Opinion ID: 173269
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Reference to Lopez-Medina's Weight Gain

Text: Fowers testified to gaining a significant amount of weight since he stopped using methamphetamine. During cross-examination, the government elicited testimony from Lopez-Medina that he had gained 23 pounds since his arrest. In closing argument, the prosecution referred to Lopez-Medina's post-arrest weight gain, arguing it was because he's not using methamphetamine anymore. (R. Supp. Vol. I, Doc. 181 at 58.) Counsel then compared it to Fowers' weight gain and argued: Methamphetamine causes you to lose weight, but not necessarily in a good way. ( Id. ) Lopez-Medina contends this was error because it informed the jury he was incarcerated and presented the prosecutors as behavioral and methamphetamine experts. (Appellant's Br. at 57.) The government contends this was a permissible argument based on the evidence and tend[ed] to make it more likely than not that Lopez-Medina had used drugs as Kiesz testified. (Appellee's Br. at 63.) While we agree the prosecution's statement corroborated Kiesz's testimony concerning Lopez-Medina's drug use, we do not agree this was a permissible argument based on the evidence. [T]he cardinal rule of closing argument [is] that counsel must confine comments to evidence in the record and to reasonable inferences from that evidence. Whittenburg v. Werner Enters. Inc., 561 F.3d 1122, 1128-29 (10th Cir.2009). Here, there was no testimony regarding the connection between the cessation of methamphetamine use and weight gain. Thus, the prosecutor's statements connecting the two were impermissible personal opinion. See United States v. Jones, 468 F.3d 704, 708 (10th Cir.2006) (A prosecutor may not express his personal opinion....). However, they do not constitute plain error because they neither affected Lopez-Medina's substantial rights nor seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. See Ruiz-Terrazas, 477 F.3d at 1199. We have often held that a stray improper remark in closing is no basis for upsetting a trial and requiring the parties and district court to redo their ordeal. Whittenburg, 561 F.3d at 1131. This is especially true where, as here, the jury is advised that arguments of counsel are not evidence. See id.