Opinion ID: 1442370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Precedent Relevant to Student Speech in Public Schools

Text: Plaintiffs-Appellants' claims lead us to wrestle with a most difficult question: how to balance some students' rights to free speech with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone, Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), taking into account the authority of school officials to maintain the discipline and learning environment necessary to accomplish the school's educational mission. The district court granted the Board's motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs-Appellants' First Amendment and Equal Protection claims because the Confederate flag did not need to have caused a disruption in the past in order for school officials to ban it when (1) there were racially motivated incidents at the school that caused tension among the student body and (2) such a ban was not implemented in a viewpoint-discriminatory manner. J.A. at 35 (Tr. at 92:17-23); J.A. at 38 (Tr. at 95:6-9); J.A. at 41 (Tr. at 98:3-14). We affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Board. The Supreme Court has made clear that students do not `shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.' Morse v. Frederick, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2618, 2622, 168 L.Ed.2d 290 (2007) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733). [T]he constitutional rights of students in public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682, 106 S.Ct. 3159, 92 L.Ed.2d 549 (1986), and courts must apply the rights of students in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506, 89 S.Ct. 733). In Tinker, the Court considered whether a public school district violated high-school and junior-high-school students' First Amendment rights when the district suspended students who had worn black armbands to school as an expression of their opposition to the Vietnam War. The school had implemented a ban on the wearing of armbands after learning of some students' plans to protest the war by wearing black armbands during the holiday season in December 1965. The Court determined that because the wearing of armbands. . . was entirely divorced from actually or potentially disruptive conduct by those participating in it, the wearing of the armbands was closely akin to `pure speech.' Tinker, 393 U.S. at 505-06, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court also determined that there existed no evidence that the suspended students' protest interfered with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone and, accordingly, that the case did not concern speech or action that intrude[d] upon the work of the schools or the rights of other students. Id. at 508, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court concluded that the school's ban on armbands was motivated by an urgent wish to avoid the controversy which might result from the expression. Id. at 510, 89 S.Ct. 733. Because of the absence of evidence that the school authorities had reason to anticipate that the wearing of the armbands would substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students, the Court reversed the en banc court of appeals decision below affirming the district court's dismissal of the plaintiffs-students' complaint. Id. at 509, 514, 89 S.Ct. 733. In two subsequent cases, the Court qualified when the Tinker standard should be applied and clarified that schools did not in every situation need to justify regulation of student speech on the basis that the speech would materially and substantially interfere with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733 (quotation omitted). In Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser , the Court considered whether a public high school infringed upon a student's free-speech rights when the school suspended the student for violating a school policy that prohibited the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. 478 U.S. at 678, 106 S.Ct. 3159. The suspended student had given a speech at a school-sponsored assembly, in support of another student's candidacy for elective office, which employed an elaborate, graphic, and explicit sexual metaphor. Id. at 677-78, 106 S.Ct. 3159. The Court noted [t]he marked distinction between the political `message' of the armbands in Tinker and the sexual content of the respondent's speech in [ Fraser ], id. at 680, and observed that prior Court decisions had allowed limitations on speech in the interest of protecting children, especially those in captive audiences, from sexually explicit, vulgar, and offensive spoken language. Id. at 684, 106 S.Ct. 3159. Accordingly, the Court held that schools, as instruments of the state, may determine that the essential lessons of civil, mature conduct cannot be conveyed in a school that tolerates lewd, indecent, or offensive speech and conduct such as . . . Fraser's. . . plainly offensive [speech.] Id. at 683, 106 S.Ct. 3159. Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier involved a suit brought by former staff members of a high-school newspaper who argued that the school principal violated their First Amendment rights when he deleted two pages of the newspaper containing articles discussing students' experiences of pregnancy and the effect of divorce on students. The Court concluded that because the school lent its name and resources to the newspaper, the Tinker standard did not apply to the case. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272-73, 108 S.Ct. 562. The Court held that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. Id. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562. The above trilogy of cases yields three principles: (1) under Fraser, a school may categorically prohibit vulgar, lewd, indecent, or plainly offensive student speech, [5] Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-85, 106 S.Ct. 3159; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 n. 4, 108 S.Ct. 562; (2) under Hazelwood, a school has limited authority to censor school-sponsored student speech in a manner consistent with pedagogical concerns, 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562; and (3) the Tinker standard applies to all other student speech and allows regulation only when the school reasonably believes that the speech will substantially and materially interfere with schoolwork or discipline, 393 U.S. at 513, 89 S.Ct. 733. Guiles, 461 F.3d at 325; Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1176-77 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 1484, 167 L.Ed.2d 225 (2007); Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 214 (3d Cir.2001); see also Castorina ex rel. Rewt v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir.2001). Tinker governs the instant case because by wearing clothing depicting images of the Confederate flag students engage in pure speech not sponsored by the school. Castorina, 246 F.3d at 539-40. Hazelwood does not apply to the instant case because no one would reasonably believe that [Plaintiffs-Appellants' clothing] bore the school's imprimatur. Morse, 127 S.Ct. at 2627. Therefore, our inquiry in this case is whether the ban on clothing depicting the Confederate flag is necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with schoolwork or discipline. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 511, 89 S.Ct. 733. The Court's most recent student-speech case, Morse v. Frederick , does not modify our application of the Tinker standard to the instant case. Morse affirmed that schools may regulate some speech even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school and that the rule stated in Tinker is not the only basis for restricting student speech. 127 S.Ct. at 2627 (internal quotation omitted). The Morse decision, however, resulted in a narrow holding: a public school may prohibit student speech at school or at a school-sponsored event during school hours that the school reasonably view[s] as promoting illegal drug use. Id. at 2629. Justice Alito's concurrence states that he joins the majority opinion on the understanding that (a) it goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction of speech that can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or social issue. Id. at 2636 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito also makes clear that he joins the majority only insofar as the opinion does not hold that the special characteristics of the public schools necessarily justify any other speech restrictions beyond those articulated in Tinker, Fraser, and Hazelwood. Id. at 2637.