Opinion ID: 181375
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Primary Purpose Requirement's Origins as a Limit on the Executive's Claimed Inherent Authority to Conduct Warrantless Surveillance for Foreign Intelligence Information

Text: To explain the basis for our decision, we begin by noting that the primary purpose requirement urged by Abu-Jihaad was originally formulated to address a constitutional concern not present in this case: the scope of presidential authority to conduct warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance. In United States v. United States District Court ( Keith ), 407 U.S. 297, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972), the Supreme Court rejected a claim of inherent executive authority to conduct warrantless domestic security surveillance, while specifically not deciding the scope of executive authority to conduct surveillance with respect to activities of foreign powers or their agents, id. at 321-22, 92 S.Ct. 2125 (emphasis added). The Fourth Circuit addressed that question in United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir.1980), a case involving warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance conducted before enactment of FISA, and resolved it favorably to the executive: the Executive Branch need not always obtain a warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance, id. at 913. At the same time, however, the court ruled that the executive's power to act without a warrant was cabined by the Article II authority over foreign affairs from which it derived. Thus, Truong held that warrantless foreign intelligence surveillance was constitutionally authorized only with respect to a foreign power, its agent or collaborators and when conducted `primarily' for foreign intelligence reasons. Id. at 915. Some twenty-eight years later, however, the FISA Review Court declined to impose a comparable primary purpose requirement on the warrantless surveillance provisions of the PAA, applicable to foreign powers or agents of foreign powers reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. See In re FISA Section 105B Directives, 551 F.3d at 1010-12 (holding that more appropriate consideration is whether programmatic purpose of the surveillances . . . involves some legitimate objective beyond ordinary crime control). We have no occasion here to consider these warrantless surveillance decisions. We note simply that there is an important distinction between warrantless surveillances premised exclusively on executive authority, and surveillances pursuant to warrants issued by courts in compliance with standards enacted by Congress. The former require identification of an exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. See United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 72 (collecting cases recognizing such exception); see also In re FISA Section 105B Directives, 551 F.3d at 1011-12. By contrast, the latter implement that requirement. Whatever purpose limits might be placed on the president's authority to conduct warrantless surveillance to ensure that the exception does not extend beyond the constitutional ground for its recognition, it does not follow that the Fourth Amendment demands the same limitation when, as under FISA, the powers of all three branches of governmentin short, the whole of federal authorityare invoked in determining when warrants may reasonably be sought and issued for the purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence information. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).