Opinion ID: 2365370
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: The Mount Laurel Doctrine

Text: When this Court decided Mount Laurel I in 1975 [t]here [was] not the slightest doubt that New Jersey ha[d] been, and continue[d] to be, faced with a desperate need for housing, especially of decent living accommodations economically suitable for low and moderate income families. Mount Laurel I, supra, 67 N.J. at 158, 336 A. 2d 713 (footnote omitted). Despite the documented lack of acceptable accommodations for those most in need, the only kinds of housing realistically permitted in most places ... [consisted of] relatively high-priced, single-family detached dwellings on sizeable lots and, in some municipalities, expensive apartments. Id. at 159, 336 A. 2d 713. Although the plaintiffs in that case represented poor minorities who claimed that Mount Laurel's land use regulations unconstitutionally barred them from living in the township due to their limited income and resources, we recognized at the outset that the issue ... [was] not confined to Mount Laurel. Id. at 160, 336 A. 2d 713. We said then: The same question arises with respect to any number of other municipalities of sizeable land area outside the central cities and older built-up suburbs of our North and South Jersey metropolitan areas (and surrounding some of the smaller cities outside those areas as well) which, like Mount Laurel, have substantially shed rural characteristics and have undergone great population increase since World War II, or are now in the process of doing so, but still are not completely developed and remain in the path of inevitable future residential, commercial and industrial demand and growth. [ Ibid. ] Those words sound prophetic when, in hindsight, we observe the enormous growth that has taken place in the intervening years. U.S. Census Bureau, Historical Census of Housing TablesUnits in Structure, at http://www.census.gov/hhes/ www/housing/census/historic/units.html (last revised Dec. 15, 2000). Yet, then and now, some municipalities have found that it is in their best fiscal interest to exclude low and moderate income persons from their towns. Mount Laurel I, supra, 67 N.J. at 160, 336 A. 2d 713. Mount Laurel candidly admitted that its land use regulation was intended to result and has resulted in economic discrimination and exclusion of substantial segments of the area population.... Id. at 160-61, 336 A. 2d 713. We held then, and reaffirm now, that a municipality may not validly, by a system of land use regulation, make it physically and economically impossible to provide low and moderate income housing in the municipality for the various categories of persons who need and want it and thereby ... exclude such people from living within its confines because of the limited extent of their income and resources. [ Id. at 173, 336 A. 2d 713.] That holding was grounded in the state constitutional requirements of substantive due process and equal protection of the laws, implicit in the power to regulate land use for the general welfare. Id. at 174-75, 336 A. 2d 713 (citing N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 1); see N.J. Const. art. IV, § 6, ¶ 2; see also Mount Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 208, 456 A. 2d 390 (stating that constitutional power to pass land use regulations, delegated to the municipalities subject to legislation, is but one portion of the police power [that] must be exercised for the general welfare). Mount Laurel I thus established the contours of municipalities' constitutional obligation to provide a realistic opportunity for the development of low and moderate income housing. But, as we said in that case, [c]ourts do not build housing nor do municipalitiesbuilders, private associations, and special governmental agencies do. Mount Laurel I, supra, 67 N.J. at 192, 336 A. 2d 713. Under Mount Laurel I and our subsequent exclusionary zoning cases, a municipality is responsible for promulgating appropriate land use ordinances under which a developer could be expected to construct the municipality's fair share of affordable housing. Ibid. In Madison, supra, 72 N.J. at 549-51, 371 A. 2d 1192, however, the Court created a judicial remedy for the enforcement of the Mount Laurel doctrine known generally as the builder's remedy. The builder's remedy was designed as an incentive for the institution of socially beneficial but costly litigation ... [in order to] get[ ] on with the provision of needed housing for at least some portion of the moderate income elements of the population. Id. at 550-51, 371 A. 2d 1192. Without the inducement of such a remedy there was little reason for a private developer to challenge a municipality's zoning ordinances. We also recognized in Mount Laurel I, supra, and Mount Laurel II, supra, that municipal zoning ordinances have a substantial impact beyond a municipality's borders implicating the general welfare of those residing outside of the municipality but within the region that contributes to the housing demand within the municipality. 67 N.J. at 177, 336 A. 2d 713; 92 N.J. at 208, 456 A. 2d 390. For that reason, we determined in Mount Laurel I that a developing municipality has a presumptive constitutional obligation affirmatively to afford a realistic opportunity for the construction of its fair share of the present and prospective regional need for low and moderate income housing. Mount Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 204-05, 456 A. 2d 390 (citing Mount Laurel I, supra, 67 N.J. at 174, 336 A. 2d 713). At that time, the Court chose to limit its holding to a general notion of developing communitiesland areas, outside of central cities and older suburbs, that are in the path of anticipated growthbecause there was no official guidance ... as to the state's plans for its own future, its own determination of where development should occur and where it should not, and what kind of development.... Id. at 224-25, 456 A. 2d 390. Yet, as we observed in Mount Laurel II, the concept was vague, at best, and endangered prime agricultural land, open spaces, and areas of scenic beauty in towns that fit within the category of a developing community but that should not yield to `inevitable future residential, commercial and industrial demand and growth.' Id. at 224, 336 A. 2d 713 (emphasis in original). When, in 1980, the Legislature enacted the State Development Guide Plan (SDGP or Plan), provid[ing] a statewide blueprint for future development, id. at 225, 336 A. 2d 713, we embraced its use in exclusionary zoning cases. [T]he SDGP discussed a variety of factors related to New Jersey's growth and development, including population distribution, natural resources, infrastructure, and the economy. Van Dalen, supra, 120 N.J. at 241, 576 A. 2d 819 (citing Mount Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 225, 456 A. 2d 390). The maps developed as part of the Plan provided a framework for decision-making [b]y clearly setting forth the state's policy as to where growth should be encouraged and discouraged. Mount Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 226, 456 A. 2d 390. Accordingly, we held that the Mount Laurel mandate should apply essentially in the areas marked for growth by the SDGP. Id. at 227, 456 A. 2d 390. We observed that the SDGP promoted sound statewide planning because it `ensure[d] that the imposition of fair share obligations will coincide with the State's regional planning goals and objectives.'  Van Dalen, supra, 120 N.J. at 242, 576 A. 2d 819 (quoting Mount Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 225, 456 A. 2d 390). In respect of determining a municipality's fair share, and in the absence of legislative direction on this issue, Mount Laurel II established new procedures for the handling of exclusionary zoning litigation in the courts. We understood at that time that our failure to require the designation of a region, its [present and prospective] need, and the fair share of the municipality in each case had weakened the Mount Laurel mandate. Mount Laurel II, supra, 92 N.J. at 251, 456 A. 2d 390. Consequently, we restricted those cases to three judges, each to be responsible for matters arising in his or her region of the State, with the expectation that after several cases ha[d] been tried before each judge, a regional pattern for the area for which he or she is responsible [would] emerge. Id. at 254, 456 A. 2d 390. We believed that the method for calculating a municipality's fair share would be consistent within the region, [13] and that [u]ltimately a regional pattern for the entire state [would] be established. Ibid. In rejecting our earlier approach, we stated: What is required is the precision of a specific area and specific numbers. They are required not because we think scientific accuracy is possible, but because we believe the requirement is most likely to achieve the goals of Mount Laurel. Id. at 257, 456 A. 2d 390. In Mount Laurel II we also provided guidance to municipalities regarding what it means to create a realistic opportunity for low and moderate income housing. We called for municipalities, at the very least, [to] remove all municipally created barriers to the construction of their fair share of lower income housing. Id. at 258-59, 456 A. 2d 390. But, because merely removing barriers to the construction of low income housing might not be sufficient to bring about that housing, we required affirmative measures to make the opportunity real. Id. at 261, 456 A. 2d 390. To induce builders to provide affordable housing we suggested (1) encouraging or requiring the use of available state or federal housing subsidies, and (2) providing incentives for or requiring private developers to set aside a portion of their development for lower income housing. Id. at 262, 456 A. 2d 390. Our strong preference for legislative action enforcing the constitutional mandate could not have been more clearly stated than in Mount Laurel II, wherein we said that a brief reminder of the judicial role in this sensitive area is appropriate, since powerful reasons suggest, and we agree, that the matter is better left to the Legislature. We act first and foremost because the Constitution of our State requires protection of the interests involved and because the Legislature has not protected them. [ Id. at 212, 456 A. 2d 390.] As discussed earlier, supra at 513, 803 A. 2d at 59, the Legislature responded in July 1985 by enacting the FHA. Under that statute COAH was charged with, among other things, determining State housing regions, N.J.S.A. 52:27D-307a, estimating the State and regional present and prospective need for low and moderate income housing, id. at -307b, and adopting criteria and guidelines for a [m]unicipal determination of its present and prospective fair share of [the region's] housing need. Id. at -307c(1). COAH's review and mediation process is considered by the Legislature to be the preferred method for resolution of Mount Laurel disputes. Id. at -303. When a Mount Laurel challenge is filed in the Superior Court, the plaintiff must also file a notice to request review and mediation with COAH. Id. at -316b. If the municipality submitted a housing element [14] and fair share plan to COAH before the litigation commenced then the plaintiff must exhaust review and mediation ... before being entitled to a trial on [the] complaint. Ibid.; id. at 309b. Municipalities not faced with a Mount Laurel challenge may seek COAH review of their zoning and affordable housing regulations, id. at -314, in order to receive a degree of protection from a future challenge. See id. at -317a. A municipality may voluntarily seek substantive certification from COAH, id. at -313, after consenting to COAH's jurisdiction by submitting a resolution of participation, a housing element, and a proposed fair share housing ordinance implementing the housing element. N.J.S.A. 52:27D-309. After review, if COAH finds that the municipality's housing element provides a realistic opportunity for the development of affordable housing units equal to its fair share obligation, substantive certification is granted, id. at -314, thereby establishing a presumption of validity for a ten-year period that may be overcome in subsequent litigation only by clear and convincing evidence. See id. at -317a; id. at -313a. A municipality may attempt to meet its affordable housing obligation by any method designed to achieve that end, but must at least consider nine specific techniques, including rezoning for [higher] densities necessary to assure the economic viability of any inclusionary developments. Id. at -311a(1). Further, a municipality may, through a Regional Contribution Agreement, propose the transfer of up to 50% of its fair share to another municipality within its housing region. Id. at -312a. Both the FHA and COAH's regulations address the necessary components of a municipal housing element. At a minimum, it must contain detailed information in respect of present housing inventory, a ten-year projection of the anticipated housing stock, and an analysis of the demographic and employment characteristics of the municipality. Id. at -310a to -310d; N.J.A.C. 5:93-5.1(b)1 to -5.1(b)4. When a municipality's housing element purports to create new low and moderate income units within [its] borders by sponsoring their construction ... or by zoning for inclusionary development, id. at -5.3(a), or if the municipality has included in its housing element a municipally sponsored [affordable housing] construction [and gut rehabilitation] program, additional and substantial data must be submitted to COAH. Id. at -5.5(a). If the housing element contains inclusionary zoning, each site must be described, existing environmental constraints must be identified, and details regarding available infrastructure must be supplied. Id. at -5.3(c)1 to -5.3(c)3. The municipality also must furnish data for each site in respect of the total number of housing units; the gross and net density of the proposed development; the total number of low and moderate income units; and the number of low and moderate income units that will be for sale and for rent. Id. at -5.3(c)4. Similarly, if a municipality has included in its plan a municipally sponsored affordable housing construction and rehabilitation program, it must provide site-specific information, such as documentation that there is municipal control of the site(s); an administrative mechanism to construct the proposed housing; a funding plan and evidence of adequate funding capacity; and timetables for construction of the units. Id. at -5.5(a). COAH's review process is extensive and probing. By way of example, COAH's consideration of a municipality's plan to zone for inclusionary development covers the existing densities surrounding the proposed inclusionary site; the need for a density bonus in order to produce low and moderate income housing; whether the site is approvable, available, developable and suitable ...; the site's conformance with the [State Development and Redevelopment Plan] ...; the existence of steep slopes, wetlands and floodplain areas on the site; the present ability of a developer to construct low and moderate income housing at a specific density; the length of time an inclusionary site has been zoned at a specific density and set-aside without being developed; and the number of inclusionary sites that have developed within the municipality at specific densities and set asides. [ Id. at -5.6(b).] It is only after that review that COAH makes its determination whether the municipality's housing element provides a realistic opportunity for the development of the requisite number of affordable units. In upholding the constitutionality of the FHA, we recognized that it represent[ed] a substantial effort by the other branches of government to vindicate the Mount Laurel constitutional obligation. Hills, supra, 103 N.J. at 21, 510 A. 2d 621. We stated then that [t]his kind of response, one that would permit us to withdraw from this field, is what this Court has always wanted and sought. Id. at 65, 510 A. 2d 621. We found that the FHA dealt with the central concerns of our earlier cases, and, specifically, the need for consistency on a statewide basis of the determination of regional need, fair share, and the adequacy of the municipal measures. Id. at 37, 510 A. 2d 621. Instead of varying and potentially inconsistent definitions of total need, regions, regional need, and fair share that can result from the case-by-case determinations of courts involved in isolated litigation, an overall plan for the state is envisioned, with definitions and standards that will have the kind of consistency that can result only when full responsibility and power are given to a single entity. [ Id. at 22, 510 A. 2d 621.] Further, we believed that municipal acceptance of inclusionary zoning would be strengthened by the designation of COAH as the arbiter of municipalities' fair share obligations because of the legitimacy and presumed expertise that derives from selection by the Governor and confirmation by the Senate, in accordance with the will of the Legislature. Ibid. In furtherance of consistent determinations of regional needs and fair share allocations, we stated that the judiciary, assuming the statutory plan functions reasonably effectively, will be responsive to the actions of the Council and conform its decisions in this field to the Council's various determinations. Id. at 37, 510 A. 2d 621 (emphasis in original). Those who challenged the FHA expressed their concern that the Act does not mandate participation by municipalities, either to seek substantive certification from COAH or to subject themselves to COAH's mediation and review process. It was argued that by not requiring participation the FHA allows some municipalities to ignore their Mount Laurel obligations and risk the burdens of litigation if they believe that strategy to be in their best interest. The argument has as its premises that the Act depends on the voluntary cooperation of municipalities, that the lack of an assured builder's remedy will result in a total loss of interest on the part of builders, which in turn will mean that there will be no construction, and, ultimately, that there will never be lower income housing through any device other than a builder's remedy. If true, this attack is substantial. [ Id. at 43, 510 A. 2d 621.] We rejected that argument because it was based on speculation that the FHA would not achieve its stated goals, speculation that could not trump the presumption of constitutionality. Ibid. We held that before this Act may be declared un constitutional [for failing to achieve its goals], the contention that it will not work must be close to a certainty. Ibid. (emphasis in original). Because municipalities that choose not to participate in the COAH process would be subject to Mount Laurel litigation, we believed that they would choose otherwise. Id. at 36, 510 A. 2d 621. We concluded: It can therefore fairly be assumed that most municipalities that have a potentially significant Mount Laurel obligation will file their petition for substantive certification, their housing element, and fair share housing ordinance within a reasonable period of time after the Council's adoption of its criteria and guidelines. Thus, what appears at first to be simply an option available to municipalities is more realistically a procedure that practically all municipalities with a significant Mount Laurel obligation will follow, both to determine and to satisfy their Mount Laurel obligation. [ Ibid. ]