Opinion ID: 2637287
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the district court's summary dismissal of mr. berry's strict liability claim was proper

Text: ¶ 31 Mr. Berry contends that the district court erred when it summarily dismissed his claim that PCMR was strictly liable for damages for his injuries because skiercross racing is an abnormally dangerous activity as defined by the factors set out in section 520 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. In aid of his argument, Mr. Berry points to numerous articles in popular ski publications, describing in dramatic terms the injuries sustained, seemingly as a matter of routine, by racers in skiercross competitions. These aspects of the record may indeed advance Mr. Berry's cause regarding the degree of peril that skiercross races pose. To us, they establish convincingly alternative grounds upon which to affirm the district court's rejection of Mr. Berry's strict liability claim. See, e.g., State v. Robison, 2006 UT 65, ¶ 19, 147 P.3d 448 (allowing affirmance of the judgment appealed from based `on any legal ground or theory apparent on the record' (quoting Bailey v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58, ¶ 10, 52 P.3d 1158)). ¶ 32 Assuming the skiercross racing is an abnormally dangerous activity, Mr. Berry's role as a participant excludes him from eligibility to recover under a theory of strict liability. See, e.g., Pullen v. West, 278 Kan. 183, 92 P.3d 584 (2004) (holding that an individual who lit fireworks while a guest at an Independence Day party was a participant in an abnormally dangerous activity and therefore barred from recovery on a strict liability theory). As a general principle, the Restatement's protections extend to those individuals who are injured as the result of an activity that carries the existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 (1977). Like the Pullen court and others, we agree that the scope of section 520 excludes participants, like Mr. Berry, who engage in the very activity for which they seek to recover damages based on strict liability. See, e.g., Whitlock v. Duke Univ., 637 F.Supp. 1463, 1475 (M.D.N.C.1986); Gaston v. Hunter, 121 Ariz. 33, 588 P.2d 326, 341 (Ct.App.1978); Trull v. Carolina-Virginia Well Co., 264 N.C. 687, 142 S.E.2d 622, 622-26 (1965). This conclusion is not undermined by the principles upon which Mr. Berry rests his claim to strict liability recovery. ¶ 33 Section 520 generally states that a court should consider the following factors in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous: (a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes. Mr. Berry argues the eligibility of skiercross racing under several of these. Although we fully recognize that all of these factors may aid a court in evaluating whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, we view the first factor as qualitatively different than the rest and therefore worthy of separate consideration. See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 520 cmt. f (Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient of itself . . . for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily.). Unlike its five colleagues, the first factor targets the very nature of the strict liability protection  who is eligible. Section 520 exposes landowners who conduct abnormally dangerous activities on their land  harboring dangerous animals has of particular concern to the drafters of the Restatement  to strict liability for injury suffered by those who come onto the land under color of privilege, but not for injury suffered by those who participated in the abnormally dangerous activity. We accordingly affirm the district court's dismissal of Mr. Berry's strict liability claim.