Opinion ID: 1222518
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Develop a Theory of Defense

Text: The petitioner faults his trial counsel for not capitalizing on the evidence at hand to develop a credible theory of the case. In Miller, we addressed this very issue: Indeed, we agree with the defendant that it would be unusual for counsel to develop and rely upon self-defense at trial and then offer no instructions on the defense. Such a maneuver is indicative of the lack of a trial strategy and `[n]o competent defense attorney would go to trial without first formulating an overall strategy.' Welsh S. White, Effective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Cases: The Evolving Standard of Care, 1993 U.Ill.L.Rev. 323, 356. Effective trial counsel typically prepares for a criminal defense by asking questions such as: (1) What is the objective of the defense? (2) What is the trial strategy to reach that objective? (3) How does one implement that strategy? The record before us, however, does not conclusively show the lack of a trial strategy. 194 W.Va. at 15-16, 459 S.E.2d at 126-27. (Footnote omitted). When questioned about his theory of the case during the habeas corpus hearing, trial counsel stated the defense basically ... was kind of accidental as to being hit on the head and waking up disoriented and improperly reacting to the circumstances surrounding [the petitioner] However, trial counsel failed to develop evidence which would support the petitioner's claim that a blackout occurred. The petitioner had a history of three D.U.I. charges, had undergone treatment for alcohol abuse, and was drunk on the evening the shooting took place. Furthermore, the petitioner informed trial counsel that he previously experienced similar blackouts while intoxicated. None of the evidence showing the petitioner's serious drinking problem was put before the jury. Similarly, the petitioner contends that given the fact he consumed a large amount of alcohol prior to the shooting, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to submit a diminished capacity instruction to the jury. In fact, the record indicates that such instruction was prepared yet withdrawn by trial counsel apparently at the surprise of the trial court. Contrary to the petitioner's claims on this appeal, trial counsel stated at the habeas corpus hearing that the petitioner rejected a defense of diminished capacity because it would likely have resulted in conviction. Trial counsel stated the petitioner wanted to go for it all and seek complete acquittal. Furthermore, the State asserts the petitioner's blackout claim was refuted by the trial testimony of the treating physician at the emergency room that the petitioner stated he did not lose consciousness that evening. In State v. Watson, 164 W.Va. 642, 650, 264 S.E.2d 628, 633 (1980), this Court stated: There is no precise formula guiding a determination of when the failure to raise an available defense will constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. The absence of clear standards may be unavoidable, since the strength of an available defense in each particular circumstance may vary as broadly as the factual occurrences that give rise to a criminal prosecution. Thus, a determination of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to raise an available defense involves a case-by-case examination of the particular facts in order that the issues those facts fairly raise can be compared with the defenses actually presented by counsel. See Annot., Modern Status of Rule as to Test in Federal Court of Effective Representation by Counsel, 26 A.L.R.Fed. 218, § 10(a) (1976). It seems apparent that the habeas corpus court accepted counsel's version of what happened. The petitioner cannot expect counsel to properly investigate and present a defense when the petitioner changes his mind as to which defense to use at every turn in the case. In Strickland, the Supreme Court held that trial counsel's decisions may be based on information given to him or her by the petitioner: The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions. Counsel's actions are usually based, quite properly, on informed strategic choices made by the defendant and on information supplied by the defendant. In particular, what investigation decisions are reasonable depends critically on such information.... In short, inquiry into counsel's conversations with the defendant may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's investigation decisions, just as it may be critical to a proper assessment of counsel's other litigation decisions. 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066, 80 L.Ed.2d at 695-96. This, too, appears to be a close issue. We find the choices made by trial counsel were reasonable and were strategic considerations based upon information from the petitioner and were not made because trial counsel was unprepared or conducted no pretrial discovery. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 106 S.Ct. 2574, 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986), is one of the few cases where the Supreme Court found ineffective assistance of counsel. In Kimmelman, the Supreme Court noted that defense counsel failed to file a timely suppression motion, not due to trial strategy considerations, but because he was unaware of the search, and of the State's intention to introduce the ... evidence, due to the fact he had conducted no pretrial discovery. Syl. pt. 2(a). This case is different. Furthermore, trial counsel and the petitioner disagree as to the petitioner's desire to forego this defense. The circuit court at the habeas hearing found against the petitioner on this and other issues, and we have no basis to reverse that finding. In cases where there is a conflict of evidence between defense counsel and the defendant, the circuit court's findings will usually be upheld. I Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on West Virginia Criminal Procedure 53 (2nd ed. 1994). Finally, based on the record evidence, we do not find the trial attorney's tactics were so deficient as to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Although no evidence was presented regarding the petitioner's history of alcohol problems, the jury was aware that he and his friends had consumed large quantities of alcohol throughout the evening prior to the shooting. Furthermore, we agree with the State that the petitioner's black out claim was essentially refuted by the evidence at trial, rendering this theory of the case suspect.