Opinion ID: 2811842
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: mohsenzadeh’s challenges to term adjustments

Text: Pursuant to agency regulations, Mohsenzadeh re- quested reconsideration of the patent term adjustments for both the ’362 and ’963 patents. He argued that each patent was entitled to the 1,476 days that the PTO delayed in issuing the restriction requirement for the ’984 patent. The PTO denied both requests, reasoning that 37 C.F.R. § 1.704(c)(14) provides that when prosecution occurs via a continuing application, any delays arising prior to the actual filing date of the application will not apply to the application that results in the patent. Mohsenzadeh filed an action challenging the denials of his reconsideration requests under 35 U.S.C. § 154(b)(4)(A), which provides applicants a remedy in the form of a civil action against the Director of the PTO in the Eastern District of Virginia. The government moved for summary judgment, principally arguing that the repeated use of singular nouns throughout § 154(b)(1)(A)—“an original patent,” “an application”— followed by instructions on extending the term of “the patent” shows that an applicant “is entitled to ‘A delay’ only for the patent that yielded from the initial application.” J.A. 687–88. The district court granted the government’s motion for summary judgment on two grounds. First, the court held that 35 U.S.C. § 154 unambiguously requires that a patent term adjustment apply for delays that occurred during prosecution of the actual application from which the patent directly issued, not the application 6 MOHSENZADEH v. LEE from which it derived priority. Second, the court held that the PTO’s interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 154 was “reasonable and entitled to some deference.” The court then entered final judgment in favor of the government. Mohsenzadeh appeals from the grant of summary judgment to the government. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).