Opinion ID: 793892
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Present Certain Evidence at Mitigation

Text: 58 Next, Carter claims that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not presenting certain mitigating evidence and testimony during the sentencing phase. The only evidence presented at sentencing was Carter's own statement, in which he described being raised by his troublesome stepfather, acknowledged his anger problems, and stated that he has since turned to prayer and religion to control his temper and counsel troubled youths. State v. Carter, 64 Ohio St.3d 218, 594 N.E.2d 595, 601 (Ohio 1992). Carter argues that trial counsel should have introduced the testimony of his family members regarding his troubled background, including his experiences with drugs and alcohol at an early age, his history of violent behavior, his experience with racial prejudice, and the influence of his alcoholic, philandering father. In support, Carter has submitted affidavits from his mother, Brenda Walton; his step-father, William Walton; his sister, Marrell; his younger brother, LaMarck; his older brother, George, Jr.; his half-sister, Melissa Walton; and his paternal aunt, Mary Carter Coleman. All of the affiants stated they would have been willing to testify if called, and three of them stated they were never contacted by trial counsel. Carter contends that their testimony would have provided the jury with much more mitigating evidence to weigh against the aggravating factors and ultimately would have led to a lesser sentence. 5 59 The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded that Carter had failed to establish either ineffective assistance of trial counsel or prejudice, finding that the affidavits cited by Carter to support this claim contained information which was essentially cumulative to that already presented [in his statement] and did not present evidence sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing on this claim. State v. Carter, Nos. C940375, C-940835, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Oct. 4, 1995). 60 Although it appears that counsel failed to contact three of Carter's family members, his younger brother, LaMarck; his older brother, George, Jr.; and his paternal aunt, Mary Coleman; their testimony would have offered little insight. They do not appear to have witnessed, nor been themselves, significant influences on Carter's life. Conversely, there are no allegations that counsel did not contact the four family members who appear to know more about Carter and his background than anyone else-his mother, his step-father, his sister, and his half-sister. Also, curiously absent from the record is any statement from trial counsel describing what he did or did not do in investigating Carter's background. By not detailing trial counsel's efforts to learn of Carter's background, Carter has provided no basis for a finding that trial counsel's investigation was unreasonable. 61 Even if trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance, Carter was not prejudiced by it. The testimony Carter's family members were prepared to give-other than that which would have been cumulative to Carter's own statement-can hardly be described as mitigating. In fact, the affidavits describe a relatively stable, although imperfect, family environment. There are no allegations of physical or sexual abuse of Carter. While his father, George, Sr., was apparently an alcoholic and may have physically abused his mother, Brenda Walton, once or twice, 6 he left his family around the time Carter was three years old, and Carter has had almost no contact with him since. About the time George, Sr. left, Brenda Walton began dating William Walton, whom she later married. Brenda's children lived with her and William. They were a religious family, attending weekly church services and Bible study classes. William did his best to maintain discipline in the house, often through the use of corporal punishment. Eventually, William and Brenda moved the family from the projects in downtown Cincinnati to Mt. Healthy, Ohio, a more affluent suburb, in order to get the kids into a better atmosphere and escape an area that had become infested with drug pushers. 62 Moreover, had the family members' testimony been admitted, the prosecutor would have been free to extract testimony of Carter's criminal history, his history of drug use and alcohol abuse, and his notoriously quick temper and violent character. There are multiple references in the affidavits to Carter's experience with the criminal justice system, including one incident where Carter turned himself in after beating someone with a baseball bat. Brenda Walton stated that she has seen Carter fight, but that [h]e only jumped on people for a reason. She also recounted that at fourteen or fifteen, Carter began stealing for drug money. Marrell noted that Carter had been expelled from school for breaking a white kid's jaw during a fight. She also stated that Carter had a quick temper.... [His] temper would flare up even if he hadn't been drinking. Carter's brother LaMarck stated that he and Carter fought with [their] fists and had reputations at [their] schools. He further remarked that Carter 63 had a bad temper.... At fifteen he could still be reasoned with, but at twenty a confrontation usually ended in a fight. [Carter] would have to get a punch in and could not stop until he felt like it. As an adult, [Carter] would go off over something as simple as when I chastised our twin brothers. 64 Carter once beat a student and tried to stuff his head down the sewer. George, Jr. said that Carter would fight until he had demolished his opponent or was ready to quit. Several family members also mentioned Carter's penchant for alcohol and regular use of marijuana. In short, the testimony of Carter's family members likely would have reinforced that he was a temperamental, violent person despite his relatively stable background. 65 The Supreme Court has found more limited investigations into a defendant's background justified where any evidence presented would have a double edge. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003) (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987); Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)). This Court has recently stated that counsel's strategic decision to limit testimony about [defendant]'s past in order to prevent `opening-the-door' to evidence of [defendant]'s criminal background supported the reasonableness of the Ohio Court of Appeals' determination regarding the performance of defense counsel. Clark v. Mitchell, 425 F.3d 270, 286 n. 6 (6th Cir.2005). Thus, this Court has concluded that it is not even deficient performance, let alone prejudicial, for trial counsel to fail to introduce evidence of a defendant's background that would likely [make] him look even worse to the jury. Moore v. Parker, 425 F.3d 250, 254 (6th Cir.2005). 66 Given the lack of mitigating evidence available in this case and the likelihood that the testimony of Carter's family members would have done more harm than good, this was a sound decision. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 672-73, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (finding to be reasonable trial strategy counsel's decision to present only Strickland's plea colloquy at sentencing in order to hide damaging evidence of Strickland's criminal history while at the same time emphasizing his remorse and acceptance of responsibility). 67 Carter's reliance on Austin v. Bell, 126 F.3d 843 (6th Cir.1997), is misplaced. In that case, the court vacated Austin's sentence and remanded the case to the district court because of defense counsel's ineffective assistance during sentencing. Id. at 849. Austin's defense counsel did not present any mitigating evidence because he did not think that it would do any good. Id. (emphasis added). The court ultimately found that counsel's  failure to investigate or present any mitigating evidence undermined the adversarial process and rendered the death sentence unreliable. Id. (emphasis added); cf. Hamblin v. Mitchell, 354 F.3d 482, 490 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding ineffective assistance where defense counsel stated in an affidavit that he did not obtain any information into the defendant's background nor did he contact any of the defendant's family members). Unlike the court in Austin, which had before it evidence of counsel's failure to investigate, we simply have no evidence that trial counsel did not investigate Carter's background. Without proof to the contrary, we must assume that counsel did investigate but ultimately decided that the best strategy at sentencing was not to present the testimony of Carter's family members. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([T]he defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101, 76 S.Ct. 158, 100 L.Ed. 83 (1955))); Monzo v. Edwards, 281 F.3d 568, 582 n. 6 (6th Cir.2002) (Petitioner bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.). In short, Carter simply failed to satisfy his burden. 68 Likewise, the three other cases Carter cites as comparable to his own are not. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471; Hamblin, 354 F.3d 482; Frazier v. Huffman, 343 F.3d 780 (6th Cir.2003). As this court has already noted, those three cases involve situations in which counsel failed entirely to seek or present mitigating family-background evidence. Moore, 425 F.3d at 255 (citing Wiggins, Hamblin, and Frazier ). Since Carter has not provided evidence that trial counsel wholly failed to conduct an investigation into his family background, his reliance on Wiggins, Hamblin, and Frazier is misplaced 69 Therefore, we conclude that the Ohio Court of Appeals' denial of relief on this claim was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. 70