Opinion ID: 220347
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Failure to Provide Brady Material

Text: Henness next argues that the State improperly withheld evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963). He failed to present this claim to the state courts. He did raise the Brady claim in his state post-conviction petition, but the claim was conclusory and did not cite any specific evidence allegedly withheld by the prosecution. As Henness never raised a claim in state court that relied on the evidence that underlies his current Brady claim, he must demonstrate cause and prejudice to obtain federal habeas review. Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 690-91, 124 S.Ct. 1256, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166 (2004); Bell v. Bell, 512 F.3d 223, 231 n. 3 (6th Cir. 2008). If Henness can meet the elements of his Brady claim and the withheld evidence was the reason the claim was not presented to the state court, he also has established cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural default. Banks, 540 U.S. at 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256; Bell, 512 F.3d at 231 n. 3. Thus, our procedural default analysis is encompassed within the discussion of the merits of his Brady claim. Brady requires the prosecution to disclose all material exculpatory evidence to the defendant before trial. To succeed on a Brady claim, a habeas petitioner must show that (1) evidence favorable to the petitioner (2) was suppressed by the government and (3) the petitioner suffered prejudice. Banks, 540 U.S. at 691, 124 S.Ct. 1256; Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281-82, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999). Favorable evidence is material under Brady if a reasonable probability exists that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Cone v. Bell, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1769, 1783, 173 L.Ed.2d 701 (2009). The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). The withheld evidence must be considered collectively, rather than individually. Apanovitch v. Houk, 466 F.3d 460, 475 (6th Cir.2006). The evidence supporting the defendant's conviction also must be considered when determining potential prejudice from a Brady violation. Towns v. Smith, 395 F.3d 251, 260 (6th Cir.2005). As the basis for his Brady claim, Henness points to several police informational summaries that were not provided to him prior to trial. Informational Summary # 21 details a police interview with Teresa Thomas, a friend of Henness and Tabatha. Thomas stated that Henness was extremely upset that Tabatha was buying large quantities of crack cocaine from dealers who may have been Cuban. Henness argues that this statement is exculpatory because it supports his claim that Myers was mistakenly killed by Cuban drug dealers who actually were targeting Henness and Tabatha. Thomas's statement demonstrates that Henness was aware of Tabatha's alleged purchasing of crack cocaine from Cuban dealers. Since Henness was aware of the essential facts that would enable him to take advantage of the exculpatory evidence, no Brady violation occurred. See Spirko v. Mitchell, 368 F.3d 603, 610 (6th Cir.2004) (citing U.S. v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 405 (6th Cir.1990)). Similarly, Informational Summary # 39 revealed that, shortly before Myers's murder, Henness contacted the police about investigating an individual who used Tabatha to run drugs. Henness argues that this action supports his contention that Myers's death was the result of a drug deal gone bad. Henness already knew of his own contact with the police at the time of trial, so the prosecution's failure to provide this information was not a Brady violation. See id. Informational Summary #31 describes a police detective's interview with Henness's mother, Connie Parsons. Parsons told the detective that Tabatha's mother, Mrs. James Keith, stated that Tabatha had been involved in a homicide. Tabatha told Keith that she had witnessed the murder. Henness maintains that Parsons's statement should have been disclosed to him. Because this statement is hearsay and therefore inadmissible, Henness must demonstrate that the statement would lead to the discovery of additional, admissible evidence that could have resulted in a different result at trial. See Wood v. Bartholomew, 516 U.S. 1, 6, 116 S.Ct. 7, 133 L.Ed.2d 1 (1995). Henness fails to make this showing. From Parsons's statement, it is not clear that the alleged murder witnessed by Tabatha involved Myers, the victim in this case. Henness's speculation that it did involve Myers and could have led to additional information reflecting Tabatha's involvement in the murder is insufficient to establish a Brady violation. See id. at 6-8, 116 S.Ct. 7 ([I]t should take more than supposition on the weak premises offered by respondent to undermine a court's confidence in the outcome.). Informational Summaries #36 and # 37 revealed that, after Myers's murder, Parsons received a letter reading, Tell your son we are serious. The police performed fingerprint and handwriting testing on the letter and determined that Henness did not send it. Henness asserts that this letter is significant because it supports his allegation that Myers was killed as part of a drug deal gone bad, in which Tabatha was involved. However, the linkage between the letter and Myers's murder is tenuous. The letter contains no suggestion that it involves Myers's death or the drug dealing by Tabatha or Henness. Speculation that the letter relates to the murder is insufficient to establish a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result at trial would have been different. Cone, 129 S.Ct. at 1783; United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985); Apanovitch, 466 F.3d at 474. Finally, considering the evidence cumulatively, Henness does not establish a reasonable probability that the result of his trial would have been different had the evidence been disclosed to the defense.