Opinion ID: 1058173
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the plea in bar to count v

Text: While [t]he standards of review for a defensive plea in bar and a demurrer are substantially similar, Sullivan v. Jones, 42 Va.App. 794, 802, 595 S.E.2d 36, 40 (2004), [a] plea in bar presents a distinct issue of fact which, if proven, creates a bar to the plaintiff's right of recovery. The moving party has the burden of proof on that issue. Hilton v. Martin, 275 Va. 176, 179-80, 654 S.E.2d 572, 574 (2008). A circuit court's judgment that a party has met his burden of proof will be upheld unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Hudson v. Lanier, 255 Va. 330, 333-34, 497 S.E.2d 471, 473 (1998); see also Upper Occoquan Sewage Auth. v. Blake Constr. Co., 266 Va. 582, 590-92, 587 S.E.2d 721, 725-26 (2003) (reversing judgment on a plea in bar that the court sustained without evidence to support it). Gadams and Marathon argue that Station #2's breach of contract claim is barred by the statute of frauds. [9] However, they have failed to prove that the statute applies. They argue that Station # 2 needed an easement to install the soundproofing material in the void space. However, they did not prove that 237 Granby owned the void space. [10] Based upon these facts we conclude that Station #2 merely needed a license, i.e., permission to enter the second story for the purpose of installing the soundproofing material. [11] Permission to enter the real property of another does not rise to the level of an easement. An easement concerns the continuing use of real property. Russakoff v. Scruggs, 241 Va. 135, 138, 400 S.E.2d 529, 531 (1991) (Easements are ... the privilege to use the land of another in a particular manner and for a particular purpose. (quoting Brown v. Haley, 233 Va. 210, 216, 355 S.E.2d 563, 567-68 (1987)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also United States v. Blackman, 270 Va. 68, 76, 613 S.E.2d 442, 445 (2005) (Easements are described as being `affirmative' easements when they convey privileges on the part of one person ... to use the land of another.... Easements are described as being `negative' when they convey rights to demand that the owner ... refrain from certain otherwise permissible uses of his own land.). Permission merely to enter the real property of another without such continuing use is a license. Stanley v. Mullins, 187 Va. 193, 200, 45 S.E.2d 881, 885 (1948); Power v. Tazewells, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 786, 790 (1875). [T]he grant of an easement is embraced within the statute of frauds, and therefore must be in writing. Buckles-Irvine Coal Co. v. Kennedy Coal Corp., 134 Va. 1, 15, 114 S.E. 233, 237 (1922) (quoting Wynn v. Garland, 19 Ark. 23, 34 (1857)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, it has long been established that a license may be granted orally without violating the rule. Power, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) at 790. The record establishes nothing more than that 237 Granby owned the upper stories. Moreover, the parties agree that the circuit court did not determine the ownership of the void space. Without establishing 237 Granby as the owner, Gadams and Marathon failed to show there was any real property in their possession and control that Station # 2 would need to use. Absent such a showing, Station # 2 required no more than their permission to enter the second story. Gadams and Marathon did not prove that the agreement required more than the grant of a license to which the statute of frauds does not apply. The circuit court erred in sustaining their plea in bar because there is no evidence to support it. We will reverse and remand for trial on Station # 2's breach of contract claim. [12]