Opinion ID: 1310539
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of Article XVI, Section 5

Text: The Tiedes contend that article XVI, section 5 of the Utah Constitution prohibits the State from invoking immunity from a wrongful death action. That section provides: The right of action to recover damages for injuries resulting in death, shall never be abrogated, and the amount recoverable shall not be subject to any statutory limitation, except in cases where compensation for injuries resulting in death is provided for by law. Utah Const. art. XVI, § 5. The Tiedes argue that this section requires the State, along with everyone else, to be subject to liability for wrongful death or any other tort resulting in death. In examining this section nearly eighty years ago, this court explained that because the Constitution clearly prohibits the Legislature from abrogating the right of action, it becomes necessary to inquire what that right was and who enjoyed it at the time the Constitution was adopted by the people of this state. As we have seen, the Constitution says the right of action shall not be abrogated; hence the right referred to must be deemed to be the right as it then existed and not merely an abstract right. Garfield Smelting Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 53 Utah 133, 138-39, 178 P. 57, 59 (1918) (emphasis added) (striking down part of workers' compensation statute that attempted to limit death benefits to minor heirs). Thus the scope of protection afforded by the wrongful death provision is limited to rights of action that existed at the time the provision was adopted. Sovereign immunity was a settled feature of the common law when Utah became a state and adopted its constitution. In Wilkinson v. State, 42 Utah 483, 492-93, 134 P. 626, 630 (1913), this court stated: [I]n the absence of either express constitutional or statutory authority an action against a sovereign state cannot be maintained. The doctrine is elementary and of universal application, and so far as we are aware there is not a single authority to the contrary. See also State v. District Court, 94 Utah 384, 389, 78 P.2d 502, 504 (1937) (The State cannot be sued unless it has given its consent or has waived its immunity.); Campbell Bldg. Co. v. State Road Comm'n, 95 Utah 242, 249, 70 P.2d 857, 861 (1937) ([A]ction may not be maintained unless the state has, through legislative or constitutional action, given consent to be sued.). At the time the constitution was adopted in 1895, there was no express constitutional or statutory authority allowing suits for wrongful death against the State. Instead, all claims against the State had to be presented to the State Board of Examiners, composed of the governor, the secretary of state, and the attorney general. See 1898 Revised Statutes of Utah § 929. The Board heard evidence on the merits of each claim and either denied the claim or approved payment of a sum of money to settle the claim. Id. §§ 933-937. In the latter case, the settlement was then sent to the legislature for its approval and appropriation. Id. § 938. In sum, by retaining governmental immunity from wrongful death suits against the State, section 63-30-10(2) does not abrogate any previously existing right of action and therefore does not violate article XVI, section 5. We sympathize with the Tiedes for the tragedy they have suffered. Nevertheless, we are bound by the legislature's policy decisions and are constrained by the immunity act to deny recovery against the State. We affirm the district court's dismissal of this action. ZIMMERMAN, C.J., and DURHAM and RUSSON, JJ., concur in the opinion of HOWE, J.