Opinion ID: 1372176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: The key question.

Text: According to the opinion by Justice Peterson,    the key question in the case at bar is whether the murder of the plaintiff's decedent was (quoting from Stewart, supra, 255 Or. at 609, 469 P.2d 783) `so highly unusual that we can say as a matter of law that a reasonable man, making an inventory of the possibilities of harm which his conduct might produce, would not have reasonably expected the injury to occur.' It takes a real stretch of the imagination to say that the murder of Officer Christensen was `reasonably to be expected' by Murphy when she `permitted and assisted defendant Thompson in entering the center.' Also, according to that opinion, This obligation of the court involves the element of foreseeability (see Justice O'Connell's comment in Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., supra, at 609, 469 P.2d 783) and involves our determination of the boundary of community standards that a person is responsible for an injury because it could have been anticipated because there was a reasonable likelihood that it could happen. (Emphasis added) We disagree. As Justice O'Connell stated in Stewart : If in our appraisal of the community conception of fault, we find that the conduct in question clearly falls outside the conception, we are charged with the duty of withdrawing the issue from the jury. (Emphasis added) As also held by this court in many cases, the question is whether we can affirmatively say that reasonable minds could not differ on this question. [4] Thus, the question before this court is not how a majority of the members of this court would decide the issue of foreseeability if they were the triers of the facts, but whether considering the wide leeway which must be accorded to juries in such cases, this court can affirmatively say that all reasonable minds could not differ on this question and could draw but one inference. Jurors, as men and women of the world, are expected to evaluate evidence not only in the light of their general experience, but in the light of facts generally known in the community. See Powell v. Moore, 228 Or. 255, 262-63, 364 P.2d 1094 (1961), and McCormick on Evidence 2d, 762, § 329 (1972). It is common knowledge today that many juvenile delinquents carry knives and that that problem has become so serious that ordinances and laws are enacted to prohibit the carrying of such knives. In my view, we cannot say that a jury of reasonable men could not properly find that when this jail matron permitted and assisted this juvenile delinquent punk to enter this detention facility at night and to visit his girl friend, who was then being held there as an inmate, and did so with knowledge that the two of them had previously stolen a car and fled the county, that this jail matron, in making an inventory of the possibilities of harm that might result, could reasonably have expected without any real stretch of the imagination, that Thompson was a juvenile delinquent punk who would not only be likely to act as a confederate for his girl friend in assisting her to escape from the detention center but that he would physically resist attempts by a police officer to block the escape; that juvenile delinquent punks often carry knives, and that, as a result, it was reasonably foreseeable that a police officer who attempted to block the escape might be stabbed by this juvenile punk. Conversely, we cannot properly say that all reasonable men could not differ on this question. Indeed, to so hold, in the face of a contrary belief by some members of this court, would be to impugn their rationality as reasonable men. I also believe that such a finding by a jury would not be out of range for a jury of reasonable men and that such a jury could properly find that the conduct of this jailer or police matron in permitting and assisting Thompson to enter the jail at night and to visit his girl friend with the knowledge that the two of them had previously stolen a car and attempted to flee the county was blameworthy according to the community sense of fault, so as to properly permit the jury to impose liability under these facts.