Opinion ID: 1987143
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Elements of Intentional Interference Claims.

Text: Both theories alleged by the agents, intentional interference with contract and intentional interference with prospective business relations, require proof that the defendant intentionally and improperly interfered with the relationship at issue. See Willey v. Riley, 541 N.W.2d 521, 526-27 (Iowa 1995); Robert's River Rides, Inc. v. Steamboat Dev. Corp., 520 N.W.2d 294, 303 (Iowa 1994). The distinction between these torts is that to recover for interference with prospective business relations, a plaintiff must prove the defendant acted with the sole or predominant purpose to injure or financially destroy the plaintiff. See Willey, 541 N.W.2d at 526-27; Burke v. Hawkeye Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 474 N.W.2d 110, 114 (Iowa 1991). The existing contracts with which the agents claim Hawkeye interfered are the agents' contracts with the individual banks. As noted earlier, it is undisputed that these contracts were terminable at will. We have previously held that contracts terminable at will are more properly protected as a prospective business advantage rather than as a contract. See Water Dev. Co. v. Board of Water Works, 488 N.W.2d 158, 162 (Iowa 1992). Consequently, the higher standard of proof requiring substantial evidence that the defendant's predominant or sole motive was to damage the plaintiff is required. See id. In the present case, therefore, if the record lacks substantial evidence of such a motive, Hawkeye is entitled to summary judgment on both of the agents' tortious interference claims. We conclude such evidence is lacking.