Opinion ID: 2303668
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonable Anticipation of Litigation in Maine

Text: [¶24] The second part of the analysis, whether the employer by its conduct reasonably could have anticipated litigation in Maine, requires an assessment of whether the foreign corporation has sufficient contacts with the forum State to make it reasonable ... to require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is brought there. Harriman, 518 A.2d at 1037 (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 317, 66 S.Ct. 154). The requisite minimum contacts are present when the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. Id. (quotation marks omitted). A defendant's activities are sufficient to establish minimum contacts when (1) the activities of the defendant have been directed at the forum's residents; (2) the defendant deliberately engages in significant activities in the forum; or (3) the defendant creates continuing obligations between itself and residents of the forum. Id.; see also Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475-76, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985). [¶25] In this case, the hearing officer determined that Houston purposely availed itself of the privilege of conducting business in Maine when its agent came to Maine to negotiate and execute Cavers's employment contract. [1] [¶26] The reasonable anticipation analysis can be informed by precedent and practice in other jurisdictions. Seventy-three years ago the United States Supreme Court addressed due processpersonal jurisdiction issues in a workers' compensation case with minimum contacts facts very similar to this appeal. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532, 538, 55 S.Ct. 518, 79 L.Ed. 1044 (1935), a person living in California executed an employment contract in California agreeing to work in Alaska during the salmon canning season for specified wages and payment of transportation costs. The employee was injured while working in Alaska. Id. at 537, 55 S.Ct. 518. Upon return to California, he filed a workers' compensation claim in California and received a compensation award. Id. at 538-39, 55 S.Ct. 518. The employer appealed asserting, among other issues, a due processpersonal jurisdiction bar to the employee's claim. Id. at 539, 55 S.Ct. 518. The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the due process claim. Id. at 542, 55 S.Ct. 518. In its holding, the Supreme Court noted that an employment contract that is signed in a state, by a person living in that state, [2] even if it is to be performed elsewhere, puts the obligations of the contract within the reach of the power that the state of residence may constitutionally exercise without violating the due process clause. Id. at 540-42, 55 S.Ct. 518. [3] [¶27] In its opinion, the Supreme Court observed that on the facts before it, a minimum contacts analysis might be insufficient to support exercise of jurisdiction over a tort claim, but the execution of the employment contract in the state, by a resident of the state, distinguished the case from a tort claim and was sufficient to justify exercise of state authority over employment issues, including workers' compensation issues, arising out of the contract. Id. at 540-41, 55 S.Ct. 518. [¶28] The Alaska Packers precedent has been applied to a workers' compensation claim asserted by a minor league baseball player in a case virtually on all fours with the facts of this appeal. Bowen v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 73 Cal. App.4th 15, 86 Cal.Rptr.2d 95 (1999). [¶29] In Bowen, a California resident was drafted by the Florida Marlins in 1992. Id. at 97. Bowen signed the Minor League Uniform Player Contract, with addenda, at his residence in California. The contract had been mailed to Bowen after Bowen had negotiated, by telephone, with a Marlins scout who was also a resident of California. The contract began with the 1993 baseball season. Bowen was initially assigned to a team in Erie, Pennsylvania. He continued playing for Marlins-affiliated minor league teams in 1994, 1995, and 1996, signing contract addenda that were sent by mail to his California residence. Bowen played only for Marlins-affiliated minor league teams in the northeast and in Florida. He never played or trained in California. In the off-season, he continued to reside in California. Id. [¶30] In April 1996, Bowen was injured while pitching in a game in Clearwater, Florida. After a period on the disabled list, Bowen pitched with discomfort for the rest of the 1996 season. He was released by the Marlins at the end of the 1996 season. Id. [¶31] Bowen applied for workers' compensation benefits in California. Id. at 96. His claim was initially denied by the Workers' Compensation Appeals Board. The Appeals Court reversed, holding that an employee who is a professional athlete residing in California, such as Bowen, who signs a player's contract in California furnished to the athlete here by an out-of-state team, is entitled to benefits under the act for injuries received while playing out of state under the contract. Id. at 104. The Court of Appeals cited Alaska Packers in rejecting the Marlins' denial of due process argument that there were insufficient contacts with the state to support exercise of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 103-04. [¶32] A more recent California Court of Appeals opinion, New York Yankees v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Board, No. D036556, 66 Cal. Comp. Cases 291, 2001 Cal. Wrk. Comp. Lexis 4872, at  (Cal.Ct.App. Jan. 23, 2001) reached the same result on a workers' compensation claim filed by a New York Yankees pitcher, who was a resident of California but was injured during spring training in Florida. [4] [¶33] The same due process principles have been applied to claims by players recruited to play college sports. In Barile v. University of Virginia, 2 Ohio App.3d 233, 441 N.E.2d 608, 616 (1981), the Ohio Court of Appeals held that Ohio courts, without violating due process, had jurisdiction to hear a breach of contract and damages action brought by an Ohio resident who signed a letter of intent in Ohio to play football at the University of Virginia and was subsequently injured while playing football in Virginia. In Rodwell v. Pro Football, Inc., 45 Mich.App. 408, 206 N.W.2d 773, 780 (1973), the Michigan Court of Appeals reached a similar result on a professional football player's workers' compensation claim brought by a Michigan resident against the Washington Redskins. [¶34] The law articulated in these opinions is supported by treatises surveying the law: If the defendant is the employer, it may be possible to obtain long-arm jurisdiction for the suit based on an injury incurred out of state, if the plaintiff's employment was the result of the defendant's recruiting activity in the forum state, even though the defendant's operations are conducted elsewhere. Robert C. Casad and William M. Richman, Jurisdiction in Civil Actions § 7-2(2)(e)(vi) (3d ed. Lexis 2004); see also Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 22.04[1][b] (2008). [¶35] Based on the law of personal jurisdiction from 1935 to date, and with recent precedent directly applicable to Major League Baseball, the Astros had sufficient contacts with Maine to have reasonably anticipated a court or administrative action in Maine arising from Cavers's employment contract negotiated and signed in Maine.