Opinion ID: 1918053
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application to the DCHRA

Text: Ms. Owens contends that § 12-309 does not apply to suits brought against the District of Columbia under the DCHRA. Although we have not previously addressed this issue, several Superior Court judges and judges of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia have held that § 12-309 applies to statutory claims, including DCHRA claims. Byrd v. District of Columbia, 538 F.Supp.2d 170, 175-76 (D.D.C.2008) ([Plaintiffs'] DCHRA claims  to the extent they seek unliquidated damages  are dismissed for failure to provide mandatory notice.; citing cases holding that § 12-309 does apply to the DCHRA). [2] The plain language of § 12-309 supports this conclusion. Section 12-309 provides: An action may not be maintained against the District of Columbia for unliquidated damages ... unless, within six months after the injury or damage was sustained, the claimant ... has given notice in writing to the Mayor of the District of Columbia of the approximate time, place, cause, and circumstances of the injury or damage. A report in writing by the Metropolitan Police Department, in regular course of duty, is a sufficient notice under this section. This broad language applies to all claims for unliquidated damages, not distinguishing between common law and statutory claims. Byrd, 538 F.Supp.2d at 176 (emphasis added). Id. As this court has previously explained, the general notice requirements of § 12-309 serve several important purposes: they (1) permit the District of Columbia to conduct an early investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding a claim, (2) protect the District of Columbia against unreasonable claims, and (3) encourage prompt settlement of meritorious claims. Pitts v. District of Columbia, 391 A.2d 803, 807 (D.C.1978) ([T]he section was designed to aid the District of Columbia in the defense of the public interest where claims are filed within the applicable statute of limitations but so long after the event that it is impossible for the city to obtain evidence for use in litigation which may result.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Jenkins v. District of Columbia, 379 A.2d 1177, 1178 (D.C.1977); Wilson v. District of Columbia, 338 A.2d 437, 438 (D.C.1975). These statutory purposes are equally served when the District is facing DCHRA claims. We repeatedly have held that compliance with the statutory notice requirement is mandatory, Pitts, 391 A.2d at 807, and that § 12-309 is to be construed narrowly against claimants. Brown v. District of Columbia, 853 A.2d 733, 736 (D.C.2004); District of Columbia v. Dunmore, 662 A.2d 1356, 1359 (D.C.1995) (same). We have also explained many times before that written notice under § 12-309 is a condition precedent to filing suit against the District. Tucci v. District of Columbia, 956 A.2d 684, 695 (D.C.2008) (internal citation omitted); Gwinn v. District of Columbia, 434 A.2d 1376, 1378 (D.C.1981) (same). Without citing any supporting authority, Ms. Owens argues that § 12-309 does not apply here because the DCHRA does not specifically mention compliance with that statute as a precondition to filing suit. Yet, nothing in the language of the DCHRA, or its legislative history, expressly provides that § 12-309 does not apply, and repeals by implication are not favored. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 549, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974); see also District of Columbia Metro. Police Dep't v. Perry, 638 A.2d 1138, 1144 (D.C.1994) (same). Moreover, the broad and general language of § 12-309 mentions no exceptions. The legislative history of the DCHRA indicates that it should be read in harmony with and as supplementing other laws of the District, rather than as generally displacing them. Evans v. United States, 682 A.2d 644, 648 (D.C.1996) (quoting Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 319 (D.C.1995) (citing COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SERVICES AND CONSUMER AFFAIRS, REPORT ON BILL 2-179, THE HUMAN RIGHTS ACT OF 1977, at 3 (July 5, 1977))). We have previously refused to assume, in the absence of specific textual support, that the DCHRA shows the Council's inten[t] to cut back on [a] previously-existing, statutorily-permitted practice. Evans, 682 A.2d at 649 (DCHRA did not prohibit exercising the statutory right to peremptory challenges on the basis of age). We are even less inclined to assume from silence that the DCHRA was meant to override a previously-existing, statutorily-mandated requirement that timely notice be given to the Mayor. We therefore conclude that § 12-309 applies to claims for unliquidated damages brought against the District of Columbia under the DCHRA.