Opinion ID: 201768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Right of Appeal and Collateral Challenge

Text: 17 Ciampi argues that the district court violated Rule 11(c), in that it failed to specifically inquire during the plea colloquy whether he understood that he was waiving his right to appeal or to collaterally challenge the gambling conviction. Ciampi relies upon United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 24 (1st Cir.2001), where we asserted that such a waiver-of-appeal provision normally would not be enforceable unless (i) the written plea agreement signed by the defendant contains a clear statement elucidating the waiver and delineating its scope; (ii) the court's interrogation [during the plea hearing] suffices to ensure that the defendant freely and intelligently agreed to waive her right to appeal her forthcoming sentence, and (iii) the waiver otherwise constitutes a miscarriage of justice. Id. at 24-25; see Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(b)(1)(N) (noting that court must address the defendant personally in open court ... [and] inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands ... the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence). The Ciampi contention fails. 18 First, it is undisputed that paragraph 6 of the Ciampi plea agreement contains a plain expression of the nature of the waiver, and that paragraph 4 likewise clearly states its scope: This disposition encompasses both the counts of the Indictment and the Information to which Defendant is pleading guilty, and the count of the Indictment on which the jury found Defendant guilty.  (Emphasis added.) Ciampi was given a copy of the plea agreement at the plea hearing, and his counsel signed an acknowledgment that Ciampi had read and understood its provisions. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26 (noting that attorney acknowledgments furnish prima facie evidence of the appellant's knowledge and volition). 19 Second, turning to the evidence contained in the transcript of the plea colloquy, the government recited in open court all the terms of the plea agreement, including the waiver of appellate and habeas rights. Immediately thereafter the district court addressed Ciampi and asked [A]re those the terms of your agreement with the government as you understand them? Ciampi answered yes. During the hearing, the court had repeatedly told Ciampi that he could consult with his attorney if he did not understand anything the court said. Although it is true that the district court never asked Ciampi specifically or directly: Do you understand the provision waiving your appellate and habeas rights, we have prescribed no mandatory language for such an inquiry because the circumstances will vary from case to case, from defendant to defendant, and from plea agreement to plea agreement. We caution only that the court's interrogation should be specific enough to confirm the defendant's understanding of the waiver and her acquiescence in the relinquishment of rights that it betokens. Id. at 24 n. 7. The temporal proximity of the government's open-court recitation and the district court's omnibus inquiry satisfy us that Ciampi was not unduly prejudiced by the district court's failure to repeat each of the provisions just enumerated by the government. 20 Third, Teeter is legally distinguishable on one especially significant front. Rule 11(c) was last amended in 1999, following the Ciampi plea hearing in this case, whereas the Teeter case dealt with the amended rule. Prior to the 1999 amendment, some courts had approved waivers even though the district court had not engaged in the sort of specific questioning regarding the waiver now explicitly required under the new Rule 11(c). See id. at 24 (noting that 1999 amendment — which was in force when Teeter changed her plea — alters the decisional calculus) (citing United States v. Wenger, 58 F.3d 280, 282 (7th Cir.1995) (upholding a waiver despite the absence of specific questioning by the court)). Here, the government's recitation of the terms of the plea agreement, followed immediately by the district court's inquiry of Ciampi as to whether he understood the import of each of those terms, arguably satisfied the less specific, pre-1999 version of Rule 11. 4 21 Fourth, it is noteworthy that the district court said nothing else during the plea hearing which remotely would have negated or counteracted its inquiry regarding Ciampi's understanding of the waiver, or misled Ciampi into any false belief that he was retaining either his right to appeal or to assert a collateral challenge to the gambling conviction. Cf. Teeter, 257 F.3d at 26-27 (finding Rule 11(c) violation, noting that in addition to absence of direct inquiry, the court later confused defendant by asking: [D]o you also understand that both you and the government will have a right to appeal any sentence I impose?). 22 Finally, our holding does not rest exclusively upon either the written terms of the plea agreement or the precise words uttered during the plea colloquy. The ultimate test for determining Rule 11(c) compliance continues to be whether, given the totality of the circumstances, it fairly can be said that the defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. See Teeter, 257 F.3d at 24 (noting that the district court's failure to make particularized inquiry regarding waiver of rights of appeal, will constitute error and may serve to invalidate the waiver, depending upon what the record shows as to the defendants' knowledge (that is, whether the defendant, notwithstanding the absence of a particularized inquiry, understood the full significance of the waiver) and the existence vel non of prejudice). Here, we are well satisfied that the totality of the circumstances afford no good reason to suppose that Ciampi realistically could have expected that the government would enter into a plea agreement in which it dropped many of the serious counts remaining for retrial, arranged for a reduction in his potential sentence from 30 to 18 years, but then left him the prerogative to appeal and/or collaterally challenge his gambling conviction. See id. at 22 (Allowing a criminal defendant to agree to a waiver of appeal gives her an additional bargaining chip in negotiations with the prosecution; she may, for example, be able to exchange this waiver for the government's assent to the dismissal of other charges.). Far from creating a miscarriage of justice, id. at 25, the plea agreement in this case plainly conferred upon Ciampi a considerable benefit and an opportunity to escape the perils of a retrial, and Ciampi would have been naive indeed to suppose that he could have his cake ( viz., significantly reduced jail time) and eat it too ( viz., an appeal). 23 As the record on appeal, viewed in its entirely, amply persuades us that Ciampi understood the nature and scope of the waiver of appeal rights prescribed in the plea agreement, the district court correctly rejected his claim, and dismissed the amended habeas petition. 24 Affirmed.