Opinion ID: 3063901
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the enterprise structure and operation

Text: We will describe the entire operation here in some detail, as this is necessary 4 when considering the reasonableness of the sentences imposed by the district court.
The Defendants were part of an organized crime enterprise (the Corporation) that ran “bolita,” a numbers gambling operation in New York and New Jersey. The organization was devoted to making as much money as possible – especially for those at the top – through numerous bolita gambling locations. It also existed to protect that money by any means necessary. The indictment charges that the conspiracy began in 1964, and involved the commission of a variety of predicate acts, including murder, arson, and money-laundering. Jose Battle, Sr. was at various times the head of the Corporation and was the father and codefendant of Battle, Jr., who also played a leadership role for a certain period of time. Battle Sr. plead guilty, but he died after he was sentenced. Acuna was a long-time confederate of Battle, Sr., who acted as Battle Sr.’s bodyguard and worked as an “enforcer” for the organization. In the beginning Abraham Rydz and fellow Cuban emigres, including Battle Sr., Juan Mojica, and Humberto Davila, operated separate bolita operations in New York and New Jersey. Over time, Rydz became a partner of Mojica, who had moved to Spain, Antonio Rodriguez, who lived in Florida, and Luis Tinta. Rydz and Tinta managed 40 bolita “spots” (a location such as a business or store where a 5 bolita worker took bets, also known as a “store” or “bank”) that collected over a million dollars in bets per week. Davila’s bolita operation, known as the “Company,” rivaled Battle Sr.’s Corporation. The Corporation’s enforcers would ensure compliance with the “two-block rule” (that a new spot could not be opened within two blocks of a competitor’s existing spot) by first issuing a warning to business owners and workers; if unsuccessful, enforcers would then resort to such tactics as destruction of property, arson, assault, extortion, and murder. In 1977, Battle Sr. and Acuna were tried for the murder of Ernesto Torres, a former Corporation employee. Torres had left the organization because of a dispute with Battle, Sr. over his own outside gambling activities, which Battle, Sr. believed were inconsistent with the interests of the organization. Torres also owed the organization bolita money that he had collected as a banker. After Torres kidnapped and killed one of the Corporation's bankers, Acuna and Battle, Sr. tracked Torres down in Florida, where he was living with his girlfriend Idalia Fernandez. Acting under the direct orders of Battle, Sr. Acuna entered the apartment, shot and wounded Fernandez while she watched television in the living room, and following a shootout with Torres, shot and killed him in the bedroom closet. The deposition testimony of two witnesses from that murder trial, Carlos 6 Hernandez and Idalia Fernandez, was read into the record in the instant case. Within weeks of being deposed, Fernandez was shot to death in New York. Battle, Sr. plead guilty to conspiracy to murder Torres and the charges against Acuna were dismissed.2 Upon release from prison in late 1979, Battle, Sr. began working with his son, who in a sense, had been “tutored” in the bolita business by Rydz at Battle, Sr.’s request. Manuel Marquez, Sr., his uncle, helped run the operations. Rydz asked Battle, Jr. if he could represent that they were partners so that Battle, Sr.’s reputation would afford Rydz’s some protection. Battle, Jr. agreed. Rydz’s partners wanted to retire, and Rydz, needing protection, agreed to merge his bolita operation into the Battles’ smaller business. At that point, Rydz, Battle, Jr. and Battle Sr. each received 16% of the profits, and Marquez was paid a percentage of the business as a salary. This combined organization operated in Queens, the Bronx, Brooklyn and in portions of Manhattan. Battle, Sr. confided to Rydz that he had gone to Miami in 1976 in order to get rid of Torres, and that he would also like to get rid of Fernandez, who had been with Torres when he was murdered. Battle, Sr. later told Rydz that Fernandez had to be “disappeared” because she had witnessed Torres’ 2 Specifically, Battle, Sr. was convicted on conspiracy and solicitation counts, but on appeal, the conspiracy charge was dismissed and the solicitation counts were reversed; he later pleaded guilty to conspiracy and was sentenced to 33 months’ probation with credit for time served. Acuna had absconded after the 1977 Torres murder charge; he was arrested in 1984. 7 murder and had testified against Battle Sr. in his murder trial. (Fernandez had testified that on June 16, 1976, after she and Torres fled to Florida, that Acuna broke into their Hialeah, Florida apartment, shot her in the face and chest, and, when she awoke, she discovered Torres had been killed.) Rydz and Battle, Jr., now allies, moved to Miami in 1982, and Battle Sr. likewise relocated there. Battle, Sr. set up a 20-acre farm called “El Zapotal.” While Marquez managed bolita operations on a day-to-day basis, Rydz and Battle, Jr. called Marquez and others in New York on a daily basis, checking on operations and managing the business. Rydz and Battle, Jr. traveled to New York at least twice a month to review gambling records and reports, claim their percentage of profits in cash, and make management decisions. Employees of the enterprise transported millions in cash from New York to Miami and delivered the money to Battle, Jr., Rydz, and Battle Sr. and later, to Marquez, after he relocated to Florida. The testimony at the trial in the instant matter showed that the enterprise expanded quickly to the point where by 1988, it operated 250-300 spots and 12-15 offices for processing bets, counting cash and keeping records. It involved the use of bankers who, in exchange for operating spots, would be reimbursed for operational overhead, would be provided protection, and would receive a portion of the profits. 8 Competition with Davila increased. In response to Davila’s establishment of competing spots in violation of the two-block rule, the enterprise began an arson campaign, burning out spots in order to protect its share of the business, maintain the respect of its competitors and preserve the loyalty of its bankers and employees. The enforcers were paid to commit bodily harm, arson, and murder. From 1983 through 1984, one enforcer paid a thug for 30 to 35 arsons of rival bolita spots. Some arsons resulted in deaths. The Corporation established an account called “UNESCO” to pay for these arsons and other enforcement actions, including bail and legal defense of enterprise employees or associates. Battle, Jr. did not favor the arsons and preferred to negotiate when the two-block rule was violated; in fact, Battle, Jr. never authorized an arson before it was committed. Nevertheless, both Rydz and Battle Jr. continued to receive bolita profits while the arson campaign raged on and for years thereafter. Acuna served as Battle Sr.’s bodyguard and personal assistant. He also worked as an enforcer, collecting money from delinquent debtors, sometimes by force.
The evidence at trial further established the laundering of the enterprise’s bolita proceeds. Battle, Jr., Rydz, Battle, Sr., Marquez and others – with the help of the accountant for the criminal organization, Orestes Vidan – concealed the 9 enterprise’s proceeds in domestic and foreign bank accounts and foreign corporation’s bank accounts (located in Panama and Curacao). Battle, Jr. and his co-conspirators used nominee names or “front men” to hide the true identities of the owners of the money. The main persons used as nominees or “front men” for these foreign corporations were Vidan and Maurilio Marquez, the brother of Marquez, Sr. Marquez, Sr., Rydz, and Battle, Jr. each had foreign bank accounts set up in Switzerland. The money was either wire transferred to the Swiss accounts through nominee accounts in the names of Vidan and Maurilio Marquez, or was body carried directly to Switzerland. They also invested their bolita earnings in real estate or otherwise legitimate businesses to avoid arrest, hide the illegal source of their wealth, and provide for their children. One such business was Union Financial Research (“UFR”), a mortgage company located in Florida, where Battle, Jr. and Rydz worked and in which they had acquired a 25% interest. Another was a clothing manufacturing business. Cash from the Corporation’s illegal gambling operations was also physically carried by members of the conspiracy to Panama, where it was deposited into various foreign bank accounts in the names of various foreign corporations. The most significant of these foreign corporations were Panamanian corporations, Voltaire Trading and Investment Corporation (“Voltaire”) and Aztec Financial 10 Enterprises, Inc. (“Aztec”), both of which were incorporated in Panama and utilized to invest in real estate in south Florida, and Stanara N.V. (“Stanara”), which was incorporated in the Netherlands Antilles. One of the primary money laundering schemes was to transfer the money as “loans” from the foreign corporations to a series of domestic corporations which were partially or wholly owned by members of the criminal enterprise. These corporations would then pay members of the Corporation large salaries. The first one of these domestic corporations was UFR, the mortgage company incorporated in Florida. In 1983 Rydz and Battle, Jr. were stopped at JFK airport carrying $500,000 in bolita cash that they had obtained from Marquez in New York. The cash was seized. Battle, Jr. was carrying a report of bolita business for the week of April 2, 1983, which listed $2,173,448 in assets and possibly accounts receivable, and the contents of the UNESCO account. The publicity surrounding the seizure caused the bank which had loaned $20 million to UFR to demand the identity of the source of the funds which Battle, Jr. and Rydz had loaned the company. This, in turn, caused Rydz and Battle to cash out of UFR. This return of capital contributions were transferred by Vidan through various foreign bank accounts and ultimately wound up in Union Bank of Switzerland accounts belonging to Battle, Jr. and 11 Rydz. The evidence at trial also showed that several domestic clothing manufacturing businesses were involved in the manufacturing and sale of women’s clothing to further launder illegal gambling proceeds. In order to buy into these domestic companies, Rydz and Battle, Jr. received money in the form of “loans” from another puppet company, Stanara Company Corporation (“Stanara Corp.”) Battle and Rydz also laundered bolita proceeds through commercial real estate corporations which held accounts oversees. The Corporation also utilized companies to purchase real properties in Florida, construct multi-million dollar homes on the properties, and then “lease” the residences to the owners of the illegal gambling money. This included Voltaire’s purchase of 350 Island Drive, Key Biscayne, Florida, using Battle, Sr.’s bolita proceeds; this house was leased by Voltaire to Battle, Jr.’s mother in 1984. Battle, Jr. eventually sold the house for $1.9 million in 2001. Of this, $281,000 received at closing was deposited in Voltaire’s account at Ocean Bank, most of which was later wired to Marquez’s account in Curacao, and then to a Swiss account owned by Battle, Jr. Voltaire held a $1.3 million balloon mortgage on the house from the buyer, and Battle, Jr. ordered that this mortgage be assigned to Key Financial Services in return for $150,000. Battle owned stock in Key Financial 12 Services, which received interest payments on the house, $285,000 in cash, and then took a loss on the sale in 2002. Similarly, in 1984 Rydz and Marquez purchased real estate at 730 and 740 Mashta Drive, Key Biscayne, through a Panamanian corporation, Aztec Financial Enterprises; the money came from UFR proceeds as well as other Panamanian accounts containing bolita proceeds. Marquez later transferred title to lot 730 to Battle, Jr. Rydz and Battle, Jr. supervised the enterprise’s bolita operations in New York and New Jersey until early 1989. At a funeral for a family member, Rydz and Battle both expressed to other bolita managers their desire to retire from daily bolita operations. Luis Perez testified that Rydz took a small calendar out of his pocket on which a date was circled, and told a fellow corporation member, “This is the day I’m leaving. Have my totals ready.” However, the government maintained at trial that Rydz and Battle, Jr. continued to launder their own and the enterprise’s bolita proceeds long after ending their direct involvement in the gambling operation. Battle, Jr. delayed construction on his Florida residence until 1994; ultimately, Battle, Jr. and Rydz leased the houses from Aztec, after using various corporate accounts, rather than their own names, to finance construction of the 13 houses. Marquez had moved to Florida in 1985 and reviewed bolita reports and visited the various offices until the end of 1995, when he fled to Spain. Battle, Jr. had planned to move to Spain and was beginning to move his bolita money to the Canary Islands. Rydz sold the property located at 740 Mashta Drive for $2,717,500 on June 4, 2001; Battle, Jr. sold 730 Mashta Drive on May 8, 2002. Aztec received $2,128,664.98 at closing for 740 Mashta Drive and $2,866,311.66 at closing for 730 Mashta Drive. At Battle, Jr.’s direction, Vidan deposited these proceeds in Aztec’s account at Plantars Bank, then wired $2,400,000 to a corporate account in the Canary Islands. The Curacao corporation’s accounts remained active for some time. In August and September of 1998, it wired $903,000 to Rydz’s and Battle, Jr.’s accounts in Switzerland, which were never closed, and in 2000 it wrote certain small payment checks to pay for corporate registration and such. The daily management of the enterprise’s bolita business was conducted by Willie Pozo, and by 1996, the bolita’s profits had decreased. From 1985 through 1995, the Corporation took in $2 million in bets weekly; in contrast, from 1995 through 2003, the total diminished to $700,000 weekly. In early 2000, Battle, Sr. threatened to kill Pozo and an associate in order to “take his business back.” Marquez continued to receive a share of the Corporation’s illegal gambling profits 14 until 2001. The enterprise’s central bolita office was managed by Luis Perez, who was arrested in the summer of 2003. When Rydz and Battle, Jr. were arrested in March 2004, they were still receiving money from the commercial real estate business in Miami. The corporate tax returns for El Zapotal, Battle, Sr.’s 20-acre farm in Miami, showed that in 1999, Battle, Sr. gave El Zapotal to Battle, Jr. and his family as a gift, and that corporate returns had been filed from 2000-2002, listing Battle, Jr. as the largest shareholder.