Opinion ID: 2517375
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the Carroll case

Text: In State v. Carroll, 63 Haw. 345, 627 P.2d 776 (1981), the defendant was arrested for allegedly starting a fire at a school. Id. at 346, 627 P.2d at 777. The arresting police officer conducted a routine search of the defendant and found a cannister in the defendant's possession. Id. Believing that the canister contained nasal spray, the officer returned it to the defendant. Id. The defendant was then transported to the police station and booked for attempted criminal property damages in the second degree. Id. During a custodial search, a second officer recovered the cannister and identified it as mace. Id. The defendant was subsequently charged with possession of an obnoxious substance. Id. The defendant was first tried and acquitted of the misdemeanor charge of possession of an obnoxious substance  the mace. Id. at 346-47, 627 P.2d at 777-78. The defendant was subsequently brought to trial on the attempted criminal property damage charge. Id. at 347, 627 P.2d at 778. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that (1) the two offenses were part of a single episode within the context of HRS § 701-109(2) and, (2) inasmuch as the offenses were part of the same episode and not prosecuted in the same proceeding, the second case was prohibited by HRS § 701-111(1)(b). Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment, and the prosecution appealed. Id. On appeal, this court observed that: [HRS] § 701-109(2) . . . reflects a policy that a defendant should not have to face the expense and uncertainties of multiple trials based on essentially the same conduct or episode. It is designed to prevent the [prosecution] from harassing a defendant with successive prosecutions where the [prosecution] is dissatisfied with the punishment previously ordered or where the [prosecution] has previously failed to convict the defendant. Id. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780 (citations omitted). This court held that the preconditions for the application of HRS § 701-109(2) had been satisfied inasmuch as (1) it was uncontested that the appropriate prosecuting officer was aware of the . . . [a]ttempted [c]riminal [p]roperty [d]amage charge at the time that the possessory charge was prosecuted and (2) both charges [were] clearly within the jurisdiction of a single court. Id. at 349, 627 P.2d at 779 (footnote and citations omitted). Additionally, this court declared that, [i]n view of the dual considerations of fairness to the defendant and society's interest in efficient law enforcement, the test for determining the singleness of a criminal episode should be based on whether the alleged conduct was so closely related in time, place and circumstances that a complete account of one charge cannot be related without referring to details of the other charge. Id. at 351, 627 P.2d at 780. Applying the test to the facts presented, this court held that the two cases did not arise from the same episode because: [the] defendant was charged with the commission of offenses which occurred at different times and places and under different circumstances. Our rationale is based primarily on the fact that the arresting officer failed to recognize the illegal nature of the cannister at the time of the search for weapons. As a result, defendant's possession of the [m]ace continued after his initial arrest, until the subsequent discovery and identification at the police station. Id. at 352, 627 P.2d at 781. This court further reasoned that: While it is true that the possessory offense can be traced to the time of the first arrest, we cannot say that the possessory charge should be deemed effective as of the time of that arrest. The point in time at which the [m]ace was identified is important because prior to the identification, the facts and circumstances within the first arresting officer's knowledge did not afford probable cause to believe that an offense other than [a]ttempted [c]riminal [p]roperty [d]amage in the [s]econd degree had been committed. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Carroll court reversed the trial court's order granting the defendant's motion to dismiss. Id. at 353, 627 P.2d at 781.