Opinion ID: 201989
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evaluation of Douglas' Arguments

Text: 46 Douglas' first theory — that she has shown a question of fact about her overall inability to function in society that prevents her from asserting any legal rights — is easily defeated. On this record, Douglas did function in general and did assert other legal rights. 47 Douglas' stronger argument is her second one-that the McAfee standard should be read in reference to the specific claim made, here of rape, and not to whether she otherwise had an ability to function in society and to protect her other legal rights. There may or may not be support for this view in a sentence in Chasse. That case rejected defendant's argument that the mentally retarded plaintiff was not mentally ill within the meaning of § 853 because she had been married and divorced: Such evidence ... gives no indication that Chasse possessed sufficient competence to comprehend and exercise her legal rights in the circumstances of this case.  580 A.2d at 157 (emphasis added). The phrase may be nothing more than a recognition that one could marry or divorce without necessarily being competent to function or protect one's legal rights. Douglas reads it for more; she focuses on the final phrase — in the circumstances of this case — to help make her argument that only the legal rights at issue in the present case are material for the second prong of the McAfee test. The defendants argue that that would be an unnatural reading of McAfee 11 and at tension with the first prong. In fairness, we think the Maine Law Court has never been asked or resolved the precise question. 48 Nevertheless, the Maine courts have consistently taken a narrow approach to this tolling provision and have consistently focused on the overall ability to function in society. As a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction we have no license to expand Maine law beyond its present limits. See Bucci v. Essex Ins. Co., 393 F.3d 285, 293-95 (1st Cir.2005). Moreover, there is little reason to think the courts of Maine will suddenly shift to a liberal interpretation. Douglas' second theory requires that the overall inability to function portion of the test be minimized. We think Maine law does not permit this. Because Douglas' second theory is premised on a broader view of the tolling provision at issue here than the Maine courts would be willing to recognize, the second theory must also fail. 49 We agree with the district court and the magistrate judge that no reasonable fact finder could conclude that Douglas was incapacitated from bringing her rape claim before 1996 (for the federal claims) or 1998 (for the state claims). One can accept Dr. Schetky's psychiatric testimony that Douglas lacked the emotional and psychological strength to proceed in a lawsuit to address the rapes. Against the evidence of her life as a whole, this assessment is simply not enough to establish the mental illness disability. Douglas remembered the rapes and told other people about them, and thus confronted the rapes in several conversations with others well before 1996. This demonstrates an ability to deal with the fact that she had been raped. That her psychiatrist opined she lacked the strength to take the further step of suing is simply not enough against the entire record of background evidence showing she did function in society to protect herself and her legal rights. Douglas was reasonably self-sufficient throughout the period in question, maintaining employment and paying rent, and hiring counsel twice to protect her rights. She took action to improve her lot by attending AA meetings for a decade and completing two courses of study. Indeed, given Douglas' history, the story of her redeeming her life and becoming responsible is independently praiseworthy. 50 Statutes of limitations serve important purposes, including those of repose and fairness. Maine's allowance for fairness to the mentally ill in its tolling provision simply cannot be stretched so far as to toll Douglas' claim. 51 Given the approach that the Maine courts have taken in the past to Maine's statute, the judgment of dismissal is affirmed. No costs are awarded.