Opinion ID: 201642
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claims Based on Actions By Executive to Implement Law 94

Text: 34 The plaintiffs also seek damages for the actions taken by Governor Calderón, Miranda-Rodriguez (Governor Calderon's Chief of Staff), and Charriez to implement the new legislation: the naming of a new Chairman and new Commissioners, the notice to the plaintiffs that their positions had been eliminated, and the consequent termination of their employment. 35 The actions by the executive officials (including the governor) taken to implement legislation are not shielded by legislative immunity. Under Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974), these implementation actions (as opposed to the governor's signing the law) should be evaluated under the qualified immunity doctrine, rather than under legislative immunity. Id. at 247-48, 94 S.Ct. 1683. The district court properly did so. 36 This circuit usually evaluates qualified immunity claims under a three-part test. See, e.g., Riverdale Mills Corp. v. Pimpare, 392 F.3d 55, 60-61 (1st Cir.2004). The first part of the test asks: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? Id. at 61 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the second stage, the question is whether the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation such that a reasonable officer would be on notice that his conduct was unlawful. Id. (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). And in the last stage, we ask whether a reasonable officer, similarly situated, would understand that the challenged conduct violated the clearly established right at issue. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 37 As we ordinarily must do, we start first with the question of whether the plaintiffs have stated a claim for violation of the First Amendment at all. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 150 L.Ed.2d 272 (2001). We conclude they have not. 38 Under the plain language of Law 94, the Governor was entitled to appoint a Chairman of the Commission. The First Amendment did not require the Governor to make her choice from the existing twenty-five Commissioners. The same is true of the appointment of the other three Commissioners. 39 The claim concerning termination of the plaintiffs' employment, on different facts, could come out differently. If the plaintiffs had argued that the defendants had selectively replaced some of the previous Commissioners, but not others, using political affiliation as the criteria, the plaintiffs may have stated a claim. See Acevedo-Garcia, 204 F.3d at 10-11; Rutan, 497 U.S. at 65-66, 110 S.Ct. 2729. But the plaintiffs have made no such claim; instead, the pleadings show that all Commissioners were terminated on the same neutral principle: that Law 94 eliminated the positions of all twenty-five previous Commissioners. 40 Whether the articulated neutral principle—that the statute eliminated the positions—is correct or not may raise a question of Puerto Rico law, but it does not state a First Amendment claim. There is no claim based on the First Amendment for disparate impact based on the political affiliation doctrine because [i]t is in the nature of a change in administration that job actions by the new party in power will have a disparate impact on members of the outgoing party. Sanchez-Lopez v. Fuentes-Pujols, 375 F.3d 121, 140 (1st Cir. 2004). To put it differently, even if under Puerto Rico law the plaintiffs turn out to have some sort of tenure, they still have no First Amendment claim. All Commissioners' positions were eliminated on the basis that there was no such tenure; therefore, there was no discrimination.