Opinion ID: 779593
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Limits on Smith's cross examination of Lowe's defense witnesses.

Text: 60 Smith alleges that the district court improperly precluded him from cross-examining any of Lowe's witnesses, including Lowe, who presented testimony potentially adverse to Smith. As we noted earlier in connection with the limitations of Lowe's cross examination of Swick, a district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion, Aldaco, 201 F.3d at 985, but the standard of review becomes de novo when an adverse evidentiary ruling implicates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, Cavender, 228 F.3d at 798. 61 Although resolution of this issue is quite straightforward, the following context is necessary to an understanding of Smith's meritless claim. Because this case involved a joint trial of Lowe and Smith, Lowe presented his defense before Smith. Before Lowe began his defense, the government inquired about the order of cross examination as between itself and Smith. The district court stated, Well, [counsel for Smith] may cross as to anything related to his client, but otherwise he really is going to have to call him.... I think it's better to do it that way. Then the jurors will have it straight who is being called by whom. During this exchange, Smith's lawyer commented, I understand, Judge. That's fine. 62 The next day, counsel for Lowe presented impeachment evidence that suggested Swick might have observed large quantities of marijuana at Smith's body shop. Counsel for Smith requested a limiting instruction because the impeachment evidence should not be admitted against Smith on the conspiracy charges. The district court replied, I understand that. The reason I limited you before is because I think you wanted to get out evidence that you thought might be helpful to your client, and I thought it was better to separate it from the other defendants. But if there's something that comes out that you think is adverse, I'll let you cross-examine. During the same exchange, Smith's counsel acknowledged that the inconsistency of statements made by Lowe's first two witnesses had been of minor importance and could be effectively addressed during his own direct examination. Smith's counsel then expressed concern about Lowe's subsequent witnesses, including Lowe himself. Yet, Smith's counsel did not request an opportunity to cross-examine either Lowe or his two remaining character witnesses. 63 Thus, as is apparent from the record, the major problem with Smith's argument is that counsel for Smith explicitly agreed to the court's handling of some of the witnesses and failed to assert his right to cross-examine others, despite the court's ruling that he [might] cross as to anything related to his client. Cast in the light most favorable to Smith, any claim that the prescribed cross examination procedure infringed upon Smith's Sixth Amendment rights has either been waived or forfeited or some combination of the two. See Penny, 60 F.3d at 1261 (stating that constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy is waived when there is the `intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right' and that the simple failure to assert a right-forfeiture-is distinct from an intentional act-waiver) (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). 64 Waiver of a personally-held constitutional right is not reviewable, whereas forfeiture of that same right may be reviewed for plain error. Penny, 60 F.3d at 1261. In that respect, [o]nly those errors that affect substantial rights and `seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings'... amount to plain error warranting reversal. United States v. Haywood, 70 F.3d 507, 511 (7th Cir.1995) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732, 113 S.Ct. 1770). Smith fails to point to a single example of how his substantial rights were harmed by the cross examination procedure prescribed by the court. Based on our review of the record, the district court's handling of witnesses appears to have been quite sensitive to Smith's procedural and substantive rights. The district court did not err in this issue.