Opinion ID: 1685999
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: failure to strike two venirepersons for cause

Text: During voir dire Ms. Leason, a venireperson, approached the bench and advised the court that she was not certain that she could sit impartially in appellant's trial. She was a social worker employed by CHR and working with the CACU. The following is a transcription of Ms. Leason's voir dire at the bench with the trial judge, the Commonwealth and appellant's counsel. Leason: I don't know any of these people personally, I'm just familiar with them through work.... I'm an investigative social worker with Child Protection Services. Judge: So does part of your job involve investigating claims of sexual abuse of children or sexual crimes committed against children? Leason: Yes. Judge: Do you feel that that position would affect your ability to be fair and impartial as a juror in this case? Leason: Yes. Commonwealth: If you are selected as a juror in this case and you sit over there in the jury box and you listen to all of the evidence, are you going to be fair and going to listen to the evidence and are you going to make a decision based on what you hear here in court? Leason: Yes. Commonwealth: Can you be fair and listen to the evidence and make a decision of guilt or innocence based on what you hear here in court? Leason: My job is different from the legal aspect. I'm not sure how much I'd be able to separate the social work from the legality. Commonwealth: What I'm asking you is, if you sat on the jury in this case can you promise the court that you will listen to the evidence and you'll make a decision from what you hear from the witness stand whether or not the defendant is guilty or not guilty? Leason: Yes. Commonwealth: You'll do that? Leason: Yes. Defense Counsel: You have concerns? Leason: If I'm being asked to make a decision in a legal sense, yes, I've never had to do that. I purely do it from the social work stand. Yes, I feel like I could do that. Defense Counsel: Do you think there's things you've learned as a social worker, maybe some baggage you carry with you that could affect your judgment in this case. Leason: No. Judge: Do you feel, Ms. Leason, that as a result of being engaged in investigating complaints of sexual abuse of children that without knowing anything about this case that you would be more inclined, based on your past experience, to believe what the child said versus what the defendant said? Leason: No. . . . . . Defense Counsel: Do you have a working relationship with CACU? Leason: Yes. Toward the end of voir dire, another venireperson, Mr. Woods, approached the bench. The following conversation ensued. Woods: Is this a mixed marriage? ... I have a distaste for that. Now, I'm mature enough to know that my dislike for something like that doesn't necessarily make the man guilty or innocent. I just want that to be known. Judge: If evidence is introduced that Mr. Alexander's wife is white do you feel that that character ... Woods: No, no. I just want it to be known that I have a dislike for it. I have been around a long time and I know what is fair and what isn't fair. And I believe what's right is right and what's wrong is wrong and that wouldn't enter into it. . . . . . Judge: Would the fact that Mr. Alexander is African-American and the child is a bi-racial child ... Woods: No it wouldn't. I mean that doesn't, no, I don't firmly believe it would. Defense Counsel: Debbie Alexander is a white woman and she's married to Earl [appellant]. She might testify in this case. Do you think in the back of your mind, while you're listening to the testimony, you might be thinking what kind of woman is this? Maybe judging her credibility a little bit differently than, say, if she was a black woman? Woods: I have to be honest, I probably would. A degree of difference would probably be there, yes. Defense Counsel: So you don't think that you could necessarily look at her testimony as the same as you would, say, a different witness? Woods: No, no. Testimony, that would be a different matter. Now you were talking about whether I would feel what kind of woman that is. Maybe a degree, but her testimony would be something else. Defense Counsel: Would you use that maybe as a factor to decide if she is a credible witness, whether maybe she should be believed? Woods: No. A person's preference doesn't mean they're not honest about something. Defense Counsel: So you wouldn't use that in any way? Woods: I don't believe I would. . . . . . Commonwealth: If you're selected as a juror in this case, can you listen to the evidence, make a decision of guilt or innocence and be fair about it? Woods: Yes. Commonwealth: Certain? Woods: Yes. The trial court overruled defense counsel's motions to strike both of these venirepersons for cause. After the motion to strike Mr. Woods was overruled, defense counsel moved to be permitted an extra peremptory challenge. This motion was also overruled. All of appellant's peremptory challenges were used, two of which were used to strike Ms. Leason and Mr. Woods. It has long been held that [i]t is the probability of bias or prejudice that is determinative in ruling on a challenge for cause. Pennington v. Commonwealth, Ky., 316 S.W.2d 221, 224 (1958). [A] party charged with a criminal offense is entitled to be tried by a fair and impartial jury composed of members who are disinterested and free from bias and prejudice, actual or implied or reasonably inferred. Tayloe v. Commonwealth, Ky., 335 S.W.2d 556, 558 (1960). The question of whether a venireperson should be excused for cause is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. We hold that the lower court abused its discretion in regard to the above two venirepersons. Ms. Leason stated that she was not personally familiar with the individuals involved in the trial. However, she did inform the court that she is currently an investigative social worker with CHR and that she has a working relationship with CACU. In Tayloe the Court stated: where it is shown that an organization of which a venireman was a member is in some manner interested in or connected with the prosecution of the case, he should be regarded as incompetent to serve on the jury. Tayloe at 558. In the case before us, Ms. Leason was employed by CHR, the same organization with which Horrar, a key witness for the Commonwealth, was employed. CHR has assigned Ms. Leason to CACU, the same unit to which Horrar and Detective Fraction are assigned. Under these circumstances we find that the probability of bias on behalf of Ms. Leason was so great that it was an abuse of the trial court's discretion to fail to excuse her for cause. As to the issue of whether Mr. Woods should have been excused for cause, the United States Supreme Court has stated that: [w]e recognize, of course, that a defendant has the right to an impartial jury that can view him without racial animus, which so long has distorted our system of criminal justice. We have, accordingly, held that there should be a mechanism for removing those on the venire whom the defendant has specific reason to believe would be incapable of confronting and suppressing their racism. Georgia v. McCollum, ___ U.S. ___, ___ _ ___, 112 S.Ct. 2348, 2358-2359, 120 L.Ed.2d 33 (1992). Appellant is black, Mrs. Alexander is white and A.C. is bi-racial. Mr. Woods expressed to the court a distaste for mixed marriages. Mr. Woods also stated that he would judge Mrs. Alexander's credibility a degree differently than he would judge the credibility of other witnesses. Until testimony or evidence demonstrates otherwise, the credibility of one witness should stand the same as the credibility of all other witnesses. Like Ms. Leason, the probability of Mr. Woods' bias was so great, he should have been excused for cause. The Commonwealth attempted to rehabilitate both venirepersons by asking both of them if they could decide the case based solely upon the evidence presented at trial. Both Ms. Leason and Mr. Woods responded affirmatively to this magic question. This Court has stated that: [t]here is no magic in the magic question. It is just another question where the answer may have some bearing on deciding whether a particular juror is disqualified by bias or prejudice, ... ... the magic question does not provide a device to rehabilitate a juror who should be considered disqualified by his personal knowledge or his past experience, or his attitude as expressed on voir dire. Montgomery v. Commonwealth, Ky., 819 S.W.2d 713, 718 (1991). (Emphasis in original.) [T]o obtain a reversal for infringement of his right to exercise peremptory challenges, appellant need only show that the trial court erred in overruling any one of his challenges for cause. Marsch v. Commonwealth, Ky., 743 S.W.2d 830, 834 (1988). In the case before us, Ms. Leason's attitude and past experiences and Mr. Woods' attitude created a reasonable inference of bias or prejudice. The affirmative response to the magic question did not eradicate the bias and prejudice. Their statements, given in response to leading questions, that they would disregard all previous information, opinions and relationships should not have been taken at face value. Id. Because both venirepersons should have been stricken for cause, the trial court committed reversible error. For the foregoing reasons we affirm as to issues one through three; we reverse and remand to the trial court issues four through six for further consideration in conformity with this Opinion. LAMBERT, REYNOLDS, SPAIN and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., concur as to issues one through three. STEPHENS, C.J., LEIBSON, COMBS, LAMBERT and REYNOLDS, JJ., concur as to issues four through six. STEPHENS, C.J., dissents and files opinion as to issues one through three. LEIBSON and COMBS, JJ., join in the dissent. SPAIN, J., dissents and files opinion as to issues four through six. WINTERSHEIMER, J., joins in his dissent.