Opinion ID: 2209161
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Removals of Elected Officers of Political Subdivisions for Cause Are Subject to Doctrine of Separation of Powers.

Text: The above cases and numerous others were decided previous to the 1963 Constitution. The strengthening of the entire judiciary by that Constitution, particularly of the probate courts, makes doubtful their present applicability and renders untenable the attorney general's claim that probate courts are a different variety than other courts. The Constitution of 1963, by article 3, § 7, continues in force the statute laws not repugnant to its provisions. The fundamental issue is whether CL 1948, § 201.7, as amended, survived after January 1, 1964, the effective date of the new Constitution, and continues in force. (a) Constitution of 1835. The separation of powers article (article 3) in the Constitution of 1835 did not specifically proscribe individual conduct since it asserted that one department shall never exercise the powers of another department. Under that Constitution (article 6) the judicial power was vested in one Supreme Court and such other courts as the legislature might establish. Section 3 of that same article provided that a court of probate shall be established in each of the organized counties. It made no mention of the jurisdiction of that court. By article 8 the legislature was to provide by law for the removal of county officers. The legislature placed the power in the governor to remove all county officers except county judges, judges of probate and county clerks. RS 1846, ch 15, § 6. If the charges did not involve the prosecuting attorney, the governor could direct him to conduct an inquiry. Examination of witnesses was to be before some county judge. The county judge made no decision on the merits of the removal charge. He certified the transcript and delivered it to the prosecuting attorney for transmittal to the governor. Under the 1835 Constitution, the county judge had been endowed by the legislature with judicial power but the separation of powers article was so obscurely worded as to leave doubtful its application to individual action. (b) Constitution of 1850. The separation of powers article (article 3) of the 1850 Constitution cast the proscription in terms of personal conduct by providing that no person belonging to one department shall exercise the powers properly belonging to another except in the cases expressly provided in this Constitution. The word cases as there used had the same meaning as situations or conditions. Under article 6 the judicial power was vested in one Supreme Court, in circuit courts, in probate courts, and in justices of the peace. By article 6, § 13, courts of probate were to be established in each of the organized counties. The jurisdiction, powers and duties of such courts shall be prescribed by law. Removal of county officers was covered by article 12 which stated that the legislature shall provide by law for the removal of any officer elected by a county in such manner and for such cause as to it shall seem just and proper. County courts were discontinued. A circuit court commissioner was substituted for the county judge as the person before whom examination of witnesses in removal proceedings might be held. See PA 1853, No 19. By PA 1871, No 63, a judge of probate was added as an officer before whom such examination could be held. There appear to be no adjudicated cases or reported decisions under the 1850 Constitution holding that a judge of probate could not properly be designated by the legislature as one of the officials before whom the evidence in a removal proceeding could be held nor are there any cases in which the question was raised. (c) Constitution of 1908. The separation of powers article (article 4) in this Constitution was the same as in the 1850 Constitution. By article 7 judicial power was vested in one Supreme Court, circuit courts, probate courts, and justices of the peace. A modification was made relating to inferior courts established by the legislature. Article 7, § 13, dealing with the jurisdiction of probate courts, was substantially changed from the corresponding provision in the 1850 Constitution. The Constitution of 1850 stated: The jurisdiction, powers and duties of such courts shall be prescribed by law. In the 1908 Constitution the language read: In each county organized for judicial purposes, there shall be a probate court. The jurisdiction, powers and duties of such courts and of the judges thereof shall be prescribed by law, and they shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases of juvenile delinquents and dependents. After the adoption of the 1908 Constitution, the Supreme Court held that under section 13 of article 7 the legislature had plenary authority to prescribe the powers and duties of the probate courts and the judges thereof. In re Merrill (1918), 200 Mich 244, 248. The provision for removal of county officers in article 9, § 8, was slightly different from the corresponding provision in the 1850 Constitution and, in substance, said that any officer elected by a county may be removed from office in such manner and for such cause as shall be prescribed by law. (d) Constitution of 1963. The language relating to the separation of powers article (article 3, § 2) is changed and made more precise. Under the 1908 Constitution there was an opportunity to question the meaning of the words the powers properly belonging to another [department] (emphasis supplied). Did this mean the whole power relating to any particular objective? Under the present Constitution the proscription is against the exercise of powers properly belonging to another branch. The term powers is all inclusive, meaning that power which is exercised and all of its components, stages, or steps. Under the 1908 Constitution, the exception read except in the cases expressly provided. [Emphasis supplied.] Now the exception reads except as expressly provided in this Constitution. [Emphasis supplied.] This change removes the doubt as to what was a case or situation intended to be covered as an exception by language found elsewhere in the 1908 Constitution. The language now means that the exception must be expressed in the Constitution itself, whereas the language of the 1908 Constitution could have been construed to mean the legislature might deal with the situation as being an exception. Under the 1963 Constitution, the language makes it clear that the exception relates to the crossing over from one branch to another in the exercise of powers. Consequently, where the legislature is authorized to act, it is required to conform to the separatikn of powers concept as being fundamental and basic and may grant an exception only when it can find authorization in the Constitution. For the first time, the judicial article of the 1963 Constitution (article 6, § 1) speaks of the judiciary in terms of one court of justice. That one court of justice is the judicial branch. The courts which make up the one court of justice do not exercise identical or corresponding jurisdiction. Each has its particular level of judicial administration. But since all courts form but one court of justice to which the judicial power has been granted by the Constitution, it seems clear all courts perform solely by the exercise of judicial power. Therefore the separation of powers article would apply to a court as follows: No person (a judge) exercising powers (judicial power) of one branch (the court of justice which constitutes the judicial branch) shall exercise powers properly belonging to another branch. It then becomes necessary to look for an exception (expressly provided) in the Constitution. The Constitution of 1963 does not define the entire jurisdiction of probate courts. This responsibility is left to the legislature by article 6, § 15: The jurisdiction, powers and duties of the probate court and of the judges thereof shall be provided by law. The committee on style and drafting of the constitutional convention of 1961 made a distinction in the use of the words prescribed by law and the words provided by law. Where provided by law is used, it is intended that the legislature shall do the entire job of implementation. Where only the details were left to the legislature and not the overall planning, the committee used the words prescribed by law. See 2 Official Record, Constitutional Convention of 1961, pp 2673, 2674. The provision of the 1963 Constitution last above quoted placed the responsibility on the legislature to draft the law but did not grant authority for departure from the requirements and proscriptions of the Constitution. It does not have the effect of permitting disregard of the separation of powers article. The removal power, appearing as it does in the article on local government, might have been implemented by the legislature solely on the level of local government without involving any of the three branches of State government. See Speed v. Detroit Common Council, supra . However, when a particular removal power is assigned to one branch of government, that power must be exercised within that branch if the doctrine of separation of powers is to be meaningful. The framers of the Constitution did not expressly provide for the joint exercise of the removal power by two or more branches of government. Since there is no express provision to this effect, it must be concluded that article 7, § 33, is subject to the provisions of article 3, § 2. The statute (CL 1948, § 201.7 et seq., as amended) does not pass the survival test under the 1963 Constitution. It imposes on a probate judge a function in the removal process which is a partial exercise of executive power because the legislature by statute placed the obligation and responsibility for removal of county officers in the governor. The function of hearing witnesses, including the respondent, can be performed by the governor. If a probate judge is appointed by the governor to undertake that function, the judge becomes the governor's substitute. The attorney general states in his brief, in commenting on In the Matter of Richardson (1928), 247 NY 401 (160 NE 655): We would have no hestitancy in conceding great force to the Richardson Case, at least as to its first ground of decision, if the Michigan statute had authorized the governor to name (and he had so acted) one of our circuit judges for the purpose in question. (Emphasis supplied.) The forceful reasoning of Judge Benjamin Cardozo in Richardson, as found by the Court of Appeals, is applicable here. It applies to Michigan probate courts which are a part of a single court system as well as to the office of circuit court commissioner as long as that office as presently constituted continues to exist. The superintending control of all courts is placed by the Constitution in the Supreme Court. To hold that executive, quasi -judicial, administrative, or ministerial functions can be shouldered at will upon the judicial branch of government would ignore the strengthening of the judiciary that occurred in the 1963 Constitution. To permit the chief executive to pick and choose statewide among the probate judges in selecting a participant in an executive removal proceeding would be to require the probate judge to exercise powers belonging to the executive branch of State government. Based upon the reasoning of this opinion, the order of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. Such affirmance is not to be construed as in any way affecting the validity of CL 1948, § 201.7 et seq., as amended, insofar as the executive authority to conduct a removal proceeding for cause is therein set forth (see Attorney General v. Bairley, supra ), nor should it be construed that only the governor, or the lieutenant governor in the absence of the governor from the State, must conduct such hearing in person where authority to delegate within the executive branch of government is provided by statute as is exemplified by such delegation of authority in the uniform criminal extradition act (PA 1937, No 144 [CL 1948, § 780.1 et seq. (Stat Ann 1954 Rev § 28-1285[1] et seq. )]).