Opinion ID: 164802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: back pay & front pay

Text: 9 A district court's decision to award back or front pay under the ADA is an equitable one. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (Relief may include ... back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate [.]); McCue v. Kansas, 165 F.3d 784, 791-92 (10th Cir.1999) (interpreting back and front pay to be equitable remedies under § 2000e-5(g)(1) in a Title VII case). As an equitable consideration, a district court has broad discretion in fashioning relief to achieve the broad purpose of eliminating the effects of discriminatory practices and restoring the plaintiff to the position that she would have likely enjoyed had it not been for the discrimination. Dilley v. SuperValu, Inc., 296 F.3d 958, 967 (10th Cir.2002) (quotations and alterations omitted). 10 We review a district court's determination of front and back pay for abuse of discretion. Davoll v. Webb, 194 F.3d 1116, 1143 (10th Cir.1999). Under the law of this circuit, judicial action which is arbitrary, capricious, or whimsical.... [or a] ruling based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence ... constitute[s] an abuse of discretion. Amoco Oil Co. v. EPA, 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir.2000) (citations and quotations omitted). That the court's discretion is equitable in nature, hardly means that it is unfettered by meaningful standards or shielded from thorough appellate review. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 416, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975) (citations omitted). Indeed, when affording remedies under the ADA, [a] court must exercise this [equitable] power in light of the large objectives of the Act. Id.
11 Mr. Bartee argues that the District Court erred by limiting the damages for his reasonable-accommodation claim to his lost pay, minus his disability insurance payments, from the time that Michelin failed to accommodate him on May 3, 1999, to his termination on June 3, 1999. Finding that the District Court failed to establish a sufficient factual basis for its equitable award, we reverse and remand for a calculation of back- and front-pay damages consistent with this opinion.
12 First, like the District Court, we must interpret whether the verdicts are consistent. Here, neither party timely asserted inconsistent verdicts. A failure to object to general jury verdicts on the ground of inconsistency before the jury is discharged constitutes waiver, unless the verdict is inconsistent on its face such that the entry of judgment upon the verdict is plain error. 1 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Stone, 998 F.2d 1534, 1545 (10th Cir.1993). Plain error exists only when verdicts are inconsistent on their face. 2 Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Zinke & Trumbo, Ltd., 791 F.2d 1416, 1424 (10th Cir.1986). 13 In Diamond Shamrock, we formulated the plain-error inconsistency test as follows: 14 A verdict that resolves separate and distinct causes of action in favor of both parties is not inconsistent on its face.... In contrast, when several causes of action are identical and defended on the same ground, a verdict for the plaintiff on one cause of action and for the defendant on another is inconsistent. Id. at 1424-25. 15 In Oja v. Howmedica, Inc., 111 F.3d 782 (10th Cir.1997), however, we interpreted this standard to find a verdict for plaintiff in negligence and for defendant in strict liability inconsistent on its face. We found this inconsistency, despite the facial differences between these causes of action, because the only two elements contested at trial, product defectiveness and injury causation, were common to all of Oja's claims. Id. at 791. 16 We note that some tension may exist between these two formulations; however, we need not resolve any possible tension today because the verdicts here are facially consistent under either standard. 3 First, noting that the third elements differ for the claims of wrongful termination and failure to accommodate under the ADA, 4 they appear to present separate and distinct causes of action. See Diamond Shamrock, 791 F.2d at 1424. 5 Second, both parties vigorously contested the third elements of the reasonable accommodation and the wrongful termination claims. 6 Hence, the verdicts are consistent under plain error review because the disputed elements were not common to both causes of action and the jury could have logically reached opposite conclusions on those elements. See Oja, 111 F.3d at 790-91.
17 Having found the verdicts consistent, we next evaluate the District Court's factual basis for limiting Mr. Bartee's back-pay award. Pursuant to the Seventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution, in fashioning equitable relief, a district court is bound both by a jury's explicit findings of fact and those findings that are necessarily implicit in the jury's verdict. 7 Smith v. Diffee Ford-Lincoln-Mercury, Inc. 298 F.3d 955, 965-66 (10th Cir.2002) (holding that the district court abused its discretion in refusing front pay under an ADA and FMLA claim because it disregarded the jury's implicit finding that [the plaintiff] would have been employed at least until the date of trial). In other words, the subsequent findings by the trial judge in deciding the equitable claims [cannot] conflict with the jury's [explicit and implicit] determinations. Ag Services of America, Inc. v. Nielsen, 231 F.3d 726, 731 (10th Cir.2000). Moreover, a district court must construe the implied factual findings from both jury verdicts in harmony before using them as the basis for its equitable relief. Diamond Shamrock, 791 F.2d at 1431 (McKay, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Finally, to facilitate appellate review, a district court must make clear on the record the findings of fact on which it relies. Cf. United States v. Pelliere, 57 F.3d 936, 940 (10th Cir.1995) (noting that an appellate court cannot review findings of fact under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(b) unless the district court makes those findings on the record); Heinold Hog Mkt., Inc. v. Superior Feeders, Inc., 623 F.2d 636, 637 (10th Cir.1979) ([T]he function of appellate review is to decide whether the correct rule of law was applied to the facts found[.]). 18 Here, although the District Court briefly addressed the matter, 8 the findings are insufficient to enable us to evaluate whether the District Court abused its discretion by basing its equitable remedy on findings of fact that conflict with those implied by both jury verdicts. 9 See Ag Servs., 231 F.3d at 731; Smith, 298 F.3d at 965-66. Thus, we reverse and remand the award of equitable relief for specific findings of fact by the District Court and, if necessary, recalculation of equitable damages. These findings of fact should include implied findings of fact from both jury verdicts — read in harmony — as well as any independent findings of fact necessary for determination of the proper equitable relief.