Opinion ID: 2609775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Introduction of Pleadings or Settlement Agreements As Judicial Admissions

Text: Objections to appellants' offer into evidence of the pleadings and settlement agreements of Anselmi and Sleeping Indian Outfitters were sustained. These documents were offered in an apparent attempt to establish negligence on the part of Anselmi and Sleeping Indian Outfitters. Appellants argue that the trial court should have admitted prior pleadings and settlement agreements as judicial admissions. The admission of evidence at trial is within the sound discretion of the trial court and evidentiary rulings will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Wyo.1989); L.U. Sheep Co. v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 790 P.2d 663, 673 (Wyo.1990). W.R.E. 408 provides: Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) accepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotiations is likewise not admissible. This rule does not require exclusion when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or prejudice of a witness, negativing a contention of undue delay, or proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution. [emphasis added] Thus, under W.R.E. 408, evidence concerning settlements is not admissible to prove liability. Rule 408 is founded on public policy to encourage out of court settlements and is in the nature of a privilege. Coulter, Inc. v. Allen, 624 P.2d at 1202 ( citing the Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 408). The evidence of an offer to compromise is irrelevant since it may be motivated by a desire for peace, rather than any concession of weakness. Hursh Agency, Inc. v. Wigwam Homes, Inc., 664 P.2d at 36. See also McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 84 A.L.R.Fed. 259 (1st Cir.1985) (citing Advisory Committee Note to Fed.R.Evid. 408). The policy reasons for excluding settlement negotiations are so strong that courts have said [g]enerally, statements regarding settlement negotiations are considered to be highly prejudicial and are typically sufficient grounds for a mistrial. Georgia Casualty and Sur. Co. v. White, 582 So.2d 487, 494 (Ala.1991). New trials are often granted where evidence of settlement was admitted. See McInnis, 765 F.2d at 246. Although W.R.E. 408 does allow evidence of settlement to be admitted if not offered to prove liability, this exception should be used sparingly, with due care. Weinstein's Evidence notes: [c]are should be taken that an indiscriminate and mechanistic application of this exception to Rule 408 does not result in undermining the rule's public policy objective. The almost unavoidable impact of the disclosure of such evidence is that the jury will consider the offer or agreement as evidence of a concession of liability.    The trial judge should weigh the need for such evidence against the potentiality of discouraging future settlement negotiations. 2 J. Weinstein, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 408[05] at 408-31 (1991). Because of the potential prejudice when the issue is doubtful, the better practice is to exclude evidence of compromises or compromise offers. Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d 1356, 1364 (10th Cir.1987). Appellants contend that the agreements should have been admitted for the jury to correctly apportion fault among the settling and nonsettling defendants. The admission would have been highly prejudicial. The settlement agreements are not evidence of negligence or fault, yet the jury could have interpreted the settlement agreements as an admission of fault of a party not at fault at all. Further, were we to approve the admission of these settlement agreements, there would be a very real risk that parties would be deterred from settling future cases because of a fear that their agreement would be received in evidence and become public knowledge, thereby compromising goals in settling, i.e., not admitting liability in exchange for peace and plaintiff not having liability established detrimental to the continuing case against nonsettling defendants. Thus, attempts at settlement would be chilled. Appellants fail to articulate an acceptable reason for admitting the settlement agreements other than proving liability which is impermissible under W.R.E. 408. Next appellants contend that they should have been allowed to introduce appellee's original complaint and pleadings which contained the settling defendants as parties. Appellants argue that the pleadings constitute judicial admissions that Sleeping Indian Outfitters, Inc. and Paul Anselmi were at fault and should have been admitted under W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(C). W.R.E. 801 relates to hearsay. W.R.E. 801(d)(2)(C) provides: (d) Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if:       (2) Admission by Party-Opponent.The statement is offered against a party and is    (C) a statement by a person authorized by him to make a statement concerning the subject[.] Appellee alleged negligence on the part of Anselmi and Sleeping Indian Outfitters in the amended complaint. After settlement, the complaint was again amended to allege negligence only of appellants. Under W.R.C.P. 8 [2] a party may also state as many separate claims or defenses as he has regardless of consistency[.] W.R.C.P. 8(e)(2). Therefore, it was proper for appellee to include Sleeping Indian and Anselmi in the original complaint and later amend the complaint to eliminate claimed negligence on their part. Appellee took advantage of the liberal modern pleading rules and pled in the alternative. Appellants cite Louisell and Mueller stating that pleadings, answers to interrogatories, and responses to requests for admissions filed on behalf of a party in a civil action generally qualify as admissions by the party. 4 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, § 425, p. 302 (1980 and 1992 Supp.). Although appellants quote Louisell and Mueller, they fail to recognize limitations placed upon the introduction of pleadings. W.R.C.P. 8 allows parties to plead hypothetically, inconsistently, and in the alternative. Therefore, when an inconsistency in pleading is present because of the liberal modern pleading rules, use of the pleading as an evidential admission should be disallowed. Louisell and Mueller at p. 306. In a products liability case, the defendant attempted to introduce statements made by the plaintiff in his complaint as judicial admissions. Whatley v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 861 F.2d 837, 839 (5th Cir.1988). The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found that reliance on the pleadings was not proper because the pleadings provide little real evidence of the liability of the settling defendants, [and] they provide no evidence upon which a jury could determine the percentage or extent of liability[.] Whatley, 861 F.2d at 839. This argument against admitting pleadings is especially applicable here because the trial court found that the pleadings were in the alternative, were not admissions, and had no probative value. Furthermore, the appellants' attempts to introduce the pleadings into evidence were in reality an attempt to allude to the settlement agreements which were inadmissible. The trial court properly refused admission of the settlement agreements and pleadings.