Opinion ID: 1148653
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Challenge to Order of Certification by Motion under Section 995 of the Penal Code

Text: A question arises as to the propriety of challenging a certification order on a motion made pursuant to Penal Code section 995. [12] That section provides that an information must be set aside if the defendant has not been legally committed by a magistrate, and that an indictment must be set aside if it has not been found, endorsed, or presented as prescribed in the Penal Code. (7) `The phrase legally committed, ... refers to the examination of the case and the holding of the defendant to answer, as prescribed by title 3, chapter 7, of the Penal Code.' [Citation.] (8) An information, of course, will not be set aside merely because there has been some irregularity or minor error in procedure in the preliminary examination. [Citation.] But where it appears that, during the course of the preliminary examination, the defendant has been denied a substantial right, the commitment is unlawful within the meaning of section 995, and it must be set aside upon timely motion. ( People v. Elliot, supra, 54 Cal.2d 498, 502-503; italics deleted; see also, Jennings v. Superior Court (1967) 66 Cal.2d 867, 874 [59 Cal. Rptr. 440, 428 P.2d 304].) Challenges so raised generally allege defects which denied the defendant a substantial right during the preliminary examination process itself. (See, e.g., Jennings v. Superior Court, supra, 66 Cal.2d 867, 874-875, and cases cited therein.) It has been said that `[t]he obvious purpose of section 995 is to eliminate unnecessary trials and to prevent accusatory bodies ... from encroaching on the right of a person to be free from prosecution for crime unless there is some rational basis for entertaining the possibility of guilt.' ( People v. McBride (1969) 268 Cal. App.2d 824, 828-829 [74 Cal. Rptr. 375], quoting, People v. Sigal (1967) 249 Cal. App.2d 299, 305 [57 Cal. Rptr. 541].) (9) It is manifest on the face of Penal Code section 995 and from the cases defining its purpose that it does not purport to embrace a challenge to a certification order made by a juvenile court in collateral proceedings. (See People v. Browning, supra, 45 Cal. App.3d 125, 141.) It appears, moreover, that should such a challenge be allowed or made available as a remedy in addition to that available by extraordinary writ those heretofore noted advantages to the accused and the resultant improvement of the administration of justice by a timely resolution of a challenge to a defective certification order will be negated. A review of an order denying relief on a motion made pursuant to Penal Code section 995 in a routine criminal case may be delayed until appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction. (See Pen. Code, §§ 996, 1259; Nelson v. Superior Court (1947) 77 Cal. App.2d 783, 785-786 [176 P.2d 390].) Such a procedure, however, if applied to a challenge as to the propriety of an order of certification would afford a route by which an accused juvenile could raise on appeal the propriety of a juvenile court order certifying the accused's unfitness to be treated in juvenile court facilities. [13] We have already determined for reasons stated that there is no statutory authorization for review of such an order of certification on appeal from an ensuing judgment of conviction. We conclude, accordingly, that the propriety of a juvenile court certification order cannot be raised or determined on a motion pursuant to Penal Code section 995 in superior court proceedings on charges for which the accused was certified. We do not, of course, purport to foreclose the right of an accused or one convicted of a crime to assert in a proper case by petition for the writ of habeas corpus a challenge to his detention on the ground of a fundamental jurisdictional defect (see Witkin, Cal. Criminal Procedure (1963) pp. 773-776) or, as here, a challenge to a defect which may have been waived but which, unlike the present case, the accused nevertheless preserved by timely if unsuccessful action. Defendant in the instant case has failed to avail himself of the timely remedy available. As indicated earlier, however, the reported cases provide conflicting directions as to the proper manner in which and time at which a challenge to a certification order should be asserted. For that reason the rule announced herein will be applied only prospectively to criminal prosecutions commenced after the finality of our opinion herein, and we will consider on the merits the instant claim that the certification order is defective. [14]