Opinion ID: 2633477
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether Discovery Must Be Limited Because of the Physician-Patient Privilege

Text: John also asserts that the medical information sought by the subpoenas is protected by the physician-patient privilege but concedes, as he must, that [t]here is no privilege under this article as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the condition of the patient in a proceeding to recover damages on account of the conduct of the patient if good cause for disclosure of the communication is shown. (Evid.Code, § 999.) John contends that discovery must nonetheless be denied because a good cause showing should require at a minimum an expert declaration regarding the [plaintiff's] infection status; the probable exposure period; and a description of the plaintiff's sexual history that establishes the defendant as a probable transmitter. John cites no authority for his contention that a plaintiff must essentially eliminate other possible agents of infection before discovery may proceed. (Cf. M.M.D. v. B.L.G., supra, 467 N.W.2d at pp. 647-648 [evidence was sufficient to support liability despite inability of medical expert to determine whether plaintiff's herpes outbreak was due to a recent infection or a dormant virus].) The statutory standard is good cause, and Bridget has amply established good cause for disclosure of John's medical records concerning HIV and AIDS: she has recently been diagnosed as HIV positive; John, too, has been diagnosed as HIV positive, but his viral infection has already progressed to full-blown AIDS; during the two years preceding Bridget's diagnosis, she was dating John, engaged to him, and married to him; and the couple engaged in unprotected sex during that period. Bridget thus has offered far more than conjecture or a speculative presumption to justify the requested discovery. ( Mendez v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 557, 570-571, 253 Cal.Rptr. 731.) Moreover, John has not offered any evidence to suggest that an expert could pinpoint the time period for Bridget's exposure to the virus. We therefore find that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in overruling John's objection under the physician-patient privilege. [12]