Opinion ID: 1149589
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appeal of the District and the Board

Text: The motion to dismiss that was filed by the District and the Board did not specify under which rule the motion was being made. The superior court, however, treated the motion as if it were a motion for summary judgment. [4] Accordingly, we shall review its ruling under the standards applicable to the granting of a motion for summary judgment. The issues to be determined are whether there were genuine issues of material fact and, if not, whether the District and the Board were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Alaska R.Civ.P.; Moore v. State, 553 P.2d 8, 15 (Alaska 1976). In reaching our decision we must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Shatting, the non-moving party. Clabaugh v. Bottcher, 545 P.2d 172, 175 n. 5 (Alaska 1976). Although there is apparently disagreement over whether particular events occurred in Shatting's classroom and whether the District conducted a proper evaluation of Shatting as required by Department of Education regulations, these facts were not material to the superior court's determination of this case. It is only issues of material fact that preclude the granting of a motion for summary judgment. See Carlson v. State, 598 P.2d 969, 972 n. 5 (Alaska 1979). The issues before the superior court were: (1) whether Shatting was entitled to judicial review of the Board's decision not to retain him and (2) whether the Board, on the basis of the information presented to it, acted properly in deciding not to retain Shatting. The material facts pertaining to these two issues were not in dispute. Thus, the only issue left for our determination is whether the Board and the District were entitled to judgment as a matter of law.