Opinion ID: 1492333
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Were there facts alleged which would support a verdict on grounds of strict liability?

Text: In this facet of the argument, Myers urges that we adopt the Rule of Restatement, Torts 2d (1965) § 402 A, which articulates the doctrine of strict liability irrespective of fault: Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. § 402 A was the basis of the decision in Ilnicki v. Montgomery Ward & Co., supra, 371 F.2d 195. The same contention was urged on us in Telak v. Maszczenski, 248 Md. 476, 237 A.2d 434 (1968), where we commented on the debate which § 402 A had invoked, and declined to espouse the cause of strict liability at that time. Nor are we prepared to do so in this case. Comment g to 402 A says that the section applies only where the product is, at the time it leaves the seller's hands, in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him. (Emphasis added) It is quite obvious that there was no change in the mower from the time Myers purchased it until the day of the accident. It would appear that Myers had used the mower for more than a year, and it is not unreasonable to assume that it functioned properly. Myers does not allege that the accident was the result of an unknown defect in the mower; at most he argues that the accident, caused by his fall and not by an unobserved defect, might have been prevented had the mower been equipped with certain safety devices. This is quite different from the situation in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897, 13 A.L.R.3d 1049 (1962), relied on by Myers where a defect in design caused a breakdown in the Shopsmith after some hours of use. As we have previously indicated, however, the absence of these safety devices was apparent at the time of purchase, and, in a free market, Myers had the choice of buying a mower equipped with them, of buying the mower which he did, or of buying no mower at all. For the reasons stated, we find no cause to disturb the result reached below. Order affirmed; costs to be paid by appellants.