Opinion ID: 773819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Buchmeier's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment on Duplicity Grounds

Text: 17 Prior to the commencement of his trial, Buchmeier moved to have Counts I, III, IV, and VI of the indictment dismissed, arguing that they were impermissibly duplicitous. The district court denied the motion, finding that the government's decision to charge Buchmeier in four counts rather than in twenty counts was reasonable and not prejudicially duplicitous. United States v. Buchmeier, No. 97 CR 82-01, 1997 WL 695678, at  (N.D. Ill. Nov. 4, 1997). Buchmeier now appeals the district court's decision. 18 'Duplicity' is the joining of two or more offenses in a single count. United States v. Marshall, 75 F.3d 1097, 1111 (7th Cir. 1996). We have explained that the prohibition of duplicitous counts is embodied in Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides for 'a separate count for each offense.' United States v. Berardi, 675 F.2d 894, 897 n.5 (7th Cir. 1982). However, an indictment charging multiple acts in the same count, each of which could be charged as a separate offense, may not be duplicitous where these acts comprise a continuing course of conduct that constitutes a single offense. See id. at 898. 19 Buchmeier contends that sec. 922(g)(1) and sec. 922(j) both contemplate a violation to include the possession of a single firearm. Because the counts against him included multiple firearms, Buchmeier asserts that they each encompass more than one offense and are therefore impermissibly duplicitous. 20 In order to address Buchmeier's argument we must determine Congress' intended unit of prosecution for these subsections. Section 922(g)(1) prohibits a convicted felon from possess[ing] . . . any firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce. Likewise, sec. 922(j) makes it unlawful for any person to receive . . . any stolen firearm that has traveled in interstate commerce. Although the use of the word any in these subsections creates [u]ncertainty as to the unit of prosecution intended by Congress, United States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1998), this court has found guidance for interpreting such statutes in the Supreme Court's decision in Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 75 S. Ct. 620, 99 L. Ed. 905 (1955). See McFarland v. Pickett, 469 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1972); United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1982). In Bell, the Supreme Court reviewed a provision of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. sec. 2421, which explained that '[w]hoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce . . . any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery, or for any other immoral purpose. . . . Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.' 349 U.S. at 82 (quoting 18 U.S.C. sec. 2421). The Court addressed the question of whether an individual who admitted to transporting two women in the same car on the same trip for purposes prohibited by sec. 2421 had committed one or two violations of that section. See id. at 82-83. Finding there to be no clear congressional expression of a desired unit of prosecution, the Court found that the defendant should only have been charged with one violation. See id. at 83. The Court explained that when Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses. Id. at 84. 21 Relying on the Court's reasoning in Bell, this court evaluated the language of sec. 922(j) in McFarland v. Pickett, 469 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1972). 1 The question in McFarland was whether a defendant who was found with two stolen firearms could be charged with a separate count for each firearm in his possession. See 469 F.2d at 1278. Unable to discern any clear congressional intent as to the desired unit of prosecution from the language any stolen firearm or stolen ammunition, this court concluded that the government could not charge McFarland with separate counts of concealing and storing stolen firearms in violation of sec. 922(j) for each of the firearms found in his possession when there [wa]s no evidence to show whether the two firearms were stored at the same or different locations or whether they were acquired at the same or different times. 469 F.2d at 1279. 22 Subsequent to McFarland, in United States v. Oliver, 683 F.2d 224 (7th Cir. 1982), this court reviewed the predecessor to the current version of sec. 922(g)(1), at that time 18 U.S.C. sec. 922(h), 2 and again found Congress' intended unit of prosecution to be unclear. 683 F.2d at 232-33. Therefore, we relied on Bell and McFarland to conclude that a convicted felon found to be in possession of both a firearm and ammunition could only be charged with one violation of sec. 922(h) if the government could not show that the ammunition and revolver were acquired at different times. Id. at 232; see also United States v. Calhoun, 510 F.2d 861, 869 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding that under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1202(a), absent a showing that two firearms were stored or acquired at different times or places, there is only one offense, not two). 23 These decisions indicate that this court, like every other circuit court, has been unable to clearly determine Con gress' intended unit of prosecution for these subsections. We have thus determined that when a defendant's possession of multiple firearms is simultaneous and undifferentiated, the government may only charge that defendant with one violation of sec. 922(g)(1) and sec. 922(j), regardless of the actual quantity of firearms involved. See McFarland, 469 F.2d at 1278; Oliver, 683 F.2d at 232-33; see also United States v. Verrecchia, 196 F.3d 294, 298 (1st Cir. 1999) ([T]he simultaneous possession by a felon of multiple firearms, that is, possession of multiple firearms in one place at one time, is only one violation of sec. 922(g)(1).); accord United States v. Pelusio, 725 F.2d 161, 168-69 (2d Cir. 1983) (construing sec. 922(g)(1)'s predecessor sec. 922(h)); United States v. Frankenberry, 696 F.2d 239, 244-45 (3d Cir. 1982) (construing sec. 922(h)); United States v. Dunford, 148 F.3d 385, 390 (4th Cir. 1998); United States v. Hodges, 628 F.2d 350, 352 (5th Cir. 1980) (construing sec. 922(h) and sec. 18 U.S.C. 1202(a)); United States v. Adams, 214 F.3d 724, 728 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Kinsley, 518 F.2d 665, 668-70 (8th Cir. 1975) (construing sec. 18 U.S.C. 1202(a)(1)); United States v. Szalkiewicz, 944 F.2d 653, 654 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 292-94 (10th Cir. 1983) (construing sec. 922(h)); United States v. Bonavia, 927 F.2d 565, 568-69 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v. Cunningham, 145 F.3d 1385, 1398 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 24 Thus, under sec. 922(g)(1), a convicted felon is seemingly punished for each transaction or acquisition by which heattempts to arm himself unlawfully. Likewise, under sec. 922(j), an individual is punished for each separate transaction involving stolen firearms. Therefore, these decisions also suggest that the government may charge an individual with multiple violations of either sec. 922(g)(1) or sec. 922(j) where it can produce evidence demonstrating that the firearms were stored or acquired separately and at different times or places. See McFarland, 469 F.2d at 1279; Oliver, 683 F.2d at 232-33; see also United States v. Keen, 96 F.3d 425, 431 n.11 (9th Cir. 1996) (Guns that are acquired at different times or stored in separate places permit separate punishment to be imposed for each violation of sec. 922(g).); Cunningham, 145 F.3d at 1398 (When a felon possesses multiple weapons, only one offense is committed unless the weapons are stored or acquired at different times or places.). But see United States v. Valentine, 706 F.2d 282, 294 (10th Cir. 1983) (reserving the issue of whether sec. 922(h) . . . should be construed to support multiple convictions because separate times of receipt and possession are shown). 25 Turning to the facts of this case, we find that the government properly limited the charges it filed against Buchmeier for the firearms he acquired from Schroeder on August 6, 1994. The government charged Buchmeier with having committed one violation of sec. 922(g)(1) (Count IV) and one violation of sec. 922(j) (Count VI) on August 6, listing all seven firearms involved in this transaction in these two counts. Because these firearms were simultaneously acquired and received by Buchmeier, any attempt to charge him with more than one violation of either sec. 922(g)(1) or sec. 922(j) for these seven firearms would have been multiplicitous. 26 The closer question, however, is whether the government's decision to charge Buchmeier with one count of violating sec. 922(g)(1) (Count I) and one count of violating sec. 922(j) (Count III) for the stolen firearms he acquired from Schroeder through the two transactions on August 5 resulted in these counts being duplicitous. Throughout this case the government has repeatedly described the interactions between Schroeder and Buchmeier as three separate acquisitions of stolen firearms in which Buchmeier, a convicted felon, attempted to arm himself unlawfully. The evidence supports this characterization. Thus, we find that the government could have charged Buchmeier with three separate counts of both sec. 922(g)(1) and sec. 922(j). Of course, just because we find that the facts of this case permitted the government to charge Buchmeier with three sets of counts, one for each transaction, does not mean that it was required to do so. See United States v. Hammen, 977 F.2d 379, 383 (7th Cir. 1992) (explaining that although each count of conviction for committing bank fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 1344 requires the execution of some act in furtherance of a scheme, the law does not require the converse: each execution need not give rise to a charge in the indictment). However, once the government chose to charge Buchmeier with acquiring and receiving all ten firearms, we find that it was required to either charge him with one violation of sec. 922(g)(1) and sec. 922(j), by way of a continuing course of conduct, or with three separate violations of sec. 922(g)(1) and sec. 922(j), in order to avoid formulating either a duplicitous or multiplicitous indictment. Therefore, we do not think the government's decision to combine the two August 5 transactions into the same two counts of the indictment was proper. 27 The government has argued that the indictment is not duplicitous because the multiple acts charged in each count were part of a continuing course of conduct. In support of this argument the government asserts that the three transactions taken together could be seen as a continuing course of conduct because the same persons were involved in the same action over the course of a relatively short period of time. As alluded to above and as we further explain below, we agree that Buchmeier could have been charged with one continuing violation. However, the government's reliance on this argument is misplaced in light of the manner in which it chose to charge Buchmeier. 28 In United States v. Berardi, 675 F.2d 894 (7th Cir. 1982), the defendant was charged with multiple counts, including one count of obstruction of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. sec. 1503. 675 F.2d at 897. Although sec. 1503 only requires one discrete act for a violation, 3 this count described three episodes in which Berardi was alleged to have furthered this endeavor. Id. While this court acknowledged that each episode listed in the count could have constituted a separate violation and therefore a separate count in the indictment, we observed that [t]he three alleged acts of obstruction occurred within a relatively short period of time, were committed by one defendant, involved a single witness, and were in furtherance of [the] solitary object of influencing [a witness] not to reveal [information] to the grand jury. Id. at 898. Thus, finding that the indictment, fairly interpreted, charge[d] Berardi with a continuing course of conduct, during a discrete period of time, to influence one witness's grand jury testimony, we concluded that these acts constituted one violation of sec. 1503, and therefore, the count was not prejudicially duplicitous. Id. at 898, 899. 29 Unlike the indictment in Berardi, the indictment in this case did not charge Buchmeier with one continuing course of conduct. Instead, the government chose to divide the three transactions and the firearms involved in each of these transactions based on the day that each of the transactions took place; one count included the two transactions on August 5, 1994, and another count dealt with the one transaction that took place on August 6, 1994. Thus, we are left wondering why the government broke up this alleged course of conduct into two separate counts if it truly wished to rely on our analysis in cases like Berardi. Ironically, the facts of this case provide substantial support for the government's argument that the three interactions between Buchmeier and Schroeder could reasonably be characterized as a continuing course of conduct. The three meetings took place over a very short period of time, less than forty-eight hours, they involved the same activity between the same two parties, and there was only one instance of payment, which took place after the third and final interaction. However, the government's decision to charge Buchmeier with multiple counts of each violation renders it unable to successfully assert this argument in defense of the indictment. Therefore, we set aside the government's proffered argument. 30 Having concluded that Counts I and III are duplicitous, we must now determine if this error affected the fairness of Buchmeier's trial. See United States v. Tanner, 471 F.2d 128, 139 (7th Cir. 1972) (The duplicity of Count III would not require a dismissal if it were shown to constitute 'harmless error' under Rule 52(a).); see also United States v. Kimberlin, 781 F.2d 1247, 1250 (7th Cir. 1985). 'The overall vice of duplicity is that the jury cannot in a general verdict render its finding on each offense, making it difficult to determine whether a conviction rests on only one of the offenses or both.' United States v. Marshall, 75 F.3d 1097, 1111 (7th Cir. 1996) (quoting United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 699 n.17 (6th Cir. 1994)). Additionally, we have explained that a duplicitous indictment may expose a defendant to other adverse effects including improper notice of the charges against him, prejudice in the shaping of evidentiary rulings, in sentencing, in limiting review on appeal, in exposure to double jeopardy, and of course the danger that a conviction will result from less than a unanimous verdict as to each separate offense. Id.; see also Kimberlin, 781 F.2d at 1250; Berardi, 675 F.2d at 899. 31 In United States v. Marshall, 75 F.3d 1097 (7th Cir. 1996), we upheld an indictment containing a count that included arguably separate and distinct offenses. Id. at 1112. Our conclusion that the indictment was not fatally flawed rested in large part on the fact that the district court had avoided prejudicing the defendant by instructing the jury that it was required to unanimously agree as to which of the offenses included in the disputed count the defendant had committed. See id.; see also United States v. Cherif, 943 F.2d 692, 701 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the possibility that the defendant was convicted by a less than unanimous jury-- where a count of the indictment listed two unlawful acts in the same count-- could have been eliminated by an instruction requiring the jury to unanimously agree as to which act the defendant was guilty of committing); accord United States v. Nattier, 127 F.3d 655, 657 (8th Cir. 1997) (The risk inherent in a duplicitous count . . . may be cured by a limiting instruction requiring the jury to unanimously find the defendant guilty of at least one distinct act.); United States v. Trammell, 133 F.3d 1343, 1354-55 (10th Cir. 1998) ('One cure for an otherwise duplicitous indictment is to give an augmented instruction requiring unanimity on one or the other of the acts charged within a count that otherwise appear to constitute separate offenses.') (citation omitted). Referring to all four counts against Buchmeier, the district court explained to the jury that: 32 [i]n order to return a verdict of guilty on any one count, you must find that the defendant possessed at least one of the firearms listed in that count, and you must unanimously agree as to which particular firearm or firearms listed in that count the defendant possessed. If you cannot agree in that manner, you must find the defendant not guilty of that count. 33 Because the jury received this specific instruction, Buchmeier can be assured that the decision to convict him on Counts I and III was the result of a unanimous verdict. Additionally, the other adverse effects that can result from a duplicitous indictment have not occurred in this case: the specificity of the counts properly notified Buchmeier of the charges against him; he was not subjected to any prejudicial evidentiary rulings during the course of his trial; the review he has sought on appeal has not been limited by the duplicitous counts; he was not prejudiced in sentencing as his sentence of 188 months was the low end of the applicable range of sentences given his status as an armed career criminal; and he faces no risk of double jeopardy because the government has conceded that he cannot again be charged for any of the firearms listed in the indictment. Because Buchmeier was not prejudiced by the duplicitous counts of the indictment and none of the concerns that can arise with a duplicitous indictment have been implicated in this case, we find that the government's improper formulation of the indictment was harmless error. Therefore, we will affirm Buchmeier's conviction on these counts. 34