Opinion ID: 1952326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the trial court err in denying defendant's request for a definition of the term accomplice during the court's charge on own conduct?

Text: Defendant argues that the proofs at trial offered three scenarios for the jury to have considered. Chew could have been the actual killer of Theresa Bowman; he could have been a lookout in the hotel lobby and found Theresa killed by Joe, the drug dealer; or, because there was evidence he had tried to hire others to kill Theresa, there was a possibility that he had been involved in the planning of the murder but not the actual killing by the Kenny Rogers look-alike. In that case defendant would have been guilty of murder as an accomplice but not death-eligible since he would not have committed the crime by his own conduct. Defendant argues that the trial judge effectively removed this third possibility from the jury's consideration because of an inadequate own conduct charge. When the issue of accomplice liability was first raised, defendant did not seek an accomplice charge. After consulting with the Appellate Section of the Public Defender's Office, however, Chew's attorney requested an accomplice charge in the definition of own conduct, noting I don't know how to do the own conduct charge without the accomplice charge and that's why I'm asking [for] it. She argued to the court that there was evidence that another person, possibly the man seen by the chef, actually killed Theresa. That person could possibly have been hired by defendant although there was no evidence that money had been exchanged. Defense counsel noted: My concern is that the by your own conduct without explaining the accomplice charge to them, especially in light of the fact that it's not [defense counsel's] theory and he's not going to be speaking to the jury about that, I think they need to be told what an accomplice is. The court, however, observed when you ask for an accomplice charge, as I understand what you are asking for, what you want me to do is to tell the jury you can find Mr. Chew guilty as a principal or an accomplice. Defense counsel, however, did not ask for an accomplice charge in connection with the murder charge. During the colloquy, the court stated: What I'm having difficulty seeing is why you would want [the theory that Chew hired the Kenny Rogers look-alike] as a part of deciding whether he's guilty or not as opposed to dealing with it in the own conduct charge which is really what you're concerned about. Defense counsel responded: That is what I'm concerned about. That's absolutely true. I do not want that being charged an accomplice some other place in the charge and then thinking, focusing in on that. I want it as part of the own conduct charge, that's correct. The court then stated that, then I misunderstand what you're saying. I asked you before, I thought I asked you before whether you wanted the accomplice charge as part of the murder charge so the jury could decide whether [defendant was] guilty of murder as an accomplice. Defense counsel said, I don't want that. The court stated, Oh, I thought that's exactly what you wanted, to which defense counsel replied: No. I never wanted that, and if I expressed myself badly on that, I'm sorry. My only concern is the by your own conduct charge and giving them more information about what an accomplice could be. Defendant now claims that the court misinformed trial counsel as to the effect of an accomplice charge, specifically that defendant would be death-eligible if found guilty as an accomplice to murder. Counsel argues that the trial court erroneously reasoned that if the jury found that Chew did not kill Bowman but hired someone to do it  the man who resembled Kenny Rogers  the crime would still be death-eligible under the act. The court said: That's not accomplice in the general accomplice liability or accomplice which would spare the defendant a death penalty verdict, that if a jury found that, that he hired someone to kill, that would be own conduct. So I'm not going to charge it. I don't think there is any factual basis whatsoever to charge it, and for the reason that to charge it under the hypothesis given to me by [defense counsel] would create a State v. Marshall situation which would put it, which would trigger off the death penalty phase anyway so the application is denied. Thus, during its guilt-phase charge the court did not mention the term accomplice, but simply defined murder as purposefully or knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury resulting in death that did not occur in the heat of passion resulting from reasonable provocation. The court correctly defined own conduct: A defendant commits a murder by his own conduct if he actively and directly participated in the murder, that is the infliction of the injuries from which the victim died. The state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's conduct ... was the direct and immediate cause of death ... [and] that the defendant was the person who actually committed the murder.... If you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the killing was by his own conduct, or if you are unable to reach a unanimous decision beyond a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant committed the murder by his own conduct, that is a permissible final verdict on this issue. That would result in the imposition of a mandatory sentence for murder of at least thirty years in prison without parole. Defense counsel again objected to the omission of an accomplice discussion in the explanation of the own-conduct charge. She explained that there was a possibility that Chew did not actually hire someone to kill Bowman but was nevertheless involved in the planning and commission of the murder. She suggested that Helen Borden may have been involved. Defendant claims that the jury was thus never told of the ramifications of accomplice liability in a case in which such a finding would have made the difference between life and death. Of course, a charge on accomplice liability is absolutely necessary when the charge can mean the difference between life and death. A court may not deny a jury the mechanism to decide which of the two forms of murder charged has been proven, murder as a principal or murder as an accomplice when evidence is present for either form. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 575 A. 2d 435 (1990). A jury need not unanimously agree on the theory of liability as principal or accomplice in order to convict of murder. State v. Brown, 138 N.J. 481, 651 A. 2d 19 (1994). But only a jury verdict that finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the murder by his or her own conduct triggers the penalty phase. State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 550 A. 2d 117 (1988). It overstates the analysis to suggest that if Chew did not personally kill Bowman he would still be eligible for the death penalty because he must have hired someone else to commit the homicide. Accomplices to murder need not necessarily be paid to kill. Brown, supra, 138 N.J. 481, 651 A. 2d 19 (killings committed by two unpaid accomplices). There are two distinct capital triggering devices: to kill by one's own conduct or to hire another to kill. The State proceeded on the basis that defendant committed the killing by his own conduct. Even if the jury believed that Chew did not kill Theresa but, rather, hired the Kenny Rogers look-alike, it could not find, without defendant's consent, the procuring factor without an indictment charging it. See R. 3:7-3 (requiring that capital murder indictments specify the triggering device, whether it be own conduct, procuring, or drug-related conduct). The problem with defendant's argument, however, is that defendant did not ask the court to submit accomplice liability as one of the forms of murder the jury could consider in its verdict. Defendant attempted to walk a tightrope to freedom or a verdict of less than murder. Defense counsel did not wish to expose her client to a conviction of murder as an accomplice. Had Chew been an accomplice to the killing, there would have been no realistic way for the jury to return a manslaughter verdict. (The jury was charged on passion-provocation manslaughter.) Instead of seeking a charge on murder as an accomplice, defendant sought to read into the own-conduct definition the principles of vicarious liability. Although largely mirroring the common-law distinction between principal and accomplice liability, the own-conduct concept is simply irrelevant to the question of whether defendant is guilty of purposeful or knowing murder. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 100, 549 A. 2d 792. During guilt-phase proceedings, the jury first must determine whether defendant should be convicted of murder considering, where appropriate, principles of vicarious liability under N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6 [such as accomplice or conspiratorial liability]. Only after it has unanimously found defendant guilty of purposeful and knowing murder should the jury turn to the question of whether defendant committed the homicidal acts by his or her own conduct. [ Ibid. ] With the exceptions of murder for hire or the drug kingpin (not charged here), a conviction based on a theory of vicarious liability cannot subject the defendant to death-penalty proceedings. The own-conduct provision is not an element of the offense of murder. It is merely a triggering device for the death penalty phase of the trial. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 99, 549 A. 2d 792. The own-conduct analysis requires a slightly different factual inquiry by a jury than the analysis of principal and accomplice liability. This is because a judgment must be made as to whether a defendant's participation in the homicidal act was qualitatively sufficient to make the defendant death eligible. For example, in Gerald, the defendant was one of several men involved in the beating of an elderly person. We there held that the own conduct language does not necessitate a specific finding that the defendant's actions standing alone caused the victim's death. The relevant inquiry is whether or not the defendant actively and directly participated in the homicidal act, i.e., in the infliction of the injuries from which the victim died. The critical elements are that [the] defendant in fact acted, and the immediacy of his conduct to the victim's demise. [ Id. at 97, 549 A. 2d 792.] There was thus an element of unfairness in the way in which defendant sought to have the court instruct the jury. It would have been unfair to the State to deny the jury the opportunity to convict defendant of murder as an accomplice but then to have the jury consider accomplice liability only in the triggering phase. In a sense, defendant's suggestion presents the converse of State v. Purnell, 126 N.J. 518, 601 A. 2d 175 (1992). We there held that a penalty-phase jury could not consider a theory of death eligibility (murder in the course of a felony) without permitting the jury in the guilt phase to consider a non-capital verdict on that basis. It is true that the public interest may require that a particular charge be given to the jury, where the facts rationally support such a charge, even though neither the defense nor the prosecution has requested it; that enforcement of the criminal law is too important to be controlled completely by the contentions of the adversaries; and that the court has an obligation to see to it that the jury, as the representative of the public, is given all of the facts and all of the possible offenses that might reasonably be found from such facts. [ State v. Choice, 98 N.J. 295, 298-99, 486 A. 2d 833 (1985).] However, the duty of the trial court to charge on any possible offense arises only when the facts clearly indicate the appropriateness of that charge, id. at 298, 511 A. 2d 80, and when the instruction does not conflict with a defendant's trial strategy. While the public interest in giving the jury all of the facts and the option to choose from all of the consequent possible offenses may prevail over counsel's interest ..., that may not be the case where the injection of that [unrequested] issue by the court will enhance the risk of a murder conviction. [ Id. at 300-01, 511 A. 2d 80.] The trial court did not mislead defense counsel. The colloquy concerning defendant's death eligibility if he had hired a killer came at the end, not the beginning of the process. Defendant's charge request came late in the trial and the communications between the Appellate Section and trial counsel may have missed something in the translation. The court was always prepared to give a straight accomplice charge. It was the request to incorporate the accomplice charge in the own-conduct charge that caused the problem. Ultimately, the trial court reasoned that even if there were a scenario of accomplice liability, [t]he other [answer] is that the charge itself on own conduct is abundantly clear that in order to find the defendant committed a murder by his own conduct, he's got to be the one that actually killed her. I say that in my charge. I don't know how much more you would want. All the accomplice thing would do would be first of all to introduce some theory that has no factual basis and serve to confuse the jury. It may be argued now that it was ineffective assistance on the part of trial counsel to have sought the instruction that she did. Without barring a later ineffective assistance claim, we are satisfied that under the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test there is not a reasonable probability that these deficiencies materially contributed to defendant's conviction. State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58, 519 A. 2d 336 (1987). [11] Only the most generous interpretation of this record would provide a rational basis for an accomplice charge. The State argues that only under the most bizarre patchwork of facts could defendant have been found to be on the periphery of this crime. His sister placed him at the scene of the crime with blood on his clothes. How he and another could have gotten into the Corvette with Theresa is not easily explained. In State v. Biegenwald, we held that the failure to instruct the jury on accomplice liability, when neither that theory nor facts supporting it were ever put before the jury, was not error. 126 N.J. 1, 19, 594 A. 2d 172 (1991). So too, in this case, we are satisfied that defendant suffered no prejudice at the trial. The court clearly explained to the jury in connection with the own-conduct charge that it must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant alone had committed the crime. The jury was thus clearly informed, and its verdict sheet indicated, that a less than unanimous verdict on that point would have entitled defendant to a life sentence.