Opinion ID: 1560501
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: SOLEXCO as Movant

Text: `[T]he manner in which the [summary-judgment] movant's burden of production is met depends upon which party has the burden of proof ... at trial.' Ex parte General Motors Corp., 769 So.2d 903, 909 (Ala.1999) (quoting Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So.2d 686, 691 (Ala.1989) (Houston, J., concurring specially)). If ... `the movant has the burden of proof at trial, the movant must support his motion with credible evidence, using any of the material specified in Rule 56(c), [Ala.] R. Civ. P. (`pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits').' 769 So.2d at 909. `The movant's proof must be such that he would be entitled to a directed verdict [now referred to as a judgment as a matter of law, see Rule 50, Ala. R. Civ. P.] if this evidence was not controverted at trial.' Id. In other words, `when the movant has the burden [of proof at trial], its own submissions in support of the motion must entitle it to judgment as a matter of law.' Albee Tomato, Inc. v. A.B. Shalom Produce Corp., 155 F.3d 612, 618 (2d Cir.1998) (emphasis added). See also Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Union Independiente de la Autoridad de Acueductos y Alcantarillados de Puerto Rico, 279 F.3d 49 (1st Cir.2002); Rushing v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 185 F.3d 496 (5th Cir.1999); Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir.1986); Calderone v. United States, 799 F.2d 254 (6th Cir.1986). Denmark v. Mercantile Stores Co., 844 So.2d 1189, 1195 (Ala.2002). Moreover, Rule 56(c), Ala. R. Civ. P., requires that the movant's narrative summary of facts `include specific references to pleadings, portions of discovery materials, or affidavits for the court to rely on in determining whether' a summary judgment is proper. Horn v. Fadal Machining Ctrs., LLC, 972 So.2d 63, 69-70 (Ala.2007) (quoting Northwest Florida Truss, Inc. v. Baldwin County Comm'n, 782 So.2d 274, 277 (Ala.2000)). This requirement is not satisfied if the materials on which the movant purports to rely have not been filed with the court. `[T]he party moving for summary judgment has the burden to show that he is entitled to judgment under established principles; and if he does not discharge that burden, then he is not entitled to judgment. No [response] to an insufficient showing is required. ' Horn, 972 So.2d at 69 (quoting Ray v. Midfield Park, Inc., 293 Ala. 609, 612, 308 So.2d 686, 688 (1975)). Otherwise stated, [a] motion that does not comply with Rule 56(c) does not require a response ... from the nonmovant, and a judgment may not be entered on such a motion even in the absence of a response from the nonmovant. Horn, 972 So.2d at 70. Jones-Lowe contends that SOLEXCO failed to satisfy its initial burden of showing through competent evidence that no genuine issue of material fact existed and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Jones-Lowe's reply brief, at 14. Consequently, according to Jones-Lowe, the burden never shifted[,].... [t]hat is, Jones-Lowe was not required to substantively oppose SOLEXCO's motion due to its fatal procedural failure. Jones-Lowe's reply brief, at 14. We agree. The burden was upon SOLEXCO, as the party seeking a summary judgment on the claim asserted in its complaint, to present evidence in the nature of the material specified in Rule 56(c), [Ala.] R. Civ. P., such as depositions and affidavits, that would entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law if this evidence was not controverted at trial. Denmark, 844 So.2d at 1195. This it did not do. Although it purported to rely on various deeds allegedly filed in the probate court, SOLEXCO provided no copies of any such deeds to the circuit court in support of its motion averments. SOLEXCO's motion averments are not evidence in any sense. The following principles are well settled: `[M]otions and arguments of counsel are not evidence. ' Williams v. Akzo Nobel Chemicals, Inc., 999 S.W.2d 836, 845 (Tex.App.1999). `[S]tatements in motions are not evidence and are therefore not entitled to evidentiary weight. ' Singh v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 213 F.3d 1050, 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000). `[B]riefs submitted in support of motions are not evidence to be considered by the Court in resolving a summary judgment motion. ' Direct Media Corp. v. Camden Tel. & Tel. Co., 989 F.Supp. 1211, 1217 (S.D.Ga.1997). Fountain Fin., Inc. v. Hines, 788 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2000) (emphasis added). It is obvious that the circuit court relied almost exclusively on the motion averments as the basis for its judgment. That judgment was based on the conclusion that there wasin facta conveyance of the mineral rights from O.T. Holmes in 1890, before Margaret Hall allegedly attempted to convey that interest outside the chain of title in 1919. It was for that reason, according to the circuit court, that SOLEXCO's title was superior to [Jones-Lowe Company's] defective color of title emanating from a source who had no title to convey. (Emphasis added.) Because these and other such naked averments were not facts before the court, the circuit court erred in entering a summary judgment for SOLEXCO. That judgment is, therefore, reversed.