Opinion ID: 704006
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Andrews as defense witness.

Text: 99 Beets's theory that Andrews should have testified as a defense witness runs thus: if the jury believed that Andrews first suggested to her, eighteen months after Jimmy Don's disappearance, the possibility of claiming Jimmy Don's death benefits from the fire department, they could not find that Beets murdered Jimmy Don for remuneration. Andrews was therefore a material exculpatory witness who was ethically required to withdraw and testify on her behalf. 100 Both prongs of Strickland are at issue here: whether Andrews's performance was unconstitutionally deficient and whether his failure to testify prejudiced the defense. From an ethical standpoint, the lawyer-as-witness conflict, unlike the loyalty conflict implicated by a media rights contract, is difficult to sort out. This court may be guided but is not constitutionally bound by the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility effective at the date of trial:If, after undertaking employment in contemplated or pending litigation, a lawyer learns or it is obvious that he or a lawyer in his firm ought to be called as a witness on behalf of his client, he shall withdraw from the conduct of the trial and his firm, if any, shall not continue representation in the trial.... 101 Supreme Court of Texas, Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-102(A) (1982) (emphasis added). For reasons that are intuitively obvious, neither this nor similar provisions creates a bright-line ethical rule requiring withdrawal of a lawyer whenever he might be a witness for his client. 23 The constitutional evaluation of a lawyer's decision whether to take the stand must also be flexible and must accord a heavy measure of deference to the lawyer's presumed professional capability. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. The essential inquiry is what sort of testimony he could have given in Beets's defense. 102 Regarding the alleged advocate/witness conflict, the district court concluded that 103 Andrews obviously should have known of his dual status as witness and advocate prior to trial. Andrews' dual status should have also been apparent to both the judge and district attorney as the trial unfolded. The Court is persuaded that the conflict never occurred to any of the participants. 104 The court correctly found that the experienced trial court participants never perceived of Andrews as a potential defense witness. 24 Perhaps it can be inferred from this collective unawareness that Andrews's exculpatory testimony was not highly significant. But more important than speculation is a careful review of the state court and federal habeas records, which considerably diminishes the force of such potential testimony. 105 Beets relies heavily on an affidavit Andrews executed for the federal habeas proceeding stating that Beets 106 had no idea whether she was entitled to benefits. She did not even know whether benefits existed. She did not know, for instance, whether her husband had been insured, or whether he had a pension, nor did she know whether she was the beneficiary. She did not know who, if anyone, may have been her husband's insurer or what amount he may have been insured for. 107 Andrews Affidavit p 7. He also stated that he was the one who mentioned the possibility that she may have been entitled to benefits. Id. p 10, Beets, 986 F.2d at 1487. 108 Taken at face value, the affidavit suggests that Andrews would have been a helpful witness to Beets. At the habeas hearing, however, his answers to questions posed by Beets's new attorney were not nearly as strong: 109 Q. Well, as your affidavit states, I believe she came to you looking for insurance benefits, but not with respect to the death of Jimmy Don Beets, rather for a home that had been burned. Is that correct? 110 A. [Andrews] Well, I believe that was a mobile home. 111 Q. Correct. And it was your idea that she may have some benefits arising from this death and she had no idea of this. Is that correct? 112 A. Well, I thought it would be my idea and I think my obligation too because I don't know if it's in this affidavit or not, but her husband had been missing for quite some time and everybody in the community knew that. I knew Mr. Beets worked for the Fire Department. It was through an investigation of myself and two lawyers here in Tyler that we realized that some benefits might be due and payable. 113 Q. Did Ms. Beets suggest this or did you in your initial conversations with her? 114 A. Partner, that's been a long time ago. I believe that I went into it first. I couldn't swear to that and I'm under oath. 115 Q. Well, in your affidavit you've stated that you knew from your discussions with her that this was not the case, that is, that the State could not prove that she took the life of Mr. Beets for the purpose of remuneration. Is that correct? Is that a true statement? 116 A. What page are you reading from? 117 Q. That's Paragraph 14. 118 A. That was my thought and belief. Yes, that's true and correct. 119 Q. And just to reference Paragraph 7 of the affidavit, you also stated that when you first questioned Ms. Beets you quickly discovered that she had no idea whether she was entitled to benefits and you've sworn that that was a true statement. Is that correct? 120 A. That was a conclusion that I drew by my conversation with Betty Beets. 121 The most that Andrews could persuade the jury of was his conclusion that Betty Beets knew nothing of her husband's benefits when she visited him. 25 122 Moreover, Andrews was not the only source of testimony that Beets was unaware of Jimmy Don's death benefits before she visited Andrews. Beets herself so testified at trial under questioning by Andrews. Had Andrews elicited this testimony believing or knowing it to be false, he would be exposed to a charge of suborning perjury. 123 Additional testimony on Beets's ignorance of the death benefits was adduced from Bruce Roberts. The only part of Andrews's proposed testimony that Bruce Roberts could not replicate was Andrews's affidavit statement that he had been the one to suggest to Beets that she seek her missing husband's insurance and pension benefits. Beets vastly overrates the importance of this statement by Andrews, however. Because Andrews had no knowledge of Beets's activities from the time of the murder until nearly two years later when she met with him, he could not testify as to her knowledge of what benefits might be available. Both he and Roberts could only draw an inference or speculate upon her state of mind from their conversations. 124 In any event, neither Andrews nor Roberts was the first witness to discuss Jimmy Don's death benefits with Beets. That distinction belonged to Denny Burris, who testified that when he visited her a few days after the disappearance, she inquired about benefits. The fact of inquiry does not show that she knew beforehand of the existence of benefits, but her inquiry and discussion with Burris necessarily weakened the argument that, many months later, Beets's attorneys thought she knew nothing of potential death benefits. Neither Andrews nor Roberts could dispel a certain skepticism about that claim. 125 Because Andrews's potential testimony for Beets was cumulative, he was not a necessary witness for her defense and did not face a substantial advocate/witness conflict. His failure to withdraw and testify was not professionally unreasonable under Strickland. 126 Not only was Andrews's potential exculpatory testimony largely cumulative, but when considered against the totality of evidence that Beets committed murder for remuneration, we cannot say that his failure to testify was prejudicial. Beets told her daughter Shirley Stegner, in connection with the murder of Beets's fourth husband, that she would have lost the trailer, which he owned, if they had simply divorced. Beets surreptitiously tried to obtain a life insurance policy on Jimmy Don only months before he disappeared. After his death, Beets sold his boat and tried to sell and then to collect fire insurance proceeds on his separately owned trailer home. Chaplain Denny Burris testified that Beets was interested in Jimmy Don's benefits within days after he went fishing. All of this evidence, as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted, was pertinent to the question of Beets's remunerative motive. Finally, the cold, calculated nature of the crime and its cover-up strongly suggested that Beets had a motive beyond simply getting rid of her husband after one year of marriage. She wanted it to appear that he died of natural causes. If he had merely disappeared, suspicion would have focused on her and she could not have benefitted from the crime. Neither we nor the dissent can conclude that the result of her prosecution would in reasonable probability have differed if Andrews had testified.