Opinion ID: 612891
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Complaining Witness

Text: Adams asks us to view Hanson's acts differently: she claims that Hanson was acting as a complaining witness, not a prosecutor. At common law, witnesses testifying in court received absolute immunity, Burns, 500 U.S. at 489-90, 111 S.Ct. 1934, but complaining witnesses  those swearing to the facts in the initial complaint  did not, Kalina, 522 U.S. at 130-31, 118 S.Ct. 502. But see id. at 133-35, 118 S.Ct. 502 (Scalia, J., concurring) (disputing that complaining witness was a meaningful label at common law). A complaining witness is not entitled to absolute immunity, Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 340-45, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986), nor is a prosecutor who performs the same role, Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129-31, 118 S.Ct. 502. Hanson, however, was not acting as a complaining witness. In Kalina, the Supreme Court assessed whether a prosecutor acted as a complaining witness when she undertook three separate acts: filing an information, a motion for an arrest warrant, and a sworn affidavit, in which she swore that the underlying facts provided to the court to support the arrest warrant were true. Id. at 121, 118 S.Ct. 502. An arrest warrant was issued on the basis of the prosecutor's sworn statements. Id. The Supreme Court determined that all these acts were prosecutorial except for swearing to the underlying facts in the affidavit, id. at 129-31, 118 S.Ct. 502, in which the prosecutor personally vouched for the truth of the facts set forth in the certification under penalty of perjury, id. at 121, 118 S.Ct. 502. By offering sworn testimony, the prosecutor performed an act that any competent witness might have performed. Id. at 129-30, 118 S.Ct. 502. Testifying about facts is the function of the witness, not of the lawyer, and therefore, [e]ven when the person who makes the constitutionally required `Oath or affirmation' is a lawyer, the only function that she performs in giving sworn testimony is that of a witness. Id. at 130-31, 118 S.Ct. 502. Advocating before the trial court in order to procure witness testimony, as Hanson did, is more analogous to the application for a warrant that the Court held to be prosecutorial than the acts of a complaining witness. First, as described supra, Hanson's conduct fell within her prosecutorial role. Second, there is no allegation that Hanson provided sworn testimony. Adams asserts that the distinction between a prosecutor's unsworn representations and a witness's sworn representations is a distinction without a difference. But the Supreme Court in Kalina found determinative that a prosecutor was testifying to facts under penalty of perjury or giving sworn testimony. Id. at 129, 131, 118 S.Ct. 502 (emphasis added). The Court explained: Indeed, except for her act in personally attesting to the truth of the averments in the certification, it seems equally clear that the preparation and filing of the [sworn affidavit] was part of the advocate's function as well. The critical question, however, is whether she was acting as a complaining witness rather than a lawyer when she executed the certification [u]nder penalty of perjury. Id. at 129, 118 S.Ct. 502 (emphasis added). Following Kalina, the Eleventh Circuit in Rivera concluded that a prosecutor who provided the court with mistaken information, causing the wrong man to be arrested, did not act as a complaining witness because he did not provide sworn testimony. Rivera v. Leal, 359 F.3d 1350, 1354-55 (11th Cir.2004); see id. at 1355 (The sworn/unsworn distinction is more than critical; it is determinative.). A prosecutor's acts in preparing and presenting to the court information in support of an arrest, and a witness's acts in swearing to the truth of the facts supporting criminal charges, serve distinct and essential functions. See Kalina, 522 U.S. at 129, 118 S.Ct. 502; Ireland, 113 F.3d at 1447 (holding that prosecuting attorneys who prepared and presented the contents of a criminal complaint were entitled to absolute immunity). In this case, Hanson's unsworn statements during a pretrial court appearance[] by the prosecutor in support of taking criminal action against a suspect, are acts of advocacy protected by absolute immunity. [8] Burns, 500 U.S. at 492, 111 S.Ct. 1934; see also Sanders v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 226 Fed. Appx. 687, 690 (9th Cir.2007) (unpublished opinion) (holding that a prosecutor's statements before a grand jury did not render him a complaining witness, and so deprive him of absolute immunity, because word choice in the course of advocacy cannot turn a prosecutor into a witness).