Opinion ID: 1345677
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Delaney's Constitutional Rights

Text: Our determination that the reporters' observations of the police search are unpublished information within the scope of article I, section 2(b) does not decide the issue of whether the municipal court properly held the reporters in contempt for refusing to disclose that information. (15) The reporters themselves concede, as they must, that the shield law's protection is overcome in a criminal proceeding on a showing that nondisclosure would deprive the defendant of his federal constitutional right to a fair trial. Although this court has not decided a case involving the application of the shield law in a criminal prosecution, the principle is beyond question. ( CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 85 Cal. App.3d 241, 251; Hallissy v. Superior Court, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d 1038; Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 154 Cal. App.3d 14, 24-25; Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 402; cf. People v. Borunda (1974) 11 Cal.3d 523, 527 [113 Cal. Rptr. 825, 522 P.2d 1] [defendant seeking identity of anonymous informant].) [18] The incorporation of the shield law into the California Constitution cannot restrict a criminal defendant's federal constitutional right to a fair trial. ( Mulkey v. Reitman (1966) 64 Cal.2d 529, 533 [50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825], affd. (1967) 387 U.S. 369 [18 L.Ed.2d 830, 87 S.Ct. 1627] [explaining that California constitutional amendment adopted by ballot must conform to the United States Constitution].) Such result would violate the supremacy clauses of the federal and state Constitutions. (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2; Cal. Const., art. III, § 1; Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 399, fn. 4.) [19] (16) (See fn. 20.), (17a) The parties disagree, however, as to the nature of the showing a criminal defendant must make to overcome a claim of immunity under the shield law. [20] Delaney contends he need establish only a reasonable possibility that the evidence sought to be discovered might result in his exoneration. The reporters propose a more complex, four-part test under which a defendant would have to show the following: (1) The information must go to the heart of defendant's case. (2) The information must have a significant effect on the outcome of the case. (This proposed element seems to be the same as the heart-of-the-case element.) (3) The information is not available from alternative sources. (4) The infringement on the defendant's rights caused by nondisclosure must outweigh the newsperson's interests. (This element seems to be the conclusion a court would reach under the test rather than an element of the test.) As we will explain, precedent and principle lead us to conclude that neither test is entirely warranted.
To formulate the proper test we begin with our decision in Mitchell v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d 268, in which we set forth a balancing test to determine when a reporter must disclose confidential information. We identified four relevant factors for a trial court to consider when making that determination. First, we noted the nature of the proceeding and observed that, In general, disclosure is appropriate in civil cases, especially when a reporter is a party to the litigation. ( Id., at p. 279.) Second, the Mitchell court stated the information must be more than merely relevant and that it must go to the heart of the case for the party seeking discovery. ( Id., at pp. 280-282.) Third, the court stated that discovery should generally be denied unless it is shown that all alternative sources of the information have been exhausted. ( Id., at p. 282.) Fourth, Mitchell stated that the trial court should consider the importance of protecting confidentiality in the case at hand. ( Id., at pp. 282-283.) Although Mitchell, a defamation action, helps to illustrate the competing concerns that arise when a litigant seeks information from a newsperson, an identical approach is not entirely appropriate in a criminal proceeding. We were careful to emphasize in Mitchell that In criminal proceedings, both the interest of the state in law enforcement, recognized as a compelling interest in Branzburg (see 408 U.S. 665, 700 [33 L.Ed.2d 626, 650]), and the interest of the defendant in discovering exonerating evidence outweigh any interest asserted in ordinary civil litigation. ( Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at p. 278.) We did not consider the factors a court should consider in a criminal case.
In now deciding the issue, we must first consider the threshold showing a criminal defendant must make. The reporters claim Delaney must show their testimony would go to the heart of his case. He contends he need show only a reasonable possibility the evidence might result in his exoneration. On this point, Delaney has the better view. In CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 85 Cal. App.3d 241, the court explained, Against this right [of a free press] we are obliged to measure the threat to defendants' right to a fair trial. The existence of such a right is clear.... [I]t has resulted in the rule that, where a criminal defendant has demonstrated a reasonable possibility that evidence sought to be discovered might result in his exoneration, he is entitled to its discovery. ( Id., at p. 251, italics in original; Hallissy v. Superior Court, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d 1038, 1045.) Similarly, in Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d 388, the court stated, `Allowing an accused the right to discover is based on the fundamental proposition that he is entitled to a fair trial and an intelligent defense in light of all relevant and reasonably accessible information.' ( Id., at pp. 398-399, quoting Pitchess v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 531, 535 [113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 522 P.2d 305], italics added.) We hold that, to overcome a prima facie showing by a newsperson that he is entitled to withhold information under the shield law, a criminal defendant must show a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his defense. A criminal defendant is not required to show that the information goes to the heart of his case. [21] (18) A criminal defendant's constitutional right to compulsory process was intended to permit him to request governmental assistance in obtaining likely helpful evidence, not just evidence that he can show beforehand will go to the heart of his case. The need to develop all relevant facts in the adversary system is both fundamental and comprehensive. The ends of criminal justice would be defeated if judgments were to be founded on a partial or speculative presentation of the facts. The very integrity of the judicial system and public confidence in the system depend on full disclosure of all the facts, within the framework of the rules of evidence. ( United States v. Nixon (1974) 418 U.S. 683, 709 [41 L.Ed.2d 1039, 1064, 94 S.Ct. 3090], italics added [claim of presidential privilege].) [22] The reasonable possibility requirement is also far more workable than the heart of the case test proposed by the reporters. It would be impractical to require a trial court to attempt to divine whether the evidence sought from the newsperson would cause a jury to exonerate a criminal defendant. A court cannot be expected to have that degree of prescience. Moreover, if applied literally, the heart of the case requirement would allow a defendant to obtain only evidence that would support a directed verdict in his favor. (19a) To provide guidance to the trial courts, we believe it helpful to make clear how the threshold requirement must be applied in practice. First, the burden is on the criminal defendant to make the required showing. ( Hallissy v. Superior Court, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d 1038, 1045.) Second, the defendant's showing need not be detailed or specific, but it must rest on more than mere speculation. Third, the defendant need not show a reasonable possibility the information will lead to his exoneration. He need show only a reasonable possibility the information will materially assist his defense. The distinction between exoneration and assisting the defense is significant. (20) Exoneration means the removal of a burden, charge, responsibility, or duty. (Black's Law Dict. (5th ed. 1979) p. 516, col. 2.) Stated more simply, in criminal proceedings, exoneration is generally understood to mean an acquittal or dismissal of charges. (19b) Evidence, however, may be critical to a defense even if it will not lead to exoneration. For example, evidence may establish an imperfect defense, a lesser included offense, a lesser related offense, or a lesser degree of the same crime; impeach the credibility of a prosecution witness; or, as in capital cases, establish mitigating circumstances relevant to the penalty determination. A criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial includes these aspects of his defense. [23]
(17b) By meeting the threshold requirement, a defendant is not necessarily entitled to a newsperson's unpublished information. The trial court must then consider the importance of protecting the unpublished information. ( Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d at pp. 282-283.) This determination may properly be characterized as a balancing of the defendant's and newsperson's respective, perhaps conflicting, interests. [24] The factors to be considered in making this determination are as follows:
If the information is not confidential, the court should consider whether it is nevertheless sensitive, that is, whether its disclosure would somehow unduly restrict the newsperson's access to future sources and information. (We hereafter refer to this type of nonconfidential information as sensitive information.) [25] Generally, nonconfidential or nonsensitive information will be less worthy of protection than confidential or sensitive information. Disclosure of the latter types of information will more likely have a significant effect on the newsperson's future ability to gather news. ( U.S. v. LaRouche Campaign (1st Cir.1988) 841 F.2d 1176, 1180-1182 [noting slight deference due nonconfidential information].) The protection of that ability is the primary purpose of the shield law. (Ballot Pamp., Proposed Amends. to Cal. Const. with arguments to voters, Primary Elec., supra, p. 19; see ante, at p. 802, fn. 13.) [26]
Even if the information was sensitive or obtained in confidence, other circumstances may, as a practical matter, render moot the need to avoid disclosure. If, as in this case, the criminal defendant seeking disclosure is himself the source of the information, it cannot be seriously argued that the source (the defendant) will feel that his confidence has been breached. [27] The reporter's news-gathering ability will not be prejudiced. Other circumstances may also mitigate or eliminate the adverse consequences of disclosure. We do not purport to decide the significance to be given to any future set of facts before a trial court. The point is simply that a trial court must determine whether the policy of the shield law will in fact be thwarted by disclosure.
A defendant in a given case may be able not only to meet but to exceed the threshold reasonable possibility requirement. For example, he may be able to show that the evidence would be dispositive in his favor, i.e., to use the reporters' phrase, that it goes to the heart of defendant's case. If so, the balance will weigh more heavily in favor of disclosure than if he could show only a reasonable possibility the evidence would assist his defense.
We stated in Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d 268, 282, that discovery of a reporter's confidential information should be denied unless the party seeking it has exhausted all alternative sources of obtaining the needed information. This requirement has also been imposed on criminal defendants. ( Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d 388, 399; Hallissy v. Superior Court, supra, 200 Cal. App.3d 1038, 1045-1046.) Whether there is an alternative source is indeed a factor for the trial court to consider in a criminal proceeding. In light of a defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial, however, Mitchell, a civil case, does not mandate a rigid alternative-source requirement in criminal proceedings. The facts in Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d 268, also suggest the alternative-source requirement may not always be appropriate. In Mitchell, the plaintiff sought documents that would reveal confidential sources of information. ( Id., at p. 272.) [28] The obvious purpose of the alternative-source requirement is to protect against unnecessary disclosure of a newsperson's confidential or sensitive information. Where the information is shown to be not confidential or sensitive, the primary basis for the requirement is not present and imposing a rigid requirement would be to sustain a rule without a reason. As we have explained above, the proper balancing in a criminal case must take into account whether the unpublished information is confidential or sensitive and, if so, the importance of protecting the information in a given case. ( Ante, at pp. 810-811.) For the same reason, a trial court should consider the nature of the information in determining whether to impose an absolute alternative-source requirement in a given case. We also note that in Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d 268, the information request was for documents that would reveal the identity of possible witnesses. We noted that the names of these persons likely could be obtained from sources other than the newsperson. Objective evidence of that nature is likely unaffected by its source. The contents of a document do not depend on the source of the document (assuming no alteration). Similarly, the name of a witness is the same regardless of who provides the name. The evidence sought by Delaney in this case, however, is qualitatively different from that sought in Mitchell. Delaney seeks the reporters' testimony as to their percipient observations of the events leading to his search and arrest. Two witnesses to an act may  indeed, likely do  see it differently, and even when their perceptions are substantially the same, their recollection of the event may differ. Moreover, even if their testimony is substantively similar, one witness may have more credibility with a jury. Likewise, two witnesses may convince the jury of a fact where one witness by himself would not do so. Finally, we note a significant practical difference between this case and Mitchell, supra, 37 Cal.3d 268. That case arose out of a pretrial discovery order in a civil case. In light of the wide range of procedures available for pretrial discovery in civil litigation, it is not unreasonable to require a party seeking information from a newsperson to look elsewhere first. There are no similar procedures available to a criminal defendant. For example, he cannot compel a witness's attendance at a deposition and, if unsuccessful in obtaining information, subpoena a different witness. Moreover, the economic reality of the criminal justice system is such that a criminal defendant will generally have less opportunity than a civil litigant to obtain information before trial. (21) For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that a universal and inflexible alternative-source requirement is inappropriate in a criminal proceeding. In considering whether the requirement is appropriate in a given case, the trial court should consider the type of information being sought (e.g., names of potential witnesses, documents, a reporter's eyewitness observations), the quality of the alternative source, and the practicality of obtaining the information from the alternative source. The trial court must also consider the other balancing factors set forth above: whether the information is confidential or sensitive, the interests sought to be protected by the shield law, and the importance of the information to the criminal defendant. In short, whether an alternative-source requirement applies will depend on the facts of each case. [29]
(17c) Although a trial court must consider the foregoing factors, their relative importance will likely vary from case to case. In some cases, as in the present one, all the factors may weigh strongly in favor of disclosure. In others, the balance may be more even, and in some cases one factor may be so compelling as to outweigh all the others. We decline to hold in the abstract that any factor or combination of factors must be determinative. A mechanistic, checklist approach would not in the long run (nor perhaps even in a particular case) serve the best interests of either newspersons or criminal defendants.
The reporters contend an in camera hearing must be held in every case before a newsperson can be forced to disclose unpublished information. The contention is overbroad. The purpose of an in camera hearing is to protect against unnecessary disclosure of confidential or sensitive information. The reporters fail to explain what purpose an in camera hearing would serve when the information, as in this case, is admittedly not confidential or sensitive. [30] In the cases cited by the reporters, the information was at least arguably confidential. For example, in CBS, Inc. v. Superior Court, supra, 85 Cal. App.3d 241, the Court of Appeal remanded to the trial court for an in camera hearing but noted the newspersons' claimed pledge of secrecy. ( Id., at p. 254.) The reporters' reliance on Hammarley v. Superior Court, supra, 89 Cal. App.3d 388, in which the court affirmed a contempt judgment, is even more misplaced. In Hammarley, the newsperson argued that the shield law immunity was absolute and that an in camera hearing should not have been allowed. The Court of Appeal concluded to the contrary. ( Id., at pp. 402-403.) The decision in no way supports the view that an in camera hearing is required in every case. [31] When a criminal defendant, however, seeks confidential or sensitive information, the practical need for an in camera hearing is obvious. The shield law would be illusory if a reporter had to publicly disclose confidential or sensitive information in order for a court to determine whether it should remain confidential or sensitive. We emphasize, however, that a trial court need not waste its valuable resources for an in camera hearing based on a specious claim of confidentiality or sensitivity. [32] The court has discretion in the first instance to determine whether a newsperson's claim of confidentiality or sensitivity is colorable. If the court determines the claim is colorable, it must then receive the newsperson's testimony in camera.
(22) Under the proper balancing test set forth above, Delaney was clearly entitled to the reporters' testimony as to whether he consented to the police search of his jacket. Threshold showing  Even under the test advocated by the reporters (heart of the case), Delaney would be entitled to their testimony. The municipal court explained to the reporters' counsel the lack of probable cause for the search: If there were probable cause for the search, I guarantee you the prosecutor would not be introducing the matter of [Delaney's] consent. The court explained that if there was no consent the search was therefore illegal, and the charge against Delaney would have to be dismissed. Conversely, if he consented to the search, it was legal, the brass knuckles would be admitted into evidence, and Delaney would have little chance of an acquittal. As the court put it, the case will rise or fall on the admission or not of those metal knuckles. We agree. It is an understatement to say, in the words of the test we adopt, that there is a reasonable possibility the reporters' testimony will assist Delaney in his defense. There is a substantial certainty that the reporters' testimony will materially affect the outcome of the criminal proceeding. Delaney has met and surpassed the required threshold showing. Balancing factors  The balance weighs overwhelmingly in favor of requiring the reporters to testify. A brief review of the factors to be balanced makes this clear. (1) Whether the unpublished information is confidential or senstitive  As we have already noted, the reporters do not claim their percipient observations of Delaney's search and arrest in a public place were made in confidence or were sensitive. (2) The interests sought to be protected by the shield law  There is not even a suggestion in this case that the reporters' testimony would impinge on their future news-gathering ability or other interest, if any, sought to be protected by the shield law. Both parties who were observed by the reporters (Delaney and the police) are seeking their testimony. Thus, it cannot be said the parties or anyone else would be reluctant to provide these reporters with future information based on a belief that the reporters had breached a confidence or divulged sensitive information. (3) The importance of the information to the criminal defendant  As explained above, the reporters' testimony will likely be determinative of the outcome of this case. (4) Whether there is an alternative source for the unpublished information  We have explained that a criminal defendant need not always show the lack of an alternative source for a newsperson's unpublished information. We need not consider whether such a showing was required in this case because the municipal court implicitly assumed that it was required, and Delaney made a satisfactory showing. At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the reporters' counsel suggested that Delaney be required to take the stand and testify as to whether he had consented to the search. The court promptly advised counsel as to a defendant's constitutional right not to do so. [33] Counsel also urged as alternative sources Delaney's companion, who was present at the time of the search, and four other officers who might have been within hearing distance of the search. The court correctly explained that neither the companion nor the other officers would be disinterested witnesses. The only two persons fitting that description are the two reporters. Thus, contrary to their assertion, their testimony would not be merely cumulative to that of the other potential witnesses. We concur in the municipal court's determination that there was no meaningful alternative source for the reporters' testimony. In short, the court struck the correct balance. Delaney's personal liberty is at stake. The reporters are not being asked to breach a confidence or to disclose sensitive information that would in any way even remotely restrict their news-gathering ability. All that is being required of them is to accept the civic responsibility imposed on all persons who witness alleged criminal conduct.
(23) Finally, the reporters contend almost in passing that we are not bound by the municipal court's decision, which they characterize as being comprised of legal conclusions rather than factual findings. The reporters attack the decision on two grounds. First, they contend it is not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree. We have reviewed the record and, as set forth above, we find the municipal court's decision to be amply supported. Second, the reporters contend we are required to exercise our independent judgment as to the correctness of the municipal court's order of contempt because important constitutional interests are at stake. Apparently, the reporters would have us hold that independent appellate judgment is mandated in all cases under the shield law. Article I, section 2(b) makes no provision for such a standard of review. Nor do the reporters cite authority from any jurisdiction requiring such review under a shield law. We need not and do not decide the issue, however, because, as noted above, we have reviewed the record, and we independently conclude without difficulty that it fully supports the municipal court's thoughtful decision. [34]