Opinion ID: 1233857
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Heading: Open Court Provision of Idaho Constitution

Text: Olsen contends that Idaho's statute of repose, notwithstanding its rebuttable presumption provision, effectively blocks free access to the courts as guaranteed by Idaho Constitution art. 1, § 18, commonly referred to as the open courts provision. § 18. Justice to be freely and speedily administered.  Courts of justice shall be open to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person, property or character, and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay or prejudice. ID CONST. art. 1, § 18. Olsen asserts that this article of the Constitution prohibits the legislature from abolishing a right of action existing at common law without substituting some other means for redress. At the outset, we again observe that the legislature clearly has the power to abolish or modify common law rights and remedies. Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977). A statute placing limitations on remedies does not contradict the provision of the Idaho Constitution that courts of justice shall be open to every person and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury of person. Id. In Jones, this Court stated: The legislature may at any time by a legislative act repeal any part of the common law either expressly or by passage of an act inconsistent therewith on any particular subject. Vogts v. Guerrette, 142 Colo. 527, 351 P.2d 851, 865 (1960). In Cummings v. J.R. Simplot Co., 95 Idaho 465, 511 P.2d 282 (1973), a statute was held constitutional which provided that the time for making a claim for an industrial injury should commence to run from the date of the accident, not from the date of manifestation of compensable injuries, even though the statute acted to preclude recovery for a particular claimant or group of claimants. It is well established that the open courts provision governing access to courts of justice does not prohibit the legislature from abolishing or modifying a common-law right of action. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg. Corp. v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19, 644 P.2d 341 (1982); Jones v. State Bd. of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914, 97 S.Ct. 2173, 53 L.Ed.2d 223 (1977). The principle which allows the legislature to modify the rules of the common law is not a recent change in the law of this jurisdiction. In Moon v. Bullock, 65 Idaho 594, 151 P.2d 765 (1944), the Supreme Court stated, [W]e must recognize that it is the province of the Legislature, and not of the court, to modify the rules of the common law. 65 Idaho at 607, 151 P.2d at 771. This principle certainly is not unique to Idaho. In Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 101 S.Ct. 715, 66 L.Ed.2d 659 (1981), the United States Supreme Court stated: The Minnesota Supreme Court may be correct that the act is not a sensible means of conserving energy. But we reiterate that it is up to the legislatures, not courts, to decide on the wisdom and utility of legislation. 101 S.Ct. at 726. Olsen urges this Court to follow the decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985), which held a similar statute unconstitutional where there is no substitute or alternative remedy provided. The Utah court held abrogation of the remedy or cause of action may be justified under the open courts provision of the Constitution only if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving the objective. [9] Unlike Idaho's statute of repose, the Utah statute was absolute and barred all legal actions for death, personal injury, or damage to property caused by a defective product, if the action is filed more than six years after the date of first sale for use or consumption, or ten years after the date of manufacture. U.C.A. 1953, § 78-15-1. Although Berry is attractive and persuasive at first glance, a careful review and analysis reveals substantial differences in the Utah statute and I.C. § 6-1403, primarily in the presence of a rebuttable presumption in the Idaho statute and the absence of a rebuttable presumption in the Utah statute. Despite differences and variations in legal theories and statutes, a common theme is found among court decisions upholding the constitutionality of product liability statutes of repose. Many courts have expressed concern that a strict interpretation of the open court clause would restrict the legislature's ability to enact new laws and repeal old laws and that such restrictions upon the legislature could freeze common law rights in perpetuity. Reeves v. Ille Elec. Co., 170 Mont. 104, 551 P.2d 647 (1976); Josephs v. Burns, 260 Or. 493, 491 P.2d 203 (1971). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressed its concern and analyzed the issue as follows: This court would encroach upon the Legislature's ability to guide the development of the law if we invalidated legislation simply because the rule enacted by the Legislature rejects some cause of action currently preferred by the courts. To do so would be to place certain rules of the common law and certain non-constitutional decisions of the courts above all rules of the common law and certain non-constitutional decisions of courts above all change except by constitutional amendment. Such a result would offend our notion of the checks and balances between the various branches of government, and of the flexibility required for the healthy growth of the law. Freezer Storage, Inc. v. Armstrong Cork Co., 476 Pa. 270, 382 A.2d 715, 721 (1978). The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee addressed this issue and reasoned as follows: Reasons of sound policy have led to the general adoption of laws of both descriptions [statutes of limitation and repose], and their validity cannot be questioned. The time and manner of their operation, the exceptions to them, and the acts from which the time limited shall begin to run, will generally depend on the sound discretion of the legislature, according to the nature of the titles, the situation of the country and the emergency which leads to their enactment. Cases may occur where the provisions of a law on those subjects may be so unreasonable as to amount to a denial of a right, and call for the interposition of the court; but the present is not one. Hargraves v. Brackett Stripping Mach. Co., 317 F. Supp. 676, 683 (E.D.Tenn. 1970), quoting Jackson ex dem. Hart v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 7 L.Ed. 679 (1830). The role of the judiciary is limited when encountering a limitation when considering legislation, including a statute of repose. The words of former Chief Justice Donaldson in Leliefeld warrant repeating: So long as the statute is constitutional, we have no intrinsic ability to review its inherent wisdom or, if it seems unwise, the power to change it. Whenever lines are drawn by legislation, some may seem unwise, but the responsibility for drawing these lines rests with the legislature and judicial review is limited. 104 Idaho at 375, 659 P.2d at 129. Accordingly, having found the statute to be constitutional, we limit our review as directed in Leliefeld. The statute of repose contained in I.C. § 6-1403 does not violate the open courts provision of art. 1, § 18 of the Idaho Constitution, cf. Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387, 788 P.2d 435 (1990), and we reaffirm the well-established principle of law in this jurisdiction that it is the province of the legislature to modify the rules of the common law.