Opinion ID: 900579
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Extraneous Evidence in Suppression Hearing

Text: [¶ 10.] Jackson contends that during the hearings on the motion to suppress, the circuit court considered information that was not presented in Evans' affidavit. She characterizes this extraneous information as highly inflammatory, prejudicial speculation. During these hearings, the court and counsel discussed various hypothetical circumstances encompassing the right to search persons arriving on the scene of a search being conducted with a search warrant. Whatever conclusions these remarks may have generated, they have no bearing on our independent review of the affidavit. Thus, Jackson's complaints in this respect are pointless. [¶ 11.] The determination of whether an affidavit in support of a search warrant shows probable cause for issuance of the warrant must be based upon an examination of the four corners of the affidavit. State v. Lodermeier, 481 N.W.2d 614, 622 (S.D.1992) (quoting State v. Iverson, 364 N.W.2d 518, 522 (S.D. 1985)); State v. Smith, 281 N.W.2d 430, 433 (S.D.1979). Reasonable inferences may be drawn from the information in the affidavit. Lodermeier, 481 N.W.2d at 622 (citing State v. Kaseman, 273 N.W.2d 716, 722-23 (S.D.1978)). When reviewing a judge's probable cause determination, the only evidence to be considered is what was before the judge at the time the application was made. Smith, 281 N.W.2d at 433 (citing State v. Gerber, 90 S.D. 432, 241 N.W.2d 720 (1976)). Therefore, the existence of probable cause for the search warrant must rise or fall on the affidavit itself which was the only evidence presented to the magistrate for his determination of probable cause. Id.; State v. Gage, 302 N.W.2d 793, 796-97 (S.D.1981).