Opinion ID: 2808502
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Logan next contends that the Commonwealth introduced insufficient evidence to prove that Harriet engaged in prostitution or that she transferred any money to him. Logan challenged the sufficiency of the evidence on direct appeal. The Massachusetts Appeals Court -- applying its familiar sufficiency standard under Commonwealth v. Latimore, 393 N.E.2d 370 (Mass. 1979) -- rejected this claim. Barbosa I, 2010 WL 680349, at - 2. We have held that the Latimore test that the Appeals Court applied is functionally identical to the Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), standard the Supreme Court applies in sufficiency challenges, as Logan concedes. See Leftwich v. Maloney, 532 F.3d 20, 23-24 (1st Cir. 2008). The operative - 11 - question for determining sufficiency of the evidence is whether, 'after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.' Latimore, 393 N.E.2d at 374 (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). Under § 2254(d), Logan can prevail on this claim only if the Appeals Court unreasonably applied this standard. It did not. There was more than enough evidence to prove that Harriet was engaged in prostitution and that Logan knew that fact. Police detectives observed Harriet and another young woman walking down a street in an area known to attract prostitution activity in a manner consistent with prostitution on the night of February 23, 2004. One of the detectives observed Harriet perform oral sex on a man in a parked truck on February 24. Harriet spoke briefly on a walkie-talkie after leaving the truck and before entering another car for approximately ten minutes, and Logan had a walkie-talkie on him when he was arrested, at which time Harriet was in his vehicle. Logan argues that, even if Harriet was involved in prostitution, he could have been a john rather than a pimp. In support of this argument, he notes that his zipper was down when he was pulled over. But this evidence does not mean that the state - 12 - court unreasonably applied the facts to the law on this element. [W]hen the record is fairly susceptible of two competing scenarios, the choice between those scenarios ordinarily is for the jury. Morgan v. Dickhaut, 677 F.3d 39, 48 (1st Cir. 2012) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Logan had a large amount of cash on him, a walkie-talkie (like Harriet), and was present on Beecham Street on both nights. This evidence allowed the jury to conclude that he was not merely Harriet's customer. The state court did not unreasonably apply the law in supporting the jury's choice of one view over the other. The conclusion that Harriet transferred money to Logan was also reasonable. Not only did the detectives observe Harriet and her companion enter Logan's car on February 23, Harriet was also a passenger in Logan's car when Logan was arrested the following night. Upon being arrested in the gray Saab, Logan had $1,459 in cash on him, while Harriet had $32 in cash on her -- less than the $40 to $60 that Detective Hall testified was the average rate for oral sex from a prostitute in the area. See id. at 47 ([A] conjecture consistent with the evidence becomes less and less a conjecture, and moves gradually toward proof, as alternative innocent explanations are discarded or made less likely. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). - 13 -