Opinion ID: 2626647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Issue 5: Expert testimony regarding whether PRC violated applicable regulations

Text: [¶ 38] In his pretrial memorandum, Mr. Cramer designated an expert witness to testify about applicable safety standards, chiefly the MSHA regulations at 30 CFR §§ 77.1713 and 77.409. The expert was also designated to offer his opinion that PRC had violated those standards. PRC designated counter experts to offer opinions that PRC had not violated the MSHA standards. On the parties' cross motions to limit the experts' testimony, the district court allowed the experts to testify about the safety standards. It did not allow the experts for either side to present opinions on whether PRC had violated or complied with those standards. Mr. Cramer appeals that decision. As noted above, we review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. [¶ 39] Mr. Cramer claims that the district court improperly limited his expert's testimony on the regulations and the applicable standard of care. That claim is not borne out by the record. The district court allowed the expert to testify about the general regulatory framework of MSHA, and about the specific regulations pertinent to the case. It allowed the expert to explain the regulations, if necessary, and to indicate their application to PRC. The record establishes that the district court allowed all of the expert testimony offered by Mr. Cramer dealing with the regulations and the standard of care. [¶ 40] The district court did, however, exclude the expert's opinion on whether PRC violated the MSHA regulations. In excluding this testimony, the district court commented that it invades the province of the jury. Mr. Cramer correctly points out that, under W.R.E. 704, expert testimony is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. On that basis, he claims that the district court erred in limiting the testimony of his expert witness. [¶ 41] When the district court's comments are placed in context, however, they indicate a different basis for limiting the expert's testimony. The district court said it had considered the several motions to strike in connection with . . . Daubert.  This is a reference to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), a seminal case involving the proper foundation for admission of expert testimony. Walters v. State, 2008 WY 159, ¶ 8 n. 1, 197 P.3d 1273, 1276 n. 1 (Wyo.2008). The district court further explained that there are a couple of factors that aid in determining the propriety of expert testimony, even before the Daubert factors come into play. And it is really on the basis of one of those factors that the Court is going to issue its ruling here. As the district court's comments suggest, Daubert is well-known for establishing four factors to be used in determining the admissibility of expert testimony pursuant to F.R.E. 702. [1] Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94, 113 S.Ct. at 2796-97. But as the district court's comments also indicated, the Daubert opinion stated that, even before applying those four factors, a trial judge must determine at the outset whether the expert opinion offered will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. Id., 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. [¶ 42] The district court noted that the regulations in question appear pretty straightforward and not difficult to understand. The accuracy of that comment is apparent from the text of the regulations, as quoted in the jury instructions. Instruction No. 35 read as follows: You are instructed that MSHA Regulation codified at 30 CFR Chapter 1, Section 77.409, states as follows: (a) shovels . . . shall not be operated in the presence of any person exposed to a hazard from its operation. . . . It was followed by Instruction No. 36: You are instructed that MSHA Regulation codified at 30 CFR Chapter 1, Section 77.1713, states as follows: (a) At least once during each working shift, or more often if necessary for safety, each active working area and each active surface installation shall be examined by a certified person designated by the operator to conduct such examinations for hazardous conditions and any hazardous conditions noted during such examinations shall be reported to the operator and shall be corrected by the operator. [¶ 43] When a statute or regulation establishes the applicable standard of care with reasonable clarity, expert testimony as to that standard and its breach are unnecessary. Hulse v. First American Title Co., 2001 WY 95, ¶ 60 n. 9, 33 P.3d 122, 141 n. 9 (Wyo.2001). In a case presenting a similar issue, we affirmed a district court's ruling that an expert could not give his opinion that a landlord had violated applicable building code regulations: A district court is vested with discretion to exclude expert testimony if it is deemed unnecessary or not helpful to the trier of the factual issues. . . . Whether in any given case expert testimony is necessary to aid the jury in its search for the truth depends upon a variety of factors readily apparent only to a trial court, and we must depend heavily upon its judgment. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Lyden to present expert testimony. The proposed expert testimony involved matters that the average juror could understand. The safety of stairs, including handrails and headroom, is not so beyond an average person's experience and understanding that expert testimony is required to explain it. The district court reasonably concluded that the testimony should not be allowed, and no abuse of discretion occurred. Lyden ex rel. Lyden v. Winer, 913 P.2d 451, 455-56 (Wyo.1996) (internal citations omitted). In Mr. Cramer's case, it was not unreasonable for the district court to determine that the jury could understand the regulations, and that the jury was capable of determining whether PRC's actions had violated the regulations without the need of expert opinion. Depending heavily on the district court's judgment, as exercised under the particular circumstances of this case, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that the expert opinion testimony was unnecessary and not helpful to the jury.