Opinion ID: 60520
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Final Policymaker Analysis

Text: Maschmeier filed suit against Scott in his official capacity as Sheriff of Lee County only. Suits against state officials in their official capacity are treated as suits against the state itself. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 25, 112 S. Ct. 358, 361 (1991). Maschmeier’s suit therefore attempts to hold Lee County liable for Scott’s actions as Sheriff. Municipalities cannot be liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on a theory of respondeat superior. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691, 98 S. Ct. 2018, 2036 (1978). Rather, “[m]unicipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may be premised upon a single illegal act by a municipal officer only when the challenged act may fairly be said to represent official policy, such as when that municipal officer possesses final policymaking authority over the relevant subject matter.” Morro v. City of Birmingham, 117 F.3d 508, 510 (11th Cir. 1997). Therefore, in order for Maschmeier to prevail on his § 1983 claims, Scott must have been the final policymaker in regard to Maschmeier’s termination. A municipal official is not a final policymaker when his or her decisions are subject to meaningful administrative review. Scala, 116 F.3d at 1401. Automatic review of the official’s decisions is not required for the review to be meaningful; an opportunity for meaningful review is sufficient. Id. at 1402. When a council or board has the power to review and reverse a municipal official’s decision, final 5 policymaking authority does not vest in the official. See Id. (holding that a city manager and his subordinate were not final policymakers in regard to plaintiff’s termination because a civil service board had the authority to review the termination); Quinn v. Monroe County, 330 F.3d 1320, 1326 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding that the career services council’s power to review the county administrator’s termination decision deprives the county administrator of final policymaking authority); Manor Healthcare Corp. v. Lomelo, 929 F.2d 633, 637 (11th Cir. 1991) (holding that the city council’s ability to override the mayor’s veto in regard to zoning issues meant that the mayor was not the final policymaker for zoning decisions). The plaintiff can try to demonstrate that the board’s review is not meaningful, such that the official should be considered the final policymaker. See Quinn, 330 F.3d at 1326; Scala, 116 F.3d at 1402. To succeed in such an argument, the plaintiff would need to show that the board has defective procedures, merely “rubber stamps” the official’s decisions, or ratified the official’s decision and improper motive. See Quinn, 330 F.3d at 1326; Scala, 116 F.3d at 1402. However, the existence of a reviewing board has generally been sufficient to find that the official in question did not have final policymaking authority. See, e.g., Quinn, 330 F.3d at 1326; Morro, 117 F.3d at 514; Scala, 116 F.3d at 1402-03. 6 In this case, there is a civil service board (“Board”) that reviews the sheriff’s termination decisions. The Board has the authority to reinstate an employee terminated by the sheriff. Maschmeier has not argued that the Board’s proceedings or process are deficient, nor has he argued that the Board ratified Scott’s allegedly unconstitutional decision and improper motive.3 Instead, Maschmeier contends that because the Board has only overturned one termination by the sheriff in fifteen years, it does not provide meaningful review of the sheriff’s decisions. Even taken in the light most favorable to Maschmeier, we cannot conclude that this low reversal rate renders the Board’s review meaningless under our case law. As Maschmeier himself acknowledges, a majority of the employees appearing before the Board admit their wrongdoing and seek only a mitigation of the penalty. Given the minority of cases in which the employee is seeking a reversal of his or her termination, one overturned termination in fifteen years is not sufficient to show that the Board is a mere “rubber stamp.” Therefore, we find that the sheriff’s termination decisions are subject to meaningful administrative review, and Scott thus cannot be the final policymaker.4 3 Maschmeier did not appeal his termination to the Board, so he cannot make this argument in any event. 4 Maschmeier also argued on appeal that the district court erred in denying him additional time for discovery to rebut Scott’s assertion that he was not a final policymaker. In order to hold a municipality liable for the acts of a municipal official, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the 7 Because Scott was not the final policymaker in regard to Maschmeier’s termination, Maschmeier’s § 1983 claims must fail. We note that the district court did not address Maschmeier’s claim of retaliation for filing a complaint with the Florida Election Commission. However, because Scott was not the final policymaker, Maschemeier cannot proceed with this retaliation claim, and we accordingly find no error. Finally, Maschmeier’s argument regarding the applicability of section 30.078 of the Florida Statutes is misplaced. Section 1983 provides a cause of action when a state or local official has violated the plaintiff’s federal constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .”). Therefore, a claim for a violation of section 30.078 of the Florida Statutes cannot be brought under § 1983. The official was a final policymaker. Morro, 117 F.3d at 510. The final policymaker element must be proven as part of the plaintiff’s case; it is not an affirmative defense to municipal liability under § 1983. Manor Healthcare, 929 F.2d at 636-37. We therefore find no error in the district court’s refusal to grant extra discovery to Maschmeier. 8 judgment of the district court is accordingly AFFIRMED. 9