Opinion ID: 48279
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Possession of false-but-blank immigration documents

Text: 10 As he did before the district court, Uvalle-Patricio contends that the 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) prohibition of the possess[ion of] blank permits refers only to genuine permits, not false ones. Section 1546 provides in part: 11 Whoever knowingly forges, counterfeits, alters, or falsely makes any . . . [immigration] permit . . . or . . . possesses . . . any such . . . permit . . ., knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made . . .; or 12 Whoever, except under direction of the Attorney General . . . knowingly possesses any blank permit, . . . or makes any print, photograph, or impression in the likeness of any . . . permit . . ., or has in his possession a distinctive paper which has been adopted by the Attorney General . . . for the printing of such visas, permits, or documents; . . . 13 Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than . . . 10 years .... 14 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (emphasis added). 15 The first paragraph of § 1546(a) criminalizes possession of forged immigration documents. Cf. United States v. Principe, 203 F.3d 849, 852 (5th Cir.2000) (Those acts described in the first paragraph revolve around a defendant's individual procurement, possession, or use of various fraudulent immigration documents.). Specifically, the first paragraph prohibits knowingly forg[ing], counterfeit[ing], alter[ing], or falsely mak[ing] any immigrant or nonimmigrant . . . permit. In addition, the statutory provision prohibits the possess[ion of] . . . any such . . . permit, but only if the defendant possessed the false document knowing it to be forged, counterfeited, altered, or falsely made. 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a). For a conviction under the first paragraph, the Government must prove (1) knowing possession of (2) false documents (3) that are known by the possessor to be false. 16 The second paragraph of § 1546(a), as a whole, criminalizes possession of materials that can be used to produce false immigration documents. Cf. Principe, 203 F.3d at 852 (The second paragraph concerns a defendant's procurement, possession, or use of materials which would enable the defendant to manufacture or provide various fraudulent immigration documents to others.). As is relevant to Uvalle-Patricio's charge, the second paragraph prohibits knowingly possess[ing] any blank permit without authorization by specified government officials. 17 The Government clearly charged Uvalle-Patricio with violating only the second paragraph of § 1546(a). 2 There is no real question that the Government proved the elements that the jury was asked to consider: (1) knowing possession of (2) blank immigration documents (3) without official permission. But there also is no question that the documents did not derive from an official governmental source. As a result, for Uvalle-Patricio's conviction to stand, any blank permit must include false immigration documents. 18 In their interpretation of the statute, the parties' focus is limited to the paragraph in which the contested language appears; both claim that the plain language of the statute supports their respective positions. Uvalle-Patricio argues in favor of a restrictive reading of the statute that would limit the offending conduct to possession of blank documents that were created by the federal Bureau of Engraving and Printing. The Government urges a broader interpretation and asserts that the unlimited language and the disjunctive nature of the statute support an unrestricted interpretation of any blank permit. Based on a reading of the statute's provisions in context, we agree with the Government, albeit for slightly different reasons, that the second paragraph of § 1546(a) forbids the possession of blank immigration documents whether the documents be genuine or false. 19 When interpreting statutes, we begin with the plain language used by the drafters. Furthermore, each part or section of a statute should be construed in connection with every other part or section to produce a harmonious whole. United States v. Williams, 400 F.3d 277, 281 n. 2 (5th Cir. 2005) (internal citation omitted). Cognizant of these directives, we turn to the statute in question. 20 The language of the statute suggests a broader construction than that urged by the defendant. As noted, the second paragraph of § 1546(a) prohibits knowingly possess[ing] any blank permit. The use of any, which modifies blank permit, § 1546(a), undercuts the attempt to impose this narrowing construction. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 56, 118 S.Ct. 469, 139 L.Ed.2d 352 (1997) (citing United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 604-05 & n. 5, 106 S.Ct. 3116, 92 L.Ed.2d 483 (1986), and Trainmen v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 529, 67 S.Ct. 1387, 91 L.Ed. 1646 (1947)). Moreover, the use of or separates the possession of blank documents from the other proscribed conduct that addresses possession of authentic materials. See 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a) (forbidding knowingly possess[ing] any blank permit . . . or [the possession of] a distinctive paper which has been adopted by the Attorney General . . . for the printing of [immigration documents]) (emphasis added). Cf. United States v. Holmes, 822 F.2d 481, 486 (5th Cir.1987) (emphasizing that the use of or results in a disjunctive interpretation). The statute's use of or indicates that several different activities are punishable under it, thereby creating distinct categories and suggesting that conduct related to any blank permit is distinct from proscribed conduct related to authentic materials. 21 Additionally, while at first the use of the term permit might appear to suggest a restriction to genuine documents in light of the statute's use of the phrase except under direction of the Attorney General, a later part of the statute shows this not to be the case: the broad language any print, photograph, or impression in the likeness of any . . . permit, indicates that the statute covers both genuine and false documents. 22 In addition to the statute's plain language, we must consider the operation of the statute as a whole and in context with other provisions. The first paragraph of the statute prevents individuals from possessing false permits. The second paragraph of the statute prevents individuals from possessing blank permits without authorization from the government. Reading any blank permits to include both genuine and false blank documents not only comports with the plain language of the statutory text but also results in a seamless operation of the statute. 23 Uvalle-Patricio's reading of the statute, conversely, runs counter to the expansive language Congress used and would also lead to incongruent results. By reading any blank permit to exclude false-but-blank documents, the possession of those documents, like those Uvalle-Patricio had, would not be a criminal act if the possessor believed them, in error, to be genuine. Such a reading would render conduct—the knowing possession of blank immigration documents—non-criminal simply because the possessor was under the mistaken belief that the documents were genuine. The statute's construction does not indicate that this sort of conduct was meant to be excluded from criminal punishment. We will not adopt a reading that leads to such incongruent results. 24 We therefore hold that any blank permit includes both genuine and false immigration documents. Accordingly, we reject Uvalle-Patricio's challenges to the denial of his Rule 29 motion and the sufficiency of the evidence.