Opinion ID: 2550843
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Is SB 84 Unconstitutional?

Text: Smith first argues that SB 84 is unconstitutional under the United States and the Delaware Constitution. Her Delaware constitutional argument is that Sections 5 and 6 of SB 84 violate the Separation of Powers Doctrine, and alternatively, they violate the single-subject requirement. Her Federal constitutional claim is that SB 84 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court reviews claims involving the constitutionality of a statute de novo. [21]
As a predicate matter, this Court must first determine whether (uncodified) Sections 5 and 6 of SB 84 constitute operative Delaware law. Both Smith and Guest agree that they do. The Family Court held that in interpreting SB 84, it was not required to consider Sections 5 and 6, because although those Sections were included in the Historical and Statutory Notes of the final statute, they were not included in the codified text. [22] In so ruling, the Family Court erred. The General Assembly enacted SB 84 in its entirety, not just Sections 1-4. [23] That the Revisors (the Delaware Code's editors) [24] decided not to codify Sections 5 and 6 of SB 84 does not render those sections legally nugatory or ineffective. The Code expressly states that the Revisors shall not alter the sense, meaning or effect of any act of the General Assembly.... [25] One possible explanation for their failure to codify is that the Revisors believed Sections 5 and 6 to be construction clauses [26] whose omission was required by 1 Del. C. § 211(b). [27] But, even if that were the case, Sections 5 and 6 cannot be disregarded in interpreting SB 84, because to do so would ignore the General Assembly's express intent. [28] In Elliott v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Delaware, this Court held that the Revisors' failure to incorporate [an] amendment into the 1974 revised Code does not void it. Having been duly passed by the General Assembly and signed by the Governor, the amendment is law. [29] Although Sections 5 and 6 of SB 84 did not amend any particular section of the Code, the Elliott rationale applies here with equal force. Once enacted by the legislature and signed by the Governor, the entirety of the bill becomes effective Delaware law. Having determined that the entirety of the enacted bill, including Sections 5 and 6, must be considered in interpreting SB 84, we turn to the merits of Smith's constitutionality claims.
Smith first challenges SB 84 on the ground that it violates the constitutionally-mandated separation of powers between the judicial and the legislative branches, by overturning our decision in Smith I. Smith points out that Section 5 makes the new definition of legal parent retroactive, and that Section 6 prohibits a court from holding that Smith I has preclusive effect in determining whether Guest is a legal parent of ANS. Read together, Smith contends, those sections violate Delaware's separation of powers requirement, because a legislature cannot dictate how a court should apply the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata when determining the effect of court judgments that have become final. Smith analogizes this case to Evans v. State , where this Court determined that House Bill No. 31 (HB 31) was unconstitutional because it specifically recited that the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in the case of Evans v. State, 2004 WL 2743546 (Del.Supr.), is null and void. [30] In Evans, we held that it was constitutionally impermissible for legislation to require[] its own [retroactive] application in a case already adjudicated [and] reverse a determination once made, in a particular case. [31] Therefore, we found that the legislation challenged in Evans violated Article IV, §§ 1 and 11 of the Delaware Constitution, because it purported to exercise judicial power in a specific case. [32] Smith's argument is unpersuasive, for three reasons. First, it is well-recognized that the legislature may limit or bar the application of judge-made common law, [33] including preclusion doctrines such as collateral estoppel and res judicata. [34] Legislation of that kind does not amount to the General Assembly exercising judicial power, nor does it raise a separation of powers issue. [35] Second, Evans is materially distinguishable from this case. In Evans, the General Assembly explicitly sought to render null and void this Court's final judgment in a prior case. Indeed, HB 31 expressly referenced the previous case name and citation in its text. [36] In the case of SB 84, that did not occur. Unlike HB 31, Section 6 of SB 84 does not identify a specific case, either by case name or citation. [37] Further, the Senate debates on SB 84 show that that bill was introduced specifically in response to this Court's implicit invitation in Smith I, wherein we observed that [p]roviding relief in such situations [like Guest's] is a public policy decision for the General Assembly to make. [38] Unlike what occurred in Evans, SB 84 was not enacted to overrule retroactively our decision in Smith I. Third, SB 84, as applied to this case, does not retroactively reverse our Smith I decision or render it null and void. Smith I held that Guest lacked standing to petition for custody, because she was not a parent within the meaning of the then-applicable statutory definition. [39] That determination was not predicated upon, nor did this Court address, the merits of whether Guest was a de facto parent or had custody rights to ANS. Smith I addressed only the issue of standing. A litigant's standing to sue (or lack thereof) may change over time. [40] Here, the General Assembly enlarged the categories of statutorily-recognized parent-child relationships. That change in the statutory definition of parent, in turn, enlarged the categories of litigants with standing to petition for custody. [41] Under the newly enacted version of 13 Del. C. § 8-201 (as amended by SB 84), de facto parents, such as Guest, are now parents who have standing to petition for child custody under 13 Del. C. § 721(a). SB 84 did not change the outcome of our decision in Smith I, however, because Smith I interpreted an earlier version of the law. That is, Guest and other de facto parents would still lack standing if they were to petition for custody under the pre-amendment version of Section 8-201, since the legal definition of parent at that time did not include a de facto parent. [42] Because SB 84 did not reverse or render null and void our decision in Smith I, the separation of powers rationale of Evans v. State is inapplicable.
Smith next claims that SB 84 is invalid because it violates the single-subject requirement of the Delaware Constitution. This argument, which overlaps somewhat with Smith's separation of powers claim, runs as follows: Sections 1-4 of SB 84 purport to address the legal definition of parent. Sections 5 and 6, however, are a legislative effort to exercise fundamental judicial powerswhich is a separate subject under Evans. Combining those two separate subjects into one statute, therefore, violates the single-subject requirement. Article II, section 16 of the Delaware Constitution provides that [n]o bill or joint resolution, except bills appropriating money for public purposes, shall embrace more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. [43] As explained in Evans, [t]he single-subject and title provisions in Article II, § 16 are intended to assure sufficient notice that legislation, the content of which was inadequately brought to the public attention, or so-called sleeper legislation does not slip through the General Assembly. [44] That is, article II, section 16 is intended to prevent the introduction in the legislature of a bill with a seemingly harmless title[], but by the time it is enacted by both legislative chambers, it has collected such numerous amendments that its ultimate subject matter has changed entirely from what it was initially. [45] For that reason, a bill that contains multiple subjects or whose title would trap the unwary into inaction violates the Delaware Constitution. [46] In Evans, we pointed out that HB 31 graphically illustrates the dangers of an uninformed legislative vote where the title of [the] bill is inadequate. [47] The first part of HB 31 expressed a legislative intent to declare null and void this Court's earlier decision in Evans v. State , [48] whereas in the second part, the General Assembly established itself as the ultimate arbiter of the intent, meaning, and construction of its laws. [49] Further, it required judicial officers to strictly interpret or construe legislative intent and to use the utmost restraint in interpreting or construing the laws of this State. [50] The title of HB 31, however, gave no notice that it would impact at least sixty other statutes in which the General Assembly stated that those statutes must be liberally or broadly construed to accomplish the General Assembly's intent. [51] We held, for those reasons, that HB 31 unconstitutionally contained two separate and distinct subjects of legislationthe first being to null[ify] and void an earlier decision of this Court, and the second being to confer upon the General Assembly fundamental judicial powers. [52] The legislation involved in this case differs markedly from that invalidated in Evans. Unlike HB 31, SB 84 does not address multiple subjects. SB 84's title reads AN ACT TO AMEND TITLE 13 OF THE DELAWARE CODE RELATING TO PARENTS. [53] Sections 1-3 add a new subsection to 13 Del. C. § 8-201 that includes de facto parent status as an additional type of legal parent-child relationship. Section 4 amends the statutory definition of parent in 13 Del. C. § 2302 to include a de facto parent. [54] Section 5 states that [t]he provisions of this Act shall have retroactive effect, and Section 6 provides that [n]o Court decision based upon a finding that Delaware does not recognize de facto parent status shall have collateral estoppel or res judicata effect. These latter two Sections fall within the scope of the title's stated subject matter, because they relate to defining, interpreting, and construing de facto parenthood. Nor do Sections 5 and 6 of SB 84 introduce the separate subject of establish[ing] prospective standards for the judicial interpretation and application of Delaware laws, as occurred in Evans. [55] Neither provision would affect at least sixty other statutes, and neither purports to confer upon the General Assembly fundamental judicial powers or to declare the General Assembly as the ultimate arbiter of the intent, meaning, and construction of Delaware law. Section 6 merely specifies the circumstances where the judicial doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata will not apply. Those circumstances all relate to de facto parenthood. [56] In short, Sections 5 and 6 of SB 84 deal only with the one subject identified in SB 84's title parents, and more specifically, de facto parenthood.
Smith's final constitutional claim is that SB 84 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Smith first argues that the Family Court violated her due process rights by failing to consider whether her rights as ANS's sole parent were being unconstitutionally infringed, before determining whether Guest had any parental rights at all. Smith relies on Troxel v. Granville , [57] where the United States Supreme Court held that a nonparent visitation statute violated a parent's due process rights because it effectively permit[ted] any third party seeking visitation to subject any decision by a parent concerning visitation of the parent's children to state-court review. [58] Smith contends that SB 84 similarly enables a nonparent, such as Guest, to petition the Family Court for visitation rights without requiring the Court to defer to Smith's decision, as ANS's sole parent, that that visitation would not be in ANS's best interests. Troxel does not control these facts. The issue here is not whether the Family Court has infringed Smith's fundamental parental right to control who has access to ANS by awarding Guest co-equal parental status. Rather, the issue is whether Guest is a legal parent of ANS who would also have parental rights to ANSrights that are co-equal to Smith's. This is not a case, like Troxel, where a third party having no claim to a parent-child relationship ( e.g., the child's grandparents) seeks visitation rights. [59] Guest is not any third party. Rather, she is a (claimed) de facto parent who (if her claim is established, as the Family Court found it was [60] ) would also be a legal parent of ANS. Because Guest, as a legal parent, would have a co-equal fundamental parental interest in raising ANS, allowing Guest to pursue that interest through a legally-recognized channel cannot unconstitutionally infringe Smith's due process rights. In short, Smith's due process claim fails for lack of a valid premise. Our holding is supported by other state court decisions. [61] For example, in In re Parentage of L.B., [62] the Washington Supreme Court addressed a situation nearly identical to the case at bar. There, the court considered whether the petitioner had standing to petition for custody of a minor child conceived through artificial insemination during the petitioner's 12-year same-sex relationship with the child's biological mother. [63] The biological mother argued that allowing the petitioner to seek custody of the minor child would infringe the biological mother's fundamental parental interests under Troxel. [64] The Washington Supreme Court held it would not, because de facto parents were in legal parity with biological and adoptive parents. [65] If the petitioner could establish de facto parentage, then the petitioner and the biological mother would both have a fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody, and control of [the child]. [66] In those circumstances, there could be no due process violation. [67] Some courts have concluded that under the common law, de facto parentage does not confer standing to petition for custody or visitation of a minor child. [68] Those cases are inapposite, however, because the right conferred here was created legislatively, not judicially. The Delaware General Assembly has expressly decreed that de facto parents are legal parents who have standing to petition for custody. [69] Moreover, none of those cases addresses the legal question presented herewhether a law permitting a de facto parent to seek custody of a minor child violates the due process rights of the child's other legal parent. [70] As discussed above, we conclude that it does not.
Smith next claims that SB 84 violates the Equal Protection Clause, because it constitutes special legislation, specifically directed at her, that changes the result in Smith I. This argument essentially restates, albeit in a different form, Smith's earlier claim that Sections 5 and 6 of SB 84 seek to nullify this Court's Smith I decision. [71] More specifically, Smith argues that because those Sections undermine the finality of, and substantively overturn, Smith I, SB 84 draw[s] a line between [Smith] and all others who have prevailed in a final judicial determination [by] purporting to render Smith I a nullity, but permitting all other Supreme Court decisions to stand. To succeed on an equal protection claim under a class of one theory, the plaintiff must show that: (1) there are other similarly-situated people who were treated differently, and (2) there is no rational basis for that disparate treatment. [72] To prevail on the first prong, the plaintiff must show that the other similarly-situated persons are  prima facie identical in all relevant respects. [73] Smith's claim fails, because she cannot show disparate treatment as between herself and other similarly-situated persons. That is, SB 84 does not create a class of one, as Smith argues. Sections 5 and 6 of SB 84 do not draw a line between [Smith] and all others who have prevailed in a final judicial determination, because SB 84 does not reverse or render our decision in Smith I a nullity. [74] Nor does SB 84 amount to special legislation that creates an arbitrary and discriminatory classification, since it does not specifically name Smith as the person who is to benefit (or be harmed). [75] To the contrary, SB 84 operates identically and in the same manner upon all persons similarly situated i.e., all those who are the subject of a judicial decision that de facto parent status is not recognized in Delaware. [76] Because SB 84 does not create any classifications among those who have been subjected to that judicial determination, it does not offend the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.