Opinion ID: 1199801
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for the Convictions

Text: (17a) Defendant contends in substance that the evidence is insufficient under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the due process clause of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution to support his convictions for rape and first degree murder. (18) In reviewing the sufficiency of evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and/or the due process clause of article I, section 15, the question we ask is `whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime'  and the identity of the criminal  `beyond a reasonable doubt.' ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 269, quoting Jackson v. Virginia (1979) 443 U.S. 307, 319 [61 L.Ed.2d 560, 573, 99 S.Ct. 2781], italics in original.) (17b) Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support either his rape or first degree murder conviction on the ground that it is inadequate to identify him as the perpetrator. In view of the evidence described above (see pt. I.A., ante ), a rational trier of fact could surely have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was in fact the perpetrator. One need only recall the evidence relating to defendant's pickup truck, its tires, and the tire tracks; defendant's shoes and the shoe prints; defendant's jewelry clasp; the abrasion on Hildreth's right cheek displaying a pattern similar to that of the sole of defendant's right shoe; the stain on the shoelace of defendant's right shoe apparently produced by Hildreth's blood; defendant's and Hildreth's pubic hairs found on the latter's body; Hildreth's right thumbprint on the inside surface of the passenger-door window of defendant's pickup truck; and defendant's self-incriminating statements to friends and acquaintances and to investigating law enforcement officers. Defendant argues to the contrary. To be sure, the inculpatory evidence is not without weaknesses in certain particulars, including the matter of time. But considered as a whole, it is altogether substantial. Defendant establishes nothing more than that some rational trier of fact might perhaps have declined to identify him as the perpetrator. That is not enough. (19) Defendant separately claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his rape conviction. In particular, he argues that evidence is lacking that he engaged in sexual intercourse with Hildreth, and specifically that he accomplished penetration; that he did so without her consent; and that he did so while she was alive. As charged here, [r]ape is an act of sexual intercourse ... with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator accomplished against a person's will by means of force or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another. (Pen. Code, former § 261, subd. (2), as amended by Stats. 1985, ch. 283, § 1, pp. 1307-1308; accord, Pen. Code, present § 261, subd. (a)(2); cf. id., § 262, subd. (a) [rape of spouse].) Any sexual penetration, however slight, is sufficient to complete the crime. ( Id., § 263.) Thus, for rape there must be, inter alia, an act of sexual intercourse with at least some penetration, involv[ing] a live victim [citation] who does not effectively consent [citation]. ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 269.) In view of the evidence described above, a rational trier of fact could certainly have found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant raped Hildreth. As to sexual intercourse with at least some penetration: Hildreth's vagina contained sperm cells. As to lack of consent: Hildreth's upper clothing had been pushed up above her chest toward her neck and the lower clothing had been pulled down around her left ankle; her right iliac or pelvic region had been abraded; and her vagina contained blood cells. As to vitality: all the injuries on Hildreth's body were ante mortem. Defendant's contrary argument again proves too little, establishing nothing more than that some rational trier of fact might perhaps have declined to find him guilty of rape. Notwithstanding his implication, the absence of genital trauma is not inconsistent with nonconsensual sexual intercourse. ( People v. Rowland, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 265.) And notwithstanding his assertion, in his summation the prosecutor did not concede lack of penetration. Defendant attempts to deny the existence of evidence that Hildreth's vagina contained sperm cells. He cannot succeed. As noted, a serologist testified that a vaginal swab revealed the presence of sperm cells, spermatozoa. That he also testified that the swab revealed the presence of only a very, very small amount of semen is without consequence here  especially in light of the fact that defendant had apparently ejaculated not long before the rape when he engaged in sexual intercourse with Pena. One point deserves special comment. Relying on the evidence referred to in the preceding paragraph and also on the fact that Hildreth's legs were spread apart in death, a rational trier of fact could have rejected, beyond a reasonable doubt, the following scenario that defendant suggests, to wit, that he engaged in consensual sexual intercourse and only thereafter turned to violence: such a trier could have concluded to the requisite degree of certainty that violence accompanied sex. (20a) Finally, defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his first degree murder conviction. The People prosecuted the case on two theories of first degree murder. The primary was felony-murder-rape. The secondary was willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. In his summation, the prosecutor all but expressly withdrew the latter. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being ... with malice aforethought. (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a).) As pertinent here, [a]ll murder which is perpetrated ... by any ... kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing ... is murder of the first degree.... (Pen. Code, § 189.) The mental state required is, of course, a deliberate and premeditated intent to kill with malice aforethought. (See id., §§ 187, subd. (a), 189.) Similarly, [a]ll murder ... which is committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, certain enumerated felonies, including rape, is murder of the first degree.... (Pen. Code, § 189.) (21) The mental state required is simply the specific intent to commit the underlying felony; neither intent to kill, deliberation, premeditation, nor malice aforethought is needed. (See, e.g., People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868-869 [236 P.2d 570]; see, generally, 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal. Criminal Law, supra, Crimes Against the Person, § 470, p. 528; see also People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 346 [253 Cal. Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289] [stating that [w]e have required as part of the felony-murder doctrine that the jury find the perpetrator had the specific intent to commit one of the enumerated felonies, even where that felony is a crime such as rape].) There is no requirement of a strict causal (e.g., People v. Ainsworth (1988) 45 Cal.3d 984, 1016 [248 Cal. Rptr. 568, 755 P.2d 1017]) or temporal (e.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348) relationship between the felony and the murder. All that is demanded is that the two are parts of one continuous transaction. (E.g., People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 1016; see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348.) There is, however, a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the underlying felony. (See, e.g., People v. Whitehorn (1963) 60 Cal.2d 256, 264 [32 Cal. Rptr. 199, 383 P.2d 783].) (20b) Defendant maintains that the evidence is insufficient as to the felony-murder-rape theory. In part, defendant argues that evidence is lacking for rape. He is unpersuasive. The analysis above proves the point. In other part, defendant argues that evidence is lacking for specific intent to commit the underlying felony of rape. Again, he is unpersuasive. A rational trier of fact could surely have found the requisite intent beyond a reasonable doubt. There are facts disclosing defendant's manifest desire to engage in sexual intercourse with any woman whom he could pick up: remember Pena. There are also facts disclosing Hildreth's manifest desire not to engage in sexual intercourse with him: remember the appearance and condition of her body when it was found. In still other part, defendant argues that the evidence failed to establish either an intent to kill or, if such intent existed, that it arose prior to conclusion of the rape. An intent to kill formed after termination of any actual or attempted rape, and unrelated to those offenses, would not support a felony-murder conviction.... Yet again, he is unpersuasive. Contrary to what appears to be his assumption, felony murder does not require intent to kill or a strict causal or temporal relationship between the felony and the murder. In any event, the relationship that a rational trier of fact could have discerned from the evidence is enough. [12] Defendant also maintains that the evidence is insufficient as to the willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder theory. This point need not be addressed. The conviction rests, at least, on the adequately supported felony-murder-rape theory. The fact is established by the jury's first degree murder and rape verdicts and its felony-murder-rape special-circumstance finding  which, under the instructions actually given, necessarily entail a unanimous determination of felony-murder-rape beyond a reasonable doubt. (Compare People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 351 [arriving at a similar conclusion on a similar record]; People v. Ainsworth, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 1015-1016 [same].) [13]