Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: whether the trial court erred in finding evans competent to stand trial.

Text: ś 176. On June 4, 1993, defense counsel filed a Motion to Determine Competency. In a letter to the trial court Evans objected to the pleadings and argued that his refusal to consult with his attorneys was not the result of mental incompetency but rather his continued effort to maintain his right to proceed pro se. ś 177. On August 9-11, 1993, the trial court held an extensive hearing to determine whether Evans was competent to stand trial. Seven of Evans current and former attorneys testified that Evans was incompetent to stand trial. Dr. Marc Zimmerman testified on Evans' behalf and concluded that Evans was not competent to stand trial. Dr. Henry Maggio, testifying for the State, concluded that Evans was competent to stand trial. ś 178. Evans now argues the trial court erred in finding that Evans was competent. For the sake of clarity and brevity sub-issues raised by Evans have been consolidated.
ś 179. Evans argues that the trial court erroneously required Evans to prove his competency by substantial evidence. Evans argues that although a defendant has the burden of production at a competency hearing, the prosecution must prove by a preponderance that a defendant is competent to stand trial. ś 180. When making the ruling on competency, the trial court specifically stated that [a]s stated in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572 [2578-79], 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1244, 113 S.Ct. 19, 120 L.Ed.2d 946 (1992), the burden of proof in this case rests upon the movants to prove by substantial evidence that the defendant is mentally incompetent to stand trial. The trial court concluded that the movants failed in the presentment of their case. ś 181. In Emanuel v. State, 412 So.2d 1187, 1188-89 (1982), this Court announced the procedure to be utilized where there is a serious question about an accused's sanity or competency to stand trial. In Emanuel, this Court specifically held [i]t naturally devolves upon the defendant to go forward with the evidence to show his probable incapacity to make a rational defense. Id. at 1188. ś 182. The procedures set forth in Emanuel have been approved by the United States Supreme Court. Griffin v. State, 504 So.2d 186, 191 (Miss.1987). In Griffin, this Court held that although on the federal level the prosecution is required to prove the competency of a criminal defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, this Court would not impose a greater burden on state officials, especially in light of the fact that our procedures for determining competency are specifically designed to afford the accused due process of law and ensure that he is capable of making a rational defense prior to being tried for the crime for which he is accused. Id. (citing Emanuel, 412 So.2d 1187 (Miss. 1982)). In Griffin, this Court held that the State was not required to prove competency beyond a reasonable doubt or by clear and convincing evidence. ś 183. Moreover, in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 448, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2578-79, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1244, 113 S.Ct. 19, 120 L.Ed.2d 946 (1992), the United States Supreme Court held: Once a State provides a defendant access to procedures for making a competency evaluation, however, we perceive no basis for holding that due process further requires the State to assume the burden of vindicating the defendant's constitutional right by persuading the trier of fact that the defendant is competent to stand trial. ś 184. In Medina, the Supreme Court concluded that the allocation of the burden of proof to a criminal defendant to prove incompetence does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 445, 112 S.Ct. at 2577. ś 185. The trial judge committed no error in holding that the burden of proof was allocated to the defense. This issue is without merit.
ś 186. As stated earlier, the procedures which govern a competency determination were set forth in Emanuel v. State, 412 So.2d 1187, 1188-89 (Miss.1982). See also Uniform Rule of Circuit and County Court Practice Rule 9.06 (1996). In Emanuel, this Court held: When the trial court has made a finding that the evidence does not show a probability that the defendant is incapable of making a rational defense, we will not overturn that finding unless we can say, from the evidence, that the finding was manifestly against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. The evidence must show more than a possibility that defendant is incompetent to stand trial-the evidence must go further until it appears to the trial court that there is a probability that defendant is incapable of making a rational defense. In this initial inquiry, the trial judge must weigh the evidence and be the trier of the facts. Emanuel, 412 So.2d at 1189. ś 187. At the hearing on the Motion to Determine Competency, Evans first called Dr. Marc Zimmerman, clinical psychologist with a sub-specialty in forensic psychology. Dr. Zimmerman testified that he visited with Evans on two occasions at the Harrison County Detention Center for a total of approximately ten hours. Zimmerman testified he administered both an MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) and the Short Categories Test. Zimmerman testified that he reviewed Evans' VA and Texas Department of Corrections records; spoke with several of Evans' attorneys and jail personnel; and reviewed pleadings and correspondence drafted by Evans. ś 188. Zimmerman concluded that Evans did not have sufficient capabilities to rationally understand the proceedings against him or to enable him to consult with counsel. Zimmerman also testified that Evans demonstrated psychotic symptoms, such as delusions of persecution and grandeur which prevented him from interacting with counsel in a rational manner because he believed that his attorneys were involved in a conspiracy against him. On cross-examination, Zimmerman highlighted portions of letters written by Evans which purportedly demonstrated the delusions. However, Zimmerman conceded that an individual may be delusional without being psychotic. Moreover, Zimmerman agreed that Evans had been factually correct in representations made to the court. ś 189. Zimmerman concluded that Evans displayed symptoms of paranoid schizophrenia and may have also suffered from organic brain dysfunction. Zimmerman's testimony was consistent with prior psychological evaluations wherein Evans was diagnosed as suffering from schizophrenia and personality disorders. ś 190. Evans' second witness was Capital Defense Association staff attorney John Holdridge. Holdridge testified that he was asked to visit Evans during 1992 by Evans' advisory counsel, James Tucker, and thereafter, had weekly telephone conversations with Evans. Holdridge testified that although intelligent, Evans was not competent to stand trial because Evans did not have the ability to confer with counsel nor did he possess a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings. Holdridge testified that Evans could advise his counsel but not in a rational manner. For example, Holdridge testified that he could not gain any information from Evans about possible mitigation in the pending proceedings. ś 191. Holdridge testified that he had met Evans twice and that Evans became incredibly irrational during stressful situations. On cross-examination, Holdridge conceded that Evans had a factual understanding of the proceedings, but did not understand that an execution would actually take place. Holdridge testified that he had seen Evans make objections and that Evans is a very smart guy and knows a lot about the law. Holdridge testified that he never denied that Evans could make legal arguments, but he could not determine how sound the argument is. ś 192. Evans also called attorney Jim Davis, who represented Evans for approximately one month during 1991. Davis, like Holdridge, testified that he was unable to get Evans to speak about the pending charges during meetings, but rather Evans rambled about collateral matters. Davis testified that Evans was irrational; would not follow advice; and became violent on one occasion. Davis testified that Evans did not possess a rational or factual understanding of the proceedings. On cross-examination, Davis conceded that the majority of defendants trust a public defender less than a retained attorney. Davis also testified that there had been a competency hearing in Texas relating to pending criminal charges wherein Evans had been found competent to stand trial. ś 193. Dale Robinson, a Gulfport attorney appointed to represent Evans for approximately three weeks, was Evans' next witness. Robinson testified that he met with Evans on two occasions for a total of eight hours and shortly thereafter filed a motion to withdraw. Robinson testified that although Evans had a factual understanding of the proceedings, he was not able to consult with his attorneys in a rational manner. Robinson testified that Evans was unable to carry on a coherent conversation and did not trust him. Robinson testified that as formal proceedings grew closer the pressure would cause him to lose whatever little control he continues to lose more and more. On cross-examination, Robinson testified that although Evans did file motions and make objections, he did not make rational decisions. ś 194. James Tucker, Evans' standby counsel for approximately nine months, testified that he was unable to get Evans to help to prepare the case for trial. Tucker testified that Evans was irrational and would not discuss the facts of the case although Evans understood the pending charges and was aware of the potential sentence. Tucker conceded that various motions filed by Evans were articulated in a coherent fashion and that legal research requested by Evans on various issues did appear to be on point with pending legal issues. Moreover, Tucker testified that at times Evans simply did not want to make decisions. ś 195. Fred Lusk, Evans' appointed attorney on federal kidnapping charges, testified that he represented Evans for approximately two months on state charges. Lusk testified that he requested a competency evaluation prior to the federal guilty plea primarily for his own protection, however, after the guilty plea hearing he became more concerned about Evans' competency. Lusk testified that Evans had the ability to understand and respond and was very adamant with his opinions. However, Lusk testified that Evans refused to discuss the facts of the case after he was appointed to represent Evans on state capital murder charges because Evans wanted to proceed pro se. Lusk testified that Evans was very remorseful and wanted the death penalty, but also did things for attention and sought control. ś 196. William S. Boyd, III, Evans' defense counsel at trial, testified that he initially believed Evans was rational. Boyd testified that Evans had some working knowledge of the court system, but would not discuss the preparation of a defense. Rather, Evans only wished to discuss collateral matters. Boyd testified that Evans later began exhibiting signs of paranoia and extreme mistrust. Boyd testified that Evans wanted control and would go into a rage if not in control. Boyd testified that of approximately 120 hours of telephone conversations with Evans approximately two hours were productive. Boyd testified that Evans did not possess a sufficient ability to consult with an attorney nor did Evans have a rational and factual understanding of the proceedings brought against him. However, on cross-examination, Boyd agreed that Evans understood the charges against him and the possible sentence. Boyd also conceded that Evans had been rational at different times since his arrest. ś 197. Defense attorney, Donald Smith indicated, via proffer to the court, that his testimony would be cumulative of Boyd and the opinions were identical. Smith did not testify. ś 198. Dr. Henry Maggio, psychiatrist, was the final witness. Maggio testified that he was asked to evaluate Evans in 1991 in conjunction with the federal guilty plea. Maggio testified that the interview lasted approximately three and a half hours, however, for approximately two hours Evans spoke with his attorney about locating bodies in other murder cases Evans claimed to have committed. ś 199. Evans eventually began his interview with Maggio. Based on his observations and formal evaluation, Maggio concluded that Evans was of normal intelligence and competent to assist counsel and to stand trial. At that time, Maggio did not make a formal diagnosis. Maggio testified that although Evans was very manipulative, he was oriented to person, place, time and situation, and possessed an excellent memory. ś 200. Maggio evaluated Evans for purposes of the state capital murder prosecution during August, 1993. Prior to this visit, Maggio received Evans prior mental health records. Maggio testified that when he arrived Evans was on the phone with his attorney and refused to speak. Maggio testified that Evans was collected, in complete control and manipulative. Following this second examination, Maggio again concluded that Evans was competent to stand trial. Maggio testified that he found no evidence of psychosis or schizophrenia. Rather, Maggio concluded that Evans suffers from mixed personality disorder with paranoid and grandiose features. Maggio described individuals with such disorders as intact with reality, [aware of] what they are doing, ... keen, shrewd, manipulative, cunning, [and] ... commonly known as a con artist. Maggio concluded that Evans has the ability to understand the nature and extent of charges against him as well as the ability to cooperate with counsel if he so chooses. ś 201. On cross-examination, Maggio testified that some assumptions he operated under when formulating his opinion were based on newspaper accounts and conceded that he was irritated with Evans during the evaluation. Maggio disagreed with the previous diagnosis of schizophrenia because Evans did not demonstrate symptoms for a six month period, but acknowledged that Evans had been hospitalized four times for schizophrenia and personality disorders. However, Evans was never under observation for a six-month period and each facility released Evans because he was not psychiatrically incompetent. ś 202. After hearing extensive testimony, the trial court found that substantial evidence demonstrated that Evans was competent to stand trial. In reaching this conclusion the trial judge noted that he placed great value on Evans' appearance and demeanor during court appearances as well as the multitude of motions filed by Evans, each of which demonstrated Evans' understanding of the nature of the charges against him and his ability to rationally confer with counsel. ś 203. Evans, however, argues that the findings of the trial court demonstrate that the trial judge ignored the testimony of seven attorneys who testified that Evans was incompetent to stand trial. As argued by Evans, the United States Supreme Court in Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 450, 112 S.Ct. 2572, 2579-80, 120 L.Ed.2d 353 (1992), reh'g denied, 505 U.S. 1244, 113 S.Ct. 19, 120 L.Ed.2d 946 (1992), acknowledged that defense counsel will often have the best-informed view of the defendant's ability to participate in his defense. Despite Evans' claims, there is no indication that the trial court ignored the testimony of the attorneys. Rather, the trial court allowed extensive questioning of each attorney, followed by questions by the court. Moreover, the trial court specifically indicated that he had relied on the testimony of attorneys Tucker, Lusk and Boyd in making his decision. ś 204. Additionally, a review of the testimony reveals that all of the attorneys conceded that Evans did possess a factual understanding of the proceedings and the charges against him. However, conflicting evidence was presented on the issue of whether Evans could or simply chose not to rationally confer with counsel and aid in his own defense. This type of conflict is properly resolved by the trier of fact. ś 205. Evans also argues that the trial court discounted and ignored the testimony of Dr. Zimmerman, the defense psychologist, because Zimmerman was not a psychiatrist. Evans argues that the trial judge labored under a misconception that a psychiatrist was at a higher and more respected level than a psychologist. ś 206. Evans correctly argues that psychologists are considered competent to evaluate criminal defendants. The record demonstrates the trial judge did have some concerns over the exact subject matter about which a clinical psychologist could testify. Specifically, the trial court was concerned about Zimmerman's testimony about medications. During voir dire, the record reflects that Zimmerman testified that psychologists and psychiatrists function similarly in the clinical evaluation of individuals, but that psychiatrists are medically-trained and may prescribe medication. The trial court simply required Zimmerman to confine his testimony within the bounds of expertise developed on voir dire. While the trial court noted the differences between a medically-trained psychiatrist and a psychologist, there is no indication in the record that the trial court ignored Zimmerman's testimony. ś 207. We are faced with a record which reveals a great deal of conflict and tension among Evans and his attorneys, and conflicting evidence about whether Evans could not or would not aid in the preparation of his defense. The record, however, demonstrates that Evans has the ability to recall events, relate those events and has an excellent memory. There was no dispute that Evans understood the proceedings and charges against him. The conflict in testimony, however, arises over Evans' response to this knowledge. Initially, Evans refused to accept the advice given by his attorneys and chose instead to make statements to law enforcement. Each attorney believed this to be irrational. While Evans perhaps made decisions contrary to his attorneys' advice, this is not the equivalent of mental incompetency. Evans clearly preferred to proceed pro se and did not want the services of an attorney. As a result, Evans was uncooperative with each of the seven attorneys appointed to represent him. However, throughout the trial, Evans consistently displayed an awareness of the proceedings as well as an ability to make objections and confer with counsel and the trial court. There is no dispute that Evans, throughout his lifetime, has been treated for various mental disorders, however, as noted by Dr. Maggio, one suffering from mental illness may be rational and competent to stand trial. From the evidence presented at the hearing, the trial court's decision does not appear to be against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. This issue is without merit.