Opinion ID: 2051397
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did the Trial Court Abuse its Discretion in Refusing to Declare a Mistrial due to Prosecutorial Misconduct?

Text: A. Standard of review. [T]rial courts [have] broad discretion in ruling on claims of prosecutorial misconduct. State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 676 (Iowa 1993). Therefore, we review a district court's ruling on a motion for mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct for abuse of discretion. See id. We find an abuse of discretion only where (1) there is misconduct, and (2) the defendant was so prejudiced by the misconduct as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Anderson, 448 N.W.2d 32, 33 (Iowa 1989). Thus, [i]t is not the prosecutor's misconduct [that] entitles a defendant to a new trial, but rather any resulting prejudice [that] prevents the trial from being a fair one. Id. B. Background facts. After his arrest, Reese gave an incriminating statement to the police. In that statement he admitted purchasing two eight balls of methamphetamine from Paradine on the day the search warrants were executed. He also admitted that he had purchased drugs from Paradine in the past. In addition to incriminating himself, he also inculpated Paul Greene and another man by the name of Paul, the confidential informant used by the authorities in its investigation of the defendants. This statement became a focal point when the State sought to consolidate the trials of Reese and Greene. Greene objected, claiming he would be unfairly prejudiced by a joint trial due to the inculpatory statement given by Reese. Greene filed a motion to sever and, in the alternative, asked that Reese's statements implicating Greene be excluded. The court denied the motion to sever, but ruled that [t]he State shall present no evidence that Reese made any statement inculpating Greene. The State shall instruct its witnesses accordingly and shall excise from defendant Reese's written statement all inculpatory references to defendant Greene. (Emphasis added.) During the direct examination of Paradine, the prosecutor attempted to elicit testimony from the witness as to whether she had any information that one of the eight balls found on Reese was, in fact, for Greene. Greene moved for a mistrial. He argued that the State had violated the trial court's pretrial order prohibiting testimony concerning Reese's inculpatory statements about Greene. This order was violated because, Greene contended, any knowledge of Paradine as to who the eight balls were for came from Reese. The prosecutor replied that her question had not been about Reese's statement, but about Paradine's understanding. The court agreed that the prosecutor's question did not call for a repetition of any statement by Reese, and so overruled Greene's motion for a mistrial. Paradine then answered the prosecutor's question, stating that she did not remember who the eight balls were for. Later in the trial Reese's statement was read into evidence with all references to Greene redacted. Greene made a second motion for mistrial during closing arguments. At that time the prosecutor said: [I]n this confession defendant Reese indicates he was getting 1/8th for himself. When he said 1/8th, doesn't mean 1/8th for his personal use. Don't be confused on that. Kim Paradine testified the other one was for defendant Greene. So it's a joint operation. (Emphasis added.) Greene argued again that the State was bringing up material that had been redacted from Reese's statement, in violation of the court's pretrial order. Again, the court overruled Greene's motion, agreeing with the State that the prosecutor was not talking about any statement by Reese, but rather about what Paradine said. Notwithstanding the court's denial of Greene's motion for mistrial, the court admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statements. On appeal, Greene argues that the court abused its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial. He claims that the prosecutor's examination of Paradine and the prosecutor's statement in closing argument in reference to this examination violated the court's pretrial order excluding any statements of Reese that were inculpatory of Greene. Greene also claims that the prosecutor misrepresented Paradine's testimony insofar as Paradine never testified that one of the eight balls was for Greene; to the contrary, Paradine stated that she could not remember. [1] C. Prosecutorial misconduct. We first consider whether there was prosecutorial misconduct. We agree with the trial court's conclusion that the prosecutor's questioning of Paradine and later reference to Paradine's testimony did not violate the court's pretrial order. This questioning was directed to Paradine's knowledge, not to statements made by Reese to the police after his arrest. Even though Paradine's knowledge may have been based on statements made by Reese, they were statements made to her, not to the police, and therefore were not encompassed within the court's pretrial ruling. We are, however, concerned about the prosecutor's misrepresentation of Paradine's testimony. As this court has previously pointed out, [i]n closing arguments, counsel is allowed some latitude. Counsel may draw conclusions and argue permissible inferences which reasonably flow from the evidence presented. However, counsel has no right to create evidence or to misstate the facts.  Thornton, 498 N.W.2d at 676 (emphasis added). The State acknowledges on appeal that the prosecutor's argument did not accurately describe Paradine's testimony. Not only do we agree that the argument was inaccurate, we cannot attribute the prosecutor's statement to a slip of the tongue. The admissibility of Paradine's testimony as to what Reese told her when he purchased the methamphetamine from her was the subject of debate on at least two occasions outside the presence of the jury. Moreover, the prosecutor's question of Paradine as to whether one of the eight balls was for Greene was the basis for a motion for mistrial. It is hard to believe that under these circumstances the prosecutor would forget Paradine's answer. We conclude the prosecutor was guilty of misconduct. D. Prejudice. We next appraise whether the prosecutor's misconduct deprived Greene of a fair trial. In doing so, we consider the whole trial, including the court's admonition to the jury. Anderson, 448 N.W.2d at 33. Whether the incident was isolated or one of many is also relevant; prejudice results more readily from persistent efforts to place prejudicial evidence before the jury. See id. Finally, we consider whether the evidence against the defendant is strong. See id. A consideration of these factors leads us to the conclusion that the defendant was not prejudiced by the prosecutor's misconduct. We first note that the court admonished the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement. Second, the prosecutor's mischaracterization of Paradine's testimony was an isolated incident. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the evidence in this case was exceedingly strong. The misrepresented testimony about Reese's purchase of methamphetamine for Greene was pertinent to the charge of possession of methamphetamine with intent to deliver. See Iowa Code § 124.401(1)(c). The State's theory on this charge was that Greene aided or abetted Reese's purchase of methamphetamine on the day in question, that Greene and Reese were involved in a common scheme to possess methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, or that Greene conspired with Reese to possess the methamphetamine. The evidence in support of this charge was strong and overwhelming. Paradine testified that Greene and Reese, separately and together, had been regularly buying methamphetamine from her for about eight months, generally in quantities of an eight ball or more. There was expert testimony that such quantities are consistent with drug trafficking, not personal use. Paradine's testimony was corroborated by several other witnesses who had seen Greene and Reese together at Paradine's house, buying methamphetamine or waiting to buy it. Another witness saw Reese and Greene selling methamphetamine at their trailer and several witnesses testified they had purchased methamphetamine from Greene. The trailer occupied by Reese, Greene, and Kane contained many items consistent with trafficking in methamphetamine such as records of sales, a snitch list, trifolds for packaging small amounts of the drug, a cutting agent, and scales. As the State argues, [t]his evidence amply warranted the conclusion that Greene and Reese were jointly involved in an on-going methamphetamine-trafficking scheme. The events on the day Reese purchased the methamphetamine in question are also consistent with this conclusion. Reese and Kane left the trailer they shared with Greene and purchased 6.86 grams of methamphetamine at Paradine's house. This was an amount that exceeded what one would have for personal use. After making this purchase, Reese and Kane returned to the trailer where Greene had remained with four persons who were not residents of the trailer. It is reasonable to infer that Greene was waiting with potential customers while his co-conspirators obtained the drugs. In summary, we think the prosecutor's isolated misrepresentation of Paradine's testimony is insignificant in the context of the overwhelming evidence showing that Reese and Greene were engaged in an on-going drug-trafficking enterprise. Therefore, Greene was not deprived of a fair trial by the prosecutor's misconduct and accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a mistrial.