Opinion ID: 4542320
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Expansion of Grounds for Removal

Text: Under the notice pleading standard, 5 the Petition “contain[ed] sufficient allegations of material facts to inform a defendant of the nature and character” of VSBE’s VFOIA claim. Preferred Systems Solutions, Inc. v. GP Consulting, LLC, 284 Va. 382, 407 (2012); Rule 1:4(d). The language in the Petition specified that on “at least three occasions” the Board met without providing proper notice to the public as required by VFOIA. Appellants do not dispute that the three dates VSBE referred to in the enumerated portions of the Petition were sufficient to have violated VFOIA. Generally, a pleading must state the essential facts and legal claims to notify the defendant of the nature of the case. See generally City of Norfolk v. Vaden, 237 Va. 40, 44 (1989); Bolling v. Acceptance Corporation, 204 Va. 4, 9 (1963) (“The function of pleading is to inform the opposing party of the nature of the case to be made against him.”); see also Rule 1:4(d) and (j). The Petition alleged numerous VFOIA violations since at least April 2018, alleging that “Silvestro and Townes repeatedly failed to follow [VFOIA] open meeting requirements.” Information about these violations were also contained in the 138 pages of exhibits attached to the Petition. 5 As explained in footnote 4, removal proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, which increases the requisite burden of proof but maintains aspects of civil trials such as civil discovery and pleading standards. 16 At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence including: more than three meetings that did not comply with VFOIA; evidence of meeting agendas that were not made available for public inspection; and evidence of meeting minutes not being created or posted on Hopewell’s website. Appellants contend that introducing evidence regarding the meeting agendas and minutes exceeded the allegations in the Petition. We disagree. The Petition and its attached exhibits gave Townes and Silvestro sufficient notice of the scope of the VFOIA violations and “clearly inform[ed them] of the true nature of the claim.” Rule 1:4(d). The Petition specifically stated that on “at least three occasions” the Board had met without proper notice to the public. The Commonwealth then introduced evidence of more than three occasions on which the Board met without proper notice. The allegations in the Petition “clearly inform[ed them]” that the VSBE intended to introduce at least three occasions, if not more, on which Appellants failed to properly notice meetings in compliance with VFOIA. Additionally, the Petition alleged that Townes and Silvestro “repeatedly failed to follow [VFOIA] open meeting requirements.” Code § 2.2-3707 requires that “all meetings of public bodies shall be open,” “[e]very public body shall give notice” of its meetings, “the proposed agenda and all agenda packets . . . shall be made available for public inspection,” and the recordation of minutes “at all open meetings,” which are “deemed public records and subject to the provisions of [Code § 2.2-3707].” The Commonwealth alleged that Townes and Silvestro did not comply with these requirements for open meetings under VFOIA. Therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the presentation of evidence showing the lack of meeting agendas and minutes in addition to the meetings which were held without proper notice. 17