Opinion ID: 24884
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Arbitrator’s Opinion

Text: The Union argues that the arbitrator’s original decision awarded the punitive damages in their favor, and that the arbitrator’s subsequent clarification is not legally binding. In a letter dated April 16, 1999, in response to a request for clarification by the Union, Mr. Bankston addressed the distribution of the $100,000.00 punitive damage award by stating in pertinent part: My opinion is that a distribution of $90,000.00 to the affected membership in further compensation of their wage loss, and $10,000.00 to the Local Union for its admirable prosecution of the case, is imminently fair and just. That is, unless the $90,000.00 is more than sufficient to make whole those members affected by the day-off program. If that is the case, then whatever 11 remains of the $90,000.00 ought properly go to the Local Union in addition to the $10,000.00, as stated. The Court affirms Mr. Bankston’s clarification letter, however the Court believes that he stopped one step short of finalizing his opinion. Mr. Bankston failed to explain how the parties are to determine which employees were not made whole by the compensatory damage award, and how the parties are to determine the amount of additional award each employee was entitled to receive. As Mr. Bankston himself points out, proving the total lost wages of each employee was a difficult task.2 In his April 16 clarification letter, he describes his desire to supplement the employee’s lost wages award, however does not explain how the employees are to prove their losses considering the difficulty the Union had trying to do so during the original arbitration hearing. With this in mind, the Court remands the issue to Mr. Bankston, charging him with the task of developing a suitable and fair method or formula for determining how much each affected employee should receive and what they need to produce to prove their loss. The Union claims that the common law doctrine of functus officio renders the arbitrator’s April 16 clarification letter meritless. The functus officio doctrine bars an arbitrator from revisiting the merits of an award once the award has been rendered.3 However, a widely accepted 2 At page 2-3 of the original arbitration supplemental opinion and award delivered July 18, 1997, Mr. Bankston attributes the fact that the Union was only able to show actual employee back pay losses of $152,323.42, while known losses were close to $300,000.00, because the National Gypsum Company “trashed its scheduling records after the Union had requested production of those records. Part of the records were retrieved by a vigilant Union from a Company dumpster.” Additionally, pertinent schedules and time cards were missing or not supplied by the company. 3 This definition of functus officio is according to F. Elkouri & E. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works (4th ed. 1985). It is a fundamental common law principle that once an arbitrator has made and published a final award his authority is exhausted, he is functos officio and can do nothing more in regard to the subject matter of the arbitration. See McClatchy News papers v. Central Valley Union, 686 F.2d 731, 734 (9th Cir. 1982). The recognized exceptions to the doctrine are that the arbitrator can correct a mistake which is apparent on the face of his award, complete an arbitration that is not complete, and clarify an ambiguity in the award. See id. 12 exception to this doctrine occurs when a federal court finds that an award is incomplete or ambiguous, in which case the court often remands it to the arbitrator for clarification. See International Bhd. of Elec Workers v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 628 F.2d 644, 647 (1st Cir. 1980). The foundation for a federal court’s power to remand an ambiguous arbitration award is the policy in favor of clear final awards that completely resolve the dispute originally submitted to the arbitrator. See id. It is not the court’s place to determine the intent of an arbitrator when the award fails to make the arbitrator’s intent clear. See New York Bus Tours Inc., v. Kheel, 864 F.2d 9, 12 (2nd Cir. 1988). Consistent with the case law and federal statutes, a court should not undertake to construe the meaning of arbitration awards where they are unclear. See id. This would only serve to undermine the authority of arbitrators. See id. Where parties have elected to submit their disputes to arbitration, they should be completely resolved by arbitration, rather than only partially resolved. See Iron Workers Local #272 v. Bowen, 624 F.2d 1255, 1264 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing San Antonio Newspaper Guild Local No. 25 v. San Antonio Light Division, 481 F.2d 821, 825 (5th Cir. 1973)). See also United Steelworkers of America v. Bradley, 551 F.2d 72, 73 (5th Cir. 1977) (where ambiguous phrase in the arbitrator’s award was the fulcrum of the dispute, the court remanded to the arbitrator). The Court at this juncture is left with two possible options: (1) to start the grievance procedure over again resulting in a second arbitrator interpreting the language of the original arbitrator; or (2) the more efficient and preferred option, and the option that the Court adopts today, is to remand to the original arbitrator who is already familiar with the details of the case. See United Steelworkers of America v. Interpace Corp., 447 F.Supp. 387, 391 (W.D. Pa. 1978); See also Automotive, Petroleum and Allied Indus. Employees Union v. Sears, 13 Roebuck and Co., 581 F. Supp. 672, 677 (E.D. Mo. 1984). Court clarification would amount to preemption of the arbitrator’s fact-finding function, and this Court declines to do so. See id.