Opinion ID: 2734145
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Permit

Text: Pet Supply also argues that the revocation of its pet dealer permit without a prior hearing violated a clearly established due-process right. The parties agree that Pet Supply had a protected property interest in the permit. Pet Supply alleges that McKamey and Walsh revoked the permit. R. 1 (Compl. at ¶ 60, 62, 64) (Page ID #11, 12). Pet Supply does not allege that Nicholson played any role in the permit revocation. Accordingly, Nicholson is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. We conclude that the revocation of the permit violated due process. The City Code authorized the revocation of a permit “if negligence in care or misconduct occurs that is detrimental to animal welfare or to the public.” R. 70-4 (City Code at 25) (Page ID #1513). After McKamey revoked Pet Supply’s permit, Pet Supply never had an opportunity—either predeprivation hearing or post-deprivation—to challenge the permit revocation. Pet Supply could challenge the citations for violations of animal-welfare laws in city court, but the city court did not have authority over the permit and could not order the reinstatement of the permit. R. 69-12 (City Court Order at 3 n.1) (Page ID #1370) (“[t]he court is [ ] of the opinion the City Court has no authority to revoke or make any order relative to the license of the Pet Company.”). It was the policy and practice of McKamey and the City of Chattanooga to require an individual or company whose permit was revoked to apply for a new permit. R. 69-9 (7/21/2010 Hr’g Tr. at 113–16) (Page ID #1350–53). This process does not truly allow for a reinstatement of the permit; even if the City Court were to conclude that the permit holder had not violated the City Code, the permit holder was nonetheless required to apply for a new permit, pay the fee, and go through the inspection process again. The fact that the permit holder can ultimately obtain a new permit after jumping through various hoops does not address the lack of a mechanism to challenge the initial revocation. Due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a “meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552. The failure to provide a hearing prior to a license or permit revocation does not per se violate due process. See Barry v. Barchi, 443 U.S. 55, 65–66 (1979) (holding that the summary suspension of a horse trainer’s license without a prior hearing did not violate due process, but the failure to provide a timely post-suspension No. 13-5181 United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga et al. Page 26 hearing did violate due process). But there is no dispute that never providing an opportunity to challenge a permit revocation violates due process. Thus, the revocation of Pet Supply’s permit without a pre-deprivation hearing or a post-deprivation hearing violated due process. No reasonable officer could believe that revoking a permit to do business without providing any pre-deprivation or post-deprivation remedy was constitutional. Walsh argues that she was entitled to rely on the constitutionality of the Chattanooga City Code, which does not provide for a hearing on the revocation of a pet-dealer permit. Certainly, there are policy reasons that counsel in favor of allowing government officials to presume the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 (1979). But the Chattanooga City Code does not make the revocation of the permit automatic upon the determination that negligence or misconduct has occurred. The Code states that an animal-related permit “may be revoked if negligence in care or misconduct occurs that is detrimental to animal welfare or to the public.” R. 70-4 (City Code at 25) (Page ID #1513). The Code did not tie Walsh’s hands; it was her discretionary decision immediately to revoke the permit. This is one of the rare situations where the unconstitutionality of the application of a statute to a situation is plainly obvious. In Leonard v. Robinson, 477 F.3d 347 (6th Cir. 2007), we denied qualified immunity to a police officer in a § 1983 suit alleging First Amendment violations because there was no probable cause to support arresting an individual for uttering “God damn” at a township board meeting. Id. at 359–60. We rejected the police officer’s argument that various Michigan statutes supported probable cause because we concluded that “no reasonable police officer would believe that any of the three other Michigan statutes relied upon by the district court are constitutional as applied to [the individual’s] political speech during a democratic assembly.” Id. Similarly, here, no reasonable officer could believe that revoking this permit without providing any opportunity for a hearing was constitutional. Accordingly, the evidence taken in the light most favorable to Pet Supply demonstrates the violation of a clearly established right, and so we deny qualified immunity to Walsh on this claim. No. 13-5181 United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga et al. Page 27 D. Fourth Amendment Pet Supply next argues that the warrantless seizure of its animals and business records violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures. “A ‘seizure’ of property, [the Supreme Court has] explained, occurs when ‘there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s possessory interests in that property.’” Soldal v. Cook Cnty., 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). The protections of the Fourth Amendment are not limited to criminal investigations. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 335 (1985). No one disputes that dispossessing Pet Supply of its animals and business records is a seizure of property within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The only issue is whether the warrantless seizure of the animals and records violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right. The Fourth Amendment is a powerful background norm that prohibits government officials from engaging in a warrantless search or seizure, with limited exceptions. “[A] search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances,’” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971), or another of the carefully delineated exceptions to the warrant requirement. The defendants-appellants argue that the warrantless seizure of the animals and business records was justified by the plain-view and exigent-circumstances doctrines. Thus, we must “evaluate whether ‘an objectively reasonable officer confronted with the same circumstances could reasonably believe that exigent circumstances existed.’” Kovacic v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Dep’t of Children & Family Servs., 724 F.3d 687, 695 n.1 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 501 (6th Cir. 2002)). Under the plain-view doctrine, “if police are lawfully in a position from which they view an object, if its incriminating character is immediately apparent, and if the officers have a lawful right of access to the object, they may seize it without a warrant.” Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). Generally, the lawful-right-of-access requirement obliges a government official to “get a warrant if possible before he seizes an item in plain view. He No. 13-5181 United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga et al. Page 28 cannot seize absent exigent circumstances. If he could obtain a warrant, then . . . he cannot use the ‘plain view’ exception for the evidence.” United States v. McLevain, 310 F.3d 434, 443 (6th Cir. 2002). Under the exigent-circumstances doctrine, there must be a “‘need for prompt action by government personnel, and [a conclusion] that delay to secure a warrant would be unacceptable under the circumstances.’” Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 695 (quoting United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1517 (6th Cir. 1996)). Classic examples of exigent circumstances that may justify a warrantless property seizure include the likelihood that a suspect will destroy evidence, see Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 331–32 (2001), and when there exists “‘the need to assist persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury,’” Kovacic, 724 F.3d at 695 (quoting Johnson v. City of Memphis, 617 F.3d 864, 868 (6th Cir. 2010)). 1. Animals We conclude that the warrantless animal seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. As discussed supra, it is undisputed that the animals were dehydrated and in high heat and without water, that one hamster had a large cut that had not received medical care, and that the Pet Supply employees were unaware that a hamster had died in its cage. A reasonable officer could believe that this constituted neglect under the Chattanooga City Code5 and that the conditions justified the warrantless seizure of the animals. Unlike in Kovacic, where exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless seizure of a child from a home based on “reliance on weeks-old incidents” and the fact that the child’s mother had missed a meeting, here, the 5 Chattanooga City Code § 7-28(a) makes it “unlawful for any person to neglect an animal as neglect is defined in this Chapter.” R. 70-4 (City Code at 21) (Page ID #1509). “Neglect” is defined in § 7-2 as: (1) Failing to sufficiently and properly care for an animal to the extent that the animal’s health is jeopardized; (2) Failing to provide an animal with adequate living conditions as defined in this chapter (adequate feed, adequate water, adequate shelter, adequate space, etc.); (3) Failing to provide adequate veterinary care; (4) Keeping any animal under conditions which increase the probability of the transmission of disease; (5) Failing to provide an adequate shelter for an animal; (6) Negligently allow any animal, including one who is aged, diseased, maimed, hopelessly sick, disabled, or not ambulatory to suffer unnecessary neglect, torture, or pain; or (7) Meeting the requirements of the definition of an Animal Hoarder. R. 70-4 (City Code at 8–9) (Page ID #1496–97. No. 13-5181 United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga et al. Page 29 conditions of the store created an imminent and ongoing danger to the health of the animals. Cf. Siebert, 256 F.3d at 657–58 (concluding that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless seizure of horses because standing in a muddy pasture, drinking from streams, and being exposed to cold temperatures do not constitute exigent circumstances). Given the high heat and squalid conditions in which the animals were found, on June 15, 2010, a reasonable official could believe that the exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of the animals. Accordingly, Walsh and Nicholson are entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. 2. Business Records Pet Supply asserts that the warrantless seizure of business records “including the store operations manual, employee handbook, animal logs, animal health certificates, veterinary treatment records, pedigree records, and transportation records,” R. 1 (Compl. at ¶ 58) (Page ID #11), violated the Fourth Amendment. Because Pet Supply does not allege or present any evidence that Nicholson removed business records, it has not demonstrated that he violated a constitutional right, and so Nicholson is entitled to qualified immunity on this claim. Pet Supply alleges that Walsh seized the records. R. 74 (Memo. Summ. J. at 5) (Page ID #2066). Walsh is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because no reasonable officer could conclude that the plain-view doctrine or exigent circumstances justified the warrantless seizure of the business records. The defendants-appellants do not even attempt to argue that the very nature of the records was incriminating, so the seizure was not justified by the plain-view doctrine. Nor is the seizure of the records justified by the exigent-circumstances doctrine. There is no evidence in the record that the seized business records provided evidence of a crime or other legal violation, or that the McKamey employees feared destruction of the evidence. See United States v. Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655, 662–65 (6th Cir. 2005) (exigent circumstances justified warrantless seizure of documents providing evidence of an alien smuggling and fraud ring when police came upon defendants burning other documentary evidence). The business records obviously do not pose a danger to anyone’s health or safety. To the extent that the defendantsappellants needed information about the animals to care for them properly, that need was No. 13-5181 United Pet Supply, Inc. v. City of Chattanooga et al. Page 30 satisfied by obtaining photocopies of the animals’ records from Pet Supply employees. R. 67-1 (Hurn Aff. at ¶ 13) (Page ID #1207–08). There is no pre-2010 caselaw that disrupts the presumption that the Fourth Amendment applies to the seizure of business records. No reasonable officer could have concluded that the seizure of the business records was justified by an exception to the warrant requirement. Accordingly, the seizure violated a clearly established Fourth Amendment right, and so Walsh is not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim.