Opinion ID: 2538601
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Coastal development and habitats standards

Text: The coastal development standard directs agencies to prioritize development in coastal areas for water-dependent and water-related uses, placing third and last in the hierarchy uses and activities which are neither water-dependent nor water-related for which there is no feasible and prudent inland alternative to meet the public need for the use or activity. [42] The Division concluded that the Airport's proposal was neither water-dependent nor water-related but that no feasible and prudent inland alternative to meet the public need for the use or activity exists. The habitats standard similarly declares that agencies may allow uses and activities in coastal zone wetlands that would not maintain or enhance the ... characteristics of the habitat and that would not assure adequate water flow, nutrients, and oxygen levels and avoid adverse effects on natural drainage patterns, the destruction of important habitat, and the discharge of toxic substances if three conditions are met. [43] These three conditions are that there is a significant public need for the proposed use or activity, that there is no feasible prudent alternative to meet the public need for the proposed use or activity which would conform to [the above] standards, and that all feasible and prudent steps to maximize conformance with the [above standards] will be taken. [44] These three conditions are stringent and strongly protective. [45] The standard is meant to apply a strict limitation on impacts to the point of prohibition unless these conditions are met. [46] The Division determined that the Airport's project satisfied these three conditions.
A 1982 Informal Attorney General Opinion explained public need as follows: [t]he proposed activity cannot merely be convenient, though it need not be indispensable. The need is not that of an individual or corporation, but that of the community or some larger element of the public (e.g., state or nation). [47] The habitats standard imposes a higher standard than the coastal development standard, requiring significant public need; [w]hile the distinction ... is necessarily somewhat subjective, factors such as immediacy of the need and the potential for loss of life or harm to health could assist in the classification. [48] Presumably because the showing needed for the habitats standard is greater, the Division addressed the public need criterion for both the coastal development and habitats standards in its discussion of the habitats standard. The Division referred to the Airport studies, specifically the June 1999 AIA Master Plan Update in Chapter 3, Facility Requirements, indicating that additional facilities will be needed for the airport to remain a viable commercial hub for the State of Alaska. [49] The Division declared that [t]his is not the desire or need of a few individuals, rather it is meeting a statewide need. Moreover, it is not just a desire, but is a central part of the statewide transportation network and [it] is in the public interest to maintain a viable international airport and seaplane base in Anchorage. Because the Division identified a significant public need for a functional international airport in Anchorage, it found this condition to be satisfied. The determination that a significant public need ... exists is exactly the type of `policy decision, involving complex issues that are beyond this court's ability to decide,' to which we give considerable deference. Without evidence that this decision was arbitrary or capricious, we cannot negate this policy decision.... [50] ACE claims that the Division failed to show public need, much less significant public need, for any particular use or activity on the consistency determination's list of possible uses. ACE maintains that the Division's statements in the consistency determination and the Airport's statement in its application that the purpose of the project is to allow [the Airport] to meet the air transportation needs of Anchorage and Alaska and the development demands from current and future aviation operations are merely conclusory generalit[ies] and do not show that a public need exists for anything, much less everything, on the [r]evised [u]ses list. ACE's arguments again stem from its view of the specificity needed for a project. ACE's proposed methodology of separately explaining the need for each allowable use is an acceptable approach but is not the only or the required approach; addressing the development of uses in the aggregate is also allowable. In Kachemak Bay Conservation Society [51] and Ninilchik Traditional Council v. Noah , [52] we concluded that the agency reasonably determined that a significant public need existed for oil and gas lease sales because of the public need for revenues, jobs, and economic stabilitybenefits that stem from the project as a whole as opposed to individual uses or activities. [53] We therefore hold that the Division did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in considering whether a significant public need existed for airport expansion as a whole, as opposed to for each particular potential use or activity. ACE further asserts that neither the Division nor the Airport identified anything resembling a factor of immediacy or any threat of potential loss of life or harm to health that would indicate a significant public need to satisfy the habitats standard. These are not the only possible indicators, however; the attorney general's opinion clearly states that the difference between public need and significant public need is somewhat subjective and offered those two factors merely as ones that could assist in the classification. [54] As just noted, the public need we held to be reasonable in Kachemak Bay and Ninilchik included economic benefits such as jobs and revenue. Here, the Division pointed to the statewide need for Anchorage International Airport to remain a viable commercial hub for the State of Alaska and to the fact that the Airport is a central part of the statewide transportation network. The Airport's critical role in the state was explained in its application, including the fact that it was responsible for one out of every ten jobs in Anchorage. The Division also had before it the Corps public notice of the Airport's permit application, which cited a study evaluating the economic impacts of the proposed wetland development and estimating that it could result in an additional 3,594 jobs in Anchorage. When reviewing the Airport's application for consistency with the Anchorage CMP, the Municipality's Department of Community Planning and Development commented that the Airport has long demonstrated the tangible and secondary elements of public need for these airport improvements, specifically airport viability including fund generation for expansion, public health and safety, and as a generator of economic impetus for the community. These economic, transportation, and other benefits could provide a reasonable basis for a finding of significant public need. In responding to a citizen petition, the Municipality also noted that the Anchorage [Coastal] District, along with the other agencies, spent a lot of time and energy validating the applicant's public need assertions. [55] The agencies' determination that a significant public need existed thus stemmed from a hard look. Given the considerable deference due the Division's determination of significant public need and the absence of any evidence that this decision was arbitrary or capricious, we cannot negate this policy decision. [56]
The regulations define feasible and prudent to mean consistent with sound engineering practice and not causing environmental, social, or economic problems that outweigh the public benefit to be derived from compliance with the standard which is modified by the term `feasible and prudent.' [57] The final environmental impact statement prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act [58] for the ACMP indicates that the phrase is used to describe situations when a normally applicable standard may be departed from, where forcing compliance with the standard would be impossible or cause a worse result than non-compliance. [59] The environmental impact statement further indicates that the Alaska Coastal Policy Council's intent was that `feasible and prudent' deviations from the normal standards should be narrow in interpretation and result only where the public good outweighs the public costs. [60] In addressing the habitats standard, the Division stated only that [t]he lack of feasible and prudent alternatives to construct aviation-related development is addressed under the statewide Coastal Development Standard (6 AAC 80.040). [61] In that discussion, the Division declared that the proposal's extensive analysis indicating a lack of alternatives led to the Airport's decision to seek a long-term permit to accommodate growth, noting that the Anchorage Wetlands Management Plan acknowledged a lack of alternatives and included filling of these wetlands as acceptable for airport-related activities. The Division asserted that alternative airport locations outside Anchorage would also be in the coastal zone and faced costs and constraints that brought their feasibility into question, that expanding onto the Air National Guard's area was not feasible because the Guard is still using it and probably will be for many years, and that expanding into the West Air Park area was not feasible because the area has significant site constraints that led a prior attempt at development there to fail. The Division also observed that [a]lternatives for aviation-related support facilities off airport lands are constrained by the need for proximity to the airfield to avoid departure delays and to keep aircraft servicing equipment that is not licensed for operation on public roadways off the roads. The Division further noted that Anchorage International Airport provides the only general float plane facility in the Anchorage area. At present there is no feasible alternative for float or ski-based general aviation. ACE argues that the Division erred in treating all uses and activities on the [r]evised [u]ses list as if they were functionally equivalent, allowing the Division to conclude that these wetlands were the only feasible and prudent alternative location for every single use listed. As with public need, therefore, ACE contends that the Division failed to address feasible and prudent alternatives for any and every particular use or activity. This argument again relies on ACE's view of the required specificity of a project, and we again conclude that the Division did not act arbitrarily in considering whether feasible and prudent alternatives to the wetlands existed for airport expansion as a whole (with consideration of the likely mix of future uses), rather than whether alternatives existed for each individual use. Furthermore, the agencies did in fact consider whether alternatives existed for the individual uses, narrowing the list of allowable uses in the area to those that could not reasonably be located elsewhere. The Department of Fish and Game, for instance, concluded that many of the Uses with Special Conditions included in the Airport's application would not meet the habitats or coastal development standards if placed in wetlands because they do not require ... placement within the immediate airport vicinity and the applicant has not shown whether feasible and prudent inland alternatives exist. This paring down of uses indicates that the Division of Governmental Coordination and the other agencies took a hard look at which uses had feasible and prudent alternatives and limited the allowable uses accordingly. [62] ACE asserts that the Division did not establish that other approaches or locations, particularly West Air Park, did not present feasible and prudent alternatives to destroying wetlands. However, the Airport's Master Plan Update acknowledged that West Air Park would eventually become the next runway, and this limitation is also repeated in the alternatives analysis in the Airport's permit application and in the Airport's 1995 Wetlands Alternatives Analysis, both of which clearly explained the numerous deficiencies of the West Air Park site and several other sites both within and outside Anchorage International Airport's grounds. ACE also claims that all non-runway dependent uses could be located outside the wetlands, pointing to the Airport's concession in its Wetlands Alternatives Analysis Land Use Policy Paper that [b]y their nature, any [aviation or aviation-related commercial or support] land use that does not need direct access to the airfield could, if absolutely necessary, be located off the airport. That paper, however, continued by noting that these uses benefit from being on the airport, increase operational efficiency, and improve service to airport users. The Airport's permit application alternatives analysis further establishes that the aviation-related facilities were most effective and efficient if located close to the existing airport infrastructure, that not enough vacant industrial-zoned land exists in Anchorage to support all the aviation-related activities, that [t]o the extent activities could theoretically be moved to other locations in Anchorage, new problems would arise, such as increased traffic to and from the airport and development in other neighborhoods, and that moving activities away from the airport would create operational inefficiencies that could harm Anchorage International Airport's competitiveness and thereby risk jobs and revenues. ACE also faults the Division for impl[ying] that the requisite alternatives finding had already been made for all [the Airport's] proposed uses and activities, en masse, and that this finding is in the Anchorage Wetlands Management Plan, which identified the Airport's lands as sites where fill might be required for which there are no other local practicable locations and stated that permits for these sites should be entertained subject to guidelines and Clean Water Act regulations. However, the Division did not defer to the Municipality's determination; the Division merely noted as one of the bases for its decision that the Anchorage Wetlands Management Plan acknowledges a lack of alternatives. As an additional matter, ACE takes issue with the Division's treatment of the Anchorage CMP policy to discourage development in Preservation Wetlands except where it would not be contrary to the public interest and where no alternative areas exist. ACE notes that this is stricter than the no feasible and prudent alternative language in the statewide standards, and yet the Division stated that [p]ublic interest and lack of alternatives were established previously when addressing the habitats and coastal development standards. But the Municipality's consistency review of the Airport's proposal found that [w]ith the site-specific guidelines and specific runway dependent/airport-related land uses outlined by the applicant in the 10-year application, wetland fills are specifically tied to only those activities for which there are no practical alternatives and for which [s]pecific and viable alternatives ... either do not exist or are impractical. The Municipality observed that [l]and uses for which there are practical alternatives to the subject fill areas are specifically limited by the language in this permit. The Division is entitled to give substantial deference to the Municipality's assessments and can use them as one of the bases of its own conclusions, since the Municipality `is considered to have expertise in the interpretation and application of its program.' [63] In summary, the Division had a sizeable accumulated record of information before it that provided substantial support to the lack of alternatives for airport expansion, and the multi-year, multi-agency process of narrowing the list of uses that had no alternatives indicates that the agencies took a hard look at the existence of alternatives and genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making. We therefore conclude that the Division had a reasonable basis for its conclusion that no feasible and prudent alternatives existed for the Airport's project.
Under the habitats standard, wetlands must be managed so as to maintain or enhance the biological, physical, and chemical characteristics of the habitat and so as to... avoid adverse effects on natural drainage patterns, the destruction of important habitat, and the discharge of toxic substances. [64] To allow use of the wetlands, the Division had to show that all feasible and prudent steps to maximize conformance with [these managerial standards] will be taken. [65] The Division determined that the Airport's proposal maximized conformance with the habitats standard. The Division noted that: (1) the only permissible activities would be those dependent on proximity to the runway; (2) mitigating measures incorporated into the permit would attempt to maintain the wetlands' hydrologic functions; (3) permit conditions place further restraints on fill activity by limiting allowable activities, requiring best-management practices, and placing timing restrictions on fill activities; (4) the Department of Fish and Game imposed a timing restriction to reduce impacts to nesting birds; (5) the permit requires the Airport to continue monitoring groundwater levels and to submit reports of fill activity so that the state can ensure that hydrologic functions are maintained and development is tracked; (6) meetings with state and federal agencies must occur before construction can commence, unless specifically waived by the agency; (7) stipulations require non-disturbance setbacks around ponds and buffers around developments to minimize disturbance of wildlife and habitats; (8) stipulations require additional public notice for any Airport lease proposal to ensure consistency of new wetland fill or clearing activity with the permit; (9) stipulations require screening landscaping for wetland fill projects abutting uncovered wetlands to ameliorate habitat impacts and disturbance; (10) the lost habitat and ecological values will be compensated for via offsite mitigation (in Klatt Bog), as required by the FAA; and (11) the habitat value of Turnagain and Postmark Bogs is already compromised because the FAA requires the Airport to actively haze birds and wildlife frequenting the areas to prevent them from posing hazards to planes. In addition, the Division noted that [t]o avoid adverse effects on natural drainage patterns, the [Airport] provided a hydrologic analysis that provides the best estimate of how water circulates through the Turnagain Bog wetlands. The [Airport] 10-year permit will require discontinuous development cells between each filled lot to ensure flow patterns are not altered. [The Airport] is required to monitor affected wetlands. The permit is subject to modification if new information indicates unacceptable hydrological effects. The Department of Environmental Conservation also required its approval of a facility's storm/runoff water collection and treatment system design plan before any fill placement at that facility's site could occur. Furthermore, the Division had before it the conditions that the Corps would impose with the permit, including conditions for maintaining Turnagain Bog's hydrologic pattern and for controlling the order of development to protect wetlands should full build-out not occur; the Airport incorporated these conditions into its description of the project. ACE argues that the Division erred in declaring that only activities dependent on runway proximity would be permissible, since only one of the Revised Uses list's categories consists of runway-dependent uses, with the other category being for aviation and aviation-related commercial and support uses. ACE is correct. It is likely that the Division meant to say something like proximity to the airport instead of proximity to the runway. ACE also maintains that nothing in the text of the maximize conformance factor indicates that it can be satisfied by offsite mitigation. This may be, but at the same time, nothing in the factor indicates that offsite mitigation cannot be one of several feasible and prudent steps to preserve habitat. ACE further asserts that even if the FAA could override 6 AAC 80.130(d)(3) to force destruction of wetlands, the FAA's guidance on hazing birds and wildlife frequenting airport areas discourages only the creation of wildlife hazards, such as by siting landfills or other attractants too close to airports, but not the preservation of existing wetlands. The FAA, however, recommends that airport expansions that result in unavoidable wetlands disturbances may require mitigation off-site so as not to create a wildlife hazard. ACE thus picks out for criticism small parts of the Division's rationale and claims that these challenges show that in finding maximum conformance [the Division] relied on a false premise. Only the first of these small criticisms appears to be accurate, however, and taken together, ACE's challenges still leave the vast majority of the Division's rationale intact. ACE further argues that this criterion of maximizing conformance was not applied for each use and activity on the Airport's list of possible uses. Again, this argument relies on ACE's view of the specificity required in a project, and we again conclude that the Division did not act arbitrarily in considering airport expansion as a whole (with consideration of the likely mix of future uses), rather than whether the permit maximized conformance for each individual use. Given the numerous conditions and stipulations the Division cited in making its determination, we conclude that the Division took a hard look at the maximizing conformance factor and had a reasonable basis for its decision. [66] Since the Division therefore took a hard look at all three conditions and had a reasonable basis for concluding that they were satisfied, we hold that the Division did not act arbitrarily in finding the Airport's project to be consistent with the habitats and coastal development standards.