Opinion ID: 1301279
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Government's Direct Regulation of Speech

Text: We focus on the parties' contentions with the broad guarantees of Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 6 in mind. The Commission claims that Mountain Bell, as a public utility, is subject to reasonable regulation and that its order does not significantly infringe on Mountain Bell's right of free speech. The Commission also argues that Mountain Bell lacks standing to assert the information providers' free speech rights. We reject the notion that Mountain Bell may not assert the information providers' free speech rights. See Franzi v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 556, 563, 679 P.2d 1043, 1050 (1984) (recognizing standing to challenge an overbroad regulation of speech even though the challenger asserts the rights of third parties); see also Jennings, 107 Ariz. at 561, 490 P.2d at 567 (reporters, as members of the public, have standing to challenge a gag order). No other rule on standing would protect the free flow and distribution of information and ideas. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630, 40 S.Ct. 17, 22, 63 L.Ed. 1173 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Thus, Mountain Bell, the medium of communication, has standing to assert the providers' free speech rights as well as its own. The Commission ordered Mountain Bell to devise a presubscription plan and present it for the Commission's approval. Order No. 56039, ¶ 18, at 19. Some presubscription approaches would be less intrusive to the providers' free speech rights than others. For example, if the Commission allowed Mountain Bell to develop a universal presubscription system, so that a customer's single subscription unblocked all ScoopLines at once, the intrusion on the providers' free speech rights would be less than under a presubscription plan that required customers to separately arrange to unblock each individual ScoopLine. [13] The providers argue, however, that even a universal presubscription plan giving access to all ScoopLines would still burden their free speech rights because this new information industry would be less available to the public at large. We agree with the providers. Although individualized presubscription would burden free speech the most, any requirement of prior subscription, even universal presubscription, adversely affects the right to speak and publish. We would not, for instance, look kindly on a government regulation that required all those who wish to read a newspaper or magazine to first sign a general subscribers' list before they could buy any publication at the neighborhood store. Thus, the Commission's order impinges on the rights that art. 2, § 6 of the Arizona Constitution guarantees. We believe the presubscription requirement, whether universal or individualized, affects or impairs the right to freely speak. Nor does the argument that the less serious impairment of universal subscription is justified when balanced against the Commission's responsibility to regulate public service corporations persuade us. The Arizona Constitution does not speak of major or minor impediments but guarantees the right to freely speak. Although we may need to balance competing constitutional rights, such as the right to a fair trial and the right of free speech, we avoid, where possible, attempts to erode constitutional rights by balancing them against regulations serving governmental interests. Instead, we opt for a more literal application of art. 2, § 6. See Phoenix Newspapers and Jennings. The framers of our constitution did not give our judges authority to censor speech or decide how much speech the constitution allows. Phoenix Newspapers, 101 Ariz. at 259, 418 P.2d at 596 (there can be no censor appointed to whom the press must apply for prior permission to publish). Instead, the framers gave every person the right to freely speak, write and publish and made judges responsible to uphold and enforce those rights.