Opinion ID: 782363
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review of Murrell's Ineffective Assistance Claim

Text: 38 Murrell claims that he was denied effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment. To prevail on his ineffective assistance claim, Murrell must demonstrate that: (1) his counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) caused him prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to satisfy the prejudice requirement, Murrell must establish that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. at 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (emphasis added). 39 Our review of the state court's adjudication of Murrell's ineffective assistance claim is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Under the AEDPA, a state prisoner who petitions for a writ of habeas corpus must establish that the state court adjudication of his case was  contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly-established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.  28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (emphasis added). It is clear from the record before us, and our review of the law, that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals properly identified and applied Strickland as the proper legal standard governing Murrell's ineffective assistance claim. Thus, unless we can hold that the state appellate court unreasonably applie[d] [the Strickland standard] to the facts of the case, we are without authority to grant Murrell's petition for habeas relief. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 1850, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002) (emphasis added). 40 The bar for establishing that a state court's application of the Strickland standard was unreasonable is a high one: we have stated on prior occasion that ` only a clear error in applying Strickland would support a writ of habeas corpus,' Dixon v. Snyder, 266 F.3d 693, 700-01 (7th Cir.2001) (quoting Holman v. Gilmore, 126 F.3d 876, 882 (7th Cir.1997)), because  Strickland calls for inquiry into degrees, thereby add[ing] a layer of respect for a state court's application of the legal standard. Whitehead v. Cowan, 263 F.3d 708, 731 (7th Cir.2001) (emphasis added). Accordingly, this Court is obligated to affirm the district court's decision to deny the writ, so long as the Wisconsin Court of Appeals t[ook] the [constitutional standard] seriously and produce[d] an answer within the range of defensible positions.  Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 591 (7th Cir.2000) (emphasis added). 41 Additionally, in reviewing the state trial and appellate courts' adjudication of an ineffective assistance claim, we MUST presume that all factual determinations made by the state courts, including credibility determinations, are correct, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See Collier v. Davis, 301 F.3d 843, 848 (7th Cir.2002) (we presume [a state court's factual] determination to be correct unless [it is] rebut[ted] ... with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). This stands to reason, in light of the long-held principle of jurisprudence that  the trial judge is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses ..., United States v. Woods, 233 F.3d 482, 484 (7th Cir.2000) (emphasis added), when indeed, the  [trial judge] has... the best `opportunity to observe the verbal and non-verbal behavior of the witnesses focusing on the subject's reactions and responses to the interrogatories, their facial expressions, attitudes, tone of voice, eye contact, posture and body movements,' as well as confused or nervous speech patterns in contrast with merely looking at the cold pages of an appellate record. Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting United States v. Tolson, 988 F.2d 1494, 1497 (7th Cir.1993)). We extend great deference to [trial courts' credibility determinations] because... [such deference] is mandated by Congress under the AEDPA, Tolson, 988 F.2d at 1497 (discussing this Court's deference to a trial judge's determination of acceptance of responsibility in the sentencing context, based on the same jurisprudential principle that the sentencing judge is in a unique position to evaluate witness credibility). See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n. 7, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997) (outlining the AEDPA's presumption of correctness of state-court factual findings, and emphasizing the Act's highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings on collateral review). 42 As we have previously remarked, the criterion for assessing the reasonableness of a state court's application of Supreme Court case law, pursuant to § 2254(d)(1), is whether the determination is at least minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case. Sanchez v. Gilmore, 189 F.3d 619, 623 (7th Cir.1999) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted, emphasis added). In this case, after conducting our review of the record, transcripts and state trial and appellate courts' orders and opinions, we are convinced that the state courts' adjudication of Murrell's claim was not only minimally consistent with the facts in this case, but indeed was wholly supported by the plethora of damning evidence presented against Murrell. 43