Opinion ID: 44401
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: FECA: a Purely Administrative Remedy

Text: FECA establishes a comprehensive and exclusive workers’ compensation scheme for federal employees. It provides that “the United States shall pay compensation . . . for the disability or death of an employee resulting from personal injury sustained while in the performance of his duty.” 5 U.S.C. § 8102(a). In order to receive benefits provided for work-related injuries, FECA requires that an employee “submit to examination by a medical officer of the United States, or by a physician designated or approved by the Secretary of Labor,5 after the injury and as frequently and at the times and places as may be reasonably required.” 5 U.S.C. § 8123(a). Subsection (d) of § 8123 further provides that an employees’s right to compensation will be suspended if an employee refuses to 5 The Secretary of Labor has the authority to administer and decide all questions arising under FECA. 5 U.S.C. § 8145. FECA also authorizes the Secretary to prescribe rules and regulations necessary for the enforcement and administration of the Act. 5 U.S.C. § 8149. 7 submit to or obstructs a medical examination. 5 U.S.C. § 8123(d). The claimant must, however, be given notice and an opportunity to explain his failure to attend the examination; the OWCP procedures require that the claimant be notified in writing regarding his scheduled medical appointment and the ramifications of his failure to attend. 20 C.F.R. § 10.540. Once a decision has been made by the OWCP, if a claimant is unhappy with the outcome, FECA provides several avenues for administrative review and potential relief. From the date of decision, the claimant may: 1) within thirty days, request a hearing before an OWCP hearing representative or request that the representative review the written record, 5 U.S.C. § 8124; 2) within thirty days, request reconsideration, 5 U.S.C. § 8128; or 3) within one year, file an appeal with the ECAB. 20 C.F.R. § 501. Accordingly, we conclude that Congress provided a remedy via FECA that is exclusively administrative. See 5 U.S.C. § 8121(b); 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has stated that “[Through FECA] employees are guaranteed the right to receive immediate, fixed benefits, regardless of fault and without need for litigation, but in return they lose the right to sue the Government.” Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 194 (1983). Therefore, the Secretary’s decisions regarding benefit determinations pursuant to FECA are not subject to judicial review. Grijalva v. United States, 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5th Cir. 1986). C. The Exception under FECA allowing Judicial Review We have, however, recognized a limited exception to FECA’s preclusion of judicial review–courts are not precluded from considering substantial constitutional claims. Garner v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 221 F.3d 822, 825 (5th Cir. 2000). Merely affixing a constitutional label to an otherwise precluded claim, however, will not suffice. See Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 (“[A] 8 suit may sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.”) Keeping these considerations in mind, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of this case, holding that Ramirez is prohibited from challenging the merits of the Department of Labor’s decision to suspend his compensation benefits, as such review on the merits of any aspect of his claim is precluded under 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b). He had the opportunity to appeal the OWCP’s decision to the ECAB, but he did not do so. As for Ramirez’s claim that the ECAB violated his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection in the administration of his claim by failing to conduct an appellate review and render a decision regarding the suspension of his FECA benefits, we also agree with the district court. Our conclusion, however, requires additional analysis. D. Ramirez’s Constitutional Claims
Ramirez argues that ECAB made “him wait more than five (5) years” and continues to do so “without reviewing the administrative record of the case . . . in violation of his civil rights 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983.” A viable equal protection claim, however, must allege that similarly situated persons were intentionally treated differently and the facts pled must be specific. Stoneburner v. Sec’y of the Army, 152 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 1998). Here, Ramirez states that he was treated differently than other similarly situated federal employees, but he fails to set forth any substantial cognizable constitutional challenge sufficient to overcome FECA’s preclusion of review; Ramirez does not present a fact, statute, regulation, or case to support his position that he was treated differently than other similarly 9 situated federal employees. Accordingly, we hold that the district court properly dismissed Ramirez’s equal protection claim.
In evaluating Ramirez’s due process claim, we note that “[t]he fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965)). Ramirez complains that after the OWCP rendered its decision suspending his benefits, the ECAB failed to review his case and render its own decision. As the district court held, however, Ramirez, after due notice, having failed to timely appeal his OWCP decision to the ECAB, had no such constitutional right to receive a decision from the ECAB. Ramirez was given timely notice and an opportunity to be heard regarding the suspension of his benefits prior to the disposition of his case; he was 1) told the consequences of not reporting for his medical examinations; 2) notified after he failed to attend his medical examinations that his benefits would be suspended unless he provided an explanation within fourteen days; 3) informed, after his benefits were suspended, of all rights available to him to challenge this determination; and 4) advised in the OWCP’s decision that he could seek further review, by means of reconsideration or appeal to the OWCP. Ramirez did not heed the government’s advice–he did not attend his medical examinations, provide an explanation within fourteen days or timely appeal the decision of the OWCP. Therefore, because the record is clear that Ramirez was afforded meaningful notice and opportunity at each step leading to the ultimate suspension of his benefits, we agree with the district court’s determination that Ramirez’s due process 10 complaint has no basis in fact or law, even though, as Koromilas asserts, it is cloaked in constitutional garb.6 E. Denial of Ramirez’s Request for Discovery Finally, we hold that the magistrate judge did not err in denying Ramirez’s discovery request, as discovery was unnecessary prior to ruling on the defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment. Ramirez states that a “discovery plan are [sic] required in responding to defendants-appellees’ motion for summary judgment to prove the said continuous . . . conduct against Ramirez was applied only to him in violation of his civil rights 42 U.S.C. [§] 1983.” Ramirez, however, had a certified copy of the entire agency record made available to him via his first proceeding in the district court against the Department of Labor. This same information was also accessible under the Privacy Act. Furthermore, before the ECAB, Ramirez failed to articulate any legitimate basis for his need for discovery. To succeed in his claim, Ramirez “must show how the additional discovery will defeat summary judgment and create a genuine dispute as to a material fact.” Washington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 901 F.2d 1281, 1285-86 (5th Cir.1990). Ramirez has not made such a showing. Accordingly, we affirm the magistrate judge’s decision to deny discovery.