Opinion ID: 223533
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Absence of Co-Defendants Delatorre and Benabe

Text: Guzman argues that the district court abused its discretion in denying his motion to sever because he was unfairly prejudiced by Delatorre’s and Benabe’s removal from the courtroom unless and until they would promise to behave with appropriate decorum in front of the jury.2 The government argues that he forfeited (or, arguably, waived) this argument by not renewing his motion to sever at the close of the evidence. See Gov’t Br. at. 74, citing United States v. Alviar, 573 F.3d 526, 538-39 (7th Cir. 2009)(discussing waiver of a motion to sever that 2 The circumstances of the district court’s extraordinary step of excluding Delatorre and Benabe from the courtroom are described more fully in Benabe, No. 09-1190, — F.3d at —. For purposes of this order, it suffices to say that Delatorre and Benabe engaged in an ill-conceived campaign to obstruct the trial with repeated outbursts, nonsensically declaring that the court and the government had no jurisdiction over them as “sovereign citizens” and “flesh-andblood human beings,” and refusing even to promise to refrain from this behavior in the presence of the jury. Nos. 09-1190, 09-1224, 09-1225, 09-1226, 09-1227, 09-1251 Page 8 was not renewed at the close of evidence). Guzman has not rebutted the point, so we review this issue only for plain error. Guzman relies on United States v. Stratton, 649 F.2d 1066 (5th Cir. 1981), but the facts in Stratton hardly compare to the situation the district court faced here. In Stratton, co-defendant Smith, who was the central figure in the charged conspiracy, had a heart attack and was severed from the trial. See id. at 1072. Because of Smith’s central role in the conspiracy, however, much of that evidence had to do with Smith. The jury found that the conspiracy existed and that three of the five remaining co-defendants were guilty. The same jury later reconvened to decide the case against Smith, finding him guilty of three of four of the counts against him, an outcome the Fifth Circuit found to be “not surprising.” Id. at 1080. The court remanded the case for a new trial, finding that all the defendants had been unduly prejudiced by the absence of Smith and his counsel from the first trial. Stratton, 649 F.2d at 1083. Unlike the situation in Stratton, here Delatorre and Benabe knowingly and voluntarily chose to absent themselves from the courtroom by refusing to promise to conduct themselves with proper decorum. Their counsel remained to participate in the trial, and the jury considered the charges against all of the defendants. The court thoroughly examined potential jurors for any bias they might harbor because of Delatorre’s and Benabe’s absences. Potential jurors who indicated that they could not remain neutral were excused. At the close of trial, the jury was instructed that it was not to consider Delatorre’s and Benabe’s absences in any way. The jury was properly screened and properly instructed. We find no error. As we explain in our published opinion, Delatorre’s and Benabe’s choices put the district judge in an extremely difficult position – one that he managed superbly. If the judge had left Delatorre and Benabe in the courtroom, the risks of prejudice to the other defendants, including Guzman, were great. See, e.g., United States v. Mannie, 509 F.3d 851, 85657 (7th Cir. 2007). If we were to accept Guzman’s theory of prejudice and hold that the other defendants could not be tried at the same time as the absent defendants, we would effectively transfer the power to decide severance issues in complex cases from district judges to the defendants themselves. We affirm the decision of the district court to try Guzman in the first trial along with the gang’s major players.