Opinion ID: 491653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Costs of the Receivership.

Text: 24 On its cross-appeal, the government argues that it should not have been assessed the costs of the receivership in the first instance    without prejudice to an application by the Government at the time of final judgment, should the Government prevail, to have [the costs] taxed against one or more of the defendants. Ianniello, 646 F.Supp. at 1300. We reject the government's contention. 25 We note at the outset that we have pendent appellate jurisdiction over what would normally be a nonappealable, interlocutory decision of the district court. See San Filippo v. U.S. Trust Co. of New York, Inc., 737 F.2d 246, 255 (2d Cir.1984) (once we have taken jurisdiction over one issue in a case, we may, in our discretion, consider otherwise nonappealable issues in the case as well). Here, the issues of the appointment of a receiver and of where to assess his costs, even though the latter is technically raised on the government's cross-appeal rather than on the defendants' appeal, are sufficiently intertwined to justify addressing them simultaneously. 26 The purpose of appointing the receiver, as distinguished from that of the underlying litigation, is limited to preventing skimming from Umberto's profits during the pendency of the litigation. The major point of the skimming, according to the government, was to avoid taxes due on Umberto's sales and profits. By ensuring that the true receipts are reflected on Umberto's books, the receiver will, presumably, cause the taxes paid by the corporate entity to increase. Since the benefit of the receivership is thus enjoyed by the public, it seems appropriate at this stage to impose the costs of the receivership on the government, at least pending a resolution of its charges against the defendants. If it is established that Umberto's as a corporate entity has benefited from the receivership, it might then be appropriate to reimburse the government for some, or perhaps all, of the expenses of the receiver. That is a question, however, whose answer awaits the outcome of the underlying litigation. 27 After oral argument in this case we received a letter from the government, presenting additional argument in an attempt to clarify a point made by counsel for defendants during the argument. Such letters are not authorized by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, see Fed.R.App.P. 28(j) (authorizing post-argument letters limited to calling to court's attention pertinent and significant authorities [that have] come to the attention of a party    after oral argument but before a decision and requiring such letters to be without argument). Accordingly, we have given no consideration to the letter. 28 The order appealed from is affirmed.