Opinion ID: 170424
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Search of His House

Text: Perrine also challenges the search of his house. In particular, he argues [t]he affidavits in support of the search warrants do not establish probable cause as the facts revealed therein were not particularized as to [Perrine], contained stale information of alleged criminal activity relating to [Perrine], and materially omitted facts vitiating probable cause. Appellant's Br. at 22. [P]robable cause exists where attending circumstances `would lead a prudent person to believe there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.' United States v. Cantu, 405 F.3d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir.2001)). In assessing whether there is probable cause for a warrant, we assess the sufficiency of a supporting affidavit based on the totality of the circumstances. Id. Further, a magistrate's or judge's determination that a warrant is supported by probable cause is entitled to great deference. Id. On review, our task is to ensur[e] `that the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed.' United States v. Tisdale, 248 F.3d 964, 970 (10th Cir.2001) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). The affidavits in support of the search warrants in this case provided sufficient information for the judge to conclude that probable cause existed. They recited essentially the same facts as in the applications for the disclosure orders, quoted above, with the addition of a description of the information obtained from Yahoo! and Cox, which identified Perrine as stevedragonslayer. They also recited the fact that Wichita police officer Shawn Bostick, after further investigation of Perrine/stevedragonslayer, discovered that he had been previously convicted in Kansas state court of exploitation of a child, was still on probation for that offense, and that the prior case involved Perrine sending images of child pornography and showing videos containing child pornography via Yahoo! Messenger using a web cam. Perrine argues they were not particularized to him, Appellant's Br. at 22, because they did not state that Yahoo!'s records showed that stevedragonslayer was in fact logged on to Yahoo! on September 2, 2005. For the same reasons we found that this omission did not undermine the sufficiency of the applications for the disclosure orders, we find it does not undermine the sufficiency of the affidavits in support of the search warrants. Perrine next argues that the affidavits contained stale information. Perrine asserts that 111 days had passed between the chat between stevedragonslayer and Vanlandingham and the submission of the affidavits. Whether information is stale depends on the nature of the criminal activity, the length of the activity, and the nature of the property to be seized. United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 860 (10th Cir.2005) (further quotation omitted). We have explained: The observation that images of child pornography are likely to be hoarded by persons interested in those materials in the privacy of their homes is supported by common sense and the cases. Since the materials are illegal to distribute and possess, initial collection is difficult. Having succeeded in obtaining images, collectors are unlikely to destroy them. Because of their illegality and the imprimatur of severe social stigma such images carry, collectors will want to secret them in secure places, like a private residence. This proposition is not novel in either state or federal court: pedophiles, preferential child molesters, and child pornography collectors maintain their materials for significant periods of time. Id. at 861 (quoting United States v. Lamb, 945 F.Supp. 441, 460 (N.D.N.Y.1996)); see also United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318, 1322-23 (3d Cir.1993); United States v. Koelling, 992 F.2d 817, 823 (8th Cir.1993); United States v. Rabe, 848 F.2d 994, 997 (9th Cir.1988). The district court correctly found that the information in the affidavits was not stale. Finally, Perrine argues the affidavits omitted information that would have vitiated probable cause. Essentially, he reiterates the argument that the affidavits did not state that none of the log ons by the IP address connected to stevedragonslayer occurred on September 2, nor did they attach the Yahoo! Login Tracker, which revealed that fact. He argues that the judge, had he known those facts, would not have found probable cause. For the reasons already stated, we reject this argument. The affidavits gave the issuing judge a substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing] that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even were we to conclude that probable cause was not established, we would affirm the denial of Perrine's motion to suppress under the good faith exception of United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920-24, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984). In Leon, the Supreme Court adopted a good-faith exception to the application of the exclusionary rule and specifically applied that exception where `an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,' even though the search warrant was later deemed to be invalid. United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1249 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920, 104 S.Ct. 3405). In this circuit, we have concluded that `Leon's good faith exception applies only narrowly, and ordinarily only when an officer relies, in an objectively reasonable manner, on a mistake made by someone other than the officer.' United States v. Cos, 498 F.3d 1115, 1132 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Herrera, 444 F.3d at 1249). In this case, law enforcement personnel searched Perrine's house in reliance on warrants issued by a state judge. When reviewing the reasonableness of an officer's reliance upon a search warrant, this court must examine the underlying documents to determine whether they are `devoid of factual support.' Danhauer, 229 F.3d at 1006 (quoting United States v. McKneely, 6 F.3d 1447, 1454 (10th Cir. 1993)). The Leon Court recognized four situations in which an officer would not have reasonable grounds for believing that a search warrant had been properly issued. In any of those situations, the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule does not apply. Thus, if the issuing judge was misled by an affidavit containing false information or information that the affiant would have known was false but for his reckless disregard of the truth, the evidence should be suppressed. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405. Or suppression is required when the affidavit supporting the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable. Id. (further quotation omitted). Additionally, the exception does not apply when a warrant is so facially deficient that the executing officer could not reasonably believe it was valid. Danhauer, 229 F.3d at 1007 (citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. 3405). None of those situations is present in this case.