Opinion ID: 1616376
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Color Photographs

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred to reversal by allowing certain color photographs, offered by plaintiff, to be admitted into evidence. The basis of defendant's contention is that the photographs showed post-accident modifications to the shuttle welder, which were apparently made for the purpose of making the machine safer. Generally, evidence of subsequent repairs is not admissible to establish negligence, although it may be admissible to show identity of ownership, to show control of the locus, to contradict or impeach a witness, or to lessen the weight of an expert opinion. Norwood Clinic, Inc. v. Spann, 240 Ala. 427, 199 So. 840 (1941). Another permissible use may occur where such evidence is offered to establish a condition existing at the time of the accident. Leeth v. Roberts, 295 Ala. 27, 322 So.2d 679 (1975). Defendant contends that the photographs were not admissible under any exceptions to the general rule. Assuming, without deciding, that defendant is correct on that point, we find, with the exception of plaintiff's exhibits one, six, nine, and ten (to which defendant objected at the time they were offered), that defendant failed to preserve error as to the photographs. Defendant theorizes that it preserved error as to all photographs by its motion in limine, and that an objection to the photographs, at the time they were offered into evidence, was unnecessary. We disagree. At the beginning of trial, defendant orally moved for a motion in limine: MR. GAINES: If it please the Court, on behalf of the Defendant, we move for an order in limine, Judge, if that is the way it is supposed to be phrased, and I think it is, and ask the Court to enter an Order preventing or prohibiting the attorneys for the Plaintiff from going into any evidence regarding any change or changes made in the machine in question after this accident; and also, prohibiting them from offering any photographs of the machine showing a changed condition after the accident in question. And, Judge, we believe that we are entitled to this. We believe that the overwhelming law of many jurisdictions is that such evidence is not admissible if any changes are made, whether they are for remedial purposes or precautionary purposes, of taking precautionary measures. Evidence of subsequent steps is not admissible to prove say negligence, I mean any design defects they claim. It is not admissible as evidence of any of the unreasonable danger, dangerous nature, of the machine in question. We have a number of citations, if the Court would like to look at them. We don't believe that the evidence should be admitted in the case, and we ask for an order in limine prohibiting it. After that, plaintiff and defendant argued their positions to the trial judge, who viewed the disputed photographs and rendered a decision on their admissibility. The judge ruled that some photographs were admissible, that others were not admissible, and that some would be admissible only after objectionable portions were cut off: THE COURT: Let her mark them and then I will go get the scissors. On Plaintiff's Exhibit 1,1 am going to cut off that part right through there (indicating). And on Plaintiff's Exhibit 2, I am going to cut off that (indicating). On 3,1 don't see any problem. No. 4, it is at such a distance that I don't really see any problem. No. 6, there doesn't seem to be any problem. I think that one, No. 7, there is no way to correct it. No. 8look at it. MR. GAINES: That is all right. THE COURT: No. 3, No. 6, No. 2, and No. 1, there seems to be no objection. No. 7, first of all, I don't think it is a very good picture and it has got that pole right in the middle of it. I sustain the objection to No. 7. I overrule your objection to 4 and I think that is more of a duplication, No. 5 is. I sustain your objection to 5. As far as 9, 9 will be all right. 10 MR. GAINES: I don't even know what that is. In Acklin v. Bramm, 374 So.2d 1348 (Ala. 1979), this court effectively overruled Bradford v. Birmingham Electric Co., 227 Ala. 285, 149 So. 729 (1933), and held that use of a motion in limine is permissible in this jurisdiction. Defendant contends that because its motion in limine was granted, it was not required to object again when the photographs were offered into evidence. This court has not previously been called upon to answer this question. [1] Our review of the facts in this case leads us to conclude that it is unnecessary for us to answer that question. We find defendant's motion inadequate to preserve the error asserted in the absence of objections to the photographs at the time they were admitted into evidence. The Supreme Court of Iowa has noted the proper use of a motion in limine: The motion should be used, if used at all, as a rifle and not as a shotgun, pointing out the objectionable material and showing why the material is inadmissible and prejudicial. Since no one knows exactly how the trial will proceed, trial courts would ordinarily be well advised to require an evidentiary hearing on the motion when its validity or invalidity is not manifest from the face of the motion. Lewis v. Buena Vista Mutual Insurance Association, 183 N.W.2d 198 at 201 (Iowa 1971), State v. Garrett, 183 N.W.2d 652 at 654 (Iowa 1971). More broadly, the Supreme Court of Washington has discussed the considerations applicable to the granting or denying of a motion in limine: Taken together, these cases indicate that the trial court should grant such a motion if it describes the evidence which is sought to be excluded with sufficient specificity to enable the trial court to determine that it is clearly inadmissible under the issues as drawn or which may develop during the trial, and if the evidence is so prejudicial in its nature that the moving party should be spared the necessity of calling attention to it by objecting when it is offered during the trial. To enable the court to make such a determination prior to trial and out of context the moving party should provide a memorandum of authorities showing that the evidence is inadmissible. If the court does not have the benefit of legal arguments, it can hardly be said to have abused its discretion if it denies a motion asking it to rule on the admissibility of evidence before it knows what the issues and circumstances are. [Citations omitted.] Fenimore v. Donald M. Drake Construction Company, 87 Wash.2d 85, 549 P.2d 483 at 488 (1976). Encompassed in the above-quoted authorities is the concept that, as specifically as possible, a motion in limine must apprise the trial court of its object. This is especially true in the case of exhibits which the non-movant may seek to offer into evidence. A broad-based motion which leaves the trial court to speculate as to the motion's object may be insufficient to preserve subsequent error which is not called to the trial court's attention. This is the case here. It is clear from the record that the defendant initially did not object to plaintiff's exhibits one, two, three, and six. Of those, two and three were later entered into evidence without objection. Although, in ruling on defendant's motion in limine, the trial court found plaintiff's exhibit four to be admissible, it was later offered into evidence with defendant's consent. Therefore, defendant cannot allege error as to that photograph. Plaintiff's exhibits five and seven were never offered into evidence. Plaintiff's exhibit eight was offered without objection, which defendant concedes. As to these photographs, defendant failed to preserve error by either failing to object to their introduction or by implicitly waiving objection, as in the case of plaintiff's exhibit four. The record reveals that the remaining photographs, plaintiff's exhibits one, six, nine, and ten, were objected to by defendant at the time they were offered into evidence. Therefore, we will consider the propriety of the trial court's allowing these photographs into evidence. Defendant's objection to the photographs, and reason for its motion in limine, was that they purportedly showed post-accident modifications to the shuttle welder in the form of guard screens and posts which were later installed. The guard screens and posts were red in color and readily stood out against the background of the shuttle welder, which was dark green. In response to defendant's motion in limine, the trial judge used a pair of scissors to cut off portions of the photographs containing the post-accident modifications. On appeal, defendant contends this was reversible error because that action emphasized to the jury the defendant had something to hide. We cannot agree. Plaintiff's exhibits originally were color photographs measuring eight by ten inches. Plaintiff's exhibits one, six, nine, and ten, were trimmed along the borders to eliminate the objectionable modifications. [2] The result was four color photographs with dimensions ranging from approximately eight by nine inches, to approximately five by seven inches. We find no error in the trial court's action. This court has often said that where physical evidence or statements contain objectionable matter or references which cannot be separated from the whole, they may, nevertheless, be admitted under proper circumstances. Central of Georgia Railway Company v. Steed, 287 Ala. 64, 248 So.2d 110 (1971); Sims v. Struthers, 267 Ala. 80, 100 So.2d 23 (1958); Hunt v. Ward, 262 Ala. 379, 79 So.2d 20 (1955); Sims v. State, 253 Ala. 666, 46 So.2d 564 (1950); Pittman v. Calhoun, 233 Ala. 450, 172 So. 263 (1937); Kennedy v. State, 85 Ala. 326, 5 So. 300 (1888). The converse, logically, is true, applying the above-cited cases. Where objectionable matter can be separated from proffered evidence, the objectionable matter may be deleted and the remainder admitted. We find the case of Rogall v. Kischer, 1 Ill.App.3d 227, 273 N.E.2d 681 (1971), authority supporting the trial court's action in trimming the photographs. There, photographs showing damage to plaintiff's automobile were allowed into evidence over defendant's objection. The photographs had car damage written on them with arrows indicating the damaged parts of the vehicle. The trial court judge allowed the photographs to be admitted after they were trimmed to remove the writing contained on them. The Illinois Appellate Court sanctioned the trial court's action. Similarly, it upheld the showing of a motion picture to the jury, after excluding certain inflammatory portions. Although Rogall v. Kischer did not involve the issue of trimming a photograph to remove evidence of post-accident modifications or repairs, the same result still applies. Where a photograph depicts objectionable material which is capable of being severed, the remainder of the photograph may be admitted into evidence in the trial court's discretion. The vesting of that discretion in the trial court in the admission of photographs is well established. Photographs and testimony are relevant and admissible to help the jury to better understand the persons, object, locale, or conditions in issue. However, relevancy and introduction of both testimony and photographs are within the sound discretion of the trial court. This discretion is not reviewable in the absence of a gross abuse of that discretion. Costarides v. Miller, 374 So.2d 1335 (Ala.1979); Moon v. Nolen, 294 Ala. 454, 318 So.2d 690 (1975). Raines v. Williams, 397 So.2d 86 at 88 (Ala. 1981), quoted with approval in Shiver v. Waites, 408 So.2d 502 (Ala.1981). Reviewing photographs trimmed by the trial court, we are unable to conclude that their admission was an abuse of discretion, in light of the above-cited principles. Instead, we find that the trial court wisely exercised its discretion by trimming the photographs and admitting them into evidence. By so doing, the jury was afforded additional views of the shuttle welder to aid them in their resolution of the issues presented at trial.