Opinion ID: 1276283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: right to postponement of sentence

Text: The provision regarding postponement of the execution of the sentence to allow for preparation of appeal is set forth in W.Va. Code, 62-7-1. [1] Expressed in mandatory language, the provision states that upon application of any person entitled to appeal, the circuit court shall make an order postponing the execution of the sentence. [2] In Ex parte Doyle, 62 W.Va. 280, 57 S.E. 824 (1907), overruled on other grounds, State ex rel. Blankenship v. McHugh, W.Va., 217 S.E.2d 49 (1975), this Court held that the right of a criminal defendant to a postponement of the execution of his sentence to enable him to prepare for appeal was mandatory and not subject to the discretion of the trial court: We see the word `shall' in the first clause. We interpret this clause as clearly obligatory and mandatory. The court has no discretion to refuse a suspension of the sentence. In felony cases such is surely the construction from the word `shall,' and because it is a provision in favor of suspension of enforcement of the judgment to allow time necessary to prepare the record to enable a person to have recourse by a writ of error granted by law to a person to save his life or liberty from erroneous conviction. [62 W.Va. at 281, 57 S.E. at 824] Doyle involved the 1906 counterpart to W.Va.Code, 62-7-1 [Chapter 160, Section 2 of the 1906 Code]. The 1906 statute, however, contained a significant difference  that, as to any conviction which carried the death penalty or confinement in the penitentiary, the court shall postpone the execution of its sentence, and as to any other criminal conviction, the court  may postpone the execution to enable preparation of an appeal. [Emphasis supplied] Under this statute, it would appear that in felonies a postponement was mandatory, and in misdemeanor convictions it was discretionary. Doyle involved a misdemeanor conviction of the unlawful selling of liquor, and yet the court held that a postponement of sentence was mandatory. The Doyle Court relied on a vigorous dictum by Judge Dent, who discussed this same statute in State ex rel. Stafford v. Hawk, 47 W.Va. 434, 34 S.E. 918 (1900): This, however, should be a warning to the circuit court to grant to persons convicted of felony the reasonable time provided by statute, and compel its officers to discharge their duties so as to facilitate, instead of delaying, their applications for writs of error to this court. Neither a court nor any of its officers should be permitted to indirectly deprive a prisoner of his statutory rights. [47 W.Va. at 436, 34 S.E. at 918] The 1931 revision of the West Virginia Code gave the statute its present form, which conforms with the decision in Doyle and makes mandatory a postponement of the execution of a criminal sentence, whether for a felony or a misdemeanor, for preparation of an appeal. In interpreting a postponement-of-sentence statute somewhat similar to our 1906 statute, the Virginia court adopted a position similar to that of Doyle, by holding that the refusal to grant a postponement of the execution of a criminal sentence is error because it deprives the defendant of his right to an appeal. Dodson v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 57, 37 S.E.2d 744 (1946); Ramey v. Commonwealth, 145 Va. 848, 133 S.E. 755 (1926). The trial court raised the possibility that, if the sentence were postponed, the relator might gain release on bail and commit subsequent offenses. These considerations may affect the decision to grant post-conviction bail, but they are not relevant to the postponement issue in the face of the mandatory statutory language. The trial court viewed W.Va.Code, 62-7-1, to be limited to those cases where we have granted an appeal, rather than to those cases where application for appeal is being prepared. However, such a construction would be inconsistent with the plain language of the statute, which states that the postponement of the sentence is to enable him to prepare and present bills of exceptions and to secure a transcript of the evidence. All of these matters are preliminary to the actual presentation of the appeal to this Court. Furthermore, nothing in our prior opinions suggests such a limitation. Both Ex parte Doyle, supra , and State ex rel. Stafford v. Hawk, supra , discussed the statute in terms of defendants who were in the process of petitioning for writ of error. We, therefore, conclude that W.Va.Code, 62-7-1, is mandatory, and that any person under a judgment of conviction is entitled to a postponement of the execution of his sentence for a reasonable time to enable him to prepare and present bills of exceptions and to secure a transcript of the evidence before the court at the trial, and until a reasonable time beyond the first day of the next term of the supreme court of appeals. Postponement of the execution of the sentence does not entitle the defendant to be released from confinement. In the absence of appropriate bail, he is subject to detention in jail during the pendency of the appeal.