Opinion ID: 1708005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Securing the PremisesExigent Circumstances

Text: The majority opinion quotes language in support of the proposition that the securing of the Johnson residence by officers, while waiting for a search warrant, was legal. Segura v. U.S., 468 U.S. 796, 810, 812, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 3388-89, 82 L.Ed.2d 599, 612-13 (1984). In fact, this language was not a part of the majority holding of Segura. Part IV of the opinion, from which these quotations are taken, was written by Chief Justice Burger, and only Justice O'Connor joined this writing. Thus, this is not persuasive authority for the legality of securing the premises in this instance. See also State v. Habbena, 372 N.W.2d 450, 455 (S.D.1985) (We find the decision to be of little precedental [sic] value.) Although the police did not proceed with a warrantless search, the warrantless entry and securing of the premises is nearly as repugnant. [T]he mere fact that law enforcement may be made more efficient can never by itself justify disregard of the Fourth Amendment. The investigation of crime would always be simplified if warrants were unnecessary. But the Fourth Amendment reflects the view of those who wrote the Bill of Rights that the privacy of a person's home and property may not be totally sacrificed in the name of maximum simplicity in enforcement of the criminal law. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290, 301 (1978). The Supreme Court has also stated that, The Fourth Amendment is designed to prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful police action. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n. 12, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2042 n. 12, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 696 n. 12 (1969). In any event, no exigent circumstances existed in this case. The Express Mail packagewhich the magistrate reasonably contemplated would be the focus of the searchwas safely locked in the trunk of Dalziel's car. In regard to exigent circumstances, this court has noted that the fact that there may be some delay or inconvenience in getting a search warrant is not a valid reason for averting the constitutional requirements. State v. Heumiller, 317 N.W.2d 126, 129 (S.D.1982). And, as stated by an Iowa appeals court, when the creation of [the] exigency was the officer's announcement to the [defendant] that he wished to search ... the appropriate rule to be applied in such a situation is that the State may not profit by an officer's choice to forego the constitutional process by attempting to create an exigency by his own actions. Latham v. Sullivan, 295 N.W.2d 472, 478 (Iowa App.1980). Rather than attempt to follow an accepted procedure for a controlled delivery as outlined in Engel, 465 N.W.2d 787, the officers in the present case chose to follow a different course. The State should not profit from that choice by pleading exigent circumstanceswhere none existedto justify the illegal securing of the Johnson residence. Thus, I dissent from the majority opinion's determination that the securing of the premises was legal. Additionally, I agree with Justice Henderson's writing on the issue of joinder. Under these facts, separate trials should have been granted to these defendants.