Opinion ID: 1795326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: State Enactment or Enforcement

Text: The second step in the preemption analysis involves determining whether Black's claims, if allowed, would constitute enactment or enforcement of a state law within the meaning of the ADA's preemption clause. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 281. In deciding whether contract claims are preempted, we distinguish between obligations dictated by the State and those voluntarily undertaken by the airline. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233, 115 S.Ct. 817. When parties privately negotiate a contract's terms and then sue in state court for breach of those terms, there is generally no specter of state-imposed regulation. Id. at 228-29, 115 S.Ct. 817. Thus, as we noted in Kiefer, the enforcement of a contractual commitment voluntarily undertaken does not amount to state enactment or enforcement of a law that the ADA's preemption provision forbids. 920 S.W.2d at 281-82. In Wolens, the Supreme Court determined that a frequent flyer program was a self-imposed undertaking between private parties and was therefore too tenuous or peripheral to constitute state enforcement. 513 U.S. at 228-29, 115 S.Ct. 817. Unlike Wolens' claims that related to a self-imposed frequent flyer program, Black's claims relating to Delta's ticketing and boarding procedures implicate directly the federal interest in deregulated air transportation. See Somes, 33 F.Supp.2d at 85; Rockwell v. UPS, No. 2:99-CV-57, 1999 WL 33100089, at , 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22036, at  (D.Vt. July 7, 1999) (noting that preemption applies to services which are `regular, recurrent, or necessary features of actual flight or airline operations' (as opposed to beverage services and similar amenities)) (quoting Somes, 33 F.Supp.2d at 83); Smith, 134 F.3d at 259; Chukwu v. Bd. of Dirs. British Airways, 889 F.Supp. 12, 13 (D.Mass.1995). Thus, contrary to the ADA's purpose, Black's claims have the potential for intrusive regulation of airline business practices. Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 282. When Black purchased the airline tickets, a binding contract of carriage was created between Black and Delta. See Woodard v. Tex. & P. Ry. Co., 126 Tex. 30, 86 S.W.2d 38, 39 (1935); Boon, 17 S.W.3d at 55. Pursuant to the regulatory authority conferred by Congress under the ADA, the DOT promulgated comprehensive regulations interpreting the ADA. Black and Delta's contract for carriage incorporates these regulations. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 253.4,.5; Wolens, 513 U.S. at 230, 115 S.Ct. 817 (authorizing airlines to incorporate the federal regulations into their contracts of carriage). In particular, part 250 permits the DOT to regulate oversales in air carrier service. 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.1-.9. These regulations require every air carrier to establish priority rules and criteria for determining which passengers holding confirmed reserved space shall be denied boarding on an oversold flight in the event that an insufficient number of volunteers agree to relinquish their seat. Id. § 250.3. Section 250.5 requires airlines to pay compensation to any passenger who is involuntarily denied boarding caused by an oversold flight. Id. § 250.5. A passenger who is involuntarily denied boarding, however, is not required to accept this compensation and can instead decline the payment and seek to recover damages in a court of law or in some other manner. Id. § 250.9. The federal regulations also provide that under certain circumstances, a passenger denied boarding involuntarily from an oversold flight is not entitled to receive compensation from the airline. Id. § 250.6. In particular, if a passenger is offered accommodations or is seated in a section of the aircraft other than that specified on the ticket at no extra charge, then that passenger is not eligible for denied boarding compensation. Id. § 250.6(c). Black contends that, pursuant to section 250.9, he had the option to decline compensation under the federal scheme and instead seek to recover damages in a court of law. Id. § 250.9(b). The court of appeals agreed and held that, although Black was not entitled to denied boarding compensation, he could forego the remedies provided by the DOT regulations and seek damages in court. ___ S.W.3d at ____. The court of appeals based its decision on the DOT regulations relating to passengers that are involuntarily denied boarding. Id.; see also 14 C.F.R. § 250.9. But Black and the court of appeals misread these regulations. Black was not denied boarding, as that term relates to section 250.9. The passenger option of declining payment from the airline and instead seeking recovery in a court of law is reserved for those passengers who are involuntarily denied boarding and thus eligible for denied boarding compensation. 14 C.F.R. § 250.9. Because Delta offered Black's wife another seat on the same flight, she was not denied boarding. Even if we considered Black's wife to have been involuntarily denied first-class boarding, the Blacks do not have a valid claim for denied boarding compensation. This is so because they fall within one of the eligibility exceptions to qualify for compensationa passenger is not eligible for denied boarding compensation if the airline offers the passenger accommodations in another section of the aircraft at no charge. Id. § 250.6. Because Delta offered Black and his wife various accommodations, including coach seats, Black and his wife were ineligible for denied boarding compensation. Id. And because Black and his wife were not eligible to receive the denied boarding compensation from Delta, they could not possibly decline this compensation and seek to recover damages in a court of law. Id. § 250.9. Accordingly, Black cannot rely on section 250.9, which, as a prerequisite to recover, requires the party to be eligible to receive denied boarding compensation. As discussed above, the parties' contract incorporated the DOT regulations on denied boarding compensation. Black, however, seeks to enlarge Delta's obligations to him. He attempts to modify the contract terms to allow him and his wife to forego the regulatory remedies and instead sue in court. This Court, however, is confined, in breach-of-contract actions, to the parties' bargain. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 233, 115 S.Ct. 817. We cannot enlarge or enhance that bargain based on state law or policies external to the agreement. Id. Nothing in the contract entitles Black to the external remedy of reimbursement for the cost of a private chartered jet. The regulations promulgated under the ADA, which are incorporated as part of the contract, provide the procedure and remedy in the event a passenger is denied boarding but offered specified accommodations, and therefore preclude the additional remedies Black has pursued in state court. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 250.1-.9. Even were the contract silent about the federal regulations, other courts have applied similar reasoning to preempt breach of contract claims that relate to price or service and seek to impose state laws or policies. [6] As the court of appeals in this case correctly noted: [W]e cannot overlook the fact that the alleged contractual violation at issue in this appeal involves a common condition unique to the airline industrythe failure to seat an allegedly confirmed ticket holder because of overbookingand that unlike the frequent-flier agreements at issue in Wolens, specific federal regulations govern compensation for air passengers who are involuntarily prevented from boarding a flight due to overbooking. ___ S.W.3d at ____. These specific federal regulations have a national purpose in that they provide a uniform system of compensation to passengers. If passengers were permitted to challenge airlines' boarding procedures under state common law, the airline industry would potentially be subject to regulation by fifty different states. Smith, 134 F.3d at 258-59 (allowing passengers to challenge boarding procedures would permit the fifty states to regulate an area of unique federal concernairlines' boarding practices.); see also John W. Freeman, State Regulation of Airlines and the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 44 J. Air L. & Com. 747, 755 (1979) (noting that the effect of the provision was to `prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations') (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978)). The fact that federal regulations expressly address airline boarding procedures strengthens our conclusion that Black's breach of contract claims resulting from Delta's boarding and seating procedures are preempted by the ADA. To hold otherwise could create extensive multi-state litigation, launching inconsistent assaults on federal deregulation in the airline industry, every time an airline reassigned a passenger's seat. We conclude that Delta's boarding and seating policies relate to the services it provided to Black, and that Black's claims can only be adjudicated by reference to laws and policies external to its contract with Delta. Accordingly, we hold that 49 U.S.C. section 41713(b) preempts Black's contract claims. We now turn to Black's remaining claims for misrepresentation and fraud, which he argues survive ADA preemption. We disagree. Because Black's misrepresentation and fraud claims are premised on Delta's ticketing and boarding procedure, they are directly related to Delta's services. See discussion supra Part III.A. The court of appeals concluded, however, that because Black's misrepresentation claims did not turn on any requirement imposed by a Texas legislative body, they were not preempted. ___ S.W.3d at ____. To the contrary, state tort actions can be state enforcement under 49 U.S.C. section 41713(b)(1). See, e.g., Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's Legal Comm., 531 U.S. 341, 351, 121 S.Ct. 1012, 148 L.Ed.2d 854 (2001); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959) (recognizing the regulatory effect of state law damage claims and their potential for frustrating congressional objectives); Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 282. Moreover, both Wolens and Kiefer suggest that state misrepresentation and fraud claims are preempted by the ADA. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228, 115 S.Ct. 817; Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 283. Wolens held that state law claims under a state consumer fraud act were preempted by the ADA. Wolens, 513 U.S at 228, 115 S.Ct. 817. Claims under a consumer fraud statute are comparable to claims for misrepresentation. In Kiefer, we indicated that an action for negligent misrepresentation might be ... indistinguishable from the statutory consumer protection actions in Morales and Wolens.  Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 283. Both would impose state policies on the operation of air carriers that are external to the parties' agreement. Wolens, 513 U.S. at 229 n. 5, 115 S.Ct. 817; Kiefer, 920 S.W.2d at 282. A state's common law cannot operate against an airline in this context when it would constitute state enforcement of a law relating to airline services. See Morales, 504 U.S. at 383, 112 S.Ct. 2031. Accordingly, because Black's misrepresentation and fraud claims relate to the services Delta provides and if allowed would amount to enactment or enforcement of state law, they are preempted.