Opinion ID: 6340648
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: conclusion

Text: For these reasons, because the district court imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence of imprisonment based on clearly erroneous facts or impermissible factors, this Court VACATES the sentence and REMANDS for re-sentencing. 2 On the one side of the debate are the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits. The Tenth Circuit reasons that Rule 32.1’s protections do not extend to the sentencing: “[T]he sentencing phase of a revocation hearing is governed by the rule surrounding normal sentencing, Rule 32, not Rule 32.1.” United States v. Ruby, 706 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2013). The Fifth Circuit appears to concur, finding Rule 32.1 did not require the district court to provide a defendant “with pre-sentencing notice of all points raised in the revocation sentencing colloquy.” United States v. Warren, 720 F.3d 321, 331 (5th Cir. 2013). In a similar, albeit distinct, vein, the Eleventh Circuit has found that waiver of a revocation hearing also waives any rights Rule 32.1 affords. United States v. Jones, 798 F. App’x 494, 497 (11th Cir. 2020). The Second Circuit grapples with Rule 32.1 primarily in the hearsay context, see United States v. Diaz, 986 F.3d 202 (2nd Cir. 2021), but seems to be in step with the finding from the Eleventh Circuit that waiving a revocation hearing waives Rule 32.1 rights. United States v. Shapiro, 711 F. App’x 25, 29 (2nd Cir. 2017). On the other side of the debate are the First, Eighth, Ninth and D.C. Circuits, which apply Rule 32.1 to the sentencing phase of revocation hearings, as least for certain purposes, such as timing and allocution. Of these Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has most firmly found that Rule 32.1 applies to the sentencing portion of a supervised release hearing. United States v. Reyes-Solosa, 761 F.3d 972, 974 (9th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted) (“We have said that sentencing procedures for probation and supervised release violations are primarily governed by Rule 32.1 . . . not Rule 32.”). The Eighth Circuit said: “We agree with the Ninth Circuit that Rules 32 and 32.1 are complementing rather than conflicting[.]” United States v. Patterson, 128 F.3d 1259, 1261 (8th Cir. 1997) (citing another source). Similarly, the D.C. Circuit has said: “[W]hen a court revokes a defendant’s supervised release, it is sentencing him.” United States v. Abney, 957 F.3d 241, 251 (D.C. Cir. 2020). The First Circuit has expressed some ambivalence but clearly leans towards finding that Rule 32.1 extends to sentencing procedures. United States v. Colon-Maldonado, 953 F.3d 1, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 2020) (citing another source) (“[W]e’ve already written that Rule 32.1 governs post-revocation sentencing. . . . Still, this statement . . . was arguably dictum[.]”). The Fourth Circuit is poised to add some clarity to this debate. Br. for the Appellee, United States v. Combs, (No. 21-4064) (4th Cir. 2021), 2021 WL 3616436. - 10 -