Opinion ID: 4179974
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Relevant Law and Arguments Presented

Text: Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 98, “[a] party may, in lieu of presenting direct testimony, offer the prepared testimony of relevant witnesses in the form of 8 MEZA V. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCS. affidavits or declarations under penalty of perjury.” To be received as evidence, however, a copy of the declaration must be served on the opposing party, “together with a current address of the affiant that is within 150 miles of the place of trial, and the affiant is available for service of process at that place for a reasonable period of time, during the 20 days immediately prior to trial.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 98(a). 2 The dispute here centers on the meaning of “available for service of process.” California rules of statutory interpretation seek to “ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.” State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Garamendi, 88 P.3d 71, 78 (Cal. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Under California law, courts “look first to the words of the statute themselves, giving to the language its usual, ordinary import and according significance, if possible, to every word, phrase, and sentence in pursuance of the legislative purpose.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). California courts also “read every statute with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.” Id. (internal quotation omitted). If the statute is clear, then there is no need for judicial construction. Hughes v. Bd. of Architectural Examiners, 952 P.2d 641, 649 (Cal. 1998). However, if the statute is ambiguous—i.e., capable of two reasonable constructions— 2 The declaration may also be received as evidence if “[t]he statement is in the form of all or part of a deposition in the case, and the party against whom it is offered had an opportunity to participate in the deposition.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 98(b). MEZA V. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCS. 9 then California courts will “consider evidence of the Legislature’s intent beyond the words of the statute.” Id. Both Meza and PRA contend that the plain language of the statute supports their respective positions. Meza’s argument focuses on the language of § 98 read in conjunction with other California statutory provisions. She argues that the California Legislature must have contemplated that the affiant be personally available for service of process at the address provided in the declaration because § 98 operates as an exception to the general rule against hearsay evidence. See Cal. Evid. Code § 1200. Though § 98 broadly allows a party to present witness testimony in the form of a declaration, § 98(a) in turn requires the offering party to provide a current address of the affiant so that the opposing party can seek to require the affiant’s attendance at trial. It therefore preserves the opposing party’s right to cross-examine the affiant, should that party wish to challenge the hearsay evidence. See Rocha, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 159–60. For this protection to work, Meza claims that the affiant must be physically located at the address provided in the declaration. She cites California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1985(a) and 1987(a) in support of this argument. Read alongside § 98, these provisions could suggest that the affiant’s attendance at trial can only be secured through the use of a subpoena, § 1985(a), and that a subpoena must be delivered to the witness personally, § 1987(a). Thus, Meza argues that § 98(a) implicitly requires physical presence, since its protective purpose can only be enforced through the use of a trial subpoena, according to other provisions of the California Code of Civil Procedure. See Rodgers, 176 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 847–48; Rocha, 157 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 160. 10 MEZA V. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCS. PRA argues that § 98’s language does not require actual physical presence. Had the California Legislature intended physical presence at the address provided in the declaration, it could have easily required the affiant to provide “a current residential or work address,” rather than simply “a current address.” See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 98(a). The Legislature also could have required an address where the affiant is subject to subpoena prior to trial. But because the Legislature merely demanded an address where the affiant is “available for service of process,” id., PRA argues that the court should not add words to an otherwise clear statutory provision. Moreover, PRA argues that such an exercise would contravene the legislative history and purpose of § 98. See Hughes, 952 P.2d at 649. California Code of Civil Procedure §§ 90–100, collectively referred to as Economic Litigation for Limited Civil Cases, were enacted to reduce costs in cases involving relatively small dollar values. As originally introduced, § 98 allowed a party to introduce the affidavit of any witness if “[a] copy, together with the current address of the affiant, has been received by the party against whom it is offered at least 15 days prior to trial, and the affiant is subject to subpena [sic] for the trial.” Assemb. B. 3170, 1981–1982, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1982) (as introduced, March 10, 1982). It was then amended in the Assembly on April 21, 1982, and enacted into law as part of Senate Bill No. 1820 later that year. The 1982 version allowed parties to prepare affidavits or declarations, in lieu of trial testimony, provided that “[a] copy, together with the current address of the affiant, has been served on the party against whom it is offered at least 30 days prior to the trial, and the affiant is available for service of process at a place designated by the proponent, within 150 miles of the place MEZA V. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCS. 11 of trial.” Assemb. B. 3170, 1981–1982, Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1982) (as amended, April 21, 1982). In 1983, § 98(a) underwent one final amendment. It remains in effect today: A party may, in lieu of presenting direct testimony, offer the prepared testimony of relevant witnesses in the form of affidavits or declarations . . . provided that . . . (a) A copy has been served on the party against whom it is offered at least 30 days prior to the trial, together with a current address of the affiant that is within 150 miles of the place of trial, and the affiant is available for service of process at that place for a reasonable period of time, during the 20 days immediately prior to trial. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 98(a). PRA argues that these amendments strongly support its position that § 98(a) does not require physical presence at the address provided. According to California rules of statutory interpretation, “[t]he rejection by the Legislature of a specific provision contained in an act as originally introduced is most persuasive to the conclusion that the act should not be construed to include the omitted provision.” People v. Soto, 245 P.3d 410, 420 (Cal. 2011) (quoting Rich v. State Bd. of Optometry, 45 Cal. Rptr. 512, 522 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1965)). As such, PRA contends that the court should not read § 98 to require the use of a trial subpoena. Rather, PRA argues that the Legislature clearly contemplated other forms of service of process, forms that 12 MEZA V. PORTFOLIO RECOVERY ASSOCS. do not require the affiant to be personally available to accept service of process. 3 Given the seemingly ambiguous language of § 98, and the inconsistent outcomes reached by California Superior Courts, we believe the California Supreme Court is in the best position to interpret the statute and settle an important question of state law. We therefore respectfully request that the California Supreme Court exercise its discretion to decide the certified question. Absent certification, we will attempt to determine how the California Supreme Court would interpret this statute, though we are not the final expositor of California law. Walker v. City of Lakewood, 272 F.3d 1114, 1125 (9th Cir. 2001); Pacheco v. United States, 220 F.3d 1126, 1131 (9th Cir. 2000).