Opinion ID: 518096
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claddis Arrington and Wayne Davis.

Text: 14 Arrington and Wayne Davis contend that their retrial is barred by the fifth amendment because there was no manifest necessity to declare mistrials against them. Specifically, they argue that since it was not their counsel who was to become a witness at trial, the declaration of mistrials as to them was improper. We disagree. 15 The fifth amendment does not bar retrial where there is manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165 (1824). Under this standard, the prosecution bears the 'heavy' burden of showing a mistrial to have been demanded by a 'high degree' of necessity. United States v. Kwang Fu Peng, 766 F.2d 82, 85 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-06, 98 S.Ct. 824, 830-31, 54 L.Ed.2d 717 (1978)). The finding of manifest necessity does not lend itself to the simple application of precise formulas or rigid rules. Thus, [a] great deal of discretion [is] vested in the trial judge, who is usually best situated to determine the degree of necessity for the declaration of a mistrial. Dunkerley v. Hogan, 579 F.2d 141, 145 (2d Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1090, 99 S.Ct. 872, 59 L.Ed.2d 56 (1979). The trial judge's evaluation is entitled to the highest degree of respect. Washington, 434 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct at 833; see also United States v. Ruggiero, 846 F.2d 117, 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 491, 102 L.Ed.2d 528 (1988); United States v. Mastrangelo, 662 F.2d 946, 950 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 973, 102 S.Ct. 2236, 72 L.Ed.2d 847 (1982). 16 During the trial, Arrington and Wayne Davis announced their intention to call Simels to testify about a critical issue in the case. The problem created by this proposed testimony is not, as argued by defendants, strictly an issue of conflict between an attorney and his client. Regardless of which defendant Simels represented, the jury observed him acting as lead counsel during the entire trial. Thus, the problem presented by Simels' dual role of attorney and witness is whether such a performance so blurs the line between argument and evidence that the jury's ability to find facts is undermined. 17 The inherent difficulties present when a lawyer is both counsel and witness are recognized by Ethical Consideration 5-9 of the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that opposing counsel may be handicapped in challenging the credibility of the lawyer when the lawyer also appears as an advocate in the case. Once a jury sees an attorney take an oath on the witness stand, it may accord testimonial weight to that which he has argued, cf. MacArthur v. Bank of New York, 524 F.Supp. 1205, 1208 (S.D.N.Y.1981), or it may place undue weight on the testimony of an officer of the court. Id. While EC 5-9 contemplates testimony by an attorney on behalf of his client, the same concerns are present when lead defense counsel is called to testify on behalf of a defendant not his client. 18 We do not mean to suggest that an attorney in a multiple-defendant case may never testify on behalf of his client's co-defendant. See United States v. Reeder, 614 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir.1980). The propriety of such testimony is left to the discretion of the trial court. 19 Here, the trial court was in the best position to observe Simels' performance before the jury in his vigorous and lead role as defense counsel. The court carefully considered the nature of Simels' proposed testimony and its critical importance to the defense of Arrington and Wayne Davis. The court's finding that there was manifest necessity to declare mistrials as to Arrington and Davis because the jury would be unable to judge [Simels'] credibility as a witness independently of their view of his activities as a lawyer, was a proper exercise of the court's discretion. 20