Opinion ID: 204059
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Postverdict Juror Inquiry

Text: Appellant was convicted on both counts on August 24, 2007 after a jury trial. Hours after the verdict was delivered, defense counsel returned to his office and received an e-mail entitled Juror No. 66. In the e-mail, the juror stated: I felt compelled to send this to you. I don't know if I should even be doing this but I don't care. I know it's late but I want you to know that there were at least 3 people on that jury who actually listened to the testimony with an open mind. We tried to make the rest pay attention. We made them go through every piece of evidence and every witness. Between us we pointed out every discr[e]p[a]ncy. They made up some story to explain it away. I want you to know that I will go to jail before I ever serve on another jury. It was awful. I'm sorry we couldn't do anything. We finally decided to not prolong that young man's hope any longer. We could have stayed there for another week. Their minds were made up from the first day. Here's one example, A man said I guess we're profiling but they cause all the trouble. Well I won't keep you longer. Again I am sorry we couldn't do more. You know if I thought he would have gotten a different kind of jury the next time I think [I] would have kept them there. These people are the salt of the earth and there is no gray in their lives. I really hope they never get into the scales of blind justice because she isn't. God bless you and Mary keep you safe. (Appellee's Br.App. at 1 (emphasis added).) On August 27, 2007, defense counsel moved to set aside the jury's verdict, arguing that there was the possibility of bias and prejudice on the part of at least one juror based upon Villar's Hispanic ethnicity. The court subsequently summoned the juror who contacted defense counsel to appear at a special hearing on August 28, 2007 to inquire about the e-mail. With respect to the motion to set aside the verdict, the trial court stated: I don't believe that [ United States v. Connolly, 341 F.3d 16 (1st Cir.2003)] or [ Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 107 S.Ct. 2739, 97 L.Ed.2d 90 (1987)] give me the authority if I choose to because I, for example, attach  I personally believe that ethnic bias is so reprehensible in the deliberative process and so damaging and dangerous, that if it were up to me, if I had a hint of juror bias based on a statement from one juror that another juror made a comment which could reflect racial bias, if I were balancing the constitutional interests versus the interests that underlie the rule, I might balance that interest differently. But it's not up to me. If you think it is, let me know. I don't believe I'm free to inquire simply because I attach relatively greater weight to the Sixth Amendment interest in a fair trial free from ethnic bias than does the Supreme Court or the drafters of the rule. He concluded that based on the evidence he had available, Rule 606(b) did not give him discretion to act. He also noted that his instinct as a trial judge was to develop the record immediately rather than waiting 18 months to do it. Defense counsel argued that under the Fourteenth Amendment, [3] racial bias constitutes an exception to Rule 606(b). However, there was no separate discussion about the constitutional issues. Concluding that he did not have the authority or power under the Rule to inquire into the matter further than verifying that the juror had, in fact, sent the e-mail to defense counsel, the trial judge held: I ultimately have to apply the Rules of Evidence and the Supreme Court and First Circuit case law applying those rules to the facts of this case, and doing that I conclude that I am constrained from breaching the confidentiality of the deliberative process in questioning the juror on the basis of the e-mail, which is all we have at this time to call into question the integrity of the jury's deliberative process. A limited voir dire of the juror followed to authenticate the e-mail. On August 31, 2007, Villar filed a motion to set aside the jury's verdict, to which the government objected. On October 2, 2007, the court issued an endorsed order denying Villar's motion. On November 27, 2007, the Court sentenced defendant, and this timely appeal followed.