Opinion ID: 902272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Briley Lawsuit

Text: As in Doe Run I, we quote extensively from the complaint in the Briley Lawsuit because the duty to defend normally “is determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy with the allegations in the [underlying] complaint.” McCormack, 989 S.W.2d at 170. The named plaintiff in Briley alleged, inter alia: 1. This is an action to seek redress . . . for injuries, damages and losses suffered by the Plaintiff as a result of the release of metals and other toxic chemicals from the chat and tailings piles owned, operated, managed, supervised and used by [Doe Run] . . . (“the Leadwood Pile”). These damages and losses include but are not limited to the need for medical monitoring services for children arising out of their exposure to lead and other toxic substances released from the Leadwood Pile. 6. The Leadwood Pile . . . consists of an estimated 5,100,000 cubic yards of mine waste . . . . In addition to high residual lead content in this mining waste, other heavy metals including cadmium and zinc also are present. The Missouri Department of Conservation has detected elevated lead levels in fish downstream of the Leadwood Pile . . . . 7. Dust created by wind erosion and by activities occurring at the Leadwood Pile has and continues to contaminate the surrounding area posing a hazard to residents. . . . 9. During the course of its operations . . . the Leadwood Pile has released to the area beyond its boundaries, including the property on -4- which Plaintiff resided, metals and other substances, including but not limited to lead and cadmium, both negligently, carelessly and recklessly. 10. At all times relevant hereto, Doe Run has owned, operated, managed and used the Leadwood Pile and is responsible for the negligent, careless and reckless release of lead and other toxic substances to areas beyond the boundaries of the Leadwood Pile. Following these General Allegations, the Briley complaint asserted four common law tort causes of action: COUNT I -- Negligence 26. [Doe Run] . . . negligently, carelessly and recklessly generated, handled, stored, treated, disposed of, and failed to control and contain the metals and other toxic substances at the Leadwood Pile, resulting in the release of toxic substances and exposure of Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class. [Doe Run] also negligently . . . failed to warn Plaintiff and Plaintiff Class of the release of the metals and other toxic substances into the environment and community surrounding the Leadwood Pile and of the reasonably foreseeable effects of such releases. COUNT II -- Absolute or Strict Liability 31. The handling and processing of metals and other toxic substances at the Leadwood Pile . . . constitutes an abnormally dangerous activity or ultra hazardous activity, because such activities create a high risk of significant harm. 33. The collection, handling and processing of hazardous wastes and toxic substances at the Leadwood Pile has directly and proximately caused release of such substances into the environment and the community surrounding the Leadwood Pile. -5- 34. As a direct and proximate result of the releases from the Leadwood Pile . . . the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class . . . will continue to suffer . . . injuries, damages and losses. . . . COUNT III -- Private Nuisance 37. [Doe Run’s] conduct at the Leadwood Pile . . . constitutes an unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment of the property on which the Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class resided by releasing heavy metals and other toxic substances from the Leadwood Pile onto Plaintiff’s property and the property of the members of Plaintiff Class. COUNT IV -- Trespass 41. [Doe Run’s] conduct at the Leadwood Pile . . . has resulted in an entry and intrusion onto the property on which Plaintiff and members of the Plaintiff Class resided by the transport and deposition of emissions from the Leadwood Pile without permission. 42. The entry and intrusion by Defendants has caused and continues to cause damages to Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class. 43. As a direct and proximate result of the releases from the Leadwood Pile, the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff Class . . . will continue to suffer . . . injuries, damages and losses. . . . Like the allegations in every cause of action asserted in the underlying complaint in Doe Run I, every tort cause of action asserted in the Briley Lawsuit was entirely premised on allegations that Doe Run is liable for causing the “release” of “hazardous wastes” and “metals and other toxic substances” from the Leadwood Pile, thus mirroring the language of Lexington’s absolute pollution exclusions. Indeed, the Briley complaint described the chat and tailings as mine wastes even more explicitly than did the underlying complaint in Doe Run I, allegations that made these materials, when inadvertently released into the surrounding environment, indistinguishable from -6- the wastewater treatment sludge at issue in Casualty Indemnity Exchange v. City of Sparta, 997 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Mo. App. 1999). For example, the trespass claim in paragraphs 40 through 44 alleged the “transport and deposition of emissions” onto other property, including land on which the Briley plaintiffs resided, based on allegations in fact paragraphs 9 and 10 that Doe Run “released” metals and other toxic substances beyond the boundaries of the Leadwood Pile. Paragraph 43 then alleged damages resulting from injuries caused by these “releases.” Thus, the trespass claim, like the other causes of action asserted in the Briley Lawsuit, was a classic claim for damages caused by environmental pollution. Doe Run argues, as it did in Doe Run I, that Lexington’s pollution exclusions nonetheless do not apply as a matter of law. For the reasons explained in Part III of our opinion in Doe Run I, we again conclude (i) that the Missouri Court of Appeals decision in Hocker Oil Co. v. Barker-Phillips-Jackson, Inc., 997 S.W.2d 510 (Mo. App. 1999), “does not mandate the conclusion that Lexington’s pollution exclusions are ambiguous as applied to the [Briley] Lawsuit,” slip op. at 10; and (ii) that deletion of a broad lead exclusion from the Lexington Policies issued after October 2004 “left the remainder of the CGL policy in full force and effect, including its absolute pollution exclusion,” id. at 13. For these reasons, we agree with the district court that Lexington’s pollution exclusions unambiguously apply and therefore bar a duty to defend the Briley Lawsuit.