Opinion ID: 1298362
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We move next to the authority of this Court to hear the matter, addressing the substance of a motion filed here by Appellees after this appeal was docketed by this Court, asserting that we have no jurisdiction of the appeal because the circuit court remanded the matter to a lower court with directions. We consider challenges to our jurisdiction even when not raised as an assignment of error. As set forth in syllabus point two of In re Boggs' Estate, 135 W.Va. 288, 63 S.E.2d 497 (1951), [t]his Court, on its own motion, will take notice of lack of jurisdiction at any time or at any stage of the litigation pending therein. The issue addressed by the motion is essentially the same as that posed in another case decided this term, Foster v. Sakhai, 210 W.Va. 716, 559 S.E.2d 53 (2001). There the Appellee claimed that this Court lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal of an order granting a new trial in the circuit court because the Legislature had amended a statute addressing the jurisdiction of this Court, removing a provision, inter alia, expressly authorizing appeals of orders granting a new trial. In Foster, this Court determined that the Legislature could not have intended to remove from the jurisdiction of this Court certain matters over which this Court has historically exercised jurisdiction and matters over which this Court has authority by virtue of constitutional provisions. [19] We agree with the reasoning employed in Foster. Since the adoption of the 1974 Judicial Reorganization Amendment, the constitution has contained the following regarding this Court's appellate jurisdiction: The court shall have appellate jurisdiction in civil cases at law where the matter in controversy, exclusive of interest and costs, is of greater value or amount than three hundred dollars unless such value or amount is increased by the legislature; in civil cases in equity; in controversies concerning the title or boundaries of land; in proceedings in quo warranto, habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and certiorari; and in cases involving personal freedom or the constitutionality of a law. It shall have appellate jurisdiction in criminal cases, where there has been a conviction for a felony or misdemeanor in a circuit court, and such appellate jurisdiction as may be conferred upon it by law where there has been such a conviction in any other court. In criminal proceedings relating to the public revenue, the right of appeal shall belong to the State as well as to the defendant. It shall have such other appellate jurisdiction, in both civil and criminal cases, as may be prescribed by law. The court shall have power to promulgate rules for all cases and proceedings, civil and criminal, for all of the courts of the State relating to writs, warrants, process, practice and procedure, which shall have the force and effect of law. W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3. Until 1998, the legislative enactment related to this Court's jurisdiction read as follows: A party to a controversy in any circuit court may obtain from the supreme court of appeals, or a judge thereof in vacation, an appeal from, or a writ of error or supersedeas to, a judgment, decree or order of such circuit court in the following cases: (a) In civil cases where the matter in controversy, exclusive of costs, is of greater value or amount than one hundred dollars, wherein there is a final judgment, decree or order; (b) In controversies concerning the title or boundaries of land, the probate of a will, or the appointment of a personal representative, guardian, committee or curator; (c) Concerning a mill, road, way, ferry or landing; (d) Concerning the right of a corporation, county or district to levy tolls or taxes; (e) In any case of quo warranto, habeas corpus, mandamus or prohibition; (f) In any case involving freedom or the constitutionality of a law; (g) In any case in chancery wherein there is a decree or order dissolving or refusing to dissolve an injunction, or requiring money to be paid, or real estate to be sold, or the possession or title of property to be changed, or adjudicating the principles of the cause; (h) In any case where there is a judgment or order quashing or abating, or refusing to quash or abate, an attachment; (i) In any civil case where there is an order granting a new trial or rehearing, and in such cases as appeal may be taken from the order without waiting for the new trial or rehearing to be had; (j) In any criminal case where there has been a conviction in a circuit court or a conviction in an inferior court which has been affirmed in a circuit court. Appeals shall not lie under subdivisions (g), (h) and (i) where pecuniary interests only are involved, unless the amount in controversy, exclusive of costs, exceeds one hundred dollars. W.Va.Code § 58-5-1 (1925) (Repl.Vol.1997). In its 1998 amendment of West Virginia Code § 58-5-1, the Legislature elected to address only sub-section (a) of the former enactment, relating to the appeal of final orders in civil cases, as follows: A party to a civil action may appeal to the supreme court of appeals from a final judgment of any circuit court or from an order of any circuit court constituting a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all claims or parties upon an express determination by the circuit court that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment as to such claims or parties. The defendant in a criminal action may appeal to the supreme court of appeals from a final judgment of any circuit court in which there has been a conviction or which affirms a conviction obtained in an inferior court. W.Va.Code § 58-5-1 (1998) (Supp.2001). As enacted, the 1998 amendment operates only to clarify the ability to appeal civil actions in which final judgments have been entered or partial final judgments have been entered pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and to remove the requirement that an appealable civil action involve any particular amount in controversy. In its 1998 amendment of West Virginia Code § 58-5-1, the Legislature acknowledged that the former provisions of that section were not in conformity with rules of appellate procedure promulgated by the supreme court of appeals, but elected not to address with particularity any of the myriad of matters other than appeals of final orders previously addressed in that section. 1998 W.Va. Acts ch. 110. Some of those other matters had been addressed in the statute for decades. In particular, the ability to appeal orders granting new trials has been a part of our statutory law since 1868. [20] Instead, the Legislature left these matters to be dealt with under the grant of jurisdiction and rule-making authority contained in the constitution. W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3. In his concurring opinion in State ex rel. Allen v. Bedell, 193 W.Va. 32, 454 S.E.2d 77 (1994), Justice Cleckley called upon the Legislature to amend West Virginia Code § 58-5-1 to provide for ordinary interlocutory review whenever the question presented is either of great practical importance in a particular case or of general importance as a matter of procedural law. Id. at 39, 454 S.E.2d at 84. Unfortunately, the Legislature did not heed that advice in writing its 1998 amendments, preferring to address only final judgments and partial final judgments. Notwithstanding this Court's agreement with former Justice Cleckley that the Legislature should both recognize and expressly provide for flexible interlocutory review within West Virginia Code § 58-5-1, we share the view articulated in Foster that this Court's jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeals of orders granting a new trial is encompassed within the authority granted under the state constitution for appellate review of both cases of law and cases of equity. W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3. We are also mindful of the action of the Legislature in giving the magistrate courts the status of a court of limited record in civil cases heard by a jury. See W.Va.Code § 50-5-8(e) (1994). In doing so, the Legislature provided that, upon appeal to a circuit court of such case, the appeal was to be on the record made below and the circuit court, rather than holding a trial de novo as in the past, is to review the case for errors in law according to specific standards set out by statute. See W.Va.Code § 50-5-12(c)(3) (1994). [21] In so doing, the Legislature has clothed the magistrate courts in such cases with a status closely akin to the court of record of limited jurisdiction created and implemented under the former provisions of Article VIII, § 19 of the West Virginia Constitution and West Virginia Code § 58-4-1 (1931), et seq. While the cited constitutional provisions have been repealed, the related statutory provisions remain on the books. In West Virginia Code § 58-4-17 (1931), the Legislature had provided with respect to cases originally heard in such court of limited jurisdiction and subsequently appealed to circuit courts, that an appeal would lie to this Court from any action of the circuit court in affirming or reversing any judgment, decree or order of such court of limited jurisdiction. W.Va.Code § 58-4-17 (1931). We read that language as treating as an appealable order any action of the circuit court reversing the judgment of an inferior court, even though the order reversing the judgment undertook to remand the case to the inferior court for a new trial or other proceedings. In a similar light, it appears that an order of a circuit court reversing a judgment of a magistrate court in an action heard there on its merits constitutes an appealable order, notwithstanding any language in the circuit court order undertaking to remand the case to the magistrate court for a new trial or other proceedings. In light of the foregoing, we conclude that this Court is vested with jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a circuit court judgment reversing the judgment of the magistrate court in a matter heard there on the merits, notwithstanding the fact that the order also undertakes to remand the case to the magistrate court for a new trial or other proceedings. Insofar as Ritchie County Bank v. Ritchie County Court, 65 W.Va. 208, 63 S.E. 1098 (1909), and its progeny may be read to hold otherwise, they are overruled.