Opinion ID: 1816238
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Error during trial.

Text: During the cross-examination of the complaining witness, the following occurred: Q. Say, you have got a history of having epileptic fits? A. Yes, sir. [District Attorney]: I object, it is irrelevant. Q. No, it isn't. [District Attorney]: How is it relevant? Q. Have you ever been committed because of that? [District Attorney]: Objection, irrelevant. The Court: Objection sustained. Q. Are you sure that you were in good shape that night so that you can remember all these things? A. Yes, sir. Witnesses may be questioned regarding their mental or physical condition where such matters have bearing on their credibility. As a general rule, anything having a legitimate tendency to throw light on the accuracy, truthfulness, and sincerity of a witness may be shown and considered in determining the credit to be accorded his testimony. 98 C. J. S., Witnesses, p. 323, sec. 460. A witness may be cross-examined to test his intelligence, this rule applying although the court has held him competent to testify; and, as bearing on the question of the credibility of his testimony, he may be crossexamined as to his mental condition at the time of testifying, or at the time to which his testimony referred, his physical condition at that time, and his mental attitude toward the case. 98 C. J. S., Witnesses, p. 381, sec. 486. However, at the time of the objection the defendant did not state he was attacking the witness' credibility, nor did he attempt to show how an epileptic condition could affect the credibility of the witness.  The mental capacity of a witness is proper to be considered as bearing on his credibility. Thus the impaired condition of the mind either from a temporary cause, . . . or other infirmities, is deemed a proper subject of inquiry for the consideration of the jury in determining the credibility of a witness. So it may be shown that the witness has a mind or memory impaired from disease or other cause; but mere mental impairment, without more, is not sufficient to affect credibility, . . . Moreover, evidence that a witness was subject to epilepsy does not warrant disregarding his testimony in the absence of a showing as to what effect epilepsy has on the memory. 98 C. J. S., Witnesses, pp. 326, 327, sec. 461. The trial court later gave the defendant an opportunity to make an offer of proof; however, the defendant failed to do so. In State v. Moffett (1970), 46 Wis. 2d 164, 168, 169, 174 N. W. 2d 263, this court stated that where counsel fails to state the purpose for which excluded testimony was elicited and fails to make an offer of proof, a claim of error by the trial court in excluding testimony is without merit: In discussing the necessity of an offer of proof following the alleged erroneous exclusion of evidence in civil cases, this court has said: `. . . An offer of proof must be made as a necessary condition precedent to our review of any alleged error in the exclusion of evidence. Without such offer of proof there is no way for this court to know whether the exclusion of evidence was prejudicial.' The same reasoning applies with equal force to criminal trials. In State v. Klein, this court held that where the defense counsel failed to state the purpose of the interrogation objected to, the trial court could properly sustain the objections. Similarly, here, the defense counsel failed to state the purpose of the interrogation which was objected to. Without such an explanation it lay within the discretion of the trial court to conclude that the information sought was irrelevant to the issues of the case.  We find no error was committed in sustaining the objections to the questions propounded to the witness. In the second trial, there was a conflict of testimony concerning the time of night at which the alleged crime occurred. Before finding the defendant guilty, the trial judge referred to a statement by a police officer concerning the time at which the alleged offense occurred and which was not in evidence. However, the trial court found the time element to be immaterial, and we agree that it was. Thus, even if the trial judge did consider the statement evidence, it does not appear that he relied on the officer's statement in finding the defendant guilty. This court has held that in a trial to the court without a jury, the admission of improper evidence is harmless error unless the court's finding would have been different had the evidence not been admitted. . . . While evidence that is not admissible in a jury trial is equally inadmissible in a trial to the court, yet this court views the situation as distinct. We have previously stated: `In a case tried by the court the admission of improper evidence is to be regarded on appeal as having been harmless, unless it clearly appears that but therefor the finding would probably have been different.' Birmingham v. State (1938), 228 Wis. 448, 454, 279 N. W. 15, quoting from Topolewski v. State (1906), 130 Wis. 244, 109 N. W. 1037. Gauthier v. State (1965), 28 Wis. 2d 412, 421, 137 N. W. 2d 101. By the Court. Judgment and order affirmed.