Opinion ID: 2329080
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Failure to Interview Potential Witnesses

Text: Appellant claims that his counsel was ineffective because, in preparation for trial, he refused to interview either Mustafa Brown or Xavier Gray and did not locate the woman identified only as Versace. Mr. Birdsong testified at the hearing that appellant had told him before trial that Brown and Gray were his friends and that they will say whatever you want them to say. From this comment Mr. Birdsong concluded that not talking to these two men would be in appellant's best interest because otherwise they might be treading very close to perjury. He conceded that he did not present any alibi witnesses, but he explained that he did not know of any available witnesses who could provide an alibi without perjuring themselves. This court, like all courts, has recognized that an attorney has a duty not to present false testimony to a court. Tibbs v. United States, 628 A.2d 638, 640 (D.C.1993). In his brief, appellant concedes that under prevailing professional norms it would have been reasonable for counsel not to call Brown or Gray to testify if he believed either man would commit perjury. We cannot conclude that counsel was ineffective because he refused to present perjured testimony. See id. at 640-641. In support of his § 23-110 motion, appellant submitted to the trial court affidavits from both Brown and Gray. Appellant now argues that because Brown's affidavit said he was with appellant on the afternoon of November 13, counsel failed in his professional duty by not interviewing Brown to explore this potential alibi. But the affidavit is vague about the time and place when Brown was allegedly with appellant, and of course we cannot overlook the fact that Mr. Funnyre testified that he was shot by appellant in that same afternoon and that Brown was there at the scenein other words, that Brown's potential alibi was not an alibi at all. Moreover, it is more than likely that Brown would not have been available to testify at appellant's trial, because at the post-trial hearing Brown asserted his Fifth Amendment right and refused to testify on appellant's behalf. Appellant offers us no reason to believe that Mr. Brown would have behaved differently and chosen to testify at the trial. See Sykes v. United States, 585 A.2d 1335, 1340 (D.C.1991). In a similar vein, we cannot say that counsel was ineffective for failing to interview Mr. Gray. In his affidavit Gray reported that he was approximately a block away from his home at 1517 F Street, N.E., when he heard shots. He said he ran toward the spot where the gunfire came from, but found nothing unusual there. Thus, by his own admission, Gray was not present at the scene of the shooting and did not arrive until after it had occurred. Since he was not an eyewitness and his testimony would not have provided any new evidence helpful to appellant, counsel's decision not to call him as a witness does not amount to ineffective assistance. See Joseph v. United States, 597 A.2d 14, 23 (D.C.1991). The trial court thus properly concluded that even if Gray had testified as set forth in his affidavit, appellant failed to show with any reasonable possibility that the trial's outcome would have been different. As for Versace, the court found that appellant's contentions regarding counsel's failure to locate this mystery woman were vague and conclusory. [9] Appellant did not present any evidence that Versace possessed any relevant first-hand knowledge about the shooting or that, if located, she would have been willing to testify at his trial. Furthermore, his assertion that, had defense counsel interviewed Gray and Brown, Versace might have been located, is also without merit. Even appellant's current counsel, who did interview Brown and Gray, has been unable to identify Versace or determine her whereabouts. Without some kind of statement or proffer as to what her testimony might have been, appellant cannot make the necessary showing of prejudice required under Strickland. The trial court therefore did not err in rejecting appellant's complaint about counsel's failure to find and interview Versace. See Lanton v. United States, 779 A.2d 895, 901 (D.C. 2001).