Opinion ID: 1967477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Insufficiency of Service of Process

Text: [S]ince Super. Ct. Civ. R. 52(a) does not require the trial court to issue findings of fact or conclusions of law on motions under Rule 12(b), this court must, as a practical matter, conduct an independent review of the record whenever the trial court, as was the case here, grants a motion to dismiss without issuing findings of fact or conclusions of law. Vaughn v. United States, 579 A.2d 170, 172-73 (D.C. 1990). Although defendant made several arguments as to why service of process was improper, see discussion of other arguments at pages 1253-55, infra, the motion granted by the trial court was predicated on the contention that plaintiff was required to re-serve her complaint once it had been dismissed on December 7, 2001, even though it was reinstated on January 3, 2002. This is the argument in support of the trial court's ruling pressed in the brief on appeal. We disagree that the complaint had to be re-served for there to be effective service of process. Rule 41(b) provides that any involuntary order of dismissal, including, as here, those entered under Rule 4(m) for failure to timely file proof of service, shall not take effect until fourteen (14) days after the date on which it is docketed, and shall be vacated upon the granting of a motion filed by plaintiff within such 14 day period showing good cause why the case should not be dismissed. SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 41(b) (emphasis added). [4] The plain meaning of Rule 41(b) clearly indicates that an involuntary dismissal is vacated once the plaintiff satisfies the requirements of timeliness and good cause, such that, as a legal matter, once the dismissal is vacated, it is a nullity and the case retains the procedural status that existed prior to the entry of the order of dismissal. Although, as here, motions under Rule 41(b) are often captioned as seeking reinstatement, convenient (but inexact) labeling does not alter the operation of the rule. Despite the connotation imparted by use of the word reinstate, an action is not revived or brought anew upon entry of an order vacating dismissal under Rule 41(b); the procedural clock is not reset, nor are valid filing and service of the complaint rendered ineffective. Based on the plain meaning of Rule 41(b), we conclude that plaintiff's complaint was never effectively dismissed, therefore obviating the need to re-file or re-serve the complaint under Rule 4. An independent review of the record, see Vaughn, 579 A.2d at 172-73, further reveals that defendant's other variously asserted arguments for a Rule 12(b) dismissal lack merit. Defendant argued in the trial court that dismissal was warranted because (1) service on its statutory agent was improper absent a copy having been mailed to defendant's corporate address as required by Rule 4(h), and (2) the complaint was not served until December 4, 2001more than sixty days after its filing on September 28, 2001. The first argument fails for the simple reason that a plaintiff is required to mail a copy of the process paperwork to a defendant's corporate address only if the statute authorizing the agent to receive process so provides. See SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 4(h)(1). The controlling statute authorizes service upon the mayor when, among other reasons, the registered agent cannot be found with reasonable diligence and does not require a plaintiff to deliver a copy of the process paperwork to the defendant's corporate address. See D.C. CODE § 29-101.108(b). [5] The statute contemplates that after the mayor is served, it is the [m]ayor [who] shall immediately cause one of the copies to be forwarded by registered or certified mail to the corporation at its principal office .... D.C. CODE § 29-101.108(b). In this case, the executive, through DCRA, in fact fulfilled this charge. Consistent with the obligation imposed by the statute, plaintiff tendered proof of reasonable diligence by representing, upon information and belief, that defendant did not have a registered agent within the District of Columbia at the time service was effectuated. This representation was made in a sworn affidavit of counsel submitted to DCRA as a prerequisite to its acceptance of service of process for the defendant. See note 2, supra. [6] Our review of defendant's final argument that it was untimely served on December 4, 2001, not only reveals that the contention is unfounded, but definitively resolves against defendant the ultimate question of proper service. Defendant argued in the trial court that it ultimately received the summons through [DCRA] but not until December 4, 2001. Regardless of when defendant received the summons, DCRA acknowledged in its cover letter to defendant that service was made upon DCRA on November 2, 2001. In the absence of any argument demonstrating that DCRA was not defendant's proper statutory agent, it is the November 2 date that controls. Just as actual notice of an action cannot cure ineffective service of process, neither may lack of actual notice forestall effective service of process. Cf. Bulin v. Stein, 668 A.2d 810, 814 (D.C. 1995) (noting that actual notice is immaterial to service of process) (citation omitted). In cases where, as here, the defendant claims to have first learned of the action some time after service upon its agent duly authorized by appointment or by law, we hold that the effective date of service for purposes of Rule 4(m) is the date on which the agent was served. [7] See generally SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 4(h)(1) (providing that service of process upon a corporation shall be effected upon delivery of a copy of the complaint, summons, and initial order to a duly authorized agent). Although DCRA's account of the date on which it was served ( i.e., November 2) varies from the account attested to by plaintiff's process server ( i.e., October 9), it is indisputable that even the later date falls within the sixty-day period in which the rules require process be served. See SUPER. CT. CIV. R. 4(m). Thus, by defendant's own account, its statutory agent was served in a timely manner. We accordingly conclude that the trial court's June 7 order dismissing plaintiff's complaint for failure to effect service of process is not supported by the rules, the applicable statute, or the record. [8]