Opinion ID: 6111925
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Personal Injury Claim

Text: Antoine Morris, a Shell/Motiva employee was working on a berth when he caught sight of the Aris T alliding with a berth over 1,000 feet away. The berth he was standing on was not struck and did not move or shake. Morris simply panicked at the surprising sight of the vessel alliding with another berth, lost his footing, and fell. The district court dismissed his negligence claim, and Morris challenges the dismissal on both procedural and substantive grounds. We affirm the district court’s dismissal. Morris raises four points of error. First, he contends that the district court abused its discretion by denying him a continuance on the morning of the trial because his key expert, Dr. Axelrad, was at his brother’s deathbed and would be unable to testify in person. This prejudiced him, Morris says, because the other parties’ expert witness sharply criticized Dr. Axelrad’s deposition testimony, and Dr. Axelrad could not respond. The matter of a continuance is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 446 (1940). District courts are given “exceedingly wide” discretion in making “scheduling decision[s], such as whether a continuance should be granted.” HC Gun & Knife Shows, Inc. v. City of Hous., 201 F.3d 544, 549 (5th Cir. 2000). We determine that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the last-minute continuance. The numerous other parties also had expert witnesses who had arranged their schedules around the existing trial dates. Denying the continuance did not prejudice Morris because the trial court admitted Dr. Axelrad’s video perpetuation deposition as evidence. As the district court explained, “[the video] was taken for perpetuation purposes, and that’s what the rules provide, and for -- just for situations such as this that are unanticipated that render a witness unavailable, and then the deposition becomes the reasonable substitute for that testimony.” 23 Case: 20-30019 Document: 00516177053 Page: 24 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 No. 20-30019 Second, Morris contends that the district court erred by relying on the testimony of Dr. Ginzburg, a forensic psychiatrist retained by the Aris T Interests, over Morris’s expert, Dr. Axelrad. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52, “findings of fact are reviewed for clear error and legal issues are reviewed de novo.” Becker v. Tidewater, Inc., 586 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 2009). Because Morris’s objection is about the district court’s finding that one expert’s account of Morris’s injury was factually correct, it is reviewed for clear error. “When findings are based on determinations regarding the credibility of witnesses, Rule 52(a) demands even greater deference to the trial court’s findings.” Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). Objective evidence contradicting a witness’s testimony or internal inconsistencies can render a district court’s accepting a witness’s testimony clearly erroneous. Id. “But when a trial judge’s finding is based on his decision to credit the testimony of one of two or more witnesses, each of whom has told a coherent and facially plausible story that is not contradicted by extrinsic evidence, that finding, if not internally inconsistent, can virtually never be clear error.” Id. District courts make credibility decisions, and the district court was well within its discretion to credit Dr. Ginzburg’s diagnosis over Dr. Axelrad’s. Morris has pointed to no inconsistencies in Dr. Ginzburg’s testimony, nor has he pointed to any extrinsic evidence that leaves a firm conviction that the district court’s crediting Dr. Ginzburg was error. Third, Morris asserts that the district court erred in concluding he was not in the zone of danger and therefore could not recover emotional damages. He argues that the district court impermissibly relied on the fortuity that the berth Morris was on was not struck, and that despite this, the Aris T was close enough to Morris to put him in immediate danger. Specifically, he argues that the 1,000-foot distance between the Aris T and himself was not that large 24 Case: 20-30019 Document: 00516177053 Page: 25 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 No. 20-30019 because the Aris T was large, and the poor visibility conditions made it seem closer than it was. Under a zone-of-danger tort theory, plaintiffs can recover for emotional injuries if they “are placed in immediate risk of physical harm by that conduct.” Consol. Rail Corp. v. Gottshall, 512 U.S. 532, 548 (1994). The theory extends the ambit of plaintiffs who can recover for emotional injuries from those who sustain a physical impact from the tort to those who were close enough to reasonably be emotionally damaged by it. See id. at 547–48. We have “repeatedly declined to adopt or preclude the zone of danger theory” for general maritime law. Gough v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am., 996 F.2d 763, 766 (5th Cir. 1993). 12 Even assuming arguendo that plaintiffs can recover under the zone-of-danger theory in general maritime law, analogous case law from other contexts state that a plaintiff must establish that “the claimant was objectively within the zone of danger; claimant feared for his life at the time of the accident or person was in danger, and his emotional injuries were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s alleged negligence.” Owens, 2005 WL 840502, at . To be in the zone of danger, a plaintiff must be in “immediate risk of physical harm.” Consol. Rail Corp., 512 U.S. at 548. And in determining whether emotional injuries were reasonably foreseeable, courts can consider the experience seamen are likely to have. See Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc., 966 F.2d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 12 Our court, however, has allowed recovery under a zone-of-danger theory under the Jones Act. See Naquin v. Elevating Boats, L.L.C., 744 F.3d 927, 938 (5th Cir. 2014). Moreover, district courts throughout the circuit regularly allow recovery under general maritime law using this theory. See, e.g., Owens v. Glob. Santa Fe Drilling Co., No. Civ. A. 04-702, 2005 WL 840502, at  3 (E.D. La. Apr. 8, 2005) (citing Anselmi v. Penrod Drilling Corp., 813 F. Supp. 438, 442 (E.D. La. 1993); Williams v. Treasure Chest Casino, L.L.C., Nos. 2:95-CV-3968, 2:97-CV-0947, 1998 WL 42586 (E.D. La. Feb. 4, 1998)). 25 Case: 20-30019 Document: 00516177053 Page: 26 Date Filed: 01/24/2022 No. 20-30019 We agree with the district court. Morris was never in any danger of being hurt by the Aris T, as he had ample time to leave the berth before the Aris T would have reached it. The ship was travelling less than 3 miles per hour, giving Morris several minutes to leave the berth, even with his fall. Moreover, Morris remained on the berth after his fall. Finally, Morris argues that the accident was a substantial cause of his fall, so he can recover physical damages. “Questions of . . . causation[] are factual issues, and may not be set aside on appeal unless clearly erroneous.” In re Omega Protein, 548 F.3d at 367. Under maritime law, causation requires that the negligence be “a substantial factor” in the injury. Donaghey, 974 F.2d at 649 (citation omitted). “The term ‘substantial factor’ means more than ‘but for the negligence, the harm would not have resulted.’” Id. (quoting Spinks v. Chevron Oil Co., 507 F.2d 216, 223 (5th Cir. 1975)). In addition, foreseeability is also relevant to the proximate-cause determination. See In re Signal, 579 F.3d at 490 n.12. The district court’s determination of causation is subject to clearerror review, and nothing Morris has pointed to leaves a firm conviction that the accident was a substantial factor in his fall. On the contrary, we agree with the district court’s conclusion that Morris unreasonably panicked, and that this unforeseeable panic caused the accident. Thus, at a minimum, he cannot meet the proximate-cause element of his negligence case.