Opinion ID: 753001
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 12 Chrysler is in an unusual procedural position because it appeals from the district court's affirmance of a bankruptcy court order it never appealed from. A party may appeal from a final judgment, order, or decree of a bankruptcy judge to a district court as of right by filing a notice of appeal with the [bankruptcy court] clerk within the time allowed by Rule 8002. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8001. Moreover, the [f]ailure of an appellant to take any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the district court ... deems appropriate. Id. By implication, Chrysler's failure to file a notice of appeal to the district court from the bankruptcy court does affect the validity of its appeal to the Court of Appeals. See Shareholders v. Sound Radio, Inc., 109 F.3d 873, 879 (3d Cir.1997) (The failure to file a timely notice of appeal [from the bankruptcy court] creates a jurisdictional defect barring appellate review.); In re Colon, 941 F.2d 242, 245-46 (3d Cir.1991) (a late filing is insufficient to vest the district court with jurisdiction of the appeal). 13 Rule 8002 gives persons aggrieved by a bankruptcy order ten days to file a notice of appeal. Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8002(a). However, that rule also provides for an extension in certain circumstances: 14 Effect of Motion on Time for Appeal. If any party makes a timely motion of a type specified immediately below, the time for appeal for all parties runs from the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding. This provision applies to a timely motion: (1) to amend or make additional findings of fact under Rule 7052, whether or not granting the motion would alter the judgment; [or] (2) to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 9023.... A notice of appeal filed after announcement or entry of the judgment, order, or decree but before disposition of any of the above motions is ineffective to appeal from the judgment, order, or decree, or part thereof, specified in the notice of appeal, until the entry of the order disposing of the last such motion outstanding. Appellate review of an order disposing of any of the above motions requires the party, in compliance with Rule 8001, to amend a previously filed notice of appeal. 15 Fed. R. Bankr.P. 8002(b). Because the bankruptcy court hasn't ruled on Chrysler's motion to alter or amend, neither Krebs nor Chrysler can appeal the underlying orders at this time. Also, the bankruptcy court has not ruled on Chrysler's motion to reconsider, so Chrysler may not found its appeal here on that motion. Finally, while Krebs has appealed the denial of its motion to reconsider, Chrysler did not appeal that decision, either. Hence, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal from Chrysler. It follows that we lack jurisdiction over Chrysler's appeal from the district court order emanating from Krebs's appeal. 16 In the cases cited by Chrysler and GMAC, the parties had first appealed a bankruptcy court order to the district court. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. H.K. Porter Co., 45 F.3d 737, 740-41 (3d Cir.1995) (order granting motion to vacate withdrawals and defaults of claims); In re Dykes, 10 F.3d 184, 186 (3d Cir.1993) (order confirming Chapter 13 plan); In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 152-53 (1st Cir.1987) (order granting U.S. leave to sue a former trustee); In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 441 (9th Cir.1983) (order authorizing employment of special counsel for bankruptcy trustee). Chrysler cites only one case that even arguably supports its position regarding our jurisdiction over its appeal. In In re Colonial Broad. Corp., 758 F.2d 794 (1st Cir.1985), the bankruptcy court issued an order accepting Joaquin Villamil's offer to buy the debtor's assets. The debtor, the committee of debtor's equity security holders, and Charles Woods (a potential buyer who submitted a higher, but belated bid) all filed motions for reconsideration. After the bankruptcy court denied these motions, all three appealed the underlying order accepting the Villamil bid to the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico. The district court dismissed the debtor's appeal for failure to prosecute. Although the equity security holders and Woods filed separate appeals, the equity security holders appeared in Woods' appeal by both filing a statement of intent to join and fully support Woods' position and then filing their own brief. Id. at 798. The district court dismissed the remaining two appeals because it held that the bankruptcy court's order accepting the Villamil bid was interlocutory, and not appealable. Considering the notices of appeal as motions for leave to appeal an interlocutory order, the district court denied leave to appeal because a subsequent bankruptcy court order confirming the sale on different terms mooted the order accepting the bid. All three previous appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, including the debtor whose appeal had been dismissed. 17 The Court of Appeals first addressed the debtor's untimely appeal from the district court's dismissal: 18 We begin by noting that we have no jurisdiction over the appeal of the debtor, ACBC. ACBC's appeal ... was dismissed by the district court for failure to prosecute. No notice of appeal was filed within the thirty-day period allowed for appeals. Fed. R.App. P. 4(a). The requirements of Rule 4(a) are 'mandatory and jurisdictional,' and ACBC's failure to comply with these requirements leave this court without jurisdiction. 19 Id. at 799 (citation omitted). The Court continued, Nor can we consider ACBC a proper party to appeal the district court's denial of the Woods appeal since, unlike the Equity Security Holders, ACBC did not either file an appearance or join in that action. Id. Chrysler now cites this statement for the proposition that it can appeal to this Court without first appealing from the bankruptcy court because it submitted a brief to the district court. 20 We reject this argument. First, the sentence in Colonial Broadcasting upon which Chrysler relies is dicta, in light of the Court's previous determination that the debtor's appeal should be dismissed as untimely. Here, although Chrysler has timely appealed from the district court's decision, it failed to appeal from the bankruptcy court. Second, to allow a party like Chrysler to appear before a court of appeals without first appealing to the district court, even if that party somehow participated in the district court proceedings, would nullify bankruptcy rules 8001 and 8002. Following Chrysler's logic, if a party at the bankruptcy court level could convince an appellant at the district court level to name it as an appellee, it would be able to bypass district court review--hardly a desirable or contemplated result. This, however, does not mean that a non-party can never appeal a bankruptcy court order. The person aggrieved rule covers that situation. If an aggrieved party files a timely appeal from both the bankruptcy court and the district court, the court of appeals will have jurisdiction over its claim.