Opinion ID: 2966640
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Validity of the Domestic Violence Statute

Text: Bailey claims that the second charge of his indictment, alleging violations of the recently enacted interstate domestic violence statute 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a), should have been dismissed because he claims that Congress exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause. The 9 interstate domestic violence statute is in Title II of the Violence Against Women Act. The statute provides:

els across a State Line or enters or leaves Indian Country with the intent to injure, harass, or intimidate that person's spouse or intimate partner, and who, in the cause of or as a result of such travel, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to such spouse or intimate partner shall be punished as provided in sub- section (b).
person who causes a spouse or intimate partner to cross a State line or to enter or leave Indian Coun- try by force, coercion, duress, or fraud and, in the course or as a result of that conduct, intentionally commits a crime of violence and thereby causes bodily injury to the person's spouse or intimate partner, shall be punished as provided in subsec- tion (b). 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a).5 Bailey was one of the first charged under the statute, and so far as has come to our attention, the statute has not been previously challenged in a reported case or in any of the courts of appeals. Two district courts, however, have reached opposite conclusions as to the constitutionality of a part of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act, which creates a private right of action against an individual who commits a crime of violence motivated by gender. 6 See 42 U.S.C. § 13981(c). _________________________________________________________________ 5 We do not deal here with an intimate partner, Mrs. Bailey was Bailey's wife. 6 See Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996) (finding 42 U.S.C. § 13981, a part of Title III of the Violence Against Women Act to be a 10 Bailey's challenge to § 2261(a) relies on the Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. 4343 (1995), which restricted Congress' commerce power. In Lopez the Court reviewed the constitutionality of former 18 U.S.C.§ 922(q), the GunFree School Zone Act of 1990, which made it a federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. at 4343 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(a)(1988 ed., Supp. V)). The Court found that Congress had acted beyond its commerce power in enacting the statute because the statute had nothing to do with `commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, 63 U.S.L.W. at 4346, nor anyjurisdictional element which would insure . . . that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce. Lopez, 63 U.S.L.W. at 4347. Bailey asserts that after Lopez, where Congress is acting pursuant to its commerce power it can regulate the (1) channels and (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce, but beyond that it may only regulate (3) activities that are substantially related to commerce. Bailey argues that §2261(a) does not regulate either of the first two categories (channels or instruments of interstate commerce) and thus the Lopez analysis requires that the conduct to be regulated must have more than an interstate nexus, it must directly affect commerce. The government argues that by contrast, the domestic violence statute contains such a provision (by requiring the crossing of a state line) and thus is not subject to what is called the substantially and directly analysis of Lopez. We find it unnecessary to go in detail into the arguments applicable in Lopez, for we think previous decisions of the Supreme Court apply and that the statute in question is valid. _________________________________________________________________ proper exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause); but see Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State University, 935 F. Supp. 779 (W.D. Va. 1996) (holding the same section invalid as an unconstitutional exercise of Congress' power). We express no opinion as to the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C. § 13981, a part of Title III of the Act. We are concerned only with the validity of 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a), a part of Title II of the Act. 11 In Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), the Court held valid the White Slave Traffic Act of 1910. In that case, the defendant had been convicted of transporting and causing to be transported and aiding in the transportation of a certain woman from Sacramento, California to Reno, Nevada for the purpose of debauchery, that is to say, that the woman should be the mistress of the defendant. The Court upheld the conviction and stated: The transportation of passengers in interstate commerce, it has long been settled, is within the regulatory power of Congress, under the commerce clause of the Constitution, and the authority of Congress to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from immoral and injurious uses has been frequently sustained, and is no longer open to question. 242 U.S. at 491. In Cleveland v. United States, 392 U.S. 14 (1946), the defendant was convicted of a violation of the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. § 398, which forbade the transportation in interstate commerce of any woman or girl for the purpose of prostitution or debauchery or for any other immoral purpose. The defendants had transported women across state lines for the purpose of cohabiting with them as plural wives in violation of law. The Court sustained the convictions and stated: The fact that the regulation of marriage is a state matter does not, of course, make the Mann Act an unconstitutional interference by Congress with the police powers of the States. The power of Congress over the instrumentalities of interstate commerce is plenary; it may be used to defeat what are deemed to be immoral practices; and the fact that the means used may have the quality of police regulations is not consequential. 329 U.S. at 19. The present case is so similar to Cleveland and Caminetti that we think those cases are controlling. The statute requires the crossing of a state line, thus placing the transaction squarely in interstate com12 merce. And it requires the commission of a crime of violence causing bodily injury, which certainly is not different from the immoral purpose forbade in Cleveland and the debauchery forbade in Caminetti. We are of opinion the statute is valid.