Opinion ID: 1976705
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Alimony Issue.

Text: On this issue, the husband appealed only the entry of the monetary judgment for the arrearages of alimony. As to it, the husband insists, because the Florida court still retained jurisdiction of his pending, though stayed, petition for modification, that that court could alter or change its alimony decree, and contends that the Maryland court lacked authority to enter judgment. We disagree. In the first place, it is clear that the pending modification proceedings did not toll the vesting of the installments of alimony which continued to accrue month after month. The second Florida decree not only declared that the husband was in contempt for failure to pay the $700 due as of March 1, 1955, but specifically provided that the proceedings would be stayed until the husband had made all payments required to be made under the first decree. There was no proof in the case at bar that the husband had ever purged himself of contempt nor was there any proof  indeed it was admitted  that he had not paid in full the alimony payments which continued to accrue and vest under the Florida decree after March 1, 1955. Moreover, in Florida, an alimony decree may not be modified except upon a strong showing that the husband's ability to pay has depreciated. Chastian v. Chastian, 73 S.2d 66 (Fla., 1954). It is not until then, under the Florida statute [F.S.A. (1951), § 65.15], that a decree for alimony is deemed to have been modified for the purpose of all actions or proceedings of every nature and wherever instituted, whether within or without    [the] state. Secondly, since the authority to modify a foreign alimony decree, insofar as future payments are concerned, does not apply to payments which have already accrued and vested, in the absence of proof that the foreign court could retroactively modify its decree or had done so prior to the maturity of the installments claimed to be due, the wife was entitled to judgment. There was no such proof, and there could be none in this case, because Florida holds that, even though a decree is subject to modification as to future payments, the right to alimony already accrued is vested, and a court is without power to modify past-due payments. Andruss v. Andruss, 144 Fla. 641, 198 So. 213 (1940). Accord, Blanton v. Blanton, 154 Fla. 750, 18 S.2d 902 (1944). That a court in this State will enforce an alimony decree of another state for the amount lawfully due and unpaid thereunder was settled by the decision in Rosenberg v. Rosenberg, 152 Md. 49, 135 A. 840 (1927). Therein, citing Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910), it was firmly established that, in the absence of proof to the contrary, it will be presumed that a foreign decree for alimony is not subject to annulment or modification as to the installments which had accrued and are unpaid, so as to preclude an action in Maryland to recover such unpaid installments. [1] See also McCabe v. McCabe, supra , in which it was further established that a court of equity is a proper forum in which to enforce a foreign decree for alimony accrued and to accrue. For the reasons assigned the decree in its entirety will be affirmed. Decree affirmed, the appellant to pay the costs.