Opinion ID: 4644041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bail Jumping

Text: Appellant argues this charge should be viewed as fruit of the poisonous tree because “[h]ad he not been arrested, there would never have been a bail.” Since bail jumping is a separate criminal offense, we disagree. KRS 520.070(1), the first-degree bail jumping statute, reads as follows: A person is guilty of bail jumping in the first degree when, having been released from custody by court order, with or without bail, upon condition that he will subsequently appear at a specified time and place in connection with a charge of having committed a felony, he intentionally fails to appear at that time and place. (Emphasis added). We agree with our Court of Appeals, which held the statute is “plain and unambiguous,” and that “the nature of the charge(s) against a defendant at the time he jumps” is the determining factor. Curley v. Commonwealth, 895 S.W.2d 10, 12 (Ky. App. 1995). In Curley, the defendant had originally been charged with a felony, but, by the time he jumped bail, had been reduced to a misdemeanor charge. Due to the “nature of the charge” at the time he jumped bail being a misdemeanor rather than a felony, the defendant could not be charged with first-degree bail jumping. Adopting and applying the reasoning of Curley, here, Appellant was charged with felony drug trafficking when he jumped bail—therefore, that is the “nature of the charge” we consider. It is immaterial whether the evidence used to support the underlying charge should have been suppressed. Bail convicted felon. Not only did defense counsel not object to this line of questioning, it had implied that Appellant was not dealing drugs, as he was unarmed. 14 jumping is an independent charge. While Appellant may well ultimately be acquitted of the drug charge, the fact still remains that he jumped bail. Appellant had to comply with the trial court’s order to appear and should have disputed his charges through the proper process. To hold otherwise would encourage those defendants with a belief evidence against them is unconstitutional to avoid appearing in court. It would be a slippery slope and encourage defiance with trial courts’ bonding conditions. We decline Appellant’s invitation to embark upon such a perilous journey in the present case.