Opinion ID: 2119366
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Judgment on the Evidence

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed finding (judgment on the evidence) as to Count III, felony murder, at the conclusion of the State's case-in-chief. A defendant who proceeds to produce evidence in his behalf after the trial court denies his motion for judgment on the evidence waives his right to challenge that denial. Gajdos v. State (1984), Ind., 462 N.E.2d 1017; Miller v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 454, 417 N.E.2d 339; Love v. State (1980), 272 Ind. 672, 400 N.E.2d 1371. See also Dickson v. State (1988), Ind., 520 N.E.2d 101 (if evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction on appeal, then denial of motion for directed finding cannot be error). He argues, however, that in a multiple-count trial, a defendant should be allowed to present a defense to the counts of his choosing without waiving the rights to another [c]ount wherein he moved for a directed finding at the close of the State's case. Brief of Appellant at 68. He further asserts that automatic waiver should not operate to preclude a defendant from pursuing a bona fide insanity defense after denial of a motion for directed finding because the burden of proof is on the defendant to establish such defense. Ind. Code § 35-41-4-1(b). Assuming, arguendo, that waiver is inapplicable, we nevertheless find that the trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed finding (judgment on the evidence) with regard to Count III at the close of the State's case-in-chief. A trial court must grant a motion for judgment on the evidence where there is a total absence of evidence on some essential issue or where the evidence is without conflict and susceptible of only the single inference favoring the defendant. State v. Goodrich (1987), Ind., 504 N.E.2d 1023; White v. State (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 725; State v. Lewis (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 1110, cert. denied (1982), 457 U.S. 1118, 102 S.Ct. 2931, 73 L.Ed.2d 1331. Count III charged the defendant with felony murder, alleging, inter alia: On or about the 19th day of May, 1985, in the County of Allen and in the State of Indiana, said defendant, Terry Lee Lowery, while committing rape and/or criminal deviate conduct, or aiding Johnnie A. Winners, male/white/14, DOB: 3/31/71, to commit rape and/or criminal deviate conduct, to wit: by striking Tricia L. Woods with his fists to force said Tricia L. Woods to submit to sexual intercourse and/or criminal deviate conduct with Johnnie A. Winners and said defendant and co-participant, Johnnie A. Winners, did then and there kill Tricia L. Woods, a human being, by striking at and against the body of said Tricia L. Woods with their fists and a certainly deadly weapon, to wit: a piece of wood, and did thereby inflict a mortal wound in an [sic] upon the body of said Tricia L. Woods causing her to die on May 19, 1985. In its case-in-chief, the State presented the videotaped defendant's statement of June 24, 1985. During the course of that statement, the defendant's version was that on May 19, 1985, he and Winners drove Woods, Winners's thirteen-year-old girlfriend, to a nearby wooded area, which the three entered on foot. About twenty minutes later, the defendant observed Winners and Woods kissing. Winners then pulled a knife on Woods and requested that she have sex with him. Woods declined, and Winners threatened her that if she didn't, he would kill her. When she stated her intention to report Winners and the defendant to the police, the defendant hit her with his fist, which dropped her to the ground. At this point, Winners had sex with Woods and then refused to allow her to get up off the ground. Upon Winners's request, the defendant picked up two two-by-four boards to hit her with and handed one to Winners. The defendant then hit Woods in the back of her head with his board and it busted in half. When Woods tried to get up, Winners hit her in the face with a two-by-four and caved her face in. Next Winners put a stick up her vagina and kicked it. At this point, Winners and the defendant returned to the car and drove away. Record at 542-43. Winners's trial testimony contrasted with the foregoing description of events from the defendant's statement. According to Winners, when Woods, Winners, and the defendant arrived in the woods, the defendant asked Woods to have sex with him. When Woods refused, the defendant hit her on the back of the head with a two-by-four, then came around and caught her right eye and busted it open, whereupon she fell to the ground. The defendant then went down, put his hand over Woods's mouth and told her to remove her clothes. She complied and the defendant had sex with her, with Winners standing nearby. The defendant then instructed Winners to go back to the car, and the defendant joined him there ten to fifteen minutes later with blood on his hands and grass stains and blood on his pants. Winners heard the defendant admit killing Woods. Record at 571-73. The State's evidence also included the testimony of Allen County Police Officer Joseph King to whom the defendant voluntarily spoke as King was escorting him out of the courtroom following the initial hearing. As they walked out of the courtroom, the defendant asked King, did they say death penalty? Officer King responded in the affirmative, whereupon the defendant told him, I only hit her in the back of the head twice. Johnnie's the one that messed up her face. I only hit her until the two-by-four broke. Record at 606-07. The parties stipulated that the victim died from multiple blows to the face and head. The victim's nearly naked, badly decomposed body was discovered in the woods at the area described by both the defendant and Winners. The defendant contends that the State's evidence failed to prove rape of the victim by the defendant because of the absence of proof of vaginal penetration by the defendant. He argues that Winners's testimony that the defendant had sex with her, is insufficient proof of penetration to prove rape. In contrast the defendant's videotaped statement provides somewhat greater detail regarding the nature of the sexual activity he claims was forced upon the victim by Winners. When asked [w]hat kind of sex was it, the defendant replied, Just regular sex. He  he got on top of her. The defendant also denied that there was any other type of sex involved. Record at 544. This is sufficient to support a reasonable inference of penetration. The defendant further alleges an absence of proof that the he personally penetrated the victim's sex organ with the stick. Significantly, however, the felony murder count not only charged the defendant's personal commission of the felonies but also alternatively charged the defendant with aiding Winners to commit rape and/or criminal deviate conduct. A person is responsible for a criminal offense if he knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit the offense. Chinn v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 1000; Ind. Code § 35-41-2-4. The defendant's statements provide the evidence that establishes the occurrence of both rape and the criminal deviate conduct allegedly inflicted by Winners upon the victim, as well as the defendant's role as intentionally aiding in these crimes. Thus there was evidence favoring the State's alternative grounds in the felony murder charge. Moreover, while there is no evidence which directly establishes that the defendant personally committed the criminal deviate conduct, the indirect evidence is strong and substantial. It is through the videotaped defendant's statement that there is the description of the violent insertion of the stick into the victim's vagina. Winners testified that after he observed the defendant have sex with the victim, he returned to the car and did not see the defendant for ten to fifteen minutes. Winners stated that he did not observe the use of the stick to penetrate the victim's sex organ and that he first learned of this aspect of the incident shortly before trial. This evidence is clearly susceptible to the reasonable inference that it was the defendant, not Winners, who committed the criminal deviate conduct upon the victim. The trial court did not err in denying the defendant's motion for directed finding (judgment on the evidence) as to Count III, felony murder, at the conclusion of the State's case.