Opinion ID: 70412
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ostrout

Text: 11 Appellee I.K. Ostrout was a correctional officer at MCI in late 1990. Appellant alleges that Ostrout cited him for two disciplinary violations because of his race and because of his prior litigation activities. Although the prison disciplinary review board found Appellant not guilty of one of the violations Ostrout documented, Appellant was found guilty of making spoken threats, resulting in the suspension of Appellant's recreational privileges. Ostrout denies that he cited Appellant for improper reasons and maintains that he never made racist statements or indicated a desire to retaliate against Appellant. 12 As explained above, Appellant's allegation of retaliation states a valid First Amendment claim. In addition, the allegations against Ostrout state an independent Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim. Under the Equal Protection Clause, prisoners have a right to be free from racial discrimination. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 83-85, 107 S.Ct. at 2259; Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333, 88 S.Ct. 994, 19 L.Ed.2d 1212 (1968). 13 In considering the joint motion for summary judgment, the magistrate judge apparently overlooked the affidavits of two MCI inmates. These documents corroborate Appellant's version of the events of November 1990 which led to Appellant's citation by Ostrout. Both affidavits state that Ostrout used racist language when referring to Appellant. The affidavits also attribute statements to Ostrout that, if true, would clearly indicate that he filed disciplinary reports against Appellant in retaliation for Appellant's earlier litigation. Finally, the inmates' affidavits dispute Ostrout's contention that Appellant threatened him. In sum, the two inmate affidavits, if credited by the trier of fact, provide evidence to support both Appellant's allegation of retaliation in violation of the First Amendment and his allegation of racial discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 14 The issue of discriminatory intent is a question for the trier of fact. Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-91, 102 S.Ct. 1781, 1790-91, 72 L.Ed.2d 66 (1982); Beckwith v. City of Daytona Beach Shores, 58 F.3d 1554, 1560 (11th Cir.1995). Direct evidence of an illegal motive will usually suffice to create a genuine issue of fact and preclude summary judgment. See Swint v. City of Wadley, Alabama, 51 F.3d 988, 1000 (11th Cir.1995) (single witness testimony regarding a defendant-officer's racist remark was sufficient to preclude summary judgment). Even if the district court believes that all the evidence presented by one side is of doubtful veracity, it is not proper to grant summary judgment on the basis of such credibility choices. See Perry v. Thompson, 786 F.2d 1093, 1095 (11th Cir.1986). 15 With the foregoing principles in mind, we conclude that the district court erred by granting summary judgment for Ostrout. We make no comment on the ultimate merits of the claims against Officer Ostrout. We merely hold that when a civil rights plaintiff provides the type of direct evidence of a defendant's illegal motive that Appellant has in this case, summary judgment is not appropriate.