Opinion ID: 652876
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Danger to Any Person or the Community.

Text: 41 The rulings of both Judge Sotomayor and Judge Kram regarding Rivera on this issue were entirely conclusory. Judge Sotomayor simply stated that Rivera continues to be a danger to this community, relying in this respect upon the prior rulings of three magistrate judges who had considered the issue of Rivera's release. Judge Kram ruled, without elaboration, that the Court finds that the bail conditions proposed by defense counsel will adequately ensure the safety of community members. Rivera, slip op. at 4. There is a statutory presumption that 42 no condition or combination of conditions will reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the safety of the community if the judicial officer finds that there is probable cause to believe that the person committed an offense for which a maximum term of imprisonment of ten years or more is prescribed in the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act (21 U.S.C. Sec. 951 et seq.). 43 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). That presumption is obviously applicable to Rivera (and Millan) in this case. Cf. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d at 88 (presumption continues to be weighed even after presentation of rebuttal evidence); Jackson, 823 F.2d at 6-7 (same). In addition, in making a release assessment, a judicial officer must take into account: 44 (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including whether the offense is a crime of violence or involves a narcotic drug; 45 (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 46 (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including-- 47 (A) the person's character, physical and mental condition, family ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and 48 (B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and 49 (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person's release. 50 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(g)(1)-(4) (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (emphasis added). 51 In assessing these considerations, we note that Rivera was arrested in 1982 for possession of a controlled substance, was again arrested in 1983 for loitering and the unlawful use of a controlled substance, and pled guilty to these charges. Rivera was convicted of criminally negligent homicide in the 1983 shooting death of his wife. Moreover, much of the ongoing criminal activity charged in the indictment occurred during Rivera's five years of probation following his homicide conviction. 52 The district court's assessment of Millan's dangerousness was more extensive. At the outset of the memorandum in which his release was ordered, the court explicitly stated that the evidence presented supports Millan's continued detention on the ground[ ] of dangerousness, Millan, 824 F.Supp. at 39, but concluded that such detention was constitutionally impermissible. Id. Its subsequent discussion of the issue, however, expressed a more mixed view. 53 After summarizing testimony by former Blue Thunder confederates that Millan had ordered numerous shootings, beatings, and a contract murder, and had issued threats against the families of witnesses who testified adversely to him at trial, the court stated that Millan did not present[ ] a danger to any specific individual, id. at 44, noting that he had not individually threatened the testifying confederates or their families, and that the cooperating witnesses had difficulty attributing any specific acts of violence directly to Millan because (in the words of one of the witnesses) he gets others to do his dirty work for him very often. Id. 54 The court then inferred that the principal concern raised by the prosecution was the prospect that Millan would return to criminal activity to the detriment of the community. Id. at 45 (citing United States v. Leon, 766 F.2d 77, 81 (2d Cir.1985) (it is clear that the harm to society caused by narcotics trafficking is encompassed within Congress definition of 'danger' )). The court concluded that an adequate likelihood of recidivism had not been established to warrant continued confinement, noting that the offenses charged are Millan's first and that his alleged misconduct occurred over two years ago [i.e., before he was detained]. The court's ultimate conclusion was that continued detention, beyond twenty-three months, of a person presumed to be innocent is fundamentally unfair and violates due process. Id. 55 In our view, the district court employed an erroneous analysis in assessing the danger that Millan posed to the safety of any other person or the community within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3142(e)-(g) (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The court invoked a statement in S.Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3195, that: The reference to safety of any other person is intended to cover the situation in which the safety of a particular identifiable individual, perhaps a victim or witness, is of concern.... The report goes on to state that the language referring to the safety of the community refers to the danger that the defendant might engage in criminal activity to the detriment of the community. Id. The district court concluded, in effect, that because drug trafficking falls within the concept of danger to the community, the prosecution's contentions that Millan posed a danger to the community should be confined to the likelihood that he would resume such activity; and that the absence of a particularized threat to intimidate a specific witness precluded a finding that Millan posed a danger to the safety of any other person. 56 We reject this analysis. Our ruling in Leon that narcotics trafficking constitutes criminal activity to the detriment of the community of the sort envisioned by the Senate report should not be read to imply that obstruction of justice by intimidation of witnesses does not fit within the concept. Further, the notion that only threats to particular, specified witnesses provide a basis for detention is contravened by our ruling in United States v. Gotti, 794 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.1986). 57 In that case, a specific past instance of witness tampering was deemed to provide an adequate basis for confinement in the face of Gotti's claim that the due process clause prohibits pretrial detention based on a prediction that a defendant will intimidate witnesses because he has done so in a prior case. Id. at 779 (emphasis added). The district court opinion that we affirmed was similarly unspecific, concluding only that if continued on bail John Gotti would improperly influence or intimidate witnesses in this case. United States v. Gotti, 634 F.Supp. 877, 887 (E.D.N.Y.) (emphasis added), aff'd, 794 F.2d 773 (2d Cir.1986). 58 Neither the district court nor this court required the identification of a particular trial witness or witnesses that might be the object of influence or intimidation. We reject the notion that such an identification is required in the instant case, where credible testimony has been presented that Millan repeatedly threatened to harm any witnesses that might testify against him, and their families. Cf. Rodriguez, 950 F.2d at 88 (repudiating requirement imposed by district court that the violent conduct witnessed by the informant be connected to the activity charged in the indictment). 59 We conclude that the district court did not adequately examine the issue of dangerousness with respect to Rivera, and conducted a legally flawed examination with respect to Millan. See Shakur, 817 F.2d at 196 (The clearly erroneous standard does not apply to the district court's ultimate finding ... if the court has made an error of law.) (citing Melendez-Carrion, 790 F.2d at 994). It is our view that both Rivera and Millan would pose a very serious danger to the community in the event of their pretrial release on bail. We note in this respect that: 60 the constitutional limits on a detention period based on dangerousness to the community may be looser than the limits on a detention period based solely on risk of flight. In the former case, release risks injury to others, while in the latter case, release risks only the loss of a conviction. 61 Orena, 986 F.2d at 631. 62