Opinion ID: 1042586
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Promissory Estoppel Claim Against Vecchio

Text: On appeal, Vandenheede recharacterizes her “detrimental reliance/breach of contract” claim as one for promissory estoppel, and she argues that the district court prematurely made factual findings on the pleadings in concluding that “[a]ny promise made by Vecchio [regarding payment of attorneys’ fees] would have been a representation made on behalf of his client Mr. Chinn, not one made on his own personal behalf.” In view of her pleadings, we discern no error. The complaint acknowledges that Vecchio represented Chinn “[t]hroughout the time” she dated Chinn, or from 1992 2009. (Compl. ¶¶ 11, 14.) It further avers that “Vecchio, individually and as trustee of the . . . Trust, told [her] to have a prenuptial agreement prepared, and that if she did so he would reimburse her the attorney fees.” (Id. ¶ 75.) These allegations reflect Vandenheede’s understanding that Vecchio served in a representative capacity for Chinn and the Trust, a fact that she does not contest on appeal. Michigan’s courts recognize that an agent acting on the behalf of a disclosed principal does not become a party to a contract absent facts demonstrating that the attorney intended to become a party to the contract. See, e.g., Andersons, Inc. v. Horton Farms, Inc., 166 F.3d 308, 315 (6th Cir. - 11 - No. 13-1253 Vandenheede v. Vecchio et al. 1998); Uniprop, Inc. v. Morganroth, 678 N.W.2d 638, 641 42 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004); Riddle v. Lacey & Jones, 351 N.W.2d 916, 919 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984). For instance, the court in Riddle affirmed the dismissal of a promissory-estoppel claim against the attorney of a disclosed principal because “[a]ny promise made by the [attorney] was clearly made on behalf of his principal.” Riddle, 351 N.W.2d at 920. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on § 320 of the Restatement (Second) of Agency and its commentary: We also find plaintiff’s complaint to be deficient based upon principles of agency law as summarized in 2 Restatement Agency, 2d, § 320, p 67: “Unless otherwise agreed, a person making or purporting to make a contract with another as agent for a disclosed principal does not become a party to the contract.” Comment (a) to § 320 explains, in pertinent part: “Whether or not a person purporting to act as agent for another becomes a party to the contract depends upon the agreement between such person and the other party. See § 146. As stated in Section 4, a principal is disclosed if, at the time of making the contract in question, the other party to it has notice that the agent is acting for a principal and of the principal’s identity. One who purports to contract on behalf of a designated person does not manifest by this that he is making a contract on his own account, and only where he so manifests does the agent become a party to the contract which he makes for the principal. In the absence of other facts, the inference is that the parties have agreed that the principal is, and the agent is not, a party.” Id. at 919 (emphasis in Riddle). - 12 - No. 13-1253 Vandenheede v. Vecchio et al. Although the complaint refers to Vecchio as “intermeddling” and faults him for preventing her marriage to Chinn, it offers no facts supporting a plausible inference that Vecchio acted in any capacity other than a representative capacity in requesting the prenuptial agreement and offering to pay for related fees. Her appellate briefing again attempts to fill in these gaps by alleging ill will harbored by Chinn’s children and arguing that the trustees’ firms viewed Chinn’s company as an important client, but these allegations neither appear in the complaint nor speak to her claim against Vecchio. Absent well-pleaded facts supporting a plausible claim that Chinn’s attorney individually promised to pay Vandenheede’s legal fees, we affirm the district court’s judgment.