Opinion ID: 1443906
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Ex Post Facto Challenges in Other jurisdictions

Text: Sex offender registration and disclosure statutes have been constitutionally challenged, often on the grounds that such statutes are ex post facto laws. KSORA's disclosure section, K.S.A. 22-4909, appears to be the broadest provision to receive an ex post facto challenge. Neither the parties in this case nor our independent research have located a case upholding the constitutionality of a sex offender statute providing for unlimited public disclosure. Statutes held constitutional when challenged on ex post facto grounds have provided for: no public disclosure, see, e. g., Snyder v. State, 912 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Wyo. 1996) (Wyoming statute allows access only to those already authorized by law to receive criminal history information); limited disclosure, see, e.g., Noble, 171 Ariz. at 176 (in Arizona, information only available in statutorily specified circumstances where it serves regulatory purpose); or carefully tailored community notification, see, e.g., John Doe v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 74, 662 A.2d 367 (1995) (New Jersey statute tailors scope of notification to offender's risk level). Of the sex offender registration laws that have successfully overcome ex post facto challenges, none have provided for unlimited public access to the registered sex offender information. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 423 Mass. at 1227 (pending Massachusetts legislation proposing community notification law not facially punitive); John Doe, 142 N.J. at 73-75 (under New Jersey law, community notification appropriate only after a due process hearing involving judicial review determining that the offender poses sufficient risk); State v. Costello, 138 N.H. 587, 590, 643 A.2d 531 (1994) (New Hampshire registered information kept confidential by authorities); Ward, 123 Wash.2d at 502 (Washington law authorizes release of sex offender registration information to the public when necessary for public protection); People v. Starnes, 273 Ill. App.3d 911, 653 N.E.2d 4 (1995) (Illinois child sex offender registration information kept confidential; Ill. Cons. Stat. Ann. ch. 730, 150/9 [Smith-Hurd 1996 Supp.]); Manning, 532 N.W.2d at 246 (Minnesota registered information kept private and used only for law enforcement purposes). The Arizona sex offender registration act was upheld in Noble, 171 Ariz. 171. The Arizona Supreme Court reviewed two conflicting Court of Appeals panel decisions, after each panel had applied the Mendoza-Martinez factors to determine if the registration requirement was punishment. The Arizona registration requirements were similar to those in KSORA. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3821 (1989). Although the law contained no notification provisions, it did provide for release of information concerning the registered sex offender's record to noncriminal justice agencies for evaluating prospective employees, public officials, or volunteers; governmental licensing agencies for evaluating prospective licensees; prospective employers and volunteer youth-service agencies whose activities involve regular contact with minors; and the department of economic security and the superior court for determining the fitness of prospective custodians of juveniles. 171 Ariz. at 176 n.8 (citing Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 41-1750[B][8], [9], [11], [13] [1992]). Noble reasoned that registration did not impose any affirmative disability or restraint on the offender. Registration did not restrain or inhibit the offender's movement or activities, although it did make information available in statutorily specified circumstances where it serves a clearly regulatory purpose. 171 Ariz. at 176. Noble observed that registration' has traditionally been viewed as punitive (referencing Nathaniel Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter), but noted that the provisions limiting access to the information dampen[ed] its stigmatic effect. 171 Ariz. at 177. The registration requirement served a regulatory purpose by facilitating law enforcement and aiding in investigative work, and as applied to child sex offenders (because of more significant risk of recidivism), was not excessive in relation to, the nonpunitive purpose. 171 Ariz. at 177-78. Noble implies that if disclosure of the information had not been statutorily limited, it would be regarded as the kind of affirmative disability or restraint usually associated with criminal punishment. 171 Ariz. at 176. The constitutionality of the Washington sex offender registration and disclosure law also withstood an ex post facto challenge. Ward, 123 Wash.2d 488. The appellants in Ward attacked the disclosure provisions, which provided that [p]ublic agencies are authorized to release relevant and necessary information regarding sex offenders to the public when the release of the information is necessary for public protection. 123 Wash.2d at 502 (quoting Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.550[1] [1994]). Ward noted that existing law already provided for public disclosure of conviction information. 123 Wash.2d at 501. In interpreting the statutory disclosure provisions, Ward judicially imposed the following restrictions: We note that the statute [Wash. Rev. Code § 4.24.550(1)], on its face, requires the disclosing agency to have some evidence that the offender poses a threat to the community. Absent evidence, of such a threat, disclosure would serve no legitimate purpose. Therefore, we hold that a public agency must have some evidence of an offender's future dangerousness, likelihood of reoffense, or threat to the community, to justify disclosure to the public in a given case. This statutory limit ensures that disclosure occurs to prevent future harm, not to punish past offenses. ... An agency must disclose only that information relevant to and necessary for counteracting the offender's dangerousness. [T]he geographic scope of dissemination must rationally relate to the threat posed by the registered offender.... The scope of disclosure must relate to the scope of the danger.... [W]e leave to the appropriate agencies the specific decisions of whether, what, and where to disclose within the parameters outlined above. 123 Wash.2d at 503-04. Ward concluded that Washington's disclosure provisions did not alter the standard of punishment which existed under prior law, finding that the statutory limits on disclosure ensure that the potential burdens placed on registered offenders fit the threat posed to public safety. 123 Wash.2d at 504. The disclosure provision in KSORA contains no restrictions. Registration information is open to inspection in the sheriff's office by the public. K.S.A. 22-4909. The Supreme Court of New Hampshire upheld that state's sex offender registration act from an ex post facto attack in Costello, 138 N.H. 587. The sex offender was required to register with the state police and to report a current address annually to the local law enforcement agency. The information is kept confidential within the law enforcement community. Costello held that the nonpenal, or regulatory purpose of the legislation was manifest and that the punitive effect of registration was de minimis. 138 N.H. at 591. In John Doe, 142 N.J. 1, the New Jersey Supreme Court found New Jersey's Megan's Law to be lacking in its original form but by the court's crafting of a judicial review procedure, upheld the act against ex post facto, double jeopardy, bill of attainder, and cruel and unusual punishment attacks. John Doe determined that the registration and notification laws implicated a sex offender's liberty interest in privacy and reputation and triggered due process rights. The fundamental fairness doctrine required a hearing and accompanying judicial review before statutory notification of the community for sex offenders identified as moderate and high risk (Tier II and Tier III). 142 N.J. at 107. John Doe interpreted the statute and judicially revised the Attorney General Guidelines on risk level assessment and notification to conform with the court's notion of what was required to provide adequate due process. The court augmented its holding in a later order by specifically outlining the procedure to be followed in such review. John Doe acknowledged that the basic attack on these laws is the alleged excessiveness of community notification. 142 N.J. at 29. State v. Babin, 637 So.2d 814 (La. App. 1994), considered conditions of parole requiring Babin, a sex offender, to notify people within a 1-mile radius of his residence and the school district superintendent of Babin's conviction. He was also required to publish notice of his conviction twice within the official journal of the local governing authority, in compliance with legislation enacted after Babin committed the crimes. Without any analysis, the Babin court declared the notification requirements unconstitutional as ex post facto legislation. But see State v. Sorrell, 656 So.2d 1045, 1048 (La. App. 1995) (Louisiana sex offender registration statute was not an ex post facto law as applied to a rapist convicted before enactment but paroled afterwards. Registration and notification requirements were imposed as a condition of parole, and the law in effect at the time of release should govern the terms of release.). In State v. Manning, 532 N.W.2d 244 (Minn. App. 1995), the Court of Appeals of Minnesota determined that the Minnesota sex offender registration statute was not an ex post facto law. The registered information includes address, fingerprints, photograph, and other information required by the bureau of criminal apprehension, and such information is only to be used for law enforcement purposes. Minn. Stat. § 243.166 (1992 & 1993 Supps.). The Manning court determined that the statute did not impose an affirmative restraint or disability. Manning reasoned that registration is not historically regarded as punishment (noting that the registration information is confidential), the deterrent effect of registration is minimal, and the law has a nonpunitive purpose: to help police investigations. 532 N.W.2d at 248. Although not an ex post facto case, the California Supreme Court determined in In re Reed, 33 Cal.3d 914, 191 Cal. Rptr. 658, 663 P.2d 216 (1983), that registration was a form of punishment. The California sex offender registration statute was challenged as cruel and unusual punishment as applied to a misdemeanor offender convicted of soliciting lewd or dissolute conduct from an undercover officer in a public restroom. Under the statute, the misdemeanant was required to register for life with the local police as a sex offender. The offender could petition for release from the registration requirement, but there was no procedure for expungment of the initial registration. The court first consulted the Mendoza-Martinez factors and determined that the registration requirement was a form of punishment. The court then applied the three-part test of In re Lynch, 8 Cal.3d 410, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 503 P.2d 921 (1972), and determined that the punishment was cruel or unusual as applied to Reed. The court noted that relatively minor conduct, such as a flirtation accompanied by touching done in a public place, could constitute an offense. Such an offender did not pose a grave threat to society, warranting permanent police surveillance.