Opinion ID: 2541918
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Charles King

Text: KRS 44.070(1) provides that the Board of Claims is established to investigate, hear proof, and to compensate persons for damages sustained to either person or property as a proximate result of negligence on the part of the Commonwealth, or any of its officers, agents, or employees while acting within the scope of their employment. (Emphasis added.) Similarly, KRS 44.072 provides that [i]t is the intention of the General Assembly to provide the means to enable a person negligently injured by the Commonwealth . . . to be able to assert their just claims as herein provided. (Emphasis added.) Finally, KRS 44.073(9) states that [n]egligence as used herein includes negligence, gross negligence, or wanton negligence. While the Appellants attempt to fit King's actions within the definition of wanton negligence, such characterization does not fit. There is no escape from the conclusion that King's actions in conversion of the proceeds of the judicial sale constituted an intentional tort, not any form of negligence. Therefore, all other issues relating to King's conduct aside, his actions do not come within the scope of the Board of Claims Act's limited waiver of sovereign immunity for negligence. The Commonwealth has not waived its sovereign immunity in such a manner that awards to claimants based upon intentional torts would be paid from the state's general treasury fund.