Opinion ID: 1806648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: churchill's negligence and strict liability claims

Text: In his initial complaint, Churchill raised the theories of negligence and strict liability in tort. He argued that both Pearl River Basin Development District and Pike County were liable for the dangerous and defective condition of the river. Both the District and County asserted the defense of sovereign immunity. The Circuit Court judge entered summary judgment for both entities, holding that neither had waived sovereign immunity. At the time Churchill filed his complaint, Mississippi Code § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1987) read: Section 4. This act, being Chapter 495, Laws of 1984, as reenacted and amended by Chapter 474, Laws of 1985, as amended by Senate Bill No. 2166, 1986 Regular Session, shall apply only to causes of action that accrue on or after July 1, 1987, as to the state, and on or after October 1, 1987, as to political subdivisions. Causes of action that accrue prior to July 1, 1987, as to the state or, prior to October 1, 1987 as to political subdivisions, shall not be affected by this act but shall continue to be governed by the case law governing sovereign immunity as it existed immediately prior to the decision in the case of Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046, and by the statutory law governing sovereign immunity in effect from and after the passage of Chapter 474, Laws of 1985. This statute, having been enacted after Churchill's August 1, 1981, injury, is not applicable. Moreover, in Presley v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 608 So.2d 1288 (Miss. 1992), we found § 11-46-6 to be unconstitutional. Further, because the injury occurred prior to our decision in Pruett, we apply sovereign immunity case law prior to Pruett. However, we must first address the status § 11-46-6, following this Court's decision in Presley. In Presley, Part I, this Court held Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-6 unconstitutional. That section of the opinion received votes from a majority of the full Court. Part II of the opinion holds that the statute is unconstitutional prospectively only. However, Part II of the opinion only received a plurality vote of four justices. Of the remaining five votes, three justices concurred with Part I, but dissented from Part II, writing the holding should not be purely prospective. Two justices wrote that the statute was not unconstitutional. In Lakewood v. Plain Dealer, 486 U.S. 750, 108 S.Ct. 2138, 100 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988), the U.S. Supreme Court observed that it is settled jurisprudence that when no single rationale commands a majority, `the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by those members who concurred in the judgmen[t] on the narrowest grounds.' Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 51 L.Ed.2d 260, 97 S.Ct. 990 (1977). 486 U.S. at 764, 108 S.Ct. at 2148, 100 L.Ed.2d at 787, n. 9. It has been noted that normally a majority vote of all sitting judges is required to create precedent: Constitutional or statutory provisions requiring that a designated number of judges shall concur in an opinion in order that there may be a valid and binding adjudication by the court, or in order that a statute be declared unconstitutional, must be complied with. The general rule, however, unless the law provides otherwise, is that a concurrence of a majority of the judges sitting is necessary or sufficient although those concurring are not a majority of all the judges of the court. Where the necessary number have concurred in an opinion, the decision rendered is the decision of the court, at least on the points as to which the required number have concurred, although not on points as to which fewer have concurred. A change in the personnel will not warrant a reopening of the controversy unless the court itself orders a reargument. 21 C.J.S. Courts § 138 (1990). In Dean v. State, 173 Miss. 254, 162 So. 155 (1935) this Court [1] held: When this court is sitting in [sic] banc, there must be at least four of its judges present; and no action can be taken by it unless a majority of the judges present concur therein. When a cause is brought to the court on appeal, the judgment of the trial court is presumed to be correct and must remain in effect unless and until the court enters an order on its minutes reversing or setting it aside. This can be done only when a majority of the judges participating in the decision concur therein. ... Dean, 162 So. at 157 (emphasis added). Thus, it is a logical conclusion for this Court to recognize that a plurality vote does not create a binding result. The narrowest holding in Presley, in which a majority of the sitting justices concurred, was that Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-6 is unconstitutional. As there is no majority vote for Part II, we can only note that it has no precedential value. It is our holding in Pruett that will determine the outcome of this particular issue. In Pruett, we abolished judicially-created sovereign immunity, but made the action prospective, except as to Pruett. Id. at 1052. The opinion only applied to actions which accrued on or after July 1, 1984. Id. In the case sub judice, Churchill was injured on August 1, 1981, thus the prospective holding in Pruett ostensibly protects both the District and the County from tort liability. See Jagnandan v. Mississippi State University, 373 So.2d 252 (Miss. 1979), cert. denied 444 U.S. 1026, 100 S.Ct. 690, 62 L.Ed.2d 660, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 914, 101 S.Ct. 34, 65 L.Ed.2d 1177 (1980); Rolph v. Board of Trustees of Forrest County General Hospital, 346 So.2d 377 (Miss. 1977); and Berry v. Hinds County, 344 So.2d 146 (Miss. 1977) (all overruled prospectively from July 1, 1984, by Pruett v. City of Rosedale, 421 So.2d 1046 (Miss. 1982)). Churchill, however, argues that the District should be estopped from asserting its defense of sovereign immunity because it had purchased public liability insurance in the amount $1.5 million. This insurance was purchased under the general powers of the District, because no statutory authority specifically provided it the power to obtain liability insurance. In French v. Pearl River Valley Water Supply District, 394 So.2d 1385 (Miss. 1981), we held that the mere purchase of liability protection by a governmental body does not waive sovereign immunity. Id. at 1388. In Joseph v. Tennessee Partners, Inc., 501 So.2d 371 (Miss. 1987), we further stated that a governmental body does not give up its protection of sovereign immunity simply because it has obtained liability insurance without express statutory authority. Id. at 375. As we noted in Strait, In both French and Joseph, there was no statutory authority for the governmental entities' purchase of insurance and no statutory implication that the legislature intended sovereign immunity to be waived. 523 So.2d at 39. [2] We find that French and its progeny perpetuate the ill-advised policy of eschewing the notion that an insurance company is accountable for that which it has been paid a premium. Thus, we overrule French and hold that the Pearl River Basin Development District is amenable to suit to the extent of coverage of any available liability policy or indemnification plan.