Opinion ID: 1102725
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Choosing The Grand-Jury Foreperson

Text: Drinkard was indicted by a Morgan County grand jury. He claims that the manner by which the grand-jury foreperson in his case was selected violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and his due-process rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution; the Alabama Constitution; and other Alabama law. We address this issue because it remains justiciable with respect to the indictment by which Drinkard was charged. Although Drinkard is white, he has standing to challenge the alleged discriminatory exclusion of blacks from a grand jury, on the basis of equal-protection guarantees. The United States Supreme Court has held recently that a white defendant has standing to raise an equal protection challenge to discrimination against black persons in the selection of his grand jury. Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S. 392, 118 S.Ct. 1419, 1424, 140 L.Ed.2d 551 (1998). In Campbell, however, the Supreme Court did not hold that a defendant has standing to raise an equal-protection issue by a challenge to the selection of the grand-jury foreperson. Campbell, 523 U.S. at 397-403, 118 S.Ct. at 1423-25. Because we hold that the method of selecting grand-jury forepersons in Morgan County is not discriminatory, we need not today determine if a white defendant has standing to raise an equal-protection challenge. The State argues that this Court has previously held that the method of selecting grand-jury forepersons in Morgan County was not discriminatory. See Pace v. State, 714 So.2d 332 (Ala.1997). Drinkard argues that our holding in Pace merely dealt with the application of the plain-error doctrine to the issue. In Pace, this Court held that there had been a history of discrimination in the selection of grand-jury forepersons in Morgan County, but it did not reverse the Court of Criminal Appeals' affirmance of the defendant's conviction, because the defendant had not properly preserved the issue for appeal. We held that the discrimination did not rise to the level of plain error. Drinkard objected to the manner by which the foreperson of the grand jury that returned the indictment against him was selected. Therefore, the plain-error analysis of Pace does not apply here. We must still answer the question whether the manner by which the grand-jury foreperson was selected was discriminatory, using the criteria applied by the United States Supreme Court in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 565, 99 S.Ct. 2993, 61 L.Ed.2d 739 (1979). The United States Supreme Court in Rose set forth three criteria for determining if the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the manner of selecting a grand-jury foreperson is racially discriminatory: `The first step is to establish that the group is one that is a recognizable, distinct class, singled out for different treatment under the laws, as written or as applied.... Next, the degree of underrepresentation must be proved, by comparing the proportion of the group in the total population to the proportion called to serve as [foreman], over a significant period of time.... This method of proof, sometimes called the rule of exclusion, has been held to be available as a method of proving discrimination in jury selection against a delineated class.... Finally ... a selection procedure that is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral supports the presumption of discrimination raised by the statistical showing.' Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. at 565, 99 S.Ct. 2993 (quoting Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977)). First, it has been long established that African-Americans make up a recognizable, distinct class. Second, we must analyze the history of discrimination. Before our holding in Pace, there had never been a black grand-jury foreperson in Morgan County. Drinkard was tried in 1995, the same year this Court, in Pace, addressed Morgan County's method of selecting grand-jury forepersons; this means that at the time of Drinkard's indictment there was no record indicating any black had ever served as grand-jury foreperson in Morgan County. Because 10% of the population in Morgan County is black, before 1997 there was a marked degree of underrepresentation. However, the third criterion is whether the selection method is susceptible of abuse or is not racially neutral. Morgan County has recently changed its method of selecting grand-jury forepersons. Before 1993, the trial court appointed grand-jury forepersons, based on the recommendation of the prosecutor. Since that time, grand-jury forepersons have been selected by the members of the grand jury itself. As we noted in Pace, the new procedure [in which the grand-jury members themselves choose the grand-jury foreperson] should limit any appearance of discrimination in the judicial process. 714 So.2d at 338, n. 6. Allowing the grand jury the freedom to choose its own foreman forecloses a question of discrimination in the judicial process. However, even if we assumed that such discrimination did occur, we would hold, as the United States Supreme Court did in Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 346, 104 S.Ct. 3093, 82 L.Ed.2d 260 (1984), that because of the ministerial function of grand-jury forepersons in Alabama, there is no invasion of the the distinctive interests of the defendant protected by the Due Process Clause. In Hobby, the United States Supreme Court proceeded on the assumption that discrimination had occurred in the selection of the grand-jury foreperson. Today, we use the Supreme Court's analysis to determine if Drinkard's indictment should be dismissed. When determining if such discrimination requires the dismissal of an indictment, the Supreme Court in Hobby looked at two factors: First, was the grand jury itself properly constituted? Second, did the grand-jury foreperson have more than a ministerial function in the grand-jury process? The Court in Hobby looked at the constitution of the grand jury itself because [t]he due process concern that no `large and identifiable segment of the community [be] excluded from jury service,' Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. [493], at 503, 92 S.Ct. 2163, 33 L.Ed.2d 83 [(1972)], does not arise when the alleged discrimination pertains only to the selection of a foreman from among the members of a properly constituted federal grand jury. 468 U.S. at 345, 104 S.Ct. 3093. Drinkard has not shown that the grand jury itself was improperly constituted. Indeed, the record indicates that of the 18 grand-jury members, 2 were black, and that blacks make up only 10% of the population in Morgan County. Therefore, the grand jury itself was an appropriate representation of the community as a whole and was properly constituted. Second, the Supreme Court in Hobby held that, given the ministerial role of a federal grand-jury foreman, discrimination in the selection of one person from among the members of a properly constituted grand jury can have little, if indeed any, appreciable effect upon the defendant's due process right to fundamental fairness. 468 U.S. at 345, 104 S.Ct. 3093. The United States Supreme Court distinguished the role of the federal grand-jury foreman, as discussed in Hobby, from the role of a Tennessee grand-jury foreman, as discussed in Rose v. Mitchell, supra: Under the federal system, by contrast, the foreman is chosen from among the members of the grand jury after they have been empaneled, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 6(c); the federal foreman, unlike the foreman in Rose, cannot be viewed as the surrogate of the judge. So long as the grand jury itself is properly constituted, there is no risk that the appointment of any one of its members as foreman will distort the overall composition of the array or otherwise taint the operation of the judicial process. Hobby, 468 U.S. at 348, 104 S.Ct. 3093. This Court in Pace examined the role of the grand-jury foreperson that was discussed in Rose v. Mitchell and compared that to the role of the grand-jury foreperson in Alabama: In Rose, the Supreme Court noted that Tennessee grand jury forepersons, in addition to the ministerial functions of presiding over the grand jury, administering oaths to witnesses, and signing indictments and subpoenas, had a substantive duty to assist the district attorney in the investigation of crimes. 443 U.S. at 548, n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 2993. In contrast, Alabama grand jury forepersons have no duty to assist the district attorney in the investigation of crimes and are generally limited to merely reporting grand jury votes and signing the appropriate paperwork prepared by the court or the district attorney. Rule 12.5, Ala. R. Cr.P. ... Unlike the dominant and authoritative role the Tennessee grand jury foreperson played in Rose, the role of the grand jury foreperson in this case was to perform merely ministerial tasks. The Tennessee grand jury foreperson in Rose had a virtual veto power over the indictment process because under Tennessee law the failure of the foreperson to sign an indictment renders the indictment `fatally defective.' 443 U.S. at 548, n. 2, 99 S.Ct. 2993. In contrast, the role of a grand jury foreperson in Alabama is so ministerial that even his or her failure to participate in deliberations and to vote with the panel is not fatal to the indictment.... Noah [v. State, 494 So.2d 870 (Ala.Crim.App.1986)]. Pace, 714 So.2d at 338. This Court concluded in Pace that [i]n this state, the function of a grand jury foreperson is almost entirely ministerial in nature, very similar to that of a federal grand jury foreperson. 714 So.2d at 336. Because the grand jury itself was properly constituted and the grand-jury foreperson in Alabama performs a ministerial function similar to that of the foreperson in the federal court, we conclude that the grand jury in Drinkard's case was not tainted to the point that Drinkard's due-process rights were infringed.