Opinion ID: 746864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Independent and Adequate State Procedural Ground

Text: 50 Generally, federal habeas review of federal claims is barred if a petitioner defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an independent and adequate state procedural rule ... Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). When a state appellate court affirms a conviction with an opinion, we cannot assume that the decision rested on a procedural default. See Rosenfeld v. Dunham, 820 F.2d 52, 54-55 (2d Cir.1987). Indeed, in order to preclude federal review, the last state court to render judgment must clearly and expressly state[ ] that its judgment rest[ed] on a state procedural bar. Glenn v. Bartlett, 98 F.3d 721, 724 (2d Cir.1996) (citation omitted). 51 The State urges us to adhere to the rule set forth in Martinez v. Harris, 675 F.2d 51, 54 (2d Cir.1982) and assume that the state appellate court's decision rested on procedural grounds. See Rosenfeld, 820 F.2d at 54 ([W]hen a state appellate court affirms petitioner's conviction without opinion and the People had urged affirmance on both procedural and substantive grounds the federal habeas court will assume that the state appellate court rested its decision on petitioner's procedural failure to object.). However, the Martinez rule is inapplicable when, as here, an opinion is available. We are bound by the grounds stated in the opinion. Id. at 54-55. 52 In its May 9, 1996 decision and order, the Appellate Division, stated: [w]e have considered defendant's remaining contentions and find them to be without merit. Jones, 227 A.D.2d at 196, 642 N.Y.S.2d at 247. Because we may not assume that the state court's decision rested on a procedural default without an explicit statement to that effect, we find that the state court considered and rejected the merits of Jones' Sixth Amendment claim. Accordingly, federal habeas review is not procedurally barred. Writ of Habeas Corpus 53 Having concluded that Jones exhausted his state remedies and is not procedurally barred from federal review, we now consider whether the district court properly granted the petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 54 A writ of habeas corpus will not be granted unless the state court adjudication of the claim either: 55 (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or 56 (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 57 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). On a petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that his constitutional rights have been violated. See Machado v. Commanding Officer, 860 F.2d 542, 544 (2d Cir.1988). A. Right to Counsel 58 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the assistance of counsel for his defense 1 and stands as a constant admonition that if the constitutional safeguards it provides be lost, justice will not still be done. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343, 83 S.Ct. 792, 796, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963) (citation omitted). However, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not permit unfettered communication between the accused and his lawyer during trial proceedings. See Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284, 109 S.Ct. 594, 601-02, 102 L.Ed.2d 624 (1989). The risk of improper coaching during cross-examination lies at the heart of such restriction. 59 In Geders v. United States, the Supreme Court held that an overnight ban on consultation during the defendant's testimony violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel and constituted reversible error. See 425 U.S. 80, 91, 96 S.Ct. 1330, 1336-37, 47 L.Ed.2d 592 (1976). The Court reasoned that: 60 [t]o the extent that conflict remains between the defendant's right to consult with his attorney during a long overnight recess in the trial, and the prosecutor's desire to cross-examine the defendant without the intervention of counsel, with the risk of improper coaching, the conflict must, under the Sixth Amendment, be resolved in favor of the right to the assistance and guidance of counsel. 61 Id. (citation omitted). 62 The issue of a ban on consultation during shorter periods of time was addressed in Perry. There, the Court held that a ban on consultation during a short recess does not violate the defendant's constitutional right to counsel. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 284, 109 S.Ct. at 601-02. The Court recognized that normal attorney-client consultation during extended adjournments would encompass a multitude of trial-related matters including the day's testimony, but opined that one may presume that nothing but the testimony will be discussed during a short recess. Id; see also Geders, 425 U.S. at 88, 96 S.Ct. at 1335. Inherent in Geders, and later made explicit, is the presumption that prejudice is so likely to follow a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel that it constitutes a structural defect which defies harmless error analysis and requires automatic reversal. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629-30, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1717-18, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993); Perry, 488 U.S. at 280, 109 S.Ct. at 599-600; Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2067, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 63 The facts of this case fall squarely within the Geders rule and would raise no exceptional issues were it not for the unusual sequence of events resulting from the snowstorm on Friday, February 11, 1994. It is undisputed that the state trial judge issued an overnight ban which violated Jones' Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Geders, and we find that Jones has satisfied his burden of proof for a writ of habeas corpus. Nevertheless, the State maintains that the error was cured when the trial judge rescinded the ban on Friday, affording Jones the opportunity to consult with his attorney during the ensuing three-day weekend. Jones claims that the order was not rescinded. B. Recision of the Ban On Consultation 64 The official trial record supports Jones' position that the trial judge did not rescind the order banning consultation during cross-examination. The only stenographic notation indicates that proceedings were adjourned until Monday. The record is devoid of any discussion of the court's previously issued overnight ban on consultation and whether it would continue over the weekend. The State claims that the trial judge rescinded the ban off the record. 65 The presumption of regularity assumes that the record contains all rulings made during the trial. See N.Y. Jud. Law § 295; People v. De La Cruz, 227 A.D.2d 241, 242, 642 N.Y.S.2d 649, 650 (1st Dep't 1996); Lipscomb v. U.S., 209 F.2d 831, 834 (8th Cir.1954). The proponent of an off the record statement must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the statement was made. See generally Chambers v. Blickle Ford Sales, Inc., 313 F.2d 252, 256 (2d Cir.1963)(The party asserting the existence of a fact bears the burden of proving that fact.); Junior Money Bags, Ltd. v. Segal, 798 F.Supp. 375, 379 (E.D.La.1990), aff'd, 970 F.2d 1 (5th Cir.1992)(A person asserting a fact must establish that fact by a preponderance of the evidence.). 66 The testimony adduced during the evidentiary hearing 2 makes it quite clear that the State failed to meet its burden. Although the trial judge testified that he lifted the ban during a robing room conference with defense counsel Kelligrew and prosecutor Hynes, and again in open court before defense counsel Morosco, Jones, Jones' wife, Kelligrew and Hynes--his testimony was not corroborated: (1) defense counsel Kelligrew denied being in the robing room but stated that there was a conversation at sidebar that did not address the ban on consultation. He also stated that he did not remember the judge saying anything at any time about the ban being lifted; (2) defense counsel Morosco had no recollection of the ban being rescinded; (3) defense investigator Escala testified that she did not observe the trial judge tell Morosco or Kelligrew that they may speak to Jones over the weekend; (4) prosecutor Klein testified that she was in court for four to five minutes and could not recall the trial judge issuing any order; and (5) prosecutor Hynes admitted being in the robing room on Friday morning with the trial judge and defense counsel Kelligrew, but could not remember whether the trial judge lifted the ban. 67 The testimony is contradictory, confusing and vague, but one thing is clear--no one remembers whether the trial judge rescinded the ban that Friday morning. In addition, there were no trial notes in the judge's benchbook regarding the ban on consultation, and the trial transcript on Monday is devoid of references to Friday's proceedings, save a mention of the snowstorm and those in attendance. 68 While we do not believe the trial judge testified untruthfully, we recognize that the written word in the record is black and white evidence of what did or did not occur, whereas an individual's recollection of those same events blur into gray. This case demonstrates the validity of an old legal truism: God may know but the record must show. See Peoples Coin Laundromat Corp. v. Beckmann, 20 Misc.2d 867, 869, 190 N.Y.S.2d 131, 133 (Sup.1959). We find that the overnight ban on consultation was not rescinded and conclude that the snowstorm not only chilled the New York City area, but froze Jones' Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 69 Our constitutional rights must be respected ab initio and we should not rely on unforeseen circumstances to correct judicial error. Therefore, we decline to speculate whether a rescission of the ban on consultation could have cured a Geders violation. Because the state courts' adjudication of Jones' Sixth Amendment claim was contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in Geders, we find the district court's grant of a writ of habeas corpus appropriate.