Opinion ID: 2547047
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: identity of the shooter

Text: Hunter asserts that the circuit court erred in denying an evidentiary hearing on his claim of newly discovered evidence of codefendant Eric Boyd's recent confession to shooting Taurus Cooley, one of the surviving victims, in a dispute over drugs. [2] Hunter alleged in his postconviction motion that the testimony of Boyd, Bruce Pope, [3] and Charles Anderson [4] would verify that the reason for the trip to Daytona Beach was for Mr. Boyd (who was armed with a pearl handled pistol) to obtain the drugs or money from Mr. Cooley. Hunter alleged that the newly discovered evidence would establish that Hunter was not involved in the shooting and that, in fact, he was not in the immediate area when the shooting took place. The circuit court denied this claim, finding that it failed to satisfy the first prong of Jones v. State, 709 So.2d 512 (Fla.1998), and that the allegations were facially insufficient to establish that Hunter would probably be acquitted of the murder of Wayne Simpson. To obtain a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant must meet two requirements. Jones, 709 So.2d at 521. First, the evidence must not have been known by the trial court, the party, or counsel, and it must appear that the defendant or defense counsel could not have known of it by the use of due diligence. Id. (citing Torres-Arboleda v. Dugger, 636 So.2d 1321, 1324-25 (Fla. 1994)). Second, the evidence must be of such nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Id. (citing Jones v. State, 591 So.2d 911, 915 (Fla.1991)). Newly discovered evidence satisfies the second prong of the Jones test if it weakens the case against [the defendant] so as to give rise to a reasonable doubt as to his culpability. Id. at 526 (quoting Jones v. State, 678 So.2d 309, 315 (Fla.1996)). In denying Hunter's claim, the circuit court concluded that Hunter failed to satisfy the first prong of Jones because the fact concerning the reason Defendant and his co-defendants came to Daytona Beach, and the sequence of events at the crime scene, are within Defendant's knowledge. While the court's observation may be correct in the sense that those specific facts were within Hunter's knowledge, the circuit court erred in finding that Hunter's entire claim failed to meet the first prong of Jones. The bulk of Hunter's claim was based on his assertion that codefendant Boyd recently confessed to shooting Cooley in a dispute over drugs and that his testimony and the testimony of codefendants Pope and Anderson would corroborate that the reason for the trip to Daytona Beach was for Boyd to obtain the drugs or money from Cooley. Moreover, Hunter alleged that Boyd previously refused to give a statement because he was promised by prosecutors that they would clear the matter up and that he should keep quiet. Hunter also alleged that Pope and Anderson remained silent because of promises from the State that they would receive leniency from their sentences. In similar circumstances, Florida courts have found post-trial confessions from codefendants to qualify as newly discovered in the sense that the evidence was not known at the time of trial and could not have been known by the use of due diligence. See Brantley v. State, 912 So.2d 342, 342-43 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing based on the affidavit of a codefendant which stated the defendant was not present and was not involved in the shooting and based on the postconviction motion which alleged that defense counsel tried to obtain the codefendant's cooperation but was refused); Roundtree v. State, 884 So.2d 322, 323 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (holding that the defendant's allegations that his codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery and that the codefendant had not testified on the defendant's behalf because he had been coerced by the State were sufficient to state a prima facie claim of newly discovered evidence); Kendrick v. State, 708 So.2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (stating that a codefendant's sworn post-trial testimony that he lied to police and that he was told by police to say he got the cocaine from the defendant in order to keep his own prison time to a minimum qualified as newly discovered evidence because it was unknown, the codefendant was unwilling to give the testimony previously, and the testimony could not have been secured through due diligence); State v. Gomez, 363 So.2d 624, 626-28 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (treating as newly discovered evidence the post-trial affidavit of a codefendant confessing to having committed the robbery without the defendant's assistance). Nevertheless, we do not find that the circuit court erred in summarily denying this claim. In denying Hunter's claim, the circuit court concluded that Hunter's allegations were facially insufficient to establish that Hunter would probably be acquitted of the murder of Wayne Simpson and noted that Hunter's motion did not allege that Boyd claimed to have murdered Simpson. Hunter's allegations are indeed insufficient to support his claim of innocence of first-degree murder. Hunter was convicted of multiple charges against multiple victims: the first-degree murder and attempted armed robbery of Simpson, the attempted first-degree murder and armed robbery of Cooley, the attempted first-degree murder and armed robbery of Theodore Troutman, and the attempted first-degree murder and armed robbery of Michael Howard. However, Hunter's motion only specifically alleged that codefendant Boyd confessed to shooting one victim: Cooley. Although Hunter's motion repeatedly referred to another codefendant having confessed to being the shooter and stated that the evidence would establish that Hunter was not present during the shooting or involved in the shooting, the only shooting specifically identified in the motion was the shooting of Cooley. Although Hunter contends on appeal that Boyd's confession leads to the logical conclusion that Boyd shot the four victims, this was never alleged in the motion. At the Huff hearing on the motion, postconviction counsel even conceded that he was not prepared to say that Boyd had confessed to killing Simpson. Unlike the cases discussed above in which the courts remanded for an evidentiary hearing based on the post-trial confession of a codefendant, the confession in this case does not concern the only crime for which the defendant was convicted. Cf. Brantley, 912 So.2d at 342-43 (noting that the defendant was convicted of the first-degree murder of one victim and that the codefendant's affidavit alleged that the defendant was not present during the victim's shooting); Roundtree, 884 So.2d at 323 (observing that the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and that the codefendant admitted that the defendant had no role in the robbery); Kendrick, 708 So.2d at 1012 (noting that the defendant was found guilty of trafficking in cocaine and that the codefendant confessed that the cocaine was not the defendant's); Gomez, 363 So.2d at 625-26 (discussing the defendant's conviction for robbery and the codefendant's post-trial confession to having committed the robbery without the defendant's assistance). The confession in this case only addresses one of several crimes and does not address the crime for which Hunter claimed innocence in his motion. Moreover, apart from the specific allegation regarding Boyd's confession and the reason for the trip to Daytona Beach, the motion was otherwise vague. Although it alleged that the newly discovered evidence would establish that Hunter was not present or involved, it contained no factual allegations to support this statement. Thus, Hunter's motion insufficiently alleged the facts supporting this claim, in contravention of rule 3.851(e)(1)(D). Even if we were to find Hunter's claim to be facially sufficient, Hunter has not satisfied the second prong of Jones. The newly discovered evidence is not of such a nature that it would probably produce an acquittal on retrial. [5] As explained below, evidence was presented at trial through the testimony of multiple witnesses on each of the matters alleged in Hunter's successive motion. First, each of the surviving victims testified at trial. Michael Howard testified that he was with Wayne Simpson, Theodore Troutman, and Taurus Cooley shortly after midnight on September 17, 1992, at the Munch Shop near Bethune-Cookman College. He testified that they were approached by four black males that he had never seen before and told to give it up. Howard identified Hunter in court as the one who told them to give it up. Howard testified that Hunter had a chrome gun. Howard said that Hunter ordered Cooley to take off his shirt and that Hunter then shot Cooley in the chest with the chrome gun. Howard testified that he then saw the gun wave toward him and that he turned around and heard three more shots. Howard said he noticed that he had been shot after he started running away and there was blood running down his back. Troutman testified that he was with Simpson, Howard, and Cooley at the Munch Shop during the late evening hours of September 16, 1992, until just after midnight on September 17, 1992. Troutman testified that he and his friends were approached by several men and that he heard one of them say to give it up. Troutman stated that he saw multiple guns, including a long, black gun that had been put to his neck and a silver handgun. Troutman identified Hunter as one of the men that night. Troutman testified that he saw Hunter with the silver gun. Troutman testified that he saw Cooley taking off his shirt and that Troutman then heard gunfire. Troutman testified that he himself was later shot. Cooley testified that he was with Simpson, Troutman, and Howard at the Munch Shop on the night of September 16, 1992, when they were approached by four men. Cooley testified that he had never seen any of the four men prior to that night. However, Cooley identified both Hunter and Boyd in court. Cooley testified that three of the men had guns and that Hunter told them to give up their possessions and money and that Boyd told them to lie down. Cooley testified that Boyd put a long gun to Troutman's neck and that Hunter put a gun on Cooley. Cooley testified that Hunter had a small chrome handgun, like a .25. Cooley testified that Hunter pointed the gun at Cooley and told him to take off his shirt. Cooley said that he took off his shirt and had it in his hand when Hunter shot him in the chest. Cooley testified that Hunter shot Simpson, Troutman, and Howard a couple of seconds later. Second, two of Hunter's companions on the night in question also testified at trial. Tammie Cowan testified that she was with James Hunter, Charles Anderson, Bruce Pope, Eric Boyd, and Cathy Woodward on September 16, 1992, and traveled with them from St. Augustine to DeLand and then to Daytona in a friend's car that she was driving. She testified that Hunter told her that he wanted to go to Daytona and gave her directions from DeLand to Daytona. Cowan said that Hunter said he wanted to go by a girl's house to get marijuana. She testified that after they went to the girl's house, she drove a couple of blocks and that Hunter told her to stop. Cowan stated that she had seen a few black men and that Hunter told her to stop the car about three blocks from the men they had seen. Cowan testified that the four men in the car got out with the guns. Cowan testified that Hunter had the silver gun and that Boyd had a gun. Cowan testified that the men walked behind the car and across the street. She said that while she and Woodward were sitting in the car, she heard a sound like a backfire of a car. Cowan testified that she heard one shot and then three more from the direction that the men walked in. Cowan stated that the four men came back to the car and that Hunter told her to drive off and that Hunter said one of the men tried to run so he shot at him. Cowan also testified that Hunter had the silver gun when he got back in the car and that Boyd and Anderson had the BB guns with them. Pope testified that on September 16, 1992, he traveled with Hunter, Cowan, Woodward, Boyd, and Anderson to DeLand from St. Augustine to visit Pope's mother. He testified that Hunter had a.25 automatic chrome gun with a white pearl handle and that Anderson and Boyd had BB guns. He testified that after leaving DeLand, they went to Daytona. He said that it was Hunter's idea and that Hunter gave Cowan directions. Pope testified that they stopped at a girl's house in Daytona to get marijuana and that Hunter got out of the car. Pope stated that after Hunter got back in the car, they drove around with Hunter telling Cowan how to get where they wanted to go. Pope testified that near the Bethune-Cookman College area they saw four guys sitting down and that Hunter told Cowan to stop the car. He testified that he got out of the car with Hunter, Boyd, and Anderson and that Anderson and Boyd had the BB guns and that Hunter had the silver gun. Pope testified that they went to where the men were sitting. Pope testified that Hunter pointed a gun at the chest of one of the men and that the man took off his shirt. Pope said that he was turned around and that then he heard a gunshot and saw a flash from Hunter's gun. Pope testified that at the time that the man was shot taking off his shirt, Boyd was standing with his gun over three of the men who were lying on the ground. Pope said that after he saw the flash from Hunter's gun, Pope ran back to the car and heard three more gunshots. Pope stated that he saw Hunter with the silver gun on his way back to the car. In sum, every part of Hunter's newly discovered evidence claim was addressed through the testimony of multiple witnesses at trial. Multiple witnesses testified that it was Hunter's idea to go to Daytona Beach to obtain marijuana from a girl. Multiple witnesses, both victims and perpetrators, testified that Hunter was armed with a chrome handgun and was present at the scene of the robberies and shootings. Moreover, multiple witnesses testified that Hunter shot Cooley (and the other victims), or they gave testimony implying as much. This is not a situation where the State's case was based on the testimony of one key witness and there was no other evidence tying the defendant to the crimes. Cf. Johnson v. Singletary, 647 So.2d 106, 111 (Fla.1994) (remanding for an evidentiary hearing where the State's case was based almost entirely on one person's eyewitness testimony and there was no other evidence tying the defendant to the crime and where several affidavits stated that another person confessed to committing the crime). Furthermore, even if Pope is now recanting his trial testimony as Hunter's motion implied and would testify at a new trial, he could still be impeached at a new trial with his prior inconsistent statements given at Hunter's original trial. See § 90.608(1), Fla. Stat. (2007). In light of the strong testimonial evidence establishing Hunter's guilt, we conclude that the newly discovered evidence would not probably produce an acquittal on retrial. Accordingly, we hold that the circuit court did not err in denying an evidentiary hearing on Hunter's claim of newly discovered evidence that another codefendant was the shooter.