Opinion ID: 1697053
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failing to Object to Prejudicial Comments Elicited by the State

Text: Evans argues that counsel was ineffective for failing to object to several improper comments elicited by the State, including testimony from Thomas that she was sixteen or seventeen at the time of the crime and later became pregnant with Evans' child and testimony from Waddell that Evans was in a gang. Evans also asserts that counsel failed to object to the State's comment during closing arguments that the murder was execution-style. As to the testimony that Thomas was sixteen or seventeen years old at the time of the crime and later became pregnant with Evans' child, the trial court concluded that counsel made a strategic decision not to object. At the evidentiary hearing, counsel testified that he decided not to object to this testimony because it comported with the defense's strategy that Thomas had a motivation to lie and was information that would not be viewed negatively as it is commonplace now, and ... pretty well accepted by society. Additionally, he believed the prosecutor could simply have asked Thomas her age and the jury could clearly see how old she was when she testified. We agree with the trial court that neither deficiency nor prejudice has been demonstrated. Evans next asserts that counsel was deficient for failing to request a Richardson hearing and waiving a motion for mistrial by accepting a curative instruction concerning Waddell's comment that Evans was in a gang. [18] Although counsel never requested a Richardson hearing based upon the State's failure to inform the defense about this testimony, the colloquy that followed his objection to the remark and motion for a mistrial confirms that the State was unaware of this information and did not willfully withhold it from the defense or otherwise violate a discovery rule that would have required a Richardson hearing. Because counsel took immediate action to rectify the improper testimony and there was no basis to conclude that the State violated a discovery rule, counsel's decision to move for a mistrial rather than request a Richardson hearing was reasonable under the norms of professional conduct. Occhicone, 768 So.2d at 1048. [19] Evans also claims that counsel was deficient for failing to object to the State's comment during closing argument that the murder was execution-style. This Court has previously held that a murder involving a gunshot to the head can be classified as an execution-style killing. See Ford v. State, 802 So.2d 1121, 1133 (Fla.2001). Here, evidence was presented that Pfeiffer was shot three times, once in the back and twice in the head, at a distance of at least two feet. Because the facts in evidence support the inference that this was an execution-style murder and the prosecutor's comment was therefore not improper, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to object. See Rogers v. State, 957 So.2d 538, 549 (Fla.2007). [20] Thus, we affirm the trial court's denial.