Opinion ID: 773819
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Buchmeier's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal

Text: 10 We will first review Buchmeier's claim that the district court improperly denied his motion for judgment of acquittal because if he is correct, we need not address his other claims. Buchmeier argues that the district court erred in denying his motion because the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The government contends that the district court properly denied his motion. 11 We note that there is a question of whether Buchmeier made his motion for a judgment of acquittal in a timely manner. In a case where a defendant has been convicted by a jury, Rule 29(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure explains that a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. Fed. R. Crim. P. 29(c). The jury's guilty verdict was returned on January 15, 1998; however, Buchmeier did not file his motion for a judgment of acquittal until February 2, 1998. We have previously found that a defendant's failure to properly file such a motion results in the waiver of any challenge on appeal to the sufficiency of the evidence absent a manifest miscarriage of justice. United States v. Baker, 40 F.3d 154, 160 (7th Cir. 1994). The government has not argued that Buchmeier waived this argument on appeal, however, instead choosing to argue that there was sufficient evidence presented at Buchmeier's trial to support his conviction. Thus, the government has waived Buchmeier's waiver. See id. at 160 (citing United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 745-46 n.33 (7th Cir. 1988)). 12 At the conclusion of Buchmeier's trial, the district court instructed the jury that it could find Buchmeier guilty of any of the four counts charged in the indictment if it unanimously agreed that he possessed at least one of the firearms listed in that charge and if it also agreed as to which particular firearm he possessed. This general verdict of guilty for those counts listing multiple firearms may be upheld only if there is sufficient evidence to support the charge as to each of the acts alleged. United States v. Berardi, 675 F.2d 894, 902 (7th Cir. 1982). We have explained that [t]he reason for this rule is that, with the 'one-is-enough' instruction that was given here, it would be impossible to determine whether the jury based its decision on an act for which there w[as] insufficient evidence. Id. In evaluating Buchmeier's claim that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction we will consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor. United States v. Fraizer, 213 F.3d 409, 416 (7th Cir. 2000). Additionally, we will find for Buchmeier only if there is no evidence from which the trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Polin, 194 F.3d 863, 866 (7th Cir. 1999). 13 The main thrust of Buchmeier's challenge is an attack on the testimony of various witnesses called by the government during his trial. He first argues that Haverstock's testimony as to what firearms were stolen from his house is not credible. He likewise contends that DeMarcco, Rossi, and Weiss testified inconsistently as to whether they actually saw him in possession of any of the firearms listed in the indictment. Buchmeier asserts that these alleged weaknesses in the government's evidence indicate that there is reasonable doubt as to his culpability for the crimes for which he was convicted. 14 We have repeatedly explained with regard to claims like Buchmeier's that [b]ecause questions of credibility are solely for the trier of fact, such arguments are 'wasted on an appellate court.' United States v. Hatchett, 31 F.3d 1411, 1416 (7th Cir. 1994) (quoting United States v. Marin, 7 F.3d 679, 688 (7th Cir. 1993)) (citation omitted). [I]t is not our role, when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, to second- guess a jury's credibility determinations. United States v. McGee, 189 F.3d 626, 630 (7th Cir. 1999). Therefore, 'absent extraordinary circumstances,' this court will not reevaluate the testimony of a witness to determine his or her motives or other possible measures of reliability. United States v. Dunigan, 884 F.2d 1010, 1013 (7th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted). 15 There are no circumstances present in this case which require us to reevaluate the reliability of the witness testimony presented by the government at Buchmeier's trial. The testimony at trial repeatedly confirmed Buchmeier's acquisition and possession of each of the firearms listed in the indictment. Although Buchmeier is correct in noting that at the time of his trial in January 1998 Haverstock was no longer able to recall the makes, models, and serial numbers of the missing firearms, the record demonstrates that Haverstock knew which firearms were missing from his house when he made the inventory of the missing guns for the police in August of 1994. Haverstock noted that four of the missing weapons were handguns, and the rest were rifles and shotguns. Haverstock used a photograph of his rifles and shotguns to substantiate the loss of these firearms. He also referred to the boxes that several of the firearms had been in when he originally purchased them. Witness testimony describing the firearms Schroeder removed from Haverstock's house matched Haverstock's written description of the firearms that were stolen from his house. Additionally, multiple witnesses placed the firearms taken by Schroeder in Buchmeier's possession. Further testimony also indicated that Buchmeier knew these firearms were stolen and that he sold or intended to sell the majority of these stolen firearms. We find, therefore, that the evidence presented against Buchmeier was sufficient to support a guilty jury verdict for any of the firearms listed in the indictment. 16