Opinion ID: 1179060
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: applicability of section 1-7.7 to comparative negligence actions

Text: We must first examine the statute in question for the purpose of ascertaining what the legislature intended by its enactment. The source of that intent must, wherever possible, be found in the language of the statute itself. Wyoming State Treasurer v. City of Casper, Wyo., 551 P.2d 687, 697 (1976); Mahoney v. L.L. Sheep Company, 79 Wyo. 293, 333 P.2d 712, 715 (1958). In Geraud v. Schrader, Wyo., 531 P.2d 872, 878 (1975), cert. den. sub nom., Wind River Indian Education Association, Inc. v. Ward, 423 U.S. 904, 96 S.Ct. 205, 46 L.Ed.2d 134, we said: ... Where the language of a statute is plain, unambiguous and conveys a clear and definite meaning, there is no occasion for resorting to rules of statutory construction, and the court has no right to look for and impose another meaning. Druley v. Houdesheldt, 1956, 75 Wyo. 155, 160, 294 P.2d 351, 352, reh. den. 75 Wyo. 155, 296 P.2d 251. Courts will not usurp the power of the legislature by deciding what should have been said. Barber v. State Highway Comm'n, 1959, 80 Wyo. 340, 351, 342 P.2d 723, 725. Unless it is clearly repugnant to the intention of the legislature, the words and phrases used in a statute shall be taken in their ordinary and usual sense (§ 8-18, W.S. 1957, 1975 Cum.Supp.), and when a word has a well-settled meaning in the law at the time of usage it will be so understood unless a different meaning is unmistakably intended. School Districts Nos. 2, 3, 6, 9, and 10 v. Cook, Wyo., 424 P.2d 751, 757 (1967). See also, Title Guaranty Company of Wyoming, Inc. v. Belt, Wyo., 539 P.2d 357, 359 (1975). We said in Markle v. Williamson, Wyo., 518 P.2d 621, 625: In Kilpatrick v. Superior Court, 105 Ariz. 413, 466 P.2d 18, 27, the Arizona Supreme Court had this to say about the role of courts and judicial tinkering: `Courts are not at liberty to impose their views of the way things ought to be simply because that's what must have been intended, otherwise no statute, contract or recorded word, no matter how explicit, could be saved from judicial tinkering. Moreover, if the sense of a word is not to be taken in its usual and commonly understood meaning except under circumstances where a different meaning is clearly intended, it becomes impossible for men to mean what is said or say what they mean and purposeful communication is unattainable.' It is with these rules in mind that we consider the meaning and application of the last sentence in 1-7.7, i.e., In all cases the court shall inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict. Our primary concern is with the phrase, In all cases. Black's Law Dictionary, Revised Fourth Edition, p. 98, defines all to include: ... Every member of individual component of; each one of  used with a plural noun. In this sense, all is used generically and distributively... . All has also been defined as a word that ... is commonly understood and usually does not admit of an exception, addition, or exclusion.  [Emphasis supplied] Consolidated Freightways Corp. of Del. v. Nicholas, 258 Iowa 115, 137 N.W.2d 900, 904 (1965). The use of the phrase, In all cases, conveys a clear and commonly-understood meaning which can be applied in a fashion consistent with the other provisions of the statute. The phrase relates to a class of civil actions which are characterized as personal injury or wrongful death and refers without exception to all cases which fall into this class. Thus, the very language of § 1-7.7 makes it clear to the practitioner that when a pleading sets forth a claim for relief based upon personal injury or wrongful death, there are three requirements which are triggered by the statute: (1) The ad damnum clause shall not state a dollar amount as alleged damages or demand a sum as judgment other than an allegation to the effect that the damages meet jurisdictional requirements; (2) The limitation upon the ad damnum clause shall not be construed to prevent argument to the court or jury concerning the amount of any party's claim; and (3) The court shall inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict. We hold that a mere reading of the language in § 1-7.7 evinces a clear and definite meaning. It is, therefore, not within our power to search for and impose another meaning. That would be judicial tinkering! This being the case, we hold that the legislature, by its enactment, manifested a clear intendment for its provisions to apply without exception to all personal-injury actions, including those cases brought by ... any person or his legal representative to recover damages for negligence resulting in death or in injury to person or property, ... § 1-7.2(a), supra. Our task would now be complete were it not for the apparent conflict which arises between the construction just placed on § 1-7.7 and the construction placed on § 1-7.2(a) in Woodward v. Haney, supra. In that case, we applied the rule that when the legislature adopts a statute from another state, it is presumed to have adopted the existing construction placed upon the statute by the courts of last resort of that state as part of the law and to have intended for the same construction to apply in this state. 564 P.2d at 845. We then followed Wisconsin precedent and held that under § 1-7.2(a), it is reversible error to inform the jury by argument or instruction of the effect of its verdict. We are not, however, without aid or authority in resolving the conflict between the two statutes. Statutory provisions may be amended by implication, and this commonly occurs when an act, purportedly independent of the prior act, substantively alters, modifies, or adds to the older law. 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sands 4th Ed., § 22.13. Amendments by implication, like repeals by implication [5] , are not favored ( Geraud v. Schrader, supra, quoting from 1A Sutherland, supra, at § 22.13), and will not be upheld unless there is a manifested repugnancy or irreconcilable conflict between the two statutes. Rickards v. State, 45 Del. (6 Terry) 573, 77 A.2d 199, 203 (1950); Miami Water Works Local No. 654 v. City of Miami, 157 Fla. 445, 26 So.2d 194, 196, 165 A.L.R. 967 (1946); Hallahan v. Sawyer, Ky., 390 S.W.2d 664, 665 (1965); Bell v. State, 236 Md. 356, 204 A.2d 54, 60 (1964); and 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 252. All statutes relating to the same subject or having the same general purpose must be read as constituting one law, and, where possible, should be harmoniously construed in order to avoid conflicting and confusing results. In re Adoption of Female Child X, Wyo., 537 P.2d 719, 723 (1975); Woolley v. State Highway Commission, Wyo., 387 P.2d 667, 673 (1963). However, if the conflict cannot be reconciled so that the provisions can stand together, then the later provision will prevail over the prior one, and the prior law is considered amended by implication only to the extent of the conflict. [6] Co-ordinated Transport v. Barrett, 412 Ill. 321, 106 N.E.2d 510, 515 (1952), aff'd 344 U.S. 583, 73 S.Ct. 468, 97 L.Ed. 567, reh. den. 345 U.S. 931, 73 S.Ct. 778, 97 L.Ed. 1360; Jumper v. Moore, 110 Me. 159, 85 A. 485, 486 (1912); State v. Fowler, 207 Or. 182, 295 P.2d 167, 173 (1956). We feel that there is enough of a conflict between § 1-7.7 and § 1-7.2(a) that the two cannot stand together. If we were to decide that § 1-7.2(a), as construed, was not subsequently amended by that portion of § 1-7.7 having to do with the requirement of informing the jury of the effect of its verdict, then we would inject irreconcilable inconsistency and confusion to our jurisprudence. We would, in effect, rewrite the last sentence to read: In all cases the court shall inform the jury of the consequences of its verdict, with the exception of those cases which fall under the provisions of § 1-7.2(a).  We are without authority to modify § 1-7.7 by writing into it an exception which the legislature did not express. Cf. Longacre v. State, Wyo., 448 P.2d 832, 834 (1964). In Ivey v. Wiggins, 276 Ala. 106, 159 So.2d 618 (1964), the Supreme Court of Alabama was faced with the question of whether a cause of action for wrongful death survives against the personal representative of the deceased tortfeasor. In its disposal the court had to determine whether a statutory provision applied to a separate statute. The court, in examining the language of the former act, said: The word `all,' in ordinary use, is wholly inclusive as we understand it. It must embrace every personal cause of action. If we should hold that it does not embrace or include causes of action for wrongful death, then we would have to read it as `all personal causes of action except for wrongful death survive,' etc. The legislature did not write in the exception and this court is not authorized to do so.  Ibid., 159 So.2d p. 620. [Emphasis supplied] In Woodward v. Haney, supra, we pointed out that Colorado, whose comparative-negligence statute was patterned after that of Wisconsin, had followed Wisconsin precedent in holding that it is reversible error to inform the jury on the effect of its percentage findings on the ultimate outcome of the case, citing Avery v. Wadlington, 186 Colo. 158, 526 P.2d 295 (1974). Since the opinion in that case, the Colorado General Assembly amended its comparative-negligence statute, effective July 1, 1975, to require instruction to the jury on the effect of its findings and allowing argument by counsel to the jury on the effect of such instruction. [7] Section 13-21-111(4), Colorado Revised Statutes 1973, 1976 Cum.Supp., reads as follows: In a jury trial in any civil action in which contributory negligence is an issue for determination by the jury, the trial court shall instruct the jury on the effect of its finding as to the degree of negligence of each party. The attorneys for each party shall be allowed to argue the effect of the instruction on the facts which are before the jury. (Colo. Laws 1975, Ch. 152, § 1) This amendment has been recently construed as imposing an independent duty upon the trial court to instruct the jury on the comparative-negligence statute's effect even though the plaintiff's counsel did not make a request for such an instruction. Appelgren v. Agri Chem, Inc., Colo. App., 562 P.2d 766 (1977). We hold that the Wyoming Legislature, in enacting § 1-7.7, supra, clearly intended for its provisions to apply to comparative-negligence actions and amended § 1-7.2(a) to the extent that in such actions the jury shall be informed by the trial court on the effect of its percentage findings, as those findings affect the outcome of the case, and particularly the damage issue.