Opinion ID: 1854829
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Development of Michigan's Choice of Law Jurisprudence

Text: The evolution of Michigan's choice of law jurisprudence has paralleled national trends. In Abendschein v. Farrell, 382 Mich. 510, 170 N.W.2d 137 (1969), this Court declined to join the emerging conflicts of law movement. In adhering to the doctrine of lex loci delicti, the Court asserted that the quagmire of unanswered and perceivably unanswerable questions arising out of the proposed new doctrine appears less attractive than our admittedly hard and fastand occasionally unjust, it is true rule that the law of the place of the wrong is applied when the forum is a Michigan court. [ Id. at 516, 170 N.W.2d 137.] Despite adherence to the traditional rule, Michigan courts continued to employ various escape devices in order to mitigate harsh consequences. See, e.g., Sweeney v. Sweeney, 402 Mich. 234, 262 N.W.2d 625 (1978); Shaheen v. Schoenberger, 92 Mich.App. 491, 285 N.W.2d 343 (1979); Branyan v. Alpena Flying Service, Inc., 65 Mich.App. 1, 236 N.W.2d 739 (1975). In these cases, courts readily found public policy reasons to displace the lex loci delicti with forum law. A majority of this Court finally abandoned the lex loci delicti rule in the companion cases of Sexton v. Ryder Truck Rental and Storie v. Southfield Leasing, 90 Mich.App. 612, 282 N.W.2d 417 (1979). After exhaustively reviewing the history of choice of law jurisprudence in Michigan, the Court noted that the purported advantages of the traditional rule were, in practice, nonexistent. The Court stated: Review of the arguments for lex loci and the alternate choice-of-law methodologies convinces us that slavish devotion to the rigidities of lex loci no longer is either the reasonable policy to follow or the generally accepted law in the United States. As a matter of fact, the courts of Michigan have frequently departed from lex loci in individual instances. [ Sexton, supra at 425, 320 N.W.2d 843.] While Sexton marked the end of the lex loci delicti rule in Michigan, it did not produce a consensus on the appropriate choice of law methodology to be applied. Justice Williams' opinion [18] expressly declined to embrace any of the modern approaches to conflicts of law. Id. at 433, 320 N.W.2d 843. Instead, his opinion held that forum law would be applied when Michigan residents or corporations doing business in Michigan are involved in accidents in another state and appear as plaintiffs and defendants in Michigan courts. Id. Justice Levin, on the other hand, wished to create a presumption in favor of forum law for all tort cases involving personal injury or property damage. He stated: [W]e should go the distance and declare that Michigan law will apply in all personal injury and property damage actions without regard to whether the plaintiffs and defendants are all Michigan persons unless there is some compelling reason for applying the law of some other jurisdiction, and that merely because the injury arose out of an occurrence in another state is not such a reason. [ Id. at 442, 320 N.W.2d 843 (Levin, J., concurring).] Because Sexton did not produce a clear majority, lower courts struggled with its application. Some courts read Sexton to apply only to cases in which all the parties are Michigan residents and adhered to the lex loci delicti rule for all other cases. [19] Other courts have read Sexton to require a balancing of interests of the various states in the event that one of the parties is not from Michigan. [20] This Court clarified much of the confusion surrounding Sexton in Olmstead v. Anderson, supra . Olmstead involved an automobile accident in Wisconsin between a Michigan driver and two Minnesota residents. The plaintiff, the administratrix of the estates of the deceased Minnesota residents, originally filed suit in Minnesota, but this suit was dismissed for improper venue and lack of jurisdiction. The plaintiff then filed suit in Michigan. The choice of law issue was vitally important in Olmstead, because Wisconsin law at the time limited recovery in wrongful death cases to $25,000. Neither Michigan nor Minnesota limited recoverable damages at that time. In addressing the choice of law question, this Court began with the presumption that Michigan law would apply. Id. at 24, 30-31, 400 N.W.2d 292. The Court then asked whether reason requires that foreign law supersede the law of this state. Id. at 24, 400 N.W.2d 292. In analyzing whether a rational justification for displacing Michigan law existed, the Court in Olmstead reviewed Wisconsin's interests in having its law applied. The Court noted that neither party was a resident of Wisconsin, and that Wisconsin therefore did not have any interest in seeing its limitation of damages provision applied to this case. The Court also noted that because the insurance companies of both parties knew of the possibility of unlimited liability, no unfairness would result from the application of Michigan law. Id. at 25, 400 N.W.2d 292. Because Wisconsin did not have an interest in having its law applied, the lex fori presumption was not overcome, and the Court did not undertake an analysis of Michigan's interests.