Opinion ID: 2107935
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of evidence relating to the destruction of property charge

Text: Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in finding that he destroyed Ms. Deloatch's cell phone because there was no evidence corroborating Ms. Deloatch's allegation that her cell phone was damaged. In reviewing a claim of sufficiency of evidence, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. See Peery v. United States, 849 A.2d 999, 1001 (D.C.2004). In a bench trial, this court will not reverse `unless an appellant has established that the trial court's factual findings are plainly wrong or without evidence to support them.' Id. at 1001 ( quoting Mihas v. United States, 618 A.2d 197, 200 (D.C.1992)). Further, this court cannot reexamine the credibility of witnesses where the trial court has had the opportunity to view and assess their demeanor. In re E.H., 718 A.2d 162, 168 (D.C.1998) (citations omitted). This court has held that in a criminal trial, [a] conviction based upon a single eyewitness identification will not be disturbed if a reasonable juror [or fact finder] could find the circumstances surrounding the identification convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. Frye, 926 A.2d at 1097 (quoting ( Kevin ) Hill v. United States, 541 A.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C.1988) (internal quotations and other citations omitted)). Ms. Deloatch testified that appellant stomped on her phone and smashed it to pieces. Appellant denied damaging Ms. Deloatch's cell phone. The trial court, however, determined that Ms. Deloatch's testimony was significantly more credible and adopted it. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that appellant was guilty of destruction of property. See generally Peery, 849 A.2d 999.