Opinion ID: 1198942
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duty to instruct on all supportable theories of lesser included offense.

Text: As below, defendant urges the trial court's voluntary manslaughter instructions were defective because they did not include the heat of passion theory despite support for that theory in the evidence. The omission, defendant suggests, deprived him of his constitutional right to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence. ( People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Cal.2d 722, 730, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33 ( Modesto ); see also People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 335, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311 ( Wickersham ).) The People, on the other hand, argue that the duty to instruct sua sponte on a lesser included offense is satisfied when the court instructs on the theory of that offense most consistent with the evidence and the line of defense pursued at trial. The court, the People urge, need not further provide, in the absence of a defense request, instructions on additional, and perhaps conflicting, theories of the lesser offense. We find defendant's position more persuasive. Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. (§ 187, subd. (a).) A defendant who commits an intentional and unlawful killing but who lacks malice is guilty of ... voluntary manslaughter. (§ 192.) ( People v. Barton (1995) 12 Cal.4th 186, 199, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531 ( Barton ).) Generally, the intent to unlawfully kill constitutes malice. (§ 188; People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1113, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588; see In re Christian S. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 768, 778-780, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574 ( Christian S. ).) But a defendant who intentionally and unlawfully kills lacks malice ... in limited, explicitly defined circumstances: either when the defendant acts in a sudden quarrel or heat of passion' (§ 192, subd. (a)), or when the defendant kills in `unreasonable self-defense'the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense (see [] wChristian S. [, supra, ]7 Cal.4th 768, 30 Cal.Rptr.2d 33, 872 P.2d 574; [] Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1). ( Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 199, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Because heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense reduce an intentional, unlawful killing from murder to voluntary manslaughter by negating the element of malice that otherwise inheres in such a homicide ( ibid. ), voluntary manslaughter of these two forms is considered a lesser necessarily included offense of intentional murder ( id. at pp. 201-202, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531). [5] `It is settled that in criminal cases, even in the absence of a request, the trial court must instruct on the general principles of law relevant to the issues raised by the evidence. [Citations.] The general principles of law governing the case are those principles closely and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which are necessary for the jury's understanding of the case.' ( People v. St. Martin (1970) 1 Cal.3d 524, 531, 83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390.) That obligation has been held to include giving instructions on lesser included offenses when the evidence raises a question as to whether all of the elements of the charged offense were present (see, e.g., People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal.3d 444, 82 Cal.Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370), but not when there is no evidence that the offense was less than that charged. ( People v. Noah (1971) 5 Cal.3d 469, 479, 96 Cal.Rptr. 441, 487 P.2d 1009; People v. Osuna (1969) 70 Cal.2d 759, 767, 76 Cal.Rptr. 462, 452 P.2d 678.) The obligation to instruct on lesser included offenses exists even when as a matter of trial tactics a defendant not only fails to request the instruction but expressly objects to its being given. ( People v. Mosher (1969) 1 Cal.3d 379, 393, 82 Cal.Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659; People v. Graham (1969) 71 Cal.2d 303, 319, 78 Cal.Rptr. 217, 455 P.2d 153.) Just as the People have no legitimate interest in obtaining a conviction of a greater offense than that established by the evidence, a defendant has no right to an acquittal when that evidence is sufficient to establish a lesser included offense. ([] St. Martin, supra, 1 Cal.3d 524, 533, 83 Cal.Rptr. 166, 463 P.2d 390.) ( Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 715-716, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, fn. omitted; see Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at pp. 194-198, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Cases have suggested that the requirement of sua sponte instructions arises, among other things, from the defendant's right under the California Constitution to have the jury determine every material issue presented by the evidence. (E.g., People v. Geiger (1984) 35 Cal.3d 510, 519, 199 Cal. Rptr. 45, 674 P.2d 1303 ( Geiger ), overruled on other grounds, Birks, supra, 19 Cal.4th 108, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 848, 960 P.2d 1073; see also Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 335, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311; Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 720, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913; Modesto, supra, 59 Cal.2d 722, 730, 31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33.) However, we have consistently stressed the broader interests served by the sua sponte instructional rule. As we have said, insofar as the duty to instruct applies regardless of the parties' requests or objections, it prevents the strategy, ignorance, or mistakes of either party from presenting the jury with an unwarranted all-or-nothing choice, encourages a verdict ... no harsher or more lenient than the evidence merits ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 324, 185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, italics added), and thus protects the jury's truth-ascertainment function ( Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 196, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531). These policies reflect concern [not only] for the rights of persons accused of crimes [but also] for the overall administration of justice. ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 324, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) We have noted the danger of all-or-nothing verdict choices as a basis for the instructional rule. However, we have never intimated that the rule is satisfied once the jury has some lesser offense option, so that the court may limit its sua sponte instructions to those offenses or theories which seem strongest on the evidence, or on which the parties have openly relied. On the contrary, as we have expressly indicated, the rule seeks the most accurate possible judgment by ensur[ing] that the jury will consider the full range of possible verdicts  included in the charge, regardless of the parties' wishes or tactics. ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 324, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, italics added.) The inference is that every lesser included offense, or theory thereof, which is supported by the evidence must be presented to the jury. The People effectively concede that the rule they suggest is not consistent with existing law. They argue only that we should reexamine the sua sponte duty to that extent and should impose the proposed limit as a matter of first impression. [6] We decline to do so. The rule the People advocate would contravene the policies our cases have consistently expressed in support of the existing instructional requirement. The People present no persuasive reason for departing from these well-established principles. Indeed, in Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531, we recently considered and rejected a defendant 's contention that the sua sponte instructional rule for lesser included offenses should be narrowed in a fashion closely akin to that suggested by the People here. A brief background discussion is necessary to explain the context in which the Barton issue arose. In Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, we noted that the sua sponte duty to instruct on all material issues presented by the evidence extends to defenses as well as to lesser included offenses ( id. at p. 716, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913), but we drew a sharp distinction between the two situations. In the case of defenses, we concluded, a sua sponte instructional duty arises only if it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case. ( Ibid., italics added.) Thus, when the trial court believes there is substantial evidence that would support a defense inconsistent with that advanced by a defendant, the court should ascertain from the defendant whether he wishes instructions on the alternative theory. ( Id., at p. 717, fn. 7, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913, italics added.) By contrast, [w]hen the charged offense is one that is divided into degrees or encompasses lesser offenses, and there is evidence from which the jury could conclude that the lesser offense had been committed, the court must instruct on the alternate theory even if it is inconsistent with the defense elected by the defendant .... ( Ibid., italics added.) Wickersham later concluded that the unreasonable self-defense theory of voluntary manslaughter comes within Sedeno 's category of `defenses' for purposes of the obligation to instruct sua sponte.  ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 329, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) Hence, Wickersham reasoned, sua sponte instructions on that theory, even if supported by the evidence, were not necessary unless consistent with the defendant's trial theory. ( Ibid. ) On the other hand, Wickersham confirmed that where the evidence in a murder case would support a heat of passion theory of voluntary manslaughter, the trial court is obligated to instruct on the theory. ( Id. at p. 325, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) The instructional distinction between defenses and lesser included offenses arose again in Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531. There, the defendant fatally shot the victim during a heated, parking lot argument. The defendant had extensive military firearms training and was, as usual, legally carrying a semiautomatic pistol. The exact circumstances of the shooting were in substantial dispute. The defendant claimed he saw a knife in the victim's hand, brandished his gun to hold the victim for the police, but then fired reflexively while stepping backward to avoid the victim's threatening movement. The defendant requested the omission of instructions on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense included in murder, because such instructions would contravene his theory that he killed accidentally. The trial court denied the request and instructed on both heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense theories of voluntary manslaughter. In their jury arguments, the prosecutor claimed an intentional murder, while defense counsel adhered to the premise of an accidental, and thus excusable, killing. On appeal from his manslaughter conviction, the defendant urged that we abrogate Sedeno 's differing instructional treatment of offenses and defenses, thus allowing him, as in the case of defenses, to veto instructions on lesser included offenses inconsistent with his trial strategy. We declined the invitation. We concluded that Sedeno 's reasoning in this respect was sound, and that the rule requiring sua sponte instructions on lesser included offenses regardless of the parties' strategies should be retained. Barton explained that [f]ailure to ... instruct [on defenses not asserted by the defendant] will not deprive the jury of the opportunity to consider the full range of criminal offenses established by the evidence. Nor is the prosecution denied the opportunity to seek conviction on all offenses included within the crime charged. Moreover, to require trial courts to ferret out all defenses that might possibly be shown by the evidence, even when inconsistent with the defendant's theory at trial, would not only place an undue burden on the trial courts but would also create a potential of prejudice to the defendant. As we said in Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d at pages 716-717, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913: `Appellate insistence upon sua sponte instructions [concerning defenses] which are inconsistent with defense trial theory or not clearly demanded by the evidence would hamper defense attorneys and put trial judges under pressure to glean legal theories and winnow the evidence for remotely tenable and sophistical instructions.' ( Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 197, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) On the other, hand, Barton concluded, [a] trial court's failure to inform the jury of its option to find the defendant guilty of [a] lesser [included] offense [supported by the evidence] would impair the jury's truth-ascertainment function by forcing the jury to make an `all or nothing' choice between conviction of the crime charged or complete acquittal, thereby denying the jury the opportunity to decide whether the defendant is guilty of a lesser included offense established by the evidence. ( Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 196, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531, italics added, fn. omitted.) [7] Barton then analyzed whether heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense, insofar as they reduce a murder to voluntary manslaughter, are mere defenses which the defendant may control under Sedeno. Barton answered that question in the negative. We acknowledged in Barton that because it is [ordinarily] the defendant who offers evidence on these theories, and because they operate to reduce murder to the lesser offense of manslaughter, they resemble traditional affirmative defenses. Mindful of Wickersham 's holding on the issue, we also noted in particular the close conceptual similarities between unreasonable self-defense and the actual defense of true self-defense. ( Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 199-200, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Nonetheless, we explained, voluntary manslaughter is itself an offense, i.e., an unlawful lolling distinguished from murder only because it is without malice (§ 192). ( Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 199, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense, we observed, merely establish the lack[] [of] malice that distinguishes the one offense from the other. ( Ibid. ) Hence, we concluded, Wickersham had not been correct in characterizing unreasonable self-defense as a mere defense for purposes of the sua sponte instructional rule of Sedeno. `[U]nreasonable self-defense,' we stated, is ... not a true defense; rather, it is a shorthand description of one form of voluntary manslaughter. And voluntary manslaughter, whether it arises from unreasonable self-defense or from a killing during a sudden quarrel or heat of passion, is not a defense but a crime; more precisely, it is a lesser offense included in the crime of murder. Accordingly, when a defendant is charged with murder the trial court's duty to instruct sua sponte, or on its own initiative, on unreasonable self-defense is the same as its duty to instruct on any other lesser included offense: this duty arises whenever the evidence is such that a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendant killed the victim in the unreasonable but good faith belief in having to act in self-defense. ( Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th.186, 200-201, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531, italics added.) Thus, Barton concluded, the trial court did not err in that case by instructing on both heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense as theories of voluntary manslaughter, even though the defendant objected to such instructions and both parties had relied on inconsistent theories. As Barton explained, [t]he trial court must instruct on lesser included offenses ... [supported by the evidence]..., regardless of the theories of the case proffered by the parties. ( Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 203, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Barton confirmed at length that there was substantial support for both heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense in the confused circumstances surrounding the shooting at issue. ( Id. at pp. 201-203, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) Under Barton, heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense, as forms of a lesser offense included in murder, thus come within the broadest version of the California duty to provide sua sponte instructions on all the material issues presented by the evidence. ( Sedeno, supra, 10 Cal.3d 703, 715, 112 Cal.Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913.) In the interests of justice, this rule demands that when the evidence suggests the defendant may not be guilty of the charged offense, but only of some lesser included offense, the jury must be allowed to consider the full range of possible verdictsnot limited by the strategy, ignorance, or mistakes of the parties, so as to  ensure that the verdict is no harsher or more lenient than the evidence merits. ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 324, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, italics added; see also Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 196, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531.) The inference is inescapable that, regardless of the tactics or objections of the parties, or the relative strength of the evidence on alternate offenses or theories, the rule requires sua sponte instruction on any and all lesser included offenses, or theories thereof, which are supported by the evidence. In a murder case, this means that both heat of passion and unreasonable self-defense, as forms of voluntary manslaughter, must be presented to the jury if both have substantial evidentiary support. The People raise several objections to a rule which fails to limit the sua sponte instructional duty to those lesser offenses or theories most obviously and openly presented by the trial record. None of the People's arguments are convincing. First, the People seek to diminish the force of Barton by distinguishing that case in several respects. They suggest Barton was solely concerned with the unfairness, to the prosecution in particular, that would arise if the defendant could preclude lesser offense instructions which the prosecution actually wished to present. No similar unfairness arose here, the People assert, because the prosecution, like the defense, relied exclusively on a theory other than voluntary manslaughter and neither party sought instructions on heat of passion. Moreover, the People urge, Barton involved a defendant's attack on his conviction of a lesser included offense over his objection. Barton, they assert, did not establish that a conviction of the charged offense may be challenged because the defendant was denied the opportunity for conviction on every latent, if technically plausible, theory of a lesser included offense. Such a rule, the People suggest, allows a defendant to remain silent about instructions, pursue only the strongest line of defense, gamble that the court's incomplete lesser offense instructions will produce an acquittal or conviction of the lesser offense, then complain on appeal if convicted of the charged offense. Aside from Barton, the People contend that Sedeno 's policies are not furthered by requiring the court, sua sponte, to present the jury with all supportable theories of a lesser included offense, even those on which the defendant has not relied. So long as the jury may consider at least one theory of a lesser included offense, the People reason, there is no unfair all-or-nothing choice between the charged offense and acquittal. Indeed, the People aver, lesser offense instructions may harm more than help the defendant when they advance theories that are obscure in the evidence, were not pursued in the defense case, and actually contradict the defense presented. Finally, the People suggest, the sua sponte rule of Sedeno stemmed in significant part from a concern that counsel's inadvertence might prejudice the defendant by causing a pertinent lesser included offense to be withheld from the jury. However, the People assert, the doctrine of constitutionally ineffective counsel has developed substantially since Sedeno was decided. Today, the People insist, mistaken failures to request lesser offense instructions are best handled through the procedures by which such ineffective assistance may be remedied. The general answer to these arguments is the one we have already given. The California rule requiring sua sponte instructions on all lesser included offenses, insofar as supported by the evidence, simply addresses concerns broader than those the People identify here. As we have seen, the rule protects both the defendant and the prosecution against a verdict contrary to the evidence, regardless of the parties' own perceptions of their strongest lines of attack or defense. The rule's purpose is not simply to guarantee some plausible third choice between conviction of the charged offense or acquittal, but to assure, in the interest of justice, the most accurate possible verdict encompassed by the charge and supported by the evidence. [8] These overriding considerations exist in every case, regardless of its procedural posture. They would be substantially undermined if a trial court were permitted to limit its instructions on lesser included offenses to those theories the court believes have the greatest merit or conform to the defense actually presented, while ignoring other theories also supported by the evidence. [9] We therefore affirm that a trial court errs if it fails to instruct, sua sponte, on all theories of a lesser included offense which find substantial support in the evidence. On the other hand, the court is not obliged to instruct on theories that have no such evidentiary support. Accordingly, we next consider whether there was substantial evidence in this case to support a verdict of manslaughter based on heat of passion. In our view, such evidence existed here. As our prior decisions explain, the existence of  any evidence, no matter how weak will not justify instructions on a lesser included offense, but such instructions are required whenever evidence that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense is substantial enough to merit consideration by the jury. ( Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, fn. 12, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, original italics; see also People v. Bacigalupo (1991) 1 Cal.4th 103, 127, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 335, 820 P.2d 559; People v. Ramos (1982) 30 Cal.3d 553, 582, 180 Cal.Rptr. 266, 639 P.2d 908.) Substantial evidence in this context is `evidence from which a jury composed of reasonable [persons] could ... conclude[ ]' that the lesser offense, but not the greater, was committed. ( Flannel, supra, at p. 684, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1, quoting People v. Carr (1972) 8 Cal.3d 287, 294, 104 Cal. Rptr. 705, 502 P.2d 513; accord, Barton, supra, 12 Cal.4th 186, 201, fn. 8, 47 Cal. Rptr.2d 569, 906 P.2d 531 [evidence that a reasonable jury could find persuasive].) In deciding whether there is substantial evidence of a lesser offense, courts should not evaluate the credibility of witnesses, a task for the jury. ( Flannel, supra, 25 Cal.3d 668, 684, 160 Cal.Rptr. 84, 603 P.2d 1; see also Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 324, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) Moreover, as we have noted, the sua sponte duty to instruct on lesser included offenses, unlike the duty to instruct on mere defenses, arises even against the defendant's wishes, and regardless of the trial theories or tactics the defendant has actually pursued. Hence, substantial evidence to support instructions on a lesser included offense may exist even in the face of inconsistencies presented by the defense itself. [10] An intentional, unlawful homicide is upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion (§ 192(a)), and is thus voluntary manslaughter ( ibid. ), if the killer's reason was actually obscured as the result of a strong passion aroused by a provocation sufficient to cause an `ordinary [person] of average disposition... to act rashly or without due deliberation and reflection, and from this passion rather than from judgment.' ( People v. Berry (1976) 18 Cal.3d 509, 515, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777, quoting People v. Valentine (1946) 28 Cal.2d 121, 139, 169 P.2d 1; People v. Borchers (1958) 50 Cal.2d 321, 328-329, 325 P.2d 97.) `[N]o specific type of provocation [is] required....' ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d 307, 326, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, quoting People v. Berry, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 515, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777.) Moreover, the passion aroused need not be anger or rage, but can be any `[v]iolent, intense, high-wrought or enthusiastic emotion' ( Wickersham, supra, at p. 327, 185 Cal.Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311, quoting People v. Berry, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 515, 134 Cal.Rptr. 415, 556 P.2d 777) other than revenge ( People v. Valentine, supra, 28 Cal.2d at p. 139, 169 P.2d 1). However, if sufficient time has elapsed between the provocation and the fatal blow for passion to subside and reason to return, the killing is not voluntary manslaughter.... ( Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 327, 185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311.) Here, there was evidence that a sizeable group of young men, armed with dangerous weapons and harboring a specific hostile intent, trespassed upon domestic property occupied by defendant and acted in a menacing manner. This intimidating conduct included challenges to the defendant to fight, followed by use of the weapons to batter and smash defendant's vehicle parked in the driveway of his residence, within a short distance from the front door. Defendant and the other persons in the house all indicated that the number and behavior of the intruders, which defendant characterized as a mob, caused immediate fear and panic. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could infer that defendant was aroused to passion, and his reason was thus obscured, by a provocation sufficient to produce such effects in a person of average disposition. [11] A rational jury could also find that the intense and high-wrought emotions aroused by the initial threat had not had time to cool or subside by the time defendant fired the first few shots from inside the house, then emerged and fired the fatal second volley after the fleeing intruders. At one point in his police statement, defendant suggested that he acted in one continuous, chaotic response to the riotous events outside his door. [12] Finally, even though defendant insisted in his police statement that he did not aim[ ] or fire at them, a jury could reasonably disbelieve that claim and conclude, from all the evidence, that defendant killed intentionally, but while his judgment was obscured due to passion aroused by sufficient provocation. We therefore conclude that the trial court erred in this case when it failed to instruct, even absent a defense request, on heat of passion as a theory of voluntary manslaughter. The issue remains whether the error warrants reversal of defendant's murder conviction, as the Court of Appeal concluded. While we do not finally resolve this issue, we are persuaded that the standard of reversal employed by the Court of Appeal, in accordance with existing California law, is too strict. As we explain below, that standard can and should be replaced with a rule under which actual prejudice is determined from the whole record. We will therefore remand the cause to the Court of Appeal for a determination of prejudice under correct principles.