Opinion ID: 213686
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Direct and Collateral Review

Text: On direct appeal from his conviction, Jones argued that the testimony about what Lewis told the detectives violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him. A majority of the Indiana Court of Appeals rejected this claim. The majority acknowledged Jones' attempt to establish that Aaron was the only source of evidence against him and acknowledged that this attack may have weakened the State's case since Aaron testified in the trial pursuant to the terms of a plea agreement. Jones I, No. 45A03-0407-CR-339, at 6-7. Although the majority admitted that the testimony about Lewis' statement pointed toward [Jones'] guilt and had great prejudicial impact since it suggested that Jones committed the quadruple homicide, the majority said that the prosecution had to introduce[ ] the police detectives' testimony to prove that there was a great deal of evidence that was developed prior to [Aaron's] statement that was based upon evidence given to them by [Lewis]. Id. at 7 (quotation marks omitted). It was necessary, the majority declared, to explain to the jury why the police started investigating Jones because Jones sought to prove that Aaron, whose credibility was in question, was the only source of evidence against him. Id. at 9. Because the testimony of the police detectives regarding [Lewis'] statement about his brother's confession was [proffered only] to show the course of police investigation ... the testimony did not constitute hearsay, and [Jones'] right to confront the witnesses against him was not violated. Id. at 10-11. The Court of Appeals majority also said that admission of the Lewis statement was harmless because the judge instructed the jury every time that the statement was only offered to prove the course of the police investigation and not the truth of the matter. Id. at 7. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Judge Kirsch argued that the purpose of the hearsay evidence was clearly to bolster the State's case against Jones, not to show the conduct of the police investigation. Id. at 17. Jones' counsel made no comment about the police investigation, he pointed out, but merely noted that the only evidence which the jury would hear would come from [Aaron], who had struck a favorable plea bargain with the State. Id. Given this fact, the State's claim that the challenged evidence was being admitted for a purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted strains credulity. Id. Judge Kirsch wrote that the majority seems to say that because the admissible evidence against Jones was weak, and Jones' counsel noted such fact, it was proper to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence. Id. at 16. Under that rationale, he feared, any hearsay statement to police during the course of their investigation would be admissible whenever a defendant makes any comment on the evidence. Id. at 17. The Indiana Supreme Court declined to hear the case, and Jones' conviction was later upheld on state collateral review. Having exhausted his state post-conviction remedies, Jones petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court, again asserting that the introduction of Lewis' statement violated his Sixth Amendment rights. The district court disagreed, determining that the admissibility of Lewis' statement was merely an issue of state evidentiary law, so that habeas relief could be granted only if that statement's admission violated either due process or the Sixth Amendment's Confrontation Clause. Jones v. Finnan, No. 09-cv-052, at 4 (S.D.Ind. Sept. 24, 2009), quoting Johnson v. Bett, 349 F.3d 1030, 1037 (7th Cir.2003). The district court did not reach the merits of Jones' Sixth Amendment claim, however. Rather, the district court framed the issue in terms of whether Lewis' statement violated Jones' right to due process of law. Even if a constitutional violation had occurred, the district court added, any error was harmless because the detectives' `testimony was not the only testimony that pointed toward [Jones'] guilt' and because `the [trial] judge instructed the jury every time that [Lewis'] statement was only offered to prove the course of police investigation and not the truth of the matter asserted.' Id. at 4, quoting Jones I, No. 45A03-0407-CR-339, at 7. As we will see, on this key point, both the state appellate court and the district court erroneously described the trial record and applied the wrong legal standard. After denying Jones' habeas petition, the district court also denied Jones' request for a certificate of appealability, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A), on the grounds that no reasonable jurist could disagree with its resolution of Jones' constitutional claims. The district court went on to say that Jones' appeal was not taken in good faith because there was no objectively reasonable argument which [Jones] could present to argue that the disposition of [his petition] was erroneous. This court granted a certificate of appealability on the sole issue of whether the admission of out-of-court statements at trial violated Jones' Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.