Opinion ID: 1247105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The permissible scope of section 403

Text: Since the Constitution indubitably affords some measure of protection to the free expression of all those present at a meeting  speakers, officials, and audience  section 403's prohibition of disturbances potentially may collide with safeguarded First Amendment interests. (2a) Nonetheless, the state retains a legitimate concern in ensuring that some individuals' unruly assertion of their rights of free expression does not imperil other citizens' rights of free association and discussion. (See Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) 336 U.S. 77, 86 [93 L.Ed. 513, 521, 69 S.Ct. 448, 10 A.L.R.2d 608].) Freedom of everyone to talk at once can destroy the right of anyone effectively to talk at all. Free expression can expire as tragically in the tumult of license as in the silence of censorship. (See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Com., supra, 395 U.S. 367 [23 L.Ed.2d 371, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1805, 1810, fn. 23]; cf. Kovacs v. Cooper, supra, 336 U.S. 77, 81 [93 L.Ed. 513, 519, 69 S.Ct. 448, 10 A.L.R.2d 608] (ordinance prohibiting sound trucks emitting loud and raucous noises upheld; [u]nrestrained use throughout a municipality of all sound amplifying devices would be intolerable.).) (3) We recognize, of course, that because the `threat of sanctions may deter almost as potently as the application of sanctions' ( Burton v. Municipal Court (1968) 68 Cal.2d 684, 691 [68 Cal. Rptr. 721, 441 P.2d 281]), constitutionally permissible restrictions upon the exercise of First Amendment rights ... must be drawn with a narrow specificity calculated to prevent repression of expressive activities as to which restriction is constitutionally forbidden. ( In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 155 [65 Cal. Rptr. 273, 436 P.2d 273]; see, e.g., Dombrowski v. Pfister (1965) 380 U.S. 479, 486-487 [14 L.Ed.2d 22, 28-29, 85 S.Ct. 1116]; NAACP v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 432-433 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 417-418, 83 S.Ct. 328].) On its face, section 403 applies to every person who ... willfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly or meeting ..., and if the section were literally applied with the breadth of coverage that its terms could encompass, the statute would be constitutionally overbroad and could not stand. (4a) In the instant case, in instructing the jury, the trial court simply read, verbatim, the language of section 403. In such a broad unrestricted rendition the court invited the jury to apply the statute unconstitutionally and to find individuals guilty of nothing more than an expression of free speech protected by the Constitution. Thus the jury, under such an instruction, might convict persons whose expressive conduct disturb[ed] a meeting only because the content of the expression conflicted with the views espoused by the meeting's organizers or official speakers. The right to free expression articulated through disturbances that are no more than announced differences in ideology or beliefs lies at the heart of the First Amendment; governmental prohibition of such activity, under any statutory scheme, could not constitutionally be countenanced. (See Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) 337 U.S. 1, 4 [93 L.Ed. 1131, 1134, 69 S.Ct. 894].) As the United States Supreme Court made clear in Terminiello, in overturning an ordinance which prohibited, as a breach of the peace, misbehavior which violates the public peace and decorum ... if it stirs the public to anger, invites disputes, brings about a condition of unrest or creates a disturbance. [9] ... [A] function of free speech under our system of government is to invite disputes. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may strike at prejudice and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea. Without judicial interpretation, the statute is therefore susceptible of an unconstitutionally overbroad application. (5) We must, however, presume that the Legislature intended to enact a valid statute; we must, in applying the provision, adopt an interpretation that, consistent with the statutory language and purpose, eliminates doubts as to the provision's constitutionality. ( City of Los Angeles v. Belridge Oil Co. (1957) 48 Cal.2d 320, 324 [309 P.2d 417]; Miller v. Municipal Court (1943) 22 Cal.2d 818, 828 [142 P.2d 297].) (6) Accordingly, we now explicitly recognize that, in light of the purposes of the provision and the competing First Amendment interests at stake, section 403 authorizes the imposition of criminal sanctions only when the defendant's activity itself  and not the content of the activity's expression  substantially impairs the effective conduct of a meeting. (7a) To effectuate section 403 within constitutional limits we interpret it to require the following showing to establish its transgression: that the defendant substantially impaired the conduct of the meeting by intentionally committing acts in violation of implicit customs or usages or of explicit rules for governance of the meeting, of which he knew, or as a reasonable man should have known. In applying these standards, the nature of a meeting necessarily plays a major role. (Cf. State v. McNair (1965) 178 Neb. 763 [135 N.W.2d 463].) The customs and usages at political conventions may countenance prolonged, raucous, boisterous demonstrations as an accepted element of the meeting process; similar behavior would violate the customs and usages of a church service. Audience participation may be enthusiastically welcomed at a bonfire football rally or an athletic contest, but considered taboo at a solemn ceremony of a fraternal order. Explicit rules governing the time and place of permitted nonviolent expressions (cf. Gaddis v. State, supra, 180 N.W. 590; State v. Stuth, supra, 39 P. 665) may in some circumstances fix the limits of permissible conduct. Violation of such customs or rules by one who knew or as a reasonable man should have known of them would justify the application of section 403. [10] Thus, rather than enacting monolithic standards, section 403 draws its content from the implicit customs and usages or explicit rules germane to a given meeting. (8a) In the instant case the application of section 403 must in the first instance be examined in the light of the nature of the meeting involved here: a large, public celebration held outdoors in a public park, featuring, in the course of a political campaign, a public official as the principal speaker. Informality characterized this public rally: people could come and go as they pleased; members of the audience could move at will to other areas of the meeting. By custom and usage nonviolent demonstrations of political views are reasonably to be expected at such a gathering. As the evidence at trial disclosed, our history reveals that heckling and disputatious remarks at such affairs are commonplace occurrences. Indeed, the principal speaker at the rally, an elected public official, stated that the relevant custom sanctioned the demonstrative conduct of petitioners as a legitimate means of expression. The prosecution offered no evidence that clapping, flag waving, and sloganeering are not generally accepted and permitted at a public meeting, addressed by controversial elected officials, such as the instant one. Since the nature of that meeting contemplated acceptance of the nonviolent expression of alternative viewpoints, the petitioners' protest did not impair the conduct of the meeting but instead constituted a legitimate element of it. Moreover, the prosecution failed to show that the activities substantially impaired the conduct of the meeting. Not every violation of a general custom or of an explicit meeting rule becomes so grave as to warrant application of criminal sanctions; nor does section 403 contemplate such extensive coverage. (Cf. State v. McNair (1965) 178 Neb. 763 [135 N.W.2d 463]; People v. Malone (1913) 156 App. Div. 10 [29 N.Y. Crim. 325, 141 N.Y.S. 149].) [11] (2b) The free expression that our constitutional form of government so highly values may not be subjected to regulation by state action in the absence of an important state interest. ( Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 508-509 [21 L.Ed.2d 731, 738-739, 89 S.Ct. 733].) (9) Whether a given instance of misconduct substantially impairs the effective conduct of a meeting depends upon the actual impact of that misconduct on the course of the meeting; the question cannot be resolved merely by asking persons present at the meeting whether they were disturbed. (See Morris v. State (1888) 84 Ala. 457 [4 So. 628]; Calvert v. State (1883) 14 Tex. Crim. App. 154.) (8b) In the instant case, the questioned conduct continued for only a few minutes, Congressman Tunney was able to complete his speech, and it does not appear that a large part of the audience could not hear his remarks. We conclude that the state failed to meet its burden of establishing a substantial impairment of the conduct of the meeting. Finally, we do not believe that there was a sufficient showing that the defendants disturbed the meeting within the constitutionally permissible limits of the statutory term disturb. Generally, if disturbances are occasioned by nonviolent exercise of free expression, section 403 will require that defendants be shown to have engaged in such conduct with knowledge, or under circumstances in which they should have known, that they were violating an applicable custom, usage, or rule [12] of the meeting. (10) In instances in which the appropriate standard of conduct lies in doubt, a warning and a request that defendants curtail their conduct, either by officials or law enforcement agents, should precede arrest or citation. [13] If section 403 were not so interpreted, individuals would be forced to speculate as to what conduct might entail criminal sanctions and would necessarily ... `steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' ( Keyishian v. Board of Regents (1966) 385 U.S. 589, 604 [17 L.Ed.2d 629, 641, 87 S.Ct. 675]; see Interstate Circuit v. Dallas (1968) 390 U.S. 676, 684 [20 L.Ed.2d 225, 232, 88 S.Ct. 1298]; Baggett v. Bullitt (1964) 377 U.S. 360, 372 [12 L.Ed.2d 377, 385, 84 S.Ct. 1316]; Speiser v. Randall (1958) 357 U.S. 513, 526 [2 L.Ed.2d 1460, 1472, 78 S.Ct. 1332].) The chilling effect on the protected expression of participants at a meeting that would be engendered by a less stringent reading of section 403 would raise serious questions concerning the provision's constitutionality. [14] (8c) Given the general customs, usages, and rules applicable to the large public meeting in the instant case, petitioners may well have been attempting only to express a particular political point of view in a peaceful manner appropriate to the occasion. No evidence adduced at trial supported the conclusion that petitioners intended substantially to impair the conduct of the meeting. After petitioners began their nonviolent activity, neither the leaders of the meeting nor any other officials notified them that their actions were inappropriate for the public gathering or substantially impaired the conduct of the meeting. No one instructed, or even requested, petitioners to cease their activity; indeed, Congressman Tunney's remarks during the meeting explicitly, and correctly, encouraged petitioners to believe that their conduct was constitutionally protected. Under these circumstances, we cannot find that petitioners disturbed the meeting within the meaning of section 403. Our accommodation of the competing constitutional postulates will serve to preserve both section 403 and the constitutional protections. It prevents so excessive a use of the First Amendment right to protest that the right would be devoured in its own excesses. (7b) Thus, participants at a meeting may express disagreement but must not violate explicit rules or implicit customs and usages, pertaining to the meeting, of which they knew or should have known; such activity, when it is intentional and when it substantially impairs the conduct of a meeting, violates section 403. In view of the foregoing discussion of the scope of section 403, we need not decide whether, without such definition, the statute would be void for vagueness. [15] (4b, 8d) Although in instructing the jury on the necessary elements of a violation of section 403, the trial court erred in failing to designate the constitutionally compelled limits of the broad statutory language as discussed above, we do not remand the case for a new trial since we conclude that section 403 cannot constitutionally be applied so as to reach the facts in the instant case. Accordingly, habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy. ( In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Cal.2d 666, 668 [36 Cal. Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182, 10 A.L.R.3d 840].) Inasmuch as section 403 does not apply to petitioners' conduct, we need not determine whether the penalty assessed in the case at bar was unconstitutional because so severe as to chill legitimate activity. [16] The writ is granted. The judgment against petitioners is set aside.