Opinion ID: 673769
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Denial of Continuance by the Indiana Trial Court

Text: 14 McFarland contends that the trial court erroneously denied his request for a continuance in order to obtain the testimony of Leon Woods, his asserted alibi witness. During the trial, McFarland's attorney informed the court that Woods was having difficulty finding transportation and that Woods was not present when a defense investigator arrived at his home to drive him to the courthouse. The investigator had spoken with Woods over the phone that morning. The prosecution refused to stipulate to Woods' proposed testimony, and the trial court issued a bench warrant for Woods. Woods was not arrested and did not appear in court. Later that day, when Woods still could not be found, the court granted McFarland's request for a continuance for one day. The next day, Woods was still unavailable, and the defense investigator testified before the jury concerning his efforts to locate Woods. No further continuances were granted. 15 A denial of a continuance violates due process only when the trial court has abused its discretion and the denial results in a fundamentally unfair trial. United States ex rel. Searcy v. Greer, 768 F.2d 906, 913 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 996 (1985); see also Manlove v. Tansy, 981 F.2d 473, 476 (10th Cir.1992). Factors relevant to this inquiry are: (1) whether due diligence has been exercised to obtain the attendance of the witness; (2) whether substantial favorable evidence would be tendered by the witness; (3) whether the witness is available and willing to testify; and (4) whether the denial of the continuance would materially prejudice the defendant. United States ex rel. Searcy v. Greer, 768 F.2d at 913. 16 The trial court's refusal to grant an additional continuance was not an abuse of discretion and did not result in a fundamentally unfair trial. The trial court had already granted one continuance and had issued a bench warrant for Woods. Although McFarland was diligent in attempting to obtain Woods' presence, Woods was unavailable and apparently unwilling to testify. Further, the record does not indicate that Woods would have tendered substantial evidence favorable to McFarland, nor does it indicate that McFarland was materially prejudiced by Woods' failure to testify. The alibi was already in evidence through McFarland's own trial testimony. Woods testified at the post-conviction hearing only that he saw McFarland at his home about 5:00 or 6:00 p.m. and again before 9:00 or 10:00 p.m. on August 24, 1976. The robbery and murder occurred after 11:00 p.m. that evening. 2