Opinion ID: 2639278
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Improper Definition of Burden of Proof

Text: The defendant also argues the prosecutor improperly defined the State's burden of proof with the following: I would submit to you that a reasonable doubt is really nothing more than a fair doubt that's based on reason and common sense and arises from the status of the evidence. It's impossible for me to prove everything to you by an absolute certainty. At the same time, a defendant should not be convicted just on speculation and conjecture, but you have much more than that in this case. You don't just have speculation or conjecture that Tom Finley is guilty. All the evidence, all the inferences to be drawn from that evidence point to only one verdict in this case, and that is that Tom Finley is guilty. Thank you. The defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's argument regarding the burden of proof. The defendant argues this court's decision in State v. Mitchell, 269 Kan. 349, 7 P.3d 1135 (2000), requires a finding that the above is improper comment on the reasonable doubt standard. Mitchell is not helpful because it involves the prosecutor's attempt to equate reasonable doubt with common sense. 269 Kan. at 358. The defendant also cites State v. Banks, 260 Kan. 918, 927 P.2d 456 (1996). The Banks court held the following definition of reasonable doubt to be improper: Reasonable doubt means if you are going to say these men are not guilty of something, you have to give a reason for it. 260 Kan. at 926. It should be noted that the Banks court, in an analysis of the lower court's refusal to grant a mistrial based on the faulty definition, ultimately affirmed the trial court. 260 Kan. at 927-28. The Tenth Circuit in U.S. v. Miller, 84 F.3d 1244, 1251-52 (10th Cir. 1996), rev'd in part on other grounds U.S. v. Holland, 116 F.3d 1353 (10th Cir. 1997), approved the following instruction used by a trial court: A reasonable doubt is a fair doubt based on reason and common sense and arising from the state of the evidence. It is rarely possible to prove anything to an absolute certainty, but at the same time, a defendant is not to be convicted on mere suspicion or conjecture. You are instructed that a reasonable doubt is a doubt that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act in the graver and more important transactions of life. The problem with the prosecutor's argument in this case is that she stopped after the suspicion or conjecture language. Thus, the risk is that the definition gave the jury the impression something more than suspicion or conjecture is sufficient to reach reasonable doubt; however, this ignores the first part of the prosecutor's argument, which defined reasonable doubt in the language sanctioned by the Miller court. It cannot be said the prosecutor's argument regarding the burden of proof denied Finley a fair trial.