Opinion ID: 3064204
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Circuit Precedents

Text: “The Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantee that any person brought to trial in any state or federal court must be afforded the right to assistance of counsel before he or she can be validly convicted and 26 punished by imprisonment.” United States v. Verderame, 51 F.3d 249, 251 (11th Cir. 1995). “Implicit in th[e] right to counsel is the notion of adequate time for counsel to prepare the defense . . . .” Id. at 252. Whether a denial of a continuance motion amounts to a violation of due process depends on the circumstances of the particular case. Id. at 251 (stating that “[t]here are no mechanical tests” for making the determination (quotation marks omitted)). “To prevail on such a claim, a defendant must show that the denial of the motion for continuance was an abuse of discretion which resulted in specific substantial prejudice.” Id. We have applied these principles on several occasions. United States v. Valladares, 544 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2008); Verderame, 51 F.3d 249; United States v. Gossett, 877 F.2d 901 (11th Cir. 1989). We review each case. In Gossett, we concluded that the defendants failed to show the “specific, substantial prejudice” required to obtain relief. 877 F.2d at 906. Both defendants were convicted of murdering a ship’s captain, attempted murder of his first mate, and mutiny. Id. at 903. The original six-count indictment was returned on August 28, 1987, and the trial was set for November 9. Id. at 905. On October 29, the grand jury returned a superceding indictment, which dropped two of the original charges and added a felony murder charge. Id. Upon the government and defendants’ joint motion, the district court granted a continuance until November 23. The issue was whether the court abused its discretion in not granting the extra 27 seven days until November 30 as requested by the parties. Id. at 906. The defendants in Gossett claimed that, “due to the changes in the superceding indictment,” they “had inadequate time to prepare for trial.” Id. at 906. In concluding that defendants failed to show “specific, substantial prejudice,” this Court stated that the defendants “suggested nothing to this Court, nor can we find anything in the record that would indicate the possibility of a different outcome if the defendants had been given an additional seven days to prepare for trial.” Id. In Verderame, however, we concluded that the district court abused its discretion in repeatedly denying Verderame’s unopposed motions for a continuance. 51 F.3d at 250. The government charged Verderame with participation in two separate conspiracies to import and distribute cocaine and marijuana and with criminal forfeiture. Id. On May 13, Verderame filed an unopposed motion for a continuance of his June 3 trial,15 which the court denied. Id. On May 26, the government filed a bill of particulars listing for the first time the items subject to forfeiture (including Verderame’s home, business, liquor license, and other personal property items). Id. Verderame filed two more continuance motions, arguing his counsel had inadequate time to prepare a defense and had not received copies of all relevant documents. Id. at 250-51. On June 3, 15 A magistrate judge set Verderame’s trial for July 1, 1993. Verderame, 51 F.3d at 250. At the May 4 arraignment, the district court advanced his trial date to June 3. Id. 28 the district court denied the motions. Id. at 251. The government then dismissed the cocaine conspiracy charge, but on the first day of trial (June 7) filed a second bill of particulars adding $2.4 million in cash to the list of forfeitable property. Id. At trial, “[t]he bulk of the evidence which the government presented against Verderame consisted of the testimony of an internal revenue agent who had analyzed Verderame’s financial records.” Id. The analyst testified that Verderame spent more between 1988 and 1992 than he listed as income on his tax returns for those years, indicating Verderame derived income from illegal activities. Id. In reversing Verderame’s conviction, we concluded that the 34 days between arraignment and trial failed to provide ample time to defend against “a case which the government spent years investigating, . . . which grew during the 34-day interval to encompass further property subject to forfeiture, . . . which abruptly shifted focus away from the cocaine conspiracy a mere four days before trial.” Id. at 252. We also noted that the 34 days did not provide the government sufficient time to supply Verderame with the documents it had seized and to which he was entitled. Id. Finally, in Valladares, we concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant’s unopposed motions to continue her trial because Valladares failed to show that “specific, substantial prejudice” resulted from those denials. 544 F.3d at 1265. Indicted for participating in a Medicare 29 fraud scheme, Valladares had 34 days between her arraignment and trial to plan her defense. Id. at 1261, 1264.16 Because “Valladares ha[d] not pointed to any specific documents or relevant, non-cumulative evidence she would have presented, nor ha[d] we found anything in the record that would indicate a different result had the motions been granted,” we affirmed Valladares’s three convictions. Id. at 1264 (quotation marks omitted). We distinguished a case like this from Verderame, “where the government’s case was based primarily on an IRS agent’s testimony about the defendant’s financial records and defense counsel argued that there were specific financial records that he needed to refute the agent’s testimony but did not have time to obtain and review before the trial began.” Id. We also noted that, “in light of the extensive testimony by the pharmacy owners and two Medicare beneficiaries implicating Valladares in the Medicare fraud scheme, it is unlikely that presentation of these records [the government delayed producing or had not produced] would have changed the outcome of her case.” Id.17 16 According to the government, Valladares would pay Medicare beneficiaries to visit doctors, whom she also bribed, to obtain prescriptions for unnecessary medications. Valladares, 544 F.3d at 1261. Valladares then gave these prescriptions to pharmacies in exchange for kickbacks, and the pharmacies used them to submit fraudulent reimbursement claims to Medicare. Id. Although it was not charged in the indictment, the government also presented evidence that Valladares independently submitted fraudulent Medicare claims on behalf of her company, PRN Home Health Care (“PRN”). Id. at 1261. 17 Valladares had argued prejudice in that (1) PRN did not file claims on behalf of certain Medicare beneficiaries that the government attributed to her in the pharmacy scheme, (2) the government delayed in making billing records available to her that “would have assisted the defense to demonstrate a lack of association between many [of those Medicare beneficiaries] and Mrs. Valladares,” and (3) the government failed to turn over Medicare “Explanation of Benefits” forms for the PRN claims from 2000 through 2007, which “clearly were relevant to the defense.” 30