Opinion ID: 2093682
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was Simonson deprived of a property right?

Text: At this point in our discussion, we believe it helpful to clarify that Simonson was not suspended, but rather was placed on paid administrative leave pending the investigation of the sexual harassment complaint filed against him.
Public employees who can be discharged only for cause have a constitutionally protected property interest in their tenure and cannot be fired without due process. Gilbert, 520 U.S. at 929, 117 S.Ct. at 1811, 138 L.Ed.2d at 126. A person must have a legitimate claim of entitlement to his or her employment to have a property interest in it. Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d at 561. When such a property interest exists, the employee is entitled to a hearing or some related form of due process before being deprived of the interest. Winegar v. Des Moines Ind. Community Sch. Dist., 20 F.3d 895, 899 (8th Cir.1994). Property interests `are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law....' Bennett v. City of Redfield, 446 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 1989) (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 577, 92 S.Ct. at 2709, 33 L.Ed.2d at 561). A property interest typically arises from contractual or statutory limitations on the employer's ability to terminate an employee or can also be created by implied contract, arising out of customs, practices, and de facto policies. Winegar, 20 F.3d at 899 (parties agreed that high school teacher had protected property interest in employment by virtue of teacher's continuing contract under Iowa Code §§ 279.13-.19 relating to contracts with teachers). Thus, to determine whether a public employee has a property interest in continued employment, we look to state law and any contractual rights Simonson may have. See Bennett, 446 N.W.2d at 472; Wagner v. Texas A & M Univ., 939 F.Supp. 1297, 1311-12 (S.D.Tex.1996) (stating that where employee did not claim deprivation of compensation, state law and any contractual rights must be examined to determine whether employee had property interest in ability to continue to perform job duties). In this case, Simonson was not deprived of any economic benefits because he was placed on paid administrative leave. Cases from other jurisdictions have concluded that a government employee has no constitutionally protected property interest in actually performing his or her job and thus an employee's due process rights are not implicated so long as he or she continues to receive pay and benefits. See Harris v. Board of Educ., 105 F.3d 591, 596-97 (11th Cir.1997) (school board was entitled to qualified immunity where it relieved superintendent of duties while continuing to pay salary; public employee has only a constitutionally protected property interest in economic benefits of his position and does not have any right to actually hold the position and execute the duties of the office); City of Annapolis v. Rowe, 123 Md.App. 267, 717 A.2d 976, 988 (1998) (firefighter who was suspended with pay had no constitutionally protected property interest in actually performing his job, was not deprived of due process, and was not entitled to presuspension hearing), and cases cited therein. Other cases have held, however, that even though the employee is not deprived of the economic benefits of the job, an employee has a constitutionally protected property right in continuous employment by virtue of certain statutorily created procedural rules concerning suspension or demotion. See Wedges/Ledges of Cal., Inc. v. City of Phoenix, 24 F.3d 56, 62 (9th Cir. 1994) (Although procedural requirements ordinarily do not transform a unilateral expectation into a protected property interest, such an interest is created if the procedural requirements are intended to be a significant substantive restriction on... decision making.) (quotations and citations omitted); Winegar, 20 F.3d at 899 (the parties agreed that a high school teacher had a protected property interest in his employment by virtue of his continuing contract under Iowa Code §§ 279.13-.19 prescribing procedures for teacher termination or nonrenewal of teacher contracts, culminating with a hearing before the school board); Division of Family Servs. v. Cade, 939 S.W.2d 546, 553 (Mo. Ct.App.1997) (Missouri statutes which require written notice be given to employees who are to be suspended for more than five days, and permit suspension only for certain causes, give government employees a property interest in jobs); Arneson v. Jezwinski, 225 Wis.2d 371, 592 N.W.2d 606, 618-19 (1999) (state university employee had protected property interest in wages and in continuous employment with university under state statute prescribing that civil service employees may be removed, suspended without pay or discharged only for just cause).
In this case, Simonson was placed on paid administrative leave and thus he was not deprived of any economic benefits while the University investigated the sexual harassment complaints against him. The district court concluded, however, that Simonson's property interest in continued employment as a tenured professor is guaranteed by his contract with the University and the Board of Regents and by the following provisions of Iowa Administrative Code rule 681-9.1 relating to Policies, Practices and Procedures of the State Board of Regents: [1] 10.  Suspension of a member of the faculty or staff means that during a specified period of time, the member of the faculty or staff is not eligible to continue as an employee of the university, or to resume employment status .... .... C. Sanctions 1. Any student or member of the faculty or staff who is found after appropriate hearings to have violated any of the rules of personal conduct ... may be sanctioned up to and including suspension, expulsion or dismissal. ... A faculty or staff member [professor] who is suspended shall receive no salary during the period of suspension; provided, however, that the faculty member shall be paid for work done prior to the date of the suspension order. Appropriate hearings as used throughout these rules means pursuant to existing hearing procedures in effect at the university for students and members of the faculty and staff. (Emphasis added.) The University's personnel policies make no reference concerning when a professor may be placed on paid administrative leave, whether a hearing is required before doing so, or whether such action constitutes a sanction. According to the University's personnel policies, a faculty member may be sanctioned after appropriate hearings. As noted above, the phrase may be sanctioned includes suspension, expulsion or dismissal without pay. Thus, by inference, a faculty member who is placed on administrative leave with pay is not suspended as that term is defined in the University's personnel policies. We believe that the phrase may be sanctioned is suggestive of disciplinary action that is taken after a formal investigation is completed and would not include the decision to place a professor on paid administrative leave made at the initial stages of an investigation into sexual harassment complaints. Additionally, any sanction imposed on Simonson affecting his tenure would come after the University held proceedings concerning the merits of the sexual harassment complaints. Thus, assuming without deciding that the University's procedural rules concerning suspension create a property interest in employment which entitles a professor to an appropriate hearing prior to suspension, those procedural rules would not seem to apply to the University's decision to place a professor on paid administrative leave. We, therefore, conclude that nothing in ISU's personnel policies or rules regarding suspension of employees gives Simonson a protected property interest entitling him to a hearing prior to being placed on paid administrative leave pending investigation of the complaints against him. Thus, Simonson was not deprived of a protected property interest, in the form of an economic benefit or otherwise, when he was placed on paid administrative leave. See Harris, 105 F.3d at 596-97; City of Annapolis, 717 A.2d at 988. We reverse the decision of the district court on this issue.