Opinion ID: 1727284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Improper Habitualization

Text: We also accepted jurisdiction in several cases in which the defendant alleges that a habitual offender sentence was imposed in violation of the statutory requirements. See Speights, 711 So.2d at 168; Edwards, 707 So.2d at 969; Jerry v. State, 732 So.2d 500 (Fla. 5th DCA), review granted, 744 So.2d 454 (Fla.1999) (Case No. 95,866); McKnight v. State, 759 So.2d 686 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998), review granted, 729 So.2d 394 (Fla.1999) (Case No. 94,256); Smith v. State, 721 So.2d 455 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998), review granted, 729 So.2d 394 (Fla.1999) (Case No. 94,703). In Speights, the First District certified the following question to be one of great public importance: When a habitual violent felony offender sentence is imposed without record evidence of a prior conviction of an enumerated predicate felony, but without any objection by the defendant to the imposition of such a sentence, and the resulting sentence is above the statutory maximum without habitualization but below the statutory maximum period of incarceration after habitualization, is the sentencing error one that may be raised on appeal for the first time, and corrected despite the lack of any motion in the trial court to correct the sentence pursuant to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(b)? Speights, 711 So.2d at 169. The consequences to the defendant of improper habitualization are graphically demonstrated in Speights, where the defendant's guidelines sentence was six years and two months and the statutory maximum for the offense without habitualization was fifteen years. However, because the defendant was improperly habitualized, he received a twenty-two year sentence. The First District reasoned that even though the offense of carjacking was not a statutorily-authorized predicate offense for habitualizaton, the sentence was not illegal because it did not exceed the statutory maximum for the offense after habitualization. See id. After the First District's decision, the State conceded error during oral argument in Speights v. State, and pursuant to that concession, we ordered the trial court to correct the sentence immediately. See Speights v. State, 749 So.2d 503 (Fla.1999). This is similar to the error in Smith where the defendant claims that his prior felony convictions were an insufficient predicate for habitualization because two of the convictions were entered on the same day and the third occurred after the date of the offense. 721 So.2d at 455. Further, without expressly receding from Speights, the First District in McKnight in fact corrected a similar error of improper habitualization because habitual offender sentencing is expressly prohibited for possession of cocaine, and the sentence exceeds the maximum permissible non-habitual offender statute for that offense. 759 So.2d at 686; see Gregory v. State, 739 So.2d 100 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) (correcting the same type of unpreserved error although defendant pleaded guilty, because it is serious and patent); Denson, 711 So.2d at 1230 (same); see also Nelson, 719 So.2d at 1232-33 (correcting habitual offender sentence for felony petit theft, which is expressly prohibited by statute). This is the same type of error at issue in Edwards, where the Fifth District issued a per curiam opinion affirming the imposition of a habitual offender sentence for the possession of cocaine, although this sentence is specifically prohibited by statute. 707 So.2d at 969. Because we find that improper habitualization of the defendant contrary to specific statutory requirements is a patent, serious error that has a quantifiable effect on the length of the defendant's incarceration, we find that this type of error should be corrected on direct appeal as fundamental. For these reasons we approve the First District's opinions in McKnight and Nelson and the Second District's opinion in Denson on this issue. Accordingly, we answer the certified question in Speights in the affirmative and, as we did by previous order in Speights, quash the district court's opinion in Edwards. We also disapprove the district court's decisions in Smith and Jerry.