Opinion ID: 2070377
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PEOPLE v MURRAY

Text: The defendant, Robert L. Murray, was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(e); MSA 28.788(2)(1)(e), and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b; MSA 28.424(2). Following a bench trial on October 24, 1984, Murray was found guilty as charged. Sentencing took place on November 16, 1984. The sentencing information report indicated that the sentencing guidelines recommended a minimum sentence range of eight to fifteen years. [2] The judge chose to impose a sentence within the recommended range, sentencing Murray to concurrent terms of fifteen to thirty years in prison on the first-degree criminal sexual conduct convictions, and to the mandatory two-year term of imprisonment on the felony-firearm conviction. The sentencing judge explained these sentences as follows: I still think you raped her. She was one of the most credible witnesses I have seen in a long time. And because I think you are dangerous to the women of this community I am going to impose a sentence within the guidelines, but at the top of that, 180 months in prison at the minimum, the maximum is 30 years. That is on the CSC charge. You will have to do two years before that sentence commences to run on the felony-firearm charge. Murray filed a claim of appeal in the Court of Appeals alleging, inter alia, that the term of his sentence was shocking to the judicial conscience and that the trial court failed to articulate its reasons for imposing the sentence as required by Coles, supra . [3] The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge's statement that she was sentencing defendant pursuant to the sentencing guidelines was sufficient to meet the Coles requirement to articulate the reasons for the sentence imposed and that any sentence falling within the sentencing guidelines was not shocking to the Court's conscience. [4] The defendant then requested this Court to review the matter pursuant to MCR 7.303. The letter request was treated as an application for leave to appeal and was granted pursuant to this Court's order of June 24, 1986. [5]