Opinion ID: 1122777
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Constitutionality Under the Federal Constitution

Text: Does there exist any constitutional impediment to imposing either death or life imprisonment without parole upon one who kills during a dangerous felony, in the absence of proof of an intent to kill? With due respect, I find wholly unconvincing the majority's analysis of the serious constitutional questions which would arise were we to construe section 190.2 as it is written. In Enmund, supra, the high court strongly suggested that either an intent to kill or personal involvement in the killing would be sufficient to justify imposing the death penalty in a felony murder case. Thus, Enmund held that the Eighth Amendment does not permit imposing that penalty on one such as Enmund who aids and abets a felony in the course of which a murder is committed by others but who does not himself kill, attempt to kill, or intend that a killing take place or that lethal force will be employed. (Italics added, 458 U.S. at p. 797 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 1151, 102 S.Ct. at pp. 3376-3377].) As the court explained,  Enmund did not kill or intend to kill and thus his culpability is plainly different from that of the robbers who killed; yet the state treated them alike.... (Italics added, id., at p. 798 [73 L.Ed.2d at p. 1152, 102 S.Ct., p. 3377].) Thus, the states may continue to punish with death (and certainly with life imprisonment without parole) those persons who, in the course of committing a dangerous felony, actually kill someone, whether or not they actually intended the killing to occur. Can there be any doubt that imposition of such punishment under such circumstances has a rational penological basis? The purpose underlying the felony murder special circumstances provision is perfectly obvious. It was and is to deter felons from using deadly weapons or deadly force, or taking other action likely to result in death, by severely punishing the commission of those dangerous felonies which actually result in a killing. The fact that some intentional murders may be punished less severely certainly does not invalidate the challenged statute: [A]symmetry in the scale of penalties arouses constitutional alertness but breaches the cruel and unusual punishment clause only if it lacks a rational basis. ( In re Maston (1973) 33 Cal. App.3d 559, 565 [109 Cal. Rptr. 164] [life imprisonment without parole for aggravated kidnaping is constitutional form of punishment despite lesser penalty for premeditated murder]; see People v. Crane (1983) 142 Cal. App.3d 92, 101-103 [190 Cal. Rptr. 785]; People v. Noble (1981) 126 Cal. App.3d 1011, 1018-1021 [179 Cal. Rptr. 302].) In an age when the state and nation are awash with murders and violent felonies, it is within the power of the Legislature or the people themselves by initiative to judge which felonies are deemed more serious, and to include only those offenses within the felony murder special circumstances statute. The present classification and identification of these felonies are abundantly reasonable. In sum, given Enmund's strong implication that one who personally kills while committing a dangerous felony constitutionally may be subject to the death penalty, any serious constitutional questions are illusory with respect to the provision at issue here.