Opinion ID: 2624953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Finks' Failure to Wear Lap Belt Restraints

Text: [¶ 41] Officer Schell testified on cross-examination that the Finks had their shoulder belts on and no lap belt restraints. The Finks' vehicle was apparently equipped with shoulder belts that move as you open and close the door. Appellant contends that his defense counsel was ineffective because he did not grasp the significance of the Finks' failure to wear lap belt restraints as to whether appellant's conduct proximately caused the Finks' deaths, the failure to wear proper restraints having constituted an intervening cause. According to appellant, defense counsel therefore improperly conceded in opening statement that the accident caused Mr. Fink's death, and did not sufficiently emphasize the lap belt restraint issue in opening statement, closing argument, or questioning the witnesses. The State merely argues, without citation to pertinent authority, that there is nothing in the record that indicates the injuries would have been less severe had the seatbelts been used differently. Of course, this failure to develop the evidence, in part, provides the basis for appellant's ineffective assistance of counsel argument. [¶ 42] The state must prove that a defendant's wrongful conduct (recklessness or driving while under the influence, depending upon which statutory subsection is used to charge the defendant) proximately caused the victims' deaths. To be the proximate cause, the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct; a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries or death. Bloomquist, 914 P.2d at 820 ( quoting Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992) and McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo.1983)). The contributory negligence of a victim is not a defense in a criminal prosecution, but a victim's actions may be considered whenever those actions have a bearing upon the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct [8] or in determining whether the defendant's wrongful conduct was the proximate cause of a victim's death. Candelaria v. State, 895 P.2d 434, 438 (Wyo.1995); Buckles, 830 P.2d at 707-08. A defendant is usually relieved of liability by an unforeseeable intervening cause. However, an intervening cause does not relieve an earlier actor of liability if it was reasonably foreseeable. The causal connection is not broken where the original wrongdoer could reasonably have foreseen that injury to another would be a probable consequence of his [wrongful conduct]. Glazier, 843 P.2d at 1205 ( quoting McClellan, 666 P.2d at 414); Bloomquist, 914 P.2d at 820-21. [¶ 43] In the context of this criminal aggravated vehicular homicide case involving evidence of appellant's intoxication, we find the following reasoning persuasive: One who drinks and drives should reasonably foresee that some among the potential victims of drunken driving will not wear seat belts and that such victims, among others, might be seriously injured in an alcohol-induced collision. State v. Freeland, 176 Ariz. 544, 863 P.2d 263, 267 (1993). For this reason, a victim's failure to wear a seat belt does not supersede a criminal defendant's causal responsibility. [9] Other jurisdictions have similarly found that a victim's failure to wear a seat belt is not sufficient to supersede a criminal defendant's conduct in causing the victim's injuries or death. See generally Panther v. State, 780 P.2d 386, 394-95 (Alaska App.1989); State v. Stewart, 60 Conn.App. 301, 759 A.2d 142, 147-49, cert. granted on other grounds, 255 Conn. 913, 763 A.2d 1039 (2000), cert. denied, 258 Conn. 909, 782 A.2d 1250 (2001); State v. Hubka, 480 N.W.2d 867, 870-71 (Iowa 1992); State v. Myers, 88 N.M. 16, 536 P.2d 280, 286 (1975); State v. Dodge, 152 Vt. 503, 567 A.2d 1143, 1144 (1989); State v. Nester, 175 W.Va. 539, 336 S.E.2d 187, 189 (1985); and State v. Turk, 154 Wis.2d 294, 453 N.W.2d 163, 164-65 (1990). To the extent a contrary inference might arise from our decision in Candelaria, 895 P.2d 434, [10] it is overruled. [¶ 44] Accordingly, appellant's counsel was not ineffective in this respect.