Opinion ID: 186698
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Constitution of California

Text: 19 The Supreme Court of California has ruled that the California Constitution protect[s] speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping centers even when the centers are privately owned. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899, 910, 153 Cal.Rptr. 854, 860, 592 P.2d 341 (1979). Fashion Valley therefore seeks refuge in the reasonably exercised limitation upon petitioning, pointing out that the Court in Pruneyard also said a private shopping center is not required to host expressive activities that interfere with normal business operations, 153 Cal.Rptr. at 860-61, 592 P.2d 341, and reasoning that Rule 5.6.2 is lawful because it merely protects the Mall from disruption of normal business operations and . . . interference with customer convenience. H-CHH Assocs. v. Citizens for Representative Gov't, 193 Cal.App.3d 1193, 1208, 238 Cal.Rptr. 841, 850 (1987); see also Diamond v. Bland, 3 Cal.3d 653, 666, 91 Cal.Rptr. 501, 509, 477 P.2d 733 (1970) (parties may restrict speech in order to prevent obstruction of or undue interference with normal business operations); In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845, 852, 64 Cal.Rptr. 97, 101, 434 P.2d 353 (1967) (protestors not permitted to interfere[] with the conduct of the railroad business). 20 In the Company's view, that is, the Union's constitutional right to engage in expressive activities does not extend to any activity that interferes with the Mall's primary purpose, namely, to facilitate the ease of commerce and to promote the business of its merchant tenants. H-CHH Assocs., 238 Cal.Rptr. at 859. According to Fashion Valley, in urging a boycott what the protestor is asking the customer to do ... is inherently inconsistent with the dedicated purpose of the shopping center — the promotion of merchandise and services in the shopping center. 21 Alternatively, Fashion Valley argues, even if there is no primary purpose doctrine in Pruneyard and H-CHH Associates, the Mall is not a public forum under the laws of California and therefore its regulation of expressive activity need only be reasonable; yet the Board failed to address the forum analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court of California in Clark v. Burleigh, 4 Cal.4th 474, 482-489, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 455, 460-65, 841 P.2d 975 (1992). Under Fashion Valley's reading of Clark, all property other than streets and parks, and hence the Mall, is a non-public forum. 22 Finally, Fashion Valley argues that even if the Mall is a public forum, Rule 5.6.2 is a permissible, content-neutral regulation of speech. In Los Angeles Alliance for Survival v. City of Los Angeles, 22 Cal.4th 352, 93 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 993 P.2d 334 (2000), the Supreme Court of California, defining a content-neutral regulation as a restriction justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d at 10, 993 P.2d 334, upheld an ordinance that banned all solicitation in certain defined places and aggressive solicitation in any public place, 93 Cal. Rptr.2d at 7, 993 P.2d 334. Fashion Valley maintains Rule 5.6.2 is similarly content-neutral because it prohibits all boycott appeals directed at the Mall's stores or any of the goods or services sold by Mall merchants, regardless of the subject matter of the protest or the protestor's ... viewpoint. 23 The Board disagrees with Fashion Valley on all counts. First, the Board argues Fashion Valley misreads Pruneyard and H-CHH Associates to mean California has created a forum open to all speech except for that criticizing the actions of mall tenants. In the Board's view, the reference in H-CHH Associates to freedom from disruption of normal business operations means only that a shopping mall may impose appropriate time, place, and manner restrictions on expressive activity. 24 Second, relying upon the Ninth Circuit's decision in Glendale Associates, Ltd. v. NLRB, 347 F.3d 1145 (2003), the Board maintains the Mall is indeed a public forum under the State Constitution. In Glendale the court read Pruneyard to mean privately-owned shopping centers are required to respect individual free speech rights on their premises to the same extent that government entities are bound to observe state and federal free speech rights. Id. at 1154. The Board also adverts to our decision in Waremart, in which we held that under California law a grocery store could exclude union handbillers from its parking lot, but in passing noted that in Pruneyard the Supreme Court of California reasoned that shopping centers had become the functional equivalents of `miniature downtowns' and should be treated as public forums, from which expressive activity cannot be entirely excluded. 354 F.3d at 872. 25 Finally, the Board argues Rule 5.6.2 is not content-neutral but rather a content-based restraint on speech because it facially prohibits persons from urging or encouraging, in any manner, customers not to purchase the merchandise or services offered by any Mall tenant. In Glendale, the Ninth Circuit held a shopping mall regulation that prohibited the distribution of written materials mentioning by name any tenant, owner, or manager of the mall, 347 F.3d at 1147, was not content-neutral because it was based on hostility. . . towards the underlying message expressed. Id. at 1157-58. So, too, says the Board of Fashion Valley's ban on boycotts: Indeed the Shopping Mall admits that it maintains the rule because it disfavors speech that may adversely affect its business. 26 Neither party's argument is fully persuasive. Each marshals the California case law to advantage, but the fact remains that no California court has squarely decided whether a shopping center may lawfully ban from its premises speech urging the public to boycott a tenant. The case closest in point is UNITE v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 56 Cal. App.4th 996, 1020, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 838, 854 (2d Dist.1997), which involved Prohibition[s] Against Interference With Mall Tenants very similar to Fashion Valley's Rule 5.6.2. Although the court said the anti-boycott rules could lead to impermissible content-based regulation of expressive activities in violation of the State Constitution, it did not determine whether the rules actually were unconstitutional because the issue had not been preserved. 65 Cal.Rptr.2d at 854-55. The Supreme Court of California we think could reasonably agree with either Fashion Valley or the Board.