Opinion ID: 1893188
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Trial delay.

Text: Bonner asserts that the delay itself prejudiced him because the jurors were allowed to roam at large for 55 days with the State's side of the story in their minds, citing People v. Dinsmore, 102 Cal. 381, 36 P. 661 (1894), and People v. Logan, 123 Cal. 411, 56 P. 56 (1899). In Dinsmore, supra, an exceptional case, it was held an abuse of discretion for the trial court to discharge the jury for sixty-three days, on motion by the State and against the objection of the defendant, for the purpose of continuing the testimony of a witness who had become ill, where the situation was occasioned by no fault or act of the defendant and where the defendant was charged with a peculiarly aggravated offense (rape) which was well calculated to arouse the feelings and passions of the people of the surrounding country. In Logan, supra, a case involving the alleged rape of a young girl, it was held that the trial court properly refused to continue a trial for two months, prior to the introduction of any evidence but after the jury was impaneled, on the ground of the illness of a witness. The court, citing Dinsmore, said that the granting of such a continuance would have been reversible error. A trial court's decision whether or not to continue a criminal trial is a discretionary act. State v. Larson, 253 N.W.2d 433, 435 (N.D.1977); § 29-19-03, N.D.C.C.; Rule 50, N.D.R.Crim.P. It is also within the discretion of the trial court to permit the jury to separate during trial. § 29-21-27, N.D.C.C.; State v. Glass, 29 N.D. 620, 151 N.W. 229, 232 (1915). For separation to constitute reversible error there must be an objection supported by an affirmative showing that the defendant was prejudiced because of the separation. State v. Bergeron, 340 N.W.2d 51, 59 (N.D. 1983). No case involving circumstances identical to this case has been cited by either party. In most cases, however, where the trial court has permitted the jury, under proper admonitions, to separate during long periods during which the trial was postponed or continued, the defendant has been denied relief because of such separation, either because the court had authority to permit the separation, or the defendant failed to establish prejudice. Annot., Separation of Jury During Trial, 72 A.L.R.3d 131. E.g., Packwood v. State, 244 Ind. 585, 193 N.E.2d 494 (1963). In the instant case, the court admonished the jury, prior to separation, to avoid activity that might affect its impartiality. There has been no showing of the occurrence of any event or circumstances during the prolonged separation capable of prejudicing the deliberative function of the jury. Furthermore, no objection was made at trial by attorney Brown to the delay itself. In fact, in requesting that the court poll the jury concerning the newspaper article, Brown said: If we have a good jury, I don't want to knock out a good jury,.... Bonner's own conduct necessitated the withdrawal of his counsel. See n. 1, supra. We believe that the trial court's decision to delay the trial as a result of the withdrawal struck an appropriate balance between Bonner's right to adequate representation of counsel and a fair trial, and the possibility of jury prejudice and the public interest in the prompt and efficient administration of justice. Considering the totality of circumstances, we cannot say that Bonner has demonstrated the existence of prejudice in law or fact on this issue. The trial court was acting within its discretion when it proceeded to trial with the same jury.