Opinion ID: 2607539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: (See fn. 16.) DISCUSSION [16]

Text: The Attorney General argues that Dr. Mitchell's use of tests and an asserted profile constitutes a new scientific technique subject to Kelly/Frye. He insists that defendants have failed to show that this technique is generally accepted in the psychiatric or psychological community for the purpose offered here  to uncover personality traits that are linked to noncommission of the charged criminal acts. Grafton and Palomo insist that a close reading of this record reveals that testimony on only one narrow trait was offered. Referring variously to that trait as lack of sexual deviance, homosexuality, incestuous desires, or pedophilia, defendants argue that expert opinion as to its existence has always been admissible, without reference to Kelly/Frye, to show that a defendant is not likely to commit criminal sexual misconduct. As we will discuss, defendants provide a more accurate picture of the law and facts. (4) At the outset, defendants' claim that the testimony is relevant character evidence must be sustained. (§§ 210, 1102.) In People v. Jones, supra, 42 Cal.2d 219, 222, we found prejudicial error in the exclusion of expert opinion testimony that defendant is not a sexual deviate where offered to prove that he did not commit lewd and lascivious acts upon a child. Jones noted that certain now-repealed Welfare and Institutions Code sections assumed a logical connection between conviction under Penal Code section 288 and subsequent psychiatric diagnosis as a sexual psychopath. (42 Cal.2d at p. 224.) Jones concluded that the opposite inference is also reasonable, i.e., absence of such a disposition tends to prove that defendant has not committed the crime. ( Id. at pp. 224-225.) Section 1102 allows an accused to present expert opinion testimony of this kind to indicate his nondisposition to commit a charged sex offense. [17] This section was enacted in 1965, after People v. Jones, supra, 42 Cal.2d 219, was decided. (Stats. 1965, ch. 299, § 2, p. 1336.) As the accompanying Law Revision Commission comment makes clear, the statute codified Jones's rule permitting introduction of defense expert opinion of good character to show noncommission of charged crimes. (29B West's Ann. Evid. Code (1966 ed.) § 1102, pp. 12-13; Deering's Ann. Evid. Code (1986 ed.) § 1102, pp. 293-295.) The Legislature thus implicitly endorsed lack of deviance as a relevant character trait in a lewd and lascivious conduct case, even though the sexual psychopathy provisions cited in Jones were overhauled in the same, as well as prior, years. (See, e.g., former Welf. & Inst. Code, § 5501, amended by Stats. 1963, ch. 1913, § 5, p. 3907, repealed by Stats. 1965, ch. 391, § 3, p. 1630, replaced by Stats. 1965, ch. 391, § 5, p. 1643 [mentally disordered sex offender (MDSO) provisions; later revised and repealed].) [18] Contrary to the Attorney General's reading of this record, Dr. Mitchell indicated that no psychological profile entered into his diagnosis. (See p. 1161, fn. 22, post. ) Rather, much as in People v. Jones, supra, 42 Cal.2d 219, the proffered opinion was that Grafton (and presumably Palomo) displays a normal personality function, and shows no indications of deviancy. Dr. Mitchell's emphasis on low indication for antisocial or aggressive behavior implied that Grafton is unlikely to commit the charged acts or any serious crime. This link between personality and behavior is buttressed by Dr. Mitchell's suggestion that such diagnoses are routinely used in many contexts to determine whether troublesome behavior has occurred in the past or may occur in the future. The trier of fact is free to decide the weight, if any, to afford this opinion. However, we cannot say as a matter of law that it has no logical bearing on the defense case. (5) We also agree with defendants that the proffered evidence satisfies limits placed by section 801, subdivision (a), on all expert opinion testimony. That subdivision requires that such testimony be [r]elated to a subject that is sufficiently beyond common experience that the opinion of an expert would assist the trier of fact. (Italics added.) We have interpreted this language to require exclusion of expert opinion  only when it would add nothing at all to the jury's common fund of information.... ( People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 367, italics added.) Here, testimony by the alleged victims implicated Grafton and Palomo in homosexual or incestuous acts with children, including participation in at least one adult-child group sex encounter. Since the jury could not otherwise have been aware of personality traits inconsistent with such misconduct, Dr. Mitchell's testimony had potential to assist the jury on a pertinent point. (6) The proffered testimony also does not offend section 801, subdivision (b), simply because it was based, in part, upon standardized written personality tests and patient interviews. This subdivision requires that expert opinion testimony be [b]ased on matter (including knowledge, experience, and education) perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion upon the subject to which his testimony relates, except as otherwise precluded by law. (Italics added.) No precise legal rules dictate the proper basis for an expert's journey into a patient's mind to make judgments about his behavior. In effect, however, California courts have deferred to a qualified expert's decision to rely on standardized psychological tests such as the MMPI to reach an opinion on mental state at the time acts were committed. (See People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 78-81 [211 Cal. Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189] [MMPI and Rorschach Test]; People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 248 [162 Cal. Rptr. 1, 605 P.2d 830] [standard tests]; People v. Coogler (1969) 71 Cal.2d 153, 165 [77 Cal. Rptr. 790, 454 P.2d 686] [MMPI and Rorschach Test]; People v. Nicholas (1980) 112 Cal. App.3d 249, 275 [169 Cal. Rptr. 497] [MMPI]; People v. Phillips (1979) 90 Cal. App.3d 356, 360 [153 Cal. Rptr. 359] [MMPI and achievement/intelligence tests]; People v. Cox (1978) 82 Cal. App.3d 221, 223 [147 Cal. Rptr. 73] [MMPI]; People v. Humphrey (1975) 45 Cal. App.3d 32, 35 [119 Cal. Rptr. 74] [MMPI].) Such deference is no less appropriate here. Indeed, voir dire testimony indicated that qualified professionals routinely use raw material from the MMPI and MCMI as a basis for assessing personality, and drawing behavioral conclusions therefrom. [19] To the same end, Dr. Mitchell was entitled to base his opinion on observations of, and statements made by, the patient during a routine psychological interview. (See People v. Santa Cruz, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 248; People v. Coogler, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 164.) Of course, any expert may be cross-examined at trial as to the material and reasoning underlying his opinion. (§ 721, subd. (a).) (7) Admission of expert opinion into evidence does not preclude the trier of fact from reject[ing] the expert's conclusions because of doubt as to the material upon which [they] were based. ( Coogler, supra, at p. 166.) (8a) The Attorney General argues that even if the proffered testimony satisfies the foregoing authorities, it also must meet California's version of the rule first announced in Frye, supra, 293 Fed. 1013 (hereafter Frye test), for the admissibility of new scientific technique[s]. ( Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d 24, 30.) We disagree. (9) The hallmark of the Kelly/Frye rule, and the point emphasized by the Attorney General here, is that the proponent must establish, usually by expert testimony, that the technique is `sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.' ( Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 30, quoting Frye, supra, 293 Fed. at p. 1014, italics omitted.) The proponent also must establish that the witness furnishing such testimony is properly qualified as an expert to give [such] an opinion. (17 Cal.3d at p. 30, italics omitted.) The third and final requirement, which the Attorney General also suggests was not met here, is for the proponent to show that correct scientific procedures were used in the particular case. ( Ibid. ) While the standards imposed by the Kelly/Frye rule are clear, the definition of a new scientific technique is not. In Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pages 29-30, for example, the parties did not dispute that the Frye test applied to an identification process in which an expert analyst compares voiceprints, or graphs of human voices, produced by a spectrograph machine. Because the inventions and discoveries which could be considered scientific have become virtually limitless in the near-70 years since Frye was decided, application of its principle has often been determined by reference to its narrow common sense purpose, i.e., to protect the jury from techniques which, though new, novel, or `experimental,' convey a `misleading aura of certainty.' ( Kelly, supra, at pp. 30-32, citation omitted; see also People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 372-373.) This approach has produced two discernible themes. First, Kelly/Frye only applies to that limited class of expert testimony which is based, in whole or part, on a technique, process, or theory which is new to science and, even more so, the law. The courts are willing to forego admission of such techniques completely until reasonably certain that the pertinent scientific community no longer views them as experimental or of dubious validity. This all-or-nothing approach was adopted in full recognition that there would be a `considerable lag' between scientific advances and their admission as evidence in a court proceeding. ( Kelly, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 31, citation omitted.) The second theme in cases applying Kelly/Frye is that the unproven technique or procedure appears in both name and description to provide some definitive truth which the expert need only accurately recognize and relay to the jury. The most obvious examples are machines or procedures which analyze physical data. Lay minds might easily, but erroneously, assume that such procedures are objective and infallible. (See e.g., People v. Coleman (1988) 46 Cal.3d 749, 774-775 [251 Cal. Rptr. 83, 759 P.2d 1260] [hemostick method of presumptive testing for presence of blood]; People v. Brown (1985) 40 Cal.3d 512, 528-535 [220 Cal. Rptr. 637, 709 P.2d 440] [electrophoretic testing of body fluid and blood stains to identify donor]; see also People v. Shirley (1982) 31 Cal.3d 18, 51-52 [181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 723 P.2d 1354] [listing cases which have applied the Frye test to polygraph examinations, truth serum, Nalline testing, human bite marks, and microscopic identification of gunshot residue particles].) Kelly/Frye also has been applied to less tangible new procedures which carry an equally undeserved aura of certainty. In People v. Shirley, supra, 31 Cal.3d at page 66, we applied the Kelly/Frye rule to, and barred admission of, post-hypnotic testimony of a rape complainant. We explicitly rejected the Attorney General's claim in that case that the Kelly/Frye rule was limited to techniques analyzing physical evidence. ( Id. at p. 52.) We noted that, given the rule's prophylactic purpose, nothing precludes its application to a new scientific process operating on purely psychological evidence. ( Id. at p. 53.) As thoroughly explained in Justice Mosk's majority opinion, the danger of hypnotically refreshed testimony lies in the tendency of the process to actively contribute[] to the formation of pseudo-memories, to the witness' abiding belief in their veracity, and to the inability of the witness (or anyone else) to distinguish between the two. ( Id. at p. 53.) However, absent some special feature which effectively blindsides the jury, expert opinion testimony is not subject to Kelly/Frye. This distinction was recently confirmed in our unanimous decision in People v. McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d 351. There we found prejudicial error in the exclusion of defense expert testimony on the psychological factors undermining the accuracy of eyewitness identification. In dispensing with any need for a Kelly/Frye showing in that case, Justice Mosk noted that [w]hen a witness gives his personal opinion on the stand  even if he qualifies as an expert  the jurors may temper their acceptance of his testimony with a healthy skepticism born of their knowledge that all human beings are fallible.... [¶] ... We have never applied the Kelly/Frye rule to expert medical testimony, even when the witness is a psychiatrist and the subject matter is as esoteric as the reconstitution of a past state of mind or the prediction of future dangerousness, or even the diagnosis of an unusual form of mental illness not listed in the diagnostic manual of the American Psychiatric Association ( People v. Phillips (1981) 122 Cal. App.3d 69, 86-87 [175 Cal. Rptr. 703] (`Munchausen's syndrome by proxy')). ( McDonald, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 372-373.) (8b) The psychological testimony proffered here raises none of the concerns addressed by Kelly/Frye. The methods employed are not new to psychology or the law, and they carry no misleading aura of scientific infallibility. California courts have routinely admitted defense expert opinion analogous to the one offered here, with no suggestion that Kelly/Frye applies. In some of these cases, expert testimony of defendant's personality was admitted to prove that defendant was not likely to commit certain acts in the future. (See, e.g., People v. Burnick (1975) 14 Cal.3d 306, 312 [121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 535 P.2d 352] [MDSO proceeding: defendant is not homosexual or pedophilic but is depressed, highly immature, and `predominately heterosexual']; People v. Monroe (1985) 168 Cal. App.3d 1205, 1214 [215 Cal. Rptr. 51] [proceeding to challenge registration as sex offender: defendant is not `dangerous' or `sexual[ly] deviant'].) In other cases, the testimony was introduced as circumstantial evidence that the defendant did not harbor the requisite criminal intent or mental state at the time he committed the charged act. (See, e.g., People v. Robbins (1988) 45 Cal.3d 867, 874 [248 Cal. Rptr. 172, 755 P.2d 355] [guilt phase/capital trial: defendant with `primary diagnosis' of pedophilia unintentionally murdered uncooperative molestation victim during unthinking rage]; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 641 [244 Cal. Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836] [penalty phase/capital trial: defendant murdered in fit of `homosexual rage']; People v. Memro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 658, 693 [214 Cal. Rptr. 832, 700 P.2d 446] [guilt phase/capital trial: defendant has no psychosis or organic brain syndrome but suffers from a severe personality disorder, i.e., he is a homosexual pedophile who murdered during a fit or rage]; People v. Rosenkrantz (1988) 198 Cal. App.3d 1187, 1198 [244 Cal. Rptr. 403] [noncapital murder trial: defendant's reasoning process obscured by severe adjustment disorder with mixed emotional feature, certain stress reactions, and/or Egodystonic homosexuality]; but see Pen. Code, § 29, as added by Stats. 1984, ch. 1433, § 3, p. 5030.) Moreover, as Dr. Mitchell testified, diagnostic use of written personality inventories such as the MMPI and MCMI has been established for decades. Modern courts have not resisted reference to these tests. As already noted, defense expert opinion on an impressive range of psychiatric diagnoses has been admitted without reference to Kelly/Frye where the expert made known at trial that he relied, in part, on the MMPI or analogous tests. (See, e.g., People v. Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 78 [defendant is subject to `psychotic decompensation,' or `break-down[s] involving gross distortion' in `interacting with the world, behaving, [and] mood']; People v. Coogler, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 165 [defendant is a borderline schizophrenic who under stress may become psychotic].) We see no reason to depart from this settled approach. As discussed, criminal defendants are authorized to use character evidence, including expert opinion, to prove  conduct in conformity. (§ 1102, italics added.) This principle applies where lack of deviance is offered as circumstantial evidence that a defendant is unlikely to have committed charged acts of molestation. ( People v. Jones, supra, 42 Cal.2d at pp. 224-225.) Contrary to the dissent's claim, expert reliance on the MMPI and MCMI for this particular purpose is not a revolutionary development. (Dis. opn., post, p. 1167.) As the dissent concedes, standardized personality tests previously have been used in forming expert opinion admitted to show that an accused did not harbor the requisite  mental state at the time the alleged acts were committed. (Dis. opn., post , p. 1167, italics added.) Here, defendants offered similar expert testimony to suggest that they did not commit the requisite act. In either case, the fundamental purpose of the testimony is the same  to raise a reasonable doubt as to guilt of charged crimes. The dissent offers no legal or logical basis for conditioning application of the Kelly/Frye rule upon the particular theory by which the accused seeks to exclude [himself] from the relevant class of offenders. (Dis. opn., post, p. 1167, original italics omitted.) It would be anomalous to view the MMPI and similar tests as a new technique at this late date. We also are persuaded that no reasonable juror would mistake an expert's reliance on standardized tests as a source of infallible truth on issues of personality, predisposition, or criminal guilt. Here, for example, Dr. Mitchell stated that the MMPI was essentially 70 percent accurate in diagnosing some patients, but completely invalid as to others. Although the witness expressed faith in his own methods, he recounted one instance in which an admitted child sex offender had tested normal on the MMPI. Thus, despite testimony regarding validity scales, the test results  which were never actually described below  were not made to appear foolproof. (Dis. opn., post, p. 1168.) More importantly, the MMPI and MCMI are obviously a springboard for a far more normative and subjective diagnostic process. That this process is a learned professional art, rather than the purported exact science with which Kelly/Frye is concerned, is well illustrated by the witness's guarded testimony here. Dr. Mitchell left no doubt that he relied heavily upon patient interviews, case history, and past experience in forming his educated, but debatable, opinion. Along these lines, we reiterate that issues of test reliability and validity may be thoroughly explored on cross-examination at trial. (See § 721, subd. (a).) The prosecution also may call, in rebuttal, another expert of comparable background to challenge defense expert methods. (See, e.g., People v. Rosenkrantz, supra, 198 Cal. App.3d at p. 1199.) Even the dissent acknowledges cases in which the test-based opinion of the defendant's expert was admitted into evidence, and then rebutted by the prosecution's expert. ( People v. Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 78-81; People v. Cruz, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 247-248.) [20] Contrary to the dissent's suggestion, we find no California case in which an attempt to introduce similar defense evidence was rebuffed. [21] The Attorney General nonetheless insists that the proffered testimony is inadmissible under People v. Bledsoe, supra, 36 Cal.3d 236. However, that case is not controlling. Bledsoe involved a rape prosecution in which the victim and defendant gave conflicting testimony on the issue of consent. In the prosecution's case-in-chief, the victim's rape counselor testified that, in her expert opinion, the victim had been suffering from rape trauma syndrome. (36 Cal.3d at pp. 243-244.) The counselor described the concept as an `acute stress reaction to the threat of being killed'; it often progressed in three phases encompassing such varied behavior as agitation, fear, masked feelings, acting as though nothing has happened, looking normal to others, and depression. ( Id. at pp. 242-243.) Defendant objected at trial on relevance grounds. ( Id. at p. 241.) On appeal, the parties debated whether the evidence satisfied the Kelly/Frye test, with no one disputing that such test was the appropriate standard. (See id. at pp. 245-247 & fn. 7.) In Bledsoe, we first noted that other evidence at trial had established that the victim promptly reported the attack, immediately displayed emotional upset, and bore bruises and other signs of injury. We therefore inferred that the expert's testimony was not offered for the limited purpose of explaining any post-rape conduct (e.g., delayed reporting) which a lay jury might otherwise view as inconsistent with a forcible rape claim. Under our view of the facts, expert testimony describing the syndrome and applying it to this victim was used to prove that a rape in the legal sense had, in fact, occurred. (36 Cal.3d at p. 248, italics added.) Bledsoe understandably concluded that the counselor's testimony was erroneously admitted for this purpose. A careful reading of Bledsoe reveals that our primary concern was the logical irrelevance of the evidence: (1) the syndrome was designed solely as a nonjudgmental means by which to identify, predict and treat the victim's emotional problems; (2) since counselors rarely question the victim's factual account, the syndrome is an inappropriate means of deciding the intricate legal issue of consent (i.e., whether the defendant reasonably, and in good faith believed that the victim consented despite her good faith belief that she did not) ; (3) the syndrome is characterized by a broad range of emotional trauma not limited to victims of rape; and (4) a counselor's assessment of the victim's feelings is not necessarily an accurate measure of whether a third party, namely the defendant, acted in legally culpable manner. (36 Cal.3d at pp. 249-250, & fn. 12.) Bledsoe acknowledged a handful of out-of-state cases applying the Frye test to evidence of rape trauma syndrome on grounds that juries might view this therapeutic diagnosis as scientific proof a rape had occurred. (See 36 Cal.3d at p. 248.) However, Bledsoe did not hold that the Kelly/Frye test applied to the expert opinion in that case, nor did we discuss the test's relationship to syndrome or other expert psychological evidence in general. [22] Assuming, like the parties, that the test did apply, we simply concluded that the prosecution would not be able to prove that rape trauma syndrome was generally accepted by the counseling community to prove criminal guilt. Faced with the question here, we are persuaded that Kelly/Frye did not preclude admission of Dr. Mitchell's proffered testimony. Expert opinion that defendants show no obvious psychological or sexual problem is circumstantial evidence which bears upon whether they committed sexual acts upon children, and is admissible character evidence on their behalf. The testimony and the matter upon which it is based also meet traditional standards for competent expert opinion, without need for additional screening procedures applicable to new, novel, or experimental scientific evidence not previously accepted in court. We conclude the trial court erred in using Kelly/Frye to exclude the testimony proffered by Grafton and Palomo. (10) Moreover, the error was prejudicial in this case. No physical evidence corroborated any of the five witnesses who testified against Grafton and Palomo. Although four of these boys (Victor, J., A., and D.) stated that nude photographs were taken at Stoll's house on at least two separate occasions, no photos were discovered during an official search conducted several hours after the first child, J., was interviewed. No medical examinations were requested, even though J. told investigators that he had been sodomized as recently as two weeks before the interview. Of course, there were no direct nonvictim accounts of the pertinent charged events. Mrs. M. corroborated her son Victor's testimony insofar as he claimed that two upsetting events  neither of which she witnessed  occurred while he was playing with Center Street friends. On the other hand, testimony by Chris's mother, Rochelle, lent support to Grafton's partial alibi defense. It is true that at least one child-witness gave an unequivocal eyewitness account of Grafton's and Palomo's respective roles in each count under review (counts 1, 2, 3, 9, 24, 25). As to the group event charged in counts 1 through 3, the four witnesses confirmed that all defendants and several children were naked together at Stoll's house; two witnesses agreed that sexual touching of an unspecified nature had been committed against a third child that day. Nevertheless, in several key respects, these same four children contradicted each other's account of the same event. Unlike Chris and A., D. was adamant that no adult committed sex acts upon him or any child. The other witness, J., could not remember having been sexually abused on that occasion, despite Chris's and A's testimony to the contrary. Also, Chris recalled no nude picture-taking, while the three other children disagreed as to the identity of the alleged photographer. Further, the defense mounted a thorough attack on the credibility of each witness. Four of the children who testified against Grafton and Palomo (Chris, J., A., and D.) admitted that they had lied at the preliminary hearing. Chris and J. further conceded that their trial testimony contained at least one untruth. Pretrial statements of these four children, as well as the fifth child, Victor, contradicted their trial testimony as to the type of, or circumstances surrounding, the sex crimes at issue here. Finally, investigators specifically directed J., A., and D. to discuss sexual contact with defendants, including Grafton. Both A. and D. were told about J.'s accusations before they answered investigators' questions. In light of the foregoing, the jury might well have been swayed by expert opinion testimony that neither Grafton nor Palomo was the type of person to commit the charged acts. The pair claimed to be romantically involved, and were charged with far fewer crimes than the other two defendants. Dr. Mitchell's testimony would have lent credence to Grafton's and Palomo's personal denials of guilt. We therefore consider it reasonably probable that erroneous exclusion of the proffered testimony affected the judgment. ( People v. Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Insofar as it upholds the convictions against defendants Grafton and Palomo, the judgment of the Court of Appeal is reversed.