Opinion ID: 1234258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

Text: Under the rule established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan , above, a media defendant may not be held liable for damages in a defamation action involving a public official plaintiff unless actual malice is pleaded and proved. This rule was extended to public figure plaintiffs (such as respondent Allen) in Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 87 S.Ct. 1975, 18 L.Ed.2d 1094 (1967). Actual malice (or more appropriately, constitutional malice) is defined as knowledge of the falsity of the statement or a reckless disregard for the truth. New York Times, above, at 280, 84 S.Ct. at 726. [7] Reckless disregard for the truth was defined in Garrison v. Louisiana, above, a criminal libel suit, as a high degree of awareness of [the] probable falsity [of the statement]. Id. at 74. In St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968), the stated test was whether there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of [the] publication. Id. at 731, 88 S.Ct. at 1325. (Emphasis supplied.) In contrast to common law malice, the inquiry in actual malice focuses largely on the defendant's belief regarding truthfulness of the published material rather than on the defendant's attitude toward the plaintiff. See Greenbelt Coop. Pub. Ass'n, Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10, 90 S.Ct. 1537, 1540, 26 L.Ed.2d 6 (1970). The standard for appellate review is comparable to the method applied in determining the voluntariness of a confession in criminal law. Because a constitutional guaranty is involved, the trial court must first determine whether there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could conclude that the statements were uttered with actual malice. See Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 616 (9th Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102, 101 S.Ct. 897, 66 L.Ed.2d 827 (1981). A jury's finding of actual malice must be based on clear and convincing evidence. New York Times, above. [8] Because a constitutional right is implicated, the jury determination is subject to close appellate scrutiny. The fundamental inquiry, as one court has stated it, is Did the defendant lie? See Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., 576 F.2d 495, 506 (3rd Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 861, 99 S.Ct. 181, 58 L.Ed.2d 170 (1978). The test is subjective, with the focus on what the defendant believed and intended to convey, not what a reasonable person would have understood the message to be. R. Sack, above, at 212-13. Evidence of negligence, motive, and intent may be used, cumulatively, to establish the necessary recklessness. Id. at 214. It is clear that in most instances one factor alone will not establish actual malice by convincing clarity. Id. at 217. Support for the jury's finding of actual malice can be supplied by the following evidence: (1) Hernstadt's admittedly deliberate decision not to ask Allen about the check until Allen was on live television, see Alioto, above, at 1371 (failure to pursue the most obvious source for corroboration), Rebozo v. Washington Post Co ., above, (reporter's decision to resolve ambiguity in information against plaintiff although reporter had contacted witness who could clarify ambiguity); (2) Hernstadt knew that Allen had not drawn or passed the check in question; (3) The commonplace word your, as in your check, need not be taken to mean your campaign's [check], regardless of Hernstadt's testimony as to his meaning, and could well be taken to mean Allen's own check; (4) Hernstadt's attempt at correction could be taken as a republication since it insinuates the following: (a) that Allen committed a wrongful act short of a felony; (b) that Allen had a dishonorable motive as indicated by his failure to explain why the original agency check was returned; and, (c) that payment after the fact of the broadcast was additional proof that Allen was dishonorable; see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 580A comment d (1977) (republication by defendant after notification that plaintiff considers the statement to be false and defamatory may be treated as evidence of reckless disregard); (5) Several material contradictions exist with regard to Hernstadt's trial testimony and his previous deposition testimony; these include his admissions at deposition that (a) he told others of his intention to mention the check during the live broadcast and, (b) he intended to convey to the audience that Allen was not honorable, see, e.g., Holter v. WLCY T.V., Inc., 366 So.2d 445, 453 (Fla.App.1978); Davis v. Schuchat, 510 F.2d 731, 736 (D.C. Cir.1975) (jury may consider credibility of witnesses in determining issue of actual malice). Hernstadt's position on the issue of actual malice is essentially that he held a good faith belief in the truth of his comments. Hernstadt testified that he believed the check in issue to be Allen's because it was Allen's campaign check; he further testified that he believed FCC regulations required advance payment for political advertising, and that Allen, therefore, was legally and morally responsible for the bad check. Hernstadt claimed that he bore no ill will toward Allen and that the actual substance of his remarks resulted because the bounced check was hot news, which did not allow him time to investigate. Hernstadt knew the check was Golden West's; furthermore, he made no demand of Allen, prior to the show, for payment to cover the check. In light of those facts, it seems disingenuous for Hernstadt to claim that he believed Allen to be a dishonorable candidate who did not pay his bills. There is enough in the record to support a jury finding of constitutional malice.