Opinion ID: 6341456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We have jurisdiction to adjudicate Lesko’s claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). However, this case presents a difficult question about the District Court’s jurisdiction. In Lesko’s present habeas petition, he challenges both his 1981 guilt-phase trial and 1995 resentencing. As to the guilt-phase, Lesko argues (1) his Brady rights were violated 15 and (2) his right to testify was obstructed by his ineffective trial counsel. As to his resentencing, Lesko argues (3) his legal team was ineffective in investigating and presenting a mitigation case and (4) he suffered prejudice from the cumulative effect of their errors. Lesko’s current habeas petition presented the first opportunity in which he could challenge his resentencing. However, he already litigated a petition contesting his guiltphase proceedings. Under AEDPA, a district court lacks jurisdiction to consider claims presented in a “second or successive habeas corpus application” unless a court of appeals has authorized the petition in accordance with a restrictive criterion.4 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2), (b)(3)(A). Lesko did not seek, let alone obtain, the requisite authorization under this portion of the statute. Thus, the question is whether the guilt phase challenges in his petition constitute a prohibited second or successive petition. If so, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate it. In Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010), the Supreme Court interpreted AEDPA’s second or successive provision in a related scenario. There, the defendant was 4 Specifically, a court of appeals must certify that the petition relies on either: (1) “a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable[,]” or (2) newly discovered facts which, if proven, would “establish by clear and convincing evidence that . . . no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)-(B). If the court of appeals finds that these requirements are not satisfied, the petition must be dismissed. Id. § 2244(b)(3)(C). 16 convicted of murder and sentenced to death in state court. Id. at 323. After exhausting state court remedies, he filed a federal habeas petition, ultimately achieving vacatur of his sentence. Id. The state court conducted an entirely new sentencing proceeding, which ended in the same result: a death sentence. Id. at 326. Magwood then filed a second habeas petition, this time attacking his new sentence on the basis that he “did not have fair warning that his offense could be punished by death.” Id. at 327. The State argued that because Magwood could have made a fair-warning argument in his initial habeas petition after his first sentencing, but did not, his petition was second or successive. Id. at 331. The Supreme Court disagreed. It reasoned that “both § 2254(b)’s text and the relief it provides indicate that the phrase ‘second or successive’ must be interpreted with respect to the judgment challenged.” Id. at 332-33. Thus, where “there is a new judgment intervening between the two habeas petitions, . . . an application challenging the resulting new judgment is not ‘second or successive’ at all.” Id. at 341-42 (internal quotation and citation omitted). Lesko’s present habeas petition indeed challenges his new 1995 sentence, but also his undisturbed 1981 conviction. The Magwood Court recognized the possibility of such a scenario. Though the prisoner there did not seek to relitigate his undisturbed conviction, the State argued that the Court’s “reading of § 2244(b) would allow a petitioner who obtains a conditional writ as to his sentence to file a subsequent application challenging not only his resulting, new sentence, but also his original, undisturbed conviction.” Id. at 342. The Court refused to address the question, saying that it would not speculate about what might arise in future cases. Id. Thus, it is an open question whether a petition like Lesko’s, which attacks 17 both a new sentence and an undisturbed conviction, runs afoul of the second or successive rule. Since Magwood was decided, five Circuits have held that the Magwood rule applies with equal force to cases like this one, concluding that a second-in-time5 petition is not second or successive as to an undisturbed conviction because a new sentence creates a new judgment which has not yet been challenged. See In re Gray, 850 F.3d 139, 141-43 (4th Cir. 2017); King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154, 158 (6th Cir. 2015); Insignares v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 755 F.3d 1273, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014) (per curiam); Wentzell v. Neven, 674 F.3d 1124, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 2012); Johnson v. United States, 623 F.3d 41, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2010). Despite AEDPA’s tightening of habeas relief, these courts have concluded, Magwood compels the conclusion that a prisoner who obtains relief as to his sentence may nonetheless take another bite at the apple in contesting his original conviction. See, e.g., Johnson, 623 F.3d at 46 (“[W]here a first habeas petition results in an amended judgment, a subsequent petition is not successive regardless of whether it challenges the conviction, the sentence, or both.”). Two Circuits, the Seventh and the Tenth, have ruled otherwise. In Dahler v. United States, a pre-Magwood case, the Seventh Circuit held that a habeas petition challenging an error preceding resentencing “must be treated as a collateral attack on the original conviction and sentence, rather than as an initial challenge to the latest sentence.” 259 F.3d 763, 765 (7th Cir. 2001). Because Magwood expressly left this question 5 By “second-in-time,” we mean any numerically second petition. All “second or successive” petitions are “second-in-time,” but not all “second-in-time” petitions are “second or successive” within the meaning of § 2244(b). 18 open, the Seventh Circuit has adhered to its precedent and held that a second-in-time habeas petition is barred as second or successive where it attempts to challenge a prisoner’s undisturbed conviction after he already litigated a habeas petition. See Suggs v. United States, 705 F.3d 279, 281-84 (7th Cir. 2013). For its part, the Tenth Circuit has held that a resentencing does not create a new judgment that resets AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitation, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1), a related procedural hurdle housed in the same section as the second-or-successive rule. See Prendergast v. Clements, 699 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2012). Prendergast, however, relied on pre-Magwood precedent from our own Circuit without mentioning Magwood. See id. at 1186-88 (citing Fielder v. Varner, 379 F.3d 113 (3d Cir. 2004)). We have not yet weighed in on this post-Magwood debate about how to interpret § 2244, though we have acknowledged the circuit split. Romansky v. Superintendent Greene SCI, 933 F.3d 293, 299-300 (3d Cir. 2019). Now, after careful consideration, we hold that the majority interpretation of § 2244(b) is correct: a prisoner who receives relief as to his sentence is not barred from raising, in a second-in-time habeas petition, a challenge to an undisturbed conviction. Notwithstanding the troubling implications for comity and finality, we are persuaded the reasoning of Magwood compels this conclusion. The Supreme Court in Magwood held that a new “judgment” resets the count for second-or-successive purposes. See Magwood, 561 U.S. at 341-42. Before AEDPA, the Court had stated on more than one occasion that “[a] judgment of conviction includes both the adjudication of guilt and the sentence,” Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 132 (1993) superseded by statute, Pub. L. 115–391, § 403(a), 132 Stat. 5221, as recognized in United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 19 2319, 2324 n.1 (2019), emphasizing that a “[f]inal judgment in a criminal case means sentence[;] [t]he sentence is the judgment,” Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147, 156 (2007) (quoting Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211, 212 (1937)). And Magwood makes clear that the Court continues to read it that way in the context of AEDPA. For purposes of a § 2254 petition, the Court explained, a “judgment” is that which “authoriz[es] the prisoner’s confinement,” and custody “is inextricable from the judgment that authorizes it.” Magwood, 561 U.S. at 332-33 (internal quotation omitted). Because both a conviction and sentence are necessary to authorize a prisoner’s confinement,6 and resentencing creates a new judgment authorizing a prisoner’s continued confinement, a petition challenging either component of that new judgment— be it conviction or sentence—is not second-or-successive.7 Our decision in Romansky is not to the contrary. There, we held that a habeas petitioner’s resentencing as to one count 6 True, a prisoner like Lesko whose original sentence is vacated typically remains in custody pending resentencing, but this is not because his conviction alone is sufficient to authorize his confinement. Rather, it is because a federal court has issued a conditional writ and delayed habeas relief “in order to provide the State an opportunity to correct the constitutional violation,” Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987), and to “replace an invalid judgment with a valid one,” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 87 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring). 7 We interpret “judgment” only as that term appears in the federal habeas statutes. We offer no view on what might constitute a new or intervening judgment for purposes of other statutes not presently before us. 20 of conviction “did not impose a new judgment” as to other counts for which both the conviction and sentence remained undisturbed, see Romansky, 933 F.3d at 300-01, and each count of conviction for which a separate sentence was imposed authorized its own confinement, each constituting a distinct “judgment” for purposes of AEDPA. The Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar approach, holding that, because vacating a conviction and sentence for a lesser included offense did not disturb either the conviction or sentence for the greater offense, it did not constitute a new judgment.8 See In re Lampton, 667 F.3d 585, 588-89 (5th Cir. 2012); see also Patterson v. Sec’y Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 849 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2017) (holding that only changes to sentences that authorize new confinements constitute new judgments under Magwood). Romansky thus stands for the proposition that a resentencing as to one count of a conviction that makes no changes to the confinements authorized by the other undisturbed counts does not affect the “judgment” as to those counts and, hence, does not reset the habeas counter. 933 F.3d at 300. What we confront today, however, presents a different question, one we anticipated in Romansky. There, we suggested that where a court “undertake[s] a de novo 8 In contrast, the Second and Ninth Circuits treat the convictions and sentences for multiple counts as “components” of a single judgment such that a change to any resets the habeas counter for all. See Wentzell, 674 F.3d at 1127; Johnson, 623 F.3d at 46. We see no reason, however, to treat separate counts of conviction and sentences imposing separate confinements as components of a single judgment merely because they were handed down at the same time; rather, consistent with Romansky, we will treat these are separate and distinct judgments for purposes of AEDPA. 21 resentencing as to all counts of conviction if any count is vacated on appeal . . . the resentencing might constitute a new judgment as to every count of conviction.” Id. As we have explained here, that reasoning is compelled by Magwood. Resentencing creates a new judgment as to each count of conviction for which a new or altered sentence is imposed, while leaving undisturbed the judgments for any counts of conviction for which neither the sentence nor the conviction is changed. Lesko was resentenced as to all counts of his conviction; as a result, his guilt-phase claims are not barred as second-or-successive. One of Lesko’s guilt-phase claims is not barred for a second reason as well. In his present petition, Lesko contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by preventing him from exercising his Sixth Amendment right to testify at his 1981 guilt-phase trial. That same lawyer, Rabe Marsh, represented Lesko for nearly twenty years, including at Lesko’s first guilt and sentencing trials, first direct appeal, first PCRA proceedings, and first federal habeas proceedings, along with his 1995 resentencing and the ensuing direct appeal. It was only after Marsh withdrew in 1999 and Lesko obtained new counsel that Lesko for the first time raised the issue of Marsh’s ineffectiveness at trial. The PCRA court granted a new trial and sentencing, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, denying his ineffective assistance claim—and all but one of his other claims—as untimely. Lesko XIII, 15 A.3d at 359-73. Now, in his second round of federal habeas proceedings, Lesko attempts to advance this claim once more. Recognizing these circumstances to be unique, we requested additional briefing on how the term “second or successive” should be construed in such a situation and whether Marsh, having continuously represented Lesko since the guilt-phase trial, could be expected to argue his own 22 ineffectiveness either in Lesko’s state PCRA or initial federal habeas proceedings. Lesko argued that he could not. We agree. In Martinez v. Ryan, the Supreme Court warned that “[a] prisoner’s inability to present a claim of trial error is of particular concern when the claim is one of ineffective assistance of counsel.” 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012). And we, along with several of our sister circuits, have recognized that lawyers cannot be expected to argue their own ineffectiveness. See United States v. Cocivera, 104 F.3d 566, 570 (3d Cir. 1996); see also Harris v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 874 F.3d 682, 690 (11th Cir. 2017) (observing that a lawyer’s “personal interest in not being found to have performed ineffectively . . . conflicts with the interests of a client asserting a claim based on his lawyer’s ineffectiveness”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 276 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[C]ounsel cannot be expected to raise his own ineffectiveness on appeal . . . .”); United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1996) (agreeing that “forcing trial counsel to prove his own ineffectiveness” created a conflict of interest); Ciak v. United States, 59 F.3d 296, 303 (2d Cir. 1995) (“We cannot expect ineffective assistance claims to be raised on direct appeal—and therefore we should not penalize a petitioner for failing to raise them—when a petitioner’s counsel on direct appeal also represented him at trial.”). Here, attorney Marsh was operating under a conflict of interest which effectively prevented him in either the state PCRA or initial federal habeas proceedings from raising a claim that he interfered with his client’s right to testify. “Advancing such a claim would have required [counsel] to denigrate [his] own performance”—something he “cannot reasonably be expected to” do, as it would “threaten[] [his] professional reputation and livelihood.” Christeson v. Roper, 23 574 U.S. 373, 378 (2015); see also Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 285 n.8 (2012) (explaining that a “significant conflict of interest” arises when a lawyer’s “interest in avoiding damage to [his] own reputation” is at odds with the petitioner’s “strongest argument”); Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct 1.7 cmt. 10 (“[I]f the probity of a lawyer’s own conduct in a transaction is in serious question, it may be difficult or impossible for the lawyer to give a client detached advice.”). Our conclusion that attorney Marsh could not have been expected to raise a claim as to his own ineffectiveness at trial has significant implications for our second or successive analysis. The Supreme Court has held that “the § 2244(b) restrictions simply do not apply to” certain claims based on a prisoner’s inability to raise them in an initial habeas petition. Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 642 (1998). Likewise, we have previously stated that “a subsequent petition . . . is clearly not a ‘second or successive’ petition within the meaning of § 2244 if the claim had not arisen or could not have been raised at the time of the prior petition.” Benchoff, 404 F.3d at 817. That is the case here: because Marsh was operating under a conflict of interest when he filed Lesko’s first habeas petition, the ineffectiveness claim “could not have been raised at [that] time,” id, and Lesko’s first opportunity to raise his counsel’s ineffectiveness was in his second-in-time petition. Put differently, if Lesko’s petition were barred as second-or-successive, he would, as a practical matter, have never had a chance to bring that claim. Yet “[t]he right to the effective assistance of counsel at trial is a bedrock principle in our justice system.” Martinez, 566 U.S. at 12. We therefore decline to interpret § 2244(b) in a way that allows for an ineffective assistance counsel claim to completely evade federal habeas review. Instead, we hold that a second-in-time habeas petition is not second or successive to the extent it raises 24 an ineffective assistance of counsel claim that the prisoner lacked opportunity to raise because the same counsel represented him both at trial and in his first round of habeas proceedings.9 As Lesko’s current habeas petition is not second or successive with respect to his guilt-phase claims, the District Court had jurisdiction to decide it, and we may proceed to address the merits of his claims. B. Lesko’s claim that his Brady rights were violated We now turn to the merits of those guilt-phase claims. Lesko first argues that the Commonwealth violated his Brady rights by withholding evidence that he could have used to impeach Montgomery and Rutherford. A Brady violation occurs when the defendant demonstrates that (1) the evidence was favorable to the accused, either because it was exculpatory or had impeachment value; (2) the government withheld the evidence, either willfully or inadvertently; and (3) the evidence was material. Dennis v. Sec’y, PA Dep’t of Corr., 834 F.3d 263, 284–85 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc). This claim involves three pieces of evidence that the Commonwealth did not produce before trial: The first is a copy of an “agreement and statement of intent” between the Westmoreland County District Attorney 9 We stress the narrowness of this holding. We simply hold that in the rare circumstance where a conflict of interest— like ripeness, Stewart, 523 U.S. at 644-45, or a procedural bar, Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 487-88 (2000)—makes it impossible to bring a claim of trial ineffectiveness in a first habeas petition, that claim is not second or successive when raised in a subsequent petition with new counsel. 25 and Montgomery in which the district attorney agreed that he would not prosecute Montgomery for any crimes against property that were alleged to have occurred in December 1979 or January 1980. In exchange for this promise, Montgomery agreed to advise and testify as a witness about the deaths of Miller, Newcomer, and Levato. The second piece of evidence is a police report prepared by Trooper Michael K. Steffee of the Pennsylvania State Police on January 8, 1980, recording his interview with Montgomery. This interview occurred before Montgomery began to cooperate with authorities. At this time, Montgomery told Steffee that after he joined Lesko and Travaglia in the hotel room, Travaglia asked if he wanted a gun, and “[t]hat is when I should have known something was wrong.” J.A. 4734. Montgomery went on to say, “I don’t know anything about the cop getting shot or any armed robberies.” Id. The last is Rutherford’s juvenile file. Lesko believes that three pieces of this file are particularly important: (1) notes reporting that on November 27, 1980, and December 29, 1980, Rutherford was allowed to leave the Juvenile Detention Center for five hours to spend time with his family; (2) a copy of a letter from one of the prosecutors to Rutherford’s attorney stating that “a disposition of this case prior to the completion of the first trial in the matter of Michael Travaglia and John Lesko would be too risky from a prosecution standpoint,” id. at 4755; (3) an “Application to Transfer Case to Juvenile Court,” in which Rutherford’s counsel claimed that transfer was necessary because Rutherford’s “medical and psychiatric condition require that, if convicted, he not be confined to custody along with adults and that he be given adequate opportunity for medical and psychiatric treatment.” Id. at 4762. 26 Lesko argues that, had the prosecution disclosed this evidence, he would have been able to mount more effective cross-examinations of Montgomery and Rutherford, which would have helped his case in both the guilt and sentencing phases. The PCRA Court concluded that the Commonwealth violated Brady with respect to these items. The Court explained that this evidence would have called into question testimony from Montgomery and Rutherford and undermined the case that Lesko possessed the requisite intent for firstdegree murder. On appeal, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that Lesko’s claims concerning Montgomery’s agreement and Rutherford’s juvenile file were time-barred, see Lesko XIII, 15 A.3d at 371, and that the Steffee report was not material, see id. at 372. The Supreme Court acknowledged that Montgomery’s earlier statement that he knew nothing about a police officer’s being shot would have been useful to impeach his testimony that Travaglia had admitted to shooting an officer and that Lesko had said he wanted to. However, the Court concluded that “Montgomery’s earlier non-cooperation with police would not have made his in-court testimony disappear, nor would it have altered the overall volume of abundant, independent evidence offered at the 1981 trial establishing Lesko’s course of conduct and intent.” Id. The District Court, addressing the claims in the § 2254 proceedings, agreed that the withheld evidence was not material. Starting with Rutherford’s file, the Court found the fact Rutherford received two short furloughs to be insignificant. It also concluded that the attorney’s statement about psychiatric conditions was mere boilerplate and that Lesko had not shown that Rutherford had any such condition. See Lesko XIV, 2015 WL 249502, at . The Court further ruled that the prosecutor’s letter did not say anything that 27 Lesko did not already know because Rutherford testified at some length that he was facing charges for murder and that the district attorney had agreed that his case would be disposed of in juvenile court if he testified truthfully in Lesko’s case. See id. The Court also determined that Officer Steffee’s report was cumulative of two other reports of police interviews with Montgomery before he began cooperating in which he also did not say that Lesko had made any incriminating comments. See id. at . Likewise, the Court concluded that Montgomery’s agreement was not material because his deal with the prosecution was discussed in a hearing that was transcribed and provided to Lesko, see id., and that Montgomery’s testimony was of limited importance at trial, further reducing the value of any evidence that could have been used to impeach him, see id. at 20. Here, Lesko argues that the crucial issue at trial was his intent—i.e., that the prosecution in large part sought to prove his intent through testimony from Montgomery and Rutherford, and that the withheld evidence was material because it would have caused the jury to question that testimony. More specifically, Lesko contends that “[h]ad the Steffee Report and the written agreement been disclosed, defense counsel could have argued that Montgomery’s testimony was fashioned to ensure the benefit of an extremely favorable immunity deal, because Montgomery’s initial account of his interactions with Lesko—before the deal was worked out—was devoid of inculpatory evidence.” Br. at 47. And “[t]he defense could have made similar arguments about Rutherford’s testimony had the full benefits of his deal been disclosed, i.e., that he literally walked away from two murder charges shortly after Lesko’s trial.” Id. at 54. Lesko also argues that “the juvenile file could have been used as evidence of 28 Rutherford’s psychiatric illness to challenge his credibility and his ability to accurately report events.” Id. The Commonwealth’s argument largely tracks the District Court’s analysis. It contends that any inquiry into Rutherford’s psychiatric condition would not have been fruitful, that there is no evidence his brief furloughs affected his testimony, that the Steffee report is cumulative, and that the impeachment evidence concerning Montgomery is of limited consequence. Br. at 39. The Commonwealth also argues that “it should have been clear to [Lesko] that it is common practice to keep pending charges open until the terms of the bargain have been fulfilled, in this case, Rutherford’s testimony,” Br. at 46, and that there was no secret deal to drop the charges after Lesko’s trial, see id. at 46–47. The key question is whether this undisclosed evidence was material. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court concluded that Officer Steffee’s report was not material and that decision is entitled to AEDPA deference. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 100. Because the Supreme Court disposed of the other parts of the claim—i.e., the written non-prosecution agreement with Montgomery and the contents of Rutherford’s juvenile file— on purely procedural grounds, we will review those aspects of the claim de novo. See Thomas 570 F.3d at 114. “The ‘touchstone of materiality is a reasonable probability of a different result.’” Dennis, 834 F.3d at 285 (quoting Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995)). “The materiality of Brady material depends almost entirely on the value of the evidence relative to the other evidence mustered by the state.” Johnson v. Folino, 705 F.3d 117, 129 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Rocha v. Thaler, 619 F.3d 387, 396 (5th Cir. 2010)). Nevertheless, “[t]he question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different 29 verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. We consider materiality based on the collective value of the withheld evidence. See Dennis, 834 F.3d at 312. At the outset, the guilt-phase evidence against Lesko was reasonably strong, albeit largely circumstantial. Under Pennsylvania law, the elements of first-degree murder are “that a human being was unlawfully killed, that the accused was responsible for the killing, and that the accused acted with a specific intent to kill.” Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 279 (Pa. 2008). Since Travaglia was the one to pull the trigger, the Commonwealth pursued an accomplice-liability theory against Lesko. “To establish Lesko’s accomplice culpability for first degree murder, the Commonwealth was required to prove that petitioner, with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of first degree murder, aided, agreed, or attempted to aid Travaglia in planning or committing the murder of Officer Miller.” Lesko VI, 881 F.2d at 53; see also Pagan, 950 A.2d at 279. Intent can be proved solely through circumstantial evidence. See Pagan, 950 A.2d at 279. The most compelling evidence of Lesko’s intent— which is what Lesko seeks to attack here—came from the surrounding context. As we previously stated, in explaining the importance of the evidence concerning the Nicholls killing— The jury could only have fairly evaluated the Commonwealth’s theory regarding Lesko’s state of mind by hearing evidence tending to show that Travaglia and Lesko had jointly embarked that evening on a crime spree, that they had already committed a homicide likely to command the 30 death penalty, and that they had in their possession powerful evidence of their guilt of that homicide. Moreover, to be in a position to evaluate Lesko’s state of mind during the critical moments during the Miller encounter, the jury needed to hear sufficient details about these matters to be able to appreciate the nature of the evening’s joint undertaking, the relationship and mood of the participants, and the extent of the criminal exposure of those participants in their apprehension by Miller. Lesko VI, 881 F.2d at 54. This evidence—as well as the fact that Lesko and Travaglia stopped to get another gun and Lesko determined that birdshot was insufficient for their purposes— strongly points toward Lesko’s guilt. That evidence was reinforced by two statements from Lesko. First, Rutherford testified that, when the car chase with Miller began, Lesko warned him to “lay down in the back, because it might turn into a shooting gallery.” J.A. at 589. This statement, of course, tended to show that Lesko anticipated that the episode with Miller would turn violent. Second, Montgomery testified that, after Travaglia told him that he had shot a cop, Lesko said, “I wanted to.” Id. at 680. This comment, although made after the fact, also supported the notion that the killing was a joint enterprise. Lesko argues that the three pieces of Brady evidence were material because they would have helped him impeach Montgomery and Rutherford and thus cause the jury to disbelieve their testimony. We will discuss the significance of each piece of evidence in turn, then consider the importance of the evidence in combination. See generally Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437 n.10 (“We evaluate the tendency and force of the 31 undisclosed evidence item by item. . . We evaluate its cumulative effect for purposes of materiality separately and at the end of the discussion[.]”). 1. Montgomery’s Non-Prosecution Agreement Is Not Material In this agreement, the Commonwealth promised that, in exchange for Montgomery’s testimony in the Lesko trial, it would not prosecute him for his involvement in property crimes that occurred in December 1979 or January 1980. Lesko argues the existence of this deal could damage Montgomery’s credibility. See, e.g., Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154–55 (1972); Simmons v. Beard, 590 F.3d 223, 236 (3d Cir. 2009). The force of this evidence is weakened by the fact that Lesko possessed a copy of a transcribed hearing involving Montgomery and the assistant district attorney that covered the same ground. In that hearing, Montgomery affirmed that his attorney had explained to him “the extent of the agreement and statement of intent,” which “pertain[ed] to crimes and offense generally described as offenses against property, such as burglary, robbery and theft and similar crimes.” J.A. at 4444– 45. Montgomery went on to acknowledge that he was required to answer the prosecution’s questions truthfully, and then gave his account of his interaction with Lesko and Travaglia, which was similar to his testimony at trial.10 10 Montgomery also testified that Lesko had told him the day before the shooting that he and Travaglia had a contract to kill a cop, which Montgomery said “scare[d] the hell out of [him],” J.A. at 4461, and that Lesko stated, after the Officer Miller killing, “I would shoot my own mother if the price was 32 Thus, the suppressed evidence is cumulative of impeachment evidence that the Commonwealth did produce. See Johnson, 705 F.3d at 129 (“Suppressed evidence that would be cumulative of other evidence . . . is generally not considered material for Brady purposes.”). Although the agreement is somewhat more precise than the hearing testimony, the marginal value of this added specificity does not undermine the fairness of the trial. See, e.g., Landano v. Rafferty, 856 F.2d 569, 574 (3d Cir. 1988) (considering impeachment evidence immaterial under Brady where the “marginal effect in diminishing [the witness’s] perceived credibility would have been negligible”). Moreover, Montgomery’s testimony, while helpful to the prosecution, was not vital. Rutherford’s testimony was much more important in establishing Lesko’s intent than Lesko’s after-the-fact statement to Montgomery. Accordingly, the evidence about the agreement and the statement of intent is not material. See, e.g., Smith v. Cain, 565 U.S. 73, 76 (2012) (“We have observed that evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State’s other evidence is strong enough to sustain confidence in the verdict.”). 2. Officer Steffee’s Report is Not Material In this document, Officer Steffee wrote that, when questioned by police on January 8, 1980, Montgomery said, “I don’t know anything about the cop getting shot or any armed robberies.” J.A. 4734. This, of course, contradicts Montgomery’s testimony at trial that Travaglia had told him that he had shot a cop and that Lesko had said he wanted to, and thus would have been useful impeachment evidence. right.” Id. at 4466. For reasons that are not provided in the record, Montgomery did not mention these statements at trial. 33 Again, however, the Commonwealth produced similar materials to Lesko: police reports from January 4, 1980, and January 5, 1980, in which Montgomery described how Travaglia had given him the gun without mentioning a shooting. Lesko argues that Officer Steffee’s report would have been somewhat more useful on cross-examination than the other two reports because, unlike the other reports, it would have allowed the defense to cross Montgomery about a contradiction rather than a mere omission. We cannot agree that Officer Steffee’s report is material because in its absence, the trial still “result[ed] in a verdict worthy of confidence.” Kyles, 514 U.S. at 434. The trajectory of Montgomery’s statements is clear: he initially denied knowing anything about Officer Miller’s shooting then, after obtaining counsel and entering into a cooperation agreement, changed course and testified that Lesko and Travaglia made incriminating statements.11 The defense could have made this point without Officer Steffee’s report; counsel could have asked, for instance, “When the police interviewed you on January 4 (or 5), 1980, you didn’t tell them that Lesko stated, ‘I wanted to,’ did you? You added these details to your statement after you entered into an agreement with the district attorney, right?” Those questions would have made the same point—that Montgomery should not be believed because he 11 At the PCRA hearing, Montgomery readily admitted to having changed his statements. When asked whether his statement that Lesko and Travaglia had not told him about killing anyone was true, he flatly responded, “No sir, that’s not so, that they didn’t tell me that, because, yes, sir, it was told.” J.A. 3691. 34 tailored his testimony to curry favor with the prosecution—as any questions based on Officer Steffee’s report. See generally United States v. Georgiou, 777 F.3d 125, 140 (3d Cir. 2015) (“To the extent Appellant argues that additional information about the intensity or duration of Waltzer’s substance abuse may have impacted the trial’s outcome, he explains neither why he did not probe these issues more fully on cross examination, nor why such new information would have changed the trial’s outcome when the substance abuse evidence that was set out at trial did not.”). In short, the added value of Officer Steffee’s Report is too insignificant to render it material, a conclusion which is reinforced by the relatively minor importance of Montgomery’s testimony in the overall scheme of trial. 3. The Three Items in Rutherford’s Juvenile File Are Not Material Lesko next argues that, had the prosecution produced Rutherford’s juvenile file, he could have impeached him based on (1) his receiving two five-hour furloughs, (2) his attorney’s stating in a legal filing that he had a psychiatric condition, and (3) the prosecutor’s stating that the juvenile case should not be disposed until after Lesko’s trial. The first two items are not compelling. First, the jury was informed that Rutherford was cooperating with the Commonwealth and that, in return for his cooperation, his case would proceed in Juvenile Court. It is unlikely that the fact that he also received two short furloughs would have caused the jury to view his testimony any differently. See United States v. Walker, 657 F.3d 160, 186 (3d Cir. 2011) (concluding that evidence of further non-prosecution was not material on the ground that it would have “little, if any, probative value because it is impeachment by the same avenue already taken 35 by the defendants, namely Rhoades’s motivation for testifying against the Walkers as part of a bargained-for reduction in criminal penalties” (quotation marks omitted)). Second, the pertinent statement from Rutherford’s Application to Transfer Case to Juvenile Court, in full, provides that “the applicant’s medical and psychiatric condition require that, if convicted, he not be confined to custody along with adults and that he be given adequate opportunity for medical and psychiatric treatment.” J.A. 4762. This was one of four grounds that counsel claimed justified transferring the proceedings to Juvenile Court; the filing did not further elaborate upon any psychiatric condition. This document would have been sufficient to permit Lesko’s counsel to have asked Rutherford about his psychiatric condition on cross-examination. In general, counsel must have a “good faith basis” to ask a question on cross, see Commonwealth v. May, 887 A.2d 750, 763 (Pa. 2005), and this filing meets that standard. See generally Cogley v. Duncan, 32 A.3d 1288, 1292 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011 (“The general rule is that admissions of fact in pleadings are admissible, but that the pleader’s conclusions of law are not admissions of facts in issue.”) (citation omitted); cf. J.A. at 4150 (prosecutor’s arguing at the PCRA hearing that “I would object to that, Your Honor, because I don’t know how he would cross examine him on an application that’s made by his lawyer and is not signed by the witness himself.”). Nevertheless, evidence of a witness’s mental health will be material only if it “undermines [the witness’s] reliability []or calls into question his ability to perceive, remember and narrate perceptions accurately.” Georgiou, 777 F.3d at 141 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Lesko has possessed this document since at least 2002 but has never presented any 36 evidence that Rutherford suffered from a psychiatric condition that would affect his ability to testify accurately. It is therefore pure speculation to conclude that this document, either on its own or as a way of prompting counsel to investigate the matter further, would have served to undermine Rutherford’s credibility. This is not enough to show materiality. See Riley v. Taylor, 277 F.3d 261, 302 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that evidence was not material because its exculpatory nature was too speculative); United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 811, 817– 818 (3d Cir. 2001) (concluding that evidence was not material in part because it showed only “the possibility of an alibi defense” rather than “demonstat[ing] the [the petitioner] had an alibi”). Lesko’s argument about the letter from the prosecutor to Rutherford’s counsel is somewhat more complicated. The Commonwealth interprets the letter to say only that Rutherford’s case in Juvenile Court would remain open until after Lesko’s case had concluded. That fact was squarely addressed at trial, so having another document making the same point could not have affected the verdict. See, e.g., Walker, 657 F.3d at 186 (noting that cumulative impeachment evidence is not probative). Lesko also argues that the letter reflects an agreement that all charges against Rutherford would be dismissed after Lesko’s trial. We disagree. The letter purports to confirm a telephone conversation between Rutherford’s attorney (John Murtagh) and the prosecutor; the prosecutor states that it was his “[f]eeling that a disposition of this case prior to completion of [Lesko’s trial] would be too risky from a prosecution standpoint.” J.A. 4755. The relevant section of the Juvenile Act (both now and at the time the prosecutor wrote the letter) refers to the outcomes of cases involving delinquent children as “dispositions.” See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6352 (in section titled 37 “Disposition of delinquent child,” stating that “[i]f the child is found to be a delinquent child the court may make any of the following orders of disposition.”). Authorized “dispositions” range from returning the child home with new conditions to committing the child to an institution. See id. Thus, the most natural reading of the letter is that it refers simply to resolving Rutherford’s case, not dismissing the charges, as Lesko argues here. This interpretation is also supported by the other evidence in the record. The letter followed a phone call between the prosecutor and Rutherford’s attorney, Murtagh. In an affidavit, Murtagh later stated that “[b]ased on [the prosecutor’s] communication with me, I understand that the Commonwealth believed that, if Mr. Rutherford’s case was resolved before he testified against Mr. Lesko and Mr. Travaglia, there was a substantial chance he would not testify against them.” April 3, 2002, affidavit. This statement is consistent with the Commonwealth’s interpretation of the letter, not Lesko’s. Murtagh’s testimony at the PCRA hearing was similar. Likewise, at the 1995 resentencing, Lesko’s attorney asked Rutherford, “And you received no punishment for these two murders because you made a deal with the District Attorney, didn’t you?” J.A. 2165. Rutherford responded, “The deal was that I would be tried as a juvenile. There was no other deal.” Id. In sum, Lesko has not shown that there was any agreement to dismiss the charges against Rutherford. Accordingly, this Brady claim also fails. See Simon v. Gov’t of the V.I., 929 F.3d 118, 127 (3d Cir. 2019) (“[F]avorable treatment alone is insufficient to state a Brady claim.”); Shabazz v. Artuz, 336 F.3d 154, 165 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The government is free to reward witnesses for their cooperation with favorable treatment in pending criminal cases without 38 disclosing to the defendant its intention to do so, provided that it does not promise anything to the witnesses prior to their testimony.”).12 4. The Cumulative Prejudice Would Not Have Affected The Verdict Viewing the evidence in combination does not change our analysis in a meaningful way. Even if the prosecution had produced Montgomery’s agreement and Officer Steffee’s report, it is unlikely that the jury would have doubted Montgomery’s statement or changed its view of Lesko’s guilt. The same is true as to Rutherford’s juvenile file. His furloughs and his attorney’s statement concerning possible psychiatric issues are of only trivial value as impeachment evidence. Moreover, the natural interpretation of the letter between the prosecutor and Rutherford’s attorney memorialized only an agreement to wait to resolve the juvenile case until after Lesko’s trial—information that was already shared with the jury. Accordingly, Lesko has failed to show that this evidence is material even when viewed collectively. 5. The Suppressed Evidence Did Not Affect The Sentencing Phase Lesko also argues that this evidence was material at the sentencing phase. Again, we disagree. If anything, Lesko’s argument is weaker in this context. The jury had already found that Lesko was guilty of first-degree murder. At sentencing, the 12 As previously noted, the fact that the Commonwealth had promised to resolve Rutherford’s case in Juvenile Court after Lesko’s trial was cumulative of evidence already presented to the jury. Thus, to the extent that this letter merely restates that point, it was not material. See Johnson, 705 F.3d at 129. 39 jury was focused on the statutorily prescribed aggravating and mitigating factors, and it sentenced Lesko to death because it concluded that the aggravating factors (that he committed several previous violent felonies and killed two other individuals before Officer Miller’s murder) outweighed the mitigating factors (that he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, had an awful childhood, and had behaved well in prison). It is our opinion that this relatively weak impeachment evidence would not have affected the jury’s overall balance of those factors.13 13 In its COA grant, the District Court authorized Lesko to appeal the denial of his claim that counsel had performed ineffectively by failing to properly cross-examine Montgomery and Rutherford. However, Lesko has not presented any argument in support of that claim in his brief and has therefore forfeited the claim. See, e.g., In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). Regardless, the claim lacks merit. It is primarily directed toward counsel’s alleged deficient performance in failing to cross-examine Montgomery more fully. However, it is easy to see why counsel would have kept his cross-examination of Montgomery brief: on direct examination, Montgomery did not include the much more damaging comments he made during the hearing about Lesko’s saying that he had a contract to kill a police officer and that he would kill his mother if the price were right. Further, there was some indication that Montgomery had participated in prior robberies with Lesko and Travaglia, and counsel could also have reasonably wished to avoid informing the jury about those incidents. 40 C. Lesko’s Claim That Trial Counsel Was Ineffective By Violating His Right To Testify On his second guilt-phase claim, Lesko contends his counsel prevented him from testifying at his trial. The possibility that Lesko would testify was first raised to the court near the end of trial, when Lesko’s lawyer, Marsh, stated: I would like to reiterate on the record what I advised the Court this morning and off the record this afternoon; that it was my advice to John Lesko that if Michael Travaglia did not testify that he should not testify. I have many good reasons for it, both legal and tactical, and I am not sure whether my client is going to follow my advice. And I will need to spend some time with him to find out what he wants to do. Hopefully, he will follow my advice. J.A. 1222-23. Travaglia conferred with his counsel and decided not to testify. Marsh then said: I have discussed with my client the possibility of his taking the witness stand in his own behalf, so he knows he has that right. He told me he does wish to take the witness stand in his own behalf. And I advised him that that is the wrong thing to do in this case for legal and tactical reasons. He has told me he will follow my advice reluctantly, but he will follow my advice. J.A. 1227. Lesko did not testify. Lesko claims that his lawyer failed to properly advise him that it was his decision whether to testify. Before the PCRA court, Lesko testified that counsel “never discussed with me that I had the right to testify,” even though Lesko expressed 41 his desire to do so. J.A. 4241. Lesko said he wanted to refute Rutherford’s testimony that Lesko had said that the car was about to become a shooting gallery shortly before Officer Miller was killed, and also Montgomery’s testimony that Lesko had said that he wanted to shoot the officer. According to Lesko, Marsh closed the defense case without his consent and without giving him a chance to take the stand. Marsh offered little response to these allegations. In the PCRA proceedings, he testified that he had no “independent recollection” of Lesko’s desire to testify. J.A. 2874. The PCRA court granted relief to Lesko, concluding that Lesko’s recounting of how he wanted to testify was credible. The court found that Lesko was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged interference because he could not “rebut the testimony of Mr. Montgomery and Mr. Rutherford that [Lesko] made statements that demonstrated his intent to commit first degree murder.” J.A. 168. The Commonwealth appealed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the claim was untimely and did not address its merits. See Lesko XIII, 15 A.3d at 359-60. Lesko then asserted the claim in his federal habeas proceedings. The District Court assumed counsel had performed deficiently by preventing Lesko from testifying but concluded that he had not been prejudiced. It reasoned that even if Lesko took the stand to deny making the statements Rutherford and Montgomery attributed to him, he would not have been able to refute the other evidence establishing his intent, “including the details of the horrific crime spree the defendants embarked upon when they abducted Nicholls, then murdered him, then stole the handgun that would subsequently be used to kill Officer Miller, then stole bullets that could be used with the gun, and then goaded Officer Miller into chasing them.” Lesko XIV, 2015 WL 249502, at . The Court further determined that it was 42 unlikely that Lesko’s testimony about his side of the story would have meaningfully advanced his defense. That is, because Lesko’s statement to police after his arrest was admitted as evidence, the jury already knew that he claimed the plan had been only to draw Officer Miller away from the convenience store to rob it; the jury simply did not credit that account. See id. at . Before us, Lesko once again claims that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance by interfering with his right to testify. Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), Lesko must show that counsel performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced by that deficiency. Palmer v. Hendricks, 592 F.3d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 2010). Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court rejected this claim as time-barred and did not address its merits, AEDPA’s deferential standards do not apply. See id. at 400. However, the PCRA court’s factual findings—that Lesko told Marsh he wanted to testify but Marsh overrode Lesko’s decision—are still presumed to be correct under § 2254(e)(1). See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2007). It is an open legal question whether the Commonwealth, as opposed to a habeas petitioner, may rebut the presumption of correctness. See id. at 202. Today, however, we need not decide the question. Even if we were to accept the PCRA court’s findings and conclude that counsel performed deficiently by interfering with his client’s right to testify, Lesko cannot prevail. He fails to establish prejudice. See Palmer, 592 F.3d at 394 (courts may resolve a Strickland claim by concluding that prejudice has not been established). In evaluating prejudice, we consider Lesko’s proposed testimony in the context of the other evidence presented at trial. See id. at 399. Lesko argues that if he was allowed to testify, 43 there is a reasonable probability that the result would have been different, because he “would have spoken to the central dispute at trial, would have explained his state of mind and his relatively minor role in the offense, and would have undercut the credibility of the principal witnesses against him,” Rutherford and Montgomery. Br. 59. There is no question that a defendant’s own testimony is significant. We have stated that it “is very likely to be highly important” and, “‘as a general matter, it is only the most extraordinary of trials in which a denial of the defendant’s right to testify can be said to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Palmer, 592 F.3d at 399 (alteration omitted) (quoting Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 1157 (9th Cir. 1991)). At the same time, a finding of prejudice is hardly foreordained. In Palmer, we recognized the importance of the defendant’s testimony but nevertheless concluded that the defendant failed to establish prejudice. See id. at 394. There, counsel failed to advise the defendant that he controlled the decision whether to testify. See id. The defendant later asserted that had he been properly advised, he would have told the jury his side of what happened when a bar fight broke out and he fired a gun, killing one person and injuring another. See id. at 388, 390. That conclusory assertion, however, was insufficient to establish prejudice. A mere “desire to tell his side of the story” was not enough on its own. Id. at 395. Nor was his “conclusory invocation of the words ‘self-defense”—an “unadorned legal conclusion”—without detailed factual analysis of how the testimony would have swayed a juror. Id. We also rejected the contention that prejudice should be presumed or a reversal automatic when a defendant’s right to testify has been violated. See id. at 397. Rather, we applied the Strickland standard, which requires that a defendant “affirmatively prove prejudice.” Id. at 398 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693). 44 Palmer is instructive. Lesko has repeatedly asserted that it was critical for him to testify that he did not say the words that Rutherford and Montgomery attributed to him. However, a “stated desire to tell his side of the story ‘falls far short of satisfying Strickland’s prejudice element.’” Id. at 400 (quoting Sayre v. Anderson, 238 F.3d 631, 635 (5th Cir. 2001)). Lesko does go farther than the Palmer petitioner, saying he would have denied Rutherford’s and Montgomery’s statements, which the Commonwealth relied upon to show he possessed the intent to commit first-degree murder. But ultimately, he fails to show prejudice. At the outset, is it questionable that the jury would believe Lesko’s self-interested denials rather than the testimony of Rutherford and Montgomery, especially because Lesko apparently did not plan to contest the veracity of any other part of their detailed factual narratives. Moreover, the record indicates that Lesko would not have been a persuasive witness. Brian O’Leary, co-counsel at Lesko’s resentencing, who spent hours interviewing Lesko and saw him testify at his 1995 resentencing, has since described Lesko as having “a flatness to his personality I had never encountered in a human being before.” J.A. 3127. And, according to O’Leary, the “pivotal moment” where the mitigation case was lost was when Lesko crumbled under cross-examination. J.A. 3127. A lawyer’s judgment about how effective his client’s hypothetical testimony may have been is meaningful in evaluating prejudice. See El-Tabech v. Hopkins, 997 F.2d 386, 390 (8th Cir. 1993). So too is the fact that a defendant projects flatness when describing something so weighty as a violent homicide. See Matylinsky v. Budge, 577 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that petitioner failed to establish prejudice because, in part, he had a “flat” affect and would have 45 described the killing of his wife in a “matter-of-fact” and “disinterested” manner). Putting Lesko on the stand also came with other risks. Even if he could effectively rebut Rutherford’s and Montgomery’s statements by testifying that he did not know Travaglia intended to shoot Officer Miller, Lesko still would have faced hazardous cross-examination about the Nicholls killing. Lesko’s confession to police showed that his role in it was even greater—and more horrifying—than Rutherford knew. While Rutherford’s testimony and Lesko’s confession would congruently establish that Lesko beat, mocked, and tortured Nicholls and that Nicholls perished at the lake after Lesko and Travaglia dragged him away, cross-examining Lesko with the details of his confession would paint the final moments of Nicholls’ life in even more gruesome detail. Lesko admitted to police that he had knocked Nicholls unconscious but knew the man to still be alive when they dragged him down to the lake. Lesko confessed that he knew the plan was to kill Nicholls at the lake. Lesko admitted that he attached a 150pound brick to Nicholls by tying it to his torso before throwing him head-first into the frozen waters. Lesko watched Nicholls resurface once and then disappear back into the water, never to return. A painstaking blow-by-blow of those details would likely dispense of any sympathy the jury might have felt for Lesko. Moreover, Lesko’s purposeful conduct in Nicholls’ torture and murder would also directly aid the prosecution in establishing Lesko’s premeditated intent when he helped steal Travaglia’s father’s gun, returned for lethal ammunition to replace the birdshot inside it, and then participated in the goading and killing of Officer Miller. Nicholls’ drawn-out murder—which occurred just hours before Miller was murdered—would only buttress the Commonwealth’s case that Lesko knew and intended exactly what would transpire. 46 Lesko’s testimony may have opened the door to other damning evidence as well. Though Lesko had been involved in the Levato and Newcomer killings, evidence of those crimes had been excluded as impermissible character evidence. But if Lesko took the stand, he might have said something which would have opened the door to this evidence coming in for the permissible purpose of impeachment. Commonwealth v. Nypaver, 69 A.3d 708, 716 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (“A litigant opens the door to inadmissible evidence” if his testimony “creates a false impression refuted by the otherwise prohibited evidence.”). This was a potentially catastrophic risk which we properly consider in the prejudice analysis. See Smith v. Dickhaut, 836 F.3d 97, 107 (1st Cir. 2016); Medley v. Runnels, 506 F.3d 857, 861 (9th Cir. 2007). Finally, even assuming that the jury would have believed Lesko over both Rutherford and Montgomery and that Lesko would have somehow dodged the perils of crossexamination, there still would be substantial evidence to convict him of intentional, premeditated murder. The jury knew that Lesko and Travaglia had jointly engaged in a multiday killing spree, had just stolen a gun which Lesko took pains to ensure was equipped with the bullets necessary for a fatal shooting, and had just intentionally killed Nicholls when they made multiple efforts to get Officer Miller to chase them. This is not a case where trial evidence was scant, see Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11th Cir. 1992), nor was it one where the defendant’s testimony would have been an affirmative denial of involvement in the crime, see Owens v. United States, 483 F.3d 48, 59-60 (1st Cir. 2007). “Strickland’s second prong requires a petitioner to show that the errors were ‘sufficiently serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.’” Palmer, 592 F.3d at 394 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). On balance, the jury’s 47 decision to convict was not rendered unreliable by any violation of Lesko’s right to testify. D. Lesko’s Claim That Counsel Was Ineffective At His Resentencing Lesko also contests his 1995 resentencing, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. At resentencing, Lesko was once again represented by Attorney Marsh—who had previously represented Lesko in his initial guilt and sentencing proceedings—as well as Brian O’Leary. According to O’Leary, Marsh called him less than five days before jury selection for the resentencing and asked him to be his cocounsel. Despite never having handled a criminal matter or a trial, O’Leary agreed. He soon realized that their “backs were against the wall”: trial was just days away, and Lesko’s counsel still did not have an expert report from their mental health expert. J.A. 3036. O’Leary was in “panic” at the level of preparation undertaken. J.A. 3036. He believed that Marsh had failed to adequately prepare a mitigation case. O’Leary interviewed Lesko and learned that “none of the people or institutions that [he] had come to learn about in [his] interview with [Lesko] had been contacted” directly by Marsh. J.A. 3045. Marsh also failed to obtain Lesko’s records from Allegheny County Children and Youth Services, and appeared “burnt out,” with O’Leary describing the case as being like a “ball and chain” for Marsh who just wished to be “relieved of [its] burden.” J.A. 3125. O’Leary sought to right the ship. He contacted several of Lesko’s family members and other key characters, but the limited time before trial did not allow for the extent of interviewing and preparation O’Leary desired. He also subpoenaed Lesko’s CYS records, but they did not arrive until trial was already underway. 48 Marsh had made some efforts to present a mitigation case, however. In 1992, he hired Alfonso Associates to complete a psychosocial assessment of Lesko. As with other parts of pre-resentencing preparation, this was not without problems. According to the founder of Alfonso Associates, Marsh failed to communicate and failed to pay the firm’s bill, so in late 1992 or early 1993, they stopped working on Lesko’s case. Once work resumed in October 1994, Alfonso’s founder was “taken aback by the short time that [they] had,” and decided to assign case worker Lois Nardone, who had a master’s degree and some familiarity with the case, to handle it. J.A. 3770. Nardone testified that she “was uncomfortable with the amount of time” she had to work up the case, believing it “insufficient.” J.A. 3897. During the four months she had to prepare a social history report of Lesko, she also had little communication with Marsh. And, because Alfonso previously had trouble getting paid, the firm limited the amount of work Nardone could do. Nardone later admitted that, based on her constraints in time and funding, she “did an insufficient investigation.” J.A. 3958. Marsh also hired clinical and forensic psychologist Dr. Herbert Levit to examine Lesko. After performing multiple psychological tests, Dr. Levit diagnosed Lesko with borderline personality disorder: “a person who is emotionally explosive at times, has erratic behavior, engages in behavior which is contrary to society’s standards, is frequently immature, and has had difficulty in adjusting.” J.A. 2410-11. He further opined that, at the time of the crimes, Lesko was suffering from polysubstance dependence—he was using drugs and alcohol consistently and excessively, to the point that his functioning was impaired. According to Dr. Levit, Lesko, despite being 21 at the time of the murders, “was emotionally a teenager at best.” J.A. 2414. He suffered from diminished capacity—the 49 “ability to think clearly, rationally, logically and in a mature manner.” J.A. 2415. Dr. Levit concluded that Lesko was “sufficiently under the influence of alcohol, drugs[,] and the trauma of having discovered what happened to his [molested] brother, which triggered off some of the feelings as to what happened to himself, so that his ability to conform to [the law] was justly impaired.” J.A. 2415-16. Thus, at resentencing, Marsh and O’Leary presented a multi-faceted mitigation case that included: (1) a sympathetic narrative of Lesko’s life, as retold by investigator Nardone; (2) family member testimony buttressing that narrative; (3) expert testimony from a competent psychologist; and (4) Lesko’s own words. The jury found four aggravating factors and four mitigating factors, and ultimately voted for death. Lesko claims his counsel performed ineffectively by failing to prepare and present his mitigation case in three overlapping and self-reinforcing ways. First, he says Marsh and O’Leary failed to identify and advance an argument that he suffered organic brain damage. Second, he says they failed to interview or adequately prepare fact witnesses who knew him. Third, he says they failed to timely acquire and use his CYS records. Lesko also alleges that he suffered prejudice from the cumulative effect of these errors. The PCRA court granted relief, concluding that Lesko’s counsel failed to develop and present mitigating evidence, and that “there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different if [his] counsel had adequately prepared.” J.A. 163. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed. It concluded that counsel was not deficient in the mitigation case they did put on. Describing that mitigation case, the Court observed that Lesko’s lawyers presented persuasive testimony from Nardone, who detailed Lesko’s life 50 and trauma, and from Dr. Levit, who had been qualified as an expert witness in several hundred court proceedings. See Lesko XIII, 15 A.3d at 381–82. On balance, the Court found as to the presentation of a mitigation case that counsel “undertook a reasonable investigation and presented a compelling and partly successful case in mitigation,” as evidenced by the jury finding multiple mitigating factors. Id. at 381. As to organic brain damage, the Court held, any qualms with Marsh’s failure to discover it were properly directed at Dr. Levit, and counsel was not ineffective for relying on a qualified expert who missed a diagnosis. See id. at 382. The Court further concluded that even if counsel had performed deficiently, Lesko had not been prejudiced: Faced with the aggravating circumstances where the defendant has been found guilty of multiple murders occurring within a one-week period, including the cold-blooded murder of an on-duty police officer, and the case in mitigation already successfully presented, we simply cannot conclude that Strickland relief can be premised upon the additional mitigation evidence the PCRA court found would have carried the day. Id. at 385.14 14 The decision was not unanimous. Justice Saylor, concurring in the judgment, found that counsel performed deficiently but that Lesko had not been prejudiced. See id. at 417-18 (Saylor, J., concurring). Justice Todd dissented, arguing that Lesko was entitled to a new sentencing hearing because counsel performed ineffectively by failing to “retain a neuropsychologist for the purpose of evaluating Lesko and 51 In Lesko’s habeas proceedings, the District Court ruled that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s analysis was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law. “At the very most, . . . Lesko only show[ed] that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court arguably reached an incorrect result (although this Court does not think so, particularly with respect to its holding that Lesko was not prejudiced by counsel’s alleged deficient performance).” Lesko XIV, 2015 WL 249502, at . Focusing primarily on prejudice, the District Court held that, given “the powerful aggravating circumstances presented by the prosecution, the mitigating evidence that his defense counsel did present, and the mitigating circumstances that the jury did find,” Lesko could not show that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s application of federal law was objectively unreasonable. Id. Recognizing that under AEDPA, our “‘review must be doubly deferential’ in order to afford ‘both the state court and the defense attorney the benefit of the doubt,’” Woods v. Donale, 575 U.S. 312, 316-17 (2015) (per curiam) (quoting Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 15 (2013)) (internal quotation marks omitted), we agree with the District Court. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Lesko had to show that his lawyers performed deficiently and that he was prejudiced as a result. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Deficient performance is shown by proving that the representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” under “prevailing professional norms.” Id. at 688. Prejudice requires a showing of a reasonable probability that, had counsel performed properly, at least one juror would presenting testimony on organic brain damage.” Id. at 426 (Todd, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 52 have found the mitigating factors to outweigh the aggravating factors. See Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 309 (3d Cir. 2001). But we review here not merely with this high standard in mind, but also cognizant of the deference owed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s determinations under AEDPA. See Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011). So Lesko must “show that the state court’s ruling on [his ineffectiveness claim] was so lacking in justification that there was an error beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Burt, 571 U.S. at 19-20 (alterations omitted) (quoting Harrington, 562 U.S. at 103). This standard presents a “formidable barrier to federal habeas relief,” and here, at least as to prejudice if not also performance, that barrier has not been cleared. Id.
In assessing deficient performance, we must keep in mind the claim at issue: alleged deficiency in failing to develop and present a mitigation case. Lawyers have “a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. In the death penalty context, prevailing professional standards call for counsel to make “efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecutor.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, Guideline 11.4.1(C) (1989) (emphasis in original)). The state supreme court held that Lesko’s team did not run afoul of these duties, as this was not “a case where counsel conducted minimal 53 investigation and failed to uncover evidence that was immediately available.” Lesko XIII, 15 A.3d at 381.15 Instead, Attorney Marsh put on a significant mitigation case and was successful in persuading the jury to find four mitigating factors. He presented testimony from Dr. Levit, who interviewed Lesko and his family members and conducted psychological testing of Lesko. Dr. Levit diagnosed Lesko with borderline personality disorder and stated his opinion that Lesko was suffering from polysubstance abuse at the time of the crimes, all of which led the jury to find as a mitigating factor that Lesko was under the influence of extreme emotional or mental disturbance pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(e)(2). Marsh also presented an account of Lesko’s childhood, including extensive and compelling testimony from Nardone as to the conditions under which Lesko lived and the abuse he suffered; this persuaded the jury to find that Lesko’s horrible childhood was another mitigating factor pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(e)(8). In addition, he provided evidence of Lesko’s change in character and service to others during his incarceration, which persuaded jurors to find two additional mitigating factors under 42 Pa. C.S. § 9711(e)(8). Lesko contends that his legal team was constitutionally required to do more. First, he argues that counsel should have 15 “[A] state court conclusion that counsel rendered effective assistance is not a finding of fact binding on the federal court”; rather, “it is a mixed question of law and fact.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 698. While “state court findings of fact made in the course of deciding an ineffectiveness claim are subject to the deference requirement” of § 2254(e)(1), id., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court here did not make any such findings related to counsel’s actions before and at resentencing. 54 obtained helpful mitigation testimony from more people who knew him, specifically, eyewitnesses to his traumatic upbringing, including siblings who did not testify, a neighbor, CYS caseworkers, and a priest who supervised him when he was institutionalized. He also asserts his counsel should have performed more thorough examinations of those who did testify. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that “defense counsel’s ‘decision not to seek more’ mitigating evidence from the defendant’s background ‘than was already in hand’ fell ‘well within the range of professionally reasonable judgments.’” Lesko XIII, 15 A.3d at 386 (quoting Bobby v. Van