Opinion ID: 4528256
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: District court proceedings concerning Count 6

Text: Count 6 of the indictment charged Garcia with possessing and discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). The district court instructed the jury that the predicate crime charged in Count 6, first-degree murder in violation of Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5402, “is a crime of violence.” Supp. R., Vol. 1 at 59. For purposes of § 924(c)(1)(A), a “crime of violence” is “an offense that is a felony” that “(A) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another” or “(B) that by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” § 924(c)(3). We refer to § 924(c)(3)(A) as the “elements” clause (Garcia calls it the “force” clause), and to § 924(c)(3)(B) as the “residual clause.” While Garcia’s direct appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Johnson II, holding unconstitutionally vague a similar residual clause in the definition of “violent 3 felony” in the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA)—“any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year . . . that . . . otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). 135 S. Ct. at 2557. In his § 2255 motion, Garcia’s entire argument regarding the Count 6 instruction was: “Per the holding in Johnson murder is not categorically a ‘crime of violence’ within the meaning of § 924(c)(3)(B) since physical force is not required to be held accountable for the offense of murder.” R., Vol. II at 141. The district court decided the claim was procedurally defaulted because Garcia did not present good cause for failing to raise it on direct appeal. In the alternative, the court determined the claim had no merit. The court concluded Garcia failed to show how the crime charged was not a crime of violence because Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5402(a)(1) “defines murder in the first degree as a killing of a human being intentionally and with premeditation,” and the jury had returned a special verdict finding Garcia had committed first degree murder. R., Vol. II at 211.