Opinion ID: 182691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Claim, the Counterclaim, and the District Court's Rulings

Text: Chandok commenced the present action against Klessig in August 2005 seeking damages in excess of $75,000 for defamation, alleging, in a single cause of action, that Klessig made numerous false statements as to the accuracy or veracity of her NOS research, thereby causing significant damage to her reputation in the scientific community. The complaint alleged that those statements were made out of ill will and spite towards Dr. Chandok (Amended Complaint ¶ 35) and with actual and common law malice ( id. ¶ 36); that they were made [i]n retaliation for [Chandok's] not assisting [Klessig] in continuing his research ( id. ¶ 33); and that [a]t the time of making these allegations, [Klessig] knew that these statements were untrue and/or recklessly disregarded whether such statements were true ( id. ¶ 35). Although the statements of which Chandok complained were not set out in the complaint, during discovery she specified 23 statements from August 26, 2004, through January 25, 2005, that she claimed were false and defamatory (the Statements). These included the statements quoted in Part I.A.2. above, as well as various drafts and preliminary statements sent by Klessig to Stern and Pola, and e-mails from Klessig to other fellow scientists. See Chandok, 648 F.Supp.2d at 452-55 & nn. 3-17 (summarizing each of the 23 Statements). Klessig, in answer to Chandok's complaint, denied, inter alia, that he had uttered any false statements or any statements out of spite, ill will, or malice, or with reckless disregard for the truth. ( See Amended Answer ¶¶ 33-36). He also denie[d] that he uttered any statements that injured plaintiff's reputation except (a) such statements as may have described truthfully and accurately (i) her research, (ii) his and BTI's inability to replicate her test results and to verify the existence of the critical varP expression vectors that plaintiff claimed she had used and (iii) other aspects of her conduct and performance, and (b) such other statements as were and are true and/or privileged and/or otherwise non-actionable. ( Id. ¶ 27.) In addition, Klessig asserted a counterclaim seeking damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, from Chandok for bringing the present action. The counterclaim alleged that within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 70-a et seq., Chandok's participation in obtaining federal funds for the NOS project made her a public applicant ( see id. ¶¶ 60-62); that Klessig had a continuing obligation to ensure that those funds were expended in compliance with federal law and to report suspected misconduct to BTI and ORI ( see id. ¶ 64); that Chandok's defamation claim against Klessig was materially related to Klessig's reports and comments on Chandok's use of federal funds in the NOS project ( see id. ¶ 63); that her claim was without a substantial basis ( see id. ¶ 66), given that she had actual knowledge that she had falsified data in connection with the NOS project and the results she had claimed to have achieved regarding the claimed NOS activity ( id. ¶ 67); and that her defamation claim therefore constitute[d] a SLAPP suit in violation of New York Civil Rights Law §§ 70-a et seq. ( id. ¶ 65). Following a period of discovery, Klessig moved for summary judgment dismissing Chandok's defamation claim, arguing, inter alia, that several of the Statements of which Chandok complained were neither false nor defamatory because they merely expressed opinions, which were incapable of being proven false and were thus protected by the First Amendment and unactionable under New York law. He also argued that the Statements were part of a public controversy and that Chandok could not prevail because she could not establish that Klessig made any of the Statements with knowledge of falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth; that many of the Statements were published only to individuals who helped Klessig write the documents in which the Statements appeared, and publication among coauthors is not actionable under New York law; and that any other Statements he made were absolutely or qualifiedly privileged. Chandok moved for summary judgment dismissing Klessig's counterclaim. Noting that federal funding was not a prerequisite to NOS research, she contended principally that she was not a public applicant within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. In Chandok, 648 F.Supp.2d 449, the district court granted both sides' motions for summary judgment. With respect to Chandok's complaint, the court stated that [t]o establish a claim of defamation under New York law, a Plaintiff must establish 1) that the statement averred was defamatory; 2) that the statement was published by the defendant; 3) that the statement was communicated to a party who was not the plaintiff; and 4) the resultant injury to the plaintiff. Id. at 456. The court noted, however, that a person's individual interest in protecting her reputation must be weighed against society's interest in fostering free speech, as reflected in the First Amendment, especially in cases involving public figures and public issues. See id. at 458. Thus, it noted that a public figure cannot prevail on a defamation claim unless, in addition to the above elements, she establishes with convincing clarity that the statements were false and that the defendant published the statements with actual malice, i.e., knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth, id. at 459. The district court ruled that Chandok is a limited issue public figure in the area of plant biology. Id. It noted that there is an international community of plant biologists, see id. at 458-59, and that Chandok admitted that she was well known within the plant biology community, id. at 459. The court stated that [s]cientific articles are inherently subject to robust criticism, and for good reason, id. at 458, as the free exchange of ideas is indispensable to the progress of scientific research. The court reasoned that Chandok, as the lead author of the articles publishing her reports of her findings, had willfully interjected herself into a public controversy by way of creating the very subject of the controversy, id. at 459, and that Klessig's constitutional privilege to speak on the matter thus could not be overcome unless Chandok proved with convincing clarity that his statements were false and had been made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth. Although the court found that each of the 23 Statements that Chandok alleged defamed her was reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning, id. at 457, it concluded after reviewing the record that [i]t is not a reasonable inference that the reported inability of numerous scientists to duplicate [Chandok's] result either was substantially false or that Dr. Klessig knew that it was false, or certainly that the references to such data were made with reckless disregard for the truth, id. at 459-60; see also id. at 459 n. 18 (In fact, Plaintiff never contends that Defendant's comments that numerous other scientists were unable to duplicate Plaintiff's results are false. Plaintiff does not appear to take issue with the factual portions of the Statements, only with the veracity of Defendant's conclusions as to the implications of those factsthat if numerous other scientists could not replicate the results, the original results must have been fabricated or falsified.). The court concluded as a matter of law that Chandok could not prove falsity or malice by clear and convincing evidence and that Klessig was thus entitled to summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Turning to Klessig's counterclaim, the district court identified three elements of a claim under the anti-SLAPP statute: 1) there must be a public application or petition, 2) the public applicant or permittee of that application must file a lawsuit against a person who is materially related to any efforts of the defendant to report on, comment on, rule on, challenge or oppose such application or permission, and 3) that the lawsuit must be, at a minimum, substantially without merit. Id. at 460 (quoting N.Y. Civ. Rights Law §§ 70, 76). The court concluded that Klessig's counterclaim should be dismissed because the first element was not satisfied: The defining aspect of a public application or petition, is that it is a required government process that must be satisfied to perform some other task. See Harfenes v. Sea Gate Assoc., Inc., 167 Misc.2d 647, 647 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.County, 1995). Receipt of a grant may certainly assist in conducting research, but research can proceed without this specific grant. . . . [R]equests for money, without other restrictions, are not public applications. Id. As there is no public application, there can neither be a public applicant nor a commentator to the same. Accordingly, there is no cause of action under the SLAPP statute. Chandok, 648 F.Supp.2d at 460-61. This appeal and cross-appeal followed.