Opinion ID: 1885630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the lower court erred by admitting as evidence the fingernail scrapings, the pubic hair combings and the blood sample taken from parson because they all were products of searches which violated due process.

Text: The facts surrounding the accumulation of this evidence are as follows: Parson, after taking the police to the ditch where the body of the victim was found, was taken to the Beebe Hospital in Lewes and there given treatment for the cut on his arm. He was taken from there to the police station near Georgetown where he was questioned and gave as a matter of fact a lengthy written statement as to the circumstances of the crime. This statement was not offered in evidence. Following the taking of the statement, Parson signed a written permission to have a blood sample taken, he consented to have his fingernails scraped and he, himself, actually took the pubic hair combings. Parson, at the time, was in police custody and the police investigation had long passed the accusatory stage. Parson was the suspected person, was in police custody, and to all intents and purposes under arrest. Parson cites in support of his argument United States v. Townsend, 151 F.Supp. 378 (D.C.1957) and State v. Wolf, 3 Storey 88, 164 A.2d 865 (1960). We think, however, the two cases do not aid his argument. In the Townsend case the defendant was charged with rape and was in the police station where he apparently was bleeding from blows allegedly inflicted by the police. Thereafter, blood was obtained, over his protests, by scrapings from his pubic hair and this evidence was rejected. However, it appears that perhaps the main reason for the rejection of the blood sample was that there was no proof of where the blood came from. It may have come from the cuts from which the defendant himself was bleeding, or it may have come from the victim of the rape. In any event, we think the case is not persuasive in the matter before us. Similarly, the Wolf case is of no aid to Parson. In it, a blood sample taken from a defendant while he lay unconscious in a hospital was ordered suppressed as having been obtained in violation of Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution, and of 11 Del.C. §§ 2301 and 2303. Those two Code sections permit the search of a person or place in the absence of a warrant without consent if it is made as an incident of a lawful arrest. We think rather the question is controlled by Schmerber v. California, 384 U. S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) and Brent v. White, 5 Cir., 398 F. 2d 503, cert. den. 393 U.S. 1123, 89 S.Ct. 998, 22 L.Ed.2d 130 (5th Cir. 1968). This evidence was obtained from searches of the person of Parson as incident to a lawful arrest or a keeping in custody. They were consented to by Parson and there is no evidence whatsoever that any form of coercion was used to force him to consent. As a matter of fact, in the case of the pubic hair, he not only consented but performed the combing himself. There was no error in the admission of this evidence.