Opinion ID: 567926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mata's Challenge to the Sufficiency of the Evidence.

Text: 21 Mata contends that there was insufficient evidence to support either his conspiracy conviction or his firearm conviction. In challenging a conviction on the ground of insufficient evidence, a defendant bears a heavy burden. See, e.g., Alkins, 925 F.2d at 555; United States v. Gonzalez, 922 F.2d 1044, 1053 (2d Cir.1991); Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 978. A conviction must be upheld if, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and drawing all reasonable inferences in its favor, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). 22 In attacking the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conspiracy conviction, Mata essentially reiterates the arguments made in connection with his challenge to the court's refusal to give a multiple conspiracies or a buyer-seller instruction to the jury. Thus, Mata contends that the evidence demonstrated that he was a buyer and his co-defendants were sellers, and, as such, that he could not, as a mere buyer, be considered part of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine. As demonstrated above, these arguments are factually and legally untenable. Thus, viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence is, as discussed in Part I, more than sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find that Mata and his co-defendants were engaged in a common endeavor to buy cocaine with the intent to distribute it. 23 Mata next attacks the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) for using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. The specific issue on appeal is whether having a loaded .9 millimeter pistol on a table in the same room where large amounts of buy money (almost $47,000) were stored is sufficient to constitute use under the statute. 24 To use a firearm under section 924(c), a defendant need not fire the weapon. Rather, use can be established where circumstances surrounding the crime indicate that the firearm was  'an integral part of the narcotics offense and facilitated that offense.'  United States v. Alvarado, 882 F.2d 645, 653 (2d Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Meggett, 875 F.2d 24, 29 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 858, 110 S.Ct. 166, 107 L.Ed.2d 123 (1989)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1114, 107 L.Ed.2d 1021 (1990). We have held that this standard has been met where circumstances indicate that the defendant intended to use the weapon by strategically placing it so that it could be available for use during a drug transaction. See Alvarado, 882 F.2d at 654; Meggett, 875 F.2d at 29. For example, in Alvarado, three weapons were found in defendant's apartment where cocaine had been sold to DEA informants. Two of the weapons were located in a locked safe along with approximately $3,000 in cash. Next to the safe was a quantity of cocaine and a bullet-proof vest. Upholding defendant's firearm conviction, we reasoned that a reasonable jury could infer that the guns were located there to protect both the money and the cocaine in the event a drug deal went sour and a buyer demanded a return of his cash. 882 F.2d at 654. 25 Relying principally on our decision in United States v. Feliz-Cordero, 859 F.2d 250 (2d Cir.1988), Mata contends that the evidence was insufficient as a matter of law to convict him of violating section 924(c). In Feliz-Cordero, this Court held that where a gun was found inside a dresser drawer in the same room as some of defendants' drug paraphernalia, the evidence was insufficient to conclude that the gun was placed for ready use during a drug transaction. Id. at 254. Mata argues that, as in Feliz-Cordero, the gun in his bedroom was not strategically placed so as to be available for use during the transaction. Specifically, Mata argues that because he brought the money out of his bedroom and left the gun behind, he did not intend to use the weapon in connection with the drug buy. Rather, Mata contends that the gun was there to protect him and his family from crime. Although this case is close given Mata's decision mid-way through the transaction to leave the gun in his bedroom, we believe that there was sufficient evidence to support Mata's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 26 Unlike Feliz-Cordero, where the weapon was placed in a drawer in a room containing mere narcotics paraphernalia, the firearm in the present case was placed on top of a dresser in Mata's bedroom, where he kept large sums of cash to purchase narcotics. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, and consistent with our decisions in Alvarado and Meggett, a reasonable jury could conclude that Mata had the gun to protect his buy money. Mata's claimed reason for keeping the gun--to protect his family from crime--is unpersuasive given his decision to invite drug traffickers into his apartment and conduct drug transactions there involving wholesale quantities of cocaine. Moreover, simply because Mata decided mid-way through the transaction that he no longer needed the gun--and therefore left it in the bedroom after retrieving the cash--does not mean as a matter of law that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction. Indeed, Mata insisted that the sale take place in the familiar surroundings of his apartment and knew that he would be able to meet Perez and evaluate the need for the gun before getting the cash from his bedroom. A jury therefore could reasonably conclude that the gun was strategically placed and available to protect the cash during the transaction as long as Mata deemed such protection necessary. 27