Opinion ID: 1182778
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court Jurisdiction Pending Appeal

Text: The first question to be determined is whether the trial court had jurisdiction to enter any order allowing Gerald to leave the state pending appeal from the March 9th custody order. [1] Section 946 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides: Whenever an appeal is perfected, as provided in the preceding sections of this chapter, it stays all further proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed from, or upon the matters embraced therein.... It is therefore well established that an appeal from a custody order deprives the trial court of jurisdiction to change the custody status at the time of the appeal. ( Vosburg v. Vosburg, 137 Cal. 493, 495 [68 P. 694]; Ex parte Queirolo, 119 Cal. 635, 636 [51 P. 956]; Browne v. Browne, 60 Cal. App.2d 637, 642 [141 P.2d 428]; Moon v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. App.2d 447, 449 [139 P.2d 84]; In re Browning, 108 Cal. App. 503, 506 [291 P. 650]; see 2 Cal.Jur. 416-418; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 324f.) An appeal from a judgment or order would be futile, and this court would be deprived of jurisdiction if pending the appeal the judgment or order appealed from could be modified or changed into something radically different by a subsequent order of the trial court. ( Vosburg v. Vosburg, supra, 137 Cal. 493, 496.) [2] The loss of jurisdiction is so complete that even the consent of the parties is ineffective to reinvest the trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter of the appeal. ( Kinard v. Jordan, 175 Cal. 13, 16 [164 P. 894].) [3a] Clarence contends that the trial court may nevertheless allow temporary removal to New Jersey pending appeal, relying upon the provision in section 946 that the court below may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and not affected by the order appealed from. Clarence points out that the order appealed from is the order of March 9th modifying the final decree by transferring custody of Gerald from Betty to Clarence. He states that his application to enroll the boy in the New Jersey school has absolutely no relationship to the custody order, but would merely change the locale of the boy's education from the Menlo School to New Jersey. The contention that the removal proceeding is not upon a matter embraced within the custody appeal disregards the factual setting of this action. At the time Betty perfected her appeal from the modification order of March 9th, the parents had joint legal custody and Gerald was enrolled full time at Menlo School, where Betty wished him to be educated, where she could visit him, and where she could invoke the protection of California courts to enforce the provisions of the final divorce decree. [4] The essence of custody is the companionship of the child and the right to make decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and religion. (See Roche v. Roche 25 Cal.2d 141, 144 [152 P.2d 999].) [3b] If the child could be removed 3,000 miles to a school in New Jersey, chosen by Clarence against Betty's will, the provisions of the custody decree favorable to Betty would be vitiated. The proposed New Jersey order, in fact, would be more severe from Betty's viewpoint than the order appealed from. Under the March 9th order Betty lost legal custody, but the court at least ordered that the boy remain at a California school where Betty could visit him. The New Jersey order, by contrast, would effectively end visitation rights. Although the removal is labelled temporary, it would substantially destroy the custody status at the time the appeal was taken, in clear violation of the provisions of section 946. ( Vosburg v. Vosburg, supra, 137 Cal. 493, 495.) [5] Moreover, an examination of the recognition given custody decrees in other states demonstrates that the phrase in section 946, all further proceedings in the court below upon the judgment or order appealed from, must be interpreted to include action by a trial court giving temporary permission to take a child from the state pending appeal from a custody order. [6] Although it may be assumed that the California decree would receive the same respect in other states that foreign custody decrees receive in our courts (see Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Cal.2d 763, 779 [197 P.2d 739]), the physical presence of the child would give the foreign state jurisdiction to decide for itself what action would be in his best interests. ( Sampsell v. Superior Court, supra, 32 Cal.2d 763, 779; Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719, 726 [68 P.2d 719]; Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34, 39 [29 P.2d 206]; see In re B's Settlement, 1 Ch. 54 (1940); 160 A.L.R. 408; 17 Am.Jur. 521.) [7] Custody decrees are universally subject to modification upon a showing of facts that require a change in the order to protect what the foreign court considers the welfare of the child. Even if the foreign forum eventually follows the California decision, protracted litigation is meanwhile inevitable. Thus, in the Foster proceedings the South Dakota decree was eventually enforced in this state, but only after the parent disobeying the South Dakota decree kept the children in this state for three years of trial and appellate litigation. (See Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719 [68 P.2d 719]; Foster v. Foster, 5 Cal.2d 669 [55 P.2d 1175]; Foster v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 125 [47 P.2d 701]; Foster v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. App.2d 466 [41 P.2d 187].) Again, in Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979, the father disregarded the provisions of a California decree and fled with the child to Maryland. The mother followed him and was awarded custody by the Maryland court but the father moved on to the District of Columbia before the mother could obtain physical custody of the child. Despite the conduct of the father, the District of Columbia court awarded custody to the father on the ground of changed circumstances. The father thus shopped from state to state until he found a court willing to award him custody. There are many other instances where parents violated court orders forbidding removal of a minor from the state with impunity. (See In re Memmi, 80 Cal. App.2d 295, 300 [181 P.2d 885]; Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945, 946; Gaunt v. Gaunt, 160 Okla. 195, 196 [16 P.2d 579]; Crowell v. Crowell, 184 Ore. 467, 472 [198 P.2d 992]; Haynie v. Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 853 [85 So. 99]; White v. White, 77 N.H. 26, 30 [86 A. 353]; Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 423 [148 A. 524]; Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 146 [112 S.W.2d 165, 116 A.L.R. 1293]; Jones v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 89 [77 P. 439]; People ex rel. Wagner v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47, 51 [27 P.2d 1038]; Helton v. Crawley, 241 Iowa 296 [41 N.W.2d 60]; Ex parte Peddicord, 269 Mich. 142, 145 [256 N.W. 833].) We do not mean to imply that the foregoing decisions were incorrectly decided. They are cited only to demonstrate that Betty cannot be adequately protected during her appeal if the trial court may enter orders allowing her child to be taken from the state. [8] Clarence contends that the trial court has power to make all necessary orders needed for the child's welfare and is not to be blocked by an appeal based on mere partisan interest and desire. This contention assumes the question to be decided by the appeal: did the trial court correctly decide that the status of the child's custody as of March 9th was not in his best interests? The paramount concern in custody proceedings is the walfare of the child ( Puckett v. Puckett, 21 Cal.2d 833, 839 [136 P.2d 1]), but Betty has the right and duty to safeguard Gerald until determination of the appeal. Clarence asserts that the best interests of Gerald require his attendance at the New Jersey school, but Betty does not agree and, until custody is taken from her and the order affirmed on appeal, questions of the child's education are governed by provisions of the final divorce decree as modified by the consent order. It may be noted that if extraordinary circumstances requiring protection of the child during the appeal arise, application may be made to the appellate court for appropriate relief. (See Gantner v. Gantner, post, p. 691 [242 P.2d 329].) [9] Clarence invokes decisions to the effect that pending appeal a trial court has jurisdiction to require a father to make payments for child support. (Civ. Code, § 137.2; Dixon v. Dixon, 216 Cal. 443, 444 [14 P.2d 498].) The fact that a trial court has the power to protect the child during the appeal by continuing the natural obligation of a father to support his child does not mean that it has the power to issue orders that would render futile the appellate determination on the merits. ( Vosburg v. Vosburg, 137 Cal. 493, 496 [68 P. 694].) [3c] Clarence next contends that any order affecting Gerald's education is not a matter embraced in the appeal from the March 9th order, on the ground that Betty consented to the Menlo School provision in the final decree and a consent order cannot be appealed. (See cases collected in 2 Cal.Jur. 225.) The record does not indicate that the May 25th consent, as adopted in the March 9th decree, waived Betty's rights of physical custody for more than one semester, and there is nothing to show that Betty ever consented at any time that the child could be enrolled in any school other than the Menlo School. In any event, Betty has filed a valid appeal from that part of the March 9th order awarding custody to Clarence, and that appeal would be undermined by an order allowing the child to be taken from the state. Clarence contends that the appeal did not operate to stay the New Jersey order on the ground that Betty had voluntarily delivered the boy to the Menlo School before perfecting her appeal. Clarence relies on In re McKean, 82 Cal. App. 580, 584 [256 P. 226], where the mother did not appeal until after execution of the order appealed from, which required her to give up custody to the father. The court properly refused to issue habeas corpus to return the child to the mother, on the ground that under section 946 the appeal stayed only future action by the trial court and did not undo action taken by the parties before the appeal. In re Siddall, 143 Cal. 313, 315 [76 P. 1115]; see In re Browning, 108 Cal. App. 503, 507 [291 P. 650].) The McKean decision is inapplicable here, since Betty enrolled the boy in the Menlo School pursuant to the May 25th modification of the final decree, and not in obedience to the March 9th decree, the subject of the present appeal. [10] A litigant in a custody action is entitled to appellate review before his rights are finally determined. If the appellant is not protected from adverse action by the trial court that would destroy the fruits of his appeal, the right of appeal is illusory. In contending that the trial court can permit removal of the children pending appeal, Clarence in effect contends that custody orders should be immediately executed and not stayed by appeal. The statutes and decisions of this state are opposed to this contention, although some states have a contrary rule. (See Scheffers v. Scheffers, 241 Iowa 1217 [44 N.W.2d 676, 679].) [11] In summary, at the time Betty perfected her appeal, she had custody of Gerald under a decree providing that the boy should attend the Menlo School. An order which so disturbs the custody of the child as to permit him to be taken out of this state, pending final determination of the appeal, would be an act in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial court. ( Vosburg v. Vosburg, supra ; see State ex rel. Cash v. District Court, 58 Mont. 316, 318 [195 P. 549]; Nolan v. Nolan, 257 Ill. App. 401, 403; cases collected in 163 A.L.R. 1320; 3 Am.Jur. 192; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 324f.) [12] The writ of prohibition may therefore issue to prevent the trial court from entering the New Jersey order. ( Foster v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 125, 127 [47 P.2d 701].)