Opinion ID: 2320446
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Factual Context of Sixth Amendment Challenge

Text: The government moved in limine to preclude cross-examination of S.L. concerning her suffering a mental breakdown which resulted in her hospitalization in May 1999, some three years after the offense date. [6] These medical records indicated that S.L. told her doctors that she thought that her pastor and his wife were trying to kill her. The government also represented that S.L. had been on medication (Haldol) at the time of her hospitalization and for one week thereafter, and that two weeks before trial, she completed using prescription medication to relieve the side effects of the Haldol. The May 1999 medical records referred to S.L.'s treatment in 1996 for depression following the assault. Defense counsel argued that S.L.'s statements to her doctors during her 1999 episode were evidence that she had made prior false accusations, which were probative of her credibility, veracity and truthfulness at trial. The trial court rejected the defense argument. It reasoned that: The defendant has, in my view, failed to justify an invasion into the witness' privacy and an invasion into her prior mental health history because there is not a sufficient connection between what we know of her mental health history and the defense theory. There is nothing about her mental health history that supports her being an incredible witness. The fact that in May of '99, three years after this incident, she suffered a psychotic episode and had some delusional beliefs is very different than what the defense theory is in this case, which is that she intentionally lied about the assault by Mr. Velasquez and later recanted and indicated that it was false. There is no expert opinion offered to support the defense theory that a psychotic delusional episode in May 1999 is relevant to what claims she made in September 1996 and whether or not those claims are credible. The court noted the absence of a history of false reports and that, in spite of her delusional beliefs, S.L. had not attempted to charge her husband or pastor with a crime. The court observed that there was no evidence that S.L. was delusional or psychotic before May 1999. Further, the court weighed the probative value against the prejudicial effect and concluded that: (1) there was a significant degree of prejudice in the way that a lay person might view mental health history; and (2) the connection is so minimal that the prejudice outweighs the probative value of any cross examination of S.L. in this regard. The court reconsidered the issue after S.L. testified and requested a further proffer. Defense counsel repeated its earlier reliance on the 1999 medical records. The court adhered to its earlier ruling, absent any additional information supporting a good faith basis for the inquiry.