Opinion ID: 6335605
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Acceptance of Responsibility Finding

Text: Major next challenges the district court’s finding that he had not accepted responsibility for his conduct and therefore was not entitled to a reduction in his offense level under the Guidelines. The Guidelines state that a two-level reduction is appropriate if “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). The defendant bears the burden of proving his acceptance of responsibility by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Lister, 432 F.3d 754, 759 (7th Cir. 2005). “We review the district court’s decision on this fact-based finding for clear error.” Id. In doing so, we accord “[g]reat deference” to the sentencing court, which is better equipped to “assess whether a particular defendant is motivated by genuine acceptance of responsibility or by a self-serving desire to minimize his own punishment.” United States v. Cunningham, 103 F.3d 596, 598 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). No. 20-2829 19 When making this finding, “the sentencing judge is re- quired to look beyond formalistic expressions of culpability and to determine whether the defendant has manifested an acceptance of personal responsibility for his offense in a moral sense.” Id. (citation omitted). For this reason, simply pleading guilty does not entitle a defendant to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. United States v. Sellers, 595 F.3d 791, 793 (7th Cir. 2010). “A defendant who falsely denies, or frivolously contests, relevant conduct that the court determines to be true” generally will not qualify for the reduction. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 1(A). “Attempt[ing] to minimize [one’s] level of involvement in an offense” is sufficient to deny a reduction for acceptance of responsibility, even when the defendant has pleaded guilty. United States v. Munoz, 610 F.3d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 2010). Once again, plenty of evidence supported the district court’s factual finding. First, “[c]onduct resulting in an [obstruction-of-justice] enhancement … ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. 4. It is only in “extraordinary cases” that a defendant may receive an enhancement for obstruction of justice and also receive a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Id. It was not clearly erroneous for the district court to conclude that this was not such an extraordinary case. Moreover, Major objected to the presentence report’s conclusion that he sold the drugs that led to A.K.’s death, which was a fact the court found to be both true and relevant. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3 (defining “relevant conduct” for sentencing purposes to include “harm that resulted from” acts that were “part of the same course of conduct … as the offense of 20 No. 20-2829 conviction”). On appeal, Major argues that his counsel—not Major—contested whether heroin and fentanyl he sold contributed to A.K.’s death. In support, he cites United States v. Purchess, in which we held that “where the defendant remains … silent as to relevant conduct but his lawyer challenges certain facts alleged in the PSR,” then the district court “should attempt to ensure that the defendant understands and approves the argument before attributing the factual challenges in the argument to the defendant for purposes of assessing acceptance of responsibility.” 107 F.3d 1261, 1268 (7th Cir. 1997); see also Munoz, 610 F.3d at 994 (distinguishing between factual challenges, which will jeopardize an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction, and legal arguments regarding undisputed facts, which will not). But Purchess is not relevant here, because Major personally disputed whether his drugs caused A.K.’s death in his allocution at sentencing. For example, Major told A.K.’s mother, “I’m not even sure who’s at fault [for A.K.’s death], but I understand that me, being a heroin dealer, that you would look at me as being at fault here.” When the district court asked directly whether Major was admitting to selling Bukowski the heroin and fentanyl that she resold to A.K., Major responded, “Sir, by what’s being said here today, I really don’t know because, you know, I, I—first, I really didn’t believe that I didn’t [sic] sell them bags to [Bukowski] because I know what took place that particular day…. I’m just saying I don’t know, and I don’t believe the State [sic] proved to know it either. But it’s a possibility that she did get them from me.” It is clear from this exchange that Major himself contested this factual finding. No. 20-2829 21 This, combined with the obstruction of justice finding, was more than sufficient for the court to conclude that Major had not accepted responsibility for his conduct. But any lingering doubt is erased by other statements Major made during his allocution. For instance, Major attempted to minimize his conduct, telling the district court, “I never meant to sell nobody no fentanyl. I can’t believe that I’m honestly facing this much time when all I actually did was sell [Bukowski] two dime, three dime bags of dope for $50. That’s what my conspiracy really consists of. Your Honor, I sold a friend a bag of dope for $50 on two different occasions.” He also doubled down on his claim that he did not know that the heroin he sold contained fentanyl—despite his admissions to the contrary in text messages (referring to “that fintnal”) and under oath at his change-of-plea hearing. When directly asked by the district court at sentencing, “So, you had no idea fentanyl was in them?” Major replied, “I mean, no, I didn’t.” Immediately after this exchange, the district court concluded, “I’m glad you made a statement, Mr. Major, because it confirms for me that I made the right decision on acceptance of responsibility….” Ample evidence supported the district court’s conclusion that Major had not accepted responsibility for his conduct by the time he was sentenced; this finding was not clearly erroneous. B. The Substantive Reasonableness of Major’s Sentence Finally, Major argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because—even though he technically qualifies as a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines—that label overstates his criminal history. In essence, Major argues that the district court abused its discretion when it did not ignore the career offender enhancement when it sentenced him. 22 No. 20-2829 A defendant is classified as a career offender if:
at the time the defendant committed the instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a felony that is either a crime of vi- olence or a controlled substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony con- victions of either a crime of violence or a con- trolled substance offense. U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a). Such a designation sets the defendant’s criminal history category to Category VI, and when the offense of conviction’s statutory maximum sentence is between twenty and twenty-five years (as is the case for Major), the designation sets the offense level to 32. See id. § 4B1.1(b)(3). For Major, this resulted in a Guidelines range of 210–262 months’ imprisonment, which was adjusted to 210–240 due to the statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment for his convictions. 3 The district court sentenced Major to 240 months’ incarceration. As we have noted, Major was convicted of two prior offenses that qualify him for the career offender designation: a previous felony drug conviction and a conviction for aggravated kidnapping. Major does not challenge these facts. But, he complains, he was convicted of aggravated kidnapping in 1993, over twenty-five years prior to his sentencing in this case. He also argues that the nature of that crime is unrelated 3Without the career offender designation, Major’s offense level would have been 28, his criminal history would have been Category III, and his Guidelines range would have been 97–121 months’ imprisonment. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A. No. 20-2829 23 to the instant conviction and that the aggravated kidnapping conviction has “no bearing” on his propensity to commit other offenses similar to the drug distribution charges at issue in this case. For support, Major points to a Sentencing Guidelines policy statement, which says that “[i]f reliable information indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially over-represents the seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the defendant will commit other crimes, a downward departure may be warranted.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1). Although the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), rendered the departure provisions “obsolete,” “district courts can still take guidance from the departure provisions” and consider them “when assessing the § 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Bell, 887 F.3d 795, 798 (7th Cir. 2018) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Notwithstanding Major’s arguments, the district court handed down a sentence squarely within the concededly applicable career-offender Guidelines range. Such sentences are presumed to be reasonable on appeal. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007). Moreover, in “reviewing sentences for substantive reasonableness, we do not substitute our judgment for that of a district judge, who is better situated to make individualized sentencing decisions.” United States v. Porraz, 943 F.3d 1099, 1104 (7th Cir. 2019). In fact, we will “uphold a sentence so long as the judge offers an adequate statement of his reasons consistent with the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Id. Here, the district court did just that. It thoroughly explained the reasons for its sentence, citing in particular the 24 No. 20-2829 following facts: Major’s prior conviction for aggravated kidnapping, his previous drug distribution conviction, the fact that he “went right back to dealing drugs” after serving a fourteen-year sentence for his drug conviction, his decision to deal in the particularly dangerous combination of heroin laced with fentanyl, his leadership role in the conspiracy, the need to protect others from him, his attempt to obstruct justice, his minimization of his own wrongdoing, and his role in the unfortunate death of A.K. Given these facts, the court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing Major as a career offender and imposing a Guidelines sentence of 240 months in prison.