Opinion ID: 653732
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the district court had authority to order

Text: 10 Chukwura's deportation. 11 Chukwura contends that the district court lacked authority to order his deportation as a condition of supervised release. He argues that the INS maintains exclusive jurisdiction to deport aliens. The government contends that pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3583(d), the district court could properly order Chukwura to serve the period of the supervised release outside the country. This is an issue of first impression in this circuit and requires that we interpret and apply section 3583(d). 12 We begin our analysis through an examination of the language of the statute. Unless the language of the statute is ambiguous, or would lead to absurd results, its plain meaning controls. United States ex rel. Williams v. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d 1493, 1498 (11th Cir.1991). Because the language of section 3583(d) is unambiguous on its face, we need not go beyond its plain meaning. NEC Corp., 931 F.2d at 1498. 13 Section 3583(d) provides, in part: If an alien defendant is subject to deportation, the court may provide, as a condition of supervised release, that he be deported and remain outside the United States, and may order that he be delivered to a duly authorized immigration official for deportation. Chukwura contends that this language, at most, allows the court to order a defendant surrendered to the INS after completing a custodial sentence. His argument ignores the plain language of section 3583(d). 14 Section 3583(d) plainly states that if a defendant is subject to deportation, a court may order a defendant deported as a condition of supervised release. The statute then provides that if the court decides to order the defendant's deportation, it then may order the defendant delivered to a duly authorized immigration official for deportation. Nothing in this language supports Chukwura's interpretation. The language is unequivocal and authorizes district courts to order deportation as a condition of supervised release, any time a defendant is subject to deportation. 15 The last clause of this provision states that after a defendant is ordered deported, the district court may order that he be delivered to a duly authorized immigration official for deportation. Sec. 3583(d). This language is equally plain and clarifies any possible confusion that may arise from the administration of the deportation process. The mandatory term delivered, requires authorities to surrender defendants to duly authorized immigration official[s] if deportation is ordered as a term of supervisory release. In this manner, the INS maintains responsibility for the actual processing of a person ordered deported. The statutory language does not involve the court in deporting defendants, as this ministerial responsibility resides with the INS and its authorized immigration officials. 16 Contrary to Chukwura's assertions, this statute does not infringe upon the INS's authority to deport resident aliens. The INS maintains, at all times, the authority to deport individuals and to carry out the actual deportation. Pursuant to section 3583(d), however, courts may also order deportation. Because we must assume that Congress is aware of existing laws when it passes legislation, we construe the court's authority under section 3583(d) to coexist with the INS's deportation authority. Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S. 19, 32, 111 S.Ct. 317, 325, 112 L.Ed.2d 275 (1990). Thus, while both may order defendants deported, only the INS may actually deport them. 17 Finally, Chukwura argues that the district court's deportation order denied him a deportation hearing. The Sentencing Guidelines specifically require sentencing courts to address many of the factors that arise at regular INS deportation hearings. While we do not require district courts, contemplating whether to order a defendant deported, to conduct an INS type hearing, we are confident that in this case the sentencing hearing met those requirements. Thus, Chukwura's argument lacks merit, and we hold that the sentencing court had authority to order deportation. 18