Opinion ID: 2823814
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Principles of Equity Reserved Under the Colorado Probate Code

Text: Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â Colorado merged its courts of law and equity during its early days of statehood. Hickerson, Â¶ 11, 316 P.3d at 623. The purpose of a court sitting in equity is to promote and achieve justice with some degree of flexibility, according to the particular circumstances of each case. Garrett v. Arrowhead Improvement Assân, 826 P.2d 850, 855 (Colo. 1992); see also In re Estate of Fuller, 862 P.2d 1037, 1039 (Colo. App. 1993) (stating that where no legal remedy is adequate, âequity may then intervene to fashion a remedyâ); Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mars, 821 P.2d 826, 832 (Colo. App. 1991) (echoing the equitable maxim that â[t]here can be no wrong without a remedyâ). Equity plays a critical role in providing a probate court with authority to account for the unique circumstances of a particular proceeding and to ensure that parties are treated fairly and the decedentâs will is upheld. See, e.g., In re Estate of Leslie, 886 P.2d 284, 287 (Colo. App. 1994) (affirming assessment of administrative costs and fees incurred by the estate against a particular party despite the lack of a specific provision authorizing such action). Indeed, the Probate Code is âequitable in nature.â Id.Â Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â The General Assembly granted probate courts broad equitable jurisdiction. See Â§ 13-9-103(3), C.R.S. (2014) (âThe court has jurisdiction to determine every legal and equitable question arising in connection with decedentsâ, wardsâ, and absenteesâ estates . . . .â). In addition, section 15-10-103 of the Probate Code instructs that, â[u]nless displaced by the particular provisions of this code, the principles of law and equity supplement its provisions.â This section thus preserves the common law and equitable powers the probate court traditionally exercised before adoption of the Probate Code, unless a particular provision displaces that authority. Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â No Colorado case specifically addresses the operation of the term âdisplacedâ in the context of the probate courtâs equitable authority. In Lunsford v. Western States Life Insurance, however, we considered the comparable question of when the Probate Code displaces the probate courtâs common law authority. 908 P.2d 79, 80â81 (Colo. 1985). In that case, we concluded that the Probate Codeâs âslayer statuteâ provision did not preempt common law principles barring payment of life insurance policy proceeds to the insuredâs murderer. Id. at 87â88. We observed that â[s]tatutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed, so that if the legislature wishes to abrogate rights that would otherwise be available under the common law, it must manifest its intent either expressly or by clear implication.â Id. at 87 (emphasis added) (quoting Van Waters & Rogers, Inc. v. Keelan, 840 P.2d 1070, 1076 (Colo. 1992)). We emphasized this presumption against preemption by specifying that a provision of the Probate Code will displace a courtâs common law powers when there has been âexplicit legislative directionâ to do so. Id.; see also Vigil v. Franklin, 103 P.3d 322, 329 (Colo. 2004) (explaining that we recognize modifications to the common law when the legislature has âclearly and manifestly expressed its intent, through the plain language of the statuteâ). Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â Applying the canons of statutory interpretation, when analyzing a specific provision that conflicts with a general provision, our first task is to attempt to give effect to both provisions. Â§ 2-4-205. However, if the conflict between the two is irreconcilable, the special provision controls over the general one. Id. Therefore, we determine that particular provisions of the Probate Code displace a courtâs general equitable authority when an exercise of equity conflicts with the plain language of that specific provision and the two cannot be reconciled.