Opinion ID: 2090964
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Was the judgment in the mortgage foreclosure proceeding void for lack of jurisdiction of the court over the corporate defendant, Fenwick Island Company?

Text: Defendants assert that the service of the writ was wholly ineffectual to confer jurisdiction over the corporation. This contention is founded upon the Sheriff's return, which reads: Summons served personally on Fenwick Island Land Company (a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Delaware by acceptance of service by Charles L. Harmonson Secretary and Resident Agent for the Capital Trust Company authorized by law to accept service for the Fenwick Island Land Company (a corporation existing under the laws of the State of Delaware this the 15th day of April A.D. 1939 So ans. Grier H. Minner Sheriff It is conceded that this return is improperly worded. The return should have stated that the writ had been served by delivering a copy thereof to Charles L. Harmonson, secretary of Capital Trust Company, the corporate resident agent of the defendant, the president of the defendand residing out of the State. See the statute governing service of process upon Delaware corporations, Revised Code of 1935, § 2080, 8 Del.C. § 321. But the return does not affirmatively show that the service was improper. It simply fails to show the fact that the president resided out of the State, and fails to describe the Capital Trust Company as corporate resident agent of the defendant. It also fails to show that a copy of the writ was left with the resident agent. And it ineptly speaks of personally serving a writ upon a corporation. But the facts are that the president did reside out of the State and that the Capital Trust Company was the corporate resident agent of the defendant. The return was irregular, but the service was not void. The distinction between a return showing affirmatively that the statute was not complied with and a return that simply fails to set out all the requisites of legal service is well settled. See Gibbons v. Mason, 1 Har. 452; 1 Woolley on Delaware Practice, § 201. The return could, of course, have been amended, on timely application to the court, to show the facts. 1 Woolley on Delaware Practice, § 206 et seq. But the service was not void, and the return would not have been quashed if the facts had been shown. The court acquired jurisdiction over the defendant, and the return cannot now be attacked collaterally, since the want of jurisdiction is not manifest from the record. Frankel v. Satterfield, 9 Houst. 201, 206, 19 A. 898; 31 Am.Jur., Judgments, § 602. The court below so held, and we agree.