Opinion ID: 169086
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction—Standing and Mootness

Text: 33 To pursue a case in federal court, a plaintiff must satisfy the twin requirements of standing and mootness. Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727, 731 (10th Cir.2006). Without a live, concrete controversy, we lack jurisdiction to consider claims no matter how meritorious. Because we conclude Mink faces no credible threat of prosecution under the criminal libel statute, he lacks standing to pursue his claims for prospective relief. 4 For the same reasons, we also conclude his claim is moot. Therefore, we cannot reach the merits of his constitutional challenge to the statute. 34 a. Standing. To establish standing, Mink must show (1) he has suffered an injury in fact, (2) traceable to the defendants, (3) that can be redressed by a favorable decision of this Court. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992); see also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11, 124 S.Ct. 2301, 159 L.Ed.2d 98 (2004). A plaintiff's injury must be actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130. 35 In freedom of expression cases, injury in fact can be shown by alleging (1) an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest, but proscribed by statute, and (2) a credible threat of future prosecution. Ward v. Utah, 321 F.3d 1263, 1267 (10th Cir.2003). Allegations of possible future injury do not satisfy the injury in fact requirement, though a plaintiff need not expose himself to actual arrest or prosecution to be entitled to challenge a statute that he claims deters the exercise of his constitutional rights. Initiative & Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d at 1087-88 (internal quotations omitted). But the mere presence on the statute books of an unconstitutional statute, in the absence of enforcement or credible threat of enforcement, does not entitle anyone to sue, even if they allege an inhibiting effect on constitutionally protected conduct prohibited by the statute. Winsness, 433 F.3d at 732. 36 To satisfy the injury in fact requirement, the plaintiff must demonstrate that expressive activities will be inhibited by an objectively justified fear of real consequences, which can be satisfied by showing a credible threat of prosecution or other consequences following from the statute's enforcement. Id. While past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury, O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974), they do not confer standing to pursue prospective relief without some credible threat of future injury. See Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). [A]ssurances from prosecutors that they do not intend to bring charges are sufficient to defeat standing, even when the individual plaintiff had actually been charged or directly threatened with prosecution for the same conduct in the past. Winsness, 433 F.3d at 731 (quoting D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir.2004)). 37 But standing is determined at the time the action is brought, Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), 528 U.S. 167, 180, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000), and we generally look to when the complaint was first filed, not to subsequent events. Nova Health Sys. v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th Cir.2005) (internal citations omitted). In this case, however, the standing inquiry is complicated by the unique timeline of events. Mink's original and amended complaint both allege that as of January 8, 2004, Mink face[d] an imminent threat of being charged with a violation of Colorado's Criminal Libel Statute. Aplt.App. at 77. Before answering the complaint, the district attorney's office concluded it could not prosecute the case and issued a No File decision on January 20, 2004. Mink filed an amended complaint on February 19, 2004. Although an investigation was pending at the time the complaint was filed, the threat of prosecution was still speculative at that time. Moreover, by the time he filed the amended complaint, even the investigation had entirely dissipated. We look to the amended complaint in assessing a plaintiff's claims, including the allegations in support of standing. And since an amended complaint supercedes an original complaint and renders the original complaint without legal effect, In re Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 209 F.3d 1064, 1067 (8th Cir.2000); 3 Moore's Federal Practice, § 15.17[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed.), the justiciability of Mink's constitutional claim is further cast in doubt. 38 Given this procedural posture, our cases suggest several outcomes: 39 (1) In Faustin v. City & County of Denver, 268 F.3d 942 (10th Cir.2001), we held the disavowal of an intent to prosecute under a statute prior to the filing of a complaint defeated standing. 40 (2) In D.L.S. v. Utah, 374 F.3d 971 (10th Cir.2004), we held the disavowal of an intent to enforce a criminal sodomy statute against the plaintiff after the complaint was filed, even if it might be enforced against another class of persons, was enough to defeat standing. 5 41 (3) Finally, in Winsness v. Yocom, 433 F.3d 727 (10th Cir.2006), we found lack of standing in two situations where the plaintiff sought prospective relief from prosecution under a statute: (a) where the plaintiff received assurances from the District Attorney that the flag-abuse statute [would] not be enforced against him though the assurances came after [the plaintiff] filed his lawsuit, id. at 733; and (b) where the plaintiff was already cited for flag-abuse, but the prosecutor quickly dropped the charges and disavowed an intent to prosecute before the plaintiff filed his suit. 42 Each of these cases concluded the plaintiff lacked standing because he could not establish a credible fear of prosecution under the challenged statute. Mink's facts differ only slightly from these precedents. Uniquely, the disavowal of prosecution in this case came between the time the lawsuit was filed and the filing of the amended complaint. At the time the original complaint was filed, moreover, police had conducted a search of Mink's residence, seized his computer and papers, and were retaining them pending further investigation. Attempts by Mink's counsel to dissuade the district attorney from charging him had yet to bear fruit. Thus, when he brought the suit Mink appeared to have a legitimate basis for alleging a credible fear of future prosecution. 43 Nonetheless, we conclude Mink lacks standing under our case law. First, based on his review of controlling Supreme Court precedents, the district attorney disclaimed an intent to prosecute immediately after the lawsuit was filed. In both D.L.S. and Winsness, the prosecutor's quick disavowal of an intent to prosecute demonstrated a lack of injury in fact. 6 No charges were ever filed against Mink and the district attorney publicly announced he would not prosecute well before his office filed an answer or motion to dismiss. Where a plaintiff only seeks prospective relief, standing is defeated when there is evidence the government will not enforce the challenged statute against the plaintiff. See, e.g., Harmon v. City of Kansas City, 197 F.3d 321, 327(8th Cir.1999) (plaintiffs lost standing to seek an injunction when city conceded all of their activities were constitutionally protected and were not prohibited by the ordinance). 44 Second, it is significant Mink filed an amended complaint after the district attorney disclosed his intent not to prosecute. The sequence of events confirms Mink had no injury in fact for prospective relief when he filed his amended complaint. 7 Any threat against Mink at that time was hypothetical, not actual and imminent. 45 Finally, although the No File letter conceivably might not bind other district attorneys, we have held the possibility of future enforcement need not be reduced to zero to defeat standing. Winsness, 433 F.3d at 733. It is not necessary for defendants [] to refute and eliminate all possible risk that the statute might be enforced to demonstrate a lack of a case or controversy. Id. Since this case commenced, moreover, the office of both the Attorney General and the District Attorney has changed hands with no change in the government's position that the statute will not be enforced against Mink. 8 46 Mink, however, suggests the district attorney fumbled away its disavowal by admitting in the answer to the amended complaint that Mink faced an imminent threat of prosecution. In the context of the procedural posture of this case and especially in light of the district attorney's No File letter, this oversight is of no significance. It is obvious no charges against Mink would be pursued, and, as we have explained, [n]othing in our case law prevents government actors from responsibly retreating from an ill-advised prosecution, in response to controlling Supreme Court authority. Winsness, 433 F.3d at 736. 47 The government should be encouraged, not dissuaded, from assuring citizens that it will not pursue prosecutions based on statutes that cannot be constitutionally enforced. Given the realities of a public law office, it is not surprising the ultimate legal conclusion here—the case could not be prosecuted—would be made at the highest policy levels. By jumping the gun and filing a complaint for prospective relief, a plaintiff cannot retain standing where the prosecutor immediately concludes the statute cannot be constitutionally enforced. 48 Based on the representations of the public officials charged with enforcing the statute against Mink, we agree with the district court that no credible threat of prosecution existed when Mink filed his amended complaint. Thus, he lacks standing to seek prospective relief. 49 b. Mootness. Even if we were to assume a credible threat of prosecution existed before the lawsuit was filed, we also conclude Mink's claim for prospective relief is moot. [I]t is not enough that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or when review was obtained, a live controversy must remain throughout the litigation. Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477-78, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400 (1990). Article III of the Constitution limits us to live controversies that exist at all stages of litigation, including appellate review. Moongate Water Co. v. Dona Ana Mut. Domestic Water Consumers Ass'n, 420 F.3d 1082, 1088 (10th Cir.2005). When intervening acts destroy a party's legally cognizable interest in the lawsuit, the federal courts are deprived of jurisdiction. Id. 50 Merely stopping the complained of conduct ordinarily is not enough, however, to establish mootness. For good reason, courts are reluctant to deem a controversy moot based merely on assurances from the defendants that they will not engage in unlawful activity again. Winsness, 433 F.3d at 736 (citing United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) ([V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, [in part because] . . . [t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways.)). Instead, a defendant must show no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at 633, 73 S.Ct. 894 (internal citations and quotations omitted). But in many circumstances it is obvious previously threatened conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur. See, e.g., Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir.2004) (finding a controversy moot because a city had provided documents demonstrating it had changed its practices to comply with federal law and because [n]othing in the record suggests [the defendant] intends to resume its discontinued policies . . . .). 51 We recently discussed mootness in a First Amendment declaratory judgment case challenging Utah's flag desecration statute. Winsness, 433 F.3d 727. In Winsness, a Salt Lake City resident burned a symbol onto a United States flag and hung the flag on his garage. A neighbor reported the incident to police, and Winsness was cited for flag-abuse. The flag was confiscated as evidence. After the citation was filed, prosecutors concluded the ordinance could not be constitutionally enforced against Winsness and immediately scuttled the case. The district attorney filed an affidavit with the court assuring it that charges would not be pursued. Based on that record, we concluded that [e]ven if we assume that a credible threat of prosecution existed before this lawsuit was filed, the prosecutors' affidavits have rendered the controversy moot. Winsness, 433 F.3d at 736. The government had foresworn any intention to bring criminal charges against individuals who alter the flag for expressive purposes and had categorically announc[ed] the office would bring no prosecutions under the statute. Id. at 736. We found these assurances established mootness since the government (1) had quickly repudiated the action initially taken against Winsness, (2) its statements were made in sworn affidavits, and (3) it based its decision on controlling Supreme Court precedent, making future prosecutions unlikely. 52 These factors similarly cut against Mink. First, no citation or formal charges were ever brought against Mink. And prior to the filing of charges the district attorney preemptively issued a legal opinion that precluded prosecution. His opinion letter explained the statute could not be constitutionally applied to the conduct attributed to Mink, and, accordingly, charges would not be filed in this matter. 53 Second, although the No File decision was not in the form of an affidavit, the district attorney took an unequivocal position (1) advising Mink in writing, and (2) advising the court that Mink would not be prosecuted under the statute now or in the future. We find persuasive, as did the district court, the district attorney's repudiation of an intent to prosecute, and its representation of the same to us on appeal. 54 Finally, the parties concede on appeal that Supreme Court precedent makes enforcement of the Colorado criminal libel statute unconstitutional under the facts as alleged here. The parties have conceded Professor Peake is a public figure, and well established case law requires falsity and actual malice to prove libel. Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 94 S.Ct. 2997. Moreover, the Colorado Supreme Court has interpreted that statute to embody these standards. People v. Ryan, 806 P.2d 935 (Colo.1991). Accordingly, the district attorney recognized the force of these precedents and his No File decision supports our conclusion that the third Winsness factor has been met in this case. 55 Despite these assurances, Mink contends the district attorney's disavowal is limited to the specific statements made in the first three issues of The Howling Pig and does not apply more broadly to the type of statements that sparked this controversy or to those statements which might appear in future editions of the publication. In short, he claims that without a ruling that the Colorado criminal libel law is unconstitutional, he may be subject to prosecution in the future. We find this argument unpersuasive. The analysis provided by the attorney general and district attorney demonstrate their legal reasons for not enforcing the statute in this case would carry over to further statements of the type Mink has subsequently made or intends to make. Although the district attorney's No File decision was based upon the pending investigation, we see no reason his analysis would not apply to subsequent statements that are legally indistinguishable. 56 In short, we see no credible threat of prosecution against Mink. The district attorney did what one would hope from a public official: he responsibly retreat[ed] from an ill-advised prosecution, in response to controlling Supreme Court authority. Winsness, 433 F.3d at 736. Because standing and mootness are jurisdictional and non-waivable, Moongate Water Co., 420 F.3d at 1088, we need not consider the merits of Mink's First Amendment challenge to the Colorado criminal libel statute in this case. 57