Opinion ID: 2211982
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: removal of blood for testing

Text: The initial inquiry must be whether the actual taking of the blood constituted a search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Clearly, a blood test conducted under the direction of police falls within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. Schmerber v California, 384 US 757; 86 S Ct 1826; 16 L Ed 2d 908 (1966). However, before constitutional protections from searches and seizures can be activated, state action must be involved in the alleged search. See United States v Jacobsen, 466 US 109; 104 S Ct 1652; 80 L Ed 2d 85 (1984). In Jacobsen, the majority stated that the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable `to a search or seizure, even an unreasonable one, effected by a private individual not acting as an agent of the Government or with the participation or knowledge of any governmental official.' Id., p 113, quoting Walter v United States, 447 US 649, 662; 100 S Ct 2395; 65 L Ed 2d 410 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Perlos, the Court of Appeals found that there was sufficient state involvement to activate Fourth Amendment protections. [8] The Court held that a search and seizure improperly took place without a search warrant, and that none of the exceptions to the warrant requirement applied to authorize the prosecutorial action. [9] Thus, the statute was found to be unconstitutional. In England, the Court of Appeals considered the Perlos Court's analysis of this issue and rejected it. The England Court stated that the Perlos decision fails to recognize the distinction between the withdrawal of the blood and the turning over of blood test results to the state. The search performed here, i.e., the removal of the blood sample from defendant, was done strictly for purposes of medical treatment and not at the direction of the police, the prosecutor, or state agents. Thus, the actual removal of the blood sample is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment, since state action is not involved. [176 Mich App 343-344.] We agree with the distinction drawn by the England Court and its conclusion that the Fourth Amendment was not implicated when defendants had their blood withdrawn for medical treatment. Certainly there are various medical reasons for a doctor to order an alcohol analysis on a patient. For example, determining an alcohol level may be a necessary step for doctors to prescribe safe and effective medication. In these cases, blood was drawn for medical reasons, by medical personnel, and not in connection with any police investigation. [10] Subsection 9 of the implied consent act is not designed to influence the judgment of medical personnel regarding whether chemical analyses should be performed. Since there was no state involvement in the withdrawal and testing of defendants' blood, we find that there were no Fourth Amendment intrusions at this stage of the cases. In similar circumstances, other state courts have reached the same conclusion. See State v Johnston, 108 NM 778; 779 P2d 556 (1989); Nelson v Alaska, 650 P2d 426, 427 (Alas, 1982); Wisconsin v Jenkins, 80 Wis 2d 426, 427-434; 259 NW2d 109 (1977); Turner v Arkansas, 258 Ark 425, 435-437; 527 SW2d 580 (1975); Oregon v Enoch, 21 Or App 652, 654; 536 P2d 460 (1975); Pennsylvania v Gordon, 431 Pa 512, 517-519; 246 A2d 325 (1968), cert den 394 US 937 (1969).