Opinion ID: 2508322
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Johnson's statement to Sergeant Voznik

Text: Sergeant Voznik, a defense witness who had also testified for the prosecution, testified that on May 12, 1987, Johnson came to the police station with his attorney. Voznik told them that Johnson would be treated as a suspect and that, if Johnson wished to give a statement, the police would thereafter make a determination as to Johnson's involvement in the murders. Johnson asked to speak privately with Jesse Slaughter, who had come to the police station shortly after Johnson. Sergeant Voznik allowed Johnson, his attorney, and Slaughter to speak privately. Johnson then declined to give a statement to the police, and was arrested on an outstanding warrant. The next morning, Johnson telephoned Sergeant Voznik from jail and said he had changed his mind and wanted to make a statement. Voznik contacted Johnson's attorney, and the three met that afternoon at the police station. During the ensuing interview, Johnson told Voznik that, on April 27, defendant negotiated with Thompson about buying crack cocaine and gave her money for it. Johnson also said that he was present when Thompson and Robinson were killed and that defendant had killed them. On cross-examination by the prosecution, Sergeant Voznik testified that his interview with Johnson was tape-recorded. The prosecutor marked for identification a 28-page transcript of Johnson's interview and referred to the transcript in questioning Voznik about the details of the interview. Johnson told Voznik that defendant shot Thompson and Robinson about 10:00 p.m. on April 27, 1987, in an alley outside the apartment of Lisa McKaufman. Defendant snatche[d] Robinson with his left hand, pulled a gun from the front of his pants with his right hand, placed the gun to Robinson's neck and fired one shot. Robinson just drop[ped], and Thompson lay on the ground in a fetal position screaming and hollering. Defendant then straddled Thompson and shot her two to three times on the side of her head. Defendant did not object to any of this testimony. When the prosecutor asked Sergeant Voznik where defendant went after shooting Thompson, defense counsel objected to the testimony as being no longer within the realm of [Evidence Code section] 356. The trial court overruled the objection. Voznik then testified that Johnson said that defendant leaped past him after shooting Thompson. Without objection from the defense, Voznik also stated that defendant's gun was a rust-colored revolver with a three-inch barrel. The court sustained several of defendant's objections to identified portions of the Johnson interview as outside the scope of Evidence Code section 356 or as cumulative. Over defendant's objection that the testimony was cumulative, Sergeant Voznik further testified that during the interview Johnson said that when defendant shot Robinson the gun was touching Robinson's neck, and when defendant shot Thompson the gun was two or three feet from Thompson's head. Defendant contends that Johnson's statement to Sergeant Voznik providing details about the Thompson/Robinson murders, which the prosecutor elicited during cross-examination, was inadmissible hearsay. Because he did not object at trial on this ground, he has not preserved the issue for review. (See People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1035, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) Even if the issue was properly before us, the contention lacks merit, as discussed below. Evidence Code section 356 permits introduction of statements `on the same subject' or which are necessary for the understanding of the statements already introduced. [Citation.] ( People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 419-420, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) Accordingly, once defendant had introduced a portion of Johnson's interview with Sergeant Voznik into evidence, the prosecution was entitled to introduce the remainder of Johnson's interview to place in context the isolated statements of Johnson related by Voznik on direct examination by the defense. (See People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 959, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704.) The trial court's admission of Johnson's statements was therefore proper under California statutory law. Defendant also contends that by admitting the statement the trial court violated his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against him, under the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution and article I, section 15 of the California Constitution. Even if he has not forfeited this claim by his failure to raise it at trial, the claim lacks merit. Recently, the United States Supreme Court stated that when testimonial hearsay evidence, which includes [s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations ( Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 52, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1364, 158 L.Ed.2d 177), is at issue, the Sixth Amendment demands ... unavailability [of the declarant] and a prior opportunity for cross-examination ( id. at p. 68, 124 S.Ct. at p. 1374). But the high court has not said whether Crawford applies to cases that, like this one, were tried before it was decided. Assuming for the sake of argument that under Crawford, admission of Johnson's statements to Voznik violated the Sixth Amendment, admission of the statements would require reversal unless we found beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent any error. ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 7-10, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35; see also People v. Bolden (2002) 29 Cal.4th 515, 560, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 802, 58 P.3d 931.) Under that standard, any error in admitting Johnson's statements was harmless. The important factual issue at trial was identity, not the manner in which the victims were killed. On this point, defendant himself elicited from Sergeant Voznik the statement by Johnson identifying defendant as the shooter, which was consistent with defendant's admission of guilt to Davis. The details of the murders provided by Davis, as relayed to him by defendant, were largely identical to the details provided by Johnson, but for the order in which the victims were killed. The locations and the analysis of the victims' wounds corroborated evidence that they were killed at very close range. Under these circumstances, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt the jury's verdict would have been the same absent the admission of evidence elicited by the prosecution on cross-examination of Voznik about the details of Johnson's statement to him.