Opinion ID: 2636938
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Marital privilege of Bruce Baros.

Text: On the morning of December 18, 1990, just before Deborah Baros (Deborah) was to testify concerning her qualifications as a witness to the Mackey murder, defense counsel suggested that Bruce Baros (Bruce), Deborah's current husband, should be excluded from the courtroom as a potential witness. Counsel explained that Bruce had been present when Deborah was interviewed by two defense investigators the previous year, and that, if given the opportunity, the defense may well call Bruce to impeach Deborah on details of the interview. Counsel disclosed that the idea of calling Bruce had arisen only because Bruce had come to the trial with Deborah from their New Hampshire home, and counsel conceded he could use the interviewing investigators themselves for impeachment. Over counsel's indignant disagreement, the prosecutor objected that counsel was claiming Bruce as a potential witness only to deny Deborah the supportive presence of Bruce during her testimony. Concerned about the marital privilege, and about the potential loss of courtroom support for Deborah, the court appointed counsel to confer with Bruce. The court then asked Bruce on voir dire whether he would invoke a spousal privilege if called to testify. Bruce replied that, based on his counsel's advice, he would do so, because he did not want to testify against his wife. After further argument, the trial court ruled in limine that if Bruce was called solely to impeach Deborah, and if Bruce invoked a marital privilege, the court would uphold the privilege under Evidence Code section 970. The court explained that this statute gives a witness the privilege not to testify against a spouse, that the policy is to avoid marital discord, that the privilege may be overcome by fair-trial concerns, but that the balance favors the privilege where the witness is called only to impeach the spouse, and other witnesses (here, the defense investigators) are available for that purpose. Accordingly, the court determined, Bruce would not be excluded from the courtroom as a potential witness. However, the court agreed that if the defense later decided to call Bruce, the court should be notified out of the jury's presence, whereupon, if Bruce claimed the privilege, counsel could preserve the record by obtaining a ruling and entering a formal objection at that time. The defense did not thereafter attempt to call Bruce. Defendant now argues the trial court's evidentiary ruling was error, because Evidence Code section 970 only gives a witness the privilege not to testify against his spouse in any proceeding. (Italics added.) Defendant urges that one does not testify against a spouse when called only to impeach the spouse in a proceeding where the spouse is not a party. If Evidence Code section 970 does apply in this situation, defendant insists, it violates his constitutional rights to due process of law, fair trial, confrontation and cross-examination and equal protection. However, we need not address the merits of these arguments, because defendant failed to preserve the issue for appeal. In general, a judgment may not be reversed for the erroneous exclusion of evidence unless the substance, purpose, and relevance of the excluded evidence was made known to the court by the questions asked, an offer of proof, or by any other means. (Evid.Code, ง 354, subd. (a); see, e.g., People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 235, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; People v. Livaditis (1992) 2 Cal.4th 759, 778, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 72, 831 P.2d 297 ( Livaditis ); People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 648, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849 ( Whitt ); see also Staten, supra, 24 Cal.4th 434, 456, 101 Cal.Rptr.2d 213, 11 P.3d 968.) This rule is necessary because, among other things, the reviewing court must know the substance of the excluded evidence in order to assess prejudice. (See Whitt, supra, 51 Cal.3d 620, 274 Cal.Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849; cf. People v. Collins (1986) 42 Cal.3d 378, 383-385, 228 Cal.Rptr. 899, 722 P.2d 173 [defendant may not challenge ruling that prior crime will be admitted for impeachment unless he takes the stand and suffers the impeachment].) Here, counsel explained why Bruce might be called, i.e., to impeach Deborah concerning her interview with defense investigators, but counsel did not offer to show what material impeachment Bruce might provide. Counsel then dropped the matter and never actually called Bruce to the stand. This was insufficient. Even if an offer of proof was impractical in advance of Deborah's testimony, it could have been made after Deborah had testified. Nor would it have been futile for defendant to call Bruce and make an offer of proof. (Evid.Code, ง 354, subd. (b).) In its in limine ruling, the trial court acknowledged that fair-trial concerns might outweigh the privilege, and the court expressly agreed to a mechanism by which defendant could later call the witness, have the privilege invoked, and obtain a ruling. Under these circumstances, defendant failed to make a record that permits a finding he was prejudiced by the loss of Bruce's testimony. Indeed, such prejudice appears unlikely, because Francis Leaman and Charles Small, the defense investigators who interviewed Deborah in Bruce's presence, both testified about the interview at the hearing concerning Deborah's competence, and Leaman gave testimony on that subject before the jury. Defendant demonstrates no basis for reversal.