Opinion ID: 2822110
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Sufficiency of the Superseding Indictment

Text: In his pro se brief, Cummings argues that the superseding indictment was flawed in two key respects. First, he alleges that because the § 922(o) charge (Count Five) failed to provide proper notice of what the government considered a machinegun and what statute made it illegal, his Fifth Amendment right to due process was violated. Second, he claims that the superseding indictment's reference to crack cocaine in Counts Two and Seven was insufficient following the Supreme Court's 2011 decision in DePierre v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2225 (2011), which clarified the meaning of cocaine base. Cummings never raised these 13 This thirteen-day period excludes the eight-day overlap with Cummings's pro se motion. 14 Cummings objects to the exclusion of these days because the court never made explicit its findings and rationale for granting the continuance. As we stated above, this is not necessary if the reasons are obvious. Pringle, 751 F.2d at 432. The government explains that the continuance was requested due to the impending filing of the superseding indictment. Because a continuance in this situation would allow all Defendants to be tried together and to avoid piecemeal and repetitive proceedings, the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interests of the defendant in a speedy trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A), and thus the days are properly excluded. See Barnes II, 251 F.3d at 256. -20- challenges in the district court, and his failure to do so constitutes a forfeiture, which confines appellate review to plain error. United States v. Troy, 618 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2010); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3)(B) (stating that challenges to the sufficiency of an indictment must be raised prior to trial). Plain error exists when: (1) an error occurred; (2) which was clear or obvious; and both (3) affected the defendant's substantial rights; and (4) seriously impaired the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Troy, 618 F.3d at 33. We need not go past the first step, however, because neither alleged error has any merit.
Defective An indictment is legally sufficient if it 'first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.' United States v. Berk, 652 F.3d 132, 137 (1st Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Cianci, 378 F.3d 71, 81 (1st Cir. 2004)). Here, Count Five of the superseding indictment alleges that [o]n or about May 2nd, 2012, in the District of Puerto Rico and within the jurisdiction of this Court, Jeffrey Cummings-Ávila, the defendant herein, did knowingly and unlawfully possess, machineguns, to wit: (1) a Glock -21- pistol, Model 23, .40 caliber, serial number on the body PDW-403 and another different serial number ETE-057 on the side; (2) a Glock pistol, model 23, .40 caliber, serial number RYM722, both firearms modified to shoot automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. All in violation of Title 18, U.S.C. Section 922(o) and 924(a)(2). This description contains all of the elements of Section 922(o)(1),15 which provides that it shall be unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machinegun, and it quotes verbatim from 26 U.S.C. § 5845(b), which defines a machinegun as any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. It also describes the specific machineguns at issue. As such, Cummings was fairly informed of what he had to defend against, and the indictment was therefore sufficient. See Berk, 652 F.3d at 137; United States v. Just, 74 F.3d 902, 904 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding indictment for possession of a machinegun sufficient where it only cited to § 922(o) and did not include language defining a machinegun). That the superseding indictment only quotes the language of § 5845(b) without citing to the statute directly does not alter this conclusion.16 It is the language describing the elements that 15 Cummings makes no argument regarding § 924(a)(2). 16 We do note, however, that in an abundance of caution it would be in the government's best interest to cite to all relevant provisions, especially when directly quoting from those provisions. -22- puts a defendant on notice, not a simple citation to a statute. Cf. United States v. Daniels, 973 F.2d 272, 275 (4th Cir. 1992) ([T]he mere citation to the statute of which the defendant is charged with violating is insufficient to cure the failure of the indictment to charge each essential element of the offense because the citation alone does not insure that the grand jury considered and found each of these elements.). Moreover, while Cummings was charged with violating § 922(o), this is merely a subsection of § 922. A full reading of § 922 directs the reader to § 5845 for the meaning of a machinegun, see § 922(a)(4), (b)(4), and it is hornbook statutory construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning. Sorenson v. Sec'y of Treasury, 475 U.S. 851, 860 (1986)(internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g., United States v. Ozuna-Cabrera, 663 F.3d 496, 499 (1st Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we find no error with Count Five of the superseding indictment. 2. Counts Two and Seven of the Superseding Indictment Are Not Defective In Counts Two and Seven of the superseding indictment, the government charged Cummings with possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base (and other narcotics), respectively. In Count Two, the superseding indictment states that Cummings did knowingly and intentionally possess with intent to distribute a -23- measurable amount of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base ('crack') . . . . Count Seven, meanwhile, states that forty-four conspirators, including Cummings, did knowingly and intentionally combine, conspire and agree with each other . . . to possess with the intent to distribute . . . twohundred and eighty (280) grams or more of a mixture or substance containing a detectable amount of cocaine base ('crack') . . . . According to Cummings, the inclusion of crack renders the superseding indictment insufficient because DePierre decriminalize[d] certain individual's conduct . . . [which] would have otherwise been aggravated violators. Cummings, however, badly misreads DePierre. In DePierre, the Supreme Court h[e]ld that the term 'cocaine base' as used in § 841(b)(1) means not just 'crack cocaine,' but cocaine in its chemically basic form. 131 S. Ct. at 2237. In other words, the Supreme Court expanded the meaning of cocaine base to include other forms of cocaine in addition to crack cocaine.17 Id. at 2231. It in no way decriminalized crack cocaine as Cummings seems to allege. Counts Two and Seven of the superseding indictment charge possession with the intent to distribute and conspiracy to possess with the intent to distribute cocaine base. The parenthetical 17 These include freebase and coca paste. DePierre, 131 S. Ct. at 2231. -24- inclusion of crack simply specified which form of cocaine base was at issue. There is nothing improper about this practice.18