Opinion ID: 4564794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Other Evidence of Discrimination

Text: To the extent Adams argues it was unnecessary for him to establish a prima facie case where other circumstantial evidence supports an inference of intentional discrimination, the district court did not err in concluding that Adams failed to present such evidence. Even if a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination, he will “survive summary judgment if he presents circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the employer’s discriminatory intent.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). “A triable issue of fact exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. (quotation marks and footnote omitted). The City showed that Adams was terminated as a result of the operation of established rules. The PAO, which is part of the consolidated City government, has both civil service and appointed employees. Under the City’s Charter and Civil Service Rules, civil service employees who take appointed positions retain the right to revert back to the same or comparable civil service position and may displace or “bump” a civil service employee from that position if it is occupied. Adams was terminated when a more senior PAO employee, who was also older 5 Case: 19-15186 Date Filed: 09/11/2020 Page: 6 of 7 than him, exercised this right, displacing Adams from the only civil service position within the PAO. Adams argues that the City falsely used the term “reduction in force,” misrepresented who had the authority to hire for appointed positions within the PAO, offered to settle with him, and filled appointed positions to which he himself did not apply with individuals who were younger than him. The evidence that he presented, however, fails to create a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence from which intentional discrimination can be inferred. See id. While the City hired some younger individuals for appointed positions within the PAO following Adams’s termination, these hiring decisions do not give rise to an inference of discrimination because Adams never applied for any PAO position after he was laid off, and one new hire was older than Adams. Cf. Jameson, 75 F.3d at 1532 (“[W]here a job for which the plaintiff is qualified, and for which the plaintiff applies, is available at the time of termination, and the employer offers the job to an individual outside the protected age group, an inference of intentional discrimination is permissible.”); Beaver v. Rayonier, Inc., 200 F.3d 723, 729-30 (11th Cir. 1999) (concluding, in RIF case, that employer’s failure to hire plaintiff into the supervisor position for which he applied, decision to fill supervisor positions with younger employees, and comment about attracting younger employees, supported inference of intentional discrimination). Although Adams 6 Case: 19-15186 Date Filed: 09/11/2020 Page: 7 of 7 argues no alternative appointed positions were offered or even mentioned to him, the record does not reflect that the City kept him from knowing of or applying for such jobs. The district court therefore did not err in concluding that Adams failed to present a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would allow for an inference of intentional discrimination.