Opinion ID: 856641
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Byrom’s Remaining Claims

Text: Before Byrom’s trial, the court ordered psychiatric evaluations for Byrom, Junior, and Gillis. The same doctor, Dr. Criss Lott, conducted each evaluation, and the results were transmitted to the trial court for in camera review. To date, Byrom has not seen Dr. Lott’s evaluation of Junior. However, Byrom contends that Junior confessed sole responsibility for Edward’s murder to Dr. Lott. Byrom makes this inference on the basis of information gleaned from two sources. First, in a newspaper article about Gillis’s trial, an Assistant District Attorney purportedly stated that, while preparing to try Gillis, the government learned of statements Junior made to Dr. Lott that conflicted with his anticipated testimony. Second, Dr. Lott has apparently confirmed Junior’s statement to Byrom’s counsel. Dr. Lott was even preparing to share Junior’s evaluation before the trial court forbade him from doing so. However, Byrom was aware of Junior’s alleged statement to Dr. Lott before her state court appeal 16 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 17 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 and yet did not challenge the evidence’s suppression. Having failed to raise these claims previously, they are procedurally barred. Nevertheless, Byrom seeks discovery of Dr. Lott’s report in order to establish three constitutional claims: (1) a Brady violation; (2) her actual innocence under Schlup; and (3) her ineligibility for the death sentence under Sawyer. Discovery is permitted only if good cause is found. Murphy v. Johnson, 205 F.3d 809, 814 (5th Cir. 2000). Good cause may be found when a petition for habeas relief “establishes a prima facie claim for relief.” Id. (quoting Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290 (1969)). As explained below, Byrom has not met this standard.
“Under Brady, a defendant’s due process rights may be violated when exculpatory or impeachment evidence, which is both favorable to the defendant and material to guilt or punishment, is concealed by the government.” Id. In this context, “materiality does not require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal.” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 434 (1995). Rather, the defendant need only show a reasonable probability of a different result. Id. A Brady violation is established by “showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. at 435. Here, Byrom has not made a prima facie showing of a Brady violation because Dr. Lott’s report does not create a reasonable probability of a different result at Byrom’s trial. According to Byrom, Junior’s evaluation would demonstrate that Junior took responsibility for Edward’s death when interviewed by Dr. Lott. She seizes on this in order to claim that, had the report been produced before trial, it would have discredited Junior’s testimony and aided Byrom’s case. This may be true, but, through cross-examination 17 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 18 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 concerning the jailhouse letters, Junior’s testimony was already discredited at trial and in precisely the fashion Byrom describes here. While Byrom was restricted from showing Junior’s letters to the jury, her attorney questioned Junior about the letters’ contents and elicited testimony that undermined Junior’s testimony broadly and his statements regarding his mother’s role in the murder specifically. He has already admitted to giving multiple inconsistent statements regarding who was responsible for Edward’s murder. The inclusion of one additional instance of such a statement thus does not create a reasonable probability of a different outcome. Dr. Lott’s report would merely bolster Byrom’s initial attempt at discrediting Junior’s testimony; it would not “put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” Id. Since this does not amount to good cause, we deny Byrom’s claim.
As discussed previously, raising an actual innocence claim requires showing “that ‘a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.’” Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986)). This test “does not merely require a showing that a reasonable doubt exists in the light of the new evidence, but rather that no reasonable juror would have found the defendant guilty.” Id. at 329. Byrom characterizes the aforementioned Brady claim as the constitutional violation underpinning her actual innocence claim. However, for the same reasons discussed above, Dr. Lott’s report does not establish a prima facie case of actual innocence. Byrom would have used Dr. Lott’s report in precisely the way she used Junior’s jailhouse letters. The effect of the report thus falls well short of the requisite standard. See Schlup, 513 U.S. at 327 (requiring that new evidence make it “more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Having failed to show good cause, Byrom’s claim is denied. 18 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 19 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026
In order to contest her eligibility for the death penalty, Byrom must show, based on the evidence proffered and all record evidence, that there is a fair probability that a rational trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt as to the existence of the facts which made her eligible for the death penalty. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 346–47 (1992). Here, Byrom claims that the evidence produced at trial—taken together with Dr. Lott’s report—would create a fair probability that no rational juror would have found her guilty of participating in a murder-for-hire scheme, the capital crime for which she was convicted. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(d). Byrom has not, however, made the requisite showing. While Dr. Lott’s report would have supported Byrom’s theory of the case, in light of the other evidence produced at trial—including Byrom’s own confessions—it cannot be said that a rational trier of fact would have entertained a reasonable doubt regarding the existence of a murder-for-hire scheme. According to Byrom, the parties planned to murder Edward. Junior implicated Byrom, Gillis, and himself; and Byrom separately implicated herself on more than one occasion. Even with Dr. Lott’s report, it cannot be said that a rational trier of fact would harbor a reasonable doubt as to Byrom’s guilt. Byrom has thus failed to show good cause, and we deny her claim accordingly. Having disposed of Byrom’s motion for an expanded COA and Byrom’s motion for additional discovery, the Court will next address those issues for which the district court granted a COA.
AEDPA was enacted to address perceived abuses in the habeas system, limit prisoners’ ability to delay justice by filing frivolous claims, and respect state court determinations of fact and law. See Michael Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000) (stating that AEDPA’s purpose was to “further comity, 19 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 20 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 finality, and federalism,” and highlighting the importance of “limit[ing] the scope of federal intrusion into state criminal adjudications and . . . safeguard[ing] the States’ interest in the integrity of their criminal and collateral proceedings”); Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 (2006) (AEDPA was passed to “promote[] judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources . . . and lend[] finality to state court judgments within a reasonable time”). AEDPA thus “imposes a highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings and demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). AEDPA governs our review of state court determinations of law and mixed issues of law and fact.7 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Section 2254(d)(1) prohibits federal courts from granting habeas relief unless the state court’s denial “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Id. See also Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 946 (5th Cir. 2001) (“We review questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact under the ‘contrary to’ and ‘unreasonable application’ prong of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).”). The state court’s decision was contrary to federal law if the “the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Terry Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412–13 (2000). The state court unreasonably applied federal law if it “identifies the correct governing legal principle . . . but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 413. In other words, in order to obtain habeas relief from a federal court, “a state prisoner must show that the state 7 AEDPA also controls when reviewing state court findings of fact. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). No findings of fact are contested here, however. 20 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 21 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 court’s ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011). This standard governs our review of the state court’s adjudication of Byrom’s claims.
In the wake of Edward’s murder, the police interviewed Byrom on five separate occasions: (1) 8:38 p.m. on June 4; (2) 10:47 p.m. on June 4; (3) 6:53 a.m. on June 5; (4) 9:00 a.m. on June 6; and (5) 3:03 p.m. on June 7. The first four interviews took place while Byrom was still hospitalized, and Byrom implicated herself in interviews two through five. At trial, the court excluded interviews two and three because of defective Miranda warnings. It permitted the introduction of interviews four and five, however, against Byrom’s objection. Byrom now claims that the trial court erred when it admitted these two interviews because interviews two and three were the product of coercion and that coercion carried over, thus marring her subsequent statements. The Mississippi Supreme Court dismissed this argument as moot because the trial court excluded the interviews during which coercive conduct allegedly occurred, i.e., interviews two and three. Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 861 (Miss. 2003) (“This argument is moot because the statements were excluded. . . . The remedy for coercive interrogation practices is exclusion of the statements in which the coercion was present. It does not require the exclusion of all subsequent interrogations that are preceded by proper Miranda warnings and are not coercive.”). The Supreme Court has made clear, however, that coercive tactics can indeed carry over to subsequent interviews, implicating Fifth Amendment concerns, regardless of whether earlier interviews are suppressed. Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309–10 (1985). Indeed, the Supreme Court has enumerated factors for determining whether coercion taints subsequent 21 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 22 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 interrogations. See id. at 310 (“When a prior statement is actually coerced, the time that passes between confessions, the change in place of interrogations, and the change in identity of the interrogators all bear on whether that coercion has carried over into the second confession.”). As explained below, since neither AEDPA exception applies to the Mississippi Supreme Court’s determination on the merits, Byrom’s claim fails. Cf. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787 (“And if the state court denies the claim on the merits, the claim is barred in federal court unless one of the exceptions to § 2254(d) set out in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (2) applies.”). In order to validly waive the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, an individual’s waiver “must be voluntary in that it was not the product of intimidation, coercion, or deception.” Hopkins v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 583 (5th Cir. 2003). Proving that a confession was coerced requires showing that the confession “resulted from coercive police conduct and it is essential that there be a link between the coercive conduct of the police and the confession of the defendant.” Id. at 584. Such conduct includes official overreach and direct coercion, as well as promises and inducements. See United States v. Blake, 2012 WL 3045649, at  (5th Cir. July 26, 2012) (unpublished) (per curiam). Trickery or deceit only constitutes coercion “to the extent [the defendant is deprived] of knowledge essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the consequences of abandoning them.” Hopkins, 325 F.3d at 584. “Neither mere emotionalism and confusion, nor mere trickery will alone necessarily invalidate a confession.” Self v. Collins, 973 F.2d 1198, 1205 (5th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations marks omitted). For instance, this Court found that coercion occurred when a defendant confessed to a murder after being assured by police that the conversation was confidential. Hopkins, 325 F.3d at 584–85. The defendant had been isolated for fifteen days and was even interviewed by a close friend in order to help elicit a confession. Id. at 584. Likewise, coercion was found when a mother confessed only after police threatened to cut off her state 22 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 23 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 financial aid and take custody of her children. Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963). Here, Byrom alleges that the police coerced the confessions she gave during interviews two and three—the two interviews that were suppressed for Miranda reasons—and that the coercion carried over into the subsequent two interviews during which she further implicated herself. Byrom focuses her claim on a handful of statements made to her during the course of interviews two and three, as well as the fact that she was heavily medicated while in the hospital.8 At the beginning of her second interview, the sheriff told Byrom that Junior had already confessed and warned Byrom against letting Junior bear the full weight of Edward’s murder on his own: “He’s already given us a statement on this. Don’t let him be out here by himself on this.” The sheriff reiterated the point later when he told Byrom that she was “trying to leave him out there by himself.” The sheriff also told Byrom that she and Junior would be in danger as long as the triggerman remained free. Finally, the sheriff warned Byrom that he would tell the judge whether and to what extent Byrom cooperated: “There are [sic] stuff you are leaving out here. Now I’m going to tell you. Once we get to the point where we have to talk to the Judge and everything. All that’s going to matter. He’s going to ask me how did she cooperate? . . . Well I’m gonna have to tell him that you had a memory lapse on some ‘stuff,’ we had to pick it out of her. Now the Judge ain’t going to like it.” Byrom claims that these statements deceived her and exploited her emotions, thereby constituting coercion that tainted her subsequent confessions. Having reviewed the transcripts of these interviews, it is clear that Byrom’s confessions were not coerced. While the sheriff’s statements were 8 The doctors treating Byrom told law enforcement officers that Byrom’s medications would not interfere with her ability to be interviewed. In any event, such a claim is procedurally barred for failure to adequately present it in prior proceedings. 23 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 24 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 certainly intended to cajole Byrom into confessing using her emotions and a measure of deception, they did not constitute coercion. Byrom first implicated herself after the sheriff implored Byrom to not leave Junior “hanging out there to bite the big bullet.” The sheriff made that statement early during the interview, after a series of denials from Byrom. While the statement certainly suggested that Junior was facing serious legal consequences regarding Edward’s murder, the police did not make any threats, promises, or other coercive statements. Insofar as the sheriff made other, subsequent statements, Byrom had already confessed and continued to do so. In any event, Byrom was not promised leniency and she was not threatened in any capacity. The sheriff merely utilized an appeal to emotion and urged her to confess to spare Junior harsher legal consequences, a permissible tactic since Byrom was not thereby deprived of knowledge essential to an understanding of her rights and the consequences of waiving them. Hopkins, 325 F.3d at 584. Byrom relies on cases like Lynumn to claim that law enforcement threats regarding relatives, especially one’s children, are particularly coercive. In Lynumn, the police made serious threats regarding unrelated matters, such as the defendant’s access to welfare benefits and custody of her children, and they did so in a way that left the defendant with “no reason not to believe that the police had ample power to carry out their threats.” 372 U.S. at 534 (“These threats were made while she was encircled in her apartment by three police officers and a twice convicted felon who had purportedly ‘set her up.’ There was no friend or adviser to whom she might turn.”). However, no comparable conduct occurred here. The sheriff told Byrom that she and Junior were at risk as long as the triggerman remained free and stated that Junior’s confession meant he was facing serious repercussions. The sheriff’s statements implicated Byrom’s son, but only because he was in fact a suspect. It was not incorrect to tell Byrom that admitting her role in the plot could spare Junior a harsher 24 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 25 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 punishment. Junior was not threatened with physical harm, and Byrom was not threatened by the sheriff. Byrom was in a safe setting and was not encircled by law enforcement officials. There was no official overreach or direct coercion. Since neither AEDPA exception applies, we deny Byrom’s claim. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 787.
Byrom also claims that the trial court erred when it failed to consider all of the mitigating evidence she presented at sentencing. Specifically, Byrom urged the court to consider (1) that she had no significant criminal history; (2) that she committed the crime under the influence of extreme mental and emotional disturbances; (3) that Edward was a participant in the crime since his abuse provoked the crime; and (4) that her ability to appreciate the criminality of her conduct or conform it to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired. At sentencing, the court made the following oral statement: The Court, likewise, considered the mitigating factors, specifically, that the defendant had no prior criminal record of any kind, so far as the record indicates. And, further, the Court has considered the assertion that the defendant was acting while under the influence of some extreme mental or emotional disturbance. Parenthetically, the Court would observe that these factors are the only factors suggested which would appear and bear consideration by this Court. Byrom claims that this portion of the trial court’s colloquy indicates that the court failed to consider some of Byrom’s mitigating evidence, thereby undermining her death sentence. She argues that the trial court conceded its failure to fully consider Byrom’s mitiating evidence when it noted that only two of her mitigating claims “bear consideration.” The Mississippi Supreme Court subsequently denied Byrom’s claim, finding that the trial court in fact considered all mitigating circumstances. See Byrom v. State, 863 So. 2d 836, 881–82 (Miss. 25 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 26 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 2003). For the reasons that follow, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not misapply clearly established federal law when it denied Byrom’s claim. In capital cases, the sentencer may not refuse to consider mitigating evidence. Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 394 (1987). The exclusion of mitigating evidence can invalidate a death sentence. Id. at 399. “The sentencer, and the Court of Criminal Appeals on review, may determine the weight to be given relevant mitigating evidence. But they may not give it no weight by excluding such evidence from their consideration.” Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 114–15 (1982). Byrom’s claim fails for two reasons. First, and most importantly, the trial court did in fact consider all of Byrom’s mitigating evidence. The trial court’s sentencing determination was not limited to the oral statements made in court. The court also entered a formal written sentencing order. In that order, the trial court’s sentencing determination was prefaced by the following language, which clearly establishes that the court considered all mitigating evidence: The court, having considered each of the mitigating factors suggested by the Defendant and all other mitigating circumstances concerning the Defendant’s character and history and the circumstance[s] of the offense which might be considered mitigating on behalf of the Defendant, and having weighed the aggravating factor[s] against the mitigating factors finds that the mitigating factors do not outweigh or overcome the aggravating circumstances and that the death penalty should be imposed. (emphasis added) As this text makes clear, the trial court considered all of Byrom’s mitigating evidence and simply determined that it did not overcome the aggravating circumstances also deemed present. Second, to the extent Byrom claims that the court’s colloquy conflicts with the written sentencing order, the language cited by Byrom does not actually demonstrate that the trial court refused to consider mitigating evidence. When the trial court stated that only two of Byrom’s proposed mitigating factors “bear 26 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 27 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 consideration,” the court was not refusing to consider the other two factors. Rather, the court used the verb “bear” in the sense of “to call for” or “to have relevance.” The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 161 (3d ed. 1996). As the court clarified in its written sentencing order, two of Byrom’s proposed mitigating factors lacked merit. That is, the trial court evaluated all of the mitigation factors proposed by Byrom, but found two had little relevance to the final sentencing determination. In that sense, they did not “bear consideration.” Fair minded jurists could not disagree. See Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786. Therefore, we deny Byrom’s claim. E. Ineffective Counsel Regarding Mitigating Evidence Byrom’s last claim alleges that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial attorneys failed to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of the trial. In order to make an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Byrom must show that her attorneys’ performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the deficient performance prejudiced her case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). The attorneys’ representation must fall below an objective standard of reasonableness such that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed . . . by the Sixth Amendment.” Feldman v. Thaler, 695 F.3d 372, 377–78 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Byrom “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Id. at 378 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689). Further, under AEDPA, the crucial question is whether the state court unreasonably applied Strickland. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 (2011); Williams v. Thaler, 684 F.3d 597, 604 (5th Cir. 2012). When considering a habeas petition, our inquiry focuses on “whether there is any reasonable argument that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard.” Richter, 131 27 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 28 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 S. Ct. at 788. “[A] habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or, as here, could have supported, the state court’s decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision of this Court.” Id. at 786. Prejudice is shown when there is “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the sentencing context, Byrom must establish “a reasonable probability that a competent attorney, aware of [the mitigating evidence available], would have introduced it at sentencing,” and that there is a reasonable probability that the sentence would have been different as a result. Wong v. Belmontes, 130 S. Ct. 383, 386 (2009) (quoting Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535, 536 (2003)) (alteration in original). “[T]he question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . . would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances did not warrant death.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1408 (2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). Byrom claims that she received ineffective assistance of counsel because her trial attorneys failed to adequately investigate potential mitigating evidence before sentencing and failed to present mitigating evidence at sentencing. Counsel interviewed a number of Byrom’s family members, but Byrom claims counsel should have pursued further leads after uncovering evidence of persistent abuse in Byrom’s childhood and adult life. Moreover, at sentencing, Byrom’s trial counsel only offered psychiatric reports and medical evaluations detailing Byrom’s abuse and the numerous mental and physical ailments she has suffered from. As the record makes clear, Byrom suffered a childhood of mental, physical, and sexual abuse at the hands of her stepfather, and yet more abuse at the hands of Edward. Despite the availability of at least six family 28 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 29 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 members able and willing to personally attest to the violence Byrom was subjected to, trial counsel did not present a single live witness at sentencing. Instead, trial counsel relied on psychiatric reports and medical records, supposedly because of a tactical decision to withhold witness testimony in anticipation of a new trial. Byrom has pressed these ineffective assistance of counsel claims at each stage of review. Because the Supreme Court of Mississippi issued a reasoned opinion on point, it is that decision we review in applying the standard of review provided by AEDPA. Jackson v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 641, 651 (5th Cir. 1999). A divided Mississippi Supreme Court decided that Byrom had not received ineffective assistance of counsel at her sentencing. Despite finding that Byrom’s trial counsel made a “perplexing” choice by not presenting live mitigating evidence, the majority opinion nevertheless held as “speculative” the proposition that testimony already known to the trial judge would have “been any more convincing or persuasive if presented through witness testimony.” Byrom v. State, 927 So. 2d 709, 720–21 (Miss. 2006). On the other hand, the dissent struggled to find “a more egregious case of ineffective assistance of counsel during the sentencing phase of a capital case.” Id. at 732 (Dickinson, J., dissenting). For the reasons that follow, applying § 2254(d)(1), the Mississippi Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland to Byrom’s claim of failure to investigate or to her claim of failure to present mitigating evidence.
Byrom claims that her trial counsel were aware of her extensive history as a victim of abuse, but that they entirely failed to investigate potential evidence on point. However, trial counsel clearly stated that they interviewed potential witnesses, including members of Byrom’s family. In fact, counsel went so far as to make arrangements so that out-of-state family members could be in Iuka, Mississippi for Byrom’s trial. Indeed, in October 2000, one of Byrom’s 29 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 30 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 attorneys furnished a list of nine witnesses for trial, most of whom were family members who could confirm Byrom’s history as a victim of abuse. In support of her claim, Byrom primarily relies on the fact that her trial attorneys could not recall the specific names of which family members they interviewed in anticipation of trial. She also points to statements from family members claiming that they were not contacted by trial counsel. Nevertheless, other family members capable of providing further corroboration of abuse suffered were both interviewed by counsel and present in Iuka for the trial. Byrom has not identified what additional information would have been uncovered had her trial counsel interviewed additional family members. While those who were interviewed presented a picture of abuse, their accounts largely overlap and cover nearly identical details. Such claims thus do not demonstrate that the state court’s application of Strickland was unreasonable or contrary to established federal law. Fairminded jurists could not disagree with the Mississippi Supreme Court’s determination that Byrom’s attorney conducted a reasonable investigation under Strickland. Accordingly, we deny Byrom’s claim. Richter, 131 S. Ct. at 786.
At sentencing, Byrom’s attorneys declined to present witness testimony regarding Byrom’s history of abuse, and instead opted to present two psychiatric reports detailing Byrom’s claims of abuse and the various maladies diagnosed, as well as a medical evaluation detailing Byrom’s many other illnesses. There are at least six family members Byrom’s attorneys could have presented at sentencing, some of whom had directly witnessed the abuse Byrom suffered at the hands of both her stepfather and husband. These witnesses would have substantiated claims regarding the alcoholism of Edward and Byrom’s stepfather, as well as both men’s verbal, physical, and sexual abuse of Byrom. The psychiatric reports presented at sentencing nevertheless covered much of 30 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 31 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 the same information; and Byrom’s history as a victim of abuse was addressed at trial as well. Despite acknowledging that Byrom’s attorneys made a “perplexing” decision in their refusal to present witness testimony at sentencing, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that the witnesses’ potential testimony, of which the trial judge was already aware, would not likely have been any more persuasive if presented through live witness testimony. Byrom v. State, 927 So. 2d 709, 721 (Miss. 2006). The state court viewed this decision as a strategic one; Byrom’s attorneys sought to reserve the family members’ testimony in the event of a new trial. Further, the Mississippi Supreme Court held that Byrom’s claim of prejudice was speculative at best. Id. As explained below, the Mississippi Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland. “[E]vidence about a defendant’s background and character is relevant because of the belief, long held by this society, that defendants who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or to emotional and mental problems, may be less culpable than defendants who have no such excuse.” Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989). The right to have mitigating evidence presented means little, however, if counsel fails to present a case for mitigation at sentencing. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 706 (1984) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Helen Gredd, Comment, Washington v. Strickland: Defining Effective Assistance of Counsel at Capital Sentencing, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 1544, 1549 (1983)). That said, Strickland does not “require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at sentencing in every case.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 533 (2003). A petitioner challenging the adequacy of counsel’s conduct must show that counsel’s conduct fell below the standard guarantee by the Sixth Amendment, as well as prejudice: a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the proceeding’s result would have been different. Id. at 534. 31 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 32 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 Here, Byrom’s counsel made the unusual decision to withhold mitigating witness testimony at sentencing in hopes of reserving said testimony for an anticipated retrial. Counsel instead elected to rely on a series of medical reports detailing Byrom’s abuse and the various illnesses she suffered as a result of the abuse. However, even assuming arguendo that counsel’s strategic decision fell below the standard required by Strickland, it cannot be said that Byrom was prejudiced. In order to find prejudice here, there must exist a reasonable probability that Byrom would not have received a death sentence had counsel introduced the live testimony of Byrom’s family members. The Supreme Court has instructed that “[a] reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In Wiggins, the Supreme Court found prejudice where the petitioner’s attorney had failed to investigate and present substantial mitigating evidence at the petitioner’s jury sentencing. 539 U.S. at 534–36. The omitted mitigating evidence included would-be accounts of substantial abuse and neglect at the hands of the petitioner’s mother and repeated instances of abuse, molestation, and rape suffered at various foster homes throughout Wiggins’s childhood. Id. at 516–17. However, while Wiggins and Byrom each suffered substantial abuse prior to committing their respective crimes, their cases are otherwise distinguishable. Wiggins’s counsel failed to present to the sentencing jury substantial mitigating evidence that the jury had no other access to. On that basis, the Supreme Court found that at least one juror would have voted differently had the jury been presented with Wiggins’s “excruciating life history.” Id. at 537. Byrom, on the other hand, was sentenced by the same judge that conducted her trial, and the mitigating evidence at issue was substantively addressed both at trial and sentencing. In other words, to the extent the judge that sentenced Byrom was not already aware of Byrom’s mitigating evidence from trial, he was 32 Case: 11-70026 Document: 00512190481 Page: 33 Date Filed: 03/28/2013 No. 11-70026 certainly made aware of Byrom’s history of abuse by virtue of the mitigating evidence presented at sentencing. The trial judge reviewed Byrom’s medical records, which included details of the abuse Byrom had suffered, before closing arguments at sentencing. The live testimony withheld by counsel would thus