Opinion ID: 1467769
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: judge graae's order releasing protective order payments to gulf

Text: Davis also challenges Judge Graae's order, after a hearing, [14] releasing to Gulf payments which Davis had deposited in the court registry during the pendency of Gulf's action. The Landlord and Tenant Branch routinely orders such payments in possession cases in order to provide the landlord protection of his fair compensation for the possession he loses during the period of litigation. Cooks v. Fowler, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 245, 250, 459 F.2d 1269, 1274 (1971); see generally Davis v. Rental Associates, Inc., 456 A.2d 820, 823-24 (D.C. 1983) (en banc). Davis argues that PMPA, RSSA, and the terms of Davis' service station lease all make clear that Gulf's obligations as a landlord were inexorably intertwined with its obligations to sell gasoline to Davis and to deliver it to the premises. It follows from this premise, Davis contends, that Gulf's obligation to supply him with gasoline continued as long as he lawfully remained in possession of the service station premises. Because Gulf stopped delivering gasoline to Davis' station as of March 10, 1983, and Davis could not thereafter operate as a branded Gulf retailer, Davis argues that he was subject to a constructive eviction and should not have been held liable for rent during the pendency of Gulf's action. We agree with Davis' initial premise. Both PMPA and RSSA clearly recognize that there is a unique relationship between franchisors and franchisees in the petroleum industry. This relationship, which usually is built upon a combination of sales contracts and leases between the parties, imposes special duties on each party not to disrupt unnecessarily the business of the other. [15] Moreover, the service station lease in this case fixed Davis' rental payments according to the sale of gasoline between the parties ( see supra note 1 and accompanying text) and provided that the breach of any of the terms or conditions of [the gasoline sales] contract shall constitute a breach of this Lease. Similarly, the contracts for the sales and delivery of gasoline contain several references to Davis' status and obligations as a tenant under the service station lease. Davis is therefore correct in asserting that, during the course of the franchise relationship, Gulf's obligations to supply gasoline were not completely independent of its obligations as a landlord under the service station lease. The question here, however, is whether Gulf had an obligation to continue delivering gasoline to Davis after it had done everything required by the franchise agreement and PMPA to cancel the service station lease and the contracts for sale and delivery of gasoline; i.e., after Gulf effectively had nonrenewed the franchise relationship. Alternatively stated: did Davis retain a right to demand delivery of gasoline from Gulf after March 10, 1983, based not on the contract of sale or on Davis' possession of the premises under the lease, but instead based on the law of this jurisdiction which permits a tenant to retain possession after the expiration of a lease while the landlord attempts to regain possession through prescribed judicial procedures. See Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781, 786-87 (D.C.1978) (en banc). Given our conclusion that Gulf had properly non-renewed the franchise relationship effective March 10, 1983, this question does not involve any interpretation of the parties' rights or obligations under PMPA. We need consider only whether Gulf's refusal to deliver gasoline justified an abatement of Davis' rent under District of Columbia landlord and tenant law. In Mendes, this court held that the landlord's common law right of self-help has been abrogated, and the legislatively created remedies for reacquiring possession are exclusive. A tenant has a right not to have his or her possession interfered with except by lawful process. 389 A.2d at 787. Thus, when a tenant elects to hold over after the expiration of a lease to challenge the landlord's right to regain possession, the landlord may not take it upon himself to remove the tenant, either by physically evicting the tenant, Mendes, or by constructively evicting him. Cf., e.g., Ackerhalt v. Smith, 141 A.2d 187, 189 (D.C.1958) (constructive eviction may result when landlord refuses to make repairs and premises become untenantable). Davis has not, however, called to our attention any case in which a landlord's refusal to carry on business dealings with a tenant has been held to constitute a constructive eviction. In the context of this commercial lease, and in light of our conclusion that Gulf did everything legally required to terminate its contract to supply Davis with gasoline, we conclude that Gulf's conduct did not amount to a constructive eviction and, accordingly, did not provide a basis for relieving Davis of his obligation to pay rent for the full period he remained in possession of the service station. Affirmed.