Opinion ID: 1096403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Timeliness of Mrs. Martin's Action

Text: We must now turn our attention to the trial court's holding that Mrs. Martin's action was premature, and that she must wait until the permanent well has been drilled and she can show that she has suffered actual damage before requesting injunctive relief. We recognize that whether to grant or to deny injunctive relief rests in the sound discretion of the trial court and that the trial court's ruling will not be set aside unless that court has abused its discretion. Acker v. Protective Life Insurance Co., 353 So.2d 1150 (Ala.1977). In addition, courts will not use the extraordinary power of injunctive relief merely to allay an apprehension of a possible injury; the injury must be imminent and irreparable in a court at law. United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Allen, 519 So.2d 506, 508 (Ala.1988). The primary reason for issuing an injunction is to prevent an irreparable injury, i.e., an injury not redressable by an award of pecuniary damages in a court of law. Triple J Cattle, Inc. v. Chambers, 551 So.2d 280 (Ala.1989). Accordingly, this Court must consider whether Mrs. Martin faces an irreparable injury in order to determine if her request for injunctive relief was premature. The City admits that if Mrs. Martin has proved an irreparable injury, then an injunction could be issued, but it contends that Mrs. Martin has failed to do so. This Court concludes that Mrs. Martin has proved an imminent irreparable injury, and, therefore, the trial court's ruling that held that her action was premature constituted an abuse of discretion. Mrs. Martin asserts, and we agree, that she has the right to bring this action under Ala.Code 1975, § 6-5-210, which reads: The owner of realty having title downwards and upwards indefinitely, any unlawful interference with his rights, below or above the surface alike, gives him a right of action. Also, Mrs. Martin contends, and we agree, that waiting until a permanent well has been drilled and a pipeline constructed at great expense to the City could substantially affect her chances of prevailing in a later action. The law states that where a public use of water has been developed at great expense, landowners whose rights are adversely affected are not entitled to an injunction if, with knowledge of the development, they stood by without objection. See Barton v. Riverside Water Co., 155 Cal. 509, 101 P. 790 (1909), 93 C.J.S. Waters § 100 (1956). Several other reasons justify bringing the action at the present time. The proposed permanent well and pipeline will be an expensive undertaking, and this matter should be addressed before citizens' money is expended. This Court has noted that the contentions of the parties regarding the potential drawdown effect to Mrs. Martin's well as a result of the City's well, i.e., a potential lowering of the water table, forcing Mrs. Martin to drill a deeper well than the one she now has. We agree with the City that this potential harm is not sufficient to warrant the issuance of an injunction, because the appellant has an adequate remedy at law, and the City has offered to pay for any damage or new equipment and drilling needed by the plaintiff. However, more significantly, Mrs. Martin offered expert testimony concerning more serious potential damage to both her land and her water supply if the City is allowed to continue to drill its well. This testimony was presented both in the first litigation on this matter ( Hereford ) and in the present action; the trial court in this action took judicial notice of the record in the Hereford case. This testimony concerns the prevalence of saltwater contamination throughout much of the aquifers in Marengo County, which is one of the reasons the City needs a supply of freshwater. Very little is known about the location of the saltwater contamination front and its proximity to Mrs. Martin's well in the freshwater aquifer at issue here. A hydrologist at the Hereford proceeding testified that the large amount of freshwater drawn daily by this proposed well could cause the saltwater contamination front to move further into the freshwater of the aquifer; if this happened, it would be irreversible and would cause the freshwater aquifer to become more mineralized and eventually to be ruined for human consumption. This in turn could leave Mrs. Martin with no freshwater for either domestic or agricultural use upon her farmlands, effectively destroying much of the value of the land. Taken one step further, if the City continued to use the well, eventually the water supply could be ruined for the City as well, and one of the few sources for freshwater in the area would be destroyed. The City argues that the possibility of saltwater contamination of the freshwater aquifers in the area of Mrs. Martin's well is simply that, a possibility, and that it has offered expert testimony that any potential drawdown effect on the aquifers would be so small as to preclude saltwater contamination. Viewed in a light most favorable to Mrs. Martin, the evidence shows that the potential contamination to Mrs. Martin's water supply would constitute an irreparable injury for which there would be no adequate remedy at law. Thus, this action was not premature. See Koch v. Wick, 87 So.2d 47 (Fla.1956), in which the Florida Supreme Court held that the plaintiff in a similar factual setting did not have to wait until his well was damaged. See also Farmer's Investment Co. v. Bettwy, 113 Ariz. 520, 558 P.2d 14 (1976); Higday v. Nickolaus, 469 S.W.2d 859 (Mo.App.1971); and Jarvis v. State Land Dep't, 104 Ariz. 527, 456 P.2d 385 (1969) (modified on other grounds, 106 Ariz. 506, 479 P.2d 169 (1970)). Accordingly, the summary judgment entered for the City, holding that the plaintiff's action is premature, must be reversed and the cause remanded.