Opinion ID: 799452
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: EEOC's Investigation and Conciliation

Text: In its first point on appeal, the EEOC urges that we reverse the district court's decision to bar the EEOC from pursuing claims as to 67 women based on its failure to reasonably investigate or good-faith conciliate. We hold that the district court did not err in dismissing the EEOC's claims as to 67 women for its failure to investigate and conciliate them.
Section 706 of Title VII, the provision under which the EEOC sued, authorizes the EEOC to bring suit in its own name, on behalf of a person or persons aggrieved by the employer's unlawful employment practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); accord Gen. Tel. Co. of Nw. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324, 100 S.Ct. 1698, 64 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980) (Given the clear purpose of Title VII, the EEOC's jurisdiction over enforcement, and the remedies available, the EEOC need look no further than § 706 for its authority to bring suit in its own name for the purpose, among others, of securing relief for a group of aggrieved individuals.). However, [a]s originally enacted[,] Title VII did not empower the [EEOC] to sue employers to enforce the Act. EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944, 947 (8th Cir.1974) (citing Act of July 2, 1964, Pub.L. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 253). Rather, [c]ooperation and voluntary compliance were selected as the preferred means for achieving equality of employment opportunities. Voluntary compliance proved elusive, however, as more than half of the EEOC's conciliation efforts were deemed unsuccessful. Consequently, Congress enacted the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 which amended Title VII to permit the EEOC suits. The statutory mandate that the EEOC attempt conciliation was not abandoned, however, and the Act expressly conditions the EEOC's power of suit on its inability to secure from the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the EEOC. Id. (internal footnotes omitted); accord Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368, 97 S.Ct. 2447, 53 L.Ed.2d 402 (1977). Thus, [i]n the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Congress established an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure culminating in the EEOC's authority to bring a civil action in a federal court. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 432 U.S. at 359, 97 S.Ct. 2447 (internal footnote omitted). First, an employee files with the EEOC a charge alleging that an employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice. Id. Second, [t]he EEOC is then required to investigate the charge and determine whether there is reasonable cause to believe that it is true. Id. If reasonable cause does exist, the EEOC moves to the third step, which attempts to remedy the objectionable employment practice through the informal, nonjudicial means `of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.' Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b)). However, if unsuccessful, the EEOC may move to the fourth and final step and bring a civil action to redress the charge. Id. at 359-60, 97 S.Ct. 2447 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). As we have recognized, the EEOC's `power of suit and administrative process [are not] unrelated activities, [but] sequential steps in a unified scheme for securing compliance with Title VII.' Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d at 948 (alterations in original) (emphasis added) (quoting EEOC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 373 F.Supp. 1321, 1333 (D.Del. 1974)); accord EEOC v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185 (4th Cir.1981).
The district court barred the EEOC from pursuing claims as to 67 women based on its conclusion that the EEOC did not investigate, issue a reasonable cause determination or conciliate the claims. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 2524402, at . On appeal, the EEOC avers that the district court wrongly concluded that the EEOC's investigation, resulting reasonable-cause determination, and conciliation were insufficient to satisfy § 706. It argues that the district court (1) misconstrued the EEOC's efforts through serial requests for information to investigate discrimination suffered by persons other than Starke; and (2) incorrectly assumed that the EEOC had to investigate, issue a cause finding [regarding], and conciliate each individual instance of CRST's failure to respond appropriately to a harassment complaint. The EEOC contends that it needed only to investigate, issue a cause finding as to, and conciliate each type of discrimination alleged. In its analysis, the district court acknowledged that the EEOC was entitled to expand its investigation of Starke's Charge and consider whether CRST had tolerated the sexual harassment of other female drivers. Id. at . It noted that, during the course of its investigation, the EEOC did discover the allegations of a number of other female drivers, including Essig, Morgan, Peeples and Thiel. Id. (concluding that these female drivers' allegations of sexual harassment grew out of the EEOC's investigation of Starke's Charge). The court also recognized that it could not second-guess the EEOC's finding in the Letter of Determination that, inter alia, reasonable cause existed `to believe that [CRST] ha[d] subjected a class of employees and prospective employees to sexual harassment, in violation of Title VII.' Id. Nevertheless, the court determined that, based on the factual record in this case, the EEOC did not conduct any investigation of the specific allegations of the allegedly aggrieved persons for whom it seeks relief at trial before filing the Complaintlet alone issue a reasonable cause determination as to those allegations or conciliate them. Id. at . The district court concluded that the EEOC wholly abandoned its statutory duties as to the remaining 67 allegedly aggrieved persons for whom the EEOC . . . intend[ed] to seek relief at trial. Id. The court based its conclusion upon the following, undisputed facts:  The EEOC did not investigate the specific allegations of any of the 67 allegedly aggrieved persons until after the Complaint was filed. For example, the EEOC did not interview any witnesses or subpoena any documents to determine whether any of their allegations were true.  The EEOC did not identify any of the 67 allegedly aggrieved persons as members of the Letter of Determination's class until after it filed the Complaint. Indeed, prior to filing the Complaint, CRST enquired as to the size of the class[,] and the EEOC responded that it did not know.  The EEOC did not make a reasonable[-]cause determination as to the specific allegations of any of the 67 allegedly aggrieved persons prior to filing the Complaint. Indeed, at the time the EEOC issued the Letter of Determination on July 12, 2007, 27 of the remaining 67 allegedly aggrieved persons had not yet been sexually harassed. Indeed, most of these 27 women allege they were sexually harassed after the instant lawsuit was filed. Although 38 of the remaining 40 allegedly aggrieved persons allege [that] they were sexually harassed before the EEOC issued the Letter of Determination on July 12, 2007, the EEOC admits that it was not even aware of their allegations until after the filing of the Complaint. The EEOC used discovery in the instant lawsuit to find them.  The EEOC did not attempt to conciliate the specific allegations of the 67 allegedly aggrieved persons prior to filing the Complaint. Id. (internal footnote omitted). The EEOC's suit alleging multiple acts of discrimination by CRST arose out of Starke's single initiating charge. Relevant precedents permit such an expansion by the EEOC, so long as the EEOC satisfies all of its pre-suit obligations for each additional claim. The Supreme Court has observed that when the EEOC brings suits under § 706 on behalf of a group of aggrieved persons, the EEOC is master of its own case. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 291, 122 S.Ct. 754, 151 L.Ed.2d 755 (2002). And, as a general rule, the nature and extent of an EEOC investigation into a discrimination claim is a matter within the discretion of that agency. EEOC v. KECO Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 1097, 1100 (6th Cir.1984). Although the EEOC enjoys wide latitude in investigating and filing lawsuits related to charges of discrimination, Title VII limits that latitude to some degree by `plac[ing] a strong emphasis on administrative, rather than judicial, resolution of disputes.' U.S. Equal Opportunity Comm'n v. Dillard's Inc., No. 08-CV-1780-IEG (PCL), 2011 WL 2784516, at  (S.D.Cal. July 14, 2011) (slip op.) (quoting EEOC v. Jillian's of Indianapolis, Ind., Inc., 279 F.Supp.2d 974, 979 (S.D.Ind. 2003)). For our part, we have recognized that [t]he permissible scope of an EEOC lawsuit is not confined to the specific allegations in the charge; rather, it may extend to any discrimination like or related to the substance of the allegations in the charge and which reasonably can be expected to grow out of the investigation triggered by the charge. The original charge is sufficient to support EEOC action, including a civil suit, for any discrimination stated in the charge or developed during a reasonable investigation of the charge, so long as the additional allegations of discrimination are included in the reasonable cause determination and subject to a conciliation proceeding. EEOC v. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d 664, 668 (8th Cir.1992) (emphasis added). Thus, while [t]he EEOC may seek relief on behalf of individuals beyond the charging parties and for alleged wrongdoing beyond those originally charged, it must discover such individuals and wrongdoing during the course of its investigation.  Dillard's Inc., 2011 WL 2784516, at  (citing Jillian's, 279 F.Supp.2d at 980; EEOC v. Harvey L. Walner & Assoc., 91 F.3d 963, 968 (7th Cir.1996) ([The] EEOC may allege in a complaint whatever unlawful conduct it has uncovered during the course of its investigation, provided that there is a reasonable nexus between the initial charge and the subsequent allegations in the complaint.); EEOC v. United Parcel Serv., 94 F.3d 314, 318 (7th Cir.1996) ([The EEOC] may, to the extent warranted by an investigation reasonably related in scope to the allegations of the underlying charge, seek relief on behalf of individuals beyond the charging parties who are identified during the investigation.); Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of E. Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 380 (6th Cir.2002) ([W]here facts related with respect to the charged claim would prompt the EEOC to investigate a different, uncharged claim, the plaintiff is not precluded from bringing suit on that claim. (internal quotation marks omitted)); EEOC v. Farmer Bros. Co., 31 F.3d 891, 899 (9th Cir.1994) ([T]he jurisdictional scope of [an individual] Title VII claimant's court action depends upon the scope of both the EEOC charge and the EEOC investigation.) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The relatedness of the initial charge, the EEOC's investigation and conciliation efforts, and the allegations in the complaint is necessary to provide the defendant-employer adequate notice of the charges against it and a genuine opportunity to resolve all charges through conciliation. Id. (citing EEOC v. Outback Steak House of Fla., Inc., 520 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1263 (D.Colo.2007) (citing EEOC v. Am. Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185 (4th Cir.1981))). In summary, while we recognize that [t]he EEOC enjoys significant latitude to investigate claims of discrimination, and to allege claims in federal court based on the results of its investigations, we find a clear and important distinction between `facts gathered during the scope of an investigation and facts gathered during the discovery phase of an already-filed lawsuit.' Id. at  (quoting Jillian's, 279 F.Supp.2d at 982). [12] Where the scope of its pre-litigation efforts are limitedin terms of geography, number of claimants, or nature of claimsthe EEOC `may not use discovery in the resulting lawsuit as a fishing expedition to uncover more violations.' Id. (quoting EEOC v. Target Corp., No. 02-C-146, 2007 WL 1461298 (E.D.Wis. May 16, 2007) (citing Walner, 91 F.3d at 971)). Here, after Bloomer discovered during the course of her investigation that Essig, Morgan, Peeples, and Thiel had filed formal charges of discrimination against CRST for alleged sexual harassment, the EEOC requested that CRST provide `a copy of all other [c]harges of [d]iscrimination that [CRST] has received in the past five years from any government agency that alleges sexual harassment.' CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 2524402, at . It additionally requested that CRST provide `the name, gender, home address, and home telephone number of all employees that were trained by either [Smith] and/or [Goodman],' including `the dates of the training and documentation of any complaints made against these two trainers by any of these trainees.' Id. The EEOC later requested information for female driver[s] that began [their] employment on or after January 1, 2005. Id. at . Although CRST felt that the EEOC's request for such information was overly broad, it ultimately mailed the remainder of the information to the EEOC on a computer disc. Id. at . Thereafter, the EEOC issued a Letter of Determination to CRST, stating, inter alia, that `there is reasonable cause to believe that [CRST] has subjected a class of employees and prospective employees to sexual harassment, in violation of Title VII.' Id. at . The Letter of Determination did not provide CRST with any notice as to the size of the `class of employees and prospective employees [subjected] to sexual harassment.' Id. at . And, during conciliation, the EEOC was unable to provide [CRST] names of all class members. . ., or an indication of the size of the class. Id. at . Likewise, the EEOC's Complaint provides no indication of how many `similarly situated female employees' the EEOC alleged to exist. Id. at . It was not until after the commencement of the instant suit that the EEOC sought to ascertain the size of the class. See id. at  (On May 29, 2008, for example, the EEOC sent 2,000 letters to former CRST female employees to solicit their participation in this lawsuit. On September 28, 2008, the EEOC sent another 730 solicitation letters to former CRST female employees. There was a clear and present danger that this case would drag on for years as the EEOC conducted wide-ranging discovery and continued to identify allegedly aggrieved persons. The EEOC's litigation strategy was untenable: CRST faced a continuously moving target of allegedly aggrieved persons, the risk of never-ending discovery and indefinite continuance of trial.). The number of purported class members continuously changed throughout the discovery process. See id. at -10. Ultimately, the EEOC identified 67 members of the class. Id. at . The EEOC's aforementioned conduct demonstrates that it did not reasonably investigate the class allegations of sexual harassment during a reasonable investigation of the charge. Delight Wholesale Co., 973 F.2d at 668. Instead, it engaged in fact-gathering as to the class during the discovery phase of an already-filed lawsuit. Dillard's Inc., 2011 WL 2784516, at  (quotation and citation omitted). Our review of the undisputed facts demonstrates that the EEOC was us[ing] discovery in the resulting lawsuit as a fishing expedition to uncover more violations. Id. (quotation and citation omitted). [T]he EEOC did not investigate the specific allegations of any of the 67 allegedly aggrieved persons [, i.e., the class members,] until after the Complaint was filed. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 2524402, at  (emphasis added). Tellingly, at the time the EEOC issued the Letter of Determination on July 12, 2007, 27 of the remaining 67 allegedly aggrieved persons had not yet been sexually harassed Indeed, most of these 27 women allege they were sexually harassed after the instant lawsuit was filed. Although 38 of the remaining 40 allegedly aggrieved persons allege they were sexually harassed before the EEOC issued the Letter of Determination on July 12, 2007, the EEOC admits that it was not even aware of their allegations until after the filing of the Complaint. Id. Absent an investigation and reasonable cause determination apprising the employer of the charges lodged against it, the employer has no meaningful opportunity to conciliate. See EEOC v. Gen. Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 366 n. 14 (4th Cir.1976) (Since the determination of reasonable cause defines the framework for conciliation, it follows that the issues to be litigated here must be those which can fairly be said to be encompassed within the determination resulting from the [initiating] charge.) (quotations and citation omitted). [13] Moreover, contrary to the EEOC's contention, the district court did not abuse its discretion in opting to dismiss, rather than stay, the EEOC's complaint as to these 67 women. Under § 706(f)(1) of Title VII, [u]pon request, the court may, in its discretion, stay further proceedings for not more than sixty days pending . . . further efforts of the EEOC to obtain voluntary compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (emphasis added). The EEOC concedes in its brief that our review of the district court's decision to stay or dismiss an EEOC suit for failure to satisfy Title VII's pre-suit requirements is for abuse of discretion. In its order below, the district court concluded that [h]ere, dismissal is a severe but appropriate remedy, footnoting that it might have stayed the instant action for further conciliation in lieu of dismissal [h]ad the EEOC not wholly abdicated its role in the administrative process. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 2009 WL 2524402, at  & n. 24. The present record confirms that the EEOC wholly failed to satisfy its statutory pre-suit obligations as to these 67 women, thus we cannot conclude that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing the EEOC's suit.