Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Failure to Substitute New Counsel for the Purpose of Penalty Phase Argument

Text: Defendant contends the judgment of death must be reversed because the court accepted defense counsel's waiver of penalty phase argument to the jury on his behalf. Specifically, defendant argues that the court was duty bound to appoint new counsel for that single purpose once defendant responded affirmatively to the court's inquiry whether he would accept the proposed substitution of counsel. [22] For reasons next explained, this claim of trial court error must be rejected on appeal. Moreover, resolution of the closely related question whether counsel's failure to present any penalty phase arguments constituted ineffective assistance of counsel must await formal presentation of the claim in a petition for writ of habeas corpus predicated on an adequately developed factual record. A. Background After conclusion of the People's case in aggravation of penalty, the defense rested without introducing any evidence. Questioned outside of the jury's presence, counsel indicated that although their investigation had produced some evidence regarding defendant's character, background, and mental and physical condition, they did not wish to present any of it. Defendant personally affirmed that counsel had consulted with him and had informed him of the right to put on mitigating evidence, and that he wished to forgo the exercise of that right. The court told counsel for both parties that each side would have one opportunity for argument, the prosecution first and the defense last, but that both attorneys for each party could argue if they wished. Prosecutors Holliman and Lutes then argued for the People, emphasizing the aggravating circumstances of the crime. The next morning (July 18, 1990), after a discussion about an instruction to be given on lingering doubt as a factor in mitigation, the court called on the defense for argument. Counsel Maple responded, If your Honor pleases, on behalf of Mr. Miller and myself, we will submit the case to the jury without argument. Outside the presence of the jury, the court expressed its astonish[ment] that after receiving a continuance, and court funding, to perform investigation for the penalty phase of trial, the defense offered no witnesses and not one word to the jury. The court then asked counsel why they were not presenting a sympathy or any other moralistic reason or any other reason on behalf of Mr. Snow. After counsel conferred privately, the following colloquy occurred: The Court: Does counsel for the defense wish to respond to the court's inquiry? Mr. Maple: I do not, your Honor. The Court: Mr. Miller? Mr. Miller: No, sir. The Court: Let the record reflect that this court has expended a great amount of funds as to this penalty trial for the defense attorneys' investigation as to factors in mitigation. I have continued this trial almost six weeks [for penalty phase investigation]. I don't know what the billings are for all these investigators in other states, but not one witness was called on behalf of Mr. Snow at the penalty trial. This astonishes the court.... Not one word is being argued in his behalf as to the penalty aspect of this trial before this jury. May I know why, counsel? Mr. Miller, have you any reply? Mr. Miller: No, sir. No, your Honor. The Court: Mr. Maple? Mr. Maple: No, your Honor. The Court: I am going to recess this matter until 1:30. I wish to get a representative from the State Bar here. The jury was then released for lunch and told to return at 1:45 p.m. Outside the presence of the prosecutors, the court continued its inquiries of defense counsel: [23] The Court: Record should reflect that in the penalty trial the defense has presented no evidence in mitigation in behalf of Mr. Snow, and today I've learned that there will be no offer of arguments in behalf of Mr. Snow. Mr. Miller, is this pursuant to the wishes of the defendant? Mr. Miller: Your Honor, I'm in no position to answer the court's question. The Court: Thank you. Is this pursuant to tactical reasons that you have developed in the course of this trial? Mr. Miller: I cannot answer the court's question. The Court: And why, may I ask, are you not presenting arguments or any evidence in mitigation in light of the expenditure of this court in behalf of your defense? Mr. Miller: Your Honor, I cannot answer the court's question. The Court: Mr. Snow, I inquired of you yesterday whether or not you were aware that you have a right to present evidence in this case.... I believe I gave you a rundown as to what factors in mitigation you may present. It may pertain to the case itself, it may pertain to your background, physical or mental condition, as well as any character evidence that you may have. There was none. Are you aware that you can have this evidence presented, Mr. Snow? The Defendant: Yeah. The Court: Thank you. And today to the court's astonishment, and I've never had this happen, and I know of no court in which there has been no arguments whatsoever as to the attorneys. You realize that I cannot force your attorneys to argue. They have a right to waive that argument. However, I want you to be aware, if you want someone to argue in your behalf, I will gladly appoint another lawyer and to have him review this case for purposes of arguments. Mr. Snow, are you aware that you that the arguments before this jury in your behalf can cover great areas such as sympathy, moral factors, as well as any background evidence that you may have? Among the background evidence that could be presented to the jury is that you have been in custody since 1980, to my knowledge, and for the last 10 years perhaps there ha[s] been no evidence of you being not a model prisoner. That could be a factor in mitigation. There are so many aspects to factors in mitigation as to your case. You understand this Mr. Snow? The Defendant: Yes. The Court: Do you wish the court to appoint another lawyer in your behalf? The Defendant: Yes. The Court: Thank you. This will be for the purposes of the arguments in this case. Do you understand this? The Defendant: (Defendant nods head in the affirmative.) The Court: Was Mort Borenstein here? The Clerk: He was here this morning. The Court: Can we get him here at 1:30[?] The Clerk: I will call his office. The Court: I am going to try to find Mr. Mort Borenstein who tried a capital case by the name of People versus Beltran in this case [ sic: court] and was able to obtain a verdict of not guilty. I know him to be a very resourceful as well as a most competent attorney. I want him. I am going to try to get a hold of him; have him here at 1:30 this afternoon. After a recess, the court reconvened at 1:40 p.m., again outside the presence of the jury and district attorney. The court continued its examination of defense counsel regarding their obligation to present mitigating evidence if any was available. Attorneys Maple and Miller responded that they needed the advice of counsel and had obtained such representation in Attorney Robert Gerstein, who was present outside the courtroom. Maple further asserted that Gerstein had been previously appointed counsel for defendant, having been appointed for all purposes by Judge Xanthos, presiding judge of the same court, who in his capacity as master calendar judge, was handling counsel and expert witness appointments and investigator funding. The trial court (Judge Tso), taking apparent umbrage at the assertion that, without his knowledge, an attorney had been appointed in this case for all purposes, invited Judge Xanthos into the courtroom to confirm or disprove the claim. Before he arrived, the following colloquy occurred: Mr. Maple: Thank you. I wish to amplify the record so that it is complete and not incomplete, your Honor. If I may be heard in this regard. Mr. Gerstein's status in the case occurred as a result of Mr. Miller and myself deciding to take a writ. We employed him. Utilizing trust funds that were provided by Judge Xanthos, among other things. Your Honor has no knowledge of the reasons for it. Except to the extent that you were furnished a copy of the petitions for the writs. Over the signature of Mr. Gerstein as counsel for Mr. Snow. Now, in this present situation unbenounst [ sic ] to your Honor there are factors that I cannot disclose to you. And because if [ sic: of] your statements about involving the State Bar, Mr. Miller and I asked Mr. Gerstein to come here to represent Mr. Snow for the purpose of explaining that to the court. And I think we have a right to do that. The Court: What will he explain to the court? Mr. Maple: I am not going to say anything further in that regard because that is his job. Not mine. The Court: All right. Thank you. Judge Xanthos then arrived and stated he had no recollection of having ever appointed Gerstein for any purpose. Finally, the court agreed to hear Gerstein, and the following discussion ensued: The Court: What's your purpose for being present today, please? Mr. Gerstein: Well, I was called by Mr. Maple on the basis that I have been involved in this case and have been representing the defendant in the appellate courts, or did at least on the writ matter, and have continued to consult with them; that they had gotten into a situation where they were concerned that there might be a conflict in their making an argument which they felt should be made on Mr. Snow's behalf. That is to say, they were concerned because of the threat of State Bar sanctions against them and that put them into a The Court: Because of what? Mr. Gerstein: Because of the threat of, as I understood it, your Honor, of State Bar sanctions against them. Possibly, because of their conduct. The Court: For what purpose? Why? Mr. Gerstein: Well, apparently because ofas I understood it, your Honor, because of your concern that they were not making any presentation of evidence or argument at the penalty phase in this matter. The Court: And what iswell, why are you here now? Mr. Gerstein: Because they felt that that put them into a, at least awkward, an awkward situation to make the argument for their The Court: They stated that they had no argument. Mr. Gerstein: No. I'm sorry, your Honor, their argument that they should continue to represent Mr. Snow and that it would be an interference with his right to counsel to have someone else now appointed by you to carry on with the penalty phase. That argument, your Honor. The Court: Well, all that's left is the arguments. Mr. Gerstein: Yes. The Court: Because there was no presentation of factors in mitigation. Mr. Gerstein: Yes, I understand that. The Court: I've cited the Deere case on the record. [24] Mr. Gerstein: Yes. The Court: That requires them, as officers of the court, to present factors in mitigation, if any. The Court [ sic: Mr. Gerstein]: Well, yes, your Honor. That was precisely theirthat was precisely their concern. They have shared with me some of the confidential material on the basis of which they have made their considered judgment that, in the interest-in Mr. Snow's interest, that they should not present any evidence, your Honor. The Court: I had asked them whether or not they were doing this based upon the request of the defendant or if it was a tactical matter, and both the attorneys had refused to answer the court. So the court was left in a dilemma of not knowing what to do with respect to that in light of People versus Deere. Mr. Gerstein: Uh-huh. Well, your Honor, my understanding is that they are The Court: Now, with your statement, it appears that it's solely tactical, and the presumption is that evidence to the contrary, the appellate court will take that presumption. Mr. Gerstein: Well, your Honor, perhaps I have gone too far in saying that. The Court: Well, you've made the statement and I've accepted it. Mr. Gerstein: I'veI understand what I do want to say, your Honor, is that they are representing the client's best interests in their professional judgment. Now, I did not mean to The Court: That's all I want to hear. Mr. Gerstein:I did not mean to say by that that this was not the defendant's judgment or that it was the defendant's judgment, that that was not taken into account. I have no intention of saying that or that it was a tactical decision as opposed to any other sort of decision, but The Court: Your statements to the court relieves the court's mind in that you have talked with the attorneys and they have indicated to you the reason. Mr. Gerstein: Yes. The Court: And I'll accept that. I will now instruct the jury. Mr. Gerstein: Okay. The Court: Thank you. Mr. Gerstein: Thank you. The Court: Now, Mr. Snow, the law requires that the attorneys control the proceedings as to any criminal case, and that would include the arguments or no arguments. They have elected to waive arguments and that is their right. That right affects you. So what I'm going to do is proceed and accept the waiver of arguments and simply instruct the jury. Defendant made no response on the record. The prosecutors were then readmitted to the courtroom. After further discussion of proposed instructions, the court began instructing the jury. The penalty phase instructions included the following admonition: The jury is instructed not to draw any adverse inference from the defendant's failure to testify at the penalty trial or offer evidence in mitigation or arguments by his attorney. The jury must decide for itself the appropriate penalty based on the factors previously given by the court. At the request of the defense, the court also instructed the jury on lingering doubt and the burden of proving identity through eyewitness testimony. Also relevant to our inquiry regarding this claim are certain confidential Declaration] Re Preparation For Penalty Trial filed by Miller and Maple in the superior court's master calendar department on the date the penalty phase was commenced (July 17, 1990), as well as the declaration of Joel A. Sickler, a court-appointed defense investigator, which was appended to Maple's July 17 declaration, and a second declaration by Maple filed on July 18, the second day of the penalty phase and the date on which the events giving rise to this claim transpired. [25] Miller stated in his July 17 declaration, among other things, that The defendant advised both counsel that he would not aid in their preparation for penalty trial. He also advised counsel that he did not want any member of his family called as a witness at his penalty trial, and that he had instructed all family members not to cooperate with defense counsel or their investigators, [¶] I submitted visiting passes at the Los Angeles County Men's Central Jail, where the defendant is housed, on June 15,19, 21, 22,1990, and on July 11, 1990. The defendant would not respond to any of the requests for a visit. He advised the Sheriff that he was refusing, in each instance. I have not spoken to the defendant since our last court appearance on June 12, 1990. Miller further related that After a guilty verdict was rendered against the defendant, I contacted [court-appointed defense investigator Joel A.] Sickler to ... update an earlier report by the California Appellate Project, interview all family members and potential penalty phase witnesses, and to inspect the [defendants'] institutional record. Mr. Sickler rendered his report on July 16, 1990. His report reveals, in essence, [defendant's] institutional record, and other facts about his family background contained in official documents. No family member would consent to an interview. [¶] This declaration is submitted so that the appellate Court will be aware of the posture of the defense as we proceed into penalty trial. Maple stated in his first declaration (July 17, 1990), among other things, that On June 27, 1990 I was contacted by Harraletta Murphy, the oldest sister of defendant ... indicating her concern about the health of defendant. She related that she had received a telephone call from ... a prisoner in the Los Angeles County Central Jail [relating] that defendant, after a visit by members of defendant's family at the visiting screen of the jail, reportedly had been assaulted by deputy sheriffs in the jail and was in the hospital. Harraletta Murphy requested that I investigate the matter. I immediately contacted the Sheriffs medical facilities and was unable to confirm any hospitalization of the defendant. Maple went on to relate that he contacted Miller regarding the concerns of defendant's family, and that Miller informed him defendant had been refusing visits from both Miller and defense investigator Sickler. Maple then related that on July 11, 1990, he was contacted by Marcia Brunier, another sister of defendant who had visited him in the jail, and Ms. Brunier confirmed that she and other members of the family had been advised by the defendant not to cooperate in any penalty investigation by defense investigators and Mr. Miller but that defendant would consent to a visit in the Central Jail Attorney Room by me [Maple] only. Maple continued in his declaration, On July 12, 1990, after conferring with [Miller and Sickler,] I visited [defendant] at the Central Jail Attorney Room in Los Angeles. In the course of the interview with the defendant, I discussed the incident that occurred after the family visit at the Jail Visiting Screen which involved a complaint by the defendant about the visiting screen telephones which did not operate. Mr. Snow confirmed that there was a physcial [ sic ] encounter between himself and members of the Sheriffs Department because of his persistence in making a complaint about the visit. Mr. Snow also confirmed that he refused interviews with Mr. Miller and the penalty phase investigator and indicated that he had advised members of his family not to assist in any investigation by the defense for the penalty trial. In his affidavit dated July 16, 1990, and appended to Maple's July 17 declaration, defense investigator Sickler averred, among other things, that on June 7, 1990, Miller telephoned him and explained that he would be needed to conduct a penalty phase investigation after all. Miller asked Sickler to review a California Appellate Project penalty phase type report that had been prepared by a California Appellate Project investigator, and verify its contents and to update it. He also asked me to interview Snow at the county jail, speak with members of Snow's family, and inspect his institutional record. Sickler then explained, My investigation began on June 8, 1990. In the course of my work, I contacted several members of defendant's family. I was told by each family member that they (members of the Snow family) were instructed by the defendant not to cooperate with my investigation. In fact, the defendant's older sister, Harraletta Murphy, his father and step-mother, Fentress & Jacqueline Snow, told me in effect, that they would have no comment and would not grant me an interview. In addition to speaking with Harraletta Murphy, Fentress Snow and Jacqueline Snow, I telephoned Marcia Brunier (a sister), Barbara Snow (a sister), Benito Snow and Keith Snow (both brothers). Messages were left for each on approximately three occasions. As of July 16, 1990, I did not receive a return phone call or any sort of reply from these family members. Sickler also reported in his affidavit that he had attempted to visit defendant in the central jail on July 2, 1990, and was told by the deputy on duty that defendant was refusing to see him. Last, Sickler related that, while I was unable to interview Snow or any members of his family, I was able to retrieve and inspect various public records which detailed Snow's personal history. These records were obtained from the California Department of Corrections, California Youth Authority, Los Angeles County Recorder, Pasadena Board of Education, Pasadena City College, City of Pasadena, Bushnell Optical (a private company), California Appellate Project, and the Kansas City, Missouri, Division of Vital Records. In his second declaration, filed July 18, 1990, Maple stated, On July 17, 1990, I discussed with [defendant] the impact of [defendant's physical encounter with sheriffs deputies in the jail visiting room], if known to the prosecution, as probable rebuttal evidence to any testimony that might be offered on his behalf by penalty investigator Joel A. Sickler and shared with him the results of [Sickler's] investigation which contained much favorable information concerning his [defendant's] conduct while in custody over the years. Maple then explained that he was still trying to learn additional information about the physical encounter incident from the jail inmate who had reported it to defendant's sister, but that the inmate was refusing an interview with him. Maple stated, I told my client that in my judgment under the circumstances and present posture of the case, that no defense material should be presented to the jury. Mr. Snow concurred in the judgment. B. Analysis Defendant contends that the trial court, rather than accepting counsel's waiver of penalty phase argument on defendant's behalf, should have appointed new counsel for the purpose of making a penalty phase argument to the jury. If additional time was needed, defendant argues, the court should have continued the penalty trial on its own motion, or, if that course was deemed impractical because of constraints on the jurors' availability, declared a mistrial of the penalty phase. The Attorney General, in response, surmises that defense counsel's decision to present no penalty phase argument was a tactical one. The trial court, the Attorney General argues, could not properly have appointed new counsel for purposes of argument merely out of disagreement with Miller's and Maple's sense of appropriate strategy. The issue is both complex and troubling. Troubling because, assuming a capital murder defendant going into the sentencing phase of his trial is determined that his life should be spared, it is difficult to imagine how a penalty phase in which counsel present no mitigating evidence, call no witnesses, refrain from cross-examining the prosecution's witnesses, and make no argument to the jury on the defendant's behalf, could ever produce a reliable penalty verdict. On the other hand, this claim does not arise in a vacuum. We have noted that defendant was previously convicted and sentenced to death on the instant charges. We reversed the earlier judgment in People v. Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d 216, 242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452, because of the prosecutor's misuse of peremptory challenges in jury selection. Two penalty phases were conducted during the course of that first trial, at which Halvor Miller, defendant's lead counsel in this trial, was also lead defense counsel. The record of the first penalty phase proceeding [26] reflects that defendant adamantly refused to cooperate with any defense strategy designed to spare his life, and indeed, was determined to receive the death penalty. Defendant stated on the record at the first penalty trial that he had directed Mr. Miller not to offer any mitigating circumstances or any mitigating evidence to oppose the prosecution's case of aggravating circumstances. I don't feel that there are any.... [¶] ... [I]f I am guilty of murder, I do not want to go to prison for the rest of my life and I would preferand I would explain that to the jury that I would prefer that the jury sentence me to death. When pressed by the trial court as to whether they objected to defendant's proposed course, Miller and his cocounsel ultimately stated they took no position in light of his right to testify. The matter proceeded accordingly, with defendant taking the stand and testifying that in his opinion there were no factors in mitigation, that he had instructed his attorneys not to present any argument for life imprisonment, and that he did not want to go to prison for the rest of his life. After approximately one day of deliberation, the jury returned a verdict of death. Thereafter, the trial court granted a new trial motion as to penalty based upon the giving of an improper commutation instruction. (See People v. Snow, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 221, 242 Cal.Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452.) The second penalty trial did not fare much better for the defense, which again offered no mitigating evidence, but did submit its guilt phase evidence in support of a lingering doubt defense, which Miller argued to the jury at some length. The second jury, like the first, returned a verdict of death. In short, from the record of the first trial, it is quite clear that defendant at that time was opposed to the presentation of any case in mitigation, including argument to the jury, and that Attorney Miller had to work within those extreme limitations imposed by his client, to whatever extent possible. At the very least we know that Miller was capable of making an appropriate record and demonstrated that he could make a thorough final argument for lingering doubt. The course of events at this penalty trial was even more extraordinary. The defense not only rested without making an opening statement, calling any witnesses, introducing any other evidence, or cross-examining any of the prosecution witnesses, but, following the prosecutor's closing argument, defense counsel announced they would submit the case without any argument. Counsel further refused to tell the court their reasons for this decision. Yet defendant, when asked by the court at one point whether he wanted a new attorney appointed to argue to the jury in his behalf, answered yes. Finally, assured by still another attorney, who had earlier in the trial assisted Miller and Maple in presenting a petition for writ of mandate to the Court of Appeal, that the two appointed attorneys were representing the client's best interests in their professional judgment, the trial court accepted their decision not to make a penalty phase argument and submitted the case to the jury. A close reading of defendant's supplemental brief reveals that his argument that his death judgment must be reversed on appeal rests on two alternative grounds. Defendant first contends that trial court error requires reversal on appeal. He argues that the court, by refusing to appoint new counsel to make a penalty phase argument after he had responded affirmatively to the court's inquiry whether he would accept appointment of new counsel, thereby failed to safeguard Mr. Snow's rights to due process and a fair trial during the penalty phase, to assure the attainment of a fair and accurate penalty determination, and to assure that Mr. Snow was afforded assistance of counsel during the penalty phase. Alternatively, defendant argues that reversal on appeal is also required as a result of Miller's and Maple's ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. The two grounds are closely intertwined. Defendant recognizes that normally a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus (see, e.g., People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134), where relevant facts and circumstances not reflected in the record on appeal, such as counsel's reasons for pursuing or not pursuing a particular trial strategy, can be brought to light to inform the two-pronged inquiry of whether counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and whether there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ( Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) But defendant nonetheless also argues that counsel's performance at the penalty phase was so deficient that it must be deemed to have entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing ( United States v. Cronic (1984) 466 U.S. 648, 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 ( Cronic )), thereby relieving appellate or habeas corpus counsel of the burden, which they would otherwise bear under Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 of showing that specific deficiencies in trial counsel's performance prejudicially affected the penalty trial. Since counsel's assertedly deficient performance is at the root of this claim, we address it first before turning to the closely related question whether the trial court itself committed reversible error by failing to appoint new counsel to make a penalty phase argument in defendant's behalf. 1. Ineffective assistance of counsel It is settled that the failure to present any mitigating evidence on behalf of the defendant at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial does not, in and of itself, render a judgment of death constitutionally unreliable. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1029-1033, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627 ( Lang) ; People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1228, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) As we observed in Lang, To require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection would be inconsistent with an attorney's paramount duty of loyalty to the client and would undermine the trust, essential for effective representation, existing between attorney and client. ( Lang, supra, at p. 1031, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) Here, counsel's confidential declarations in the record on appeal raise a reasonable inference that defendant did not desire, and indeed would not permit, defense counsel to investigate or present any family background evidence in mitigation of penalty. According to counsel's declarations, defendant had instructed his family members not to cooperate with the defense, thereby eliminating them as potential witnesses in his behalf. Defendant had also agreed that, as a matter of trial strategy, evidence of his good conduct while in custody should not be presented to the jury because it would open the door to impeachment with evidence of his recent involvement in an altercation with sheriffs deputies in the central jail. On this state of the record, it may also be reasonable to infer that counsel knew, or reasonably believed, that defendant did not desire them to present any argument to the jury in his behalf. [27] As the confidential declarations outlined above reveal, defendant had steadfastly refused to cooperate with any investigation or defense strategy in preparation of a case in mitigation of penalty. He had instructed his relatives not to cooperate with defense counsel or their investigator. He had refused all jailhouse visits or communication with lead counsel Miller during the six-week break between the guilt and penalty phases of triala continuance that had been granted for the very purpose of allowing further investigation and preparation of a case in mitigation of penalty. And he had agreed with Maple that evidence of his past good conduct while in custody should be withheld from the jury for tactical reasons. Moreover, having represented defendant at the first trial of these charges, Miller knew that defendant once before had directed him not to offer any mitigating evidence in opposition to the prosecution's case in aggravation, and that defendant had personally taken the stand and told the jury that in his opinion there were no factors in mitigation of penalty, that he had instructed his attorneys not to present any argument for life imprisonment, and that he did not want to go to prison for the rest of his life. If the truth of the matters related in the confidential declarations are established at a habeas corpus proceeding, it might well be concluded that counsel must have known or believed that defendant did not want them to argue to the jury to spare his life. But unless and until we know with certainty all the reasons for counsel's actions and omissions at the penalty phase, specifically, counsel's determination to waive penalty phase arguments, we cannot make a fully informed judgment as to whether Miller and Maple rendered ineffective assistance of counsel at that phase of trial based on the record on appeal. ( People v. Mendoza Tello, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 266-267, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) Although Miller and Maple, reasonably or unreasonably, obviously believed that confidentiality or attorney-client privilege prohibited them from revealing to the court their reasons for forgoing the presentation of any mitigating evidence, it is less clear from the record what motivated counsel to refrain from making any penalty phase argument. Similarly, although counsel may have reasonably believed that to make a penalty phase argument to the jury to spare defendant's life would contravene defendant's wishes, given all of his efforts to thwart the investigation or preparation of a case in mitigation of penalty, to so conclude on this record would likewise require speculation. It is clear that the court ultimately determined to defer to Miller and Maple's reasoned judgment, once the court became convinced, after hearing Attorney Gerstein state that they are representing the client's best interests in their professional judgment, that Miller and Maple were acting consistently with their client's desires or interests. What remains unclear from the record on appeal is precisely what reasons in fact led counsel to conclude that penalty phase arguments should be waived. The Attorney General surmises that defense counsel sought to preserve an inadequacy of counsel issue for appeal. As the argument goes, one can imagine no valid strategic reason for competent defense counsel to waive penalty phase arguments on behalf of the defendant in the face of his express wishes to the contrary. Accordingly, by opting to forgo making an opening statement, calling any witnesses, introducing any other evidence, or cross-examining any of the prosecution witnesses, Miller and Maple must have intended to lay the groundwork for a successful claim, on appeal or in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, that they had entirely fail[ed] to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing ( Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039), thereby relieving appellate or habeas corpus counsel of their usual burden under Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 of establishing prejudice from counsel's deficient performance. The problem with this argument, separate and apart from its speculation that trial counsel were willing to cast aside their ethical obligations and fall on their swords to build reversible error into the trial of a client who was adamantly unwilling to assist or cooperate with them in preparing a defense in a trial for his life, [28] is that it fails to assign to defendant any role or responsibility whatsoever for the manner in which the penalty phase of his trial unfolded below. Indeed, defendant suggests in his supplemental brief that [a]s usual, caught in the middle of the debacle was Mr. Snowthe debacle being counsel's asserted wholesale abandonment of their client at the penalty phase and the trial court's erroneous refusal to appoint new counsel for the purpose of making a penalty phase argument in the face of counsel's deficient performance. Unlike defendant and our colleagues in dissent, we are unwilling to repose uncritical confidence in defendant's single answer yes to the court's initial inquiry whether he would agree to a substitution of counsel for the purpose of making a penalty phase argument. [29] Nor do we believe that defendant's affirmation that he would accept the appointment of new counsel for the purpose of making a penalty phase argument necessarily reflects that Miller and Maple contravened defendant's express wishes by themselves refusing to make such an argument, thereby rendering ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant's affirmative answer to the court's inquiry, if considered in isolation, might support an inference that he wanted a penalty phase argument made in his behalf, whether by Miller and Maple or, if they would not do so, then by newly appointed counsel. But what should we make of defendant's other conduct, which was entirely inconsistent with such an inference? What would defendant have expected Miller and Maple to argue to the jury once he had thwarted their every effort to investigate and prepare a defense in his behalf for the penalty phase? And what could defendant have reasonably expected newly appointed counsel to argue in his behalf, given the restraints he had placed on his own penalty trial? It is perhaps just as likely that defendant answered yes to the court's inquiry upon realizing that the appointment of new counsel at that late stage of trial might result in a lengthy delay or continuance, or perhaps even better, a mistrial. But once again, to so conclude would require some measure of speculation on the limited record on appeal before us. We nevertheless view all the circumstances as raising a reasonable doubt that defendant, by his single answer yes to the court's inquiry, was necessarily expressing a genuine and unambiguous desire that a penalty phase argument be made to spare his life. Notwithstanding defendant's unwillingness to cooperate in his own penalty phase defense, and his agreement with Maple that mitigating evidence of his good conduct while in custody should not be presented for tactical reasons, it might still be concluded that counsel, at the very least, could have argued lingering doubt to the jury, consistent with defendant's position at the guilt phase that he had nothing to do with Roll's murder. But then again, Miller had taken that tack at the second penalty phase of defendant's first trial, and he knew that, as a matter of trial tactics, it had proved unsuccessful on that occasion. Experience therefore may have led Miller to conclude that, once this jury unanimously found that the guilt phase evidence established defendant as Roll's murderer beyond a reasonable doubt, it was better to simply submit the matter of lingering doubt at the penalty phase on an appropriate lingering doubt instruction, without arguing lingering doubt to the jury and thereby drawing further attention to the guilt phase evidence. As the high court explained in Cronic, Of course, the Sixth Amendment does not require that counsel do what is impossible or unethical. If there is no bona fide defense to the charge, counsel cannot create one and may disserve the interests of his client by attempting a useless charade. [Citation.] ( Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 656, fn. 19, 104 S.Ct. 2039.) We recognize that Cronic was not a capital murder case. [30] And we further recognize that, at least in the abstract, there can always be a bona fide argument made to the jury at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial that the defendant's life should be spared. But as we explained in Lang, which was an automatic appeal from a judgment of death, an attorney's duty of loyalty to the client means the attorney `should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the client....' (ABA Model Code Prof. Responsibility, EC 7-8.) ( Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at p. 1031, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627, italics added.) If Miller and Maple, knowing their client had refused to permit them to conduct a meaningful investigation to build a case in mitigation of penalty, also knew, or reasonably believed, that defendant was likewise desirous that no argument be presented to the jury in his behalf, it might well be concluded that counsel were simply following what they believed were their client's wishes in waiving penalty phase arguments, and such omission would not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel within the meaning of Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Indeed, we might conclude on that same showing, that defendant, by his own actions, is estopped at the threshold from claiming ineffective assistance based on counsel's acquiescence in his wishes. (See discussion, post, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 327, 65 P.3d at p. 796; see Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1030-1031, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) But once again, until counsel are afforded an opportunity to fully explain their reasons for refraining from making a penalty phase argument below, reasons that are not fully amplified in the record on appeal, there is neither an adequate factual or legal basis upon which to predicate a reversal of the death judgment on grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel. Nor does the high court's recent decision in Bell v. Cone (2002) 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 ( Cone ) [122 S.Ct. 1843] lend any further support to defendant's claim that his death judgment must be reversed on appeal, under the holding of Cronic, because counsel rendered ineffective assistance in waiving penalty phase arguments. In Cone, the defendant was convicted of, and sentenced to death for, the murder of an elderly couple in Memphis, Tennessee. ( Id. at p. 689 [122 S.Ct. at p. 1847].) The defense conceded that the defendant had committed the murders, but sought to prove he was not guilty by reason of insanity. In furtherance of that effort, the defense presented evidence that the defendant suffered from substance abuse and posttraumatic stress disorders related to his military service in Vietnam. ( Id. at p. 690 [122 S.Ct. at p. 1848].) The jury rejected his insanity defense and found him guilty of two counts of first degree murder. The capital sentencing hearing took place the next day and lasted approximately three hours. ( Ibid. ) At that hearing, defense counsel made an opening statement in which he called the jury's attention to the mitigating evidence already before them and suggested that the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental disturbance or duress, that he was an addict whose drug and other problems stemmed from the stress of his military services and that he felt remorse. ( Id. at p. 691, 122 S.Ct. at p. 1848.) After both sides rested, the junior prosecuting attorney gave a `low key' closing argument, after which defense counsel waived closing argument, thereby preventing the lead prosecutor, who by all accounts was an extremely effective advocate, from arguing in rebuttal. ( Id. at p. 692, 122 S.Ct. at p. 1845.) Under these circumstances, the high court held, a state court's characterization of counsel's waiver of final argument as a competent tactical choice was not an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. ( Cone, supra, at pp. 698-702 [122 S.Ct. at pp. 1852-1854].) Observing that the waiver of closing argument is plainly of the same ilk as other specific attorney errors we have held subject to Strickland's performance and prejudice components ( id. at pp. 697-698 [122 S.Ct. at p. 1852]), the high court in Cone concluded that its holding in dicta in Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657that prejudice may be presumed if counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing ( id. at p. 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039)was inapplicable to defense counsel's waiver of closing argument. Defendant seeks to distinguish Cone on its facts, pointing out that by the time of the capital sentencing hearing in that case, counsel had already put considerable mitigating evidence before the jury in connection with the guilt and sanity phases of trial, and in his opening penalty phase statement had brought that evidence to the jury's attention, urging them to consider it in determining the appropriate penalty. But we find another distinguishing aspect of Cone of greater significance here Cone had reached the high court in the procedural posture of a federal habeas corpus proceeding [a]fter a hearing in which [defendant's] trial counsel testified ( Cone, supra, 535 U.S. at p. 685 [122 S.Ct. at p. 1845]), an evidentiary hearing that in turn furnished the basis for the state criminal court's rejection of Cone's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to present mitigating evidence and waiving final argument at the capital sentencing hearing, and its denial of postconviction habeas corpus relief. ( Ibid. ) Here, we hold only that defendant's assertion that Miller and Maple rendered ineffective assistance of counsel in waiving penalty phase arguments must properly await resolution on a fully developed factual record in a habeas corpus proceeding appropriately instituted in conjunction with this appeal. The high court's decision in Cone fully supports that disposition of defendant's claim on appeal. 2. Trial court error We now turn to defendant's closely related claim that the trial court erred in failing to protect his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by not following through on the court's initially stated intent to appoint new counsel for the purpose of making a penalty phase argument. Our dissenting colleagues agree with defendant's contention that once defendant answered yes to the court's initial inquiry as to whether he wanted substitute counsel appointed for the sole purpose of making an argument to the jury, the court had no choice but to appoint new counsel for that single purpose. On this state of the record we cannot agree. It is true that the trial court expressed astonishment, as well might be expected, when Maple announced on behalf of himself and Miller that the defense would rest without presenting any argument to the jury. It is also true, however, that because Miller and Maple obviously believed that confidentiality or attorney-client privilege precluded them from informing the court of their reasons for electing their chosen course of action at the penalty trial, the court was left largely in the dark regarding counsel's reasons for failing to call any witnesses or present any mitigating evidence. Although the court questioned defendant at the conclusion of the prosecution's case in aggravation of penalty and did learn that defendant had consulted with counsel, had been informed of his right to present mitigating evidence, and was forgoing exercise of that right, the court apparently was not aware that defendant had instructed his family members not to cooperate with the defense investigation, had steadfastly refused to assist Miller, Maple, and defense investigator Sickler in any way with their investigation of a penalty phase defense, and had refused all contact or communication with counsel and the investigator, with the exception of two contacts with Attorney Maple, one on July 12, 1990, five days before the scheduled start of the penalty trial, and the other on July 17, 1990, the day the penalty trial commenced. In those two contacts with Maple, defendant confirmed that he had refused any interviews with Miller and investigator Sickler, and had instructed members of his family not to cooperate or assist in any investigation by the defense. Defendant also agreed with Maple that as a result of his altercation with sheriffs deputies in the jail, evidence from institutional records of his good conduct while incarcerated over the years should not be presented to the jury. The record further reflects that the court was laboring under the mistaken assumption that this court's 1985 decision in People v. Deere, supra, 41 Cal.3d 353, 222 Cal.Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925 ( Deere I ), required counsel to present any available evidence in mitigation of penalty even over a defendant's expressed objections. This was not the state of the law, however, by the time defendant's penalty phase was conducted in July 1990. As we explained in People v. Deere (1991) 53 Cal.3d 705, 280 Cal.Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181 ( Deere II) , in response to Deere's claim that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to present evidence in mitigation: The claim is totally without merit, if not specious, [¶] As noted earlier, we held in Deere I, supra, 41 Cal.3d 353, 222 Cal.Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925, that defendant was denied adequate representation at the penalty phase as a result of counsel's failure to present evidence in mitigation, notwithstanding defendant's unequivocal desire that no such evidence be presented. Defendant was represented at the penalty retrial by the same deputy public defender who had appeared on his behalf at the first trial. Defendant's views with respect to the presentation of mitigating evidence also remained unchanged; defendant was adamant, in counsel's words, that `[h]e does not want any evidence presented on his behalf because in his heart that is his private life and to bring that evidence into court would violate his relationships with everybody he holds dear and respects in this world. And to him, those relationships are more important than anything else, including his life.' [¶] Thus, counsel was confronted with the unenviable and wrenching choice of obeying the law as defined by this court in Deere I, or honoring his client's deeply held convictions. To make the dilemma even more acute, the trial court ordered counsel to present whatever mitigating evidence was available in accordance with our decision, or be held in contempt. ( Deere II, supra, at p. 714, 280 Cal.Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181.) We went on to explain in Deere II, in the following three quoted paragraphs, that: Furthermore, decisions subsequent to the instant penalty retrial have largely undermined the court's holding in Deere I. As explained in People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698, which held that a sentence of death was not constitutionally unreliable merely because a self-represented defendant chose not to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase: `To the extent that Deere, supra, 41 Cal.3d 353, 222 Cal.Rptr. 13, 710 P.2d 925, suggests that failure to present mitigating evidence in and of itself is sufficient to make a death judgment unreliable, it is based on a mistaken understanding of the Eighth Amendment's reliability requirement and its reasoning in that regard is hereby disapproved.' ( Id. at p. 1228, fn. 9, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698, italics added.) Rather, `the required reliability is attained when the prosecution has discharged its burden of proof at the guilt and penalty phases pursuant to the rules of evidence and within the guidelines of a constitutional death penalty statute, the death verdict has been returned under proper instructions and procedures, and the trier of penalty has duly considered the relevant mitigating evidence, if any, which the defendant has chosen to present.' ( Id. at p. 1228, 259 Cal.Rptr. 669, 774 P.2d 698.) We further underscored our disapproval of Deere I in People v. Lang [, supra ], 49 Cal.3d 991, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627: `Deere was disapproved [in People v. Bloom ] to the extent it suggests that a defendant's failure to present mitigating evidence, in and of itself, is sufficient to make a judgment of death constitutionally unreliable.' ( Id. at p. 1030, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) Indeed, Lang went on to reject explicitly the proposition that `defense counsel should be forced to present mitigating evidence over the defendant's objection,' noting that it contravenes the attorney's `paramount duty of loyalty to the client,' undermines `the trust, essential for effective representation, existing between attorney and client,' and ultimately reduces the quality of that representation by forcing defendants `who otherwise would not have done so to exercise their Sixth Amendment right of self-representation ... in order to retain control over the presentation of evidence at the penalty phase....' ( Id. at pp. 1030-1031, 264 Cal. Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) Finally, as further noted in People v. Lang , a defendant who insists that mitigating evidence not be presented at the penalty phase is estopped from later claiming ineffective assistance based on counsel's acquiescence in his wishes. `The invited-error doctrine operates, in particular, to estop a defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's acts or omissions in conformance with the defendant's own requests.' (49 Cal.3d at p. 1032, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627, fn. omitted.) ( Deere II, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 716-717, 280 Cal.Rptr. 424, 808 P.2d 1181.) Bloom was decided in June 1989. Lang was decided in December 1989. By the time of defendant's penalty trial in July 1990, our decisions in Lang and Bloom had announced that the rule of Deere I that counsel was required to present any available evidence in mitigation of penalty even over the defendant's objectionwas disapproved. It is clear from the transcript of the July 18 proceedings that the trial court in this case mistakenly believed Deere I obligated Miller and Maple to present any available mitigating evidence even over defendant's objections. [31] And although it cannot be discerned with certainty from this record whether Miller, Maple, and Gerstein knew that the court was laboring under a mistaken understanding of the applicable law, we surmise from the transcript of the July 18 proceedings that the disparity between the court's and counsel's understanding of counsel's obligation to present mitigating evidence even over defendant's objection, was at the heart of the standoff between counsel and the court that led the court to suggest it might need the assistance of a member of the State Bar, and Miller and Maple to respond by securing the attendance of attorney Gerstein to explain to the court that counsel had their confidential reasons for refusing to present any mitigating evidence. Although the record on appeal is less clear regarding Miller and Maple's specific reasons for waiving penalty phase argument than it is regarding their reasons for failing to call any witnesses or present any mitigating evidence, the record rather clearly reflects that once the trial court was satisfied that Miller and Maple had their reasons for not presenting any mitigating evidence, the court was also inclined to accept that they had tactical or other sound reasons for waiving penalty phase argument, and to defer to their judgment in that regard as well. Our dissenting colleagues conclude that the court's erroneous acceptance of counsel's waiver of argument, following as it did their decision not to make any opening statement, present any mitigating evidence, or cross-examine any of the People's witnesses, resulted in what may be described either as a `complete denial of counsel' ( United States v. Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659, 104 S.Ct. 2039) at the critical stage of jury argument or as a complete failure of the defense to subject the prosecution's penalty phase case `to meaningful adversarial testing' ( ibid. ). Either way, `there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversarial process itself presumptively unreliable.' ( Ibid. ). (cone. & dis. opn. of Werdegar, J., Post, 132 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 339, 65 P.3d at p. 805, italics added.) As the italicized language above reveals, although the dissent purports to argue that trial court error alone requires reversal on appeal, in actuality the dissent has concluded that the trial court's refusal to appoint new counsel to make a penalty phase argument, in the face of counsel's omissions and ineffective representation leading up to that determination, together resulted in a violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The problem with this reasoning is that our precedents normally do not permit us to conclude that counsel's performance fell below an objectively reasonable standard of representation on a cold record on appeal. ( People v. Mendoza Telia, supra, 15 Cal.4th 264, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.) The circumstances related in Miller's, Maple's, and investigator Sickler's confidential declarations serve as a good example of the reason for the rule. We conclude that if, on an appropriately expanded factual record on habeas corpus, Miller and Maple are shown to have acted within an objectively reasonable standard of representation ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052) in refraining from presenting any argument to the jury consistent with what they reasonably believed were their client's wishes, it would be anomalous, in the face of such an informed finding, to fault the trial court for ultimately deferring to counsel's judgment and determining not to substitute new counsel in the eleventh hour of this trial. To reverse the judgment on appeal for trial court error without garnering all the relevant facts would be tantamount to handing defendant a technical victory when, in actuality, defendant may have received precisely the kind of penalty phase representation he desired and sought below. We therefore reject defendant's claim that the trial court's failure to appoint new counsel to make a penalty phase argument violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Sixth Amendment claim is more appropriately addressed in the context of the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which must be presented in a habeas corpus petition in conjunction with this appeal. We caution that our conclusion in this regard must not be understood as an endorsement of the wholesale abdication of all meaningful representation of a client by counsel at the penalty phase of a capital murder trial. This penalty phase had none of the hallmarks of a capital sentencing proceeding whereby the defense makes a determined effort to convince the jury to spare the defendant's life. But the question posed is not whether a penalty phase in which there is no defense opening statement, no cross-examination of the prosecution's witnesses, and no presentation of defense evidence or argument in mitigation of penalty, can ever, as a matter of sound trial tactics, lead to a reliable penalty verdict. Rather, the question left open for decision on habeas corpus is whether counsel's failure to present a penalty phase argument did or did not fall within an objectively reasonable standard of penalty phase representation ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052) in light of the totality of circumstances which counsel faced at the penalty trial below. If, on a fully developed factual record on habeas corpus, counsel's decision to refrain from making a penalty phase argument is shown to have fallen within that standard, then defendant may be estopped at the threshold from claiming ineffective assistance of counsel ( Lang, supra, 49 Cal.3d at pp. 1030-1031, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627), and as a consequence of his refusal to cooperate and reasonably communicate with counsel and their defense investigator, defendant would bear the ultimate responsibility for the irregularity of his penalty phase proceedings below. On the other hand, if, on a fully developed factual record, it is shown that counsel's decision to forgo penalty phase argument fell below the applicable standard of competent representation, we will not hesitate to reverse the penalty judgment on habeas corpus and remand the matter for a new penalty trial.