Opinion ID: 2831310
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Neutral Principles

Text: In Jones v. Wolf the Supreme Court approved the neutral principles methodology as constitutionally permissible. 443 U.S. at 604. Jones concerned the Vineville Presbyterian Church, which was incorporated under Georgia law and was a member church of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS). The PCUS maintained a hierarchical form of government. Id. at 597-98. Under the PCUS polity, the actions of local churches were subject to review and control by higher church courts. Id. at 598. The powers and duties of each level of the church hierarchy were set out in the PCUS constitution, the Book of Church Order. Id. At a 1973 meeting, the Vineville Church’s pastor and a majority of its members voted to separate from the PCUS and unite with the Presbyterian Church in America. Id. The Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the PCUS concluded that the minority faction remaining loyal to the PCUS constituted “the true congregation of Vineville Presbyterian Church.” Id. The Presbytery then withdrew “all authority to exercise office derived from the PCUS” from the majority faction and the minority sued in state court to establish their right to exclusive possession of the church property. Id. at 598-99. The trial court granted judgment for the majority. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting the minority faction’s First Amendment challenge and holding that the trial court had correctly applied neutral principles of law. Id. at 599. The United States Supreme Court affirmed. It held that the methodology employed by the Georgia courts was not constitutionally infirm. Id. at 600 (citing Carnes v. Smith, 222 S.E.2d 322 (Ga. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868; Presbyterian Church v. E. Heights, 167 S.E.2d 658, 658-60 (Ga. 1969) (Presbyterian II), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868). Under the neutral principles methodology, 14 ownership of disputed property is determined by applying generally applicable law and legal principles. That application will usually include considering evidence such as deeds to the properties, terms of the local church charter (including articles of incorporation and by laws, if any), and relevant provisions of governing documents of the general church. E.g., Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03; see Presbyterian II, 167 S.E.2d at 659-60. The Court held that the First Amendment precluded neither application of neutral principles of law nor a state’s adopting a presumptive rule of majority rule. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604, 607. It noted that “any rule of majority representation can always be overcome, under the neutral-principles approach, either by providing in the corporate charter or the constitution of the general church, that the identity of the local church is to be established in some other way . . . [such as] by providing that the church property is held in trust for the general church and those who remain loyal to it[,]” or any other method that “does not impair free-exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters of religious controversy.” Id. at 607-08. Since the identity of the local Vineville congregation was a matter of state law, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Georgia Supreme Court. On remand the Georgia Supreme Court held that Georgia applies the presumptive majority rule to church identity and nothing in Georgia’s statutes or the relevant corporate charters, deeds, and organizational constitutions of the denomination rebutted that presumption “as to the right to control the actions of the titleholder.” Jones v. Wolf, 260 S.E.2d 84, 85 (Ga. 1979).