Opinion ID: 2038942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inapposite Authority

Text: The majority states that defendant's failure to attach a second affidavit or explain its absence is fatal to his petition. 202 Ill.2d at 66, 270 Ill.Dec. at 5, 782 N.E.2d at 198. In support of this statement, the majority cites People v. Turner, 187 Ill.2d 406, 414, 241 Ill.Dec. 596, 719 N.E.2d 725 (1999), People v. Coleman, 183 Ill.2d 366, 380, 233 Ill.Dec. 789, 701 N.E.2d 1063 (1998), and People v. Jennings, 411 Ill. 21, 26, 102 N.E.2d 824 (1952). 202 Ill.2d at 66, 270 Ill.Dec. at 5, 782 N.E.2d at 198. These cases are manifestly distinguishable from the case at bar. Jennings is inapposite because that case predates the addition of section 122-2.1(a)(2) to the Act. The petitioner in Jennings was represented by counsel and summary dismissal was not a possibility. Turner and Coleman are death penalty cases. There is no summary dismissal for post-conviction petitions filed in capital cases. See 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(1) (West 2000). It is plainly inappropriate to rely on these decisions in this case, which is concerned solely with the requirements a noncapital post-conviction petition must meet at the summary dismissal stage. Although the majority cites no pertinent authority to support its holding, there is authority from this court, directly on point, which is contrary to the majority's position. As I noted in my original dissent in this case, over 30 years ago, in People v. Williams, 47 Ill.2d 1, 264 N.E.2d 697 (1970), this court held that when a pro se post-conviction petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on an attorney-client conversation, the only supporting affidavit required is the defendant's own. In Williams, we stated: The State's only contention is that the petition is insufficient to entitle petitioner to a hearing in that it was not accompanied by supporting affidavits. But the only affidavit that petitioner could possibly have furnished, other than his own sworn statement, would have been that of his attorney who allegedly made the misrepresentation to him. The difficulty or impossibility of obtaining such an affidavit is self-apparent. In People v. Wegner, 40 Ill.2d 28 [237 N.E.2d 486], where similar allegations of misrepresentations of counsel as to sentence were made, we held that dismissal of the petition without a hearing was improper; that defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing even though the State had filed a counteraffidavit of defendant's attorney in which he denied making the statement attributed to him. It would certainly follow that if a defendant is entitled to a hearing despite a counteraffidavit of his attorney denying the allegations of the petition then a defendant should not be denied a hearing merely because he did not obtain a supporting affidavit from the attorney who represented him at the time of his plea. Under such circumstances, to so strictly construe the Act as requested by the State would defeat its very purpose by denying petitioner a hearing on the factual issue raised by the pleadings. However, as stated in People v. Reeves, 412 Ill. 555 [107 N.E.2d 861], we do not intend hereby to lessen the duty of petitioners under the Act to make a substantial showing of a violation of constitutional rights, for the allegations of mere conclusions to that effect under oath will not suffice. We do find that in this case the sworn statements of petitioner warrant a fair inference of a violation of constitutional rights which are not negated by the State nor by the record, and that an evidentiary hearing is required to determine the truth or falsity of petitioner's allegations. Williams, 47 Ill.2d at 4-5, 264 N.E.2d 697. I explained at length in my original dissent in this case why the majority's attempt to factually distinguish Williams fails. I leave it to the reader to decide whether the majority has accurately represented the facts in Williams. For myself, I must reluctantly conclude, as Chief Justice Harrison once remarked, that [s]tare decisis means nothing ( People v. Kinkead, 182 Ill.2d 316, 348, 231 Ill.Dec. 136, 695 N.E.2d 1255 (1998) (Harrison, J., specially concurring)) to the majority in this case. Rehearing should be granted in this case to strike the citations to inapposite case law and to conform the majority opinion with our holding in Williams.