Opinion ID: 201444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Applicability of the Settlement Act

Text: 15 The Wampanoag Tribe claims that the Settlement Act did not extinguish their rights to the land in question because it extinguished aboriginal title in Rhode Island, and the Tribe argues they hold something more than aboriginal title to the disputed land. In addition, the Wampanoags argue that the Settlement Act does not apply to their claim to the land because they never transferred their rights in the disputed land.
16 The Tribe claims that the deed generated by the transaction between the predecessors to the Wampanoag Tribe and Captain Willett in 1661 converted their interest in the disputed land from aboriginal title to either recognized title or fee simple deeded title. As such, the Tribe argues that their claim to the disputed land has not been extinguished by the Settlement Act, which extinguished only Indian land claims by Indians qua Indians. See H.R.Rep. No. 95-1453, at 12 (Extinguishment of Indian land claims is limited to those claims raised by Indians qua Indians, and is not intended to affect or eliminate the claim of any Indian under any law generally applicable to Indians as well as non-Indians in Rhode Island.). The Tribe claims that if the colonists were given a fee simple in the land then deeded to them by Willett, the Indians must also have received a fee simple estate to their Indian reservation, regardless of the nature of their prior holdings. In the alternative, the Tribe argues that the deed should be considered a recognized treaty title of a reservation of land to the Indians. Upon reviewing these arguments, we find that the deed in question does not give the Wampanoag Tribe recognized title or fee simple title to the land in question. 17 An Indian tribe establishes aboriginal title by showing that it has inhabited the land from time immemorial. Mashpee Tribe v. Secretary of the Interior, 820 F.2d 480, 481-82 (1st Cir.1987) (quoting County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985)). This right does not have to be traced to a written document or land grant. Instead, the tribe must show historical evidence of the tribe's long-standing physical possession of the land. Zuni Indian Tribe v. United States, 16 Cl.Ct. 670, 671 (1989). The Supreme Court has defined this right not as a fee simple property right, but rather as a right of occupancy which the sovereign [Federal Government] grants and protects against intrusion by third parties. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279, 75 S.Ct. 313, 99 L.Ed. 314 (1955). This right of occupancy may be terminated and such lands fully disposed of by the sovereign itself without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians. Id. 18 Specific congressional action ... is necessary to `recognize' aboriginal title. Zuni Indian Tribe, 16 Cl.Ct. at 672. Generally recognized title to Indian lands is recognized via federal treaty or statute. Id. While [t]here is no particular form for congressional recognition of Indian right of permanent occupancy, it is clear that there must be a definite intention by congressional action or authority to accord legal rights, not merely permissive occupation. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians, 348 U.S. at 278-79, 75 S.Ct. 313. There is nothing to indicate any intention by Congress to grant to the Wampanoags any permanent rights in the lands of Rhode Island. The Wampanoags are not a federally recognized tribe and the House Report at the time of the Settlement Act clearly stated that Congress did not believe there were any possible Indian claims in Rhode Island other than those of the Narragansetts. H.R.Rep. No. 95-1453, at 13. 19 In addition to recognized title as a result of direct congressional action, [i]ndians holding recognized title to land under a foreign government may retain their title under the United States Government if such is provided for by international agreement or treaty. Zuni Indian Tribe, 16 Cl.Ct. at 672. There is no indication of a treaty or agreement under which the United States would have retained recognized title for the Wampanoags to lands which they do not appear to have even occupied at the time the Union was formed. According to the Tribe's complaint, Captain Willett was authorized by the General Court of New Plymouth to negotiate the North Purchase with the Tribe's ancestors. The area later became a part of the colony of Rhode Island pursuant to the Charter of King Charles II, dated July, 15, 1663. [T]he charter of the crown was considered as indispensable to [the] completion of an Indian grant in order for it to constitute a complete title. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603, 5 L.Ed. 681 (1823) (discussing the Rhode Island Charter granted by Charles II and the Charter's sanction [of] a previous unauthorized purchase from Indians). 3 The deed in question was not recorded or tendered to the Court of New Plymouth until April 10, 1666, when Captain Willett transferred the conveyance to the court. Then, in 1672, the transfer was confirmed in the first book of the records of the Rehoboth North Purchase. The book described the purchased lands, and confirmed that excepted out of this purchased land was a Meete proportion of lands for the use of the Indians at Sinnichiteconett (also known as Mishanegitatonett). 4 We see nothing in this history that shows a treaty or international agreement establishing recognized title for the Wampanoags by the colonial sovereign which would have been retained by the United States government upon its formation. For the above reasons, we find that the Wampanoag Tribe does not have recognized title to the disputed lands. 5 20 We also fail to see any indication that the deed was ever intended to convey fee simple title to the Indians. As we previously noted, the deed reserved a competent portion of the land for some of the Natives at Mishanegitatonett for to plant and sojourn upon. This is the same as saying that Captain Willet took ownership to all of the land, including underlying fee title to the Indian land that was reserved so that the Wampanoags' ancestors could continue to occupy and use the land. 21 What the Wampanoags do have is a right that appears to fall somewhere between aboriginal title and recognized title. As we noted, recognized title is not completely separate from and a replacement of aboriginal title, but rather lends a more permanent property right to the holder of aboriginal title, resulting in a right to compensation under the Fifth Amendment if the property is taken. Zuni Indian Tribe, 16 Cl.Ct. at 672. The Wampanoag Tribe had aboriginal title to the land at the time of its negotiations with Captain Willet in 1661, based on their historical presence and use of the land. While the Tribe argues that the Charter provided them with greater title, this cannot be, because the Charter was not granted until two years after the transaction creating the deed. We agree with the district court that the deed did not alter the aboriginal status of the Wampanoags' interest in the land. Greene v. Rhode Island, 289 F.Supp.2d 5, 11 (D.R.I.2003). The deed merely reserved for the Wampanoags a portion of the land over which they would continue to have aboriginal title and could continue to use as they had from time immemorial.
22 In its complaint, the Wampanoag Tribe sought, among other things, possession of the subject land, damages, disgorgement of any unjust enrichment as a result of the illegal taking of the subject lands, and a declaration that the State authorized the taking of the subject lands from the ancestors of the Tribe in violation of federal and state common law and in violation of the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act (the Indian Nonintercourse Act), 25 U.S.C. § 177. On appeal, the Tribe reasserts that the Settlement Act does not bar their claims to the subject land because the Tribe's right to use and occupy the land was never transferred. The State maintains that the Settlement Act extinguished the Tribe's claims because the land can be found to have been transferred under the Settlement Act's broad definition of a transfer. We find that the provisions of the Settlement Act bar the Tribe's land claims. 6 23
24 In provisions pertinent to this dispute, the Settlement Act provides for the ratification of various transfers of land and natural resources, extinguishment of aboriginal title, and the elimination of any further Indian claims arising subsequent to the transfer to land and natural resources in Rhode Island. Specifically, the Settlement Act ratified any transfer of land or natural resources located anywhere within the State of Rhode Island outside the town of Charlestown from, by, or on behalf of any Indian, Indian nation, or tribe of Indians as congressionally approved as of the date of the transfer. 25 U.S.C. § 1712(a)(1). The Act also provided for ratification of any transfers of land or resources located within the town of Charlestown. Id. § 1705(a)(1). The Settlement Act defines a transfer as including, but not limited to, any sale, grant, lease, allotment, partition, or conveyance, any transaction the purpose of which was to effect a sale, grant lease, allotment, partition, or conveyance, or any event or events that resulted in a change of possession or control of land or natural resources.  Id. § 1702(j) (emphasis added). 25 The Act then extinguished any Indian claims of aboriginal title to all such property as of the date of the transfer. Id. §§ 1705(a)(2), 1712(a)(2). The Settlement Act also provided that: 26 by virtue of the approval of such transfers of land or natural resources effected by this subsection or an extinguishment of aboriginal title effected thereby, all claims against the United States, any State or subdivision thereof, or any other person or entity, by any such Indian, Indian nation, or tribe of Indians, arising subsequent to the transfer and based upon any interest in or rights involving such land or natural resources ( including but not limited to claims for trespass or claims for use and occupancy ), shall be regarded as extinguished as of the date of the transfer. 27 Id. § 1712(a)(3) (emphasis added). 28 The Settlement Act included an exception to these provisions that section 1712 would not apply to any claim, right, or title of any Indian, Indian nation, or tribe of Indians that is asserted in an action commenced in a court of competent jurisdiction within one hundred and eighty days of the Settlement Act's enactment. Id. § 1712(b). 29 The Wampanoags contend that following the transfer of land to Captain Willett in 1661, the Tribe never transferred their interest in the remaining portion of land which was reserved for them in the deed. Therefore, the Wampanoags argue, the Settlement Act does not apply to their land claim. In bringing this suit, however, the Wampanoag Tribe has declared that it has been wrongfully dispossessed of these lands. The Settlement Act's broad definition of transfer includes a catchall — any event or events that resulted in a change of possession or control, Id. § 1702(j) — which shows Congress's intent to include a situation such as this one, where the Wampanoags clearly had an Indian claim to the land long ago and now cease to possess the land. In addition, the Settlement Act ratified any transfer of land from, by, or on behalf of any Indian, Indian nation, or tribe of Indians. Id. §§ 1705(a)(1), 1712(a)(1) (emphasis added). This would certainly encompass the Wampanoag Tribe of Indians. We therefore agree with the district court's conclusion that this broad language precludes claims such as those asserted by the Wampanoags in this case. 30 The Settlement Act left a brief window in which claims such as the Wampanoags' could be brought. Id. § 1712(b). However, because the Wampanoags failed to bring their claims within the 180-day statute of limitation period provided for in section 1712(b), they are now barred from asserting the claims presented in this suit. 31