Opinion ID: 566334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction of the State Court Guilty Plea

Text: 20 Maestas next argues that the introduction of his stipulated plea of guilty to the state misdemeanor charge of unlawfully possessing a firearm on February 5, 1990, resulted in an unknowing waiver of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and his sixth amendment rights to confront witnesses and to trial by jury. 6 It is well settled that a guilty plea is admissible in a subsequent collateral criminal trial as evidence of an admission by a party-opponent. See, e.g., United States v. Holmes, 794 F.2d 345, 349 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Andreadis, 366 F.2d 423, 433 (2d Cir.1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1001, 87 S.Ct. 703, 17 L.Ed.2d 541 (1967). Maestas argues, however, that the guilty plea evidence should have been excluded in this case because the state trial judge failed to inform him that the plea could be used against him in a subsequent federal criminal trial. 21 When a defendant mounts a collateral attack on a guilty plea, it is appropriate to examine the plea only if defects of a constitutional dimension are alleged. See United States v. Howze, 668 F.2d 322, 323 (7th Cir.1982). Maestas asserts that his plea could not have been intelligent and voluntary, as required by Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 1711, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), absent his knowledge that it could be introduced against him to prove an element of the federal crime. We reject this reasoning, however, because Maestas attempts to place responsibilities on state courts which they need not undertake in our system of dual sovereigns. We stated long ago in Shelton v. United States, 246 F.2d 571 (5th Cir.1957), rev'd on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26, 78 S.Ct. 563, 2 L.Ed.2d 579 (1958), that a defendant pleading guilty must be fully aware of the direct consequences.... Id. at 572 n. 2. In United States v. Long, 852 F.2d 975 (7th Cir.1988), the court explained why use of a state guilty plea in a subsequent federal proceeding is not a direct consequence of the plea: 22 [T]he state court has no direct role in federal prosecutions. The state and federal systems are separate and distinct, and the defendant need only be informed of the direct consequences he may face within the particular system. Therefore, the state court, even if knowledgeable about federal criminal law, need not undertake to inform the defendant of his potential federal criminal liability: the nature of the state sentence was unaffected by the federal prosecution and sentence. 23 Id. at 979. 24 We recognized in Shelton that collusion between state and federal officials, misrepresentation, or an effort to hide the consequences of a plea might require a different result. Shelton, 246 F.2d at 572 n. 2; see also Long, 852 F.2d at 979. But there is nothing in the record of this case to indicate that the federal authorities made any efforts to pressure Maestas's waiver of rights in the state court. Indeed, on the day Maestas entered the plea in state court for unlawful possession of a weapon on February 5, he had already been indicted on the federal charge (which included possession of a firearm on February 5, 1990). Thus, he knew he was admitting to one of the elements of the crime for which he was charged in federal court. 7 In all other respects, the record reveals that Maestas was fully informed of his rights, including his right to counsel, and that his guilty plea was intelligent, knowing and voluntary as required under Boykin. We therefore find that the district court properly admitted the state court guilty plea. 8