Opinion ID: 2353917
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Step Two: Factors

Text: As previously noted, in the second step of the prosecutorial misconduct analysis we consider three factors: (1) whether the misconduct was gross and flagrant, (2) whether the misconduct showed ill will on the prosecutor's part, and (3) whether the evidence was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of jurors. Adams, 292 Kan. at 66, 253 P.3d 5. In assessing whether gross and flagrant conduct has occurred, appellate courts should look to whether the prosecutor repeated or emphasized the conduct. State v. Madkins, 42 Kan.App.2d 955, 961, 219 P.3d 831 (2009) (citing State v. Miller, 284 Kan. 682, 719-20, 163 P.3d 267 [2007]). Similarly, a prosecutor's ill will is usually reflected through deliberate and repeated misconduct or indifference to a court's rulings. Madkins, 42 Kan.App.2d at 961, 219 P.3d 831 (citing State v. Bunyard, 281 Kan. 392, 407, 133 P.3d 14 [2006]). Although the prosecutor asked several questions in a row, the statute of limitations questions were not otherwise emphasized in the trial. Further, although the first objection was sustained, when the prosecutor rephrased the question in response to the objection, the trial court overruled all further objections. Consequently, we do not find deliberate misconduct or indifference to the court's rulings. Turning to the third factor, whether the evidence against the defendant was of such a direct and overwhelming nature that the misconduct would likely have had little weight in the minds of the jurors, in the past we frequently stated the third factor cannot override the first two factors unless we are able to say the harmless error tests of both K.S.A. 60-261 (inconsistent with substantial justice) and Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), reh. denied 386 U.S. 987, 87 S.Ct. 1283, 18 L.Ed.2d 241 (1967) (conclusion beyond reasonable doubt that the error had little, if any, likelihood of having changed the results of the trial), have been met. See, e.g., Ward, 292 Kan. at 549, 256 P.3d 801; Adams, 292 Kan. at 66, 253 P.3d 5; Tosh, 278 Kan. at 93, 91 P.3d 1204. Our recent opinion in Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 256 P.3d 801, brought about a modification in this portion of the prosecutorial misconduct standard. Ward synthesized our caselaw on harmless error and recognized the same standard applies regardless of whether we are applying an analysis under K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 or Chapman. That standard is whether the error affected the substantial rights of the party as measured by whether it affected the outcome of the trial. Ward, 292 Kan. at 553-55, 256 P.3d 801. The difference between our state statutory standard and the federal constitutional standard is primarily the level of certainty that applies. Ward, 292 Kan. at 556-56, 256 P.3d 801. (We also reserved a question of whether there is a difference regarding which party has the burden of production when the state statutory standard applies. Ward, 292 Kan. at 568-69, 256 P.3d 801). Ward recognized that the federal constitutional standard requires the party benefitting from the error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of will not or did not affect the outcome of the trial in light of the entire record. Ward, 292 Kan. at 568-69, 256 P.3d 801. In contrast, if the fundamental failure does not infringe upon a constitutional right, an appellate court should apply K.S.A. 60-261 and K.S.A. 60-2105 and determine if there is a reasonable probability the misconduct affected the outcome of the trial. Ward, 292 Kan. at 569, 256 P.3d 801. Hence, satisfying the level of certainty imposed by both the state and the federal constitutional harmless error standard, as we have required in our past cases, necessarily means the State, as the party who has benefitted from the prosecutorial misconduct, bears the burden to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the defendant's substantial rights, i.e., there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the verdict. We have adopted this view in several recent decisions. This recognition simply means the third factor cannot override the first two factors unless we are able to say the Chapman constitutional error standard has been met. See State v. Naputi, 293 Kan. ___, ___, 260 P.3d 86 (2011); State v. Hall, 292 Kan. 841, Syl. ¶¶ 14, 15, 257 P.3d 272 (2011); State v. Hernandez, 292 Kan. 598, 603-04, 257 P.3d 767 (2011) State v. Stieben, 292 Kan. 533, 539, 256 P.3d 796 (2011);. Even though the State's burden is more difficult to meet under this standard than under the state statutory harmless error standard that applied to our analysis of Issue 1, we conclude the State has met its burden. We note that Inkelaar's argument of prejudice is based on inferences that were never argued to the jury; it would require the jury to conclude Inkelaar has not been and will not be prosecuted for these crimes and the sole reason for the lack of prosecution is the bar of the statute of limitations. Even assuming the jury independently connected all of the necessary dots to get to this conclusion, which seems unlikely, evidence was presented that the charges had been brought against Inkelaar for these alleged crimes and those charges were subsequently dismissed. The jury was aware one of the victims had recanted her accusations after the charges had been dismissed. Consequently, even if the jurors were to infer there was not or would not be a prosecution against Inkelaar because of his actions relating to K.M. and B.W., they were aware charges had been filed within the statute of limitations. These circumstances weaken any suggestion the jury would be inclined to believe Inkelaar could not be prosecuted because of the statute of limitations or would be inclined to punish Inkelaar for charges the State chose not to prosecute. More important, there was strong evidence of the crimes against M.C. and Z.C. that was independent of the alleged prior wrongs relating to K.M. and B.W. In addition, M.C. and Z.C. gave consistent statements in most material respects throughout the investigation and at trial. We hold there is no reasonable possibility the questions regarding the statute of limitations affected the verdict in this case.