Opinion ID: 2682729
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Warrant Was Facially Valid

Text: ¶24 In considering a challenge to a warrant for lack of probable cause, we normally limit our review to the facts in the supporting affidavit since it is assumed that ―the information put forth is believed or appropriately accepted by the affiant as true.‖6 But the United States Supreme Court in Franks v. Delaware created a narrow exception to this general rule by permitting a defendant to challenge a search warrant using extrinsic evidence where it is alleged that the affidavit contains false statements or omissions.7 ¶25 Where a defendant has challenged a warrant for lack of probable cause based on an alleged omission, as is the case here, the court may grant a defendant a hearing to support his claims, but only if the defendant, by a ―detailed offer of proof,‖8 (1) makes a ―substantial showing that the affiant intentionally or recklessly omitted facts required to prevent technically true statements in the affidavit from being misleading‖9 and (2) demonstrates ―that the 6Franks, 438 U.S. at 164–65; see State v. Walker, 2011 UT 53, ¶ 13, 267 P.3d 210 (concluding that review of a magistrate‘s probable cause determination requires the court to ―consider the affidavit relied upon by the magistrate in its entirety and in a common sense fashion‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)). 7 438 U.S. at 155–56 (―[W]here the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and if the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant‘s request.‖); see State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188, 191 (Utah 1986) (extending Franks to the case of omissions); accord United States v. McKissick, 204 F.3d 1282, 1297 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300–01 (4th Cir. 1990). 8 United States v. Craighead, 539 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008). 9Lombardi v. City of El Cajon, 117 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300 (―The Franks test also applies when affiants omit material facts with the intent to make, or in reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit misleading.‖ (internal quotation (continued) 8 Cite as: 2014 UT 29 Opinion of the Court affidavit if supplemented by the omitted information would not have been sufficient to support a finding of probable cause.‖ 10 The burden on the defendant here is high—he must specifically point to portions of the affidavit he claims to be misleading, though he can also introduce extrinsic evidence to substantiate his claim.11 For example, he can include ―[a]ffidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable statements‖ to support his claim.12 If the defendant fails to properly substantiate his claim, he is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.13 ¶26 If, on the other hand, a defendant meets this burden and overcomes the presumptive validity of the warrant,14 the defendant is entitled to a hearing but must prove by a preponderance of the evidence both that the omission in the affidavit was material and that the critical information was intentionally or recklessly excluded.15 To show that the affiant deliberately or recklessly misled the magistrate, the defendant must offer either ―direct evidence of the affiant‘s state of mind or inferential evidence that the affiant had obvious reasons for omitting facts.‖16 Such evidence can be presented through direct testimony or by affidavit. marks omitted)); State v. Missouri, 524 S.E.2d 394, 397 (S.C. 1999) (same). 10 United States v. Reivich, 793 F.2d 957, 961 (8th Cir. 1986). 11 United States v. McMurtrey, 704 F.3d 502, 509 (7th Cir. 2013) (―It is relatively difficult for a defendant to make the ‗substantial preliminary showing‘ required under Franks. Allegations of negligent or innocent mistakes do not entitle a defendant to a hearing, nor do conclusory allegations of deliberately or recklessly false information.‖); United States v. Garcia-Zambrano, 530 F.3d 1249, 1256 (10th Cir. 2008) (discussing the standard of review for a trial court‘s interpretation of an affidavit where the trial court used extrinsic evidence to aid in interpreting the affidavit). 12 Franks, 438 U.S. at 171. 13 See United States v. Souffront, 338 F.3d 809, 822 (7th Cir. 2003). 14 Id. 15Franks, 438 U.S. at 156 (discussing the defendant‘s burden of proof); Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191 (clarifying the Franks requirements in the context of an omission). 16 Souffront, 338 F.3d at 822 (internal quotation marks omitted). 9 STATE v. FULLER Opinion of the Court ¶27 Critical here, and for all allegations of an intentional omission, is proof that the affiant intended to mislead the magistrate or recklessly omitted material information. Though such intent or reckless disregard for the truth ―may be inferred from the omission of information from an affidavit,‖ such an inference cannot be made unless ―the material omitted would have been clearly critical to the finding of probable cause.‖ 17 We also note that ―the Franks threshold is even higher for defendants making claims of omissions rather [than] affirmative false statements‖18 because of the myriad inferences that can be drawn from an omission. Indeed, ―[t]he mere fact that the affiant did not list every conceivable conclusion does not taint the validity of the affidavit.‖19 Requiring any lower threshold of proof would ―open[] officers to endless conjecture about investigative leads, fragments of information, or other matter[s] that might, if included, have redounded to defendant‘s benefit.‖20 ¶28 And a defendant forfeits his Franks challenge if he does not raise it in the trial court.21 A Franks challenge must ―be 17United States v. Carnahan, 684 F.3d 732, 735 (8th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 18 United States v. Clenney, 631 F.3d 658, 664 (4th Cir. 2011). 19 Colkley, 899 F.2d at 301 (internal quotation marks omitted). 20 Id. 21We acknowledge that the terms ―waiver‖ and ―forfeiture‖ ―are often used interchangeably,‖ In re Adoption of Baby E.Z., 2011 UT 38, ¶ 51 n.1, 266 P.3d 702 (Lee, J., concurring), even though the two concepts are fundamentally different; ―[w]hereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right, waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right,‖ United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). See, e.g., UTAH R. CRIM. P. 12(f) (―Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof . . . .‖); United States v. Lopez-Merida, 466 F. App‘x 731, 735–36 (10th Cir. 2012) (treating defendant‘s suppression argument as ―waived‖ where the defendant ―failed to make this argument during the suppression hearing or in the posthearing briefing‖). This distinction is important because a defendant is generally precluded from (continued) 10 Cite as: 2014 UT 29 Opinion of the Court presented to the trial court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to rule on that issue.‖22 In other words, a defendant must specifically challenge the warrant for lack of probable cause and put the trial court on notice of his request for a Franks hearing.23 On appeal, a defendant can challenge a trial court‘s ruling denying his Franks hearing or in rejecting his claim of falsity or omission, but these challenges are forfeited if not raised in the trial court, and on appeal they will be reviewed only for plain error.24 ¶29 As an initial matter, Mr. Fuller forfeited his Franks challenge because he failed to request an evidentiary hearing or in any manner bring his challenge to the attention of the trial court. Indeed, Mr. Fuller‘s central argument in his Motion to Suppress is that the warrant lacked particularity and that the probable cause was stale. In his Motion to Suppress, Mr. Fuller never argues that the warrant lacks probable cause due to an intentional omission; in fact, he raises such an issue only once, and it is in the context of his request to have the warrant struck as insufficiently particular under the Utah Constitution. Therein, he cited to our decision in State v. Krukowski,25 and stated that obtaining appellate review when he waives a right, but he may still obtain review for plain error when the right has only been forfeited. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733 (discussing forfeiture and plain error review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b)). 22438 Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51, 99 P.3d 801 (internal quotation marks omitted). 23United States v. Naiken, 874 F.2d 817,  (9th Cir. 1989) (declining to reach defendant‘s argument that trial court failed to grant a Franks hearing where the argument was never raised before the district court). 24United States v. Snow, 228 F. App‘x 203, 205–06 (3d Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (―We review for plain error a defendant‘s claim that the district court erred by not holding a Franks hearing or suppressing evidence on the basis of a fraudulent omission in the warrant affidavit, when the defendant failed to request a Franks hearing or raise a challenge to the truthfulness of the affidavit securing the warrant before the district court.‖). 2004 UT 94, ¶ 15, 100 P.3d 1222 (internal quotation marks 25 omitted). 11 STATE v. FULLER Opinion of the Court [j]ust as police officers may not include materially false statements in a search warrant affidavit, they similarly cannot omit information that materially affects the finding of probable cause, and the scope of the person(s) and property to be searched and seized. And in the single paragraph of analysis that follows, Mr. Fuller argues overbreadth—not that the warrant lacked probable cause. ¶30 In responding to the forfeiture concern during oral argument before us, Mr. Fuller‘s counsel cited to a portion of the transcript of the hearing on the Motion to Suppress. In that portion, the prosecutor suggests that, in the context of the Leon good faith exception, there was no basis to conclude that the ―officers intentionally misled the Federal magistrate.‖ This responsive argument by the prosecution was also insufficient, however, to put the court on notice of a Franks challenge. Given the above, we consider Mr. Fuller‘s Franks challenge forfeited below. ¶31 Because Mr. Fuller forfeited his Franks challenge, our review is limited to whether the trial court committed plain error in failing to grant Mr. Fuller an evidentiary hearing.26 And we cannot conclude that is the case here. To obtain an evidentiary hearing when an omission is alleged, as described above, the burden was on Mr. Fuller to establish that the affiant here recklessly or intentionally omitted the MAC address or LimeWire UsernameID from the affidavit, and that the warrant would have lacked probable cause had these more specific identifiers been included. In his Motion to Suppress, Mr. Fuller brought two separate claims: one under the United States Constitution, and the second under the Utah Constitution. Although he makes references throughout both claims to the MAC address and LimeWire UsernameID, he claims only that the affiant ―could have‖ included such identifiers. He in no way supports his Motion with any evidence that the affiant intentionally or recklessly omitted them.27 We also cannot infer such intent since Mr. Fuller has failed 26See United States v. Iiland, 254 F.3d 1264, 1267 n.1 (10th Cir. 2001). 27See McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1297 (―The standards of deliberate falsehood and reckless disregard set forth in Franks apply to material omissions, as well as affirmative falsehoods.‖). 12 Cite as: 2014 UT 29 Opinion of the Court to establish that these identifiers were ―critical‖ to the probable cause determination or even that ―the omitted facts are so striking that the inference is compelling.‖28 ¶32 Mr. Fuller also failed to demonstrate that these specific identifiers were ―necessary‖ for a probable cause determination. Quite the opposite, Mr. Fuller concedes at several points in his Motion to Suppress that probable cause would still exist with the identifiers included, but that particularity was the issue.29 It is here that the flaw in Mr. Fuller‘s argument becomes clear. If the warrant application had included the more specific identifiers, at most this would have potentially narrowed the scope of probable cause, which is really a concern over the particularity of the warrant. Including these identifiers, however, would not have altogether prevented a finding of probable cause, as is required by Franks. Because of these failures, and because ―the Franks threshold is even higher for defendants making claims of omissions rather [than] affirmative false statements,‖30 we cannot conclude that the trial court committed plain error in failing to grant Mr. Fuller a Franks evidentiary hearing. 2. The Information Contained in the Warrant Was Not Stale ¶33 Mr. Fuller also challenges the warrant for lack of probable cause by claiming that the information in the warrant affidavit was stale because approximately two months had passed between the initial internet search and the warrant application. Because the lapse of time here was relatively brief, and given the facts of this WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 28 FOURTH AMENDMENT § 4.4(b) (5th ed. 2012). 29In his Motion to Suppress, Mr. Fuller contends that ―[i]n addition to the searches regarding the MacID and/or Limewire UsernameID, the initial search could have been limited to determining whether or not the specific images which were downloaded on September 29, 2008, and which gave rise to probable cause supporting the warrant, were present on a particular computer.‖ (emphasis added). He further states that ―the agents conducting the investigation made no effort to utilize the Limewire UsernameID or the MacID of the actual computer suspected to be utilized in criminal activity, even though it could have easily been used to limit the scope of the search to that for which they had probable cause.‖ (emphasis added). 30 Clenney, 631 F.3d at 664. 13 STATE v. FULLER Opinion of the Court case, we reject Mr. Fuller‘s staleness claim. ―Staleness issues arise where so much time has passed that there is no longer probable cause to believe that the evidence is still at the targeted locale.‖31 But staleness is not determined merely by the passage of time32— the court must make an individual determination based on the facts of the case and a variety of factors, including ―the length of time, . . . the nature of the suspected crime (discrete crimes or ongoing conspiracy), habits of the accused, character of the items sought, and nature and function of the premises to be searched.‖33 ¶34 Further, ―[w]hen a defendant is suspected of possessing child pornography, the staleness determination is unique because it is well known that images of child pornography are likely to be hoarded by persons interested in those materials in the privacy of their homes.‖34 And ―because the crime is generally carried out in the secrecy of the home and over a long period, the same time limitations that have been applied to more fleeting crimes do not control the staleness inquiry for child pornography.‖35 For example, information that is over a year old is not necessarily stale,36 and in the digital age where deleted files can easily be recovered, staleness is unlikely to be as great of a concern until much more time has passed.37 ¶35 Here, only two months had passed between the initial search and the warrant application, and federal courts have State v. Norris, 2001 UT 104, ¶ 16 n.4, 48 P.3d 872 (internal 31 quotation marks omitted). 32 United States v. Trinh, 665 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2011). 33United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 1256, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). 34United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 125 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). 35 United States v. Paull, 551 F.3d 516, 522 (6th Cir. 2009). 36United States v. Newsom, 402 F.3d 780, 783 (7th Cir. 2005) (―Information a year old is not necessarily stale as a matter of law, especially where child pornography is concerned.‖). 37 United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630, 636 (9th Cir. 2000) (rejecting a staleness claim where the probable cause affidavit stated that ―even if [the defendant] had deleted the files, they could nevertheless be retrieved by a computer expert‖). 14 Cite as: 2014 UT 29 Opinion of the Court rejected staleness claims for much longer periods of time.38 Also, given that the crime here involved possession of child pornography, and given the affidavit explaining how collectors of child pornography habitually ―retain pictures [and other forms of child pornography] for many years,‖ the probable cause was demonstrably still fresh. This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that the initial search uncovered an advertisement for a child pornography convention, which indicated that this behavior was likely ongoing. Finally, Agent Nordstrom‘s affidavit explained that child pornography can be recovered from digital storage devices even ―after they have been deleted.‖ Given the above, we reject Mr. Fuller‘s staleness claim and conclude that the warrant was supported by probable cause.