Opinion ID: 448897
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scope of the Mississippi Long-Arm Statute.

Text: 11 The Mississippi long-arm statute, Miss.Code Ann. Sec. 13-3-57, provides in pertinent part: 12 Any nonresident person, firm, general or limited partnership, or any foreign or other corporation not qualified under the constitution and laws of this state as to doing business herein, who shall make a contract with a resident of this state to be performed in whole or in part by any party in this state, or who shall commit a tort in whole or in part in this state against a resident or nonresident of this state, or who shall do any business or perform any character of work or service in this state, shall by such act or acts be deemed to be doing business in Mississippi. Such act or acts shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment by such nonresident of the secretary of state of the State of Mississippi, or his successor or successors in office, to be the true and lawful attorney or agent of such nonresident upon whom all lawful process may be served in any actions or proceedings accrued or accruing from such act or acts, or arising from or growing out of such contract or tort, or as an incident thereto, by any such nonresident or his, their or its agent, servant or employee. 13 (Emphasis added.) 14 Looking to the tripartite test 3 for personal jurisdiction under the long-arm statute that was employed by the Mississippi Supreme Court in Collins v. Truck Equipment Sales, Inc., 231 So.2d 187 (Miss.1970), the magistrate determined that Crimson was not doing business in Mississippi and, consequently, was not amenable to an assertion of personal jurisdiction over it by a Mississippi court. Because there was no showing of any purposeful act or consummation of a transaction in Mississippi, the magistrate reasoned, it could not be said that Crimson was doing business in Mississippi under the first prong of the test set out in Collins. 15 The plaintiffs contend that the Mississippi Supreme Court has interpreted the reach of Mississippi's long-arm statute to include nonresident defendants who commit a single tort in the state, even if the alleged tortfeasor is not physically present in the state when the injury occurs. The plaintiffs argue that the magistrate's reliance on Collins was misplaced in view of the broadening effect of the statute's 1964 amendment. 16 In its brief, Crimson makes passing reference to the tripartite test for personal jurisdiction but chose not to address the issue of its amenability to suit under the Mississippi long-arm statute, focusing only on the due process issue. Citing Charia v. Cigarette Racing Team, Inc., 583 F.2d 184, 185-86 n. 2 (5th Cir.1978), and Benjamin v. Western Boat Building Corp., 472 F.2d 723, 725 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 830, 94 S.Ct. 60, 38 L.Ed.2d 64 (1973), Crimson declares that this Court has stated that it believes that principles of federalism mandate that cases of this type be decided on the constitutional ground where that can readily be done on the authority of existing decisions. Appellee's Brief at 10. While recognizing that in some cases it might be appropriate to avoid construction of the state long-arm statute, we choose to address the issue of the reach of the Mississippi statute in this case because the constitutional issue should not be considered if service was defective under the Mississippi statute. 17 The seminal case construing the long-arm statute as amended in 1964 is Smith v. Temco, Inc., 252 So.2d 212, 216 (Miss.1971). In Smith, a products liability action, the court recognized that, with the state's recent adoption of Sec. 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, one of the legislative purposes undergirding the 1964 amendment to the long-arm statute was to extend the jurisdictional reach of state courts to nonresidents who commit a tort, in whole or in part, in Mississippi which causes injury to a Mississippi resident. This extension provided a practical means to enforce rights accruing under the newly adopted products liability doctrine. Id. The Smith court observed: 18 In enacting the 1964 amendment, it will be assumed that the Legislature acted in the light of the decisions of this Court which dealt with the extent of the [in] personam jurisdiction of Mississippi courts in cases brought in this State against nonresidents under the statute as formerly written. 19 In the cases decided under the statute before the 1964 amendment, this Court held, in effect, that Mississippi courts['] [in] personam jurisdiction of the nonresident defendant was dependent upon whether such defendant had, or had not been doing business in Mississippi, or whether it had or had not sufficient significant contacts in Mississippi to subject it to the jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts. This test was further restricted to those cases in which traditional notions of fair play and of substantial justice were not offended. Collins v. Truck Equipment Sales, Inc., 231 So.2d 187 (Miss.1970); Hilburn [sic] v. California-Western States Life Ins. Co., 210 So.2d 307 (Miss.1968); Mladinich v. Kohn, 186 So.2d 481 (Miss.1966); Breckenridge v. Time, Inc., 253 Miss. 835, 179 So.2d 781 (1965); Republic-Transcon Industries, Inc. v. Templeton, 253 Miss. 132, 175 So.2d 185 (1965); Mladinich v. Kohn, 250 Miss. 138, 164 So.2d 785 (1964). 20 By the insertion of the new matter, there can be no doubt that the intention of the Legislature was to broaden the scope of the statute and to enlarge the jurisdiction of the Mississippi courts so as to reach nonresident defendants in two new and distinct categories: (1) The nonresident defendant who shall make a contract with a resident to be fulfilled in the State in whole or in part, and the (2) nonresident defendant who shall commit a tort, in whole or in part, in this State against a resident of the State. 21 The statute, as amended in 1964, has not been construed previously by this Court. 22 252 So.2d at 215. 23 It is apparent from the court's discussion of the 1964 amendment and the cases construing the pre-1964 statute, which number Collins among them, that the tripartite test for personal jurisdiction survives only as to the doing business category of Mississippi's existing long-arm statute. See Washington v. Norton Manufacturing, Inc., 588 F.2d 441, 445-47 & n. 8 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 942, 99 S.Ct. 2886, 61 L.Ed.2d 313 (1979); Cole v. Alton, 567 F.Supp. 1081, 1083-84 (N.D.Miss.1983); cf. Edwards v. Associated Press, 512 F.2d 258 (5th Cir.1975). This comports with the court's characterization of the tort and contract categories as new and distinct categories. See Dawkins v. White Products Corp., 443 F.2d 589, 593 (5th Cir.1971) (indicating that Collins was decided on doing business basis for long-arm jurisdiction without reference to the amendment dealing with a nonresident who committed a tort in whole or in part within Mississippi); see also Breeland v. Hide-A-Way Lake, Inc., 585 F.2d 716, 719 (5th Cir.1978); Chromcraft Corp. v. Mirox, S.A., 446 F.Supp. 342, 345 (N.D.Miss.1977). The Mississippi Supreme Court has indicated that, although Smith was a products liability action, the statute applies in other cases in tort and contract which are properly covered by the statute, and is not restricted to [products liability cases]. Mandel v. James Graham Brown Foundation, Inc., 375 So.2d 1017, 1018 (Miss.1979). 24 We must determine, then, whether the terms of the Mississippi long-arm statute contemplate Crimson's alleged tort. The Smith court stated that [t]he tort is not complete until injury occurs, and if the injury occurs in this State, then, under the amended statute, the tort is committed, at least in part, in this State, and [in] personam jurisdiction of the nonresident tort feasor is conferred upon the Mississippi court. 4 252 So.2d at 216. See Estate of Portnoy, 730 F.2d at 290; Cosper v. Allred, 592 F.Supp. 376, 378-79 (N.D.Miss.1984); Cannon v. Tokyu Car Corp., 580 F.Supp. 1451, 1453 (S.D.Miss.1984); see also Prejean v. Sonatrach, Inc., 652 F.2d 1260, 1270 (5th Cir.1981) (a tort occurs when and where the actual injury or accident takes place) (Texas statute). 25 As a practical matter, then, regardless of the plaintiff's theory of tort liability, an essential element of the tort is some kind of injury. It is undisputed that the injuries at issue in the instant case were occasioned by the automobile accident occurring in Mississippi. Thus, it is clear that at least a part of the tort allegedly committed by Crimson was committed in Mississippi so as to make Crimson amenable to suit in a Mississippi court under the Mississippi long-arm statute. See Brown v. Flowers Industries, Inc., 688 F.2d at 333 & n. 12 (Both by its language and by interpretation the statute includes in its reach defendants who commit a single tort. An alleged tortfeasor need not have been present in the state. If, as is alleged in this case, he causes injury in Mississippi, he is covered by the statute.) (citing cases from other jurisdictions construing statutes like Sec. 13-3-57 similarly); see also DeMelo, 711 F.2d at 1269. We therefore conclude that the Mississippi long-arm statute by its terms potentially conferred jurisdiction over Crimson upon the district court. 5 26