Opinion ID: 184507
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Record Under Review

Text: The second preliminary issue relates to the record. EPAobjects that petitioners' claims are based on information notavailable to it at the time the first spent potliner rule wasissued in April 1996. See Brief for Respondents at 23-28. The Agency contends that petitioners waived their objectionsto the treatment standard because they failed to raise themduring the original rulemaking, and that review is limited tothe administrative record compiled at that time. Accordingto EPA, it never reopened the issue of the treatment standard in the January or July 1997 rulemakings, and thusreview of evidence discovered after the April 1996 rule isforeclosed. Id. at 27. Undoubtedly, new information calling into question theefficacy of the treatment standard and the Reynolds processprompted many of petitioners' current challenges. Petitioners cannot be deemed to have waived these claims by failingto present them in April 1996. While judicial review shouldbe based on the full administrative record before an agency atthe time of its decision, see Citizens to Preserve OvertonPark, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Walter O. BoswellMemorial Hosp. v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir.1984), there are at least two ways in which the recorddeveloped after the April 1996 Rule is properly before us. Although we are concerned not with the timeliness of thepetitions--each petition for judicial review was timely withrespect to the rule it challenged--but with the content of thedecisionmaking record, our analysis draws on the law regarding the time limits for seeking review. First we look to the doctrine of reopening. When anagency's actions show that it has not merely republished anexisting rule ... but has reconsidered the rule and decided tokeep it in effect, challenges to the rule are in order. PublicCitizen v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n, 901 F.2d 147, 150(D.C. Cir. 1990). Reopening may be explicit, or it may beimplicit. See Kennecott Utah Copper Corp. v. United StatesDep't of Interior, 88 F.3d 1191 (D.C. Cir. 1996); State of Ohiov. EPA, 838 F.2d 1325 (D.C. Cir. 1988). Statements made in the January 1997 Rule, which the July1997 Rule referred to as a notice, 62 Fed. Reg. at 37,695,indicate that EPA was considering whether environmentalperformance was so dismal that the treatment standardshould be re-written. Given the new information about theactual results at the Reynolds facility, it would have beensurprising if EPA had no second thoughts. In almost allcases, EPA stated in January 1997, simply meeting thetreatment standards suffices for s 3004(m), but wheretreatment is not operating so as to reduce environmentalavailability of key hazardous constituents appreciably ... theAgency must question the adequacy of the treatment. 62Fed. Reg. at 1994. EPA cautioned that its action should notbe read to vitiate a treatment standard whenever treatmentperformance turns out in practice to be less than predicted byanalytic protocols such as the TCLP, id., thus implying thatin this particular case poor performance had underminedEPA's confidence in its treatment standard. EPA's reopening of its fluoride concentration limit, whichhad been based on the data in the Reynolds' delisting petition, was more explicit. In the January Rule, EPA noted thatit may have to ultimately revise the treatment standard forfluoride.... EPA will be seeking more information to morefully characterize the treatment process for fluoride duringthe extended national capacity variance period. 62 Fed.Reg. at 1995 n.13. That EPA reopened the entire spent potliner treatmentstandard becomes all the more apparent when one considersthat the question whether to extend the national capacityvariance under s 3004(h)--which EPA insists was the solefocus of its January and July 1997 rulemakings--is inextricably linked with the question whether the s 3004(m) treatmentstandard worked. EPA now denies this, saying that theprotective standard of s 3004(h) alone controls the determination whether there is adequate disposal capacity. Brief forRespondents at 38. But the Agency said something quitedifferent when these matters were before it. In its JulyRule, EPA described the issue confronting it not as one ofadequate volume of treatment capacity, but as environ- mental adequacy, specifically whether treatment satisfies therequirements of section 3004(m) which says that treatment isto be sufficient to minimize threats to human health and theenvironment posed by land disposal of the waste, and section3004(h)(2) which says that to be adequate treatment anddisposal capacity must be protective of human health and theenvironment. 62 Fed. Reg. at 37,695. EPA itself announced that its January notice was premised on twofactors: 1) treatment performance that was less than predicted through the use of models in the delisting proceeding and(for constituents whose treatment is measured by the TCLPprotocol) the [land disposal restriction] treatment standard; and 2) unsafe disposal.... The two rationales are linked andinfluence one another. Responses to Major Comments forWaste K088 (July 7, 1997). Once an agency reopens an issue, whether by solicitingcomments or indicating a willingness to reconsider, a newreview period is triggered. Kennecott, 88 F.3d at 1213. Bythe same token, once an agency reopens, the record beforethe agency at the time of reopening may be reviewed by thecourt. Because EPA reopened the treatment standard, therecord developed at the time of the January and July rulemakings is the record for the purpose of judicial review. The same result may be reached by a different route. RCRA provides that a petition for review may be filed afterthe ninetieth day if based solely on grounds arising aftersuch date. 42 U.S.C. s 6976(a)(1). See Natural ResourcesDefense Council, Inc. v. EPA, 907 F.2d 1146, 1165 (D.C. Cir.1990). With respect to a similar provision in the Clean AirAct, we said that the provision was designed to assure thatstandards were revised whenever necessary on the basis ofnew information. Oljato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train,515 F.2d 654, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Oljato laid out, as aprecondition, presentation to the Administrator of any newinformation thought to justify revision of a standard of performance. Id. at 666. What occurred here satisfied the Oljato standard. Afterissuing its April 1996 Rule, new data came to EPA's attentionby the fall of 1996. EPA published the data in its January1997 Rule. 62 Fed. Reg. at 1993. Petitioners also submittedto EPA numerous comments and petitions, now withdrawn,discussing the implications of these developments. AlthoughEPA did not formally act on petitioners' submissions, it didrespond to comments, saying it was considering these questions ... but not in the context of the present proceeding. In Group Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. EPA, we heldthat evidence submitted in the form of comments ... ratherthan in a formal petition satisfied the procedural requirements because the agency appear[ed] here to have takenheed of petitioners' comments. 665 F.2d 1284, 1290 (D.C.Cir. 1981). For the purpose of our inquiry, it is importantonly that the information was presented to EPA at the time itdecided against altering the treatment standard. WhetherEPA's decision to stand pat represented a decision not toreconsider the standard is, in light of the information knownto EPA at that time, a distinction having no bearing on ourreview of the record.