Opinion ID: 1479911
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Finally, the Defendants, Merle and Michael Jackson, say that the evidence was insufficient to entitle the jury to find that the Defendants knew that the projector had been stolen and that the Justice should have granted their motions for acquittal at the close of the evidence. M.R.Crim.P., Rule 29(a). The jurors had before them the evidence of the Defendant Michael's unsuccessful attempt to demonstrate the projector for sale, the Defendants' explanation that the projector belonged to Michael's father, Merle's apparent warning of danger when the officer arrived, the hasty exit from the home, their unwillingness to remain with the officer while he made further radio inquiry as to the status of the projector, their later flight from the officer, Michael's attempt to hide the projector in the bushes, Michael's offer to sell the projector for a price far below its fair value, and Ewen's assertion of ownership and his offer to sell to the officer for a figure four times that of Michael's offer to the lady. The jury could properly infer from Defendants' conduct that the Defendants believed the projector was stolen property. State v. Beale, Me., 299 A.2d 921 (1973); State v. Melanson, Me., 325 A.2d 14 (1974). Furthermore, none of the Defendants rested at the close of the State's evidence, and the jury also heard Merle Jackson and Norman Ewen testify that they had found the projector at the North Whitefield dump and that Michael, aware of this alleged explanation of their acquisition, had bought it from them for $35.00. The jury was entitled to weigh this explanation in the light of the other facts of the case. The Defendant Ewen argues to us that there is a complete absence of evidence indicating that he in any way aided in concealing the stolen property. He characterizes his conduct as that of simply sitting in the back of the car with the projector. Mere presence in the car with the property, he reminds us, will not constitute possession of the property. State v. Dall, Me., 305 A.2d 270 (1973). The term aid is defined in Black's Law Dictionary 91 (4th ed.rev. 1968) as [t]o support, help, assist or strengthen ... [s]upplement the efforts of another. The jury was entitled to conclude from the evidence that the three Defendants were engaged in a joint enterprise in which they concealed from the owner the location of his stolen property, knowing it to have been stolen, with the intention of disposing of it as their own for profit. The Defendant Ewen was more than a passive spectatorhe asserted his ownership to the officer, offered to sell it to the officer, and, in offering to sell it to the officer, quoted a price which might have been calculated to appear more in keeping with the appearance of innocence than the $50.00 figure they were asking from the occupants of the house. After the Defendant Michael Jackson had left the car with the projector following the miring of the car, it was Ewen who told the State Police officer that the man who had just left the car was an unknown hitchhiker whom they had picked up. Finally, the Defendant Ewen urges that at the close of the case, the State's evidence was not sufficient to exclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, every other hypothesis except that of the Defendants' guilt. In the first place, the sufficiency of proof to withstand a motion for acquittal made at the completion of all the evidence is measured by the totality of the evidence and not by the State's evidence alone. State v. Brewer, Me., 325 A.2d 26 (1974); Glassman, Maine Practice, § 29.3. Secondly, we suggested in State v. Tomer, Me., 304 A.2d 80, 85 (1973) that the often repeated statement that circumstantial evidence must be sufficient to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis except that of the respondent's guilt is but the repetition of a useless ritual which many courts have abandoned and which adds nothing to a jury's understanding of its duties. Later, in State v. Pike, Me., 306 A.2d 145, 149 (1973) we repeated our warning as to the suspect quality of this language. The United States Supreme Court has declared it to be confusing and incorrect as a part of a judge's instruction when the jury has been properly instructed on the standards for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-140, 75 S.Ct. 127, 137, 99 L.Ed.2d 150, 166 (1954). We consider that this language is valueless as it suggests a special test concerning sufficiency of circumstantial evidence as distinguished from direct evidence. In either case, the test is the samethat is, whether from all the evidence and from such reasonable inferences as may properly be drawn therefrom the guilt of a defendant has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. This standard was made abundantly clear to the jurors. The Defendant Ewen offered innocent explanations for his conduct in connection with the stolen projector. It was within the province of the jurors, after assessing credibility of these explanations, to find that they raised no reasonable doubts as to the Defendant Ewen's guilt. The evidence was sufficient to justify the convictions and there was no error in the Justice's denial of the Defendants' motions for acquittal. The entry will be: Appeals denied.