Opinion ID: 1798836
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant's Waiver of Constitutional Error in Procedure as to Voluntariness.

Text: Goodchild's attorney did not object to the introduction into evidence of any of the statements or confessions. Neither did he object to the procedure employed for determining voluntariness of the confession. [38] Relying on Henry v. Mississippi , [39] the attorney general contends that Goodchild is bound by this waiver on the part of his attorney. As noted, Henry was decided after Jackson. It involved evidence purportedly obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure, but the rule announced would be applicable in a confession case. In Henry evidence was admitted at the trial without objection, but on appeal to the state court the defendant alleged that the evidence had been obtained as the result of an illegal search. The court decided that the failure to object was fatal to defendant's appeal. The United States supreme court held that the defendant was bound only if his counsel knowingly waived objection to the evidence for purposes of trial strategy. [40] After discussing possible reasons for the failure to object, the court said: If either reason motivated the action of petitioner's counsel, and their plans backfired, counsel's deliberate choice of the strategy would amount to a waiver binding on petitioner and would preclude him from a decision on the merits of his federal claim either in the state courts or here. [41] The case was remanded for a factual determination of whether the failure to object was due to ignorance or `for strategic, tactical, or any other reasons that can fairly be described as the deliberate by-passing of state procedures.' [42] The question of whether it is necessary to object to preserve errors based on constitutional rights is somewhat confused by what actually happened in Jackson. There, as in the present case, no objection was made when the confession was introduced. The majority opinion did not even consider the waiver problem. [43] So, but for Henry, the fact that there was no objection would seemingly be of no relevance in the determination of this case. The announced holding of Henry is inconsistent with what was actually done in Jackson, particularly if Jackson's attorney did not raise objections as a matter of trial technique. This inconsistency was not discussed in the Henry opinion. However, inasmuch as the Henry decision was addressed to the specific issue of waiver while Jackson primarily dealt with the practice of submitting a confession to the jury on the voluntariness issue, it is only reasonable to assume that Henry is controlling. In the instant case there is no need for a Henry type hearing to determine whether the defendant waived any objection he may have had relative to constitutional error associated with the manner in which the issue of voluntariness of his confessions was resolved. Goodchild's counsel was a former Manitowoc county district attorney. When the district attorney offered Exhibits No. 14 and No. 15 into evidence, Attorney Dewane declared I have no objection to them; I want the jury to have the whole thing. Similarly, when Exhibit No. 16 was offered, Dewane again repeated that he had no objection, and further said I want the jury to have the whole story. He expressly stated that he had no objection to the introduction of any of the other statements or confessions. Dewane himself insisted that the whole of the confession Goodchild had given the psychiatrist (Exhibit No. 25) be received when the district attorney only offered portions of it. At oral argument before this court, Dewane explained that he felt that objecting to the confessions and statements would have alienated the jury against his client. An examination of the record and counsel's explanation on oral argument indicate beyond any doubt that Attorney Dewane deliberately declined to object for tactical reasons. The court suggested in Henry that under exceptional circumstances the accused is not precluded from asserting constitutional claims despite counsel's strategy. [44] There was no elaboration in the opinion of just what might constitute such circumstances. Attorney Dewane defended Goodchild in an able and vigorous fashion. That a conviction nonetheless resulted is not enough of itself to declare that the trial technique employed by counsel was so unwise or questionable as to relieve Goodchild of the consequences of his counsel's waiver. Indeed, Goodchild was not convicted of first-degree murder as charged but of the included lesser offense of second-degree murder. We conclude that because of Henry, Goodchild waived any constitutional error that was involved in the manner in which the issue of voluntariness was resolved. There is no merit in any other grounds for the issuance of the writ as contained in the subject petition. By the Court. Issuance of writ of habeas corpus denied.