Opinion ID: 1446554
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: revenue retention

Text: The plaintiffs also challenge the portion of the injunction excluding from the division of university financial support the revenue generated by any specific sport or program. The injunction allows each sport to reap the benefit of the revenues it generates. We hold the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Exclusion of sports-generated revenue from the calculations of university financial support is not prohibited under applicable state law and can be supported by several policy considerations. We affirm this portion of the trial court's injunction. The plaintiffs cite no law or authority which would have required the trial court to include sports-generated revenues in its calculations. They cite RCW 28B.10.704 as an indication of legislative support for their position. RCW 28B.10.704 provides in relevant part: Funds used for purposes of providing scholarships or other forms of financial assistance to students in return for participation in intercollegiate athletics... shall include but not be limited to moneys received as contributed or donated funds, or revenues derived from athletic events, including gate receipts and revenues obtained from the licensing of radio and television broadcasts. The plaintiffs contend this statute indicates a legislative intent to pool sports-generated revenues to make them available for athletic scholarships. [3] The legislative history does not support reading such intent into this provision. The statute, Laws of 1971, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 28, was enacted following a request for an attorney general opinion regarding the constitutionality of using sports-generated revenues for athletic scholarships. The Attorney General had indicated the revenues were state funds and were subject to the provisions of article 8, section 5 of the constitution, regarding gifts of state funds. After the statute was enacted, the Attorney General concluded the statute acted to place such athletic scholarships outside of the boundaries of constitutionally prohibited gifts. See Attorney General Informal Opinion to M.A. Allan, President, Highline Community College, at 7-9 (August 23, 1971); see also Memorandum from Richard Hemstad, Legal Assistant, Office of the Governor, to Governor Daniel J. Evans (April 13, 1971). The legislative history supports the contention sports-generated revenues are in fact state funds. We believe it does not, however, support the plaintiffs' assertion this statute should be used to prohibit the trial court's decision, nor is plaintiffs' assertion a necessary inference from the language of the statute. The trial court chose an injunctive remedy neither required nor prohibited by applicable law and acted within its discretion in choosing to create a funding plan allowing each sport to benefit from the revenues it generates. The trial court's funding plan provides incentive for all sports to develop revenue-generating capability of their own. As the trial court stated in its findings of fact and conclusions of law: There is an incentive to coaches and to a lesser extent their athletes to produce as much income as possible from all sources because they are the persons who first benefit from such income. The funding plan encourages the sports to fund their expenses through their own efforts, rather than depend upon direct legislative appropriations. The injunction specifically requires the sex equity committee to recommend ways to encourage and promote women's sports to increase their own revenues; the funding plan would further promote such a goal. The plan thus requires the University to create equal opportunity to raise revenue for men's and women's sports. The funding plan allows disproportionate expenses of any particular sports program to be derived from the program itself. The plan is also gender neutral. It provides a solution which does not violate the Equal Rights Amendment and encourages revenue development for all sports while accommodating the needs of the sports programs incurring the greatest expenses at this time. Our decision upholding the trial court's conclusion regarding sports-generated revenues does not in any way modify the University's obligation to achieve sex equity under the Equal Rights Amendment. The trial court's minimum requirements for participation opportunities and scholarships, already discussed, must be achieved; the court's guidelines for distribution of nonrevenue funds must be followed, and the remaining portions of the injunction, including promotion and development of women's sports, must be observed. In addition, our conclusion allowing each sport to use the revenues it generates does not, of course, require the sport to do so. The record reflects the football program was transferring $150,000 or more per year from its revenues to the women's program before the injunction was entered. We encourage such practices to continue, along with other efforts to foster cooperation within the department. We therefore reverse the trial court's exclusion of football from its calculations for participation opportunities and scholarships and affirm the trial court's decision to exclude sports-generated revenues from its distribution of financial support. We emphasize the portion of the injunction requiring additional promotion of women's sports and development of their revenue-generating capability and encourage continued cooperation and efforts to bring the University's intercollegiate athletic program into compliance with the Equal Rights Amendment.