Opinion ID: 786787
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: administrative exhaustion requirement

Text: 11 It is undisputed that Pichardo never appealed the IJ's deportation order to the BIA. Generally, the exhaustion doctrine requires a party to pursue all possible administrative relief within the deciding agency before seeking federal judicial review of an unfavorable decision. This Court considers an alien's waiver of the right to appeal to the BIA as a failure to exhaust administrative remedies for jurisdictional purposes. Beharry v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 51, 56 (2d Cir.2003). The requirement of administrative exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially imposed. The distinction between the two exhaustion requirements can be `pivotal,' because statutory exhaustion requirements are mandatory, while the judicial (common-law) exhaustion doctrine is discretionary and includes a number of exceptions. Id. at 56-57 (internal citations omitted); see also Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 741 n. 6, 121 S.Ct. 1819, 149 L.Ed.2d 958 (2001) (courts will not read futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion requirements where Congress has provided otherwise); McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144, 112 S.Ct. 1081, 117 L.Ed.2d 291 (1992) (judicially imposed exhaustion requirements are prudential and statutory ones are jurisdictional). 12 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1) requires a habeas petitioner to exhaust all available agency remedies before appealing the IJ's decision to federal court. 4 See Theodoropoulos II, 358 F.3d at 169. This provision provides, in pertinent part, that federal courts may review a final order of removal only if... the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right. This Circuit recently held that section 1252(d)(1) is a statutory exhaustion requirement and, accordingly, common law exceptions — including futility — [are] simply not available [.] Id. at 172; see also Duvall v. Elwood, 336 F.3d 228, 234 (3d Cir.2003) (holding that section 1252(d) effects a statutory exhaustion requirement, which accordingly precludes any common law exceptions for procedural default); Sundar v. INS, 328 F.3d 1320, 1323, 1325 (11th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1006, 124 S.Ct. 531, 157 L.Ed.2d 412 (2003). Nonetheless, the court in Theodoropoulos II also recognized an exceedingly narrow exception. It stated that although as a general rule, courts are required to strictly enforce statutory exhaustion requirements[,] there are some limited circumstances in which an exception to the general rule might apply. 358 F.3d at 172-73. We invoke the narrow leeway afforded by Theodoropoulos II and hold that in light of the unusual facts of Pichardo's case, an exception is necessary to prevent manifest injustice. 13 Courts have historically interpreted procedural rules to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (holding that in the case of state procedural default, a federal habeas review of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate [among other things] that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (Federal courts retain the authority to issue the writ [in cases of fundamental miscarriage of justice]); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986) (observing that where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent ... a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural default); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 330, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (finding that even though petitioner did not fully exhaust administrative review procedures, courts could nonetheless entertain claimant's constitutional claims). 14 Prior to Theodoropoulos II, courts of this Circuit have on numerous occasions acknowledged that it could excuse a habeas petitioner's procedural default in an immigration proceeding under extreme circumstances. See, e.g., Dixon v. Miller, 293 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir.) (even if habeas petitioner procedurally defaulted on his claims, there is a limited exception to avoid a fundamental miscarriage of justice) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 955, 123 S.Ct. 426, 154 L.Ed.2d 305 (2002); Theodoropoulos v. INS, 313 F.3d 732, 737 (2d Cir.2002) (A petitioner may avoid even statutorily established administrative exhaustion requirements when ... [the petitioner raises] a substantial constitutional question.). 15 The First and Seventh Circuits have both suggested that, although section 1252(d)(1) effects a statutory exhaustion requirement, failure to exhaust may be excused if the petitioner raises a substantial constitutional claim or where a miscarriage of justice may occur. Singh v. Reno, 182 F.3d 504, 510-11 (7th Cir.1999) (finding that a narrow exception existed to correct bizarre miscarriages of justice); Sousa v. INS, 226 F.3d 28, 32 (1st Cir.2000) (reviewing court could consider extreme cases involving a miscarriage of justice notwithstanding procedural default). 16 Indeed, one Fifth Circuit case has suggested that, notwithstanding the fact that section 1252 mandates exhaustion, a common law futility exception may still be available. Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir.2001) (habeas petitioner's failure to exhaust may be excused where resort to the [BIA] would be futile because the challenge is one that the agency has no power to resolve in the applicant's favor) (quotation marks omitted). The First Circuit also appears to endorse this approach. Sousa, 226 F.3d at 32 (noting in dicta that the exhaustion requirement may be excused where a resort to the agency would be futile because the challenge is one that the agency has no power to resolve in the applicant's favor). 17 Animated by this line of authority, we find it appropriate to employ the narrow exception provided for by Theodoropoulos II. We therefore hold that, notwithstanding a habeas petitioner's failure to exhaust his claims before the BIA, as required by section 1252(d), we nonetheless have jurisdiction to consider the petitioner's claim if it is necessary to avoid manifest injustice. 18 Our inquiry then turns to whether Pichardo's case poses such dire consequences. We find that it does. As a preliminary matter, Pichardo resided in the United States for over twenty-six years with his wife and daughter, and his extended family. He claims to have no ties with the Dominican Republic. Moreover, at the time of Pichardo's removal proceedings based on his New York DUI convictions, he proceeded pro se. At that time, BIA precedent clearly provided that a DUI conviction was a crime of violence. See In re Puente-Salazar, Int. Dec. No. 3412, 1999 WL 770709 (BIA Sept. 29, 1999) (Texas); In re Magallanes-Garcia, Int. Dec. No. 3341, 1998 WL 133301 (BIA Mar. 19, 1998) (Arizona). Indeed, only three months prior to the entry of Pichardo's deportation order, the BIA, construing the same New York DUI statute, held that such a crime constituted a crime of violence, see Dalton, 257 F.3d at 203, and this Court had not yet reviewed the BIA's decision in Dalton. 19 It is also significant that Pichardo's claim refers not to a collateral matter, but to one going to the very basis of his deportation. Moreover, his claim is virtually certain to succeed if considered on appeal. Finally, we find it notable that the government failed to raise the issue of administrative exhaustion below, and raises this defense for the first time on appeal. Curiously, in its opposition to Pichardo's motion for reconsideration, in which Pichardo first raised his Dalton claim, the government did not bring up the fact that Pichardo never appealed to the BIA. 20 In light of these compelling circumstances, we hold that manifest injustice will occur if we fail to consider Pichardo's claims based on his failure to exhaust. Accordingly, we hold that it is appropriate for this court to exercise jurisdiction over Pichardo's claims on appeal. 21