Opinion ID: 2633370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Discussion: Pretrial Issues

Text: On September 29, 1982, before defendant was arraigned, his defense counsel expressed a doubt as to defendant's present competence. The trial court agreed and appointed two psychiatrists, Dr. Paul Cutting and Dr. Francis Criswell, to examine defendant. The proceedings were suspended until the two doctors could examine defendant and file their reports with the court. On October 27, 1982, the court was in possession of the reports of both doctors. Both found defendant was legally competent. Defense counsel and the prosecutor submitted the question of defendant's competence on these two psychiatric reports, and the trial court found defendant competent. The proceedings then resumed. Defendant contends the failure to hold a full-blown adversarial hearing on the question of his competence deprived him of due process and requires that we vacate his convictions. Essentially, defendant claims counsel could not waive a full jury trial with live witnesses. We rejected this precise claim in People v. McPeters (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1148, 1169, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146: Section 1368 entitles defendant to a `hearing' on the issue of competence and he received one. Although defendant's counsel, for understandable reasons, elected to waive certain available incidents of the hearing procedure, i.e., the right to jury trial and the rights to present oral testimony and to confront and cross-examine witnesses, defendant presented evidence and received an independent judicial determination of his competence to stand trial based on the stipulated record. [Citation.] [¶] Defendant cites no authority holding that submission to the court of the issue of competence to stand trial based on psychiatric reports is per se unconstitutional or a violation of statute. Of course, trial of an incompetent defendant violates an accused's right to due process. ( Medina v. California (1992) 505 U.S. 437, 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 120 L.Ed.2d 353; Pate v. Robinson (1966) 383 U.S. 375, 378, 86 S.Ct. 836,15 L.Ed.2d 815; People v. Hale (1988) 44 Cal.3d 531, 539, 244 Cal.Rptr. 114, 749 P.2d 769; People v. Pennington (1967) 66 Cal.2d 508, 58 Cal. Rptr. 374, 426 P.2d 942.) But contrary to defendant's arguments, neither Hale nor any of our other precedents precludes a defense attorney from waiving a jury, forgoing the right to present live witnesses, and submitting the competency determination on the psychiatric reports filed with the court. The statutory references to a hearing (§ 1368, subd. (b)) or a trial (§ 1369) simply mean that a determination of competency must be made by the court (or a jury if one is not waived), not, as defendant contends, that there must be a court or jury trial, at which the criminal defendant's rights of confrontation, cross examination, compulsory process and to present evidence are honored by the court and counsel. Unlike in People v. Marks (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1335, 1343, 248 Cal.Rptr. 874, 756 P.2d 260, defense counsel did not attempt to waive the competency issue; he merely submitted the matter on the psychiatric reports. To the extent defendant attempts to impugn the validity of the appointed experts' conclusions on grounds they failed to consider the effect of defendant's medication on his competency, the time to raise such a challenge has long since passed. Having submitted the competency determination on the two psychiatric reports, defendant may not now relitigate that question with arguments he did not make below. We also reject the further claim that defense counsel was constitutionally ineffective under the state and federal Constitutions for waiving a jury trial and submitting the matter on the reports. We have examined the reports and conclude counsel's decision against challenging the conclusions therein was a reasonable one. [2] Defendant cites two appellate opinions in support, but neither assists him. To the extent defendant contends Moore v. United States (9th Cir.1972) 464 F.2d 663, 666, indicates the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals applies a per se reversal rule to a competency determination submitted on medical reports rather than pursuant to a full-blown jury trial, we agree with respondent that defendant misconstrues the federal appellate court's position on this issue. ( Greenfield v. Gunn (9th Cir.1977) 556 F.2d 935, 939 [submission of competency question on doctor's reports permissible].) Finally, People v. Ramirez (1979) 25 Cal.3d 260, 158 Cal.Rptr. 316, 599 P.2d 622, also cited in support, is manifestly distinguishable; Ramirez concerned the procedural due process that must be afforded before an inmate can be excluded from the California Rehabilitation Center. Ramirez sheds no light on whether a defense attorney validly may waive the trial authorized by section 1369 and submit the competency determination on the psychiatric reports. In sum, we have already decided a defense attorney may validly submit a competency determination on the available psychiatric reports ( People v. McPeters, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1169, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 834, 832 P.2d 146), and defendant fails to persuade us McPeters was decided incorrectly. We thus reject this claim, finding no error under section 1368, no violation of either the state or federal Constitution, and no showing counsel was constitutionally ineffective for deciding to submit the competency determination on the psychiatric reports.
Citing prejudicial pretrial coverage of his trial in the local media, defendant moved for a change of venue from Kern County. In support, he submitted to the trial court a survey of public opinion about the case and 12 articles from the Bakersfield Californian, the area's major newspaper. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion. Defendant now claims the trial court erred. The applicable principles are settled. A trial court should grant a change of venue when the defendant demonstrates a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, he cannot obtain a fair trial. ( People v. Jennings (1991) 53 Cal.3d 334, 359, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009; People v. Williams (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1112, 1125, 259 Cal.Rptr. 473, 774 P.2d 146.) On appeal, we make an independent determination of whether a fair trial was obtainable. ( Jennings, supra, at p. 360, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009; People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 177, 222 Cal.Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480.) To make that decision, we examine five factors: the nature and gravity of the offense, the nature and extent of the news coverage, the size of the community, the status of the defendant in the community, and the popularity and prominence of the victim. ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 495, 268 Cal.Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640.) Because this is a capital case and a double murder, the nature and gravity of the offense tilts strongly in favor of granting a change of venue, although this factor is not dispositive. ( People v. Jennings, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 360, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009.) The size of the community is relatively neutral; as defendant asserts, Kern County is neither large nor small. At the time of trial, the county had a population exceeding 450,000 and Bakersfield, where the trial was held, had a population of 200,000. The key consideration is whether it can be shown that the population is of such a size that it `neutralizes or dilutes the impact of adverse publicity.' ( Jennings, supra, at p. 363, 279 Cal.Rptr. 780, 807 P.2d 1009, quoting Lansdown v. Superior Court (1970) 10 Cal. App.3d 604, 609, 89 Cal.Rptr. 154.) As explained, post, the adverse publicity in this case was neither relentless nor virulent. The moderate size of Kern County thus does not undermine the trial court's decision to deny the change of venue motion. Both defendant and the victims were strangers to the community, and neither held any position of prominence or popularity. Although defendant argues the fact that the victims were a young couple starting their life together and were religious, church-going people necessarily enhanced their status in the community, nothing in the record suggests these factors had any effect on the jury pool. The nature, extent, and penetration of the news coverage, especially from the Bakersfield Californian, was the most heavily litigated of the five factors. Defendant contends the press coverage flowed evenly for months, was vituperative in nature, pandered to base instincts, and referred to innuendoes that never proved true but which severely prejudiced [defendant]. By contrast, respondent argues [t]he coverage of the murders in the newspaper in question was factual, not sensational. The truth lies somewhere between these two characterizations. Defendant submitted 12 articles from the Bakersfield Californian. They ranged from a short mention on February 7, 1981, of Radford's murder and Levoy's disappearance ( Man Found Beaten To Death On Desert Highway), to an article on July 28, 1982, reporting that defendant had been linked to the crimes ( San Quentin Inmate Linked To Kern Homicide Victim), to a June 7, 1983, article describing defense attorney's request for a pretrial gag order ( Gag Order Asked In Murder Trial). The period of time in which the 12 articles were published was 29 months, hardly a flood of information. Jury selection began on October 9, 1984, 16 months after publication of the last article submitted by defendant. This interval suggests that any possible prejudice flowing from the press coverage was blunted by the passage of time. With two significant exceptions, the 12 articles are largely factual and not sensational, although the reader is naturally swayed by reports of the anguish of the victims' friends and relatives. Two articles went beyond mere factual reporting. On August 12, 1982, the Bakersfield Californian published an article bearing the headline Suspect Expresses Regret At Raping Virgin. The article noted Levoy was good-looking, a Mormon, and a virgin. Defendant was reported as regretting raping her because he thought that meant she wouldn't go to heaven. The same article noted that in addition to the two murders and kidnapping, defendant was charged with rape, sodomy, and oral copulation, charges that were later dropped. Then, on Sunday, May 29, 1983, the main headline on the front page of the Bakersfield Californian stated, Man Boasts About His Killings; the subheading read, Trucker Suspected In Rapes, Murders Of Two Dozen Hitchhikers. The article reported on revelations from court documents that defendant had told cellmate Ricky Gibson that although it takes a long time to strangle someone, it's exciting, very exciting, to watch a woman turn blue after she has taken her last breath. (Defendant later testified at trial he generally exaggerated his crimes to Gibson to appear more dangerous and intimidating, and that he did not realize he was strangling Levoy, but blacked out when she bit him. He specifically denied telling Gibson that he liked to watch women turn blue when they were dying.) The article continued, reporting that law enforcement officers in seven states suspect [defendant] may be involved in as many as two dozen hitchhiker homicides, including numerous rapes. Defendant has not, however, been charged with or convicted of any other hitchhiker-related crimes, with the exception of his crimes against David Galbraith and Michelle D., discussed post, which occurred after Radford's and Levoy's murders. The same article reported that in one incident, when defendant drove off with Michelle D. and raped her, he kept her for several days, raping and sodomizing her in the sleeper compartment of his truck-trailer rig as he drove to his home in Oroville. [¶] He locked her in the closet in Oroville, taking her out only for sex. This lurid tale proved largely untrue, as the victim's own testimony at the penalty phase shows. In short, neither defendant's nor respondent's characterization of the publicity leading up to the trial is accurate. Two newspaper articles that went well beyond mere factual reporting created a potential for prejudice. These articles emphasized the more sensational aspects of the case, aspects that the evidence presented at trial showed were either not true or not proved. Did publication of these two articles tip the balance, requiring the trial court to grant defendant's motion for a change of venue? We conclude they did not. Although the potential for prejudice was certainly present, almost 17 months had elapsed from the time of the most inflammatory article to the commencement of jury selection. More importantly, the evidence of public opinion presented by defendant's own expert demonstrated that the effect of the two sensationalistic articles was minimal. Defendant employed Terry Newell, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, to conduct a poll of public opinion. Of 377 persons contacted at random, only 187, or 53 percent, had even heard of the case. Of those 187 persons, only 18 percent recalled defendant was suspected of crimes in other states, 14 percent thought their knowledge of the case would affect their verdict if they were to serve on defendant's jury, and 17 percent already thought he was guilty. The survey, moreover, was conducted on July 22-24, 1983, more than a year before jury selection began. Because the record does not indicate additional articles were published, we assume the public's recollection of the case diminished over time. Examination of the voir dire proceedings also supports the conclusion that pretrial publicity failed to penetrate the public's consciousness to such an extent as to compromise defendant's ability to obtain. a fair trial. Although many prospective jurors averred they recalled something about the case, the vast majority assured the court they could set aside their impressions and judge the case fairly. Although defendant emphasizes the number of prospective jurors who recalled something about the case, jurors need not be wholly ignorant of the facts of a case. It is sufficient if the jurors can, as here, assure the court they can set aside their prior impressions and render a decision based solely on the evidence presented in court. ( People v. Bean (1988) 46 Cal.3d 919, 941, 251 Cal.Rptr. 467, 760 P.2d 996.) In sum, although the gravity and nature of the crime support a change of venue, the size of the community is a neutral factor, and the status of both defendant and his victims in the community supports a denial of a change of venue. The critical factor, the extent and nature of the pretrial publicity, wasconsidering the totality of the evidencemildly supportive of a denial of a change of venue despite the publication of two potentially prejudicial articles. Weighing all these factors, we conclude the trial court correctly denied the motion. [3]
In preliminary proceedings, the court organized the jury pool into groups, telling certain prospective jurors to return for voir dire after lunch, while assigning others future times and days in which they were to return to court for voir dire. Before the latter jurors left the courtroom, the trial court did not admonish them against discussing the case, reading or listening to media accounts, or visiting the scene of the crimes. Defendant acknowledges that the statutory requirement that jurors be admonished (§ 1122) applies only after a jury is sworn and thus does not expressly apply to this preliminary period in the jury selection process. ( People v. Horton (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1068, 1094, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478.) Nevertheless, he contends the trial court's failure to admonish the jury violated his federal constitutional rights to a fair trial, an impartial jury, and a reliable guilt and penalty verdict, as well as his analogous rights under the state Constitution. We have explained that the giving of the admonition to prospective jurors during the voir dire process constitutes a sound judicial practice ( People v. Horton, supra, 11 Cal.4th at p. 1094, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 516, 906 P.2d 478), but that failure to do so does not constitute error. Because our Horton opinion makes no mention of whether we considered all the constitutional bases defendant now asserts, Horton does not fully dispose of defendant's claim. We nevertheless find three reasons why the claim is meritless. First, defendant failed to object or call the trial court's attention to the lack of an admonishment. The issue is thus forfeited on appeal. (Cf. People v. Heishman (1988) 45 Cal.3d 147, 175, 246 Cal.Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629 [where § 1122 applies, a timely objection is necessary].) Second, even assuming the issue were preserved for appeal, we are unaware of any constitutional requirement that our trial courts admonish prospective jurors so far in advance of a trial. Certainly defendant does not cite any authority to that effect. Third, any prospective jurors who discuss the case, form opinions, view the crime scene, or do legal research can be discovered during the voir dire process and be either excused or rehabilitated at that time. Although defendant directs our attention to a few jurors who may have acquainted themselves with the law after being notified they might be chosen for the jury, he fails to explain why his right to a fair trial and an impartial jury could not be protected by rehabilitating those jurors or excusing them for cause or peremptorily if they could not be rehabilitated. He thus fails to show prejudice. ( People v. Heishman, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 175, 246 Cal. Rptr. 673, 753 P.2d 629.) Defendant's ability to strike such jurors also protects his rights under both the state and federal Constitutions to a reliable verdict. Defendant also contends his trial attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to ask the court to admonish the prospective jurors. He claims his counsel could have had no conceivable tactical reason for the omission. Even assuming that to be true, defendant fails to demonstrate how he was prejudiced. Accordingly, he does not show his trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective under either the state or federal Constitution. ( In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257, 259 Cal.Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 691-692, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.)
During voir dire, two venirepersons questioned by defense counsel expressed the general belief that the death penalty was the appropriate penalty for all murders. Defendant challenged the prospective jurors for cause. In each instance, the prosecutor questioned the prospective juror and rehabilitated him somewhat. The trial court denied defendant's challenges for cause, leading defendant to excuse each venireperson by exercising a peremptory challenge. Defendant now contends the trial court's failure to excuse the two prospective jurors for cause violated his rights under the state and federal Constitutions. We disagree. The state and federal constitutional guarantees of a trial by an impartial jury include the right in a capital case to a jury whose members will not automatically impose the death penalty for all murders, but will instead consider and weigh the mitigating evidence in determining the appropriate sentence. ( People v. Crittenden (1994) 9 Cal.4th 83, 120-121, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) [A] juror may be challenged for cause based upon his or her views concerning capital punishment only if those views would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of the juror's duties as defined by the court's instructions and the juror's oath. ( Id. at p. 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887, quoting Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841.) If the death penalty is imposed by a jury containing even one juror who would vote automatically for the death penalty without considering the mitigating evidence, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence. ( Morgan v. Illinois (1992) 504 U.S. 719, 729, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492.) Assessing the qualifications of jurors challenged for cause is a matter falling within the broad discretion of the trial court. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1146, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) The trial court must determine whether the prospective juror will be unable to faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case. ( Id. at p. 1147, 36 Cal. Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1.) A juror will often give conflicting or confusing answers regarding his or her impartiality or capacity to serve, and the trial court must weigh the juror's responses in deciding whether to remove the juror for cause. The trial court's resolution of these factual matters is binding on the appellate court if supported by substantial evidence. ( Ibid.) [W]here equivocal or conflicting responses are elicited regarding a prospective juror's ability to impose the death penalty, the trial court's determination as to his true state of mind is binding on an appellate court. [Citations.] ( People v. Ghent (1987) 43 Cal.3d 739, 768, 239 Cal.Rptr. 82, 739 P.2d 1250.) Applying these rules to this case, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's two challenges for cause. At the threshold, we note that a defendant challenging on appeal the denial of a challenge for cause must fulfill a trio of procedural requirements: (1) the defense must exercise a peremptory challenge to remove the juror in question; (2) the defense must exhaust all available peremptory challenges; and (3) the defense must express dissatisfaction with the jury as finally constituted. ( People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) In this case, defense counsel moved to excuse Prospective Jurors B.M. and F.M. for cause, each challenge was denied, and counsel exercised a peremptory challenge to remove each juror. Counsel subsequently exhausted the 26 peremptory challenges then granted by statute. (Pen. Code, former § 1070, subd. (a), repealed by Stats. 1988, ch. 1245, § 30, p. 4155; see now Code Civ. Proc., § 231, subd. (a), added by Stats.1988, ch. 1245, § 2, p. 4152 [granting each side 20 peremptory challenges in a capital case].) Defense counsel failed, however, to express on the record his dissatisfaction with the jury. Defendant concedes as much. Accordingly, the issue was not preserved for appeal, as it is possible that counsel, despite initial misgivings, was ultimately satisfied with the overall composition of the jury. Also possible is that, had counsel expressed dissatisfaction, the trial court would have allowed him to exercise additional peremptory challenges. (See People v. Bittaker (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1046, 1087, 259 Cal.Rptr. 630, 774 P.2d 659.) Although a procedural obstacle thus exists to reaching this issue on appeal, we do not, for several reasons, rest our decision solely on this procedural lacuna. First, language in past cases suggested that counsel's expression of dissatisfaction with the jury was not always a necessary prerequisite to challenging on appeal a trial court's decision denying a challenge for cause. (E.g., People v. Crittenden, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 121, fn. 4, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 474, 885 P.2d 887.) Second, defendant argues it is inconceivable that counsel was satisfied with the jury, as it contained one juror with strong ties to the law enforcement community who stated on voir dire that he believed the death penalty was warranted for any premeditated murder. Third, because the presence of even a single juror compromising the impartiality of the jury requires reversal, counsel would be constitutionally ineffective if he had failed to voice dissatisfaction with the jury as constituted, all the while knowing a biased juror was sitting among the 12 seated jurors. We thus turn to the merits.
Juror B.M, a refinery worker, professed knowing almost nothing about the case. He informed the court that he could impose either the death penalty or a life sentence without the possibility of parole, depending on all the evidence he heard. But when defense counsel Donnalee Huffman asked him his views concerning the death penalty, Mr. B.M. stated that, as a taxpayer, I am personally in favor of it. He admitted he was more apt to impose a sentence of death over life imprisonment and, when asked whether there was any other way that you could vote, he replied, I don't believe so. The prosecutor, Ronald Shumaker, then explained to the juror the penalty phase process, with the People presenting aggravating evidence and the defense presenting mitigating evidence. He further explained that the trial court would instruct the jury to weigh the two sides before coming to a decision on the appropriate penalty. The following then occurred: Q [Mr. Shumaker] Could you, if the Court instructs you in that regard, follow those instructions and make a decision on that kind of a standard? A [Juror B.M.] Yes, on that standard, yes. Q Even though you may feel that the life without parole is an expensive process, you could still render that decision if in fact you felt that the factors favoring [a life term] outweighed those favoring the death penalty? A Yes, I could. This record indicates that although Juror B.M. initially expressed the view he would automatically vote for the death penalty, when informed of the penalty phase process he retracted that rigid position and professed a willingness and ability to follow the trial court's instructions to weigh all the evidence before coming to a penalty decision. The trial court obviously credited this latter testimony in denying the challenge for cause. Substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual determination. We thus find no abuse of discretion in the court's denial of the challenge to Juror B.M. for cause.
When questioned by the trial court, Juror F.M. affirmed his ability to vote for life imprisonment without the possibility of parole if, based on all the facts, it was the appropriate penalty. He could also vote for the death penalty. When questioned by cocounsel for the defense, Donnalee Huffman, however, Juror F.M. stated that if a person's life is taken and he is found guilty, then he should be sentenced to death. When asked whether every murder conviction should be given the death penalty, Juror F.M. replied, Well, I think so, yes, murder conviction, yes. He admitted he was death penalty prone and that he believed the death penalty was the proper punishment in almost every situation. He also stated, however, that he could consider sympathy and mercy and that to vote for a life sentence, he would look for mitigating factors such as medical and psychiatric testimony. He several times averred he would have to hear the evidence from the entire case before making up his mind. Mr. Shumaker explained to the juror the penalty phase process, including the necessity of weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence, and asked him whether, [i]f the Court tells you that that's the law and the instruction you are to follow in this case, do you feel that you could do that? He replied, Yes, life without parole, yes. He also affirmed that he could judge both sides of the issue by the same standard. As with Juror B.M, the record indicates that although Juror F.M. initially asserted that he would automatically vote for the death penalty, he modified his view when informed by the prosecutor of the penalty phase process. He then affirmed his willingness and ability to follow the trial court's instructions to weigh all the evidence before coming to a penalty decision. We cannot say the trial court's decision to credit these statements was made in the absence of substantial evidence, or that its decision to deny the challenge for cause was an abuse of discretion. In the alternative, defendant argues the trial court's erroneous denial of his two challenges for cause forced him to excuse Jurors B.M. and F.M. by exercising two of his peremptory challenges, thereby infringing on his federal constitutional right to a state-created liberty interest in his full statutory complement of peremptory challenges. He claims he should not be forced to surrender one constitutional right (his asserted state-created liberty interest in a full complement of peremptory challenges) to vindicate another constitutional right (his right to a jury free from biased jurors). We rejected this argument in People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1248, footnote 4, 270 Cal.Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251, [4] and defendant does not convince us we should reconsider that decision. We conclude defendant failed to preserve this issue for appeal, and that even if the issue were properly before us, he does not demonstrate the trial court abused its wide discretion when it denied his challenge to Jurors B.M. and F.M. for cause. Moreover, because neither prospective juror actually sat on defendant's jury, he was not deprived of his constitutional right to an impartial jury. ( Ross v. Oklahoma (1988) 487 U.S. 81, 86, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80.)