Opinion ID: 1226603
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: damages for shortened life expectancy as a separate item of recovery

Text: This action is based on the following language of Washington's survival statute: (1) All causes of action by a person or persons against another person or persons shall survive to the personal representatives of the former and against the representatives of the latter, whether such actions arise on contract or otherwise, and whether or not such actions would have survived at the common law or prior to the date of enactment of this section: Provided, however, That no personal representative shall be entitled to recover damages for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation personal to and suffered by a deceased. (Some italics ours.) RCW 4.20.046. This statute does not create a separate claim for the survivors, but merely preserves the causes of action that a person could have maintained had he not died, other than for pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation. In Harvey v. Cleman, 65 Wn.2d 853, 857-58, 400 P.2d 87 (1965), RCW 4.20.046 was interpreted by this court to preserve all causes of action of the decedent except those specifically enumerated in the proviso to that statute. We again had occasion to interpret the survival statute in Warner v. McCaughan, 77 Wn.2d 178, 182-83, 460 P.2d 272 (1969), and came to a similar conclusion: It is urged that the proviso of RCW 4.20.046, supra, excludes all items of damage thought to be personal to a decedent, i.e., permanent injuries, shortened life expectancy, and impaired earning capacity, not just those items expressly excluded by the proviso  pain and suffering, anxiety, emotional distress, or humiliation. We do not agree. (Last italics ours.) From the above quotation, which implies shortened life expectancy is somehow distinguishable from impaired earning capacity, appellant predicates the right to recover damages for shortened life expectancy as a separate item of damages. In Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81 Wn.2d 327, 330, 501 P.2d 1228 (1972), we cited Warner for the proposition that Shortened life expectancy caused by the child's death and the resulting loss of value of her future earning capacity to her estate are specifically recognized as items of recovery not excluded by the statute. (Citation omitted. Italics ours.) Appellant further submits that his proposed instruction No. 6B, which would have permitted the jury to award separate damages for shortened life expectancy and lost earning capacity, was based upon an instruction approved by this court in Hinzman, at pages 329-30, where the jury was instructed that it shall allow such sum as general damages as in your opinion will fairly and justly compensate her [decedent's] estate for her wrongful death. In this regard you may take into consideration and award compensation for the shortened life expectancy caused by her death, as well as the loss of the value of her future earning capacity caused by her wrongful death.' (Italics ours.) The above language gives the impression that shortened life expectancy and loss of future earning capacity are separate and distinct elements of damage in a survival action. On the next page of the opinion, however, a very different meaning is imparted by the following language: In this suit, the estate of Lauretta Hinzman claimed damages under the survival statute for general damages consisting of loss of value of her future earning capacity as affected by her shortened life expectancy caused by her death. (Italics ours.) Hinzman, at 331. Appellant fails to define the term shortened life expectancy anywhere in his brief, but we note that the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association amicus brief would generally equate that term with the impairment of an ability to enjoy the pleasures of life which a person otherwise would have enjoyed. Brief of amicus Washington State Trial Lawyers Association, at 10-16. To demonstrate the shortened life expectancy element of damages, appellant cites Reed v. Jamieson Inv. Co., 168 Wash. 111, 10 P.2d 977 (1932) and Parris v. Johnson, 3 Wn. App. 853, 479 P.2d 91 (1970) for the proposition that a qualitative loss of life's pleasures is a separate element of damages apart from pain and suffering. Appellant then extends the argument to conclude that such a recognition of qualitative loss of life's pleasures should give rise to a separate element of damages for a quantitative loss of those same pleasures. We disagree. [1] The cases cited by appellant are distinguishable for at least two reasons. First, Reed and Parris are personal injury cases where the plaintiffs sought recovery for their permanent injuries which prevented them from continuing to enjoy certain activities for the remainder of their lives. Second, appellant ignores the following language of the Parris opinion: Although disability exists as a distinct element of damages, it is frequently a natural concomitant of pain and suffering. The relationship between disability and pain and suffering may be direct or indirect, but the two are so frequently interwoven that a clear distinction cannot be made in many instances. Parris, at 860. It seems fairly certain the Parris court considered the lost enjoyment of life's pleasures as merely a component of damages for pain and suffering  items of damage specifically excluded by the proviso to RCW 4.20.046. Likewise, the Court of Appeals in this case found that insofar as damages for shortened life expectancy imply damages for the loss of life's pleasures and amenities, such damages are but a component of pain, suffering, anxiety, and distress. (Citation omitted.) Wooldridge v. Woolett, 28 Wn. App. 869, 876, 626 P.2d 1007 (1981). The case of Willinger v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, 482 Pa. 441, 393 A.2d 1188 (1978), addresses issues similar to those confronting us in this case. Willinger involved a wrongful death and survival action where plaintiff sought separate damages for the shortened life expectancy of a minor child. Despite the fact that Pennsylvania's survival statute is even broader than RCW 4.20.046 in permitting recovery, the court rejected the separate claim for loss of life's amenities and pleasures. [1] In so holding, the court reasoned: We discern little or no distinction between seeking to calculate the value of life itself and the value of experiencing life's pleasures. Were we to permit compensation for loss of life itself, undoubtedly this intangible item would have to be measured in terms of the loss of those very opportunities to enjoy family, work, and recreation the trial court directed the jury to consider in measuring the loss of life's pleasures.... Even where the victim survives a compensable injury, this Court has never held that loss of life's pleasures could be compensated other than as a component of pain and suffering.... [T]o a large extent it has been the plaintiff's consciousness of his or her inability to enjoy life that we have compensated under the rubric of loss of life's pleasures. Unlike one who is permanently injured, one who dies as a result of injuries is not condemned to watch life's amenities pass by. Unless we are to equate loss of life's pleasures with loss of life itself, we must view it as something that is compensable only for a living plaintiff who has suffered from that loss. (Italics ours.) Willinger, at 447. We find Willinger to be persuasive authority in settling the issues before us. The loss of life's amenities should be recoverable only by plaintiffs who survive compensable injuries, since such lost pleasures are personal to that individual and essentially represent pain and suffering. Damages for loss of life's amenities should not be recoverable in a survival action, however, because such damages are a back-door method of obtaining compensation for pain and suffering, or for obtaining those damages otherwise recoverable in a wrongful death action. See RCW 4.20.010, .020, and RCW 4.24.010. The proper method for determining damages in a survival action as opposed to a wrongful death action, was set out in Criscuola v. Andrews, 82 Wn.2d 68, 507 P.2d 149 (1973). In that case, we stated that the potential for double recovery (not a problem here) can be avoided if recovery under the survival action is limited to the prospective net accumulations of the deceased. Criscuola, at 70. We believe that the loss of the ability to enjoy life's pleasures and amenities is not an asset to be accumulated by the deceased. The concept of shortened life expectancy was never at issue in the Cleman, Warner, and Hinzman line of cases. Those cases concerned only the recovery of damages for disabilities and loss of value of a decedent's future earning capacity. To the extent that dicta in those cases and our approval of the jury instruction in Hinzman intimate that shortened life expectancy is a separately recoverable element of damages in a survival action, we now specifically disapprove of that dicta. Instead, we hold that shortened life expectancy is relevant in a survival action only to the extent it affects the loss of value of a decedent's future earning capacity.