Opinion ID: 1189530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: on appellant's motion to vacate decree

Text: DECREE REVERSED WITH DIRECTIONS TO DISMISS. TOOZE, J. This matter is now before us upon the motion of the defendant Florence Polen Meyer to vacate the decree entered by the trial court on June 15, 1954, from which decree defendant appealed to this court. This suit was commenced in the circuit court for Multnomah county on March 26, 1953, by Arthur M. Dibble, as guardian of the person and estate of Louis E. Meyer, an incompetent person, as plaintiff, for the purpose of annulling the marriage of said Louis E. Meyer and Florence Polen (the defendant), which occurred  on September 10, 1952. On April 13, 1953, Louis E. Meyer died, and the cause of suit abated. Thereafter, Arthur M. Dibble, acting under an order of the probate court purporting to appoint him a special administrator for the sole purpose of continuing said suit, was substituted as a party plaintiff herein, and, as such, prosecuted the suit to its termination by the decree of June 15, 1954. After defendant had perfected her appeal to this court from that decree, and before having made any appearance in this court on the appeal, Arthur M. Dibble died. On November 18, 1954, Walter E. Meyer, a nephew of Louis E. Meyer, deceased, filed his motion in this court to be substituted as a plaintiff herein in lieu of Arthur M. Dibble, deceased, or in the alternative that he be added as a party plaintiff. On January 12, 1955, by written opinion, we denied that motion. In denying the motion we held that the original appointment of Arthur M. Dibble as a special administrator was void, and that as such special administrator he had no legal capacity to prosecute such suit. We also held that the death of Louis E. Meyer on April 13, 1953, abated the suit, and that it could not be revived. 4, 5. The decree entered in said suit on June 15, 1954, is void and of no effect. The trial court had no jurisdiction to enter such a decree. The death of Louis E. Meyer, and not the decree, terminated the marriage relation. Upon the death of Louis E. Meyer prior to the decree, the trial court lost all jurisdiction of the subject matter of the suit. When Dibble, purporting to act as a special administrator, moved the trial court to be substituted as party plaintiff, the court was advised of the death of Louis E. Meyer. It should then have refused to proceed further and dismissed the suit,  acting on its own motion if necessary. Anderson, Adm. v. Clough et al., 191 Or 292, 302, 230 P2d 204; Holton v. Holton, 64 Or 290, 296, 129 P 532. 6. However, the appeal from the purported final decree transferred jurisdiction of the cause to this court for trial de novo. The matter is now out of the hands of the trial court. Therefore, it remains for us to do what is necessary and proper in the premises. 7. There has been no appearance in this court in opposition to the motion now under consideration; in fact, there is no one who could properly appear in opposition. From the record before us, and in the light of what we said in Dibble, Special Administrator, v. Meyer, supra, it is manifest that defendant must prevail on her appeal. Reason dictates that the matter be promptly and finally terminated, and, to that end, we shall treat the motion before us as a submission of the matter upon its merits. Simply to dismiss the appeal, as is suggested in the motion to vacate the decree, as an alternative, would not accomplish the result which the facts and the law demand. It is unnecessary for us in this opinion to discuss further the merits of the case, as we covered the subject in detail in our former opinion: Dibble, Special Administrator, v. Meyer, supra. The decree is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the suit.