Opinion ID: 2079415
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plain Language of Section 31-4(a)

Text: The State first contends that the plain language of section 31-4(a) contradicts defendant's assertion of the exculpatory no doctrine. Defendant counters that we should construe section 31-4(a) narrowly to preserve application of the exculpatory doctrine, as the appellate court did in Brooks. We agree with the State. The primary rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature's intent. Solich v. George & Anna Portes Cancer Prevention Center of Chicago, Inc., 158 Ill.2d 76, 81, 196 Ill.Dec. 655, 630 N.E.2d 820 (1994). To determine the legislature's intent, a court first looks to the statute's language, according that language its plain and commonly understood meaning. If possible, the court must give effect to every word, clause, and sentence; it must not read a statute so as to render any part inoperative, superfluous, or insignificant; and it must not depart from the statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. Kraft, Inc. v. Edgar, 138 Ill.2d 178, 189, 149 Ill.Dec. 286, 561 N.E.2d 656 (1990). As noted previously, a person obstructs justice pursuant to section 31-4(a) of the Code when he or she knowingly furnishes false information with intent to prevent the apprehension or obstruct the prosecution of any person. 720 ILCS 5/31-4 (West 1996). In this case, the State alleged that defendant violated section 31-4(a) when he furnished false information in an effort to obstruct his own apprehension or prosecution. Before this court, the State essentially argues that the phrase any person is expansive and literally means any person, including situations where the target of the apprehension or prosecution is also the declarant of the false statement. Defendant counters that the legislature could not have intended that the phrase any person include the declarant of the false statement. We find that the phrase any person has a commonly understood and ordinary meaning. It is broad and expansive and therefore must include a person that makes false statements to obstruct his or her own apprehension or prosecution. Any other conclusion would depart from the well-settled rule that courts must not depart from a statute's plain language by reading into it exceptions that the legislature did not express. See Kraft, 138 Ill.2d at 189, 149 Ill.Dec. 286, 561 N.E.2d 656. If the legislature intended to exclude a declarant-suspect from liability for false denials of information regarding his or her true identity, it could have easily used alternate terms such as another person or of another or separate person. The legislature did not use such language, and we are not in a position to assume that the statute means something other than what it says. We therefore reject defendant's argument on this point.