Opinion ID: 2374292
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Heading: States continuing to recognize doctrine

Text: Twelve states continue to recognize the doctrine; Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee, and Wyoming. [7] The basis for decision varied in the above states but quotations from three will present all of the reasons assigned for retention of the doctrine. In Alfree v. Alfree, 410 A.2d 161 (1979), the Delaware Supreme Court reexamined its position recognizing the doctrine and continued to support it, saying at pages 162-63: It is settled law in Delaware that one spouse may not sue the other at law in tort. Plotkin v. Plotkin, Del. Supr., 125 A. 455 (1924); Peters v. Peters, 20 Del. Ch. 28, 169 A. 298 (1933); du Pont v. du Pont, 33 Del. Ch. 571, 98 A.2d 493 (1953); Owens v. Owens, Del. Supr., 149 A.2d 320 (1959); Saunders v. Hill, Del. Supr., 202 A.2d 807 (1964); Fields v. Synthetic Ropes, Inc., Del. Supr., 215 A.2d 427 (1965) and Short Line, Inc. of Penn. v. Perez, Del. Supr., 238 A.2d 341 (1968). We are not persuaded that the common law rule as recognized by the Superior Court in the Plotkin case in 1924 and by the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court since 1924 should be overruled by judicial decision. `[T]he right [of spouses] to sue each other strikes at the very heart of domestic relations and its effect not only upon the home ties, but upon society generally would be far reaching.' Plotkin v. Plotkin, supra, 125 A. at 457. We are aware of the modern, widespread criticism of the rationale of the doctrine. See e.g. Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951, 958-960 (1978). [`... currently only a handful of courts unqualifiedly retain the doctrine in its pristine formulation' 388 A.2d at 954; and `[i]t is clear, ..., that despite its survival in varying forms, interspousal immunity is no longer the doctrinal monolith it was in olden times.' 388 A.2d at 955.] But, nonetheless, we think that, in addition to its time-honored recognition in this State, it retains sufficient merit to warrant continued adherence by this Court for two sets of reasons. First as to tort law, elimination of the doctrine could: (1) open up the possibility of various tort actions such as assault and intentional infliction of emotional harm which could go to the heart of public policy and legislative policy relating to marriage; (2) make many routine automobile cases by way of contribution an involuntary suit of one spouse against another; (3) make common automobile negligence issues, including assumption of the risk and guest statute questions, ones of aggravated accusation by one spouse against another; and (4) affect legislative policy in the no-fault insurance field. Second, as to property law, we note that marriage has many protective attributes not available to others including the duty to support, the right to inherit, and the right to hold property free from assault by a spouse's individual creditors as tenants by the entirety. Thus, the public policy relating to the marriage status is more complex than treatment of interspousal immunity doctrine in isolation would suggest. Like the public policy considerations involved in the oft-attacked Automobile Guest Statute, the problem is `more appropriate for legislative solution than for judicial determination. The General Assembly has access to relevant information bearing upon these matters more significant than any afforded this Court, bound as it is by the limitations of the record of this judicial proceeding.' Justice v. Gatchell, Del. Supr., 325 A.2d 97, 102 (1974). `If a change is to be effected in the well-settled public policy of this State, such change must be effected by the Legislature and not by this court.' Saunders v. Hill, supra, 202 A.2d at 810. In Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So.2d 352 (1979), the Supreme Court of Florida in a 4-3 decision, continued to support the doctrine, saying at page 355: Adversary tort lawsuits between spouses have an upsetting and embittering effect upon domestic tranquility and the marital relationship. But non-adversary lawsuits that do not disturb the peace and harmony of the marriage encourage fraudulent and collusive claims, particularly where a third-party insurance company must pay any judgment awarded. Florida's solution to this dilemma since 1829 has been interspousal tort immunity. This is still a viable solution. There have been many changes in Florida since 1829, but the policy reasons justifying interspousal tort immunity still exist. Accordingly, we hold that the common law doctrine of interspousal tort immunity is still viable in Florida and that it precludes a tort action between husband and wife in all cases. In Robeson v. Int'l. Indemnity Co., 282 S.E.2d 896 (Ga. 1981), the Supreme Court of Georgia, acknowledging widespread modern criticism of the doctrine that in the last decade had been abrogated in an increasing number of states, the majority opinion nevertheless said at page 898, et seq.: For two reasons, we hold that the doctrine of interspousal immunity should not now be abrogated by this court. (a) If interspousal tort litigation was allowed, it would be broadly divisible into two distinct types: those suits in which the judgment would actually be paid by one of the spouses and those suits in which an insurance company would be liable for payment of the judgment. Since husband and wife do live from the same purse, it is somewhat problematic to order one to pay a money judgment obtained by the other in a tort suit for personal injury. It is, in essence, a taking from Peter to pay Paul[ine]. And those suits in which the judgment is to be paid by an insurance company are invariably friendly and/or collusive, at least as between the spouses. The present case is no exception. As previously stated, defendant Joel does not deny that he was negligent. From the totality of decisions in the twelve states retaining intact the interspousal immunity doctrine, we glean the following reasons for such retention: 1. The unity of husband and wife. Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (Hawaii 1981) 2. Interspousal tort actions will destroy the harmony of the marital relationship. Alfree v. Alfree ; Raisen v. Raisen , Robeson v. Int'l. Indemnity Co., all supra; Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (Hawaii 1981) [8] ; Sink v. Sink, 239 P.2d 933 (Kan. 1952); Varholla v. Varholla, 383 N.E.2d 888 (Ohio 1978) 3. Retention of the doctrine will prevent collusive and fraudulent claims. Alfree v. Alfree , Raisen v. Raisen , both supra; Peters v. Peters, 634 P.2d 586 (Hawaii 1981) 4. Retention of the doctrine will guard against an increase in trivial claims. Alfree v. Alfree, supra ; Smith v. Smith, 287 P. 2d 572 (Oregon 1955); Varholla v. Varholla, 383 N.E.2d 888 (Ohio 1978) 5. Divorce and criminal courts furnish adequate redress. Thompson v. Thompson, supra ; McKinney v. McKinney, 135 P.2d 940 (Wyo. 1943); Austin v. Austin, 100 So. 591 (Miss. 1924) 6. Change is solely within the purview of the Legislature. Alfree v. Alfree, supra ; Rogers v. Rogers, 177 S.W. 382, 384 (Mo. 1915); McKinney v. McKinney, 135 P.2d 940 (Wyo. 1943); Austin v. Austin, 100 So. 591 (Miss. 1924); Wooley v. Parker, 432 S.W.2d 882 (Tenn. 1968). In McKinney v. McKinney, 135 P.2d 940 (1943), the Supreme Court of Wyoming (a three Judge court) after holding that the Statutes of the State did not abrogate the common law rule of interspousal immunity for torts, expressed the view that the doors of courts should not open for ordinary actions for negligence between the spouses when if the domestic tranquility has been so thoroughly upset and the parties have lost all affection for each other, the divorce court is always available; and that the legislature is the proper body to make such an important change of policy as opening a field for disturbing the tranquility of family relations. A concurring Judge in McKinney urged that there is no reason to deny interspousal actions in motor torts where there was insurance protection. He acknowledged that such a course created danger of fraud and collusion but maintained that the courts possess the power to prevent such danger. A dissenting Judge expressed the view that the State's Married Womens Act left no basis for the common law disability of the spouses to sue each other. As previously stated, 35 States have abrogated the doctrine fully or partially. It would unduly prolong this opinion to set forth in full detail the basis for decision in every such State. We believe that quotations from opinions in a few of such States will serve fully to present all of the reasons for the conclusion that abrogation of the doctrine was required.