Opinion ID: 778180
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bruce's Challenge to the Evidence of His Income

Text: 69 Bruce also challenges the admissibility and the sufficiency of the government's evidence to show that he derived substantial income from the enterprise, as required by 21 U.S.C. § 848(c)(2)(B). His admissibility challenge is meritless; his sufficiency challenge is frivolous. 70 Bruce argues that the government's evidence of his income was inadmissible because it consisted of impermissible hearsay and lay opinion. He concedes that these objections are largely unpreserved; but he argues that the admission of the testimony constituted plain error. (Bruce brief on appeal at 25.) We are unpersuaded. 71 Virtually all of the evidence as to the level of Bruce's earnings during the conspiracy period came from the testimony of Hamilton. Hamilton was present in Far Rockaway during most of the conspiratorial period, was essentially Bruce's partner in the drug enterprise even though they divided the weeks, had personal knowledge of the quantities of drugs being sold and the money grossed from those sales, and testified based on that personal knowledge. It was well within the bounds of discretion for the court to allow Hamilton to estimate the amount of income received by the respective coconspirators. See generally Fed.R.Evid. 701; United States v. Rivera, 22 F.3d 430, 434-35 (2d Cir.1994); Brady v. Chemical Construction Corp., 740 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir.1984). 72 Hamilton testified that from mid-1993 through 1997, Bruce controlled one out of every three weeks on the block, selling crack cocaine and marijuana every day of his week, 24 hours a day. During the earlier part of that period, Hamilton likewise controlled one week, and in their respective weeks, Hamilton and Bruce sold an average of some 10-18 ounces of crack cocaine and 5-8 pounds of marijuana. Hamilton's own average weekly gross intake was about $14,000 to $16,000 and was sometimes as high as $20,000; and from a gross of between $16,000 and $20,000, Hamilton's profit was between $8,000 and $12,000. Hamilton testified that from mid 1993 to 1995, Bruce's average gross income was about $15,000 a week. 73 During the latter part of the conspiracy period, Hamilton controlled two of every three weeks, while Bruce still controlled one week. They each continued to sell 24 hours a day, every day during their respective weeks. Hamilton testified that from 1995 until late 1997, he and Bruce averaged weekly sales of about nine ounces of crack cocaine and grossed about $8,000 to $12,000 a week. Bruce interposed no objection to Hamilton's testimony as to Bruce's income prior to the middle of 1996, and that testimony indicated that just from 1993 through mid 1996, Bruce, in the weeks he controlled, grossed at least $598,000. Bruce's contention that the evidence was insufficient to show that he received substantial income from the enterprise is thus frivolous, even without considering his sales from mid-1996 to April 1998. 74 Hamilton testified that beginning in the summer of 1996, he was not always present to oversee his Beach 26th Street sales, and in late 1997 he left New York. Grimes took over Hamilton's weeks; but Hamilton retained an interest in the level of sales in the Beach 26th Street operation, for Hamilton (and his mother) shared in Grimes's profits. Hamilton testified that Grimes sold about 4-4½ ounces of crack cocaine a week and grossed about $3,000 to $4,000. When Hamilton was asked how much Bruce grossed during that period, Bruce made his first objection to Hamilton's testimony. The court sustained the objection, instructing the government that it needed to lay a proper foundation. Hamilton then provided a foundation, testifying, without further objection by Bruce, that he had knowledge as to the amount Bruce was making in an average week during the 1997-98 period. He stated that he knew because he usually talked to them and was told that Bruce was making approximately $2,000 to $2,500 a week. Bruce now argues that this testimony was hearsay. 75 In order to meet the plain-error standard with respect to this contention, Bruce must demonstrate that the district court committed an error in admitting Hamilton's testimony, that the error was plain, that it prejudicially affected Bruce's substantial rights, and that it seriously affected the fairness of the trial. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770. He has not met any part of this standard. 76 First, it is not clear that Hamilton's testimony that, as to the 1997-98 period, the[y] told him how much money Bruce was earning was hearsay. Obviously the statement was objectionable for lack of specificity; but no objection was made, and Hamilton was not asked to clarify who the[y] were. It is possible that one person to whom Hamilton referred was Bruce himself; to the extent that Hamilton's testimony repeated what Bruce had told him, it would not have been hearsay because the statement of a party, when offered against him, is defined as nonhearsay, see Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A). It is also possible that the[y] included Alberto, Carf, or any of several other coconspirators who worked for both Hamilton and Bruce, and that the court, if the issue had been raised, would have found that the statements were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. To that extent, those statements would have been nonhearsay as defined by Fed.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(E). Thus, we cannot say that the admission of Hamilton's testimony as to Bruce's income was error; or that, if error, the error was plain; or that it prejudiced Bruce's substantial rights. Further, in light of the facts (a) that Bruce refrained from making the obvious objection to Hamilton's reference to them and sought no clarification of that reference, and (b) that a clarification might well have been adverse to Bruce's interests by showing that the[y] were none other than Bruce and his agents and coconspirators, we cannot conclude that the admission of that testimony adversely affected the fairness of the trial. 77 In sum, the government proved that Bruce received substantial income from the continuing criminal enterprise, and its reliance on the testimony of Hamilton to prove that element provides no basis for reversal.