Opinion ID: 2982321
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Two 2003 Tennessee Cocaine Convictions

Text: Twice in 2003, Chatmon was convicted in Tennessee state court of cocaine possession. At sentencing, he argued that the two convictions should only count as a single predicate offense for career-offender purposes. His counsel stated: We believe that those cases were merged at the front end, they were merged at the time of sentencing, that since that time period the indictments have been merged nunc pro tunc to just make explicit what was already very clear, that those cases were merged, that the indictments were merged and the cases were consolidated for sentencing. And we’re prepared to put on proof of state court procedures as it relates to indictments, docket numbers, judgments, and other things that I think would be significant to the Court and to the court of appeals as well. The Guidelines provide seemingly clear instructions on whether to count related convictions separately or as a single sentence. Section 4A1.2 provides: Prior sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense). If there is no intervening arrest, prior sentences are counted separately unless (A) the sentences resulted from offenses contained in the same charging instrument; or (B) the sentences were imposed on the same day. Count any prior sentence covered by (A) or (B) as a single sentence. § 4A1.2(a)(2). According to the presentence report, Chatmon committed the first offense on August 9, 2001, committed the second offense on December 13, and then was arrested for the first offense on December 14. Because Chatmon was not arrested for the first offense prior to committing the second offense, there was no “intervening arrest.” Nonetheless, the presentence report maintains that the sentences for the two convictions resulted from separate indictments. Additionally, the presentence report also maintains that Chatmon was sentenced for the first conviction on March 4, 2003, and for the second conviction on March 14; these sentences appear to be imposed on different days. At first blush, it would appear that Chatmon’s two Tennessee cocaine-possession convictions count separately under § 4A1.2(a)(2). 17 But the matter is not so simple. Chatmon filed a sentencing memorandum in which he argued that the two Tennessee convictions were consolidated per state-court rules. He also argued that the two Tennessee convictions would unquestionably have been treated as a single sentence under an older version of the Guidelines Manual. Before Amendment 709 to the Guidelines Manual became effective in 2007, § 4A1.2(a)(2) provided an alternative method to determine whether to count offenses separately or as a single transaction. Under the old Guidelines Manual, “Prior Sentences imposed in related cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of §4A1.1(a), (b), and (c).” § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2006). Application Note 3 clarified that “prior sentences are considered related if they resulted from offenses that (A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for trial or sentencing.” § 4A1.2 cmt. n.3 (2006). Chatmon offers strong evidence that the two Tennessee convictions were consolidated. Most notably, Chatmon submits a nunc pro tunc order from Hamilton County Criminal Court, where the two convictions originated, that consolidates the two indictments for sentencing. But after Amendment 709 to the Guidelines Manual, whether prior sentences are consolidated is no longer dispositive in determining whether those offenses should be counted separately or as a single offense. See U.S.S.G. app. C, amend. 709 (2013). Amendment 709 replaced the old test with a new one, under which a court looks to whether the prior sentences resulted from offenses in the same charging instrument or whether the sentences were imposed the same day.12 § 4A1.2(a)(2). The amendment was intended to “simplif[y] the rules for counting multiple 12 Additionally, Amendment 709 altered the method of determining which misdemeanors and petty offenses are eligible to be counted in a defendant’s criminal-history score. See app. C, amend. 709. 18 sentences and [to] promot[e] consistency in the application of the guideline.” App. C, amend. 709. The ordinary situation is that a defendant sentenced under the old version of § 4A1.2(a)(2) seeks a sentence reduction because he would have been better off under the new version of § 4A1.2(a)(2), as modified by Amendment 709. See, e.g., United States v Hunter., 427 F. App’x 469, 472 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Atkinson, 427 F. App’x 420, 421–23 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Horn, 612 F.3d 524 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Curb, 625 F.3d 968, 971–72 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Goodloe, 388 F. App’x 500, 506–07 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Gibbs, 626 F.3d 344, 351–52 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Vassar, 346 F. App’x 17, 28 (6th Cir. 2009). That argument is futile for defendants because the Sentencing Commission did not make Amendment 709 retroactive, and the amendment may not be applied retroactively. Horn, 612 F.3d at 527. Here, however, Chatmon suggests the opposite: that he would have been better off under the old version of § 4A1.2(a)(2) and its accompanying Application Note 3. This is not the first time a defendant has advanced such an argument. See United States v. Rogers, 347 F. App’x 218, 219–21 (6th Cir. 2009). A defendant may not obtain relief based on “language . . . stricken from the Guidelines prior to his sentencing.” Id. at 219. That is, a defendant may not rely on the “superseded ‘related cases’ language from [the] earlier version of the Guidelines.” Id. at 220. Chatmon’s argument, though, is of a different hue: he argues that his Tennessee convictions should be counted as a single offense under the current version of the Guidelines because they result from offenses effectively contained in the same charging instrument and effectively imposed on the same day. He submits the affidavit of the Hamilton County prosecutor responsible for both of Chatmon’s 2003 cases. The prosecutor states that both 19 offenses were to be incorporated into a single plea agreement and that “it was of no consequence that there were two plea agreements, two Judges, and two plea dates, as all cases were consolidated in the first plea agreement.” He also states that the plea agreement, as to both convictions, was effectively entered on March 4, 2003, and that the second plea agreement was filed on a separate date simply as a matter of procedure. He states that he negotiated this arrangement with Chatmon’s attorney “with federal consequences in mind.” As evidence that the two 2003 convictions were effectively imposed on the same day, Chatmon submits a nunc pro tunc order from Hamilton County Criminal Court consolidating the indictments for sentencing. The order states that “consolidation of these indictments may be a significant issue if this defendant is sentenced in a Federal venue.” Indeed it has proven to be. That order was signed by Chatmon’s Hamilton County prosecutor. The order was entered nunc pro tunc. “When an order is signed ‘nunc pro tunc’ as of a specified date, it means that a thing is now done which should have been done on the specified date.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1100 (8th ed. 2004) (quoting 35 C.J.S. Federal Civil Procedure § 370, at 556 (1960)). A nunc pro tunc order does not necessarily operate as a get-out-of-jail-free card for a defendant. In the immigration context, for instance, an alien may not escape removal by vacating a prior conviction with a nunc pro tunc order entered solely for rehabilitative or immigration purposes. Boar v. Holder, 475 F. App’x 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2012). We previously addressed the applicability of a nunc pro tunc consolidation order for criminal-history purposes in United States v. Williams, 238 F.3d 426, 2000 WL 1872059 (6th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table opinion), another case involving multiple convictions from Tennessee state court. In Williams, the defendant submitted a motion and proposed nunc pro tunc order to the Honorable Joe Brown, Shelby County Criminal Court, consolidating ten prior 20 aggravated burglary convictions. See ibid. Judge Brown granted the motion and entered the order. See ibid. At the defendant’s subsequent federal sentencing, the defendant argued that the nunc pro tunc consolidation order meant that his prior convictions were consolidated. The district court declined to give effect to the order because defense counsel “had resorted to duplicitous and potentially unethical means to convince Judge Brown to grant the order.” We identified five non-dispositive factors that our court had previously looked at to assess the significance of a state-court consolidation order: (1) [whether] the order . . . indicate[s] that it was to have nunc pro tunc effect; (2) [whether] the order was apparently obtained in an ex parte proceeding, [i.e., whether] there was no indication in the record that the state prosecutor’s office had agreed to the terms of the consolidation motion; (3) [whether] the order was drafted by defense counsel and presented to the judge for signature without additional background information concerning the defendant; (4) [whether] defense counsel candidly conceded that the purpose of the consolidation order was to assist his client in obtaining a reduced federal sentence; and, (5) [whether] sentence consolidation[‘s goal] . . . of providing defendants with enhanced opportunities for rehabilitation . . . would . . . [be] served, [notwithstanding that] defendant had already served his state court sentences. Ibid. In Williams, Judge Brown’s order was entered nunc pro tunc. But central to the panel’s decision not to give effect to the order was the fact that “it was obtained without notice to or consent from the appropriate Tennessee state prosecutor and without first providing Judge Brown with information concerning the purpose of the order.” Ibid. In obtaining the consolidation order, defense counsel “never disclosed [its] purpose to Judge Brown, either orally or in writing.” Id. n.1. Defense counsel, in fact, never “disclose[d] to the district court until questioned the manner in which he had obtained the consolidation order from Judge Brown.” Ibid. Additionally, in United States v. Odom, 199 F.3d 321 (6th Cir. 1999), we held that the district court correctly discounted a state court’s consolidation order for these reasons: the order 21 did not state it was entered nunc pro tunc; there was no indication that the state prosecutor agreed to the order’s terms; there was nothing to indicate what background information, if any, was provided to the judge; and defense counsel admitted that the order was obtained solely to help the defendant. Id. at 324. Chatmon’s case differs from Williams and Odom in several aspects. First, as noted above, a different version of § 4A1.2 is now in effect. Second, unlike in Williams and Odom, the appropriate state prosecutor consented to and signed the consolidation order.13 Third, Chatmon’s counsel made clear to the state-court judge the purpose of the consolidation order, and that purpose is stated squarely in the order itself. In Williams, an unpublished opinion, we “emphasized . . . that our decision in no way establishes a per se rule against use of after-the-fact consolidation orders as evidence of relatedness.” Id. n.10. At any rate, Chatmon’s argument is not that his two 2003 convictions were consolidated because of the nunc pro order—but merely that the order evinces that “the parties explicitly understood these cases to be joined and incorporated and pled and sentences on the same day.” The district court declined to rule on Chatmon’s objection to counting the 2003 convictions separately, finding that its decision regarding the 1999 Georgia conviction rendered the issue moot. Although there is some evidence in the record on point, the parties have not had an opportunity to development arguments. Chatmon himself contends that the issue should be decided by the district court in the first instance on remand. See Appellant Br. 7 n.3. Accordingly, we remand to the district court to address this issue in the first instance.14 13 Not only did the prosecutor consent to the consolidation order, he specifically attested that he did so in order to document his intentions at the time of Chatmon’s 2003 plea and “to memorialize the consolidation which existed at the time of the plea.” 14 The district court’s rulings on the 1999 Georgia conviction may again render moot the need to decide this issue. 22