Opinion ID: 3033675
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The prior proceeding was the type of proceeding

Text: to which this court will give preclusive effect. Nelson v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 862 P.2d 1293, 129697 (Or. 1993) (citations omitted). Oregon applies issue precluTHORNTON v. CITY OF ST. HELENS 12459 sion to issues of fact and law. Drews v. EBI Cos. (In re Compensation of Drews), 795 P.2d 531, 535 (Or. 1990). [7] In this case, all five parts of the issue preclusion test are satisfied. As to the first element, the issue of whether cities may require that renewal applicants comply with local regulations was at the heart of the prior action. In the state proceeding, Mr. Thornton asserted that the City could not “deny . . . wrecker certificate renewal if [he met] the standards of [Or. Rev. Stat. §] 822.140(2)” and that the City lacked the power to “impose requirements more restrictive than [section] 822.135 as conditions for approving” a renewal application. In denying Mr. Thornton’s motion for summary judgment and granting judgment in favor of the City, the trial court necessarily held that the City has the power to condition renewal applications on compliance with local regulations. Cf. Nelson, 862 P.2d at 1298-99; Scherzinger v. Portland Cust. Civil Serv. Bd., 103 P.3d 1122, 1128-29 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). No other holding would have resolved Mr. Thornton’s claims. In the present litigation, the Thorntons contend that the City lacks the power to condition a renewal application on compliance with local regulations. That raises precisely the same issue that was litigated to finality in the prior proceeding. Cf. Dodd, 136 F.3d at 1225; Shuler v. Distrib. Trucking Co., 994 P.2d 167, 173-74 (Or. Ct. App. 1999). Although the Thorntons seek to distinguish the issue in the prior action on the ground that Ordinances 2808 and 2832 were not directly involved, the governing state statutes are the sole measure of the City’s ability to condition approval of renewal applications on compliance with local regulations. The state court interpreted those statutes as allowing the City to consider its own regulations in determining whether to approve a renewal application. Those statutes have not changed. [8] The remaining elements of issue preclusion are not seriously disputed. The foregoing issue was actually litigated to finality in state court, and Mr. Thornton had a full and fair opportunity to be heard at the trial and appellate levels. Mr. 12460 THORNTON v. CITY OF ST. HELENS Thornton was a party to the first action, see Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 29 (1982), and the Thorntons have not argued on appeal that Mrs. Thornton lacks privity of interest with her husband and co-owner, so any argument of that nature is deemed waived. See Smith, 194 F.3d at 1052; Greenwood v. FAA, 28 F.3d 971, 977 (9th Cir. 1994). Finally, the prior proceeding—a court action—is the type of proceeding to which Oregon courts give preclusive effect. See, e.g., Rennie v. Freeway Transp., 656 P.2d 919, 927 (Or. 1982). [9] With all five parts of the issue preclusion test satisfied, the Thorntons cannot revisit their challenge to the City’s power to condition a renewal application on compliance with local regulations. See Skeen v. Dep’t of Human Res., 17 P.3d 526, 528-29 (Or. Ct. App. 2000). Because the City has the discretion to deny a renewal application for noncompliance with local regulations, City approval of a renewal application is a condition precedent to reissuance of a certificate. See, e.g., Wojcik v. City of Romulus, 257 F.3d 600, 611 (6th Cir. 2001). Without City approval, the Thorntons cannot establish a property right in the reissuance of a certificate, even if their application otherwise satisfies state law. See Mustafa v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 1169, 1178 (9th Cir. 1998); Jacobson, 627 F.2d at 180. Because the Thorntons cannot demonstrate a property right, their due process claim fails. See, e.g., Foss, 161 F.3d. at 588. 2. Equal Protection [10] To state a § 1983 claim for violation of the Equal Protection Clause “ ‘a plaintiff must show that the defendants acted with an intent or purpose to discriminate against the plaintiff based upon membership in a protected class.’ ” Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 686 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). “ ‘The first step in equal protection analysis is to identify the [defendants’ asserted] classification of groups.’ ” Freeman v. City of Santa Anna, 68 F.3d 1180, 1187 (9th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). The groups must be comTHORNTON v. CITY OF ST. HELENS 12461 prised of similarly situated persons so that the factor motivating the alleged discrimination can be identified. Id. An equal protection claim will not lie by “conflating all persons not injured into a preferred class receiving better treatment” than the plaintiff. Joyce v. Mavromatis, 783 F.2d 56, 57 (6th Cir. 1986). [11] According to the Thorntons, the City adopted Ordinance 2808 “to harm [them] because of [Mrs. Thornton’s] American Indian Heritage.”3 The Thorntons have not, however, come forward with admissible evidence that, even viewed in the light most favorable to them, demonstrates discriminatory intent. Cf. Bingham v. City of Manhattan Beach, 341 F.3d 939, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2003); Huebschen v. Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d 1167, 1171 72 (7th Cir. 1983). Although the Thorntons maintain that Defendants made a race-based classification, they have not offered evidence of racial discrimination, beyond the observation that Mrs. Thornton is Native American. Mere indifference to the effects of a decision on a particular class does not give rise to an equal protection claim, see Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446, 454 (7th Cir. 1996), and conclusory statements of bias do not carry the nonmoving party’s burden in opposition to a motion for summary judgment,4 see Buchanan v. City of Bolivar, 99 F.3d 1352, 1360 (6th Cir. 1996). So, too, the fact that Mrs. Thornton is Native American and certain City councilmembers and administrators are not, standing alone, does not mean that Defendants have discriminated on the basis of race. Bingham, 341 F.3d at 948. Without evidence of discrimina- 3 On appeal, the Thorntons also argue that the City retaliated against them for exercising their First Amendment rights. We do not consider this claim because it was not properly raised in the district court. See Sofamor Danek Group, Inc. v. Brown, 124 F.3d 1179, 1186 n.4 (9th Cir. 1997). 4 We accept Mr. Thornton’s factual averments as true, but we disregard averments that are not based on personal knowledge, Coca-Cola Co. v. Overland, 692 F.2d 1250, 1255 (9th Cir. 1982), or that are purely conclusory in nature, Delange v. Dutra Const. Co., 183 F.3d 916, 921 (9th Cir. 1999). 12462 THORNTON v. CITY OF ST. HELENS tory intent, the Thorntons cannot make out a claim for discrimination based on a suspect classification. As a fallback classification, the Thorntons group themselves with other wrecking yards in the state and other businesses in the City’s “Heavy Industry” zone and contend that those yards and businesses are not subject to the same review requirements. Although “[a] successful equal protection claim may be brought by a ‘class of one,’ ” the plaintiff still bears the burden of proving that she “has been intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated and that there is no rational basis for the difference in treatment.” SeaRiver Mar. Fin. Holdings, Inc. v. Mineta, 309 F.3d 662, 679 (9th Cir. 2002). The problem with grouping the Thorntons with other wrecking yards in the state or other businesses in the City’s “Heavy Industry” zone is that those groups are not comprised of “similarly situated” persons. See id.; Freeman, 68 F.3d at 1187-88. There are no other auto wreckers in St. Helens and, therefore, the City is not imposing a burden on the Thorntons that it does not also impose on other wreckers within its jurisdiction. The City has no authority to regulate wreckers located beyond its boundaries. Similarly, there is nothing in the record to indicate that any of the other businesses in the City’s “Heavy Industry” zone are either sufficiently comparable to wrecking yards or subject to the same state licensing requirements as auto wreckers. If the other businesses are not required to renew their respective certificates annually and are not directed to obtain the City’s approval in the process, they are not similarly situated to the Thorntons. Evidence of different treatment of unlike groups does not support an equal protection claim. Cf. Freeman, 68 F.3d 1187-88.