Opinion ID: 511959
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of defendants' statements

Text: 12 Vazquez objects on various grounds to the admission into evidence of the interchange between him and Pizarro in the supervisor's office. In that exchange, Vazquez said to Pizarro: Listen, why you say you know me? I don't know you. I don't you. I never seen you before. Pizarro's retort was:  'No me joda.' You know me. Now I'm going to get all the blame and you guys are going to get out. Because we find no error in the district court's evidentiary rulings on the admissibility of these statements, we reject Vazquez's contentions.
13 Vazquez's most significant claim is that the statements were the products of an unconstitutional custodial interrogation made before Vazquez had been informed of his Miranda rights. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). Specifically, we must decide whether the customs officials' action in taking Vazquez to the supervisor's office constituted a form of custodial interrogation, as that concept has been defined by the Supreme Court. If so, the failure to administer the Miranda warnings to Vazquez before bringing him to the room would require suppression of any statements he made as a result of the interrogation. In addition, Pizarro's response--as the fruit of Vazquez's statement--would also have to be excluded. 1 14 The Supreme Court developed the Miranda rules as a prophylactic measure to dissipate the coercion inherent in the custodial interrogation setting, with a goal of ensuring that any statements made by a suspect are truly the product of free choice. 384 U.S. at 457, 458, 86 S.Ct. at 1619. In Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a police practice not involving direct questioning was the functional equivalent of interrogation. The defendant, a murder suspect, had been picked up by police officers and was being driven to a police station in the back of the officers' cruiser. The defendant was separated from the officers only by a wire mesh and could hear and be heard by the officers. The murder weapon, a sawed-off shotgun, had not been found, and the officers in the car expressed their concern that handicapped children in the vicinity would come across it and be injured. Upon hearing the conversation, the defendant--who had been given a Miranda warning and who stated his desire to see an attorney before making any statement--directed the officers to the weapon. The question before the Court was whether his confession as to the location of the weapon was coerced or compelled, that is, whether it was the result of interrogation or its equivalent. 15 In addressing the issue, the Court reviewed the concerns that underlaid its decision in Miranda: Many police practices do not involve express questioning, but nonetheless create an environment in which the degree of coerciveness is equivalent to that of direct questioning. Such techniques of persuasion include the use of psychological ploys, such as to 'posi[t]' 'the guilt of the subject,' to 'minimize the moral seriousness of the offense,' and 'to cast blame on the victim or on society.'  446 U.S. at 291, 100 S.Ct. at 1682 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 450, 86 S.Ct. at 1615). The Court then concluded: 16 [T]he Miranda safeguards come into play whenever a person in custody is subjected to either express questioning or its functional equivalent. That is to say, the term interrogation under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. The latter portion of this definition focuses primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. This focus reflects the fact that the Miranda safeguards were designed to vest a suspect in custody with an added measure of protection against coercive police practices, without regard to objective proof of the underlying intent of the police. A practice that the police should know is reasonably likely to evoke an incriminating response from a suspect thus amounts to interrogation. But, since the police surely cannot be held accountable for the unforeseeable results of their words or actions, the definition of interrogation can extend only to words or actions on the part of police officers that they--should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. 17 Id. at 301-02, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). Applying that standard to the facts before it, the Court concluded that the record did not show that the officers should have known that their conversation about the handicapped children was reasonably likely to elicit the defendant's self-incriminating response. Id. at 303, 100 S.Ct. at 1690-91. 18 More recently in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520, 107 S.Ct. 1931, 95 L.Ed.2d 458 (1987), the Court considered whether police officers had interrogated a man suspected of killing his son when they allowed his wife to converse with him in the presence of another officer who openly recorded the defendant's statements. At trial, the sergeant, who had made the decision to allow the conversation to take place, testified that when he placed another officer in the room, he knew that the defendant possibly would make an incriminating statement. Id. 107 S.Ct. at 1934 n. 2. 19 Applying the Innis standard, the Court held that the officers' actions were not the functional equivalent of police interrogation. Although the police officers were aware of the possibility that Mauro would incriminate himself while talking with his wife, the Court stated that [w]e doubt that a suspect, told by officers that his wife will be allowed to speak to him, would feel that he was being coerced to incriminate himself in any way. 107 S.Ct. at 1936. The Court emphasized that the purpose underlying Miranda was to prevent[ ] government officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to extract confessions that would not be given in an unrestrained environment. Id. at 1936-37. That danger was not implicated in the case before it. Moreover, the Court found that the officers acted reasonably and in good faith; they were not required to bar suspects from speaking with their spouses or prohibited from doing so in a way that met legitimate security concerns. Id. at 1937. 20 In one way, this case is just like Mauro. The police brought together two suspects who might be expected to speak to each other. Mauro tells us that this action, without more, is not the equivalent of interrogation. Indeed, it could not be that simply bringing two individuals, even two suspects, together is so frequently likely to be coercive that the Miranda presumption should apply. 21 A customs official would have no reason to anticipate that processing simultaneously two narcotics suspects through search and arrest procedures would trigger an incriminating statement. Although two suspects who know each other might be expected to converse when placed side-by-side, that expectation is insufficient to trigger the prophylactic recitation of Miranda warnings. See Mauro, 107 S.Ct. at 1936 & n. 6 (a possibility that a suspect would incriminate himself is insufficient to meet the Innis standard). Unlike direct questioning, simply placing two individuals or suspects in the same area does not focus the police attention on a suspect in such a way that the suspect necessarily would feel added pressure--pressure above and beyond that inherent in custody itself--to say something. Innis, 446 U.S. at 300, 100 S.Ct. at 1689. That added, directed compulsion is what the Miranda doctrine was designed to alleviate. 2 22 Despite our clear sense that bringing two suspects together does not by itself trigger the need for Miranda warnings, this is a difficult and close case. See Mauro, 107 S.Ct. at 1939 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (It is undisputed that a police decision to place two suspects in the same room and then to listen to or record their conversations may constitute a form of interrogation even if no questions are asked by any police officers.) (Emphasis added.) In deciding whether the Miranda presumption of coercion should apply in a given case, it is appropriate to focus primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1690. Any knowledge the police may have had concerning the unusual susceptibility of a defendant to a particular form of persuasion might be an important factor in determining whether the police should have known that their words or actions were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. Id. at 302 n. 8, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 8. 23 In this case, at least some of the officials knew that Vazquez and Pizarro were providing inconsistent stories about their relationship. Thus, it could be argued that the customs agents should have known that the conflicting stories would make Vazquez feel unusually pressured when confronting Pizarro to say something that would persuade the authorities that he did not know Pizarro. In addition, unlike in Mauro, the authorities here could be reasonably sure of the nature of the comments likely to be made by the suspect and his possible associate--comments concerning their relationship that would be directly relevant to Vazquez's guilt or innocence. In Mauro, where the two individuals were husband and wife and there was no previous conflict in their statements to police officers, it arguably was less likely that any conversation would be directly relevant to the suspect's guilt or innocence, and thus incriminating. In Mauro, the couple would be just as likely to discuss personal matters. 24 These differences put this case much closer to the Miranda line than was Mauro. Nevertheless, we conclude that bringing together--in an otherwise non-coercive setting--two suspects who have given authorities conflicting stories is not sufficiently likely to elicit an incriminating response to meet the legal standard of interrogation. In this case, the record shows a sudden, spontaneous exchange between Vazquez and Pizarro as soon as Vazquez was brought into the supervisor's office. There is no suggestion that the customs agents thrust Vazquez in front of Pizarro in an effort to elicit a comment from either of them. Nor is there evidence of any other tactic designed to encourage Vazquez or Pizarro to erupt upon meeting. This room was neither packed full of hostile officers glaring at Vazquez nor was there evidence that the officers had primed Vazquez for the meeting by expressly suggesting that he confront Pizarro head-on. 25 Our conclusion on whether a Miranda violation occurred might well be different had Vazquez presented evidence showing that the customs agents sought to elicit incriminating statements from him. [W]here a police practice is designed to elicit an incriminating response from the accused, it is unlikely that the practice will not also be one which the police should have known was reasonably likely to have that effect. Innis, 446 U.S. at 302 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. at 1690 n. 7. Although a purpose to elicit information is not dispositive, our consideration of the actual impact of the technique cannot help but be influenced by whether the police believed that it would produce a response from the suspect. 26 In this case, however, Vazquez presented no evidence indicating that the customs officials engaged in a conscious design to create an interrogation environment. There is, for example, no evidence that the customs agent who brought Vazquez to the supervisor's office even knew that Pizarro already was there. In fact, the officers may simply have been processing Pizarro in the supervisor's office and, by happenstance or ordinary process, Vazquez was brought to the same room. Indeed, the customs officers may have planned, consistent with routine procedure, to give Vazquez the Miranda warnings when he reached the supervisor's office. That the exchange between the two suspects was unanticipated, and unintended, is a logical inference from the fact that Pizarro was quickly removed from the room after it occurred. 27 We note, moreover, that the defendant made virtually no attempt to prove to the district court that he was either in custody or interrogated. He failed to request a suppression hearing, and only through the most generous reading of the transcript can it be said that he preserved the custodial interrogation issue. Indeed, defendant did not attempt to exclude his own statement until the day after it was offered into evidence. His argument regarding Pizarro's retort, made briefly during a sidebar conference during trial, focused on whether it should not be admitted because of an in limine order excluding certain of Pizarro's post-arrest statements. Although counsel did allege during the conference that both defendants were in custody at the time of the exchange, this assertion seems to have related only to whether the statements were made after arrest for purposes of the in limine motion. Counsel never mentioned Miranda at this time, nor did he suggest that Pizarro's statement should be excluded because of a violation of Vazquez's constitutional rights. 3 28 Because we conclude that on this record the defendant has failed to show that the customs agents violated the Miranda doctrine, the district court did not err in admitting into evidence Vazquez's and Pizarro's statements.
29 Vazquez raises several other grounds for excluding Pizarro's statement, all of which are more readily rebutted. First, he suggests that the district court already had ruled the comment inadmissible in an in limine order. That order, however, merely excluded any post-arrest declarations by Pizarro made out of the presence of Vazquez. The out of the presence condition was requested by Vazquez himself. Clearly the statement in question is not covered by that order. 4 30 Next, Vazquez disputes the government's contention that the statement was admissible as the declaration of a co-conspirator under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), since that Rule excludes from hearsay treatment only statements made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Vazquez is correct in this regard--undoubtedly the conspiracy was over by the time that Pizarro accused Vazquez of leaving him holding the bag (so to speak), and the declaration is in fact hearsay. But Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is not the logical basis for admission of the statement. 5 Instead, it is admissible as a hearsay exception under Rule 803(2) because it was made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by [a startling] event or condition. 6 See United States v. Bailey, 834 F.2d 218, 228 (1st Cir.1987). The customs official testified that after Vazquez reproached him, Pizarro got mad at that moment and lashed out at Vazquez. Given the circumstances of the abrupt encounter, Pizarro's spontaneous statement had sufficiently substantial guarantees of trustworthiness to allow its admission as an exception to the hearsay rule. Indeed, if Vazquez had not been part of the plan to import, little purpose would be served in Pizarro accusing him of such; there would be no reason for Pizarro to implicate his friend unless he felt that he was being hung out to dry. 31 This same logic defeats Vazquez's final ground for exclusion. He contends that the statement amounts to a confession or admission of a codefendant, inadmissible as a violation of the confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment under the teachings of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). We already have held that Bruton does not present an obstacle to admission of a statement otherwise admissible as a spontaneous exclamation. McLaughlin v. Vinzant, 522 F.2d 448, 450-51 (1975). Recently we have established even more clearly that excited utterances, whose admission emanates from a firmly rooted hearsay exception, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), bear adequate indicia of reliability to avoid running afoul of the confrontation clause. Puleio v. Vose, 830 F.2d 1197, 1204-06 (1st Cir.1987). The admission of Pizarro's statement therefore withstands this final challenge.