Opinion ID: 1349527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mental stress engendered by work conditions

Text: The claimant asserts that the facts of his case closely resemble those in Bill Gover Ford Company v. Roniger . [19] There, a clerical worker, approximately two weeks before sustaining a heart attack, was required to perform new and additional duties which subjected her to both mental and physical strain. In Roniger the court recommitted itself to the rule that heart disabilities may be caused by serial episodes of micro-strains or exertions. We also observed that in other jurisdictions strain is not confined to physical activity, but may also consist of unusual emotional stress, nervous strain, anxiety or tension. Roniger's teaching, which has been applied to on-the-job mental stress, [20] is in the mainstream of today's national jurisprudence. [21] In Oklahoma City v. Schoonover [22] the claimant was a police officer who aggravated a pre-existing ulcer and subsequently died during a surgical procedure to repair the ulcer. The medical evidence clearly linked the ulcer's aggravation to the mental stress and strain of the officer's work. The Schoonover employer  as does the employer in the present case  attempted to equate worry, as defined in Snead and Kinser, with the officer's on-the-job mental stress. The court viewed the two as fundamentally different. The deceased officer's mental stress and strain was not created by worry over inability to work; rather, it was engendered by the employment's work conditions. [23] Similarly, in Stiles v. Oklahoma Tax Com'n. [24] the claimant, a tax auditor, was subjected to work-related stresses which aggravated a pre-existing arthritic condition. The claimant's disability was held to be compensable. The essence of our inquiry is thus narrowed to determining whether the circumstances under which the claimant's heart attack occurred are more akin to those in Snead and Kinser or those in Schoonover and Stiles. We hold they correspond to the latter cases. Here, no evidence was presented which indicates that the claimant is an innate worrier, i.e., one who suffered from self-generated mental stress. Until 1984 the claimant's work conditions were unremarkable and he manifested no stress-related symptoms. Claimant's workplace milieu changed considerably in 1984. Before the change, the claimant had worked in a relaxed atmosphere with little supervision and was not required to perform duties except those for which he was specifically hired. The claimant's work environment was modified when Ms. C.'s status changed from that of co-worker to supervisor without a clarification of her responsibilities vis-a-vis the claimant. When she asked the claimant to perform additional duties for which he would not be compensated and he refused, their relationship turned into one of mutual dislike. Although higher-level school supervisors knew about the friction between them, no action was taken to alleviate the stressful milieu. Instead, Mr. B. and Dr. K., for the first time, rated the claimant's performance as unsatisfactory. Dr. K. threatened to terminate the claimant without specific explanation of what improvements could be made to avoid discharge. It was simultaneously with these changes in work conditions that the claimant began suffering from anxiety and insomnia. We are not persuaded by the employer's assertion that Schoonover is factually distinguishable from the present case. The key element in both Schoonover and Stiles, which is also present here, is that the claimant's injury resulted from stress and anxiety caused by the employment's work conditions, not by a self-generated innate propensity to worry. The requirement that the claimant's injury result from a risk reasonably incident to his employment is thus satisfied. In sum, the evidence that the claimant's mental stress existed and was caused by the work environment is uncontroverted. There is no competent evidence to contradict the established nexus of the work-related stress with the claimant's heart attack. We therefore hold that the trial tribunal's legal conclusion that the claimant did not suffer an accidental personal injury arising out of and in the course of his employment is unsupported by any competent proof. The Court of Appeals' opinion and the review panel's order are vacated and the cause is remanded to the trial judge for further proceedings not inconsistent with this pronouncement. DOOLIN, C.J., and HARGRAVE, V.C.J., and LAVENDER and ALMA WILSON, JJ., concur. KAUGER and SUMMERS, JJ., concur by reason of stare decisis. HODGES and SIMMS, JJ., dissent.