Opinion ID: 1976261
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: restriction on expert psychiatrist from testifying as to hearsay statements of the defendant.

Text: On two occasions Dr. Ornsteen attempted to testify as to various statements made to him by the defendant. The prosecutor's objection that the testimony was hearsay and not admissible because the doctor was not a treating physician was sustained by the court. This was an undue restriction on the scope of the doctor's testimony. Generally such statements are not hearsay because they are not offered as proof of the facts asserted, but merely as circumstantial indications of the state of mind (insanity) of the accused as a foundation for the doctor's findings. See 2 Wigmore, supra, § 228, p. 14; 6 Wigmore, supra, § 1790. The rationale of the non-hearsay aspects of such testimony is that one of the main sources of proof of insanity is the conduct of the person. In this connection verbal conduct is as important as non-verbal in the psychiatrist's view. The psychiatrist is not so interested in the truth of what is said as he is in the fact it was said. Witness the classic illustration of a man who claims that he is Napoleon. Such statements are evidence of irrationality. See McCormick, supra, § 288, at pp. 467-468. However, the error was not prejudicial. An examination of Dr. Ornsteen's subsequent testimony reveals the ruling did not impede the doctor's ability to fully and adequately convey his diagnostic impressions and opinions. It should be noted that there may be instances in which statements made by the accused to the psychiatrist might also relate to the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the instant case, for instance, Dr. Ornsteen did testify fully without the presence of the jury concerning statements made to him by the defendant. Among these was the statement that Lucas denied guilt of the crime. In such instances the introduction of the testimony is permissible where the psychiatrist asserts that it constituted a necessary element in the formulation of his opinion. In that event, the testimony should be circumscribed by an appropriate limiting charge by the trial court to the effect that it should not be considered by the jury as substantive evidence relating to the question of guilt or innocence of the accused, but only as evidence tending to support the ultimate expert conclusion of the psychiatrist on the question of insanity. If it further appears that the psychiatrist's opinion hinges upon the truth of the matter asserted, rather than the fact that it was said, then the jury should be instructed that the probative value of the psychiatrist's opinion will depend upon whether there is, from all the evidence in the case, independent proof of the statement made by the accused.