Opinion ID: 1637413
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fourth Amendment right to be free from improper search and seizure.

Text: ¶ 26. Finally, Deeds claims that taking his blood sample constituted an unlawful search and seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, alleging that Officer Gibbs had no probable cause to take his blood, nor were exigent circumstances present to necessitate taking the blood sample without a warrant. Deeds was not arrested at the time of the accident but was transported to the hospital for medical treatment. Accordingly, the taking of his blood sample was not a search incident to arrest. ¶ 27. This Court has ruled that [a] search made without a warrant and not incident to a lawful arrest is not illegal per se, but if the fruits of the search are to withstand the exclusionary rule, the search must have been predicated on probable cause. Hailes v. State, 268 So.2d 345, 346 (Miss.1972). In Wilkerson v. State , we held that drawing blood evidence from a defendant at the hospital without a warrant following an accident was not a violation of the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights because the law enforcement officer had probable cause. Wilkerson v. State, 731 So.2d 1173 (Miss.1999). This Court held that: Probable cause for a search is a common sense determination that the facts and circumstances known to the police officer, either through his own direct knowledge or gained second-hand from reliable sources, are such that contraband or evidence material to a criminal investigation will be found in a particular place. It must be more than mere or reasonable suspicion, but it need not meet the requirements of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.... Id. at 1177-78. ¶ 28. The facts of Wilkerson are substantially similar to those in the present case. Id. at 1176. The officer in Wilkerson knew that (1) the defendant had been involved in a head-on collision; (2) the collision had occurred in the other vehicle's lane of travel; (3) the defendant had been driving recklessly; and (4) the defendant had a strong odor of intoxicating substances on his person. Id. Similarly, Deeds's head-on collision with Bridges occurred in Bridges's lane of travel. Bridges testified that when she saw Deeds crossing into her westbound lane of Goodman Road, he [l]ooked like to me he was flying. More importantly, Officer Gibbs testified that he detected the scent of intoxicating beverage emanating from both the vehicle and from Deeds's breath when he checked to see if Deeds was breathing. Officer Gibbs also observed a half-empty, half-gallon bottle of whisky sitting on the floorboard of Deeds's vehicle. These facts and circumstances evince more than a mere or reasonable suspicion that evidence material to the criminal investigation, an illegal blood alcohol level, would be found. We find, as the trial court did, that Officer Gibbs had probable cause to obtain a blood sample from Deeds. ¶ 29. Further, [a] warrantless search is permissible in certain exigent circumstances if it can be shown that grounds existed to conduct the search that, had time permitted, would have reasonably satisfied a disinterested magistrate that a warrant should properly issue. Holloman v. State, 820 So.2d 52, 55 (Miss.Ct. App.2002) citing Sanders v. State, 678 So.2d 663, 667 (Miss.1996). In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court noted that search warrants are normally required for searches of homes, and held that absent an emergency, no less could be required where intrusions into the human body are concerned. Id. at 770, 86 S.Ct. 1826. The Court found that exigent circumstances existed to justify the warrantless seizure of blood samples: The officer in the present case, however, might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence, Preston v. U.S., 376 U.S. 364, 367, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777. We are told that the percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant. Given these special facts, we conclude that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. 1826. ¶ 30. During the suppression hearing, Officer Gibbs testified that exigent circumstances existed: Q: Now, the question remains: Why didn't you get a warrant? How long would it have taken you to describe to the Court what procedures you would have had to undertake at that point in time to retrieve a warrant? A: If I did, I would have to go back to the police department, sit down, type up an affidavit at that point as well as the warrant, and then goI would have to drive out to Judge typically, we have our warrants signed by Judge McGarrh, who lives quite a bit out in the country so to speak, and then after I get it signed, come back and head down to the MED. Q: Now, based off of your previous experiences, how long would that entire process have taken? A: It's tough to say, but I mean, it could be anywhere from an hour and a half to two and a half hours. Q: Now, based off your experience as a law enforcement officer and having been a DUI officer, as you stated earlier, what affect [sic] does time have on the level of blood alcohol in the human system? A: As time goes on, it decreases. ¶ 31. Based on this testimony, and the facts and circumstances of this case, this Court is satisfied that exigent circumstances existed that justified taking a blood sample without first seeking a warrant. These circumstances include not only the undisputed fact that alcohol rates begin to dissipate after drinking ceases, but also the fact that the officers were involved in the investigation of a major vehicle accident involving serious injuries to multiple people, requiring their transportation to nearby hospitals, as well as the time that would have been required to obtain a warrant before traveling to the hospital to obtain the samples. Accordingly, we find this assignment of error to be without merit. ¶ 32. For the reasons stated, the judgment of the Circuit Court of DeSoto County is affirmed. ¶ 33. CONVICTION OF DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE CAUSING INJURY AND SENTENCE OF FIFTEEN (15) YEARS IN THE CUSTODY OF THE MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, WITH EIGHT (8) YEARS OF POST-RELEASE SUPERVISION, AND FIVE (5) OF THOSE YEARS REPORTING TO A PROBATION OFFICER PURSUANT TO MISS. CODE ANN. § 47-7-34, WITH CONDITIONS, AND PAY A FINE OF $1000.00, AND $100.00 TO THE MISSISSIPPI CRIME VICTIM'S COMPENSATION FUND, AFFIRMED. WALLER, C.J., CARLSON, P.J., DICKINSON, RANDOLPH AND PIERCE, JJ., CONCUR. KITCHENS, J., DISSENTS WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN OPINION JOINED BY GRAVES, P.J., AND CHANDLER, J.