Opinion ID: 2175548
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the claim for indemnity

Text: Since we have held that R. & G. is entitled to a new trial with respect to the question of its own liability, it may be that R. & G.'s claim for indemnity will never be reached. If, at a new trial, R. & G. should receive a favorable verdict, its cross-claim against Howard will be moot. We ordinarily do not decide questions which depend on contingencies which may not arise. Smith v. Smith, 310 A.2d 229, 231 (D.C.1973). The parties have, however, fully briefed and argued the issue of indemnity and, unless we address it now, a second appeal would probably be necessary in the event of a second substantial verdict in Ms. Brown's favor. We therefore believe it to be good judicial husbandry, United States v. Dogan, 314 F.2d 767, 772 (5th Cir.1963), to decide the point at this time. Unfortunately, we are compelled to conclude that the trial judge's resolution of R. & G.'s claim for indemnity is internally inconsistent. Specifically, the findings in the text of his written order cannot, in our view, reasonably be reconciled with his findings in the footnote. Moreover, the legal consequences of the two apparently incompatible findings are critically different; R. & G. is entitled to indemnity or its equivalent if the text is correct, but only to contribution if the judge was right in the footnote.
In order to assess the judge's disposition of the indemnity issue, it is necessary to set forth his findings in some detail. In the text of his order, the judge wrote as follows: The court is satisfied, based on the evidence presented at trial and through Dr. McGlamry's deposition, that it preponderates in favor of a finding that both R. & G. and Howard were negligent in the care they rendered to plaintiff, and that the negligence of both R. & G. and Howard constituted proximate causes of plaintiff's injuries. In this regard, the court credits and finds persuasive the testimony of: (1) Dr. Patricia Schultz that she prescribed a custom-molded shoe with a plastizote insole for plaintiff; (2) plaintiff's expert, Dr. Peter Cavanaugh, that the shoe provided by R. & G. failed to comply with the prescription and violated the standard of care applicable to an orthotist such as R. & G.; and (3) plaintiff's experts, Dr. Clark Miller and Dr. David Morowitz, that, to a reasonable medical certainty, the ulcers on plaintiff's foot were caused or complicated by the R. & G.supplied improperly fitting shoe, that they could have been resolved without the amputation of plaintiff's foot if Howard had hospitalized her on July 9, 1985, and that the standard of care applicable to Howard required such hospitalization. Consequently, the court concludes that R. & G. is entitled to judgment against Howard for contribution on its cross-claim, and that contribution should be assessed pro rata, i.e., that R. & G. should be entitled to a credit in one half the amount of the verdict. See Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 132, 300 F.2d 721, 724 (1962). (Emphasis added). In a footnote, however, the judge added, in pertinent part, the following: R. & G. asserts in its memorandum in support of its cross-claim, relying on law from other jurisdictions, that it not only is entitled to a credit against plaintiff's verdict based upon the settlement reached between plaintiff and Howard, but that it is entitled to full indemnification from Howard because any original injuries which R. & G. caused plaintiff were profoundly worsened by Howard.... Assuming without deciding that under District of Columbia law there conceivably might arise circumstances where a tortfeasor who proximately caused a plaintiff's injuries would be entitled to full indemnification from another joint tortfeasor who also proximately caused such injuries, this plainly is not such a case. There is no basis in the evidence to conclude that Howard's conduct worsened plaintiff's injuries; to the contrary, the evidence shows that R. & G.'s conduct plainly would have led to the amputation of plaintiff's foot had Howard never entered the picture. Here, the evidence shows that R. & G. and Howard were joint tortfeasors, that they were both guilty of active negligence in their care of plaintiff, and that their negligence concurred in causing her injury. See Nordstrom v. District of Columbia, 213 F.Supp. 315, 320 (D.D.C.), rev'd on other grounds, 117 U.S.App. D.C. 165, 327 F.2d 863 (1963). (Emphasis added). We must, of course, approach the judge's findings with appropriate deference. A judgment may not be set aside except for errors of law unless it is plainly wrong and without evidence to support it. D.C.Code § 17-305(a) (1989); see also Super.Ct.Civ.R. 52(a). The question is not whether this court would have found the facts as the trial court did, but rather whether on the entire evidence we are left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Cahn v. Antioch University, 482 A.2d 120, 128 (D.C.1984) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 123, 89 S.Ct. 1562, 1576, 23 L.Ed.2d 129 (1969)). The problem here, however, is that if we defer to the judge's finding in the text, we must ignore his footnote; if we defer to the footnote, we contravene the finding in the text. The internal inconsistency which we have discerned in the judge's findings is identified in the underscored language which we have quoted above. The judge's explicit statement in the text that the ulcers could have been resolved without amputation if Howard had exercised due care cannot reasonably be reconciled with his remark in the footnote that there was no basis in the evidence to conclude that Howard's conduct worsened plaintiff's injuries, and that R. & G.'s conduct plainly would have led to the amputation of plaintiff's foot had Howard never entered the picture. It appears from the judge's finding in the text regarding Howard's negligence that, as a result of Howard's failure to hospitalize Ms. Brown, a patient who was readily treatable without amputation in July became one whose leg had to be amputated in October. This was surely a worsening of her condition, whether it resulted from Howard's affirmative acts or from its failure to act. Moreover, if Howard had not entered the picture, Ms. Brown would presumably have been treated by some other doctor or podiatrist, and we must presume that there would have been no malpractice Cf. F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Williams, 59 App.D.C. 347, 348, 41 F.2d 970, 971 (1930) (legal presumption is that due care was exercised). Thus, according to the judge's finding in the text, there would have been no amputation for which R. & G. could be held responsible. [17]
The law recognizes that there may not be a single proximate cause for every injury; several causes may combine to produce the harm. Hill v. McDonald, 442 A.2d 133, 137 (D.C.1982). Where the negligence of two defendants contributes to a single injury, both are jointly and severally liable, regardless of the degree of negligence on the part of each. Id. at 137-38. In such circumstances, however, a tortfeasor who has compensated the injured party may be entitled to recover from the second wrongdoer all or part of what he or she has expended. Recovery may be based on two principal theories, contribution and indemnity, or on various permutations of each doctrine. [18] Contribution is the more common and more modest of these remedies. It is based on the quintessentially equitable notion that as each tortfeasor was at fault in bringing about the injury to the innocent party, then in justice each tortfeasor should share [sic] his part in the burden of making the injured party whole again. Martello v. Hawley, 112 U.S.App.D.C. 129, 131, 300 F.2d 721, 723 (1962). Generally, one tortfeasor is entitled to contribution from a second in the amount of one half of the award, and the fact that the negligence of one may be greater than that of another does not give rise to a right of indemnity and does not change the method of equally apportioning contribution. Early Settlers Ins. Co. v. Schweid, 221 A.2d 920, 923 (D.C.1966). The District is not a comparative negligence jurisdiction, and the rule that each tortfeasor ordinarily pays half is consistent with this approach. Id. In Martello, as in this case, the plaintiff had settled with one of the tortfeasors and received judgment against the second. The court held that the non-settling defendant was entitled to contribution in the amount of one half of the verdict. 112 U.S.App. D.C. at 132, 300 F.2d at 724. In the present case, the trial judge, citing and following Martello, likewise held that R. & G. was entitled to a credit in one half of the amount of the verdict. R. & G. contends, however, that contribution is an inadequate remedy on this record, and that it is entitled to indemnity. It claims that Howard was an actively negligent successor tortfeasor who was primarily responsible for the loss of Ms. Brown's foot, while R. & G.'s own negligence actively caused, at most, only the ulcerations and not the amputation. This court recently had occasion to discuss in some depth the contours of the doctrine of indemnity. See East Penn Mfg. Co. v. Pineda, 578 A.2d 1113 (D.C.1990). Noting that the duty to indemnify often arises from a contract that provides for it, id. at 1126, we explained that such a duty may also exist in the absence of a contract where indemnification is required to prevent injustice. Id. We recognized that an obligation to indemnify may be implied in fact (on an implied contract theory) or implied in law in order to achieve an equitable result. Id. at 1127 n. 20. After discussing various traditional formulations ( e.g., active as against passive negligence, or primary as against secondary liability) and commenting upon the difficulties which courts have encountered in applying them, we quoted with approval the articulation of the concept by Prosser and Keeton: Indemnity is a shifting of responsibility from the shoulders of one person to another; and the duty to indemnify has been recognized in cases where the equities have supported it. A court's view of the equities may have been based on the relation of the parties to one another, and the consequent duty owed; or it may be because of a significant difference in the kind or quality of their conduct. Id. at 1128 n. 20 (quoting W. PROSSER & R. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 51, at 344 (1984)). The fundamental question before us, as Prosser and Keeton have explained, is whether in the present case the equities support a requirement that Howard indemnify R. & G.. The correct answer to that question depends, in our view, on whether the findings in the text or the findings in the footnote rule the day.
If the findings in the text of the judge's order are correct, then in July 1985, when Dr. Schultz failed to order hospitalization, Ms. Brown's condition was readily treatable without amputation. If Howard had exercised due care, there would have been no amputation. If R. & G.'s negligence merely caused ulceration, but if amputation could have been avoided, then as between R. & G. and Howard, as a matter of equity, the responsibility of the latter for the amputation substantially outweighs the responsibility of the former, and Howard should be required to indemnify R. & G. with respect to so much of the injury, including the amputation, as is primarily attributable to Howard's malpractice. This is particularly true in light of Howard's responsibility to Ms. Brown over a long period of time both before and after R. & G.'s role, which responsibility included prescribing the very orthopedic shoes which precipitated R. & G.'s liability. Although this court has not previously addressed the question whether a duty to indemnify arises in such a context, the proposition that Howard must indemnify R. & G. is supported by reason and by the overwhelming weight of authority. See generally Annotation: Right of tortfeasor initially causing injury to recover indemnity or contribution from medical attendant aggravating injury or causing new injury in course of treatment, 72 A.L.R. 4th 231, 238-48 (1989) (hereinafter 1989 annotation). A hypothetical example demonstrates why this is so. Suppose that the plaintiff's hand is cut as a result of an initial tortfeasor's negligence. All that is required is to clean and dress his wound. If that were accomplished with due care, the plaintiff's injury would be minimal. Following the injury, however, a physician negligently fails to clean the wound, which becomes infected and gangrenous, so that the plaintiff's arm must be amputated. As between the plaintiff and the original tortfeasor, it arguably may be reasonable to require the latter to compensate the former for his entire injury. If no physician had entered the picture, the plaintiff would have lost his arm. As between the original tortfeasor and the negligent physician, however, there is no equity in requiring the former to pay half of that part of the plaintiff's compensation which is for the harm directly attributable to the physician's malpractice. Where one defendant was responsible for a minor injury and a second defendant's conduct was the effective cause of a major one, the first is unjustly penalized, and the second receives a windfall, if each must pay the same amount to the plaintiff. In Travelers Indemnity Co. v. Trowbridge, 41 Ohio St.2d 11, 321 N.E.2d 787 (1975), a workman had been injured while on the job. The employer's insurer had made payments to the workman to compensate him for the loss. The insurer then sued the physician who had treated the workman, claiming that the physician's malpractice had aggravated the injuries. The insurer contended that the physician should be required to indemnify the insurer for that portion of the damages due directly to the physician's malpractice. The court, reversing the dismissal of the complaint below, held that a tortfeasor who negligently causes an injury has a right to indemnity from a physician who negligently causes a new injury or aggravates the existing injury during the course of his treatment of the injury caused by the tortfeasor. Id. at 16, 321 N.E.2d at 790. Explicating its rationale, the court stated, in pertinent part: In the ordinary joint or concurrent tortfeasor situation, a single indivisible injury is produced, and each of the tortfeasors is charged with liability for the results of the negligence of the other, with no right of contribution or indemnity between them.... The physician and the tortfeasor are not typical concurrent tortfeasors but, rather, are more in the nature of successive tortfeasors. Id. The court recognized that, as between the injured party and the original tortfeasor, the latter was liable for the entire injury, for the physician's intervening negligence had not broken the chain of proximate cause. [19] The court held, however, that as between the tortfeasor and the physician, the latter's responsibility was far more direct and far greater, and that the equities therefore required indemnification. Citing a prior annotation superseded by the 1989 annotation, [20] the court stated that almost all jurisdictions which have considered the issue have concluded that a tortfeasor who caused an initial injury has the right to recover indemnity from a physician who negligently either caused a new injury or aggravated the existing injury during the course of his treatment.... [T]he rationale, that he who actively causes an injury should be responsible to another who is liable for such injury because of his own negligence but who did not actively create such injury, produces a just and equitable result. Id., 321 N.E.2d at 790. In Niles v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App.3d 230, 116 Cal.Rptr. 733 (1st Dist. 1974), Kelly, an eleven-year-old boy, was injured in a fight at the playground of his school. Employees of the City negligently failed to prevent the fight. After complaining of pain, the injured boy was transported to the emergency room of a local hospital, where signs and symptoms of severe head injury were observed by the treating physicians. In spite of this, Kelly was sent home with his father, apparently because a hospital representative erroneously believed that the boy could not be admitted because he was not being treated by a physician with staff privileges at the hospital. After Kelly's pulse rate fell, he was rushed back to the hospital. By the time the doctors were able to perform neurosurgery, however, he had become permanently paralyzed and mute. The public entities which were alleged by Kelly to have negligently failed to prevent his injuries at the playground filed a cross-claim against the hospital for indemnity. The jury found that both the public entities and the hospital were negligent. On the cross-claim for indemnity, however, the jury apportioned the damages in the amount of $25,000 against the City and in the amount of $4,000,000 against the hospital. The appellate court upheld the verdict, reasoning as follows: The jury determined that the negligent acts of appellants and the public entities caused separate and identifiable damages; the evidence supports that determination. There was expert testimony that Kelly had an excellent chance of complete recovery if he had been properly treated when he first arrived at the hospital, and that Kelly's condition did not deteriorate to the point of permanent disability until after Kelly had been sent away and had spent some time at his father's apartment. Id. at 249, 116 Cal.Rptr. at 738. It is noteworthy that in Niles, the hospital did not take any active steps which aggravated Kelly's condition. Rather, its negligence lay in failing to treat Kelly and to stem the tide of events which, without the intervention of a reasonably prudent physician, resulted in catastrophic injuries. Niles therefore cannot be reconciled with any notion that the duty to indemnify arises only if the physician affirmatively inflicts a new injury ( e.g. by administering AIDS-infected blood in treating an abrasion). Aggravation of an injury by negligent failure to treat it, resulting in catastrophe, may also trigger the duty to indemnify, where equity and justice so require. In New Milford Bd. of Educ. v. Juliano, 219 N.J.Super. 182, 530 A.2d 43 (1987), Karen, aged thirteen, was injured when a volleyball stanchion fell on her foot at school. Physicians who subsequently treated her allegedly so aggravated her injury that three of her toes had to be amputated. As in Niles, the Board of Education sought indemnity from the physician. Noting that no New Jersey court had previously decided a claim of indemnity on a comparable state of facts, the court analyzed the issue as follows: A claim for indemnity by initial tortfeasors, such as plaintiffs, against successive tortfeasors, such as defendant doctors, is fundamentally different from a claim for indemnity by one joint tortfeasor against another. Plaintiffs do not seek to escape responsibility for their tortious conduct by holding defendant doctors liable for all damages incurred by Karen. Rather, plaintiffs' claim is limited to the difference between what Karen's damages would have been if defendants had not committed malpractice and the full amount of damages which she suffered as a result of both the original accident and the subsequent malpractice. It is clear that a tortfeasor is responsible for all damages that naturally and proximately flow from the initial tort, including the consequences of medical malpractice in treating the injuries caused by his wrong.... However, in our view, the responsibility of an initial tortfeasor for the additional harm caused by subsequent medical malpractice is less immediate and less direct than the responsibility of the party or parties who have actually committed the malpractice. Indeed, the initial tortfeasor's responsibility for that additional harm can be viewed as a form of constructive or secondary liability.... Consequently, we conclude that justice requires recognition of plaintiffs' right to seek indemnification against defendant doctors. Id. 219 N.J.Super. at 186-87, 530 A.2d at 45. (Emphasis added and citations omitted). The court stated that its conclusion was supported by nearly all the decisions in other jurisdictions, and listed an impressive array of applicable precedents. Id., 530 A.2d at 45. [21] If the trial judge's findings in the text of his order in the present case are accepted as correct, then the reasoning of Niles, as well as Trowbridge, and Juliano, applies with equal force here. The negligence of R. & G. was responsible for Ms. Brown's ulcerations, and R. & G. is entitled to no indemnity or contribution for damages directly flowing from its negligence, up to the point that Howard's malpractice intervened. According to the judge's findings in the text, however, Howard's negligence converted Ms. Brown from someone whose foot did not require amputation into someone for whom such radical surgery was necessary. In that respect, the situation parallels the circumstances in the three cases cited, and the same result must follow. R. & G. therefore has the right to indemnity from Howard for the difference between what [Ms. Brown's] damages would have been if [Howard] had not committed malpractice and the full amount of damages which she suffered as a result of both [R. & G.'s original negligence] and the subsequent malpractice. Juliano, supra, 219 N.J.Super. at 186-87, 530 A.2d at 45. [22] If the question of indemnity is not mooted, and if the judge reiterates the findings in the text of his order, then he will be obliged to calculate and apportion damages as contemplated in Juliano. [23]
The legal consequences are entirely different, however, if the facts are as found in the judge's footnote. If R. & G.'s conduct plainly would have led to the amputation of plaintiff's foot had Howard never entered the picture, and if the active negligence of both defendants concurred in causing [Ms. Brown's] injury, then the judge's disposition of the cross-claim was plainly correct. Under those circumstances, there is no equitable basis for a claim of indemnity, and no inquiry is to be made with respect to the issue of comparative fault. Martello, supra, 112 U.S.App.D.C. at 132, 300 F.2d at 724; Schweid, supra, 221 A.2d at 923. [24]