Opinion ID: 695161
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Duty to Recuse

Text: 14 The appellants argue that the district court should have disqualified itself sua sponte pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455. 5 In response, the government, relying on the failure of the appellants to make a recusal motion in the district court, contends that the argument is untimely and that we should not consider it. However, our precedent clearly establishes that under this statutory provision, which contains no explicit timeliness requirement, even when such motions are not made in the district court, we can exercise review over a district judge's failure to recuse. The standard of review does, though, change. Thus, where no objection to the district court's failure to recuse was made at trial, a plain error standard of review applies. United States v. Dalfonso, 707 F.2d 757, 760 (3d Cir.1983) (citing United States v. Schreiber, 599 F.2d 534 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843, 100 S.Ct. 86, 62 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979)). The plain error doctrine derives from Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) which provides that [p]lain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court. 6 15 When a party makes a recusal motion at trial, a district court's failure to recuse is reviewed for abuse of discretion. A conviction may be reversed under the plain error doctrine only when [t]here [was] an 'error' that is 'plain' and that 'affect[s] substantial rights.'  United States v. Olano, --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 1776, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993) (first alteration added). Moreover, Rule 52(b) leaves the decision to correct the forfeited error within the sound discretion of the Court of Appeals and the court should not exercise that discretion unless the error ' seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. '  Id. (citations omitted) (alteration in original). 7 16 The appellants' allegations of bias derive in large part from a colloquy that occurred between the United States Attorney and the district court at the sentencing hearing, when the district court was considering the amount of restitution to award. We quote the passage at length, with all its surrounding context: 17 MR. CHERTOFF 8 : Finally, your Honor, in connection with the Court's observation about the fact that the public is to be the beneficiary of this, I'd like to suggest to the Court that in ordering restitution the Court define the appropriate class of victims to receive the restitution, which I think would be those who on a net--those investors, other than co-conspirators of the offense or the defendants, themselves, who on a net basis lost money trading in the securities of Crazy Eddie before June 2nd, 1988. And to the extent there is money left over, that any third parties who had to make compensation to those victims be themselves compensated. 18 THE COURT: Because that is a more complex issue, I'd like to get the input from the SEC and experts. I will defer to another day the disposition of the moneys so far as the public is concerned. 19 My Trustee-Receiver will hold it. Then I would anticipate the U.S. Attorney's office, in connection with the SEC, will make appropriate applications on notice to the defendant and the defendant's counsel so that we can get everyone's total input. 20 My object in this case from day one has always been to get back to the public that which was taken from it as a result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant and others. We will work the best possible formula we can to be as fair as possible to the public. If we can get the 120 million back, we would have accomplished a great deal in this case. 21 Tr. Sentencing Hearing 407-08 at app. 1008 (emphasis added). Of course, the italicized language is the crucial passage. Appellants argue that the statement reflects an appearance that the district court had prejudged [their] guilt and that a number of his rulings were skewed by his determination to enforce his Repatriation Order in the civil case and to 'get back' the money from Mr. Antar. Eddie br. at 10. Thus, in their view, the judge's sentencing comments shed light on the reasons behind several of his rulings, including his computation of their prison terms and the amount of restitution. Lurking in this series of arguments is the contention that the district court's goal during the trial simply was improper and that that in itself mandated the judge's disqualification. In response, the government relies on the fact that [b]y that time, however, Antar had of course been found guilty, and that therefore the statement did not indicate that the court had been unfair to Antar, or even that it had believed he personally was guilty 'from day one.'  Br. at 66. 22 The pertinent recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 455(a), provides that a judge must disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Liteky v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1150, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994); United States v. Bertoli, 40 F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d Cir.1994). As the Supreme Court recently made clear, generally beliefs or opinions which merit recusal must involve an extrajudicial factor. Liteky, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1157. For example, if a judge has acquired a dislike of a litigant because of events occurring outside of the courtroom, a duty to recuse might ensue. However, although such situations are not common, opinions formed during a judicial proceeding may in certain instances give rise to a duty to recuse. Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1412. As the Liteky Court pointed out, if during a lengthy trial ... the presiding judge for the first time learns of an obscure religious sect, and acquires a passionate hatred for all its adherents, the fact that the beliefs arose through a judicial proceeding does not negate the duty to recuse. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1154; see also Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1412. 23 Biases stemming from facts gleaned during judicial proceedings themselves must be particularly strong in order to merit recusal. A favorable or unfavorable predisposition can ... deserve to be characterized as 'bias' or 'prejudice' [when] even though it springs from the facts adduced or the events occurring at trial, it is so extreme as to display clear inability to render fair judgment. Liteky, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1155. In such situations, then, the court's actions must reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make fair judgment impossible. Id. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1157. By the statutory language itself, though, section 455(a) mandates an objective rather than a subjective inquiry. See Bertoli, 40 F.3d at 1412 (The judge does not have to be subjectively biased or prejudiced, so long as he appears to be so.) (quoting Liteky, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1156 n. 2) (emphasis in original); Alexander v. Primerica Holdings, Inc., 10 F.3d 155, 162 (3d Cir.1993) ([T]he public's confidence in the judiciary, which may be irreparably harmed if a case is allowed to proceed before a judge who appears to be tainted, requires that justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.) (quoting In re Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 776 (3d Cir.1992)); In re Int'l Business Mach. Corp., 45 F.3d 641, 643 (2d Cir.1995). Therefore, if a reasonable man, were he to know all the circumstances, would harbor doubts about the judge's impartiality under the applicable standard, then the judge must recuse. In re Larson, 43 F.3d 410, 415 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1111 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 820, 101 S.Ct. 78, 66 L.Ed.2d 22 (1980)). 24 Post-Liteky cases involving allegations of bias derived from judicial proceedings have construed the exception to the extrajudicial source requirement narrowly. In United States v. Young, 45 F.3d 1405 (10th Cir.1995), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the following colloquy between the trial court and the defense attorney regarding the scheduling of a trial date. The colloquy occurred after the judge had refused to accept the defendant's guilty plea (upon finding that she had not sufficiently admitted to criminal wrongdoing) and after the government's attorney informed the judge that a plea still was expected: 25 MR. JAPHA 9 : Well, your Honor.... I'm wondering then if we could start that trial, then, on Monday, May 17, because I have a conflict in the middle of the week May 26th and 27th. 26 THE COURT: No, because I've got the Sarmiento crowd. No. That's the week I'm in Washington for the federal judges' association. We've got a union meeting. 27 MR. JAPHA: What about the week before? 28 COURTROOM DEPUTY: He's in trial. 29 THE COURT: That's when we're going to be in trial on this Sarmiento case for two weeks. That's the six weeks' case that we're going to do in two. So we're going to have to do your lady on the 24th unless she sees the light. 30 MR. JAPHA: I hear you. I'll just say, the difficulty I have is, on Wednesday the 26th and 27th-- 31 THE COURT: And bear in mind this: that the obvious thing that's going to happen to Ms. Young is that she's going to get convicted, and then they're going to sprinkle her and bless her with immunity, and then she's going to get to testify. And then she's going to pull the same act on me again, and then she's going to the county jail for at least 30 if not 60 or 90 days for contempt. And we'll do that as often as necessary until she starts talking. 32 Id. at 1414. 33 In Young, the court of appeals found that the district court was not obligated to recuse. As the court pointed out: The comments reflected the judge's belief that Ms. Young was likely to be convicted if she went to trial. Such an opinion of what the jury was likely to find does not show that the judge could not possibly render fair judgment. Nothing in the remark indicates that the judge was unable or unwilling to carry out his responsibilities impartially. Id. at 1415-16. In fact, the judge only was indicating what he would have done had certain contingencies occurred. Nothing he said showed that he would be partial if those contingencies did not occur. Moreover, the judge made the statements after the defendant's first attempt to plead guilty. Therefore [t]he setting in which [the statement] was made indicates that the judge intended to convey a message to [the defendant] that if she wanted to enter a guilty plea she would have to admit knowledge sufficient to constitute an offense under the statute. Id. at 1416. 34 In a recent case from the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, a bankruptcy judge summarily denied defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint, summarily granted plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, and stated during a hearing that  'any predisposition this court has in this matter is a result of things that have taken place in this very courtroom,' and asserted that 'I am perfectly entitled to conclusions and judgments based on what takes place in the courtroom.'  In the Matter of Huntington Commons Assocs., 21 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir.1994). The court of appeals ruled that the judge's impatience with and admonishments to the defendant, combined with adverse judicial rulings and a vague reference to a possible predisposition were not remotely sufficient evidence of the required 'deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that would render fair judgment impossible.'  Id. at 159 (quoting Liteky, --- U.S. at ----, 114 S.Ct. at 1157). There was nothing to indicate that the judge's rulings were based on improper considerations. 35 This case is different from those cases and also from nearly all the reported recusal cases we have come across. This is not a case where the district judge is accused of being biased in a personal way against a litigant. Nor is this a case where a judge's rulings are so indefensible that combined with particular comments they arguably demonstrate partiality towards or against a party. It is not even a case where, as in Huntington Commons, it is argued that the judge's previous experience with the case may have left him disdainful of one party's position. Rather, this is a case where the district judge, in stark, plain and unambiguous language, told the parties that his goal in the criminal case, from the beginning, was something other than what it should have been and, indeed, was improper. Of course, a trial judge in a criminal proceeding should ensure that a fair and orderly trial takes place in the courtroom. Here, however, the district court told the parties that his goal from the beginning of the criminal proceeding was to enforce a repatriation order and final judgment issued during a concurrent civil proceeding and give back the proceeds recovered to the public. It is difficult to imagine a starker example of when opinions formed during the course of judicial proceedings display a high degree of antagonism against a criminal defendant. After all, the best way to effectuate the district judge's goal would have been to ensure that the government got as free a road as possible towards a conviction, which then would give the judge the requisite leverage to order a large amount of restitution. And it goes without saying that this is an improper role for a district judge during a criminal trial. 36 We reject the implications of the government's argument--that because the statement occurred after the trial, it cannot form the basis of an allegation of bias during the trial. Suppose, for instance, that at sentencing the district judge informs a defendant that throughout the trial his object had been to see the defendant behind bars. A reasonable observer in such a scenario would have serious reason to question whether prior rulings in the case were based on impartial considerations or on the judge's stated goal. The fact that the judge's motivation came to light only after the conclusion of the trial would be of no moment. Furthermore, it does not matter that the judge's rulings in the case may have been otherwise defensible, for we are concerned with the appearance of partiality. 37 Moreover, we consider what the situation would have been if, instead of revealing his goal at the end of the trial, the judge made the same statement at the beginning of the trial. In that scenario, the judge would have said: My goal in this case will be to get back to the public that which was taken from it as a result of the fraudulent activities of this defendant and others. There would be very little question that such a statement would give rise to a duty to recuse. The fortuitous fact that the judge made his goal clear at the end rather than at the beginning of trial is of no principled consequence. 38 We nevertheless consider whether we should read the judge's words as meaning something other than what they say on their face, particularly where, as here, the judge is a distinguished and respected jurist whose career has demonstrated anything but unfairness to litigants. Thus, the government at oral argument before us contended that the district judge really was referring to the civil SEC proceeding rather than the criminal proceeding. Or, we could imagine that the district judge made an unfortunate and isolated statement--a stray remark--after the defendants had been convicted and during a lengthy and partly spontaneous colloquy during a sentencing hearing. In this latter interpretation, the judge would be pointing out his recognition that from the beginning of the trial it had been clear that the public had been defrauded and that after conviction it became clear that it was the defendants who had perpetrated the fraud. 39 In considering whether the remark should be so read, we recognize that the matters before the district court were both lengthy and complicated. Moreover, we are conscious of the constant pressures exerted on the district court in a high profile case such as this and are aware that we are focusing on one sentence out of volumes of transcripts. 40 But in determining whether a judge had the duty to disqualify him or herself, our focus must be on the reaction of the reasonable observer. If there is an appearance of partiality, that ends the matter. Haines v. Liggett Group Inc., 975 F.2d 81, 98 (3d Cir.1992); Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 789 (3d Cir.) (Impartiality and the appearance of impartiality in a judicial officer are the sine qua non of the American legal system.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880, 103 S.Ct. 176, 74 L.Ed.2d 144 (1982). That being the case, we must be careful not to rewrite what the judge said and render unreasonable the clearest and most obvious reading of the language. After all, we are reviewing a record, and when all is said and done, the transcript of the proceeding speaks for itself. If a reasonable observer is entitled to take the judge at his word--and certainly he or she is so entitled--we think that after reading the judge's remarks at sentencing, that reasonable observer would think that the judge, as he indicated, had the goal in the trial of recovering substantial funds from the appellants, a goal which their convictions would help him reach. 41 Our conclusion is further compelled by the particular circumstances of the case, combined with certain of the judge's comments and decisions during the trial, which when read in light of the remark at sentencing, make a reasonable observer even more concerned that the judge had an improper goal. 42 For one thing, hearings in the civil SEC case and the criminal proceeding routinely were held one after another on the same day. On January 11, 1993, the district court heard arguments on both Eddie Antar's arraignment in the criminal case and the SEC's application for an order to show cause why Eddie should not be incarcerated until he purged himself of civil contempt by repatriating the $52 million that was the subject of the judge's prior final judgment in the civil case. See app. 160-73. As Eddie's trial counsel put it, the civil case and the criminal case are clearly interrelated. App. 167. On January 14, 1993, the district court held a scheduling and discovery hearing in the criminal case, and heard arguments by the SEC on the order to show cause, which became returnable on February 2, 1993. App. 176-92. On February 2, the court both heard testimony on the SEC's application and heard arguments and ruled on the government's application to detain Eddie without bail in the criminal proceeding. App. 193-269. Thus, it is certainly believable, in light of the sentencing colloquy, that the judge's frustration at Eddie's refusal to obey the repatriation order seeped into his orders in the criminal case. 43 The repatriation order also figured heavily during the arguments on the bail application, as one point of contention centered around whether the $52 million could be considered Eddie's assets for that purpose: 44 THE COURT: What about somewhat between 50 and $100 million that lay out there some place? What if Mr. Antar were to be put in a situation, escape, go run and through some way get his hands on some 50 or $100 million that might be available to him in other places?.... 45 MR. ARSENEAULT: 10 Your Honor, I have two responses. I recognize the need for the Court to engage in hypothetical hyperboles in weighing this application. But in terms of the reality, the reality, your Honor, is the assets of Mr. Antar abroad are frozen. They have been frozen since at least June of this year.... So there is no realistic possibility that those assets are available for anybody. 46