Opinion ID: 2390579
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: General Voir Dire

Text: Defendant alleges for the first time on appeal that inadequate voir dire denied him his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury in violation of the federal and state constitutions. Specifically, defendant claims that the trial court's voir dire failed to elicit sufficient information concerning the jurors' attitudes toward the death penalty and toward racial prejudice to enable counsel intelligently or effectively to exercise his right to challenge. Our independent review of the entire voir dire process leads us to conclude that the voir dire questioning was adequate. Voir dire attempts to assure an impartial jury, a critical and indispensable component of a fair trial. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 409, 550 A. 2d 1172 (1988) ( Williams II ). The test for determining juror ineligibility to serve in capital cases is whether the prospective juror's opinions, be they for or against the death penalty, would `prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties in accordance with his instructions and his oath.' State v. Bey, supra, 112 N.J. at 151, 548 A. 2d 887 (citations omitted); see also State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 255, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987) (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed. 2d 581, 589 (1980)). The examination of each juror's views on capital punishment must be sufficiently probing to assure compliance with the governing legal standards, and open-ended questions requiring the juror to articulate those views in his or her own words are preferable. State v. Hunt, 115 N.J. 330, 354, 558 A. 2d 1259 (1989); Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 413, 550 A. 2d 1172. The questions and instructions used by the trial court to select death-qualified jurors showed a balanced discussion about the differing views that jurors might have about the death penalty, the only qualification being that they could follow the court's instructions. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 480, 575 A. 2d 435 (1990); see also State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 29, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987) (an independent review of the record reveals that the overall scope and quality of the voir dire was sufficiently thorough and probing to assure the selection of an impartial jury.). In addition to basic biographical information requested by the questionnaire, each juror was asked specific questions aimed at exposing the impact of a defendant's or witness's drug use or homosexuality on the juror's assessment of that person. Moreover, while the voir dire was conducted by the trial court, the court readily accommodated any request by defense counsel for additional voir dire. Defendant, relying on Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172, decided after this trial, argues that the court's introductory remarks explaining that jurors would be disqualified only if personally-held beliefs prevented them from following the law were in error. In Williams II, the Court expressed serious reservations about such an instruction because it tells a juror what answers during the death qualification process lead to automatic excusal and what responses avoid excusal. Id. at 412, 550 A. 2d 1172. Defendant argues that the two excluded death-scrupled jurors, Thomas Seavey and Kevin Mauro, purposely disqualified themselves, noting that both indicated an inability to sit for the extended period the court estimated the case would take. The trial court obviously was not aware of this Court's disapproval of the instruction, but it is apparent that it did not operate negatively in defendant's case. The trial court's instructions contained a balanced discussion about the differing views that jurors might have about the death penalty, the only qualification being that they could follow the court's instructions. State v. Long, supra, 119 N.J. at 480, 575 A. 2d 435 (rejecting similar claim). Moreover, many jurors who were qualified expressed similar difficulties with participation in a long trial. Most importantly, a review of the voir dire of jurors Seavey and Mauro plainly shows that each tried to answer the trial court's inquiries honestly. Nothing indicates an intent to get excused from jury duty. There is no indication that the preliminary instruction was harmful. Although further inquiry into the views of a particular juror might have further assisted counsel in the evaluation of that juror, the trial court complied with our instruction in State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 354, 558 A. 2d 1259, and Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 413, 550 A. 2d 1172, by assuring each juror's compliance with the governing legal standards and by using open-ended questions requiring the juror to articulate his or her views in his or her own words. There was nothing perfunctory about the process; rather, the trial court's mixture of open-ended initial questioning and more-particularized follow-up questioning nicely meshed the duty to probe sufficiently with allowing a juror to use his or her own words. Nothing in that process resulted in prejudice to the defendant or the impaneling of a jury that could not perform its duty in accordance with its instruction or oath. See Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 151-52, 548 A. 2d 887; State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 255, 524 A. 2d 188.