Opinion ID: 1711914
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: Robert Paylor

Text: Paylor testified that Paylor met with Harris so that Harris could let [Paylor] know who had shot Paylor. Harris objected, and an off-the-record discussion was had. Neither the basis for the objection nor any ruling of the court appears on the record. The State's examination of Paylor resumed with the State's instructing Paylor to tell the jury only what Harris said about the murder of Jones. During Paylor's remaining testimony, Paylor made a comment indicating that Harris told Paylor that Howard had shot Paylor. Harris objected that the answer was nonresponsive and moved to strike it. Even though Harris did not have standing to object to an answer being nonresponsive, because the State was questioning Paylor, see Cardenas v. Peterson Bean Co., 180 Neb. 605, 144 N.W.2d 154 (1966), the district court nonetheless struck the answer and instructed the jury to disregard it. Harris later made a motion for mistrial based on the unresponsive answer, which was overruled. We again note, with reference to this testimony, that no § 27-404(2) objection appears in the record, and Harris cannot claim that ground on appeal as the basis for objection. No ruling on Harris' first objection appears in the record, nor does a motion to strike the objectionable testimony. Based on the same principles set forth above, Harris has also waived error in regard to this testimony. Furthermore, with respect to Paylor's second statement, Harris' objection on other grounds was sustained and the testimony stricken. Ordinarily, when an objection to or motion to strike improper evidence is sustained and the jury is instructed to disregard it, such instruction is deemed sufficient to prevent prejudice. State v. McLemore, 261 Neb. 452, 623 N.W.2d 315 (2001). The record presents no basis for concluding that the district court's instruction to the jury to disregard the testimony was insufficient to dispel any prejudice to Harris.