Opinion ID: 1915019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standing Under Maine's Campaign Statutes and MAPA

Text: [¶ 8] In Maine, standing jurisprudence is prudential, rather than constitutional. Roop v. City of Belfast, 2007 ME 32, ¶ 7, 915 A.2d 966, 968. (quotation marks omitted). Standing is a threshold issue and Maine courts are only open to those who meet this basic requirement. Ricci v. Superintendent, Bureau of Banking, 485 A.2d 645, 647 (Me.1984). While there is no set formula for determining standing, a court may limit access to the courts to those best suited to assert a particular claim. Roop, 2007 ME 32, ¶ 7, 915 A.2d at 968 (citation omitted). In addition, the question of whether a specific individual has standing is significantly affected by the unique context of the claim. Id. [¶ 9] In the context of an administrative decision, as is the case here, the right to judicial review is governed by statute. Nelson v. Bayroot, LLC, 2008 ME 91, ¶ 9, 953 A.2d 378, 381. Whether a party has standing depends on the wording of the specific statute involved. Id. [¶ 10] Title 21-A M.R.S. § 1003(2) (2007) of Maine's campaign statutes provides: A person may apply in writing to the commission requesting an investigation concerning the registration of a candidate, treasurer, political committee or political action committee and contributions by or to and expenditures by a person, candidate, treasurer, political committee or political action committee. The commission shall review the application and shall make the investigation if the reasons stated for the request show sufficient grounds for believing that a violation may have occurred. [¶ 11] There is no express provision here or elsewhere in the Maine campaign statutes allowing or precluding judicial review of Commission enforcement determinations. As the Commission noted, MAPA governs judicial review of its actions. [5] Lindemann's standing to obtain judicial review of the Commission's enforcement decision, therefore, depends on whether he has standing under MAPA. [¶ 12] MAPA provides a right to judicial review to any person aggrieved by an agency's final action or an agency's failure or refusal to act. 5 M.R.S. § 11001(1), (2) (2007). [6] We conclude that neither provision of MAPA supports Lindemann's claim for standing. [¶ 13] First, section 11001(2) is inapplicable to Lindemann's claim because the Commission has not failed or refused to act. Only a person aggrieved by the failure or refusal of an agency to act is entitled to judicial review pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 11001(2). Here, Lindemann made an investigation request to the Commission pursuant to 21-A M.R.S. § 1003(2). The Commission reviewed and accepted Lindemann's request and undertook an extensive investigation that included oral testimony at Commission meetings and review of extensive written submissions and documents. [7] The Commission's final agency action occurred when it voted and issued a written enforcement decision on the matter. Because the Commission has not failed or refused to act, section 11001(2) is not implicated. [¶ 14] Section 11001(1) also provides no avenue to Lindemann to judicially attack the Commission's findings because he is unable to demonstrate that he is aggrieved. Only a person who is aggrieved by final agency action shall be entitled to judicial review. 5 M.R.S. § 11001(1). Aggrieved, while not defined in MAPA, has been previously defined by this Court as requiring particularized injurythat is, the agency action or inaction must operate prejudicially and directly upon the party's property, pecuniary or personal rights. Nelson, 2008 ME 91, ¶ 10, 953 A.2d at 382. In addition, we have required that the particularized injury be distinct from any injury experienced by the public at large. Id.; Ricci, 485 A.2d at 647. [¶ 15] In limited circumstances, we have allowed individual members of the public to vindicate public rights in a judicial forum. See generally Fitzgerald v. Baxter State Park Auth., 385 A.2d 189 (Me.1978). For example, we recognized standing for citizens asserting a political right shared by the public at large, when a particularized interest was demonstrated. McCaffrey v. Gartley, 377 A.2d 1367, 1370 (Me.1977) (recognizing plaintiffs' standing as voters, property taxpayers, and signers of an initiative). Even in these circumstances, we still require a particularized injury or direct and personal injury. Fitzgerald, 385 A.2d at 197; see also Heald v. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 74, 387 A.2d 1, 3 (Me.1978) (finding no standing when plaintiffs did not demonstrate direct personal injury). Being affected by a governmental action is insufficient to confer standing in the absence of any showing that the effect is an injury. Collins v. State, 2000 ME 85, ¶ 7, 750 A.2d 1257, 1260. [¶ 16] Here, Lindemann is arguably affected, but not directly or personally injured, by the Commission's enforcement decision. Assuming there was an injury that flowed from the Commission's final decision, the injury affected all citizens, not just Lindemann. [8] His alleged informational injury is indistinguishable from any injury experienced by other Maine citizens. [¶ 17] Because the Commission did not fail or refuse to act and Lindemann is not aggrieved by the Commission's decision, we conclude that MAPA does not confer standing on Lindemann to appeal from the Commission's decision. [9] Furthermore, an agency charged with enforcing a particular statute or rule has the prerogative of electing not to take action. See generally, Herrle v. Town of Waterboro, 2001 ME 1, ¶¶ 10-11, 763 A.2d 1159, 1161-62 (discussing prosecutorial discretion in enforcement actions). These decisions are left to the sole discretion of the agency and are not ordinarily subject to judicial review at the behest of members of the general public. In this matter, if the Commission received Lindemann's request for an investigation and elected not to investigate, the same result would occur Lindemann lacks standing to seek judicial review. His right, as established in section 1003(2), is to request the Commission to conduct an investigation; the Commission's obligation vis-à-vis Lindemann is simply to accept and review his request. A review concluding that no action or investigation will be undertaken creates no right of judicial review in Lindemann or any other member of the general public.