Opinion ID: 6329622
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Summary Adjudication Was Appropriate.

Text: Alborn contends that material factual disputes precluded summary adjudication and that the ALJ erroneously analyzed the facts when applying the Western 15 Titus v. State, Dep’t of Admin., Div. of Motor Vehicles, 305 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Alaska 2013) (quoting Alaska Exch. Carriers Ass'n, Inc. v. Regul. Comm'n of Alaska, 202 P.3d 458, 460 (Alaska 2009)). 16 North Slope Borough v. State, Dep’t of Educ. & Early Dev., 484 P.3d 106, 113 (Alaska 2021). 17 Id. (quoting Nicolos v. North Slope Borough, 424 P.3d 318, 325 (Alaska 2018)). 18 Id. (quoting Tesoro Alaska Petrol. Co. v. Kenai Pipe Line Co., 746 P.2d 896, 903 (Alaska 1987)). 19 Anderson v. Alaska Hous. Fin. Corp., 462 P.3d 19, 25 (Alaska 2020); Griswold v. Homer Bd. of Adjustment, 426 P.3d 1044, 1045 (Alaska 2018). -9- 7589 Alaska multifactor legal test to determine the project was “public construction” covered by the Act.20 But Alborn alleges no specific factual disputes, and the applicability of a statutory definition is a question of law.21 Alborn also asserts that because the ALJ did not order an evidentiary hearing about the State’s role in the project and the parties’ intent underlying Amendment 55, the ALJ drew “sua sponte” conclusions not based on evidence. But “[t]here is no right to an evidentiary hearing in the absence of a factual dispute.”22 As the Department of Labor notes responds, the ALJ explained that at the summary adjudication phase: “All inferences that could be drawn regarding the truth of the fact will be drawn in Alborn’s favor.”23 The ALJ accepted as true Alborn’s contentions that Juneau I “initiated many of the projects that later became Amendment 54” and that “the relative role of the [S]tate in the financing of the project was small compared to the role of Juneau I.” Alborn disagrees with the ALJ’s ultimate analysis of the facts in applying the Western Alaska test, but Alborn identifies no other material facts that the ALJ did not already assume to be true. The ALJ concluded that no evidentiary hearing was needed to decide that Amendment 55 was a sham contract because the material facts were in the record, 20 See 909 P.2d 330, 333-34 (Alaska 1996) (explaining five-factor “public construction” test); AS 36.95.010(3) (defining “public construction” under Act). 21 Western Alaska, 909 P.2d at 332. 22 Church v. State, Dep’t of Revenue, 973 P.2d 1125, 1129 (Alaska 1999) (quoting Hum. Res. Co. v. Alaska Comm’n on Post-Secondary Educ., 946 P.2d 441, 445 n.7 (Alaska 1997)). 23 See Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Skin, 211 P.3d 1093, 1098 (Alaska 2009) (explaining at summary judgment stage all factual inferences must be drawn in favor of non-moving party). -10- 7589 offered by Alborn itself, undisputed, addressed at the hearing, and addressed again after Alborn’s motion for reconsideration. For example, the ALJ noted Alborn’s statement that Amendment 55’s purpose was avoiding the Act’s coverage while keeping the construction project substantially the same, and Alborn states the same to us. Given Alborn’s direct admission, an evidentiary hearing about the nature and purpose of Amendment 55 was unnecessary. Based on the undisputed facts, summary adjudication was appropriate.