Opinion ID: 363006
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Service of Process to Speigel

Text: 28 The then applicable 11 Pennsylvania long-arm service of process statute, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8307, required the signed registered or certified mail return receipt of a party served with process to be attached to and made a part of the return of service of such process unless that person refuses to accept the notice mailed or cannot be found at his last known address. The U.S. marshal's service return Document stated that (s)ervice upon Armin Speigel (was) returned Unclaimed  (emphasis added). 29 Appellants contend that service upon Speigel was invalid under section 8307 because, under that section, an unclaimed service is not the same thing as a refused service. They argue that the exception to the signed return requirement which takes effect when service is refused is designed to prevent an intended recipient from deliberately evading service. But, they claim, there is no evidence that Speigel intentionally did anything to avoid receipt of process. 30 In attempting to distinguish refused service from unclaimed service, we think appellants ignore the precise language and obvious purpose of 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8307. Section 8307 states that proof on the return of service form that the party being served received the process is unnecessary not only when that party refuses to accept the notice mailed, Id., but also when he cannot be found at his last known address. Id. The Pennsylvania legislature's use of the cannot be found phrase which carries no connotation of deliberate refusal to accept process is a clear indication to us that, contrary to appellants' claim, actual receipt of process is in some situations unnecessary even when the party being served did not affirmatively attempt to avoid service. 31 In our view, section 8307 was designed to insure merely that service of process be reasonably calculated, Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463, 61 S.Ct. 339, 85 L.Ed. 278 (1940), to notify a party that judicial proceedings will take place in which he may have an interest. Ordinarily, sending process to a person's last known address by certified or registered mail guarantees that the person will receive the process. Thus, delivery by certified or registered mail is an efficient notice-providing mechanism. The drafters of the statute realized however, that in certain circumstances, even delivery by certified mail will not result in the intended recipient actually obtaining the papers sent to him. The recipient may have been at home but deliberately refused service. Alternatively, he may not have been found at his last known address, either because he had moved and left no forwarding address, because he was out of town on vacation or business, or for various other reasons. Since the legislature did not intend for service to be invalidated in those circumstances in which a party follows section 8307's requirement of certified or registered mailing but nevertheless fails to receive a signed return receipt from the person served, the statute specifically provides that service in such circumstances is proper. Id.; see Action Industries Inc. v. Wiedeman, 236 Pa.Super. 447, 346 A.2d 798, 804 n.11 (1975). 32 In this case, Speigel admitted in his answer to Alperin's petition that he resided at 23 Goodge Street, London, W.1, England. The Goodge Street address was the one to which the U.S. Marshal mailed the process. Thus, if Speigel failed to receive the process, it had to be either because he refused to accept it 12 or because, for one reason or another, he could not be found at his last known address, i. e., 23 Goodge Street. In either event,42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8307 explicitly provides that service is valid even without a return receipt signed by Speigel. 13 33 Finally, appellants argue that even if service to Speigel was proper under the statute, the failure of Speigel to receive service in this case violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Appellants' claim appears to be that Alperin did not use the means best calculated to apprise Speigel of his petition. They state that Alperin had previously employed British counsel and suggest that Alperin should have contacted counsel to aid him in serving Speigel when the registered mail approach was unsuccessful. 34 We find no merit to this claim. Whether a method of service of process accords an intended recipient with due process depends on whether or not the form of . . . service (used) is Reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard. Milliken, 311 U.S. at 463, 61 S.Ct. at 343 (emphasis added); See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315, 70 S.Ct. 652, 94 L.Ed. 865 (1950). As long as a method of service is reasonably certain to notify a person, the fact that the person nevertheless fails to receive process does not invalidate the service on due process grounds. In this case, Alperin attempted to deliver process by registered mail to defendant's last known address. That procedure is a highly reliable means of providing notice of pending legal proceedings to an adverse party. That Speigel nevertheless failed to receive service is irrelevant as a matter of constitutional law. See McCully-Smith Assoc. v. Armour & Co., 358 F.Supp. 331, 333 (W.D.Pa.1973); Wiedeman, 346 A.2d at 804 n.171.