Opinion ID: 2075892
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Marital Confidences

Text: Defendant's efforts to bar testimony of a broad array of his wife's observations and conduct would effectively turn Vermont's relatively confined privilege of marital confidences and confidential communications into a rule rendering all spousal testimony incompetent. In our view, this interpretation of Rule 504 is altogether too broad and misunderstands the design of the Vermont provision. The early common law disqualified the spouse of a party from testifying either for or against the party in any case. McCormick at § 66. A remnant of this broad competency rule persists in many states: [I]t is sometimes provided that the prosecution may not call the spouse, without the consent of the accused spouse, thus preserving for criminal cases the privilege of the accused to keep the spouse off the stand altogether. Id.; see Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 906, 911 n. 9, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980). This rule has been sharply criticized, however. Professor Wigmore termed it `the merest anachronism in legal theory and an indefensible obstruction to truth in practice.' Trammel, 445 U.S. at 45, 100 S.Ct. at 909 (quoting 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2228, at 221 (McNaughton rev. 1961)). The Uniform Rules of Evidence, reflecting the United States Supreme Court's decision in Trammel, place the privilege to refuse to testify against an accused in the hands of the spouse of the accused. Unif.R.Evid. 504(b), 13A U.L.A. 302 (1986). While the Vermont rule applies equally to civil and criminal cases, Vermont is not one of the states that retains a broad privilege against adverse testimony. As stated in the Reporter's Notes to Rule 504: The present rule bars only particular testimony as to communications and confidences. Reporter's Notes, V.R.E. 504, at 366. The privilege for matters that would reveal a marital confidence fits hand in glove with the privilege for confidential communications. The latter protects what is expressed in confidence between the spouses; the former protects what is learned in confidence. [I]t literally include[s] not only communications but any knowledge that the testifying spouse had obtained as a result of marital confidence.... Reporter's Notes, V.R.E. 504, at 365. Thus would the privilege be expected, with perhaps unwarranted optimism, to protect and promote the marital relationship by encouraging and preserving confidences between the wife and husband. Furthermore, the provision on marital confidences is written expressly to give the trial judge discretion. As with any discretionary ruling, a party claiming abuse of discretion must show that the court failed to exercise its discretion, or that its discretion was exercised for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. In re T.S., 144 Vt. 592, 594, 481 A.2d 21, 22 (1984). On appeal, the burden of showing an abuse of discretion is on the party seeking to overturn the trial court's judgment. Id. [15] In our view, the trial judge properly exercised her discretion in allowing all of the disputed testimony. None of the items would clearly lead to a violation of marital confidence. Perhaps Ms. Wright's most damaging testimony concerned the missing boning knife. There was no indication, however, that her knowledge of the missing knife was obtained in confidence. Most likely, she simply observed, in her daily use of the kitchen, that one of the knives was missing. We might usefully contrast her testimony with the hypothetical testimony that she watched her husband remove a knife from the kitchen set and leave the apartment. That evidence could properly be excluded as leading to a violation of marital confidence. Cf. French v. Ware, 65 Vt. at 347-48, 26 A. at 1099 (wife may not testify to any facts or transactions which directly show the husband has been guilty of a crime, such as that she saw him in the act of committing the crime. The law assumes that no husband will commit a crime in the presence of his wife, except in the confidence induced by the marital relation.). The testimony that defendant changed his clothes when he returned home presents a somewhat closer question. Changing one's clothes is frequently a private act. However, absent other evidence that, for example, his clothes were covered with blood and he gave them to her to launder, or that changing his clothes in the evening was so unusual as to signify emotional turmoilthere was no reason to suppose that the testimony would lead to a violation of marital confidence, and allowing it was not an abuse of discretion. As is evident from these examples, the privilege may be irrational from the point of view of one seeking the truth; the most incriminating testimony appears to be privileged. This insight demonstrates only that Rule 504 is not about promoting the truth: it is designed to protect matters of confidence between spouses regardless of their value to determining the correct outcome at trial. Ms. Wright also testified that she observed symptoms of cocaine use evident in defendant's facial features. But defendant's use of cocaine was notorious, and many of his acquaintances might have observed the symptoms. She further testified that he arrived home only two hours after the crime was committed. There was nothing private or confidential in that fact. She testified that she purchased a color television with cash. This was a public act in a public place and involved no breach of confidence. We turn finally to the testimony regarding the family finances. Here, Ms. Wright's testimony would be expected to reveal to the jury and the public matters that for some are private and on occasion embarrassing; in short, matters that a married couple often expects to keep to itself. On the other hand, Ms. Wright's knowledge of their finances may have been obtained quite independently of her husband; to that extent, the marital privilege did not apply. The trial court concluded that in the circumstances of this case the disputed testimony would not betray a confidence. No abuse of discretion has been shown. In any event, the testimony on the couple's finances was the least damaging portion of Barbara Wright's testimony. Even had the Wrights been mired in debt, the fact would have produced little insight in a trial where several other witnesses testified that defendant was often in their debt and typically short of cash. But Ms. Wright's testimony was not even that conclusive. This is the full extent of her testimony regarding finances: Q. Mrs. Wright, what were your family finances around November 29th of 1986? A. They were fine. Q. When you say fine, what do you mean? A. We weren't destitute. Q. Did you have a lot of money? A. No. Q. Were you able to pay all your bills? A. We tried to. Q. But you were not able to pay them all? A. Well, we could pay the rent and everything. Considerable evidence was produced at trial to support a motive for robbery; this particular testimony added little, if any, weight. We can say with confidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the outcome of the trial would have been the same had Ms. Wright's testimony on the family finances been excluded. See State v. Hamlin, 146 Vt. at 106, 499 A.2d at 52. Therefore, even if the admission of the evidence violated Rule 504's marital privilege, the error was harmless. Affirmed.