Opinion ID: 2997244
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of the 2003 and 2004 Appropriations Acts

Text: While the parties arrive at this question from different paths, the main issue before us is whether the 2003 and 2004 appropriations measures make a substantive change to the FOIA by exempting the databases. Hence, we will consider both pieces of legislation. The FOIA was enacted in 1966 in response to perceived abuse by federal agencies of their discretion to disclose information to the public; it was felt that such secrecy was used by officials to cover mistakes and irregularities within the agencies. GTE Sylvania, Inc. v. Consumers Union, 445 U.S. 375, 384-86 (1980). The goal of the FOIA was to “establish a general philosophy of full agency disclosure.” Id. at 385. Under the FOIA, courts recognize a “strong presumption in favor of disclosure.” N.L.R.B. v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 236 (1978). Accordingly, we interpret exemptions to FOIA narrowly. No. 01-2167 5 The framework of FOIA mandates that federal agencies make information available to the public upon request unless that information falls into one of nine exemptions outlined in the statute. One of those exemptions allows information to be withheld if another statute specifically exempts that information from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). To be in conformity with this exemption, the statute must either require “that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue” or refer to “particular types of matters to be withheld.” Id. On their face, the 2003 and 2004 appropriations measures do not specifically exempt the databases from disclosure under the FOIA, instead they direct that “no funds . . . shall be available” to the ATF to disclose the information. This sort of indirect language is not normally used to create substantive exemptions under the FOIA, rather, in the past when Congress desired to create a statutory exemption to the FOIA legislation, it looked more like the following: “Information concerning the nature and specific location of a National Park System resource which is endangered . . . may be withheld from the public in response to a [FOIA] request . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 5937. As a result of the unusual language in the 2003 and 2004 appropriations measures, the question to us is whether, in enacting the pertinent provisions of the bills in question, Congress engaged in “repeal by implication”—that is to say, whether Congress intended to exempt the databases from FOIA’s generally duty of disclosure, despite its failure to explicitly do so. As a rule of statutory construction, repeals by implication are disfavored. Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 189-90 (1978). The Supreme Court has noted that this policy of disfavor “applies with full vigor” when the statute in question is an appropriations measure, such as is the case here. Id. at 190; see also Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1, 9 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (noting that “while appropriation acts are ‘Acts of Congress’ which can substan- 6 No. 01-2167 tively change existing law, there is a very strong presumption that they do not.”) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Building & Construction Trades Dept., AFL-CIO v. Martin, 961 F.2d 269, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Further, when faced with a conflict between appropriations legislation and a substantive statute, we construe the appropriations legislation narrowly. Calloway, 216 F.3d at 9. While generally disfavored, repeals by implication will work in two situations: (1) if one act is “clearly intended as a substitute” for the other, or (2) if the two statutes are in “irreconcilable conflict.” Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003). ATF is quick to highlight the cases in which courts have found that appropriations measures repealed portions of substantive legislation. We will discuss these.
In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), the Court considered the effect of the “Northwest Timber Compromise.” The Compromise, a part of the 1990 appropriations measures, was passed in response to controversy surrounding an endangered species—the northern spotted owl—and the logging industry in the Northwest. It established “a comprehensive set of rules to govern harvesting” in thirteen national forests. Id. at 433. The Compromise bears no resemblance to the 2003 and 2004 appropriations measures. Rather than simply denying funding, it created a detailed system to replace portions of other substantive legislation.3 In short, it fell directly under what we 3 The Robertson Court described the Northwest Timber Compromise as follows: “The Compromise both required harvesting and expanded harvesting restrictions. Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) required the Forest Service and the BLM respectively to offer for sale specified quantities of timber from the affected lands before the end of fiscal year 1990. On the other hand, subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) (continued...) No. 01-2167 7 described above as a “clearly intended substitute” for portions of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act and other substantive environmental legislation. In arriving at its holding, the Court noted that the Compromise “provided by its terms that compliance with certain new law constituted compliance with certain old law, the intent to modify was not only clear, but express.” Id. at 440 (emphasis in original).
The remainder of the cases we discuss today involve appropriations measures that were in “irreconcilable conflict” with previously enacted substantive legislation—the more likely scenario for ATF. In United States v. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 554 (1940) and United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980), the Supreme Court found that appropriations measures substantively changed statutes regarding compensation for federal employees. The underlying statutes in those cases provided, respectively, an allowance to enlisted men and annual pay raises for federal judges. In Dickerson, the Court considered the legislative history and concluded that Congress intended the 1938 appropriations bill to make the same substantive change to enlistment allowances that its predecessor appropriations bills had done (via direct language) in 1934, 1935, 1936 and 1937. Dickerson, 310 U.S. 3 (...continued) prohibited harvesting altogether from various designated areas withing those lands, expanding the applicable administrative prohibitions and then codifying them for the remainder of the fiscal year. In addition, subsections (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(4), specified general environmental criteria to govern the selection of harvesting sites by the Forest Service. Subsection (g)(1) provided for limited, expedited judicial review of individual timber sales offered under § 318.” Id. at 433-34. 8 No. 01-2167 at 561. In Will, all legislation in question ordered a simple denial of funds for judicial salary increases. The Court— recognizing repeal by implication is disfavored—found that the “plain words” of the appropriations statutes showed that Congress intended to substantively repeal the raises for the judges for each of the years in question. Will, 449 U.S. at 222. Although these cases concluded that appropriations legislation rendered a change to pre-existing substantive statutes, the underlying substantive statutes involved were significantly different from the FOIA. They concerned only the transfer of funds by the government to government employees, hence, by making the funds in question unavailable Congress was able to squarely defeat the purpose of those statutes. Two courts of appeals have considered variations on the themes in Will and Dickerson with differing results. In Calloway v. District of Columbia, 216 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2000), the D.C. Circuit considered appropriations measures in which Congress capped the amount of attorneys’ fees that the District could pay in suits brought under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The court determined that, although the cap affected the District’s ability to pay the fees, it did not affect the portions of the IDEA that gave courts discretion in awarding attorneys’ fees. Id. at 11. The court found that there was no irreconcilable conflict between the two provisions because they applied to two different governmental bodies: the District and the courts. Acknowledging that this would yield inconsistent results in future IDEA litigation (i.e., courts awarding higher fees than the District was permitted to pay), the court opined that these conflicts would be for Congress to resolve, not the judiciary. Id. at 9-10. Conversely, in McHugh v. Rubin, 220 F.3d 53 (2nd Cir. 2000), the Second Circuit considered the effect of an apNo. 01-2167 9 propriations bill that ordered no funds would be available to ATF to investigate and act upon applications by felons for relief from federal firearms disabilities. Such applications had been numerous, the subsequent investigations by ATF agents of the individuals filing them was time-consuming and costly. The Second Circuit determined that there was a “positive repugnancy” between the statute authorizing ATF review of the applications and the statute denying funds, such that it was impossible for ATF to review applications without expending funds. Id. at 57-58.4 The substantive statute involved in McHugh more closely resembles our case because it mandated more than a simple transfer of funds; that legislation created a system for ATF to conduct background investigations for applicants for relief from firearms disabilities. However, in McHugh, the investigations could only be conducted by ATF agents, and due to the volume of applications and resources needed to investigate they could not be conducted without federal funding. Unlike McHugh’s application investigations, a FOIA request involves nominal costs and may be conducted by persons not connected with the agency. Cal-Almond, Inc. v. United States Department of Agriculture, 960 F.2d 105, 108 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding no repeal by implication when Congress banned the use of federal funds to disclose USDA information). In considering an almost identical ban on funds to disclose USDA information under the FOIA, the Ninth Circuit had little trouble concluding that, so long as the party seeking the information paid the cost to photocopy the document in question, they should be allowed access. Id. 4 The Supreme Court considered a factually similar situation in United States v. Bean, 537 U.S. 71, 74-76 (2002), and quickly disposed of its finding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because, without funding, the ATF had been unable to conduct a review of the plaintiff ’s original application. 10 No. 01-2167 at 108-09. That court further noted that any remaining costs to USDA, for example to monitor the photocopying or give the photocopier directions to the right room, were de minimis. Id. at 108. We agree with the Ninth Circuit. Unlike many other statutes, the FOIA deals only peripherally with the allocation of funds—its main focus is to ensure agency information is made available to the public. Indeed, at oral argument both parties to the immediate litigation conceded that the financial cost to retrieve the data in question would not be significant. Based on the nature of the FOIA, we have little trouble concluding that there is no “irreconcilable conflict” between prohibiting the use of federal funds to process the request and granting the City access to the databases. On a final note, ATF urges us to consider the legislative history of the 2003 and 2004 appropriations measures. We find that the measures are facially unambiguous and accordingly decline to do so. Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).