Opinion ID: 2824385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We first consider whether an out-of-state law firm's representation of a Nevada client, combined with the communications that are incident to an attorney-client relationship, is sufficient in and of itself to subject the law firm to specific personal jurisdiction in Nevada. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently addressed this identical issue in Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257, 1279-81 (10th Cir. 2013), and the court's opinion provides helpful guidance to us here. In Newsome, a Canadian law firm was hired by a Canadianbased company and its United States subsidiary doing business in Oklahoma. Id. at 1262-63. As part of the firm's work for the companies, the firm helped consummate a business transaction in Canada, facilitated the placement of liens on certain property in Oklahoma, and received payments from an Oklahoma bank account. Id. at 1280-81. A bankruptcy trustee for the subsidiary company then sued the Canadian firm in Oklahoma. Id. at 1263. On appeal, the Tenth Circuit considered whether the lower court properly dismissed the firm from the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. As part of its analysis, the Newsome court canvassed decisions from other jurisdictions and arrived at what it believed to be a majority approach and a minority approach to the issue of whether an out-of-state law firm's representation of a client is sufficient to subject the law firm to personal jurisdiction in the client's home state. Id. at 1280. The Newsome SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 11 (0) 1947A court identified the majority approach as one that declines to find personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state law firm based solely on its representation of an in-state client. Id. In so doing, the Newsome court explained, [Ole majority reasons that representing a client residing in a distant forum is not necessarily a purposeful availment of that distant forum's laws and privileges and that, instead, Mlle client's residence is often seen. . . as a mere fortuity. Id. (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, under the majority approach, communications incidental to the attorney-client relationship that are directed to the forum state simply because the client resides there are also seen as merely fortuitous and do not constitute purposeful availment. See, e.g., Saw telle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391-92 (1st Cir. 1995) (concluding that written and telephone communications with the clients in the state where they happened to live were not sufficient to subject an out-of-state law firm to personal jurisdiction); Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (explaining that placing phone calls to the client in the forum state, mailing letters to the client in the forum state, and accepting payments from the client's forum-state bank are all normal incidents of. . . representation that, by themselves, do not establish purposeful availment); Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 226 (8th Cir. 1987) (concluding that phone calls made to the client's home state, monthly billings mailed to the client's home state, and payments made from the client's home-state bank were not sufficient to subject an out-ofstate law firm to personal jurisdiction); Exponential Biotherapies, Inc. v. Houthoff Buruma N.V., 638 F. Supp. 2d 1, 9 (D.D.C. 2009) (Plaintiff must establish more than the attorney-client relationship and contacts incidental to the attorney-client relationship in order to SUPREME COURT OF . NEVADA 12 (0) 1947A meet. . . constitutional due process requirements.); We're Talkin' Mardi Gras, LLC v. Davis, 192 F. Supp. 2d 635, 640 (E.D. La. 2002) ([A]11 of the communications to Louisiana rest on nothing more than the mere fortuity that [the client] happened to be a resident of Louisiana. They would have been the same regardless of where [the client] lived. Thus such communication can not be considered purposeful availment . . . .). In contrast, the Newsome court explained, [t]he minority view reasons that attorneys can accept or reject representing clients in distant forums, and that those who accept such representation have fair warning that they might be sued for malpractice in the client's forum. 722 F.3d at 1280 (internal quotations omitted). The Newsome court also recognized that, under the minority approach, the normal communications that make up an active attorney-client relationship are [seen as] the sort of repeated, purposeful contacts with the client's home forum sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Id. (citing Cartlidge v. Hernandez, 9 S.W.3d 341, 348 (Tex. App. 1999)); see Keefe v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267, 1272 (Colo. 2002) (concluding that communications and attempted communications with [a client] by mail and telephone were among the purposeful contacts that an attorney made with the forum state). Ultimately, the Newsome court agreed with the majority approach and affirmed the dismissal of the Canadian law firm for lack of personal jurisdiction. 722 F.3d at 1280-81. To that end, it concluded narrowly that an out-of-state attorney working from out-of-state on an out-of-state matter does not purposefully avail himself of the client's home forum's laws and privileges, at least not without some evidence that the attorney reached out to the client's home forum to solicit the client's SUPREME COURT OF . NEVADA 13 (0) 1947A business. Id. We agree with this conclusion and its formulation of the majority approach in two key respects. First, we agree that a lack of solicitation on the out-of-state law firm's part is highly relevant to the inquiry of whether the firm purposefully availed itself of the privileges of acting in Nevada. Second, we agree that an out-of-state firm's representation of a client on a non-Nevada matter is highly relevant to that same inquiry. Applying the majority approach here leads to the conclusion that petitioners did not subject themselves to specific personal jurisdiction in Nevada simply by virtue of representing Verano. It is undisputed that petitioners did not actively seek out Verano's business, but rather, it was Verano's general partner that reached out to petitioners in Texas. 6 Similarly, it cannot reasonably be disputed that the matter for which petitioners were retained to represent Verano was a Texas real-estatedevelopment project. 7 Thus, we conclude that petitioners' representation of Verano on an out-of-state matter and petitioners' communications with 6 Inthis regard, our decision in Peccole v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 111 Nev. 968, 899 P.2d 568 (1995), is distinguishable. While we stated in Peccole that use of the telephone can be sufficient for 'purposeful availment, id. at 971, 899 P.2d at 570 (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 481 (1985)), that statement was made in the context of concluding that the Colorado defendants may have solicited the Nevada plaintiffs' business via telephone. See id. 7We disagree with Verano's suggestion that petitioners always treated the project as an investment project by Nevadans and for Nevadans. To the contrary, petitioners' engagement agreement with Verano expressly stated that petitioners were being retained in connection with advising you regarding a real estate, economic development and tax increment financing matters concerning a Texas A&M University location in San Antonio, Texas (the 'Matter'). SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 14 (0) 1947A Verano that were incidental to that representation is, without more, not sufficient to make a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction. Based on the existing record, Verano's evidence of petitioners' additional Nevada contacts is insufficient to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction We next consider whether Macon's attendance at two presentations in Las Vegas was sufficient contact in Nevada to make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. In opposing petitioners' motion to dismiss, Verano submitted an affidavit from one of its investors attesting to the fact that he attended two presentations in 2010 in Las Vegas at which Macon participated. According to the investor, at those presentations, Macon (1) solicited additional investment funds from Verano's investors; and (2) failed to disclose the existence of VTLM Texas, the entity that Macon helped to create as part of the alleged effort to deprive Verano of the public funds from the City of San Antonio. Based on this evidence, the district court concluded that Macon had provided legal advice to Verano's investors in Nevada and that, consequently, petitioners had purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of acting in Nevada. We are not persuaded that this evidence amounted to purposeful availment sufficient to make a prima facie showing of specific personal jurisdiction. Purposeful availment requires that [t]he cause of action. . . arise from the consequences in the forum state of the defendant's activities. Consipio Holding, 128 Nev. at , 282 P.3d at 755 (internal quotations omitted). Here, although the district court concluded that Macon provided legal advice to Verano's investors at the two presentations, the record contains no indication of what that legal advice SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 15 (0) 1947A was, much less how Verano's causes of action against petitioners arose from that legal advice. See id. As the above-described majority approach recognizes, a law firm does not purposefully avail itself of the benefit of acting in the client's home state simply by meeting with the client in that state. See, e.g., Sher, 911 F.2d at 1363 (concluding that three trips to the client's home state of California to meet with the client were discrete events arising out of a case centered entirely in Florida [that] appear[ed] to have been little more than a convenience to the client); Austad Co., 823 F.2d at 226 (concluding that a law firm associate's three-day visit to the client's office for the purpose of reviewing documents was insufficient to show purposeful availment). Thus, without any evidence as to how Macon's legal advice at the two Las Vegas presentations related to Verano's causes of action against petitioners, we conclude that Macon's two trips to Nevada did not amount to petitioners purposefully availing themselves of the privilege of acting in Nevada. See Consipio Holding, 128 Nev. at , 282 P.3d at 755. We further note that the affidavit from Verano's investor, while providing slightly more detail than the district court's order, suffers from the same shortcoming. Specifically, although the investor attested to Macon soliciting additional investment funds, Verano's complaint contains no allegation that any additional funds were raised as a result of Macon's solicitations, much less that those funds were somehow misspent and thereby form a basis for Verano's claims against petitioners. Similarly, it is not immediately apparent from Verano's complaint how Macon's failure to mention the existence of VTLM Texas, which at the time of the presentations had been in existence for at least two years, relates to Verano's causes of action against petitioners. See id. In any event, we 16 question whether those nonstatements regarding a Texas entity would have a substantial enough connection with the forum state to make the exercise of jurisdiction over the defendant Es] reasonable. Id. (internal quotations omitted).