Opinion ID: 880519
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: product liability in montana

Text: Strict liability is not new to Montana. Section 402A was first adopted in Brandenburger, in which we discussed the policy reasons for applying strict liability in tort. There are two decisions in Montana which are pertinent here. The first is Thompson v. Nebraska Mobile Homes Corp. (1982), 198 Mont. 461, 647 P.2d 334; the second, McJunkin v. Kaufman (Mont. 1987) 748 P.2d 910, 44 St.Rep. 2111. In Thompson, the plaintiff complained of defects in her 1972 Magnolia Futurama Mobile Home, including loose shingles on the roof and poor seals in the corners of the home. We held that strict liability was expanded to those instances where there is damage only to the defective product. Personal injury is not required. In McJunkin, a K & B Mobile Home had numerous alleged defects shortly after the home was purchased. It was held that the plaintiff failed to show that the product was defective. We also held that the phrase defective condition unreasonably dangerous in § 402A is an indivisible requirement to be proved by the plaintiff. Defendants contended that the plaintiffs were required to prove that the mobile home was both in a defective condition and unreasonably dangerous. Montana, however, has not addressed the initial question of whether the injury-causing thing is a product. We did not consider whether the mobile homes were products in Thompson or McJunkin, although, in the case of prefabricated homes and mobile homes which are mass-produced and sold in the stream of commerce, they may qualify as products. We hold that the summary judgment decision that the treater facility was not a product by the District Court must be upheld because: (1) The respondents were not in the business of selling separator facilities as required by the Restatement; (2) The alleged product did not reach the stream of commerce nor was the decedent a consumer as defined by the policy considerations in Brandenburger; and (3) The treater facility, a building, is not a product. Section 402A refers specifically to one who sells a product in a defective condition, where the seller is engaged in the business of selling the product. The respondents here are not sellers of treater facilities. They engage in the business of extracting oil and gas for refinement. They are, therefore, not sellers within the § 402A definition. This provision was incorporated in our statutes in 1987. See § 27-1-719, MCA. In testing the alleged cause of death for product status, it is necessary to test the alleged product against the list of policy considerations. According to the policy considerations in Brandenburger, whether the product is in the stream of commerce is relevant. See also: Immergluck v. Ridgeview House, Inc. (1977), 53 Ill. App.3d 472, 11 Ill.Dec. 252, 368 N.E.2d 803; Boddie v. Litton Unit Handling Systems (1 Dist. 1983), 118 Ill. App.3d 520, 74 Ill.Dec. 112, 455 N.E.2d 142; Moorman Manufacturing Co. v. National Tank Co. (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 136, 47 Ill.Dec. 186, 414 N.E.2d 1302, rev'd in part, aff'd in part (1982), 91 Ill.2d 69, 61 Ill.Dec. 746, 435 N.E.2d 443. This is apparent in three specific policy considerations, i.e., the public interest in discouraging the marketing of defective products, the limitations and solicitations of the manufacturers to the purchaser of the product, and the ability of the consumer to inspect the product. The separator facility did not enter the stream of commerce. It was part of the property passed from one lessee to another. The facility was not a product which was in the stream of commerce. Because Papp was not a consumer, using the treater facility after it had reached the stream of commerce, there was no issue of disparity in bargaining power or a manufacturer's use of persuasive advertising or marketing devices to cause the consumer to buy the product. Moreover, no issue has arisen as to whether the decedent was able to inspect the facility. The treater facility is not a product under the widely used policy considerations. A product is narrowly defined in the area of buildings, and the treater facility and the building which houses it do not fit within the definition prescribed by the Restatement. Leading cases have held that a building is not a product, unless the building is mass-produced or prefabricated. The separator facility is not mass-produced but is unique in nature. Considering that the structure which houses the separator facility is a building, the facility is not a product within a strict liability definition. Other jurisdictions have held that components within a building are products. However, even though the cracked PVC pipe is a component and is known to be brittle and of poorer quality than the poly pipe, it is not that component alone which caused the death here. The H[2]S gas leaking from the pipe was deadly because it was not allowed to evaporate into the atmosphere, but was confined within the housing structure. The building and its component parts are indivisible in this case. We hold that the building is not a product within the definition of § 402A of the Restatement.