Opinion ID: 783542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: FMLA Individual Liability for Public Agency Employers

Text: 72 Mitchell's final assertion on appeal is that the district court erroneously interpreted the FMLA as to preclude individual liability claims against public agency employers. The issue of whether the FMLA provides for individual liability against a public employer is a matter of first impression for this Court. 73 Under accepted canons of statutory interpretation, we must interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous. See Lake Cumberland Trust, Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection Agency, 954 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir.1992) (citation omitted). The plain meaning of the statute controls, except in rare cases in which the literal application of the statutory language would compel an odd result or produce a result demonstrably at odds with legislative intent. See Public Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989). We must begin with the statute's plain language, and may resort to a review of congressional intent or legislative history only when the language of the statute is not clear. See In re Comshare, Inc., 183 F.3d 542, 549 (6th Cir.1999) (citing Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). 74 Turning to the statute, the FMLA entitles eligible employees to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave in any twelve-month period for qualifying medical or family reasons. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1). The statute ensures that the employee will be restored to the same or an equivalent position upon returning to work. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a)(1). 75 The statute creates a private right of action entitling eligible employees to seek both equitable relief and money damages against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction, 29 U.S.C. § 2617(a)(2), should that employer interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of FMLA rights, 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1). 76 The FMLA expressly incorporates into its provisions the Fair Labor Standards Act's (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994), definition of employee. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (The terms `employ', `employee', and `State' have the same meanings given such terms in subsections (c), (e), and (g) of section 203 of this title [the FLSA].). The FLSA defines employee as any individual employed by an employer and includes any individual employed by the United States Postal Service. 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(1) & (2)(B). An eligible employee under the FMLA is an employee who has been employed for at least 12 months by the employer with respect to whom leave is requested...; and for at least 1,250 hours of service with such employer during the previous 12-month period. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A). The FMLA defines employer as follows: 77 (4) Employer 78 (A) In general 79 The term employer — 80 (i) means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or proceeding calendar year; 81 (ii) includes — 82 (I) any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of an employer to any employees of such employer; and 83 (II) any successor in interest of the employer; 84 (iii) includes any public agency, as defined in section 203(x) of this title; and 85 (iv) includes the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress. 86 (B) Public agency. 87 For purposes of subparagraph (A)(iii), a public agency shall be considered to be a person engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 2611. 16 88 The issue of whether the FMLA imposes individual liability turns on an interpretation of the term employer. Of particular pertinence, the FMLA defines an employer, in part, as any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of the employer. 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I). This language mirrors the FLSA's definition of employer. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) with 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of any employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, but does not include a labor agency....). This is not a coincidence. The applicable regulations indicate: 89 An employer [under the FMLA] includes any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer to any of the employer's employees. The definition of employer in section 3(d) of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), similarly includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee. As under the FLSA, individuals such as corporate officers acting in the interest of an employer are individually liable for any violations of the requirements of the FMLA. 90 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d); 17 see also Chandler v. Specialty Tires of Am., 283 F.3d 818, 827 (6th Cir.2002) (recognizing that the provisions of the FMLA generally mirror those provided in the FLSA) (citation omitted). This Court has interpreted the FLSA's any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of the employer language to impose individual liability on private-sector employers. See United States Dep't of Labor v. Cole Enters., Inc., 62 F.3d 775 (6th Cir.1995); Fegley v. Higgins, 19 F.3d 1126 (6th Cir.1994). The presence of identical language in the FMLA tends to support a similar finding. See Darby v. Bratch, 287 F.3d 673, 681 (8th Cir.2002) (comparing the FMLA and FLSA definitions of employer and determining that each statute imposes individual liability); see also Cantley v. Simmons, 179 F.Supp.2d 654, 655-58 (S.D.W.Va. 2002) ([I]ndividual liability is permitted under the FMLA.); Brunelle v. Cytec Plastics, 225 F.Supp.2d 67, 82 (D.Me.2002) (holding that individual liability under the FMLA arises from a similar definition of employer under the FLSA); Richardson v. CVS Corp., 207 F.Supp.2d 733, 741-44 (E.D.Tenn.2001) (finding that the majority of the courts have found that individuals can be subject to liability under the FMLA); Morrow v. Putnam, 142 F.Supp.2d 1271, 1275-76 (D.Nev.2001) (holding that individual liability exists under the FMLA); Longstreth v. Copple, 101 F.Supp.2d 776, 780 (N.D.Iowa) (same); Carpenter v. Refrigeration Sales Corp., 49 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1030 (N.D.Ohio 1999) (recognizing that the majority of courts extend individual liability in FMLA claims); Meara v. Bennett, 27 F.Supp.2d 288, 290 (D.Mass.1998) (Although the court has not been able to locate any Court of Appeals decisions addressing the issue of individual liability under the recently enacted FMLA, the decisional law developing at the district court level appears to favor individual liability.); Bryant v. Delbar Prods., Inc., 18 F.Supp.2d 799, 807-09 (M.D.Tenn.1998) (noting that the majority of courts have determined that the FMLA extends individual liability to those who control a plaintiff's ability to take a leave of absence); Mercer v. Borden, 11 F.Supp.2d 1190, 1190 (C.D.Cal.1998) (Since the definition of `employer' in the FMLA is identical to the definition of `employer' in the [Fair Labor Standards Act], the Court holds that individuals are potentially subject to liability under the FMLA. The plain language of the FMLA compels this result.); Rupnow v. TRC, Inc., 999 F.Supp. 1047, 1048 (N.D.Ohio 1998) ([T]he weight of authority favors individual liability for a supervisor where the `supervisor exercise[s] sufficient control over the plaintiff's ability to take protected leave.'); Stubl v. T.A. Systems, Inc., 984 F.Supp. 1075, 1083 (E.D.Mich.1997) (Although reasonable arguments could be made that the policy rationale underlying the Title VII decisions finding no individual liability should dictate the same result under the FMLA, the plain language of the statute and the regulations mandate otherwise.); Waters v. Baldwin County, 936 F.Supp. 860, 863 (S.D.Ala.1996) (finding that employer as used in the FMLA parallels employer in the FLSA; therefore, individual liability exists under the FMLA); Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F.Supp. 659, 664 (D.Md.1996) (Liability of individual defendants in their individual capacities is not foreclosed under the FMLA.); Johnson v. A.P. Prod., Ltd., 934 F.Supp. 625 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (holding that employer in the FMLA mirrors that used in the FLSA which imposes individual liability); Freemon v. Foley, 911 F.Supp. 326 (N.D.Ill.1991) (same). 18 91 However, the narrow issue before this Court is whether the FMLA imposes individual liability on public agency employers. The FMLA's definition of employer segregates the specific provision regarding individual liability (i.e., the directly or indirectly clause), see 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii)(I) (hereinafter the individual liability provision), from the specific provision addressing public agency employers, see 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iii) (hereinafter the public agency provision). The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has determined that this separation is of little interpretative import, noting that it did not see `why public officials should be exempted from liability while managers in the private sector are not.' Darby, 287 F.3d at 681 (quoting Morrow, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1275). In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit has determined that the FMLA does not impose individual liability on employees of public agencies. See Wascura v. Carver, 169 F.3d at 683, 686 (11th Cir.1999). 92 Notwithstanding the guidance from these decisions, we respectfully note that neither Darby nor Wascura attempt a textual analysis of the FMLA. The court in Darby limited its reasoning to the general proposition that public and private employers should not be treated separately under the statute. See Darby, 287 F.3d at 681. The Wascura court concluded that it was constrained by a prior decision of that court that did not extend individual liability under the FLSA to public agency employers. See Wascura, 169 F.3d at 686 (citing Welch v. Laney, 57 F.3d 1004 (11th Cir.1995)). By addressing the issue in terms of the FLSA, the Eleventh Circuit avoided the potential interpretive dilemma posed in 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4). 93 Similarly, the district courts have resolved the issue with conflicting results. See Morrow, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1273 (allowing FMLA suit against individual postal supervisors); Keene, 127 F.Supp.2d at 776 (holding no governmental individual liability under the FMLA); Kilvitis v. County of Luzerne, 52 F.Supp.2d 403, 412 (M.D.Pa. 1999) (allowing FMLA suit against district justice in individual capacity); Meara, 27 F.Supp.2d at 291 (allowing FMLA suit against the district attorney in his individual capacity); Knussman, 935 F.Supp. at 664 (allowing FMLA individual capacity suit against officers in state highway patrol); Freemon, 911 F.Supp. at 330-31 (allowing FMLA supervisory liability claim against state hospital employee); Frizzell, 906 F.Supp. at 449 (determining no supervisory liability for public officials under the FMLA). 94 Our independent examination of the FMLA's text and structure reveals that the statute does not impose individual liability on public agency employers. Three factors compel this conclusion. 95 First, the section defining employer, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A), explicitly separates the individual liability provision and public agency provision into two distinct clauses. Section 2611(4)(A) 19 commences with `The term employer —', and follows with four clauses addressing what the term employer means and includes. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A). The use of an em dash following employer indicates that clauses (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv) modify the term employer. 20 Therefore, the plain text of the statute provides the following definition of employer: 96 (1) An employer means any person engaged in commerce or in any industry or activity affecting commerce who employs 50 or more employees for each working day during each of the 20 or more calendar workweeks in the current or proceeding calendar year. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i). 97 (2) An employer includes any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer to any of the employees of such employer; and an employer includes any successor in interest of an employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii). 98 (3) An employer includes any public agency as that term is defined in the FLSA. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iii). 99 (4) An employer includes the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress. 21 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(iv). 100 The relationship between employer and clauses (i)-(iv) is not in contention. Rather, it is the purported interrelationship among clauses (i)-(iv) that yields conflicting views regarding whether the FMLA imposes individual liability on public agency employers. Compare Keene, 127 F.Supp.2d at 775 (explaining that Congress separated the individual liability provision from the public agency provision in an effort to clarify the commingling of public agency and private employers evident in the FLSA) with Morrow, 142 F.Supp.2d at 1273 (interpreting the individual liability provision and public agency provision as inter-related.) An examination of Section 2611(4)(A)'s text and structure demonstrates that the individual liability provision and public agency provision are separate and distinct. 101 As noted earlier, the FMLA introduces related provisions through the use of the em dash. In accordance with this practice, Section 2611(4)(A) implements the em dash into its definition of employer. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A). Similarly, Section 2611(4)(A)(ii) utilizes the em dash to establish a relationship between the individual liability provision and the provision addressing successors in interest. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii). Notwithstanding this repeated and consistent use of the em dash, Section 2611(4)(A) lacks any punctuation demonstrating an inter-relationship between clauses (ii)-(iv). Indeed, the separation of otherwise related concepts (i.e., what the term employer includes) into distinctly enumerated clauses compels an interpretation that treats each clause in an independent manner. This is particularly the case in light of clause (ii)'s inclusion of an em dash preceding the individual liability provision and successor in interest provision. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(ii). It stands to reason that if clauses (ii)-(iv) are similarly inter-related, the text of the statute would likewise provide punctuation or analogous language linking the clauses. In the absence of such guidance, and in accordance with the plain text's separation of the clauses into distinct provisions, the structure of Section 2611(4)(A) patently demonstrates that the individual liability provision and public agency provision are separate and distinct. 102 The text of Section 2611(4)(A) further compels an interpretation that separates the individual liability provision from the public agency provision. The straightforward interpretation advanced supra, demonstrates that the term employer means what is included in clause (i) and includes what is provided in clauses (ii), (iii), and (iv). On the other hand, the commingling of clauses (i)-(iv) into the term employer yields an interpretation that renders other provisions of the statute superfluous, as well as creates several oddities. 103 Initially, an interpretation that commingles clauses (i) and (ii) into the definition of employer presents little difficulty. For instance: The term employer means any person engaged in interstate commerce... who employees 50 or more employees...; and includes any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of any person engaged in interstate commerce who employs 50 or more employees ...; and any successor in interest of any person engaged in interstate commerce ... who employs fifty or more employees.... 22 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i) & (ii). However, when the public agency provision is introduced into an interpretation with clauses (i) and (ii), the statute provides — the term employer means any person engaged in interstate commerce ... who employees 50 or more employees ...; and includes any person who acts directly or indirectly in the interest of any person engaged in interstate commerce ... who employs 50 or more employees ...; and any successor in interest of any person engaged in interstate commerce ... who employs fifty or more employees; and includes any public agency engaged in interstate commerce ... who employs 50 or more employees ...; and includes any person who acts directly or indirectly, in the interest of the public agency engaged in interstate commerce ... who employs fifty or more employees; and any successor in interest of the public agency ... engaged in interstate commerce ... who employs fifty or more employees.... See 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(A)(i),(ii), & (iii). 104 Beyond the obvious redundancy in this interpretation, the commingling of clause (i) and (ii) with the public agency provision renders superfluous Section 2611(4)(B). See 29 U.S.C. 2611(4)(B) ([A] public agency shall be considered to be a person engaged in commerce or in an industry or activity affecting commerce.). In addition, it is well-settled that a public agency does not have to meet the 50 employee requirement to be considered an employer under the statute. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a) (Public agencies are covered employers without regard to the number of employees employed.). Consequently, an interpretation commingling clauses (i), (ii), and (iii) into the FMLA's definition of employer cannot be sustained. See Lake Cumberland Trust, 954 F.2d at 1222. 105 The result is similarly untenable when the interpretation aggregates clause (iv) with clauses (i) and (ii). 23 The result yields the following: The term employer means any person engaged in interstate commerce... who employs 50 or more employees...; and includes any person who acts, directly or indirectly, in the interest of any person in interstate commerce ... who employs fifty or more employees...; and includes a successor in interest of any person engaged in interstate commerce... who employs fifty or more employees...; and includes the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress; and includes a successor in interest of the General Accounting Office and the Library of Congress. See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4)(A)(i), (ii), & (iv). This interpretation implies that the FMLA extends specific protection to employees of the GAO and the Library of Congress from future successors in interest. While the Court would at least consider, albeit skeptically, an interpretation of the FMLA that included protections against a successor in interest of public agencies in general, 24 it is an exercise in absurdity to consider that the FMLA sought to protect employees of two long-standing federal entities from threats posed by any future successors in interest. 25 Accordingly, we must reject an interpretation that creates such a result. See Lake Cumberland Trust, 954 F.2d at 1222. 106 A third factor also undermines an interpretation of employer that extends the individual liability provision to public agencies. A definition of employer that incorporates the individual liability provision and public agency provision into a single clause is substantially similar to, if not identical, to the FLSA's definition of employer. Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Employer includes any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of any employer in relation to an employee and includes a public agency, ...). As discussed supra, the FMLA adopts several of the FLSA's provisions. However, in each instance where the FMLA adopts a provision of the FLSA, the FMLA refers directly to the FLSA, rather than provides a restatement of the FLSA's provision. The court in Keene explained the significance of the FMLA's modification of the FLSA's employer: 107 In 1974 Congress merely engrafted Public Agency into the FLSA by adding to an existing definition for private employers. This did create an ambiguous situation concerning the liability of public agency employees. But, in the FMLA, Congress explicitly took Public Agency out of the private employer definition and disconnected it from liability based on a person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer. Therefore, a better way to view the situation is that the FMLA corrected the ambiguity of the FLSA, as opposed to letting the ambiguity of the FLSA control the interpretation of the FMLA. 108 Keene, 127 F.Supp.2d at 775. 26 This rationale is entirely persuasive in light of the FMLA's text and framework. 109 We therefore conclude that the FMLA's individual liability provision does not extend to public agencies. Three factors emanating from the text and framework of the statute support this conclusion. First, Section 2611(4)(A) segregates the provision imposing individual liability from the public agency provision. Second, an interpretation that commingles the individual liability provision with the public agency provision renders certain provisions of the statute superfluous and results in several oddities. Finally, as evidenced by other provisions of the statute, the FMLA distinguishes its definition of employer from that provided in the FLSA by separating the individual liability and public agency provisions. 110 We note in passing that several factors extending beyond the plain text of the statute support our conclusion against individual liability for public employers. First, our interpretation is in accord with the regulations propounded by the Secretary of Labor. Title twenty nine 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a) provides that employers covered by FMLA also include any person acting, directly or indirectly, in the interest of a covered employer to any of the employees of the employer, any successor in interest of a covered employer, and any public agency. 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(a). The regulation's express separation between public agency and the directly or indirectly language supports our similar interpretation of Section 2611(4)(A). In addition, the example of individual liability provided in the regulations exclusively pertains to the corporate setting, thereby evincing an intent to limit such liability to the private sector. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.104(d) (As under the FLSA, individuals such as corporate officers' acting in the interest of an employer' are individually liable for any violations of the requirements of the FMLA.). In that same vein, we note that this Court has never extended individual liability to public employees under the FLSA. 27 Consequently, in addition to the text and structure of the statute, the regulations interpreting the FMLA and this Court's lack of precedent to the contrary, compel the conclusion that the FMLA does not impose individual liability on public agency employers. 111 Accordingly, we conclude that the district court correctly interpreted the FMLA as to preclude Mitchell's individual capacity claims under the statute.