Opinion ID: 1102151
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Pre-Trial Phase Issues

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress his statements because Customs Inspector Garner lacked probable cause to detain and search defendant at the border. A search conducted without a warrant issued upon probable cause is per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). Border searches constitute one of the exceptions to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment. The border search exception permits a government officer at an international border to conduct a routine search and seizure, without probable cause or a warrant, in order to regulate the collection of duties and to prevent the introduction of contraband into this country. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 105 S.Ct. 3304, 87 L.Ed.2d 381 (1985); United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir.1998)(Under the border-search doctrine, government agents may conduct a `routine search' at the international border or its functional equivalent without probable cause, a warrant, or any suspicion to justify the search.) Furthermore, pat-downs and frisks, the removal of outer garments or shoes and the emptying of pockets, wallets, or purses are all routine searches, and require no justification other than the person's decision to cross our national boundary. United States v. Sandler, 644 F.2d 1163, 1169 (5th Cir.1981); See also United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir.1984)(luggage search, pat-down, and frisk are routine searches because they intrude only slightly on a person's privacy). Thus, contrary to defendant's argument that Inspector Garner was without authority to pat him down after discovering a large amount of undeclared cash in Timothy Taylor's backpack, defendant's detention and pat-down were permissible as a border search, even in the absence of probable cause. Consequently, this claim fails on the merits. Defendant further argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress because Customs and FBI agents interrogated him after he had already invoked his right to remain silent. A review of the transcript from the motion to suppress hearing indicates defendant was placed in a holding cell at approximately five o'clock p.m. After Agent Matthew Schmitt from Customs, accompanied by Inspector Garner, verbally advised the defendant of his Miranda rights, defendant refused to talk to the officers. At this point, the officers immediately left the holding cell. Shortly thereafter, Agents Bradley Manning and Ronald Mesa from Customs arrived on the scene. Agent Schmitt informed the officers he had read defendant his Miranda rights; however, he did not mention defendant had invoked his right to remain silent. According to Agent Manning, he entered defendant's holding cell for the sole administrative purpose of obtaining defendant's signature on a Miranda advisement form. At 5:50 p.m., defendant was given his Miranda warnings by Agent Manning and defendant signed a form confirming he understood his rights and further signed a waiver indicating he wanted to make a statement and talk to the officers. The holding of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), protects an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege during incommunicado interrogation in a police-controlled atmosphere. The privilege guards against compelled self-incrimination and prevents a criminal defendant from being made the deluded instrument of his own conviction. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961)(Frankfurter, J., quoting 2 W. Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 595 (8th ed. 1824)). Miranda does not require that a defendant exercise his right to remain silent by any particular phrasing. In fact, the Supreme Court in Miranda stated, if the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-474, 86 S.Ct. 1602. When a defendant exercises his privilege against self-incrimination the validity of any subsequent waiver depends upon whether police have scrupulously honored his right to remain silent. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 102, 96 S.Ct. 321, 46 L.Ed.2d 313 (1975). Whether police have scrupulously honored an accused's right to silence is determined on a case-by-case basis under the totality of the circumstances. Id.; State v. Brooks, 505 So.2d 714, 722 (La.1987); State v. Harper, 430 So.2d 627, 633 (La.1983); State v. Thucos, 390 So.2d 1281, 1285 (La.1980); State v. Manning, 380 So.2d 46, 50 (La.1980). Factors going into the assessment include who initiates further questioning, although, significantly, police are not barred from reinitiating contact, Mosley, 423 U.S. at 103-104, 96 S.Ct. 321; cf. Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990) (invocation of right to counsel during custodial interrogation has greater protection than invocation of right to remain silent, as police may not thereafter question defendant unless he initiates further contact); whether there has been a substantial time delay between the original request and subsequent interrogation; whether Miranda warnings are given before subsequent questioning; whether signed Miranda waivers are obtained; and, whether the later interrogation is directed at a crime that had not been the subject of the earlier questioning. Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. at 105, 96 S.Ct. 321; Brooks, 505 So.2d at 722; Harper, 430 So.2d at 633. Here, many of the Michigan v. Mosley factors for determining scrupulous honoring of the right favor the state. Although Agent Manning approached defendant shortly after [4] defendant had already refused to speak with Agent Schmitt, Agent Manning was unaware of defendant's invocation of his right to silence. Instead, Agent Manning only knew defendant had received a verbal advisement of his Miranda rights. To secure a signed acknowledgment confirming defendant was read his rights, Agent Manning, following routine procedure, met with defendant and re-administered the Miranda warnings; thus, there is no showing that Agent Manning approached defendant with the intention of browbeating him into making a statement. At any rate, Agent Manning's recitation of Miranda rights can hardly be considered an interrogation. See State v. Holmes, 467 So.2d 1177, 1185 (La.App. 2d Cir.1985)(court reluctant to call officer's questioning of defendant an interrogation about the crime when he only asked defendant whether he understood his rights and would waive them). Furthermore, neither Agent Schmitt nor Agent Manning mentioned the charges against defendant. In fact, Agent Manning was aware only of the fact that defendant's name appeared on the NCIC computer. Given defendant was merely re-advised of his rights by a different officer who had no knowledge of the offenses committed by defendant, defendant's decision to change his mind and waive his rights and speak with Agent Manning was voluntary and intelligent and not the product of police misconduct. Cf. State v. Hohn, 95-2612, pp. 7-8 (La.App. 4 Cir. 1/19/96), 668 So.2d 454, 459 (agents failed to honor scrupulously request to remain silent when police initiated further questioning; time delay between original refusal and subsequent questioning was relatively brief; defendant was not advised of his rights before questioning, although he was advised when he began discussing his case; acknowledgment of rights was signed by defendant but not the waiver and the form was not presented to defendant until after his inculpatory statement had been made). Consequently, defendant fails to show the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress his statements.