Opinion ID: 6536853
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal Constitutional Principles

Text: {179} The Majority justifies its decision to direct this litigation to Garcia and comparative proportionality review because, in their view, the construction of Section 31-20A-4(C)(4) embraced in Garcia does not uphold the promises of the United States Constitution and is insufficient to eliminate the possibility of an arbitrary and capricious sentence, contrary to Furman.  Maj. Op. ¶¶ 12, 34.  Furman and Gregg , they contend, require more. Maj. Op. ¶¶ 74-75. {180} The Majority misinterprets the United States Supreme Court's case law on capital punishment and comparative proportionality review and wrongly concludes that this Court is required to ensure a form symmetry in the capital sentencing context that is not required. As we shall see, the federal Constitution does not forbid the application of the death penalty simply because other defendants who committed superficially similar crimes did not receive death sentences. The Supreme Court's case law points in the opposite direction. {181} The origins of the [Supreme] Court's death penalty reform efforts can be traced to 1932, when it ruled [in Powell v. Alabama , 287 U.S. 45 , 53 S.Ct. 55 , 77 L.Ed. 158 (1932) ] that state criminal defendants have a right to appointed attorneys in capital cases. Robert A. Burt, Disorder in the Court: The Death Penalty and the Constitution , 85 Mich. L. Rev. 1741 , 1743 (1987).  From 1932 until the 1960s, the prehistory of death penalty jurisprudence, it seemed unlikely ... that a constitutional claim against the death penalty as such would ever gain serious attention. Id. at 1744 . This stems, in part, from the fact that [t]he very text of the Constitution seemed to conclude the matter with the fifth amendment's explicit, though backhanded, endorsement that a person might be deprived of life so long as due process of law was observed. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The view that the Court would not meaningfully question the constitutionality of capital punishment was confirmed by McGautha v. California , 402 U.S. 183 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 , 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971). {182} In McGautha , the Court considered whether a defendant's constitutional rights were infringed by permitting the jury to impose the death penalty without any governing standards. Id. at 185 , 91 S.Ct. 1454 . The Court concluded that standards were not required by the Federal Constitution. Id. The reader, wondering how such a holding could be when not a year later in State v. Furman , 408 U.S. 238 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 , 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972), the Court reached the exact opposite conclusion, must know that the Court had specifically restricted the grant of certiorari in McGautha to a due process challenge and in Furman the logically distinct 'cruel and unusual punishment' issue was addressed. Burt, supra , 1755 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). If this explanation seems unsatisfactory, the reader may be consoled by the fact that others felt this way too. {183} Justice Douglas openly questioned, in Furman , how the textual source of the right could explain the obvious tension between McGautha and Furman . Furman , 408 U.S. at 248 n.11, 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Douglas, J., concurring). And, [o]f the Justices who participated in both McGautha and Furman , four (including Brennan) took apparently inconsistent positions in the two cases. Burt, supra , at 1754. This logical difficulty need not be worked out, it need only be noted. {184} Furman was issued only one year after McGautha and, as is well known, it is comprised of nine separate opinions. Every Justice on the Court wrote. [T]he majority 'opinion' in [ Furman ] is a one-paragraph per curiam invalidating under the Eighth Amendment the death sentences imposed on the three petitioners in the case. Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment , 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355 , 362 (1995). Each of the five Justices in the majority then appended his own opinion, none of which was joined by any other Justice. Each of the four dissenters wrote his own opinion as well, although some of them joined in each other's dissents. Id. Because each Justice wrote separately, Furman is a case of unusual, if not overwhelming, complexity. {185} Scholarship points out that identifying the 'concerns' of Furman is a daunting task. Steiker, supra , 362. Any reader who picks up the opinion will see the truth of this immediately. The various opinions present[ ] a staggering array of arguments for and against the constitutionality of the death penalty and offer[ ] little means, aside from shrewd political prediction, of determining which arguments would dominate in the decision of any future cases. Id. One writer suggests that Furman so starkly deviated from the traditional format that it can be characterized as a decision in which there was not only no Court opinion but no Court-only a confederation of individual, even separately sovereign, Justices. Burt, supra , at 1758. The Justices themselves later acknowledged that the variety of opinions supporting the judgment in Furman engendered confusion as to what was required in order to impose the death penalty in accord with the Eighth Amendment. Lockett v. Ohio , 438 U.S. 586 , 599, 98 S.Ct. 2954 , 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978) (Burger, J.). This is not to say, however, that we cannot discern from Furman a central proposition of law. {186} Several of the Justices concurring in Furman pointed to statistics that showed that the death penalty was being applied on racial lines and with pronounced frequency on black defendants. 408 U.S. at 249-50 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 310 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 364 , 92 S.Ct. 2726 (Marshall, J., concurring);  see generally Samuel R. Gross and Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and Homicide Victimization , 37 Stan. L. Rev. 27 , 31-32 (1984). While this point of agreement is significant, it is not the main point of agreement in Furman . The main point of agreement between the concurring Justices was, as the Court later clarified, that where discretion is afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action. Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. 862 , 874, 103 S.Ct. 2733 , 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Put slightly differently, the unequivocal point of unison was that the death penalty was so arbitrary in its application, so as to render cruel and unusual any death sentence imposed under the existing system. Lucy Adams, Death by Discretion: Who Decides Who Lives and Dies in the United States of America? , 32 Am. J. Crim. L. 381 , 383-84 (2005). This holding effectively put an end to capital punishment in the United States. But this was only temporary. {187} In the wake of and in reaction to Furman , thirty-five state legislatures amended and then reenacted their death-penalty statutes. Burt, supra , at 1765. To some of the Justices concurring in Furman , this reenactment came as a surprise. Burt, supra , at 1766-67. These events prompted Marshall to openly question whether the American public was in fact an  informed citizenry. Gregg v. Georgia , 428 U.S. 227 , 232, 96 S.Ct. 2971 , 49 L.Ed.2d 904 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The constitutionality of these reenacted capital statutes was considered by the Court in five companion cases: Gregg ; Proffitt v. Florida , 428 U.S. 242 , 96 S.Ct. 2960 , 49 L.Ed.2d 913 (1976) ; Jurek v. Texas , 428 U.S. 262 , 96 S.Ct. 2950 , 49 L.Ed.2d 929 (1976) ; Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S. 280 , 96 S.Ct. 2978 , 49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) ; and Roberts v. Louisiana , 428 U.S. 325 , 96 S.Ct. 3001 , 49 L.Ed.2d 974 (1976). All were issued on the same day. Burt, supra , at 1765. The resolutions reached in these cases constituted an abrupt about-face. See id. at 1751. Furman , it turns out, was short-lived; ... the Court effectively reversed direction. Id. {188} Unlike Furman , each of the Justices did not speak or vote alone [in Gregg and its companion cases]. As in Furman , however, there was no Court at work. The judgments resulted from an aggregation of plurality voting lacking any majority rationale to explain the different outcomes in these cases. Burt, supra , at 1765. Yet, an outcome was produced. {189} [T]he Georgia [ ( Gregg ) ], Florida [ ( Profitt ) ], and Texas [ ( Jurek ) ] statutes that specified various substantive standards for jury discretion were upheld and the North Carolina [ ( Woodson ) ] and Louisiana [ ( Roberts ) ] statutes that purported to abolish jury discretion by mandating death as the penalty for specific criminal offenses were invalidated. Burt, supra , at 1765.  Gregg and its accompanying quartet clarified that the death penalty was not per se invalid under the Eighth Amendment and that the Court would now be involved in the ongoing business of determining which state schemes could pass constitutional muster. Steiker, supra , at 363. The Gregg , Proffitt , and Jurek opinions did not attempt to list in any definitive fashion the prerequisites for a valid capital punishment regime; rather, they simply upheld each particular scheme presented on the basis of its own peculiar mix of procedural protections. Steiker, supra , at 363. Whether comparative proportionality was such a prerequisite was eventually litigated in Pulley . {190} Unlike Furman and Gregg , Pulley garnered a six-justice majority opinion by Justice White. 465 U.S. at 38 , 104 S.Ct. 871 . Justice Stephens concurred in part and concurred in judgment, id. at 54 , 104 S.Ct. 871 , and Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, restating their foundational objections to the death penalty, principal among them that the penalty is imposed and exacted along racial lines. Id. at 65 , 104 S.Ct. 871 . The defendant in Pulley , a California resident, was convicted of a capital crime, sentenced to death, and argued on appeal that California's capital punishment statute was unconstitutional as it did not provide for comparative  proportionality review. Id. at 38-39 , 104 S.Ct. 871 . The Court rejected this assertion and held that California's capital punishment statute ensured that death sentences in California were not arbitrarily imposed, despite the fact that comparative proportionality review was not required. Id. at 48-51 , 104 S.Ct. 871 . The Court offered the following explanation for this conclusion. {191} The Court examined the line of cases beginning with Furman and emphasized that those cases simply did not require comparative proportionality review to ensure that death sentences are not arbitrarily imposed. Pulley , 465 U.S. at 44-51 , 104 S.Ct. 871 . Rather the check on arbitrariness, the Court explained, was principally provided by a host of different mechanisms including: the bifurcation of trial and sentencing proceedings in the capital context; a limitation on crimes that may serve as death eligible offenses; and the requirement that juries consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances when deciding whether to impose a death sentence. Id. The Court also showed how in each of the capital cases preceding Pulley it was evident that the existence of comparative proportionality review was at maximum an optional, additional safeguard[,] 465 U.S. at 45 , 104 S.Ct. 871 , and at minimum constitutionally superfluous. Id. at 49 , 104 S.Ct. 871 . The Court stressed that the suggestion that comparative proportionality was constitutionally required to ensure symmetry in capital sentencing was not only incorrect but suggested a misunderstanding of the import of Furman . Any capital sentencing scheme may occasionally produce aberrational outcomes. Such inconsistencies are a far cry from the major systemic defects identified in Furman . As we have acknowledged in the past, there can be no perfect procedure for deciding in which cases governmental authority should be used to impose death. Pulley , 465 U.S. at 54 , 104 S.Ct. 871 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). This point was, in fact, a position Justice White articulated in a slightly different way eight years earlier in Gregg, 428 U.S. at 225-26, 96 S.Ct. 2909 (White, J., concurring in judgment). {192} There, Justice White rejected the contention, in broad and sweeping language, that capital sentencing must be carried out with perfect symmetry or not at all. I reproduce his words in their entirety as they have a force that is difficult to replicate. [The] argument that there is an unconstitutional amount of discretion in the system which separates those suspects who receive the death penalty from those who receive life imprisonment, a lesser penalty, or are acquitted or never charged, seems to be in final analysis an indictment of our entire system of justice. Petitioner has argued, in effect, that no matter how effective the death penalty may be as a punishment, government, created and run as it must be by humans, is inevitably incompetent to administer it. This cannot be accepted as a proposition of constitutional law. Imposition of the death penalty is surely an awesome responsibility for any system of justice and those who participate in it. Mistakes will be made and discriminations will occur which will be difficult to explain. However, one of society's most basic tasks is that of protecting the lives of its citizens and one of the most basic ways in which it achieves the task is through criminal laws against murder. I decline to interfere with the manner in which Georgia has chosen to enforce such laws on what is simply an assertion of lack of faith in the ability of the system of justice to operate in a fundamentally fair manner. Id. In the last of the cases we need consider, McCleskey v. Kemp , 481 U.S. 279 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987), the Court reiterated that sentencing disparities in the capital context do not necessarily render the death penalty unconstitutional. {193} The defendant in McCleskey -a black, male, resident of Georgia-was sentenced to death for murdering a white police officer in the course of a robbery. Id. at 283 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 . In a habeas petition challenging his conviction, the defendant submitted a sophisticated and rigorous statistical study establishing that black defendants in Georgia are, on the whole, more likely to be sentenced to death than white defendants and that this likelihood increases even further  when the victim is white. Id. at 286-87 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 . The defendant claimed that this state of affairs rendered the Georgia death-penalty statute unconstitutional on equal protection and Eighth Amendment grounds. Id. at 291, 299 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 . The Court rejected both arguments, id. at 299, 308-19 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , and rejected the Eighth Amendment claim with language that has unquestionable significance here. {194} The Court understood the defendant to be arguing that his death sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because it was disproportionate to the sentences in other murder cases[,] id. at 306 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , and responded to this claim with three points. First, the Georgia Supreme Court had already concluded that the defendant's death sentence was not disproportionate to other death sentences and supported this conclusion with citation to several cases involving generally similar murders. Id. Second, Pulley made clear that, where the statutory procedures adequately channel the sentencer's discretion, such proportionality review is not constitutionally required. McCleskey , 481 U.S. at 306 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 (citing Pulley , 465 U.S. at 50-51 , 104 S.Ct. 871 ). Third, a defendant could not prove a constitutional violation by demonstrating that other defendants who may be similarly situated did not receive the death penalty. Id. at 306-07, 107 S.Ct. 1756 . The Court explained that  '[n]othing in any of our cases suggests that the decision to afford an individual defendant mercy violates the Constitution.'  Id. at 307 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 (quoting Gregg , 428 U.S. at 199, 96 S.Ct. 2909 ). The Court went on to clarify and expand upon this last point. {195} The Court explained that  Furman held only that, in order to minimize the risk that the death penalty would be imposed on a capriciously selected group of offenders, the decision to impose it had to be guided by standards so that the sentencing authority would focus on the particularized circumstances of the crime and the defendant. Id. The Court then observed that the Georgia sentencing procedures from which McCleskey's sentence arose did adequately focus the sentencing authority's discretion. Id. at 308, 107 S.Ct. 1756 . The Court accepted the fact that divergent sentencing outcomes in the capital sentencing context were inevitable, id. at 309-12 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 , identified the varying factors that made this so, id. at 307-08 n.28, 311-12, 107 S.Ct. 1756 , and was unwilling to treat the racial disparities McCleskey's statistical study demonstrated as proof of unconstitutional prejudice against black defendants. Id. at 309 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 . The mere fact that juries in the capital context will reach divergent conclusions, the Court stated, is no basis to question the validity of those judgments. Id. at 311 , 107 S.Ct. 1756 . Why one jury would, in a particular case, impose death and another show mercy, the Court stated, probed into areas of human judgment that need not and cannot be explained. Individual jurors bring to their deliberations qualities of human nature and varieties of human experience, the range of which is unknown and perhaps unknowable. The capital sentencing decision requires the individual jurors to focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal defendant. It is not surprising that such collective judgments often are difficult to explain. But the inherent lack of predictability of jury decisions does not justify their condemnation. On the contrary, it is the jury's function to make the difficult and uniquely human judgments that defy codification and that buil[d] discretion, equity, and flexibility into a legal system. Id. (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Having concluded a survey of the relevant Supreme Court case law, we are now in a much better position to examine the Majority's claim that the federal constitution requires us to revisit Garcia and reconsider the comparative proportionality of Fry's and Allen's death sentences. {196} The Majority cannot contend that the need to engage in the comparative proportionality review they suggest is necessary derives from the promise of the federal constitution. Where proportionality review need not be conducted to satisfy the constitution, it cannot be that a death sentence is  unconstitutional because of some claimed failure to conduct meaningful enough statutory comparative proportionality review. In addition, the contention that Fry and Allen have been subjected to unconstitutionally arbitrary death sentences because of allegedly inadequate comparative proportionality review entirely ignores the fact that Fry and Allen are members of a select and specific cadre of murderers that may, under the CFSA, ever be permissibly put to death, and that Fry's and Allen's juries were only permitted to impose death sentences after Fry and Allen received the many procedural protections assured them by the CFSA. In other words, the Majority makes such a monolith of comparative proportionality review that they effectively ignore the many limiting and channeling functions of the CFSA.