Opinion ID: 197864
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Basement

Text: It is now beyond cavil in this circuit that a tenant lacks a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of an apartment building. See United States v. Cruz Pagn, 537 F.2d 554, 557-58 (1st Cir. 1976). The unenclosed areas of the basement of this apartment building were such common areas. See id.Appellant thus had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the basement common area. See United States v. Thornley, 707 F.2d 622, 625 (1st Cir. 1983). Once legally inside this area, the police had a right to perceive whatever was available to them through the use of their senses, including their common sense. Cf. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925) (probable cause is a flexible common sense standard). This exercise revealed, (1) that all the lockers were numbered, except two; (2) that one of the two numbers missing corresponded to Appellant's apartment number; (3) that the keys legally obtained in Appellant's apartment fitted one of the unnumbered lockers, and thus that area was most likely subject to his control; and (4) that the boxes that could be observed through the chicken wire most likely belonged to Appellant and could contain additional evidence relevant to the subject of the criminal investigation. Proceeding with this information to seek a search warrant to inquire into the contents of the boxes was exactly what was appropriate under the circumstances of this case. The evidence uncovered as a result of this procedure was thus legally admissible against Appellant. II. Appellant's Attempted Withdrawal of Conditional Plea Four criteria have been established as determinative in considering motions to withdraw guilty pleas: (1) the plausibility of the reasons prompting the requested change of plea; (2) the existence or not of an assertion of innocence; (3) the timing of the motion; and (4) whether, when viewed in the light of emergent circumstances, the plea was knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, within what is mandated by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. United States v. Muriel, 111 F.3d 975, 977 (1st Cir. 1997). Appellant does not claim any defect in the Rule 11 proceeding.The colloquy shows that there was none. Appellant was thoroughly questioned by the trial judge without any coercion being apparent from the record or being claimed thereafter. It further shows that he clearly understood the charges against him, that he voluntarily and intelligently admitted his guilt and the facts sufficient to support these charges, and that he understood the consequences of these actions. Against this scenario, we have Appellant's claim, made 16 months after he entered his plea and 9 months after he was sentenced, that he was unaware of the firearms contained in one of the boxes found in the basement, which according to this latest version, were brought into his house by his former wife in 1993, and then stored in the basement. To this, Appellant adds the insinuation that the firearms were planted in these boxes by his former wife's police officer boyfriend. Fortunately, although perhaps less so for Appellant, we need not enter this potential morass. Appellant seems to overlook that he was charged and convicted under Count Two of the indictment for being a felon in possession of ammunition, in itself a violation of 922(g), independent of the charges contained in Count One.None of his contentions affect his conviction on the second count, because that count stemmed from the evidence seized in Appellant's apartment, and was not based upon evidence taken from his storage locker. Appellant's conviction on Count Two alone would have been sufficient to support the sentence he received.For this reason, all of the arguments raised as to Count One are, in fact, irrelevant. The district court did not exceed its discretion in denying Appellant's request to withdraw his conditional guilty plea.