Opinion ID: 2226747
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 9 Discretion in the charging decision.

Text: (a) In addressing himself to the decision whether to charge, the prosecutor should first determine whether there is evidence which would support a conviction. . . . (e) The prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or degree than he can reasonably support with evidence at trial. In Thompson, supra, this court also looked to DR7-103 (A) of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility. That standard was adopted by this court and sets forth the following disciplinary rule: A public prosecutor or other government lawyer shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause. SCR 20.37 (1) (1980). This court has stated: . . . it is an abuse of discretion to charge when the evidence is clearly insufficient to support a conviction. It is also an abuse of discretion for a prosecutor to bring charges on counts of doubtful merit for the purpose of coercing a defendant to plead guilty to a less serious offense. (Emphasis supplied.) Thompson, supra at 330. See also: Karpinski, supra at 609. Reading SCR 20.37, standard 3.9 of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice Relating to the Prosecution Function, Thompson, supra, and Karpinski, supra, together with Mark, supra, and its progeny, we conclude that the issue before the trial court was to determine whether the district attorney abused his discretion in reciting a charge that was (1) not within the confines of the evidence adduced at the preliminary; (2) wholly unrelated to the facts and circumstances testified to at the preliminary; and/or (3) of doubtful merit for the purpose of coercing the defendant to plead guilty to a less serious offense. [4] The defendant does not claim that the district attorney herein abused his discretion in preferring the second-degree murder charge in order to coerce her to plead guilty to a less serious offense. Thus, we hold that in ascertaining whether the prosecutor abused his discretion, this court must look to the record of the preliminary examination to determine if the charge recited in the information was within the confines of and not wholly unrelated to the facts and circumstances testified to at that hearing. If the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing supports the district attorney's charging decision, then it follows that the charges recited in the information are within the confines of and not wholly unrelated to the testimony elicited at that examination. In applying this standard, however, we remain cognizant of the fact that a preliminary hearing is not a full evidentiary trial and that the purpose of a preliminary examination is only to determine whether further criminal proceedings are justified. Taylor v. State, 55 Wis.2d 168, 172-73, 197 N.W.2d 805 (1972). The defendant argues that the facts established at the preliminary hearing did not warrant the charge of second-degree murder because: (1) there is no support for a finding that second-degree murder was committed; and (2) there is no support for a finding that the defendant was the one who committed the murder. She bolsters her claims with the fact that there was no testimony describing the acts which produced the child's injuries and the fact that she did not have exclusive control of the child during the time in question (August 1st through September 25, 1978) so as to give rise to the inference that the injuries were caused by her. The state concedes that there was no direct evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing with respect to both the nature of the conduct which produced the child's injuries, and the identity of the person engaging in that conduct. However, the state asserts that child abuse cases and in particular assaults causing the death of young children are by their very nature secretive and usually incapable of direct proof, People v. Massay, 49 Ill. App. 3d 588, 594, 364 N.E.2d 933 (1977), and notes that criminal convictions may be based wholly on circumstantial evidence, State v. Marshall, 92 Wis.2d 101, 121, 284 N.W. 2d 592 (1979); State v. Koller, 87 Wis.2d 253, 266, 274 N.W.2d 651 (1979). Indeed, as recited in the Wisconsin Jury InstructionsCriminal, §170: It is not unusual in a criminal case to rely upon circumstantial evidence. . . . Circumstantial evidence may [often] be stronger and more convincing than direct evidence. Thus, the state contends that if circumstantial evidence may be a sufficient basis upon which to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at trial, its introduction at a preliminary hearing may surely provide a reasonable basic for a specific charge and therefore argues that the nature of the conduct which produced the death causing injuries and the identity of the assailant may certainly be inferred from the overwhelming circumstantial evidence. The state asserts that the testimony of the pathologist, Dr. Fodden, supplies a reasonable basis for the conclusion that second-degree murder was committed and that the undisputed testimony of Robert Hooper and the others who had taken care of (babysat) Amanda during the time in question gave rise to more than a reasonable inference that the defendant inflicted the injuries, for the purposes of a preliminary hearing. A. Second-Degree Murder The question addressed here is whether Dr. Fodden's (pathologist) testimony supports a reasonable inference that the injuries causing Amanda's death were inflicted [b]y conduct imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life; Sec. 940.02(1), Stats. The Wisconsin Jury Instructions define imminently dangerous conduct as to the crime of second-degree murder as that: . . . conduct dangerous in and of itself. It must have been conduct inherently and consciously dangerous to life and not such as might casually produce death by misadventure. Wis. J.I.Criminal §1110. This jury instruction further describes the element of conduct evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life in the following language: . . . The depravity of mind referred to in second degree murder exists when the conduct causing death demonstrates an utter lack of concern for the life and safety of another and for which conduct there is no justification or excuse. Dr. Fodden characterized the degree of force required to produce the fractures of the skull, tibia, humerus, ribs and nose as considerable and violent and directly applied. He testified the force necessary to produce the child's tibia and humerus fractures as 50 pounds per square inch at the end of each fractured end. Further, Dr. Fodden described the force required to cause Amanda's skull fractures as equivalent to that which would be produced if the child were dropped on its head onto a hard surface from a height of twenty feet. Fodden's assessment of the causes of the varied fractures was that none of them showed any indication of an accidental origin. His overall testimony gives rise to a reasonable inference that the fractures were caused by sharp, crisp blows, applied directly over the site of the break. The defendant argues that the pathologist's testimony is insufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the child's injuries were caused by conduct evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life. She cites Olson v. State, 75 Wis.2d 575, 582, 250 N.W.2d 12 (1977), which states The qualities of the conduct being imminently dangerous and evincing a depraved mind regardless of life are found in the act itself and the circumstances of its commission, and in essence claims that this statement from Olson requires direct evidence of the acts that inflicted the injuries. The defendant wishes to disregard the Wisconsin case law and jury instructions on circumstantial evidence and obviously misreads the quotation from Olson, supra, for it expressly states that the qualities of conduct that is imminently dangerous and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of life are found in the act itself and the circumstances of its commission.  (Emphasis supplied.) id. Thus, the language in Olson does not bar the proof of second-degree murder with circumstantial evidence. Since the totality of the circumstances of the commission of a particular act include the type, nature, extent and degree of force required to produce the injuries which resulted from that act, Dr. Fodden's testimony delineating the force necessary to produce the child's injuries provides the type of circumstantial evidence envisioned in Olson, supra . The defendant also contends that it is not absolutely inconceivable that Amanda's fractures were caused by accident. Dr. Fodden's testimony to the contrary stands unrefuted at this stage of the proceedings. The fact that Amanda suffered eight fractures (two on the skull, three ribs, nose, tibia and humerus) and that all eight were sustained during a short seven week period (August 1st to September 25, 1978), together with the reasonable inference that can be drawn from Dr. Fodden's testimony that she suffered from repeated acts of violence (fractures caused by considerable, violent force directly applied to the site of the breaks), supports the prosecutor's conclusion that all of the fractures could not have had an accidental origin. [5] Considering the severity of Amanda's injuries as related in the testimony of Dr. Fodden characterizing the force necessary to produce the various fractures and the manner in which that force had to be applied, we conclude that the evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing supports a reasonable inference that the conduct responsible for the child's death was (1) inherently and consciously dangerous to life as to be imminently dangerous and (2) demonstrated an utter lack of concern for life that it evinced a depraved mind regardless of human life. This is particularly true in view of the fact that the victim was a defenseless eight and one-half month old child and that child abuse cases are secretive and seldom, if ever, provable with direct evidence. Therefore, we hold that the evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing provides a factual basis upon which the district attorney may have reasonably concluded that the crime of second-degree murder was committed. B. Identity There is no dispute that the death causing injuries were sustained between August 1st and September 25, 1978. Robert Hooper testified that the defendant was the person who was primarily responsible for the care of the child during this two-month period. Further, Mr. Hooper and all others who babysat for the child during that two-month period specifically denied having inflicted any injury or observed the child sustaining any injury. This testimony was undisputed. Thus, the only reasonable inference that one could draw from this evidence is that the injuries were sustained while the child was in the defendant's care. [6] The defendant argues that since others had control of the child at various times during the crucial two-month period and that the state failed to establish the precise times of the injuries, the evidence does not reasonably support a conclusion that the child was in her care when the injuries were sustained. She claims that the state must establish that she had exclusive control over Amanda at the time the injuries were inflicted and that evidence that others had control of the child sometime during the relevant period belies that conclusion. The defendant forgets the procedural posture in which this case arises. This is not an appeal from a trial on the merits; rather, it is an appeal from an order dismissing an information before arraignment but after a bindover decision (unchallenged). Further, a preliminary examination is not a full evidentiary trial on the issue of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Taylor v. State, supra ; Gaddis v. State, 63 Wis.2d 126, 122-23, 216 N.W. 2d 527 (1974), but rather is intended to be a summary proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is a reasonable probability that the defendant committed a felony and thus a substantial basis for bringing the prosecution and further denying the accused his right to liberty. State ex rel. Huser v. Rasmussen, 84 Wis.2d 600, 606, 267 N.W.2d 285 (1978). As the appellate court stated, the defendant's argument requires an assumption that one of the witnesses who babysat the child was lying. Thus, she is contending that the testimony of one or more of these witnesses was incredible. While this assertion may or may not be true, it involves the issue of credence or credibility and is thus a matter that is properly left for the trier of fact, the judge or the jury. State v. Knudson, 51 Wis.2d 270, 280-81, 187 N.W.2d 321 (1971); State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, 40 Wis.2d 223, 228, 161 N.W.2d 369 (1968). As stated in State v. Marshall, supra at 115: We have held that `the purpose of the preliminary is not to make a final judgment on the credibility of [a witness]; the court's role [is] simply to ascertain the plausibility of her story and whether, if believed, it would support a bindover.' Virgil v. State, 76 Wis.2d 133, 144, 250 N.W.2d 378 (1977). `The preliminary hearing `. . . is not the proper forum to debate and determine issues as to credibility and weight of evidence once essential facts as to probability have been established'' State ex rel. Huser v. Rasmussen, 84 Wis.2d 600, 614, 267 N.W.2d 285 (1978), quoting State v. Knudson, 51 Wis.2d at 280, and State ex rel. Evanow v. Seraphim, 40 Wis.2d 223, 228, 161 N.W.2d 369 (1968). [15] [7] Therefore, in view of our review of the testimony for the purposes of filing an information after a preliminary hearing and the case law and statutes applicable thereto, we hold that the district attorney did not abuse his discretion in filing the charge of second-degree murder. By the Court. The decision of the court of appeals is affirmed and the case is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.