Opinion ID: 1735055
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: does operative petition allege compensable injury resulting from accident?

Text: Both the review panel and the Court of Appeals concluded that the operative petition stated a workers' compensation claim based upon accidental injury. This court first addressed the issue of compensability of an accidental injury resulting from a mental stimulus in Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942). In that case, an elevator operator witnessed the accidental death of a passenger who was caught between the elevator floor and a floor of the building. Although the operator suffered no physical injury, she experienced extreme emotional shock immediately after the accident and was hospitalized for several days due to elevated heart rate and blood pressure. For some time after the incident, she suffered head and back pain. In addressing the operator's accidental injury claim, this court determined that the elevator malfunction was an unexpected and unforeseen event which happened suddenly and violently, producing objective symptoms of injury including elevated heart rate and blood pressure. We then addressed the more perplexing problem of whether there was violence to the physical structure of the operator's body, as required by the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act. Bekelski, 141 Neb. at 659, 4 N.W.2d at 743. The court framed the issue as whether disabling shock and nervousness, when unaccompanied by an impairment of the physical structure of the body, is compensable under our compensation law. Id. Resolving this question in the negative, the court reasoned: It seems to us that the legislature required, not only that there should be an accident attended by objective symptoms arising out of and in the course of the employment, but that the accident must be accompanied by violence to the physical structure of the body. The language indicates a clear distinction between physical and bodily injury on the one hand and mental, nervous and psychiatric injury unaccompanied by violence to the physical structure of the body on the other. The plain import of the words used eliminates from the operation of the law disabilities resulting from mental disturbances, nervousness and psychiatric ailments when violence to the physical structure of the body cannot be established. Bekelski, 141 Neb. at 660, 4 N.W.2d at 743. Based on this rationale, the court concluded that because the elevator operator suffered no physical injury in the elevator incident, she was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits. The issue of whether a compensable injury may result from a mental stimulus was next addressed in Sorensen v. City of Omaha, 230 Neb. 286, 430 N.W.2d 696 (1988). There, a firefighter claimed that he sustained stress-related physical and psychological injuries as a result of a demotion and harassment by his employer. A physician diagnosed the firefighter's symptoms, including stomach pain, nausea, vomiting, psychomotor retardation, and rectal bleeding, and opined that these physical symptoms were related to job stress. Finding no dispute regarding the fact that mental rather than physical stimulus caused the injuries, we applied the reasoning of Bekelski in concluding that the essential element of violence to the physical structure of the body was not established. We specifically declined to adopt an approach utilized by other jurisdictions which holds that a distinct physical injury caused by a mental stimulus is compensable, noting that this approach was inconsistent with the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Act as interpreted and applied in Bekelski. See, also, Dyer v. Hastings Indus., 252 Neb. 361, 562 N.W.2d 348 (1997) (finding depression caused by workplace harassment was result of mental rather than physical stimulus and not compensable as accidental injury). The critical distinction between mental and physical stimulus as the basis for a compensable injury is illustrated by Johnston v. State, 219 Neb. 457, 364 N.W.2d (1985). There, a state employee patronizing a state cafeteria poured and drank what she believed to be coffee from a coffee urn. In fact, it was urn cleaner. She was diagnosed with caustic irritation of the mouth and pharynx, as well as superficial injuries to her esophagus. In addition, she experienced panic attacks, anxiety, and subtle symptoms of depression. Relying on Bekelski v. O.F. Neal Co., 141 Neb. 657, 4 N.W.2d 741 (1942), the State argued that she could not recover workers' compensation benefits for mental injuries in the absence of a proven physical injury. While agreeing that this was the applicable legal rule, we concluded that a physical injury occurred when the employee ingested the cleaner, and therefore all of her resulting injuries were compensable. Tarvin v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 238 Neb. 851, 472 N.W.2d 727 (1991), did not alter the principle first articulated in Bekelski and consistently applied by this court. In Tarvin, a worker claimed disabling depression and anxiety caused by job-related stress and pressure. Although there was no evidence of trauma, the worker claimed that he suffered violence to the physical structure of the body based upon the testimony of a physician that job-related stress caused the worker's neurochemical level to become imbalanced and prevented normal transmission of messages from his brain. Another physician testified that job-related stress did not cause a chemical alteration of the brain and that the employee's mental condition and resulting disability were attributable solely to conditions which preceded his employment. The compensation court determined that the worker failed to prove a compensable injury. Applying a clearly erroneous standard of review, we concluded that based upon the medical evidence, the compensation court in resolving a factual question, could reasonably have concluded, and did conclude, that [the employee] failed to prove that his condition was caused by employment. Id. at 857, 472 N.W.2d at 732. We affirmed on that basis without reaching the issue of whether the injury would have been compensable if it had been related to the worker's employment. Thus, while the issue presented in this case was raised in Tarvin, it was not decided. In this case, the allegation that Zach's brain underwent physical changes simply identifies objective symptoms of an injury. There is no allegation that such changes were caused by any physical stimulus. To the contrary, it is specifically alleged that the changes to Zach's brain were caused by being advised of the consequences of an error, which is clearly a mental stimulus. Based upon principles articulated in Bekelski and subsequent cases, an injury caused by a mental stimulus does not meet the requirement in § 48-151(4) that a compensable accidental injury involve violence to the physical structure of the body. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals and the review panel of the Workers' Compensation Court erred in concluding that the operative petition stated a claim for accidental injury arising out of and in the course and scope of Zach's employment with the Nebraska State Patrol.