Opinion ID: 2590411
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the odpa act controls over the guardianship act

Text: ¶ 20 Our goal in construing statutes is to determine the Legislature's intent. Benjamin v. Butler, 2008 OK 83, ¶ 16, 194 P.3d 1269, 1273. If legislative intent is ascertainable from a statute's plain and unambiguous language, the statute's words will be given their obvious and ordinary meaning and will be followed without additional inquiry. Id. This Court construes statutes to avoid rendering any language superfluous. See Bed Bath & Beyond, Inc. v. Bonat, 2008 OK 47, ¶ 11, 186 P.3d 952, 955. A specific statute will control over a conflicting general statute on the same subject. Glasco v. State ex rel. Okla. Dept. of Corrections, 2008 OK 65, ¶ 17, 188 P.3d 177, 184. Legislative acts are to be construed in such manner as to reconcile the different provisions and render them consistent and harmonious, and give intelligent effect to each. Eason Oil Co. v. Corp. Comm'n, 1975 OK 14, ¶ 9, 535 P.2d 283, 286. ¶ 21 Applying these rules leads to the conclusion that the ODPA Act, subsection 1074(A) controls over the Guardianship Act's provisions relied on by Russell. First, the language of the ODPA Act, section 1074 is clear that the Legislature intended that a DPA and guardianship coexist. To construe subsection 1074(A) otherwise would render the language giving the guardian the power to revoke or amend a DPA superfluous. Second, title 58, section 1074 is a specific provision dealing with the continuation of a DPA after the appointment of a guardian. As such, it would control over the general statutes of the Guardianship Act upon which Russell relies. Third, nothing in the Guardianship Act requires the automatic termination of a DPA upon the appointment of a general guardian. In spite of Russell's urging differently, the guardianship statutes can be applied in a manner to accommodate section 1074. ¶ 22 Russell relies on Rice v. Floyd, 768 S.W.2d 57, 58-61 (Ky.1989), which recognizes that the UDPA Act provides for the coexistence of durable powers and guardians or conservators, and the attorney-in-fact is accountable to the fiduciary and the principal, and allows the attorney-in-fact to continue to manage the principal's financial affairs, while the court-appointed fiduciary would take the place of the principal in overseeing the actions of the attorney-in-fact. The Rice court noted that Kentucky does not follow the UDPA Act's section 3, which is identical to title 58, section 1074 of the ODPA Act, and that, unlike the UDPA, section 386.093 of the Kentucky Revised Statutes, at the time Rice was decided, [16] required the termination of the power of attorney upon the appointment of a fiduciary. Rice, in fact, supports Chase's position. ¶ 23 Russell also cites Prickett v. Moore, 1984 OK 54, 684 P.2d 1191, for the proposition that a guardian cannot bind the ward's estate by contract except for necessaries authorized by statute and a ward cannot sever a joint tenancy. We note that Prickett was decided before Oklahoma law provided for a DPA. Prickett stands for the proposition that a ward cannot elect to sever a joint tenancy and that a guardian may not elect to sever a joint tenancy in the absence of valid judicial authority. Prickett has no application to the question before this Court. ¶ 24 Russell states Corr v. Smith, 2008 OK 12, ¶¶ 9-10, 12, 18, 178 P.3d 859, addresses the issue presented by the certified question by glibly stat[ing] ... that a guardian appointment voids a power of attorney. The issue in Corr was whether the court had authority pursuant to title 60, section 175.57(D) [17] to award the plaintiffs costs and attorney fees. The opinion does state: The special guardianship rendered void the court-approved power of attorney Mrs. Corr had just given Mrs. Garrison. We reject that this necessarily supports Russell's position. There is no indication that this is anything more than a factual statement of the ward's mental capacity at the time of executing the power of attorney in favor of Mrs. Garrison rather than a legal conclusion. To the extent that it can be construed as stating that a guardianship automatically terminates a durable power of attorney, we reject this conclusion as inconsistent with title 58, section 1074.