Opinion ID: 3062121
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel

Text: Wilson makes two separate arguments in support of his contention that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. First, he contends that he was forced to choose between being represented by incompetent counsel and representing himself. He maintains that his appointed counsel refused to pursue his claims of selective and vindictive prosecution, so he was forced to proceed pro se in order to file his motions to dismiss the superseding indictment. But by Wilson’s own measure, this claim has no merit if this court affirms the district court’s denial of those motions. Therefore, we have no occasion to consider it further. Wilson’s second contention is that the district court failed to advise him, in connection with his request to proceed pro se at trial, of the potential penalties he was facing if he were convicted, including sentence enhancements and aggravating factors, possible consecutive sentences, and the use of uncharged conduct in sentencing, as well as possible defenses to the charges. Wilson asserts that his waiver of counsel was therefore not knowing and voluntary. When a defendant chooses to exercise his constitutional right to represent himself, his relinquishment of the benefits of representation by counsel must be knowing and intelligent. United States v. Turner, 287 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2002). And it is up to the trial judge to assure that the defendant’s waiver of counsel - 23 - is knowing and intelligent. Id. “However, there is no precise litany of questions that must be asked of defendants who choose self-representation.” Id. (quotation and brackets omitted). And reversal is not required “if the surrounding facts and circumstances indicate that the defendant understood his right to counsel and the difficulties of pro se representation.” Id. (quotation omitted). We review de novo the validity of a waiver of counsel, and we will not reverse the underlying factual findings absent clear error. See id. When Wilson moved to proceed pro se in the district court, the court held a hearing during which it carefully reviewed the charges against him and the possible penalties he would face for each offense. The court cautioned Wilson that if he chose to represent himself he would be proceeding against very experienced prosecutors; that the court would not advise him with regard to how to try the case or positions he should take; that it would apply to him the same evidentiary and legal rules it would apply to the prosecution; and that he would have to make decisions about what defenses he wanted to present, including any defenses to the merits of the charges if his pro se motions to dismiss the superseding indictment were not successful. As to each of the court’s cautionary statements, Wilson affirmatively stated his understanding. The district court ultimately advised Wilson of its opinion that he would be better off being represented by counsel, but he persisted in his wish to represent himself. We conclude, based on the record, that Wilson understood his right to counsel and that he effectively waived that right. - 24 - 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Establish that the Victim Banks Were Federally Insured To support a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1344(1), “the government must prove that: (1) the defendant knowingly executed or attempted to execute a scheme or artifice to defraud a financial institution; (2) the defendant had the intent to defraud a financial institution; and (3) the bank involved was federally insured.” United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1223 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Wilson contends that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to establish that the victim banks were federally insured at the time of the alleged crimes. The government notes that Wilson does not point in the record to where he raised this issue in the district court. This court applies a “waiver rule,” under which “we review for plain error where a defendant appeals the sufficiency of the evidence based upon an argument that he failed to make or reaffirm before the district court. Our plain error analysis in this context, however, is essentially the same as our usual sufficiency-of-the-evidence analysis.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted). “Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, given the direct and circumstantial evidence, along with reasonable inferences therefrom, taken in a light most favorable to the government.” Id. at 1222 (quotations omitted). The bank-fraud charges in this case related to ELCU and Chase, and the government presented testimony from representatives of each of these banks that its deposits were federally insured. Wilson argues that the evidence failed to establish that the banks were federally - 25 - insured at the time of the offenses, but that was a reasonable inference the jury could make based upon the witnesses’ testimony. Therefore, Wilson’s insufficientevidence contention is without merit. 4. Denial of Rule 29 Motion Wilson argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for acquittal under Fed. R. Crim. P. 29. But rather than making any argument in his appeal brief, he refers the court to the arguments he made in the trial court. This is not acceptable appellate argument. Tenth Circuit Rule 28.4 provides, “Incorporating by reference portions of district court or agency briefs or pleadings is disapproved and does not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 28(a) and (b).” Wilson argues in his reply brief that he was not able to present a detailed argument on this issue until March 20, 2012, the date he says he received a copy of the record on appeal. But that assertion fails to excuse his decision not to comply with the court rules, because he submitted his deficient argument to the court on April 5, 2012. We hold that Wilson has waived appellate consideration of the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 motion.