Opinion ID: 2633286
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Retention of Juror

Text: Defendant contends the trial court improperly retained Juror R. during deliberations despite time conflicts that placed pressure on the jury to reach a verdict.
On Wednesday, September 1, 1993, approximately 30 minutes after jury deliberations commenced, the jury returned to the courtroom. Juror R. informed the trial court that he intended to start a two-week vacation on Friday. The trial court informed the juror that travel commitments were not a legal cause to excuse him from jury duty. The trial court then told Juror R. that he could be excused if he were to experience a financial hardship. Juror R. stated he would not permit his vacation plans to affect his deliberations. The trial court admonished the jury to resume its deliberations. The court declined counsel's request to remove Juror R. The jury deliberated until 4:00 p.m. On Thursday, prior to the readback of certain testimony at the jury's request, the trial court made further inquiry into Juror R.'s travel plans. Juror R. stated he made arrangements to begin his vacation on Saturday. If the jury did not reach a verdict before Saturday, he intended to claim a financial hardship based on the prepaid costs of his vacation. Juror R. assured the court that his vacation plans would not affect his deliberations. No juror indicated that his or her deliberations would be affected by Juror R.'s vacation plans. The jury deliberated until 4:15 p.m. On Friday, at 3:00 p.m., the court and counsel conferred to discuss Juror R.'s status. Defense counsel asked the court to excuse Juror R., substitute an alternate juror in his place, and commence deliberations anew immediately, rather than on Tuesday. The prosecutor noted the time and argued that nothing would be gained by permitting the jury to commence deliberations anew for one hour rather than allowing Juror R. to continue deliberating with the jury until the end of the day and substitute an alternate juror at that time, if needed. Trial counsel complained that there was a subconscious coercion by permitting Juror R. to remain on the jury. The trial court stated that it saw no risk of coercion and that it preferred the original 12 jurors render the penalty verdict. It was reluctant to disturb the composition of the original jury except in those instances where I find a risk to a fair and impartial outcome or a hardship on a juror. The court brought the jury into the courtroom and informed them that Juror R.'s status remained the same. The court stated that if the jury could not reach a verdict by the end of the day, it would excuse Juror R. and an alternate juror would be substituted in his place. The court admonished the jury that Juror R.'s situation should not affect their deliberations. No juror indicated that it would. Approximately one hour later, the jury returned its death verdict.
Penal Code section 1089 provides in relevant part that If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, . . . a juror requests a discharge and good cause appears therefore, the court may order the juror to be discharged and draw the name of an alternate, who shall then take a place in the jury box. . . . A trial court's ruling whether to discharge a juror for good cause under section 1089 is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 596, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976 P.2d 683; People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 989, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) The juror's inability to perform the functions of a juror must appear in the record as a demonstrable reality and will not be presumed. ( People v. Lucas, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 489, 48 Cal.Rptr.2d 525, 907 P.2d 373.) The trial court's finding whether good cause exists will be upheld on appeal if substantial evidence supports it. ( Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 975, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) Here, based on our review of he record, we conclude the trial court properly retained Juror R. during the penalty phase deliberations. Juror R. unequivocally stated he would vote for the penalty he thought was appropriate without regard to his vacation plans. Our review of the record finds nothing to suggest he was unable to function as a juror. The trial court, moreover, was in the best position to observe Juror R.'s demeanor. ( People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 989, 39 Cal. Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) The record also does not indicate that any other juror was affected by Juror R.'s vacation plans or that the jury was coerced into rendering its verdict. The trial court asked the jurors twice whether Juror R.'s vacation plans would affect their deliberations and on both occasions received no affirmative response from any juror. It also made clear to the jury, including Juror R., that if it did not reach a verdict, it would remove Juror R. to permit him to go on his vacation. Thus, the jury knew that Juror R. would have his vacation whether or not it reached a verdict. Defendant's assertion that the jury would hasten its deliberations to accommodate Juror R.'s vacation plans finds no support in the record. Finally, we reject defendant's contention that the trial court insufficiently questioned the jury to ascertain the effect of Juror R.'s vacation plans, if any, on its deliberations. The trial court retains discretion about what procedures to employ, including conducting a hearing or detailed inquiry, when determining whether to discharge a juror. ( People v. Beeler, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 989, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) We discern no abuse of discretion in the manner the trial court conducted its inquiry of the jury.