Opinion ID: 1992276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: PEOPLE v BEWERSDORF

Text: After entering guilty pleas, Kim Bewersdorf was convicted of the felony of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, third offense, MCL 257.625(6); MSA 9.2325(6), and of being an habitual offender, second offense, MCL 769.10; MSA 28.1082. Defendant was charged with OUIL-3, a felony, because his record included two prior misdemeanor OUIL convictions within the preceding ten years. In addition, defendant had previously been convicted of the felony of breaking and entering an occupied building with intent to commit larceny, MCL 750.110; MSA 28.305. Prior to sentencing, the circuit judge advised defendant that he was subject to a maximum prison sentence of seven and one-half years. It was explained that, absent the felony conviction for breaking and entering, defendant would have been subject under the Motor Vehicle Code to a maximum prison sentence of five years for the current OUIL-3 felony. However, because this OUIL-3 offense is a second felony conviction, the maximum prison sentence was enhanced under the habitual offender act by one and one-half times, or seven and one-half years. After accepting defendant's pleas of guilty, the court sentenced him to one year in the county jail for the OUIL-3 offense, and then vacated that sentence and imposed an identical sentence for the habitual offender conviction. [5] Thereafter, defendant moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, claiming that he had been inadequately advised of his rights. [6] After the motion was denied, defendant appealed and for the first time challenged the applicability of the habitual offender act. [7] The Court of Appeals directed defendant's attorney to submit a brief addressing, inter alia, the question whether the enhancement provisions of the Habitual Offender Act, MCL 769.11; MSA 28.1083, [may] be combined with the enhancement provisions of § 625(6) of the Motor Vehicle Code to generate a maximum possible punishment of 7 1/2 years imprisonment.[ [8] ] Thereafter, a divided Court of Appeals panel affirmed defendant's felony OUIL-3 conviction, but vacated the habitual offender conviction. 181 Mich App 430; 450 NW2d 271 (1989). Relying on People v Tucker, 177 Mich App 174; 441 NW2d 59 (1989), the majority reasoned that the specific sentencing scheme applicable to OUIL offenses under the Motor Vehicle Code prevails to the exclusion of the general habitual-offender statute. 181 Mich App 433. The prosecutor applied to this Court, and we granted leave to appeal. 435 Mich 867 (1990).