Opinion ID: 786209
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction Over the ERISA Claim

Text: 42 The district court did not have jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs' ERISA claims because the Settlement rendered null and void the welfare benefit plans upon which the ERISA claims were premised. Our ruling above that the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the § 301 claim does not automatically deprive the district court of the ability to hear the ERISA claims; the court's power to entertain the ERISA claims springs from a different statutory provision, as the court has jurisdiction over a § 1132(a)(1)(B) action pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)(1). Nonetheless, the Settlement that divested the district court of jurisdiction over the § 301 claim has the same effect on the ERISA claims. In Adcox, we held that because a settlement agreement superseded a CBA, which included a benefit plan, the district court lacked jurisdiction under § 1132 to entertain a challenge to the Plant Closing Agreement's validity. Adcox, 21 F.3d at 1388. This court concluded that [b]ecause ... the [CBA] pursuant to which plaintiffs seek the special distribution benefits is no longer `in force,' the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the ... claim. Id. In Heussner, we reached the exact same conclusion when a plaintiff argued that 29 U.S.C. § 1132 provided an independent basis for district court jurisdiction over claims [for pension, health, insurance, and unemployment benefits] based on the superseded [CBA]. Heussner, 887 F.2d at 677. We held, Section 502 [§ 1132] does not give subject matter jurisdiction to federal courts over actions to collect benefits due under an expired collective bargaining contract. Because Section 502 authorizes suits for benefits to be brought in federal court only while a collective bargaining contract remains in force, the district court in this case did not have jurisdiction.... Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 43 There is no doubt that the Settlement superseded the Medical and SUB Plans. First, the Medical and SUB Plans were fully incorporated into the CBA, and the Settlement expressly trumped all previous CBAs and agreements. Additionally, the Settlement explicitly stated that [a]ny and all other severance provisions and/or or [sic] other benefits, of whatever nature, including but not limited to the [SUB] Plan [and the Medical Plan] ... shall be null and void in their entirety. J.A. at 100 (Settlement). Because the agreements that created the plans are no longer in force, Heussner and Adcox apply, and the district court did not have jurisdiction over the ERISA claim. The Plaintiffs urge us to reconsider these precedents, but we are bound by our prior decisions. 44 The Plaintiffs offer several responses, all unsuccessful variations of the assertion that Heussner and Adcox do not apply because the Settlement either did not or could not supersede the Medical and SUB Plans. First, the Plaintiffs claim that the Medical and SUB Plans were not a part of the CBA. This is a highly dubious point, given that the 1997 CBA specifically incorporates the SUB Plan as part of the CBA and applies the CBA's duration period to the Medical Plan. It is also a moot point because the Settlement not only expressly superseded the CBA but also explicitly abrogated the Medical and SUB Plans. 45 Second, the Plaintiffs try to demonstrate, to no avail, that the terms of the Medical and SUB Plans precluded their elimination by the Settlement. Each plan, however, can by its terms be abrogated by subsequent agreement or by the residual effect of the termination of other benefit plans. The Medical Plan generally states that termination of the CBA does not affect the duration of the Medical Plan. J.A. at 224 (art. V, § 6). The Settlement, however, did not just terminate the CBA; it specifically voided the Medical Plan as well. The only provision of the Medical Plan to address the termination of the Plan states, Notwithstanding the termination of the Plan in accordance with its terms, the benefit programs provided for therein shall be continued for a period of 90 days following such termination. J.A. at 224 (art. V, § 7). The Settlement provided for the ninety-day coverage required in the event of the Medical Plan's termination. J.A. at 101 (Settlement, § 9.b). 46 Additionally, Article four, section K(3) of the Medical Plan, which is the operative provision dealing with continued medical benefits following layoff, states, In the event that the [SUB] Plan shall be terminated in accordance with its terms prior to the termination of this Plan, Section K(1)(b) shall thereupon cease to have any force or effect. J.A. at 219 (art. IV, § (K)(3)). 8 The fate of the continuing-coverage provisions of the Medical Plan is tied with that of the SUB Plan. The interdependence of the Plans is logical given that the length of the continuing coverage depended on the number of weeks of SUBs to which an employee was entitled. If the SUB Plan no longer existed or the funding position dropped below 4%, no continuing medical coverage beyond the ninety days would be afforded to the employees. 47 Similarly, the SUB Plan was terminable. The SUB Plan provided,  So long as the [CBA] of which this Plan is a part shall remain in effect, the Plan shall not be ... terminated. J.A. at 326 (art. X, § 4(a)) (emphasis added). Upon the termination of the [CBA], the Company shall have the right to continue the Plan in effect and to ... terminate the Plan.... J.A. at 326 (art. X, § 4(a)) (emphasis added). The Settlement superseded the 1997 CBA, and therefore the terms of the SUB Plan did not prevent its termination. 48 Third, the Plaintiffs contend that the benefits conferred by these two plans were vested and thus could not be affected by the Settlement. The terms of the agreement, the plain language of ERISA, and our caselaw interpreting ERISA belie such a statement. The SUB Plan explicitly declared that the employees did not have a vested interest in the assets of the SUB fund or in the company contributions to the fund. J.A. at 322 (art. IX, § 5). The Medical Plan did not explicitly state that the health care benefits were vested. ERISA distinguishes between welfare benefit plans and pension plans. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) with 29 U.S.C. § 1002(2)(A). Welfare benefit plans include severance benefit plans, Adams v. Avondale Indus., Inc., 905 F.2d 943, 947 (6th Cir.1990), medical, surgical, or hospital care benefit plans, 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)(A), and unemployment benefit plans. Id. Welfare benefit plans are not subject to mandatory vesting requirements under ERISA, unlike pension plans. Therefore, there is no statutory right to vested ... benefits, and the parties must agree to vest a welfare benefit plan. Maurer v. Joy Techs., Inc., 212 F.3d 907, 914 (6th Cir.2000) (citation omitted). As a matter of law under ERISA, one of the key differences between welfare and pension plans is that welfare plan benefits do not vest. Gregg v. Transp. Workers of Am. Int'l, 343 F.3d 833, 844 (6th Cir.2003). We have explained, 49 Apparently, Congress chose not to impose vesting requirements on welfare benefit plans for fear that placing such a burden on employers would inhibit the establishment of such plans. In drawing the line between employer actions subject to the fiduciary duty requirement and those not, we must avoid any rule that would have the effect of undermining Congress' considered decision that welfare benefit plans not be subject to a vesting requirement. 50 Adams, 905 F.2d at 947 (citation omitted). Plaintiffs are thus simply incorrect in their protestations that their welfare benefits were vested interests, particularly given that the terms of the Plans either specifically disclaim vesting or are silent on the issue. 51 In sum, the district court did not have jurisdiction to hear the Plaintiffs' ERISA claims because the Settlement terminated the SUB and Medical Plans. Our precedents, such as Adcox and Heussner, clearly dictate that federal courts have no power to hear an ERISA claim regarding a welfare benefit plan that has been superseded. On remand, the district court should dismiss the ERISA claims. 52