Opinion ID: 1202382
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Victim's Statements Indicating Fear of Defendant

Text: (1a) Defendant first contests the admissibility of certain statements by Fleischli to Tracy Leitch concerning Fleischli's fear that defendant might kill her. Tracy Leitch testified that around 8 p.m. on the night of the crime, when the parties were still at the pizza parlor, Fleischli asked Tracy whether, if she went with Tom (the defendant), Do you think Tom would kill me? The prosecution sought to introduce this statement pursuant to Evidence Code section 1250 as evidence of declarant's state of mind on the evening she was killed. There was evidence the victim had had sexual intercourse near the time of her death, and the prosecution's theory was that it was rape, not consensual intercourse. Defendant was charged not only with murder but with rape and the special circumstance of murder during the commission of rape. The victim's fear of defendant would tend to prove that she did not have intercourse willingly. The defense objected that even with a limiting instruction the jury would not consider this evidence only to determine the victim's lack of consent to sexual intercourse; they would use it to determine whether defendant killed her. Further, counsel argued the circumstances of the statement cast doubt on its reliability. It was just something said when the parties were sitting around, having a bunch of cocktails. There had been no evidence of animosity between defendant and Fleischli prior to this alleged statement being made. The court accepted the prosecution's argument that this evidence would be important in showing intercourse was not consensual, and it expressed the belief a jury could follow a limiting instruction on this matter. It therefore ruled: ... the court has weighed and considered the legitimate interest of the People to prove lack of consent and will allow the information about the statement or state of mind of the victim to be elicited from this witness.... Prior to the testimony coming in, the court, in compliance with Evidence Code section 355, gave the jury a limiting instruction which said: Ladies and gentlemen, you are not to consider the following testimony as proof of the truth that the murder occurred or that defendant committed such killing. [ถ] You may consider it only for a determination of the state of mind of the victim, Ginger Fleischli, as it regards a rape and as it may negate a consensual sex act. Okay? [ถ] I'll read the last part one more time. [ถ] You may consider it only for a determination of the state of mind of the victim, Ginger Fleischli, as it regards a rape and as it may negate a consensual sex act. [ถ] That's the only purpose for this, and it's the only use you can put it to in your deliberations.
Evidence Code section 1250, subdivision (a) provides that evidence of a statement of a declarant's then-existing state of mind or emotion is not inadmissible under the hearsay rule when (1) [t]he evidence is offered to prove the declarant's state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an issue in the action; or (2) [t]he evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the declarant. Where that evidence involves the victim's fear of the defendant, we have initially looked to whether the victim's state of mind was really in dispute and whether it was relevant to an issue in the case. ( People v. Armendariz (1984) 37 Cal.3d 573, 584-587 [209 Cal. Rptr. 664, 693 P.2d 243]; People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 526-527 [186 Cal. Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338]; People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 23 [164 Cal. Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468]; People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 529-532 [75 Cal. Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, 40 A.L.R.3d 1323]; People v. Lew (1968) 68 Cal.2d 774, 779 [69 Cal. Rptr. 102, 441 P.2d 942].) Here Fleischli's conduct on the evening of the killing, and specifically whether she willingly had intercourse with defendant, was very much in issue given the prosecution theory of murder during commission of rape. [15] As her expression of fear of defendant on the very night of the murder tends to indicate she did not consent to intercourse, it was relevant in this case. (See Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 527; Lew, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 779.) Even if such evidence is relevant, we have stressed its potential prejudice and have required that the trial court engage in a careful weighing of its probative value against the danger of undue prejudicial effect on the jury. ( People v. Coleman (1985) 38 Cal.3d 69, 92-93 [211 Cal. Rptr. 102, 695 P.2d 189]; Armendariz, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 588-589; Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 26.) Here the statement did not occur long before the rape and killing. It was not cumulative to other evidence. And as originally introduced, it seemed significant to the prosecution case. The autopsy did not provide direct evidence of forcible sexual intercourse although it also did not negate it. The suggestion that Fleischli feared defendant and on returning from the liquor store to find him alone in the apartment would not have engaged in a sexual encounter with him contributed to the inference of force to be gained from bruises on, and the condition of, the victim's body. As for prejudicial effect, this rather isolated statement stands in contrast to the situation in Coleman where poignant letters described the victim's feelings of despair and the tragic development of the family's problems. ( Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 81-82.) The victim in Coleman described at length the conduct of the defendant in trying to hurt her and threatening to kill her family. ( Id. at p. 82.) Here no conduct was ascribed to defendant. The statement related to Fleischli's attitude alone. (Compare also, People v. Ruiz (1987) 44 Cal.3d 589, 607-609 [244 Cal. Rptr. 200, 749 P.2d 854] [involving several statements of fear made by the victim well before the fatal incident].) (2) Defendant points out that the weighing process which trial courts are required to engage in under Evidence Code section 352 must appear on the record. ( Green, supra, 27 Cal.3d at p. 25.) He complains that the weighing process was not made explicit in this case. We must disagree. There is no particular formula a trial court must follow in indicating that probative value has been weighed against prejudice. The goal is that the trial court engage in such process and that the record affirmatively demonstrate, for purposes of later appellate review, that it has done so. ( Ibid. ) The record amply reflects such careful consideration in this case. (1b) Defendant further notes that under Evidence Code section 1252, a statement of mental or physical condition remains inadmissible if the statement was made under circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness. (See also Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 84; Lew, supra, 68 Cal.2d at p. 780; People v. Hamilton (1961) 55 Cal.2d 881, 893 [13 Cal. Rptr. 649, 362 P.2d 473] [disapproved on other grounds in People v. Wilson (1969) 1 Cal.3d 431, 442 [82 Cal. Rptr. 494, 462 P.2d 22].) But the victim's statements here did not purport to narrate past conduct and there is no obvious reason for her to manufacture an expression of fear she did not feel. (See generally People v. Howard (1987) 44 Cal.3d 375, 404-405 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) If we accept that she made the statement, and Tracy Leitch was subject to cross-examination in that regard, it was not made under circumstances suggesting a motive to fabricate. In short, given that defense counsel explicitly argued lack of trustworthiness to the court prior to the court's ruling, the trial court would appear to have considered and rejected this argument in the course of considering the probative value of this evidence.
Finally, defendant contends that limiting instructions, such as those noted above, are ineffective. He finds support in our decision in People v. Coleman, supra , which while not involving the exception in Evidence Code section 1250, does contain colorful language concerning the enormous impact of accusations from the grave whose reverberating clang drown out all weaker sounds. ( Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 82-83, 93.) We have no quarrel with Coleman's conclusion that [a]ccusatory statements `from the grave' such as these have so great a potential to unfairly prejudice the defendant that the courts have long recognized that a limiting instruction will be insufficient to prevent improper use. ( Id. at p. 93 citing, inter alia, Shepard v. United States (1933) 290 U.S. 96 [78 L.Ed. 196, 54 S.Ct. 22].) But the statements Coleman referred to involved inflammatory letters written by one of the victims, defendant's wife, months before the crime. They poignantly described her feelings of hopelessness and despair and asserted that defendant had twice tried to hurt her and many times had threatened to kill the family. ( Coleman, supra, 38 Cal.3d at pp. 81-82.) Here the victim only hours before her death made one statement indicating her personal fear of the defendant, a statement directly relevant to her subsequent conduct and recounting no past conduct of the defendant. Coleman's conclusion as to the inadequacy of limiting instructions just does not apply in this context. The limiting instructions as set forth above repeatedly directed the jury to consider Fleischli's statement only insofar as it was relevant to the subsequent alleged rape. There is no reason to believe the jury was incapable of following those instructions. We therefore conclude that the trial court did not err in admitting her statement into evidence. [16]
Defendant contends that subsequent instructions to the jury at the conclusion of the guilt phase of this trial contradicted the limiting instruction and permitted the jury to consider Fleischli's statement for the improper purpose of determining whether defendant had killed her rather than for the limited purpose of her state of mind and likely conduct on the night of the crime. He points first to the fact the trial court gave the standard instruction on prior inconsistent statements (CALJIC No. 2.13) which informed the jury that prior consistent or inconsistent statements could be considered not only for the purpose of testing the credibility of the witness, but also as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness on such former occasion. It does not appear that this general instruction could have been understood by the jury as directly inconsistent with the prior limiting instructions telling the jury that Fleischli's statements of fear should be considered only as to her state of mind. Furthermore, it is not reasonable to believe that a jury would apply this instruction to accept the truth of the statement as initially testified to by Tracy Leitch when she admitted she had altered it in an attempt to protect her former husband. (See fn. 16, ante. ) Finally, the instruction on prior inconsistent statements was immediately followed by instructions directing the jury, in judging the credibility of witnesses, to consider bias, interest, or other motive, inconsistencies in testimony, and admissions of untruthfulness; and the jury was advised that a witness willfully false in one material part of his testimony was to be distrusted in others. (CALJIC Nos. 2.20, 2.21.) Obviously these more directly relevant instructions would have had more impact on the jury's consideration of Tracy Leitch's testimony than did the prior inconsistent statement instruction. (3) A more significant problem, however, is presented by an instruction requested by the People and given by the court which advised the jury that: In deciding whether the defendant's guilt has been established beyond a reasonable doubt as to the murder charge, you may consider the following evidentiary factors: ... [ถ] Seven, that prior to the victim's demise she had expressed a fear of physical harm from the defendant. This did directly contradict the limiting instruction given when the evidence was admitted, [17] and it improperly advised the jury that it could consider the victim's expression of fear as evidence defendant had committed the murder. It would appear that including this factor in the list of evidentiary matters to be considered with respect to the murder charge was an error the parties simply overlooked. Both sides submitted special instructions containing separate lists of such factors for the murder and for the rape. The victim's statement of fear should, consistent with the limiting instruction, have been included in the instruction governing factors relevant to the rape only. However, given the other listed factors โ including defendant's access to handcuffs and knife, being alone in the apartment, and inconsistencies in defendant's accounts of the crime โ it is not likely the jury would have focused on this factor. Certainly in his final argument the district attorney did not argue this factor, accepting instead the possibility that Fleischli did ask whether David Leitch would have defendant kill her, and focusing on the importance of Tracy Leitch in establishing defendant's lie, made also to the police, that Fleischli had left with Kashani on the night of the crime. Finally, in many ways the defense gained as much from the prosecutor's opening up of this area as it lost. Because Fleischli's alleged fear of defendant had been introduced, the defense presented evidence that prior to the crime Fleischli had called police to help her remove her personal property from the apartment since she feared David Leitch and claimed he had threatened to kill her. They also introduced evidence that three years earlier, David Leitch had assaulted some traveling companions, sending one to the hospital with a concussion. Fleischli knew of this incident, and the defense suggested and argued in its closing argument that if Fleischli feared anyone, she feared David Leitch. (See generally People v. Hall (1986) 41 Cal.3d 826 [226 Cal. Rptr. 112, 718 P.2d 99] [right of defendant to introduce evidence of third-party culpability].) Furthermore, the court gave proposed defense instructions which listed, as evidentiary factors going to whether there was a reasonable doubt defendant committed the murder, Seven, that on no occasion prior to the victim's demise had the defendant expressed any animosity, ill will or intent to harm the victim. [ถ] Eight, that prior to the victim's demise she had expressed a fear of physical harm from David Leitch. [ถ] Nine, that prior to the victim's demise David Leitch had expressed hate and ill will toward the victim and had threatened to have her killed. In sum, the effect upon the guilt phase of this trial of improperly listing Fleischli's statement of fear of the defendant in requested instructions relating to murder, rather than in requested instructions on factors relating to the rape, was harmless under any standard of prejudice.