Opinion ID: 3159995
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suppression of March 20, 2012 Statement

Text: Appellant next contends that the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by failing to suppress the statement he made to police on March 20, 2012, after he was handcuffed and arrested for the murder of Jaques11 At this point in time, the 10 As noted, the trial court also denied suppression of the November 11, 2011 statement on the ground that Appellant was not in custody. While Appellant asserts that he was a suspect on November 11, 2011, and that the police interrogated him to obtain incriminating statements, Brief for Appellant at 32, he does not suggest that his freedom was restricted in any way during the interview and does not dispute that he left the police station when the interview concluded. See Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1028 (Pa. 2012) (holding that “a person is in custody for Miranda purposes only when he is physically denied his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation”) (internal citations omitted). 11 The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is offense-specific and cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions; it only attaches at the commencement of prosecution, i.e., when criminal proceedings are initiated by charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, (continuedN) [J-2-2015] - 27 autopsy report had been released, which indicated that the cause of Jaques’s death was blunt force trauma and that the manner of death was homicide. While still handcuffed after the arrest, Detective Clarkson read Appellant Miranda warnings and he indicated that he understood his rights. 12 When asked if he wanted to make a statement, Appellant responded, “I’ll answer whatever you want, you know, I could care less. I already told you that.” Interview Transcript, Mar. 20, 2012, at 3. Consistent with the two previously recorded statements provided to police on November 7, 2011, and November 11, 2011, Appellant reiterated that he had “popped” Jaques for defecating on the carpet, grabbed him by his ear in an effort to get him upstairs to the bathroom to clean up, left him in the bathtub alone, discovered Jaques unresponsive in the bathtub minutes later, and subsequently went to the neighbor’s house for help. Id. at 6-20. When the detective confronted Appellant with the findings in the autopsy report, he denied any physical abuse or wrongdoing. Id. at 22-28. At the end of the interview, the detective told Appellant what was going to happen following his arrest, to which he responded that his attorney was Clarence Allen, and that he had just seen him at the corner barber shop. Id. at 27. (Ncontinued) information, or arraignment. Commonwealth v. Keaton, 45 A.3d at 1065 (citing McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. at 175). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is to protect the accused during critical confrontations with the government, after the adverse positions of government and the defense have solidified regarding a particular alleged crime. Id. (citations omitted). 12 The well-known and often-cited Miranda warnings caution that the accused has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can and will be used against him in court, and that the accused has the right to consult with counsel and to have counsel present during interrogation; if he is indigent, counsel will be appointed for him. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-69, 471-72. [J-2-2015] - 28 Appellant acknowledges that Detective Clarkson provided him with Miranda warnings, but contends that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because Detective Clarkson “failed to advise [him] that even if he talked to police, he could stop the interrogation at any time and request an attorney.” Brief of Appellant at 33. Absent such specific direction, Appellant claims, his waiver of the right to counsel was invalid as it was not knowingly made. The Commonwealth summarily refutes this claim, emphasizing that Detective Clarkson advised Appellant of his Miranda warnings and Appellant waived those rights expressly prior to making his statement to police. The trial court agreed with the Commonwealth, holding that Appellant’s recorded statement given to police on March 20, 2012 did not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. It found that when Appellant was given his Miranda warnings, he indicated that he understood them, and when asked whether he wanted to give a statement, replied, “I’ll answer whatever you want, you know. I could care less. I already told you that.” Transcript of March 20, 2012 Interview, at 3. The trial court concluded that this commentary established that Appellant acknowledged his right to counsel and validly waived the same. As before, we conclude that the facts as found by the suppression court are supported by the record and the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. The record demonstrates that Appellant was informed of his right to counsel and, nevertheless, indicated that he wanted to give a statement in the absence of counsel. Nothing more is required under the law.