Opinion ID: 2193335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Claims Against Queen Barred By Res Judicata

Text: On appeal, the Parkers argue that the trial court erred in finding that their claims against Queen were barred by res judicata because appellants never surrendered their claims against Queen with respect to the correct Property nor with respect to Queen's management of that Property and because the two suits at issue relied on completely separate sets of facts, res judicata did not apply. [17] This court has recognized that a voluntary dismissal with prejudice constitutes a complete adjudication of the matter and precludes further action between the parties based on the principle of res judicata .... Thoubboron v. Ford Motor Co., 809 A.2d 1204, 1210 (D.C.2002) (emphasis in original) ( citing Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 121 S.Ct. 1021, 149 L.Ed.2d 32 (2001)). No court has squarely addressed the issue presented by appellants that when the 1996 case was dismissed with prejudice it was only as to the claims against Queen with respect to the property located at 1600 A Street S.E. It is clear from the arguments put forth by Queen in the trial court, however, that the Parkers understood that their complaint in the 1996 case was directed at asserted negligence on Queen's part at 1600 A Street N.E., the actual residence. [18] The trial court found that Queen was unfairly prejudiced by the Parkers' decision to revive the complaint four years later, since she did not keep the documents nor other items needed for her defense because she rightly relied on the 1996 praecipe that the Parkers' claims would not be brought against her again. Under the doctrine of claim preclusion ( res judicata ), a valid final judgment on the merits absolutely bars the same parties from relitigating the same claim in a subsequent proceeding. ( Charles) Williams v. Board of Trustees of Mount Jezreel Baptist Church, 589 A.2d 901, 906 (D.C.1991) ( citing Washington Medical Center, Inc. v. Holle, 573 A.2d 1269, 1280-81 (D.C.1990)); Henderson v. Snider Bros., Inc., 439 A.2d 481, 485 (D.C. 1981) (en banc). A final judgment on the merits `embodies all of a party's rights arising out of the transaction involved, and a party will be foreclosed from later seeking relief on the basis of issues which might have been raised in the prior action.' ( Charles) Williams, 589 A.2d at 906 ( quoting Stutsman v. Kaiser Found. Health Plan, 546 A.2d 367, 370 (D.C. 1988)). This doctrine also applies to judgments entered by consent, compromise or agreement of the parties. ( Charles) Williams, 589 A.2d at 906 ( quoting Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Gogos, 184 A.2d 197, 198 (D.C.1962)). In Gogos, the appellant filed an action demanding a monetary judgment or the return of a specifically identified automobile but filed a praecipe dismissing the action with prejudice before an answer was filed. Gogos, 184 A.2d at 198. Subsequently, appellant filed a second action solely for a monetary judgment arguing that while both the present action and the previous action involve the same parties, the same conditional sale and the same automobile, the primary purpose of each suit was different, and therefore, res judicata did not apply. Id. The court rejected this argument because appellant sought a monetary judgment in the first action, res judicata barred the second action. The Parkers' argument here that this action is a different cause of action from the 1996 case because it contains a different address is meritless. It is the factual nucleus, not the theory upon which a plaintiff relies, which operates to constitute the cause of action for claim preclusion purposes. Stutsman, 546 A.2d at 370; see also ( Arthur) Williams v. Gerstenfeld, 514 A.2d 1172, 1179 (D.C.1986) (It is irrelevant that the nature of the two proceedings is different; as long as the parties are the same, and the essence of the claim and evidence necessary to establish it are the same, res judicata applies.). The Parkers pursued the 1996 claim on the same factual nucleusalleging that Queen's failure to abate the lead paint resulted in David Matthews' injuryas the current case against Queen. The singular difference of the incorrect quadrant is not enough to demonstrate that the essence of the claim and the evidence necessary to establish it are not the same. Therefore, the trial court did not err in finding that res judicata applied. [19]