Opinion ID: 1762353
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: regulation of activities outside the practice of law

Text: The purpose of the Kentucky Bar Association is to maintain a proper discipline of the members of the bar [.] SCR 3.025 (emphasis added). In addition, the KBA has authority to initiate proceedings concerning the unauthorized practice of law, SCR 3.460(1), as well as violations of disbarment or suspension orders. See Wright v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 169 S.W.3d 858 (Ky.2005) (during period of suspension, Wright filed a pleading upon behalf of a client and failed to disclose to Court that she was suspended); Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Klapheke, 122 S.W.3d 64 (Ky.2003) (finding that Klapheke failed to follow the Court's order to notify his clients of his suspension). Yet, [w]hatever duties the code of professional conduct may impose upon licensed attorneys, it has no relevance to the conduct of lay persons, Gailor v. Alsabi, 990 S.W.2d 597, 605 (Ky. 1998), or non-members, unless they attempt to practice law in Kentucky, Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Shane, 553 S.W.2d 467 (Ky.1977), or fail to comply with disbarment or suspension orders. Klapheke, supra . In Kentucky, there is no requirement that escrow agents be licensed attorneys. Simply put, there are no recognized or mandatory connections between the activities of an escrow agent and the practice of law. See SCR 3.130-1.15, Comment 4. On the other hand, a licensed attorney undertaking to act as an escrow agent remains subject to the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct. That is because of his status as a licensed attorney, not his assumption or performance of the duties of an escrow agent. Here, the record discloses that the Trial Commissioner and the Board of Governors, in arriving at their Findings and Conclusions, considered Mr. Craft's conduct from 1990 through 2005, even though Mr. Craft was not a member of the KBA, nor acted as counsel, from the period of his resignation in June 1998 through the hearing on June 29, 2005, nor is there any assertion he was in violation of any orders involved in his resignation. It was thus improper to apply the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct to Craft during the time period (post-June 1998) when he was neither licensed, violating orders of resignation, or practicing law without a license. [13] Continuing to act as an escrow agent for multiple parties after proper cessation of practice is not a matter regulated by the rules. This rule, we think, will not unduly circumscribe the disciplinary function of the Bar Association. In Re Wehrman, 327 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Ky.1959). Even the cases cited by the KBA in their brief [14] support this position, as all deal only with post-disbarment or suspension violations involving (1) unauthorized continuation of practice, and/or (2) failure to notify the courts or clients of the loss of the privilege to practice. Templeton v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 54 S.W.3d 154 (Ky. 2001), for example, involved SCR 3.130-3.3(a)(1) (candor towards a tribunal) when the movant knowingly filed an incorrect itemized invoice with this Court in support of his petition to dissolve an order of temporary suspension. Quite different from the facts here. We do not hold that a failure to notify a client of the loss of the privilege to practice is not actionable, as it surely is. Yet in this case, we do not believe the record supports any finding or conclusion other than that Craft withdrew from the representation of the defendants in 1991. This belief is overwhelmingly supported by the testimony of Coburn's widow, Levita Coburn, and the $350 retainer check paid to Will Collins in 1991 after Coburn's conversation on their behalf with Craft. Moreover, all of this is supported by the fact that there is no evidence in this record that at any time after these events in 1991, Anne Hurst, while in good health, (1) contacted or retained any other counsel for herself, (2) complained to, or inquired of, Craft (whom she had taught and known), or (3) complained to any other official or entity concerning the matter. As SCR 3.130-1.4(a) deals only with clients for whom [the attorney] is actively involved in litigation and similar legal matters, see SCR 3.390 and Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Perry, 102 S.W.3d 507 (Ky.2003), no such obligation or notification requirement existed here. [15] Continuing to hold money simply as an escrow agent for multiple parties after the cessation of practice does not establish or continue the parties in interest as one's active clients. To hold otherwise would inconsistently establish Adams as Craft's client also.