Opinion ID: 792809
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to give requested jury instruction

Text: 133 Defendants contend that the District Court erred by failing to instruct the jury, as proposed in Stewart's Request Number 17, that 134 Neither Martha Stewart nor Peter Bacanovic has been charged with Insider Trading in this case. Your deliberations are limited to the facts that have been proved in court during the course of this trial. Thus you may only consider that which was presented in court in relation to the charges in the Indictment. 135 You may consider Insider Trading only insofar as it pertains to motive for the obstruction charge. The government contends that information about the Waksal sales was believed by Ms. Stewart to constitute inside information. Ms. Stewart vigorously denies that she so believed or that it was her intention to violate the law by trading on this type of information. You may not, and I caution you strongly against this, you may not conclude that the government should have charged Ms. Stewart with Insider Trading and convict her of anything else in place of a charge that was not filed by the government and charged by the grand jury because it appeals to your sense of fairness or justice or what have you. You may not convict Martha Stewart unless there is sufficient evidence independent of Insider Trading to support a conviction on the charge in question. 136 It is not clear that Defendants preserved this argument because the request was not discussed at the charge conference, nor was there any explicit objection to its omission. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 30 (a party objecting to the failure to give a requested instruction must inform the court of the specific objection and the grounds for the objection before the jury retires to deliberate). We need not resolve the waiver issue, however, because the argument fails whether we review the District Court's decision de novo, see, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez, 407 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir.2005), or for plain error, see, e.g., United States v. Crowley, 318 F.3d 401, 414 (2d Cir.2003). 137 In charging the jury, the District Court identified each specific charge against each Defendant and instructed the jury as to the elements essential to convicting each Defendant on each count as well as the necessity that the elements be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to support a guilty verdict. In addition, the jury received a copy of the Redacted Superseding Indictment and a verdict sheet that identified each specification in each count against each Defendant. The jury was directed to weigh the evidence and reach a verdict based solely on a consideration of the evidence and the instructions, and the District Court stressed that it would violate your sworn duty to base a verdict upon any other view of the law than that which I give you. 138 `A conviction will not be overturned for refusal to give a requested charge . . . unless that [requested] instruction is legally correct, represents a theory of defense with basis in the record that would lead to acquittal, and the theory is not effectively presented elsewhere in the charge.' United States v. Holland, 381 F.3d 80, 84 (2d Cir.) (quoting United States v. Han, 230 F.3d 560, 565 (2d Cir.2000) (alteration in original)), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 921, 160 L.Ed.2d 814 (2005). We look at the charge as a whole to see if it correctly stated the law, United States v. Jones, 30 F.3d 276, 284 (2d Cir.1994), and will not find reversible error unless a charge either failed to inform the jury adequately of the law or misled the jury as to the correct legal rule, United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 148 (2d Cir.2002). Defendants do not cite any precedent for finding that a trial was unfair because the jury did not receive an instruction not to consider culpability for specified uncharged crimes, where the instructions were otherwise proper. 139 The District Court's instructions were sufficient to restrict the jury's use of the evidence to the crimes charged. It is clear from the partial verdict of acquittal that the jury carefully evaluated the evidence and rendered [a] discriminating verdict[ ] and not one that was based on uncharged acts or bad character. United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1153 (2d Cir.1989); see also United States v. Diaz, 922 F.2d 998, 1007-08 (2d Cir.1990) (partial acquittal belies notion of spillover prejudice). Certainly, the theory that Defendants should not be convicted for uncharged conduct was effectively presented elsewhere in the charge, namely in the portion devoted to explaining the elements that must be found beyond a reasonable doubt in order to convict. See Holland, 381 F.3d at 84. 140 The District Court gave clear instructions as to the charges against each Defendant and the type and quantum of evidence on which to base a guilty verdict. We presume that juries follow their instructions, and the record does not suggest that the jurors were either confused or prejudiced against Defendants in determining the counts of conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Geibel, 369 F.3d 682, 700 (2d Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Allen v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 619, 160 L.Ed.2d 457 (2004) and Conner v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 1827, 161 L.Ed.2d 732 (2005). On this record, therefore, we find that the District Court did not err by omitting Stewart's Request Number 17, much less commit plain error. See United States v. Carr, 424 F.3d 213, 221 (2d Cir.2005) (There being no error, it follows a fortiori that there was no plain error.).