Opinion ID: 2543513
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Character Propensity Evidence

Text: ¶ 35 The second ground upon which the trial court deemed inadmissible the evidence concerning Egan's acceptance of a ride from a stranger in September 1996 was that the information constituted impermissible character propensity evidence, namely, that because . . . Egan had previously gotten into a stranger's car willingly, she must have conducted herself similarly in this case. ¶ 36 The admissibility of character evidence is controlled by rules 404 and 405 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. As a general principle, rule 404 prohibits introduction of evidence concerning a person's character or a trait of character . . . for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion. Utah R. Evid. 404(a). At the same time, however, rule 404 allows the admission of certain character propensity evidence if it qualifies under an exception to the rule's blanket prohibition. Specifically, one of rule 404's exceptions allows criminal defendants to offer evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim of the crime. Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(2); see also State v. Gotschall, 782 P.2d 459, 463 & n. 4 (Utah 1989). ¶ 37 Where evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the victim is offered in a criminal case, rule 405 governs. Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(2); see Utah R. Evid. 405. That rule prescribes the dual manner in which character propensity evidence may be introduced. First, specific instances of a person's character may be admitted if the character or a trait of character of [the] person is [an] essential element of a charge, claim, or defense. Utah R. Evid. 405(b); see also State v. Miller, 709 P.2d 350, 354 (Utah 1985). Second, to the degree character propensity evidence is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion. Utah R. Evid. 405(a); accord United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1155-56 (10th Cir. 1992). When such testimony is given, moreover, evidence of relevant specific instances of conduct may be introduced on cross-examination to discredit the opinion or reputation testimony of a victim's character. Utah R. Evid. 405(a); accord Talamante, 981 F.2d at 1155-56; Bright v. Shimoda, 819 F.2d 227, 228 (9th Cir.1987). ¶ 38 In this case, the State argued that Egan's testimony constituted the true and correct version of what occurred on the night of December 29, 1996, because her account was reasonable and comported with common sense, while Martin's explanation was unreasonable and difficult to swallow. The clear import of this argument was that responsible people do not willingly enter the vehicle of a stranger only moments after initially encountering the individual, and that Egan is in fact a responsible person. In support of this contention, the State introduced evidence at trial of Egan's character as a dependable and responsible individual. Explaining that she was surprised Egan had not returned home shortly after leaving for the store, Egan's sister testified: Lorraine isn't like that. She is very dependable. She had a child waiting at home.... She is very dependable. [N]ormally, when she says she is going to do something, she does it. We expected her home in twenty minutes, and under any other circumstances she would have been home in twenty minutes. Having introduced this evidence, the State placed Egan's character into question, and the defense was therefore allowed to discredit the testimony of Egan's sister by inquir[ing] into relevant specific instances of conduct that might contradict her opinion of Egan's character as dependable and responsible. Utah R. Evid. 405(a); accord Bright, 819 F.2d at 228. Indeed, we have already determined that the evidence of Egan's accepting a ride from a stranger in September 1996 is relevant to the central issue of this casewhose version of the events to believeand we accordingly hold that the trial court erred by excluding that evidence as inadmissible character propensity evidence. Martin I, 1999 UT 72 at ¶ 16, 984 P.2d 975; see supra ¶ 34. While the Utah Rules of Evidence do generally prohibit evidence of a person's character . . . for the purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion, Utah R. Evid. 404(a), those same rules plainly allow a criminal defendant to attempt to discredit, with evidence of specific instances of conduct, testimony of an alleged victim's relevant character once it has been introduced. Utah R. Evid. 405(a); see Bright, 819 F.2d at 228; Utah R. Evid. 404(a)(2).