Opinion ID: 1461960
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Commercial Agriculture

Text: Petitioners contend that the Court of Special Appeals erred by failing to give the proper deference to the decision of the Board of Appeals and by substituting its judgment for that of the Board of Appeals in construing the BCZR. We agree with petitioners that the Court of Special Appeals did not properly defer to the presumed expertise of the Board of Appeals in interpreting the BCZR. Moreover, there was substantial evidence to support its findings and its conclusions. The question before the Board of Appeals was whether respondent's business qualified as commercial agriculture under the definition of farm. If his business qualified as commercial agriculture then he would be able to conduct his business because a farm is a use permitted as of right in an R.C.4 zone. The Board of Appeals determined that respondent had not satisfied the definition of commercial agriculture, [12] because respondent was not using the land for the raising of animals. The Board of Appeals stated that the raising, breeding, and marketing of the Boas and Pythons do not require the use of the land in an agricultural sense. The Board of Appeals also determined that respondent had not satisfied the definition of commercial agriculture because respondent's business was not animal husbandry as it was intended in the definition of commercial agriculture. The Board of Appeals found that respondent's snakes were wild animals as supported by respondent's application for the holding facility/kennel/wild life animal license in 1994 for his residence and as supported by the definitions of wild animal and domestic animal. The Board of Appeals determined that animal husbandry concerned domestic animals and that the snakes bred by respondent do not fit the definition of domestic animals. We commence our analysis of the relevant aspects of the BCZR by attempting to ascertain the intent of the legislative body, in this case the County Council of Baltimore County. In State v. Bell, 351 Md. 709, 720 A.2d 311 (1998), we stated that: We have said that `[t]he cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the legislature.' Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995). Legislative intent must be sought first in the actual language of the statute. Marriott Employees Fed. Credit Union v. Motor Vehicle Admin., 346 Md. 437, 444-45, 697 A.2d 455, 458 (1997); Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (quoting Tidewater[/Havre de Grace, Inc.] v. Mayor [and City Council] of Havre de Grace, 337 Md. 338, 344, 653 A.2d 468, 472 (1995)); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 256, 674 A.2d 951, 957 (1996); Romm v. Flax, 340 Md. 690, 693, 668 A.2d 1,2 (1995); Oaks, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429; Mauzy v. Hornbeck, 285 Md. 84, 92, 400 A.2d 1091, 1096 (1979); Board of Supervisors v. Weiss, 217 Md. 133, 136, 141 A.2d 734, 736 (1958). Where the statutory language is plain and free from ambiguity, and expresses a definite and simple meaning, courts normally do not look beyond the words of the statute to determine legislative intent. Marriott Employees, 346 Md. at 445, 697 A.2d at 458; Kaczorowski v. Mayor [and City Council] of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 633 (1987); Hunt v. Montgomery County, 248 Md. 403, 414, 237 A.2d 35, 41 (1968). ... This Court recently stated that `statutory language is not read in isolation, but in light of the full context in which [it] appear[s], and in light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence.` Stanford v. Maryland Police Training & Correctional Comm'n, 346 Md. 374, 380, 697 A.2d 424, 427 (1997) (alterations in original) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). To this end, [w]hen we pursue the context of statutory language, we are not limited to the words of the statute as they are printed.... We may and often must consider other `external manifestations' or `persuasive evidence,' including a bill's title and function paragraphs, amendments that occurred as it passed through the legislature, its relationship to earlier and subsequent legislation, and other material that fairly bears on the fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal, which becomes the context within which we read the particular language before us in a given case. ... [I]n State v. One 1983 Chevrolet Van, 309 Md. 327, 524 A.2d 51 (1987),... [a]lthough we did not describe any of the statutes involved in that case as ambiguous or uncertain, we did search for legislative purpose or meaning what Judge Orth, writing for the Court, described as `the legislative scheme.' [Id. at] 344-45, 524 A.2d at 59. We identified that scheme or purpose after an extensive review of the context of Ch. 549, Acts of 1984, which had effected major changes in Art. 27, § 297. That context included, among other things, a bill request form, prior legislation, a legislative committee report, a bill title, related statutes and amendments to the bill. See also Ogrinz v. James, 309 Md. 381, 524 A.2d 77 (1987), in which we considered legislative history (a committee report) to assist in construing legislation that we did not identify as ambiguous or of uncertain meaning. Kaczorowski, 309 Md. at 514-15, 525 A.2d at 632-33 (some citations omitted). Id. at 717-19, 720 A.2d at 315-16 (some alterations in original); see Williams v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 Md. 101, 115-17, 753 A.2d 41, 48-49 (2000); Riemer v. Columbia Medical Plan, Inc., 358 Md. 222, 235-36, 747 A.2d 677, 684-85 (2000); Laznovsky v. Laznovsky, 357 Md. 586, 606-07, 745 A.2d 1054, 1065 (2000). The Baltimore County Planning Board (hereinafter Planning Board) was charged by the Baltimore County Council, in response to the number and the complexity of zoning regulations for farms and agriculture-related businesses, to study the situation. The County Council requested that the Planning Board propose amendments to the BCZR in order to clarify the various zoning regulations dealing with farming and agriculture related operations. A Final Report of the Planning Board was presented on October 17, 1991. The report was titled Proposed Amendments to the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations Regarding Definition of Commercial Agriculture and Farm. The Planning Board started the report by providing background as to why amendments were needed to the definition for a farm. The Planning Board stated that: The agricultural industry is changing dramatically. Consumer preferences and economic necessity are transforming the manner in which agricultural businesses are operated. More and more farmers are engaged in retail distribution in addition to production activities. For example, The Pennsylvania Farmer, a magazine geared towards the farming community, reports innovative business practices which have greatly increased farm revenues. One farmer raised his income by selling some of his fruits in fruit baskets and delivering them to nearby offices and homes, as well as shipping them via mail order. Another farmer began to process his crops into cider after a hailstorm downgraded his apples. Today he is blending his ciders with cranberries, cherries, grapes and fruits purchased from other farms and is producing 10,000 gallons per day. Different products are being tried out. An apiarian, who initially restricted his production to honey only developed a carob/cranberry bar utilizing honey and by-products from honey processing. Ocean Spray, the cranberry operative, became one of his major buyers.... New types of crops are becoming commonplace. Farmers experiment with raising ornamental and edible fish, shellfish and aquatic plants for the wholesale and retail trade. Hardier varieties of plants allow the cultivating of grapes in local climates and more County farmers are trying their hand in wine production. Today the uses are frequently included when agriculture is defined in zoning regulations. All of the business practices listed above are far removed from traditional agricultural operations. Smaller parcels of land are used to produce higher yields with the aid of intensive application of pesticides. Agricultural crops are processed, packaged and stored on site and many producers adopt the same marketing and distribution principles as commercial and industrial operations. Other aspects indicative of the changes in the agricultural industry are reflected in the type of equipment used and the modes of chemical application. Often involved in processing and distribution, today[`]s farmers are more likely to use heavy equipment. Some farmers own a fleet of trucks. Other farmers use airplanes to apply pesticides. The industrialization of agriculture has enormous implications on land use and it is essential to acknowledge that reality in the proposed definition. Recognizing the transformation of agriculture, this report provides recommendations for updating the Zoning Regulations. The Planning Board then went on to discuss the new definition of agriculture. The Planning Board stated that: Formulation of a separate definition for agriculture is essential to complete the proposed set of farm definitions. `Agriculture' has a broader meaning than `farm'. Comparable in concept to words like `comm' must be ancillary to the principal `industrial', `agriculture' represents a class of land uses and thus accommodates operations which might be agricultural in nature but do not fit into the narrower, traditional farm definition. For example, riding stables, firewood operations, landscape operations do not qualify as farms yet they are related to agriculture. ... The principal standard that sets agricultural uses apart is that land or structures and buildings are utilized to produce plants or raise animals for income. The proposed definition acknowledges that agriculture is an industrial use which involves such activities as storage, processing, marketing, distributing and financing, but qualifies that all of the above activities must be ancillary to the principal agricultural operation. [Emphasis added.] The Planning Board then examined the old definitions of farm and discussed why a new definition for farm and commercial agriculture was needed. The Planning Board stated that: The Baltimore County Zoning Regulations presently offer two definitions for farm and two additional definitions, which describe different types of farms: Farm: Three acres or more of land, and any improvements thereon, used primarily for commercial agriculture, including but not limited to: crop, dairy, stock and poultry farming; greenhousing, flower farms and nurseries, whether wholesale or retail, excluding a limited-acreage wholesale flower farm. {Bill No. 85, 1967.} Farm: A single tract of land more than three acres, primarily devoted to agriculture, including but not limited to raising of crops, dairy, forestry, livestock and poultry farming; horse breeding, training and stabling, grazing, commercial greenhousing, flower farms and nurseries, whether wholesale or retail, excluding a limited acreage wholesale flower farm and commercial or noncommercial riding stables. {Bill No. 98, 1975.} Farm, Satellite: A tract of land owned by the farmer or another individual or individuals which is more than 5 acres, and is primarily devoted to productive agriculture, including but not limited to the raising of crops, forestry, dairy, or livestock grazing: provided that the products from these areas are processed on the site or are brought to and processed on the principal farm, as defined, or are processed in other appropriate areas. {Bill No. 98,1975.} The existing farm definitions are repetitive and obsolete and Planning Board recommends replacing them with a version which more accurately addresses the special needs of today's farming industry. Discussions with farm representatives revealed that Baltimore County has a continuum of different farm types, all of which can be grouped under the catchall of `metrofarm'. They range from large scale field crop producers to small, intensively farmed operations. Farmers may conduct their business on a full-time or on a part-time basis and in addition to production, they may be involved in an array of industrial type activities. The `Farm, Satellite' definition has limited application. Its primary purpose is to accommodate individual farmers or farm cooperatives who own or lease non contiguous parcels of land and who use the principal farm building or other appropriate areas for processing purposes. Planning Board believes that that form of land use is accommodated in the proposed farm definition and recommends deleting the Farm, Satellite definition. Section 100 of the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations includes a fourth definition for small farms between three and ten acres which are either commercial or noncommercial operations. The definition of `farmette' includes a livestock ratio table which is intended to control animal waste pollution and overgrazing on small lots. Farmette: A parcel of land more than 3 acres and less than 10 acres, devoted primarily to a single-family residence with associated agricultural uses such as commercial or noncommercial raising of farm produce, flowers, nursery stock, greenhousing and limited livestock [13] ..... The Planning Board then proposed a definition for Commercial Agriculture that was eventually enacted, without change, by the County Council by Bill No. 51-93 on April 19, 1993. This proposed and enacted definition is the same as the definition used by the Board of Appeals in the case at bar. At the hearing before the Board of Appeals, petitioners presented testimony from two experts in the area of land planning. The first to testify was Paul Solomon, who, among other credentials, had worked for the Baltimore County Office of Planning and Zoning and the Baltimore County Department of Environmental Protection and Resource Management. Specifically, Mr. Solomon was the planner in charge of the implementation of the resource conservation zoning classifications, which included the R.C.4 zone. In his testimony, Mr. Solomon stated that: Q. Do you remember the question? Do you agree with the Zoning Commissioner's approach to the issues? A. Yes, I recall the question. No, I do not agree with the Zoning Commissioner's opinion, nor the basis for it in this case. Q. Why not, Mr. Solomon? ... A. Well, there are several reasons that I base my answer on. First, there's no apparentit's not apparent he considered the evolution of the R.C. zones that took place and then the need for them, so forth, I think clearly sheds light on this issue of what is a farm. Secondly, in the definition itself, the definition is now in the zoning regulations which was put in in `91. Incidently, he didn't consider all the aspects of the definition which have to be taken together, and pulls out one word, basically, animals, and he does not consider the various types of agricultural described in that definition and how they relate to this exotic use. He does not understand or consider the fact that land is the key component of the definition. He does not consider the ancillary structures are just that. They are ancillary to the total agricultural use of the land. He apparently did not consider the assessment requirement of that definition, since it's my understanding that this property is zoned residential and not agricultural. He did not consider the report that was done in 1991 by the planning board which updated the definition as described here and provides a lot of insight into the meaning of this definition and the types of agriculture which the planning board and the County Council were alluding to. That's a quick review. That's why I find fault with the Zoning Commissioner's decision in this case. ... Q. Now, during the time the R.C. zones were under study, under your direction heading the committee you have just discussed, did you or your colleagues have a concept as to what animals would be considered as part of an agricultural operation? A. Yes. ... Q. Mr. Solomon, what did you have in mind when that terminology `raise or keep animals for income' was included in the commercial agriculture definition? A. Well, I must say, in all honesty, this definition is totally consistent with and actually reinforces the earlier definition. But this definition is somewhat different, but with that footnote, the basis which we utilized consistent throughout the process was this activity involving these animals, farm animals, basically, was that it was land-based. In other words, did it need land as a raw resource to function, or was it production of food and fiber? So, basically, if either one of those conditions had been met, then the likelihood was that that particular use for that livestock would qualify, and I think we were pretty steadfast in that regard. Q. Now, for example, would breeding of dogs be included in this concept you just described? A. No, it would not. Q. Why not? A. In the first place, it is not land based. It doesn't require land for feed or even towards disposal of waste materials, anything of that type. It is more of a suburban-urban type use involving kennels, so forth. Dogs are not food or fiber, so it passed neither aspects of the tests. It is not land based, and it was not production of food or fiber. ... Q. Now, you mentioned earlier in your testimony when you were discussing the agriculturalcommercial agriculture definition in the Baltimore County zoning regulations, thatstrike that. There was a prior definition before the one that's currently in the zoning regulations, is that correct? A. That is correct. Q. And, in your opinion, does the current definition differ materially from the original definition of commercial agriculture? ... A. It differs only in one regard, a very specific regard, that is, the newer definition requires that in order ... to accommodate commercial agriculture, the land must qualify for the agricultural use assessment. With that one difference, the definition is precisely, or is the same. And, in fact, reinforces the intent and meaning of the earlier definition by adding other agricultural uses such as aquaculture. It's conspicuous here it does not add uses such as exotic pets, or other non agricultural uses. ... Q. In your opinionI will rephrase the question. Does the planning board report [the October 17, 1991 report of the Planning Board discussed supra] suggest any change in the understanding of the term `commercial agriculture' from a previous definition in the 1970s to the current definition in 1993, other than the change about the agricultural use assessment? A. No, it does not. ... Q. What are the changes that are contained in the planning board report of 1991? A. Well, the impetus of this report was that agriculture was evolving in the sense that there was someinvolving some farming enterprises which were not covered under traditional agricultural. They wanted to clarify. They mentioned four agricultural uses of the land in particular which included the raising of grapes, called viticulture; the production of fish, which is aquaculture; forestry, which is simply reiterated from the earlier definition, and then the raising of bees. And they felt that these should be added to the more traditional accepted uses because of the state of transition of agriculture.... ... A. Well, there's no indication in the report that they consideredthere's no indication in the report in considering all of the various types of agricultural uses that they were aware of, including the ones they added, of course, in that review, they did not apparently entertain any notion of kennel or animal boarding place or exotic snake farms as being within the definition of agricultural use. ... Q. Are you familiar with the phrase `animal and poultry husbandry'? A. Yes, I am. Q. Based on your experiences in developing the agricultural zones in Baltimore County, what is your understanding of the term `animal husbandry'? ... A. Animal husbandry consists of production of livestock or the raising of livestock primarily for food, although in the case of the horse industry, for other uses as well, but it's also land-based. Q. And in your opinion, does the operat[ion] conducted by Mr. Kahl consist of animal husbandry, or is it consistent with that definition? ... A. No, it is not land-based. It is not land-based in any sense of the word. ... Q. In preparing for the zoning case, is it appropriate to sometimes consult the Baltimore County Code for reference? A. Yes, it is. Q. And did you consult the Code in this case? A. Yes, I did. Q. What, if anything, did you find that may be relevant to the issues that we are discussing today? A. In looking or in reviewing the County Code, I reviewed the Title VI, Article 9. Title VI is entitled animals, and Article 9 refers to wild animals. But in the definition section, it breaks down animals into various groupings. It breaks them down into domestic animals, cats and dogs, basically, or as an example. It distinguishes very clearly farm animals. And then it includes a third category called wild or exotic animals.... ... Q. Was the County Code helpful to you in forming your opinion in this case? A. It was helpful, yes. Q. In forming your opinion, did you make, and based on the testimony you heard, and in your review of the matters in this case, did you make a determination as to what category Mr. Kahl's raising and breeding and selling snakes would fit into? A. Yes. It would fall under the wild or exotic animals. Not, obviously, farm animals. ... Q. Why would it not fall into the definition of a farm animal under the Baltimore County code? A. It statesthe definition states farm animals means any animal being maintained for production of food, food product, and fiber, period. That's the entire definition, and that's consistent with the definition or the expressed understanding we had when we developed the R.C. zones. Q. Have you heard anything today concerning Mr. Kahl's operation though that would lead you to believe it is an agricultural operation? A. No. Q. Now, based on these experiences that you discussed with Baltimore County zoning laws, and based on your investigation in this case and the matters that you heard today, do you have an opinion whether the use requested by the petitioner qualifies as commercial agriculture? ... A. I do have an opinion. Q. What is that opinion? A. It is that his operation does not qualify under the definition in the Baltimore County zoning regulations for commercial agriculture. Q. What do you base that opinion on? If you could tell the Board. A. I base it first on the definition itself, which in its entirety makes it very clear what animals are. In the first instance, the definition starts out by saying `the use of land,' so the livestock operation, the animal operation has to be land-based, which it is not in this case. Then there's a comment after land. It goes on to say `including ancillary structures and buildings,' which makes it very clear that any structures are ancillary or secondary to the actual use of the land. Then it goes on to say `to cultivate plants or raise or keep animals for income, providing that the land also qualifies for farm or agriculture or agricultural land use assessment.' In this case, there is clear, clear evidence that it is presently not assessed for agricultural use.... ... A. So I am now discussing the actual definition of commercial agriculture in trying to show where the use that's before this Board is not consistent with this definition. Coming to the end of that definition, it lists, and it is updated, it lists based on the `90 changes to the definition which includes all types of agriculture, they list nine or ten forms of agriculture. They take commercial agriculture. It includes production of field crops, dairying, pasturage, agriculture, horticulture, aquaculture, apiculture, viticulture, forestry and animal and poultry husbandry, horse breeding and horse training. And then it includes ancillary activities such as processing packages, so forth. But if the Zoning Commissioner would have taken a look at those uses, there is not a hint there it involves pets or exotic animals or anything of the kind. ... Q. Mr. Solomon, my original question was, on what did you base your opinion? Is there anything else? A. Yes. Q. Other than what you have discussed? A. In addition to the definition itself, the Zoning Commissioner, in my opinion, should have looked at the County Code as far as looking at the definitions of animal, which very clearly distinguishes farm animals and other animals. He should have considered the evolution and the process involving the construction of the R.C. zones, determined what, if any, meaning could be gleaned from that research. He could have looked, should have looked at the Maryland assessment law to see how that was consistent with the definition. So in concluding my answer to you question, he should have looked both within the definition in its entirety for enlightenment and consistency, and should have looked at the external office I alluded to, and the whole process of the R.C. zone. Q. Finally, Mr. Solomon, based on your position in Baltimore County in doing the R.C. 4 zones and based upon your experience, was there ever any thought given to including raising, breeding reptiles, snakes, as a farming activity? A. No, never. Mr. Solomon also stated in his testimony that it was his opinion that respondent's business could be located in a zone that allowed an animal boarding place. After the testimony of Mr. Solomon, petitioners presented Mr. Norman Gerber, who also was accepted as an expert in land planning. Mr. Gerber worked in the planning office in Baltimore County for thirty years and he was the Director of Planning for eight years. As the Director of Planning, Mr. Gerber had been involved with the R.C. zones legislation and the application of the legislation to the land. Mr. Gerber stated that in his opinion respondent's business could not be conducted in an R.C.4 zone, but Mr. Gerber stated that in his opinion respondent's business could be located in a zone that allowed an animal boarding place class B. Mr. Gerber stated that he disagreed with the Zoning Commissioner's decision and that he thought that the Zoning Commissioner overlooked the fact that there is a broad zone (animal boarding place class B) in which this use is permitted. Mr. Gerber stated that this use does not meet the definition of a farm and that this use is not related to the land. Respondent alleges that he is using the land in the same manner as poultry husbandry and aquaculture, two forms of commercial agriculture. [14] At the hearing, the distinction was drawn between the two recognized forms of commercial agriculture in that they both provide food. Respondent also alleges that he practices animal husbandry within the definition of commercial agriculture. The Board of Appeals distinguished respondent's business because it involves wild animals, not domestic animals, and the definition of animal husbandry is the production and care of domestic animals. After an examination of the record, we determine that there is substantial evidence in the record to support the Board of Appeals' decision to find that the breeding, raising, and selling of snakes is not a permissible use in an R.C.4 zone. There is no dispute as to the facts. Moreover, the legislative intent, as evidenced by the County Council's adoption of the Planning Board's proposed amendments and the testimony as to the intent of the Planning Board, provided the Board of Appeals with substantial evidence to interpret and apply the statutes in the manner in which it did. Examining the Board of Appeals' decision and giving the appropriate deference to the expertise of the Board of Appeals in interpreting the BCZR, we hold that the Board of Appeals' decision was not premised on an erroneous conclusion of law. Furthermore, we have held that a change in a statute as part of a recodification will not modify the law unless the intent of the legislative body to change the law is clear. In Blevins & Wills v. Baltimore County, 352 Md. 620, 642, 724 A.2d 22, 32-33 (1999), we stated that: We have long recognized and applied the principle that `a change in a statute as part of a general recodification will ordinarily not be deemed to modify the law unless the change is such that the intention of the Legislature to modify the law is unmistakable.' Duffy v. Conaway, 295 Md. 242, 257, 455 A.2d 955 (1983) (emphasis added); In re Special Investigation No. 236, 295 Md. 573, 458 A.2d 75 (1983). That is because the principal function of code revision `is to reorganize the statutes and state them in simpler form,' and thus `changes are presumed to be for the purpose of clarity rather than for a change in meaning.' Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek, 272 Md. 143, 155, 321 A.2d 748, 754 (1974), quoting from Welsh v. Kuntz, 196 Md. 86, 97, 75 A.2d 343, 347 (1950). Resolution number 29-90 of the County Council requested that the Planning Board propose amendments to the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations in order to clarify the various zoning regulations dealing with farming, forestry activities, and agriculture related operations. There was not an intent on the part of the County Council to modify the law; the County Council was looking to clarify the law. Examining the previous definitions of farm in the BCZR that were clarified by the definition of farm and commercial agriculture, we cannot detect any intent of the County Council to change the meaning of the preceding definitions. The preceding definitions clearly do not include respondent's business as an activity that occurs on a farm. Moreover, there was no discussion before the Planning Board of extending any of the relevant definitions to include any new animals involved in new types of commercial agriculture that were not explicitly stated in the new definition. Clearly, snakes were not an animal that the Planning Board or the County Council considered as falling within the province of the definition of farm or commercial agriculture. Furthermore, there are certain instances where it is appropriate to consider other factors when interpreting a statute, some of which were alluded to by the petitioners' expert witness. They include the fact that we do not set aside common experience and common sense when construing statutes. Absurd constructions are to be avoided. Simply stated, in the absence of proof that the legislative body expressly intended otherwise, the terms farm or farm animals would not normally include pythons and boa constrictors. Pythons, boa constrictors, and, for that matter, snakes in general, are not farm animals. One can breed, raise, and sell snakes, but you cannot farm them. A snake is no more the equivalent of chickens, pigs, cows, goats, and sheep, than are lions, tigers, and elephants. In arriving at this assumption, we do not rely on treatises, scientific documentation, or other published works; we rely on common sense. A snake, however loveable it may be to some, is not a farm animal unless legislatively declared to be such. A boa constrictor can be an animal on a farm, but that does not make it a farm animal, any more than a fox on the way to raiding the hen house is a farm animal. We hold that the Court of Special Appeals failed to give the proper deference to the decision of the Board of Appeals. The decision of the Board of Appeals was supported by substantial evidence in the record and was not premised on an erroneous conclusion of law. The Court of Special Appeals erred in finding that respondent's business was a permitted use in an R.C.4 zone. The Court of Special Appeals should have affirmed the decision of the Board of Appeals.