Opinion ID: 152880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Do The Defendants' Sentences Violate The Ex Post Facto Clause?

Text: Next, Kumar and Richards contend that application of the 2005 Guidelines to their fraud offenses, which were completed in 2000, violated the Ex Post Facto clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 3; see also art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from passing any ex post facto law). We believe this claim is without merit. A sentencing court must generally apply the version of the Guidelines that is in effect at the time of sentencing, unless there is an ex post facto problem with such application. United States v. Rodriguez, 989 F.2d 583, 587 (2d Cir.1993) (internal citation omitted); see also U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(a) (2008) (The court shall use the Guidelines Manual in effect on the date that the defendant is sentenced.). For a law to contravene the Ex Post Facto clause, two critical elements must be present: First, the law must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment; and second, it must disadvantage the offender affected by it. Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423, 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed.2d 351 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted); see United States v. Kilkenny, 493 F.3d 122, 126 (2d Cir.2007) ([T]he Ex Post Facto Clause enshrines in the Constitution a basic presumption of our law, that is, legislation in the criminal law is not to be applied retroactively. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The defendants contend that application of the 2005 Guidelines to their fraud offenses was both disadvantage[ous] and retrospective. Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446. They argue that their fraud offenses were completed ... in October 2000, when the New Business Model brought an end to the 35-day month practice, Kumar Br. 16, and therefore, that application of the 2005 Guidelines to their securities fraud offenses, which substantially increased their sentences, violated the Ex Post Facto clause. The government responds by citing the one-book rule, in effect prior to the time of the defendants' commission of fraud, which provides that [i]f the defendant is convicted of two offenses, the first committed before, and the second after, a revised edition of the Guidelines Manual became effective, the revised edition of the Guidelines Manual is to be applied to both offenses. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3). Here, there is no question that application of the 2005 Guidelines disadvantaged the defendants by subjecting them to the higher ranges of the 2005 Guidelines compared to the 1998 version of the Guidelines in effect when the 35-day month practice was discontinued in October 2000. [10] Both Kumar and Richards were convicted of fraud and obstruction. In accordance with U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2(c), these crimes were grouped together for sentencing under the higher of the two applicable offense levels, which groups the separate offenses of fraud and obstruction into a single group because one of the counts, here, obstruction, embodies conduct that is treated as a[n] ... adjustment to the guideline applicable to [the other] count[], here, fraud. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The effect of the aforementioned revisions to the 1998 Guidelines, see supra n.10, resulted in a 20-level enhancement for both Kumar and Richards, from offense levels of 30, calling for a range of 97 to 121 months' imprisonment, to offense levels of 50, calling for life imprisonment. [11] The differences between the application of the 1998 and the 2005 version of the Guidelines is decidedly detrimental to the defendants. Thus, our only inquiry is whether application of the 2005 Guidelines to the defendants' sentences was retrospective within the meaning of the Ex Post Facto clause. See Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446. [12] We previously reserved ruling on this question. See United States v. Santopietro, 166 F.3d 88, 96-97 (2d Cir.1999), abrogated on other grounds, Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 124 S.Ct. 1941, 158 L.Ed.2d 891 (2004). In Santopietro, we noted that [t]he Commission has issued a policy statement specifying that where some offenses occur before and some occur after a revised Guidelines version, the later version is to be applied to all offenses. Id. at 96; accord U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11(b)(3) (1998). However, the Commission's policy statement does not mark the end of the inquiry, because an agency's interpretation of its own regulations is only given controlling weight where its interpretation does not violate the Constitution or a federal statute. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 45, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted); accord United States v. Stephens, 347 F.3d 427, 430 (2d Cir.2003). Thus, we must independently consider whether the one-book rule violates the Ex Post Facto clause. A majority of circuit courts has held that the one-book rule does not contravene the Ex Post Facto clause, at least as applied... to a series of similar offenses. Santopietro, 166 F.3d at 96. In United States v. Vivit , the Seventh Circuit held that the enactment of the grouping rules [under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.2] provides fair notice such that the application of §§ 1B1.11(b)(3) and 3D1.2 does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. 214 F.3d 908, 919 (7th Cir.2000). According to the Seventh Circuit, the combination of the grouping rules and the one-book rule puts a defendant on notice that the version of the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time he committed the last of a series of grouped offenses will apply to the entire group. Id. at 918 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits agree. See United States v. Bailey, 123 F.3d 1381, 1404-05 (11th Cir.1997) ([T]he one book rule, together with the Guidelines grouping rules and relevant conduct, provide that related offenses committed in a series will be sentenced together under the ... Manual in effect at the end of the series.) (footnotes omitted); see also United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1262-63 (10th Cir.2001); United States v. Lewis, 235 F.3d 215, 218 (4th Cir.2000); United States v. Kimler, 167 F.3d 889, 893-95 (5th Cir.1999); United States v. Cooper, 35 F.3d 1248, 1254-55 (8th Cir.1994), vacated, 514 U.S. 1094, 115 S.Ct. 1820, 131 L.Ed.2d 742 (1995), reinstated, 63 F.3d 761, 762 (8th Cir.1995) (per curiam), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1158, 116 S.Ct. 1548, 134 L.Ed.2d 650 (1996). [13] The Third and Ninth circuits, however, have rejected the Commission's position as incompatible with the Ex Post Facto clause. In United States v. Ortland , the defendant was charged with five identical counts of mail fraud. 109 F.3d 539, 547 (9th Cir.1997). The offenses charged in four of the counts occurred prior to November 1, 1989, when the relevant Guidelines section for calculating loss in a fraud case was amended, and the fifth count covered conduct that took place in December 1989, after the amendment. Id. at 546. The district court, finding no ex post facto problem, applied the amended Guidelines section to all five counts resulting in an enhanced sentence for the first four counts. Id. The Ninth Circuit viewed each count as a completed offense, and concluded that [a]pplication of the [Commission's] policy statement in this case would violate the Constitution; its application would cause Ortland's sentence on earlier, completed counts to be increased by a later Guideline. Id. at 547. The Ortland court further questioned the logic[] behind the one-book rule, opining that [t]he harm caused by the earlier offenses can be counted in sentencing the later one. That does not mean that the punishment for the earlier offenses themselves can be increased, simply because the punishment for the later one can be. In fact, were the later count to fall at some time after sentencing, all that would remain would be the earlier sentences, which would be too long. There are, in fact, five separate crimes; each carries its own punishment, even if the sentences are all run concurrently to the extent that they overlap. Id. (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). The Ortland court effectively found that application of the one-book rule under the circumstances would be akin to the tail wagging the dog. See, e.g., United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1404 n. 17 (3d Cir.1994) (concluding that, while the one-book rule ... certainly can compel application of the earlier Manual, the Ex Post Facto clause may apply so as to prohibit the application of the later Manual to all counts); see also Santopietro, 166 F.3d at 96 (discussing the related problem, left by Ortland and Bertoli, of whether the grouping rules of the earlier or later versions are to be applied, after each version has been used to determine the adjusted base offense level for each count). In Santopietro we declined to reach this issue, in part because of the circuit conflict, and in part because it was possible that the defendant's sentence in that case would not be affected by the difference in the two Guidelines versions. Id. at 96-97. [14] In this case, we must face the issue because the defendants' Guidelines calculations under the later version had an unequivocally negative impact on their recommended sentences. In addition, in the decade since Santopietro was decided, courts within this circuit have repeatedly wrestled with, and are divided on, the issue. Compare United States v. Weisberg, No. 07CR66, 2008 WL 2323376, at -5 (W.D.N.Y. June 2, 2008) (finding no ex post facto problem where defendant was on notice that any tax offense committed after November 2001 would face the more stringent tax table), with United States v. Johnson, Nos. 97-CR-206, 98-CR-160, 1999 WL 395381, at -11 (N.D.N.Y. June 4, 1999) (concluding that the most appropriate way to handle ... multiple counts in light of the [E]x [P]ost [F]acto clause is to apply the earlier Sentencing Manual to those counts as to which the underlying conduct was completed before the later version became effective ... and apply the current version to counts involving subsequent conduct). Thus, this case presents the appropriate opportunity to provide[] definitive instructions on how to handle such a situation. Johnson, 1999 WL 395381, at . We conclude that the one-book rule set forth in § 1B1.11(b)(3) does not violate the Ex Post Facto clause when applied to the sentencing of offenses committed both before and after the publication of a revised version of the Guidelines. [C]entral to the ex post facto prohibition is a concern for `the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated.' Miller, 482 U.S. at 430, 107 S.Ct. 2446 (quoting Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24, 30, 101 S.Ct. 960, 67 L.Ed.2d 17 (1981)). The existence of an ex post facto violation turns on whether an individual was deprived of fair notice, not [on] an individual's right to less punishment. Weaver, 450 U.S. at 30, 101 S.Ct. 960. The Framers' intent in requiring such notice was to assure that legislative Acts give fair warning of their effect and permit individuals to rely on their meaning until explicitly changed. Id. at 28-29, 101 S.Ct. 960. Applying these principles to § 1B1.11(b)(3), we hold that the adoption of the one-book rule prior to the commission of the defendants' obstruction offense had placed them on notice of the consequences of committing that second offense. That the consequences of the second offense included the application of the post-amendment Guidelines to all offenses considered at the defendants' sentencing was fully apparent prior to the commission of the crimes that triggered those consequences. When the defendants committed their obstruction offenses, it was not the amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines that disadvantaged [the defendants], it was [their] election to continue [their] criminal activity. Cooper, 35 F.3d at 1250; accord Vivit, 214 F.3d at 919. Our affirmance of the defendants' sentences on this ground offends neither of the fundamental concernsnotice and governmental restraintprotected by the Ex Post Facto clause. As to notice, we observe that prior to the commission of their obstruction offenses the defendants could have altered their conduct so as to avoid any heightened punishment imposed on the basis of the one-book rule by choosing not to obstruct the government's investigation of their prior fraud. As to governmental restraint, our holding continues to prevent the Sentencing Commission and Congress from imposing a heightened punishment following the commission of the criminal conduct triggering that punishment. As the Guidelines themselves recognize, application of the one-book rule does not, and indeed may not, entail the application of a sentencing range devised after the commission of all of the offenses subject to sentencing. See § 1B1.11 cmt. background (2008) ([E]ven in a complex case involving multiple counts that occurred under several different versions of the Guidelines Manual, it will not be necessary to compare more than two manuals to determine the applicable guideline range the manual in effect at the time the last offense of conviction was completed and the manual in effect at the time of sentencing. (emphasis added)). [15] The one-book rule, when it leads to a higher sentencing range than would be applied to a single offense, operates in a manner similar to that of the recidivist statutes and three strikes laws upheld by the Supreme Court and our sister circuits in the past. The Supreme Court in Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728, 68 S.Ct. 1256, 92 L.Ed. 1683 (1948), rejected the defendant's argument that the consideration of his past offenses in determining his sentence for a later offense was foreclosed by the Ex Post Facto clause. Id. at 732, 68 S.Ct. 1256. ([W]e [do not] think the fact that one of the convictions that entered into the calculations by which petitioner became a fourth offender occurred before the Act was passed, makes the Act invalidly retroactive....). The Ninth Circuit has on several occasions upheld such laws. United States v. Ahumada-Avalos, 875 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir.1989) (per curiam) (upholding a repeat offender statute); see also United States v. Kaluna, 192 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir.1999) (en banc) (The Supreme Court and this court uniformly have held that recidivist statutes do not violate the Ex Post Facto clause if they are `on the books at the time the [present] offense was committed.' (alteration in original) (quoting Ahumada-Avalos )). The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits have come to this same conclusion. See United States v. Rosario-Delgado, 198 F.3d 1354, 1356 (11th Cir. 1999); United States v. Rasco, 123 F.3d 222, 227 (5th Cir.1997); United States v. Washington, 109 F.3d 335, 338 (7th Cir. 1997) (The three-strikes law was enacted before Washington committed the bank robberies, so he had fair warning of the consequences attached to new violent offenses.); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 841 (8th Cir.1996). The fact that the impetus for enacting the recidivist statutes was to reflect the greater culpability associated with the latter offenses, whereas the impetus for the enactment of the one-book rule is to avoid piecemeal sentencing, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.11 cmt. background (2008), is of no relevance for purposes of determining the retroactivity of the legal consequences of a defendant's actions. It might also be argued that the recidivist statutes impose punishment upon only a single crime, the prior offenses having already been committed and for which the defendant had been sentenced. Of the seven cases cited above, however, six place no reliance on that potential distinction. Only the Eighth Circuit, in Farmer, implies that the sentencing of only the last crime that triggered the consequences of the recidivist statute was a factor supporting the constitutionality of the three strikes law. 73 F.3d at 841 ([S]o long as the actual crime for which a defendant is being sentenced occurred after the effective date of the new statute, there is no ex post facto violation. (quoting United States v. Allen, 886 F.2d 143, 146 (8th Cir.1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Despite this statement in Farmer, the distinction between the recidivist statutes and the one-book rule makes neither a practical nor a logical difference for purposes of an analysis under the Ex Post Facto clause. In both cases, prior conduct becomes the basis for imposing a heightened sentence only upon conviction for a later criminal act. [16] Here, the defendants' obstruction offense is the actual crime triggering the application of the one-book rule, the defendants had prior notice of the consequences of that crime, and therefore the application of the one-book rule is proper. [17] Kumar offers a hypothetical situation that, he claims, demonstrates the incorrectness of our ruling. Kumar Br. 25. In his hypothetical, he posits two defendants, A and B, and that the fraud penalties are increased, as here, between 2000 and 2004 in the event of a conviction for both fraud and obstruction of justice. Defendant A is convicted of committing fraud in 2000 and is found at a Fatico hearing to warrant a sentencing enhancement on the basis of obstruction of justice perpetrated in 2004, although he is not tried or convicted of that crime. Defendant B is convicted of both fraud committed in 2000 and of obstructing justice in 2004. Kumar notes that in such a situation, as a result of the one-book rule, B's offense level [for the fraud] would be higher than A's ... even though their conduct was the same. Kumar Br. 25-26. The error in Kumar's reasoning, of course, is that the hypothetical defendants face different consequences as a result of substantially different circumstances. Defendant A could have received a higher sentence for the fraud if the prosecutor had obtained a conviction for both offenses because Defendant A would have been on notice of the legal consequences of a conviction for the obstruction, which would have triggered the one-book rule and, thus, would have included a higher sentence for fraud than would have been the case without the obstruction conviction. In this hypothetical, however, only Defendant B's conduct resulted in a conviction for obstruction. Because the prosecutor in Defendant A's case did not obtain a conviction for the obstruction, the sentence for the fraud is necessarily lower. The difference is not the result of an inequity in the guidelines; it is the result of a successful prosecution of Defendant B for obstruction, which triggered the operation of the one-book rule of which Defendant B had notice, and which was absent in the case of Defendant A. Kumar's hypothetical has no ex post facto implications. In substance, the defendants propose a rule requiring notice before the first offense of the sentencing consequences flowing from subsequent offenses. The emptiness of the notice demanded by the defendants' position is obvious. Notice of the consequences of a subsequent offense, an offense presumably not even contemplated at the time the first offense is committed, would have no bearing on the commission of the first offense. The one-book rule only becomes relevant to a defendant at the time of the commission of a subsequent offense, when it puts the defendant on notice that when he commits that subsequent offense the sentence for his first offense will be higher than it would have been otherwise. In rejecting the holdings of the Third and Ninth circuits, we recognize the practicalthough unlikelyrisk that applying the one-book rule to offenses that straddle a Guidelines revision could result in a defendant being sentenced for offenses according to the revised Guidelines only to see the second offense, which enabled the application of the one-book rule, fall out after sentencing. See Ortland, 109 F.3d at 547. The hypothetical posed in Ortland is, of course, irrelevant on the facts of this case. Kumar and Richards were sentenced based on two proper convictions, and the application of the one-book rule to their sentencings does not offend the Constitution's Ex Post Facto clause.