Opinion ID: 212058
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The case-by-case framework

Text: 29 The case-by-case framework was first articulated by the Board in Hobbs v. Office of Personnel Management, 58 M.S.P.R. 628 (1993), and later adopted by this court in Bingaman. Bingaman, 127 F.3d at 1436. This framework relied on articulated factors and an individual employee's actual work experience to determine whether or not a federal employee was a LEO. These factors were to be considered as a whole and weighed by the Board on a case-by-case basis. 30 In Hobbs, the Board relied on the legislative history behind 5 U.S.C. § 8331(20) to establish a series of factors that would help in determining an employee's LEO status. Accordingly, the Board construed the term investigation in § 8331(20) to mean criminal investigation or, specifically, the investigation of suspected or known criminals for the immediate purpose of criminally prosecuting them if warranted. Hobbs, 58 M.S.P.R. at 633. The Board went on to identify hazard and physical stamina requirements as integral to a LEO determination. In deciding the case, the Board relied on six factors to determine that Hobbs's position as a special inspector for the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms was not a law enforcement position for the purposes of § 8331(20). Those factors were: 1) contact with suspected or known criminals; 2) authorization to carry a weapon and requirement to maintain proficiency in using a weapon; 3) giving Miranda warnings to witnesses interviewed in the course of investigation; 4) requirement to be on call twenty four hours a day; 5) working overtime frequently; and 6) requirement to maintain a level of physical fitness. See Hobbs, 58 M.S.P.R. at 633 n. 5. 31 Four years after Hobbs, we adopted the Hobbs factors for ourselves in Bingaman. Bingaman, 127 F.3d at 1436. There, we affirmed the Board's denial of LEO status based on an analysis of the facts performed under the rubric of Hobbs. In Bingaman, we specifically adopted the six Hobbs factors and explained, while the scope of the statutory category of `law enforcement officer' cannot be crisply defined with a single phrase, the set of factors the Board has developed [in Hobbs and afterward] captures the essence of what Congress intended. Id. 32 In December of 2000, we applied the Hobbs-Bingaman factors to a case involving a DI's request for LEO retirement credit. See generally Hannon II, 234 F.3d at 674. In that case, which was similar to this one on the facts and which will be discussed more thoroughly below, we affirmed the Board's determination that a DI who failed to meet four of the six Hobbs-Bingaman factors was not a LEO under § 8331(20). Id. at 677-82. 33 Finally, in Hall, we affirmed the Board's denial of LEO retirement credit to a Canine Enforcement Officer of the Customs Service. Hall described the Hobbs-Bingaman factors as being a set of tools to assist the Board in gauging whether an employee's assigned activities properly fall within the scope of the law enforcement duties recognized by and contained within the statutory ambit of the retirement statutes dealing with LEOs. Hall, 264 F.3d at 1056. Thus, in our view, the factors were not set forth as a substitute for the statute, but rather as a framework for the factual inquiry needed to ascertain coverage under the statutory scheme. Id.