Opinion ID: 1435226
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The State's Challenge to the Finding of Ineffectiveness During the Penalty Phase

Text: Morales claims that his counsel were ineffective in preparing for the penalty phase of his trial. The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected this claim, finding that trial counsel had made a permissible strategic decision to present mitigating evidence during the guilt, rather than the penalty, phase of the trial. J.A. at 503-05 (Journal Entry at A37-A39). The state appellate court did not expressly address Morales's argument that counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation, which would have yielded significant additional evidence that could have been presented in mitigation. And, because the Ohio court found that counsel's performance was not deficient, it did not reach the prejudice step of the Strickland analysis. The district court disagreed with the state court and granted habeas relief on this claim, setting aside Morales's death sentence and instructing the state to conduct a new sentencing trial or impose a life sentence. Morales, 98 F.Supp.2d at 904.
Because the state courts resolved the issue of deficient performance on its merits, we owe AEDPA deference to their conclusion. We agree with the district court, however, that that conclusion is an unreasonable application of clearly established constitutional law. In support of its conclusion that the performance of Morales's trial counsel was deficient, the district court cited counsel's failure to interview any member of Morales's family, any of his friends, or anyone else who knew him; to search any records pertaining to [Morales's] education, health, mental problems, or juvenile offenses; to retain any mitigation expert; to adequately prepare [Morales] to make an unsworn statement in the penalty phase of the trial; to adequately investigate [Morales's] cultural background and the effect it had on [his] life; and to investigate the possibility of a neurological cause of [Morales's] mental and emotional deficiencies due to his lifelong alcohol consumption. Morales, 98 F.Supp.2d at 898-99. The district court also noted that Morales's trial counsel did not request time between the guilt and penalty phases to conduct a mitigation investigation. The district court agreed with Morales that documentary evidence exists, which has been a part of the record, to support each of the points that Morales claims should have been, but were not, raised by trial counsel, namely:  The chaotic and dysfunctional family environment in which the Petitioner was raised.  The alcohol abuse by the Petitioner's mother and father.  The effect that his mentally retarded brother had on his life.  The effect that the suicide of his emotionally disturbed sister had on him.  The effect of the Petitioner's mother's emotional problems on his development.  The role of alcohol in the Native American Indian culture in which he was raised.  The early (since age 9) and continued use of alcohol by the Petitioner.  The Petitioner's drug abuse.  The lack of parental supervision during his youth and adolescence.  The prejudices the Petitioner experienced.  The lack of counseling or programming received by the Petitioner while he was incarcerated in the Mansfield Correctional Facility. Id. at 899-900. Accordingly, the district court determined that the state courts had unreasonably applied Strickland in concluding that trial counsel's performance was simply the result of an informed strategic or tactical decision, and thus in the state courts' view was not deficient. Id. at 899-901. Morales's evidence establishes that his trial counsel conducted an inadequate investigation in preparation for the penalty phase. First, the record clearly demonstrates that defense counsel failed to interview key witnesses for both the prosecution and the defense. Richard Tyler, who testified in Morales's defense during the guilt phase of the trial, states that defense counsel never interviewed him before calling him to the stand. J.A. at 740 (Richard Tyler Aff. at 1 ¶¶ 4-5). Danny Thompson and Georgia Lee Thompson, both prosecution witnesses, similarly aver that defense counsel never contacted them prior to trial. J.A. at 741-42 (Thompsons Affs.). Moreover, defense counsel did not hire a mitigation specialist or investigator and did not himself contact any of Morales's family members other than Morales's father, Richard, even though numerous other family members were willing to testify. In particular, Morales's mother avers that defense counsel never contacted her prior to or during Morales's trial, despite the fact that she attended the trial. If asked, she would have testified that both of her parents abused alcohol; that she herself used peyote during her first marriage; that her daughter, Morales's half-sister, was an emotionally disturbed child who committed suicide when she was twenty years old; that Morales's brother was born mentally disabled and that Morales had felt obligated to protect his brother during their childhood; that Morales's brother was subsequently committed to a psychiatric hospital at least three times for explosive behavior; that Morales's father abused alcohol and neglected the family during Morales's youth; that Morales's parents separated when he was young; that Morales had little discipline growing up and began drinking and using drugs as an adolescent; that she now realize[s] how neglected [Morales] was while he was growing up; and that she loves her son and does not want him to be executed. J.A. at 722-25 (Ella Morales Aff. at 1-4 ¶¶ 7-9). Morales's aunt, Virginia Johnson, would, if contacted, have testified that both of her parents (Morales's maternal grandparents) were alcoholics; that Morales's maternal grandfather was murdered in jail after being arrested for drunkenness; that Morales's half-sister was emotionally disturbed and eventually committed suicide; that Morales's father, Richard, would drink most of his money away when Morales was a child; and that Morales's mother neglected Morales, devoting her attention instead to Morales's disabled brother. J.A. at 720-21 (Johnson Aff. at 1-2 ¶¶ 1-3). Morales's uncle, Ron Morales, would, had he been contacted by Morales's attorney, have testified that Morales's father and all of his father's siblings drank heavily and that two of the siblings died of cirrhosis due to alcohol abuse; that Ron Morales himself began drinking at the age of fifteen and, for the next ten years, consumed between three and four bottles of wine per day, suffering numerous blackouts and getting into trouble frequently because of my drinking, which tended to lead to violent fights with his friends; that Morales was a restless child who would try almost anything; that Morales's father's heavy drinking and his parents' separation frequently left Morales unsupervised and without discipline as a child; that Morales began drinking at an early age; and that Morales's drinking led to blackouts. J.A. at 732-33 (Ron Morales Aff. at 1-2 ¶¶ 2-3). Morales's first cousin, Mike Morales, executed an affidavit to the effect that he would, if contacted, have testified that Morales frequently had to stand up for his mentally retarded brother as a child, a situation that created much tension and stress for Morales; that Morales was first given alcohol by older Native Americans when he was in the sixth or seventh grade; that those older Native Americans pressured young men in the community to drink alcohol and criticized as unmanly those who refused; and that Morales had a tendency to become violent and have blackouts when he drank. J.A. at 734-35 (Mike Morales Aff. at 1-2 ¶¶ 1, 4-5). Morales's father avers that he set up two appointments for defense counsel to meet potential defense witnesses (including, presumably, the family members whose potential testimony is described above), but counsel cancelled both meetings at the last minute. J.A. at 727 (Richard Morales Aff. at 2 ¶ 8). Richard Morales further asserts that he met with Morales's attorney for only ten minutes before testifying (the only family member to do so) in Morales's defense during the guilt phase of the trial. J.A. at 727 (Richard Morales Aff. at 2 ¶¶ 10-11). Had he been contacted in connection with the mitigation phase, Richard Morales would have testified that two of his siblings, Morales's aunt and uncle, died of cirrhosis of the liver caused by alcohol abuse; that another of Morales's uncles has a history of blacking out when drinking; that Morales was forced into the role of `protector' for his older brother[, a] role he did not want, that that brother was once hospitalized after assaulting his and Morales's mother; that Morales was often left unsupervised as a child due to Richard Morales's heavy drinking; that Morales did not graduate from high school; that Morales had requested, but was denied, treatment for his alcoholism while he was incarcerated in the Mansfield Reformatory prior to the murder; and that he, Richard Morales, loves his son and does not want him to be executed. J.A. at 727-29 (Richard Morales Aff. at 2-4 ¶¶ 8-13). Joseph Samson, the former principal of the high school that Morales attended (but from which he did not graduate), avers that he would have been willing to testify that Morales was a victim of an inadequate home environment which lacked stability; that Morales's school attendance was very poor due to the fact that he felt like a social misfit; and that, after Morales had dropped out of school, he returned . . . to visit me several times to demonstrate to me how manly he had become. J.A. at 738-39 (Samson Aff. at 1-2 ¶¶ 1, 3-5). Morales was drunk on both [of] these occasions and had to be escorted out of the building. J.A. at 739 (Samson Aff. at 2 ¶ 5(H)). The available testimony that Morales's counsel failed to discover and, thus, to present was significant and was not cumulative of the evidence that the defense actually presented during the guilt and penalty phases of Morales's trial. Notably, defense counsel presented no sworn testimony and submitted no evidence at all during the penalty phase. In fact, counsel did not even make an opening statement, and his closing statement was a mere three pages long. J.A. at 967-70 (Trial Tr. at 1711-14). The only evidence offered by the defense at the penalty hearingMorales's own unsworn statementdid not include many of the salient details set forth above. Morales stated to the jury, for example, that he had a sister who died when he was nine years old, but he did not mention her emotional disturbance, that her death was a suicide, or the fact that she was responsible for his welfare. He spoke briefly of his brother's violence toward him, but he did not say that his brother was mentally retarded and had also been violent toward their mother and had been repeatedly hospitalized in a psychiatric institution for his dangerous behavior, nor did he discuss the onerous pressure that he had felt, as a child, to protect his brother from other children. He made no mention of his grandparents', aunts', and uncles' alcoholism, which caused at least two of their deaths, or of his father's and mother's drinking and neglect. He explained that he himself drank alcohol as a child because of the fact that I couldn't deal with a lot of things, wasn't able to accept a lot of things, and was tired of people making fun of me, and . . . was tired of people treating me the way they did, but he failed to mention the pressure to drink exerted on Native American boys by older men in the community. J.A. at 960 (Trial Tr. at 1704). It is true that not all of the undiscovered testimony reflects favorably on Morales. Morales's friends and family members admit that Morales was resistant to discipline as a child and repeatedly engaged in violent and criminal acts as a young adult, usually while intoxicated. J.A. at 707-10 (Ruffin Aff. at 13-16). But the jury already knew much of this information. See J.A. at 850 (Trial Tr. at 1481) (Richard Morales testimony) (Then he was under the influence of alcohol then [as a teenager], and then Ia number of times I've battled him tooth and nail trying to stop him from drinking, and he wouldn't listen.), 852-54 (Trial Tr. at 1483-85) (Richard Morales testimony) (describing Morales's previous arrests and convictions), 866-68 (Trial Tr. at 1497-99) (Richard Morales testimony) (same), 903 (Trial Tr. at 1539) (Politzer testimony) (conceding that Morales's behavior is impulsive and violent), 909 (Trial Tr. at 1545) (Politzer testimony) (describing a disciplinary notice for fighting issued to Morales during his incarceration at Mansfield Reformatory). The United States Supreme Court has held that defendants have a rightindeed, a constitutionally protected rightto provide the jury with the mitigating evidence that their trial counsel either failed to discover or failed to offer. Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 393, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). In Terry Williams, as here, defense counsel neglected to interview at least one witness and failed to present evidence of mistreatment, abuse, and neglect during [the defendant's] early childhood, as well as testimony that he . . . had suffered repeated head injuries, and might have mental impairments organic in origin. Id. at 369-70, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Similarly, the defendant in Wiggins v. Smith was deprived of competent representation when his counsel abandoned their investigation of [his] background after having acquired only rudimentary knowledge of his history from a narrow set of sources. 539 U.S. 510, 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). The Wiggins defense team obtained the defendant's pre-sentence investigation (PSI) report and records kept by the Baltimore City Department of Social Services (DSS) describing Wiggins's placements in foster care as a child. Id. at 523, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Defense counsel also had Wiggins examined by a psychologist in preparation for trial. Id. The Supreme Court held that [c]ounsel's decision not to expand their investigation beyond the PSI and the DSS records fell short of the professional standards that prevailed in Maryland in 1989, which required the preparation of a social history report, and of the standards promulgated by the American Bar Association (ABA), standards to which we long have referred as guides to determining what is reasonable. Id. at 524, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court held in Wiggins that [t]he scope of their investigation was also unreasonable in light of what counsel actually discovered in the DSS records. Id. at 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527. The records revealed several facts: Petitioner's mother was a chronic alcoholic; Wiggins was shuttled from foster home to foster home and displayed some emotional difficulties while there; he had frequent, lengthy absences from school; and, on at least one occasion, his mother left him and his siblings alone for days without food. Id. According to the Court, any reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary, especially as there was no evidence that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless. Id. The Supreme Court again reaffirmed counsel's duty to investigate under circumstances such as those of this case, in Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 125 S.Ct. 2456, 162 L.Ed.2d 360 (2005). In Rompilla, trial counsel failed to present significant mitigating evidence concerning Rompilla's traumatic childhood, mental illness, and alcoholism, relying instead at the penalty phase upon his family members' pleas for mercy. Id. at 390, 125 S.Ct. 2456. The Court held that defense counsel had a duty to examine Rompilla's school records and juvenile and adult incarceration records and to look for evidence of a history of dependence on alcohol that might have extenuating significance, id. at 382, 125 S.Ct. 2456, even though Rompilla was uninterested in helping with the preparation of a case in mitigation and his family, though cooperative, didn't really feel as though they knew him all that well since he had spent the majority of his adult years and some of his childhood years in custody, id. at 381-82, 125 S.Ct. 2456 (internal quotation marks omitted). Our own precedents lend further support to the district court's finding that Morales's counsel was ineffective. See Harries v. Bell, 417 F.3d 631, 639-40 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to pursue viable leads regarding Harries's poor mental health and troubled family background); Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir.2003) (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to discover that Hamblin grew up in extreme poverty and neglect, surrounded by family violence and instability, had a poor education and likely suffers from mental disability or disorder), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925, 125 S.Ct. 344, 160 L.Ed.2d 223 (2004); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 450-51 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence that the defendant was abused, neglected, and abandoned as a child, had twice been hospitalized for head injuries, and had dropped out of school in the ninth grade), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1031, 122 S.Ct. 1639, 152 L.Ed.2d 647 (2002). In sum, the social history report, records, and testimony proffered by Morales's habeas counsel demonstrate conclusively that Morales's trial attorney failed adequately to investigate and, thus, was unable to present to the jury compelling mitigating evidence that was readily available at the time of trial.
As noted above, the Ohio courts did not reach the prejudice step of the Strickland inquiry, and thus we review the issue de novo. The district court determined that Morales was prejudiced by his counsel's deficient performance, Morales, 98 F.Supp.2d at 901-02, and we agree. As the district court observed, the available information that Morales's trial counsel failed to discover and present to the jury included many specific details about his tumultuous life, continued and uncontrolled alcohol and drug abuse, dysfunctional family history, potential mental health problems, and detailed cultural background. Id. at 902. In light of the volume and compelling nature of this evidence, there is a reasonable probability [6] that effective counsel could have achieved a different outcome. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052; compare Dickerson, 453 F.3d at 698-99 (holding that a petitioner satisfied the prejudice requirement by showing that his trial counsel neglected to discover evidence that he was nearly mentally retarded, that his biological father denied their relationship, that his family called him the moron, and that he grew up surrounded by pimps, prostitutes and drug dealers (internal quotation marks omitted)), and Hamblin, 354 F.3d at 489-93 (holding that a petitioner satisfied the prejudice requirement by showing that his trial counsel neglected to discover evidence that he grew up in extreme poverty and neglect, surrounded by family violence and instability, had a poor education and likely suffers from mental disability or disorder), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 925, 125 S.Ct. 344, 160 L.Ed.2d 223 (2004), with Durr v. Mitchell, 487 F.3d 423, 435-36 (6th Cir.2007) (holding that a petitioner did not establish prejudice by presenting character evidence undiscovered by trial counsel that was simply cumulative of the evidence presented at trial), and Foley v. Parker, 488 F.3d 377, 382-83 (6th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the state courts' determination of no prejudice was not unreasonable where a petitioner presented no evidence of a difficult childhood or mental problems that might have portrayed him in a more sympathetic light). Because the net effect of the undiscovered and unpresented evidence, viewed cumulatively and in light of the totality of the circumstances, demonstrates the existence of significant mitigating evidence that favored Morales, it is reasonably probable that at least one juror hearing that evidence would have been persuaded to impose a life, rather than a death, sentence. Accordingly, the district court properly granted habeas relief on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of Morales's trial.