Opinion ID: 1450539
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Plaintiff's agricultural services liens were valid.

Text: Defendant Dunn contends that plaintiff's agricultural services liens were invalid because ORS 87.242(2)(b) provides that the notice of the lien must contain the name of the owner of the chattel to be charged with the lien;    and that this requirement was not satisfied because the notice named John Heritage as the owner of the chattels, whereas the true and actual owner was Heritage Farms, Inc., a corporation. In support of that contention defendant Dunn cites our decision in Timber Structures v. C.W.S.G. Wks., 191 Or. 231, 229 P.2d 623 (1951), in which we said (at 246, 229 P.2d 623) in referring to a lien statute that: The statute is strictly construed as to persons entitled to its benefits and as to the procedure necessary to perfect the lien; but when the claimant's right has been clearly established, the law will be liberally interpreted toward accomplishing the purposes of its enactment. Defendant Dunn also contends that the Court of Appeals, in holding that plaintiff substantially complied with the statute in naming the owner in the manner given ignored the plain words of the statute and that the filing of a lien against an individual does not put a third party on notice that the liens are against the property of the corporation unless the corporation is named. We agree with the well-reasoned opinion by the Court of Appeals in holding that plaintiff had complied substantially with the requirements of the statute and that its liens were valid under the facts of this case and for the reasons stated in that opinion. We would only add a few additional comments in view of the contentions now made by the petitioner. Timber Structures, cited by defendant Dunn, involved a mechanics' or materialman's lien statute (now ORS 87.010). In other decisions under that statute, while recognizing the rule as stated in Timber Structures, we have nevertheless held that a showing of substantial compliance with requirements of the statute is sufficient. See, e.g., Lemire v. McCollum, 246 Or. 418, 427, 425 P.2d 755 (1967), citing other cases to the same effect, including Timber Structures. The same rule has also been applied to other statutory liens. See, e.g., Lambert v. Stupek, 237 Or. 498, 501, 392 P.2d 255 (1964), citing other cases to the same effect. See also our recent decision in Steel Products Company of Oregon, Inc. v. Portland General Electric Company et al, 291 Or. 41, 628 P.2d 1180 (1981). As noted by the Court of Appeals (49 Or. App. at 495-96, 620 P.2d 488), this rule of substantial compliance has been applied by the court to sustain the validity of liens in various types of cases. [1] We have found no previous decision by this court which undertakes to define the term substantial compliance as applied in lien cases or to hold what elements are of importance in deciding whether there has been substantial compliance in such cases. The Indiana Court of Appeals recently considered this problem in Beneficial Finance Co. v. Wegmiller Bender Lbr. Co., Ind. App., 402 N.E.2d 41 (1980), a case in which a lien filed on property owned jointly by husband and wife omitted the name of the wife. In holding that the lien substantially complied with the statute even though the wife's name was omitted, the court said (at 45): [W]hether there has been substantial compliance by the lien claimant depends upon the degree of noncompliance with the letter of the statute, the policy which underlies the particular statutory provision in question, and the prejudice which may have resulted to either the owner of the property or other third parties who have an interest in the real estate. We find there was substantial compliance   in the present case. This is consistent with previous decisions by this court in which we have recognized that lack of prejudice is a proper factor for consideration in such cases. See Mercer Steel v. Park Construction Co., 242 Or. 596, 600, 411 P.2d 262 (1966), and Drake Lumber Co. v. Paget Mortgage Co., 203 Or. 66, 80-81, 274 P.2d 804 (1955). Defendant Dunn contends in this case that the filing of a lien against an individual does not put a third party on notice that the liens are against property of a corporation unless it is named as the owner. Plaintiff's first claim of lien named Heritage Farms, c/o John Heritage and the remaining two named John Heritage doing business as Heritage Farms. We believe that under the facts of this case these lien notices were sufficient to give adequate notice to third persons, despite these discrepancies. The corporation, whose only directors were John Heritage and his wife, does not contest the validity of the liens. Also defendant Dunn does not question the further statement by the Court of Appeals (49 Or. App. at 496, 620 P.2d 488) that all parties concede that they knew of plaintiff's liens and that there is no claim of prejudice in this case. Under these facts and for these reasons we agree with the holding by the Court of Appeals that plaintiff's liens were valid.