Opinion ID: 1086291
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: .. (c) Coordination with section 1182

Text: The provisions of paragraphs (4), (5), and (7)(A) of section 1182(a) of this title shall not be applicable to any alien seeking adjustment of status under this section, and the Secretary of Homeland Security or the Attorney General may waive any other provision of such section (other than paragraph (2)(C) or subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E) of paragraph (3)) with respect to such an alien for humanitarian purposes, to assure family unity, or when it is otherwise in the public interest.36 Looking to § 209(a)(1)(C), the BIA reasoned that only those aliens who have not yet acquired LPR status are eligible to seek adjustment under this section. As a result, the BIA held that Nguyen was not eligible for a § 209(c) waiver because she could not seek adjustment of status under § 209. Nguyen argues that the BIA incorrectly interpreted statutory law when it concluded that she was ineligible for a § 209(c) waiver of inadmissibility because she had already adjusted from refugee status to LPR status. She 36 8 U.S.C. § 1159. 11 Case: 12-60364 Document: 00512414647 Page: 12 Date Filed: 10/21/2013 No. 12-60364 contends that she did not lose her refugee status, nor was it terminated, merely because she previously adjusted to LPR status. As a basis of this argument—that she has not lost her refugee status by virtue of adjusting to LPR status—Nguyen points us to In re Smriko,37 which held that an alien who has been admitted as a refugee and has adjusted to LPR status may be placed in removal proceedings because termination of refugee status is not a precondition to the initiation of removal proceedings.38 Thus, because her refugee status was never terminated, Nguyen argues that she is entitled to readjust her LPR status and apply for a § 209(c) waiver of inadmissibility. She argues that the authority for allowing readjustment for someone in her position is supported by precedential BIA and Attorney General decisions.39 The BIA has previously dealt with this same question. In In re S-I-K-, an alien who had been admitted as a refugee and who had adjusted to LPR status urged, following a conviction for an aggravated felony, that he was entitled to seek adjustment of status under § 209(a) in conjunction with a waiver of inadmissibility under § 209(c) because of his refugee status.40 Like Nguyen, the alien argued that he remained a refugee and that he should be given an opportunity to reapply for adjustment of status under § 209(a) in conjunction with the waiver of inadmissibility under § 209(c).41 The BIA held as follows: 37 23 I. & N. Dec. 836 (BIA 2005). 38 Id. at 840, 842. Summarizing the refugee adjustment process set forth in In re Jean, on which Nguyen relies, the BIA in In re Smriko held that “[t]he respondent’s argument that the Attorney General’s termination of refugee status is a precondition to removal is directly refuted by the statute, the promulgating regulation, and the Attorney General’s explanation of the refugee adjustment process in [In re] Jean.” Id. at 840. 39 She points us to In re D-K-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 761 (BIA 2012); In re H-N-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1039 (BIA 1999) (en banc); In re Jean, 23 I. & N. Dec. 373 (A.G. 2002). She also tries to analogize her case to In re Rainford, 20 I. & N. Dec. 598 (BIA 1992) and In re Gabryelsky, 20