Opinion ID: 456390
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the common law tort claim

Text: 30 Cargill, whether or not he acted in a way which we might deem reprehensible, is shielded from tort liability by a consistent line of cases in this Circuit which guarantees absolute immunity to military personnel from common law tort claims by other servicemen for injuries suffered in the course of duty. See Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 628 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 1595, 80 L.Ed.2d 126 (1984); Mattos v. United States, 412 F.2d 793, 794 (9th Cir.1969); Bailey v. Van Buskirk, 345 F.2d 298, 298 (9th Cir.1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 948, 86 S.Ct. 1205, 16 L.Ed.2d 210 (1966); see also Tirrill v. McNamara, 451 F.2d 579, 579 (9th Cir.1971). These decisions constitute extensions of the doctrine of Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 71 S.Ct. 153, 95 L.Ed. 152 (1950), which erected a barrier to tort actions against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries suffered by members of the armed forces incident to their military service. 31 Other circuits are in general accord with our adaptation of Feres. E.g., Misko v. United States, 453 F.Supp. 513, 514 (D.D.C.1978), aff'd, 593 F.2d 1371 (D.C.Cir.1979); Rotko v. Abrams, 338 F.Supp. 46, 48 (D.Conn.1971), aff'd per curiam, 455 F.2d 992 (2d Cir.1972); Jaffee v. United States, 663 F.2d 1226, 1234-35 (3d Cir.1981) (en banc), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972, 102 S.Ct. 2234, 72 L.Ed.2d 845 (1982); Hass ex rel. United States v. United States, 518 F.2d 1138, 1143 (4th Cir.1975); Stanley v. Central Intelligence Agency, 639 F.2d 1146, 1152-53 (5th Cir.1981); Hefley v. Textron, Inc., 713 F.2d 1487, 1490-92 (10th Cir.1983); see also Kennedy v. Maginnis, 393 F.Supp. 310, 311-12 (D.Mass.1975); Fountain v. United States, 533 F.Supp. 698, 703 (W.D.Ark.1981). 32 On occasion, courts have declined to provide absolute immunity to military personnel for their tortious conduct. See Henderson v. Bluemink, 511 F.2d 399, 401-02 (D.C.Cir.1974); Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 736-40 (10th Cir.1977) (en banc). Neither of these cases, however, involved a plaintiff who was serving on active duty in the military at the time of his injury, and so each case was decided with general principles of governmental immunity rather than the special doctrines applicable to intramilitary torts. See Misko, 453 F.Supp. at 514 (distinguishing Bluemink ); Hass, 518 F.2d at 1143 (distinguishing between the two different immunity doctrines). 33 The only possible obstruction in this otherwise smoothly flowing stream of authority is a mid-19th century Supreme Court case, Wilkes v. Dinsman, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 89, 12 L.Ed. 618 (1849), after remand, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 390, 13 L.Ed. 1036 (1851). Wilkes essentially offered only a qualified intramilitary immunity, which would be unavailable in cases involving maliciously motivated tortious conduct. The case has continued to be cited occasionally, although apparently only in dicta. E.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2368 n. 2 (1983); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 492-94, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2903-04, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Feres, 340 U.S. at 141 n. 10, 71 S.Ct. at 157 n. 10; Jaffee, 663 F.2d at 1246 & n. 8, 1257-60 (Adams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part; Gibbons, J., dissenting); Lewis v. United States, 663 F.2d 889, 891 n. 3 (9th Cir.1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1133, 102 S.Ct. 2959, 73 L.Ed.2d 1350 (1982). 34 While Wilkes has never been explicitly overruled, its significance has been so reshaped by the incessant flow of common law development, led by the Supreme Court itself, that it does not obstruct the stream of subsequent cases that have created an absolute intramilitary tort immunity. A common law case undergoes a process of mutation as it is applied to new and different factual situations, as other regions of the law are developed and changed, and as the real world context itself evolves. In the case of Wilkes, its significance has been altered with the expansion of the Feres doctrine. Wilkes was utilized by the Court in Feres to confine its holding to negligent, and not intentional, torts; yet Feres has since been extended, unimpeded by Wilkes, to cover not only actions against the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act for negligent torts, but also actions against individuals, actions for constitutional torts, actions based upon the common law of torts, and actions for injuries arising out of intentional tortious conduct. See, e.g., Chappell, supra; Stanley v. CIA, 639 F.2d at 1152-53 (and cases cited therein). 35 Moreover, since the time of Wilkes, significant changes have been made establishing a comprehensive system of military justice. Chappell, 462 U.S. at 305 n. 2, 103 S.Ct. at 2368 n. 2. Hence, there has been increasing cause for judicial reluctance to enter into regulation of the armed forces, a responsibility reserved for Congress by Article I of the Constitution, and a corresponding shrinking need for the civil remedy and the burdensome intrusion into military affairs which it entails. See id. at 302-04, 103 S.Ct. at 2366-67. 36 As a consequence, Wilkes does not undermine the subsequent authorities which have created an absolute intramilitary immunity to common law tort liability for injuries sustained in the line of duty. Trerice's common law tort claim on behalf of his son was properly dismissed.