Opinion ID: 1148390
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legality of Billings Arrest

Text: Appellant relies on Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971) and State v. Richards, 110 Ariz. 290, 518 P.2d 113 (1974) for his proposition that probable cause for a warrantless arrest was lacking in Laramie ergo it was also missing in Billings where appellant and Lande were arrested after receiving information by phone and tele-type from Laramie police. Whiteley, Richards and the appellant agree that the Billings officers were entitled to act on the strength of the police bulletins, subject, however, to the risk that Laramie police then had the required facts upon which to base a conclusion that appellant probably committed the crimes charged. The Court in Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. at 568, 91 S.Ct. at 1037, held that the basic complaint for an arrest warrant signed by a sheriff in another county was fundamentally erroneous because it contained only conclusions. However, the radio bulletin giving descriptions of the suspects and their car, as well as details of the burglary, was relied on by the arresting officer in an adjoining county to effect an arrest and search. The Court said: We do not, of course, question that the Laramie police were entitled to act on the strength of the radio bulletin. Certainly police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid offered the magistrate the information requisite to support an independent judicial assessment of probable cause.    Earlier the Supreme Court had said in U.S. v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 111, 85 S.Ct. 741, 747, 13 L.Ed.2d 684,    Observations of fellow officers of the Government engaged in a common investigation are plainly a reliable basis for a warrant applied for by one of their number.    As said in State v. Richards, supra, and to the same effect in many other authorities:    Probable cause exists where the arresting officers have reasonably trustworthy information of facts and circumstances which are sufficient in themselves to lead a reasonable man to believe an offense is being or has been committed and that the person to be arrested is committing or did commit it. A brief review of the evidence in this case leads the Court to observe that the Laramie police, unlike the San Diego police in Richards, had exercised excellent detection functions to arrive at probable cause for the arrest of appellant. While talking to the Laramie (Albany County) prosecuting attorney, in the presence of Officer Roylance, on July 24, 1975, Roylance testified that appellant's wife asked a rhetorical question: Those television sets are stolen, aren't they?. She further stated that the television sets had arrived at her house while she was working, between 11:00 p.m. on July 23 and 7 o'clock the next morning; that her husband had given them to her as an anniversary present; that his driver's license had incorrect initials preceding his name; that he was an escapee from the Michigan State Prison at Marquette, Michigan; that he was sentenced there to serve 2 1/2 to 5 years; that there was a warrant out for him; that she had last seen her husband at about 1:00 p.m. on July 24th; that he might be going back to Billings, Montana; she gave the Laramie officials a vehicle registration in her name for a 1959 Oldsmobile; that her husband was driving that car; the registration certificate gave the license number and other descriptions of the car; that she readily gave permission to the seizure of the television set and stereo equipment; that the model numbers of the equipment were identical to those taken from Montgomery Ward's warehouse; Mrs. Williams also advised the police that her husband would probably use his gun to avoid going back to prison, if he had a gun with him. When Mrs. Williams made the foregoing statements she was not under arrest nor was she taken into custody. The record is devoid of any evidence of coercion, as appellant now claims. The statements were voluntarily made in 15 minutes in a police car parked near her house. Carpenter v. U.S., 463 F.2d 397, 401 (10th Cir.1972) Both Mrs. Williams and Ms. Watts disappeared soon after the incident and did not appear as witnesses at the trial. The testimony from which most of the above facts were taken came in large part from direct and cross-examination of Officer Roylance, who was present at all times. His testimony was not controverted. The officer also connected Lande and his foot-prints to both burglaries and in the company of appellant. He also related that Ms. Watts told him that the television and stereo equipment in her house had been brought there the night before by Lande. The equipment was identical to that taken from Ward's warehouse. There is no merit in the assertion that Mrs. Williams' statements were unreliable. The statements against her husband's interest would indicate the reverse. The fact finders found nothing untrustworthy in her statements which the officer related. As a result it is clear that the facts, and reasonable inferences from them, were sufficient to meet the definition of probable cause. With that background the Billings officers had every fact necessary to effect the arrest of appellant for the Gibson's and Ward's warehouse burglaries. The above recitation disposes of appellant's first two issues on appeal, namely the arrest without probable cause and the coerced and involuntary consent to search given by appellant's wife. Appellant's third issue on appeal concerns the legality of the search of his car in Billings. Acting on the information received from the Laramie Police Department, two Billings, Montana, officers observed a car of the description given them leaving the Interstate at an exit in Billings. They stopped the vehicle, ordered the occupants out of the car, patted them down, gave each of them the Miranda rights, placed them under arrest, recognized Lande as a parolee of Montana having been arrested by them before. Both officers, Hensley and Timarco, testified that appellant consented to a search of his car, and that he had said the trunk lock was broken and would not open. Appellant denied giving permission to search but testified: As we were going back he wanted me to open the trunk, said open the trunk and I said it wouldn't open anyway, can't open it. Both officers also testified that they had been informed by way of information from Laramie that another television set, 45 hand guns and some ammunition, probably in a duffle bag, had not been recovered in Laramie. Appellant admitted he was an escapee. The Billings officers also testified that after booking the two suspects they drove the car to the city impoundment lot; that there are General Orders of the Billings police department to inventory all items taken from an impounded car and to remove any property from the vehicle that may be lost or stolen and to protect the police department from any complaints or allegations by the person who owns the car that there were items taken while impounded. It was during this standard procedure that one of the officers inserted a screwdriver in the trunk lock and in 15 seconds opened it. A television and a duffle bag containing miscellaneous hand guns were immediately observed. Those items were taken by Detective Roylance from the Billings officer and introduced in evidence without objection except appellant's continuing objection made early in the trial to the effect they were illegally seized. They were identified by the Billings and Laramie officers and by the store employee. They consisted of 33 hand guns, a green GI type duffle bag and a 17 inch General Electric television. Testimony thereafter connected the television as the one taken from Lueras Oldsmobile garage and the remainder of the items as being those taken from Gibson's Discount Center on the night in question. Until July, 1976, the United States Supreme Court had not determined the validity of police inventories of the contents of impounded vehicles. The case which decided the question was South Dakota v. Opperman, ___ U.S. ___, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000. It held that under certain circumstances, (apparently all present in the case at bar) seizure of the contents was legal and the intrusion reasonable although no warrant had been issued. In arriving at that conclusion the court considered four factors:    the protection of the owners' property    the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property    the protection of the police from potential danger    police frequently attempt to determine whether a vehicle has been stolen.    The court said Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967), Harris v. U.S., 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968), and Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 439, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973) pointed the way to the resolution of Opperman. Opperman does not define the scope of an inventory search. It is apparent, however, that probable cause, as it is usually required, is not necessary for an inventory search. This is especially true when there is a general order promulgated by the police or sheriff's departments mandating such searches, as there was in Billings. It did approve the opening of the unlocked glove compartment wherein marijuana was found. In the case at bar the officers used a quick technique to open the locked trunk of the car. Opperman, therefore, is not on all fours, but it would appear that it is but a short step away. For the purposes warranting such a search it appears that it is just as reasonable to look in the trunk as in a glove compartment, especially when the trunk was so readily opened. However, Opperman is bolstered in this case by the enigmatic consent to search given by appellant to the Billings officers, as quoted above. Furthermore, if it was necessary, the Billings officers had sufficient probable cause to search the vehicle at the scene of the arrest and, therefore, at the station house without obtaining a warrant and over the objection of appellant, under the holding of Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209, (decided December 1, 1976). Texas and Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 2471, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974) follow the leading case of Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 29 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). In any event we hold that the search of appellant's wife's car in Billings was not illegal.