Opinion ID: 786677
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Conditions of Crawford's Parole

Text: 196 At the time of the search and detention, Crawford was on parole from California state prison. When he was released from prison, he signed what is sometimes called a Fourth Waiver form, which imposed certain conditions during his parole. I am willing to assume for purposes of this case that these conditions of parole are valid. However, none of these conditions authorized a suspicionless search whose sole purpose was the investigation of a pre-parole crime.
197 Judge Trott contends in his separate opinion that the parties in this case have misunderstood the legal status of a Fourth Waiver form. As I understand his argument, Judge Trott contends that at all relevant times California had the authority under state law to enter into an agreement with a would-be probationer, but did not have such authority with a would-be parolee. According to Judge Trott, the State unilaterally imposes conditions of parole, in contrast to conditions of probation, which are established by agreement between the State and the would-be probationer. 198 Judge Trott relies on the decision of the California Supreme Court in People v. Reyes, 19 Cal.4th 743, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d 445 (1998). In explaining why consent by a would-be parolee cannot be used to validate an otherwise illegal search, the court wrote, in language quoted by Judge Trott: 199 The consent exception to the warrant requirement may not be invoked to validate the search of an adult parolee because, under the Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, parole is not a matter of choice. The Board of Prison Terms must provide a period of parole; the prisoner must accept it. (Pen.Code § 3000 et seq.) Without choice, there can be no voluntary consent to inclusion of the search condition. 200 Id. at 448 (citation omitted) (italics indicate sentence not quoted in Judge Trott's opinion). Under this reasoning, the State has no authority to bargain with the would-be parolee, and therefore lacks the authority to threaten to withhold parole unless the parolee agrees to waive some or all of his Fourth Amendment rights. Judge Trott thus argues that what the parties in this case call a Fourth Waiver form is not an agreement under which the parolee agrees to waive his Fourth Amendment rights in order to gain parole. Rather, the Fourth Waiver form is a notification to the parolee of conditions unilaterally imposed upon him by the State. 201 Judge Trott understands California law somewhat differently from the Deputy Attorney General representing the State as amicus, and from the Assistant United States Attorney. During oral argument to our en banc court, both attorneys represented that the conditions of parole at issue in this case were at all relevant times a matter of agreement between the State and the parolee. Both attorneys told us that if California state prisoners choose not to waive their Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of being granted parole, those prisoners do not get parole and stay in prison. The Deputy Attorney General, in particular, represented that California law has changed since the California Supreme Court's decision in Reyes. The State's brief maintains that between March 1, 2001 and October 1, 2003, sixty-seven inmates refused to sign new conditions of parole and were returned to prison. 202 In some circumstances, it might matter whether conditions of parole are unilaterally imposed by the State, as contended by Judge Trott, or are imposed pursuant to an agreement between the State and the parolee, as contended by the Deputy Attorney General and the Assistant United States Attorney. In this case, however, it does not matter. For the purposes of this case, I assume that the conditions contained in the Fourth Waiver form signed by Crawford are valid. They may be valid because, as Judge Trott contends, the State had the power unilaterally to impose them. Or they may be valid because Crawford agreed to them as a condition of gaining parole. Or, indeed, they may be invalid. But it makes no difference in this case, for in no event do the conditions of parole in the Fourth Waiver form authorize a suspicionless search of Crawford's residence to investigate a pre-parole crime.
203 Crawford signed the Fourth Waiver form in 2000, just before he was released from prison. There are several possible readings of the parole conditions contained in the form, but under none of these readings did these conditions authorize the suspicionless search conducted by Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers. To understand the conditions, it is helpful first to sketch out the legal background against which they were written. 204
205 For many years, the California Supreme Court has upheld conditions allowing suspicionless probation and parole searches. See, e.g., People v. Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, 1028 (1999) (probation); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 448 (parole); People v. Bravo, 43 Cal.3d 600, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d 336, 342-43 (1987) (probation). The court has indicated that these conditions have two purposes: first, to ensure compliance with the law while on probation or parole; and, second, to ensure compliance with the terms of probation or parole. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1027. Probation and parole searches must be reasonably related to these two purposes. See People v. Robles, 23 Cal.4th 789, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 914, 3 P.3d 311, 316 (2000) (As our decisions indicate, searches that are undertaken pursuant to a probationer's advance consent must be reasonably related to the purposes of probation.). 206 The California Supreme Court has described the purpose of ensuring compliance with the law only in terms of a probationer's or parolee's current compliance, not pre-probation or pre-parole compliance. For example, in Woods, the California Supreme Court stated, [T]he dual purpose of a search condition [is] to deter further offenses by the probationer and to ascertain compliance with the terms of the probation. 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1024 (emphasis added); see also Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 450 (`[T]he purpose of an unexpected, unprovoked search of a defendant is to ascertain whether [the parolee] is complying with the terms of [parole]; to determine not only whether he disobeys the law, but also whether he obeys the law. ') (quoting People v. Mason, 5 Cal.3d 759, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d 630, 632 (1971)) (emphasis added); Bravo, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d at 342 (also quoting Mason, 97 Cal.Rptr. 302, 488 P.2d at 632). The California Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld suspicionless parole searches for evidence of current crimes. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1028 (suspicionless search for evidence of current crime); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 447 (suspicionless search for evidence of current drug use); Bravo, 238 Cal.Rptr. 282, 738 P.2d at 343(search for evidence of current drug sales). But I am unaware of any case in which the California Supreme Court has upheld either a suspicionless search for evidence of a pre-parole crime, or a suspicionless search whose sole purpose is to investigate a pre-parole crime. 207 In 2000, when Crawford signed his conditions of parole, the case law of our circuit was even stricter than that of the California Supreme Court. In a long line of cases, we had repeatedly held that probation and parole searches could dispense with the ordinary requirements of a warrant and probable cause only when the search was not a subterfuge for investigation into past or current crimes. See, e.g., United States v. Ooley, 116 F.3d 370, 372 (9th Cir.1997) ([W]e have long recognized that the legality of a warrantless search depends on a showing that the search was a true probation search and not an investigation search.); United States v. Vought, 69 F.3d 1498, 1501 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 794 (9th Cir.1995), rev'd on other grounds, 519 U.S. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554 (1997); United States v. Harper, 928 F.2d 894, 897 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 811, 815 (9th Cir.1991); United States v. Richardson, 849 F.2d 439, 441 (9th Cir.1988); United States v. Jarrad, 754 F.2d 1451, 1454 (9th Cir.1985); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir.1975) (en banc); Smith v. Rhay, 419 F.2d 160, 162-63 (9th Cir.1969). Probable cause and a warrant were required for ordinary law enforcement investigations of probationers and parolees — of both past and present crimes — where the Fourth Amendment would otherwise so require. 208 A year after Crawford signed his Fourth Waiver form, the Supreme Court partially overruled this line of cases in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). Relying on the California Supreme Court's decision in Woods, 21 Cal.4th 668, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d 1019, the Court upheld an investigatory probation search, based on a California probation condition, where officers had reasonable suspicion that evidence of a current crime would be found. The Court repeated the dual justifications given by the California Supreme Court for probation searches: It was reasonable to conclude that the [California probation] search condition would further the two primary goals of probation — rehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal violations. 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (emphasis added); see also id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587 (When an officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, ... an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy is reasonable.) (emphasis added). 209 The Court in Knights addressed only the level of suspicion, or cause, required for probation searches for evidence of current crimes. It did not address the level of suspicion required to justify searches for evidence of past crimes. But for purposes of understanding Crawford's Fourth Waiver form, the question is not what Knights means or might mean. The question, rather, is what California officials understood to be the law when they presented the Fourth Waiver form to Crawford a year before Knights was decided, and what Crawford might reasonably have understood to be the meaning of that form when he signed it. 210
211 The Fourth Waiver form signed by Crawford contained two clauses: 212 You [Crawford] and your residence and any property under your control may be searched without a warrant by an agent of the Department of Corrections or any law enforcement officer. Parolee's Initials You agree to search or seizure by a parole officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and with or without cause. Parolee's Initials 213 Clause 1 specifies that you and your residence and any property under your control may be searched; authorizes searches by law enforcement officers and agents of the Department of Corrections; and authorizes searches without a warrant. By contrast, Clause 2 specifies only that you (Crawford) agree to be searched; authorizes searches by parole officers and other peace officers; and authorizes searches and seizures both with or without a search warrant, and with or without cause. 214 Three different readings of the two clauses are possible. The first two readings understand the clauses as part of an integrated whole in which each clause has a distinct meaning. The third reading understands the clauses as having synonymous meanings. Under none of these readings does the Fourth Waiver form authorize a suspicionless search of Crawford's residence to investigate a pre-parole crime. 215 The first reading focuses on the fact that Clause 1 is narrow and relatively protective. Clause 1 specifies that it applies to searches of Crawford, his residence, and property under his control; and it dispenses only with a requirement for a warrant. By contrast, Clause 2 is general and relatively non-protective. It does not specify any particular kind of search, and it dispenses with both a warrant and a cause requirement. The reference in Clause 1 to a search of a residence suggests that a residential search is authorized under Clause 1, but not under Clause 2. Further, the absence of a statement in Clause 1 that a search may be conducted with or without cause suggests that a search under Clause 1 requires cause, unlike Clause 2. Under this reading, Agent Bowdich's search was not authorized under either clause because Clause 1 does not authorize suspicionless searches at all, and Clause 2 does not authorize suspicionless searches of residences. 216 The second reading focuses on the nature of a parole search under California law. Clause 2 clearly authorizes a conventional suspicionless parole search as described and authorized under California case law. See, e.g., Bravo, 738 P.2d 336. It allows searches at any time with or without a search warrant and with or without cause, and it specifically refers to searches by a parole officer. If Clause 1 is to have some independent meaning, it must refer to other kinds of searches. Searches to investigate pre-parole crimes, not specifically authorized by California case law, would be among these other searches. Under this reading, Agent Bowdich's search was not authorized under either clause because Clause 1 does not allow suspicionless searches at all, and because Clause 2 does not authorize suspicionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes. 217 The third reading abandons the attempt to read the Fourth Waiver form as an integrated whole in which Clauses 1 and 2 have independent meanings. As seen above, Clause 2 authorizes a standard suspicionless parole search under California case law. Clause 1 may be read, redundantly, to authorize exactly the same type of search. In several cases, the California Supreme Court has interpreted a parole condition worded precisely as Clause 1 is worded to authorize a suspicionless parole search. See, e.g., People v. Sanders, 31 Cal.4th 318, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 630, 73 P.3d 496, 499 (2003); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 446. In these cases, the court has interpreted the phrase without a warrant to mean not only without a warrant but also without cause. However, the court in these cases did not discuss any other parole conditions that might also have been present. I therefore do not know whether the court would interpret the phrase without a warrant to dispense with a requirement for cause if there had been an additional parole condition, comparable to Clause 2, dispensing with both warrant and cause. 218 But even if I read Clause 1 to dispense with a requirement for cause, I should not read the clause more broadly than the California Supreme Court has read it. The California Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the purposes of parole and probation searches are to ensure current compliance with law and with probation and parole terms. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1027. Given this case law, I would require a very clear statement in the Fourth Waiver form that it authorizes a suspicionless search to investigate pre-parole crimes. There is no such clarity in the form Crawford signed. Thus, under any reading consistent with California law, Agent Bowdich's search was not authorized under either Clause 1 or Clause 2, because neither clause authorizes suspicionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes. 219 During oral argument, the Deputy Attorney General told us that the Fourth Waiver form signed by Crawford is no longer used for California parolees. That fact may lessen the long-term importance of this case, but it does not change the parole conditions of which Crawford was given notice. Under any of the possible readings of the Fourth Waiver form, the form does not authorize a suspicionless search of Crawford's residence to investigate a pre-parole crime. The question posed in this case is thus whether the suspicionless search of Crawford's residence was valid in the absence of an explicit parole condition authorizing such a search. 220 B. A Parolee's Expectation of Privacy in the Absence of a Controlling Condition of Parole 221 We know that a parolee has a reduced expectation of privacy, and that a State may condition parole on compliance with often strict terms and conditions of ... release. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998). This expectation of privacy may be reduced but not entirely eliminated. See Knights, 534 U.S. at 120-21, 122 S.Ct. 587(balancing privacy interest of probationer). Pursuant to the special needs doctrine, a State may require, as an explicitly stated condition of probation, that a probationer's residence may be searched without a warrant. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 877, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). However, the Supreme Court has never held that a parolee can be subjected to a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-parole crime. 1. United States v. Knights 222 The opinion closest on point is the Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). That opinion strongly suggests — indeed, almost compels — the conclusion that at least in the absence of an explicitly stated condition of parole providing otherwise, any search of a parolee's residence to investigate a pre-parole crime must be based on at least reasonable suspicion. A California court sentenced Knights to probation subject to the condition that Knights would `[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer.' Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. Pursuant to this condition, State authorities conducted a warrantless search of Knights's apartment and found evidence of a current crime. 223 The search of Knights's apartment was not based on probable cause, but merely on reasonable suspicion of current criminal activity. The Court construed the terms of the explicit probation condition to permit a suspicionless search, but, because the search in the case was supported by reasonable suspicion, it did not reach the question whether such a suspicionless search condition was valid. Id. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587. Nor did the Court reach the question whether Knights's purported consent to a search contained in the explicit conditions of probation was, in and of itself, a valid waiver of his Fourth Amendment rights. Id. at 112, 122 S.Ct. 587. 224 The Court did consider the condition of probation a salient circumstance under a totality of the circumstances test because it provided notice to Knights of the searches to which he might be subject. Id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587. Weighing the probationer's interest in privacy against the government's interest in the intrusion, the Court held that the balance of ... considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of this probationer's house. Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587(emphasis added). Using an ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis, id. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 587, the Court concluded: 225 Although the Fourth Amendment ordinarily requires the degree of probability embodied in the term probable cause, a lesser degree satisfies the Constitution when the balance of governmental and private interests makes such a standard reasonable. Those interests warrant a lesser than probable-cause standard here. When an officer has a reasonable suspicion that a probationer subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the probationer's significantly diminished privacy interests is reasonable. 226 Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 227 In Knights, the probationer was subject to an explicitly stated condition of probation allowing suspicionless searches of his residence for evidence of current crimes, which the court treated as a salient circumstance. Id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587. In this case, by contrast, Crawford was subject to no explicit condition of parole that allowed suspicionless searches to investigate pre-parole crimes. The argument in favor of the suspicionless search in this case is thus much weaker than in Knights. Not only was Knights subject to an explicit condition of probation; he was also searched for evidence of a current crime. Both of these circumstances indicate that the balance of interests under the totality of the circumstances would require greater justification for a valid search in Crawford's case than in Knights's. 2. Special Needs Doctrine 228 Judge Trott contends that the special needs doctrine allows a suspicionless search in this case. I disagree for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court has authorized suspicionless searches only in a narrowly defined class of cases, where special needs of the state beyond the normal need for law enforcement justify the program of searches. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 76 n. 7, 121 S.Ct. 1281, 149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring)). The purpose of the search here — investigation of a bank robbery that took place over two years earlier — clearly served the normal need for law enforcement to solve past crimes. 229 Second, in addition to Knights (discussed above), Judge Trott relies on Pennsylvania Board of Probation & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998), and Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). Scott and Griffin both involved enforcement of explicit conditions of parole or probation. Neither Scott nor Griffin supports the application of a special needs analysis to uphold a suspicionless search to investigate a pre-parole crime. 230 In Scott, an explicit condition of parole prohibited Scott from owning or possessing firearms or other weapons. When firearms, a compound bow, and three arrows were found in his bedroom, his parole was revoked. The Court did not need to reach the question of the constitutionality of the search of Scott's bedroom because its narrow holding that the exclusionary rule did not apply in parole revocation hearings was sufficient to decide the case. Id. at 362 n. 3, 118 S.Ct. 2014. Without mentioning the phrase special needs, the Court wrote, [t]he State ... has an `overwhelming interest' in ensuring that a parolee complies with [conditions of parole] and is returned to prison if he fails to do so. 524 U.S. at 365, 118 S.Ct. 2014. 231 In Griffin, an explicit condition of probation permitted a warrantless search of probationer Griffin's residence so long as there were reasonable grounds to believe Griffin possessed contraband. 483 U.S. at 870-71, 107 S.Ct. 3164. The Court held that supervision of probationer Griffin was a `special need' of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large. Id. at 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164. Reasonable grounds, as interpreted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, required less suspicion than probable cause, but more than no suspicion. In Griffin's case, the reasonable grounds requirement was satisfied by the presence of a detective's tip that contraband might be present. The Court upheld a search of Griffin's residence: 232 We think it clear that the special needs of Wisconsin's probation system make the warrant requirement impracticable and justify replacement of the standard of probable cause by reasonable grounds, as defined by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 233 Id. at 875-76, 107 S.Ct. 3164. 234 In this case, by contrast to Scott and Griffin, the State cannot rely on an explicit condition of parole. Without such a condition in the Fourth Waiver form, we have no formal expression of need — special or otherwise — by the State. Moreover, the explicit search condition whose constitutionality was sustained in Griffin — based on the State's formal expression of its special need — did not permit a suspicionless search. It permitted only a search based on reasonable grounds. Finally, and perhaps most important, the searches in both Scott and Griffin were for evidence of current crimes. By contrast, Crawford's residence was searched because Agent Bowdich was investigating a pre-parole crime. In sum, neither Scott nor Griffin supports allowing a suspicionless search here.
235 Crawford had a sufficient subjective expectation of privacy, on the facts of this case, that he should be able to enforce the right to privacy to which he is objectively entitled. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S.Ct. 1809, 90 L.Ed.2d 210 (1986) (describing a two part inquiry: has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy and is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable); see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33, 121 S.Ct. 2038, 150 L.Ed.2d 94 (2001) (citing Ciraolo ). 236 Crawford's subjective understanding is somewhat unclear. On the one hand, Crawford testified that as a general matter, I just, you know, just took for granted that, you know, I'm on parole, that I don't have no rights at all [.] On the other hand, he also twice testified, specifically as to the early morning search actually conducted by Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers, that he was in shock as a result of the search. Taking these statements together, I conclude that Crawford did not expect the search and detention to which he was subjected. 237 It is not unrealistic to expect the State to draft language in a parole condition form with the care customarily used by a competent lawyer; nor is it unrealistic to read language drafted by the State according to the rules of construction ordinarily applied to documents having legal consequence. But it is unrealistic to use legal analysis to interpret a parolee's general oral statement that he has no rights at all, explaining his decision to acquiesce to apparent police authority, to deprive him of his otherwise applicable Fourth Amendment rights. See United States v. Sandoval, 200 F.3d 659, 660 (9th Cir.2000) (observing that our court has rejected the argument that a person lacks a subjective expectation of privacy simply because he ... could have expected the police to intrude on his privacy). 238
239 Judge Kleinfeld contends in his separate opinion that probationers and parolees should be treated differently for purposes of probation and parole searches. I disagree. The Court in Knights did not address the question of whether, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a probationer and a parolee should be treated comparably. However, other cases by the Court suggest that they should be. See, e.g., Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164 ([I]t is always true of probationers (as we have said to be true of parolees) that they do not enjoy `the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only... conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.') (quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)) (alteration in original). The California Supreme Court invokes the same justifications for conditions of probation and parole, without differentiating between probation and parole. See, e.g., Woods, 88 Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 981 P.2d at 1027(probation); Reyes, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734, 968 P.2d at 450 (parole). I agree with Judge Kleinfeld that for some purposes probationers and parolees can be treated differently, but I do not believe that they are different for present purposes. Indeed, we have explicitly stated that probationers and parolees are indistinguishable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Harper, 928 F.2d at 896 n.1 (Nor do we see a constitutional difference between probation and parole for purposes of the fourth amendment.).
240 The Supreme Court in Knights has told us that the key to a Fourth Amendment analysis is a balancing of interests. The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and the reasonableness of a search is determined by assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests. 534 U.S. at 118-19, 122 S.Ct. 587 (citation omitted). Under ordinary circumstances, of course, a residential search must be justified by a warrant based on probable cause. Here, however, Crawford was a parolee, and the State therefore had a greater interest than usual in conducting searches to ensure that Crawford was obeying the law. On the other hand, the Fourth Waiver form drawn up by the State and signed by Crawford did not assert the right to conduct suspicionless searches of Crawford's residence to investigate pre-parole violations of the law. That is, not only did the State not assert that it needed to conduct such searches in order to promot[e] legitimate governmental interests; Crawford was also never given notice that he would be subjected to such searches. 241 Given the balance of interests — informed by the Fourth Waiver form that Crawford signed, the inapplicability of the special needs analysis, Crawford's subjective and objective expectation of privacy, and the comparable treatment of probationers and parolees under the Fourth Amendment — I conclude that Agent Bowdich and his fellow officers needed, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion to justify their search of Crawford's residence and Crawford's accompanying detention. The sole purpose of the search and detention was to investigate a pre-parole crime, and to justify that search Agent Bowdich needed at least a reasonable suspicion that he would find evidence of that crime. Because Agent Bowdich had no such suspicion, I conclude that the search of Crawford's residence, and the accompanying detention of Crawford during that search, violated the Fourth Amendment. 242