Opinion ID: 1863276
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Callens's Breach-of-Contract Claim

Text: In her original complaint, Callens, in her individual capacity, alleged that JCNH contracted with her to provide care and treatment for her mother and to preserve her mother's dignity. Callens states that she suffered damage as a result of the breach of contract. When JCNH moved for a summary judgment on Callens's breach-of-contract claim, it argued only that Callens's claim sounds in tort, not in contract and that her sole remedy is a wrongful-death action based on a claim of medical negligence. In opposition to JCNH's motion for a summary judgment, Callens submitted her affidavit and a series of documents that she characterized as a contract between her and JCNH. [5] These documents included an estimate of costs for a Medicaid patient (Exhibit A to her affidavit) and a description of the items and services included in the nursing home's daily pay rate for private-pay residents (Exhibit B to her affidavit). The description of items included in the rates for private-pay residents included [l]inen, housekeeping and maintenance services to ensure a safe, clean and comfortable environment. In her affidavit, Callens stated: During her stay in Jefferson County Nursing Home, [Presley] was forced to live in unsafe and unsanitary conditions; she was relegated to an ant infested bed; she was frequently dressed in unclean and urine soiled clothing; her unit smelled of urine; and her unit was infested with flies. Callens also included these allegations in her complaint. JCNH did not respond to Callens's submission in opposition to the summary-judgment motion. The trial court entered a summary judgment for JCNH, stating that Callens had not presented evidence indicating that Presley's death was caused by the alleged negligence. On appeal, Callens argues that the trial court erred in entering the summary judgment on her claim, made in her individual capacity, for damages for breach of contract. She again refers to the evidence in her affidavit regarding unsanitary conditions that, according to her affidavit, indicate a breach of contract. While Callens does not specifically draw our attention to the aforementioned portion of Exhibit B that says Presley would be ensured a safe, clean and comfortable environment, it is part of the materials she submitted in the trial court as evidence of her contract. JCNH's only response is the same argument it made in the trial courtthat Callens's claim arises in tort, not in contract. JCNH does not controvert the plaintiff's claim of contamination, nor does it argue that the referenced portion of Exhibit B does not create an express contract sufficient to take this case beyond the realm of cases where a duty is only implied from a contract lacking specificity as to the manner of performance. See Wilkinson v. Moseley, 18 Ala. 288 (1850), cited with approval in Eidson v. Johns-Ridout's Chapels, Inc., 508 So.2d 697 (Ala.1987). The Wilkinson court provided an example that is helpful in this case. A contract to ride a horse to a specified place cannot support an action in contract if the rider's excessive speed kills the horse, because the contract only implies a duty to ride at a moderate speed. On the other hand, a contract to ride a horse to a specified place at a reasonable speed would give rise to a claim for breach of contract if the rider rode at an excessive speed. Wilkinson, 18 Ala. at 291. In this present case, the duty to maintain sanitary conditions is expressed in the contract; therefore, a breach of that duty is actionable in contract. We reverse the summary judgment insofar as it related to Callens's breach-of-contract claim.