Opinion ID: 2229929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Shifting of the Burden of Proof

Text: Defendant argues that he is entitled to a new trial because the prosecutor improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant in his cross-examination of defense expert Randell Libby and in his closing argument. The following relevant exchange occurred during the prosecutor's cross-examination of Libby: Q. Now, one of the things the NRC says that-is that scientifically the best way to resolve ambiguity is to repeat the experiment. Do you agree with that? A. I would agree, yes. Q. Now, you know from the case that Mr. Metzger, after his completion of the case, had extra sample left? A. Well, no, I do not agree that he had extra sample left which was untested or unmanipulated by that laboratory. I agree that there are some extra pieces [of] Exhibit 31, swab number 1. Q. That's right. There was an extra swab left, right? A. No, there was not an extra swab, there was a partially, sort of manipulated, consumed swab which is sort of remaining. But I would have the same position with retesting that the FBI has. Defense counsel objected to this line of questioning, arguing that it improperly suggested to the jury that the defense had a burden to perform further DNA testing. The trial court, outside the presence of the jury, sustained the objection. Later, during closing argument, the prosecutor stated that Libby didn't like it when he was questioned about the NRC's conclusion that the best way to cure ambiguous test results is to rerun the test. Citing to People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d 467, 220 N.E.2d 432 (1966), defendant asserts that the prosecutor's questioning of Libby and his comments during closing argument improperly shifted the burden of proof to defendant and, therefore, that he is entitled to a new trial. In Weinstein, the prosecutor told the jury, on five or six occasions during closing argument, that it was the burden of defendant to present evidence creating a reasonable doubt of her guilt. At one point, the prosecutor confusingly stated that to overcome the presumption of innocence she must raise this reasonable doubt. Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d at 469, 220 N.E.2d 432. This court concluded that the persistent and repeated arguments of the prosecutor destroyed the presumption of innocence, imposed a heavier burden upon the defendant than the law required, and manifestly prejudiced the defendant. Weinstein, 35 Ill.2d at 469-70, 220 N.E.2d 432. The questions and statements of the prosecutor in the case at bar clearly do not rise to the level of the inappropriate arguments made in Weinstein. In this case, the prosecutor never told the jury that defendant had a burden of proof at trial, and certainly did not make repeated arguments to that effect. See People v. Leger, 149 Ill.2d 355, 400, 173 Ill.Dec. 612, 597 N.E.2d 586 (1992) (no error found, in part, because the prosecutor made only one comment which allegedly shifted the burden of proof). In addition, defense counsel told the jury that defendant did not have to prove his innocence, and the jury was so instructed by the trial court. Furthermore, any inference which the prosecutor sought to plant with the jury with respect to defendant's duty to test the semen sample found on the swabs was precluded, in large measure, by Libby's answer that there was no swab remaining which had not been manipulated or consumed by the testing performed by the state police laboratory. For these reasons, we reject defendant's contention that the prosecutor's questions and statement constitute reversible error.