Opinion ID: 2750348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII Tenure Denial Claim

Text: Generally, a Title VII claim is timely under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) if it is filed within either 180 days or 300 days 5 of the alleged discriminatory act. As the Supreme Court explained in Delaware State College v. Ricks, this time period is deemed to have commenced “at the time the tenure decision was made 3 Tiblier v. Dlabal, 743 F.3d 1004, 1007 (5th Cir. 2014). 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-5(e)(3)(A). 5 See Haire v. Bd. of Supervisors of La. State Univ., 719 F.3d 356, 363 n.5 (5th Cir. 2013) (“Under Title VII, a plaintiff alleging gender discrimination must file a complaint with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act or within 300 days if the plaintiff has initially instituted proceedings with a state or local agency with authority to grant relief.”). 5 Case: 13-11225 Document: 00512832068 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/10/2014 No. 13-11225 and communicated” to the aggrieved employee. 6 Accordingly, the date on which this limitation period began to run was May 2010, when the Provost informed Niwayama of the decision to deny her application for tenure. Although the President of the University did not finally reject Niwayama’s appeal and confirm the Provost’s decision until March 2011, the law is clear that the limitation period is not tolled or affected in any way by “the pendency of . . . university grievance procedures,” which a plaintiff voluntarily chose to pursue but legally “need not have pursued” prior to commencing a Title VII lawsuit. 7 As the district court concluded, the tenure denial claim expired under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) in October 2011, and Niwayama filed her lawsuit in May 2012. Niwayama argues, however, that the limitation analysis is altered by the Ledbetter Act. The Act provides that “an unlawful employment practice occurs . . . when a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice is adopted . . . including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole or in part from such a decision or other practice.” In Niwayama’s view, because the Provost’s decision to deny her tenure had consequences for her compensation, the Provost’s decision constituted a “discriminatory compensation decision” under the Ledbetter Act. Accordingly, Niwayama argues, a new Title VII claim for denial of tenure accrued each time she received a paycheck that was affected “in whole or in part” by the Provost’s allegedly discriminatory decision. As authority, Niwayama cites only to Gentry v. Jackson State University, 610 F. Supp. 2d 564, 567 (S.D. Miss. 2009). Niwayama acknowledges, however, that this district court’s decision stands for “a minority view.” 6 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980). 7 See Holmes v. Texas A&M Univ., 145 F.3d 681, 685 (5th Cir. 1998). 6 Case: 13-11225 Document: 00512832068 Page: 7 Date Filed: 11/10/2014 No. 13-11225 Indeed, Niwayama’s argument is contrary to the overwhelming weight of authority on this issue. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit explained that under the Ledbetter Act “hiring, firing, promotion, demotion, and transfer decisions, though often touching on pay, should and do accrue as soon as they are announced.” 8 Similarly, the District of Columbia Circuit held that the Ledbetter Act’s use of “the phrase ‘discrimination in compensation’ means paying different wages or providing different benefits to similarly situated employees, not promoting one employee but not another to a more remunerative position.” 9 The Third Circuit also rejected an argument similar to Niwayama’s because a more “expansive interpretation of ‘other practice’ . . . would potentially sweep all employment decisions under the ‘other practice’ rubric” set forth in the Ledbetter Act. 10 Finally, this Court in an unpublished opinion held that the Ledbetter Act does not apply to “discrete acts” by employers such as “termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, and refusal to hire.” 11 Based on these authorities, therefore, the district court was correct to conclude that the limitation period under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) had run on May 14, 2012 when Niwayama filed her suit. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed Niwayama’s tenure denial claim under Title VII.