Opinion ID: 1725936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Was defendant denied his right to speedy trial?

Text: Defendant contends his statutory and constitutional rights to speedy trial were violated. The informations in this case were filed April 8, 1977. On the same day counsel was appointed for defendant, who pled not guilty to each charge. Trial was scheduled for May 17. On the May 9 deadline set by the arraigning judge for filing additional minutes of testimony, State filed and served on defendant minutes for twenty additional witnesses. Defense counsel successfully moved for continuance to enable him to investigate and interview these witnesses. Trial was rescheduled for June 20, seventy-three days after the informations were filed. State filed and served additional minutes of testimony on June 2, 14, and 16 without objection. Defendant filed five separate motions on June 14 which were ruled on by the court. State timely complied with these rulings and trial commenced as rescheduled. The following from § 795.2, The Code, 1975, is pertinent: If a defendant indicted for a public offense, whose trial has not been postponed upon his application, be not brought to trial within sixty days after the indictment is found, the court must order it to be dismissed, unless good cause to the contrary be shown. (Emphasis supplied.) See present rule 27(2)(b), Rules of Criminal Procedure (ninety days). The issue of speedy trial was not raised until sentencing. Defendant then personally stated: Under habeas corpus, I was not honored a sixty-day trial in accordance with 2795.2 [sic] of the Iowa Code. I would further like to state that I gave no written or verbal consent to delay. I did not sign power of attorney. We have held the § 795.2 speedy trial right is waived if a defendant who is represented by counsel delays until adverse verdict to move for dismissal. State v. Paulsen, 265 N.W.2d 581, 585 (Iowa 1978). But defendant raises an issue of first impression in this jurisdiction: that the statutory right is fundamental and personal to him and can be waived only by him, on the record and only after being fully advised of the nature of the right. He asserts no authority other than the § 795.2 phrase his application. State argues § 795.2 was waived by defense attorney's continuance motion. We have enforced the § 795.2 provision which denies statutory speedy trial rights to a defendant whose trial has    been postponed upon his application. See State v. Manning, 224 N.W.2d 232, 235-36 (Iowa 1974); State v. Shockey, 214 N.W.2d 146, 150-51 (Iowa 1974). This rule applies here if defendant is bound by his lawyer's continuance motion. Ordinarily a criminal defendant is bound by his or her counsel's actions taken on the client's behalf. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2534, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, 573 (1975); State v. Benson, 247 Iowa 406, 410, 72 N.W.2d 438, 441 (1955); Shores Co. v. Iowa Chem. Co., 222 Iowa 347, 350-51, 268 N.W. 581, 582-83 (1936). See also § 610.16(1) (attorney has authority to execute in client's name any instrument necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action). The word his in § 795.2 must be read in conjunction with § 610.16(1) and supportive case law. Interpreting § 795.2 in this light, we conclude the legislature intended speedy trial rights would be waived by continuance motions made by the defense, not merely those made by defendant. This holding is consistent with the rationale used and result reached by other courts confronting this question. Townsend v. Superior Court, 15 Cal.3d 774, 543 P.2d 619, 126 Cal.Rptr. 251 (1975); People v. Carr, 9 Ill.App.3d 382, 292 N.E.2d 492 (1972); State v. McBreen, 54 Ohio St.2d 315, 376 N.E.2d 593 (1978); State v. Franulovich, 18 Wash. App. 290, 567 P.2d 264 (1977). It is also consistent with our observation in State v. Brandt, 253 N.W.2d 253, 255-56 (Iowa 1977), that the acts or omissions of defendant or counsel can constitute good cause for delay beyond sixty days. If counsel can act for defendant in ways that can attribute delay to defendant, counsel should be able to waive the statute altogether. Although defendant refers to a constitutional right to speedy trial in arguing his main premise, no constitution or constitutional provision is cited. The issue is deemed waived. Rule 14(a)(3), R.App.P.; Miller v. International Harvester Co., 246 N.W.2d 298, 304 (Iowa 1976); State v. Vick, 205 N.W.2d 727, 729 (Iowa 1973). We observe in passing that under the balancing test delineated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972), we detect no constitutional violation in these circumstances.