Opinion ID: 1794434
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Effect of the Federal-Court Action

Text: The insurer and its agent contend that under Rule 13(a), Fed.R.Civ.P., Rule 13(a), the matters made the basis of the state-court action are compulsory counterclaims in the federal-court action. Rule 13(a) provides: (a) Compulsory Counterclaims. A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which at the time of (a) serving the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction. But the pleader need not state the claim if (1) at the time the action was commenced the claim was the subject of another pending action, or (2) the opposing party brought suit upon the claim by attachment or other process by which the court did not acquire jurisdiction to render a personal judgment on that claim, and the pleader is not stating any counterclaim under this Rule 13. The insurer and its agent rely on Cincinnati Insurance, which deals with the substantially similar Rule 13(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., and in which we stated: The purpose of Rule 13[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] `is to avoid circuity of actions and to enable the court to settle all related claims in one action and thereby avoid a wasteful multiplicity of litigation on claims that arose from a single transaction or occurrence.' 806 So.2d at 379 (quoting Grow Group, Inc. v. Industrial Corrosion Control, Inc., 601 So.2d 934, 936 (Ala.1992), and citing 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1409 (2d ed.1990)). In Cincinnati Insurance, the plaintiff in the state-court action asserted claims that arose out of the same nucleus of operative facts as was involved in a previously filed declaratory-judgment action in the federal court. After a judgment had been entered in the federal-court action without the state-court plaintiff's having asserted a counterclaim in the federal court, the defendant in the state court unsuccessfully sought dismissal of the state-court action. We granted the defendant's petition of a writ of mandamus and issued the writ, holding, independently of § 6-5-440, that the state-court action was barred by the implicit prohibition derived from the mandatory terms of Rule 13, Fed.R.Civ.P., against the subsequent assertion of claims that should have been set forth as compulsory counterclaims in a concluded prior proceeding in the federal court. Because the federal-court action here has not been reduced to a judgment, we lay aside Cincinnati Insurance as not on point. The insurer and its agent also rely upon Ex parte Canal Insurance Co., supra, in which this Court held: Since the matter raised in the state court complaint constitutes a compulsory counterclaim in the federal court action that was pending at the time the state court action was commenced, the statute [§ 6-5-440] compels dismissal of the state court action. 534 So.2d at 585. In Ex parte Breman Lake View Resort, L.P., this Court described the interplay between a procedural rule requiring service of compulsory counterclaims and § 6-5-440, as follows: This Court has held that the obligation imposed on a defendant under Rule 13(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., to assert compulsory counterclaims, when read in conjunction with § 6-5-440, Ala.Code 1975, which prohibits a party from prosecuting two actions for the same cause and against the same party, is tantamount to making the defendant with a compulsory counterclaim in the first action a `plaintiff' in that action (for purposes of § 6-5-440) as of the time of its commencement. 729 So.2d at 851. Gray does not contend that the matters made the basis of the state-court action are so factually disparate as not to arise out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of Metropolitan's federal-court action. Instead, Gray contends, among other things, that a jurisdictional defect prevents the assertion of the claim he now asserts in the state-court action as a compulsory counterclaim in the federal-court action. We deal with this potentially dispositive issue first. Gray argues that the prospect for joinder of Hardy as an additional defendant on any counterclaim he might file in the federal-court action would destroy diversity of citizenship necessary for federal-court jurisdiction and that, therefore, his claim is not a compulsory counterclaim. Gray cites no authority for this proposition. In fact, the settled law is to the contrary. See 6 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1436 (2d ed. 1990) (It generally has been held that persons brought into an action under Rule 13(h) as parties to either a compulsory counterclaim under Rule 13(a) or a cross-claim under Rule 13(g) will come under the ancillary subject matter jurisdiction of the court.). Gray also contends that the federal court had not assumed jurisdiction over this action as of the time he filed the state-court action, thus rendering Canal Insurance inapplicable. Gray points out critical facts omitted from the insurer and its agent's petition. Metropolitan's complaint in the federal court not only failed to allege Metropolitan's principal place of business, but it also failed to allege the citizenship of Gray, alleging only his residence. Moreover, attached to Gray's response to the petition is an order entered sua sponte in the federal-court action on April 6, 2006, stating: The allegations of the plaintiff's complaint are insufficient to invoke this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332. The federal court gave Metropolitan the opportunity to amend its complaint, and the materials before us reflect that Metropolitan filed a timely amendment correcting the defects but that that amended complaint was filed several days after commencement of the state-court action. We agree with Gray that a determination that the federal-court action was pending at the time of the commencement of the state-court action is essential to the reliance by the insurer and its agent on Canal Insurance. The federal court's finding that the allegations of Metropolitan's original complaint were insufficient to invoke this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1332 calls into question the existence of the essential prerequisite of priority of the federal-court action. However, the insurer and its agent have not given us any argument or authority (a) as to whether Metropolitan's amended complaint relates back to the date of filing of the initial complaint and, if so, (b) whether the legal fiction [2] of relation back should apply in the context of proceedings in which a party invokes § 6-5-440. The burden of establishing a clear legal right to the relief sought rests with the petitioner. Cincinnati Insurance, 806 So.2d at 379. It is not this Court's function to do independent research to determine whether a petitioner for a writ of mandamus has established a clear legal right. In Ex parte Showers, 812 So.2d 277, 281 (Ala.2001), this Court stated: Rule 21(a), Ala. R.App. P., requires that a petition to an appellate court for the writ of mandamus `shall contain . . . a statement of the reasons why the writ should issue, with citations to the authorities and the statutes relied on. ' (Emphasis added.) Similarly, Rule 28(a)(5), Ala. R.App. P., requires that arguments in briefs contain ` citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the record relied on. ' (Emphasis added.) It is settled that a failure to comply with the requirements of Rule 28(a)(5) requiring citation of authority for arguments provides the Court with a basis for disregarding those arguments: `When an appellant fails to cite any authority for an argument on a particular issue, this Court may affirm the judgment as to that issue, for it is neither this Court's duty nor its function to perform an appellant's legal research. Rule 28(a)(5); Spradlin v. Birmingham Airport Authority, 613 So.2d 347 (Ala.1993).'