Opinion ID: 1306155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: errors assigned by defendants lester barnett and carl wilder.

Text: These defendants assign as error the joinder of the charges against all defendants for trial. These assignments have no merit. Upon written motion of the prosecutor charges against two or more defendants may be joined for trial [w]hen each of the defendants is charged with accountability for each offense. G.S. 15A-926(b)(2)a. See also State v. Smith, 301 N.C. 695, 272 S.E.2d 852 (1981); State v. Slade, 291 N.C. 275, 229 S.E.2d 921 (1976). Ordinarily, motions to consolidate cases for trial are within the sound discretion of the trial court, State v. Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222, death penalty vacated, 429 U.S. 809, 97 S.Ct. 46, 50 L.Ed.2d 69 (1976), and absent a showing that a joint trial has deprived an accused of a fair trial, the exercise of the court's discretion will not be disturbed on appeal. State v. Fox, 274 N.C. 277, 163 S.E.2d 492 (1968). Each of the defendants was charged on 12 August 1980 with the robbery and the murder of Chalmers H. Wallace. The evidence showed that each defendant participated in the robbery and that Wallace was killed with a deadly weapon during the commission of the robbery. That being true, each defendant was charged with accountability for the felony-murder of Wallace and was subject to conviction for first degree murder. G.S. 14-17; State v. Shrader, 290 N.C. 253, 225 S.E.2d 522 (1976). We hold the court did not abuse its discretion in consolidating the cases for trial. The question of defendants' alleged deprivation of a fair trial is hereinafter discussed.
Lester Barnett and Wilder each assigns as error the admission into evidence of the sanitized statement of his codefendants. There is no merit in this assignment. These defendants argue that inasmuch as the trial court, over their objections, allowed the state's motion for joinder of their trials, the admission into evidence of the confessions of all defendants violated their constitutional rights under Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Bruton, there was a joint trial of Evans and Bruton for armed postal robbery. Evans did not testify and a postal inspector testified with respect to Evans' oral confession that Evans and Bruton had committed the robbery. The trial judge instructed the jury that the confession evidence was not admissible against Bruton and the jury could not consider it in determining Bruton's guilt or innocence. Both defendants were convicted. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit set aside Evans' conviction on the ground that his admissions to the postal inspector were tainted by his prior unconstitutional confession, but the Court affirmed Bruton's conviction because of the trial court's limiting instructions. Id. at 124-25, 88 S.Ct. at 1621-1622. The United States Supreme Court allowed Bruton's petition for certiorari and reversed the lower court. The Supreme Court held that since Evans did not testify, the introduction of his confession added substantial weight to the government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, thereby violating Bruton's Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation. The Court also concluded that this encroachment on Bruton's Right of Confrontation could not be avoided by instructing the jury to disregard the confession in Bruton's case. In State v. Fox, supra, 274 N.C. at 291, 163 S.E.2d at 502, this Court, after recognizing the Bruton principle, said: The result is that in joint trials of defendants it is necessary to exclude extrajudicial confessions unless all portions which implicate defendants other than the declarant can be deleted without prejudice either to the State or the declarant. If such deletion is not possible, the State must choose between relinquishing the confession or trying the defendants separately. See also State v. Davis and State v. Fish, 284 N.C. 701, 202 S.E.2d 770, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 857, 95 S.Ct. 104, 42 L.Ed.2d 91 (1974); G.S. 15A-927(c). In the case at hand, the record clearly discloses that the trial court admitted the confessions into evidence only after modifying them as mandated by Fox and in compliance with G.S. 15A-927(c)(1). [3] All parts of each defendant's confession that referred to or implicated any other defendant were deleted. The assignment of error is overruled.
Defendants Lester Barnett and Wilder assign as error the trial court's permitting the jury to examine and read their sanitized written confessions. These assignments have no merit. After the jury had gone to the jury room and began their deliberations, they returned to the courtroom with some questions and a request that they be allowed to review defendants' written confessions which had been admitted into evidence. The court would not allow the jury to take these statements to the jury room but did allow the jury to review the statements in the courtroom. The action of the trial judge is clearly authorized by G.S. 15A-1233(a), which provides in pertinent part: The judge in his discretion, after notice to the prosecutor and defendant, may direct that requested parts of the testimony be read to the jury and may permit the jury to reexamine in open court the requested materials admitted into evidence. [Emphasis added.] Defendants do not contend that they did not have notice as provided by the quoted statute. They argue that the judge should not have allowed the jury to reexamine the statements without their consent. Consent is required, however, only when the jury is allowed to take writings or exhibits to the jury room. G.S. 15A-1233(b). [4] We hold that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion and the assignments of error are overruled.
Defendants Lester Barnett and Wilder assign as error the failure of the trial court to submit to the jury the issue of the voluntariness of defendants' confessions. There is no merit in these assignments. Defendants concede that under current law as restated in State v. Miley, 291 N.C. 431, 230 S.E.2d 537 (1976), the trial judge is not required to submit to the jury the issue of voluntariness, but they ask us to reconsider Miley in light of the decision in United States v. Inman, 352 F.2d 954 (4th Cir.1965). In State v. Miley, supra, 291 N.C. at 434-35, 230 S.E.2d at 539-40, this Court said: In connection with the issue of defendant's statement to the police, defendant contends that the trial court should have submitted the question of voluntariness to the jury. Counsel for defendant, citing State v. Hill, 276 N.C. 1, 170 S.E.2d 885 (1969), concedes that the present law in North Carolina does not require the issue of voluntariness of the confession to be submitted to the jury, but requests that this Court reconsider its position on this question. In State v. Hill, supra, at 14-15, 170 S.E.2d at 894, Justice Higgins, speaking for the Court, said: `Defense counsel also argue that the voluntariness of the confession should have been one of the issues submitted to the trial jury. Under North Carolina procedure, voluntariness is a preliminary question to be passed on by the trial judge in the absence of the jury. State v. Vickers, 274 N.C. 311, 163 S.E.2d 481; State v. Gray, 268 N.C. 69, 150 S.E.2d 1; State v. Barnes, 264 N.C. 517, 142 S.E.2d 344. This procedure, we think, is approved by the Supreme Court of the United States. In Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908] (Foonote 19), the Court uses this language: ... [T]he states are free to allocate functions between the judge and the jury as they see fit.' We see no reason to change this well established rule and refrain from doing so in this case. In Inman, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit not only held that the trial judge must pass upon the voluntariness of a confession, but further held that in federal prosecutions within the Fourth Circuit final appraisal of the voluntariness of a confession should be left to the jury. With respect to the question of voluntariness being determined solely by the trial judge, the Court said: There is, concededly, authority at least implying that this procedure in State prosecutions is not Constitutionally impermissible. 352 F.2d at 955-56 (citing Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964)). We adhere to our decision in Miley; therefore, the assignments of error are overruled.
Defendants Lester Barnett and Wilder assign as error the trial court's instructions to the jury on the question of common purpose. There is no merit in these assignments. The trial court's charge to the jury included the following instruction: Again, in determining guilt or innocence as to this crime [murder], the court instructs you that for a person to be guilty of a crime, it is not necessary that he, himself, do all the acts necessary to constitute the crime. If two or more persons in the presence of each other act together with a common purpose to commit the crime of murder, each of them is held responsible for the acts of the others done in the commission of the crime. Each is responsible for all the acts committed by the others in the execution of the common purpose which are the natural or probable consequence of the unlawful combination of the undertaking. [Emphasis added.] Defendants except to that part of the instruction in italics. They argue that there was no evidence tending to show that there was a common purpose on the part of two or more of the defendants to commit the crime of murder; that, at most, the evidence tended to show a common purpose to commit the offense of armed robbery. We disagree. An essential element of armed robbery, indeed the heart of the offense, is that a firearm or other dangerous weapon be used whereby the life of a person is endangered or threatened. G.S. 14-87. This act is by its nature inherently dangerous to human life; and if this danger against which the statute is aimed occurs and the robber kills, the act is ordinarily murder under the felony-murder rule. Here all three defendants were armed with firearmsthe Barnetts with pistols and Wilder with a shotgun. There was evidence that both of the Barnetts shot Wallace [5] and Wilder shot at the escaping witness, Cheryl Little. Because of these facts and because of the nature of the crime of armed robbery, we think the jury could infer, although it would not have been compelled to do so, that all three defendants had a common purpose to murder if murder became necessary during the course of the robbery to overcome the victim's resistance, to eliminate the victim or others as potential witnesses, or to aid in their escape. We find no error, therefore, in the instruction. The assignments are overruled.
Defendants Lester Barnett and Wilder assign as errors the denial of their motions to set aside the verdicts as to them and to grant them new trials. These assignments have no merit. As the grounds for these assignments, defendants depend on the soundness of their contentions hereinabove discussed. Having rejected all of these contentions, we conclude that defendants have shown no support for the assignments; hence they are overruled.