Opinion ID: 1085121
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Retirement Pay

Text: A member of a military reserve component is entitled, upon application, to retired pay if he: (1) has attained the applicable eligibility age; (2) has performed at least 20 years of service; and (3) is not entitled, under any other provision of law, to retired pay from an armed force. See 10 U.S.C. § 12731(a). Here, the applicable eligibility age is 60 years. Id. § 12731(f)(1). In the proceedings below, the Government did not dispute that Shelkofsky meets all of these criteria. Shelkofsky, 110 Fed. Cl. at 17. Nonetheless, the Claims Court found that, “[w]hile Mr. Shelkofsky appears to meet the statutory requirements for retirement pay eligibility, he waived his right to age-based retirement pay when he was separated from the Air Force in 2000.” Id. at 18. Therefore, while the Claims Court 6 SHELKOFSKY v. US noted that this case had been “infected by an odd series of government errors,” it concluded that the AFBCMR’s decision not to award retirement pay was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. Id. We agree. In an August 2008 memorandum, the AFBCMR granted Shelkofsky’s request to correct his military records to place him on the inactive status list reserve section. Shortly thereafter, DFAS informed Shelkofsky that this correction could not be accomplished because he was already retired on the PDRL and would need to return seven years of disability retirement pay. A60-61. In response, he asked to withdraw his previous request to correct his military records. A59. In a Corrected Directive, the AFBCMR then declared the previous memorandum void. A64. After the memorandum was declared void, DFAS notified Shelkofsky that he was also going to be removed from the PDRL as he never qualified for the PDRL. A65. Shelkofsky, again, approached the AFBCMR, this time asking it to reinstate his previous request to place him on the inactive status list reserve section. In a March 15, 2011 decision, the AFBCMR found that: After a thorough review of the available evidence, we are not persuaded any corrective action is war- ranted. In this respect, we note that on 30 Jul 00, the applicant’s name was removed from the TDRL and he was discharged by reason of physical disa- bility, with entitlement to severance pay. At that time, he had the option to transfer to [the inactive status list] and instead elected to be discharged with severance pay, acknowledging that he under- stood that he would forfeit all rights to receive retired pay at age 60, under the governing statute. A73. The AFBCMR also found the previous decision to void the memorandum “final and conclusive on all officers SHELKOFSKY v. US 7 of the government, unless obtained by fraud.” Id. And, the AFBCMR noted no showing of fraud. Id. Electing severance pay in lieu of retirement pay waives any right to military retirement. Barnick v. United States, 80 Fed. Cl. 545, 557 n.10 (2008) (“When Mr. Barnick made his election to accept severance pay, in lieu of retirement pay, he waived any right to a military retirement.”). Here, Shelkofsky has forfeited his right to age-based retirement pay, not once, but twice. He first forfeited his right when he elected severance pay and signed a form that stated “I elect to be discharged with severance pay as provided under Section 1203, Chapter 61, Title 10 USC. I understand that I forfeit all right to receive retired pay under Chapter 1223, 10 USC, at age 60.” When Shelkofsky requested AFBCMR to void the memorandum correcting his records by moving him to the inactive status list reserve section, he again forfeited his right to age-based retirement pay. The AFBCMR’s decision to void the memorandum also became final and conclusive. Based on this reasoning, we find the AFBCMR’s decision denying retirement pay was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law.