Opinion ID: 883634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Private v. Public Use

Text: The District Court recognized that it was required to make more than the de minimus ruling. The court understood that our remand without a ruling meant that the substantive issues involved in an eminent domain case were still subject to appeal if the issue of the Chamber's presence was not de minimus. The court stated: On March 1, 1994, the Montana Supreme Court remanded the case to this Court ... requiring that the Court consider the evidence of the Chamber's involvement in the project when determining whether the Plaintiffs validly exercised their eminent domain power over the Vaniman's property, and ... to determine whether the Chamber's [Bozeman Area Chamber of Commerce] involvement is de minimus. . .. . A de minimus inquiry in this case, does not involve itself with incidental private benefit which arises where a lawful taking of private property by condemnation indirectly yields an incidental private benefit, but gets directly to the validity of the Bozeman Chamber of Commerce's proposed direct participation by privately using part of the property being condemned. Consequently, this Court construes the specific directions in the Supreme Court's Opinion as holding that this Court must specifically rule on whether the Chamber's participation (even though not fixed by an executed contract) impacts the validity of the entire eminent domain proceeding, before it issues a Preliminary Condemnation Order. In its September, 1994, Memorandum and Order following remand, the court determined that the condemnation of the 8.72 acres of the Vaniman property was necessary and for a public purpose and, therefore, appropriate, but that the Chamber's involvement in the project was not appropriate and must be excised because it constituted a private and not a public use. The court then ordered that the Chamber could no longer be part of the project. According to the Vanimans, the court's action of severing the Chamber's offices from the visitor center plans was beyond the court's jurisdiction. While the Vanimans characterize this action on the part of the court as a redesigning of the visitor center, such is not the case. The court specifically stated that: FOF 11. The current architectural development schematic drawings of the information/visitor center, on which many of Defendant's objections are based, were prepared in April, 1993. These schematic drawings represent early preconstruction designs which can readily be, and often are, changed before any construction occurs. Though such schematic drawings indicate that the Chamber's private corporate offices are a part of the information/visitor center building, no bids have been let on the construction of the rest area and information/visitor center, and no work whatsoever has commenced on this schematically designed building. FOF 14. Schematic drawings are those usually prepared when only about 15% of project completion is reached. Here, no work whatsoever has begun or is completed regarding the proposed building's construction. Such schematic drawings are not now, and never were, a part of the State's Condemnation Order of March 24, 1993, nor a part of Plaintiffs Complaint for Condemnation in this action. Thus, it is clear that the court was aware that the plans from which it severed the Chamber's offices were early plans and that later plans would follow. We interpret the court's severance of the Chamber's offices, not as a redesigning of the building  which would be a permanent and final change  but an indication that the Chamber's offices must not appear in future plans for the building. The record substantiates the court's findings. Testimony from the hearing on remand indicates that all connected with the project knew that the plans introduced into evidence were only preliminary plans and that other final plans would follow. Therefore, substantial evidence supports the court's findings. Further, the court correctly apprehended the evidence and we are not left with a firm conviction that an error has been made. The court was not, therefore, clearly erroneous. The Vanimans argue that legally the court could not modify plans that had already been approved by the State but that the court must negate the entire condemnation because the State had in essence condemned a property for private use. The court's legal determination to sever the Chamber's offices was an outgrowth of its determination that the Chamber was a private organization and that its participation in the visitors' center built on land that had been taken by eminent domain was inappropriate. Our statutes declare that in order for eminent domain to be appropriate, the land taken must be put to a public use. Section 70-30-101, MCA. The District Court determined that the use of the Vaniman property for a highway interchange and a visitor center was expressly provided for in our statutory system. We stated as much in Vaniman I. Vaniman, 264 Mont. at 80, 869 P.2d at 793. There is no question that the proposed project for Interchange 19 is a public use according to our statutory list of appropriate public uses in § 60-4-103, MCA. The pivotal concern is whether the Chamber's presence within a building on land condemned for public use requires that the entire eminent domain action be negated. The court concluded that the Chamber's portion of the visitors' center was a private use and was constitutionally offensive, but that the rest of the project could stand. The court concluded that the Chamber had no authority to participate in an otherwise public project and that [t]he Chamber shall have no right to locate or operate its private corporate business on any portion of the property acquired from Defendants in this eminent domain proceeding. The court then granted the request for the preliminary condemnation order of the 8.72 acres for the purpose of an interchange and visitor center. We have stated that: It is well established that a condemning authority can not acquire a greater interest or estate in the condemned property than the public use requires. Silver Bow County v. Hafer (1975), 166 Mont. 330, 332, 532 P.2d 691. Here, the record shows that whether the Chamber is included in the plans or not, the same amount of land will be taken. This fact is not disputed by the Vanimans nor any official connected to the governmental entities involved. Therefore, the condemnation order is appropriate for 8.72 acres so long as the purpose for which the property condemned is appropriate. It is also not disputed that the uses of a highway interchange and visitors center constitute a public use required by our eminent domain statute. Sections 70-30-101, MCA, and 60-4-103, MCA. The record shows that the original condemnation complaint filed by the State mentions only the use of the interchange and the visitors' center/information center. Thus, the complaint was properly granted because the use was public, the State had the right to eminent domain, and the proper procedures were followed. However, the Chamber is a private corporation. Whether its involvement began before or after the issuance of the complaint is of little concern because there is no question from the record that at some point the Chamber offices became a substantial part of the building to be erected on the condemned property. We pointed this out to the court and on remand the District Court determined, based upon the testimony at the May 12, 1994, hearing, that the Chamber's portion of the visitors' center amounted to about 40% of the area anticipated for the building. The State provided adequate evidence that the project was appropriate; it then became the Vanimans' burden to prove by clear and convincing proof that the taking by the government was excessive or arbitrary. Lincoln/Lewis & Clark Co. Sewer v. Bossing (1985), 215 Mont. 235, 696 P.2d 989. The Vanimans attempted to prove the State's actions as arbitrary or excessive by submitting evidence of the size and nature of the Chamber's portion of the building. Yet, there is nothing whatsoever in the record to disprove the State's contention that the taking of the 8.72 acres for an interchange and visitor center is appropriate or that the taking would be less if the Chamber were not part of the project. The Chamber was not mentioned in the original complaint for condemnation. The purpose in the complaint was public, to that all agree. The Chamber's participation is a collateral concern and does not change the public use designation of the project as proved to the court. The Chamber is a private business. It is a fundamental law of eminent domain that private property may not be taken without an owner's consent for the private use of another. McTaggart v. Montana Power Co. (1979), 184 Mont. 329, 602 P.2d 992. Further, both the United States and the Montana Constitutions prohibit a taking by the State for merely private use. U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Art. II, Sec. 17, Mont.Const. (1972). In certain cases, a public use and a private use can be commingled without a finding of unconstitutionality. J. Sackman & P. Rohan, 2A Nichols Law of Eminent Domain, The Public Use, § 7.08 (1990). In considering whether the private nature of the Chamber's business is appropriately allowed as a part of the public purposes of the visitors' center/information center we consider the following: If the use for which land is taken by eminent domain is public, the taking is not invalid merely because an incidental benefit will enure to private individuals... . . The use for which the property is acquired by eminent domain must ordinarily be the use of the condemnor... . [An] ulterior public advantage may justify a comparatively insignificant taking of private property for what, in its immediate purpose, is a private use. Moreover, where, despite the commingling of private and public uses, the taking will aid in the establishment of a public project, the courts are disposed to ignore the private element as purely incidental... . J. Sackman & P. Rohan, 2A Nichols Law of Eminent Domain, Public Use, § 7.08 (1990). In analyzing when a private use is appropriate within an eminent domain taking, we adopt this analysis and compare the Chamber's use by this three-tiered standard: 1. Will the public use create an incidental benefit to private individuals? 2. Is the overall use that of the condemnor? 3. Is the private use insignificant? An analysis of all three elements shows that the Chamber's presence is inappropriate within this public project. First, the Chamber's corporate offices are not incidental to the project. In other words, its presence is not a necessary derivative of the visitor center and highway interchange. Any benefit that the Chamber derives from having its offices located at this Interchange is in no way connected to the public use of the highway or the rest area/visitor center. The Chamber's presence may be convenient for the Chamber as well as the State, but that is not the test. The test is whether any benefit to the Chamber comes as a necessary corollary to the public purpose. The record indicates no such benefit. Second, the use for which the land is taken must be that of the State. If the Chamber occupies a major portion of the visitor center, then the use is not that of the State. Finally, the record indicates that the Chamber's presence is not insignificant; it will occupy a major part of the visitor center. Therefore, we conclude that the Chamber's private presence within this otherwise public project cannot stand as the Chamber cannot meet the elements of the above test in any way. In other fact situations, such a determination could mean that the entire condemnation would fail or that the taking would have to be limited. Under the facts of this case, the loss of the Chamber's participation does not limit the taking. All agree that the same amount of land must be taken regardless of the Chamber's presence. Further, the complaint and order of possession do not mention the Chamber and the plans which include the Chamber offices are only preliminary to the project. We conclude that the District Court correctly granted the preliminary condemnation order because the Chamber's presence was not a part of the request for condemnation. We hold that the court did not err in finding that the State had lawfully exercised its power of eminent domain but that the Bozeman Chamber of Commerce could not be part of the planned highway interchange building complex. Affirmed. TURNAGE, C.J., and TRIEWEILER, HUNT and LEAPHART, JJ., concur. concur.