Opinion ID: 2518898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the plain language of utah code section 76-5-404.1

Text: ¶ 6 When interpreting statutes, our primary goal is to evince the true intent and purpose of the Legislature. State v. Martinez, 2002 UT 80, ¶ 8, 52 P.3d 1276 (internal quotation marks omitted). The first step of statutory interpretation is to evaluate the best evidence of legislative intent: the plain language of the statute itself. Id. When examining the statutory language we assume the legislature used each term advisedly and in accordance with its ordinary meaning. Id. ¶ 7 Utah's child sex abuse statute, which deals with sexual touching that does not amount to rape of a child, [2] reads as follows: (1) As used in this section, child means a person under the age of 14. (2) A person commits sexual abuse of a child if, under circumstances not amounting to rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or an attempt to commit any of these offenses, the actor touches the anus, buttocks, or genitalia of any child, the breast of a female child, or otherwise takes indecent liberties with a child, or causes a child to take indecent liberties with the actor or another with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily pain to any person or with the intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person regardless of the sex of any participant. Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-404.1(1)-(2) (2003) (emphasis added). ¶ 8 Z.C. contends that children under the age of fourteen cannot commit child sex abuse because they are not included within the definition of a person under this statute. More specifically, she argues that the juxtaposition of the definition of the term child in subsection (1) with the statute's use of the term person in subsection (2) creates an ambiguity as to whether children are included within the term person. A close reading of the statute, however, belies the proposition that such a limited definition of the term person is plausible. ¶ 9 The statute itself defines a child as a person under the age of 14, tacitly acknowledging that a child falls within the definition of the more general term person. In addition, excluding children under the age of fourteen from the definition of person is problematic because the statute uses the term person to discuss the victim of the crime. In order to convict an adult of child sex abuse, the State must show that the individual acted either with intent to sexually gratify any person or with intent to cause substantial emotional or bodily harm to any person. Id. § 76-5-404.1(2). If children are excluded from the definition of person under this statute, an adult who sexually touched a child with the sole intent to emotionally damage the child could not be held accountable because the child would not be a person. Avoiding such a patently absurd result while maintaining Z.C.'s interpretation of the statute requires an unreasonably tortured reading in which person means one thing at the beginning of subsection (2) and quite another at the end of that same subsection. ¶ 10 We accordingly find that Z.C.'s proposed interpretation of the statute is untenable and instead read the statute pursuant to the commonly accepted definition of person, which includes children. Black's Law Dictionary 1162 (7th ed.1999) (defining a person as [a] human being); Webster's New Twentieth Century Dictionary 1338 (2d ed.1983) (defining a person as an individual human being . . . an individual man, woman, or child). Thus, under the plain language of the statute, a child is a person and may be adjudicated delinquent for sexually touching another child with the requisite intent.