Opinion ID: 2721127
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Computer Use Enhancement

Text: The district court increased Pringler’s advisory range under U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B) based on the use of a computer in the offense. Section 2G1.3(b)(3) provides for a two-level increase to the defendant’s base offense level: If the offense involved the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to (A) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, the minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct; or (B) entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor. U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3(b)(3). The Commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines states: Subsection (b)(3) is intended to apply only to the use of a computer or an interactive computer service to communicate directly with a minor or with a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor. Id. § 2G1.3 cmt. n.4. 8 Case: 12-10029 Document: 00512747031 Page: 9 Date Filed: 08/26/2014 No. 12-10029 The parties disagree over the legal significance of application note 4. Pringler argues that §2G1.3(b)(3) does not apply to the facts of this case under application note 4. Since Pringler met B.L. in person, he did not “use . . . a computer . . . to communicate directly with a minor” or “with a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor.” Citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993), the government responds that where the commentary is inconsistent with the Guideline it purports to interpret, it does not control our application of that guideline. The government also argues that, even if we apply application note 4, the district court was correct to apply the computer-use enhancement because Pringler exercised custody and control over B.L. Therefore, third parties that contacted Pringler using a computer in response to website advertisements had “communicate[d] directly with . . . a person who exercises custody . . . of the minor.” We note at the outset that if we were to apply note 4, Pringler would be ineligible for the computer use enhancement. Nothing in the record reflects that he or Norman used a computer “to communicate directly with a minor or with a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor.” We reject the government’s contention that the circumstances of this case could simultaneously satisfy application note 4 and the computer use enhancement. According to that argument, which is based on the unpublished Third Circuit decision in United States v. Burnett, 377 F. App’x 248, 252 (3d Cir. 2010) (unpublished), a pimp could use a computer to advertise or solicit sex with the minor. A third party seeking to have sex with the minor would contact the pimp using a computer. The third party in that scenario might assume the pimp had custody or control over the minor. Then, the facts would meet the requirement of application note 4, because the third party would have used a 9 Case: 12-10029 Document: 00512747031 Page: 10 Date Filed: 08/26/2014 No. 12-10029 computer to communicate directly “with a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor.” The problem with Burnett’s reasoning is that it would make the relevant “use of the computer” the third party’s use. That would satisfy the language of application note 4 by having the third party communicate in some instances with a pimp, who has control or custody over the minor. But, the third party’s “use” cannot be the “use” referred to in Subsection 3(B). Reading the third party’s “use” back into the language of the Guideline, the third party does not “use the computer” to entice another to engage in sexual activity with the minor as Subsection 3(B) requires. He is instead using the computer to try to arrange to engage in sexual activity with the minor himself. So, we cannot follow the Third Circuit’s attempt to harmonize Subsection 3(B) and application note 4. Consequently, we must decide whether the computer use enhancement § 2G1.3(b)(3) applies to uses of the computer beyond the scenarios mentioned in application note 4. We have reason to avoid giving effect to an interpretive or explanatory application note only if we determine that the note “is inconsistent with, or a plainly erroneous reading of” the Guideline. Stinson 508 U.S. at 38. Whether application note 4 to § 2G1.3(b)(3) meets this test is an issue of first impression in this circuit. 2 Guideline § 2G1.3(b)(3) contemplates two distinct scenarios in which the computer use enhancement might apply. Under the first scenario, Subsection 2 In United States v. Phea, 12-51031, 2014 WL 2694223 (5th Cir. June 13, 2014), we recently upheld a sentence under Guideline § 2G1.3(b)(3)(A), where the defendant “used a computer to facilitate the travel of” a minor and “used a computer to communicate” with the minor for two days. Id. at . Since the defendant in that case had used a computer to communicate directly with a minor, the Phea court did not have occasion to address the inconsistency between additional note 4 and the Guideline. Phea also did not address a sentencing enhancement under (b)(3)(B) of the Guideline. 10 Case: 12-10029 Document: 00512747031 Page: 11 Date Filed: 08/26/2014 No. 12-10029 (3)(A) involves the use of a computer to persuade a minor to engage in prohibited sexual conduct. In the second, by contrast, Subsection 3(B) involves the use of a computer to persuade, solicit, or entice a third party “john” to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor. “‘Subsection [3](B), which applies when the defendant entices ‘a person’ to engage in illegal sexual conduct with the minor, does not apply without three people—the defendant, the minor, and the third person who is being enticed.’” United States v. Murphy, 530 F. App’x 522, 524 n.1 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Lay, 583 F.3d 436, 448 (6th Cir. 2009) (Merritt, J., dissenting in part) (emphasis added)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Our sister circuits that have confronted computer use enhancements under the third party inducement scenario have divided on the proper approach. Two circuits, the Eleventh and the Fourth, have found application note 4 inapplicable and relied on the plain meaning of the Guideline alone in upholding computer use sentencing enhancements under Subsection (3)(B). The Fourth Circuit found that the defendant’s advertisement and solicitation of customers using the Internet “fall[s] squarely within the plain language of the Guideline” and remarked that “Application Note 4 . . . appears to address only the situation posited in [Subsection] (3)(A).” United States v. Winbush, 524 F. App’x 914, 916 (4th Cir. 2013). The Eleventh Circuit similarly rejected an argument that “the [Subsection 3(B)] enhancement is inapplicable in [the defendant’s] case because he did not personally solicit the minors.” United States v. Vance, 494 F.3d 985, 997 (11th Cir. 2007), superseded on other grounds by U.S.S.G. supp. to app. C, amend. 732 (2009). The court found that this argument “ignores the plain meaning” of the Guideline, and the defendant’s communication on a website with a supposed pimp, whom the defendant assumed would provide minors for sexual activities, “squarely fit 11 Case: 12-10029 Document: 00512747031 Page: 12 Date Filed: 08/26/2014 No. 12-10029 into the plain language.” Id; see also Murphy, 530 F. App’x at 528 (assuming that Subsection (3)(B) applied without discussing application note 4 where the defendant “took photographs of [the minor] that he uploaded onto his computer and burned onto compact discs” which were eventually used in flyers for his escort business). 3 Other circuits have reached a different conclusion and found application note 4 to be authoritative. The Seventh and Third Circuits each applied application note 4, though to reach opposite results. The Seventh Circuit found the enhancement inapplicable based on application note 4’s language, where internet ads for the defendant’s minor prostitute were posted by another minor who was working for a different pimp. United States v. Patterson, 576 F.3d 431, 434, 443 (7th Cir. 2009). In contrast, the Third Circuit found the enhancement applicable even in light of application note 4’s language, where the defendant made postings related to a minor prostitute on craigslist.org. Burnett, 377 F. App’x at 252. The Burnett court found that its application of the (b)(3)(B) enhancement was not inconsistent with application note 4, because the pimp “exercised a type of ‘supervisory control’ over [the minor 3 In addition, on plain error review, the Ninth Circuit has noted, without deciding, that the plain language of Subsection 3(B) “would seemingly apply to the facts of this case because it contemplates using a computer to entice or solicit a third party—the ‘person’—to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with the minor” while application note 4 “indicates, . . . that § 2G1.3(b)(3) would not apply to the facts of this case because the computer was not used to communicate directly with the minor or her custodian.” United States v. Jackson, 697 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2012) (declining to decide whether the plain language is inconsistent with the application note and upholding the enhancement on the ground that the district court did not commit plain error); see also United States v. Madkins, 390 F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2010) (acknowledging that a “persuasive case has been made that the commentary [of application note 4] is at odds with the plain language of the [Subsection 3(B)] enhancement” but declining to reach the issue on plain error review). 12 Case: 12-10029 Document: 00512747031 Page: 13 Date Filed: 08/26/2014 No. 12-10029 prostitute]” and “individuals who responded to the postings must have believed so.” Id. We are persuaded by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits and hold that application note 4 is inconsistent with Subsection 3(B). 4 If we were to give application note 4 controlling weight, it would render Subsection 3(B) inoperable in all but a narrow subset of cases under only one of the numerous criminal statutes the Guideline covers. In fact, under § 1591, there is no factual scenario for which an individual could receive the computer use enhancement, were we to apply application note 4. In light of the Guideline’s drafting history, we also conclude that application note 4’s coverage of Subsection 3(B) is itself the result of a drafting error. We can come up with no scenario in which conduct made criminal by § 1591 could satisfy both Subsection 3(B) and application note 4. Rather, we can conceive of only one scenario in which other criminal offenses could satisfy both provisions. See U.S.S.G. § 2G1.3 cmt. (noting that the Guideline covers not just individuals convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1591, but also under 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (if the offense involved a minor); 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421 (if the offense involved a minor), 2422 (if the offense involved a minor), 2423, and 2425). Section 2422(b) criminalizes “knowingly persuad[ing], induc[ing], entic[ing], or coerc[ing] any individual who has not attained the age of 18 years, to engage in prostitution or any sexual activity for which any person can be charged with 4 Pringler urges us to follow the Seventh Circuit’s approach in Patterson, finding application note 4 authoritative and finding the enhancement inapplicable. We decline to do so. The Seventh Circuit case is distinguishable on the facts. There, neither the defendant nor someone part of the same criminal activity used a computer to solicit patrons. See Patterson, 576 F.3d at 434. The enhancement would not have been applicable, irrespective of application note 4. 13 Case: 12-10029 Document: 00512747031 Page: 14 Date Filed: 08/26/2014 No. 12-10029 a criminal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). An individual could commit that crime by using a computer to communicate with the minor’s custodian in order to persuade the minor to engage in prohibited sexual activity, either with the defendant or the custodian. See, e.g., United States v. Berk, 652 F.3d 132, 140 (1st Cir. 2011) (affirming conviction under § 2422(b), where defendant communicated with a minor’s custodian over the Internet); United States v. Nestor, 574 F.3d 159, 161–62 (3d Cir. 2009) (same). Based on our review, no other scenario would make the application note consistent with Subsection 3(B). Therefore, if we were to give application note 4 controlling weight, it would render Subsection 3(B) inoperable in all but this narrow subset of cases under only one of the criminal statutes the Guideline covers. This leads us to conclude that the application note “can’t mean what it says.” Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 510–11 (1989). In addition, the drafting history of the Guideline shows that applying application note 4 to Subsection 3(B) is the result of a drafting error. The note was only intended to apply to “the situation posited in [Subsection 3(A)].” Winbush, 524 F. App’x at 916. Before November 1, 2004, a single guideline section covered the promotion of a commercial sex act with another, regardless of the victim’s age: U.S.S.G. § 2G1.1. It contained both a provision and application note with nearly identical language to that at issue here. As subsection (b)(5)(A) then stated: If a computer or an Internet-access device was used to (A) persuade, induce, entice, coerce, or facilitate the travel of, a minor to engage in prostitution; or (B) entice, encourage, offer, or solicit a person to engage in prohibited sexual conduct with a minor, increase by 2. Application note 8 stated: 14 Case: 12-10029 Document: 00512747031 Page: 15 Date Filed: 08/26/2014 No. 12-10029 Subsection (b)(5)(A) is intended to apply only to the use of a computer or an Internet-access device to communicate directly with a minor or with a person who exercises custody, care, or supervisory control of the minor. Accordingly, the enhancement in subsection (b)(5)(A) would not apply to the use of a computer or Internet-access device to obtain airline tickets for the minor from an airline’s Internet site. (emphasis added). Crucially, the nearly identical application note specifies that it applies, as is logical, only to Subsection 3(A) of the enhancement, not to the entire enhancement. Then, the Commission revised § 2G1.1 effective November 1, 2004, to cover only those offenses that do not involve minors by striking the entire language of § 2G1.1 and replacing it with language that addressed only adults. U.S.S.G. Appx. C, Vol. III, Amendment 664, page 25–31. In the same amendment, the Commission explained that offenses involving a minor victim were now to be sentenced under § 2G1.3. Id. at page 33. The Commission thereby amended the Guidelines by moving the previous language and commentary of § 2G1.1 involving minors 5 to a new section § 2G1.3 at the end of subpart 1. Id. at 34. Thus came into being the new troublesome language of application note 4. The new application note mirrors the language of the the old § 2G1.1 application note, with a big difference. That note which applied explicitly only to subpart (A) of § 2G1.1(b)(5) now applied to both provisions of (b)(3). This change was a mere drafting error. For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the commentary in application note 4 is “inconsistent with” Guideline § 2G1.3(b)(3)(B), and we therefore follow the plain language of the Guideline alone. Stinson, 508 U.S. at 38; cf. United 5With a few semantic changes, like “Internet access device” changed to “interactive computer service.” 15 Case: 12-10029 Document: 00512747031 Page: 16 Date Filed: 08/26/2014 No. 12-10029 States v. Ashburn, 20 F.3d 1336, 1340–41 (5th Cir. 1994) (refusing to apply application note 6 to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) because the note “would contradict the language of the Guidelines”), vacated in non-relevant part, 38 F.3d 803 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). Applying the language of the Guideline alone, we conclude that the district court did not err in applying the computer use enhancement on these facts. 6 Pringler owned the computer that Norman repeatedly used to advertise her services on websites. Based on Norman’s testimony, Pringler bought the computer, showed her how to use the webcam feature on the computer, knew that Norman and B.L. were using the webcam to capture video of their encounters with customers, and knew of Norman’s use of the computer for advertising B.L.’s services. Therefore, the district court could conclude that the offense involved the use of a computer to induce third parties to engage in sexual activity with a minor.