Opinion ID: 2121946
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Taxpayer Action

Text: We now turn to the merits of the taxpayer action. Article XIV, section 3, of our constitution establishes a constitutional initiative process for amending the legislative article: Amendments to Article IV of this Constitution may be proposed by a petition signed by a number of electors equal in number to at least eight percent of the total votes cast for candidates for Governor in the preceding gubernatorial election. Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV. (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 3. The CBA contends that the proposed amendment is invalid because it does not meet the subject matter requirement of article XIV, section 3. The CBA argues that the proposed amendment does not affect either the General Assembly's structure or procedure and certainly not both. We emphasize that this court voices no opinion as to the wisdom or desirability of the proposed amendment. Rather, our judgment is based solely on our settled construction of article XIV, section 3. See CBA, 137 Ill.2d at 407, 148 Ill.Dec. 744, 561 N.E.2d 50. As in Coalition I, we are presented with the question of whether a proposed amendment to our constitution satisfies the constitution's own requirements for its amendment. As this court explained in Coalition I: Article XIV, section 3, of the Constitution provides specific requirements for the proposing of amendments under the initiative procedure. The Constitution has an express limitation as to the subject matter of a proposal: `Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV.' Any offered amendment under the initiative obviously must comply with the procedure and limitations on amendment set out in section 3 before it can be submitted to the electorate. As this court has observed: `The constitution is the supreme law    and every court is bound to enforce its provisions.' [Citation.] Coalition I, 65 Ill.2d at 460, 3 Ill.Dec. 728, 359 N.E.2d 138. The controlling legal principles are settled. The prior constitutions of this State did not provide for amendment through the direct initiative process. ( CBA, 137 Ill.2d at 398, 148 Ill.Dec. 744, 561 N.E.2d 50.) The Framers of the 1970 Illinois Constitution intended article XIV, section 3, to be a very limited form of constitutional initiative. The Framers considered that a general initiative provision was unnecessary due to the liberalized amendment procedures of the new constitution. ( CBA, 137 Ill.2d at 401, 148 Ill.Dec. 744, 561 N.E.2d 50.) The Framers also expressed concern that a general initiative provision would be subject to abuse by special interest groups and might result in hasty and ill-conceived attempts to write what should have been the subject of ordinary legislation into the Constitution. Coalition I, 65 Ill.2d at 467, 3 Ill.Dec. 728, 359 N.E.2d 138. Based on the Framers' concerns, article XIV, section 3, provides only for amendment of the legislative article, article IV. Further, not every aspect of the legislative article is subject to amendment through the initiative process. Rather, `Amendments shall be limited to structural and procedural subjects contained in Article IV.' (Emphasis added.) CBA, 137 Ill.2d at 398, 148 Ill.Dec. 744, 561 N.E.2d 50, quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. XIV, § 3. In Coalition I, this court held that the word and in the structural and procedural requirement means and. Accordingly: As commonly understood, the word `and' would thus limit initiatives to amendments whose subjects would be both structural and procedural, such as a proposal for the conversion from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature or for the conversion from multiple- to single-member legislative districts. Giving effect to the language of section 3 would produce no absurdity or unreasonable result. This court is without authority to substitute `or' for the `and' the constitutional convention used in stating `structural and procedural' unless a contrary intention is clearly manifested. We judge a contrary intention is not clearly manifested. Coalition I, 65 Ill.2d at 466. 3 Ill.Dec. 728, 359 N.E.2d 138. Applying these principles to the instant case, it is clear that the proposed amendment does not meet the structural and procedural requirement of article XIV, section 3. The eligibility or qualifications of an individual legislator does not involve the structure of the legislature as an institution. The General Assembly would remain a bicameral legislature consisting of a House and Senate with a total of 177 members, and would maintain the same organization. Likewise, the eligibility or qualifications of an individual legislator does not involve any of the General Assembly's procedures. The process by which the General Assembly adopts a law would remain unchanged. The dissent does not dispute these legal principles or the necessary result from an application of these principles to the proposed amendment. Rather, the dissent relies upon Justice Schaefer's dissent in Coalition I to argue that the word and in the structural and procedural requirement of article XIV, section 3, should mean or. 161 Ill.2d at 518-19, 204 Ill.Dec. at 309, 641 N.E.2d at 533 (Harrison, J., joined by Miller & Heiple, dissenting), relying on Coalition I, 65 Ill.2d at 473-76, 3 Ill.Dec. 728, 359 N.E.2d 138 (Schaefer, J., dissenting). However, even if the word and in the structural and procedural requirement meant or, the result in this case would not change. As we explained, the proposed amendment does not meet either the structural or the procedural requirement of article XIV, section 3. Further, and more fundamentally, the dissent relies upon a dissent and not the law as declared by this court. The doctrine of stare decisis is the means by which courts ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. Stare decisis permits society to presume that fundamental principles are established in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals. The doctrine thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government both in appearance and in fact. Stare decisis is not an inexorable command. However, a court will detour from the straight path of stare decisis only for articulable reasons, and only when the court must bring its decisions into agreement with experience and newly ascertained facts. Vasquez v. Hillery (1986), 474 U.S. 254, 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624-25, 88 L.Ed.2d 598, 610. Specifically, [a]lthough adherence to precedent is not rigidly required in constitutional cases, any departure from the doctrine of stare decisis demands special justification. ( Arizona v. Rumsey (1984), 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2311, 81 L.Ed.2d 164, 172.) In the present case, the Proponents have not shown any special justification for this court to depart from our holding in Coalition I. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of mandamus in cause No. 77405 is dismissed; and the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County in cause No. 77566 is affirmed. No. 77405 Petition dismissed. No. 77566 Judgment affirmed.