Opinion ID: 1651227
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Defamation Claim: Truth as a Defense.

Text: The first issue we address is whether the district court erred in overruling the defendants' motion for directed verdict on the ground that the alleged slanderous statements were true as a matter of law. 1. Applicable law. The law of defamation includes the twin torts of libel and slander. Schlegel v. The Ottumwa Courier, 585 N.W.2d 217, 221 (Iowa 1998). Libel is generally a written publication of defamatory matter, and slander is generally an oral publication of such matter. Id. (citation omitted). As we noted in Schlegel, [t]he law of defamation embodies the public policy that individuals should be free to enjoy their reputation unimpaired by false and defamatory attacks. An action for defamation or slander is based upon a violation of this right. The gravamen or gist of an action for defamation is damage to the plaintiff's reputation. It is reputation which is defamed, reputation which is injured, and reputation which is protected by the law of defamation. Defamation is an impairment of a relational interest; it denigrates the opinion which others in the community have of the plaintiff and invades the plaintiff's interest in the [plaintiff's] reputation and good name. Id. (quoting 50 Am.Jur.2d Libel and Slander § 2, at 338-39 (1995)). In Hovey v. Iowa State Daily Publication Board, Inc., we adopted the view espoused in Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 581A comment f that if an allegedly defamatory statement is substantially true, it provides an absolute defense to an action for defamation. 372 N.W.2d 253, 256 (Iowa 1985). Comment f provides that many charges are made in terms that are accepted by their recipients in a popular rather than a technical sense. . . . It is not necessary to establish the literal truth of the precise statement made. Slight inaccuracies of expression are immaterial provided the defamatory charge is true in substance. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 581A cmt. f (1977). Prior to Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 110 S.Ct. 2695, 111 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), as a matter of constitutional law, a statement of opinion was thought not to be defamatory. As the United States Supreme Court stated in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., [u]nder the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error materially advances society's interest in uninhibited, robust, and wide-open debate on the public issues. They belong to that category of utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. 418 U.S. 323, 339-40, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3007, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805 (1974) (citations omitted); accord Jones v. Palmer Commc'ns, Inc., 440 N.W.2d 884, 891 (Iowa 1989) (Opinion is absolutely protected under the first amendment.), overruled on other grounds by Schlegel, 585 N.W.2d at 224. This statement in Gertz was dictum; however, a majority of the federal courts of appeal interpreted this dictum to mean that statements of fact can be actionable defamation but statements of opinion cannot. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc. v. Wilner, 760 A.2d 580, 596 (D.C.2000). As one court observed, [b]y this statement, Gertz elevated to constitutional principle the distinction between fact and opinion, which at common law had formed the basis of the doctrine of fair comment. Gertz's implicit command thus imposes upon state and federal courts the duty as a matter of constitutional adjudication to distinguish facts from opinions in order to provide opinions with the requisite, absolute First Amendment protection. Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 975 (D.C.Cir.1984) (footnotes omitted). The framework of analysis was therefore to determine whether the alleged defamatory statement was fact or opinion. Because the degree to which alleged defamatory statements have real factual content can vary greatly, the court in Ollman noted that courts should analyze the totality of the circumstances in which [such] statements are made to decide whether they merit the absolute First Amendment protection enjoyed by opinion. Id. at 979. In evaluating the totality of the circumstances, the court considered four factors in assessing whether the average reader or listener, in contrast to the most skeptical or most credulous reader or listener, would view the statement as fact or opinion. Id. at 979 & n. 16. These factors, the court was convinced, would lead to a proper accommodation between the competing interests in free expression of opinion and in an individual's reputation. Id. at 978. Following the lead of many other federal circuit courts of appeals, the eighth circuit adopted this four-factor test in Janklow v. Newsweek, Inc., 788 F.2d 1300, 1302 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 883, 107 S.Ct. 272, 93 L.Ed.2d 249 (1986). Relying on Janklow, we adopted the four-factor test in Palmer Communications, Inc., 440 N.W.2d at 891-92. The first relevant factor is whether the alleged defamatory statement has a precise core of meaning for which a consensus of understanding exists or, conversely, whether the statement is indefinite and ambiguous. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 979; see also Palmer Commc'ns, Inc., 440 N.W.2d at 891. We characterized this factor as the precision and specificity of the disputed statement. Palmer Commc'ns, Inc., 440 N.W.2d at 892 (citation omitted). The second relevant factor is the degree to which the [alleged defamatory] statements are . . . objectively capable of proof or disproof []. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 981. We related this factor to the first factor and noted that if a statement is precise and easy to verify, it is likely the statement is fact. Palmer Commc'ns Inc., 440 N.W.2d at 891. In this connection, one writer has defined a factual statement as one that relates to an event or state of affairs that existed in the past or exists at present and is capable of being known. See Ollman, 750 F.2d at 981 n. 22 (citation omitted). This verification factor is, in actuality, merely one of many rules in tort that prevent the jury from rendering a verdict based on speculation. Id. at 981. The third relevant factor is the context in which the alleged defamatory statement occurs. Id. [T]he context to be considered is both narrowly linguistic and broadly social. Id. We characterized this factor as the `literary context' in which the disputed statement [is] made. Palmer Commc'ns, Inc., 440 N.W.2d at 891. The degree to which a statement is laden with factual content or can be read to imply facts depends upon the article or column, see id., or in this case the whole discussion. The last relevant factor is the broader social context into which [the alleged defamatory] statement fits. Ollman, 750 F.2d at 983. Important here are the types of writing or speech in which the statement appears. Id. We likewise characterized this factor as the social context, and noted that this factor focuses on the category of publication, its style of writing and intended audience. Palmer Commc'ns Inc., 440 N.W.2d at 891-92 (citation omitted). We also noted that we consider the `public context' or political arena in which the statements were made. Id. at 892 (citations omitted). In 1990 the Court in Milkovich rejected this per se approach providing blanket First Amendment protection of all statements of opinion: [W]e do not think this passage from Gertz [quoted above] was intended to create a wholesale defamation exemption for anything that might be labeled opinion . . . . Not only would such an interpretation be contrary to the tenor and context of the passage, but it would also ignore the fact that expressions of opinion may often imply an assertion of fact. 497 U.S. at 18, 110 S.Ct. at 2705, 111 L.Ed.2d at 17. Noting that the Gertz dictum ignored the fact that expressions of `opinion' may often imply an assertion of fact, the Court gave the following example to support this statement: If a speaker says, In my opinion John Jones is a liar, he implies a knowledge of facts which lead to the conclusion that Jones told an untruth. Even if the speaker states the facts upon which he bases his opinion, if those facts are either incorrect or incomplete, or if his assessment of them is erroneous, the statement may still imply a false assertion of fact. Simply couching such statements in terms of opinion does not dispel these implications; and the statement, In my opinion Jones is a liar, can cause as much damage to reputation as the statement, Jones is a liar. Id. at 18-19, 110 S.Ct. at 2705-06, 111 L.Ed.2d at 17-18. Citing existing law, the Court clarified that only statements regarding matters of public concern that are not sufficiently factual to be capable of being proven true or false and statements that cannot reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts are absolutely protected under the Constitution. In making this clarification, the Court rejected the creation of an artificial dichotomy between `opinion' and fact. Id. at 19-20, 110 S.Ct. at 2705-06, 111 L.Ed.2d at 18. In rejecting this dichotomy, the court did not, however, abolish the constitutional protection for opinions. It merely narrowed that protection. Hunt v. Univ. of Minn., 465 N.W.2d 88, 94 (Minn.Ct.App.1991). Thus, the framework of analysis is no longer whether the alleged defamatory statement is fact or opinion. Rather the framework of analysis now is whether the alleged defamatory statement can reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts and whether those facts are capable of being proven true or false. Under this analysis, statements of opinion can be actionable if they imply a provable false fact, or rely upon stated facts that are provably false. Moldea v. New York Times Co., 22 F.3d 310, 313 (D.C.Cir.1994). The statement that the plaintiff must prove false is not the literal wording of the statement but what a reasonable reader or listener would have understood the author to have said. Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 16-17, 110 S.Ct. at 2704-05, 111 L.Ed.2d at 16. Although the Court in Milkovich rejected the dichotomy between fact and opinion as the framework of analysis, we agree with the following: The test used in Milkovich to identify protected opinions is very similar to the four-factor inquiry used by the circuit courts to distinguish fact from opinion. Specificity and variability are closely related to whether the statement is capable of being proven false. Whether a remark can be reasonably interpreted as stating actual facts must be inferred from the political, literary, and social context in which the statement was made. Given the similarity between the Supreme Court's definition of protected opinion and the circuit courts' fact/opinion analysis, decisions applying the Janklow test are still helpful under Milkovich. Hunt, 465 N.W.2d at 94; see also Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 24-25, 110 S.Ct. at 2709, 111 L.Ed.2d at 21-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority's statement of the law but disagreeing with the majority's application of the law to the facts; also noting that among the circumstances a court is to consider in determining whether a statement purports to state or imply actual facts about an individual are the same four factors used to distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion first stated in Ollman and adopted in Janklow ). We will therefore employ the four-factor test we adopted in Palmer Communications to identify protected opinion under the Milkovich framework of analysis. A trial court's initial task in a defamation action is to decide whether the challenged statement is capable of bearing a particular meaning, and whether that meaning is defamatory. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 614(1) (1977); see also Levy v. Am. Mut. Liability Ins. Co., 196 A.2d 475, 476 (D.C.1964) (It is only when the court can say that the publication is not reasonably capable of any defamatory meaning and cannot be reasonably understood in any defamatory sense that it can rule, as a matter of law, that it was not libelous.). In carrying out this task, a court should not, however, indulge far-fetched interpretations of the challenged publication. The statements at issue should . . . be construed as the average or common mind would naturally understand [them]. If the court determines that a statement is indeed capable of bearing a defamatory meaning, then whether that statement is in fact defamatory and false [is a question] of fact to be resolved by the jury. Guilford Transp. Indus., 760 A.2d at 594 (citations omitted). 2. The merits. As mentioned, minutes of the Commission meeting on November 16, 2000 reflect that attorney Crawford questioned the reasons given for terminating the Yates Kennel when kennels ranked lower than it received contracts for 2001, and over half of the kennels consistently had less than the required number of greyhounds on the active list. The minutes further reflect that in responding to this comment, attorney Ditmars stated the following: Yates Kennel is second from last in the kennel standings. The kennel in last place did not receive a six-month contract in the previous year, as did the Yates Kennel due to poor performance in 1999. Beverly Yates testified Ditmars' statement that Yates Kennel is second from last in kennel standings was true. She further testified over hearsay objections that she read newspaper accounts of the Commission meeting stating that Yates Kennel had a poor, noncompetive kennel. David Ungs testified that he was president of the IGA at the times material to this action. Ungs further testified that in his capacity as president he met with Vern Welch, a representative of Bluffs Run management, some time before the commission meeting on November 16, 1999. In his conversation with Welch, Ungs stated he and Welch discussed the possibility of kennels losing their booking contracts. According to Ungs, Welch stated that Bluffs Run was one of the leading tracks in the country as far as payouts were concerned and that the kennels would need to be more competitive or they would be eliminated. Later at the Commission hearing on November 16, which Ungs attended, Ungs learned that the Yates Kennel's booking contract would not be renewed. He recalled that at the November 16 meeting Ditmars said that Yates Kennel did not receive a booking contract because they were a substandard or lower kennel. The plaintiffs contend that the references to Yates Kennel as substandard and poor performers as testified to by Beverly Yates and David Ungs were defamatory. For reasons that follow, we disagree. The issue boils down to whether the Ditmars statement substandard and poor performers, which is an opinion, implies a provably false fact, or relies upon stated facts that are provably false. Viewing this statement in context, we first note that Ditmars' statement was in response to Crawford's questioning of the reasons given for terminating the kennel's booking contract. Ditmars set out facts (the kennel's ranking compared to other kennels), which signaled to a reasonable listener that his statement poor and substandard performers represented a characterization of those facts. Moreover, substandard and poor performers do not have a precise and verifiable meaning and are therefore less likely to give rise to clear factual implications. But even if the words substandard and poor performers are verifiable, that assessment is supported by stated facts that are true. Cf. Moldea, 22 F.3d at 317 (Assuming statement, contained in review of book reporting on alleged gang connections with professional football, that author had engaged in too much sloppy journalism, was capable of verification, statement was not defamatory because book review author had supported statement with illustrations from book itself). Ditmars' disclosure of the facts underlying his statement of substandard and poor performers, facts that Beverly Yates conceded were true, makes this case different from Milkovich. A reasonable reader could conclude that Ditmars was giving his personal conclusion or opinion about those undisputed facts. The reader could further conclude that Ditmars' statement did not imply any provable false fact. See Phantom Touring, Inc. v. Affiliated Publ'ns, 953 F.2d 724, 731 & n. 13 (1st Cir.1992) (Newspaper articles that allegedly falsely accused touring company of deliberate effort to pass off its musical-comedy version as widely acclaimed Broadway show of same name did not constitute actionable defamation because assertion of deceit reasonably could have been understood not as a statement of fact but only as reporter's personal conclusion about information that was presented which was not challenged as false.) A good example of a statement with a well-defined meaning is an accusation of a crime. See, e.g., Cianci v. New Times Publ'g Co., 639 F.2d 54, 63 (2d Cir.1980) (holding that an article that implied a mayor had committed rape and that charged him with paying the alleged victim not to bring charges was not protected opinion). Clearly, an accusation of a crime is laden with factual content and the facts are easily verifiable. Such was the case in Milkovich. In that case a high school wrestling coach argued that an Ohio newspaper libeled him by printing a column that alleged he had perjured himself in his testimony to a state court concerning his role in an altercation between his team and an opposing team at a wrestling match. The column stated that Anyone who attended the meet . . . knows in his heart that Milkovich. . . lied at the hearing . . . . Milkovich, 497 U.S. at 5, 110 S.Ct. at 2698, 111 L.Ed.2d at 9. The Court rejected the argument that an accusation of perjury was nonactionable merely because it was offered as the writer's opinion. Id. at 21, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19. The Court noted that the connotation that the petitioner committed perjury is sufficiently factual to be susceptible of being proved true or false . . . . `Unlike a subjective assertion the averred defamatory language is an articulation of an objectively verifiable event.' Id. at 21-22, 110 S.Ct. at 2707, 111 L.Ed.2d at 19 (citation omitted). For all of these reasons, we conclude as a matter of law that the statement substandard and poor performers constituted nothing more than Ditmars' conclusion or opinion, which contained nothing that implied any provable false fact. Moreover the statement was based on facts that were true. As such the statement was not defamatory.