Opinion ID: 658330
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence of Section 924(c)(1) Violations

Text: 58 Little, Lloyd, and Huffman all argue that there was insufficient evidence to convict them of violating 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). 59 Little takes issue with the sufficiency of the evidence of only one of his section 924(c)(1) convictions, arguing, with respect to count 6, that there was no evidence that he had ever used or possessed the two guns found in the Patton house on June 30, 1989, and further, no evidence that anyone ever used either of the firearms in relation to a drug offense. Lloyd argues that because the government never produced the .357 revolver that the agent testified Lloyd wielded at a drug transaction on February 27, 1991, there was insufficient evidence to convict him of having used it. 18 Finally, Huffman contests both of his 924(c)(1) convictions, arguing (1) that there was no evidence of when or why he touched the gun seized in the November raid at Appoline, and (2) that there is no evidence of a nexus between drug trafficking at the Patton address and use of the guns. 60 The statute under which the defendants were convicted reads, in relevant part, as follows: 61 Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime ... uses or carries a firearm, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, be sentenced to imprisonment for five years. 62 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). The statute thus requires a dual showing: that the defendant used or carried a firearm, and that the carrying was during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. See Smith v. United States, --- U.S. ----, ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2050, 2053, 2058, 124 L.Ed.2d 138 (1993). And this court has extended the Pinkerton doctrine 19 to encompass coconspirator liability under 924(c)(1). United States v. Christian, 942 F.2d 363, 367 (6th Cir.1991). 63 In Smith, the Court made clear that in order to constitute use within the meaning of section 924(c)(1), a defendant's action must facilitate[ ] or further[ ] the drug crime. Id. --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2056. Courts, including this one, have construed the during and in relation to language of 924(c)(1) quite expansively. See id. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2058-59. Thus, 64 [i]n cases involving firearms found on premises under the control of a drug offense offender, the courts have developed a fortress analogy theory, which holds that if it reasonably appears that the firearms found on the premises controlled or owned by a defendant and in his actual or constructive possession are to be used to protect the drugs or otherwise facilitate a drug transaction, then such firearms are used during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 65 United States v. Henry, 878 F.2d 937, 944 (6th Cir.1989). Nonetheless, [t]he phrase 'in relation to' ... clarifies that the firearm must have some purpose or effect with respect to the drug trafficking crime; its presence or involvement cannot be the result of accident or coincidence. Smith, --- U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2059. Mere possession of a firearm, therefore, when the firearm's presence is entirely 'unrelated' to the crime, id. (citation omitted), does not merit conviction under 924(c)(1). See United States v. Brown, 915 F.2d 219, 224 (6th Cir.1990). But [e]ven if a firearm remains hidden throughout a crime, its concealed presence may have been in relation to the crime if it facilitated the crime by emboldening the defendant, giving him the security and confidence to undertake the criminal act. Id. 66 We will first dispose of the arguments which present the easiest cases. Lloyd's argument is patently lacking in merit. It is plainly not necessary to actually produce the weapon in order for a reasonable jury to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that Lloyd in fact did use or carry the weapon during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The agent's decisive testimony in this regard was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. 67 Next, Huffman's argument that there was insufficient evidence to warrant a 924(c)(1) conviction on count 3, relating to the gun found at the Appoline residence, is also patently lacking in merit. His liability could either be direct, because his fingerprint was found on the gun and he was in close proximity to it, or could be coconspiratorial. And the government adduced sufficient evidence to show that drug trafficking was occurring at Appoline, and therefore, a loaded weapon in the hallway of the residence is without question a weapon that a jury could reasonably conclude was used during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. 68 Turning now to the convictions of Little and Huffman with respect to the guns seized at the Patton residence, we are not entirely unpersuaded by their arguments: the paucity of evidence showing that the guns were used during and in relation to drug trafficking--that is, the failure to find drugs at the Patton house during the June 20, 1989, raid--makes these convictions more controversial than those already discussed. Several factors convince us, however, of the propriety of the convictions. First of all, only the day before, the investigators purchased crack from the residence, and at the time of the raid, drug paraphernalia and large amounts of cash were found in the house. Thus, it is clear that the residence was habitually used as a drug distribution center. We next consider the location of the weapons. One gun--a rifle, no less--was found in the corner bedroom, and a box of ammunition was found, readily accessible, on the windowsill. The other gun was found under a mattress, only a few feet from the closet containing the drug proceeds. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we think that a rational jury could have found that the purpose for which the firearms were present was to protect the drugs and drug proceeds, and could have thus found the elements of 924(c)(1) to have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 20