Opinion ID: 3166429
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Judgment: Hostile Work Environment

Text: We review de novo a district judge’s granting summary judgment and construe the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Baloco v. Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1246 (11th Cir. 2014). Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Scant evidence supporting the nonmoving party’s position is insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment; there must be substantial evidence produced for a jury reasonably to find in Corbett’s favor. Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1165 (11th Cir. 2009). To establish a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Corbett must show discriminatory behavior “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment.” Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 133, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2347 (2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). She must prove: (1) that [she] belongs to a protected group; (2) that [she] has been subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) that the harassment [was] based on a protected characteristic of the employee, such as national origin; (4) that the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of employment and create a discriminatorily abusive working environment; and (5) that the employer is responsible for such environment under either a theory of vicarious or of direct liability. 14 Case: 14-11049 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 15 of 20 Miller v. Kenworth of Dothan, Inc., 277 F.3d 1269, 1275 (11th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added); see Bryant v. CEO DeKalb Co. Jones, 575 F.3d 1281, 1296 n. 20 (11th Cir. 2009) (recognizing the “same standards of proof” apply in Title VII and the Equal Protection Clause, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, for discrimination claims alleging a hostile work environment). “[T]o be actionable, this behavior must result in both an environment ‘that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive’ and an environment that the victim ‘subjectively perceive[s] . . . to be abusive.’” Miller, 277 F.3d at 1276 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993)). In evaluating the objective severity of the alleged hostile work environment, we consider “(1) the frequency of the conduct; (2) the severity of the conduct; (3) whether the conduct is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and (4) whether the conduct unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance.” Mendoza v. Borden, Inc., 195 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). But Title VII is not a general civility code; “ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing” cannot form the basis of a claim for actionable harassment or hostile work environment. Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788, 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2284 (1998) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, “conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in terms and conditions 15 Case: 14-11049 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 16 of 20 of employment.” Id., 118 S. Ct. at 2284 (emphasis added). Title VII “is not a shield against harsh treatment in the workplace”; “[p]ersonal animosity is not the equivalent of [gender] discrimination.” Succar v. Dade Cnty. Sch. Bd., 229 F.3d 1343, 1345 (11th Cir. 2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Under these standards, we analyze Corbett’s allegations to determine if they rise to the level of a hostile work environment. Corbett asserts she had humiliating and derogatory remarks made to her by her male coworkers in Narcotics; she states she was called “bossy,” “bitchy,” “abrasive,” “dumb,” and a “stupid fucking bitch.” 10 These comments, however, were isolated and sporadic during the time Corbett worked in Narcotics. She does not represent, and the record does not show, that they were daily occurrences; therefore, they were not sufficiently pervasive to constitute a hostile work environment. Any discord between Corbett and the male Narcotics detectives was the result of personality conflicts, not discriminatory animus. The record also does not support her allegations of being deprived of overtime, training, or other conditions of her work. Significantly, Corbett’s employment status as a CCSO Deputy Sheriff was not affected. Viewing all Corbett’s allegations in her favor, she has failed to establish a hostile work environment under the controlling law. The district judge correctly granted 10 Corbett also alleges she was asked by Detective Nelson if she wanted to “fuck” on a table while on duty in 2008. This comment was brought to the attention of Lieutenant Abramowitz and sufficiently addressed. 16 Case: 14-11049 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 17 of 20 summary judgment to Sheriff Beseler on Corbett’s claim of hostile work environment. B. Judgment as a Matter of Law: Gender Discrimination and Retaliation The district judge granted the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of all the evidence by Sheriff Beseler’s counsel, which included Corbett’s remaining issues of gender discrimination and retaliation. We review de novo the granting of judgment as a matter of law and apply the same standards as the district judge. Collins v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 749 F.3d 951, 956-57 (11th Cir. 2014). A district judge appropriately grants judgment as a matter of law, “when the plaintiff presents no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for [her] on a material element of [her] cause of action.” Id. at 957 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We “consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and grant the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” Bogle v. Orange Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 162 F.3d 653, 656 (11th Cir. 1998). We “affirm a judgment as a matter of law only if the facts and inferences point so overwhelmingly in favor of the movant that reasonable people could not arrive at a contrary verdict.” Id. (citation, internal quotation marks, and ellipsis omitted). To establish a prima facie case of gender discrimination with circumstantial evidence, Corbett must show (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was 17 Case: 14-11049 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 18 of 20 qualified for her job; (3) she was subjected to an adverse employment action; and (4) her employer treated similarly situated employees outside her class more favorably. Maynard v. Bd. of Regents of Div. of Univs. of Fla. Dep’t of Educ., 342 F.3d 1281, 1289 (11th Cir. 2003). To prove an adverse employment action, Corbett “must show a serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of [her] employment.” Davis v. Town of Lake Park, Fla., 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2001). Corbett contends she incurred adverse employment actions when she was transferred to Pharmaceutical Investigations and was denied training and overtime opportunities. As we explained relative to the alleged hostile work environment, the record evidence shows Corbett had the same opportunities as other Narcotics detectives to sign up for overtime; she also had numerous training opportunities, including being certified to dismantle a meth lab, and a transfer without any diminution in salary and title is not an adverse employment opportunity. 11 Throughout her CCSO employment, Corbett has continued to receive the same compensation, terms, conditions, and privileges of employment as all other deputy sheriffs, commensurate with her position and level of seniority without regard to her gender. Since she has failed to meet the threshold standard for an 11 To the extent Corbett views her separation from Detective Michon as a partner and being given a new partner to be an adverse employment action, she admitted supervising officers have the authority to determine partners in the Narcotics division. 18 Case: 14-11049 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 19 of 20 adverse employment action by showing a “serious and material” change in her CCSO employment because of her gender, no jury reasonably could conclude she has proved a prima facie case of gender discrimination. The district judge properly granted Sheriff Beseler’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on Corbett’s claim of gender discrimination. To establish her claim of retaliation, Corbett must prove she “engaged in statutorily protected activity, [she] suffered a materially adverse action, and there was some causal relation between the two events.” Butler v. Ala. Dep’t of Transp., 536 F.3d 1209, 1212-13 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Corbett’s protected activity relates to her gender discrimination complaints with CCSO Human Resources and the EEOC. To the extent she contends the written counseling she received was a retaliatory adverse action, Corbett testified at trial that the counseling did not cause her to lose any pay, benefits or promotional opportunities; it did not affect her job whatsoever. Similarly, Corbett’s transfer to Patrol was not a retaliatory adverse action for engaging in protected activity. 12 Corbett was out on self-requested medical leave for surgery for six weeks prior to her transfer to Patrol. When she returned and requested a transfer, the only transfer position available was Patrol. There is no 12 The only possible loss from transferring from Narcotics was $50 pay, which was a clothing allowance to compensate Narcotics detectives for wearing and caring for their own clothes. Corbett does not complain about this pay loss. 19 Case: 14-11049 Date Filed: 12/30/2015 Page: 20 of 20 evidence in the record that her transfer to Patrol was other than voluntary. A transfer to a different position may be an adverse employment action only if it “involves a reduction in pay, prestige, or responsibility.” Hinson v. Clinch Cnty., Ga. Bd. of Educ., 231 F.3d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 2000). No jury reasonably could conclude any of these work occurrences were retaliatory. The judge correctly granted Sheriff Beseler’s motion for judgment as a matter of law concerning Corbett’s retaliation claim. AFFIRMED. 20