Opinion ID: 196623
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ecker's Arguments

Text: 13 Although conceding that the statute is silent, Ecker argues that the structure of the relevant statutes, their legislative history, and the caselaw compel the conclusion that Congress intended to require dismissal of a pending indictment upon commitment. We disagree, and address each of Ecker's arguments in turn, explaining why we find them unpersuasive. 14 First, Ecker asserts that section 4246 applies only to individuals who no longer realistically can be considered to be awaiting trial because there is little possibility of their regaining competency, quoting United States v. Charters, 829 F.2d 479, 485 (4th Cir.1987) (not addressing dismissal of indictment), reh'g, 863 F.2d 302 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1016, 110 S.Ct. 1317, 108 L.Ed.2d 493 (1990). From that premise, Ecker concludes that Congress plainly intended that the liberty of such a person would be restricted only by the requirements of section 4246, not as a result of the continued pendency of an indictment. 15 That argument is unconvincing. Ecker's liberty is not restricted by the pendency of the indictment, but rather by section 4246 (which authorizes his hospitalization). The only effect that the pending indictment has on Ecker's liberty results from a Massachusetts state policy 4 of refusing to accept mentally ill federal detainees who are subject to a pending federal indictment. We fail to see how that state policy, or its effect on Ecker, can indicate that Congress intended section 4246 to require dismissal of any pending indictment. 16 Ecker's second argument is that there is no statutory mechanism to revisit the issue of competency once a defendant is committed as dangerous under section 4246. While recognizing that section 4247 requires annual reports on the mental condition of a person committed under section 4246, he asserts that such reports address dangerousness and not competency to stand trial. That argument finds some support in the October 1994 annual report on Ecker, which concluded that he was still dangerous without addressing his competency for trial on the pending indictment. Ecker argues that nothing in this statutory scheme suggests that Congress envisioned further competency determinations once a defendant is indefinitely committed as dangerous under section 4246. This unexplained gap, he contends, indicates that Congress must have intended that a pending indictment would be dismissed once a defendant has been committed for dangerousness. 17 We agree that the statute does not expressly address the reevaluation of trial competency of a defendant committed as dangerous under section 4246. The statute does, however, provide for annual reports by the facility director concerning the mental condition of the person and containing recommendations for the need for his continued hospitalization. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(e)(1)(B). This broad requirement of a report on mental condition would seemingly allow the facility director to report to the court that a defendant has regained competency. Moreover, a defendant or his counsel may bring any relevant change in condition, or a request for release, to the court's attention through a motion for a hearing under section 4247(h). 18 In any event, it is far too great a leap to conclude from this asserted shortcoming in the statutory scheme that Congress intended to require the dismissal of a pending indictment once a defendant has been committed for dangerousness. Congress could plausibly have expected that a prosecutor bent on trying a committed person would file a motion under section 4241 for a new evaluation of competency. 5 On the other hand, the asserted gap might be the result of simple oversight or poor draftsmanship, due in part, perhaps, to an expectation that prosecutors will usually exercise their discretion to dismiss indictments against persons committed under section 4246. An appropriate judicial response to this statutory shortcoming would be to order further competency reevaluations if requested by either the government or a defendant, rather than a judicial rewriting of the statute to require dismissal of an indictment that the prosecutor seeks to preserve. 19 The third argument advanced by Ecker is more difficult to decipher than the preceding two. He asserts that section 4246 was clearly designed to deal only with persons about to be released from the federal criminal justice system, and therefore Congress must have intended that charges be dropped when a defendant is committed under section 4246. Ecker demonstrates this clear design by pointing out that two of the three categories of persons covered by section 4246 (those whose sentence is about to expire and those against whom all charges have been dismissed because of mental illness) are no longer subject to punishment and would be released but for the provisions of section 4246. Then Ecker states that it would be strange, indeed, to include in the same statute, without explanation or separate procedures, a group of people still subject to indictment and trial. It is more plausible, he argues, that those defendants subject to section 4246 after being found incompetent under section 4241 would also be subject to release due to the dismissal of the charges. 20 While it is perhaps odd that the statute lacks express procedures for reevaluating the competency of a person committed under section 4246, it would be far more strange for Congress to have intended a statutory requirement that an indictment be dismissed automatically on commitment, yet never mention that requirement in the statute. Again, all that Ecker has done is point to some ambiguities in certain procedural aspects of section 4246, and then attempt to bootstrap those ambiguities into an implied requirement that a pending indictment must be dismissed whenever that statute is invoked. We are not persuaded. 21 As further support for his third argument (that it would be strange if the statute did not require the dismissal of an indictment), Ecker directs us to the statute's legislative history. We are reluctant to take that direction, because a court should resort to legislative history ... [only] when the words of a statute give rise to ambiguity or when they lead to an unreasonable interpretation. United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 297 (1st Cir.1993). The words of the statutes at issue here do neither. In an abundance of caution, however, we have reviewed the legislative history cited by Ecker and find it to contain nothing that would lead us to conclude that Congress intended the statute to require, sub silentio, the dismissal of pending charges. See S.Rep. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3404-36. As the Supreme Court remarked in construing the federal civil commitment statute that preceded the current section 4246, this is a case for applying the canon of construction of the wag who said, when the legislative history is doubtful, go to the statute. Greenwood v. United States, 350 U.S. 366, 374, 76 S.Ct. 410, 415, 100 L.Ed. 412 (1956). 22 As a fourth argument, and as support for the first three, Ecker quotes the Eighth Circuit's opinion in his earlier appeal of his commitment. In rejecting Ecker's argument that it was unreasonable to hold him for nearly four years before committing him under section 4246, the Eighth Circuit stated that: At all times, Ecker remained subject to criminal process calling for a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. He remained subject to possible trial until the final judicial determination of incompetency on April 16, 1993. Ecker, 30 F.3d at 969 (emphasis added). The Eighth Circuit, however, was not concerned with the dismissal or validity of the indictment after Ecker's section 4246 commitment; the issue it faced was the duration of Ecker's detention for determination of competency under section 4241, and whether that lengthy confinement was a due process violation. The Eighth Circuit had no reason to consider whether the indictment remained valid after Ecker was committed under section 4246; if the quoted statement addresses that question at all, it is mere dictum. 23 Finally Ecker points out that the executive branch of the federal government is in a peculiar position because section 4246 requires the Attorney General to make all reasonable efforts to place Ecker in a state institution, but the United States Attorney in Massachusetts is preventing that placement by not dropping the indictment. Ecker adds that the continued validity of the indictment interferes with defendant's statutory right to state placement. This argument invites a number of obvious rejoinders. First, the government has the discretion to solve the dilemma by dismissing the charges. Second, the Attorney General is only required to make reasonable efforts to place Ecker in state care. The Massachusetts policy denying placement of persons under federal indictment prevents Ecker's placement, and we would not conclude (nor does Ecker argue) that it is unreasonable not to drop the charges in order to facilitate placement. Third, while the statute imposes a duty on the Attorney General to attempt to place Ecker with the state, we do not conclude that it endows Ecker with a right to state placement. 24 None of Ecker's statutory arguments persuade us that Congress intended sections 4241 and 4246 to require sub silentio the dismissal of a pending indictment.