Opinion ID: 885764
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Counsel as an advocate and adversary

Text: ¶ 84 To what extent an attorney representing a patient-client in an involuntary commitment proceeding should adopt an adversarial posture is a subject of extensive debate among state legislatures and commentators, and is noticeably absent from Title 53, Chapter 21 statutes. ¶ 85 As indicated earlier, other states have adopted express statutory provisions defining this role. See, e.g., Minn.Stat. Ann. § 144.4177 (counsel shall be a vigorous advocate on behalf of the client). As the Commentary to the Guidelines states: [w]hen an attorney fails to act as an advocate and assumes a paternalistic or passive stance, the balance of the system is upset, the defense attorney usurps the judicial role, and the defendant's position goes unheard. Guidelines, Part E2 Commentary, at 466 (internal quotations omitted). ¶ 86 Accordingly, we agree with the Guidelines as well the approach taken in Texas, that the proper role of the attorney is to represent the perspective of the respondent and to serve as a vigorous advocate for the respondent's wishes. See Guidelines, Part E2, at 465. Further: To the extent that a client is unable or unwilling to express personal wishes, the attorney should advocate the position that best safeguards and advances the client's interest. Guidelines, Part E2, at 465. Additionally: In the courtroom, an attorney should engage in all aspects of advocacy and vigorously argue to the best of his or her ability for the ends desired by the client. Guidelines, Part F5, at 483. ¶ 87 The foregoing guidelines create the presumption that a client wishes to not be involuntarily committed. The ultimate decision of whether a patient-respondent should be involuntarily committed, therefore, should not be independently made by counsel. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 574.004 (providing that regardless of an attorney's personal opinion, the attorney shall use all reasonable efforts within the bounds of law to advocate the proposed patient's right to avoid court-ordered mental health services if the proposed patient expresses a desire to avoid the services). ¶ 88 Thus, we conclude that pursuant to the foregoing guidelines, evidence that counsel independently advocated or otherwise acquiesced to an involuntary commitmentin the absence of any evidence of a voluntary and knowing consent by the patient-respondentwill establish the presumption that counsel was ineffective. ¶ 89 One final statutory consideration is whether a post-trial disposition hearing should be conducted separately, utilizing the five-days permitted pursuant to § 53-21-127(2), MCA. Again, a continuation to fully examine and assert a least restrictive alternative at a second hearing may be in the client's best interest, and therefore should be pursued by counsel when necessary.