Opinion ID: 891567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Detoxification Act

Text: {9} In 1941, the Legislature created the Commission on Alcoholism to study the problems of alcoholism and to evaluate the methods and facilities available for treatment and rehabilitation. See 1949 N.M. Laws, ch. 114, § 3 (codified at NMSA 1953, § 46-12-3 (Vol. 7, Repl.)). In addition, the Legislature authorized the district courts to commit an alcoholic to an institution for up to three years if he was found to be a habitual drunkard, chronic alcoholic, ... any person who has been five times convicted of intoxication... or who is a person who has been legally determined to have lost the power of self control from the intemperate use of spirituous or intoxicating liquors. 1949 N.M. Laws, ch. 114, § 7 (codified at NMSA 1953, § 46-12-7 (Vol. 7, Repl.)). {10} In 1973, the Legislature passed the Detoxification Act, which signaled a shift in the way the state addresses alcoholism. NMSA 1953, §§ 46-14-1 to -7 (Vol. 7, Repl., 1975 Pocket Supp.). Notably, the Legislature repealed Section 40A-20-2 and decriminalized drunkenness. See 1973 N.M. Laws, ch. 331, § 8. [6] Rather than continuing to punish alcoholism, the Act authorized peace officers to transport intoxicated persons to their residences, or to a health care facility or jailin that order, depending on the circumstancesuntil the intoxicated person became orderly. Section 46-14-3. The Act noted, however, that [a]n intoxicated person held in protective custody at a jail or transported to a health care facility under the Detoxification Act shall not be considered to have been arrested or charged with any crime. Section 46-14-7(B). {11} This shift continued in 1977, when the Legislature amended the Act creating the Commission on Alcoholism [7] to add a new section detailing the policy of the State regarding alcoholism, which read: It is the policy of this state that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution because of their consumption of alcoholic beverages but rather should be afforded a continuum of treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as productive members of society. NMSA 1953, § 46-12-2.1 (1977) (emphasis added). {12} The following year, in 1978, the Compilation Commission recompiled the New Mexico Statutes and combined the Detoxification Act, Sections 46-14-1 to -7, with the Act authorizing the Commission on Alcoholism, Sections 46-12-1 to -13, and recodified them together, see NMSA 1978, §§ 43-2-1.1 to -23 (2005), as the DRA. {13} Notably, the Legislature amended the DRA's policy statement in 2005 and removed language that would have been helpful to resolving the present dispute. Rather than stating that a person may not be subjected to criminal prosecution because of the consumption of alcohol,  the policy statement now reads: It is the policy of this state that intoxicated and incapacitated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution, but rather should be afforded protection. It is further the policy of this state that alcohol-impaired persons and drug-impaired persons should be afforded treatment in order that they may lead normal lives as productive members of society. NMSA 1978, § 43-2-3 (2005). {14} Under the pre-2005 version of the Act, it was clear that the Legislature intended to eliminate criminal prosecution for the act of consuming alcohol, and to prohibit statutes where drunkenness is an element of the offense. [8] The Act is less clear following the 2005 amendment, largely due to the Legislature's substituted statement that intoxicated and incapacitated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution. Taken literally, this language would suggest that a person could not be criminally prosecuted for any offenseincluding murderif the accused happened to be intoxicated at the time of the crime. However, this language must be viewed in the context of the overarching amendments to the policy statement. {15} The 2005 amendment broadened the scope of the DRA to include substance abuse as well as alcoholism. In conjunction with this change, it was necessary to remove the language because of the consumption of alcohol from the policy statement, although the Legislature could have modified the language to make clearer its intent. [9] Accordingly, it appears that the change in the policy statement indicates the Legislature's intent to address a broader category of substance abuse through the DRA, rather than limiting it to intoxication. Nothing else in the amended DRA suggests an intent to make a radical change in existing criminal law. {16} An expansive interpretation of the statement intoxicated and incapacitated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution would contravene longstanding New Mexico law. For example, a literal interpretation would mean that an accused would not be criminally liable for murder, burglary, assault, or battery if he was intoxicated when he committed the offense. However, our courts and our Legislature have never suggested that voluntary intoxication could provide wholesale immunity to the accused, or preclude the State from pursuing criminal sanctions. See, e.g., State v. Nozie, 2009-NMSC-018, ¶ 41, 146 N.M. 142, 207 P.3d 1119 (stating that intoxication may be raised as an affirmative defense to negate specific intent). Such a position would have far-reaching implications and would dramatically alter the Criminal Code in New Mexico. We find no indication that the Legislature intended to do so by way of textual changes to a mere policy statement defining the purpose of the DRA. {17} The narrower issue before us is to determine whether the Legislature, through the DRA, intended to preclude the handling of drunkenness under any of a wide variety of petty criminal offense statutes, such as loitering, vagrancy, disturbing the peace, and so forth. Unif. Alcoholism and Intoxication Treatment Act, 9 U.L.A. 229, 230 (1999). The historical relationship between drunkenness and disorderly conduct suggests that in earlier years the Legislature specifically intended to punish disorderly conduct resulting from intoxication. However, as the State's policy on alcoholism evolved, so too did the relationship between disorderly conduct and drunkenness. When the Legislature classified disorderly conduct and drunkenness as separate offenses in 1963, it signaled an end to the century-old relationship between the two offenses, perhaps in recognition that a person may behave in a disorderly manner without consuming alcohol and conversely that just because a person is intoxicated even in a public placedoes not make him disorderly. {18} It is significant that the Legislature repealed only drunkenness when it enacted the Detoxification Act in 1973, and did not modify the disorderly conduct statute. When the Legislature stated that alcoholics and intoxicated persons may not be subjected to criminal prosecution because of their consumption of alcoholic beverages,  it made clear that citizens should not be criminally punished solely for being intoxicated. Section 43-2-3 (emphasis added). Therefore, peaceful public drunkenness could not be criminally punished, either as drunkenness or any other petty misdemeanor, including disorderly conduct. {19} However, the DRA does not purport to prohibit punishment for conduct that is otherwise criminal or otherwise qualifies as disorderly conduct merely because the offender may be intoxicated. While intoxication itself is not criminal, any criminal offenses committed while an accused is intoxicated are still punishable under the Criminal Code. The DRA does not indicate that intoxication can ever be a mitigating factor, an affirmative defense, or a ground for dismissal when a defendant's conduct is also disorderly within the meaning of Section 30-20-1(A). Therefore, we conclude that the DRA does not remove disorderly conduct from criminal prosecution merely because an accused is intoxicated, as long as the statutory elements of the charge are satisfied. An accused's intoxication cannot alone form the basis for the charge; the elements of disorderly conduct must all be proven. Accordingly, because we perceive no conflict between the DRA and the Criminal Code, we proceed to evaluate Defendant's challenge to his conviction for disorderly conduct.