Opinion ID: 1855982
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Proof of Habitual Criminal Status

Text: Finally, Sardeson urges the view that the district court erred in finding that the State had borne its burden to prove, for enhancement of sentence pursuant to Neb. Rev.Stat. § 29-2221 (Reissue 1985), this state's habitual criminal statute, that he is the same Patrick A. Sardeson who had been previously convicted of felonies. In the absence of a sentencing court's abuse of discretion, the sentencing court's procedure utilized for presentation of information at a hearing for imposition of the habitual criminal penalty prescribed by § 29-2221 will be sustained on appeal. State v. Jackson, 225 Neb. 843, 408 N.W.2d 720 (1987). In the pretrial suppression hearing of January 4, 1988, Sardeson testified on cross-examination as follows: Q. Sir, have you ever been convicted of a felony within the last ten years? [Sardeson] The last ten years? Q. Yes. [Sardeson] Yes. Q. And how many? [Sardeson] Three. Following trial, in a hearing to determine the applicability of § 29-2221 to Sardeson's sentencing in these cases, the State offered three authenticated records of prior felony convictions in the name of Patrick Sardeson. Sardeson objected, as he does in this court, to their being introduced until there's some connection between the person named in those exhibits and the defendant. The State asked the district court to note that Sardeson had identified himself as Patrick Sardeson in testimony in the suppression hearing; with no objection by Sardeson, the district court did so. Neither side offered any additional evidence. On this basis, the district court announced its specific finding that defendant has been twice previously convicted of felonies and sentenced and committed by courts of this state. Therefore, defendant is deemed to be an habitual criminal and shall be sentenced in both cases accordingly. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-2222 (Reissue 1985) provides as follows: At the hearing of any person charged with being an habitual criminal, a duly authenticated copy of the former judgment and commitment, from any court in which such judgment and commitment was had, for any of such crimes formerly committed by the party so charged, shall be competent and prima facie evidence of such former judgment and commitment. This court has previously held that under § 29-2222, an authenticated record establishing a prior conviction of a defendant with the same name is prima facie sufficient to establish identity for the purpose of enhancing punishment and, in the absence of any denial or contradictory evidence, is sufficient to support a finding by the court that the accused has been convicted prior thereto. State v. Jackson, supra . See, also, State v. Wakeman, 231 Neb. 66, 434 N.W.2d 549 (1989). Sardeson neither denied that he was the person sentenced for the prior felonies alleged, nor did he seek to establish by contradictory evidence that he was not the person so named. Rather, Sardeson contends that the State failed to meet its burden of proof in this regard, a contention in which he is clearly mistaken. We need not, and do not, consider the implication of Sardeson's express admission in the suppression hearing to conclude that the trial court committed no abuse of discretion. Sardeson's seventh and final summarized assignment of error is, like those which have preceded it, without merit.