Opinion ID: 877316
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the background of the death penalty morass:

Text: The defendant has become ensnared in a death penalty morass that has gone far past nightmarish proportions. The legal quagmire can perhaps be best understood if the background of the death penalty problem is set forth in relation to the first appeal and then to the present appeal. Defendant Fitzpatrick, along with Gary Radi, Travis Holliday, and Paul Bad Horse, were charged with robbery, aggravated kidnapping, and deliberate homicide. The victim was Monte Dyckman, and the crimes were committed on April 5, 1975. Defendants Fitzpatrick and Radi were convicted on all three counts. Defendants Holliday and Bad Horse were convicted of robbery only. Sentencing -43- of defendants Fitzpatrick and Radi for the crimes of aggravated kidnappin< and cleliberate homicide, raised the specter of the death penalty. By the time of the sentencing hearing, the United States Supreme Court had already ruled that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional. But there was great confusion to what kind of death penalty statutes would meet the approval of the Supreme Court. One extreme, and apparently the one taken by the legislature which had passed the death penalty laws involved in this case at the first sentencing, was that only a mandatory death penalty scheme would pass constitutional muster. The belief apparently was that only then could a statute eliminate the doubt attendant upon the surrounding of exercise of discretion in the decision of whether or not to impose the death penalty. Obviously, if the death penalty was mandatory, there would be no discretion at all. It was also the position of the first sentencing judge that only the mandatory death penalty would pass constitutional muster. For this reason, however, a dilemma existed in relation to the deliberate homicide penalty. For some reason, the legislature had overlooked the deliberate homicide statute in changing the statutes, and the death penalty was not mandatory. Section 94-5-105, R.C.M. 1947, provided the death penalty for deliberate homicide unless there are mitigating circumstances. Thus, the qualifying phrase prevented the deliberate homicide penalty from qualifying as a mandatory death penalty statute. On the other hand, the aggravated kidnapping statute, section 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947 explicitly mandated the death penalty if the victim was dead as a result of the kidnapping. This was the statutory picture at the time the penalties were imposed by the first sentencing judge. -44- Defendants Fitzpatrick and Radi were sentenced on each of the three counts. For robbery, each was sentenced to 100 years in prison (each had been found to be a persistent felony offender); for deliberate homicide (apparently because the sentencing judge thought the statute to be unconstitutional because it was not mandatory) each was sentenced to 100 years in prison; and for aggravated kidnapping, each was given the death penalty. Defendants Holliday and Bad Horse were each sentenced to 40 years in prison for the crime of robbery. All the defendants appealed from the convictions. In State v. Fitzpatrick (1977), Mont. , 569 P.2d 383 34 St.Rep. 736 , this Court ruled that it was prejudicial error to try all the defendants jointly under the particular factual circumstances of the case, and we reversed all convictions. We ordered new and separate trials for each-of them. We thus did not reach the death penalty arguments raised by Fitzpatrick and Radi in their first appeal simply because our reversal of the convictions did not require us to determine the death penalty issues. As events would later prove, however, the first sentencing judge did not accurately assess the constitutional picture. In State v. Coleman (1977), 171 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d 1023, this Court, because of the United States Supreme Court decision, declared the mandatory death penalty for aggravated kidnapping to be unconstitutional. On the other hand, in State v. McKenzie (1976), 171 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d 1023, this Court upheld the constitutionality of the deliberate homicide statute, apparently for the reason that the qualifying words unless there are mitigating circumstances saved it from being designated as a mandatory death penalty statute. Now to the results of the new trials where each of the defendants was tried separately. Two of the defendants were -45- a g a i n c o n v i c t e d o f r o b b e r y and t h e i r c o n v i c t i o n s w e r e a f f i r m e d by t h i s C o u r t . S t a t e v . ~ o l l i d a y( 1 9 7 9 ) , Mont . , 598 36 St.Rep. 1535 p.2d 113?; S t a t e v . Bad Horse (1980) , Mont . -P.2d . 37 St.Rep. 45 . Defendant Radi was a c q u i t t e d on a l l charges. F i t z p a t r i c k w a s a g a i n c o n v i c t e d on a l l t h r e e c o u n t s , and a g a i n t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y became an i s s u e a t s e n t e n c i n g . F i t z p a t r i c k w a s s e n t e n c e d t o 100 y e a r s i n p r i s o n f o r r o b b e r y b e c a u s e h e was found t o be a p e r s i s t e n t f e l o n y o f f e n d e r . But h e was e n s n a r e d i n a d o u b l e b i n d i n r e l a t i o n t o t h e c o n v i c t i o n s on t h e c o u n t o f a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g and t h e c o u n t o f d e l i b e r a t e homicide. A t t h e f i r s t sentencing defendant w a s sentenced t o d e a t h u n d e r t h e mandatory s t a t u t o r y p r o v i s i o n t h e n e x i s t i n g . By t h e t i m e o f t h e second s e n t e n c i n g however, w e had r u l e d i n S t a t e v. Coleman, s u p r a , t h a t t h e mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y w a s unconstitutional. The s e n t e n c i n g judge r e s o l v e d t h i s l i t t l e problem by r e t r o a c t i v e l y a p p l y i n g t h e 1977 d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s t o t h e c r i m e s committed i n 1975. I n t h e process of enacting t h e 1977 d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s , t h e l e g i s l a t u r e had a l s o r e p e a l e d s e c t i o n 94-5-304, which c a l l e d f o r t h e mandatory d e a t h p e n a l t y f o r aggravated kidnapping. Ch. 338, 516, L a w s of Montana ( 1 9 7 7 ) . The s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t made t h i s r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of t h e l a w o s t e n s i b l y under t h e r a t i o n a l e o f and a u t h o r i t y c o n f e r r e d by t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s Supreme C o u r t i n Dobbert v. F l o r i d a ( 1 9 7 7 ) , 432 U.S. 282, 92 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344, which h e l d t h a t r e t r o a c t i v e a p p l i c a t i o n of death penalty s t a t u t e s does n o t v i o l a t e t h e e x p o s t f a c t o c l a u s e o f t h e United S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o n i f t h e s t a t u t e s are c o n s t r u e d as b e i n g p r o c e d u r a l o r  a m e l i o r a t i v e  i n nature. I n a b r i e f f i l e d with t h e sentencing court, t h e A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l ' s O f f i c e a l s o urged t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t t o r e t r o a c t i v e l y a p p l y t h e 1977 s t a t u t e s t o t h e c r i m e s committed i n 1975. By t h i s d e c i s i o n , t h e Supreme C o u r t a p p a r e n t l y r u l e d t h a t a d e f e n d a n t h a s no c o n s t i t u t i o n a l argument and c a n n o t t h u s complain -46- i f a c o u r t should determine t h a t t h e s t a t u t e s w e r e designed f o r h i s b e n e f i t r a t h e r t h a n f o r h i s demise, even though h e m e e t s h i s demise by an a p p l i c a t i o n o f t h e s t a t u t e s . Needless t o s a y , t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t w a s n o t t o be d e n i e d ; it r e t r o a c t i v e l y a p p l i e d t h e 1977 s t a t u t e s and s e n t e n c e d t h e d e f e n d a n t t o d e a t h f o r t h e c r i m e of a g g r a v a t e d k i d n a p p i n g . Subsequent t o t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t t o r e t r o a c t i v e l y a p p l y t h e 1977 d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s , t h i s C o u r t approved o f j u s t s u c h a scheme i n t h e second Coleman c a s e , S t a t e v. Coleman ( 1 9 7 9 ) , - Mont . I- P.2d , 36 St.Rep. 1134. T h e r e , a s h e r e , I lodged a w h i s p e r i n g i n t h e wind d i s s e n t t o t h i s u n j u s t and inhumane i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of e x p o s t f a c t o l a w s . The second p a r t of t h e double b i n d r e l a t e s t o t h e p o s s i b l e p e n a l t y f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide. The f i r s t s e n t e n c i n g judge had s e n t e n c e d d e f e n d a n t t o 100 y e a r s i n p r i s o n f o r t h i s c r i m e , and t h e second s e n t e n c i n g judge had t o c o n f r o n t t h i s f a c t . I n order t o go beyond what t h e f i r s t s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t d i d , two h u r d l e s had t o b e c r o s s e d . F i r s t t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t had t o comply w i t h North C a r o l i n a v. P e a r c e ( 1 9 6 9 ) , 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, which sets f o r t h s t r i c t s t a n d a r d s b e f o r e a punishment can b e i n c r e a s e d a f t e r a second t r i a l . Second, t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t , i n d e c i d i n g t o a p p l y t h e 1977 d e a t h p e n a l t y s t a t u t e s t o t h e 1975 c r i m e s , had t o f i n d a s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e e x i s t i n g under s e c t i o n (4 $s -2206.8, R.C.M. 1947, now section-&-18-303, MCA, b e f o r e t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y c o u l d b e imposed. N e e d l e s s t o s a y , t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t r u l e d t h a t it had complied w i t h P e a r c e and t h a t a s t a t u t o r y a g g r a v a t i n g c i r c u m s t a n c e +d e x i s t e d under s e c t i o n 45-18-303, and t h u s imposed t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y f o r d e l i b e r a t e homicide. A l a r g e p o r t i o n of m d i s s e n t y w i l l be d e v o t e d t o a d e m o n s t r a t i o n t h a t t h e s e n t e n c i n g c o u r t n o t o n l y f a i l e d t o comply w i t h t h e s t a n d a r d s imposed by P e a r c e , -47- but worse than this, the sentencing court and the majority opinion here totally nullified the Pearce standards. Furthermore, it is equally apparent that the facts of the deliberate homicide do not justify a determination that an aggravating 4 circumstance exists under section 4%-18-303, MCA. SCOPE OF DISSENT: Defendant's contention that the 1977 death penalty statutes were unconstitutionally applied to the 1975 crimes has, unfortunately, already been decided against him in the second Coleman case, supra. I dissented to the majority opinion in this regard and my dissent in Coleman shall also constitute ; y dissent here.. n P . 2 d -, 36 St.Rep. 1157A-1157QQ. I raise in this dissent however, an entirely different issue in respect to the sentencing judge's decision to apply the 1977 death penalty statutes to the 1975 crimes. This point was not raised in the second Coleman case, and it has not been raised here. I believe if the majority of this Court is to remain consistent, that the statutory sentencing scheme in effect and approved in State v. McKenzie (1976), 171 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d 1023, should also have been applied here. This would, of course, have obviated any need to apply the 1977 death penalty statutes to the 1975 crimes. In short, if the statutory scheme passed constitutional muster in McKenzie, there is no reason why it should not have also been applied here. Failure to apply this scheme has prejudiced the rights of Fitzpatrick. I set forth my position in this regard in ---- part I1 of this ?.issent. Defendant also contends that the sentencing judge, when he increased the sentence for deliberate homicide from 100 years in prison to the death penalty, failed to comply with the objective standards set forth in Pearce, supra. I agree; but more than this, I believe that fundamental due process of law should prohibit an increase of punishment after the second trial to that of death. My position in this regard is set forth in part - - - I11 of this dissent. The majority has taken the position that the sentencing court complied with all standards as set forth in Pearce. In fact, there was absolutely no compliance by the sentencing court with the standards set forth in Pearce. Since, however, the majority has totally obliterated the standards set forth in Pearce, I must necessarily demonstrate the havoc that has been wreaked by the majority opinion by the failure to apply Pearce. This analysis is set forth in part - - - IV of this dissent. The final part of my dissent concerns the failure of this Court to determine whether or not a statutory aggravating circumstance under section 95-2206.8, R.C.M. 1947, now section 4618-303, MCA, existed for the imposition of the death penalty for the crime of deliberate homicide. It is clear that a statutory aggravating circumstance did not exist, and thus that the death penalty could not be imposed for the crime of deliberate homicide. The majority opinion has totally neglected to discuss this issue, even though one of the duties of mandatory review imposed by section 46-18-310, MCA, requires this Court to determine whether or not there existed a statutory aggravating circumstance. This analysis is set forth in part V of this ---- dissent. 11. IT WAS ERROR FOR THE SENTENCING COURT TO APPLY THE 1977 DEATH PENALTY STATUTES TO CRIMES COMMITTED IN 1975. In 1976, this Court decided the case of State v. McKenzie (1976), 171 Mont. 278, 557 P.2d 1023. In that case the Court upheld the constitutionality of the statutory sentencing scheme as against an attack that the sentencing statutes and appellate review statutes were constitutionally deficient. The statutes involved in that case were in existence before the commission of the crimes in March 1975; they were in existence at the time of the first sentencing; at the time of the second sentencing, and, as a matter of fact, they are still in effect today. One may logically ask then, if these statutes passed constitutional muster in McKenzie, why then were they not also applied in the second Coleman case, supra, and in the present case? Although the second McKenzie case was not decided at the time either Coleman or Fitzpatrick were sentenced for the second time, nonetheless the majority opinion again confirmed the constitutionality of the statutory sentencing scheme then in existence. State v. McKenzie (1978), - Mont . , 581 P.2d 1205, 35 St.Rep. 759. If statutes already in existence at the time of the crime had passed constitutional muster, and were still in existence at the time of the second sentencing of both Coleman and Fitzpatrick here, what right did the sentencing courts have in choosing instead to use the 1977 statutes and apply them retroactively? Retroactive application of the 1977 death penalty statutes is important for two reasons in the case of aggravated kidnapping and important for one reason in the case of deliberate homicide. Retroactive application of the 1977 death penalty statutes was the only way Dewey Coleman could be reached to impose the death penalty for aggravated kidnapping; and likewise, the same is true in the case of the death penalty imposed on Fitzpatrick for the crime of aggravated kidnapping. If the sentencing court applied the sentencing statutes held constitutional in McKenzie, it would still have been confronted with section 94-5-304, R.C.M. 1947: -50- A court shall impose the sentence of death following conviction of aggravated kidnapping if he finds that the victim is dead as the result of the criminal conduct. Since the death penalty was mandatory, and since this mandatory death penalty has been declared unconstitutional in the first Coleman case, there would have been no legal way to again impose the death penalty. But application of the 1977 death penalty statutes provided an out. In enacting a new scheme of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the 1977 legislature also in the same process repealed section 94-5-304. Ch. 338, S16, Laws of Montana (1977). The repeal of the mandatory death penalty by the 1977 legislature freed the sentencing court to impose the death penalty for aggravated kidnapping by use of the guidelines set forth in the new 1977 death penalty statutes. In retroactively applying the 1977 death penalty statutes, the sentencing court in the second Coleman case, and the sentencing court here, relied on the State's argument that Dobbert, supra, permitted the application of the 1977 death penalty statutes to the crimes committed in 1975. But the sentencing court in Coleman, and the sentencing court here failed to recognize that this Court in McKenzie had already upheld a statutory system and method of imposing the death penalty. Clearly, therefore, there was no need to use the 1977 statutes, if the statutes in effect at the time of the commission of the crimes had already passed constitutional muster in McKenzie. On the other hand, Dobbert does not involve a situation where the statutes in effect at the time of the commission of the crime had already passed constitutional muster. It would thus appea; obvious that the statutes approved in McKenzie, should have been the statutes used in this case at the second sentencing hearing for both Coleman, and for Fitzpatrick. The argument can, of course, be made that the sentencing court would have sentenced defendant to death regardless of whether it used the statutory guidelines approved in McKenzie, or the 1977 death penalty statutes. If the sentencing court had not relied on the 1977 legislative repeal of the mandatory death penalty for aggravated kidnapping, it could not have imposed the death penalty at all for that crime. Thus being barred for constitutional reasons, it would then have had to rely exclusively on the provisions of the deliberate homicide statute which was saved from constitutional death by the savings clause at the end, unless there are mitigating circumstances. The phrase unless there are mitigating circumstances did not hamstring a sentencing court in determining what factors it chose to consider as being mitigating circumstances. On the other hand, the mitigating circumstances statute in the 1977 statutes, set forth a list of mitigating circumstances. Section 95-2206.9, R.C.M. 1947, now 46-18-304, MCA. Thus the sentencing court was compelled to follow the list when it sentenced defendant, and after it found no mitigating circumstances under the list, it was, of course, under considerable pressure to impose the death penalty. 94 Furthermore, section 95-2206.10, R.C.M. 1947, now 6-18305, MCA, imposes considerably more pressure to assess the death penalty. It requires the death penalty to be imposed if the sentencing court finds one or more of the aggravating - circumstances and find that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial - - - for leniency. to call The mitigating circumstances in relation to the deliberate homicide statute, on the other hand, did not require that they be sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The only requirement was the presence of mitigating circumstances, without regard to how substantial they may have been. Under these circumstances, I believe that Fitzpatrick was clearly prejudiced by the decision of the sentencing court to -52- use and apply the 1977 death penalty statutes to his case. It is more than a trifle inconsistent for the majority to have upheld the statutory sentencing scheme in McKenzie and then not insist that the statutes be applied to this case. 111. A SENTENCING FUNCTION THAT ESPOUSES FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS WILL NOT TOLERATE THE ESCALATION IN PUNISHMENT AFTER A SECOND TRIAL TO THAT OF DEATH. In permitting the sentencing court to escalate the punishment after the second trial to the death penalty, the majority overlooked the fundamental unfairness inherent in such decision. No judicial system espousing principles of due process of law should tolerate a result where the price exacted for the exercise of a constitutional right to a fair trial is death itself. The general issue of whether the punishment can be increased after a second trial has been extensively litigated. 12 A.L.R.3d 978 (1966). Indeed, it would appear that the results were so diverse in the federal circuits as well as in the state courts, that the United States Supreme Court finally decided the issue in North Carolina v. Pearce (1969), 395 U.S. 711, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed. 2d 656. Although the Supreme 'court held that the practice does not violate the double jeopardy or equal protection clauses, it did recognize the potential evils engendered by such a practice and therefore set forth objective standards which the sentencing court must follow in any decision increasing the punishment. Neither Pearce, nor its two companion cases also decided at the same time, involved an increase of punishment to that of death. Conceptually, at least, the issue of increasing the punishment the second time around to that of capital punishment, is no different from that of simply increasing the imprisonment the second time around, or increasing a fine the second time around. That would appear to be the position the United States -53- Supreme C o u r t t o o k i n Pearce, when it h e l d t h a t i n c r e a s i n g a p r i s o n sentence w a s n o t a v i o l a t i o n of t h e double jeopardy equal o r /'protection clauses. The C o u r t c i t e d S t r o u d v. U n i t e d S t a t e s ( 1 9 1 9 ) , 157 U.S. 1 5 , 4 0 S.Ct. 5 0 , 6 4 L.Ed. '103 i n r e a c h i n g its decision. I n S t r o u d , t h e Supreme C o u r t r a t h e r summarily b r u s h e d a s i d e a c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e d o u b l e jeopardy p r o v i s i o n p r e v e n t e d a d e f e n d a n t from r e c e i v i n g t h e d e a t h p e n a l t y a f t e r he h a s s e c u r e d a reversal of h i s f i r s t c o n v i c t i o n which had imposed a l i f e s e n t e n c e . S t r o u d d i d n o t however, d e c i d e t h e due process question. Whether t h e Supreme C o u r t would t o d a y s t i l l a p p l y S t r o u d t o a s i t u a t i o n where t h e a n t e h a s been r a i s e d t o one o f c a p i t a l punishment, i s a q u e s t i o n c r y i n g f o r an answer. D i s r e g a r d i n g t h e u n s p e a k a b l e dilemma o f a d e f e n d a n t f a c i n g t h e p r o s p e c t o f a d e a t h s e n t e n c e t h e second t i m e around as t h e p r i c e of having s u c c e s s f u l l y a t t a c k e d h i s f i r s t c o n v i c t i o n , t h e u n d e r l y i n g r a t i o n a l e s u p p o r t i n g an i n c r e a s e d s e n t e n c e i s no d i f f e r e n t i n a c a p i t a l c a s e t h a n i n a n o n c a p i t a l c a s e . In j u r i s d i c t i o n s p e r m i t t i n g a h i g h e r s e n t e n c e t h e second t i m e a r o u n d , a t l e a s t t h r e e r e a s o n s have been advanced i n s u p p o r t of t h i s position. F i r s t , t h a t t h e defendant i n obtaining a new t r i a l a f t e r t h e c o n v i c t i o n o f a c r i m e assumes t h e r i s k o f a more s e v e r e s e n t e n c e t h a t w a s f i r s t imposed s h o u l d h e a g a i n be reconvicted of t h a t c r i m e . 12 A.L.R.3d a t 981. Second, t h a t a d e f e n d a n t who invoked t h e a c t i o n o f a n a p p e l l a t e c o u r t i n o r d e r t o r e v e r s e a c o n v i c t i o n c a n n o t complain on d o u b l e jeopardy grounds t h a t h i s s e n t e n c e c a n n o t be i n c r e a s e d i f h e i s c o n v i c t e d a g a i n a f t e r a second t r i a l . 1 2 A.L.R.3d a t 982. The a n n o t a t i o n i n t h i s r e g a r d , cites Stroud, s u p r a , as a u t h o r i t y f o r t h i s position. T h i r d , t h a t a s l o n g as t h e d e f e n d a n t i s n o t c o n v i c t e d of a h i g h e r d e g r e e o f crime, t h e second t i m e a r o u n d , a n i n c r e a s e o f punishment d o e s n o t c o n s t i t u t e d o u b l e jeopardy. 12 A.L.R.3d a t 982. -54- Needless to say, there are strong counter-arguments. One view reasons that the potential for a higher punishment after a second trial subjects a defendant to an unconscionable burden to pay as the price for having exercised his constitutional right to a fair trial by appealing his first conviction. 12 A.L.R.3d at 985. This position is illustrated by State v. Wolf (1966), 46 N. J. 301, 216 A. 2d 586; 12 A.L.R. 3d 970. Wolf involved a potential death penalty should the defendant be convicted at his second trial. Another view is that an increase in punishment after a second trial does constitute double jeopardy. 12 A.L.R.3d at 984. This view, insofar as the federal constitution is concerned, was effectively nullified by the majority opinion in Pearce, supra. Now such a view would hold only if a state court invoked the double jeopardy clause of its own state constitution. A third approach, and one reached after the decision in Pearce, is that taken by the Alaska Supreme Court in Shagloak v. State (Alaska ), 597 P.2d 142. The Court flatly held that a greater punishment after a second trial violates the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution. The determination that the courts must not be a party to a process which exacts such a horrible price from a defendant when he exercises his rights by appealing his first conviction, is essentially grounded on due process considerations. As a matter of judicial policy, this position is even more compelling where the greater punishment after the second trial may be the death penalty. Because capital punishment is a price too high to pay for-having successfully attacked a first conviction, several state courts have wisely eliminated the possibility that such a horrible dilemma might be a recurring reality. The case of People v. Henderson (1963), 60 Cal.2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, preceded State v. Wolf, supra, in holding that a -55- defendant convicted of first degree murder and given a life sentence, could not, upon a second trial be subjected to the death penalty. The California Supreme Court ruled that the double jeopardy provision intervened to prevent the imposition of a death penalty. In so reasoning, the Court took the liberty of concluding that Stroud v. United States, supra, had been vitiated by Green v. United States, supra, thus concluding that the price to be paid by Henderson in exercising his right to appeal his conviction was too high if he could be subjected to a death penalty upon a retrial. The Court, however, couched its reasoning more in a due process analysis: . . . A defendant's right to appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke that right. Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to appeal. 386 P.2d at 686. In People v. Ali (1967), 66 Cal.2d 277, 424 P.2d 932, the California Supreme Court extended the Henderson rationale to apply to any increase in sentence after a second trial. The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Wolf, supra, deliberately avoided grounding its decision on the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution. Although the court agreed with the rationale in Henderson, supra, it was not as certain that the United States Supreme Court would agree that the grisly choice faced by such a defendant was sufficiently alarming to cause the Supreme Court to bar the practice of increasing the punishment after the second trial. Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court declared that fundamental fairness in the administration of the court system would not tolerate such an unjust result: Traditionally appellate courts have exercised a greater degree of caution in dealing with capital cases, and they have shown special concern over procedures which interfere with the right of appeal. In this case the prosecutor's thesis endangers a vital societal principle, that no person shall be deprived of his life or liberty except by a trial free from prejudicial error. Awareness of that principle naturally stimulates judicial reluctance to see the price of an appeal set at the risk of a man's life. Such a price, in our judgment, is a hardship so acute and so shocking that our public policy cannot tolerate it. Consequently, we hold that since the State has granted the universal right of appeal, standards of procedural fairness forbid limiting the right by requiring the defendant to barter with his life for the opportunity of exercising it. 216
The State argued in Wolf that the threat of a death penalty to a defendant should he successfully attack his first conviction, fosters a beneficial institutional interest of the courts by deterring the number of appeals. To this the New Jersey Supreme Court responded: . . . In a choice between forcing the defendant either to surrender his right to an error-free trial as well as his right of appeal, and to accept the life imprisonment sentence, or to put his life at stake again on retrial following a successful appeal, justice can follow only one course. That course is the one demanded by procedural fairness and principles of public policy, namely, prohibition of such a fearsome election, and the restriction of available punishment at a new trial to life imprisonment, if a second conviction results. (Citing cases.) Otherwise, a defendant with perfect grounds of appeal may be deterred from seeking appellate review just the same as one whose appeal rests entirely on frivolous grounds. 593 A.2d at 591. 2 ' 6 Although the New Jersey Supreme Court deliberately avoided a direct due process ruling, the essence of its decision rests upon fundamental fairness, the essential ingredient of due process of law. These same policy considerations expressed in Wolf., are expressed in decisions of the Oregon, Minnesota and Alaska Supreme Courts. The Oregon Supreme Court exhaustively discussed the pros and cons of the cases addressing the issue of increasing the penalty after a second trial, and then concluded that the risk of increased punishment is a price that should not be exacted by the judicial system. State v. Turner (1967), 247 Or. 301, 429 P.2d 565. On the basis of public policy the Court adopted the following rule: We believe that the interest of the public and the individual can best be served by the following rule: After an appeal or post- conviction proceeding has resulted in the ordering of a retrial for errors other than an erroneous sentence, such as in the Froembling cases, and the defendant has again been convicted, no harsher sentence can be given than that initially imposed. If the initial sentence was incarceration, the defendant subsequently cannot be sentenced to any longer term than the time still to be served upon his initial sentence. 429 P.2d at 570-571. The Oregon Supreme Court, however, following the lead of the New Jersey Supreme Court, expressly declined to decide the case on a constitutional ground. The Court quoted extensively from Wolf, supra, and then stated the ground upon which it rested its decision: There also remains the issue of whether the rule proposed should be grounded upon the due process or double jeopardy provisions of the state or federal constitutions or whether it should be grounded upon the statutes or the common law. We do not find it necessary to decide the constitutional issues as we conclude that when the state grants a criminal appeal as a matter of right to one convicted of a crime, as it has, our procedural policy should be not to limit that right by requiring the defendant to risk a more severe sentence in order to exercise that right of appeal. ORS 138.020. 429 P.2d 571. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in State v. Holmes (1968), 161 N.W.2d 650, also examined the cases pro and con and recognized that the federal and state courts were hopelessly divided. The Court ruled, however, that it is contrary to public policy to permit increased punishment after a second trial, for it discourages a defendant from exercising his legal rights. The court held: . . . The third approach, and the one which we adopt, precludes inquiry into the motives of the sentencing judge and holds as a matter of law that any increase in penalty upon a retrial inevitably discourages a convicted defendant from exercising his legal rights and is contrary to public policy. Except for convictions resulting from Federal offenses, the Federal courts have been obliged to base their decisions on constitutional grounds, which we decline to do. 161 N.W.2d at 653. The Alaska Supreme Court, by invoking its own due process clause, flatly rejected the rule set forth in Pearce, supra. Shagloak v. State (Alaska 1979), 597 P.2d 142. In holding that a greater punishment after a second trial violates the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution, the court stated: We believe if a more severe sentence may be imposed after retrial for any reason, there will always be a definite apprehension on the part of the accused that a heavier sentence may be imposed. Such apprehension or fear would place the defendant in . an 'incredible dilemma' in considering whether to appeal the conviction. A 'desparate' choice exists, and may very well deter a defendant from exercising the right to assert his innocence and request a retrial. Such deterrence violates the due process clause of the Alaska Constitution. The fundamental standard of procedural fairness, which is the basic due process right claimed in this case, forbids placing a limitation on the defendant's right to a fair trial by requiring a defendant to barter with freedom for the opportunity of exercising it. See State v. Wolf, A.2d 586, 590-591, 12 A.L.R.3d 970, 46 N.J. 301, T 976 (1966). T e state has no valid interest in imposing unreasonable conditions on Shagloak's legitimate exercise of his due process right. The imposition of the five-year sentence after his trial following the change of plea from guilty to not guilty was a denial of due process of law under the Alaska Constitution and cannot be countenanced by this court. 597 P.2d at 145. Beyond these compelling policy considerations in favor
of adopting a strict rule prohibiting an increase in punishment after a second trial under any circumstances, the question arises as to whether the judicial system is capable of effectively reviewing an increased sentence imposed after a second trial. The standards set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Pearce, supra, no doubt were designed with this problem in mind. But notwithstanding these standards, the fact remalns that vindictiveness of a sentencing judge is something that can rarely be demonstrated by the cold record. A sentencing judge will certainly not admit to a character trait of vindictiveness. Furthermore, a truly vindictive judge will be careful enough to leave no tracks in the sentencing record as to the true basis of his decision. Only in the most flagrant cases can vindictiveness be demonstrated by the cold record. Thus, as a practical matter it becomes almost impossible from the cold sentencing record to isolate and identify vindictiveness as the impelling motive. The record of review consists of only what the sentencing court wants to supply for public consumption and the review of the appellate court. The inherent defects of this situation are not cured at all by the performance of lawyers in presenting a case for review, or by a review court in reviewing the case. As a general rule, lawyers are most unwilling to venture into a judicial political thicket with any kind of zeal, regardless of the merits of the case. Nor are appellate judges willing to undertake the kind of review that is needed. Indeed, an appellate court has a distinct reluctance to categorize the decision of the sentencing judge as vindictive, even though the appellation may be abundantly deserved. Place all these factors into the same judicial pot and it is immediately apparent that effective appellate review is institutionally impossible. There is, in this process, an institutional bias or prejudice which cannot effectively handle a fundamental problem such as this. The judiciary is, of course, not the only institution which can be accused of this interest in self preservation. At least in the limited context of sentencing, the courts can recognize this inherent -60- institutional bias and the debilitating effect that it has on the administration of justice. Having recognized it, an appellate court can eliminate it by simply not permitting an increase of punishment after a second trial. Only in this way can the institutional bias of the judiciary be effectively neutralized. The United States Supreme Court has, of course, always taken a special interest in constitutional issues which would have a chilling effect on one's assertion of a constitutional right. There is ample authority from cases decided by the Supreme Court which indicate that it would look upon with a dim view the chilling effect that the appellate process may pose to one who has had the death penalty imposed as a result of having successfully appealed his first conviction. In Green v. United States (1957), 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199, defendant Green was charged with first degree murder and was convicted of second degree murder. A state court reversed the conviction, and upon retrial, Green was convicted of first degree murder. In reversing the conviction, the United States Supreme Court grounded its decision on the double jeopardy clause, holding that at the first trial the conviction of second degree murder carried therein an implied acquittal of the higher charge of first degree murder. By itself, the holding may not stand for too much in the context of Fitzpatrick here facing the death penalty the second time around. But the court, in deciding the case, also rejected the government's argument that a defendant, by appealing a conviction, must be willing to take a gamble that he may be convicted of a greater crime the second time around: . . . the Government contends that [defendant] must be willing to barter his constitutional protection against a second prosecution for an offense punishable by death as the price of a successful appeal from an erroneous conviction of another offense for which he was sentenced to five to twenty years' imprisonment. As the Court of Appeals said in its first opinion in this case, a defendant faced with such a 'choice' takes a 'desparate change' in securing the reversal of the erroneous conviction. The law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incredible dilemma. 355 U.S. at 193, 78 S.Ct. at 226, 2 L.Ed.2d 207; 61 A.L.R.2d 1127. Without question, the court concluded that the prospect of a death penalty is too high a price to pay for the assertion of a constitutional right. In a different context, but with the same policy consideration involved, the court decided Fay v. Noia (1963), 372 U.S. 391, 83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d'8-7 There, in opposing the defendant's petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he had a chance to appeal many years ago and did not do so, the government contended that the defendant had waived his right to invoke habeas corpus. To this, the Supreme Court answered: . . . For Noia to have appealed in 1942 would have been to run a substantial risk of electro- cution. His was the grisly choice of whether to sit content with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful, might well have led to a retrial and death sentence. . . . He declined to play Russian roulette in this fashion.. . . 372 U.S. at 439-40. Admittedly, the issue of whether the death penalty could be constitutionally imposed after a second trial and conviction, was not directly before the Court. But the specter of such a result is such that even the possibility is anathema to our system of.justice. This is the essence of Fay. This same policy consideration was expressed in Jackson v. United States (1968), 390 U.S. 570, 88 S.Ct. 1209, 20 L.Ed.2d 138. There, the defendant challenged a provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, which provided for the death penalty only if the verdict of the jury shall so recommend. The Court ruled that such provision needlessly encourages waivers of jury trials or guilty pleas to avoid the possibility of the death penalty. One could assert his constitutional right of jury trial only at the risk of the death penalty. This, the Court ruled, is an intolerable burden on the exercise of a constitutional right. 390 U.S. at 585. The possibility of a death penalty being the price one must pay for securing a reversal of a conviction and a second trial is, under any system of justice having fundamental fairness as one of its basic tenets, intolerable. Had the majority considered the implications of its decision and the burden it placed on the availability of the appellate process, I believe that this Court would never have had to decide whether the sentencing court had properly applied Pearce. What happened here, however, is even worse. Not only has the majority failed to acknowled.ge the fundamental due process issue underlying an increase of punishment to that of death after the second trial, this omission has been compounded by the majority's analysis of Pearce. In reaching its decision that the sentencing court lawfully complied with Pearce in increasing the punishment to that of death, the majority has totally nullified the Pearce standards. IV. IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY AFTER THE SECOND TRIAL, THE SENTENCING COURT IGNORED THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN PEARCEj AND IN REVIEWING THE SENTENCE, THIS COURT HAS OBLITERATED THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN PEARCE. I have already set forth the background of the federal and state deckhswhich prompted the United States Supreme Court to decide the case of Pearce, supra. Since the majority has not done so, it perhaps would be useful to set out the essential facts of Pearce and the rules promulgated by the majority decision in Pearce. -63- Pearce was one of three cases decided on essentially the same point. Pearce was convicted of a crime and successfully appealed this conviction to a higher court and was granted a new trial. After his retrial, presided over by a different judge, he was again convicted, but this time he was given a greater punishment than after his first conviction. He contended this greater punishment violated the double jeopardy and due process provisions of the United States Constitution. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding equal that neither the double jeopardy nor /protection clauses are violated by imposition of a greater punishment. However, in so holding, the Supreme Court recognized the great potential for evil that inheres in such a process and so adopted specific standards which must be followed before the greater punishment can be upheld. The Supreme Court expressly recognized that without close scrutiny of such cases, the end result is that a defendant is needlessly punished by exercising his right of appeal. The sentencing court and the majority opinion has patently ignored the requirements of Pearce. Furthermore, in seeking to justify its cancellation of the Pearce requirements in this State, the majority has patently misinterpreted and misapplied three United States Supreme Court cases decided after Pearce. Those cases are Colten v. Kentucky (1972), 407 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 1953, 32 L.Ed.2d 584; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe (1973), 412 U.S. 17, 93 S.Ct. 1977, 36 L.Ed.2d 714; and Blackledge v. Perry (1974), 417 U.S. 21, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 40 L.Ed.2d 628. It apparently is the position of the majority here that these three cases have effectively vitiated the standards set forth in Pearce so that it is after only eleven years of existence, no longer the law. To the contrary, Pearce is alive and well, but unfortunately, ignored in this State. -64- It is true, as the majority states, Pearce is primarily aimed at detecting vindictiveness in the imposition of a higher punishment after a second trial. Thus the following standards must be used whenever an increased punishment is imposed after a second trial:
state on the face of the record, . i t s reasons for imposing the higher penalty and set forth the factual data supporting this decision.
higher penalty must consist of specific, identifiable conduct of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceedings. 3 9 5 U.S. at 7 2 5 - 7 2 6 . Unfortunately the sentencing court and this Court somehow ignored the application of these standards to this case. The three reasons announced by the sentencing court and given the green light by this Court for increasing the punishment to death are: (1) that defendant testified at his second trial permitting an assessment of his character; (2) that Christine Fetters gave considerable information relating to defendant's activities in planning the crime and in relation to his conduct after the commission of the crime; and ( 3 ) that the constitutionality of the death penalty at the first trial was in doubt, but now all doubts have been resolved. None of these stated reasons comply with the Pearce standards. A. THE DEATH PENALTY JUDGMENT ITSELF ADMITS NONCOMPLIANCE WITH PEARCE. In a footnote at page 9 of the death penalty judgment, the sentencing court admitted its noncompliance with Pearce and set forth its reasons for departing from the Pearce standards: This increase in sentence from the 100 years previously given admittedly raises a question for - - consideration upon review. ~ o2r F 2Carolina h v. Pearce, 3 9 5 U.S. 711, 8 9 S.Ct. 0 7 , allows for the imposition of a greater sentence in the light of events subsequent to the first trial that may throw some light upon the defendant -- information may come and such -- to - judge's attention from evidence adduced - the - - second trial itself, as well as other at the sources. At the same time, in requiring that a more severe sentence must be accompanied by a showing of the reasons for the incGease in- severity, the reasons .. . ' must be based upon the objective information concerning identifiable conduct on the part of the defendant occurring after the time of the original sentencing proceeding.' (Emphasis added by District Court.) The question then is whether the judge can act only upon subsequently occurring conduct or whether he can act upon new information concerning past conduct which was not known to the judge at the time of the prior sentencing. I have interpreted the Pearce decision as being aimed at preventing vindictiveness against a defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction, and therefore have concluded -- that the evidence necessary to justify a - - more severe sentence ---- can come fromnew information about - defendant's conduct - - commission the in the - of - crime, i.e. past conduct as well as from the new conduct occurring after the original proceeding. Admittedly, there - - - - new conduct relevant has been no - Shea.) to - J. that issue - - - case. (Emphasis added by in this By his own admission, the sentencing judge relied on conduct of the defendant which preceded the first sentencing, but chose to give Pearce his own special interpretation in order that he could consider this information. This interpretation flies in the face of the Pearce standards. We thus have a situation where the sentencing court openly admitted that it did not comply with Pearce but declared that it really did not matter because it was not vindictive, and that Pearce was aimed only at vindictiveness. At least, however, the sentencing court did not attempt to rationalize its decision by asserting that the United States Supreme Court had later retreated from strict enforcement of the Pearce standards. It simply ignored the Pearce standards. On the other hand, the majority opinion has misinterpreted and misapplied three postPearce cases and would have us believe that the United States Supreme Court has already abandoned the standards set forth in Pearce in 1969. Each of the cases cited and quoted by the majority can be understood only in the peculiar circumstances existing in each case. The United States Supreme Court did not apply the Pearce standards in Colten v. Kentucky, supra, and in Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, supra, because the legal structure existing in the appellate process and later sentencing process satisfied the Court that vindictiveness as a factor in the imposition of a higher sentence, was deminimis. On the other hand, contrary to the implications of the majority opinion, in Blackledge v. Perry, supra, the Supreme Court extended the Pearce standards by applying them' to a prosecutor who was permitted by state law to charge a defendant with a higher degree of crime if the defendant appealed his conviction to a higher court. A brief analysis of each of these cases is in order. B. THE MAJORITY HAS MISINTERPRETED AND MISAPPLIED THREE DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. In Colten v. Kentucky, supra, the situation involved a two-tiered trial system. A defendant convicted at the lower court and sentenced, had an absolute right to appeal to the higher court and have his case tried again. The lower court found defendant guilty and fined him $10; the defendant appealed to the higher court; he was found guilty after a trial de novo, and the fine was increased to $50. He claimed that this was retaliatory sentencing and thus prohibited by Pearce. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the threat of vindictiveness was de minimis where defendant was entitled to a complete retrial of the facts without reference to what happened at the lower court or to the fact of the appeal itself. Here, it was the system itself upon which the Supreme Court focused, not on whether there was actual vindictiveness demonstrated by the record. -67-