Opinion ID: 901037
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Valid Postnuptial Agreement

Text: [¶ 9.] Even if Ray had signed an unconditional waiver of his elective share rights in 1981, Merry contends that such a postnuptial agreement would not have been enforceable and would have been against public policy. We considered, whether a postnuptial agreement could be valid and enforceable in Estate of Gab, 364 N.W.2d 924 (S.D.1985). In that decision, we held the agreement to be lawful. Id. at 925. In Gab, the parties had several children from previous marriages. Id. To ensure that the assets from each estate would go only to their children from the previous marriages, both spouses executed wills disinheriting the other. Id. Later, the parties signed a postnuptial agreement. Id. In effect, the agreement prevented the surviving spouse from petitioning for an elective share of the deceased spouse's estate. Id. In holding the agreement valid, we reasoned that so long as the extent and nature of the decedent's property was revealed, and so long as the agreement was entered into freely and for good consideration, a postnuptial agreement could survive the strict scrutiny standard required of such an agreement. Id. at 926. [¶ 10.] Merry would have us hold that any postnuptial agreement entered into by Marcella and Ray would not have survived application of the strict scrutiny standard. Using the findings of the trial judge, as we must because they were not clearly erroneous, there is no reason to believe that an elective share waiver would not have survived strict scrutiny. In his decision, the judge found that Ray would have entered into the agreement voluntarily and that there was no evidence that Marcella was predisposed to fraud or deceit to accomplish the agreement. [3] These are the exact criteria that we laid out in Gab. Consequently, we believe that based on the findings of the trial judge, the conclusion, [t]hat the waiver would have been effective against future changes in the law and in the estates of the parties, is not in contravention of our previous holdings. [¶ 11.] Merry asserts that had Marcella required Ray to sign an absolute waiver by threat of divorce while insisting that Ray pay most of the living expenses, such a waiver would be a violation of the public policies behind the marital support laws and the elective share laws. Marcella, Merry maintains, had a continuing obligation, throughout the course of her marriage to Ray, to take no deliberate action which would deprive Ray of proper support, including food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance, or which would leave him, then, or in the future, in a destitute condition. [¶ 12.] As foundation for his proposition, Merry cites SDCL 25-7-1 and 25-7-4. However, the language of these statutes does not contemplate the situation presented in this case. SDCL 25-7-1 provides: A person shall support himself or herself and his or her spouse out of his or her property or by his or her labor. Likewise, SDCL 25-7-4 commands: Every person with sufficient ability to provide for his or her spouse's support, or who is able to earn the means of the spouse's support, who intentionally abandons and leaves his or her spouse in a destitute condition, or who refuses or neglects to provide such spouse with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical attendance, unless, by the spouse's misconduct, he or she is justified in abandoning the spouse or failing to so provide is guilty of a Class 6 felony. (Emphasis added.) Merry's interpretation of the statute would have us construe a postnuptial agreement as containing the requisite intention, refusal, or neglect contemplated in the statute. This we decline to do.