Opinion ID: 421082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: labor protective conditions

Text: 148 In reviewing a railroad merger, the ICC must consider, as part of its public interest determination, the interest of carrier employees affected by the proposed transaction. 49 U.S.C. § 11,344(b)(1)(D). Moreover, id. § 11,347 requires the ICC to protect displaced employees: 149 When a rail carrier is involved in a transaction for which approval is sought under [§ 11,344], the Interstate Commerce Commission shall require the carrier to provide a fair arrangement ... [for] employees who are affected by the transaction .... Notwithstanding this [Act], the arrangement may be made by the rail carrier and the authorized representative of its employees. 150 The Commission provided suitable arrangements for Maine Central and Boston & Maine employees. It did not consider the interests of, nor provide protection for, employees of competing railroads who may lose their jobs as a result of traffic diversions. See Boston & Maine Merger, 366 I.C.C. at 344. Lamoille Valley asserts that this was error. We affirm the Commission's interpretation of §§ 11,344(b)(4) and 11,347 as requiring it to protect only employees of the merging railroads and not employees of other railroads. 151 First, the ICC's interpretation of the language of § 11,347 is sensible. The second sentence of § 11,347 provides that the arrangement may be made by the rail carrier and the authorized representative of its employees. (Emphasis added.) The phrase the rail carrier presumably refers back to the preceding sentence and thus includes only a rail carrier ... involved in the transaction. But an arrangement between a rail carrier involved in the transaction and its employees will not protect employees of other carriers. Thus, Congress must not have contemplated protecting employees of nonapplicant railroads. As for § 11,344(b)(4), it was first enacted at the same time as § 11,347, and the two sections should be construed in pari materia. 152 The legislative history of § 11,347 strongly supports this interpretation. See Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad v. United States, 632 F.2d 392, 411-12 (5th Cir.1980) (reviewing the legislative history), aff'g Burlington Northern--Control--St. Louis-S.F., supra note 37, 360 I.C.C. at 948-50, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017, 101 S.Ct. 3004, 69 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981). 59 153 Second, while there may be policy reasons for treating all railroad employees alike regardless of their employer, the Commission's interpretation is supported by considerations of practicality and administrative [229 U.S.App.D.C. 46] economy. As the Commission explained in Burlington Northern, 360 I.C.C. at 949-50: 154 It is difficult enough to determine which employees of a railroad involved in the transaction have been adversely affected by that transaction. To require a determination that employees of another competing carrier have also been affected by a merger ... would place an impossible burden on the party required to rebut the allegation. 155 Third, the Commission has consistently interpreted § 11,347, since its original enactment in 1940, to exclude employees of non-applicant railroads. 60 That consistent interpretation is entitled to deference, especially since Congress implicitly approved that interpretation in revising and reenacting § 11,347 in 1976. 61 See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275, 94 S.Ct. 1757, 1762, 40 L.Ed.2d 134 (1974) (additional deference to an agency's statutory interpretation is due where Congress has reenacted the statute without pertinent change) (footnote omitted). 156 Finally, other courts that have addressed this issue have consistently approved the Commission's interpretation, including the only court to consider the issue since the 1976 amendments to the Interstate Commerce Act. See Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad v. United States, 632 F.2d 391, 411-12 (5th Cir.1980) (a thorough opinion on which our own analysis relies heavily), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1017, 101 S.Ct. 3004, 69 L.Ed.2d 388 (1981); Florida East Coast Railway v. United States, 259 F.Supp. 993, 1019 (M.D.Fla.1966) (3-judge court), aff'd mem. in part and appeal dismissed in relevant part as moot, 386 U.S. 544, 87 S.Ct. 1299, 18 L.Ed.2d 285 (1967); Railway Labor Executives' Association v. United States (RLEA 2d), 226 F.Supp. 521, 524-25 (E.D.Va.) (3-judge court), vacated and remanded per curiam, 379 U.S. 199, 85 S.Ct. 307, 13 L.Ed.2d 338 (1964). 62