Opinion ID: 2295872
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Continuing Course of Conduct Doctrine

Text: On appeal, plaintiffs argue that both § 9-1-13 and § 9-1-14.3 were tolled under the continuing course of conduct theory. The plaintiffs allege that their claims against defendants stem from [defendants'] mismanagement and breach of fiduciary duties as co-executors, and attorneys for the co-executors of [decedent's estate], and because Factor continues as the executor today, defendants' fiduciary duties to plaintiffs still exist. In an attempt to keep their claims alive, plaintiffs point to a theory developed by Connecticut courts in cases where there is an ongoing relationship between the parties. The plaintiffs specifically cite to Giulietti v. Giulietti, 65 Conn.App. 813, 784 A.2d 905 (2001), in which the Appellate Court of Connecticut explained: The continuing course of conduct doctrine reflects the policy that, during an ongoing relationship, lawsuits are premature because specific tortious acts or omissions may be difficult to identify and may yet be remedied.... [T]he doctrine is generally applicable under circumstances where [i]t may be impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a particular negligent act or omission that caused injury or where the negligence consists of a series of acts or omissions and it is appropriate to allow the course of [action] to terminate before allowing the repose section of the statute of limitations to run.... Id. at 925-26 (quoting Sanborn v. Greenwald [39 Conn.App. 289] 664 A.2d 803, 807 (Conn.App.Ct. 1995)). The plaintiffs argue that their case is analogous to the facts and circumstances of Giulietti, [15] because, like the defendant in that case, defendants here had a fiduciary duty to plaintiffs that continued for many yearsat least from 1976 until March 2008. According to plaintiffs, their relationship with defendants should toll the statute of limitations because of Factor's failure to present a Second and/or Final Accounting. As such, plaintiffs contend, the nature and scope of the allegations against [defendants] were not actionable in the Superior Court until such time as the Probate Court lost jurisdiction or [defendants] ceased in their roles as co-executors and attorneys for the co-executors because [d]amages could not be ascertained with the requisite specificity until the accountings were presented. However, this Court has not adopted the continuing course of conduct doctrine, and we decline to do so in the context of this case. 2