Opinion ID: 590729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: eligibility for political asylum

Text: 3 Under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), the Attorney General has discretion to grant asylum to refugees. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 428 n. 5 (1987). The Immigration and Naturalization Act in turn defines a refugee as a person who is unable to return to his country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.... 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). We review the BIA's factual determination that an alien has failed to prove a well-founded fear for substantial evidence, and will not reverse if the conclusion is substantially reasonable. De Valle v. INS, 901 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir.1990). The same standard applies to our review of credibility assessments. See Turcios v. INS, 821 F.2d 1396, 1399 (9th Cir.1987). 4 Woldesmayate presents two possible bases for reversing the denial of political asylum: (1) the decision was not based on substantial evidence; and (2) he retained his original refugee status even after becoming a permanent resident. We consider these issues in turn.
5 Woldesmayate contends that: (1) he suffered actual persecution; and (2) his fear of persecution is well-founded within the meaning of the statute. The BIA, however, concluded that the case is not made by the evidence. 6 To establish eligibility for asylum based on a well-founded fear of future persecution, applicants must demonstrate both objective and subjective fear. Estrada-Posadas v. United States INS, 924 F.2d 916, 918 (9th Cir.1991). An applicant's  'candid, credible, and sincere' testimony demonstrating a genuine fear satisfies the subjective component. Blanco-Comarribas v. INS, 830 F.2d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir.1987). The objective component requires credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record, of facts that would support a reasonable fear that the petitioner faces persecution. Rodriguez-Rivera v. United States Dep't of Imm. & Naturalization, 848 F.2d 998, 1002 (9th Cir.1988) (emphasis in original). 7 The record indicates that Woldesmayate claimed to have been jailed and released in 1974, but later stated that the date was 1973. Similarly, he claimed to have left for Sudan in 1974 and 1977. Woldesmayate further stated that he was arrested only once, but at another time claimed that it happened twice. Finally, he did not account for the three years between his alleged release in 1974 and his departure for Sudan in 1977. 8 The BIA allowed for Woldesmayate's communication problems and nevertheless concluded that these inconsistencies and the lack of important details undermined his claims. It particularly stressed his failure to account for the 1974-77 period. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the BIA's determination that no actual persecution occurred. Similarly, Woldesmayate failed to present candid, credible and sincere testimony and thus did not satisfy the subjective component of the well-founded fear standard. See Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1256-58 (9th Cir.1992) (finding substantial evidence in light of inconsistencies and lack of detail in application). 9 Woldesmayate maintains that the BIA's credibility assessment is unfounded, because that court never observed his demeanor. This argument is without merit. The BIA is entitled to draw derivative inferences from the facts themselves. Cf. Penasquitos Village, Inc. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1074, 1078 (9th Cir.1977); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951) (the substantiality of evidence [in support of the Board's decision] must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight). Moreover, the IJ's credibility findings are of limited benefit to Woldesmayate, because he termed Woldesmayate's description of his offenses less than candid.
10 Woldesmayate alternatively contends that he still is entitled to the refugee status conferred in 1982 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a), 1 despite the fact that he was subsequently granted permanent resident status. Under this reasoning, Woldesmayate would presumptively qualify for asylum even though he lost his permanent resident status when the deportation order became final. Woldesmayate thus concludes that the INS now bears the burden of proving that he is not entitled to asylum, and cannot deport him until it terminates this status in accord with 8 C.F.R. § 207.8. 11 This argument is untenable in light of the legislative history of The Refugee Act of 1980. The Senate bill originally provided that refugees admitted under normal flow procedures would be admitted as lawful permanent residents. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 781, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 160, 162. Those entering in emergency situations could be admitted conditionally or as lawful permanent residents. Id. In contrast, the House Amendment provided that all aliens must enter as refugees with retroactive adjustment of status after two years. Id. The Conference later modified this provision by allowing adjustment after one year. Id. 12 Senator Edward Kennedy, the Senate bill's chief sponsor, described this process: 13 [T]he Conferees compromised on the House version and established a new refugee admission status--different from either the present conditional entry or parolee status. This new status will end after only one year--rather than two years--after which the refugee can adjust to permanent resident status. This one year refugee status would also be counted towards the five-year period required for naturalization. 14 126 Cong.Rec. S3756, 3757 (daily ed. February 26, 1980) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). These statements indicate that Congress only intended refugee status to last one year, and thus refute Woldesmayate's contention. Woldesmayate's status as a refugee ceased, and was supplanted by his status as a permanent resident. 15 Woldesmayate's other arguments are similarly unavailing. Notwithstanding the prior determination, he still bears the burden of proving his eligibility for asylum. See Rebollo-Jovel v. INS, 794 F.2d 441, 448 (9th Cir.1986). Moreover, he has no basis to argue that the INS must affirmatively act to terminate his status under Matter of Garcia-Alzugaray, 19 I. & N. Dec. 407 (1986). In that case, the BIA held that a refugee with less than one year of residence did not receive proper notice under 8 C.F.R. § 207.8. See id. at 408-09. Garcia-Alzugaray does not hold that permanent residents are entitled to this notice, and Woldesmayate's reliance on this case is thus misplaced.