Opinion ID: 2974833
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lieutenant Ellsworth

Text: Livermore also asserts that Lt. Ellsworth, who commanded the Emergency Services team and attempted to confront Rohm in the LAV, intentionally or recklessly created the circumstances leading to Rohm’s death. With respect to this claim, the district court stated that: Plaintiff’s law enforcement practices expert, D.P. Van Blaricom, has also provided reliable opinion evidence that the police practices used and ordered by Jerry Ellsworth were reckless and contributed to the use of excessive force. His conclusions include that the fatal incident was triggered by the unjustified and reckless decision to rush the suspect, without warning, at a time when he was trapped and did not pose any imminent threat. Although this record could be interpreted otherwise, the interpretation required by Rule 56 establishes that there are genuine issues of material fact requiring the denial of summary judgment as to whether Defendants recklessly used excessive force in violation of federal and state law. No. 06-1465 Livermore v. Lubelan, et al. Page 7 Defendants argue that the district court erred in denying their motion for summary judgment with respect to Livermore’s Fourth Amendment claim against Lt. Ellsworth. They contend that Livermore’s theory of recovery as to Lt. Ellsworth is not cognizable under a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim. In support of her claim against Lt. Ellsworth, Livermore points to Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177 (9th Cir. 2002), in which the Ninth Circuit held that a plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim against police officers who used deadly force may survive summary judgment, even where the particular seizure is reasonable, if the defendant police officers acted recklessly in creating the circumstances which required the use of deadly force. Id. at 1189 (stating that “even though the officers reasonably fired back in self-defense, they could still be held liable for using excessive force because their reckless and unconstitutional provocation created the need to use force.”). Although this circuit has not addressed Billington directly, we have rejected such an analysis. The proper approach under Sixth Circuit precedent is to view excessive force claims in segments. Gaddis v. Redford Twp., 364 F.3d 763, 772 (6th Cir. 2004); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1161 (6th Cir. 1996). That is, the court should first identify the “seizure” at issue here and then examine “whether the force used to effect that seizure was reasonable in the totality of the circumstances, not whether it was reasonable for the police to create the circumstances.” Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1161 (quoting Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992)). The Dickerson court reasoned: The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases. Other than random attacks, all such cases begin with the decision of a police officer to do something, to help, to arrest, to inquire. If the officer had decided to do nothing, then no force would have been used. In this sense, the police officer always causes the trouble. But it is trouble which the police officer is sworn to cause, which society pays him to cause and which, if kept within constitutional limits, society praises the officer for causing. Id. (quoting Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994)); see also id. at 1161-62 (citing with approval Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778-80 (4th Cir. 1993) (rejecting a claim that an officer who resorts to deadly force in self-defense violates the Fourth Amendment if he unreasonably provokes the shooting by failing to identify himself as a police officer)); id. at 1162 (citing with approval Cole v. Bone, 993 F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993) (scrutinizing “only the seizure itself, not the events leading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment” because the “Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable seizures, not unreasonable or ill-advised conduct in general.”)). Applying the segmented analysis here that Dickerson requires, we conclude that Lt. Ellsworth is entitled to summary judgment on Livermore’s excessive force claim. Livermore, through her expert, asserts that Lt. Ellsworth acted recklessly by creating circumstances to justify shooting Rohm, by ordering snipers to shoot Rohm if he raised a weapon at the LAV, by failing to warn Rohm that he would be fired upon, and by “rushing” the assault on Rohm. Because Livermore argues that Lt. Ellsworth acted negligently by increasing the likelihood that Rohm would be shot, the seizure at issue is the shooting of Rohm. All of the actions concerning Lt. Ellsworth, however, occurred in the hours and minutes leading up to Rohm’s killing; Dickerson instructs us to disregard these events and to focus on the “split-second judgments” made immediately before the officer used allegedly excessive force. See Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1162 (citing Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991) and Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802, 805-06 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc)). The only force used against Rohm during the standoff was the two shots that killed him, and it is undisputed that the only officer to shoot Rohm was Sgt. Lubelan. Under Dickerson, the preceding decisions made by Lt. Ellsworth are immaterial and not a sufficient basis for a claim under the Fourth Amendment. We therefore reverse the district court’s denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to Livermore’s excessive force claim against Lt. Ellsworth. No. 06-1465 Livermore v. Lubelan, et al. Page 8