Opinion ID: 1688754
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: the lower court erred in denying appellant's motion for funds to employ an expert to examine blood and semen samples, which denied defendant due process of law.

Text: The three assignments of error here are covered by the same test. The issue was pending before the United States Supreme Court, which granted certiorari in Caldwell v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 243, 83 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984), when the case sub judice was submitted. Caldwell was decided by the United States Supreme Court June 11, 1985, [___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985)] and the judgment of this Court was reversed on trial argument of the district attorney, not on the question here involved. The Court denied certiorari on the same issue in Dufour v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1231, 84 L.Ed.2d 268 (1985) and Billiot v. Mississippi, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 1232, 84 L.Ed.2d 369 (1985), leaving undisturbed our holding that the Constitution does not require a State to furnish an indigent defendant with expert or investigative assistance upon demand. We recognize that the doctrine of fundamental fairness, guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, at times requires authorization for appointment of a particular expert or investigator. Ruffin v. State, 447 So.2d 113 (Miss. 1984), stated Mississippi's position on the question as follows: There is no merit in this assignment of error. That there can conceivably be instances when the state in fairness should be required to pay the cost of an expert needed by the defense to insure a fair trial for an indigent accused must be conceded. Those cases can only be left to the discretion of the trial court, and they will be rare. See: U.S. v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 73 S.Ct. 391, 97 L.Ed. 549 (1952); U.S. v. Pennsylvania, 452 F.2d 557 (3rd Cir.1971); Aldisert, C.J., p. 563; State v. Grant, 560 S.W.2d 384 (Mo. 1977); Graham v. State, 547 S.W.2d 531 (Tenn. 1977); and State v. Montgomery, 291 N.C. 91, 229 S.E.2d 572 (N.C. 1976). As aptly stated in Oregon v. Acosta, 41 Or. App. 257, 597 P.2d 1282, 1284 (1979): It is apparent that an indigent's statutorily enacted right to defense expenses is not absolute, but is conditioned upon a showing that such expenses are needed to prepare and present an adequate defense. (Citations omitted) Neither the statute nor the constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel and of equal protection require that an investigator or expert be furnished at public expense upon demand. (Citations omitted) There is no single test for determining whether the services of an investigator or an expert are necessary; that decision will depend on the facts and circumstances of the particular case and must be committed to the sound discretion of the court to which the request for expenses is directed. (Citations omitted) [Emphasis added.] See also, 34 A.L.R.3rd 1256, §§ 7 through 17. 447 So.2d at 118. Whether the denial of expert assistance for an accused is prejudicial to the assurance of a fair trial must be weighed on a case-by-case basis. Bullock v. State, 391 So.2d 601 (Miss. 1980); Davis v. State, 374 So.2d 1293 (Miss. 1979). The majority of state and federal jurisdictions express a similar view and hold that relief will be granted only where the accused demonstrates that the trial court's abuse of discretion is so egregious as to deny him due process and his trial was thereby rendered fundamentally unfair. The record in the case sub judice reflects that appellant's counsel had full access to the experts of the State, together with the investigation and the reports of those experts. Counsel were able to subject them to rigid cross-examination. There is nothing to indicate that the State experts were biased or incompetent. In our opinion, appellant was not prejudiced for failure of the lower court to provide him funds with which to obtain his own experts, nor has he suffered any disadvantage thereby. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the lower court did not abuse its discretion in declining to provide appellant's counsel with requested experts and reversible error was not committed. [3]