Opinion ID: 2999874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Distinction Between Investigations and

Text: Enforcement Actions The Union’s principal argument against enforcement of the subpoena is that the investigation into Berg’s complaint, and the subpoena issued in furtherance of it, is an investigation into possible violations of Title I and thus beyond the authority conferred upon the Secretary by § 521. In attempting to draw a definitional boundary around the concept of a “Title I violation” as it pertains to the limitation on investigatory power contained in § 521, the Union relies on the statutory language describing the circumstances under which the Secretary is authorized to bring a Title IV enforcement action. Proceeding from this premise, the Union concentrates its argument on whether the October election was “completed” or not. In essence, the Union claims that any possible violation of the LMRDA that is related to an election that is “never completed” is necessarily and exclusively a Title I violation that lies beyond the investigatory power conferred by § 521. To support this position, the Union relies on language in § 483 stating that the civil enforcement action by the Secretary for violations of Title IV shall be the “exclusive” remedy as to an election “already conducted.” Thus, the argument goes, if an election has not been “already conducted,” enforcement power rests exclusively with union members pursuant to Title I, and the Secretary not only has no authority to bring a civil enforcement action seeking nullification of the election results, but also has no authority to investigate pursuant to § 521. The first and principal answer to the Union’s argument is that it confuses the Secretary’s broad power to investigate 8 No. 05-2478 with her more limited authority to bring an action in federal court seeking redress for violations of Title IV of the LMRDA. The present case is not a civil enforcement action, and we need not concern ourselves with whether the remedy of an enforcement suit (hypothetical at this point in the investigation) would properly rest with the Secretary or an individual union member. In the absence of a civil enforcement action, there is no inherent textual reason to resort to § 483, or any other provision of Title IV, as a means to define the limitation on the Secretary’s investigatory power contained in § 521. The present suit is an action for enforcement of a subpoena duces tecum that is, at least at this point, unrelated to any enforcement action that might possibly be brought under §§ 482 and 483.2 Section 521 contains one—and only one—limitation on the Secretary’s power to launch an investigation (including issuing subpoenas), and that limitation excludes possible violations of Title I. Indeed, the power to investigate conferred by § 521 is not limited to Title IV violations, is not limited to elections, and certainly is not limited to elections “already conducted.” It is also not limited to investigations into conduct that could possibly form the basis for a civil enforcement action in federal court. The Union would like us to read the powers of § 521 as coterminous with those of § 482 and hold that a subpoena issued pursuant to § 521 is 2 Because this is not a § 482 enforcement action, we have no occasion to express an opinion as to whether such actions are limited to Title IV violations relating to elections that have been “already conducted.” See 29 U.S.C. § 483. Neither do we express an opinion as to the Union’s implied premise that the October election does not qualify as being “already conducted” for purposes of § 483. Compare McDonough v. Local 825, Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, 470 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 1972), with Crowley v. Local No. 82, Furniture & Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978, 992-93 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984). No. 05-2478 9 valid only if the Secretary simultaneously has statutory authority to bring an action under § 482 stemming from the same conduct. But such a construction would be to render § 521 largely superfluous as redundant of the power to investigate member complaints of Title IV violations conferred by 29 U.S.C. § 482. Instead, § 521 grants the Secretary broad authority to investigate “whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this chapter” (meaning any provision of the LMRDA) other than Title I, regardless of whether a civil action in federal court is expected or even authorized. There is simply nothing in § 521 that requires the Secretary to demonstrate a basis for federal court jurisdiction over a hypothetical Title IV enforcement action in order to commence and pursue an investigation into possible non-Title I violations of the LMRDA. In short, the statutory limitations on an enforcement action pursuant to §§ 482 and 483 are not the measuring stick by which the Secretary’s § 521 power to investigate (and subpoena) is evaluated, and the limiting reference to Title I made in § 521 is not defined by the enforcement power conferred by §§ 482 and 483. The scope of the investigative authority bestowed by 29 U.S.C. § 521 is consequently not limited to elections “already conducted.” Indeed, we note that § 521 expressly extends investigatory power to situations in which any person “is about to” violate any provision of the LMRDA. With respect to the investigation of elections, the quoted language clearly presupposes an incomplete election process, as it would be difficult to envision a situation in which a person “is about to” violate the LMRDA in connection with an election that is fully complete. This distinction between the broad investigatory power conferred by § 521 and the more narrowly circumscribed enforcement power conferred by § 482 has been recognized in the decisions of several of our sister circuits. 10 No. 05-2478 In Marshall v. Stevens People & Friends for Freedom, 669 F.2d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 1981), the Fourth Circuit described the distinction as follows: Congress granted the Secretary broad powers of investigation [in § 521] in order to facilitate enforcement of the Act without resort to unnecessary litigation. Consequently, the Secretary may initiate an investigation without probable cause to believe that the Act has been violated. . . . The Secretary’s administrative powers of investigation have been likened to a grand jury, which unlike a court, ‘does not depend on a case or controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.’ United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43, 70 S. Ct. 357, 363-64, 94 L. Ed. 401 (1950). In Wirtz v. Local 191, International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 321 F.2d 445, 447-48 (2d Cir. 1963), the Second Circuit held that while the Secretary’s power to bring an enforcement action pursuant to § 482 may be limited to those cases in which an individual union member has filed a complaint and done so in compliance with the exhaustion requirements of that section, the power to investigate possible LMRDA violations conferred by § 521 is not so limited. In other words, the Secretary’s investigative power is in no manner restricted to cases in which statutory authority to bring a Title IV enforcement action exists: It may be that some or all of the limitations of [29 U.S.C. § 482], such as the exhaustion of internal remedies, are relevant to the suit which that section authorizes; there is in [29 U.S.C. § 521] no similar limitation on the Secretary’s power to investigate and report. Presumably the Secretary can bring an action only when a complaint has been filed by an No. 05-2478 11 individual member [Section 482]. But he can investigate and report without such a complaint. Id. at 448. A similar conclusion was reached in Holmes v. Donovan, 796 F.2d 173, 178 (6th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted), where the Sixth Circuit held that in the LMRDA: [T]he Secretary was empowered to sue only under specific conditions, but the Secretary was at the same time given broad investigatory powers. See 29 U.S.C. § 521. That power to investigate election complaints has been held not to be subject to the exhaustion requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 482. . . . Furthermore, the Secretary may pursue violations without the issuance of a complaint by a union member. Finally, in Local 57, International Union of Operating Engineers v. Wirtz, 346 F.2d 552, 554 (1st Cir. 1965), the First Circuit explained the enforcement/investigatory distinction as follows: Section 402 [29 U.S.C. § 482] provides for the Secretary’s instituting a court action to set aside an election; his power to do so is conditioned upon the filing of a complaint by an individual union member who has exhausted his internal union remedies. Section 601 [29 U.S.C. § 521], on the other hand, authorizes the Secretary to investigate an election; his power to do so is not conditioned upon receipt of a complaint from an individual member of the union. We perceive no conflict which is created by thus reading Section 601 as permitting the Secretary to investigate in circumstances where he could not bring suit under Section 402. (Emphasis added.) Section 521 thus requires that we focus on whether the Secretary’s subpoena was issued in furtherance of an investigation into a Title I violation, excluded under § 521, not on whether the election was “completed” or voided prior 12 No. 05-2478 to completion. If the investigation is not strictly concerned with a possible Title I violation, then an investigatory subpoena is authorized by the text of 29 U.S.C. § 521, regardless of whether the activity being investigated is related to an election “already conducted” and without regard to the identity of the person or entity that might have authority to bring a hypothetical enforcement action relating to the same conduct.3