Opinion ID: 1856655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: rescission of partition for lesion

Text: The rescission of an extrajudicial partition for lesion is governed by La.Civ.Code art. 814, which provides: An extrajudicial partition may be rescinded on account of lesion if the value of the part received by a co-owner is less by more than one-fourth of the fair market value of the portion he should have received. [6] (Footnote added). The proper method of establishing lesion beyond one-fourth is twofold: (1) the community property's true value (net value) must be ascertained; and (2) it must then be determined from the property acquired whether a party received value less than ¾ of ½ share of the true value of the property partitioned. Oberfell v. Oberfell, 516 So.2d 424 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1987); Cowling v. Cowling, 486 So.2d 1060 (La.App. 2 Cir.1986); Beatty v. Vining, 147 So.2d 37 (La.App. 2 Cir.1962). The value of the property exchanged is determined as of the date the exchange was executed. Ozane v. Ozane, 392 So.2d 774 (La.App. 3 Cir.1980); Beatty v. Vining, supra. See also, La.Civ.Code art. 2590; La.Civ.Code art. 814 comment (b). Our analysis begins with an inventory of the property exchanged in the partition. The settlement agreement plainly states that three elements that had once been community property were partitioned by the agreement: 1) the property in Livingston Parish in the town of Albany, acquired during the community, was allocated to Mr. McCarroll; 2) movable property in Mr. McCarroll's name or possession that was acquired during the community was allocated to Mr. McCarroll; 3) movable property in Mrs. McCarroll's name or possession that was acquired during the community was allocated to Mrs. McCarroll. In addition, Mrs. McCarroll acknowledged receipt of $5,000. The settlement agreement provided that any remaining property would continue to be held by the parties in indivision. As noted by the trial court, an ambiguity was raised by the language of the agreement: should the community portion of the retirement benefits, as incorporeal movables, be allocated to Mr. McCarroll under the terms of the agreement; or did the parties contemplate a future partition of the retirement benefits, as evidenced by the fact that they were unmentioned in the agreement? The trial court held a hearing on this issue and determined that the parol evidence preponderated in favor of the inclusion of the retirement benefits in the settlement agreement. The trial court also determined that the inclusion of the benefits was explained by a side agreement, made by the parties over ten years earlier, in which Mrs. McCarroll agreed to relinquish any right she had to the community in exchange for the exclusive use of the family home. The trial court therefore determined that the value received by Mrs. McCarroll in using the family home should be considered as having been a part of the settlement agreement in addition to the $5,000 acknowledged in the settlement. The inclusion of the rental value as consideration is the linchpin issue of the case sub judice, since without the rental value the settlement agreement is obviously and grossly lesionary.