Opinion ID: 2978634
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: See U.S.S.G., ch. 5, pt. A.

Text: Furthermore, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Chen’s request for a three-level downward departure based on the grounds that he had harbored aliens for purposes “other than for profit” as permitted under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1)(A). “Since Booker, we have reaffirmed -7- the doctrine that district judges in determining defendants’ sentences may consider facts that they find under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” Klups, 514 F.3d at 537. Consequently, “[i]n many cases, the sentencing judge, not the jury, will determine the existence of . . . facts” that increase the sentence. Rita, 551 U.S. at 352. Because Chen requested a downward departure, Chen bore the burden to demonstrate that he had harbored aliens other than for profit in order to be entitled to the downward departure. United States v. Rodriguez, 896 F.2d 1031, 1032 (6th Cir. 1990) (“[W]hen a defendant seeks to establish facts which would lead to a sentence reduction under the Guidelines, he shoulders the burden of proving those facts by a preponderance of the evidence.”). The district court determined that Chen failed to meet this burden and, moreover, affirmatively found that he did harbor aliens for personal financial gain. By doing so, the district court did not clearly err in concluding that Chen’s conduct was motivated by profit. See United States v. Young, 553 F.3d 1035, 1051 (6th Cir. 2009) (explaining that an appellate court must review a district court’s determination that a factual finding is supported by a preponderance of the evidence using the clear-error standard). The district court made “particularized findings related to evidence presented at trial” and provided both defense counsel and the government with an opportunity to argue for and against the three-level downward departure. Id. The district court explicitly rejected Chen’s arguments that he was not in the business of harboring aliens, that he intended to deduct rent from at least one of the illegal alien’s monthly paychecks, and that he paid the illegal aliens a living wage. The evidence presented at trial and defense counsel’s admission at sentencing that Chen’s harboring “certainly was related to the -8- business, there’s no question about that” provided sufficient evidence for the district court to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Chen harbored the illegal aliens for private financial gain. See United States v. Zheng, 306 F.3d 1080, 1083, 1087 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding sufficient evidence from which a rational jury could find a “for profit” motive beyond a reasonable doubt when a restauranteur housed illegal aliens without rent so that they could work in his restaurant and paid an average monthly salary of $900 to $1,900 per month). The district court did what was required of it post-Booker, particularly given that Chen bore the burden of proving entitlement to the mitigating factor by a preponderance of the evidence. 2. Chen did not seek a non-Guidelines sentence, and so we need only review the district court’s analysis of the § 3553(a) factors to determine whether the district court satisfied the second prong of the Bolds procedural reasonableness analysis. See Bolds, 511 F.3d at 581. While we review a district court’s determination that the § 3553(a) factors justify a particular sentence with considerable deference, “our inquiry into the procedures used by the district court . . . is more searching.” Id. at 579 n.4 (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). “In applying Congress’s mandate that sentencing courts must ‘consider’ the § 3553(a) factors, we have not lost sight of the fact that the district court judges are involved in an exercise of judgment, not a ritual.” Grossman, 513 F.3d at 595. Thus, this court requires an “‘articulation of the reasons the district court reached the sentence imposed,’” Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580 (quoting United States v. Jackson, 408 F.3d 301, 305 (6th Cir. 2005)), with “only . . . enough detail to allow an appellate court to conduct ‘meaningful -9- appellate review’ and to conclude that the district court adequately considered the relevant statutory factors,” Grossman, 513 F.3d at 595. Although the district court did not explicitly analyze each of the § 3553(a) factors in turn, it did address those factors in rejecting the parties’ requests for upward and downward departures for obstruction of justice and purpose other than for profit. For example, the district court’s discussion of possible departures and split sentencing acknowledged “the kinds of sentences available” and the Sentencing Guidelines’ treatment of the offense committed. See § 3553(a)(2)–(4). Furthermore, the government’s argument for an obstruction of justice enhancement included consideration of the seriousness of the crime, the deterrence effect, and the import of respect for the law. See § 3553(a)(2). The judge acknowledged that “Chen was not fully forthcoming with the agents at any point[,] which I will reflect in my sentence within the guidelines range recommended by the probation office of 10 to 16 months.” Sentencing Tr. at 35; see § 3553(a)(1)–(2). The district court also considered the “nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant” when he heard Chen’s allocution, discussed the for-profit aspects of the convicted crime, and waived any fine because of Chen’s lack of resources. See § 3553(a)(1). We find, therefore, that the district court’s discussion of the factors, though not itemized, was sufficient to permit “meaningful appellate review” of its consideration of § 3553(a) factors in sentencing Chen. 3. The third Bolds requirement is also satisfied because the district court adequately explained its reasoning for imposing the seven-month split sentence. The district court considered the parties’ -10- arguments regarding a possible enhancement for obstruction of justice and downward departure for a non-profit purpose, heard the allocution and testimony of Chen regarding mitigating factors, and imposed a split sentence at the low end of the applicable Guidelines range. See Bolds, 511 F.3d at 580 (“[R]eversible procedural error occurs if the sentencing judge fails to ‘set forth enough [of a statement of reasons] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decision making authority.’” (quoting Rita, 551 U.S. at 356) (alteration in original)); United States v. Jones, 489 F.3d 243, 251 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[W]hen ‘a defendant raises a particular argument in seeking a lower sentence, the record must reflect both that the district judge considered the defendant’s argument and that the judge explained the basis for rejecting it.’” (quoting United States v. Richardson, 437 F.3d 550, 554 (6th Cir. 2006))). The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion by imposing Chen’s sentence, and the sentence was clearly within the Guidelines and procedurally reasonable under Booker. B. Having found that the district court’s sentencing determination was procedurally reasonable, we must “then consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-ofdiscretion standard.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. Because Chen’s sentence is within the Guidelines range, we may—and do— presume that it is reasonable. Id. at 51. The portion of the sentence to be served in prison—seven months—is well below the minimum sentence required by the relevant Guidelines range of 10 to 16 months. Even with the addition of seven months’ supervised release at a CCC, the total time that Chen is to spend in custody—fourteen months—remains within the ten-to-sixteenmonth Guidelines range. -11- The sentence that the district court imposed was therefore both substantively and procedurally reasonable in accordance with Booker.