Opinion ID: 2299853
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Woolley's Impeachment

Text: On cross-examination, Walsh questioned Woolley regarding alleged perjurious statements she had previously made in front of the grand jury in connection with this case. At trial, Woolley admitted that she had been convicted of several crimes including shoplifting, breaking and entering, forgeries, receiving stolen goods, operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license, fraudulent use of credit cards, illegally obtaining a credit card, and larceny. Walsh alleges, however, that during the grand jury proceeding, Woolley attributed her thirty-year suspended sentence to the crime of operating a motor vehicle on a suspended license. When Woolley was confronted with a transcript of her grand jury proceeding, she insisted that there was an error in transcription, and that she did not make the statements contained in the transcript. Thereafter, Walsh continued in his effort to impeach Woolley by attempting to cross-examine Special Assistant Attorney General, Albert Medici (Medici), a witness called by the state in its case in chief, who presented the case to the grand jury and knew the information Woolley had provided at that proceeding. While acknowledging that Woolley's grand jury testimony was not the subject of direct examination, Walsh requested that he be allowed to elicit    or attempt to elicit [impeaching evidence against Woolley from Medici] to avoid having to recall this witness as his own. At a sidebar conference, the trial justice denied Walsh's request to pursue this line of questioning. Walsh argues that the trial justice committed error by precluding the introduction of this evidence to demonstrate that Woolley lied under oath in front of the grand jury about the extent of her criminal record. In making his determination, the trial justice relied on State v. Tutt, 622 A.2d 459 (R.I.1993), and State v. Cuddy, 641 A.2d 1308 (R.I.1994). As a general rule, a non-defendant witness may not be impeached by extrinsic evidence on a collateral issue, and the cross-examiner is limited to the answers provided by the witness sought to be impeached. Tutt, 622 A.2d at 462; see also State v. Brown, 574 A.2d 745, 749 (R.I.1990). However, Walsh argues that Woolley's credibility is not at all collateral, and therefore, the case law that the trial justice relied upon to exclude the testimony is inapplicable. We reject this argument. This Court has previously concluded that the exercise of discretion by the trial justice in limiting the scope of cross-examination will not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of that discretion. State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1110 (R.I.1999); see also State v. Anthony, 422 A.2d 921, 924 (R.I.1980). The trial justice also has wide discretion in determining the appropriate order of proof and it was well within his discretion to limit cross-examination to that which was addressed on direct examination. See State v. Lassor, 555 A.2d 339, 351 (R.I.1989). In this instance, the trial justice denied Walsh's request to cross-examine Medici regarding subject matter beyond the scope of direct examination. Moreover, we conclude that the evidence which Walsh attempted to elicit from Medici was clearly an attempt to impeach Woolley on a collateral matter through the use of extrinsic evidence, and therefore was properly excluded. Finally, although Walsh was permitted to cross-examine Woolley regarding her own alleged perjurious statements, he is limited to the answers Woolley provided.