Opinion ID: 194928
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Questions Asked By the Jurors

Text: 50 At the beginning of the trial, before any of the attorneys had made opening statements, the court told the jury that it could ask the witnesses questions. The court explained that the questions had to be written; that the written questions would be submitted to the court, which would review them; and that the court might not ask a jury question if the question could not be put in a proper legal form or it couldn't make any legal difference at all. During the 24-day trial, the court asked the witnesses eleven questions that the jurors had submitted. 51 The defendants did not object to the court following the practice thus to ask questions or, indeed, to any particular question asked. In the absence of a timely objection our review is limited to examining the record for plain error, and we will correct only particularly egregious errors ... that seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 340 (1st Cir.1987) (internal quotations omitted). 52 In United States v. Sutton, 970 F.2d 1001 (1st Cir.1992), decided after the trial in the present case, we upheld the actions of the same district judge in employing this practice in a mail and wire fraud prosecution, in which the court asked witnesses seven questions submitted by the jurors. We held that especially in complex cases, allowing juror-inspired questions in a criminal case is not prejudicial per se, but is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Id. at 1005. We noted that other circuits similarly had so concluded. Id. 53 We explained that [a]llowing jurors to pose questions during a criminal trial is a procedure fraught with perils. In most cases, the game will not be worth the candle. Nevertheless, we are fully committed to the principle that trial judges should be given wide latitude to manage trials. Id. Although we stated that in most situations, the risks inherent in the practice will outweigh its utility, we held that we would review the propriety of the practice on a case-by-case basis based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. 54 In Sutton, we held that for four reasons, the court's asking of the juror questions was not reversible error. First, Sutton neither objected nor requested any additional safeguards. Id. at 1006. Second, [b]ecause [Sutton ] was a factually complex case in which a greater-than-average risk of jury confusion existed, the positive value of allowing juror-inspired questioning was relatively high. Id. Third, the court used appropriate procedural safeguards, such as requiring that the questions be presented in writing to the court and explaining to the jury that the court might not ask all juror questions. Id. Fourth, the questions themselves were few in number and bland in character. Id. (footnote omitted). 55 The first three reasons unquestionably are equally applicable here: the defendants did not object to the questioning, the case was factually complex, and the court adopted procedural safeguards nearly identical to those in Sutton. 56 Sutton involved seven jury questions the court asked during a 2 1/2 day trial. The present case involves eleven questions asked during a 24-day trial. The issue, thus, is whether this significantly larger number of questions so seriously undermined the fairness of the trial as to constitute plain error. We answer that question negatively. 57 The juror questions the court asked were relatively bland in character, id., and designed to clarify and explain testimony already given. For example, one juror wanted Paul Pires to identify the word that followed his signature on one of the exhibits. The word was Pres. Another juror wanted Nancy Rullo to explain what the preliminary title that she referred to in her testimony meant. One juror sought clarification of who had done the appraisal the witness was discussing. Although the defendants have objected to allowing juror questions and to the number asked in this case, they have not now argued that any specific question was improper. Other courts of appeals have upheld convictions where the court asked varying numbers of questions that the jurors proposed. In United States v. Lewin, 900 F.2d 145 (8th Cir.1990), the court, over objections made in the jury's presence, asked six questions. The Fourth Circuit upheld a conviction in which the trial court asked ninety-five juror questions during a three-week trial. DeBenedetto v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 754 F.2d 512 (4th Cir.1985). The Fifth Circuit approved the asking of one juror question. United States v. Callahan, 588 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 826, 100 S.Ct. 49, 62 L.Ed.2d 33 (1979). 58 In each of these cases the court focused on the effect of the questions on the trial, not the number of questions, in and of itself. Thus, the Lewin court approved the asking of juror questions because they were factual in nature and merely sought clarification of previous testimony and did not introduce new or unrelated subject matter. 900 F.2d at 148. In DeBenedetto, despite the large number of questions, the court examined carefully each of the questions propounded by the jurors and [ ] perceive[d] no bias in any of the questions. 754 F.2d at 517. 59 In Sutton, we noted that juror-inspired questioning becomes particularly troublesome when questions are directed at the [criminal] defendant. 970 F.2d at 1006 n. 6. In Sutton, the court asked only one such question of the defendant. Id. 60 In the present case, the court asked the defendant Cassiere four juror questions during his testimony which spanned three days. Here, as in Sutton, the appellant did not object to [the questions]; and he has not argued on appeal that th[ese questions were] improper or harmful. Id. We cannot say that the district court committed plain error in asking the defendant Cassiere four relatively benign juror questions during Cassiere's three days of testifying. 61 The defendants argue, however, that by asking the jury questions during the testimony of the witnesses, the court improperly interfered with their ability to conduct direct and cross-examination of the witnesses. The district court, however, has broad discretion to control trial proceedings. Id. at 1005 (we are fully committed to the principle that trial judges should be given wide latitude to manage trials); see also United States v. Slone, 833 F.2d 595, 597 (6th Cir.1987) (The court must see that the issues are not obscured and that the testimony is not misunderstood.). While objections from opposing counsel and sidebars may be similarly disruptive of counsel's examination, they are interruptions that are also critical to the fair and rational progression of the trial. We cannot say that the court's asking of the jurors' questions so interfered with counsels' questioning of the witnesses as to constitute a denial of the defendants' right to a fair trial. 62 Although we uphold the district court's asking the juror questions in this case, we reiterate what we said in Sutton regarding the use of this practice. As we there indicated, the practice should be reserved for exceptional situations, and should not become the routine, even in complex cases. The district court should inform counsel at the earliest possible time of its intention to use this technique and allow counsel the opportunity to object. The court should instruct the jurors that they should limit their questions to important points, that at times the rules of evidence will dictate that the court not ask a question, and that the jurors should draw no implication from the court's failure to pose a juror-proposed question to the jury. The jurors should reduce their questions to writing and pass them to the court. Before asking a question, the court should offer a sidebar conference to give counsel the opportunity to object. Finally, in its charge, the court should include a prophylactic instruction, along the lines suggested in Sutton.