Opinion ID: 1665225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Motion to Suppress Lineup Evidence

Text: Ibar contends the trial court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the live lineup and the statements made by Gary Foy identifying him at that lineup. He alleges that he was in custody at the time Miramar police arrived at the Miami-Dade homicide unit with a warrant requiring him to participate in a lineup. Ibar requested his counsel be present for the lineup, but police told him that they did not want to wait for his counsel to arrive and they proceeded without counsel. The State argues that Ibar was not in the custody of the Miramar police on the triple homicide and had not been charged on these crimes; therefore, Ibar's right to counsel had not been triggered. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we accord a presumption of correctness to the trial court's determination of historical facts; however, we independently review mixed questions of law and fact that ultimately determine constitutional issues arising in the context of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments and, by extension, article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution. See Connor v. State, 803 So. 2d 598, 608 (Fla. 2001). Under the state constitution, a defendant's right to counsel's presence applies at each crucial stage of the proceedings; under the federal constitution, defendant is entitled to counsel at each critical stage of the proceeding. State v. Jones, 849 So. 2d 438, 441 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003) (citing Smith v. State, 699 So. 2d 629, 638 (Fla. 1997)); see also Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 968 (Fla. 1992). Although [i]t is well settled that viewing a post-charge/arrest live lineup is a critical or crucial stage, Jones, 849 So. 2d at 441, a pre-charge lineup is not a critical or crucial stage because formal proceedings have not actually begun. The United States Supreme Court has stated that the formal proceedings begin when the government makes a commitment to prosecute, which occurs when the defendant is arraigned, indicted, or formally charged. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-91 (1972) (plurality opinion) (holding that a lineup conducted after a defendant's arrest, but before arraignment, indictment, or formal charges is merely investigatory in nature; therefore, the defendant is not entitled to presence of counsel at such a lineup). When the government makes a formal commitment to prosecute, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches. See id. at 689 ([I]t is only then that the government has committed itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant have solidified.). The pre-arrest investigatory lineup in this case was not a critical stage of the proceedings because when the lineup was conducted, it was not apparent that the government had decided to prosecute Ibar for the triple homicide. Ibar maintains that his arrest in Dade County on unrelated charges established that he was in custody or under arrest. The right to counsel when an accused or suspect is in custody or under arrest applies when there is an official interrogation, in which case the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is triggered and Miranda [5] warnings are given. See Sapp v. State, 690 So. 2d 581 So. 2d 581, 585 (Fla. 1997). An official interrogation refers to words or actions that are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980). A prearrest investigatory lineup does not elicit any response from the suspect; therefore, it is not an interrogation and the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is not triggered. Furthermore, the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel is offense specific and applies only to the offense or offenses with which the defendant has actually been charged, and not to any other offense he may have committed but with which he has not been charged. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Vasquez, 974 F.2d 1099 (9th Cir. 1992); West v. State, 923 P.2d 110 (Alaska Ct. App. 1996) (holding that the fact that the right to the assistance of counsel has attached in a particular case does not entitle the defendant to demand representation in connection with factually and legally unrelated matters in which the state has made no accusation and taken no adversary action); State v. Williams, 922 S.W.2d 845 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that in a murder prosecution, the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel for an unrelated murder had not attached where no formal proceedings had been brought against him for that murder). At the time Ibar was subjected to the live lineup, he had not been charged for the triple homicide and his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had not been triggered. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Ibar's motion to suppress.