Opinion ID: 2640942
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existing Case Law Applying the Intentional Injury Exception

Text: ¶ 21 We first turn to our existing case law. This court first articulated the intentional injury exception in Bryan. Recognizing that the Act is remedial and designed to implement a social policy, we noted that the legislature had defined personal injury, by accident, [to] include injury caused by the willful act of a third person and that willful implied something in addition to mere negligence. [17] We concluded, however, that an intentional act differed from a willful act, and that the word intentional, when used to describe a wrongful act. . . [means] that the act was not only done knowingly, but with the knowledge that it was wrongful to do it. [18] Thus, following Bryan, the exclusive remedy provision barred employee suits for injuries caused by negligent or willful acts, but not for intentionally injuriousi.e., wrongfulacts. ¶ 22 Sixteen years later, in Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., we again applied the intentional injury exception. [19] Mounteer, the plaintiff, brought suit against his employer, Utah Power & Light Co. (UP&L), for injuries caused when his co-employee called the supervisor over a loudspeaker and accused Mounteer of being on drugs. [20] We stated that the exclusive remedy provision barred any common law action against the employer unless he or she intended or directed the injurious act of the co-worker. [21] In applying this rule, we analyzed whether UP&L ordered the broadcast, but did not analyze whether UP&L ordered that the broadcast be injurious. [22] We upheld the dismissal of Mounteer's suit because he had not provided evidence that UP&L directed or intended the broadcast. In fact, the only evidence provided by Mounteer was an allegation that the broadcast violated UP&L's company policy. With only this piece of information, we reasoned that no inference could be made that UP&L directed or intended the broadcast. [23] ¶ 23 During the interim between Bryan and Mounteer, the court of appeals decided Lantz. [24] In Lantz, an employee's injuries from exposure to a chemical spill that occurred in his work area were allegedly exacerbated by delayed evacuation. [25] Lantz argued that the failure to issue an evacuation order constituted an intentional tort because injury was substantially certain to result from his exposure to fumes. Relying almost entirely on Larson's treatise, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, [26] (Larson's), the court of appeals rejected this argument. [27] Instead, the court of appeals concluded that the intentional injury exception only applied in situations characterized by `a conscious and deliberate intent directed to the purpose of inflicting injury.' [28] This standard requires an injured employee to show that his employer or fellow employee manifested a deliberate intent to injure him. [29] This is the same standard adopted by a majority of jurisdictions, [30] although twelve states have recognized a broader definition of intentional in order to subject some employers to liability for gross negligence. [31] ¶ 24 We join the majority of states in adopting the intent to injure standard in order to distinguish between intentional injuries that fall within the intentional injury exception and negligent or accidental injuries, which are covered by the exclusive remedy provision of the Act.