Opinion ID: 2585351
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Role of Evenhandedness

Text: Even when the government relief accorded religious institutions cannot be characterized as an accommodation of free exercise, the proper governmental stance of neutrality toward religion may manifest itself in an evenhanded provision of benefits to religious and secular institutions alike. This is true not only when the scope of benefits approaches universality (see Everson v. Board of Education, supra, 330 U.S. at pp. 17-18, 67 S.Ct. 504 [citing such general government services as police and fire protection and sewage disposal] ), but also, as seen below, when religious institutions are included in a limited set of recipients rationally defined by a secular governmental purpose. In Walz v. Tax Commission of New York City, supra, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 ( Walz ), the high court considered a New York law exempting from property taxation corporations and associations `organized exclusively for the moral or mental improvement of men and women, or for religious, bible, tract, charitable, benevolent, missionary, hospital, infirmary, educational, public playground, scientific, literary, bar association, medical society, library, patriotic, historical or cemetery purposes.' ( Id. at p. 667, fn. 1, 90 S.Ct. 1409.) In rejecting an establishment clause challenge to the exemption, the court relied prominently on the generality with which it had been offered: The legislative purpose of the property tax exemption is neither the advancement nor the inhibition of religion; it is neither sponsorship nor hostility. New York, in common with the other States, has determined that certain entities that exist in a harmonious relationship to the community at large, and that foster its `moral or mental improvement,' should not be inhibited in their activities by property taxation or the hazard of loss of those properties for nonpayment of taxes. It has not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious worship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and patriotic groups. The State has an affirmative policy that considers these groups as beneficial and stabilizing influences in community life and finds this classification useful, desirable, and in the public interest. ( Id. at pp. 672-673, 90 S.Ct. 1409.) In Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1, again facing the question whether a tax exemption benefiting religious organizations violated the establishment clause, the court distinguished the evenhanded exemption of Walz from the narrow religious benefit provided by the Texas statute: In [Walz and other cases], . . . we emphasized that the benefits derived by religious organizations flowed to a large number of nonreligious groups as well. Indeed, were those benefits confined to religious organizations, they could not have appeared other than as state sponsorship of religion. . . . ( Texas Monthly, supra, at p. 11, 109 S.Ct. 890 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) In contrast, Texas' sales tax exemption for periodicals published or distributed by a religious faith and consisting wholly of writings promulgating the teaching of the faith lacks sufficient breadth to pass scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to become `indirect and vicarious donors.' [Citations.] Insofar as that subsidy is conferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious groups benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establishment Clause. However, when government directs a subsidy exclusively to religious organizations that is not required by the Free Exercise Clause and that either burdens nonbeneficiaries markedly or cannot reasonably be seen as removing a significant state-imposed deterrent to the free exercise of religion, as Texas has done . . ., it `provide[s] unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations' and cannot but `conve[y] a message of endorsement' to slighted members of the community. ( Id. at pp. 14-15, 109 S.Ct. 890, fn. omitted.) The main concurring opinion agreed that by confining the tax exemption exclusively to the sale of religious publications, Texas engaged in preferential support for the communication of religious messages. ( Id. at p. 28, 109 S.Ct. 890 (cone. opn. of Blackmun, J.).) In a variety of other factual contexts, as well, the high court has considered the evenhandedness, or generality, of benefits an important factor in its establishment clause analysis. Besides Walz and Texas Monthly, one may look to such cases as Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995) 515 U.S. 819, 839-840, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (holding that use of a student activity fund to pay costs of a Christian student publication would not violate the establishment clause, because the fund was used to create an open forum for speech and publication, evenhandedly supporting a wide variety of student publications); Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc. (1985) 472 U.S. 703, 710, footnote 9, 105 S.Ct. 2914, 86 L.Ed.2d 557 (law requiring employers to give religious employees their Sabbath days off was held unconstitutional, in part because it gives Sabbath observers a valuable right not provided to employees with legitimate, but nonreligious, reasons for wanting a particular day off); Mueller v. Allen (1983) 463 U.S. 388, 397, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 77 L.Ed.2d 721 (state tax deduction for educational expenses was upheld, in part because its benefits extend to families with children in public schools and nonsectarian private schools); and Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist (1973) 413 U.S. 756, 794, 93 S.Ct. 2955, 37 L.Ed.2d 948 (tax benefits were held unconstitutional, in part because they would go primarily to parents of children in sectarian private schools). Just last term, in Mitchell v. Helms, supra, 530 U.S. 793, 120 S.Ct. 2530, the plurality, concurring, and dissenting justices all recognized the important role of evenhandedness in assessing an establishment clause challenge. Though the justices disagreed sharply as to whether evenhandedness in the distribution of benefits is, by itself, a sufficient condition of constitutionality under the establishment clause, all agreed it is an important, in some cases necessary, condition of constitutionality. [11] More specifically, the evenhandedness aspect of the neutrality principle bars government from engaging in religious gerrymanders. ( Walz, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 696, 90 S.Ct. 1409 (cone. opn. of Harlan, J.).) With the exception of relief reasonably needed to alleviate substantial government burdens on free exercise, religious adherents and institutions must neither be denied nor granted government benefits on the basis of religion itself. In the absence of a demonstrable need for special accommodation of religion, religious institutions must not be singled out for special treatment, though they may, of course, be included in rationally drawn regulatory groups. In any particular case the critical question is whether the circumference of legislation encircles a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institutions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter. ( Ibid. ) Two recent cases from the same federal district court, Renzi v. Connelly School of Holy Child, supra, 61 F.Supp.2d 440 ( Renzi ), and Concerned Citizens of Carderock v. Hubbard (D.Md.2000) 84 F.Supp.2d 668 ( Concerned Citizens ), illustrate the role of generality in establishment clause challenges to land use law exemptions. In Renzi, a county zoning ordinance that required property owners to obtain a special exception for nonconforming uses in residential zones exempted any private school located on the grounds of a church or religious organization. ( Renzi, supra, 61 F.Supp.2d at p. 442.) In finding an establishment clause violation, the court relied both on the lack of a substantial burden needing accommodation ( id. at pp. 446-447) and on the ordinance's unnecessary limitation to schools on religious property, a lack of evenhandedness the court concluded violated the principle of government neutrality. In the final analysis, it is on this principle that [the exemption] founders because it fails to be neutral in a context where neutrality is possible. By favoring sectarian schools over most other non-profit private educational institutions, it belies any secular purpose and has a principal effect of advancing religion. ( Id. at p. 444, fn. omitted.) Concerned Citizens involved a different part of the same county zoning ordinance, setting out a lengthy list of nonresidential uses permitted in the county's RE 2 zones. These included churches . . . and other places of worship, but also included such diverse institutions as embassies, small bed and breakfasts, group homes, child and adult daycare facilities, adult foster care homes, libraries and museums. Non-permitted uses could be located in the zone only if they obtained a special exception. ( Concerned Citizens, supra, 84 F.Supp.2d at p. 670 & fn. 2.) In finding the ordinance passed establishment clause muster, the court again relied on generality as a measure of neutrality, concluding in this case that the ordinance grants a benefit . . . to a wide array of `nonsectarian [uses] as well as religious [uses] . . .,' [ Texas Monthly, supra, ] 489 U.S. at 14, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1, consistent with its purpose of preserving single family residential neighborhoods. The Ordinance envelops a broad circle of beneficiaries designating some 41 categories of permitted uses in the RE-2 zone, into which `churches . . . and other places of religious worship' naturally fit. ( Id. at p. 674, first ellipsis added.) Renzi was distinguished as involving a law the operative characteristic [of which] was religion. ( Concerned Citizens, supra, at p. 675, italics omitted.) Both cases seem to me correctly decided, and, as discussed below, I find the present case more like Renzi than Concerned Citizens. [12] Here, too, the law's operative characteristic is religion, for sections 25373(d) and 37361(c) provide the valuable privilege of self-exemption from landmark laws solely to religiously affiliated corporations and associations. Here, too, the blanket grant of this self-exemption power was unnecessary to prevent government interference with, or to alleviate a significant burden on, the free exercise of religion. Like the ordinance in Renzi, supra, 61 F.Supp.2d at page 444, our law fails to be neutral in a context where neutrality is possible.