Opinion ID: 2301718
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Government's Obligation to Correct False Testimony

Text: Consistent with the Due Process Clause, the government may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, nor may it allow such testimony, though not solicited by the government, to go uncorrected when it appears. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); see also Woodall v. United States, 842 A.2d 690, 696 (D.C. 2004) (`A prosecutor may not knowingly... permit evidence, known to be false [or misleading], to go uncorrected' before the trier of fact.). A conviction obtained by the knowing use of false testimony is fundamentally unfair, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), and undermines public faith in the integrity of judicial proceedings. [4] Requiring the government to correct false testimony serves to uphold the truth-seeking function of the trial process, id. at 104, by ensur[ing] [that the] jury is not misled by falsehoods, Woodall, 842 A.2d at 697 (citing United States v. Meinster, 619 F.2d 1041, 1044 (4th Cir. 1980)). Thus, although this doctrine protects a defendant's due process right to a fair trial, it does so in a particular manner  by providing the fact-finder (whether a judge or jury) with truthful testimony. The government claims that it fulfilled its obligations in this case because it did not allow [Sergeant Evans' testimony] to go `uncorrected' at trial. Rather, Sergeant Evans testified truthfully on both direct and cross-examination and was impeached by the defense with his mistaken testimony. The jury was therefore presented with a full explanation of the contradiction between Officer Nagurka's trial testimony and the preliminary hearing testimony of Sergeant Evans  including Sergeant Evans' account of why his testimony had changed  and could weigh that information during its deliberations. See United States v. Thomas, 987 F.2d 1298, 1301 (7th Cir.1993) ([T]he court allowed the government ... to lay all of [the witness's] relevant testimony  both favorable and unfavorable  before the jury. Far from being a violation of due process, this is precisely how the trial process is supposed to work.). Emphasizing that Napue requires the government to correct false testimony when it appears, 360 U.S. at 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, appellant contends that the government had an affirmative duty to immediately disclose the falsity to defense counsel (before the jury heard the evidence) so that she could make informed decisions regarding defense strategy. See also Miller v. United States, 14 A.3d 1094, 1107-08 (D.C.2011) (stressing that, in Brady [5] context, the Constitution requires that disclosure be made at such a time as to allow the defense to use the favorable material effectively in the preparation and presentation of its case.... Prosecutorial resort to a strategy of `delay and conquer[ ]' ... is not acceptable.) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Appellant places important limitations on his own argument. He is not suggesting that the government generally must disclose how it is planning on rehabilitating witnesses friendly to its side or how it intends to explain discrepancies in statements witnesses have made. Moreover, the government generally does not need to disclose how it intends to meet the force of a witness called by the defense.... And he has not argued that the Due Process Clause imposes some generalized duty on the United States to disclose inculpatory evidence.... When, however, the government realizes that sworn testimony its witness provided at an earlier hearing simply was false, and where the falsity is important in the case, the Due Process Clause requires disclosure. By waiting until the defense had called Sergeant Evans and relied on the inaccurate testimony, appellant asserts, the government was able to capitalize on its failure to make timely correction of the false testimony by unambiguously explain[ing] away the apparent, but actually non-existent, conflict between Evans's preliminary hearing testimony and Officer Greg Nagurka's trial testimony. Appellant claims that the government's ambush violated its duty to refrain from striking foul blows, Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935), and prevented the defense from making strategic decisions based on an accurate record. [6] See also Scipio v. State, 928 So.2d 1138, 1145 (Fla.2006) ([T]he policy of avoiding trial by ambush or surprise has even greater application in the criminal context, where the stakes are much higher and the obligation of the State to see that justice is done is much greater than that of the private litigants in a civil dispute.). [7] There is much force to appellant's argument. We think it evident, and the government conceded at oral argument, that if the prosecutor had discovered the witness's mistake upon leaving the preliminary hearing, he would have had an obligation to immediately inform the court and defense counsel of the erroneous testimony so that the magistrate judge could have revisited her finding of probable cause and the attendant detention decision. [8] If that had happened in this case, appellant would have learned of the error long before trial and would have been able to use this information when making decisions about trial strategy. Here, however, the falsity of the testimony was not discovered until the trial was in progress, by which time the preliminary/detention hearing was a distant memory. Neither the court nor the prosecutor would naturally have focused on a need to correct the record of that proceeding. See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1208 (D.C.Cir.1973) (the return of an indictment bars relitigation of the question of probable cause). The current phase of the litigation was being conducted before a different trier of fact, and the government had not called Sergeant Evans as a witness at trial. The prosecutor's immediate obligation under Napue was to ensure that the jury was not misled by false or misleading testimony. That was accomplished here, although it is not clear from the record whether this occurred because of the prosecutor's attention to the requirements of Napue or as a by-product of the adversary process. In any event, this is not a case where false testimony went uncorrected. [9] Thus, the question raised by appellant is what the prosecutor should have done in the few hours after he realized Sergeant Evans had mistakenly testified at the preliminary hearing and before Evans testified for the defense at trial. We have found no binding precedent, and appellant points us to none, that holds that a prosecutor has a duty to notify defense counsel about prior false testimony before he corrects that false testimony in front of the finder of fact. [10] Although such advance notice might help the defendant make better strategic decisions at trial, we decline to decide, on the record before us, whether the Napue doctrine serves such a strategic purpose. Instead, we will assume, without deciding, that error occurred. Cf., e.g., Scipio, 928 So.2d at 1145 (concluding that the prosecutor struck a foul blow by failing to inform defendant before trial, under Florida discovery rules, that its investigator had changed his testimony). Even if the government improperly delayed its disclosure, reversal is not warranted in this case because appellant was not substantially prejudiced.