Opinion ID: 2998236
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission of the Baghdad File

Text: Dumeisi filed a motion in limine objecting to the admission of the Baghdad File. He described the Baghdad File as “the single most important piece of government evidence,” but asserted that it was unauthenticated hearsay. The government responded that the Baghdad File was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the residual exception to the hearsay rule, as well as under Rule 803(6) (business records), Rule 803(8) (public records), and Rule 801(d)(2)(E) (co-conspirators’ statements). The district court postponed ruling on this matter until trial was underway, ultimately admitting the evidence under Rule 807. We review a district court’s ruling on the admissibility of evidence for abuse of discretion. See Chemetall GMBH v. ZR Energy, Inc., 320 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2003); United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 758 (7th Cir. 1996). “Trial courts have a considerable measure of discretion in deciding when a hearsay statement fits the residual exception.” Sinclair, 74 F.3d at 758 (internal quotation omitted). We reverse only when no reasonable person could take the view of the trial court. Chemetall, 320 F.3d at 722 (citation omitted). We first tackle the question of whether the Baghdad File was properly authenticated. Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) requires, as a condition precedent to admissibility, “evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims.” Authentication can be established in a variety of ways, including by “[t]estimony of [a] witness with knowledge . . . that a matter is what it is claimed to be[,]” Rule 901(b)(1), and by distinctive characteristics such as “[a]ppearance, contents, subNo. 04-1882 11 stance, [or] internal patterns . . . taken in conjunction with circumstances[,]” Rule 901(b)(4). Dumeisi challenges authentication under both methods. The government presented “Mr. Sargon”1 as a “witness with knowledge” who could identify the Baghdad File as genuine IIS records. Indeed, Sargon had worked for the IIS from 1979 to 2003 and had advanced in rank to a high position not spoken on the record but made known to the jury. He had been assigned to posts outside of Iraq, including the United States, and had knowledge of the IIS missions as well as the organizational structure of the IIS. Sargon worked in Directorate M4, the group concerned with external intelligence, from 1999 to 2003. In that role, he had regular contact and information exchange with the M40 Directorate, which was responsible for “hostile activities,” or opposition groups within and outside of Iraq. Sargon unequivocally testified that he could “positively identify [documents making up the Baghdad File] as Iraqi Intelligence cables, as well as correspondence between the New York Station and M40.” (Tr. at 406-07.) Sargon was also the primary witness for the second method of authentication used by the government; he identified distinctive characteristics including the style and form of the documents (“in line with the way that the Iraqi Intelligence service will prefer to produce a document”), symbols, codes, abbreviations, and signatures of some fellow IIS officers. (Tr. at 406.) The one thing Sargon did not identify as a typical trait of IIS documents was the blue and clear plastic folder in which the Baghdad File was found. The “circumstances” which we must consider in conjunction with the physical characteristics discussed above include circumstances surrounding discovery. See United 1 Sargon is not the true name of the witness; he testified under an assumed name pursuant to agreement. 12 No. 04-1882 States v. Harvey, 117 F.3d 1044, 1049 (7th Cir. 1997) (approving introduction of written materials as sufficiently authenticated because they were found in an isolated campsite occupied only by the defendant); United States v. Arce, 997 F.2d 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1993) (finding the fact that drug ledgers were discovered in known drug trafficker’s home to be evidence of authenticity). In this case, classified information surrounding the initial discovery of the Baghdad File bolsters the contention that the file is what the government purports it to be. We find this authentication evidence taken together to be at least as reliable as that relied upon in United States v. Elkins, 885 F.2d 775 (11th Cir. 1989). In that case, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy and engaging in illegal exporting activity involving the sale of two aircraft to Libya. Id. at 779. The defendant challenged the use of circumstantial evidence to authenticate two documents used to show that the aircraft were purchased by the Libyan military. Id. at 785. The Eleventh Circuit held that Rule 901 “requires only some competent evidence in the record to support authentication”; the circumstantial evidence of where the documents were found (in West Germany, in the briefcase of a Libyan arms dealer) was sufficient to authenticate the documents in the absence of any evidence of adulteration or forgery. Id. at 785-86. Here, in addition to the circumstantial evidence regarding the discovery of the file alluded to above, we have Sargon’s testimony that the file contained genuine IIS documents. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Baghdad File was properly authenticated under Rule 901. As stated above, the Baghdad File was admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 807, the residual exception to the hearsay rule. Rule 807 permits evidence to be admitted if it has sufficient “circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.” Sargon’s testimony, already discussed in the context No. 04-1882 13 of authentication, provides some circumstantial guarantee of the trustworthiness of the statements in the Baghdad File. There were also witnesses at trial who positively identified the handwriting of Zaitawi and Dumeisi on AlShammari’s phone records and on the report related to AlShammari’s Chicago visit, respectively. In addition, we have Zaitawi’s relationship to Al-Shammari and her access to telephone records. At oral argument, Dumeisi clarified that the hearsay statement with which he takes issue is not so much the individual documents making up the Baghdad File—he concedes that many of the documents are admissible and are IIS communications as they purport to be—but rather with the statement that these documents were found together, in Baghdad, especially considering the sketchy circumstances surrounding the file’s whereabouts before it was given to Andrews. Dumeisi raises a valid question with respect to the timing of the discovery of the Baghdad File: if the file was not obtained by Andrews until June 2002, how could the FBI question Zaitawi at least a month earlier, in April/May 2002, about Al-Shammari’s telephone records allegedly found in Iraq? We can only point out that the evidence presented at trial, including Andrews’s testimony about when he received the file, is not inconsistent with the FBI having knowledge from another source, prior to June 2002, that Al-Shammari’s telephone records had been discovered in Baghdad. A review of the classified evidence convinces us that this timing issue is not fatal to the district court’s finding of authenticity and trustworthiness; the evidence in fact provides a significant guarantee of trustworthiness that the Baghdad File was found, Dumeisi’s contributions and all, in circumstances reinforcing its legitimacy as a coherent file of IIS documents. Finally, Dumeisi raises a Sixth Amendment issue with respect to admission of the Baghdad File, arguing that the government’s failure to present sufficient “indicia of reliabil14 No. 04-1882 ity” regarding the evidence implicates the Confrontation Clause. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980) (excluding hearsay except under certain circumstances when the evidence is so trustworthy that the rationale for the hearsay rule is not offended), abrogated by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (regarding only testimonial evidence). If evidence is not covered by a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, it must possess particularized guarantees of trustworthiness at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 821 (1990). Because this argument was not raised in the district court, our review is for plain error; we reverse only if there is a clear or obvious error that affected the outcome of the trial. See United States v. Shearer, 379 F.3d 453, 456 (7th Cir. 2004). Dumeisi correctly points out that the residual hearsay exception is not a firmly rooted exception for Confrontation Clause purposes. Cf. Wright, 497 U.S. at 817. But in determining that the Baghdad File was admissible, the district court expressly considered the same circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness that justify admission of business records and official records without violating the Confrontation Clause. For example, the court relied upon Sargon’s testimony that IIS officers had a duty to accurately record their own activities and the information received from their sources. The lack of a motive to falsify information and the fact that written records are often more reliable than the potentially hazy memory of the recorder are the classic reasons for excepting business records and official records from the hearsay rule—in other words, for making them firmly rooted hearsay exceptions. See Felzcerek v. INS, 75 F.3d 112, 116 (2d Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Klinzing, 315 F.3d 803, 810 (7th Cir. 2003). Thus, the district court did not violate the Confrontation Clause in admitting the Baghdad File. No. 04-1882 15 It was within the court’s discretion to admit the Baghdad File under Federal Rule of Evidence 807. The government argues that it would have been proper to admit the file under several other hearsay exceptions as well, including the business records exception in Rule 803(6) and the public records exception in Rule 803(8); however, because we have already found the evidence admissible under Rule 807, it is unnecessary to analyze its admissibility under these rules. Once the court admitted the Baghdad File in evidence, it was within the purview of the jury to assign the file its proper probative weight. See, e.g., United States v. Hedman, 630 F.2d 1184, 1197-98 (7th Cir. 1980).