Opinion ID: 494124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Right to the Transcript

Text: 7 On the morning of the suppression hearing defendant Ariel filed a motion for continuance of the trial, which was scheduled to begin the following day, until a transcript of the hearing could be provided. The district court, in denying the motion, stated that counsel would have to rely on their notes because the court reporter could not be forced to transcribe the hearing overnight. Appellants claim that the court abused its discretion because the transcript was vital for impeachment at trial of the government's key witness, the undercover agent. At the hearing, the agent testified that Ariel opened the door when he was leaving to buy shoes for Flores, whereas at trial, the agent testified that he himself opened the door. This is the only discrepancy alleged in the agent's testimony. 8 Considering the overwhelming evidence against defendants, this difference in the agent's testimony, even assuming an abuse in the court's discretion, a conclusion which is not justified by the circumstances, is not sufficient to constitute prejudice. See, e.g., United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329, 1333-34 (11th Cir.) (admission of telephone statements of coconspirator later charged in superseding indictment, if error, harmless beyond reasonable doubt because defendant's participation in conspiracy established by overwhelming independent evidence), aff'd per curiam, 691 F.2d 977, 978 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1082, 103 S.Ct. 1771, 76 L.Ed.2d 344 (1983); United States v. Glover, 677 F.2d 57, 59 (10th Cir.1982) (dictum) (admission of coconspirator's testimony before defendant's participation in conspiracy shown, if error, harmless because testimony not particularly inculpatory and conspiracy proved by sufficient competent evidence). This minor detail would have had no impact on the jury's decision. In United States v. Sullivan, 694 F.2d 1348, 1349 (2d Cir.1982), the denial of a new defense counsel's motion to adjourn sentencing pending receipt of the trial transcript was held to be harmless error because no specific prejudice was shown from the lack of the transcript at sentencing. Appellants cannot appeal an error from which no harm resulted. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(a). Since there was no prejudice, we do not consider whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion.