Opinion ID: 2088662
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Order of Seating Potential Jurors

Text: At trial, the court had the bailiff call 14 prospective jurors to the box, two of whom were designated as alternates. When one of the regular prospective jurors was excused, the vacancy was filled from the jury pool rather than by a juror seated in a designated alternate's seat. The defendant argues that this method is contrary to Ind.Trial Rule 47(B)'s requirement that [a]lternate jurors in the order in which they are called shall replace jurors who, prior to the time the jury returns its verdict, become or are found to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties and to the provision in Ind. Code § 33-4-5-9(d) that [t]he sheriff or bailiff shall call the jurors to the jury box in the same order in which their names were drawn. Section 9(e) of that statute requires the defendant to show harm to his substantial rights to obtain a reversal based on noncompliance with the statute. The harm the defendant cites is his inability to have a particular juror considered for selection on the regular panel simply because they appeared as number 13 and 14 on the list. The purpose of the jury selection procedures is to assure that jurors are chosen on a random basis, to avoid even the possibility of bias. Phillips v. State (1978), 268 Ind. 556, 559, 376 N.E.2d 1143, 1145. No litigant has the right to have any particular individual sit on the jury[,] even if qualified[,] as his right is one of rejection and not selection[,] and if he is eventually tendered a fair and impartial jury to try his case that is all to which he is entitled. Highshew v. Kushto (1956), 126 Ind. App. 584, 600, 133 N.E.2d 76, 77. See also Robinson v. State (1983), Ind., 453 N.E.2d 280. In the absence of purposeful, nonrandom exclusion of prospective jurors, and with no showing of harm to the defendant, any technical noncompliance with the statutory requirements for jury selection does not amount to reversible error. Russelburg v. State (1988), Ind., 529 N.E.2d 1193, 1196. The defendant here has shown neither purposeful exclusion nor harm. He is not entitled to reversal on this issue.