Opinion ID: 2747140
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of the Statutory Duty

Text: The first Restatement factor is the nature of the statutory duty: “Does [the statute] clearly let both the court and the actor know in advance what conduct is prohibited? Or is it posed in broad, general terms that will acquire specific meaning only if—and after—the court has determined to supply the tort remedy and expressed it for the benefit of the persons being affected?” Restatement at § 874A comment h(1). This factor asks whether the statute at issue sufficiently notifies the court and potential defendants of the risk of liability. In this case, the court recognizes that “the city’s duty under ORS 243.303(2) is specific: The city shall provide health insurance to retirees on the same basis as provided to current employees.” 356 Or at 369 (emphasis in original). The court then notes that the statute qualifies that specific and mandatory duty with the phrase “insofar as and to the extent possible” and that that qualification makes the “standard of conduct less certain.” Id. But whether a statutory standard of conduct is “less certain” than it theoretically could be does not address whether the statutory duty is sufficiently certain to satisfy the first Restatement factor. The court does not engage in that analysis. Instead, the court questions whether plaintiffs’ claim comports with “any existing tort claim.” Id. at 370. Because plaintiffs do not label the tort claim that they seek to bring except as a “violation of ORS 243.303,” the court expresses concern about the elements of the claim that the court would recognize and the “mental state” that it would “supply.” Id. (citing Burnette v. 6 Those factors are (1) the nature of the legislative provision; (2) the adequacy of existing remedies; (3) the extent to which the tort action will aid or supplement or interfere with existing remedies and other means of enforcement; (4) the significance of the purpose that the legislative body is seeking to effectuate; (5) the extent of the change in tort law; (6) the burden that the new cause of action will place on the judicial machinery. Restatement at § 874A comment h. 390 Doyle v. City of Medford Wahl, 284 Or 705, 711-12, 588 P2d 1105 (1978)).7 Based on that analysis, the majority finds that the first Restatement factor weighs against the creation of a tort. The court’s analysis is off-base in two different directions. First, the court incorrectly assumes that it can recognize only common-law tort claims that comport with existing torts. Second, the court does not address the question actually posed by the first Restatement factor—whether the statutory duty at issue is sufficiently specific to be enforceable in a private right of action. As to the first bar that the court raises, it should not be at all surprising that plaintiffs “have not identified any existing tort that comports with their pleaded theory.” Id. If plaintiffs could identify such a tort, they would not need to ask this court for assistance. In each instance in which a plaintiff asks this court to recognize or create a private right of action for damages based on the breach of a statutory duty, it is the statute that the plaintiff seeks to enforce that establishes the nature of that duty and the elements of the plaintiff’s claim. Thus, this court has held, “[O]ne who violates a statute enacted for protection of others may be civilly liable in damages for injuring the protected interest even when there is no corresponding common law basis of recovery.” Cain v. Rijken, 300 Or 706, 715-16, 717 P2d 140 (1986). In this case, plaintiffs, like the plaintiffs in Nearing and Chartrand, pleaded that defendant violated an Oregon statute and that plaintiffs suffered damages as a result. The fact that plaintiffs did not reference or incorporate additional elements of existing torts does not mean that the statute at issue is insufficiently clear to permit a tort remedy. The correct question for analysis is whether the duty imposed by 7 The court’s citation to Burnette for the proposition that “we are reluctant to supply elements of a common-law claim for relief that plaintiffs have failed to identify” is incorrect. In Burnette, the court considered the Restatement factors but did not address the need to plead the elements of an existing tort or the nature of the statutory duty. Burnette, 284 Or at 725-26. Instead, the court discussed a separate Restatement factor: the extent to which the action will aid or supplement or interfere with existing claims and associated remedies and other means of enforcement. Restatement at § 874A comment h(3). In this case, the court concludes that that factor weighs in favor of plaintiffs. 356 Or at 374. Cite as 356 Or 336 (2014) 391 ORS 243.303(2) is sufficiently specific that a tort claim is an appropriate means of enforcement. The court’s second error is in its consideration of that question. The statutory duty at issue is the duty to provide health insurance to retirees on the same basis as provided to current employees. ORS 243.303(2). That duty is subject to an affirmative defense—“that it was not possible, under the statutory standard, to make coverage available to retirees.” Doyle v. City of Medford, 347 Or 564, 579, 227 P3d 683 (2010). The court does not take the position that that defense makes the statutory duty so general that it does not give rise to an action for damages. In fact, the court acknowledges that that duty is actionable under the Declaratory Judgments Act, and correctly so. In other cases, this court has considered statutory duties that are more general than the duty imposed by ORS 243.303(2) and statutory duties that are subject to affirmative defenses and has concluded that those duties permit tort remedies. For instance, in Cain, the court considered a statutory duty to “act reasonably in treating and controlling conditionally released patients,” 300 Or at 721, and the statutory duty at issue in Nearing is subject to affirmative defenses, 295 Or at 709. In both cases, the court held that the legislatively created duties gave rise to tort claims. In Nearing, a police officer had a statutory obligation to arrest a person if the officer had probable cause to believe that the person had violated a restraining order. 295 Or at 710. Thus, whether the officer had an obligation to act depended on the officer’s determination of “probable cause.” Id. Nevertheless, the court held that relevant statutes “identify with precision when, to whom, and under what circumstances” the police must arrest a person. Id. at 712. Further, the court noted that there could be various defenses to a plaintiff’s claim that an officer had violated those statutes and that an officer “would not be liable, for instance, for failing to make an unconstitutional arrest.” Id. at 709. However, the court went on to explain, the fact that a defense could be asserted did not preclude a civil action to enforce the statutory duty. Id. 392 Doyle v. City of Medford Just as the availability of an affirmative defense did not preclude a tort claim for damages in Nearing, the availability of an affirmative defense should not preclude a similar claim here. It was the legislature that imposed the statutory duty in both cases. And if the legislature deemed the duty at issue in Nearing sufficiently certain to give rise to tort liability, I do not see why this court should hesitate to do likewise when it considers the clarity of the duty imposed by ORS 243.303(2). I also wonder how that statutory duty can be suffi- ciently certain to give rise to a remedy for monetary damages under the Declaratory Judgments Act, but not sufficiently certain to permit the same tort remedy. Perhaps the court gleans from the Declaratory Judgments Act a legislative intent to permit an award of monetary damages for violation of ORS 243.303(2) regardless of that statute’s specificity or lack of clarity. However, if the court’s decision rests on its recognition of legislative intent, then the court should not hesitate to give effect to that intent by recognizing a damages remedy in tort. By requiring local governments to make available to retirees the same health insurance benefits that they make available to current employees, ORS 243.303(2) specifically advises the court and potential defendants what conduct is required. The first Restatement factor weighs in favor of recognizing a tort remedy for violation of that statutory duty.