Opinion ID: 820615
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counts 37 and 38, Possession with Intent to

Text: Distribute Crack on July 28 and August 3, 2009 Mr. Little was convicted of two counts of possessing with intent to distribute five grams of crack cocaine (Counts 37 and 38). For each of those counts, he argues that the District Court erroneously admitted certain exhibits, and that 10 Mr. Little also suggests that his “right to due process” was violated when the District Court admitted evidence of these uncharged transactions. However, Mr. Little failed to brief this argument, or to offer any explanation at all as to why this would be the case. Thus, we will not consider this undeveloped claim here. See Holland, 677 F.3d at 1066. 30 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 31 of 41 without these exhibits, the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he committed the offenses alleged. 1) Count 37, Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack on July 28, 2009 For Count 37, the government offered as evidence video and audio recordings of Mr. Little shepherding the CI to Otis Walker’s house, where the CI purchased drugs from Walker. Over Mr. Little’s objection that the government had failed to establish that the recording devices were in proper working order, the District Court received these exhibits into evidence. Mr. Little points to this as error. “We review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Trujillo, 146 F.3d 838, 843 (11th Cir. 1998). “Even where an abuse of discretion is shown, non-constitutional evidentiary errors are not grounds for reversal absent a reasonable likelihood that the defendant’s substantial rights were affected.” United States v. Range, 94 F.3d 614, 620 (11th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). Generally, “the trial judge has broad discretion in determining whether to allow a recording to be played before the jury.” United States v. Biggins, 551 F.2d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1977). Still, “the party introducing a tape into evidence has the burden of going forward with sufficient evidence to show that the recording is an 31 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 32 of 41 accurate reproduction of the conversation recorded.” United States v. Sarro, 742 F.2d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 1984). In order to authenticate a taped recording, the government, in a criminal case, must show: (1) the competency of the operator; (2) the fidelity of the recording equipment; (3) the absence of material deletions, additions, or alterations in the relevant part of the tape; and (4) the identification of the relevant speakers. Id. “If there is independent evidence of the accuracy of the tape recordings admitted at trial, we shall be extremely reluctant to disturb the trial court’s decision even though at the time that decision was made the government had not carried its particularized burden of going forward.” Biggins, 551 F.2d at 67. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the July 28 recording. Mr. Little’s argument that the government failed to produce evidence of the “the fidelity of the recording equipment” is contradicted by the record. DEA Agent Vattiato testified that he supplied the CI with audio-only and audio/video equipment on July 28 and that the audio/video equipment was operating correctly. Although Vattiato did not testify that the audio-only equipment was also operating correctly, he did testify that he had the opportunity to watch the audio/video recording, that the events in that recording were “encompassed” in the audio-only recording, and that each recording “match[ed] the surveillance that [he] observed that day.” From this testimony the District Court could infer that the audio-only equipment was also working properly. 32 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 33 of 41 Although the District Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the audio and video recordings of the July 28 transaction, we must still consider whether it abused its discretion by denying Mr. Little’s motion for judgment of acquittal for lack of sufficient evidence. Friske, 640 F.3d at 1290–91. Mr. Little argues that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of possession with intent to distribute crack on July 28 because the government failed to prove the element of possession. Specifically, he contends that the government cannot prove actual possession because “the cocaine was beyond [his] control” at all times during the transaction, and the government cannot prove constructive possession because he was forced to wait outside while the CI purchased the drugs inside Otis Walker’s house, and the drugs were “clearly not under [his] direction or control.” We agree with Mr. Little that, on this record, the government failed to prove the element of possession. It is clear from the video that the CI purchased the drugs directly from Otis Walker and, thus, that they were never in Mr. Little’s actual possession. It is equally clear that Mr. Little was forced to wait on Otis Walker’s porch as Walker conducted the transaction with the CI inside.11 To prove constructive possession, “the government must produce evidence showing 11 The government concedes that “Little was not allowed in Walker’s house” during the drug deal. Otis Walker emphasized this point in his testimony at trial when he explained that he forced Mr. Little to wait on the porch “[b]ecause he didn’t come to spend no money.” 33 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 34 of 41 ownership, dominion, or control over the contraband itself or the [location] in which contraband is concealed.” Wright, 392 F.3d at 1273 (quotation marks and alterations omitted). Walker’s demand that Mr. Little stay outside, and Little’s acquiescence to that demand, defeats any claim that Little exercised ownership, dominion, or control over these drugs, or the location where they were concealed. Cf. United States v. Clavis, 956 F.2d 1079, 1089 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that evidence was insufficient to prove constructive possession where the defendant was in jail at the time the drugs were seized from his residence). The government’s failure to prove that Mr. Little possessed the drugs at issue in Count 37 does not end our inquiry, however, because Mr. Little was also charged with aiding and abetting the distribution of narcotics on July 28, and the jury was instructed on an aiding and abetting theory. To convict under a theory of aiding and abetting, the Government must prove: (1) the substantive offense was committed; (2) the defendant contributed to and furthered the offense; and (3) the defendant intended to aid in its commission. United States v. Tagg, 572 F.3d 1320, 1324 (11th Cir. 2009). Additionally, our precedent provides that “in a prosecution for aiding and abetting possession of [narcotics] with intent to distribute, there must be evidence connecting the defendant with both aspects of the crime, possession and intent to distribute.” United States v. Longoria, 569 F.2d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 1978). 34 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 35 of 41 Mr. Little does not contest that a substantive offense occurred here. Instead, he contends that the government cannot prove the remaining elements required to convict him on an aiding and abetting theory because “[m]ere presence is all the evidence showed in this transaction.” Mr. Little’s argument fails. As previously discussed, Mr. Little was aware of and involved in the conspiracy to distribute crack in Coconut Grove, along with Otis Walker 12 and Mr. Frederick. The audio and video recordings are definitive that after meeting each other on the street, Mr. Little walked the CI to Mr. Walker’s house, where the CI requested that Mr. Little get Walker’s attention. Mr. Little then knocked on Otis Walker’s door, thereby initiating the transaction. When Mr. Walker opened the door, the CI asked if Walker “could help [him] out with something good,” at which point Walker and the CI each entered the house, closing the door behind them. Once inside, the video shows the CI purchasing crack from Mr. Walker. Viewed in the light most favorable to the government, it was reasonable for the jury to infer from this evidence that Mr. Little intentionally and successfully shepherded the CI to Mr. Walker’s residence for the purpose of purchasing crack, and that a crack transaction was completed. This was enough to prove that Mr. Little intentionally “contributed to and furthered” Mr. Walker’s possession and distribution of narcotics, see Tagg, 572 at 1324, and to connect him to each 12 Mr. Walker was an indicted co-conspirator who testified at trial that he received crack from Mr. Burke and Mr. Frederick. 35 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 36 of 41 element of Walker’s offense, see Longoria, 569 F.2d at 425. Therefore, the evidence was sufficient to convict Mr. Little of Count 37 on a theory that he aided and abetted the distribution of the drugs involved in that count. 2) Count 38, Possession with Intent to Distribute Crack on August 3, 2009 Over Mr. Little’s objection for lack of sufficient foundation, the government also introduced audio and video recordings of the alleged drug transaction between Little and the CI at the Bermuda Market on August 3, 2009. These recordings capture fragments of conversations between Mr. Little and the CI, the sound of money being counted, and Mr. Little’s statement “I’ll go get 14.” After that, Mr. Little is seen walking away. Agents testified that soon after he walked away, he came back. Agents also testified that they later recovered fourteen dime bags of crack from the CI. Mr. Little argues again here that the audio and video recordings should not have been admitted into evidence because the government failed to lay a proper foundation. For the reasons that follow, we find this argument to have merit. For the August 3 transaction, the government offered little proof of the fidelity of the recording equipment. The extent of the evidence was Miami Police Officer Jose Mercedes’s testimony that he gave the equipment to the CI before the buy, recovered it after the buy, and then gave it to a colleague for conversion to a CD. Although the government offered proof that agents independently observed 36 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 37 of 41 the meeting between the CI and Mr. Little, thus corroborating the video portion, neither Mr. Little nor the CI testified about this transaction and there was no independent testimony to corroborate the audio of the encounter. Because there was no testimony about the fidelity of the audio equipment, Sarro, 742 F.2d at 1292, and no independent evidence of the accuracy of the audio recordings, Biggins, 551 F.2d at 67, the District Court should not have admitted the audio portion of the tape. Compare United States v. Brown, 587 F.3d 1082, 1093 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[W]here the agent laying the foundation can testify he or she heard the original conversation that was being recorded and that it is the same as the one being played at trial, this also provides sufficient evidence of authenticity.”). Establishing that the district court abused its discretion in admitting the audio recording, however, is not the end of the inquiry. Even if [an evidentiary] ruling constitutes an abuse of discretion, it will result in reversal only if the error was not harmless. An error is harmless unless there is a reasonable likelihood that it affected the defendant’s substantial rights. Stated another way, nonconstitutional error will be harmless unless the court concludes from the record as a whole that the error may have had a ‘substantial influence’ on the outcome of the proceeding. United States v. Bradley, 644 F.3d 1213, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, we are not convinced that the District Court’s admission of the audio had a substantial influence on the outcome of Mr. Little’s case. This is because in 37 Case: 10-14332 Date Filed: 02/14/2013 Page: 38 of 41 addition to the audio recording, the jury had: (1) the authenticated video recording of the meeting between Mr. Little and the CI; (2) the agents’ testimony that they independently observed that meeting; and (3) the agents’ testimony that they prepared the CI for a controlled buy from Mr. Little, and that after the meeting they recovered fourteen dime bags of crack from the CI. In the light most favorable to the government, this evidence was sufficient to conclude that Mr. Little possessed and distributed the drugs at issue in Count 38. We also reject Mr. Little’s argument that the District Court erred in admitting the fourteen dime bags recovered from the CI on August 3 because this evidence was not relevant. Evidence is relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable than it would be without the evidence, Fed. R. Evid. 401, and relevant evidence is generally admissible, Fed. R. Evid. 402. Here, the dime bags of crack recovered from the CI following the controlled buy were relevant because they tended to prove that Mr. Little possessed and distributed narcotics on August 3, as alleged in Count 38.