Opinion ID: 2345444
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Attorney General Subpoena Power

Text: Neither Johnson, the State, nor the Superior Court has specifically addressed the fact that the seized letters were obtained pursuant to a subpoena issued by the Attorney General of Delaware. Rather, the argument on this point has been focused instead on case law which addresses the general right of prison officials to inspect, censor or confiscate inmate mail. Nonetheless, even when the issue is framed in terms of the Attorney General's subpoena power, the Superior Court's decision to deny Johnson's motion to suppress his letters to Stewart must be upheld. The Attorney General's right to seize evidence pursuant to a subpoena is statutory, arising under two provisions of the Delaware Code. [48] First, under title 29, section 2504(4) of the Delaware Code, the Attorney General has the power, duty and authority [t]o investigate matters involving the public peace, safety and justice and subpoena witnesses and evidence in connection therewith.... [49] Second, under title 29, section 2508(a), [t]he Attorney General or any assistant may ... issue process to compel the attendance of persons, witnesses and evidence at the office of the Attorney General or at such other place as designated. [50] In defining the scope of the subpoena power granted to the Attorney General, Delaware case law seems to interpret these statutes as interchangeable. [51] This Court has held that [t]he purpose of this statutory grant of power [is] to `confer upon the Attorney General, in the investigation of crime and other matters of public concern, powers similar to those inherent in grand juries', including the grand jury's power to `compel the appearance of witnesses and the production of documents.' [52] Importantly, however, although this subpoena power is similar to that of a grand jury, the Attorney General's power to investigate is not terminated by arrest or indictment, and continues throughout the prosecution of an alleged crime. [53] This Court has held that the Attorney General has no independent power to enforce a subpoena once it is issued. [54] Rather, if the individual to whom the subpoena has been directed refuses to abide by its terms, the Attorney General must seek redress in a court, which will then determine independently whether the subpoena is enforceable. [55] Similarly, the party presented with the subpoena may move to quash the subpoena, likewise triggering court review. [56] In this case, the subpoena was directed to the prison officials where Johnson was housed, rather than to Johnson himself. As Johnson stated in his motion to suppress the letters, [e]xamination and seizure of the mail has been conducted without the knowledge or approval of Defendant. In other words, the Attorney General's subpoena power went effectively unchecked, because Johnson had no notice and therefore no ability to seek court review of the subpoena before the Attorney General received copies of his mail. [57] Nonetheless, Johnson's inability to move to quash the subpoena prior to delivery of his letters to the State is not dispositive. Johnson did learn of the subpoena's issuance, when the State informed him that it planned to offer the letters into evidence at trial. The Superior Court thereafter independently reviewed the subpoena on Johnson's motion to suppress the letters, and found the subpoena valid. [58] The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires that a subpoena for the seizure of documents be reasonable. [59] In order to meet the test of reasonableness, (1) the subpoena must specify the materials to be produced with reasonable particularity, (2) the subpoena must require the production only of materials relevant to the investigation, and (3) the materials must not cover an unreasonable amount of time. [60] First, the subpoena here states: Please forward copy of all incoming and outgoing mail for inmate Shannon Johnson (SBI 0311727) from 11/15/2006. This command specifies with reasonable particularity what materials must be produced. Second, with respect to relevancy, the State's proffered basis for issuing the subpoena, as argued at the suppression hearing, was the belief that Mr. Johnson was tampering with the witness testimony. I believe that that's from the statement made from Ms. Stewart at the time of her plea on November 10, 2007, and then confirmed from the telephone conversations and the visitor logs. The defense argued that this basis for the subpoena only entitled the State, at most, to see letters that Johnson had sent directly to Truitt. The defense further argued that before it learned from two informants, in early January 2008, that Johnson and Stewart allegedly had a plot to kill Truitt, the State had no viable reason to access mail sent from Johnson to Stewart. The State's purpose of assuring Truitt's attendance and cooperation at trial, however, was sufficiently relevant to the subject matter of the subpoena. Johnson had been ordered to have no contact with Truitt. Contrary to the defense's argument, the information that the State had on December 6, 2007, supported inspection of all of Johnson's mail, and, in particular, his letters to Stewart. Stewart was the witness who alerted the State to Johnson's alleged contact with Truitt. The police could not contact Truitt herself. Stewart was the individual harboring Johnson at the time of his capture. [61] Cumulatively, this information presents a reasonable basis for the State to suspect that Johnson might attempt to contact Truitt indirectly, and that Stewart, in particular, might be involved in or aware of this communication. Moreover, after the information, revealed by the informants in January 2008, about a potential plot between Johnson and Stewart to kill Truitt, the State had even more reason to inspect all of Johnson's mail, and in particular his mail to Stewart. Third, with respect to the reasonableness of the time span covered by the records, the beginning date of November 15, 2006, on the subpoena reflects the date that Johnson was captured and began his pre-trial incarceration. It was reasonable to require the production of all letters that Johnson sent during the entirety of his incarceration pending trial in order to ascertain whether he had contact with Truitt either directly or indirectly. The State's reasonable purpose in making the inspection was to ensure that Truitt would be available to testify at Johnson's trial. We have concluded that the same standards that apply to the proper promulgation of a prison regulation regarding the inspection of inmate mail apply to the Attorney General's subpoena. Accordingly, we have applied the Martinez standard to the inspection and copying of Johnson's outgoing prison mail. The record reflects that although Johnson had no prior notice that his outgoing prison mail was being inspected and copied, his letters were not admitted into evidence until there had been an independent judicial determination that the issuance of the Attorney General's subpoena was reasonable. We hold that there was no violation of Johnson's rights under either the First or Fourth Amendments of the United States Constitution.