Opinion ID: 1125205
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: ex post facto jurisprudence

Text: Both Olivieri and Hutchinson contend that application of Louisiana's Megan's Law to their particular cases violates the ex post facto provisions of both the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. In State ex rel. Glover v. State, 93-2330 (La.9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189, 1201 and State v. Loyd, 96-1805 (La.2/13/97), 689 So.2d 1321, 1326, this Court recognized that Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 111 L.Ed.2d 30 (1990) overruled Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1883) and Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, 18 S.Ct. 620, 42 L.Ed. 1061 (1898), concluding that those cases which had broadened the scope of the definition of an ex post facto law, were not `consistent with the term ex post facto at the time the Constitution was adopted.' Collins, 497 U.S. at 47, 110 S.Ct. 2715. Although we recognized in Glover and Loyd that the recent Supreme Court cases narrowed the focus of ex post facto consideration, we did not reach the question of whether Louisiana's ex post facto jurisprudence should likewise be changed. Because of the posture of the two cases before us, we must reach the question we averted in Glover and Loyd. Thus, we must compare and contrast the treatment of ex post facto in federal and Louisiana state courts.