Opinion ID: 518934
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Request Requirement

Text: 5 The requirements set out in section 501(b) are designed to protect union officers from harassment. Loretangeli v. Critelli, 853 F.2d 186, 189 (3d Cir.1988). The fiduciary responsibilities created in section 501(a), however, are designed to protect union members. Id. These two policies must be balanced when deciding what is required to satisfy the requirement of a request for an accounting. Dinko v. Wall, 531 F.2d 68, 73 (2d Cir.1976). 6 The district court held, however, that exhaustion of internal union remedies is also necessary before leave to file a complaint under section 501 may be granted, relying on Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 101 S.Ct. 2088, 68 L.Ed.2d 538 (1981). This reliance is misplaced. The plaintiff in Clayton brought suit under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a), alleging breach of the collective bargaining agreement by his employer and breach of the duty of fair representation by his union in processing his grievance. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 682, 101 S.Ct. at 2091-92. The Court held that where an internal union appeals procedure cannot result in reactivation of a grievance, or an award of the complete relief sought under section 301, exhaustion is not required. Id. at 696, 101 S.Ct. at 2099. 7 The exhaustion requirement for grievances brought under section 301 was originally set out in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 653-54, 85 S.Ct. 614, 616-17, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). Exhaustion is required because Congress expressly stated contract grievance procedures are a favored method of settling disputes in the plant, 29 U.S.C. section 173(d), and a contrary rule would deprive employees and employers of the opportunity to establish  'a uniform and exclusive method for orderly settlement of employee grievances' . Clayton, 451 U.S. at 686, 101 S.Ct. at 2094, quoting Republic Steel, 379 U.S. at 653, 85 S.Ct. at 616-17. The rule in Republic Steel is intended to protect the integrity of the collective-bargaining process and to further ... national labor policy that encourages private rather than judicial resolution of disputes arising over the interpretation and application of collective-bargaining agreements. Clayton, 451 U.S. at 687, 101 S.Ct. at 2094 (emphasis added). 8 The present action is brought under section 501 of the LMRDA. We held in Horner v. Ferron, 362 F.2d 224, 231 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958, 87 S.Ct. 397, 17 L.Ed.2d 305 (1966), that exhaustion of intraorganization remedies is not required prior to filing a section 501(b) application. 9 It is a condition precedent to a suit under section 501(b), that the plaintiff, as a member of the labor organization, request that organization or its governing board or officers to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief from the asserted violations of fiduciary duties defined in section 501(a).... Section 501(b) makes reference to no other intraorganization remedies which must be pursued. It follows that the pursuit of other internal remedies which may be available need not be alleged to show 'good cause,' or proved to prevail on the merits. 10 Horner, 362 F.2d at 231. 11 Rohrbach contends that our holding in Horner is no longer good law in light of Clayton. We disagree. Clayton applies to actions brought under the LMRA, an act designed to assist relations between employer and employee and encourage resolution of disputes by the terms of collective bargaining agreements rather than by the courts. The purpose of the LMRDA, in contrast, is to further union democracy and prevent the misuse of power by union leaders. Phillips v. Osborne, 403 F.2d 826, 831 (9th Cir.1968). While we have not considered the exhaustion issue as it relates to section 501 actions in the wake of Clayton, other circuits which have decided cases after Clayton have not required exhaustion of internal remedies. See Adams-Lundy v. Ass'n of Professional Flight Attendants, 844 F.2d 245, 248 (5th Cir.1988) (union member may sue under section 501(b) after requesting the union  'sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate relief'  and the union has refused to take action within a reasonable time following the request); Erkins v. Bryan, 663 F.2d 1048, 1052 (11th Cir.1981) (as amended 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989, 103 S.Ct. 343, 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982) (petitioners may act after notifying union, requesting suit be brought, and union fails to take action within reasonable time). As the court stated in Erkins, [t]he trial court could not second guess the purpose of the statute by saying that some other precondition to the filing of a petition may take the place of the one laid down in the text of the section. Erkins, 663 F.2d at 1052-53. 12 We therefore hold that Horner survives Clayton; exhaustion of internal union remedies is not a prerequisite to the filing of a complaint under section 501(b). We also conclude that Cowger met the first requirement of section 501(b): he made a sufficient showing of an appropriate request of the union, and a failure of the union to act within a reasonable period of time. 5