Opinion ID: 2060551
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Need for a Special Verdict Form in Such Cases

Text: Because only a jury and not a judge may convict a defendant of an offense when a jury trial has been demanded, I disagree with the disapproval of the special verdict form approved for use in State v. Latimore, 197 N.J. Super. 197, 484 A. 2d 702 (App.Div. 1984). The majority criticizes the Latimore opinion for ignoring this Court's decision in Stewart. The criticism is misplaced. Stewart never held that a court may convict of the offense that is predicate to a Graves Act sentence. Latimore involved a prosecution under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a whereas Stewart involved a prosecution for robbery, one of the nine other crimes enumerated in the Graves Act. The Latimore court did not follow Stewart because, unlike the majority, it recognized the distinction under the Graves Act between N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4a and the other nine enumerated crimes. Although it is true that a conviction under 2C:39-4a for possession of a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully may be obtained without specifying whether the defendant intended to use the weapon against the person or property of another, it does not follow that the defendant does not have a right to request that the jury specify for what purpose the weapon was used. A jury need not always agree unanimously on every fact that establishes the essential elements of an offense. See State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628, 633-35, 592 A. 2d 228 (1991). When, however, there is a possibility of a patchwork verdict because some jurors may believe the defendant guilty on one basis and others on another, a jury may be required to specify its findings. Id. at 637, 592 A. 2d 228. Our law has long required that a jury instruction on a charge of gun possession for unlawful purpose must include an identification [by the court] of such unlawful purposes as may be suggested by the evidence. State v. Jenkins, 234 N.J. Super. 311, 316, 560 A. 2d 1240 (App.Div. 1989). Thus, the Model Jury Charge currently in use requires the court to set forth the State's contention concerning the defendant's unlawful purpose in possessing the firearm. Model Jury Charges (Criminal) § 2C:39-4a, Possession of a Firearm with a Purpose to Use It Unlawfully Against the Person or Property of Another (Mar. 30, 1993). If a hypothetical defendant were charged with having possessed a gun for the purpose of shooting Smith's car and threatening to shoot Jones, it is inescapable to me that a court may not refuse to have the jury indicate for which of the two purposes (or both) it found the defendant had unlawfully possessed the gun. Writing for the Court in State v. Diaz, 144 N.J. 628, 677 A. 2d 1120 (1996), Justice Coleman recently reaffirm[ed] the propriety of using the type of written special verdict sheets recommended in State v. McAllister [211 N.J. Super. 355, 365-67, 511 A. 2d 1216 (App.Div. 1986)]. The special verdict sheet in McAllister specifically referred to possession of a weapon with the purpose of using it unlawfully against a person.  211 N.J. Super. at 365, 511 A. 2d 1216 (emphasis added). Hence, although the majority seems to believe that its decision will simplify things, the decision will likely result in more work for lawyers and judges, and more trials rather than fewer in most instances. Competent counsel will not permit patchwork verdicts in cases in which the conviction predicate to a Graves Act sentence is in doubt. As an aside, this conviction is quite sustainable on the basis that the defendant waived his right to trial by jury. If he insists on repleading, the State should be free to reinstate the aggravated assault counts. I doubt the defendant really wants that. Justice POLLOCK joins in this opinion. For reversal  Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices HANDLER, GARIBALDI, STEIN and COLEMAN  5.