Opinion ID: 1919690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: the prosecution's discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violated the federal and state constitutions and state law.

Text: Davis argues that the State struck nine of ten eligible black veniremen in violation of Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991) [5] . Davis promptly objected under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986), after the State exercised its peremptory strikes and therefore this issue is properly before this Court. Ordinarily, a defendant claiming a Batson/Powers violation must first make a prima facie showing of discrimination by establishing: (1) that he is a member of a cognizable racial group; (2) that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire members of the defendant's race; (3) that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Davis v. State, 551 So.2d 165, 170 (Miss. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074, 110 S.Ct. 1796, 108 L.Ed.2d 797 (1990); Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346, 1349 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988); see also Taylor v. State, 524 So.2d 565, 566 (Miss. 1988). The United States Supreme Court held in Powers that a white defendant had standing to challenge the prosecution's use of its peremptory strikes to remove black venire members. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991). Consequently, Davis does not have to show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Id. Recent federal decisions, however, make it clear that once a prosecutor comes forward with reasons for his peremptory strikes, as the State did in this case, the sufficiency of the defendant's prima facie showing is no longer at issue. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395, 405 (1991). The State, during Davis' hearing on the motion for a new trial, gave its reasons for striking black venire members. Davis was then given the opportunity to rebut the State's reasons for striking the black venire members. The State was then given an opportunity to respond to Davis' objections. The question thus becomes whether the reasons offered by the prosecution are race neutral. Lockett, 517 So.2d at 1349. The prosecutor offered the following as race neutral reasons: Minnie Moore: (1) vacillated on her stated ability to give the death penalty; (2) owned a day-care center and had expressed concerns that she would be worried all during the trial if she was forced to be away from her day-care; (3) was late to jury voir dire one day; (4) had a friend charged with murder; (5) stated that the prosecution must prove Davis absolutely guilty; (6) had no ties to law enforcement; (7) had not been a victim of crime nor did she know anyone who had been a victim of crime; (8) Moore's views on the death penalty were not ones that she had held for a long time. Glen James: (1) had no friends or relatives in law enforcement; (2) was late in reporting for voir dire one morning; (3) D.A.'s first impression of James was that he was very dumb; (4) was unemployed and had a very unstable work record; (5) did not voluntarily disclose that he had been charged with DUI; (6) had several friends in jail; (7) the prosecution, based on comments made during voir dire, felt that James would look for reasons not to give Davis the death penalty. Ross Clay: (1) stated on his juror form that he had no opinion about the death penalty; (2) was avoidant as to whether he could vote for death penalty; (3) thought the death penalty was unfairly applied; (4) became belligerent when the prosecution tried to pin him down on death penalty; (5) the prosecution felt, based upon Clay's answers to questioning, that Clay was displeased with the death penalty. Tommie C. James, Jr.: (1) the prosecution argued that James was crazy; (2) James last worked in 1979; (3) was on medication (200 mg. Mellaril daily) for his mental illness; (4) he had a brother who had been addicted to cocaine. Evone Wall: (1) was avoidant; (2) was a member of the Disciples of Christ church and members of that church are opposed to the death penalty; (3) had no ties to law enforcement; (4) first stated that she had never been a victim of crime and then changed her story; (5) made no eye contact; (6) when asked if she could think of a situation that would justify the death penalty she said not really; (7) the prosecution felt that Wall would look for an excuse not to give the death penalty; (8) defense asked Wall few questions. Doris Summers: (1) had never been a victim of crime; (2) no ties to law enforcement; (3) fifty-two years old and only job she ever had was as a babysitter, e.g., no stable work history; (4) prosecution felt that Summers was a dyed redhair[ed], drunk; (5) Summer's body language indicated that she was opposed to death penalty; (6) her juror form said don't believe in taking another's life; (7) Summers felt courts were not fair; (8) raised her hand and said that she had conscientious scruples against infliction of the death penalty; (9) equivocated on whether she could take another person's life. Paul Campbell: (1) is an artist and the prosecution argued that artsy people are pro-defense; (2) has been an art instructor his entire adult life; (3) unsure about whether he would favor life without parole over death penalty; (4) felt that whites get more appeals and that there is a disproportionate application of the death penalty to blacks; (5) the prosecution mistakenly thought that Campbell said that parole was an important consideration and the prosecution thought that because this crime had occurred two years earlier, the wounds had healed, and that parole was something he would consider; (6) first stated that he knew no one in law enforcement and then remembered that his first cousin, with whom he was very close, was a cop in Chicago and had been seriously wounded. (7) the prosecution felt that Campbell had something to hide. Earl Ward: (1) his age; (2) was a retired minister; (3) the prosecution believed Davis' alcohol and drug use would affect his views on the death penalty; (4) he was not alert during voir dire; (5) was confused as to serving on a petit jury as opposed to serving on a grand jury; (6) Ward was from Utica and the prosecution had a juror from Utica in Marion Albert Pruett's case that had refused to return the death penalty for Pruett; (7) Ward felt that life without parole was the same as the death penalty, only slower; (8) had unpleasant experience as a juror on a civil trial; (9) his answers tended to ramble. Mary A. Bailey: (1) unstable work record; (2) the prosecution believed that Bailey slept through parts of jury voir dire; (3) Bailey's brother was awaiting trial for shooting a police officer; (4) she was an unmarried mother of five children; (5) she vacillated and gave contradictory answers as to the death penalty; (6) the prosecution stated that she had no ties to law enforcement. After the State gave its reasons for striking the above listed jurors, Davis was allowed to rebut the State's reasons for striking nine black veniremen. The State was then given a chance to respond to Davis' rebuttal. After hearing all of the reasons given by the State for striking certain black venire members, the trial judge, in his Opinion and Order, stated in part: .... Since the Powers' [sic] decision was anticipated, I was observant of the Voir Dire to be in a position to rule on challenges in the event the Powers case was rendered prior to completion of jury selection. To further assist the attorneys and me, a transcript of the Voir Dire was ordered. In addition to my observations during the trial, I have reviewed the transcript, my own trial notes, a transription [sic] of the reasons given by the prosecution for their challenge and a transcription of the rebuttal to the challenge as given by the defense. I have considered the reasons for each individual challenge as stated by the prosecution and I find that the stated reasons for the challenges are valid ones and do not indicate any racial motivations. The challenge of juror Campbell requires specific attention. At the first Motion hearing the State gave reasons for the challenge and later on rebuttal to the defense argument contended that the challenge was simply one of mistake and that the State excused him in error [6] . I accept this explanation. The challenge was not understandable to me at the time that it was made but I long ago gave up trying to understand the reasons for peremptory challenges. Jury selection is not a science and attorneys are subject to confusion in this area just as much as they are in others, especially after lengthy questioning of many prospective jurors. .... The United States Supreme Court in Batson pointed out that `[t]here are any number of bases' on which a prosecutor reasonably may believe that it is desirable to strike a juror who is not excusable for cause ... however, the prosecutor must give a `clear and reasonably specific' explanation of his `legitimate reasons' for exercising the challenges. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. Today we reiterate Batson's holding that the prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level of justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. In Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1346 (Miss. 1987), this Court presented a list of reasons accepted as race neutral by other courts throughout the country in an effort to provide guidance to trial judges in this state. Included among those reasons: age, demeanor, marital status, single with children, prosecutor distrusted juror, educational background, employment history, criminal record, young and single, friend charged with crime, unemployed with no roots in community, posture and demeanor indicated juror was hostile to being in court, juror was late, short term employment. In the case at bar, the trial judge found that the State's reasons for striking black venire members were sufficiently race neutral. These findings are entitled to great deference from this Court on appellate review, Davis, 551 So.2d at 171, (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 n. 21), and such findings will only be reversed when it is evident that the trial judge's findings are clearly erroneous. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d at 1350. Because we cannot say that the trial judge's findings are clearly erroneous, we reject this assignment of error.