Opinion ID: 1275328
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Albemarle & Section 7(h) of the Fair Employment Practices Act

Text: We think that the Albemarle standard should be the standard under § 7(h) of the Fair Employment Practices Act. In fact, we agree with dissenting Judge MacKENZIE in the Court below that the case for a result such as the Court reached in Albemarle is more compelling under the state statute than under the federal statute. Dep't of Civil Rights v Sparrow Hospital Ass'n, supra, p 395 (MacKENZIE, J., dissenting ). The operative section of the federal Title VII reads, the court may ... order such affirmative action as may be appropriate, which may include ... reinstatement ... with or without back pay.... 42 USC 2000e-5(g). Such language is clearly discretionary. Section 7(h) of the state Fair Employment Practices Act, on the other hand, reads, the commission shall ... take such further affirmative or other action as will effectuate the purposes of this act, including ... reinstatement ... with or without back pay.... The with or without language in § 7(h) imparts some sense of discretion. However, that discretion, by the express terms of the statute, shall be exercised so as to effectuate the purposes of the act. Furthermore, as in Albemarle, the power to award back pay was given by the Legislature as part of legislation that was directed at an historic evil. The Legislature bestowed this power on the commission to further transcendent legislative purposes.... Albemarle, supra, p 417. To permit inconsistent application of the back-pay provision would be to frustrate those purposes. In accordance with the above discussion, we think that the decision to deny or grant back pay must be measured by the purposes of the Fair Employment Practices Act. We find that the purposes of the Fair Employment Practices Act, like Title VII, were to eradicate discrimination and to make persons whole for injuries suffered as a result of discrimination. The purpose of eradicating discrimination is clearly stated in the act itself. At the time this action was commenced, the preamble to the Fair Employment Practices Act read in pertinent part, AN ACT to promote and protect the welfare of the people of this state by prevention and elimination of discriminatory employment practices and policies .... Preamble, MCL 423.301 et seq.; MSA 17.458(1) et seq., as amended by 1976 PA 52 (emphasis added). [2] In fact, this Court has forthrightly and consistently recognized this purpose in construing the Fair Employment Practices Act and its successor the Civil Rights Act. See Boscaglia v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, 420 Mich 308, 314-316; 362 NW2d 642 (1984); Miller v C A Muer Corp, 420 Mich 355, 362-363; 362 NW2d 650 (1984); Highland Park v Fair Employment Practices Comm, 364 Mich 508, 512; 111 NW2d 797 (1961). We reitarate and emphasize that dominant purpose. Like Title VII, a second major purpose of the act was to make whole those who suffered injury on account of discriminatory practices. As previously noted, the Albemarle Court pointed out that Title VII armed the courts with full equitable powers ... and that it is the historic purpose of equity to `secur[e] complete justice....' Albemarle, supra, p 418, quoting Brown v Swann, supra, p 503. This historic purpose was part of the Fair Employment Practices Act because, much the same as Title VII, the Fair Employment Practices Act bestowed upon the commission a full array of powers that were equitable in nature. See MCL 423.307; MSA 17.458(7). Albemarle, supra, p 418, quoting Brown v Swann, supra, p 503. The Fair Employment Practices Act also dealt with injuries that were largely economic in nature, and as the Court stated in Albemarle, in such situations [t]he injured party is to be placed, as near as may be, in the situation he would have occupied if the wrong had not been committed. Albemarle, supra, pp 418-419, quoting Wicker v Hoppock, 6 Wall 94, 99; 18 L Ed 752 (1867). In addition, § 7(h) of the Fair Employment Practices Act, like the back-pay provision of Title VII, was modeled on the corresponding National Labor Relations Act provision, Boscaglia v Michigan Bell Telephone Co, supra, p 316, n 12. See Highland Park v Fair Employment Practices Comm, supra, pp 516-517. Pursuant to that provision, the National Labor Relations Board has awarded back pay as a matter of course. Albemarle, supra, pp 419-420. We must assume that the Legislature was aware of this fact when it enacted the back-pay provision of the Fair Employment Practices Act. Albemarle, supra, pp 419-420. See 2A Sands, Sutherland Statutory Construction (4th ed), § 52.02. We conclude that § 7(h) of the Fair Employment Practices Act had a twofold purpose, to eliminate discrimination and to make whole those who have suffered through discrimination. Thus, following a finding of unlawful discrimination, back pay should not be denied except for reasons which, if applied generally, would not defeat these two central purposes. [3]