Opinion ID: 1406068
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Word crimes in Subdivision (d)

Text: Defendant Jones argues the use of the plural word crimes in both subdivision (c) and subdivision (d) necessitates the conclusion that subdivision (c) is limited to the multiple ESO situation. (3) (See fn. 5.) Defendant Jones's logic proceeds as follows: since subdivision (d) only applies to the multiple ESO situation and the word crimes appears in both provisions, that word must refer in subdivision (c) to a minimum of two ESO convictions as it concededly does in subdivision (d). [5] This argument too is incorrect in light of applicable rules of statutory construction and the important differences in the language and effect of subdivisions (c) and (d). (4) It is presumed, in the absence of anything in the statute to the contrary, that a repeated phrase or word in a statute is used in the same sense throughout. [Citations.] The rule is, however, quite flexible: `There is no rule of law that necessarily requires the same meaning to be given to the same word used in different places in the same statute.' [Citations.] `When the occasion demands it, the same word may have different meanings to effectuate the intention of the act in which the word appears.' [Citations.] ( People v. Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 462, 468 [179 Cal. Rptr. 239, 637 P.2d 706].) Clearly, subdivisions (c) and (d) both authorize the sentencing court to impose a full, consecutive sentence for each ESO conviction. However, while subdivision (c) permits full, consecutive sentencing of each ESO conviction on a discretionary basis, subdivision (d) mandates full, consecutive sentencing of ESO convictions under the circumstances therein specified. The functional difference between a legislative grant of discretionary authority and a legislatively mandated sentencing scheme would suggest that the meaning of the word crimes in subdivisions (c) and (d) may not have been intended to be the same. In addition to the difference in their function, the language of subdivisions (c) and (d) is manifestly different. First, subdivision (c) features the following prefatory clause which is conspicuously absent from subdivision (d): In lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1.... (5) This passage discloses a legislative purpose  one which we have already discussed  which must pervade any discussion of subdivision (c): that it was intended to provide, in the context of violent sex offenders, a discretionary sentencing alternative to the standard consecutive sentencing formula in section 1170.1. ( People v. Belmontes, supra, 34 Cal.3d 335, 343-346; see People v. Stought, supra, 115 Cal. App.3d 740, 742.) Subdivision (d) contains no similar language and is not an alternative as such, but rather constitutes a mandatory consecutive sentencing scheme applicable only when a defendant has been convicted of two or more ESO's. (See People v. Fitch (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 211, 214 [217 Cal. Rptr. 197].) Secondly, as subdivisions (c) and (d) were originally enacted and as they read at the time defendant committed the crimes and was sentenced in this case, there was a significant language difference in the word immediately preceding and modifying the word crimes in the two subdivisions. (Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 10, p. 3258 (see fn. 2, ante ).) The relevant language delimiting the application of subdivision (c) read as follows: whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction. ( Id., italics added.) The correlative phrase in subdivision (d) read: if such crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions. ( Id., italics added.) By using the word such to modify the word crimes in subdivision (d), the Legislature made it clear it intended the word crimes in that provision to refer back to the immediately preceding list of ESO's. In this way the Legislature indicated that subdivision (d), the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision, was intended to cover only the multiple ESO situation. In subdivision (c), on the other hand, the neutral article the was used rather than the word such. (6) Of course, when different words are used in contemporaneously enacted, adjoining subdivisions of a statute, the inference is compelling that a difference in meaning was intended. And we are required to ascribe significance to every word of each statute we are called upon to apply. ( People v. McCart (1982) 32 Cal.3d 338, 342 [185 Cal. Rptr. 284, 649 P.2d 926].) As we noted earlier (see fn. 2, ante ), subdivision (d) was amended in 1985 to change the words such crimes to the crimes. But nothing in the legislative history of the 1985 amendment reveals any substantive purpose for that change. In fact, the amendment indiscriminately removed all 14 appearances of the word such from not only subdivision (d) but from all of section 667.6 as it was originally enacted. (Compare Stats. 1979, ch. 944, § 10, p. 3258 with Stats. 1985, ch. 401, § 1, pp. 1593-1594.) We believe the piecemeal removal of every appearance of the word such from the statute constituted a technical, nonsubstantive revision. Thus it would be incorrect to conclude that the 1985 amendment changed the meaning of subdivisions (c) and (d) with respect to the question raised in this case or, as the dissent suggests, that the removal of the word such from subdivision (d) merely revealed that the Legislature intended all along that the word crimes in subdivisions (c) and (d) would refer to the same thing, i.e., multiple ESO's. While the dissent apparently prefers simply to disregard the significance of the Legislature's original use of the words such crimes in subdivision (d) and the words the crimes in the correlative portion of subdivision (c), we believe such disregard would be improvident. (7) The adjective `such' sometimes serves a useful purpose, as where it saves having to repeat a concept that cannot be referred to in a word or two. In statutes and regulations, for example, it may be necessary to make clear that the second reference is to exactly the same concept mentioned previously. The word `such' is the simplest way to do so. (Weihofen, Legal Writing Style (2d ed. 1980) p. 37, italics added.) (8) We conclude, therefore, that the word crimes as used in subdivision (c) does not refer to the same crimes as does the word crimes in subdivision (d). As already explained, given the introductory clause in subdivision (c) noting that sentences imposed pursuant to it are [i]n lieu of the term provided in Section 1170.1, which clause is wholly absent from subdivision (d), and given the additional fact that the consecutive sentencing scheme set forth in section 1170.1 comes into play only when the defendant has been convicted of multiple felonies, we believe the words the crimes in subdivision (c) were meant to refer to the multiple sex or nonsex felonies otherwise required to bring section 1170.1 into play, not just to multiple ESO's. By contrast, as we have discussed, the words such crimes in the mandatory subdivision (d) as originally enacted, by necessary inference from the limited situational scope of its application, referred to the ESO's alone.