Opinion ID: 76989
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tanner's Standing Rights

Text: 17 In determining that Tanner did not have standing to challenge the entire ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine, the district court relied heavily on this Circuit's previous decision in Granite State Outdoor Adver., Inc. v. City of Clearwater, 351 F.3d 1112 (11th Cir.2003) ( Clearwater ). The Clearwater court stated that a plaintiff cannot gain standing under the overbreadth doctrine to assert the rights of third parties not before the court until the plaintiff has fully satisfied all three constitutional standing requirements. Id. at 1116. The court conceded that the plaintiff had suffered an actual injury as to one section of the code, and granted overbreadth standing under that section. Id. at 1117. Nonetheless, the court concluded that the injury was not sufficient to allow it to grant overbreadth standing to the plaintiff to challenge the rest of the Ordinance. Id. Thus, the Clearwater panel took the position that a plaintiff challenging the facial constitutionality of a city's sign ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine can only challenge portions of the ordinance under which the plaintiff itself was actually injured. Id. at 1116-17. 18 Here, the district court found that Tanner had personally suffered an Article III injury-in-fact only as to § 1-43. The court followed the reasoning set forth in Clearwater and determined that Tanner had standing to challenge only that section as applied to it, and under the overbreadth doctrine, as applied to non-commercial speech. Tanner argues that it is entitled to challenge every unconstitutional aspect of the Ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine. Tanner notes that the overbreadth doctrine was designed to protect the freedom of speech, which is a right of paramount importance under the Constitution. 19 As the Clearwater court stated, before a plaintiff can launch an overbreadth challenge, the plaintiff must suffer an injury in fact. See Clearwater, 351 F.3d at 1116 (citing Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass'n., Inc., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93, 108 S.Ct. 636, 642-43, 98 L.Ed.2d 782 (1988); Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 634, 100 S.Ct. 826, 834, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); Bischoff v. Osceola County, 222 F.3d 874, 884 (11th Cir.2000)). The Clearwater court overlooked our past Eleventh Circuit precedent, however, when it assumed that under the overbreadth doctrine, a plaintiff can only challenge the one section under which it suffered a concrete injury. 351 F.3d at 1117-19. 20 Prior to Clearwater, if a claim was brought challenging the constitutionality of a sign ordinance, and the plaintiff met the Article III minimal requirements for standing under one provision of the ordinance, it was accepted that courts would grant standing for the plaintiff to also make a broad facial challenge to the constitutionality of the Ordinance as a whole. See, e.g., Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 505 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 2882; Granite State Outdoor Adver. v. City of St. Petersburg, 348 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.2003) ( St. Petersburg ); Dimmitt v. City of Clearwater, 985 F.2d 1565 (11th Cir.1993); National Adver. Co. v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 934 F.2d 283 (11th Cir.1991) ( National ); Solomon v. City of Gainesville, 763 F.2d 1212 (11th Cir.1985). Even when a statute was constitutionally applied to the litigant but might be unconstitutionally applied to third parties not before the court, then overbreadth standing was proper. See Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 129-30, 112 S.Ct. 2395 (It is well established that in the area of freedom of expression an overbroad regulation may be subject to facial review and invalidation even though its application in the case under consideration may be constitutionally unobjectionable.). Thus, under prior precedent, once a plaintiff could demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact as to one provision of a statute governing speech, the plaintiff gained standing to challenge the statute as a whole. 21 Specifically, in Metromedia , the Supreme Court recognized that parties with a commercial interest in speech may raise a facial challenge to an ordinance and raise the noncommercial speech interests of third parties. 453 U.S. 490, 505 n. 11, 101 S.Ct. 2882, 69 L.Ed.2d 800. Additionally, in National , a panel of this Court held that an outdoor advertising company had standing to assert claims for the alleged violations of First Amendment rights on behalf of itself and its advertisers. 934 F.2d at 285. In St. Petersburg, another panel of this Court assumed, without discussion, that the plaintiff sign company had standing to facially challenge the city's sign ordinance. 348 F.3d at 1280. Finally, in Solomon, this Court granted the plaintiff standing to facially challenge an ordinance on the ground that it might substantially abridge the First Amendment rights of parties not before the Court. 763 F.2d at 1214-15. 3 22 In light of the strong precedent from the Supreme Court and this Circuit concerning the doctrine of overbreadth which preceded the Clearwater decision, we are compelled to follow our prior precedent or earliest case rule and uphold our decisions preceding Clearwater and disregard the narrow approach to the overbreadth doctrine employed by the Clearwater court. The prior precedent rule dictates that: 23 A prior panel decision of this Court is binding on subsequent panels and can be overturned only by the Court sitting en banc. . . . When faced with an intra-circuit split we must apply the earliest case rule, . . . a panel should look to the line of authority containing the earliest case, because a decision of a prior panel cannot be overturned by a later panel. 24 Morrison v. Amway Corp., 323 F.3d 920, 929 (11th Cir.2003) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Because this Court sitting en banc has not overruled St. Petersburg, Dimmitt, National , and Solomon, and because they came before the Clearwater decision, we hold that Tanner has standing to make a facial challenge to the Ordinance as a whole. 25 Additionally, we note that the Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit cases that came after Clearwater reaffirm this Circuit's previous authority concerning the overbreadth doctrine. See e.g., City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 124 S.Ct. 2219, 159 L.Ed.2d 84 (2004). In Littleton, the Supreme Court granted the plaintiff overbreadth standing to facially challenge the judicial review provisions of the Littleton adult business licensing scheme even though the plaintiff brought a lawsuit before even attempting to obtain a license under the city's ordinance. Id. at 2222, 2226. Furthermore, the Court did not limit the plaintiff's facial standing to the specific provision that rendered the plaintiff's use unlawful under the city's regulation. In fact, the Court permitted the plaintiff to make a facial challenge without ever even discussing the plaintiff's individual injury. Id. Similarly, in Cafe Erotica, a panel of this Court determined that two adult businesses had standing to challenge the County's sign ordinance as applied and on its face. 360 F.3d at 1281. This court concluded that the adult businesses could facially challenge the ordinance under the overbreadth doctrine because it placed unbridled discretion in the hands of county officials. Id. 26 Finally, we note that in Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1257-1273, 2005 WL 1262094, -16 (11th Cir.2005) this Court afforded the plaintiff standing to make a broad challenge to all unconstitutional elements of the sign code even though the plaintiff had not suffered an injury from all the provisions in the code. Thus, we conclude that because Tanner suffered an injury in fact as to section 1-43 of the statute, it has standing to challenge the statute as a whole.