Opinion ID: 2504311
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Title to Little Jack Rowe Island

Text: Appellants argue the master erred in finding Little Jack Rowe was not subject to a presumption of State ownership, as set forth in Coburg. After much consideration, we take this opportunity to overturn the specific holding of Coburg that [t]itle to islands situate within marshland follows title to the marshland. Coburg II, 318 S.C. at 513, 458 S.E.2d at 548. In Coburg I, Lesser received a permit from the South Carolina Coastal Council to construct a walkway and floating dock on marshland that contained two small islands, Glass Island and Small Island. Coburg I, 309 S.C. at 253, 422 S.E.2d at 97. These islands were bordered on one side by the Wappoo Creek, a navigable tidal stream on the Intracoastal Waterway, and on the remaining sides by marshland. Coburg brought an action to quiet title to the marshland and islands, claiming ownership pursuant to a 1967 deed which traced back to a 1703 grant from the Lords Proprietors to Robert Gibbes. Coburg II, 318 S.C. at 512, 458 S.E.2d at 548. After reciting the established principle that [p]resumption of title to marshland rests in the State of South Carolina, to be held in trust for the benefit of the public, Coburg I, 309 S.C. at 253, 422 S.E.2d at 97, this Court followed, stating ownership of islands situate within marshland follows ownership of the marshland. Id. ( comparing with McCullough v. Wall, 4 Rich. 68, 53 Am.Dec. 715 (1850)). This Court remanded the case so the State could be added as a party. Id. at 255, 422 S.E.2d at 98. In Coburg II, this Court found the Lord Proprietors grant upon which Coburg relied did not contain specific language showing the intent to convey land below the high water mark of Wappoo Creek. Coburg II, 318 S.C. at 513, 458 S.E.2d at 548. This Court then repeated its statement from Coburg I that [t]itle to islands situate within marshland follows title to the marshland; ultimately concluding the marshland and the islands in question belonged to the State. Id. Under the public trust doctrine, the State holds presumptive title to tidal land below the high water mark to be held in trust for the benefit of all people of South Carolina. McQueen v. S.C. Coastal Council, 354 S.C. 142, 149, 580 S.E.2d 116, 119 (2003); State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. 50, 84 (1884). In areas subject to the public trust doctrine, presumption of State ownership may be overcome only by showing a specific grant from the sovereign which is strictly construed against the grantee. McQueen, 354 S.C. at n. 6, 580 S.E.2d at n. 6. The proposition that the public trust doctrine extends to lands above the high water mark first appeared in Coburg I, 309 S.C. at 253, 422 S.E.2d at 97. The proposition was supported by a comparison citation to McCullough v. Wall, 4 Rich. at 68, 53 Am.Dec. at 715, which involved a dispute over the ownership of a fishing rock located in the Catawba River. Id. The defendant in that case argued if the area of the river surrounding the rock was navigable by boat, the fishing rock was for the enjoyment of the public. Id. However, if this area was non-navigable, the plaintiff, who allegedly owned the land to the west of the river, possessed title to the rock under the principle of medium filum aquoe, which imposes an imaginary property line at the center of the river. Id. This Court found the plaintiff owned the rock pursuant to his deed to the bordering riparian land. In dicta this Court stated, [i]slands in rivers fall under the same rule as to the ownership of the soil and its incidents as the soil under water does. Id. We decide today that neither the facts, nor the holding of McCullough v. Wall offer a substantial enough foundation for the principle propounded in Coburg. Importantly, McCullough involved riparian rights. McCullough, 4 Rich. at 68, 53 Am.Dec. at 715. This Court has long recognized that riparian property rights differ from the rights of landowners subject to the ebb and flow of tides. See State v. Pacific Guano Co., 22 S.C. at 79 (It is a settled principle of the English law that the right of owners of land bounded by the sea or on navigable rivers where the tide ebbs and flows, extends to high water mark. . . . But grants of land bounded on rivers . . . carry the exclusive right and title of the grantee to the centre of the stream). The brief statement in Coburg that title to marsh islands follows title to the surrounding marsh has not been subsequently applied by this States' courts to quiet title in the State. Instead, our jurisprudence has continued to reflect the longstanding principle that the public trust doctrine extends only up to the land below the high water mark. See State v. Fain, 273 S.C. 748, 752, 259 S.E.2d 606, 608 (1979) (to prove its case that it owned certain lands, the State provided photographic evidence that the disputed land was covered by normal high tide); see also State v. Hardee, 259 S.C. 535, 543, 193 S.E.2d 497, 501 (1972) (In the absence of specific language, either in the deed or on the plat, showing that it was intended to go below high water mark, the portion of the land between high and low water mark remains in the State in trust for the benefit of the public). The principle that the State is unqualifiedly the presumptive owner of all marsh islands situated in state-owned marsh appears to be unique to South Carolina. In limited instances, some states have found islands to be state-owned based on a lack of permanence. See Giles v. Basore, 154 Tex. 366, 374, 278 S.W.2d 830, 835 (1955) (islands formed in river by deposits of silt, soil, and logs that were not in existence at time land was granted is property of the owner of that area at the time it was granted, in that case the state); see also Mulry v. Norton, 55 Sickels 424, 432, 100 N.Y. 424, 3 N.E. 581, 584 (1885) (if marine increase be by small and almost imperceptible degrees, it goes to the owner of the land; but if it be sudden and considerable it belongs to the sovereign). In Coburg, the islands in question were described in Coburg's predecessor's deeds since 1843 and appeared on plats since at least 1853. Coburg, Inc. v. Lesser, No. 90-CP-10-2034R (S.C.Ct.Com.Pl. Mar. 13, 1991). Thus, the Coburg principle was not premised on permanence. We decline to diminish the bright line of the public trust doctrine with a test that requires case by case determination. Coastal lands are notoriously subject to the volatility of changing tides, erosion, and accretion. Landowners and potential landowners are well aware of the long-standing principle that the State is presumptive owner of lands below the high water mark. Accordingly, a person who possesses title to land especially vulnerable to this volatility takes title with the knowledge their land is at risk of loss to the State by natural forces. Other grounds by which this Court might narrow the reach of Coburg are similarly flawed. The master in this case found the Coburg principle did not apply to Little Jack Rowe for two reasons: (1) the physical characteristics of the islands differed; and (2) Respondent in this case held a specific title to Little Jack Rowe, whereas in Coburg, there was no evidence of a specific deed or history of record title for the small islands. Although we recognize the master's effort to reach an equitable solution, in our view, an attempt to limit Coburg, either by physical characteristic or title history, will sacrifice clarity and uniformity for the sake of stare decisis. The master found Little Jack Rowe was not situate within marshland because it is located on the Cooper River. In our view this is a distinction without a difference because both the Coburg islands and Little Jack Rowe are bordered by navigable waterways on the Intracoastal Waterway. Therefore, when this Court established the principle that the State is the presumed owner of marsh islands, it did not intend to limit that presumption only to islands completely surrounded by marshland. The master additionally distinguished the islands by size, stating the Coburg islands were insubstantial marsh hummocks, [3] while Little Jack Rowe is a substantial island of more than fifteen acres. [4] Based on the definition given hammocks by the South Carolina Department of Natural Resources (DNR), [5] both the Coburg islands and Little Jack Rowe are considered hammock islands. For clarity, we believe marsh hammocks to be the technical term for islands situate within marshland, Coburg II, 318 S.C. at 513, 458 S.E.2d at 548. Because marsh hammocks can vastly vary in size, [6] the State and its courts cannot practically and uniformly apply the presumption of State ownership theory based on an island's size. In our view, an attempt to confine Coburg to include only smaller hammocks would arbitrarily extend the public trust doctrine and would likely cloud titles of thousands of coastal islands. [7] Lastly, the master distinguished the Coburg islands by noting those islands lacked a specific deed or history of record title. In Coburg, Coburg's deed description included the two islands; however, the sovereign grant upon which Coburg relied, did not include a specific description of those islands. Coburg II, 318 S.C. at 512, 458 S.E.2d at 548. This case presents a similar factual scenario, as Respondent's deed described Little Jack Rowe, but the Federal Tax Certificate upon which Respondent relied did not specifically describe the island. Therefore, this is another distinction without a difference. It is common for ancient coastal deeds to convey groups of islands, without mention of specific island names. It is equally common for these islands' names to have changed over time. In our view, narrowing Coburg on the ground the State is the presumptive owner of marsh islands whose sovereign grant lacks a specific description of the island claimed would cloud title to a vast number of marsh islands in this State, many containing homes, businesses, and infrastructure. [8] In sum, the jurisprudence of this State is consistent that [p]resumption of title to marshland rests in the State of South Carolina, to be held in trust for the benefit of the public. Coburg I, 309 S.C. at 253, 422 S.E.2d at 97. However, the proposition that the State is the presumed owner of land that remains above the high water mark is at odds with coastal property jurisprudence that predated Coburg, and expands the public trust doctrine beyond its historic bounds. Of the 3,467 coastal islands in South Carolina, the DNR estimates that 72% of these are privately owned. We do not see a practical and uniform way to narrow the scope of Coburg without clouding the title of potentially thousands of marsh islands. [9] We do not underestimate the importance of these islands as the vestiges of our State's most fragile ecosystems, and we recognize the State's interest in protecting and preserving these lands for the enjoyment of all citizens. DHEC and other agencies of this State have the regulatory authority to prevent or limit the development of our State's pristine coastal areas, and our opinion today leaves them at liberty to continue those efforts. Current and potential marsh island owners should be keenly aware of this regulatory risk. However, we do not believe the protection and preservation of these islands should be effected through the unprecedented expansion of the public trust doctrine. Therefore, we overrule the specific principle found in the Coburg cases that ownership of islands situate within marshland follows ownership of the marshland. Coburg I, 309 S.C. at 253, 422 S.E.2d at 97.