Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Peremptory Challenge of Two African-American Potential Jurors

Text: Defendant, the victim and all the percipient witnesses involved in this matter were African-Americans. After the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges to remove six African-American prospective jurors, defendant moved to quash the jury panel under People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]. The prosecutor had earlier accepted the jury with two African-Americans on it, and three African-Americans had been seated when the defense Wheeler motion was made. At that point, the defense had also excused one African-American. After inquiring into the prosecutor's specific reasons for his peremptory challenges of African-American prospective jurors, the trial court denied defendant's Wheeler motion. (1a) Defendant argues reversal of his conviction is required because the prosecutor's peremptory challenges of African-American potential jurors Frederick Bussey and Mary Smith violated his state and federal constitutional rights to trial by a jury drawn from a representative cross-section of the community. According to defendant, the trial court erred under both People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d 258, and Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 79 [106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69], in permitting the prosecutor to excuse Bussey and Smith, without adequate explanation, after defendant had presented a prima facie case of discrimination based on presumed group bias. (2) A party's use of peremptory challenges is presumed to be valid. The presumption is rebutted if the other party establishes a prima facie case that jurors were challenged solely on the basis of their presumed group bias. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 278-281.) To establish a prima facie case, a party should make as complete a record of the circumstances as is feasible. Second, he must establish that the persons excluded are members of a cognizable group within the meaning of the representative cross-section rule. Third, from all the circumstances of the case he must show a strong likelihood that such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because of any specific bias. ( Id. at p. 280, fn. omitted.) Although the court did not expressly rule that defendant had made a prima facie case under Wheeler, the record supports a conclusion that the trial court so found. Once a prima facie case has been shown, the burden shifts to the other party to provide race-neutral explanations for each of the disputed peremptory challenges. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 280-282; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 96-98 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1722-1724].) If the court finds, as to any of the challenges, that the burden of justification is not sustained, the presumption of validity is rebutted. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 281-282.) (1b) Defendant does not quarrel with the specific reasons the prosecutor gave for peremptorily challenging four of the African-Americans excused from service on defendant's jury. Defendant does object, however, to the reasons the prosecutor gave for his peremptory challenges of African-American prospective jurors Smith and Bussey.
The prosecutor stated he had excused prospective juror Smith in error. More specifically, the prosecutor stated: She should be on this jury. I got her confused. She's a police officer, and I made a mistake. I should have kept her on. Let me show you what I have here. I have an eight to nine for guilt. Eight to nine for overall. I didn't pull this one out beforehand, and I thought we were going this way and.... In response to further questioning from the court, the prosecutor stated he wanted Smith on the jury. I will be glad to pull my other statements as to the other blacks on the panel, and her guilt rating and death rating are higher than theirs. That was a flat out mistake. The prosecutor offered to call her back and put her on the panel  if [the] defense wants to stipulate to this.... Defense counsel stated: I don't think it is an issue at this time. Defendant argues the prosecutor's claim his challenge of potential juror Smith was simply a mistake did not constitute a sufficient rebuttal of the prima facie case of presumed racial bias the trial court impliedly found. (3a) Defendant points out that, in Wheeler, we stated that in order to sustain his burden of justification, the allegedly offending party must satisfy the court that he exercised such peremptories on grounds that were reasonably relevant to the particular case on trial or its parties or witnesses  i.e., for reasons of specific bias.... ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282; see also People v. Johnson (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216 [255 Cal. Rptr. 569, 767 P.2d 1047].) In People v. Johnson we contrasted Wheeler 's holding that peremptory challenges are permissible so long as they are based on specific bias, with the rule of Batson v. Kentucky which does not use the term `specific bias' [but] permits the challenges so long as they may be justified by a `neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried.' ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d 1194, 1216, citing Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 [106 S.Ct. at pp. 1723-1724].) (1c) Defendant argues the prosecutor's proffered reason for excusing prospective juror Smith  a mistake  amounts to no reason at all, hence neither a reason on grounds of specific bias ( Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277) nor one related to the particular case to be tried ( Batson, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1724]). We disagree. First, a mistake is, at the very least, a reason, that is, a coherent explanation for the peremptory challenge. It is self-evidently possible for counsel to err when exercising peremptory challenges. Second, a genuine mistake is a race-neutral reason. Faulty memory, clerical errors, and similar conditions that might engender a mistake of the type the prosecutor proffered to explain his peremptory challenge are not necessarily associated with impermissible reliance on presumed group bias. ( People v. Davis (1987) 189 Cal. App.3d 1177, 1194 [234 Cal. Rptr. 859], overruled on other grounds by People v. Snow (1987) 44 Cal.3d 216 [242 Cal. Rptr. 477, 746 P.2d 452].) Third, a mistake may be a reason based on specific bias ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 277) where, as appears to have been the case here, the prosecutor's error is one of erroneously believing, owing to clerical error, that a prospective juror had earlier been evaluated as specifically biased, when in fact she had not. Finally, a mistake is a reason related to the particular case to be tried ( Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1724]) to the extent the possibility that genuine errors of this sort will be made exists in every case. We realize the possibility always exists that counsel called upon to explain a questionable peremptory challenge will take refuge in a disingenuous claim the challenge was mistakenly made. In such a case, we rely on the good judgment of the trial courts to distinguish bona fide reasons for such peremptories from sham excuses belatedly contrived to avoid admitting acts of group discrimination. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 282.) We and the United States Supreme Court give great deference to the trial court's determination that the use of peremptory challenges was not for an improper or class bias purpose. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1724].) Defendant suggests the trial court never even reached the analytic stage of making the sincere and reasoned attempt to evaluate the prosecutor's explanation ( People v. Hall (1983) 35 Cal.3d 161, 167-168 [197 Cal. Rptr. 71, 672 P.2d 854]) we expect from the trial court as the price of our deference. The record refutes the suggestion. After the prosecutor indicated he had made a mistake in excusing prospective juror Smith, the court requested clarification: so you excused her in error? When the prosecutor responded affirmatively, the court pressed for additional clarification: you wanted her to . Only after the prosecutor had offered to pull my other statements as to the other blacks and show that her guilt rating and death rating are higher than theirs, did the court indicate it would accept these reasons at this time. In short, nothing in the record suggests the trial court failed to make the requisite sincere and reasoned determination regarding the genuineness of the prosecutor's explanation for challenging prospective juror Smith. Though in making its determination a trial court is not necessarily required affirmatively to make further inquiry of the prosecutor concerning his proffered explanations for disputed peremptory challenges ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1222), the trial court in this instance, where the proffered explanation was of a type particularly susceptible to abuse by overzealous prosecutors, wisely engaged in such inquiry. The trial judge's findings in such a context, largely turning on evaluations of credibility, are entitled to great deference. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1221; Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 98, fn. 21 [106 S.Ct. at p. 1724].)
The prosecutor stated as his basis for excusing juror Bussey: [H]e had a high death rating, but he had a low guilt rating because of his Blood association at Morningside High School. I have him down as a six to seven on guilt rating and seven is the breaking point for me. The prosecutor also stated: I have an eight to nine for a death rating on him. Defendant concedes the prosecutor's proffered explanation for excusing prospective juror Bussey is facially neutral as to race, but argues such an explanation functions, in practice, as a proxy for race. Defendant cites U.S. v. Bishop (9th Cir.1992) 959 F.2d 820, 827-828 as illustrating the principle that a potential juror's place of residence often acts as an ethnic badge and suggests we should find the prosecutor's proffered explanation invalid in light of the fact a person's place of residence often determines the high school he attends. Of course, Bishop, supra, 959 F.2d 820, is not controlling. (4) Decisions of lower federal courts interpreting federal law are not binding on state courts. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 989 [17 Cal. Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704].) (1d) More importantly, Bishop is not apposite. There, a prosecutor peremptorily challenged African-American jurors who lived in a predominantly low-income, black neighborhood and therefore were likely to believe the police `pick on black people.' ( U.S. v. Bishop, supra, 959 F.2d at p. 821, quoting the prosecutor.) The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit invalidated the peremptory challenge as based on stereotypical presumed group bias, but only because there was no nexus between the jurors' characteristic  i.e., that they lived in a poor, predominantly African-American city  and their possible approach to the specific trial. ( U.S. v. Bishop, supra, 959 F.2d at p. 825.) The court elaborated thus: This is not to say that residence never can constitute a legitimate reason for excluding a juror, even after a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination has been made.... What matters is not whether but how residence is used. Where residence is utilized as a link connecting a specific juror to the facts of the case, a prosecutor's explanation based on residence could rebut the prima facie showing. ( U.S. v. Bishop, supra, 959 F.2d at p. 826.) The prosecutor here used residence as a link connecting prospective juror Bussey to the facts of defendant's case. Referring to evidence that defendant is a Blood gang member, the prosecutor stated he suspected Bussey would be sympathetic toward Blood gang members owing to his having attended Morningside High in a Blood gang area. Indeed, on voir dire, Bussey confirmed he had gone to school with gang members, that the Bloods gang was prevalent at Morningside High School and that the whole school would get together and run [the Crips] out if they came to Morningside High. (3b) The law recognizes that a peremptory challenge may be based on a broad spectrum of evidence suggestive of juror partiality. The evidence may range from the obviously serious to the apparently trivial, from the virtually certain to the highly speculative. ( People v. Wheeler, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 275.) (1e) Despite the fact Bussey also stated on voir dire that he did not become involved with gangs at high school and defendant's being a Blood wouldn't mean a thing to him, the prosecutor may have concluded the likelihood Bussey would evince sympathy for defendant owing to his high school familiarity with Bloods gang members was sufficient to warrant use of a peremptory challenge. The trial court accepted the prosecutor's reason; we see no error in its having done so. Thus, we conclude the trial court's denial of defendant's Wheeler motion was not erroneous.