Opinion ID: 2792379
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Exclusion of the EPO File History

Text: Sandoz sought to introduce into evidence the EPO file history, which allegedly chronicled some of the discussions held at the Geneva meeting. Sandoz did not list this document in its original exhibit list. It only sought to amend the exhibit list after the pretrial conference and after briefing and supplemental briefing on the various motions in limine were complete. In an oral order, the district court refused to allow Sandoz to introduce the EPO file history into evidence. The district court based its decision on several grounds, remarking that Sandoz’s attempt to introduce the evidence was “an eleventh hour proffer”; that it would take plaintiffs “quite a bit of preparation” to deal with these documents; that it was “told” but did not know that European patent law would regard oral presentations and accompanying documentation, even if not widely available, as prior art; and that the file contained attorney arguments and not factual statements. The district court acknowledged that, as parties to the original proceedings, plaintiffs were aware of these documents and that “[s]ome courts might consider th[e] [European proceedings] to be pretty powerful evidence.” Sandoz argues that the district court abused its discretion in precluding it from amending the exhibit list. According to Sandoz, the EPO file history contains factual admissions about the date and content of the Geneva meeting relevant to its obviousness case. Sandoz further contends that there was no finding of bad faith or improper tactics in the filing of its motion to amend and that the prejudice to plaintiffs of allowing this evidence would have been minimal. Plaintiffs counter that the district court’s basis for excluding this document was sufficient and did not amount to an abuse of discretion. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(e) states that a “court may modify the order issued after a final pretrial 18 INSITE VISION INCORPORATED v. SANDOZ, INC. conference only to prevent manifest injustice.” The Third Circuit considers five Pennypack factors in determining whether a district court abused its discretion in excluding evidence:
against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified” or the excluded evidence would have been offered; (2) “the ability of that party to cure the prejudice”; (3) the extent to which allowing such witnesses or evidence would “disrupt the or- derly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the court”; (4) any “bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court’s order”; and (5) the importance of the excluded evidence. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 298 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894, 904–05 (3d Cir. 1977)). “The importance of the evidence is often the most significant factor.” Id. (citing Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 302 (3d Cir. 1991) and Pennypack, 559 F.2d at 904). A decision to exclude testimony should be disturbed only if there is “‘a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment.’” Id. at 293 (quoting In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666 (3d Cir. 1999)). Here, we do not have such a definite and firm conviction for several reasons. We agree with the district court’s assessment of the relevant Pennypack factors as being either neutral or favoring plaintiffs. The district court had ample basis to find prejudice to the plaintiffs as plaintiffs, on the eve of trial, would have had to prepare arguments explaining the differences between European and United States’ patent law and the significance of the statements in the prior proceedings. There is also no indication of how plaintiffs would have been able to cure that prejudice. Thus, the first two factors favor plaintiffs. INSITE VISION INCORPORATED v. SANDOZ, INC. 19 The third factor, disruption of trial, is neutral at best. Likewise, the fourth factor, bad faith, is neutral, given the fact that the district court made no finding either way on the question of bad faith. “Making no finding on the question of bad faith (which is what the district court did) is quite different from finding that there was no bad faith.” Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 720 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997). As for the fifth factor, relating to the importance of the excluded evidence, the district court was correct to at least question the relevance and probative value of the EPO file history under United States law. The situation here is thus notably different from the facts of ZF Meritor, where the exclusion of testimony “clear[ly]” foreclosed plaintiffs’ suit, despite the fact that they had won at the liability stage. 696 F.3d at 299. This factor, like the others, does not favor Sandoz. In view of the totality of evidence, we do not have a definite and firm conviction that the district court abused its discretion and have no reason to disturb the district court’s decision to exclude the EPO file history.