Opinion ID: 1176285
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial juries.

Text: Some may argue that the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury prohibits the state from discriminating in the selection of the jury panel, but not in the selection of the trial jury. We reject this hypothesis. Any discriminatory exclusion from either the jury panel or the trial jury directly impairs the constitutional right to the opportunity to obtain a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. McCray, 750 F.2d at 1128. In either event, a discriminatory process has skewed the demographic odds and created a racially selected jury. In such cases, the state's discrimination against a distinctive group deprives a defendant of the opportunity to obtain a trial jury representing a fair cross-section of the community. See Buchanan v. Kentucky, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 107 S.Ct. 2906, 2913-14, 97 L.Ed.2d 336 (1987). The harm done by such state discrimination is not limited to violation of a defendant's constitutional rights. It also damages our system of justice by depriving minorities of their opportunity for jury service, one of the most important privileges and responsibilities of citizenship. Worse yet, such methods create a perception that the American criminal justice system is imposed on certain minorities rather than operating to protect and further the rights of all citizens. For these reasons, we believe that the sixth amendment guarantee of an impartial jury forbids the state from discriminating in jury selection, whether before or after the drawing of the names of the veniremen. We therefore adopt a clear, simple rule: under the jury trial clause of the sixth amendment, the state may not make discriminatory use of the peremptory challenge to exclude any substantial and identifiable class of citizens from the privilege and obligations of jury service. See Buchanan, Peters. [4] This is not to say, of course, that the state is forbidden to exclude any or all members of a cognizable group from the trial jury under any circumstances. Neither equal protection concepts nor the right to trial by a fair cross-section of the population gives the defendant the right to a trial jury of any particular composition. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 106 S.Ct. 1758, 90 L.Ed.2d 137 (1986); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 95 S.Ct. 692, 42 L.Ed.2d 690 (1975); McCray, 750 F.2d at 1129; Wheeler. The constitution only prohibits the prosecutor from destroying the possibility of a fair cross-section by the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges to exclude jurors because of their membership in an identifiable group. Roman, McCray, Wheeler, Gilmore. The prosecutor is as free as ever to use the peremptory challenges to exclude jurors for nondiscriminatory reasons. Like the Batson rule, the construction we today give to the sixth amendment is retroactive to those cases not yet final or pending on direct appeal as of the date of this opinion. See Griffith, 479 U.S. at 328, 107 S.Ct. at 716. Of course, as in the cases presenting the original Batson issue, waiver governs the retroactivity issue. See State v. Holder, 155 Ariz. 83, 745 P.2d 141 (1987) ( Batson challenge does not involve fundamental error and was waived absent timely objection). In the instant case, we conclude, therefore, that the trial judge neither exceeded his jurisdiction nor erred in requiring the county attorney to provide an explanation for the use of peremptories excluding all Black veniremen from the jury. DEFENDANT'S PRIMA FACIE SHOWING The state argues, finally, that the defendant failed to make a prima facie showing that the state made discriminatory use of the peremptory challenges. We agree with the court of appeals' opinion and analysis on this point.