Opinion ID: 2628954
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Out-of-State Cases

Text: As the Schmidt court recognized, its decision is contrary to cases from some other jurisdictions. The difference is not in the rule i.e., that there must be control of a nature that could prevent the harmbut in the determination of whether that type of control existed. After discussing the split of authority, this court adopted what some view as the narrower approach and determined that requisite control does not exist in a parole situation. See 265 Kan. at 385-87, 961 P.2d 677. Similarly, there is a split of authority in the cases considering whether a Restatement § 319 duty exists between mental health care providers and mentally ill outpatients. Several courts have concluded an outpatient setting inherently lacks the level of control to give rise to a Restatement § 319 duty or that public policy militates against imposing a duty in that setting. See, e.g., Currie v. United States, 836 F.2d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1987); Hasenei v. United States, 541 F.Supp. 999, 1009 (D.Md.1982); King v. Smith, 539 So.2d 262, 264 (Ala.1989); Cooke v. Berlin, 153 Ariz. 220, 224-25, 735 P.2d 830 (Ct.App. 1987); Boynton v. Burglass, 590 So.2d 446, 448-49 (Fla.Dist.App.1991); Santa Cruz v. N.W. Dade Com. Health Ctr., Inc., 590 So.2d 444, 445-46 (Fla.Dist.App.1991); Wagshall v. Wagshall, 148 A.D.2d 445, 446-47, 538 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1989). The Plaintiffs in this case cite and rely on a case taking the opposite view Morgan v. Fam. Counseling Ctr., 77 Ohio St.3d 284, 673 N.E.2d 1311 (1997). In Morgan, the Ohio Supreme Court noted that Restatement § 320 imposes a duty on one who takes the custody of another to control the conduct of the other to prevent them from doing harm to others. As compared to this requirement of custody, the Ohio court viewed the takes charge requirement of Restatement § 319 as covering diverse levels of control which give rise to corresponding degrees of responsibility. Morgan, 77 Ohio St.3d at 299, 673 N.E.2d 1311. In part, the Ohio Supreme Court based the mental health care provider's ability to control on the ability to commit the patient. Morgan, 77 Ohio St.3d at 309, 673 N.E.2d 1311. In addition, the Ohio Supreme Court aligned the mental health care provider's duties to the patient with the duties owed to third parties, stating: Society's interest in being free from harm caused by mentally ill persons is, in the final analysis, dependent upon `[t]he patient's right to good medical care.' [Citation omitted]. Without good medical care, society would stand unprotected from mental patients with violent propensities. 77 Ohio St.3d at 307, 673 N.E.2d 1311. As we consider this holding, we recognize the validity of the analytical distinction between Restatement §§ 319 and 320. Yet, Kansas precedent is contrary to the rationale of the Morgan decision. First, this court rejected a reliance on the duties arising from a psychiatrist-patient relationship as a basis for a duty with a person outside that relationship in Boulanger, 258 Kan. at 297-98, 303, 900 P.2d 823. Second, Boulanger held that the leverage of having a mechanism to involuntarily commit a patient did not give rise to a duty to commit, 258 Kan. at 303, 900 P.2d 823, and Hesler, indicates that even involuntarily committed patients are entitled to the least restrictive environment called for by the patient's current condition. 266 Kan. at 632, 971 P.2d 1169. In addition, the view adopted in Schmidt and other Kansas cases is more in line with the view taken by the Ohio Supreme Court dissenters in Morgan, who argued that Restatement § 319 requires evidence of an ability to control in a manner that would be meaningful in the prevention of the harm that actually occurred. Morgan, 77 Ohio St.3d at 317-19, 673 N.E.2d 1311 (Cook, J., dissenting; Moyer, C.J., and Stratton, J., concurring in dissent); see Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. Carneyhan, 169 S.W.3d 840, 853 (Ky.2005) (considering whether special relationship exists in employment situation; recognizing cases generally require `control' ... `in a very real sense' and that the control must be related in some manner to the harm caused by the person under control, such that its exercise would restrict the person's ability to cause harm). Hence, Morgan does not persuade us that a duty arises under Restatement § 319.