Opinion ID: 1976538
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion for Directed Verdict on the Pricefixing Claim

Text: Murray maintains that the trial judge improperly denied his motion for a directed verdict on his pricefixing counterclaim under Maine's Motor Fuel Distribution and Sales Act. At the close of Webber's direct case, Murray moved for a directed verdict. That motion clearly applied only to Webber's claims and the motion was denied. At the close of Murray's case, including both his defenses to the action and his counterclaims, Murray renewed his motion for a directed verdict stating through counsel: Again, just for the record, your honor, we would renew our motion for directed verdict on plaintiff's case in chief based upon the status of the record at the close of the defendant's case, as well (emphasis supplied). That motion, restricted likewise to Webber's claims, was also denied. Finally, at the close of all the evidence, Murray stated through counsel: Counterclaimant/defendant would like to move for directed verdict now at the close of all the evidence pursuant to Rule 50, both for the reasons stated previously on the record and in chambers. M.R.Civ.P. 50(a) is clear: A motion for a directed verdict shall state the specific grounds therefor. This Court has no idea what the lawyers stated in chambers. The reasons stated previously on the record are limited to those in connection with the motions for directed verdict on Webber's claims alone. Consequently the record does not show that Murray ever sought a directed verdict on his counterclaim, let alone the specific pricefixing component of that claim. We have searched the record in vain for any suggestion that Murray alerted the trial judge to his arguments for a directed verdict on the pricefixing claim. We conclude that Murray therefore failed to preserve the issue for appellate review. Knowles v. Jenney, 157 Me. 392, 396, 173 A.2d 347, 349 (1961).