Opinion ID: 1126567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the right of one to represent himself

Text: Mr. Ellis in appearing pro se claims a right to do so under HRS § 605-2 which in part provides: [N]othing in this chapter shall prevent any person, plaintiff, defendant, or accused, from appearing in person before any court, or justice, and there prosecuting or defending his own cause, without the aid of legal counsel. (Emphasis added.) Our statute's import mirrors that of an early federal law. [11] While authoritative analysis of HRS § 605-2 is lacking, in matters relating to the conduct of business before our courts the construction of a counterpart federal provision is highly persuasive. Ellis v. Crockett, 51 Haw. 45, 61, 451 P.2d 814, 824 (1969). We find, therefore, federal pronouncements on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1654, supra n. 11, helpful in construing the right asserted. Clearly by statute or otherwise this right of self-representation is available to a person in a civil proceeding. [12] But regardless of the right's derivation or the proceeding where it is invoked, the question is whether one seeking to represent himself pro se is a person who by the substantive law has the right sought to be enforced. Put differently, is Mr. Ellis, in conducting the litigation, the real party in interest? Heiskell v. Mozie, 65 App.D.C. 255, 82 F.2d 861, 863 (1936). We think not. As indicated by the foregoing discussion (Part I), after dissolution, the stockholders of the Kula Development Corporation were the real parties in interest upon all claims in favor of or against this corporation at the time of dissolution. Clark Estate Co. v. Gentry, 362 Mo. 80, 91, 240 S.W.2d 124, 130 (1951). Their interests, in turn, were subject to the liens of creditors. On the other hand, in legal proceedings aimed at winding up the former corporation's affairs, the interest of Mr. Ellis as trustee is remedial in nature and premised upon procedural necessity. State ex rel. McDowell v. Libby, supra . The paucity of precedent notwithstanding, as Mr. Ellis' status of trustee is intended to insure nothing more than the orderly administration of assets, he may not claim his statutory function includes the right to present argument pro se in the courts of this state. In this capacity he is representing the interests of others, and in judicial proceedings it is our opinion that he is engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.