Opinion ID: 153599
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Effect of the Antiterrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act of 1996

Text: 7 In addition to amending the statutory provisions regarding the standards for granting certificates of probable cause, the Act also amended, inter alia, the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 that govern federal court review of state court factual determinations in habeas corpus proceedings. See Pub.L. No. 104-132, tit. I, sec. 104(3)-(4), 110 Stat. 1214, 1219 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)-(e)). Prior to these amendments, a reviewing federal court could abandon the presumption of correctness if the state court's factual determination was not fairly supported by the record. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (unamended). By contrast, the new amendments greatly heighten the degree of deference paid to a state court's findings of fact. See Pub.L. No. 104-132, tit. I, sec. 104(3), 110 Stat. at 1219 (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)) (providing that a writ of habeas corpus shall not be granted unless the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts); id. at sec. 104(4) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B)) (placing on the applicant the burden to rebut the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence). 8 The Act, however, does not provide courts with any clear directive as to the effective date of the provisions relevant to this case. Cf. Pub.L. No. 104-132, tit. I, sec. 107(c), 110 Stat. 1214, 1226 (expressly providing that special provisions for habeas review of capital cases shall apply to cases pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act). It is unclear whether Congress intended that the new, more deferential standard of review should be applied to habeas corpus petitioners in Mr. Jamerson's shoes, whose petitions attacking non-capital convictions were pending when the amendments were enacted. To date, this lack of clarity has resulted in widespread confusion about the applicability of the amendments to pending cases, as reflected by the differing approaches of the district courts. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Centanni v. Washington, Nos. 95C7393, 95C7394, 1996 WL 251438,  1 (N.D.Ill. May 8, 1996) (unreported disposition) (reasoning that the express statement that the special provisions for capital cases shall apply to pending cases, contrasted with the lack of a comparable statement for the general habeas provisions, creates an inference that the latter provisions do not apply to pending cases); Houchin v. Zavaras, 924 F.Supp. 115, (D.Colo.1996) (noting that because the Act gives no guidance on the question, courts are left to speculate as to whether the general provisions apply to pending cases, and concluding that they do). 9 However, we need not decide this issue in order to adjudicate the controversy presently before us. We assume, without deciding, that the pre-enactment law applies. Because Mr. Jamerson has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness under the pre-amendment standards, which are more favorable to a petitioner, it follows that he would also fail to meet the greater burden imposed by the heightened deference required by the Act. Cf. Stone v. Farley, No. 95-1796, 1996 WL 325937,  3 n. 3 (7th Cir. June 14, 1996) (We need not determine to what extent the Act's amendments to federal habeas review govern cases pending when the Act became effective because we determine that even under the more expansive scope of review prior to the Act, [the appellant] was not entitled to federal habeas corpus relief.). The district court was correct in concluding that the failure to appeal was a result of Mr. Jamerson's decision to waive that right rather than to any constitutional deficiency of counsel. Mr. Jamerson has therefore failed to make a substantial showing of the denial of his right to counsel. 10 Because Mr. Jamerson has failed to make a such a showing, his petition for a certificate of probable cause is DENIED, and the appeal is DISMISSED. 11 The mandate shall issue forthwith.