Opinion ID: 1126207
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Legal Analysis of Suppression Claim

Text: The first subissue within the suppression claim is whether Lukehart received adequate Miranda warnings. Lukehart argues that all of the statements he made from the moment he first encountered Trooper Davis at approximately 8 p.m. on the evening of the baby's disappearance through his statements that led to the finding of the baby's body the following day should have been suppressed in accord with the decisions of United States Supreme Court and this Court as to Miranda protections against forced self-incrimination. We do not agree. Here, the trial court found that Lukehart was neither in custody nor being interrogated during the period before he waived his Miranda rights. As to custody, it is undisputed that Lukehart was handcuffed for his own protection because he told Trooper Davis that he had tried to kill himself during an early stage of the investigation prior to his Miranda waivers. In his written statement given to law enforcement officers after his Miranda waivers, Lukehart wrote concerning the initial period he spent in the yard of Trooper Davis: I wandered into the yard of a state trooper ... and asked him to notify the police and let them know where I was. I even asked him to restrain me. As to interrogation, the evidence supports the trial court's findings that the police considered Lukehart to be an eyewitness rather than a suspect before he waived his Miranda rights in the presence of Detective Goff and Lieutenant Waugh. Evidence also supports the trial court's finding that Lukehart made only voluntary statements during that time period. Such voluntary statements to law enforcement officers do not warrant a presumption of compulsion. Brown v. State, 565 So.2d 304, 306 (Fla.1990) (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985)). The Supreme Court held in Elstad that [a] subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. 1285. Here, law enforcement officers did administer Miranda warnings subsequent to Lukehart's unwarned voluntary statements. In Jennings v. State, 718 So.2d 144 (Fla.1998), we recently reiterated our often-made statement that a determination of the issues of both the voluntariness of a confession and a knowing and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights requires an examination of the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 150. See also Traylor v. State, 596 So.2d 957, 964 (Fla.1992). The trial court determined, based upon this substantial evidentiary record, that Lukehart voluntarily made his statements after validly waiving his Miranda rights. This determination is supported by the record. Law enforcement officers are not required to state the Miranda [6] procedural safeguard against compelled self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution or article I, section 9 of the Florida Constitution unless a person is both in custody and being interrogated. Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980); Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966. In Sapp v. State, 690 So.2d 581, 585 (Fla. 1997), we recently stated: We agree with the reasoning in [ Alston v. Redman, 34 F.3d 1237 (3rd Cir. 1994)] and find it entirely consistent with the underlying premise of Miranda. Miranda 's safeguards were intended to protect the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination by countering the compulsion that inheres in custodial interrogation. [T]he presence of both a custodial setting and official interrogation is required to trigger the Miranda right to counsel prophylactic.... [A]bsent one or the other, Miranda is not implicated. Alston, 34 F.3d at 1243 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 477-78, 86 S.Ct. 1602). Sapp, 690 So.2d at 585. Under the facts before the trial court in this case, the court could reasonably have concluded that through the time of the arrival of Detective Goff no interrogation of Lukehart had been undertaken. Moreover, we agree with the trial court that there is competent, substantial evidence to conclude that through that point in time Lukehart was not in custody as to the abduction of the baby. At the end of the suppression hearing, Lukehart's argument was based upon his complaint that Lieutenant Redmond had not advised him of his rights after Lukehart told Lieutenant Redmond that he would tell him the truth. In rejecting this claim, the trial court stated: Goff gives his constitutional rights, which the defendant freely admits he received and then ultimatelyReddish, I should say, gives him some constitutional rights when he comes on the scene, he transports him down to the Police Memorial Building, gives him some more constitutional rights. In the meantime, they are now signing rights. So how many does he have to give before they stick? That's my point, I mean, if he had never been given any rights, anything that he said after he said I want a lawyer up to the time that he was given his constitutional rights, anything that was obtained byfrom the defendant was something that he voluntarily gave, not that it was solicited by way of a question by any officers. ... [W]hen does the constitutional rightswhen do we have to quit giving it to him? He said on each occasion he signed at least one form that he understood it all, so where is the point there that we don't have to continue giving him rights? We believe the trial court's conclusion is supported by the evidence, and that under the totality of the circumstances, Lukehart's statements were obtained in a manner compatible with the requirements of the United States and Florida Constitutions. Stano v. Butterworth, 51 F.3d 942, 944 (11th Cir.1995). In the second subissue within this claim, Lukehart argues that the trial court erred in admitting his statements into evidence because, although he had invoked his right to counsel very early on the evening of February 25 by saying to Officer Davis that he wanted to talk to a lawyer, police had interrogated him without providing him with a lawyer. Lukehart contends that the interrogation violated principles set forth in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981), and Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966, which hold that once a person in custody has requested a lawyer, all interrogation must stop until that person has a lawyer present. However, as set forth in detail in the law enforcement officers' testimony in the suppression hearing, the officers did not begin interrogating Lukehart until after Lukehart initiated the conversations by repeatedly stating that he wanted to talk to detectives to tell his side of the story. Even then, the questioning began only after Lukehart had waived his Miranda rights. As to the claim in this Court regarding Lukehart's request for a lawyer, we rejected a similar argument recently in Jennings, 718 So.2d at 150. As noted previously, Lukehart initiated the contact with Detective Goff by requesting the opportunity to tell his side of the story. Detective Goff responded appropriately by telling Lukehart that he understood that Lukehart had requested a lawyer previously and that he would talk with him only after he read Lukehart his Miranda, rights. In this situation, we find our statement in Jennings to be controlling: In short, the totality of the circumstances establishes that even if Jennings invoked his right to counsel, see State v. Owen, 696 So.2d 715 (Fla.[1997]), he voluntarily initiated further contact with the police. He gave the statements he now seeks to suppress after voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waiving the Miranda rights. Jennings, 718 So.2d at 150 (citation omitted). Likewise, in Traylor, we earlier held: Once a suspect has requested the help of a lawyer, no state agent can reinitiate interrogation on any offense throughout the period of custody unless the lawyer is present, although the suspect is free to volunteer a statement to police on his or her own initiative at any time on any subject in the absence of counsel. Traylor, 596 So.2d at 966 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). After talking with Detective Goff, Lukehart volunteered statements to detectives and waived the right to counsel three more times. Thus, the trial court did not err in denying the motion to suppress on Miranda right-to-counsel grounds. As his third subissue within this claim, Lukehart argues that law enforcement officers coerced him to make his statements by using three illegal tactics. First, Lukehart contends that his statements were erroneously admitted because they had been obtained after police read him his Miranda rights so many times that the very reading of the rights became a coercive action. Lukehart cites Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 111 S.Ct. 486, 112 L.Ed.2d 489 (1990), in which the Supreme Court held that when a suspect in custody requests counsel, interrogation must cease until counsel is present and may not be reinitiated without counsel present, even if the accused has consulted with his or her attorney. Id. at 153, 111 S.Ct. 486. The Court explained that the purpose of its holding was to protect suspects from persistent attempts by officials to persuade him to waive his rights. Id. Here, the law enforcement officers testified at the suppression hearing that they read Lukehart his Miranda rights four times: twice at the Clay County scene, once at the Police Memorial Building, and once at the Duval County scene where Gabrielle's body was found. Under the totality of these circumstances, we find that this repeated reading of constitutional rights was an effort to provide the procedural safeguards at every step of the investigation and not an attempt to persist in attempts to persuade Lukehart to talk to the law enforcement officers. Lukehart's own testimony does not support this argument on appeal. In contrast to the appellant in Minnick, Lukehart had voluntarily given police information about the disappearance of the victim and repeatedly said to Officer Davis that he wanted to tell his side of the story. We find that no coercion occurred in the administration of the Miranda warnings. Lukehart next alleges that Lieutenant Redmond used the so-called Christian burial technique of interrogation, which this Court found in Roman v. State, 475 So.2d 1228 (Fla.1985), to be unquestionably a blatantly coercive and deceptive ploy. Id. at 1232. Lieutenant Redmond testified at the suppression hearing that he merely told Lukehart that law enforcement officers needed to find the baby's body so that she could have a decent burial. However, as in Roman and Hudson v. State, 538 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1989), we consider the totality of the circumstances and find that the reference to finding the body so that it could be buried was insufficient to make an otherwise voluntary statement inadmissible. In this case, the evidence was in conflict as to whether the word Christian was used. There was no evidence that Lieutenant Redmond knew anything about Lukehart's religious beliefs. Moreover, we find that the use of this tactic, no matter how the officer worded the burial comment, did not directly result in Lukehart's giving his statement, and, thus, the trial court did not err in declining to suppress the statements that Lukehart made subsequent to Lieutenant Redmond's burial comment. Finally, Lukehart argues that Lieutenant Redmond's showing him a photograph of the baby was coercive in that it prompted Lukehart to become emotional and then to confess. Lieutenant Redmond testified that, as he sat in a patrol car with Lukehart, someone handed him a photograph to help to identify the baby and Lukehart saw it. In the suppression hearing, Lukehart testified that he did not find the viewing of such a photograph for identification purposes to be unusual. Moreover, as with the burial comment, we find that the photograph did not directly result in Lukehart's statement, which he had already agreed to give. Thus, we find that this subissue of the suppression claim has no merit. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's ruling on the motion to suppress Lukehart's statements.