Opinion ID: 589634
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Execution of the Basin F IRA.

Text: 33 Applying the discretionary function analysis to the Army's activities at Basin F, Plaintiffs contend that the Army violated several specific and mandatory statutory and regulatory provisions, and, in the alternative, that its actions were not policy based and therefore should not be shielded by the discretionary function exception. Plaintiffs' on appeal have thoroughly briefed arguments in an attempt to demonstrate how specific Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) provisions, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6901 et seq., and various air pollution provisions were applicable to the IRA and how the Army failed to comply. 9 In response, the Government relies primarily on a waiver theory, arguing that we should not address these arguments regarding violations of specific and mandatory directives because Plaintiffs did not raise them in the district court. The Government also disputes Plaintiffs' policy arguments. 34 Our review of the record confirms the Government's assertion. The complaint contains no reference to the violations now alleged, and none was raised specifically and developed in response to the Government's motion to dismiss. Rather than discussing RCRA, to which the bulk of their appellate briefs is dedicated, Plaintiffs argued below that CERCLA required that the Basin F IRA be conducted in a manner which would protect human health and that the Government's discretion was restricted at every turn by a myriad of statutes, regulations, policies, guidelines and standards that were imposed by the federal government and by agreements among the principal actions. Applt. app. at 184 (Plaintiffs' response to Government's motion to dismiss). Plaintiffs attached thick documents to their response in an attempt to provide a paper trail for the court, but they made no specific arguments, leaving it to the court to divine which of the myriad regulations were violated and how such violations related to the allegations in the complaint. Faced with a ream of material and a total lack of guidance from Plaintiffs, the district court sought assistance at oral argument, repeatedly asking Plaintiffs' counsel to apply the discretionary function exception analysis by referencing and arguing specific violations so that the record could be further developed. See applt. brief, attachment at 9-13. This counsel failed to do. Not surprisingly, the district court did not proceed through a detailed review of the record in search of Plaintiffs' arguments. Instead, the court granted the motion without opinion or comment as to its rationale, noting only that it considered itself constrained by Tenth Circuit case law. 35 As a general rule we refuse to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal unless sovereign immunity or jurisdiction is in question. Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 928 F.2d 966, 970-71 (10th Cir.1991). Although sovereign immunity and hence subject matter jurisdiction are at issue in this case, our responsibility to ensure even sua sponte that we have subject matter jurisdiction before considering a case differs from our discretion to eschew untimely raised legal theories which may support that jurisdiction. Ceres Gulf v. Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199, 1207 n. 16 (5th Cir.1992). We have no duty under the general waiver rule to consider the latter. Id. As Plaintiffs suggest, however, we may depart from the general waiver rule in our discretion, particularly when we are presented with a strictly legal question the proper resolution of which is beyond doubt or when manifest injustice would otherwise result. See Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Hicks, 928 F.2d at 970; Cavic v. Pioneer Astro Industries, Inc., 825 F.2d 1421, 1425 (10th Cir.1987). We apply this discretionary exception on a case by case basis. Hicks, 928 F.2d at 970. 36 Plaintiffs stress that our review of the district court's subject matter jurisdiction determination is de novo, and they contend that their legal arguments undoubtedly establish jurisdiction. Given these factors, Plaintiffs argue that it would be manifestly unjust for us not to consider their arguments. Indeed our standard of review is de novo and we owe no deference to the district court, but we nevertheless lack the facilitation accorded appellate review we otherwise would have had if the district court had been allowed to consider these arguments and develop the record fully. Hicks, 928 F.2d at 970. Fairness to the district court and the Government, neither of which was made aware of Plaintiffs' arguments, militates against granting an exception. See id. at 970-71 (basic policies which underlie the waiver rule include considerations of fairness to both the district court and the opposing party, avoidance of surprise on appeal necessitating remands for additional findings, and the need for finality of litigation). Moreover, we cannot say that Plaintiffs have undoubtedly demonstrated an unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity; the Government has argued in the alternative that any of the shortcomings that might have occurred involved Applicable or Relevant and Appropriate Regulations (ARARs), which the Government contends are discretionary under CERCLA because it was required to comply only to the maximum extent possible. See CERCLA § 121(b)(1); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9621(b)(1). We need not delve into an in depth analysis on this point other than to say that the Plaintiffs new arguments do not go unchallenged. Plaintiffs had ample opportunity to develop their arguments below--with over two years of discovery, a response to the Government's motion to dismiss, and a motion to reconsider--and they simply failed to do so. Under these circumstances we cannot find injustice and therefore we refuse to consider the new arguments. 37 Without the new arguments and the vague reference to the myriad of regulatory provisions, Plaintiffs are left with the only argument on appeal which bears any resemblance to what was argued below--that the Army violated CERCLA's health and safety provisions by gassing the neighborhood. Congress did have an overriding concern for public health and safety in enacting CERCLA. This is evidenced in the language of CERCLA § 104(a)(1), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1), which provides the general authorization for response actions such as those taken at the Arsenal. Section 104(a)(1) authorizes the President to take any response measure which is consistent with the national contingency plan [and] which the President deems necessary to protect the public health or welfare or the environment. Furthermore, § 104(a)(1) instructs the President to give primary attention to those releases which the President deems may present a public health threat. Also, CERCLA § 101(23), 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(23), is pertinent because the Basin F IRA was the substantial equivalent of a removal action. That section, as discussed above, see supra II, defines removal actions as including measures necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare.... Plaintiffs also point to CERCLA § 121(d)(1), which requires that any overall remedial action attain a degree of cleanup of ... at a minimum which assures protection of human health and the environment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9621(d)(1). 10 In essence, Plaintiffs argue that the Army did not have the discretion under these statutory provisions to release toxic gases into their neighborhood and thereby create an imminent and substantial endangerment to their health and welfare. Applt. brief at 22. 38 Harsh as it may be, whether the Army substantially endangered Plaintiffs' health and welfare is irrelevant to the discretionary function determination. The question is not whether the Army fell short in its efforts to attain the general health and safety goals of CERCLA, but whether the Army's shortcomings involved violations of specific, mandatory directives. And the health and safety provisions cited by the Plaintiffs are not such specific and mandatory directives. We rejected a similar argument in Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417 (10th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004, 108 S.Ct. 694, 98 L.Ed.2d 647 (1988), the case relied on but not elaborated on by the district court. The Allen plaintiffs complained of injuries caused by fallout from open-air atomic and nuclear weapons testing. The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had carried out the open-air tests pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, Pub.L. No. 585, 60 Stat. 755, in which Congress ... repeatedly evinced the general intent that the tests should be conducted so as not to jeopardize the health and safety of the population downwind. Id. at 1425 (McKay, J., concurring). Critical to the holding, however, was that Congress had left it to the Atomic Energy Commission to determine how to attain this public health and safety goal. Id. at 1421 (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 81 L.Ed.2d 660, wherein it was left to the Secretary of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration to determine how to attain general safety goals). The Allen plaintiffs were unable to point to a single instance in which [AEC] personnel ignored or failed to implement specific [directives]. Id. Instead, their entire case rest[ed] on the fact that the government could have made better plans. Id. at 1424. In light of the policies which underlay the plans--public safety and national security--we refused to second-guess the AEC and held that the discretionary function exception barred suit. Id. (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. at 2764). See also Kennewick Irrigation District v. United States, 880 F.2d 1018, 1026 (9th Cir.1989) (A general statutory duty to promote safety, as was incumbent upon the FAA in Varig, would not be sufficient [to remove discretion].). 39 As in Allen, Plaintiffs' challenge to the execution of the Basin F cleanup is but an assertion that the Army could have done a better job in planning for and attaining the overall goals of public health and safety as expressed throughout CERCLA. For example, in their first amended complaint Plaintiffs allege that the United States Army and Shell rushed into the clean-up without proper planning concerning the effects of the clean-up activities on site conditions or upon the health and property of those living in surrounding neighborhoods, First Amended Complaint p 95, and that the Army and Shell were each a principal participant in all technical analyses, decisions and recommendations related to the Clean-up of Basin F, id. p 101. Without evidence of specific violations, these generalized claims cannot survive the discretionary function exception unless the challenged discretion is not policy based. 40 There seems little doubt in this case that the Army's actions at the Arsenal, and at Basin F in particular, involved policy choices of the most basic kind. The Army, Shell, and the EPA were faced with a monumental task in the cleanup and remediation of the hazardous waste contamination at the Arsenal, a task which had run into the $200 million range at the start of this litigation. Nothing in CERCLA or the National Contingency Plan compelled them to prioritize the removal action at Basin F. Instead, through the process of a lengthy RI/FS study involving numerous federal agencies, the state of Colorado, and public comment, they determined that Basin F and the other thirteen IRA sites on the Arsenal presented the greatest risk to the environment and to human health because of continuing environmental contamination. How they were to go about containing the spread of contamination before further damage could occur while still protecting public health touched on policy choices, not the least of which involved the translation of CERCLA's general health and safety provisions into concrete plans. Allen, 816 F.2d at 1427 (McKay, J., concurring). This type of translation involve[s] the very essence of social, economic, and political decisionmaking--the precise policy choices protected by the discretionary function exception. Id. The administrator must balance overall priorities--in this case the need for a prompt cleanup and the mandate of safety--with the realities of finite resources and funding considerations. Id. (citing Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. at 2767). See also The Law of Hazardous Waste § 12.03[a] (discussing general principles underlying CERCLA, including prompt cleanup of waste sites, protection of human health and the environment). We are not permitted to second-guess that policy determination. 41 It is insufficient under the discretionary function exception for Plaintiffs simply to allege that the Army rushed into the clean-up without proper planning concerning the effects of the clean-up activities on site conditions or upon the health and property of those living in surrounding neighborhoods. See supra. When government agents are authorized to exercise discretion in carrying out established government policy, such as the policies underlying CERCLA response actions, the exercise of that discretion is presumed to be grounded in policy. See Gaubert, --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1274. To overcome this presumption, a plaintiff must allege facts which would support a finding that the challenged actions are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in the policy of the regulatory regime. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 111 S.Ct. at 1274-75. Otherwise, the plaintiff will not have met his burden of pleading facts which would establish the court's jurisdiction. In light of our opinion in Allen, we do not think that Plaintiffs' general allegations of deficient planning and execution of the Basin F IRA overcome this presumption. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's dismissal. 11