Opinion ID: 1743160
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: remaining ineffective assignments

Text: The remaining complaints Johnson makes of his trial counsel are a litany of Monday morning quarterbacking, attempts to again litigate issues decided, and assertions outside the record. All these fall far short of demonstrating his counsel were not reasonably effective. The record in this case reveals that two dedicated, assidious trial attorneys did the best they could to defend Johnson. Had the facts which pointed to Johnson's guilt not been overwhelming, his attorneys, no doubt, would have fared much better. In addition, the circuit judge, a jurist renowned for his patience, kindness and forbearance, more than lived up to his reputation in trying this case. No practicing attorney could hope for more consideration from a trial judge than these attorneys received in this case. It is true we criticized defense counsel in our decision affirming Johnson's conviction for their manner of requesting a continuance, and by their request to withhold objections to the state's closing argument until its conclusion. But there was nothing about our comments to intimate that they harmed Johnson in doing so. To hold that Johnson's trial counsel, in this case, from this record, lacked that degree of competency guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would make the Sixth Amendment virtually impossible to abide by. No rational mind can conceive of such a proscriptive constitutional requirement as a condition precedent to the validity of a criminal conviction. The jury in this case believed that Johnson stabbed a highway patrolman in the back and instructed another to shoot him with the patrolman's own gun. Their verdict was supported by overwhelming evidence. This officer was carrying out his duty in a peaceful manner, and posed no physical threat to Johnson or any of his companions. Civilized society depends upon peace officers for its survival. Such a murder can be equated with treason. In his motion for post-conviction relief, Johnson asserts assignments XII, XVIII and XXIII which he failed to raise at trial or on the direct appeal. Having failed to raise them at trial or upon appeal, Johnson waived his right to assert them in his motion for post-conviction relief. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21 (Supp. 1985); Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 311 (Miss. 1986); Mann v. State, 490 So.2d 910, 911 (Miss. 1986); Evans v. State, 485 So.2d 276, 280 (Miss. 1986); Dufour v. State, 483 So.2d 307, 308 (Miss. 1985). Johnson also asserts assignments III, IV, V, VI, VIII, IX, XI, XIII, XVI, XVII, XIX, XXI, XXII, XXIV and XXV, which were considered and addressed by us on the direct appeal of his case. Consequently, these assignments are res judicata and cannot be raised again. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21 (Supp. 1985); Irving v. State, supra ; Evans v. State, supra . DENIED AND WEDNESDAY, JULY 22, 1987, IS SET AS THE DATE FOR EXECUTION OF THE SENTENCE AND INFLICTION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE MANNER PRESCRIBED BY LAW. WALKER, C.J., ROY NOBLE LEE, P.J., and DAN M. LEE, ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON, PRATHER and SULLIVAN, JJ., dissent.