Opinion ID: 2087167
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 15

Heading: Constitutionality of Appellate Court's Decision

Text: We now address the constitutionality of the appellate court's decision, which essentially allowed both Williams and McDunn to fill a single judicial vacancy. We agree with the Attorney General that the appellate court's order is unconstitutional for the following reasons: (1) it increases the number of judges in Cook County; (2) it usurps this court's power to appoint persons to fill judicial vacancies, if viewed as an appointment; (3) it fails to place the proper constitutional limitations concerning judges on Williams, if viewed as an appointment; and (4) because it was made with no legislative appropriation of State funds. The judgment of the appellate court, delivered by Justice Tully, found that McDunn had, under a strict application of the election rules, won the primary. However, the court went on to find that Williams had in fact received more votes in the 1990 primary, was on the 1990 general ballot, and was elected by the voters of Cook County, who believed him to be the valid Democratic nominee to fill Kiley's position. Relying on section 763 of the Election Code and Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5), the court thus fashion[ed] a remedy in the interests of fairness and equity. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 763; 134 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5).) In order to insure the integrity of the election process [as well as]    guarantee the individual and constitutional rights of the electorate, the court ordered: Williams shall continue to serve in the office of judge of the circuit court of Cook County until his resignation, retirement or failure to be retained,    [and] Susan J. McDunn's name [shall be simultaneously placed] on the November 3, 1992, general election ballot to fill the judicial vacancy of the Honorable Roger J. Kiley, Jr. 247 Ill.App.3d at 947, 187 Ill.Dec. 671, 618 N.E.2d 262. The two other justices each concurred in part and dissented in part from the majority opinion. Justice Greiman joined in that part of the decision granting relief for Williams, but dissented from that part of the opinion affirming the trial court with regard to McDunn. Justice Greiman based this decision on his finding that the parties had stipulated there was no fraud present or alleged, and that the parties had acted in good faith in resolving their dispute. Justice Greiman concluded that McDunn's election contest was moot because it had not been resolved prior to the general election. The third justice, Justice Scariano, agreed with the majority opinion as far as affirming the trial court and having McDunn placed on the 1992 general election ballot to fill Kiley's vacancy. However, Justice Scariano dissented from that part of the opinion allowing Williams to continue to serve as a circuit judge. Justice Scariano believed that allowing both judges to fill the one judicial vacancy would violate our constitution. The Illinois Constitution of 1970 grants the General Assembly the power to provide by law, with certain minimum requirements, the number of circuit judges to serve in each circuit court. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 7(b).) Pursuant to this grant of power, the General Assembly has specified the number of authorized circuit court judges in the Circuit Courts Act (Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 37, par. 72.01 et seq.). The appellate court's order, in effect, has created an additional circuit court judicial position for Cook County, an act exclusively within the province of the legislature pursuant to our constitution. Not only does this violate the clear language of article VI, section 7, of our constitution and the Circuit Courts Act enacted thereunder, it also violates the separation of powers established in article II, section 1, of our constitution, as the appellate court's order infringes upon exclusively legislative power. Ill. Const.1970, art. II, § 1. We also note that our constitution provides that the General Assembly may provide by law the procedure to fill judicial vacancies. In the absence of such a law, our constitution states that this court shall have such authority. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 12(c).) The General Assembly has deferred by statute to this court for the filling of certain judicial vacancies. Ill.Rev. Stat.1989, ch. 37, par. 72.42 et seq. As the Attorney General notes in his brief, the appellate court's order may be interpreted as an appointment of Williams to an inevitable opening for a circuit court position in Cook County. However, this power has been granted by our constitution to the legislature, which has deferred the matter to this court. The appellate court's order, then, if viewed as an appointment, usurps this court's authority to make appointments to judicial vacancies in violation of the constitution and the legislative enactment deferring such duty to this court. Moreover, if interpreted as an appointment, the appellate court's order is further unconstitutional, as it provided only that Williams serve until his resignation, retirement or failure to be retained. (247 Ill.App.3d at 947, 187 Ill.Dec. 671, 618 N.E.2d 262.) Our constitution provides more restrictions on a person appointed to fill a judicial vacancy, including one of time: A person appointed to fill a vacancy    shall serve until the vacancy is filled for a term at the next [applicable] election. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 12(c).) Our constitution also places a behavior restriction on judges, as any judge may be removed from office by the Illinois Courts Commission for willful misconduct in office, persistent failure to perform his duties, or other conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice or that brings the judicial office into disrepute. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 15(e); see also Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 13. We further note that our constitution authorizes only the General Assembly to appropriate for the State expenditure of funds. (Ill. Const.1970, art. VIII, § 2(b).) Thus, without the legislative creation of an additional circuit court position, or notice to this court of a vacancy, there will be no source of appropriated State funds available to pay both Williams and McDunn. In fact, any attempt by the Comptroller to pay a position not appropriated by the legislature would raise serious separation of powers problems. See Board of Trustees of Community College District No. 508 v. Burris (1987), 118 Ill.2d 465, 113 Ill.Dec. 937, 515 N.E.2d 1244; American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees v. Netsch (1991), 216 Ill.App.3d 566, 159 Ill.Dec. 138, 575 N.E.2d 945. Williams argues, however, that courts may create an additional circuit court position because the constitution only provides that the number of circuit court judges shall be provided by law. (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 7(b).) Williams argues that the constitution does not specify that the law must be an enactment by the legislature detailing the number of circuit court judges. Instead, Williams suggests, the law in this instance is section 763 of the Election Code, which allows courts to hear and determine primary election contests and make such orders and enter such judgment as justice may require. Ill.Rev.Stat. 1989, ch. 46, par. 763. The appellate court did base its order on section 763 of the Election Code, as well as Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5), which allows the appellate court to grant any relief    that the case may require. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 46, par. 7 63; 134 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5).) However, nothing in section 763 suggests that the legislature intended to allow the appellate court to increase the number of circuit court positions in direct contravention of the Circuit Courts Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 37, par. 72.01 et seq.). Moreover, specific statutory provisions generally control over general provisions on the same subject. ( Williams v. Illinois State Scholarship Comm'n (1990), 139 Ill.2d 24, 150 Ill.Dec. 578, 563 N.E.2d 465.) We also note that nothing in our Rule 366 suggests such a result. As the Attorney General argues, such an interpretation would allow courts to create an unlimited number of political offices in the name of equity and justice. Courts are bound to presume that absurd consequences were not contemplated by the legislature   . ( Illinois Chiropractic Society v. Giello (1960), 18 Ill.2d 306, 312, 164 N.E.2d 47.) Moreover, [t]he equitable powers of a court may not be exercised to direct a remedy in contradiction to the plain requirements of a statute. ( 601 West 81st Street Corp. v. City of Chicago (1984), 129 Ill.App.3d 410, 418, 84 Ill.Dec. 690, 472 N.E.2d 827.) Such an interpretation also ignores the fact that the legislature must appropriate the necessary funds for any new position. We conclude this discussion by noting that the appellate court's order is also troublesome because the court based its decision for McDunn on the law as to uninitialled ballots, but then granted relief to Williams, in part, by ignoring that same law. After finding McDunn won the 1990 primary because uninitialled ballots could not be counted under the Election Code, the appellate court then ordered relief for Williams, stating: [W]e cannot ignore the fact that Williams actually received a larger number of votes than McDunn [in the 1990 primary]. (247 Ill.App.3d at 946, 187 Ill.Dec. 671, 618 N.E.2d 262.) If such were the case, there could be more than one primary winner in every instance where uninitialled ballots were a factor.