Opinion ID: 1435290
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Validity of Brodheim's Claim on the Merits

Text: Prison walls do not form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the Constitution. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); see also Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). It is well-established that, among the rights they retain, prisoners have a First Amendment right to file prison grievances. See Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 566 (9th Cir.2005); Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1288 (9th Cir.2003). Retaliation against prisoners for their exercise of this right is itself a constitutional violation, and prohibited as a matter of clearly established law. See Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 566; Pratt v. Rowland, 65 F.3d 802, 806 & n. 4 (9th Cir. 1995). In Rhodes v. Robinson , we set forth the five basic elements of a viable claim of First Amendment retaliation [3] in the prison context: (1) An assertion that a state actor took some adverse action against an inmate (2) because of (3) that prisoner's protected conduct, and that such action (4) chilled the inmate's exercise of his First Amendment rights, and (5) the action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. 408 F.3d at 567-68. See also Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813, 815-16 (9th Cir.1994) (per curiam). We also noted that a plaintiff who fails to allege a chilling effect may still state a claim if he alleges he suffered some other harm. Rhodes, 408 F.3d at 568 n. 11. The district court found that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to four of these elements: The existence of an adverse action, the causation for the adverse action, the chilling of Brodheim's rights, and the relationship of any action to a legitimate correctional goal. We find the district court erred on each of these four grounds.
The district court found there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Cry's handwritten statement constituted an adverse action. In doing so, the court acknowledged that a threat of discipline or transfer was sufficient to state a claim for retaliation, but held that, on a motion for summary judgment, a plaintiff must present evidence showing that such a threat to transfer for the exercise of First Amendment rights actually occurred, and that Brodheim failed to do so. This was the incorrect standard to apply. As we have stated multiple times, a retaliation claim may assert an injury no more tangible than a chilling effect on First Amendment rights. Gomez v. Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127 (9th Cir.2001), citing Hines v. Gomez, 108 F.3d 265, 269 (9th Cir.1997). See also Burgess v. Moore, 39 F.3d 216, 218 (8th Cir.1994) ([A] threat of retaliation is sufficient injury if made in retaliation for an inmate's use of prison grievance procedures.). In Rhodes itself, we made this clear by noting that an allegation that a person of ordinary firmness would have been chilled is sufficient to state a retaliation claim, and that, since harm that is more than minimal will almost always have a chilling effect [, a]lleging harm and alleging the chilling effect would seem under the circumstances to be no more than a nicety. 408 F.3d at 568, n. 11 (emphasis in original). Thus, the mere threat of harm can be an adverse action, regardless of whether it is carried out because the threat itself can have a chilling effect. The district court and the defendants, however, contend that a threat of harm must be explicit and specific to constitute an adverse action. Thus, they argue, the threat here was not an adverse action because it failed to explicitly state that discipline, transfer, or some other negative result would occur as a consequence for failing to comply. Outside the prison context, we have never held that a plaintiff must establish an explicit threat to prevail on a retaliation claim. See, e.g., Berry v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642, 655 (9th Cir.2006) (noting implicit threat of adverse action sufficient to establish Title VII prima facie case); N.L.R.B. v. Island Film Processing Co., Inc., 784 F.2d 1446, 1451 (9th Cir. 1986) (Implied threats of retaliation suffice to taint a [labor representation] election.); see also Yanowitz v. L'Oreal USA, Inc., 36 Cal.4th 1028, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 436, 116 P.3d 1123 (2005) (holding that implied threat of termination plus pattern of negative treatment may be adverse employment action for sex discrimination retaliation claim). We see no reason why a different standard should apply in this setting. Thus, Brodheim need not need establish that Cry's statement contained an explicit, specific threat of discipline or transfer if he failed to comply. As the Second Circuit held in a related context, the question for the district court to ask is whether the record, taken in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, reveals statements by the defendant that a reasonable factfinder could ... interpret as intimating that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action would follow. Okwedy v. Molinari, 333 F.3d 339, 343 (2d Cir.2003) (per curiam) (internal marks omitted). Under this standard, the record before the district court was sufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Cry's warning constituted an adverse action. By its very nature, a statement that warns a person to stop doing something carries the implication of some consequence of a failure to heed that warning. There were a number of things that Cry, as a corrections officer, could have done if Brodheim failed to comply with his warning that would have had a negative effect. In addition to the words of the warning itself, the district court also had before it the 2004 memorandum sent by Cry to the Warden, which stated that Brodheim's continued use of the grievance system was indeed the motivating factor for his recommendation that Brodheim be transferred. While this memorandum was not submitted until after the commencement of this suit, it is circumstantial evidence that a jury could view as supporting Brodheim's contention the warning was a threat of transfer or disciplinary action if he was not careful as to what he wrote in his grievances. The power of a threat lies not in any negative actions eventually taken, but in the apprehension it creates in the recipient of the threat. Based on the record before the district court, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Cry's statement intimated that some form of punishment or adverse regulatory action would follow a failure to comply. Thus, we reverse the district court's finding that Brodheim produced inadequate evidence of an adverse action.
To prevail on a retaliation claim, a plaintiff must show that his protected conduct was the `substantial' or `motivating' factor behind the defendant's conduct. Soranno's Gasco, Inc. v. Morgan, 874 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.1989). To show the presence of this element on a motion for summary judgment, Brodheim need only put forth evidence of retaliatory motive, that, taken in the light most favorable to him, presents a genuine issue of material fact as to [Cry's] intent in issuing the warning. Bruce v. Ylst, 351 F.3d 1283, 1289 (9th Cir.2003). Even if there is a dispute as to whether Brodheim's disrespectful language or the grievance as a whole was the motivating factor for Cry's warning, [4] we have previously held that disrespectful language in a prisoner's grievance is itself protected activity under the First Amendment. Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276, 1281-82 (9th Cir.1995) (holding that prison officials may not punish an inmate merely for using `hostile, sexual, abusive or threatening' language in a written grievance.). It is thus undisputed that the warning was motivated by Brodheim's protected conduct, and we reverse the district court's contrary finding.
The district court examined several occasions on which Brodheim claims his exercise of the right to file grievances was chilled, as well as the number of grievances that Brodheim filed after the incident, and concluded that Brodheim failed to produce sufficient evidence of such chilling. However, this focus on whether or not the record showed Cry was actually chilled was incorrect. In Rhodes, we explicitly held that an objective standard governs the chilling inquiry; a plaintiff does not have to show that his speech was actually inhibited or suppressed, but rather that the adverse action at issue would chill or silence a person of ordinary firmness from future First Amendment activities. 408 F.3d at 568-69, quoting Mendocino Enviro. Center v. Mendocino Cty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1300 (9th Cir.1999) (emphasis in original). To hold otherwise would be unjust as it would allow a defendant to escape liability for a First Amendment violation merely because an unusually determined plaintiff persists in his protected activity. Id. at 569. We cannot say that, as a matter of law based upon the record before us, Brodheim has failed to meet this objective standard. A reasonable person may have been chilled by Cry's warning. We therefore reverse the finding of the district court as to chilling.
To prevail on a retaliation claim, a prisoner must show that the challenged action did not reasonably advance a legitimate correctional goal. Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 568 (9th Cir.2005). The district court appeared to conclude that Cry's action reasonably advance[d], id., the legitimate penological goal of prohibiting disrespectful language. This is contrary to our established precedent. In Bradley v. Hall, 64 F.3d 1276 (9th Cir.1995), we considered a challenge to Oregon correctional regulations which prohibited the use of hostile, sexual, abusive, or threatening language. 64 F.3d at 1278. In invalidating these disrespect regulations, we acknowledged that they furthered several legitimate penological interests, but balance[d] the importance of the prisoner's infringed right against the importance of the penological interest served by the rule to find that, as applied to the content of formal written grievances, the rule impermissibly substantially burdened prisoners' right of access to the courts. Id. at 1280-81. The Supreme Court explicitly disapproved of our balancing method of analysis, though not the holding of Bradley, in Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 121 S.Ct. 1475, 149 L.Ed.2d 420 (2001). There, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the four factors set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), are the only factors a court is to consider in determining whether a proffered legitimate penological interest is reasonably related to a regulation which infringes on a prisoner's constitutional right. The Court re-elucidated these factors: First and foremost, there must be a `valid, rational connection' between the prison regulation and the legitimate [and neutral] governmental interest put forward to justify it. If the connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is arbitrary or irrational, then the regulation fails, irrespective of whether the other factors tilt in its favor. In addition, courts should consider three other factors: the existence of alternative means of exercising the right available to inmates; the impact accommodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources generally; and the absence of ready alternatives available to the prison for achieving the governmental objectives. 532 U.S. at 228, 121 S.Ct. 1475, quoting Turner (internal citations omitted); see also Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 884 (9th Cir.2008) (noting Turner factors). A balancing inquiry, the Court noted, would lead courts to unnecessarily perpetuat[e]the involvement of the federal courts in affairs of prison administration. 532 U.S. at 230, 121 S.Ct. 1475, quoting Turner, 482 U.S. at 89, 107 S.Ct. 2254. Removing the balancing step from our analysis, and solely applying the Turner factors, we reach the same result as the Bradley court. In Bradley, we found that the policy at issue failed to meet the first Turner factor of the connection between the valid interest and the regulation at issue. The court stated: We of course acknowledge the prison's valid interest in the peaceable operation of the prison through the insistence on respect, rather than through violent confrontation. However, the link between this important purpose and the disrespect rules as applied to formal written grievances is weak. The director and his experts argue that to permit the utterance of disrespectful language in any forum at any time would result in a total breakdown of prison security and discipline. Other courts that have addressed this argument in similar contexts have rejected it. We agree with these courts that such absolutist arguments for enforcement of disrespect rules in every communication public and private overstate their substantial importance. 64 F.3d at 1281 (citations omitted). The reasoning applies equally in this case; there is no indication that language in a written complaint like Brodheim's posed such a substantial threat to security and discipline in CMF. The district court distinguished this case from Bradley by seizing on dicta that stated that, in that case, the corrections department's legitimate security concerns would be largely served by procedures that require grievances to be in writing and shield those prison officials who are in direct contact with the inmates from reading any insulting remarks that might be contained in those grievances. 64 F.3d at 1281. The district court commented that such an alternative was impossible in this circumstance, because it was Cry himself who was the subject as well as the intended reader of plaintiff's complaint, and therefore could not be `shielded' as Bradley proposed. This is inconsequential for several reasons. First, immediately after the passage quoted by the district court, we explicitly disclaimed that we were mandating such a shielding alternative; rather, it was merely one of multiple obvious, simple alternatives that both accommodate the prisoner's right to file a grievance and prevent any open expression of disrespect or any disrespectful communication between prisoner and guard or between prisoner and prisoner. Second, it was indeed possible to shield Cry from these complaints, [5] by developing a system by which grievances about a specific individual are not processed by that individual. This is in fact what happened in 2004 when Brodheim's grievances were assigned to a different appeals coordinator. Finally, in no way is the fourth Turner factor, the presence or absence of alternative means of achieving the stated objective, dispositive. [6] Examining the other Turner factors, we find that the warning was insufficiently related to legitimate penological interests. It does not appear that there was any other way for Brodheim to exercise his grievance rights other than via the written grievance system. As to the other factor, the effect accommodation of the asserted right would have on the corrections system, we explained in Bradley: It takes little imagination to structure a grievance system and regime of disrespect rules that would make a prisoner's statements in a complaint or grievance invisible to all those involved in the daily operations of the prison, alleviating any security concern. A prisoner's statement in a grievance need not have any more impact on prison security through the maintenance of respect than the prisoner's unexpressed thoughts. 64 F.3d at 1281. We stand by this statement today, and hold that Cry's warning of Brodheim cannot escape constitutional scrutiny by citing a legitimate penological interest. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's finding that a legitimate penological interest barred plaintiff's claim. Since we reverse the district court on each of the alternative grounds on which it granted summary judgment for defendants, the entire grant of summary judgment is reversed. Since the district court declined to exercise its discretion to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Brodheim's state law claims solely on the basis of summary judgment on the federal claims, these claims are also reinstated.