Opinion ID: 1684876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reference to Appellant's Prior Incarceration

Text: Appellant's first allegation of error stems from a statement made during Mrs. Anderson's testimony. On direct examination, the prosecutor asked Mrs. Anderson how long she and her husband had known Appellant. She responded: When I moved here, we didn't know him. He hadn't been out of prison that long. Appellant's lawyer immediately objected and a bench conference ensued. The trial court began the conference by acknowledging that the statement was inadmissible and asking Appellant's lawyer whether he wanted an admonition. Appellant's lawyer told the court that he wanted an admonition that would not identify the inadmissible portion of the statement. The trial court told him that it would be difficult to craft such an admonition because the rest of Mrs. Anderson's statement was admissible. Appellant's lawyer then requested a mistrial, but the trial court denied the motion and asked again whether Appellant wanted an admonition. Appellant's lawyer responded: I don't think I want an admonition. The trial court then asked the prosecutor to instruct Mrs. Anderson not to say anything further about Appellant's prior incarceration. The prosecutor did so and the trial continued. Appellant now claims that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant his motion for a mistrial. Mrs. Anderson's statement was evidence that Appellant had previously been arrested for a crime different from the one for which he was standing trial. Evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible, [4] though such evidence is admissible (1) if offered for a purpose other than proving a person's character in order to show action in conformity therewith, e.g., to prove motive, intent, opportunity, et cetera, [5] or (2) if the evidence is so inextricably intertwined with other evidence essential to the case. . . . [6] Mrs. Anderson's statement was not offered pursuant to nor does it fall under either exception, and, as such, the statement was inadmissible. Although we find that Mrs. Anderson's statement was inadmissible, we disagree with Appellant's suggested conclusion and hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. We have long held that an admonition is usually sufficient to cure an erroneous admission of evidence, [7] and there is a presumption that the jury will heed such an admonition. [8] A trial court only declares a mistrial if a harmful event is of such magnitude that a litigant would be denied a fair and impartial trial and the prejudicial effect could be removed in no other way. [9] Stated differently, the court must find a manifest, urgent, or real necessity for a mistrial. [10] The trial court has broad discretion in determining when such a necessity exists because the trial judge is best situated intelligently to make such a decision. [11] The trial court's decision to deny a motion for a mistrial should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. [12] First we note that Mrs. Anderson's statement was, in part, non-responsive to the prosecutor's question. We noted in Phillips v. Commonwealth [13] that [w]here evidence of other crimes is introduced into evidence through the non-responsive answer of a witness, this court must look at all of the evidence and determine whether the defendant has been unduly prejudiced by that isolated statement. [14] In Phillips , a First-Degree Rape trial, the victim gave unsolicited testimony that informed the jury that Phillips had previously escaped from prison. [15] Phillips objected and moved for a mistrial, and although the trial court found the statement inadmissible, it refused to declare a mistrial. [16] On appeal, we affirmed the order of the trial court because we did not believe, in view of all of the evidence presented by the Commonwealth, that Phillips was unduly prejudiced by the victim's comment. [17] The facts here are similar to those in Phillips . As in Phillips , Appellant appeals from the trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial on the grounds that evidence of a prior crime was introduced through the non-responsive answer of a witness for the prosecution. In both cases, the statement complained of came from the victim, and, in both cases, the victim supplied other crucial testimony without which a conviction would not have been possible, meaning that the jury was forced to determine whether it found the victim more credible than the defendant. But just as an isolated, non-responsive reference to prior crimes was insufficient to create a manifest necessity for a mistrial in Phillips , the reference here was also insufficient. We have also previously held in Graves v. Commonwealth [18] that an admonition to the jury cures an unsolicited reference to prior criminal acts. In Graves , a witness made a veiled reference to the appellant's prior criminal conviction by saying, I knew he wasn't supposed to have a gun. [19] We noted that the reference was sufficiently oblique that its implications probably escaped the notice of the jury. [20] Nevertheless, we also held that even an unambiguous reference would not have necessitated a mistrial because this type of evidentiary error is easily cured by an admonition to the jury to disregard the testimony, [21] but that the appellant did not request an admonition. [22] Similarly, the proper remedy in this case was an admonition. And indeed, the trial court offered to give an admonition, but Appellant refused the offer. The trial court was not required to give Appellant extraordinary relief simply because he refused the offer of another legally sufficient remedy. The trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial was not an abuse of discretion.