Opinion ID: 2621451
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Was Asch denied his right to due process of law as a result of his legs being shackled during the jury trial?

Text: [¶ 55] Asch was confined in the Natrona County Detention Center at the time of his jury trial. It has long been the policy of the Natrona County Sheriff that any inmate being transported to court from the detention center be restrained through the use of some combination of hand restraints, arm restraints, leg restraints, and belly chains. In his decision letter after the remand hearing, the district court judge confirmed testimony from the hearing that for at least thirty (30) years the following policy has been in effect in Natrona County as to restraint of defendants within the courtroom itself: With respect to the first of the topics mentioned above, the general policies of the Natrona County Sheriff's Office and this district court were delineated in testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing. That testimony set forth the established procedures which provide for a criminal defendant's hands to be free from restraints during all trial proceedings, for his legs to be restrained during the trial proceedings, for the criminal defendant to enter the courtroom and be seated behind counsel table before members of the jury enter the courtroom (thereby precluding prospective jurors or jury members from seeing the leg restraints), and for the leg restraints to be removed in the event that a criminal defendant needs to cross the courtroom to take the witness stand. The policy and procedures are designed to assure that a criminal defendant is not observed to be shackled before the jury. The purposes behind the established procedures are to assure safety in the bar of the court, to maintain the custody of the criminal defendant, and to remove possibilities of his or her escape from custody. The administrator of the detention center testified that defendants would be unshackled in the courtroom only if they had obtained a court order to that effect or if the judge orally authorized removal of the leg shackles. [¶ 56] There is no dispute that, consistent with the above policy, Asch's hands were free while he was in the courtroom, but his legs were shackled. There is also no dispute that, despite the precautions described by the detention center administrator and the district court judge, one juror observed Asch in shackles throughout the one-day trial. No evidence was presented suggesting that any other juror saw the leg shackles or that the shackling played any role in the juror's deliberations. [¶ 57] The shackling of a criminal defendant in the presence of a jury is universally condemned, although reversal of a conviction in such circumstance is not automatic. See Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Propriety and Prejudicial Effect of Gagging, Shackling, or Otherwise Physically Restraining Accused During Course of State Criminal Trial, 90 A.L.R.3d 17 (1979). In State v. Finch, 137 Wash.2d 792, 975 P.2d 967, 997-99, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 922, 120 S.Ct. 285, 145 L.Ed.2d 239 (1999), the Supreme Court of Washington analyzed cases from across the United States and presented the following rationale for the general rule, from which we quote approvingly at length: It is well settled that a defendant in a criminal case is entitled to appear at trial free from all bonds or shackles except in extraordinary circumstances .... This is to ensure that the defendant receives a fair and impartial trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 and article I, section 22 (amendment 10) of the Washington State Constitution.... This court has emphasized: Section 22, art.1, of our constitution, declares that, In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person. [11] The right here declared is to appear with the use of not on[ly] his mental but his physical faculties unfettered, and unless some impelling necessity demands the restraint of a prisoner to secure the safety of others and his own custody, the binding of the prisoner in irons is a plain violation of the constitutional guaranty. ... Courts have recognized that restraining a defendant during trial infringes upon this right to a fair trial for several reasons. The one most frequently cited is that it violates a defendant's presumption of innocence.... The presumption of innocence, although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system of criminal justice. Estelle [v. Williams ], 425 U.S. [501], 503, 96 S.Ct. 1691 [48 L.Ed.2d 126 (1976)]. ... Courts have recognized that the accused is thus entitled to the physical indicia of innocence which includes the right of the defendant to be brought before the court with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and innocent man .... Courts of other jurisdictions, including our own, have long recognized the substantial danger of destruction in the minds of the jury of the presumption of innocence where the accused is required to wear prison garb, is handcuffed or is otherwise shackled.... Shackling or handcuffing a defendant has also been discouraged because it tends to prejudice the jury against the accused.... Measures which single out a defendant as a particularly dangerous or guilty person threaten his or her constitutional right to a fair trial.... The Supreme Court has stated that use of shackles and prison clothes are inherently prejudicial because they are unmistakable indications of the need to separate a defendant from the community at large. Holbrook [v. Flynn ], 475 U.S. [560], 568-69, 106 S.Ct. 1340, [89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986)] (emphasis added). When the court allows a defendant to be brought before the jury in restraints the jury must necessarily conceive a prejudice against the accused, as being in the opinion of the judge a dangerous man, and one not to be trusted, even under the surveillance of officers. [State v.] Williams, 18 Wash. [47], 51, 50 P. 580 [(1897)].... ... Shackling or handcuffing a defendant has also been discouraged because it restricts the defendant's ability to assist his counsel during trial, it interferes with the right to testify in one's own behalf, and it offends the dignity of the judicial process.... ... When determining whether restraints should be used during a courtroom proceeding this court has stated: A trial judge must exercise discretion in determining the extent to which courtroom security measures are necessary to maintain order and prevent injury. That discretion must be founded upon a factual basis set forth in the record. A broad general policy of imposing physical restraints upon prison inmates charged with new offenses because they may be `potentially dangerous' is a failure to exercise discretion. [ State v.] Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d [383] 400, 635 P.2d 694 [(1981)]. (Emphasis in original.) [¶ 58] While the shackling of criminal defendants at any time in the courtroom has been condemned on several grounds, shackling in the presence of the jury has clearly been seen as the most problematic. People v. Hill, 17 Cal.4th 800, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, 695 (1998). The concern that jurors will be influenced by observing the defendant in physical restraints is obviated, of course, if the jurors do not actually see the defendant in restraints. Consequently, it has been held that the mere fact that the defendant was somehow physically restrained during a jury trial does not demand reversal. United States v. Ware, 897 F.2d 1538, 1541-42 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 496 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2629, 110 L.Ed.2d 649 (1990), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Jones, 235 F.3d 1231, 1236-37 (10th Cir.2000); State v. Apelt, 176 Ariz. 349, 861 P.2d 634, 645-46 (1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 834, 115 S.Ct. 113, 130 L.Ed.2d 59 (1994); State v. Woolcock, 201 Conn. 605, 518 A.2d 1377, 1382 (1986); State v. Montana, 489 So.2d 348, 349 (La.App.1986); State v. Weidul, 649 A.2d 318, 319 (Me.1994); State v. Scott, 323 N.W.2d 790, 792 (Minn.1982). Likewise, some courts have held that an inadvertent view by a juror of a defendant's shackles in the courtroom does not necessarily create prejudice or necessitate reversal. Harrell v. Israel, 672 F.2d 632, 635-37 (7th Cir.1982); Gillie v. State, 305 Ark. 296, 808 S.W.2d 320, 324-25 (1991). [¶ 59] For several reasons, however, we are not convinced that a defendant's right to a fair trial is adequately protected by a rule that requires him to prove actual prejudice from in-court shackling. Our major concern, as it is the major concern of most courts, is, of course, the effect of shackling upon the jury. The problem with requiring a defendant to prove prejudice is that the jurors, themselves, may not even be aware that they have been prejudiced. The Court of Appeals was correct to find that Justice Giannini's assessment of jurors' states of mind cannot be dispositive here. If a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in due process, Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 542-543, 85 S.Ct. 1628, 14 L.Ed.2d 543 (1965), little stock need be placed in jurors' claims to the contrary. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 351-352, 86 S.Ct. 1507, 16 L.Ed.2d 600 (1966); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961). Even though a practice may be inherently prejudicial, jurors will not necessarily be fully conscious of the effect it will have on their attitude toward the accused. This will be especially true when jurors are questioned at the very beginning of proceedings; at that point, they can only speculate on how they will feel after being exposed to a practice daily over the course of a long trial. Whenever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently prejudicial, therefore, the question must be not whether jurors actually articulated a consciousness of some prejudicial effect, but rather whether an unacceptable risk is presented of impermissible factors coming into play, [ Estelle v. ] Williams, 425 U.S., at 505, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570, 106 S.Ct. 1340, 89 L.Ed.2d 525 (1986). Because of this unacceptable risk, the issue of the necessity for shackling or other restraints must be addressed by the trial court before such prejudice may arise. [¶ 60] Shackling's effect on the jury is not the only concern. Not only is it possible that the sight of shackles and gags might have a significant effect on the jury's feelings about the defendant, but the use of this technique is itself something of an affront to the very dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is trying to uphold. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 344, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970). Further, shackling offends the presumption of innocence and it may interfere with the defendant's ability to participate in his own defense. Zygadlo v. Wainwright, 720 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 941, 104 S.Ct. 1921, 80 L.Ed.2d 468 (1984). [¶ 61] Previously in this opinion, we discussed Estelle in the context of a defendant being forced to wear prison clothing at trial. We noted there that, if the defendant objects, and there is no showing by the State of a compelling reason, he cannot be forced to wear prison clothing during his jury trial. But failure to object in that situation negates the presence of compulsion. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 512-13, 96 S.Ct. 1691. Many courts find the shackling of a defendant to be similar, and find that failure to object acts as a waiver of the right not to be shackled or otherwise restrained. See State v. Mills, 196 Ariz. 269, 995 P.2d 705, 708 (1999); People v. McCue, 175 Ill.App.3d 762, 125 Ill.Dec. 243, 530 N.E.2d 271, 273 (1988); and People v. Hyche, 77 Ill.2d 229, 32 Ill.Dec. 893, 396 N.E.2d 6, 12 (1979). On the other hand, if a pretrial objection to shackling is lodged, it is an abuse of discretion for the trial court not to hold a hearing. Rhoden v. Rowland, 10 F.3d 1457, 1460 (9th Cir.1993). [¶ 62] Once again, we are not convinced that it should be a criminal defendant's responsibility to ensure that he is provided a trial free from inherently prejudicial practices. That duty should belong to the State and to the court. Consequently, we hold that in future cases, defendants shall not be shackled or otherwise physically restrained in the courtroom during a jury trial, nor shall other exceptional security measures be utilized, unless the State has first moved that such measures be utilized, the court has heard such motion, and after allowing the defendant an opportunity to contest the motion, the court has stated on the record the compelling reasons justifying the measures. See United States v. Theriault, 531 F.2d 281, 285 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898, 97 S.Ct. 262, 50 L.Ed.2d 182 (1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 870, 98 S.Ct. 212, 54 L.Ed.2d 148 (1977). At such hearing, the State has the burden of establishing the necessity for particular restraints and that such restraints are the least drastic effective measures available. State v. Thompson, 832 S.W.2d 577, 580 (Tenn.Crim.App.1991). The trial court must consider alternatives, and may not rely blindly on the judgment of correctional officers. Finch, 975 P.2d at 1003. In exercising its discretion, the court should consider at least the following factors: [T]he seriousness of the present charge against the defendant; defendant's temperament and character; his age and physical attributes, his past record; past escapes or attempted escapes, and evidence of a present plan to escape; threats to harm others or cause a disturbance; self-destructive tendencies; the risk of mob violence or of attempted revenge by others; the possibility of rescue by other offenders still at large; the size and the mood of the audience; the nature and physical security of the courtroom; and the adequacy and availability of alternative remedies. Finch, 975 P.2d at 1002 ( quoting State v. Hartzog, 96 Wash.2d 383, 400, 635 P.2d 694 (1981)). [¶ 63] The rule just announced does not apply to the situation where one or more jurors inadvertently sees a defendant in physical restraints outside the courtroom. This Court has twice before considered that issue. In Smith v. State, 773 P.2d 139 (Wyo. 1989), three jurors inadvertently observed the defendant, in handcuffs, being transferred from the jail to the courtroom. The defendant moved for a mistrial, which motion was denied. We affirmed because [t]here was nothing in the record which identifies the three jurors, nor is there any evidence presented to show that appellant was prejudiced thereby. Id. at 141. After characterizing the incident as brief and incidental, we concluded that such an incident is not necessarily prejudicial, and to justify a new trial, actual prejudice must be shown. Id. Similarly, in Eustice v. State, 11 P.3d 897 (Wyo.2000), the jury briefly observed the defendant in handcuffs and shackles in the hallway as he was being returned to the courtroom following a break in the trial. Citing Smith, we affirmed the defendant's conviction on the ground that a jury's brief or incidental viewing of the defendant in restraints is not necessarily prejudicial, and there had been no showing of actual prejudice. Id. at 901. We further concluded that defense counsel was not ineffective for having failed to move for a mistrial. Such a motion would have been futile because there was no inherent prejudice. Id. at 905. [¶ 64] We continue to adhere to the holdings of Smith and Eustice because such occurrences outside the courtroom, unlike physical restraints within the courtroom, do not carry the same risk of inherent prejudice, do not constitute the same affront to the dignity of the judicial process, and do not infringe upon the defendant's right to the presumption of innocence and his right to participate fully in his own defense. In addition, the sheriff's duty to maintain custody over a prisoner during transportation to and from the courthouse creates a presumed necessity for physical restraints, and that necessity must be outweighed by specific evidence of actual prejudice. Consequently, if such an incident occurs, the defendant must bring the matter to the trial court's attention through a motion for a mistrial, a request for a cautionary instruction, or some other curative action, or the issue is waived. If an appropriate motion is made, the court shall hold a hearing, not to determine the necessity for the restraints, but to determine whether the defendant was prejudiced.