Opinion ID: 6536853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Competing Forces at Work in the CFSA

Text: {197} The Majority's construction of Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) seems to assume that, so long as we are assiduous enough in unearthing comparison cases and do as robust a comparative review as possible, we can be assured an objectively correct answer about the merits of a jury's capital sentencing decision will emerge. I respectfully disagree. This view ignores the tensions at work in the CFSA between the statute's requirement for individualized capital sentencing proceedings and consistent capital sentencing outcomes. These commands are at odds with one another and any construction of Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) must necessarily impose a compromise between them. {198} The Majority appears to believe that these difficult tensions are resolved by the basic realization that [c]omparative proportionality is not a question for the jury but rather is intended to serve as a check on the exercise of jury discretion in sentencing and that [t]he primary focus [in assessing the comparative proportionality of a death sentence] is not on the reasonableness of the jury's sentence of death, but rather on how that sentence compares to jury dispositions in comparable cases. Maj. Op. ¶ 77 (third alteration in original) (quoting Papasavvas , 790 A.2d at 827 (Stein, J., concurring)). This approach (1) wrongly diminishes the importance of individualized sentencing in the capital context, (2) overstates the efficacy and coherence of comparison as method, and (3) values consistency in the capital sentencing context over any other important and constitutionally significant concerns.
{199} All of the provisions of the CFSA must be considered when construing its terms. State v. Thompson , 1953-NMSC-072 , ¶ 9, 57 N.M. 459 , 260 P.2d 370 . Subsections 31-20A-1(B) and -2(B) direct that where a capital defendant is tried before a jury, that jury shall select the appropriate sentence. It is hardly surprising these provisions exist. {200} [I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978 (Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ. concurring). The sentencing jury asked to choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do little more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. Witherspoon , 391 U.S. at 519, 88 S.Ct. 1770 . And one of the most important functions any jury can perform in making such a selection is to maintain a link between contemporary community values and the penal system-a link without which the determination of punishment would hardly reflect [the Eighth Amendment's concern with] the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society. Id. at 519 n.15, 88 S.Ct. 1770 . It is inevitable that juries in the capital context will reach divergent outcomes in seemingly similar cases, and this, in and of itself, is no basis to question the validity of those judgments. McCleskey , 481 U.S. at 311 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 . {201} Despite the fact that the CFSA gives to sentencing juries the authority to determine whether to impose death or extend mercy, and despite the fact that this  delegation of authority has a constitutional dimension and necessarily grants discretion, Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) nevertheless directs this Court to verify the correctness of the sentencing jury's determination. The problem inherent with Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) should be self-evident. {202} On one hand, the constitution requires an individual assessment of the capital defendant's circumstances and crime and the CFSA ensures that this will occur by granting to juries the right to decide the propriety of capital punishment. On the other hand, Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) assumes that the facts giving rise to death sentences may be flattened for comparison and that this Court may, somehow, meaningfully judge the capital sentencing determinations of juries. I am not the first to acknowledge that these concerns are entirely at odds with one another and present us with what appears to be an unresolvable conflict. {203} Other courts have already recognized that comparison of capital sentences is inherently problematic given the constitutional requirement for individualized sentencing in the imposition of death sentences, and is also inherently illogical as that which is unique is also incommensurable. Addison , 7 A.3d at 1255 . For these reasons, some have expressed the belief that the entire concept of comparing death sentences is beset with so many problems that the exercise is incapable of meaningful application. Joseph T. Walsh, The Limits of Proportionality Review in Death Penalty Cases , 21 Del. Law. 13, 15 (2004). The experiment conducted in New Jersey over the last half-century compellingly illustrates this point and proves that comparative proportionality review is no panacea. {204} The Majority mentions the statistical model of comparative proportionality review adopted by the New Jersey Supreme Court, Maj. Op. ¶ 45, but fails to note that some scholars denounce New Jersey's attempts-which have been vigorous and resource intensive-to make comparative proportionality review an empirical and scientific endeavor as nothing more than an abject failure. Barry Latzer, The Failure of Comparative Proportionality Review of Capital Cases (with Lessons from New Jersey) , 64 Alb. L. Rev. 1161 , 1234 (2001). The lesson to be learned from New Jersey is, according to some, one available from the exercise of common sense: statistics can inform human judgment, not substitute for it. Id. The fact that comparative proportionality review is, as New Jersey teaches us, a process in which subjective, human judgment is exercised and not one whereby objective, empirical inquiry produces an objectively correct answer is one the Majority appears to reject. They present comparative proportionality review as an objective inquiry. It is not. {205} Comparative proportionality review is conducted on an individual basis for each death sentence and [a]t its heart, ... will always be a subjective judgment as to whether a particular death sentence fairly represents the values inherent in [any given] sentencing scheme for [the most depraved forms of] murder. Gregory , 427 P.3d at 637 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For this reason, the Majority's contention that this Court cannot inject its own subjective views about the propriety of any given death sentence-something the Majority seems to believe it is not doing-rings hollow. See Maj. Op. ¶ 11.
{206} The Majority holds out cross-case comparison as a reliable method to evaluate the merits of death sentences and suggests that consistency in outcomes of capital cases is not only desirable but required. They embrace two incorrect assumptions: first, comparing death sentences, in the way envisioned by the Majority, reliably answers whether a death sentence has been appropriately imposed; and second, any perceived inconsistency in the application of the death penalty is unacceptable. Both of these assumptions are wrong. {207} The type of comparison in which the Majority engages-one that seeks to assess the correctness of death sentences by scrutinizing the facts and details of capital crimes and sentences-is inappropriate. As one court effectively and imaginatively explained, a court undertaking comparative proportionality  review should not treat the endeavor as a forensic scientist would. [The defendant] would have us review [the comparative disproportionality of his death sentence] as a forensic scientist analyzes fingerprints, looking for a specified number of identity points. Only if one can conclusively determine that each swirl, ridge, and whorl is present in both samples is a match declared. We decline to do this. Crimes, particularly the brutal and extreme ones with which we deal in death penalty cases, are unique and cannot be matched up like so many points on a graph. State v. Lord , 117 Wash.2d 829 , 822 P.2d 177 , 223 (1991) (overruled in part by State v. Schierman , 192 Wash.2d 577 , 438 P.3d 1063 (2018). The point of the metaphor is that appellate courts cannot and should not sift through the fine details of capital crimes and the death sentences they produce and compare them. Doing this draws appellate courts into a realm they simply do not belong and provides only the most superficial assurance of the validity of a death sentence. And this point brings me back to my preliminary criticism of the language with which the Majority has described its task here. The validity of a death sentence cannot be based on our judgment about the severity of the murder that gave rise to the sentence. {208} This Court does not sit in judgment of what crimes are most severe, heinous, and deserving of the death penalty. Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) cannot be construed to provide this Court that authority. To do so intrudes into an area that is reserved solely for the jury, the only entity capable of deciding what punishment is appropriate for the most severe violations of community norms. So what is the concern for courts undertaking a comparative proportionality review? {209} The concern is with alleviating the types of major systemic problems identified in Furman : random arbitrariness and imposition of the death sentence based on race. Lord , 822 P.2d at 223 . Technical inconsistencies in a line-by-line comparison cannot be equated with those core concerns. Id. Comparative proportionality review is simply not intended to ensure that there can be no variation on a case-by-case basis, nor to guarantee that the death penalty is always imposed in superficially similar circumstances. Id. {210} For these reasons, the secondary literature indicates that death sentences are overturned as comparatively disproportionate only very rarely. See Leigh B. Bienen, The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases By State High Courts After Gregg: Only The Appearance of Justice? , 87 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 130 (1996) (surveying the states that perform comparative proportionality review and noting only a limited number of instances where death sentences were overturned as comparatively disproportionate). It is, ironically, the Majority's position in this case that is the outlier.
{211} There is no reason why a death sentence imposed upon a defendant who committed a particularly deplorable, death-eligible murder could not stand alone as a permissible death sentence despite the fact that all other death-eligible defendants received only life sentences. The existence of a statistical outlier in no way establishes that the imposition of a death sentence is necessarily comparatively disproportionate so long as there is some justification for that death sentence . Garcia seems to have embraced this very thought when it observed that a death sentence could be justified even if life sentences were normally imposed for the category of murder in which the crime producing the sentence belongs so long as there is some justification for that death sentence. 1983-NMSC-008 , ¶ 34, 99 N.M. 771 , 664 P.2d 969 . {212} It is difficult to see how, if our Legislature ever elected to reinstate the death penalty, any murder involving kidnapping or sexual assault could possibly be deemed not comparatively disproportionate in the wake of the Majority's opinion. And this illuminates the point that comparative disproportionality is-if taken too far and permitted to serve as a demand for the sort of symmetry and consistency in sentencing Pulley and McCleskey made clear is neither practical nor required-the poisoned pill  the Majority claims it is not. See Maj. Op. ¶ 53 (stating that comparative proportionality review is not a poisoned pill designed to eliminate the death penalty in entire categories of murder, an outcome that would indeed be a  de facto repeal of the death penalty).