Opinion ID: 3162598
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Enumerated-Offense Clause

Text: A prior conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate offense if it “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives.” § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). To determine if a past conviction is for one of those crimes, this Court utilizes a categorical approach in which we “compare the elements of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements of the No. 15-5136 United States v. Priddy Page 8 ‘generic’ crime - i.e., the offense as commonly understood.” Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2281 (2013). The prior conviction “qualifies as an ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.” Id. If the prior conviction involves the violation of a “divisible” statute—i.e., one which consists of multiple, alternative versions of the crime—then this Court utilizes a “modified categorical approach” and “consult[s] a limited class of documents, such as indictments and jury instructions, to determine which alternative formed the basis of the defendant’s prior conviction.” Id. at 2281. In this second step, we may consult “the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial record of this information” to determine the precise subsection to which Defendant pleaded guilty. Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 26 (2005). 1. Defendant’s Three Aggravated Burglary Convictions Tennessee law explains the elements of aggravated burglary in Tenn.Code Ann. § 39–14– 403: “Aggravated burglary is burglary of a habitation as defined in §§ 39–14–401 and 39–14– 402.” The Supreme Court of Tennessee elaborated on this definition in State v. Langford, 994 S.W.2d 126 (Tenn. 1999), stating that “[a]ggravated burglary occurs when an individual enters a habitation ‘without the effective consent of the property owner’ and . . . intends to commit a felony.” Id. at 127 (quoting Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39–14–402 to –403). Relying on this state-law definition of the crime, this Court has held that Tennessee’s aggravated burglary statute “represents a generic burglary capable of constituting a violent felony for ACCA purposes.” United States v. Nance, 481 F.3d 882, 888 (6th Cir. 2007). Because the Tennessee aggravated burglary statute is a generic version of the crime of burglary, it constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA’s enumerated-offense clause, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) (listing burglary as a violent felony). Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 599 (1990) (“We conclude that a person has been convicted of burglary for purposes of a § 924(e) enhancement if he is convicted of any crime, regardless of its exact definition or label, having the basic elements of unlawful or unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.”). No. 15-5136 United States v. Priddy Page 9 The holdings from Taylor and Nance are controlling and establish that a Tennessee conviction for aggravated burglary is categorically a violent felony under the ACCA’s enumerated-offense clause. 2. Defendant’s Two Burglary Convictions The Tennessee burglary statute under which Defendant was convicted provides that a person commits burglary when, “without, the effective consent of the property owner,” he (1) Enters a building other than a habitation (or any portion thereof) not open to the public, with intent to commit a felony or theft; (2) Remains concealed, with the intent to commit a felony or theft, in a building; (3) Enters a building and commits or attempts to commit a felony or theft; or (4) Enters any freight or passenger car, automobile, truck, trailer, boat, airplane or other motor vehicle with intent to commit a felony or theft. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–402(a) (1990). Because the statute “list[s] potential offense elements in the alternative,” it is divisible under Descamps. See also United States v. Moore, 578 F. App’x. 550, 553 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–402 is divisible under Descamps); Mitchell, 743 F.3d at 1065 (“The ordinary use of the conjunction ‘or’ is almost always disjunctive, that is, the words it connects are to be given separate meanings” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). We find that the first three variants of Tennessee burglary, i.e., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39– 14–402(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), qualify as generic burglary since they each involve “unprivileged entry into, or remaining in, a building or structure, with intent to commit a crime.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 599. We also find that Tennessee burglary under § 39–14–402(a)(1) involves the “entry-into” variant of generic burglary since it substantially corresponds to Taylor’s definition of generic burglary. Likewise, burglary under § 39–14–402(a)(2) tracks Taylor’s definition of the “remaining-in” variant of generic burglary. And, burglary under § 39–14–402(a)(3) is also a “remaining-in” variant of generic burglary because someone who enters a building or structure and, while inside, commits or attempts to commit a felony will necessarily have remained inside the building or structure to do so. See, e.g., Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602 (“[A]n offense constitutes ‘burglary’ for purposes of [the ACCA] if either its statutory No. 15-5136 United States v. Priddy Page 10 definition substantially corresponds to ‘generic’ burglary, or the charging paper and jury instructions actually required the jury to find all the elements of generic burglary in order to convict the defendant.”). On the other hand, the fourth variant of Tennessee burglary, i.e., Tenn. Code Ann. § 39– 14–402(a)(4), does not qualify as generic burglary since the locations listed in that subsection of the statute are not buildings or structures. See, e.g., Shepard, 544 U.S. at 15-16 (“The [ACCA] makes burglary a violent felony only if committed in a building or enclosed space (“generic burglary”), not in a boat or motor vehicle.”); Moore, 578 F. App’x. at 553 (finding that burglary under Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–402(a)(4) does not qualify as generic burglary). The Tennessee burglary statute, however, provides an easier way to distinguish the variants of the offenses which are generic burglary–§ 39–14–402(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)–from the variant which is not–§ 39–14–402(a)(4). The statute labels violations of its first three subsections as “Class D felonies,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–402(c), but labels a violation of the fourth subsection as only a “Class E felony,” Tenn. Code Ann. § 39–14–402(d). See also Moore, 578 F. App’x. at 554 (noting the class of felony distinctions in the Tennessee burglary statute). Therefore, if the conviction records for a Tennessee burglary offense indicate that the defendant was convicted of a Class D felony, then that offense was necessarily a violation of Tenn. Code Ann. § 402(a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3) and, as a result, was a generic burglary under Taylor. See id. (“Because [the Shepard documents] indicate that Moore pleaded guilty to a Class D version of burglary . . . we can safely conclude that Moore must have been charged with violating subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3).”). Id. Here, both Defendant and the government agree that Defendant pleaded guilty to a Class D felony. Given this fact, we can safely conclude that Defendant must have been charged with violating subsection (a)(1), (a)(2), or (a)(3). However, Defendant argues that it is impossible to determine which precise subsection he violated. Ultimately, though, we conclude that it makes little difference. The important takeaway is that Defendant could not have pleaded guilty to violating subsection (a)(4) because a violation of that subsection is a Class E felony. Therefore, because each of those subsections qualifies as generic burglary under Taylor, Defendant’s offenses were necessarily generic burglaries and, thus, violent felonies under the ACCA. No. 15-5136 United States v. Priddy Page 11