Opinion ID: 790531
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Relative Merits of Position

Text: 66 Quite simply, Kay prevailed — cleanly, unequivocally, and absolutely. First Trust has taken the losing position in virtually every significant issue involved in this case, from the venue matter to the valuation matter, to whether Kay should be joined, and even to advising the court on which claimant had superior rights to the benefits, 8 not to mention the fact that First Trust is aggressively seeking its attorney's fees when it knew or should have known from the outset that the source of reimbursement for its fees should be from the Trust Fund or the employer. Apart from merely filing the interpleader suit for a court to resolve the ownership dispute, First Trust cannot be said to have taken meritorious positions. 67 Furthermore, we cannot help but note the considerable inequity of extracting from Kay's benefits First Trust's attorney's fees that were related to virtually the entire proceedings in this case — fees that First Trust jacked up with numerous arguments, as this opinion reflects. Yet the district court made no attempt to limit fees when they were related to issues on which First Trust plainly lost, like the venue issue and the valuation issue, matters that did not even involve Kay because she was not a party until after the case had been transferred to Kentucky and she moved to intervene. 9 Indeed, the award of such substantial fees was particularly inequitable given that First Trust did not accuse Kay of improper conduct. The court seemed oblivious to the fact that First Trust was a sophisticated entity that could foresee and plan for interpleader suits, unlike Kay, an individual who likely initially had no knowledge of her rights under ERISA, probably did not know about the Plan, and had to hire an attorney to protect her interests. In awarding fees to First Trust, the court also seemed oblivious to the glaring omission by First Trust in failing to join Kay as a defendant, which undermined the very purpose of bringing an interpleader suit — to join all the claimants in one forum to avoid the vexation of multiple suits and liability for disbursing the funds to the wrong person. 68 Furthermore, in its May 19, 1999 fee request, First Trust claimed that $56,000 in fees stemmed from litigation thrust upon it principally by the sons and Brenda, not Kay. 69 In short, all of the equities favor Kay, and all five Foltice factors weigh against an award of attorney's fees to and costs to First Trust. We therefore hold that the district court abused its discretion in awarding any attorney's fees to First Trust. Had First Trust behaved as a truly disinterested stakeholder, it would have been reasonable to award it the $2700 in attorney's fees for the cost of bringing the interpleader action. However, given its actions throughout this litigation, we see no reason why First Trust should not be required to bear all of its own costs. 70 We now consider whether Kay was entitled to all of her attorney's fees.