Opinion ID: 814569
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Stop of Lawing’s Vehicle

Text: Law enforcement can stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the officer has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity ‘may be afoot,’ even if the officer lacks probable cause. United States v. Christmas, 222 F.3d 141, 143 (4th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v. Sololow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). Reasonable suspicion is simply a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is a less demanding standard than probable cause and requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the evidence [even though] [t]he Fourth Amendment [still] requires at least a minimal level of objecUNITED STATES v. LAWING 9 tive justification for making the stop. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000). Here, the police had reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, to believe that criminal activity was afoot when it conducted the stop of Lawing’s vehicle. The CI had relayed information to the police in a face-to-face setting thereby affording them the clear ability to judge his credibility and corroborate the information he provided. See United States v. Perkins 363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004) (stating that law enforcement in a face-to-face encounter with an informant, can judge the credibility of the tipster firsthand and thus confirm whether the tip is sufficiently reliable to support reasonable suspicion). Informants who report tips faceto-face are more trustworthy and reliable than [an] anonymous tip because law enforcement can hold the informant accountable for false statements. Christmas, 222 F.3d at 144. Moreover, informants who make statements adverse to their own penal interests may bolster their credibility. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573, 583 (1971) (stating [a]dmissions of crime . . . carry their own indicia of credibility.). The totality of the circumstances in the case at bar afforded the police reasonable suspicion to stop Lawing’s car. Police had a face-to-face encounter with the informant, who provided substantial and verifiable details that established the necessary indicia of reliability: Lawing drove the car that the CI said he would drive; Lawing took the route that the CI said he would take; Lawing appeared at the time the CI said he would arrive, in a place close to the intended delivery address. This course of events allowed law enforcement to corroborate the CI’s account of the time and circumstances of the intended cocaine delivery. By exposing himself to potential criminal liability in telling the police he had previously purchased crack cocaine from Drew, the CI further enhanced his credibility. 10 UNITED STATES v. LAWING Despite significant factual distinctions between what occurred in this case and the facts in Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000), Lawing cites J.L. as support for his argument that the police lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle. However, the facts in J.L. stand in such contrast to those in the case at bar that J.L. actually supports the holding of the district court and the position of the government in this appeal. In J.L., an anonymous informant in an unknown location provided police the present location of a person alleged to possess a firearm. The police carried out a Terry8 stop of J.L., recovered a firearm, and J.L. moved to suppress. Id. at 26869. The Supreme Court agreed that the motion to suppress was properly granted. The Court held that the police needed more than just an anonymous tip lacking indicia of reliability to stop and detain J.L. Id. at 274. Because the police knew neither the identity nor the location of the informant, police could not assess the informant’s credibility nor hold the informant responsible for fabricated information. As the Court explained, [a]ll the police had to go on . . . was the bare report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about J.L. Id. at 271. The anonymous tip in J.L, without more, was insufficient as a matter of law because reasonable suspicion . . . requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its tendency to identify a determinate person. Id. at 272. The facts of the case at bar, however, are materially different from those in J.L. Here, police had ample indicia that the CI’s tip was credible. Unlike in J.L., the CI here was known to police. And unlike in J.L., the CI ordered cocaine base from the defendant in the presence of the officers, thus providing the police with a credible assertion that Lawing was engaged in illegal activity. Furthermore, the CI’s tip here con- 8 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). UNITED STATES v. LAWING 11 tained predictive information that the Supreme Court found lacking in J.L. Cf. id. at 271. In sum, the CI’s tip in this case had a tendency to identify a determinate person, i.e., Lawing, and was reliable in its assertion of illegality. Id. Accordingly, we reject Lawing’s contention that J.L. requires reversal of the district court, and readily conclude that the stop of Lawing’s vehicle was appropriate.