Opinion ID: 880476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hansens' Cross-Appeal

Text: The District Court relied mainly on the terms of the contract for deed in deciding Hansens' counterclaim. Hansens were unable to convince the court that their alleged entitlement to the balance of the contract price overcame the contract's forfeiture clause, which reads in relevant part: IT IS FURTHER MUTUALLY UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED by and between the parties hereto that said forty (40) days and ninety (90) days is a reasonable and sufficient notice to be given to the said Party of the Second Part in case of his failure to perform any of the covenants on his part hereby made and entered into, and shall be sufficient to cancel all obligations hereunder on the part of the said Parties of the First Part and fully reinvest them with all right, title and interest hereby agreed to be conveyed, and in case of such cancellation, the Party of the Second Part shall forfeit all payments made by him on this contract, and all his right, title and interest in all buildings or other improvements whatsoever, and such payments shall be retained by the said Parties of the First Part in full satisfaction and in liquidation of all damages by them sustained ... (Emphasis added.) Hansens' claim for the contract balance rested on this Court's decision in Glacier Campground v. Wild Rivers, Inc. (1978), 184 Mont. 543, 597 P.2d 689. In Glacier, we held that a seller under a contract for deed could pursue a remedy other than forfeiture and repossession as long as the contract did not preclude the remedy sought or provide that forfeiture and repossession was the exclusive remedy for breach. On cross-appeal, Hansens again assert their entitlement to seek specific performance (payment of the balance of the contract price) under the rule in Glacier. In response, Holman raises two arguments, one based on parol evidence and one based on the doctrine of election of remedies. We need not address the election of remedies issue, because parol evidence admissible on this claim establishes the intent of the parties to this contract that specific performance would not be available to the Hansens. In Glacier, we allowed the seller to seek a remedy outside the contract in part because the forfeiture clause in that case was on its face, ambiguous and uncertain requiring recourse to rules of construction and extrinsic evidence to give it meaning. Glacier, 597 P.2d at 692. Hansens point out that the forfeiture clause in this case is very similar to that construed in Glacier, which by analogy should allow them to go outside the contract and seek specific performance. We noted in Glacier that a primary rule of contract construction is to give effect to the mutual intent of the parties. Glacier, 597 P.2d at 692; see § 28-3-301, MCA. Hansens placed the imperfections in the forfeiture clause in issue by seeking an alternative remedy based on Glacier. We are therefore able to look to extrinsic evidence in order to discover the mutual intent of Holman and the Hansens. Section 28-2-905, MCA. Holman placed two affidavits before the District Court, his own and that of the attorney representing him when the contract was negotiated, pointing out that George Hansen had requested a clause giving Hansens the right to seek specific performance. According to the affidavits, Holman rejected such a provision, and none was included in the contract. As the District Court stated in the explanatory comment to its order of April 6, 1988, these affidavits were not contradicted by Hansens. It is thus apparent that the mutual intent of these parties was that specific performance would not be a possible remedy under this contract. Hansens were precluded from pursuing that remedy. We affirm the decision of the District Court. TURNAGE, C.J., and HARRISON, GULBRANDSON, HUNT and WEBER, JJ., concur. SHEEHY, J., did not participate.