Opinion ID: 1301570
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Duty under the circumstances of this case

Text: ¶ 14 This case concerns the allegation that uphill landowners have a duty to abate naturally occurring surface water that runs downhill onto the Hockings' property. Although three distinct doctrinesthe common enemy doctrine, the civil law rule, [6] and the reasonable use rulehave developed over the years in order to analyze surface water problems, Wisconsin has adopted the reasonable use rule. 2 Robert E. Beck et al., Waters and Water Rights § 10.03(b)(3) (1991 ed., repl. vol. 2008); 5 Robert E. Beck, Waters and Water Rights § 59.02(b) (1991 ed., repl. vol. 2006). Over the past sixty years, many states have shifted from the common enemy and civil law rules to the reasonable use rule. Id., § 59.02(b)(7). ¶ 15 Prior to 1974, surface water cases in Wisconsin were governed by the common enemy doctrine. See State v. Deetz, 66 Wis.2d 1, 8-10, 13-16, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974) (rejecting the common enemy doctrine and adopting the reasonable use rule). The common enemy doctrine provided: The right of an owner of land to occupy and improve it in such manner and for such purposes as he may see fit, either by changing the surface or the erection of buildings or other structures thereon, is not restricted or modified by the fact that his own land is so situated with reference to that of adjoining owners that an alteration in the mode of its improvement or occupation in any portion of it will cause water, which may accumulate thereon by rains and snows falling on its surface or flowing onto it over the surface of adjacent lots, either to stand in unusual quantities on other adjacent lands, or pass into and over the same in greater quantities or in other directions than they were accustomed to flow. Watters v. Nat'l Drive-in, Inc., 266 Wis. 432, 435-36, 63 N.W.2d 708 (1954) (emphasis added). Therefore, under the common enemy doctrine, each landowner ha[d] a privilege to deal with, dispose of, block, or divert diffused surface water in any manner as he sees fit, without legal liability for the injurious consequences to his neighbors' lands. 5 Beck, supra, § 59.02(b)(2). ¶ 16 This court applied the common enemy rule in Watters where the defendant constructed a drive-in theater on property that adjoined the plaintiff's property. Watters, 266 Wis. at 433, 63 N.W.2d 708. The defendant's property was such that some water percolated into the soil and the remaining ran off and onto the plaintiff's property. Id. However, as a result of the drive-in theater construction, which included facilities, driveways, tile drains, and sewage-disposal facilities, the land was graded and filled up so as to change the natural contour of said land, which [ ] caused the artificial and unnatural flow of surface waters to drain onto the plaintiff's property. Id. This drainage caused damage to the plaintiff's roadway and resulted in losing the use of some property. Id. This court in Watters concluded that [u]nder the established law of this state[, i.e., the common enemy doctrine,] the plaintiffs have no cause of action for damages caused by drainage of surface waters, either because of the installation of tile drains or by changing the natural flow of such waters. Id. at 436, 63 N.W.2d 708. ¶ 17 While this court had applied the common enemy doctrine prior to 1974, in Deetz, we rejected that doctrine in favor of the reasonable use rule, which is embodied in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822, adopted by this court. Crest, 129 Wis.2d at 138, 384 N.W.2d 692; Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 Wis.2d 635, ¶ 25 n. 4, 691 N.W.2d 658. ¶ 18 In Deetz, this court concluded that the reasonable use rule as set forth in the Restatement of Torts better comports with the realities of modern society than does the common enemy doctrine. Deetz, 66 Wis.2d at 18, 224 N.W.2d 407. Under the reasonable use rule, `each possessor is legally privileged to make a reasonable use of his land, even though the flow of surface waters is altered thereby and causes some harm to others, but incurs liability when his harmful interference with the flow of surface waters is unreasonable.' Id. at 14, 224 N.W.2d 407 (citation omitted). ¶ 19 In Deetz, the plaintiff brought an action to abate a nuisance caused by an uphill landowner. Id. at 6, 224 N.W.2d 407. The defendant developed land on top of a bluff overlooking Lake Wisconsin. Id. Prior to development, the bluff land was used for crops and pasture, and thus the erosion and runoff was minimal. Id. However, after construction, one of the roads at the bottom of the bluff was covered by unusual amounts of sand in many places and the downhill plaintiff noticed that substantial sand deltas had formed along the lakeshore and in the lake, which led to a lake that was not navigable in some places. Id. The court, in Deetz, remanded to the circuit court for a determination of reasonableness. Id. at 21, 224 N.W.2d 407. Remand was necessary because the factual record was undeveloped due to the circuit court's dismissal under the common enemy rule. Id. ¶ 20 Accordingly, under the common enemy doctrine, no duty and thus no liability arose regardless of the defendants' actions. In other words, under the common enemy doctrine, a landowner was privileged to do with his land what he wanted. CEW Mgmt. Corp. v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 88 Wis.2d 631, 633, 277 N.W.2d 766 (1979); see also 5 Beck, supra, § 59.02(b)(2) (discussing the absolute freedom provided by the common enemy doctrine). ¶ 21 However, with the adoption of the reasonable use rule we altered a landowner's responsibility. Under this rule, a landowner must use his land reasonably, and a duty to act will arise if the landowner's use of his land that resulted in altering the flow of surface waters is unreasonable. See 5 Beck, supra, § 59.02(b)(4) (stating that the rule compares benefits and hardships with liability arising when the hardships are unreasonable under all circumstances). [7] As a result, when the defendant's conduct is unreasonable, that defendant has a positive duty to act to abate the nuisance. A positive duty to act must exist before liability will arise in a failure to abate claim such as the one presented here. CEW, 88 Wis.2d at 635, 277 N.W.2d 766; Wis JICivil 1920; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 824 (1979). Consequently, the defendants here have a positive duty to abate this nuisance only if the use of their property had altered the flow of surface water and was an unreasonable use of their property. ¶ 22 In the case at hand, however, the defendants' conduct did not involve a use of their property that altered the flow of surface water. Therefore, their use is not unreasonable, and they have no duty to abate in the first instance. The defendants merely purchased a home, lived in that home, paid property taxes, and established a tie to the community in which they live. They are living the American dream by owning a home. Their conductliving in their homedoes not deviate from typical behavior. They did not create the flow of rainwater or alter the property so to create this problem on the Hockings' property. The development by Rogers allegedly caused these problems. The defendants, for example, did not create a trench that increased the flow of water to the Hockings' property. The defendants did not point oversized downspouts at the Hockings' property. The defendants did not landscape in such a way so to unreasonably increase water flow to the Hockings' property. Instead, the defendants purchased a home in a development and lived there. The defendants could not reasonably be required to take positive action that would affect rainwater runoff onto the Hockings' property. ¶ 23 Moreover, as a practical matter, the necessary remedy to address the Hockings' problem could not be carried out by these defendants. Even the Hockings' civil engineer asserts that the development of the land by Rogers allegedly caused the nuisance because it converted the land from absorptive agricultural to impervious surfaces, altered the grading around the Hockings' property, and altered the streets surrounding the Hockings' property. According to the Hockings' own expert, the problem should be remedied by the installation of storm sewers, the construction of retention ponds, and the installation of a storm water collection and draining system. These remedies could not possibly be carried out by the defendantsone neighboring landowner in an uphill development. What duty would then exist for the landowners who are uphill from these defendant landowners? ¶ 24 The defendants' conduct in this case is reasonable under the circumstances, and as a result, no positive duty to abate this nuisance arises and the Hockings' claims for maintaining a nuisance cannot survive. ¶ 25 Still, the Hockings and the concurrence assert that a duty is owed to the world at large, and as a result, a duty here is assumed. As we stated above, however, duty is and always has been relevant under Wisconsin law even though cases have predominantly been analyzed under the public policy factors when there has been an assumption that a duty exists. The concurrence would conclude that mere home ownership employs a duty to all who could possibly be affected by the homeowner's property. Such a drastic implication of homeowner liability should not be assumed without further analysis under the circumstances. It is not the homeowner's duty to remedy every possible impact that could occur on a neighboring parcel. Sometimes, there is just no such duty to act under Wisconsin law. ¶ 26 The Hockings assert that by failing to act, one can be liable for continuing a nuisance even if the landowner did not cause the problem. We do not disagree that there are circumstances where liability can be established for failing to abate a nuisance. See Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 277 Wis.2d 635, ¶¶ 63-74, 691 N.W.2d 658 (referencing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 839 (1979)). However, no negligence exists in this case because the defendants' conduct did not involve altering the flow of surface water, and therefore, there is no duty to abate. As a result, the Hockings' claim for negligent maintenance of a nuisance cannot survive. ¶ 27 The Hockings spend significant time discussing the application of public policy factors in this case. However, we decline to address the public policy factors and instead resolve this case under a duty analysis because under the circumstances of this case, there is no doubt that the defendants did not have a duty to abate this nuisance. ¶ 28 Accordingly, under the reasonable use rule, a duty to act may arise when one uses his or her property unreasonably. If the property is being reasonably used, however, the landowner has no duty to abate the nuisance under the reasonable use rule. In this case, all the defendant landowners reasonably used their property, and as a result, they satisfied their duty of ordinary care under the circumstances.