Opinion ID: 200225
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantial truth

Text: 22 The district court went on to hold that the statement about the complaint through the State was also substantially true. A statement is not actionable [defamation] if it is substantially true. Simpkins v. Snow, 139 N.H. 735, 661 A.2d 772, 776 (1995). The district court interpreted the complaint as not disputing that two other complaints had been made against Moss. On that premise, it held the statement about the State complaint was not actionable: 23 [G]iven that Moss does not challenge the truth of Grabill's statement about the two direct complaints, the number of complaints against Moss — two versus three — is also an insubstantial detail. Even under the facts as alleged by Moss, multiple complaints of inappropriate contact have been made against him. Thus, Grabill's statement, which does little more than imply a third similar complaint, was substantially true — in the sense that complaints about inappropriate contact had indeed been made against Moss. 24 This is the same premise that led the court to conclude that with Moss having acknowledged that two similar complaints had been made to the Camp, the implication that a third complaint had been made to the State may not reasonably be read as further lowering the esteem in which Moss would be held. 25 We find the court's reasoning that a defamatory statement is an insubstantial detail if made in the context of other similar, unchallenged statements to be unpersuasive. In any event, the court's premise that Moss does not challenge the truth of Grabill's statement about the Camp complaints impermissibly draws an inference adverse to the pleader. That Grabill's statement about the State complaint was false is established on the face of the pleadings. In context, that Moss did not specifically allege that the statement about the Camp complaints was also false does not compel the inference that he failed to challenge it. To the contrary, Moss alleges that because he lacked the underlying information about the Camp complaints, he pressed Grabill about the specific details of the complaints and unsuccessfully requested his personnel file pursuant to New Hampshire law. Grabill refused to provide details except some purported partial details of one of them, and as of the filing of the complaint, Moss had not received any documentation of any complaint against him. Thus, Grabill denied Moss access to the evidentiary support that would have enabled him to determine whether the Camp complaints had been made. Cf. Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3). Given that Grabill's statement about the State complaint was false, the allegation that he withheld information about the Camp complaints raises a reasonable inference that Grabill's statement about the Camp complaints also was false. Moss's complaint, moreover, is directed at Grabill's entire statement to Donovan that he had received three complaints, not only the State complaint, alleging that it caused him physical and emotional injury. Thus, the district court's conclusion that the only reasonable inference [is] that ... these two complaints were in fact made is unsupportable. Because the complaint presents a set of facts that, if proven true, would justify recovery, the judgment of dismissal must be reversed. Cooperman, 171 F.3d at 46. 26