Opinion ID: 1782423
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Venue transfer from Carroll County.

Text: ¶ 9. Turner retained two renowned attorneys, John Collette of Jackson and James K. Dukes of Hattiesburg. Collette continued to represent Turner in the direct appeal. Collette and Dukes enjoy a statewide reputation of respect and competency, and both are well seasoned trial attorneys with years of experience in representing criminal defendants. ¶ 10. The standard for determining if a criminal defendant received constitutionally effective counsel is well established. The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness [of counsel] must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A defendant must demonstrate that his attorney's actions were deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Id. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052. The focus of the inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Id. Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. (citation omitted) . . . A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action `might be considered sound trial strategy.' Stringer, 454 So.2d at 477, citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Defense counsel is presumed competent. Johnson v. State, 476 So.2d 1195, 1204 (Miss.1985) Then, to determine the second prong of prejudice to the defense, the standard is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss.1991). This means a probability sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome. Id. . . . There is no constitutional right then to errorless counsel. Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 315 (Miss.1988); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426, 430 (Miss. 1991) (right to effective counsel does not entitle defendant to have an attorney who makes no mistakes at trial; defendant just has right to have competent counsel). If the post-conviction application fails on either of the Strickland prongs, the proceedings end. Neal v. State, 525 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1987); Mohr v. State, 584 So.2d 426 (Miss. 1991). Davis v. State, 743 So.2d 326, 334 (Miss. 1999), citing Foster v. State, 687 So.2d 1124, 1130 (Miss.1996). ¶ 11. Turner first argues that his attorneys were ineffective in asking that venue be transferred from Carroll County. Upon the advice of counsel, Turner knowingly waived his right to be tried in Carroll County. In retrospect, Turner now maintains that Carroll County residents and potential jurors likely would have known about his troubled family history and his psychiatric treatments. His unpersuasive argument is that Carroll County jurors might have been more lenient than the jurors of Forrest County. ¶ 12. The only case cited by Turner is State v. Caldwell, 492 So.2d 575 (Miss. 1986). In Caldwell, the defendant's death penalty trial was transferred to another county at the defendant's request. He was convicted and sentenced to death. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court reversed the death sentence and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. Upon remand, Caldwell requested that the hearing be held in the original county. That request was denied by the trial judge. This Court found that Caldwell had the right to be tried in the county where the crime occurred and the fact that he had previously waived that right was not binding, after an appellate court later reversed for a new trial. Id. at 577. ¶ 13. Caldwell is distinguishable, as it did not involve issues of attorney effectiveness. The issue there was whether the defendant had the right to undo a previous request to transfer venue from where the crime was committed in a subsequent proceeding. The Court found that he still had the right to be tried in that county. Turner had the right to be tried in Carroll County. However, he waived that right and venue was properly transferred to Forrest County. In the absence of remand, the issue of where he would like to be tried is moot. ¶ 14. Turner asserts that his attorneys were ineffective in requesting that venue be transferred, but fails to offer proof that would demonstrate that the attorneys' performance was deficient. Any prejudice claimed by Turner is entirely hypothetical. Turner has not shown, and we ponder, how it could be shown, that a Carroll County jury would have found differently. See Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 317 (Miss.1988); Gilliard v. State, 462 So.2d 710, 714 (Miss.1985) (finding that petitioners had shown no prejudice in attorneys' failure to seek transfer of venue). ¶ 15. Additionally, Turner cannot overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, seeking a change of venue was sound trial strategy. See Knox v. State, 901 So.2d 1257, 1262 (Miss.2005)(citing Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984)). In Wilcher v. State, 863 So.2d 719, 750 (Miss.2003) this Court held that defense counsel is under no duty to attempt to transfer venue and, therefore, the decision not to would fall within the realm of strategy. We find that, likewise, the decision to obtain a venue change is within the realm of strategy. (Internal citations omitted). ¶ 16. Turner's attorneys filed a motion in which they alleged that there had been a great deal of highly prejudicial and adverse pervasive publicity in this case, including both media and word of mouth publicity, making a fair trial impossible. On the day after the murders, the Greenwood Commonwealth printed a story about the crimes with a picture of Turner in handcuffs after his arrest. The attorneys' decision that Turner was more likely to get a better result in another county was more than justified. The question is whether counsel's strategic advice resulted in such a breakdown in the adversarial process so that the conviction and sentence were rendered unreliable. Stringer v. State, 454 So.2d 468, 477 (Miss.1984). We find that there were valid strategic reasons for the attorneys' decision to request a change of venue from Carroll County. We find no deficiency in the performance of Turner's attorneys on that claim.