Opinion ID: 67025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: r etaliation

Text: It is unlawful “for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII].” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To establish a prima facie case of retaliation forbidden by Title VII, the plaintiff must show that: “[(1)] he engaged in statutorily protected activity, [(2)] he suffered a materially adverse action, and [(3)] there was some causal relation between the two events.” Goldsmith v. Bagby Elevator Co., Inc., 513 F.3d 1261, 1277 (11th Cir. 2008). The first requirement may be satisfied by the filing of an EEOC charge, as it constitutes a “statutorily protected activity.” See id. Second, a materially adverse action is one that “well might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2415 (2006) (quotation marks omitted). Third, the causal connection can be established by the “close temporal proximity” between the employer’s knowledge of the protected activity and the adverse action. See Higdon v. Jackson, 393 F.3d 1211, 1220 (11th Cir. 2004). However, “mere temporal proximity between knowledge of protected activity and an adverse action 8 must be very close” to meet the requirement. Id. (quotation and alterations omitted). Thus, without more, a time gap of three months or more does not establish a causal connection. Id. at 1221. “After the plaintiff has established the elements of a claim, the employer has an opportunity to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the challenged employment action as an affirmative defense to liability.” Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1277 (citation omitted). If the employer offers legitimate reasons, “the presumption of retaliation disappears.” Sullivan v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 170 F.3d 1056, 1059 (11th Cir. 1999). “The plaintiff must then show that the employer’s proffered reasons for taking the adverse action were actually a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct.” Id. An employee may show pretext by demonstrating “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder could find [those reasons] unworthy of credence.” Silvera v. Orange County Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). “The plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of proving retaliation by a preponderance of the evidence and that the reason provided by the employer is a pretext for prohibited retaliatory conduct.” Goldsmith, 513 F.3d at 1277. Here, assuming Summers established the first two prongs of a prima facie 9 case of retaliation, in that he engaged in statutorily protected expression by filing an EEOC complaint and later suffered an adverse employment action by being denied early retirement, Summers did not establish a causal relationship between the two events. Summers filed an EEOC complaint in December 2005, and his request for early retirement was denied sometime between Spring and September of 2006. The only evidence linking these events was a temporal proximity of several months. Because the temporal proximity was not very close, more evidence was required to demonstrate the causal connection. See Higdon, 393 F.3d at 1220. Thus, Summers failed to establish the causal connection necessary for a prima facie case. Moreover, even assuming Summers did establish a prima facie case, the Navy gave a legitimate nonretaliatory reason, explaining that it denied his request because it would have been prohibited from filling his position after he left. Summers did not demonstrate pretext, as he offered no evidence that the Navy’s explanation was not true.