Opinion ID: 2053918
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Attempt

Text: We now examine the mental state required for attempted second degree murder, if such crime were to exist. As the attempt statute provides, for a defendant to commit an attempted offense, he must intend to commit a specific offense. Defendants argue that the intent required for attempted second degree murder is simply the intent to kill. The State responds that under the specific language of Illinois' attempt statute, the intent required for attempted second degree murder, if it exists, would be the intent to kill without lawful justification and with either a sudden passion or an unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force. We agree with the State. The Reagan decision is helpful here. As noted in Reagan, the mental state required for attempted voluntary manslaughter, if such crime existed, would not simply have been the intent to kill, but the intent to kill without lawful justification. This is because the attempt statute requires the intent to commit a specific offense, and simply intending to kill is not an offense. For example, killing in self-defense is not a crime. This court further noted in Reagan that a defendant intending to defend himself, although unreasonably, would not have the intent to unlawfully kill. Such a defendant would have the intent to lawfully kill using self-defense. The two different intents, intent to kill unlawfully and intent to kill in self-defense, cannot coexist in the same crime. Turning now to attempted second degree murder, we note that the crime of attempted second degree murder would require the intent to commit the specific offense of second degree murder. Thus, the intent required for attempted second degree murder, if it existed, would be the intent to kill without lawful justification, plus the intent to have a mitigating circumstance present. However, one cannot intend either a sudden and intense passion due to serious provocation or an unreasonable belief in the need to use deadly force. Moreover, concerning the mitigating factor of an imperfect self-defense, one cannot intend to unlawfully kill while at the same time intending to justifiably use deadly force. Thus, the offense of attempted second degree murder does not exist in this State. Defendants, however, argue that this analysis is faulty. Defendants contend: Since second degree murder is first degree murder plus mitigation, it follows that attempt[ed] second degree murder is nothing more than attempt[ed] first degree murder plus mitigation. Thus, the correct analysis is first whether the defendant attempted to commit attempt[ed] first degree murder and then whether he was acting under a sudden and intense passion. This, however, is not what the attempt statute specifies. Attempt requires the intent to commit a specific offense, and first and second degree murder are separate offenses. While they share the same elements, second degree murder requires the presence of a mitigating circumstance, which, while not an element or mental state, does reduce the culpability and thus the sentencing range. (See Jeffries, 164 Ill.2d at 121-22, 207 Ill.Dec. 21, 646 N.E.2d 587.) We hold that for an attempted second degree murder, the defendant must intend the presence of a mitigating factor, which is an impossibility. We note that while defendants and legal commentators have argued (see O'Neill, An Analysis of Illinois' New Offense of Second Degree Murder, 20 J. Marshall L.Rev. 209, 223; see also Steigmann, First and Second Degree Murder in Illinois, 75 Ill.B.J. 494, 498, 511 (1987)) that the specific intent required for attempted second degree murder is simply the intent to kill, their assertion is without merit. These arguments fail to consider the specific language of Illinois' attempt statute, which plainly requires the intent to commit a specific offense, not simply the intent required to commit the predicate offense. Thus, our decision is based on the wording of our attempt statute rather than some notion of how the crime of attempt should be defined. These arguments concerning the intent required for attempt are better addressed to the State legislature than to this court. Finally, defendant Lopez argues that this court's failure to recognize the crime of attempted second degree murder results in the possibility that a defendant would be sentenced to a greater term of imprisonment if the victim lives than if the victim dies. Lopez notes that attempted first degree murder is a Class X felony punishable by a term of imprisonment ranging from 6 to 30 years. (720 ILCS 5/8-4(c)(1) (West 1992); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(3) (West 1992).) However, had Lopez actually killed his wife and the jury believed he acted under a sudden and intense passion due to serious provocation, he would have been guilty of second degree murder, a Class 1 felony, which is punishable by a term of imprisonment ranging from 4 to 15 years. (720 ILCS 5/9-2(d) (West 1992); 730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(4) (West 1992).) (The legislature has increased the sentencing range for second degree murder to 4 to 20 years effective January 1, 1994). (730 ILCS 5/5-8-1(a)(1.5) (West Supp.1993).) Lopez argues that this possibility violates the Illinois Constitution's requirement that [a]ll penalties    be determined    according to the seriousness of the offense. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 11. We disagree. As this court noted in People v. Steppan (1985), 105 Ill.2d 310, 85 Ill. Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300: `This court has traditionally been reluctant to override the judgment of the General Assembly with respect to criminal penalties. It indicated at an early date that the constitutional command that penalties shall be proportioned to the nature of the offense would justify interference with the legislative judgment only if the punishment was cruel, degrading or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community.` ([ People v. Gonzales (1962)] 25 Ill.2d 235, 240 [, 184 N.E.2d 833].) ( Steppan, 105 Ill.2d at 320, 85 Ill.Dec. 495, 473 N.E.2d 1300.) We do not believe that the disparity in sentencing range here is cruel, degrading, or so wholly disproportionate to the offense committed as to shock the moral sense of the community. Accordingly, we hold that under the Illinois attempt statute, no crime of attempted second degree murder exists. The judgments of the appellate court are affirmed. Affirmed.