Opinion ID: 1301325
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wisconsin Contempt Law

Text: ¶ 48 We begin our analysis by focusing on the provisions of Wis. Stat. ch. 785, which codifies the law on Contempt of Court. Wisconsin Stat. § 785.01(1) defines contempt of court as intentional: (a) Misconduct in the presence of the court which interferes with a court proceeding or with the administration of justice, or which impairs the respect due the court; (b) Disobedience, resistance or obstruction of the authority, process or order of a court; (bm) Violation of any provision of s. 767.117(1); (c) Refusal as a witness to appear, be sworn or answer a question; or (d) Refusal to produce a record, document or other object. ¶ 49 Wisconsin Stat. § 785.02 provides that a court of record may impose a remedial or punitive sanction for contempt of court under this chapter. The terms remedial sanction and punitive sanction are defined in Wis. Stat. § 785.01 as follows: (2) Punitive sanction means a sanction imposed to punish a past contempt of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court. (3) Remedial sanction means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court. ¶ 50 As noted, in Wisconsin, contempt sanctions are classified as either punitive or remedial. [4] See Wis. Stat. § 785.04. The remedies authorized by statute are the exclusive remedies available. . . . State ex rel. N.A. v. G.S., 156 Wis.2d 338, 341, 456 N.W.2d 867 (Ct.App. 1990). The imposition of either a punitive or a remedial sanction does not preclude imposition of the other type of sanction. Robert J. Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 U. Cin. L.Rev. 677, 704 (1981) (interpreting Wis. Stat. § 785.04(3) and acknowledging that a punitive sanction may be imposed for past conduct which was a contempt of court even though similar present conduct is a continuing contempt of court). However, punitive sanctions may not be imposed in remedial sanction proceedings. N.A., 156 Wis.2d at 341, 456 N.W.2d 867. ¶ 51 Punitive sanctions are imposed to punish a past contempt of court for the purpose of upholding the authority of the court. Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2) (emphasis added). As the definition implies, punitive sanctions are to be imposed for  past contempt of court only. Id. (emphasis added); Wis. Stat. § 785.04(3) (A punitive sanction may be imposed for past conduct.. . .); Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 34, 736 N.W.2d 85 (quoting Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2)); Evans v. Luebke, 2003 WI App 207, ¶ 21, 267 Wis.2d 596, 671 N.W.2d 304 (same); B.L.P. v. Circuit Court for Racine County, 118 Wis.2d 33, 42, 345 N.W.2d 510 (Ct. App.1984) (The `punitive sanction' . . . is imposed to punish a past contempt of court. . . .); Martineau, supra, at 694 (The punitive sanction is concerned with past conduct. . . . [The punitive sanction is] concerned exclusively with past conduct. . . .); see also State v. King, 82 Wis.2d 124, 131-32, 262 N.W.2d 80 (1978) (determining that the circuit court did not have authority to impose punitive sanctions in a civil contempt proceeding because the underlying dispute was settled, and thus, the contempt was no longer continuing, which was a requirement for civil contempt under the previous statute). ¶ 52 Therefore, a court imposing a punitive sanction is not specifically concerned with protecting private rights. Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 34, 736 N.W.2d 85; Martineau, supra, at 694 ([B]ecause the sanction is directed only at past conduct, its imposition cannot directly aid a litigant harmed by the contempt.); see also Griffin v. Reeve, 141 Wis.2d 699, 706-07, 416 N.W.2d 612 (1987) (stating that the sanctions in that case must be remedial because the case was brought on behalf of a private litigant); Marna M. Tess-Mattner, Comment, Contempt of Court: Wisconsin's Erasure of the Blurred Distinction Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 66 Marq. L.Rev. 369, 377 (1983) (noting that, under the previous contempt statutes, criminal contempt was not intended to benefit anyone, its sole purpose was to vindicate the court's authority). ¶ 53 The imposition of punitive sanctions for past contempt serves at least two important objectives: it upholds the court's authority and it punishes the contemnor. See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2); Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 34, 736 N.W.2d 85; Griffin, 141 Wis.2d at 708, 416 N.W.2d 612; Evans, 267 Wis.2d 596, ¶ 21, 671 N.W.2d 304; Diane K.J. v. James L.J., 196 Wis.2d 964, 969, 539 N.W.2d 703 (Ct.App.1995); B.L.P., 118 Wis.2d at 42, 345 N.W.2d 510; Martineau, supra, at 694. In fact, imposing punitive sanctions is much akin to imposing a criminal penalty, which is why the legislature has required that proceedings for punitive sanctions be brought exclusively by [t]he district attorney of a county, the attorney general or a special prosecutor appointed by the court in a nonsummary procedure. Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(b); see also D.L.D. v. Circuit Court for Crawford County, 110 Wis.2d 168, 179, 327 N.W.2d 682 (1983) (Traditionally, a punitive sanction was imposed for criminal contempt. . . .); Martineau, supra, at 693 (demonstrating the commonality between the current statute's definition of punitive sanction and the previous statute's definition of criminal contempt). ¶ 54 Conversely, remedial sanctions are imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) (emphasis added). Logically, this means that remedial sanctions may be imposed only when action or inaction constituting contempt of court is ongoing and needs to be terminated. Id. ; Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 ([A] remedial sanction is appropriate only when the contempt is continuing . . . .) (emphasis added); see also Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶¶ 4, 31, 736 N.W.2d 85 (imposing remedial sanction for continuing contempt for failing to timely comply with a filing required by court order, thereby depriving the opposing party of her traditional remedy under the law); Griffin, 141 Wis.2d at 707-08, 416 N.W.2d 612 (continuing contempt and imposition of remedial sanctions for the father's failure to pay past-due child support even after the child reaches the age of majority); Evans, 267 Wis.2d 596, ¶¶ 22, 27, 671 N.W.2d 304 (continuing contempt with remedial sanctions imposed for the guardian ad litem's ongoing failure to deposit funds as ordered). Without a continuing contempt of court, nothing remains to be terminated, and thus, a remedial sanction is unwarranted. See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3); Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 ( [A] remedial sanction. . . cannot be imposed if for any reason the contempt has ceased, even as the result of the settlement of the case.); see also King, 82 Wis.2d at 131-32, 138, 262 N.W.2d 80 (disallowing civil contempt proceedings under the previous contempt statutes after the underlying dispute settles); 17 Am.Jur.2d Contempt § 145 (2004) (When the parties settle the underlying case that gave rise to a civil contempt sanction, the contempt proceeding is moot, since the case has come to an end.). ¶ 55 A continuing contempt is required for the imposition of a remedial sanction because remedial sanctions are not designed to punish the contemnor, vindicate the court's authority, or benefit the public. See Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 35, 736 N.W.2d 85. Rather, the stated and principal objective of a remedial sanction is to force the contemnor into compliance with a court order for the benefit of a private partythe litigant. Id. (Remedial contempt is concerned with the private interests of the litigant and is `designed to force one party to accede to another's demand.' (quoting King, 82 Wis.2d at 130, 262 N.W.2d 80 (interpreting civil contempt under the previous contempt statutes))); Griffin, 141 Wis.2d at 707, 416 N.W.2d 612 (The purpose of a remedial sanction . . . is to insure present and future compliance.. . .); D.L.D., 110 Wis.2d at 179, 327 N.W.2d 682 (A remedial sanction means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.) (internal quotations omitted); Evans, 267 Wis.2d 596, ¶ 22, 671 N.W.2d 304 ([T]he circuit court imposed . . . remedial sanctions, i.e., ones imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.) (internal quotations omitted); Benn v. Benn, 230 Wis.2d 301, 309, 602 N.W.2d 65 (Ct.App.1999) (Remedial contempt seeks to procure present and future compliance with court orders. . . .); Diane K.J., 196 Wis.2d at 968, 539 N.W.2d 703 (Remedial contempt is imposed to ensure compliance with court orders.); B.L.P. 118 Wis.2d at 42, 345 N.W.2d 510 (`[R]emedial sanctions' . . . [are] imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.). [5] The private nature of a remedial sanction is evidenced by the fact that only a party aggrieved by a contempt of court may seek imposition of a remedial sanction . . . in the proceeding to which the contempt is related, Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(a), for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court, Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3). [6] ¶ 56 The court may impose the following remedial sanctions for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court: (a) Payment of a sum of money sufficient to compensate a party for a loss or injury suffered by the party as the result of a contempt of court. (b) Imprisonment if the contempt of court is of a type included in s. 785.01(1)(b), (bm), (c) or (d). The imprisonment may extend only so long as the person is committing the contempt of court or 6 months, whichever is the shorter period. (c) A forfeiture not to exceed $2,000 for each day the contempt of court continues. (d) An order designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of the court. (e) A sanction other than the sanctions specified in pars. (a) to (d) if it expressly finds that those sanctions would be ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt of court. Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1). ¶ 57 The sanctions listed under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1) are essentially the same as under prior law. Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1357. [7] Moreover, all but one of the remedial sanctions described in Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1) expressly reflect the prerequisite of a continuing contempt of court. See Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(b) (The imprisonment may extend only so long as the person is committing the contempt of court or 6 months, whichever is the shorter period.) (emphasis added), (1)(c) ( A forfeiture not to exceed $2,000 for each day the contempt of court continues. ) (emphasis added), (1)(d) ( An order designed to ensure compliance with a prior order of the court.) (emphasis added), (1)(e) ( A sanction other than the sanctions specified in pars. (a) to (d) if it expressly finds that those sanctions would be ineffectual to terminate a continuing contempt of court. ) (emphasis added). ¶ 58 Section 785.04(1)(a), if read in isolation, could be somewhat ambiguous on this score. [8] Standing alone, the paragraph could be interpreted as allowing payment of a sum of money for a loss or injury suffered in the past; however, such an interpretation would ignore the fact that the continuing nature of the contempt is what authorizes the court to impose a remedial sanction as opposed to a punitive sanction. [9] See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) (`Remedial sanction' means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.); Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 ( [A] remedial sanction . . . cannot be imposed if for any reason the contempt has ceased, even as the result of the settlement of a case.) (emphasis added); see also King, 82 Wis.2d at 131-32, 138, 262 N.W.2d 80 (disallowing civil contempt proceedings under the previous contempt statutes after the underlying dispute settles); 17 Am. Jur.2d Contempt § 145 (When the parties settle the underlying case that gave rise to a civil contempt sanction, the contempt proceeding is moot, since the case has come to an end.). Permitting the imposition of a remedial sanction in a situation where there is no continuing contempt would effectively rewrite the statute. [10] Therefore, the key to the issue in this case is whether the County's contempt of court was continuing on and after the September 13, 2004 motion for a finding of contempt and imposition of remedial sanctions. ¶ 59 Chapter 785 does not define a continuing contempt of court. If the court is required to interpret a statute and the words in the statute are not defined, the court must apply the ordinary meaning of the words to give effect to the statutory language. Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 45, 681 N.W.2d 110. ¶ 60 The word continuing has many definitions. However, when using continuing in the context of determining whether something has either been terminated or is ongoing, as in this statute, see Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3), the word generally means [t]o go on with a particular action or in a particular condition; persist, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 408 (3d ed. 1992), see also Black's Law Dictionary 316 (7th ed. 1999) ((Of an act or event) that is uninterrupted .). ¶ 61 This definition of continuing is consistent with our prior case law interpreting whether a contempt of court is continuing so that a remedial sanction may be imposed. ¶ 62 For instance, one obvious example of a continuing contempt justifying a remedial sanction is where a parent is delinquent in paying child support. See Larsen, 165 Wis.2d at 682, 685, 478 N.W.2d 18 (upholding remedial sanctions and purge conditions imposed for the father's complete failure to pay child support as ordered); Griffin, 141 Wis.2d at 700-01, 707-08, 416 N.W.2d 612 (holding remedial sanctions to be appropriate, even after the child reaches the age of majority, where the father has refused to pay court-ordered support); Benn, 230 Wis.2d at 306-07, 315, 602 N.W.2d 65 (upholding remedial sanctions and purge condition for the father's repeated failure to pay child support as ordered). ¶ 63 In Griffin, the mother initiated contempt proceedings against the father, after the child reached the age of majority, for his failure to make child support payments as required by the divorce decree. Griffin, 141 Wis.2d at 701, 416 N.W.2d 612. [11] The father disputed the court's authority to impose a remedial sanction in that case, arguing that his contempt could no longer be continuing. Id. at 707, 416 N.W.2d 612. His theory was that once a child reaches the age of majority, the parent's duty to support ceases, and a delinquent parent's contempt ends. Id. The father contended that any sanction the court imposed against him for his delinquent child support payments would be a punitive sanction because his contempt had been terminated by the child's 18th birthday and was no longer continuing. Id. at 708, 416 N.W.2d 612. ¶ 64 In response, this court concluded that the father's contempt was continuing because, while the court could not modify or terminate the support order after the child reached majority age, the force of the order does not expire until the parent complies. Id. In other words, A parent's failure to pay child support after the child reaches majority is a continuing disobedience of a court order. The contempt is not past; it is ongoing.  Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, the court determined that the circuit court did have authority to impose remedial sanctions against the father for his continuing contempt of court. Id. at 708-09, 416 N.W.2d 612. ¶ 65 A second example of a continuing contempt of court is found in Evans. There, the original guardian ad litem, appointed by the court to obtain approval of settlement agreements for four minors in two personal injury lawsuits, failed to deposit the settlement awards in restrictive trust accounts as ordered by the circuit court. Evans, 267 Wis.2d 596, ¶¶ 1 n. 1, 4-5, 671 N.W.2d 304. After learning of the original guardian ad litem's delinquency, the circuit court replaced her with a new guardian ad litem who then moved the circuit court to order the original guardian ad litem to repay the missing funds. Id., ¶¶ 5-6. Because the original guardian ad litem failed to repay the funds as ordered, the circuit court entered judgment against her for the full amount of the funds using its power under Wis. Stat. § 805.03. [12] See id., ¶¶ 8, 10. ¶ 66 In affirming the circuit court, the court of appeals modified the circuit court's rationale by employing the contempt statutes rather than Wis. Stat. § 805.03. Id., ¶ 20 ([W]e conclude that the circuit court's authority to sanction [the guardian ad litem] for noncompliance with its substantive order directing the disposition of the minors' settlement proceeds is more firmly grounded in Wis. Stat. ch. 785, specifically in § 785.03(1)(a) [(describing procedure for remedial sanctions)].). The court of appeals concluded that the circuit court had actually imposed remedial sanctions in the case but did not follow the nonsummary procedures required under Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(a). Id., ¶¶ 22, 25. Therefore, the court of appeals remanded the case to the circuit court with instructions to follow the procedures set forth in Wis. Stat. § 785.03(1)(a) and determine whether the original guardian ad litem's failure to deposit the minors' funds as ordered was intentional and therefore, qualified as contempt. See id., ¶ 30. The court of appeals noted that, if the circuit court found the original guardian ad litem in contempt, it could then impose monetary remedial sanctions because the contempt would be continuing. [13] Id., ¶ 22 (So long as no properly restricted accounts containing the settlement proceeds existed, [the] alleged contempt continued. ) (emphasis added). ¶ 67 In contrast, the most obvious case of a contempt of court that has been terminated and is no longer continuing occurs when the underlying dispute between the parties has been settled. For example, in King, under the pre-1979 contempt statutes, this court decided that the circuit court did not have the authority to conduct civil contempt proceedings after the principal action between the parties was settled and no longer continuing. King, 82 Wis.2d at 138, 262 N.W.2d 80. ¶ 68 King was an opinion dealing with violations of an injunction that required certain state employees to refrain from picketing and other strike-related activities. Id. at 126, 262 N.W.2d 80. Three days after the strike was settled and the employees returned to work, the Attorney General commenced civil contempt proceedings against those state employees who violated the injunction. Id. at 127-28, 132, 262 N.W.2d 80. After noting the distinctions between civil and criminal contempt, [14] id. at 129-30, 262 N.W.2d 80, the supreme court held that civil contempt proceedings were inappropriate under these facts because the strike was no longer continuing and [t]he only purpose for a contempt action brought at the time the contempt was sought in these cases was punishment to vindicate the authority of the court, id. at 132, 262 N.W.2d 80. The court did state, however, that the acts complained of could have been the basis for criminal contempt, and all the indicia of contempt point toward criminal contempt. Id. at 131, 262 N.W.2d 80. In fact, the court explained, These cases would have presented no foreseeable problems if they had been brought as criminal contempt. Id. at 131-32, 262 N.W.2d 80. ¶ 69 The King court rejected the state's theory of a third category of contempt, a hybrid approach that would allow punitive sanctions in civil contempt. Id. at 134, 262 N.W.2d 80. Its decision was aided by the legislature's determination to no longer recognize[ ] punitive sanctions for civil contempt after 1975. Id. at 134-35, 262 N.W.2d 80 (citing Wis. Stat. § 295.02(5) (1975-76) (No person may be imprisoned, nor required to pay any sum of money to the court or to a party, under this chapter except as specified in subs. (1) and (2) [(concerning remedial and coercive sanctions but not punitive sanctions)].)). ¶ 70 The plaintiff class in this case relies on Frisch, a case decided just two years ago by this court. In Frisch, the underlying dispute was related to child support and the disclosure of the father's financial information. Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 6, 736 N.W.2d 85. In particular, the divorce judgment between the father and mother incorporated their settlement agreement, which required the father to provide the mother with a copy of his tax returns and all supporting schedules. Id. The required tax information would permit the mother to monitor the father's financial situation and to seek modifications in the support payments if warranted. Id., ¶ 4. After the father failed to disclose his tax returns, which would have shown a substantial increase in income, the mother initiated contempt proceedings. Id., ¶ 7. The court dismissed the contempt proceedings but revised the father's payment schedule and reiterated his financial disclosure obligations. Id., ¶¶ 7-8. This time, however, the court ordered the father to make his tax returns and schedules available to the mother by May 12 of each year as long as he had an ongoing child support obligation. Id., ¶ 8. ¶ 71 After many months of court proceedings, the mother was forced to move for contempt again, alleging that the father had failed to make the necessary financial disclosures. Id., ¶ 12. However, before a finding of contempt could be made, the father complied with the financial disclosure order and produced his tax returns for the mother. Id., ¶¶ 14, 26. Despite the father's belated attempt at compliance, the circuit court found him in contempt and imposed a $100,000 sanction against him. Id., ¶ 23. On appeal, the court of appeals concluded that a remedial sanction was improperly imposed against the father because he had complied with the circuit court's order before it found him in contempt. Id., ¶ 26. As the contempt was no longer continuing, the court of appeals concluded, the circuit court was without authority to impose a remedial sanction against the father. Id. ¶ 72 On review, this court reinstated the imposition of the remedial sanction against the father for his repeated failure to abide by the court's order requiring the timely disclosure of his tax return information. Id., ¶ 4. The sole dispute in relation to the contempt issue was whether remedial contempt was properly employed in this case because [it is] dispute[d] whether [the father's] contempt was continuing at the time the circuit court found [him] in contempt. Id., ¶ 37; see also id., ¶ 53 ([T]he real question today is whether the contempt is continuing.). The court answered this question in the affirmative. Specifically, this court stated the following about the father's belated attempt at compliance and how it did not suffice to terminate his contempt of court: Although [the father] did produce all the required documents before the circuit court found him in contempt, his contempt was continuing . . . because his production of documents came too late to undo the problems he had created by failing to produce documents on time. . . . Failure to timely produce income information `as required' was really the essence of [the father's] contempt because it shielded him from exposure to regular, contemporary court-ordered modifications of child support. If [he] had supplied the information timely, he would likely have been paying more support than he did. By his repeated failures, [the father] deprived [the mother] of the information necessary to seek the periodic modification of support she was entitled to request under the law, and he deprived the court of its authority to timely modify its child support order. The contempt was continuing because [the father's] failure to comply with the court order deprived [the mother] of her ability to utilize traditional remedies in the law. Id., ¶ 47 (emphasis added). ¶ 73 In Frisch, the father paid all the child support that the court had ordered. See id., ¶ 23. But he did not pay all the child support he would have had to pay if he had complied with the court's order by disclosing his tax returns by May 12 of each year. Id., ¶ 23 n. 10. Timely disclosure was the essence of the order. Id., ¶ 47. Delinquent disclosure was ineffectual because it deprived the mother of her traditional remedies in the law, as the court was blocked by statute from retroactively modifying the father's child support obligations. Id. ¶ 74 In the present case, the circuit court found that the County had been in contempt of court, that is, the County had violated the 30-Hour Rule component of the Consent Decree in the past. But the court found, and the plaintiff class conceded, that the 30-Hour Rule was not being violated in May, June, July, August, or September 2004, meaning that none of the members of the plaintiff class had a complaint that they were being detained in violation of the 30-Hour Rule at the time the motion for contempt was filed. In short, the County's contemptuous conduct was no longer continuing, [15] and there is no suggestion that the County has violated any part of the Consent Decree since April 2004. [16] Thus, we are left with the question of whether the circuit court, under these circumstances, had the statutory authority to impose a remedial sanction of any sort against the County for its past contempt. The answer to this question is No. ¶ 75 Because the County's violation of the Consent Decree had indisputably terminated before the contempt proceedings began, there is no way we can justify the plaintiff class's request for monetary damages on grounds of a continuing [or persistent or uninterrupted] contempt of court. Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3); The American Heritage Dictionary, supra, at 408; Blacks Law Dictionary, supra, at 316; see also King, 82 Wis.2d at 132, 262 N.W.2d 80 (disallowing the maintenance of civil contempt proceedings because the contemptuous conduct was terminated prior to the initiation of the contempt proceedings). As the County's contempt was not continuing, the court could not impose a remedial sanction against the County for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court. Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3); see also Note, § 11, ch. 257, Laws of 1979, at 1355 ([A] remedial sanction is appropriate only when the contempt is continuing. . . .); D.L.D., 110 Wis.2d at 179, 327 N.W.2d 682 (A remedial sanction means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.) (internal quotations omitted); B.L.P., 118 Wis.2d at 42, 345 N.W.2d 510 (stating that remedial sanctions are imposed only to terminate a continuing contempt of court). In fact, the principal objective that would be served by the imposition of a contempt sanction in this case now would be the punishment of the County and the vindication of the circuit court's authorityboth of which are punitive sanction objectives. See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(2); Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 34, 736 N.W.2d 85; Griffin, 141 Wis.2d at 708, 416 N.W.2d 612; Evans, 267 Wis.2d 596, ¶ 21, 671 N.W.2d 304; Diane K.J., 196 Wis.2d at 969, 539 N.W.2d 703; B.L.P., 118 Wis.2d at 42, 345 N.W.2d 510; Martineau, supra, at 694. ¶ 76 This is not a case where a contempt of court causes irreparable harm by depriving a victim of her ability to utilize traditional remedies in the law. Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 47, 736 N.W.2d 85. For instance, the plaintiff class may be able to seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). With adequate proof, individual plaintiffs may be able to recover damages in personal injury suits. [17] The County's contempt of court cannot be said to have deprived the plaintiff class of its traditional remedies in the law, and consequently, we cannot say the County's contempt is continuing on that basis. See Frisch, 304 Wis.2d 1, ¶ 47, 736 N.W.2d 85. ¶ 77 Finally, simply because the monetary remedial sanctions set forth in Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1)(a) do not expressly recognize that they can be imposed only for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court does not carry the day for the plaintiff class. See Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3). All the sanctions listed under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1) carry the label of Remedial sanction. Remedial sanction is a defined term that  means a sanction imposed for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court.  Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3) (emphasis added). Because the definition of remedial sanction is clear on its face, we are not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the statute. Kalal, 271 Wis.2d 633, ¶ 46, 681 N.W.2d 110 (internal quotations and citation omitted). Therefore, regardless of whether all the remedial sanction provisions contained in Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1) expressly recognize that they can be imposed only for the purpose of terminating a continuing contempt of court, Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3), the fact that they are remedial sanction[s] and the definition of remedial sanction clearly requires a continuing contempt of court means that, to impose any sanction listed under Wis. Stat. § 785.04(1), there must be a continuing contempt of court, see Wis. Stat. § 785.01(3). [18] ¶ 78 Inasmuch as the County's contempt of court had ceased and was no longer continuing at the time the contempt proceedings were initiated, remedial sanctions could not be imposed. Consequently, we affirm the circuit court's judgment denying the plaintiff class remedial sanctions in this case.