Opinion ID: 2223873
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Murder and Manslaughter Instructions

Text: In his requested jury instructions 10 and 13, Dilger requested that the jury be instructed that, before it could find Dilger guilty of murder, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting under extreme emotional disturbance for which there was reasonable excuse, and that, if the jury had a reasonable doubt as to whether the crime was murder or manslaughter, it had to find manslaughter rather than murder. The trial court refused to give either requested instruction and gave its own, which defined the crimes, stated the elements that must be found, and stated that each element must exist beyond a reasonable doubt. [2] Dilger contends that once he raised evidence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was reasonable excuse, lack of extreme emotional disturbance became an element of the crime of murder that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. In other words, once a defendant raises evidence of extreme emotional disturbance, the State must prove the non-existence of extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury can convict the defendant of murder. The relevant portions of our murder statute, Section 12.1-16-01, N.D.C.C., provide:  12.1-16-01. Murder. A person is guilty of murder, a class AA felony, if he: 1. Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being; 2. Causes the death of another human being under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or       Subsections 1 and 2 shall be inapplicable in the circumstances covered by subsection 2 of section 12.1-16-02. Our manslaughter statute, Section 12.1-16-02, N.D.C.C., provides:  12.1-16-02. Manslaughter. A person is guilty of manslaughter, a class B felony, if he: 1. Recklessly causes the death of another human being; or 2. Causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would be murder, except that he causes the death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse. The reasonableness of the excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a person in his situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be. An emotional disturbance is excusable, within the meaning of this subsection, if it is occasioned by any provocation, event, or situation for which the offender was not culpably responsible. Dilger points to Section 12.1-01-03, N.D. C.C., which provides, in pertinent part, as follows:  12.1-01-03. Proof and presumptions. 1. No person may be convicted of an offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. An accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. The fact that he has been arrested, confined, or charged with the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial. `Element of an offense' means: a. the forbidden conduct; b. the attendant circumstances specified in the definition and grading of the offense; c. the required culpability; d. any required result; and e. the nonexistence of a defense as to which there is evidence in the case sufficient to give rise to a reasonable doubt on the issue.       3. Subsection 1 does not apply to any defense which is explicitly designated an `affirmative defense'. An affirmative defense must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of evidence. He contends that extreme emotional disturbance is an element of the crime under either b or e of Section 12.1-01-03(1). We believe the grading spoken of in subdivision b refers to relative levels of the same offense. One example might be Section 12.1-18-01, in which it is provided that, Kidnaping is a class A felony unless the actor voluntarily releases the victim alive and in a safe place prior to trial, in which case it is a class B felony. Another example is Section 12.1-23-05, N.D.C.C., which grades theft offenses according to the value or nature of the property stolen. Subdivision b does not make the attendant circumstances specified in the definition and grading of one offense an element of another offense. Whether or not extreme emotional disturbance falls within Section 12.1-01-03(1)(e) requires a determination of whether or not extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a defense to a charge of murder, thus requiring the State to prove the nonexistence of extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt before the jury could convict Dilger of the offense of murder. Extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse has not been explicitly designated as a defense, as, for example, lack of criminal responsibility is under Section 12.1-04-03, N.D.C.C., or justification is under Section 12.1-05-01, N.D. C.C., the nonexistence of which must be proved by the State as an element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Section 12.1-01-03(1), N.D.C.C. Clearly, the Legislature could have drafted our murder statute to require the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of an extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse had the Legislature chosen to do so. Recognition of extreme emotional disturbance as a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in order to obtain a conviction. As the United States Supreme Court said in Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 209, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 2326, 53 L.Ed.2d 281, 291 (1977): To recognize at all a mitigating circumstance does not require the State to prove its nonexistence in each case in which the fact is put in issue, if in its judgment this would be too cumbersome, too expensive, and too inaccurate. We conclude that, as extreme emotional disturbance has not been designated as a defense to a charge of murder, the State was not required to prove the nonexistence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was reasonable excuse beyond a reasonable doubt in order for the jury to convict Dilger of murder. The same is true with regard to a charge of manslaughter. An extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse is a mitigating circumstance for the establishment of which the Legislature has prescribed no burden of proof. It is a mitigating circumstance that the jury may consider if evidence of such a condition is raised. While the Legislature has provided no specific burden of proof on the matter, it is certainly true that the prosecution can be expected to endeavor to prove the elements of the highest offense; it will attempt to disprove the mitigating circumstance. Because only the defendant will gain by establishing the mitigating circumstance, he alone will be concerned with showing its existence. State v. Muscatello, 55 Ohio St.2d 201, 378 N.E.2d 738, 740 (1978). Dilger's reference to Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975), is inappropriate. There, malice aforethought was presumed and the defendant could overcome the presumption only by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the act was committed in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation. The instant case involves no presumption against Dilger that he must overcome by a preponderance of the evidence. In light of the foregoing, we next proceed to examine the instructions given the jury on the murder and manslaughter charges. As we stated in State v. Tipler, 316 N.W.2d 97, 100 (N.D.1982): The law governing our review of jury instructions is well established. The instructions must fairly inform the jury of the law that must be applied. A court need not give instructions in the specific language requested by the defendant. State v. Folk, 278 N.W.2d 410, 414 (N.D. 1979). Jury instructions should not mislead or confuse the jury. State v. Jensen [251 N.W.2d 182 (N.D.1977)], supra. `In determining whether a jury instruction is misleading, the instruction as a whole must be considered.' State v. Roquette, 290 N.W.2d 260, 265 (N.D.1980), quoting State v. Erickson, 241 N.W.2d 854, 861 (N.D.1976). The trial court's instruction on murder, noted in footnote 2, supra, correctly instructed the jury. The instruction informed the jury of the elements of the offense charged and informed them that each element must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. It also correctly informed the jury that before it could convict Dilger of murder it must consider whether or not he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable excuse. The trial court's instruction on the offense of manslaughter, noted in footnote 2, supra, incorrectly stated that extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse is an element of the offense of manslaughter that the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. This placed a higher burden upon the State than the statute requires. We recognize, as Dilger has pointed out, that a similar instruction was discussed in State v. Muscatello, supra . The Ohio Supreme Court held the instruction to be impermissible, stating at 378 N.E.2d 738, 740: Because only the defendant will gain by establishing the mitigating circumstance, he alone will be concerned with showing its existence. Therefore, the import of the instant instruction is as if the trial court had instructed the jurors that appellee bore the burden of establishing the presence of the described emotional stress by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. We decline to adopt that reasoning. The instruction given by the trial court in the instant case very clearly, although incorrectly, placed the burden of proving the existence of extreme emotional disturbance beyond a reasonable doubt upon the State. As the trial court's instruction on murder was correct and the error in the manslaughter instruction placed a greater burden upon the State than the statute requires, which redounded to Dilger's benefit, rather than to his prejudice, and of which he therefore cannot complain, we find no error requiring reversal of the judgment. See, State v. Morris, 331 N.W.2d 48, 57 (N.D. 1983), and State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d 826, 847 (N.D.1982). Our view of the murder and manslaughter instructions given renders unnecessary a determination of whether or not the trial court should have instructed the jury that if they had a reasonable doubt as to which crime, murder or manslaughter, was committed, they should convict only of manslaughter.