Opinion ID: 200968
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: GHL's Ownership Rights

Text: 11 GHL contends that the district court inappropriately focused on the public nature (or lack thereof) of GHL's use in commerce. The company argues that, under our decision in Purolator, Inc. v. EFRA Distrib. Inc., 687 F.2d 554 (1st Cir.1982), the fact that GHL's use included both transportation and subsequent sales to consumers eliminates the need for such an inquiry. In Purolator, we held that interstate shipment of automobile filters in unmarked boxes, followed by solely intrastate sale, was sufficient use in interstate commerce so as to bring the dispute within the jurisdiction of the Lanham Act. Id. at 559. GHL cites cases from other circuits that similarly find jurisdiction based on a combination of non-public transportation and consumer sales. See, e.g., John Walker and Sons Ltd. v. DeMert & Dougherty, Inc., 821 F.2d 399, 408 (7th Cir.1987) (interstate shipment of cans bearing allegedly infringing trademark, followed by subsequent sales overseas, brought dispute within jurisdiction of Lanham Act); Scotch Whiskey Ass'n v. Barton Distilling Co., 489 F.2d 809, 812-13 (7th Cir.1973) (determining that shipments of infringing labels from the United States to Panama gave rise to extraterritorial jurisdiction under Lanham Act). What GHL fails to recognize, however, is the distinction between a jurisdictional inquiry and an ownership dispute. The use in commerce test for establishing jurisdiction looks at whether shipments traveled from state to state or from the United States to a foreign jurisdiction, and not at whether the shipments were exposed to the public. See Techsplosion, 261 F.3d at 1195 n. 8 (citing Mendes, 190 F.2d at 417-418)([The Mendes ] ownership test is not for the purpose of establishing the `use in commerce' jurisdictional predicate of the Lanham Act.). 12 In a second line of attack on the continuing validity of the public use requirement, GHL argues it became obsolete with adoption of the intent to use system in 1988. As noted earlier, see supra n. 5, applicants may now obtain registration based on plans to use the trademark in the near future. GHL contends that if future use is sufficient, demonstrated public awareness could not be a prerequisite to ownership. This argument again mixes apples and oranges. An applicant may obtain registration of a mark based on anticipated use, but registration connotes ownership only if the applicant ultimately demonstrates actual use. Courts have continued to incorporate the public use requirement as set forth in Mendes in their ownership analyses. See Techsplosion, 261 F.3d at 1195; CCBN.com v. C-Call.com, 73 F.Supp.2d 106, 110 (D.Mass.1999). Moreover, the requirement retains vitality as a matter of logic. The public purpose underlying trademark protection is the preservation of good will associated with the mark, and public awareness is obviously a requisite of good will. See Brookfield Comm., Inc., 174 F.3d at 1051 (observing that a mark is not meritorious of trademark protection until it is used in public in a manner that creates an association among consumers between the mark and the mark's owner). 13 To the extent that wholly foreign sales — thus outside the scope of commerce regulated by Congress — are a key element of GHL's claimed use, GHL runs into a further stumbling block. In Avakoff v. Southern Pacific Co., 765 F.2d 1097 (Fed.Cir.1985), a case relied on by the district court, the Federal Circuit held that a trademark applicant could not bolster an application for registration based primarily on intra-corporate shipments (admittedly nonuse) by pointing to a concurrent advertising campaign. 8 This is because advertising is not a use within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 1098. Under the rubric of Avakoff, the fact that GHL follows intra-corporate shipments (serving no source identifying function) with overseas sales is likewise insufficient to garner trademark protection in the United States. The subsequent sales between the United Kingdom and the Middle East are not a use in commerce within the purview of the Lanham Act. See Buti v. Perosa, S.R.L, 139 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir.1998) (promotional activities in the United States did not merit Lanham Act protection for a mark associated entirely with ongoing business overseas). 14 On this basis, we affirm the district court's conclusion that, at least as to the most recent three years of activity, GHL has not used the Kent mark in commerce and therefore KIP demonstrated prima facie evidence of abandonment.