Opinion ID: 1270085
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: prosecutorial discretion to charge manslaughter or careless use of a firearm

Text: Keith contends that on the facts of this case his conviction must be overturned as a violation of his constitutional equal protection and due process rights. [28] The basis for his claim is that the legislature had provided two statutes which proscribed the same conduct: careless use of firearms, AS 11.15.200, which was a misdemeanor, and manslaughter, AS 11.15.040, which was a felony. The manslaughter statute on which Keith's conviction is based stated: Manslaughter. Except as provided in §§ 10-30 of this chapter, a person who unlawfully kills another is guilty of manslaughter, and is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not less than one year nor more than 20 years. [29] The careless use statute which is at issue in this case provided in part: Careless use of firearms. (a) A person who intentionally, and without malice, points or aims a firearm at or toward a person, or discharges a firearm so pointed or aimed at a person, or points and discharges a firearm at or toward a person or object without knowing the identity of the object and maims or injures a human being, is guilty of the careless use of firearms, and upon conviction is punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000, or imprisonment for not more than one year, or by both.... (b) If death ensues from the maiming or injuring, the person discharging the firearm may, in the discretion of the prosecuting officer or grand jury, be charged with the crime of manslaughter. (c) This section does not apply to a case where firearms are used in self-defense or in the discharge of official duty, or in case of a justifiable homicide. [30] Keith's contention is that section (b) of the careless use statute vests impermissible discretion in the prosecutor to charge either manslaughter or careless use of firearms whenever a death results from an act which is a violation of the careless use statute. According to appellant, this situation exists because the two statutory offenses include precisely the same elements of criminality where death results from the use of the firearm. Under this interpretation of the careless use of firearms statute, appellant argues the degree of prosecutorial discretion involved raises serious questions of improper prosecutorial discretion and violation of equal protection. [31] However, this court has a duty to construe statutory provisions, whenever possible, to avoid the dangers of unconstitutionality. [32] In this case, the court must construe both the manslaughter statute and the careless use of firearms statute. At the time of the offense, AS 11.15.040 made any unlawful killing, except one which constitutes murder in the first or second degree, manslaughter. [33] The statute contained no listing of factors which constitute the crime of manslaughter; [34] however, it was generally recognized that unlawful killing meant either a voluntary act, but without malice, as upon a sudden heat of passion, or an involuntary act, done in the commission of some unlawful act. [35] In contrast to most jurisdictions, [36] the manslaughter statute in Alaska drew no distinction between the punishment of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. [37] Alternatively, manslaughter could be committed through [the] killing of a human being by the culpable negligence of another, [38] when the killing did not contain the elements of first or second degree murder, and was not justifiable [39] or excusable. [40] The state contends that a manslaughter conviction is appropriate anytime the state can prove that a violation of a misdemeanor statute, in this case careless use of firearms, has occurred and a death was proximately caused by the violation. [41] This position is termed the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine by the commentators and enjoys wide acceptance in other jurisdictions. [42] In Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897, 906 (Alaska 1970), we held that a killing done in the perpetration of a felony, but without a specific intent or purpose to kill, constitutes manslaughter. This is, in a sense, a felony-manslaughter rule and appears to be a rather distinctive homicide scheme. This court has never previously directly considered whether the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine is encompassed in the unlawful killing language of AS 11.15.040. This question is of significance to the present case because the jury was instructed on a misdemeanor-manslaughter theory, namely, that commission of all the elements of careless use of firearms with a death resulting, constituted manslaughter. In Christie v. State, 580 P.2d 310, 319 (Alaska 1978), this court interpreted the careless use statute as providing three ways in which it can be violated. The types of prohibited conduct were: 1. Intentionally, and without malice, pointing or aiming a firearm at or toward a person; 2. [Unintentionally] [d]ischarging a firearm which is pointed or aimed, intentionally and without malice, at a person; 3. Pointing and discharging, without malice, a firearm at or toward a person or object without knowing the identity of the object and maiming or injuring a human being. [footnote omitted] Id. Under the state's theory of this case, a violation of any of the prohibited conduct which resulted in a death would be manslaughter. [43] But resolution of Keith's prosecutorial discretion claims is complicated by the express statutory language of the careless use statute which, in part, specifically provided: If death ensues from the maiming or injury, the person discharging the firearm may, in the discretion of the prosecuting officer or grand jury, be charged with the crime of manslaughter. [44] Keith contends that this provision of AS 11.15.200(b) introduced an impermissible element of discretion in the prosecuting authority to charge a felony, manslaughter, or a misdemeanor, careless use of firearms, for the same conduct. We disagree for the following reasons. First, it should be noted that, by its express terms, the discretion-to-charge provision applies only to the third type of conduct listed above as an act contravening the careless use statute. [45] Thus, we think it notable that the legislature ascribed significance and accorded special statutory treatment to a killing which results from the pointing and discharging of a firearm not knowing the identity of the object it is pointed at and as result wounding or maiming a person. This is the only type of conduct under the careless use statute which requires actual injury to a human being for conviction of careless use. We think this indicates a legislative judgment that the type of behavior proscribed in (3) above is less culpable than an intentional pointing of a firearm at a person, even where no killing results. Thus, we conclude that a reasonable construction of former AS 11.15.200 is to find that the conduct in (1) and (2) above, essentially an intentional pointing and an intentional discharge of a firearm, if it results in death, is manslaughter. In essence, we hold that the misdemeanor-manslaughter doctrine was encompassed within the unlawful killing phraseology of AS 11.15.040, Alaska's former manslaughter statute. We further hold that in regard to this misdemeanor-manslaughter rule the conduct proscribed in the first two portions of the careless use statute, if death results, constitutes manslaughter under this doctrine. [46] As a result, we find no violation of equal protection because the misdemeanor statute sets forth the particular application of this doctrine. The statutes do not proscribe the same conduct because manslaughter under this provision requires the additional element of death of the victim.