Opinion ID: 4566362
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bystander NIED Precedent

Text: [¶16] We begin by revisiting Culbert and Cameron, the two cases that clarified the standard for bystander NIED claims. In Culbert, a mother sought to recover damages from a baby food manufacturer and a supermarket for the emotional distress she suffered after she observed her child choke and gag on a “hard substance” contained in a jar of baby food. 444 A.2d at 433-34 13 It is undisputed that Thomas and his son, Philip, were closely related, and we need not address that issue in this appeal. Further, although Gagne & Son has conceded that Thomas was present at the scene of the accident, we conclude in our de novo review of the summary judgment record that, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Cowards, Thomas was present at the accident scene. Thomas was at his home on the day of the accident and was located approximately 100 feet from the delivery area. Although we do not attempt to adopt a bright-line rule of 100 feet to establish a bystander’s presence at an accident scene, Thomas’s proximity to the injury-producing act of Gagne & Son and his ability to hear the accident occur are sufficient to demonstrate that he was “present at the scene of the accident.” Cameron, 610 A.2d at 284. 12 (quotation marks omitted). The trial court dismissed claims against the manufacturer and entered a summary judgment in favor of the supermarket, concluding that the mother had not been a foreseeable victim because she had not been in the zone of danger. Id. [¶17] We concluded that “the traditional tort concept of foreseeability [would] circumscribe . . . the tortfeasor’s liability in bystander cases” and, as a result, adopted the three-factor test articulated in Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912 (Cal. 1968), “for determining whether an injury was reasonably foreseeable.” Culbert, 444 A.2d at 437. Accordingly, we held that in some circumstances, “a bystander may recover damages for serious mental distress foreseeably resulting from witnessing another person harmed by the tortfeasor’s negligent act,” concluding that a bystander’s “psychic injury may be deemed foreseeable when the plaintiff bystander [(1)] was present at the scene of the accident, [(2)] suffered mental distress as a result of observing the accident and ensuing danger to the victim, and [(3)] was closely related to the victim.”14 Id. at 438. 14 In Dillon v. Legg, the Supreme Court of California defined these three factors as “guidelines” that would be used to help resolve “whether [a] defendant should reasonably foresee the injury to [a] plaintiff.” 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968). In relevant part, the court defined the contemporaneous perception factor as “[w]hether the shock resulted from a direct emotional impact upon plaintiff from the sensory and contemporaneous observance of the accident, as contrasted with learning of the accident from others after its occurrence.” Id. Later, in Thing v. La Chusa, the California court rejected the three “guidelines” in Dillon and applied a more restrictive three-factor test, holding that “a plaintiff may recover damages for emotional distress caused by observing the negligently inflicted injury of a third person if, but only if, [the] plaintiff (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is 13 We also recognized that because “the imposition of liability is ultimately a factual determination which must be made on a case by case basis, the Dillon test should not be applied [formulaically] to bar arguably valid claims.” Id. at 437. Thus, we vacated the dismissal and the summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings in the trial court. Id. at 438. [¶18] A decade later, in Cameron, we reviewed a bystander NIED claim brought by parents who were not present at the scene of a car accident involving their son, but who were notified of the accident “shortly after it occurred” and then arrived at the hospital to see their son “cut, bloody, and battered.” 610 A.2d at 280. The parents remained with their son at the hospital until he died, six days later. Id. There, the “essential issue” that we considered was “whether a person, not at the scene when an accident occurs but who present at the scene of the injury producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim; and (3) as a result suffers serious emotional distress—a reaction beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness and which is not an abnormal response to the circumstances.” 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989) (emphases added) (footnotes omitted); see also Bird v. Saenz, 51 P.3d 324, 328 & n.3 (Cal. 2002) (describing the Thing contemporaneous awareness requirement as requiring a bystander to perceive the “impact on the victim” and to “then know it is causing injury,” but not permitting recovery when the “knowledge is acquired moments later”). Here, the parties dispute whether our reliance on the reasoning in Thing, 771 P.2d 814, when we explained our later holding in Cameron, 610 A.2d at 284-85, amounted to us adopting the narrow holding of Thing. It did not. To be sure, we were “persuaded by the reasoning of the Thing court to resist any expansive application of the standard adopted in Culbert” when concluding that a defendant’s duty was limited by policy considerations. Cameron, 610 A.2d at 284. However, we did not expressly adopt Thing’s holding and, as we stated in Cameron, we “reaffirm[ed]” our holding in Culbert. Id. at 284-85; see Thing, 771 P.2d at 829-30. 14 subsequently witnesses the accident victim’s pain and suffering, can recover for severe emotional distress against the defendant who negligently caused the accident.” Id. (emphasis added). In considering that question, we also addressed the parents’ contention that the Culbert standard had evolved into to a “pure foreseeability” test, “dependent solely on the factfinder’s determination whether the injury was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s negligence.” Id. at 281, 284. [¶19] We concluded, first, that a defendant’s duty is informed not only by the foreseeability of the harm, but also by relevant policy considerations, including “the necessity of avoiding both unlimited liability and liability out of all proportion to culpability.” Id. at 282-83. In rejecting the “pure foreseeability” standard urged by the parents, we also recognized that “the scope of the defendant’s duty should be limited to the emotional vulnerability that arises in parents upon actually witnessing their child receiving an injury.” Id. at 284. We reasoned that “[t]he impact of such an experience”—that is, of a bystander witnessing the victim receiving an injury while the bystander is at the accident scene—“is qualitatively and quantitatively different from the distress occasioned by a subsequent visit to the hospital.” Id. Therefore, in the circumstances of Cameron, where the parents were not present at the accident 15 scene and had observed their son’s pain and suffering only after arriving at the hospital, we “resist[ed] any expansive application of the standard adopted in Culbert” and, relevant to our discussion here, “reaffirm[ed] that a plaintiff must demonstrate that he . . . suffered serious mental distress as a result of contemporaneously perceiving the accident.” Id. at 284-85. [¶20] As these two cases make clear, we have focused our analysis in these NIED claims on a bystander’s presence at the accident scene and the corresponding ability to be aware of the victim’s injuries while the bystander and victim are at the scene. Thus, we recognized a “qualitative[] and quantitative[]” difference between the emotional distress suffered by a bystander who is at the scene and observes the victim’s injuries and that distress experienced by a bystander who witnesses a victim’s later pain and suffering away from the scene, after the accident has concluded. Id. at 284; see also Dillon, 441 P.2d at 920 (recognizing the different emotional distress experienced by a bystander when “learning of the accident from others after its occurrence”). Although we have not expressly defined the term “contemporaneous perception,” we have confined this temporal limitation to instances in which a bystander is in close proximity to the accident and “witness[es] another person harmed,” Culbert, 444 A.2d at 438; “observ[es] the 16 accident and ensuing danger to the victim,” id.; or “witness[es] [the victim] receiving an injury,” Cameron, 610 A.2d at 284. As such, this temporal limitation extends to a bystander’s perception of the injury or harm suffered by a victim at the scene but does not permit recovery where a bystander views or learns of the same injury or harm at the hospital or otherwise away from the accident scene. [¶21] Contrary to the contention of Gagne & Son, we have not expressly required that a bystander who witnesses the injury-producing event must, at that moment, possess an immediate knowledge that the event is causing harm to a victim. Indeed, in other instances, we recognized that a bystander’s “contemporaneous involvement in all that went on” at the scene over a span of more than three hours was sufficient to state a claim for NIED. See Purty v. Kennebec Valley Med. Ctr., 551 A.2d 858, 859-60 (Me. 1988) (emphasis added); see also Culbert, 444 A.2d at 438 (discussing the “ensuing danger to the victim” (emphasis added)); but see Champagne, 1998 ME 87, ¶ 14, 711 A.2d 842 (concluding that a bystander could not establish a claim for bystander NIED in part because the bystander did not became aware of the victim’s injury until one hour later). Although the contemporaneous perception factor must impose a temporal limit on a bystander’s NIED claim, that limit is not as narrow as the 17 one urged by Gagne & Son. In short, we are not persuaded to adopt the rule proposed by Gagne & Son that would define “contemporaneous perception” as meaning that a bystander is required to directly witness the injury-producing event and be immediately aware that it is causing injury to the victim. [¶22] Therefore, we seek to clarify and define the temporal limits of what is required for a bystander to “contemporaneously perceive[e] [an] accident.” Cameron, 610 A.2d at 284-85 (emphasis added).