Opinion ID: 2634839
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Penal Code Section 1016, Former Subdivision (3)

Text: Defendant, however, argues that even if the SVPA civil commitment proceeding is not a civil action but a special proceeding of a civil nature, the definition of civil suit under Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), is broader than a civil action, encompassing all actions at law, actions in equity and special proceedings. The Attorney General, however, maintains an action is the same thing as a suit; therefore, the provision does not apply to an SVPA proceeding and defendant's 1978 conviction may be used to support his civil commitment. [5] Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), provided in part that a nolo contendere plea may not be used against the defendant as an admission in any civil suit based upon or growing out of the act upon which the criminal prosecution is based. (Stats.1976, ch. 1088, § 1, p. 4931.) [6] The former subdivision did not define the term civil suit, nor does the current version define it in the context of nolo contendere pleas in nonfelony cases. ( Id., § 1016, subd. (3).) In construing a statute, our task is to determine the Legislature's intent and purpose for the enactment. ( People v. Tindall (2000) 24 Cal.4th 767, 772, 102 Cal.Rptr.2d 533, 14 P.3d 207.) We look first to the plain meaning of the statutory language, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. ( Ibid. ) If there is no ambiguity in the statutory language, its plain meaning controls; we presume the Legislature meant what it said. ( Ibid. ) `However, if the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider various extrinsic aids, including the purpose of the statute, the evils to be remedied, the legislative history, public policy, and the statutory scheme encompassing the statute.' [Citations.] ( People v. Garcia (2002) 28 Cal.4th 1166, 1172, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 464, 52 P.3d 648.) For reasons that follow, we reject defendant's contention that the term civil suit under Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), is broader than a civil action, and includes a special proceeding. As noted above, the term civil action is by definition not a special proceeding (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 22, 23, 30), and civil action does not have a different meaning from civil suit. (See ante, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 332-333, 123 P.3d at pp. 607-608.) Furthermore, the Legislature used both civil suit and civil action in complementary statutory provisions (Pen.Code, § 1016, former subd. (3); Evid.Code, former § 1300; see ante, at p. 332-333, 123 P.3d at p. 607-608), confirming that these terms are interchangeable in this context. When the Legislature added former subdivision (3) to Penal Code section 1016 in 1963 and used the term civil suit, it was presumably aware of not only these statutory definitions, but also our earlier holding that [s]exual psychopathy proceedings are special proceedings of a civil nature. ( Gross, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 820, 270 P.2d 1025.) The Legislature, of course, is deemed to be aware of statutes and judicial decisions already in existence, and to have enacted or amended a statute in light thereof. [Citation.] ( People v. Harrison (1989) 48 Cal.3d 321, 329, 256 Cal.Rptr. 401, 768 P.2d 1078.) Based on the statutory language, we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to include a special proceeding like a sexual psychopathy proceeding within the definition of civil suit. (Pen.Code, § 1016, former subd. (3).) Although there is little legislative history of the amendment adding the nolo contendere plea to Penal Code section 1016, [7] the background behind this amendment undercuts defendant's broad definition of civil suit. (See Quinn v. State of California (1975) 15 Cal.3d 162, 173, 124 Cal.Rptr. 1, 539 P.2d 761 [contemporaneous construction ... may shed important light on legislative intent].) In 1963, the Legislature amended Penal Code section 1016  permitting defendants to enter a nolo contendere plea with the consent of the district attorney and the approval of the court  reportedly in response to our decision in Teitelbaum Furs, Inc. v. Dominion Ins. Co., Ltd. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 601, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439 ( Teitelbaum ). (Note, Nolo Contendere  Its Use and Effect (1964) 52 Cal. L.Rev. 408, 409 (hereafter Nolo Contendere. ) In Teitelbaum, we held that in certain circumstances, any issue necessarily decided in a prior criminal proceeding is conclusively determined as to the parties if it is involved in a subsequent civil action. ( Teitelbaum, supra, 58 Cal.2d at p. 607, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439.) We also said, A plea of guilty is admissible in a subsequent civil action on the independent ground that it is an admission. ( Id. at p. 605, 25 Cal.Rptr. 559, 375 P.2d 439.) After our Teitelbaum decision, [i]t is reported that at the legislative hearings on California Penal Code Section 1016(3), a general dissatisfaction was voiced against using criminal cases as a basis for civil actions. [Fn. omitted.] By providing defendants with a nolo plea, the legislators hoped to curb the overlapping of criminal and civil cases. The plea enables the defendant both to save the time and expense of trial and guard himself against admissions that could be used in a subsequent civil suit. ( Nolo Contendere, supra, 52 Cal. L.Rev. at p. 409.) Reviewing the 1963 legislation, the State Bar Journal explained, The plea of nolo contendere permits speedy disposal of the criminal charge. Defendants charged with traffic offenses and defendants in corporate fraud cases, which are usually long and complex, are among those expected to utilize the plea. ( Review of 1963 Code Legislation (1963) 38 State Bar J. 751, 752.) The foregoing suggests that when the Legislature added former subdivision (3) to Penal Code section 1016, limiting the use of a nolo contendere plea in a subsequent civil suit, it intended the limitation to apply to matters like traffic offenses and corporate fraud. The Legislature's subsequent amendment of section 1016  deleting the limitation with respect to felony cases  supports this understanding of the legislative intent. (Stats.1982, ch. 390, § 3, p. 1725; see ante, 36 Cal.Rptr.3d at p. 333, fn. 6, 123 P.3d at p. 608, fn. 6.) Although an expression of legislative intent in a later enactment is not binding upon a court in its construction of an earlier enacted statute, it is a factor that may be considered. [Citations.] ( Cummins v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 478, 492, 30 Cal.Rptr.3d 823, 115 P.3d 98.) In amending section 1016, former subdivision (3), the Legislature declared its intent to assist the efforts of victims of crime to obtain compensation for their injuries from the criminals who inflicted those injuries. (Stats.1982, ch. 390, § 1, p. 1725.) The Legislature further finds and declares that the practice of permitting defendants in criminal cases to enter pleas of nolo contendere and thus avoid the use of the criminal conviction in a civil suit wherein the victim of the crime seeks to recover damages for injuries sustained by the criminal act runs counter to the interest of victims of crime. ( Ibid. ) Matters like traffic offenses, corporate fraud, and crime victims' damages suits are quite distinct from SVPA proceedings, which identify a `small but extremely dangerous group of sexually violent predators that have diagnosable mental disorders' ( Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1144, fn. 5, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584), and are highly critical to the public's safety. (But see People v. Vasquez (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1225, 1233, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 610, 25 P.3d 1090 [SVPA commitment and loss or denial of professional license both seek to protect public from felon's future harmful conduct].) As the Attorney General points out, to preclude the use of a nolo contendere plea in a subsequent SVPA proceeding would frustrate the narrow and important purpose of the Act, which is confining and treating mentally disordered individuals who have demonstrated their inability to control specific sexually violent behavior through the commission of similar prior crimes. ( Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 1164, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584.) Delaying this necessary identification and treatment would obviously place the public at significant risk. The Legislature indicated that to the extent such persons are currently incarcerated and readily identifiable, commitment under the SVPA is warranted immediately upon their release from prison. The Act provides treatment for mental disorders from which they currently suffer and reduces the threat of harm otherwise posed to the public. ( Id. at p. 1144, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584, italics added.) Defendant and the dissent, however, assert that our decision in Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d 762, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134, is dispositive of the meaning of civil suit, and precludes the use of defendant's 1978 conviction in the SVPA proceeding. We disagree. In Cartwright, chiropractor Adam Cartwright pled no contest to Penal Code section 316, a misdemeanor, for keeping a disorderly house for purposes of prostitution. ( Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 765, fn. 3, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134.) Based on this conviction, the state Board of Chiropractic Examiners (Board) revoked Cartwright's license to practice because the Board concluded the conviction constituted a conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude under section 10 of the Chiropractic Act. ( Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 764-765, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134.) Ordering the Board to set aside its revocation, the trial court concluded that under a settled California rule of decision a conviction based on a plea of nolo contendere could not be a basis for discipline under section 10 of the Chiropractic Act. ( Id. at p. 765, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134.) In a four-to-three decision, we affirmed the trial court's judgment. ( Ibid. ) After reviewing the relevant case law, the Cartwright majority agreed with the trial court that the reasonable expectations of persons examining the law on the subject are that a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea cannot be used as a ground for discipline or other adverse consequences authorized by a statute for convictions generally. ( Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 773, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134, relying on Caminetti v. Imperial Mut. L. Ins. Co. (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 476, 139 P.2d 681 [Insurance Commissioner's conservatorship]; In re Hallinan (1954) 43 Cal.2d 243, 272 P.2d 768 [State Bar discipline]; Kirby v. Alcoholic Bev. etc. App. Bd. (1969) 3 Cal.App.3d 209, 83 Cal.Rptr. 89 ( Kirby ) [revocation of liquor license].) The settled nature of the California rule against collateral use of convictions based on nolo contendere pleas is an important reason for permitting the rule to remain in effect unless and until changed by legislation. Those who have entered nolo contendere pleas in the past instead of standing trial were entitled to rely upon the limitations announced by California decisions on subsequent uses of their pleas and of the ensuing convictions. [Citation.] ( Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 773, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134.) Contrary to defendant's and the dissent's suggestion, Cartwright is not dispositive of the issue here. It did not rest its holding on Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), much less critically examine its statutory language. Although the Cartwright majority may have implicitly rejected the argument that an administrative proceeding is not a civil suit under former subdivision (3) (see Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 779-780, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134 (dis. opn. of Richardson, J.) ), it did not therefore give civil suit an expansive meaning to include a special proceeding of a civil nature. (See City of Oakland v. Public Employees' Retirement System (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 29, 48, 115 Cal.Rptr.2d 151 [administrative proceeding is neither a civil action nor special proceeding of a civil nature for statute of limitations purposes].) Moreover, Cartwright does not reasonably stand for the broad proposition that a conviction based on a nolo contendere plea cannot be used in any subsequent proceedings. (See Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 770-771, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134, discussing Kirby, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d 209, 83 Cal.Rptr. 89.) Kirby, on which the Cartwright majority extensively relied, made clear that it was concerned with the effect of a nolo contendere plea in an administrative proceeding in particular. ( Kirby, supra, 3 Cal.App.3d at p. 219, 83 Cal.Rptr. 89 [The collateral effect of a nolo contendere plea in an administrative proceeding is a subject that produces little unanimity of opinion in legal circles].) Significantly, neither Cartwright nor the cases it relied on involved a sexual psychopathy-type proceeding, which we had already concluded was a special proceeding of a civil nature. ( Gross, supra, 42 Cal.2d at p. 820, 270 P.2d 1025.) A fair reading of Cartwright makes clear that the decision at most extended the reach of the bar against using the nolo contendere plea and conviction (see Pen.Code, § 1016, former subd. (3)) to administrative proceedings. Indeed, because our earlier holding in Gross strongly suggested that the limitations of Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), would not apply in sexual psychopathy proceedings, Cartwright's main concern that defendants were entitled to rely upon the limitations announced by California decisions on subsequent uses of their pleas and the ensuing convictions ( Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 773, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134), is not an issue in the SVPA context. Defendant also points out that Cartwright emphasized that a conviction is significant in the statutory scheme only insofar as it is a reliable indicator of actual guilt. ( Cartwright, supra, 16 Cal.3d at p. 773, 129 Cal.Rptr. 462, 548 P.2d 1134.) A nolo contendere plea's reliability as such is substantially reduced because of a defendant's reservations about admitting guilt for all purposes, and the suggested weakness in the available proof of guilt. ( Ibid. ) However, in the SVPA context, a conviction based on a defendant's nolo contendere plea does not undermine the determination of a defendant's suitability for civil commitment. For instance, requisite convictions alone shall not be the sole basis for the determination that a person is an SVP. (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3).) A person alleged to be an SVP shall be entitled to a trial by jury, to the assistance of counsel, to the right to retain experts or professional persons to perform an examination on his or her behalf, and to have access to all relevant medical and psychological records and reports. (§ 6603, subd. (a).) If the person demands a jury trial, a unanimous verdict is required. ( Id., subd. (f).) The trier of fact shall determine whether, beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator. (§ 6604.) Thus, we conclude the SVPA provides sufficient safeguards to ensure that a defendant's conviction from a nolo contendere plea is reliable as evidence of the defendant's current mental disorder and future violent sexual behavior. (See Hubbart, supra, 19 Cal.4th at pp. 1145-1146, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584.) In sum, we conclude that Penal Code section 1016, former subdivision (3), does not preclude the use of defendant's 1978 conviction based on his nolo contendere plea. [8]