Opinion ID: 196673
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence Regarding Effects of Phase I

Text: (i) Evidence Regarding Effects of Phase I Redevelopment. The NHDES studies discussed in the Varney letter Redevelopment. and the post-FEIS studies on the Spaulding Turnpike/Gosling Road interchange indicate that Phase I redevelopment activities will conform to the section 7506(c)(1)(B) criteria, as long as New Hampshire improves the Spaulding Turnpike/Gosling Road interchange as required.7 As discussed above, NHDES studies used 1989 and 1990 emissions estimates as the baseline for performing the conformity analyses. The EPA, Air Force, and the FAA adopted those studies in making their conformity determinations. 7 New Hampshire is committed to making these improvements because, as noted above, NHDES's conclusion that Pease redevelopment through Phase I meets the conformity criteria was based on the assumption that this interchange would be improved. See supra p. 42 n.6. Similarly the FAA's conformity determination was based in part on improvement of the Spaulding Turnpike/Gosling Road interchange. -37- Section 7506(c)(1)(B) states that [t]he determination of conformity shall be based on the most recent estimates of emissions . . . . NHDES explained that it selected 1989 and 1990 rather than 1991 (the year it performed the analysis) as baseline years because 1989 was the most recent year representative of full- scale military operation at Pease. This appears to us to be the most relevant comparison, since Congress's intention in Section [7506(c)] is clearly to evaluate new developments in the context of pre-existing conditions . . . . We assume that Congress did not intend that a project like Pease redevelopment would be penalized under [7506(c)] because there is a temporal gap between the federal government's decision to terminate operations at Pease and the start- up of the State's redevelopment of the base, during which a temporary reduction in the emission inventory occurred as a result of activity phase-down. Use of 1991 as a baseline, it added, would unfairly penalize the Pease redevelopment project, since 1991 emissions of CO, NOX and VOCs are significantly less than historical norms because of the Air Force's cessation of activities at Pease. Under the Chevron doctrine, an agency's interpretation of a statute is entitled to weight when the statute is silent or ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-3 (1984). As an abstract matter, the words of the statute, most recent estimates, would not be considered ambiguous; a literal interpretation would require the agencies to use 1991 data. See 42 U.S.C. 7506(c)(1)(B) (conformity determination shall be -38- based on the most recent estimates of emissions . . . .) (emphasis added). Courts have, however, recognized that [a] statute may be ambiguous if its application leads to an irrational or absurd result. Ewing v. Rodgers, 826 F.2d 967, 970 n.3 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing In re Rodman, 792 F.2d 125, 128 n.8 (10th Cir. 1986)); see also United States v. Real Estate Known as 916 Douglas Ave., 903 F.2d 490, 492 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1126 (1991). Courts have also recognized that [t]he plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters.' United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989), (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc. 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)) (emphasis added). This appears to us to be one of those rare cases where the plain meaning would lead to a result that is irrational and at odds with the intention of the legislature. Read literally, the plain language of the statute as applied in base-closing cases would require conformity determinations to be based on a wholly artificial situation, the interval during which military operations have shut down and civilian activities not yet started. The likely consequence in many cases would be to preclude any economically beneficial use of a closed military base. Such a result is irrational and presumably unintended by Congress. In view of Congress's strong support of civilian redevelopment of closed military bases, see -39- infra pp. 57-58, it would not have wanted to erect a major obstacle to economically beneficial, post-closing uses of a base. Thus, the agencies' reliance on the NHDES studies based on 1989 and 1990 estimates was reasonable under the circumstances. Those studies support the determination that Phase I redevelopment meets the statutory conformity criteria.