Opinion ID: 48706
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: failure to consult public defender on appointed counsel

Text: 122 Fields's first guilt-phase claim is that the district court erred by failing to secure the advice of the Federal Public Defender (FPD) before appointing him capital counsel. The appointment of counsel to represent indigent defendants in capital cases is governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3005. It provides that those charged with federal capital offenses are entitled to two lawyers, one of whom shall be learned in the law applicable to capital cases. Section 3005 further requires: In assigning counsel under this section, the court shall consider the recommendation of the Federal Public Defender organization, or, if no such organization exists in the district, of the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
123 After Fields was charged with a capital offense, his attorney, Scott Peterson, filed a motion pursuant to section 3005 asking the court to appoint a second attorney learned in the law of capital cases. Attorney Peterson advised the court that Rob Swanton had agreed to be co-counsel. The court stated that Swanton was more than acceptable because he was an excellent, excellent attorney. Two days later, the court entered an order formally appointing Swanton as lead counsel. It found, Mr. Swanton is learned in the law applicable to capital cases and is qualified to appear as counsel because of his distinguished prior experience in the trial of death-penalty cases. Fields made no objection either to the court's decision to appoint Swanton or to its failure to consult the FPD before so deciding. 124 After trial, Fields moved to supplement the appellate record with the affidavit of Lucien Campbell, the Federal Public Defender for the Western District of Texas. In the affidavit, Campbell stated that the district court did not request his recommendation for the appointment of counsel. The court granted the motion to supplement and acknowledged on the record that it did not confer with the FPD. It also stated, Scott Peterson and Rob Swanton were appointed to represent Mr. Fields because of their years of experience in the criminal defense field, including numerous capital cases. Additionally, Mr. Peterson was the Defendant's attorney of record on the original federal gun case for which he was in jail at the time of his escape.
125 Fields contends that we should review de novo even though he raises the court's noncompliance with section 3005 for the first time on appeal. However, a contemporaneous objection ordinarily is required to preserve error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). None of Fields's arguments provides justification for us to deviate from that general rule. Section 3005 came into play, at the earliest, only after the Government charged Fields with a capital offense. By that time, Fields already was represented by counsel, Attorney Peterson. Fields had ample opportunity to object below through his attorney on the grounds he now asserts. Since he failed to do so, we review his claim for plain error. Fields can only prevail if he shows that (1) there is an error, and that the error (2) is plain, (3) affects substantial rights, and (4) seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. See United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 169 (5th Cir.2005), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1444, 164 L.Ed.2d 143 (2006).
126 Assuming arguendo that Fields's claim would succeed on the first two prongs of plain-error review, it fails on the third prong. Fields cannot show prejudice. He acknowledges that the purpose of securing the FPD's recommendation is to ensure the high-quality representation necessary in capital cases. See United States v. Shepherd, 576 F.2d 719, 728-29 (7th Cir.1978). He does not argue, however, that the district court erred in determining that Swanton was an excellent attorney who was learned in the law of capital defense (indeed distinguished) or that the court incorrectly found that both his attorneys, Swanton and Peterson, had each tried numerous capital cases through years of experience in the field of criminal defense. Thus, Fields cannot show that the error affected his substantial rights. 32 127 Unable to show actual prejudice, Fields argues that no such showing should be required due to the fundamentally structural character of the error. The Supreme Court has indicated that the structural error doctrine applies only in a very limited class of cases. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999). Only errors that undermin[e] the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole . . . require[] reversal without regard to the mistake's effect on the proceeding. See United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004). The statutory error asserted here is not so fundamental. Additionally, there is no strong support in the operable statute to suggest an implied repeal of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52, which requires us to disregard errors that do not affect substantial rights. See Zedner v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S.Ct. 1976, 1989, 164 L.Ed.2d 749 (2006). 128 In support of his argument that the error here is structural, Fields cites a line of Fourth Circuit cases. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 544 F.2d 1215, 1218 (4th Cir.1976) (holding that failure to appoint second counsel under section 3005 gives rise to an irrebuttable presumption of prejudice). This line of cases is inapposite. They all involve district courts' failures to appoint any second counsel. Such an error is considerably more serious than what occurred here. Moreover, the Third Circuit has explicitly rejected the Fourth Circuit's presumed-prejudice approach to a court's failure to appoint second counsel. See United States v. Casseus, 282 F.3d 253, 256 n. 1 (3d Cir.2002). Without taking sides in this Circuit split, we decline to extend the Fourth Circuit's approach in the way Fields suggests. Accordingly, we reject Fields's claim that failing to consult the FPD before appointing capital counsel is structural error or that prejudice must be presumed. Since Fields cannot show prejudice, his claim fails. 129