Opinion ID: 4541411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Attempt to Influence a Public Servant

Text: ¶14 We first determine whether the trial court plainly erred when it instructed the jury on the attempt to influence a public servant charge. Assuming without deciding that an error occurred here, we consider whether that error was plain. Because we determine that any error was neither obvious nor substantial, we 5Some cases treat obviousness, substantiality, and fundamental fairness as three distinct requirements that must be satisfied in order for an error to be plain. See Lehnert v. People, 244 P.3d 1180, 1185 (Colo. 2010). Regardless of the test used, however, we conclude that the instructional errors here were not plain. Thus, we need not clarify that standard today. 9 conclude that any infirmity in the trial court’s instruction on the attempt to influence a public servant charge did not rise to the level of plain error.
¶15 The General Assembly is vested with the authority both to establish the legal components of criminal liability and to define criminal conduct. Copeland v. People, 2 P.3d 1283, 1286 (Colo. 2000). Except in those statutes enumerating strict liability crimes, a defendant cannot face criminal sanctions “unless the prosecution establishes that, in addition to committing a proscribed act, the person acted with the culpable mental state required for the particular crime.” Id. Moreover, section 18-1-503(4), C.R.S. (2019), provides that “[w]hen a statute defining an offense prescribes as an element thereof a specified culpable mental state, that mental state is deemed to apply to every element of the offense unless an intent to limit its application clearly appears.”
¶16 Hoggard contends that the instruction on attempt to influence a public servant was plainly erroneous because it failed to apply the intent requirement to all elements of the offense, thereby contravening section 18-1-503(4). Assuming without deciding that an error occurred, we must determine whether that error was plain. 10 ¶17 To begin, we must consider whether any error was obvious. Miller, 113 P.3d at 750. Turning first to the statute, section 18-8-306, C.R.S. (2019), prohibits a person from attempting to influence a public servant by means of deceit with the intent to affect the public servant’s decision, opinion, or action: Any person who attempts to influence any public servant by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal against any person or property, with the intent thereby to alter or affect the public servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter which is to be considered or performed by him or the agency or body of which he is a member, commits a class 4 felony. (Emphasis added.) The trial court’s instruction on this charge substantially tracked the language of the statute: The elements of the crime of Attempt to Influence a Public Servant are:
2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, 3. attempted to influence a public servant, 4. by means of deceit 5. with the intent to alter or affect the public servant’s decision, vote, opinion, or action concerning any matter, 6. which was to be considered or performed by the public servant or the agency or body of which the public servant was a member. (Emphasis added.) This instruction included the requisite mental state—“with the intent”—as it is stated in section 18-8-306. See Weinreich, 119 P.3d at 1076 (noting that jury instructions should substantially track the statutory language describing 11 the crime). Furthermore, although the instruction did not apply the mental state to all subsequent elements, it did track the model instruction that existed at the time of Hoggard’s trial: The elements of the crime of attempt to influence a public servant are: 1. That the defendant, 2. in the State of Colorado, at or about the date and place charged, 3. attempted to influence a public servant, 4. [by means of deceit] [by threat of [violence] [economic reprisal] against any person or property], 5. with the intent to alter or affect the public servant’s [decision] [vote] [opinion] [action] concerning any matter, 6. which was to be considered or performed by [him] [the agency or body of which he was a member]. CJI-Crim. 1st 19:13 (1983) (emphasis added). And while simply following model instructions does not provide “safe harbor that insulates instructional error from reversal,” Garcia v. People, 2019 CO 64, ¶ 22, 445 P.3d 1065, 1069, it certainly makes any error that occurred here less obvious. ¶18 Moreover, the trial court’s instruction adhered to our decision in People v. Norman, 703 P.2d 1261 (Colo. 1985). In Norman, we analyzed section 18-8-306 for a sufficiency of the evidence claim. Id. at 1269. We explained that the critical elements of attempt to influence a public servant are “(1) an attempt to influence a public servant (2) by means of deceit or by threat of violence or economic reprisal 12 (3) with the intent to alter or affect the public servant’s decision or action.” Id. (emphasis added); see also People v. Janousek, 871 P.2d 1189, 1194 (Colo. 1994) (providing the same “critical elements” of attempt to influence a public servant). The trial court’s instruction here conformed with our recitation of the critical elements of the crime in Norman. Thus, because the instruction here comported with the language of the statute, the model instruction as it existed at the time of Hoggard’s trial, and our precedent, we conclude that any error was not obvious. ¶19 Although the determination that any error was not obvious resolves the issue of whether any infirmity in the instruction was plain, we consider the question of the impact of any error on the verdict. Specifically, we consider whether there is a reasonable possibility that any instructional error contributed to Hoggard’s conviction for attempt to influence a public servant. See Miller, 113 P.3d at 750. Hoggard’s defense on this charge pertained to identity. During closing argument, Hoggard’s counsel stated that “Shawna Hoggard is not the only person that could have altered [the email].” Significantly, Hoggard’s defense focused on who altered the email and not why the email was altered. In other words, Hoggard did not argue about intent. Thus, we conclude that no reasonable possibility exists that any instructional error on this charge contributed to Hoggard’s conviction. 13 ¶20 In sum, because we conclude that any error was neither obvious nor substantial, we hold that even if the instruction on attempt to influence a public servant was erroneous, any error was not plain.6