Opinion ID: 1835835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Crown Pontiac, Inc.

Text: The arbitration agreement executed by Louis Clements is found in the Retail Buyer's Order; it reads:  DISPUTE RESOLUTION AGREEMENT I HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGE AND AGREE THAT ALL DISPUTES AND CONTROVERSIES OF EVERY KIND AND NATURE BETWEEN MYSELF AND CROWN PONTIAC-NISSAN, INC. ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE PURCHASE OF THIS VEHICLE BY ME, WILL BE RESOLVED BY ARBITRATION IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROCEDURE SET FORTH IN THIS RETAIL BUYER'S ORDER. In pertinent part, the procedure set out on the reverse side of the retail buyer's order provides: All disputes and controversies of every kind and nature between the parties hereto arising out of or in connection with this contract, its subject-matter or its negotiation, as to the existence, construction, validity, interpretation or meaning, performance, nonperformance, enforcement, operation, breach of contract, breach of warranty, continuance or termination thereof or any claim alleging fraud in fact, fraud in the inducement, deceit, or suppression of any material fact shall be submitted to binding arbitration pursuant to the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act under the following procedures: . . . . (f) The parties stipulate that the provisions hereto shall be a complete defense to any suit, action, or proceeding instituted in any federal, state, or local court or before any administrative tribunal with respect to any controversy or dispute arising hereunder. (g) The parties agree that it is the purpose of this provision of the contract and the intent of the parties hereto, to make the submission to arbitration of any dispute or controversy arising out of this Agreement, as set forth hereinabove, concerning any complaint or claim of CONSUMER, an express condition precedent to any legal or equitable proceeding of any nature whatsoever by CONSUMER. (Emphasis added.) Crown Pontiac contends that Louis Clements executed a binding arbitration agreement. However, Clements argues that the buyer's order is a contract of adhesion and indicates an absence of mutuality of remedy and is, therefore, unconscionable. Clements argues that the buyer's order, specifically subsection (g), denies him the right to judicial relief, but allows Crown Pontiac to seek judicial relief against any claims it may have against Clements. We find no merit in Clements's contention. To prove a contract of adhesion, Clements must show that the contract was not fairly entered into because he, being in an inferior bargaining position, had no meaningful choice of agreeing to arbitration or not. See Northcom, Ltd. v. James, 694 So.2d 1329 (Ala.1997). However, Clements offered no evidence tending to show that he was presented the terms of the buyer's order on a take it or leave it basis, nor did he show that he was not provided a reasonable chance to negotiate and that under such conditions he could not purchase the automobile in question except by agreeing to the terms of the contract. Clements has not shown that his contract is one of adhesion. The arbitration agreement included in the buyer's order does not lack mutuality of remedy and is not unconscionable merely because it requires Clements to arbitrate claims that he may have against Crown Pontiac, but allows Crown Pontiac to litigate claims it may have against Clements. See Northcom, supra. We also find that Clements's claims against Crown Pontiac are included in the broad language of the arbitration agreement executed between him and Crown Pontiac. Clements alleges that Crown Pontiac conspired to commit common law fraud by financing the sale of an extended-service contract as part of the purchase of his automobile without including the cost of the contract in the finance charge section of the sales document. The arbitration agreement signed by Clements covers  all disputes and controversies of every kind and nature between [Clements] and Crown Pontiac-Nissan, Inc. arising out of or in connection with the purchase of this vehicle by [Clements].  Clearly, Clements's allegation of fraud arose out of the purchase of his vehicle from Crown Pontiac, and it is, therefore, encompassed by this broad arbitration clause. Therefore, we hold that Louis Clements should be compelled to arbitrate his claims against Crown Pontiac, pursuant to the terms of the arbitration agreement. We reverse the trial court's order denying Crown Pontiac's motion to compel arbitration against Louis Clements.