Opinion ID: 2823791
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Heading: Batson Prohibits Purposeful Racial Discrimination

Text: Â¶10Â Â Â Â Â Â In Batson, the U.S. Supreme Court recognized that âthe Equal Protection Clause orbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the Stateâs case against a black defendant.â 476 U.S. at 89. To implement this directive, the Court laid out a three-step analysis intended to uncover racial discrimination in theÂ exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecutor in a criminal case. 4 Id. at 96â98. If the defendant can make out a prima facie case that the prosecutor struck a prospective juror on the basis of race, then, at the second step, the burden of production shifts to the prosecutor to proffer a race-neutral reason for excusing the prospective juror. Id. at 96â97. After the defendant has a chance to rebut the prosecutorâs explanation, the trial court determines, at the third step, whether the defendant has established purposeful discrimination by the prosecutor. Id. at 98. Â¶11Â Â Â Â Â Â Wilson contends that the trial court committed clear error in its step-three uling because both the trial court and the prosecutor mischaracterized Mr. E.âs voir dire, raising an inference that the prosecutor struck Mr. E. because of his race. Wilson urges us to adopt and apply the court of appealsâ rule that, where the record refutes the prosecutorâs asserted race-neutral reasons for striking a prospective juror, the discrepancy âsuggest[s] pretext sufficient for finding discriminatory purpose.â See Wilson, Â¶ 15. In some cases, however, a discrepancy between the prosecutorâs justification and the record of voir dire can reflect a mistaken recollection rather than purposeful discrimination. E.g., Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1547 (10th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Therefore, after we describe the standard of review, we begin our analysis withÂ 2e overview of the quantum of proof required to establish purposeful discrimination at the third step of the Batson analysis. Next, we examine the trial courtâs ruling in the instant case and determine that, under the deferential standard of review required at Batsonâs third step, the trial court did not clearly err by accepting the prosecutorâs race-neutral reason for excusing Mr. E. from the jury panel.
Â¶12Â Â Â Â Â Â The standard of review âdepends upon which step of the Batson analysis is before us.â Valdez v. People, 966 P.2d 587, 590 (Colo. 1998). The trial court in this case heard the prosecutorâs race-neutral explanation and ruled on the ultimate issue of purposeful discrimination. The question of whether Wilson established a prima facie case at step one is therefore moot. People v. Cerrone, 854 P.2d 178, 186 n.13 (Colo. 1993) (citing Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991) (plurality opinion)). Nor is step two before us, because Wilson concedes that the prosecutor offered a race-neutral explanation. We therefore focus on the third and final step of the Batson analysis: whether the opponent of the peremptory challenge proved purposeful discrimination. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98. Â¶13Â Â Â Â Â Â Describing step three, the Batson Court analogized to the standard of proof for sex discrimination under Title VII. See id. at 98 n.21 (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575â76 (1985)). The Court stated that a trial courtâs step-three finding as to the existence of discrimination is due âgreat deference,â as it âturn[s] on evaluation of credibility.â Id. The inquiry at step three requires the trial court to decide whether to believe counselâs race-neutral explanation for a peremptoryÂ challenge. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. â[T]he best evidence often will be the demeanor of the attorney who exercises the challenge,â evaluation of which lies ââpeculiarly within a trial judgeâs province.ââ Id. (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985)). We therefore review the trial courtâs factual determination at step three only for clear error. Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 477 (2008); accord Valdez, 966 P.2d at 590.
Â¶14Â Â Â Â Â Â At step three, âthe critical questionâ becomes âthe persuasiveness of the prosecutorâs justification for h[er] peremptory strike.â Miller-El v. Cockrell (Miller-El I),537 U.S. 322, 338â39 (2003). The trial court must gauge the prosecutorâs credibility by evaluating her demeanor, how reasonable or improbable her explanations are, and whether her âproffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.â Id. at 339. If the prosecutorâs asserted race-neutral reasons do not hold up, and âthe racially discriminatory hypothesisâ better fits the evidence, then the trial court must uphold the Batson challenge. See Miller-El v. Dretke (Miller-El II), 545 U.S. 231, 265â66 (2005) (concluding, based on historical patterns of practice and the disparate treatment of black and white veniremembers during jury selection, that the prosecutor struck black potential jurors because of their race). Though the trial court must evaluate all relevant facts, âthe ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike.â Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995). Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Â It is true that a prosecutorâs mischaracterization of a prospective jurorâs voir dire estimony may indicate an ulterior, racial motive. See, e.g., Miller-El II, 545 U.S. at 244 (concluding that counsel misrepresented a venirememberâs inability to vote for death toÂ disguise âan ulterior reason for keeping [him] off the juryâ). Yet dissonance between a prosecutorâs race-neutral explanation and the transcript of voir dire does not prove that the prosecutor lied to conceal racial discrimination. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 1 S.W.3d 691, 694 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (holding that proof that an explanation was incorrect is insufficient to satisfy a Batson challengerâs burden of persuasion). Most courts find other indications of racial motivation before concluding that race-neutral explanations belied by the record are pretextual. See, e.g., Johnson v. Vasquez, 3 F.3d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1993). Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â For example, in Johnson, the Ninth Circuit observed that the prosecutor initially justified his strike of a minority veniremember by pointing to defense counselâs strike of another minority veniremember, suggesting that race factored into the prosecutorâs decision-making. Id. at 1330. The prosecutor also gave four, facially race-neutral reasons for his strike. Id. Only after the court noted that the prosecutorâs initial explanation raised âa strong indicationâ of racial bias did it compare the record to the prosecutorâs other stated reasons. Id. at 1329, 1330. Then, concluding that the record either undermined or did not support each of the prosecutorâs four race-neutral reasons, the court held that those reasons were pretext for racial discrimination. Id. at 1330; see also Flowers v. State, 947 So. 2d 910, 923â26 (Miss. 2007) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendantâs Batson challenge where the prosecutorâs main reason for striking a black veniremember applied with equal force to a white veniremember whom the prosecutor accepted and the record refuted another of the prosecutorâs reasons for striking the black veniremember). Â¶17Â Â Â Â Â Â Standing alone, however, proffered reasons that are contradicted by the record do not imply pretext but can instead reflect mistaken recollection. In Hurd, the Tenth Circuit explained that a shortcut linking a mistaken reason to a pretextual reason conflates the second and third steps of the Batson analysis. 109 F.3d at 1547. To pass muster at step two, the strike proponentâs explanation need not be âpersuasive, or even plausible,â as long as it is race-neutral. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. But at step three, the challenger must âconvince the [trial] court that the reason proffered for the strike was unworthy of belief and that the strike was racially motivated.â Hurd, 109 F.3d at 1548. In Hurd, counsel justified his strike of the only black veniremember by stating that the man previously found for a railroad employee in a civil case. Id. at 1546â47. As opposing counsel and the trial court immediately pointed out, however, the veniremember had stated that he served on a civil jury that reached a verdict, but he never said that the jury had rendered a verdict for the plaintiff. Id. at 1547. The trial court, having observed the attorneyâs demeanor âat length,â determined that, despite the attorneyâs error in recollection, âhe had truthfully represented his belief . . . and had not struck the [prospective] juror because of the color of his skin.â Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 892 F. Supp. 245, 248 (D. Kan. 1995). The Tenth Circuit deferred to the trial courtâs finding that counsel for the university made an honest mistake and held that the plaintiff had not proved facts sufficient to establish purposeful discrimination. Hurd, 109 F.3d at 1548. Â¶18Â Â Â Â Â Â The court of appealsâ contrary view in this case, which labels as pretext any justification unsupported by the record, elevates an appellate courtâs review of a coldÂ record above the trial courtâs firsthand observation of the proceedings and the attitude of the participants. Only the trial court can assess non-verbal cues, such as hesitation, voice inflection, and facial expressions, that are not recorded on a transcript. The court of appealsâ method also creates a presumption that arrogates the trial courtâs step-three duty to distinguish between sham excuses that violate the Equal Protection Clause and bona fide, race-neutral explanations for a peremptory strike. See Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365; Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n.21. Such a regime is at odds with the U.S. Supreme Courtâs Batson jurisprudence, which acknowledges the âpivotal roleâ of the trial court in evaluating the credibility and demeanor of both the prosecutor and the prospective juror. Snyder, 552 U.S. at 477; see also Valdez, 966 P.2d at 599 (Kourlis, J., dissenting) (âDiscrimination is as sly as it is insidious. It lives in inference, tone, and gesture as much as in action.â). The Batson analysis exists to expose and prevent racial discrimination in jury selection, ânot to test [a] prosecutorâs memory.â People v. Jones, 247 P.3d 82, 99 (Cal. 2011). When an appellate court presumes racial motivation any time a prosecutor misremembers a prospective jurorâs voir dire testimony, it discounts the possibility that the error was a result of an innocent transpositionâand that race did not motivate the strike.
Â¶19Â Â Â Â Â Â The prosecutor in this case explained that she excused Mr. E. for two facially race-neutral reasons: (1) his âdiscomfortâ with DNA evidence and (2) his inability to return a guilty verdict without eyewitness identification. In rebuttal, the defenseÂ argued that Mr. E.âs responses indicated that he was both comfortable with DNA and âwould have no problem with the alleged victim not being able to identifyâ her attacker. After listening to the prosecutorâs explanation and Wilsonâs rebuttal, the trial court noted its own impression of Mr. E. The court observed that Mr. E. âwaffled back and forthâ in response to the prosecutorâs questions about DNA evidence and âhesitated for an extended periodâ before answering questions about the lack of eyewitness identification. Although the trial court never uttered the magic words âno purposeful discrimination,â it concluded that the prosecutor had articulated âan appropriate basis to excuse [Mr. E.].â The court therefore denied Wilsonâs Batson challenge. Â¶20Â Â Â Â Â Â The court of appeals disagreed and held that the trial court erred by denying Wilsonâs Batson challenge because the prosecutorâs account of Mr. E.âs responses conflicted with the transcript of voir dire. Wilson, Â¶Â¶ 16â17. While the court of appeals correctly noted the variance, it failed to credit the trial courtâs finding that Mr. E. âhesitated for an extended periodâ because it concluded that the record refuted the courtâs other finding: that Mr. E. âwaffled back and forthâ with respect to his confidence in DNA evidence. Id. at Â¶ 19. The court of appeals decided that the incongruity between the transcript of Mr. Eâs responses and the prosecutorâs account of voir dire indicated a discriminatory purpose behind the prosecutorâs peremptory strike of Mr. E. Id. at Â¶ 18. Â¶21Â Â Â Â Â Â The record of voir dire does not, however, carry the weight that the court of appeals assigned to it. Asked about the persuasiveness of DNA evidence and theÂ absence of eyewitnesses to a crime, Mr. E.âs answers arguably indicated skepticism: He gave appropriate responses, but used qualifiers like, âin that case,â â[n]ot in and of itself,â and, âI believe so.â Furthermore, he answered affirmatively when the prosecutor asked him if a witnessâs inability to identify her attacker would âcause [him] any pause.â The prosecutor interpreted these responses as indications that Mr. E. was âuncomfortableâ with DNA evidence and might not be willing to return a guilty verdict if the victim could not identify her attacker. Her intuition that Mr. E. might not be a suitable juror in a case based extensively on DNA evidence, where the victim could not identify the defendant, was both reasonable and grounded in trial strategy. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 339 (âCredibility can be measured by . . . how reasonable, or how improbable, the explanations are[] and by whether the proffered rationale has some basis in accepted trial strategy.â); cf. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97 (emphasizing that âthe prosecutorâs explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for causeâ). Â¶22Â Â Â Â Â Â Wilson nevertheless claims that the prosecutorâs reasons for excusing Mr. E. better fit other prospective jurors, like Mr. N., who was leery of the âmargin of error with DNA.â At the time of the Batson challenge, Wilson argued only that, contrary to the prosecutorâs explanation, Mr. E. was comfortable with DNA evidence and the lack of eyewitness identification. No further record was made. Wilson never claimed that the prosecutor treated similarly situated veniremembers differently based on their race, and we decline to resolve such a claim raised for the first time before this court. Valdez, 966 P.2d at 594; see also Snyder, 552 U.S. at 483 (â[A] retrospective comparison of jurorsÂ based on a cold appellate record may be very misleading when alleged similarities were not raised at trial.â). At most, the record suggests that the prosecutor may have misremembered Mr. E.âs voir dire. Â¶23Â Â Â Â Â Â The prosecutorâs possible erroneous recollection does not, however, evince the purposeful discrimination that Batson prohibits. See 476 U.S. at 98. The prosecutor may have made a mistake, but that is insufficient to prove that race motivated her decision to strike Mr. E. Cf. Hurd, 109 F.3d at 1548. Having observed the prosecutorâs demeanor firsthand, the trial court concluded that she stated âan appropriate basisâ for excusing Mr. E. The court thus implicitly found that the prosecutor was credible and that her race-neutral explanation for excusing Mr. E. was sincere. See Miller-El I, 537 U.S. at 338â39. These findings deserve deference because â[t]he trial judge is the judicial officer who watches and listens as voir dire unfolds, and who can discern the presence or absence of discriminatory intent.â Valdez, 966 P.2d at 599 (Kourlis, J., dissenting). Although the prosecutorâs justification may appear discordant with the record, the trial court in this case did not commit clear error by believing her race-neutral explanation and denying Wilsonâs Batson challenge.