Opinion ID: 1152592
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claimed Davenport error.

Text: (38) Section 190.3 sets out the factors in aggravation and mitigation that the jury may consider in determining the appropriate penalty. We have held that it is improper for a prosecutor to argue that the absence of evidence of a statutory factor in mitigation permits or requires that the factor be considered in aggravation. ( People v. Davenport (1985) 41 Cal.3d 247, 289 [221 Cal. Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861].) Defendant argues, and the People concede, the prosecutor erred in arguing to the jury that the absence of evidence of certain factors in mitigation was a factor in aggravation. [19] In this post- Davenport trial, defendant failed to object to these statements, and the claim was waived. ( People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 939; People v. Webb (1993) 6 Cal.4th 494, 533 [24 Cal. Rptr.2d 779, 862 P.2d 779].) Defendant claims that any failure to object was ineffective assistance of counsel. We disagree. As we have said before, mere failure to object to argument seldom establishes counsel's incompetence. ( People v. Douglas (1990) 50 Cal.3d 468, 539 [268 Cal. Rptr. 126, 788 P.2d 640].) We have repeatedly held that the prosecutorial comment to which defendant now objects is nonprejudicial. ( People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 939; People v. Montiel (1993) 5 Cal.4th 877, 937 [21 Cal. Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277].) Here, as we explain, defendant is unable to show there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel's failure to object, defendant would have received a more favorable determination. ( Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 697-698].) We have said that the transgression must be viewed in the context of both the prosecution and defense arguments and the court's instructions to determine whether we can `be confident that the jury properly understood the nature of the weighing process and its relation to the appropriateness determination....' ( People v. Cox, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 683-684.) In the present case, contrary to defendant's claim that the prosecutor's main argument in aggravation was the asserted absence of evidence of the factors in mitigation, the prosecutor stressed the aggravated nature of the charged crimes, relevant under section 190.3, factor (a), as the main basis for a determination that the verdict should be death. Given the evidence of the circumstances of the charged crime, as well as the other evidence of defendant's prior violent conduct, relevant under section 190.3, factor (b), we cannot accept defendant's claim that had the jury not been told to treat the absence of evidence in mitigation as evidence in aggravation, there would have been little evidence upon which to base a death judgment. Further, as in the similar case of People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159], the prosecutor assured the jury it was free to reject his characterization of the evidence and the weight to be applied to the statutory factors. Defense counsel properly argued that certain factors in mitigation were inapplicable, and strongly urged the jury to look at the totality of the circumstances rather than mechanically adding up the factors. Nor are the mere number of potential mitigating factors mentioned in the argument suggestive of prejudice. (See People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1234.) Further, the jury was instructed to consider only those sentencing factors it deemed applicable, to weigh the statutory factors and assess whatever value it deemed appropriate to them, to reach a determination of what penalty it deemed appropriate without a process of mechanical weighing of factors, and to impose the death penalty only if each juror determined the aggravating evidence was so substantial in comparison with the mitigating circumstances that it warranted death. These instructions helped assure that the jury was not misled ( People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 937; People v. Gonzalez, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1234), and permit us to assume the jury understood how to evaluate the absence of a particular mitigating factor ( People v. Whitt (1990) 51 Cal.3d 620, 654 [274 Cal. Rptr. 252, 798 P.2d 849]). Such properly instructed jurors were unlikely to give substantial aggravating weight to the absence of obviously mitigating factors, such as victim participation or consent, belief in moral justification, or extreme duress or domination, which are rarely present in capital homicides. ( People v. Turner, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 714.) Because we conclude there is no reasonable possibility the jury was misled, we see no reasonable probability that but for counsel's omission, defendant would have received a more favorable determination.