Opinion ID: 50061
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Wu’s Credibility

Text: An asylum applicant must establish her eligibility for asylum “by offering credible, direct, and specific evidence in the record.” Forgue v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 401 F.3d 1282, 1287 (11th Cir. 2005) (internal marks and citation omitted). Wu’s main evidence in support of her petition was her own testimony. The IJ determined that Wu’s testimony was not credible because of substantial inconsistencies and because the IJ concluded -- based on observing Wu’s demeanor during testimony and listening to her story first-hand -- that Wu was 7 “willing to say anything and put down anything to get what she wants.” We review the IJ’s credibility determinations under the substantial evidence test. Id. When the IJ enumerates inconsistencies that are supported in the record, we may not substitute our judgment for the IJ’s on the credibility findings. D- Muhumed, 388 F.3d at 819. “[A]n adverse credibility determination alone may be sufficient to support the denial of an asylum application” when nothing else evidences persecution. Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1287. “Once an adverse credibility finding is made, the burden is on the applicant alien to show that the IJ’s credibility decision was not supported by ‘specific, cogent reasons’ or was not based on substantial evidence.” Id. The IJ set out specific, cogent reasons for his credibility determination. Perhaps most damaging to Wu’s credibility -- and among the reasons noted by the IJ in deeming Wu not credible -- were those instances when she (1) twice made a statement during her testimony only to deny making that same statement when questioned later;3 (2) gave inconsistent answers about her employment in China; 3 The IJ summarized one of these incidents this way: Then we have what [sic] I was questioning her about her passport and I asked her, why does your passport indicate that you are a manager, and she says, because at the time I applied for my passport I was a manager. And I said, oh, what were you a manager of? I was a manager of a food manufacturing company. And I asked her specifically, at the time you applied for and got your passport were you a manager of a food manufacturing company? And she said, yes. Then when being questioned later by the government attorney she indicated that she was not a manager at the time 8 and (3) gave testimony about her travels in the United States that conflicted with testimony from Jin Chung Pang, a friend of Wu’s with whom Wu lived during portions of her stay in the United States. Wu has attempted to explain these inconsistencies as the product of simple misunderstandings. But even Wu’s explanations would not compel a reasonable factfinder to reverse the IJ’s credibility determination. On this record, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Wu was not credible. We have written that, if an applicant “produces other evidence of persecution, whatever form it may take, the IJ must consider that evidence, and it is not sufficient for the IJ to rely solely on an adverse credibility determination in those instances.” Id. Wu did present other evidence of persecution beyond her testimony: the receipt she received after paying her fine upon release from “Administrative Detention.” The record indicates that the IJ considered this evidence -- and did not rely solely on his adverse credibility determination -- in denying Wu’s petition. she applied for her passport, that she only put that down because the company that was assisting her with her passport told her to do that. And at that point I interrupted and I said, wait a minute. You told me earlier that you were, in fact, a manager and that you were a manager of a food manufacturing company. And she flat out said she didn’t say that. 9 The receipt shows only that Wu paid a fine to be released from administrative detention. Although this evidence may prevent this case from being decided solely on the adverse credibility determination, Wu’s credibility is still an important factor in assessing the evidence as a whole. B. Past Persecution & Reasonable Fear of Future Persecution To establish asylum eligibility, Wu must show (1) past persecution on account of a statutorily listed factor, or (2) a “well-founded fear” that the statutorily listed factor will cause future persecution. Ruiz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 440 F.3d 1247, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(a), (b)). The IJ concluded that Wu was not entitled to asylum or withholding of removal because she did not demonstrate past persecution or a reasonable fear of future persecution. We agree. We have written that “[n]ot all exceptional treatment is persecution.” Gonzalez v. Reno, 212 F.3d 1338, 1355 (11th Cir. 2000). Persecution is an “extreme concept, requiring more than a few isolated incidents of verbal harassment or intimidation, and . . . mere harassment does not amount to persecution.” Sepulveda, 401 F.3d at 1231 (quotations and internal marks 10 omitted). In Zheng v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 451 F.3d 1287 (11th Cir. 2006), we affirmed the denial of asylum and withholding of removal when the petitioner, a Falun Gong practitioner who came to the United States under circumstances similar to Wu, was detained for five days by Chinese authorities and made to watch reeducation videos and stand in the sun before signing a pledge not to practice Falun Gong. Like Wu, the petitioner in Zheng was fired from his job as a result of his Falun Gong practice. Id. at 1289. He was also subject to surveillance and periodic searches by local officials. Id. Although the IJ deemed the petitioner in Zheng to be credible, none of these things compelled us to conclude that the petitioner suffered past persecution. Id. at 1290-91. Wu alleged similar treatment in her asylum petition. Unlike in Zheng, however, Wu contends that she suffered some physical harm during her detention. We are not persuaded that this single incident of detention -- even with some minor physical harm -- amounts to persecution sufficient to compel asylum. This position is strengthened some by Wu’s lack of credibility. Other than her testimony, Wu presented no evidence to substantiate her claim that she suffered physical harm. Although the receipt from her fine is evidence that Wu was detained, it is no evidence that she suffered physical harm during her detention. Wu has not carried her burden. 11 Substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s determination that Wu failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. We have explained: If an alien does not establish past persecution, he bears the burden of showing a well-founded fear of persecution by showing these things: (1) he fears persecution based on his membership in a particular social group, political opinion, or other statutorily listed factor; (2) there is a reasonable possibility that he will suffer persecution if removed to his native country; and (3) he is unable or unwilling to return to his native country because he fears persecution. Id. at 1291 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(2)(i)). A “well-founded fear” must be both subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable. Ruiz, 440 F.3d at 1257. That Wu avoided persecution for 13 months in China while continuing to practice Falun Gong supports the IJ’s determination that Wu did not have a wellfounded fear of future persecution. See Zheng, 451 F.3d at 1292 n.3 (concluding that successfully avoiding persecution for extended period “is evidence indicating there is not a reasonable possibility [petitioner] will suffer future persecution upon his return to China”). That no evidence suggests Wu was a Falun Gong leader also supports the IJ’s conclusion. See id. at 1291-92 (citing State Department’s 2002 Country Report on Human Rights Practices for China in noting that “Falun Gong followers were generally released from detention and . . . harshest punishments were reserved for core leaders of the movement”). On this record, 12 Wu has not carried her burden to show a reasonable possibility of future persecution upon her return to China. C. Withholding of Removal & CAT Relief Because we conclude that Wu has not satisfied the less stringent standard for asylum, she is also not entitled to withholding of removal or CAT relief. Id. at 1292 (citing Forgue, 401 F.3d at 1288 n.4).