Opinion ID: 4536248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Steadfast

Text: In Steadfast, we addressed whether the Grand River Dam Authority (“GRDA”), an Oklahoma nonprofit agency, was an arm of the state. 507 F.3d at 1256. We “look[ed] to four primary factors in determining whether a[] [defendant] constitutes an ‘arm of the state.’” Id. at 1253 (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280); accord Ambus v. Granite Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 992, 994 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc) (explaining “[t]he [Mt. Healthy] Court ruled four factors to be relevant”).6 These four factors are: (1) “the character ascribed to the [defendant] under state law”; (2) “the autonomy accorded the [defendant] under state law; (3) “the [defendant’s] finances”; and (4) “whether the [defendant] in question is concerned primarily with local or state affairs.” Steadfast, 507 F.3d at 1253 (citations omitted). We determined that each factor supported finding GRDA to be an arm of the state. Id. at 1252-56. First, GRDA’s foundational statute, other Oklahoma statutes, and the Oklahoma Supreme Court described GRDA as an agency of the state. Id. at 1253-54. Second, the state “exercise[d] significant supervision and control” over GRDA. Id. at 6 Before Steadfast, we treated the arm-of-the-state inquiry as a two-factor test that embodied the same overall factors as in Steadfast. See, e.g., Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000); Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 574-75 (10th Cir. 1996). 8 1254-55 (explaining Oklahoma law limited GRDA’s authority over its property, lands, employees, board of directors, and finances). Third, although GRDA could issue bonds, it lacked taxing authority and its revenue was designated as “state funds.” Id. at 1255. Fourth, GRDA was “primarily concerned with state, rather than local, affairs” because it serviced 24 Oklahoma counties and its employees were “classified and treated as state employees.” Id. at 1255-56. We thus held that “GRDA is an agency of the State of Oklahoma . . . entitled to claim Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” Id. at 1256. b. McMillian – Whether an Alabama sheriff is a state or local official In McMillian v. Monroe County, a former prisoner sued Monroe County, Alabama under § 1983 for damages arising from allegedly unconstitutional actions taken by the Monroe County sheriff. 520 U.S. at 783-84. The prisoner’s conviction for capital murder had been overturned because the sheriff suppressed exonerating evidence. Id. at 783. The county argued that it could not be liable for the sheriff’s actions because he was a state policymaker. Id. at 784. The question presented to the Supreme Court was “whether Alabama sheriffs are policymakers for the State or for the county when they act in a law enforcement capacity.” Id. at 785. The Court held that “Alabama sheriffs, when executing their law enforcement duties, represent the State of Alabama, not their counties.” Id. at 793.7 7 McMillian did not address Eleventh Amendment immunity because the prisoner sued only the county. 9 The McMillian Court’s “inquiry [was] guided by two principles.” Id. at 785. First, the sheriff’s state or municipal status depends on his specific function “in a particular area, or on a particular issue.” Id. The Court addressed the Alabama sheriff’s law enforcement capacity, not “a characterization of Alabama sheriffs that [would] hold true for every type of official action.” Id. at 785-86. Thus, an official may be considered a state official for the purpose of one function and a municipal official for another. Second, like the Mt. Healthy/Steadfast arm-of-the-state inquiry, the McMillian Court’s inquiry is “dependent on an analysis of state law.” Id. at 786. The Court explained that “our understanding of the actual function of a governmental official, in a particular area, will necessarily be dependent on the definition of the official’s functions under relevant state law.” Id. There is thus “no inconsistency created by court decisions that declare sheriffs to be county officers in one State, and not in another” because states have “wide authority to set up their state and local governments as they wish.” Id. at 795.8 8 Most circuit courts to address the issue have concluded that a sheriff acting in a law enforcement function is a county actor. See, e.g., Williams v. Kaufman Cty., 352 F.3d 994, 1013-14 (5th Cir. 2003) (Texas sheriffs); Crabbs v. Scott, 786 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir. 2015) (Ohio sheriffs); Franklin v. Zaruba, 150 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 1998) (Illinois sheriffs); Dean v. Cty. of Gage, Neb., 807 F.3d 931, 942 (8th Cir. 2015) (Nebraska sheriffs); Brewster v. Shasta Cty., 275 F.3d 803, 811 (9th Cir. 2001) (California sheriffs); Abusaid v. Hillsborough Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 405 F.3d 1298, 1304-05 (11th Cir. 2005) (Florida sheriffs); but see Grech v. Clayton Cty., 335 F.3d 1326, 1327 (11th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (Georgia sheriffs acting in a law enforcement function are state actors). 10 In its state law analysis, the McMillian Court relied on Alabama’s unique constitutional history. Id. at 787-89. Because renegade local sheriffs abused their office during the early nineteenth century, Alabama’s 1819 Constitution listed sheriffs in the state “executive department.” Id. at 787-88. Later constitutional amendments made impeachment procedures for Alabama sheriffs and state legal officers and judges the same, further indicating that sheriffs were considered state officials. Id. at 788-89. The Court also noted the Alabama Supreme Court had determined counties lacked respondeat superior liability for a sheriff’s tortious acts in his official capacity. Id. at 789. The McMillian Court viewed relevant Alabama code provisions as “less compelling, but still [in] support” of finding the sheriff was a state actor. Id. For example, the Alabama code gave the Governor and attorney general, not the county commissions, direct control over how the sheriffs fulfilled their law enforcement duties. Id. at 791. The Court deemed four other Alabama code provisions relevant but insufficient to “tip the balance in favor” of finding the sheriff to be a county actor: (1) the county paid the sheriff’s salary; (2) the county provided the sheriff with equipment; (3) the sheriff’s jurisdiction was limited to the county; and (4) county voters elected the sheriff. Id. at 791. The Court concluded the “weight of the evidence” supported finding that Alabama sheriffs represented the state in their law enforcement capacity. Id. at 793. We consider 11 McMillian in further detail below to compare how Alabama and Kansas law apply to sheriffs in each state.9