Opinion ID: 1176389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cooperation with State Lawyers Assistance Committee.

Text: The final cause of complaint concerns activities of the State Lawyers Assistance Committee (SLAC) vis-a-vis the accused. On June 1, 1985, the State Professional Responsibility Board of the Bar referred the accused to the SLAC. This referral grew out of complaints against the accused concerning his handling of collection and divorce matters that have been the subject of previous disciplinary actions. See In re Chandler (Chandler I), Disciplinary Board Opinion, Nos. 84-126, 84-127 (7-31-86) and In re Chandler (Chandler II), 303 Or. 290, 735 P.2d 1220 (1987). On June 7, 1985, both the accused and the chairperson of the SLAC were notified of the referral through correspondence from the office of the General Counsel. The chairperson then wrote to the accused to inform him of the purpose and function of the SLAC and to notify him that a SLAC committee member would contact him to discuss the referral. Accordingly, on June 26, 1985, a SLAC committee member wrote to the accused and offered to meet with him. The committee member placed several telephone calls to the accused's office, none of which were answered. Neither the chairperson nor the committee member ever received a response from the accused. Subsequently, on May 3, 1986, the SLAC voted to refer the accused to the office of the General Counsel for an investigation. On May 7, 1986, the SLAC chairperson wrote to the office of the General Counsel to inform that office of the accused's failure to respond to the SLAC's attempts to contact him. The office of the General Counsel wrote to the accused on June 12, 1986, to sum up the attempts that the SLAC had made to reach him and to request a response by July 3, 1986. When no response was forthcoming, the office of the General Counsel referred the matter to the Benton/Lincoln/Polk County Local Professional Responsibility Committee (LPRC) for an investigation. An LPRC investigator then interviewed the accused by telephone on August 26, 1986. The accused admitted to communication from the SLAC in 1985, and stated that he was not sure that he tried to respond. The accused stated, however, that he thought that he was not required to respond and that the matter was a voluntary one. Again, the accused did not claim a right or privilege justifying his failure to cooperate with the SLAC. On these facts, the Bar has charged the accused with violating DR 1-103(C) and DR 1-103(F)(1) and (3). DR 1-103(C) previously has been quoted. DR 1-103(F)(1) and (3) provide: A lawyer who is the subject of a complaint or referral to the State Lawyers Assistance Committee shall, subject to the exercise of any applicable right or privilege, cooperate with the committee and its designees, including: (1) Responding to the initial inquiry of the committee or its designees;    (3) Participating in interviews with the committee or its designees. Plainly, the accused did not respond to the reasonable request of the General Counsel that he respond by July 3, 1986; therefore, the accused violated DR 1-103(C). It also is clear that the accused failed to respond to the multiple attempts by the SLAC to contact him. He failed both to respond to the initial inquiries by the SLAC chairperson and the committee member and to participate in meetings that the committee member attempted to arrange. In so failing, he does not assert a right or privilege. Accordingly, we conclude that the accused has violated DR 1-103(F)(1) and (3).