Opinion ID: 511694
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: legal basis for the union's policy

Text: 67 Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA makes it an unfair labor practice for a union to restrain or coerce ... employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in Section 7. However, the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A) provides that that section shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein. 2 The challenged policy is clearly protected under this section of the Act. 68 The proviso preserves the right of unions to adopt rules governing internal matters such as membership. Thus, 8(b)(1)(A) affords unions the authority to determine the rights and privileges that all members of the union, including core members, will enjoy. Upon examining the legislative materials dealing with section 8(b)(1)(A), the Supreme Court noted that there are a number of assurances by its sponsors that the section was not meant to regulate the internal affairs of unions. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 175, 186, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2009, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967). Section 8(b)(1)(A), hence, does not invalidate internal union rules even if they tend to restrain or coerce employees exercising their rights under section 7. However, internal union rules are not exempt from the strictures of section 8(b)(1)(A) if they have an external effect, i.e., if they affect employment status. 69 The Supreme Court has adhered to the distinction between internal and external enforcement of union rules and has made it clear that section 8(b)(1)(A) applies only to the latter. See, e.g., Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95, 102-03, 105 S.Ct. 3064, 3068-69, 87 L.Ed.2d 68 (1985). Internal union regulations that do not affect the employment status of the employees generally do not run afoul of the prohibitions embodied in section 8(b)(1)(A). For, as the Allis-Chalmers Court explained, Congress did not propose [by means of section 8(b)(1)(A) ] any limitations with respect to the internal affairs of unions, aside from barring enforcement of a union's internal regulations to affect a member's employment status. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. at 195, 87 S.Ct. at 2014. See also NLRB v. Boeing Co., 412 U.S. 67, 73-74, 93 S.Ct. 1952, 1956, 36 L.Ed.2d 752 (1973) (under 8(b)(1)(A), the NLRB has authority to pass on those rules affecting an individual's employment status but not on his union membership status); NLRB v. International Ass'n of Bridge, Etc., 600 F.2d 770, 777 (9th Cir.1979) (section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it unlawful for unions to act in an unreasonable, arbitrary, or invidious manner in regard to an employee's employment status), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 1275, 63 L.Ed.2d 599 (1980). 70 It is also well established that a union may withhold from non-members extra-contractual services and benefits in full conformity with [its] right to regulate its internal affairs. NLRB v. Amalgamated Local 286, U.A.W., 222 F.2d 95, 98 (7th Cir.1955) (group and hospitalization insurance coverage). In Del Casal v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 634 F.2d 295 (5th Cir.1981), the Fifth Circuit declared that a union is not obligated to extend those internal benefits enjoyed by its members to nonmembers. Id. at 300. For similar reasons, a union may withhold extra-contractual benefits from non-full members or financial core members. 3 71 There are practical consequences that flow from an employee's decision to opt for limited rather than full union membership. For example, an employee required by a union security agreement to assume financial 'membership' is not subject to union discipline. Pattern Makers' League of North America v. NLRB, 105 S.Ct. at 3071 n. 16 (1985). Financial core employees place themselves outside the reach of union rules. By the same token, they renounce their right to participate in the internal conduct of union business. They [are] 'member[s]' of the union only in the most limited sense. Id. (emphasis supplied). Their association with the union is confined to the collective bargaining process. Therefore, financial core members can only demand nondiscriminatory representation. Cf. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209, 221 n. 15, 97 S.Ct. 1782, 1792 n. 15, 52 L.Ed.2d 261 (1977) (duty of fair representation). They are not entitled to any of the other benefits that union membership entails. See generally C. Morris, The Developing Labor Law 1365-67 (1983 & Supp.1987); R. Gorman, Labor Law 644-46 (1976). 72 There are several reasons why unions provide a wide range of benefits and make them available only to those willing to accept the advantages and obligations of full membership. The simplest is a desire to service the needs of its full members. Another is to afford those persons a tangible reward for accepting the responsibilities of membership. A third is to create practical incentives for other employees to join the union and participate fully in its affairs. All these are valid and lawful reasons, particularly in light of the proviso to section 8(b)(1)(A). 73 The federal labor laws not only allow but encourage unions to engage in legitimate efforts to increase their active memberships. Unions play a central role in our national labor policy. In the words of the Supreme Court: National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the employees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improvements in wages, hours, and working conditions. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. at 2006. An increase in full membership augments unions' bargaining power and, consequently, their effectiveness in carrying out national labor policy. In Allis-Chalmers, the Court declared expressly: Integral to this federal labor policy has been the power in the chosen union to protect against erosion [of] its status under that policy.... Id. at 181, 87 S.Ct. at 2007. Thus it is fully consistent with national labor policy for unions to offer full members extra-contractual benefits and to use these benefits as an inducement to non-members or core members to step up to full membership status. 74 Similarly, the denial of union-provided extra-contractual benefits to core members does not constitute unlawful coercion against employees who choose to exercise their right to refrain from union activity. 4 Employees are not entitled to have it both ways. They cannot insist that they will not accept any of the obligations of union membership and at the same time demand that they receive all of the benefits. Consequently, absent some additional factor that would bring them within the strictures of 8(b)(1)(A), the policies adopted by the union in this case relate to internal union affairs, are exempted from the section and are protected by the proviso. Rather than prohibiting the union's policies, section 8(b)(1)(A) was meant to protect precisely the type of conduct in which the union engaged. The failure of the majority and the Board to recognize this point makes it impossible for them properly to evaluate the union's motivation or the legality of its conduct. 5 75 The Board and the majority also ignore the fact that the union had compelling reasons for adopting the challenged policies. Not one of those reasons is given credence in either opinion. The Board seizes on the fact that it was only after the strike that the union adopted a rule limiting the rights of core members. Yet, it was only after the strike that the union faced, for the first time in its history, the need to adopt rules governing the rights and privileges of financial core members. Prior to its strike against the Employers [the Union] did not represent a single employee who was a financial core member. ALJ op. at 8, reprinted in 275 N.L.R.B. at 915. Consequently, when the strike ended, the union had an obligation to define the respective rights and privileges of its full and financial core members. To be sure, in carrying out that duty, the union was not free to undermine or affect in any way the employment status of its financial core members. Nor could the union penalize or in any way discriminate against those employees who crossed the picket line or chose financial core status but were willing to return to full membership. In other words, the union was required to formulate an internal policy that did not affect any employee's employment rights or single out or discriminate against any employee for his or her past conduct--and that is precisely what the union did. 76 While under ordinary circumstances it would be reasonable for a union to afford greater benefits to full members than to financial core members, here the Union had additional cause for its actions. The union was legitimately concerned over the loss of a large number of its full members during the strike. It had every reason to look for ways to help restore the participation level that it had achieved before the strike commenced. It could, certainly, offer new extra-contractual services to its full members as part of a concerted effort to persuade financial core members to re-join. Alternatively, the union could, as it did here, limit the currently-provided benefits which were extra-contractual in nature and not subsidized by union dues to persons who were willing to become, or remain, full members.