Opinion ID: 2792926
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The statute of conviction is overbroad and

Text: divisible. We employ the “categorical approach” set forth in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), to determine whether a prior state court conviction qualifies as a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines. Under the Taylor framework, we determine whether the statute of conviction is categorically a “crime of violence” by comparing the elements of the statute of conviction with the generic federal definition. United States v. Caceres-Olla, 738 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2013). If the statute of conviction is broader than the generic federal definition, we must determine whether the statute of conviction is divisible. Alvarado v. Holder, 759 F.3d 1121, 1126 (9th Cir. 2014). A divisible statute is one that “‘comprises multiple, alternative versions of the crime,’ at least one of which ‘correspond[s] to the generic offense.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2284–85). If the statute of conviction is divisible, then under the “modified categorical approach” we may examine a limited class of judicially noticeable documents to determine whether the alternative corresponding to the generic offense was the basis of the conviction. United States v. GonzalezMonterroso, 745 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2014). When a defendant’s conviction was based on a guilty plea, such documents include the “charging document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the defendant assented.” Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005). The documents must show that the defendant “necessarily admitted [the] elements of the generic offense.” Id. at 26; see 10 UNITED STATES V. SAHAGUN-GALLEGOS also United States v. Marcia-Acosta, No. 13-10475, — F.3d —, 2015 WL 1283771, at –5 (9th Cir. Mar. 23, 2015). In this case, Sahagun-Gallegos was convicted of violating A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2). A.R.S. § 13-1204(A)(2) provides: “A person commits aggravated assault if the person commits assault as prescribed by § 13-1203” and “the person uses a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.” A.R.S. § 131203(A) defines “assault” as follows: A person commits assault by:
causing any physical injury to another person; or
reasonable apprehension of imminent physical injury; or
the intent to injure, insult or provoke such person. The parties agree that A.R.S. § 13-1203(A) is overbroad because the definition of “assault” in subsection (1) encompasses acts done with ordinary recklessness, whereas a “crime of violence” requires a mens rea of at least heightened recklessness. See United States v. GomezHernandez, 680 F.3d 1171, 1175 (9th Cir. 2012). The parties also agree that A.R.S. § 13-1203(A) is divisible. See United States v. Cabrera-Perez, 751 F.3d 1000, 1004–05 (9th Cir. UNITED STATES V. SAHAGUN-GALLEGOS 11 2014).3 Finally, the parties agree that, under Cabrera-Perez, an aggravated assault predicated on A.R.S. § 13-1203(A)(2) is a “crime of violence,” specifically, an offense “that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.”4