Opinion ID: 2966691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Implied Repeal of the Old Effective Date

Text: In its final argument, the Government turns to a direct consideration of implied repeal. According to the Government, each of the previous six arguments was in fact an argument for express repeal, while this final argument is an argument for implied repeal. In none of the previous six arguments, however, did the Government point to any language in the 1981 Amendment by which Congress repealed the effective date of the 1976 Amendment. Thus, there is no express 13 repeal, and the arguments regarding Congress's intentions are best read as arguments for implied repeal. In any event, in this final argument, the Government couches its argument in terms of the test outlined above for implied repeal. Because the district court relied heavily on Gallenstein v. United States, 975 F.2d 286 (6th Cir. 1992), the Government argues primarily against the reasoning in Gallenstein. First, the Government argues that there is an irreconcilable conflict between the two effective dates because [l]imiting the application of the 1981 definition of `qualified joint interests' to spousal joint interests created after 1976 completely frustrates Congress' clear intent to replace the patchwork statutory scheme with a bright-line test for inclusion in the deceased spouse's gross estate. (Appellant's Br. at 33.) This argument is simply another appeal to inferential congressional intent, and it does not show an irreconcilable conflict between the operation of the two sections. Statutory provisions will not be considered to be in irreconcilable conflict unless there is a `positive repugnancy' between them such that they `cannot mutually coexist.' Mitchell, 39 F.3d at 472 (quoting Radzanower, 426 U.S. at 155). Here, the sections are not so irreconcilable: The statutory provisions at issue here cannot be characterized as being irreconcilably in conflict in the sense that there is a positive repugnancy between them or that they cannot mutually coexist. It is not enough to show that the two statutes produce different results when applied to the same factual situation, for that no more than states the problem. [Section] 2040(b)(1) applies to a qualified joint interest created after 1976, and . . . § 2040(b)(2) redefines a qualified joint interest for estates of decedents dying after 1981. Gallenstein, 975 F.2d at 291 (citations omitted). We agree with this reasoning. There is no inherent tension between the operation of the two provisions. Second, the Government tries to prove that § 2040(b)(2) covers the whole subject matter of § 2040(b)(1), primarily by referring to the history of the section as described above. Again, evidence of Congress's intent is relevant only if § 2040(b)(2) covers the whole subject 14 matter of § 2040(b)(1), and the Government is not permitted to bootstrap its way out of the requirement that the subsequent enactment cover the entire subject matter of the first. As described in Gallenstein: The statutes at issue here are far from mutually exclusive in the manner necessary for such an assumption. Congress expressly made one subsection applicable to all decedents dying after 1981. Another subsection, applicable to interests created before 1977, allowed a different computation for purposes of calculating the estate's taxable income.. . . Despite the government's extensive discussion of legislative history, we find the fact that Congress chose not to change § 2040(b)(1)'s operative effective date dispositive of this case. 975 F.2d at 292. Again, we are persuaded by this reasoning. The Government simply has not proven that § 2040(b)(2) covers the whole subject matter of § 2040(b)(1). Therefore, evidence of congressional intent should be ignored.