Opinion ID: 1843568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: district court's consideration of stineman's testimony

Text: Cerny first asserts that the district court erred in considering Stineman's testimony regarding the conduct required by the School's coaches under the standard of care. Although Cerny concedes that Stineman is qualified as an expert witness, Cerny nonetheless objects to the weight accorded Stineman's testimony by the district court and claims that the district court erred in considering Stineman's testimony to the effect that the School's coaches' conduct was within the applicable standard of care. We reject this argument. We have recognized that determining the weight that should be given expert testimony is uniquely the province of the fact finder. Hawkins v. City of Omaha, 261 Neb. 943, 627 N.W.2d 118 (2001); Anderson/Couvillon v. Nebraska Dept. of Soc. Servs., 253 Neb. 813, 572 N.W.2d 362 (1998). We have further stated that in reviewing a judgment awarded in a bench trial under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, it is not the purview of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence. See City of LaVista v. Andersen, 240 Neb. 3, 480 N.W.2d 185 (1992). As the finder of fact, the district court had the authority to determine what weight, if any, it would give to Stineman's testimony. See Hawkins v. City of Omaha, supra . It is apparent from the district court's journal entry that it evaluated all of the expert witnesses' testimony, as it was directed to do on remand. See Cerny I. It is also apparent from the district court's journal entry that the district court accorded weight to certain of Stineman's testimony, as it was permitted to do. Contrary to Cerny's argument, Stineman's testimony was not limited to anecdotal subject matter. To the contrary, Stineman's testimony was helpful to the finder of fact because aspects of his testimony related to the year 1995 in particular. It is not the function of this court to second guess the district court's decision with regard to the weight given to an expert's testimony or to reweigh that evidence in this appeal. See, Hawkins v. City of Omaha, supra ; City of LaVista v. Andersen, supra . Accordingly, we conclude that Cerny's first argument is without merit.