Opinion ID: 1247105
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The application of section 403 involves competing First Amendment interests

Text: Section 403 of the Penal Code provides: Every person who, without authority of law, willfully disturbs or breaks up any assembly or meeting, not unlawful in its character, ... is guilty of a misdemeanor. With one exception, not relevant here, the section has not been interpreted by a California court since its enactment almost a century ago. (See Farraher v. Superior Court (1919) 45 Cal. App. 4 [187 P. 72].) (1) We initially recognize that in analyzing the application of section 403 to the facts of this case, and, more generally, to comparable situations, we must be guided by the constitutional doctrines governing statutory regulations affecting First Amendment rights. Disturbances of meetings arise in a wide variety of forms; the modern techniques of the politics of peaceful confrontation frequently result in a clash of ideological expressions which may, in many senses, disturb a meeting. Without doubt petitioners' conduct in the instant case, including clapping ( Edwards v. South Carolina (1963) 372 U.S. 229, 233 [9 L.Ed.2d 697, 700, 83 S.Ct. 680]), cheering and shouting ( Cox v. Louisiana (1965) 379 U.S. 536, 546 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 479, 85 S.Ct. 453]), and flag waving ( Stromberg v. California (1931) 283 U.S. 359, 362 [75 L.Ed. 1117, 1119, 51 S.Ct. 532, 73 A.L.R. 1484]), was closely akin to `pure speech' ( Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. (1969) 393 U.S. 503, 505 [21 L.Ed.2d 731, 736, 89 S.Ct. 733]). The imposition of criminal sanctions for such conduct under section 403 clearly raises the serious question of the constitutionally permissible bounds of this provision. We turn to an examination of the applicable competing constitutional principles. Under most circumstances, of course, ordinary good taste and decorum would dictate that a person addressing a meeting not be interrupted or otherwise disturbed. The Constitution does not require that any person, however lofty his motives, be permitted to obstruct the convention or continuation of a meeting without regard to the implicit customs and usage or explicit rules governing its conduct. ( Gregory v. Chicago (1969) 394 U.S. 111, 125 [22 L.Ed.2d 134, 143-144, 89 S.Ct. 946] (Black, J., concurring); Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) 336 U.S. 77, 81, 97 [93 L.Ed. 513, 519, 527, 69 S.Ct. 448, 10 A.L.R.2d 608].) The constitutional guarantees of the free exercise of religious opinion, and of the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and petition for a redress of grievances, would be worth little if outsiders could disrupt and prevent such a meeting in disregard of the customs and rules applicable to it. (Compare Wall v. Lee (1865) 34 N.Y. 141, 145.) This inhibition does not mean, however, that the state can grant to the police a roving commission to enforce Robert's Rules of Order, [5] since other First Amendment interests are likewise at stake. Audience activities, such as heckling, interrupting, harsh questioning, and booing, even though they may be impolite and discourteous, can nonetheless advance the goals of the First Amendment. For many citizens such participation in public meetings, whether supportive or critical of the speaker, may constitute the only manner in which they can express their views to a large number of people; the Constitution does not require that the effective expression of ideas be restricted to rigid and predetermined patterns. ( NAACP v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 431 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 417, 83 S.Ct. 328].) A cogent remark, even though rudely timed or phrased, may contribute to the free interchange of ideas and the ascertainment of truth. ( Garrison v. Louisiana (1964) 379 U.S. 64, 73 [13 L.Ed.2d 125, 132, 85 S.Ct. 209]; see Gaddis v. State (1920) 105 Neb. 303 [180 N.W. 590, 591, 12 A.L.R. 648].) An unfavorable reception, such as that given Congressman Tunney in the instant case, represents one important method by which an officeholder's constituents can register disapproval of his conduct and seek redress of grievances. The First Amendment contemplates a debate of important public issues ( New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. 254, 270 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 700, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412]); its protection can hardly be narrowed to the meeting at which the audience must passively listen to a single point of view. The First Amendment does not merely insure a marketplace of ideas in which there is but one seller. (Compare Lamont v. Postmaster General (1965) 381 U.S. 301, 308 [14 L.Ed.2d 398, 403, 85 S.Ct. 1493] (Brennan, J., concurring).) The very possibility of adverse audience reaction may aid in the correction of evils which would otherwise escape opposition. Government officials might attempt to advance a partisan political cause by forcing the audience at a publicly financed event, such as a display of fireworks, to listen first to speakers of a particular persuasion. (Compare Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. Federal Communications Com. (1969) 395 U.S. 367 [23 L.Ed.2d 371, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1807-1808]; Cox v. Louisiana, supra, 379 U.S. 536, 557-558 [13 L.Ed.2d 471, 485-486, 85 S.Ct. 453].) An astute and disputatious audience could deter such practices. Although a public official usually occupies a far better position than the ordinary citizen to publicize his views by the communications media, [6] those who disagree with such an official may be able to proclaim disagreement by criticism to his face. Audience response, moreover, may force a speaker to discuss a difficult issue that he may wish to avoid, or to explain some past conduct that he hopes will be forgotten. The public interest in an active and critical audience has long been recognized. The heckling and harassment of public officials and other speakers while making public speeches is as old as American and British politics; [7] here, as in Great Britain, such protestant conduct has been thought to lie outside the realm of legal regulation except in the most egregious of cases. Justice Black, dissenting in Feiner v. New York (1951) 340 U.S. 315, 325-326 [95 L.Ed 295, 302-303, 71 S.Ct. 303], remarked: It is neither unusual or unexpected that some people at public street meetings mutter, mill about, push, shove, or disagree, even violently, with the speaker. Indeed, it is rare where controversial topics are discussed that an outdoor crowd does not do some or all of these things. In Payroll Guar. Assn. v. Board of Education (1945) 27 Cal.2d 197, 202-203 [163 P.2d 433, 16 A.L.R. 1300], we stated: Speakers who express their opinions freely must run the risk of attracting opposition; they cannot expect their opponents to be silenced while they continue to speak freely. In Landry v. Daley (N.D. Ill. 1968) 280 F. Supp. 968, 970, the court commented: Political campaigns, athletic events, public meetings and a host of other activities produce loud, confused or senseless shouting not in accord with fact, truth, or right procedure to say nothing of not in accord with propriety, modesty, good taste or good manners. The happy cacophany of democracy would be stilled if all `improper noises' in the normal meaning of the term were suppressed. [8]