Opinion ID: 1926229
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Enhancement of appellant's sentence

Text: Appellant argues that because the government did not establish that appellant had been convicted of sex offenses against at least two victims, the trial court erred in enhancing his sentence to remove the possibility of parole under D.C.Code § 22-4120(a)(5). Appellant acknowledges that he was convicted of two federal offenses transportation in interstate commerce to commit rape and kidnapingand two rape offenses in the Commonwealth of Virginia. He argues, however, that the federal offenses, interstate transportation and kidnaping, are not sex offenses within the meaning of the enhancement statute, and that there was no finding on the record that the two rape convictions in Virginia involved two different women, which he claims is a requirement of the language in the District of Columbia Code that the prior offenses be committed against 2 or more victims. See D.C.Code § 22-4120(a)(5). Appellant's argument is frivolous. The record could not be more clear that appellant was convicted of two rape offenses against two different women in Virginia. There is no requirement, as appellant argues in his Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing and on appeal, that the convictions be less than ten years old. See D.C.Code § 22-4120. For the reasons stated above, we affirm appellant's conviction and the trial court's denial on the merits of his application to appoint counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. Affirmed.