Opinion ID: 534763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Crutchfield's Arguments

Text: 14 Notwithstanding this evidence of congressional intent, Crutchfield contends that the Constitution compels application of the IDRA's substantive release test to him and makes two arguments to that effect. We will address each in turn. 15 While some of the intricacies of Crutchfield's first argument escape us, he appears to contend that the Constitution does not empower the federal district court in D.C. to consider detaining a person because his mental illness renders him dangerous to himself. Rather, the Constitution leaves such parens patriae functions solely to the states and to the District of Columbia. Brief for Appellant, Questions Presented. More specifically, he argues that the passage of the IDRA made application of the D.C.Code's self-harm provision by the district court unconstitutional because the existence of the [IDRA] ousts the district court of power to use that non-federal standard. Brief for Appellant at 30. 8 16 We fail to see how the Constitution precludes Congress from mandating that the D.C. district court apply the D.C.Code's insanity discharge provisions to those federally committed under the D.C.Code while simultaneously mandating IDRA application in all other cases. Federal courts commonly apply local law. So long as equal protection rights are not violated, the Constitution explicitly authorizes the Congress to make such a distinction. Article I, Sec. 8, cl. 17 grants the federal government the authority [t]o exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District ... as may ... become the Seat of the Government of the United States. 17 Crutchfield does make an equal protection argument, however, but we do not find it persuasive. First, prior to the IDRA's passage we held in United States v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 128 (D.C.Cir.1984), that application of the D.C.Code's commitment provisions to federal defendants in D.C. in the absence of a generally applicable federal provision did not constitute an equal protection violation. The fact that Congress has since enacted the IDRA, the discharge provisions of which are slightly different than those of the D.C.Code, works no significant change in terms of equal protection analysis. As we explained in great detail in Cohen, 733 F.2d at 132-36, equal protection challenges to the D.C.Code's commitment provisions are reviewed according to the rational basis test, under which a statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961). The fact that Congress has explicit constitutional authority to legislate for the District is in and of itself enough to satisfy the rational basis test. But even absent that constitutional grant, Congress' decision to apply the same statute for commitment as well as discharge purposes--D.C.Code Sec. 24-301--is not only reasonable, but given the IDRA's higher burden of proof, also may be constitutionally required. 9