Opinion ID: 1173488
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of Common-group Membership

Text: Defendant asserted an alibi. Defense witnesses Ozaeta, Reeves, Valenzuela, and defendant himself, testified that he was elsewhere during the offense. On cross-examination, and over defendant's objections, the prosecution was permitted to establish that defendant and his witnesses each belonged to a youth group known as the El Monte Flores. The majority's accusation that the prosecutor portray[ed] appellant as a Chicano gang member predisposed to commit violent crimes ( ante, p. 914) seriously misstates the record. The prosecutor made no references whatever to gangs, Chicanos, or violent crimes, and he offered no evidence on these subjects. As the record shows, the prosecutor was merely permitted to show that defendant and his alibi witnesses were each members of the same youth group. Defendant's own witness described the group as just good friends that are in our neighborhood. The prosecutor offered no evidence to refute that benign characterization. Subsequently, defense counsel elicited the further information that the group consisted of 250-300 members and was believed by the police to be a gang. The majority holds that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the prosecution to introduce evidence pertaining to the group membership shared by defendant and defense witnesses. In my view, the issue is controlled by In re Wing Y. (1977) 67 Cal. App.3d 69, 79 [136 Cal. Rptr. 390], a case which the majority conveniently ignores. In Wing Y., during the course of a wardship proceeding, the prosecutor cross-examined defense witnesses regarding their membership with defendant in the Wah Ching, a Chinatown gang. Unlike the present case, evidence was also introduced regarding the gang's past criminal activities. The Wing Y. court acknowledged the general proposition, fully applicable here, that a witness may, on cross-examination, be asked about group membership he shares with a party to the action, on the theory that such common membership is a factor that tends to impeach a witness' testimony by establishing bias.... Thus, the prosecution in the instant case properly could inquire of [defense] witnesses ... regarding their friendship with Wing, including their common group membership, as a means of attacking their credibility as witnesses, by establishing a bias in favor of the minor. (67 Cal. App.3d at pp. 76-77, italics added; see also People v. Dominguez (1981) 121 Cal. App.3d 481, 499 [175 Cal. Rptr. 445]; People v. Perez (1981) 114 Cal. App.3d 470, 477 [170 Cal. Rptr. 619] [gang membership admissible if relevant]; People v. James (1976) 56 Cal. App.3d 876, 886 [128 Cal. Rptr. 733]; People v. Avila (1938) 29 Cal. App.2d 627, 631 [85 P.2d 200]; Evid. Code, § 780, subd. (f).) The court in Wing Y. concluded, however, that it was improper to introduce evidence of both (1) defendant Wing's gang membership, based upon hearsay and reputation evidence rather than upon the personal knowledge of the testifying officer; and (2) the gang's supposed criminal activities. (67 Cal. App.3d, at pp. 77-79.) The court stressed that, apart from its use for impeachment purposes, evidence of gang membership ordinarily has no `tendency in reason' to prove a disputed fact, i.e., the identity of the person who committed the charged offense. Membership in an organization does not lead reasonably to any inference as to the conduct of a member on a given occasion. Hence, the evidence was not relevant. It allowed, on the contrary, unreasonable inferences to be made by the trier of fact that the minor Wing was guilty of the offense charged on the theory of `guilt by association.' (P. 79, italics in original.) The case before us is readily distinguishable from Wing Y. Here, in questions pointed to the subject of the group membership shared by defendant and his witnesses, the prosecution relied on neither hearsay nor reputation evidence, but upon the direct knowledge of the witnesses. Moreover, my review of the record discloses that no testimony was elicited, nor prosecutorial suggestions advanced, regarding any criminal activities by the group's members. Thus, the majority's assertion that the jury undoubtedly identified the group as a criminal gang ( ante, p. 905) is totally speculative and unfounded. In any event, had defendant believed that the jury might infer some improper gang activities by El Monte Flores, he could readily have sought appropriate limiting instructions or an admonition which would have confined the jury's consideration of such evidence to impeachment purposes. Having failed to request such an admonition or instruction, defendant cannot now complain that evidence, properly admissible for impeachment purposes, was inadmissible to prove his guilt or discredit his character. This is the clear implication of section 355 of the Evidence Code. (See People v. Collie (1981) 30 Cal.3d 43, 63-64 [177 Cal. Rptr. 458, 634 P.2d 534] and fn. 19, disapproving People v. Williams (1970) 11 Cal. App.3d 970, 976-978 [90 Cal. Rptr. 292].)