Opinion ID: 1163403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 67

Heading: Scope of Evidence Concerning Prior Convictions: Admissibility

Text: Brett argues the trial court erred in allowing cross examination of Sandra Youngen, [6] concerning her knowledge of facts underlying Brett's conviction for assault and kidnapping. Youngen testified she met Brett when he transferred from Echo Glen to Maple Lane and that he was not a management problem while at the latter facility. The prosecutor cross-examined Youngen as follows: Q: Were you aware or did you know at the time that Mr. Brett was at Maple Lane that he had been previously convicted of assaulting a staff member at Echo Glen? A: Yes, I was aware of that. Q: Were you aware of the facts and circumstances of the particular offense? A: Yes. You're talking about when  in the escape from Echo Glen? Q: That's correct. Where he had plead [ sic ] guilty to Kidnapping in the First Degree, Assault in the Second Degree, and Escape in the First Degree for an incident that occurred March of 1985. A: Yes, I was aware of that. Q: And were you aware of the fact that he had snuck up on a staff counselor from behind, placed a tightly wound towel around her mouth and then moved the towel to her throat and strangled her with the towel? Were you aware of that? MR. FOISTER: I'm going to object to that question, Your Honor. She's indicated she was familiar with the circumstances at Echo Glen. MR. CURTIS: The jury's not. THE COURT: It's overruled, Counsel. It's cross examination. I think it's appropriate. Go ahead. Q: (BY MR. CURTIS) Were you aware of those facts? A: I don't recall. I'm sure at the time I was because we do share that type of information but I don't specifically recall that the  the exact incidents that happened. I know there was an assault on a staff member in an escape attempt and that she was severely injured. Q: And that she was bound with electrical cord prior to Mr. Brett escaping ? A: I do recall something about her being bound, yes. Q: So in expressing your opinion to this jury that you were surprised that Mr. Brett was involved in the murder of a person, were you also incorporating into your thinking that prior incident which you had knowledge of? A: I was. I was asked by counsel my reaction, and my initial reaction was I was very shocked when I heard the news. Q: Even though you knew Mr. Brett has a history of violence in the juvenile system? (Italics mine.) Report of Proceedings vol. 16, at 28-29. Brett maintains the trial court erred in permitting the State to introduce before the jury evidence about the facts and circumstances attending his prior convictions. The majority disagrees on the ground State v. Bartholomew, 101 Wn.2d 631, 642-43, 683 P.2d 1079 (1984) ( Bartholomew II) permits the prosecutor to introduce evidence to rebut matters raised in mitigation by the defendant subject to the balancing test set forth in ER 403. Designated majority, at 189 (citing Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 642-43; State v. Lord, 117 Wn.2d 829, 891, 822 P.2d 177 (1991), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 164 (1992)). The majority's suggestion that all evidence is admissible on cross examination for the purpose of rebuttal is unwarranted. This court expressly held that the admissibility of prior convictions under RCW 10.95.070 does not give the State an absolute license to expose the jury to the facts and circumstances attending those convictions. See Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 642-43. Cf. Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 889-90. Cross examination may not be conducted indiscriminately. (We do not intend ... that the prosecution be permitted to produce any evidence it cares to so long as it points to some element of rebuttal no matter how slight or incidental.), Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 643 (quoting State v. Bartholomew, 98 Wn.2d 173, 198, 654 P.2d 1170 (1982) ( Bartholomew I), State's cert. granted and remanded, 463 U.S. 1203, defendant's cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1212 (1983)). In deciding whether to admit the statements at issue, the trial court is required to apply a balancing test similar, but not identical, to that contemplated by ER 403. As I noted in Lord, under ER 405, once character evidence about the defendant has been introduced, the presumption is that rebuttal evidence is admissible. Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 890. The opposite presumption applies under the Bartholomew test: Only if the rebuttal value of the evidence outweighs the prejudicial effect should the evidence be admitted. Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 928 (Utter, J., dissenting) (quoting Bartholomew II, 101 Wn.2d at 643) (quoting Bartholomew I, 98 Wn.2d at 198). The State's introduction of the facts and circumstances surrounding Brett's assault was unwarranted given the presumption against admissibility established in Bartholomew II. Not only was the reference prejudicial, it was gratuitously so, because the State could have impeached Youngen's statements by simply referring to the conviction resulting from this assault, a conviction already before the jury. To summarize, the disproportionality of Brett's sentence of death alone warrants the reversal of his sentence. In addition to its disproportionality, his sentence should also be reversed because the trial court's failure to grant Brett a continuance to obtain an expert's evaluation of whether he suffers from fetal alcohol syndrome compromised his capacity to adequately develop and present mitigating evidence; the scope of the evidence admitted to rebut his mitigation witnesses exceeded its permissible scope; and the instructional error suggesting unanimity was required before the jury could reach a final verdict was confusing and therefore casts doubt on its decision to impose the penalty of death. SMITH and JOHNSON, JJ., concur with UTTER, J. Reconsideration denied June 9 and August 17, 1995.