Opinion ID: 768715
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging and Plea Bargaining

Text: 73 It is well established that the decision as to what federal charges to bring against any given suspect is within the province of the Executive Branch of the government. 74 The Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain 'broad discretion' to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985) (quoting United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380, n. 11 (1982)). They have this latitude because they are designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed. U.S. Const., Art. II, §3; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 516, 547. As a result, [t]he presumption of regularity supports their prosecutorial decisions and, in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties. United States v. Chemical Foundation, Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14 15 (1926). 75 United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996). 76 This broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. 77 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); see also id. at 607-08 (judicial supervision of prosecutorial decisions would entail a variety of systemic costs potentially hampering law enforcement). 78 Prosecutorial discretion is, of course, subject to constitutional constraints, United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 125 (1979); the decision whether to prosecute may not be based on an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 (1962); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). But [i]n the ordinary case, 'so long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.' Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 464 (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) (emphasis ours)). [W]hen an act violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants. Batchelder, 442 U.S. at 123 24. 79 Prosecutorial discretion in the decision as to which charges to bring and which to forgo, resting on assessments of the factors discussed in Wayte, e.g., the government's priorities and overall enforcement plan, is also integral to the plea-bargaining process. 80 [T]he guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are important components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can benefit all concerned. The defendant avoids extended pretrial incarceration and the anxieties and uncertainties of a trial; he gains a speedy disposition of his case, the chance to acknowledge his guilt, and a prompt start in realizing whatever potential there may be for rehabilitation. Judges and prosecutors conserve vital and scarce resources. The public is protected from the risks posed by those charged with criminal offenses who are at large on bail while awaiting completion of criminal proceedings. 81 Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).