Opinion ID: 459453
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ineffective assistance in respect to calling keys as a

Text: WITNESS AT THE THIRD TRIAL 7 David Keys was called by the state at the first trial. He testified that he, Wallace, and Rodney Crawford (who was tried with Wallace) went to the victim's apartment to 'sell some clothes.' According to Keys, an 'altercation' with the victim ultimately ensued. Keys saw a struggle beginning between Wallace and the victim. Keys then admitted that he (keys) fired three times in self-defense. Mr. Keys stated: 'I really don't know' when asked if Wallace had a gun. 8 During Keys' testimony, the state tried to have him declared a hostile witness. The state attorney tried to impeach Keys with testimony that he apparently gave in his own trial. But the trial court refused to let the jury consider this supposed testimony. Keys was convicted on a lesser manslaughter charge before Wallace's trial. It is unclear whether Keys testified in the second trial after the first hung jury. 9 Under Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984), the habeas petitioner must prove that an error of counsel was 1) 'so serious that counsel was not functioning' according to a constitutionally-guaranteed standard of minimal competence, and 2) that the error significantly 'prejudiced the defense.' Thus the question before us is whether the defense counsel's decision not to call Keys reflected a competent legal strategy that did not significantly prejudice Wallace's defense. 10 At the evidentiary hearing on this issue, Wallace's former defense counsel indicated his view that Keys' testimony could give rise to an 'inference' regarding Wallace's possession of a gun. 3 On its face, Keys' testimony would not appear to contribute to this inference. But the defense counsel could have been legitimately concerned about the credibility of Keys' testimony and the possibility of impeachment based on testimony at his own trial. Keys' testimony also provided no perspective on the facts significantly different from that provided from Wallace's own testimony. Moreover, at the third trial new testimony from Wallace's former mother-in-law added crucial support to the state's case. She testified about Keys' receiving a gun before going to the victim's apartment. Under these circumstances we cannot hold that the failure of Wallace's counsel to call Keys at the third trial was so erroneous as to satisfy the two-prong Strickland test. 11