Opinion ID: 73516
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Feres

Text: 18 To decide whether Feres applies in this case to preclude recovery by the parents and estate of a foreign serviceman who died in the United States because of the negligence of an Army driver, we have direction from the Supreme Court's development of the Feres doctrine as it relates to the FTCA and consider the interpretation of our circuit cases. The FTCA permits a limited waiver of sovereign immunity that enables the government to be subject to tort liability as a private person would be in similar circumstances. 12 The measure of recovery is the amount allowed by state law for the plaintiff's claim if the plaintiff were suing the United States as a private person. See 28 U.S.C. § 2674. While the FTCA exempts recovery for military injuries or death resulting from combat service, see 28 U.S.C. § 2680(j), 13 liability of the government under the FTCA for peacetime injuries to military members was a void that the Supreme Court filled with Feres and its progeny, see Pierce v. United States, 813 F.2d 349, 351 (11th Cir.1987) (per curiam). The Feres Court acknowledged that courts must determine whether any claim is recognizable in law. Feres, 340 U.S. at 141, 71 S.Ct. at 157. We review both questions of law and a district court's application of law to the facts de novo. 14 Reich v. Davis, 50 F.3d 962, 964 (11th Cir.1995).
19 The Court delineated the Feres doctrine, which creates an exception to FTCA recovery when a service member is injured or killed incident to military service, in a trilogy of cases, Brooks v. United States, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200 (1949); Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950); United States v. Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 75 S.Ct. 141, 99 L.Ed. 139 (1954). See Parker v. United States, 611 F.2d 1007, 1009 (5th Cir.1980). Analysis of these core cases is instructive for review of subsequent Supreme Court cases applying the Feres doctrine and in deciding this case because the Court has never deviated from [its] characterization of the Feres bar. Nor has Congress changed this standard in the ... years since it was articulated.... Instead, the Feres doctrine has been applied consistently to bar all suits on behalf of service members against the Government based upon service-related injuries, and the Court has declined to modify it. United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681, 686, 687-88, 107 S.Ct. 2063, 2066-67, 95 L.Ed.2d 648 (1987). 20 Prior to Feres, the Supreme Court determined that recovery was available under the FTCA for injuries unrelated to military service sustained by members of the United States armed forces. See Brooks, 337 U.S. 49, 69 S.Ct. 918, 93 L.Ed. 1200. Brooks involved a vehicle accident on a public highway when a father and his two servicemen sons were struck by an Army truck, driven by a civilian employee. One of the sons died; the father 15 and other son suffered severe injuries. 21 In contrast, Feres concerned three consolidated cases wherein the decedents and plaintiff were in active duty and on a military base when the negligent government acts that resulted in their deaths or injuries occurred. 16 In distinguishing Brooks, the Feres Court noted a vital distinction: The injury to Brooks did not arise out of or in the course of military duty. Brooks was on furlough, driving along the highway, under compulsion of no orders or duty and on no military mission. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159. Based on this distinction, the Court held that the Government is not liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the course of activity incident to service. Id. 22 The Court subsequently applied Brooks rather than Feres to permit FTCA recovery to a veteran for injury caused during a knee operation at a Veterans Administration hospital, although the original knee injury occurred during active duty and resulted in honorable discharge. See Brown, 348 U.S. 110, 75 S.Ct. 141. The Court provided the principal underlying rationale for its holding in Feres: 23 The peculiar and special relationship of the soldier to his superiors, the effects of the maintenance of such suits on discipline, and the extreme results that might obtain if suits under the Tort Claims Act were allowed for negligent orders given or negligent acts committed in the course of military duty, led the Court to read [the FTCA] as excluding claims of that character. 24 Id. at 112, 75 S.Ct. at 143; see United States v. Shearer, 473 U.S. 52, 57, 105 S.Ct. 3039, 3042, 87 L.Ed.2d 38 (1985) ( 'In the last analysis, Feres seems best explained by [the military discipline rationale.]'  (citation omitted)). 17 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed recovery under the FTCA, [s]ince the negligent act giving rise to the injury in [Brown ] was not incident to the military service. Brown, 348 U.S. at 113, 75 S.Ct. at 144 (emphasis added). 25 The Court has reiterated that interfering with military discipline is the concern at the heart of the Feres doctrine. Johnson, 481 U.S. at 692, 107 S.Ct. at 2069; see United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 702, 107 S.Ct. 3054, 3074, 97 L.Ed.2d 550 (1987) ([T]he concern for the instinctive obedience of soldiers to orders[ ] is of central importance in the Feres doctrine.). [N]o military organization can function without strict discipline and regulation that would be unacceptable in a civilian setting. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983). Indeed, [t]he special nature of military life--the need for unhesitating and decisive action by military officers and equally disciplined responses by enlisted personnel--would be undermined by a judicially created remedy exposing officers to personal liability at the hands of those they are charged to command. Id. at 304, 103 S.Ct. at 2367. Thus, the Feres doctrine addresses the Court's concern as to whether [an FTCA] suit requires the civilian court to second-guess military decisions and whether the suit might impair essential military discipline. 18 Shearer, 473 U.S. at 57, 105 S.Ct. at 3043. Furthermore, the Court has cautioned that plaintiffs cannot escape the Feres doctrine and focus by a claim of negligence when, in actuality, a decision of command is involved. Id. at 59, 105 S.Ct. at 3043. 26 The Court has instructed that [t]he Feres doctrine cannot be reduced to a few bright-line rules; each case must be examined in light of the statute as it has been construed in Feres and subsequent cases. Id. at 57, 105 S.Ct. at 3043. At the outset of our analysis, we note that permitting recovery under the FTCA by Lieutenant Whitley's parents and estate will not impinge on military discipline, the primary concern of the Feres doctrine. Lieutenant Whitley was not acting under orders from the British military, of which he was a member, and he was in guest status with respect to the Army. Additionally, the Court has distinguished the negligence of the driver in Brooks, where FTCA recovery was allowed, from negligence in military decisions, which implicates military discipline. 27 This case involves the off-base negligence of the Army driver and, consequently, is apposite to Brooks rather than Feres. As the trial and appeal in this case have shown, the alleged negligence is not of the sort that would harm the [Army] disciplinary system if litigated. Pierce, 813 F.2d at 354. The claim by Lieutenant Whitley's parents and estate that Specialist Kanney negligently caused a single-vehicle accident on a public highway while driving a British rugby team, composed of DWR and civilian members, from a civilian rugby match does not implicate military discipline, challenge military orders, or intrude upon the relationship of any service member with superior officers. Thus, the dire consequences that the government envisions are unfounded on the facts of this case. Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52, 69 S.Ct. at 920. 28
29 The former Fifth Circuit differentiated between the rationales or policy considerations that the Court used to justify the Feres doctrine and its application to decide the incident to service line of demarcation for compensation determination under the FTCA. See Parker, 611 F.2d at 1010-15. More analysis than a purely causal relationship with the military is required; that is, one cannot merely state that but for the individual's military service, the injury would not have occurred. Id. at 1011; see Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52, 69 S.Ct. at 920 (recognizing that all human events depend upon what has already transpired). Our court derived from Parker, a three-part test, which considers (1) duty status, (2) location, and (3) activity, to determine whether a service member's injuries resulting from government negligence are compensable under the FTCA because they are incident to service. See Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353-54; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013-15. After evaluating the totality of these factual circumstances, we decide whether the injury in question was incident to service. See Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013. 30
31 Critical to the Court's determination that the injuries to the three servicemen in Feres were incident to service was their active duty status. The Court specified that [t]he common fact underlying the three cases is that each claimant, while on active duty and not on furlough, sustained injury due to negligence of others in the armed forces. Feres, 340 U.S. at 138, 71 S.Ct. at 155 (emphasis added). Our court has recognized that the serviceman's duty status was the most important criterion in determining whether an injury was incident to military service. Jimenez v. United States, 158 F.3d 1228, 1229 (11th Cir.1998) (per curiam). 32 While a service member who is on active duty and on duty for the day is acting 'incident to service,'  a member of the armed forces on furlough or leave, as in Brooks, normally has an FTCA action. 19 Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013. The service member in Parker had requested and received permission to be absent from his normal duty hours for four days and five nights for the purpose of moving his family to another residence away from the military reservation. At the inception of this leave, as Parker was returning home after his normal duty hours and still on the military reservation, another serviceman driving a military vehicle negligently collided head-on with Parker, who died from the injuries that he sustained. In reversing the district court's determination that Parker was acting incident to service at the time of his accident, the court permitted the FTCA action because it concluded that Parker's exercised right to be absent for four days was actually more like a furlough than mere release from the day's duties. Id. at 1014 (emphasis added). The court rejected the active duty distinction based on subjectivity to recall advanced by the government by noting the government's admission that even soldiers on furlough can be recalled, yet those soldiers have an FTCA action if injured. Id. at n. 10. 33 In Pierce, the serviceman requested and received permission to leave the military base for the afternoon to take care of personal business. As Pierce was traveling on his motorcycle on a public highway, a naval recruiter, acting within the scope of his official duties, negligently collided with him and Pierce's resulting injuries caused him to be seventy-percent disabled. Aligning that case with Brooks and Parker, our court determined that by exercis[ing] the right to be absent from regular duty, the serviceman attains a status much akin to being on furlough, which enables the service member on a pass to maintain an FTCA action. Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353; see Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013 (distinguishing the claimants in Zoula v. United States, 217 F.2d 81, 82-83 (5th Cir.1954), who had merely the unexercised right to a pass (emphasis added)). 34 Pursuant to the authorization of his commanding officer, Lieutenant Whitley was off-duty during the extended time that he was in the United States to participate in the DWRRT tour. 20 Lieutenant Colonel Santa-Olalla considered the rugby tour a reward or recreation for the DWRRT members who wanted to participate in it. Lieutenant Whitley and his teammates voluntarily had requested and received authorization to be absent from their regular duty status and to travel to the United States to play in various rugby matches. 21 The DWRRT players did not wear their uniforms or dog tags, and they did not refer to one another by military rank. 22 They financed their tour, including trip insurance, with non-military funds, traveled to the United States on a civilian airplane, and paid for their own lodgings. 23 Given these factual indicia, we conclude that Lieutenant Whitley's off-duty status relative to his British regiment was analogous to furlough as in Brooks. 35
36 [T]he situs of the injury is an important factor in determining whether the activity is 'incident to service,'  Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353, especially with vehicular collisions, Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013. If the soldier is on furlough and off the military reservation, Brooks teaches that an action lies under the FTCA. Id. at 1014. Even a service member's returning to a military base but outside the premises line permits an FTCA action. 24 See id.; Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353 n. 6 (allowing FTCA recovery, although injured serviceman on a pass was approximately 500 feet from the boundary of the military reservation when the motor vehicular accident occurred). 37 It is undisputed that the fatal accident for Lieutenant Whitley occurred on Interstate 85, a public highway in Coweta County, outside Newnan, Georgia. This site is many miles from Fort Benning, where the DWRRT was staying while in the United States. With respect to location, this case is analogous to Brooks and Pierce, where the injuries to the service members occurred off a military base and were not considered to be incident to service. 38
39 We finally must consider the activity in which Lieutenant Whitley was engaged when he was killed. In distinguishing Brooks, the Feres Court determined that a service member injured on leave is not analogous to that of a soldier injured while performing duties under orders. Feres, 340 U.S. at 146, 71 S.Ct. at 159 (emphasis added); see Zoula, 217 F.2d at 82 n. 1 (A person on a furlough or leave is not subject to military duty, although he may actually spend the time provided in the furlough or the leave on a military reservation.). Significant to the Parker court's conclusion that the serviceman was not acting incident to service when he was injured was that he was not directly subject to military control; he was not under the compulsion of military orders; he was not performing any military mission. Parker, 611 F.2d at 1014. In Pierce, we recognized that to construe any conceivable personal activity as 'incident to service' because that activity happened to be performed by a member of the armed forces would preclude service members from bringing FTCA actions merely by virtue of the fact that the claimants are wearing a United States uniform. Pierce, 813 F.2d at 354. By contrast, we determined regarding the death of a United States Navy Airman Recruit while participating in sea rescue training that [d]espite the extreme circumstances surrounding [his] death, we cannot escape the fact his death arose out of an activity incident to his military service. Kitowski v. United States, 931 F.2d 1526, 1530 (11th Cir.1991). 40 At the time of his fatal accident, Lieutenant Whitley was traveling with his DWR rugby teammates, including civilians, from Atlanta where the British team had played a rugby match and socialized with a civilian team. Neither Lieutenant Whitley nor any DWRRT member was subject to the supervision or command of the Army. 25 The rugby tour for the DWRRT members was not organized by the British Army in any way; the commanding officer of the DWR merely gave the rugby players who wanted to participate permission to be absent from their regular duties for the duration of the tour. Participation in the rugby tour was purely voluntary for both the DWR and civilian team members. 41 Specifically, Lieutenant Whitley was asleep when he sustained lethal injuries in the single-vehicle accident caused by the negligence of Specialist Kanney. Unlike the Feres serviceman who died while asleep when his base barracks burned, clearly incident to his service or he would not have been there, 26 Lieutenant Whitley and the other DWR members as well as civilian rugby teammates were in the United States to participate in the rugby tour by choice, and he had authorization from his commanding officer to be absent from his regular duties. In this furlough-like status, Lieutenant Whitley's situation was distinct from that of the Kitowski serviceman, who was actively participating in a military exercise when he died. 27 42 Additionally, cases dealing with recreational activities made available to service members on a military reservation because they are serving in the armed forces are inapposite. Like sleeping, participating in recreational activities is part of the daily lives of service members residing on a military base. The former Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and expressly adopted its reasoning in a case where an Army staff sergeant riding his motorcycle from a military softball practice was killed in a collision with a post shuttle bus. See Watkins v. United States, 462 F.Supp. 980 (S.D.Ga.1977), aff'd, 587 F.2d 279 (5th Cir.1979) (per curiam). Determining that Feres barred FTCA recovery, the court reasoned that the serviceman's active duty status, 28 the location of the accident on the military base, and the fact that he was leaving a military softball team practice made Feres dispositive. 29 See id. at 988. 43 In contrast, the Watkins court observed that an 'off-duty' serviceman who is injured off-base in a traffic accident totally unrelated to his military service should now receive the benefits of the Brooks rationale. Id. Pierce exemplifies this reasoning. Similarly, the court applied Brooks to allow an FTCA action when a serviceman on a twenty-four-hour pass was traveling from his off-base residence to an off-base bird hunt and his vehicle collided with a negligently driven Army vehicle. See Hand v. United States, 260 F.Supp. 38 (M.D.Ga.1966). Holding that a pass is equivalent to a furlough with respect to military duties, the court explained: There is no difference in the freedom which the man enjoys. In both instances the man is relieved from military duty during the period specified. Id. at 41 (emphasis added). 44 Particularly significant to this case are cases where FTCA actions have been permitted based on Brooks because the service members were not taking advantage of a military privilege or status during their leave or off-duty time; instead, they were engaging in civilian activities on a par with civilians. The service member in Pierce, for example, had used his afternoon leave to accomplish personal errands and to eat lunch off base; the accident that resulted in his injuries occurred as he was returning to base from having engaged in these activities. Other circuits have decided cases similarly. 30 Common to the respective courts' decisions in these cases was the determination that the service members were not acting pursuant to military orders or any differently than civilians when they were injured or killed. Consequently, the courts concluded that the service members were not acting incident to service at the time of their injuries or death and, therefore, permitted FTCA actions. 45 In this case, Lieutenant Whitley was asleep and a passenger returning from a rugby match in Atlanta with his DWR teammates when he was fatally injured in the single-vehicle accident. Civilians were members of the British rugby team, which shows that this was a recreational event rather than a military exercise. The rugby match that the DWRRT had played was with a civilian rugby club in Atlanta. Lieutenant Whitley was not on a military mission or acting under military orders at the time of his death. Thus, at the time of the fatal accident for Lieutenant Whitley, there was no military purpose to this particular rugby match and the concomitant transportation to and from Atlanta for it. 31 We conclude that the civilian rugby match in which Lieutenant Whitley had participated and the socializing afterward were solely recreational and in no way connected to any military mission of either the British or American armed forces. Consequently, neither the recreational activities in which Lieutenant Whitley had been involved prior to his fatal injuries nor his sleep at the time of his death was incident to his military service. 46
47 Having analyzed each of the three factors that our circuit uses to determine whether the activity in which a service member was engaged at the time of injury was incident to service, we must consider the totality of these circumstances. See Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013. First, Lieutenant Whitley was on a furlough-like or authorized off-duty status when he was killed because of the negligence of an Army driver. He was under no military orders for the duration of the rugby tour in the United States. He had volunteered for the trip and received permission to go from his commanding officer. He primarily financed his participation in the rugby tour, and he observed no military protocol during the tour, such as being addressed by his rank. Thus, his authorized absence from duty was analogous to furlough in Brooks, particularly given the duration and distance of the trip. See Hand, 260 F.Supp. at 41-42 (We, therefore, attach no significance to the fact that in the Brooks case the man was on what is known as 'furlough' and in this case the Plaintiff was on what is known as a 'pass' and conclude that the fact that the man was on a pass instead of a furlough would not tend to make a quail hunt 'an activity incident to (his) military service.'  (alteration in original)). 48 Second, the single-vehicle accident that resulted in Lieutenant Whitley's death occurred on a public highway far from the Fort Benning military reservation, where he was staying with his rugby teammates while in the United States. Third, Lieutenant Whitley was asleep when he died and a passenger in a commercially leased van. There was nothing about the preceding rugby match and socialization with a civilian team or the travel involved with playing the rugby match that made it a military exercise. Considering these factors cumulatively, we conclude that Lieutenant Whitley was not engaged in an activity incident to service at the time of his death. See Brooks, 337 U.S. at 52, 69 S.Ct. at 920 (determining that the injuries sustained by the servicemen brothers in the automobile accident with another serviceman had nothing to do with the Brooks' army careers). Accordingly, Feres does not prevent the FTCA actions by Lieutenant Whitley's parents and estate in this case.
49 This case requires an additional step in the Feres analysis because it involves a foreign service member. Feres and its progeny involve United States service members. Since recovery is sought by or on behalf of a foreign service member under the FTCA, a United States law, and money damages from the United States government, the same Feres analysis that applies to American service members is appropriate for foreign service members who claim injury or death resulting from the negligence of United States armed forces. Otherwise, there would be two standards of FTCA recovery, American and foreign, which would impair military discipline, the principal Feres concern. [M]ilitary discipline could be disrupted just as much by a foreign serviceman's law suit as by an American's; and liability for negligent orders would be equally detrimental whether the serviceman asserting a claim is a member of the United States or a foreign military. Daberkow v. United States, 581 F.2d 785, 788 (9th Cir.1978); see In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 506 F.Supp. 762, 780 (E.D.N.Y.1980) ([T]o rule that the United States government has waived sovereign immunity with respect to the tort claims of foreign servicemen but not with respect to the claims of American servicemen would distort the underlying purposes of the FTCA, defy common sense, and almost certainly be contrary to the intent of an elected Congress.), reconsideration in part on other grounds, 580 F.Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y.1984). 50 Like a United States service member, a foreign service member who pursues an FTCA action because of injury or death resulting from the negligence of American armed forces, is adjudicated under the Feres, incident-to-service standard. If the injury to the foreign service member is determined to be incident to service, then FTCA recovery is precluded under Feres. In contrast, if the injury to the foreign service member is not incident to service, then FTCA recovery is permissible under the Brooks rationale. As with United States service members pursuing FTCA actions against the American military, such actions must be analyzed on a case by case basis. 51 While not binding upon us, the few cases involving injuries or death to foreign service members support our conclusion. In Daberkow, the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany contracted to provide flight training at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona to German student pilots to produce approximately 100 combat capable pilots a year. 32 Daberkow, 581 F.2d at 786. Attempting to follow the instructions of a United States Air Force pilot in another plane, a German officer assigned to the German squadron on a solo training flight crashed and was killed. Denying the FTCA action by the German officer's wife and son, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the Feres prohibition on actions brought for injuries to servicemen arising out of activity incident to their service[ ] should apply with equal force in this case, although the serviceman is not a member of the United States military. Id. at 788. 52 In re Agent Orange concerned, inter alia, claims by Australian veterans that they suffered injuries resulting from their exposure to the herbicidal, defoliating chemical, Agent Orange, used by the United States during the Vietnam war. The Australian veterans concede[d] that their presence in southeast Asia during the period in question was the direct result of their country's participation in joint military operations with the United States. In re Agent Orange, 506 F.Supp. at 780. The court recognized that the factual elements that determine the Feres incident-to-service standard include whether the activity in question has a  'real and substantial relationship'  to the service member's military service, id. at 775 (citation omitted), or whether it is  'inseparably entwined' with, and directly related to, plaintiffs' military service, id. at 779 (citation omitted). Applying the incident-to-service standard to the facts in that case, the court determined that Feres barred the claims of the Australian veterans. 53 In Aketepe v. United States, 925 F.Supp. 731 (M.D.Fla.1996), aff'd, 105 F.3d 1400 (11th Cir.1997), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 118 S.Ct. 685, 139 L.Ed.2d 632 (1998), crew members of a Turkish destroyer and their survivors brought a negligence suit against the United States to recover for the injuries and deaths that resulted when live missiles were fired from an American carrier during a naval exercise. The navies of several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, including Turkey, were involved in a combined naval exercise to simulate wartime encounters between opposing powers. Id. at 734. A United States Navy admiral was the commander in chief in charge of all the participating NATO forces. During the  'enhanced tactical' or battle problem phase of the exercise, forces that included an American aircraft carrier and a Turkish destroyer were to actively seek and destroy each other in a simulated attack. Id. There was no advance notice to the American naval team of the drill when they were awakened at night to conduct it. Additionally, the personnel involved in the missile firing were unaware that the exercise was a simulation. The naval officers conducting the drill failed to understand the terminology and commands, which resulted in a live missile attack on the Turkish destroyer. 33 Consequently, members of the Turkish crew were injured or killed. 54 The district judge recognized that [t]he Plaintiffs in this case were members of the Turkish Navy who, as an incident of their service, participated in military exercises in which they were under the supervision of an American supervisor. Id. at 737 (emphasis added). Although citing Daberkow and noting that Feres would provide an alternative basis for dismissing the case, 34 see id. at n. 3, the district judge granted summary judgment to the United States because he determined that the case involved a nonjusticiable political question. Acknowledging the application of Feres to friendly fire cases involving American service members, the district judge noted that the principle behind Feres, that a service member should be precluded from suing the government for injuries suffered as a result of actions by a fellow service member, should apply with equal force in this case [involving foreign service members]. Id. at 737 n. 2. 55 The deaths or injuries in Daberkow, In re Agent Orange, and Aketepe occurred to active-duty, foreign service members during combat or combat training. The significance in these cases of the joint military operations under American supervision is that this supervision provided a conduit for recovery under the FTCA. Obviously, if the negligence that resulted in the injuries or deaths derived from their own commanders, or military supervisors from another country, there would be no cause of action under the FTCA. 56 The distinction between those cases and this case is readily apparent. The DWRRT, which included civilian players, was in the United States on off-duty status akin to furlough 35 and principally at their own expense at the invitation of the Columbus-Fort Benning Rugby Club, a civilian organization. This private rugby club had arranged various civilian rugby games for the DWRRT. During the British team's return from a civilian game and socializing in Atlanta, the single-vehicle accident occurred because of the negligence of the Army driver. 57 In contrast to the joint military exercises or combat in Daberkow, In re Agent Orange, and Aketepe, the connection of the DWRRT with the United States military was attenuated. The DWRRT was not to play in the official military Tournament; instead, the British team was to play one exhibition game with all-stars from the competing military teams. The British team was lodged on the Fort Benning reservation, but they paid for their own accommodations at a hotel there. The Army provided drivers for the commercially leased vans to transport the DWRRT while in the United States, but it extended similar courtesies to other civilian visitors. Plainly, the interaction of the British rugby team with the Army did not constitute a military purpose that would make the circumstances in which Lieutenant Whitley was killed apposite with the cases that have determined that Feres barred the claims of foreign service members injured or killed during military exercises with American military members. 36 As the district judge concluded: The courtesies provided by the American military do not implicate the sorts of concerns that would lead to the application of the Feres doctrine.... The Plaintiffs could just as easily have been a foreign civilian rugby team afforded the same accommodations. R5-60-29, 30. 58 We have explained that foreign service members and American service members must be treated alike in applying Feres to prevent disruption of military discipline. Previously herein, we analyzed the circumstances of Lieutenant Whitley's death under our circuit, three-part test to determine whether a foreign service member's injury or death is incident to service under Feres. 37 See Pierce, 813 F.2d at 353-54; Parker, 611 F.2d at 1013-15. Accordingly, our conclusion that Lieutenant Whitley's death was not incident to his military service and does not preclude plaintiffs-appellees' FTCA action on the facts of this case is unaffected by the fact that Lieutenant Whitley was a foreign soldier. Significantly, Specialist Kanney's negligence that caused the single-vehicle accident on a public highway while driving the British rugby team from a civilian game does not implicate military discipline by challenging military orders or intruding upon the relationship of any service member to superior officers.