Opinion ID: 151997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Similar In Kind

Text: Johnson argues that rioting at a correctional institution is not similar in kind to the ACCA's enumerated offenses because the act of rioting does not require purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. According to defendant, many forms of passive and nonviolent conduct could violate the statute, thus making it over-inclusive. He also argues that the absence of any particular scienter requirement renders rioting at a correctional institution a strict liability crime and, therefore, it is not similar in kind to those enumerated in the ACCA. See State v. Nixon, 32 Conn. App. 224, 630 A.2d 74, 86 (1993) (The offense of rioting at a correctional institution does not expressly provide for any particular scienter requirement.); see also Begay, 553 U.S. at 145, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (explaining that driving under the influence of alcohol is most nearly comparable to[] crimes that impose strict liability, criminalizing conduct in respect to which the offender need not have any criminal intent at all). The government responds that rioting at a correctional institution is a general intent crime that typically involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct so as to resemble in kind those crimes enumerated. We hold that rioting at a correctional institution is similar in kind to the ACCA's enumerated offenses. First, the rioting statute, as construed by the Connecticut state courts, is a crime of general intent and not one of strict liability. In State v. Pascucci, 164 Conn. 69, 316 A.2d 750 (1972), for example, the Connecticut Supreme Court, construing the statutory predecessor of § 53a-179b, [3] held that [i]ntent to do the prohibited act, not intent to violate the criminal law, is the only intent requisite for conviction in the case of many crimes constituting violations of statutes in the nature of police regulations. This statute was obviously such a police regulation. Id. at 753 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); see also State v. Nixon, 32 Conn.App. 224, 630 A.2d 74, 86 (1993) (discussing § 53a-179b and noting: When the elements of a crime consist of a description of a particular act and a mental element not specific in nature, the only issue is whether the defendant intended to do the proscribed act. If he did so intend, he has the requisite general intent for culpability. (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)); cf. Black's Law Dictionary 882 (9th ed. 2009) (defining general intent as [t]he intent to perform an act even though the actor does not desire the consequences that result and noting that [t]his is the state of mind required for the commission of certain common-law crimes not requiring a specific intent or not imposing strict liability). Because it is clear that rioting at a correctional institution is a crime of general intent, we reject defendant's argument that § 53a-179b imposes strict liability. As a general intent crime, we are satisfied that rioting at a correctional institution typically involves the purposeful conduct required by Begay. See 550 U.S. at 144, 127 S.Ct. 1610. In United States v. Daye , we acknowledged that although a statute proscribing sexual assault of a child admittedly imposed strict liability with regard to the age of the victimthat is, it did not require that the defendant know that the victim was a minorit still involve[d] deliberate and affirmative conduct and therefore satisfied Begay's requirement that a felony typically involves purposeful conduct. 571 F.3d at 233-34; see also Begay, 553 U.S. at 152, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that one of the enumerated crimesthe unlawful use of explosivesmay involve merely negligent or reckless conduct (internal quotation marks omitted)). The conduct proscribed by Connecticut's rioting statute is similarly deliberate and affirmative. Even the hypothetical acts of passive disobedience that defendant cites in his brief all involve deliberate and purposeful conduct. See Appellant's Br. 12 (arguing that [d]isobedience giving rise to criminal liability includes, for example, inciting or participating in a hunger strike, refusal to work at a prison job, refusal to attend counseling programs, refusal to ingest medication, and refusal to lockup in an assigned cell or housing unit); cf. Chambers, 129 S.Ct. at 692 (noting that failure to report ... amounts to a form of inaction, a far cry from ... purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct). Moreover, the categorical approach, as described in Begay, requires only that the typical instance of the crime be purposeful. See 550 U.S. at 144, 127 S.Ct. 1610. We also have little doubt that rioting at a correctional institution typically involve[s]... violent, and aggressive conduct. Id. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581 (internal quotation marks omitted). In its brief, the government has provided statistics based on reported decisions involving convictions under § 53a-179b where offense conduct was discussed. Appellee's Br. 32-33 (collecting cases); cf. Chambers, 129 S.Ct. at 692-93 (considering statistical evidence in determining whether failure to report is typically violent). In all of the cases analyzed, the conduct at issue either (1) involved the use of a weapon or (2) resulted in injury to a guard, an inmate, or both. Id. A majority of cases involved both the use of a weapon and injury. Id. Defendant takes issue with the accuracy and completeness of the government's statistics. [4] In our view, however, the statistics merely confirm what is evident from the plain language of the rioting statute and its construction by Connecticut courtsthat is, that leading, planning, or joining in a disturbance in violation of the rules of a correctional institution typically involves violent and aggressive behavior. At a minimum, we have no doubt that a typical instance of this crime will involve conduct that is at least as intentionally aggressive and violent as a typical instance of burglary. Daye, 571 F.3d at 234; see id. ( Begay does not require that every instance of a particular crime involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. (emphasis in original)); see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 21, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (noting that available statistics demonstrate that burglaries only rarely involve physical violence). The fact that some arguably nonviolent conductsuch as a hunger strikemight violate the statute, or even that some convictions under the statute have actually involved nonviolent conduct, is not dispositive. We recently held, in United States v. Thrower , that larceny from the person is a violent felony under the ACCA. 584 F.3d 70, 74 (2d Cir.2009). We did so notwithstanding the fact that some conduct that is neither violent nor aggressive such as pickpocketingwould surely be covered by the statute at issue in that case [5] Similarly, the fact that the sexual assault statute at issue in Daye could have been applied to the conduct of consenting teenagers did not foreclose a holding that a typical instance of this crime will indeed involve violent and aggressive conduct. 571 F.3d at 234. [6] Judge Parker argues that we fail to consider whether each of the statutorily delineated criminal acts in Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-179b typically involves violent and aggressive conduct. See Dissent at 96 (noting that the statute proscribes five distinct criminal acts: (1) disorders, (2) disturbances, (3) strikes, (4) riots, and (5) organized disobedience to a prison's rules and regulations). He maintains that by referring to disorders and disturbances, the statute criminalizes conduct akin to disorderly conduct or disturbing the peace, neither of which are violent felonies. Id. at 96, 95 (relying on Conn. Gen.Stat. §§ 53a-182, 53a-181a). In his view, only the act of rioting typically involves violent and aggressive behavior and, therefore, we must apply the so-called modified categorical approach to determine which part of the Connecticut rioting statute Johnson was convicted of violating. Cf. Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1265, 1273, 176 L.Ed.2d 1 (2010) (explaining that [w]hen the law under which the defendant has been convicted contains statutory phrases that cover several different generic crimes, some of which require violent force and some of which do not, the modified categorical approach... permits a court to determine which statutory phrase was the basis for the conviction by consulting the trial record (internal quotation marks omitted)). [7] We agree that [w]hen a statute encompasses both violent and non-violent felonies... we make a limited inquiry into which part of the statute the defendant was convicted of violating. United States v. Mills, 570 F.3d 508, 511 (2d Cir.2009). In our view, however, the Connecticut rioting statute encompasses only violent felonies because each of the acts proscribed by the statute typically involves violent and aggressive behavior. See Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45, 128 S.Ct. 1581. Categorical treatment of all convictions under that statute as violent felonies is therefore required. By drawing analogies to other Connecticut statutes that use similar terminology, Judge Parker fails to account adequately for at least one critical distinction: the Connecticut rioting statute applies only to conduct occurring in prisons. Creating a disturbance or disorder in a prison environment is qualitatively different from doing the same on a public street corner. See Part II, post. And, in our view, such behavior is typically at least as violent and aggressive as a typical instance of burglary. See Daye, 571 F.3d at 234. Furthermore, to hold that a violation of the Connecticut rioting statute is not categorically a violent felony would require[ ] a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility, that the State would apply its statute to conduct that is not typically violent or aggressive. See James, 550 U.S. at 208, 127 S.Ct. 1586 (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzales v. Duenas-Alvarez, 549 U.S. 183, 193, 127 S.Ct. 815, 166 L.Ed.2d 683 (2007)). But there is simply no evidence that Connecticut regularly applies § 53a-179b to nonviolent conduct. To the contrary, nearly all reported cases involving convictions under the statute involve conduct that can only fairly be characterized as violent and aggressive. Like Judge Parker, we assume that there have been some convictions that resulted in no published decision. But there is no basis for assuming, as Judge Parker does, that the vast majority of convictions under § 53a-179b are not accounted for in the government's statistics, see Dissent at 98 n. 3, nor that such unreported convictions typically involve conduct that is any less violent or aggressive than the conduct described in the cases relied on by the government. We agree with Judge Parker that the ACCA is aimed at violent and aggressive behavior that makes it more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145, 128 S.Ct. 1581. At bottom, our disagreement results from differing views of what constitutes violent and aggressive behavior. In State v. Rivera , for example, the Appellate Court of Connecticut described the facts as follows: [After repeated orders to clear the yard a] group of about 200 inmates began to march around ... shouting loudly. [Correction Officer] McDevitt observed the defendant with about ten other inmates near the front of this group....... [Despite attempts to calm the inmates,] the disturbance escalated into a fullfledged riot. Inmates began running in all directions, throwing rocks and setting fires. Some inmates displayed a banner demanding media coverage. The inmates looted some buildings and burned others. Using tear gas, the correctional emergency response team restored order several hours later. 619 A.2d at 1148. Judge Parker suggests that the defendant's conduct in that case marching at the front of a group of 200 shouting inmateswas not violent and aggressive. Dissent at 98 n. 3. We respectfully disagree. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that rioting at a correctional institution is similar in kind to the offenses of burglary, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives. The conduct proscribed by Conn. Gen.Stat. § 53a-179b is precisely the sort that makes it more likely that an offender, later possessing a gun, will use that gun deliberately to harm a victim. Begay, 553 U.S. at 145, 128 S.Ct. 1581.