Opinion ID: 1766983
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The Secretary of State's Argument

Text: The Secretary of State, as a member of the executive branch, argues that his actions in preparing the preliminary map infringe upon the powers granted to the legislative branch, in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. He specifically argues that the discretion afforded him in drawing the final boundary map gives him the authority to convey public trust lands which can otherwise only be conveyed by legislative enactment. The applicable section of the Mississippi Constitution reads as follows: Section 2. No person or collection of persons, being one or belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any power properly belonging to either of the others. The acceptance of an office in either of said departments shall, of itself, and at once, vacate any and all offices held by the person so accepting in either of the other departments. Miss. Const. art. I, § 2 (1890). The State of Mississippi argues that the Secretary of State did not claim a separation of powers violation at the lower court level, and therefore should not be permitted to raise this issue on appeal. See Sanders v. State, 479 So.2d 1097, 1104-05 (Miss. 1985); State v. Cabana Terrace, Inc., 247 Miss. 26, 37-38, 153 So.2d 257, 260-61 (1963). In Howell v. State, 300 So.2d 774 (Miss. 1974), we stated that while the Legislature could not delegate its power to make law, it may delegate the power to determine certain facts. Id. at 779. In the present case, the Secretary of State's discretion is limited to comments and/or documentation submitted within the sixty day period. Any disagreements or discrepancies resulting from the preliminary map can be either negotiated or brought to trial. In Hinds-Rankin Metropolitan Water and Sewer Association v. Mississippi Public Service Commission, 263 So.2d 546 (Miss. 1972), this Court quoted 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Bodies and Procedure, § 29, pp. 324-25 (1951) as follows: In determining whether the delegation of power to an administrative body is an unconstitutional grant of legislative power or a proper grant of administrative power, the distinction is between a delegation of power to make the law, which involves a discretion as to what the law shall be, which delegation is void; and the delegation of authority or discretion as to the execution of a law to be exercised under, and in pursuance of, the law, to which delegation no objection can be made.       [A] statute is complete and validly delegates administrative authority when nothing with respect to a determination of what is the law is left to the administrative agency, and its provisions are sufficiently clear, definite, and certain to enable the agency to know its rights and obligation. 263 So.2d at 552. This Court in Hinds-Rankin Metropolitan Water and Sewer went on to state that: [w]here the legislature sufficiently prescribes a policy, standard, or rule for the guidance of the administrative body, or otherwise confines it within reasonably definite limits, authority may be delegated to the administrative body to carry out the legislative purposes in detail, and to exercise administrative power to regulate and control. Id. This legislation is analogous to the statutes dealing with the management of the Sixteenth Section trustlands (§ 29-3-1). In Turney v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 481 So.2d 770 (Miss. 1985), we stated: The State, as trustee, may not divest itself of its duties. However, the State, by statute, may vest in others the authority to do acts which the trustee cannot practicably be expected to perform. Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 171 (1959). The State, as a matter of practical necessity, manages its sixteenth section trust property through local county boards of education.       The charge of the statute is that Boards of Education manage the school trust lands as trust property and assure that adequate compensation is received. Even though the State has vested in the local boards of education certain management powers and duties, the State at all times holds the fee as trustee and maintains the authority and responsibility to oversee the management of the trust and to assure that the trust is properly executed. Id. at 777. In the present case, the Legislature enacted the tidelands law and delegated to the Secretary of State the administrative duty to implement it. This legislation in no way gives the Secretary of State the power or authority to make laws. Rather it provides that he be used as a tool in the implementation of the Tidelands Act. Therefore, the Secretary of State, as a member of the executive branch, in no way infringed upon the powers granted exclusively to the Legislature.