Opinion ID: 2514209
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Closing and rebuttal arguments

Text: Valdivia isolates six instances of alleged prosecutorial misconduct during the DPA's closing and rebuttal arguments. We address each in turn.
Valdivia asserts that the DPA attempted to mislead the jury into believing that any statements which the witnesses had adopted as not being part of their reports were not evidence. While discussing the charge of second degree terroristic threatening, which the prosecution alleged Valdivia had committed against Ihara, see supra note 6, the DPA stated: . . . [A]s to TT II, Mr. Ihara, Mr. Ihara is just driving down the road, minding his own business, and he doesn't know what's going on. But he came in here and he told you, and afterwards he wrote a report, and after he got home, he wrote another report. Why? Well, not a report, he wrote it for himself so he could remember. Why? Because he was so scared and shaken up after this happened, he didn't get everything down in his [first] report. And the reason why I mention that is because when the defense attorney gets up here, you're going to hear about how people didn't write things in their reports, or they didn't say things before, so now they must be lying. Okay? Reports are just that. They are not evidence. You did not get anybody's report in evidence. What you got  Defense counsel objected on the ground that the DPA had misstated the law and requested a bench conference. During the bench conference, defense counsel argued: Your Honor, this is misleading to the jury. This is misleading. The jury did not receive any report into evidence. What they adopted as true about cross-examination regarding reports is evidence. So when the prosecutor says, yes, I did put something in my report, the [fact is] that they didn't get the report. Whatever he said about the report they adopted from cross-examination is evidence. The circuit court sustained the objection and informed the DPA that he needed to rephrase his argument; the remark was not stricken, defense counsel having made no such request, and no curative instruction was given to the jury. On appeal, Valdivia reasserts that the DPA's statement was an attempt[ ] to mislead the jury on the applicable law, insofar as the DPA stat[ed] that statements adopted on cross-examination based on the police reports were not evidence. We disagree that the DPA's statement was misleading in that manner. In context, the DPA was clearly referring to Ihara's statement to the police and to his subsequent written report. The DPA was not referring to police reports. But, even if the DPA's remarks were susceptible to such a construction, he was still simply and correctly noting that the reports themselves (Ihara's, as well as those of the various police officers who testified) had not been received into evidence as exhibits and, thus, were not a part of the record. Accordingly, we do not believe that the DPA's statements regarding the evidentiary value of Ihara's previous statement and report constituted misconduct in the first instance; thus, we need not consider whether the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Valdivia asserts that the DPA remarked as follows on his failure to testify and to adduce any evidence: . . . Ladies and gentlemen, a lot of evidence, a lot of testimony, a lot of things for you to consider. But if you remember common sense, what happened[,] and what is in evidence. And remember, opening statements are not evidence. And opening statements, you heard things [from defense counsel] about, oh, it's a mistake, the officer got tangled, this and that. Okay? That was not the evidence that was presented to you. The evidence that was presented to you about the kidnapping and the arm being pinned in the car  Defense counsel objected, arguing during a bench conference that the foregoing statements were a flagrant effort . . . to make a comment on the fact that defense did not present any evidence, and [did] not present Mr. Valdivia to testify[.] Defense counsel maintained that the DPA had, inter alia, comment[ed] on the defendant's right to remain silent. The circuit court overruled the objection but noted that it thought Mr. Bakke has improperly commented on the defendant's exercise of his constitutional right [to remain silent]. The circuit court cautioned the DPA to restrict [his] argument to the fact that what was said in opening statements are not evidence, without trying to characterize it any way. The DPA's statements, however, were not stricken, nor did defense counsel move for them to be, and no curative instruction was given to the jury. This court has said that [t]he test to be applied in determining whether a prosecutor has improperly commented upon a defendant's failure to testify is whether the language used was `manifestly intended or was of such a character that the jury would naturally and necessarily take it to be a comment on the failure of the accused to testify.' State v. Padilla, 57 Haw. 150, 158, 552 P.2d 357, 363 (1976) (quoting United States v. Wright, 309 F.2d 735, 738 (7th Cir.1962)). Utilizing this formulation, we disagree with Valdivia that the DPA's statement constituted misconduct. The most that can be said is that the DPA was highlighting the fact that the evidence adduced at trial did not comport with defense counsel's assertions during opening statements. So construed, the DPA's remark appears to be within the bounds of legitimate argument, inasmuch as a prosecutor is, in closing argument, given wide latitude . . . in discussing the evidence and may state, discuss, and comment on the evidence as well as draw all reasonable inferences therefrom. State v. Clark, 83 Hawai`i 289, 304, 926 P.2d 194, 209 (1996) (citations omitted). Moreover, the statement did not expressly refer to Valdivia or to the fact that he did not testify. We do not believe that the jury would foreseeably interpret the DPA's statement as a comment on Valdivia's failure to testify. Accordingly, we hold that the DPA's statement did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct in the first instance and need not reach the question whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The final four statements that Valdivia posits constitute prosecutorial misconduct all involve the DPA allegedly asserting his personal opinions during rebuttal argument. First, the DPA remarked: Ladies and gentlemen, these charges are not trumped up because officers are lying or that this is some blue wall of conduct, that they're trying to get even for what this guy did to some of their officers. Remember, the person he almost killed was the person that was in that green car. Maybe he should have been charged with attempted murder. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, and the circuit court ordered the statement stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it. Second, Valdivia asserts that the DPA once again offered his personal opinion when arguing that Officer Heatherly had not lied during his testimony: Fairness, integrity, respect. You heard the [dispatch] tape, listen to the tapes, listen to what they did that day. When I look at those injuries [.] Defense counsel's objection was sustained, but the DPA's statement was not stricken, nor did defense counsel request that it be, and no curative instruction was given. Third, Valdivia notes that the DPA, after asserting, in response to defense counsel's objection to the foregoing statement, that he would rephrase his argument, then opined that Valdivia should have been shot by the police: Take a look at those injuries; you see some bruising. Those pictures were taken the day after in cellblock. You know that if you get hit in the head, what happens  in the eye? Officer Kawelo said, yeah, there was something around the eye, maybe some redness, some abrasion. Not that bruising. Bruising doesn't show up for a day or so. Anybody's who's had a bruise has seen a bruise get worse and worse and worse over time. They're not trying to hide the fact that [Valdivia] got injured, and it's not the fact that he got beaten up. But where's the bullet hole? Do you see any bullet holes in his head? Because he should have had one. Defense counsel's objection was sustained, and the circuit court ordered the DPA's statement stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it. Finally, Valdivia asserts that the DPA improperly asserted that he was attempting to deceive the jury. In discussing the inconsistencies in the testimony adduced during trial, the DPA argued: Officer Kailihou, I didn't see the other guy get maced. The other officers? Yeah, we maced him. Does it make any difference in the scheme of things? No. Are they lying about everything, do you throw out their testimony? No, okay? That's what Defense wants you to do. They want you to say, you know what, you believe the officers for these traffic-type offenses that we just can't argue our way out of, and then  Defense counsel's objection was sustained, and the circuit court ordered the DPA's statement stricken and instructed the jury to disregard it. After the DPA completed his rebuttal argument, defense counsel requested surrebuttal and, in the alternative, moved for a mistrial. The circuit court denied both defense counsel's request for surrebuttal and her motion for a mistrial because the DPA's [c]omments. . . for which the objections were sustained were stricken, and the jury was told to disregard it[.] The DPA's comments that Valdivia should have been charged with attempted murder and shot in the head were flagrantly improper and clearly constituted inflammatory assertions of the DPA's personal opinion. See, e.g., State v. Marsh, 68 Haw. 659, 660-61, 728 P.2d 1301, 1302 (1986). However, objections to both comments were sustained, they were immediately stricken, and the jury was promptly instructed to disregard them. In addition, as we noted supra in section III.C.1, the jury was instructed no less than three times that statements and arguments of counsel were not evidence and should not be considered as such. Moreover, as we also noted supra in section III.C.1, the evidence against Valdivia was not so weak as to favor finding the remarks harmful. Accordingly, given the prompt curative instructions and the circuit court's general instructions, we cannot say that the DPA's comments, although unprofessional, contributed to Valdivia's convictions. We hold, therefore, that the DPA's statements were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. With regard to the DPA's remark, When I look at those injuries, the DPA impliedly conceded, in agreeing to rephrase his argument, that rendering his personal opinion about what he thought when he viewed Valdivia's injuries was improper. Id. Although no curative instruction was promptly given, we note that the remark, left unfinished, does not appear on the record before us to have contributed to Valdivia's convictions. As noted above, the evidence against Valdivia was not so weak as to favor holding this inchoate remark prejudicial, and the circuit court more than adequately instructed the jury that statements and arguments of counsel were not evidence and should not be considered as such during its deliberations. Thus, we hold that this particular remark was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Regarding the blue wall of conduct comment that, according to Valdivia, constitutes prosecutorial misconduct, we hold that it was not an improper assertion of personal opinion regarding Valdivia's credibility. See Clark, 83 Hawai`i at 304-306, 926 P.2d at 209-211 (remark characterizing defendant's testimony as a cockamamie story held to be well within the limits of propriety). Valdivia did not testify, and, thus, his credibility as a witness was not before the jury. To the extent that the comment urged the jury not to credit the defense's blue wall theory urging the jury to find the testimony of the officers unbelievable, we do not believe that the comment was improper. See id. Accordingly, it did not constitute prosecutorial misconduct in the first instance, and we need not consider whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Given that any improper remarks by the DPA were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, their cumulative effect was similarly harmless and did not deprive Valdivia of a fair trial. Thus, the DPA's misconduct in the present matter, not warranting reversal of any of Valdivia's convictions, does not implicate the Rogan holding or the double jeopardy clauses of either the United States or Hawai`i Constitutions. Cf. Rogan, 91 Hawai`i at 415-24, 984 P.2d at 1242-50.