Opinion ID: 1917869
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Arraignment on Charge of Operating a Motor Vehicle Without Owner's Consent.

Text: The trial court, at the time of defendant's arraignment on the charge of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, did advise defendant of his right to counsel. The court, however, did not explain that if defendant was indigent he was entitled to have counsel appointed for him at public expense. This court has held that a perfunctory statement made to an accused that he is entitled to be represented by counsel, without advising that counsel would be appointed at public expense, is not sufficient compliance with sec. 957.26 (2), Stats. Van Voorhis v. State, supra, at page 221; State ex rel. Casper v. Burke (1959), 7 Wis. (2d) 673, 677, 97 N. W. (2d) 703; State v. Greco (1955), 271 Wis. 54, 57, 72 N. W. (2d) 661. [1] Furthermore, if an accused is not represented by counsel, it is the duty of the trial court before accepting a plea of guilty to make sure that the accused understands the nature of the crime with which he is charged and the range of punishments. State ex rel. Burnett v. Burke (1964), 22 Wis. (2d) 486, 494, 126 N. W. (2d) 91. See also Ailport v. State (1960), 9 Wis. (2d) 409, 417, 100 N. W. (2d) 812. The record does not disclose that this was done. After defendant's arraignment he did appear with Mr. Lent as his counsel before the trial court on June 25, 1963. The proceeding opened by the court stating that defendant is before the Court this morning for sentencing on a charge of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent. Mr. Lent made a plea to the court for leniency during the course of which he stated: I think the record before the Court speaks for itself; that he [defendant] came before the Court and faced up to his guilt and admitted it and chose not to put the state and the Court to the time and trouble of a trial. I think this is an indication of the fact now that he has reached eighteen years of age and starting to mature, he will be able to fulfill any promise of good faith that the Court might see fit to extend him. Thus defendant's counsel took advantage of defendant's plea of guilty previously made without benefit of counsel as a ground for the court extending leniency. This strategy paid off because the trial court placed defendant on probation for one year and withheld sentence. The United States supreme court held in Henry v. Mississippi (1965), 379 U. S. 443, 451, 85 Sup. Ct. 564, 13 L. Ed. (2d) 408, that a constitutional right may be waived by counsel's deliberate choice of strategy and that this would be binding upon the accused client. In State ex rel. Goodchild v. Burke, ante, p. 244, 133 N. W. (2d) 753, the rule of the Henry Case was applied in a situation where counsel for defendant for strategy made no objection to the introduction of defendant's confessions and admissions into evidence. It was held that this constituted a waiver of the right to later contend that these confessions and admissions had been involuntarily obtained in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. Mr. Lent, counsel for the instant defendant, is a former assistant district attorney of Dane county, experienced in the field of criminal law. When he was retained to represent defendant after the latter's arraignment a choice of two alternative courses was open to him. One was to move to withdraw or change the plea of guilty because of any defects, constitutional or otherwise, in the arraignment proceedings. The other was to utilize the existing guilty plea and urge it as a reason for leniency. Counsel chose the latter and we conclude this was an effective waiver of the right to now raise the objections here made that defendant did not intelligently waive counsel and understandingly enter his plea of guilty. Counsel for defendant rely on Hamilton v. Alabama (1961), 368 U. S. 52, 82 Sup. Ct. 157, 7 L. Ed. (2d) 114, as authority that any defect with respect to intelligent waiver of counsel at time of arraignment cannot be cured by later appointment of counsel. The facts in the Hamilton Case are readily distinguishable. It was a capital case in which the defendant received a death sentence in an Alabama court on a charge of breaking and entering with intent to ravish. He was not represented by his appointed counsel at time of arraignment and pleaded not guilty. Thereafter he was tried with counsel present and convicted. In reversing a judgment of the Alabama supreme court denying relief by way of coram nobis, the United States supreme court stressed that under Alabama law a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity or a plea in abatement had to be made at time of arraignment, or the opportunity to do so was lost. This feature of the Hamilton Case was pointed out in Sparkman v. State, ante, at page 101, 133 N. W. (2d) 776.