Opinion ID: 551133
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Immunity for Liability for Civil Damages.

Text: 36
37 The plaintiffs allege that defendants Brennan and Vocke, both Wisconsin State Circuit Court judges, along with the other defendants, conspired to destroy the Life Science Church and deprive the plaintiffs of their above-mentioned constitutional rights. Paragraph 4(h) of Count I of the amended complaint specifically mentions Brennan as conspiring with the other defendants by signing a search warrant based on two allegedly false affidavits. Plaintiffs allege that this search warrant permitted various defendants to illegally trespass and confiscate property and to commit an assault and battery on plaintiff Stockheimer. 38 Paragraph 4(n) of Count I of the amended complaint alleges that Vocke ordered the removal of the mobile homes, septic systems, and sanitary systems from the Life Science Church property. In Count III, the plaintiffs allege that Vocke issued an opinion and judgment denying plaintiffs' request to intervene in a state court action identified only as Cause No. 80-CV-172, and also ordered that the Life Science Church be disbanded. As to defendants Brennan and Vocke, the plaintiffs seek monetary damages; an order enjoining Vocke's order to remove various structures; a return of the confiscated property; and a declaration that the above-mentioned affidavits, search warrant and orders are void. 39 Defendants Brennan and Vocke move to dismiss based upon the principles of absolute judicial immunity, absention, and res judicata. As more fully detailed below, the Court finds that the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity cloaks defendants Brennan and Vocke from civil liability for damages pursuant to the allegations contained in plaintiffs' amended complaint. 40 On a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the allegations thereof being taken as true, and, if it appears reasonably conceivable that at trial the plaintiff can establish a set of facts entitling him to some relief, the complaint should not be dismissed. Mathers Fund, Inc. v. Colwell Co., 564 F.2d 780, 783 (7th Cir.1977). 41 The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity was first announced by the United States Supreme Court in Bradley v. Fisher, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) 335 (1871), which held that a judge was not to be held liable in civil damages for judicial acts committed while exercising his jurisdiction, even if accused of acting maliciously and corruptly. See also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978); Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.1987) (Wisconsin judge who altered trial transcript and docket sheet was immune from Sec. 1983 action). Moreover, the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is not limited by 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. 42 The doctrine of absolute judicial immunity is for the benefit of the public, whose interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence and without fear of consequences. Scott v. Stansfield, L.R. 3 Ex. 220, 223 (1868) quoted in Bradley, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 349. The Supreme Court in Bradley identified five policy reasons supporting the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity: 43 1) A judge must exercise his duty to make decisions free of worries about personal liability for making those decisions. 44 2) Losing parties may be quick to accuse a judge of improper motives in his decisions. 45 3) It is too easy to allege bad faith if judges had only a qualified good faith immunity. 46 4) Faced with the possibility of defending civil actions, judges may not be free to exercise their judgment and may be forced to keep unnecessary voluminous records. 47 5) Other procedural safeguards reduce the need for civil actions against judges. 48 Eades v. Sterlinske, 810 F.2d at 725, paraphrasing Bradley, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 347. 49 A judge will be liable for his actions only when they were taken in the clear absence of all jurisdiction or taken in excess of jurisdiction. Bradley, 13 U.S. (1 Wall.) at 351. Therefore, the crucial question is whether the judge's acts were judicial acts. Stump, 435 U.S. at 348. In Stump, the Supreme Court stated that the factors determining whether an act by a judge is a 'judicial' one relate to the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. 435 U.S. at 362. 50 The specific act that plaintiffs attribute to Brennan is the signing of a search warrant. The specific acts attributed to Vocke are issuing and entering various orders, an opinion, and a judgment. Further, plaintiffs attribute other general acts of conspiracy to these two defendants. 51 Wisconsin law vests in these two defendants as judges, the jurisdictional authority to perform the specific acts which plaintiffs attribute to them in their amended complaint. Therefore, the first part of the Stump test is satisfied. Further, plaintiffs were dealing with Brennan and Vocke in their judicial capacities and, thus, the second part of the Stump test is satisfied. The Court finds that defendants Vocke and Brennan are immune from liability for civil damages in this action and, accordingly, their motions to dismiss will be granted. 52
53 The amended complaint's only allegations pertaining to defendant Nagy are set forth in Count I. This count alleges that Nagy participated in a conspiracy to falsely prepare an affidavit alleging unlawful activity by Thomas Stockheimer. Plaintiffs allege that this affidavit served as a basis for the issuance of a search warrant by Judge Brennan. Based on these factual allegations, plaintiffs contend that defendant Nagy committed criminal trespass and illegally confiscated property. Additionally, the plaintiffs allege that in executing this search warrant Nagy was involved in an assault and battery upon plaintiff Kathryn Stockheimer. Plaintiffs seek to recover monetary damages pursuant to these Count I allegations. 54 Nagy moves the Court for summary judgment arguing that he is absolutely immune form civil damages based on the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity or, in the alternative, that the doctrine of qualified immunity cloaks him from civil liability since he acted in good faith and with a reasonable belief in the validity of the search warrant. 55 To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the moving party must show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, viewing all factual inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Company, 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 56 Here, plaintiffs have not submitted any briefs or affidavits in response to Nagy's motion for summary judgment. Rule 56(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require[s] a party opposing a motion for summary judgment, supported by affidavits, to produce enough evidentiary matter to establish a genuine issue for trial for the 'very mission of the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial.'  Markwell v. General Tire And Rubber Company, 367 F.2d 748, 750 (7th Cir.1966) quoting 6 Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) p 56.01(14). Since plaintiffs have not responded to defendant Nagy's summary judgment motion, this motion must be resolved on the basis of the pleadings and defendant Nagy's evidentiary submissions filed in support of his motion. See Young v. South Side Packing Company, 369 F.Supp. 59, 60 (E.D.Wis.1973). 57 In executing the search warrant, defendant Nagy, then a Clark County deputy sheriff, was acting pursuant to a Wisconsin circuit court order. Inasmuch as plaintiffs are alleging that defendant Nagy, in his individual capacity, trespassed and illegally confiscated property while obeying a court order, defendant Nagy is absolutely immune from liability on civil damages. Nonjudicial officials whose official duties have an integral relationship with the judicial process are entitled to absolute immunity for their quasi-judicial conduct. Henry v. Farmer City State Bank, 808 F.2d 1228, 1238 (7th Cir.1986) (holding that the enforcement of a court-ordered judgment is intimately related with the judicial process, and a person obeying that court order has quasi-judicial or absolute immunity for his acts as directed by the court). 58 Regarding that aspect of plaintiffs' allegations pertaining to Nagy's participation in a conspiracy to prepare a false affidavit, the Court finds that Nagy is immune from civil liability for these alleged acts. In Malley v. Briggs, --- U.S. ----, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1097 (1986), the United States Supreme Court recently announced that a law enforcement officer is entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages under Sec. 1983 for his conduct in applying for an arrest warrant by presenting a complaint and an affidavit. The Supreme Court stated that in determining whether a law enforcement officer is afforded the protection of qualified immunity in the warrant application setting, the test is whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have applied for the warrant, with the knowledge that probable cause is required. Malley, 106 S.Ct. at 1098. 59 Wis.Stat. Sec. 968.12(1) requires a showing of probable cause before a search warrant may issue. Probable cause is shown where there are sufficient facts to excite an honest belief in a reasonable mind that objects sought are linked with the commission of a crime, and that the objects sought will be found in the place to be searched. State v. Edwards, 98 Wis.2d 367, 373, 297 N.W.2d 12 (1980). This probable cause showing may be based upon an affidavit whose contents derive from the affiant's information and belief. Wis.Stat. Sec. 968.12(2). 60 Nagy's affidavit, submitted in conjunction with the search warrant application, identifies two people who observed the commission of a crime and noted the documents used in that crime. The court transcript of the proceedings conducted pursuant to the search warrant application included the testimony of one of these eye witnesses and of Nagy himself. Considering this evidence of probable cause, and recognizing that plaintiffs have not responded to the summary judgment motion, the Court finds that Nagy had a reasonable basis for applying for the subject search warrant. Accordingly, the Court finds that defendant Nagy is immune from liability for damages in this action for his conduct in applying for the search warrant.