Opinion ID: 1041239
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Which Claims Survive?

Text: Despite the court’s error in denying the requested continuance, we will not reverse and remand with respect to those claims for which additional discovery would be fruitless.13
A plaintiff alleging workplace discrimination must exhaust his administrative remedies before he may sue under the ADEA, Title VII, or the TCHRA.14 We will “not condone lawsuits that exceed the scope of EEOC exhaustion, because doing so would thwart the administrative process and peremptorily substitute litigation for conciliation.”15 Instead, we “construe an EEOC complaint broadly but in terms of the administrative EEOC investigation that ‘can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimination.’”16 Castro’s EEOC claims in this case did not in any way signal that he might have been a victim of race or sex discrimination. Although the form contained boxes to check for discrimination based on “race,” “color,” “sex,” “religion,” 12 Culwell, 468 F.3d at 872. 13 See id. at 874. 14 See Jefferson v. Christus St. Joseph Hosp., 374 F. App’x 485, 489 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Foster v. Nat'l Bank of Bossier City, 857 F.2d 1058, 1060 (5th Cir. 1988)) (ADEA); McClain v. Lufkin Indus., 519 F.3d 264, 273 (5th Cir. 2008) (Title VII); Schroeder v. Tex. Iron Works, Inc., 813 S.W.2d 483, 485-86 (Tex. 1991) (TCHRA). 15 McClain, 519 F.3d at 273. 16 Id. (quoting Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970)). 7 Case: 12-20584 Document: 00512377950 Page: 8 Date Filed: 09/18/2013 No. 12-20584 “national origin,” retaliation,” “age,” “disability,” genetic information,” and “other,” Castro checked only the retaliation and age boxes. In the form’s section asking for the “particulars” of his claim, he explained only the basis for his age discrimination charge, making reference to neither his race or sex, nor to incidents of discrimination based on those characteristics. He concluded: “I believe that I have been discriminated against because of my age, and retaliated against, in violation of the [ADEA].” We cannot see how an investigation into race or sex discrimination “[could] be expected to grow out of” this charge.17 Castro sheds no light, only declaring that his race and sex discrimination claims are “inextricably entwined” with his age discrimination claim because TDCJ replaced him with a younger, black female. But he did not even allege the race and sex of his replacement in his administrative charge or provide any other evidence of discrimination based on these characteristics. Our case law requires more from a plaintiff than Castro provided. As Castro never even presented claims based on race or sex to the EEOC, he could not have exhausted them.18
By contrast, Castro properly exhausted his state and federal age discrimination claims, and, having alleged facts that raise the specter of age discrimination, he should have been granted some discovery to defend against TDCJ’s motion. In its order and reasons granting summary judgment, the district court either ignored Castro’s state law age discrimination claim entirely or implicitly addressed it alongside his ADEA claim. The court did not, however, 17 Id. 18 See Jefferson, 374 F. App’x at 490 (concluding that plaintiffs who neither checked boxes nor included facts on their EEOC charges to identify discrimination based on certain characteristics had failed to exhaust those claims). 8 Case: 12-20584 Document: 00512377950 Page: 9 Date Filed: 09/18/2013 No. 12-20584 address TDCJ’s specific contention that Texas’s procedure for election of remedies precluded Castro from advancing both state and federal theories in the same action. The Texas Labor Code’s ‘Election of Remedies” provision states: “A person who has initiated an action in a court of competent jurisdiction . . . based on an act that would be an unlawful employment practice under this chapter may not file a complaint under this subchapter for the same grievance.”19 The section “limits the ability to pursue multiple grievances in multiple forums over the same alleged conduct.”20 Thus, “[i]n the realm of employment discrimination litigation—where federal, state, and local governments individually declare their opposition to unlawful discrimination—Section 21.211 merely means a plaintiff cannot file an administrative complaint [under the TCHRA] after having already (1) filed a lawsuit under a federal or local anti-discrimination measure covering the same conduct or (2) begun administrative proceedings with the EEOC or local enforcement entities based on the same conduct.”21 But, as the TCHRA is not “the exclusive word on work-related discrimination and retaliation in Texas,”22 “claimants are free to seek relief under parallel federal or local laws,”23 and Section 21.211 “does not preclude a plaintiff from arguing in the alternative” as permitted by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.24 TDCJ’s interpretation of the exclusive remedies provision has no merit. We reverse and remand for the 19 TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.211. 20 City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 155 (Tex. 2008). 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Sauceda v. Bank of Tex., N.A., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3769,  (N.D. Tex. March 9, 2005). 9 Case: 12-20584 Document: 00512377950 Page: 10 Date Filed: 09/18/2013 No. 12-20584 district court to allow Castro to conduct discovery relevant to both his state and federal claims of age discrimination.