Opinion ID: 2023392
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: financial transaction device

Text: In order to resist a challenge by a plea in abatement, the evidence received by the committing magistrate need show only that a crime was committed and that there is probable cause to believe that the accused committed it. The evidence need not be sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bottolfson, 259 Neb. 470, 610 N.W.2d 378 (2000). The State's first assignment of error requires us to determine whether credit card account numbers included on the billing statements taken from the premises of FDR constitute a financial transaction device as defined by § 28-618(7). In making this determination, we consider the language of the statute in conjunction with the familiar principle that if the language of a statute is clear, the words of such statute are the end of any judicial inquiry. In re Guardianship & Conservatorship of Garcia, 262 Neb. 205, 631 N.W.2d 464 (2001); Mulinix v. Roberts, 261 Neb. 800, 626 N.W.2d 220 (2001). We respectfully disagree with the reasoning of the district court that the terms instrument and device in § 28-618(7) refer exclusively to such items as tangible bank or credit card[s] and not to account numbers on billing statements. This construction ignores the plain language of the statute which includes an account number representing a financial account within the definition of a financial transaction device. § 28-618(7). If it can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence of a statute should be rejected as superfluous or meaningless. Hatcher v. Bellevue Vol. Fire Dept., 262 Neb. 23, 628 N.W.2d 685 (2001); City of Lincoln v. Nebraska Liquor Control Comm., 261 Neb. 783, 626 N.W.2d 518 (2001). Here, it is clear that the Legislature intended to include both tangible items such as credit cards and the account numbers reflected on such cards within the definition of a financial transaction device. We note that even under statutes less explicit than ours, other state courts have held that the wrongful use of a credit card number is the equivalent of wrongfully using the credit card itself. See, State v. Morgan, 985 P.2d 1022 (Alaska App.1999); State v. Shea, 221 Wis.2d 418, 585 N.W.2d 662 (Wis.App.1998); Patterson v. State, 326 Ark. 1004, 935 S.W.2d 266 (1996); State v. Howard, 221 Kan. 51, 557 P.2d 1280 (1976). The reasoning of the Alaska Court of Appeals in State v. Morgan, 985 P.2d at 1023, is typical and instructive: Policy considerations and case law support the conclusion that a credit card number is included in the definition of credit card. As the Arkansas Supreme Court recognized in Patterson v. State , [i]t is the use of the account numbers on a credit card which gives the plastic card any credit value. Most people are aware that once they memorize the number on their plastic credit card, they no longer need the plastic card to make long-distance telephone calls or to purchase other goods or services over the telephone or across the Internet. In these transactions, merchants and buyers do not meet face-to-face, and merchants do not demand proof that the buyer is holding a plastic card. Rather, the buyer's knowledge of the credit card number is what allows the buyer to make these purchases on credit. Physical possession of the plastic card is unnecessary, for the value of the card resides in the number. (Emphasis supplied.) We conclude that the district court erred in holding that the credit card account numbers on the statements Rhea took from FDR did not constitute financial transaction devices as defined by § 28-618(7).