Opinion ID: 65776
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of Co-Conspirators' Guilty Pleas

Text: Evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. King, 541 F.3d 1143, 1146 (5th Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 947, 173 L.Ed.2d 144 (2009). When, as here, the defendant did not object to admission of the evidence at trial, this court reviews only for plain error. United States v. Valuck, 286 F.3d 221, 228 (5th Cir.2002). Setser argues that the district court erred in allowing the prosecution to make various references to the guilty pleas entered by his co-conspirators, because the prosecution sought to use such evidence as substantive evidence of guilt and not for legitimate purposes. Setser particularly complains about other guilty pleas being mentioned at these times: during the government's opening statement; during the examination of Setser's daughter, Cassie Setser Schmidt; during the examination of an unindicted IPIC employee, Charmaine Sears; and, at greatest length, during the examination of Joshua Setser, Gregory Setser's son, who pled guilty to securities fraud. While a guilty plea by a co-conspirator may not be used as evidence of guilt, it `may be admitted into evidence if it serves a legitimate purpose and a proper limiting instruction is given.' Id. (quoting United States v. Marroquin, 885 F.2d 1240, 1247 (5th Cir.1989)). In analyzing an admission of a co-conspirator's guilty plea, this court considers: (1) presence or absence of a limiting instruction; (2) proper evidentiary purpose in introducing the guilty plea; (3) improper use of the guilty plea as substantive evidence of the defendant's guilt; and (4) whether the introduction was invited by defense counsel. United States v. Samak, 7 F.3d 1196, 1198 (5th Cir.1993). Preemptively introducing a plea to counteract anticipated defense efforts at impeachment is a proper purpose. Valuck, 286 F.3d at 228. A defense strategy that itself heavily relies on the guilty pleas with frequent, pointed, and direct references, defeats subsequent attempts to claim error in the government's use of the pleas. United States v. Leach, 918 F.2d 464, 467 (5th Cir.1990). We apply these principles. First, the district court gave thorough limiting instructions that are similar to those approved by this court in Valuck. 286 F.3d at 228. As to the second and third factors, the government asserts that it was using the pleas for the permissible purpose of rebutting anticipated impeachment. The government does acknowledge that it could be said to have placed undue weight on the guilty pleas at a few specific instances. While the lengthy questioning of Joshua Setser is justifiable, since Joshua Setser pled guilty and was testifying against his father, the government's much more limited references in the examinations of the two women are suspect, since those witnesses had not pled guilty. The government may have mentioned the pleas there in an attempt to make the witnesses' denials that they knew about criminal activity seem implausible. Nonetheless, the references were quite limited, so this factor weighs only slightly against the government. The fourth factor, the defense's own use of the pleas, weighs against finding error. With respect to Joshua Setser, the record confirms that the defense devoted a significant portion of its cross-examination to the plea agreement, Setser called another witness and inquired about the details of his plea agreement, and the defense's closing argument suggested that plea agreements gave Joshua Setser an incentive to lie. We find no reversible error.