Opinion ID: 472982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Plaintiffs' Entitlement to Declaratory Relief

Text: 179 Plaintiffs requested as equitable relief both expungement of their arrest records and a declaration that their seizure and incarceration on March 22, 1982, shall be deemed, for all purposes, detentions rather than arrests. The district court entered a sealing order, but did not provide for declaratory relief. On appeal, plaintiffs press their request for declaratory relief. They urge the difficulty to which they are currently exposed when confronted with applications inquiring whether they have ever been arrested. Our case law supports coupling an expungement or sealing order with such declaratory relief in analogous situations. See Tatum v. Morton, 562 F.2d 1279, 1285 n. 17 (D.C.Cir.1977). At this juncture, of course, relief concerning the arrest records is contingent upon the outcome of the new trial our judgment requires. 180 In response to this court's inquiry, made by order dated April 9, 1986, the District stated, in an April 18 submission, that it opposes relief in the form of a declaration that the seizure of plaintiffs herein shall be deemed detentions rather than arrests. At most, the District urges, plaintiffs might be entitled to a declaration that the arrests here were made without probable cause. Response to Order, filed April 18, 1986. Prior to such a declaration, however, the District contends, the trial court should satisfy itself independently of the jury that there was no probable cause for the arrest[s]. Id. at 3. As authority, the District cites local precedent, pursuant to which decisions concerning the sealing of arrest records are entrusted to trial judges, applying a clear and convincing evidence standard, and are subject to appellate reversal, absent an error of law, only if plainly wrong or unsupported by evidence. See Earle v. District of Columbia, 479 A.2d 877, 879-80 (D.C.1984). 181 The trial judge in this case, however, had already ordered, without objection on the part of the District, that plaintiffs' arrest records be sealed. Indeed, in its initial brief on appeal, the District recognized that the district court had in fact found that the plaintiffs were arrested on March 22, 1982 without probable cause. Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 58. Therefore, the issue tendered in the parties' briefs is not the one presented in Earle, i.e., whether sealing denied by the trial court should be ordered on appeal; instead, the question posed here is whether a district court's finding of no probable cause for plaintiffs' arrest and resultant sealing order should be complemented by declaratory relief. 14 182 We discern no cogent reason, should plaintiffs prevail at trial, for refusing to relieve them of the stigma of responding Yes to the question, Ever arrested? 15 Accordingly, we instruct the district court, in the event that plaintiffs prevail on remand, to direct, by declaratory order, that: 1) plaintiffs Charles Carter and Aleta Parker may disregard the episode in suit in answering any inquiry regarding whether he or she has ever been arrested, see Natwig v. Webster, 562 F.Supp. 225, 227, 232 (D.R.I.1983); and 2) the seizure and incarceration of plaintiffs at issue shall be deemed, for all purposes, detentions rather than arrests. See Tatum, supra. With that declaratory relief, neither plaintiff would ever have to report the March 22, 1982, incident as an arrest on an application for employment or for admission into an educational program, or on any similar form requesting biographical data. See Brief of Appellants Charles Carter and Aleta Parker at 71-72.E. Vanderbloemen's Default 183 As we have already observed, Vanderbloemen, one of the individual police officer defendants involved in the events in suit, defaulted. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(a). In his charge, the trial judge informed the jurors that, because of Vanderbloemen's default, they were to determine damages with respect to him even if they found the two other individual defendants, officers Markovich and Tarantella, not liable. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 55(b)(2). The judge further instructed the jurors that, because the city had conceded that all three officers were acting within the scope of their employment at the time of the March 22, 1982, incident, the District of Columbia would therefore be liable for the damages assessed against Markovich, Tarantella and/or Vanderbloemen on the common law claims. Tr. 1463, 1471-73. Defendants renew on appeal their contention before the district court that the jury should have received no instruction at all on Vanderbloemen's default; the information imparted in the charge, according to defendants, conflicted with redoubtable Supreme Court precedent, Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552, 21 L.Ed. 60 (1872), and was devastatingly prejudicial. Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 68. The district court appropriately disposed of these objections. 184 First, the Frow decision is inapposite. Plaintiffs De La Vega in that case alleged a joint conspiracy by several defendants to deprive him of a large tract of land; he sued in equity to regain clear title to the property. One of the defendants, Frow, failed to answer on time. He was denied leave to file late and a default decree was entered against him adjudging that plaintiff De La Vega held good title to the property. The remaining defendants had answered on time. They denied fraud, prevailed at trial, and obtained an order dismissing De La Vega's complaint. The lower court's successive dispositions thus stood in irreconcilable conflict. According to the default declaration, De La Vega had title; according to the adjudication at trial, the claimants adverse to De La Vega did. In those circumstances, the Supreme Court said, any result other than dismissal of the complaint as to all defendants, including the defaulter, would be absurd. Id. at 554. 185 Defendants here have extracted language from Frow and placed it wholly outside the domain of that land title dispute. Frow was about inconsistent adjudications as to joint liability or as to a single res in controversy, and remains good law in that setting. In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1257-58 & n. 40 (7th Cir.1980). But the venerable Frow case should not be extended to a context for which it was never intended. Id. at 1257. The holding in Frow did not rest solely on the fact that the liability alleged was joint; 16 more importantly, Frow responded to the reality that [u]nder plaintiff's demand for relief, it was necessary that judgment be entered against all of the defendants in order to be effective. See 6 J. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE p 55.06, at 55-38 to 55-39 (2d ed. 1985) (Frow stands for the narrow rule that a default judgment may not be entered against one of several defendants (1) where the theory of recovery is one of true joint liability, such that, as a matter of law, no one defendant may be liable unless all defendants are liable, or (2) where the nature of the relief demanded is such that, in order to be effective, it must be granted against each and every defendant.). 186 Defendant Frow, despite his default, eventually shared the success his co-defendants achieved, since the full adjudication, which concluded with dismissal of the complaint, could not be reconciled with the earlier declaration that plaintiff De La Vega held good title to the single tract of land in controversy. 17 Here, by contrast, Vanderbloemen's situation was severable from Markovich's and Tarantella's. As the district judge correctly instructed the jury: 187 [W]here there is more than one defendant involved in a particular claim, it does not follow that if one is liable all the others in that claim are also liable. 188 Each defendant is entitled to a fair consideration of his own defense and is not to be prejudiced by the fact ... that you may find against the other defendant or defendants.... If you should find that only one defendant is liable, then your verdict should be in favor of the plaintiff against that defendant alone. 189 Tr. at 1450-51. 190 Nor did the trial judge restrict the District in its introduction of evidence regarding Vanderbloemen's actions. The city endeavored, constantly, at length, and without court constraint, both in the course of trial and in its summation, to persuade the jury that the conduct of all three officers, individually and jointly, was appropriate under the circumstances. Mem.Op. at 12. It was open to the jury, as the district court pointed out, id., and will be open to the jury on remand, to hold for defendants Marokovich and Tarantella, and to award only nominal damages against Vanderbloemen. 191 We note, finally, that prejudice might have worked against plaintiffs had the trial judge followed the counsel of the defense to say nothing of the default. Vanderbloemen figured conspicuously in the March 22, 1982, incident. The jury would have been left to engage in unguided speculation had it been sent off to deliberate without information about Vanderbloemen's absence. In sum, we find no reversible error in the district court's treatment of officer Vanderbloemen's default. F. Plaintiffs' Closing Argument 192 Prior to counsels' summations, punitive damage claims had been excised from the case. See Tr. 1344-45. In the course of his closing argument, plaintiffs' counsel three times asked the jury to send a message that the police conduct at issue will not be tolerated. Defendants contend that plaintiffs' send a message pleas were out of order once the parties understood that the damages at issue were solely compensatory. They unsuccessfully moved in the district court for a mistrial, and now ask us to order a new trial, on the ground that the send a message statements effectively invited a punishing verdict. 193 Both sides, review of the record reveals, pressed overheated closing argument upon the jury. The trial judge allowed counsel considerable leeway, but he ultimately reminded the jury to base its verdict on the evidence, not on counsels' remarks. See Tr. 1442-45. While we do not say that we would order a new trial if closing argument here were the only ground, 18 we anticipate that on remand the judge will hold counsel for both sides to a tighter rein. G. The Emotional Distress Claim 194 Defendants fault the district judge for failing to direct a verdict in favor of officers Markovich and Tarantella on the charge that they intentionally inflicted emotional distress on plaintiffs Carter and Parker. Both plaintiffs testified to multiple indignities heaped upon them by all three officers on March 22, 1982. Furthermore, construing the evidence favorably to plaintiffs as a judge must in ruling on a directed verdict motion by the defense, see Alden v. Providence Hospital, 382 F.2d 163, 165 (D.C.Cir.1967), one could readily conclude that all three officers, in the full and cool light of day, deliberately uttered false reports of criminal activity on Carter's and Parker's part. 195 Plaintiffs are entitled to the judgment of a jury on the quality of the officers' conduct. And a reasonable jury, crediting plaintiffs' account of the episode in suit, could well find that officers Markovich and Tarantella, in arresting and thereafter filing charges against Carter and Parker, acted egregiously, intentionally, or recklessly to cause plaintiffs severe emotional distress. See Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33, 37 (D.C.1982); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS Sec. 46 comment e (1965) (outrageous conduct may consist of abuse of position of authority, particularly by, inter alia, police officers). The argument that, as a matter of law, Markovich and Tarantella should have been exonerated on the intentional infliction of emotional distress charge is rootless.