Opinion ID: 175877
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Residual Diplomatic Immunity

Text: Under 22 U.S.C. § 254d, a district court must dismiss [a]ny action or proceeding brought against an individual who is entitled to immunity with respect to such action or proceeding under the [Vienna Convention]. This statutory dictate is consistent with the Vienna Convention itself, which provides that a diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal... civil and administrative jurisdiction  of the receiving state. Vienna Convention art. 31(1) (emphasis added). Cf. Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed.2d 47 (1993) (sovereign immunity means immunity from jurisdiction). We note that the Supreme Court has specifically declined to rule on whether a related treaty, the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77 (entered into force in U.S. Dec. 13, 1972), is a self-executing treaty. See Medellin, 552 U.S. at 506 n. 4, 128 S.Ct. 1346 ([Here] it is unnecessary to resolve whether the Vienna Convention is itself `self-executing'....); see also id. (citing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343, 126 S.Ct. 2669, 165 L.Ed.2d 557 (2006) ([F]or purposes of addressing petitioners' claims, we assume, without deciding, that [the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations] does grant [petitioners] asserted rights.)). Because Swarna does not seek a remedy under the Vienna Convention, but instead seeks a remedy under state and federal law, we similarly need not determine whether the treaty is self-executing or whether the treaty provides rights conferred directly upon individuals that are assertable, in a private action brought directly under the Convention itself or pursuant to [federal law]. Mora, 524 F.3d at 193. Although diplomats enjoy broad immunity pursuant to the Vienna Convention from civil and criminal process, see Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir.2010), diplomats lose much of their immunity following the termination of their diplomatic status, Vienna Convention art. 39(2); see also Brzak, 597 F.3d at 113. Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention states: When the functions of a person enjoying privileges and immunities have come to an end, such privileges and immunities shall normally cease at the moment when he leaves the country, or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so, but shall subsist until that time, even in case of armed conflict. However, with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, immunity shall continue to subsist. Vienna Convention art. 39(2) (emphasis added). Article 39(2) of the Vienna Convention thus provides for so-called residual immunity, which is a less expansive immunity that remains with the former diplomats for certain acts committed during their occupation of the diplomatic station. Specifically, once a diplomat becomes a former diplomat, he or she is not immune from suit for prior acts unless those acts were performed in the exercise of [the former diplomat's] functions as a member of the mission. Vienna Convention art. 39(2). Initially, we address whether Al-Shaitan, the wife of a diplomat, is entitled to residual diplomatic immunity under Article 39(2). She is not. Residual immunity applies only to a person who was a member of the mission. See Vienna Convention art. 39(2). Al-Shaitan was accredited by Kuwait as Al-Awadi's spouse, but she was never a member of the Kuwait Mission. Thus, she enjoys no residual immunity from the civil jurisdiction of the United States. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 29 (Al-Shaitan was never a member of the Kuwait Mission.... Accordingly, Al-Shaitan could not have conducted any acts under Article 39(2) `as a member of the mission.'). To be sure, members of the family of a diplomatic agent forming part of his household shall, if they are not nationals of the receiving State, enjoy the privileges and immunities [of the diplomatic agent] specified in articles 29 to 36. Vienna Convention art. 37(1). But residual immunity is contained in Article 39, which, in turn, specifically limits its application to member[s] of the mission. Vienna Convention art. 39(2). In short, while Al-Shaitan enjoys the same scope of immunity as her diplomat-husband while he is a member of the mission, once the husband's tenure as diplomat has expired, such derivative immunity normally cease[s] at the moment when [s]he leaves [the United States], or on expiry of a reasonable period in which to do so. Vienna Convention art. 39(2). With respect to Al-Awadi, it is undisputed that he was a member of the [Kuwait] mission, and so our inquiry turns to whether Al-Awadi's employment and treatment of Swarna were acts performed... in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission. Vienna Convention art. 39(2). To this end, we find it significant that Article 39(2) does not immunize acts that are incidental to the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission. Residual immunity, as consistent with the Vienna Convention's purpose of not ... benefit[ting] individuals but ... ensur[ing] the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions, Vienna Convention pmbl, cl. 4, is limited to a narrow set of acts that are committed in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission,  Vienna Convention art. 39(2) (emphasis added). [M]odern international law has adopted diplomatic immunity under a theory of functional necessity. 767 Third Ave. Assocs. v. Permanent Mission of the Republic of Zaire, 988 F.2d 295, 300 (2d Cir. 1993). Accordingly, a diplomat enjoys broad personal immunity from civil and criminal jurisdiction while performing the functions of a member of a diplomatic mission. See Vienna Convention art. 31. This immunity exists not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States. Vienna Convention pmbl. cl. 4. For this reason, while residual diplomatic immunity applies to the acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission, Vienna Convention art. 39(2), it does not apply to actions that pertain to his household or personal life and that may provide, at best, an indirect rather than a direct ... benefit to diplomatic functions. Park v. Shin, 313 F.3d 1138, 1142 (9th Cir.2002) (defining the concept of residual consular immunity under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations). Although Al-Awadi asserts at one point that residual immunity encompasses all acts that are incidental and indispensable to diplomatic activities, acts incidental and indispensable to diplomatic activities include, in this context, only such acts as are directly imputable to the state or inextricably tied to a diplomat's professional activities. This conclusion is supported by the Vienna Convention's drafting history. The Vienna Convention grew out of the work of the International Law Commission which was tasked with undertak[ing] the codification of the topic of `[d]iplomatic intercourse and immunities,' [in light of] existing principles and rules and recognized practice. G.A. Res. 685(VII), ¶ ¶ 2, 5 (Dec. 5, 1952), available at http://www.un. org/documents/ga/res/7/ares7.htm; see also 767 Third Ave. Assocs., 988 F.2d at 300 (noting that the Vienna Convention codified longstanding principles of customary international law with respect to diplomatic relations); Finzer v. Barry, 798 F.2d 1450, 1458 (D.C.Cir.1986) (`[T]he 1961 Vienna Conference examined the articles in the light of modern conditions, surveying the body of law and practice which had developed over the years regarding the rights, duties, and privileges of diplomatic missions ....' (quoting Leonard Meeker, Legal Adviser of the Dep't of State, Hearing on the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Before the Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 89th Cong. at 2 (1965))). The draft version of Article 39(2) was written by the International Law Commission's Special Rapporteur, A.E.F. Sandström. See [1955] II INT'L L. COMMISSION Y.B. 9-17. According to the 1957 Report of the International Law Commission, [u]nder the first sentence of paragraph 2 it appeared that all members of diplomatic missions, including diplomatic staff proper, would lose all immunity in respect of acts that had not been performed in the exercise of their functions as soon as such functions came to an end. [1957] I INT'L L. COMMISSION Y.B. 142, ¶ 34. One delegate asked the Special Rapporteur whether he would agree to replace the words `in the exercise of his functions' by `during the exercise of his functions.' Id. ¶ 35. In response, the Special Rapporteur explained that in his view, immunity should subsist only in respect of acts performed in the exercise of diplomatic functions. Id. ¶ 38; accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 464 n. 10 (1987) (Immunity from legal process with respect to the agent's official acts continues indefinitely even after the termination of the agent's diplomatic status.); SATOW'S DIPLOMATIC PRACTICE 131 (Desmond Pakenham, ed., 5th rev. ed. 1979) (The immunity of a diplomatic agent for his official acts  acts performed in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission  is on the other hand unlimited in time. Immunity in regard to such acts is not a personal immunity of the diplomatic agent but is in reality the immunity of the sending sovereign state.) Consistent with the text and drafting history of Article 39(2), the United States, through the Department of State, has limited the application of residual immunity to official acts only. Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 11. We note that [i]t is well settled that the Executive Branch's interpretation of a treaty `is entitled to great weight.' Abbott, 130 S.Ct. at 1993 (quoting Sumitomo, 457 U.S. at 184-85 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 2374). In fact, more than twenty years ago, the Legal Adviser of the Department of State explained the practices of the United States with respect to diplomatic immunity and declared that only official acts and official functions were protected under Article 39(2)'s provision for residual immunity. See Declaration of Abraham D. Sofaer 3-7 (July 5, 1988), reprinted in Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, add. 3-7. The Legal Adviser further observed, at the time, that the United States' interpretation of Article 39(2) was consistent with [the] practice of other sovereign states, including the almost 150 states which are party to the Vienna Convention. [4] Id. at 8, reprinted in Br. for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at add. 8; see also Abbott, 130 S.Ct. at 1993 (In interpreting any treaty, the opinions of our sister signatories are entitled to considerable weight. (internal quotation marks, ellipsis, and alteration omitted)); cf. Regina v. Bow Street Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte (No.3), 1999 WL 250052, [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 202 (House of Lords Mar. 24, 1999) ([U]nder article 39(2) the ambassador, like any other official of the state, enjoys immunity in relation to his official acts done while he was an official.); Zoernsch v. Waldock, [1964] EWCA (Civ), 2 All E.R. 256 (U.K.) (The English cases show that in English law an envoy's immunity from suit and legal process in respect of acts done in his private capacity endures only so long as he is en poste .... Quite different considerations, however, apply to acts done by him in his official capacity.). Article 31 establishes that the diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State and from its civil and administrative jurisdiction except in three cases  none of which are relevant here. Article 32(9), on residual immunity, does not distinguish between civil or criminal jurisdiction. In light of a long history of granting broad jurisdictional immunity to former diplomats who acted in their official capacities, and a well established canon of deference with regard to Executive Branch interpretation of treaties, Abbott, 130 S.Ct. at 1993, it seems to us appropriate to apply the Legal Adviser's declaration regarding criminal acts to civil acts as well, in accordance with the advice of the United States in its amicus brief. In his attempt to broaden the scope of residual immunity to encompass not only official acts but all acts that are peripheral to official acts, Al-Awadi relies on a textual distinction in the Vienna Convention. He asserts that two provisions of the Vienna Convention, Articles 31 and 38, specifically refer to official functions and official acts in describing certain elements of immunity of a sitting diplomat. See Vienna Convention arts. 31(1)(c), 38(1). By contrast, he asserts that Article 39 does not refer to official functions or official acts but, as noted above, extends residual immunity to those acts performed in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission. Vienna Convention art. 39(2); cf. Vienna Convention art. 31(1)(c) (exempting from immunity a diplomat's commercial activities that are outside his official functions); Vienna Convention art. 38 (immunity applicable to official acts in cases where a diplomat is also a national of the receiving state). This difference must be accounted for, according to Al-Awadi, by giving the in the exercise of language in Article 39(2) a substantially broader meaning than the official functions and official acts language of Articles 31 and 38. But Articles 31 and 38 apply to the service of sitting diplomats and thus implicate different policy considerations than Article 39, which applies to the service of former diplomats. Sitting diplomats are accorded near-absolute immunity in the receiving state to avoid interference with the diplomat's service for his or her government. See Brzak, 597 F.3d at 113 (International law provides extensive protection for diplomatic envoys.... Although current diplomatic envoys enjoy absolute immunity from civil and criminal process... former diplomatic envoys retain immunity only `with respect to acts performed by such a person in the exercise of his function' as a diplomatic envoy. (quoting Vienna Convention art. 31)); cf. Tachiona v. United States, 386 F.3d 205, 215 (2d Cir.2004) (The Vienna Convention, which governs the privileges and immunities that are extended to diplomatic envoys ... [w]ith limited exceptions ... broadly immunizes diplomatic representatives from the civil jurisdiction of the United States courts. (emphasis added)). Once the diplomat's service for his or her government has expired, any threat of diplomatic interference is presumably minimized, and Article 39 accordingly directs that the privileges and immunities shall normally cease. Vienna Convention art. 39(2). Articles 31 and 38 are, therefore, different provisions that implicate different considerations than Article 39. Thus, the textual distinction between Article 39 and Articles 31 and 38 does not compel the conclusion that the language of Article 39 (in the exercise of his functions as a member of the mission) is broader than Article 31 and 38's official acts and official functions language so as to cover Swarna's employment and alleged treatment. Cf. United States ex rel. Chicago, N.Y. & Boston Refrigerator Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 265 U.S. 292, 295, 44 S.Ct. 558, 68 L.Ed. 1024 (1924) (It is quite true that because words used in one statute have a particular meaning they do not necessarily denote an identical meaning when used in another and different statute.). More importantly, accepting Al-Awadi's argument would result in an interpretation of Article 39(2) that is contrary to the drafting history of Article 39 and the practice of the United States as well as other foreign states. Having determined that Article 39(2) is limited to official acts, we now consider whether Al-Awadi's employment and treatment of Swarna constituted official acts. In conducting this analysis, we must not judge whether the underlying conduct actually occurred, or whether it was wrongful. Brzak, 597 F.3d at 113. Rather, our consideration is a functional one, which parallels the objective tests we have adopted in applying other forms of immunity. Id. & n.  (In applying th[e] functional test, we ... look[ ] to the objective acts ... in question, not to the type of injury alleged.). Thus, for example, in Brzak we held that U.N. officials qualified for residual immunity under the Vienna Convention against alleged acts of sex discrimination, retaliation, the intentional infliction of emotional distress, and acts constituting a violation under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, all of which occurred in the course of the U.N. officials' management of their office. Id. at 113. We concluded that these allegations, as they were articulated by the plaintiffs in Brzak, involved personnel management decisions falling within the ambit of the [U.N. officials'] professional responsibility. Id. Al-Awadi argues that Swarna was employed ... to assist [him] in the exercise of [his] mission-related functions, and, therefore, all acts arising from that employment relationship are immune from suit under the Vienna Convention's provision for residual immunity. Ultimately, however, Al-Awadi's argument must be rejected, as it assumes a fact that is not supported by the record. The alleged facts clearly show that Swarna was employed to meet Al-Awadi's and his family's private needs and not any mission-related functions. Swarna worked an average of seventeen hours a day, seven days a week, cooking, cleaning, caring for Al-Awadi's children, and tending to the family's personal needs. Al-Awadi also allegedly raped Swarna. If Swarna's work for the family may not be considered part of any mission-related functions, surely enduring rape would not be part of those functions either. Although Swarna also cooked and served guests at official functions from time to time and taught other servants how to cook Kuwaiti dishes, these duties were incidental to her regular employment as Al-Awadi's personal servant. Cf. Park, 313 F.3d at 1143 (determining that supervision and management of a domestic servant who was required to cook, clean, care for the children, and otherwise tend to the diplomat's personal affairs, but also required to assist in entertaining official guests at the diplomat's home were not consular functions within the meaning of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art 43(1): Plaintiff was hired as the [diplomat's] personal domestic servant. Any labor that she performed on behalf of the Consulate was incidental to her employment as a personal servant.). Moreover, the facts that Swarna was paid out of Al-Awadi's private funds and that she received a G-5 visa further indicate that she was employed by Al-Awadi and not by the Kuwait Mission. In the application for Swarna's visa, the individual defendants represented to the United States that they would pay Swarna's salary. Only some of her expenses (such as dental care) were covered by the mission. Recipients of the G-5 visa are aliens employed in a domestic or personal capacity by a principal alien, who are paid from the private funds of the principal alien and seek to enter the United States solely for the purpose of such employment. 22 C.F.R. § 42.21(a)(4). Had Swarna been an employee of the Kuwait Mission, she would have been issued a G-2 visa. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(G)(ii) (listing nonimmigrant visa for other accredited representatives of such a foreign government); 8 C.F.R. § 214.2(g) (The determination by a consular officer prior to admission and the recognition by the Secretary of State subsequent to admission is evidence of the proper classification of a nonimmigrant....). Swarna's nonimmigrant status reflected precisely her occupation in the United States: a personal servant hired to meet the individual defendants' private needs. Al-Awadi relies on Tabion v. Mufti, 73 F.3d 535, 538-39 (4th Cir.1996), a case in which the Fourth Circuit stated that [d]ay-to-day living services such as dry cleaning or domestic help were not meant to be treated as outside a diplomat's official functions ... [b]ecause these services are incidental to daily life. But that statement was made in the context of considering whether a sitting diplomat's hiring of a domestic servant fell within the commercial activity exception to diplomatic immunity under Article 31(1)(c). Under Article 31(1), a diplomat enjoys absolute immunity save for three exceptions in civil cases, one of which is for an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. Vienna Convention art. 31(1)(c). The Tabion court agreed with the U.S. Department of State that the term commercial activity in Article 31(1)(c), as modified by its latter phrase outside his official functions, focuses on the pursuit of trade or business activity; it does not encompass contractual relationship for goods and services incidental to the daily life of the diplomat and family in the receiving State. Tabion, 73 F.3d at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Tabion articulates the scope of acts as they relate to the term commercial activity under Article 31(1)(c) for sitting diplomats; Tabion does not define official functions, much less define the official acts that are accorded perpetual immunity under Article 39(2) to former diplomats. Al-Awadi also cites to three foreign cases, which he explains applied residual immunity to (1) an Austrian Ambassador who accidentally shot and killed the French Ambassador during a hunting expedition, which was arranged by the President of Yugoslavia to further good relations between the countries, Heirs of Pierre S v. Austria, Case No. 1 Ob 49/81, 86 ILR 546 (1982); (2) a Portuguese diplomat who ordered a translation on behalf of Portugal, Portugal v. Gonclaves, 82 ILR 115 (1982); and (3) a detective on the diplomatic staff of the Australian High Commission who sent certain evidence to Australian law enforcement in violation of the laws of England, Propend Fin. Pty Ltd. v. Sing, 111 ILR 611 (1997). See Appellant's Opening Br. at 23-27. These cases, however, are distinguishable in numerous ways, the most obvious being that the actors in these cases were employees of the state (Swarna was paid by the individual defendants, not Kuwait) and were involved in activities that were clearly associated with the functions of the diplomatic mission. [5] Finally, so far as private servant[s] are explicitly referred to in Vienna Convention Article 1(h) (defining private servant), [6] these references are insufficient to support the contention that the employment of private servants is necessarily an official act and that any conduct taken against them automatically is protected by residual immunity. Moreover, assuming arguendo that Swarna's employment constituted an official act, it does not follow that Al-Awadi is accorded immunity for any and all acts committed against her. For example, while Al-Awadi could claim diplomatic immunity for common crimes directed at Swarna while he was serving as a member of the mission, he could not commit these crimes and claim residual immunity merely because his initial hiring of Swarna constituted an official act. Only if the commission of such crimes could be considered an official act would residual immunity apply. Cf. Brzak, 597 F.3d at 114 (leaving open the question of whether a U.N. official's alleged commission of the tort of battery against a U.N. employee constituted activity outside the scope of residual immunity). Accordingly, we reject Al-Awadi's argument that Swarna's employment and his treatment of her were included within his official acts as a diplomat. Residual immunity, therefore, is no barrier to Swarna's claims against the individual defendants. [7]