Opinion ID: 1700511
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Failure to Make all Constitutional Challenges to Death Penalty

Text: Ryan claims that the record supports the following direct constitutional challenges to the death penalty: (1) The jury verdict was based, at least in part, on an aiding and abetting theory; (2) the court refused to permit the jury to consider a diminished capacity defense; and (3) trial counsel failed to understand the burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances. We turn first to Ryan's claim that his death sentence should have been challenged on constitutional grounds because the jury verdict was based in part upon an aiding and abetting theory. We have found no evidence in the record to support such a claim. The jury was instructed in the alternative, that is, that the State was required to prove that Ryan killed Thimm, either alone or while aiding and abetting another. The record reflects that five verdict forms were given to the jury: guilty of first degree murder, guilty of second degree murder, guilty of manslaughter, not responsible by reason of insanity, and not guilty. The jury returned the verdict form finding Ryan guilty of first degree murder. There is no indication whether the jury based its verdict upon a finding that Ryan acted alone or upon a finding that Ryan was aiding and abetting another in the killing of Thimm. Assuming that the jury in fact rejected an aiding and abetting theory, Ryan could not have been prejudiced by any failure of trial counsel to make a constitutional challenge to the death penalty on that basis. Ryan also argues that he could not have aided and abetted another in the killing of Thimm because only he, of the five participants in the killing, was convicted of first degree murder. This argument is apparently premised on the erroneous notion that an aider and abettor cannot be convicted of a greater offense than a principal. Such is not the law in this state. In State v. Secret, 246 Neb. 1002, 1009-10, 524 N.W.2d 551, 557 (1994), we held: The common-law distinction between a principal and an aider and abettor has been abolished in Nebraska. State v. Thomas, 210 Neb. 298, 314 N.W.2d 15 (1981); State v. Rice, 188 Neb. 728, 199 N.W.2d 480 (1972). A person who aids, abets, procures, or causes another to commit any offense may be prosecuted and punished as if he were the principal offender. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 28-206 (Reissue 1989).... ... An aider and abettor can be convicted of any crime, even a greater offense than the principal, provided the conviction is supported by the evidence of the facts and the defendant's state of mind. (Emphasis supplied.) Therefore, the jury properly could have convicted Ryan of first degree murder on an aiding and abetting theory, if it did in fact choose to do so, even though none of the other participants in the killing were found guilty of first degree murder. Trial counsel could not have successfully challenged Ryan's death sentence on this basis. Ryan also argues that under the Eighth Amendment, an aider and abettor to a killing cannot be sentenced to death unless there is a finding that the defendant killed or intended that death would result. He cites Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), in support of this proposition. Ryan's reliance upon Enmund and Tison is misplaced. The Enmund case may not be read that broadly, and such is not the holding of Tison. In Enmund, the defendant was the driver of a getaway car who sat some 200 yards away on the roadside while two other individuals robbed and killed an elderly couple in their farmhouse. There was evidence that the couple was killed after the husband called out for help and the wife appeared with a gun and shot one of the robbers. Enmund was convicted of first degree murder and robbery and sentenced to death. His sentence was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court, even though that court concluded that the only evidence of the degree of [Enmund's] participation is the jury's likely inference that he was the person in the car by the side of the road near the scene of the crimes. Enmund v. State, 399 So.2d 1362, 1370 (Fla.1981). The U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the imposition of the death penalty, in those circumstances, was inconsistent with the 8th and 14th Amendments and reversed the judgment of the Florida Supreme Court upholding Enmund's death sentence. The Court based its holding on the fact that Enmund neither killed nor intended to kill and that for the purposes of the death penalty, his culpability was limited to his participation in the robbery. Five years later, in Tison, the Supreme Court again addressed the issue of whether the death penalty may be imposed upon a defendant who has aided and abetted a killing. The facts of that case are significantly different from the facts in Enmund. In Tison, two defendant brothers and other family members planned and executed the escape of their father and another inmate from prison. After experiencing a breakdown of their vehicle, the group decided to flag down a passing motorist and steal a vehicle. When John and Donnelda Lyons, accompanied by their 2-year-old child and 15-year-old niece, stopped to render aid, the Tison group took the Lyons vehicle at gunpoint, drove the Lyons family into the desert, and brutally shot all four family members to death with shotguns. Two of the Tison brothers were apprehended after a shootout at a police roadblock. The two brothers were convicted of capital murder, armed robbery, kidnapping, and car theft in connection with the Lyons killings, and the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed those convictions, even though the two brothers had not actually fired the shots killing the Lyons family members. The Supreme Court, in analyzing Tison, revisited its analysis of Enmund: Enmund explicitly dealt with two distinct subsets of all felony murders in assessing whether Enmund's sentence was disproportional under the Eighth Amendment. At one pole was Enmund himself: the minor actor in an armed robbery, not on the scene, who neither intended to kill nor was found to have had any culpable mental state. Only a small minority of States even authorized the death penalty in such circumstances and even within those jurisdictions the death penalty was almost never exacted for such a crime. The Court held that capital punishment was disproportional in these cases. Enmund also clearly dealt with the other polar case: the felony murderer who actually killed, attempted to kill, or intended to kill. The Court clearly held that the equally small minority of jurisdictions that limited the death penalty to these circumstances could continue to exact it in accordance with local law when the circumstances warranted. (Emphasis supplied.) 481 U.S. at 149-50, 107 S.Ct. at 1683-84. The Court recognized that the Tison brothers' cases did not fall into either of these neat categories. However, the Court further noted that neither do most state laws fall at the poles of the spectrum, but, rather, into two intermediate categories: Four States authorize the death penalty in felony-murder cases upon a showing of culpable mental state such as recklessness or extreme indifference to human life. Two jurisdictions require that the defendant's participation be substantial and the statutes of at least six more, including Arizona, take minor participation in the felony expressly into account in mitigation of the murder. [Nebraska is one of these six states. See § 29-2523(2)(e).] These requirements significantly overlap both in this case and in general, for the greater the defendant's participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless indifference to human life. (Emphasis supplied.) 481 U.S. at 152-53, 107 S.Ct. at 1685. The Court focused upon the importance of mental state in its analysis, holding that the reckless disregard for human life implicit in knowingly engaging in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death represents a highly culpable mental state, a mental state that may be taken into account in making a capital sentencing judgment when that conduct causes its natural, though also not inevitable, lethal result. (Emphasis supplied.) 481 U.S. at 157-58, 107 S.Ct. at 1687-88. Ultimately, the Court held that  major participation in the felony committed, combined with reckless indifference to human life, is sufficient to satisfy the Enmund culpability requirement. (Emphasis supplied.) 481 U.S. at 158, 107 S.Ct. at 1688. Thus, while Enmund held the death penalty to be unconstitutional in the case of a minor actor who had no culpable mental state with regard to killing, Tison allows the death penalty to be imposed on a major participant in a killing who acts with reckless indifference to the life of the victim. Ryan was not a minor actor in the killing of Thimm. As noted above, it is a mitigating circumstance under Nebraska law that [t]he offender was an accomplice in the crime committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor. § 29-2523(2)(e). In sentencing Ryan to death, the sentencing court explicitly rejected this mitigating circumstance, stating: The trial record clearly identifies and shows that the defendant was the leader on the Rulo farm and more specifically, was the leader and instigator of the atrocities committed on James Thimm. Michael W. Ryan was the first person to probe, whip, shoot a finger, break a limb, and skin James Thimm. Ryan's death sentence does not offend Enmund. There is also ample support for Ryan's death sentence under the Tison standard. Regardless of whether Ryan struck the final, fatal blows to Thimm, the evidence of his involvement in the killing is overwhelming. Ryan participated fully in the abuse of Thimm. It was Ryan who consulted Yahweh as to the various tortures to be inflicted upon Thimm. It was Ryan who communicated Yahweh's desires as to Thimm's fate to the four other participants and directed them to carry out Yahweh's wishes. By any definition, Ryan was a major participant in the killing of Thimm. Moreover, Ryan's actions in connection with the torture and killing of Thimm exhibited a reckless indifference to human life. By his own admission, he was aware that the torture being inflicted upon Thimm carried a grave risk of death. In fact, Ryan testified that Yahweh had indicated to him that Thimm should die. Ryan felt at some point that it was inevitable that Thimm would die. Even though he knew that Thimm was severely injured after his bowel had been ruptured, Ryan did not seek any type of medical attention for Thimm in order to save his life. Greater indifference to human life cannot be imagined. As Justice Sandra Day O'Connor explained in Tison, some nonintentional murderers may be among the most dangerous and inhumane of all[, for example,] the person who tortures another not caring whether the victim lives or dies .... This reckless indifference to the value of human life may be every bit as shocking to the moral sense as an intent to kill. (Emphasis supplied.) 481 U.S. at 157, 107 S.Ct. at 1687. Ryan's death sentence meets the constitutional requirements of Tison. Ryan could not have prevailed on any constitutional challenge to his death sentence based upon his claim that his verdict was based in part upon an aiding and abetting theory. Therefore, Ryan suffered no prejudice from his counsel's failure to make such a challenge. As to Ryan's contention that counsel should have made a constitutional challenge to the death penalty based on the court's refusal to permit the jury to consider a diminished capacity defense, we held in Ryan I that such an instruction is not required under our law and that the trial court had not erred in refusing to give the jury Ryan's requested instruction on diminished capacity. Specifically, we stated that `a special diminished capacity instruction need not be given where the jury had otherwise been properly instructed that intent was an element of the crime charged.' 233 Neb. at 105, 444 N.W.2d at 632. Therefore, Ryan has suffered no prejudice because any challenge to the death penalty on this basis would have been unavailing. This issue will not be revisited further, even though it is now framed in the language of ineffective assistance of counsel. Ryan also claims that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to understand the burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances. Ryan states in his brief that Goos testified [at the postconviction hearing] that ... he may have believed at the time, that the burden of proof was on the State to disprove the existence of the mitigating factors he presented. Brief for appellant at 99. Ryan also maintains that there is no discussion in the sentencing brief concerning which party had the ultimate burden of persuasion with respect to statutory mitigating circumstance[s]. Id. The record is to the contrary. On October 16, 1986, prior to sentencing, Goos submitted a document to the sentencing court entitled Argument and Brief in Support of Life Imprisonment. In a subsection entitled Statutory and Nonstatutory Mitigating Circumstances, Goos wrote the following: There is another marked difference between the aggravating and mitigating factors, and that arises from the fact that the aggravating must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt whereas the mitigating need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. And using that standard of proof, defendant believes that he is entitled to (1)(b), (c) and (g) of the statutory mitigating circumstances .... (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, Goos was aware that it was the defendant's burden to prove the existence of the statutory mitigating circumstances, and to prove their existence by a preponderance of the evidence. To suggest otherwise borders on frivolity.