Opinion ID: 2334397
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Flores defined public agency largely by reference to an organization's public funding sources.

Text: In holding that there was a right to counsel in Flores, we noted that, although the custody proceedings below had been initiated by a private individual, [14] that individual was represented by counsel provided by a public agency and [f]airness alone dictates that the petitioner should be entitled to a similar advantage. [15] Later in the opinion, we reiterated that a parent in a custody case who is without the aid of counsel ... will be at a decided and frequently decisive disadvantage and [t]his disadvantage is constitutionally impermissible where the other parent has an attorney supplied by a public agency. [16] This emphasis on fairness and equal advantage indicates that the right to counsel where the opposing party is represented by a public agency arises, at least in part, from the government's otherwise one-sided support for the party with an attorney supplied by a public agency. Such support need not be provided exclusively through funding or the direct provision of government resources; but fairness considerations undoubtedly do arise where one party benefits from the government's funding of a public agency. As ANDVSA puts it, this court was concerned in Flores with the fundamental imbalance of power that occurs when one side has an attorney being paid in part by public funding and the other side is indigent and is without any counsel. The notion that government funding sources are among the characteristics required for an organization to be classified as a public agency is underscored by the remedy we provided in Flores: after finding that ALSC and the Public Defender Agency could not provide representation under the circumstances of the case, we concluded that counsel should be appointed from the private bar, with attorney compensation provided by the State pursuant to Administrative Rule 15.1. [17] In other words, the solution to the potential unfairness of public agency representation for one party was to pay for representation of the other party through public funds, thus equalizing the public financial support on both sides of the dispute. [18] In its brief, OPA provides an overview of how courts in other jurisdictions have defined public agency, both pre-1980 (i.e., during the Flores period) and post-1980. OPA explains that this history is set forth to give this Court a broad range of sources from which to review whether or not ANDVSA meets any `public agency' definition. We find this approach overbroad. The question before us is not whether ANDVSA meets any public agency definition, but whether ANDVSA is a public agency under Flores and the related statute. Definitions of public agency used in other contexts and jurisdictions are useful only to the extent that they represent the background that the Flores court may have had in mind when it chose to use the term. But, given that the Flores court did not cite to any other jurisdictions or definitions, there is no indication of an intention to draw on prior interpretations of public agency; and it is unlikely that the court considered criteria for public agencies that only appeared in cases that came after Flores. Moreover, where definitions from other jurisdictions are in direct conflict with the Flores holding that ALSC was a public agency, those definitions are clearly irrelevant to the question on appeal. It is reasonable to assume, at a minimum, that the Flores court was aware of the characteristics of ALSC specifically identified by Justice Connor in his partial dissent, where he noted that the Alaska Legal Services Corporation is a private corporation and not an agency of the state or federal government. [19] The court presumably considered these aspects of ALSC's organizational structure and status, but nonetheless determined that ALSC was a public agency. Flores thus suggests that the characteristics identified by Justice Connornamely, being a private non-profit corporation with no connection to a formal government agencydo not preclude an organization from designation as a public agency. Several of the public agency definitions cited by OPA require that an organization be a government agency or government-created agency in order to qualify as a public agency. To now adopt those definitions would, as ANDVSA argues, effectively overrule the approach we took in Flores. We decline to take that step. [20] We conclude that the use of the term public agency in Flores must be understood as referring primarily to the nature of an organization's funding sources, and not to an organization's status as a government agency.