Opinion ID: 2514346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Shoplifting Evidence

Text: Trial courts are afforded considerable discretion in deciding evidentiary issues, so such decisions will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Masters v. People, 58 P.3d 979, 996 (Colo.2002). However, a trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if it bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932, 936 (Colo.2004).
At the outset, we clarify some confusion in the trial court's ruling because it is not entirely clear under what rule the trial court found the question objectionable. The trial court merged its analysis of the evidence under two evidentiary rules: it found the substance of the shoplifting question objectionable pursuant to CRE 404(b) and found the method of proof objectionable pursuant to CRE 608(b). We first explain why the shoplifting question was properly at issue under rule 608(b), rather than rule 404(b). Both rule 404(b) and rule 608(b) permit admission of evidence that would otherwise be considered inadmissible character evidence for limited purposes. Rule 404(b) prohibits the use of evidence to show a person acted in conformity with a certain character, but does not preclude use of that evidence for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, plan, or absence of mistake. People v. Kraemer, 795 P.2d 1371, 1377 (Colo.App.1990). Rule 404(b) does not address the use of evidence for impeachment. Id.; see also CRE 404(a)(3) (explaining that evidence of a person's character is admissible as provided in rule 608). In contrast, rule 608(b) governs evidence used to impeach a witness's credibility. Thus, evidence of specific acts used solely for impeachment is governed by rule 608(b), rather than rule 404(b). Kraemer, 795 P.2d at 1377; People v. Harris, 892 P.2d 378, 382 (Colo. App.1994) (suggesting that if the evidence is admitted solely for impeachment purposes, it is questionable whether a rule 404(b) analysis is required). Here, defense counsel asked T.L. about the shoplifting act in order to impeach her credibility. This purpose is made apparent by counsel's foundational question: But you're not always honest, are you? The evidence was not offered for any of the purposes listed in rule 404(b), so the trial court erred when it applied that rule to the evidence.
We next consider whether defense counsel's question was admissible under rule 608(b), starting with whether the question was the correct method of impeachment. Specific instances of conduct intended to impeach the credibility of a witness may not be proved by extrinsic evidence, but may be inquired into on cross-examination of a witness. CRE 608(b); People v. Cole, 654 P.2d 830, 832 (Colo.1982). The rule provides: Specific instances of the conduct of a witness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' character for truthfulness other than conviction of crime as provided in [section] XX-XX-XXX may not be proved by extrinsic evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness (1) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. . . . CRE 608(b). Extrinsic evidence is evidence not contained in the source before the court, but which is available from other sources. Black's Law Dictionary 597 (8th ed.2004). Thus, where a witness is testifying, her answer to any question is intrinsic evidence, while the admission of any documents or calling of other witnesses constitutes extrinsic evidence. See People v. Taylor, 190 Colo. 210, 213-14, 545 P.2d 703, 705-07 (1976). Here, defense counsel inquired about an act of shoplifting during cross-examination, which is intrinsic evidence that complies with rule 608(b). Therefore, the trial court erred in concluding that asking the question on cross-examination was extrinsic evidence. Because the question was not extrinsic evidence, we next consider whether an act of shoplifting is proper impeachment evidence under rule 608(b). If a witness takes the stand and testifies, she puts her credibility in issue. People v. Drake, 748 P.2d 1237, 1246 (Colo.1988). Thus, the opposing party is entitled to impeach the witness's credibility. See id. Under rule 608(b), a witness may be asked about specific instances of conduct [2] that are probative of a witness's character for truthfulness or untruthfulness. E.g., People v. Pratt, 759 P.2d 676, 680 (Colo. 1988). The rule does not explain how to determine if an act is probative of truthfulness, and there is no committee comment on the rule to guide our inquiry. Colorado courts have held that the following instances of conduct are probative of the witness's truthfulness: providing false information to a police officer, e.g., People v. Garcia, 17 P.3d 820 (Colo.App.2000); intentionally failing to file tax returns, Kraemer, 795 P.2d 1371; and misrepresenting financial information to obtain a loan, People v. Distel, 759 P.2d 654 (Colo.1988). In contrast, Colorado courts have excluded acts of violence, People v. Ferguson, 43 P.3d 705 (Colo.App. 2001); instances of drug use, People v. Saldana, 670 P.2d 14 (Colo.App.1983); and bigamy, People v. Lesslie, 939 P.2d 443 (Colo. App.1996), because those acts are not probative of truthfulness. This court has never considered whether an act of shoplifting is probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness pursuant to rule 608(b). In People v. Jones , however, the court of appeals concluded that although shoplifting obviously involves a form of dishonesty, a disregard of property rights of others is not probative of a propensity to be truthful or untruthful. 971 P.2d 243, 244 (Colo.App.1998). We take this opportunity to decide whether shoplifting, an act that involves dishonesty, is probative of truthfulness. To aid our analysis, we conducted a fifty-state and federal survey, which revealed the law is not well-settled. [3] A majority of federal courts and some state courts have held that acts of theft are not probative of truthfulness [4] or do not involve dishonesty. [5] In contrast, a number of courts have concluded that theft is probative of truthfulness [6] or dishonesty. [7] These cases can be grouped into three categories, based on their view of the definition of truthfulness or dishonesty: broad, middle, and narrow. 3 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence § 6.33 (3d ed.2007). The broad approach would allow testimony of any indication of weak or bad character as probative of veracity. Id. This approach improperly subjects a witness to questioning about almost any event in her past. Almost no modern decisions adopt this view. Id. In contrast, the narrow approach requires the act to have an element of false statement or deception, limiting the inquiry to acts such as perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense. Id. A majority of federal courts take this view. [8] The middle view incorporates the narrow view but also suggests that conduct seeking personal advantage by taking from others in violation of their rights reflects on dishonesty or truthfulness. Id. In our view, the middle approach strikes the appropriate balance, as it acknowledges that some acts that do not involve false statement or misrepresentation are nonetheless probative of truthfulness. See id.; United States v. Manske, 186 F.3d 770, 775 (7th Cir.1999). Therefore, we decline to follow the courts that have reasoned that only acts that have an affirmative element of misrepresentation or false statement are probative of truthfulness, because these holdings create an unduly narrow category of acts that reflect on one's character for truthfulness. We are most persuaded by those courts that have taken the middle approach and have concluded theft is probative of truthfulness or dishonesty. [9] Dishonest is a synonym for untruthful. Webster's New College Dictionary 1568 (2005). It is illogical to conclude that an act which involves dishonesty is at the same time an act that is not probative of truthfulness. Moreover, common experience informs us that a person who takes the property of another for her own benefit is acting in an untruthful or dishonest way. See Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C.Cir.1967) ([A]cts of . . . stealing, for example, are universally regarded as conduct which reflects adversely on a man's honesty and integrity.); see also State v. Shaw, 328 S.C. 454, 492 S.E.2d 402, 404 (Ct.App.1997). Such behavior reflects on one's truthfulness because a person who stole from another may be more inclined to obtain an advantage for herself by giving false testimony. Varhol v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1567 (7th Cir.1990). Therefore, we hold that shoplifting is a specific instance of conduct that is probative of truthfulness pursuant to CRE 608(b). To the extent Jones, 971 P.2d 243, is contrary to our holding, we overrule it. We note that a prior act of shoplifting does not always mean a witness will testify untruthfully. This is especially true where there are facts that lessen the blame attached to the act, e.g., the act is committed at a young age, as a result of peer pressure, or involves property of minimal value. However, such considerations generally go to the weight given the evidence by the jury, rather than to its admissibility. Additionally, our holding does not restrict admissibility considerations under CRE 403 and other applicable evidentiary rules. See, e.g., People v. Lesslie, 939 P.2d 443, 452 (Colo.App.1996) ([I]t is well within [the court's] discretion to exclude [CRE 608(b) evidence] as being more prejudicial than probative.). Therefore, a trial court could exercise its discretion to exclude an act of shoplifting if it found the act inadmissible for other reasons. [10] Furthermore, our holding in no way suggests a misdemeanor conviction for shoplifting is probative of truthfulness. Rather, only the underlying circumstances surrounding the act are admissible pursuant to rule 608(b). E.g., Drake, 748 P.2d at 1246; People v. Robles, 183 Colo. 4, 7, 514 P.2d 630, 631 (1973); People v. Garcia, 17 P.3d 820, 829 (Colo.App.2000); People v. Armstrong, 704 P.2d 877, 880 (Colo.App.1985). Because the trial court erroneously determined CRE 404(b) applied to the evidence and incorrectly interpreted CRE 608(b), we hold that the trial court abused its discretion in finding defense counsel's question improper.