Opinion ID: 2518817
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sister-state decisions

Text: The first court to apply the reckless disregard or intentional conduct standard to golf appears to have been the Supreme Court of Ohio in Thompson v. McNeill (1990) 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 559 N.E.2d 705 (Thompson) . ( Schick v. Ferolito (2001) 167 N.J. 7, 767 A.2d 962, 966 (Schick) .) In Thompson, at page 706, the defendant shanked [6] a shot. The plaintiff, a member of the defendant's foursome, was standing at a 90-degree angle to the intended path of a ball that struck her. The Ohio Supreme Court held that only injuries caused by intentional conduct, or in some instances reckless misconduct, may give rise to a cause of action [by one golfer against another]. (Thompson, at p. 706.) Applying that standard, the Thompson court affirmed a grant of summary judgment in the defendant's favor. Shanking the ball is a foreseeable and not uncommon occurrence in the game of golf. The same is true of hooking, slicing, pushing, or pulling a golf shot. We would stress that `[i]t is well known that not every shot played by a golfer goes to the point where he intends it to go. If such were the case, every player would be perfect and the whole pleasure of the sport would be lost. It is common knowledge, at least among players, that many bad shots must result although every stroke is delivered with the best possible intention and without any negligence whatsoever.' Benjamin v. Nernberg (1931), 102 Pa.Super. 471, 475-476, 157 A. 10, 11. ( Thompson, supra, 559 N.E.2d at p. 709.) In Schick, supra, 167 N.J. 7, 767 A.2d 962, the New Jersey Supreme Court followed Thompson, supra, 53 Ohio St.3d 102, 559 N.E.2d 705, as well as Dilger, supra, 54 Cal.App.4th 1452, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 591. In Schick, at page 963 the defendant hit a second tee shot, or mulligan, [7] striking a member of his foursome. The New Jersey Supreme Court applied the reckless or intentional misconduct standard. We perceive no persuasive reason to apply an artificial distinction between `contact' and `noncontact' sports. In fact, only a minority of courts do so. [Citations.] (Id. at p. 968.) The New Jersey Supreme Court went on to hold that the trial court erred in granting the defendant's motion for summary judgment because the facts would have supported a verdict of recklessness. The court pointed to defendant's own testimony that he perceived plaintiff to be in the `line of fire' and that he waved plaintiff off in an effort to induce plaintiff to move from his location. (Id. at p. 970.) Plaintiff did not move. The defendant did not wait for him to do so and hit his shot anyway. The court held, [t]hat scenario presents a set of facts that a jury could find constitutes reckless conduct because it may reflect a conscious choice of a course of action with knowledge or reason to know that the action will create serious danger to others. (Ibid.) In Gray v. Giroux (2000) 49 Mass.App. Ct. 436, 730 N.E.2d 338, the Massachusetts Appeals Court held that the wilful, wanton, or reckless standard of conduct, and not ordinary negligence is the appropriate standard of care in noncontact sports such as golf. (Id. at p. 341.) Applying that standard, the appeals court affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, a member of the plaintiffs playing group. Here, the undisputed facts demonstrate that the plaintiff was standing at the edge of the woods on the left side of the fairway about thirty-five to fifty yards in front of the defendant, whose ball was in the rough on the same side. Because the hole was a dogleg to the right, and the plaintiff and the defendant were both on the left side of the fairway, the defendant obviously was not aiming his shot toward the edge of the woods where the plaintiff was standing; instead, he was trying to place the ball on the green to the right. Thus, the plaintiff was not within the intended path of the defendant's shot. Moreover, it is undisputed that the defendant did not see the plaintiff before he took his shot. In these circumstances, the fact that the defendant's shot did not follow its intended path does not amount to wilful, wanton, or reckless conduct. (Ibid., fns. omitted.) In Allen v. Donath (Tex.App.1994) 875 S.W.2d 438, the plaintiff was struck by a mulligan hit by a member of his threesome. It was disputed whether the defendant announced his intention to hit a second ball. The Texas Court of Appeals, following the Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Thompson, supra, 559 N.E.2d 705, rejected the plaintiffs argument that the appropriate standard of care should be dependent on whether the sport in question is a contact sport. While the genteel game of golf can hardly be described as a `competitive contact sport,' we believe the reckless and intentional standard is every bit as appropriate to conduct on the links as it is to conduct on the polo field. ( Allen v. Donath , at p. 440.) The court affirmed the judgment in favor of the defendant on the ground that the jury was properly instructed on the standard of care. (Ibid.) In Yoneda v. Tom (2006) 110 Hawai'i 367, 133 P.3d 796, the plaintiff was struck by a ball hit by a golfer in another group. The plaintiff sued the other golfer as well as the owner and operator of the golf course. The Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that the primary assumption of risk doctrine applied to define the defendant golfer's duty, relying in part on Knight, supra, 3 Cal.4th 296, 11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696, and Dilger, supra, 54 Cal. App.4th 1452, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 591. (Yoneda, at pp. 804-809.) Upholding a grant of summary judgment for the defendant golfer, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that no one could have reasonably anticipated that a person in the plaintiffs location was in danger of being struck by the defendant's shot. (Id. at p. 809.) [8]