Opinion ID: 2611853
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ultimate Fact

Text: Another fallacy in defendant's argument is exposed by examining the requirement that the issue to be foreclosed be of ultimate fact. ( Ashe, supra, 397 U.S. at p. 443 [25 L.Ed.2d at p. 475].) Identity of the defendant in Ashe as one of the robbers was clearly an ultimate fact; it had to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt for him to be found guilty of that robbery no matter what the rest of the evidence showed. Knife use is just as clearly an ultimate fact as to the use enhancement. But it is not an ultimate fact of murder. In Dowling v. United States, supra, 493 U.S. 342, during the trial for one crime, the prosecution presented evidence of another crime for which the defendant had previously been tried and acquitted. The defendant argued this violated the collateral estoppel rule of Ashe. The high court disagreed because, unlike the situation in Ashe v. Swenson , the prior acquittal did not determine an ultimate issue in the present case. ( Dowling v. United States, supra, 493 U.S. at p. 348 [107 L.Ed.2d at p. 717].) The court assume[d] for the sake of argument that Dowling's acquittal established that there was a reasonable doubt as to whether Dowling was the [man who entered the house where the other crime was committed]. ( Ibid. ) But the court noted that the prosecution did not have to prove that fact beyond a reasonable doubt for the evidence to be admissible at the second trial; thus, the collateral-estoppel component of the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapposite. ( Id. at p. 349 [107 L.Ed.2d at p. 718].) Dowling involved separate prosecutions, not a retrial. Two recent decisions that, like this case, did involve a retrial analyzed the relevance of Dowling to this situation. They independently reached the same conclusion, a conclusion fatal to defendant's position. The first decision, U.S. v. Seley (9th Cir.1992) 957 F.2d 717, 723, noted that  Dowling did not alter Ashe so much as it introduced a new perspective on the meaning of the `ultimate fact' decided in the first trial. (11) Instead of meaning that certain acts did not happen, an acquittal means that they were not proved beyond a reasonable doubt. If an act that could have been proved to a lesser degree than that required for conviction is for some reason probative in a subsequent trial, it need not be excluded because of the prior acquittal. (Italics added.) The second decision, U.S. v. Bailin, supra, 977 F.2d at page 280, stated,  Dowling thus establishes that issue preclusion in criminal cases only applies when the relevant issue is `ultimate' in the subsequent prosecution, i.e., when the issue must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. (3h) These cases confirm that the jury's not true finding on the enhancement allegation does not mean defendant did not use the knife, only that there was a reasonable doubt that he did. In Ashe, the verdict, viewed realistically, showed the jury had a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's identity as the robber. That doubt necessarily precluded conviction of the robbery charge. But the same doubt as to knife use did not preclude a murder conviction here, although it did mandate a not true enhancement finding. Evidence that defendant personally used a knife was highly relevant to show that he was guilty of murder as that offense is defined by statute. That evidence, together with the evidence that if he did not use a knife, he was guilty as the aider and abettor, combined to permit the murder conviction. But the specific fact of personal use does not have to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt to find defendant guilty of murder. Hence, personal use is not an ultimate fact of murder. We thus hold that collateral estoppel does not apply. We disapprove of the contrary conclusion of People v. White, supra, 185 Cal. App.3d 822. [10]