Opinion ID: 173410
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. Eisenman

Text: State attorneys ... who perform functions analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and pursuing civil and administrative enforcement proceedings are absolutely immune from suit under section 1983 concerning activities intimately associated with the judicial process. Scott, 216 F.3d at 908 (internal quotations omitted). Such government actors are not immune, however, for actions that are primarily investigative or administrative in nature. Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir.1991). To distinguish between actions that are intimately associated with the judicial process and those that are investigative or administrative in nature, we look to whether the actions can rightly be considered advocacy because that is the prosecutor's main function and the one most akin to his quasi-judicial role. Id. Furthermore, absolute immunity may attach even to... administrative or investigative activities `when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may fulfill his function as an officer of the court.' Id. (quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 693 (10th Cir.1990)). The Jensens base their claims against Ms. Eisenman on: (1) misrepresentations she allegedly made to the juvenile court; (2) her research regarding the American Academy of Pediatrics's guidelines for clinicians who render pediatric care and her resistance to the Jensens' attempt to have P.J. treated by doctors who were not qualified under those guidelines; and (3) misrepresentations she allegedly made to the Salt Lake County District Attorney. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that any statements Ms. Eisenman made to the juvenile court were made in her role as an advocate for the state's interest in the custody dispute. Likewise, any research Ms. Eisenman performed regarding the appropriate type of doctor for P.J. and any actions she took to ensure that P.J. was treated by an appropriately credentialed doctor were intimately associated with the judicial process and Ms. Eisenman's role as an advocate for the state. Therefore, those actions are clearly within the scope of Ms. Eisenman's claimed absolute immunity. The protection afforded Ms. Eisenman's statements to the Salt Lake County District Attorney, however, is less clear. The Jensens argue that by making misrepresentations to the Salt Lake County District Attorney which eventually led to their criminal prosecution, Ms. Eisenman was acting as a complaining witness rather than as a prosecutor. Furthermore, the Jensens correctly point out that a complaining witness is not entitled to absolute immunity. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-41, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Under the circumstances of this case, however, we agree with the district court that Ms. Eisenman's presentation of facts to the Salt Lake County District Attorney was intimately associated with the juvenile court process and was done in Ms. Eisenman's role as an advocate for the state. The day Ms. Eisenman met with the Salt Lake County District Attorney, the juvenile court had ordered the Jensens to present P.J. to the court for the purpose of beginning chemotherapy treatment. The Jensens were aware of this juvenile court order and had, in fact, stated their intention not to comply with it. Furthermore, the Jensens admit they were attempting to hide P.J. from state authorities in order to prevent the effectuation of the juvenile court order. Under these circumstances, Ms. Eisenman's presentation of evidence to the Salt Lake County District Attorney was necessary to effectuate the juvenile court's order and to pursue the interest of the state in ensuring that P.J. receive treatment for his life-threatening illness. Accordingly, these actions were necessary to fulfill both her roles as officer of the court and advocate for the state, and are therefore protected by absolute immunity.