Opinion ID: 30756
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Proximity of Object to Employees.

Text: 19 The argument that constructive knowledge can be inferred from the close physical proximity of an unreasonable risk to the employees of a premises owner was recently rejected by the Texas Supreme Court in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Reece. 10 In that case, a Wal-Mart employee walked directly past a puddle of liquid on the floor, but did not notice the liquid until after the plaintiff had slipped on it and fallen. The plaintiff maintained that Wal-Mart had constructive knowledge by virtue of the employee's propinquity to the puddle, despite the employee's undisputed lack of actual knowledge of the liquid's presence. Wal-Mart argued that, as none of its employees knew of the spill, the plaintiff failed to bear her burden of proving knowledge, constructive or actual, on the part of a premises owner. The plaintiff in Reece did not adduce any evidence of what caused the spill or — more importantly — how long prior to her slip and fall the spill had occurred. The jury found in the plaintiff's favor, and the Texas appellate court affirmed the verdict based solely on the proposition that the Wal-Mart employee's proximity to the puddle satisfied the element of Wal-Mart's constructive knowledge of the puddle's existence. 20 In the Texas Supreme Court, Wal-Mart insisted that alone an employee's proximity to a hazard cannot establish constructive knowledge. Wal-Mart argued that such a rule would (1) require omniscience of a premises owner, (2) not a provide premises owner with a fair opportunity to inspect, correct, or warn invitees of the risk, and (3) impose constructive knowledge instantly, at the moment a hazard is created, and thus make a premises owner a de facto insurer of invitees' safety. 11 The Texas Supreme Court agreed with all of Wal-Mart's arguments, reversed the trial court and the intermediate appellate court, and rendered a take-nothing judgment against the plaintiff. 12 In so doing, the Reece court announced the rule that proximity evidence alone is insufficient to establish constructive notice absent some indication that the hazard existed long enough to give the premises owner a reasonable opportunity to discover it. 13 21 Reece further establishes that physical proximity evidence is relevant only in case-by-case determinations of constructive knowledge based on the length of time that the risk has been present. A plaintiff might be able to show, for instance, that a shorter presence is required to establish constructive knowledge for a conspicuous hazard that is near a premises owner's employees than for an inconspicuous hazard that is remote from such employees. 14 Still, the rule in Texas is that temporal evidence, not proximity evidence, is the sine qua non of a premises owner's constructive knowledge. 15 22 Dixon argued before the district court that Wal-Mart's motion for judgment as a matter of law should be rejected because the accident happened two feet from a cashier. She did not argue that this is only an additional factor for determining the reasonableness of Wal-Mart's constructive knowledge based on her temporal evidence. Neither did she adduce any evidence at trial of the conspicuousness of the plastic binder on the floor. She argued only that the plastic binder's proximity to Wal-Mart employees serves as an independent basis for finding that Wal-Mart had constructive knowledge of the plastic binder's presence on the floor. Yet, Reece mandates the conclusion that the accident's occurrence just two feet from a cashier is, by itself, nondeterminative of Wal-Mart's constructive knowledge. Thus, Dixon's proximity argument and her reliance on proximity evidence fails the legal standard under Texas law for determining a premises owner's constructive knowledge.