Opinion ID: 172252
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Byrum Failed to Establish a Fair and Just Reason to Withdraw His Plea

Text: Having found the court accepted the guilty plea, the remaining question is whether Byrum presented a fair and just reason to withdraw his plea as required by Rule 11. Byrum contends that even if we determine the district court accepted his guilty plea, the court abused its discretion in refusing to permit him to withdraw his plea. In particular, he claims that although he pleaded guilty and allocuted under oath to the facts of his crimes, the district court erred in failing to recognize his later protestations of innocence. He further alleges that his guilty plea resulted from misrepresentations by his court-appointed counsel. Finally, he contends he should have been permitted to obtain new counsel and that the district court should have held a full hearing on the issue. We review the district court's denial of motion to withdraw a guilty plea for an abuse of discretion. Sandoval, 390 F.3d at 1297. When a defendant moves to withdraw a guilty pleaafter its acceptance by the district court but prior to sentencingthe court must assess whether there is a fair and just reason for withdrawal. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(d)(2)(B). The court should consider the following factors: (1) whether the defendant has asserted his innocence; (2) whether withdrawal would prejudice the government; (3) whether the defendant delayed in filing his motion, and if so, the reason for the delay; (4) whether withdrawal would substantially inconvenience the court; (5) whether close assistance of counsel was available to the defendant; (6) whether the plea was knowing and voluntary; and (7) whether the withdrawal would waste judicial resources. United States v. Yazzie, 407 F.3d 1139, 1142 (10th Cir.2005). Here, the district court determined that Byrum's motion, filed after it had performed a thorough Rule 11 colloquy, after Byrum had admitted the facts underlying his offense, and after both parties had negotiated and entered into a plea agreement, would be pointless. R., Vol. III at 4. Essentially, the court concluded Byrum asserted no grounds permitting withdrawal of his guilty plea. We agree for the following reasons. First, although Byrum asserted his innocence in his letter immediately preceding the August 29 sentencing hearing, he did not raise any doubts as to his knowing and voluntary admission of guilt at the earlier plea colloquy. Even on appeal he does not disclaim his admissions of guilt at the plea colloquy. While an assertion of innocence may, in some cases, satisfy the first Yazzie factor, the mere assertion of a legal defense is insufficient; the defendant must present a credible claim of legal innocence. United States v. Hamilton, 510 F.3d 1209, 1214 (10th Cir.2007); see also United States v. Hickok, 907 F.2d 983, 985 n. 2 (10th Cir.1990) ([T]he assertion of a defendant's subjective belief in his own innocence does not mandate allowing him to withdraw his plea of guilty. (quotation and alteration omitted)). Byrum failed to make [any] factual argument that supports a legally cognizable defense. See Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1214. Byrum's change of heart, without more, is not sufficient to swing this factor in his favor. See Hickok, 907 F.2d at 986. Second, despite Byrum's attempt to fashion a conflict with his court-appointed counsel, his own testimony at the plea colloquy belies this assertion. Byrum claims that his appointed counsel misrepresented the merits of his case and later refused to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea. But both in his letter to the district court and now on appeal, Byrum fails to identify any meritorious defense he would have raised but for his attorney's alleged misrepresentations. Rather, we are faced with a record where Byrum expressed satisfaction with his counsel's services: [Court]: Have you told [your appointed counsel] all that you think he needs to know to counsel and assist you in this case? [Byrum]: As far as I know, Your Honor. [Court]: Are you satisfied with his services? [Byrum]: Yes, Your Honor. R., Vol. II at 7. The district court even noted that if it were to rank Byrum's counsel, his counsel is certainly one of the top of the effective and competent and persuasive counsel on behalf of defendants. R., Vol. III at 4; see United States v. Siedlik, 231 F.3d 744, 750 (10th Cir.2000) (upholding a district court's refusal to permit the defendant to withdraw his guilty plea in part because the defendant was represented by a skilled and respected counsel through the plea negotiations and because the defendant had himself testified to satisfaction with counsel). Finally, we disagree with Byrum's contention that the district court abused its discretion by failing to specifically address the remaining Yazzie factors or hold a hearing on the issue. We have previously held that a court need not address the prejudice to the government, the timing of the defendant's motion, the inconvenience to the court, or the waste of judicial resources factors unless the defendant establishes a fair and just reason for withdrawing his guilty plea in the first instance. Hamilton, 510 F.3d at 1217. Because Byrum has not established a fair and just reason for withdrawal of his plea, he has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. See id. In sum, the district court did not err in accepting Byrum's guilty plea and then refusing to let him withdraw it.