Opinion ID: 2625875
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Restriction on Second Counsel in Argument

Text: Before the defense began its guilt phase argument, the trial court indicated it would allow only one attorney (Miller, the lead defense attorney) to argue, despite counsel's suggestion that Maple could better argue the technical aspect of the experts. At this point, at least, the court was apparently unaware of section 1095, which permits two counsel to argue in a capital case. During a break in Miller's argument, however, the court reversed itself in part, offering to allow Maple to argue the bubble shield and paint expert testimony. Defense counsel accepted the offer: Maple said he would argue only the particular technical aspects. Court and counsel, however, apparently understood the proposed division of argument differently; the court thought Maple would argue only the paint comparison evidence, while Maple and Miller believed Maple was to argue all the expert testimony. Thus, when Maple, after a long discussion of the paint evidence, began talking about the fingerprint on the bubble shield, the court interrupted to urge him to stay on the subject of paint because Mr. Miller, as you know, is going to cover all the other aspects, or so I've been told. Maple, on the other hand, observed that there is a technical aspect of this bubble shield and the fingerprint examination that he wished to address. The court gave Maple an opportunity to tie ... up the two subjects, and Maple argued that the absence of fingerprint powder on the bubble shield's exterior (convex) surface cast doubt on the fingerprint evidence. But when Maple then began to address the testimony of the prosecution handwriting expert, the court precluded him from continuing to do so, suggesting that Miller pick this up instead. Defendant contends the trial court violated section 1095 and so restricted the defense argument as to deprive defendant of the effective assistance of counsel. The Attorney General maintains that the court's order for division of argument was within its discretionary control over trial proceedings under section 1044 and that counsel gave a competent argument. We need not decide whether the trial court's restriction on the division of argument violated section 1095 or was within the court's discretion under section 1044. Any error did not preclude counsel from arguing the case effectively. Maple was permitted to argue the technical aspect of the fingerprint evidence, as he wished to do, and made such an argument before trying to also discuss the handwriting evidence. Maple's only question regarding the handwriting expert drew an objection, which was sustained on grounds not challenged on appeal. The record does not reflect what, if any, additional topics regarding the handwriting evidence Maple would have discussed had he been permitted to continue on that subject; nor does it provide any reason to imagine that Miller was incapable of discussing those topics, if there were any. To the extent Miller needed preparation time in order to address the handwriting (or fingerprint) evidence, the record reflects that, not long after he resumed arguing, the court recessed for the day, and reconvened the next day, providing an opportunity for such additional preparation. Thus, the record reflects no prejudice, and in particular no infringement of the right to effective assistance, resulting from the court's ruling. ( People v. Rodrigues (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1060, 1184-1186, 36 Cal.Rptr.2d 235, 885 P.2d 1; People v. Bonin (1988) 46 Cal.3d 659, 694-695, 250 Cal.Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217, overruled on other grounds in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Nor do we decide whether counsel's guilt phase argument was, taken as a whole, constitutionally inadequate, a point disputed by the parties on appeal. Though Miller did not address the handwriting evidence in his resumed argument, that may well have been a tactical decision. Even if the prosecution expert's testimony were successfully attacked, the spiralbound notebook remained linked to defendant because it was found in his automobile. The defense, as the Attorney General points out, may have decided that as to this topic the less said, the better. In these circumstances, where the appellate record does not reveal whether counsel had a legitimate reason for a litigation choice, we generally reserve consideration of any ineffective assistance claim for possible proceedings on petition for writ of habeas corpus. ( People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610, 674-675, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 629, 22 P.3d 392; People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264, 266-267, 62 Cal. Rptr.2d 437, 933 P.2d 1134.)