Opinion ID: 2975596
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 2001 and 2002 Failure-to-Promote Claims

Text: Austion also asserted his 2001 and 2002 failure-to-promote claims under both Title VII and the THRA. Austion did not explicitly present his 2001 failure-to-promote claim to the EEOC, and he is therefore barred from asserting this claim under Title VII. Austion, however, did include his 2002 failure-to-promote claim in his August 2002 EEOC charge, and the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter on September 6, 2002. Once the administrative agency notifies the plaintiff of the dismissal of the charge by issuing a right-to-sue letter, the plaintiff has 90 days to file a civil action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Strouss v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 250 F.3d 336, 342 (6th Cir. 2001). Austion did not file this lawsuit until September 15, 2003, which is more than a year after he received the right-tosue letter. The district court recognized this procedural deficiency but nevertheless found that Austion’s failure to file within the 90-day time period was cured by the continuing-violations theory. We, 10 however, have expressly held that “[t]he continuing[-]violation doctrine . . . does not relieve a plaintiff of the need to file an action within 90 days of receiving the right-to-sue letter.” Wade v. Knoxville Utils. Bd., 259 F.3d 452, 461 (6th Cir. 2001). The district court thus erred in applying the continuing-violations doctrine to extend the 90-day filing period, and we hold that Austion’s 2001 and 2002 failure-to-promote claims are time-barred under Title VII. These claims are also untimely under the THRA. As previously noted, a claim under the THRA must be filed “within one year after the alleged discriminatory practice ceases.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 4-21-311(d). Even though Austion’s last promotion denial occurred in May 2002, he did not file suit until September 2003, more than one year later, and we therefore lack jurisdiction under the THRA. Moreover, as discussed above, the statutorily incorporated continuing-violations exception to the THRA’s statute of limitations does not extend the limitations period on “discrete acts of discrimination.” Booker, 188 S.W.3d at 647 (citing Weber, 938 S.W.2d at 391). Because both the 2001 and 2002 promotion denials are discrete acts of discrimination, the continuing-violations theory does not apply. Austion attempts to save his 2001 and 2002 failure-to-promote claims by arguing that he actually brought these claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. While Austion’s complaint did state that Clarksville’s refusal to promote him violated § 1981, we find that he clearly abandoned § 1981 as a basis for these claims. After filing his complaint, Austion did not refer to or in any way invoke § 1981; he did not assert § 1981 in any of his proposed jury instructions or other motions submitted to the district court. We therefore find that he cannot now, having learned of his procedural deficiencies under Title VII and his jurisdictional dilemma under the THRA, appeal to § 1981 — a statutory basis which he has already abandoned — for the sole purpose of saving his 2001 and 2002 11 failure-to-promote claims.5 Because Austion has not timely filed his failure-to-promote claims under Title VII or the THRA, we find that the district court erred in failing to dismiss these claims.