Opinion ID: 1772790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: did the lower court err in refusing instruction d-6 on circumstantial evidence?

Text: Johnson's attorney offered instruction D-6 on circumstantial evidence which reads as follows: The Court instructs the jury that although circumstantial evidence is admissible in any case, still in its application the jury must use the utmost caution and vigilance, and it is not sufficient to convict where, assuming all to be proved in behalf of the State which the evidence tends to prove in that behalf, there remains within the evidence or the want of evidence some other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence, for it is the actual exclusion of every other hypothesis which invests mere circumstances with the force of truth. The circumstances proved may produce a strong suspicion of guilt, but that is insufficient to justify a verdict of guilty at your hands. The court refused this instruction on the ground that it was repetitive because of court instruction C-15 and court instruction C-16. Court instruction C-15 reads as follows: The law presumes every person charged with the commission of a crime to be innocent. This presumption places upon the state the burden of proving the defendant guilty of every material element of the crime with which she is charged. Before you can return a verdict of guilty, the state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt (and to the exclusion of every other reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence) that the defendant is guilty. The presumption of innocence attends the defendant throughout the trial and prevails at its close unless overcome by evidence which satisfies the jury of her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant is not required to prove her innocence. Court instruction C-16 is as follows: If you can reconcile the evidence upon any reasonable hypothesis consistent with the defendant's innocence, you should do so and find her not guilty. Johnson argues that if the instructions were repetitive, then the court should have taken Johnson's instruction and withdrawn the court's. This contention is without merit. First, instruction C-15 and C-16 properly stated the circumstantial evidence instruction. See Billiot v. State, 454 So.2d 445, 461 (Miss. 1984). Instruction D-6 is a confusing one at best. Furthermore, when instructions are cumulative with others which were granted the trial court is not required to grant several instructions on the same question in different verbiage. Jones v. State, 381 So.2d 983, 991 (Miss. 1980). There is no merit to this assignment.