Opinion ID: 4678932
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Merits Judgment

Text: A notice of appeal in a civil case must ordinarily be filed “within 30 days after entry of the . . . order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). A notice of cross-appeal must be filed within 14 days after the other party’s timely appeal or within 30 days after entry of the order appealed from, whichever period ends later. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(3). In 2018, after the district court entered the Merits Judgment, the parties timely filed notices of appeal of the Merits Judgment. However, that appeal terminated 3 In its notice of appeal, Pathway also claimed to appeal the Remand Order. Setting aside the issue of whether the Remand Order is an appealable final decision in and of itself, see 28 U.S.C. § 1291, Pathway’s arguments on appeal ultimately challenge only the Merits Judgment, the Merits Fees Award, and the Remand Fees Award. We thus consider only whether each of those three decisions was timely appealed. 5 Case: 20-50259 Document: 00515828241 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/20/2021 No. 20-50259 once our mandate in MidCap I issued. Because Pathway did not file any notice of appeal until 31 days after the district court entered the Remand Order and MidCap filed its notice of cross-appeal an additional 12 days later, this court must dismiss the parties’ post-mandate attempts to re-appeal the Merits Judgment unless an exception to the general rule applies. 4 We discuss each of Pathway’s arguments for such an exception in turn. 1. MidCap I’s remand was a full, not partial, remand Pathway first argues that because the MidCap I panel’s remand was “limited,” a new notice of appeal was not required to reinstate its appeal of the Merits Judgment after remand. Pathway mischaracterizes the MidCap I remand. It is true that in some cases where this court has remanded with a specific directive to the district court, we have retained jurisdiction over the appeal, obviating the need for the appellant to file a new notice of appeal after the district court’s remand proceedings. However, in those cases, this court specified that we retained jurisdiction over the appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Arellano-Banuelos, 912 F.3d 862, 869 (5th Cir. 2019) (“We remand to the district court with instructions that, within sixty days after the entry of this remand, it provide a supplemental order setting forth its findings . . . . We 4 During oral argument, and later in a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j) letter, Pathway argued for the first time that, rather than 30 days, it had 180 days to notice its appeal after entry of the Remand Order because the Remand Order failed to comply with the “separate document” requirement of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(a). Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a); see generally United States v. Mtaza, 2021 U.S. App. LEXIS 6825, 2021 WL 911959 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2021) (per curiam) (unpublished). Pathway failed to adequately brief this argument and has thus waived the issue. See Cinel v. Connick, 15 F.3d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1994) (“A party who inadequately briefs an issue is considered to have abandoned the claim.”). Because Pathway has the burden to establish appellate jurisdiction, we need not consider grounds for appellate jurisdiction that Pathway has not properly raised. See SCF Waxler Marine, L.L.C. v. ARIS T M/V, 902 F.3d 461, 464 (5th Cir. 2018). 6 Case: 20-50259 Document: 00515828241 Page: 7 Date Filed: 04/20/2021 No. 20-50259 retain jurisdiction over this appeal.”); OneBeacon Am. Ins. Co. v. Barnett, 761 F. App’x 396, 404 (5th Cir. 2019) (vacating the judgment and remanding the case for trial; specifying that “[w]e retain jurisdiction over this appeal”; and directing that after the district court remand proceedings, “the district court clerk shall return this matter to this court for disposition by this panel”). See generally David G. Knibb, Federal Court of Appeals Manual ch. 27 (6th ed. 2013). Nowhere does the MidCap I opinion specify that this court retained jurisdiction over the appeal or that the remand was limited. See MidCap I, 929 F.3d at 316. The judgment entered by this court remanded the Merits Judgment to the district court in full and was issued as the mandate on July 31, 2019. Moreover, as noted earlier, the district court confirmed that the parties’ appeals were not pending in our court after entry of the Remand Order. Because MidCap I remanded the Merits Judgment in full, and mandate issued, the parties, at minimum, were obligated to file a timely notice of appeal of the remanded judgment after the district court entered the Remand Order. 5 Cf. Malone v. Avenenti, 850 F.2d 569, 573 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that where “a decision remanding for further proceedings in the 5 We note that the parties had earlier alternatives to maintain their appeals of the Merits Judgment. First, prior to mandate issuing, the parties could have sought clarification as to whether this court had retained jurisdiction. Second, once mandate issued, the parties could have sought to recall the mandate to reinstate their appeals pending the district court’s remand proceedings. In a different context, the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure advisory committee has observed that courts of appeal should be instructive and clear with remand language. See Fed. R. App. P. 12.1 advisory committee’s note to 2009 amendment. Likewise, a leading treatise has highlighted the perils to unwary litigants of unclarified remand language. See David G. Knibb, Federal Court of Appeals Manual 671–73 (6th ed. 2013). In this regard, we observe that parties might request clarification language used by other courts. See, e.g., Halleran v. Hoffman, 966 F.2d 45, 48 (1st Cir. 1992); EOTT Energy Operating Ltd. P’ship v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., 257 F.3d 992, 999 (9th Cir. 2001). 7 Case: 20-50259 Document: 00515828241 Page: 8 Date Filed: 04/20/2021 No. 20-50259 district court does not explicitly express the court’s intention to retain jurisdiction over the appeal, a litigant wishing to appeal an order of the district court after remand must file a new notice of appeal within the period prescribed by rule 4(a)”). 2. The district court exceeded its authority by granting Pathway’s extension motion after the time to appeal had expired Pathway next argues that the district court, by virtue of its April 27 order, extended the deadline to file the notice of appeal until 30 days after entry of the Remand Fees Award. The district court, however, lacked authority to issue the April 27 order. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58(e) provides that “if a timely motion for attorney’s fees is made under Rule 54(d)(2), the court may act before a notice of appeal has been filed and become effective to order that the motion have the same effect under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) as a timely motion under Rule 59.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e). Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A)(iii), if a party files a timely motion for attorney’s fees under Rule 54 and the district court extends the time to appeal under Rule 58, the time to appeal runs from the date the district court enters its order ruling on the attorney’s fees motion. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(iii). In Burnley v. City of San Antonio, we held that Rule 58(e), 6 together with Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii), authorizes a district court to delay the finality of a judgment to allow parties to appeal the merits judgment and the fee judgment 6 Burnley referenced the 2006 version of Rule 58(c)(2), which is substantively identical to the current Rule 58(e). The 2007 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure resulted in the re-lettering of Rule 58’s subparts as well as stylistic changes. Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2) (2006), with Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(e). 8 Case: 20-50259 Document: 00515828241 Page: 9 Date Filed: 04/20/2021 No. 20-50259 at the same time if the district court issues such order before (1) an “effective appeal has already been taken from the merits judgment”; (2) the attorney’s fees motion has been decided; and (3) the merits judgment has become final and unappealable. 470 F.3d 189, 199 (5th Cir. 2006). On the last point, we reasoned that “when the merits judgment has already become final and unappealable, a mere delay of that judgment is no longer possible, and the court lacks any authority under FRAP 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) and FRCP 58[(e)] to modify the finality or the effect of the merits judgment.” Id. This court reiterated Burnley’s interpretation of Rule 58(e) and Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) in Heck v. Triche: “The only temporal limitation on the court’s authority to treat a Rule 54 motion for attorney’s fees as a motion under Rule 59 is that the order must be issued before a party has filed a notice of appeal and before the time to notice an appeal has expired.” 775 F.3d 265, 275 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Burnley, 470 F.3d at 200). 7 Here, the time to appeal after remand expired on March 25, 2020— 30 days after entry of the Remand Order. Although Pathway properly moved for an extension under Rule 58(e), the district court exceeded its authority by granting this motion on April 27, 2020—33 days after the time to notice an appeal had already expired. Pathway argues that Burnley is inapplicable because the appellant in that case filed its motion to extend after the time to appeal had expired. While it is true that Pathway, unlike the appellant in Burnley, filed its motion to extend before the appeal deadline, that fact alone cannot save Pathway. 7 The Second Circuit, in an opinion cited in Burnley, and the Seventh Circuit embrace this interpretation. See Mendes Junior Int’l Co. v. Banco do Brasil, 215 F.3d 306, 311–15 (2d Cir. 2000) (holding that Rule 58 does not authorize a district court to “revive an expired time to appeal”); Robinson v. City of Harvey, 489 F.3d 864, 868–69 (7th Cir. 2007) (following Mendes). Pathway cites to no circuits that disagree. 9 Case: 20-50259 Document: 00515828241 Page: 10 Date Filed: 04/20/2021 No. 20-50259 Burnley specifies that a district court cannot extend an appeal deadline pursuant to Rule 58(e) after the time to appeal has already lapsed. Burnley, 470 F.3d at 199–200; see also Heck, 775 F.3d at 275. 3. The district court did not grant Pathway’s extension motion for good cause or excusable neglect under Rule 4(a)(5) Pathway further attempts to sidestep the Burnley rule by characterizing its motion as a Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5) extension motion for excusable neglect or good cause. Rule 4(a)(5), unlike Rule 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) and Rule 58(e), does allow a district court to revive an untimely notice of appeal after the original time to appeal has expired. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5). Pathway’s motion cannot be construed as a Rule 4(a)(5) motion, however. The extension motion cites Rule 58(e) rather than Rule 4(a)(5), and its arguments are relevant only to the former: The leave sought by Pathway is sought so that justice may be done and Pathway may avoid including the attorneys [sic] fee issue in its Notice of Appeal if the Court denies MidCap’s request for attorneys’ fees. It would be more efficient for the parties and the Court to have any additional appellate points presented at one time instead of piecemeal, should either side wish to appeal any aspect of the future ruling on MidCap’s second motion for attorneys’ fees. On appeal, Pathway does not present any argument for excusable neglect or good cause within the meaning of Rule 4(a)(5). Nor does the district court’s order granting the extension mention Rule 4(a)(5). Although the extension order states that it finds “good cause” for the extension, its cited reason for granting the extension is relevant only to Rules 4(a)(4)(A)(iii) and 58(e): “Pathway requests that the time for filing an appeal be extended until the Court resolves Plaintiff’s Second Motion for 10 Case: 20-50259 Document: 00515828241 Page: 11 Date Filed: 04/20/2021 No. 20-50259 Attorneys’ Fees (Dkt. No. 143), so that only one appeal from the Court’s order on remand is necessary.” Pathway’s motion to extend thus cannot be characterized as a Rule 4(a)(5) motion, and the district court lacked authority to grant it after the time to appeal had expired. We conclude that neither Pathway nor MidCap timely appealed the remanded Merits Judgment after the district court’s Remand Order, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review it. 8