Opinion ID: 1953592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Crampton Standard for Disqualification

Text: Pursuant to Crampton, the question is whether the present situation is one where experience teaches that the probability of actual bias ... is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. 395 Mich. at 351, 235 N.W.2d 352. Analysis of disqualification issues under Crampton requires a case-by-case determination of when the risk of actual bias is too prevalent, so that the constitutional guarantee of a fair trial would be inhibited. As stated in n 33, the constitutional standard for disqualification is not easily met. We stress that it is only through an examination of the four listed scenarios and their concomitant examples that the experience teaches test articulated in Crampton is rendered meaningful. See n 36. We find that Judge Giddings' apparent conflict with the Governor is not a proper basis for disqualification under the test or the scenarios articulated in Crampton. A narrow reading of Crampton leads us to conclude that the facts of this case are unquestionably distinguishable from those situations listed in Crampton. First, Judge Giddings was not the target of personal abuse by a party before him, as was the judge in Mayberry. See part V(B). [50] Rather, the comments were made by the nonparty Governor who at that time was at the height of his campaign for reelection. We find it most unfortunate that Judge Giddings failed to recognize and insulate himself from the political climate in which he was operating at the time. [51] However, it is this Court's belief that with the passage of time, so comes the cooling of tempers and the cooling of rhetoric. What was once a very hot climate surrounding this case has now become considerably cooler. Accordingly, the remarks made some time ago are not likely to resurface. Furthermore, [t]he mere fact that a judge has been subjected to press criticism in connection with a case or a party does not necessarily require the judge's disqualification. Illinois v. Coleman, 168 Ill.2d 509, 541, 214 Ill.Dec. 212, 660 N.E.2d 919 (1995). [52] The Governor is not the department, just as the department is not the Governor. This Court is confident that the department will not be denied a fair trial of this matter. Second, unlike the judge in Johnson, supra, Judge Giddings is not enmeshed in other matters involving the department or other parties to this case. [53] This Court finds that the struggle between the Governor and Judge Giddings does not rise to the level of being enmeshed as set forth in Crampton. See part IV(B). Judicial officers should resist the temptation to enter into public political discussions with candidates for public office. However, this Court recognizes the ability of individual judges to file requests for investigation with the Attorney Grievance Commission pursuant to the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct. [54] Moreover, on the basis of the facts of this case, we understand Judge Giddings' concern regarding the accuracy of the statements made to the press. Cognizant of the fact that the propriety of Judge Giddings' allegedly overbroad media contacts order is not before us, it must be remembered that trial judges are human and they do make mistakes. However, the remedy for mistakes made by trial judges lies in the appellate process, not in motions to disqualify. Therefore, we do not think that Judge Giddings' vigorous attempt to regulate the accuracy of statements made to the press is a sound basis for his disqualification. Additionally, we do not find that Judge Giddings' actions at the September 12, 1994, in-chambers meeting warrant his disqualification. In reaching this conclusion, we choose to defer to the findings of both Judge Giddings and Chief Judge Houk. See pp. 226-228. [55] Particularly, we accept Judge Houk's decision regarding the events that took place during that meeting. This is not only a class action, it is a class action involving a class of prisoners who are proceeding in propria persona. Therefore, the nature of this lawsuit dictates that the judge assume a more active role than he would in ordinary day-to-day civil litigation. Accordingly, we find that Judge Giddings' advice to the plaintiffs appearing in propria persona regarding the structure of their motion was appropriate. This Court is less certain about the propriety of Judge Giddings suggestion that the August 12 letter from the Governor to Attorney General Frank Kelley was an alternative ground for a contempt motion. Nonetheless, defense counsel did not object at that time, nor were any objections made at the hearing following that in-chambers meeting. Each of the events challenged by the department, even when viewed together, do not amount to the judge being enmeshed in other matters to the extent that disqualification is required.