Opinion ID: 2612687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: judicial recognition of federal reserved water rights

Text: Of all the parties before us in these appeals, only Denver takes issue with the fundamental proposition that the United States has reserved water rights in Colorado. Specifically, Denver argues that: (1) the United States never succeeded to any interest in the waters of the Colorado Territory and, accordingly, could not reserve any such waters from appropriation; (2) on the basis of the Desert Land Act of 1877, 43 U.S.C. ง 321 (1976), the Act of July 9, 1870, 43 U.S.C. ง 661 (1976), and the Act of July 26, 1866, 43 U.S.C. ง 661 (1976), the United States abandoned any interest in the waters on the public domain in Colorado and, therefore, could not subsequently reserve any waters to itself; (3) under the equal footing doctrine enunciated in Pollard's Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 11 L.Ed. 565 (1845), and in Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 14 S.Ct. 548, 38 L.Ed. 331 (1894), the admission of Colorado into the United States divested the federal sovereign of any interest in water within Colorado; [24] (4) the United States acquiesced in Colorado's claim, embodied in Article XVI, section 5 of the Colorado Constitution, that the ownership of the waters in this State was vested in the public and, accordingly, forfeited all federal interest in Colorado's waters; (5) the McCarran Amendment bars the United States from acquiring any water rights except pursuant to state substantive water law; and (6) the water court lacked authority under Colorado law to recognize federal reserved water rights or to specify their incidents. In addition, Denver characterizes United States Supreme Court decisions contrary to its position as mere dicta or otherwise inapposite, and alleges that they should be disregarded by this Court. Each of Denver's contentions was rejected in the opinion of the master-referee and, subsequently, in the decision of the water court. On appeal, Denver again seeks a repudiation of the very existence of reserved water rights and an affirmation of an unfettered power in the State of Colorado to determine all federal claims to the use of water in this State by Colorado law. The proposition advanced by Denver was for many years an article of faith throughout the West and was adopted by this Court in Stockman v. Leddy, 55 Colo. 24, 129 P. 220 (1912): This constitution of ours was ratified and adopted by the legal voters of the state in accordance with the conditions prescribed by the enabling act of Congress, and the president of the United States in his proclamation admitting Colorado into the Union found the fact to be that the fundamental conditions imposed by congress on the State of Colorado to entitle it to such admission had been complied with. Congress, in passing the enabling act, and the President, in issuing his proclamation, were aware of the existing physical conditions and of the topography and geography of the state. The federal government, by its lawmaking and executive bodies, knew that the natural streams of this state are, in fact, nonnavigable within its territorial limits, and practically all of them have their sources within its own boundaries, and that no stream of any importance whose source is without those boundaries, flows into or through this state. The entire volume of these streams is therefore made up of rains and snows that fall upon the surface of lands included within the exterior lines of this state and of springs which issue from the earth within the same area. Such being the peculiar conditions, the state was justified in asserting its ownership of all the natural streams within its boundaries. When Colorado was admitted into the Union with such a constitution, the federal government, through its lawmaking and executive departments, thereby recognized and confirmed such right of ownership as belonging to the state in its sovereign capacity. We therefore find it to be not only that our state constitution and pertinent statutes, but the decisions of the courts and duly announced public policy, all are in accord on the proposition to which the federal government has, as we have just shown, given its consent that the waters of the natural streams of this state belong to the people, to the state, in its sovereign capacity, and that its right to their distribution and control within its borders is free from any interference by any other sovereignty. Id. at 28-29, 129 P. at 222. See also Bannister, The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters in Priority States, 28 Harv.L. Rev. 270 (1915). Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, however, it is our duty to adhere to the principles of federal law that have been enunciated by the United States Supreme Court. [25] We therefore reject Denver's argument that the United States ceded to Colorado absolute power to create or establish water rights in this state, and take cognizance of the holdings of the United States Supreme Court that articulate the basic principles of the reserved water rights doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. 696, 98 S.Ct. 3012, 57 L.Ed.2d 1052 (1978); California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645, 98 S.Ct. 2985, 57 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1978); Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 96 S.Ct. 2062, 48 L.Ed.2d 523 (1976). To the extent that Stockman v. Leddy, supra , conflicts with our disposition, we overrule it and affirm the decision of the water court on this issue. [26] The doctrine of federal reserved water rights is judicially created. The power of the United States to legislate a federal system for the use and disposition of unappropriated non-navigable waters on federal lands generally, and on reserved lands specifically, is derived from the Property Clause of the United States Constitution. [27] U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 3. Based upon a recognition of Congress' underlying power, the United States Supreme Court has constructed a body of law, derived by judicial implication from congressional actions, holding that: Congress, in giving the President the power to reserve portions of the federal domain for specific federal purposes, impliedly authorized him to reserve `appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purposes of the reservation. ' United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 699-700, 98 S.Ct. at 3013-3014, quoting Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. at 138, 96 S.Ct. at 2069 (emphasis in original). The existence of the reserved rights doctrine is now well recognized, and the United States Supreme Court has confirmed its existence as a matter of federal law in several cases throughout the past one hundred years. [28] See, e.g., United States v. New Mexico, supra ; Cappaert v. United States, supra ; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 10 L.Ed.2d 542 (1963); Federal Power Commission v. Oregon, 349 U.S. 435, 75 S.Ct. 832, 99 L.Ed. 1215 (1955); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 28 S.Ct. 207, 52 L.Ed. 340 (1908); United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 19 S.Ct. 770, 43 L.Ed. 1136 (1899). The scope of the reserved rights doctrine has, however, been defined only recently. In Cappaert v. United States, supra , the United States Supreme Court set forth a concise statement of the doctrine upon which the federal reserved water rights claims rest: This Court has long held that when the Federal Government withdraws its land from the public domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, the Government, by implication, reserves appurtenant water then unappropriated to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation. In so doing the United States acquires a reserved right in unappropriated water which vests on the date of the reservation and is superior to the rights of future appropriators. Reservation of water rights is empowered by the Commerce Clause, Art. I, ง 8, which permits federal regulation of navigable streams, and the Property Clause, Art. IV., ง 3, which permits federal regulation of federal lands. The doctrine applies to Indian reservations and other federal enclaves, encompassing water rights in navigable and nonnavigable streams. 426 U.S. at 138, 96 S.Ct. at 2069 (citations omitted). In Cappaert, the Supreme Court unanimously held that the reservation of the Devil's Hole National Monument under the American Antiquities Preservation Act of June 8, 1906, 34 Stat. 225, 16 U.S.C. ง 431 (1976), also reserved sufficient unappropriated water to sustain the scientific value of the reservation. The reservation required that the water level in Devil's Hole be maintained at the minimal level necessary to allow survival of the Devil's Hole pupfish, a unique species that had been endangered by a drop in the water level. The water level in the pool had declined due to pumping of groundwater by a nearby irrigator. [29] The Court noted that in determining whether there is a federally reserved water right implicit in the federal reservation, the crucial issue is whether the government intended to reserve unappropriated water. 426 U.S. at 139-40, 96 S.Ct. at 2069-70. Intent is inferred if previously unappropriated waters are necessary to accomplish the purposes for which the reservation was created. Id. The amount of water reserved, however, was only that amount of water necessary to fulfill the purpose of the reservation, no more. Id. at 141, 96 S.Ct. at 2070 (citations omitted). The Court found that the reservation of Devil's Hole included an explicit reservation of some of the unappropriated water since a pool of water is meaningful only if the water remains. Id. at 139-40, 96 S.Ct. at 2069-70. From this intention, the Court found a corresponding intention to reserve to the United States water to sustain the Devil's Hole pupfish. Because the Cappaerts' water rights were junior to the 1952 rights of the United States based upon the date of the presidential proclamation creating the national monument, the federal government was entitled to the amount of water necessary to maintain the water level in Devil's Hole. The Court expressly approved the action of the lower court in tailoring its decree to satisfy the minimal need [30] of the government. Id. at 141, 96 S.Ct. at 2070. Thus, the existence of a federal reservation does not in and of itself denote a reservation of water. Rather, there must be a determination of the precise federal purpose to be served, a determination that the purpose would be frustrated without water, and a determination of the minimum quantity of water required to fulfill the purpose. In United States v. New Mexico, supra , the Supreme Court upheld, for the first time, a denial of reserved water rights to the federal government. In New Mexico, the United States Forest Service asserted reserved rights to waters within the Gila National Forest, including minimum instream flows, for the requirements and purposes of the forests as of the date that various tracts of public lands were withdrawn from the public domain for inclusion in the national forest. Id. The Forest Service's claims to reserved rights for, inter alia, maintenance of instream flows, recreation, and stock watering were initially granted by the special master appointed to consider the claims. They were ultimately denied by the New Mexico Supreme Court on appeal on the basis that such uses were not among the purposes included in the Organic Administration Act of 1897 (Organic Act of 1897), pursuant to which the Gila National Forest was created. See Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, ง 1, 30 Stat. 34, 36 (now codified in 16 U.S.C. ง 473 (1976)). The New Mexico Supreme Court drew a distinction between the primary purposes for which a federal reservation is created and the secondary uses of federal lands that may be permitted or authorized by statute or administrative practice, and concluded that only the former provides a basis for reserved rights. Mimbres Valley Irrigation Co. v. Salopek, 90 N.M. 410, 564 P.2d 615 (1977). The New Mexico Supreme Court also declared that the primary purposes of national forest reservations were limited to the preservation of timber and securing water flows for public and private uses. Id. The United States Supreme Court agreed with both the result and analysis of the New Mexico Supreme Court. The majority noted that the application of the reserved water rights doctrine requires a careful examination of both the asserted water right and the specific purposes for which the land was reserved and must rest upon a conclusion that without the water the purposes of the reservation would be entirely defeated. United States v. New Mexico, 438 U.S. at 700, 98 S.Ct. at 3014 (footnote omitted). Such an examination and tailoring of the reserved right is necessary because the reservation is implied, rather than explicit, and because of congressional intent in the field of federal-state jurisdiction with respect to allocation of water. Id. at 701-02, 98 S.Ct. at 3015. The Court recognized that whatever powers the States acquired over their waters as a result of congressional Acts and admission into the Union, however, Congress did not intend thereby to relinquish its authority to reserve unappropriated water in the future for use on appurtenant lands withdrawn from the public domain for specific federal purposes. Id. at 698, 98 S.Ct. at 3013. The Supreme Court accepted the distinction of primary purposes and secondary uses drawn by the New Mexico Supreme Court: Where water is necessary to fulfill the very purposes for which a federal reservation was created, it is reasonable to conclude, even in the face of Congress' express deference to state water law in other areas, that the United States intended to reserve the necessary water. Where water is only valuable for a secondary use of the reservation, however, there arises the contrary inference that Congress intended, consistent with its other views, that the United States would acquire water in the same manner as any other public or private appropriator. Id. at 702, 98 S.Ct. at 3015. Based upon the legislative history of the Organic Act of 1897, the Court concluded that Congress' intent in authorizing the reservation of Gila National Forest was that water would be reserved only where necessary to preserve the timber or to secure favorable water flows for private and public uses under state law. [31] Id. at 718, 98 S.Ct. at 3023. The Court found recreation, wildlife, and stockwatering to be secondary uses rather than primary purposes of the reservation, and accordingly upheld the state court's denial of reserved rights for such uses. [32] We believe that in these appeals, as in Cappaert and New Mexico, our real task lies not so much in an examination of federal power to reserve waters, but rather with the necessity to state the limits and contours of the exercise of such federal power. To that end, we approve the procedure utilized by the water court in determining the federal government's entitlements under the reserved water rights doctrine. For each federal claim of a reserved water right, the trier of fact must examine the documents reserving the land from the public domain and the underlying legislation authorizing the reservation; determine the precise federal purposes to be served by such legislation; determine whether water is essential for the primary purposes of the reservation; and finally determine the precise quantity of waterโthe minimal need as set forth in Cappaert and New Mexico โrequired for such purposes. However, absent an enunciation of a rule of federal law by the United States Supreme Court, absent congressional action, and absent impingement on vital federal interests, we hold that Colorado law governing the determination of water rights is properly applied as the rule of decision by which we determine the contours of the reserved rights asserted by the United States. Our conclusion serves the general congressional policy of deference to state water law, mitigates the disruptive effect which reserved water rights have on other water rights, and aids in the integration of federal rights into the network of highly interdependent relative priorities to the use of water on common stream systems. Colorado River Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976). After Cappaert and New Mexico, it is clear that the implied reservation doctrine applies to all federal enclaves and that the federal government may acquire rights to unappropriated water on federal lands when the land has been reserved pursuant to congressional authorization for a specific federal purpose that requires the use of water. Denver's arguments to the contrary must therefore be rejected. Accordingly, we conclude that the United States possesses reserved rights for its federal reservations in Colorado in waters unappropriated upon the date of reservation of the federal lands from the public domain, and in the amount necessary to achieve the primary purposes of the reservations.