Opinion ID: 2973072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Young’s Appeal of His Convictions

Text: -4- Nos. 04-5677/04-5704/04-5678 United States v. Williams Young argues that the district court erred by denying his pretrial request for the disclosure of the identities of confidential informants that the government relied upon in its affidavit supporting a request for authorization of electronic surveillance. Because defendant did not renew his objection at trial, the standard of review is plain error. See United States v. Kelly, 204 F.3d 652, 655 (6th Cir. 2000) (motion in limine is insufficient to preserve objection absent contemporaneous objection); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). Plain error involves a legal error that is obvious and that affects substantial rights. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-34 (1993). Defendant has the burden of showing prejudice. Id. at 734. When deciding whether a defendant is entitled to disclosure of the identities of confidential informants, the trial court must “balanc[e] the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense.” United States v. Moore, 954 F.2d 379, 381 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 62 (1957)). The defendant must demonstrate that disclosure is essential to a fair trial. Id. While Young raises the possibility of having private detectives investigate the informants, he fails to demonstrate how not disclosing the informants affected the outcome of the proceedings. Accordingly, we decline to reverse the denial of disclosure of the identities of the confidential informants.
Young asserts that the district court erred when it denied a pretrial motion to strike his “Capone” alias from the indictment and to exclude mention of the alias during trial. According to Young, he was identified at trial by twenty-six witnesses, and of those, three referred to him only by his street name, and just three co-defendants referred to him by both his street name and his given -5- Nos. 04-5677/04-5704/04-5678 United States v. Williams name. The alias is also used in the undercover videotapes of the gang’s meetings, which the government introduced at trial. As mentioned earlier, each meeting began with a ritual in which each member identified himself by his alias and his rank in the gang. A motion to strike surplusage from the indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 7(d) is subject to the district court’s discretion. United States v. Kemper, 503 F.2d 327, 329 (6th Cir. 1974) (citing Dranow v. United States, 307 F.2d 545, 558 (8th Cir. 1962)). With respect to the introduction of the alias at trial, the district court’s ruling under Rule 403 is likewise reviewed for abuse of discretion. As a general rule, we disfavor the use of aliases in indictments and at trial, and permit their use only when they are relevant to identify the defendant. United States v. Wilkerson, 456 F.2d 57, 59 (6th Cir. 1972). In this case, the district court found that Young’s alias was relevant because the conspirators referred to each other by aliases, aliases appeared in videotapes that the government used at trial, and some witnesses knew the defendants by their aliases. Young argues that the government did not need to use his alias to connect him to the crime since so many witnesses identified him by his given name. While it is true that “use of an alias in an indictment and in evidence is permissible if it is necessary to connect the defendants with the acts charged,” United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 394 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Hines, 955 F.2d 1449, 1454 (11th Cir. 1992)), as long as the alias assists in identifying the defendant, it is relevant and admissible. Here, the government introduced undercover videotapes of gang meetings in which members identified themselves by their aliases. Moreover, some witnesses knew defendant only by his alias. Because reference to the alias was relevant to identify -6- Nos. 04-5677/04-5704/04-5678 United States v. Williams defendant, the only question is whether the reiteration of the alias was unduly prejudicial. Our review of the trial transcript convinces us that the government did not emphasize the alias in a way that would predispose the jury against Young or suggest improper character inferences. See Wilkerson, 456 F.2d at 59 (finding non-prejudicial error when prosecutor inflamed jury by commenting in closing argument that people with nothing to hide do not use aliases). In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to this ruling.