Opinion ID: 2543191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Inadequate Investigative Funds

Text: Defendant contends there was inadequate provision of investigative funds. The facts are these. On January 17, 1996, counsel requested funds to hire Pat McGregor, an investigator specializing in penalty phase preparation. He represented that she was willing to work for $35 per hour, which was higher than the $20 per hour standard rate for investigators in Kern County at the time. The trial court, again Judge Oberholzer, reluctantly agreed to compensation at the higher rate because the case was coming to trial shortly and because there would be only one attorney on the case. The trial court ordered a total of $7,000 in investigative funds, some of which had already been allocated to an investigator hired by the previous counsel, leaving a balance of approximately $4,375. On April 3, 1996, when counsel submitted a bill for McGregor of $507, Judge Oberholzer apparently changed his mind, determining that there was no evidence of special expertise that would justify the higher $35 per hour rate, and that McGregor would henceforth be compensated at $20 an hour. Counsel offered to speak with McGregor about her willingness to work at the lower rate but apparently she stopped work on the case. The next day the trial court authorized expenses for Counsel Eyherabide himself to travel to Oregon to interview witnesses. Later, Joe Serrano did some investigative work, primarily the service of subpoenas and interviews with jurors for the new trial motion discussed below, for $20 per hour for a total of approximately $1,610. The balance of the authorized investigative funds went unspent. Defendant contends that the trial court's payment rate of $20 an hour made it impossible to hire a competent death penalty specialist. He claims that this low rate, combined with the lack of Keenan counsel, prejudicially hampered his counsel's ability to uncover and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, and that this violated his right to counsel, due process, equal protection and a reliable penalty determination. [3] The right to competent counsel under the federal and state Constitutions includes the right to reasonably necessary ancillary defense services. ( Corenevsky v. Superior Court (1984) 36 Cal.3d 307, 319, 204 Cal.Rptr. 165, 682 P.2d 360.) Section 987.9, subdivision (a) provides among other things that upon the proper showing, funds will be provided to indigent capital defendants for payment of investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense. The trial court is to rule on the reasonableness of the request and shall be guided by the need to provide a complete and full defense for the defendant. ( Ibid. ) We have held that failure to seek pretrial investigative funds pursuant to section 987.9 was one indication that counsel had failed to adequately investigate possible defenses, requiring reversal in its entirety of a capital judgment. ( In re Jones (1996) 13 Cal.4th 552, 565, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 52, 917 P.2d 1175.) Even if it were true that the unreasonable denial of section 987.9 funds leading to an inadequate investigation and preparation could constitute reversible error under some circumstances, a question we do not decide, no such error is evident from the present record. There is no showing that $7,000 for conducting the investigation, paid at a $20 per hour rate, was inadequate, or that it was impossible to hire a competent specialist at that rate. In other words, defendant fails to show that the trial court acted unreasonably pursuant to section 987.9. Moreover, inasmuch as defendant's claim can be understood as one for ineffective assistance of counsel, based on counsel's failure to adequately investigate available defenses because he was unable to do so, it is without merit. To find ineffective assistance of counsel a court must determine that counsel's performance was deficient, falling `below an objective standard of reasonableness ... under prevailing professional norms' [citations], and that there is a reasonable probability that `but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' ( People v. Kaurish (1990) 52 Cal.3d 648, 677, 276 Cal.Rptr. 788, 802 P.2d 278.) Here, counsel himself conducted extensive witness interviews and, as discussed above, mounted a substantial penalty phase defense. Defendant contends that additional witnesses could have been produced to testify to the abuse defendant suffered as a child. But given the quality and quantity of witnesses testifying for the defense, there is no showing on this record that the penalty phase defense mounted on defendant's behalf fell below professional norms, or that, had more witnesses been produced, it is reasonably probable a more favorable verdict would have resulted. We therefore deny this claim.