Opinion ID: 1172635
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Cakewalk

Text: (39) Defendant contends that his federal and state constitutional rights were violated by admission of evidence respecting his participation in an unadjudicated shooting at a July 19, 1980, church carnival (the Cakewalk). Defendant and another Bloods gang member shot into the crowd attending the Cakewalk, which included members of a Crips gang. Several people were injured and four people (Karry Island, Mary Nixon, Barbara Nixon and Deontray Turner), including a minister of the church (Barbara Nixon), testified they recognized defendant when the red bandanna he was wearing slipped from his face. Initially, charges respecting the Cakewalk incident were filed against defendant, but they were dismissed and never refiled. Defendant contends admission of the evidence was erroneous in several respects. First, defendant argues, presentation of an unadjudicated felony charge as to which the statute of limitations had expired denied him due process and a fair penalty trial and resulted in a death sentence based on unconstitutionally unreliable evidence. As defendant concedes, however, we consistently have rejected the contention that a defendant's statutory or constitutional rights are violated by the consideration, as a factor in aggravation of penalty, of evidence of unadjudicated criminal activity for which prosecution would be time-barred. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1244 [14 Cal. Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1]; People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1152 [282 Cal. Rptr. 465, 811 P.2d 757].) We have long recognized that, as `[section 190.3, factor] (b) imposes no time limitation on the introduction of violent crimes; the jury presumably may consider criminal violence which has occurred at any time in the defendant's life.' ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 529 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640], quoting People v. Balderas (1985) 41 Cal.3d 144, 202 [222 Cal. Rptr. 184, 711 P.2d 480], original italics.) Defendant asks us to reconsider our holding that the Eighth Amendment's aim of assuring the reliability of penalty determinations is furthered, not frustrated, by the admission of ... prior violent criminal activity. ( People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1244.) Defendant somewhat opaquely argues that our reasoning in Johnson was circular. Having considered defendant's arguments and reviewed Johnson `s reasoning and rationales, we are not persuaded we should revisit that decision in this case. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention of error in admission of evidence concerning the Cakewalk incident, even though the statute of limitations had, at the time of trial, expired as to crimes with which defendant was originally charged in connection with that incident. (40) Second, defendant argues, his rights under the state and federal Constitutions were violated because he received inadequate notice that the prosecution would introduce evidence respecting the Cakewalk. We have reviewed the record and conclude defendant received adequate notice. As defendant acknowledges, the prosecution sent a letter to defense counsel dated November 21, 1983, which gave notice that evidence respecting the Cakewalk incident was going to be used in aggravation at the penalty phase. The prosecution's letter specifically stated that [t]he evidence includes, but is not limited to, five counts of murder and assault with intent to commit murder, which was the subject of Case No. A449580, dismissed 8-4-80 after witnesses failed to appear.... On December 3, 1983, in response to the prosecution's notice letter, defense counsel requested (and later received) certain discovery, including the arrest report on the Cakewalk incident. Before defendant's trial commenced, on March 10, 1985, the prosecution sent another notice letter to trial defense counsel. The second letter listed the specific Cakewalk-related counts and enhancements the prosecution intended to present in aggravation. Before the commencement of the penalty phase, defense counsel moved to exclude the prosecution's Cakewalk-related evidence on the ground the arrest report of the Cakewalk incident did not establish substantial evidence of defendant's involvement so as to render the Cakewalk-related evidence relevant and admissible against him. The trial court denied defendant's motion, finding the Cakewalk evidence admissible. Finally, the trial court gave defense counsel a continuance in order to conduct any interviews of Cakewalk witnesses to be presented by the prosecution; defense counsel interviewed three witnesses (Karry Island, Mary Nixon, and Michael Hardwick). The prosecution presented testimony of Karry Island, Mary Nixon, Michael Hardwick, Thelma Turner, Barbara Nixon and Deontray Turner. In light of the foregoing, it is apparent defendant received adequate notice the prosecution intended to introduce evidence respecting his participation in the Cakewalk incident as a factor in aggravation of penalty. Defendant correctly observes section 190.3 provides no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. (Italics added.) Defendant argues that, because the notice his counsel received (i.e., the previously described letters and discovery) did not specify which of the individuals mentioned in the Cakewalk police report would be called to testify, what their testimony would be, or what physical evidence would be introduced in conjunction with their testimony, the notice provided was statutorily inadequate. We previously have rejected the identical contention. (See People v. Grant (1988) 45 Cal.3d 829, 852-854 [248 Cal. Rptr. 444, 755 P.2d 894].) In Grant, defendant contended the prosecution's notice was insufficient under section 190.3 because, while the notice advised defendant of the particular prior offenses the prosecution planned to prove at the penalty trial ( People v. Grant, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 853), it did not state which specific testimony, writings, material objects, or other things (Evid. Code, § 140) would be offered. We ruled: The point is unpersuasive. A challenge to the sufficiency of a notice of aggravating evidence ... cannot be resolved by a mechanical application of a general definition of the word `evidence.' ( People v. Grant, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 853.) In Grant, the notice given to defendant ... advised him of the date, place, and charge of certain prior charges and the date, place, nature, and victim of certain additional criminal acts that the prosecution intended to prove he had committed. In these circumstances, the notice was adequate to fulfill the statutory purpose.... ( People v. Grant, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 853-854.) Similarly, here there was no error. (41) Third, defendant argues, the trial court denied him due process in refusing to conduct a lineup to test several eyewitnesses' identification of him as a shooter in the Cakewalk incident. Defendant relies on Evans v. Superior Court (1974) 11 Cal.3d 617 [114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 522 P.2d 681] ( Evans ). In Evans, we held that due process requires in an appropriate case that an accused, upon timely request therefor, be afforded a pretrial lineup in which witnesses to the alleged criminal conduct can participate. ( Id. at p. 625.) We explained, however, that the right to a lineup arises only when eyewitness identification is shown to be a material issue and there exists a reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification which a lineup would tend to resolve. ( Ibid. ) Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for a lineup because the in-court eyewitness identification testimony actually elicited at the penalty phase of his trial was unreliable. Specifically, defendant complains that: (1) approximately five years had elapsed between the Cakewalk incident and the eyewitness testimony to it at the penalty phase of his trial; (2) the eyewitnesses who testified against him had strong motivation to lie, because they were either rival gang members or family members of rival gang members; and (3) the eyewitnesses each testified that, prior to their testimony, they had known or encountered defendant at times and places other than the Cakewalk incident. There was, here, no reasonable likelihood of a mistaken identification such as was discussed in Evans. (See Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 625.) In Evans, [i]t was argued in support of the motion [for a lineup] that because [the defendant] was identified at the scene of the robbery by witnesses ... who saw only a limited view of [the defendant]'s head and shoulders from the rear, the identification was faulty; [and] that because the witnesses had committed themselves as to the identifications [at the preliminary hearing] they would be reluctant to recede from such a position, even if in error, at later proceedings in court.... ( Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 621.) Neither argument was  or could have been  made in support of defendant's motion. The witnesses who identified defendant as a participant in the Cakewalk incident testified to seeing his face. Moreover, as defendant himself emphasizes, their testimony identifying him at trial was the first these witnesses had given respecting the Cakewalk incident. Defense counsel, in addition to having the opportunity to cross-examine the prosecution's Cakewalk eyewitnesses, was given, just prior to their testimony, a continuance to interview them. Counsel did not request any further continuance. As we have previously noted, [i]nsofar as defendant contends that an in-court identification not preceded by a lineup is impermissibly suggestive and prejudicial as a matter of law, he is wrong. ( People v. Rodrigues, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 1155.) We emphasized in Evans that the resolution [of a lineup request] must be arrived at after consideration not only of the benefits to be derived by the accused and the reasonableness of his request but also after considering the burden to be imposed on the prosecution, the police, the court and the witnesses. ( Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 625.) Before ruling, the judge at defendant's penalty phase heard argument at some length from defense counsel as well as the prosecution on the relative benefits and burdens of conducting a lineup. Even defense counsel conceded a lineup might not accomplish much, your honor, though he did think it would accomplish something. We noted in Evans that [t]he questions whether eyewitness identification is a material issue and whether fundamental fairness requires a lineup in a particular case are inquiries which necessarily rest for determination within the broad discretion of the magistrate or trial judge. ( Evans, supra, 11 Cal.3d at p. 625.) In light of the attendant circumstances, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's having denied defendant's motion for a lineup. Fourth, defendant argues, he was denied due process of law because the allegation that he was involved in the Cakewalk incident was adjudicated by the same jury that had previously convicted him of murder. As defendant acknowledges, we repeatedly have rejected the claim that due process rights are infringed when the same jury that convicted a capital defendant subsequently determines the truth or falsity of previously unadjudicated aggravating charges. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 1244; People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 204-205.) Defendant requests we reconsider our original holding in Balderas to that effect, but we quite recently declined to do so. (See People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 427 [53 Cal. Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000].) Defendant suggests no basis for our concluding differently in this case. (42) Finally, defendant argues, the trial court committed prejudicial error by admitting one Willie Smith's medical records to show that Smith was injured in the Cakewalk shooting. Karry Island testified that Smith was present at the Cakewalk carnival during the shooting. Island also testified that Smith grabbed Michael Hardwick when Hardwick was shot by defendant and, because Hardwick was unable to run from the shooting, dragged him into the back of a nearby truck for safety. Smith was not able to appear because he was in state prison at the time of defendant's trial. The trial court admitted Smith's medical records into evidence. Defendant concedes that evidence defendant shot Smith at the Cakewalk would be relevant as a factor in aggravation of penalty. The record contains evidence that defendant discharged a shotgun several times at this crowded neighborhood carnival. (There was also testimony that another individual discharged a shotgun.) Several people were wounded by shotgun pellets. As discussed, there was evidence that Willie Smith was present at the Cakewalk and that he assisted another shooting victim to safety. Plainly, medical records indicating Smith sustained gunshot wounds on the date of a shooting at which he was present and at which several other individuals also present in the crowd were injured, have a tendency in reason to prove or disprove (Evid. Code, § 210) that Smith sustained his wounds there and then. Even assuming, however, that the inference defendant shot Smith at the Cakewalk was so tenuous that Smith's medical records should have been excluded on relevancy grounds, defendant has not shown prejudice. Record evidence shows that a number of children were in the area into which defendant shot, and that at least one child was hit by a shotgun pellet. There was testimony that Karry Island, Stacey Jones and Michael Hardwick all were wounded. Hardwick sustained injuries in the chest, stomach and arm. Shotgun pellets were still lodged in Hardwick's arm at the time of trial. We agree with the People that, under these circumstances, evidence that Smith also was shot at the Cakewalk can hardly be considered prejudicial, even if it was improperly admitted. In sum, we cannot conclude that admission at the penalty phase of evidence respecting the Cakewalk incident was, in any of the particulars of which defendant complains, prejudicially erroneous.