Opinion ID: 157419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Inability to Cross-Examine the Declarant

Text: The Sixth Amendment provides that “the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. A literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would seem to preclude all hearsay from being introduced as evidence against a criminal defendant. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has declined to impose such a reading. In White v. Illinois the Court stated that “unavailability analysis is a necessary part of the Confrontation Clause inquiry only when the challenged out-of-court statements were made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding.” 502 U.S. 346, 354 (1992). The White Court proceeded to hold that it was unnecessary to prove unavailability of declarants of spontaneous declarations 8 and statements made in the course of receiving medical care. 9 See id. at 356-57. Because the ATF certificate was not the product of a judicial proceeding, the government’s decision to introduce the ATF certificate into evidence without putting Mr. Marshall on the stand is not assailable for failure to make him available or prove him unavailable. See also 8 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2). 9 See Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). -24- Earnest v. Dorsey, 87 F.3d 1123, 1130 n.5 (10th Cir.) (citing White for its limitation of availability requirement), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 527 (1996). Additionally, there is no evidence in the record that the defendant did not have the opportunity employ his Sixth Amendment right of Compulsory Process 10 to subpoena Mr. Marshall. In deciding that there is little benefit in imposing an unavailability rule for out-of-court statements not made in the course of a prior judicial proceeding, the Court stated that “[m]any declarants will be subpoenaed by the prosecution or defense, regardless of any Confrontation Clause requirement, while the Compulsory Process Clause and evidentiary rules permitting a defendant to treat witnesses as hostile will aid defendants in obtaining a declarant’s live testimony.” White, 502 U.S. at 355; see also United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387, 397-400 (1986) (holding that unavailability of coconspirator need not be proved when “the defendant himself can call and crossexamine such declarants”). Some circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, have followed the Court’s cue and held that there is no violation of the Confrontation Clause when the defendant neglected to exercise rights that would have enabled the him to confront the witnesses against him. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 88 F.3d 845, 847 n.2 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to 10 have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. VI. -25- (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that the excited utterance admitted into evidence did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in part because the defendant could have called the declarant as a witness and cross-examined him) (citing Inadi, 475 U.S. at 397-98 & n.8,); Reardon v. Manson, 806 F.2d 39, 42 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[I]t has become settled that, at least in those borderline cases where the likely utility of producing the witness is remote, the Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of an opportunity for effective cross-examination is satisfied where the defendant himself had the opportunity to call the declarant as a witness.”). But see Simmons v. United States, 440 F.2d 890, 891 (7 th Cir. 1971) (holding that it is the government’s burden to produce the declarant when the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant is essential to the defendant’s right of confrontation). Because the admission of the ATF certificate does not implicate the Sixth Amendment’s limited requirement of availability, and because the defendant could have called Mr. Marshall as a witness, Rith’s Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was not denied by the failure of the government to call Mr. Marshall as a witness. -26-