Opinion ID: 2092103
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Predominance of Common Questions of Law and Fact.

Text: Defendants first argue that the plaintiffs have failed to establish one of the criteria of the rules, that common questions of law or fact predominate over any question affecting only individual members. See Iowa R.Civ.P. 42.3(a)(5). Inherent in our inquiry into the predomination issue is the recognition of the class action device is appropriate only where class members have common complaints that can be presented by designated representatives in the unified proceeding. The question as to whether common issues of fact or law predominate over those affecting only individuals is a fairly complex one. The defendants, in attacking the class action certification, point to the alleged oral contracts relied upon by the plaintiffs and claim that oral contracts, by their very nature, are unsuitable for class action treatment because they are not necessarily the same in each case. We recognize and appreciate the difficulty involved in trying a class action suit based on individual, oral representations. See Simon v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 482 F.2d 880, 882 (5th Cir.1973); Miller v. Central Chincilla Group, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 411, 415 (S.D.Iowa 1975); Ingenito v. Bermec, Corp., 376 F.Supp. 1154, 1166-67 (S.D.N.Y.1974). As we read the plaintiffs' petition, however, they merely refer in passing to the oral contracts. The gist of their claim is that the defendants' employment manual sets out a specific severance pay schedule with which defendants failed to comply. To the extent that all employees relied on the terms of the written provisions of that manual, their claims focus on common questions of whether the terms of the employment manual were violated. Defendants also argue that the severance pay policy had been revised and that the plaintiffs ignore the fact that, even under the provisions of the employment manual as it stood, they could not collect. Certification of a class action, however, does not depend on a determination of whether the plaintiffs will ultimately prevail on the merits but whether or not the requirements of the rule governing class actions are met. As the Supreme Court has stated: We find nothing in either the language or history of rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2152-53, 40 L.Ed.2d 732, 748 (1974). We believe the questions raised in this regard go to the merits of plaintiffs' claim and therefore do not have a direct bearing on the question of certification. The defendants also argue that the individual nature of the plaintiffs' damage claims make it difficult to process the case as a class action. They claim that the amount of severance pay that [plaintiffs] claim each individual is entitled to receive would vary with that individual's length of service with Blue Cross, with the rate of pay. They also contend that the length of time each employee had been employed after leaving EDSF and whether they received any severance pay, would require each plaintiff's claim to be treated differently. In this regard, it appears that the damage figure may be easily calculated as to each plaintiff by considering only the length of employment and the rate of pay of each member. In any event, the fact that a potential class action involves individual damage questions does not preclude class action certification when issues of liability are common to the class. See 1 Newburg on Class Actions, § 1155A, at 263-64 (1977). See also Letson v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 90 F.R.D. 642 (N.D.Ga.1981) (If damages alone had to be determined individually, this matter could still proceed as a class action.). The plaintiffs have presented other theories of liability including (1) that the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs as third-party beneficiaries of the agreement between the defendants BC/BS and EDSF concerning the transfer of employment. They also contend that the defendants stand to be unjustly enriched if liability is not imposed in this case and that, under the Iowa Wage Payment Collection Law, Iowa Code chapter 91A, the defendants are liable to the members of the class. It is not necessary that the individual claims be carbon copies of each other. One authority has observed that courts have held that [a class] action can be brought ... even though there is not a complete identity of facts relating to all class members, as long as a common nucleus of operative facts is present.... The common questions need not be dispositive of the entire action. In other words, predominate should not be automatically equated with determinative or significant. Therefore, when one or more of the central issues in the action are common to the class and can be said to predominate, the [class] action will be considered proper.... 7A Wright & Miller, supra § 1778, at 53-54. Despite the variations in the individual claims, the theories presented include common issues of fact and law which encourage the use of a class action procedure. The district court did not abuse its discretion in so holding.