Opinion ID: 2205346
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Did Wacker Act to His Detriment or Prejudice and What is Remedy?

Text: The State does not address whether Wacker acted to his detriment or prejudice when performing the agreement. The confession, however, was not used against Wacker at trial. Thus, the argument could be made that Wacker was not prejudiced by his statements or that suppression is the appropriate remedy for the State's breach. We disagree. [6] The test is whether in performing, the defendant acted to his or her detriment or prejudice. State v. Howe, 2 Neb. App. 766, 774, 514 N.W.2d 356, 362 (1994). Providing self-incriminating information can constitute detrimental reliance. Id. See State ex rel. Fortner v. Urbom, 211 Neb. 309, 318 N.W.2d 286 (1982). Some courts have recognized suppression as a remedy or a manner in which to return the defendant to the status quo. See, People v Gallego, supra ; State v. Sturgill, supra ; Com. v. Stipetich, 539 Pa. 428, 652 A.2d 1294 (1995). Here, suppression would be an insufficient remedy for the State's breach. [7] Had Wacker known that the State's promise would not have been kept, it is unlikely he would have given up his constitutional right against self-incrimination. When a promise is made by police to an individual, in exchange for a confession, the standards of substantive due process prohibit the State from `welshing' on the bargain. State v. Sturgill, 121 N.C. App. at 645-46, 469 S.E.2d at 567. See, also, Rowe v. Griffin, 676 F.2d 524 (11th Cir. 1982). In the context of a plea agreement, it has been said that a defendant is entitled to specific performance when `no other remedy is appropriate to effectuate the accused's legitimate expectation engendered by the governmental promise.' People v. Macrander, 756 P.2d 356, 361 (Colo. 1988). Here, Wacker reasonably expected that by providing information about the accidentparticularly by admitting that he was driving the vehiclethat he would not be charged with man-slaughter and instead would be charged with only motor vehicle homicide. In anticipating a motor vehicle homicide charge, Wacker detrimentally relied upon the promise by providing incriminating information. Suppression of the confession could not place Wacker back in a position that achieves his legitimate expectation. Additionally, a confession affects whether a defendant will testify. Although Wacker's statement was suppressed, had he chosen to testify, he could have possibly been impeached with his confession. Thus, the confession, made in reliance on Downing's promise of a lesser charge, posed a risk for Wacker if he chose to testify at trial. Thus, the statement's suppression cannot put Wacker back in the status quo. Although we recognize that in some circumstances suppression might cure the effects of a broken cooperation agreement, here, we determine that it was insufficient. We determine that suppression was not sufficient to negate Wacker's detrimental reliance on the State's promise and is not the appropriate remedy. The State made an agreement with Wacker promising that he would be charged with motor vehicle homicide in exchange for his confession. Wacker agreed and performed in reliance on the promise, and the State breached the agreement. Thus, the district court erred when it denied Wacker's motion to dismiss or to compel the State to amend the charge. To meet Wacker's expectation interest based on his reliance on the State's promise, we vacate the manslaughter conviction and sentence and remand the cause for a new trial at which Wacker cannot be charged again with manslaughter, but may be charged with motor vehicle homicide or a lesser offense. Because we remand the cause for a new trial, we do not address Wacker's remaining assignments of error. CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED, AND CAUSE REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.