Opinion ID: 424926
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Farmer Exception to Preemption.

Text: 25 The second argument urged by Jackson is that the outrageous conduct of Conrail requires recognition of an exception to the preemption doctrine in this case as it did in cases such as Farmer v. Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local 25, 430 U.S. 290, 97 S.Ct. 1056, 51 L.Ed.2d 338 (1977) (Farmer ); and Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County District Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 98 S.Ct. 1745, 56 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978) (Sears ). In both Farmer and Sears, the Supreme Court held that state claims were cognizable because they were not preempted by the federal labor laws. 26 In Farmer, the Court held that a California state court could exercise jurisdiction over the claim of a local union officer alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. Hill, the petitioner's decedent, had alleged that, as a result of disagreement with other union officials, he was subjected to a campaign of ridicule and personal abuse and was discriminated against by the union hiring hall. After reviewing exceptions to the preemption doctrine recognized in earlier cases, Farmer, 430 U.S. at 295-97, 97 S.Ct. at 1060-61, the Court stated that one must determine the scope of the general preemption rule by examining the state interests in regulating the conduct in question and the potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme. Id. at 297, 97 S.Ct. at 1061. 27 In applying this test to Hill's claim, the Court first noted that the state had a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from the alleged outrageous conduct. Id. at 302, 97 S.Ct. at 1064. The Court recognized that, because the abusive conduct was intertwined with allegations of hiring hall discrimination, there was some potential that Hill's state claim would touch on areas generally within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). This potential interference did not overcome the state's interest, however, because resolution of the state tort suit turned on whether the union's actions had caused Hill severe emotional distress whereas the focus of an unfair labor practice inquiry would have been on whether the union's conduct discriminated against Hill in terms of employment opportunities. As a result, the tort action could be resolved without reference to any accommodation of the special interests of unions and members in the hiring hall context. Id. at 305, 97 S.Ct. at 1066. 28 Similarly, in Sears, the Court held that Sears could rely on state trespass laws in seeking an injunction against union picketing on its private property. As in Farmer, the primary focus of the Sears Court was on whether recognition of the state trespass law would interfere with the federal regulatory scheme. The Court stated: 29 The critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to (as in Garner ) or different from (as in Farmer ) that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board. 30 Id. 436 U.S. at 197, 98 S.Ct. at 1757. Applying this test to the facts presented in Sears, the Court found that the focus of the state trespass proceeding would be on where the picketing occurred--private property--whereas the focus of an unfair labor practice proceeding would have been on the objective of the picketing. Id. at 198, 98 S.Ct. at 1758. 8 31 Sears and Farmer both raised questions of preemption under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 151-166 (NLRA), rather than under the RLA. Although this does not mean that the test articulated in Farmer and refined in Sears is inapplicable to the preemption issue in the present case, the difference between the impact of the NLRA and the RLA has significance. The focus of the NLRA is on specific conduct that Congress has deemed subject to either prohibition or protection, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 157-158. Often, as illustrated by Sears, it is the objective of certain conduct, rather than the mere exercise thereof, that is relevant to determining whether actions are protected or prohibited by the NLRA. In contrast, the RLA has made any grievance arising out of the collective bargaining agreement subject to the exclusive arbitral remedies contained in that Act, 45 U.S.C. Sec. 153 First (i). It follows from this difference that a state claim is more likely to impinge on an area of exclusive administrative jurisdiction under the RLA than under the NLRA. 9 32 The lower court cases that have applied the Farmer test in the RLA context illustrate this result. For instance, in Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930, 99 S.Ct. 318, 58 L.Ed.2d 323, the plaintiff sued the defendant railroad and officers thereof in state court, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress. The gravamen of Magnuson's complaint was that his discharge, following a head-on collision between two freight trains, was part of a conspiracy to cover up the railroad's own negligence which was responsible for the accident. After removal to the federal court, the district judge dismissed Magnuson's complaint on the ground that it was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the dispute resolution processes established by the RLA. Id. at 1368. 33 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. In distinguishing Farmer, upon which Magnuson relied, the majority stated: Unlike Farmer, this action is based on a matrix of facts which are inextricably intertwined with the collective bargaining agreement and the R.L.A. Id. at 1369. The court noted that both the wrongful discharge aspects of Magnuson's claim and those pertaining to the propriety of the investigation and hearing had a  'not obviously insubstantial relationship to the labor contract. Id. at 1369-70. 34 Similarly, in Majors v. U.S. Air, Inc., 525 F.Supp. 853 (D.Md.1981), the district court distinguished Farmer in concluding that jurisdiction over Majors' state claims for defamation and false imprisonment was precluded by the RLA. Majors' claims arose from an investigation conducted by the airline into whether he had stolen airline property. The district judge found that because his claim was based on some incident of the employment relationship, it was subject to the RLA. Id. at 857; see also Carson v. Southern Railway, 494 F.Supp. 1104, 1112 (D.S.C.1979) (state defamation claim is in essence and substance an employment grievance solely within the jurisdiction of the NRAB); Pandil v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad, 312 N.W.2d 139, 143 (Iowa App.1981) (facts relevant to plaintiff's claim of wrongful denial of recall from furlough status inextricably intertwined with the grievance procedures of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore preempted by the RLA). 35 In applying Farmer to the instant case, we must examine the state interest in regulating the conduct in question and the potential for interference with the federal regulatory scheme. 430 U.S. at 297, 97 S.Ct. at 1061. First, we note that the district court found that Indiana recognized a tort action for retaliatory discharge in Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973). 10 The plaintiff in Frampton had been a terminable-at-will employee. She filed a claim pursuant to the Indiana Workmens' Compensation Act of 1929, Ind.Code Secs. 22-3-2-1--22-3-6-3, when she learned of a thirty percent loss of use in her arm as the result of a work-related injury. She received a settlement for her injury. Approximately one month later, she was discharged without any reason being given. The Indiana Supreme Court upheld Frampton's cause of action, stating: [W]hen an employee is discharged solely for exercising a statutorily conferred right an exception to the general rule [that, under ordinary circumstances, an employee-at-will may be discharged without cause] must be recognized. 297 N.E.2d at 428. 36 It is significant that Frampton was a terminable-at-will employee whereas Jackson was not. Although no Indiana court has addressed whether an employee subject to a union collective bargaining agreement can sue for retaliatory discharge, other courts have limited the action to employees-at-will, reasoning that the retaliatory discharge action provides the only means for such an employee to seek redress. E.g., Cook v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 85 Ill.App.3d 402, 40 Ill.Dec. 864, 407 N.E.2d 95 (1980). Contra, Wyatt v. Jewel Companies, Inc., 108 Ill.App.3d 840, 64 Ill.Dec. 388, 439 N.E.2d 1053 (1982) (refusing to follow Cook ). 37 Conrail has waived any challenge to Jackson's claim on the ground that it fails to state a cause of action. We need not resolve, therefore, whether the Indiana court would extend Frampton to provide Jackson, an employee who could seek relief pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, a cause of action for retaliatory discharge. Recognizing that this issue is not clearly resolved is, however, a point of law that this court must consider in determining the state's interest in providing Jackson a judicial forum for his claim. 38 The second inquiry mandated by Farmer is the potential interference with the federal regulatory scheme. It is established under Andrews that a claim of wrongful discharge is subject exclusively to the administrative remedies established by the RLA. 406 U.S. at 325, 92 S.Ct. at 1565. Conrail defended against Jackson's retaliatory discharge claim by urging that he was discharged for cause: the violation of Railroad Safety Rules. The inquiry mandated by these two varying explanations of Jackson's dismissal must focus to a significant extent on the validity of Conrail's defense. As such, it is precisely the sort of inquiry required in any wrongful discharge action. Because Jackson's claim could not be resolved by examining only his FELA rights, it is abundantly clear that resolution of his suit impinges on those areas left, under the RLA, to exclusive administrative resolution. The claim raised by Jackson, pursuant to Indiana law, is identical to the claim he would have made, had he pursued the grievance through administrative channels, and therefore the potential interference with the federal regulatory interest is too great, under Sears, 436 U.S. at 197, 98 S.Ct. at 1757, to permit an exception to the preemption doctrine. 39