Opinion ID: 1309317
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Improper Interpretation of Former Section 190.3, Subdivision (b)

Text: (15) The prosecution presented no evidence that defendant had engaged in any criminal activity involving force or violence other than the underlying crimes for which he had been convicted at the guilt/special-circumstance phase. During closing argument at the penalty phase, however, the prosecutor  in discussing factor (b) of the statutory list of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, i.e., the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence (former § 190.3, 5th par., subd. (b))  urged the jury to find the presence of violent criminal activity within the meaning of this factor simply on the basis of the underlying offenses in this case. The presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence. All that we have before you is the killing of Harry and Avone Margulies. What more violent use of force do you ever expect to see? That 45 minutes, ladies and gentlemen, is the true identity of Eric Kimble. Shortly thereafter, defense counsel moved for a mistrial, arguing the prosecutor had misinterpreted this provision of the statute and that factor (b) was intended to apply only to criminal activity other than the underlying offense. The court denied the motion, indicating it did not find the prosecutor's argument improper. Defendant contends the court should have made it clear to the jury that violent criminal activity referred only to criminal activity other than the crimes of which defendant was convicted in the guilt phase. As we have recently held in People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 105-106 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127] (1978 death penalty law), it is improper for a prosecutor to argue that the jury should view the guilt phase crimes as aggravating evidence under subdivision (b). A close reading of the former (1977) statute  the relevant language of which is identical to the present (1978) statute  discloses that the term criminal activity in subdivision (b) does not include the immediate circumstances for which the death penalty is being contemplated. The first paragraph of former section 190.3 states: In the proceedings on the question of penalty, evidence may be presented by both the people and the defendant as to any matter relevant to aggravation, mitigation, and sentence, including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the present offense, the presence or absence of other criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or which involved the express or implied threat to use force or violence, and the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition and physical condition. (Italics added.) Subsequent paragraphs refer to other criminal activity or prior criminal activity. Viewing the statute as a whole, we must read former section 190.3 to mean that only evidence of criminal activity other than the capital offense is relevant to subdivision (b). ( Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d at pp. 105-106.) Such a reading is consistent with the statute, which appears to distinguish between the present offense and other criminal activity, and would avoid possible constitutional problems involving artificial inflation of aggravating circumstances. We disagree, however, with defendant's suggestion that reading the instruction per se amounts to error. As we stated in Miranda, supra, 44 Cal.3d 57, we doubt a reasonable jury would double count under subdivisions (a) and (b), in the absence of misleading argument by the prosecutor inviting it to do so. On this record, however, it is apparent that the prosecutor's argument was improper. (16) Nevertheless, we conclude that any error was harmless. First, the comment was brief. Second, the comment expressly declared that only the crimes for which defendant was being tried were before the jury for its consideration, and simply referred to the crimes for emphasis; the reference could not reasonably have skewed the sentencing determination by suggesting there was other criminal activity or by inviting double counting. Third, the evidence that the prosecutor asked the jury to consider in aggravation under subdivision (b) could properly have been considered under subdivision (a). In view of the properly admitted aggravating factors presented to the jury  specifically, the evidence under factor (a) (the circumstances of the present crime and any special circumstance found true)  we find it inconceivable that the jury would have reached a different verdict in the absence of the improper argument; accordingly, there was no prejudice. For the same reasons we also reject defendant's assertion that the prosecutor's comments constituted prejudicial misconduct.