Opinion ID: 1166483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The .22 Caliber Gun.

Text: The trial court concluded that the statement taken from the defendant-appellee by Farmington authorities on October 9 was the result of a Miranda violation. That is, that the statement was the product of successive interrogation conducted after defendant-appellee had invoked his right to counsel. The district judge further found as fact that the discovery and seizure of the pistol was the direct result of the defendant's statement. Applying the exclusionary rule known as the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the district judge suppressed the pistol as evidence. The question of whether Miranda v. Arizona, supra , requires the exclusion of derivative evidence acquired as the result of an initial Miranda violation has not been decided by the United States Supreme Court. Annot., The Progeny of Miranda v. Arizona in Supreme Court, 46 L.Ed.2d 903, 923 (1977); Shapiro, Miranda Without Warning: Derivative Evidence as Forbidden Fruit, 41 Brooklyn L.Rev. 325, 329 (1975), citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 94 S.Ct. 2357, 41 L.Ed.2d 182 (1974). Most of the state and lower federal courts which have considered the admissibility of secondary evidence derived from Miranda violations have applied the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Shapiro, supra, 41 Brooklyn L.Rev. at p. 332. The reasoning behind this approach was succinctly stated in an early federal decision: The seizure is thus the direct result of the unlawful questioning; everything that was taken, therefore, is inadmissible at trial. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441... . United States v. Harrison, 265 F. Supp. 660 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). We agree, in principle, that courts must be willing to bar the physical fruits of inadmissible statements and confessions, as well as the confessions and statements themselves. However, because the admissibility of the .22 caliber gun turns entirely on the legality of the October 9 interrogation which led to its recovery, the trial court's suppression of the gun is reversed and remanded for reconsideration along with the statement which led to its recovery. In summary, we hold: First, that an accused person in custody, having once invoked his right to have counsel present after being advised of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, supra , may subsequently change his mind, waive his right to have counsel present, and give statements admissible in evidence at a subsequent trial; Second, that such an accused person having once invoked his right to have counsel present, the State bears a heavy burden in demonstrating that a subsequent waiver of that right was knowing and voluntary; Third, that the district judge misapprehended the rule of law to be applied where successive police interrogations follow an accused person's initial invocation of his right to counsel and that, therefore, the district judge's order suppressing the defendant-appellee's statements of September 30, October 4 and October 9 is reversed and remanded for application to the facts of the rule of law as announced in this opinion; Fourth, that the admission into evidence of spontaneous and voluntary statements, not given in response to police questioning, is not prohibited by the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution and, therefore, that the order of the district judge suppressing the defendant-appellee's statement of October 3 is reversed. IT IS SO ORDERED. EASLEY and PAYNE, JJ., concur.