Opinion ID: 171440
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Political Affiliation Claim

Text: The right not to be demoted from a position that does not require political allegiance is clearly established in both Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit caselaw. See Gann v. Cline, 519 F.3d 1090, 1095 (10th Cir.2008) ([C]onditioning hiring decisions on political belief and association plainly constitutes an unconstitutional condition, unless the government has a vital interest in doing so.) (quoting Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 78, 110 S.Ct. 2729, 111 L.Ed.2d 52 (1990)). Ordinarily, in order for the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority from other courts must have found the law to be as the plaintiff maintains. Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226, 1238 (10th Cir.1996). However, the plaintiff need not show that the specific action at issue has previously been held unlawful, he need only show that the alleged unlawfulness was apparent in light of preexisting law. Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). This circuit has stated that the relevant test for qualified immunity is whether the right was sufficiently clear that a reasonable government officer in the defendant's shoes would understand that what he or she did violated that right. Casey v. West Las Vegas Indep. Sch. Dist., 473 F.3d 1323, 1327 (10th Cir.2007) (emphasis added); see also Gomes v. Wood, 451 F.3d 1122, 1134 (10th Cir.2006) (The law is clearly established if a reasonable official in the defendant's circumstances would understand that her conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional right.). To determine what a reasonable person in Huff's shoes would have thought about the legality of his decision to demote Poindexter, we may not inquire into Huff's knowledge of the law. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 186 (D.C.Cir.1986). We may, however, inquire into what someone in Huff's position would reasonably understand the facts to be regarding the nature of Poindexter's position. Cf. id. (noting that the Supreme Court precluded inquiries into a defendant's knowledge of the law, but did not eliminate inquiry into intent unrelated to knowledge of the law). In this case, Huff's testimony indicates that someone in his position would understand the nature of the Road Foreman position well enough to know whether the job required political loyalty. See Jantzen, 188 F.3d at 1259 (declining defendant's request for qualified immunity and relying, most importantly, [on] the fact the Defendant Hawkins himself knew and had empirical evidence that the lack of political loyalty by [the plaintiffs] did not interfere with the effective performance of [plaintiffs'] jobs). And, if the jury chooses to believe the defendant Huff's own testimony on this matter, they could conclude that it was clearly established that the job of Road Foreman was not a politically sensitive position. Until the jury determines that factual question, therefore, Huff is not entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of summary judgment. See Roska ex rel. Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1251 (10th Cir.2003) (The objective legal reasonableness of the officer's actions is a legal question. But where the historical facts material to [that] issue are in dispute [there] ... [is] an issue for the jury.) (internal citations and quotations omitted).