Opinion ID: 45358
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hartzog’s Jencks Act Claim

Text: Hartzog raises two claims in this appeal based on the Jencks Act. First, he claims that the Jencks Act required Hartzog’s 6 prosecutors to disclose unredacted versions of the DEA-6 reports because these reports contained information provided by cooperating witnesses that could have been used for impeachment purposes. To support his claim that these DEA-6 reports constituted “statements” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e), Hartzog points out that the government referred to them as statements during his trial. Second, Hartzog claims that the district court erred in denying his objection without conducting an in camera review to determine if the DEA-6 reports contained “statements,” as defined by the Jencks Act. To support this second claim, Hartzog refers to our opinion in United States v. Conroy, 589 F.2d 1258, 1272-73 (5th Cir. 1979), in which we vacated and remanded a trial court’s judgment based on that court’s failure to examine material allegedly covered by the Jencks Act. In response, the government contends that Hartzog has failed to show that the DEA-6 reports were witness “statements” as defined by § 3500(e), because Hartzog has not made a showing that the reports were ever read or adopted by the witnesses. The government also claims that Conroy is inapposite because the district court in this matter, unlike the court in Conroy, actually examined the DEA-6 reports before denying Hartzog’s motion. We review the district court’s determination that a DEA-6 report did “not constitute a ‘statement’ requiring disclosure 7 under the Jencks Act for clear error.” United States v. Brown, 303 F.3d 582, 591 (5th Cir. 2002); see also United States v. Durham, 587 F.2d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 1979) (“We will not overturn a trial court’s ruling that reports are not statements under the Jencks Act unless that finding is clearly erroneous.”). Moreover, even when the government is found to have violated the Jencks Act, that failure is subject to harmless error analysis. See United States v. Martinez, 151 F.3d 384, 391 (5th Cir. 1998) (finding no indication that a Jencks Act violation occurred, but quoting United States v. Beasley, 576 F.2d 626, 629 (5th Cir. 1978), and “reiterat[ing] this circuit’s holding” that “‘the harmless error doctrine must be strictly applied in Jencks Act cases’”). Hartzog’s first claim is misplaced; the DEA-6 reports are not “statements” as defined by the Jencks Act. The Jencks Act defines the term “statement” thusly: The term “statement,” as used in . . . this section in relation to any witness called by the United States, means-- (1) a written statement made by said witness and signed or otherwise adopted or approved by him; (2) a stenographic, mechanical, electrical, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim recital of an oral statement made by said witness and recorded contemporaneously with the making of such oral statement; or (3) a statement, however taken or recorded, or a transcription thereof, if any, made by said witness to a grand jury. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(e). We have applied this provision and held that in order for “interview notes” such as the DEA-6 reports at 8 issue in this appeal “to qualify as a statement under § 3500(e)(1) the witness must have signed, read, or heard the entire document read.” United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Hogan, 763 F.2d 697, 704 (5th Cir. 1985)). The witnesses did not sign or otherwise verify these DEA-6 reports. Moreover, we have held in the past that “DEA-6 reports are not verbatim accounts” but are rather “‘short, concise, summaries of the witnesses’ version of the facts as recounted to the agents.’” United States v. Weintraub, 871 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Merida, 765 F.2d 1205, 1215 (5th Cir. 1985)). Hartzog has not shown that the DEA-6 reports at issue in this appeal depart from the norm and provide substantially verbatim accounts of the witnesses’ version of the facts. Because Hartzog has failed to show that the DEA-6 reports qualify as statements under the Jencks Act, he has failed to show that a violation of the Jencks Act occurred. Hartzog’s second claim is also misplaced because Conroy is inapposite. In Conroy, the trial court completely failed to review any of the documents at issue and relied entirely on the government’s assertions. See 589 F.2d at 1273 (stating that “where the court fails even to look at the complete materials, thereby abdicating its responsibility to government counsel, the reviewing court has no choice but to vacate the judgment and remand for an appropriate examination”). In contrast, the 9 district court in this matter reviewed the redacted DEA-6 reports and made specific findings that the reports did not contain “statements” as defined by the Jencks Act. Because the district court carefully reviewed the DEA-6 reports before denying Hartzog’s Jencks Act motion, Hartzog has failed to show that the district court’s failure to hold an in camera review was reversible error.