Opinion ID: 1273939
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Asserted Insufficiency of the Evidence Against Drivers

Text: The majority further hold ( ante, pp. 397, 404) that there was insufficient evidence to corroborate Hickman's judicial confession insofar as it implicated Drivers in the commission of the crime. In reaching that conclusion, however, the majority rely on what we have heretofore held to be an erroneous and obsolete theory of the function of an appellate court in reviewing the issue of sufficiency of corroborative evidence. When the evidence here presented is viewed under currently accepted principles of law, it is seen to be abundantly sufficient for the purpose of corroboration of an accomplice. Penal Code section 1111 declares in relevant part that A conviction cannot be had upon the testimony of an accomplice unless it be corroborated by such other evidence as shall tend to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense; and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances thereof. (Italics added.) Construing this requirement we have consistently held  as summarized by Mr. Justice Peters in People v. Howk (1961) 56 Cal.2d 687, 704 [10] [16 Cal. Rptr. 370, 365 P.2d 426], quoting from People v. Wade (1959) 53 Cal.2d 322, 329 [1, 2] [1 Cal. Rptr. 683, 348 P.2d 116]  that The only corroboration necessary [for compliance with the statute] is that which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, not evidence of the corpus delicti. [Citing cases.] The corroborative evidence may be slight and entitled to little consideration when standing alone. [Citing case.] Defendant's own admissions are sufficient corroboration. [Citing case.] Finally, corroborative evidence may be circumstantial. [Citing case.] (Italics added.) (Accord, People v. Santo (1954) 43 Cal.2d 319, 327 [5, 6] [273 P.2d 249], and cases there cited.) In this connection the majority discuss the evidence of Drivers' fingerprints which were found on both sides of the right-hand front (passenger) door of the intended getaway car. It will be remembered that this car, a 1950 Ford purchased by defendant Robinson only a day or so before the commission of the crime, was abandoned with its gears jammed in the parking lot of the Fox Hills Country Club, facing the exit, and with its rear license plate obscured by means of a white rag. Although the fingerprint expert could not fix an exact time when Drivers' prints were placed on the car, he also testified that one such print was found on the outside surface of the door glass and that prints disappear soon when exposed to the elements in that manner. The majority summarized ( ante, p. 398) by saying that this evidence showed no more than that Drivers had been present in or about the Ford on some recent date. But the majority then stress the fact that both Drivers, who is Hickman's cousin, and Campbell, the original owner of the Ford, had been frequent visitors to Hickman's apartment. On the basis of that fact the majority proceed to deny any corroborative value to the evidence of Drivers' fingerprints, theorizing that such prints are as equally susceptible to an inference that they came there innocently, as they are to any inference that their presence connects defendant with the commission of the crime. (Italics added.) ( Ante, p. 398.) Again, the majority refer to Drivers' story to the police wherein he claimed that early in the evening of the crime he and Robinson had driven in the Ford to take one of Hickman's children to visit a friend; and the majority conclude ( ante, p. 399) that the important feature of this explanation is that it shows that Drivers' fingerprints could have been placed on the Ford in a manner entirely unconnected with the crime. [5] It is true that in such relatively early cases as People v. Robbins (1915) 171 Cal. 466, 470 [154 P. 317], relied on by the majority, support may be found for their theory that corroborative evidence is insufficient as a matter of law when, in the opinion of the reviewing court, it is equally susceptible to an inference of the defendant's innocence. But in People v. Henderson (1949) 34 Cal.2d 340 [209 P.2d 785], this court recognized that such a theory is in conflict with the proper function and limits of appellate review as set forth in the leading case of People v. Newland (1940) 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [1]-684 [2] [104 P.2d 778]. Thus we stated in Henderson (at pp. 346-347 [6] of 34 Cal.2d) that When as in the present record it is discovered that there is testimony aside from that of the accomplice which tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime, the function of the appellate court is performed. Questions of the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are for the trial court, and since the circumstances reasonably justify the finding of guilt, an opposing view that they also may be reconciled with innocence will not warrant interference with the judgment on appeal. ( People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778], and cases cited.) (Italics added.) Other decisions continue to reflect a similar view (see, e.g., People v. Malone (1947) 82 Cal. App.2d 54, 60 [2-3] [185 P.2d 870], and People v. Allen (1951) 104 Cal. App.2d 402, 412 [5] [231 P.2d 896]), and in People v. Gallardo (1953) 41 Cal.2d 57, 63, unnumbered fn. [257 P.2d 29], we recognize and articulate the change in the law as follows: Although it has been said that corroboration is not sufficient where the circumstances are consistent with the innocence of the accused (see, e.g., People v. Davis, 210 Cal. 540, 555 [293 P. 32]; People v. Kempley, 205 Cal. 441, 461 [271 P. 478]; People v. Robbins, 171 Cal. 466, 470 [154 P. 317]), the more recent decisions have held that whether the corroborating evidence is as compatible with innocence as it is with guilt is a question of weight for the trier of fact (see People v. Henderson, 34 Cal.2d 340, 347 [209 P.2d 785]; People v. Estes, 99 Cal. App.2d 745, 747 [222 P.2d 454]; cf. People v. Newland, 15 Cal.2d 678, 681 [104 P.2d 778]). [6] It thus appears that the majority opinion seeks to resurrect an outmoded theory of appellate review whose passing was expressly observed by this court over a decade ago. Moreover, the majority reject the fingerprint evidence as showing only association with the criminal, not with the crime itself (citing People v. Reingold (1948) 87 Cal. App.2d 382, 399-400 [6] [197 P.2d 175], and People v. Braun (1939) 31 Cal. App.2d 593, 601-602 [3] [88 P.2d 728]). But this court has held that The relationship of the men [i.e., the defendant and his accomplice] and all of their acts and conduct may be considered in determining whether there are corroborating circumstances. ( People v. Henderson (1949) supra, 34 Cal.2d 340, 343 [4].) In the latter case we held that within the evidence that shows corroboration was the following: It was established by the testimony of the accomplice's sister and by the two women companions that Roberts [the accomplice witness] and the defendant were together most of the day preceding the attempted robbery and that they were together in the defendant's car when the women were taken to their homes which was about three hours before the crime was committed. ( Id. at pp. 345-346 [5] of 34 Cal.2d.) Likewise, in the case at bench, Drivers' own admissions to the police placed him in company with Robinson in the Ford in the late afternoon and early evening of the night of the crime, only a few hours before the murder was committed; and the evidence of Drivers' recent fingerprints inside and outside that same vehicle was unquestionably relevant to establishing the kind of relationship referred to in Henderson. It is true that here, just as in Henderson, the mere association of Drivers and Robinson shortly before the crime is not in and of itself sufficient corroboration; but such association when considered in conjunction with other corroborating circumstances has been held to be a factor tending to connect an accused with the commission of the offense. ( People v. Moore (1963) 211 Cal. App.2d 585, 594 [8] [27 Cal. Rptr. 526], citing People v. Henderson (1949) supra ; People v. Hoyt (1942) 20 Cal.2d 306, 310-311 [125 P.2d 29]; and People v. Willmurth (1947) 77 Cal. App.2d 605, 611-612 [1] [176 P.2d 102]; accord, People v. Wayne (1953) 41 Cal.2d 814, 822 [2b] [264 P.2d 547]; People v. Frankfort (1952) 114 Cal. App.2d 680, 692 [17] [251 P.2d 401]; People v. Dodd (1952) 113 Cal. App.2d 682, 686 [1, 2] [248 P.2d 965]; People v. Ross (1941) 46 Cal. App.2d 385, 395 [3] [116 P.2d 81], and cases there cited.) The latter proposition, of course, is simply an illustration of the broader principle that the prosecution is not required to single out an isolated act or word which in and of itself is offered as sufficient corroboration of the accomplice's testimony; rather, the prosecution may rely for this purpose on the combined and cumulative effect of all the relevant nonaccomplice evidence and the inferences that the jury may reasonably have drawn therefrom. The majority purport to recognize this principle in asserting ( ante, p. 398) that none of the items of evidence discussed, independently or cumulatively, constituted the requisite corroboration. But the majority then go on to consider and evaluate each item independently; nowhere are the corroborative facts actually considered cumulatively, nowhere do the majority see the whole picture that was put before the jury. For example, the majority view the evidence of Drivers' conflicting statements to the police entirely out of context. The majority say ( ante, p. 400) that the witness, Officer Wrona, was able to point to but one conflict in the repetition of a narrative covering Drivers' movements for three days (i.e., the place in which he slept during the early morning hours of February 4th). But this seemingly innocuous discrepancy takes on a far different light when it is remembered that it was precisely during those same early morning hours of February 4th that this murder was committed. The inconsistency in the suspect's explanations of his whereabouts during that period was obviously of the utmost importance. As that inconsistency could not reasonably be reconciled with total innocence, the majority are compelled to concede ( ante, p. 400) that At best, it tends to prove that Drivers, while talking to the police, had a guilty frame of mind.  (Italics added.) But again attempting to find this evidence equally susceptible to an inference that Drivers was innocent of this crime, the majority ask: But in regard to what? It may be reasonable to assume that he had in mind some activity which he desired to hide from the police. But, there is no reasonable inference that his conflicting replies were made for the purpose of hiding connection with the crime with which he is now charged. ( Ante, pp. 400-401.) To so hold is to refuse to face the facts of this case. It will be remembered that when first asked (on the way to the police station) where he had spent the night of February 3-4, 1962, Drivers told the police he had spent it at his aunt's house. Once at the police station, however, Drivers changed his story and said he was in a dance hall from 10:30 p.m. that evening to 2 a.m. the next morning, but that he saw no one there he knew; that he then had a hamburger and went to Hickman's apartment at 3:30 or 4 a.m., noticed that it had been searched, and spent the remainder of the night there. It is well settled that False and contradictory statements of a defendant in relation to the charge are themselves corroborative evidence. ( People v. Santo (1954) supra, 43 Cal.2d 319, 327 [8]; accord, People v. Simpson (1954) 43 Cal.2d 553, 564 [6] [275 P.2d 31]; People v. Hannie (1962) 202 Cal. App.2d 462, 465 [2] [20 Cal. Rptr. 808]; People v. Dykes (1961) 198 Cal. App.2d 75, 80 [2b] [17 Cal. Rptr. 564]; People v. Neely (1958) 163 Cal. App.2d 289, 301 [3] [329 P.2d 357]; cf. People v. Osslo (1958) 50 Cal.2d 75, 93 [4] [323 P.2d 397], and cases there cited.) The majority's attempt to distinguish Santo is ineffectual, for it is obvious that in this area of the law each case must turn on its own facts. What is important is the rule of law illustrated by such decisions, and here the jury were properly instructed in that regard. Moreover, the jury were entitled to consider more than the bare contradiction between Drivers' stories; they could also consider the contents of either or both of such explanations. In particular, the jury could weigh the significance of Drivers' claim that at 10:30 p.m. on February 3 he went to a public dance hall and remained there until 2 a.m. on February 4. Such an alibi would neatly account for his whereabouts during the crucial period of time relating to the murder (which was committed shortly after 1 a.m. on February 4), yet would have been virtually impossible to verify because the asserted locale was a public dance hall and Drivers claimed he knew no one there. The jury could also consider the significance of Drivers' movements thereafter. In spite of the lateness of the hour he did not return home but (according to his second story to the police) went to Hickman's apartment at about 3:30 or 4 a.m. that night. The jury could reasonably infer that the purpose of Drivers' nocturnal visit was not an innocent social call, but to learn whether Robinson and Hickman had successfully escaped after their getaway car had stalled while leaving the scene of the crime. Upon reaching Hickman's apartment, however, Drivers observed that the police had arrived before him and were still on the premises; but rather than entering to see if he could be of any assistance to his cousin, Drivers remained outside until the police departed. He then went into the apartment and found that it had been searched and Hickman was not there; nevertheless Drivers remained in the empty apartment until morning. When no one returned (Robinson and Hickman had already been arrested, but Drivers did not yet know this) he left and spent the day at his uncle's house. At 10 p.m. Drivers took a bus to downtown Los Angeles, and slept that night in an all-night movie theater. The majority assert (ante, p. 401) that there was no evidence of flight on Drivers' part, but fail to mention any of the foregoing facts. While Drivers' evasion and flight may not have been as prolonged [7] as was shown of the defendants in People v. Santo (1954) supra, still the jury could reasonably infer that such was his original intent as manifested by the above described movements. The question was one for the jury to determine (Pen. Code, § 1127c; People v. Santo (1954) supra, 43 Cal.2d 319, 330 [13-14]), and they were properly so instructed. In summary, the picture presented to the jury was as follows: Drivers' contradictory stories to the police concerned his whereabouts not just on any night, but during the precise period of the murder of Grego at the Fox Hills Country Club on February 4, 1962. Drivers' fingerprints were found not just in a car of a relative, but in the particular car used by that relative and his accomplices as an attempted getaway vehicle after the commission of that same murder. And Drivers' evasive movements thereafter covered not just any sequence of time but the days and nights immediately following, again, the murder of Grego in the early morning hours of February 4. It is stretching the long arm of coincidence to the breaking point to require the jury as a matter of law  as the majority do  to find no corroboration of Hickman's testimony in the cumulative effect of the foregoing sequence of events.