Opinion ID: 1160958
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The doctrine of laches

Text: The trial court found that the doctrine of laches barred Tom's complaint. Laches is available as an equitable defense when a plaintiff unreasonably delays seeking relief and a defendant suffers prejudice as a result of the delay. [15] Although Alice knows the identity of Allie's biological father and neither she nor CSED have attempted to locate him, the trial court in finding laches stated that Tom's long delay has prejudiced the ability for CSED and [Alice] to seek out the actual biological father and hold him liable for support. In finding prejudice to Alice and CSED, the trial court made a finding which would also satisfy the economic prejudice element of equitable estoppel. The trial court measured Tom's delay from the date of Allie's birth. Quoting Keener, [16] the court wrote: [T]he period of delay for laches begins to run when the party discovers or could have discovered the wrong of which he complains,... or where, in light of any resulting prejudice to the defendant, it becomes reasonable to expect the plaintiff to act upon the wrong. The wrong from which [Tom] seeks redress is the fact that he was listed as the father on the birth certificate. [Tom] was aware of this wrong from the very beginning. Tom argues that the court erred in concluding that the period of delay began at Allie's birth. He claims that he could not have sought to disestablish his paternity then without putting a burdensome strain on the new marriage and did not object to supporting Allie while he was married to and living with Alice. He contends that it was not until CSED sought to impose a support obligation on him in January of 1994, a few months after the parties separated, that he can be charged with the duty of timely action for laches purposes. And he contends that since he contested CSED's efforts administratively and judicially in a timely manner, no basis exists for concluding that he was guilty of unreasonable delay. We agree with Tom that to apply the delay period for laches from Allie's birth would be inappropriate. It was reasonable for Tom, in view of the parties' recent marriage, not to bring a paternity disestablishment proceeding at that point. He no doubt believed that the marriage would last and that he would support Allie during her childhood. Tom also argues that laches has not been judicially recognized as a doctrine capable of barring a putative father from asserting non-paternity. He contends that it should not receive recognition because it expands the paternity-by-estoppel doctrine. CSED agrees as a matter of Alaska case law that laches has not been applied in cases similar to the present one. But it contends that little reason exists not to recognize the defense since it relates closely to the estoppel doctrine which we do recognize. CSED also cites two cases from other jurisdictions which have applied laches to bar a man from denying paternity. We turn first to the cases cited by CSED. The first is In re the Marriage of Boer. [17] In this case the husband had strong grounds to believe the child, born in 1967, was not his since at the time of conception the parties were not cohabiting. [18] The parties reconciled one month before the birth of the child and at the time of their 1972 dissolution the husband agreed that the child was of the marriage and agreed to pay child support. [19] Some years later the husband collaterally attacked the dissolution decree, contending that the child was not his. [20] The appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief. [21] An alternative ground for this decision was laches: The husband had ample opportunity to contest paternity in the dissolution proceeding and chose otherwise. The husband's conduct contains all the necessary elements to conclude that he is barred by laches. [22] We note that in this case the court indicated that the husband had a duty to act when dissolution proceedings were brought, not five years earlier at the birth of the child. The second case is Arvizu v. Fernandez. [23] Here the husband became convinced after the divorce decree that the child was not his, but delayed for more than a decade in asserting his non-paternity. [24] In the interim two post-judgment proceedings had occurred at which he could have asserted non-paternity but did not. [25] The Arizona Court of Appeals held that the claim of non-paternity was barred by laches. [26] Since the father ha[d] waited at least twelve years and ha[d] neglected several opportunities to bring his claim to the court's attention, the court held his delay unreasonable. [27] Both of these cases employ the doctrine of laches in a post-separationindeed, post-divorcecontext. They do not support using the doctrine to establish paternity before a judicial decree has been entered. We believe that laches should not be available as an independent defense in paternity disestablishment actions which are brought prior to a judicial decree establishing paternity. Paternity by estoppel is an exception to the rule that only biological or adoptive parents are responsible for child support payments. If a party could defeat a paternity disestablishment action by proving the prejudice element alone, without a representation of paternity and reliance, the paternity by estoppel exception would be broadened beyond recognition. As we recently stated in B.E.B., paternity by estoppel is the exception, not the norm. [28] In our view there should not be a second exception which imposes a legal obligation of support on a husband who has not represented himself to be a child's father, or on one who has made such a representation which has not been relied on. [29]