Opinion ID: 676067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conspiracy to Commit a Robbery

Text: 9 Medina argues that the evidence at trial was insufficient to convict him of conspiring to rob the construction company. We disagree and begin by noting the heavy burden a defendant must carry when challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. See e.g., United States v. Alkins, 925 F.2d 541, 555 (2d Cir.1991). In reviewing Medina's conviction, we must consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, see United States v. Torres, 901 F.2d 205, 216 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 273, 112 L.Ed.2d 229 (1990), drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all issues of credibility in its favor, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 554 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 966, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 530 (1988). 10 Medina's primary attack on his conspiracy conviction is that he could not have conspired with Lopez as a matter of law, because Lopez was already acting as a government informant when he agreed to commit the robbery for Medina. Lopez testified that he agreed to participate in Medina's robbery plan on either December 11 or December 13. The government contends that Lopez did not become an informant until December 15. Medina argues, however, that Lopez was acting as an informant by December 11, and that the evidence conclusively demonstrates this. He directs our attention to the fact that Lopez was initially arrested for the carjacking on November 17, 1992, and released the same day after exchanging beeper numbers with one of the detectives who had arrested him. Lopez and the detective contacted one another using the beeper numbers prior to December 15. Although the police obviously knew where Lopez could be found and had obtained an arrest warrant on November 25, they made no attempt to arrest him until December 15. The government, for its part, cites trial testimony explaining that Lopez was released after his initial arrest because the carjacking victim failed to identify him in a line-up; that Lopez's telephone conversations with detectives between November 17 and December 15 concerned other participants in the carjacking; and that Lopez's arrest on December 15 was based on information provided by an accomplice. 11 Medina claims that the evidence can support but one possible inference: that Lopez was acting as an informant by December 11. There is evidence, however, to support the view that Lopez's conversations with detectives prior to December 15 concerned the carjacking, and that he was not acting as an informant until after that date. Drawing all inferences and resolving all credibility issues in favor of the government, we cannot say that such a jury determination would be irrational, and therefore will not disturb it. 12 The evidence is also sufficient to support a finding that Medina conspired with Villanueva. When Lopez told Medina that he had brought Villanueva into the scheme, Medina expressly approved the participation of the new coconspirator, on the principle that two heads are better than one. Medina also learned from Lopez that Villanueva would be carrying a gun to the robbery and, with this knowledge, offered to supply Lopez with a second gun. It does not matter that Medina was unaware of Villanueva's full identity, or that they had never met. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 375, 71 S.Ct. 438, 443, 95 L.Ed. 344 (1951) (one person can be convicted of conspiring with persons whose names are unknown). All that is required to sustain Medina's conviction for conspiracy is  'some evidence from which it can reasonably be inferred that the person charged with conspiracy knew of the existence of the scheme alleged in the indictment and knowingly joined and participated in it.'  United States v. Sanchez Solis 882 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Gaviria, 740 F.2d 174, 183 (2d Cir.1984)). Evidence that Medina knew of the robbery conspiracy and knowingly joined and participated in it is overwhelming. Indeed, Medina thought of the crime and set it in motion. 13 Nor was there any error in the district court's jury instruction that Medina could conspire with Villanueva or Delgado through Lopez as an intermediary, even if Lopez was acting as an informant. Although a person acting as an agent of the government cannot be a coconspirator, the presence of a government agent does not destroy a conspiracy in which at least two other private individuals have agreed to engage in an unlawful venture. United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 175 (2d Cir.) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 347, 116 L.Ed.2d 287 (1991). A defendant can conspire with individuals he has never met, so long as he participates and is aware of their assistance in the criminal venture. Rogers, 340 U.S. at 375, 71 S.Ct. at 443. The evidence is sufficient to show an agreement between Medina and Villanueva to rob the construction company, because Medina continued to provide information and advice regarding the proposed robbery after he learned of Villanueva's participation on December 15. Even if Medina and Villanueva communicated solely through Lopez, and Lopez was acting as an informant, Medina and Villanueva could nevertheless be coconspirators: [A] government agent may serve as a 'link' between 'genuine' conspirators. United States v. Fincher, 723 F.2d 862, 863 (11th Cir.1984) (citing Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 142 (5th Cir.1965)). The fact that conspirators select an informer as a conduit for transmitting information is a business risk; it does not neutralize the conspiracy or insulate the conspirators from prosecution, see United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 43 (1st Cir.1981) (Breyer, J.). Medina's conviction on Count One is affirmed. 14