Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to

Text: Counsel; Massiah Error On appeal, defendant argues that even though he had not yet been charged for Pamela’s murder, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached when he was in federal custody for the money licensing violation. On that point, he asserts the federal and state prosecutions were “inextricably intertwined” and that the federal prosecution was a “sham” to hold defendant in custody while state authorities investigated the murder case against defendant. Defendant maintains that because Smith was acting as an agent for the government, any statements Smith elicited from defendant were inadmissible under Massiah. For reasons that follow, we deny this claim. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the 11 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. assistance of counsel for his defense.” (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.; see Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206.) This constitutional protection “guarantees the accused, at least after the initiation of formal charges, the right to rely on counsel as a ‘medium’ between him and the State.” (Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 176; see Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206.) The “clear rule of Massiah is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him.” (Brewer v. Williams (1977) 430 U.S. 387, 401.) The high court has “pegged commencement to ‘ “the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” ’ ” (Rothgery v. Gillespie County (2008) 554 U.S. 191, 198 (Rothgery); see Kirby v. Illinois (1972) 406 U.S. 682, 689-690.) Likewise, we have held that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel “does not exist until the state initiates adversary judicial criminal proceedings, such as by formal charge or indictment.” (People v. DePriest (2007) 42 Cal.4th l, 33 (DePriest); see People v. Viray (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1194.) By its terms, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense specific. It cannot be invoked once for all future prosecutions, for it does not attach until a prosecution is commenced . . . . ” (McNeil v. Wisconsin (1991) 501 U.S. 171, 175 (McNeil); see Rothgery, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 198; People v. Cunningham (2015) 61 Cal.4th 609, 648; Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 180.) The high court has made clear that there is no exception to this offense-specific requirement for uncharged offenses that are “ ‘ “closely related” ’ ” to or “ ‘ “inextricably intertwined” ’ ” with the charged offense. (Texas v. 12 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. Cobb (2001) 532 U.S. 162, 173; see People v. Slayton (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1076, 1082-1083.) That said, “when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches, it does encompass offenses that, even if not formally charged, would be considered the same offense under the Blockburger test.”5 (Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173, italics added.) Here, the state prosecution for Pamela’s murder had not yet commenced when defendant, who was in federal custody for the unrelated money licensing charge, made the incriminating remarks to Smith. Contrary to defendant’s suggestion, we have expressly endorsed, in recognition of the offense specific requirement, a “bright-line precharging rule against attachment of a Sixth Amendment right.” (DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 34.) Thus, “[a] defendant’s incriminating statements about offenses for which he has not been charged may be admitted consistently with his Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee notwithstanding its attachment on other charged offenses at the time.” (Id. at p. 33.) Defendant fails to persuade why the “bright-line precharging rule against attachment of a Sixth Amendment right” (DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 34), should not apply here. 5 Under Blockburger v. United States (1932) 284 U.S. 299, “ ‘the test to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the other does not.’ ” (Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173, quoting Blockburger, supra, 284 U.S. at p. 304.) As such, the high court also described the “Sixth Amendment as ‘prosecution specific,’ insofar as it prevents discussion of charged offenses as well as offenses that, under Blockburger could not be the subject of a later prosecution.” (Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173, fn. 3, italics added.) 13 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. For instance, notwithstanding the Sixth Amendment’s “offense specific” requirement (McNeil, supra, 501 U.S. at p. 175), defendant insists that state and federal authorities had “worked collectively” to ensure that defendant was detained without bail in the federal case, thus making the federal licensing charge “inextricably intertwined” with the state murder charge. In support, defendant relies on principles underlying the dual sovereignty doctrine in the Fifth Amendment double jeopardy context. (See Gamble v. United States (2019) __ U.S. __, ___[139 S.Ct. 1960, 1964] (Gamble) [“Under this ‘dual-sovereignty’ doctrine, a State may prosecute a defendant under state law even if the Federal Government has prosecuted him for the same conduct under a federal statute”].) Specifically, defendant emphasizes that the high court left open the possibility that double jeopardy principles may ban a successive state prosecution that serves as a “sham and a cover” for the federal prosecution. (Bartkus v. Illinois (1959) 359 U.S. 121, 124 (Bartkus).) By analogy, defendant argues that the federal prosecution for the licensing violation was in fact a “sham” used to detain defendant while the state investigated Pamela’s murder. He maintains, therefore, that his arrest and federal detention prohibited any questioning on the state murder case. Even assuming that the dual sovereignty doctrine applies in the Sixth Amendment context (see U.S. v. Coker (1st Cir. 2005) 433 F.3d 39, 45), and further, that the sham prosecution serves as a “potential exception” to this doctrine (Gamble, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 1994, fn. 3 (dis. opn. of Ginsburg, J.)), we conclude defendant’s claim lacks merit. As noted, the sham prosecution theory only applies to provide defendant relief if there were successive prosecutions by 14 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. two sovereigns for the same offense. (See Gamble, supra, 139 S.Ct. at p. 1964 [affirming dual sovereignty doctrine].) Here, the offenses—Pamela’s murder and the federal licensing charge— were clearly not the same. In fact, at his federal detention proceedings, defendant argued that the federal licensing charge and the as-yet charged murder were “unrelated” and “disconnected.” Nevertheless, we agree with defendant that both federal detention hearings focused heavily on facts surrounding Pamela’s murder and defendant’s possible involvement. To the extent defendant argues that federal and state authorities “worked collectively” to have him detained in federal custody, i.e., through sharing information about the murder and providing a “detention script” prepared by the LAPD, this level of cooperation and collaboration simply represents the “conventional practice between the two sets of prosecutors throughout the country” (Bartkus, supra, 359 U.S. at p. 123). “As Bartkus makes plain, there may be very close coordination in the prosecutions, in the employment of agents of one sovereign to help the other sovereign in its prosecution, and in the timing of the court proceedings so that the maximum assistance is mutually rendered by the sovereigns. None of this close collaboration amounts to one government being the other’s ‘tool’ or providing a ‘sham’ or ‘cover.’ ” (U.S. v. Figueroa-Soto (9th Cir. 1991) 938 F.2d 1015, 1020.) Further, even if state authorities deliberately delayed arresting defendant for Pamela’s murder, which purportedly gave them more time in which to elicit defendant’s incriminatory statements in federal custody, this “conscious delay” does not violate his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. (People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 527 [no Massiah violation where investigators told wife to 15 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. “intensify her questioning” of defendant about capital crimes while defendant was incarcerated on unrelated charges].)6 Finally, defendant relies on Elkins v. United States (1960) 364 U.S. 206, to argue specifically that concepts of due process and fundamental fairness dictate that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached. Not so. Elkins’s abrogation of the “silver platter” doctrine—which previously allowed evidence obtained by a state agent’s unreasonable searches or seizures to be used in a federal trial—does not have any application here. (Elkins, supra, 364 U.S. at p. 222.) As discussed above, we reject defendant’s assertion that federal authorities acted improperly in detaining defendant; thus, the high court’s concerns of “subterfuge and evasion with respect to federal-state cooperation in criminal investigation” are not realized in this case. (Ibid.) Based on these reasons, we reject defendant’s claim that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had attached to the uncharged murder when he made the incriminating statements in federal custody. (See Texas v. Cobb, supra, 532 U.S. at p. 173.) 6 Because it is clear that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right had not attached when he made the incriminating statements to Smith, it is unnecessary to address, for purposes of defendant’s Massiah claim, whether Smith “(1) was acting as a government agent, i.e., under the direction of the government pursuant to a preexisting arrangement, with the expectation of some resulting benefit or advantage, and (2) deliberately elicited incriminating statements.” (In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 915.) Whether Smith’s allegedly coercive actions rendered defendant’s statements involuntary, however, is an issue we discuss below. (See post, at pp. 18-20.) 16 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.