Opinion ID: 75572
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of State Judicial Opinion

Text: The AG and TIECO were parties in the state criminal proceeding before Judge Garrett. Burr & Foreman represented USX in the proceeding, but USX was not a party. In dismissing the indictments, Judge Garrett issued an opinion which adopted in toto a memorandum of facts prepared by TIECO in connection with its motion to dismiss the indictment. Over Appellants' objection, the district court admitted the opinion, including the memorandum of facts. The memorandum was an exhaustive account that neatly conformed to Appellees' allegations, especially with respect to the malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and civil conspiracy counterclaims. As is set forth in the margin, the memorandum depicted in great detail Appellees' view about the nature of USX's involvement in the AG's investigation of TIECO.10 Furthermore, Judge Garrett did not mince words, as he found, [T]he misconduct of the [AG] in this case far surpasses in both extensiveness and measure the totality of any prosecutorial misconduct ever previously presented to or witnessed by this Court. Judge Garrett's opinion was a significant portion of Appellees' case (as well as their brief on appeal). During the examination of witnesses, Appellees' counsel repeatedly referred to the proceedings before Judge Garrett, and on at least one occasion, counsel read verbatim an extensive portion of the opinion. In closing argument, Appellees' counsel told the jurors if they had any question about the credibility of Appellants' witnesses, they should read Judge Garrett's opinion. Prior to trial, Appellants filed a motion in limine objecting to Judge Garrett's opinion, and they raised the objection again at trial. Appellants argued the opinion should be excluded pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 401 and Fed.R.Evid. 403. We address solely the Rule 403 argument.
10 The memorandum of fact described, inter alia: (1) cooperation between the AG and USX in reviewing TIECO's seized documents, (2) a meeting on November 8, 1995, where USX informed the AG that it intended to sue TIECO and would be providing the AG with copies of charts; (3) the coordination between the AG and USX in having TIECO's computer tapes reformatted and read; (4) USX's agreement to repay the AG for reformatting the tapes; (5) an implication that either USX's lead auditor, Mr. Wager, or the AG's investigator, John Mulligan, had lied about the repayment agreement; (6) legal advice given to the AG and USX that USX should not be used as quasi government agency; (7) cooperation between the AG and USX in conducting interviews of USX's employees; and (8) the AG's sending TIECO's records to USX in preparation for the interviews. Rulings on the admission of evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Adair, 951 F.2d 316, 320 (11th Cir.1992). An error on an evidentiary ruling will result in the reversal of a jury's verdict only if a party establishes a substantial prejudicial effect or a manifest injustice. See Anderson v. WBMG-42, 253 F.3d 561, 563 (11th Cir.2001) (citing Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1305 (11th Cir.1999)). As a preliminary matter, had Appellants lodged an objection pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 801(c), the admissibility of Judge Garrett's opinion could be easily resolved. See United States v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1554 (11th Cir.1994). In Jones, the district court admitted factual findings made in a separate case by another district court. See id. at 1551. We concluded such factual findings were hearsay, and they could not be either judicially noticed or admitted under the public records exception to the hearsay rule. See id. at 1553-54 (citing Fed.R.Evid. 201 and Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C)); see also Nipper v. Snipes, 7 F.3d 415, 417-18 (4th Cir.1993). Despite not being raised, the conclusion that Judge Garrett's opinion was inadmissible hearsay is not inconsequential to our analysis under Rule 403.11 Rule 403 involves balancing, on the one side, the evidence's probative value and, on the other side, the evidence's dangers, including its unfairly prejudicial and misleading nature. By comparison, hearsay is disfavored because it is not subjected to the oath, the rigors of cross-examination, or the first-hand scrutiny of the jury. See United States v. Parry, 649 F.2d 292, 294-95 (5th Cir.1981)12 (citing McCormick on Evidence § 245 (2d ed.1972)). As a result, hearsay can be unreliable; for instance, in the context of the Confrontation Clause,13 hearsay that does not fall within a firmly-rooted exception is presumed unreliable. See Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 818, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 3148, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990). Due to its unreliability, hearsay can be misleading and unfairly prejudicial. 11 Rule 403 provides, Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by consideration of undue delay, waste of time, and needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 12 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en banc), this Court adopted as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 13 Of course, the Confrontation Clause is not applicable to civil cases, but we refer to its jurisprudence to illustrate hearsay's unreliability. The hearsay in Judge Garrett's opinion—which does not satisfy a firmly-rooted exception14—was particularly unreliable and misleading. Although the statement of facts was presented to the jury as Judge Garrett's finding, it was prepared entirely by Appellees' counsel. In effect, the admission of the statement of facts permitted counsel to testify on his client's behalf, without being cross-examined. Further, the statement of facts was intended to exculpate TIECO, and thus, it was self-serving and unreliable. Cf. United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1168-69 (11th Cir.1984). Of course, Judge Garrett accepted the statement of facts by incorporating it into his opinion. But this made the hearsay contained therein even more unfairly prejudicial and misleading. As the Fourth Circuit has stated, [J]udicial findings of fact present a rare case where, by virtue of their having been made by a judge, they would likely be given undue weight by the jury, thus creating a serious danger of unfair prejudice. Nipper, 7 F.3d at 418 (internal quotations omitted). The Fourth Circuit's Nipper decision is particularly pertinent to the instant case. When we ruled in Jones that a judicial finding was inadmissible hearsay, we relied heavily on Nipper. See Jones, 29 F.3d at 1554. In Nipper, like here, the plaintiff introduced the factual findings of a state court to prove a civil conspiracy. See Nipper, 7 F.3d at 416. While reversing on the ground that the judicial findings were inadmissible hearsay, the Fourth Circuit also concluded that judicial findings, due to the danger of unfair prejudice, were inadmissible under Rule 403. See id. at 417-418; see also Carter v. Burch, 34 F.3d 257, 265 (4th Cir.1994); United States v. DeSantis, 134 F.3d 760, 770 (6th Cir.1998) (Nelson, J., concurring); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 141 F.Supp.2d 320, 324, 325 (E.D.N.Y.2001); Hariston v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., No. CIV. 93-2127 (D.D.C. April 10, 1997). The district court abused its discretion in admitting Judge Garrett's opinion. The jury, not Judge Garrett, was charged with making factual findings on Appellees' allegations in this case. Moreover, Appellants have shown they were substantially prejudiced by the admission of Judge Garrett's opinion, as Appellees relied on the opinion throughout the trial. Most notably, during closing argument, Appellees' counsel told the jury to use the opinion to make credibility determinations. Therefore, the district court's admission of the opinion constituted reversible error. 14 As we noted in Jones, the common law did not permit the admission of a judgment from another case. 29 F.3d at 1554. One court has found that judicial findings are admissible under the residual exception to the hearsay rule. See Jones v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 946 F.Supp. 1011, 1019-20 (D.D.C.1996). But that exception is not firmly rooted. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 817-18, 110 S.Ct. at 3147-48.