Opinion ID: 2783269
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Termination of the Mother’s parental rights.

Text: The Mother argues that the circuit court erred in terminating her parental rights. More precisely, the Mother contends that the circuit court erred in finding that she left Prestera’s Addictions Recovery Center early and that she had not made sufficient progress towards reunification with her children and had not substantially complied with the family case plan. Conversely, the DHHR argues that the circuit court properly terminated the Mother’s parental rights because she failed to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the conditions of abuse and neglect could be corrected. The DHHR maintains that she “failed to comply with her improvement period or to consider recommendations that would result in her timely reunification with her children,” because she ignored the DHHR’s recommendations regarding where to enroll in treatment for her addiction thereby frustrating reunification with her children. This Court has held that [a]t the conclusion of the improvement period, the court shall review the performance of the parents in attempting to attain the goals of the improvement period and shall, in the court’s discretion, determine whether the conditions of the improvement period have been satisfied and whether sufficient improvement has been made in the context of all the circumstances of the case to justify the return of the child. Syl. Pt. 6, In re Carlita B., 185 W. Va. 613, 408 S.E.2d 365 (1991). Moreover, we have held 15 that [a]s a general rule the least restrictive alternative regarding parental rights to custody of a child under W. Va. Code, 49-6-5 [1977] will be employed; however, courts are not required to exhaust every speculative possibility of parental improvement before terminating parental rights where it appears that the welfare of the child will be seriously threatened, and this is particularly applicable to children under the age of three years who are more susceptible to illness, need consistent close interaction with fully committed adults, and are likely to have their emotional and physical development retarded by numerous placements. Syl. Pt. 1, In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. 496, 266 S.E.2d 114 (1980). Finally, [t]ermination of parental rights, the most drastic remedy under the statutory provision covering the disposition of neglected children, W. Va. Code, 49-6-5 [1977] may be employed without the use of intervening less restrictive alternatives when it is found that there is no reasonable likelihood under W. Va. Code, 49-6-5(b) [1977] that conditions of neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected. In re R.J.M., 164 W. Va. at 496, 266 S.E.2d at 114, Syl. Pt. 2. The undisputed evidence before the circuit court clearly demonstrated that the Mother successfully completed the twenty-eight-day inpatient rehabilitation at the Prestera Center. The record is completely devoid of any evidence that supports the finding that the Mother left this program. Moreover, completion of an inpatient treatment program was the requirement of her case plan and the record shows that she did complete such a program. Again, there is no evidence in the record, or in the circuit court’s order, that supports any 16 finding that the Mother was directed by the circuit court to obtain treatment only where the DHHR recommended. Rather, the requirement placed on the Mother was that she had to undergo treatment. The Mother successfully completed both inpatient and long-term outpatient treatment programs for her addiction. She has also been participating in individual and group therapy, individual and group supportive intervention, as well as twelve-step groups. According to the Mother’s brief, she has attended AA and NA meetings on a daily basis since January 10, 2014. Additionally, the Mother removed herself from the abusive relationship with the children’s father. She remains sober, she is employed, she is going to attend college, and, according to her status update, she has obtained housing.19 The circuit court focused solely upon the Mother’s failure to complete the treatment program in Beckley recommended by the DHHR. The DHHR maintained, and the circuit court found, that because of this, the Mother frustrated the goal of reunification with her children and failed to make her children her first priority.20 19 In her status update filed with the Court pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Appellate Procedure 11(j), the Mother is currently living in Vienna, West Virginia, in an apartment with a one-year lease. She has been working at Red Lobster since October 20, 2014. She was previously employed by SRBI, a telemarketer, from March 2014 to October 2014. She was supposed to start school at WVU-Parkersburg on January 12, 2015, with the goal of becoming a surgical technician. She will attend classes on Mondays and Wednesdays. She continues to screen weekly for drugs and her results have been negative. 20 Visitation between parent and child during an out-of-custody improvement period is important in evaluating whether a parent is making strides towards reunification with the child. As we stated in In re Carlita B., “[a] parent’s level of interest in visiting with his or (continued...) 17 The Mother’s choice of undergoing treatment for her addiction in Huntington as opposed to Beckley may have made it more difficult to visit her children. Despite the representations by the DHHR and the guardian ad litem regarding the difficulty with visitation caused by the Mother undergoing treatment in Huntington, there is no evidence 20 (...continued) her child during an out-of-home improvement period is an extremely significant factor for the circuit court to review. A parent who consistently demonstrates a desire to be with his child obviously has far more potential for being a nurturant and committed parent than one whose interest in being with his child is erratic.” 185 W. Va. at 628, 408 S.E.2d at 380. In the instant case, the Mother enunciated a sound reason for choosing the Huntington treatment program. Moreover, her interest in visiting her children was not at issue, rather the logistics of arranging visitations with the Mother was made more difficult due to her decision to enter a treatment program that was further away from her children. That decision was necessitated by her desire to remedy the thing that made her a neglectful mother – her addiction to drugs and alcohol. The DHHR, and the circuit court, therefore, lost sight of the purpose of the improvement period We also discussed the purpose of improvement periods in In re Carlita