Opinion ID: 398632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 2 Bulman and Jones argue that the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient for their conviction. Because each raises issues peculiar to his own case, we consider the arguments of each individually below. Common to the arguments each makes, however, is our standard of review. Our general standard of review concerning the sufficiency of the evidence is to determine whether, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the jury necessarily must have entertained a reasonable doubt concerning the guilt of an appellant. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80, 62 S.Ct. 457, 469, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 826, 828 (11th Cir. 1981). The former Fifth Circuit has elaborated on that standard in the particular context of conspiracy convictions, noting that we must find substantial evidence connecting an appellant to a conspiracy, United States v. Malatesta, 590 F.2d 1379, 1381 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied sub nom. United States v. Bertolotti, 440 U.S. 962, 99 S.Ct. 1508, 59 L.Ed.2d 77 (1979). 2 In determining whether there was such evidence, the former Fifth Circuit has noted that mere association with persons involved in a criminal enterprise is insufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy, see, e.g., United States v. DeSimone, 660 F.2d 532-537 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Horton, 646 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1981), and that mere presence at the scene of the crime is not enough to sustain a conspiracy conviction. See, e.g., DeSimone, supra, 660 F.2d at 537; United States v. Reyes, 595 F.2d 275, 280 (5th Cir. 1979). Rather, we must be satisfied ... that these appellants had 'the deliberate, knowing, specific intent to join the conspiracy.'  DeSimone, supra, 660 F.2d at 537 (quoting United States v. Morado, 454 F.2d 167, 175 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917, 92 S.Ct. 1767, 32 L.Ed.2d 116 (1972)).
3 Bulman raises several issues that depend ultimately upon the sufficiency of the evidence for his conviction. He asserts that the district court should have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal, that the evidence was insufficient to convict him either of conspiracy to import marijuana or of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute marijuana, and that the court should have instructed the jury to disregard statements referring to Kenny. We reject all of his arguments. 4 The crux of Bulman's arguments is his assertion that the government never explicitly identified him as the Kenny who was present at the May 21 conspirators' meeting and so never linked him to the conspiracy. In particular, Bulman asserts that the government never identified him as the Kenny who was present at the May 21 meeting at which the participants discussed critical elements of the smuggling operation. 3 Substantial circumstantial evidence, however, identifies Bulman as Kenny. A DEA agent at trial identified Bulman as an individual he saw on May 21 outside the motel at which the conspirators, including Kenny, met. Kenny was the individual who agreed to obtain the money to pay for the marijuana; the money Rece and Fagan received on May 23 was in the envelope of a business for which Bulman was authorized to write checks. A telephone number at which Kenny could be reached, which appellant Howard gave a DEA undercover agent, was for a motel room rented in Bulman's name. Kenny advised a DEA agent on May 25 that he would fly to Columbia, South Carolina, that morning. Bulman arrived in Columbia later in the morning on the 25th. Finally, the agent who had talked to Kenny over the telephone identified Bulman as the man to whom he had talked on the telephone. 4 A jury, considering the above evidence, reasonably could conclude that Bulman and Kenny were the same person and that Bulman was a participant in the conspiracy to import marijuana. The district court did not err in denying the motion for judgment of acquittal or in refusing to instruct the jury to disregard references to Kenny in considering the evidence pertaining to Bulman. 5 Bulman also contends that, even if there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction for conspiracy to import marijuana, the evidence was insufficient to prove conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute. There is no evidence, Bulman asserts, that he ever discussed distribution or that he was involved in arrangements to unload the plane. The very amount of the drug to be imported can, however, show intent to distribute. United States v. Perry, 480 F.2d 147, 148 (5th Cir. 1973). The size of the expected load, 5,000 pounds, and his question concerning the possibility of importing three such loads provided a jury with reasonable basis for concluding that Bulman was guilty of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute.
6 Jones' argument that there was insufficient evidence for his conviction rests largely on whether we uphold the ruling of the district court that the statements of coconspirators were inadmissible against him. We therefore begin by considering the admissibility of coconspirators' statements against Jones. 7 Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) provides that a statement is not excludable as hearsay if offered against a party and made by a coconspirator of the party during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. The former Fifth Circuit in United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575 (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917, 99 S.Ct. 2836, 61 L.Ed.2d 283 (1979), has explained how to apply that rule, holding that, if the party against whom the statement is introduced objects to the use of the evidence, the court should determine whether substantial evidence, independent of the statements to be introduced, shows the existence of a conspiracy to which the party belonged. In this case the trial court held a hearing to determine whether coconspirators' statements were admissible under James. The court ruled that they were admissible against all defendants but Jones. The government contests the correctness of the ruling concerning Jones. The trial court's determination is a finding of fact that we can overturn only if clearly erroneous. United States v. Perry, 624 F.2d 29, 30-31 (5th Cir. 1980). 8 The evidence of Jones' participation in the conspiracy is his presence at meetings on May 16 and 25 at which financial and operational details of the smuggling operation were discussed, his departure for South Carolina with several other defendants, his staying at rooms with them, and his travelling to a local airport with another defendant to pick up Lloyd and Bulman. Jones, stating that he never talked at a meeting, provided no money, was merely travelling north to Atlantic City, and only intended to show the co-defendant the way to the local airport, asserts that the evidence, though admittedly showing that he knew of the conspiracy, did not show that he joined in it. We agree. Although we might find the coconspirators' statements admissible against Jones if deciding the matter without a prior ruling by the court below, we are not, after a review of the record, left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395, 68 S.Ct. 525, 542, 92 L.Ed. 746 (1948), that makes it necessary to overturn the district court's determination as clearly erroneous. 5 9 Without the statements of coconspirators available as evidence against Jones, we find, as the government seems to concede, that the jury must necessarily have entertained a reasonable doubt about his guilt. We reverse Jones' conviction. 6 10 II. THE FAILURE OF THE DISTRICT COURT TO RECONSIDER ITS INITIAL RULING ADMITTING COCONSPIRATORS' STATEMENTS AGAINST BULMAN 11 Bulman next asserts that the district judge erred in failing to reconsider his initial James ruling at the end of trial and decide whether a preponderance of the independent evidence introduced at trial sufficiently connected him with the conspiracy. James, he asserts, requires such a redetermination. His conviction, he argues, therefore should be reversed. We disagree. Bulman never made a motion to have the district court reconsider its initial determination that the coconspirators' statements were admissible against him. James itself states that a court need only reconsider its initial determination on proper motion by a defendant. See 590 F.2d at 582; see also United States v. Berry, 644 F.2d 1034, 1038 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ricks, 639 F.2d 1305, 1310 (5th Cir. 1981). 7 In any event, since we have held that there was sufficient evidence to connect Bulman to the conspiracy, any error by the court in failing explicitly to state that it found that the James requirements were met would be harmless.