Opinion ID: 2779737
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Over and over and over and over again. I—

Text: The prosecutor continued, Q. When you said that his penis went into your vagina over and over and over, was it more than three times? A. Yes. Q. At various different times when he would stop, do something else and then come back and put his penis in your vagina was more than three times [sic]? A. Yes. Q. Okay. How did the incident all come to an end? 18 Case: 13-10700 Date Filed: 02/17/2015 Page: 19 of 28 A. We—I was laying there pretending like I was asleep and he finally stopped, got up, went into the kitchen. In sum, Lahood’s testimony supports a determination that Stoddard penetrated her with his penis at least three times, and that the acts of penetration were separated by Stoddard stopping, doing something else, and then returning. Given this testimony, as well as the length of time that Stoddard and Lahood were at the apartment, it would not have been unreasonable for the state court to find that there was a temporal break between acts of penetration sufficient under Florida law for Stoddard “to pause, reflect, and form a new criminal intent between the occurrences.” Eaddy, 789 So. 2d at 1095; see White v. State, 924 So. 2d 957, 959 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (defendant had sufficient time to form a new criminal intent where the criminal acts were separated by the victim going to and returning from the bathroom). Moreover, Stoddard’s statements during his recorded interview indicate that he and Lahood had engaged in intercourse in “a couple of different positions,” which also supports the state court’s finding of distinct acts of penile penetration. See Saavedra, 576 So. 2d at 958; see also Paul, 934 So. 2d at 1172-73. The fact that some of Lahood’s testimony—that the incident ended when Stoddard “finally stopped, got up, went into the kitchen”— could be interpreted as supporting Stoddard’s contention that he was on the bed the 19 Case: 13-10700 Date Filed: 02/17/2015 Page: 20 of 28 entire time does not demonstrate that a contrary finding was unreasonable. See Lee, 726 F.3d at 1192. Because the state court concluded that Stoddard committed distinct criminal acts of sexual battery under Florida law during the series of events after the bathroom, and the factual determinations underlying that decision were not unreasonably found, we cannot say that the state decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, federal law, given that the doublejeopardy guarantee “does no more than prevent the sentencing court from prescribing greater punishment than the legislature intended.” See Hunter, 459 U.S. at 366, 103 S. Ct. 673, 678. In sum, Stoddard has not established a right to habeas relief on his double-jeopardy claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Burgess, 723 F.3d at 1315.