Opinion ID: 1198939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The HCRC's Reasonable Cause Determination As To The Existence Of An Unlawful Discriminatory Practice Was Properly Made, In Accordance With Statute.

Text: HRS § 368-13 (1993) governs the HCRC's investigation and conciliation of a complaint, providing in pertinent part that: (a) After the filing of a complaint, or whenever it appears to the commission that an unlawful discriminatory practice may have been committed, the commission's executive director shall make an investigation in connection therewith.... (b) The executive director shall issue a determination of whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that an unlawful discriminatory practice has occurred within one-hundred and eighty days from the date of filing a complaint unless the commission grants an extension of time to issue a determination. (Emphases added.) The practice and procedure of the HCRC is further governed by HAR, title 12, chapter 46, Civil Rights Commission, HAR. Like HRS § 368-13, HAR § 12-46-12(f) (1992) provides that [a]n investigation shall be concluded within one hundred eighty days of the filing of the complaint; provided that the commission may grant an extension. (Emphasis added.) The HCRC formally began its operations on January 2, 1991, assuming jurisdiction over 266 employment discrimination complaints that had been filed previously with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations. Burdened with a heavy caseload, the HCRC was unable to complete its investigations and issue reasonable cause determinations within one hundred eighty days, as provided for by the HRS and HAR. [5] Thus, beginning in March 1993, the HCRC voted to implement four incremental extensions of the time in which to investigate all cases. [6] Gould's complaint was filed on October 20, 1992, and the investigation of Gould's complaint was thereafter extended four times before the Executive Director made her reasonable cause determination on January 25, 1995. Dr. Steinberg contends that the HCRC failed to meet the technical requirements of [HRS § 368-13(b)]. Citing no authority, Dr. Steinberg submits that: The HCRC's minutes use language like to extend the period of investigation for all complaints or extended the time for the investigation of all cases. The HCRC minutes do not use the statutory requirement of an extension of time to issue a determination. The difference in purpose is not the same[;] to investigate means that there is more work to be done to find out the facts as they are, and to make a determination means that the Executive Director has sufficient facts, but is unable to finalize a decision and to put it into writing. In the instant case the HCRC did not grant an extension of time to issue a determination. It granted a number of extensions, four in this case ..., of time to investigate all cases. While this may be nit-picking, it comes closer to the intent of the legislature in establishing a time limitations on actions.... Dr. Steinberg's claims are patently meritless. Read in pari materia, HRS § 368-13(f) and HAR § 12-46-12(f) clearly authorize the HCRC to extend the time to complete an investigation of a complaint before making a reasonable cause determination. Additionally, based on the plain language of both the HRS and the HAR, the number of extensions that may be granted is not limited. Inexplicably, Dr. Steinberg attempts to treat HRS § 368-13(b) as analogous to a statute of limitations provision. Nonetheless, we are unaware of any case law, legislative history, or other authority that supports such a proposition. Indeed, the legislative history is completely silent as to the intent of permitting extensions of investigations. [7] In the absence of a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, [the language of the statute] must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive. Kaiama v. Aguilar, 67 Haw. 549, 553, 696 P.2d 839, 842 (1985) (citation omitted). Accordingly, we hold that the HCRC did not exceed its statutory authority under HRS § 368-13(b) and HAR § 12-46-12(f) by granting four extensions of the investigation into Gould's complaint. Thus, the Executive Director's reasonable cause determination as to the existence of unlawful discriminatory conduct was timely made.