Opinion ID: 3018373
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The district court gave sufficient reasons for

Text: not sentencing Lloyd below the guideline range. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(1), a district court is obligated to state in open court “the reasons for imposing a sentence at a particular point within [a guidelines sentencing] range” exceeding 24 months. That section obligates a district court to “give concrete reasons” for its sentence. United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 363 (3d Cir. 2002). Prior to Booker, we held that a court’s failure to comply with this requirement was harmless if it sentenced the defendant at the bottom of the guidelines range as the defendant received the lightest possible sentence, absent a departure. Id. at 363 n.15. Lloyd contends that now that the guidelines are merely advisory, a sentence at the bottom of the range is not the least possible sentence and, accordingly, a court’s failure to comply with section 3553(c)(1) is not harmless. Therefore, Lloyd argues that the district court must comply with the requirement to state its reasoning in all sentencings where the guidelines range exceeds 24 months, even in cases where the sentence is at the bottom of the guidelines range. Lloyd did not advance this contention in the district court. Even assuming that Lloyd is correct that a violation of section 3553(c)(1) is no longer necessarily harmless if the court sentences the defendant at the bottom of the guidelines range, in this case the court was in compliance with any requirement, if there was one, that it state its reasoning for imposing the sentence at a particular point within the applicable range and the fact that it did not give a fuller explanation certainly could not rise to the level of plain error or, indeed, any error at all.6 In reaching this conclusion we recognize that, of course, it is 6 We have explained the application of the plain error standard as follows: “Thus, for this Court to grant the relief the defendant[] seek[s], the District Court must have committed plain error that prejudiced them. Even where error and prejudice are found, we will only exercise our discretion to correct the error if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Merlino, 349 F.3d at 161 (citations omitted). 11 always possible for a court to say more at a sentencing than it does. Yet a court can provide “concrete reasons” for its sentence without speaking at great length and the court did so here. After all, among other things, it stated that Lloyd’s “criminal history for [a] relatively young man is significant and clearly played a role here,” and observed that the sentence was in proportion to the sentences of the two co-defendants. App. at 123. Moreover, the court referred to the original sentencing, in which it said: I want to make it clear that I don’t believe that you’re simply a misguided youth at this point in your life. You appear, from the evidence that I’ve seen, to be a sophisticated businessman . . . , but who has chosen as his stock and trade the poison of drugs, which are a curse on society and which, in supreme irony, inflict upon others the very circumstances that have been so terribly detrimental in your own life. That’s not lost on me at all. And the poison that you were instrumental in bringing into this community may very well be – indeed, it’s almost certain to be producing another boy whose mother or father will die early, who will beat and abuse them because of drug abuse, and who will, in turn, have their life wrecked. App. at 5-6. Plainly the court satisfied its obligation to provide “concrete reasons” for the sentence, which included Lloyd’s criminal record, the co-defendants’ sentences, and the danger of Lloyd’s crime to society. Indeed, we believe that ordinarily a court when fully explaining its sentence will satisfy section 3553(c)(1) even without mentioning that section. In the circumstances, we repeat that the court did not commit plain error or any error at all under section 3553(c)(1).7 7 Lloyd’s positions on this appeal seem to be inconsistent. First he argues that the guidelines are merely one factor among numerous considerations of equal weight in the sentence. Then he contends that section 3553(c)(1) has an enhanced significance after Booker, though it might be expected that his contention on the second point in view of his 12