Opinion ID: 583356
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: sentencing guideline departure.

Text: 74 The last issue in Barr's appeal which we will discuss at length is the sentence imposed. At the sentencing hearing, the district court departed upward four levels on the basis of what it found to be an aggravating circumstance not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission: the fact that Henry Barr held a high ranking position with the Department of Justice and that criminal activity by public officials tends to erode public confidence in government. App. at 724. 75 Barr challenges this departure as violating federal law on several grounds. He argues that the four level upward departure cannot be supported by the record, because (1) issues relating to conduct affecting the public trust have already been taken into consideration by the guidelines, (2) the aggravating circumstance requisite for departure under the sentencing guidelines did not exist on the facts of this case, (3) the court did not give notice of its intention to depart as mandated by the Supreme Court in Burns v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991), and (4) the degree of departure cannot be deemed reasonable. 76 The procedure for our review of sentencing departures is well-established. District courts are required to impose a sentence within the applicable guideline range unless they find that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1098 (3d Cir.1990) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1988)). If a district court bases its decision to depart on a circumstance that has been adequately considered by the sentencing commission in formulating the guidelines, the departure must be reversed on appeal. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(1) (1988)). Appellate review of this issue is plenary. Id. (citing United States v. Ryan, 866 F.2d 604, 610 (3d Cir.1989)). In determining whether a circumstance has been adequately taken into consideration by the sentencing guidelines, a court shall consider only the sentencing guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary of the Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b). 77 We will begin our consideration of this question by examining the documents prepared for the sentencing both by the Probation Office and by the parties. 78 To assist the Probation Officer in his preparation of the Presentence Report, the defendant submitted Defendant's Version of the Offense, App. at 744-74, and the U.S. Attorney submitted a Sentencing Memorandum, App. at 776-83. The defendant's submission focused on acceptance of responsibility and, in fact, the original Presentence Report awarded Barr a two level reduction in offense level for acceptance of responsibility. App. at 736, p 36. The defendant made no mention in this memorandum of any departure from the guidelines, either up or down. 79 The U.S. Attorney in his Sentencing Memorandum noted: 80 It is the position of the United States that the defendant abused a position of public trust in a manner which significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense. As was testified to at trial, Henry Barr was brought in under a special exemption by the Attorney General. That special exemption and his high position of public trust caused the Security Office of the Department of Justice to give great deference to his representations where most applicants are thoroughly investigated prior to granting them any access to national security information. Thus, Barr's position of public trust significantly facilitated the concealment of the offense, thereby warranting an increase in his guideline level by two additional levels. 4 81 App. at 782. The U.S. Attorney then recommended, [b]ased upon the abuse of the public trust by a high-ranking public official as well as the significant security risk that the United States was exposed to by Henry Barr's drug activity and his misrepresentations, that Barr be sentenced to a significant period of confinement. App. at 782-83. No request was made in the Government's Sentencing Memorandum for any departure from the guidelines. 82 In the first version of the Presentence Report, dated March 15, 1991, the Probation Officer noted the Government's request for the two level increase: 83 The Government's sentencing memorandum reflects that the defendant abused a position of public trust in a manner which significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the false statement offenses. The Government contends that Mr. Barr was brought in under special exemption and his high position of public trust caused the security office of the Department of Justice to give great deference to his representations where most applicants are thoroughly investigated prior to granting them any access to nation [sic] security information. 84 The probation officer does not believe that the enhancement for abuse of a position of public trust is applicable in this case. There is no indication that the defendant used his position as Assistant to the Attorney General to facilitate his making false statements to the Government. While his position at the Department of Justice may have contributed to that department giving him deference with regard to representations made on an application and during an interview, it does not appear that Mr. Barr took any affirmative or overt action to conceal his false statements or to hinder his background investigation. 85 App. at 735. 5 As we note above, the Probation Officer also included, in his calculation of the Offense Level in this original version of the Presentence Report, a two level reduction reflecting what he found to be Barr's acceptance of responsibility. 86 At the conclusion of the Presentence Report, Paragraph 68, Factors That May Warrant Departure, the Probation Officer commented that the Court could increase the sentence above the guideline range if the defendant committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense. He commented that Barr's false statements concealed his past possession of cocaine but noted that the increase in offense level resulting from the application of the multiple counts provisions may have adequately addressed this matter. The Probation Officer concluded by stating that he had identified no other factors warranting a departure. App. at 742-43. 87 On April 5, 1991, the U.S. Attorney sent a letter to the Probation Officer, commenting on the Presentence Report. He objected to the award of a two level reduction in the offense level for acceptance of responsibility. He then turned to Barr's violation of public trust: 88 Second, beyond Mr. Barr's failure to give any meaningful acknowledgement of guilt, of the consequences of his conduct and of its effect upon law enforcement efforts in this country, the Pre-Sentence Report does not, in the Government's view, accord sufficient recognition of the importance of the high position of public trust violated by Henry Barr. In fact, the Report makes no distinction between Mr. Barr and a gas station attendant, for example, in terms of his actions or his responsibility. Mr. Barr was an Assistant to the chief law enforcement office [sic] of the United States and handled criminal and intelligence matters. The seriousness of Mr. Barr's conduct in light of the access he had to highly sensitive law enforcement information and to national security information needs to be addressed and underscored both by your office and by the Court. 89 App. at 786. The U.S. Attorney also commented in this letter on the advisability of an upward adjustment of two levels for obstruction of justice, relating to the 1986 investigation of Richard Guida. 90 The Probation Officer issued a revised Presentence Report on April 8, 1991. He amended his previous calculations of the offense level to delete the two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because the materials and post-trial statements submitted by the defendant did not completely meet guideline criteria. App. at 793. Paragraph 68, Factors That May Warrant Departure, was identical to the Paragraph 68 included in the March 15 version of the report. App. at 800. 6 91 The defendant responded to this revised report by objecting to the failure to award the two level reduction for acceptance of responsibility. 92 On April 18, 1991, a second revised Presentence Report was issued by the Probation Office. Again, a two level reduction for defendant's acceptance of responsibility was not granted. In this second revised report, the Probation Officer calculated a Total Offense Level of 8, calling for two to eight months imprisonment. Paragraph 68, Factors That May Warrant Departure, remained the same. App. at 865. 93 In the Addendum to the April 18 report, the Probation Officer noted that the Government had identified four objections in its Sentencing Memorandum and letter. One of these had been resolved by disallowing the reduction for acceptance of responsibility. The other three objections were described as referring to 1) Paragraph 19 of the report, Adjustment for Role in the Offense; 2) Paragraph 13, Adjustment for Obstruction of Justice; and 3) Paragraph 68, Factors That May Warrant Departure. Concerning the objection to Role in the Offense, the Probation Officer repeated the two paragraphs from his March 15 Report on abuse of a position of public trust, including his conclusion that enhancement for abuse of such a position was not applicable in this case. App. at 866. 94 In his comments in regard to the third Government objection, the Probation Officer stated: 95 In its letter, the Government also contends that the presentence report fails to accord sufficient recognition to the unique combination of offense and Governmental position in the defendant's case, and indicates that these aggravating circumstances need to be addressed by both the probation office and the Court. There is the inference that the circumstances may warrant an upward departure. 96 In response, the probation officer notes that the grounds for departure listed in Section 5K2.1 through 5K2.15 of the Guidelines generally involve actual conduct or tangible consequences as justification for an upward departure. Although there may have been the potential for abuse, there is no evidence that Mr. Barr compromised his position while in Government service. As noted by the Government, a defendant's employment background is not ordinarily relevant to guideline calculations. The matter raised by the Government may be better addressed, if at all, through imposition of a sentence within the applicable guideline range rather than through an upward departure. 97 App. at 867 (emphasis added). 98 The Probation Officer concluded the section addressing the Government's objections by commenting that these objections would need to be resolved by the Court. 99 At the sentencing hearing, the district court denied both the Government's requests to increase and the defense's request to decrease the Probation Officer's calculated Total Offense Level of 8. In doing so, the judge commented that 100 the Probation Officer resolved all of the objections correctly, and for the reasons that have been communicated to the parties in the pre-sentence report. And we accept the reasons of the Probation Officer in their resolution and will affirm the resolution in each instance by the Probation Officer. 101 App. at 705. 7 After resolving the objections, the trial judge determined that he would depart upward from the guidelines in imposing sentence. He found that 102 aggravating circumstance exist [sic] that was not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines. The calculated guideline range gives no consideration to the fact that Henry Barr held a high ranking position with the Department of Justice and that criminal activity by public officials tends to erode public confidence in government. As an Assistant to the Attorney General, Henry Barr served as a liaison to various law enforcement agencies. He was responsible for reviewing sensitive and classified information related to criminal and intelligence matters. For these reasons, the Court is departing upward four levels to a guideline range of 10 to 16 months. App. at 724. 8 103 Barr's first argument in support of his appeal of the sentence is that the issues relating to his employment and to conduct affecting the public trust already have been taken into consideration by the sentencing guidelines and, therefore, the reasons articulated by the district court are insufficient to justify the departure under § 3553(b). Specifically, he points to guideline § 3B1.3 which provides: If the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill, in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense, increase by two levels. Barr argues that this section reflects the Commission's judgment that it is not the position that should be considered in imposing judgment of sentence, but whether or not the position is used to facilitate the commission of an offense. 104 It may be correct that § 3B1.3 itself speaks directly only to those abuses of public trust that facilitate the commission or concealment of an offense. We do not agree, however, with Barr's contention that the language of this section reflects the Commission's considered judgment that a combination of high-ranking position and criminal activity other than that which specifically falls under § 3B1.3 can never be deemed the type of aggravating circumstance that justifies departure under § 3553(b). Our review of the guidelines, policy statements, and the relevant commentary leads us to the opposite conclusion. In fact, the guideline's general application principles for departure state that, with the exception of several factors not applicable to Barr's case, the Commission does not intend to limit the kinds of factors, whether or not mentioned anywhere else in the guidelines, that could constitute grounds for departure in an unusual case. Sentencing Guidelines Chapter One, Part 4, Departures. Thus we reject Barr's contention that the district court's departure was erroneous because the circumstances relied upon for the departure had been taken into consideration by guideline § 3B1.3. 105 Barr also asserts that the district court erred in finding that in his position as Assistant to the Attorney General he was involved in preventing criminal activity by public officials. In particular, Barr points to the Attorney General's testimony that Barr had no substantive law enforcement responsibilities. See App. at 370. 106 Barr is correct in asserting that the circumstances relied upon by the district court in departing from the guidelines must in fact exist. We are required, however, to accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e). See also Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1098. The district court made the following findings in conjunction with sentencing Barr: 107 As an Assistant to the Attorney General, Henry Barr served as a liaison to various law enforcement agencies. He was responsible for reviewing sensitive and classified information related to criminal and intelligence matters. He was involved in preventing criminal activity by public officials. 108 App. at 724. 109 Our review of the record reveals that then-Attorney General Thornburgh testified that Barr served as a liaison between the Attorney General's office and various law enforcement and intelligence agencies with whom we dealt.... He would process information that came to my office, review the paper work, and carry out any assignments that I had that related to pending matters within the criminal and intelligence community. App. at 369-70. Testimony concerning Barr's duties at the Justice Department was also presented by Mary Lawton, the Justice Department Counsel for Intelligence Policy. Ms. Lawton explained that Barr was responsible for reviewing, before passing on to the Attorney General, each application made under the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act for permission to wiretap for intelligence, counter-intelligence, and counter-terrorism purposes. These applications were classified either secret or top secret. App. at 237. Ms. Lawton further testified that Barr was responsible for reviewing requests by intelligence agencies to engage in undercover activities for counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism purposes. App. at 240. Based on this testimony, we conclude that the district court's findings of fact can not be deemed clearly erroneous. We, therefore, reject Barr's argument that the aggravating circumstance upon which the district judge based his departure from the guidelines did not exist on the facts of this case. 110 As his next challenge to the upward departure, Barr alleges that the district court erred in failing to give notice of its intention to depart from the sentencing guidelines. If indeed the court did fail to give notice, we must vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing. The Supreme Court has recently held in Burns v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991), that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 requires a district court to provide reasonable notice that it is contemplating departure from the sentencing guidelines on a ground not identified as a ground for upward departure either in the presentence report or in a prehearing submission by the Government. Such notice must specifically identify the ground on which the district court is contemplating an upward departure. Burns, 111 S.Ct. at 2187. 111 To resolve this question, we must look to the record developed prior to and during the sentencing hearing. We have described above the various communications between the attorneys and the Probation Officer. As a result of our review of these documents, we find that Barr's claim regarding notice has merit. The Government nowhere directly requests a departure. The only reference to a likelihood of departure is the Probation Officer's finding of an inference in the Government's April 5, 1991, letter that the circumstances of the unique combination of offense and Governmental position in Barr's case may warrant an upward departure. App. at 867. This inference is not endorsed by the Probation Officer; he is of the opinion that the matter may be better addressed, if addressed at all, through imposition of a sentence within the applicable guideline range rather than through an upward departure. Id. Thus, the Probation Officer, finding just an inference of such a contention by the Government, does not deem a departure appropriate or give the defendant sufficient notice that a departure is sought. 112 Moreover, even if one might have considered the inference to be a request by the Government for departure, the trial court at the sentencing hearing resolved the Government's objections by adopting the determinations of the Probation Officer, including perforce the recommendation that abuse of position would be better addressed through imposition of a sentence within the applicable guideline range. One must assume from the language of the court that it was considering all objections, including the Probation Officer's response to the inferred Government objections to Paragraph 68, Factors that May Warrant Departure. As the court stated, 113 In this case I spent some time, after reviewing the report, in conferring with the Probation Department and doing some independent research. We're wrong sometime and we're right sometime. But, after our research, and an examination of these objections, as well as the arguments that were made here today, I'm perfectly satisfied that the Probation Officer resolved all of the objections correctly, and for the reasons that have communicated to the parties in the pre-sentence report. And we accept the reasons of the Probation Officer in their resolution and will affirm the resolution in each instance by the Probation Officer. 114 App. at 705. 115 When the court then announced the upward departure due to aggravating circumstances not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines, i.e., that Henry Barr held a high ranking position with the Department of Justice and that criminal activity by public officials tends to erode public confidence in government, App. at 724, the court, as a consequence of its prior resolution of the objections to the Presentence Report, already had eliminated the Government's inferred grounds for departure. It is not clear to us how the grounds cited by the court for departure in fact differ from the Government's inferred grounds. However, it is exactly because this is not clear that the defendant could not have had adequate notice either that the court was contemplating departure or, if so, of the grounds for that departure. In effect the court decided the factual and legal predicates for departure without notifying the parties. Such a procedure is now forbidden by Burns. Consequently, we will vacate Barr's sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing, with instructions both to provide Barr with the requisite notice of any ground on which the court contemplates an upward departure, and to determine the degree of departure from the guidelines in the manner that it finds appropriate for this case. 9 See Kikumura, 918 F.2d at 1113.IV. ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY. 116 Finally, we reject Barr's contention that the district court erred in denying him a reduction in sentence for acceptance of responsibility. Section 3E1.1(a) of the sentencing guidelines authorizes a reduction of two levels in the sentence of a defendant who clearly demonstrates a recognition and affirmative acceptance of personal responsibility for his criminal conduct. 117 The district court adopted the rationale of the Probation Officer, 10 who suggested that the court deny such a reduction in Barr's sentence for acceptance of responsibility. In making this suggestion, the Probation Officer explained that Barr submitted materials to him indicating that Barr was engaged in unsuccessful plea negotiations with the Government up to the time of trial. During these negotiations Barr expressed willingness to plead guilty to either drug possession or false statement charges. Because no agreement was reached, Barr proceeded to trial not necessarily to deny his offense conduct but to preserve certain issues for appeal. App. at 856. In the Addendum to the presentence report, the Probation Officer further explained that, after Barr was found guilty, the Probation Officer interviewed him, and requested that he submit a written statement that would in part provide information relative to the guideline adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. A statement was promptly received, but [the Probation Officer] felt the statement fell short as a direct acknowledgement of essential simple misconduct. 11 App. at 868. Barr later responded affirmatively when questioned by the Probation Officer regarding whether he had committed the offense conduct described in the indictment. Id. 118 On appeal, Barr reiterates the argument that he chose to go to trial only to preserve the issue of the applicability of the exculpatory no doctrine to the facts of his case for appeal, not to contest factual guilt. 119 Because the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate a defendant's acceptance of responsibility, we give great deference on review to a sentencing judge's decision not to apply the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility to a particular defendant. See Guidelines § 3E1.1 application note 5; United States v. Riviere, 924 F.2d 1289 (3d Cir.1991) (appellate review of a district court's determination of this question is under the clearly erroneous standard); United States v. Singh, 923 F.2d 1039, 1042-43 (3d Cir.1991) (a sentencing judge's evaluation of a defendant's acceptance of responsibility should not be disturbed unless it is without foundation). 120 In light of the entire record, including the parties' conflicting accounts of the course of the pre-trial negotiations, and the Probation Officer's finding that Barr's written statement fell short as a direct acknowledgement of essential simple misconduct, we cannot say that the court's determination that Barr had not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct, and therefore was not entitled to a two-level reduction in his sentence, was clearly erroneous.