Opinion ID: 1818601
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: conclusion

Text: For the foregoing reasons, we hold that that in light of the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, Golphin's encounter with police was consensual, and this otherwise consensual encounter did not mature into a seizure simply because the police retained Golphin's identification which he had consensually and voluntarily produced for the purpose of conducting the computerized check for warrants in his presence at that location. The discovery of Golphin's outstanding arrest warrant, arrest, and subsequent search incident to that arrest were not the fruits of an illicit seizure. We therefore approve the decision of the Fifth District below which affirmed the trial court's denial of Golphin's motion to suppress. It is so ordered. LEWIS, C.J., and WELLS and BELL, JJ., concur. CANTERO, J., specially concurs with an opinion, in which WELLS, J., concurs. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result only with an opinion, in which ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur. CANTERO, J., specially concurring. I agree with the majority that the totality of the circumstances in this case demonstrate that Golphin was not seized when a police officer held his identification and conducted a brief check for outstanding warrants. I also agree with the majority's application of our recent decision in State v. Frierson, 926 So.2d 1139 (Fla.2006), and its conclusion that, even if the encounter in this case constituted a seizure, suppression of the evidence discovered during the search was not required. I write separately because, unlike the majority, I believe that our conclusion that Golphin was not seized finds strong precedential support in Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1051, 104 S.Ct. 1330, 79 L.Ed.2d 725 (1984). The district court in this case, in holding that the defendant consented to the encounter with the police and voluntarily relinquished his identification, cited Lightbourne as controlling. Golphin v. State, 838 So.2d 705, 706 & n. 2 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). I agree. In that case, under similar circumstances, we held that a defendant was not seized when he voluntarily relinquished his identification to a police officer who approached his parked car. In the analysis that follows, I(A) summarize Lightbourne, and (B) explain how similar the circumstances are to those in this case.
In Lightbourne, a police officer approached a parked car that was brought to his attention through a citizen complaint, motivated by a concern that the [occupant] might be in need of assistance. 438 So.2d at 388. The officer found the defendant sitting awake in the car. After asking a few questions, the officer requested identification, which the defendant voluntarily relinquished. While the defendant remained inside his car, the officer took the license to his patrol car to check for outstanding warrants. Upon returning to the defendant's car, observing the defendant's furtive movements and nervous appearance, the officer removed him from the car and searched him for weapons. Id. at 388-89. The defendant claimed he had been unreasonably seized in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. Although we acknowledged that when the officer approached the defendant he had no probable cause or well-founded suspicion that the defendant was about to commit or had committed any crime, id. at 387, we held that the defendant consented to the identification check, which meant that no showing of founded suspicion was required to justify the encounter. Id. at 388 (citing State v. Rawlings, 391 So.2d 269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981)). We reasoned as follows: Officer McGowan's investigation of the suspicious vehicle in this case does not rise to the level of an unconstitutional stop or seizure. Officer McGowan simply approached the parked car, asked defendant a few simple questions as to the reason for his presence there, his current address, and then ran a routine check on the defendant's car and identification. Surely the average, reasonable person, under similar circumstances, would not find the officer's actions unduly harsh. There is nothing in the record that would indicate that prior to defendant voluntarily relinquishing his driver's license to Officer McGowan he was not free to express an alternative wish to go on his way. Id. at 387-88. We quoted a district court opinion holding that mere contact between a citizen and a police officer which evokes voluntary cooperation on the part of the citizen is not a `seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 388 (quoting Rawlings, 391 So.2d at 270) (emphasis added). We then held that no `stop' or `seizure' of the defendant within the meaning of Terry and its progeny occurred prior to [the defendant's] removal from the car . . . to conduct the pat-down search. Id. at 388. Thus, Lightbourne was based on the voluntary nature of the encounter. We unambiguously held that the defendant was not seized when the officer checked the defendant's identification in his patrol car while the defendant waited in his car. [12] Because the encounter in Lightbourne began with an officer investigating a suspicious car and eventually matured to the point where the defendant was removed from the car based on his furtive movements and nervous appearance, id. at 387-88, some courts have interpreted that case as one resting entirely on reasonable suspicion. See State v. Taylor, 826 So.2d 399, 405 n. 8 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002) (suggesting that Lightbourne involve[d] an officer responding to a call about suspicious or criminal activity that, when coupled with the officer's observations, could create the requisite degree of reasonable suspicion); Baez v. State, 814 So.2d 1149, 1152 & n. 1 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (distinguishing Lightbourne as a case involving a suspicious activity rather than consent, but conceding that we may be wrong in our interpretation), quashed, 894 So.2d 115 (Fla.2004). Most courts, however, recognizing that the initial encounter, and the relinquishment of the license, were consensual, have interpreted it as a consent case. See, e.g., Chappell v. State, 838 So.2d 645, 647 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) (holding under Lightbourne that the officers asking Chappell for identification and running a check did not change the encounter into a detention); State v. Chang, 668 So.2d 207, 209 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (holding under Lightbourne that an officer's asking for identification, receiving Chang's driver's license, and running a check for warrants was nothing more than a consensual encounter). [13] I agree that this is the correct interpretation. The encounter with police, and specifically the relinquishment of identification, were consensual.
The circumstances of this case are similar. The defendant was standing on a sidewalk among a group of men. When police officers approached, some of them walked away. The defendant stayed. One of the officers asked for his identification, which he relinquished. The officer then ran a warrants check, which took no more than a couple of minutes. Golphin, 838 So.2d at 706. While waiting for the results, the defendant warned the officer that he had a history of arrests and that he probably had an `open warrant.' Id. He was rightand was arrested. Now he claims that the identification check constituted an unreasonable seizure in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. While I recognize that in order to determine whether a particular encounter constitutes a seizure, a court must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter rather than rely on per se rules, Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 439, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), the circumstances in this case are so similar to those in Lightbourne that we could not hold in the defendant's favor without either receding from that case or creating an inconsistency in the law. In fact, in Lightbourne the officer's conduct came closer to a Fourth Amendment violation than the conduct at issue here. There, the officer returned to his patrol car to check for warrants, whereas in this case the officer apparently without moving away [from Golphin] simply commenced a computer check for outstanding warrants. Majority op. at 1178. The check lasted only two minutes, during which Golphin spoke with the officer. Moreover, because Golphin was standing on the street instead of driving a car, he could have walked away without his identification, thus feeling more freedom to end the encounter than the defendant in Lightbourne, who needed his license to drive away lawfully. Under the totality of the circumstances, therefore, the encounter in this case was even less coercive than the one in Lightbourne. A holding that this defendant was seized while the defendant in Lightbourne was not would create confusion and inconsistency in our Fourth Amendment law. Although the United States Supreme Court has explained that a totality of the circumstances approach may render appellate review less circumscribed by precedent than otherwise, United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 276, 122 S.Ct. 744, 151 L.Ed.2d 740 (2002), some degree of deference to relevant precedent remains prudent. We have an obligation not only to the lower courts, but also to Florida citizens and law enforcement officers to maintain consistency and predictability in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. While every police encounter will involve slightly different circumstances, not every difference is constitutionally significant.
Unlike either the majority, see majority op. at 1179 n. 2; or the concur-in-result only op. at 1198 (Pariente, J.), I believe that our decision in Lightbourne controls the outcome, or at least, given the similarity of the circumstances, that it has great persuasive force. We should rely on Lightbourne in rejecting Golphin's Fourth Amendment claim. WELLS, J., concurs. PARIENTE, J., concurring in result only. I agree with the majority that the evidence need not be suppressed. The majority addresses two issues: whether Golphin was illegally detained and, if so, whether our recent decision in State v. Frierson, 926 So.2d 1139 (Fla.2006), controls. I concur in result only because I disagree with the majority's conclusion that this was a consensual encounter. Once the officer retained Golphin's identification to run a warrants check, Golphin was unlawfully detained in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Nevertheless, because of the existence of the outstanding warrant and no evidence of bad faith on the part of law enforcement, Frierson controls. [14] Golphin was lawfully on the street, exhibiting no behavior justifying detention, when he was approached by an officer and asked for identification. When the officer retained the identification to conduct a warrants check, a reasonable person in Golphin's position would not have felt free to request the return of his identification or to walk away from the officer without identification in hand. I conclude that when the officer unilaterally retained Golphin's identification in order to conduct a warrants check, the consensual encounter became a detention. Because there was no reasonable, founded suspicion to detain Golphin pending the outcome of the warrants check, Golphin was subjected to an unlawful Fourth Amendment seizure. Initially, I note that the majority wisely declines to hold as a matter of law that whenever a citizen voluntarily relinquishes his or her identification card to a police officer, the officer may retain it to conduct a warrants check without triggering the protections of the Fourth Amendment. That holding would be inconsistent with Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 503, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), in which agents' act of retaining an airline passenger's driver's license and ticket contributed to the Court's conclusion that the person was in effect under arrest for purposes of determining whether the consent to search was voluntary. Rather, the Court's determination today that no detention occurred is fact specific, relying on the totality of the circumstances including the officer's act of retaining Golphin's identification card. [15] As stated in United States v. Jordan, 958 F.2d 1085, 1087 (D.C.Cir.1992), the totality of the circumstances test does not mean that each and every circumstance in the case must be assumed to have the same degree of relevance and weight. There are times when one circumstance among the totality converts what would otherwise be a consensual encounter into a detention. Here the officer testified that she held Golphin's identification while teletype had his name, and in fact never returned the identification because the warrants check resulted in Golphin being taken into custody. When an identification is retained under those circumstances, no reasonable person would believe that he or she could simply terminate the encounter by asking the officer to return the government-issued identification or by walking away without having regained possession of this important document. Our assessment of whether Golphin was seized when the officer retained his identification is guided by United States Supreme Court precedent. The majority discusses that Court's decisions concerning searches of bus and airline passengers, as well as cases focusing on the authority of police officers to demand identification from individuals who have been detained. As noted above, in Royer the officers retained the driver's license and ticket of the airline passenger defendant, which along with other circumstances led the Court to conclude that consent to search was obtained during a de facto arrest without probable cause, making its fruits inadmissible. See 460 U.S. at 504, 103 S.Ct. 1319 ([B]y returning his ticket and driver's license, and informing him that he was free to go if he so desired, the officers may have obviated any claim that the encounter was anything but a consensual matter from start to finish.). The Court distinguished United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 558, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980), in which it upheld a consent search during an encounter in which officers examined and returned another airline passenger's license and ticket. See Royer, 460 U.S. at 504 n. 9, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (The case before us differs in important respects. Here, Royer's ticket and identification remained in the possession of the officers throughout the encounter; the officers also seized and had possession of his luggage.). In Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 431, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991), the Court approved the admission of evidence obtained in a search of a bus passenger pursuant to consent after the passenger's identification and ticket were were immediately returned to him as unremarkable. In each of those cases, the Court took into account whether officers kept or returned the defendant's identification in assessing whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the defendant had been detained. Although the Court did not assign any particular weight to this circumstance, I believe it is critical in this case because of the necessity of having government-issued identification to navigate contemporary American life. The use of government-issued photo identification has only grown in the years since Bostick, Royer, and Mendenhall were decided. As one commentator has noted, the state driver's license is the most commonly requested form of verification in industries ranging from banks, to nightclubs and liquor stores, to trains, planes, and rental cars. In fact, it would be difficult to cash checks, enter secured areas, or even purchase alcohol without a driver's license. In this way, it has become the form of identification upon which Americans most often depend. Neda Matar, Are You Ready for a National ID Card? Perhaps We Don't Have to Choose Between Fear of Terrorism and Need for Privacy, 17 Emory Int'l L.Rev. 287, 321 (2003); see also María Pabón López, More Than a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of Driver's Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. Ill. U.L.J. 91, 109 (2004-2005) (noting that drivers' licenses are now used for many purposes tied to verifying identityfrom obtaining a library card to cashing a check). [16] Because this case does not concern a request that a defendant already under detention identify himself, the line of United States Supreme Court cases concerning requests for identification under stop and identify statutes is not controlling here. See Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177, 124 S.Ct. 2451, 159 L.Ed.2d 292 (2004); Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 75 L.Ed.2d 903 (1983); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). Florida has a similar statute authorizing officers to ascertain a person's identity during a lawful detention, see section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (2006), but it is not implicated in this case because there was no reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity. Thus, we are not precluded from considering decisions from other jurisdictions by the conformity clause in article I, section 12 of the Florida Constitution, which requires that constitutional search-and-seizure issues be decided in accord with United Statutes Supreme Court precedent construing the Fourth Amendment. See art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. Further, as the majority recognizes, neither our plurality decision in State v. Baez, 894 So.2d 115 (Fla.2004), nor the Court's decision in Lightbourne v. State, 438 So.2d 380 (Fla.1983), controls here. See majority op. at 1179 n. 2. Baez involved suspicious circumstances not present in this case. See 894 So.2d at 117 (holding that where defendant was found slumped over wheel of his van in a dimly lit warehouse area at night, officer had sufficient cause to further investigate by conducting a computer check based on Baez's suspicious behavior). Lightbourne focused on whether the defendant was detained at the point that he gave the police officer his driver's license, which is not the issue here. See 438 So.2d at 388 (There is nothing in the record that would indicate that prior to defendant voluntarily relinquishing his driver's license to Officer McGowan he was not free to express an alternative wish to go on his way.). [17] Thus, the issue we address in this case, whether a pedestrian in a public area is detained when a police officer retains his or her license for a warrants check, is not governed by any applicable precedent from this Court. Appellate courts in other jurisdictions that have faced this issue under similar facts have held that retaining an individual's identification for a warrants check transforms a street encounter into a detention. In State v. Daniel, 12 S.W.3d 420, 428 (Tenn.2000), the Tennessee Supreme Court, applying the Fourth Amendment's totality-of-the-circumstances test, so held without addressing whether the officer left the defendant's presence to run the warrants check. The court directly addressed the dilemma faced by individuals placed in this situation: [W]hat begins as a consensual police-citizen encounter may mature into a seizure of the person. While many of the circumstances in this case point in the direction of a consensual police-citizen encounter, one circumstance reflects a distinct departure from the typical consensual encounterOfficer Wright's retention of Daniel's identification to run a computer warrants check. Without his identification, Daniel was effectively immobilized. Abandoning one's identification is simply not a practical or realistic option for a reasonable person in modern society. Contrary to the State's assertion, when an officer retains a person's identification for the purpose of running a computer check for outstanding warrants, no reasonable person would believe that he or she could simply terminate the encounter by asking the officer to return the identification. 12 S.W.3d at 427 (citations omitted). In People v. Mitchell, 355 Ill.App.3d 1030, 291 Ill.Dec. 786, 824 N.E.2d 642, 644, appeal denied, 215 Ill.2d 611, 295 Ill.Dec. 525, 833 N.E.2d 7 (2005), the officer took the license he had obtained from the defendant in a street encounter to his police car to run a warrants check. The appellate court concluded that a reasonable person in Mitchell's position would not have felt free to approach the squad car, knock on the window, and demand the immediate return of his identification. A reasonable person would have stood right where the police had left him and waited for them to return his identification. Id. at 647. Similarly, in Salt Lake City v. Ray, 998 P.2d 274, 276 (Utah Ct.App.2000), an officer requested identification during an encounter with the defendant outside a convenience store and then stepped away from her to conduct the warrants check on a portable radio. The appellate court held that in moving away from the defendant while retaining the license, the officer escalated a permissive encounter into a detention without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See id. at 278-81; see also State v. Markland, 112 P.3d 507 (Utah 2005) (assuming that officer's act of retaining defendant's license for warrants check during street encounter resulted in a detention); Commonwealth v. Morton, No. 0497-00-2, 2000 WL 949489, at  (Va.Ct. App. July 11, 2000) (holding that officer who asked for and received identification card and stuck it in his belt while continuing investigation detained defendant). Courts have also found that defendants encountered in or around parked cars, and passengers encountered during traffic stops, were detained when officers retained their licenses to conduct warrants checks. See United States v. Chan-Jimenez, 125 F.3d 1324, 1326 (9th Cir.1997) (holding that officer who received identification and registration of driver of truck pulled to roadside with hood raised seized defendant within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when he asked to look in bed of truck without returning documents); Piggott v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 45, 537 S.E.2d 618, 619 (2000) (holding that by retaining identification of automobile passenger during warrants check, officer detained defendant); State v. Thomas, 91 Wash.App. 195, 955 P.2d 420, 423 (1998) (concluding that when officer took license of defendant sitting in parked car to the rear of the car to conduct a warrants check, a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment . . . occurred). In all of these cases, the courts grounded their decisions in the Fourth Amendment's guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures, including the distinction between consensual encounters and detentions as well as the totality of the circumstances test for determining whether the defendant was detained. In accord with the out of state precedent, as well as the Fourth District Court of Appeal decision in Perko v. State, 874 So.2d 666, 667 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004), dismissed as moot, 894 So.2d 972 (Fla.2005), I conclude that Golphin was seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when the officer retained his license to call in a warrants check on her portable radio. In Perko, the district court ruled that the fruits of a consent search obtained while an officer was holding Perko's driver's license for a warrants check were inadmissible. See 874 So.2d at 666-67. Although the Fourth District relied in part on its decision in Baez, which was later overturned by this Court, Perko is distinguishable from Baez because it lacks any mention of suspicious circumstances justifying investigative detention. Under analogous circumstances, we have found a Fourth Amendment violation where a law enforcement officer extended a traffic stop past the point that reasonable suspicion dissolves by then obtaining additional information that led to the driver's arrest. See State v. Diaz, 850 So.2d 435, 439-40 (Fla.2003). We relied on precedent holding that after the legitimate purpose of a traffic stop has been accomplished, an officer may not extend the detention by obtaining the driver's license and registration. See id. at 439. Consistent with Diaz, we should not allow a law enforcement officer to transform a consensual street encounter into a detention by retaining an identification for the same purpose. In ruling to the contrary, we are sending the confusing message to law enforcement officers that they may conduct nearly unconstrained warrants checks on pedestrians but are precluded from conducting suspicionless license checks on motorists. The majority acknowledges Diaz and recognizes that the exhibition of unqualified police discretion in the context of a consensual encounter is likewise troublesome. Majority op. at 1183 n. 7. But in reaching a conclusion that I consider inconsistent with Diaz, the majority places too much reliance on the fact that the officer never left Golphin's company during the warrants check. Although relevant, this fact does not change the conclusion that no reasonable person would believe he is free to leave when the police retain government-issued identification. The difficulty in securing the return of an identification from an officer who has retreated to a closed police vehicle may contribute to the defendant's sense of being detained, see, e.g., Mitchell, Thomas, but so too might the officer's act of remaining in the defendant's presence, which might have discouraged the defendant from believing he could simply walk away unchallenged. Contrary to the conclusion of the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Analla, 975 F.2d 119, 124 (4th Cir.1992), on which the majority relies, no reasonable person would feel free to ask for the return of an identification card from an officer almost immediately after surrendering it, regardless of whether the officer is next to the defendant or twenty feet away in a patrol car. [18] As stated in Piggott, an officer's act of retaining an individual's license is an implicit[ ] command[ ] . . . to stay. 537 S.E.2d at 619. Further, the answer to the question whether Golphin was detained should not turn on whether he was about to engage in an activity for which he might need his identification. Rather, in determining whether a consensual encounter has become a detention, the issue is whether the individual is constrained in exercising his freedom of movement or association. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n. 16, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (stating that a seizure occurs when an officer has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen). In a society in which official identification is necessary for a myriad of activities, the defendant should not have to establish that he or she will need the license or identification immediately following the encounter with police. Regarding the assertion that Golphin could simply have walked into the apartment where he was staying, there is no testimony that he was prepared to retire for the evening and no indication how his identification might have been returned to him if he had departed the scene. [19] Like the notion that an individual feels free to request the return of identification relinquished to police, the suggestion that an individual feels free to simply walk away from a police officer who has the person's identification and is attempting to ascertain if grounds exist to arrest the person for past conduct is a fiction divorced from the realities of everyday life. The defendant's failure to request the return of his identification under these circumstances is no more than acquiescence to the officer's authority. Certainly, no reasonable person would feel free to leave while a police officer holds his or her identification. The majority accurately acknowledges the growing disconnect between the evolution of the reasonable person standard and the realities of modern society, but I respectfully suggest that its holding perpetuates that disconnect. I cannot reconcile the Court's recognition that presentation of government-issued identification [is] a necessary part of human endeavors with its assertion that Golphin could either request the return of his identification or simply end the encounter by walking into the apartment in which he was staying. The Fifth District Court of Appeal also stated that Golphin could request the return of his license, leading Judge Klein of the Fourth District to make the following response in Perko: Our sister court, which upheld a search under these circumstances, did so under the assumption that a person can withdraw his consent at any time by, for example, asking that his license be immediately returned. Golphin v. State, 838 So.2d 705, 707 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003). This, of course, presupposes that the person knows the law of search and seizure. I, for one, despite my law school education, had no idea there was such a thing as a consensual encounter until I became a judge. Because police officers are, in our society, charged with maintaining order and enforcing the law, it would never have occurred to me that I could insist on the return of my license before the officer was finished with it. Nor would it occur to any other person unversed in search and seizure law. As Professor LaFave has written [i]t is nothing more than fiction to say that all of these subjects have consented to the confrontation. Wayne R. LaFave, Search and SeizureA Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 9.3(a), at 95-96 (3d ed.1996). 874 So.2d at 667 (Klein, J., concurring specially) (alteration in original). Therefore, under the totality of the circumstances, and giving due weight to the fact that the officer asked for Golphin's identification and then retained it as a matter of course to conduct a warrants check, I conclude that Golphin was detained without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. But for our decision in Frierson holding that discovery of an active arrest warrant constitutes an attenuating circumstance that dissipates the taint of the illegal stop under circumstances analogous to this case, I would quash the decision below and remand with directions to reverse the trial court's denial of Golphin's motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of this illegal detention. Finally, this case and others like it cause me grave concern about our freedom as Americans to lawfully move about without attracting the unwanted and coercive attention of the authorities. Evidently, police officers in some jurisdictions view a warrants check as a routine feature of almost any citizen encounter. See, e.g., People v. Bouser, 26 Cal.App.4th 1280, 32 Cal.Rptr.2d 163, 164 (1994) (noting that during consensual encounter, officer used information provided by defendant to run a records check, as was his standard procedure); Mitchell, 291 Ill.Dec. 786, 824 N.E.2d at 644 (noting that officer testified that whenever he meets someone on the street, he runs a warrant check on that individual); Wilson v. State, 874 P.2d 215, 222 (Wyo.1994) (noting that officer testified that his department's policy is to conduct national and local warrants checks of everyone police contact late at night). This practice essentially forces a citizen who is not reasonably suspected of committing a crime to satisfy a police officer that he or she has a right to walk the streets. What the Court stated in Diaz in addressing the illegal extension of a traffic stop rings equally true here: It would be dangerous precedent to allow overzealous law enforcement officers to place in peril the principles of a free society by disregarding the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 850 So.2d at 439. [20] An independent judiciary exists in large measure to prevent this type of encroachment on our constitutional rights, of which none is more fundamental than the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const., amend. IV. We must not shirk our duty in this regard because in the end each new and seemingly small step we take to accept limited government intrusion into our lives for the sake of safety or security takes us slowly but surely away from our cherished freedoms. ANSTEAD and QUINCE, JJ., concur.