Opinion ID: 1743543
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Sandra's, Monica's, and Alex's Liability

Text: Deana argues that the Lozanos, including Sandra, Monica, and Alex, were involved in Junior's abduction scheme and that their involvement may reasonably be inferred from their conduct. She points to their refusing to share information with her, providing financial assistance to Junior, delaying discovery, asserting Fifth Amendment privileges to resist her requests for discovery, [1] undermining her efforts to locate Bianca by removing posters, and slandering her. We must view the evidence in a light that tends to support the jury's finding of the disputed facts and disregard all evidence and inferences to the contrary. See Weirich, 833 S.W.2d at 945. We must also view each piece of circumstantial evidence, not in isolation, but in light of all the known circumstances. Barksdale, 141 S.W.2d at 1038; Felker, 929 S.W.2d at 464; Brinegar, 705 S.W.2d at 238-39; see also Long, 125 S.W.2d at 1036. Following these standards, the totality of the circumstances viewed in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict supports the jury's verdict against Sandra, Monica, and Alex. Chief Justice Phillips concludes that the jury was unreasonable in inferring from these facts that Sandra aided or assisted Junior in abducting Bianca and that there is no logical bridge between these facts and the jury's finding. Despite Chief Justice Phillips' inability to see it, common sense provides the logical bridge between these circumstances and the jury's finding that Sandra aided or assisted Junior in abducting Bianca. Chief Justice Phillips misses the bridge because, although he states the correct standard of review, he examines each piece of evidence in isolation. Taken together, these facts support the jury's finding against Sandra. See Brinegar, 705 S.W.2d at 239 (A single factor standing alone may be insufficient, but when joined by other factors constituting a significant whole, the combination can justify a conclusion.); Barksdale, 141 S.W.2d at 1038 (All of the circumstances shown by the evidence should be considered, and even though none of the circumstances standing alone would be sufficient to show undue influence, if when considered together they produce in the ordinary mind a reasonable belief that undue influence was exerted in the procurement of a will, they are sufficient to sustain such conclusion.) (citations omitted). Chief Justice Phillips dissents to the Court's conclusions about Monica and Alex on the ground that there is no evidence that Alex and Monica's actions successfully aided or assisted Junior. In doing so, he creates an additional and higher burden of proof that the statute does not contemplate. In construing a statute, we ascertain legislative intent in the plain and common meaning of the words used. Tex. Gov't Code § 311.011; Kroger Co. v. Keng, 23 S.W.3d 347, 349 (Tex.2000). Thus, we cannot enlarge the unambiguous language of a statute beyond its ordinary meaning. See Montgomery I.S.D. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 564 (Tex.2000); Sorokolit v. Rhodes, 889 S.W.2d 239, 241 (In applying the plain and common meaning of the language in a statute, courts may not by implication enlarge the meaning of any word in the statute beyond its ordinary meaning.). But Chief Justice Phillips does just that when he interprets aid or assist to mean successfully aid or assist. The plain language of the statute does not include a requirement that the aid or assistance be successful. Further, Chief Justice Phillips' interpretation of aid or assist frustrates legislative intent. The Legislature enacted chapter 42 as part of a comprehensive attack on parental kidnapping. See Sampson, Texas Family Code Symposium SupplementTitle 2. Parent and Child, 17 Tex. Tech L.Rev. 1065, 1268 (1986). Chief Justice Phillips' construction of aid and assist would weaken this attack by rendering section 42.003 useless. It would be virtually impossible for custodial parents to prove that a defendant's actions were successful in helping to take, retain, or conceal a child in violation of the parent's right to possession. For example, Chief Justice Phillips states that there is no evidence that Monica's taking down one poster had any effect on the efforts to locate Junior and Bianca. But how could anyone know whether the poster could or would have alerted someone who had seen Junior and Bianca and prompted them to call the authorities? The burden of proof the Chief Justice creates would be difficult enough in cases in which the child has been found but is impossible to meet in cases, like this, where the child remains missing. III. CONCLUSION Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's inferences and in the light of all known circumstances, there is some evidence to support the jury's verdict against Sandra, Alex, Monica, and Blanca. See Weirich, 833 S.W.2d at 945. Therefore, I dissent to the Court's decision that there is no evidence to support the jury's fact finding about Sandra's culpability. I concur with the remainder of the Court's opinion.