Opinion ID: 785396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Analysis of Remedial Measures

Text: 53 Because we conclude, for purposes of summary judgment, that McGinest suffered a hostile work environment, we must consider whether GTE is liable for the harassment. As a preliminary matter, we address the district court's overall approach to the question of remediation. The district court considered the sufficiency of GTE's remedial measures on an event-by-event basis, stating: After eliminating the incidents for which McGinest's proof is wholly inadequate, and those incidents to which [GTE] has adequately responded, McGinest's case rests on a few sporadic occurrences of arguably racially motivated conduct. Although the district court's approach does not appear unreasonable at first blush, it led the court to underestimate the impact of the environment on McGinest and underemphasize GTE's responsibility to take remedial action to discourage discriminatory conduct. Instead, a court must first assess whether a hostile work environment existed, and then determine whether the response was adequate as a whole. 54 An employer's liability for harassing conduct is evaluated differently when the harasser is a supervisor as opposed to a coworker. Swinton, 270 F.3d at 803. An employer is vicariously liable for a hostile environment created by a supervisor, although such liability is subject to an affirmative defense. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 877 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. at 780, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662). If, however, the harasser is merely a coworker, the plaintiff must prove that ... the employer knew or should have known of the harassment but did not take adequate steps to address it. Swinton, 270 F.3d at 803. 55
56 An employer may raise a two-pronged affirmative defense to avoid vicarious liability for a hostile environment created by a supervisor. 12 Nichols, 256 F.3d at 877. Although GTE mentions this defense in its motion for summary judgment, it does not raise it before us. In consequence, we assume that GTE is liable for the acts of its supervisors, and we leave it to the district court to evaluate the defense if it is raised on remand. See Smith v. Mash, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir.1999). Thus, for the purposes of summary judgment we assume that GTE is liable for the offensive comments by coordinator Hughes 13 and supervisor Ledbetter, supervisor Roberts' denial of bonus pay for McGinest's overtime while a relief supervisor and refusal to provide for McGinest's automotive safety, and the derogatory comments and exposure to hazardous industrial situations by supervisor Noson.
57 [E]mployers are liable for failing to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work environment of which management-level employees knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d at 881 (quoting EEOC v. Hacienda Hotel, 881 F.2d 1504, 1515-16 (9th Cir.1989)); Swinton, 270 F.3d at 803. GTE had actual knowledge of the events of which McGinest informed his immediate supervisor or manager, including the offensive comments by coworkers Daniel DeLeon, Jim Frick and Alex Talmadge, as well as the one incident of graffiti that was reported. Additionally, GTE had imputed knowledge regarding the remaining incidents of racist graffiti, because managers also used the restrooms and other facilities where this graffiti was prevalent. 58 GTE may nonetheless avoid liability for such harassment by undertaking remedial measures reasonably calculated to end the harassment. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882; see also Yamaguchi v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 109 F.3d 1475, 1482 (9th Cir.1997). The reasonableness of the remedy depends on its ability to: (1) `stop harassment by the person who engaged in the harassment;' and (2) `persuade potential harassers to refrain from unlawful conduct.' Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875 (quoting Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882). To be adequate, an employer must intervene promptly. Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 778 (9th Cir.1992). Remedial measures must include some form of disciplinary action, Yamaguchi, 109 F.3d at 1482, which must be proportionate[] to the seriousness of the offense, Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882 (Title VII requires more than a mere request to refrain from discriminatory conduct.). 59 GTE took action by counseling DeLeon and by painting over the racial graffiti reported in April 1998. GTE alleges that these remedial measures stopped the harassment, and were therefore sufficient to protect it from liability. However, it is clear that McGinest has presented sufficient evidence to establish disputed issues of material fact with regard to the adequacy of the remedial measures taken by GTE. In fact, on the record before us, GTE would be unable to avoid liability through its remedial measures. 60 First, GTE only responded to the one act of graffiti that was reported, despite the fact that GTE knew or should have known of numerous other instances. Inaction constitutes a ratification of past harassment, even if such harassment independently ceases. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1529 (9th Cir.1995) (noting that Title VII condemns the existence of past harassment, every bit as much as the risk of future harassment); Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875-76 (When the employer undertakes no remedy, or where the remedy does not end the current harassment and deter future harassment, liability attaches for both the past harassment and any future harassment.). 61 Additionally, although painting over the graffiti was a necessary first step, the record before us reveals no actions taken by GTE to ensure that this recurrent problem would cease, 14 and in fact it did not cease. Thus, this case resembles Daniels v. Essex Group, in which inadequate remediation was found where similar racist graffiti reappeared after being painted over, the defendant made virtually no effort to investigate the incidents, 937 F.2d at 1275, and management neither called a meeting of the workforce to condemn the racial harassment nor issued a warning announcing the employer's abhorrence of racial harassment, id. at 1267. 62 Furthermore, the reactions of management upon learning about the graffiti indicate that the incident was not taken seriously. After being informed about the graffiti, supervisor Roberts first joked that he himself was responsible for it, and then added an additional humorous comment that had racial overtones. 15 Rather than remedying the harassment, Roberts' behavior appears to have added to it. 63 GTE's remediation of DeLeon's racial comments also gives cause for concern. Although counseling and a warning may suffice if successful in stopping the harassment, see Intlekofer, 973 F.2d at 779, GTE did not issue this warning until McGinest had filed a complaint with the EEOC. In fact, McGinest had informed his manager or immediate supervisor of the events involving Noson, Hughes, DeLeon, and others, to no avail. In each of these cases, GTE did not respond until McGinest initiated formal proceedings. This delay does not satisfy Title VII's requirement of prompt remedial action. See, e.g., Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1528; Intlekofer, 973 F.2d at 778; Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464. 64 Taken as a whole, GTE's responses were troubling for another reason. We have been clear that in order to be adequate, remedial actions must be designed not only to prevent future conduct by the harasser, but also by other potential harassers. See, e.g., Fuller, 47 F.3d at 1528; Nichols, 256 F.3d at 875; Ellison, 924 F.2d at 882. GTE's actions may have been successful in persuading identified harassers to cease their activities. But over a ten-year period, McGinest was subjected to inappropriate comments by a minimum of six individuals, and was allegedly physically endangered or financially harmed through the actions of several others. On the record before us, GTE took no action to ensure that this level of harassment did not continue for the rest of McGinest's tenure at the company. IV. FAILURE TO PROMOTE 65 The remaining two claims raised by McGinest involve GTE's failure to promote him to the position of Outside Plant Construction Installer Supervisor in October 1998. McGinest alleges that he was denied this promotion because of racial discrimination and in retaliation for his complaint to the EEOC regarding the hostile work environment. A. Racial Discrimination 66 Under Title VII, an individual suffers disparate treatment when he or she is `singled out and treated less favorably than others similarly situated on account of race.' Jauregui v. City of Glendale, 852 F.2d 1128, 1134 (9th Cir.1988) (quoting Gay v. Waiters' & Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694 F.2d 531, 537 (9th Cir.1982)); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2003). Failure to promote is a common manifestation of disparate treatment. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 67 L.Ed.2d 207 (1981); Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 440-41 (9th Cir.1995); Jauregui, 852 F.2d at 1134. 67 [T]he plaintiff in a disparate treatment case must show the employer's intent to discriminate, but intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Id. (quoting Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1435 (9th Cir.1984)). The parties debate at length the question of whether McGinest adduced direct or circumstantial evidence of discrimination, and the relevance of the resolution of this question to the proper analytical framework by which a disparate treatment claim is evaluated. Their confusion is understandable considering the proliferation of conflicting case law on this question. See Costa v. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d 838, 852-53 (9th Cir.2002) (reviewing case law and describing it as a quagmire that defies characterization, chaos, and a morass), aff'd by 539 U.S. 90, 123 S.Ct. 2148, 156 L.Ed.2d 84 (2003). However, the Supreme Court recently brought much-needed clarity to this area of law when it affirmed our en banc opinion in Costa v. Desert Palace. 68 In Costa, the Supreme Court held that circumstantial and direct evidence should be treated alike, noting: Circumstantial evidence is not only sufficient, but may also be more certain, satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence. 123 S.Ct. at 2154 (quoting Rogers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n. 17, 77 S.Ct. 443, 1 L.Ed.2d 493 (1957)). Because the Supreme Court held that the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence is irrelevant to determining what analytical framework to apply, we need not resolve the parties' arguments regarding the proper characterization of McGinest's evidence. 69 Our decision in Costa establishes that although the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework 16 is a useful tool to assist plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage so that they may reach trial, nothing compels the parties to invoke the McDonnell Douglas presumption. 299 F.3d at 855. Rather, when responding to a summary judgment motion, the plaintiff is presented with a choice regarding how to establish his or her case. McGinest may proceed by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively, may simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated GTE. Id. (noting that plaintiff may succeed by introducing other sufficient evidence — direct or circumstantial — of discriminatory intent). 70 The district court applied the McDonnell Douglas test. It determined that McGinest established a prima facie case of failure to promote due to racial discrimination. McGinest 1) is a member of a protected class; 2) applied for and was qualified for an open job; 3) was rejected for that job; and 4) rather than filling the position by promoting any of the interviewees, GTE transferred a white manager into the position. 17 GTE produced a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the action, claiming that it was due to a hiring freeze. The district court concluded, however, that McGinest failed to produce evidence indicating that the reason given by GTE was a pretext, and thus granted summary judgment to GTE. 71 Once the defendant produces evidence of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason to counter the plaintiff's demonstration of a prima facie case, the McDonnell Douglas presumption of discrimination `drops out of the picture.' Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prod., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) (quoting St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993)). Because the district court correctly found that the first two steps of the McDonnell Douglas framework had been established, the sole remaining issue was `discrimination vel non. ' Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983)). Thus, despite the parties' vociferous contentions, in this case it is not particularly significant whether McGinest relies on the McDonnell Douglas presumption or, whether he relies on direct or circumstantial evidence of discriminatory intent to meet his burden. Under either approach, McGinest must produce some evidence suggesting that GTE's failure to promote him was due in part or whole to discriminatory intent, and so must counter GTE's explanation that a hiring freeze accounted for its failure to promote him. 72 As McGinest argues, the absence of any documentation confirming that a company hiring freeze was in place during the relevant time period is sufficient to raise a genuine factual dispute as to whether the asserted reason was pretextual. Indeed, even if such decisions were commonly conveyed to yard managers by word-of-mouth, the fact that a company the size of GTE does not have a memorandum, meeting notes, or other evidence of this hiring freeze or the financial difficulties that allegedly spurred the hiring freeze provides circumstantial evidence that the hiring freeze did not in fact exist. 18 73 Proof that the defendant's explanation is unworthy of credence is [a] form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147, 120 S.Ct. 2097. Additionally, GTE's permissive response to harassing actions undertaken by coworkers and supervisors, combined with the absence of black supervisors and managers in the workplace, also is circumstantial evidence of pretext. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817 (noting that possible methods of demonstrating pretext include treatment of [the employee] during his prior term of employment ... and [the employer's] general policy and practice with respect to minority employment, such as information demonstrating a general pattern of discrimination against blacks); Warren, 58 F.3d at 443-44 (holding that plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact as to employer's motive by showing that less-qualified white employees were promoted over him, combined with racist remarks and statistical evidence); Bergene v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 272 F.3d 1136, 1143 (9th Cir.2001) (holding that absence of female supervisors was one factor establishing pretext for failure to promote). 74 We have held that very little[] evidence is necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding an employer's motive; any indication of discriminatory motive ... may suffice to raise a question that can only be resolved by a fact-finder. Schnidrig, 80 F.3d at 1409. When [the] evidence, direct or circumstantial, consists of more than the McDonnell Douglas presumption, a factual question will almost always exist with respect to any claim of a nondiscriminatory reason. Sischo-Nownejad, 934 F.2d at 1111; see also Lam, 40 F.3d at 1564. As the district court recognized, this is a close case. Such uncertainty at the summary judgment stage must be resolved in favor of the plaintiff. Id. (We require very little evidence to survive summary judgment precisely because the ultimate question is one that can only be resolved through a `searching inquiry' — one that is most appropriately conducted by the fact finder, upon a full record.). Because a number of factors cast doubt upon GTE's proffered explanation for its failure to promote McGinest, while providing support for his contention regarding racial discrimination, McGinest has met his burden of showing a genuine factual issue with regard to discriminatory intent. Lam, 40 F.3d at 1559. B. Retaliation 75 Section 704 of Title VII prohibits retaliation against an employee for opposing unlawful discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2003). Like discrimination, retaliation may be shown using the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework. To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, McGinest must show 1) that he acted to protect his Title VII rights; 2) that an adverse employment action was thereafter taken against him; and 3) that a causal link existed between the two events. Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464. If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the employer to proffer an alternative explanation for its action, which the employee may attempt to rebut. 76 McGinest has established the first and second prongs of the prima facie case. 19 However, McGinest has not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate a causal link between his complaint and the denial of the promotion. Because the two events were separated by a year and a half, the timing alone does not establish a connection, and McGinest does not offer any other explanation. See Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1065 (9th Cir.2002). Thus, we affirm the district court's dismissal of the retaliation claim.