Opinion ID: 199327
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Opinion v. Fact

Text: 16 There is an important threshold determination for any misrepresentation claim, be it for deceit or for negligent misrepresentation: only statements of fact are actionable; statements of opinion cannot give rise to a deceit action, McEneaney v. Chestnut Hill Realty Corp., 650 N.E.2d 93, 96 (Mass. App. Ct. 1995), or to a negligent misrepresentation action, Logan Equip. Corp. v. Simon Aerials, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 1188, 1199 (D. Mass. 1990) Cummings argues that the district court erred in concluding that HPG's representations about its roofs were non-actionable statements of opinion. As to the first statement -- that the roof would last twenty years -- we do not consider it to be a statement of opinion. The second statement, the supposed superiority of the PVC product, does fall in the opinion category, as normal commercial puffing. HPG's statement that the roof was suitable for the New England Climate is close to the line between the two categories, but it is at least arguably more like a statement of fact than of opinion. 17 To draw the difficult distinction between a statement of fact and a statement of opinion, Massachusetts courts have looked to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which provides that a representation is one of opinion if it expresses only (a) the belief of the maker, without certainty, as to the existence of fact; or (b) his judgment as to quality, value, authenticity, or other matters of judgment. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 538A (1977), quoted in McEneaney, 650 N.E.2d at 96. Statements touting the superlative quality of an item, such as mint condition or prime merchandise are considered mere puffing or seller's talk, non-actionable statements of opinion. Greenery Rehab. Group, Inc. v. Antaramian, 628 N.E.2d 1291, 1293 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); see also Powell v. Rasmussen, 243 N.E.2d 167, 168 (Mass. 1969) (statements of mere opinion, estimate, or judgment cannot give rise to deceit action). 18 In contrast, statements that are susceptible of actual knowledge can give rise to a claim of deceit, if those statements are false. Zimmerman v. Kent, 575 N.E.2d 70, 74-75 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991). For example, a statement by the builder of a house that there would be no water in the cellar was deemed an actionable misrepresentation because it was susceptible of the builder's actual knowledge, Pietrazak v. McDermott, 167 N.E.2d 166 (Mass. 1960), as was a false representation by a corporate agent about a corporation's net worth, Gopen v. American Supply Co., 407 N.E.2d 1255, 1257 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980). Even a statement that in form is one of opinion may constitute a statement of fact if it may reasonably be understood by the recipient as implying that there are facts to justify the opinion or at least that there are no facts that are incompatible with it. McEneaney, 650 N.E.2d at 96. Here, HPG's representation that their roofs would last twenty years was specific and verifiable, not a mere expression of opinion or estimate. That statement was susceptible of HPG's actual knowledge, and, even if opinion, indicated that HPG, the manufacturer of the roofs, knew facts to justify its statement. Similarly, HPG's statement that the roofs were suitable for the Massachusetts climate is at least arguably a statement of fact.