Opinion ID: 2611431
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Custody Schedule

Text: A child custody or visitation award may be modified if the court determines that a change in circumstances requires the modification of the award and the modification is in the best interests of the child. AS 25.20.110(a); see also A.H. v. W.P., 896 P.2d 240, 244 (Alaska 1995). When a court determines the best interests of a child in the context of changed circumstances, the scope of judicial inquiry is limited to facts directly affecting the child's well-being. S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985) (citing AS 25.24.150(d)). Because Lawson's move to Las Vegas constituted a change of circumstances, the superior court's analysis at the hearing should have focused on whether alternating custody would be in Shelby's best interests in light of the changed circumstances. See House v. House, 779 P.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Alaska 1989). However, the record indicates that in determining Shelby's best interests, the court placed undue weight on the existing custody agreement. Although the court did consider the best interests of the child, its findings suggest that its modification determination was substantially influenced by the agreement's provision that the parties share physical custody equally. Reliance on the agreement was unwarranted because the visitation provision, which established that physical custody would be shared equally, was based on the assumption that both parties would live in Anchorage. [3] Moreover, the evidence in this case does not support a conclusion that the alternating six-month custody schedule is in Shelby's best interests. We addressed the issue of an alternating six-month custody schedule where one parent intended to live outside of Alaska in Kelly v. Kelly, 926 P.2d 1168 (Alaska 1996). We observed that divided physical custody cases typically involve parents who reside in the same community, and that awards of divided physical custody where parents live in different parts of the country may foreclose `a stable environment and the development of permanent associations....' Id. at 1169 (quoting John P. McCahey et al., 2 Child Custody and Visitation Law and Practice § 13.04(2) (1993)). Although we considered the case close, we upheld the alternating six-month schedule because [n]o evidence was presented that the arrangement was likely to prove harmful to [the child]. Id. [4] In this case, by contrast, evidence was presented that an alternating six-month custody schedule is likely to prove harmful to a three-year-old child such as Shelby. Most notably, Dr. Henderson-Dixon submitted a report in which she traced the three stages of a preschool child's emotional and psychological development and highlighted the critical nature of stability and consistency of caregiver and surroundings for a three- or four-year-old child. [5] She explained that [i]t is not in a preschool child's best interest to have major environmental change, and that while a preschool child ideally needs to be emotionally connected to both parents, she primarily needs a consistent and stable environment with one parent and frequent contact with the other. She further emphasized the detrimental effects of an alternating six-month custody schedule: While a 6 month on/6 month off visitation schedule may be doable for parents, it does not satisfy the emotional needs of the preschool child and is, in fact, destructive to the child. In her testimony at the modification hearing, Dr. Henderson-Dixon stressed that an alternating six-month custody schedule is a very bad arrangement and would be debilitating to a child Shelby's age, and that for a child that age, they are severely handicapped in their development and it will affect them for the rest of their lives. In a memorandum to the lower court, West also presented evidence about the harmful effects of an alternating six-month custody schedule, citing literature from the field of child psychology that cautions against extended visits away from home for three-year-olds. [6] The evidence presented by West is consistent with the prevailing view in the field of child psychology that alternating physical custody schedules can undermine stability in children's lives. See McCahey, supra, § 13.04(2) (Although courts have awarded alternating custody in appropriate cases,[] divided custody is generally disapproved.); Jeff Atkinson, 1 Modern Child Custody Practice § 6.06, at 361 (1986) (Alternating custody is controversial because, more than other custodial arrangements, it carries the potential for creating disruption in the child's life.); see also Joseph Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 32-34 (rev. ed. 1979) (emphasizing the importance of continuity of care and stability for infants, toddlers and young children). In accordance with this view, a number of courts have disfavored alternating physical custody arrangements as unduly disruptive to a child's life. See Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So.2d 717, 719 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991) (holding rotating custody presumptively not in a child's best interests); Heard v. Heard, 353 N.W.2d 157, 162 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (holding annual rotation of custody not in a child's best interests absent extraordinary circumstances); Fisher v. Fisher, 370 Pa.Super. 87, 535 A.2d 1163, 1166 (1988) (holding alternating year physical custody not in a child's best interests where parents lived in different states). Where both parents reside in the same community, however, we have affirmed the use of an alternating week physical custody arrangement as a thoughtful and sensitive approach to a difficult problem. Deininger v. Deininger, 835 P.2d 449, 451 (Alaska 1992). Other courts likewise approve of alternating physical custody arrangements where parents live in the same community, and emphasize the importance of minimizing the disruption of a child's life. See Peyton v. Peyton, 457 So.2d 321, 323 (La. Ct. App. 1984) (affirming alternating three-month custody schedule where parents lived across the street from each other); In re Marriage of Ryan, 222 Mont. 188, 720 P.2d 691, 693 (1986) (affirming alternating week custody schedule where parents lived in same community and where, if either parent moved out of the area, parent remaining in the area would have physical custody during the school year); Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63, 72 (1981) (recognizing that geographic proximity of the two homes is an important factor in awarding joint physical custody); Lapp v. Lapp, 293 N.W.2d 121, 129 (N.D. 1980) (affirming alternating six-month custody schedule where the court noted there would be no substantial disruption for the child because both parents are of close geographical proximity). In such instances, where disruption can be minimized and continuity of care maintained, alternating physical custody may be in a child's best interests. Consistent with the views of experts in the field and other courts, we have expressed a strong preference for preserving stability in children's lives. See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875, 878 (Alaska 1985) ([W]e have repeatedly stated our concern with maintaining continuity of care and avoiding disturbing and upsetting the child with repeated custody changes.) (citing Gratrix v. Gratrix, 652 P.2d 76, 81 (Alaska 1982)); Morel v. Morel, 647 P.2d 605, 608 (Alaska 1982) (We have continually stressed the desirability of maintaining continuity of care.). This concern is echoed in the [f]actors for consideration in awarding shared child custody contained in AS 25.20.090. In promulgating this statute, the legislature recognized the importance of maintaining stability in a child's life in the context of shared custody arrangements, requiring that [i]n determining whether to award shared custody of a child the court shall consider .... (5) the advantages of keeping the child in the community where the child presently resides; (6) the optimal time for the child to spend with each parent considering (A) the actual time spent with each parent; (B) the proximity of each parent to the other and to the school in which the child is enrolled; (C) the feasibility of travel between the parents;... AS 25.20.090. Despite the concerns reflected in AS 25.20.090, Dr. Henderson-Dixon's opinion that an alternating six-month custody schedule would be destructive and debilitating, and the prevailing view that alternating physical custody is disfavored in cases such as this, the superior court found that an alternating six-month custody schedule would be in Shelby's best interests. The court concluded that Dr. Henderson-Dixon's testimony was too general in nature to aid in the determination of Shelby's best interests: I have some concern about and don't find very helpful the testimony of Dr. Henderson-Dixon, primarily because what she gave the court was standard treatise, textbook average child. She's never seen the child. She did not indicate that she had looked at any medical records or anything else about the child and I don't find her testimony to be very helpful in trying to decide what in  are in the best interests of this child. The court made no other findings about the evidence of the potential harmful effects on Shelby of an alternating six-month custody schedule. More particularly, the court did not point to any evidence indicating that Shelby had less need for stability than a textbook average child. Furthermore, neither the court's oral findings nor its written custody decree addressed the factors enumerated in AS 25.20.090. First, although the court recognized the issue of proximity, it failed to discuss it. [7] See AS 25.20.090(6)(B). Because the proximity of each parent to the other is at the heart of this case, such an omission is error. Second, although the court raised the issue of travel to determine how to distribute travel expenses between the parties, it failed to consider the feasibility of travel. See AS 25.20.090(6)(C). Finally, the court failed to address any advantages of keeping Shelby in Anchorage, the community in which she resided at the time of the hearing. See AS 25.20.090(5). We conclude that the superior court erred by giving undue weight to the custody agreement, failing to give adequate weight to the evidence presented by West, and failing to consider the relevant factors in AS 25.20.090. Where one parent has moved to a distant locale, we hold that a six-month alternating physical custody arrangement disrupts the stability of a young child's life and thus is not in the child's best interests absent compelling evidence to the contrary. In this case, the record indicates that no such compelling evidence exists.