Opinion ID: 1759877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proposed Instruction D-1A

Text: ¶ 122. Scott argues that the trial court erred in denying proposed sentencing instruction D-1A, which provided: The prosecution has introduced what is known as victim impact evidence. Victim impact evidence is not the same as evidence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. Introduction of victim impact does not relieve the state of its burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. This evidence is simply another method of informing your [sic] about the harm caused by the crime in question. To the extent that you find that his evidence reflects on the defendant's culpability you may consider it, but you may not use it as a substitute for proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance. ¶ 123. Without providing any specific authority, Scott contends that if the jury has received victim impact evidence, and the defendant requests the jury to be instructed on their use of such evidence, an instruction should be given. Scott further states that at best such a lack of instruction is vague as to how the jury is to use the evidence. The authority relied on by Scott in support of his vagueness argument is Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361, 108 S.Ct. 1853, 1857, 100 L.Ed.2d 372 (1988) ([C]laims of vagueness directed at aggravating circumstances defined in capital punishment statutes ... characteristically assert that the challenged provision fails adequately to inform juries what they must find to impose the death penalty.) and Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 1081, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 2928, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992) (Our cases ... establish that an aggravating circumstance is invalid ... if its description is so vague as to leave the sentencer without sufficient guidance for determining the presence or absence of the factor.). ¶ 124. The trial court gave jury instruction S-1A which instructed the jury as to the aggravating factors and how to apply the aggravating factors. Furthermore, Instruction S-2A was given by the trial court which instructed the jury to weight the aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing. Instruction S-1A provided: You have found the Defendant, Kevin B. Scott, guilty of the crime of capital murder. You must now decide whether the defendant will be sentenced to death or life imprisonment without parole. In reaching your decision, you may objectively consider the detailed circumstances of the offense for which the defendant was convicted, and the character and record of the defendant himself. You should consider and weigh and aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as set forth later in this instruction, but you are cautioned not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling.
To return the death penalty in this case you must first unanimously find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the following facts existed: 1. That the defendant actually killed Richard Lee. 2. That the defendant attempted to kill Richard Lee. 3. That the defendant intended the killing of Richard Lee take place or; 4. That the defendant contemplated that lethal force would be employed.
To return the death penalty you must find that the mitigating circumstances  those which tend to warrant the less severe penalty of life imprisonment without parole  do not outweigh the aggravating circumstances  those which tend to warrant the death penalty. Consider only the following elements of aggravation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed: (1) whether the capital offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, (2) whether the capital offense was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of robbery. You must unanimously find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that one or more of the preceding aggravating circumstances exists in this case to return the death penalty. If none of these aggravating circumstances are found to exist, the death penalty may not be imposed, and you shall write the following verdict on a sheet of paper: We the jury, find the defendant should be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. If one or more of the above aggravating circumstances is found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must consider whether there are mitigating circumstances which outweigh the aggravating circumstance (s). Consider the following elements of mitigation in determining whether the death penalty should be imposed: (1) any matter, any other aspect of the defendant's character or record, any other circumstance of the offense brought to you during the trial of this cause which you, the jury, deem to be mitigating on behalf of the defendant. If you find from the evidence that one or more of the preceding elements of mitigation exists, then you must consider whether it (or they) outweigh(s) or overcome(s) the aggravating circumstance(s) you previously found. In the event that you find that the mitigating[mitigation] circumstance(s) do not outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstance(s), you may impose the death sentence. (emphasis added). ¶ 125. Instruction S-2A, provides: The Court instructs the jury that it must be emphasized that the procedure that you must follow is not a mere counting process of a certain number of aggravating circumstances versus the number of mitigating circumstances. Rather, you must apply your reasoned judgment as to whether this situation calls for life imprisonment without parole, or whether it requires the imposition of death, in light of the totality of the circumstances present. ¶ 126. This Court finds that there was nothing vague in instruction S-1A given by the trial court. The jury was properly instructed as to what it could consider as an aggravating factor in this case. ¶ 127. As the State argues, Scott's proposed instruction D-1A requests the trial court to provide an instruction on the weight to be given to particular evidence, notably Lurline's testimony. The trial court should not grant instructions that do not provide a correct statement of law or provides improper comment on the weight to be given to particular evidence. See Austin v. State, 784 So.2d 186, 193 (Miss.2001)(Issues of fact and of weight and credibility for the jury to resolve.). See also Coleman v. State, 697 So.2d 777, 782 (Miss.1997) (If instructions fairly state the law and create no injustice, no reversible error will be found.). In fact, the authority cited by Scott does not support his position. Scott cites Hall v. State, 78 Fla. 420, 83 So. 513, 522 (1919) (It is improper segregate ... any fact from all the material facts sought to be established), and Mills v. State, 625 S.W.2d 47 (Tex.App.1981) (an instruction which singles out limited parts of evidence is error), which also do not support singling out, Lurline's testimony. ¶ 128. In the case sub judice, the trial court, in denying the proposed instruction D-1A, stated that [W]e cannot have an all-inclusive list of those things that are not aggravating circumstances. ¶ 129. In S-1A, the trial court also cautioned the jury to not to be swayed by mere sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. This Court has repeatedly held that jury instructions are to be viewed as a whole. See Smith v. State, 835 So.2d 927, 937 (Miss.2002) (Jury instructions are to be read together and taken as a whole with no one jury instruction taken out of content); Milano v. State, 790 So.2d 179, 183 (Miss.2001) (When considering a challenged to a jury instruction on appeal, we do not review jury instructions in isolation; rather, we read them as a whole to determine if the jury was properly instruction.). ¶ 130. This Court finds that this issue is without merit. Scott's concern that the jury know what aggravating circumstances should be considered in sentencing was adequately addressed in instruction S-1A.