Opinion ID: 1541708
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: State v. Dorman

Text: At approximately 11:54 p.m. on September 10, 2004, Detective Corporal Edward Gorski of the Wildwood Crest Police Department was on motor patrol traffic detail, parked in a restaurant parking lot on the 5400 block of Atlantic Avenue. Cpl. Gorski observed defendant James Dorman and Frederick Luzier riding their motorcycles; [5] Dorman and Luzier were stopped at the intersection of Cresse and Atlantic Avenues heading southbound. While stopped at the traffic light, Dorman started to spin [his] back wheel and create a cloud of white smoke. Once the light turned green, both Dorman's and Luzier's motorcycles accelerated from the light passing [Cpl. Gorski] at a high rate of speed[,] a speed he estimated as well over the speed limit of 25 miles an hour. Cpl. Gorski activated his emergency overhead lights and siren, and gave pursuit. He caught up with Dorman when Dorman turned onto East Morning Glory Road, pulled into a driveway, and began doing 360's[,] thus creating a large cloud of white smoke and being [v]ery loud. Very, very loud. Cpl. Gorski radioed for assistance and, once additional officers arrived, he approached Dorman. Addressing Dorman, Cpl. Gorski noted that Dorman spoke in a slurred speech and there was an odor of alcohol present about his breath. More specifically, Cpl. Gorski described that there was a strong intense odor of alcoholic beverage about his breath and that [h]is eyes  his eyes were  were not open, they were kind of squinty, closed. When I did get to look at them they appeared to be a little blood shot. While Cpl. Gorski asked if Dorman had been drinking, Dorman replied that he'd had a few beers. After administering field sobriety tests to Dorman, Cpl. Gorski concluded that Dorman was impaired and . . . placed him under arrest for operating under the influence of intoxicating beverage  beverage or drug. Cpl. Gorski then transported Dorman to police headquarters, where he was advised of his Miranda rights and where Cpl. Gorski twice administered a Breathalyzer® test. Dorman's Breathalyzer® readings twice showed a blood alcohol concentration level of 0.14% by weight of alcohol in his blood, almost double the minimum blood alcohol concentration level of 0.08% by weight of alcohol in the blood required to sustain a conviction for driving while intoxicated. Dorman was charged with violating N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a), the driving while intoxicated statute. Dorman was tried before the Wildwood Crest Borough Municipal Court. Again focusing solely on the issue relevant to this appeal, at trial Dorman challenged the admissibility of two Breath Testing Instrument Inspection Certificates tendered by the State that bracketed the time period during which Dorman's Breathalyzer® tests were conducted. Dorman asserted that these documents are testimonial in nature, at least in part, and, therefore, inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. Citing Crawford, he argued that it doesn't matter whether or not there are hearsay exceptions to . . . any other rule of evidence[ because t]he right to confront witnesses against you trumps any traditionally established or codified rule of evidence[.] The municipal court overruled Dorman's objections to the admissibility of the inspection certificates. It ultimately found Dorman guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of driving while intoxicated, in violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a)(1)(ii), based both on the Breathalyzer® readings and on Cpl. Gorski's observations. Like Sweet, Dorman too was sentenced to the minimum seven-month suspension of his driving privileges required by law, and to additional fines, penalties, assessments, surcharges and twelve hours of mandatory detention and attendance in an Intoxicated Driver Resource Center. The municipal court denied Dorman's application to stay the license suspension portion of his sentence, noting that Dorman could seek such relief from the Superior Court. [6] On an appeal de novo on the record to the Superior Court, the Law Division rejected Dorman's Crawford challenge to the inspection certificates and, based on the entire record, concluded that [t]he appeals are denied[ and t]he lower court's conclusions are affirmed. Dorman's next appeal also was unavailing. Before the Appellate Division Dorman claimed that, among other things, the breath testing instrument inspection certificates should not have been admitted over his objection. In a published opinion, the Appellate Division disagreed. State v. Dorman, 393 N.J.Super. 28, 922 A. 2d 766 (App.Div.2007). [7] The panel rejected Dorman's Crawford claims, explaining that decisions [applying Crawford ] have a common element triggering a defendant's right of confrontation: the State's use of a document created for the specific purpose of establishing an essential element of the offense. By contrast, the certificates of operability at issue here were not created with any specific case in mind. These operability certificates are intended to document the regular business function of maintaining a particular breathalyzer machine. As such, these documents are properly admissible as a business record under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(6). [ Id. at 33, 922 A. 2d 766.] It thus determined that the inspection certificates at issue are hearsay statements admissible under the business records exception of the hearsay rule and that they are nontestimonial for Crawford purposes. Ibid. The panel emphasized that [o]ther jurisdictions that have considered this issue have come to a similar conclusion and that the Law Division reached a similar conclusion in State v. Godshalk, 381 N.J.Super. 326, 333, 885 A. 2d 969 (Law Div.2005)[,] noting that [w]e approve the holding in Godshalk to the extent that it is consistent with the conclusion we reach here. Id. at 33-34, 885 A. 2d 969 (footnote omitted). It therefore affirmed Dorman's conviction for driving while intoxicated. Dorman filed a petition for certification, which was granted limited solely to the question of whether in light of [ Crawford ], the admission of the breathalyzer machine certificate of operability violated the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution. State v. Dorman, 192 N.J. 475, 932 A. 2d 26 (2007).