Opinion ID: 543179
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Safeco's Duty to Indemnify Miller

Text: 9
10 Central to the dispute is the interpretation of the term willful under Cal.Ins.Code Sec. 533 (West 1975), which states that [a]n insurer is not liable for a loss caused by the wilful act of the insured.... Section 533 applies to all insurance contracts in California, and is equivalent to an exclusionary clause in the contract itself. Evans v. Pacific Indem. Co., 49 Cal.App.3d 537, 540, 122 Cal.Rptr. 680, 682 (1975). Miller's Safeco policy, consistent with section 533, explicitly excludes from personal liability coverage those payments made to others for bodily injury caused by the insured which is expected or intended by any insured. 11 Citing a line of California cases, Morton contends that section 533 only excludes harmful conduct from coverage if the insured intended the harmful consequences of the conduct (citing Clemmer v. Hartford Ins. Co., 22 Cal.3d 865, 887, 151 Cal.Rptr. 285, 297, 587 P.2d 1098, 1110 (1978)). Congregation of Rodef Sholom of Marin v. American Motorists Ins. Co., 91 Cal.App.3d 690, 696-97, 154 Cal.Rptr. 348, 351-52 (1979). She distinguishes the presence of a specific intent to do harm from the presence of an intent solely to do the acts. She argues that only the former is embraced by the exclusion. Any harm flowing from the latter, however, is within the coverage of Safeco's policy, Morton argues. 12 Her argument fails because California and most other states infer[ ] a specific intent to injure as a matter of law from the fact of sexual misconduct with a minor. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Abbott, 204 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1026, 251 Cal.Rptr. 620, 629 (1988), review denied, Dec. 15, 1988. 2 That inference may not be overcome by evidence of a subjective lack of intent to harm. Id. at 1029, 251 Cal.Rptr. at 630. 13 We have accepted these decisions as authoritative statements of California law. See State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Estate of Jenner, 874 F.2d 604 (9th Cir.1989); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Abraio, 874 F.2d 619 (9th Cir.1989). Thus, we have held California's inference of intent to be an irrebuttable presumption of intent to harm if the insured could form the intent to act. Abraio, 874 F.2d at 622. 14 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the district court was correct in holding that acts of sexual molestation committed by Miller against Morton are excluded from coverage under his policy pursuant to section 533. 15
16 Safeco also alleged that sexual molestation, by its nature, is purposeful, not accidental, and therefore is not within the scope of coverage set forth by the policy. See note 2, supra. We agree. In Merced Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 213 Cal.App.3d 41, 50, 261 Cal.Rptr. 273, 279 (1989), the California Court of Appeal concluded that [a]n accident ... is never present when the insured performs a deliberate act unless some additional, unexpected, independent, and unforeseen happening occurs that produces the damage. Applying that conclusion to the case before it, which concerned forcible sexual assault of an adult woman, the court concluded that the conduct was not an accident within the meaning of the policy. Id. at 50, 261 Cal.Rptr. at 280. See also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Talbot, 690 F.Supp. 886, 888-89 (N.D.Cal.1988) (applying the same reasoning to case of sexual molestation of a minor); Western Nat'l Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 43 Wash.App. 816, 822, 719 P.2d 954, 958 (1986) (same). We affirm, therefore, on this alternative ground as well.