Opinion ID: 43714
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence as a Matter of Fact

Text: We review de novo a defendant’s claim of insufficient evidence in fact to sustain a conviction. See United States v. Christo, 129 F.3d 578, 579 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). In making this determination, we “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices made in the government’s favor.” See id. (citation omitted). Under this standard, we are required to affirm a conviction if “any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). Based on this standard, we reject Smart’s contention that the government failed to present facts which proved its case on the money laundering charge. The evidence demonstrated that Smart made at least three payments: one in the amount of $7,000 to Castrejon in early 2001, one in the amount of $3,000 to Castrejon in July 2001, and another payment in the amount of $3,000 to Castro in 2002 for money he owed to Castrejon. Moreover, the government presented evidence which indicated that Smart was involved in the trafficking of methamphetamine 12 with Castrejon and Big Tony. In addition, the government described the process of “fronting,” in which drugs were given to dealers to be sold on consignment and then the proceeds were paid to suppliers in exchange for the continued receipt of subsequent drug shipments. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have concluded that Smart’s payments of money constituted transactions involving proceeds from his sale of methamphetamine which was given to him by Arturo Castrejon and that these payments were made so that Smart would continue to receive drug shipments from Castrejon. Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Smart’s conviction for money laundering under § 1956(a)(1)(A)(i).