Opinion ID: 793562
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Farber Fails to Satisfy the Identifiable Class Requirement

Text: 19 It bears repetition that a § 1985(3) claimant must allege some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action in order to state a § 1985(3) claim. Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790. Regardless of the alleged basis for discrimination, however, and whether that basis is invidious or not, the allegation of a `class-based animus' naturally presumes that there is a specific, identifiable class against whom the defendants can have discriminated. See Aulson, 83 F.3d at 5. At a minimum, Griffin 's use of the word class unquestionably connotes something more than a group of individuals who share a desire to engage in conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors. Otherwise, innumerable tort plaintiffs would be able to assert causes of action under § 1985(3) by simply defining the aggrieved class as those seeking to engage in the activity the defendant has interfered with. 20 Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 269, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993). 21 Thus, § 1985(3) defendants must have allegedly conspired against a group that has an identifiable existence independent of the fact that its members are victims of the defendants' tortious conduct. This independent existence is necessary to preserve the distinction between two of the requirements of a § 1985(3) claim: that the conspirators be motivated by class-based invidiously discriminatory animus and that the plaintiff be the victim of an injury he or she seeks to remedy by means of § 1985(3). If merely alleging the latter could satisfy the former, the requirement of class-based animus would be drained of all meaningful content, Aulson, 83 F.3d at 5 (citing Bray, 506 U.S. at 269, 113 S.Ct. 753), and would transform § 1985(3) into the general federal tort law Congress did not intend to enact. See Bray, 506 U.S. at 269, 113 S.Ct. 753. 22 In order to ensure that a § 1985(3) class has an independent identifiable existence, a reasonable person must be able to readily determine by means of an objective criterion or set of criteria who is a member of the group and who is not. Aulson, 83 F.3d at 5-6. For example, women, or registered Republicans, may constitute an identifiable class as opposed to a more amorphous group defined by conduct that the § 1985(3) defendant disfavors, such as women seeking abortion, see Bray, 506 U.S. at 269, 113 S.Ct. 753, or persons who support [political] candidates, see Aulson, 83 F.3d at 4-5. 23 In Bray, the Supreme Court held that abortion clinics and organizations that support abortion and have members who may wish to use abortion clinics failed to state a § 1985(3) claim against an anti-abortion organization whose conspiratorial efforts to obstruct access to abortion clinics allegedly deprived women seeking abortions of their right to interstate travel. 506 U.S. at 266-67, 113 S.Ct. 753. The Court explained that, while women generally constituted a class that might substantively qualify for § 1985(3) protection, 3 the subgroup of `[w]omen seeking abortion' is not a qualifying class because the class `cannot be defined simply as the group of victims of the tortious action.' Id. at 269-70, 113 S.Ct. 753 (quoting Scott, 463 U.S. at 850, 103 S.Ct. 3352 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 24 In Aulson, a local public officeholder brought a § 1985(3) claim against an incumbent group of old guard politicians who controlled town politics, alleging that he faced illegal searches and sham prosecutions because he was a member[ ] of a political group which supports candidates who oppose the politics of the `old guard.' 83 F.3d at 2 (alteration in original). The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found that the plaintiff failed to allege discrimination by an identifiable class because 25 this group is wholly indeterminate. It might include all the voters in Georgetown, or it might include only voters who have spoken out against incumbent selectmen, or it might include only the two individuals featured in the complaint, or it might include anyone whose inclusion would benefit the plaintiff at any given time. There is simply no way to characterize this group as an identifiable segment of the community by reference to any objective criteria, and, hence, it cannot serve as a cognizable class within the purview of § 1985(3). 26 Id. at 6 (citing Gleason v. McBride, 869 F.2d 688, 695 (2d Cir.1989) (rejecting class status under § 1985(3) when the plaintiff alleged only that he was a political opponent of the defendants and was extremely vocal in his opposition to their management of the [municipality])). 27 In our own jurisprudence, we have often addressed the second question involved in the Griffin analysis — whether an identified class has been invidiously discriminated against such that one injured may avail himself or herself of § 1985(3) — without the need to address the predicate question of whether an objectively identifiable class existed in the first place, because the answer was obvious. In Novotny, for example, we held that § 1985(3) extended to women, who constitute an objectively identifiable class, while noting that Griffin 's class-based invidiously discriminatory animus requirement works to screen out claims where no class exists at all, citing, among others, our decision in Jennings v. Shuman, 567 F.2d 1213 (3d Cir.1977). 4 Novotny, 584 F.2d at 1240-44, 1241 n. 19. Similarly, we concluded, in Lake v. Arnold, that the scope of . . . § 1985(3) is sufficiently broad to protect the mentally retarded as a class, assuming, albeit implicitly, that the mentally retarded constitute an objectively identifiable class in the first place. 112 F.3d 682, 685, 688 (3d Cir. 1997). Simply put, some groups, particularly those deemed to be distinguishable from others by immutable characteristics, such as African-Americans, women, and the mentally retarded, are so clearly accepted as objectively identifiable that no extended analysis is needed. As the Court in Bray demonstrated, however, it is not always a simple matter, particularly when what is at issue is a putative class defined, as here, by mutable characteristics such as opinion or conduct. 28 The District Court erred when it concluded that Farber [pled] sufficient class-based animus when she alleged that Defendants conspired against her because she is a Republican.  Farber, 327 F.Supp.2d at 425 (emphasis added). Not only does Farber not allege in her complaint that she is the victim of discrimination because she is a Republican, she does not allege that she is a Republican and does not even allege that the conspiracy was motivated by a desire to discriminate against Republicans. Farber only alleges that she was terminated because she was affiliated with and a supporter of the administration of former Mayor Martin G. Barnes, 5 who, at another point in her complaint, she identifies as a Republican. Indeed, Farber does not even argue that her support for Mayor Barnes, or her resulting injury, was founded on his status as a Republican. 29 When determining whether an independently identifiable class exists, there are differences between being discriminated against because of membership in a political party and being discriminated against because of support for the policies of a politician who also happens to be a member of the party. We need not discuss those differences, however, for the class Farber attempts to assert is so subjectively defined and wholly indeterminate that [t]here is simply no way to characterize [it] as an identifiable segment of the community by reference to any objective criteria, and, hence, it cannot serve as a cognizable class within the purview of § 1985(3). See Aulson, 83 F.3d at 6. 6 30