Opinion ID: 2274592
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Martinez's Right to Appeal

Text: At the outset, we address Holthus's contention that Martinez, the defendant in Holthus, may not be an appellant in this matter. Holthus argues that the trial court's order was not a final judgment with regard to Martinez as a defendant and, because it does not fall within any exceptions to the final judgment rule, Martinez must wait for a final judgment before he may appeal the order. Generally, `a party may appeal only from a final judgment.' St. Joseph Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cardiac Surgery Assocs., 392 Md. 75, 84, 896 A.2d 304, 309 (2006) (quoting Nnoli v. Nnoli, 389 Md. 315, 323, 884 A.2d 1215, 1219 (2005)). See also Md.Code, Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-301 (1974 & 2006 Repl. Vol.) ([A] party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by the circuit court.). There are, however, three well-identified, but infrequently sanctioned, limited exceptions to the final judgment rule which permit appellate review before a final judgment has been rendered. St. Joseph, 392 Md. at 84, 896 A.2d at 309. The exceptions are: `appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute; immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602;[ [7] ] and appeals from interlocutory orders allowed under the common law collateral order doctrine.' 392 Md. at 84, 896 A.2d at 309 (quoting Salvagno v. Frew, 388 Md. 605, 615, 881 A.2d 660, 666 (2005)). Martinez does not contend that his appeal fits within any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule. Rather, he argues that Dr. Falik is the real party in interest in this case and, thus, the issue is not whether Martinez has the right to maintain his own appeal pursuant to the final judgment rule or its exceptions, but, whether Martinez has the right to join in the appeal maintained by Dr. Falik by virtue of Martinez's abundant interest in the outcome of the appeal. In St. Joseph, a non-party to the underlying suit filed an interlocutory appeal from the trial court's refusal to grant a protective order from discovery in favor of the non-party. We held that the order was appealable, not under any of the exceptions to the final judgment rule, but because the order was a final judgment as to the non-party. 392 Md. at 88-89, 896 A.2d at 312. We reasoned that because the third person was not a party to the case, it would not have standing to challenge the discovery order by appealing from a final judgment in that case. Id. at 88, 896 A.2d at 312. Thus, analytically, it is a final judgment with respect to that appellant. Id. at 90, 896 A.2d at 313. Therefore, it is pellucid that, all other things being equal, Dr. Falik possessed a right to appeal from the orders entered in the present cases. That conclusion does not mean, however, that Martinez has a right to appeal the order under his theory that he may tag along in Dr. Falik's appeal. There is no statutory authority permitting an interlocutory appeal of a discovery order of this nature, nor is this appeal permitted under Rule 2-602. Thus, the only circumstance that would permit Martinez's appeal at this time is the collateral order doctrine. The collateral order doctrine treats as final and appealable interlocutory orders that (1) conclusively determine the disputed question; (2) resolve an important issue; (3) resolve an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action; and (4) would be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The collateral order doctrine is a very narrow exception to the final judgment rule, and each of its four requirements is very strictly applied in Maryland. In particular, the fourth prong, unreviewability on appeal, is not satisfied except in extraordinary situations. St. Joseph, 392 Md. at 86, 896 A.2d at 310 (quoting Nnoli, 389 Md. at 329, 884 A.2d at 1223) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). In the instant case, Martinez and Dr. Falik are challenging an interlocutory discovery order. It is well established in Maryland that generally interlocutory discovery orders do not meet the requirements of the collateral order doctrine and are not appealable under that doctrine. Id. at 87, 896 A.2d at 311. Interlocutory discovery orders are not appealable because most do not comply with the third requirement of the collateral order doctrine, as they generally are not completely separate from the merits of the lawsuit. Instead, a typical discovery order is aimed at ascertaining critical facts upon which the outcome of the . . . controversy might depend. In addition, discovery orders fail to meet the collateral order doctrine's fourth element, as they are effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Id. (citing In re Foley, 373 Md. 627, 635, 820 A.2d 587, 592 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)). The singular circumstance in which an interlocutory discovery order is reviewable on appeal under the collateral order doctrine involves trial court orders permitting the depositions of high level governmental decision makers for the purpose of `extensively probing . . . their individual decisional thought processes.' Id. at 88, 896 A.2d at 311 (quoting Montgomery County v. Stevens, 337 Md. 471, 479, 654 A.2d 877, 881 (1995)). The order in Holthus clearly does not fall within that category. Thus, we dismiss Martinez's appeal. [8]