Opinion ID: 145277
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adverse Employment Actions and Causation

Text: “Title VII’s protection against retaliatory discrimination extends to adverse actions which fall short of ultimate employment decisions.” Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998). However, in order to sustain a Title VII retaliation claim, an employee must show that “a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse,” such that the action would “dissuade[] a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.” Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68, 126 S.Ct. 2405, 2415, 165 L.Ed.2d 345 (2006). “[T]rivial harms” and “petty slights” do not constitute adverse employment actions. Id. 14 Entrekin cites the following adverse employment actions: (1) failing to sustain her complaint against Lieutenant Leonard; (2) having Hartwell usurp an emergency call that she should have taken; (3) being switched to a different shift and “having difficulties in getting the shifts straightened out due to child care concerns”; (4) refusing to allow her to leave early one day when she did not take a lunch break; (5) failing to initially excuse her from the car pool requirement; (6) investigating the Creamer complaint; (7) investigating the Taylor complaint against her; (8) refusing to accept her complaint against Taylor; and (9) contriving allegations against her in IA Investigation 08-04. The PCPD’s failure to sustain Entrekin’s complaint against Leonard and failure to investigate Entrekin’s complaint against Taylor are not adverse employment actions, because these actions were not taken against Entrekin herself. In interpreting Title VII’s retaliation provision, we have stated that the plaintiff herself must suffer an adverse employment. See Pennington, 261 F.3d at 1266. Therefore, the PCPD’s failure to take action against other individuals does not constitute an adverse employment action, because Entrekin herself suffered no harm. Hartwell’s response to an emergency call and Rausa’s refusal to allow Entrekin to leave work early one day also are not adverse employment actions, because they amount to mere “trivial harms” and “petty slights” that would not 15 dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See Burlington, 548 U.S. at 68, 126 S.Ct. at 2415. Similarly, Entrekin suffered no harm with respect to the City’s car pool policy, because she admitted at her deposition that the policy was never enforced against her. Entrekin’s reassignments also did not constitute adverse employment actions. As soon as Entrekin voiced a concern about her reassignment, Chief Van Etten offered to transfer her back to her original assignment. When Entrekin noted that an immediate reassignment would disrupt her child care schedule, Van Etten permitted Entrekin to postpone the change until the end of the week, as Entrekin had requested. Because each reassignment occurred either as a result of Entrekin’s complaint against Hartwell or at Entrekin’s request, the reassignments were not adverse actions. The investigation of the Creamer complaint did not constitute an adverse action, because the complaint ultimately was not sustained and Entrekin, therefore, suffered no harm from the filing of the complaint. Although Entrekin received a one-day suspension based on her conduct during the investigation of the Creamer complaint, this suspension was a result of Entrekin walking out of an interview with Rausa and Leonard about the complaint, rather than a result of the actual complaint filed against her. Finally, Entrekin cites the Taylor Complaint, which resulted in IA 16 Investigation 08-03, and the Miller Complaint, which resulted in IA Investigation 08-04, as adverse employment actions. These investigations, which ultimately led to Entrekin’s placement on administrative leave and termination, appear to rise above “trivial harms” because it is likely that the initiation of an internal investigation against an employee would dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination. See id. Entrekin argues that the adverse employment actions she lists should be viewed cumulatively. However, as discussed above, except for IA Investigations 08-03 and 08-04, the incidents Entrekin cites either had no adverse effect on Entrekin or constituted mere “petty slights.” Even if these incidents are viewed collectively, they do not constitute adverse employment actions or a pattern of retaliatory actions, because the collective harm that Entrekin suffered from these events, if any, was trivial. See id. Accordingly, as the district court correctly found, only IA Investigations 08-03 and 08-04, as well as Entrekin’s termination, constituted adverse employment actions.