Opinion ID: 1900993
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Under the Facts and Law, was an armed robbery committed?

Text: The indictment in this case was drawn under Mississippi Code Annotated § 97-3-79 (1972), which follows: Every person who shall feloniously take or attempt to take from the person or from the presence the personal property of another and against his will by violence to his person or by putting such person in fear of immediate injury to his person by the exhibition of a deadly weapon shall be guilty of robbery and upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the state penitentiary if the penalty is so fixed by the jury; and in cases where the jury fails to fix the penalty at imprisonment for life in the state penitentiary the court shall fix the penalty at imprisonment in the state penitentiary for any term not less than three (3) years. In Hermann v. State, 239 Miss. 523, 123 So.2d 846 (1960), a gas station attendant filled up Hermann's gasoline tank with 16.8 gallons of gasoline. Then he hung up the gasoline hose, walked over to Hermann and informed him that the cost of the 16.8 gallons of gasoline was $6.38. [1] According to the attendant, Hermann opened the car door, obtained a rifle from the car, and pointed it at the attendant's stomach. Hermann instructed him not to try anything and told the attendant if you try to follow me, I will hurt you. Hermann drove the vehicle away leaving the attendant standing with his arms raised in the air. Hermann contended that the violence or intimidation (putting in fear) occurred after the taking of the gasoline. This Court said: It is stated in Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Anderson, Volume 2, page 243 that In the absence of statutory modification, the constituent elements of the offense of robbery are (1) a felonious taking, (2) accompanied by an asportation, of (3) personal property of value (4) from the person of another or in his presence, (5) against his will, (6) by violence or by putting him in fear, (7) animo furandi. Again at page 252 of the same text it is stated: The actual taking and asportation of some of the victim's personal property is an essential element of robbery. (Italics ours). Again at page 253 of the same text it is stated: As in larceny, there must also be an asportation of carrying away of the goods. In the instant case the appellant, Richard Hermann, did not take complete control and dominion over the property of W.O. Dewease until he pointed the rifle on the gasoline station attendant, James Roy Dewease, and placed him in fear by telling him, Don't start anything, and If you try to follow me, I will hurt you. This occurred after the obtaining of conditional possession of the gasoline (on the assumption that the occupants of the car would pay for the gasoline) but prior to any attempt to asport the same. They resorted to the means of drawing the rifle in a threatening manner to make good their intention of removing the gasoline from the presence of the gasoline service station attendant and of making good their escape. Again at page 263, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure, Anderson, Volume 2, it is said: The act of the defendant may either precede or be concurrent with the taking of the victim's property. We think that the taking away of the gasoline was contemporaneous with the point of the rifle at the gasoline station attendant, and that the commission of this act was essential to the completion of the crime of robbery. After the enactment of Chapter 328, Laws of 1932, known as our Robbery with Firearms Statute this Court in the case of Fortenberry v. State, 190 Miss. 729, 1 So.2d 585, 586, said: Following upon the descent of the nation-wide financial depression, one of the effects of which was a marked increase in the crimes of larceny, robbery, and burglary, and with the advent of the automobile everywhere and the construction of improved highways, one of the criminal developments which had thrust itself, perhaps above all others, upon public attention in this State, as well as elsewhere, was the robbery of banks, mercantile establishments, filling stations and the like, by those who had taken to banditry as a business, or who for the time being had copied the crucial characteristics of that course, and suddenly appearing and thereafter hastily escaping, would use deadly weapons in enforcing their purpose and who were so intently predetermined upon the accomplishment of that purpose that they would kill in its execution and would kill also in making their escape. From the foregoing views, it follows that we are of the opinion that this case is distinguishable from the case of Register v. State, supra, principally relied on by appellants, in that the drawing of the rifle on the gasoline station attendant in the case at bar was the means employed to enable them to asport the gasoline from the premises and to enable them to make good their escape. 123 So.2d at 849. In the case sub judice, employees of the store saw the appellant take two packages of steak from the meat counter, one of which he was able to conceal in his trousers, and start walking hurriedly toward the front exit. The manager was immediately notified of the theft, and he and the meat cutter converged upon appellant, attempted to stop him from leaving the store, then followed him outside through a parking lot where appellant finally discarded the stolen meat and the pursuit was discontinued. The record overwhelmingly reflects that the store manager did not touch or restrain appellant from leaving the store and the area by physical force because he was afraid of the knife, which appellant exhibited to him, apparently for the purpose of instilling fear to stop the apprehension and pursuit. Even a pocketknife in the hands of a thief could produce serious bodily harm, viz, throat and jugular, eyes and head. In Harper v. State, 434 So.2d 1367, 1368 (Miss. 1983), the Court held that fear expressed in the statute simply amounts to an expectation that personal injury may result from the weapon possessed by the accused. The Court said: There is no merit to the appellant's contention that the victim was not placed in fear but was only made mad. The fear contemplated by the statute does not require the victim to be frightened or terrified. It is quite sufficient if he expect or anticipates that personal injury may result, as did Mr. Murff, if he does not abide by the instructions of the assailant, who is threatening the use of a deadly weapon. We are of the opinion that the crime, which began as petty larceny or shoplifting, escalated into armed robbery, that the issues were properly submitted to the jury, and that the conviction must stand.