Opinion ID: 2224284
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Applicability of Escobedo.

Text: At the trial on the charge of conspiracy one of the statements taken from defendant on September 20, 1963, the evening of his arrest, was offered in evidence by the state. Police officers testified that defendant was advised he did not have to answer questions without first obtaining counsel. This was denied by defendant. They testified that he then gave the statement. Holloway contends that this statement was unconstitutionally obtained from the defendant. He first asserts that this follows from the application of the Escobedo rule. [1] In Escobedo the United States supreme court prohibited the use in evidence of post-arrest, police-station, and pretrial statements made there by Escobedo. . . . [W]here, as here, the investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent . . . . [2] This court limited Escobedo to its facts. In Browne v. State, [3] for example, the accused had not requested and been refused a lawyer during interrogation. The court held that this fully distinguished the Escobedo Case so that Escobedo was not controlling. The court has applied this view of Escobedo in several later cases, requiring that each fact of Escobedo be met by the case at bar before the Escobedo doctrine would be applied. [4] Although there is no evidence in the record that the plaintiff in error requested counsel prior to giving his confessions, defendant relies on his own and his attorney's post-trial allegation that defendant had requested an attorney prior to submitting a statement. In his rulings on the post-conviction motions, the trial court expressly found that Holloway was effectively advised of his right to remain silent and of his right to counsel and that the writing of the statement was the voluntary and deliberate choice of the defendant. Is this determination subject to review by this court? The case of State v. Burnett [5] involved precisely the same facts as the case at bar, and the court refused to apply the Escobedo doctrine. In his attempt to exclude the confession by coming within the Escobedo doctrine, in a post-trial affidavit Holloway alleged that he made known his desire to contact counsel. He also argues that his testimony was that he was not told of his right to remain silent, and this refutes the testimony of the police officer. Abuses of criminal process, not in the record, cannot be reviewed by our supreme court on writ of error. [6] Holloway cannot raise the Escobedo problem by inserting an essential element of that defensethe request for counselinto the record by a post-trial affidavit which merely reiterates his own contradicted testimony given on the same issue during the trial. Although plaintiff in error testified to the contrary at the trial the trial judge made a ruling that he was advised of his right to remain silent and this was supported by the evidence.