Opinion ID: 1228498
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Property award.

Text: This court has held that the division of the marital property is a decision resting within the sound discretion of the trial court and such decision will not be reversed on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown. Vier v. Vier (1974), 62 Wis. 2d 636, 215 N. W. 2d 432; Husting v. Husting (1972), 54 Wis. 2d 87, 194 N. W. 2d 801. In Lacey v. Lacey (1970), 45 Wis. 2d 378, 173 N. W. 2d 142, this court set forth some of the relevant considerations useful in determining a fair division of the marital property under the flexible approach required by sec. 247.26, Stats., including: (1) The length of the marriage, (2) the age and health of the parties, (3) the ability of the parties to support themselves, (4) the liability of the  parties for debts, (5) the general circumstances of the case including grievous misconduct by one of the parties, (6) whether the division was in addition to or in lieu of alimony, (7) the method by which the marital estate was acquired, (8) whether the wife had any separate estate, and (9) whether there was any liability for support of minor children. Lacey v. Lacey, supra, pages 383, 384. This court has also held that tax consequences are a relevant consideration. Wahl v. Wahl, supra, pages 517, 518. In the present case, the trial court did not specifically state how it evaluated these specific factors in arriving at its decision; however, the opinions and findings of the court do reflect their consideration and the record appears sufficiently complete for this court to review the trial court's decision in relation to these factors. Commenting on the review posture of a case where the trial court's decision did not expressly evaluate the Lacey factors, we have said: However, the Lacey Case stated that: `The responsibility of the trial court is to fairly, equitably and justly divide the marital property between the spouses, and where it begins is not crucial. It is where it ends that is to be reviewed on appeal.' Here, although the trial court did not precisely follow or use the Lacey guidelines, it did list the factors which it felt made its division of property an equitable result. It is now up to this court to determine whether in fact the division was a proper exercise of discretion. Tesch v. Tesch, (1974), 63 Wis. 2d 320, 328, 217 N. W. 2d 647. The record reflects that the following factors favor the appellant: (1) The marriage was for nearly thirty years; (2) appellant is fifty years old and has some arthritic problems in her fingers which might limit her ability to work; (3) appellant has borne and raised four children during the marriage and thereby contributed greatly to  the marital estate Wahl v. Wahl, supra, page 523 Spheeris v. Spheeris (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 497, 155 N. W. 2d 130; (4) all of the marital estate was accumulated during the marriage; and (5) appellant has the custody of the remaining minor child (age fifteen) which may make it more difficult for her to work and care for the child. On the other hand, the following factors favor the respondent: (1) appellant, despite arthritic problems, is not incapacitated for work and has educational background and experience sufficient to allow her to do stenographic and bookkeeping work; (2) respondent is liable for debts in excess of $29,000; (3) respondent is liable for permanent alimony of $400 per month and child support payments of $150 per month as well as the doctor and dentist expenses of the minor child; (4) respondent has been contributing the total cost of putting the second youngest child through school (although he is not legally required to do so); (5) the appellant has some inheritance from her family (amount undisclosed); and (6) the misconduct of the appellant which served as the basis for awarding the divorce to the husband, although not grievous, did involve her continued association with other married men over the few years immediately preceding the divorce. It further appears that some consideration was given to the tax considerations of the property division, in particular as to the $17,000 amount that respondent is to pay over ten-and-one-half years. Originally the trial court indicated that it would award $10,000, but after the appellant argued tax considerations in her trial brief, the court changed the award to $17,000. Based on the trial court's figures, the net award to the wife was approximately one third of the marital estate. Appellant contends that the $17,000 should be reduced to present value because it is paid over ten-plus years. This court has not heretofore introduced the element of reduction to present value as a consideration in the  determination of the percentage of the property division of a marital estate in a divorce action. We decline to do so in this case. However, we have recognized there may be a requirement to pay interest when payment of money in a property settlement is to be made in deferred installments. Tesch v. Tesch, supra, page 325. We have heretofore determined that the findings of the trial court as to the values of the house, cottage, hunting camp and government bonds, are against the great weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. The values on such items which we here determine are supported by credible evidence, increase the value of the assets of the marital estate by approximately $8,000. We are of the opinion that equity and justice require that the appellant receive the full benefit of such increased adjustment in the marital estate. Thus the cash award to the appellant is increased from $17,000 to $25,000, which we deem to be fair and reasonable under the facts and circumstances of this case. On appeal, appellant requests that as to each asset where this court decides an error has been made below, that this court fix a fair value additur or remittitur. Cf. Helleckson v. Loiselle (1967), 37 Wis. 2d 423, 155 N. W. 2d 45. Ordinarily, we would do so. However, in this case, we are of the opinion that the interest of justice and of both parties will best be served by the resolution of this issue on appeal rather than by remand with an option of a new trial or an additur. However, the resolution of the manner in which it is paid must be made by the trial court, and in consideration of the need of the appellant and the ability of the respondent to pay. Also, on remand, a suggestion that need not be followed is that the trial court give consideration to the payment of interest on the deferred payments of the marital estate division.