Opinion ID: 1669150
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether counsel's improper statements and argument prejudiced the jury.

Text: Anderson next argues that the jury was prejudiced as a result of statements made by Johnson's counsel throughout the trial as well as his closing argument. At trial, Johnson's counsel on several occasions referred to the fact that Anderson's counsel had retained certain experts who examined Anderson and who were planning to testify on his behalf. Additionally, in his closing argument, Johnson's counsel stated that America was a over-lawyered litigious, sue-happy country and that there is a phenomenon growing up that is know (sic) here as the litigation industry. Anderson objected to this argument. The trial court sustained his objection and properly admonished the jury to disregard the comments. Anderson made no motion for mistrial. Anderson argues that these improper statements were so prejudicial as to require a new trial. We do not find that the statements by Johnson's counsel that Anderson had retained and compensated his experts were improper. SDCL 19-14-8 specifically provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party. We have previously held that, on cross-examination, one may inquire into statements by the witness concerning matters relating to his possible partiality. See State v. Wiegers, 373 N.W.2d 1 (S.D.1985). We have also held that a party's financial interest in the litigation is a proper subject for cross-examination and proof. Corn Exchange Bank v. Tri-State Livestock, 368 N.W.2d 596 (S.D.1985). Thus, counsel's questions and statements concerning the fact that certain of Anderson's witnesses were retained and compensated experts were not improper. Moreover, it does not appear that Anderson ever objected to these statements during the course of trial. We have previously held that such objections must be made to the trial court in order to allow it to correct its mistakes, and an objection not properly raised below cannot be reviewed by this court on appeal. See Till v. Bennett, 281 N.W.2d 276 (S.D.1979); see also Johnson v. John Deere Company, 306 N.W.2d 231 (S.D.1981); Hepper v. Triple U Enterprises Inc., 388 N.W.2d 525 (S.D. 1986); State v. Carlson, 392 N.W.2d 89 (S.D.1986). We find that the statements of Johnson's counsel in closing argument were unprofessional, offensive, and exceeded the proper bounds of trial advocacy. The trial court would have been justified in granting a mistrial had one been requested. We do note that upon proper objection by Anderson the trial court admonished the jury to disregard the improvident statements. Under our settled law, we assume the jury accepted the admonition. Lastly, Anderson argues that evidence involving the results of his thermographic examination was wrongfully excluded by the trial court. We first note that the admissibility of results of thermographic testing is in dispute throughout the country. This dispute centers around the acceptance of such results within the scientific community, the reliability of the results, the accepted procedures as to the administration of the test, and the qualifications necessary to perform and testify concerning thermography tests. See generally Annot., Thermographic Tests: Admissibility of Test Results in Personal Injury Suits, 56 A.L.R. 4th 1105 (1987 and 1988 Supp.). Anderson wishes to have us hold that the results of such tests are admissible. However, we need not reach this decision. It is clear that thermographic testing and its results are utilized in order to discern the amount of damage caused by an injury. Here, the jury found for Johnson on the basis of liability. Since the thermography results would relate only to the issue of damages (an issue which the jury never reached), Anderson's argument concerning the admissibility of such test results is not properly before us. See Kallis v. Beers, 375 N.W.2d 642 (S.D.1985). Affirmed.