Opinion ID: 2383207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Waiver Ineffective

Text: The parties agree that the holding of Welty is determinative of the claim presented to this Court by Briscoe. We have independently concluded that the ratio decidendi of Welty is dispositive in this matter. Consequently, we must apply those legal precepts to the factual circumstances presented by Briscoe in this appeal. A trial court must first decide whether defendant's request for new counsel, on the eve of trial, is substantial enough to justify a continuance of the trial in order to allow the defendant to obtain new counsel. United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d at 188. If, after making the appropriate inquiries, the trial court determines that the defendant has not shown good cause for a substitution of counsel, it may properly insist that the defendant choose between representation by his existing counsel and proceeding pro se.  Id. It is vital that the trial court take particular pains in discharging its responsibility to conduct these inquiries concerning substitution of counsel and waiver of counsel. Perfunctory questioning is not sufficient. Id. at 187. The first step of the analysis required by Welty is to determine whether the trial court made sufficient inquiry into the reasons for Briscoe's dissatisfaction with his attorney on the eve of trial. Id. In the case sub judice, the trial judge allowed Briscoe to state, at length, the reasons for his disagreements with counsel. Thereafter, the record reflects that the trial judge denied Briscoe's request for new counsel. The efficacy of the foregoing inquiry and the propriety of the trial court's decision not to appoint substitute counsel are not at issue in this appeal. At issue in this appeal, however, is the second inquiry that a trial court must make pursuant to the holding in Welty, after a request for substituted counsel has been denied on the eve of trial, i.e., whether Briscoe wanted to retain his existing counsel or to proceed pro se. Id. A condition precedent to the latter decision is a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The State acknowledges that Briscoe was permitted to proceed pro se without any colloquy concerning the hazards of self-representation, notwithstanding the mandate of the holding in Welty. Nevertheless, the State argues that Briscoe was not deprived of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The State's argument is premised upon the fact that, in accordance with the well-established practice in Delaware, the Superior Court permitted Briscoe to proceed pro se with the assistance of standby counsel, who took an active part in the trial. The Superior Court's action, and consequently the State's position, is supported by some prior decisions of this Court. See United States ex rel. Axselle v. Redman, 624 F.Supp. 332, 339 (D.Del.1985) (citing Axselle v. State, Del.Supr., 483 A.2d 632 (1984); Hicks v. State, Del.Supr., 482 A.2d 765 (1984)). This Court has previously held, in construing Welty, that a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was not violated, even though he had not made a complete waiver of that right, when he proceeded pro se and was provided with a standby attorney who was familiar with the case and was ready to act upon the defendant's behalf. Id. However, the foregoing interpretation of the holding in Welty by this Court was unequivocally rejected by the Delaware District Court. Id. In setting aside this Court's decision in Axselle, and vacating this Court's affirmance of the defendant's convictions, the Delaware District Court stated: The mere appointment of standby counsel can never cure a defective waiver. The issue is whether the presence of standby counsel in the factual context of this case cures an ineffective waiver of counsel. Although there might be circumstances in which the performance of standby counsel may cure a defective waiver, this is not such a case. Id. at 339. When a trial court concludes the inquiries articulated in Welty and considers all other facts, it may decide to permit the defendant to proceed pro se and, in the exercise of its discretion, to appoint standby counsel. A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se is not violated when a trial judge appoints standby counsel  even over the defendant's objection  to aid the accused if and when the accused requests help, and to be available to represent the accused in the event that termination of the defendant's self-representation is necessary. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 n. 46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975). [2] See Pennell v. State, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 1368 (1992). However, the federal courts have clearly held that the appointment of standby counsel, for a defendant who proceeds pro se, is not an acceptable alternative to a knowing and intelligent waiver of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938); United States v. Welty, 674 F.2d 185 (3d Cir.1982); United States ex rel. Axselle v. Redman, 624 F.Supp. 332 (D.Del.1985).