Opinion ID: 1875306
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Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Critical Municipal Employee

Text: Disputes over the interpretation of a statute can arise even with the most carefully drafted laws. 2A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 45:02, at 15 (6th ed. 2000) [hereinafter Singer]. Disputes arise because it is nearly impossible, even for the most thoughtful lawmakers, to anticipate all future circumstances and neatly corral them into communicative words. Id. Thus, it is a fundamental role, and duty, of courts to interpret statutes enacted by our legislature when particular disputes arise. See Slockett v. Iowa Valley Cmty. Sch. Dist., 359 N.W.2d 446, 448 (Iowa 1984) ([I]t is the fundamental prerogative of the legislature to declare what the law shall be, but of the courts to declare what it is. (Citation omitted.)); accord Lynch v. Saddler, 656 N.W.2d 104, 108 (Iowa 2003) (In general, it is the legislature's duty to declare the law and the court's responsibility to interpret the law. (Citation omitted.)). Courts have, over time, carefully crafted and refined rules of construction to help ascertain the legislative intent of a statute. See State v. DeCamp, 622 N.W.2d 290, 294 (Iowa 2001) (In the absence of clear legislative intent, we turn to the rules of statutory construction. (citing State v. Perez, 563 N.W.2d 625, 628 (Iowa 1997))); Singer § 45:02, at 13 (Accepted rules of statutory construction can provide helpful guidance in uncovering the most likely legislative intent.). We apply these rules in resolving statutory disputes to attain our goal of interpreting statutes according to the intent of the legislature. See Iowa Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 606 N.W.2d 359, 363 (Iowa 2000) (In interpreting the statute, our ultimate goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. (citing Iowa Fed'n of Labor AFL-CIO v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 427 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1988))). We begin in this case, as we do in all cases, with the language of the statute. See Singer § 47:01, at 208 (The starting point in statutory construction is to read and examine the text of the act....). Iowa Code section 400.17 provides, in relevant part: Cities may set reasonable maximum distances outside of the corporate limits of the city that police officers, fire fighters and other critical municipal employees may live. Iowa Code § 400.17. Gotto claims the legislature intended the phrase critical municipal employees to cover only employees who regularly respond to emergency situations that threaten life or property, such as police and firefighters. The City claims the legislature intended the phrase to be broad enough to cover employees who operate snow-removal equipment. These claims illustrate the ambiguity in the statute presented by the circumstances of this case, and require us to interpret the statute. [2] Neither the phrase critical municipal employees, nor the term critical, was defined by our legislature in the civil service statute or any other section of the Code. Additionally, we have not established the meaning of the phrase in our prior decisions. [3] Absent a definition by the legislature or an established meaning in the law, we have repeatedly said that words in the statute are given their ordinary and common meaning by considering the context within which they are used. Auen v. Alcoholic Beverages Div., Iowa Dep't of Commerce, 679 N.W.2d 586, 590 (Iowa 2004) (citing Midwest Auto. III, L.L.C. v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 646 N.W.2d 417, 426 (Iowa 2002)); accord Gen. Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 702 N.W.2d 485, 489 (Iowa 2005) (`Ordinarily, the usual and ordinary meaning is to be given the language used but the manifest intent of the legislature will prevail over the literal import of the words used.' (quoting Welp v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue, 333 N.W.2d 481, 483-84 (Iowa 1983); citing Gen. Elec. Co. v. Iowa State Bd. of Tax Review, 492 N.W.2d 417, 420 (Iowa 1992))); see also Worth County Friends of Agric. v. Worth County, 688 N.W.2d 257, 263 (Iowa 2004) (stating when a term is not defined in the statute, `we look to prior decisions of this court, similar statutes, dictionary definitions, and common usage' (quoting Bob Zimmerman Ford, Inc. v. Midwest Auto. I, L.L.C., 679 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Iowa 2004))). We begin down the path of legislative intent with this rule of construction in mind. In the context of describing a person, the dictionary definition of critical means essential, or indispensable for the weathering, solution, or the overcoming of a crisis. Webster's Third New International Dictionary 538 (2002); accord Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 275 (10th ed. 2002) (vital, indispensable). This meaning reveals that the phrase critical municipal employee is not limited to traditional emergency responders, but rather would encompass any employee who performs work that is essential or indispensable in responding to or dealing with any municipal crisis or potential crisis. Notwithstanding, the court of appeals identified another interpretive aid to support its conclusion that our legislature did intend to limit the phrase critical municipal employee to employees who regularly work as emergency responders. This aid of statutory interpretation is known as ejusdem generis. [4] It provides that when general words follow specific words in a statute, the general words are read to embrace only objects similar to those objects of the specific words. Messerschmidt v. City of Sioux City, 654 N.W.2d 879, 884 (Iowa 2002) (citing Shatzer v. Globe Am. Cas. Co., 639 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 2001)); accord Maxim Techs., Inc. v. City of Dubuque, 690 N.W.2d 896, 902 (Iowa 2005); Black's Law Dictionary 535; Singer § 47:17, at 272-81. The rule recognizes and gives effect to both the specific and general words by using the class indicated by the specific words to extend the scope of the statute with the general words to include additional terms or objects within the class. Id. at 285. In using the doctrine as an interpretative aid, it is important to keep in mind that it is not applied in a vacuum, and disputes cannot be resolved by merely tying the issue to the procrustean bed of ejusdem generis.  United States v. Weadon, 145 F.3d 158, 162 (3d Cir.1998). In fact, there are several conditions that have been identified for the doctrine to apply, but none more important than the identification of the class. [5] Classes can be defined in a vast number of ways, but the key to unlocking the true value of the doctrine is to ensure that the identified class has some objective relationship to the aim of the statute. Singer § 47:18, at 289. In other words, the basis for determining which among various semantically correct definitions of the class should be given effect is found in the purpose and subject of the statute as revealed in the legislative intent. Id. In this case, the court of appeals found the specific enumerations  police and firefighters  identified a class of emergency responders, or employees who respond quickly to emergencies that threaten life or property. While it is undeniably true that police and firefighters are both emergency responders, this classification lacks a connection to the residency of the employees. Consequently, the classification has a tenuous relationship to the purpose and intent of the statute. We think the germane feature of the class under the statute is not that the included employees respond to emergencies in the performance of their regular duties for the municipality, but that the employees in the class perform a critical function for the municipality that may require them to reliably and quickly respond from their residence to a community crisis or potential crisis. As a public safety measure, the statute ensures that critical employees will be able to promptly get to work in the event of an emergency or crisis. In this light, not only is it important for employees who regularly respond to emergencies in their work to be able to quickly respond to a community crisis or potential crisis from their residence, but it is also important for employees who may not regularly respond to emergencies in their work but who nevertheless perform critical duties for the municipality in the event of a crisis or potential crisis. This feature is the essential element of the class in the context of the residency requirement imposed under the statute. An interpretation that restricts critical employees to emergency responders would not give full effect to the purpose and intent of the statute. Once the class is properly tied to the subject and purpose of section 400.17, the doctrine of ejusdem generis reveals, as does the common meaning of the language of the statute, that critical employees are not limited to employees who regularly respond to emergencies, but includes all employees who must report to work from their homes at times to perform critical functions for a municipality in the event of a community crisis. We conclude our legislature did not intend to limit the class of critical municipal employees to emergency responders. Notwithstanding, Gotto further argues that a snowplow operator is not a critical employee even if the statute includes employees other than emergency responders. He maintains, as the court of appeals found, that snowplow operators must no longer respond quickly to snow and ice storms in light of the advanced warning of storms provided by modern forecasting technology, as well as the modern anti-icing and snow-removal technology. We disagree that Gotto is not a critical employee for three reasons. First, we reject the underlying premise relied upon by the court of appeals. While it may be possible for a court to take judicial notice of improved weather forecasting and the improved predictability of impending storms, the nature and severity of storms, and the precise location of storms in particular, remain very uncertain. A regional forecast of a few inches of snow can quickly turn into a substantial amount of snow or ice in a particular location within the forecast region. Second, the undisputed evidence in the case was that Gotto has been called into work from his home to perform his snow-removal duties in the past. This evidence reveals Gotto is an indispensable component of a team of city employees that responds to crises and emergencies faced by the community. It is hard to imagine that a snowplow operator would not be a critical municipal employee in Iowa, in light of our dependence on travel and the need for our government to keep roads and streets open to facilitate travel during inclement winter weather at all times of the day and night. A snowplow is often the lifeline to winter travel. Indeed, it would be ironic to include regular emergency responders as critical employees but exclude those employees charged with the responsibility of keeping streets and roads open during snow and ice storms for emergency responders to perform their duties. We will not interpret a statute to reach an absurd result. See State v. Petithory, 702 N.W.2d 854, 859 (Iowa 2005) (stating we interpret statutes in a commonsense manner and avoid absurd results (citing State v. Anderson, 636 N.W.2d 26, 35 (Iowa 2001)); Harrington v. State, 659 N.W.2d 509, 520 (Iowa 2003)). That too is an interpretive aid that supports our conclusion that snowplow operators are critical municipal employees under section 400.17. As a public safety measure, we will not interpret section 400.17 too narrowly so as to undermine or jeopardize its purpose. Instead, we interpret statutes consistent with their purpose. See IBP, Inc. v. Harker, 633 N.W.2d 322, 325 (Iowa 2001) (stating we give statutes `a reasonable construction that will effectuate the statute's purpose rather than one that will defeat it' (quoting Voss v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 621 N.W.2d 208, 211 (Iowa 2001))).