Opinion ID: 1878821
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Bias of the Trial Judge and Resentencing Judge/Ineffective Assistance

Text: Patton, in his ninth issue, alleges both that the trial judge was biased and that counsel was ineffective for failing to request the trial judge be removed for making biased decisions. [11] The record supports the conclusion that all of the trial judge's decisions were either proper, did not affect the outcome, or were addressed on direct appeal and are not subject to review in this postconviction proceeding. Therefore, there is no basis to find that counsel was ineffective for failure to file a motion to recuse. First, Patton alleges the trial judge was biased for rushing to trial before counsel had an adequate opportunity to prepare. This claim is conclusively refuted by evidence that the trial judge granted defense counsel a two-month continuance and a two-week continuance. No other continuances were requested during the guilt phase of the trial. Next, Patton claims the trial judge was biased for refusing to grant a continuance prior to the penalty phase. Patton cannot demonstrate any prejudice stemming from this claim because the case was remanded for resentencing. Patton's argument that the trial judge was biased for scheduling a competency hearing before his arraignment and before counsel was assigned likewise does not entitle him to relief. He cannot demonstrate any prejudice based on this decision because counsel also requested a competency hearing. Patton next alleges the trial judge was biased because he held ex parte proceedings. This claim is procedurally barred and without merit as discussed above. Patton also claims the trial judge was biased in denying the request for additional peremptory challenges. This claim is procedurally barred because it was raised on direct appeal. See Patten, 467 So.2d at 979. He argues the trial judge was biased because he denied counsel an opportunity to be heard on the effect of the media's presence in the courtroom. This issue too was raised and rejected on direct appeal. See id. Patton argues the trial judge was biased because he denied counsel adequate funds to properly prepare the defense necessary to ensure a fair trial. This claim is conclusively rebutted by the record because all funds counsel requested were granted and the judge gave counsel the opportunity to request additional funds as necessary. Counsel consulted with other lawyers, mental health experts, investigators, ballistic experts, and jury consultants. Patton has failed to allege or demonstrate what additional persons or funds were needed. Lastly, Patton contends the trial judge was biased because he made inflammatory comparisons between the defendant and Satan or Hitler in front of the jury. This claim is conclusively rebutted by the record. The trial judge made these references during the questioning of a juror who was opposed to the death penalty. In an effort to determine how deep-rooted her opposition was, the trial judge asked the juror if she would feel the same way if the defendant was Satan or Hitler. There was certainly no comparison made between Patton and either Satan or Hitler. None of the allegations of bias by the trial judge either individually or collectively demonstrate bias or prejudice by the trial judge. Patton also alleges the resentencing judge was biased and that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to request removal of the resentencing judge based upon his biased decisions. All of Patton's allegations are without merit. First, he alleges the resentencing judge was biased because he did not impanel a new jury after the jury read a newspaper article that stated the prior jury had been deadlocked but ultimately returned with a death recommendation. This claim is conclusively rebutted by the record. The resentencing judge offered to impanel a new jury; however, counsel made a strategic decision not to do so. Patton further argues the resentencing judge acted with bias by making it known to counsel that he believed in the death penalty. This claim is also conclusively rebutted by the record. The comment complained of was made by the judge, out of the presence of the jury, after the prosecutor objected to the judge telling the jury the method of execution would be death by electrocution. The judge stated that it was the truth and most people, including himself, believed in it. When the comment is taken in this context it demonstrates the judge was not biased, rather he was refuting the prosecutor's objection. See Jernigan v. State, 608 So.2d 569 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992). Patton alleges the resentencing judge was biased in not allowing evidence of his sister's suicide in mitigation. Patton cannot demonstrate that the decision to exclude this evidence affected the outcome of his case in light of the substantial amount of mitigating evidence that was presented. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Finally, Patton claims the resentencing judge was biased because he talked to the victim's mother in public view. This claim is insufficiently pled as discussed above with regard to the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The defense has failed to demonstrate that the either the trial judge or the resentencing judge was biased. Therefore, defense counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to request recusal of the trial or resentencing judge. Accordingly, this claim was properly summarily denied.