Opinion ID: 4556500
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Analytical Framework Applied

Text: We first observe that the statute speaks nothing of a specific consequence or result. Rather, the crime is complete when the defendant, acting with the requisite culpability, “engages in conduct that constitutes a substantial step toward” committing murder, regardless of whether those actions result in actual harm to the victim or victims. I.C. § 35-41-5-1(a); I.C. § 35-42-1-1(1). This reading of the statute finds support in our case 12Our research reveals at least one case in conflict with this rule. In Clem v. State, this Court held that the killing of two or more persons by the same act amounts to a single offense. 42 Ind. 420, 429 (1873). “Where, by the discharge of a fire-arm, or a stroke of the same instrument,” the Court explained, “an injury is inflicted upon two or more persons, or their death is produced, there is but one crime committed.” Id. Considering our more recent precedent, we deem Clem an outlier, and thus expressly overrule that case. Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-527 | August 18, 2020 Page 11 of 19 law. See Zickefoose v. State, 270 Ind. 618, 623, 388 N.E.2d 507, 510 (1979) (interpreting the attempt statute as focusing not on “the result of the conduct” but rather “on the substantial step that the defendant has completed”); Wethington v. State, 655 N.E.2d 91, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (noting that it makes no difference “whether the act, the substantial step taken toward the commission of murder, results in any injury whatsoever, so long as it is coupled with the intent to kill”). Based on this precedent, it’s reasonable to conclude that attempted murder is a conduct-based crime—a crime in which “a single discrete incident can be the basis for only one conviction,” no matter the number of victims. See Paquette, 101 N.E.3d at 239. Accord Kelly, 527 N.E.2d at 1155 (OWI is a completed crime when the intoxicated person operates the vehicle, even if no harm results); Scuro v. State, 849 N.E.2d 682, 687 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that, because the statute focused on the defendant’s actions rather than the harm to each victim, “a defendant may not be convicted of more than one count of dissemination of matter harmful to minors based on one occurrence, even if there was more than one victim”). Still, other interpretations of the statute pull us in the opposite direction. Despite the lack of a specific result or consequence, the statute clearly contemplates a victim (or potential victim) by use of the direct object “another human being.” And by referring to the victim in the singular, this language suggests that each victim in an attempted murder calls for separate punishment. Our courts have held as much under different statutes. See, e.g., Brown v. State, 912 N.E.2d 881, 896 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that, under the child pornography statute, the listing of objects in the singular indicates a legislative intent to criminalize each possession of child pornography as a distinct violation). To be sure, a reference in the singular to the statute’s direct object doesn’t always indicate a clear intent to impose separate punishments for each corresponding victim. By the legislature’s own rules, a statute’s use of language in the singular “may be also applied to the plural of persons and things.” I.C. § 1-1-4-1(3) (2019). See also Off. of Code Revision, Legis. Servs. Agency, Drafting Manual for the Indiana General Assembly 10 (2012), Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-527 | August 18, 2020 Page 12 of 19 http://iga.in.gov/legislative/2020/publications/bill_drafting_manual/#docu ment-ae6c0119 [https://perma.cc/Q44J-JKUZ] (urging use of the “singular instead of the plural, because singular words apply to several persons or things as well as to one person or thing”). But had the legislature instead used “human beings” or “any human being,” the statute arguably would have contemplated only a single offense despite harm to multiple victims. See Mathews, 849 N.E.2d at 585 (noting that, in defining felony arson, the “legislature chose to use the phrase ‘endanger human life’ and not ‘endanger a person,’” suggesting that “endangerment of multiple persons without more, entails no additional consequences beyond endangerment of a single person”). The statute’s contemplation of a victim, whether actual or potential, suggests that attempted murder is a result-based crime: rather than simply showing the defendant intentionally committed criminal conduct that could have resulted in death, the State must show that the defendant intended for his conduct to produce such a result. As this Court has noted, the defendant’s “attempt” in attempted murder “must be to effect the proscribed result and not merely to engage in proscribed conduct.” Smith v. State, 459 N.E.2d 355, 358 (Ind. 1984) (emphasis added). See also Ramsey v. State, 723 N.E.2d 869, 871 (Ind. 2000) (same). These alternative readings of our attempted-murder statute reveal equally legitimate ways of thinking about the statute’s unit of prosecution: either by conduct or by result. And when a statute permits more than one reasonable interpretation, we consider that statute ambiguous. Day v. State, 57 N.E.3d 809, 813 (Ind. 2016). So, under our test, unless the facts show that Powell’s multiple gunshots amounted to distinguishable offenses, we conclude that the statute permits the prosecution for only a single criminal offense. See Duncan, 274 Ind. at 464, 412 N.E.2d at 775–76 (applying rule of lenity). B. Powell’s criminal acts indicate two distinguishable offenses. This step of our analysis requires us to decide whether Powell’s criminal acts amount to a single offense or whether they indicate several Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-527 | August 18, 2020 Page 13 of 19 distinguishable offenses. To answer this question, we look to whether those acts are “so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction.” Walker, 932 N.E.2d at 735. 1. Pitfalls in the Analytical Framework We pause first to consider the “elusive nature of attempting to define precisely” when otherwise independent criminal acts “coalesce into a single offense.” Nunn v. State, 695 N.E.2d 124, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). See also Jeffrey M. Chemerinsky, Note, Counting Offenses, 58 Duke L.J. 709, 726–28 (2009) (outlining the flaws in this approach). To be sure, there may be some cases in which—intuitively, at least—the question is an easy one. See Nunn, 695 N.E.2d at 125 (rejecting the idea that a defendant, having fully discharged an automatic weapon with a fifty-round clip in “one burst,” could be charged with and convicted of fifty attempted murders of a single person). But, at the end of the day, there’s really “no way to make sense out of the notion that a course of conduct is ‘really’ only one act, rather than two or three, or, indeed, as many as one likes.” Westen & Drubel, Toward a General Theory of Double Jeopardy, supra, at 114. Still, this analytical step is a necessary one. In Indiana, two or more criminal offenses “may be joined in the same indictment or information,” whether those offenses “are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan,” or whether they’re “based on the same conduct or on a series of acts connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.” I.C. § 35-34-1-9(a) (emphasis added). Despite the lack of mandatory joinder under our criminal code, when “two or more charges are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan, they should be joined for trial,” otherwise the prosecutor risks having those charges dismissed on subsequent prosecution. Williams v. State, 762 N.E.2d 1216, 1219 (Ind. 2002) (quoting State v. Wiggins, 661 N.E.2d 878, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)). See I.C. § 35-34-1-10(c) (permitting a “defendant who has been tried for one (1) offense” to “move to dismiss an indictment or information for an offense which could have been joined for trial with the prior offenses”). Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-527 | August 18, 2020 Page 14 of 19 Importantly, while this statutory framework may incentivize the joinder of criminal offenses in a single trial, the prosecutor’s decision to proceed that way “does not prove that [the defendant’s] criminal actions arose out of a single episode of criminal conduct.” Slone v. State, 11 N.E.3d 969, 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). Hence, the need for our analysis of the facts. Of course, the legislature is free to define whether a single statutory offense will “subsist for a definite period or cover successive, similar occurrences.” Hines, 30 N.E.3d at 1220. See supra, n.6. And when it does, we simply follow that guidance and our analysis is complete. But without such direction, we’ve long been reluctant to permit the fragmentation of a single offense into multiple crimes. See Jackson v. State, 14 Ind. 327, 328 (1860) (“The state cannot split up one crime and prosecute it in parts.”); Snodgrass v. State, 273 Ind. 148, 150, 406 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1980) (acknowledging the same principle). With these qualifications in mind, we proceed to our analysis of the facts and circumstances here. 2. The Analytical Framework Applied According to the State, each pull of Powell’s trigger amounted to “separate acts” designed to kill each person in Travis’s car. Appellee’s Br. at 22. And the fact that Powell “unleashed his violence at multiple people close in time and space,” the State insists, “does not make it a single crime.” Reply in Support of Trans. at 4. We disagree. Although Powell stands convicted of only two attempted murders (one for each victim), under the State’s theory, he could have faced “five or six” counts of attempted murder for each victim (one for each shot fired), potentially culminating in a 480-year sentence upon conviction of all twelve counts. See I.C. § 35-50-2-4(b) (2014) (specifying a maximum sentence of forty years for conviction of a Level 1 felony).13 For good reason, our courts 13The absurdity of such a scenario comes into even sharper relief when we consider the fact that, had he managed to kill his intended victims, Powell would have faced a maximum termof-years sentence of only 130 years in prison. See I.C. § 35-50-2-3(a). Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-527 | August 18, 2020 Page 15 of 19 have rejected such a theory. See Nunn, 695 N.E.2d at 125. See also Benson v. State, 73 N.E.3d 198, 203 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (holding that, where the defendant shot at an officer twice during a continuous ninety-second pursuit, the State could charge only a single count of attempted murder, not two). Space and time, however, aren’t the only elements we factor into our analysis. For multiple criminal acts to be continuous and indistinguishable, Powell must also have committed those acts with a “singleness of purpose.” See Walker, 932 N.E.2d at 735. So long as there’s sufficient evidence he possessed the requisite mens rea to kill both victims by firing his weapon multiple times, both convictions may stand.14 See O’Connell v. State, 742 N.E.2d 943, 950 (Ind. 2001) (finding evidence that defendant, during a single transaction, fired two successive shots at two victims standing side-by-side sufficient to prove that he “harbored the specific intent to kill [them] both”). Powell insists that the evidence supports only his conviction for the attempted murder of Travis. Because Travis was the only person with whom he had a beef, and because he had never met Davyn, Powell contends that his conviction for the attempted murder of Davyn lacks sufficient evidentiary support. Davyn, he insists, was simply an unfortunate bystander—an inadvertent victim caught in the line of fire. We disagree with Powell’s characterization of facts and circumstances surrounding his commission of the crimes. Having learned of the impending confrontation over the Taurus, Powell drove to Howard’s house and stopped his car parallel to the black Cadillac parked just outside. With his window adjacent to that of Davyn’s, and with Davyn in plain sight, Powell asked his presumptive nemeses whether they “had a problem” with Howard. Tr. Vol. II, p. 99. As the animosity crescendoed, Powell loaded his gun, aimed it toward the 14When there’s more than one victim, the element of intent is critical to our analysis. Otherwise we risk either over-punishment (where the defendant intended to harm only one victim) or under-punishment (where the defendant intended to harm each victim). Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-527 | August 18, 2020 Page 16 of 19 occupied vehicle, and discharged five to six shots. Two of these shots struck Davyn, nearly killing her. This evidence—the animosity between the parties, Powell’s confrontational demeanor, and his firing of multiple shots at an occupied vehicle—is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Powell fired his weapon multiple times with the dual purpose of intentionally killing both Travis and Davyn.15 See Perez v. State, 872 N.E.2d 208, 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that evidence of defendant firing multiple shots into a car occupied by several passengers, along with evidence of “an ongoing altercation” between the parties, was sufficient to prove attempted murder). See also Simmons v. State, 999 N.E.2d 1005, 1008, 1010–11 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that defendant’s knowledge of several police officers in the direction in which he fired a “barrage” of gunfire was sufficient to support multiple attempted-murder convictions). To be sure, this Court has cited the “drive-by shooting” as “the paradigm problematic attempted murder case.” Richeson v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1008, 1010 (Ind. 1998). In those situations, it’s “often unclear whether the defendant intended to murder or to batter, whether he knew of a high probability of death or a touching, or whether he simply recklessly disregarded either.” Id. But this isn’t a case in which the defendant fired blindly into a group of individuals. To the contrary, Powell directly engaged with his victims, both of whom sat facing him, only feet away, through an open car window. And as the conversation grew heated, Powell—with calculated deliberation—drew his weapon, loaded it, and fired at the car as it began pulling away—all without reciprocal provocation of violence. Nor is this a case, as Powell insists, in which a defendant, “while intending to kill one person, mistakenly kills another through 15Because of the “stringent penalties for attempted murder,” and because of the difficulty often involved in proving this offense, we construe the attempt statute as imposing a heightened mens rea to convict the defendant. Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 12 (Ind. 2015). Under this Court’s Spradlin Rule, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the offense intentionally, not just knowingly or recklessly. Richeson v. State, 704 N.E.2d 1008, 1009–10 (Ind. 1998) (citing Spradlin v. State, 569 N.E.2d 948, 950 (Ind. 1991)). Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 19S-CR-527 | August 18, 2020 Page 17 of 19 inadvertence, or bad aim.” See Appellant’s Br. at 15. In other words, Davyn did not simply “g[e]t in the way” as Powell shot at Travis. See Appellant’s Resp. to Trans. at 8. Rather, Powell sprayed the side of the Cadillac, firing multiple shots at close range, fully aware of the vehicle’s occupants. See Tr. Vol. III, pp. 88–92 (documenting the path of bullet holes along the side of the car). The prosecutor emphasized these facts in closing, urging the jury “to apply common sense and decide what [Powell] was thinking” when, knowing that Davyn and Travis were inside the car, he fired “indiscriminately” at them both.16 Id. 230–31. Based on this evidence and these arguments, along with the separate attempted-murder charges, the jury could have reasonably inferred that Powell intended to kill both Travis and Davyn. Indeed, if “intent to kill may be inferred from the deliberate use of a deadly weapon in a manner likely to cause death or serious injury,” then there’s no issue with the jury inferring Powell’s intent to kill Davyn and intent to kill Travis by directly “firing a gun in the[ir] direction.” See Henley v. State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 652 (Ind. 2008).