Opinion ID: 1608200
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Due Process Hearing For Reduction In Rank Statutory Claim

Text: ¶ 58. Kraus asserts the right to a hearing under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5). This provision spells out the procedure for Disciplinary Action Against Subordinates. Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) provides, in part, that No subordinate may be suspended, reduced in rank, suspended and reduced in rank, or removed by the board under par. (e), based on charges filed . . . unless the board determines whether there is just cause, as described in this paragraph, to sustain the charges. Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) (emphasis added). ¶ 59. In Antisdel, we analyzed the factors in the statute to determine if probationary sergeant James Antisdel was entitled to § 62.13(5)(em) protections. Tracking the statute's language, we stated, Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) requires that an employee seeking the procedural protections of that section [1] be a `subordinate' [2] who `is suspended, reduced in rank, . . . or removed . . . [3] based on charges [4] filed . . . by the chief.' Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶ 19. We concluded that Antisdel satisfied all the factors. ¶ 60. Antisdel was on probation, but there was no dispute that he was disciplined. [18] This court determined that an officer who is subjected to a disciplinary charge fits within the boundaries of Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em), even if the officer has probationary status. Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶ 25. This conclusion is consistent with the observation in Larson v. City of Tomah, 193 Wis. 2d 225, 532 N.W.2d 726 (1995), that: Under sec. 62.13(5), every police officer who is disciplined by a superior in the department is entitled to have the disciplinary action reviewed by the city's police and fire commission. If the commission sustains the disciplinary action, it must make written findings and determinations. Sec. 62.13(5)(f). The aggrieved officer may then appeal from the commissioner's order to the circuit court. Sec. 62.13(5)(i). Id. at 231-32. It is also consistent with the need to provide an opportunity to vindicate an employee's liberty interest, as discussed in Roth. Roth, 408 U.S. at 573. ¶ 61. Kraus contends that he, too, satisfies the factors in Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) and should have been afforded a just cause hearing. ¶ 62. As to the first factor, Kraus was clearly a subordinate, as that term has come to mean all police officers besides the chief of police. See Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 503; see also Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶ 20. Second, Kraus was reduced in rank as that phrase is understood in the context of § 62.13(5)(em). See Antisdel, 234 Wis. 2d 154, ¶¶ 21-22. In addition, Kraus's demotion was recommended in writing by the Chief. Consequently, if the Chiefs letter constituted a charge, the fourth factor was met. In short, the applicability of the statute appears to hinge on whether charges were filed against Kraus. ¶ 63. Wisconsin Stat. § 62.13(5)(a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (em), (h), (i), and (j) all refer to charges. The term is not defined, but Kraus contends that it should be interpreted expansively to include all determinations leading to demotion or a negative job action. We disagree. ¶ 64. The term charges commonly denotes an accusation of misconduct or of a violation of laws, rules, or policies. The contextually relevant dictionary definition of the term is a claim of wrongdoing; an accusation. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 322 (3d ed. 1992). Evaluating a person's job performance as unsatisfactory or not up to expectation, or otherwise determining that a person is not fully suited to a supervisory position, is quite different from charging a person with some breach of duty or violation of a rule or order. ¶ 65. The statute itself is captioned Disciplinary Actions Against Subordinates. This title implies a distinction between disciplinary actions and nondisciplinary actions. In Kaiser, we noted that Kaiser was not disciplined; he was terminated as not suited for service as a police officer. Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 503. [19] We went on to say that Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) applies to disciplinary actions. Id. at 502; see also Eastman v. City of Madison, 117 Wis. 2d 106, 115, 342 N.W.2d 764 (Ct. App. 1983) (Section 62.13(5) on its face only applies to proceedings of a disciplinary nature.). [20] [7] ¶ 66. The statute speaks of adverse personnel actions that may be taken as a penalty when charges are sustained against the accused. Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(a), (c), (e). Paragraph (em) then outlines the standards for finding just cause to sustain the charges, and it repeatedly refers to whether rules and orders were violated by the disciplined subordinate. [21] This language clearly points to proceedings based upon allegations of misconduct or rule violation. Hence, while Kraus argues that the Antisdel decision cannot be cited for the proposition that officers demoted for nondisciplinary reasons are not protected by § 62.13(5), the statute itself can be cited for that proposition. [22] ¶ 67. Quite simply, Kraus was not charged with violating any rule. He was returned to his former rank before his probationary period ended for performance reasons. This action was taken because Kraus did not satisfy his chief's expectations for him as a police sergeant. Similar to the officer in Kaiser, Kraus was judged as unsuited for service as a police sergeant. See Kaiser, 104 Wis. 2d at 503 (Kaiser . . . was terminated as not suited for service as a police officer). ¶ 68. After Antisdel, we cannot interpret every suspension, reduction in rank, or removal as discipline without emasculating the concept of probation and making logically inexplicable an officer's removal without hearing on such grounds as a budgetary shortfall. Hearings are required for some negative job actions that are not disciplinary, especially for subordinates who have an established property interest, but these hearings are not governed by Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em). [8] ¶ 69. In sum, disciplinary charges were not levied against Kraus. Upon recommendation of the Chief, the PFC determined that Kraus's performance was not equal to the performance it expected of its supervisory officers. This largely unstated assessment was not a disciplinary charge and thus Kraus's reduction in rank was not a penalty. Consequently, Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5) did not apply to the PFC's decision, and no just cause hearing under Wis. Stat. § 62.13(5)(em) was required.