Opinion ID: 353287
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Voting Dilution

Text: 14 In describing voting dilution claims, it is imperative at the outset to distinguish the typical reapportionment case, which presents the traditional one person, one vote inquiry. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964). In such a case, there are a number of coordinate districts (e. g., state legislative districts), and voters in larger districts allege that their votes are devalued in comparison to those of voters in smaller ones. The issue in a typical reapportionment case, therefore, is whether population deviations from the average district are impermissibly large. See, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 37 L.Ed.2d 314 (1973); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 93 S.Ct. 2321, 37 L.Ed.2d 298 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 93 S.Ct. 979, 35 L.Ed.2d 320 (1973). The comparison is one based purely on population figures; no showing of discrimination along racial, ethnic, or political lines need be shown. 15 A case alleging violation of the one person, one vote standard, based solely on a mathematical analysis, may properly be called a  quantitative reapportionment case. That an apportionment scheme satisfies the quantitative standard does not, however, insure equality in all the aspects of political representation. The heterogeneity of our society manifests itself in an unequal distribution of interest groups; racial and ethnic groups tend to be compartmentalized. Thus, even a districting plan drawn without regard to the distribution of such groups may distort their relative voting strengths. And, of course, these underlying patterns present the opportunity for subtle discrimination by the manipulation of district lines. Such discrimination can occur even if perfect population equality exists. Cases alleging a distortion of group voting power of this type have been termed qualitative reapportionment cases because they focus not on population-based apportionment but on the quality of representation. Whitcomb v. Chavis,403 U.S. 124, 142, 91 S.Ct. 1858, 1868, 29 L.Ed.2d 363 (1971). 16 A familiar type of qualitative reapportionment case is one alleging gerrymander, the drawing of district lines to fence out, e. g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 81 S.Ct. 125, 5 L.Ed.2d 110 (1960), or slice up a compact interest group, e. g., Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, ---U.S. ----, 98 S.Ct. 512, 54 L.Ed.2d 454 (1977). Another, similar variety of qualitative reapportionment case is the dilution case, such as the one presented here. An at-large scheme operating to dilute the voting efficacy of an interest group does so by exploiting the tendency of large districts to diminish what would be the natural effect of residency patterns if legitimate single-member districts were employed instead. If the single-member districts are small enough, a compact interest group will constitute a majority in some districts and will thus have the capacity to elect candidates sympathetic to its needs. The large districts characteristic of at-large plans tend to submerge compact groups in constituencies whose predominant segments may be unsympathetic to the group and its needs. 17 The Constitution, however, does not demand that each cognizable element of a constituency elect representatives in proportion to its voting strength. White v. Regester; Whitcomb v. Chavis; Kirksey v. Board of Supervisors; Zimmer v. McKeithen. Even consistent defeat of a group's candidates, standing alone, does not cross constitutional bounds. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 152-53, 91 S.Ct. 1858. 18 The issue in dilution cases, therefore, is not whether a given group elects a minimum number of candidates, and the standards are not different when, as here, the interest binding the group is one of race. (I)t is not enough that the racial group allegedly discriminated against has not had legislative seats in proportion to its voting potential. White v. Regester,412 U.S. at 765-66, 93 S.Ct. at 2339. Rather, in the absence of evidence that the at-large provisions themselves were conceived or operated as purposeful devices to further racial . . . discrimination, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149, 91 S.Ct. at 1872, the inquiry becomes one of determining whether the influence of a given racial group has been distorted because its members have been denied equal access to political processes such as party nominating procedures, registration, and, of course, voting. Seeid. at 149-50, 91 S.Ct. 1858. As explained in White v. Regester, the only Supreme Court case to date that has struck down an at-large scheme under a dilution rationale, 19 (t)he plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally open to participation by the group in question that its members had less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice. 20 White v. Regester, 412 U.S. at 766, 93 S.Ct. at 2339, (citing Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. at 149-50, 91 S.Ct. 1858). 21 In Zimmer v. McKeithen this circuit explicated the tests established in Chavis and Regester by enumerating certain factors the district courts should consider to determine whether a dilution case has been made out. These criteria were designed to guide the district court in the reception of evidence by establishing certain inquiries subsidiary to the ultimate issue of dilution. The district court is to make a particularized determination under each criterion and then weigh its findings to ascertain whether in the aggregate they point to dilution. Hendrix v. Joseph, 559 F.2d 1265 (5th Cir. 1977); David v. Garrison, 553 F.2d 923, 929 (5th Cir. 1977); Nevett v. Sides, 533 F.2d 1361, 1365 (5th Cir. 1976); Zimmer, 485 F.2d at 1305. 22 The court in Zimmer established two categories, one containing criteria going primarily to the issue of denial of access or dilution, the other containing inquiries as to the existence of certain structural voting devices that may enhance the underlying dilution. The primary factors include: the group's accessibility to political processes (such as the slating of candidates), the responsiveness of representatives to the particularized interests of the group, the weight of the state policy behind at-large districting, and the effect of past discrimination upon the group's participation in the election system. 485 F.2d at 1305. The enhancing factors include: the size of the district; the portion of the vote necessary for election (majority or plurality); where the positions are not contested for individually, the number of candidates for which an elector must vote 10 ; and whether candidates must reside in subdistricts. Id. 23 The following discussion demonstrates that a finding of racially discriminatory dilution under the Zimmer criteria raises an inference of intent and, therefore, that a finding under the criteria satisfies the intent requirement of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). Before this discourse is set out, we will examine the relevance of Davis to the voting dilution principle. 24