Opinion ID: 2391972
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: expert testimony on the battered wife syndrome

Text: It is important to keep in mind that the trial court permitted the registered nurse who was offered as an expert witness to testify for the defense about the battered wife syndrome to explain and discuss the syndrome. This evidence was presented to the jury. The witness was not permitted to testify (1) that the accused was suffering from this syndrome, (2) that this syndrome would explain why she would not leave her mate and (3) why (in the witness' opinion) the accused believed that it was then necessary for her to kill in self-protection. Thus the court permitted a limited use of expert testimony, but drew the line at permitting the witness to diagnose the accused's mental condition and to offer the conclusion that the accused believed that it was then necessary for her to kill her husband in self-defense. In Ford v. Commonwealth, Ky., 665 S.W.2d 304, 309 (1984), we stated: On the question of experts, it has long been the law of this jurisdiction that the decision as to the qualifications of an expert rests in the discretion of the trial court. Thus the trial judge's decision as to whether a proposed witness is qualified to testify as an expert should not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977). This is the standard of review for both the decision permitting the witness to testify as an expert and the decision on the limits of the witness' expertise. Inherent in the trial court's decision to permit the expert to testify as to the existence and nature of the battered wife (or spouse abuse) syndrome was a finding that this syndrome represents scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [which] will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 702. In this case the witness provided background information sufficient to demonstrate the scientific acceptability of the battered wife (or spouse abuse) syndrome as a mental condition or entity generally recognized in the medical community. Thus, the case is distinguished from Lantrip v. Commonwealth, Ky., 713 S.W.2d 816 (1986), wherein expert testimony regarding the so-called sexual abuse accommodation syndrome was excluded because there was no evidence that the syndrome had obtained scientific acceptance or credibility among clinical psychologists or psychiatrists. Further, it was reasonable for the trial court to conclude that evidence regarding this battered wife syndrome might be of assistance to the jury as trier of fact because it tends to explain why a person suffering from the syndrome would not leave her mate and would be driven by fear of continuing episodes of increased aggression against herself to perceive certain conduct was necessary in her self-defense, even though another person not suffering from such a condition might believe or behave differently. It was for this reason that the Georgia Supreme Court held that evidence of the battered woman's syndrome should be admitted in Smith v. State, 247 Ga. 612, 277 S.E.2d 678, 18 A.L. R.4th 1144 (1981). See also, Annot., 18 A.L.R.4th 1153-59 (1982), and supplemental ALR citations. We agree that, as a general proposition, evidence of this nature is admissible after a proper foundation has been provided by evidence that this is a mental condition constituting a recognized scientific entity and that the witness is qualified to testify about it. Nevertheless, the principal issue presented to us on review is not the admissibility of the subject matter, but the limitations placed by the trial court on the witness' testimony. The trial court refused to permit the witness to express opinions and conclusions that the accused was a person suffering from the battered wife syndrome and that this explained her state of mind as one of self-defense at the moment she pulled the trigger. We conclude that the trial court's ruling should be sustained against the charge of abuse of discretion on two grounds: (1) this was a registered nurse rather than a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist trained to diagnose mental conditions in specific individuals; and (2) the offer of testimony extended beyond a professional opinion regarding the accused mental condition to the ultimate question of the accused's state of mind at the time of the act, decisive of her guilt or innocence. As we explained in Hampton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 666 S.W.2d 737 (1984), either or both of these circumstances justify excluding the evidence. In Kentucky we draw a distinction between testimony about the mental condition of an accused and his actual mental attitude at a particular time and place. Koester v. Commonwealth, Ky., 449 S.W.2d 213, 215 (1970). It is the difference between an objective opinion and a subjective conclusion. [Citation omitted.] Or put another way, it is the difference between the mental abnormality and the specific `product' produced thereby. Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence have been recently revised to limit Rule 704 in line with the Kentucky rule. Formerly FRE 704(a) stated without qualification that [t]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. It has been revised by adding the following qualification: (b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. Amendment effective October 12, 1984, Pub.L. No. 98-473. The trial court was within its discretion in deciding that this registered nurse, however experienced, was not qualified to diagnose the mental condition of the accused. It would be the same as permitting a nurse to provide a diagnosis as to whether an accused was suffering from a designated mental illness. Further, even if the witness were qualified to give a diagnosis, she was properly not permitted to express an opinion as to whether the accused believed it was necessary to shoot in self-defense at the moment she pulled the trigger.