Opinion ID: 197576
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the nature of the statements

Text: 26 The two statements that the district court permitted the jury to consider are not in legal equipoise. Hence, we discuss them separately.A. Talking Trash. 27 The district court ruled that the adjective trashy stated an opinion that implied a provably false fact and was, therefore, actionable. This ruling rested on the court's expressed view that the term had a single, readily ascertainable meaning--dirty or unkempt--and that, in Judge Carter's words, Olson's statement could be verified or disproved through straightforward inquiry into the condition of [Levinsky's] store's physical appearance. We do not agree. 28 Despite avowals that all speech is infinitely malleable, see, e.g., Lewis Carroll, Through the Looking Glass, ch. 6 (1872) (reporting Humpty Dumpty's declaration: When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean--neither more nor less.), the First Amendment does not allow courts the luxury of a deconstructionist approach to language. Some words or phrases evoke a multiplicity of meanings; others do not. Under the aegis of the First Amendment, a particular word or phrase ordinarily cannot be defamatory unless in a given context it reasonably can be understood as having an easily ascertainable and objectively verifiable meaning. The vaguer a term, or the more meanings it reasonably can convey, the less likely it is to be actionable. See, e.g., Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 728 (holding that newspaper articles that referred to the plaintiff's production of The Phantom of the Opera as fake and phony were not actionable because the descriptions were unprovable, inasmuch as those adjectives admit of numerous interpretations); McCabe v. Rattiner, 814 F.2d 839, 842-43 (1st Cir.1987) (holding that a newspaper headline which referred to the plaintiff's real estate development as a scam was not actionable because the word means different things to different people and [t]he lack of precision makes the assertion 'X is a scam' incapable of being proven true of false). 29 It is against this mise-en-scene that we must explore the meaning of the word trashy. We start, as we often do in searching out the meaning of a word, with the dictionary. Lexicographic sources do not reflect any specific meaning of the word. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2432 (1986) (defining trashy as resembling or containing trash: of inferior quality: worthless ... covered or strewn with dried or withered vegetable matter); 20 Oxford English Dictionary 440 (2d ed.1989) (defining trashy as [o]f the nature of trash; rubbishy; worthless .... [e]ncumbered with trash, that is, with the withered growth of the previous season); The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1904 (3d ed.1992) (defining trashy as [r]esembling or containing trash; cheap or worthless ... [i]n very poor taste or of very poor quality). 30 Going beyond the lexicon, an impromptu survey of the case law confirms that the word has been used to convey many different meanings. See, e.g., Giano v. Senkowski, 54 F.3d 1050, 1058 (2d Cir.1995) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (describing erotic magazines as trashy); Johnson v. City of Pleasanton, 781 F.Supp. 632, 638 (N.D.Cal.1991) (using the word to denote inferior physical appearance; commenting that satellite antennas make a building look trashy), aff'd in part, 982 F.2d 350 (9th Cir.1992); Christy v. Servitto, 699 F.Supp. 618, 625 (E.D.Mich.1988) (quoting attorney's description of a presumably disreputable woman as flashy trashy), aff'd, 932 F.2d 502 (6th Cir.1991). 31 Literary sources also illustrate the variations in meaning associated with the word trashy. For example, Jeremiah Dyke employed the term's inferior quality meaning when he spoke of [s]uch solvenly meat, such trashy meat, such bitter meat. Jeremiah Dyke, Divers Select Sermons (1640). An English author preferred its prurient interest connotation when she complained of reading the trashiest heap of novels. Jane Welsh Carlyle, Letters and Memorials (1883). Edmund Wilson found the lacking worth meaning useful when he described Rudyard Kipling's Stalky & Company as crude in writing [and] trashy in feeling. Edmund Wilson, The Wound and the Bow 114 (1941). Louis Bromfield showed a more traditionalist bent, favoring the classic covered with withered growth meaning of the word when he wrote of a seedbed that was rough and trashy. Louis Bromfield, Pleasant Valley 174 (1945). While these four illustrations merely scratch the surface, they amply demonstrate the term's definitional flexibility. 32 The usages paraded through the courtroom by Levinsky's able counsel reinforce this point. Particularly revelatory are his opening and closing statements, in which he seemed frankly to acknowledge the word's many connotations. At various times, counsel suggested to the jury that Olson's statement referred to the manner in which the plaintiff maintained its stores (in this context meaning filthy and dirty), to the merchandise that the plaintiff purveyed (in this context meaning inferior and crappy), and to the character of the persons associated with the enterprise (in this context meaning sleazy and untrustworthy). 5 This broadcast acknowledgement that the word trashy possesses a multitude of fairly ascribable meanings is in itself telling. 6 33 In this instance, moreover, the inherent elusiveness of trashy is not pinned down by context. Indeed, the imprecision of the word is accentuated by the testimony of the journalist, Boardman, who, when asked his understanding of trashy as Olson had voiced it, responded, It's always been hard for me to define exactly what he was referring to. In the same vein, Boardman reported that Olson's only amplification of the remark was that customers should pay a little more money to buy the same item they want somewhere else. Like trashy itself, this comment presents a moving target. 34 The polysemous nature of the word trashy dooms Levinsky's effort to recover for Olson's use of it. The word trashy is a chameleon that continuously changes colors and shades of meaning. It admits of numerous interpretations. We can imagine no objective evidence that might conclusively prove or disprove it. Like the equally pejorative terms used in Phantom Touring (fake, phony, rip-off), McCabe (scam), and Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 310-11 (7th Cir.1996) (allowing no defamation remedy when one scholar calls another a crank), trashy is quintessentially subjective. 35 To say more about this point would be supererogatory. Branding a store, its merchandise, its customers, or its proprietors as trashy is uncomplimentary, and it may be unwarranted; in the last analysis, however, such a comment is loose language that cannot be objectively verified. Consequently, it belongs squarely in the category of protected opinion. It follows inexorably that Levinsky's reliance on this unflattering adjective to underpin a defamation claim offends the First Amendment. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20-21, 110 S.Ct. at 2706-07; Washington v. Smith, 80 F.3d 555, 556-57 (D.C.Cir.1996); Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 728; McCabe, 814 F.2d at 842-43; see also Fudge v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 840 F.2d 1012, 1016 (1st Cir.1988). 36 B. On Hold. 37 The district court likewise ruled that Olson's second statement (when calling Levinsky's, you are sometimes put on hold for 20 minutes--or the phone is never picked up at all) encompassed matters of fact (or opinions that implied provably false facts) and was, therefore, actionable. Wal-Mart takes exception to this ruling. Its principal argument is that constitutional shelter for this statement can be found in the First Amendment protections typically afforded figurative language and hyperbole. 7 We think not. 38 Certain excesses of language cannot ground a defamation claim because, in context, those excesses involve only puffery or epithets, and thus are insufficiently fact-based. See, e.g., Austin, 418 U.S. at 284-86, 94 S.Ct. at 2781-82 (traitor); Bresler, 398 U.S. at 13-14, 90 S.Ct. at 1541-42 (blackmail). These turns of phrase are recognized rhetorical devices; they are not actionable because they are commonly understood, in context, as imaginative expressions rather than statements of fact. 39 Paddling furiously to reach this safe harbor, the appellant urges us to interpret Olson's comment as an obvious exaggeration, tantamount to the statement you are sometimes put on hold forever. No reasonable listener, the appellant asseverates, would consider this variant an assertion of literal truth. But the appellant's argument requires a leap of faith that we are unwilling to essay. The First Amendment does not allow courts to distort the reality of events under the guise of protecting freedom of expression. Thus, a reviewing court must evaluate a speaker's statement as it was given and must resist the temptation to replace what was actually said with some more innocuous alternative. 40 The determination of whether a statement is hyperbole depends primarily upon whether a reasonable person could interpret the statement to provide actual facts about the individual or institution it describes. See Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 20, 110 S.Ct. at 2706-07; cf. Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50, 108 S.Ct. 876, 879, 99 L.Ed.2d 41 (1988) (precluding recovery on the ground that an advertising parody, which claimed that a minister had lost his virginity in a drunken rendezvous with his mother, was incredible). Under this criterion, the 20 minutes statement seems sufficiently factual to be proved true or false. For one thing, Olson's use of a specific time frame cuts against treating his remark as hyperbole or other non-factual speech. For another thing, the assertion can be verified or rebutted by objective evidence of how Levinsky's staff handled telephone calls (evidence of the type that, in fact, Levinsky's adduced and the jury heard). In addition, the statement is not inherently implausible. Especially given the pervasive folklore concerning the difficulties that consumers encounter in dealing with merchants telephonically, we believe that a reasonable listener could interpret the 20 minutes comment as a statement of fact about Levinsky's business practices. 41 As the appellant correctly notes, we cannot take the 20 minutes remark in isolation. Seizing this potential lifeline, Wal-Mart struggles to persuade us that the second part of Olson's statement--the phone is never picked up at all--colors the context and makes it plain that he was speaking figuratively. Though context is an important aspect of the Milkovich inquiry, see Phantom Touring, 953 F.2d at 727; McCabe, 814 F.2d at 842-43, it does not aid the appellant here. While the second portion of Olson's statement does not incorporate a fixed temporal interval, that remark, when read in tandem with the first portion of the statement, does not defuse the defamatory potential. A reasonable listener could well conclude that Levinsky's service was so bad that the company not only left customers dangling on the line for 20 minutes at a crack, but also, on some occasions, simply did not bother to answer the telephone. 42 In fine, the overall context does little to dispel the impression that Olson's comment stated facts about Levinsky's business practices. After all, Levinsky's and Wal-Mart were locked in hand-to-hand combat for shoppers' dollars, and Olson held an executive position with Wal-Mart. While a reasonable listener might be skeptical given Olson's likely motive (to try to lure potential customers to his store), he gave his assertion a particularized factual component. A listener reasonably could conclude that Olson intended to describe from personal knowledge how Levinsky's treated callers. 8 43 The short of it is that neither the type of language employed nor the overall tenor of the article negated the reasonable impression that Olson steadfastly maintained that Levinsky's telephone practices were in fact as he described them to be. On this basis, the 20 minutes statement properly could be treated as fact-based defamation. So viewed, the statement does not fit within the contours of protected speech, and it was, as the lower court concluded, amenable to suit under the Milkovich regime.