Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecution's peremptory excusal of Prospective Juror Nadyne T.

Text: The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against Prospective Juror Nadyne T., who was Black. Defendant concedes that by failing to raise a timely objection in the trial court that the excusal was improperly founded on Ms. T.'s race (see, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748), he waived such a direct claim on appeal. (E.g., People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 316, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374 ( Bolin) ; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 909, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277 ( Montiel. )) However, defendant urges that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object, and that the dismissal of Nadyne T. violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. [8] To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show counsel's performance fell below a standard of reasonable competence, and that prejudice resulted. (E.g., People v. Staten (2000) 24 Cal.4th 434, 450-451, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968 ( Staten) ; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 216-217, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839 ( Ledesma. )) When a claim of ineffective assistance is made on direct appeal, and the record does not show the reason for counsel's challenged actions or omissions, the conviction must be affirmed unless there could be no satisfactory explanation. ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 426, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859 ( Pope. )) Even where deficient performance appears, the conviction must be upheld unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice, i.e., that, `but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.' ( Staten, supra, at p. 451, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968, quoting Ledesma, supra, 43 Cal.3d 171, 217-218, 233 Cal.Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839; see also Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) Here, the record affords no basis for concluding that counsel's omission was not based on an informed tactical choice. Counsel may have felt the prosecutor could provide genuine race-neutral reasons for the excusal. (See Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 317, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) Ms. T., then 76 years old, insisted she had no scruples for or against the death penalty and felt duty-bound to follow instructions despite her personal feelings, but her deep religious convictions led to the belief, derived from the Bible, that everyone should be forgiven 70 times seven times. This could give the prosecutor sincere pause about her ability to impose the punishment of death. Moreover, though Ms. T. professed excellent health, the prosecutor could have been concerned about her ability to withstand the effort and stress of a protracted capital penalty trial. The possibility also arises that defense counsel himself preferred to dispense with this prospective juror. (See Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 317, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) Aside from her age and endurance, her disclosure that she had given little thought to the death penalty, and her dogged adherence to her belief that the court's instructions must prevail over any personal feelings, could cause apprehension that she would not be receptive to untethered defense arguments for mercy and leniency. Since the decision may well have been `an informed tactical choice within the range of reasonable competence, the conviction must be affirmed. [Citation.]' ( Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th 297, 317, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374, quoting Pope, supra, 23 Cal.3d 412, 425, 152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859.)