Opinion ID: 2982291
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Susceptibility to Abuse

Text: Even if the underrepresentation were substantial, however, Maddox has not shown evidence that the jury selection process was susceptible to abuse or was not racially neutral. As the deputy clerk’s affidavit explained, the Eastern District of Tennessee summons prospective jurors at random from a jury wheel based on a list of registered voters that have been screened for their qualifications. Rather than alleging this specific process is discriminatory, Maddox relies on Rose v. Mitchell, in which the Supreme Court stated that “one may assume for purposes of this case that the Tennessee method of selecting a grand jury foreman is susceptible of abuse.” 443 U.S. at 566 (emphasis added). Maddox argues the Court “was referencing the historical racial -9- Case Nos. 11-5829/5837/5860/6191/6192/6196/6198, United States v. Miller, et al. discrimination in the South.” Not only was the state-court method of grand jury selection in Rose substantially different than the randomized process used by the federal court here—jurors in Rose were selected by jury commissioners and foremen by judges, see Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 347 (1984) (“Rose must be read in light of the method used in Tennessee to select a grand jury and its foreman”)—the Rose Court itself warned against relying on broad arguments of historical discrimination in the place of case-specific evidence in jury-selection cases. 443 U.S. at 572 n.12. Otherwise, Maddox argues that the district court’s reliance on state voter files to compile lists of potential jurors is not race-neutral because of a 5.4 percent disparity between the rate of white and African-American voter registration. However, this Court has explicitly recognized that “[v]oter registration lists are the presumptive statutory source for potential jurors” and that the Constitution does not require a supplemental source “‘simply because an identifiable group votes in a proportion lower than the rest of the population.’” United States v. Odeneal, 517 F.3d 406, 412 (6th Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). Maddox fails to persuasively distinguish Odeneal.