Opinion ID: 218529
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Chronicle's First Amendment right of access to the sentencing proceeding

Text: The first question in this case is whether the press and public, including the Chronicle, have a First Amendment right of access to a sentencing proceeding. We conclude that they do. The Supreme Court has developed a two-part test for determining whether there is a First Amendment right of access to a particular criminal proceeding: (1) whether the proceeding has historically been open to the public and press; and (2) whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9, 106 S.Ct. 2735; see also Press-Enterprise Co. v. Super. Ct. ( Press-Enterprise I ), 464 U.S. 501, 505-09, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984). This test has been referred to as the experience and logic test. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (explaining that the institutional value of the open criminal trial is recognized in both logic and experience); see also Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9, 106 S.Ct. 2735 (summarizing the test as considerations of experience and logic). In applying this test, the Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment right of access to various aspects of a criminal prosecution. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10, 106 S.Ct. 2735 (preliminary hearings as conducted in California); Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 505, 104 S.Ct. 819 (jury voir dire); Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (trial); Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 576-77, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (trial). The courts of appeals have also recognized a First Amendment right of access to various proceedings within a criminal prosecution. See, e.g., United States v. Danovaro, 877 F.2d 583, 589 (7th Cir.1989) (proceeding at which guilty plea was taken); United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir.1988) (plea hearings); In re Knight Publ'g Co., 743 F.2d 231, 233 (4th Cir.1984) (trials); United States v. Klepfer ( In re Herald Co. ), 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir.1984) (pretrial hearing on motion to suppress); United States v. Chagra, 701 F.2d 354, 363-64 (5th Cir.1983) (pretrial bond reduction hearing); United States v. Brooklier, 685 F.2d 1162, 1167-71 (9th Cir.1982) (jury voir dire, pretrial hearing on motion to suppress, and hearing conducted during trial on motion to suppress); Criden, 675 F.2d at 557 (pretrial suppression, due process, and entrapment hearings). But see Edwards, 823 F.2d at 116-17 (First Amendment right of access does not attach to mid-trial questioning of jurors about potential misconduct). [1] Although neither the Supreme Court nor this court has specifically considered whether the First Amendment applies to a sentencing hearing, the Second, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have done so, and each has concluded that it does. United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 196-99 (2d Cir.2005); United States v. Eppinger, 49 F.3d 1244, 1252-53 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v. Soussoudis ( In re Washington Post Co. ), 807 F.2d 383, 389 (4th Cir.1986) (plea hearings and sentencing proceedings); CBS, Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 765 F.2d 823, 825 (9th Cir.1985) (The primary justifications for access to criminal proceedings ... apply with as much force to post-conviction proceedings as to the trial itself.). [2] Relatedly, courts of appeals have also recognized a First Amendment right of access to documents filed for use in sentencing proceedings. Washington Post v. Robinson ( Robinson ), 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C.Cir.1991) (plea agreements); Oregonian Publ'g Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir.1990) (plea agreements and related documents); Haller, 837 F.2d at 86 (plea agreements); CBS, Inc., 765 F.2d at 824-25 (defendant's motion to reduce sentence under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35 and government's response); United States v. Santarelli, 729 F.2d 1388, 1390 (11th Cir.1984) ([T]he public has a First Amendment right to see and hear that which is admitted in evidence in a public sentencing hearing.). We conclude, as have the other courts that have considered this question, that the public and press have a First Amendment right of access to sentencing proceedings. Indeed, we agree with the Second and Fourth Circuits that the Supreme Court's holdings in Globe Newspaper Co. and Richmond Newspapers, Inc. that there is a First Amendment right of access to a trial should, logically, already encompass sentencing hearings: Sentencing may ... be viewed as within the scope of the criminal trial itself. Sentencing can occur before the termination of the trial proceeding, and, even if it occurs in a separate hearing, it clearly amounts to the culmination of the trial. Moreover, even if ... sentencing hearings are not considered a part of the trial itself, they are surely as much an integral part of a criminal prosecution as are preliminary probable-cause hearings, suppression hearings, or bail hearings, all of which have been held to be subject to the public's First Amendment right of access. Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 196-97 (quoting In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 389) (quotation marks omitted). The First Amendment right of access to a sentencing proceeding is especially salient in this case, where, as in the vast majority of criminal cases, there was no trial, but only a guilty plea. Id. at 199 (It makes little sense to recognize a right of public access to criminal courts and then limit that right to the trial phase of a criminal proceeding, something that occurs in only a small fraction of criminal cases. (quoting In re Herald Co., 734 F.2d at 98 (quotation marks omitted)).). Moreover, applying the experience and logic test set out by the Supreme Court confirms that the public and press have a First Amendment right of access to sentencing proceedings. First, sentencing proceedings have historically been open to the press and public. Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 197 n. 7 (listing numerous cases from the nineteenth century describ[ing] sentencing proceedings held in open court and citing secondary sources to explain that [h]istorically, [s]entences were often imposed immediately after the jury returned a guilty verdict in open court); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 389 (Sentencings have historically been open to the public....). As the Chronicle points out, the United States has a rich and proud tradition of conducting public criminal trials and sentencing proceedings. These include numerous high profile cases of defendants who were considered dangerous [3] : the open trial and sentencing proceeding held in the Southern District of Texas (Houston) for Juan Garcia Abrego, who was a predecessor of Cardenas-Guillen [4] as the leader of the Gulf Cartel; [5] the open sentencing held in the Southern District of New York for Jorge Mario Paredes-Cordova, [6] who was designated by the United States Department of Justice as one of the world's most significant drug kingpins; [7] the open sentencing proceeding held in the Eastern District of Virginia for Zacarias Moussaoui, for his participation in the attacks of September 11, 2001; [8] the open sentencing proceeding held in the Southern District of New York for Mohamed al-`Owhali, Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, Mohamed Odeh and Wadih el-Hage, for their roles in the 1998 bomb attacks on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; [9] the open trial and sentencing proceeding held in the Southern District of New York for Ramzi Yousef, for his role in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center; [10] the open trial held in the Northern District of Illinois for Al Capone; [11] the open sentencing proceeding held in the Eastern District of New York for John Gotti; [12] and the open trial and sentencing of Timothy McVeigh for his role in the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. [13] Second, public access plays a significant positive role, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8-9, 106 S.Ct. 2735, in a sentencing hearing. In particular, the Supreme Court has recognized several interrelated ways in which openness is beneficial in a criminal trial. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 593-97, 100 S.Ct. 2814. The recognized benefits of having open trials also apply in the context of sentencing proceedings. To begin with, [t]he knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power .... Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 596, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (quoting In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 270, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948)) (quotation marks omitted); see also Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. 2613 ([I]n the broadest terms, public access to criminal trials permits the public to participate in and serve as a check upon the judicial processan essential component in our structure of self-government.). The need for such a restraint is also present in the sentencing context. The presence of the public operates to check any temptation that might be felt by either the prosecutor or the court ... to seek or impose an arbitrary or disproportionate sentence. In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 389. Indeed, the fact that there is no jury at the sentencing proceeding, in contrast to jury trials, heightens the need for public access. Cf. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 12-13, 106 S.Ct. 2735 ([T]he absence of a jury, long recognized as `an inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge,' ... makes the importance of public access to a preliminary hearing even more significant. (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968)).). Relatedly, openness in a trial builds public confidence in the criminal justice system because members of the public can observe whether justice is being carried out in adjudicating guilt or innocence. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 595, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (Open trials assure the public that procedural rights are respected, and that justice is afforded equally. Closed trials breed suspicion of prejudice and arbitrariness, which in turn spawns disrespect for law.). Likewise, openness in the sentencing context allows the public to observe whether the defendant is being justly sentenced, especially where the court, rather than a jury, is determining the sentence. Eppinger, 49 F.3d at 1253 (The public must have the opportunity to observe and criticize the judiciary in the operation of its duties. In sentencing, unlike other aspects of criminal proceedings, it is the distinct province of the court to determine what constitutes [a] proper sentence. (quoting United States v. Carpentier, 526 F.Supp. 292, 295 (E.D.N.Y.1981))); In re Washington Post Co., 807 F.2d at 389. Similarly, openness of a proceeding also promotes more accurate fact-finding, either because witnesses are more hesitant to commit perjury in a proceeding open to the public, or because key witnesses unknown to the parties may learn about a trial if it is public. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 596-97, 100 S.Ct. 2814. As there may well be witnesses and contested issues of fact in a sentencing proceeding, see Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 198 (explaining that in both trials and sentencing proceedings, [t]he defendant ... can present evidence, call witnesses, and cross-examine government witnesses), this rationale applies in a sentencing proceeding as much as it applies in a trial. Relatedly, the Supreme Court has explained that [u]nderlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the common understanding that `a major purpose of that Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,' Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966)), and to ensure that this constitutionally protected `discussion of governmental affairs' is an informed one, id. at 605, 102 S.Ct. 2613. This rationale also applies in the sentencing context. For example, allowing the public to see the application of sentencing laws in person is important to an informed public debate over these laws. Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 199 (citing Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 85 (1998)). Finally, there is a community therapeutic value to having an open proceeding, because of the concerns and emotions of members of the public who have been affected by a crime or crimes. Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 570, 100 S.Ct. 2814. When a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often follows. Thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. Id. at 571, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (citation omitted); see, e.g., Mark Eddy et al., Guilty on Every Count, Denver Post, June 3, 1997, available at http://extras. denverpost.com/bomb/bombv1.htm (describing the reaction of survivors of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing upon hearing that the jury had found Timothy McVeigh guilty on all counts: survivors rushed into the hall outside the courtroom where they cried, hugged and tried to console each other as this chapter in the bombing tragedy drew to a close). This rationale applies as strongly in a sentencing proceeding as it does in a trial. Alcantara, 396 F.3d at 198; see, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Mastermind Gets Life for Bombing of Trade Center, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1998, available at 1998 WLNR 2795240 (Several victims of the [1993 World Trade Center] blast attended the [sentencing proceeding of Ramzi Yousef]. One, Charles Maikish, a former [World] Trade Center official, nearly broke down as he addressed the court on behalf of the families, reading a list of the names of each victim who had died in the bombing. Patricia Smith, whose pregnant daughter-in-law, Monica Smith, was killed in the explosion, did not speak in court but glared at Mr. Yousef's back as he stood just a few feet in front of her, addressing the judge. Later, Ms. Smith said she wanted to hit him with her cane.). In sum, we conclude, as have the other courts of appeals that have addressed this issue, that the press and public have a First Amendment right of access to sentencing proceedings. [14]