Opinion ID: 169086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Damages Claim Against the District Attorney

Text: 65 The most difficult issue in this case is Mink's claim for damages against the deputy district attorney based on her review of the application for a search warrant. The district attorney argues that this conduct is protected by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The district court agreed, concluding the prosecutor acted as an officer of the court in a quasi-judicial capacity to which absolute immunity applied.
66 Absolute prosecutorial immunity is a complete bar to a suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n. 13, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976). The doctrine evolved from the absolute immunity judges historically enjoyed for any judicial act done by them within their jurisdiction. Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. 335, 80 U.S. 335, 351, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871). 67 Traditionally, the doctrine did not apply to other public officials—such as police officers, governors, and other executive officials—who were entitled only to qualified immunity for actions performed in their official capacity. Under the common law, the scope of immunity for prosecutors was limited to suits for malicious prosecution and defamation, although its reach in § 1983 damages cases was unclear. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421, 96 S.Ct. 984. 68 a. Supreme Court Framework. The Supreme Court developed the modern doctrine of prosecutorial immunity in § 1983 cases in a series of cases beginning in 1976. In Imbler v. Pachtman, the Court rejected the argument that limited, or qualified, immunity would be adequate to protect the prosecutor from the threat of litigation that could shade their otherwise independent judgment. Merely providing qualified immunity would prevent the vigorous and fearless performance of the prosecutor's duty that is essential to the proper functioning of the criminal justice system. 424 U.S. at 427-28, 96 S.Ct. 984. According to the Court, it was better to leave unredressed the wrongs done by dishonest officers [of the court] than to subject those who try to do their duty to the constant dread of retaliation. Id. at 428, 96 S.Ct. 984 (quoting Learned Hand in Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir.1949)). Thus, prosecutors are absolutely immune for those activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984. To apply this standard, the Court crafted a functional approach by which we examine only the actions taken by the prosecutor in initiating [] and in presenting the State's case for trial. Id. at 431, 96 S.Ct. 984. 69 The Supreme Court was careful to note, however, that not every activity of a prosecutor involves initiating and presenting a case. Absolute immunity does not extend to those aspects of the prosecutor's responsibility that cast him in the role of an administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.  Id. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984 (emphasis added): 70 We recognize that the duties of the prosecutor in his role as an advocate for the State involve actions preliminary to the initiation of a prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom . . . . Preparation, both for the initiation of the criminal process and for a trial, may require the obtaining, reviewing, and evaluating of evidence. At some point, and with respect to some decisions, the prosecutor no doubt functions as an administrator rather than as an officer of the court. Drawing a proper line between these functions may present difficult questions, but this case does not require us to anticipate them. 71 Id. at 431 n. 33, 96 S.Ct. 984 (emphasis added). Concluding the challenged conduct in Imbler fell on the advocacy side of the spectrum, the Court granted the prosecutors absolute immunity against the claim that they had procured false testimony during the course of a criminal trial. 72 The Supreme Court later extended the doctrine of absolute immunity to some prosecutorial conduct occurring before trial. In Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991), a prosecutor was accused of (1) eliciting false testimony in a probable cause hearing that led to the issuance of a search warrant, and (2) advising police on inappropriate methods of interrogating a suspect. 73 Regarding the probable cause hearing, the Court concluded absolute immunity extended to any hearing before a tribunal which performed a judicial function and included the presentation of testimony in support of an application for a search warrant. Id. at 490, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (internal quotations omitted). The prosecutor's actions at issue here—appearing before a judge and presenting evidence in support of a motion for a search warrant—clearly involve the prosecutor's role as advocate for the State, rather than his role as administrator or investigative officer, the protection for which we reserved judgment in Imbler.  Id. at 491, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis added). 10 The Court went on to observe, since the issuance of a warrant is unquestionably a judicial act, appearing at a probable-cause hearing is intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process. Id. at 479, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (internal citations and quotations omitted). 74 Burns, however, did not extend absolute immunity to every aspect of the prosecutor's legal advice to police. The Supreme Court concluded that advising police in the investigative phase of a criminal case could be too far removed from the judicial process to warrant extending immunity on that basis. It thus rejected the argument that legal advice is categorically of a judicial nature because the prosecutor is, like a judge, called upon to render opinions concerning the legality of conduct. Id. at 493, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (internal quotations omitted). Noting it had previously rejected the extension of absolute immunity to police officers, the Court found it incongruous to allow prosecutors to be absolutely immune from liability for giving advice to the police, but to allow police officers only qualified immunity for following [that] advice. Id. at 495, 111 S.Ct. 1934. 75 The Court also rejected the government's argument that giving legal advice is related to a prosecutor's role[] in screening cases for prosecution and in safeguarding the fairness of the criminal judicial process. Id. As the Court pointed out, Almost any action by a prosecutor, including his or her direct participation in purely investigative activity, could be said to be in some way related to the ultimate decision whether to prosecute. Id. We do not believe, however, that advising the police in the investigative phase of a criminal case is so `intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process,' that it qualifies for absolute immunity. Id. at 493, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430, 96 S.Ct. 984). 11 76 To qualify for absolute immunity, then, an action must be closely associated with the judicial process. Id. at 495, 96 S.Ct. 984. Advising police on interrogation methods or the existence of probable cause does not qualify. Id. at 487, 96 S.Ct. 984. 77 The Supreme Court refined the investigative/advocacy distinction in Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993). In that case, the plaintiff accused prosecutors of fabricating evidence during the preliminary investigation of a crime. In finding the pretrial investigation was not entitled to absolute immunity, the Court emphasized, We have not retreated . . . from the principle [articulated in Burns ] that acts undertaken by a prosecutor in preparing for the initiation of judicial proceedings or for trial, and which occur in the course of his role as an advocate for the State, are entitled to the protections of absolute immunity. Id. at 273, 113 S.Ct. 2606. But there is a difference between the advocate's role in evaluating evidence and interviewing witnesses as he prepares for trial, on the one hand, and the detective's role in searching for the clues and corroboration that might give him probable cause to recommend that a suspect be arrested, on the other hand. Id. The Court ultimately concluded that, where there is no common-law tradition of immunity for a function, a prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested. Id. at 274 & n. 5, 113 S.Ct. 2606. 78 The Supreme Court's final and most recent case on prosecutorial immunity is similarly instructive. In Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 118 S.Ct. 502, 139 L.Ed.2d 471 (1997), a prosecutor was sued for her (1) preparation and filing of an information and motion for an arrest warrant, and (2) attestation to the truth of the facts contained in the accompanying affidavit. The Court found absolute immunity for the first activity but not for the second. It concluded the preparation and filing of the information and motion was part of the advocate's function, id. at 129, 118 S.Ct. 502, since she was acting as an advocate in her drafting of the certification, her determination that the evidence was sufficiently strong to justify a probable-cause finding, her decision to file charges, and her presentation of the information and the motion to the court . . . indeed, even the selection of the particular facts to include in the certification to provide the evidentiary support for the finding of probable cause. Id. at 130, 118 S.Ct. 502. 79 In contrast, attesting to the accuracy of the facts in the affidavit, the prosecutor was acting as a complaining witness rather than a lawyer. Id. at 129, 118 S.Ct. 502. The key, according to the Court, was whether the task involved the exercise of professional judgment, not merely the review of the truth or falsity of the factual statements themselves. Id. at 130, 118 S.Ct. 502. 80 b. Tenth Circuit Framework. We have applied the above Supreme Court precedent in a variety of contexts. In Roberts v. Kling, 104 F.3d 316, 319 (10th Cir.1997), for example, we found absolute immunity applied to a deputy district attorney who approved a criminal complaint for prosecution. We emphasized, however, that ours is a continuum based approach and the more distant a function is from the judicial process, the less likely absolute immunity will attach. Id. at 318-19 (quoting Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1475 (10th Cir.1994)). The determinative factor is `advocacy' because that is the prosecutor's main function and the one most akin to his quasi-judicial role. 104 F.3d at 319. 81 But absolute immunity may attach even to . . . administrative or investigative activities when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an officer of the court. Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir.1991). Thus, we have found absolute prosecutorial immunity for (1) preparation and initiation of charges, id.; (2) prosecuting civil and administrative enforcement proceedings, Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673 (10th Cir.1990); and (3) investigating and filing a commitment proceeding, Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897 (10th Cir.2000). 82 c. Summary. As the above cases demonstrate, there is no bright line between advocacy and investigation. It is clear that a prosecutor's courtroom conduct falls on the advocacy side of the line. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 274, 113 S.Ct. 2606. And it is equally clear that advocacy is not limited to filing criminal charges or arguing in the courtroom. Id. at 272, 113 S.Ct. 2606. Thus, especially when considering pre-indictment acts, it is important to consider other factors, such as (1) whether the action is closely associated with the judicial process, Burns, 500 U.S. at 495, 111 S.Ct. 1934, (2) whether it is a uniquely prosecutorial function, id. at 491 n. 7, 111 S.Ct. 1934, and (3) whether it requires the exercise of professional judgment, Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130, 118 S.Ct. 502. 83 In sum, a prosecutor is entitled to absolute immunity for those actions that cast him in the role of an advocate initiating and presenting the government's case. Absolute immunity, however, does not extend to those actions that are investigative or administrative in nature, including the provision of legal advice outside the setting of a prosecution. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, 96 S.Ct. 984; Burns, 500 U.S. at 486, 493-94, 111 S.Ct. 1934.
84 We now turn to whether absolute immunity applies to the deputy district attorney's review of the affidavit in support of the search warrant in Mink's case. For the following reasons, we conclude the district attorney was not wearing the hat of an advocate and, thus, is not entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity. 85 As a preliminary matter, the district attorney does not contend she acted as an advocate intimately involved in a judicial proceeding. Rather, she alleges her role was limited to review and approval of the search warrant application; she does not even contend she evaluated whether probable cause existed to arrest or press charges. At the time she reviewed the affidavit, moreover, police had only the allegations of Professor Peake and had not yet confirmed the authorship of the articles contained in The Howling Pig. It is obvious the search of Mink's residence was part of a continuing effort to obtain evidence and the attorney's review was, at most, legal advice as to the sufficiency of the affidavit. It is also clear that the district attorney was far from filing charges at the time of the search, and subsequent events show that the office came to believe the case could not be prosecuted. 86 Second, the review of the affidavit cannot be said to be a uniquely prosecutorial role. While it is laudable that a legal review occur before the police proceed to a magistrate for a warrant, the Supreme Court made it clear in Burns that a legal review for the sufficiency of evidence to support probable cause is not sufficient to confer absolute immunity. Absolute immunity applies to the prosecutor's role in judicial proceedings, not for every litigation-inducing conduct. Burns, 500 U.S. at 494, 111 S.Ct. 1934. And while it may at times be difficult to discern the line between investigation and advocacy, here we do not even have a case where the prosecutor was preparing for her role as advocate for the State. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 271, 113 S.Ct. 2606. No one suggests that the district attorney was preparing for a judicial proceeding in merely reviewing the affidavit. 87 Finally, although the review of the affidavit can be said to require the exercise of professional judgment, that is true every time a prosecutor provides legal advice. Under the Supreme Court's functional approach, we look to which role the prosecutor is performing—advocate or investigator. Here, the review of the affidavit squarely falls on the side of investigatory legal advice, and not advocacy before a judicial body. The deputy district attorney played no role in preparing the affidavit, nor was she involved in preparing, analyzing, and presenting pleadings to a court. If she were, this would be quite a different case. 88 We acknowledge this conclusion is complicated by those cases where prosecutors have been absolutely immunized for drafting, filing, and arguing in support of an arrest or search warrant. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-31, 118 S.Ct. 502(arrest warrant); Burns, 500 U.S. at 487, 111 S.Ct. 1934 (search warrant). And the Supreme Court has explicitly recognized the issuance of a search warrant is unquestionably a judicial act. Burns, 500 U.S. at 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934. In those cases, however, the prosecutor was acting as an advocate— evaluating evidence, preparing pleadings, and appearing in court. It may be true that a lawyer's more active involvement in preparing a warrant application and presenting it in court will confer absolute immunity. But in this case the prosecutor's function was not that of an advocate; her function was to provide legal advice outside the courtroom to aid a nascent investigation. The premise of Burns was that, in providing advice to the police, the prosecutor acted to guide the police, not to prepare his own case. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 285, 113 S.Ct. 2606 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Here, the prosecutor was not preparing her case. Accordingly, in these circumstances, immunity does not attach. 89 The district attorney urges us to consider her reliance on Colorado law in support of a finding of absolute immunity. Colorado law requires district attorneys to render, in their quasi-judicial capacity, legal advice to peace officers, upon the request of such officers or of the court, pertaining to the preparation and review of affidavits and warrants for arrests, searches, seizures . . . and confers immun[ity] from liability under state law. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 20-1-106.1. As the district court correctly noted, however, a state statute—even one requiring affirmative action—cannot create immunity from a federal civil rights claim where the functional analysis suggests otherwise. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 375-76, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990). And under the Supreme Court's functional analysis we look to what the attorney did—she provided legal advice—and not to what state law requires. 90 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the district court erred in dismissing Mink's damages claim on the ground that it was barred by the doctrine of absolute immunity. The deputy district attorney, however, may be entitled to qualified immunity if she reasonably concluded probable cause existed to support the warrant application, or that the application of the Supreme Court's First Amendment cases to the criminal libel statute was not clearly established under the circumstances here. 91 The district court did not address the application of qualified immunity in these circumstances, and we decline to do so in the first instance. Accordingly, we remand that issue to the district court.