Opinion ID: 2557276
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Relevant Standards of Judicial Review

Text: We employ the same standards [of review] as would the circuit court, [for] the inquiry is not whether the circuit [or intermediate appellate] court erred, but rather whether the administrative agency erred. Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 160, 874 A.2d 919, 939 (2005) (citation omitted). The standards for judicial review of the action of state administrative agencies are derived from the Maryland Administrative Procedure Act (APA), codified at Title 10 of the State Government Article (SGA). In reviewing an agency decision, a court may, under Section 10-222(h): (1) remand the case for further proceedings; (2) affirm the final decision; or (3) reverse or modify the decision if any substantial right of the petitioner may have been prejudiced because a finding, conclusion, or decision: (i) is unconstitutional; (ii) exceeds the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the final decision maker; (iii) results from an unlawful procedure; (iv) is affected by any other error of law; (v) is unsupported by competent, material, and substantial evidence in light of the entire record as submitted; or (vi) is arbitrary or capricious. These provisions are instructive in understanding the applicable standards of review, as they lay out a basic analytical framework. See Spencer v. Md. State Bd. of Pharm., 380 Md. 515, 528, 846 A.2d 341, 348 (2004) (Section 10-222(h)(3)(i)-(vi) provides a statutory framework for understanding the scope of judicial review of agency decisions.). They do not provide, however, complete guidance, in and of themselves, how to approach each category of questions cognizable in a challenge to an agency decision. Appellate courts have devoted many pages to the consideration of the meaning (and implications) of this subject. See id. (Our jurisprudence has expanded on the meaning of these statutory provisions and provided guidance for their application by the courts.). We review challenges to an agency's conclusions of law ... [according to a generally non-deferential standard] for correctness. Schwartz v. Md. Dep't of Natural Res., 385 Md. 534, 554, 870 A.2d 168, 180 (2005); Spencer, 380 Md. at 528, 846 A.2d at 348-49. Interpreting the pure meaning of a statute is deemed a question of law. See Miller v. Comptroller of Md., 398 Md. 272, 280-81, 920 A.2d 467, 472 (2007) ([T]he question is one of statutory interpretation and [is], therefore, a purely legal inquiry.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted); State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation v. North Baltimore Ctr., Inc., 129 Md.App. 588, 595, 743 A.2d 759, 763 (2000) (The interpretation of a statute normally presents a question of law.) (citations omitted). In considering such an agency decision, however, [w]e frequently give weight to an agency's experience in interpretation of a statute that it administers. Schwartz, 385 Md. at 554, 870 A.2d at 180; see also Board of Physician Quality Assur. v. Banks, 354 Md. 59, 69, 729 A.2d 376, 381 (1999) (Even with regard to some legal issues, a degree of deference should often be accorded the position of the administrative agency.). That is especially true (and justified) where the implicated statutory provisions are ambiguous or unclear. Cf. Div. of Labor & Indus. v. Triangle Gen. Contrs., Inc., 366 Md. 407, 417, 784 A.2d 534, 539-40 (2001) ([W]hen a statutory provision is entirely clear, with no ambiguity whatsoever, administrative constructions, no matter how well entrenched, are not given weight.) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Defining the extent of that deference, however, remains an elusive snipe hunt. In Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 305 Md. 145, 161-62, 501 A.2d 1307, 1315 (1986), we explained that the proper quantum of deference turns on various considerations, including whether the agency (1) administers the statute it is interpreting, (2) developed its interpretation through a well-reasoned process, (3) in an adversarial proceeding or formal rule promulgation, and (4) consistently applied that interpretation for a long period of time. Thus, the amount of deference may be seen to fluctuate with the number of considerations present in a given record. [8] Maryland courts also recognize, and have for some time in Administrative Law matters particularly, the characterization of a mixed question of law and fact. See e.g., Ramsay, Scarlett & Co. v. Comptroller, 302 Md. 825, 837, 490 A.2d 1296, 1302 (1985). When a party challenges how an agency applied, as opposed to interpreted, a statute, he, she, or it raises a so-called mixed question. See id. (The difference between the [parties'] position[s]... [are] based essentially on differing viewsnot as to the law governing the casebut rather its proper application to the established evidence of record....); Charles County v. Vann, 382 Md. 286, 296, 855 A.2d 313, 319 (2004) (defining mixed questions as those where [t]he agency has correctly stated the law and its fact-finding is supported by the record, but the question is whether it has applied the law to the facts correctly). The central dispute, therefore, involves not an interpretation, but that last touch of selection (or discretion), which the agency had to exercise to make the statute meaningful and determinative in a particular case. FTC v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 484-87, 72 S.Ct. 800, 808-10, 96 L.Ed. 1081, 1092-94 (1952) (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Consumer Prot. Div. v. Morgan, 387 Md. 125, 874 A.2d 919 (2005) (construing the question presented as mixed because to calculate an appropriate fine amount the agency had to apply uncontested statutory factors to known facts). We review such mixed questions under the deferential substantial evidence standard. See Baltimore Lutheran High School Assoc. v. Employment Sec. Admin., 302 Md. 649, 662, 490 A.2d 701, 708 (1985) (elucidating the substantial evidence standard as such relevant evidence [that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion); see also Vann, 382 Md. at 298, 855 A.2d at 320 (Deferential review over mixed questions of law and fact is appropriate in order for the agency to fulfill its mandate and exercise its expertise.). [9] There is no dispute in the present case as to the material facts. Where there is such a dispute, we apply the very deferential substantial evidence test. Christopher v. Montgomery County Dep't of Health and Human Servs., 381 Md. 188, 199, 849 A.2d 46, 52 (2004) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).