Opinion ID: 201075
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority to enter the May 30 order

Text: 21 David argues that the May 30 order is effectively an attempt to execute on the judgment and that, on his reading of Fed.R.Civ.P. 69(a), a writ of execution is required. 5 Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.1 requires such writs to be served within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court sits (here, Massachusetts). David claims that he is a Florida resident and that the district court in Massachusetts therefore does not have authority to execute the judgment against him. 22 This argument comes too late. On appeal from the denial of a motion to modify an injunction, review does not extend to the propriety of the original order. 16 Federal Practice & Procedure § 3924.2; see also Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Group, Inc., 204 F.3d 397, 401 (2d Cir.2000). This argument is an attack on the district court's authority to issue the May 30 order (and, indeed, on its power to issue the original August 4, 1993 order), not the court's refusal to strike ERISA and social security benefits from that order. Accordingly, it is beyond the scope of our review. If David wished to make such a challenge, he should have appealed directly from the May 30 order within the thirty-day appeals period. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (interlocutory appeals may be taken from preliminary injunctions); Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (allowing thirty days from the entry of the order to file an appeal).