Opinion ID: 811910
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act

Text: Title II of the ADA provides that no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Similarly, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act prohibits programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance from excluding, denying benefits to, or discriminating against otherwise qualified disabled individuals. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Because the standards adopted by the two statutes are -12- nearly identical, we consider the merits of these claims together. See Abrahams v. MTA Long Island Bus, 644 F.3d 110, 115 n.3 (2d Cir. 2011). To assert a claim under Title II of the ADA or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) the defendant is subject to one of the Acts; and (3) he was denied the opportunity to participate in or benefit from the defendant's services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the defendant because of his disability. Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261, 272 (2d Cir. 2003). A qualified individual with a disability is an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable modifications to rules, policies, or practices, the removal of architectural, communication, or transportation barriers, or the provision of auxi liary aids and services, meets the essential eligibility requirements for the receipt of services or the participation in programs or activities provided by a public entity. 42 U.S.C. § 12131. A disability is defined as a physical -13- or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities. Id. § 12102(1)(A). Under both statutes, a defendant discriminates when it fails to make a reasonable accommodation that would permit a qualified disabled individual to have access to and take a meaningful part in public services. 2 Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2004); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (the term discriminate under the ADA includes not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a 2 Although McElwee brought the instant case pursuant to Title II of the ADA, we may look for guidance to case law under Title I of the ADA, which governs employment discrimination, because (i) courts use the terms reasonable modifications in Title II and reasonable accommodations in Title I interchangeably, see, e.g., Powell v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 364 F.3d 79, 85, 88 (2d Cir. 2004) (discussing accommodations provided in Title II case); Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 500 F.3d 1185, 1195 n.8 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that Title II's use of the term 'reasonable modifications' is essentially equivalent to Title I's use of the term 'reasonable accommodation'); and (ii) McElwee's volunteer position at Valley View was analogous to that of an employee, see, e.g., Bauer v. Muscular Dystrophy Ass'n, Inc., 427 F.3d 1326, 1333 (10th Cir. 2005) (noting that reference to Title I case law was appropriate in Title III case where plaintiffs, who were volunteers, act[ed] in a capacity at least somewhat analogously to that of an employee). -14- disability who is an applicant or employee). A 'reasonable accommodation' is one that gives the otherwise qualified plaintiff with disabilities 'meaningful access' to the program or services sought. Henrietta D., 331 F.3d at 282 (quoting Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985)). Although a public entity must make reasonable accommodations, it does not have to provide a disabled individual with every accommodation he requests or the accommodation of his choice. See Fink v. N.Y.C. Dep't of Personnel, 53 F.3d 565, 567 (2d Cir. 1995). An accommodation is not reasonable if it would impose an undue hardship on a program's operation or would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.  Powell, 364 F.3d at 88 (citing 28 C.F.R. §§ 41.53, 35.130(b)(7)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, under the ADA, workplace misconduct is a legitimate and nondiscriminatory reason for terminating employment, even when such misconduct is related to a -15- disability. 3 A requested accommodation that simply excuses past misconduct is unreasonable as a matter of law. 4 Although it is generally the responsibility of the individual with a disability to inform the employer that an accommodation is needed, Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting Graves v. Finch Pruyn & Co., 457 F.3d 181, 184 (2d Cir. 2006)) 3 See Sista v. CDC Ixis N. Am., Inc., 445 F.3d 161, 172 (2d Cir. 2006) (the ADA does not require that employers countenance dangerous misconduct, even if that misconduct is the result of a disability); see also Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 54 n.6 (2003) (rejecting suggestion that employer's refusal to rehire someone because of his disability-related misconduct would violate the ADA); Halpern v. Wake Forest Univ. Health Scis., 669 F.3d 454, 465 (4th Cir. 2012) ([M]isconduct -- even misconduct related to a disability -- is not itself a disability and may be a basis for dismissal. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 4 See Canales-Jacobs v. N.Y.S. Office of Ct. Admin., 640 F. Supp. 2d 482, 500 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (The ADA does not excuse workplace misconduct because the misconduct is related to a disability.); Fahey v. City of N.Y., No. 10 Civ. 4609 (ILG) (MDG), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15104, at  (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012) (rejecting plaintiff's failure to accommodate claim where requested accommodation was to receive penalty other than termination for past misconduct); Whalley v. Reliance Grp. Holdings, Inc., No. 97 Civ. 4018 (VM), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 427, at  (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2001) (holding that plaintiff's belated request for accommodation after learning of employer's decision to terminate him amounted to a request for a second chance); U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Enforcement Guidance: Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with Disabilities Act, question 36 (2002) (Since reasonable accommodation is always prospective, an employer is not required to excuse past misconduct even if it is the result of the individual's disability.). -16- (internal quotation marks omitted), under certain circumstances, an employer is required to act proactively and engage in an interactive process to accommodate the disability of an employee even if the employee does not request accommodation, see id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (To determine the appropriate reasonable accommodation it may be necessary for the covered entity to initiate an informal, interactive process with the individual with a disability in need of the accommodation.). Nevertheless, an employee may not recover based on his employer's failure to engage in an interactive process if he cannot show that a reasonable accommodation existed at the time of his dismissal. See McBride, 583 F.3d at 99-101. A plaintiff alleging that he was denied a reasonable accommodation bears the burdens of both production and persuasion as to the existence of some accommodation that would allow him to meet the essential eligibility requirements of the service, program, or activity at issue. See id. at 97. Once the plaintiff has demonstrated that there is a plausible accommodation, the -17- costs of which, facially, do not clearly exceed its benefits, the defendant bears the burden of proving that the requested accommodation is not reasonable. Borkowski v. Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 63 F.3d 131, 138 (2d Cir. 1995).