Opinion ID: 1450597
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Denial of Beuke's Requests for a Continuance prior to the Penalty Phase

Text: Beuke argues that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his motion for a continuance prior to the penalty phase. [6] The jury returned its guilty verdict on Wednesday, October 5, 1983, at 9:23 p.m. Just minutes later, the judge held a sidebar and asked Beuke's attorneys if they could be ready for a sentencing hearing by the following afternoon. Defense counsel responded, Come on . . ., [t]here is no way in the world. The judge proceeded to set the sentencing hearing for the morning of Friday, October 7, 1983, and told defense counsel to request any necessary materials, such as a presentence investigation, by early the next morning. In response, defense counsel opined that this quick turnaround was a little ridiculous under the circumstances. After the judge sequestered the jury, defense counsel reiterated their belief that the Friday morning sentencing hearing did not provide adequate time to prepare. The court, however, ordered all the attorneys to return the next morning so that defense counsel could make a formal request for a presentence investigation. At the Thursday morning hearing, defense counsel stated that they were not waiving [their] objection that . . . there ha[d] not been sufficient time to make adequate determinations or to prepare to come to th[e] [sentencing] hearing. Defense counsel then presented a formal request for a presentence investigation and psychiatric evaluation, and indicated that Beuke's parents would be the only two mitigation witnesses called at sentencing. At the beginning of the Friday morning sentencing hearing, defense counsel reiterated their objection to the quick turnaround between the guilt and penalty phases, noting that there hasn't been sufficient time. Defense counsel then objected to having only one hour to review the presentence investigation and psychiatric evaluation, whereupon the court provided a thirty-minute recess so counsel could further review those reports. A trial court's denial of a continuance rises to the level of a constitutional violation only where there is an unreasoning and arbitrary `insistence upon expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable request for delay.' Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610, 75 L.Ed.2d 610 (1983) (quoting Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964)); United States v. Moreno, 933 F.2d 362, 371 (6th Cir.1991). There are no mechanical tests for deciding when a denial of a continuance is so arbitrary as to violate due process. The answer must be found in the circumstances present in every case, particularly in the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time the request is denied. Ungar, 376 U.S. at 589, 84 S.Ct. 841. To obtain habeas relief, it is not sufficient for the petitioner to show that the trial court arbitrarily denied the continuance request; he must also show that the denial of a continuance actually prejudiced his . . . defense. Burton v. Renico, 391 F.3d 764, 772 (6th Cir.2004). Actual prejudice may be demonstrated by showing that additional time would have made relevant witnesses available or otherwise [would have benefited] the defense. Powell v. Collins, 332 F.3d 376, 396 (6th Cir.2003). We reject Beuke's claim that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by denying his request for a continuance. Beuke has not demonstrated that he made a justifiable request for a continuance, see Slappy, 461 U.S. at 11-12, 103 S.Ct. 1610; his counsel did not state any particular reason why the trial court should grant the continuance, asserting only that the court provided insufficient or inadequate time to prepare and that the judge's timetable was a little ridiculous under the circumstances. Such generalized objections do not constitute a justifiable request for a continuance. [7] While it is true that only thirty-six hours separated the jury's verdict and the commencement of the sentencing hearing, Beuke's attorneys had two-and-a-half months to prepare for the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. And as we address further below, the record does not establish that counsel did not prepare for the penalty phase during that pre-trial period. Beuke's claim additionally fails because he has not established prejudice from the trial court's denial of his request for a continuance. Beuke contends that the trial court deprived him of the opportunity to investigate and present mitigation evidence showing: he did not have many friends; he held a low opinion of himself; he had a need to prove himself to others; he was a haphazard follower; he exhibited extreme personality traits; he frequently used drugs; he was raised in a strict religious home where he was always under a microscope; his family lived frugally; his mother was timid; and his father was domineering. We fail to see how this evidence would have benefited Beuke's mitigation defense and, in any event, the jury received much of this information through the testimony of Beuke's parents, who collectively testified that Beuke's father did not have a well-paying job, their family did not have a lot of money, they attended church regularly, and their household was run on the Ten Commandments. Mrs. Beuke also told the jury about an incident in Beuke's childhood where he did not get along with other children. [8] We conclude that Beuke has not shown prejudice resulting from the trial court's denial of his request for a continuance. Because Beuke did not articulate a justifiable basis for a continuance, and because he failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the denial of his request, we find his claim to be without merit.