Opinion ID: 757051
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Common-Law Right of Allocution

Text: 37 Hall next contends that, even if Rule 32(c)(3)(C) does not expressly provide him with a per se right to make an unsworn statement of remorse before the jury, he possesses a common-law right to do so. He further argues that we should not construe § 3593 as abrogating this common-law right because [i]t is a well-established principle of statutory construction that '[t]he common law ... ought not to be deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this purpose.'  Norfolk Redev. & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35, 104 S.Ct. 304, 78 L.Ed.2d 29 (1983) (quoting Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603, 623, 3 L.Ed. 453 (1813) (second set of brackets and ellipses in original)). We conclude, however, that no such common-law right exists. 38 At common law, a felony defendant had a right to have the court formally inquire  'what he had to say why judgment should not be given against him.'  Paul W. Barrett, Allocution, 9 MO. L.REV. 121 (1944) (quoting Rex & Regina v. Geary, 2 Salk. 630 (K.B.1689-1712)); see also State v. Green, 336 N.C. 142, 443 S.E.2d 14, 42 (1994). The right of allocution developed in a time in which the common-law judge had no discretion as to the punishment for felonies; as such, the point of the question to the defendant was not to elicit mitigating information. See Barrett, supra, at 120-21. Rather, the question was designed to afford the defendant a formal opportunity to present certain strictly-defined common-law grounds requiring the avoidance or delay of sentencing, including a claim that the defendant was not the person convicted, had the benefit of clergy, was insane, or was pregnant. See id.; 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, THE CRIMINAL LAW 698, 761-62 (1841); 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 525, at 82 (2d ed. 1982) (The common law for many centuries has recognized the right of a defendant to 'allocution,' a formal statement by the defendant of any legal reason why he could not be sentenced.). 39 Since the mid-nineteenth century, however, modern developments in criminal procedure, including the advent of sentencing discretion, the right of the accused to counsel, and the right of the accused to testify on his own behalf, have led to varied treatment of the right of allocution. See Barrett, supra, at 126-43. Some jurisdictions have concluded that the common-law right of allocution encompasses the right of the defendant to make unsworn statements to the jury that are not subject to cross-examination. See, e.g., Harris v. State, 306 Md. 344, 509 A.2d 120, 127 (1986) (We conclude that, under the common law applicable to capital sentencing proceedings at the time [the defendant] was sentenced, a defendant who timely asserts his right to allocute [before the jury], and provides an acceptable proffer, must be afforded a fair opportunity to exercise this right.); Homick v. State, 108 Nev. 127, 825 P.2d 600, 604 (1992) (We conclude that capital defendants in the State of Nevada enjoy the common law right of allocution [before the jury].); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 548 A.2d 1022, 1046 (1988) (recognizing under the court's supervisory power the right of a capital defendant to make an unsworn plea for mercy to the jury); State v. Lord, 117 Wash.2d 829, 822 P.2d 177, 216 (1991) (indicating that the defendant had a right to make an unsworn plea for mercy before the jury that was not subject to cross-examination). However, other jurisdictions have held that no such common-law right exists. See, e.g., People v. Robbins, 45 Cal.3d 867, 248 Cal.Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355, 369 (1988) (Given [that a capital defendant possesses the right to testify and offer other mitigating evidence], we fail to see the need, much less a constitutional requirement, for a corresponding 'right to address the sentencer without being subject to cross-examination' in capital cases.); People v. Kokoraleis, 132 Ill.2d 235, 138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202, 224 (1989) (declining to exercise its supervisory power to recognize a rule allowing defendants in capital sentencing hearings ... to make a brief, unsworn plea for leniency without being subject to cross-examination); State v. Whitfield, 837 S.W.2d 503, 514 (Mo.1992) (en banc) (Despite defendant's claim to the contrary, the right of allocution in Missouri does not extend to addressing the jury.); State v. Perkins, 345 N.C. 254, 481 S.E.2d 25, 41 ([W]e have held that a defendant does not have a constitutional, statutory, or common law right to make unsworn statements of fact to the jury at the conclusion of a capital sentencing proceeding.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 111, 139 L.Ed.2d 64 (1997); Duckett v. State, 919 P.2d 7, 22 (Okla.Crim.App.1995) ([W]e conclude that there is no statutory, common-law or constitutional right of a defendant to make a plea for mercy or otherwise address his sentencing jury, in addition to closing argument by counsel. (footnote omitted)); State v. Stephenson, 878 S.W.2d 530, 551 (Tenn.1994) (holding that no common-law right of allocution exists in Tennessee because the right is nothing more than an empty formality in light of the criminal defendant's right to counsel). 40 Suffice it to say, Hall stands on shaky ground when he asserts that a general common-law right exists entitling a capital defendant to address the sentencing jury unsworn and not subject to cross-examination. Moreover, even if such a common-law right existed, its continued recognition in federal capital cases would be inconsistent with the procedural framework for capital sentencing hearings established by the FDPA. As noted earlier, § 3593(c) vests the district court with a gatekeeping role in determining what information--both mitigating and aggravating--reaches the jury. It may exclude information if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted that state's capital sentencing scheme, which vests the trial court with similar authority, to abrogate any common-law right of the defendant to make unsworn statements to the jury on the following grounds: 41 Whatever force the common law of allocution has with respect to other criminal cases, the General Assembly has abrogated that law and replaced it with statutory law devised specifically for first degree murder cases. The legislature has provided that a sentencing hearing is required at which evidence may be presented to the jury, or the judge as the case may be. The court is given discretion to determine what evidence will be received as relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed. Following the presentation of evidence, counsel are permitted to argue to the sentencing body for or against the death sentence. 42 It is apparent from the structure provided that this evidentiary hearing is intended to serve as part of the truth-determining process to enable the sentencer to discern and apply the facts bearing on the determination of the appropriate sentence. Implicit in the fact that the statute assigns to the defendant the burden of proving mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of evidence is the understanding that the jury is to asses[s] the evidence for credibility. It must be left open for the Commonwealth to challenge the veracity of facts asserted and the credibility of the person asserting those facts, whether that person is a witness or the defendant. We find no reason in law or logic why the defendant's presentation of evidence in support of his claim that life imprisonment is the appropriate sentence should be shielded from the testing for truthfulness and reliability that is accomplished by cross-examination. 43 Abu-Jamal, 555 A.2d at 857-58. We find this analysis persuasive in construing the FDPA. We therefore conclude that Hall possessed no federal common-law right to allocute before the jury. 44