Opinion ID: 1985567
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Objections to DNA Testimony.

Text: Belken does not challenge the validity of the testing methods used by Harman or the science to support the testing results. Instead, he claims Harman was not qualified to present her testimony. Belken asserts she lacked sufficient education and experience, her laboratory was not accredited, and she failed to provide any statistical foundation for her random match probability opinion.
Like all expert testimony, the admissibility of DNA evidence must satisfy our accepted standards for admission of expert testimony. Yet, we have traditionally adhered to a liberal rule when reviewing claims concerning the admissibility of expert testimony. Mensink v. Am. Grain, 564 N.W.2d 376, 379 (Iowa 1997); State v. Buller, 517 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa 1994); Cook v. State, 476 N.W.2d 617, 620 (Iowa 1991). As a general rule, we permit expert testimony if it consists of specialized knowledge that will aid the jury in understanding the evidence or in deciding a material issue. Iowa R. Evid. 702; Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co. v. Black & Veatch, 497 N.W.2d 821, 827 (Iowa 1993); Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 32. We have previously found expert testimony explaining DNA evidence to be quite helpful to the trier of fact. See Williams, 574 N.W.2d at 297-98; Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 31-33. Additionally, the witness through whom the testimony will be offered must be sufficiently qualified as an expert in that particular field. Iowa R. Evid. 702. We afford the trial court wide latitude in its rulings on the admissibility of expert testimony, and reverse only if the court abused its discretion and the defendant was prejudiced. Buller, 517 N.W.2d at 713; Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 32. Any special knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education can qualify a witness as an expert. Iowa R. Evid. 702. However, no precise rule governs how a witness may acquire the requisite qualifications. 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 525, at 329 (1996). The witness need not be considered a specialist in the particular field as long as the testimony is within the general area of expertise. Hunter v. Bd. of Trs. of Broadlawns Med. Ctr., 481 N.W.2d 510, 519 (Iowa 1992); DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 138 (Iowa 1986). Furthermore, the witness need not possess a particular license, certification, or educational degree. See 7 Iowa Practice § 702.3, at 520; 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 524, at 327, § 525, at 329-30. On the contrary, witnesses may acquire expert knowledge through practical experience and training, as well as through formal education. DeBurkarte, 393 N.W.2d at 138; see Buller, 517 N.W.2d at 714. We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Harman's testimony regarding the DNA analysis she performed for this case. Although Harman did not obtain a special license or graduate degree, she received a bachelor's of science degree from the University of Missouri and took graduate courses focusing on DNA and statistical analysis from the Federal Bureau of Investigation Academy. Moreover, Harman received ongoing training in the field of serology, studying blood and body fluids, while employed as a forensic scientist by the St. Louis County Police Department for thirteen years. In addition, Harman attended numerous intensive seminars at a variety of institutions throughout the country involving DNA typing. Harman had been testing DNA samples for five years before she and her husband formed their own DNA testing laboratory in 1998. The evidence also reveals that Harman used a 310 genetic analyzer manufactured by Perkin-Elmer and received extensive training from the manufacturer on the use of the analyzer. Furthermore, Harman has engaged in proficiency testing five times a year by the American College of Pathologists. She has never failed any of the tests. Considering Harman's education, training, and experience, we conclude she was sufficiently qualified to testify as an expert witness in this case. See Buller, 517 N.W.2d at 714 (years of experience and training with dog qualified dog handler as expert witness regarding dog's reactions); Iowa-Illinois Gas & Elec. Co., 497 N.W.2d at 827-28 (extensive experience sufficient). Additionally, we do not believe the State was required to show Harman's laboratory was certified in order to independently establish she was competent to apply and use the DNA technology. The standards for admission of expert testimony relate to the ability of the analytical method to produce accurate results when properly applied. See Shea, 957 F.Supp. at 340-41. They do not necessarily relate to the skill of the particular individual using the analytical method. Id. at 340. The ability of an expert to perform the accepted method typically affects the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Id. at 341.
Statistical analysis is important in DNA profiling, but the basis for the average match probability is based upon methods of computation that are readily accepted in the field and have been adopted by the National Academy of Sciences. See Imwinkelried & Kaye, 76 Wash. L.Rev. at 456. Computer programs are used by DNA profilers to make the calculations based on the information they have attained from their analysis, which are accepted and relied upon in the field of DNA profiling. See Shea, 957 F.Supp. at 341. In this case, Harman utilized nine STR loci to arrive at her random match probability of one in 431 billion Caucasians. Although Harman is not a specialist in statistics, she has had significant training and experience in using statistical analysis in DNA profiling. See Mercy Hosp. v. Hansen, Lind & Meyer, P.C., 456 N.W.2d 666, 671 (Iowa 1990) (considering witness' experience and other education, he need not be an accountant to render an expert opinion on the computation of hospital profits); see also 7 Iowa Practice § 702.3, at 522. Furthermore, we find Harman adequately detailed at trial the statistical process used in reaching her conclusion that Belken's genetic profile could be found in only one in 431 billion Caucasians. In explaining how she calculated her conclusions, Harman explained the number of loci tested, the variations per locus, and the alleles frequency. She was also generally familiar with the mathematical and genetic principles which formed the basis for the calculation. Harman was not obligated to explain the specific mathematical computations utilized during the DNA process. See Iowa Rs. Evid. 703 (bases of expert witness' opinion testimony), 705 (expert witness need not disclose underlying data); Mercy Hosp., 456 N.W.2d at 671 (expert witness need not introduce the records reviewed in formulating opinion); see also 7 Iowa Practice § 703.1, at 529, § 705.1, at 555. To the contrary, Belken was responsible for bringing out the underlying data when cross-examining Harman. See Iowa R. Evid. 705; Mercy Hosp., 456 N.W.2d at 672. As the evidence of the DNA match was accompanied by the statistical probability, Harman's expert testimony satisfied the statistical foundation requirements delineated in our prior opinions. See Williams, 574 N.W.2d at 298 (finding error when DNA match evidence not accompanied by statistical probability); Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 32-33 (expert testimony regarding mathematical probability would assist jury in considering DNA evidence). Moreover, any asserted deficiencies in Harman's qualifications and the statistical foundation were considered by the jury in determining what weight to attribute to the expert testimony. See Hunter, 481 N.W.2d at 520; Brown, 470 N.W.2d at 33.