Opinion ID: 767955
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Issue of Remedy

Text: 114 Finally, although my principal disagreement with the majority is over the Vienna Convention and the Bilateral Treaty's creation of individual rights, I must also take issue with their treatment of the question of remedy. 11 The majority holds that even if appellants have rights under Articles 36 and 35, they are not entitled to suppression of the wrongfully obtained evidence (or dismissal of the indictment) when the government violates those rights. 12 I would first say that whenever a court of the United States takes such a position, there is an inevitable erosion of the Judiciary as an institution. It is difficult to harmonize the principle of the rule of law with the granting of governmental immunity from the consequences of its violations of the Law. 115 The majority's no remedy rationale is based entirely on the conclusory assertion that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention, and the complementary Article 35 of the Bilateral Convention, do not create--explicitly or otherwise--fundamental rights on par with the rights to be free from unreasonable searches, the privileges against self-incrimination, or the right to counsel. I disagree with that conclusion, and I believe that the issue at least deserves a more thorough examination than the cursory treatment afforded it by the majority. 116 As the majority notes, the exclusionary rule has been reserved for violations of fundamental rights such as those protected by the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. What the majority does not discuss, however, is what makes these rights fundamental. In my view, we consider these rights fundamental not merely because they appear (along with others) in the Constitution, but because they are essential to the fair and efficient administration of our justice system. 117 Underlying the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for instance, is the recognition that the ordinary criminal defendant is unqualified and ill-prepared to navigate the intricacies of our legal system without assistance. As the Supreme Court stated eloquently in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68-69 (1932): 118 Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. 119 Quoted in Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). The Court has also recognized a right to counsel at the investigatory stage of criminal proceedings, based on the Fifth Amendment's protection against compelled self-incrimination. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 470 (1966) (noting that presence of counsel at interrogations can mitigate dangers of untrustworthiness and help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution at trial). 120 In my view, the right to consular notification and access responds to the same basic concerns for fairness and efficient administration of justice as does the right to counsel. The appellants in this case, for example, were detained by the United States half a world away from their homes. They spoke no English. They had no relatives or friends in the United States or any of the places where they were detained by U.S. authorities before being brought here. None had ever been to the United States before, and we must assume that none had any understanding of the American legal system. They very likely did not know that they had a right not to incriminate themselves and a right to be represented by counsel, nor even that they had a right to trial by jury. 13 In these unfamiliar circumstances, appellants were detained for nearly fifty days without counsel while they were shipped literally around the world, from Bermuda in the Atlantic, to Guantanamo in the Caribbean, to Wake Island and Hawaii in the Pacific, and finally to Boston. 121 It seems to me, under these circumstances, that consular notification and access are absolutely essential to the fair administration of our criminal justice system. Just as a lawyer guides a criminal defendant through the unknown territory of the justice system, diplomatic officials are often the only familiar face for detained nationals, and the best stewards to help them through the ordeal of criminal prosecution. A consular official offers two things of utmost importance to detained nationals: (1) the familiar background, language, and culture of the alien's homeland, and (2) a familiarity with the criminal system threatening to take away the alien's liberty. Without these aids, I think that we presume too much to think that an alien can present his defense with even a minimum of effectiveness. The result is injury not only to the individual alien, but also to the equity and efficacy of our criminal justice system. 122 Because I think the rights to consular notification and access incorporated into domestic law by the Senate's ratification of the Vienna Convention and the Bilateral Convention are fundamental to the fair and efficient administration of our justice system, I would hold that the exclusionary rule may be an appropriate remedy, at least where the defendant alien can demonstrate prejudice from the violation of his treaty rights. 14