Opinion ID: 4539141
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: analysis

Text: 1. Motion to Suppress (a) Additional Background Law enforcement officers interviewed Guzman and recorded the conversation. When Guzman was brought into a room at 13 See State v. Vasquez, 271 Neb. 906, 716 N.W.2d 443 (2006). 14 State v. Thalken, supra note 12. 15 Neb. Ct. R. App. P. § 2-101(E) (rev. 2015). 16 See, § 29-2315.01 and Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2321 (Reissue 2016). 17 See State v. Stafford, 278 Neb. 109, 767 N.W.2d 507 (2009). 18 See State v. Artis, 296 Neb. 172, 893 N.W.2d 421 (2017), modified on denial of rehearing 296 Neb. 606, 894 N.W.2d 349. 19 State v. Kantaras, 294 Neb. 960, 885 N.W.2d 558 (2016). - 385 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 his place of employment, a detective identified himself as a police officer and read Guzman his Miranda rights. There is no dispute that from that point forward, Guzman was in custody. Guzman moved to suppress his statements to police. He claimed that at almost 2 hours into the interview, he “clearly invoked his right to counsel, asking if he had the opportunity to get a lawyer, to which officers responded no.” At the hearing on the motion to suppress, a detective testified that Guzman began asking questions “about when he could get a lawyer.” According to the detective, Guzman did not say he wanted a lawyer; rather, “he just asked about the process of getting one.” The detective testified: “We were talking about the search warrant. Essentially he was asking questions if he could get an attorney to deal with . . . the search warrant, if it could be stopped.” The court overruled the motion to suppress. With regard to the invocation of a right to counsel, the court stated: [A]t the 1 hour, 54 minute mark, [Guzman] asked officers, “Can I talk to a lawyer first?” . . . [W]hen putting it in the context of what was occurring during said exchange, the Court finds that [Guzman] did not clearly invoke his rights. Specifically, law enforcement [officers were] in the process of searching [Guzman’s] phone, and while doing so, [Guzman] was conversing with them about the search and asked if he could speak with a lawyer before they searched his phone. [They] informed him that they already had a search warrant and that he did not get to speak to an attorney before they conducted the search. Thus, the Court finds that [Guzman’s] statement of “Can I talk to a lawyer first” was in the context of the search, rather than a clear invocation of his Miranda rights for purposes of the custodial interrogation. (b) Standard of Review [5] In reviewing a motion to suppress a statement based on its claimed involuntariness, including claims that law - 386 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 enforcement procured it by violating the safeguards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 20 an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear error. Whether those facts meet constitutional standards, however, is a question of law, which an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination. 21 (c) Discussion On appeal, Guzman does not dispute that he waived his Miranda rights during the custodial interrogation. “[A]fter a knowing and voluntary waiver of the Miranda rights, law enforcement officers may continue questioning until and unless the suspect clearly requests an attorney.” 22 And Guzman does not challenge the district court’s factual findings. Rather, Guzman argues that he requested an attorney at the 1-hour54-minute mark of the recorded interrogation and that thus, any statements he made should have been suppressed. [6] In order to require cessation of custodial interrogation, the subject’s invocation of the right to counsel must be unambiguous and unequivocal. 23 “Statements such as ‘“[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer”’ or ‘“I probably should have an attorney”’ do not meet this standard.” 24 Guzman contends that his question—“‘Can I talk to a lawyer first?’”—was a clear invocation of the right to counsel. We disagree. “An expression of doubt or uncertainty cannot be considered unequivocal.” 25 Similarly, an Arizona court determined that “‘Do you think I 20 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 21 State v. Clifton, 296 Neb. 135, 892 N.W.2d 112 (2017). 22 Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 461, 114 S. Ct. 2350, 129 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1994). 23 State v. Goodwin, 278 Neb. 945, 774 N.W.2d 733 (2009). 24 Id. at 959, 774 N.W.2d at 744-45. 25 State v. Lynch, 169 N.H. 689, 697, 156 A.3d 1012, 1019 (2017). - 387 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 should get a lawyer?’” does not constitute an invocation of right to counsel. 26 Here, Guzman never explicitly stated that he wished to have an attorney present. The circumstances surrounding an alleged invocation are part of the objective inquiry into whether such an invocation of the right to counsel was made. The U.S. Supreme Court explained that “if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, [the Court’s] precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.” 27 Here, the officers perceived Guzman’s question about an attorney to be in connection with the search for his cell phones and not an assertion that Guzman did not wish to speak without an attorney present. That perception was reasonable under the circumstances. The district court did not err in overruling Guzman’s motion to suppress. 2. Motion for Mistrial (a) Additional Background In March 2018, Ruben Rodriguez was deposed on Guzman’s behalf. At trial, the State called Rodriguez as a witness during the State’s case in chief. When asked where he had lived in the past 5 years, Rodriguez provided information which was inconsistent with his deposition testimony. When Rodriguez testified that he saw B.G. at her party in October 2017, the prosecutor impeached him with his deposition testimony that the party was in September. When Rodriguez named seven people with whom he went to the party, the State pointed out that Rodriguez testified in his deposition that he went to the party with four individuals. During trial, Rodriguez also gave answers different from those in his deposition as to when he took an individual home, how may beers he consumed at the 26 See State v. Prince, 160 Ariz. 268, 272, 772 P.2d 1121, 1125 (1989). 27 Davis v. United States, supra note 22, 512 U.S. at 459 (emphasis in original). - 388 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 party, whether a certain individual was at the party, whether he saw Guzman walk B.G. up the stairs, and whether he made a “gas station run.” In a conversation out of the jury’s presence and unprompted by defense counsel, the court raised a concern that Rodriguez provided no substantive evidence. The court opined that “the sole purpose for hi[s] being called was to discredit him in any testimony he may have,” which the court did not think was permissible. The prosecutor responded that he expected Rodriguez would testify consistently with his deposition. Because Rodriguez did not, the prosecutor wanted “to make sure that the record’s clear on what he’s testifying to.” The prosecutor stated that he did not call Rodriguez “simply to impeach him.” The court then directed the parties to brief whether it is permissible to call a witness for the limited purpose of discrediting the witness. With the jury present, the court announced, “There ha[ve] been some conversations between Counsel and I need them to follow up on something for me, so we’re going to be recessing for the weekend a little bit early today.” When trial resumed after the weekend break, Guzman moved for a mistrial. His counsel explained that he subpoenaed Rodriguez, because Rodriguez had exculpatory information, but that “what the State did was discredit that witness before [the defense] could call him and elicit the exculpatory information.” The State argued that it “can’t control whether someone is going to get up there and lie or not, and they [sic] had no reason to expect them [sic] to.” The court found that there was not sufficient evidence that the State called Rodriguez for the purpose of impeachment. (b) Standard of Review [7] Decisions regarding motions for mistrial are directed to the discretion of the trial court, and will be upheld in the absence of an abuse of discretion. 28 28 State v. Schmaltz, 304 Neb. 74, 933 N.W.2d 435 (2019). - 389 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 (c) Discussion Guzman argues that the court erred in not granting his motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct. Before considering whether a mistrial would be proper, we must determine whether there was misconduct by the prosecution. [8,9] When considering a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, an appellate court first considers whether the prosecutor’s acts constitute misconduct. 29 Prosecutorial misconduct encompasses conduct that violates legal or ethical standards for various conducts because the conduct will or may undermine a defendant’s right to a fair trial. 30 Prosecutors are charged with the duty to conduct criminal trials in such a manner that the accused may have a fair and impartial trial, and prosecutors are not to inflame the prejudices or excite the passions of the jury against the accused. 31 A prosecutor’s conduct that does not mislead and unduly influence the jury is not misconduct. 32 According to Guzman, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by calling Rodriguez as a witness and impeaching him with testimony from his deposition on “trivial matters.” 33 Guzman contends that the State attacked Rodriguez’ credibility before Guzman could call Rodriguez as a witness. [10-12] Generally, the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party who called the witness. 34 One means of attacking the credibility of a witness is by showing inconsistency between his or her testimony at trial and what he or she said on previous occasions. 35 But a party cannot impeach his or her own witness without limitation. 36 29 Id. 30 Id. 31 Id. 32 Id. 33 Brief for appellant at 25. 34 State v. Dominguez, 290 Neb. 477, 860 N.W.2d 732 (2015). 35 Id. 36 Id. - 390 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 The State’s impeachment of Rodriguez does not amount to prosecutorial misconduct. The State called Rodriguez to testify, because he had information useful to the State’s case. The State had no reason to anticipate that Rodriguez would not testify consistently with his sworn deposition testimony. Assuming without deciding that Guzman’s motion for mistrial was timely, the court did not abuse its discretion in overruling the motion. 3. Motion for Directed Verdict (a) Additional Background [13] Guzman challenges the denial of his motion for directed verdict, but he waived the issue by presenting evidence. After the court overruled Guzman’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal on both charges, the defense proceeded to call a witness. A defendant who moves for dismissal or a directed verdict at the close of the evidence in the State’s case in chief in a criminal prosecution and who, when the court overrules the dismissal or directed verdict motion, proceeds with trial and introduces evidence, waives the appellate right to challenge correctness in the trial court’s overruling the motion for dismissal or a directed verdict but may still challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. 37 We consider Guzman’s argument as one challenging the sufficiency of the evidence. (b) Standard of Review [14] Regardless of whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial, or a combination thereof, and regardless of whether the issue is labeled as a failure to direct a verdict, insufficiency of the evidence, or failure to prove a prima facie case, the standard is the same: In reviewing a criminal conviction, an appellate court does not resolve conflicts in the evidence, pass on the credibility of witnesses, or reweigh the evidence; such matters are for the finder of fact, and a conviction will be affirmed, 37 State v. Briggs, supra note 8. - 391 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 in the absence of prejudicial error, if the evidence admitted at trial, viewed and construed most favorably to the State, is sufficient to support the conviction. 38 (c) Discussion [15] When a criminal defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence upon which a conviction is based, the relevant question for an appellate court is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 39 The State met its burden with respect to both charges. With respect to the sexual assault charge, Guzman’s brief does little more than attack the credibility of B.G. But an appellate court does not pass on the credibility of witnesses or reweigh the evidence. B.G. testified that she did not consent to having sex with anyone on the night of her party, and an attendee at the party testified that Guzman said he had sex with B.G. There was also abundant testimony about B.G.’s intoxication. Viewing the evidence most favorably to the State, a fact finder could conclude that Guzman subjected B.G. to sexual penetration without her consent or under circumstances when he knew or should have known that B.G. was mentally or physically incapable of resisting or appraising the nature of her conduct. 40 Guzman also contends that the State failed to adduce sufficient evidence to support the charge of tampering with a witness. Under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-919(1) (Reissue 2016): A person commits the offense of tampering with a witness or informant if, believing that an official proceeding or investigation of a criminal or civil matter is pending or about to be instituted, he or she attempts to induce or otherwise cause a witness or informant to: 38 State v. Case, 304 Neb. 829, 937 N.W.2d 216 (2020). 39 Id. 40 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-319(1) (Reissue 2016). - 392 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 (a) Testify or inform falsely; (b) Withhold any testimony, information, document, or thing; (c) Elude legal process summoning him or her to testify or supply evidence; or (d) Absent himself or herself from any proceeding or investigation to which he or she has been legally summoned. Guzman asserts that he merely relayed a message asking B.G. to drop the charges and that such action did not constitute tampering with a witness. He claims that he did not threaten or bribe B.G., did not ask her to testify falsely, and did not ask her not to go to court. But B.G. reported that she was sexually assaulted. By asking B.G. to drop the charges, Guzman was essentially asking her to inform falsely or to withhold information. The State adduced sufficient evidence at trial to support the conviction for tampering with a witness. 4. Sentences (a) Additional Background Finally, Guzman argues that his sentences were excessive. For first degree sexual assault, a Class II felony, 41 the court imposed a sentence of 12 to 20 years’ incarceration. At the time of the crime and sentencing, tampering with a witness was a Class IV felony. 42 For that conviction, the court imposed a concurrent sentence of 2 years. (b) Standard of Review [16] An appellate court will not disturb a sen­tence imposed within the statutory limits absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court. 43 [17] Plain error may be found on appeal when an error unasserted or uncomplained of at trial is plainly evident from the 41 See § 28-319(2). 42 See § 28-919(3). 43 State v. Iddings, 304 Neb. 759, 936 N.W.2d 747 (2020). - 393 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 record, affects a litigant’s substantial right, and, if uncorrected, would result in damage to the integrity, reputation, and fairness of the judicial process. 44 (c) Discussion [18] Where a sentence imposed within the statutory limits is alleged on appeal to be excessive, the appellate court must determine whether a sentencing court abused its discretion in considering and applying the relevant factors as well as any applicable legal principles in determining the sentence to be imposed. 45 In determining a sentence to be imposed, relevant factors customarily considered and applied are the defendant’s (1) age, (2) mentality, (3) education and experience, (4) social and cultural background, (5) past criminal record or record of law-abiding conduct, and (6) motivation for the offense, as well as (7) the nature of the offense and (8) the amount of violence involved in the commission of the crime. 46 The appropriateness of a sentence is necessarily a subjective judgment and includes the sentencing judge’s observation of the defendant’s demeanor and attitude and all the facts and circumstances surrounding the defendant’s life. 47 Guzman argues that an examination of the presentence report shows the sentencing factors weigh in favor of a lighter sentence. Some do. According to the presentence report, Guzman was 21 years old, was a high school graduate, and was consist­ ently employed prior to incarceration. His minimal criminal record consisted of traffic violations, an “MIP,” and a curfew violation. But other considerations do not favor a light sentence. An instrument designed to determine a defendant’s risk for recidivism put him in the high risk range to reoffend. With respect to the charges he stated: “‘Bullshit. It’s embarrassing and has affected everyone around me. This case has ruined 44 State v. Briggs, supra note 8. 45 See State v. Iddings, supra note 43. 46 Id. 47 Id. - 394 - Nebraska Supreme Court Advance Sheets 305 Nebraska Reports STATE v. GUZMAN Cite as 305 Neb. 376 my character. It’s the worst thing that could have happened to me.’” We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in sentencing Guzman. However, the State asserts that the court’s sentence for the witness tampering conviction was erroneous. Here, the court imposed a sentence for a Class II felony and a concurrent determinate sentence for a Class IV felony for offenses occurring in 2017. But a statute provides: For any sentence of imprisonment for a Class . . . IV felony . . . imposed consecutively or concurrently with . . . a sentence of imprisonment for a Class . . . II . . . felony, the court shall impose an indeterminate sentence within the applicable range in section 28-105 that does not include a period of post-release supervision, in accordance with the process set forth in section 29-2204. 48 [19,20] The court plainly erred by imposing a determinate sentence for the Class IV felony. The failure to impose an indeterminate sentence when required by statute constitutes plain error. 49 An appellate court has the power on direct appeal to remand a cause for the imposition of a lawful sentence where an erroneous one has been pronounced. 50 We therefore vacate Guzman’s sentence for tampering with a witness and remand the cause for resentencing on that conviction.