Opinion ID: 752952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Request for an Injunction for Correction of the PSR

Text: 30 The ruling that State probation officers are entitled to absolute immunity in a suit for damages, however, did not resolve Hili's claim for injunctive relief. Prior to October 1996, it was established that a public official's right to immunity, whether absolute or qualified, pertained only to claims for monetary damages. See, e.g., Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 536-37, 104 S.Ct. 1970, 1977-78, 80 L.Ed.2d 565 (1984) (holding that judicial immunity did not extend to claims for injunctive relief); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 314 n. 6, 95 S.Ct. 992, 997 n. 6, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975) (immunity from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief); Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d at 139; Heimbach v. Village of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir.1979) (per curiam). Under these precedents, defendants would not have been entitled to immunity from Hili's claim for injunctive relief. 31 In October 1996, Congress amended § 1983 to bar injunctive relief in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity ... unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp.1997), see Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-317, § 309(c), 110 Stat. 3847, 3853. The term judicial officer is not defined in the amendment, although the legislative history of the amendment refers parenthetically to judicial officers as (justices, judges and magistrates). S.Rep. No. 104-366, at 37 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4202, 4217. It is not clear from the language of the amendment or from our cursory review of the legislative history whether the new restriction on the granting of injunctive relief against judicial officers was meant to extend to other officials whose entitlement to absolute immunity from damages had been recognized in light of their roles in judicial proceedings. 32 We need not decide in the present case, however, whether the amendment would make probation officers immune from injunctive relief in connection with their presentence report duties, for we conclude that Hili's complaint, alleging that the PSR contains hearsay and statements that are inaccurate, was properly dismissed because it failed to state a claim on which injunctive relief can be granted against Sciarrotta and Eich. 33 It is well established that a defendant has a due process right not to be sentenced on the basis of information that is materially false, and that that right is protected by affording the defendant notice of and an opportunity to respond to information on which the court intends to rely in imposing sentence. See, e.g., Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S. at 741, 68 S.Ct. at 1255; United States v. Berndt, 127 F.3d 251, 257 (2d Cir.1997). It is also well established that, subject to that protection, the judge's discretion in sentencing is largely unlimited either as to the kind of information he may consider, or the source from which it may come. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446, 92 S.Ct. 589, 591, 30 L.Ed.2d 592 (1972). Thus, [h]earsay information may unquestionably be used in the discretion of a sentencing judge and given such weight as appears in his discretion to be merited. Such information does not violate due process requirements. United States v. Napolitano, 761 F.2d 135, 139 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 842, 106 S.Ct. 129, 88 L.Ed.2d 106 (1985); see Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51, 69 S.Ct. 1079, 1084-85, 93 L.Ed. 1337 (1949) (sentencing courts' age-old practice of seeking information from out-of-court sources to guide their judgment toward a more enlightened and just sentence does not violate due process); see also United States v. Fatico, 579 F.2d 707, 713 (2d Cir.1978). 34 As discussed in Part II.A. above, a presentence report is meant to provide the court with information as to, inter alia, the circumstances of the offense, including the victim's version of the offense, and any other matter that the agency conducting the investigation deems relevant to the question of sentence, N.Y.Crim. Proc. L. §§ 390.30(1) and (3); see also Dorman v. Higgins, 821 F.2d at 137-38 (the goal of a complete compendium of all significant objective information means that the probation officer should not filter out any statements that are relevant). A presentence report thus normally contains information from a variety of sources; the inclusion of hearsay statements is virtually inevitable; and [t]he requirement of accurate reporting ... may result in the inclusion in the report of statements that are themselves inaccurate. Though verification of the information collected is desirable, verification simply is not always possible. Id. at 138. Thus, the mere presence of hearsay or inaccurate information in a PSR does not constitute a denial of due process. The defendant is afforded due process protection against sentencing on the basis of misinformation through his opportunity to challenge before the court any statement in the report that he contends is inaccurate. Probation officers, who are required by law to include in the report all relevant data collected in their investigation, cannot be enjoined to omit any such information. 35 Hili's complaint alleged that the PSR in his case is being used to deny him parole and various privileges as a prisoner. Presumably such use[ ] is by the State's parole board and department of correction; there is no allegation of any use of the PSR by Sciarrotta or Eich. Accordingly, we conclude that the complaint failed to state a claim against Sciarrotta and Eich upon which injunctive relief can be granted. 36 If a defendant claims to be detrimentally affected by the use of an inaccurate PSR in decisionmaking as to parole or the conditions of his incarceration, he should challenge such use in the parole proceedings or seek injunctive relief against the relevant parole or correctional officials. In the present case, notwithstanding Hili's inclusion of the phrase et al [sic ] in the caption of his complaint, Sciarrotta and Eich are the only defendants. Accordingly, there is no defendant here against whom relief could be granted. We note also that were relief to be sought against appropriate defendants on the claim that Hili is improperly being denied parole, that claim could be pursued only by means of a petition for habeas corpus, prior to which he would be required to exhaust his state remedies, rather than by means of a suit under § 1983, see Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499-500, 93 S.Ct. 1827, 1841-42, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973).