Opinion ID: 516191
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Instructions on Mitigating Circumstances

Text: 131 Jones argues that the jury instructions at the sentencing phase were insufficient to enable them to give his mitigating evidence independent mitigating weight as constitutionally required by Lockett v. Ohio. 58 The court instructed the jury: 132 You are required to consider the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deciding which sentence should be imposed.... Before you decide that a sentence of death should be imposed you must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one statutory aggravating circumstance existed.... If you find beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the relied on statutory aggravating circumstances existed you may consider imposing a sentence of death. If, however, you do not unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the relied upon statutory aggravating circumstances existed then life imprisonment without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence is the only sentence that may be imposed. However, even if you find the existence of an alleged aggravating circumstance relied on by the State you must also consider any mitigating circumstances before you decide that a sentence of death should be imposed.... You are not limited only to those mitigating circumstances which are specifically defined because ... you can consider any other relevant mitigating circumstance which you feel should mitigate the severity of the penalty to be imposed. 133 Jones claims that the instruction was improper because (1) the jury might speculate that Jones had to prove mitigating factors beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the jury was not told it had the option to exercise mercy and return a life sentence even if no mitigating factors were present; (3) the jury was not instructed to weigh aggravating against mitigating circumstances; (4) the jury would not know whether to weigh the relative number of aggravating and mitigating circumstances or their relative substantiality; and (5) the jury was not told that it was not bound by its finding of aggravating factors at the guilt phase. The trial court denied Jones's request for instructions that he claims would have cured each of these infirmaries. 134 In examining Jones's first ground of error, then, it is not relevant that the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated 59 that there is no burden of proof on the defendant in establishing mitigating circumstances. The standard we follow in interpreting jury instructions is  'what a reasonable juror could have understood the charge as meaning,'  not what the state courts declare their meaning to be. 60 If there is a substantial possibility that the jury may have rested its verdict on an improper ground, we must remand for resentencing. 61 135 Jones argues that since the only burden of proof mentioned in the instructions is the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard for establishing aggravating circumstances, the jury might reasonably conclude that Jones had to establish mitigating circumstances to that degree of certainty. This argument is relevant only if the state disputed the existence of a mitigating circumstance. Jones offered as mitigating circumstances that he had no significant prior criminal activity, that the offense was committed while he was emotionally distressed about breaking up with the victim's mother, that he had been drinking on the night of the crime, and that he loved and was loved by his family. The state did argue at sentencing that no evidence was presented of any emotional or mental disturbance, but did not challenge Jones's evidence about his relationship with the victim's mother on which his alleged emotional state was based. Thus, the failure to instruct the jury that Jones had no burden of proof in establishing mitigating circumstances did not prejudice Jones, even if the jury believed that it had to prove the existence of mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable juror might conclude that, because Jones's evidence was undisputed, he had established those mitigating circumstances. 136 Jones's second contention is that the court erred in not instructing the jury that it had the option to exercise mercy even absent other mitigating factors. In California v. Brown, 62 the Supreme Court upheld an instruction not to be swayed by mere sentiment [or] sympathy, concluding that there is no constitutional requirement that the jury consider emotional responses that are not rooted in the aggravating and mitigating evidence introduced during the penalty phase. 63 Since the jury was allowed to consider all mitigating circumstances, it was allowed to respond to the sympathy that would properly arise from them. 137 We reject Jones's contention that the court erred in denying him an instruction that the jury must weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances in reaching a sentencing recommendation. As we have stated earlier, Louisiana law does not require the weighing of aggravating against mitigating circumstances. 64 Unless the jury is precluded from considering mitigating circumstances, 65 the Constitution does not require a state to adopt specific standards for instructing the jury in its consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. 66 Since the jury was instructed here, as required by the Louisiana sentencing statute, 67 to consider mitigating circumstances before deciding on a sentence, the instructions were constitutional. 138 We cannot accept Jones's claim that the instructions might have misled the jury into thinking it was supposed to weigh the number, rather than the weight, of the aggravating circumstances against the mitigating ones. It strains credulity that a reasonable juror would think it had to ignore how important it viewed an aggravating or mitigating circumstance, and treat every circumstance, once proved, as of equal force in assessing a jury punishment. 139 As to Jones's assertion that the jury might have thought that it was bound by its finding of aggravating factors at the guilt stage, the language of the instructions makes such a belief highly unlikely. The instructions told the jury it had to find an aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and used the conditional if to leave open the possibility that it would not.