Opinion ID: 182691
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Klessig's Counterclaim

Text: Klessig contends that Chandok's present action constitutes a SLAPP suit, arguing that her participation in the application to NIH for federal funding for NOS research made her a public applicant within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute. That statute provides, in part, that [a] defendant in an action involving public petition and participation, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section seventy-six-a of this article, may maintain a[] . . . counterclaim to recover damages, including costs and attorney's fees, from any person who commenced or continued such action, N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 70-a(1), if that action was commenced or continued without a substantial basis in fact and law and could not be supported by a substantial argument for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law, id. § 70-a(l)(a). Section 76-a defines [a]n `action involving public petition and participation,' in pertinent part, as an action . . . for damages that is brought by a public applicant or permittee. Id. § 76-a(l)(a). The statute defines public applicant or permittee as any person who has applied for or obtained a permit, zoning change, lease, license, certificate or other entitlement for use or permission to act from any government body, or any person with an interest, connection or affiliation with such person that is materially related to such application or permission. Id. § 76-a(1)(b) (emphases added). The district court ruled that Klessig's counterclaim should be dismissed on the ground that Chandok was not a public applicant or permittee because government permission or support was not a prerequisite to her NOS research. We agree. The New York Court of Appeals has noted that the enactment of the anti-SLAPP statute in 1992 was prompted by a rising concern about the use of civil litigation, primarily defamation suits, to intimidate or silence those who speak out at public meetings against proposed land use development and other activities requiring approval of public boards. Termed SLAPP suitsstrategic lawsuits against public participationsuch actions are characterized as having little legal merit but are filed nonetheless to burden opponents with legal defense costs and the threat of liability and to discourage those who might wish to speak out in the future. . . . 600 West 115th Street Corp. v. Von Gutfeld, 80 N.Y.2d 130, 137 n. 1, 589 N.Y.S.2d 825, 828 n. 1, 603 N.E.2d 930 (1992). Accordingly, noting that the anti-SLAPP statute was specifically designed to protect those citizens who, usually before a government agency, publicly challenge applications by developers or other businesses for environmental and land use permits, leases, licenses or other approvals, Harfenes v. Sea Gate Association, Inc., 167 Misc.2d 647, 650, 647 N.Y.S.2d 329, 331 (Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co.1995) (emphasis added), the Harfenes court held that a homeowners' association that had sought a loan from the Small Business Administration had not thereby become a public applicant within the meaning of the statute. The court reasoned that an application for a government loan was not an application for an `entitlement for use or permission to act from [a] government body,' id. at 653, 647 N.Y.S.2d at 333. Uniformly, the New York courts have found that the persons properly alleged to be public applicants within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute were persons whose proposed actions required government permission. See, e.g., Novosiadlyi v. James, 70 A.D.3d 793, 793-94, 894 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (2d Dep't 2010) (building use permit was required); Singh v. Sukhram, 56 A.D.3d 187, 194, 866 N.Y.S.2d 267, 274 (2d Dep't 2008) (permission to operate an airline was required); Related Properties, Inc. v. Town Board, 22 A.D.3d 587, 588-89, 591, 802 N.Y.S.2d 221, 222-23, 225 (2d Dep't 2005) (land use permit was required); Duane Reade, Inc. v. Clark, 2 Misc.3d 1007(A), 2004 WL 690191, at  (N.Y.Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co. Mar. 31, 2004) (permit process of the New York City Department of Buildings was a prerequisite to the activity carried out by the plaintiff to which the defendant Clark was opposed); Street Beat Sportswear, Inc. v. National Mobilization Against Sweatshops, 182 Misc.2d 447, 452, 698 N.Y.S.2d 820, 824 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.N.Y.Co.1999) (apparel manufacturer c[ould] only operate its business with the permission of the Labor Commissioner). We are aware of no case that has held the New York anti-SLAPP statute applicable to a person who is entitled to engage in her proposed course of conduct without government permission or to a person who merely sought government funding for a project that could be financed privately. In light of the language and intent of the statute, and the New York courts' interpretations of it, we conclude that Klessig's counterclaim was properly dismissed.