Opinion ID: 757025
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Suppress Contents of the Storage Shed

Text: 47 At trial, the government introduced homemade nitroglycerine and large quantities of bomb making ingredients seized from a storage shed (the Shed), at the Space Station storage facility in Jersey City (the Space Station). Salameh argues that Judge Duffy should have suppressed this evidence. Salameh is wrong. 48 On March 5, 1993, a Magistrate Judge in the District of New Jersey issued a search warrant for the Shed. Probable cause for the warrant was based upon an affidavit of FBI Special Agent Eric Pilker. 49 Before trial, Salameh moved to suppress the evidence from the Shed on the ground that Pilker's affidavit did not establish probable cause for the search. Salameh also requested a hearing to test alleged misstatements in Pilker's affidavit. Judge Duffy denied the motion to suppress as well as the requested hearing, finding that: (1) Salameh lacked standing to contest the search; (2) there was probable cause for the search warrant; and (3) even if the warrant was not supported by probable cause, the search was proper because it was conducted in good faith reliance on the search warrant. Because we agree that there was both probable cause and good faith, we need not and do not address the standing argument.
50 In deciding whether probable cause exists for a search warrant, a judge must determine whether there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983). [O]nly the probability, and not the prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause. Id. at 235, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In assessing the proof of probable cause, the government's affidavit in support of the search warrant must be read as a whole, and construed realistically. See id. at 230-31, 103 S.Ct. 2317. 51 We accord great deference to a judge's determination that probable cause exists, and we resolve any doubt about the existence of probable cause in favor of upholding the warrant. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 803 (2d Cir.1992). Our duty is simply to ensure that the magistrate had a 'substantial basis for ... conclud[ing]' that probable cause existed. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317 (citation omitted; alterations in original). 52 Pilker's affidavit in support of the search warrant stated that an explosion had occurred at the World Trade Center, and that an FBI explosives expert had determined that it was caused by a bomb. The affidavit also related that the expert knew from examining an auto part recovered at the crime scene that the part belonged to whatever vehicle carried the bomb. Using the part's vehicle identification number, investigators traced it to a yellow Ford Econoline 350 van registered in Alabama to the Ryder Truck Rental Company and leased by Mohammad Salameh from a rental office in Jersey City for a one-week period beginning three days before the explosion. 53 Elsewhere in the affidavit, Pilker related that a Space Station employee informed the FBI that storage shed number 4344 was under lease to Kamil Ibrahim. The employee told the FBI that on February 25, 1993, one day before the bombing, he observed Kamil Ibrahim, along with other males, making numerous trips to the Shed using a yellow Ryder van. Moreover, the same Space Station employee stated that on March 4, 1993, less than one week after the bombing, he entered the Shed and observed containers marked sulfuric acid, nitric acid and urea. A forensic chemist at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms informed the FBI that those three substances could be combined to produce a powerful bomb. 54 Finally, the affidavit described that, when renting the Ryder van, Salameh had given a telephone number that belonged to someone named Jodie Hadas at 34 Kensington Avenue, Apt. 4, in Jersey City. When investigators searched that apartment on March 4, 1993, they found tools, wiring and manuals concerning antennae, circuitry and electromagnetic devices. A law enforcement bomb technician advised the FBI that these items indicated that a bomb maker lived in that apartment. 55 Cumulatively, this evidence provided ample probable cause to believe that the Shed contained evidence of the World Trade Center bombing.
56 Salameh argues that Pilker's affidavit contained recklessly false statements regarding the alleged evidence of bomb making discovered at the Kensington Avenue apartment. Salameh asserts that Judge Duffy should have granted him a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), to test the accuracy of Pilker's claims. 57 To be entitled to a Franks hearing, a defendant must make a substantial preliminary showing that: (1) the claimed inaccuracies or omissions are the result of the affiant's deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth; and (2) the alleged falsehoods or omissions were necessary to the judge's probable cause finding. See United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 43 (2d Cir.1987). If, after setting aside the allegedly misleading statements or omissions, the affidavit, nonetheless, presents sufficient information to support a finding of probable cause, the district court need not conduct a Franks hearing. See id. 58 In his affidavit, Pilker related that the Kensington Avenue apartment contained evidence of a bomb maker. Salameh maintains that this statement was false, and that Pilker was reckless in including it in his affidavit. 59 In support of his claim of recklessness, Salameh proffered the affidavit of Musab Yasin, an electrical engineering professor who claimed to reside in the Kensington Avenue apartment. Yasin averred that the materials discovered by the government were used in his electrical engineering studies. He also said that he informed Pilker of this fact on two separate occasions, but Pilker failed to include Yasin's benign explanation of the materials in the affidavit in support of the search warrant. 60 The district judge did not err in denying Salameh a Franks hearing because the allegedly false statements in Pilker's affidavit were not necessary for a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Trzaska, 111 F.3d 1019, 1027-28 (2d Cir.1997). As detailed above, there was a wealth of evidence presented in Pilker's affidavit which raised a reasonable probability that the Shed contained evidence of the World Trade Center bombing. Disregarding the allegedly false statements in Pilker's affidavit, the other evidence presented by the government amply supported a finding of probable cause. See United States v. Marin-Buitrago, 734 F.2d 889, 895 (2d Cir.1984).
61 Even assuming, arguendo, that probable cause was lacking for the issuance of the search warrant, Judge Duffy properly declined to suppress the evidence discovered in the Shed because the search of the Shed was conducted in good faith reliance on the search warrant. 62 If a reviewing court determines that a search warrant was not supported by probable cause, a motion to suppress will still be denied if the court finds that the officers who conducted the search acted in good faith reliance on a facially valid warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918-23, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). An officer's reliance on a warrant is not in good faith when the application supporting the warrant is  'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in [the existence of probable cause] entirely unreasonable.'  Id. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975) (Powell, J., concurring in part)). 63 For the reasons explained above, the application for the warrant presented ample indicia of probable cause. Thus, the agents' reliance on the warrant in conducting the search of the Shed was reasonable and in good faith.