Opinion ID: 1175474
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Evidence on the Theory of the Defense

Text: The theory of the defense was that a woman could mistake the sensations of a normal bimanual pelvic examination for a sexual assault, could mistake the sight of a gloved hand for an erect penis, could confuse examination lubricants with semen, and could misunderstand normal examination room conversation. Appellant testified about these topics himself and called five other witnesses who also discussed them. Kathy Gifford, one of appellant's nurses, described his normal examinations. She explained that he used flesh-colored disposable gloves and cream-colored phisohex. She also testified that there was often a discharge from a patient's vagina that had to be wiped off with a tissue. Judy Gifford, a patient of appellant's who also worked for him as a nurse, confirmed her sister-in-law's testimony about the gloves and phisohex. She described appellant's bimanual examination procedures in great detail, explaining that he would ask his patients whether they could take any more, and whether he could go any deeper, the same words appellant allegedly used during the sexual assaults. She also stated that he sometimes injected warm medications which the patients could feel as it entered their vaginas. Finally, she described the vaginal discharge which she said was commonly associated with the examinations. Appellant's next witness, Jacqui Bischoff, was a nurse at the Big Horn Hospital and one of appellant's patients. After testifying about appellant's reputation, defense counsel asked her to compare the pelvic examinations she received from appellant with those she had been given by other doctors. The prosecutor objected on relevancy grounds, but the court allowed her to answer. She said there was no difference. Defense counsel then attempted to inquire about the specific differences, the prosecutor objected, and the court held a bench conference. Defense counsel explained that Ms. Bischoff's testimony was relevant because it showed that there were more than just one or two patients who received uneventful pelvic examinations from appellant. When the court asked where the line would be drawn, defense counsel stated that six more witnesses would be called to discuss their normal examinations. Appellant was entitled to nine witnesses, according to the defense, because nine victims had testified for the prosecution. The court ruled that the testimony of those additional six witnesses would be cumulative but it permitted the defense to continue its interrogation of Ms. Bischoff. Despite the court's ruling, defense counsel asked another one of appellant's patients, Robyn Winland, about her normal pelvic examinations. When the prosecutor objected, the court called a bench conference. Defense counsel informed the court that Ms. Winland would describe her vaginal secretions, the words used by appellant, and the manner in which appellant's clothing brushed against her. The court stood by its prior ruling and held that the testimony about the secretions and language was cumulative. The defense was permitted to inquire about the clothing, however, because it was new evidence. Appellant contends that the court abused its discretion by limiting the introduction of evidence on this theory of the case. The State counters that the evidence was properly excluded as cumulative. Rule 403, W.R.E., states in part: Although relevant, evidence may be excluded    by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Like other evidentiary rulings, a trial court's decision to exclude evidence under Rule 403 will only be overturned for clear abuse of discretion. Towner v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 45, 49 (1984); McCabe v. R.A. Manning Construction Company, Inc., Wyo., 674 P.2d 699, 711 (1983). However, Rule 403 is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly since it allows the court to exclude evidence which is concededly relevant and probative. Its major function is to exclude scant or cumulative evidence which may be unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or needlessly cumulative. Towner v. State, supra, at 49. We agree with the State that the court exercised its discretion wisely under the circumstances. The court permitted appellant and three other witnesses to testify freely about the examination procedures that the victims might have misconstrued. The court was careful to exclude only the evidence which was actually cumulative. The court did not have to allow appellant nine witnesses just because there happened to be nine victims who testified for the prosecution. Appellant's final claim of improper limits on his defense involves the testimony of his expert, Dr. Douglas Wrung. Although Dr. Wrung was permitted to testify about vaginal discharges after normal pelvic examinations, he was not allowed to describe the procedures which, in his opinion, a female patient might mistake for a sexual assault. Specifically, defense counsel asked Dr. Wrung: In your experience relative to conducting pelvic exams are there any particular procedures that come to mind that in your opinion are capable of being misinterpreted by a patient? The court sustained the prosecutor's objection that any answer to this question would be speculative. Rule 702, W.R.E., permits expert opinion testimony if it will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. In addition, the expert's opinion must be based on facts which he has personally perceived, which were introduced at the hearing, or are reasonably relied upon by experts in his field. 3 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence § 388 at 654-655 (1979). [6] Rule 703 does not abdicate judicial responsibility to the expert, for it leaves room for rejection of testimony if reliance on the facts or data is unreasonable: The Rule in effect directs the trial judge to accord deference to the expert's explanation of what is reasonable, but it does not require the trial judge to accept what amounts to wishful thinking, guesswork, or speculation. Id., § 387 at 652. Although Dr. Wrung might have described many examination procedures with which he was familiar, he could not link those procedures with physical sensations he had personally experienced. His opinion would have been nothing more than speculation which could have misled the jury. See Krucheck v. State, supra, 702 P.2d at 1271. If there was some study of female patients showing that some examination procedures could be mistaken for intercourse, then Dr. Wrung might have had a proper basis for an opinion. But defense counsel never made an offer of proof demonstrating such a basis. Under the circumstances, the testimony was properly excluded.