Opinion ID: 6929869
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Employment of a “Miner” After June 30, 1973

Text: Although we have concluded that the ALJ’s finding that Elliot did not possess substantial powers of supervision or control over mining operations on the coal lands it leased to others was correct, we must still consider the Director’s alternative argument that Elliot is an “operator” because it employed Kanour as a miner after June 30, 1973. The regulations defining an operator state, “any employer of a miner as defined in § 725.202(a) shall, to the extent appropriate, be considered an operator for the purposes of this part....” 20 C.F.R. § 725.491(a) (1992). Section 902(d) of the Act, as well as the regulations, defines a “miner” as “any individual who works or has worked in or around a coal mine or coal preparation facility in the extraction or preparation of coal.” 25 30 U.S.C.A. § 902(d); 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.-101(a)(26), 725.202(a). This Court has fashioned a two-prong test for determining whether an individual is a miner. See Hanna v. Director, OWCP, 860 F.2d 88, 91 (3d Cir.1988). “The definition of miner contains two elements — a ‘situs’ test requiring work in [or around] a coal mine [or a coal preparation facility], and the second, a ‘function’ component requiring performance of coal extraction or preparation work. Both of these requirements must be met.” Id. (quoting Wisor v. Director, OWCP, 748 F.2d 176, 178 (3d Cir.1984) (citations omitted, brackets in original)). To satisfy the situs test, a person must have worked in or around a “coal mine” or custom coal preparation facility and have been subject to coal dust exposure as a result. The term “coal mine” is defined as: an area of land and all structures, facilities, machinery, tools, equipment, shafts, slopes, tunnels, excavations, and other property, real or personal, placed upon, under or above the surface of such land by any person, used in, or to be used in, or resulting from, the work of extracting, in such area bituminous coal, lignite, or anthracite from its natural deposits in the earth by any means or method.... 30 U.S.C.A. § 802(h)(2). The function part of the test requires that the claimant’s job be “ ‘integral to the extraction or preparation of coal, not ancillary to the delivery and commercial use of processed coal.’ ” Stroh v. Director, OWCP, 810 F.2d 61, 63 (3d Cir.1987) (holding that self-employed hauler of coal was miner because he transported coal from mine site to processing plant that further processed coal before retail sale) (citation omitted); see also Hanna, 860 F.2d at 93 (holding employee of mining company that also happened to be coal consumer who loaded coal from tipple onto barges was miner because his work was necessary in preparing coal for delivery). Even work which does not meet a strict “but for” test, i.e. but for the work no coal could be extracted or prepared, may be covered if it is “part of the extraction and preparation process as it is now practiced....” Amax Coal Co. v. Fogg, 865 F.2d 916, 919 (7th Cir.1989) (holding that “work in the extraction or preparation of coal” includes all work, including plaintiffs work as reclamation bulldozer operator, which is part of the modern commonly-applied process of extracting and preparing coal). In the instant case, the ALJ specifically found that: Mr. Kanour does not meet the “situs” [prong of the situs-function] test. Mr. Kanour’s activities involved no oversight or control; he was an observer, was in the mines on an occasional basis, and reported to Elliot regarding the lessees’ operations. In Zavora v. United States Steel Corp., 2 BLR 1-1202, 1208-10 (1980), the Benefits Review Board held that a Department of Interior inspector was not a “miner” while employed at the Department because he was only occasionally in the mines. Here, Mr. Kanour was not in the leased mines enough to be considered a “miner.” Thus, Elliot did not employ a miner or miners after June 30, 1973. App. at 13. 26 We agree with the ALJ that Kanour was not a “miner.” In the instant case, it is not disputed that Elliot employed Kanour after June 30,1973. The nature and characterization of his employment is what is in dispute. He worked out of the main office that Helena and Power also used and was required to travel by company truck among five strip mines within a fifteen mile radius. He assisted Minds in performing noise samples and, according to Long, he looked after Elliot’s equipment before it was sold and answered employee questions about whether there was going to be any more work. According to Kanour himself, he took care of the permits and leases and made sure the contractors were staying within DER regulations and that the reclamation procedures were timely carried out. He also answered some of the employees’ questions concerning what they should do regarding certain regulations. According to the independent contractors, no Elliot employees, including Kan-our, assisted or directed their coal production. Avery, President of Helena and later Power, also stated in her deposition that Elliot did not send any inspectors to check the mining operations. Elliot also did not inform her of any type of specific preparation process that they should use for the coal. Furthermore, Elliot never told them how to mine the coal, never told them how to go about selling it, never sent anyone to help supervise the mining, and never had any financial interest in her company. Kanour was present at the mines on only limited occasions and did not perform the functions of a miner. Cf. Falcon Coal Co., Inc. v. Clemons, 873 F.2d 916, 918 (6th Cir.1989) (night watchman at strip mine was not “miner”). Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s finding that Kanour was not a “miner” within the meaning of the Act after June 30, 1973. 27 Thus, Elliot cannot be considered an operator on this alternative basis.