Opinion ID: 2460096
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Jeopardy

Text: The second aspect of the definition of a judgment of acquittalthe requirement that jeopardy has attachedis both substantive and temporal. This requirement is not clearly stated in K.S.A. 22-3419. Rather, the only temporal reference in K.S.A. 22-3419 indicates the district court may order the entry of judgment of acquittal after the evidence on either side is closed. Although this statutory language does not explicitly tie into the concept of jeopardy, the concept is implied by the temporal reference because jeopardy protections attach only when a jury is [i]mpaneled and sworn, or, in a bench trial, when the judge begins to receive evidence. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. at 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349; see Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 391, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) ([J]eopardy does not attach until a defendant is `put to trial before the trier of the facts.'); State v. Ruden, 245 Kan. 95, 99, 774 P.2d 972 (1989) (In a jury trial, jeopardy attaches when a jury is impaneled and sworn; [i]n a bench trial, jeopardy attaches when the first witness is sworn.). Consequently, if the order is entered after the close of one party's evidence, jeopardy would have attached. Yet, despite the statutory reference to the close of evidence, in Whorton, the court determined that an order entered during the testimony of the first trial witness was a judgment of acquittal. The Whorton court acknowledged the language in K.S.A. 22-3419 but noted that legal commentary on the federal counterpart of this statute, Rule 29(A) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, has not placed a narrow construction on such language: `Despite what appears to be the clear language of the rule, judgment of acquittal may be ordered even before the government has closed its case if the basic facts lead inescapably to a conclusion that the prosecution must fail regardless of whatever evidence may be introduced.' Whorton, 225 Kan. at 255, 589 P.2d 610 (quoting 2 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 462, p. 244 [1969]). Further, the court noted, judgments of acquittal have been rendered in federal courts before the close of the prosecution's case where the government's opening statement shows it has no case. Whorton, 225 Kan. at 255, 589 P.2d 610 (citing United States v. Dietrich, 126 F. 676, 677-78 [C.C.D. Neb.1904] [directed verdict for defendant proper after government admitted a fact during its opening statement that precluded conviction]; Annot., 75 A.L.R.3d 649 [1977] [power of district court to dismiss prosecution or direct acquittal on basis of prosecutor's opening statement]). A judgment of acquittal has also been entered after the defendant was before a jury for trial but before opening statements where basic facts lead to the conclusion the prosecution must fail regardless of the evidence to be introduced. Whorton, 225 Kan. at 255, 589 P.2d 610 (citing United States v. Weissman, 266 U.S. 377, 45 S.Ct. 135, 69 L.Ed. 334 [1924] [district court found indictment was invalid because no offense was properly charged; directed verdict granted before opening statements and introduction of evidence was not appealable]; United States v. Maryland Cooperative Milk Prod., 145 F.Supp. 151, 152 [D.D.C.1956] [granting defendant's motion for acquittal which was brought after opening statements were made and immediately following the admission into evidence of the stipulation of facts previously agreed upon by counsel]); see Note, Mandamus to Review Judgments of Acquittal in Federal Courts, 71 Yale L.J. 171, 172-73 (1961) (stating that judgments of acquittal have been rendered before the close of the prosecution's case where the government's opening statement shows that it has no case, or where the government's own evidence indicates the existence of an iron-clad defense). Relying on the federal courts' rationale, the Whorton court concluded that the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was timely under the facts despite its coming before the close of either party's evidence. Whorton, 225 Kan. at 255, 589 P.2d 610; cf. City of Salina v. Amador, 279 Kan. 266, 275-77, 106 P.3d 1139 (2005) (dismissal of charges had been made prior to district court hearing any evidence or swearing any witnesses, so jeopardy did not attach); Prockish v. City of Stockton, 6 Kan.App.2d 841, Syl. ¶ 2, 635 P.2d 975 (1981), rev. denied 230 Kan. 819 (1982) (A motion for judgment of acquittal is not proper until the close of the prosecution's evidence unless the basic facts of the case lead to the conclusion that the prosecution must fail regardless of the evidence to be introduced.). The Whorton court did not specifically state that jeopardy had to have attached, but this court clarified that requirement in the subsequent case of Ruden, 245 Kan. 95, 774 P.2d 972. The Ruden court noted that in Whorton the court had recognized the double jeopardy implications of acquittal, stating that `a judgment of acquittal, correctly or incorrectly arrived at, terminates the prosecution, and the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment bars further proceedings against the defendant.' [Citations omitted.] Ruden, 245 Kan. at 99, 774 P.2d 972 (quoting Whorton, 225 Kan. at 255, 589 P.2d 610). The Whorton court did not need to focus further on this aspect, however, because jeopardy had clearly attached and the pivotal aspect was whether the court's ruling was a resolution of factual elements. In contrast, in Ruden, 245 Kan. at 97, 774 P.2d 972, the State was appealing from a pretrial order, which the district court had labeled as a judgment of acquittal. On appeal, the State argued that the district court's action should be classified as a dismissal of the complaint and, therefore, this court had jurisdiction to consider the appeal under K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(1). This court agreed, despite the district court's characterization of its order as a judgment of acquittal. At several points in the analysis, the Ruden court emphasized that the timing was determinative. For example, the court stated: A main component of the judgment of acquittal is its prohibition against subsequent prosecutions for the same offense based upon the Fifth Amendment protection against double jeopardy. 8A Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 29.08 (2d ed.1989). The Kansas cases that have allowed a motion for judgment of acquittal to bar an appeal have involved a situation in which the trial has begun and jeopardy has attached. Ruden, 245 Kan. at 99, 774 P.2d 972. Then, in stating its holding, the court succinctly concluded: Because jeopardy had not attached, a judgment of acquittal was not appropriate. Ruden, 245 Kan. at 100, 774 P.2d 972. Roberts' Arguments With this background in mind, we turn to the specifics of Roberts' arguments, which are: (a) The district court's order of dismissal was the functional equivalent of an acquittal; (b) the Court of Appeals erred in characterizing the district court's ruling as one based on legal, rather than factual, determinations; and (c) K.S.A. 21-3108(1)(b) prevents a subsequent prosecution in this case so the order must be considered a judgment of acquittal.