Opinion ID: 524116
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the first habeas case.

Text: 9 As noted above, see supra n. 2, Lindsey's motion for appointment of new counsel was made in district court, in the context of the Rule 60(b) motion and the third habeas petition, as well as in this court, in the context of the Rule 41-1(b) motion. In denying the motion for appointment of new counsel, the district court held: 10 Lindsey has made no showing of good cause, and indeed has offered no reason, for dismissing his counsel. The Court finds the petitioner's latest motion [is] simply another attempt to circumvent the Court's decision that he is not entitled to additional or alternative counsel, and to delay execution in this case. 11 Lindsey v. Thigpen, Nos. 85-0775, 89-0388, mem. op. at 3 (S.D.Ala. May 22, 1989). We adopt this reasoning and hold that Lindsey is not entitled to appointment of new counsel at this stage of the proceedings.
12 Rule 41-1(b) provides that the mandate of this court once issued shall not be recalled except to prevent injustice. Because the denial of a motion under Rule 60(b) is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion and a certificate of probable cause should issue only when a habeas petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a federal right, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893, 103 S.Ct. 3383, 3394, 77 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1983), a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of Lindsey's Rule 60(b) motion should issue only if Lindsey has made a substantial showing that the district court abused its discretion by denying the Rule 60(b) motion. Neither with respect to the Cartwright issue nor with respect to the Adamson issue has Lindsey satisfied either the standard governing Rule 41-1(b) or that governing the issuance of a certificate of probable cause. 3 13
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15 Citing Greater Boston Television Corp. v. F.C.C., 463 F.2d 268, 278 n. 12 (D.C.Cir.1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950, 92 S.Ct. 2042, 32 L.Ed.2d 338 (1972), Lindsey argues that we should recall our mandate in order to prevent injustice, because Cartwright shows that our original disposition of his challenge to the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating factor is demonstrably wrong. 4 Assuming arguendo that Lindsey correctly states the law governing Rule 41-1(b), recall of our mandate would be improper. Contrary to Lindsey's assertion, Cartwright does not affect the correctness of the original disposition of this claim. Consequently, Lindsey also has failed to make a substantial showing that the district court's refusal to re-examine this claim perpetuated the denial of a federal right. 16 The district court's 1986 order held that Lindsey's challenge to the trial court's consideration of the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating factor was procedurally barred. Our order affirming the district court held that it was unnecessary to determine whether the claim was procedurally barred, as it was meritless. We held that Lindsey's conclusory assertion [that Alabama's heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating factor is unconstitutionally vague] is unsupported by any allegation of fact beyond the circumstances of this particular case, and thus fails to state a claim for which habeas relief can be granted. Lindsey v. Smith, 820 F.2d at 1153. Thus, although no procedural bar ultimately was applied, we never reached the question of the constitutionality of the application of the heinous, atrocious or cruel factor in Lindsey's case. Cartwright simply has no effect on the correctness of our holding. Moreover, Cartwright does not affect the constitutionality of the application of Alabama's heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating factor to the facts of Lindsey's case. 17 In Cartwright, a defendant who had shot and killed his former employer, and attempted to kill the employer's wife, successfully challenged the imposition of the death sentence upon the jury's finding that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel. Holding that the disposition of Cartwright's case was controlled by Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 100 S.Ct. 1759, 64 L.Ed.2d 398 (1980), the Supreme Court noted: 18 The aggravating circumstance at issue [in Godfrey ] permitted a person to be sentenced to death if the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. Id., at 422, 100 S.Ct., at 1762. The jury had been instructed in the words of the statute, but its verdict recited only that the murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman. The Supreme Court of Georgia, in affirming the death sentence, held only that the language used by the jury was not objectionable and that the evidence supported the finding of the presence of the aggravating circumstance, thus failing to rule whether, on the facts, the offense involved torture or an aggravated battery to the victim. Id., at 426-427, 100 S.Ct., at 1763-1764. Although the Georgia Supreme Court in other cases had spoken in terms of the presence or absence of these factors, it did not do so in the decision under review, and this Court held that such an application of the aggravating circumstance was unconstitutional ... 19 .... 20 The affirmance of the death sentence by the Georgia Supreme Court was held to be insufficient to cure the jury's unchannelled discretion because the court failed to apply its previously recognized limiting construction of the aggravating circumstance. Id., at 429, 432, 100 S.Ct. at 1765, 1766-1767. 21 108 S.Ct. at 1858-59. 22 The problem in Godfrey was that, as a result of the vague construction applied, there was 'no principled way to distinguish [the Godfrey case], in which the death penalty was imposed, from the many cases in which it was not.'  Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. at 1858 (quoting Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 433, 100 S.Ct. at 1767). Following Godfrey, the Cartwright Court focused on two points: first, that, on its face, the language especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel as used in the Oklahoma statute gave no more guidance than the 'outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman'  language in Godfrey; second, that the Oklahoma appellate court's conclusion that the facts of Cartwright's case  'adequately supported the jury's finding' was indistinguishable from the action of the Georgia court in Godfrey, which failed to cure the unfettered discretion of the jury and to satisfy the commands of the Eighth Amendment. Id. Thus, the Court's holding that the words especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel were unconstitutionally vague as applied in Cartwright was based upon the failure of the Oklahoma courts to give those words a sufficiently narrowing construction. That holding does not imply that the words especially heinous, atrocious or cruel cannot be applied in a manner that comports with the eighth amendment. 23 We read Godfrey and Cartwright to require that, in order to survive an eighth-amendment vagueness challenge, a sentencing court's consideration of the especially heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating factor must satisfy a three-part test. First, the appellate courts of the state must have narrowed the meaning of the words heinous, atrocious or cruel by consistently limiting their application to a relatively narrow class of cases, so that their use inform[s] [the sentencer of] what [it] must find to impose the death penalty. Cartwright, 108 S.Ct. at 1858. Second, the sentencing court must have made either an explicit finding that the crime was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel or an explicit finding that the crime exhibited the narrowing characteristics set forth in the state-court decisions interpreting those words. 5 Third, the sentencer's conclusion--that the facts of the case under consideration place the crime within the class of cases defined by the state court's narrowing construction of the term heinous, atrocious or cruel--must not have subverted the narrowing function of those words by obscuring the boundaries of the class of cases to which they apply. 24 A survey of Alabama cases reveals that the first prong of the analysis is satisfied. Since the 1981 case of Kyzer v. Alabama, 399 So.2d 330 (Ala.1981), the Alabama appellate courts have confined the application of the heinous, atrocious or cruel aggravating factor to those conscienceless or pitiless homicides which are unnecessarily torturous to the victim. Kyzer, 399 So.2d at 334 (citing State v. Dixon, 283 So.2d 1 (Fla.1973)). 6 The class of cases that are unnecessarily torturous to the victim is not too indefinite to serve the narrowing function mandated by the eighth amendment. See Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 255-56, 96 S.Ct. 2960, 2986, 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (opinion of Stewart, Powell, Stevens, JJ.), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875, 97 S.Ct. 198, 50 L.Ed.2d 158 (1976). Thus, when Lindsey was sentenced in 1982, the courts of Alabama had already developed and consistently applied a narrowing construction of the term heinous, atrocious or cruel as compared to other capital offenses. 25 Second, the trial judge, who is the sentencer under Alabama law, explicitly stated: 26 The Court finds the facts to be that the body of the victim, Rosemary Rutland, an elderly woman, was found in her home, face down, gagged and her hands bound behind her. It was proved that the victim had been stabbed in the back and shot in the head with a .38 caliber pistol, and that she died as a result of either the stabbing or the shooting, or both. The Court finds that the killing of Rosemary Rutland was outrageously wicked, vile and shockingly evil. The Court finds from the evidence that the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel as compared to other capital offenses. 27