Opinion ID: 1242733
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Admissibility of Cheng's Confession

Text: Cheng contends that the trial court erred in refusing to suppress incriminatory statements he made to Officer Kwan. Cheng claims that Kwan should have advised Cheng of his rights according to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), before Kwan questioned him. The record discloses that on September 8, shortly after Cheng had been taken into police custody, Officer Carter advised Cheng of his Miranda rights and that Cheng acknowledged his understanding. Thereafter, Cheng elected to talk with Carter and gave the officer a non-incriminating statement. The two-hour interrogation ended about midnight. About 9:00 a.m. the next day, Officer Kwan, while performing certain duties at the county jail, encountered Cheng. Kwan recognized Cheng because of their prior association. Kwan asked Cheng, What happened? Cheng first responded that he didn't do it. Later, Cheng told Kwan that he wanted to confess, and Kwan advised him to talk first with a lawyer. Cheng, however, proceeded to tell Kwan that he had to do it because the man had put the contract on him. In Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 548-49, 323 S.E.2d 577, 586 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111, 105 S.Ct. 2347, 85 L.Ed.2d 863 (1985), we held that where a person, after receiving Miranda warnings, has once given a knowing and intelligent waiver of his constitutional rights, such waiver will be presumed to continue in effect throughout subsequent custodial interrogations until the suspect manifests, in some way which would be apparent to a reasonable person, his desire to revoke it. An express written or oral statement of waiver of rights is not required. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 1757, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979). Waiver can be inferred from the actions and words of the person interrogated. Id. In the present case, Cheng's decision to talk with Officer Carter, after having been advised of the Miranda rights, constitutes an implied waiver of those rights. Cheng never manifested a desire to revoke the waiver at anytime thereafter. He never expressed a desire to talk with an attorney. We conclude, therefore, that Cheng's incriminatory statements were made freely and with full knowledge of his Miranda rights.