Opinion ID: 2442265
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Advertisement for Promotions

Text: Burcham next contends that the Commission violated Ark.Code Ann. § 14-51-301(b)(3)(A), by not advertising in the local paper the next promotional examination held on August 12, 1996, and, thus, the resulting eligibility list, and presumably all promotions, are invalid. The statute provides as follows: (b) These rules shall provide for: (1)(A) The qualifications of each applicant for appointment to any position on the police or fire department; (B)(i) No person shall be eligible for appointment to any position on the fire department who has not arrived at the age of twenty-one (21) years; (ii) No person shall be eligible for appointment on the police department affected by this chapter who has not arrived at the age of twenty-one (21) years; (2) Open competitive examination to test the relative fitness of applicants for the positions; (3)(A) Public advertisement of all examinations by publication of notice in some newspaper having a bona fide circulation in the city and by posting of notice at the city hall at least ten (10) days before the date of the examinations. (3)(B) The examinations may be held on the first Monday in April or the first Monday in October, or both, and more often, if necessary, under such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the board; Ark.Code Ann. § 14-51-301(b)(1), (2), and (3) (Supp.1995) (emphasis added). City of Van Buren Ordinance No. 28 of 1995 specifies that newspaper notice of examinations will be done for appointments for police and firefighter positions, but the ordinance does not include advertisement for promotions within the ranks. In granting summary judgment in favor of the City, the trial judge found that the publication requirements as set out in subsection (b)(3)(A) only apply to appointments and not to promotions. We agree with this interpretation. Burcham focuses on the words all examinations in § 14-51-301(b)(3), in arguing his case, but in doing so, he disregards the preceding subsections which refer only to applicants for appointment as opposed to applicants for promotion. In determining legislative intent, our rules for guidance have been often stated: In interpreting a statute and attempting to construe legislative intent, the appellate court looks to the language of the statute, the subject matter, the object to be accomplished, the purpose to be served, the remedy provided, legislative history, and other appropriate means that throw light on the subject. McCoy, supra ; Gritts v. State, 315 Ark. 1, 864 S.W.2d 859 (1993). Henson v. Fleet Mortgage Co., 319 Ark. 491, 495, 892 S.W.2d 250, 252 (1995). We conclude that the more reasonable interpretation in the instant case is to look to the context of the statute and to the fact that in subsections (b)(1)(A), (b)(1)(B)(i), and (b)(1)(B)(ii) of § 14-51-301, the sole focus is on appointments. The publication requirement then follows in subsection (b)(3)(B). Precise reference in the statute to advancement within the ranks or promotions is not made until subsection (b)(4)(A) which is after the publication requirement. At that point, the statute shifts its focus from appointments to requirements for promotions. Moreover, the purpose of the statutory requirement for publication of examination dates is to ensure that all potential applicants are notified. If the only pool of potential applicants are those already on the police force, it is entirely reasonable to post test dates on the troop bulletin board at the Department. There is little need to advertise to the public at large through a local newspaper when the purpose of the examination is only to decide promotion of current police officers to a higher rank. Indeed, it would be wasteful to do so. We will not give a statute an interpretation which is at odds with common sense. Stephens v. State, 328 Ark. 570, 944 S.W.2d 836 (1997); Sanders v. State, 310 Ark. 630, 839 S.W.2d 518 (1992). Affirmed.