Opinion ID: 1389514
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did imposition of consecutive sentences for armed robbery and first degree murder violate Arizona's statute prohibiting double punishment?

Text: Defendant claims that the imposition of consecutive sentences for first degree murder and armed robbery violates A.R.S. § 13-116, which provides, in part, that: [a]n act or omission which is made punishable in different ways by different sections of the law may be punished under both, but in no event may sentences be other than concurrent. The statute does not bar double punishment for different acts. It does bar consecutive sentencing or double punishment for a single act or offense. The statute was adopted, at least in part, from California. See historical note to A.R.S. § 13-116; State v. Ballez, 102 Ariz. 174, 427 P.2d 125 (1967). When first adopted, the statute was worded somewhat differently than § 13-116, and was construed to bar double conviction as well as double punishment. If the defendant had been improperly convicted for a single act under two different laws, the remedy was to retain the convictions and to remove the lesser sentence. State v. Ballez, 102 Ariz. at 175, 427 P.2d at 126. The present statute, A.R.S. 13-116, evinces an intent to permit double conviction but as we stated in State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. 55, 579 P.2d 559 (1978), the statute prohibits consecutive sentencing. This still leaves the serious problem of determining what is an act or omission. Neither A.R.S. § 13-116, its predecessor, nor the California statute defines the term. California has struggled with the concept of a single act since adoption of its statute in 1872. People v. Perez, 23 Cal.3d 545, 551, 153 Cal. Rptr. 40, 43, 591 P.2d 63, 66 (1979). Acknowledging that the legislative purpose was to insure that a defendant's punishment will be commensurate with his culpability, the California courts have declined to adopt any universal construction directing the proper application of the statute. Id. at 551, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 43, 591 P.2d at 66, 67. They have concluded that the statute does apply to any course of conduct which violates more than one statute yet constitutes an indivisible transaction. What is divisible or indivisible depends, in turn, upon the intent and objective of the actor. If the defendant had multiple, independent criminal objectives, he could be punished for each independent violation, even though the violations were all part of a single course of conduct. People v. Beamon, 8 Cal.3d 625, 636, 105 Cal. Rptr. 681, 688-689, 504 P.2d 905, 914 (1973). Finding this broad test not entirely satisfactory, the California courts eventually elaborated on the intent and objective test by applying an analysis which seeks to determine whether the various acts in the course of conduct were separate and distinct on the one hand, or incidental to or the means by which the final objective was accomplished. People v. Perez, 23 Cal.3d at 552, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 44, 591 P.2d at 68. We gave detailed consideration to our version of the statute (then A.R.S. § 13-1641) in State v. Tinghitella, 108 Ariz. 1, 491 P.2d 834 (1971). After reviewing our former decisions, not all of which were consistent, and the California decisions, also inconsistent, we held: In order to dispel any apparent ambiguity in the cases cited, we hold that the most practical method of determining the number of acts which may be punishable under § 13-1641 ... is the identical elements test.... Id., 108 Ariz. at 3, 491 P.2d at 836. This test is applied by eliminating the evidence supporting the elements of one charge and then determining whether the remaining evidence supports the elements of the other charge. Id., quoting from State v. Mitchell, 106 Ariz. 492, 478 P.2d 517 (1970). State v. Westbrook, 79 Ariz. 116, 285 P.2d 161 (1954) appears to be the first case in which the identical elements test was developed and applied in Arizona. Westbrook dealt with the prior version of the statute which was then denominated as § 43-6101, A.C.A. 1939. The inquiry there pertained to the double jeopardy portion of the statute; [7] applying the identical elements test, the court held that a defendant who had been acquitted of attempted burglary could later be prosecuted and punished for conspiracy to commit the same burglary. After reviewing the authorities, we determined in Tinghitella that Arizona would continue to follow the identical elements test, that being the most practical manner to determine the issue of double punishment. Both the state and defendant urge us to apply the Tinghitella test in this fact situation, but reach divergent results. We first note that the elements of first degree murder are: 1) intentionally or knowingly; 2) causing the death of another person; 3) with premeditation or in the course of the perpetration of specified felonies, of which robbery is one. A.R.S. § 13-1105. The elements of armed robbery are: 1) the taking of property; 2) of another; 3) from his person or presence; 4) against his will; 5) by use or threat of force; 6) with intent to coerce surrender of the property or prevent resistance of the victim; 7) where the perpetrator is armed with or uses or threatens to use a deadly weapon or dangerous instrumentality. A.R.S. §§ 13-1902, 13-1904. Citing State v. Ferguson, supra , defendant contends that after supporting the elements of first degree murder there is no evidence to support the robbery element of use or threat to use force. Since the facts involving the actual use of force (the shooting of the gun) are here necessary to support the murder elements, defendant argues that under the Tinghitella test there is insufficient evidence to independently support the robbery conviction and that the double punishment statute is therefore applicable. We did reach such a conclusion in Ferguson under very similar facts. We stated: Under the peculiar facts of our instant case, the taxicab driver was shot in the head from behind, apparently with no knowledge of what was about to take place. This shooting was the only force available to support the subsequent acts which might otherwise be characterized as robbery. Having applied the Tinghitella test, we find that the evidence will not additionally support the charge of robbery. Accordingly, the robbery conviction and sentence are set aside. State v. Ferguson, 119 Ariz. at 61, 579 P.2d at 565. The state argues that the case is distinguishable from Ferguson. Here, the state contends, the fact that the gun was placed in the victim's right ear warrants an inference that the victim was aware that a gun barrel was in his ear and thus must have known that he was threatened with force. The trial judge did not apply Ferguson and believed that the case was governed by our decision in State v. Rumsey, 130 Ariz. 427, 636 P.2d 1209 (1981). In Rumsey we distinguished Ferguson as follows: In the instant case [Rumsey], the defendant demanded the victim's wallet and threatened him with a gun prior to shooting him. Even though the victim's wallet was not taken until after the victim was shot and presumably dead, the acts which constituted the robbery were separate and apart from the acts which constituted the murder. The fatal shooting constituted first degree murder independent of the armed robbery. Under the facts of this case, we hold that the intervening crime of murder does not preclude a conviction of armed robbery as well as murder, and the trial court was correct in imposing consecutive sentences for armed robbery and murder. Id. at 430, 636 P.2d at 1212. Counsel agreed at oral argument that the distinction to be drawn between Ferguson and Rumsey is to be made on the victim's awareness of the crime. Since there was only one use of force, and that must be assigned to support the murder element, under Ferguson and Rumsey there is no evidence to support the required robbery element of the use or threat of force unless the victim was aware of the threat during the robbery. Correctly perceiving that this was the precise issue, before imposing consecutive sentences the trial judge made an express finding that the victim had been aware, if only for a brief moment, of the gun in his ear and thus aware of the threat of force. Defendant argues that there is no evidence to support that finding. We disagree. The trial judge cited the testimony of the medical examiner to the effect that the gunshot wound in the ear was a contact wound. The judge inferred from this that the victim must have been aware of the gun barrel in his ear and thus of the impending crime, so that there was a threat of force. Drawing such inferences from the facts is well within the discretion of the trial court. Neither in the trial court nor here does the defendant make any argument with regard to the effect, if any, of the felony murder rule on A.R.S. § 13-116. We note, however, that there is no question but that the murder here was premeditated and may be sustained independently of the felony murder rule. We hold, therefore, that under the identical elements test approved in Tinghitella, supra, there was sufficient independent evidence to support each of the elements of first degree murder and armed robbery. The imposition of consecutive sentences did not violate A.R.S. § 13-116. In addition to examining the issues raised by defendant, we have searched the record for fundamental error, A.R.S. § 13-4035. We find none. The judgment and sentences are affirmed. HOLOHAN, C.J., GORDON, V.C.J., and HAYS and CAMERON, JJ., concur.