Opinion ID: 2618848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: violation of the posse comitatus act

Text: Harker contends that the actions of M.P. Smith in searching and seizing evidence from him and the vehicle in which he was a passenger violated the Posse Comitatus Act. The Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1959), provides: Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. The court of appeals did not reach the issue of whether there was an actual violation of the Act. The superior court held that there was no violation because the arrest took place on an army base, ... [and] the defendant was in the military at the time he was stopped and arrested by military authorities on a military base. We are aware of only three cases in which a violation of the Act has been found. [4] In Wrynn v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 457, 463-65 (E.D.N.Y. 1961), a violation was found when active duty Air Force personnel, at the request of state authorities, flew an Air Force helicopter outside of a military installation to search for an escaped civilian convict. A technical violation of Navy regulations, which are substantially similar to the Act, was found in United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372, 374 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 983, 94 S.Ct. 2385, 40 L.Ed.2d 760 (1974). Marine Corps personnel, acting at the specific request of federal agents, bought firearms off of the military post from civilians who were selling them in violation of federal firearms statutes. A technical violation was also found in State v. Danko, 219 Kan. 490, 548 P.2d 819 (Kan. 1976). In that case, a military policeman and a city policeman patrolled together under an arrangement between military authorities and city police officials. Following an armed robbery report, the policemen stopped a car matching the description of the get away car. The military policeman, on request of the city patrolman, helped with the search of the car. Id. at 821-22. The state contends that the determining factor in whether the Act has been violated is whether an independent military purpose justified the military involvement: [I]n Wrynn and Walden, ... [there was no] valid independent military reason to search off-post for escaped civilian prisoners ( Wrynn ) or to investigate off-post violations of federal firearms laws by civilians. ( Walden ). The violation found in Danko ... was caused by the M.P.'s off-post search of a civilian vehicle, an activity that could not legitimately further the presumably valid military interest otherwise served by his joint town patrol with uniformed local police  to report uniform violations and other misconduct in town by military personnel from the nearby army post. Support for this analysis is found in Furman, Restrictions Upon Use of the Army Imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act, 7 Mil. L.Rev. 85, 128 (1960), quoted in State v. Nelson, 260 S.E.2d 629, 639 (N.C. 1979): [T]he statute is limited to deliberate use of armed force for the primary purpose of executing civilian laws more effectively than possible through civilian law enforcement channels, and ... those situations where an act performed primarily for the purpose of insuring the accomplishment of the mission of the armed forces incidentally enhances the violation of civilian law do not violate the statute. In the majority of cases in which no violation has been found, the independent military purpose that justified the military conduct was the prevention of illicit drug transactions involving active duty military personnel, regardless of whether such conduct took place on military installations. See State v. Trueblood, 265 S.E.2d 662, 664 (N.C. App. 1980); Lee v. State, 513 P.2d 125, 126 (Okla. App. 1973); Hildebrandt v. State, 507 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Okl.App. 1973); Hubert v. State, 504 P.2d 1245, 1246-47 (Okl.App. 1972); and Burns v. State, 473 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971) (army criminal investigation division agents, investigating drug sales to soldiers, arranged or participated in off-post buys and turned resulting evidence over to state authorities). See also United States v. Banks, 539 F.2d 14 (9th Cir.1976) (military agents arrested and searched civilian drug dealer on military post, turning civilian and evidence seized over to federal civilian authorities for prosecution). State v. Nelson, 298 N.C. 573, 260 S.E.2d 629 (N.C. 1979), involves a fact pattern similar to the present case; the crime, committed by military personnel, occurred off base, and the alleged violation of the statute occurred on base. Two soldiers raped a woman at gunpoint in front of her husband in a motel and robbed the couple of their money and jewelry. Both soldiers were arrested a week later on an unrelated charge and confined in a county jail. Pursuant to military regulations, which require an inventory of the property of a soldier who is absent from his Army unit more than twenty-four hours, military personnel made an inventory of items in the soldiers' quarters. After reading about the robbery in a newspaper a few days later, military personnel looked at the soldiers' property again and discovered that it matched the newspaper description of the stolen property. These items were subsequently turned over to civilian authorities. Id. at 634-35. The court found that the inventory of the soldiers' property was for an independent military purpose and that the later examination was constitutional because the items had already been legitimately seen once. Id. at 639. The court held that the act of turning over to civilian authorities evidence discovered pursuant to an independent military purpose is only a passive involvement in the enforcement of civilian law. Id. (citing United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975) (passive activities incidentally aiding civilian law enforcement not precluded by the statute)). Applying the independent military purpose criterion to this case, the state contends that M.P. Smith had an independent military duty to stop the vehicle in which Harker was riding to protect persons on the base from fleeing armed felons. The state quotes from a law review article which points out that the Code [10 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1970)] specifically provides that a commander may deliver to civil authorities a member of the armed forces accused of an offense under civil criminal law, insuring that military reservations do not become havens for those who violate criminal law. Note, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 Mil.L.Rev. 83, 104 (1975). In accordance with this analysis, we conclude that M.P. Smith had an independent military duty to stop the vehicle, arrest Harker, and then turn him over to civilian police. Harker nonetheless contends, however, that the search of the vehicle violated the Act because no military purpose could be served by searching the vehicle after it was no longer in Harker's control. This contention loses sight of the express language of the Posse Comitatus Act, which is violated when one willfully uses the armed forces for civilian law enforcement. In all other cases finding a violation of the Act, the military conduct was at the request of a civil law enforcement agency. Wrynn, 200 F. Supp. at 458; Walden, 490 F.2d at 374; Danko, 548 P.2d at 820. There is no indication in the record of this case that the police requested assistance from the Army. Instead, the broadcast was picked up by an off-duty soldier who was acting in his civilian capacity. Nor was the search of the car undertaken at the request of the Fairbanks City Police; it occurred before they arrived on the base. Therefore, the army was not willfully used for civilian law enforcement. In view of the facts that the military has a legitimate independent interest in protecting persons on base from fleeing armed felons and that the police did not request assistance from the military, we conclude that the conduct of the military police did not violate the Posse Comitatus Act. Accordingly, the conviction of Harker is affirmed. AFFIRMED.