Opinion ID: 2265520
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the use of a subpoena duces tecum

Text: The trial court concluded, however, that the issuance of a search warrant for an attorney's office was inappropriate, regardless of the degree of care used in its execution. Instead, the trial court referred to less intrusive means by which the same information could be acquired, specifically a subpoena duces tecum pursuant to 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5905, or as issued by an investigating grand jury. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 4541 et seq. Section 5905, however, is directed to the authority of the judiciary, and, in any event, is not applicable to the early stages of an investigation, the time, as Mr. Justice White observed, that search warrants are most often employed. Zurcher, supra, 436 U.S. at 561, 98 S.Ct. at 1978, 56 L.Ed.2d at 538. In relevant part, Section 5905 provides, Every court of record shall have power in any civil or criminal matter to issue subpoenas to testify, with or without a clause of duces tecum, into any county of this Commonwealth to witnesses to appear before the court. . . 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. § 5905. As is evident from the statutory language, the court lacks authority to compel the production of documents absent a pending proceeding. The essence of a subpoena's function is to aid the court in the resolution of litigation, so that if there is no formal proceeding before the court there can be no legitimate reason to issue a subpoena. Commonwealth v. Polak, 438 Pa. 67, 69, 263 A.2d 354, 356 (1970). See also Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486 Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032, 100 S.Ct. 704, 62 L.Ed.2d 668 (1980) (Subpoena concededly unlawful where, at time of issuance, there were no ongoing legal proceedings against appellant.) Characterizing the impanelment of an investigating grand jury with its subpoena powers as a less intrusive means by which to proceed, the trial judge quashed the search warrant. Similarly, appellee and amici curiae, the Pennsylvania Trial Lawyers' Association and the Allegheny County Bar Association, contend that requiring law enforcement personnel to proceed by subpoena duces tecum when seeking documents in a non-suspect attorney's possession will not unreasonably burden law enforcement efforts. Although the Commonwealth's information-gathering capabilities would thereby be somewhat restricted in the early stages of an investigation, appellee and amici view this measure as essential to preservation of attorney-client confidentiality. While several states have adopted such a proposal, [8] we do not view this as the appropriate rule for Pennsylvania. Initially, we note that the Zurcher Court, faced with the search of a newspaper office, explicitly rejected a claim that such a standard was constitutionally mandated: The Fourth Amendment has itself struck the balance between privacy and public need, and there is no occasion or justification for a court to revise the Amendment and strike a new balance by denying the search warrant in the circumstances present here and by insisting that the investigation proceed by subpoena duces tecum, whether on the theory that the latter is a less intrusive alternative or otherwise. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. at 559-560, 98 S.Ct. at 1978, 56 L.Ed.2d at 537-38. States have, of course, the constitutional power to guard individual rights, including the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, more zealously then the federal government does under the United States Constitution. Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 100 S.Ct. 2035, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980); Commonwealth v. Sell, 504 Pa. 46, 470 A.2d 457 (1983). Thus, Pennsylvania courts have often extended more privacy protection under Article I, § 8 than required by the federal constitution. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Beauford, 327 Pa.Super. 253, 475 A.2d 783 (1984) (Neither a pen register nor a dialed number recorder may be installed without a judicial order based on probable cause); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, supra (Bank customers have legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records pertaining to their affairs.) Yet our research has discovered no case wherein our Supreme Court or this Court foreclosed the use of a search warrant as a means by which to secure from a third party, things in which an individual has a recognized privacy interest. After acknowledging that the subpoena issued were invalid, the Supreme Court stated in DeJohn, supra, A bank could always be compelled to turn over customer's records when served with a valid search warrant or some other type of valid legal process . . . Id., 486 Pa. at 48, 403 A.2d at 1291. See also Commonwealth v. Duden, 326 Pa.Super. 73, 473 A.2d 614 (1984); Commonwealth v. Gannon, 308 Pa.Super. 330, 454 A.2d 561 (1982). Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Santner, 308 Pa.Super. 67, 454 A.2d 24 (1982), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 3585, 82 L.Ed.2d 883 (1984), this Court noted the impact of a search of a physician's office upon the privacy interests of patients uninvolved in the criminal scheme under investigation. Id., 308 Pa.Super. at 82, 454 A.2d at 30-31. While Santner is distinguishable from the instant case, in that there the physician himself was the target of the investigation, the privacy interests of the uninvolved clients remains the same. Furthermore, although the warrant in Santner was insufficiently particular, no suggestion was made that a constitutionally precise warrant would nonetheless fail, and that alternate investigatory methods would be required. The public has a fundamental interest in implementation of the criminal law. No evidence demonstrating that application of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness requirement will not adequately safeguard the interests of these other clients has been presented. Thus, we will not reject the search warrant, a heretofore effective and constitutionally acceptable enforcement tool.