Opinion ID: 2535651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The General Saving Statute is applicable under Tolliver II.

Text: ¶ 8. Before briefing in the instant case was complete, this Court issued its opinion in Tolliver II, 19 So.3d 67, holding that the general saving statute, found at Mississippi Code Section 15-1-69, applies to toll the statute of limitations when a case is dismissed for a plaintiff's failure to provide presuit notice in a medical malpractice action. In that case, Myrtis Tolliver's daughter died on July 13, 2002. Tolliver filed a wrongful death action, founded on medical negligence, on June 4, 2004, without providing the statutory notice. Id. 19 So.3d at 69. Following the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss, this Court granted the defendants' motion for interlocutory appeal. Id. (citing Arceo v. Tolliver (Tolliver I), 949 So.2d 691 (Miss. 2006)). In that first appeal, we reversed the trial court and rendered judgment in favor of the defendants, dismissing Tolliver's complaint without prejudice for failure to provide presuit notice. Tolliver I, 949 So.2d at 697-98. The mandate on the first appeal issued on March 15, 2007. Tolliver II, 19 So.3d at 70. ¶ 9. Tolliver filed another complaint on May 9, 2007. Id. Although she sent a letter to the defendants on February 28, 2007, informing them of her intent to sue, the trial court found that the letter did not substantially comply with the requirements of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36(15). Id. Accordingly, the trial court dismissed the action without prejudice. Id. On appeal, this Court found that the trial court properly dismissed the action for failure to comply with the statutory notice requirement. Id. The question then became whether the dismissal should have been with prejudice because, according to the defendants, the statute of limitations had run by the time Tolliver filed her second complaint. We held that, because dismissal for failure to provide the statutory notice was a dismissal based on a matter of form, the general saving statute would apply to toll the statute of limitations for one year from the date of this Court's mandate. Id. at 74-75 (applying Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-69). [2] Nevertheless, this Court found that dismissal with prejudice was proper because the plaintiff could use the saving statute to toll the statute of limitations but once. Id. at 76. Because the plaintiff's second action also was dismissed for failure to provide notice, the general saving statute did not apply to this second suit. Id. ¶ 10. Applying Tolliver II to Pringle's case, the general saving statute found at Mississippi Code Section 15-1-69 gave Pringle one year from the date of this Court's mandate to commence another action. The mandate issued on March 1, 2007, and Pringle filed his last complaint in the Rankin County Circuit Court within the year, on February 7, 2008. Given that less than a year had passed, in keeping with this Court's holding in Tolliver II, the statute of limitations had not run by the time Pringle filed this action. Unlike Tolliver II, the defendants do not argue that there was insufficient presuit notice. To the contrary, the trial judge found that the August 30, 2004, notice contain[ed] the information necessary to place the Defendants on notice of a potential lawsuit. ¶ 11. The defendants recognize this Court's holding in Tolliver II, but attempt to distinguish the case, arguing that Pringle may not benefit from the general saving statute because he acted in bad faith when filing the first lawsuit. According to the defendants, failing to provide sixty days' notice was no accident or innocent mistake, but a conscious, tactical decision by the Plaintiff to avoid tort reform. [3] As we recognized in Tolliver II, [i]n the absence of good faith in initiating an action, the saving statute offers no shelter to a litigant. Tolliver II, 19 So.3d at 75 n. 9 (citing Hawkins v. Scottish Union and Nat'l Ins. Co., 110 Miss. 23, 69 So. 710 (1915); Marshall v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co., 7 So.3d 210, 214 (Miss.2009)). ¶ 12. Pringle counters that he was acting in good faith, because the law in effect at the time he filed his first action did not require dismissal of a suit for failure to give presuit notice. Instead, this Court had held that the remedy for failure to give the statutory notice was for the defendant to request a stay, and, if the defendant failed to request a stay, the issue would be deemed to have been waived. See, e.g., Williams v. Clay County, 861 So.2d 953, 977 (Miss.2003), overruled by U. of Miss. Med. Ctr. v. Easterling, 928 So.2d 815, 820 (Miss.2006). ¶ 13. There is little case law from this Court interpreting what constitutes bad faith in filing an action for purposes of the general saving statute. Long ago, in Hawkins, this Court noted an example of bad faith: Cases might be supposed, perhaps, where the want of jurisdiction in the court was so clear that the bringing of a suit therein would show such gross negligence and indifference as to cut the party off from the benefit of the saving statute, as if an action of ejectment should be brought in a court of admiralty, or a bill in equity should be filed before a justice of the peace. Hawkins, 69 So. at 712 (Miss.1915) (emphasis added) (quoting Smith v. McNeal, 109 U.S. 426, 3 S.Ct. 319, 27 L.Ed. 986 (1883)). ¶ 14. Given the law in effect at the time Pringle filed his first action, he had no reason to expect that his case would be dismissed for failing to comply strictly with the mandates of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-36(15). Therefore, it cannot be said that Pringle acted in bad faith when he initiated the first lawsuit, and Pringle could avail himself of the general saving statute of Mississippi Code Section 15-1-69.