Opinion ID: 2586092
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Concerns about the welfare of A.D. justify delay.

Text: In Yarbor v. State, [50] we held that a seven-month pre-indictment delay did not violate the defendant's due process rights because it was not unreasonable for the state to wait three months for the mother of a sexual abuse victim to decide whether or not to press charges. Yarbor performed lewd and lascivious acts towards a ten-year old child in August 1973. Between August and December of that year the district attorney's office reviewed the case, and in December a formal complaint was prepared for the minor's mother to sign. [51] The mother was notified several times a month that the complaint was ready for her signature, but she did not sign until March of that next year. [52] Two days later, Yarbor was served with the complaint. [53] This court found that the state's decision to wait three months because of the mother's hesitation was not unreasonable. [54] The court noted that the emotional effects to the child, injury to the child's reputation, and family disruption[] all had to be considered in [the mother's] decision. [55] In Burke v. State, [56] we expanded on the justifiability of delay in cases involving sexual abuse of a minor. In that case the accused was charged with statutory rape against his stepdaughter. We explained that [a]lthough the mother in this case was not reluctant, a concern by the district attorney's office over the advisability of bringing charges of a similarly serious nature also suggests that the effects on the victim and her family are factors which must be carefully weighed by the district attorney. [57] Case law thus shows that consideration for the victim's situation is an acceptable reason for pre-indictment delay. Indeed, it is possible that the investigators had even more reason for the delay in the present case because A.D. necessitated such extensive psychiatric hospitalization allegedly due to her trauma. Furthermore, Burke and Yarbor each presented a case in which any testimony from the victims could be put to immediate use because the whereabouts of the perpetrator was known. In contrast, Detective Branchflower could reasonably hesitate even longer before bringing A.D. in front of a grand jury given that Gonzales could not be found. The superior court acknowledged that further testimony would have been necessary from A.D. for the grand jury to indict Gonzales, but faulted the state for not presenting evidence that A.D. was unable to have testified in 1992 (presumably following her release from the hospital). The superior court stated on the record, this is a case that was ready to go and it didn't go, and problems have resulted. We disagree with that characterization. Given A.D.'s emotional fragility and the defendant's absence from the state, the state acted reasonably by delaying. By the time that A.D. was released from the hospital, Gonzalez had fled. The superior court abused its discretion in determining that the state's decision to delay was unreasonable.