Opinion ID: 6335605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Finding Regarding A.K.’s Overdose Death

Text: First, Major argues that the district court clearly erred when it determined that he supplied the drugs that contributed to A.K.’s death. Significantly, the government did not seek a statutory enhancement to Major’s sentence because he was not charged with the particular sale of drugs to Bukowski that Bukowski resold to A.K. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) (requiring a sentence of twenty years to life if “death or serious bodily injury results from the use of [the distributed] substance”); U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(a)(2) (increasing the base offense level if “the offense of conviction establishes that death … resulted from the use of the substance”(emphasis added)). 1 Rather, the district court considered its finding about the relationship between Major and A.K.’s death when it weighed the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Major’s argument on this point boils down to a contention that A.K. must have acquired more drugs from a different source after leaving Bukowski’s home. Major seems to believe 1 For this reason, the government did not have to prove that the heroin and fentanyl Major distributed was the “but-for” cause of A.K.’s death, under Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204, 218–19 (2014). See United States v. Lawler, 818 F.3d 281, 285 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Nothing … prevents a sentencing court, when determining a defendant’s ultimate sentence, from considering the fact that death resulted,” even if the government cannot prove but-for causation beyond a reasonable doubt). 14 No. 20-2829 that, because A.K. did not overdose the first time she injected the drugs Bukowski provided, A.K. could not have subsequently overdosed if she injected the remainder of the drugs at home. But these inferences are not supported by the evidence submitted at the sentencing hearing. Cf. Lucas, 670 F.3d at 792 (noting that sentencing determinations cannot be based on “speculation or unfounded allegations”). Bukowski testified that A.K. was “really, really messed up” immediately after injecting the fentanyl-laced heroin that Bukowski had received from Major. In fact, Bukowski testified that she had shot up heroin with a number of people but had “never seen nobody act like that.” A.K.’s behavior was strange enough that Bukowski contacted her boyfriend at the time to share her concern. Evidence also reflected that A.K. left Bukowski’s apartment in an Uber around 7:30 PM and that she took the remaining drugs from Major with her when she left. Her mother told officers that A.K. arrived home, briefly greeted her, and then went to her room, where the mother found her unresponsive the next morning. Bukowski also testified that A.K. had asked her and her boyfriend for heroin because she was new in town, was concerned about soon experiencing withdrawal symptoms, and had no other means of acquiring the drugs. And, though A.K. left Bukowski’s apartment with leftover heroin, no drugs were found in A.K.’s home. Finally, the autopsy report concluded that the toxic effects of heroin and fentanyl contributed to A.K.’s death. This evidence supports the district court’s finding. Furthermore, the district court specifically found that Bukowski was credible. “[W]here a sentencing challenge boils down to a credibility decision, … our review is especially deferential to the district judge’s assessment of the testimony.” No. 20-2829 15 United States v. Etchin, 614 F.3d 726, 738 (7th Cir. 2010). And even though no corroboration is necessary for a court to accept witness testimony, see id. at 739, Bukowski’s statements, the testimony of the investigating officer, the Uber receipts, and text messages from the time all corroborate each other. The district court’s finding was not clearly erroneous, and this finding supported its weighing of the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).