Opinion ID: 2501833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Ambiguity in the Lease Termination Agreement

Text: The final issue for our review concerns an ambiguity in the Lease Termination Agreement executed on September 27, 2000. As indicated above, the LTA recounted, in relevant part, that a lease agreement had been entered into for that certain banking facility located on the ground floor and mezzanine located in the St. James Building at Tenth Street and Fourth Avenue[,] and further, that for and in consideration of the premises which are not mere recitals, but are an integral part of this agreement. ... [t]hat certain lease ... dated November 1, 1979 is hereby terminated effective October 31, 2000, at which time possession of the main banking facility located within the St. James Building will be surrendered to FMC. (Emphasis added) With regard to the foregoing, the circuit court determined that [a]n ambiguity arises as to what is the `main banking facility' as opposed to a `certain banking facility.' A clear use of language would have repeated the word `certain' a second time, or would have used the word `main' both times and repeated the inclusion of the mezzanine in both instances. By defining the scope of the lease of `that certain banking facility' as including `the ground floor and mezzanine' in the beginning of the LTA, but referring to the `surrender' of only the `main banking facility,' [FMC], as drafter of the LTA, created an ambiguity. Having determined the LTA was ambiguous, the court proceeded to consider evidence extrinsic to the agreement and to construe the ambiguity against FMC, the party who prepared it. The court ultimately concluded that the LTA did not impose upon City a contractual obligation to surrender the mezzanine, which was occupied by Frazier & Oxley. On appeal, FMC agrees with the circuit court that certain terms of the LTA are ambiguous. However, FMC contends that, considering the conflicting evidence as to the meaning of the ambiguous terms in the LTA, the ambiguity should have been resolved by a jury. In past cases, this Court has held that [w]here a contract is ambiguous, then issues of fact arise and a summary judgment is ordinarily not proper. Syl. Pt. 2, Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 172 W.Va. 63, 64, 303 S.E.2d 702, 703 (1983). See Syl. Pt. 1, Ohio Valley Contractors, Inc. v. Board of Educ. of Wetzel County, 182 W.Va. 741, 391 S.E.2d 891 (1990); Syl. Pt. 2, Glenmark Associates, Inc. v. Americare of W. Va., Inc., 179 W.Va. 632, 633, 371 S.E.2d 353, 354 (1988); Syl. Pt. 2, Buckhannon Sales Co. v. Appalantic Corp., 175 W.Va. 742, 743, 338 S.E.2d 222, 223, (1985). We further held in syllabus point one of Lee Enterprises that `[w]hile the general rule is that the construction of a writing is for the court; yet where the meaning is uncertain and ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible to show the situation of the parties, the surrounding circumstances when the writing was made, and the practical construction given to the contract by the parties themselves either contemporaneously or subsequently. If the parol evidence be not in conflict, the court must construe the writing; but, if it be conflicting on a material point necessary to interpretation of the writing, then the question of its meaning should be left to the jury under proper hypothetical instructions.' Syllabus Point 4, Watson v. Buckhannon River Coal Co., 95 W.Va. 164, 120 S.E. 390 (1923). 172 W.Va. 63, 64, 303 S.E.2d 702, 703. (Emphasis added) See Syl. Pt. 11, Poling v. Pre-Paid Legal Services, Inc., 212 W.Va. 589, 592, 575 S.E.2d 199, 202 (2002); Syl. Pt. 1, Leasetronics, Inc. v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 165 W.Va. 773, 271 S.E.2d 608 (1980); Syllabus, McShane v. Imperial Towers, Inc., 165 W.Va. 94, 267 S.E.2d 196 (1980). In this case, we agree with FMC that there are genuine issues of material fact regarding the use of the phrases main banking facility and certain banking facility in the LTA such that parol evidence concerning their interpretation should be considered and resolved by a jury. FMC contends that the LTA was intended to terminate the prime lease in its entirety and was not drafted to exclude the mezzanine from City's obligation to vacate. FMC's John Hankins testified that when the LTA was drafted, he was not aware that the law firm occupied the mezzanine pursuant to a sublease, but rather, he believed Messrs. Frazier and Oxley were permitted to use the offices because they were directors and board members of the bank. In contrast, City argues that, in fact, FMC knew of the subtenancy relationship, a fact it denoted on floor plans prepared for prospective tenants. Mr. Hankins explained, however, that the law firm's occupancy on the mezzanine appeared on floor plans because, considering it was already in the space, FMC considered the firm to be a prospective tenant after the prime lease ended. FMC notes further that City's Matthew Call testified that it was his intention to give up the entire lease, even the space the bank was not occupying (i.e., the mezzanine). City's Robert Hardwick similarly testified that he assumed all along that the mezzanine, the basement, and the whole operation was part of the bank. City argues, however, that the August 23, 2000, letter from Mr. Hankins to Mr. Hardwick, advising that FMC would take responsibility for negotiating a new lease for Frazier & Oxley after the prime lease ended shows that FMC knew that the law firm was occupying the mezzanine pursuant to a sublease. Mr. Hankins testified that his letter referred to the possibility of a new lease because he was unaware that one already existed. As the foregoing demonstrates, there are clearly genuine issues of fact which are material to the question of how the ambiguity in the LTA should be resolved. Thus, the circuit court erred in weighing the evidence and in granting summary judgment in favor of City.