Opinion ID: 2015196
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Maintenance Agreements

Text: The parties may themselves provide for maintenance in settlement agreements where the court could not otherwise order it. Under § 10(a) of the Dissolution Act the parties may agree in writing to provisions for the maintenance of either of them, the disposition of any property owned by either or both of them[,] and the custody and support of children. Ind.Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-10(a) (West 1979). The express purpose of this provision is to promote the amicable settlements of dissolution-related disputes, id., and Indiana law has long favored these agreements. While a court itself may award maintenance only under the narrow circumstances outlined in § 11(e), the parties are not so limited in drafting settlement agreements. The parties are free to make such continuing financial arrangements as, in a spirit of amicability and conciliation, they wish. Hull v. Hull, 436 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ind.Ct. App.1982); accord Bowman, 567 N.E.2d at 830; Baker v. Baker, 552 N.E.2d 525, 527 (Ind.Ct.App.1990); Pfenninger, 463 N.E.2d at 1119. This flexibility serves at least two purposes: (1) it enables a couple to dissolve their marital relationship on mutually acceptable terms without resort to judicial impositions, and (2) it provides the only effective mechanism by which divorcing couples can structure their financial relations so as to take advantage of the Internal Revenue Code's special treatment of maintenance payments. Hicks v. Fielman, 421 N.E.2d 716, 721 (Ind.Ct.App.1981). Section 8(d) of the Dissolution Act authorizes parties to waive a final hearing and file a settlement agreement with the court. Ind. Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-8(d) (West Supp. 1995). If the parties comply with § 8(d), the statute directs the court to enter a dissolution decree, Ind.Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-9(a)(2) (West Supp.1995), which must incorporate the settlement agreement and include an order requiring the parties to carry out its terms, Ind.Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-10(b) (West 1979). A court is not, however, bound to accept every proffered settlement agreement. Section 10(b) empowers a court to approve[ ] and consequently to disapprovethe terms of any settlement agreement. Ind.Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-10(b). Both the Uniform Act and the Study Commission's proposed act recommended making settlement agreements binding on courts unless the agreements were unconscionable. See Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act § 306(b); Proposed Dissolution Act § 208(b). The legislature rejected that strict approach but substituted no express standard of review. Nevertheless, we think the power to disapprove a settlement agreement must be exercised with great restraint. A trial judge should not reject a settlement agreement just because she believes she could draft a better one. Stockton v. Stockton, 435 N.E.2d 586 (Ind.Ct.App.1982) (involving property division). Restraint is especially justified where a settlement agreement contains provisions for maintenance, for the legislature has narrowly circumscribed the power of courts to impose maintenance on unwilling parties. [9] The mere submission by the parties of a settlement agreement containing a maintenance provision should not effectively grant to the courtunder the guise of modifying a proffered agreementa general power to set whatever amount of maintenance the court may deem just and proper. In reviewing a settlement agreement, a court should concern itself only with fraud, duress, and other imperfections of consent, Stockton, 435 N.E.2d at 590, or with manifest inequities, particularly those deriving from great disparities in bargaining power. In the absence of problems such as these, it seems likely that agreements between the parties will produce the just and reasonable outcome contemplated by the Code. Ind.Code Ann. § 31-1-11.5-11(b) (West 1979). In the usual case, freedom of contract will, it is hoped, produce mutually acceptable accords, to which parties will voluntarily adhere. [10] Moreover, the actual purpose lying behind any particular provision of a settlement agreement may remain forever hidden from the trial judge. Indeed, it may be quite idiosyncratic. While it is no doubt true that the purpose of court-imposed maintenance is to continue the support of a spouse past the dissolution of the marriage, Hicks, 421 N.E.2d at 720, we cannot agree that simple support is always the sole reason for the existence of a maintenance provision in a settlement agreement. Contra Roberts, 644 N.E.2d at 177. In the present case, for instance, the settlement agreement twice referred to all the promises and mutual covenants of the agreement as consideration. We can readily imagine that a court's bearing down on a maintenance provision could produce a rupture in the delicate consent holding together another part of the agreement. [11] For these reasons, we think it best that courts tread lightly when evaluating settlement agreements.