Opinion ID: 1058293
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Carroll argues that the circuit court erred in holding that it did not have jurisdiction over his habeas corpus claim because a credit of 288 days against his Virginia sentence would not result in his immediate release from detention. Carroll contends that an immediate release from detention is not required for habeas corpus jurisdiction. According to Carroll, habeas corpus jurisdiction should lie when the relief sought will directly impact the duration of the petitioner's custody or incarceration. The Commonwealth agrees with Carroll on this issue. The Commonwealth further asserts that the viability of the immediate release rule, as established in McDorman v. Smyth, 187 Va. 522, 525, 47 S.E.2d 441, 443 (1948), is called into question in light of subsequent statutory amendments, United States Supreme Court decisions, and decisions of this Court. The Commonwealth contends this Court should find habeas corpus jurisdiction is available where the effect of an order entered in the petitioner's favor will result in shortening time the petitioner must serve in confinement. In McDorman, this Court adopted the immediate release rule, which provides that habeas corpus jurisdiction lies only where the release of the petitioner from his immediate detention will follow as a result of a judgment in his favor. We stated: Habeas corpus is a writ of inquiry granted to determine whether a person is detained without lawful authority. Virginia Code, 1942 (Michie), section 5848. It is available only where the release of the prisoner from his immediate detention will follow as a result of an order in his favor. It is not available to secure a judicial determination of any question which, even if determined in the prisoner's favor, could not affect the lawfulness of his immediate custody and detention. It cannot be used to modify or revise a judgment of conviction. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238 [(1934)]. Id. at 525, 47 S.E.2d at 443-44 (emphasis added). When McDorman was decided, VDOC calculated service of individual sentences seriatim, and McDorman, who was serving a series of sentences, contended that some of his sentences, which were to take effect at the expiration of his current sentence, were invalid. Id. at 523-25, 47 S.E.2d at 443. We determined that the sentence McDorman was currently serving at the time of the petition was valid, and dismissed his petition because even a successful claim against sentences he had not yet begun serving would not result in his immediate release. Id. at 529, 525, 47 S.E.2d at 445, 443. Subsequent to McDorman, the scope of the writ of habeas corpus was expanded. Current Code § 8.01-654(B)(3) provides that a petitioner may allege detention without lawful authority through challenge to a conviction, although the sentence imposed for such conviction is suspended or is to be served subsequently to the sentence currently being served by petitioner. Pursuant to the current statutory authority, a defendant in the same situation as McDorman could challenge a conviction that he had not yet begun to serve, even though a successful challenge would not result in his immediate release. Recently, we found jurisdiction to grant a writ of habeas corpus for a defendant to challenge one of two concurrent sentences on two manslaughter convictions. West v. Director, Dep't of Corrs., 273 Va. 56, 639 S.E.2d 190 (2007). We stated that our decision would result in his release from immediate detention on that conviction and sentence, which complied with the purpose and scope of the writ of habeas corpus, which is to test the legality of a prisoner's detention. Id. at 66, 639 S.E.2d at 197. When this Court decided McDorman, we specifically relied on the United States Supreme Court's decision in McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S.Ct. 24, 79 L.Ed. 238 (1934), in adopting the immediate release rule. However, the immediate release rule has since been called into question because the McNally decision was overruled by the Supreme Court in Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54, 88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426 (1968). In Peyton, the Supreme Court stated: [T]o the extent that McNally relied on the notion that immediate physical release was the only remedy under the federal writ of habeas corpus, it finds no support in the statute and has been rejected by this Court in subsequent decisions. We overrule McNally and hold that a prisoner serving consecutive sentences is in custody under any one of them for purposes of [28 U.S.C.] § 2241(c)(3). This interpretation is consistent with the statutory language and with the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus in the federal courts. Id. at 67, 88 S.Ct. 1549. In Peyton, the Supreme Court noted several practical reasons for abrogating the immediate release rule, including the advantage in having the trial court resolve factual disputes and the detriment to the petitioner of possible confinement in excess of his lawful sentence if he is required to wait until almost the end of that sentence to litigate his complaint: Clearly, to the extent that the rule of McNally postpones plenary consideration of issues by the district courts, it undermines the character of the writ of habeas corpus as the instrument for resolving fact issues not adequately developed in the original proceedings. . . . . But the prematurity rule of McNally in many instances extends without practical justification the time a prisoner entitled to release must remain in confinement.... [E]ach day they are incarcerated under those convictions while their cases are in the courts will be time that they might properly have enjoyed as free men. Id. at 63-64, 88 S.Ct. 1549. The Supreme Court's decision in Peyton was based on historical use of the writ of habeas corpus under common law and the language of the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006 & Supp. I 2007). [3] In Peyton, the Supreme Court held that a petitioner serving consecutive sentences is in custody under any of the sentences for purposes of the federal habeas corpus statute. For additional support, the Supreme Court further noted that [s]ince 1874, the habeas corpus statute has directed the courts to determine the facts and dispose of the case summarily, `as law and justice require.' Id. at 66-67, 88 S.Ct. 1549 (citation omitted). A few years after Peyton was decided, in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973), the Supreme Court again addressed whether federal habeas corpus was the appropriate remedy when an order entered in the petitioner's favor would not result in his immediate release. The Court concluded: Even if the restoration of the respondents' credits would not have resulted in their immediate release, but only in shortening the length of their actual confinement in prison, habeas corpus would have been their appropriate remedy. For recent cases have established that habeas corpus relief is not limited to immediate release from illegal custody, but that the writ is available as well to attack future confinement and obtain future releases. Id. at 487, 93 S.Ct. 1827 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court's decisions in Peyton and Preiser strongly support the argument that the immediate release rule requiring immediate release from detention should be abrogated in Virginia. We agree with the parties that the immediate release rule as established in McDorman needs to be readdressed in light of statutory changes and subsequent United States Supreme Court authority. We, therefore, overrule McDorman to the extent that habeas corpus jurisdiction is predicated upon an immediate release from detention. A reversal of McDorman is not only predicated by the language of Code § 8.01-654(B)(3), but also by the practical and fairness considerations expressed by the Supreme Court in Peyton and Preiser. Circuit courts are well suited to resolve factual disputes related to convictions and sentences. Furthermore, it is obvious that factual disputes of this nature are more accurately resolved when the events are fresh and memories clear. Moreover, there is nothing in our habeas corpus jurisprudence which requires a petitioner to wait so long to pursue this remedy that he or she is at peril of being required to serve a sentence longer than his or her lawful sentence while his or her dispute is being resolved. The holding of McDorman also relies on an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of Virginia's habeas corpus statute. Code § 8.01-654(A)(1) provides: The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum shall be granted forthwith by the Supreme Court or any circuit court, to any person who shall apply for the same by petition, showing by affidavits or other evidence probable cause to believe that he is detained without lawful authority. (Emphasis added.) The statute extends the availability of the writ of habeas corpus to prisoners who claim they are detained without lawful authority. In interpreting this language, we are guided by the principle of statutory construction that remedial statutes are to be construed liberally. Greenberg v. Commonwealth, 255 Va. 594, 600, 499 S.E.2d 266, 269 (1998). Additionally, we must consider the ordinary and plain meaning of statutory terms. Winborne v. Virginia Lottery, 278 Va. 142, 148, 677 S.E.2d 304, 306 (2009). So viewed, the statutory phrase detained without lawful authority does not limit the availability of a writ of habeas corpus to situations in which a result in the petitioner's favor will result in his or her immediate release. Rather, Code § 8.01-654(A)(1) allows a petitioner to challenge the lawfulness of the entire duration of his or her detention so long as an order entered in the petitioner's favor will result in a court order that, on its face and standing alone, will directly impact the duration of the petitioner's confinement. Here, Carroll is detained for 13 years pursuant to his sentencing order, which includes the 288 days for which he is seeking credit. Thus, Carroll is detained without lawful authority within the meaning of the statute if his sentence, including the 288 days for which he seeks credit, is imposed without lawful authority. Based on Carroll's claim, an order entered in his favor would result in a court order that, on its face and as a matter of law, would directly impact the duration of Carroll's imprisonment by shortening his sentence by 288 days. Therefore, the circuit court erred in holding that it did not have habeas corpus jurisdiction to entertain Carroll's claim. Just as the Supreme Court in Peyton decided that the language in custody in the federal habeas corpus statute does not impose an immediate release rule, 391 U.S. at 67, 88 S.Ct. 1549, the language detained without lawful authority in Code § 8.01-654(A)(1) does not impose an immediate release rule in the Virginia system. Our interpretation of Code § 8.01-654(A)(1) also assures that [m]eaningful factual hearings on alleged constitutional deprivations can be conducted before memories and records grow stale, and at least one class of prisoners will have the opportunity to challenge defective convictions and obtain relief without having to spend unwarranted months or years in prison. Peyton, 391 U.S. at 65, 88 S.Ct. 1549. Our decision today does not dramatically expand habeas corpus jurisdiction. Our holding only concerns cases in which an order, entered in the petitioner's favor, interpreting a conviction or a sentence, will, as a matter of law and standing alone, directly impact the duration of a petitioner's confinement. Our holding does not extend habeas corpus jurisdiction to cases in which an order entered in the petitioner's favor will only give rise to a possibility of reducing the petitioner's term of imprisonment. Thus, disputes which only tangentially affect an inmate's confinement, such as prison classification issues concerning the rate at which a prisoner earns good conduct or sentence credits, or challenges to parole board decisions, are not proper matters for habeas corpus jurisdiction because an order entered in the petitioner's favor in those cases will not result in an order interpreting convictions or sentences that, on its face and standing alone, will directly impact the duration of the petitioner's sentence. See Virginia Parole Board v. Wilkins, 255 Va. 419, 420-21, 498 S.E.2d 695, 695 (1998) (while relying on the immediate release rule, we held the circuit court did not have habeas corpus jurisdiction over petitioner's challenge to the Parole Board's denial of discretionary parole and a two year deferral of the next parole review).