Opinion ID: 1036031
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Gratuitous violence jury instruction

Text: ¶33 Benson argues that the trial court deprived him of his rights to due process and a fair trial and his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by instructing the jury that he engaged in gratuitous violence sufficient to demonstrate the “especially heinous or depraved” aggravating circumstance if he continued to inflict violence on a victim 9 STATE v. TRENT CHRISTOPHER BENSON Opinion of the Court “after [he] knew or should have known that the victim was dead.” Because Benson failed to raise this issue to the trial court, we review only for fundamental error. State v. Henderson, 210 Ariz. 561, 567 ¶ 19, 115 P.3d 601, 607 (2005). ¶34 Benson argues that the trial court erred by using the “should-haveknown” language in the jury instruction because it effectively lessened the State’s burden to prove that Benson actually knew his victims were dead when he continued to inflict violence upon them. But this Court has repeatedly held that the state proves gratuitous violence by showing that (1) the defendant inflicted “violence beyond that necessary to kill,” and (2) “the defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred.” State v. Bocharski (Bocharski II), 218 Ariz. 476, 494 ¶¶ 85, 87, 189 P.3d 403, 421 (2008) (emphasis modified from original); see also State v. Wallace (Wallace IV), 229 Ariz. 155, 158 ¶ 10, 272 P.3d 1046, 1049 (2012) (to same effect). Benson acknowledges these holdings but argues that this Court has not applied the objective standard in practice. We rejected this argument in Wallace IV, and do so again here. 229 Ariz. at 158 ¶ 10 n.5, 272 P.3d at 1049 n.5. ¶35 Benson briefly argues that use of the should-have-known standard fails to further the goal of adducing the defendant’s mental state, which is the focus of the heinous or depraved aggravator. See id. at 158 ¶ 9, 272 P.3d at 1049. We have previously held, however, that “[a] showing that a defendant continued to inflict violence after he knew or should have known that a fatal action had occurred provides essential evidence of the defendant’s intent to inflict gratuitous violence.” Bocharski II, 218 Ariz. at 494 ¶ 87, 189 P.3d at 421. Benson offers no reason to revisit this holding. ¶36 Benson next contends that use of the should-have-known standard fails to genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty, as constitutionally required for capital sentencing schemes. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 474 (1993). We have held that a trial court sufficiently narrows application of the “heinous or depraved” part of the (F)(6) aggravator by instructing the jury to consider five factors, including gratuitous violence, as set forth in State v. Gretzler (Gretzler III), 135 Ariz. 42, 51-52, 659 P.2d 1, 10-11 (1983). See also State v. Barreras, 181 Ariz. 516, 522, 892 P.2d 852, 858 (1995). Benson does not explain how the shouldhave-known standard conflicts with that holding or unconstitutionally enlarges the class of death-eligible defendants. Under this standard, a finding of gratuitous violence applies only to murders in which a defendant continues to commit violence after the death or impending 10 STATE v. TRENT CHRISTOPHER BENSON Opinion of the Court death of the victim is apparent; it will not apply in every murder. Cf. Arave, 507 U.S. at 474 (“If the sentencer fairly could conclude that an aggravating circumstance applies to every defendant eligible for the death penalty, the circumstance is constitutionally infirm.” (emphasis omitted)). ¶37 The trial court did not err in instructing the jury on gratuitous violence.