Opinion ID: 1142334
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Prosecutorial Argument and Comments Regarding Victim Impact Evidence

Text: The defendant argues that his conviction and sentence should be reversed due to improper arguments and comments about the victim impact evidence made by the prosecutor during various stages of the trial. First, he complains about the following statement allegedly made by the prosecutor during closing arguments at the sentencing phase: those people out there ... want [Feltus] to get [the death penalty]. Our review of the prosecutor's entire closing argument reveals that no such comment was made. In fact, the record reference given by the defendant in his brief reveals that defense counsel has simply misstated the following portion of the prosecutor's argument: Feltus Taylor on the stand.... He was polite, he answered my questions, and he gave you an opinion. He knows what he did. He gave you an opinion. He said, in a sense, let me tell you ladies and gentlemen of the jury, for what I did, the death penalty is very well justified. I don't blame those people out there for wanting me to get it. In a sense, I don't blame the prosecutor. And I asked him, point blank, if this jury gives you the death penalty that I ask for, would you have anyone to blame but yourself? And he said, no. Because he knows what he did. (Emphasis added.) This argument is without merit. Second, the defendant complains of several additional comments made by the prosecutor in the following portion of his closing argument at the sentencing phase: They put on a lot of witnesses, sympathy witnesses. Used to, under the law, in the death penalty phase, the only thing you could hear would be people begging for the defendant's life, saying good things about him. The law changed very recently. And I was allowed to put on victim impact testimony. I put on three witnesses, Lisa Reeves, who I thought was a very moving witness that showed her grief over the loss of her sister; told you something about her. Her daughter, who took one look at the defendant and openly displayed hostility. And, of course, Jimmy Shatzel, who's engaged to Donna Ponsano, and told you something about her, something about their lives, something about the grief, something about the impact that a person's death has on people. And that's why I say, when you get somebody down and you handcuff them together, and you kill one of them, and you put another in a wheelchair, it doesn't end there. Because the grief of the loss of a loved one will live with these people til they die. They will suffer, they will suffer a loss, they will have problems, and that's one of the reasons that I can stand here with my head high, and tell you without any reservations whatsoever, that the only correct penalty in this case is death. That's part of it. Not because of sympathy, not because they cried up here, but because of the effect that murder has upon the lives of other people, living people. And that was put in the law. You didn't just hear the sympathy witnesses begging for the defendant's life. But they put on some good ones. I'll say something about him, he has friends, he has people that loves him, two of the most delightful ladies I've ever seen in my life, his grandmother, Henrietta, and Willie Mae Brown, two elderly delightful ladies that love him, that in a sense, begged for his life. Some other people, parent, or younger ladies that talked to him and all, these are sympathy witnesses. But you know, there comes a time when you leave your parents, you leave your grandmother, you're thirty years old, and you stand on your own. I'm sorry that the death penalty would hurt these people [referring to the defendant's family and friends], but the fact that other people may get hurt, does not, to me, justify letting him out of the death penalty for what he did on that morning. And for the pain and the suffering that will live until Keith Clark dies, and will live with Donna Ponsano's people until they die. (Emphasis added.) Initially, the defendant argues that the prosecutor's comment that the victim's survivors had cried up there was improper. In another argument, the defendant complains that the prosecutor improperly discussed the testimony of the victim's survivors. The defendant also contends that prosecutorial comments about Clark's injuries and suffering were improper. This Court has stated, as a general matter, that a prosecutor retains considerable latitude in making closing arguments. State v. Byrne, 483 So.2d 564 (La.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 871, 107 S.Ct. 243, 93 L.Ed.2d 168 (1986); State v. Morris, 404 So.2d 1186 (La. 1981). Even when we have found that a prosecutor has exceeded that latitude, the Court has often criticized the improper arguments without finding that they constitute reversible error. See, e.g., Byrne, supra; State v. Jarman, 445 So.2d 1184 (La.1984); State v. Messer, 408 So.2d 1354 (La.1982). Specifically, this Court will not overturn a guilty verdict on the basis of improper argument unless we are firmly convinced that the jury was influenced by the remarks and that they contributed to the verdict. State v. Bates, 495 So.2d 1262, 1273 (La.1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1042, 107 S.Ct. 1986, 95 L.Ed.2d 826 (1987); Byrne, 483 So.2d at 572; Messer, 408 So.2d at 1357. After reviewing these statements, in context and alone, we are not firmly convinced that the jury was influenced by them and that they contributed to the verdict. These arguments are without merit. Third, the defendant complains about the following two prosecutorial comments made about Clark during the state's opening statement at the guilt phase: [O]n the day of the crime, March 27th, 1991, Keith Clark was thirty-four years old. He was married. He had two children. He had worked at a number of places in Baton Rouge. He had worked at Hancock Bank. He had worked at the Village. He worked at Pancho's. He had worked in the food service industry mostly except that he worked at a bank, that he was in good health.       We'll show you that Keith Clark, they'll tell you that he probably should be dead, that he is aI won't say a walking miracle, but it is a miracle that he's here. We'll show you that he's had to go through months of physical therapy in Nu-Medico and other places, that now he lives and his parents help take care of him while his wife works and tries to support their children. We'll show you that he's an upbeat man and tends to overcome his now permanent handicaps. The defendant argues that these comments were improper because they inappropriately place the focus upon Clark, who was not the murder victim in this case. We conclude that these comments do not violate the wide latitude given to prosecutors, and note that defense counsel failed to object to the complained of comments as required by La.Code Crim.P. art. 841. This argument is without merit. Fourth, the defendant complains that the prosecutor gave detailed descriptions of the victim during his opening statement at the guilt phase and during his closing statement at the penalty phase. According to the defendant, this, in combination with the following comment made during closing arguments at the sentencing phase, was prejudicial and improper: He's the person that put you in the position where to do anything else would deprecate this crime. It would deprecate the pain and suffering of these victims. It would deprecate their memory. It would be a shame and a disgrace, and I ask you not to do it. I ask you to come in this court, please, stand tall, don't apologize. Tell him we've considered everything. We've considered your mitigating circumstances, and for you, Mr. Taylor, for what you've did, yourself, for what you made yourself deserve, we give you the death penalty. It's the right thing to do. It's a decision that you'll never look back on. And I tell you, my opinion, and I'll respect whatever you do, but anything else would be a disgrace. (Emphasis added.) The emphasized portion of this argument treads dangerously close to reversible error, and we caution this prosecutor to refrain from such conduct in the future. Nevertheless, we find that this statement does not warrant reversal of the sentence under current harmless error standards. Johnson, 94-1379 at p. 14, 664 So.2d at 100, citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). Before this Court will reverse a conviction or sentence on the ground of improper closing argument, it must be thoroughly convinced that the remarks influenced the jury and contributed to the verdict. Bates, 495 So.2d at 1273 (La.1986); Byrne, 483 So.2d at 572; Messer, 408 So.2d at 1357. In light of the deference given to the good sensibility and fairmindedness of juries, State v. Martin, supra , and after viewing the comments as a whole, [10] we find that the statement did not influence the jury and contribute to the verdict. See and compare, State v. Martin, supra ; State v. Bates, supra ; and State v. Monroe, 397 So.2d 1258, 1270-71 (La.1981), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1229, 103 S.Ct. 3571, 77 L.Ed.2d 1411 (1983). We find no reversible error.