Opinion ID: 2520026
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Statutes Imposing Decisional Deadlines

Text: ¶63 Judge Anderson claims that the legislature has exceeded its constitutional authority by imposing deadlines on the judiciary in conducting what is the very essence of core judicial function, the scheduling and deciding of cases. Specifically, Judge Anderson challenges the constitutionality of Utah Code section 78-3a-308(2), which imposes a requirement on juvenile courts to hold a final adjudication hearing in certain child welfare cases no later than 60 calendar days from the date of the shelter hearing, and Utah Code section 78-7-25(1), which requires that a judge of a trial court shall decide all matters submitted for final determination within two months of submission, unless circumstances causing the delay are beyond the judge's personal control. Judge Anderson argues that he cannot be held to account for violation of either of these two statutes, as the Judicial Conduct Commission has done, because it is beyond the power of the legislature to set deadlines for judges to accomplish what is clearly the central function of the judiciary, that of holding hearings and making judgments. ¶64 While there may be merit in Judge Anderson's claims, [16] Judge Anderson does not argue that his constitutional objection to the statutory deadlines was the reason he failed to observe those deadlines. If Judge Anderson had been motivated by a constitutional objection in refusing to observe the statutory deadlines, he could have cited such an objection as his reason when refusing to adjudicate a particular case within the statutory period, thus establishing a record of his grounds for decision that could then have been appealed. Alternatively, he could have sought a declaratory judgment that the statutory requirements were unconstitutional. Judge Anderson took neither of these actions. As a result, Judge Anderson's constitutional argument is raised too late to be of help. ¶65 We do not hold that Judge Anderson has failed to preserve this constitutional argument. Rather, we express the view that by failing to record his constitutional objection to the deadlines in the cases before him, or in an action for declaratory judgment, Judge Anderson has failed to register his objection in any way contemporaneous with his refusal to observe the statutory requirements. He has therefore given us no reason to believe that constitutional principle motivated that refusal. Judge Anderson cannot therefore excuse his failure to obey the statute's requirements after the fact by applying a rationale attacking those deadlines when that rationale plainly played no role in his refusal to observe the statutory deadlines for adjudicating cases. ¶66 What follows from this is not that Judge Anderson had no right to press a constitutional claim against the statutory deadlines. What follows is that the appropriate standard of behavior for a judge is to observe the law as it exists at the time, and if he seeks to challenge it, to set forth his reasoning in a record of decision in a case before him or to bring an action seeking a declaratory judgment at the time the law's requirements allegedly infringe on his constitutional rights or otherwise offend the constitution. It cannot be acceptable behavior for a judge to fail to obey the law without at the time providing any reason to believe a constitutional objection motivated the failure, only years later in disciplinary proceedings to unveil a constitutional objection. ¶67 Judge Anderson has no recourse now to a challenge of the statute itself. Judges are held to a very high standard in this regard. Judge Anderson is no exception.