Opinion ID: 465407
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Speedy Trial Motion

Text: 64 Domina's argument that he was denied a speedy trial also lacks merit. The Speedy Trial Act requires that trial begin within seventy days of the filing of the indictment. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(c)(1). The Act, however, excludes from the seventy-day period a delay due to any pretrial motion, from the time of the filing of the motion to its prompt disposition. It also excludes delay due to a continuance that the defendant requests, when the court finds that the interest of justice outweighs the public's and the defendant's interests in a speedy trial. Id. Secs. 3161(h)(1)(F), (h)(8)(A). 65 Domina was indicted on July 20, 1983, and his trial began on December 13, 1983, 146 days after the indictment. The district court properly excluded the time from August 2 to September 2, 1983, because the Government's motion for a continuance was pending at that time. The court also properly excluded the period from September 2 to October 31, 1983, which period of delay resulted from Domina's own motion for a continuance. Domina challenges neither of these exclusions on appeal. 66 Domina conceded in the trial court that the time from September 2 to October 31 was excludable. He suggested that the period from August 2 to September 2 was not entirely excludable. He has not renewed this argument on appeal. The plain language of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3161(h)(1)(F) makes that period excludable. 67 Domina argues that the district court erred by excluding time after October 28, the date the Government moved on for a continuance based on Purnell's unavailability. In fact, however, the court excluded time because of the Government's August 2 motion and Domina's September 2 motion. With these two exclusions (31 days plus 59 days), the time between the filing of the indictment and the beginning of his trial was only fifty-six days, well within the seventy-day limit.