Opinion ID: 441993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 3 Our discussion of the sufficiency of the evidence will largely be confined to that relating to Lillian Alaniz, as it is apparent that defendants' convictions are based on the claimed payment and offer of payment to her. 4 Some of the facts in this connection are undisputed. Gilberto Uresti was the incumbent county judge of Duval County seeking reelection. Aurora Canales was the wife of the mayor of San Diego, a political ally of Judge Uresti, and sister of the president of the board of trustees of a local independent school district. Elia Garcia was employed by Duval County as social services coordinator for its elderly nutrition program. She was hired by vote of the commissioner's court. On the morning of April 13, 1982 defendants Canales and Garcia, who operated together as a team in performing volunteer work for Gilberto Uresti's campaign, drove in this capacity in Canales' car to the low-income housing project in or just outside of San Diego where Alaniz lived, for the purpose of taking Alaniz to vote, absentee, for Uresti in the election. They entered Alaniz's apartment. The subject of Alaniz's voting absentee came up. Alaniz then indicated she wanted money for voting, and it was she who initiated this subject. A discussion followed at the apartment. Defendants then drove Alaniz and two of her adult children, her son, Jose, and her daughter, Nancy, to the Duval County courthouse in San Diego for the purpose of having them vote absentee in the election, and urged them to vote for Uresti, showing them a marked sample ballot. Alaniz and her two children then voted, for Uresti, as they had indicated they would. Defendants then drove the three back to the Alaniz apartment. Thereafter, Lillian Alaniz received, and subsequently cashed on April 16, a thirty dollar check of the Gilberto Uresti campaign fund payable to her order and dated April 14, 1983. Nothing on the check itself (or on anything shown to accompany it) indicates what it is for; but the stub remaining in the checkbook has the notation campaign work. The check is signed by, and it and the stub are wholly in the handwriting of, Antonio Gongora, who was the assistant treasurer of the Uresti campaign. 5 Gongora testified that he did not know who Lillian Alaniz was or whether she did any campaign work; that he did not give the check to either defendant or give or send it to Lillian Alaniz; that neither defendant instructed him to write the check; and that he wrote campaign checks only on the instructions of Judge Uresti's secretary, Olga Hinojosa, or Genoveva Garcia, but did not recall who instructed him, or even being instructed, in this instance. Although he signed some campaign checks in blank, he did not do so in this instance, and when, as here, he wrote the date in, he always wrote the date he actually signed a check. 6 At some point in April 1982 Lillian Alaniz received at her apartment posters and bumper stickers, eight to ten of each, advertising the Uresti campaign. She testified that she did not hand them out or use them, but threw them out on the instruction of her husband, and never did any work for the Uresti campaign. There is no contrary testimony. 7 The evidence is in dispute in most other relevant respects. 8 As to the conversation at the Alaniz apartment, Lillian testified, I told [sic ] them if they were giving any money and they told me that they were not ... so I told them I needed thirty dollars.... I had to make a payment.... [They said] that they didn't have the money then.... [Canales] told me she would help me out with thirty dollars. (R. 176-77.) Under questioning by the court she testified that what she asked them if they were giving any money for was to go vote, that Canales replied they weren't giving any money, that Lillian then told [sic] them if they could help me out with thirty dollars, in reply to which Canales told me that she'd help me out with thirty dollars. (R. 194.) She was asked by the prosecution whether Canales stated where she was going to get that money or who she was going to check with, and replied, She was going to check with Gilberto [Uresti]. (R. 195.) On cross-examination Lillian answered Yes when asked if Canales told her they did not have any money to pay votes. (R. 229.) 9 Lillian's son, Jose, testified, My mother asked them if they were giving any money, and they said that they didn't have any money right now, but they could get the money from Uresti. (R. 247.) He further testified that after they had voted, Mrs. Canales and Elia Garcia took us to the house and they said that they would bring a check or--you know, they said that they would bring the money later on, or tomorrow. (R. 254.) On cross-examination Jose stated, They told us that they didn't have the money right now, that they were going to get it if we went to vote, and Mrs. Canales and Elia [Garcia] said that they could help her [his mother] with thirty dollars, but they had to go with Uresti first. (R. 265.) 10 Lillian's daughter, Nancy, who had married after the events in issue, testified that defendants entered the house and they told [sic ] me and my mother and my brother if we wanted to go vote absentee.... Then my mother said that--okay, but she needed a payment, if they could help her out, and then they said 'Yes, we can help you out but if you go vote for Florencio and Uresti.'  (R. 317.) 3 When asked if defendants said anything when you went home after voting, Nancy replied, They just said that they would bring the money either this afternoon or tomorrow. (R. 324.) 4 On questioning by the court, Nancy testified: 11 The Court: Mrs. Salinas, your mother asked for thirty dollars? 12 The Witness: Yes, because she needed help for her payment, and then they said that they would help her out if we would vote for Uresti and the other one that was running. (R. 326.) 5 13 On cross-examination Nancy testified that, in response to her mother's request for thirty dollars, Canales said that they were not giving no money, but she would talk to Uresti and see what would happen. (R. 329.) 14 Lillian Alaniz's other daughter, Betty Briones, who was married at the time of the events in issue, also testified for the prosecution. She was present at least a part of the time during the discussion with defendants before her mother, brother, and sister were taken to vote, though she remained at the housing project to take care of her younger siblings. Betty testified, My mother said that if she had--that she needed so [sic ] money, and Mrs. Canales said that she didn't have it at that time, and then my mother said that she needed thirty dollars for a payment, and Mrs. Canales said that she had to talk to Mr. Uresti about that, but she wouldn't promise anything. (R. 340.) When asked by the court if the response to her mother's statement of need for thirty dollars was, We don't have it, but we'll see if we can get it, Betty replied in the affirmative. (R. 345.) On cross-examination she testified that she understood Canales to have said she would see if Mr. Uresti would agree with the thirty dollars, and that she did not hear Canales tell her mother, We don't pay or give money for votes. (R. 357.) 15 The defendants' version of these conversations was rather different. To begin with, they explained that they went to Alaniz's apartment that day because when they had arrived earlier that morning at the home of Elijio Uresti, Judge Uresti's brother and a local school principal whose residence was serving as campaign headquarters for the Uresti and allied campaigns, there was a message for Canales that Lillian Alaniz had called and asked that Aurora pick her up to vote absentee. 6 Canales, with corroboration from Garcia, testified that she had been reluctant to go on this errand because of a previous unpleasantness with Lillian arising from the fact that Canales did not invite the Alanizes to the wedding of Canales' daughter. 7 Garcia convinced her to go, however. Canales testified that when she and Garcia arrived at the Alaniz apartment, We went in and we told her that we had gotten the message that she wanted to go vote absentee. (R. 680.) Garcia testified to like effect. This contrasts with the testimony of Lillian Alaniz and her children, none of whom mention any reference at any time by the defendants to their having received a message or request that any of the Alanizes wanted to go vote. 8 16 Consistent with the testimony of the Alanizes, Canales and Garcia testified that Lillian then asked for money. However, unlike the testimony of the Alanizes, Canales and Garcia did not recall any mention of a specific figure. Canales described defendants' response to the request for money not in terms of their not having any then, as Lillian Alaniz and her children stated, but rather as, Lillian, we don't pay any money, and, Lillian, I cannot. Sorry, but we don't pay any money. (R. 680.) Garcia's description was, Aurora told her that we weren't paying any money, and I said, 'Lillian, we're not giving any money.'  (R. 723.) 17 Perhaps the clearest contrast between the defendants' and the Alanizes' version of the conversation relates to what transpired after the initial refusal, on whatever grounds, of Lillian's request. According to Canales, Lillian Alaniz said then, after the second time [her request for money was refused], she said, you know, that she wanted to work and help in the Judge Uresti campaign.... She said that she wanted to work there at the project, you know, around the neighborhood, and I said that we'd look into it, but that we couldn't promise her anything. (R. 680.) Garcia gave similar testimony, stating that after Lillian was told a second time, We're not giving any money ... then she said that she wanted to work, she wanted to work for Gilberto Uresti. (R. 723.) 9 The defendants testified that they then asked Lillian if she still wanted to vote, and on being told that she did, took her, Jose, and Nancy to do so. 10 18 The testimony of the Alanizes, however, presents a different picture. Lillian, when asked by the court, What did you do to get that check, as far as you know? replied, Well, I told them that I needed some money. I need thirty dollars for a payment and if they could help me out. But I wasn't working with the campaign. (R. 191.) On cross-examination she testified: 19 Q Did you tell Mrs. Aurora Canales that you wanted to help in the campaign? 20 A No. 21 Q Did you tell Mrs. Aurora Canales that you wanted to help Judge Uresti get elected? 22 A Yes. I want to help him. 23 Q And did you tell Mrs. Aurora Canales to see if she could send you some stickers and pictures to work in the campaign? 24 A No, I wasn't going to work in the campaign. [R. 211-12.] 25 .... 26 Q. ... [When] she [Canales] told you that she might help you out, were you thinking that she was going to help you out for working in the campaign? 27 A No, sir. [R. 222.] 28 .... 29 Q Do you remember Mrs. Canales asking you if you wanted to work in the campaign? 30 A No, sir. (R. 229.) 31 On redirect examination Lillian replied, Yes, sir when asked Were you paid thirty dollars in exchange for your vote. (R. 240.) 32 Jose Alaniz's description of the conversations contains no reference to anything resembling the possibility of campaign work on his mother's, or anyone else's, part, though neither side specifically asked him about it. He did testify, however, that he voted for Uresti because they told me to vote for him and they would help us with thirty dollars. (R. 305.) Nancy's description of the conversations likewise reflects no reference to campaign work or the like. She testified she voted for Uresti and Saenz because they paid us to vote for them. (R. 323.) On cross-examination she was asked, Is it possible that, at that point [when Canales said they were not giving out money], your mother asked for a job with the campaign, to which she replied, No. She again answered No when asked, Did your mother ask her [Canales] if she could work for the Uresti campaign. (R. 329.) Further cross-examination included the following: 33 Q Okay. Is it possible that the thirty dollars check that she [Lillian] received was to act for work she was supposed to do, to hand these [posters and stickers] out? 34 A No. 35 Q It's not possible? 36 A No. (R. 332.) 37 Betty likewise made no reference in her testimony to campaign work. As noted, she testified that what defendants were going to check into was getting the thirty dollars requested. On cross-examination she said it was not possible the thirty dollar check given her mother was for distributing posters or campaign work. She was then asked again, You're absolutely sure now that that check wasn't for campaign work, and replied, Yes, sir. (R. 352.) 38 There is also at least inferential dispute in the testimony as to how, when, and why Lillian Alaniz got the eight or ten Uresti bumper stickers and posters. Defendants sought to infer that Lillian got this material after she voted, as a result of the offer they claimed she made to them to work in the campaign. Neither defendant testified that Lillian had requested any such material or that they were aware she had it, or had requested it, on either April 13 or 14. However, defendants did testify that when they returned to the Elijio Uresti house on the afternoon of April 13 they reported that Lillian had asked to work in the campaign and, Garcia said she reported, be compensated. Canales testified that she told the other ladies there of Lillian's request to work in the campaign. (R. 683.) Garcia said she mentioned it to Elijio Uresti and, when he asked her opinion, advised that it would be a good idea. Defense witness Uresti confirmed this, and said that the same day he accordingly directed his wife to prepare a package of material for Lillian and told his wife someone would pick it up. 11 A package normally included calling cards, pencils, buttons, and a booklet, as well as posters and bumper stickers. Uresti did not direct anyone to take the package, and does not recall it being taken or who took it. Each defendant said she did not take any such items to Lillian and did not know who did. Lillian testified that she got the posters and bumper stickers as a result of a telephone call she made to Teresa Briones at the county courthouse requesting these items. She stated that Teresa personally brought them to her house. She initially testified that this all occurred on a day subsequent to the day she voted, but then said she was not sure whether it was before or after. Jose testified that it was after they voted that his mother called for the posters. Nancy said the posters and stickers were received from Teresa Briones, but she was not sure whether this was before or after the defendants went to the house. The Alanizes did not receive any campaign cards or buttons or anything other than the posters and bumper stickers. Betty testified her mother called Teresa Briones to bring her some posters and stickers, and Teresa did so. Her mother had already received these before defendants came to take her to vote. (R. 357.) 39 Elijio Uresti also testified that on April 13, after Garcia and Canales returned to his house that afternoon, and as a result of Garcia's report about Lillian, he authorized that Lillian be hired as a campaign worker. He was unable to state to whom precisely he conveyed this authorization, but said he thought Gongora was present along with several others. He stated he did not fix the amount Lillian Alaniz was to be paid. 40 On a final, significant point the testimony was in sharp conflict. Lillian Alaniz testified that the day after she voted Aurora Canales came to her house and handed her the thirty dollar check. She twice testified it was in the morning of the day after she voted, but then said it could have been in the afternoon. She said that Aurora simply handed her the check and said I could cash it; that it was a good check. (R. 189). Jose testified that the day following the day they voted he saw Canales hand his mother a check at the door of the Alaniz apartment (R. 254-56, 291), and that this occurred about noon (R. 302). He saw Garcia at that time sitting on the passenger side of the car just outside the apartment. (R. 257, 304.) Betty testified that the next day [after the day the Alanizes were taken to vote], Mrs. Canales came over with Mrs. Garcia. Mrs. Garcia didn't get down out of her car.... Mrs. Canales came over and she knocked on my mother's door, and my mother went over to the door and Mrs. Canales said that she had a check for thirty dollars, drawn on the account of Gilberto Uresti. (R. 341, 344.) She saw Garcia in the car. (R. 341, 349.) Canales and Garcia in their testimony each totally denied having ever taken any check to Lillian, or indeed having gone back to her apartment the next day or at any time following taking the Alanizes back from voting on April 13. They professed no knowledge of the check or how it got to Lillian. Other than the testimony of Lillian, Jose, and Betty, there was no evidence of how or when the check got to Lillian Alaniz. 41 In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we must examine the evidence presented in this case and the inferences that may be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the government, and ask whether a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.1982) (en banc), aff'd on other grounds, 462 U.S. 356, 103 S.Ct. 2398, 76 L.Ed.2d 638 (1983). Although the testimony of Alaniz and her children was not entirely consistent, and five witnesses testified as to Alaniz's poor reputation for truthfulness, [i]t is exclusively the function of the jury to assess credibility and [w]e are particularly loath to reject a jury's verdict when it is so manifestly dependent on credibility assessments. United States v. Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 984, 79 L.Ed.2d 220 (1984). 42 The testimony, viewed most favorably to the government, established that Canales and Garcia asked Lillian Alaniz if they could take her to vote, that Alaniz indicated she would not go unless she was paid thirty dollars, that Canales and Garcia said they didn't have any money then but Canales promised that if Alaniz and her children voted for Uresti they would obtain or try to obtain the thirty dollars for her; that thereafter Alaniz and her children were willing to be and were taken to vote by Canales and Garcia, who each told them to vote for Uresti, which the Alanizes did; that Canales and Garcia then took them home and promised to bring the requested thirty dollars the next day, which they personally did. The jury was justified in inferring that the thirty dollars was paid for the voting. It was not required to accept the testimony of Canales and Garcia that the discussion prior to voting was not of payment for voting but of working for the campaign. The Alanizes testified that that was not the discussion, and that the payment was for voting. Nor do the ambiguous circumstances surrounding and testimony concerning the posters and bumper stickers establish that the thirty dollars was paid for campaign work to be performed. Moreover, the jury could find, on the basis of the Alanizes' repeated testimony as to Canales (with Garcia in the car) having brought the check on the following day, that Canales and Garcia were consciously untruthful in their denial on the stand that any such event ever occurred. Such a fabrication could legitimately give rise to an inference that the delivery of the check was with the purpose of making payment for the voting. See Holt v. United States, 272 F.2d 272, 275-76 (9th Cir.1959); 2 Wigmore on Evidence Sec. 278(2) (Chadbourn rev. 1979). 43 Defendants urge that no offer was made because all the witnesses agreed that neither Canales nor Garcia, prior to the voting, expressed a present ability to pay, citing our recent decision in United States v. Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir.1984). While the applicability of Hernandez may be doubted, as it was based on the lack of any kind of offer at all and not on the lack of ability to pay, nevertheless it is not controlling as to the sufficiency of the evidence on count three, the substantive count, for a more fundamental reason. The conviction on count three does not depend on a technical offer having been extended, but is sustained by proof of the actual payment made. 44 Garcia claims that the proof shows no criminal involvement on her part. We reject this contention. Regardless of whether Garcia's guilt as a principal was adequately established, the evidence is plainly sufficient to support her conviction on an aiding and abetting theory, as charged in count three. She was present when the statements were made to Alaniz about getting her the thirty dollars and participated in that conversation. There was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that she was also present when the check was delivered the next day, although she denied that. Although Lillian and her children said there was no request for campaign work, Garcia testified that she told Uresti that Alaniz had requested to work in the campaign. She was Canales' teammate in campaigning, including the events of April 13. The jury could legitimately conclude that Garcia aided and abetted Canales in paying Lillian Alaniz the thirty dollars for voting for Uresti, as charged in count three. 45 We hold that the evidence, taken as a whole, is sufficient to support each defendant's conviction on count three. 46 Defendants argue, however, that count one, the conspiracy count, cannot be sustained because the single pertinent overt act alleged was merely the offer to Alaniz, not the payment to her. 12 They also contend that even if a true offer were made to Alaniz, there is no evidence that the offer was pursuant to a conspiracy, arguing in this connection that Alaniz initiated the subject of payment, and that even if Canales' response was an offer, there is nothing to suggest that Canales and Garcia, or Canales and anybody else, had conspired beforehand to make the offer. While we have some doubt as to the ultimate validity of defendants' forceful contentions in this respect, 13 we need not definitively rule on them. It is not necessary for us to separately review the conspiracy conviction because we sustain the conviction on the substantive count (count three), and the sentences are concurrent. The conspiracy count, as it relates to Lillian Alaniz, and the related substantive count three are different only in the most technical sense. The confinement imposed on each is concurrent, and the defendants have been placed on unsupervised probation. The fines imposed are the same on each count, and as soon as either is paid the other will be remitted. In these circumstances, there is no substantial likelihood that the unreviewed conspiracy conviction will adversely affect either defendant in the discharge of her respective sentence, and we hence apply the concurrent sentence doctrine and decline to review the conspiracy count (count one). See United States v. Vasquez-Vasquez, 609 F.2d 234 (5th Cir.1980) (per curiam); 8A Moore's Federal Practice (2d ed.) p 32.04. 47 We accordingly reject each appellant's claim that reversal is required on the grounds of insufficient evidence.