Opinion ID: 1846819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: predicate felony for use of firearm to commit felony

Text: Use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony occurs when a person uses a firearm, a knife, brass or iron knuckles, or any other deadly weapon to commit any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of this state or . . . unlawfully possesses a firearm, a knife, brass or iron knuckles, or any other deadly weapon during the commission of any felony which may be prosecuted in a court of this state. . . . Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-1205(1) (Reissue 2008). In accordance with the statute, the defendant must commit an underlying or predicate felony before he or she can be convicted of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Sepulveda's reliance on State v. Ring, 233 Neb. 720, 447 N.W.2d 908 (1989), and State v. Pruett, supra , is misplaced because Ring and Pruett are distinguishable from the facts of this case. In State v. Ring, supra , the defendant was convicted of felony motor vehicle homicide and using a motor vehicle as a deadly weapon to commit a felony. We interpreted the language `to commit any felony' to mean `for the purpose of committing any felony.' Id. at 724, 447 N.W.2d at 911. Accordingly, to prove a charge of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony, the State was required to prove that the defendant used the motor vehicle for the purpose of committing a felony. The elements of motor vehicle homicide include that the defendant caused the death of the victim unintentionally while unlawfully operating a motor vehicle and that the unlawful operation of the motor vehicle was a result of either driving while under the influence of alcohol or driving recklessly. The State did not prove that the defendant intentionally used the motor vehicle as a deadly weapon. Because there was no intentional action, motor vehicle homicide could not be the predicate felony for a use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony conviction. Id. In State v. Pruett, supra , the defendant was convicted of manslaughter and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony while committing the offense of reckless assault. The defendant killed his friend by accidentally firing a live round instead of a dummy round at the friend as a joke. On appeal, the defendant claimed that he could not be convicted of both manslaughter and use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony because both manslaughter and reckless assault were unintentional crimes. We agreed. When the felony which served as the basis of the use of a weapon charge is an unintentional crime, the accused cannot be convicted of use of a weapon to commit a felony. Id. Because the defendant did not commit any intentional acts, he could not be convicted of use of a deadly weapon to commit a felony. Id. In the case at bar, the jury found that Sepulveda intentionally used a firearm in the commission of the crime of manslaughter. Manslaughter is defined as an unintentional crime; however, assault is not. The trial court instructed the jury that to convict Sepulveda of manslaughter, it must find four elements: 1. That the Defendant, Domingo J. Sepulveda killed James Geiger; 2. That he did so without malice, either: a. upon a sudden quarrel, or b. unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act; 3. That he did so on or about the 25th day of November, 1995 in Douglas County, Nebraska; and 4. That the Defendant did not act in the defense of another. The jury was also instructed: Before you can find the Defendant guilty of unlawfully using a firearm in the commission of a felony as charged in Count II of the Information, the burden is upon the State of Nebraska to establish beyond a reasonable doubt each and all of the following: 1. That on or about November 25, 1995, in Douglas County, Nebraska, the Defendant did commit murder in the second degree or manslaughter as set forth in the above; 2. That in the commission of said crime a firearm was used by Defendant; 3. That such use of a firearm in the commission of the crime was intentional; and 4. That Defendant did not act in the defense of another. If the crime of manslaughter were the underlying felony for the weapons charge, Sepulveda could not be convicted of use of a firearm to commit a felony. However, Sepulveda incorrectly assumes that the predicate felony for a conviction of use of a firearm to commit a felony must be the manslaughter conviction. The jury was instructed that assault in any degree is an unlawful act within the meaning of the manslaughter statute. First degree assault is intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to another person. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-308 (Reissue 2008). First degree assault is a felony and a general intent crime. State v. Cebuhar, 252 Neb. 796, 567 N.W.2d 129 (1997). The intent required by the assault statutes relates to the act which produces the injury, not to the consequences which result from the assault. See State v. Williams, 243 Neb. 959, 503 N.W.2d 561 (1993). Although Sepulveda may not have intended that Geiger would be killed as a result of Sepulveda's actions, there is no doubt that Sepulveda intended the assault of Geiger. Manslaughter can occur either upon a sudden quarrel or unintentionally while in the commission of an unlawful act. There was no evidence that Sepulveda suddenly quarreled with Geiger or even that Sepulveda had personal contact with Geiger. There was evidence that Sepulveda bet someone $20 that he would fire his gun that night and showed the gun to several people before the shooting. Witnesses saw Sepulveda chase Geiger, point the loaded gun at him, and pull the trigger as Geiger ran away. This action resulted in the death of Geiger. The jury found that Geiger's death was unintentional. It also found that Sepulveda's use of the firearm in the commission of the crime was intentional. Under the circumstances, the act of firing the gun at Geiger which resulted in Geiger's death was an intentional and unlawful assault and was the predicate offense of use of a firearm to commit a felony. To hold otherwise would be to ignore the facts.