Opinion ID: 55800
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: horn’s sixth amendment claim

Text: As stated in Horn’s brief to this court, the essence of his defense at trial was that “the Colombians kidnapped and killed Chad Choice and [that Horn’s] involvement in the abduction and murder was the result of duress.” To show that Horn’s version of events was false, state prosecutors introduced the testimony of three current or former inmates, all of whom testified that Horn had told them that he had killed a young boy. One of these witnesses was 8 In Neal, we noted that the United States Supreme Court has emphasized “the critical distinction between an unreasonable application of federal law and a merely ‘incorrect’ or ‘erroneous’ application of federal law.” 286 F.3d at 236. Accordingly, we concluded that, “Because section 2254(d) ‘places a new constraint’ on a federal habeas court and demands greater deference to state courts, we have no authority to grant habeas corpus relief simply because we conclude, in our independent judgment, that a state supreme court’s application of Strickland is erroneous or incorrect.” Id. (referring to Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). 13 former inmate Birk, who had become acquainted with Horn while both were incarcerated at the Van Zandt County, Texas, jail. At the time of Horn’s trial, Birk was terminally ill and hospitalized in Sylvania, Ohio for liver cancer. He was not expected to improve. His doctor stated that it would be medically unsafe for Birk to travel from Ohio to testify in Texas and strongly recommended against Birk’s traveling. Over Horn’s Sixth Amendment objections, the trial court permitted Birk to testify from his hospital in Ohio by means of two-way closed-circuit television, with an attorney for the state and counsel for Horn present with Birk as he testified. Horn himself was denied permission to attend, but through the two-way system (utilizing 4x6 foot screens), Horn was able to see Birk as Birk testified, as also could the jury and the court, and Birk, as he testified, was able to see Horn.9 Birk testified that Horn had admitted that he “capped a little boy and buried him in his backyard.”10 Birk also stated that Horn 9 It is also indicated, and, there being no evidence or claim to the contrary, we conclude that Birk, as he testified, could also see the jury and the court. 10 Birk testified: “Q. [PROSECUTOR] Can you tell this jury in Texas the comments that Mr. Horn made to you? A. [BIRK] The first story that he told me was that he had told the police some of his friends and himself had buried a little boy in his backyard. Q. And why did he say he had said that a bunch of his friends and he had done that? A. He had wanted to come back to Tyler, Texas, or the surrounding area, because he wanted to escape. Q. That - - was there any discussion by him about the ability to escape from a federal penal institution versus a county jail? 14 admitted to him that he had lied to law enforcement about the Colombians’ role in Choice’s abduction and murder because he wanted to be transferred from the federal penitentiary to the local county jail where Horn thought he could escape more easily. In his petition for federal habeas relief, Horn maintains that Birk’s testimony violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation right in two ways: first, Horn asserts that the state court violated the Confrontation Clause’s literal meaning by allowing Birk to testify in a manner that precluded the type of in-person, face-to-face confrontation contemplated by the Sixth Amendment. Second, Horn claims that because Birk was in Ohio at the time the Texas trial judge administered the oath, Birk was not subject to Texas perjury laws when he testified—an important procedural safeguard guaranteed A. Yes, sir. He said the county jails were Mickey Mouse compared to the federal system. Q. So he made up the story about his friends so that he could be put in a county jail, which was Mickey Mouse, so he would have a better chance to escape? Is that your testimony?
Q. Did he - - did he mention on any other occasions the situation involving the little boy that was buried behind his backyard? A. Yes, sir. Q. Will you tell this jury how that came about and what it is that he said specifically? . . . A. He - - he had told me not to screw him, that he had capped a little boy and buried him in his backyard. Q. He had capped - - A. And he would have no resolve to doing - - taking care of me. Q. Now, he said he had capped a little boy - - A. Yes, sir. Q. - - and buried him in his backyard? In terms of your understanding of that term, what does the term ‘capped’ mean? A. Shot.” 15 by the Sixth Amendment.11 A. Testimony via two-way closed-circuit television On September 13, 1999, the state moved to allow Birk’s examination through closed-circuit television. Horn objected, arguing that the closed-circuit television examination would violate his confrontation right. The state trial court held a hearing outside the jury’s presence to discuss the issue, and initially determined that it could not grant the state’s request. However, after considering further evidence and conducting a telephone conference with Birk’s doctor in Ohio on September 15, 1999, the state court ultimately overruled Horn’s objections.12 11 The Sixth Amendment states: “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. Gochicoa, 118 F.3d at 446. 12 The trial court stated: “THE COURT: Okay. This case, very recent case, out of New York, decided January 22nd, 1999, they mentioned, of course, as to extreme exigent circumstances, the record, as a whole, as to the need for the evidence, the procedural safeguards that were implemented. I have - - I have some reluctance, but based upon the - - the evidence that’s presented here, I’m going to allow the State to move forward, but [sic] two-way closed circuit. And if there is - - I need to have some assurances here about how this is going to happen, because if it can’t be done in this way, then we won’t do it. Pretty simple. There should be a way to split screens so that Mr. Horn is here, and he is always on the screen at one time, and the witness to be interviewed is always on the screen.” The trial court apparently relied at least in part on United States v. Gigante, 166 F.3d 75, 81 (2d Cir. 1999), a case in which the Second Circuit held, “Upon a finding of exceptional circumstances . . . a trial court may 16 The state court made clear: “[A]s far as the necessity for - - for this to happen, I’m going to make that finding, that there is a - - there is a particularized need stated by the State and that only in that situation would this be - - would this be done and under the safeguards as provided.” While the United States Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the use of two-way closed-circuit television, two of its decisions concern whether a defendant’s confrontation right is violated by a witness testifying in a manner that falls short of in-person, face-to-face confrontation: Coy v. Iowa, 108 S.Ct. 2798 (1988), and Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (1990). In Coy v. Iowa, the defendant–appellant was convicted in Iowa state court of two counts of lascivious acts with a child “after a jury trial in which a screen placed between him and the two complaining witnesses blocked him from their sight.” 108 S.Ct. at 2799. The screen used in that case allowed the defendant “dimly to perceive the witnesses,” but the witnesses could not see the defendant at all. Id. at 2800. The decision to use the screen was based on an Iowa statute that provided for such child witnesses to testify via closed-circuit television or behind a screen. Id. at 2799–2800. The defendant argued that the screen’s use violated his confrontation right, but the trial court rejected this argument and the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed allow a witness to testify via two-way closed-circuit television when this furthers the interest of justice.” 17 the defendant’s conviction. Id. at 2800. The United States Supreme Court reversed the Iowa Supreme Court, stating that it was “difficult to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant’s right to a face-to-face encounter” than the use of the screen. Id. at 2803. The Court left “for another day, however, the question whether any exceptions exist” to the Confrontation Clause’s most literal requirement: that the defendant be able to confront his accuser in person, face-toface.13 Id. The Court made clear that if such an exception existed, it “would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important public policy,” and “[s]ince there have been no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here could not be sustained by any 13 The Court stated: “It is true that we have in the past indicated that rights conferred by the Confrontation Clause are not absolute, and may give way to other important interests. The rights referred to in those cases, however, were not the right narrowly and explicitly set forth in the Clause, but rather rights that are, or were asserted to be, reasonably implicit—namely, the right to crossexamine, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045-1046, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); the right to exclude outof-court statements, see Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S., at 63-65, 100 S.Ct., at 2537-2539; and the asserted right to face-to-face confrontation at some point in the proceedings other than the trial itself, Kentucky v. Stincer, supra. To hold that our determination of what implications are reasonable must take into account other important interests is not the same as holding that we can identify exceptions, in light of other important interests, to the irreducible literal meaning of the Clause: ‘a right to meet face to face all those who appear and give evidence at trial.’ California v. Green, 399 U.S., at 175, 90 S.Ct., at 1943-1944 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis added). We leave for another day, however, the question whether any exceptions exist. Whatever they may be, they would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important public policy. Cf. Ohio v. Roberts, supra, 448 U.S., at 64, 100 S.Ct., at 2538; Chambers v. Mississippi, supra, at 295, 93 S.Ct., at 1045-1046.” 108 S.Ct. at 2803. 18 conceivable exception.”14 Id. Two years after Coy v. Iowa, the Court decided Maryland v. Craig, 110 S.Ct. 3157 (1990). The defendant–respondent in Craig had been convicted in Maryland state court of various offenses, including child abuse and first and second degree sexual offenses. 110 S.Ct. at 3160, 3162. At trial, the named victim and three other children testified against the defendant by a one-way closedcircuit television procedure provided for by Maryland statute.15 Id. at 3161–62. The defendant in Craig objected that the procedure’s use violated her confrontation right, but her objection 14 The Court rejected the state’s argument that the statute on which the trial court relied to permit the screen’s use provided adequate findings to support an exception to the defendant’s confrontation right: “The State maintains that such necessity [to further an important public policy] is established here by the statute, which creates a legislatively imposed presumption of trauma. Our cases suggest, however, that even as to exceptions from the normal implications of the Confrontation Clause, as opposed to its most literal application, something more than the type of generalized finding underlying such a statute is needed when the exception is not ‘firmly . . . rooted in our jurisprudence.’ Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782, 97 L.Ed. 2d 144 (1987) (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 91 S.Ct. 210, 27 L.Ed.2d 213 (1970)). The exception created by the Iowa statute, which was passed in 1985, could hardly be viewed as firmly rooted. Since there have been no individualized findings that these particular witnesses needed special protection, the judgment here could not be sustained by any conceivable exception.” 108 S.Ct. at 2803. 15 Under the Maryland statutory procedure invoked in Craig, “[T]he child witness, prosecutor, and defense counsel withdraw to a separate room; the judge, jury, and defendant remain in the courtroom. The child witness is then examined and cross-examined in the separate room, while a video monitor records and displays the witness’ testimony to those in the courtroom. During this time the witness cannot see the defendant. The defendant remains in electronic communication with defense counsel, and objections may be made and ruled on as if the witness were testifying in the courtroom.” 110 S.Ct. at 3161. 19 was overruled. Id. Unlike in Coy v. Iowa, the trial court in Craig “made individualized findings that each of the child witnesses needed special protection.” Id. at 3163. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, however, reversed and remanded for a new trial, determining that while the Confrontation Clause does not always require that the defendant be permitted a face-to-face courtroom encounter with an accuser, the state had not made a sufficient showing to invoke the one-way closed-circuit television procedure. Id. at 3162. The United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland and remanded the case. Id. at 3171. Like the Court of Appeals of Maryland, the Supreme Court rejected the view that the Sixth Amendment uniformly demands in-person, face-to-face confrontation: “[A] literal reading of the Confrontation Clause would ‘abrogate virtually every hearsay exception, a result long rejected as unintended and too extreme.’ Roberts, 448 U.S., at 63, 100 S.Ct., at 2537. Thus, in certain narrow circumstances, ‘competing interests, if ‘closely examined,’ may warrant dispensing with confrontation at trial.’ Id., at 64, 100 S.Ct., at 2538 . . . . In sum, our precedents establish that ‘the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-toface confrontation at trial,’ Roberts, supra, 448 U.S., at 63, 100 S.Ct., at 2537 (emphasis added; footnote omitted), a preference that ‘must occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case,’ Mattox, supra, 156 U.S., at 243, 15 S.Ct., at 339-340.” Id. at 3165. The Court concluded that the “state interest in protecting child witnesses from the trauma of testifying in a child abuse case is 20 sufficiently important to justify the use of a special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify . . . in the absence of face-to-face confrontation.” Id. at 3169. The Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals of Maryland’s holding that the trial court had made insufficient findings to invoke the procedure. Id. at 3171. The Court stated, “So long as a trial court makes [] a case-specific finding of necessity, the Confrontation Clause does not prohibit a State from using a one-way closed circuit television procedure for the receipt of testimony by a child witness in a child abuse case.” Id. In Horn’s case, given the trial court’s efforts to confirm Birk’s illness and inability to travel and the care with which the other aspects of Horn’s confrontation rights were preserved, we cannot say that the decision to permit Birk to testify via two-way closed-circuit television constituted an unreasonable application of established federal law. In Craig, the Court determined that “use of the one-way closed circuit television procedure, where necessary to further an important state interest, does not impinge upon the truth-seeking or symbolic purposes of the Confrontation Clause.” Id. at 3167 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized: “We find it significant . . . that Maryland’s procedure preserves all of the other elements of the confrontation right: The child witness must be competent to testify and must testify under oath; the defendant retains full opportunity for contemporaneous cross-examination; and the judge, jury, and defendant are able to view (albeit by video monitor) the demeanor (and body) of the witness as he or she testifies. Although we are mindful of the 21 many subtle effects face-to-face confrontation may have on an adversary criminal proceeding, the presence of these other elements of confrontation—oath, crossexamination, and observation of the witness’ demeanor—adequately ensures that the testimony is both reliable and subject to rigorous adversarial testing in a manner functionally equivalent to that accorded live, in-person testimony.” Id. at 3166. The state court presiding over Horn’s trial similarly found, after discussing Birk’s condition with Birk’s doctor, that use of the unorthodox procedure was necessary, and emphasized that other aspects of the Confrontation Clause were maintained: “THE COURT: Okay. Certainly as to the image that’s projected here in the courtroom, as far as any Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses here in court, the demeanor of the witness appears to be certainly large and able to be viewed very - - very ably by the jury from their location. As far as the demeanor, the questions that will be placed before him, his - - his oath that he takes here before the jury, we’ll find that that - - that those procedural safeguards are implemented here for the presentation of this witness in these extreme circumstances as - - as we have mentioned before and that this is necessary here.” On direct review, the TCCA also noted the fact that Horn’s confrontation right was otherwise safeguarded: “[T]he closed-circuit television procedure used for Birk’s testimony preserved all of the characteristics of in-court testimony: the trial court administered an oath to Birk under the laws of the state of Texas; he was subject to full cross-examination; and he testified in full view of the defendant, jury, court, and defense counsel. In fact, members of both the defense and prosecution teams sat with Birk in Ohio while he testified.”16 16 Both the trial court and the TCCA considered Coy v. Iowa, Maryland v. Craig, and United States v. Gigante (see note 12, supra). 22 Thus, the state court records reflect that a case-specific finding of necessity was made, and that care was taken to preserve other aspects of Horn’s confrontation right. Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the determination that it was constitutionally sound to permit Birk to testify by way of the two-way television system constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. Horn has not pointed to, and our independent search has not found, any post-Craig decision by a federal appellate court that squarely states that introduction of testimony through two-way closed-circuit television violates the Confrontation Clause.17 17 Since the Court decided Maryland v. Craig, circuits have disagreed on the issue of whether Craig’s requirement of a specific finding of necessity applies to testimony by two-way closed circuit television as well as to testimony by one-way closed circuit television, the procedure employed in Craig. For example, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have explicitly concluded that Craig governs both types of closed-circuit television testimony. United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 1313 (11th Cir. 2006) (en banc); United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 555 (8th Cir. 2005). The Second Circuit, however, in at least one case has found that “[b]ecause [the district court] employed a two-way system that preserved the face-to-face confrontation celebrated by Coy, it is not necessary to enforce the Craig standard [for specific necessity findings] in this case.” Gigante, 166 F.3d at 81. The Second Circuit noted: “The closed-circuit television procedure utilized for [the witness’s] testimony preserved all of these characteristics of incourt testimony: [The witness] was sworn; he was subject to full cross-examination; he testified in full view of the jury, court, and defense counsel; and [the witness] gave this testimony under the eye of [the defendant] himself. [The defendant] forfeited none of the constitutional protections of confrontation.” 166 F.3d at 80 (footnote omitted). Horn points out in his brief on appeal that the Eleventh Circuit in its en banc decision in United States v. Yates, and the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Bordeaux, concluded that testimony via two-way closed-circuit television is “not constitutionally equivalent to a face-to-face confrontation.” Bordeaux, 400 F.3d at 554. But neither of those courts found that testimony via such a system is never constitutional; indeed, Craig precludes such a finding. 23 Moreover, other circuits have agreed that introduction of testimony by such means does not constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Fuster-Escalona v. Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 170 F. App’x 627, 629–30 (11th Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (it was “not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, established federal law to hold that no case-specific findings were required prior to [] four children testifying via two-way closed television”), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 1251 (2007); Harrell v. Butterworth, 251 F.3d 926, 931–32 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Florida Supreme Court’s decision—that the witnesses’ testimony via two-way, closed-circuit satellite transmission did not violate [defendant’s] constitutional rights—was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Federal law set forth by Supreme Court cases . . . .”). Horn admits that Craig is unfavorable to his position, but he argues that “if Craig is not implicitly overruled it is, at the very least, on shaky ground.” Horn points out that Craig was based in large part on the reliability test in Ohio v. Roberts, 100 S.Ct. 2531 (1980), and that Crawford v. Washington, 124 S.Ct. 1354 (2004), overruled Roberts. Indeed, Craig does rely in part on Roberts. See, e.g., Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3165 (citing and quoting Roberts for the proposition that the Court’s “precedents establish that ‘the Confrontation Clause reflects a preference for face-toface confrontation at trial’”). Roberts instructed “that an 24 unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement may be admitted so long as it has adequate indicia of reliability—i.e., falls within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bears ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.’” Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1359 (quoting Roberts, 100 S.Ct. at 2539). And, we agree that Crawford overruled Roberts.18 Whorton v. Bockting, 127 S.Ct. 1173, 1179 (2007) (“. . . we issued our opinion in Crawford, in which we overruled Roberts”); see Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1370–74. Crawford, however, is inapplicable in this case because it is not retroactive 18 In Crawford, the petitioner challenged the trial court’s permitting state prosecutors to introduce at his trial his wife’s “tape-recorded statements to the police as evidence that the [defendant’s] stabbing was not in self-defense.” 124 S.Ct. at 1358. The petitioner argued that admission of the evidence violated his Sixth Amendment confrontation right because he had not been given an opportunity for cross-examination. See id. at 1356–57. The trial court allowed the prosecutors to introduce the wife’s statements after concluding that there were sufficient signs of the type of reliability required by Roberts. Id. at 1358. The Washington Court of Appeals subsequently reversed the petitioner’s conviction, but it was reinstated by the Washington Supreme Court. Id. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the use of the petitioner’s wife’s statements violated the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 1359. The Court concluded that it did, and reversed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court. Id. at 1374 (“In this case, the State admitted Sylvia’s testimonial statement against petitioner, despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine her. That alone is sufficient to make out a violation of the Sixth Amendment.”). The Court explained: “Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether. Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.” 124 S.Ct. at 1374. The Court in Crawford declined to set out a “comprehensive definition” of “testimonial.” Id. 25 “to cases already final on direct review.”19 Bockting, 127 S.Ct. at 1177. Moreover, we are not at liberty to presume that Craig has been overruled sub silentio. See State Oil co. v. Khan, 118 S.Ct. 275, 284 (1997). Thus, Craig governs our analysis of Horn’s petition for habeas relief. Horn also suggests that Craig and other cases involving child victims of sexual abuse fall into a unique category where courts sought to protect abused young children from further trauma, and that Craig’s reasoning may not be extended to protect other interests. We conclude that it was not unreasonable for the state trial court and the TCCA to disagree. Craig’s references to “an important public policy” and “an important state interest,” 110 S.Ct. at 3166, 3167, are reasonably read to suggest a general rule not limited to protecting child victims of sexual offenses from the trauma of testifying in a defendant’s presence. Rather, it is possible to view Craig as allowing a necessity-based exception for face-to-face, in-courtroom confrontation where the witness’s inability to testify invokes the state’s interest in protecting the witness—from trauma in child sexual abuse cases or, as here, from physical danger or suffering. Other circuits have recognized that protection of seriously ill witnesses may give rise to the type of 19 The TCCA affirmed Horn’s conviction and sentence on direct review in 2002, Horn v. Texas, No. 73,684 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 4, 2002), and the United States Supreme Court denied Horn’s petition for writ of certiorari in 2003. Horn v. Texas, 124 S.Ct. 88 (2003). Crawford was decided in 2004. 26 necessity required under Craig to permit testimony by way of closed-circuit television. See, e.g., Yates, 438 F.3d at 1317 n.10 (acknowledging as a “legitimate reason[] why physical face-to-face confrontation cannot be accommodated” the protection of a witness’s “health and safety”); United States v. Benson, 79 F. App’x 813, 820–21 (6th Cir. 2003) (defendant’s confrontation right was not violated by the district court’s decision to permit an 85-year-old witness to testify via video conference from another state when the witness was too ill to travel). Nor are we persuaded by Horn’s observation that while Texas has a statute allowing child witnesses to testify by television, see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. § 38.071, it does not have a statute providing for such procedure when a witness is ill. There is no established law that would indicate that before the state may invoke Craig, it must be able to point to a statute codifying the important state interest it wishes to further. In light of Craig, we hold that the state court’s conclusion that it was constitutionally sound for Birk to testify via two-way closedcircuit television was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.20 20 Justice Breyer’s dissenting statement regarding the Supreme Court’s decision in 2002 to decline to transmit to Congress the Judicial Conference’s proposed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 26(b) also supports our conclusion that the state court did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court in this case. Order of the Supreme Court, 207 F.R.D. 89 (2002). Proposed Rule 26(b) would have “allow[ed] the use of video transmission whenever the parties are merely unable to take a deposition under Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 15.” 207 F.R.D. at 93. While Justice Scalia, sharing the majority’s view that the proposed rule should not be transmitted to Congress, stated that the proposed rule was “of dubious validity under the Confrontation Clause,” id., Justice Breyer filed a 27 B. The Texas court’s administration oath to Birk in Ohio Another aspect of a defendant’s confrontation right is the requirement that a witness make his statements under oath. See Craig, 110 S.Ct. at 3163 (stating that “the right guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause includes not only a ‘personal examination’ . . . but also ‘[] insures that the witness will give his statements under oath’” (internal citation omitted)). The requirement of testifying under oath impresses the witness “with the seriousness of the matter and guard[s] against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury.” Id. (quoting California v. Green, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1935 (1970)). “The combined effect of [the] elements of confrontation—physical presence, oath, cross-examination, and observation of demeanor by the trier of fact—serves the purposes of the Confrontation Clause by ensuring that evidence admitted against an accused is reliable and subject to the rigorous adversarial testing that is the norm of Anglo-American criminal proceedings.” Id. Birk voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the Texas trial court, stated that he understood that he could be prosecuted dissenting statement joined by Justice O’Connor, in which he noted, “It is not obvious how video testimony could abridge a defendant’s Confrontation Clause rights in circumstances where an absent witness’ testimony could be admitted in nonvisual form via deposition regardless,” id. at 96, and “I believe that any constitutional problems will arise, if at all, only in a limited subset of cases.” Id. at 97. 28 for any perjury, and submitted to Texas perjury laws.21 Horn, however, argues that the Texas state trial judge was unauthorized to administer an oath to Birk in Ohio, that Birk therefore was not subject to Texas perjury laws, and that consequently Birk’s testimony violates “the procedural safeguards insured by the Confrontation Clause guarantee.” When Horn raised the issue on direct appeal, the TCCA stated: “Birk voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of Texas for possible criminal liability for perjury. The jury saw him take the oath to testify truthfully and was informed that the testimony should be considered as if given before it in the courtroom. The response given to the trial court indicates that Birk believed he was subject to the penalties of the trial court should he perjure himself. Because the manner of Birk’s testimony satisfies the criteria and spirit of the Confrontation Clause, we overrule [this] point of error.” Like the TCCA, we find no merit in Horn’s second Sixth Amendment argument for habeas relief; we cannot say that the state court’s determination that Birk’s oath did not violate Horn’s confrontation right constituted an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Indeed, a Texas statute arguably would give Texas jurisdiction to prosecute Birk for perjury had he in 21 The following exchange occurred between Birk and the state trial court: “THE COURT: Okay. As far as submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court here and as to the oath that you would take and any process of - - of the Court here, are you submitting to that voluntarily here under your oath that you have previously taken, Mr. Birk? THE WITNESS: Yes, ma’am. THE COURT: Okay. And you understand that you can be prosecuted for any perjury, and it would be aggravated perjury, any kind of perjury count that would be brought against you, you are submitting to that; is that correct? THE WITNESS: Yes, ma’am.” 29 fact perjured himself. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 1.04.22 Further, there is no established law from the United States Supreme Court dictating that the administration of the oath to Birk in Ohio violated the Confrontation Clause. Given Birk’s voluntary submission to jurisdiction in Texas, we cannot say that it was unreasonable for the state court to conclude that Horn’s Sixth Amendment right was not violated. To be clear, we do not decide whether use of the two-way closed-circuit television or the Texas court’s administration of an oath to Birk in Ohio actually violated Horn’s confrontation rights.23 We hold only that the TCCA’s conclusion that these procedures did not violate Horn’s Sixth Amendment rights was not “contrary to” and did not constitute “an unreasonable application 22 Section 1.04, “Territorial Jurisdiction,” of the Texas Penal Code states in part that Texas “has jurisdiction over an offense that a person commits by his own conduct . . . for which he is criminally responsible if: . . . (2) the conduct outside this state constitutes an attempt to commit an offense inside this state .” Horn has cited no case holding that a prosecution for perjury or like offense under Texas law could not lie against a witness in Birk’s position if his testimony had been intentionally false in a material respect. See, also, e.g., 60A Am. Jur.2d, Perjury, § 13 “. . . it is generally considered immaterial whether the person administering the oath is an officer de jure or de facto, if his or her act takes place in the court’s presence and by its sanction.” And see, United States v. Williams, 71 S.Ct. 595, 600 (1951) (“. . . federal courts . . . uphold charges of perjury despite arguments that the federal court at the trial affected by the perjury could not enter a valid judgment due to lack of diversity jurisdiction, or due to the unconstitutionality of the statute out of which the perjury proceedings arose;” footnotes omitted). 23 We are aware of no decision (by any court) holding the confrontation clause violated where the court placed the witness under what purported to be a fully binding oath subject to penalties of perjury, and the witness acknowledged it to be such, but it was later determined on appeal (or collateral attack) that the oath was actually not sufficient to subject the witness to perjury prosecution for knowingly giving materially false testimony. 30 of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).24 24 Even if Horn’s confrontation right had been violated, that violation would be subject to harmless-error analysis. See Coy, 108 S.Ct. at 2803 (“We have recognized that other types of violations of the Confrontation Clause are subject to that harmless-error analysis, see e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S., at 679, 684, 106 S.Ct., at 1436, 1438, and see no reason why denial of face-to-face confrontation should not be treated the same.”). We have previously explained the applicable standard: “On direct appeal, when faced with a constitutional violation, a court must reverse the judgment of the court below unless the constitutional error is ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’ See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). However, in Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993), the Supreme Court articulated a ‘less onerous’ standard for assessing the impact of a state court’s constitutional error on collateral review. Under Brecht, a federal court may grant habeas relief on account of constitutional error only if it determines that the constitutional error had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’ See id. at 623, 113 S.Ct. 1710 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946)). Under this standard, however, the petitioner should prevail whenever the record is ‘so evenly balanced that a conscientious judge is in grave doubt as to the harmlessness of the error.’ O’Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436, 115 S.Ct. 992, 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995). As this court has explained, ‘if our minds are ‘in virtual equipoise as to the harmlessness’ under the Brecht standard, of the error, then we must conclude that it was harmful.’ Woods v. Johnson, 75 F.3d 1017, 1026–27 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 435, 115 S.Ct. 992).” Robertson v. Cain, 324 F.3d 297, 304–05 (5th Cir. 2003). The fact that the trial court and the TCCA, on direct review of Horn’s case, found only that there had been no constitutional error and did not address whether any such error was harmless, does not preclude our use of the Brecht standard. In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court stated: “We hold that in § 2254 proceedings a court must assess the prejudicial impact of constitutional error in a state-court criminal trial under the ‘substantial and injurious effect’ standard set forth in Brecht, 507 U.S. 619, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed. 2d 353, whether or not the state appellate court recognized the error and reviewed it for harmlessness under the ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard set forth in Chapman, 386 U.S. 18.” Fry v. Pliler, 127 S.Ct. 2321, 2328 (2007). Accordingly, assuming a confrontation right error, the question we would face is whether that error “had a ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Robertson, 324 F.3d at 307 (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1722 (1993)). Because of our holding that the TCCA’s determination that the challenged procedures did not violate Horn’s confrontation rights was not contrary to, and did not constitute an unreasonable application of, clearly established 31