Opinion ID: 169392
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Spear's Duties Are Similar to Those in Edwards

Text: 40 Seeking to distinguish our case law, the government urges us to recognize three distinctions between Spear's crime and Edwards: (1) only the employer was hurt in Edwards, (2) Spear's violation involved government services, and (3) the employee in Edwards had no authority to post credits to accounts so she was a conduit that did not perform the [financial] verification and safeguarding function as well. Aple. Answer Br. at 20. We disagree that these distinctions make a difference here. 41 First, as we explained, the consequences of Spear's actions are not relevant in determining whether to apply the § 3B1.3 enhancement. Nowhere in its text does the § 3B1.3 enhancement suggest differing standards when the crime hurts only the employer and not its customers. While the relationship to the victim can in some instances bolster the trust assessment, see, e.g., Hirsch, 239 F.3d at 227-28; United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 377-78 (3d Cir.2001), the mere identity of the victim is not probative. Nowhere in Edwards did we rely on such a proposition as part of our justification for not applying the enhancement. The emphasis instead is on whether the position was used to significantly facilitate or conceal the crime because of the freedom enjoyed by discretionary decision makers. 42 Second, the government intimates that the unique nature of USCIS as a government entity, in particular having a monopoly on providing immigration services, distinguishes the situation here from Edwards. But the language of § 3B1.3 does not distinguish between private or public positions of trust—both are treated equally—nor does the commentary distinguish between public and private sector violations. 43 In a related comparison, the district court also analogized to postal service employees, who qualify for positions of trust under Application Note 2 of § 3B1.3's commentary. Sent. Tr. at 25. (Ms. Spear occupied a position—if a United States postal employee holds a position of trust, Ms. Spear held a higher position of trust.). Postal service employees, however, are an express exception to the managerial or professional discretion rule and should not be used to analogize to whether the defendant occupied a position of trust. See United States v. Smaw, 22 F.3d 330, 332-33 (D.C.Cir.1994). 44 Before amended in 2005, Application Note 1 of § 3B1.3 read, Notwithstanding the preceding paragraph, because of the special nature of the United States mail an adjustment for an abuse of a position of trust will apply to any employee of the U.S. Postal Service who engages in the theft or destruction of undelivered United States mail. The 2005 amendment struck the language describing the special nature of the postal service in response to the Identity Theft Penalty Enhancement Act, Public Law 108-275, 118 Stat. 831 (2004), which directed the Commission to add enhancements for identity theft to § 3B1.3. In so doing, the Commission partitioned out Application Note 2 for listing the two categories of defendants that would receive the enhancement notwithstanding the fact they would not otherwise qualify under the standards set by Application Note 1 as employees in a position of trust. This means postal employees are subject to the enhancement for different reasons than defendants who meet the requisites of Application Note 1. Therefore, postal employees should not be used in a comparative analysis that attempts to determine whether a defendant wielded sufficient professional or managerial discretion to qualify for the § 3B1.3 enhancement. 45 Finally, Spear was no more or less responsible for office monies than the defendant in Edwards. She did not have authority to dispose of, accept, or reject applications, just as Edwards had no authority to post credits. 4 She only had the power to determine whether an applicant had checked the necessary boxes, filled in the necessary blanks, provided the requisite information, and paid the necessary fees. 46 In sum, Spear occupied a position similar to the defendant in Edwards. While their conduct was certainly abusive, by virtue of their job responsibilities neither qualifies for an enhancement for abuse of trust under § 3B1.3. Accordingly, the district court erred in applying the enhancement in this instance.