Opinion ID: 1311711
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We consider first the trial court's denial of defendant's request to withdraw his plea of guilty. The factual background leading up to this motion is as follows.

Text: When defendant entered his plea of guilty to shoplifting he refused to plead guilty to the charge of being an habitual criminal, and it seems both court and counsel treated this as if it were a separate crime, although we have held it is not. See State v. Goodwin, 212 N.W.2d 399, 401 (Iowa 1973). At the time fixed for sentencing, defendant asked permission to withdraw his guilty plea on the ground it had been tentatively worked out with the county attorney's office that [defendant] would not be charged as an habitual criminal if he pled guilty to the charge of shoplifting. Counsel stated that defendant, upon learning the State would ask that he be sentenced as an habitual criminal, was no longer willing to plead guilty to the shoplifting charge. Counsel (not the attorney who now represents defendant) made this statement to the court: [Defendant] now insists that he is innocent and states that he was a little confused with what went on last Friday [when he entered his plea] and he would like to withdraw his guilty plea at this time and enter a not guilty plea. The State then advised the trial court it had always intended to ask that defendant be sentenced as an habitual criminal. Defendant's counsel thought there had been a misunderstanding concerning the tentative arrangement to forego the request for punishment under § 747.5. The trial court denied permission to withdraw the plea, principally because the evidence of guilt as shown by the minutes of testimony was overwhelming. Defendant now argues his plea was not voluntarily entered, although strangely there is no direct appeal on that issue. Rather, the matter is raised peripherally as a basis for asking us to reverse the trial court's denial of the motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea. Even then, it was not specifically stated as a ground for the motion. However, the motion adequately presents the issue that defendant claims he was assured the State would not ask for punishment as an habitual criminal in return for a guilty plea to the shoplifting charge, and we consider it in that context. A defendant has no absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea. Permission to do so is a matter of trial court discretion, and we reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. State v. Watts, 225 N.W.2d 143, 146 (Iowa 1975); State v. Kirchner, 216 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1974); State v. Taylor, 211 N.W.2d 264, 266 (Iowa 1973); § 777.15, The Code. Simply stated, defendant's theory is that the trial court accepted his plea in the first place without following the precepts of State v. Sisco, 169 N.W.2d 542, 547 (Iowa 1969) because no inquiry was made by the court to determine the plea was made voluntarily. When this was called to the court's attention by asking to withdraw the plea, defendant argues the court erred in denying the motion. We believe there is merit to this argument. A review of the transcript reveals the trial court made no investigation as to the voluntariness of the plea. Sisco makes such a determination mandatory. See State v. Sisco, supra, 169 N.W.2d at 548. There we said: In other words, a sentencing court may not abrogate or delegate to anyone, including attorney for accused, the duty to determine defendant's knowledge of the charge, appreciation of legal consequences of a guilty plea, whether it is voluntarily entered, or existence of facts supporting it. See also State v. Watts, supra, 225 N.W.2d at 144. The ABA Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice referred to and adopted in Sisco set out as one reason for this requirement that it will permit the court to determine whether the tendered plea is the result of prior plea discussions and a plea agreement. See State v. Runge, Iowa, 228 N.W.2d 35, filed April 16, 1975. Certainly compliance with Sisco would have had that salutary result here. The State relies strongly on State v. Whitehead, 163 N.W.2d 899, 903 (Iowa 1969) and State v. Lindsey, 171 N.W.2d 859, 865 (Iowa 1969). Both are so dissimilar factually that they afford no support for the State's position. Not only was Whitehead a pre-Sisco case, but in addition the motion to withdraw the guilty plea was made after judgment. See § 777.15, The Code. In Lindsey a motion to withdraw the plea was not made at all. We said there: A defendant cannot be permitted to enter a guilty plea, gamble on the sentence, and then move to withdraw the plea if he is disappointed with the severity of the imposed sentence.    This is, in effect, what defendant attempts to do by this appeal, although at no time before or after judgment has he asked to withdraw that plea. Therefore, it must be concluded he knowingly and intentionally elected to let his plea of guilty stand and gamble on the consequences. (Emphasis added.) The circumstances presented here are quite different. In the first place, the trial court failed to explore the voluntariness of the plea independently as required by Sisco. When defendant later moved for permission to withdraw his plea on grounds which we believe adequately raised the issue of voluntariness, the trial court was alerted to this oversight and to the additional fact defendant claimed his plea resulted from promises concerning punishment. Refusal of the trial court to grant defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea under those circumstances was an abuse of discretion. We therefore reverse and remand with instructions that defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.