Opinion ID: 1904447
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Liability of the County

Text: Appellants' claim against the County for negligence rests upon an alleged breach of duty arising from the County's occupancy of the land. The trial judge concluded that Wantland was a bare licensee residing on the premises as a result of the benevolence of the County, and that the County therefore owed no greater duty to Donald than it did to Wantland. Judge Rea also found no duty on the part of the County to warn of the presence of Wantland, and no evidence of a violation of the duty owed to Donald as a bare licensee, i.e., the duty not to willfully or wantonly injure or entrap him. See Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., 282 Md. 238, 242, 384 A.2d 76 (1978); Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 521, 287 A.2d 265 (1972); Crown Cork and Seal Co. v. Kane, 213 Md. 152, 157, 131 A.2d 470 (1957); Carroll v. Spencer, 204 Md. 387, 394, 104 A.2d 628 (1954). For the reasons set forth in Part III of this opinion we conclude the trier of fact could find that Wantland was furnished lodging in return for his agreement to perform security duties. As previously noted, Jones contends that Ruffin had a separate contract with the County to provide security, and there is some support for that in the testimony given by Ruffin. If that was indeed the case, or if Appellants can show that Ruffin or Gordon secured permission from the County for Wantland to reside at the premises in return for providing extra security for the benefit of the County, the trier of fact could find an arrangement for the mutual benefit of Wantland and the County and thus afford Wantland the status of invitee on the property. We have carefully reviewed the record on this point, and we believe there is sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute concerning this material fact. There is also sufficient evidence to permit a finding that Wantland invited Donald onto the premises. Although Donald would thus enjoy only the status of a social guest as to Wantland on that portion of the property occupied by Wantland, Donald would enjoy the status of invitee as to the County on that part of the land retained in its control. Landay v. Cohn, 220 Md. 24, 150 A.2d 739 (1959); Ross v. Belzer, 199 Md. 187, 85 A.2d 799 (1952); Kalus v. Bass, 122 Md. 467, 89 A. 731 (1914); Murray v. Lane, 51 Md. App. 597, 444 A.2d 1069 (1982). An occupier of land has a duty to use reasonable and ordinary care to keep the premises safe for an invitee and to protect him from injury caused by an unreasonable risk that the invitee, by exercising ordinary care for his own safety, will not discover. Sherman v. Suburban Trust Co., supra, 282 Md. at 242, 384 A.2d 76. In Scott v. Watson, supra, 278 Md. at 166-67, 359 A.2d 548, this Court declined to impose a special duty upon landlords to protect their tenants from criminal activity, but held that the general duty to exercise reasonable care for an invitee's safety may include under some circumstances a duty to take reasonable measures to eliminate conditions contributing to criminal activity. As occupier of the land pursuant to the Use Agreement with the College, the County had authority to remove Wantland from the property if it had notice that his continued presence presented an unreasonable risk of danger to invitees. Whether the County reasonably had available to it this or any other action to avoid the danger depends upon a number of factors, including: the County's role in the arrangements made with Ruffin and Wantland concerning security; whether the County had actual or imputed knowledge 1) that Wantland was living on the premises and/or 2) of the statement Wantland had allegedly made to Rawles regarding his intention as to suspected vandals; and, whether there was sufficient time following receipt of notice to take effective action. We point out that under familiar principles of agency law notice given to Ruffin may have been imputed to Jones but not to the County if Ruffin was the employee of Jones but Jones had no fiduciary relationship with the County. See Unsat. C. & J. Fund Bd. v. Fortney, 264 Md. 246, 255-56, 285 A.2d 641 (1972). Notice to an independent contractor may or may not constitute notice to the principal, depending upon whether the independent contractor is also an agent [5] , and depending upon whether the notice is within the sphere of his authorized activity or concerns a matter about which he has a duty to report. W. Seavey, Handbook on the Law of Agency § 6, at 8 (1964); F. Mechem, A Treatise on the Law of Agency Vol. 1 § 40, Vol. 2 §§ 1802-1804 (2d ed. 1914); 3 Merrill on Notice § 1203A, § 1247 (1952). These issues, as well as the issue of proximate cause discussed in Section III, are properly resolved by trial and not by summary judgment. JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO AFFIRM THE JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY IN FAVOR OF THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF PRINCE GEORGE'S COMMUNITY COLLEGE, AND TO REVERSE THE JUDGMENTS IN FAVOR OF JOHN H. JONES AND PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND, AND REMAND FOR TRIAL. COSTS TO BE PAID ONE-THIRD BY APPELLANTS AND TWO-THIRDS BY JOHN H. JONES AND PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY, MARYLAND.