Opinion ID: 201627
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the challenges to the elements of sentence

Text: 28 Defendants raise on appeal three distinct issues of substance in respect to their sentences: (1) that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and United States v. Booker, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005) require a remand for resentencing in light of the non-mandatory status of the United States Sentencing Guidelines; (2) that the district court committed errors in imposing on Defendant Villafane a condition of supervised release requiring that he submit to searches by his supervising officer while on his term of supervised release; and (3) that the district court erred in the structure of the condition of supervised release imposed on Defendants Pena and Villafane in respect to the frequency of their submission to drug testing. 9
29 The record makes it clear that in determining all of these sentences the district court followed the analytical regime in place before rendition of the decision in Booker. It is to be presumed and it is, in fact, clear from the record that the District Judge considered herself required to determine and impose sentences as established by the Sentencing Guidelines. It is equally clear that in working out the necessary guideline determinations, she made several findings of fact critical to the determination of the extent of the final sentences which were not within the scope of jury findings in determining the guilt of the Defendants and which were not admitted by the Defendants. It is also clear that she made those findings upon application of the preponderance of the evidence standard. 30 There is now no room for doubt that sentences based upon a predicate of mandated compliance with the requirements of the Sentencing Guidelines do not now pass constitutional muster. The sentences imposed on these Defendants do not comply with the holding of Booker in that respect. 31 The Defendants did not, however, object to their sentences on Sixth Amendment grounds in the district court. 11 Because Defendants made no arguments in the district court concerning the constitutionality of the Guidelines or the application of the Guidelines to their sentences under Apprendi, we review only for plain error. 12 See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 76. 13 32 Under the four-part plain error test outlined in Olano, we grant relief only if we find (1) an error, (2) that is plain, and that not only (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights, but also (4) seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 77 (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770). The Defendants bear the burden of persuasion with respect to all four elements of the test. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mercado, 402 F.3d 294, 302 (1st Cir.2005) (citing Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 77). 33 The first two prongs are satisfied here because the district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory at sentencing. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 77. To meet the third prong of the test Defendants must show a reasonable probability that the district court would impose a more favorable sentence to the Defendants under the now advisory Guidelines. Id. at 75. [W]e are inclined not to be overly demanding as to proof of probability where, either in the existing record or by plausible proffer, there is reasonable indication that the district judge might well have reached a different result under advisory guidelines. Heldeman, 402 F.3d at 224; accord United States v. Vega Molina, 407 F.3d 511, 533 (1st Cir.2005). 34 Each Defendant has failed to present us with any argument of substance regarding the probability of a sentence reduction on remand in his case. Rather, they invite us to disregard Antonakopoulos and accept a per se remand rule in every case where a Booker error occurs. They argue that we should presume that the district court would have analyzed the case differently were it not for the mandatory nature of the Guidelines. That position was squarely rejected in Antonakopoulos. 35 We decline the Defendants' invitation to ignore Antonakopoulos. Absent unusual circumstances not present here, panels of this court are bound by prior circuit decisions. See United States v. Rodriguez, 311 F.3d 435, 438-39 (1st Cir. 2002). 14 Because Defendants have entirely failed to advance any viable theory as to how the Booker error prejudiced their substantial rights, 15 and because we find nothing in the record to suggest a basis for such an inference, we deny the requests to remand for Booker -error. Gonzalez-Mercado, 402 F.3d at 303.
36 Pena's contention in respect to a claim of sentencing manipulation must be addressed, however, as it is external to the district court's determination of his sentence. 37 Pena asserts that he is the victim of sentencing factor manipulation because the Government devised and controlled the performance of the sting operation that snared him. 16 We have said that sentencing factor manipulation occurs when a `defendant, although predisposed to commit a minor or lesser offense, is entrapped in committing a greater offense subject to greater punishment.' United States v. Woods, 210 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir.2000) (quoting United States v. Staufer, 38 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir.1994)). We have very recently limned the nature of conduct necessary to establish sentencing factor manipulation. We said: 38 Sentencing factor manipulation occurs where law enforcement agents venture outside the scope of legitimate investigation and engage in extraordinary misconduct that improperly enlarges the scope or scale of the crime. A manipulation claim can be established by showing that the agents overpowered the free will of the defendant and caused him to commit a more serious offense than he was predisposed to commit. 39 United States v. Barbour, 393 F.3d 82, 86 (1st Cir.2004) (internal citations omitted). We have also acknowledged that a sentencing court can depart from the Guidelines and statutory minimums based on sentencing factor manipulation if the Defendant shows that the Government has engaged in extraordinary misconduct in bringing about the commission of the offense. United States v. Montoya, 62 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.1995); United States v. Gibbens, 25 F.3d 28, 31 (1st Cir.1994). 40 We review for clear error the district court's denial of Pena's objection on this point. Gibbens, 25 F.3d at 30. There is no merit to Pena's claim. The evidence shows that the Government afforded Pena an opportunity to commit the crimes of conviction, and that he, being predisposed to do so, readily entered into the criminal acts proposed by the Government: conspiracy, attempt to distribute cocaine, and carrying a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking offense. The Government did not expose Pena to any lesser offense involving a lesser punishment than that applicable to the offenses of his conviction and then later attempt to entice him into more seriously punishable conduct. The Government's sole effort is shown by the evidence to have been to provide an opportunity to Pena to commit the very offenses of which he stands convicted. Accord Vazquez-Guadalupe, 407 F.3d 492, 499. There is no evidence whatsoever that the Government attempted to escalate the seriousness of the conduct involved in the offense as originally proposed. The Government offered an occasion for a single transaction: a drug transport/escort while armed. Pena committed the crime he was predisposed to commit. The criminal conduct was not exacerbated beyond the elements of the baseline offenses in the course of the execution of the offenses by Ortiz nor was the conduct otherwise prolonged. 17 There was no pressure put on Pena, despite his assertions to the contrary at sentencing, to engage in the conduct of which he stands convicted. Further, there is absolutely no evidence in the record of illegitimate motive on the part of Ortiz as an undercover agent or of misconduct in his relations as a Government agent with Pena. The district court's denial of the objection was properly grounded in the record.
41 Two other points involve the question of whether the Court erred in imposing on each of these Defendants two special terms of supervised release. 42 (1) The Search Condition 43 In supplemental briefing on appeal, Villafane has challenged (for the first time) the district court's imposition of a search condition as part of his supervised release requirements. We need not address whether the condition satisfies the requirements of United States v. Giannetta, 909 F.2d 571 (1st Cir.1990). The issue is forfeit, and does not amount to a miscarriage of justice meriting our discretionary review. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 736, 113 S.Ct. 1770. 44 (2) The Drug Treatment Condition 45 Pena asserts on appeal for the first time that the district court erred when it delegated to the Supervisory Probation Officer by the terms of a condition of supervised release the decision to order him to attend a drug treatment program if he failed a drug test. Villafane belatedly joined in the assertion of this claim in his Supplemental Brief of August 18, 2004. 46 Our review of both claims would be for plain error. Here, however, the Government concedes that the imposition of the condition constitutes error under United States v. Melendez-Santana, 353 F.3d 93, 101-02 (1st Cir.2003), and agrees that the challenged drug treatment condition should be vacated and remanded for resentencing. Government's Br. at 48. We accept, in the absence of any objection, the Government's concession. 18 The district court will reconsider the structure of this condition if it is imposed in any new sentence of any Defendant. See United States v. Ayala-Pizarro, 407 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir.2005) (A remand to correct a delegation error as to conditions of supervised release does not open up any other aspect of a sentence for resentencing.).