Opinion ID: 1972056
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Development of the Diminished-Capacity Defense

Text: Defendant's petition for post-conviction relief focuses primarily on the trial court's diminished-capacity charge. Therefore, we first review the chronological development of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, including the case law interpreting that statute. The diminished-capacity defense, like that found in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, emerged in large measure to ameliorate the relatively narrow concept of insanity under the M'Naughten test, and found its most fertile ground in capital cases, and cases in which the mens rea required premeditation. In short, the doctrine emerged from experience as an attempt to fashion a rational and coherent method for society to treat with compassion those among us who operate in the twilight of rationality. [ Muench v. Israel, 715 F. 2d 1124, 1143 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228, 104 S.Ct. 2682, 81 L.Ed. 2d 878 (1984)] Diminished capacity is a failure of proof defense: evidence of defendant's mental illness or defect serves to negate the mens rea element of the crime. Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 Colum.L.Rev. 199, 206 (1982). This failure-of-proof defense of diminished capacity was adopted as part of our State's enactment of the 1979 Code of Criminal Justice (Code), and allowed criminal defendants to introduce evidence relating to the impact of mental disease or defect on their state of mind. See L. 1978, c. 95. The diminished-capacity defense in N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 was amended in 1979 to create a rebuttable presumption that the defendant did not have or suffer from a mental disease or defect, that is, a presumption that the defendant is normal. See L. 1979, c. 178, § 11B. That amendment, however, failed to assign any burden-of-proof requirement for the defendant to overcome the presumption. Accordingly, the Legislature again amended the Code in 1981, requiring a defendant to prove the existence of a mental disease or defect by a preponderance of the evidence. See L. 1981, c. 290, § 8. Defendant was tried under that 1981 amendment. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1981 amendment in Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. 591, 532 A. 2d 199. In that case, we held that the Code does not mean that the defendant must disprove that the act was knowing or purposeful. It means only what it says, that the defendant must show that he or she suffered from a mental disease or defect that is relevant to the mental state of the offense. Id. at 611, 532 A. 2d 199. We further noted the unwavering requirement that [t]he State must prove `every fact necessary to constitute the crime.' Id. at 612, 532 A. 2d 199 (quoting In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed. 2d 368, 375 (1970)). With respect to the assertion that it was impermissibly unfair to impose on the accused the obligation to prove by a preponderance of the proof the existence of the relevant disease or defect, we explained that the structure of the statute does nothing more than create an inference that the ordinary defendant is possessed of the capacity to reach the mental states required by the Code: the diminished capacity defense thus requires the defendant to establish that he or she is not such a person.... Whether or not mental disease or defect is established, the State always bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt the essential mental elements of the crime charged. But the presence or absence of mental disease or defect is not an essential element of the crime as defined by the Legislature. [ Breakiron, supra, 108 N.J. at 613, 532 A. 2d 199.] We reversed Breakiron's conviction for murder and remanded for a new trial because of the original court's erroneous refusal to charge the jury that relevant evidence of defendant's mental disease or defect might have negated the culpable mental state. Id. at 621, 532 A. 2d 199. Less than a year later, we reiterated our Breakiron holding, that N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 was constitutional, and proposed an appropriate jury instruction: The defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he suffers from a mental disease or defect. However, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant's mental disease or defect did not negate the state of mind which is an element of the crime, that is, purposely or knowingly. In other words, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted purposely or knowingly despite his mental condition. [ Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 402, 548 A. 2d 1022.] On the whole, we found the charge given in Zola to be balanced, placing on the defendant only the burden of showing the presence of a mental disease or defect that would or could negate the state of mind necessary for the crimes charged. Id. at 402-03, 548 A. 2d 1022. The State's burden, to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, never shifted. Id. at 403, 548 A. 2d 1022. Four days after the Appellate Division issued its per curiam opinion affirming defendant's conviction and sentence, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in Humanik, supra, 871 F. 2d 432, disagreed with our analysis of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2. Although Humanik's jury charge on diminished capacity comported with our prior holdings in Breakiron and Zola, the Third Circuit found that it violated a defendant's due-process rights. Id. at 441-43, 548 A. 2d 1022. That court found that the proposed charge approved in Zola had the effect of precluding jurors from considering evidence which, although casting doubt on the presence of the requisite mental state, did not rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 443, 548 A. 2d 1022. If the defendant's evidence on mental disease or defect is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about the existence of the requisite intent, it cannot constitutionally be ignored. If a defendant's evidence on mental disease or defect is sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about any element of the offense charged, he must be acquitted. [ Ibid. ] Because the Zola -approved charge might have created an impermissible preponderance of the evidence filter, thereby precluding the jury from considering evidence dispositive of the defendant's mental state, the charge and the statute on which it was based were declared unconstitutional. Ibid. Although the decision of the Third Circuit was not binding on New Jersey courts, see State v. Coleman, 46 N.J. 16, 35-38, 214 A. 2d 393 (1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 950, 86 S.Ct. 1210, 16 L.Ed. 2d 212 (1966), the Court, through Chief Justice Wilentz, in order not to jeopardize State criminal trials by the threat of federal habeas reversals, issued a memorandum to all trial court judges on October 27, 1989, stating that a defendant raising the N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2 diminished-capacity defense no longer need prove the defect or disease by a preponderance of the evidence. See 124 N.J.L.J. 1133 (November 2, 1989). We also called on our coordinate branches of government to examine and respond to that defect. Ibid. We later extended Humanik to appeals pending as of December 8, 1989, although we noted in our memorandum that that fact does not require a reversal of every case presenting a diminished capacity issue. Other appellate principles may dictate a different result. See 124 N.J.L.J. 1562 (December 28, 1989) (summarizing Court's memorandum). Thus, we recognized that an erroneous charge under Humanik does not warrant an automatic reversal. On July 7, 1990, the Legislature amended N.J.S.A. 2C:4-2, deleting the offending language; that section now requires that a defendant invoking the diminished-capacity defense simply present some evidence of his or her mental disease or defect. See L. 1990, c. 63, § 1. It was not until two months after we had denied defendant's petition for certification, which ended defendant's direct appeal, that this Court stated that Humanik should be applied to cases pending on direct appeal. Subsequently, we explicitly adopted Humanik in the companion cases of State v. Moore, 122 N.J. 420, 585 A. 2d 864 (1991), and State v. Oglesby, 122 N.J. 522, 585 A. 2d 916 (1991), although the Appellate Division has nevertheless determined that we are obliged to follow Breakiron [in post-conviction-relief proceedings] unless the Chief Justice or our Supreme Court directs otherwise. State v. Culley, 250 N.J. Super. 558, 564, 595 A. 2d 1098 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 126 N.J. 387, 599 A. 2d 164 (1991).