Opinion ID: 215442
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Statutory Text of CAFRA

Text: Proceeding in that fashion, and so without the presumption or clear statement requirement applied by the majority, I am not persuaded that there are statute-specific reasons for concluding that fees under CAFRA must always be paid directly to the client. To support its argument that CAFRA fees should be universally awarded to litigants, not attorneys, the government first points out that the subsection containing CAFRA's attorney fee provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1), provides for the award of three things: (1) attorney fees and litigation costs; (2) post-judgment interest; and (3) either actual interest paid to the government resulting from investment of the disputed property or an imputed amount of interest where no interest was actually earned. The government argues that, because interest would almost certainly be paid directly to the claimant, payment of attorney fees should not be treated differently. But the statutory text of CAFRA does not require that conclusion. There is no reason to think that all payments provided for by subsection (b)(1) should be payable to the same person. Subsection (b)(1) provides that the United States shall be liable for those three payments, but it does not indicate to whom they are to be paid. The neutral language, applicable to all three kinds of payments, most sensibly contemplates payment to whomever is appropriatefor interest, to the claimant, and for attorney fees, to the attorney or the client, depending on circumstances such as whether the client has already paid the fees. Because there is nothing in subsection (b)(1) requiring that fees be paid to the claimant, the government advances a different argument premised on another subsection of CAFRA. The government points out that subsection (b)(2)(A) provides that [t]he United States shall not be required to disgorge the value of any intangible benefits nor make any other payments to the claimant not specifically authorized by this subsection. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The government maintains that the reference to other payments to the claimant in (b)(2)(A) is a cross-reference to the three payments listed in subsection (b)(1), mentioned above. Therefore, the argument goes, attorney fees are payments to the claimant, not the attorney. The government's suggestion that subsection (b)(2)(A) cross-references (b)(1) is, in my view, incorrect. Again, subsection (b)(2)(A) reads: The United States shall not be required to disgorge the value of any intangible benefits nor make any other payments to the claimant not specifically authorized by this subsection. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). The other payments to the claimant acknowledged in (b)(2)(A) is most naturally read as a reference to the other payments to the claimant that are mentioned in that same sentence the value of any intangible benefits. Id. In contrast, with regard to the liability created by subsection (b)(1), no payments to the claimant are specifically authorized. Rather, subsection (b)(1) establishes liability, but, as we have seen, that subsection does not indicate the person to whom the payment is to be directed. So if one reads subsection (b)(2)(A) as a cross-reference to subsection (b)(1), the net effect seems to be the opposite of the one for which the government argues: As subsection (b)(1) does not specifically authorize payments to the claimant, it must be that the payments specified in subsection (b)(1) are not to be made to the claimant, but to someone else. That result, however, would be an odd and unlikely way of dictating that fee awards are not made to claimants. The more sensible interpretation is that subsection (b)(2)(A) is self-contained and does not affect subsection (b)(1) at all. The government next emphasizes that subsection (b)(1)(A) reads reasonable attorney fees and other litigation costs reasonably incurred by the claimant. 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). According to the government, the statutory scheme is compensatory and contemplates making a claimant whole. The government maintains that ordering payment to the claimant for those costs he agreed to pay would be consistent with this compensatory scheme, whereas payment directly to the attorney without regard to the actual payment agreement would not further the statute's compensatory goals. [3] This argument is no more successful than the converse argumentthat the phrase incurred by the claimant indicates that fees are to be paid to the attorney correctly rejected by the majority. As noted by the majority, EAJA, like CAFRA, requires that recoverable fees be incurred by the client, yet prevailing parties are entitled to fees under EAJA even if they were represented free of charge. See Nadarajah v. Holder, 569 F.3d 906, 916 (9th Cir.2009). Just as a statute that makes the government `liable for' fees `incurred by' a party does not necessarily entitle counsel to a direct fee award, Maj. Op. at 757 (emphasis added), that language likewise does not necessarily mean that the fees are payable to the claimant rather than the lawyer. Instead, the consideration that fees can be incurred by a client who did not agree to or actually pay any fees indicates to me that the choice of the neutral is liable for terminology was deliberate, and connotes similar flexibility in determining to whom the fees are to be paid. Paying fees directly to the client in instances where the client did not pay the attorney, or paid an amount less than market rates, could lead to a windfall to the client, or to the client's creditors. The majority's position does not account for this windfall possibility at all.