Opinion ID: 1133268
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Grant Change of Judge

Text: On the morning of the trial, but before it began, out of the presence of the defendant and in no way connected with the case at bar, the trial judge addressed some visiting junior high school students in the courtroom. The substance of his remarks was that if a person accused of a crime is in fact guilty and pleads guilty, then the court will give him every consideration; but if he knows he is guilty, but places the State to the expense of a trial, then he will not receive any consideration from the court. Upon the basis of these remarks, made in a context entirely disassociated from the instant case, the defendant moved for a change of venue to another judge in the Second Judicial District. The trial judge denied the motion, and in so doing stated: He (defendant) will have in every respect a fair and impartial trial. And I assure you of that.    But it (the statement complained of) does not in any respect, in no respect whatsoever, have any effect upon any defendant appearing before me and receiving a fair and impartial trial. This he will be afforded. To disqualify a trial judge from presiding at the trial of a criminal case, his interest must be direct, apparent, substantial, certain or immediate, and not one which is only indirect, contingent, incidental, remote, speculative, unreal, uncertain, inconsequential or merely theoretical. Kostal v. People, 160 Colo. 64, 414 P.2d 123, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 939, 87 S.Ct. 305, 17 L.Ed.2d 218; see also Watson v. People, 155 Colo. 357, 394 P.2d 737, cert. denied, 380 U.S. 966, 85 S.Ct. 1111, 14 L. Ed.2d 156. Applying this test to the instant case, we hold that the trial judge did not err in denying defendant's motion for the case to be heard by another judge.