Opinion ID: 1621897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: testimony of white and wingo

Text: Kinder contends that the trial court improperly allowed State's witnesses Chuckie White and Dwayne Wingo to take the witness stand and invoke their Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination because the State called the witnesses knowing that they would invoke the privilege before the jury. This error, Kinder explains, allowed the jury to surmise that White was involved in the killing. Although a party may not call a witness to testify solely for the purpose of having that witness invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege, a court may require a witness to take the stand where there is a reasonable expectation that the witness will provide some legitimate testimony in addition to invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. State v. Sidebottom, 753 S.W.2d 915, 922 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 975, 109 S.Ct. 515, 102 L.Ed.2d 550 (1988). Once a witness refuses to answer a question because of possible incrimination, no inferences may be made, whether favorable or unfavorable to either the defendant or the prosecution. State v. Grays, 856 S.W.2d 87, 92 (Mo.App.1993). When White was called to testify at trial, he invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to the State's questions regarding events that took place on December 22, 1990. The trial court instructed White to answer the questions posed, and when he continued to refuse, held him in contempt. Kinder then requested a mistrial which the trial court denied. White had previously indicated during his deposition that he did not want to answer questions until he had consulted with an attorney, but he later gave a statement to both parties about the events on the night in question. Under these facts, we cannot infer that the State called White solely for the purpose of having him invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. Furthermore, Kinder was not prejudiced because the State's theory of the case was that Kinder acted alone, and there is no indication that the State attempted to create any inference through oral argument or otherwise that White was a participant in the murder. In a related argument, Kinder complains that by asking questions of White, the State was able to present substantive testimony to the jury without Kinder having the opportunity to cross-examine. The jury had been instructed, however, that questions are not evidence and that it was not to speculate on what the answers to questions might have been. MAI-CR3d 302.02. This point is denied. The other witness, Wingo, waived his privilege against self-incrimination when he testified at his deposition. At Kinder's trial Wingo initially invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, and the trial court then allowed portions of the deposition Wingo had given to be read to the jury. At that point, Wingo then waived his privilege a second time by answering the remaining questions on direct examination and all of Kinder's questions on cross examination. Because all the questions were in fact answered, there was neither error nor prejudice. Kinder also argues that the trial court erred in sustaining the State's hearsay objection during Kinder's cross-examination of Wingo when Kinder asked Wingo what the police had told him. Kinder has failed to preserve this claim for appeal, because he did not make an offer of proof as to what Wingo would have said, State v. Harris, 870 S.W.2d 798, 809 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 953, 115 S.Ct. 371, 130 L.Ed.2d 323 (1994), and plain error review has not been requested. Upon gratuitous review of the record, we find that Kinder has not suffered a manifest injustice as a result of the trial court's ruling and thus is not entitled to relief.