Opinion ID: 164589
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pretermination Procedural Due Process

Text: 33 Mr. Montgomery alleges that he possessed a constitutionally-protected property interest in his employment and that he received an inadequate level of due process before the City discharged him. The district court rejected this claim, reasoning that Mr. Montgomery received [constitutionally adequate] pre-termination due process through his conversations with [Deputy Chief] Beene and [Chief] Garrett wherein [he] was informed of his effective termination. Aplt's App. vol. II, at 422. Although it concedes that Mr. Montgomery had a protected property interest in his employment, the City urges us to adopt the district court's position that he received adequate pretermination process. In addition to Mr. Montgomery's conversations with Deputy Chief Beene and Chief Garrett on August 24, 1998, the City relies upon Mr. Montgomery's failure to seek a post-termination hearing pursuant to the grievance procedures set forth in the CBA. 34 In order to prevail on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that the defendants acted under color of state law and that the defendants' actions deprived the plaintiff of some federal right. See Sutton, 173 F.3d at 1237. To assess whether an individual was denied procedural due process, courts must engage in a two-step inquiry: (1) did the individual possess a protected interest such that the due process protections were applicable; and, if so, then (2) was the individual afforded an appropriate level of process. Watson v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 75 F.3d 569, 577 (10th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). 35 Here, there is no dispute that the City acted under color of state law and that Mr. Montgomery possessed a protected property interest in his employment. Mr. Montgomery's pretermination procedural due process claim thus turns on the appropriate level of process to which he was entitled. 36 As a general rule, the Due Process Clause requires some kind of a hearing prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted). The purpose of the pretermination hearing is to serve as a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the charges against the employee are true and support the proposed action. Id. at 545-46, 105 S.Ct. 1487. Thus, [t]he pretermination `hearing,' though necessary, need not be elaborate. Id. at 545, 105 S.Ct. 1487. 37 In particular, a pretermination hearing requires: (1) oral or written notice [to the employee] of the charges against him; (2) an explanation of the employer's evidence and [3] an opportunity [for the employee] to present his side of the story. Id. at 546, 105 S.Ct. 1487; see also Langley v. Adams County, 987 F.2d 1473, 1480 (10th Cir.1993) (Due process requires that plaintiff have had an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner before termination.... `This requirement includes three elements: 1) an impartial tribunal; 2) notice of charges given a reasonable time before the hearing; and 3) a pretermination hearing, except in emergency situations.') (quoting Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir.1992)). 38 In the instant case, the record here does not establish that Mr. Montgomery's August 24, 1998 telephone conversations with Deputy Chief Beene and Chief Garrett provided him with an adequate pretermination hearing under Loudermill. Viewed in the light most favorable to Mr. Montgomery, the evidence before us indicates that Mr. Montgomery had already been terminated when he talked to Deputy Chief Beene and Chief Garrett on that day. In particular, when asked by Mr. Montgomery about the status of his job, Deputy Chief Beene told him that they're not going to let you come back. Aple's Supp.App. at 157. Chief Garrett stated that Mr. Montgomery's rank had been done away with and that he was not going to be able to return to work. Id. at 158. 39 The written notice of Mr. Montgomery's termination provides further support for this view. As we have noted, the written notice is dated September 28, 1998, but describes the effective date of termination as August 15, 1998. Moreover, in its summary judgment brief, the City itself contends that  on August 15, 1998[Mr]. Montgomery was terminated from his employment.  Aplt's App. vol. II, at 435 (emphasis added). 40 In rejecting Mr. Montgomery's pretermination due process claim, the district court appears not to have fully considered the timing of the required hearing. The court stated that Mr. Montgomery received pre-termination due process through his conversations with [Deputy Chief] Beene and [Chief Garrett] wherein [Mr. Montgomery] was informed of his effective termination.  Id. at 422 (emphasis added). The court then cited Loudermill for the proposition that [a] terminated employee with a protected interest must receive notice of an adverse employment action taken against him. Id. However, Loudermill requires the employer to provide — before the termination — notice of the charges, a summary of the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to respond. See Hulen v. Yates, 322 F.3d 1229, 1247 (10th Cir.2003) (stating that, in Loudermill, the Court held that constitutional due process required the school board to provide a hearing before terminating a tenured school employee ) (emphasis added); Powell v. Mikulecky, 891 F.2d 1454, 1458 (10th Cir.1989) ([T]he Loudermill Court held that a `hearing' was necessary prior to termination of a public employee.) (emphasis added). 41 Moreover, there is no indication in the record that the conversations with Deputy Chief Beene and Chief Garrett satisfied the other requirements of pretermination hearings. Apparently Mr. Montgomery did not receive either a summary of the City's reasons for terminating his employment or an opportunity to respond to the City's charges. 42 Finally, even though, under the CBA there were post-termination grievance proceedings available to Mr. Montgomery, we are not convinced by the City's argument that `[Mr. Montgomery's] decision to forego [post-termination remedies] does not require that the federal court provide an alternative remedy.' City's Response Br. at 14 (quoting Tasny v. Mondragon, No. 94-2152, 1995 WL 216926, at  (10th Cir. Apr.12, 1995) (unpublished disposition)). 2 Post-termination remedies, no matter how elaborate, do not relieve the employer of providing the minimal pre-termination procedural protections noted in Loudermill. See West v. Grand County, 967 F.2d 362, 368 (10th Cir.1992) (A brief face-to-face meeting with a supervisor provides sufficient notice and opportunity to respond to satisfy the pretermination due process requirements of Loudermill. ); Seibert v. State of Okla., ex rel. Univ. of Okla. Health Scis. Ctr., 867 F.2d 591, 596 (10th Cir.1989) (noting that the plaintiff did not waive his right to a pre-termination hearing by failing to pursue post-termination remedies). 43 We therefore conclude that the City is not entitled to summary judgment on Mr. Montgomery's pretermination due process claim and that the claim must be remanded to the district court for further proceedings. Because a remand is required, we note briefly the type of damages generally available for a violation of procedural due process. 44 Generally, damages for procedural due process violations may include damages arising out of the termination of employment if there is a causal connection between the termination and the failure to provide a hearing. Alston v. King, 231 F.3d 383, 386 (7th Cir.2000) (explaining Carey v. Piphus 435 U.S. 247, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)). However, if the employer can establish that the employee would have been terminated even if a proper hearing had been given, the terminated employee cannot receive damages stemming from the termination in an action for a procedural due process violation. Id.; see McClure v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 228 F.3d 1205, 1213 (10th Cir.2000) (The [defendant] must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would have reached the same termination decision in any event. Unless the defendant carries that burden, the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages for the injury caused by the defendant's adverse action.); Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1209 (10th Cir.1998) (plaintiff entitled to compensatory damages for adverse action when defendant failed to establish adverse action would have occurred even if due process had been provided). However, even if an employer satisfies this burden, the employee may still obtain damages for emotional distress attributable to the deficiencies in procedure if the employee can convince the trier of fact that the distress is attributable to the denial of procedural due process itself rather than to the justified termination. Alston, 231 F.3d at 386. 45 From this record, it appears that there is evidence that the City would have terminated Mr. Montgomery's employment even if it had provided him with the required pretermination hearing. However, we leave the resolution of that and other questions related to Mr. Montgomery's pretermination due process claim to the district court. 46