Opinion ID: 71628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: If there is reasonable cause to believe

Text: abuse has occurred, DFCS will seek a physical examination in those instances where a medical test will be needed t o substantiate the same, or will photograph evidence of physical abuse where a medical examination is not necessary. Any physical examination will 23 invoke the protections of qualified immunity. Powell argues that Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 110 S. Ct. 975 (1990), shows that the appellees violated his son's clearly established procedural due process rights. In Zinermon, the plaintiff, a former state mental hospital patient, alleged that the State violated his due process rights by failing to have in place appropriate precommitment safeguards ensuring that state mental hospital patients are in fact competent to sign forms authorizing their be conducted as expeditiously as possible. ... [I]f a report of child abuse . . . is made to DFCS . . . and it has reasonable cause to believe such report is true, then the agency shall immediately notify the appropriate authority or District Attorney and forward the proper reports within a timely manner. ... Every abused child should have a physical examination as soon as possible following disclosure of the abuse. Typically, the child will be examined at one of the local hospitals according to accepted hospital procedure. Compl. at 12-13. 24 voluntary admission and treatment. The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff stated a procedural due process claim because the deprivation of the plaintiff's liberty was predictable and predeprivation process was feasible. Id. at 136, 110 S. Ct. at 989. Powell argues that Zinermon applies to this case. He asserts that the State should have provided predeprivation process in this case because the State should have anticipated that caseworkers might be so overloaded with cases that they would neglect their duties. He further contends that the value of predeprivation safeguards is high in child abuse cases and the State is in the position to provide predeprivation process. The appellees, however, argue that Powell cannot state a claim for a violation of his son's procedural due process rights.10 The appellees 10 As a threshold matter, the appellees argue that the Protocol did not vest Powell's son with a legitimate claim of entitlement such that a failure to follow the Protocol constituted a procedural due process violation. Because we ultimately conclude that the appellees are entitled to qualified immunity in any event, we can assume arguendo, without deciding, that Powell's son had such a liberty interest. 25 assert that Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S. Ct. 1908 (1981), and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984) control this case. In Parratt and Hudson, the Supreme Court held that there is no procedural due process violation when the act complained of is the random and unauthorized act of a state employee for which adequate postdeprivation process is available. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S. Ct. at 3203-04; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541, 101 S. Ct. at 1916. The Parratt-Hudson reasoning applies when the official action complained of is of a type that the State cannot reasonably foresee and for which predeprivation process thus is not feasible. Hudson, 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S. Ct. at 3203; Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541, 101 S. Ct. at 1916. See also Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128-30, 110 S. Ct. at 985-86. The appellees argue that in this case, the State could not reasonably foresee that the caseworkers would fail to follow the Protocol. The appellees also contend that providing predeprivation process, such as a hearing, for child abuse cases is not feasible because caseworkers often must make quick judgment calls in such cases. 26 Furthermore, the appellees argue that the State has provided Powell with adequate postdeprivation process because Powell may pursue a damage claim in the Georgia state courts under the Georgia Tort Claims Act.11 The crux of Powell's claim is his contention that predeprivation process was feasible in this case and was not provided, thus violating the baby's procedural due process rights. In Zinermon, the Court found that a predeprivation procedure was feasible and would avert the problem of incompetent people signing voluntary admission forms before receiving treatment for mental illness. The Court explained that had the State limited and guided petitioners' power to admit patients, the deprivation 11 Powell argues that this post-deprivation process is inadequate because the State has invoked sovereign immunity as to any possible claims under the Georgia Tort Claims Act. However, assuming arguendo that the State is immune, Powell's argument is foreclosed by our decision in Rittenhouse v. DeKalb County, 764 F.2d 1451, 1459 (11th Cir. 1985) (the sovereign immunity enjoyed by [the county and the government official] [does] not render appellant's state law remedy inadequate under Parratt), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1014, 106 S. Ct. 1193 (1986). 27 might have been averted. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 137, 110 S. Ct. at 989. The Court indicated that the State could provide such guidance by having a specific requirement that petitioners determine whether a patient is competent to consent to voluntary admission. Id. at 135-36, 110 S. Ct. at 98889.12 By contrast, in the instant case, the Protocol already provides predeprivation procedures for caseworkers to follow. There is no other feasible predeprivation procedure that is readily apparent to us. It is clear from the Protocol that a caseworker must make a judgment decision [i]n determining the appropriate action to be taken. Appellees' Brief at 13 (quoting Protocol). The caseworker must make 12 At several places, the Court referred to such a procedure. For example, the Court noted that [t]here is, however, no specified way of determining, before a patient is asked to sign admission forms, whether he is competent. Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136, 110 S. Ct. at 989. See also id. at 135, 110 S. Ct. at 988 (But the statutes do not direct any member of the facility staff to determine whether a person is competent to give consent, nor to initiate the involuntary placement procedure for every incompetent patient.). 28 an initial assessment and must determine on an ongoing basis whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that abuse has occurred. Compl. at 12 (quoting Protocol). We readily conclude that it would not be feasible to require a hearing before every such judgment decision by a caseworker. Indeed, the Protocol established by the appellees in the instant case would seem to be precisely the kind of procedure contemplated in Zinermon because it guides caseworkers' decision-making. We do not understand Powell to be challenging the adequacy of the Protocol itself; rather, he argues that caseworkers Rosen and Jane Doe did not follow the Protocol. The only specific procedure suggested by Powell is that the officials should have provided more staffing, supervision, and training so that neglect of duty would not result from excessive caseloads.13 However, we know of no case which 13 In his brief, Powell asserts that the State was in a position to provide the requisite predeprivation process by oversight, supervision, adequate staffing and caseload distribution, management and training. Appellant's Brief at 26-27. 29 has held that the Constitution requires a government to provide more personnel or more training in order to reduce the risk of random and unauthorized acts of neglect of duty. The Parratt decision suggests just the opposite. The deprivation there, as here, resulted from a failure to follow applicable procedures. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 531, 543, 101 S. Ct. at 1910, 1917. Although not mentioned by the Court, additional money, personnel, or training might well have averted the prison officials' negligence in failing to follow the policies and losing plaintiff's hobby kit. Because the appellees have invoked the defense of qualified immunity, Powell must prove a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot conclude that there was a clearly established constitutional right to some additional predeprivation procedure in this case. In other words, we cannot conclude that it was clearly established at the time of the appellees' actions in this case that an additional predeprivation procedure was feasible. Although the appellees' 30 actions were disastrous in hindsight, Powell has not demonstrated that the contours of his son's procedural due process rights were sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that the conduct at issue here violated constitutional rights. Accordingly, we hold that the appellees are shielded by qualified immunity from Powell's procedural due process claim. We affirm the district court as to this claim.