Opinion ID: 2338335
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Due Process Concerns From Delayed Production of Documents

Text: The defendant contended that the trial justice erred in denying his alternate motions for a mistrial or a continuance given the state's late production of the Harmony Hill documents andCarl's juvenile record. [1] As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that defendant never requested that a subpoena issue to either the state or Harmony Hill pursuant to Rule 17(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. When asked at trial whether there was ever a Rule 17(c) subpoena seeking the Harmony Hill documents, defendant's counsel replied it is entirely possible I did not issue the 17(c). I believe I may have. I'm not going to guarantee that I did. The record fails to demonstrate that defendant sought the production of Harmony Hill documents by a subpoena issued pursuant to Rule 17(c). [2] The defendant's sole request for the Harmony Hill documents was in his motion for exculpatory evidence, on October 17, 2002, which did not cite a rule. This motion was in addition to defendant's motion for discovery and inspection, on November 30, 1999, which was made pursuant to Rule 16 of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure. The defendant stated that the grounds for the additional motion for exculpatory evidence were  Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 [, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (1963), and its progeny, including State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907 (R.I.1986), and Rhode Island Constitution [a]rticle [1], [s]ections 2 and 10, and the United States Constitution Amendments V, VI, and XIV. Among the items requested were All of [Carl's] records at The Harmony Hill School, including his disciplinary records. On February 19, 2001, defendant's counsel was issued a Notice of Court Appearance directing him to appear at the Superior Court on March 2, 2001, with respect to the Motion For Exculpatory Evidence. In a criminal case action report, dated February 16, 2001, on Defendant's Motion For Exculpatory Evidence, the Superior Court justice noted: Records received for Harmony Hills [ sic ] School. Filed in locked cabinet in Clerk's office. Shortly thereafter, defendant received the 100 pages that he eventually determined, at trial, to be incomplete. [3] We have held that with respect to persons whom the [s]tate expects to call as witnesses, Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure requires that the state produce only prior recorded statements of a witness, a summary of the witness's expected trial testimony, andany records of prior convictions. State v. Brown, 709 A.2d 465, 469 (R.I.1998); State v. Kelly, 554 A.2d 632, 635 (R.I.1989). When evidence does not fit one of these three categories, but may nonetheless be helpful to defendant's effective cross-examination of a witness, a defendant's right to that evidence arises from the right of confrontation, and thus becomes an issue only when a defendant is improperly denied the ability to confront and to effectively cross-examine an adverse witness at trial. Kelly, 554 A.2d at 635. We are of the opinion that in this case defendant's right to confrontation was not violated because defendant was never improperly denied the ability to confront and to effectively cross-examine Carl, who was a witness against defendant. Brown, 709 A.2d at 469. Moreover, we believe that defendant's due process rights were not violated here even if the evidence was required to have been produced before trial. Having determined that there was no violation of Rule 16 in this case, we turn now to defendant's argument that the state failed to comply with its obligation to produce exculpatory evidence in accordance with Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and its progeny. The duty of the state to produce evidence favorable to the accused is grounded in the guarantee of due process in a criminal trial and imposes an obligation on the prosecution to produce evidence that is material either to guilt or punishment, even in the absence of a request by the accused. Cronan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 880 (R.I. 2001) (quoting Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1197, 10 L.Ed.2d at 218). The duty to disclose can encompass impeaching material as well as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 490 (1985). The first factor we examine in the due process inquiry is the reason for the nondisclosure. Cronan, 774 A.2d at 880. We have consistently applied a deliberate suppression standard that provides even greater protection to criminal defendants than the one articulated [by the UnitedStates Supreme Court]. Id. A nondisclosure is deliberate, and thus grounds for a new trial regardless of the degree of harm to the defendant, whenever the prosecution makes ` a considered decision to suppress    for the purpose of obstructing' or where it fails `to disclose evidence whose high value to the defense could not have escaped    [its] attention. ' Id. (quoting State v. Wyche, 518 A.2d 907, 910 (R.I.1986) and United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 146-47 (2d Cir.1968)). In this case, there is no allegation that the state made a deliberate or considered decision to suppress the additional Harmony Hill documents. Therefore, we must consider whether the information was of such a high value to defendant that it could not have escaped the state's attention. The defendant has articulated no basis on which we can conclude that the state should have known that the records it originally produced were incomplete. Further, defendant has uncovered no evidence suggesting that the documents could not have escaped the state's attention. Therefore, the late disclosure of the additional Harmony Hill materials was not deliberate, but rather absolutely unintentional [and] inadvertent. In re Ouimette, 115 R.I. 169, 179, 342 A.2d 250, 255 (1975). Moreover, as the trial justice noted, the missing Harmony Hill materials were uniquely familiar to defendant, who was employed by Harmony Hill for much of the period to which they refer. Any responsibility for the delayed production of documents properly falls on defendant, who was afforded six months to examine the records that were previously produced. When, as here, the nondisclosure was unintentional, we next consider the prejudicial effect of the nondisclosure. State v. Oliveira, 774 A.2d 893, 905 (R.I.2001). In these circumstances, defendant bears the burden of establishing that it was prejudicial, id., by showing that the nondisclosed evidence was material because there is a reasonable probability that, hadthe evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1948, 144 L.Ed.2d 286, 301 (1999) (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682, 105 S.Ct. at 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d at 494 (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The defendant's cross-examination of Carl delved into his numerous specific acts of misconduct and elicited from Carl multiple admissions of misdeeds and deception. For example, defense counsel gained Carl's admission that he had been suspended from Smithfield High School for touching a girl and a bunch of people in a sexually inappropriate manner. Defense counsel also asked Carl about his infractions while at Harmony Hill. In response, Carl acknowledged that he stole jewelry and other items, that he was placed on unsafe status many times for lying to the staff, and that he lodged a false accusation of stealing against defendant. In addition, counsel elicited Carl's admission that he stole a picture frame from a home, assaulted his grandmother and sister, and stole from various family members. At most, had defendant received the additional Harmony Hill documents earlier, defense counsel may have elicited from Carl some additional impeaching admissions. In our opinion, defendant's merely raising the possibility of doing so is not sufficient to establish that, had the evidence been produced sooner, there is a reasonable probability that defendant would not have been convicted. We conclude here, as we did in State v. Bassett, 447 A.2d 371, 377 (R.I.1982), that any additional impeaching statements would merely have been cumulative for impeachment purposes, and thus they fail[] the test of the likelihood that [they] would have produced a reasonable doubt of guilt. Therefore, we hold that the late disclosure in this case did not violate defendant's right to due process because it was not deliberate, and there was noreasonable probability that the jury verdict would have been different had the additional records from Harmony Hill been produced earlier. In addition, no allegation has been made that the state made a considered effort to suppress Carl's out-of-state juvenile record. The only known reference to the juvenile record was in the additional Harmony Hill documents, and consequently the juvenile record was not information that could not have escaped    [the state's] attention for the same reason the documents themselves were not. Cronan, 774 A.2d at 880 (quoting Wyche, 518 A.2d at 910 and Keogh, 391 F.2d at 146-47). Therefore, defendant had the burden of establishing that he was prejudiced by the late disclosure. On cross-examination, defense counsel did ask Carl about his juvenile record and specifically inquired whether he had pled guilty    to a larceny and a burglary charge. Moreover, Carl testified on redirect that he had had some problems with stealing and not always telling the truth. Indeed, defendant argued that a new trial was warranted in this case precisely because so much evidence was introduced challenging Carl's credibility. Furthermore, the defendant has not identified how his defense would have been different had he learned about the juvenile record sooner. See State v. Allessio, 762 A.2d 1190, 1192-93 (R.I.2000) (per curiam). Thus, defendant has not met his burden of showing that, had the additional documents been produced earlier, there is a reasonable probability that he would not have been convicted. Therefore, the material that defendant sought from Harmony Hill is not Brady exculpatory evidence that the state was obligated to produce earlier.