Opinion ID: 1351510
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Purposeful Discrimination Under Batson v. Kentucky

Text: During voir dire, the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against Black prospective juror Givan. Defense counsel objected and the following colloquy ensued: MR. BLUM [defense counsel]: Defense objects, noting the point that Miss Givan is black. I see no reason  THE COURT: Overruled. MR. BLUM: Can I just state the basis that it is systematic exclusion. THE COURT: Seeing as she is the first black that is seated on the jury, I can't see how you can get systematic exclusion. MR. COLLIER [prosecutor]: I would also note for the record that during the Witherspoon [4] voir dire, Miss Givan said she can only vote for the death penalty if she was absolutely forced to, and I am not about to place anybody on the jury since that's the only issue  who is going to indicate that. (10) Defendant now contends the prosecutor excused Ms. Givan for racial reasons, thereby violating his right to equal protection under the federal Constitution. ( Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [90 L.Ed.2d 69, 106 S.Ct. 1712].) [5] In order to establish a prima facie case of discriminatory motive, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, [citation], and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race. ( Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 96 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 87].) Next, the defendant must show that the totality of the relevant evidence demonstrates the prosecutor was exercising peremptory challenges to exclude venire persons on account of their race. This combination of factors in the empaneling of the petit jury ... raises the necessary inference of purposeful discrimination. ( Ibid. [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 88].) Once the defendant makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral explanation for challenging black jurors. ( Id. at p. 97 [90 L.Ed.2d at p. 88]; cf. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-282 [adopting this same procedure].) There is no doubt Blacks constitute a cognizable racial group for the purposes of our analysis. (See generally, Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. 79; Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 280, fn. 26.) However, defendant did not establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination or systematic exclusion solely by his observation that one prospective juror peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor was Black. He points to nothing else in the record, nor have we found anything, to support his claim that the prosecutor's challenge to Givan was racially motivated. People v. Rousseau (1982) 129 Cal. App.3d 526 [179 Cal. Rptr. 892] is illustrative. In that case the prosecutor challenged the only two Blacks on the jury panel. Counsel objected by merely noting that `there were only two blacks on the whole panel, and they were both challenged by the district attorney.' ( Id. at p. 536.) The Rousseau court found counsel's summary reason, without more, wholly inadequate to shift the burden to the People to provide a racially neutral explanation for the challenge. ( Id. at pp. 536-537; see also People v. Turner (1986) 42 Cal.3d 711, 719, fn. 4 [230 Cal. Rptr. 656, 726 P.2d 102].) As in Rousseau, defendant's brief explanation of the basis for his objection (the first Black prospective juror was challenged), without more, was insufficient to establish a prima facie showing of systematic exclusion or purposeful discrimination.