Opinion ID: 1194180
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Plaintiff's Suspension

Text: Although the record does not support municipal liability with respect to Plaintiff's reassignment out of Ward 828 and with respect to Lieutenant Cox's criticism of his accident reports, the City is potentially liable for its decision to suspend Plaintiff. Generally speaking, a municipality is not liable under § 1983 for the decisions of its officers. See Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 478, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986) ([A] municipality cannot be made liable by application of the doctrine of respondeat superior. ). When, however, an allegedly unconstitutional decision is made by an official with final policy making authority, then the municipality may be held liable for that official's decision, so long as the decision was made by the official or officials responsible under state law for making policy in that area of the city's business. City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 123, 108 S.Ct. 915, 99 L.Ed.2d 107 (1988). Furthermore, as the Supreme Court explained in Praprotnik, the hallmark of municipal liability is the finality of the decision being reviewed: When an official's discretionary decisions are constrained by policies not of that official's making, those policies, rather than the subordinate's departures from them, are the act of the municipality. Similarly, when a subordinate's decision is subject to review by the municipality's authorized policymakers, they have retained the authority to measure the official's conduct for conformance with their policies. If the authorized policymakers approve a subordinate's decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final. Id. at 127, 108 S.Ct. 915. In other words, even if the allegedly unconstitutional decision is initially made by a subordinate official, when that decision is appealed to and affirmed by an official with final authority over a matter, the municipality may be held liable for this affirmance. Applying this framework to the instant case, it is clear that the City may be held liable for the final decision of Chief Wright. Although the Memphis City Charter allows a disciplined City employee who is suspended for more than ten days to appeal this decision to the Civil Service Commission, neither the charter nor the city code provides an appeal beyond the MPD when a police officer receives a suspension of ten days or less. Memphis, Tenn. Charter, art. 34, § 247. Turning then to the MPD's internal procedures, MPD policy provides for a two stage review of a disciplinary charge against an officer. Under these procedures, such a disciplinary charge is initially reviewed by an Administering Authority. Memphis Police Dep't. Pol'y and Procedures Manual 3 (2003). [12] While an Administering Authority may be of any supervisory rank, no officer below the rank of Shift or Squad Major may suspend another officer, and no officer below the rank of Precinct/Bureau Commanding Officer may issue a suspension greater than three days. Id. When an Administering Authority sustains a charge of discipline against an officer, that decision may be appealed to an Appeal Authority. Id. Like an Administering Authority, an Appeal Authority may be of any supervisory rank, provided that they are a commanding officer or manager in the same chain of command at a higher level than that of an administering authority who hears appeals. Id. Significantly, the appeal authority shall be the last stage in the departmental review and appeal procedure. Id. at 6. In the instant case, Lieutenant Cox issued a charge of discipline against Plaintiff. This charge was sustained by Major Cooper, who served as Plaintiff's Administering Authority. As the Administering Authority, Major Cooper suspended Plaintiff from duty. Plaintiff then appealed this decision to Chief Wright, who acted as Plaintiff's Appeal Authority, and Chief Wright sustained the suspension. As the Appeal Authority, Chief Wright has final decision making power within the Memphis Police Department. Id. Furthermore, as neither the Memphis Charter nor the Memphis City Code provide for further review of Plaintiff's suspension, Chief Wright had final policy making authority with respect to Plaintiff's disciplinary charge. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123, 108 S.Ct. 915. Accordingly, insofar as Plaintiff's suspension was unconstitutional, the City may be held liable under § 1983 for the final disciplinary decision of Chief Wright. B. The Merits of Plaintiff's Disparate Treatment Claim Having determined that the City may be held liable under § 1983 for an Appeal Authority's decision to suspend an employee for ten days or less, we now turn to the merits of Plaintiff's claim that his suspension occurred as a result of racial discrimination. In weighing an employment discrimination claim asserting disparate treatment under § 1983, this Court applies the familiar McDonnell Douglas framework applicable in similar cases brought under Title VII. See Weberg v. Franks, 229 F.3d 514, 522 (6th Cir.2000) ([T]his court looks to Title VII disparate treatment cases for assistance in analyzing race discrimination in the public employment context under § 1983.) Under this burden-shifting framework: [A] plaintiff must first set forth a prima facie case of discrimination. The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. If the employer carries this burden, the plaintiff must then prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the reasons offered by the employer were a pretext for discrimination. The ultimate burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff. Newman v. Fed. Express Corp., 266 F.3d 401, 405 (6th Cir.2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Generally speaking, a plaintiff alleging employment discrimination in employee discipline must make a four-part showing in order to set forth a prima facie case of discrimination: 1) he is a member of a protected class; 2) was qualified for the job; 3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; and 4) was replaced by a person outside the protected class or treated differently than similarly situated non-protected employees. Id. at 406. Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges reverse discriminationthat is, he is a member of the majority claiming employment discriminationthe plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that he was intentionally discriminated against `despite his majority status.' Murray v. Thistledown Racing Club, Inc., 770 F.2d 63, 67 (6th Cir.1985) (quoting Lanphear v. Prokop, 703 F.2d 1311, 1315 (D.C.Cir.1983)). Accordingly, the first prong of the prima face case is adapted to require the plaintiff to prove background circumstances [to] support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Sutherland v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 344 F.3d 603, 614 (6th Cir.2003) (internal quotations omitted). Similarly, to satisfy the fourth prong, Plaintiff must show that the City treated differently similarly situated employees of a different race. Id. Plaintiff is a seventeen-year veteran of the MPD, and the City does not contest that he is qualified for his job as a police officer. Similarly, the City does not contest  and could not reasonably do sothat Plaintiff's suspension from duty constitutes an adverse employment decision. Accordingly, this case rests upon the first and fourth prongs of the prima facie case: whether Plaintiff has shown background circumstances to support the suspicion that the City is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority, and whether Plaintiff was treated differently than similarly situated non-white employees. Id. Recent Sixth Circuit precedent suggests, in the context of reverse discrimination claims, that the mere fact that an adverse employment decision was made by a member of a racial minority is sufficient to establish the first prong of the prima facie case. See Zambetti v. Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll., 314 F.3d 249, 257 (6th Cir.2002) ([T]he person in charge of hiring for CCC, Chief Harris, was himself African-American. This is sufficient, in our opinion, to satisfy Murray 's `background circumstances' requirement.) Even if this Court were to assume that Lieutenant Cox exerted sufficient influence over his white supervisors to impute his alleged racial animus onto them, however, [13] Plaintiff still has not demonstrated that he was treated differently than similarly situated non-white employees. Lieutenant Cox testified that he has never brought charges for poor performance against an African-American officer. (J.A. 563) Plaintiff claims that this alone is sufficient to demonstrate that Cox did not treat African [-]American officers the same, and therefore justifies a holding that the City is liable. (Plaintiff's Br. at 25) This argument, however, relies on a faulty comparison. Superficial similarities between a disciplined employee and his colleagues are not sufficient to show a prima facie case of discrimination. While [t]he plaintiff need not demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving more favorable treatment in order for the two to be considered `similarly-situated;' . . . the plaintiff and the employee with whom the plaintiff seeks to compare himself or herself must be similar in all of the relevant aspects. Ercegovich, 154 F.3d at 352 (internal quotations omitted). Plaintiff, however, offers no examples of minority officers who engaged in conduct potentially warranting discipline, but who received a lesser sanction than the one Plaintiff himself received. Though it may be true that Lieutenant Cox has not filed charges of discipline against a non-white officer, this alone is insufficient to show a prima facie case. Rather, Plaintiff must show that a minority officer engaged in similarly-sanctionable conduct, but received a less severe sanction. Id. Having failed to make such a showing, Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim cannot survive summary judgment.
Although Plaintiff's suspension was ratified by an official with final policy making authority, Plaintiff has failed to show a prima facie case of disparate treatment. Accordingly, the decision of the district court granting summary judgment on Plaintiff's disparate treatment claim is affirmed. III. The District Court Correctly Granted Summary Judgment on Defendant's Hostile Environment Claim Plaintiff next argues that his alleged mistreatment by Lieutenant Cox created a hostile work environment. To establish a prima facie case and move forward with this claim, Plaintiff must overcome four hurdles. First, Plaintiff must prove background circumstances [to] support the suspicion that the defendant is that unusual employer who discriminates against the majority. Sutherland, 344 F.3d at 614. Additionally, Plaintiff must show that he was subjected to unwanted racial harassment, that the harassment was based on race, and that the harassment had the effect of unreasonably interfering with [his] work performance by creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. . . . Hafford v. Seidner, 183 F.3d 506, 512 (6th Cir.1999). We believe that no reasonable jury could determine that Plaintiff was harassed because of his race. In order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff cannot rely on conjecture or conclusory accusations. See Lewis, 355 F.3d at 533 (In order to survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must be able to show sufficient probative evidence [that] would permit a finding in [his] favor on more than mere speculation, conjecture, or fantasy. (internal quotations omitted)). Yet Plaintiff's allegations of racially motivated harassment rest entirely on several statements which are either conclusory or raise no inference of racial animus. Specifically, Plaintiff claims that Lt. Cox began a barrage of racial harassment that occurred weekly that [sic] centered around Mr. Arendale writing and/or submitting allegedly improper incident reports. . . . (Plaintiff's Br. at 34) He alleges that Lieutenant Cox racially harassed him when he moved him out of Ward 828, and that Cox further racially harassed him when he could not justify the alleged performance reasons why he move [sic] Mr. Arendale out of [W]ard 828. [14] ( Id. at 34-35) Plaintiff claims that Cox continued to racially harass him when he falsely accused Mr. Arendale of leaving an accident scene, and while Plaintiff concedes that Lieutenant Cox eventually admitted that he was mistaken in this accusation, Plaintiff further alleges that Cox continued to racially harass and berate him when Cox subsequently criticized Plaintiff regarding an unknown issue. ( Id. at 35) Accompanying none of these allegations, however, is actual evidence of racial animus. Rather, Plaintiff supports each allegation only with a citation to his own testimony stating his personal opinion that he was the victim of racial harassment. [15] Conclusory assertions, supported only by Plaintiff's own opinions, cannot withstand a motion for summary judgment. See Travelodge Hotels, Inc. v. Govan, 155 Fed.Appx. 235, 237 (6th Cir.2005) (holding that briefs which are simply filled with conclusory allegations . . . failed to present sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment); Ackerman v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 670 F.2d 66, 70 (6th Cir.1982); see also Fed.R.Evid. 701 (limiting opinion testimony by lay witnesses). In addition to these statements supported only by his own opinion, Plaintiff also alleges that Lieutenant Cox falsely accused Plaintiff of cursing, yelling, and throwing papers during the April 15, 2004 incident which led to his suspension, and that Lieutenant Cox had no proper grounds to require him to write a memo about why a retired police officer was wandering the building. To support his first allegation, Plaintiff cites to Major Cooper's testimony that Lieutenant Cox accused Plaintiff of cursing, and to the affidavits of two witnesses who state that they do not recall any such cursing. To support the second allegation, Plaintiff cites the testimony of Cooper and another police major, both of whom state that a retired police officer should be permitted to look at pictures, so long as the desk officer was aware of the retired officer's location. Glaringly absent from Plaintiff's evidence, however, is anything which might raise an inference of racially motivated harassment. While Plaintiff's evidence might allow a reasonable jury to determine that Lieutenant Cox overreacted, or that he does not particularly like Plaintiff, or even that Cox may have at times behaved obnoxiously, it provides no support for Plaintiff's conclusory allegations of racial animus. Title VII does not create a general civility code in the workplace; it forbids racially motivated harassment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). Absent proof of such impermissible bias, Plaintiff's hostile environment claim cannot survive summary judgment. Accordingly, the decision of the district court granting summary judgment on this claim is affirmed. IV. The District Court Properly Granted Summary Judgment on Defendant's Retaliation Claims Finally, Plaintiff alleges that Lieutenant Cox created the April 15, 2004 conflict which led to Plaintiff's suspension, and that Major Cooper affirmed Cox's charges against Plaintiff, in retaliation against Plaintiff's February 21, 2004 EEOC filing. He brings this claim of unlawful retaliation under both Title VII and the THRA. Because the Tennessee legislature intended the THRA to be coextensive with federal law, a retaliation claim under both statutes follows the same analysis. Phillips v. Interstate Hotels Corp. No. L07, 974 S.W.2d 680, 683 (Tenn.1998). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Plaintiff must establish that: (1) he engaged in activity protected by Title VII; (2) the exercise of his civil rights was known to the defendant; (3) thereafter, the defendant took an employment action adverse to the plaintiff; and (4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Nguyen v. City of Cleveland, 229 F.3d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2000). While temporal proximity between an assertion of Title VII rights and an adverse employment action provides highly probative evidence of a causal connection, temporal proximity alone will not support an inference of retaliatory discrimination when there is no other compelling evidence. Id. at 566. Plaintiff claims that the fact that the retaliatory events occur [sic] just two months after the EEOC charge of discrimination is enough by itself to support the causal connection element. (Plaintiff's Br. at 43) This is simply a misstatement of the law. Absent other evidence of retaliation, Plaintiff's retaliation claim must fail. Nguyen, 229 F.3d at 563 As his sole additional evidence of retaliatory intent, Plaintiff again refers to his own testimony, this time citing his own statement that an MPD captain told him that Major Cooper was out to get him for filing EEOC charges of discrimination in February 2004. (J.A. 929) The district court, however, excluded this statement as inadmissible hearsay, and Plaintiff does not challenge this exclusion on appeal. Faced with no additional competent evidence of retaliation, we hold that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the City.