Opinion ID: 2548958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Assignment of Counsel

Text: A criminal defendant's right to counsel flows from different constitutional provisions[,] depending on the nature of the proceedings. United States v. Palomo, 80 F.3d 138, 141 (5th Cir.1996). More specifically, the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution [3] provides a criminal defendant with the right to counsel during all `critical stages' of a criminal prosecution, State v. Oliveira, 961 A.2d 299, 308-09 (R.I.2008), where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected. [4] Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967). Additionally, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution [5] provides for a right to counsel in certain postconviction proceedings when fundamental fairness necessitates the assistance of a trained advocate. Palomo, 80 F.3d at 141. [6] In the instant case, defendant does not assert a constitutional right to counsel under either the Sixth Amendment or the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. He argues, rather, that he was entitled to the appointment of counsel in connection with the Rule 35 proceedings pursuant to Rule 44 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The proper construction of a court rule is a question of law to which we apply a de novo standard of review. State v. Brown, 898 A.2d 69, 76 (R.I.2006). Rule 44 states that [i]f a defendant appears in Superior Court without counsel, the court shall advise the defendant of his or her right to counsel and assign counsel to represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding unless the defendant is able to obtain his or her own counsel or elects to proceed without counsel. We decline to read into Rule 44 a requirement that counsel be assigned to represent a defendant at a sentence-reduction hearing under Rule 35. It is well established that a Rule 35 motion to reduce sentence is `essentially a plea for leniency'    addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice, who may grant it if he or she decides `on reflection or on the basis of changed circumstances that the sentence originally imposed was, for any reason, unduly severe.' [7] State v. Mendoza, 958 A.2d 1159, 1161 (R.I.2008) (quoting State v. Burke, 876 A.2d 1109, 1112 (R.I.2005) and State v. Furtado, 774 A.2d 38, 39 (R.I.2001)). A motion to reduce sentence is by its very terms a posttrial proceeding; a judgment of conviction has been entered, and a sentence has been imposed. Such a proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and thus it is our opinion that it is not a stage of the proceeding to which the procedural right to counsel under Rule 44 attaches. See Palomo, 80 F.3d at 142 (motion under Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure is not a trial-related proceeding). Here, the sentence imposed on defendant, thirty years on each count, was not only authorized by statute, [8] but it also was the very sentence that defendant agreed to serve as part of the plea bargain. Moreover, there was no motion to increase defendant's sentence pending, as permitted by Rule 35(b). Thus, Mr. Chase was not confronted with the prospect of any additional loss of liberty. In the context of this case, we need not address the question of whether the dictates of fundamental fairness and due process might require an indigent defendant to be appointed counsel in a Rule 35 proceeding in an appropriate case. This is clearly not such a case.