Opinion ID: 657359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Remaining legal determinations

Text: 20 At the end of the trial, Cozzi argued that the Reboys' action could not go forward to the jury for two additional reasons. Cozzi first argued that the Indiana election of remedies doctrine bars the Reboys' suit. Cozzi next claimed that Cozzi and its subsidiary ASP were so integrated that the court should view them as a single corporate entity and as such, apply the worker's compensation exclusivity provision to bar Reboy's action. The district court rejected both arguments as incorrect legal determinations. 7 Cozzi reasserted these arguments in its post-trial motion for a new trial which the district court denied. On appeal, Cozzi asserts that the district court erred on these two grounds. We disagree and affirm the district court determinations.
21 After his accident, Reboy received worker's compensation benefits from a worker's compensation insurance policy. Cozzi secured this insurance for itself and its subsidiaries, including ASP. Reboy received twenty-two checks, four of which named Cozzi as his employer. 8 Cozzi argues that Reboy, by accepting worker's compensation benefits from Cozzi, elected to receive those benefits as his sole remedy against Cozzi and that he and his wife are estopped from asserting additional claims against Cozzi. 22 Under Indiana law, the Reboys' claims are not barred by the election of remedies doctrine. Indiana law requires a person to elect affirmatively the remedy of worker's compensation benefits for an injury before that person is barred from maintaining a common-law action for the same injury. See R.L. Jeffries Trucking Co. v. Cain, 545 N.E.2d 582, 586 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) (holding that a compensation agreement between parties approved by the Board acts as a binding admission of liability); Indiana Univ. Hosps. v. Carter, 456 N.E.2d 1051, 1058 (Ind.Ct.App.1983) (holding that plaintiff elected the remedies contained in the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act by signing an agreement for compensation which the Board subsequently approved). The record simply does not support Cozzi's contention that James Reboy actively and affirmatively sought and obtained benefits from Cozzi in the manner contemplated by Indiana law and thus we affirm.
23 In a final effort to prevent the jury from deciding the negligence issues, Cozzi asked the district court to pierce the corporate veil and find that ASP was so highly integrated with the Cozzi corporation that they should be treated as one corporate entity for the purpose of applying the exclusivity provision of the Indiana Worker's Compensation Act. Piercing the corporate veil requires that separate corporate identity be disregarded where one corporation is so organized and controlled and its affairs are so conducted by another corporation that it is a mere instrumentality or adjunct of the other corporation. 24 The district court correctly rejected Cozzi's efforts to characterize ASP as a mere instrumentality of Cozzi. The record is replete with evidence that ASP and Cozzi are distinct and separately operated corporations and that Cozzi made significant and continuing efforts to maintain separate corporate entities. There is no basis in fact for treating Cozzi and ASP as one corporate entity and therefore we affirm the district court. 9 D. Cozzi's Right to a Set-Off 25 If Reboy prevails on the employment issue at retrial, all parties agree that he will have to repay the worker compensation benefits he received after his accident to prevent a double recovery. If this occurs, we ask the district court to clarify in an order whom Reboy must repay and the amount that must be repaid.