Opinion ID: 1318702
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: New Causes of Action.

Text: The dissent begins by contending that the majority has interpreted the Idaho Tort Claims Act as creating a new cause of actionthe negligent supervision of a probationer. This, the dissent argues, the Act forbids. The dissent misconstrues the majority opinion. Nowhere does the majority hold that the Act creates the tort of negligent supervision, and in no way can the Act be viewed as creating this tort or any other tort. What the majority opinion does say about Idaho's Act, and what the United States Supreme Court has said about the Federal Act, is simply that with the enactment of these two Acts, the Idaho legislature and Congress both intended to make governmental entities responsible for their conduct in certain circumstances, whereas in the past they had enjoyed absolute immunity. [4] Thus, it is easy to understand why the Supreme Court found this change in the law by Congress novel and unprecedented, Rayonier, supra, 352 U.S. at 319, 77 S.Ct. at 377, given the fact that up to the enactment of the Federal Act, federal government entities enjoyed absolute immunity. This same reasoning applies to the Idaho Act and the Idaho legislature's intent. Clearly, the majority has not created a new tort out of the Idaho Act, but merely made the state liable for the same torts as are private persons and entities. The dissent's characterization of what the majority has said on this point is therefore erroneous. The dissent's reliance upon I.C. § 6-903(f) also is groundless. That section is clear and straightforward. It states in pertinent part: [N]othing in this act shall enlarge or otherwise adversely affect the liability of an employee or a governmental entity. Any immunity or other bar to a civil lawsuit under Idaho or federal law shall remain in effect. What the first sentence of § 6-903(f) does is prohibit the creation of causes of action based on the fact that the defendant is a governmental entity. In other words, the viability of a cause of action will not be dependent upon whether the defendant is a private individual or a public entity. The second sentence simply makes clear that Idaho's Act does not preempt other specific grants of immunity. For example, I.C. § 20-231 specifically immunizes public entities and public employees from injuries resulting from a decision either to place a prisoner on parole or to revoke a prisoner's grant of parole. Thus, pursuant to § 6-903(f), that specific grant of immunity is valid regardless of the scope of liability under the Act. The dissent misunderstands both what the majority and the Supreme Court have said regarding the changes wrought by the respective tort claims acts, and also what § 6-903(f) states. The novelty of the acts is that they made formerly immune governmental entities responsible for their conduct; tort law itself remained unchanged. If there be anything novel and unprecedented relative to this issue, it rests solely in the dissent's reasoning process.