Opinion ID: 775224
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Reversal of the Conviction

Text: 30 In Page we addressed only the availability of suppression of evidence or dismissal of an indictment as remedies to redress a violation of the Vienna Convention. Accordingly, we must turn to consideration of whether reversal of a conviction can remedy a violation of the Vienna Convention. As a threshold matter, the government contends that the Vienna Convention does not create rights individually enforceable in the federal courts. We agree. 31 Confronted in recent years with numerous claims based upon the Vienna Convention without the benefit of a definitive statement from the Supreme Court, federal courts whenever possible have sidestepped the question of whether the treaty creates individual rights--typically by concluding that remedies such as suppression of evidence or dismissal of an indictment are not available even if the treaty creates individual rights. See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 235 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 2000); Page, 232 F.3d at 540; United States v. Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 1165 (2001); Chaparro-Alcantara, 226 F.3d at 621; Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 885; Li, 206 F.3d at 66. On other occasions courts have concluded that a defendant must show prejudice to establish a violation of the Vienna Convention. See, e.g., United States v. Minjares-Alvarez, 264 F.3d 980 987-88 (10th Cir.2001); United States v. Chanthadara, 230 F.3d 1237, 1256 (10th Cir. 2000), petition for cert. filed, No. 00-9757 (May 2, 2001); Cordoba-Mosquera, 212 F.3d at 1196; United States v. Pagan, 196 F.3d 884, 890 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Ademaj, 170 F.3d 58, 67-68 (1st Cir. 1999). One circuit has held that the Vienna Convention does not establish any judicially enforceable right of consultation between a detained foreign national and the consular representatives of his nation. United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2620 (2001). See also Santos, 235 F.3d at 1109 (Beam, J., concurring) (concluding that the Vienna Convention does not confer on private citizens rights enforceable in federal court); Li, 206 F.3d at 66-67 (Selya, J. & Boudin, J., concurring) (same). No federal appellate court has yet accepted a claim based upon violations of the treaty. 32 In construing a treaty, as in construing a statute, we first look to its terms to determine its meaning. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. at 665 (citing Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985), and Valentine v. United States ex rel. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5, 11 (1936)). See also Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534 (1991); Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694, 699 (1988). Of the seventy-nine articles of the Vienna Convention, only Article 36 arguably protects individual non-consular officials. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 196. The argument that the treaty confers rights upon criminal defendants who are foreign nationals originates in the language of individual rights that appears throughout the Article among the treaty's protections for the ability of the consular officials of a sending State to communicate with a detained national. See, e.g., Vienna Convention art. 36, 1(a) (Nationals of the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and access to consular officers of the sending State.); 1(b) ([Arresting] authorities shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.). Yet the Preamble to the Vienna Convention expressly disclaims the creation of any individual rights: [T]he purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of their respective States. Vienna Convention, 21 U.S.T. at 79, 596 U.N.T.S. at 262 (emphasis added). Similarly, Chapter II of the treaty, in which Article 36 appears, concerns the privileges and immunities of consular officers, not detained foreign nationals. Moreover, consistent with the background presumption against implying personal rights in international treaties, the rights contained in Article 36 belong to the party states, not individuals. 33 Of course, there are references in the [treaty] to a right of [consular] access, but these references are easily explainable. The contracting States are granting each other rights, and telling future detainees that they have a right to communicate with their consul is a means of implementing the treaty obligations as between States. Any other way of phrasing the promise as to what will be said to detainees would be both artificial and awkward. 34 Li, 206 F.3d at 66 (Selya, J. & Boudin, J., concurring). Accordingly, we conclude that the Vienna Convention does not create in a detained foreign national a right of consular access. 35 To the extent the treaty admits of any ambiguity on the question, nontextual sources, such as a treaty's ratification history and its subsequent operation, United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 366 (1989), dispel any doubt about whether the Vienna Convention creates individual rights. In resolving doubts about the interpretation, the construction of a treaty by the political department of the government, while not conclusive upon courts called upon to construe it, is nevertheless of weight. Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933). See also El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (Respect is ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an international treaty.); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961) (While courts interpret treaties for themselves, the meaning given them by the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great weight.). 36 Since 1970 the State Department has consistently taken the view that the Vienna Convention does not create individual rights. Li, 206 F.3d at 63-64. See also Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 197; Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 887-88. In the view of the State Department, the only remedies for failures of consular notification under the Vienna Convention are diplomatic, political, or exist between states under international law. Page, 232 F.3d at 541 (quoting Li, 206 F.3d at 63) (alterations omitted). This position accords with the view of the Department and the Senate during the ratification proceedings. Li, 206 F.3d at 64-65. In practice the parties to the Convention have attempted to remedy violations of Article 36 through investigations and apologies. The State Department indicates that it has historically enforced the Vienna Convention itself, investigating reports of violations and apologizing to foreign governments and working with domestic law enforcement to prevent future violations when necessary. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886. In turn [m]any, if not most, of the countries with which the United States raises concerns that consular notification obligations have been violated with respect to U.S. citizens will undertake to investigate the alleged violation and, if it is confirmed, to apologize for it and undertake to prevent future recurrences. Li, 206 F.3d at 65. Apparently, no country remedies violations of the Vienna Convention through its criminal justice system. Id. These practices evidence a belief among Vienna Convention signatory nations that the treaty's dictates simply are not enforceable in a host nation's criminal courts[.] Id. at 66. 37 In support of his argument that the Vienna Convention creates individually enforceable rights, Emuegbunem cites Faulder v. Johnson, 81 F.3d 515 (5th Cir. 1996), and Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998). This reliance is misplaced. In Faulder, the Fifth Circuit stated that the Vienna Convention requires an arresting government to notify a foreign national who has been arrested, imprisoned or taken into custody or detention of his right to contact his consul. 81 F.3d at 520. Although state authorities admitted that they had failed to comply with the Vienna Convention, the court affirmed a capital murder conviction because on the facts presented there the violation did not merit reversal of the conviction. Id. Subsequently, the Fifth Circuit explained that its ruling in Faulder had not expressed a view on the question of whether the Vienna Convention confers rights enforceable by individuals. Flores v. Johnson, 210 F.3d 456, 457-58 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 445 (2000). 38 We do not read our opinion in Faulder as recognizing a personal right under the Convention. Rather, the panel dispatched the claim with its conclusion that any violation was harmless. Any negative implication inherent in rejecting the claim as harmless lacks sufficient force to support a contention that the panel held that the Convention created rights enforceable by individuals. While we conclude that Faulder has not decided the question, we do not reach its merits because at best Flores's assertion is Teague barred. 39 Id. at 457. Accordingly, after Flores whether the Vienna Convention created individual rights remained an open question in the Fifth Circuit, Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 195 n.2 (concluding in the wake of Faulder and Flores that the question was one of first impression in the circuit), and in Jimenez-Nava the court resolved the issue adversely to the position advocated by Defendant. Id. at 198. 40 Like Faulder, the Fourth Circuit's opinion in Breard simply attempts a description of the Vienna Convention and takes no position on the rights and remedies of criminal defendants in the United States who are foreign nationals. Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619 (4th Cir. 1998) (setting forth Breard's argument that the court should overturn his conviction and death sentence because the authorities failed to notify him that, as a foreign national, he had the right to contact the Consulate of Argentina or the Consulate of Paraguay pursuant to the Vienna Convention), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (per curiam). Two features of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Breard confirm this conclusion. First, noting that Breard had failed to raise this claim in state court, the Fourth Circuit concluded that he had procedurally defaulted the claim and that he could not show cause to excuse the default. Accordingly, the court declined to consider the merits of Breard's Vienna Convention claim. Id. at 619-20. Second, the court quoted Murphy v. Netherland, 116 F.3d 97, 100 (4th Cir. 1997), in which it rejected an argument that a habeas petitioner's Vienna Convention claim was so novel that he could not have raised it in state court proceedings, because a reasonably diligent attorney should have discovered the existence and applicability (if any) of the Vienna Convention. Breard, 134 F.3d at 620 (emphasis added). This procedural posture and the quotation from Murphy demonstrate that the Fourth Circuit in Breard took no position on the question of whether the Vienna Convention creates individual rights. 41 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the Vienna Convention does not create a right for a detained foreign national to consult with the diplomatic representatives of his nation that the federal courts can enforce. A contrary conclusion risks aggrandizing the power of the judiciary and interfering in the nation's foreign affairs, the conduct of which the Constitution reserves for the political branches. See Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 887 (The addition of a judicial enforcement mechanism contains the possibility for conflict between the respective powers of the executive and judicial branches.). Significantly, the Supreme Court has twice held that the Vienna Convention does not provide a signatory nation a private right of action in the federal courts to seek a remedy for a violation of Article 36. Federal Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111, 111-12 (1999) (per curiam); Breard, 523 U.S. at 377. If a foreign sovereign to whose benefit the Vienna Convention inures cannot seek a judicial remedy, we cannot fathom how an individual foreign national can do so in the absence of express language in the treaty.