Opinion ID: 1695460
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the jackson county board of supervisors has statutory authority to hire a youth court facilities administrator.

Text: Appellants cite many code sections, none of which establish or discuss the position of youth court facilities administrator. Specifically, appellants point to Miss. Code Ann. §§ 43-21-109, 19-2-9 and 19-3-40 as providing the authority for the Board to hire personnel to administer county youth detention and shelter facilities. Again, § 43-21-109 merely allows the Board to establish and maintain the facilities of the youth court, to include construction, remodeling and maintenance. Section 19-2-9 directs the Board to adopt and maintain a system of county wide personnel administration, which may include formulation of policies on hiring, termination and leave, among others. Section 19-3-40 provides, in relevant part: (1) The board of supervisors of any county shall have the power to adopt any orders, resolutions or ordinances with respect to county affairs, property and finances, for which no specific provision has been made by general law and which are not inconsistent with the Mississippi Constitution, the Mississippi Code of 1972, or any other statute or law of the State of Mississippi... . Appellants construe this section, together with § 43-21-109 as authorizing the Board to create and fill the position of a facilities administrator. Appellants conclude the law does not vest youth courts with authority to oversee and maintain the non-judicial functions of county facilities, including the juvenile detention and shelter facilities. He asserts the lower court erred in ruling the Jackson County Board of Supervisors has no authority to hire the youth court facilities administrator. Appellants are misleading in asserting that Judge Pigott prohibited the Board from hiring a facilities administrator. In response to the issues and pleadings before him, the judge instead determined the county officials could not interfere in the carrying out of the youth court's non-judicial functions, including the hiring of a Youth Court Administrator, and went on to note there was no statutory support for the Board's position that they could hire a youth court facilities administrator, a second and separate administrator from the court administrator under Judge Johnston's charge. The evidence clearly indicated Steele carried out the functions of a court administrator as that position is defined in § 9-17-3. She clearly was the judge's designee. There was no determination that in carrying out its responsibility to establish and maintain the youth court facilities, the Board could not employ and separately fund an individual to assist in such duties, whatever they might include. Finally, as the Youth Court is charged with the responsibility to secure proper care for each child entering its system, the Youth Court Judge is granted the authority to fulfill this function by appointing various persons to carry on the professional, clerical and other work of the youth court... . See Miss. Code Ann. § 43-21-119. By these grants of authority, Judge Johnston could appoint youth court referees, special judges, prosecutors, and even persons to function as intake units. With these powers, it appears clear that the youth court judges are placed in charge of the daily operations of their courts, as opposed to the Board's power to establish and maintain court facilities. Judge Pigott's common sense application of the law may have somewhat oversimplified the distinction in finding that while the Board could keep the roofs from leaking [and] the walls from falling, it could not interfere with Judge Johnston's administration of the court, including his appointment of an administrator to assist him. Nonetheless, the Board's position is unsupported by statutory or case law. There being no statutory authority, the Board would probably be wise to follow the law. This issue is without merit.