Opinion ID: 2630484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The identity of the controlled substance is an essential element of the crime

Text: ¶ 31 A defendant's right to be informed of all charges he will face at trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. [4] From these protections comes the well-established principle, a criminal defendant may be held to answer for only those offenses contained in the indictment or information. State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wash.2d 448, 453, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). A charging document is constitutionally sufficient ... only if it includes all `essential elements' of the crime.... State v. Goodman, 150 Wash.2d 774, 784, 83 P.3d 410 (2004) (quoting State v. Vangerpen, 125 Wash.2d 782, 787, 888 P.2d 1177 (1995)). If the necessary elements are neither found nor fairly implied in the charging document, `[the court] presume[s] prejudice and reverse[s]....' Id. at 788, 888 P.2d 1177 (quoting State v. McCarty, 140 Wash.2d 420, 425, 998 P.2d 296 (2000)). ¶ 32 The specific type of drug the defendant is accused of possessing is an essential element to the crime of possession of a controlled substance. Goodman held, the State must allege the specific identity of [a] controlled substance in the information because the specific identity of a controlled substance is an essential element of the crime. Id. at 787, 83 P.3d 410. Here, the State convicted Eaton of possession of cocaine, yet the information charged him with possession of amphetamine. Since this essential element was neither found nor fairly implied in the information, reversal of Eaton's conviction is required. ¶ 33 The concurrence, however, opines the type of drug possessed is not an essential element of the crime. Under the concurrence's novel view the drug possessed is an essential element only if it affects the resulting penalty faced by the defendant [5] or is a statutory element of the crime. Concurrence at 1273-74 (stating if a crime can be committed in one of several ways, the information need only allege, and the State need only prove, the specific way it was committed if it affects the penalty facing the defendant). According to the concurrence since cocaine and amphetamine carry the same statutory maximum, the drug type is not an element of the crime. But to reach this conclusion, the concurrence incorrectly conflates State v. Miller, 71 Wash.2d 143, 146, 426 P.2d 986 (1967) with Goodman, 150 Wash.2d 774, 83 P.3d 410, while ignoring State v. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d 143, 829 P.2d 1078 (1992). ¶ 34 Miller held the description of the gun in an information charging assault with a deadly weapon was superfluous. Miller, 71 Wash.2d at 146, 426 P.2d 986. As long as the State could prove there was a gun, it did not need to prove the specific type because the specific type of gun is not an essential element of the crime charged. Id. ¶ 35 Goodman expressly held: [S]quarely before us is whether the State must allege and prove the specific identity of the controlled substance or whether the State must prove the substance is merely a controlled one. We conclude ... the State must allege the specific identity of the controlled substance. Goodman, 150 Wash.2d at 787, 83 P.3d 410. In dicta, however, Goodman stated, the identity of the controlled substance is an element of the offense where it aggravates the maximum sentence.... Id. at 785, 83 P.3d 410. The concurrence mistakes this dicta for the holding. Moreover even if the identity of the substance is an element when it aggravates the sentence, that is not to say it is not an element when it does not aggravate the sentence. ¶ 36 The concurring opinion in Goodman confirmed this understanding and agreed with the majority that the specific substance alleged must be specifically charged. Id. at 791, 83 P.3d 410 (Chambers, J., concurring). Goodman does not require an increase in the resulting penalty for the drug type to be an essential element, but instead the specific identity of the controlled substance is always an essential element to be included in the information. Id. at 787, 83 P.3d 410. ¶ 37 Additionally, the concurrence here incorrectly concludes an element which is not statutorily required can be an essential element only if it increases the resulting penalty. But essential elements are not so limited. In Johnson we held an essential element not required by the charging statute must nevertheless be included in the information. Johnson, 119 Wash.2d at 147, 829 P.2d 1078. To reach this conclusion we did not address whether the element increased the resulting punishment. The relevant statute in Johnson [6] did not require guilty knowledge as an essential element of unlawful delivery of a controlled substance, just as the relevant statute here [7] does not require the identity of the drug as an essential element of possession in this case. Id. at 146, 829 P.2d 1078. However, in Johnson we concluded the charging documents must specify guilty knowledge because it was an essential element of the crime arising from common law. Id. Similarly, here the identity of the drug Eaton was charged with possessing is not an element under the charging statute, but is an essential element of the crime under Goodman and therefore must be included in the information. Goodman, 150 Wash.2d at 787, 83 P.3d 410.