Opinion ID: 449732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion for an Evidentiary Hearing to Determine Juror Misconduct.

Text: 9 During voir dire, juror June Jecha disclosed that she worked as a real estate agent at the Ira Berry Real Estate office in Creve Coeur, Missouri. Coincidentally, Robinson had a real estate license and worked out of the same office, but was not acquainted with Ms. Jecha. In response to general questions to all the jurors, Ms. Jecha indicated that she believed she could be impartial and that nothing in her employment situation would bias her judgment in this case. 10 After the trial, Robinson discovered that the real estate office where juror Jecha was employed received real estate listings from Monsanto for property owned by Monsanto employees who were being transferred. In his motion for an evidentiary hearing into the matter, Robinson did not allege that Jecha had personally benefitted from this business relationship. However, Robinson contends that Jecha should have disclosed the relationship in response to counsel's general questions regarding each juror's ability to remain impartial. 2 Robinson submits that admission of any business relationship with Monsanto would have been a major factor in deciding whether to strike a juror. Thus, he argues that the magistrate erred in denying his motion for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether he was entitled to a new trial due to the possible misconduct of juror Jecha. 11 The denial of such a motion is within the discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for abuse of discretion or a clear error of law in the exercise of that discretion. McCoy v. Goldston, 652 F.2d 654, 657 (6th Cir.1981). An evidentiary hearing on a juror's alleged failure to disclose information during voir dire must be granted when the movant has alleged facts which establish a prima facie case that his right to a peremptory challenge was prejudicially impaired. Id. at 657-58 (quoting Vezina v. Theriot Marine Service, Inc., 554 F.2d 654, 656 (5th Cir.1977) ). The court must first determine whether a juror deliberately concealed information or purposefully gave incorrect responses. Factors in this determination include whether the voir dire questions or responses put the juror on notice that a particular answer was required. Id. at 658. The court must then consider whether the undisclosed information is indicative of probable bias concerning either a material aspect of the litigation or its outcome. Id. at 659. 12 As the magistrate noted in his denial of the motion, the jurors were asked no direct questions regarding their own business relations or the business relations of their employers with Monsanto. Robinson failed to demonstrate that Jecha deliberately concealed any information or that the alleged business association in any way indicated Jecha's probable bias in favor of Monsanto with regard to a claim of racial discrimination. Furthermore, the right to challenge a juror is waived by failure to object at the time the jury is empaneled if the basis for objection might have been discovered during voir dire. Johnson v. Hill, 274 F.2d 110, 116 (8th Cir.1960); Morrison v. Ted Wilkerson, Inc., 343 F.Supp. 1319, 1331-32 (D.Mo.1971). Accordingly, we hold that the magistrate properly denied an evidentiary hearing into this matter. 13