Opinion ID: 2453894
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The third interview was tainted by the prior illegalities.

Text: We begin by using the Halberg factors to analyze Kalmakoff's third interview with the troopers. We agree with the court of appeals that some of the Halberg factors suggest that there was a break in the stream of events between the interviews: Kalmakoff was not in custody during the few hours that elapsed between the interviews and thus had the opportunity to speak with friends or family at home or at school; the third interview took place at Kalmakoff's home, rather than the city building; the third interview lasted less than 25 minutes; Kalmakoff's grandparents were present at the third interview; and the troopers did not use lies or trickery to convince Kalmakoff to submit to the interview. [92] But our analysis differs from that of the court of appeals with respect to three significant factors: the troopers flagrantly violated Kalmakoff's rights during the second interview; they obtained important incriminating information through those violations; and they proceeded to use that illegally obtained information to convince Kalmakoff to submit to the third interview. Given this sequence of events, it is impossible to say that the connection between the troopers' illegal conduct and Kalmakoff's third interview statements was so attenuated as to dissipate the taint. [93] The United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Illinois instructed that the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct is a particularly important factor in determining whether a subsequent statement is insulated from the prior illegality. [94] Although there is no indication that the subjective intent of the troopers was to violate Kalmakoff's rights, the misconduct that occurred in this case was flagrant. The court of appeals described the troopers' violations in the second interview as egregious. [95] The court of appeals stated that the troopers repeatedly disregarded Kalmakoff's requests to leave the interview; failed to honor [Kalmakoff's] invocation of his right to silence; and implied that [Kalmakoff] did have to speak to them. [96] Moreover, the troopers implied that Kalmakoff's only choice was whether to be questioned alone or in the presence of his grandparents; demanded to know why Kalmakoff was not willing to speak to them; and tried to get [Kalmakoff] to agree to be interrogated on a question-by-question basis. [97] But the court of appeals decided that it must draw a distinction between the troopers' conduct at the first interview and the troopers' conduct at the second interview. [98] The court thus concluded that even assuming the troopers violated Kalmakoff's Miranda rights in the first interview, [99] that violation was not flagrant because the tone of the interview was polite and Kalmakoff was not lied to, threatened, or bullied. [100] Although it may be true that this violation standing alone is not flagrant, we cannot ignore the reality that by the time of the third interview, Kalmakoff had been subjected to a pattern of violations: the failure to administer Miranda warnings at the first interview; the failure to properly administer the warnings at the beginning of the second interview; the refusal to honor his requests to leave the second interview before the warnings were administered; and the failure to honor his invocation of his constitutional right to silence after the warnings were given. We have previously recognized that ignoring or rebuffing a suspect's invocation of his or her constitutional rights will convince the suspect that such rights are illusory. [101] This consequence is undoubtedly greater when the suspect's rights are repeatedly and persistently violated. The pattern of violations in this case is thus greater than the sum of its parts, and accordingly increases the flagrancy of the official misconduct. The court of appeals also underestimated the significance of the information obtained through the troopers' misconduct. The court of appeals concluded that in the first interview, Kalmakoff admitted only two violations of the law: under-age drinking, and temporarily stealing a pistol and blanks so that he and his friend ... could go back to [the friend's] house and shoot the gun. [102] As we explained in our June 2010 order, we do not agree with this assessment: Our review of the transcripts indicates that during the first half of the first interview, Kalmakoff made three highly significant admissions that may have influenced his later decision to confess in the third interview: that he was drinking on the night of the murder; that he and his cousin found the murder weapon in the house where the victim was sleeping and took it with them; and that he and his cousin returned to check on the victim several times and the victim became angry with him.[ [103] ] Given Trooper Stephenson's remark to Trooper Mlynarik that they were hot on the trail now after Kalmakoff gave these statements, it seems that the troopers also thought these admissions were significant. Similarly, the court of appeals concluded that the troopers obtained little information from the violations that occurred in the second interview, stating that Kalmakoff made only one self-incriminating admission: that he had consumed about half a pint of whiskey on the evening of the homicide. [104] But this ignores a crucial passage from the second interview. After Kalmakoff asked to leave the interview and return to school, the troopers pressed him on why he did not want to talk to them. In response, Kalmakoff said, I don't know, sorta scared. When Trooper Allen asked what he was scared about, Kalmakoff replied, That I did it. Finally, we disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Kalmakoff's decision to participate in the third interview was not materially affected by the statements obtained from him during the first and second interviews. [105] When the troopers first asked Kalmakoff if he would speak with them in the presence of his grandparents, Kalmakoff did not respond. Trooper Allen then encouraged Kalmakoff to participate in the interview: Because you know there'sthere's some things that you might've told us already that they might not even know about. You think that'd be fair, you think? ... Eventually all the information's gonna be available.... [unknown indiscernible speaker] [W]ould you like to start off so that you can bring your [g]randparents up to speed on everything that you've talked to us about already [?] (Emphasis added.) When Kalmakoff said that he didn't know where to start, Trooper Allen prompted him by referring to a specific admission from the first interview: [D]id you talk with Trooper Stephenson about about a gun? Two things about this exchange demonstrate that Kalmakoff's decision to submit to the third interview was substantially affected by his earlier statements. [106] First, by telling Kalmakoff that it was only fair to tell his grandparents what he had told the troopers because [e]ventually all the information's gonna be available, Trooper Allen communicated to Kalmakoff that refusing to participate in the interview would be futile given his earlier incriminating statements. [107] Second, the message that it was futile to resist was compounded by Trooper Allen's direct references to the illegally obtained statements both generally, by asking Kalmakoff to bring his grandparents up to speed regarding the earlier statements, and specifically, by prompting Kalmakoff to talk about the gun. Later in the interview, the troopers asked more specific questions about Kalmakoff's earlier admissions, including about checking on the victim and the victim's angry response toward Kalmakoff. By using these statements to induce Kalmakoff to participate in the third interview, the troopers connected that interview back to the flagrant violations of Kalmakoff's rights that they had committed only a few hours earlier. We therefore conclude that Kalmakoff's statements in the third interview were not sufficiently insulated from the taint of the prior illegalities, and those statements must be suppressed.