Opinion ID: 2649691
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Preclusion of Victim Advocate’s Testimony

Text: ¶35 When Gina saw Forde at the pretrial hearing, she commented to her mother and her victim advocate that Forde looked like the female intruder. Forde subpoenaed the advocate to testify at trial, but the court granted the State’s motion to quash and prohibited Forde from interviewing the advocate, reasoning that the advocate was prohibited from divulging the conversation pursuant to the crime victim advocate privilege in A.R.S. § 13-4430. Forde contends that Gina waived the privilege by testifying about the conversation at the Dessureault hearing, and the court therefore violated her right to confront witnesses and to due process by allowing Gina to testify about the conversation “yet block[ing] the defense from disputing that testimony with the testimony of the advocate herself.” Because Forde raises these arguments for the first time on appeal, we review for fundamental error. Henderson, 210 Ariz. at 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d at 607. ¶36 At the time of Forde’s trial, A.R.S. § 13-4430(A) and (C) (2011) prohibited a crime victim advocate from disclosing “as a witness or otherwise any communication . . . between himself and the victim” unless the advocate “knows that the victim will give or has given perjured testimony or if the communication contains exculpatory evidence.” 3 The victim waives the privilege only by consenting in writing. A.R.S. § 134430(A) (2011). Because Gina did not provide written consent, she did not waive the privilege. Also, nothing in the record suggests that the information the victim advocate might have given was exculpatory. Indeed, Forde did not move for disclosure of the information, which would have permitted the court to hold an in camera hearing and order disclosure if it found “reasonable cause to believe the material [was] exculpatory.” A.R.S. § 13-4430(D) (2011). The privilege required the exclusion of the conversation. ¶37 Application of the privilege did not violate Forde’s confrontation and due process rights by allowing the State to introduce evidence of the conversation between Gina and the advocate and then blocking Forde from disputing its content. Forde ― not the State ― asked 3 In 2012, the legislature amended § 13-4430(A) to prohibit the advocate from disclosing “as a witness or otherwise any communication made by or with the victim . . . .” 11 STATE V. FORDE Opinion of the Court Gina about the pretrial hearing and her conversation with the advocate to cast doubt on the identification. Moreover, precluding the advocate’s testimony did not impede Forde from cross-examining Gina or arguing that Gina’s identification was unreliable. Cf. Pennsylvania v. Richie, 480 U.S. 39, 52–53 (1987) (holding that the right to confrontation is a trial right and is normally satisfied “if defense counsel receives wide latitude at trial to question witnesses”).