Opinion ID: 1706978
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether the trial court erred by allowing the expert testimony of phillip bryant.

Text: ¶ 23. Valley Gas contends that the trial court erred by allowing the expert testimony of the Plaintiffs' expert witness, Phillip Bryant, for appraisal values of the personal property of the Plaintiffs that was destroyed by the fire. Valley Gas asserts that the Plaintiff's failed to comply with the discovery rules regarding the seasonable supplementation of responses to its interrogatories by failing to provide the substance of the facts and opinions to which Bryant was to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion, and as a result, this case should be remanded. The Plaintiffs, however, contend that they met their duty of disclosure under the discovery rules because they disclosed Bryant's identity, the subject matter of his testimony, and by providing a summary of the damages suffered by each plaintiff, the substance of his testimony. ¶ 24. Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) of the Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure provides the following: Trial Preparations: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable under subsection (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows: (A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). Rule 26(f)(1)(B) additionally provides that [a] party is under a duty seasonably to supplement his response with respect to any question directly addressed to ... the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of his testimony. Miss. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(1)(B). Furthermore, this same principle of a duty to seasonably supplement responses to interrogatories regarding expert testimony has been expressed by this Court as follows: `a party must not only supplement interrogatories to reveal the identity of expert witnesses expected to be called at trial, but must also supplement interrogatories to reveal the substance of the testimony of such experts, if not stated in answers to the original interrogatories.'  Hudson v. Parvin, 582 So.2d 403, 413 (Miss.1991) (quoting Square D Co. v. Edwards, 419 So.2d 1327, 1329 (Miss.1982)). ¶ 25. In regard to matters relating to discovery, the trial court has considerable discretion. The discovery orders of the trial court will not be disturbed unless there has been an abuse of discretion. Dawkins v. Redd Pest Control Co., 607 So.2d 1232, 1235 (Miss.1992) (citing Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1368 (Miss.1990); Clark v. Mississippi Power Co., 372 So.2d 1077, 1080 (Miss.1979)); see also McCarty v. Kellum, 667 So.2d 1277, 1285 (Miss.1995) (stating that [t]he law within this jurisdiction allows a trial court `wide' and `considerable' discretion that is not to be disturbed unless this Court finds that there has been an abuse of the trial court's discretion). This Court, in Dawkins, set forth the following general guidelines that should be followed in determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion by the trial court: [A] trial court's discretion in the discovery area is generally guided by the principles that (a) the court follow the general policy that discovery be encouraged, (b) limitations on discovery should be respected but not extended, (c) while the exercise of discretion depends on the parties' factual showings disputed facts should be construed in favor [of] discovery, and (d) while the importance of the information must be weighed against the hardships and cost of production and its availability through other means, it is preferable for the court to impose partial limitations on discovery rather than an outright denial. Dawkins, 607 So.2d at 1236 (citations omitted). ¶ 26. In the case sub judice, the trial court allowed the testimony of Bryant over the objection of Valley Gas that it was prejudiced by such testimony because the Plaintiffs did not seasonably supplement its interrogatories with respect to information regarding the substance of Bryant's opinion allowing Valley Gas ample time to prepare for trial. On November 18, 1994, Valley Gas filed a Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Designation of Expert Witnesses or, Alternatively, for Continuance of Trial for Plaintiff's failure to designate its expert witnesses until October 24, 1994 where Valley Gas had specifically requested discovery through a specific interrogatory filed on January 12, 1993. In addition, Valley Gas filed Motions to Compel several of the Plaintiffs to answer certain interrogatories or supplement their responses thereto including specifically Interrogatory No. 6 which asked for information regarding experts consulted or retained for trial, such as the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert was expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. On December 6, 1994, the trial court granted Valley Gas' Motion for Continuance, and in response to the Valley Gas' Motions to Compel, the trial court ordered that the parties be allowed to depose each other's expert witnesses to complete discovery. ¶ 27. On October 24, 1994, the Plaintiffs provided to Valley Gas Bryant's identity as an expert witness to appraise the value of the personal property of the Plaintiffs which was lost as a result of the fire. The Plaintiffs also provided that Bryant's expert opinion would be based on his training and expertise as an appraiser, his review of Plaintiffs' interrogatory responses regarding items lost, and his discussions with the Plaintiffs. Then on May 2 and May 4, 1995, before the trial began on May 8, 1995, Plaintiffs sent through a letter and a facsimile transmission to Valley Gas the appraisal values of the Plaintiffs' personal property destroyed in the fire. ¶ 28. Valley Gas, however, contends that it was prejudiced and precluded from taking full advantage of cross-examination because it was not informed of what items of personal property that Bryant would testify as to its value nor the method which Bryant would use to place a value on the items of personal property. In support of this prejudice, Valley Gas cites to McCarty v. Kellum for the following proposition: It would seem to be a basic requirement that before a party can be afforded liberal cross-examination of an expert witness at trial, that party must be afforded the opportunity to discover a crucial expert's basis. McCarty, 667 So.2d at 1286. However, Valley Gas was afforded the opportunity to discover this information when the trial court ordered that Valley Gas may depose the Plaintiff's expert witnesses. Thus, Valley Gas can not claim prejudice by Bryant's testimony where it was afforded the opportunity to depose Bryant but chose not to do so. ¶ 29. As a result, we hold that the trial court judge did not abuse his discretion in allowing the testimony of Bryant, and thus, this assignment of error is without merit.