Opinion ID: 2140559
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Death Sentence Violated the Eighth Amendment Because the Incorrect Information Contained in the Juror's Handbook Resulted in an Inattentive, Misinformed Jury at the Defendant's Sentencing Hearing.

Text: The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination. In ensuring that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily or capriciously, the Court's principal concern has been more with the procedure by which the State imposes the death sentence than with the substantive factors the state lays before the jury as a basis for imposing death, once it has been determined that the defendant falls within the category of persons eligible for the death penalty. ( California v. Ramos (1983), 463 U.S. 463, 992, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171, 1179, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3451.) The court has required that the States adopt standards and procedures that channel jury discretion and offer guidance to the jury on the factors that the State considers relevant to the decision of whether a defendant shall live or die. Any practice that diverts the jury's attention from its principal role in the death sentencing process undermines the entire system of procedural and substantive protections established by the Constitution. Even if constitutional, such practices are bad policy and should not be condoned by this court. Cf. State v. Jones (1979), 296 N.C. 495, 501, 251 S.E.2d 425, 429 (a prosecutor's comments on appellate review and the executive's power to commute the death penalty are improper because they reduce the jury's sense of responsibility in the sentencing hearing); see also Farris v. State (Tenn. 1976), 535 S.W.2d 608, 614; People v. Morse (1964), 60 Cal.2d 631, 652-53, 388 P.2d 33, 46-47, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 214-15; Fleming v. State (1977), 240 Ga. 142, 146, 240 S.E.2d 37, 40. In this case the jury was mistakenly informed that it must not be concerned with what penalty may be imposed if the defendant is found guilty. The law requires that the judge sentence the defendant. (102 Ill.2d at 78.) These comments were contained in a pamphlet entitled, Handbook for Illinois Jurors, which was distributed to all jurors who served at the defendant's trial. The majority contends that [t]he defendant's argument that the jury was inattentive as a result of the handbook's distribution is pure conjecture. (102 Ill.2d at 79.) This contention glosses over the sworn statement of the foreman of the jury who said: That as a result of the dissemination of this information, the consensus of the jury was that they would not have to determine whether the death penalty should be imposed on the defendant and it was not until they were instructed after the sentencing hearing that they realized that this was to be their responsibility, which surprised most or all of the jurors. (Emphasis added.) The foreman's uncontradicted statement establishes that most of the jurors had read the statement on the jury's lack of responsibility for sentencing and that they had believed it. Knowing this, it defies human experience to assume that the jury was as attentive at the sentencing hearing as it would have been if it had not been misinformed. Counsel's comments in closing arguments on the attentiveness of the jury reflect nothing more than traditional courtship of the jurors. The brief verbal questions in voir dire on the jurors' attitudes towards the death penalty did not put them on notice as to their responsibilities and surely were not considered as carefully by the jurors as the written handbook that they could refer to at any time during the trial or the sentencing hearing. The majority correctly observes that this court has approved of the concept of a juror's handbook ( People v. Izzo (1958), 14 Ill.2d 203, 209), even though the handbook may contain minimal inaccuracies which do not prejudice the defendant. Prior to this case, however, this court has never held it permissible for the State to convey substantively inaccurate information to the jury by such devices. Surely this court would reverse the imposition of the death penalty if the judge had instructed the jury that they need not pay close attention to the evidence presented at the death penalty proceeding. I can conceive of no reason why the State's role in misleading the jury should not have the same result here.