Opinion ID: 774813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: There was sufficient evidence of a drug conspiracy.

Text: 62 All of the appellants assert that because the government failed to establish a drug conspiracy, the district court should have granted their motions for acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 29. We review the denial of these motions de novo, applying the same standard as the district court. United States v. Ferguson, 211 F.3d 878, 882 (5th Cir.2000). The question is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational jury could have found that the crimes were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 63 A drug conspiracy requires proof that 1) an agreement existed to violate drug laws; 2) the appellants knew of the agreement; and 3) the appellants voluntarily participated in it. United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 853 (5th Cir.1997). A jury may infer these elements from circumstantial evidence. Id. While mere association with conspirators is insufficient to prove knowing participation in an agreement, it may combine with other circumstantial evidence to support a conspiracy conviction. United States v. Cortinae, 142 F.3d 242, 249 (5th Cir.1998). 64 The appellants argue that the government failed to satisfy the first element because there was no direct evidence of an agreement. At best, the evidence demonstrated that many of them knew each other and sold drugs in the same neighborhood. Although some of them bought drugs from each other, there was no evidence that any of the appellants was fronting drugs for others to sell. Indeed, Thompkins testified that he was unaware of any agreement among the appellants. 65 In United States v. Brown, the government presented evidence at trial that three defendants supplied crack to other defendants selling drugs in a small neighborhood. 217 F.3d 247, 254-55 (5th Cir.2000), remanded on other grounds, Randle v. United States, 121 S. Ct 1072 (2001). This court rejected arguments that the defendants only bought and sold drugs individually. It concluded that the evidence of an open-air market for crack was sufficient to support the defendants' conspiracy convictions. Brown, 217 F.3d at 255. The court noted that the defendants shared a motive to profit from drug sales, and they depended upon each other because they warned each other of police activity. Id. at 254-55. 66 The evidence in this case is substantially similar to the evidence in Brown. The police repeatedly arrested most of the appellants for selling drugs in a small area. Witnesses testified that a few of the appellants provided drugs to the others. Parker interrupted a drug sale to an undercover agent. Thus, there is evidence that the appellants shared a motive to profit from an open air drug market and helped protect each other from the police. This was sufficient to establish an agreement in Brown. 67 There was considerable other evidence of an agreement, moreover. Witnesses testified that the appellants were one of two groups of drug dealers operating in the area. Some of the appellants styled themselves as Seventh Ward Hardheads or Soljuas; one of them admitted to membership in a Seventh Ward Soldiers drug gang. Finally, many of the appellants responded to the murders of their friends with killing sprees against the rival group of drug dealers. In the face of this evidence, a rational jury could reasonably have found that an agreement existed among the appellants. 68 The appellants' arguments do not convince us otherwise. Despite Thompkins's asserted ignorance of an agreement, the jury could have discredited this part of his testimony and found from the other evidence that a conspiracy existed. Nor did the government have to establish fronting to establish a conspiracy. There is no indication in Brown that this court relied on or required evidence of fronting to find a conspiracy. The inquiry is simple: could the jury reasonably conclude from the circumstantial evidence that an agreement existed among the appellants to distribute drugs? On this record, it could. 69 There is also sufficient evidence that all of the appellants knew of and participated in this agreement to operate an open-air drug market. 7 Witnesses testified that Frank, Franklin, Parker, and Schexnayder bought drugs from Baptiste or Jones, and that all six men sold drugs on the same street. Baptiste, Frank, Jones, and Parker collaborated in shooting the gang's enemies, reinforcing their complicity in the conspiracy. United States v. Tolliver, 61 F.3d 1189, 1214 (5th Cir.1995) (tying defendants to a conspiracy based on their attacks against a rival drug gang). 70 Finally, Franklin and Schexnayder took actions in the group's interest beyond purchasing drugs from Baptiste and Jones. Franklin stopped a dealer on Dorgenois Street from selling drugs to an undercover agent. Schexnayder acted as a source of drugs for Thompkins, an alleged conspiracy member. Based on the evidence, a jury could reasonably have found all the elements of a conspiracy satisfied with respect to these six appellants. 71