Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Competency Prior to Start of Penalty Retrial

Text: Next, defendant contends the trial court's finding, prior to the start of the penalty retrial, that defendant was unable competently to represent himself in the retrial should have led the court to declare a doubt as to his competency to proceed at all. We review the relevant portions of the record. On August 25, 1987, the first penalty trial ended in a mistrial on the Perez murder count. The case was continued to September 14, 1987. On the latter date, defense counsel requested a continuance. The court told defendant that if he waived time for the penalty retrial, he would be beyond the time period within which he was entitled to be sentenced on the noncapital convictions, and asked if he wished to be sentenced immediately on those convictions or wait until after the conclusion of the penalty retrial. Defendant said: No, no. I refuse that. If they didn't give me the death penalty or agree to all the charges at once, I refuse that. The court expressed uncertainty whether defendant's statement constituted a waiver. It put the matter over without a waiver in the hope that defense counsel could explain the situation to defendant. On October 6, 1987, the trial court heard and denied a defense motion to bar further proceedings on the ground of collateral estoppel. Defendant then personally addressed the court, asking for a complete new trial with pro per status and defense counsel's assistance. Defendant spoke of, among other things, alcohol as a drug and sellers of alcohol as legal drug dealers that you and all the other judges are receiving money in the form of taxes from. Defendant accused the courts of being liars and hypocrites and asked to be allowed to represent himself, saying: And I will prepare my case to where I have some defense. Not one word was said in my defense of the reason why I have become a murderer. I admit to being a murderer. I got in front of this court and gave you an eyewitness view of what it feels like to be a murderer. A hypocrite can't reach a decision. You are a hypocrite, sir. The court denied defendant's motion for new trial and gave him an application to proceed in propria persona. The court stated it would appoint Dr. Blake Skrdla under Evidence Code section 730 to interview defendant and report to the court his opinion as to whether defendant had the mental capacity to represent himself. At a November 2, 1987, hearing, the court discussed Dr. Skrdla's report. Dr. Skrdla described defendant as an alert, cooperative, loquacious fully oriented individual who spoke in a loud voice in a noticeably stereotyped tone. Thought processes were rigid, and he was very critical in attitude, with essentially bland affect. Memory was intact, and intelligence was estimated within the average to bright normal range, with ability to think abstractly. He tended to ramble somewhat in conversation, with occasional tangential remarks, and obvious preoccupation with ethical and philosophical issues. He referred to the [j]udge before whom he had been appearing as a `hypocrite,' and described the attorneys involved as `an unrighteous gangin it only for the money.' He was taking no medication in custody, and felt he needed none. [¶] There was no evidence of overt psychosis, and he denied depression or suicidal ideation. Dr. Skrdla concluded: [Defendant] understands the nature and purpose of the proceedings taken against him, and is currently capable of rational and consistent cooperation with counsel in the presentation of a defense, if motivated to do so. [¶] This examiner does not believe that [defendant] has the mental capacity to act as his own attorney at the present time. Although he has sufficient intelligence to understand the legal issues, he is so preoccupied with guilt because of his egocentric, uncaring behavior over the years that it will affect his judgment in the handling of his case. He tends to perseverate when discussing ethical, religious, and philosophical issues. Should he persist in this vein during his appearance before a jury, it is believed that he would unconsciously compromise and sabotage his case, possibly without intending to do so. Because of the intense emotional component involved, it is not believed that he is presently capable of being objective in his defense, especially in view of the seriousness of the charges, [¶] Hence, it is this examiner's opinion that [defendant] is not presently emotionally capable of preparing and conducting his own defense in propria persona. The court denied defendant's motion for self-representation, reasoning as follows: Dr. Skrdla has opined that you do not have the mental capacity to act as an attorney because of a preoccupation with guilt and because of egocentric, uncaring behavior that affects your judgment. I join in that conclusion, having observed your testimony during the first trial and having had so much contact with you during all of the proceedings in this case. I note that when you were testifying and also in court in response to motions that have been made, your answers were often tangential to the issues and rambling to the point that they were really useless. I think that it's evident to me that your entire demeanor is self-destructive, and in light of the seriousness of the charges, I feel that I cannot in good conscience in this particular case for the reasons stated permit you to represent yourself. In support of its ruling, the court also cited Dr. Vicary's guilt phase testimony. (Dr. Vicary had testified that defendant was psychotic and suffered from bipolar disorder.) On January 5, 1988, defendant unsuccessfully renewed his motion before the same judge. Again on May 2 and May 24, 1988, defendant renewed his motions for self-representation. In denying the renewed motions, the superior court judges hearing them relied on the denial of his initial motion and the reasons the court had advanced in support thereof. Defendant contends the same evidence that led the trial court to conclude that he was incapable of representing himself during the penalty retrial due to his impaired rationality should have led it to declare a doubt as to his competency and to conduct proceedings under section 1368. [4] We disagree. In the course of its November 2, 1987, ruling on defendant's self-representation motion, the trial court explicitly declared it had no doubt regarding defendant's competence to stand trial. This conclusion was supported by the declaration of Dr. Skrdla, who, as noted above, stated defendant understood the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him and was capable of rational and consistent cooperation with counsel in the presentation of a defense, if he chose to do so. As the Attorney General observes, the standard Dr. Skrdla was applying was the correct one for the determination of competency to stand trial, and even Dr. Vicary (whose testimony the court alluded to in its ruling) had concluded defendant was competent to stand trial, notwithstanding his diagnosis of defendant as psychotic and having bipolar disorder. In denying the motion, the court cited defendant's lack of objectivity and the perception that, out of guilt feelings, he might unconsciously sabotage his own defense. But a lack of objectivity and a possibly self-destructive emotional approach to self-representation does not equate to substantial evidence of incompetence to stand trial. Moreover, as in the guilt phase, the record shows that defendant, despite his bizarre actions and bizarre statements, understood the proceedings and could assist in his defense. (See People v. Koontz, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 1064, 119 Cal. Rptr.2d 859, 46 P.3d 335; People v. Laudermilk, supra, 67 Cal.2d at pp. 283, 285, 61 Cal.Rptr. 644, 431 P.2d 228.) The trial court therefore did not err in failing to declare a doubt and institute proceedings under section 1368.