Opinion ID: 2514627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: does the ugia confer to state officers an immunity from suit or an immunity from liability?

Text: ¶ 11 The distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from liability is important to the federal courts because it defines their jurisdiction. Under the collateral order doctrine, federal appellate courts have subject matter jurisdiction to hear appeals of orders denying motions to dismiss where the motions are based on immunity from suit. [7] They do not, however, have jurisdiction to hear appeals of orders denying claims of immunity from liability. [8] Thus, a federal appellate court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal turns on the scope of the immunity. [9] ¶ 12 When the claimed immunity derives from state law, the scope of the immunityi.e., whether the immunity in question is immunity from suit or immunity from liabilityis governed by state law. [10] Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has asked us to interpret the scope of the immunity conferred to state officials under the UGIA so that it can determine whether it has jurisdiction to hear the troopers' appeal. This is a question of first impression because, in Utah, there is no collateral order doctrine. [11] As a result, we have not had occasion to focus on the distinction between immunity from suit and immunity from liability under the UGIA.
¶ 13 The UGIA clearly grants immunity from suit to governmental entities. Section 63-30-3, the first substantive provision in the UGIA, begins with the following statement: Except as may be otherwise provided in this chapter, all governmental entities are immune from suit for any injury which results from the exercise of a governmental function.... [12] We have often referred to the immunity provided to governmental entities by the UGIA as a blanket immunity that protects the entities from suit unless a provision in the UGIA specifically waives that immunity. [13] ¶ 14 The UGIA does not contain a similarly explicit grant of immunity from suit to government employees. Nevertheless, section 63-30-4(3)(a) clearly provides that an action under the UGIA is a plaintiff's exclusive remedy for bringing suit against a government employee for an act occurring during the performance of the employee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under the color of authority. [14] By making suit under the UGIA a plaintiff's sole remedy against a government employee, the legislature extended to government employees the blanket immunity from suit that was explicitly granted to government entities. ¶ 15 A government employee's immunity from suit, however, is subject to three exceptions, [15] one of which is relevant here: a government employee can be sued individually if the employee acts or fails to act due to fraud or malice. [16] In order to successfully sue a government employee individually, a plaintiff must file a notice of claim with the proper government entity [17] thatas discussed in Part II of this opinioncontains an allegation of fraud or malice. When fraud or malice is properly alleged, the employee is not immune from suit and may be held personally liable if it is established that... the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or malice. [18] Accordingly, whether a notice of claim properly alleges fraud or malice raises questions regarding the employee's immunity from suit and not the employee's immunity from liability.