Opinion ID: 1632245
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Latent Injury

Text: ¶ 12. A latent injury is defined as one where the plaintiff will be precluded from discovering harm or injury because of the secretive or inherently undiscoverable nature of the wrongdoing in question. . . [or] when it is unrealistic to expect a layman to perceive the injury at the time of the wrongful act. Donald v. Amoco Prod. Co., 735 So.2d 161, 168 (Miss.1999) (citing Staheli, 548 So.2d at 1303; Smith v. Sneed, 638 So.2d 1252, 1257 (Miss.1994)). Herein lies the conflict presented sub judice. ¶ 13. It is well established that this Court must review a statute through common use of words and meanings. Perkins v. State, 863 So.2d 47 (Miss.2003) (citing Cassibry v. State, 404 So.2d 1360, 1368 (Miss.1981)) (following Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S.Ct. 1304, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957)). Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2) states [i]n actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed and which involved latent injury or disease, the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff has discovered, or by reasonable diligence should have discovered, the injury. Miss.Code Ann. § 15-1-49(2). ¶ 14. A review of this Court's prior rulings also provides insight into the statute's interpretation. The term latent injury while seemingly vague does have definitive boundaries. For an injury to be latent it must be undiscoverable by reasonable methods. Donald, 735 So.2d at 168. For instance this Court has noted that some plaintiffs may require access to medical records to discover the injury. Sarris v. Smith, 782 So.2d 721, 725 (Miss.2001). While others might gain enough actual knowledge through personal observation or experience. Robinson v. Singing River Hosp., 732 So.2d 204, 208 (Miss.1999). Some injuries may be indiscernible until a medical expert notifies the plaintiff of possible negligence. Barnes v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 733 So.2d at 206. Because there is no bright line rule, the specific facts of the case will determine whether the plaintiff knew or reasonable should have known that an injury existed. Sweeney v. Preston, 642 So.2d at 336. ¶ 15. The facts surrounding Lowery's exposure for this interlocutory appeal are not in dispute. Rather, the question is whether Lowery's own suspicions and actions thereon were enough to vest the right to a cause of action against PPG. If Lowery's cause of action accrued when she originally knew or suspected, then the statute of limitations began running upon the occurrence of her injury. ¶ 16. By her own admission, Lowery knew when, how and by whom she had been injured on the night of her acute exposure. The Court must consider Lowery's actions in determining whether she knew or reasonably should have known that she had suffered an injury. For instance, seeking medical attention for side effects or symptoms confirms that Lowery knew she was injured. In Powe, this Court found that a plaintiff's receipt of medical treatment for two years demonstrated that he knew or reasonably should have known about his injuries. Powe v. Byrd, 892 So.2d 223, 227-28 (Miss.2004). Moreover, in Powe this Court specifically rejected his claim that the statute of limitations began running when he received an expert opinion because Powe had known of his injury as evinced by the two years of prior medical treatment for the injury. Id. While Powe is a medical malpractice claim and subject to different statutes with different requirements the holding is still particularly relevant to the case sub judice. ¶ 17. Several recent decisions further erode the level of knowledge required to vest a cause of action. This Court commented that a plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known that some negligent conduct had occurred, even if they did not know with certainty that the conduct was negligent as a matter of law. Wayne Gen. Hosp. v. Hayes, 868 So.2d 997, 1000 (Miss.2004) (emphasis added); Sarris v. Smith, 782 So.2d at 725 (holding that a plaintiff need not know with absolute certainty that conduct was legally negligent). This Court has also explained that the focus is on the time that the patient discovers, or should have discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that he probably has an actionable injury. Wright v. Quesnel, 876 So.2d 362, 366 (Miss.2004) (quoting Smith v. Sanders, 485 So.2d 1051, 1052 (Miss.1986)) (emphasis added). ¶ 18. Considering Lowery's actions through the lense of this Court's recent rulings we hold that Lowery knew of her injury on October 1, 1999. Moreover, using the standards outlined in Hayes, Quesnel and Sanders, Lowery did not require absolute certainty nor an expert opinion to vest the right to a cause of action under this state's products liability statute. See, e.g. Quesnel, 876 So.2d at 366; Hayes, 868 So.2d at 1000; Sanders, 485 So.2d at 1052. ¶ 19. Lowery's initial call to the Regional Poison Control Center and her subsequent visits to the emergency room identified the source of her exposure as Porter Glyptex Enamel Paint. Sufficient evidence exists, undisputed or admitted at present, that the AEC was painted with Porter Glyptex Enamel Paint. Lowery suffered immediate complications as a result of her acute exposure requiring her to go to an emergency room for treatment. Medical professionals, during the course of Lowery's treatment, listed exposure to Porter Glyptex Enamel Paint as Lowery's alleged cause of injury. PPG admits that Porter Glyptex Enamel Paint contains a warning which reads, Vapor harmful, may affect the brain or nervous system . . . Do not breath vapors or spray mist. We conclude that the trial court erred, and we must reverse and render on this issue. ¶ 20. Because issues I and II are controlling and decided in PPG's favor, the other issues are moot and will not be addressed.