Opinion ID: 2435979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Damages in Trespass Cause of Action

Text: Our final inquiry in this case, having affirmed the existence of the trespass cause of action, is the appropriate measure of damages. Initially, we note that the rules for determining damages [in trespass actions] are based upon the purposes for which such actions are maintainable [including t]o give compensation ..., [and t]o punish wrongdoers and deter wrongful conduct... . 75 Am.Jur.2d Trespass § 118, at 89 (1991). While both parties acknowledge plaintiff's right to recover compensatory damages for the taking of plaintiff's property, defendant disputes any right to recover punitive damages. In trespass actions generally, an award of punitive damages is discretionary with the trier of fact. Id. § 148, at 111. Punitive damages may be awarded for a trespass which is wanton, oppressive, or accompanied with outrage or other aggravating circumstances. Id., § 150, at 112-13. Their purpose is to punish for outrageous conduct and to deter similar future conduct. Id., § 148, at 111. Our older cases have applied these rules of law in trespass actions involving property takings by authorized authorities. In three cases involving the wrongful cutting of trees by authorities, some with permission, some expressly without, we allowed the consideration of punitive damages. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Shaw, 102 Tenn. 313, 52 S.W. 163, 164 (1899); Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Poston, 94 Tenn. 696, 30 S.W. 1040, 1041 (1895); Memphis Bell Telephone Company v. Hunt, 84 Tenn. 456, 1 S.W. 159, 160 (1886). In Poston and Shaw, we reiterated the general rule that the jury could, in its discretion, award punitive damages upon a finding that the trespass  in these cases, the cutting of trees  was done fraudulently, wantonly, oppressively, or with gross negligence. Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Poston, 30 S.W. at 1041; Cumberland Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Shaw, 52 S.W. at 164. We recently revisited the issue of punitive damages in trespass actions in Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tenn. 1992). There, we relied on three nineteenth century cases. In an action of trespass the jury [is] not restrained, in their assessment of damages, to the amount of the mere pecuniary loss sustained by the plaintiff, but may award damages in respect of the malicious conduct of the defendant, and the degree of insult with which the trespass has been attended.... [T]hese damages should operate to punish the defendant and deter others ... [and] were legally appropriate in cases of fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d at 900 (quoting Wilkins v. Gilmore, 21 Tenn. 140, 141 (1840); Polk, Wilson & Co. v. Fancher, 38 Tenn. 336, 341 (1858); & Byram v. McGuire, 40 Tenn. 530, 532 (1859)). Defendant argues that later authority has abandoned the proposition set forth in these earlier cases. It cites Shelby County v. Barden, 527 S.W.2d 124, 127 (Tenn. 1975) and Betty v. Metropolitan Government, 835 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tenn. Ct. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1992). Neither of these cases, however, involved an owner-initiated trespass cause of action. Barden was an inverse condemnation action which involved the division of damages between a lessor and lessee of taken property. Shelby County v. Barden, 527 S.W.2d at 126. Our statement that the measure of damages to the landowner [in an inverse condemnation action] is that used in condemnation cases, does not foreclose the availability of punitive damages in the rare, appropriate trespass case for two reasons. First, the case did not involve the issue. It was an inverse condemnation action, not a trespass action. [6] Second, we are not authorized by judicial decision to take away a right conferred by statute. Concomitant with the legislative right to sue for trespass is the corresponding remedy which may in unusual, unique cases include punitive damages. Equally inapposite to defendant's position is the Betty case. That case was also an inverse condemnation proceeding, coupled with claims under the Governmental Tort Liability Act. Its thorough instructions regarding damages did not purport to resolve the issue we face, though it did acknowledge, in dicta, that in actions for `damages in the ordinary way' ... a property owner's measure of damages is the same as in any other case involving injury to real property. Betty v. Metropolitan Government, 835 S.W.2d at 7. That dicta is the holding of this case. A property owner who sues for damages in a trespass action against a taking authority may, in an appropriate case, recover punitive damages. Those appropriate cases will be few. Punitive damages are only available in egregious circumstances in which the trespass is accomplished fraudulently, wantonly, oppressively, or with gross negligence. Furthermore, punitive damages are not available against many taking authorities. But in those rare cases in which the requisite elements can be established, punitive damages may be awarded, in the factfinder's discretion. Our explicit recognition that punitive damages are available in appropriate cases based on common-law trespass rather than statutory inverse condemnation grounds is required by legal and practical considerations. The creation of the statutory inverse condemnation cause of action does not impair the common law right of action unless expressly stated. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d at 899. Here, the right is expressly reserved, as must be the corresponding remedy. Moreover, we believe that the availability of punitive damages in appropriate condemnation cases is necessary to compensate fully aggrieved landowners in accordance with the constitution. Our statute provides explicit procedures which entities with the power of eminent domain should follow. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-16-105  -122 (1980 Repl.). Those entities which proceed in compliance with those procedures are afforded protections, including the ability to avoid punitive damages claims. Those who fail to avail themselves, should under appropriate circumstances, be liable to the landowner for the full measure of damages appropriate to the cause of action. Accordingly, we reverse the prior order dismissing the request for punitive damages. On remand, the issue will be determined in accordance with the principles set forth in this opinion and in Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).