Opinion ID: 3021079
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Provide Sufficient Warning Devices

Text: Under Pennsylvania law, a railroad owes a duty to adopt a “reasonably safe and effective mode, commensurate with the danger at the crossing,” of warning travelers of an approaching train. McGlinchey v. Baker, 356 F. Supp. 1134, 1142 (E.D. Pa. 1973). A plaintiff need not demonstrate “unusual, peculiar and extra hazardous conditions,” Bouchard, 2005 WL 2266593, at  (citing Yolton v. Pa. R.R. Co., 84 A.2d 501 (Pa. 1951)), to prove that a railroad should have provided additional warning signals.4 Rather, the issue is 4 The rule that the District Court applied, that plaintiff bears the burden “to show unusual, peculiar and extra hazardous conditions at the crossing for the railroad to be charged with the duty of providing additional warning devices,” Bouchard, 2005 WL 2266593, at , does not fit the facts of this case. That rule applies in cases where the injured party ran into a train that was already in the crossing. See Yolton, 84 A.2d at 503; Wink v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 176 A. 760, 761-62 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1935). It does not apply where, as here, the injured party was struck by an approaching train. 10 whether, under the circumstances described, taking into consideration the physical conditions of the crossing, the extent of its use by the public, the nature of the surroundings, the speed of the train, and other matters tending to show exceptional dangers incident to the particular locality, [the railroad] performed [its] duty toward persons using the highway. Cummings v. Pa. R.R. Co., 151 A. 590, 591 (Pa. 1930). See also Strozyk v. Norfolk So. Corp., 358 F.3d 268, 277 (3d Cir. 2004) (railroad’s duty of care is “heavily factcontingent, with all conditions being relevant”). Although “[t]he general rule is that there is no common-law duty on the part of a railroad company to place . . . safety gates at a crossing,” the fact finder may consider the absence of gates “in determining whether or not under all the circumstances the railroad was negligent at the time the accident happened.” Cummings, 151 A. at 591. The question of whether a railroad has fulfilled this duty “present[s] a classic jury question,” such that a trial court, in most cases, is “unjustified in removing any aspect of the case from the jury’s consideration.” McGlinchey, 356 F. Supp. at 1139. Bouchard has introduced more than enough evidence to reach the jury on this issue. The record before the District Court included an expert report that opined: The Juniper Street crossing fits several specific generally accepted criteria for the installation of gates, including its status as a multiple-track crossing subject to sight obstructions caused by adjacent structures and trains on other tracks, a crossing over which hazardous materials vehicles operate, a bike path crosses, and a crossing with a high number of daily train movements. Bouchard also proffered the testimony of two witnesses that the Juniper Street crossing was guarded by gates at some point, probably in the late 1970s or early 1980s. This evidence, which the District Court improperly disregarded, at least raises a genuine issue 11 of material fact as to whether CSX fulfilled its obligation to provide a “reasonably safe and effective mode” of warning travelers of the danger of approaching trains at the Juniper Street crossing.