Opinion ID: 473672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Wainwright v. Sykes to Procedural Default during State Collateral Proceedings

Text: 18 The district court's disposition of this claim raises the novel question whether the reasoning of Wainwright v. Sykes requires a federal habeas court to defer to a state court's refusal to consider the merits of a federal constitutional claim presented in a request for collateral relief from conviction where the refusal is based on the petitioner's failure to comply with state procedural rules during state collateral post-conviction proceedings. For the reasons that follow, we believe it would be inappropriate for us to reach this issue in the context of this case. We therefore reach the merits to affirm the denial of Oliver's petition with respect to this claim. 19 In Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a state court's determination that it must refuse to consider the merits of a criminal defendant's federal constitutional claim because the defendant has failed to comply with a state contemporaneous-objection rule is an independent and adequate state ground for denying relief that is immune from federal review absent a showing of cause for the noncompliance and prejudice from the refusal to reach the merits. See also Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 102 S.Ct. 1558, 71 L.Ed.2d 783 (1981). In Ford v. Strickland, 696 F.2d 804, 816 (11th Cir.1983) (en banc), this court explained that the rationale of Sykes also applies to procedural default committed during the direct appeal stage of state proceedings. We expressly reserved the question whether Sykes should be applied in the context of procedural default committed during state collateral proceedings in Francis v. Spraggins, 720 F.2d 1190, 1192 n. 3 (11th Cir.1983), noting that extension of the doctrine to this type of case would be unprecedented in our decisions and in those of the Supreme Court, and would raise serious policy questions perhaps best left to Congress. 20 Although it appears that the question remains open, the district court in this case deferred to the Florida court's application of a procedural bar that arose during state collateral proceedings without analysis or giving reasons. Because it is not clear whether the Second DCA did in fact rely on a procedural bar to deny Oliver's attempted appeal and because any procedural bar in this case appears not to have been an adequate state ground for refusing to reach the merits, we again avoid consideration of the applicability of Sykes to procedural default committed during state collateral post-conviction proceedings. 21 Either of two procedural grounds might have formed the basis for the Second DCA's November 20, 1980 denial of Oliver's habeas corpus petition. The first is that Oliver filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus rather than a notice of appeal with that court, which is an appellate court. The Second DCA might have reasoned, as the district court speculated when it sent Oliver back to state court to request a belated appeal, that such a petition should be denied under the Rule 3.850 requirement that motions for post-conviction relief initially be filed in the sentencing court, not in the appellate court. Second, the Second DCA might have treated the petition as a notice of appeal from the trial court's denial of Oliver's 3.850 motion but denied it as untimely filed. This approach was taken by the commissioner upon Oliver's motion for belated appeal. 22 Our problem is that the Second DCA did not explain its decision; it merely stated: 23 Petitioner, pro se, having filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, upon consideration, it is 24 ORDERED that said Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied. 25 It may be, for all we can tell from this language, that the Second DCA treated the petition as an appeal and denied it for lack of merit and not for noncompliance with a procedural rule. 26 The lack of explanation is significant because federal review is not barred by the defendant's violation of a state procedural rule if the state court has overlooked the possible procedural bar and decided the case on the merits. See, e.g., Campbell v. Wainwright, 738 F.2d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir.1984). Where, as here, the state court might have invoked a procedural bar but has provided no indication that it did so, a federal court must address the merits of the petitioner's claim. Id. at 1577. If the state court does not indicate that a federal constitutional claim is barred by some state procedural rule, a federal court implies no disrespect for the State by entertaining the claim. County Court of Ulster County, New York v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 154, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2223, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). Given the absence of any explanation for the Second DCA's denial, the district court should not have assumed it rested on procedural default but should have addressed the merits of Oliver's petition. 27 The fact that the Second DCA determined, in response to Oliver's petition for a belated appeal, that his attempted appeal had been untimely filed and not frustrated by state action does not tell us that the court did not deny the petition/appeal on the merits in the first instance. The commissioner did not find that the Second DCA had relied on procedural default to deny the petition/appeal but found that unjustified procedural default barred Oliver from receiving a new appeal. This finding tells us only that there existed a procedural ground on which the court might have relied to refuse to hear the merits in the first instance. As the untimeliness argument was advanced by the state's attorney's for the first time in response to Oliver's petition for belated appeal, we have no reason to believe it actually formed the basis for the summary denial. 4 28 There is a second reason that we should reach the merits of Oliver's claims. Even were Sykes to apply, we could not defer to the state court's rejection of Oliver's constitutional claim unless it were based on an independent and adequate state ground. Allen, supra; Spencer v. Kemp, 781 F.2d 1458, 1469 (11th Cir.1986) (en banc). Where the state applies its procedural bar only sporadically or the defendant could not fairly be deemed to have been apprised of the existence of the procedural rule, a federal court may entertain a petition for the writ. Spencer, 781 F.2d 1470 (citing cases). In this case, the only state ground for refusing to consider the merits of Oliver's federal constitutional claims addressed by a state court--untimeliness--is inadequate. 5 29 Had the Second DCA and the commissioner correctly applied Florida law, they would have found that the thirty-day period for filing an appeal from the trial court's denial of Oliver's 3.850 motion had never begun to run. Fla.R.App.P. 9.110(b) provides that a notice of appeal must be filed within thirty days of rendition of the order to be reviewed. See also Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 (directing that all orders denying motions for post-conviction relief shall include notice of right to appeal within thirty days of rendition of the order). Rule 9.020(g) defines rendition as the filing of a signed, written order with the clerk of the lower tribunal. There is no dispute that the only written record of the trial court's denial of Oliver's 3.850 motion is a minute book entry, which is not an order, let alone rendition of an order. Fla.R.App.P. 9.020(e). Thus, the act triggering the thirty-day filing period has never occurred. 30 In Williams v. State, 324 So.2d 74 (Fla.1975), the Florida Supreme Court explained that the purpose of Rule 9.020(g) is to set a uniform point from which timing requirements can be measured. In that case, the court held that a notice of appeal filed prior to rendition should not be dismissed but must be held by the clerk until the notice matures upon rendition of the order. The same procedure should have been followed by the Second DCA in this case. Oliver's notice of appeal, premature because filed prior to rendition, should have been held until it matured. 31 Thus, if the Second DCA indeed denied Oliver's petition as untimely, it erred under Rule 9.020(g) because no order of denial had been rendered to trigger the thirty-day period. If it denied the petition on the ground it was prematurely filed, it erred under Williams. Either way, its decision would have seemed an unfair surprise to anyone familiar with Florida law. The elements of inconsistent application of state law and unfair surprise render any decision that Oliver's petition/appeal was untimely inadequate to bar federal review of Oliver's constitutional claims. Spencer, 781 F.2d at 1470-71. 32 Because the state court did not indicate that it was applying a procedural bar in denying Oliver's petition/appeal and because any procedural basis upon which the state court might have relied to refuse to reach the merits of Oliver's claims is not adequate to foreclose federal review of those claims, we need not decide whether to extend Sykes to procedural default that occurs during state collateral proceedings. Instead, we go on to address the merits of Oliver's ineffective assistance and prosecutorial misconduct claims.