Opinion ID: 885157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the Accident Arise Out of the Operation, Maintenance, or Use of Morehead's Vehicle?

Text: ¶ 42 The parties agree that, under the facts of this case, the relevant inquiry centers upon the use of Morehead's vehicle, rather than its operation or maintenance. The parties also agree that in order for the accident to have arisen out of the use of Morehead's vehicle, there must exist a sufficient nexus, or causal connection, between the tortfeasors' use of Morehead's vehicle and Appellant's injuries. The parties dispute, however, the legal test to be applied in determining the existence of a sufficient nexus or causal connection in the context of UM coverage. ¶ 43 Similar to his argument in the first section of this opinion, Appellant argues that the phrase arising out of the use should be broadly interpreted to effect the remedial purposes of UM coverage. Without advocating a particular test, Appellant urges this Court to adopt an expansive interpretation of arising out of the use which does not require that the injury be proximately caused by the use of the uninsured vehicle in a strict legal sense, but rather requires a showing that some nexus exists between the injury and the use of the uninsured vehicle. Appellant maintains that the fact that some instrumentality independent of the uninsured vehicle was the direct cause of injury should not, by itself, preclude UM coverage. Appellant cites General Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Olivier (R.I.1990), 574 A.2d 1240; Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Howser (1992), 309 S.C. 269, 422 S.E.2d 106; and Insurance Co. of N. Am. v. Dorris (1982), 161 Ga.App. 46, 288 S.E.2d 856, as both support for his position and examples of expansive tests which this Court may adopt to serve the purposes of UM coverage. ¶ 44 In Olivier, the insured was shot by a motorist, with whom she had previously been involved in a collision, as she stood away from her car waiting to give a statement to the police about the collision. In holding that the insured's injuries arose out of the use of the uninsured vehicle, the Florida Supreme Court construed the phrase arising out of the use as not meaning `proximately caused by' but as having a broader meaning that simply require[s] some nexus between the motor vehicle and the injury. Olivier, 574 A.2d at 1242 (following Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Novak (Fla.1984), 453 So.2d 1116 (construing the phrase in the context of personal injury protection benefits)). In support of its expansive test, the court reasoned that it was unnecessary for the uninsured vehicle to be the instrumentality of the injury because the policy should be interpreted to effect broad coverage. Olivier, 574 A.2d at 1242. The court embraced the principle that the clause `arising out of the use of the motor vehicle' is framed in general, comprehensive terms in order to express the intent to effect broad coverage. Olivier, 574 A.2d at 1242. ¶ 45 In Howser, an insured was injured when she was pursued, threatened, and then shot by an unknown assailant in a car. At the time of the shooting, the insured was driving her vehicle when the unknown motorist began following her and then bumped the back of her vehicle with his automobile. The motorist pulled alongside the insured and threatened her with a gun while attempting to get her to pull over. When the insured tried to escape in her vehicle, the motorist fired several shots at her vehicle and she was wounded. Howser, 422 S.E.2d at 107. ¶ 46 In resolving whether the insured's injuries arose out of the use of the uninsured vehicle, the court stated that the test was something less than proximate cause and something more than the vehicle being the mere site of the injury or, more simply, whether the use of the vehicle causally contributed to the claimant's injuries. Howser, 422 S.E.2d at 108 (relying on Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Klug (Minn.1987), 415 N.W.2d 876). In applying this test, the court determined that the uninsured vehicle's use causally contributed to Howser's injuries because the vehicle played an indispensable role in the attack on Howser. The court explained: In the case at bar, it is apparent that the unknown vehicle was an active accessory to this assault. This is not a case in which the assailant merely used the vehicle to provide transportation to the situs of the shooting. Nor is it a case where the assailant happened, incidentally, to be sitting in a stationary vehicle at the time of the attack. Only through use of his vehicle was the assailant able to closely pursue Howser, thereby enabling him to carry out the pistol assault. The gunshot was the culmination of an ongoing assault in which the vehicle played an essential and integral part. Additionally, only a motor vehicle could have provided the assailant a quick and successful escape. Thus, we find a sufficient causal connection exists between the use of the assailant's vehicle and Howser's injuries. Howser, 422 S.E.2d at 108 (citations omitted). After finding a sufficient causal connection, the court held it must determine if an act of independent significance occurred breaking the causal link. Howser, 422 S.E.2d at 108. The Court concluded there was no act of independent significance which broke the causal link as the unknown driver's use of his vehicle and the shooting were inextricably linked as one continuing assault. Howser, 422 S.E.2d at 109. ¶ 47 In Dorris, the insured was inspecting the mirror of his vehicle after it had been struck by another motorist moving in the opposite direction. The motorist turned his vehicle around and pulled up alongside the insured. An altercation ensued and the motorist pointed a pistol at the insured. The insured dove in his vehicle and sped away. Then the motorist pursued the insured and fired several shots, some of which hit the insured's vehicle. In the course of pursuit, the insured lost control of his vehicle and sustained injuries when his vehicle veered off the road and overturned. Dorris, 288 S.E.2d at 857. ¶ 48 In determining whether the insured's injuries arose out of the use of the uninsured vehicle, the Georgia Court of Appeals employed the following test: [T]he term arising out of does not mean proximate cause in the strict legal sense, nor require [sic] a finding that the injury was directly and proximately caused by the use of the vehicle, nor that the insured vehicle was exerting any physical force upon the instrumentality which was the immediate cause of the injury ... [A]lmost any causal connection or relationship will do.... Case law indicates that the injury need not be the proximate result of use in the strict sense, but it cannot be extended to something distinctly remote. Each case turns on its precise individual facts. The question to be answered is whether the injury originated from, had its origin in, grew out of, or flowed from the use of the vehicle. (Citations omitted.) Dorris, 288 S.E.2d at 858 (citing Southeastern Fid. Ins. Co. v. Stevens (1977), 142 Ga.App. 562, 236 S.E.2d 550 (construing the phrase arising out of the use in the context of personal injury protection coverage)). In applying this test, the court determined that the insured's injuries arose from the motorist's use of his vehicle to perpetrate an assault on the insured. The court reasoned: Had it not been for the use of the unidentified truck, the continuing assault would not have happened and, presumably, appellees would not have been injured. As thus viewed, the liability of the unidentified driver for the injuries to appellees arose from, had its origins in, grew out of or flowed from his utilization of his vehicle as a means to perpetrate an unwarranted assault upon them. Under the evidence the crash of the[insured's] truck was the result of the high speed chase during the course of which shooting occurred. We are satisfied that where a connection appears between the use of the [uninsured] vehicle and the [ultimate crash of the insured's vehicle] and resulting injuries such as to render it more likely that the one grew out of the other, it comes within the coverage defined. Dorris, 288 S.E.2d at 858-59 (citations omitted). ¶ 49 State Farm argues that the tests articulated in the above cases are much too broad and effectively make UM coverage a surrogate for general crime insurance. Moreover, State Farm argues, the above tests do not accurately reflect the intent of the parties in contracting for UM coverage. See Ulrich v. United Services Auto. Ass'n (Wyo.1992), 839 P.2d 942, 949. Relying on Ulrich, State Farm argues that the arising out of the use phrase unambiguously expresse[s] the parties' intent that UM coverage exists for injuries that result as a natural consequence from the use of an insured vehicle. See Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948. State Farm urges this Court to adopt Wyoming's natural consequences test, or a similar restrictive test, for determining whether an insured's injuries arose out of the use of the uninsured vehicle. ¶ 50 In Ulrich, a motorist, who was an acquaintance of the insured, saw the insured putting air into his tire at a gas station. The motorist pulled into the gas station and parked his truck in a manner that blocked the insured's vehicle. The motorist then began yelling and threatening the insured, attempting to pick a fight. The motorist moved his truck so that it was no longer blocking the insured's vehicle, and parked it parallel to the insured's vehicle. The motorist then pointed a gun at the insured. An exchange of gunfire ensued culminating in the motorist shooting the insured while the insured was attempting to escape in his vehicle. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 944-45. ¶ 51 In holding that the insured's injuries did not arise out of the use of the motorist's truck, the Wyoming Supreme Court applied the natural consequences test to UM coverage. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948 (following Worthington v. State (Wyo.1979), 598 P.2d 796, 807 (construing the phrase arising out of the use in the context of liability coverage)). The Worthington court described the natural consequences test as follows: In determining whether an injury arose out of use, the evidence must demonstrate that it was the natural and reasonable incident or consequence of the use of an insured vehicle, the causal connection being reasonably apparent. If the injury was directly caused by some independent or intervening cause wholly disassociated from, independent of, or remote from the use of the automobile, the injury cannot be held to arise out of its use. The resolution of the question necessarily depends to a great degree upon the particular facts presented by each individual case. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 948. Applying this test to Ulrich, the court concluded that Ulrich's injuries did not occur as a natural consequence of the use of the motorist's truck, but rather occurred as a natural consequence of the motorist's use of a gun. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. The court further commented that the motorist's intentional act of shooting was an independent, intervening cause of Ulrich's injuries, rendering the motorist's use of his truck legally insignificant. Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. ¶ 52 State Farm cites several cases from courts in other jurisdictions also applying a restrictive interpretation to arising out of the use. See e.g., Kangas v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. (1975), 64 Mich.App. 1, 235 N.W.2d 42, 50(holding that where occupants left uninsured vehicle, assaulted a pedestrian, pedestrian ran into highway and was struck by a truck, no causal connection existed between pedestrian's injuries and use of the uninsured vehicle because assaults and fisticuffs are not normal foreseeable occurrences in the use of a vehicle); Lemmons v. Prudential Property & Cas. Ins. Co. (Mo.App.Ct.1994), 878 S.W.2d 853, 857 (holding that for requisite causal connection to exist, the vehicle must be the instrumentality which caused the injury, not merely a contribution which causes a condition which in turn causes the injury); Doe v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. (E.D.Va.1995), 878 F.Supp. 862, 864-65 (holding that injuries must be connected to the use of the car as a car, i.e. as a means of transportation rather than a situs for the commission of criminal acts). ¶ 53 In advocating their respective tests, neither party explicitly addressed the issue of whether the phrase arising out of the use is ambiguous. State Farm briefly touched on the issue by quoting Ulrich which states that the arising out of the use phrase unambiguously expresse[s]the parties' intent that UM coverage exists for injuries that result as a natural consequence from the use of an uninsured vehicle. See Ulrich, 839 P.2d at 949. As previously stated, an ambiguity exists when the contract taken as a whole in its wording or phraseology is reasonably subject to two different interpretations. Holeman, ¶ 25. We examine the question of ambiguity in insurance contract language from the viewpoint of a consumer with average intelligence but not trained in the law or insurance business. Holeman, ¶ 25. Upon these principles, we determine that the phrase arising out of the use is ambiguous because it is reasonably subject to more than one interpretation. In cases where the uninsured vehicle is the instrumentality and, therefore, the legal cause of the insured's injuries, we are certain the average UM policyholder would think that his or her injuries arose out of the use of the uninsured vehicle. However, we cannot agree with State Farm that the average UM policyholder would not think his or her injuries arose out of the use of the uninsured vehicle in cases where the uninsured vehicle is not the instrumentality causing the injuries, but is a prime accessory, without which the injury-producing incident or the severity of the injuries would not have occurred. Indeed, we think the opposite. ¶ 54 Having concluded that the phrase arising out of the use is ambiguous, we resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured. Holeman, ¶ 25. We align ourselves with those jurisdictions adopting an expansive, rather than restrictive, interpretation of the phrase. Specifically, we adopt the fact-intensive test articulated in Dorris. We hold that for purposes of UM coverage, an insured's injuries arise out of the use of an uninsured vehicle if the injuries originate from, or grow out of, or flow from the use of the uninsured vehicle. Dorris, 288 S.E.2d at 858. We agree with Olivier, that the phrase arising out of the use should be broadly interpreted to effect the remedial purposes of UM coverage. Olivier, 574 A.2d at 1242. ¶ 55 We are cognizant of State Farm's slippery slope argument and its concern that applying an expansive interpretation to the phrase arising out of the use would expand UM coverage to the extent it would function as general crime insurance. However, rather than address this concern by fashioning an unduly restrictive test of causal relationship, as State Farm suggests, we think it better to apply an expansive test and, on a case by case basis, distinguish those cases where the facts suggest a remote or tenuous causal relationship between an insured's injuries and the use of the uninsured vehicle from cases where the facts demonstrate that the two are inextricably linked. ¶ 56 Moreover, it appears State Farm recognizes that the Dorris test is workable in the context of UM coverage. We note that in analogizing this case to other cases with similar facts where it was held that no causal relationship existed, State Farm cited Cannon v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co. (1994), 138 N.H. 365, 639 A.2d 270, a case employing the same expansive test as in Dorris. In Cannon, a motorist engaged the insured in a game of cat and mouse on the Interstate and would not let the insured pass. The motorist used hostile hand signals to indicate that he wanted the insured to pull over. The insured refused and drove closely behind the motorist to ascertain his license plate number. The motorist then slammed his brakes. The insured in turn slammed his brakes causing his vehicle to stall. The two vehicles came to a stop without touching each other. The motorist then exited his vehicle, ran over to the insured's vehicle, smashed the insured's driver side window with his fist, and punched the insured in the face. Cannon, 639 A.2d at 271. ¶ 57 In resolving the arising out of the use question, the court employed the originating from, or growing out of, or flowing from the use test of causal relationship. Cannon, 639 A.2d at 271. Applying this test, the court reasoned that the causal connection between use and injury here is tenuous, and held that the insured's injuries did not arise out of the use of the uninsured vehicle. Cannon, 639 A.2d at 271. See also Akerley v. Hartford Ins. Group (1992), 136 N.H. 433, 616 A.2d 511, 515-16 (employing same expansive test as Dorris and holding no causal relationship existed). The Cannon and Akerley cases demonstrate that the originating from, or growing out of, or flowing from the use test is workable in the context of UM coverage without expanding the scope of UM coverage so as to make it a surrogate for general crime insurance. ¶ 58 Having decided the proper test to be applied in determining whether an insured's injuries arose out of the use of an uninsured vehicle, we recognize that a material issue of fact is disputed in this litigation: whether Appellant's injuries originated from, or grew out of, or flowed from the use of Morehead's vehicle. Because a material issue of fact exists in this case, we hold that the District Court's grant of summary judgment was improper. ¶ 59 We reverse and remand this cause to the District Court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. TERRY N. TRIEWEILER, W. WILLIAM LEAPHART, JAMES C. NELSON, and JIM REGNIER, JJ., concur.