Opinion ID: 2267996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Inmates

Text: This case originated in the Inmate Grievance Office (hereinafter the Grievance Office), which dismissed the grievances of three inmates of the DOC: Glenn Watkins, John Dillard, and Gerald Fuller. Although the central issue in this case whether DCDs 100-105, 100-508, and 100-543 are unconstitutional ex post facto lawsis common to all three inmates, each inmate's grievance differs based on his individual circumstances.
Glenn Watkins was convicted of first degree murder and, on May 5, 1972, began serving a life sentence with a concurrent sentence of fifteen years imprisonment. During his period of incarceration until June 2, 1993, when inmates serving life sentences, including Watkins, became ineligible for work-release and family leave, he successfully had completed 57 family leave furloughs and had participated in the work-release program. On June 1, 2000, Watkins filed a grievance with the Inmate Grievance Office (hereinafter the Grievance Office) and stated: [My] complaint involves the promulgation of [DCDs] by former Commissioner of Correction, Richard Lanham, which permanently prohibit life sentenced inmates from progressing below medium security (DCD 100-005), from participating in work release programming (DCD 100-508), and from participation in family leave programming (DCD 100-543).[I] had actively achieved each of these security statuses before all life sentenced inmates were, supposedly, temporarily removed from the prerelease system on June 3, 1993. He claimed that the DCDs are in violation of the ex post facto clause[s] of the Maryland and United States Constitutions and requested that they be rescinded as illegal. On December 11, 2000, the Executive Director of the Grievance Office dismissed Watkin's grievance for the following reasons: [T]he Commissioner of Correction is responsible for the security of prisoners committed to his custody. As such, it is his responsibility to promulgate directives which establish the manner in which inmates are classified. The criteria for the various levels of security are subject to change as warranted by the Commissioner or his designees. When you were committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, you became subject to various security policies that were in place at that timeand that were subject to change. A revision of Classification procedures is not the equivalent of an ex post facto law. Watkins filed an action for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County. In affirming the decision of the Grievance Office, the court ruled that the General Assembly has accorded the DOC and the Commissioner authority to regulate within the Division of Correction and the DCDs come within the discretion of the Commissioner, constituting guidelines, which are not subject to ex post facto prohibitions....
On March 17, 1977, John Dillard was sentenced to 40 years of imprisonment for first degree rape, first degree sexual offense, and robbery with a deadly weapon. Sometime after being committed to the custody of the DOC, he was transferred to the Patuxent Institution. In April of 1983, Dillard was given a one-day leave from the institution but did not return as required. Authorities finally apprehended Dillard in Kansas on January 7, 1984, and he was returned to Patuxent on January 22 of that same year. Dillard was charged with escape, but the Howard County State's Attorney nolle prosequied the charge. Dillard never received a disciplinary sanction for the infraction. In March of 1990, Dillard was transferred from Patuxent to the DOC. From June 1991 until September 1998, he served his sentence in minimum security. During this period in minimum security, Dillard's classification status was reviewed 12 times, and on at least 9 of those occasions, the objective point system for evaluating security classifications recommended reducing Dillard's security level to pre-release status. Despite the recommendations, the case management team overrode the point assessment every time and maintained Dillard in minimum security. Dillard went before the Maryland Parole Commission for hearings in 1990, 1994, 1995, 1996, and 1997. Following each of these hearings, the Parole Commission indicated that Dillard needed to obtain work-release to test his suitability for parole release. In June of 1996, Dillard was assigned to work detail that operated outside of the correctional institute. That November, the case management staff considered Dillard for pre-release status, but he was denied. Dillard then was removed from the work detail at his request. In April 1998, the Parole Commission issued a decision, granting Dillard parole release in April 1999 subject to the completion of six-months work release. The case management team at Central Laundry Facility approved a plan for Dillard, which provided for six-months of work release prior to April 1999. Nevertheless, when the plan was presented to the Commissioner for final approval, his designee denied that plan, stating that [i]n accordance with DCD 100-508, an inmate who has escaped during the current incarceration is never work-release eligible. The Commissioner's designee offered, instead, six-months of pre-release work detail. On July 8, 1998, the Parole Commission suspended Dillard's parole release date pending a hearing scheduled for September 1998. At that hearing, on September 18, 1998, the Parole Commission hearing officer recommended rescission of the release date and complete refusal of parole. The Parole Commission adopted the hearing officer's recommendation, and Dillard was transferred to a medium security prison on October 1, 1998. Dillard brought a grievance before the Grievance Office on January 13, 1999, alleging that DCDs 100-005 (security classification) and 100-508 (work release eligibility), which both became effective after Dillard was sentenced, constitute ex post facto laws. Dillard contended that DCDs 100-005 and 100-508 operated to prevent him from serving his sentence below medium security or obtaining work release. He also complained that the Commissioner's decision to deny him work-release was arbitrary and capricious. On June 24, 1999, the Executive Director of the Grievance Office dismissed Dillard's grievance as being on its face wholly lacking of merit.... The dismissal letter stated that the various security policies governing Dillard's confinement were subject to change as warranted by the Commissioner of Correction or his designee and that [a] revision of the Classification procedures is not the equivalent of an ex post facto law. Dillard filed an action for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, which reversed the dismissal and remanded the case for a hearing to be conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings. Following that hearing on July 13, 2000, the Administrative Law Judge concluded that Dillard had not shown that DCDs 100-005 and 100-508 are ex post facto laws because their application did not increase the punishment of the crimes for which [he] was convicted. Dillard again filed an action for judicial review in the Circuit Court for Allegany County, which heard the merits of his claim on October 12, 2001, and affirmed the decision of the Administrative Law Judge. The Circuit Court stated that Dillard's contentions concern Directives for the administration of the prison ... `which every prisoner can anticipate are contemplated by his original sentence [and] are necessarily functions of prison management that must be left to the broad discretion of prison administrators.' (quoting Gaston v. Taylor, 946 F.2d 340, 343 (4th Cir.1991) (en banc)).
Gerald Fuller was sentenced to life imprisonment and committed to the custody of the DOC in October of 1979 after he pled guilty to first-degree murder, first-degree rape and robbery with a deadly weapon. On March 9, 2001, he filed a grievance in the Grievance Office, asserting that DCD 100-105 applied to prevent him from obtaining security below the level of medium security. According to Fuller, at the time he was sentenced, the security policies allowed him to progress to minimum security ... and pre-parole testing to demonstrate parole suitability, but DOC modified the security polices after his sentence to prevent him from qualifying for parole release. On September 6, 2001, the Executive Director of the Grievance Office dismissed the grievance, reasoning that the DOC security policies, represented by the DCDs, were subject to change as warranted by the Commissioner [of Correction] or his designees. As for Fuller's claim that the DCDs operated to deny him parole release, the Director characterized it as speculative and informed Fuller that the Grievance Office has no jurisdiction over matters related to parole. The Director then suggested that Fuller contact the Parole Commission directly to discuss the matter. On May 17, 2002, the Circuit Court for Washington County affirmed the decision of the Grievance Office. The Circuit Court explained its reasons: [Fuller's] sentence has not been enlarged by the modification of the DCDs. The [DCD's amendments], although increasing the level of security in which he must be maintained, did not affect him in a punitive manner. The changes were lawfully and appropriately made in order to allow the department to deal with perceived serious penological difficulties should lifers be continued on minimum security, work release or other less severe classification levels. Consequently, the implementation of DCD 100-005, viewed in isolation, does not violate the ex post facto prohibition of the State or Federal Constitutions. The Circuit Court further stated that, because the Grievance Office has jurisdiction over complaints against officials or employees of the DOC or Patuxent Institution, it was not the proper forum for pursuing claims against the Parole Commission.