Opinion ID: 807072
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: (1) Each State shall adopt and submit to the

Text: Administrator, within 3 years (or such shorter period as the Administrator may prescribe) after the promulgation of a national primary air quality standard (or any revision thereof) . . . a plan which provides for implementation, maintenance, and enforcement of such [] standard . . . within such State. 18 (2) Each implementation plan submitted by a State under this chapter . . . shall ... (D) contain adequate provisions–
of this subchapter, any source or other type of emissions activity within the State from emitting any air pollutant in amounts which will– (I) contribute significantly to nonattainment in, or interfere with maintenance by, any other State with respect to any such [NAAQS]. Id. §§ (a)(1) & (a)(2)(D)(i)(I) (emphases added). The plain text requires that within three years of EPA’s promulgation of a NAAQS, States shall submit SIPs, and those SIPs shall include adequate “good neighbor” provisions. This is the unambiguous obligation and chronology established by Congress. EPA has the first duty to set the NAAQS, and then States have series of follow-up duties, listed in section 110(a), to ensure attainment of the NAAQS. Among the duties clearly assigned to States is the inclusion in SIPs of adequate “good neighbor” provisions. The court views this “interpretation” — that is, reading the actual text of the statute — as a scene from Alice in Wonderland. See Op. at 50. It concludes that “[i]n our view, determining the level of reductions required under Section 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I) is analogous to setting a NAAQS. And determining the level of reductions under the “good neighbor” provision triggers a period during which States may submit 19 SIPs.” Id. at 51. Even if the court’s analogy were sound,8 the premise of its analogy does not support its conclusion that EPA’s determination of emission reduction obligations triggers States’ obligations to submit “good neighbor” SIPs. Rather, the court rewrites a decades-old statute whose plain text and structure establish a clear chronology of federal and State responsibilities. Nowhere does the CAA place a requirement on EPA to quantify each State’s amount of “significant contribution” to be eliminated pursuant to the “good neighbor” provision, let alone include any provision relieving States of their “good neighbor” SIP obligations in the event EPA does not first quantify emission reduction obligations.9 The court’s “view” that EPA “determining the level of reductions under the “good neighbor” provision triggers the period during which States may submit SIPs” is irrelevant in view of the unambiguously plain text of section 110(a)(1) and (a)(2)(D)(i)(I), and, if the statute were ambiguous, the court 8 The NAAQS are determined based on what is “requisite to protect the public health” and “public welfare,” 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(b)(1) & (2), and are a uniform national standard. The “good neighbor” provision, on the other hand, is not a separate national standard, but instead is simply one of the CAA’s State-specific mechanisms to ensure attainment of the NAAQS. See 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a)(2)(D)(i)(I). 9 The court’s comparison of section 110 to section 126, see Op. at 52, conflates direct federal regulation of sources with EPA’s statutory authority to enforce requirements that States comply with their “good neighbor” SIP obligations. Given that Congress included a specific provision obligating EPA to promulgate FIPs if States fail to submit adequate SIPs within three years of promulgation of a NAAQS, see CAA § 110(c)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1), and EPA relies on it in the Transport Rule, section 126's federal authorization to regulate specific sources of emissions has no bearing on the statutory analysis here. 20 would be required to defer to EPA’s interpretation that States have an independent obligation to submit “good neighbor” SIPs within three years of promulgation of the NAAQS because that interpretation is permissible under the statute, see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The court’s “role is ‘not to ‘correct’ the text so that it better serves the statute’s purposes’; nor under Chevron may [the court] ‘avoid the Congressional intent clearly expressed in the text simply by asserting that [the court’s] preferred approach would be better policy. The Congress has spoken plainly . . . .” Virginia Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs. v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 678 F.3d 918, 926 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quoting Engine Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 88 F.3d 1075, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). Furthermore, the court’s holding is entirely at odds with the holding in Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663 (D.C. Cir. 2000), see LaShawn A. v. Barry, 87 F.3d 1389, 1395 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc). In Michigan, State petitioners contended that EPA violated the CAA by prospectively informing States what their nitrogen oxides (NOx) emission reduction budgets needed to be to adequately eliminate their amounts of “significant contribution” under the “good neighbor” provision, thus acknowledging their independent obligation to submit adequate “good neighbor” SIPs, see 213 F.3d at 686-87. State petitioners in Michigan argued that EPA had no authority to do what the State petitioners now before the court contend EPA has no authority not to do. In Michigan the court deferred, pursuant to Chevron step two, to EPA’s interpretation it could set State emissions budgets prospectively, given section 110's “silence” on the question, as a permissible exercise of EPA’s general rulemaking authority under CAA section 301(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. 21 § 7601(a)(1).10 Inverting Michigan’s analysis of section 110, the court holds that under Chevron step one, see Op. at 53 n.32, section 110 itself unambiguously requires EPA to prospectively inform States of their “good neighbor” emission reduction requirements. See id. at 46-53. Nothing in section 110, section 301, or any other section of the CAA requires EPA to do this. Instead the court today turns “may” into “must,” and holds that if EPA does not exercise its general rulemaking authority in the manner of the court’s design, then section 110(a)(1)’s and 110(a)(2)(D)(i)(I)’s mandatory, unambiguous requirements that States submit adequate “good neighbor” SIPs within three years of the promulgation of a NAAQS are erased from the statute by judicial fiat — relieving States of the duty Congress imposed.11 The court offers no explanation for how its holding can be squared with Michigan in this regard. The court’s rationale for rewriting the CAA’s plain text is its own conclusion that “the upwind State’s obligation remains impossible for the upwind State to determine until EPA defines it.” Id. at 48 (first emphasis added). In its words, the statute “requires each State to take its own stab in the dark . . . [and] apply [a] homemade definition using its own homemade methodology.” Id. at 55. The court concludes EPA’s 10 Section 301(a)(1) of the CAA provides that “[t]he Administrator is authorized to prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions under this chapter.” 42 U.S.C. § 7601(a)(1). 11 Suffice it to say, it is extraordinarily unusual for a court to conclude, at Chevron step one, that it must delete mandatory obligations from a statute in order to accord with Congress’s plain intent. See Op. at 53 n.32. It is all the more unusual to suggest that an agency’s interpretation is “impermissible” at Chevron step two when the interpretation parrots the text of the statute. 22 interpretation (that is, following the statute’s plain text) produces absurd results, see id. at 53 n.32. Pretermitting whether there is a shred of record evidence to show such an impossibility, a statutory outcome is absurd [only] if it defies rationality[;] . . . an outcome so contrary to perceived social values that Congress could not have intended it.” Landstar Express, 569 F.3d at 498-99 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphases added). To the extent the court’s rationale hinges on its speculation that States lack technical capability and information, this blinks at reality. As counsel for EPA emphasized at oral argument, see Tr. Oral Arg. at 59, 61, without contradiction by any petitioners’ counsel during rebuttal oral argument, States are fully capable of measuring interstate transport of emissions by conducting modeling, and they have done so before and continue to do so: “The states can make that effort, and they can submit SIPs to EPA. Again, that is how the process works in the states that aren’t included in these transport regions.” Id. at 61. Indeed, as this court has recognized, States are charged with operating air quality monitors; “[e]xhaustive technical specifications regulate the States’ operation of a network of air monitors that collect air quality data for any given area.” Catawba Cnty., N.C. v. EPA, 571 F.3d 20, 30 (D.C. Cir. 2009); cf. ATK Launch Sys. v. EPA, 669 F.3d 330, 334 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The air quality monitoring data collected by the States is publically available in the National Emissions Inventory.12 That is, State air quality divisions are no strangers 12 See U.S. EPA, Technology Transfer Network Clearinghouse for Inventories & Emissions Factors, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttnchie1/eiinformation.html (last visited July 23, 2012); see also U.S. EPA, Technology Transfer Network Clearinghouse for Regulatory Atmospheric Modeling, available at http://www.epa.gov/ttn/scram/aqmindex.htm (last visited July 23, 2012) (providing modeling tools). 23 to complex air quality and meteorological modeling of interstate transport of emissions.13 No petitioner suggests that States lack the capability to measure their interstate emissions of pollutants or to access that information from other States to independently determine emission reduction budgets, much less that they have not had time to do so; rather their reason for not doing so appears to stem from insistence (supported by industry sources) that their reduction of emissions not be one iota greater than is necessary for downwind States to attain and maintain NAAQS and that it is easier (and presumably less costly, see Oral Arg. Tr. 58) for EPA to figure this out than it is for the individual States to do so, working cooperatively and using any EPA guidance. This may be so but it does not demonstrate that Congress’s scheme, protecting States’ choices about how to meet NAAQS 13 To cite one example: the State of Texas. The Texas Council on Environmental Quality (“TCEQ”) has published an extensive description of its air quality modeling activities and capabilities on its website. “The TCEQ uses state of the art computer models to simulate the meteorological conditions and chemical reactions that contribute to the formation of air pollutants.” TCEQ, Introduction to Air Quality M o d e l i n g , a v a i l a b l e a t http://m.tceq.texas.gov/airquality/airmod/overview/am_intro.html (last visited July 23, 2012). Furthermore, “TCEQ uses state-of-the-science, four-dimensional computer models that incorporate atmospheric physical laws and measured observations to predict weather conditions over space and time.” TCEQ, Introduction to Air Quality Modeling: M e t e o r o l o g i c a l M o d e l i n g , http://m.tceq.texas.gov/airquality/airmod/overview/am_met.html (last visited July 23, 2012. Indeed, TCEQ uses the same model EPA used to model emission contributions — CAMx. EPA notes in its brief that Texas provided some of the technical data that led to its inclusion in the final Transport Rule. See EPA Br. at 109. These are far from “homemade” methodologies. See Op. at 55. 24 requirements, in part by independently determining ways to meet their “good neighbor” obligation as the States argued in Michigan, is absurd. It is true, as the court notes, see Op. at 53-55, that in two previous “good neighbor” rulemakings EPA afforded States the opportunity to submit SIPs after announcing emission reduction budgets. But an agency is not forever restricted to its previous policy choices or statutory interpretations; instead, it may change course provided it acknowledges it is doing so, presents “good reasons” for doing so, and its approach is “permissible under the statute.” FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515 (2009). Agencies “need not demonstrate to a court’s satisfaction that the reasons for the new policy are better than the reasons for the old one.” Id. The discretion agencies enjoy in modifying their policy approaches is particularly expansive where the agency declines to exercise its discretionary rulemaking authority, as EPA did here. “It is only in the rarest and most compelling of circumstances that this court has acted to overturn an agency judgment not to institute rulemaking.” WWHT, Inc. v. FCC, 656 F.2d 807, 818 (D.C. Cir. 1981). Here, EPA acknowledged its previous approach, see Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,217; NPRM, 75 Fed. Reg. at 45,222-223, and explained its decision in response to comments requesting States be given time to submit SIPs before EPA imposed the Transport Rule FIPs. EPA stated, first, that it had no authority to alter the statutory deadlines for SIP submissions and that the CAA did not require it to issue a rule quantifying States’ “good neighbor” obligations, see Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,220; second, that the court in North Carolina, in remanding rather than vacating CAIR, “emphasized EPA’s obligation to remedy [CAIR’s] flaws expeditiously” and thus “EPA d[id] not believe it would be appropriate to establish a 25 lengthy transition period to the rule which is to replace CAIR,” Transport Rule, 76 Fed. Reg. at 48,220; and third, that in North Carolina this court also required EPA to align upwind States’ emission reduction deadlines with the NAAQS attainment dates of “2015 or earlier,” see North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 930.14 EPA’s decision to adhere to the plain text of the statute, and not to exercise its discretionary general rulemaking authority, see Michigan, 213 F.3d at 686-87, was thus well-explained by the time pressures imposed by this court. See Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515. Inasmuch as those time pressures were animated as well by concern for the public health and welfare — Congress required that attainment with the NAAQS occur “as expeditiously as practicable.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 7502(a)(2)(A) & 7511; see North Carolina, 531 F.3d at 930 — the instant case is particularly ill-suited for overturning EPA’s exercise of its discretion in not adding an additional rulemaking step to the process. Given that the court “will overturn an agency’s decision not to initiate a rulemaking only for compelling cause,” and one of those few compelling reasons is when the decision declining 14 That EPA may, under different circumstances, view it as preferable to prospectively quantify States’ emission reduction obligations, see Op. at 49, is irrelevant to whether EPA’s stated reasons for departing, in the Transport Rule from its previous approach are adequate, given the court’s instruction in North Carolina to expeditiously replace the flawed CAIR and align NAAQS attainment dates. The context of the federal register citations is, EPA’s points out, EPA’s review of a submitted SIP; the preamble does not state EPA must engaged in detailed interstate transport analysis before States must meet their statutory SIP obligations. Furthermore, consistent with the federal register citations noted by the court, EPA has traditionally issued guidance to States on calculating their “good neighbor” emission reduction obligations and it did so here, see, e.g., EPA Guidance on SIP Elements Required Under Sections 110(a)(1) and (2) for the 2006 24-hour Fine Particle (PM2.5) National Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) (Sept. 25, 2009). 26 to promulgate a rule exacerbates “grave health and safety problems for the intended beneficiaries of the statutory scheme,” Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc. v. FERC, 388 F.3d 903, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), it hardly makes sense for the court to require EPA to promulgate a rule when the effect will be to delay health benefits. Indeed, the court is most reluctant to require agencies to promulgate rules “when the interests at stake are primarily economic,” id., and the court’s view that it is “impossible” for States to comply with their independent “good neighbor” obligation under section 110(a) is animated by the burdens that obligation imposes on States and industry sources, see Oral Arg. Tr. 58. In sum, the court’s conclusion that it would have been a “homemade” “stab in the dark” for the States to submit adequate “good neighbor” SIPs prior to promulgation of the Transport Rule lacks a basis in fact, and the court’s speculation that EPA would have inevitably disapproved such submissions, see Op. at 56-57, is just that — speculation. And if that happened, States could judicially challenge the disapprovals, seeking a stay to avoid application of the Transport Rule FIPs. Absent record evidence to suggest that the plain text of the CAA’s “good neighbor” SIP obligation on States leads to “an outcome so contrary to perceived social values that Congress could not have intended it,” Landstar Express, 569 F.3d at 498-99 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added), the court is bound, in view of the host of responsibilities placed on States in the CAA, to enforce the statute as Congress wrote it in plain terms, to give deference to EPA’s permissible interpretations where the CAA is silent or ambiguous, and to adhere to the court’s interpretation of EPA’s authority in Michigan, as well as acknowledge, as the expert agency has advised without contradiction, that States have demonstrated 27 competence to satisfy their plain statutory “good neighbor” obligations.