Opinion ID: 203744
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Wyatt concludes his appeal with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. His sufficiency argument is limited to a claim that the district court erred in denying his motion for an acquittal pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 because there was insufficient evidence as to his intent. Where a defendant has moved for a judgment of acquittal on sufficiency grounds, our review is de novo. United States v. Cruz-Rodriguez, 541 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir.2008), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 129 S.Ct. 1017, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2009). Nevertheless, in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine the evidencedirect and circumstantialas well as all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict, and determine whether a rational fact finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime. Id. To sustain a conspiracy conviction, the government must adduce proof beyond a reasonable doubt (1) that an agreement existed to commit the particular crime; (2) that the defendant knew of the agreement; and (3) that he voluntarily participated in it. Id. In other words, the government must prove that the defendant joined and participated in the conspiracy with the knowledge of, and the intent to further, its unlawful objective. 1 Sand et al., Modern Federal Jury Instructions, Instruction 19-3S (2005). It is important to note, however, that such proof may consist of circumstantial evidence, such as acts committed by the defendant that further the conspiracy's purpose. Id. On this standard, it is plain to us that a reasonable fact finder could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Wyatt possessed the requisite intent. Wyatt took several steps, the facts of which are undisputed, that a reasonable fact finder could believe served to further the goals of the conspiracy. He made presentations to several counterparties to induce them to wire money for the scheme. He ordered the withdrawal of monies from an escrow account, and disbursement of the funds not only to the Stallings, but also to himself. Finally, Wyatt retained the roughly $100,000 that was disbursed to his own account and appears to have made no effort to return these funds when it became clear that the loans at issue would not close. From these facts, a rational fact finder could indeed conclude that Wyatt intended to agree with his co-conspirators to engage in a scheme to harvest loan advance fees from unsuspecting borrowers, and that Wyatt, who did not return any funds that were disbursed to him, intended to commit the underlying offense. Wyatt does not dispute the character and nature of this evidence. Rather he argues, based on other evidence such as the testimony of Moate, that he believed the Stallings had the capacity and intent to engage in the lending transactions. Wyatt further argues that if sophisticated business owners could fall prey to the scam, so could he. Finally, Wyatt argues that his disassociation from the Stallings, while they were engaging in further transactions and well in advance of their arrest, is also indicative of his innocence. Although the jury was free to credit this evidence if it so chose, we cannot conclude that a rational fact finder must credit the evidence Wyatt cites over the government's powerful evidence indicating intent: namely, that Wyatt actively solicited victims, induced them to send him large amounts of money, which he, along with others, retained, and made no effort to disgorge. As intent was the only element to which Wyatt has lodged a sufficiency objection, we cannot conclude that the jury reached a conclusion that the evidence would not support.