Opinion ID: 2981775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Narvaez’s Testimony

Text: Defendant next argues the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Narvaez to testify that defendant viewed pornography on TTC computers. We disagree. This court reviews a trial court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion. United States v. White, 492 F.3d 380, 398 (6th Cir. 2007). “A district court abuses its discretion when it relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact, when it improperly applies the law, or when it employs an erroneous legal standard.” United States v. Cline, 362 F.3d 343, 348 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). However, reversal is only warranted “where the district court’s erroneous admission of evidence affects a substantial right of the party.” White, 492 F.3d at 398 (citing Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)). This court has “consistently recognized the broad scope of allowable impeachment evidence and, more importantly perhaps, the significant discretion left to the trial court in this area.” United States v. Markarian, 967 F.2d 1098, 1103 (6th Cir. 1992). A defendant’s introduction of evidence may render his prior acts relevant for impeachment purposes, “thus making admissible what may not have been admissible otherwise” under Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). See United States v. Jackson, 95 F.3d 1153 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table opinion); United States v. Segines, 17 F.3d 847, 856 (6th Cir. 1994) (admitting theretofore inadmissible evidence after defense broached topic on 14 cross-examination). Thus, the government may elicit rebuttal testimony when a defendant makes sweeping denials of activity relevant to the case. Markarian, 967 F.2d at 1103. Though defendant did not testify himself, the testimony of his witnesses raised the inference that the defendant was not likely to have anything to do with child pornography. This, in turn, would have suggested that someone else was responsible for the images on the xcon28 user account. The government properly presented Narvaez’s testimony to rebut this position. In Markarian, 967 F.2d at 1103, the defendant, rather than another witness, made a general denial of drug dealing. However, this distinction does not change the inquiry. To hold otherwise would allow a defendant to insulate his position by calling witnesses to present that position, rather than presenting his own testimony. Cf. United States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 601 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding cross-examination questions to be proper if designed to elicit testimony with “any tendency” to make the defendant’s witness more or less credible.). Additionally, the trial court properly limited the scope of Narvaez’s testimony: Now while the testimony that was elicited is – is appropriate for relevant conduct, it is not probative of – directly of the issues charged in the indictment because he was not there at the time during the indictment. So just keep that in mind. Because we presume that jurors follow their instructions, United States v. Harvey, 653 F.3d 388, 396 (6th Cir. 2011), and the government offered Narvaez’s testimony for the legitimate purpose of rebutting defendant’s witnesses’ testimony, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony. 15