Opinion ID: 1161761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: waiver of immunity through failure to timely assert it as an affirmative defense

Text: The Board did not plead any affirmative defenses in its answer. Then, over a year after the complaint was filed, the Board raised the defense of governmental immunity in a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), W.R.C.P., which they later converted to a motion for summary judgment. Appellants contend that the Board waived the defense of governmental immunity by failing to plead it in its answer as required by Rule 8(c), W.R.C.P. [1] As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether governmental immunity is an avoidance or affirmative defense which may be waived under Rule 8(c) or whether the existence of governmental immunity creates a jurisdictional defect which cannot be waived and may be raised at any time. In this case, the question is complicated by the fact that two different types of governmental immunity are at issue. First, there is the question of whether the County enjoys common law quasi-legislative immunity from suit for its acts or omissions in approving the subdivision. Second, there is the question of whether the County has waived its tort immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act by purchasing liability insurance which covers appellants' claim. Legislative immunity rests upon the premise that no legislator can be expected to discharge his duties with the resolution and dedication they require unless he is freed from the constant threat of legal action and potential monetary liability for each exercise of his legislative judgment. Bruce v. Riddle, 464 F. Supp. 745, 748-49 (D.S.C. 1979). The doctrine prevents the judiciary from invading the province of the legislature. Because it raises separation of powers considerations and limits the power of courts, we conclude that it is a jurisdictional bar which cannot be waived. The Board did not waive the issue of legislative or quasi-legislative immunity. Immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act, in contrast, is immunity from liability, not immunity from suit. W.S. 1-39-102. Its purpose is to protect public revenues, not to protect government officials from the burden of defending lawsuits. The district courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear claims filed under the act. W.S. 1-39-117. In Texas Gulf Sulphur Company v. Robles, Wyo., 511 P.2d 963, 965 (1973), we defined an affirmative defense as a direct or implicit admission of plaintiff's claim and assertion of other facts which would defeat a right to recovery. Governmental immunity from tort liability falls within this definition. W.S. 1-39-104. We conclude that for pleading purposes under Rule 8(c), W.R.C.P., immunity under the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act is an avoidance or affirmative defense. In the present case, it should have been pleaded by the Board in its answer. The Board's failure to plead the defense, however, is not fatal. The question of whether an omitted affirmative defense may be raised for the first time by a motion for summary judgment is addressed in 2A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 8.28 (1987). The author states: [T]here is a split in authority as to whether a defendant may, subsequent to filing an answer, move for summary judgment on the basis of an affirmative defense omitted from the answer. While some cases hold that an affirmative defense not raised in the answer is waived and, therefore, not available as a basis for a summary judgment motion, other holdings provide that, absent prejudice to plaintiff, an affirmative defense may be raised by a motion for summary judgment regardless of whether it was pleaded in the answer or not. The latter position is more in keeping with the general purpose of the Federal Rules to avoid decisions based on pleading technicalities rather than the merits of a case. (Footnotes omitted.) We agree that the latter position is preferable to a mechanistic application of the waiver rule. The controlling consideration is whether the adverse party is prejudiced by the moving party's delay in raising the defense. Appellants have alleged no prejudice in this respect, and the record discloses none. We conclude that the trial court did not err in allowing the Board to raise the omitted defense of statutory immunity by a motion for summary judgment.