Opinion ID: 4561242
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amended Complaint & Renewed Motion to Dismiss

Text: Earles’s amended complaint—which is her current complaint—presents most 6 of the same material included in her previous three complaints, and asserts causes of action for:  deprivation of procedural and substantive due process, in violation of the “First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments,” id. at 232, because defendants did not follow the Oklahoma Open Meetings Act, acted with deliberate indifference toward gender discrimination and retaliation for whistleblowing, and placed false accounts of wrongdoing in her personnel file;3 and  sexual discrimination and sex-based hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. Earles also asserts various state-law claims. Defendants again moved to dismiss. They argued, among other things, that: (i) non-employer individuals cannot be liable under Title VII; (ii) the First Amendment right to freedom of association does not extend to associating with co-workers during work hours for work-related reasons; (iii) the Fifth Amendment applies only to the federal government; (iv) Earles did not have a property interest in her Fair Board job, so procedural and substantive due process do not apply; and (v) Earles failed to plausibly plead her Title VII and state-law theories of relief. Concerning her First Amendment claim, Earles responded that her “reference to [a] First Amendment violation is addressed as part of tort actions and is not alleged 3 Presumably her allegation that defendants denied her the right to associate with the Fair Board falls under the First Amendment portion of this claim. 7 as a standalone 1983 action.” Id. at 288. She then directed the reader to a section of her brief discussing a state-law claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, where she argued that “Oklahoma has a clear public policy to protect those employees who choose to exercise their First Amendment rights.” Id. at 304 (emphasis removed). She did not explain the connection between this argument and her claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. As for due process, Earles asserted for the first time that “the county’s personnel policy manual” supported her claim of a property interest in her job. Id. at 291. She also repeated her previous description of her property interest: “a limited property right to the procedures provided by the Open Meetings Act.” Id. at 293. In terms of a liberty interest, she asserted an interest in her “good name and reputation.” Id. Turning to her Title VII claim, Earles argued that she had plausibly pleaded a constitutional violation, namely, gender discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. She did not explain whether she now meant to plead an Equal Protection claim only, or an either-or gender discrimination claim (Equal Protection or Title VII or both). She also did not respond to defendants’ argument that Title VII applies to employers, not individuals.