Opinion ID: 1324820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: degree of protection afforded

Text: As we pointed out in Waite, following the principles of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), once a protected property interest is found, then the extent of due process protection that should be afforded is determined by a balancing test which we summarized in Syllabus Point 5 of Waite: The extent of due process protection affordable for a property interest requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interests that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. See also Major v. DeFrench, supra ; State ex rel. McLendon v. Morton, supra . Although the Board initially argues that under W.Va.Code, 8-22-23a, they have no discretion to evaluate the disability reports of the physicians, we do not agree. The statute provides that members applying for ... disability benefits ... shall be examined by at least two physicians under the direction of the staff of Marshall University, West Virginia University, Morgantown or West Virginia University, Charleston. W.Va.Code, 8-22-23a(a). [3] Certainly, common sense would dictate that before the Board authorizes a referral to the statutorily designated physicians, the member applying for disability benefits ought to initially supply the Board with some medical evidence that he is disabled. This was done in the present case by Mr. Barron when he supplied to the Board a report from his treating physician, Dr. Bruce. This section also states if the two physicians cannot agree a third physician shall examine such member. W.Va.Code, 8-22-23a(a). However, it does not specifically state who selects the third physician but again we believe that common sense dictates that the Board should designate. [4] Furthermore, W.Va.Code, 8-22-17, provides, in part, [a]ny such board of trustees may also in its corporate name do and perform any and all other acts and business pertaining to the trust created hereby.... This language suggests that the Board can exercise some discretion in carrying out its duties with regard to determining whether disability benefits should be awarded or denied based on the medical reports submitted to it. See 3 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations 641 (3d ed. 1982). We stated in State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 158 W.Va. 495, 498, 212 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1975), disapproved in part on other grounds, State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pearlman Realty Agency, 161 W.Va. 1, 239 S.E.2d 145 (1977), that an administrative agency possesses, in addition to the powers expressly conferred by statute, such powers as are reasonably and necessarily implied in the exercise of its duties in accomplishing the purposes of the act. See also Colvin v. State Workmen's Compensation Comm'n, 154 W.Va. 280, 175 S.E.2d 186 (1970); Mohr v. County Court, 145 W.Va. 377, 115 S.E.2d 806 (1960). Returning to the question of the procedural due process that is due, we recognize that the private interest that is affected by the official action is not insubstantial. Pension and disability benefits, which are the covered entitlements, provide important economic benefits. They are equivalent to the tenure rights that we termed a valuable property interest in McLendon. The second factor is the risk of erroneous deprivation. This risk is not as consequential as in McLendon where the question of tenure rests on a variety of criteria utilized to evaluate a teacher's performance, which may be difficult to settle without some type of evidentiary hearing. Here, the chief issue is one of medical disability, but we recognize that it can involve some complicated issues as this case illustrates. Consequently, we can perceive the need for some procedure to explore and develop disputed facts. However, we do not believe that a full adversarial evidentiary hearing is required. Finally, the State's interest in avoiding increased fiscal and administrative costs resulting from the procedural process requirements is not an insubstantial consideration. Many municipalities in this State are financially depressed. Because of the statutory scheme, the physicians chiefly involved are from Charleston, Huntington, and Morgantown. It would be difficult from a time and expense standpoint for them to attend hearings in other places. By requiring them to attend, they may well refuse employment initially. It would seem sufficient to resolve any ambiguities in their medical reports through the use of depositions. We conclude that several additional procedural safeguards could be taken that would not unduly encumber the process or add significantly to the Board's expense. The aggrieved member or his retained attorney should have the right to appear before the Board to present to it the reasons why a pension is warranted in a given case. A similar right should be accorded the municipality to oppose the pension, if desired. Finally, the Board should file a written statement for its actions. We have previously held that if the Board acts improperly with regard to denying a pension to an otherwise qualified member, mandamus will lie to correct its action. State ex rel. Williams v. Board of Trustees, supra . Thus, to summarize the procedural due process rights that should be accorded a member of the Policemen's Pension and Relief Fund, created under W.Va.Code, 8-22-16, such member is entitled to retained counsel, to take the deposition of physicians appointed by the Board, to appear before the Board to present his reasons why he qualifies, and to have the Board give a written statement outlining its reasons for denying benefits. We reverse this case in order to permit Mr. Barron to have the benefit of these procedural safeguards. In so doing, we wish to make clear that we express no opinion with regard to the underlying merits of his claim. Reversed and Remanded.