Opinion ID: 44614
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claim Thirteen

Text: 27 Coleman argues that the evidence of his future dangerousness was insufficient as a matter of law for the jury to find against him on Special Issue No. 1. 6 Coleman first raised this claim before the state habeas court, but that court denied the claim because, in Texas, sufficiency of the evidence is only reviewable on direct appeal. The district court found that Coleman's federal habeas claim was procedurally barred because Texas has long held that sufficiency of the evidence claims are not cognizable in state habeas proceedings. See Renz v. Scott, 28 F.3d 431, 432 (5th Cir.1994). Furthermore, Coleman's alleged cause of and prejudice from the procedural default are wholly conclusory, and he has failed to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice. The district court correctly held that Texas's procedural bar precludes federal habeas review of Coleman's sufficiency argument. Reasonable jurists could not debate this point. J. Claim Fourteen 28 Coleman argues that his appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective because of the failure to raise on direct appeal the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding of future dangerousness. Coleman did not raise this claim in his petition for federal habeas relief; rather, Coleman raised it for the first time in a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend the judgment. The district court found that Coleman's attempt to raise the issue after judgment was improper and refused to rule on the merits of his claim. See Schiller v. Physicians Res. Group, Inc., 342 F.3d 563, 567 (5th Cir.2003) (A motion to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59(e) . . . cannot be used to raise arguments which could, and should, have been made before the judgment issued.) (internal quotations omitted). Since Coleman did not properly raise this claim below, we do not consider Coleman's claim in this COA petition. See Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir.2003) (We generally will not consider a claim raised for the first time in a COA application.). K. Claim Fifteen 29 For his final claim, Coleman argues that the trial court erred by ordering the jury to keep deliberating after the foreman alerted the trial judge that it was at an impasse and gave the jury's numerical split. The district court found that the trial judge's instructions to the jury to continue deliberating did not render Coleman's trial fundamentally unfair. 30 The jury began penalty deliberations around midday on June 5, 1997. During the second day of deliberations, the jury foreman sent the trial judge a note: 31 Your Honor, 32 We have deceided [sic] special issues numbers one and two. We are at an impass [sic] on issue number three. We have solid votes on either side and they do not feel they can change their minds. We have been delibrating [sic] this issue since early this morning. Do you have any advice? 33 After hearing the trial judge read the note, Coleman moved for a directed verdict, which the trial judge denied. The judge called the jury in and asked the foreman the numerical split of the jury, without telling me who's for one way or who's for the other. The foreman responded: The numerical difference is eight and four. The trial judge addressed the jury: 34 I'm going to ask the jury to go to lunch and come back this afternoon. Give it at least another try, and I will certainly consider your note at that time. We just ask you to continue. See if you can make any headway. If you cannot, just let the Court know sometime this afternoon. Thank you again for your consideration. We'll take you to lunch right away. Thank you. 35 Later that afternoon, after a total of almost twelve hours of deliberation, the jury foreman sent a second note to the judge: Your Honor, At this point we are at an impass [sic]. It does not seem that it is going to change. The vote at the moment is eleven to one. Coleman again moved for a directed verdict, which the trial court denied. After receiving this jury note, the judge did not call in the jury to talk to them directly, and the record shows only that the judge wrote a reply note to the foreman as follows: Members of the Jury: Please continue deliberations. 7 36 A judge may encourage jurors who are having difficulty reaching a verdict to deliberate longer, and to give due consideration and respect to the views of their peers. United States v. Straach, 987 F.2d 232, 242 (5th Cir.1993) (citing Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896)). Such a supplemental instruction is permissible even in the death penalty context. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 238-39, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). A reviewing court must consider the propriety of the supplemental jury charge in its context and under all the circumstances. Id. at 237, 108 S.Ct. 546 (internal quotation omitted). The potential for coercion exists when a trial judge inquires as to the nature or extent of [the jury's] division and then instructs the jury to continue deliberating. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 239-40, 108 S.Ct. 546 (citing Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926)). At least in a federal criminal trial, the better approach is to ask questions regarding the division of jurors that think further deliberation will be useful. Id. at 240, 108 S.Ct. 546. 37 AEDPA, though, does not require us to hold the state courts to the same standard as we do federal district courts. See Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 9-10, 123 S.Ct. 362, 154 L.Ed.2d 263 (2002) (finding that the court of appeals erred in granting habeas relief based on its belief that non-constitutional Supreme Court precedent in federal criminal trials, based in the Court's supervisory powers over the lower courts, was equally applicable to state courts). A state trial judge's inquiry into the numerical split of the jury, so long as it is simply to assess the progress of the jury, does not render a trial fundamentally unfair so as to require habeas relief. Thompson v. Cain, 161 F.3d 802, 810 (5th Cir.1998). See also Montoya v. Scott, 65 F.3d 405, 412 (5th Cir.1995). 8 When the answer to the question reveals that the jury is split eleven to one, it is not per se impermissible for the state trial judge to ask the jury to continue deliberating. Thompson, 161 F.3d at 809-10. Furthermore, even on direct review, we have held that the unsolicited disclosure of the jury division by the foreman is not by itself a ground for a mistrial. United States v. Warren, 594 F.2d 1046, 1049 n. 3 (5th Cir.1979). 38 In a pre-AEDPA case, we denied habeas relief to a state prisoner whose trial judge asked the numerical split of the jury without reference to how many votes were on each side and then asked the jury to continue deliberating for another thirty minutes; the jury returned a verdict of death after forty minutes. Montoya, 65 F.3d at 408. As in Montoya, Coleman's trial judge did not give a traditional Allen charge to the jury; the judge did not instruct the minority to reconsider its views in light of the majority's arguments nor remind the jury of the time and expense of going through another trial. Rather, the trial judge merely asked the jury to continue deliberating. 39 The state habeas court found that the trial judge's supplemental instruction was not coercive. Instead, that court found that the jury's two notes show that the jury had been engaged in active deliberation. Coleman has failed to rebut the state habeas court's factual determination with clear and convincing evidence. Furthermore, the state habeas court's decision denying relief is neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of federal law as established by the Supreme Court. It is not only permissible but proper for a trial judge to ask a jury to continue deliberating if it appears that further deliberation might be fruitful in helping the jury reach a unanimous verdict. In its response to the second jury note, the trial court explained to the parties on the record that it was requesting the jury continue deliberating because the additional deliberations clearly moved some jurors to reconsider their initial views. When considering the totality of the circumstances, see Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 237, 108 S.Ct. 546, including the trial judge's initial jury instructions and the response to both jury notes, it is clear that the trial court did not coerce the jury into rendering a particular verdict. Nor do we find the point debatable among reasonable jurists.