Opinion ID: 1879421
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Heading: The Type of Hearing to be Accorded Support Obligors Under Iowa Code Section 252C.4.

Text: In seeking reversal of the district court's order, the agency argues that the right to a hearing which is accorded to child support obligors under sections 252C.3(1), (3), and 252C.4 is a judicial review of agency action under the provisions of Iowa Code section 17A.19. It urges that in reaching a contrary interpretation the district court misapplied the applicable statutes. The statutes under which this controversy arises provide, in part: 1. In the absence of a court order, the director may issue a notice establishing and demanding payment of an accrued or accruing support debt due and owed to the department or an individual under section 252C.2. The notice shall be served upon the responsible person in accordance with the rules of civil procedure. The notice shall include all of the following: .... f. A Statement that if the responsible person objects to all or any part of the notice or finding of financial responsibility and no negotiation conference is requested, then within twenty days of the date of service, the responsible person shall send to the office of the child support recovery unit which issued the notice a written response setting forth any objections and requesting a hearing. g. A statement that if a timely written request for a hearing is received by the office of the child support recovery unit which issued the notice, the responsible person shall have the right to a hearing to be held in district court; and that if no timely written response is received, the director may enter an order in accordance with the notice and finding of financial responsibility. Iowa Code §§ 252C.3(1)(f), (g) (1985) (emphasis added). Following these provisions, the statute continues as follows: 3. If a timely written response setting forth objections and requesting a hearing is received by the appropriate office of the child support recovery unit, a hearing shall be held in district court. 4. If timely written response and request for hearing is not received by the appropriate office of the child support recovery unit, the director may enter an order in accordance with the notice.... Iowa Code §§ 252C.3(3), (4) (emphasis added). Also relevant to the inquiry is the very next section in the Code which provides: 1. If a timely written request for a hearing is received, the director shall certify the matter to the district court in the county in which the order has been filed, or if no such order has been filed, then to a district court in the county where the dependent child resides. 2. If the matter has not been heard previously by the district court, the certification shall include true copies of the notice and finding of financial responsibility or notice of the support debt accrued and accruing, the return of service, the written objections and request for hearing, and true copies of any administrative orders previously entered. 3. The court shall set the matter for hearing and notify the parties of the time and place of hearing. 4. The court shall consider the schedule of minimum support guidelines in section 252C.10 in establishing the monthly support payment and the amount of the support debt accrued and accruing. 5. If a party fails to appear at the hearing, upon a showing of proper notice to that party, the court may find that party in default and enter an appropriate order. Iowa Code § 252C.4 (1985) (emphasis added). The basic premise underlying the agency's argument is that the subject matter of the requested hearing necessarily involves a review of agency action as that term was recognized and applied in Polk County v. Iowa State Appeal Board, 330 N.W.2d 267, 276-77 (Iowa 1983). It urges, therefore, that the judicial review provisions of chapter 17A provide the exclusive means of considering such issues. This circumstance, they urge, results in part from the so-called specific reference mandates of section 17A.1(2) and 17A.23. The statutes last referred to apply to judicial review of agency action and provide as follows: This chapter is meant to apply to all rule-making and contested case proceedings and all suits for the judicial review of agency action that are not specifically excluded from this chapter or some portion thereof by its express terms or by the express terms of another chapter. Iowa Code section 17A.1(2) (1985). Except as expressly provided otherwise by this chapter or by another statute referring to this chapter by name, the rights created and the requirements imposed by this chapter shall be in addition to those created or imposed by every other statute now in existence or hereafter enacted. If any other statute now in existence or hereafter enacted diminishes any right conferred upon a person by this chapter or diminishes any requirement imposed upon an agency by this chapter, this chapter shall take precedence unless the other statute expressly provides that it shall take precedence over all or some specified portion of this named chapter. Iowa Code § 17A.23 (1985). In challenging the agency's interpretation of the hearing requirement, David points out that, at the time the right to a hearing ripens, the agency has taken no action which is susceptible of meaningful judicial review. Although proposals have been made as to the proper level of support, the agency has made no final determination with respect thereto. As a result, David urges, a judicial review of agency action at this stage would be a meaningless review of a preliminary step in the proceeding. The agency seeks to minimize the apparent inappropriateness of reviewing a tentative proposed decision by asserting that the matter could be expanded into a de novo evidentiary hearing in the district court. In support of this suggestion, it relies on the provision of section 17A.19(7), which provides: [i]n proceedings for judicial review of agency action a court may hear and consider such evidence as it deems appropriate. We believe this argument misconceives the type of review accorded that category of administrative activity called other agency action. The discretion granted to the court to take additional evidence under section 17A.19(7) is for the limited purpose of highlighting what actually occurred in the agency in order to facilitate the court's search for errors of law or unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious action. Iowa Bankers Ass'n v. Iowa Credit Union Dep't, 335 N.W.2d 439, 448-49 (Iowa 1983). The additional evidence permitted to be offered under such circumstances is not to be utilized as a springboard for trying issues of fact de novo in the district court. [1] We agree with David that review of the agency's tentative child support proposals under section 17A.19 would not provide a useful vehicle for a judicial determination of monthly support payments under the guidelines contained in section 252C.10. That is what section 252C.4(4) mandates that the court do. Moreover, it is the clear direction of section 252C.4(1) that the director shall certify the matter to the district court. The quoted language negates any suggestion that the legislature intended the matter to be a section 17A.19 judicial review proceeding initiated by the support obligor. The district court was correct in concluding that David was entitled to an original hearing in the district court on the amount of support and that the agency had the responsibility of initiating that hearing in order to enforce its proposed claim against him. The present case poses another example of a situation in which a claimant is not required to pursue an inadequate or ineffectual administrative remedy where another statutory procedure for relief is otherwise provided. In Ruthven Consolidated School District v. Emmetsburg Community School District, 382 N.W.2d 136 (Iowa 1986), we stated: exhaustion questions are resolved by a two-step analysis: Is an administrative remedy provided? Is it intended to be exclusive? .... [A] legislative intent is ... required, for the second step, that the administrative procedure be exclusive. Id. at 139 (citation omitted). In Ruthven, we observed that, notwithstanding the presence of an administrative remedy for disputes concerning the division of assets and liabilities of the participants in a reorganized school district, the legislature had provided an alternative statutory route for such disputes to progress directly to arbitration and thereafter directly to court. Id. at 139. We do not find our conclusion to be in conflict with the so-called specific reference mandates of section 17A.1(2) or section 17A.23. As we observed in Jew v. University of Iowa, 398 N.W.2d 861, 865 (Iowa 1987), these statutes are susceptible of an interpretation that, where actions for judicial review of agency action are in fact brought, they shall be maintained in accordance with the provisions of section 17A.19. For reasons previously stated, however, we do not view the responsibility conferred on the district court by section 252C.4 as a review of agency action. The statute provides for an original judicial determination of support as an alternative to agency action.