Opinion ID: 1174632
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of Section 18-7-206, C.R.S.1973.

Text: The appellant next contends that the pimping statute, section 18-7-206, C.R. S.1973, proscribes the same conduct as paragraph (1)(b) of the pandering statute, section 18-7-203, C.R.S.1973. Since pimping is punishable as a class five felony, but pandering as defined in paragraph (1)(b) is punishable as a class three misdemeanor, [3] the appellant argues that the pimping statute violates equal protection. We do not agree. Equal protection of the laws is denied when two or more statutes provide different punishments for identical criminal conduct. E. g., People v. Czajkowski, Colo., 568 P.2d 23 (1977); People v. Hulse, Colo., 557 P.2d 1205 (1976); People v. Calvaresi, 188 Colo. 277, 534 P.2d 316 (1975). However, it is only where the same criminal conduct is proscribed in both statutes that the equal protection principle becomes applicable. People v. Hulse, supra . Here there is a distinct difference between the statutes at issue. The pimping statute is violated by any person who knowingly lives on or is supported or maintained in whole or in part by money or other thing of value earned, received, procured, or realized by any other person through prostitution .... Section 18-7-206, C.R.S.1973. Paragraph (1)(b) of the pandering statute, on the other hand, provides that a person commits pandering by [k]nowingly arranging or offering to arrange a situation in which a person may practice prostitution, in exchange for money or other things of value. Section 18-7-203(1)(b), C.R.S.1973. The pandering statute is clearly directed at a specific type of conduct, and is designed to punish persons who act as brokers to bring prostitutes together with their customers. Thus, there is an element in pandering, which is not necessarily present in pimping, i.e., the affirmative, knowing action of arranging or offering to arrange an assignation for the practice of prostitution by another. Although pimping and pandering are closely related activities, it is clearly possible for one to be guilty of pimping by living off the proceeds of an act of prostitution without actively arranging the act between prostitute and customer. Conversely, it is conceivable that one could be guilty of pandering by arranging, for pay, meetings for the practice of prostitution, yet be paid from funds other than those earned by prostitution, thus not being guilty of pimping. Therefore, the two crimes are distinguishable, and the General Assembly was free to prescribe different punishments for conduct it may have rationally perceived to have different degrees of social reprehensibility. People v. Hulse, supra . Finally, the appellant argues that the pimping statute is unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, infringes on First Amendment rights of association, and punishes mere status rather than conduct. We have recently addressed and rejected these arguments of facial unconstitutionality in People v. Stage, Colo., 575 P.2d 423 (1978). That case is dispositive here. Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.