Opinion ID: 156203
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Miranda Rights and the Confession

Text: 20 After hearing the testimony of Williams and the FBI agent, the district court found that, [w]hile defendant refused to sign the Advice of Rights forms, defendant orally waived his rights. Appellant's Br., App. at 4 (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)). The district court further found that there is simply no evidence to suggest defendant was coerced into making a confession on August 28, 1996. Under the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary. Id. Williams contends that the district court erred in concluding that he orally waived his Fifth Amendment rights and in finding that his confession was not coerced. Williams' argument appears to challenge both the district court's findings of facts as well as its legal conclusions. 21 The determination of whether a valid waiver of Fifth Amendment rights has occurred is a question of law which we review de novo; subsidiary factual determinations are reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d 778, 782 (10th Cir.1997). Whether a confession was voluntary also presents a legal question which we review de novo. United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1449 (10th Cir.1991). In making our determination, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, United States v. Robertson, 19 F.3d 1318, 1321 (10th Cir.1994), and we uphold the district court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1578-79 (10th Cir.1997).
22 As to any critical subsidiary factual findings, our standard of review gives great deference to the district court who observed the witnesses. At the suppression hearing, Williams testified that, in the first interview, he refused to answer any questions without an attorney present, and he claims that he confessed in the second interview because the agents threatened him and promised him leniency. However, the agent testified that once Williams had been fully advised of his rights, he did not request an attorney. According to the agent, Williams agreed to answer the agents' questions in the first interview with the understanding that he could stop at any time, and that, in fact, Williams did stop the questioning on two occasions, although each time he continued volunteering information without further questioning. Additionally, the agent testified that they made no threats or promises in either interview. 23 Obviously, the court believed the agent's testimony that Williams orally waived his rights as to both interviews, and that the agents made no promises or threats. These are credibility findings, and, taken in the light most favorable to the government, those findings are not clearly erroneous.
24 Having accepted the district court's finding that Williams did in fact orally waive his Fifth Amendment rights and that the agents neither threatened him nor made any promises, we now consider de novo whether that waiver and the subsequent confession were voluntary. 25 If a defendant talks to police after being advised of his right to remain silent, the government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the waiver of the right was voluntary. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d at 825 (citing Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986)). However, [a]n express statement of waiver by the defendant is not required; instead, waiver can be inferred from the defendant's actions and words. Id. (citing North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373, 99 S.Ct. 1755, 60 L.Ed.2d 286 (1979)). Nonetheless, a defendant's waiver of Fifth Amendment rights can be effective only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation shows both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986); United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1501 (10th Cir.1996). Likewise, in determining whether a confession is voluntary, we review the totality of all the surrounding circumstances, including the characteristics of the accused and the tactics employed by the police. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d at 825-26; Glover, 104 F.3d at 1579 (noting important factors such as age, intelligence, and education of the defendant; length of the detention; length and nature of questioning; whether a Miranda warning was given; and whether physical punishment was involved) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973)). 26
27 In this case, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates a voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendments rights. 4 That is, although Williams refused to sign the Advice of Rights forms, he admitted understanding his rights. Additionally, that he fully appreciated the extent of those rights is demonstrated by the evidence that, in the first interview, he actually did cut off questioning. Moreover, although he disputed (unsuccessfully) the facts surrounding that first interview, he readily admitted that he initiated the second interview, that the agents read him his rights, that he fully understood those rights, and that he agreed to talk to the agents when they had finished reading him his rights. See Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 486 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). The totality of circumstances in both interviews demonstrates an uncoerced choice and requisite level of comprehension, sufficient to find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Williams voluntarily waived his rights and agreed to talk to the agents. 5 28
29 A defendant's confession is involuntary if the government's conduct causes the defendant's will to be overborne and 'his capacity for self-determination critically impaired'. United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1101 (10th Cir.1996) (quoting Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225-26, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1937)). 30 The FBI agents testified they told Williams that his girlfriend, who had rented the car he drove and who owned the gun he carried, would be the subject of further investigation as a potential witness or accomplice. Additionally, they testified that they advised Williams they would pass on any information regarding his cooperation. Williams contends that the statements about his girlfriend coerced him into confessing, and he also argues that promises of leniency rendered his confession involuntary. In its brief to us, the government responds that neither the statements related to Williams' girlfriend, nor the statements about possible benefits of cooperation, constitute improper or coercive conduct. We agree. 31 Even if Williams' confession was motivated by a desire to spare his girlfriend from an investigation and its possible consequences, such motivation does not render the confession involuntary. 6 See Glover, 104 F.3d at 1580 (considering a defendant's desire to help a co-defendant, and finding that [t]hese types of personal psychological pressures do not amount to official coercion rendering a confession involuntary); see also United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996, 1006 (7th Cir.) (holding that agent's suggestion that defendant's cooperation would help defendant's wife did not constitute undue coercion), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 643, 139 L.Ed.2d 621 (1997); Allen v. McCotter, 804 F.2d 1362, 1364 (5th Cir.1986) (holding that defendant's confession was not involuntary by reason of his desire to extricate his wife from a possible good faith arrest). Furthermore, the fact that agents state in general that cooperation may have benefits does not compel a finding that a defendant's statement is involuntary. See Roman-Zarate, 115 F.3d at 782; Glover, 104 F.3d at 1582. 32 In assessing the voluntariness of a confession, we consider all the circumstances, including the following factors in this case: Williams was advised of his Miranda rights, the length of the interview was short, and no physical punishment or improper threats were involved. Based on our review of the entire record and the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not err in finding that Williams' confession was voluntary. 33 AFFIRMED.