Opinion ID: 1926975
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defendant's Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

Text: We first address defendant's argument that the court erred in denying its motion for judgment as a matter of law. Although defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff's case, it failed to renew the motion at the close of the evidence as V.R.C.P. 50(b) requires. Defendant argues that plaintiff introduced no evidence after defendant made its motion and urges a more flexible interpretation of the renewal requirement, in accordance with the federal approach to the rule. See Greenwood v. Societe Francaise De, 111 F.3d 1239, 1244 (5th Cir. 1997) (courts have excused technical non-compliance [with Rule 50(b) ] where the purposes of the requirement have been satisfied). It also argues that where a defendant moves for judgment as a matter of law at the close of a plaintiff's case, and then objects to a jury charge on the same grounds, the objection to the jury charge suffices as a renewal of the original motion. See id. at 1245. Contrary to federal interpretation, we have construed [Rule 50] strictly and held that even where a motion for directed verdict was made at the end of plaintiff's case, if not renewed at the close of all evidence as required by V.R.C.P. 50(b), the issues are waived. Lent v. Huntoon, 143 Vt. 539, 551, 470 A.2d 1162, 1170-71 (1983). Moreover, after defendant made its motion, plaintiff did introduce additional evidence: a Ford memorandum in which one Ford representative concluded that [i]t is probable that these sector failures are a result of an impact after which the customer did not recognize ... a problem until complete failure. In its reply brief, defendant qualifies its initial argument that plaintiff introduced no evidence after defendant's motion, arguing instead that plaintiff introduced no new evidence after defendant's motion. Regardless, we conclude that [r]enewal of the motion is necessary to appeal from a denial of or a failure to grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 50(b).
Even within a strict application of the renewal requirement, defendant argues that a failure to renew a V.R.C.P. 50(b) motion should be excused where manifest injustice will otherwise occur. See Doctor's Assocs. v. Weible, 92 F.3d 108, 113-14 (2d Cir.1996). In Weible, the court relieved the moving party from the requirements of F.R.C.P. 50 because relief was necessary to avoid the manifest injustice of a jury verdict wholly without legal support. See id. (citing Sojak v. Hudson Waterways Corp., 590 F.2d 53, 54-55 (2d Cir.1978)) (Where a jury's verdict is wholly without legal support, we will order a new trial in order to prevent a manifest injustice.). Plaintiff's theory of the case was that the steering gear sector shaft in the subject Bronco fractured and severed, causing a loss of steering control and leading to the accident. Plaintiff alleged that the defect resulted from Ford's rush to design a four-wheel vehicle to compete with the popular Chevy Blazer. Plaintiff argued that Ford compressed the time usually required to design and develop a sport utility vehiclein this case, the new Bronco  in 1978. As a result, many parts and systems for the Bronco were taken from Ford's existing vehicles, including the entire steering system, which was taken from a Ford pick-up truck and was significantly different from the system used in the older model Bronco. The effects of this steering system change were never tested in the new Bronco. According to plaintiff, Ford soon began experiencing problems with the steering systems in its new four-wheel drive vehicles. Specifically, the steering gear sector shafts would occasionally fracture, disconnecting the steering wheel from the front wheels of the vehicle. In several memoranda detailing laboratory test data, Ford acknowledged the problem but indicated that a sector shaft would not break all the way through with a stress load of less than 40,000 inch-pounds of torque. The highest recorded load from Ford's own road testing was 27,000 inch-pounds; thus, Ford's engineers concluded that sector shafts could not have been fractured by normal usage, but only by extraordinary abuse. Plaintiff, however, alleged that a fracture could be initiated at much lower loads. At trial, plaintiff argued that the Bronco steering system was defectively designed such that, prior to the accident, a stress event initiated a fracture in the subject Bronco's sector shaft. Once the fracture was started, a series of progressively smaller, less remarkable impacts completed the fracture, resulting in the loss of steering control that caused the accident. Defendant argues that plaintiff's expert on design defect and causation, Professor Hochgraf, based his opinion on speculation as to the events that caused the sector shaft failure and that, in fact, the evidence affirmatively demonstrated that the vehicle had not experienced a stress event of the type described by Hochgraf. Hochgraf testified that the prerequisite for a sector shaft failure was a load event in the range of 37,000 inch pounds followed by up to twenty additional loads of declining but significant strength. Ford claims that the evidence adduced at trial, however, revealed that the subject Bronco's sector shaft was replaced in 1990, that only Wood and Corey had driven the vehicle since the sector shaft replacement, and that their usage was minimal and normal, involving neither off-road driving nor a significant loading event. Although neither Wood nor Corey recalled any significant impact event while driving the Bronco, plaintiff's expert testified that the impact necessary to cause the initial crack could be unremarkable to a driver, particularly given the fact that the vehicle was used on dirt roads. Indeed, Corey and several other plaintiff's witnesses testified that the roads the Bronco repeatedly traveled upon were rutted, potholed, and generally very rough. Defendant seems to tacitly concede this point in its reply brief, suggesting that ruts in the road may have been so significant that the Bronco, despite Corey's attempt to turn the wheel to the left, remained firmly stuck in a rut. Thus, despite the fact that the Bronco was not used for off-road driving, several of plaintiff's witnesses testified that the vehicle was used repeatedly on rutted, pot-holed, and rough roads. Consistent with plaintiff's expert's testimony, William Daley, a witness who was at the scene immediately after the accident, testified that the driver, Corey, told him that he turned the wheel and it just, the vehicle did whatever it wanted, couldn't control it ... the vehicle just went out of control. Although defendant argues that this statement is ambiguous and could just as easily describe a tire getting caught in a rut, Ford experts agreed at trial that a sector-shaft failure would leave the driver with a free-playing steering wheel and no control over the vehicle's wheels. The evidence produced at trial sufficiently supports plaintiff's claim that the defect in the 1978 Ford Bronco steering-system design caused the subject steering sector shaft to initially fracture and eventually sever, leading to the accident that resulted in plaintiff's injuries and paralysis. Plaintiff's ample and persuasive evidence of causation, as discussed below, permits no such conclusion of [manifest] injustice. Baskin v. Hawley, 807 F.2d 1120, 1130 (2d Cir.1986). Thus, the court did not err in denying Ford's motion for judgment as a matter of law.