Opinion ID: 714850
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lack of a Limiting Instruction Request

Text: 26 Garrett contends that defense counsel's failure to request an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of Rodriguez's testimony to an explanation of the actions of Agent Hicks represented deficient performance and resulted in prejudice to him. See Fed.R.Evid. 105. 8 Defense counsel did request a limiting instruction, based on Eighth Circuit Model Criminal Instruction 2.15, which limits a jury's consideration of a co-defendant's statements. The trial judge rejected it, apparently on the grounds that Instruction 2.15 did not apply in conspiracy cases. Trial Tr. at 173-75. The district court, in its opinion on Garrett's § 2255 petition, determined that counsel may have reasonably believed that a limiting instruction would serve only to underscore the importance of the testimony, yet the transcript of the proceedings indicates that defense counsel was willing to take that risk. 27 A limiting instruction would certainly have been appropriate here. We have previously noted that if a conspirator statement is both permissible background and highly prejudicial, otherwise inadmissible hearsay, fairness demands that the government find a way to get the background into evidence without the hearsay. United States v. Alonzo, 991 F.2d 1422, 1426-27 (8th Cir.1993). The trial court should instruct the jury as to the limited purpose of any hearsay statements that cannot be avoided. Id. at 1427. Here, Garrett's first name and his race could have been redacted from the testimony with no risk of confusion as to the behavior of Agent Hicks. Without such procedures, there is a strong risk that the while the statements may be offered as background for the agents' actions, they will inevitably be used as direct evidence of the defendant's guilt. Id. (emphasis in original). In Alonzo, admission of similar statements by a co-conspirator did not pass the rigorous standard for harmless error, and a new trial was ordered. Id. at 1427-28. Here, the reasonable probability demanded by Strickland, and the other evidence against Garrett, distinguish Alonzo. Even if the failure to request another instruction limiting the jury's consideration to an explanation of the behavior of Agent Hicks was ineffective assistance, 9 Garrett has not shown that the failure to request a limiting instruction seriously compromised the integrity of the trial. 28 In United States v. King, 36 F.3d 728 (8th Cir.1994), a convicted defendant challenged the trial court's admission of a DEA agent's statement that he started an investigation on information that a man named Bill was selling cocaine from a certain address while possessing a handgun. Id. at 731. The defendant's first name was William. In King, as here, the trial court received the statement as it was not offered for its truth, but to explain the actions of the agent--no limiting instruction was requested or given. Id. at 732. The King court found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining to admit the evidence, and further found any error in the admission of the testimony, including the absence of a limiting instruction, to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt based on the other evidence against the defendant. Id. at 732-33. 10 29 That the other evidence against the defendant in King was characterized as overwhelming, and the evidence here was previously characterized by another panel of this Court as not overwhelming, 948 F.2d at 476, does not mandate an opposite result. The evidence against Garrett was significant and substantial. Garrett must prove that there exists a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would be different absent the alleged ineffective assistance--this is a more difficult standard to meet than proving that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We find that he has not carried this burden. 11 30