Opinion ID: 1740082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Applicability of Comes.

Text: We begin our analysis by addressing the plaintiffs' assertion that our decision in Comes that indirect purchasers may bring suit under chapter 553is dispositive of the present appeal. The premise underlying the plaintiffs' position is that this court in Comes held common-law rules barring recovery for remote and derivative injuries do not apply to actions brought under chapter 553. Admittedly, our Comes decision contains some expansive statements with respect to the reach of Iowa's antitrust statute. See, e.g., Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 445 (Given the clear, broad language of the state antitrust law, we conclude the Iowa Competition Law creates a cause of action for all consumers, regardless of one's technical status as a direct or indirect purchaser.), at 451 (We conclude our antitrust law contemplates all injured consumers are authorized to bring suit to enforce our antitrust laws.). Nonetheless, these statements must be interpreted within the context in which they were made. As we stated in Comes: The only issue on appeal is whether the United States Supreme Court case, Illinois Brick [ Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 97 S.Ct. 2061, 52 L.Ed.2d 707 (1977)], should be followed in interpreting the Iowa Competition Law. Id. at 442. It is appropriate, therefore, to briefly examine the holding in Illinois Brick. In Illinois Brick, the Supreme Court held that the overcharged direct purchaser, and not others in the chain of manufacture or distribution, is the party `injured in his business or property' within the meaning of [the federal antitrust law.] 431 U.S. at 729, 97 S.Ct. at 2066, 52 L.Ed.2d at 714. The Court pointed out that this issue was analytically distinct from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too remote to give them standing to sue for damages under federal law. Id. at 728 n. 7, 97 S.Ct. at 2065 n. 7, 52 L.Ed.2d at 714 n. 7. In Comes, this court decided the Illinois Brick rule prohibiting indirect-purchaser suits should not be followed in interpreting Iowa's competition law. 646 N.W.2d at 450. Accordingly, we held indirect purchasers may maintain an antitrust action in state court. Id. at 441. Because the plaintiffs in Comes qualified as indirect purchasers who had standing under state law, we had no need in that case to determine whether persons who were not indirect purchasers and who suffered injuries even more remote than those sustained by indirect purchasers had standing. Thus, with respect to setting the outer limits of what injuries are compensable under Iowa's competition law, our decision in Comes is narrow. We simply rejected the federal rule barring claims by indirect purchasers. We certainly did not, as suggested by the plaintiffs, determine there were no limits on who could sue under chapter 553. Cf. Kanne v. Visa U.S.A. Inc., 272 Neb. 489, 723 N.W.2d 293, 299-301 (2006) (holding Nebraska decision rejecting Illinois Brick indirect-purchaser rule in antitrust suit against Microsoft did not reject all standing requirements). Before discussing what limits exist with respect to who may sue under Iowa antitrust law due to the common-law remoteness doctrine, we address the plaintiffs' argument that they are indirect purchasers in the same position as the Comes plaintiffs. The plaintiffs in Comes had purchased computers that came with the Windows 98 operating system preinstalled. Comes, 646 N.W.2d at 441. As a precondition to the use of this operating system, the plaintiffs became end-user licensees of Microsoft. Id. at 441-42. The plaintiffs alleged in the class action filed on behalf of all end-user licensees of Windows 98 living in Iowa that Microsoft maintained or used a monopoly in conjunction with its Windows 98 operating system for the purpose of excluding competition or controlling, fixing, or maintaining prices in violation of the Iowa Competition Law. Id. at 442. As a result of this illegal conduct, alleged the plaintiffs, Microsoft charged a higher price for its Windows 98 system than what it would have been able to charge in a competitive market. Id. The plaintiffs bringing suit in Comes were indirect purchasers of the Windows 98 operating system because Microsoft did not directly sell its products [to the plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs] ultimately obtained the products through the stream of commerce. Comes v. Microsoft Corp., 696 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa 2005). The plaintiffs in the present action are not in a comparable position because they did not purchase, directly or indirectly, the product that is the subject of anticompetitive activity by Visa and MasterCarddebit processing services. It is clear from the petition that the plaintiffs are nonpurchasers; they simply bought merchandise from businesses that used the defendants' debit processing services. Kanne, 723 N.W.2d at 301 (holding consumer plaintiffs in identical Nebraska antitrust suit were not indirect purchasers of Visa and MasterCard services). Consequently, our decision in Comes is not dispositive of the issue presented by the present appeal: can a nonpurchaser suffering a derivative injury recover under Iowa's competition statute?