Opinion ID: 609813
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of Motion to Relieve Defense Counsel

Text: 21 Fagan contends that the district court erred by denying his attorney's motion to be relieved as counsel. Fagan argues that the district court denied the motion without inquiring adequately into the relationship between him and his attorney. We disagree. 22 Michael Treman was appointed to represent Fagan in both cases. On July 11, 1988, Judge Pfaelzer granted Treman's motion to be relieved as counsel in Case I because she found that a conflict existed between him and Fagan. Judge Pfaelzer's ruling was based primarily on the fact that Fagan had attempted to represent himself in Case I by preparing and seeking to file papers with the court. On July 13, 1988, Treman filed a motion to be relieved as counsel in Case II. The trial of Fagan and a co-defendant was scheduled to begin on July 26, 1988. Judge Tevrizian held a hearing on July 18, 1988, and denied the motion on the grounds that (1) substitution of counsel would require a continuance of the trial, and he was not willing to continue it; (2) Fagan had not expressed any dissatisfaction with Treman's representation to Judge Tevrizian, nor had Fagan sought to file any papers or otherwise represent himself; and (3) there was no evidence of a conflict between Fagan and Treman in Case II. 23 We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to substitute counsel. United States v. Wagner, 834 F.2d 1474, 1481 (9th Cir.1987). A trial court's refusal to allow substitution of attorneys may result in the denial of effective assistance of counsel if the defendant and his attorney are embroiled in an irreconcilable conflict. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir.1970). 24 In applying the Craven rule, three factors are considered: (1) the timeliness of the motion to dismiss counsel; (2) the adequacy of the court's inquiry into defendant's complaint; and (3) whether the conflict between defendant and his counsel was so great that it resulted in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. 25 United States v. McClendon, 782 F.2d 785, 789 (9th Cir.1986). 26 Considering these factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion. First, granting the motion would have required a continuance of the trial. Second, Judge Tevrizian's questioning of Treman and Fagan about the reasons for the motion provided an adequate basis for his decision. Third, nothing in the record suggests that the alleged conflict between Fagan and Treman resulted in a total breakdown of communication or prevented Treman from adequately representing Fagan at trial. Under these circumstances, Judge Tevrizian was not required to grant Treman's motion to withdraw simply because Judge Pfaelzer had found that a conflict existed in the case before her.