Opinion ID: 340081
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Informal Aural Show Ups.

Text: 134 Appellants also contend that their Fourth Amendment rights and their privilege against self-incrimination were violated, and their Sixth Amendment right to counsel denied, at a series of informal aural show ups. Appellants allege that government agents created opportunities to speak to each of the appellants both in person after their arrests, and later over the telephone by setting up a lengthy procedure for the return of their seized property. Agents testified that they did not give the warnings detailed in Miranda v. Arizona,384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), when they spoke to appellants on these occasions, 12 and appellants did not have their counsel present. 135 As we stated in connection with the formal voice exemplars, supra, neither the Fourth Amendment nor the privilege against self-incrimination is violated by the disclosure, even if compelled, of a person's voice. Appellants' complaint is not that their statements were used to incriminate them in a testimonial sense, but that the agents were able to recognize their voices on the tapes after having heard them in person and over the telephone. 136 Appellants also claim, however, that because the aural show ups formed the basis for the critical testimony identifying their voices on the tapes, they were critical stages at which the Sixth Amendment guaranteed appellants' right to counsel. A review of the testimony indicates that Agent Garibotto did speak to several of appellants briefly after their arrests, and later over the telephone. These conversations appear to have been brief and matter of fact, concerning such routine matters as the return of property which had been seized. There is no requirement that counsel be present for conversations about such routine matters when no effort at interrogation is made.IV. WAS THERE SUFFICIENT PROOF OF APPELLANTS' GUILT ON EACH OF THE COUNTS? 137 Next we consider the sufficiency of the proofs supporting appellants' convictions on the various counts of the indictment. First, appellants assert that the Pinkerton rule should not be applied to convict defendants, found to be conspirators, of each of the substantive counts without proof that each defendant actually took part in the individual transactions. Second, several appellants challenge the sufficiency of the evidence linking them to the conspiracy. Last, we will consider challenges to the proofs on counts 3, 4, 8 and 9. 138 A. The Pinkerton Rule. 139 Appellants vigorously attack the validity of the rule announced in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), that even if he did no more than join a conspiracy, a conspirator can be convicted of any substantive offense committed in furtherance of the conspiracy and as a part of it. Appellants contend that the Pinkerton rule is bad law, and that this court should not follow it. Our court, however, is constitutionally required to follow the Supreme Court's decision in Pinkerton and the cases following it, which have never been overruled, or even questioned by the Supreme Court. 140 B. The Sufficiency of the Evidence of Conspiracy. 141 Appellants Kilpatrick, Riggs, Rudolph, Cavanaugh, Horne, Hurt, and Garrett challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting their convictions. Since each of them was found guilty of conspiracy, count 1, under the Pinkerton rule, they could also be convicted of counts 3 and 4 and counts 6 through 16, which charged crimes that were part of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Appellants contend, however, that there was insufficient evidence to support their convictions on the conspiracy charge. 142 In reviewing the sufficiency of the proof of appellants' guilt, we will be guided by the following general principles. The evidence will be viewed in the light most favorable to the government. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942). Moreover, there are special evidentiary rules applicable to conspiracy cases. As we stated in United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 651 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008, 95 S.Ct. 2629, 45 L.Ed.2d 670 (1975): 143 a prima facie case of the conspiracy and the defendant's connection with it must be established by evidence independent of that offered as an admission of a co-conspirator. . . . However, a prima facie case is less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt; indeed, it is less than a preponderance. . . . Moreover, the prima facie case need not be established before the proffered hearsay may be admitted; the judge may admit it conditionally. It is sufficient if at the close of the government's proofs, a prima facie case of conspiracy and the defendant's connection with it has been established by independent or disassociated evidence. 144 Applying these principles, we turn to the evidence that is claimed to support the finding that each of these appellants was a conspirator. Willie Lee Kilpatrick 145 Appellant Kilpatrick was convicted of conspiracy, count 1, by Judge Pratt, and under the Pinkerton rule he was also convicted on counts 3, 4, and 6 through 16. We hold that the evidence was adequate to support his conviction on the conspiracy count, and we have already discussed the Pinkerton rule supra. The following evidence supported the district court's conclusion that Kilpatrick was involved in narcotic trafficking, was clearly associated with defendant Jackson and connected with the other conspirators . . . (and) was in the 'lieutenant' echelon of the Jackson organization. . . .  Kilpatrick flew to New York with appellant Riggs (Jackson's girlfriend), who was arrested carrying a quantity of narcotics when she attempted to return to Detroit. Informant Nabors testified that he observed Kilpatrick at 19315 Hubbell Street at the time scheduled for a meeting of the Jackson organization lieutenants. When Nabors refused the organization's invitation to become a lieutenant, he was not allowed to stay. A search of Kilpatrick's apartment produced substances used to dilute heroin, narcotics paraphernalia, and firearms. Kilpatrick's address book listed the names of other conspirators, and he was likewise found listed in their books. Leo Hurt 146 Judge Feikens convicted appellant Hurt on count 1 because he found beyond a reasonable doubt that Hurt purchased from the Jackson organization large quantities of narcotics for wholesale distribution. The district court took special note of a call that Hurt made to Blair in which Hurt stated that his customers were complaining about the quality of the narcotics he had sold them. Judge Feikens observed that Hurt was mentioned in the telephone and address books of several of the conspirators. Finally, Hurt was called to the Hubbell Street house on December 15 when the large shipment was being distributed, and he was arrested with heroin in his possession when he left. Although the heroin was found in Hurt's car, not on his person, there was ample evidence to support a finding of possession, since he was apparently the only person in the car, and the heroin was found on the floor by the driver's seat. This evidence is sufficient to support the conclusion that Hurt, like Cavanaugh and Rudolph, was a major distributor for and a member of the conspiracy. Accordingly, we affirm Hurt's conviction on count 1. Under the Pinkerton rule, the conviction on count 1 permitted his conviction on the counts charging the substantive crimes committed in furtherance of the conspiracy as well, including count 7. Accordingly, we need not discuss Hurt's argument that there was insufficient evidence to convict him on count 7, although we conclude that even without the Pinkerton rule, there was sufficient evidence to sustain his conviction on this charge. 147 Hurt also contends, relying upon Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), that the evidence shows only a hub and spoke cluster of several conspiracies, each between an individual dealer and the hub consisting of Jackson and his lieutenants. In Kotteakos, however, defendant Brown specialized in obtaining loans from the Federal Housing Administration by false and fraudulent applications. Several defendants, each of whom had obtained such a loan falsely and fraudulently, were charged with and convicted of a single all-encompassing conspiracy. The Supreme Court held that there was proof, not of a single, but of several conspiracies, and reversed the convictions. 148 Hurt, however, was a distributor with an ongoing relationship with the conspiracy to distribute illegal narcotics. He depended for his success upon the continuing vitality of the entire conspiracy. This is particularly true in the narcotics business, because new customers of each seller may become, by reason of addiction, a lifetime potential market for all other sellers. Fairh Lee Riggs 149 Judge Feikens convicted appellant Riggs of conspiracy, count 1, concluding that she knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy, and that she was an important courier in the transportation of narcotics as well as an intimate associate of Jackson. We hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict Riggs of conspiracy. Riggs had traveled to New York with appellant Kilpatrick and defendant Reynolds in September 1971. All three used assumed names. When airlines personnel examined appellant Riggs' carry-on luggage, they observed an estimated $30,000 in cash in a paper bag. Riggs was arrested later that day when she returned to the New York airport for a return flight to Detroit. Her luggage contained 1,917 grams of heroin and almost $5,000 in cash. She was convicted of possession of the heroin in the Eastern District of New York, and the conviction was affirmed. United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 820, 94 S.Ct. 115, 38 L.Ed.2d 53 (1973). By stipulation, the record in the New York case was incorporated into these proceedings. Riggs was Jackson's girlfriend. He arranged to take calls from another conspirator at her house. Riggs' name and telephone number, along with those of several other appellants, were found in appellant Rudolph's address book. This evidence was adequate to establish a prima facie case that appellant Riggs knowingly joined the conspiracy. Accordingly, other evidence of hearsay statements by other conspirators was admissible to strengthen the case against Riggs. Burt's testimony indicated that the Jackson organization procured several large shipments of narcotics from a source in New York. Additionally Jackson told Burt that he believed the Riggs arrest must have been a set-up because the two men with her were not arrested. Jackson tried to raise a large sum because his old lady was in jail in New York, and Blair told Burt that Jackson was trying to find a lawyer for Riggs. This evidence amply supports the conviction of Riggs on count 1. Samuel (Eugene) Horne 150 Judge Feikens concluded that it was clear beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant Samuel Horne knowingly and intentionally joined the conspiracy. He concluded that Horne's principal activity for the organization was wholesale distribution of narcotics. The government intercepted telephone conferences between Horne and Joseph Weaver, Brown, Blair, and Jackson. In particular, Judge Feikens noted that on December 9 Horne called Jackson and attempted to arrange a sale to a customer who wanted a full thing for $15,000. This evidence was more than ample to support Horne's conviction of conspiracy. Charles Cavanaugh 151 Judge Feikens convicted Cavanaugh of count 1, conspiracy, holding that he was one of the organization's wholesale distributors, and that he engaged in other kinds of supply activity for the group. Burt testified that she and Blair delivered cocaine to Cavanaugh in exchange for three outfits of clothing. The wiretap intercepted a number of calls from Cavanaugh to the Hubbell Street telephone inquiring abut the availability of narcotics. Cavanaugh indicated his familiarity with various key members of the organization by calling and asking to speak to George (Blair), Brown, or the big man (Jackson). In these calls Cavanaugh made arrangements for sales, complained about the quality of the narcotics that he had received, saying at one point that he had had to return his customers' money. On December 14 Jackson agreed to sell Cavanaugh 13 quarters of heroin. 152 This evidence was more than sufficient to prove Cavanaugh's part in the conspiracy. See, e. g., United States v. Tramunti, 513 F.2d 1087, 1112 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 832, 96 S.Ct. 54, 46 L.Ed.2d 50 (1975); United States v. Varelli, 407 F.2d 735, 748 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom. Saletko v. United States, 405 U.S. 1040, 92 S.Ct. 1311, 31 L.Ed.2d 581 (1972); United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 188 (2d Cir. 1960). Charles Rudolph 153 Judge Feikens also convicted appellant Rudolph on the conspiracy count. He held that Rudolph was deeply involved in wholesale distribution of drugs for the group. Judge Feikens cited as evidence Rudolph's telephone calls, his account records, and his automatic telephone dialing cards for other conspirators, as well as the fact that Rudolph was listed in the telephone and address books of other conspirators. In one telephone call, Rudolph told Brown he was getting low, and he would take a quantity of narcotics being held for another buyer if that transaction did not go through. Brown called Rudolph a few days before the last big delivery to tell him that the narcotics would be around in a few days, and Rudolph said that he would wait. An outgoing call to Rudolph's telephone was made from Hubbell Street on December 15 when the expected shipment was being distributed, but there was no answer. A search of appellant's home yielded 417 grams of heroin, common diluents, guns, ammunition, and a record book including the names of other conspirators and sums of money. This evidence established a prima facie showing of his status as a conspirator, and made admissible Burt's testimony that Blair told her Rudolph had once been a Jackson lieutenant, but that he broke away and now specialized in selling quarters of heroin and cocaine. It is immaterial that Rudolph no longer served the Jackson organization as a lieutenant, since he still acted as a major distributor for the organization. The evidence adequately supports his conviction. Ronald Garrett 154 Judge Feikens found appellant Garrett guilty of conspiracy on the basis of the following evidence: Garrett's telephone number was listed in Kilpatrick's address book and in Rudolph's telephone and address book, and he had a substantial account listed in Rudolph's account book. Additionally, Garrett figured prominently in a number of intercepted telephone conversations. Since Garrett was not one of the speakers in these conversations, they are admissible to prove the truth of the matters asserted only if a prima facie case is made that Garrett was one of the conspirators. However, Judge Feikens properly relied upon the fact that several of the conspirators mentioned Garrett repeatedly in the course of discussions regarding their narcotics transactions. Evidence that his name was mentioned repeatedly in the context of the narcotics transactions was not hearsay, and was competent evidence tending to show that he was a conspirator. It should be unnecessary to emphasize that proof of an illegal conspiracy is seldom direct. More often, there is only indirect proof of the unlawful agreement. We are required by Glasser to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. Accordingly, we hold that a prima facie case of conspiracy, although a minimal one, is established by the evidence of the telephone calls, considered together with the address books and Rudolph's account book, which indicated a substantial sum of money for Garrett as well as for other persons shown to be conspirators. Accordingly, the substance of the telephone conversations, in which other conspirators' statements indicated Garrett's deep involvement, was admissible. In addition, Burt's hearsay testimony that she helped Blair make a delivery which he said was for Five-O was admissible to prove Garrett's complicity. Burt identified Garrett as Five-O at trial. This evidence was adequate to support Garrett's conviction on count 1. 155 C. Counts 3 and 4. 156 Appellants Brown, Bell, Riggs, Horne, Garrett, Jones, and Rudolph challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support their convictions of count 3, the October 22 sale to Special Agent Smith, and of count 4, the November 4 sale. Since we have affirmed their convictions of conspiracy under count 1, appellants were properly convicted of the substantive charges in these counts as well under the Pinkerton rule. 157 D. Counts 8 and 9. 158 Appellants challenge the validity of convicting them on count 8 (distribution of 137.35 grams of heroin) and count 9 (distribution of 37.66 grams of cocaine) in view of the fact that the district court acquitted Cara Woods, in whose possession the heroin and cocaine were found, of the conspiracy charge. Appellants contend that since Woods was not a member of the conspiracy, his statement to Agent Garibotto regarding the source of the narcotics was hearsay and therefore not admissible to prove the guilt of the conspirators. Accordingly, they argue that there was no proof that Woods had obtained the narcotics from 19315 Hubbell. We disagree. There was compelling circumstantial evidence that the heroin and cocaine referred to in counts 8 and 9 were procured from the Jackson organization at 19315 Hubbell. Woods visited the Hubbell Street address briefly on the night of the 15th of December when a large shipment of narcotics was being rapidly distributed, and when he was arrested just as he left he was found in possession of the narcotics. Minutes before two other persons had entered briefly, and when they left they too had been arrested and were found to be in possession of narcotics. We think that this is ample evidence to support a finding that the narcotics seized from Cara Woods were distributed by the Jackson organization, and that therefore all of the conspirators could be convicted of counts 8 and 9 under the Pinkerton rule. 159