Opinion ID: 4034251
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of ORS 124.100(5)

Text: ORS 124.100 through ORS 124.140 set out a frame- work that creates a civil action for abuse of a vulnerable person. ORS 124.100(2) provides: “A vulnerable person who suffers injury, damage or death by reason of physical abuse or financial abuse may bring an action against any person who has caused the physical or financial abuse or who has permitted another person to engage in physical or financial abuse.” A “vulnerable person” is a person who is elderly, financially incapable, or incapacitated, or, in certain circumstances, has a disability.2 ORS 124.100(1)(e). “Physical abuse,” for the purpose of the statute, includes sexual abuse. ORS 124.105(1)(e)-(h). ORS 124.100(5) identifies the particular requirements for bringing an action for permitting another to engage in physical or financial abuse: “An action may be brought under this section against a person for permitting another person to engage in physical or financial abuse if the person knowingly acts or fails to act under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of the physical or financial abuse.” By its terms, that statute refers both to a requirement that the defendant “knowingly” act and that the defendant do so under circumstances in which a reasonable person “should have known” of the abuse. Not surprisingly, the parties seize 2 AMR does not dispute that plaintiffs were “vulnerable persons” within the meaning of the statute. 220 Wyers v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. on one of those two references to the virtual exclusion of the other. AMR highlights the reference to “knowing[ ]” action or inaction, and argues that “ORS 124.100(5) requires proof that the defendant engaged in ‘knowing’ and ‘intentional’ misconduct.” AMR briefly acknowledges the subsequent statutory reference to what a reasonable defendant “should have known,” but asserts that it “cannot undo the actual knowledge requirement stated earlier.” (Emphasis in original.) AMR attempts to reconcile the apparent conflict by reading the statute to require actual knowledge of the conduct that constitutes the abuse while perhaps not actually knowing—but in circumstances in which it should have known—that the conduct constituted a crime qualifying as abuse within the meaning of the statute. Plaintiffs highlight the reference to what a defendant “should have known” in ORS 124.100(5), arguing that liability depends on proof that a reasonable person merely “should have known” of the abuse. In plaintiffs’ view, AMR’s reading of that phrase is nonsensical—citing by way of example evidence that a defendant permitted another to commit such abusive acts as rape and sodomy under circumstances in which the defendant, while perhaps not actually knowing that those acts are prohibited forms of abuse, nevertheless should have known that fact. At the same time, plaintiffs not once in their brief explain the significance of the statute’s reference to “knowingly act[ ] or fail[ ] to act.” We are thus confronted with an issue of statutory construction, requiring us to determine the meaning of the statute that the legislature most likely intended, based on an examination of its text in context, legislative history, and pertinent rules of construction. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171-72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). We begin with the text of the statute, which as we have noted authorizes an action against a defendant who has permitted abuse of a vulnerable person if the defendant “knowingly acts or fails to act under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of the    abuse.” ORS 124.100(5). The statute sets out two different mental states—one that appears to refer to actual knowledge and the other that refers to constructive Cite as 360 Or 211 (2016) 221 knowledge. It is an awkwardly phrased bit of drafting, to say the least. And the parties’ difficulty in reconciling the two is understandable. We cannot, however, pick one mental state and ignore the other, as the parties effectively propose. We are obligated to take a statute as we find it and give effect to all of it, if possible. See, e.g., Force v. Dept. of Rev., 350 Or 179, 190, 350 P3d 139 (2011) (“Statutory provisions, however, must be construed, if possible, in a manner that will give effect to all of them.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)); see also ORS 174.010 (“[W]here there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”). In this case, the key to complying with that obli- gation lies in recognizing that statutory references to culpable mental states always refer to an object; said another way, a mental state is always “directed toward something.” State v. Crosby, 342 Or 419, 428, 154 P3d 97 (2007). That “something” to which a mental state is directed may be particular conduct, or it may be the circumstances in which conduct occurs, or it may be a particular result. Id. at 42829. Knowledge as to conduct, for example, can refer to an awareness of a bodily movement or knowledge of the essential character of an act, as when a criminal statute requires proof of knowledge of the “assaultive nature” of a defendant’s conduct. State v. Barnes, 329 Or 327, 337-38, 986 P2d 1160 (1999). In contrast, knowledge as to circumstances can refer to awareness of particular facts while prohibited conduct is being committed, as, for example, a criminal statute requiring proof of knowledge of the age of the person to whom a defendant has sold drugs. State v. Blanton, 284 Or 591, 593, 588 P2d 28 (1978). ORS 124.100(5) does refer to two different mental states. But the object of each of those references to a mental state is significantly different. First, the statute requires proof that a defendant “knowingly act[ed] or fail[ed] to act.” In that phrase, the adverb “knowingly” modifies conduct, namely, acting or failing to act. It does not refer to knowledge of particular circumstances. Nor does it refer to knowledge of any particular result. It refers to the quality of the defendant’s conduct—“knowing[ ],” as opposed to accidental, reckless, or something else. 222 Wyers v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. To be sure, the particular “act[ ]” or “fail[ure] to act” that the defendant must “knowingly” commit is conduct that “permit[s]” another person to engage in prohibited abuse. ORS 124.100(5). AMR argues that the use of the term “permit” necessarily implies that the one doing the permitting must have actual knowledge of the conduct that has been permitted. It is not an unreasonable argument. In ordinary usage, the word “permit” can be used to connote active authorization. Webster’s, for example, lists among its definitions of the verb “to consent to expressly or formally    to give (a person) leave,” Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1683 (unabridged ed 2002), suggesting that the actor has full knowledge of what is being permitted. But AMR’s reliance on that definition of the word “permit” is unavailing for several reasons. First, ORS 124.100(5) itself does not say that a defendant must “knowingly permit” abuse to occur. Rather, the word “knowingly” modifies “acts or fails to act.” Second, the ordinary meaning of the word “permit” is not necessarily as narrow as AMR suggests. In common usage, the word “permit” is also used to refer to an act or failure to act that has the effect of making something possible, without mention of intention as to the result. Webster’s, for example, also provides that “permit” can mean “to make possible[;]    to give an opportunity.” Id.; see also American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1315 (5th ed 2011) (“[t]o afford opportunity or possibility”). Third, the effect of AMR’s reading is to create the sort of conflict between mental state requirements that we have just noted that we are obligated to avoid, if possible. If the statute requires a defendant to have knowledge of the facts or circumstances of the abuse, then the later reference to a requirement that a reasonable defendant “should have known” of those very facts or circumstances makes no sense. See also generally Moore v. Willis, 307 Or 254, 259, 767 P2d 62 (1988) (allegation that person knew something is different from allegation that person “should have known” something; former amounts to ultimate fact, but latter requires judgment about particular set of circumstances from which conclusions must be drawn). Taking ORS 124.100(5) as it is written, it states that what a defendant must know is the character or nature Cite as 360 Or 211 (2016) 223 of the defendant’s act or failure to act. That act or failure to act must have the effect of permitting abuse to occur. But the effect of that act or failure to act of permitting abuse is a result, actual knowledge of which the statute does not require. We turn, then, to the requirement that the defen- dant have acted or failed to act “under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of the physical or financial abuse.” ORS 124.100(5). The wording of that requirement leads to several observations. First, the reference to circumstances in which “a reasonable person should have known” unambiguously sets out a constructive knowledge requirement. That is, ORS 124.100(5) applies under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of another’s abuse, regardless of whether the defendant actually knew of the abuse. Cf., Gaston v. Parsons, 318 Or 247, 266, 864 P2d 1319 (1994) (Peterson, J., dissenting) (“constructive knowledge” of harm refers to when, “in the exercise of reasonable care,” it should have been discovered even if not actually discovered); Forest Grove Brick v. Strickland, 277 Or 81, 86, 559 P2d 502 (1977) (“constructive knowledge” refers to a person “charged with knowledge that a reasonably diligent inquiry would disclose” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Second, the statute appears to assume that the “circumstances” themselves are known or available to the reasonable person. Thus, ORS 124.100(5) provides that, based on circumstances that are known to a reasonable person, certain other facts perhaps not actually known will nevertheless be imputed, because a reasonable person aware of those circumstances should have known of the abuse. Third, what a reasonable person should have known is “the physical or financial abuse.” In contrast to the first mental state requirement, then, the second one clearly refers to constructive awareness of a particular fact— another person’s physical or financial abuse—not awareness of the defendant’s own conduct. There remains an issue concerning what ORS 124.100(5) means when it refers to “the physical or financial abuse” that a reasonable person should have known. On the one hand, the use of the definite article “the” in reference to “physical or financial abuse” could refer to the specific 224 Wyers v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. incident or incidents of abuse that the defendant allegedly has permitted another to commit against the plaintiff or plaintiffs. On the other hand, it could refer more generally to the type of abuse that the defendant has permitted another to commit, whether against the plaintiff or against another vulnerable person. AMR argues for the former interpretation. In its view, ORS 124.100(5) applies only under circumstances in which it can be demonstrated that it should have known of “the very same incident of abuse that injured the plaintiff.” In fact, AMR goes even further and contends that the reference to “the” abuse in ORS 124.100(5) has the effect of transforming a statute requiring constructive knowledge of abuse to one requiring actual knowledge of that abuse. In AMR’s view, “the constructive knowledge requirement in ORS 124.100(5) is necessarily limited to knowledge of the abuse that occurred on the particular plaintiff. In other words, the defendant must have some degree of actual knowledge of the abuse on the plaintiff.” (Emphasis in original.) AMR’s contention that the requirement that a defendant reasonably should have known of “the” abuse amounts to a requirement that the defendant have actually known of that abuse is squarely contradicted by the statute’s explicit reference to constructive—not actual—knowledge. But that does not completely resolve the matter. ORS 124.100(5) does refer to constructive knowledge of “the” abuse, and AMR’s broader suggestion that the phrasing could be taken to refer to constructive knowledge of a specific instance or instances of abuse against the plaintiff or plaintiffs is not unreasonable. This court, after all, has not infrequently declared that the use of the definite article can signify a narrowing intent. See, e.g., State v. Lykins, 357 Or 145, 159, 348 P3d 231 (2015) (“As a grammatical matter, the definite article, ‘the,’ indicates something specific, either known to the reader or listener or uniquely specified.”). The court, however, has also cautioned that the use of the definite article is not always, so to speak, definitive. See, e.g., SAIF v. DeLeon, 352 Or 130, 138, 282 P3d 800 (2012) Cite as 360 Or 211 (2016) 225 (“[T]he definite article ‘the’ is not dispositive.”). Its use in context may reveal an intention to encompass less categorically specific referents. See, e.g., State v. Stark, 354 Or 1, 7-8, 307 P3d 418 (2013) (statutory reference to “the judgment” applies not only to original judgment but also to subsequently entered judgments). This is such a case for several reasons. To begin with, the statutory context suggests that it is not likely that the legislature intended its use of the definite article in ORS 124.100(5) to be dispositive. In fact, ORS 124.100 refers to “physical or financial abuse” a number of times, only sometimes using the definite article. ORS 124.100(2), for example, provides that a vulnerable person who has been abused may bring an action against a person “who has permitted another person to engage in physical or financial abuse”—without specifying “the” abuse against that particular vulnerable person. Presumably, the abuse mentioned in subsection (2) is the same as the abuse mentioned in subsection (5) of the same statute. Subsection (5) in fact specifically states that it refers to an action “brought under this section,” namely, ORS 124.100(2). Yet subsection (2) is phrased more generally, not referring solely to the particular abuse that another person may commit against a particular vulnerable person.3 At the very least, the inconsistency in phrasing between subsections (2) and (5) in this regard cautions against placing too much emphasis on the use of the definite article in the latter subsection. Aside from that, the consequences of adopting AMR’s proposed reading of the statute give us pause. If AMR is correct that ORS 124.100(5) applies only under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of the very abuse that its actions permitted, then, logically, the statute would practically never apply. It would come into play only when a defendant participated in or was present during an instance of abuse, or when the defendant 3 The wording of ORS 124.100(2) itself appears internally inconsistent on this very point. It states that a vulnerable person who was the victim of physical or financial abuse may bring an action against “any person who has caused the physical or financial abuse” (using the definite article) and any person “who has permitted another person to engage in physical or financial abuse” (omitting any article). 226 Wyers v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. had reason to know in advance of a perpetrator’s plan to abuse a particular vulnerable person. Under AMR’s reading of ORS 124.100(5), then, an employer that has received confirmed reports of an employee’s repeated abuse of multiple vulnerable patients would face no liability under that statute for allowing that employee to abuse a vulnerable patient, so long as the employer had no reason to know of the employee’s abuse of that specific patient. AMR insists that the legislative history demon- strates that ORS 124.100(5) was intended to have precisely that limited effect. According to AMR, that history shows that the statute was “directed toward ‘abusers’ and toward no one else. Individuals who ‘permitted’ abuse by third parties were just a sub-category of ‘abusers.’ ” AMR argues that the legislative history demonstrates that to be the case in two ways. First, AMR relies on the absence of legislative history suggesting a broader intended meaning of the statute. It reasons that “there was no discussion about standards of negligence or recklessness fitting into this statute, or about potentially applying this statute against negligent employers with wayward employees. Had such standards been intended, one might expect some discussion[,] given that such a law would have far-reaching implications   .” Second, AMR argues that the focus of the legislature in passing what eventually became ORS 124.100 was on abusers and that the law was not intended to target “institutional providers of care or services.” For the reasons that follow, AMR’s reliance on that “history” is unavailing. We begin with AMR’s reliance on an absence of any comment on the constructive knowledge requirement during the legislature’s deliberations on what became ORS 124.100(5). As this court has stated on a number of occasions, silence in the legislative history of a statute, by itself, is not often reliable evidence that the legislature intended anything. Lake Oswego Preservation Society v. City of Lake Oswego, 360 Or 115, 129, ___ P3d ___ (2016) (“[N]egative inferences based on legislative silence are often unhelpful in statutory interpretation.”); Weldon v. Bd. of Lic. Pro. Counselors and Therapists, 353 Or 85, 100, 293 P3d 1023 Cite as 360 Or 211 (2016) 227 (2012) (stating reluctance to infer legislative intent from silence); State v. Rutley, 343 Or 368, 375, 171 P3d 361 (2007) (“statutory silence alone is not a sufficiently clear indication of legislative intent to dispense with a culpable mental state”). Inferring legislative intent on the basis of a lack of comment in the legislative history is problematic for several reasons. At the outset, it relies on unrealistic assumptions about the legislative process and the omniscience of legislators. That is, it assumes that legislators are in a position to predict all the potential consequences of legislation and that they will always address them. Such an assumption ignores the fact that legislators often cannot be aware of every potential consequence of enacting the bills before them, as well as the fact that the press of time in legislative sessions of limited duration often does not provide legislators the opportunity to comment on all of a bill’s potential consequences. Moreover, drawing conclusions from silence in legislative history misapprehends the nature of legislative history itself, which often is designed not to explain to future courts the intended meaning of a statute, but rather to persuade legislative colleagues to vote in a particular way. Thus, for example, a proposed legislative change to the status quo might not prompt comment precisely because everyone understands that the law will have that effect or because supporters do not wish to draw attention to it. See generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Sherlock Holmes Canon, 84 Geo Wash L Rev 1, 21-35 (2016) (detailing problems with drawing inference from silence in legislative history);4 John C. Grabow, Congressional Silence and the Search for Legislative Intent: A Venture Into “Speculative Unrealities,” 64 BUL Rev 737, 765 (1984) (“necessarily frequent silences of Congress provide a wholly unreliable and unprincipled basis for inferring legislative intent”). As for the legislative history that does exist, we find little support for the conclusions that AMR draws from it. What is now ORS 124.100 was introduced in 1995 as 4 The name of the article is taken from the Sherlock Holmes story Silver Blaze, in which a watchdog failed to bark while a racehorse was stolen, leading Holmes to infer that the dog knew the thief, its trainer. Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, Silver Blaze, in The Complete Sherlock Holmes 349 (1930). 228 Wyers v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. Senate Bill (SB) 943. It was drafted by an elder-law practitioner, Bertalan, with input from an elder-abuse task force. Bertalan testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee following the introduction of the bill and its referral to that committee. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 943, Mar 23, 1995, Tape 69, Side A (statement of Lisa Bertalan). She explained that the focus of the bill was not the nursing home industry because that industry already is heavily regulated; rather, her focus in drafting the bill was less-regulated entities and individual abusers of the elderly and the vulnerable. Tape Recording, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 943, Apr 12, 1995, Tape 102, Side B (statement of Bertalan). Her written testimony explained: “The purpose of [the bill] is to protect elders and incapacitated adults from physical and financial abuse   . The aim of Senate Bill 943 is to prevent and provide a specific remedy for physical abuse and financial exploitation from relatives, the new ‘friend’ who suddenly cuts the elderly person off from family and the rest of the world, phony contractors who sell the elderly person substandard services or unnecessary goods, and the acquaintance who suddenly becomes the elderly person’s live-in caregiver in exchange for the deed to the family home or other property.” Testimony, Senate Committee on Judiciary, SB 943, Mar 23, 1995, Ex R (statement of Bertalan); see also Testimony, House Committee on Judiciary, SB 943, May 12, 1995 Ex D (statement of Bertalan) (to similar effect; purpose of bill is to provide specific remedy for “physical abuse and financial exploitation” of elderly and incapacitated persons, against relatives, acquaintances, businesspeople, and live-in-caregivers who perpetrate abuses). Following introduction of the bill, representatives of the Oregon Health Care Association proposed exclusions for nursing facilities, residential care facilities, and assisted living facilities. In response, an amendment was introduced to do just that. The committee approved the bill with that amendment. The Senate then passed the bill unanimously, as did the House of Representatives. Nothing in the foregoing history suggests that the part of SB 943 that became ORS 124.100(5) was intended Cite as 360 Or 211 (2016) 229 to apply only to individual abusers and not to employers or other institutions. To be sure, it does reflect a concern that the provisions of the bill not apply to particular institutions, namely, nursing facilities, residential care facilities, and assisted living facilities. And, consistently with that concern, the final version of the legislation contained an exemption for those institutions. See ORS 124.115 (setting out persons not subject to action under ORS 124.100). But no other institutions or entities—businesses such as AMR, for example—were included in that limited list. The express exclusion of such a list of certain entities strongly suggests that the legislature intended not to exclude any others not listed. See Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, 355 Or 476, 497, 232 P3d 980 (2014) (when a statute lists specific exemptions, “the legislature fairly may be understood to have intended to imply that no others are to be recognized”). If the reference to “circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of the physical or financial abuse” in ORS 124.100(5) does not bear the narrow interpretation for which AMR contends, there remains the question of what it does mean. As we noted earlier, that wording is reasonably capable of referring not just to circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of a particular instance of abuse against a particular plaintiff; rather, it could also refer to circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known of the same or similar abuse of a vulnerable person. Said another way, the statute could be read to apply when, in light of information known or available to a reasonable person, that person should have known of the kind of abuse that in fact occurred. That interpretation is the better of the reasonable possibilities. It gives effect to all the statute’s terms, in particular, to both of its different mental state requirements. It results in no redundancy or conflict between statutory terms. It inserts nothing into the statute that the legislature did not include. At the same time, it omits nothing from the statute that the legislature enacted. And it ensures that the statute applies beyond the very narrow circumstances in which a defendant either participated in or was present during abuse, or had reason to know in advance of a plan to abuse a particular 230 Wyers v. American Medical Response Northwest, Inc. vulnerable person, consistently with the apparent purpose of the statute as reflected in its wording and its enactment history. To summarize: ORS 124.100(5) refers to two dif- ferent mental states, one referring to actual knowledge and the other to constructive knowledge. The former refers to a defendant’s act or failure to act. The latter refers to the circumstances in which that act or failure to act occurs. The statute thus provides that there must be evidence that a defendant knowingly acted or failed to act under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known that the same sort of abuse of a vulnerable person that occurred would, in fact, occur.5 So, for example, ORS 124.100(5) applies if an employer such as AMR knowingly (as opposed to, say, inadvertently) schedules an employee to work on an ambulance run under circumstances in which a reasonable person should have known that the sort of abuse inflicted on the plaintiff would occur.