Opinion ID: 1378603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Impact of Case Law Other Than Heller on the Constitutionality of Section 922(g)(1)

Text: In United States v. Younger, 398 F.3d 1179, 1192(9th Cir.2005), we held that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment rights of a convicted felon. However, we performed only minimal analysis of the claim because, at the time, we were bound by Silveira v. Lockyer, 312 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir.2002), which held that the Second Amendment does not confer an individual right to possess arms. Younger, 398 F.3d at 1192. [2] Like Vongxay, Younger argued that § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally limits firearm possession by categories of people who have not been deemed dangerous. Appellant Clydell Younger's Opening Br., 2004 WL 1810097 at  (Jul. 2, 2004). We declined to make a distinction between violent and non-violent felons and held that § 922(g)(1), which prohibits all felons from possessing firearms, was constitutional. The reasoning upon which Younger was basedthat the Second Amendment does not give individuals a right to bear arms was invalidated by Heller. However, we are still bound by Younger. See In re Osborne, 76 F.3d 306, 309(9th Cir.1996) (holding that [f]irst, a panel of this court may not overrule a decision of a previous panel; only a court in banc has such authority and [s]econd, the doctrine of stare decisis concerns the holdings of previous cases, not the rationales (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, Younger controls. [3] Although our legal inquiry ends with Younger, our holding is buttressed by the fact that Younger upheld the very type of gun possession restriction that the Supreme Court deemed presumptively lawful. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2817 n. 26. Our examination of cases from other circuits and of historical gun restrictions also lends credence to the post- Heller viability of Younger 's holding. For example, prior to Heller, the Fifth Circuit upheld § 922(g)(1) as a limited and narrowly tailored exception to the freedom to possess firearms, reasonable in its purposes and consistent with the right to bear arms protected under the Second Amendment. United States v. Everist, 368 F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir.2004). Fifth Circuit cases from that era are particularly instructive for post- Heller analyses because, even before Heller, the Fifth Circuit held that the Second Amendment guarantees an individual right to possess guns. See United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 260(5th Cir. 2001). Thus, the Fifth Circuit determined that, although there is an individual right to bear arms, felon restrictions are permissible even under heightened scrutiny. Everist, 368 F.3d at 519(Irrespective of whether [the] offense was violent in nature, a felon has shown manifest disregard for the rights of others. He may not justly complain of the limitation on his liberty when his possession of firearms would otherwise threaten the security of his fellow citizens.). In addition, the D.C. Circuit opinion that Heller affirmed recognized an individual right to bear arms. It held: [T]he government is [not] absolutely barred from regulating the use and ownership of pistols. The protections of the Second Amendment are subject to the same sort of reasonable restrictions that have been recognized as limiting, for instance, the First Amendment. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989) ([G]overnment may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech....). Indeed, the right to keep and bear arms... was subject to restrictions at common law. We take these to be the sort of reasonable regulations contemplated by the drafters of the Second Amendment. Parker v. Dist. of Columbia, 478 F.3d 370, 399(D.C.Cir.2007), cert. granted in part sub nom. Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 552 U.S. 1035, 128 S.Ct. 645, 169 L.Ed.2d 417 (2007), and aff'd, ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008). We also note that to date no court that has examined Heller has found 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) constitutionally suspect. United States v. Baron, Nos. CR-06-2095-FVS, CV-08-3048-FVS, 2008 WL 5102307, at  (E.D.Wash. Nov. 25, 2008); see, e.g., United States v. Smith, 329 Fed.Appx. 109, 111 (9th Cir.2009) ( Heller did not disturb Lewis 's narrow holdingthat felons have no constitutional right to possess firearms.); United States v. Gilbert, 286 Fed.Appx. 383, 386 (9th Cir.2008) (holding that, under Heller, convicted felons do not have the right to possess firearms). Thus, there appears to be a consensus that, even given the Second Amendment's individual right to bear arms, felons' Second Amendment rights can be reasonably restricted. Denying felons the right to bear arms is also consistent with the explicit purpose of the Second Amendment to maintain the security of a free State. U.S. Const. amend. II; see also Parker, 478 F.3d at 399(holding that [r]easonable restrictions also might be thought consistent with a `well-regulated Militia,' and noting that felonious conduct would render a person unsuitable for service in the militia). Felons are often, and historically have been, explicitly prohibited from militia duty. See, e.g., D.C.Code § 49-401(outlining current prohibition on felons in the militia). [4] Finally, we observe that most scholars of the Second Amendment agree that the right to bear arms was inextricably ... tied to the concept of a virtuous citizen[ry] that would protect society through defensive use of arms against criminals, oppressive officials, and foreign enemies alike, and that the right to bear arms does not preclude laws disarming the unvirtuous citizens (i.e. criminals).... Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment: A Dialogue, 49 Law & Contemp. Probs. 143, 146 (1986); see also Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 Tenn. L.Rev. 461, 480 (1995) (noting that felons were excluded from the right to arms because they were deemed incapable of virtue). We recognize, however, that the historical question has not been definitively resolved. See C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can't Martha Stewart Have a Gun?, 32 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 695, 714-28 (2009) (maintaining that bans on felon gun possession are neither long-standing nor supported by common law in the founding era). In sum, we hold that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the Second Amendment as it applies to Vongxay, a convicted felon. See Younger, 398 F.3d 1179.
Vongxay also argues that 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) violates his equal protection right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment because the status of felon is determined differently from state-to-state, thereby limiting the rights of criminals differently depending on the state in which they live. In response, the government contends that many federal statutes permissibly defer to differing state laws to define their terms. Vongxay urges us to review § 922(g)(1) under strict scrutiny because, he claims, the right to bear arms is a fundamental right. We acknowledge Vongxay's contention that, if the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, rational basis analysis may no longer be appropriate for all Second Amendment challenges. [5] See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439-40, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985) (explaining that equal protection claims based on membership in a protected class or unequal burdening of a fundamental right are reviewed under strict scrutiny). However, the Supreme Court has purposefully differentiated the right to bear arms generally from the more limited right held by felons. Heller, 128 S.Ct. at 2816-2817 (holding that like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is not unlimited and that nothing in [this] opinion should be taken to case doubt on the longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons). Therefore, whatever standard of review the Court implicitly applied to Heller's right to keep arms in his home is inapplicable to Vongxay, a felon who was explicitly excluded from Heller 's holding. Id. Accordingly, we are bound by pre- Heller case law involving equal protection challenges to § 922(g). In Lewis v. United States , the Supreme Court rejected an equal protection challenge to the predecessor to § 922(g)(1), which proscribed the possession of firearms by any person (violent or non-violent) who has been convicted by a court of the United States ... of a felony. Lewis, 445 U.S. at 56 n. 1, 100 S.Ct. 915. In Lewis, the Court applied a rational basis test because it found that the right to bear arms was not a fundamental right. Noting that statutes are consonant with the concept of equal protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is some rational basis for the statutory distinctions made or they have some relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made, the Court determined that the felon-in-possession statute clearly meets that test. Id. at 65-66, 100 S.Ct. 915 (internal quotation marks omitted). Lewis was, as Vongxay contends, based on the now-erroneous presumption that the Second Amendment does not apply to individuals (and is therefore not an individual fundamental right). Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. 915 ([T]he Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia. (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, because the right established by Heller does not apply to felons, we are still bound by Lewis 's holding. See Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484, 109 S.Ct. 1917; see also State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20, 118 S.Ct. 275, 139 L.Ed.2d 199 (1997) ([I]t is this Court's prerogative alone to overrule one of its precedents.). For the reasons discussed supra Part I, we find this distinction between felons and non-felons grounded in both historical and modern understandings of the purpose of the Second Amendment. Therefore, we hold that § 922(g)(1) does not violate the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.
Vongxay also claims that Campos's pat-down search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. As a result, he argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the gun that was found in his waistband during the search. The district court denied Vongxay's motion to suppress the gun because it found that Vongxay had consented to Campos's search. Although Campos does not claim to have had probable cause to search Vongxay, he was nonetheless entitled to ask Vongxay some questions, including whether or not he would consent to a search, so long as the consent was not coerced. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). The government bears the burden of proving consent, United States v. Impink, 728 F.2d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir.1984), and it must prove that the consent was freely and voluntarily given, Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 548, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968). Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from all the surrounding circumstances. United States v. Perez-Lopez, 348 F.3d 839, 845-46 (9th Cir.2003). The encounter in question began when Campos approached Vongxay on foot and, after some preliminary questions about his presence at the club, asked him if he had a gun. Vongxay said no. Campos then asked Vongxay if he could search him for weapons. Vongxay did not answer verbally, but placed his hands on his head. After Campos began the search and felt the semiautomatic handgun in Vongxay's waistband, Vongxay attempted to pull away, leading to a prolonged struggle that ended only with the assistance of additional officers. Vongxay contends that, by putting his hands in the air, he was not consenting but rather was submi[tting] to an arrest. In general, we consider five factors in determining whether consent was voluntarily given: (1) whether the defendant was in custody; (2) whether the arresting officer had his guns drawn; (3) whether Miranda warnings were given; (4) whether the defendant was notified that he had a right not to consent; and (5) whether the defendant had been told that a search warrant could be obtained. United States v. Jones, 286 F.3d 1146, 1152 (9th Cir.2002). All five factors need not be satisfied in order to sustain a consensual search. United States v. Cormier, 220 F.3d 1103, 1113 (9th Cir.2000). Here, Vongxay was not in custody, and Campos did not have his gun drawn or exposed when he asked permission to search Vongxay. Vongxay had not yet been arrested, so the Miranda warning factor is inapplicable. See United States v. Ritter, 752 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir.1985) (It would... make little sense to require that Miranda warnings ... be given by police before requesting consent.). Vongxay was not told that a search warrant could be obtained. Thus, the only Jones factor not satisfied here is that Vongxay was not notified of his right to decline consent. [6] Further, Campos's conduct would not have communicated to a reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 569, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 100 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988). Vongxay willingly lifted his arms, so as to enable a search, in response to Campos's request for permission to search him. Given the facts surrounding the search, Vongxay's attempt to pull away after the gun was found is better understood as a flight response than as evidence that he had not consented in the first place. The district court found that Vongxay's act of raising his hands to his head constituted implied consent to search. It also found that [t]here were no threats, coercion or otherwise. Considering the totality of the circumstances, we do not find that the district court's finding of consent was clearly erroneous. We therefore affirm the denial of Vongxay's motion to suppress.