Opinion ID: 1105728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: summary judgment on the section 1983 claim

Text: We now review whether the trial court erred in granting petitioner's summary judgment motion based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. We find that this issue is ripe for review because respondent has failed to establish the existence of any genuine issue of material fact which would preclude the entry of summary judgment. See Landers v. Milton, 370 So.2d 368, 370 (Fla.1979) (summary judgment is appropriate upon failure of opposing party to present competent evidence revealing genuine issue of fact); see also Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 228, 112 S.Ct. 534, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) ([Qualified] [i]mmunity ordinarily should be decided by the court long before trial.). Moreover, dealing with immunity as a question of law is consistent with the doctrine's policy of providing immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability. Tucker v. Resha, 648 So.2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 1994) (emphasis deleted) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526-27, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). Government officials performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from civil damages to the extent that their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). Qualified immunity protection applies to all except the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law, Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, and turns upon the objective legal reasonableness of the official's action assessed in light of the legal rules that were clearly established at the time the action was taken. Anderson, 483 U.S. at 639, 107 S.Ct. 3034 (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Analyzing qualified immunity involves a two-step process. First, the official must establish that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary authority. Lowe v. Aldridge, 958 F.2d 1565, 1570 (11th Cir.1992); Brescher v. Pirez, 696 So.2d 370, 373 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 705 So.2d 10 (Fla. 1997). Once this is established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff to show that the official's action violated the plaintiff's clearly established rights which a reasonable police officer would have known. Lowe, 958 F.2d at 1570; Brescher, 696 So.2d at 373. Here, respondent concedes that petitioner was acting within her discretionary authority as a police officer. Thus, the issue is whether respondent has presented any evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that no well-trained officer in petitioner's position would have believed that petitioner's affidavit established probable cause under clearly established precedent. See Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641, 107 S.Ct. 3034; Malley, 475 U.S. at 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092. To establish probable cause for the search warrant, petitioner was required to show that she had reason to believe that a crime had been committed and that evidence would be found at the premises to be searched. Lowe, 958 F.2d at 1570. Although the affidavit petitioner submitted in support of the search warrant is not in the record, petitioner stated that the following facts contained in her deposition reflect the facts stated in her affidavit. Because this statement is not disputed, we must assume it to be true. In 1990, James Buzzella filed a complaint with the police department alleging that respondent was engaged in child pornography. [3] Mr. Buzzella provided the names of three witnesses: Debbie Buzzella, who is Mr. Buzzella's adult daughter; [4] and two minor brothers with personal knowledge of respondent's alleged criminal conduct. Petitioner contacted each of the witnesses. Ms. Buzzella informed petitioner that she witnessed respondent at the local park luring young boys into his limousine. Ms. Buzzella also told petitioner that one young boy told her that respondent was supplying the boys with quaaludes. One young boy listed as a witness told petitioner that respondent would furnish limousine rides for young boys, including himself and his brother, and then take them to his home where they would smoke marijuana. The other boy corroborated his brother's statement. Based on this uncontradicted evidence, we find no error in the trial court concluding that, as a matter of law, a reasonable, well-trained officer in petitioner's position could have believed that these facts established probable cause for the search warrant, and that therefore a summary judgment was to be entered in behalf of petitioner based on qualified immunity. Accordingly, we quash the Third District's decision and remand with instructions that the district court affirm the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner. It is so ordered. HARDING, C.J., and OVERTON, KOGAN and PARIENTE, JJ., concur. SHAW and ANSTEAD, JJ., concur in result only.