Opinion ID: 2621655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: awards of attorney fees

Text: ¶23 We now address Joe and Rikki's argument that the court of appeals improperly limited its review of the attorney fees award. Joe and Rikki assert that the court of appeals erred when it stated that the only finding relevant to its review of the award was whether Linnea obtained a recovery based on a violation of the trust. Cafferty v. Hughes, 2002 UT App 105, ¶ 24, 46 P.3d 233. We agree with Joe and Rikki that the particular language employed by the court of appeals is inappropriately narrow inasmuch as it fails to recognize the broad discretion vested in courts of equity. We do not agree, however, that the court of appeals erred in its overall review of the attorney fees issue. ¶24 All parties concede this is a case in equity, and equity cases afford courts discretion and latitude in fashioning equitable remedies. Although the court of appeals could have provided a more comprehensive opinion discussing all of the equities present in this case, it was not required to do so. A court acting in equity is not required to recite its decision in terms of specific factors or to adhere to formulaic tests. Rather, its obligation is to effectuate a result that serves equity given the overall facts and circumstances of the individual case. [2] ¶25 The court of appeals was aware of the facts and circumstances of this case as developed in the trial court proceedings and as briefed by the parties. Joe and Rikki presented their arguments relating to the fairness of awarding fees to Linnea to the court of appeals, and ultimately, the court held that Linnea's award was supported by the record. Id. The court further recognized that the case presented a breach of trust situation akin to that mentioned in Stewart. Id. A more expansive discussion of the issue was possible but not necessary. [3] ¶26 In connection with their argument that the court of appeals did not properly review the award of attorney fees, Joe and Rikki invite this court to establish a general rule governing equitable awards of attorney fees. We reject their invitation in view of our conclusion that imposition of such a rule would hamper the ability of our trial courts to fashion equitable remedies appropriate for individual cases. [4] The distinguishing characteristics of legal remedies are their uniformity, their unchangeableness or fixedness, their lack of adaptation to circumstances, and the technical rules which govern their use. . . . Equitable remedies, on the other hand, are distinguished by their flexibility, their unlimited variety, [and] their adaptability to circumstances . . . . [T]he court of equity has the power of devising its remedy and shaping it so as to fit the changing circumstances of every case and the complex relations of all the parties. 1 Spencer W. Symons, Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence § 109 (5th ed. 1941). ¶27 Each case presents unique facts and circumstances. What is relevant or persuasive in one equity decision may be meaningless in another context. As in much else that pertains to equitable jurisdiction, individualization in the exercise of a discretionary power will alone retain equity as a living system and save it from sterility. Sprague v. Ticonic Nat'l Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 167 (1939).
¶28 We now address Joe and Rikki's argument that the court of appeals upheld the award of attorney fees in contravention of equity. Joe and Rikki rely on three facts that they contend render the award of attorney fees inequitable in this case. First, Joe and Rikki argue that Linnea is guilty of serious misconduct and is therefore undeserving of an award. They point specifically to the fact that Linnea supported Dwight and John in their filing of motions designed to effectuate an unfair distribution of the estate. Although this alleged misconduct was argued to both the trial court and the court of appeals, neither court found it persuasive and neither court concluded that Linnea's actions were improper. Our review of the record reveals nothing to suggest that the court of appeals was incorrect with respect to this conclusion. ¶29 Second, Joe and Rikki assert that they acted in good faith. They therefore urge us to conclude that the award of attorney fees was improper or, alternatively, that it should be satisfied from the assets of the trust. [5] Their claim is undermined, however, by the trial court's findings that Joe and Rikki disregarded the plain language of all of the trust documents regarding priority of trustees, engaged in a pattern aimed at remaining as trustees without interference from their siblings, failed to regularly account to trust beneficiaries as required by statute, ignored legal counsel concerning the disposition of funds removed from the Marital Trust, and paid themselves excessive trustee fees. ¶30 Finally, Joe and Rikki argue that no award should have been granted because Linnea sought personal benefit in this litigation and the trust was not benefitted as a whole by her actions. We disagree. The record does not show that Linnea sought only personal gain. Indeed, the litigation resulted in a recapture of substantial funds to the trust estate, which benefitted all of the beneficiaries.