Opinion ID: 564919
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Death Penalty Today: Aggravated Murder

Text: 51 Prior to Furman, the sentencing authority in a murder case had unfettered discretion to consider virtually anything asserted in mitigation. Lockett re-established that practice. Prior to Furman, the sentencer in a capital case could consider anything, in its unfettered discretion, in aggravation. Barclay and Zant have re-established this practice so long as at least one statutory aggravating circumstance accompanies the murder. In practical terms, the Court has reinvigorated discretion in capital sentencing in order to guarantee an individualized sentencing process. 52 Engineers and surveyors use the phrase failure to close to express the idea that one has measured from a known reference point to certain unknown points without returning to the original reference point. This expression aptly describes the historical progression of death penalty jurisprudence. Shortly after Lockett, we noted the inherent tension between the Court's aspiration for individualized sentencing and objective standards. Moore v. Balkcom, 716 F.2d 1511, 1521 (11th Cir.1983). Justice Scalia has recently denounced this tension as internally contradictory. Walton v. Arizona, --- U.S. ----, ----, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3051-52, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990) (Scalia, J., concurring in part). 43 53 The Court seems to have resolved the tension by making one full turn on a coil spring or a spiral staircase of case law. The Court has returned the law largely to its pre-Furman state but has ratcheted the doctrine up one step from its starting point. Prior to Furman, simple murder was a capital crime. Today the level of criminal conduct for a capital crime has been raised; a defendant must commit the new crime of capital murder or aggravated murder in order to be eligible for the death penalty. This new crime is defined as murder accompanied by one or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances. The sentencing authority may not impose the death penalty for simple murder. The essential point of this development in the law, at least with regard to Johnson's claim of actual innocence, is that when the prosecution has proved that the defendant committed aggravated murder, the sentencing authority has very broad discretion to sentence the defendant either to life imprisonment or the death penalty. 54 Because Johnson's proposed showing of factual error does not cast doubt on his guilt of a crime for which the sentencing authority in his case could impose the death penalty (i.e., murder accompanied by at least one statutory aggravating circumstance), he has not made a colorable showing of actual innocence. Therefore, Johnson is not entitled to a review on the merits of his defaulted constitutional claim. 55