Opinion ID: 768314
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motions and Sentencing.

Text: 18 In August 1997, Rogers filed a pro se motion to dismiss counsel, alleging that he had insufficient opportunity to consult with Einhorn, that as a result the lawyer was unprepared for the suppression hearing and trial, and that Rogers was prejudiced by his lawyer's closing argument. See United States v. Lauria, No. 3:96CR185, Ruling on Alexander Rogers's Mot. to Dismiss Counsel, at 2 (D. Conn. Mar. 30, 1998). The district court denied the motion based on defendant's allegations failing to demonstrate incompetence, ineffectiveness, nor prejudice to his case. Id. 19 On February 20, 1998, Rogers filed a second pro se motion (oddly enough, dated November 6, 1997) alleging that Mr. Einhorn had rendered ineffective assistance by reason of an actual conflict of interest. The motion explained that a week after the trial Rogers learned through an article in the New Haven Register that Einhorn was a New Haven police commissioner. Citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), Rogers argued that Einhorn's position on the board of police commissioners was an actual conflict of interest that had an adverse effect on the lawyer's performance. In particular, Rogers claimed that Einhorn resisted filing the suppression motion, failed to call New Haven Police Lt. William White during the suppression hearing, made an inadequate summation, and repeatedly advised Rogers to plea guilty and cooperate with the government. Rogers also argued that Einhorn violated his ethical obligation to advise him, and the court, of any possible conflict. 20 The district court's written opinion denying Rogers's motion, issued March 30, 1998, reasoned that [e]ven if defense counsel's position on the Board of Police Commissioners could be viewed as an actual conflict with his representation of defendant, defendant must still show that 'an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' Lauria, Ruling on Alexander Rogers's Mot. to Dismiss Counsel, at 2 (quoting United States v. Stantini, 85 F.3d 9, 16 (2d Cir. 1996)). The district court found no such adverse effect because Einhorn respected Rogers's decision to go to trial, filed the motion to suppress, attempted to call Lt. White at the suppression hearing, and made statements during summation that can only be viewed as an attempt to help the defendant. Id. at 3. 21 At sentencing the following day, Einhorn reminded the court of the motions Rogers had made during the proceedings. The judge responded that he had reflected upon Rogers's motions, and said the record should not in any way suggest, that I find that there's any deficiency on your part as far as your representation of [Rogers's] interests are concerned. Lauria, No. 3:96CR185, Sentencing of Alexander Rogers, at 29 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 1998). Rogers then voiced his objection to the district court's denial of his second motion, emphasizing that if he had known before trial that Einhorn was a police commissioner, he would have moved to dismiss him as counsel at that time. The district court judge responded that he had been thoroughly aware and familiar with the fact that Mr. Einhorn has been a police commissioner for several years. Id. at 32. 22 After some back and forth about how long Einhorn had been a police commissioner (not quite six years) and Einhorn's general involvement in New Haven city government, the judge observed, The point is that, you know, he's not doing himself any favors, Mr. Rogers, by coming in here. The amount of money he gets for coming in as a defense counsel in these cases, it doesn't even cover his office expenses, frankly. . . . So therefore, he's not here to further the interest of the New Haven Police Department, and in many respects, on a totally altruistic and very highly and commendable, professional basis, he's trying to help you. Id. at 32-33. Rogers said he still ha[d] a problem with Einhorn's representation. Id. at 33. 23 Einhorn then explained the administrative and oversight roles of the board of police commissioners, emphasizing that we have no involvement in actual crimes. I am not a policeman, so we have absolutely no involvement in criminal investigations. Id. at 34-35. Unpersuaded, Rogers repeated his objection to having a police commissioner as his lawyer, and cited Einhorn's alleged failure to put Lt. White on the stand at the suppression hearing or at trial. 24 Rogers was sentenced principally to 120 months in prison followed by five years of supervised release.