Opinion ID: 4421217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A “Simple Tasks” Limitation Is Appropriate

Text: After a Finding of “Moderate” Difficulties in “Concentration, Persistence, or Pace,” if a “Valid Explanation” Is Given The next issue is whether a “simple tasks” limitation, like the one stated by the ALJ here, can be said to fairly reflect a claimant’s impairments when that claimant has been found to face “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” The government argues that such a statement of the limitation is acceptable, if an ALJ provides a “valid explanation.” Hess responds that, under Ramirez, “a limitation to simple instructions and simple work-related decisions does not reflect a claimant’s moderate restrictions in concentration, persistence, or pace.” (Answering Br. at 7-8.) We agree with the government.
Limitation Before reaching the merits of this issue, we must address one preliminary matter. Both parties treat the limitation here – “to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[,]” (App. at 3334) – as equivalent to a limitation to “simple tasks.” That is important because the case law they rely upon generally involves so-called “simple tasks” limitations. We agree with their interpretation of the ALJ’s framing of the limitation. A limitation to “simple tasks” is fundamentally the same as one “to jobs requiring understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple 25 instructions and making only simple work-related decisions[.]” (App. at 33-34;) see Davis v. Berryhill, 743 F. App’x 846, 850 (9th Cir. 2018) (treating “understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions” as equivalent to “simple tasks”); Richards v. Colvin, 640 F. App’x 786, 790 (10th Cir. 2016) (referring to a limitation “to understanding, remembering, and carrying out only simple instructions and making only simple work-related decisions” as a “simple-work limitation[]”). Indeed, both formulations – the ALJ’s and the more concise phrase “simple tasks” – relate to mental abilities necessary to perform “unskilled work.” See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1568(a), 416.968(a) (“Unskilled work is work which needs little or no judgment to do simple duties that can be learned on the job in a short period of time.”); SSR 96-9P, 1996 WL 374185, at  (July 2, 1996) (concluding that “unskilled work” requires “[u]nderstanding, remembering, and carrying out simple instructions” and “[m]aking … simple workrelated decisions”); cf. Richards, 640 F. App’x at 790 (treating “simple-work limitations” as similar to “unskilled work” limitations). So the parties’ reliance on case law related to “simple tasks” is appropriate and helpful.
Required Turning to the merits, the government is correct that, as long as the ALJ offers a “valid explanation,” a “simple tasks” limitation is permitted after a finding that a claimant has “moderate” difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” That conclusion flows directly from our decision in Ramirez. 26 In Ramirez, as Hess notes, we disapproved of a “simple tasks” limitation after an ALJ had found that a claimant suffered from deficiencies in “concentration, persistence, or pace” that arose “often[.]” 372 F.3d at 554-55. We said that “a requirement that a job be limited to one to two step tasks … does not adequately encompass a finding that [the claimant] ‘often’ has ‘deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace[.]’” Id. at 554 (citation omitted). We were specifically concerned that such a limitation would “not take into account deficiencies in pace” because “[m]any employers require a certain output level from their employees over a given amount of time, and an individual with deficiencies in pace might be able to perform simple tasks, but not over an extended period of time.” Id. On the record then before us, it seemed likely that, if the claimant often had “deficiencies in pace and this had been included in the hypothetical,” the vocational expert would have “changed her answer as to whether there were jobs in the local or national economy that [the claimant] could perform[,]” given that “the vocational expert testified that each of the jobs suitable for [the claimant] … would have daily production quotas and that [the claimant] would have to maintain a certain degree of pace to maintain those jobs.” Id. In light of all that, we concluded that “[t]his omission from the hypothetical runs afoul of our directive in [Chrupcala v. Heckler, 829 F.2d 1269, 1276 (3d Cir. 1987),] that a hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert must reflect all of a claimant’s impairments,” and conflicts with “our statement in [Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 122 (3d Cir. 2002),] that ‘great specificity’ is required when an ALJ incorporates a claimant’s mental or physical limitations into a hypothetical.” Id. at 554-55 (citations omitted). 27 We immediately noted, however, that ALJs are not forbidden from using “simple tasks” limitations. An ALJ may frame a limitation in terms of “simple tasks” if – based on the facts of the case – the ALJ provides a “valid explanation” for doing so: Of course, [we said,] there may be a valid explanation for this omission from the ALJ’s hypothetical. For example, the ALJ may have concluded that the deficiency in pace was so minimal or negligible that, even though [the claimant] “often” suffered from this deficiency, it would not limit her ability to perform simple tasks under a production quota. Id. at 555 (emphasis added). That we did not adopt a categorical rule regarding “simple tasks” limitations is confirmed by our discussion in Ramirez of case law from other circuits. Specifically, we examined four decisions, two of which held that an ALJ’s limitation statement was adequate despite a finding that the claimant had deficiencies in “concentration, persistence, or pace,” id. at 552-53 (citing Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 581-82 (8th Cir. 2001); Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 378-79 (6th Cir. 2001)), and two of which held that the statement of limitation was insufficient in light of such a finding, id. at 553-54 (citing Kasarsky v. Barnhart, 335 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2003); Newton v. Chater, 92 F.3d 688, 69495 (8th Cir. 1996)). We emphasized that the outcome of each case turned on its particular facts. Id. at 552-54. That analysis animated our adoption of a fact-specific “valid explanation” approach. 28 In sum, Ramirez did not hold that there is any categorical prohibition against using a “simple tasks” limitation after an ALJ has found that a claimant “often” faces difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” Rather, a “simple tasks” limitation is acceptable after such a finding, as long as the ALJ offers a valid explanation for it. Ramirez’s “valid explanation” rule remains the law in our circuit.13 That is true even though Ramirez dealt with a finding of difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace” that arose “often[,]” id. at 554-55, and here, due to a change in the regulatory rating scale, the ALJ expressed the limitation in different terms, saying that Hess had “moderate difficulties” in “concentration, persistence or pace,”14 (App. at 32.) 13 Our sister circuits have also adopted fact-specific approaches to whether an ALJ’s chosen limitation is acceptable notwithstanding a finding of difficulties in “concentration, persistence, or pace.” E.g., Scott v. Berryhill, 855 F.3d 853, 855, 858 (8th Cir. 2017); Vigil v. Colvin, 805 F.3d 1199, 1203-04 (10th Cir. 2015); Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 638 (4th Cir. 2015); Winschel v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176, 1180-81 (11th Cir. 2011); Stubbs-Danielson v. Astrue, 539 F.3d 1169, 1173-75 (9th Cir. 2008). 14 The regulations previously assessed “concentration, persistence, or pace” on a scale of “never, seldom, often, frequent, and constant.” Ramirez, 372 F.3d at 551. The regulations at issue here assess that functional area using a scale of “[n]one, mild, moderate, marked, and extreme.” 20