Opinion ID: 1634162
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether an attorney-client relationship existed between Thompson and McGaughy.

Text: ¶ 22. The complaint tribunal found that Thompson had not violated Rules 1.2(a) or 1.3 because no attorney-client relationship existed between Thompson and McGaughy. The Bar contends that Tubwell, acting as an agent for Thompson, communicated Thompson's consent to act as McGaughy's lawyer, and that Thompson should have known of McGaughy's reliance. ¶ 23. Rule 1.2(a) provides that a lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are pursued. M.R.P.C. 1.2(a). Rule 1.3 requires a lawyer to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client. M.R.C.P. 1.3. For either rule to be implicated, an attorney-client relationship must exist. ¶ 24. The existence of an attorney-client relationship depends upon the circumstances and may be a question of fact. M.R.P.C., SCOPE. The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, Section 14, (2000), states, in pertinent part, that: A relationship of client and lawyer arises when: (1) a person manifests to a lawyer the person's intent that the lawyer provide legal services for the person; and either (a) the lawyer manifests to the person consent to do so; or (b) the lawyer fails to manifest lack of consent to do so, and the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the person reasonably relies on the lawyer to provide the services.... Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 (2000). A lawyer's consent to represent a client need not be made by the lawyer himself. An agent for the lawyer may communicate consent, for example, a secretary or paralegal with express, implied, or apparent authority to act for the lawyer in undertaking a representation. Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers § 14 cmt. e (2000). ¶ 25. Thompson hired Tubwell to do legal research and draft briefs. He was told not to independently communicate with clients. Thus, Tubwell lacked express authority to communicate Thompson's consent to represent a client. Tubwell also lacked implied authority because communicating Thompson's consent to represent a client was not necessary, proper, and usual, in the exercise of his express duties. Patriot Commercial Leasing Co. v. Jerry Enis Motors, Inc., 928 So.2d 856, 864 (Miss.2006) (emphasis removed) (citing Bolus v. United Penn. Bank, 363 Pa.Super. 247, 259, 525 A.2d 1215, 1221 (1987), alloc. denied, 518 Pa. 627, 541 A.2d 1138 (1988)). ¶ 26. Apparent authority is authority that the principal has by words or conduct held the alleged agent out as having. Patriot Commercial Leasing Co., 928 So.2d at 864 (citing Bolus, 525 A.2d at 1221). Apparent authority requires (1) acts or conduct of the principal indicating the agent's authority, (2) reasonable reliance on those acts, and (3) detrimental change in position as a result of reliance. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church v. S & S Constr. Co., Inc., 615 So.2d 568, 573 (Miss.1993) (citing Andrew Jackson Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 566 So.2d 1172, 1181 (Miss.1990)). A principal is bound if the conduct of the principal is such that persons of reasonable prudence, ordinarily familiar with business practices, dealing with the agent might rightfully believe the agent to have the power he assumes to have. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 615 So.2d at 573. ¶ 27. The Bar cites De Vaux v. American Home Assurance Co., 387 Mass. 814, 444 N.E.2d 355 (1983), for support. In De Vaux, an individual called the attorney's office seeking legal advice. De Vaux, 387 Mass. at 816, 444 N.E.2d 355. The attorney's secretary returned this person's phone call and rendered some legal advice, arranged for a medical examination, and instructed the person to write a letter requesting the attorney's assistance. Id. This person delivered a letter to the attorney's office, but the secretary misfiled the letter. Id. As a result, the attorney failed to discover the letter until after the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 816-17, 444 N.E.2d 355. The person then filed a malpractice suit against the attorney based, in part, on a theory that the secretary had apparent authority to establish an attorney-client relationship on behalf of the attorney. Id. at 819, 444 N.E.2d 355. The plaintiff claimed that the attorney had placed the secretary in a position in which prospective clients might reasonably believe that she had the authority to establish an attorney-client relationship. Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that [i]t is a question for the jury whether the attorney allowed his secretary to act as she did, and whether he knew what she was doing. Id. at 820, 444 N.E.2d 355. ¶ 28. Thompson stated that Tubwell had not been given authority independently to communicate with clients and had been instructed not to sign any letters. She told Tubwell that any cases he worked on had to come through her office. Thompson included Tubwell's name on the law firm letterhead, but identified him as a paralegal. Furthermore, she disclaimed any knowledge of Tubwell's correspondence with McGaughy or his work on McGaughy's case. ¶ 29. We find insufficient evidence to support that Thompson, by her words, actions, or conduct, indicated that Tubwell had authority to communicate her consent to undertake the representation of a client. We also find that no attorney-client relationship was established by Thompson's failure to communicate her lack of consent to represent McGaughy. Thompson had no knowledge of McGaughy's case or Tubwell's correspondence with McGaughy, and therefore, could not reasonably have known about McGaughy's reliance on her services. ¶ 30. Because no attorney-client relationship existed, we find that Thompson did not violate Rules 1.2(a) and 1.3.