Opinion ID: 1794090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Definition of Statement

Text: The Court does not address a preliminary question regarding the definition of the term statement for statements against penal interest. MRE 804(b)(3). MRE 804(b)(3) tracks the language of FRE 804(b)(3) and in pertinent part provides as follows: A statement which was at the time of its making so far ... tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability ... that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the statement. In People v. Watkins, 438 Mich. 627, 636, 646, 475 N.W.2d 727 (1991), Justice Cavanagh concluded that the term statement should not be read broadly to encompass the declarant's entire confession. In the context of hearsay statements inculpating an accused, Justice Cavanagh reasoned: [O]ur confidence in the trustworthiness of a purported statement against interest extends only insofar as the specific factual assertions contained within the statement are, in fact, against the declarant's interest.... Each factual assertion ... must be viewed as narrowly and specifically as reasonably possible, and the court must separately ask whether each specific assertion is so intrinsically against the declarant's interest that a reasonable person would not have said it unless it were true. [Emphasis in the original.] Statements not against interest taken by themselves are not to be trusted. After our decision in Watkins, the United States Supreme Court explored the definition of the term statement in 804(b)(3). As in Watkins, the issue was the scope of the hearsay exception for statements against penal interest, and the context was use of statements inculpatory of a defendant. In Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S.___, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 129 L.Ed.2d 476 (1994), the Court held that the term refers not to the declarant's entire narrative, but covers only the parts of it that are individually self-inculpatory. Depending on the circumstances, statements that are ostensibly disserving may be either neutral or self-serving. While Williamson was remanded to determine whether the declarant's statement that he transported drugs was truly against his own interest, five justices felt it was not, because they concluded the declarant's primary purpose was to keep himself out of prison by confessing and handing over the defendant. After Williamson, the methodology of analyzing each portion of a statement to determine whether it is against penal interest has been applied to statements offered to exculpate the defendant by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, e.g., United States v. Butler, 71 F.3d 243 (C.A.7, 1995), and by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Thomas, 62 F.3d 1332 (C.A.11, 1995). Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Williamson observes that the Court's decision applies to statements against penal interest that exculpate the accused as well as to those that inculpate the accused. Thus, Justice Kennedy opined that, if the declarant said, `I robbed the store alone,' only the portion of the statement in which the declarant said `I robbed the store' could be introduced by a criminal defendant on trial for the robbery. ___ U.S. at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2443. The Court explains its failure to address the question by correctly observing that the prosecutor did not raise the argument. However, because the initial question before us is what this Court meant in the rule we promulgated, the failure to explain that the word statement is to be analyzed differently for exculpatory purposes than it is for inculpatory purposes, and differently than the identical language construed by the United States Supreme Court, is problematic. In my view, use of the Watkins-Williamson methodology clearly demonstrates that specific portions of the statement are not admissible because they are either neutral or self-serving. However, whether viewed individually or as a whole, I submit that Copeland's statement was not admissible under the hearsay exception of MRE 804(b)(3).