Opinion ID: 3052803
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preclusion Of Angelina’s Testimony

Text: At trial, Angelina attempted to testify that she did not have anything to do with Bryan’s murder, but the district court precluded any testimony on this subject on the ground that Angelina had asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination when asked during her deposition about her involvement in the murder.5 The district court found expressly that Keith was prejudiced by Angelina’s refusal to answer deposition questions about this subject. [1] Trial courts generally will not permit a party to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination with respect to deposition questions and then later testify about the same subject matter at trial. See FTC v. Sharp, 782 F. Supp. 1445, 1452 (D. Nev. 1991). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “contemplate . . . ‘full and equal discovery’ . . . so as to prevent surprise, prejudice and perjury” during trial. Id. “[B]ecause the privilege may be initially invoked and later waived at a time when an adverse party can no longer secure the benefits of discovery, the potential for exploitation is apparent.” SEC v. Graystone Nash, Inc., 25 F.3d 187, 190 (3d Cir. 1994). The rights of the other litigant must be taken into consideration “when one party invokes the Fifth Amendment during discovery, but on the eve of trial changes his mind and decides to waive the privilege. At that stage, the adverse party — having conducted discovery and prepared the case without the benefit of knowing the content of the privileged matter — would be placed at a disadvantage.” Id. at 191; see also GutierrezRodriguez v. Cartagena, 882 F.2d 553, 577 (1st Cir. 1989) (“A defendant may not use the fifth amendment to shield herself from the opposition’s inquiries during discovery only to impale her accusers with surprise testimony at trial.”). “The 5 The district court struck Angelina’s response when her attorney asked whether she was involved in the planning of Bryan’s death. RICHARDS v. RICHARDS 11883 opportunity to combat the newly available testimony might no longer exist, a new investigation could be required, and orderly trial preparation could be disrupted.” Graystone Nash, 25 F.3d at 191. “ ‘Because the privilege is constitutionally based,’ ” however, “the competing interests of the party asserting the privilege, and the party against whom the privilege is invoked must be carefully balanced,” and “ ‘the detriment to the party asserting it should be no more than is necessary to prevent unfair and unnecessary prejudice to the other side.’ ” Doe ex rel. Rudy-Glanzer v. Glanzer, 232 F.3d 1258, 1265 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Graystone Nash, 25 F.3d at 192) (addressing propriety of adverse inference as a consequence of asserting Fifth Amendment privilege during pretrial deposition). Angelina argues, as she did at trial, that Keith was not prejudiced by her assertion of the privilege at her deposition. She asserts that during the investigation of Bryan’s murder, she answered all questions asked by the investigating officers, including questions as to whether she was involved in Bryan’s murder, and that she denied any involvement unequivocally. She also contends that Keith knew of those denials, and that her deposition testimony on the subject would not have provided any additional useful information. She further argues that her statements to the officers investigating Bryan’s death were sufficient to waive her Fifth Amendment privilege, and that Keith could have filed a motion to compel her to answer deposition questions regarding the issue of her involvement, or lack of involvement, in Bryan’s death. [2] Angelina’s arguments are not persuasive. Many of the interviews with investigating officers occurred shortly after Bryan’s death in December 2001, approximately four years prior to the deposition. During those years, a number of significant events occurred that might have altered Angelina’s testimony and certainly would have been proper subjects for inquiry during the deposition. Most significantly, Torre was arrested and convicted of Bryan’s murder, and Strebendt’s 11884 RICHARDS v. RICHARDS statements describing the conspiracy between Torre and Angelina came to light. Angelina was not questioned about these events in any proceeding, as she did not testify at Torre’s criminal trial and declined to answer questions regarding her alleged involvement in the murder during her deposition in the instant case. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the district court’s finding of prejudice was warranted. [3] Moreover, Angelina’s statements to investigating officers in the days following Bryan’s death did not waive her privilege against self-incrimination with respect to the later criminal proceeding against Torre or with respect to the instant civil proceeding. See United States v. Licavoli, 604 F.2d 613, 623 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that voluntary testimony before a grand jury did not waive the privilege at trial, because “[i]t is settled that a waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege is limited to the particular proceeding in which the waiver occurs”) ; see also McCarthy v. Arndstein, 262 U.S. 355, 357—59 (1923) (holding that when a witness’s previous disclosure is not an actual admission of guilt or incriminating facts, the witness subsequently may assert the privilege and decline to testify as to matters that might incriminate him). [4] Notably, the district court precluded Angelina from testifying only as to the subject as to which she asserted the Fifth Amendment privilege, that is, her involvement (or lack thereof) in Bryan’s murder. The court’s order was narrowly tailored to impose upon Angelina only that detriment necessary to prevent unfair prejudice to Keith. Accordingly, the order did not constitute an abuse of discretion. [5] Even if we were to find that the district court did err in precluding a portion of Angelina’s testimony, any such error was harmless. When reviewing the effect of an evidentiary ruling in a civil case, we presume prejudice absent a showing that it is more probable than not that the same verdict would have been reached without the erroneous ruling. Obrey v. RICHARDS v. RICHARDS 11885 Johnson, 400 F.3d 691, 701 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Haddad v. Lockheed Cal. Corp., 720 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1983)). Here, the district court made an explicit adverse credibility finding with respect to Angelina’s assertion that she did not know the amount of the policy’s death benefit, and noted several instances in which Angelina’s testimony conflicted with other evidence. The court also cited to more than a dozen facts in support of its determination that Angelina was involved in Bryan’s murder. Based upon this record, we conclude that it is more probable than not that the district court would have reached the same verdict even if Angelina had testified.