Opinion ID: 791669
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Cao's Motion to Remand

Text: 30 Cao fulfilled all that was required of him to support a motion to remand grounded on new evidence under 8 C.F.R. § 3.2(c)(1). He informed the BIA that his wife had entered the country, and was now available to testify in corroboration of the facts underlying his claim. He attached to his motion a copy of her sworn statement in support of her own asylum claim, which corroborates Cao's testimony in all significant respects, including the key matter of her forced abortion. He also attached records from his wife's medical examination in the United States, and proof of the birth of their second child in the United States. Cao thus fulfilled his obligation to recite and corroborate the existence of new evidence that would be presented at a new hearing. He argued both that future persecution by Chinese family planning authorities would be more likely now that the couple has an additional child, and that the new evidence-including his wife's testimony and hospital records as well as the birth of their second child-was corroborative of his original claim that he and his wife had suffered past persecution for their opposition to the one family, one child policy while in China. 31 The evidence that Cao articulated is certainly material to his asylum claim and was certainly not available at the time of his original hearing. The in-court testimony of Cao's wife and her medical records from the United States were not available before his wife's arrival in the United States, and because this evidence tends to prove that Cao's wife suffered a forced abortion, it is clearly material to his claim of past persecution, which is largely predicated on his wife's forced abortion. Evidence of the birth of Cao's second child was also certainly not available when the child had not yet been born. This evidence is obviously material to the likelihood that Cao would suffer future persecution because it establishes that he is in violation of Chinese family planning policy, and is also arguably material to Cao's claim of past persecution in that it tends to corroborate his testimony that he and his wife have sought to have children in excess of the limitations imposed by that policy. We note that, according to the State Department's 1998 country conditions report, Chinese family planning policy prohibited couples in Cao's home province of Fujian from having a second child unless the first was female and the children were separated by at least four years. 32 The BIA, describing Cao's motion as one based on changed circumstances predicated on the birth of his second child in the United States, denied the motion stating only that he had provided few facts about the present basis for his claim and no evidence showing any possibility that a person in his circumstances would be persecuted if returned to China. The BIA's order is devoid of any language addressing Cao's principal argument — that his wife's testimony, medical records, and childbirth constituted new corroborative evidence that cast doubt on the IJ's finding that his testimony regarding past persecution in the form of his wife's forced abortion could not be credited. As in Blanco, [t]o the extent [the BIA] ruled on the issue that was before it, [it] ignored the principal evidence advanced by the petitioner, 68 F.3d at 646 — evidence that his wife was subjected to a forced abortion in China. 33 The BIA abused its discretion by failing to address the principal evidence and argument on which Cao relied in seeking remand to the IJ. Furthermore, while a heavy burden must be met in order to prevail on a motion to remand for consideration of new evidence, Cao appears to have met that burden here, as his wife's testimony, if credited, would conclusively establish his eligibility for asylum. See Zhao, 265 F.3d at 95-96. In Zhao we held that the BIA abused its discretion when it denied a motion to reopen for consideration of previously unavailable medical evidence that the petitioner's wife had been sterilized. Id. at 88-89, 93. The BIA had denied the motion, stating only that the sterilization occurred prior to the original hearing and that therefore the medical evidence could have been collected and presented at that time. Id. at 89. Describing the latter finding as one based on improper[]. . . speculation, id. at 96, and finding the BIA's decision ambiguous, we remanded for clarification from the BIA of whether it had actually found as a matter of fact that the sterilization occurred, but we stated that in the event that the BIA was to respond that it did not so find, petitioner must be granted a new hearing for the purpose of determining whether his wife was forcibly sterilized, because under the specific circumstances of this case . . . [petitioner's] burden to prove that the medical evidence was not previously available was met, id., and, in light of that medical evidence, the BIA's explanation of its reasons for denying the petitioner the opportunity to present evidence at a new hearing, which made reference only to the requirement of previous unavailability, was inadequate, id. at 95. 34 Under Zhao, where a petitioner has met his burden to present material, previously unavailable evidence and that evidence, if credited, would establish the petitioner's prima facie eligibility for asylum, we will remand with instructions that the BIA grant the petitioner's motion to remand unless it determines that the motion should be denied for reasons independent of the petitioner's burden to present such evidence. See 265 F.3d at 95-96. 35 The facts of the instant case militate just as strongly for such an order as those of Zhao. Here, Cao plainly met his burden to establish the existence of material, previously unavailable evidence, and if credited, that evidence would clearly establish his eligibility for asylum under C-Y-Z- . The BIA, nevertheless, denied his motion to remand for wholly inadequate reasons. In fact, the considerations supporting remand here are stronger than were those present in Zhao. Here, not only are previously unavailable medical records now available to substantiate that Cao's wife has had an abortion, but Cao's wife herself is now available to testify in support of Cao's asylum claim, and may therefore corroborate other elements of Cao's story, including the forced character of the abortion. This extent of corroboration is greater than was presented in Zhao. The new evidence that is now available tends to undermine the IJ's reliance on Cao's lack of corroboration of his wife's forced abortion and other events of which his wife should have personal knowledge. Moreover, Cao's new evidence directly supports his claim, and, if credited, may establish his eligibility for asylum under C-Y-Z- regardless of whether he was himself deemed credible. 36 We conclude that remand is necessary to allow the BIA either to grant Cao's motion to remand for a new hearing before the IJ, or to articulate an adequate reason for denying that motion. Because of the possibility that Cao will be granted a new hearing, it is not necessary for us, at this time, to consider the significant issues that Cao raises regarding the IJ's decision on the merits of his claim, such as (1) whether the IJ relied on speculation not supported by substantial evidence in finding that Cao could reasonably be expected to obtain authentication of his official Chinese documents and that because he failed to do so they were entitled to limited weight; and (2) whether substantial evidence supported the IJ's findings that (a) Cao's testimony contained internal contradictions because he twice corrected himself as to the date on which events occurred, and because he stated that a private doctor examined his wife at a public hospital, (b) Cao's marriage certificate and household registry were inconsistent as to the date of his marriage, and (c) Cao's testimony was inconsistent with the State Department's China country conditions reports. While we need not address these issues ourselves in light of our disposition of this case, we note them in order to bring them to the attention of the IJ and BIA should the IJ or BIA wish to address them during the course of the proceedings on remand.