Opinion ID: 744176
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: michael and lynn whisman's claims

Text: 30 Defendants contend Lynn and Michael Whisman, Joel's grandparents, have failed to allege the violation of a constitutional right. The grandparents alleged in the complaint that they had the right to intervene in any juvenile court proceeding concerning Joel, which right defendants deprived them of without due process of law. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 211.177.1 provides: 31 A grandparent shall have a right to intervene in any proceeding initiated pursuant to the provisions of this chapter, in which the custody of a grandchild is in issue, unless the juvenile judge decides after considering a motion to intervene by the grandparent that such intervention is against the best interest of the child. 32 Further, Rule 111.02(b) of the Missouri Juvenile Court Rules provides: 33 When a juvenile is taken into judicial custody, the juvenile shall not remain in custody but shall be released at once to the juvenile's custodian or some other suitable person, unless; 34
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36 (3) the juvenile was taken into protective custody and the court determines the conditions requiring protective custody continue to exist. 37 The complaint alleges that at the time Lynn initially requested that Joel be returned to her, a request immediately joined in by Michelle, and during the next twelve days, there was no court order for detention. In fact, the complaint alleges that Lynn was told on February 17, 1995, that a court order had to be signed for the process to begin and that it would take 30 days to obtain a court order. The grandparents allege that these actions prevented them from exercising their statutory rights as grandparents to intervene in the juvenile proceeding and such actions constitute a denial of their rights without due process. 38 The Missouri Court of Appeals held in Ruth v. State of Missouri, 830 S.W.2d 528, 530 (Mo.App.1992), that no statute confers upon a grandparent an unconditional right to intervene in juvenile court proceedings concerning the custody of a child. In 1993, the Missouri Legislature enacted Mo.Rev.Stat. § 211.177.1 which mandates the right to intervention unless the juvenile judge decides, after considering the motion of the grandparents, that the requested intervention is contrary to the best interest of the child. 39 Alleged violations of state laws, state-agency regulations, and even state court orders do not by themselves state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Only federal rights are guarded and vindicated by such statute. Ebmeier v. Stump, 70 F.3d at 1013. Constitutional significance may attach only to certain interests created by state law and it is clear that not every transgression of state law may do double duty as a constitutional violation. Id. We must be extremely careful in examining claimed violations of state laws, regulations and court orders. Only in very limited and obvious circumstances will federal constitutional significance attach in these matters. There is a body of law, to be sure, holding that state law may create a 'liberty interest' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. If, for example, a state statute gives 'specific directives to the decision maker that if the (statute's) substantive predicates are present, a particular outcome must follow,' a 'liberty interest' protected by the Fourteenth Amendment is created. Bagley v. Rogerson, 5 F.3d 325, 328 (8th Cir.1993) (quoting Kentucky Dept. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989)). 40 Michael and Lynn advance the argument that they have a liberty interest in the custody of their grandchildren. [W]e reach the more fundamental question whether ... a natural grandparent's interest in the society of her grandchildren, though an interest rooted in powerful emotions, is a liberty interest under the due process clause. If the grandchildren are in their parents' custody, the answer is probably no ... A more difficult question is presented where, as here, the grandchildren are not in the parents' custody. Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 513 (7th Cir.1982). The Whismans allege the impacts of the defendants' conduct on each individual and on the family as a whole. These are significant allegations under the plurality opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 52 L.Ed.2d 531 (1977), a case in which a zoning ordinance which prevented a grandmother from living with her grandson was struck down. The Court was there concerned with the interests of the child as well as the grandparent. It is also significant that, in the present case, there was no contest between the mother and the grandparents. They were united in interest in attempting to restore the family unit. 41 We are also under a duty to examine the complaint to determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory, even if it is a theory not advanced by the grandparents. Harrison v. Springdale Water & Sewer Comm'n, 780 F.2d 1422, 1426 (8th Cir.1986). We held over nine years before Joel was taken into custody that access to the courts is a fundamental right of every citizen. Harrison, 780 F.2d at 1427. The Missouri Legislature, in 1993, provided grandparents guaranteed access to the courts by allowing grandparents to file a motion to intervene in juvenile court proceedings. Mo.Rev.Stat. § 211.177.1. Thus, Michael and Lynn Whisman had a clearly established right in 1995 to petition the Missouri juvenile court for custody of Joel. Grandparents who wish to seek to intervene should receive whatever process is due in connection with the determination of whether intervention is in the child's best interests. Kentucky Dep't. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 463, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 1910, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). 42 Government action designed to prevent an individual from utilizing legal remedies may infringe upon the First Amendment right to petition the courts. In re Workers' Compensation Refund, 46 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir.1995). The complaint alleges that defendants intentionally failed to initiate juvenile court proceedings until March 1, 1995. Defendants were aware that the grandparents desired to obtain custody of Joel and that Michelle had authorized it. Instead of promptly initiating proceedings wherein the grandparents could petition to intervene, defendants told Lynn that they could do nothing until such proceedings were initiated and that it would take thirty days to initiate proceedings. Defendants' alleged actions in preventing the grandparents from petitioning the court for custody of Joel state a cause of action for violation of their First Amendment rights to access to the courts. The Missouri statute did not authorize grandparents to initiate any custody proceeding. It authorized intervention and defendants blocked such right by refusing to act to initiate the proceeding. Plaintiffs have alleged the violation of a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Defendants' motion to dismiss on the grounds of qualified immunity was therefore properly denied.