Opinion ID: 603512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the supplementary extradition treaty between the united

Text: STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN 32 The Supplementary Extradition Treaty amended and supplemented the Extradition Treaty between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, June 8, 1972, U.S.--Gr.Br., 28 U.S.T. 227 (entered into force Jan. 21, 1977) (1977 Treaty). It includes a retroactive provision as follows: 33 This Supplementary Treaty shall apply to any offense committed before or after this Supplementary Treaty enters into force, provided that this Supplementary Treaty shall not apply to an offense committed before the Supplementary Treaty enters into force which was not an offense under the laws of both Contracting Parties at the time of its commission. 34 Supplementary Extradition Treaty, art. 5, June 25, 1985, U.S.--Gr.Br., reprinted in S.Exec.Rep. No. 17, at 2, 99th Cong.2d Sess. 17 (1986) (entered into force Dec. 23, 1986) (Supplementary Treaty). 35 The principal substantive changes effected by the Supplementary Treaty relate to the political offense exception to extradition under the 1977 Treaty. The provisions relating to this exception in the 1977 Treaty state that a person will not be extradited if: 36 (i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by the requested Party as one of a political character; or 37 (ii) the person sought proves that the request for his extradition has in fact been made with a view to punish him for an offense of a political character. 38 1977 Treaty, art. V(1)(c), 28 U.S.T. at 230. 39 Article 1 of the Supplementary Treaty narrows the scope of the offense of a political character exception referred to above by excluding from its purview: 40 (a) an offense for which both Contracting Parties have the obligation pursuant to a multilateral international agreement to extradite the person sought or to submit his case to their competent authorities for decision as to prosecution; 41 (b) murder, voluntary manslaughter, and assault causing grievous bodily harm; 42 (c) kidnapping, abduction, or serious unlawful detention, including taking a hostage; 43 (d) an offense involving the use of a bomb, grenade, rocket, firearm, letter or parcel bomb, or any incendiary device if this use endangers any person; [or] 44 (e) an attempt to commit any of the foregoing offenses or participation as an accomplice of a person who commits or attempts to commit such an offense. 45 Supplementary Treaty, art. 1, reprinted in S.Exec.Rep. No. 17, at 15. 46 Although a person accused of any one of these crimes may no longer use the political offense exception of the 1977 Treaty, Article 3 of the Supplementary Treaty provides additional safeguards against political prosecution. The Article reads in pertinent part: 47 [E]xtradition shall not occur if the person sought establishes to the satisfaction of the competent judicial authority by a preponderance of the evidence that the request for extradition has in fact been made with a view to try or punish him on account of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions, or that he would, if surrendered, be prejudiced at his trail [sic] or punished, detained or restricted in his personal liberty by reason of his race, religion, nationality, or political opinions. 48 Id., art. 3(a), reprinted in S.Exec.Rep. No. 17, at 16. Article 3 also provides for an appeal by either party of an extradition determination and for expedited consideration at every stage. Id., art. 3(b), reprinted in S.Exec.Rep. No. 17, at 16. 49 The policy considerations underlying the President's decision to conclude the Supplementary Treaty in the exercise of his constitutional treaty making powers, U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, were articulated by the State Department's Legal Adviser in a prepared statement presented to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: 50 It is a shocking and disgraceful fact that criminals who commit [terrorist acts] against the citizens of other nations, and manage therefore [sic] to get to the U.S., are often able under current U.S. law, successfully to invoke the political offense exception and thereby escape extradition. Worst of all, in many cases in which the exception can be successfully invoked under present law, the United States is unable to prosecute the terrorists involved, because we lack jurisdiction for most offenses committed abroad.... The treaty amendment ... would prevent such travesties of justice with respect to extradition requests between the United States and the United Kingdom. 51 The United States and United Kingdom Supplementary Extradition Treaty: Hearings on Treaty Doc. No. 8 Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 248-49 (1985) (prepared statement of Abraham D. Sofaer). 52 During the debate over the ratification of the Supplementary Treaty, Senator Richard Lugar, the Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, made it clear that the treaty would reverse three cases where extradition previously had been denied on the basis of the political offense exception of the 1977 Treaty. The case of Peter G.J. McMullen was one of the three: 53 In three cases where [the political offense exception under the 1977 Treaty] has been [invoked], the Federal courts have denied requests by the United Kingdom for the extradition of members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army accused of committing acts of violence.... [I]t was because of these cases that on June 25, 1985, the United States and the United Kingdom signed the Supplementary Extradition [Treaty]. Its purpose is to reverse the three cases where extradition was denied and put an end to this development in the law. 54 132 Cong.Rec. 16,558, 16,586 (1986). 55 Senator Alphonse D'Amato expressed his concern about applying the Supplementary Treaty to those who successfully had invoked the political offense exception: 56 Approving this treaty in its present form may well result in the extradition of certain individuals who American courts have refused to extradite after the most careful consideration. 57 Such a result would be similar to the enactment of a bill of attainder or an ex post facto law in violation of the principle contained in article I, section 9, clause 3, of our Constitution.... 58 Id. at 16,592. Senator D'Amato therefore proposed an amendment that would have exempted from extradition those individuals who already had been successful in claiming the political offense exception. The amendment failed, and the Extradition Treaty was ratified as presented to the Senate. See id. at 16,600. 59