Opinion ID: 3161635
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶18. This Court consistently has held that “the trial court should dismiss a cause of action for failure to comply with discovery only under the most extreme circumstances.” Pierce, 688 So. 2d at 1388 (citing Hapgood v. Biloxi Reg’l Med. Ctr., 540 So. 2d 630, 634 (Miss. 1989), and White v. White, 509 So. 2d 205, 209 (Miss. 1987)) (emphasis added). But we find that the trial judge’s dismissal here was warranted. ¶19. This Court upheld a trial judge’s dismissal for discovery violations in Pierce v. Heritage Properties, Inc. The plaintiff there, Pierce, sued multiple defendants alleging numerous causes of action after a ceiling fan fell and hit her on the head. Pierce, 688 So. 2d at 1387. Throughout discovery, Pierce represented that there were no witnesses to the accident. Id. But the defendants later learned that Pierce was not alone at the time of the 8 accident and that there was a witness. Id. The trial judge determined that Pierce’s presentation of false testimony under oath throughout the discovery process was sufficient to justify dismissal of the case. Id. On appeal, this Court affirmed the dismissal “to protect the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. ¶20. Recently, this Court again upheld a dismissal for discovery violations in Ashmore v. Mississippi Authority on Educational Television. There, the Ashmores suffered injuries in a motorcycle accident with a vehicle driven by an employee of the Mississippi Authority of Educational Television. Ashmore, 148 So. 3d at 979. But the trial judge dismissed the Ashmores’ personal-injury case after learning that they had, in sworn testimony, intentionally misrepresented facts concerning prior medical history and the nature and extent of their injuries sustained in the accident, describing the plaintiffs’ conduct as a “deliberate attempt to subvert the judicial process.” Id. at 980. ¶21. In upholding the Ashmores’ dismissal, this Court considered the four Pierce factors, which are: (1) whether the discovery violations were the result of willfulness or bad faith; (2) whether the deterrent value may be achieved by lesser sanctions; (3) whether the wronged party has suffered prejudice as a result of the discovery violation;4 and (4) whether the abuse is attributable solely to trial counsel instead of a blameless client. Id. at 981. We ultimately determined that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by dismissing the Ashmores’ case, 4 While this consideration is relevant, the Pierce court held that “there is no requirement that the defendant be substantially prejudiced . . . .” Pierce 688 So. 2d at 1391 (emphasis added); see also Allen v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 934 So. 2d 1006, 1013 (Miss. 2006) (“substantial prejudice is not necessary under this test”). 9 as the plaintiffs intentionally had misrepresented facts, and no less drastic sanctions would have had a sufficient deterrent effect. Id. at 986-987. ¶22. With this precedent in mind, we find first here that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he found a discovery violation.5 Ferguson admitted that the affidavit he had signed was false. Ferguson’s argument that his actions were “unknowing” and “without malice” because he merely signed some paperwork placed in front of him is unconvincing. Indeed, the filing of a false affidavit is perjury and punishable under both state and federal law. See Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-19 (Rev. 2014); 18 U.S.C.A. §1621. Our statute does not contain an exception for when one simply fails to take the time to read the affidavit before signing it. And it is well-settled that a party cannot avoid the consequences of a signed legal document by claiming he did not read it. See, e.g., MS Credit Ctr., Inc. v. Horton, 926 So. 2d 167, 177 (Miss. 2006). ¶23. We find also that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by dismissing the case. An application of the Pierce factors supports this position. First, there is substantial evidence that Ferguson misled the trial court, and we cannot fault the trial judge for finding that Ferguson’s conduct was willful and/or in bad faith. Ferguson was in no way required to sign the fraudulent affidavit. He does not argue that he was not given an opportunity to read it before signing, nor does he argue that he was coerced in any way. Moreover, at the time he 5 As mentioned previously, in the order dismissing Ferguson’s case with prejudice, the trial judge stated that his decision was based on the same legal standard applied in the dismissal of the Shelbys’ case, where he carefully considered precedent on the issue, specifically Pierce and Scoggins v. Ellzey Beverages, 743 So. 2d 990 (Miss. 1999). 10 signed the affidavit, he stood to gain because the case likely would have been dismissed altogether if the Shelbys were dismissed,6 leaving Ferguson with no opportunity to recover. ¶24. As for the second Pierce factor, it is clear the trial judge recognized that he was required to impose the least restrictive sanction. In his order, the judge explicitly provided that he had considered other alternatives, such as imposing fees or reducing the verdict. Ultimately, the trial judge determined that dismissal was the least restrictive sanction considering the conduct at issue, and we cannot say that he abused his discretion in doing so, especially in light of the plaintiffs’ respective conduct in this case. ¶25. Third, we note that both UMMC and AMR have been prejudiced by the delay caused by both the Shelbys’ and Ferguson’s misrepresentations. The trial initially was set for August 2011, and the order dismissing the entire action was not entered until August 2013. This delay was in no way caused by UMMC or AMR; rather, they have incurred additional expenses by being forced repeatedly to bring the plaintiffs’ misrepresentations to the attention of the trial court. In short, both the Shelbys’ and Ferguson’s conduct have caused substantial delay and additional costs in the disposition of this matter. ¶26. Finally, the trial judge found that the Shelbys’ counsel was not to blame, and he implicitly found the same as to Ferguson when he dismissed the case with prejudice based on “the same legal standard.” Also, Ferguson stated in his response to AMR’s motion to dismiss that he did “not accuse the Shelbys’ past counsel, Garner Berry, or anyone else who may have drafted the affidavit with any wrongdoing.” 6 At the hearing on AMR’s third motion to dismiss, the trial judge stated that “[q]uite honestly, but for that affidavit nobody would be here today.” 11 ¶27. This Court recently analyzed another discovery-violation case in Kinzie v. Belk Department Stores, 164 So. 3d 974 (Miss. 2015). The plaintiff there, Kinzie, injured his back while unloading a truck on the job. Id. at 975. Kinzie filed suit against Belk, alleging that his injury resulted from Belk’s negligent loading of the truck trailer. Id. When responding to an interrogatory, Kinzie described his injuries as follows: As a result of the injuries sustained in this accident, I have the following limitations: not able to cut grass or take care of the lawn, unable to perform house cleaning, not able to drive but for very short periods of time, unable to stand or walk for long period(s) of time, cannot lift or carry objects or even groceries, difficulty engaging in usual sexual activities, unable to play and hold grandchildren, and other activities as before the incident. Id. at 976. ¶28. The defendants hired an investigator to perform surveillance of Kinzie and provided twenty-five minutes of edited video footage excerpts at trial. Id. The excerpts revealed footage of Kinzie driving and walking to the post office and his attorney’s office and working on a shed in his backyard. Id. In response to allegations of discovery violations, Kinzie argued that he did not violate any of his physicians’ orders. Id. Based on the evidence, the trial judge dismissed Kinzie’s case with prejudice, determining that Kinzie had committed a discovery violation. Id. at 977. ¶29. On appeal, this Court held that, although Kinzie had committed a discovery violation, his conduct did not warrant dismissal, specifically providing that “although the trial court found Kinzie’s response to be false, the perceived falsehood arose in an isolated incident, and it certainly has not been established that Kinzie’s statements in discovery indicate any kind of pattern of misleading or false responses.” Id. at 979 (emphasis in original). This Court 12 also found persuasive that there was no “total lack of congruence” between Kinzie’s interrogatory response and the truth. Id. ¶30. Ferguson’s case warrants different treatment. Unlike Kinzie, a “total lack of congruence” exists between the substance of Ferguson’s affidavit and his deposition testimony. And Ferguson’s false affidavit was submitted at a time when Ferguson believed it would help his chance of success, but he abandoned it once it was clear that it could no longer help him. Ferguson’s conduct also was a part of a larger pattern of misrepresentations that he continued after the Shelbys were dismissed from the action. In short, Ferguson’s conduct is much more analogous to the conduct in Pierce, where the plaintiff intentionally misled the court. ¶31. “Abuse of discretion is the most deferential standard of review appellate courts employ. A finding of abuse of discretion absent a definite and firm identification of clear error violates time-honored standard-of-review principles.” Ashmore, 148 So. 3d at 982. Based on the evidence and an application of the Pierce factors, we find that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by dismissing the case for discovery violations.