Opinion ID: 2621938
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ransdell's constitutional violation claims

Text: Ransdell's remaining claims, which the district court resolved by way of dismissal or summary judgment, all were based on his assertion that the term inoperative automobiles is unconstitutionally vague. Our review of the order dismissing Ransdell's claims for deprivation of his substantive due process and equal protection rights is rigorous, [33] as we, in determining whether Ransdell has set forth allegations sufficient to state a claim for relief, [34] accept all factual allegations in his complaint as true and construe all inferences in his favor. [35] Accordingly, Ransdell's complaint was properly dismissed only if his allegations would not entitle him to any relief. [36] In this case, Ransdell's substantive due process claim was grounded on an allegation that he could not have been adequately apprised of what items on his property were subject to abatement because the term inoperative automobiles is subject to more than one interpretation and his equal protection claim was based on an allegation that the County relies on its code in an arbitrary and capricious manner by confiscating vehicles that cannot legally be driven on public roadways, while allowing others to retain such vehicles on their property. The County's code is presumed to be constitutionally valid. [37] In order to succeed on a facial challenge to a law on vagueness grounds, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the law is `impermissibly vague in all of its applications.' [38] Under that analytical framework, a reviewing court should examine the plaintiff's conduct before analyzing other hypothetical applications of the law because [a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others. [39] A law will be upheld against a vagueness claim if its terms can be made reasonably certain by reference to other definable sources. [40] With the presumption of validity, and in light of the governing standard, under which a plaintiff must demonstrate that a law is impermissibly vague in all of its applications in order to succeed on a facial challenge grounded on vagueness, we conclude that the district court properly dismissed Ransdell's claims that he was deprived of substantive due process when the County abated his property of inoperative vehicles. [41] Addressing Ransdell's claim that he was deprived of equal protection under the law, such a claim will succeed when the plaintiff can demonstrate he has been `denied the same protection of the law which is enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances.' [42] Although Ransdell alleged that others have been allowed to retain inoperable vehicles on their property, he failed to allege that the others to which he referred were similarly situated. Nevertheless, construing his pleadings liberally, as we must, and thus assuming that Ransdell was referring to other property owners who were similarly situated in that they had violated the Clark County Code by storing inoperable vehicles, Ransdell still failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted because property owners are not a protected class, and he did not allege that he was the only person to whom Clark County Code Chapter 11.06 had been applied. [43] Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed Ransdell's equal protection claim. As for the partial summary judgment on Ransdell's claim that his procedural due process rights were violated, we review orders granting summary judgment de novo. [44] Summary judgment was appropriate here if the pleadings and other evidence on file, viewed in a light most favorable to Ransdell, demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remained in dispute and that Clark County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [45] To withstand summary judgment, Ransdell could not rely solely on the general allegations and conclusions set forth in his complaint, but must instead have presented specific facts demonstrating the existence of a genuine factual issue supporting his claims. [46] Here, Ransdell, in bringing his motion to quash the seizure warrant and in alleging in his complaint that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights, argued that the term inoperative automobile or inoperative vehicle was impermissibly vague because reasonable people could assign it different meanings. Ransdell was aware, however, through notices provided by the County, that the abatement would include the removal of inoperable automobiles or vehicles, but he neglected to challenge the County's decision to abate his property of such items through available administrative proceedings. Instead, he waited until after the abatement was completed and the nuisance items removed from his property and taken to a landfill to file his district court action. In entering summary judgment on Ransdell's procedural due process violation claim, the district court specifically found that the seizure warrant was based on probable cause [47] and that it set forth with particularity the manner and scope of the abatement, and that the warrant issued for the reasonable purpose of abating a nuisance in order to protect the public health, safety, and welfare. [48] We perceive no error in the district court's conclusion that Ransdell was afforded procedural due process and that the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on his claim that he was deprived of such process. [49]