Opinion ID: 320436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prejudice-- adequacy of the cross-examination

Text: 83 Is there any demonstrable prejudice to appellant from the introduction of Miss Brown's preliminary hearing testimony? The majority opinion states: 84 Preliminary hearing testimony is hearsay, McCormick on Evidence 225, and hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible because it is less reliable than nonhearsay testimony: it may not have been offered under oath; there may have been no opportunity for cross-examination; and the jury is given no opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness. Id. 224. Majority Op. at 1022, supra. The dangers of hearsay testimony are largely obviated in this case. One must strain the term to characterize Miss Brown's prior testimony as being more unreliable than the testimony she would have given at trial. There is no showing to this effect. If the procedural ground of unavailability is satisfied, her testimony is within the recognized exception to the hearsay rule and is properly admissible as substantive evidence. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 165-168, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970). The testimony was given in open court before the magistrate. The defendant was present. The testimony was also given under oath and the greater part of its content was evoked on cross-examination by the counsel for the accused (Tr. 491-520). Thus, the only objection of the majority that was not satisfied is the fact that the jury lacked the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness. Demeanor under such circumstances, however, is not considered to be of controlling significance since the law does permit the introduction of prior testimony from preliminary hearings and depositions as substantive evidence. 85 Professor Wigmore answers the demeanor argument made by the majority opinion as follows: 86 Nevertheless, the secondary advantage, incidentally obtained for the tribunal by the witness' presence before it-- the demeanor-evidence-- is an advantage to be insisted upon whenever it can be had. No one has doubted that it is highly desirable, if only it is available. But it is merely desirable. Where it cannot be obtained, the requirement ceases. It is no essential part of the notion of confrontation; it stands on no better footing than other evidence to which special value is attached; and just as the original of a document . . . or a preferred witness . . . may be dispensed with in case of unavailability, so demeanor-evidence may be dispensed with, in necessity. Accordingly, supposing that the indispensable requirement of cross-examination has been satisfied, the only remaining inquiry is whether the demeanor-evidence, to be obtained by the witness' production before the tribunal, is available. 87 V Wigmore, Evidence 1396 (3d ed. 1940). The points made by Wigmore are completely destructive of the position of the majority. Moreover, the magistrate here did have an opportunity to pass upon the demeanor of the witness and the action he took indicated that he credited her testimony. 88 The majority opinion argues further: But a preliminary hearing is less likely to produce extensive cross-examination and impeachment of witnesses than a trial because of the different functions respectively of the trial, designed to determine guilt or innocence, and the preliminary hearing, designed to determine only the existence vel non of probable cause to hold an accused to answer to the grand jury. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S.Ct. 1318, 20 L.Ed.2d 255 (1968). 89 Majority Op. at 1023, supra. This argument might have some application in some cases but has none here because the defendant did 'produce extensive cross-examination.' The argument is also exploded by California v. Green, supra, and according to Professor McCormick is otherwise largely discredited: 90 In many of the cases the former testimony was given at a preliminary hearing, and an argument can be made that strategy often dictates little or no cross-examination at that stage, since ample opportunity will be afforded at trial. However, the argument has not been received favorably by the courts. 91 McCormick, Evidence, 255 (2d ed. 1972). Moreover, as McCormick states: 92 Actual cross-examination, of course, is not essential, if the opportunity was afforded and waived. 93 Id. A review of the cross examination of the witness at the preliminary hearing reveals that it was in fact extensive and adequate (Tr. 491-520). 94 The majority, in discussing the absence or inadequacy of cross-examination, touches upon a point that would have merit if there were some deficiency in this respect, but, since defendant's counsel here had free rein on cross- examination and he examined on all the points that he here states are material, when he raises this point it resolves into a straw argument. Miss Brown was thoroughly cross-examined by defendant's counsel at the preliminary hearing upon all the precise points that appellant here alleges to be material (Tr. 491-520). Notwithstanding this, counsel for defendant at trial claimed that the cross-examination had not been adequate; and he now again bases his claim of inadequacy upon the same ground, i.e., that defendant's counsel at the preliminary hearing had not asked the 95 main question which should be put to Laverne Brown, should she testify, and that is where exactly she was standing when she saw all of this (Tr. 471) . . . 'Where were you standing at the moment the shots were fired?' (Tr. 472). 96 Whoever makes this point could not have read the cross-examination of Laverne Brown at the preliminary hearing. This appears at Tr. 491-520 and it should be read. In the preliminary hearing testimony Miss Brown's location in relation to the church was precisely stated and thus the trial court correctly rejected the defendant's objection with the pertinent observation, 'Well, the church doesn't move' (Tr. 472). 14 Moreover, at the preliminary hearing defendant's counsel on cross-examination of Miss Brown, by actual count asked over 22 questions directed to where she was standing when she saw the murder (Tr. 493, 494, 495, 496, 502, 503, 504, 505, 509, 512, 513, 517). These citations are dispositive of any claim of prejudice and it is significant that the majority opinion makes no effort to meet them. So it must be admitted that the testimony at the preliminar hearing did adequately cover all the questions and issues that appellant's counsel at trial and on this appeal claimed had not been covered. Interrogation of Miss Brown on these points by appellant's own counsel was extensive and complete. It was also conducted without any interruption or objection whatsoever (Tr. 491-520). In addition, the location of Miss Brown at the time she observed the murder was also determinable from a diagram introduced into evidence at the trial (Tr. 347) and from the testimony at trial of her boy friend (Crowder) who was with her all the significant times (Tr. 318, 321, 323, 324, 326, 329, 337, 347, 348, 349, 497, 503) and who was cross-examined at trial (Tr. 342-51). His testimony corroborated the prior preliminary hearing testimony of Miss Brown. So the record reveals that cross-examination was adequate on all points. 97