Opinion ID: 1541375
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Distinguish Factual From Legal Inconsistency

Text: The Majority opinion, while undoubtedly joining the minority of states that prohibit inconsistent verdicts, does not penetrate further into the jurisprudential wilderness. [2] I think it important to note explicitly that the Majority's holding applies only to legally inconsistent verdicts, not factually inconsistent verdicts. The Court should continue to recognize factually or logically inconsistent verdicts rendered by juries in criminal cases. A factually inconsistent verdict is one where a jury renders different verdicts on crimes with distinct elements when there was only one set of proof at a given trial, which makes the verdict illogical. Ashlee Smith, Comment, Vice-A-Verdict: Legally Inconsistent Jury Verdicts Should Not Stand in Maryland, 35 U.BALT. L.REV. 395, 397 n. 16 (2006). The feature distinguishing a factually inconsistent verdict from a legally inconsistent verdict is that a factually inconsistent verdict is merely illogical. By contrast, a legally inconsistent verdict occurs where a jury acts contrary to a trial judge's proper instructions regarding the law. The difference between the two is perhaps best illustrated by examples from other jurisdictions. Assume a legally intoxicated or otherwise reckless driver causes a head-on collision, killing on impact the driver and passenger of the other car. The intoxicated driver is charged with two counts of vehicular homicide. The jury convicts the defendant of vehicular homicide as to the death of the driver of the other car, but finds the defendant not guilty of the same crime with regard to the death of the passenger. Such a result would constitute factually inconsistent verdicts. [3] The verdicts in the present case also contain a factual inconsistency. Price was acquitted of being a felon in possession of a handgun, [4] but convicted of possessing a handgun in the course of drug trafficking. [5] , [6] There was no dispute at trial as to Price's prior felony convictions. Therefore, it is illogical for the jury to find that Price is guilty of possessing a firearm in the course of drug trafficking without possessing a firearm as a convicted felon. Despite the illogical verdict, this does not rise to the level of a legally inconsistent verdict. Thus, if this were the only grounds for challenging Price's conviction for possession of a handgun in the course of drug trafficking, his conviction should be affirmed. A legal inconsistency, by contrast, occurs when an acquittal on one charge is conclusive as to an element which is necessary to and inherent in a charge on which a conviction has occurred. . . . Stephen T. Wax, Inconsistent and Repugnant Verdicts in Criminal Trials, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 713, 740 (1979). Similarly, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island stated that if the essential elements of the count[s] of which the defendant is acquitted are identical and necessary to prove the count of which the defendant is convicted, then the verdicts are inconsistent. State v. Arroyo, 844 A.2d 163, 171 (R.I.2004) (internal quotation omitted). Verdicts of guilty of crime A but not guilty of crime B, where both crimes arise out of the same set of facts, are legally inconsistent when they necessarily involve the conclusion that the same essential element or elements of each crime were found both to exist and not to exist. People v. Frias, 99 Ill.2d 193, 75 Ill.Dec. 674, 457 N.E.2d 1233, 1235 (1983). [7] As Price's acquittal established conclusively that he was not engaged in drug trafficking, the Majority opinion correctly concludes that the conviction for possession of a handgun while engaged in drug trafficking may not stand.