Opinion ID: 2184797
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Self-incriminating Statements by a Third Party

Text: Initially, defendant claims that the State had knowledge that another individual, Ronald Baker, had confessed to the murder of Jimmy Christian, but the State failed to disclose this information to defendant. Defendant's post-conviction petition includes the affidavit of a defense investigator who interviewed the Reverend Jerry Gibson. During the interview, Reverend Gibson related that he had spoken with Ronald Baker in connection with Baker's marital troubles and Baker acknowledged having at some point made the statement, Yes I killed Jimmy Christian, and I'll kill you too. Reverend Gibson believed that this statement had been addressed to Brian Diffy, and that Baker made the threat because he suspected that his wife and Diffy were having an affair. Reverend Gibson told the defense investigator that he had informed the police of Baker's statements and other information concerning the Jimmy Christian murder. Subsequent to the interview, Reverend Gibson informed the defense investigator that he did not want to become involved in the case again, but that he would testify pursuant to a subpoena. We note that defendant also submitted an affidavit by Brian Diffy which would appear to indicate that any threat by Baker against Diffy was not made directly to Diffy. In his affidavit, Diffy stated, About three or four months after Jimmy Christian's murder, I heard that Ronald Baker said he had killed Jimmy Christian and would kill me too if I didn't leave his wife alone. Defendant argues that the information that Ronald Baker had admitted to killing Jimmy Christian was essential to the defense and would have been devastating to the State's case. Defendant apparently assumes, without offering any analysis, that Ronald Baker's alleged confession would have been admissible into evidence had defense counsel known about it and sought to introduce it. The general rule, however, holds to the contrary. An extrajudicial declaration, not under oath, by the declarant that he, and not the defendant on trial, committed the crime is inadmissible as hearsay, though the declaration is against the declarant's penal interest. People v. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d 314, 342, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636 (1994); People v. House, 141 Ill.2d 323, 389-90, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259 (1990); People v. Bowel, 111 Ill.2d 58, 66, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995 (1986); see People v. Rutherford, 274 Ill.App.3d 116, 123, 210 Ill.Dec. 599, 653 N.E.2d 794 (1995). Such a declaration will be admitted, however, when justice requires. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636. Where there are sufficient indicia of trustworthiness, such out-of-court statements may be admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule. Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636; Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 66, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973), the United States Supreme Court identified four factors present in that particular case underlying the Court's decision that the defendant was constitutionally entitled to introduce evidence of an extrajudicial third-party confession notwithstanding a common law rule of evidence barring the use of such confessions. The four factors in Chambers were: (1) the statement was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after the crime occurred; (2) the statement was corroborated by other evidence; (3) the statement was self-incriminating and against the declarant's interest; and (4) there was adequate opportunity for cross-examination of the declarant. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d at 311-12; see Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636. The Chambers factors are merely guidelines to admissibility rather than hard and fast requirements ( House, 141 Ill.2d at 390, 152 Ill.Dec. 572, 566 N.E.2d 259, citing Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 67, 94 Ill.Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995) and the presence of all four factors is not a condition of admissibility ( Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636). Ultimately, admissibility depends on whether the statement was made under circumstances that provide considerable assurance of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300-01, 93 S.Ct. at 1048-49, 35 L.Ed.2d at 311-12; Cruz, 162 Ill.2d at 343, 205 Ill.Dec. 345, 643 N.E.2d 636; Bowel, 111 Ill.2d at 67, 94 Ill. Dec. 748, 488 N.E.2d 995. Consideration of the four specific Chambers criteria does not favor admissibility. While Ronald Baker's alleged statement was self-incriminating and against interest, defendant has failed to establish the other three factors. See People v. Keene, 169 Ill.2d 1, 29-30, 214 Ill.Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901 (1995) (statement would not have been admissible where only Chambers factor present was that statement was self-incriminating). First, it is not known when Baker made his statement, or whether he made the statement to a close acquaintance. Indeed, the identity of the person to whom the statement was addressed is unknown. Second, there appears to be no meaningful or substantial corroboration of any statements implicating Ronald Baker in the Jimmy Christian murder. Third, assuming that Baker made the self-incriminating statement that has been attributed to him, defendant has failed to establish that Baker would have been available for cross-examination with regard to the statement. Baker might very well have asserted his privilege against self-incrimination rather than answer questions pertaining to any self-incriminating statements. Cf. Keene, 169 Ill.2d at 30, 214 Ill. Dec. 194, 660 N.E.2d 901. More generally, Baker's alleged statement was not made under circumstances that provide considerable assurance of its reliability by objective indicia of trustworthiness. The statement admitting to the murder was coupled with a threat apparently born of jealousy. As such, the self-incriminating portion of the statement (I killed Jimmy Christian) may simply represent bravado designed to bolster the threat (and I'll kill you too). Because Ronald Baker's alleged self-incriminating statements would not have been admissible, there is no reasonable probability that disclosure of Reverend Gibson's report of the statement to police would have affected the outcome of defendant's trial. Accordingly, defendant has failed to establish that the allegedly undisclosed information was material giving rise to a constitutional obligation to disclose.