Opinion ID: 168761
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: M r. Therrien argues that he set forth at least five distinct claims: (1) negligent provision of store security; (2) negligent training and supervision; (3) negligent handling of the situation with the suspect leading to the physical altercation; (4) negligently requesting assistance and directing such assistance from bystanders; and (5) liability under the rescue doctrine. To proceed with a claim of negligence under Oklahoma law, M r. Therrien must establish that (1) Target owed him a duty to protect him from injury; (2) Target failed properly to perform its duty; and (3) he suffered injuries that were proximately caused by Target’s breach of its duty. See Jackson v. Jones, 907 P.2d 1067, 1071-72 (O kla. 1995). A. O klahoma Landow ner Liability for Criminal Attacks The primary issue is whether Target owed M r. Therrien a duty to protect him from injury from a criminal attack by a third party. M r. Therrien contends that, under Oklahoma law , Target has a duty to use reasonable care to prevent a criminal attack when it knows that the attack is occurring or is about to occur. See Taylor v. Hynson, 856 P.2d 278, 281 (O kla. 1993). Oklahoma premises liability law classifies M r. Therrien as an invitee. See id. (“It is well established that a person w ho goes on land to conduct business is a business invitee for the purposes of establishing liability.”). A business generally does not have a duty to protect an invitee from criminal attacks by third -3- persons. Id. Oklahoma, however, has recognized such a duty in “unique circumstances.” Id. An invitor’s knowledge “that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur” may constitute such circumstances. Id. at 281-82 (quotation omitted). Thus, Oklahoma law recognizes that, “[w]hen an invitor has knowledge that an invitee is in imminent danger, the invitor must act reasonably to prevent injury.” Id. at 281. In M organ v. Southland Associates, 883 P.2d 205, 206 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994), a case involving a criminal attack on plaintiff at a mall food court, the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s petitions. After describing Taylor’s teachings, the court stated that because plaintiff had pleaded defendant’s knowledge of the attack, which would give rise to a duty on defendant’s part, as well as breach of the duty and damages, the trial court had erred in dismissing the petitions for failure to state a claim. Id. at 207. “To hold otherwise would be to find that the rule a business invitor has no duty to protect invitees from criminal acts of third parties is absolute.” Id. at 206-07. Similarly, M r. Therrien pleaded that Target was aware that a criminal act was imminent or occurring, so that Target had a duty to use reasonable care to prevent the suspect from harming M r. Therrien; that Target breached its duty; and that M r. Therrien suffered harm as a “direct and proximate result” of Target’s breach. Aplt. App. at 7-9. As in M organ, these allegations are sufficient to state a claim under Taylor. -4- Target urges us to decide that the fight between the Target employee and the suspect was an open and obvious condition and that M r. Therrien had knowledge equal to Target of the unsafe condition, so that Target owed M r. Therrien no duty of care. See, e.g., Dover v. W.H. Braum, Inc., 111 P.3d 243, 245 (Okla. 2005) (“There is no duty to warn the invitee of any defect or danger which is as w ell-known to the invitee as to the owner or occupant or which is obvious or which should be observed by the invitee in the exercise of ordinary care.”); Pickens v. Tulsa M etro. M inistry, 951 P.2d 1079, 1084 (Okla. 1997) (“Even vis-a-vis an invitee, to whom a landowner owes the highest duty . . ., the law does not require that the landowner protect the invitee against dangers which are so apparent and readily observable that one would reasonably expect them to be discovered.”). But since Taylor, Oklahoma’s premises liability cases involving criminal attacks focus on the invitor’s knowledge of criminal activity; they do not appear to incorporate the “open and obvious danger” analysis found in physical-defects cases. See, e.g., Taylor, 856 P.2d at 281-82; Rogers v. Burger King Corp., 82 P.3d 116, 122-23 (Okla. Civ. App. 2003); Young v. Bob Howard Auto., Inc., 52 P.3d 1045, 1048-49 (Okla. Civ. App. 2002); M cClure v. Group K Enters., Inc., 977 P.2d 1148, 1150-51 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999); Folmar v. M arriott, Inc., 918 P.2d 86, 87-89 (Okla. Civ. App. 1996); Edington v. A & P Enters., Inc., 900 P.2d 453, 455 (Okla. Civ. App. 1994); M organ, 883 P.2d at 206-07; see also Wells v. Boston Ave. Realty, 125 F.3d 1335, 1340 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Plaintiff has -5- cited no cases that support treating a criminal assault as a ‘defect’ creating premises liability.”). In any event, whether or not a particular condition is open and obvious generally requires an examination of all of the circumstances. Zagal v. Truckstops C orp. of Am ., 948 P.2d 273, 275 (Okla. 1997). Thus, we decline to hold, at this initial stage of the proceedings, that the “open and obvious danger” rule necessarily bars M r. Therrien’s claim as a matter of law. Target also argues that M r. Therrien’s “attempt to create five distinct claims is contrary to law.” A plee. Br. at 9. W e agree that four of M r. Therrien’s five claims (the exception being the negligent training and supervision claim) appear to stem from Taylor, rather than stating separate bases for recovery. But in light of the limited record before this court, we w ill let the district court evaluate each of M r. Therrien’s claims in the first instance to determine whether each should proceed separately. B. Negligent Training and Supervision M r. Therrien also alleges that Target was negligent in its training and supervision of the loss prevention employee. This claim invokes a recognized basis for recovery in Oklahoma: “[e]mployers may be held liable for negligence in hiring, supervising or retaining an employee.” N.H. v. Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), 998 P.2d 592, 600 (Okla. 1999); see also M organ, 883 P.2d at 206-07 (reversing dismissal of petition that included claims of negligent training). Negligent hiring and supervision is a separate theory of recovery based on the -6- employer’s direct negligence, rather than liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. N .H ., 998 P.2d at 600. In Oklahoma, this claim is only available if an employer’s vicarious liability is not established. Id. Consequently, while M r. Therrien has stated a claim sufficient to withstand a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on this issue, how far this claim can proceed will depend on the evidence before the district court during further proceedings.