Opinion ID: 2342099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Motions for Judgments of Acquittal

Text: One of the oddities of our practice is that by virtue of the Constitution of Maryland (1867) Art. XV, § 5, In the trial of all criminal cases, the Jury shall be the Judges of Law, as well as of fact. The history of this provision is treated in Wyley v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 372 F.2d 742 (4th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 863, 88 S.Ct. 121, 19 L.Ed.2d 131 (1967). An amendment to our Constitution, which became effective 1 December 1950, left the basic concept undisturbed but added the proviso, except that the Court may pass upon the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction. Prior to the adoption of this amendment, this Court had no power to review the sufficiency of evidence on appeal of a criminal case tried to a jury. Compare Brown v. State, 237 Md. 492, 499, 207 A.2d 103 (1965) and Giles v. State, 229 Md. 370, 384, 183 A.2d 359 (1962) with Slansky v. State, 192 Md. 94, 63 A.2d 599 (1949). The amendment had been implemented by Chapter 596 of the Laws of 1949, now Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol., 1970 Cum. Supp.) Art. 27, § 593: § 593. Jury to be judges of law and fact; motion for judgment of acquittal on ground of insufficiency of evidence. In the trial of all criminal cases, the jury shall be the judges of law, as well as of fact, except that at the conclusion of the evidence for the State a motion for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts, or on one or more degrees of an offense, may be made by an accused on the ground that the evidence is insufficient in law to justify his conviction as to any such count or degree. If the motion is denied, he may offer evidence on his own behalf without having reserved the right to do so, but by so doing, he withdraws his motion. The motion may be made at the close of all the evidence whether or not such motion was made at the conclusion of the evidence for the State. If the motion is denied the defendant may have a review of such ruling on appeal. and by Rule 755: Rule 755. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal. a. Supersedes Motion for Directed Verdict. The motion for a directed verdict of not guilty and the motion for an instruction that the evidence is insufficient in law to sustain a conviction are abolished and the motion for judgment of acquittal shall be used in their place. b. When Made. A motion for judgment of acquittal on one or more counts, or on one or more degrees of an offense, may be made by an accused at the close of the evidence offered by the State, or may be made at the close of all the evidence, whether or not such motion was made at the close of the evidence offered by the State. If the motion is not granted at the close of the evidence offered by the State, the accused may offer evidence without having reserved the right to do so, but by so doing, he withdraws his motion. c. Action by Court. If the court on such motion or on its own motion determines that a judgment of acquittal should be granted, it shall direct the clerk to enter a judgment of acquittal on one or more counts, or one or more degrees of an offense which by law is divided into degrees, and to note that it has been entered by the direction of the court. If the case is tried before a jury it shall not be necessary for the jury by its foreman, or otherwise, to render a verdict. which taken together, permit a defendant in a criminal case being tried before a jury to move for a judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence offered by the State and again at the close of all the evidence, and in the event the motion is denied, the ruling may be reviewed on appeal, Gray v. State, 254 Md. 385, 255 A.2d 5 (1969). As a practical matter this permits the court to which an appeal is taken to pass on the sufficiency of the evidence, Giles v. State, supra . The function of the appellate court is limited, however. It does not inquire into and measure the weight of the evidence to ascertain whether the State has proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, Brown v. State, supra, 237 Md. at 497 but merely ascertains whether there is any relevant evidence, properly before the jury, legally sufficient to sustain a conviction, Pressley v. State, 244 Md. 664, 667, 224 A.2d 866 (1966); Royal v. State, 236 Md. 443, 448, 204 A.2d 500 (1964); Tull v. State, 230 Md. 596, 604, 188 A.2d 150 (1963); Lee v. State, 224 Md. 260, 167 A.2d 595 (1961); Drouin v. State, 222 Md. 271, 288, 160 A.2d 85 (1960); Wright v. State, 219 Md. 643, 652, 150 A.2d 733 (1959); Briley v. State, 212 Md. 445, 447, 129 A.2d 689 (1957). The application of this approach to the case before us is a simple one. If the jury chose to believe the State's witnesses and disbelieve the testimony of the defendants and their witnesses, as it obviously did, there was evidence legally sufficient to sustain the convictions. Under its view of the case, the Court of Special Appeals never reached the question of the sufficiency of the evidence per se. The offense of perjury consists of swearing falsely and corruptly, without probable cause of belief. To be willful, the false oath must be deliberate and not the result of surprise, confusion or bona fide mistake, Brown v. State, 225 Md. 610, 171 A.2d 456 (1961); 3 Wharton, Criminal Law and Procedure §§ 1290, 1291 (Anderson ed. 1957); Code (1957, 1967 Repl. Vol.) Art. 27, §§ 435, 437. Maryland no longer requires that perjury be established by the direct testimony of two witnesses, as was the case at common law. It is enough that there is testimony of one witness and other independent corroborative evidence is of such a nature so as to be of equal weight to that of at least a second witness, thus foreclosing any reasonable hypothesis other than the defendant's guilt. Brown v. State, supra, 225 Md. at 616. Subornation of perjury is the procurement of another to make a false oath, Code, Art. 27, § 438. Since subornation is, in substance, the same as perjury, the same proof of the perjured statement is required together with proof that the statement was procured by the accused, Hammer v. United States, 271 U.S. 620, 628, 46 S.Ct. 603, 70 L.Ed. 1118 (1926), but see Boddie and Brooks v. State, 6 Md. App. 523, 535, 252 A.2d 290 (1969). Devers called Webster as a witness in the earlier trial, certainly knowing that Webster would testify about the plane trip, which Devers then substantiated by his own testimony. There was evidence, if believed, sufficient to sustain the convictions. There remains, of course, the question of Judge Bowie's remarks during the conference in chambers. The Court of Special Appeals took these as an indication that Judge Bowie meant that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. [1] We do not read them in quite the same way. To us it seems obvious that Judge Bowie was irked by the fact that the State's Attorney's office had permitted itself to become embroiled in what he regarded as no more than a family quarrel, which had aroused hard feelings. Because he had sat in the earlier cases, where he had entered judgments of acquittal in three of the cases and the jury had returned a not guilty verdict in the fourth, Judge Bowie preferred that the perjury and subornation of perjury cases go to the jury no matter what. The fact that Judge Bowie thought the jury would acquit was a conclusion based on his own appraisal of the weight of the evidence and the credibility to be given the witnesses, a function which was exclusively that of the jury. As it turned out, the jury looked at it differently. There is no suggestion that it was his conclusion that there was no evidence, if believed by the jury, sufficient to sustain a conviction. This is essentially what Judge Bowie was saying when he denied the motions for judgments of acquittal: Well, we think that nevertheless that has created a question of fact which the jury must resolve as we had indicated in chambers when we were on the record. [2] We feel that this case does present a question for the jury, a question of fact to determine whether or not the defendants are guilty as charged. and at the hearing on the motion for a new trial repeated that the court could not substitute its opinion for that of the jury.