Opinion ID: 2587576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Constitutionality of SCR 182

Text: Schaefer makes several constitutional arguments against enforcement of SCR 182. First, Schaefer argues that since the rule prohibits speech about a particular subject, i.e., the subject of the representation, it is a presumptively invalid content-based restriction that must withstand strict scrutiny to be constitutional. We note that Schaefer cites no authority in support of his argument, and so it need not be considered. [10] Moreover, the argument is clearly without merit. In Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, [11] the United States Supreme Court held that a lawyer's speech in pending cases is subject to a greater degree of regulation than that of the press. In addition, the Supreme Court has pointed out that the term content-based generally refers to whether the speech is prohibited on the basis of viewpoint, [12] and that laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content neutral. [13] A regulation is not an invalid content-based restriction merely because one must review the speech's content in order to determine whether the regulation has been violated. [14] We thus conclude that SCR 182 is not a content-based restriction, but rather is content neutral. As a content neutral restriction on speech, SCR 182 is constitutional if it is within the government's power, it furthers an important government interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and the incidental restriction on free expression is no greater than necessary. [15] We conclude that under this test, SCR 182 is constitutional. First, it is within this court's power to promulgate rules governing the legal profession, and so SCR 182 is within the government's power. Next, the rule furthers the important interests of protecting the attorney-client relationship from interference and protecting laypersons from overbearing by an opposing lawyer; this interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression. Finally, the restriction on speech is no greater than necessary. A lawyer is not prohibited from all speech or contact; rather, the lawyer must obtain permission from opposing counsel, or must otherwise be authorized by law to make direct contact with a represented person regarding the subject of the representation. Schaefer next argues that SCR 182, as applied to him when he was representing himself or Schaefer, Inc., is unconstitutionally vague, in that SCR 182 does not make clear what conduct is prohibited. Schaefer argues that the introductory phrase of the rule, [i]n representing a client, suggests that the lawyer and the client are not the same, and consequently, a self-represented lawyer is not subject to the rule. In support, he cites authority from California and Connecticut indicating that the rule does not apply to lawyers appearing pro se. [16] He also argues that Formal Opinion 8 is not binding, and moreover does not clearly state that lawyers appearing pro se are prohibited from contacting represented parties. The state bar argues that, as Schaefer is a lawyer, he should be held to a greater understanding of the rules than a layperson unfamiliar with statutory interpretation. In support, the state bar cites Wisconsin authority holding that a rule requiring a lawyer to abstain from an offensive personality clearly established the prohibited conduct, [17] and a Ninth Circuit decision indicating that a rule requiring a lawyer to refrain from conduct unbecoming a member of the bar was sufficiently clear. [18] The state bar argues that Schaefer was on notice that his conduct was prohibited by Formal Opinion 8, and by Schaefer's 1981 public reprimand for similar conduct. Schaefer is correct in noting that Formal Opinion 8 is non-binding. But Schaefer's analysis of the opinion is flawed. The opinion clearly prohibits contact between a lawyer-party and opposing parties whom the lawyer knows are represented by counsel. The committee acknowledged that the rule could be subject to different interpretations, and noted the existence of conflicting authority. Nevertheless, the committee concluded that the better-reasoned position is that SCR 182 applies to lawyers appearing pro se. As stated by the United States Supreme Court in 1926, a statute or rule is impermissibly vague if it either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. [19] This remains the test today. [20] It is well-settled that, in evaluating whether a statute is vague, judicial opinions construing the statute should be considered. [21] [T]he touchstone is whether the statute, either standing alone or as construed, made it reasonably clear at the relevant time that the ... conduct was [prohibited]. [22] In addition, questions of vagueness must be more closely examined where First Amendment rights are implicated. [23] We conclude that the non-binding nature of Formal Opinion 8, together with the existence of conflicting authority from other jurisdictions, renders SCR 182 vague as applied to Schaefer when he represented himself in the litigation at issue. In the absence of clear guidance from this court, Schaefer could have reasonably concluded that the rule did not apply in situations where he was self-represented. While a lawyer-party's insistence on contacting represented parties, even in the face of specific requests not to do so, could be viewed as unprofessional, SCR 182 arguably did not clearly prohibit the contact. We are not persuaded otherwise by the state bar's cited authority. In Matter of Beaver, the Wisconsin court considered that the term offensive personality had been sufficiently defined by case law and by its incorporation into the ethical rules of the state. [24] Here, no binding case law from this court interpreting SCR 182 was available during the time period at issue. Additionally, the rule in California, where Schaefer is also admitted to practice, permits direct contact by a self-represented lawyer with a represented person. In United States v. Hearst, [25] the Ninth Circuit referred Patricia Hearst's defense counsel, F. Lee Bailey and J. Albert Johnson, for investigation by disciplinary authorities based on their contract for a book about the case, which created at least a potential conflict of interest with their client. The court interpreted the term conduct unbecoming a member of the bar to incorporate the legal profession's code of behavior; in addition, the court relied on several other specific rules in determining that the lawyers' conduct should be investigated more fully in a disciplinary proceeding. [26] Here, no additional code or rules render SCR 182 any more clear with respect to a self-represented lawyer. In addition, we decline to consider Schaefer's 1981 reprimand as providing notice concerning SCR 182. Schaefer was publicly reprimanded in part for violating SCR 190, which in 1981, provided as follows: A member of the state bar shall not in any way communicate upon the subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel. . . . This version of the rule did not include the prefatory language of the current version of SCR 182, [i]n representing a client, and clearly forbade a lawyer from contacting a represented party under all circumstances concerning the subject of controversy. In contrast, the current version of SCR 182 arguably lends itself to some confusion when a lawyer is self-represented. Accordingly, to the extent that the violations of SCR 182 found by the panel rely on instances in which Schaefer was representing himself, they may not be considered in determining the appropriate discipline to be imposed in this case. [D]ue process bars courts from applying a novel construction of a criminal statute to conduct that neither the statute nor any prior judicial decisions has fairly disclosed to be within its scope. [27] While SCR 182 is not a criminal statute, nor is our construction precisely novel in light of Formal Opinion 8 and the decisions of several other jurisdictions, SCR 182 did not fairly disclose that direct contacts with represented parties while a lawyer is self-represented are forbidden. Nevada's lawyers are now on notice, however, that SCR 182 applies to them even when they are representing themselves. As discussed above, Schaefer's argument that the rule is vague as applied to situations where he represented Schaefer, Inc., is without merit. Schaefer next argues that SCR 182 is unconstitutionally overbroad because unobjectionable contact such as settlement discussions are included within the rule's scope. He cites no relevant authority in support of his argument, and it therefore need not be considered. [28] In addition, we note that a settlement discussion between a lawyer-party and a represented party is precisely the type of contact that raises some of the major concerns addressed by the rule. The lay party is at a disadvantage, and may inadvertently disclose privileged information during the course of such discussions. For an enactment to be overbroad on its face, it must reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected conduct. [29] Here, the rule only proscribes contact concerning the subject matter of a pending case with respect to which the lawyer knows the party to be represented. This proscription protects the party from potentially domineering behavior and preserves the attorney-client relationship between the party and counsel. As discussed above, a lawyer's speech concerning a pending case is subject to greater regulation than other forms of speech. [30] Accordingly, the rule does not reach a substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech. As Schaefer has not articulated how the rule is overbroad as applied to him, and the rule is not overbroad on its face, we conclude that his argument is without merit. Schaefer's final constitutional argument concerns his Sixth Amendment rights as a criminal defendant. He asserts that his contact with the Foxes was authorized by law because as a pro se defendant in the criminal case, he had a right to contact the witnesses in that case. He claims that he had this right even though a no-contact order had been entered, and even though Mr. Fox was a represented defendant in the civil conspiracy case. Here, Schaefer's communication concerned the civil conspiracy case, not only the criminal case. Also, a no-contact order had been entered by the court, and Schaefer violated it. Finally, the substance of Schaefer's contact was an attempt to persuade the Foxes to change their testimony in the criminal case to favor Schaeferan illegal communication. [31] Accordingly, Schaefer's argument is without merit.