testimony, the record does not support the notion that the government admitted this evidence to paint[] Appolon as a bad person, as Ralph contends. Although not every sentence of Charles's testimony was strictly relevant to facts disputed at trial, the vast bulk of it was highly probative. We acknowledge that the similarity of the uncharged conduct at issue simultaneously establishes its relevance and heightens the possibility that the jury will draw an unfair inference of propensity. See United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 123 (1st Cir. 2000). But given the facts of this case and the notable similarity between the uncharged conduct and the basis of Ralph's indictment, we are assured that the district court properly -22- evaluated the risk of an improper criminal propensity inference . . . in light of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 122. For these reasons, we affirm the district court's ruling as to the uncharged conduct.