Opinion ID: 2334796
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Issue 1: The jurisdictional basis for the State's appeal was a question reserved.

Text: It is uncontroverted that the right to appeal is entirely statutory and that the limits of appellate jurisdiction are imposed by the legislature. Harsch v. Miller, 288 Kan. at 287, 200 P.3d 467 (Kansas appellate courts may exercise jurisdiction only under circumstances allowed by statute); State v. Crozier, 225 Kan. 120, 122, 587 P.2d 331 (1978) ([I]n the absence of a statute which authorizes an appeal, an appeal is not available to the losing party in the district court.). It is further uncontroverted that the State's statutory authority to appeal, when compared to the criminal defendant's, is very limited. While the State only has limited appeal rights, a criminal defendant has a nearly unlimited right of review. State v. Boyd, 268 Kan. 600, 605-08, 999 P.2d 265 (2000); see also State v. Walker, 260 Kan. 803, 806, 926 P.2d 218 (1996) (noting that appeals by the State in criminal cases are tightly restricted by statute). It is even further uncontroverted that the only statutory jurisdictional basis ever asserted by the State for its appeal of the district court's March 9, 2005, order essentially reducing Berreth's conviction for aggravated kidnapping to simple kidnapping was K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3): a question reserved. Indeed, the prosecutor effectively conceded to this court at oral argument that K.S.A. 22-3602(b)(3), and not 60-1507(d), had been the State's only cited jurisdictional basis. This candid concession is amply supported by the facts, e.g., both by the explicit statutory citation in the State's original notice of appeal and the notice's express recitation of the essential prerequisite for an appellate court to answer a question reserved: a question of statewide interest important to the uniform administration of criminal law. See State v. Skolaut, 286 Kan. 219, 225, 182 P.3d 1231 (2008) (appellate courts will accept appeal of questions reserved when the issues are `matters of statewide interest important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law and the interpretation of statutes'). The point was reinforced 5 weeks later by the State's docketing statementwhich per Supreme Court Rule 2.041(b) (docketing statement, criminal) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 18) is used by the court to determine jurisdiction. There, the State wrote only that jurisdiction existed under a question reserved. Consistent with the predicate of answering a question reserved that it involve matters of statewide interest important to the correct and uniform administration of the criminal law, the State wrote: The Court should reconsider its opinion in State v. Robbins based on State v. Groves, 278 Kan. 302, 95 P.3d 95 (2004). And the prosecutor expressly stated that a question reserved was the  only basis for our appeal at the district court's March 29, 2005, resentencing hearing. (Emphasis added.) Indeed, many of the parties' other actions are simply inconsistent with K.S.A. 60-1507(d) as a jurisdictional basis. While Berreth properly filed his first pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence in his criminal case, 93 CR 354, his counsel twice filed purported 1507 motions under that case number. Counsel's failures to file them as independent civil matters were contrary to Supreme Court Rule 183(a) (2011 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 259), which states: A motion challenging the validity of a sentence [under K.S.A. 60-1507] is an independent civil action which should be separately docketed, and the procedure before the trial court and on appeal to the Court of Appeals is governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure insofar as applicable. See State v. Thomas, 239 Kan. 457, 459, 720 P.2d 1059 (1986) (60-1507 creates a new case, not a criminal case, and proceeding is in the nature of a civil action); Hickson v. State, 39 Kan.App.2d 678, 680, 182 P.3d 1269 (2008) (same). Similarly, the State's notice of appeal in the district court, and its later docketing statement in the appellate courts, also incorrectly bore the criminal case number. As an aside, we observe that after the State's filing of its April 25, 2005, docketing statement, it apparently was forgotten that the State was appealing solely on a question reserved. For example, both of the State's briefs in Berreth I asked for reimposition of the defendant's original, harsher sentence, which is generally inconsistent with an appeal of a question reserved. See, e.g., State v. Stallings, 284 Kan. 741, 163 P.3d 1232 (2007); State v. Roderick, 259 Kan. 107, 116, 911 P.2d 159 (1996) (Questions reserved presuppose that the case at hand has concluded but that an answer to an issue of statewide importance is necessary for disposition of future cases.). In Berreth's pro se October 18, 2007, motion, he appears to be the first one to point out since the filing of the State's notice of appeal and its docketing statement 2 1/2 years earlierand as confirmed by the prosecutor's statement at the March 2005 sentence reduction hearingthat the State had expressly appealed strictly on a question reserved. Consequently, the question becomes whether the sole statutory jurisdictional basis assertedand relied uponby the State in its appeal can be changed to another ostensibly correct jurisdictional basis. This appears to be a question of first impression in Kansas. Under the circumstances of this case, and for the reasons expressed below, we answer this question no.