Opinion ID: 596204
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Discretionary Function Exception and Plaintiffs' First Claim for Relief.

Text: 31 The first argument raised by plaintiffs is that the district court erred in concluding that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA barred plaintiffs' technical assistance claim. Plaintiffs argue that MSHA Inspector Jack Marshall's incorrect technical advice concerning the wiring of lights on the Joy 12CM 2228 did not involve the exercise of discretion grounded in social, economic, or political policy and was therefore outside the scope of the discretionary function exception. This is the same argument plaintiffs asserted in a prior appeal before this court. See Ayala v. Joy Manufacturing Co., 877 F.2d 846 (10th Cir.1989). 32 a. The Discretionary Function Exception. The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the sovereign immunity of the United States for loss caused by the negligent or wrongful acts of government employees acting within the scope of their employment. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b). This waiver is limited, however, by the discretionary function exception, which prohibits any claim against the United States based upon the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused. Id. § 2680(a). This exception marks the boundary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and its desire to protect certain governmental activities from exposure to suit by private individuals. United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 808, 104 S.Ct. 2755, 2762, 81 L.Ed.2d 660 (1984). It evinces a congressional intent to prevent judicial 'second guessing' of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort. Id. at 814, 104 S.Ct. at 2765. 33 Application of the discretionary function exception requires an examination of two factors: whether the challenged act involves an element of judgment or choice, and whether the discretion involved is of the kind that the exception was designed to shield. Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 108 S.Ct. 1954, 100 L.Ed.2d 531 (1988). The most recent Supreme Court case to discuss the discretionary function exception explained these two factors as follows: 34 The exception covers only acts that are discretionary in nature, acts that involve an element of judgment or choice, ... [a]nd it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the actor, that governs whether the exception applies. The requirement of judgment or choice is not satisfied if a federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow, because the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive. 35 Furthermore, even assuming the challenged conduct involves an element of judgment, it remains to be decided whether that judgment is of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. Because the purpose of the exception is to prevent judicial second-guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in social, economic, and political policy through the medium of an action in tort, when properly construed, the exception protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy. 36 United States v. Gaubert, 499 U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1267, 113 L.Ed.2d 335 (1991) [Quotation marks and citations omitted]. 37 b. Application of the Exception to the First Claim for Relief. The district court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the discretionary function exception is a legal issue that we review de novo. Daniels v. United States, 967 F.2d 1463, 1464 (10th Cir.1992). Plaintiffs concede that MSHA Inspector Jack Marshall had discretion in deciding whether or not to offer technical advice to Brad Bourquin concerning how to connect the add-on lights. Aplt.Br. at 27 (Marshall had a choice whether to provide assistance and what type of assistance to provide.) They vigorously dispute, however, the proposition that Marshall's discretion concerning how to connect the lights was of the kind that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. Plaintiffs argue that the technical advice provided by Marshall was governed by objective principles of electrical engineering and by mandatory MSHA regulations requiring the add-on lights to be de-energized by the methane monitor. As such, they contend, Marshall's discretion did not involve questions of social, economic or political policy. 38 The Supreme Court has made clear that not all types of judgment are protected by the discretionary function exception. The limitation of the exception to policy-based decisions was addressed in detail by the Court in Berkovitz v. United States, supra. One of the claims alleged by the plaintiffs in that case was that the Division of Biologic Standards (DBS) had been negligent in issuing a license for an oral polio vaccine that did not comply with DBS safety standards. The Court expressed some confusion as to exactly what the plaintiffs meant by this claim. They may have meant that the DBS issued a license for the vaccine without making a determination that it complied with safety standards. If that were the case, then the discretionary function exception did not bar the claim because the DBS had a clear statutory duty to make such a determination before it licensed the product. On the other hand, the plaintiffs may have meant that the DBS made a determination that the vaccine complied with safety standards, but that the DBS's determination had been incorrect. If this were the case, then the question turns on whether the manner and method of determining compliance with the safety standards at issue involve agency judgment of the kind protected by the discretionary function exception. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 545, 108 S.Ct. at 1963. The plaintiffs argued that the DBS's decision did not involve policy judgment because the determination was based on the application of objective scientific standards, while the government argued that the determination incorporated considerable policy judgment. The Supreme Court ultimately declined to rule on the issue because it had not been adequately addressed; the Court noted, however, that the parties' arguments had framed the issue appropriately. Id. 39 Berkovitz makes clear that the application of the discretionary function exception turns upon an examination of the nature of the challenged conduct. The specific allegation asserted by the plaintiffs in this case is that Marshall negligently advised Brad Bourquin to obtain power for the add-on lights on the Joy 12CM 2228 by connecting the lights just below the main circuit breaker. The district court, in finding that Marshall's conduct was protected by the discretionary function exception, did not address the specific nature of the technical advice given by Marshall. Rather, the court focused on the fact that inspectors had discretion in deciding whether or not to offer technical advice. The plaintiffs, however, are not challenging the broad discretion of MSHA inspectors to give advice. They do not allege that Marshall's decision to offer technical advice was itself an act of negligence. Rather, the specific technical assistance (i.e. to connect the wires to the wrong terminal in violation of mandatory safety standards) is what is at issue. Ayala v. Joy Manufacturing, 877 F.2d 846, 848 (10th Cir.1989). Plaintiffs contend that because the specific topic addressed by Marshall involved the application of objective electrical standards, the choice exercised by Marshall in telling Bourquin where to connect the lights was not a policy-based decision. Citing Arizona Maintenance Co. v. United States, 864 F.2d 1497, 1504 (9th Cir.1989) (If it is a choice to be exercised within established objective safety standards, and the plaintiffs claim negligence in the failure to follow such standards, the discretionary function exception does not apply.) 40 If an inspector chooses to offer technical assistance, are any technical judgments made by the inspector protected by the discretionary function exception? If the exception is to be limited by its underlying purpose, the answer to this question must be no. Cf. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. at 1959 (The exception, properly construed, ... protects only governmental actions and decisions based on considerations of public policy.) Where the particular decision challenged is not a policy-based decision, there is no reason to provide the government with immunity. In this case, the particular decision being challenged is not Marshall's decision to offer technical advice, but his recommendation of where to connect the lights to the continuous mining machine. Cf. Aple.'s Br. at 8 (When Mr. Bourquin requested Mr. Marshall's assistance in determining where to connect the lights to the machine's existing power supply, he caused the inspector to exercise judgment about both whether to provide the requested assistance and, if so, where to suggest that the power connection be made.) (emphasis added). 41 The specific decision being challenged here--concerning where to connect the lights--did not involve any considerations of social, economic, or political policy. Marshall was not called upon to balance considerations of safety or efficiency or economy. Cf. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 820, 104 S.Ct. at 2767 (Employees performing aircraft inspection were specifically empowered to make policy judgments regarding the degree of confidence that might reasonably be placed in a given manufacturer, the need to maximize compliance with FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency resources.) The discretion involved in Marshall's decision was governed solely by technical considerations. A mandatory MSHA regulation required that the add-on lights be wired in such a manner that they be de-energized by the methane monitor. It was simply a question of choosing a configuration that would cause this to happen. Either the connection recommended by Inspector Marshall would cause the lights to de-energize or it wouldn't. Cf. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 108 S.Ct. 2510, 101 L.Ed.2d 442 (1988) (The decision of how to design an escape hatch in a military helicopter required the designer to consider factors such as the trade-off between greater safety and greater combat effectiveness.) See also Daniels v. United States, 967 F.2d 1463, 1465 (10th Cir.1992) (OSHA Inspector's determination as to what type of safety guard was best was protected by the discretionary function exception.) We fail to see how the determination in this case can be labeled a policy decision. The choice was governed, as plaintiffs contend, by objective principles of electrical engineering. 4 Where the governmental conduct at issue does not involve considerations of public policy, the justification for the discretionary function exception is not present. Berkovitz, 486 U.S. at 537, 108 S.Ct. at 1959. We conclude that Inspector Marshall's advice concerning where to connect the lights was not the kind of judgment that the discretionary function exception was designed to shield. 42 The government suggests in its brief that Marshall's recommendation to connect the power just below the main circuit breaker was not incorrect but was merely incomplete. To support this argument, the government points out that even with the lights connected as suggested by Marshall, an electrician could have made the lights properly de-energize with the addition of a slave relay from the methane monitor. The government also directs attention to the district court's finding that Marshall's instructions were incorrect and inadequate. 43 Perhaps if the basis of the plaintiffs' claim had been that Marshall's advice constituted negligence because it was not detailed enough, the claim would have been barred by the discretionary function exception. Under 30 U.S.C. § 952(b), it is left to the individual MSHA inspector to determine whether and to what extent to offer technical advice. An inspector's decision to offer limited technical assistance may be a policy-based decision reflecting a need to balance the ultimate goal of safety with the reality of finite agency resources. Cf. Redmon v. United States, 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir.1991). Under the facts found by the district court in this case, however, we are clearly not faced with a situation of an inspector offering limited technical assistance. The court's findings make clear that Marshall's recommendations about where to connect the lights to the power on the Joy 12CM 2228 were incorrect--not because he failed to give further instructions on making the connection--but because he simply confused the Joy 12CM 2228 with another type of continuous miner containing different electrical circuitry: 44 Marshall knew that the continuous miner operating in Bear Creek No. 4 Mine (the first continuous miner wired with McJunkins add-on lights) was a Joy 12CM. But the evidence indicates that when Marshall advised Bourquin where to obtain the power for the add-on lights, Marshall must have been thinking of a Lee Norris continuous miner. Add-on lights on a Lee Norris miner wired substantially according to Exhibit 7 would have been de-energized because the methane monitor relay on a Lee Norris miner is upstream of the main circuit breaker. Marshall specifically recommended 20-amp fuses in the lighting circuit, but these 20-amp fuses were not appropriate in that location on the Joy 12CM 2228. The lights on the Joy 12CM 2228 did not de-energize because ... the methane monitor interrupted the power downstream from the point at which Marshall instructed Bourquin to connect the lights to the power source. 45 The court concludes that the information and instructions that Marshall provided to Bourquin regarding where to connect the add-on lights to the power supply were incorrect and inadequate. The instructions may have been correct had the lights been installed on a Lee-Norris continuous miner with different circuitry, but were not correct for the Joy 12CM 2228. 46 Ayala, 771 F.Supp. at 1105. There is no doubt from the court's findings that Marshall incorrectly determined that connecting the lights just below the main circuit breaker would allow the lights to be de-energized by the methane monitor. 47 Because the nature of the conduct being challenged by the plaintiffs in count one is not grounded in the exercise of policy judgment, the discretionary function exception does not bar the claim. Accordingly, the district court's ruling on count one of the complaint must be reversed. 5 48