Opinion ID: 2521354
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Heading: Subsequent case law construing Johnson waivers

Text: One of the first cases to address the scope and extent of a Johnson waiver was People v. Zuniga (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 739, 166 Cal.Rptr. 549 ( Zuniga ). In that case the defendant, who pled guilty to burglary, received a suspended three-year prison sentence and was placed on probation for three years conditioned on service of one year in the county jail. Defendant, who had been in pretrial custody for 168 days, was given the option of being sentenced to state prison or accepting probation conditioned on the one-year county jail term without credit for the 168 days of presentence confinement. Defendant entered a Johnson waiver, waiving the presentence custody credit and accepting the probationary terms. After serving 156 days of his one-year term, defendant escaped from jail, was recaptured, and pled guilty to escape. Probation was revoked and the previously suspended three-year state prison sentence imposed. He was given credit against his prison term for the 156 days he served prior to his escape from jail, as well as 26 days of work time credit, but not the earlier 168 days of presentence custody covered under the Johnson waiver. On appeal, he sought credit for those days, as well as behavior credits under section 4019. ( Zuniga, at pp. 742-743, 166 Cal.Rptr. 549.) The defendant in Zuniga did not argue his Johnson waiver was not knowing and intelligent in the sense that he did not understand the waiver would apply to any future prison sentence imposed. Rather, he argued the waiver should be held inapplicable given the changed circumstances  that he was going to state prison rather than jail as a condition of probation. The Court of Appeal rejected his argument, explaining: Defendant, in effect, bargained for a probationary sentence by initially waiving the provisions of Penal Code section 2900.5. The court complied and granted defendant the leniency of probation. Defendant now seeks to retract his portion of the bargain on the basis that he now has been removed from probation and sentenced to state prison. His argument appeals to neither logic nor justice. [¶] Probation is a form of leniency which is predicated on the notion that a defendant, by proving his ability to comply with the requirements of the law and certain special conditions imposed upon him, may avoid the more severe sanctions justified by his criminal behavior. Once given the opportunity for lenient treatment the choice is his as to whether he merits being continued on probation. [¶] Here defendant not only refused to comply with his conditions of probation but committed an additional crime in making his choice. He cannot use his own misconduct as a basis for setting aside the waiver which he executed as a condition for obtaining leniency in the first instance  in effect a renegotiation of his sentence on his own terms. ([Citation].) ( Zuniga, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 743, 166 Cal.Rptr. 549, italics added.) Unlike Zuniga, the defendant in Harris, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 717, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891, did argue that his Johnson waiver was not knowing and intelligent in the sense that he did not understand the waiver would apply to any future prison sentence imposed. The defendant in Harris was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon in 1981 and placed on formal probation for four years, a condition of which was that he serve five months in the county jail. On three successive occasions his probation was reinstated after findings that he had absconded in violation of the terms of his probation. In April 1986, after a fourth violation, probation was finally revoked and defendant sentenced to three years in state prison for the underlying conviction. The sentencing court credited defendant with 12 months for the time served in county jail on the third probation violation, plus credit for actual time served and work credits while awaiting judgment and sentence on the fourth violation, but denied any credit for actual time previously waived pursuant to Johnson waivers in order that the defendant could be continued on probation with only additional local jail time. ( Harris, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 719-720, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891.) On appeal, the defendant in Harris contended he should have been awarded credit against his prison sentence for county jail time served prior to his third probation violation because his prior [ Johnson ] waivers of credit for that time were not made with the knowledge that he was also waiving credit against a prison term imposed for a subsequent probation violation. ( Harris, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at p. 721, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891.) The Court of Appeal reviewed the exchanges that took place between defendant, counsel, and the trial court at sentencing for the second and third probation violation hearings when the Johnson waivers were entered. In those colloquies there was no express mention made of the circumstance that the waivers would apply to any future prison sentence that might be imposed if probation was ultimately revoked. The court also reviewed the exchanges that took place at the hearing on the fourth charged probation violation, at which time defendant stated he believed his previous waivers were limited to local jail time, and that he would not have entered those waivers had he known they would apply to a future prison sentence as well. ( Harris, at p. 725, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891.) The Court of Appeal accepted on their face defendant's hindsight representations about his understanding of the earlier entered waivers, indicating that prejudice is apparent by defendant's own representation to the [sentencing] court. ( Ibid. ) Finding that [o]n the record before us, we can only conclude defendant's ` Johnson waivers' were not knowingly and intelligently made ( ibid. ), the Court of Appeal modified the judgment to reflect an award of an additional 29 months, 18 days of credit against defendant's prison sentence. ( Id. at p. 726, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891.) In the instant case, the People concede that the trial court did not expressly advise defendant, in connection with the first Johnson waiver entered both orally and in writing, that the waiver would apply to any state prison sentence imposed if probation was ultimately revoked. On the other hand, the trial court did inform defendant that as of the date of his plea he was waiving  all time credits through today (italics added), and that there would be no immediate state prison in this case. Moreover, the entry of plea form defendant executed by defendant contained a written waiver by which he indicated he was waiving  all credits for jail term served through 10-21-97. (Italics added.) As we have noted, the Court of Appeal below (the same court that decided Harris ) expressly relied on Harris to reverse the judgment in this case and remand to the trial court to recalculate defendant's custody credits. [3] The court further indicated it was rejecting the rationale and holding of Burks, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th 232, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, instead find[ing] Harris to be more persuasive than Burks.  Burks, in contrast to Harris, held that when a defendant agrees to waive custody credits after violating probation, the waived credits may not be recaptured when probation is violated again, unless the agreement expressly reserves that right. In the absence of such a record, custody credits once waived may not be used again. ( Burks, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 234, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698.) The defendant in Burks was originally placed on probation after pleading no contest to a felony charge of stalking. He served one year in county jail as a condition of the grant of probation. After his first violation, he waived credit for the year he had served and was sentenced to an additional 90 days in county jail as a condition of reinstatement of probation. After a second violation, the court reinstated probation without imposing any additional jail time. Upon his third violation, probation was revoked and the defendant sentenced to state prison for three years. He appealed his sentence, contending he was entitled to the credit for time served that he waived when he was sentenced after his first probation violation. Because the sentencing court failed to advise him that his waiver would apply to a future prison term as well as to his county jail time, the defendant claimed his waiver was not knowing and intelligent. ( Burks, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 234, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698.) Observing that the defendant's argument was supported by the holding in Harris, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d 717, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891, the Burks court nonetheless disagreed with Harris and elected to instead follow the earlier rule stated in Zuniga, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d 739, 166 Cal.Rptr. 549, to the effect that a defendant `cannot use his own misconduct as a basis for setting aside the waiver which he executed as a condition for obtaining leniency in the first instance.' ( Burks, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 234, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698, quoting Zuniga, supra, 108 Cal.App.3d at p. 743, 166 Cal.Rptr. 549.) The Burks court explained: The question before us is whether a defendant who is sent to prison after yet another probation violation may regain his waived credits by asserting he did not understand that his credit waiver would apply to a future prison term. In Zuniga, the court rejected the argument that once a defendant is removed from probation, the bargain that got him there may be renegotiated. (108 Cal.App.3d at p. 743, 166 Cal.Rptr. 549.) The theory that a waiver of custody credits may be set aside because the defendant was inadequately informed of its consequences was first developed in Harris. There, the judge conducting the probation violation proceedings followed Zuniga and refused to give the defendant credit against his prison sentence for the time he had waived when sentenced on his second and third probation violations. The Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District decided that consideration must be given to whether the defendant's waiver was `knowingly and intelligently' made. ( Harris, supra, 195 Cal.App.3d at pp. 721-722, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891.) It concluded the defendant `was not made aware of the trap being set for him' when he waived time in order to get a county jail term instead of time in state prison. Therefore, it modified the judgment to restore the previously waived credits. ( Id. at pp. 724-726, 240 Cal.Rptr. 891.) ( Burks, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 235, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698.) The Burks court explained further: In People v. Salazar [(1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1550, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 221], the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One held that a custody credit waiver may be found to have been voluntary and intelligent from the totality of the circumstances, even if the sentencing court failed to follow the `better course' of specifically advising the defendant regarding the scope of his waiver. (29 Cal.App.4th at p. 1554, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 221.) Harris was distinguished on the ground that Salazar had failed to object when the trial court stated his waiver was `for all time and for all purposes,' supporting the inference that Salazar understood the waiver would apply to a future prison term. ( Id. at pp. 1555-1556, 35 Cal.Rptr.2d 221.) ( Burks, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 235, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698.) The Burks court in no uncertain terms made clear that [h]ere, there is nothing in the record to support an inference that Burks knew his waiver applied to state prison time. ( Burks, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 235, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698.) Positing that [i]t might be argued that by insisting on a waiver of more credits than was necessary to comply with the one-year limit on jail commitments, the [sentencing] court must have meant to deprive Burks of credits against a future term of imprisonment, the Burks court answered its own inquiry, However, there is no indication Burks understood this. ( Id. at p. 236, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 698.) On the other hand, the court further observed, there is also no indication Burks thought he would be able to use his credits to reduce a future prison term. ( Ibid. ) Faced with a silent record which did not establish one way or the other whether the defendant understood his Johnson waiver would apply to a future prison sentence if probation was revoked, the Burks court concluded: In this situation, we believe the Harris rule improperly bestows a windfall on a defendant who repeatedly violates probation. Harris permits such a defendant to renegotiate a sentencing bargain that was honored by the court but not by the defendant, the very result that was correctly rejected in Zuniga.  ( Ibid. )