Opinion ID: 1188922
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: False Statement; False Evidence; Illegal Conduct

Text: In 1989, when the accused prepared and executed the Shumway will, DR 7-102(A) (1989) provided, in part: In the lawyer's representation of a client, a lawyer shall not:      (5) Knowingly make a false statement of law or fact.      (6) Participate in the creation or preservation of evidence when the lawyer knows or it is obvious that the evidence is false.      (8) Knowingly engage in other illegal conduct or conduct contrary to a Disciplinary Rule. The trial panel concluded that the accused had violated DR 7-102(A)(5), (6), and (8). DR 7-102(A) was amended, effective January 1991, to include conduct occurring in representing the lawyer's own interests as well as conduct occurring [i]n the lawyer's representation of a client. The Shumway will was improperly witnessed in 1989, and the Bar does not offer evidence that any of the other improperly witnessed documents were executed after January 1991. Thus, the pre-1991 version of DR 7-102(A) applies in this proceeding. Before the 1991 amendment, DR 7-102(A) was prefaced with the phrase [i]n the lawyer's representation of a client. There are conflicting precedents on the meaning of that phrase. This court has held that the pre-1991 version of DR 7-102(A) concerns conduct a lawyer might use to advance the interests of a client. In re Willer, 303 Or. 241, 244, 735 P.2d 594 (1987). In Willer, the accused submitted litigation reports to a client that were misleading as to the status of legal matters that the accused had worked on for the client. Id. at 244, 735 P.2d 594. The court held that DR 7-102(A)(5) did not apply to that case because the conduct of the accused was not taken to advance the interests of the client. Id. at 244, 735 P.2d 594. See also In re Coe, 302 Or. 553, 567-68, 731 P.2d 1028 (1987) (accused did not violate DR 7-102(A)(8) because dishonest conduct was to advance his own interests to the detriment of the client); but see In re Dixson, 305 Or. 83, 89, 750 P.2d 157 (1988) (accused violated DR 7-102(A)(5) when he made false statements about the status of his client's case to the court, the Bar, and his client; no mention of the issue raised in Coe and Willer ); In re Kissling, 303 Or. 638, 640-41, 740 P.2d 179 (1987) (accused violated DR 7-102(A)(5) when he told his client that action was pending when it was not; no mention of the issue raised in Coe and Willer ). We do not decide whether the misconduct in which the accused engaged violated the provisions of DR 7-102(A). The accused's acts of misconduct in misleading his clients, in causing his staff to falsely witness documents, and in improperly notarizing wills constituted violations of DR 1-102(A)(2), DR 1-102(A)(3), DR 2-106(A), and ORS 9.527(4). Due to the sanction imposed, the fact that the same conduct also may have violated DR 7-102(A) is of no moment. [5] See In re Recker, 309 Or. 633, 638 & n. 4, 789 P.2d 663 (1990) (recognized conflict in precedent and declined to decide whether DR 7-102(A) applied to case where the accused misled court to advance her own interests because the misconduct was a violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) and the sanction would not be enhanced if it also was a violation of DR 7-102(A)(5)).