Opinion ID: 2191346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: state governmental immunity

Text: We now turn to the plaintiff's state law claims against defendant Zezulka. We must initially determine whether Zezulka is entitled to state governmental immunity. [5] To be entitled to that immunity, Zezulka must show that she was: 1) acting during the course of [her] employment and acting, or reasonably believe[d] [she was] acting, within the scope of [her] authority; 2) acting in good faith; and 3) performing discretionary, as opposed to ministerial acts. [ Ross, supra at 633-634. Citations omitted.] Although both parties agree that Zezulka satisfied the first two prongs of the state governmental immunity test, the parties argued extensively over whether Zezulka was performing a discretionary-decisional act. We note that the inquiries of immunity and negligence cannot be confused. Canon v Thumudo, 430 Mich 326; 422 NW2d 688 (1988). [T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the specific act complained of was negligent, but whether it was discretionary-decisional in nature. Id. at 350. In Ross, supra at 634-635, we decided that activities requiring personal deliberation, decision, and judgment are discretionary-decisional actions. However, acts requiring mere obedience to orders or performance of duties in which the individual had little or no choice are ministerial-operational activities. We also stated that the difference between discretionary-decisional acts and ministerial-operational acts was a difference between deciding to engage in an activity and the actual performance of that activity. We clarified this analysis in Green, supra at 12-13, when we stated that conduct involving routine administrative tasks or minor decision making, but not requiring the exercise of significant decision making, will be considered ministerial-operational in nature. Finally, we have also held that the failure to follow established policies or the failure to follow established security procedures are ministerial-operational actions to which governmental immunity would not apply. Ross, supra at 651; Bandfield v Wood, 421 Mich 774; 364 NW2d 280 (1985). With this background in mind, we undertake a factual analysis of the conduct at issue to determine whether Zezulka should be entitled to state governmental immunity. Green, supra at 9-10.
The plaintiff challenged Zezulka's claim of state governmental immunity on two grounds. First, the plaintiff argued that the failure to remove Hickey's belt when he was put into the DPS holding cell was a ministerial-operational activity. Second, the plaintiff argued that the failure to properly monitor Hickey once he was lodged in the holding cell was also a ministerial-operational action barring Zezulka's state governmental immunity claim.
MSU'S prisoner processing guidelines require the removal of all harmful objects from any detainees. The testimony about the removal of harmful objects showed that although the guidelines were not considered mandatory when they were written, the senior DPS officers considered removing a detainee's belt to be a mandatory requirement. These officers believed that the policy mandated the removal of all objects that could be harmful to the prisoner. These officers and additional experts also testified that a detainee's belt is always harmful. However, other testimony, including statements by Zezulka, indicated that the DPS guidelines were not specific directives, did not always require removal of a detainee's belt, and should be based on the officer's discretion. Although not every deviation from an established policy or rule will be considered a ministerial-operational action, Canon, supra at 350, the preparation of a detainee for holding was a ministerial-operational task that bars Zezulka's claim of immunity. Similar to the nurse's activities in Green, supra, the removal of harmful objects from a detainee was a routine practice that required only limited decision making. Furthermore, Zezulka was not deciding to engage in an activity, but was performing an activity under an established policy. Ross, supra at 635. Therefore, we find that Zezulka's actions in preparing Hickey for confinement were ministerial-operational activities not entitled to state governmental immunity.
Zezulka's alleged failure to properly monitor Hickey once he was put into the holding cell is also a ministerial-operational act that bars her state governmental immunity claim. [6] In Willis v Dep't of Social Services and Regulski v Murphy, companion cases to Ross, we held that the failure to supervise children during the course of recreation and classroom activities was a ministerial-operational activity not entitled to the protections of governmental immunity. Ross, supra at 640, 651. See Bandfield, supra . Our focus in these two cases was clearly on the visual monitoring of the children involved and not on the broader aspects denoted by the term supervision. The Random House Dictionary of the English Language: Unabridged Edition, p 1911. If the actions in Willis, Regulski and Bandfield were considered ministerial-operational in nature, clearly the failure to monitor Hickey once he was put in holding was a ministerial-operational activity that avoids Zezulka's claim of governmental immunity. The testimony at trial indicated that the MSU officer who brought in a detainee had the responsibility to properly monitor the detainee during detention. As with the failure to remove Hickey's belt, Zezulka was applying an established policy that only required minor decision making. Therefore, any failure to monitor Hickey once he was put into the holding cell was a ministerial-operational act which bars Zezulka's claim to governmental immunity.