Opinion ID: 2521384
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Full Fiscal Year Disclosure Required in Ballot Title

Text: Cacioppo's first claim alleges that because the ballot issue proposed a phased-in tax increase, article X, section 20, clause (3)(c) of the Colorado Constitution required the ballot titles submission clause to disclose the final... full fiscal year dollar increase instead of the first ... full fiscal year dollar increase. Because the trial court concluded that this claim related to the substance of the ballot issue and not the form or content of the ballot title, it heard evidence on this matter. Because it determined that the tax increase was not a phased-in tax increase, it ruled in favor of the District on the merits. While we do not specifically take issue with the trial court's conclusion, we conclude that the claim involved only the form or content of the ballot title and, therefore, that it was not appropriate for the court to hear evidence on the claim outside the five-day limitation of section 1-11-203.5. As noted above, clause (3)(c) of article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution states that [b]allot titles for tax or bonded debt increases shall begin, SHALL (DISTRICT) TAXES BE INCREASED (first, or if phased in, final, full fiscal year dollar increase) ANNUALLY ...? Thus, for all tax increases except those that are phased-in, the taxes first full fiscal year dollar increase is required to be in the ballot title; for a phased-in tax, the final full fiscal year dollar increase. The District's ballot title asked voters, SHALL THE EAGLE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT RE-50J TAXES BE INCREASED $3,115,827 ANNUALLY AND BY SUCH AMOUNTS AS ARE RAISED THEREAFTER BY THE IMPOSITION OF A MILL LEVY WITHOUT LIMITATION AS TO AMOUNT OR RATE ... AS PROVIDED BY LAW ... ? Cacioppo argued that the tax increase was phased-in. The District countered that the ballot issue called for an increase of $3,115,827 for the first year and that any increase thereafter was limited by statute. The trial court heard expert testimony concerning the nature and definition of a so-called phased-in tax as well as testimony relating to the District's intent regarding the tax and concluded that because there were no set incremental increases to be phased-in by the Districtrather, increases, if any, are determined by statutory formulathat the ballot title was appropriately worded. The trial court's inquiry into the matter, though untimely, is the kind of proceeding contemplated by section 1-11-203.5. First, the claim clearly involves the form or content of the ballot title. Indeed, the pertinent language of Colorado Constitution, article X, section 20, clause 3(c) refers only to the wording and order of the ballot title and not to the substance of what voters can approve. Cacioppo does not dispute that the District could have asked voters to approve a phased-in tax in any certain amount, only that it proceeded to do so in an illegal fashion. Second, the trial court heard evidence about the tax increase and concluded that it did not constitute a phased-in tax. Thus, had the trial court concluded the tax increase was phased-in, it had evidence at its disposal to allow it to accurately reform and reword the ballot title to conform to clause 3(c) of article X, section 20 of the Colorado Constitution; the court could have replaced the $3,115,827 figure with the figure for the final full fiscal year increase. Because this type of inquiry lends itself to the summary adjudication provided in section 1-11-203.5, the claim did not involve the substantive limits of the ballot issue itself. In summary, because Cacioppo's first claim alleged a form or content defect with the ballot title and because the alleged defect could have been corrected by the trial court following a summary adjudication under section 1-11-203.5, the claim was required by section 1-11-203.5 to be brought within five days of the District's setting of the ballot title. Because it was not, and because Cacioppo has failed to show any cause why it was not, we conclude that the claim was time-barred by section 1-11-203.5. See City of Glendale v. Buchanan, 195 Colo. 267, 578 P.2d 221, 223-24 (1978) (noting that where the general assembly has provided procedures for challenging [a] ballot title prior to elections, invalidating an election on that basis would be costly and disruptive, and cannot be justified unless good cause is shown why no challenge was made before the election) (internal citations omitted).