Opinion ID: 39678
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Express Authority to Waive Immunity

Text: We consider first defendants’ argument that they did not waive their states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit under § 504 because they lacked express authorization to do so under state law. Defendants do not challenge that they were authorized under state law to accept federal funds or that each received federal funds.12 Defendants insist, however, that as state agencies, their authority to accept federal funds is insufficient to waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, which, they argue, cannot be validly waived without express statutory authority. Defendants’ argument fails to recognize that grant programs 12 LADOE is authorized to accept federal funds pursuant to LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17:24 (C), which provides in pertinent part: The board [LADOE] is hereby designated as the State Agency with respect to federal funds for those programs under the jurisdiction of the board. The State Department of Education shall administer and distribute all federal funds received for the benefit of those phases of education under the jurisdiction of the board. (emphasis added). Similarly, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 46:51(6) provides that the Department of Social Services of Louisiana [DSS] may “[a]ct as the agent of the state to cooperate with the federal government...and in the administration of federal funds granted in the state to aid in the furtherance of any functions of the department, and be empowered to meet such federal standards as may be established for the administration of such federal funds.” (emphasis added). Likewise, TEX. EDUC. CODE. ANN. § 110.08, which governs the funding of TTUHSC, provides in pertinent part, “The board [of TTUHSC], in its discretion, may accept and administer grants and gifts from the federal government...for the use and benefit of the Health Sciences Center.” 7 based on the Spending Clause are to be interpreted under ordinary contractual principles.13 In these cases, the defendants were authorized by the State to accept the benefits of substantial sums of federal Spending Clause money burdened with the clearly stated condition under § 2000d-7 that acceptance waives immunity from suit in federal court. The statutory powers of attorney provided to defendants by their respective state legislatures to accept, administer, and expend such federal funds necessarily includes the authorization to accept the conditions that come along with those funds. Clothed with this authority, the defendants held themselves out to have authority from their states to comply with the conditions imposed by Congress in the statute. These conditions are inseparable from the offer of the funds: The States (or their authorized agencies) may reject the condition of waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity by rejecting the funds, or they may accept the funds and the conditions; they cannot, however, accept the benefits of the funds and reject the inextricably intertwined condition of waiver by claiming post hoc that the delegation of authority to accept the funds did not carry with it the authority to waive immunity. This is hornbook contract and agency law. Therefore, we reject defendants’ argument that they retain 13 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002). 8 Eleventh Amendment immunity because they lacked express statutory authority to waive their states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.14