Opinion ID: 1141081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: limitation on udot's damages

Text: After the jury returned its verdict, UDOT filed a motion objecting to the $1,517,800 judgment against it. UDOT claimed that the judgment should be reduced pursuant to section 63-30-34(1) (1987) of the Government Immunity Act (the Act), which limits recovery against a government entity to $250,000. [20] McCorvey objected to any reduction, claiming that our ruling in Condemarin v. University Hospital [21] renders the damage recovery limitation in section 63-30-34(1) unconstitutional. After receiving memoranda and hearing oral argument on the subject, the trial court reduced the judgment to $250,000. On appeal, McCorvey again challenges the constitutionality of the damage cap. He argues that imposition of the cap violates his rights under article I, sections 7, 10, 11, and 24 of the Utah Constitution. [22] He relies primarily on Condemarin and asks this court to extend that decision to this case. In its memorandum decision, the trial court concluded that Condemarin hinged on a determination that a person injured by a government entity exercising a nonessential or proprietary function has a fundamental right to full recovery for his or her injuries. The trial court reasoned that because UDOT's road maintenance activities traditionally have been considered governmental, no fundamental right was involved and Condemarin's heightened constitutional analysis was inapplicable. We believe that the trial court's memorandum is well reasoned. Condemarin's holding that section 63-30-34(1) was unconstitutional as applied to the University Hospital was premised on the conclusion that the hospital exercised a proprietary or nonessential function for which a right to recover at common law existed. [23] Because section 63-30-34(1) abrogated the common law right to recover fully against a government entity engaged in a nonessential function, the cap violated the open courts clause. [24] That, in turn prompted the court to apply heightened scrutiny to the cap. [25] The government activity in question here is the maintenance of public roads. At common law, both the municipalities and the state were immune from lawsuits based on the negligent maintenance of public roads. [26] Such activity traditionally has been considered governmental. [27] Hence, there was no right at common law to recover for injury resulting therefrom. Under the Act, governmental entities performing government functions are immunized from suit under the general grant of immunity contained in section 63-30-3 (1989). [28] However, section 63-30-8 waives immunity for injury caused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any state highway. [29] The Act then limits that liability to $250,000 under section 63-30-34(1). Under our statutory scheme, the legislature actually created, rather than abrogated, a limited right of recovery against the state for negligent maintenance of its roadways. We find no constitutional infirmity with the Act as applied to the facts of this case. Because no right existed at common law to recover from the state for injuries arising out of the state's maintenance of public roadways, the legislature is free to limit the state's liability in that area without implicating the open courts clause and its concomitant heightened scrutiny. Maintaining public highways has always been a governmental function, and as Justice Durham stated in the lead opinion in Condemarin, [T]here is no fundamental right to recover unlimited damages from government entities performing governmental functions. [30] As the trial court correctly noted, McCorvey's contentions must be considered in light of the presumption of constitutionality afforded legislative acts. [31] If a statute does not impinge on a fundamental or specifically protected interest, the legislation's opponent has the burden of proving unconstitutionality. [32] In this case, McCorvey has failed to meet his burden of proving that the cap, which does not infringe on a fundamental right, is unconstitutional as applied to him. The trial court's order reducing UDOT's damages to the statutory limit under section 63-30-34(1) is therefore affirmed. Affirmed. HOWE, Associate C.J., concurs. ZIMMERMAN, J., concurs in the result.