Opinion ID: 621302
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Date of Finality of the Conviction

Text: The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) establishes that state and federal prisoners have a one-year limitations period in which to file a habeas corpus petition. That period runs from one of four specified dates, the first of which is “the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1). Generally, a conviction becomes final upon conclusion of direct review. See Sanchez-Castellano v. United States, 358 F.3d 424, 426 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Cottage, 307 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2002)). When a federal criminal defendant appeals to the court of appeals, the judgment of conviction becomes final for § 2255 purposes upon the expiration of the ninety-day period in which the defendant could have petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court, even when no certiorari petition is filed. See id. at 426–27 (citing Clay, 537 U.S. at 532 (reading the words “becomes final” in § 2255 to have the same meaning as the analogous provision for state prisoners in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A), which specifies “by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review”)). Using the same reasoning, we have held that “when a federal criminal defendant does not appeal to the court of appeals, the judgment becomes final upon the expiration of the period in which the defendant could have appealed to the court of appeals, even when no notice of appeal was filed.” Id. at 427. At the time relevant to this suit, that period was ten days after the entry of judgment, or February 7, 2007. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1) (2008) (amended 2009). Johnson argues that his conviction did not become final, and therefore the one-year statute of limitations did not begin to run, until December 19, 2007, ninety days after the denial of his 4 motion to reconsider the dismissal of his direct appeal for untimeliness. The ninety-day period represents the expiration of the time for seeking Supreme Court review. There are circumstances under which a conviction that has become final can be rendered nonfinal for purposes of the 1-year AEDPA limitations period for filing a § 2255 or § 2254 motion. In Jimenez v. Quarterman, 555 U.S. 113 (2009), the Supreme Court held that where a state court reopens direct review of a conviction, the conviction is no longer final for purposes of the one-year statute of limitations for state habeas proceedings. Id. at 120. In Jimenez, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted petitioner the right to file an out-of-time appeal when it determined that he was denied the right to a meaningful appeal. As a result, his conviction “was again capable of modification through direct appeal to the state courts and to [the Supreme Court] on certiorari review.” Id. The pendency of his direct appeal was restored and his conviction did not become final until the time for seeking certiorari review in the Supreme Court expired. Id. Similarly, we have contemplated but not decided whether a conviction that became final at the expiration of the time to file a notice of appeal would no longer be final where a Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4) extension of time is sought and granted.1 See Sanchez-Castellano, 358 F.3d at 427. Jimenez suggests that if a 4(b)(4) motion were granted, thereby extending the time to file a direct appeal, a late notice of appeal could render a conviction nonfinal and delay the running of the oneyear limitations period until after the Supreme Court affirmed a conviction on the merits or denied a petition for writ of certiorari, or the time for filing a certiorari petition expired. 1 Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(4) allows the district court, before or after time has expired, and upon a showing of good cause or excusable neglect, to extend the time to file a notice of appeal for a period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by Rule 4(b). 5 However, the mere filing of a late notice of appeal is not sufficient under Jimenez to render a final conviction nonfinal for purposes of § 2255. See Jimenez, 555 U.S. at 120 n.4 (refusing to depart from the general rule that “the possibility that a state court may open direct review ‘does not render convictions and sentences that are no longer subject to direct review nonfinal’” (citing Beard v. Banks, 542 U.S. 406, 412 (2004))). Jimenez merely held that “where a state court has in fact reopened direct review, the conviction is rendered nonfinal for purposes of § 2244(d)(1)(A) during the pendency of the reopened appeal.” Id. (emphasis added). We reached a similar conclusion in Searcy v. Carter, 246 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2001). There, we held that where the time for seeking an appeal in the state Supreme Court had expired, the filing of a “motion for delayed appeal” under the Ohio Supreme Court Rules of Practice did not delay the running of the one-year statute of limitations because, it would effectively eviscerate the AEDPA’s statute of limitations. Leave to file a late notice of appeal can be sought at any time, even many years after conviction. If the one-year period of limitations did not begin to run until such an application for leave to appeal was denied, the one-year statute of limitations would be meaningless; merely by delaying his application for leave to file a late notice of appeal, a petition could indefinitely extend the time for seeking habeas relief. Id. at 519 (quoting Raynor v. Dufrain, 28 F. Supp. 2d 896, 898 (S.D.N.Y. 1998)). Johnson’s attempt to distinguish Searcy by characterizing his untimely notice of appeal as a direct appeal that was not resolved on the merits is unpersuasive. In Searcy, we rejected the argument that a “motion for delayed appeal” under the Ohio Supreme Court Rules of Practice was a part of the direct appeal process. Despite differences in nomenclature, petitioners in both cases were seeking leave to file an untimely appeal. The reasoning in Searcy applies with equal force to an untimely notice of appeal, which similarly can be filed “at any time, even many years after the 6 conviction.” If the filing of an untimely notice of appeal reset the running of the limitations period, the statute of limitations period would be rendered just as meaningless.2 Because Johnson filed his notice of appeal after the period in which an extension could have been granted, the district court lacked authority at that time to reopen direct review, see Fed. R. App. P. 26(b)(1), and in fact it did not do so, instead rejecting Johnson’s appeal as untimely on July 30, 2007. Therefore, we conclude Johnson’s conviction became final on February 7, 2007, ten days after entry of the amended judgment, when the time to file a notice of appeal expired without Johnson having done so.