Opinion ID: 874901
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: there is valid consent

Text: Consent is an exception to the warrant requirement. State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 791, 796, 69 P.3d 1052, 1057 (2003). Whether consent was voluntary, as opposed to being a product of coercion, is a question of fact to be determined in light of all the surrounding circumstances. Id. The district court found that Smith's consent to search was involuntary because the police told him they would get a search warrant if he did not consent. According to the district court, Smith was presented with a Hobson's choice, which is to say, no real choice at all, because the apartment would ultimately be searched whether or not he consented. [4] The district court erred by basing its decision on Smith's inability to avoid a search of his apartment. Under the Fourth Amendment, a person is assured `not that no government search of his house will occur unless he consents; but that no such search will occur that is unreasonable.' State v. Brauch, 133 Idaho 215, 220, 984 P.2d 703, 708 (1999) (quoting Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2799, 111 L.Ed.2d 148, 158 (1990)). The question is not whether Smith wanted to have his home searched, but whether he voluntarily consented to it. Smith would have preferred that no search take place, but as a practical matter that choice was not before him. He was deprived of that choice, not by police misconduct, but by the existence of probable cause to search his apartment. His options were to allow a warrantless search or insist on a warrant. While Smith did not like the choices, that does not mean he was coerced. State v. Garcia, 143 Idaho 774, 779, 152 P.3d 645, 650 (Ct.App.2006). A representation by police that they presently have a warrant renders consent involuntary because acquiescence to a claim of lawful authority is not voluntary consent. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 547-49, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 1791-92, 20 L.Ed.2d 797, 801-03 (1968). Smith, however, was not told that the police had a warrant, but that they would obtain one if he did not consent. See State v. Kilby, 130 Idaho 747, 750, 947 P.2d 420, 423 (Ct.App.1997) (distinguishing Bumper ). Likewise, a false or erroneous representation by police regarding the right to obtain a warrant weighs against a finding of voluntariness. See State v. Fee, 135 Idaho 857, 863, 26 P.3d 40, 46 (Ct.App.2001); State v. Abeyta, 131 Idaho 704, 708-09, 963 P.2d 387, 391-92 (Ct.App.1998). Baseless threats to obtain a search warrant may render consent involuntary. United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th Cir.1992). Here, however, Cox's discovery of the pipe and seeds afforded probable cause for a search warrant. He was not misleading Smith, but merely explaining the options. See Fee, 135 Idaho at 863, 26 P.3d at 46. A threat to take unlawful or improper action cuts against voluntariness, but no such threat was made. Had Smith refused to allow the search, it would have been proper for the police to secure the premises while awaiting a warrant. State v. Fees, 140 Idaho 81, 86-87, 90 P.3d 306, 311-12 (2004) (discussing Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 121 S.Ct. 946, 148 L.Ed.2d 838 (2001)). There were sufficient facts known to obtain a search warrant. Ultimately, the well founded advice of a law enforcement agent that, absent a consent to search, a warrant can be obtained does not constitute coercion. United States v. Faruolo, 506 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cir.1974).