Opinion ID: 2153560
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Lorrie appeals from the appellate court's affirmance of the trial court's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence that she was an unfit parent, and she appeals from the affirmance of the trial court's order terminating her parental rights. Lorrie first contends that the appellate court failed to correctly apply the standard that requires clear and convincing evidence of a parent's unfitness in order to terminate that parent's parental rights. According to Lorrie, this failure to apply the proper evidentiary standard is evidenced by, as Justice Heiple's dissent points out, the appellate court's explicitly stating that it must first look to Paul's present well-being and his future in reviewing this decision, and must look at the fact that once Lorrie's parental rights were terminated it would be possible for Mark and Lisa to adopt Paul, before the court perfunctorily mentioned the clear and convincing evidence standard and held that the finding of unfitness and termination of parental rights in this case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Lorrie's second contention is that, when the proper evidentiary standard is applied, it is apparent that there was not clear and convincing evidence of her unfitness. Lorrie asserts that her telephone calls and the cards, letters, and gifts that she sent to Paul and the Sycks manifested a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility for Paul and, indeed, the letters that were admitted into evidence reveal her great love and affection for Paul. There are two factors to which Lorrie asks us to pay particular attention when determining whether her efforts over the years showed the requisite degree of concern: her poor financial position and the fact that it was the Sycks' actions that rendered her attempts to communicate with Paul futile. Lorrie asserts that the trial court wrongly concluded that her sending cards, letters, and gifts did not establish the requisite degree of concern because she should have realized that, given the Sycks' attitude toward her, cards and letters to a child of this age would in essence have the practical effect of no contact at all in a maternal sense. Attempting to persuade us that we should affirm the appellate court's holding, appellees, Mark and Lisa, argue that there was clear and convincing evidence that Lorrie was an unfit parent, and they rely on the principles of review that a finding of unfitness is to be reversed only if against the manifest weight of the evidence and that a trial court's findings should be given great deference because it is in the best position to evaluate the credibility of witnesses. (See In re Brown (1981), 86 Ill.2d 147.) Appellees stress that it is a parent's concern, interest, and responsibility as to the child's welfare that is critical under section 1(D)(b) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(b)); a parent has to demonstrate more than merely love for, or a general interest in, her child  a parent must show concrete concern for the child's welfare by providing the child with face-to-face counseling and economic support. In comparison, appellees characterize Lorrie's actions over the approximately four years at issue as a paltry number of letters and cards and telephone calls which might have taken, in total, 20 to 30 hours of her time and which would have been meaningless to a child growing from two to six years of age. Exhibition of real concern for Paul's welfare, according to appellees, would have required Lorrie to move back to Illinois and then give guidance and economic aid to Paul and make the sacrifices inherent in the role of a parent. Appellees also note that the evidence showed that it was Lorrie's financial condition that prevented her from visiting Paul, not any denial of visitation by the Sycks. (Not in her letters to the Sycks, nor in a letter she wrote to the circuit court when notified of the adoption proceedings, nor, as we found, in her hearing testimony, did Lorrie claim that the reason why she did not visit Paul was, in whole or in part, the attitude of the Sycks or any limitation that they placed on her visitation.) Regarding the appellate court's review of this case, appellees deny that the conclusion that the appellate court failed to properly apply the clear and convincing evidence standard is warrantable based on the appellate court's mere mention of Paul's well-being in its Rule 23 order. Other matters discussed by appellees, such as the reasons for Mark's maneuvers designed to prevent any direct communication between Lorrie and Paul, are irrelevant to our review. In order to find that a parent is unfit under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1501(D)(b)), thereby avoiding the necessity of obtaining that parent's consent to the adoption of his or her child ( In re Adoption of Burton (1976), 43 Ill. App.3d 294, 297), the trial court must find clear and convincing evidence that the parent fail[ed] to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility as to the child's welfare. (See In re Paul (1984), 101 Ill.2d 345, 352, citing Brown, 86 Ill.2d at 152; In re Ybarra (1975), 29 Ill. App.3d 725, 729; In re Gibson (1975), 24 Ill. App.3d 981, 984; see also Peyla v. Martin (1976), 40 Ill. App.3d 373 (while there was some evidence of lack of concern by father, under circumstances of case  including mother's refusal to allow father to see infant and absence of order of court or request from mother for child support from father  there was not clear and convincing evidence of father's failure to maintain reasonable degree of interest, concern, or responsibility); cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1510(a)(1) (consent to adoption is required unless person whose consent would otherwise be required is found to be unfit by clear and convincing evidence).) The burden of presenting this clear and convincing evidence is upon those who have petitioned for adoption of the child  in this case, Mark and Lisa. In order to reverse a trial court's finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of parental unfitness, a reviewing court has to conclude that this finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Brown, 86 Ill.2d at 152; Blakey v. Blakey (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 946, 947. In this case, all that has presently been decided is that Lorrie is an unfit parent and that her parental rights are terminated. The petition for adoption of Paul by Mark and Lisa has not yet been ruled upon. Therefore, all that we are to decide is whether the finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of Lorrie's parental unfitness was against the manifest weight of the evidence presented. We hold that it was. Termination of parental rights destroys the parent-child relationship. The effect of a termination of parental rights is made grimly clear by section 17 of the Adoption Act: After the entry either of an order terminating parental rights or the entry of a judgment of adoption, the natural parents of a child sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility for such child and shall be deprived of all legal rights as respects the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 40, par. 1521.) For instance, a parent whose rights are terminated no longer has a right to visitation with his or her child. Precisely because of the devastating effect produced by a termination of parental rights, the evidence of a parent's unfitness has to be clear and convincing. We now turn to the facts in the present case. Although the appellate court expressly made reference to the merits of the termination of a natural parent's parental rights, and touched lightly upon some of the areas of testimonial conflict, procedurally it incorrectly approached this matter. Prior to mentioning these matters, the appellate court stated that it must first look to Paul's present well-being and his future in reviewing this decision and did so. After deciding that Paul's present and future well-being would be better protected by terminating Lorrie's parental rights, which eliminated any obstacle for Lisa's adoption of Paul, and after surmising that the trial court had reached the same conclusion, the appellate court proceeded to the apparently secondary matter of reviewing the evidence presented at the hearing on parental fitness. We cannot agree with appellees that the appellate court's statements about Paul's well-being were innocuous, or that it is clear that the court did not base its affirmance on this consideration and instead relied only on evidence relevant to Lorrie's parental fitness when it held that the termination of her parental rights was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. When ruling on parental unfitness, a court is not to consider the child's best interests. ( E.g., In re Jones (1975), 34 Ill. App.3d 603, 607-08.) [W]here the rights and interests of a parent are sought to be permanently severed, the best interests of the child can be considered only if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or consents to the severance [citations]. ( In re Massey (1976), 35 Ill. App.3d 518, 521.) Only evidence that bears on the issue of unfitness is to be considered, precluding evidence bearing on the child's best interests (see Burton, 43 Ill. App.3d at 299-302 (Adoption Act indicates legislature's intent that a finding of parental unfitness necessarily precede consideration of the best interests of the child; there is a two-step process of first ruling on parental unfitness and then, if called for, ruling on whether adoption is in child's best interests; in ruling on parental unfitness, all evidence of home life of petitioners is irrelevant)). At this point, it is the parent's past conduct in the then-existing circumstances that is under scrutiny. ( Paul, 101 Ill.2d at 352-53; Culkin v. Culkin (1975), 30 Ill. App.3d 1073, 1074-75; Gibson, 24 Ill. App.3d at 984-86; In re Overton (1974), 21 Ill. App.3d 1014, 1019; see also In re Hrusosky (1976), 39 Ill. App.3d 954, 957-58 (unlike other cases cited therein where there were transportation difficulties, financial limitations, or discouragement of parent's visitation by State agency, here there was no valid excuse for mother's lack of effort to communicate with child).) The child's welfare and whether the child's eventual adoption by the petitioners would improve his future financial, social, and emotional atmosphere is not relevant in judging the fitness of the natural parent ( Paul, 101 Ill.2d 345; Perkins v. Breitbarth (1981), 99 Ill. App.3d 135, 139; In re Cech (1972), 8 Ill. App.3d 642, 645-46); nor are these factors relevant in determining, as in this case, whether, in the past, the natural parent maintained a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility as to the child's welfare. Only after a parent is found, by clear and convincing evidence, to be unfit does a circuit court ruling on an adoption petition proceed to consider the child's best interests and whether those interests would be served by the child's adoption by the petitioners, requiring termination of the natural parent's parental rights. ( E.g., In re A.C.B. (1987), 153 Ill. App.3d 704, 708; Perkins v. Breitbarth (1981), 99 Ill. App.3d 135, 138-39; Gibson, 24 Ill. App.3d at 986; see also In re Shuman (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 151, 153 (without parent's being found unfit, or consenting to adoption, court cannot grant adoption even if it would be in child's best interests); cf. Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 37, pars. 802-29(2), (3) (Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides court may appoint guardian with power to consent to minor's adoption if natural parents consent or after finding, based upon clear and convincing evidence, that a non-consenting parent is an unfit person).) (In fact, at the hearing, appellees' counsel, in his opening statement, recognized that there would be two stages to the hearing on the petition for adoption, the first stage dealing solely with Lorrie's unfitness and, if that was decided favorably to petitioners, the second stage being a best interest hearing when termination of Lorrie's parental rights would be requested.) We approve these holdings, and declare that when a petition for adoption alleges that a parent is unfit, abrogating the need for that parent's consent to the adoption, the trial court is initially to determine the parental unfitness, basing that determination on any evidence relevant to the particular grounds of unfitness alleged. At least when the grounds alleged are those alleged in the present case (failure to maintain a reasonable degree of concern, interest or responsibility regarding the child's welfare), the prospective effect that the termination of parental rights and adoption of the child by the petitioners will have on the child (the child's best interests) is not relevant to determining the nonconsenting parent's status as unfit. Although it is not completely clear that the appellate court relied on its conclusion as to Paul's present and future well-being when it ruled on the correctness of the order finding Lorrie to be unfit, the analysis as expressed in the appellate court's Rule 23 order, upon which our review is based, creates a substantial probability that the appellate court did so err. After deciding that Paul's well-being would be best safeguarded by affirming the termination of Lorrie's parental rights, the appellate court proceeded to vaguely discuss the actual evidence at the hearing (as the court itself put it, the merits of the termination), to state the manifest weight of the evidence standard of review, and to conclude that the finding should be affirmed after comforting itself that its affirmance was justified because in three similar, though not identical, cases reviewing courts had upheld trial courts' findings of unfitness. Owing to the appellate court's apparent misunderstanding of its role, we disapprove its opinion. Still, we have to review the evidence before we can determine whether to reverse its holding and, consequently, to reverse the trial court's order terminating Lorrie's parental rights. As we have already stated, in determining whether a parent showed reasonable concern, interest or responsibility as to a child's welfare, we have to examine the parent's conduct concerning the child in the context of the circumstances in which that conduct occurred. Circumstances that warrant consideration when deciding whether a parent's failure to personally visit his or her child establishes a lack of reasonable interest, concern or responsibility as to the child's welfare include the parent's difficulty in obtaining transportation to the child's residence ( Gibson, 24 Ill. App.3d at 984; In re Deerwester (1971), 131 Ill. App.2d 952, 954), the parent's poverty ( Paul, 101 Ill.2d at 352-53 ([t]hat [the mother] herself has personal difficulties, including poverty , should not be overlooked)), the actions and statements of others that hinder or discourage visitation (see Culkin, 30 Ill. App.3d at 1073-74 (custodial parent denied visitation, demanded that he be present during any visitation, and moved to a distant State)), and whether the parent's failure to visit the child was motivated by a need to cope with other aspects of his or her life or by true indifference to, and lack of concern for, the child ( Paul, 101 Ill.2d at 353). If personal visits with the child are somehow impractical, letters, telephone calls, and gifts to the child or those caring for the child may demonstrate a reasonable degree of concern, interest and responsibility, depending upon the content, tone, and frequency of those contacts under the circumstances. (See In re Adoption of Barker (1976), 37 Ill. App.3d 721; Overton, 21 Ill. App.3d at 1019 (although mother moved to another State with her paramour, hoping to start a new life, there was not clear and convincing evidence of mother's failure to maintain reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility where her letters to Department of Children and Family Services showed concern for her children and Department discouraged her from visiting children).) Also, mindful of the circumstances in each case, a court is to examine the parent's efforts to communicate with and show interest in the child, not the success of those efforts. In re Drescher (1980), 91 Ill. App.3d 658, 664. Each case concerning parental unfitness is sui generis, unique unto itself. ( Perkins, 99 Ill. App.3d at 137.) In a case proceeding under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act, the issue is whether a parent maintained concern, interest and responsibility as to his or her child's welfare that, under the circumstances, was of a reasonable degree. To terminate a particular parent's parental rights, a court must find the negative of the proposition  it must find that there is clear and convincing evidence that such a level of reasonable interest and concern was not maintained. In the present case, we find that there was not clear and convincing evidence that Lorrie failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and responsibility as to Paul. The trial court's finding to the contrary is against the manifest weight of the evidence. The number of telephone calls that Lorrie made, and the number of letters, cards, and gifts that she sent to Paul and the Sycks, under the circumstances of Lorrie's life and her relationship with the Sycks, in themselves refute appellees' contention that Lorrie failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest and concern in, and responsibility for, Paul. While the sheer number of contacts will not always suffice to frustrate the establishment of clear and convincing evidence of unfitness, in this case the letters that were admitted into evidence, and the testimony of Brenda as well as Lorrie, reveal Lorrie's concern for Paul and interest in his life. We note that the Sycks refused to give Lorrie Paul's telephone number or address, thus preventing any direct communication between Lorrie and Paul, at least as long as she remained away from Peoria, Illinois. We also take into account Lorrie's difficult situation in life: her limited education and the restrictions that it put on her employment opportunities, her poor financial condition, her young age, and the absence of any substantial emotional support from family or friends. While such circumstances will not excuse a complete lack of communication with one's child, they do bear on the reasonableness of the communication a parent maintains and the interest a parent demonstrates in his or her child. The trial court seemingly accepted all of the evidence concerning Lorrie's letters, cards, gifts, and telephone calls (therefore, in our review of the trial court's order we are not contravening its findings as to the credibility of witnesses). Yet, the trial court felt that by choosing to move to Pennsylvania, making it more difficult for her to visit her son or directly contact him because she had to rely on the Sycks' cooperation, Lorrie had failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest and concern for her son. We disagree; under the circumstances we do not judge Lorrie so harshly; we do not conclude that Lorrie's decision to move to Pennsylvania and the consequent constraints that this move, and the Sycks' attitudes, placed on her ability to communicate with her son provide clear and convincing evidence that she failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern and responsibility for Paul and so is an unfit parent whose parental rights warrant termination. Contrary to the views of the trial court and appellees, to exhibit a reasonable degree of concern for Paul, Lorrie need not have moved back to Illinois even though she believed that Paul was being well taken care of by Mark and his parents. Furthermore, we disagree with appellees that Lorrie's failure to provide Paul any financial support evidenced her parental unfitness, for Lorrie was not under a court order to pay child support and was never requested to do so by Mark, assuming that she could have afforded it. See Perkins, 99 Ill. App.3d at 138-39. In sum, regardless of whether the appellate court weighed Paul's best interests when determining whether the circuit court erred in finding that Lorrie was an unfit parent, we hold that there was not clear and convincing evidence of Lorrie's parental unfitness as defined by section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act, and we thus hold that the trial court's order to the contrary is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, we reverse both the appellate court judgment and the trial court judgment, which found Lorrie A. Snyder to be an unfit parent and terminated her parental rights. Judgments reversed.