Opinion ID: 609824
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jury power to recommend a sentence other than death

Text: 38 Section 848(k) provides that, if the jury finds certain aggravating factors, the jury must then weigh the aggravating factors against any mitigating factors to determine whether to recommend that a sentence of death shall be imposed rather than a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of release or some other lesser sentence. At Chandler's sentencing, the district court instructed the jury that, in the event that it did not recommend a sentence of death, it should not be concerned with the question of what sentence he might receive. The district court also stated that the judge alone would decide Chandler's sentence if the jury did not recommend death. 39 Chandler contends that the district court violated Section 848(k) as well as the Fifth and Eighth Amendments by withholding from the jury the authority to impose a sentence other than death. However, at a pre-sentencing hearing, Chandler's counsel asserted that I don't think they [the jurors] make a recommendation of a sentence if they don't recommend death. XIV-40. The proposed jury instructions submitted by Chandler advised that, if the jury did not recommend a death sentence, the responsibility for imposition of a non-death sentence rested with the district court. Because Chandler both argued for and submitted jury instructions stating that the district court alone was responsible for sentencing Chandler if the jury did not recommend death, Chandler invited the alleged error and cannot now, on appeal, complain that the instruction was erroneous. Leverett v. Spears, 877 F.2d 921, 924 (11th Cir.1989). 40 Had Chandler not invited the instruction, the district court properly construed Section 848(k). When the language of a statute is clear, the language controls any interpretation of the statute absent a legislative intent to the contrary. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246 (1981); Harper v. Better Business Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d 1561, 1563 (11th Cir.1992). We must look to the language and design of the statute as a whole in interpreting the language at issue. McCarthy v. Bronson, --- U.S. ----, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 114 L.Ed.2d 194 (1991). 41 The language of Section 848(k) is not perfectly clear, and the legislative history of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 consists of only a few debates on the Senate floor. Nevertheless, Section 848(k) can be confidently interpreted when it is read in the context of the statute as a whole. Several provisions of Section 848 suggest that Chandler's interpretation is flawed. Section 848(l ) provides: 42 Upon the recommendation that the sentence of death be imposed, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Otherwise the court shall impose a sentence, other than death, authorized by law. 43 The second sentence of this section instructs that the district court determines the sentence if the jury does not recommend death. Similarly, Section 848(p) provides: 44 If a person is convicted for an offense under subsection (e) of this section and the court does not impose the penalty of death, the court may impose a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. 45 Thus, the statute grants the district court the discretion to sentence a defendant to life without parole if a death sentence is not recommended. These sections preclude an interpretation of Section 848(k) that gives the jury the authority to impose a non-death sentence. Correspondingly, the responsibility for sentencing has historically resided with the trial court. In the absence of clear language in a statute to lodge the sentencing responsibility with the jury, we are reluctant to interpret the statute in a strained manner to reach that result. Hence, we find that Section 848 grants the district court the power to sentence the defendant where the jury does not recommend death. 46 Chandler next insists that our interpretation of Section 848(k) violates the Fifth and Eighth Amendments. Chandler relies on Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). In Beck, the Court held that a jury in a capital case must be permitted to consider a verdict of guilty on a lesser included non-capital offense where the evidence would support such a verdict. The jury will thus not be put in a position of choosing between guilt on a capital offense and acquittal. Chandler argues that the jury at his sentencing was put in a similar position. 47 However, Beck is not directly applicable in capital sentencing hearings. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1007-09, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3457, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983). In Chandler's case, prior to sentencing the jury found Chandler guilty of murder in connection with a continuing criminal enterprise. Therefore, the jury was not choosing between guilt of a capital crime and acquittal. It was choosing between a penalty of death and some other sentence yet to be determined by the trial judge. 48 Chandler also invokes Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175 (1980). In Hicks, the Court held that due process requires that a jury must be informed of all sentences that the statute allows it to impose when exercising sentencing power. Id. at 346, 100 S.Ct. at 2229. In Hicks, the jury was vested with the power to determine the defendant's sentence, capital or otherwise. In this case, Hicks provides no guidance. The issue before us is whether Section 848 gives the jury the power to recommend a sentence other than death. Unless that question is answered in the affirmative, Hicks provides no guidance. 49 The Court has ruled that there is no single correct way to structure a death sentencing procedure. Morgan v. Illinois, --- U.S. ----, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 2228, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464, 104 S.Ct. 3154, 3164, 82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). Indeed, there is also no constitutional requirement that juries be allowed to participate in capital sentencing. Id. at 459, 104 S.Ct. at 3161-62. Accordingly, there is nothing unconstitutional with the procedure Congress established in Section 848. The jury has the sole power to recommend a sentence of death. If the jury does not recommend a death sentence, the trial judge has the responsibility to impose a sentence other than death. Hicks is inapplicable to Chandler's case because the jury, in this case, was instructed on the full range of its sentencing power; that is, the power to recommend a death sentence. 50