Opinion ID: 2997397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rehabilitation Act Framework

Text: The Rehabilitation Act protects a “qualified individual with a disability” from discrimination solely because of his disability in any program receiving federal financial assistance. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To make out a prima facie case under the Act, the plaintiff must show: that he “suffers from a disability as defined under the Act; that he was otherwise qualified for the job; that he was involved in programs receiving federal financial assistance; and that he was excluded from participation, denied benefits, or otherwise 8 No. 03-3599 discriminated against solely because of his disability.” Silk v. City of Chicago, 194 F.3d 788, 798 n.6 (7th Cir. 1999). On this appeal, we are concerned with the questions of whether Mr. Branham is “an individual with a disability” within the meaning of the Act and whether he is “qualified” for the employment position he seeks. The Rehabilitation Act defines an individual with a disability as “any person who (i) has a mental or physical impairment which substantially limits one or more of such person’s major life activities; (ii) has a record of such an impairment; or (iii) is regarded as having such an impairment.” 29 U.S.C. § 705(20)(B). The Rehabilitation Act provides that the standards of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12111 et seq., are to be used in determining whether the Rehabilitation Act has been violated in the employment context. 29 U.S.C. § 794(d); Peters v. City of Mauston, 311 F.3d 835, 842 (7th Cir. 2002); Silk, 194 F.3d at 798 n.7. Thus, we refer to the provisions and standards of the ADA in determining whether there has been a violation of the Rehabilitation Act in this context. An individual with a disability is qualified if he “can perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds or desires,” with or without reasonable accommodation. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).