Opinion ID: 835498
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Fourth Cause of Complaint: DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-103(C)

Text: In its fourth cause of complaint, the Bar alleged that, based on the accused's conduct during the Bar's investigation and this proceeding, the accused (1) engaged in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice, in violation of DR 1-102(A)(4); [17] and (2) failed to cooperate and respond fully and truthfully to the inquiries and requests of disciplinary counsel, in violation of DR 1-103(C). [18] The trial panel found that the Bar had established by clear and convincing evidence that the accused had violated DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 1-103(C) because the accused had lacked any justification to withhold discovery once the trial panel had ordered him to do so and because he unreasonably and without valid cause refused to cooperate with numerous discovery requests from disciplinary counsel. As an initial matter, we set forth the rules of procedure governing discovery in lawyer disciplinary proceedings. The Bar Rules of Procedure provide that [r]equests for admission, requests for production of documents, and depositions may be utilized in disciplinary proceedings and that the manner of discovery concerning those items shall conform as nearly as practicable to the procedure set forth in the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure. BR 4.5(b). Three rules of civil procedure are pertinent here: ORCP 36, which establishes the scope of discovery generally; ORCP 43, [19] which governs the production of documents; and ORCP 39, which sets out the procedures for taking depositions. ORCP 36 B(1) provides: For all forms of discovery, parties may inquire regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tangible things, and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The accused argues that the Bar's requests for the production of documents and the Bar's questions to him during deposition sought documents and information that were privileged or otherwise protected from disclosure and that his failure to produce the requested documents and to answer the relevant questions therefore was permissible.
With respect to DR 1-103(C), the accused argues that the trial panel erred in finding that he had violated that rule because, in every alleged instance of misconduct, he had been exercising an applicable right or privilege. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the accused's objections were not justified by any applicable right or privilege. As discussed above, the Bar's discovery requests and deposition questions related to the accused's lawyer trust account and his representation of Anderson. During this proceeding, the accused objected to those requests multiple times  in response to deposition questions, in written responses to discovery requests, and in multiple letters to the Bar and the trial panel  on various grounds, including lawyer-client privilege, client secrets, work product, and harassment. We observe first that the rules for the conduct of lawyer disciplinary proceedings and the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure permit a person from whom discovery is sought to object to the discovery request if the information requested is privileged. See, e.g., ORCP 36 B(1) (scope of discovery does not include privileged matter); ORCP 39 D(3)(c) (deponent may object and decline to answer question to preserve a privilege); ORCP 43 B (party receiving request to produce documents may object to production). When such objections are made, the rules provide procedures by which the party objecting can obtain a ruling on the objections or a party seeking discovery can obtain an order compelling discovery. See BR 4.5(c) (trial panel chairperson to rule on discovery disputes in lawyer disciplinary proceedings); ORCP 46 A (trial court may enter order compelling discovery). Thus, an accused lawyer, like a party to a civil action, does not necessarily engage in improper conduct or conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice simply by objecting to the production of documents or by refusing to answer questions at a deposition based on a claim of privilege. The accused lawyer is permitted to make an objection and force the Bar to seek a motion to compel or similar order from the trial panel. Here, however, the Bar argues that the accused did not simply make use of applicable procedures, but rather that his objections to the Bar's discovery requests were frivolous and were made solely to delay and obstruct the disciplinary proceeding. The Bar points to multiple letters, filings, and emails that document the accused's repeated refusal to provide possible deposition dates, to produce documents, and to respond to requests for admissions. The Bar also asserts that the accused's substantive objections to certain discovery requests  primarily on the grounds of lawyer-client privilege and work product  were frivolous. We agree with the Bar. As to the accused's responses to the Bar's discovery requests generally, the record amply demonstrates that the accused violated DR 1-103(C) by failing to respond fully and truthfully to inquiries from and comply with reasonable requests of the Bar and the trial panel. We also conclude that the accused's lawyer-client and work product objections to the Bar's discovery requests were frivolous. First, the Bar's document requests did not request the production of privileged documents, but rather requested that the accused identify any documents that he asserted were privileged and the basis for the privilege. The accused never articulated any basis for the asserted privilege. He never explained why the lawyer trust account records that the Bar sought constituted confidential communications in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services, such that the records might be subject to the lawyer-client privilege protected by OEC 503. More significantly, the accused's objections ignore the fact that the Bar proceeding was based on Anderson's complaint. The lawyer-client privilege is a privilege of the client, not the lawyer. It would defy logic to permit the accused to assert his client's privilege as a basis for withholding information needed for the Bar to prosecute a complaint that the client initiated. Here, given the nature of Anderson's complaint and the rules that the Bar charged the accused with violating, there was no doubt that the documents requested were necessary to investigate and prosecute the violations charged. The accused's position also ignores OEC 503(4)(c), which provides an exception to the lawyer-client privilege for a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the lawyer to the client   . Thus, even if the lawyer trust account records might be considered communications subject to the lawyer-client privilege, that privilege did not apply to the disciplinary proceeding growing directly out of Anderson's complaint about the accused's conduct. We conclude that the Bar has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused repeatedly and intentionally violated DR 1-103(C).
This court has held that, to prove a violation of DR 1-102(A)(4), the Bar must demonstrate that (1) the lawyer engaged in conduct, that is, the lawyer did something that he or she should not have done or failed to do something that the lawyer should have done; (2) the conduct occurred during the administration of justice, that is, during the course of a judicial proceeding or another proceeding that was analogous to a judicial proceeding; and (3) the lawyer's conduct resulted in prejudice, either to the functioning of the proceeding or to a party's substantive interests in the proceeding. See In re Coggins, 338 Or. 480, 486, 111 P.3d 1119 (2005) (so holding); see also In re Haws, 310 Or. 741, 746-48, 801 P.2d 818 (1990) (setting forth test). The Bar asserts that the accused violated DR 1-102(A)(4) by, among other things, failing to comply with a June 9, 2004, order of the trial panel directing him to produce certain documents. The accused argues that the trial panel erred in finding that the first and third elements of that test were met here. With respect to the first element, the accused contends that he did not fail to do something that he should have done, because the trial panel's June 9, 2004, discovery order was not entirely clear and did not specify exactly what records the Bar sought to discover. The accused is wrong. The Bar clearly articulated in its Request for Production of Documents (and its later motion to compel) that it sought discovery of those documents related to the accused's maintenance of his lawyer trust account and his representation of Anderson. In granting the Bar's motion, the trial panel expressly identified which of the Bar's requests it was ordering the accused to comply with. As noted above, the accused refused to comply with that order, and none of the various grounds that he asserted to justify his repeated objections was supported under applicable law. Consequently, the accused failed to do something that he should have done. With respect to the third element, the accused argues that any alleged misconduct was not prejudicial to the administration of justice but, rather, was the product of a contentious and vigorous defense. To conclude that a lawyer's conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice under DR 1-102(A)(4), we must find that the lawyer engaged either in repeated acts causing some harm to the administration of justice or a single act that caused substantial harm to the administration of justice. Haws, 310 Or. at 748, 801 P.2d 818. Here, the accused delayed his compliance with the Bar's request for copies of his lawyer trust account statements for more than 11 months. Additionally, his improper objections at his first deposition prejudiced the Bar's ability to prosecute this case expeditiously and resulted in the added time and expense of a subsequent deposition. Furthermore, due to the accused's intentional refusal to respond fully and truthfully about his failure to prepare and maintain lawyer trust account records, the Bar was burdened with the added expense of subpoenaing records from U.S. Bank pertaining to the accused's account. Finally, the accused admitted at his second deposition that, at some point during the Bar's investigation, he had made a conscious decision not to provide the Bar with the deposit slip reflecting a return of Anderson's $75 to his lawyer trust account. The accused's repeated actions resulted in prejudice to the conduct of this proceeding and to the interests of the Bar and the public. See In re Boothe, 303 Or. 643, 654, 740 P.2d 785 (1987) (issues in bar disciplinary proceedings directly and significantly affect members of Bar and general public). His conduct was prejudicial to the administration of justice. We conclude that the Bar has proved by clear and convincing evidence that the accused intentionally violated DR 1-102(A)(4).