Opinion ID: 1191734
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: few important facts

Text: The facts are straightforward. In 1995 the Legislature authorized King County to impose a sales tax by local ordinance to pay for a baseball stadium. The taxing ordinance was put to county referendum but was rejected at the polls by voters in the very county where the stadium was to be located. The Governor immediately called the Legislature into special session for the sole purpose of enacting a tax which could be used to fund a stadium of similar design. The Stadium Act [3] authorizes a combination of state and local taxes to raise an additional $314 million. In legal effect, the Act authorizes and imposes several taxes but does nothing to mandate construction of a stadium or keep a baseball team. Since the statute was passed as an alleged emergency, it became effective immediately. However, the Act says that the taxes may not be imposed prior to January 1; whereas, if not for the emergency clause, the taxes could have been imposed on January 15, i.e., 90 days from the end of the special session. While the Stadium Act generally authorizes new and/or higher state and local taxation to begin on January 1, 1996, and also generally provides that the taxes so collected shall be dedicated to a stadium purpose, these taxes will continue to be collected until at least June 30, 1997, whether or not the stadium is ever constructed and whether or not there is a team to play in it. However, assuming no stadium is built and no baseball team remains or is secured, there is no provision whatsoever in the enactment to refund to the taxpayers those enhanced taxes collected between January 1, 1996 and June 30, 1997. The government may well claim that under such a scenario it is entitled to retain the revenue collected for stadium purposes in its general fund to be expended for other purposes rather than refunding the same plus interest back to the taxpayers. The Act provides that after June 30, 1997 the major league team must agree to share... profits (ง 201(4)(c)). However, this is illusory because it does not set the share nor does it apply if there are none. The Stadium Act does not tell us why passage of the Act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety. It contains no legislative declarations of fact whatsoever, although at its end it does contain a so-called emergency clause identical, word for word, to the constitutional provision: This act is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, or support of the state government and its existing public institutions, and shall take effect immediately. Laws of 1995, 3d SpecSess., ch. 1, ง 310. The reason why this Act is emergently necessary is left to the imagination. The statute immediately took effect on October 17. But a citizens' group promptly requested the Secretary of State to begin the referendum process by accepting for filing its typewritten copy of the Stadium Act (the proposed subject of referendum) accompanied by its filing fee. See RCW 29.79.010, RCW 43.07.120. Our state constitution reserves for the people the right to put any statute passed by the Legislature to popular referendumโwith one narrow exception: a statute is not subject to referendum if it is necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety, support of the state government and its existing public institutions. Const. art. II, ง 1(b) (amend. VII). The Secretary of State leaped into the breech of that narrow exception and refused to process the referendum. Hence, this suit followed.