Opinion ID: 2164332
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The denial of cross-examination.

Text: Proceeding in an unorthodox manner which we deem altogether unacceptable, the Board permitted the University to recall two witnesses to testify in rebuttal, but denied petitioners the right to cross-examine them regarding their rebuttal testimony. This is not the first time that a District agency deciding zoning issues has proceeded in this manner. See Citizens' Coalition Against the Proposed Brookings Office Bldg. v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 516 A.2d 506, 512-13 (D.C. 1986) (court assumed, arguendo, that the practice was improper but found the error harmless). We hope it will be the last. The following exchange occurred at the conclusion of the examination by counsel for the University of the first of its rebuttal witnesses: CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. MR. NETTLER: Excuse me. I just have some cross-examination on just two points that he has raised CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: Are you kidding? MR. NETTLER: I am entitled to cross-examine him on his rebuttal testimony. CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: No, you are not. MR. NETTLER: I certainly am. Excuse me but I am certainly entitled to cross-examine a witness who provides rebuttal testimony; and the Board has permitted me to do so in the past and has permitted other counsel to do so. CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: We have not, Mr. Nettler; and there wasn't anything new about what Mr. Brown testified to. MR. NETTLER: Yes, he did.... After counsel attempted to explain the reasons for his view that the witness had given testimony on rebuttal which went beyond his testimony in the case-in-chief, the colloquy concluded as follows: CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: Mr. Nettler, we are not having cross-examination. MR. NETTLER: I reserve my right to object to the fact that that has not been provided us. CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: Very well. After the second rebuttal witness testified, counsel for the University, playing under the unconventional ground rules announced by the presiding officer, eschewed the time-honored words your witness, which are frequently used by attorneys to tender the witness to opposing counsel for cross-examination, and asked instead: Madam Chairperson, are there questions of Mr. Arminster from the Board? (Emphasis added). Chairperson Thornhill said No, and reiterated her ruling that no cross-examination would be permitted. Counsel for the University stated that just to protect the record, he wanted to be certain that opposing counsel could file something for the record. The attorneys for petitioners were ultimately permitted to submit questions which they would have asked and the answers they expected to elicit, but no cross-examination was allowed. The proceeding before the Board was a contested case. Rose Lees Hardy Home and School Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 324 A.2d 701, 707 (D.C.1974). A contested case is one in which a trial-type hearing is implicitly required, either by the organic act or constitutional right. Lamont v. Rogers, 479 A.2d 1274, 1278 (D.C.1984). The rebuttal witnesses were testifying about contested facts. Each party therefore had the right to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. D.C.Code 1-1509(b) (1987). Accordingly, the cross-examination which petitioners were entitled to conduct was that which is available at a trial-type hearing. In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), the Supreme Court stated that the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination ... have ancient roots.... This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases... but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny. [Citations and footnotes omitted]. Id. at 496-97, 79 S.Ct. at 1413-14. An administrative agency may neither refuse to permit any cross-examination nor unduly limit it. Giant Food, Inc. v. F.T.C., 116 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 234, 322 F.2d 977, 984 (1963), cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967, 84 S.Ct. 1121, 12 L.Ed.2d 82 (1964). In all adjudicative proceedings, cross-examination and confrontation are the handmaidens of trustworthiness in the face of factual dispute. National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. United States, 293 F.Supp. 634, 636 (N.D.Okla.1968) (three-judge court). Although we have only a paper record before us, the presiding officer's choice of words ( e.g., are you kidding?) appears to have been intended to ridicule counsel's perceived effrontery in requesting the right to cross-examine his adversary's rebuttal witnesses. But a request to conduct perfectly conventional cross-examination is not ridiculous, and the reasons given by the Chairperson for not permitting it were spurious. Where, as here, a witness has been recalled on rebuttal, there is no doubt that he may not only be examined on direct, but [also] cross-examined and re-examined. EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 4 at 7 (3d ed. 1984). The DCAPA gives every party the right to submit rebuttal evidence. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Serv., 531 A.2d 999, 1000 (D.C.1987) (per curiam). Logically, at a trial type hearing, the statute must likewise give the adversary the right to cross-examine the witnesses who provide such evidence. If the witness had in fact said nothing new, then his testimony would not have been genuine rebuttal testimony in the first place. See 6 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1873, at 672-73 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); Throckmorton v. Holt, 12 App.D.C. 552, 583-85 (1898). But once the University had been permitted to present the same evidence for a second time, petitioners had the corresponding right to cross-examine for a second time. [15] If the Chairperson intended to intimate that cross-examination of rebuttal witnesses was not permitted in this case because it is not permitted in any caseand that seems to be implicit in the words are you kidding? [16] then such a practice is impermissible no matter how uniformly the Board may have followed it. The Board undoubtedly has broad discretion with respect to the nature, scope and duration of cross-examination. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Greensboro Coca Cola Bottling Co., 180 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir.1950). But that discretion must be exercised reasonably. The Board may, for example, restrict cross-examination if further interrogation on a particular subject would be more prejudicial than probative, Goldman v. United States, 473 A.2d 852, 856 (D.C.1984), or if the evidence sought to be elicited would be cumulative. Hilton v. United States, 435 A.2d 383, 388 (D.C. 1981). [17] The Board may not, however, prohibit cross-examination altogether, Washington v. United States, 461 A.2d 1037, 1038 (D.C.1983), and must permit such cross-examination to proceed at a stage of the case when its effect is not unreasonably diluted. See People v. Becker, 210 N.Y. 274, 299-300, 104 N.E. 396, 405-406 (1914); Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 66-67, 225 A.2d 294, 303 (1966). Any restrictions which the Board may impose must be rationally related to some legitimate purpose. Whether testimony has been presented in a party's direct case or on rebuttal has no rational relationship to the opponent's need to conduct cross-examination. The Board's apparent bright line rule of practice on the subject is therefore unacceptable. Indeed, the University's only real argument in support of the Board's approach is that any error was harmless. The FGCA has been unable to point to any prejudice. It claims in the most general terms to have been denied the opportunity at the public hearings to cross-examine University witnesses on important issues such as the site selection process' failure to incorporate neighborhood concerns and the limited usefulness of steps the University planned to take to mitigate objectionable impacts. But the witnesses in question had been cross-examined at length on these subjects in connection with their initial testimony, and the BZA's findings were adequately supported without consideration of their rebuttal testimony. The University's case with respect to the selection of a site for the law school was a strong one, especially in light of the support which its decision drew from the adversaries of the 1987 Campus Plan. The Board's procedural error was a serious one, but we are satisfied that it did not result in substantial prejudice to the FGCA. See Citizens' Coalition Against the Proposed Brookings Office Bldg. v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 516 A.2d 506, 512-13 (D.C.1986).