Opinion ID: 1060560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: analysis of deterrence in the present case

Text: In conducting our own de novo review of this record, we conclude that the trial court acted reasonably in ordering incarceration based solely upon deterrence grounds. From the evidence elicited at trial, it is clear that the appellee actively recruited others to transport illegal drugs into this state as a part of an organized criminal plan, and that drugs were brought into this state on at least two occasions from New Mexico under this same scheme. On at least one of these trips, the appellee financed the trip in part by paying $500 for the lodging and food expenses of the persons transporting his marijuana. Moreover, the appellee has repeatedly engaged in the sale of marijuana, as one witness admitted in a tape-recorded statement that he purchased marijuana from the appellee on at least three separate occasions and that he saw the appellee sell marijuana to others as well. It is also clear that the appellee's motive in breaking the law was to profit or gain from his illegal conduct. This is certainly not a case where the appellee resorted to illegal conduct in order to feed his family or pay emergency expenses. Cf. State v. Barber, 595 S.W.2d 809, 810 (Tenn.1980) (reversing denial of probation on deterrence grounds in part because defendant's motive for selling marijuana was to pay his family's immediate living expenses after being laid off from his job). To the contrary, the record indicates that the appellee admitted purchasing a truck with money from drug sales. We can divine no motive for the appellee's conduct other than greed or pecuniary gain, and we find that the trial court could rationally conclude that some deterrence may be obtained by the appellee's incarceration based on this factor. We also find it significant that the Police Chief of McEwen testified that McEwen has a rather serious [drug problem] for a small town. Chief Ethridge has served in the McEwen Police Department since 1984, and he stated that he was familiar with the drug problem in and around McEwen. Although the State could have admitted statistical evidence to reinforce the testimony of Chief Ethridge, it was certainly not required to do so given that Chief Ethridge is certainly one who is generally familiar with the drug problem in McEwen. Although Chief Ethridge did not believe that the drug problem was greater in Humphreys County than in any other part of Tennessee, a community should not be required to wait until a crime problem is generally worse than in any other part of the state before preventative action can be taken, so long as the problem is significant enough to justify a need for deterrence. Finally, the trial judge also remarked that there's a whole lot of other people in this county ... that's wondering what's going to happen to Mr. Daryl Hooper. Although proof of publicity and notoriety is certainly relevant to the issue of deterrenceindeed, it may be one of the most significant factorswe see no proof of this fact in the record other than these statements. Although we will not automatically preclude a judge from taking judicial notice of some facts necessary to establish a need for deterrence, particularly in the area of publicity, this remark is really nothing more than the result of the court's extrajudicial observations, which should not be considered in sentencing. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 40-35-210(g) (1997) & Sentencing Commission Comments (Implicitly within this subsection is that the judge may not consider matters other than those factors presented in open court.); see also Vaughn v. Shelby Williams of Tennessee, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 132, 133 (Tenn.1991) (No judge is at liberty to take into account personal knowledge which he possesses when deciding upon an issue submitted by the parties. In other words, `[i]t matters not what is known to the judge personally if it is not known to him in his official capacity.'). Consequently, we do not consider these remarks in conducting our review. Based on our de novo review of the record in this case, we hold that the evidence is sufficient to support the appellee's incarceration based solely upon deterrence grounds. The proof shows that there is a need to deter drug sale and possession, at least in McEwen; that the appellee intended to profit by his intentional and illegal conduct; that the appellee actively recruited, organized, and financed trafficking of drugs into this state; and that as a significant drug dealer, the appellee repeatedly engaged in this same illegal conduct. For these reasons, we reverse that part of the intermediate court's judgment which granted the appellee a probated sentence. We affirm, however, the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals finding that the appellee's sentence of four years is appropriate in this case. Therefore, we reinstate the appellee's original term of incarceration.