Opinion ID: 1143903
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: admissibility and effect of offered and excluded testimony

Text: Because contestant asserts that if the record were not sufficient to take this case to the jury that certain testimony which was excluded and should have been received would have satisfied that requirement and made a submissible case, the admissibility and effect of this testimony will next be considered. Contestant complains that the trial court refused to receive evidence regarding mental condition unless it related to the exact time of executing the will, that no evidence of her capacity was admissible unless the witness was an expert, and that the testimony of a witness to a will is not subject to impeachment. Heavy reliance is made upon the case of In re Faragher's Estate, Wyo., 367 P.2d 972. Contestant contends the court was in error in assigning as grounds for refusal to receive testimony regarding mental condition unless it related to the exact time of executing the will. It is to be observed there is much evidence in the record of her acts and activities, both prior to and after the execution of the will. The trial court, however, would not admit or receive proffered evidence of opinions as to her condition at other times. We believe Faragher inapplicable for at least two reasons. First, the court noted that it was discretionary with the trial judge, and second, there was in that case a showing of a permanent continuing condition or disease. The effect and purpose of such evidence as to the testator's actual mental condition both before and after the execution of the will is succinctly set out and placed in proper perspective in a California case, being In re Dupont's Estate, 60 Cal. App.2d 276, 140 P.2d 866, 871, where it was said:    It is axiomatic that the critical inquiry in determining the mental capacity of a person to execute a will is directed to his condition of mind at the very time of its signing. Evidence of his previous conduct is only admissible for the light that it may throw on his condition of mind at that precise moment.    Inasmuch as all the excluded items of evidence go to the question of competency or testamentary capacity, excepting only the proffered impeaching testimony of Horiskey, these will be discussed next. It is contended that the trial court committed error when it refused to allow Robert D. Carey to express an opinion as to whether or not testatrix knew the nature and extent of her property. He bases this upon two grounds. First, that this witness had qualified as an expert because of his close association with his grandmother. No citations are noted that any such relationship and close association confer the status of expert upon such a witness. This contention need not be further considered, DeLuna v. State, Wyo., 501 P.2d 1021, 1025; Alcala v. State, Wyo., 487 P.2d 448, 456, certiorari denied 405 U.S. 997, 92 S.Ct. 1259, 31 L.Ed.2d 466, rehearing denied 406 U.S. 911, 92 S.Ct. 1613, 31 L.Ed.2d 823. It is to be observed, however, that the logical result of such a rule would be far-reaching with much possibility of mischief. Will contests, involving as they usually do accompanying family relations and close association, would certainly proliferate all will-contest proceedings with experts. Second, he contends that this evidence should have been received because laymen are competent witnesses to testify to mental capacity when they relate facts on which their opinions are based, citing In re Johnston's Estate, 63 Wyo. 332, 181 P.2d 611. However, in the later case of In re Merrill's Estate, supra, 341 P.2d at 508, there has been expressed a clear caveat sharply restricting what contestant contends was the holding in the Johnston case, when the following expression was made:    We think the voicing of opinion as to testamentary capacity by a person who is not especially trained tends to invade the province of the jury and should not be permitted.    This opinion further calls attention to the fact that even where such opinions are accepted that this has been rested upon the reasons for the opinions. There is, however, a much more compelling reason why this testimony was not admissible. In connection with both of the witnesses, Carey and Horiskey, these questions were directed at testamentary capacity. This was an ultimate fact or issue for determination by the jury. We have heretofore held it is improper for either an expert or non-expert to give an opinion upon an ultimate issue in a case, State ex rel. Kirk v. Gail, Wyo., 373 P.2d 955, 957; Macy v. Billings, 74 Wyo. 404, 289 P.2d 422, 424; Taylor v. MacDonald, Wyo., 409 P.2d 762, 764. However, insofar as expert testimony is concerned, this court in Krahn v. Pierce, Wyo., 485 P.2d 1021, 1025-1026, has indicated a possible exception. The first question directed to Mr. Horiskey was Did you form an opinion at that time [February 8, 1971] as to her testamentary capacity? Objection was made and sustained that this was invading the province of the jury. An offer of proof was made that he would have testified that she did not have such capacity, and further included that he would have testified she was not of sound and disposing mind and memory and did not have knowledge of the extent of her property, the value of it, and the natural objects of her bounty. This was made to cover both dates, February 8 and February 27, 1971. Objection was made to this on the ground of foundation. Witness Horiskey had testified to no facts upon which he could possibly have logically based this observation or opinion at either date. Johnston specifically mentions the necessity of having testified to facts or circumstances which would justify the expression of such opinion. It is to be noted that the question propounded to witness Carey, which was excluded and to which objection was made, was as follows: I will repeat the question, do you have an opinion as to her ability to know the extent and nature of her property at that time [February 27, 1971]? After the objection was sustained an offer was made that if the witness were allowed to answer he would state it was his opinion she did not have this ability, and the offer of proof also contained suggestions of additional questions concerning testamentary capacity. The court sustained an objection to this offer with the statement that the witness would not be allowed to give conclusions nor could he state his opinion. It was further suggested it was an invasion of the province of the jury since Carey was not an expert. However, from what has been said before with reference to the Horiskey testimony it is our view this was not admissible. The basis of the court's excluding such evidence is of no importance if the evidence is inadmissible, Logan v. Pacific Intermountain Express Company, Wyo., 400 P.2d 488, 491; Lawson v. Schuchardt, Wyo., 363 P.2d 90, 93. This ruling was certainly consonant with Merrill. It is our view that the proffered testimony of Robert Davis Carey was properly refused. Contestant further claims error because of the refusal of the court to admit the guardianship file in evidence. While in re Morton, supra, 428 P.2d at 733, suggests admissibility of such a file, it suggests further that when the basis of the proceeding is the care and management of the property that it is entitled to little or no weight. Again, as in Morton, testimony about this was allowed and received by the court over objection. The court had another tenable basis for refusing to receive this file because it contained letters of Drs. Bindschadler and Flett. It was indicated in the ruling that the court would not allow the letters to establish the things mentioned therein and suggested that a witness be called. When such an exhibit is offered as a whole, but which contains inadmissible material, the court is under no obligation to separate the wheat from the chaff, In re Morton, 428 P.2d at 732. Contestant further complains of the refusal of the trial court to admit as a separate exhibit the letter from Dr. Flett discussing testatrix's condition, which appeared in this file. This was offered for two purposes: First, as to Mrs. Carey's mental condition over the three-year, two-year, one-year, and six-month periods prior to September 1971. Second, for impeachment, which will be mentioned later. The record shows Dr. Flett was present and available as a witness. The contestant's pretrial memorandum had set him out as a witness but contestant offered this letter as evidence of a state of facts. The offer for the purpose of showing Mrs. Carey's mental condition obviously brings it under the stricture of the hearsay rule and it was properly excluded for that purpose. It follows that such evidence cannot be received to prove the truth of the matter asserted, VI Wigmore on Evidence, § 1766, p. 178 (3d Ed.). This court has observed in Jennings v. C.M. & W. Drilling Company, 77 Wyo. 69, 307 P.2d 122, 124:    A statement, written or otherwise, by a person not summoned as a witness and made subject to cross-examination is inadmissible as hearsay, except in certain cases which are exceptions to that rule,    No exception has been suggested in this case. It would appear that the letter might have been received by way of impeachment but no detailed examination of that will be made because of what will follow. Dr. Flett had earlier testified that he had said no woman could influence Mrs. Carey but that a man could. Horiskey was asked if Dr. Flett had made a statement about her susceptibility to influence. Objection was made and sustained thereto. Contestant's offer of proof was that the witness would testify Dr. Flett had said, it would not be any trick to get  for anyone to get her  meaning Mrs. Julia Carey  to do something she really didn't want to do. He stated the purpose of this was impeachment. The reason no discussion is expressed thereon as to the propriety of both of these as impeaching evidence is the rule that had the trial court received both Flett's letter and Horiskey's testimony it would have in no manner improved contestant's position or helped sustain his burden of proof. Such inconsistent statements only affect the credibility of the witness, Cederburg v. Carter, Wyo., 448 P.2d 608, 610, and could not subserve the purpose of affirmative evidence, State v. Alexander, 36 Wyo. 390, 265 P. 76; Crago v. State, 28 Wyo. 215, 202 P. 1099. It may be further observed that contestant raises no question of the prima facie showing by proponent. From our view of the admissibility and effect of this proffered evidence which was excluded, there is no change in contestant's showing as to have justified submission of this case to the jury.