Opinion ID: 2549367
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Graham argues that the evidence presented at trial could not have sufficiently identified him as the shooter. [2] Where identification is at issue, we must focus on the reliability of the identification. If . . . there was only one eyewitness to the crime, `the test is whether a reasonable person could find the identification convincing beyond a reasonable doubt, given the surrounding circumstances.' Lancaster v. United States, 975 A.2d 168, 171-72 (D.C.2009) (quoting Beatty v. United States, 544 A.2d 699 (D.C.1988)). And we of course view the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, `giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, and making no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.' Id. (quoting Williams v. United States, 881 A.2d 557, 566 (D.C.2005)). Graham's primary contention is that the testimony provided by the various witnesses at trial was too contradictory to sufficiently identify him as the shooter. Furthermore, he emphasizes that McCray, the only eyewitness to the shooting, changed his account of events and was influenced by a plea agreement with the government. Nonetheless, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, we find that the evidence was sufficient to identify Graham as the shooter. Contradictions between the testimony from various witnesses is unremarkable, and in and of itself is not enough to reverse a jury verdict. See Freeman v. United States, 912 A.2d 1213, 1220 (D.C. 2006) (The fact that there may be some inconsistencies between the testimony of one witness and another is therefore of no consequence. The jury has the `right to assess credibility and to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence it has heard.' (quoting Nelson v. United States, 601 A.2d 582, 593 (D.C.1991))). [I]nconsistencies in the evidence affect only its weight, not its sufficiency, and are in any event for the jury to resolve. Id. (quoting Gibson v. United States, 792 A.2d 1059, 1066 (D.C.2002)). The testimony of McCray alone, if credited by the jury, was sufficient to convict Graham. McCray testified that on the day of the murder, he heard Graham say that he should go snuff Walker. McCray also testified that he witnessed the shooting. While McCray could not testify that he saw Graham holding a gun, he testified that he was standing behind Graham as Walker was shot, and that the only other person present in the room, Fowler, was definitely not shooting. [3] Based on his observations, he concluded that Graham shot Walker. We have repeatedly held that the testimony of one witness is sufficient to sustain a conviction. [4] See Gibson, supra, 792 A.2d at 1066 ([T]he testimony of a single witness is sufficient to sustain a criminal conviction, even when other witnesses may testify to the contrary.); see also ( Kevin) Hill v. United States, 541 A.2d 1285, 1287 (D.C.1988) (A conviction based upon a single eyewitness identification will not be disturbed if a reasonable juror could find the circumstances surrounding the identification to be convincing beyond a reasonable doubt.). We conclude that a reasonable person could find the identification convincing beyond a reasonable doubt. Graham disputes McCray's credibility, arguing that McCray initially stated that he was not present during the shooting, [5] and that neither of the other witnesses placed him on the scene. In addition, Graham argues that McCray's testimony was influenced by a plea agreement with the government. None of these arguments are sufficient for us to hold McCray's testimony inherently incredible. Credibility is normally for the jury to determine. See Curry v. United States, 520 A.2d 255, 263 (D.C.1987). Inherent incredibility is a very stringent test which has been met in only a tiny number of cases, and is only invoked where testimony can be `disprove[d] . . . as a matter of logic by the uncontradicted facts or by scientific evidence' or when `the person whose testimony is under scrutiny made allegations which seem highly questionable in the light of common experience and knowledge, or behaved in a manner strongly at variance with the way in which we would normally expect a similarly situated person to behave.' In re A.H.B., 491 A.2d 490, 496 n. 8 (D.C. 1985) (quoting Jackson v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 324, 329, 353 F.2d 862, 867 (1965)). We cannot conclude that McCray's testimony was inherently incredible. Graham offers no logical proof disputing McCray's testimony, and whether to credit McCray's testimony or the testimony of other witnesses who did not place him at the scene was a decision for the jury. See Adams v. United States, 883 A.2d 76, 85 n. 17 (D.C.2005) (In any event, `inconsistent or contradictory [evidence] is not enough to reverse [his] conviction, as such considerations are best left to the jury for determining credibility.' (quoting Graham v. United States, 746 A.2d 289, 297 (D.C.2000))). Further, McCray's plea arrangement was disclosed to the jury, who were properly instructed on how to credit such testimony. Cf. McCrimmon v. United States, 853 A.2d 154, 165 n. 23 (D.C.2004) (declining to find a cooperating witness's testimony inherently incredible where the plea was disclosed and credibility determinations were left to the jury). Because the identification evidence was sufficient and the witness was not inherently incredible, we hold that the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to support the verdict.