Opinion ID: 2529828
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether a Resentencing Court May Reconsider a Defendant's Sentence at a Resentencing to Correct a Sparber Error

Text: Defendants read Sparber to direct or empower judges to revisit the propriety of a defendant's sentence as a wholeboth the incarceratory and PRS componentswhen resentencing to correct a Sparber error. While there is, at least arguably, isolated language in Sparber which lends itself to this interpretation (principally, our single use of the word vacate in the body of the opinion), this is clearly not what we meant. If it had, in fact, been what we intended, we surely would have expressed an unambiguous holding to this effect rather than risk creating a situation where thousands of Sparber resentencings might have to be repeated. We start with the proposition that a Sparber error amounts only to a procedural error, akin to a misstatement or clerical error, which the sentencing court [can] easily remedy ( Sparber, 10 NY3d at 472 [emphasis added]). In support of this statement, we cited People v DeValle (94 NY2d 870 [2000]), People v Wright (56 NY2d 613, 614 [1982]) and People v Minaya (54 NY2d 360 [1981]). We did not suggest in these cases that the sentencing judge was supposed to do anything at resentencing other than correct the discrete error prompting the resentencing in the first place ( see also People v Yannicelli, 40 NY2d 598, 602 [1976] [it was error for the trial court to revisit the defendant's entire sentence when a procedural mistake in imposing a fine was the sole defect in the original sentencing and thus the only reason why resentencing was ordered]; People v Harrington, 21 NY2d 61 [1967] [although the order, in form, was vacated by reason of a ministerial error, the reason for the remand was merely to correct this mistake and therefore the net sentence should not have been changed]). In Sparber, the defendants urged us to fix the pronouncement mistake, the only harm they alleged, by striking PRS from their sentences. We rejected this proposed remedy, deciding instead to remit their cases to Supreme Court for resentencing and the proper judicial pronouncement of the relevant PRS terms  (10 NY3d at 465 [emphasis added]). Accordingly, we declared that [t]he sole remedy for a procedural error such as this is to vacate the sentence and remit for a resentencing hearing so that the trial judge can make the required pronouncement  ( id. at 471 [emphasis added]). In the decretal paragraph itself, we directed that the order of the Appellate Division should be modified by remitting to Supreme Court for a resentencing hearing that will include the proper pronouncement of the relevant PRS term ( id. at 473 [emphasis added]). By contrast, we have explained the required corrective action in far more general language when remitting for a resentencing requiring the exercise of discretion. For example, in People v Yancy (86 NY2d 239, 247 [1995]) the sentencing court mistakenly believed that the defendant was a predicate felon. Accordingly, in the decretal paragraph we modified the Appellate Division's order by vacating defendant's sentence, and ... remitt[ing the case] to Supreme Court, New York County, for resentencing. ( Id. ) Because the sentencing court in Yancy considered inappropriate factors in fashioning the sentence, resentencing logically entailed general, plenary proceedings. But in Sparber, the sentencing court merely failed to articulate properly the altogether appropriate sentence that it intended to impose. As a result, resentencing is limited to remedying this specific procedural errori.e., to mak[ing] the required pronouncement (10 NY3d at 471). Put another way, resentencing to set right the flawed imposition of PRS at the original sentencing is not a plenary proceeding.