Opinion ID: 2975953
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: This court reviews de novo the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion for acquittal on grounds of insufficient evidence. U.S. v. Humphrey, 279 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2002). “The standard for evaluating claims that a conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence presents a very difficult hurdle for the criminal appellant.” U.S. v. Maxwell, 160 F.3d 1071, 1077 (6th Cir. 1998). “[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Va., 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original). The court thus “views all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution.” U.S. v. Talley, 164 F.3d 989, 996 (6th Cir. 1999). “Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction and such evidence need not remove every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” U.S. v. Fortson, 194 F.3d 730, 735 (6th Cir. 1999). In particular, “[b]ecause direct evidence of a defendant's fraudulent intent is typically not available, specific intent to defraud may be established by circumstantial evidence and by inferences drawn from examining the scheme itself which demonstrate that the scheme was reasonably calculated to deceive persons of ordinary prudence and comprehension.” U.S. v. 6 Winkle, 477 F.3d 407, 413 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting U.S. v. Yoon, 128 F.3d 515, 523-24 (7th Cir. 1997)). “[T]he question of intent is generally considered to be one of fact to be resolved by the trier of the facts . . . and the determination thereof should not be lightly overturned.” Winkle, 477 F.3d at 413. With respect to the conspiracy charge, “[t]he government need not show that a defendant participated in all aspects of the conspiracy; it need only prove that the defendant was a party to the general conspiratorial agreement.” U.S. v. Avery, 128 F.3d 966, 971 (6th Cir. 1997). Moreover, “a defendant's knowledge of and participation in a conspiracy may be inferred from his conduct and established by circumstantial evidence.” U.S. v. Martinez, 430 F.3d 317, 330 (6th Cir. 2005).
Defendant first argues that his mail fraud conviction was not supported by sufficient evidence because the government failed to establish that he even knew about the insurance fraud scheme, let alone that he devised or intended to devise the scheme. Rather, Defendant argues that the evidence tends to show that he turned over his business affairs to Johnston, played only a small role at Carol-Dale and the other companies, and remained largely unaware of the means by which Johnston procured and paid for the workers’ compensation policies. He says that Hurley and Johnston gave the only direct evidence that he had knowledge of the scheme and that both Hurley and Johnston agreed to testify in exchange for a sentencing recommendation. By Defendant’s account, the other evidence tending to suggest that he knew about the scheme was merely circumstantial, and the government did not produce any credible evidence that he “knowingly devised” the schemes, an essential element of the mail fraud offense. 7 Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the record contains evidence more than sufficient for the jury to conclude that Defendant possessed the requisite intent to defraud. In large part, Defendant’s argument is an attack on Johnston and Hurley’s credibility. It is wellsettled, however, “that on appeal, there is no place for arguments regarding a government witness’s lack of credibility...[i]t is for [jurors] and not for appellate courts to say that a particular witness spoke the truth or fabricated a cock-and-bull story.” Talley, 164 F.3d at 996-97. Moreover, Defendant’s argument ignores the testimony of several disinterested witnesses who suggested at trial that Defendant was knowingly involved with the mail fraud scheme. For example, Weir, the Criminal Fraud Specialist from KEMI, testified that he had received several altered documents misrepresenting the size of Carol-Dale’s payroll, all signed by Defendant. Additionally, Kathy Nall (“Nall”), an agent of Elite Insurance, testified that she had a meeting with Defendant in Pikeville, Kentucky on February 4, 2002 to discuss obtaining insurance coverage for B & G contracting. Nall testified that during the meeting, Defendant disguised his identity, misrepresenting himself as Hurley. Nall’s testimony raises the inference that Defendant was attempting to deceive Nall in order to avoid suspicion, given that KEMI had already cancelled its policy with Carol-Dale.
Defendant next argues that the government did not produce sufficient evidence that he knew funds were allegedly being laundered though the shell companies and were the proceeds of unlawful activity. He says that he signed the checks at Johnston’s direction and believed that the payments were made in the ordinary course of lawful business. 8 This argument also fails, as several witnesses gave testimony at trial tending to suggest that Defendant knew that the transactions he carried out made use of funds that were proceeds of unlawful activity. Gambrel’s testimony indicated that Defendant himself would often bring in the fraudulent checks for her to cash. Gambrel testified that the “transactions” to which these checks supposedly related were fabricated and that she would create false invoices to conceal the true nature of the arrangement. Hurley and Johnston testified that Defendant knowingly participated in the money laundering scheme. In addition, agents found false invoices hidden in Defendant’s barn. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the testimony of these witnesses provides ample evidence to support the conviction. III. Motion for a New Trial Based on Newly Discovered Evidence A. Legal Standard Pursuant to FED . R. CRIM . P. 33(a), a district judge may grant a new trial “if the interest of justice so requires.” “The decision to grant or deny such a motion rests within the discretion of the district court and should not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion.” U.S. v. Turner, 995 F.2d 1357, 1364 (6th Cir. 1993). In general, motions for a new trial are disfavored and should be granted with caution. U.S. v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 1991). “No court wishes a defendant to remain in jail if he has discovered evidence showing that he is not guilty, but after a man has had his day in court, and has been fairly tried, there is a proper reluctance to give him a second trial.” 3 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 557 (3d ed. 2004). In order to merit a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must establish four elements: (1) that the evidence was discovered after the trial; (2) that the evidence 9 could not have been discovered earlier with due diligence; (3) that the evidence is material and not merely cumulative or impeaching; and (4) that the evidence would likely produce an acquittal if the case were retried. U.S. v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 966 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied 461 U.S. 945 (1983). B. Analysis The government concedes that the first two elements of the Barlow test, that the evidence was discovered after the trial and could not have been discovered earlier, are met because the newly discovered evidence did not exist prior to the conclusion of the trial. Defendant argues the evidence is material, and not merely cumulative or impeaching, because Hurley and Johnston told Barrett that they, and not Defendant, were the sole operators of the scheme. Accordingly, Defendant says that the evidence tends directly to exculpate him, not merely to undermine the testimony that Hurley and Johnston gave at trial. Defendant also argues that the evidence would likely produce an acquittal because without Johnston and Hurley’s testimony, the government would be unable to prove that Defendant had knowledge of the fraud or money laundering. Defendant’s argument fails because the newly discovered evidence would be very unlikely to produce an acquittal, and Defendant thus cannot satisfy the fourth prong of the Barlow test. Hurley has submitted an affidavit directly refuting Barrett’s affidavit and denying that he ever made the statements attributed to him. Moreover, there is overwhelming evidence of Defendant’s guilt that is completely independent of Hurley and Johnston’s testimony. Weir, Nall, and Gambrel all gave testimony suggesting that Defendant knowingly participated in the insurance fraud and money laundering schemes. Defendant signed a false employment roster submitted to KEMI. Investigators discovered hundreds of thousands of dollars in cash hidden in 10 Defendant’s house and barn. False invoices were found in the same place as much of the cash. The testimony of Johnston and Hurley tended to corroborate the claims against Defendant, but their testimony was far from the only evidence of Defendant’s intent. At best, the newly discovered evidence creates a “conflict in the evidence, but such conflicts do not amount to a likelihood of acquittal.” Seago, 930 F.2d at 491.