Opinion ID: 715791
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: 20 In reviewing departures, we follow a three-step process. Our review is plenary as to whether a departure was permissible; clearly erroneous as to whether the facts support the grounds relied upon for departure; and deferential as to the reasonableness of the departure. See United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir.1990). 21
22 A district court may depart from the applicable guideline range only if it finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). Here, the commentary to USSG § 3D1.4 specifically instructs that Inasmuch as the maximum increase provided in the guideline is 5 levels, departure would be warranted in the unusual case where the additional offenses resulted in a total of significantly more than 5 units. USSG § 3D1.4, comment. (backg'd). 6 Following this commentary, the district court based its decision to depart on the existence of additional victims 7 not taken into account by the five level increase. 8 Under step one of our review process, we review its decision de novo. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098. 23 We must first determine upon how many additional offenses the district court based its decision to depart. It is clear that the district court calculated the extent of its (four level) departure using only the four identified, but uncounted, children in the Baltimore tapes. See discussion supra p. 865. However, the district court's threshold decision to depart was based on the identified as well as unidentified children in the Baltimore tapes. 9 We do not know the exact number of unidentified children as the presentence report simply states that, There were several other boys in [the Baltimore tapes] that were unable to be identified. (emphasis added). Giving several its ordinary meaning would suggest that there were, perhaps, three unidentified boys. This would bring the total of uncounted children in the Baltimore tapes (and the number of additional offenses upon which the district court relied) to seven (four identified boys plus three unidentified children). 10 24 We need not be concerned, however, about our inability to determine the exact number of additional offenses upon which the district court relied. The district court relied on at least four additional offenses, and four uncounted victims makes this an unusual case resulting in a total of significantly more than five units. 11 We reach this conclusion for several reasons. 25 First, assuming that the district court based its decision to depart on only four additional victims, this means that nearly half of MacLeod's ten victims were not considered. When close to half of a defendant's crimes may go unpunished, we consider this significant and worthy of departure. 26 Furthermore, in determining whether, under § 3D1.4, a case is an unusual case where the additional offenses resulted in significantly more than five units, one may consider not only the numerical difference between the six victims considered and the actual number of victims involved, but also the nature of the additional criminal conduct. See United States v. Pearson, 911 F.2d 186, 189 (9th Cir.1990) (indicating that it is permissible to take into account nature as well as number of additional offenses in deciding whether to depart in accordance with commentary to USSG § 3D1.4). In the present case, MacLeod's four additional offenses involved the sexual exploitation of young children. Two of the victims (V-7 and V-8) were under the age of sixteen. The third and fourth victim (V-9 and V-10) were only sixteen and seventeen respectively. Given the potential psychological harm to the young victims of this type of offense, we believe that the addition of (at a minimum) four victims should be considered significant, and hence that upward departure was permissible. 27 Other courts that have addressed the issue also support this conclusion. Only three published opinions (involving three different United States Courts of Appeals), deal with USSG § 3D1.4 departures for numerous offenses. See United States v. Okane, 52 F.3d 828 (10th Cir.1995); United States v. Pearson, 911 F.2d 186 (9th Cir.1990); United States v. Chase, 894 F.2d 488 (1st Cir.1990). Under plenary review (and with little comment), the Chase court found 9 uncounted robberies significant 12 while the Okane court found five uncounted robberies significant. 13 Under abuse of discretion review, the Pearson court considered two uncounted robberies significant. 911 F.2d at 189-90. 14 28
29 The district court based its decision to depart on the uncounted minors depicted in the Baltimore tapes. Under step two, we review for clear error whether the record contains a sufficient factual basis to support departure. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098. Pursuant to section 3D1.4, only six of MacLeod's victims were used to calculate his presumptive sentence. The presentence report makes clear that the Baltimore tapes involved the exploitation of at least ten identified victims as well as several unidentified victims. MacLeod pled guilty to the production of the Baltimore tapes. Thus, there is no question that his offense involved a significant number of additional uncounted minors. Accordingly, the district court's determination that the facts on record supported its ground for departure was not clearly erroneous. 30
31 Finally, we must determine whether the extent of the district court's departure--four levels for four additional offenses--was reasonable. 15 We review the court's determination for abuse of discretion. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098. We find it useful to begin our discussion with a simple mathematical analysis. Had the district court considered only one victim, MacLeod's total offense level would have been 24 and his guideline range would have been 77 to 96 months rather than 121 to 151 months (the range applicable after the five level increase of section 3D1.4). Thus, the first five additional victims raised MacLeod's term of imprisonment by fifty-five months (151 minus ninety-six). The average increment per additional offense was eleven months (fifty-five divided by five). When the district court departed an additional four levels for the four uncounted victims, MacLeod's guideline range became 188 to 235 months. Thus, these four victims raised MacLeod's sentence eighty-four months (235 minus 151) or twenty-one months per victim (eighty-four divided by four). 32 In evaluating the reasonableness of the district court's departure, we seek guidance from the guidelines themselves. See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1111 (Recognizing the need for additional standards, the courts of appeals have recently begun to look to the guidelines themselves for guidance in determining the reasonableness of a departure. Today we endorse that general approach.) (citations omitted). When departing from a sentencing range, courts should remain faithful to structured guideline principles and attempt, where possible, to create sentences analogous to those explicitly specified by the guidelines for similar offenses. We note that at higher sentencing ranges, where MacLeod's sentence falls, an increase of one level generally makes a quite large and continually increasing amount of jail time. Thus, we must consider with extreme care the district court's decision to depart four levels. 33 MacLeod's offense involved Chapter 3, Part D of the sentencing guidelines. The introductory commentary to that part indicates that its aim is provide incremental punishment for significant additional criminal conduct. USSG Ch. 3, Pt. D, intro. comment. However, the amount of additional punishment [is to] decline [ ] as the number of offenses increases. Id. (emphasis added). The district court's departure is at odds with this principle of declining marginal punishment. MacLeod's first five additional offenses carried an average of eleven additional months imprisonment. Given the district court's departure, MacLeod's final four offenses carried an average of twenty-one additional months imprisonment. Thus, contrary to the commentary to Section 3, Part D, as the number of MacLeod's offenses increased, so did his additional punishment. 34 An examination of the guideline sections pertaining to both theft and fraud also suggest that the extent of the district court's departure was problematic. These sections are a good source of comparison because they permit, without departure, an offense to be increased beyond five levels (the limit imposed for grouping increments in § 3D1.4). Especially as one gets beyond an increase of five offense levels, each one level increase requires a growing amount of harm. For instance under USSG § 2B1.1, the guideline involving theft, embezzlement and receipt of stolen property, raising a five level increase to a six level increase requires $10,000 more loss. Raising a six level increase to a seven level increase requires $20,000 more loss. Raising a nine level increase to a ten level increase requires $80,000 more loss. At the extreme, raising a nineteen level increase to a twenty level increase requires $40,000,000 more loss. USSG § 2F1.1, the guideline for fraud and deceit, forgery, and counterfeiting, follows a similar pattern. Yet, in the instant case, each level of the district court's four level departure was based on the same amount of harm--the exploitation of one child. Analogy to USSG §§ 2B1.1, 2F1.1 suggests that this is unreasonable. 35 The three court of appeals cases in this area support our decision. In the two cases that found a departure reasonable, the departure was significantly lower than it is here. In United States v. Okane, 52 F.3d 828 (10th Cir.1995), the court upheld a departure of one level for five additional bank robberies. The court wrote: 36 We find the district court's proffered reason for departing, which was Mr. Okane's additional pleas of guilty to five other robbery charges, is legally sufficient to warrant a one level upward departure.... 37 While the Guidelines' overarching purpose of achieving uniformity and proportionality in sentencing is a countervailing concern in this calculus, the Guidelines do contemplate some sentencing disparities in cases where the circumstances justify it. The Guidelines do not prohibit any sentencing disparity; they prohibit unwarranted sentencing disparities. In this case, the offenses in question are undoubtedly serious and we find they warrant a one-level departure. 38 Id. at 833 (citations omitted). Thus, in Okane, the court found reasonable a much smaller departure than the one here at issue. 39 In United States v. Chase, 894 F.2d 488, 491-92 (1st Cir.1990), the First Circuit affirmed a departure of approximately fifty months for nine additional bank robberies. Dividing fifty months by nine robberies indicates that the average additional imprisonment time for each robbery was approximately five and one-half months. As this was roughly equivalent to the additional punishment, under the guidelines, for each of the first five additional offenses, the court upheld the departure. Id. In the case at bar, the district court departed eighty-four months for four additional offenses. This resulted in an average of twenty-one additional months imprisonment per offense. In contrast to the departure found reasonable by the Chase court, this is approximately double the average punishment for the first five additional victims (eleven months). 40 In the one case that found the district court's departure unreasonable--United States v. Pearson, 911 F.2d 186, 190 (9th Cir.1990)--the district court's departure, approximately fifty-seven months for two offenses (or twenty-eight and one-half months per offense), id. at 187, closely approximates the district court's departure here. The Ninth Circuit had little difficulty in concluding that the district court's six level departure was unreasonable and that a one level departure would be appropriate instead. Id. at 190-91. 41 We appreciate the district court's dilemma here. With no previous guidance from this Court, it was obliged to sentence truly repugnant criminal behavior. Its decision to depart was certainly appropriate. However, for the reasons set forth above, the extent of its departure is inconsistent with the exercise of sound discretion. 42 The commentary to Chapter 3, Part D indicates that the amount of additional punishment should decline as the number of offenses increases. See USSG Ch.3, Pt.D, intro. comment. Thus, the average punishment for the four additional offenses should be somewhat less than eleven months (the average punishment for the first five additional offenses). An appropriate departure, therefore, should be no more than two levels. Under such a departure, MacLeod's new sentencing range would be 151-188 months. A sentence at the upper-end of that range would be a thirty-seven month increase from the original 121 to 151 month guideline (188 minus 151). Dividing thirty-seven by four indicates an addition of approximately nine months imprisonment per offense. A departure of greater magnitude is unreasonable. 16 The judgment of the district court will therefore be vacated and the case remanded for resentencing consistent with this opinion.