Opinion ID: 202976
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence Relating to the Drafting of the U-5

Text: Before trial, Galarneau filed a motion in limine to exclude all evidence of communications between Galarneau's counsel and counsel for Merrill Lynch regarding the opportunity to review and comment upon the language Merrill Lynch proposed to use in Galarneau's Form U-5. Galarneau claimed that evidence of such communications was subject to exclusion under Fed. R.Evid. 408 because it constitutes an offer and/or communication made during settlement negotiations, or, in the alternative, under Rule 403 because it had minimal relevance compared to its unfair prejudice. The district court granted the motion to exclude, stating: I'm not going to let it in. I'm not changing my previous ruling. I think under 408, 403, and in my discretion in this matter, I think it opens doors that might well require counsel to testify. I think they are settlement discussions. [T]he district court's construction of evidentiary rules is a question of law which we review de novo,  United States v. Barone, 114 F.3d 1284, 1296 (1st Cir.1997), while the district court's application of the rule to particular facts is reviewed for abuse of discretion, Blake v. Pellegrino, 329 F.3d 43, 46 (1st Cir.2003). Merrill Lynch argues that the exclusion of this evidence was prejudicial error, and it is therefore entitled to a new trial. We disagree. Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 403. The trial court employs a balancing test to determine whether Rule 403 applies, weighing the probative worth of the evidence against its potentially confusing effects. See Fryar v. Curtis, 485 F.3d 179, 184 (1st Cir.2007). Thus, even where the evidence may shed light on the disputed issues, the district judge can find the untoward effects of the proffered evidence to be so weighty that the evidence should be excluded. Faigin v. Kelly, 184 F.3d 67, 80 (1st Cir.1999). We accord district courts considerable latitude in this exercise and review the exclusion of evidence under Rule 403 for abuse of discretion. Id. at 79-80. The district judge enjoys a unique advantage in observing first-hand the nuances of trial, Faigin, 184 F.3d at 80, we therefore give the district court significant leeway in making its determinations, Williams v. Drake, 146 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir.1998). We have consistently declined to reverse the district court's judgment from the vista of a cold appellate record absent extraordinarily compelling circumstances. Faigin, 184 F.3d at 81 (quoting Freeman v. Package Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1340 (1st Cir.1988)); see also Onujiogu v. United States, 817 F.2d 3, 6 (1st Cir.1987) (Only in compelling circumstances will we reverse the exercise of a district court's informed discretion concerning the relative weight of probative value and unfairly prejudicial effect.). We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence under Rule 403 in this case. As required under the rule, the district court weighed the probative value of the evidence against the risk of confusion of the issues. Finding that the evidence was probative of both parties' contentions with respect to liability and that it would likely require testimony from the attorneys as to the motivations behind the proposed U-5 language and Merrill Lynch's refusal to adopt it, the district court excluded the evidence. Cf. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1194 (1st Cir.1990) (acknowledging the advocate-witness rule, which generally bars an attorney from appearing as both an advocate and a witness in the same litigation (internal quotation marks omitted)). We find no fault in this determination. Moreover, Merrill Lynch has not shown, nor has it alleged, any extraordinarily compelling circumstances that would justify our reversal of the district court's ruling. Rather, they have merely alleged that the district judge did not give enough weight to the probative value of the evidence. In light of the unexceptional nature of Merrill Lynch's allegations, we decline to disturb the district court's ruling under Rule 403. [10]