Opinion ID: 786874
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Prevailing Party Issue

Text: 18 Where a party seeks to argue the merits of an order that does not appear on the face of the notice of appeal, we consider two factors: (1) whether the intent to appeal a specific judgment can be fairly inferred, and (2) whether the appellee was prejudiced by the mistake. Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 414 (9th Cir.2003). The policy underlying this test is that it would violate the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to avoid a decision on the merits on the basis of mere technicalities. McCarthy, 827 F.2d at 1314 (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181, 83 S.Ct. 227, 9 L.Ed.2d 222 (1962)). 19 Generally, the intent to appeal a specific judgment can be fairly inferred where the failure to cite the specific judgment was clearly an oversight or mistake, or when such intent makes sense in light of the circumstances. See, e.g., Lolli, 351 F.3d at 414 (finding that the party's intent to appeal the grant of summary judgment against him can be inferred, as we frequently have done when a party appeals after its motion for reconsideration was denied); United States v. Belgarde, 300 F.3d 1177, 1180 (9th Cir.2002) (finding that the government intended to appeal both the dismissal of the indictment and the denial of its motion for reconsideration, even though the government failed to specify the order dismissing the indictment); Simpson v. Lear Astronics Corp., 77 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir.1996) (finding that the appellant intended to appeal both the award of sanctions and the amount of sanctions, even though the notice of appeal listed only the order setting the amount, because the notice of appeal and his opening brief gave the appellee adequate notice of his intent); McCarthy, 827 F.2d at 1314 (stating that it could be fairly inferred that the appellant intended to appeal the original summary judgment against him when he designated the denial of his postjudgment motions as the order being appealed). Thus, for example, in Belgarde, the government's intent to appeal the dismissal of the indictment, and not merely the denial of its motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing the indictment, could be inferred. Belgarde, 300 F.3d at 1180. 20 The situation here, however, is different from that presented in the precedent. It was the Shapiros, not PVUSD, who filed the original notice of appeal of the order awarding attorney's fees. The Shapiros appealed because the district court ruled against them on the issue of Walker's right to practice law in Arizona. Thus, unlike McCarthy, Belgarde, and Lolli, in which there was clearly one losing party who would appeal both a denial of a motion for reconsideration, as well as the original adverse judgment, the Shapiros were the party who wanted to appeal the original judgment that was adverse to them. PVUSD did not appeal until the amount of attorney's fees was greatly increased, and its notice of appeal stated only that it was appealing from the amended judgment entered in this action on September 3, 2002 regarding attorney fees. It therefore is not clear that PVUSD considered the original judgment to be adverse to it. PVUSD's notice of appeal, in fact, indicates that PVUSD was troubled only by the increased amount of attorney's fees. 21 The second factor, prejudice to the appellee, however, weighs in PVUSD's favor. PVUSD argued the prevailing party issue in its opening brief on cross-appeal, and the Shapiros have had the opportunity to respond to it in their answering brief to the cross-appeal. Cf. Simpson, 77 F.3d at 1173 (finding that the opening brief gave the appellee adequate notice of the appellant's intent to appeal both the award and the amount of sanctions); McCarthy, 827 F.2d at 1314 (finding no prejudice where the opening brief addressed the district court's initial ruling and the appellees had also fully briefed the issues). Moreover, both the amended judgment referred to by PVUSD and the order appealed from by the Shapiros pertain to attorney's fees. For these reasons, we conclude that the prevailing party issue raised by PVUSD's cross-appeal is properly before us.