Opinion ID: 2068331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: whether the trial court erred when it terminated mother's parental rights.

Text: Child and Mother dispute various of the trial court's dispositional findings of fact in support of their assertion the trial court erred when it terminated Mother's parental rights. Termination of Mother's parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of Child to do so and is the least restrictive alternative available commensurate with those interests. In re K.C., 414 N.W.2d 616, 620 (S.D.1987). The least restrictive alternative is viewed from the child's point of view, not that of the parent, as the prime concern of the court is the child. The best interests of the child must prevail. In re S. W., 398 N.W.2d 136, 139 (S.D.1986). See also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 760-61, 102 S.Ct. at 1398-99, 71 L.Ed.2d at 611. [13] The question before this court is not whether [we] would have made the same findings the trial court did, but whether the entire evidence leaves a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. D.H., 354 N.W.2d at 188; In re J.M.A., 286 N.W.2d 324, 326 (S.D.1979). If efforts to aid or counsel parents by the use of social services proves unavailing, termination of parental rights is justified. In re D.A.B., 313 N.W.2d 787, 788 (S.D.1981) (citing In re T.L.J., 303 N.W.2d 800, 806 (S.D.1981)). Mother and Child dispute findings VI, VII, IX, X, and XI, although only Child makes specific arguments as to these findings. Mother and Child challenge the court's findings that Mother indicates that she does not intend to work with DSS in the future and that Mother has not manifested to the child or DSS, ... a firm intention to resume physical custody of the child or to make suitable arrangements for his care. Mother and Child were present for the dispositional hearing and both testified. Mother testified she left Child and went to Las Vegas, Nevada, in August, 1990, because she felt it would be better for Child if she stayed away from him, though she no longer believes this may be true. Nevertheless, she intends to remain in Nevada. Mother stated she would be willing to let Child be in foster care until the court determined she could provide the stability Child's home life required. [14] Mother stated that if Child was ordered into long-term foster care she would only be able to visit Child on holidays as her work would permit; but she could also phone and write him. Mother said she could accept her parental rights being terminated but she still loved Child and was afraid he would have problems if he was not allowed to talk, write or see her. [15] We note however, the record clearly shows that since Child was removed from Mother's home in 1988, Mother has only rarely contacted Child. Regarding Child's disposition, Mother said it will be God who makes the decision and it will just come out of Judge Anderson's mouth. The trial court noted that although Mother had perhaps made great strides in her life, she has neglected to do what is necessary to raise Child. The court had before it the conclusions of Mother's February, 1990, psychological examination which concluded that Mother appears to be quite emotionally immature, has obvious tendencies to react in the extremes, exhibits a decreased sense of responsibility with decreased accessibility for change, and pronounced tendencies to be hypersensitive and prone to overreact without adequate thought to the consequences. She has a propensity for minimizing her problems and her responsibilities for actions, for projecting blame to others, and for rationalizing her own actions and responses, rather than accepting consequences for her own actions. She exhibits some indications of anger and hostility and a significant tendency to manipulate information and details in an attempt to project blame to others. These conclusions are supported by the record. Mother and Child allege the many changes in the case service plans and in Child's foster placements have caused Mother's problems. They are mistaken. These changes occurred because of Mother's behavioral problems; they were not the cause of her behavior. There is little to indicate Mother intends to put Child's interests first. The trial court was not clearly erroneous. Mother and Child contest the court's finding the conditions that led to removal still exist and are not likely to be remedied so that Child can be returned. [16] The parties assert those conditions only include inappropriate sexual activity and suicidal ideations. The evaluation of Child at McKennan Hospital concluded Child had suicidal ideations. They point out that Child made good progress at Crossroads in resolving his behavioral problems and his suicidal ideations. We point out, however, that Child had numerous other problems such as concerns about Mother's and stepfather's heavy drinking. [17] Child lived in a very destructive social/personal environment and ... his home life certainly was contributory to his current problems. Crossroads' counselors felt Child needed a structured home environment. Child often bragged he could do anything he wanted at home and that Mother could do nothing with him. Mother has failed to get counseling and therapy to help her overcome the conditions which led to Child's removal. Mother says yet again she will comply. Mother testified that in Las Vegas she has developed a circle of friends as a type of support system, has found religion and no longer sees herself as addicted to stepfather. At oral argument, Mother's counsel pointed out Mother has been willing to say anything to get Child back. Unfortunately, Mother has not been willing to do much of anything to be reunited with Child. [W]hen it comes to something as important as the welfare of young children, promises of the parents to conform to the standard of care for their children which is expected in our society do not carry as much weight as their past actions of not properly caring for the children. In re J.M.V.D., 285 N.W.2d 853, 855 (S.D.1979). This finding is not clearly erroneous. Much time is spent by the parties asserting that, in the mind of DSS, permanency is defined as adoption; as adoption of Child is not likely, the court could not find termination of parental rights was in the child's best interests. There was testimony that though older children such as Child are difficult to place in adoptive homes, his chances of adoption were better now than they would be later. One of Child's DSS caseworkers and Frank Dame, Phd., testified that generally foster care or group home placement is less restrictive than termination. [18] DSS could recommend no less restrictive alternative than termination of Mother's parental rights although reuniting parent and child is their usual goal. Dame testified that Mother is a thirty-seven-year-old manic depressive and that manic depressive episodes often tend to become less severe and violent as people advance into their 40s. Dame said Mother's problems in her life are treatable, but only if she desires to assume responsibility as Child's parent and then to follow through with necessary counseling and treatment. At the time of his initial recommendations for Mother's treatment, Dame felt she would be able to follow through with them. In light of her subsequent behaviors, he was no longer as convinced that she would follow through. Dame thought a combination of Mother's working with a therapist and Child's placement in a long-term group home would be a workable alternative. But the essential element for a group home to have any possibility of success was Mother's active involvement in Child's therapy. Dame's proposed plan would not be workable if Mother was in Nevada and Child was in South Dakota. He testified that in light of Mother's unwillingness to leave Nevada, there was even less likelihood of success than if Mother and Child were together. Dame said that if Mother would not follow through with the recommendations that have been made, Child would be better off having Mother's parental rights terminated and not seeing her. Child had mixed feelings about staying with Mother. Several times he testified that although he would prefer to live with her, he would rather just be adopted if she could not control her life. Child was aware adoption may never occur. He loves Mother and would like to be able to stay in contact with her, but he does not want to be left again. The trial court did not equate permanency with adoption. All parties were aware that adoption was only a possibility, not a certainty. We note that since this case first came to the attention of the court, Child has been placed in one foster home, then in a second foster home, then at McKennan Hospital, then in another foster home, then with Crossroads and then in a foster home in Viborg. From there he was abducted and taken to Texas by Mother. After Child's whereabouts was discovered, he was returned to Crossroads, then he was returned to the foster home in Viborg, then he was placed with a foster home in the Pierre area, then he was returned to Crossroads, then he was placed in a Ft. Pierre area foster home and, finally, Child was placed at Crossroads where he remained at the time of the dispositional hearing. The trial court is correct. Child needs a sense of permanency. The record contains clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court's determination that termination of Mother's parental rights is in the best interests of Child and is the least restrictive alternative available commensurate with those interests. K.C., 414 N.W.2d at 621. Affirmed. WUEST, HENDERSON, SABERS and AMUNDSON, JJ., concur.