Opinion ID: 170115
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conspiracy/Defamation Claim.

Text: “Allegations of conspiracy may . . . form the basis of a § 1983 claim.” Tonkovich v. Kansas Bd. of Regents, 159 F.3d 504, 533 (10th Cir. 1998). “However, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing an agreement and concerted action amongst the defendants,” id., and “[c]onclusory allegations of conspiracy are insufficient to state a valid § 1983 claim,” id. (quotation omitted). -7- Further, “a deprivation of a constitutional right is essential to proceed under a § 1983 conspiracy claim.” Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 701-02 (10th Cir. 1990). Thus, to prevail on such a claim, “a plaintiff must plead and prove not only a conspiracy, but also an actual deprivation of rights.” Dixon v. City of Lawton, 898 F.2d 1443, 1449 (10th Cir. 1990). As set forth above, the district court found that Mr. Kennedy “offer[ed] no evidence of any ‘concerted action’ between the defendants to deprive[] him of his constitutional rights,” and therefore concluded that he “failed to establish [there] was an agreement among defendants to deprive him of his constitutional rights.” R., Doc. 175 at 4. Having thoroughly reviewed the summary judgment record, we agree with the district court that there is insufficient evidence to establish a § 1983 conspiracy. More fundamental, however, is the complete lack of evidence showing a violation of Mr. Kennedy’s constitutional rights. See Dixon, 898 F.2d at 1449 (“[T]he essence of a § 1983 [conspiracy] claim is the deprivation of the right rather than the conspiracy.”). Construing Mr. Kennedy’s allegations liberally, the constitutional right at issue here is the right to procedural due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Specifically, Mr. Kennedy claims that defendants violated his Fourteenth Amendment right to procedural due process when they allowed the contents of the anonymous letter to be published in the local media without affording him a hearing and an opportunity to clear his name by proving that the -8- allegations in the letter were false. Consequently, “it is [Mr. Kennedy’s] liberty interests that are at issue: he alleges that the defendants deprived him of those interests without affording him the procedural protections required by the Due Process Clause.” Gwinn, 354 F.3d at 1216. As we explained in Gwinn: “‘Where a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him,’ a protectible liberty interest may be implicated that requires procedural due process in the form of a hearing to clear his name.” Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency of Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1558 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 . . . (1971)). Damage to one’s reputation alone, however, is not enough to implicate due process protections. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 . . . (1976) (stating that “reputation alone, apart from some more tangible interests such as employment, is neither ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ by itself sufficient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause”); McGhee v. Draper, 639 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1981) ([S]tigmatization or reputational damage alone, no matter how egregious, is not sufficient to support a § 1983 cause of action.”). Instead, a plaintiff asserting that the government has violated the Due Process Clause by impugning his or her “good name, reputation, honor, or integrity,” Jensen, 998 F.2d at 1558, must demonstrate that: (1) the government made a statement about him or her that is sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that is capable of being proved false, and that he or she asserts is false, and (2) the plaintiff experienced some governmentally imposed burden that “significantly altered [his or] her status as a matter of state law.” Paul, 424 U.S. at 710-11 . . . . This is sometimes described as the “stigma plus” standard. Id. Here, there is no question the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant Sexton. As the court found, “her sole role in the underlying events was limited to receiving the anonymous letter and forwarding it -9- to the Sheriff’s office.” R., Doc. 175 at 4. Further, with regard to defendants Pearson and Smith, we likewise question whether they actually “made” a derogatory statement about Mr. Kennedy when they allowed the contents of the anonymous letter to be published in the local media. However, because Mr. Kennedy has not even come close to showing the “plus” part of the “stigma plus” standard (i.e., “some governmentally imposed burden that significantly altered his . . . status as a matter of state law”), we do not need to decide whether the “stigma” part of the standard was met. To begin with, the only “plus” alleged by Mr. Kennedy is his claim that he was denied parole in October 2004 because of the publication of the contents of the anonymous letter. But, as set forth above, Mr. Kennedy testified at his deposition that he does not know why the Parole Board denied parole. R., Doc. 165, Ex. 2 at 55-56. Mr. Kennedy also testified that he does not know whether the Parole Board even knew about the two newspaper articles when it denied parole. Id. at 62-63, 66-67. Moreover, while Mr. Kennedy complains vociferously about how the district court prevented him from deposing the defendants, Mr. Kennedy never sought any discovery from the Parole Board, and he also failed to request a continuance under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to obtain such discovery. As a result, there are no “specific facts” in the summary judgment record showing why the Parole Board denied parole in October 2004. Without such evidence, it was legally impossible for Mr. Kennedy to meet his trial burden of satisfying the “plus” part of the “stigma-plus” standard, “an essential element of [his § 1983 defamation] case.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Accordingly, for this -10- reason and for the reasons relied upon by the district court, we conclude that summary judgment was properly entered in favor of defendants on Mr. Kennedy’s conspiracy/defamation claim.