Opinion ID: 76999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Election of Remedies/Satisfaction Issue

Text: 24 In the event that GEICO's tender of the policy limits did constitute a cure of Macola and Quigley's statutory bad faith claim, we must next consider whether that cure extinguished any common law claims. The district court held that Quigley elected the statutory remedy when she filed the CRN and therefore was estopped from pursuing a common law claim. It alternately held that, should the doctrine of election of remedies not apply, GEICO's tender had fully satisfied any bad faith claim. We address these alternate holdings in turn.
25 Under Florida law ... the election of remedies doctrine applies only where the remedies in question are coexistent and inconsistent. Barbe v. Villeneuve, 505 So.2d 1331, 1332 (Fla.1987). Remedies are only inconsistent where the allegations of facts necessary to support one remedy are substantially inconsistent with those necessary to support the other.... Id. at 1333 (internal quotation omitted). Since the statutory and common law bad faith claims in this case depend upon substantially similar factual allegations, they appear to be consistent under Florida law. 26 We also note that the statutory remedy at issue in this case does not preempt any other remedy or cause of action provided for pursuant to any other statute or pursuant to the common law of this state. Fla. Stat. § 624.155(8) (2004). That distinguishes the instant litigation from cases like Mandico v. Taos Construction, Inc., 605 So.2d 850, 853 (Fla.1992), wherein the Florida Supreme Court held that an employee who had received workers' compensation benefits had elected an exclusive remedy and was estopped from bringing a common law claim against his employer. See Fla. Stat. § 440.11(1) (2002) (providing that workers' compensation benefits are exclusive and in place of all other liability); Thornber v. Fort Walton Beach, 568 So.2d 914, 918 (Fla.1990) (Whether a statutory remedy is exclusive or merely cumulative depends upon the legislative intent as manifested in the language of the statute.). Because the statutory and common law remedies depend upon the same nucleus of facts and are cumulative rather than exclusive, the district court erred in holding that they are inconsistent as a matter of Florida law. Therefore, under Barbe, the district court erred in holding that Quigley's CRN constituted an election of remedy that estopped her from pursuing a common law bad faith claim.
27 While we are confident that Quigley's decision to file a CRN did not estop her common law bad faith claim, we are less certain about the effect of GEICO's tender. As noted above, the statute provides that its remedy does not preempt a common law cause of action. Fla. Stat. § 624.155(8). However, that same statutory provision also provides that [a]ny person may obtain a judgment under either a common-law remedy of bad faith or this statutory remedy, but shall not be entitled to a judgment under both remedies. Id. This would seem to be consistent with general Florida law, which provides that only a full satisfaction of the right asserted will estop the plaintiff from pursuing other consistent remedies. All consistent remedies may in general be pursued concurrently even to final adjudication; but the satisfaction of the claim by one remedy puts an end to other remedies. Barbe, 505 So.2d at 1333 (quoting Am. Process Co. v. Florida White Pressed Brick Co., 56 Fla. 116, 47 So. 942, 944 (1908)); see also Sec. & Inv. Corp. v. Droege, 529 So.2d 799, 802 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) ([I]f the remedies are concurrent or cumulative, and logically can coexist on the same facts, the doctrine of election does not apply until the injured party has received full satisfaction for his injuries.). 28 The district court held that GEICO's tender constituted a full satisfaction of Quigley's bad faith claim. If this holding is correct, then Quigley is estopped from pursuing a common law claim. 5 In other words, the district court believed that a full and valid cure 6 — i.e., the payment of the full policy limits within the required sixty days — also constituted a full satisfaction of the bad faith claim. On the other hand, Appellants argue that payment of the policy limits does not fully satisfy their bad faith claim, which they argue includes not only the contractual policy limits, but also damages resulting from GEICO's actions that left Quigley exposed to an excess judgment. We have found no controlling Florida cases, and there seem to be conflicting policy arguments. We are already certifying the cure issue to the Florida Supreme Court, and we conclude that it is appropriate to certify this issue as well.