Opinion ID: 1249059
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Title 18 U.S.C. § 3731 provides in relevant part: An appeal by the United States shall lie to a court of appeals from a decision or order of a district court suppressing or excluding evidence or requiring the return of seized property in a criminal proceeding, not made after the defendant has been put in jeopardy and before the verdict or finding on an indictment or information, if the United States attorney certifies to the district court that the appeal is not taken for purpose of delay and that the evidence is a substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. (Emphasis added). Section 3731 also states that it shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes. We have explained that the United States' right [under § 3731] to appeal a district court's order suppressing evidence is conditional. United States v. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d 1139, 1150 (9th Cir.1979) (en banc); see also Adrian, 978 F.2d at 490 (reaffirming Loud Hawk and noting that the government has to satisfy certain conditions before being entitled to appeal under § 3731). First, the appeal is not available if the defendant has been put in jeopardy. Second, the appeal must not be taken for purpose of delay. Third, the evidence suppressed must be substantial proof of a fact material in the proceeding. Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1150. The parties agree that the defendants have not been put in jeopardy and that the appeal is not for the purpose of delay. The only matter in dispute is whether the excluded evidence is substantial proof of a material fact. The government insists that the U.S. Attorney's mere certification that the evidence is substantial proof of a material fact is sufficient to establish our jurisdiction. However, we require[] more than the prosecutor's bare certification that the conditions enumerated in section 3731 exist. Adrian, 978 F.2d at 490. [2] Rather, before we may assume jurisdiction, the government must demonstrate that the evidence . . . [is] substantial proof of a fact material to the prosecution. Id. at 491 (emphasis added); see also id. at 490 (rejecting government's argument that § 3731 permits an appeal whenever the government certifies to the district court that the evidence is `substantial proof of a material fact,' regardless of the truth of that certification); see also Loud Hawk, 628 F.2d at 1150 (holding § 3731 not satisfied as to certain counts notwithstanding the government's protests to the contrary because substantial proof of material fact condition had not been met). Consequently, in order to satisfy its relatively modest burden, the government must show that the evidence makes a considerable contribution to cognition of a fact relevant to resolution of the case. Adrian, 978 F.2d at 491. In determining whether the government has made the necessary showing: we must interpret the [substantial proof] requirement . . . in a way which facilitates rather than hinders the government's ability to seek review in this court. Thus, we will find the government to have satisfied this additional jurisdictional requirement if, assuming the evidence would be admissible, a reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence persuasive in establishing the proposition for which the government seeks to admit it. Id.; see also United States v. Poulsen, 41 F.3d 1330, 1334 (9th Cir.1994).
The question of jurisdiction has bedeviled the government's attempted appeal in this case, as the government has resisted having to go beyond a bare certification to provide any useful degree of specificity that would help us (and Grace) evaluate the materiality of the excluded evidence. Nonetheless, having given the government the chance to support its certification with substance, we now address its compliance with § 3731 in light of the parties' supplemental briefing. Preliminarily, we first decline Grace's suggestion that we dismiss this appeal based on the government's apparent reluctance to comply with our certification requirements. The failure [timely] to file the certificate does not oust our jurisdiction but does require us to decide whether to exercise our discretion under F.R.App. P. 3(a) to dismiss the appeal. United States v. Gantt, 194 F.3d 987, 997 (9th Cir.1999); see also United States v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442, 444-45 (9th Cir.1991) (allowing government to file a late § 3731 certificate as an exercise of discretion). As in Gantt and Becker, we exercise our discretion to excuse the government's late showing given that it has now been forthcoming, and there is no indication that Grace will be prejudiced by our consideration of the government's appeal. See Gantt, 194 F.3d at 997 ([T]hough the government's oversight has led to a considerable waste of judicial resources, the defendant has suffered no prejudice.). Second, we reject the government's contention in its supplemental brief that it need only show that one excluded witness or one excluded document or study the government's experts intend to reply [ sic ] upon at trial is `substantial proof' of a fact material to the Superseding Indictment. (Emphasis in original). The only support the government cites for this proposition is our earlier statement that the court must interpret the requirement that the evidence suppressed be `substantial proof of a fact material' in a way which facilitates rather than hinders the government's ability to seek review in this court. Adrian, 978 F.2d at 491. The materiality of one item of evidence does not necessarily justify our jurisdiction to review all of the excluded evidence. The purpose of the materiality requirement is to force federal prosecutors to consider whether the appeal is taken for a proper purpose before they force a defendant to relitigate the evidentiary issue. Gantt, 194 F.3d at 997; see also id. (Unfortunately, some government attorneys from time to time treat the § 3731 certification requirement as a mere formality. . . .). Allowing a single item of evidence to carry the burden for what could be a wide ranging review of a district court's evidentiary rulings would not only undercut the government's obligation to be selective in its invocation of interlocutory appeal, but also invite the appellate court into refereeing what is in most cases an area of dispute committed to the discretion of the district court. Thus, we hold that each type of excluded evidence must meet the liberally construed § 3731 requirement that it be substantial proof of a material fact in order to be the subject of a proper interlocutory appeal. Third, contrary to Grace's argument, excluded evidence need not be persuasive as to the ultimate charge but rather only persuasive in establishing the proposition for which the government seeks to admit it. Adrian, 978 F.2d at 491 (emphasis added). In keeping with the liberal interpretation of § 3731, so long as the proposition is relevant to the government's case, that will suffice. Finally, we make no determinations regarding admissibility of any of the apparently excluded evidence, but rather leave that issue for the district court. See id. (emphasizing that the court was only assuming that the evidence would be admissible in its § 3731 analysis).
The government in its supplemental briefing to us identifies nine witnesses and three studies that it concludes would be excluded from its case-in-chief under the district court's December 2005 and February 2006 orders and that it argues meet § 3731's materiality standard, justifying this interlocutory appeal. [3] According to the government, some of this newly disclosed evidence differ[s] in some extent from the evidence previously disclosed to [this] Court, but asserts that the updating is due to the United States's continuous investigation and refinement of its case that is made necessary by various circumstances, including the complexity of the case and evolving medical information about asbestos-related diseases. Grace objects to the government's shifting, post-hoc attempts to justify review . . . [and] its continued failure to take this Court's § 3731 jurisprudence seriously. Nonetheless, because the government, albeit belatedly and reluctantly, has complied with our request to provide more specific information, we exercise our discretion to consider the proffered evidence and the explanation of how its materiality satisfies the government's § 3731 certification requirement. See Gantt, 194 F.3d at 997 (opting to consider defective certification where government corrected its mistake and showed it does take the certification requirements of § 3731 seriously).
The government argues that the nine witnesses and three studies are substantial proof of a fact material to the remaining charges of the indictment. Mindful of § 3731's mandate that the certification requirement be construed liberally in order to allow the government to appeal excluded evidence, we do not require extensive explanations of how the evidence fits into the government's case, but only enough specificity to evaluate the materiality of the evidence to the issues in the case. We conclude that the government has now made a showing sufficient to establish our jurisdiction over this interlocutory appeal. [A] reasonable trier of fact could find the evidence persuasive in establishing the proposition for which the government seeks to admit it. Adrian, 978 F.2d at 491.
The government asserts that five of the witnesses will testify to injuries that will prove that Grace knew of the danger posed by exposure to asbestos-contaminated vermiculite. We agree that this testimony is material to the indictment, even as limited to post-1999 conduct. Even if the testimony relates to periods for which Grace cannot be held criminally liable under the statute of limitations, knowledge does not evaporate, and thus the testimony appears relevant. The government may therefore appeal the exclusion of these witnesses' testimony. Grace does not contest the materiality of the remaining witnesses' testimony, which relates to Grace's motive during the alleged conspiracy and Grace's alleged obstruction of the EPA's investigation.
The three apparently excludable documents the government identifies are studies that it expects various expert witnesses to rely upon at trial. The government explains that the studies: (1) show that exposure to lower levels of asbestos-contaminated vermiculite than were present in the Libby mines caused asbestos-related diseases; (2) examine the exposure to airborne asbestos fibers in Libby, Montana during various activities such as sweeping; and (3) differentiate between those forms of asbestos that are listed as hazardous and those that are not. We agree that these studies could be substantial proof of a material fact to the remaining charges. In sum, the government has supplemented its initial conclusory certification with enough specificity to demonstrate the materiality of the proffered witnesses and studies to support our jurisdiction under § 3731. We therefore turn to the question of whether the district court could properly exclude such evidence.