Opinion ID: 577747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Application of Polaski Factors

Text: 10 Robinson asserts the ALJ improperly applied the Eighth Circuit standard in discrediting his subjective complaints of pain. An ALJ may not reject a claimant's subjective complaints of pain solely on the basis of personal observations. Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir.), supplemented, 751 F.2d 943 (8th Cir.1984), vacated, 476 U.S. 1167, 106 S.Ct. 2885, 90 L.Ed.2d 974 (1986), adhered to on remand, 804 F.2d 456 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 927, 107 S.Ct. 3211, 96 L.Ed.2d 698 (1987). Rather, the ALJ must make express credibility determinations and set forth on the record inconsistencies that lead to this conclusion. 11 The ALJ specifically must consider the claimant's prior work record, as well as observations by third parties regarding: (1) daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency and intensity of pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; and (5) functional restrictions. Polaski, 739 F.2d at 1322. Credibility determinations must be supported by substantial evidence. Rautio v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 176, 179 (8th Cir.1988). 12 While there is little doubt that Robinson experiences pain, the question we must address is whether the pain is so severe that he cannot perform any light or sedentary work. Russell, 950 F.2d at 545. The record is clear that the ALJ considered the Polaski factors before finding Robinson's complaints of disabling pain exaggerated and not credible. We find that the ALJ's determination is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. 13 The ALJ first found that Robinson's work record was somewhat inconsistent after 1972. Robinson's vocational report shows that while he was not injured until 1984, he did not work at all from 1973 to 1977. 14 The ALJ also considered the duration, frequency and intensity of pain, as well as precipitating and aggravating factors. While Robinson claims his pain is constant and disabling, the record reveals that Dr. Saporta, the initial treating physician, reported that as a result of a request from the patient, he released Robinson to work on October 17, 1984, two months after the accident. Similarly, Robinson asked Dr. Kratochvil on May 9, 1985, to be allowed to return to work. Kratochvil released Robinson for work on May 13, 1985. Dr. Tribulato reported on December 11, 1985, that although Robinson should not return to heavy work, he was suitable for retraining for other employment. Robinson's vocational evaluator remarked on November 25, 1985, that Robinson's only medical restrictions were to seek lighter work. 15 Moreover, the ALJ found and the record reveals that Robinson made no complaints of neck pain between January of 1986 and February of 1988. When he was treated at the University of Nebraska Medical Center on March 6, 1988, he complained of pain associated with his testicles, but did not complain of neck pain. 16 The ALJ also considered the dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication and treatment. All doctors who treated Robinson for back and neck pain prescribed conservative treatment, including physical therapy, muscle relaxants, heat and sound treatments, and pain relievers. The record reveals no evidence that Robinson sought more aggressive treatment. Robinson testified that pain relievers relieved his pain somewhat and only occasionally caused a slight queasiness in his stomach. The record also reveals that Robinson told Dr. Mathews at the University of Nebraska Medical Center in May of 1988 that Motrin helped his back pain, but he did not take it regularly. Moreover, Robinson told his vocational counselor in January of 1986 that he was not taking any pain medication. 17 Based on this evidence, the ALJ certainly could conclude that Robinson's treatment history as well as medical testimony of his treating physicians contradict his claims of disabling pain. See Thomas v. Sullivan, 928 F.2d 255, 259 (8th Cir.1991); Benskin v. Bowen, 830 F.2d 878, 884 (8th Cir.1987) (treatment by hot showers and taking doses of Advil and aspirin do not indicate disabling pain); Cruse, 867 F.2d at 1187 (minimal consumption of pain medication reveals lack of disabling pain); Rautio, 862 F.2d at 179 (failure to seek aggressive treatment and limited use of prescription medications not suggestive of disabling back pain). 18 Moreover, Robinson's requests to return to work belie the account of his daily activities. The fact that Robinson sought to return to work in October of 1984 and May of 1985 contradicts statements about his inability to perform housework. Robinson's testimony as to his daily activities reveals other inconsistencies. Robinson testified he drove his daughter two blocks to school every day and returned home immediately. He later testified he drove a total of approximately one and one-half miles each day. The record also revealed that Robinson apparently felt well enough to attempt to lift a heavy tool box in April of 1988. 19 Finally, the ALJ considered the functional restrictions on Robinson and again found inconsistencies. While Robinson reported difficulty sitting, the vocational report showed he had no difficulty sitting throughout the testing. While Robinson reported he could not lift more than ten pounds, Dr. Kratochvil gave him a lifting and carrying restriction of twenty pounds. And while Robinson reported difficulty standing, the ALJ's personal observation at the administrative hearing revealed no difficulty standing. 20 If an ALJ discredits testimony and explicitly gives good reasons for so doing, we are bound by that judgment unless it is not supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. We find substantial evidence on the record as a whole to uphold the ALJ's determination that Robinson's claims of disabling pain were not credible. 21 The ALJ also discredited the testimony of Robinson's wife. Despite our repeated directives that the Secretary specifically discuss each credibility determination made, see Smith v. Heckler, 735 F.2d 312, 317 (8th Cir.1984), the Secretary has once again failed to list specific reasons for discrediting the testimony of Jewel Robinson. Nevertheless, it is clear that the ALJ specifically addressed Jewel Robinson's testimony and found it not credible. This finding is supported by the same evidence that proved Robinson's claims not credible. While it is preferable that the ALJ delineate the specific credibility determinations for each witness, an arguable deficiency in opinion-writing technique does not require us to set aside an administrative finding when that deficiency had no bearing on the outcome. Benskin, 830 F.2d at 883.