Opinion ID: 160822
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence Regarding Constructive Discharge

Text: In a final evidentiary challenge, Sheriff Claussen contends that the district court erred in admitting evidence regarding Mr. Hall’s allegations of constructive discharge. He notes that Mr. Hall did not specifically allege a constructive discharge in his complaint. Sheriff Claussen’s argument is not supported by the record. As he acknowledges, Mr. Hall did allege that the termination of his employment violated the ADA and that Sheriff Claussen had failed to reasonably accommodate him. Although Mr. Hall’s complaint did not use the phrase “constructive discharge,” Sheriff Claussen had sufficient notice that Mr. Hall was challenging the circumstances surrounding the termination of his employment. The evidence concerning the termination of Mr. Hall’s employment was relevant to Mr. Hall’s ADA claims, and the district court did not err in admitting it. H. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) Damages Cap After the jury returned its verdict, Sheriff Claussen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the award of “damages for future earnings,” see Aplt’s App. 38 vol. I, at 121, should be reduced pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3).5 As to entities that employ more than 100 but fewer than 201 employees, that statute provides: The sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive damages awarded under this section . . . shall not exceed . . . $100,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3). The parties stipulated that Sheriff Claussen employed between 100 and 201 employees. See Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 180 (District Court Order on Defendant’s Motion to Reconsider, filed April 29, 1998, noting the parties’ stipulation). Thus, Sheriff Claussen asserted that the jury’s award of these damages should be reduced to $100,000.6 The district court rejected Sheriff Claussen’s argument. It reasoned that §1981a(3)’s limitation on damage awards for “future nonpecuniary losses” did not apply to awards of front pay because such awards were authorized by another statute, 42 U.S.C. 5 As noted above, the district court also awarded Mr. Hall $66,395 in lost back pay. Sheriff Claussen did not seek a reduction in this award pursuant to the § 1981a(3) cap on damages. Back pay awards are excluded from that damages cap. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2). 6 In his appellate brief, Mr. Hall advances the alternative theory that it was Mesa County, Colorado as a whole (with 450 employees), rather than the Sheriff’s Office, that was his employer. Because we conclude that the § 1981a(3) damages cap is not applicable to awards of front pay, consideration of that argument is not necessary to the resolution of this appeal. In any event, the case proceeded to trial on the theory that it was the Sheriff’s Department that was Mr. Hall’s employer, and Mr. Hall has offered insufficient evidence to indicate that his actual employer was the County. 39 § 2000e-5(g), which authorizes awards of “other equitable relief.” Sheriff Claussen now challenges that ruling. In the alternative, he contends that the award of front pay should have been decided by the court rather than by the jury. Because the district court’s interpretation of the applicable statutes involves questions of law, we engage in de novo review. Medlock v Ortho Biotech., Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1999). The district court’s reading of the statute is supported by our decision in Medlock. There, we noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2) expressly excludes certain forms of relief from the damages cap. “These exclusions include ‘backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [ 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) ].’” Medlock, 164 F.3d at 556 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(2)). One remedy authorized by § 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)) is “other equitable relief” that “the court may grant if deemed appropriate.” Front pay, we concluded in Medlock, constitutes “other equitable relief.” Other circuits have reached the same conclusion. See Kramer v. Logan County School Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1998) (concluding that “front pay is an equitable remedy excluded from the statutory limit on compensatory damages provided for § 1981a(b)(3)”); Williams v. Pharmacia, Inc., 137 F.3d 944, 953-54 (7th Cir. 1998) (distinguishing an award of front pay from an award of damages for a loss of future earnings and noting that the latter compensated the plaintiff “for a lifetime of diminished 40 earnings resulting from the reputational harms she suffered as a result of [the defendant’s] discrimination”); see also 5 Larson, Employment Discrimination § 93.03, at 93-11 (“[T]he sweeping exemption for ‘any other type of relief authorized under section 706(g)’ of Title VII will likely compel the courts to exclude traditional front pay from the definition of ‘future pecuniary loss.’”); Christy W. Showalter, Front Pay Under the Damages Caps of the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Legal Remedy or Equitable Relief, 30 U. Mem. L. Rev. 887, 919 (2000) (concluding that, “[b]ased . . . on the statutory interpretation and legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the policy guidelines of the EEOC, and the judicial treatment of front pay as an equitable remedy under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, front pay should be treated as equitable relief authorized by section 706(g) and, thus, excluded from the damage caps outlined in § 1981a(b)(3)”). But see Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1203 (6th Cir. 1997) (stating that “‘front pay’, by both its definition and purpose in the law, is a ‘future pecuniary loss’ [under §1981a(b)(3)] because it is a monetary award for the salary that the employee would have received but for the discrimination”). Nevertheless, we agree with Sheriff Claussen that awards of front pay must be made by the court rather than by a jury. In McCue v. Kansas Department of Human Resources, 165 F.3d 784, 792 (10th Cir. 1999), we vacated a jury award of front pay on a Title VII retaliation claim, concluding that such an award did not constitute damages for “future pecuniary losses” under § 1981a(b)(3). We reasoned that, prior to the passage of 41 section 1981a, we had held that front pay was an equitable remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) because it constituted “other equitable relief.” McCue, 165 F.3d at 792 (citing EEOC v. General Lines, Inc., 865 F.2d 1555, 1561 (10th Cir.1989)). Because front pay was available as “other equitable relief” when Congress passed 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, front pay was not included in the damages for “future pecuniary losses” that Congress authorized juries to award under 42 U.S.C. § 1981a. In his appellate brief, Mr. Hall defends the district court’s imposition of the front pay award. He notes that the district court adopted the jury’s award in a separate order and judgment adjudicating Sheriff Claussen’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law. See Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 126-40. According to Mr. Hall, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to adopt the jury’s front pay award as its own. We are not persuaded by Mr. Hall’s argument. Determining front pay requires the district court to predict future events and consider “many complicated and interlocking factors.” Mason v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 115 F.3d 1442, 1458 (10th Cir. 1997). A front pay award must identify an end date, Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1142 (10th Cir. 1999), and the court must provide an explanation of that date that indicates that it is based on more than “mere guesswork.” Carter v. Sedgwick County, Kan., 929 F.2d 1501, 1505 (10th Cir. 1991). We have identified many factors that are relevant to the court’s determination of an appropriate amount: work life expectancy, salary and benefits when the plaintiff’s employment was terminated, potential increases in salary 42 that the plaintiff could have received, the availability of other work opportunities, the period that it would take the plaintiff to become reemployed, and the discounting of the award to net present value. Id. at 1143. See also McCue, 165 F.3d at 792 (stating that “‘[b]ecause of the potential for windfall, . . . [the award of front pay] must be tempered’” and that “[t]he district court is best-equipped to equitably determine the proper amount for this award”) (quoting Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir.1991)). Here, the court’s instructions informed the jury that it could award damages for “future pecuniary losses” and that it should reduce the award to take into account the expenses that the plaintiff would have incurred in making future earnings as well as the interest that the plaintiff could earn on the award. See Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 113-14. However, there is no indication that the jury was informed of the other factors that must be considered in making a front pay award, and, more importantly, there is no indication that the district court itself considered those factors before approving the award. From our review of the record, we conclude that the jury’s award of $225,000 “as damages for future earnings,” see Aplt’s App. vol. I, at 12, represents an award of front pay. See James v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 21 F.3d 989, 997 (10th Cir. 1994) (stating that “[f]ront pay refers to the award of money as compensation for the future loss of earnings”); Medlock, 165 F.3d at 555 n.8 (concluding that a verdict form’s reference to “future damages”signified front pay only); Aple’s Br. at 55 (characterizing the $225,000 damages award as representing earnings that Mr. Hall “would have received as deputy 43 sheriff”). Because the determination of front pay is for the court rather than for the jury and because the record does not indicate that the district court considered the appropriate factors before entering the award, we conclude that the $225,000 award of future earnings should be vacated and the case should be remanded to the district court for a determination of the proper amount of front pay under the standards noted above. As we have observed, the $100,000 damages cap set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(3) will not be applicable to any subsequent award of front pay.