Opinion ID: 2822110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Disqualification of Cummings's Counsel

Text: Cummings first argues that the district court violated his constitutional right to counsel both when it ordered the disqualification of his attorney, Jorge Armenteros-Chervoni (Armenteros), due to a conflict of interest and when it later 2 None of these other co-conspirators went to trial with Defendants. -4- refused to re-appoint Armenteros despite Cummings's attempt to waive the conflict. We review decisions to disqualify an attorney for conflict of interest for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lanoue, 137 F.3d 656, 663 (1st Cir. 1998). Here, we find no such abuse.
On June 5, 2012, the district court granted Cummings's motion to be represented by Armenteros instead of a court-appointed attorney from the Office of the Federal Defender. A month later, the government became concerned over the source of Armenteros's attorney fees, so it filed a motion asking the court to determine: (1) the source of Armenteros's attorney fees; (2) whether Armenteros was retained or paid by an individual other than Cummings; (3) whether there was a conflict of interest; and (4) if there was a conflict, whether Cummings was waiving the conflict and whether the district court would accept the waiver. At a status conference on July 26, 2012, the district court set a briefing schedule and hearing date for the issue. Though the government never filed its formal motion, the district court held the hearing on August 14. At the hearing, Armenteros objected, arguing that the hearing was premature . . . because I don't know what is the issue or what is the intent. The district court disagreed, stating that the parties were there to figure out the issue. The government then informed the court that -5- it had met with Armenteros and that the government had showed him recordings of his defendant, which proved that . . . Attorney Armenteros [] was retained by another person who is not the defendant in this case. The government added that Armenteros did not deny that he was being paid by another person. In response to this proffer, the district court asked Armenteros about the source of his fees, but Armenteros refused to answer. Instead, Armenteros responded: [W]ith all due respect we're going to claim a due process right now, Your Honor, because I don't think that the hearing can come to find out what was going on. I think the prosecutor must make a claim, and we must respond to it. . . . I'm telling you that I am not clear what is the claim to which I have to respond . . . . The district court once again explained that the claim was that Cummings was not paying his own attorney fees but rather that they were coming from a third party. To this, Armenteros replied that that's not the information that I have been given. He went on to explain that he had received a $5,000 initial payment and that his relationship with Cummings date[d] back to another case in which he defended Cummings and was successful in having the case dismissed. Armenteros conceded that he had heard one of the recordings involving Cummings but nevertheless maintained that the only person that I talked to is [Cummings] who told me, go and look for some money, okay, in order to get my fees. -6- At this point, the government interjected, explaining that it was trying to protect . . . the right of the defendant because it would create a clear conflict of interest if the person paying Armenteros's fees were someone who the government might require Cummings to testify against should he enter a plea. The district court agreed, noting to Armenteros that [i]f it's true that there is a possibility that a third party is paying for your client's defense, and your client is in a situation whereby he's facing a 30-year minimum, the Government is not going to offer any plea bargaining to him, it is entirely possible that the purpose, that the purpose of somebody else paying for the defense is to keep him shut. Armenteros once again objected, arguing that he underst[oo]d that those funds came from the defendant and that the government's position presupposes . . . that that [third] person told me to go defend this person. Armenteros argued that that has never been the case and [i]n fact, there are a million phone calls of Mr. Cummings'[s] wife asking me to go and visit him once after he's arrested. Armenteros emphasized that he could recognize a conflict of interest and was positive that no conflict existed. The court then proceeded to hear the two telephone recordings of Cummings with counsel for both the government and Cummings present. In the first, Cummings spoke to Ana Saurí, Cummings's girlfriend's mother, and told her that his lawyer had come to visit him and that they paid him the money. Saurí added -7- that she spoke with Armenteros and asked him to get someone she called Negrito out of jail, to which Armenteros responded, Don't mention that name. Cummings also informed Saurí that Armenteros had told him that if they work with me on the money and stuff . . . what I ask them in order to help you, then I will come on Monday. Later on in the call, Christopher, who had not yet been indicted, took the phone from Saurí and spoke with Cummings. Cummings thanked Christopher a million for the attorney thing and added that Armenteros had told him that [t]hey gave [Armenteros] 10 and that Cummings could give Armenteros the other 10 . . . when you get out. Christopher also stated that he was going to see if . . . [he] could send something with the attorney, but it wasn't possible. The second recording involved Cummings, Saurí, her daughter Ashley, and Christopher. In this call, Cummings asked Christopher, what did the lawyerinski say to you? and Christopher responded that [h]e hasn't showed up. I have been calling him and he hasn't showed up . . . . [H]e came to talk about money, but he hasn't returned. Cummings once again thanked Christopher for the money, to which Christopher responded that [t]his is not about the money, this is about being united. At the end of the call, Cummings asked Christopher to put pressure on Armenteros because he does not come here to visit me, and Christopher responded that he -8- will try[] to call and contact him, but he doesn't want to talk to me . . . . But, everything that he tells me I will tell you. Once the recordings were finished, the district court asked Armenteros if Cummings was willing to answer some questions from the court, but Armenteros declined the invitation because it was a very dubious situation. The court emphasized that in order for me to make a decision, a balanced decision, I have to ask him some questions to figure out, you know, first of all, who is the person that is paying the fees, what is the relationship with him, and advise him of the potential conflicts, et cetera. And he has to make a decision, and then I have to make my own decision. But we have to have an exchange obviously. Still, Armenteros declined. He informed the court that Cummings was more than willing to listen to whatever the Court has to say. However, he's not in a position at this point to give any statement to the Court . . . . The government objected to this refusal, arguing [t]hat's exactly the conflict of interest. The attorney is there, and I don't know if the client wants to talk to the Court or if the attorney is not letting the client. The district court agreed: If it's clear to me that a third party is paying for the fees, then I have an obligation to have some sort of dialogue, if you will, that has to be through questions and answers with the defendant, and advise him, get information from him about this situation, and advise him of the potential risks and conflicts. But I am in a situation whereby the defendant doesn't want to deal with that issue with me. So I'm getting no information -9- from him . . . . [It] is quite clear, that [Christopher][3] is paying for the fees, and that [Christopher] has control over a bunch of things that pertain to the defense obviously. . . . . . . . All I'm saying is that it's quite clear, quite clear from those tapes that [Christopher], who is the purported leader, has advanced the funds, retained you to deal with Cummings, to represent Cummings, and that Cummings is eternally grateful to [Christopher] for having done that. Not only that, [Christopher] and Cummings are going to decide basically what the strategy's going to be together, and the strategy is going to be such that [Christopher] will not be prejudiced. . . . . . . . . . . You have been retained and paid by a third party. . . . [I]t goes beyond that, because one thing is the act of a charity of a third party to pay a defense of somebody dear to him. Another thing is a situation whereby the defense is being paid by a third party but at the same time there is intervention of that third party and the defendant as to how they're going to deal with the issue. Basically, not only to defend Cummings, but also to make certain that [Christopher] doesn't get involved. Seeing how the court was leaning, Armenteros asked the district court to delay making a ruling, but the court refused, stating that [i]t's made. The district court proceeded to explain its ruling as follows: 3 Throughout the hearing, the district court mistakenly referred to Christopher as Christian. -10- [T]he reasons are the ones that I've stated: No cooperation on defendant's side; obvious conflict of interest; failure on the defendant's side, who has a burden, too, to put me in a position to make a balancing, a balancing that is going to be very difficult to make even if he tells me something, because of the content of the tapes. Therefore, I am once again stating that there is a potential material, huge conflict of interest here that will not allow you to be his attorney in this case. Three months later, on November 28, 2012, Cummings filed a motion requesting that Armenteros be re-appointed as his attorney. In the motion, Cummings stated that Mr. Armenteros has been my attorney since February 18, 2010 . . . . I feel that he has allways [sic] and will continue to have my complete confidence as my attorney. . . . . I do not believe that Mr. Armenteros has a conflict of interest. But in any case if it were true, I am willing to waive said conflict. The motion was denied on January 28, 2013.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right of an individual accused in a criminal prosecution to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence, U.S. Const. amend. VI, which necessarily includes the right to have an attorney of one's own choosing. Lanoue, 137 F.3d at 663. This right, however, is not absolute. Id. To the contrary, because the essential aim of the Sixth -11- Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for each criminal defendant, Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988), [o]ne important limitation on th[is] right is the trial court's interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within ethical and professional standards. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 859 F.2d 1021, 1023 (1st Cir. 1998). To that end, [i]f there is a realistic potential for conflict of interest, a district court's concern may override a defendant's Sixth Amendment right freely to choose his lawyer. Id. And while a defendant can often waive the conflict, this, too, is not absolute. See, e.g., Wheat, 486 U.S. at 158-59; Lanoue, 137 F.3d at 663. A district court may decline to accept a defendant's waiver not only in those rare cases where an actual conflict may be demonstrated before trial, but [also] in the more common cases where a potential for conflict exists which may or may not burgeon into an actual conflict as the trial progresses. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 859 F.2d at 1023-24 (alteration in original) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163) (internal quotation marks omitted). Still, there must be a showing of a serious potential for conflict to overcome the presumption in favor of a defendant's selection of counsel. Id. at 1024. One such serious potential for conflict occurs when a criminal defendant is represented by a lawyer hired and paid by a third party, particularly when the third party is the operator of -12- the alleged criminal enterprise. Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 268-69 (1981); see also United States v. Urutyan, 564 F.3d 679 (4th Cir. 2009). The conflict arises because a lawyer could be inclined to prevent his client from obtaining leniency by preventing the client from offering testimony against his former employer or from taking other actions contrary to the employer's interest. Wood, 450 U.S. at 269. That was the precise situation facing the district court. The government alerted the district court that it was concerned Armenteros was being paid by Christopher -- the leader of the drug organization connected to Cummings's arrest -- and wanted the court to inquire further. In response, the district court held a hearing in which it heard two recordings unequivocally showing that Armenteros was being paid by somebody other than Cummings, most likely Christopher, and in which it learned that any plea agreement offered by the government would necessarily entail cooperation against others, including Christopher.4 Given this evidence, the potential for a conflict of interest was obvious. See Lanoue, 137 4 We reject Cummings's argument that his due process rights were violated when the district court held the hearing despite the government's failure to file a formal motion as ordered by the district court. The government made its concerns clear both through its initial informative motion to the court and through its arguments at the status conference. Moreover, the government met with Armenteros and previewed one of the recorded phone conversations. Any allegation that Armenteros was faced with an unfair surprise and was unable to prepare for the hearing, therefore, is disingenuous at best. -13- F.3d at 664 (The district court in this case did not make the decision to disqualify summarily. It held a hearing and allowed each side to present its arguments for and against disqualification.); see also Urutyan, 564 F.3d at 687 (finding no abuse of discretion in district court's disqualification of attorney due to a conflict of interest where district court heard a telephone recording between defendant and co-defendant discussing how a member of the alleged conspiracy could provide defendant with an attorney). Add to this the fact that Armenteros was uncooperative throughout the hearing and prohibited Cummings from partaking in a colloquy with the court, and the district court's conclusion that there was a likelihood of a conflict of interest was only further supported.5 Cf. United States v. Diozzi, 807 F.2d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 1986) (finding no conflict of interest where the attorneys were cooperative). Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision to disqualify Armenteros. 5 That Cummings later seemed willing to engage in a discussion with the district court through the filing of a motion to waive any conflict does not alter our analysis. This waiver occurred months after the initial hearing, and after Christopher had been indicted as a co-defendant. Christopher's indictment only increased the chances of a conflict since Armenteros would be representing Cummings while being paid not by some third party but by a codefendant with different interests. As such, the district court's decision to reject Cummings's waiver motion was also not an abuse of discretion. See Wheat, 486 U.S. at 163; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 859 F.2d at 1023. -14-