Opinion ID: 1469209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District's Claims on Cross-Appeal

Text: The first claim by the district is that the condition precedent to payment of the contingency fee described in paragraph six of the addendum was never met. In support of this position, the district claims that the district provided testimony showing that the intent of the district was to pay the contingency only if the district received the school as contemplated on October 13, 1992, and, since the school as built deviated from that contemplated design, the condition was not met. We interpret the contract according to its terms and the parties' intent as expressed in the contract language. Suchoski v. Redshaw, 163 Vt. 620, 622, 660 A.2d 290, 292 (1995). From the plain meaning of the language of paragraph six, there is no expression that the intent of the parties was to attach the satisfaction of the contingency to the actual building received. The language provides that the contingency is met if the high school GMP, as adjusted through completion of bidding, is lower than the October 13, 1992 estimate, and makes no mention of the finished project as such would relate to the contingency being met. We therefore reject the district's argument. The district's second claim is that the trial court erred in awarding attorney's fees to NEPI because the award was tied to finding a contingency, and because the trial court stated that under the circumstances NEPI was entitled to attorney's fees. As we disagree with the district that the paragraph six contingency was not met, we address only the claim that the court erred in finding that the contract entitled NEPI to fees in this case. The contract provides that, should a party breach the agreement, the party forced to take any action to collect sums due it ... may also recover all costs of collection (including court costs and reasonable legal fees). We will not disturb the trial court's findings of fact unless they are unsupported by the evidence or clearly erroneous. State v. Zaccaro, 154 Vt. 83, 86, 574 A.2d 1256, 1258 (1990). By arguing that the court's statement that NEPI is entitled to attorney's fees in this case is the equivalent of reading the contract as mandating attorney's fees in the event of a breach, the district displays a misunderstanding of the word entitle. To be entitled to fees is not only to have a mandatory right to such, but also to furnish with proper grounds for seeking or claiming. Black's Law Dictionary 477 (5th ed. 1979). In light of the trial court's finding that the contingency was owed to NEPI, its conclusion that NEPI was also entitled to attorney's fees under the contract was supported by the evidence. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.