Opinion ID: 614999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Common Law Battery and Negligence Claims

Text: Under Minnesota law, a party must commence an action for battery within two years. Minn.Stat. § 541.07. A civil action is commenced against the defendant when the summons is served upon that defendant. Minn. R. Civ. P. 3.01. If state law requires service to commence an action, state law, and not Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 3, governs for the purposes of the state statute of limitations. Anderson v. Unisys Corp., 47 F.3d 302, 309 (8th Cir.1995). The district court dismissed Johnson's common law battery claims against the officers as untimely because the two-year statute of limitations period expired on December 19, 2008, and the officers were not served until February and March 2009. Johnson contends that service is timely and proper for each appealed claim, but she has failed to explain how her battery claims against the officers were commenced within the statute of limitations, and we therefore agree that the district court properly dismissed those claims.
The district court also held that the officers were entitled to official immunity for all state law claims and the City was thus not liable. We review de novo the district court's ruling on the question of immunity. See Wiederholt v. City of Minneapolis, 581 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Minn.1998). [U]nder Minnesota law a public official is entitled to official immunity from state law claims when that official is charged by law with duties that require the exercise of judgment or discretion. Johnson v. Morris, 453 N.W.2d 31, 41 (Minn.1990). Police officers are generally classified as discretionary officers and are entitled to official immunity. Id. at 42. An exception to that immunity exists if the officer acted maliciously or willfully. Id. Malice in the context of official immunity means intentionally committing an act that the official has reason to believe is legally prohibited. Kelly v. City of Minneapolis, 598 N.W.2d 657, 663 (Minn.1999). [V]icarious official immunity protects the government entity from suit based on the official immunity of its employee, Wiederholt, 581 N.W.2d at 316, and thus generally the claim against the government entity has been dismissed without any explanation once an employee is determined to be protected by official immunity. Pletan v. Gaines, 494 N.W.2d 38, 42 (Minn.1992). We conclude that Johnson presented sufficient evidence to preclude summary judgment on the basis of official immunity on the alleged state tort claims. As set forth above, there is a factual dispute regarding whether the officers used excessive force during the arrest. Accepting Johnson's account as true, a jury could find that the officers are not entitled to official immunity because they willfully violated her right to be free from excessive force. See Brown, 574 F.3d at 500-01.