Opinion ID: 3159990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Providing the Trial Transcript to the Jury

Text: It is a “firm rule” that the district court “has broad discretion in responding to the jury’s request for the transcript of a particular witness’[s] testimony and will only be reversed upon a finding of an abuse of discretion.” United States v. Schmitt, 748 F.2d 249, 256 (5th Cir. 1984). Though the court’s discretion is broad, it cannot ignore the risk of the jury placing undue emphasis on the provided testimony. See id.; United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 148 (5th Cir. 1976). Other circuits also recognize that, in deciding whether to comply with a jury’s request for a transcript, a district court must account for “the possibility of undue emphasis on any portion of the testimony.” United States v. Escotto, 121 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Hernandez, 27 F.3d 1403, 1408–09 (9th Cir. 1992). In Hernandez, the Ninth Circuit held the trial court had abused its discretion by giving the jury the transcript of a key witness’s testimony, which included the description of the suspect. 27 F.3d at 1408. In that case, the court ordered a new trial, explaining that the district court had allowed for undue emphasis of particular testimony because “[t]he jury clearly indicated by note that its final decision turned on [the witness’s] testimony, specifically his description of the suspect.” Id. at 1409. Here, Eghobor claims that, when providing a copy of Bell’s testimony, the court ignored the risk that the jury would unduly emphasize her testimony. We reject this contention for three reasons. First, Bell’s complete testimony was provided to the jury, which mitigates the threat of the jury taking portions out of context. Second, the jury did not indicate why it wanted Bell’s transcript or the importance it attached to it, nor does Eghobor argue that her testimony was likely critical to its decision. Indeed, Eghobor in his brief acknowledges that only a small part of Bell’s testimony concerned him. This case contrasts sharply with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Hernandez where the jury “relayed 9 Case: 14-11354 Document: 00513294149 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/03/2015 No. 14-11354 that its final decision was based on” the testimony it requested. 27 F.3d at 1405. Third, given that the Ikhile transcript had already been provided, the district court acted appropriately by treating the second request equally. During the trial, the court indicated its agreement with the government’s argument that the defendants should not be able to “pick and choose” which transcripts to provide to the jury. To deny the request could be interpreted as a judicial comment on Bell’s testimony. 3 Eghobor also contends that the court, when providing the Bell transcript, erred by not including a cautionary instruction reminding the jury to consider all of the evidence as a whole and not to give undue emphasis to the provided transcript. This Court has never directly addressed whether such instructions are necessary or appropriate. Other circuits have observed that the risk of undue emphasis may be mitigated if the trial judge gives a “cautionary instruction” reminding the jury “to consider all the evidence without unduly emphasizing any portion of it.” Escotto, 121 F.3d at 85; accord United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1401 (3d Cir. 1994). We agree that a cautionary instruction reminding the jury to focus on all of the evidence, while not required, should generally be included when providing a trial transcript to the jury. Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1401. Importantly, in this case, Eghobor did not request such an instruction during the trial. He instead asserted a blanket objection to providing the Bell transcript and any other transcripts. Because his objection did not put the 3 Eghobor also attempts to justify his reason for objecting to the Bell transcript but not the Ikhile transcript on the basis that Ikhile, unlike Bell, spoke with an accent. This argument, which was not raised to the district court, misses the mark. Our inquiry focuses on what evidence, if any, suggests that the jury would give undue emphasis to the Bell transcript. It is unclear how Eghobor’s speculation as to why the jury requested the transcript of another witness, Ikhile, has bearing on whether the jury was going to unduly emphasize the Bell transcript. 10 Case: 14-11354 Document: 00513294149 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/03/2015 No. 14-11354 district court on notice as to whether it should include a cautionary instruction, we review his claim for plain error. See United States v. Sanchez-Espinal, 762 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 2014) (holding that plain error review applies where a party fails to raise an objection “specific enough to put the district court on notice of potential issues for appeal and allow the district court to correct itself”); Escotto, 121 F.3d at 85 (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 51). “Plain error exists if (1) there is an error, (2) the error is plain, . . . (3) the error affect[s] substantial rights and (4) the error seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. Garcia-Carrillo, 749 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 1126–27 (2013)). Here, the district court did not err because Eghobor failed to establish that the court ignored a risk of undue emphasis. Further, even assuming the district court erred, such error was not plain. This Court, as noted, has never expressly required trial judges to include cautionary instructions when providing the transcript. Other circuits similarly have not mandated them, although they acknowledge such instructions are “advisable.” Escotto, 121 F.3d at 85; Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1401. Eghobor also cannot show that his “substantial rights were affected”—that is, the lack of cautionary instructions “affected the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734 (1993)). The jury had previously been instructed to consider all of the evidence and Eghobor has not presented evidence to overcome the presumption that the jury followed these instructions. See United States v. Millsaps, 157 F.3d 989, 993 (5th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). Lastly, Eghobor fails to explain how the lack of a cautionary instruction casts doubt on the integrity of the judicial proceedings. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court neither abused its discretion in complying with the jury’s request for the second transcript nor 11 Case: 14-11354 Document: 00513294149 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/03/2015 No. 14-11354 committed plain error by not giving a cautionary instruction when providing the transcript.