Opinion ID: 877833
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Chronicle Staff Writer

Text: The Chairman of the Board of Natural Resources has charged that some environmental groups are losing credibility in opposing all development projects. Joe Sabol, a Bozeman attorney, and head of the volunteer state board that reviews all major utility construction charged that some groups are automatically opposed to all developments no matter how good or bad they may be. `I think it is time that these groups re-assess their positions on some proposals,' he said. `Some proposals are good, and some are not, but they are opposed to all projects, and are creating a polarization of attitudes,' Sabol charged. The attorney said the opposition to all projects is a loss of perspective and concentrates on the `trivia' that surrounds a project. Sabol made his charges during an informal press conference concerning demands that he resign his resource board position due to conflict of interest. The charges from the Montana Wildlife Federation and the Montana Wilderness Association stemmed from Sabol's working for the Ski Yellowstone development, and also sitting as chairman of the resource board. Sabol said flatly he saw no conflict, and would not quit until he believed there was a conflict of interest. He said he did not take the job as Ski Yellowstone attorney until he was assured that the position was not in conflict, and that the project itself was satisfactory in his own mind. He also said he received assurances from the governor that the two positions would not be in conflict. Sabol also said the Ski Yellowstone issue has never come up at board meetings, and that no Ski Yellowstone official has ever approached him as a member of that board. The attorney was asked to quit his post in letters that the MWA and Wildlife group sent to Gov. Judge. Sabol defended the resort as one that is better than most in alleviating bad environmental effects, and said the proposal should be recognized for its accomplishments. Referring to two environmental groups' opposition of the resort, Sabol said, `They can't find anything wrong with the merits of Ski Yellowstone, so they attack the people.' The letters were sent to Judge after Sabol wrote the governor and Wes Woodgerd, head of the Fish and Game Commission objecting to `propaganda' against the resort planned on the north shore of Hebgen Lake. Sabol objected to a grizzly bear presentation which the attorney said implied the resort would interfere with the bears' habitat. Sabol charged there is no proof that the Hebgen area is habitat for the bear. Also questioned was a Fish and Game employee's `free lancing' articles while on the state payroll. The attorney referred to articles printed in a Denver paper against the resort. The net result of the three-year delay for the resort, Sabol said, is that it is driving other developers out of the state. The proposal is still under study by the Gallatin National Forest. `The legislature and the environmentalists have done what they set out to do, minimize development,' he said. (Emphasis added.) Appellants also claim that during a recess in the Board hearing on September 24, 1976, Sabol instructed the attorney for the Department of Natural Resources and Conservation not to cross-examine the witnesses for MWA because its counsel was trying to make a record for appeal. Appellants argue this demonstrates actual bias on the part of Sabol. We note that Sabol participated as hearings officer for the Board from April 10, 1976, to September 1, 1976. During this period two preconference hearings were held on April 10, 1976, and May 12, 1976. At the second prehearing conference, Rick Applegate, a MWA and EIC member, filed an affidavit seeking disqualification of Sabol as a hearing office and member of the Board considering MPC's application. On September 1, 1976, Sabol removed himself as hearings officer but declined to remove himself as a member of the Board. The Board voted unanimously to deny the attempted disqualification. Appellant cites Withrow v. Larkin (1975), 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712, for the proposition that the constitutional due process guarantees apply to administrative agencies as well as the courts. While it is true that language supporting that premise appears in Withrow, the actual holding of that case involves the question of whether the Wisconsin Doctors Examining Board had the power to investigate unprofessional conduct as well as adjudicate it. Nowhere in Withrow do we find any facts similar to the case at bar, i.e., where the alleged bias of one of the decision makers is at issue. Appellant also cites Taylor v. Hayes (1974), 418 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 2697, 41 L.Ed.2d 897, for authority that actual bias is unnecessary and that the appearance of bias is sufficient. The facts in Taylor were that at the conclusion of a Kentucky murder trial, the presiding judge sentenced one of the lawyers to four and one-half years in prison for nine counts of contempt occurring during the trial and barred him from practicing before that court. The Supreme Court found that to so rule without a notice and hearing violated the lawyer's procedural due process rights. The court also found that the lawyer's contempt trial should be before a different judge because the original trial judge had become embroiled in a running controversy with the lawyer. This Court has stated its position clearly with regard to biased decision makers: [It is] this court's desire to zealously guard the right to fair and impartial hearings. It is not necessarily the fact of bias that concerns us but the possibility that bias might exist ... [W]e do warn ... all administrative boards and tribunals that they should zealously guard against any appearance of unfairness in the conduct of their hearings. State ex rel. Fish v. Industrial Accident Board (1961), 139 Mont. 246, 248-49, 251, 362 P.2d 852, 853, 855. Accord, Graham v. Tree Farmers Inc. (1963), 142 Mont. 483, 385 P.2d 83. Nonetheless, the holdings both in Graham and Fish, supra, state that substantial rights of the aggrieved party must have been prejudiced before the court will censure an administrative board for the conduct of a hearing. The Supreme Court in Graham, supra, stated: We are constrained here, while disapproving the use of Mr. Wood as a hearings officer, in view of the preponderance of proof in this record, to fail to see where any different result could be reached and for that reason we feel the error to be such that it does not call for a reversal and further hearings so far as the claimant is concerned.  (Emphasis added.) 142 Mont. at 497, 385 P.2d at 90. In taking a closer look at the possible influence of Sabol's activities on the Board's ultimate decision, we find the following: Sabol presided at the first prehearing conference on April 10, 1976, at which time the routing and need for the transmission lines as well as witnesses and discovery were discussed among the various lawyers. Sabol also presided over the second prehearing conference on May 12, 1976. At this conference the lawyers exchanged witness lists and discussed depositions, the order of appearance of the parties and deadlines for exchanging interrogatories and written statements. During the summer of 1976, the Department moved to bifurcate the hearing into two hearings. Also, both MWA and MPC moved to have the Board view the Gallatin Canyon area and MWA added the Ennis to Big Sky route as well. All three motions were argued at the September 1, 1976, hearing and the motions to view were granted but the motion to bifurcate was denied. It was at this September 1 hearing that Sabol removed himself as hearings officer with Andriolo being substituted for him. The actual hearings on the issuance of the Certificate of Environmental Compatability and Public Need took place on September 23 and 24, 1976. It was during a recess at the September 24 hearing that Sabol allegedly told the Department attorney not to cross-examine the MWA witnesses. Sabol's term as a Board member expired on December 31, 1976. On February 9, 1977, Andriolo issued an order that all parties' proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law be submitted by March 1, 1977, with arguments thereon on April 21, 1977, before the Board. On September 16 and October 28, 1977, the Board discussed and approved Andriolo's findings and conclusions. The statutes relating to the Board's and hearings examiner's duties are set out below: (9) At the conclusion of the hearing, the hearing examiner shall declare the hearing closed and shall, within 60 days of that date, prepare and submit to the board and in the case of a conjunctive hearing, within 90 days to the board and the board of health or department of health proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended decision. Section 75-20-220(9). XX-XX-XXX. Decision of board  findings necessary for certification. (1) Within 60 days after submission of the recommended decision by the hearing examiner, the board shall make complete findings, issue an opinion, and render a decision upon the record, either granting or denying the application as filed or granting it upon such terms, conditions, or modifications of the construction, operation, or maintenance of the facility as the board considers appropriate. While we do not approve of the alleged directions not to cross-examine the MWA witnesses, we fail to see how, on the record before us, the Board would have reached a different result had Sabol removed himself entirely from the proceedings, Graham, supra. He did not participate in the Board's deliberation or discussion of the final decision, as evidenced by sections 75-20-220(9) and 75-20-301(1), set out above. Under these statutes the Board's deliberations occur after the hearings examiner submits his proposed findings and conclusions and a recommended decision. This was done in 1977, after Sabol's term on the Board expired. The Board's decision was not rendered until October 26, 1977, and carried with four Board members voting in favor of MPC's application, one member against it, and the chairman did not vote. We fail to see how Sabol's alleged bias prejudiced the substantial rights of the appellant. Similarly, we fail to see how Sabol's connection with Ski Yellowstone, Inc. resulted in the appellants' receiving any less than a fair hearing and decision. The argument that a precedent will be set by granting MPC its transmission lines to Big Sky is tenuous at best and the fact that a developer must bear the first cost of conservation alternatives in lieu of additional electrical transmission facilities does not persuade us that Sabol had a pecuniary interest in the present proceedings. With regard to the newspaper article appearing in the Bozeman Daily Chronicle, we note that none of the cases cited by appellants (which deal with a member of a hearing panel criticizing a party already before it) are on point in the instant case. Here Sabol's comment appeared February 15, 1976, and the first prehearing conference was not until April 10, almost two months later. They do not reflect any prejudgment of the issues placed before the Board in this case. Appellants argue that Sabol improperly interfered with the conduct of the September 24, 1976, hearing by the alleged ex parte contact in the lobby during one of the recesses with Department of Natural Resources and Conservation attorney MacIntyre. However, the depositions of Doug MacIntyre and Applegate indicate that appellants wanted the DNRC to conduct friendly cross-examination, i.e. the MWA and DNRC occupied similar positions in the proceedings and were aligned on the corridor issue  both advocated the existing Gallatin Canyon corridor rather than the Jack Creek/Cedar Creek route. We have previously held that no substantial rights are prejudiced by a hearing officer's decision to limit cross-examination to those issues on which routes are adverse, because the cross-examination of nonadverse parties in reality becomes just more direct examination. Northern Plains, supra. Although neither party has raised the issue, section 75-20-220(1), MCA, merits some discussion. That statute provides in part: XX-XX-XXX. Hearing examiner  restrictions  duties. (1) If the board appoints a hearing examiner to conduct any certification proceedings under this chapter, the hearing examiner may not be a member of the board, an employee of the department, or a member or employee of the department of health or board of health. Under this statute, a hearing examiner may not be a member of the Board and Sabol was chairman of the Board at the time he was appointed hearing examiner. However, close examination of the enactment of the above statute and the facts of this case reveal that the statute did not apply to this proceeding. MPC filed its application on June 6, 1974, for a 161 KV line from Clyde Park to Dillon. On June 30, 1975, MPC filed an amended application increasing the total mileage of transmission lines requested and under the amended application, the line was to consist of the five segments set out at the beginning of this opinion. The Department, by letter dated May 30, 1975, agreed to treat the amended application as relating back to the original (June 6, 1974) application. That letter contained the following statements: The project application shall ... be deemed to have been filed on June 6, 1974... [T]he Department... will not treat the amended applications as constituting a substantial change and, therefore, will not treat the amended applications as a new application... Section 75-20-220(1) was included as part of the amendments to the Utility Siting Act and it was expressly provided that those amendments would only apply to applications received by the Department after January 1, 1975. 1975 Laws, Ch. 494, § 25. MPC's application was filed on June 6, 1974, and, due to the relation back discussed above, the amended application was deemed to have been filed on that date also. Thus the statute is not applicable to the proceedings here. Furthermore, the parties and the hearing examiner agreed that they were operating under the Utility Siting Act and not the amendments thereto. In the transcript of the third preconference hearing conducted September 14, 1976, we find the following interchange: HEARINGS EXAMINER: ... Now the first thing, it is my understanding that everybody is agreed that the hearing will be conducted under the provisions of the Utility Siting Act of 1973 rather than the Major Facility Siting Act which was enacted in 1975, I believe. Is that correct? MR. WALSH [representing MPC]: That is correct. HEARINGS EXAMINER: And how about you, Bill? Is that agreeable to you? MR. MADDEN [representing MWA]: That is correct. HEARINGS EXAMINER: And how about you, Jim? Is that agreeable to you? MR. MOORE [representing American Fork Ranch]: Yes. In the transcript of the September 23 hearing we also find this: HEARINGS EXAMINER: Thank you, Mr. Sabol. This is a hearing under the Utility Siting Act of 1973, and the proceedings under this, at this hearing will all be in conformity with that particular Act. For the above reasons, it is our opinion that section 75-20-220(1), MCA, did not apply to these proceedings. Affirmed. DALY, HARRISON and WEBER, JJ., concur. SHEEHY, J., deeming himself disqualified, did not participate.