Opinion ID: 2636190
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 1: District courts have jurisdiction to correct purported illegal sentences when the illegality favors the defendant.

Text: McCarley generally adopts the position of the Court of Appeals majority opinion. The majority first held that the State had no right to appeal the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence under K.S.A. 21-4721(e)(3) (appellate court may review a claim that the sentencing court erred in ranking the crime severity level of the current crime). It correctly noted that the statute deals with appeals; neither party had preserved a direct appeal of the sentence. The majority ultimately allowed the appeal under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3), however, by construing the State's motion and argument as a question reserved. Included in the reserved question was whether the sentence was illegal. 38 Kan.App.2d at 171, 166 P.3d 418. With this framework in mind, the Court of Appeals majority then held that the sentence was not illegal under K.S.A. 22-3504(1) for any of the three reasons recognized by case law. See, e.g., State v. Nash, 281 Kan. 600, Syl. ¶ 1, 133 P.3d 836 (2006). First, it was not imposed by a court without jurisdiction. Second, the sentence did not fail to conform with the offense of aggravated battery as to its character and term of punishment authorized. Third, the sentence was not ambiguous as to time or manner in which it was to be served. The majority further held that even if the sentence were illegal, the State had agreed to the severity level; the doctrine of invited error therefore precluded any challenge. McCarley, 38 Kan. App.2d at 176-77, 166 P.3d 418. Judge Knudson dissented, for reasons the State generally adopts on appeal to this court. He opined that because an illegal sentence was alleged, this court had jurisdiction to review under State v. Vanwey, 262 Kan. 524, Syl. ¶ 1, 941 P.2d 365 (1997), thereby rendering unnecessary the majority's characterization and discussion as a question reserved. He further opined that an illegal sentence had been imposed, suggesting that the trial court had no jurisdiction and expressly concluding that the sentence failed to conform to the one required for the conviction of record, i.e., level 5 aggravated battery. He contended that an illegal sentence may be corrected at any time; that the doctrine of invited error was inapplicable because the sentence was illegal; and that there was no evidence to support an agreement to circumvent the jury verdict or the requirements of law. As discussed below, we specifically agree with the dissent's holding and generally with its rationale. Our agreement is primarily based upon two cases of this court: Chambers v. State, 199 Kan. 483, 430 P.2d 241 (1967), and Vanwey, 262 Kan. 524, 941 P.2d 365. They establish, among other things, that this court clearly has jurisdiction to consider the matter of McCarley's purported illegal sentence and further that his sentence indeed is illegal because it was imposed by a trial court without jurisdiction. In other words, we conclude that this court has jurisdiction to conclude that the trial court had no jurisdiction. In Chambers, this court addressed a fact pattern similar to that of the instant case: the trial court mistakenly imposed sentence on a crime for which the defendant was not convicted. There, the defendants pled guilty to robbery in the first degree. However, they were erroneously sentenced for burglary in the second degree: indeterminate sentences of 5-10 years. After the error was discovered, the defendants were brought back to the court for resentencing. The trial court set aside the sentences and resentenced for robbery: 10-21 years. Defendant Chambers later brought a motion under K.S.A. 60-1507 attacking the validity of the second sentence. This court affirmed the trial court's denial of his motion and made short work of his argument: The plaintiff next argues that once the court had imposed a sentence against him it could not later resentence him. This contention is without merit. The first sentence was void, since the penalty imposed was that required by law for second-degree burglary, not [first-degree] robbery. Accordingly, it was the court's clear duty to set the original sentence aside and impose a valid sentence. (Emphasis added.) 199 Kan. at 485, 430 P.2d 241. Thirty years after Chambers, this court in Vanwey dealt with a slightly different fact pattern. It provided a more complete framework than Chambers, however, for its analysis and holding-both of which are of use in the instant case. In Vanwey, the defendant committed a crime while on parole. The trial court properly made Vanwey's new sentence consecutive to the one originally imposed, as required under K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-4608. Three years later, the defense counsel and the prosecutor apparently agreed to a nunc pro tunc order correcting a clerical error because a sentencing mistake had allegedly been made. Per the court's order, the consecutive sentences became concurrent. The State later moved to set aside the order, arguing that the modification had been misrepresented as necessary to correct a clerical error and that the trial court had no jurisdiction to modify. The trial court denied the motion, ruling that relief would have to be through appeal. Vanwey, 262 Kan. at 526, 941 P.2d 365. As in the instant case, as a threshold matter Vanwey argued that the State simply was not permitted to appeal under these circumstances. This court rejected the argument. Among other things, it cited State v. Scherzer, 254 Kan. 926, 929-30, 869 P.2d 729 (1994), to confirm its statutory jurisdiction to consider the appeal: generally under K.S.A. 60-2101(b) (court has jurisdiction to correct, modify, vacate, or reverse any act, order, or judgment of a district court in order to assure that it is just, legal, and free of abuse) and specifically under K.S.A. 22-3504 (Furse) (illegal sentence may be corrected at any time). Similar to the instant case, this court further observed that the ultimate question was whether the trial court possessed jurisdiction to grant the nunc pro tunc order in the first place. Vanwey, 262 Kan. at 527, 941 P.2d 365. If the court did not, then the sentence was illegal and correctable by the Supreme Court. See State v. Ruff, 252 Kan. 625, 628, 847 P.2d 1258 (1993) (sentence illegal if, among other things, imposed by a court without jurisdiction). The Vanwey court then held that the trial court had no authority to modify the original sentence under the statutory subparagraph for correction of clerical errors, K.S.A. 22-3504(2) (Furse), because there was no clerical error. Moreover, the court held that the parties' agreement could not bring life into an order that was invalid because of the trial court's lack of jurisdiction: We conclude that parties agreeing to a nunc pro tunc order cannot invest the court with the power to change a sentence if the court otherwise lacks jurisdiction to do so. Vanwey, 262 Kan. at 528-29, 941 P.2d 365. After concluding that the trial court had no jurisdiction under 22-3504(2) to have corrected this sentence, and had no jurisdiction created by the parties' agreement, the Vanwey court looked for other jurisdiction created by statute. After noting that the sentencing of a criminal defendant is strictly controlled by statute in Kansas, the court held that the only apparent jurisdictional alternative, K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-4603(4)(a), was inapplicable because the modification had not occurred within 120 days of the original sentence. The Vanwey court further observed that the trial court not only lacked jurisdiction to modify Vanwey's 1992 sentence, but that imposing the sentences consecutively was itself required by statute. 262 Kan. at 529, 941 P.2d 365. See K.S.A.1991 Supp. 21-4608(3) ([a]ny person who is convicted and sentenced for a crime committed while on... parole ... for a felony shall serve the sentence consecutively to the term or terms under which the person was ... on parole). Finally, this court rejected Vanwey's argument that the court lacked jurisdiction to allow his sentence to be modified yet again because it was now running concurrently and the imposition of a consecutive sentence would be a harsher sentence. (Emphasis added.) 262 Kan. at 530, 941 P.2d 365. In rejecting this harsher consequences argument, the Vanwey court simply responded that a court has authority to reinstate an original sentence when a subsequent modification is illegal. 262 Kan. at 530, 941 P.2d 365. In sum, the Vanwey court held that the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the nunc pro tunc order. It reversed the trial court's refusal to set aside the order, and ordered reinstatement of the original 1992 sentence. A synthesis of the decisions in Chambers and Vanwey reveals several principles of guidance for the instant case. When a sentence is imposed for a crime for which the defendant was not convicted, but in fact is appropriate for another crime, this court has addressed the issue on the merits. See, e.g., Chambers, 199 Kan. 483, 430 P.2d 241. As a result, the issue is within the jurisdiction of this court to review. Cf. Vanwey, 262 Kan. 524, Syl. ¶ 1, 941 P.2d 365 (jurisdiction to consider the matter under 60-2101[b], which gives general statutory authority to correct, modify, vacate, or reverse any act, order, or judgment of a district court to assure that it is just, legal, and free of abuse, and 22-3504: court may correct illegal sentence, e.g., one issued by court without jurisdiction or without conforming with the offense as to character or term of punishment authorized). At a minimum, there is jurisdiction to review the sentence as a possibly illegal one. Whether a criminal sentence is illegal, e.g., imposed without jurisdiction, is a question of law with unlimited review. State v. Davis, 281 Kan. 169, 174, 130 P.3d 69 (2006). When a sentence is imposed for a crime for which the defendant was not convicted, but in fact is appropriate for another crime, such a sentence is void. Chambers, 199 Kan. at 485, 430 P.2d 241. Specifically, it is an illegal sentence because, at a minimum, it is imposed without trial court jurisdiction. Cf. Vanwey, 262 Kan. 524, 941 P.2d 365. Under these specific circumstances, the sentence must be set aside, and the defendant resentenced for the crime of actual conviction, i.e., a valid sentence. Chambers, 199 Kan. at 485, 430 P.2d 241; cf. Vanwey, 262 Kan. at 530, 941 P.2d 365 (court set aside illegal modification and reinstated original sentence). The fact that the new, and proper, sentence is more severe than the original, improper one is of no consequence. See Vanwey, 262 Kan. at 530, 941 P.2d 365 (court expressly rejecting this argument); see also Chambers, 199 Kan. at 484-85, 430 P.2d 241 (court approved imposing new sentence which increased original, improper sentence by years). The fact that the parties have agreed to a matter involving trial court jurisdiction is of no consequence, i.e., party agreement does not establish jurisdiction where it otherwise does not exist. See Vanwey, 262 Kan. at 528, 941 P.2d 365 (Nor does agreement of the parties and the presentation of an agreed order to the trial court [to change statutorily-mandated consecutive sentence to concurrent] bring life into an otherwise invalid action.); see also State v. Johnson, 283 Kan. 649, 156 P.3d 596 (2007) (defendant's agreement to jury instruction on questionable offense does not bar his later jurisdictional challenge claiming offense neither charged nor constituted lesser included offense of a charged offense). Similarly, the more inclusive doctrine of invited error is inapplicable because the alleged invited error leading to the illegal sentence concerns jurisdiction. See State v. Belcher, 269 Kan. 2, 9, 4 P.3d 1137 (2000). Not only is McCarley's sentence illegal because it was imposed by a court without jurisdiction, but as Judge Knudson observed in his dissent, it also is illegal for failing to conform to the statutory provision, either in the character or the term of the punishment authorized. See Nash, 281 Kan. at 601, 133 P.3d 836. We have repeatedly acknowledged that the sentencing of a criminal defendant is strictly controlled by statute. State v. Martin, 285 Kan. 735, 738, 175 P.3d 832 (2008); State v. Anthony, 274 Kan. 998, 999, 58 P.3d 742 (2002). Consistent with this acknowledgment, we held in Scherzer, 254 Kan. at 939, 869 P.2d 729, that the trial court did not have authority under K.S.A.1992 Supp. 21-3405b to allow the defendant to serve his required 90 days' imprisonment by house arrest. We declared the sentence imposed illegal because it did not conform to the statutory provision and remanded to the district court for correction, i.e., actual imprisonment in the county jail. 254 Kan. at 939, 869 P.2d 729; cf. Vanwey, 262 Kan. at 529-30, 941 P.2d 365 (in addition to lack of jurisdiction to modify sentence, trial court's modification of consecutive sentences to run concurrently was clearly contrary to statute requiring consecutive sentences). The trial court's sentence for a level 8 person felony does not conform to the statutory provision for a level 5 person felony, the offense of conviction. The trial court had no statutory authority to impose such a sentence. It is therefore illegal. See Nash, 281 Kan. at 601, 133 P.3d 836. As the State points out, the flip side is also true. While the sentence imposed was proper for a level 8 offense, the jury was not instructed on, nor was McCarley convicted of, a level 8 felony. It is fundamental that a defendant cannot be sentenced for a crime for which he or she has not been convicted. In sum, this court has authority to review the State's claim of an illegal sentence. The sentence imposed is illegal because it was imposed by a trial court without jurisdiction and because the sentence did not comport with the statutory provision in the character or term of the punishment authorized.