Opinion ID: 877394
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Issue 2: Were there genuine issues of material fact in the case which made summary judgment inappropriate?

Text: Summary judgment is proper ... if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law ... Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P. Appellants contend that the District Court erred in granting the corporation's summary judgment motion because there were material issues of fact that were present and must be adjudicated by a trial. Appellants urge that they presented sufficient evidence to support their own summary judgment motion and to deny the respondent's motion. Appellants argue that because of their numerous affidavits the motion should be denied. Also, they contend that the contract voidability was a question of fact for a jury, that the judge's misquotation of their seventh defense was improper and that somehow res judicata has been improperly used against them. None of these arguments are on point. Nor are any of them sufficient to warrant a reversal of the District Court's ruling. Appellants presented nothing but fanciful and frivolous material, nothing which could be considered to be of a substantial nature. This is contrary to the law in Montana. Cheyenne W. Bank v. Young (1978), 179 Mont. 492, 587 P.2d 401, 35 St. Rep. 1806. The case law in Montana is clear on this issue and has been repeated and discussed numerous times. In Flansberg v. Montana Power Co. (1970), 154 Mont. 53, 460 P.2d 263, the Court held that the burden is upon the party opposing the motion to present evidence of a substantial and material nature raising a genuine issue of fact. Once the corporation had presented its facts in support of the motion, appellants had the burden of opposing the motion with their own facts. They failed to do so. The case law is explicit and the citations abound that the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to present material and substantial facts to oppose the motion. Harland v. Anderson (1976), 169 Mont. 447, 548 P.2d 613; Taylor v. Anaconda Federal Credit Union (1976), 170 Mont. 51, 540 P.2d 151; Rumph v. Dale Edwards, Inc. (1979), Mont., 600 P.2d 163, 36 St.Rep. 1022; 6 Moore's Fed.Prac. ¶ 56.16. In State ex rel. Burlington Northern v. District Court (1972), 159 Mont. 295, 496 P.2d 1152, we affirmed the rule that: Failure of the party opposing the motion to either raise or demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact, or to demonstrate that the legal issue should not be determined in favor of the movant, is evidence that the party's burden was not carried. Summary judgment is then proper, the court being under no duty to anticipate proof to establish a material and substantial issue of fact. 496 P.2d at 1155. In Harland v. Anderson, supra, the Court held that once the burden has shifted, the party opposing the motion is held to a standard of proof which is as substantial as that initially imposed on the moving party. Finally, in Naegeli v. Daniels (1965), 145 Mont. 323, 400 P.2d 896, the Court held that the trial court, in considering a motion for summary judgment, has no duty to anticipate possible proof that might be offered under the pleadings and that asking for such foresight demands clairvoyance not possessed by even a trial judge. The contentions for reversal that appellants argued (i.e., res judicata, contract voidability, etc.) were not presented in a substantial and material manner to the trial court. The court found the contract void because the reams of evidence presented by the respondent supported it, and one need only to look to the previous discussion to see that the evidence was awesome. Appellants had to present evidence to oppose this material. They did not, and, therefore, the summary judgment motion was proper. Appellants contend that the manner in which the judge construed their seventh defense should be sufficient to deny the motion. The substitution of the word further for later is not sufficient grounds in light of the tremendous amount of facts presented by respondent to warrant a reversal of the ruling. Finally, appellants argue that the judgment from causes 8221/8073 should not be used ( res judicata ) against them. The findings of fact and conclusions of law that were established in consolidated causes 8221/8073 are binding on the appellants. 6 Moore's Fed.Prac. ¶ 56; In Re Russell (1974), 115 Cal. Rptr. 511, 12 Cal.3d 229, 524 P.2d 1295. First, the issue is one that would involve collateral estoppel, i.e., issue preclusion; the issue does not involve res judicata, i.e., claim preclusion. Second, it would be burdensome, if not illogical, for a court not to recognize the findings and judgment of another court on the same factual issues. Finally, the contract was void ab initio in August 1968, and the contract remains so today.