Opinion ID: 1155064
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: supression of urine sample

Text: Finally, McKnight asserts the trial court erred in refusing to suppress the results of a urine sample taken at the hospital after the stillbirth, contending the sample was taken in violation of her fourth amendment rights. We disagree. Pursuant to a Conway Hospital Protocol for the Management of Drug Abuse during Pregnancy, a medical urine drug screening may be ordered at the discretion of the attending physician if an obstetrical patient meets one of several criteria, including lack of prenatal care or unexplained fetal demise. If such a drug screening test turns up positive from the hospital's lab, then hospital personnel are to request consent from the patient for forensic (medical-legal) testing. If consent is obtained, the sample is sent to the hospital's reference lab and the nursery is notified. The Department of Social Services is to be notified of positive medical urine drug screening and the criteria causing the drug screen to be done, and whether forensic testing is being done on the mother or newborn. The protocol states that As mandated by law, it is the obligation of every medical facility, as well as each individual, to report to DSS any suspected abuse or neglect involving an unborn, yet viable, fetus or newborn child. The hospital also has a Chain of Custody form and procedure for handling forensic samples. Here, an initial drug screen was ordered by the obstetrician, Dr. Niles, due to McKnight's lack of prenatal care. When the initial screen tested positive for cocaine, Mary McBride, a labor and delivery nurse, was instructed to obtain a forensic urine sample from McKnight. Before doing so, McBride read an Informed Consent to Drug Testing form to McKnight. McBride testified she read the form to McKnight, and advised her that it could be used for legal purposes; she did not, however, specifically advise McKnight that police would possibly arrest her. The form states that McKnight acknowledges she has testified positive for cocaine, and is being requested to give consent for a medical-legal (forensic) test which will confirm or deny the initial report. The form further states that It has been explained to me that I may refuse consent for this test. It has been explained to me that this test may be used for legal purposes. McKnight signed the form indicating her consent. The second sample also tested positive for cocaine. McKnight asserts the forensic/legal sample was taken in violation of her fourth amendment rights, contrary to the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001). We disagree. The issue in Ferguson, as framed by the Court, was as follows: In this case, we must decide whether a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search if the patient has not consented to the procedure. More narrowly, the question is whether the interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter pregnant women from using cocaine can justify a departure from the general rule that an official nonconsensual search is unconstitutional if not authorized by a valid warrant. 532 U.S. at 69-70, 121 S.Ct. 1281. In Ferguson, staff members of MUSC developed a written policy, in conjunction with the solicitor and police, for obtaining evidence to prosecute women who bore children who tested positive for drugs at birth. These procedures provided a plan to identify and test pregnant patients suspected of drug use without their knowledge or consent. The plan (1) required that a chain of custody be followed when obtaining and testing patients' urine samples, (2) contained police procedures and criteria for arresting patients who tested positive, and (3) encouraged prosecution for drug offenses and child neglect, and specifically set forth the offenses with which the women could be charged, as well as procedures for police to follow upon arresting the women. Id. at 70-73, 121 S.Ct. 1281. The Supreme Court held MUSC's performance of diagnostic tests to obtain evidence of the women's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes was an unreasonable search if the patient had not consented to the procedure. Id. at 84-85, 121 S.Ct. 1281. The Court held that [g]iven the primary purpose of the Charleston program, which was to use the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force women into treatment, and given the extensive involvement of law enforcement officials at every stage, the policy did not fit with the closely guarded special needs category which would justify a warrantless, non-consensual search. Id. Ferguson is distinguishable in several respects. First, there is no evidence that Conway Hospital's policy was in any way developed or implemented in conjunction with police, the solicitor, the Attorney General, or any other law enforcement personnel. Second, unlike the policy at issue in Ferguson, Conway Hospital's policy did not require hospital staff to turn drug screening results over to law enforcement personnel. On the contrary, the hospital's protocol merely requires that its department of social work services be notified and that a telephone referral be made to DSS when an assessment reveals suspicion of illegal drug use or reason to believe the unborn or newborn child is at risk. A DSS caseworker is not a law enforcement officer. State v. Sprouse, 325 S.C. 275, 478 S.E.2d 871 (Ct.App.1996). Third, unlike Ferguson, Conway Hospital's testing was not done surreptitiously, but was done with McKnight's knowledge and consent. The labor and delivery nurse specifically testified that she obtained a written consent form from McKnight to perform the second urine specimen; the consent form indicated to McKnight that she had the right to refuse the test, and that it could be used for legal purposes. We find the state sufficiently demonstrated, through the testimony of Nurse McBride, that McKnight consented to the search. The only evidence in the record on this point is the testimony of McBride, who testified that she read the form to McKnight, and told her that the sample could be used for legal purposes. The form which was read to McKnight specifically advised that she may refuse consent, and that the test may be used for legal purposes. This is sufficient evidence upon which to find the consent was voluntary. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973); State v. Wallace, 269 S.C. 547, 238 S.E.2d 675 (1977) (whether a consent to search was voluntary is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of the circumstances). Finally, even assuming arguendo that McKnight did not consent to the urine specimen, and that it was illegally obtained, we find any error in its admission was harmless. The DSS caseworker testified, without objection, that McKnight told her she knew she was pregnant and that she had been using crack cocaine when she could get it. Further, the defenses' own expert, Dr. Conradi, testified that cocaine was in the baby at some point. Both of the state's expert pathologists testified that the only way for the infant to have the benzoylecgonine present was through cocaine, and that the cocaine had to have come from the mother. Given this evidence, even assuming the urine sample was erroneously admitted, it could not have impacted the jury's verdict. Arnold v. State, 309 S.C. 157, 420 S.E.2d 834 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 927, 113 S.Ct. 1302, 122 L.Ed.2d 691 (1993) (error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt where it did not contribute to the verdict obtained). McKnight's conviction and sentence are affirmed. AFFIRMED. TOAL, C.J., and BURNETT, J., concur.