Opinion ID: 2279177
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for Armed Carjacking

Text: Downing contends that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of armed carjacking. When reviewing an insufficient evidence claim, [w]e view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, recognizing the province of the trier of fact to weigh the evidence, determine the credibility of the witnesses and to draw reasonable inferences from the testimony. Dickerson v. United States, 650 A.2d 680, 683 (D.C.1994); see Gibson v. United States, 792 A.2d 1059, 1065 (D.C.2002). The government must present `at least some probative evidence on each of the essential elements of the crime.' Price v. United States, 746 A.2d 896, 899 (D.C.2000) (quoting Robinson v. United States, 506 A.2d 572, 573 (D.C. 1986)); Mihas v. United States, 618 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C.1992) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Because it was Butler and Cade who initially bum rushed Semino and took her car, Downing alleges that he cannot be convicted of the crime. Downing also alleges that Butler and Cade's trial testimony was unreliable. We disagree. The offense of armed carjacking is committed if a person knowingly or recklessly uses force or violence to take from another person immediate actual possession of a person's motor vehicle. D.C.Code § 22-2803(a)(1); Winstead v. United States, 809 A.2d 607, 609-10 (D.C. 2002) (internal citations and quotations omitted); Pixley v. United States, 692 A.2d 438, 439-40 (D.C.1997). Immediate actual possession, borrowed from the robbery statute on which the carjacking statute is modeled, refers to the area within which the victim can reasonably be expected to exercise some physical control over the property. Winstead, 809 A.2d at 610 (citations omitted). Something within immediate actual possession is within such range that [one] could, if not deterred by violence or fear, retain actual physical control. Id. (citing Rouse v. United States, 402 A.2d 1218, 1220 (D.C.1979)). A carjacker may take immediate actual possession . . . at any point during a continuous course of assaultive conduct, not just at the starting point. Beaner v. United States, 845 A.2d 525, 533 (D.C.2004) (quoting Winstead, 809 A.2d at 611). In this case, there was more than sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer beyond a reasonable doubt that Downing was guilty of armed carjacking. All four men agreed that they would rob a pedestrian and walked over to a bus stop to look for someone to rob. Butler identified Semino from the bus stop perch that all four men occupied and, when asked, Downing told Cade to give Butler the gun. Butler testified that he drew the gun and he and Cade bum rushed Semino, who had her keys in her hand and was walking towards her car. Cade then snatched the keys and started the car while Butler moved Semino into the backseat at gunpoint. Cade also drove the car around the block and picked up Downing and Moody. Downing entered the front passenger seat and Moody entered the backseat, such that Semino sat between Moody and Butler. Shortly thereafter, Downing and the others put Semino into the trunk of her car. Based on this evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict, a jury could reasonably conclude that Downing was guilty of armed carjacking when he agreed to rob a pedestrian with the others, watched out for a victim on the bus stop, told Cade to give Butler the gun to commit the robbery, and then helped to put Semino into her trunk as the four men drove her car away. See Winstead, supra, 809 A.2d at 610. As such, we affirm Downing's conviction for armed carjacking.