Opinion ID: 2570367
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Constitutionality of Section 18-1.3-401(6)

Text: Our conclusion on the prosecution's argument requires us to consider the constitutionality of section 18-1.3-401(6). We must construe statutes to avoid constitutional conflicts if possible. People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406, 415 (Colo.1998). We have concluded that section 18-1.3-401(6) can be applied unconstitutionally in that it allows for sentencing beyond the statutory maximumas defined in Apprendi and Blakely, and as further defined by Booker based on facts that are not Blakely -compliant or Blakely -exempt. Nevertheless, this conclusion does not require a finding that the provision is unconstitutional. As we have discussed, section 18-1.3-401(6) aggravated sentencing may also be based on constitutionally authorized facts, depending on the circumstances of a particular case. Since Blakely was issued, five other state supreme courts have considered statutes functionally similar to ours. See Brown, 99 P.3d at 17-18 (Arizona statute states that defendant shall receive a presumptive range sentence and that the sentence may be increased if the trial judge finds enumerated aggravating circumstances from any evidence before or during trial); Smylie, 823 N.E.2d at 683 (Indiana statute requires a given presumptive term for each class of crimes, except when the judge finds aggravating or mitigating circumstances); State v. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d 785, 786 (Minn.2004)(Minnesota statute requires imposition of presumptive sentence unless court finds aggravating factors); State v. Dilts, 337 Or. 645, 103 P.3d 95, 99 (2004)(Oregon statute states that the sentencing judge shall impose the presumptive sentence ... unless the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure)(emphasis and alteration in original); State v. Hughes, 110 P.3d 192, 2005 WL 851137  (Wash. Apr.14, 2005)(Washington statute provides matrix for determination of standard range sentence and exceptional sentence statute allows imposition of sentence outside the standard range if the judge finds substantial and compelling reasons). In Smylie, the Indiana court found that its sentencing system runs afoul of the Sixth Amendment because it mandates both a fixed term and permits judicial discretion in finding aggravation or mitigating circumstances. 823 N.E.2d at 685 (emphasis in original). The court found that Blakely and the Sixth Amendment required that the judicial fact-finding portions of the statute be excised and the statute modified to require jury findings on facts in aggravation. Id. The Minnesota court also considered excising portions of its statute, but has not yet come to a conclusion on that issue. The court found that upward departures based on judicial fact-finding are unconstitutional and requested further briefing on the proper remedies, including excision. Shattuck, 689 N.W.2d at 786. As of this writing, that court has not issued an opinion on the remedy. The Oregon, Washington, and Arizona courts did not invalidate or excise their statutes, but vacated the particular sentences imposed. The Arizona court limited itself to answering the question before the court whether the statutory maximum was the presumptive or the aggravated sentence. The court found that the plea proceedings only authorized the presumptive term. Brown, 99 P.3d at 18. The court declined to consider other implications of Blakely in that opinion, determining that the best approach is to resolve any such questions in this dynamic area of the law in the context of a case in which the relevant issue is squarely presented, properly briefed, and addressed by the courts below. Id. at 18-19. Similarly, the Oregon court determined that the fact that the sentencing guidelines may be applied unconstitutionally, as they were in this case, does not mean that we must reject the sentencing guidelines themselves as unconstitutional. Dilts, 103 P.3d at 100. Instead, the court found only that the sentencing guidelines were applied unconstitutionally to defendant because the aggravated sentence was imposed based on judicial findings. Id. The court concluded that its sentencing system is permissible if [it is] implemented `in a way that respects the Sixth Amendment.' Id. (internal citations omitted). The Supreme Court of Washington also found that its enhanced sentencing provisions could be validly utilized when based on constitutionally permissible factors. Hughes, 110 P.3d 192, 200. (there is at least one way in which RCW 9.94A.535 can be applied constitutionally, [so] it cannot be declared facially unconstitutional). In Hughes, the court also held that an aggravated sentence relying on both valid and invalid factors can stand if the court is satisfied that the valid factors are sufficient to support the sentence. Id. at 201. Accordingly, the court individually considered the factors used to aggravate the sentences at issue in that case. Because the court found that all the factors were invalid under Blakely and held that it would not apply a harmless error standard to Blakely errors, it vacated the sentences. Id. at 202-08. Colorado's statutory sentencing system is functionally similar to Arizona's, Oregon's, and Washington's; it provides for a presumptive range and allows a judge to sentence outside that range if he or she finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances. Our sentencing statute is also similar to those state statutes because section 18-1.3-401(6) aggravated sentences can be imposed constitutionally if based on Blakely -compliant or Blakely -exempt facts. These facts may be present in the record of a sentencing hearing as section 18-1.3-401(6) requires. Therefore, we determine that section 18-1.3-401(6) can be applied constitutionally. Colorado courts must carefully consider different types of aggravating factors used in section 18-1.3-401(6) aggravation in accordance with the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment case law. [13]