Opinion ID: 168027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: sec tio n 2241 a pplic atio n

Text: W e review de novo the district court’s denial of M r. Kokoski’s § 2241 application. See Bradshaw v. Story, 86 F.3d 164, 166 (10th Cir. 1996). A petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 attacks the execution of a sentence rather than its validity and must be filed in the district where the prisoner is confined. It is not an additional, alternative, or supplemental remedy to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. A 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition attacks the legality of detention, and must be filed in the district that imposed the sentence. The purpose of section 2255 is to provide a method of determining the validity of a judgment by the court which imposed the sentence, rather than by the court in the district where the prisoner is confined. The exclusive remedy for testing the validity of a judgment and sentence, unless it is inadequate or ineffective, is that provided for in 28 U .S.C. § 2255. M ore specifically, § 2255 prohibits a district court from entertaining an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a prisoner who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to § 2255 if it appears that the applicant has -3- failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention. Failure to obtain relief under 2255 does not establish that the remedy so provided is either inadequate or ineffective. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). It is well-established that the denial of a motion under § 2255 is not in itself sufficient to establish that that remedy is inadequate or ineffective. See Williams v. United States, 323 F.2d 672, 673 (10th Cir. 1963). Nor do the procedural hurdles to filing a second § 2255 motion under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (A EDPA) render that remedy unavailable or ineffective. See Caravalho v. Pugh, 177 F.3d 1177, 1178 (10th Cir. 1999). M r. Kokoski acknowledges that the claims in his § 2241 application attacking his convictions are “identical” to those he raised in his § 2255 motion before the sentencing court. Aplt Br. (06-6045) at 14. But he argues that § 2255 was inadequate to test the legality of his sentence “due to willful blindness to the involvement of attorney’s [sic] in scheme to defraud courts in that jurisdiction.” Id. The only evidence of “willful blindness,” however, appears to be that the sentencing court (and the Fourth Circuit) disagreed with him on the merits of his § 2255 motion. M r. Kokoski therefore has not satisfied his burden to show that his case presents one of the “extremely limited circumstances” in which § 2255 is inadequate to test the legality of his federal convictions. Caravalho, 177 F.3d at -4- 1178. The district court was correct in concluding that M r. Kokoski’s claims cannot be brought under § 2241 and that it lacked jurisdiction to consider his application because, properly construed as a motion under § 2255, it must be brought in the district in w hich he w as convicted— the Southern D istrict of W est Virginia. See Bradshaw, 86 F.3d at 166; Haugh v. Booker, 210 F.3d 1147, 1150 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Because a section 2255 motion must be brought in the district in which the defendant was sentenced, the district court . . . lacked jurisdiction.”).