Opinion ID: 2612907
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver, Estoppel and Laches

Text: Miscovich also argues that, even if the trial court correctly found that the lease on the Upper Poorman claims remained valid in 1987 and that Miscovich Brothers' failure to mine the claims after 1981 amounted to a breach, the court should have concluded that Shropshire's effort to terminate the lease was barred by the doctrines of waiver, estoppel and/or laches. Miscovich maintains that invocation of these doctrines was justified by Shropshire's failure to take prompt action to enforce the lease covenants. Under Alaska law, waiver is generally defined as the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Milne v. Anderson, 576 P.2d 109, 112 (Alaska 1978); Arctic Contractors, Inc. v. State, 564 P.2d 30, 40 (Alaska 1977). Waiver may be accomplished implicitly if the actor's conduct evidences an intention to waive a right, or ... [if] neglect to insist upon the right results in prejudice to another party. Milne, 576 P.2d at 112. For an implied waiver to arise, however, there must be direct, unequivocal conduct indicating a purpose to abandon or waive the legal right[.] Id. Without knowledge of a right or claim, a party cannot be said to have waived it. Nat'l Bank of Alaska v. J.B.L. & K. of Alaska, Inc., 546 P.2d 579, 587 (Alaska 1976). The issue of whether a waiver occurred involves a question of fact; a trial court's finding on the issue will be set aside on review only if clearly erroneous. Fun Products Distributors, Inc. v. Martens, 559 P.2d 1054, 1058 (Alaska 1977); Alaska R.Civ.P. 52(a). The superior court found that Shropshire did not waive his right to terminate the lease based upon Miscovich Brothers' breach. The record indicates that Shropshire received information that Miscovich Brothers was working the mining claims as late as August 2, 1982, when John Miscovich told him that Miscovich had been working in Poorman over the years. Thereafter, Shropshire had no occasion to learn of Miscovich's continuing breach until he spoke with Tryck in 1986. Under the circumstances, the trial court's finding that Shropshire's inaction did not constitute a waiver was not clearly erroneous. Similarly, we find no error in the trial court's refusal to apply the doctrines of estoppel and laches to bar Shropshire's termination of the lease. Equitable estoppel requires the assertion of a position by conduct or word, reasonable reliance thereon by another party, and resulting prejudice. Dressel v. Weeks, 779 P.2d 324, 329 (Alaska 1989) (quoting Jamison v. Consolidated Util., Inc., 576 P.2d 97, 102 (Alaska 1978)). The proponent of equitable estoppel bears the burden of proving each element. See Dressel, 779 P.2d at 329. The trial court found that Miscovich failed to meet his burden of proof as to any of the requisite elements of equitable estoppel, because Miscovich adduced no evidence of representations by Shropshire that might have justified reasonable reliance, no evidence of actual reliance on the part of Miscovich, and no evidence of resulting prejudice. See Jamison, 576 P.2d at 102; Arctic Contractors, 564 P.2d at 40. The record discloses no basis for concluding that these findings are clearly erroneous, and Miscovich suggests none. We affirm the superior court's finding that equitable estoppel does not apply here. The equitable defense of laches applies when the trial court finds unreasonable delay in the plaintiff's assertion of a claim and resulting prejudice to the defendant. Wolff v. Arctic Bowl, Inc., 560 P.2d 758, 767 (Alaska 1977); Concerned Citizens of South Kenai Peninsula v. Kenai Peninsula Borough, 527 P.2d 447, 457 (Alaska 1974). Both elements, unreasonable delay and prejudice, must be established before the defense is invoked. Wolff, 560 P.2d at 767; Southern Pacific Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 488-89, 39 S.Ct. 533, 535-36, 63 L.Ed. 1099 (1919). The decision to sustain a defense based on laches is properly addressed to the discretion of the trial court, and will not be overturned unless we feel a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. Pavlik v. State, 637 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Alaska 1981). The superior court found that Miscovich Brothers' breach occurred around 1981. The record indicates that Shropshire became aware of the breach in 1985 or 1986 and promptly terminated the lease in 1987. Tryck brought this action to quiet title in April 1989. The breach continued throughout this period, and Miscovich presented no evidence at trial to establish prejudice resulting from any delay. Under the circumstances, the record supports the superior court's findings that there was no lack of diligence or unreasonable delay in bringing the action, and that Miscovich suffered no prejudice during the time period 1982 to 1987. These findings are not clearly erroneous. In sum, we affirm the trial court's refusal to apply waiver, estoppel, and laches to bar Shropshire's right to terminate the lease in 1987 based upon Miscovich Brothers' breach, and we conclude that the court properly awarded Tryck sole title to the Upper Poorman claims.