Opinion ID: 2361142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Payne and Garris's Other Arguments

Text: The remaining issues raised by Payne and Garris require only brief discussion. Both Payne and Garris contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion for a new trial. In August 1993, approximately six months after appellants' trial ended in conviction, Payne filed (and Garris later joined) a motion for a new trial under Super. Ct.Crim. R. 33, based upon newly discovered evidence, a 9mm. Calico Model M-950 pistol. [10] In March 1993, Maria Thompson, a former girlfriend of Preston Coe, discovered a green and beige Polo bag left at her residence by Coe. The bag contained the Calico pistol. She got in touch with a private detective for the defense, who had previously contacted her to ascertain the whereabouts of Coe, and turned the bag and weapon over to him. A defense expert, Lester W. Roane of the H.P. White Laboratory, examined 19 cartridge cases and 22 fragments from the murder scene and the victims. He concluded that to a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, all 19 cartridge cases . . . were fired from the bolt in the [Calico]. Further, [four of the] fragments were fired from the barrel in the [Calico]. The trial court held a hearing on the motion for a new trial on November 16, 1993. The defense viewed the Calico as directly contrary to all of the testimony from the Government's [two] witnesses, Christine Terry and Officer Stacey Davis; and as absolutely corroborat[ing] Mr. Garris['s] and Mr. Payne's testimony. Further, counsel for Garris asked for time to permit analysis of the Calico by either the ATF or the FBI to get something of a definitive judgment as to whether this indeed was the gun used in the killing. The trial court decided not to hear any testimony from either Maria Thompson or the defense expert, Mr. Roane, and denied the motion, saying: Counsel, without actually hearing your expert, the Court accepts it, that is your proffer as to what your expert would say. [Notwithstanding] that, the Court does not consider it to meet the requirement to grant a new trial. The Court considers the evidence to have been overwhelming in this case and the case did not turn on who had possession of that gun and the fact that this person, Mr. Coe, may have had possession at a later time or even at the time. The jury was amply given an opportunity to hear this evidence and they made a determination that your 2 defendants did the shooting there and they made no specific determination that it was with the Calico pistol or with another pistol. The jury had ample evidence and for those reasons, the Court would deny your motion for a new trial on that basis. Absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion, decisions of the trial court regarding the denial of a new trial will not be disturbed on appeal. Smith v. United States, 466 A.2d 429, 432 (D.C.1983) (citing United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 111-12, 66 S.Ct. 464, 466-67, 90 L.Ed. 562 (1946) (other citations omitted)). In Heard v. United States, 245 A.2d 125 (D.C.1968), we adopted a five-prong test for determining whether the appellant sustained his or her burden regarding a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence: (1) the evidence must have been discovered since the trial; (2) the party seeking the new trial must show diligence in the attempt to procure the newly discovered evidence; (3) the evidence relied on must not be merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) it must be material to the issues involved; and (5) of such nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal. 245 A.2d at 126 (citing Thompson v. United States, 88 U.S.App. D.C. 235, 236, 188 F.2d 652, 653 (1951)). See also Herbin v. United States, 683 A.2d 437, 441 (D.C.1996); Townsend v. United States, 549 A.2d 724, 726 (D.C.1988); Quick v. United States, 316 A.2d 875, 876 (D.C.1974). Generally, a hearing is not required on a motion for a new trial. Geddie v. United States, 663 A.2d 531, 534 (D.C.1995). We review the trial court's ruling from the perspective of a `thirteenth juror' [to] determine whether `a fair trial requires that the [claim presented in the motion for new trial] be made available to the jury.' Geddie, supra, 663 A.2d at 533 (citations omitted). Payne argues that the trial court did not address the five factor test, and further maintains that the discovery of the Calico pistol would have created enough reasonable doubt that the jury would have returned verdicts of not guilty. The government maintains that the trial court properly disposed of the new trial motion, but acknowledges that the trial court did not explicitly apply the five factor test. During the hearing on the new trial motion, counsel for Payne emphasized each factor of the five-prong test for determining whether to grant a motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. It is clear that the trial court assumed, for the purposes of the hearing, that the first four factors had been met, and focused on the fifth, whether the newly discovered evidence was of such a nature that in a new trial it would probably produce an acquittal. Focusing on only the fifth factor after assuming that the first four had been met was neither error nor an abuse of discretion. Indeed, in Townsend v. United States, supra , the trial court assumed that the first two prongs of the Heard test had been met, and this court assumed that it did likewise with respect to the third and fourth prongs. Thus, we focused on only the fifth prong. 549 A.2d at 726. In focusing on the fifth prong here, the trial judge determined that the appellants' case did not turn on who had possession of [the] gun.... Based on the record before us, we agree. Payne and Garris were identified by Woodfork and Carey as the men who were standing in front of the Nissan Pulsar just before they heard multiple shots. Moreover, Officer Davis saw two persons, not one person, firing a gun. None of the witnesses saw Coe with a gun on the night of the murders, and, given the other evidence in this case, the fact that the gun was later found in one of his bags alone would [not] probably produce an acquittal. Heard, supra, 245 A.2d at 126. Thus, based on the record before us, we conclude that there has been no clear showing of abuse on the part of the trial court in denying appellants' motion for a new trial based on the newly discovered Calico gun. Payne contends that [t]he trial court erred when it admitted the eyewitness identification by Officer Stacey Davis and visited the [crime] scene and then affirmed its ruling on the identification testimony. He maintains that the trial judge became a witness in the trial because his visit enabled him to vouch for the testimony of Officer Davis. The judge visited the scene alone, telling counsel they could go on their own. An improper view is error because of the potential problems that may result. Without presence of counsel there is no way to be certain that the premises viewed are in the same condition as when the event occurred, or that the court does not view the wrong premises or objects. Lillie v. United States, 953 F.2d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.1992) (citations omitted). [11] Clearly, the trial judge should not have visited the scene of the crime alone. However, neither Payne nor Garris preserved an objection to the trial judge's visit. Significantly, the record shows that prior to visiting the scene of the crime, the trial judge had already ruled that Officer Davis was a credible witness. Thus, he did not rely on his visit to make factual findings regarding the officer's credibility or the reliability of the eyewitness identification. Moreover, although Officer Davis's testimony contained some inconsistencies regarding the night of the murders and what he saw, he identified both Payne and Garris in court as the men he observed shooting into the Nissan Pulsar that night. Therefore, we cannot say that Payne was prejudiced by the trial judge's solo visit to the crime scene. Payne argues that Officer Davis's identification of him in court was suggestive because the officer had previously worked in the trial court and knew Payne's attorney who was seated next to Payne. The identification was unreliable, Payne also asserts, because of the inconsistencies in Officer Davis's descriptions of the appellants at the time of the crimes and Officer Davis's prior statement that more than likely [he] would not be able to see  recognize or identify either subject in the future. In In re W.K., 323 A.2d 442 (D.C.1974), we said: [w]here there has been no pretrial identification, courts have apparently taken it for granted that an in-court identification stands on its own if the witness had an opportunity to see the culprit at the scene of the crime even though he has not been called upon to recognize the suspect until the trial. Id. at 444; see also Brown v. United States, 327 A.2d 539, 542 (D.C.1974). Nothing in the record on appeal supports Payne's contention of suggestivity in the identification. We see no constitutionally cognizable impropriety in the procedure by which [Payne and Garris were] exposed to [Officer Davis] at the time of his identification. Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 134 (D.C.1979). In addition, it was the jury's task to weigh the evidence regarding the identification and to determine Officer Davis's credibility and the reliability of his identification of Payne. Consequently, we see no error in Officer Davis's eyewitness identification of Payne. See Patterson v. United States, 384 A.2d 663, 665 (D.C.1978). Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court. [12]