Opinion ID: 2371819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Presumption of Causation Remained in the Case

Text: WMATA does not challenge the ALJ's determination that McNeal triggered the presumption of a medical causal relationship between [the] alleged disability and the accidental injury, and it could not fairly do so. McNeal's testimony and various medical records reported that he was at work when a bus struck his back and neck and that shortly thereafter he was diagnosed with neck injuries. As the CRB recognized, the ALJ properly shifted the burden to [WMATA] to produce evidence that is substantial, specific and comprehensive enough to sever the potential employment connection. The ALJ undoubtedly acted within the scope of his authority when he adopted Mr. Lowery's version of events over McNeal's account, [1] but that assessment of credibility did not displace the presumption under the peculiar circumstances of this case. That is because the testimony credited by the ALJ still established a work-related eventthat one of WMATA's buses contacted [McNeal's] upper back and shoulder area, albeit lightly. Moreover, soon after this event there was objective medical evidence that McNeal had a herniated disc of the cervical spine and bilateral radiculopathy. WMATA's evidence fell short of being specific and comprehensive enough to sever the potential connection between McNeal's documented injury and the bus incident. The attack upon McNeal's credibility was largely successful, and in that sense WMATA rebutted his claim. However, on this record it was not enough for the employer to show that McNeal's encounter with the bus was less dramatic than he alleged. As we explained in Ferreira, failing to consider other possible employment-related causes of a disability is antithetical to the statutory and regulatory scheme. 531 A.2d at 659. Most importantly, we held that alternative explanations for an injury may keep the presumption of compensability in play. The record in Ferreira revealed possible alternative, work-related, causes of the injuries, and we held that [w]ith even less compelling evidence, the hearing examiner would have been required to apply the statutory presumption of compensability to this claim. Id. In Ferreira the employee claimed that she had been injured by a specific lifting incident, but the hearing examiner discredited her testimony and denied compensation. 531 A.2d at 654. We explained that this was not enough. The final flaw in the DOES decision [was] its failure to consider alternative work-related causes of petitioner's disability after rejecting her contention that a specific lifting incident occurred on October 28, 1982. Id. at 657. See also Murray v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 765 A.2d 980, 985 (D.C.2001). Under our Act, if one theory of employment causation has the potential to result in or contribute to the disability suffered, the presumption is triggered. Ferreira, 531 A.2d at 660. Here the ALJ did not have to look far to find an alternative, work-related, potential cause of petitioner's disabilityLowery's testimony provided it. To be sure, the ALJ opined that a physical contact of [such] insignificant force did not have the potential to cause McNeal's injuries. In doing so, however, the ALJ essentially substituted his own judgment on the issue of causation. His conclusion is not supported by any evidence, expert or circumstantial, and it is not self-evident to us that contact between a moving bus and a person's upper back and shoulder area lacks the potential for causing such injuries, even when the contact is only a minor brush. We will assume that ALJ Russell could disregard the medical opinions regarding causation offered by McNeal, having concluded that they were based on inaccurate descriptions of the event. See Olson v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Servs., 736 A.2d 1032, 1038 (D.C.1999) (hearing examiner did not err by discrediting the testimony of claimant's doctor as to causation when the doctor did not have [claimant's] complete medical history). But WMATA offered no evidence of its own on this subject. [2] We thus confront the question of which side loses in circumstances like this, where we are left with no competent evidence to explain whether the event described by Lowery could have caused McNeal's injuries. The presumption of compensability provides the answer. The statutory presumption applies as much to the nexus between an employee's malady and his employment activities as it does to any other aspect of a claim. Swinton v. Kelly, 180 U.S.App. D.C. at 223, 554 F.2d at 1082 (construing the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act). [3] McNeal was not obliged to present expert opinion of causation in order to enjoy the benefit of the presumption. It was not [his] burden to do that unless and until the employer presented sufficient evidence to rebut the presumed causal connection. Id. at 223 n. 35, 554 F.2d at 1082 n. 35. Because WMATA did not present such evidence, the presumption controls. [4] It is conceptually difficult to say whether WMATA failed to rebut the presumption of causation triggered by McNeal's testimony or whether its reliance on Lowery's testimony triggered a new, un-rebutted, presumption, but we do not need to answer this metaphysical question. Where, as here, the record reveals an alternative theory of employment causation, Ferreira teaches that the presumption of causation still applies. Because the Compensation Order did not address the presumption that arose from the bus incident as the ALJ found it occurred, the ALJ's finding that WMATA's evidence had overcome the statutory presumption was not in accordance with law, and the CRB erred by affirming that order. We reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision. So ordered.