Opinion ID: 4110601
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant’s Alleged Liberty Interest

Text: It is unclear whether Appellant has presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the Navy’s decision infringed a constitutionally protected liberty interest. Appellant argues 13 that, “as a proud Marine, [he] had a liberty interest in his service reputation.” Reply Br. for Appellant at 12. He amplifies this point a bit by arguing that “[t]his court has recognized that the stigma to reputation in employment gives rise to a liberty interest.” Id. (citing Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d 1092, 1104–05 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). According to Appellant, the nature of the charges against him, which included dishonesty, due to his alleged falsification of enrollment figures, “castigat[ion] at a [public] school board hearing,” and the publication of the charges against him in the local newspaper, were sufficiently stigmatizing so as to foreclose future employment opportunities. Id. at 12–13. This, he claims, was enough “to trigger a liberty interest in [his] reputation.” Id. at 13. Appellant seems to suggest, inter alia, that his liberty interest was infringed because, during the Navy’s decertification proceedings, he was accused of dishonesty in falsifying enrollment figures. Indeed, two Reconsideration Board members specifically noted the allegations of dishonesty leveled against Appellant in affirming his decertification. See JA 185, 217. He thus apparently contends that this supports his due process claim. See O’Donnell v. Barry, 148 F.3d 1126, 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (noting that “defamation alone is not actionable under the due process clause, but that defamation ‘in the course of the termination of employment’ is” (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 (1976))); see also Doe v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 753 F.2d at 1104–05. He is mistaken. In order to proceed on this claim, Appellant must demonstrate that the Navy publicized the charges against him. As we noted in Doe, in a “stigma-plus” case – i.e., a case involving a claim of defamation – “the government must be the source of the defamatory allegations.” 753 F.2d at 1108 (citing Mosrie v. Barry, 718 F.2d 1151, 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). However, there is nothing 14 in the record of this case to indicate that the Navy publicized the revocation of Appellant’s certification or the reasons for its decision. Whatever adverse publicity resulted from the decertification appears to have emanated from either the actions of the school board or reports in a local newspaper that were not attributed to the Navy. Thus, it cannot be said that the Navy infringed Appellant’s liberty interest by publicizing the details of his case. See Fried, 78 F.3d at 692 (noting that the government did not make public the claimant’s non-renewal, nor did it publicize any reasons for that non-renewal); see also O’Donnell, 148 F.3d at 1140; Orange v. District of Columbia, 59 F.3d 1267, 1274–75 (D.C. Cir. 1995). Apart from his defamation claim, Appellant contends that he suffered a stigma to his reputation that gave rise to a liberty interest. Broadly speaking, we have recognized two theories pursuant to which an individual who alleges “government interference with his future employment prospects may demonstrate the tangible change in status required to prove constitutional injury.” Taylor v. Resolution Trust Corp., 56 F.3d 1497, 1506 (D.C. Cir. 1995). First, “if [the government’s] action formally or automatically excludes [the plaintiff] from work on some category of future [government] contracts or from other government employment opportunities, that action . . . implicates a liberty interest.” Id. (quoting Kartseva v. Dep’t of State, 37 F.3d 1524, 1528 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (alterations in original). Second, if the government’s action “precludes [the plaintiff] – whether formally or informally – from such a broad range of opportunities that it interferes with [his] constitutionally protected right to follow a chosen trade or profession,” the action implicates a liberty interest. Id. (citing Kartseva, 37 F.3d at 1529) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 To the extent that Appellant’s liberty interest claim rests on the second theory – i.e., the Navy’s decision interferes with his constitutionally protected right to follow a chosen profession – he is on weak ground. His argument claims too much. Discharge from a particular job is not the same as exclusion from one’s chosen profession. See Abdelfattah v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 787 F.3d 524, 539 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (noting that “the loss of ‘one position in [the] profession’ is insufficient to implicate a Fifth Amendment liberty interest in following one’s chosen trade or profession. Rather an individual must suffer a binding disqualification from work or broad preclusion from his or her chosen field.” (citing Kartseva, 37 F.3d at 1528–29) (citations omitted)). In Fried, for example, this court held that an individual’s liberty interest was not implicated where an agency refused to renew his designated pilot examiner license because he could still “sell flight instruction services to willing private buyers.” 78 F.3d at 692. Here too, Appellant, while unable to continue in his role as a NJROTC instructor, was able to find employment as a teacher at a new institution. Reply Br. for Appellant at 13. To the extent that Appellant’s claim rests on the first theory – i.e., the Navy’s decision effectively excluded him from work on some category of future government contracts or from other government employment opportunities – it is harder to assess. The case law is somewhat difficult to square with respect to claims of “stigma to reputation,” which is the focus of Appellant’s claim in this case. In Taylor, the court explained that: Constitutional injury supposes something more than simple defamation or stigma. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Even a plaintiff who receives an 16 admittedly defamatory recommendation from a prior government employer that “would undoubtedly . . . impair his future employment prospects” cannot establish a constitutional violation “so long as such damage flows from injury caused by the defendant to a plaintiff's reputation” alone. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 234 (1991). To prove constitutional injury, the plaintiff must show not only that the government has imposed some stigma upon him, but also that it has worked some change in his status under law. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 711–12. Taylor, 56 F.3d at 1506. In other words, Appellant may not “sue purely on the basis of the stigma associated with being fired.” O’Donnell, 148 F.3d at 1139. “[S]tigma alone is not actionable, without a showing that a ‘right or status previously recognized by state law’ has been ‘distinctly altered or extinguished.’” Id. (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976)). As this case demonstrates, however, determining whether a claimant has suffered a “change in status” sufficient to support a claim of constitutional injury is not always easy. One way to read the record here is to say that the Navy’s decertification decision had a very limited effect – it merely foreclosed Appellant from serving as a NJROTC instructor, nothing more. Appellant was not barred from other government employment opportunities. Indeed, he has not even claimed that he has been unsuccessful in seeking other employment positions with the federal government. At worst, Appellant suffered damage to his reputation, which, without more, is not enough to support his liberty interest claim. In other words, it is hard to see how the Navy’s action not only “imposed some stigma upon him, but also . . . worked some change in his status under law.” Taylor, 56 F.3d at 1506. 17 On the other hand, another way to view Appellant’s situation is to say that he has been excluded from all future employment or contracting opportunities with the NJROTC program. In Old Dominion Dairy Products v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 963–64 (D.C. Cir. 1980), we held that a contractor had a viable liberty interest due process claim after a government agency found the contractor guilty of misconduct and prevented the contractor from securing further contracts with the same agency. In this case, Appellant seems to view his decertification from the NJROTC program as comparable. We acknowledge that Appellant’s claim that the Navy’s decision infringed a constitutionally protected liberty interest is not implausible. Nevertheless, we remain dubitante on this point. We need not struggle further with this issue, however, because we agree with the District Court that, even “[a]ssuming, arguendo” that Appellant had protected liberty or property interests, “he was afforded all the process he was due.” Crooks, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 102. 3. Appellant was Afforded All of the Process That He Was Due In support of his claim that he was denied constitutionally adequate process, Appellant advances several arguments. Taking into account the commands of Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), and its progeny, we find no merit in any of Appellant’s contentions. First, Appellant claims that the Navy redacted the names from letters written by some of his students. As noted above, this argument was never raised in the District Court so it is plainly forfeited. 18 Appellant also claims, without any record citation, that the Navy “stymie[d]” his investigation by preventing him from interviewing students, school staff, and naval personnel. Br. for Appellant at 14–15. The record, however, supports the Navy’s position that it did not stand in his way. A report from Appellant’s own private investigator shows that he tried to contact some of his students but was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons, none having to do with the Navy. JA 157. Appellant also concedes in his Reply Brief that the Navy played no role in his inability to interview school personnel. Reply Br. for Appellant at 15. Finally, in his reply brief, Appellant does submit an email chain that might corroborate his claim that the Navy prevented him from interviewing Commander Ladner, who conducted one of his unfavorable performance reviews. Reply Br., Exh. A. Not only does this come too late, Appellant never moved to supplement the record with those emails either in this court or before the District Court. Even if he had, Appellant eventually deposed Ladner in 2011, yet he neglects to offer any information that he gleaned from that deposition that he believes would have altered the Boards’ decisions. See Horning v. SEC, 570 F.3d 337, 347 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“In the absence of any suggestion of prejudice, we cannot conclude that [Appellant] was deprived . . . of procedural due process . . . .”). In addressing Appellant’s due process claim, the District Court stated: [Appellant] submitted a detailed rebuttal to the allegations against him prior to his decertification, and, with the assistance of counsel, to each of the Boards reviewing the decision. As the defendants 19 point out, the “[Appellant] received all the administrative review procedures that are available, except for an in-person hearing, and [Appellant] does not argue that he was entitled to such a hearing.” Defs.’ Opp’n at 15. The D.C. Circuit has held that “[d]ue process requires ‘notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.’” Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc. v. United States, 982 F.2d 594, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Thus, even assuming, without deciding, that the [Appellant] had a liberty or property interest in his NJROTC certification, the [Appellant’s] receipt of the evidence against him and his three separate opportunities, of which he availed himself, to submit rebuttal evidence, constitute sufficient due process such that the plaintiff’s right to due process under the Fifth Amendment was not abridged. Crooks, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 103 (citations and footnotes omitted). We agree. “Under the utilitarian balance prescribed by the Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, [Appellant] has received at least the quantum of process [he] was due before being” decertified by the Navy from the NJROTC program. Reeve Aleutian Airways, 982 F.2d at 602. D. The Navy’s Decertification Decision Was Neither “Arbitrary and Capricious” Nor Unsupported by “Substantial Evidence” Appellant claims that the Navy’s decertification decision was both arbitrary and capricious and lacking in substantial evidence. However, there is no material difference between the APA’s “arbitrary and capricious” standard and its 20 “substantial evidence” standard as applied to court review of agency factfinding. See Safe Extensions, Inc. v. FAA, 509 F.3d 593, 604 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[An] informal adjudication[] . . . must be supported by substantial evidence – otherwise it would be arbitrary and capricious.”) (quotation marks omitted); see also Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683–84 (D.C. Cir. 1984); EDWARDS, ELLIOTT, & LEVY, FEDERAL STANDARDS OF REVIEW, supra, at 203, 220–21. We will therefore evaluate Appellant’s arbitrary-and-capricious and substantial evidence claims in tandem in reviewing the Navy’s decertification decision. In determining whether the Navy’s actions were arbitrary and capricious, this court does not “substitute its judgment for that of the agency.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Rather, we examine an agency’s decision to ensure that it “was reasonable and reasonably explained.” Jackson v. Mabus, 808 F.3d 933, 936 (D.C. Cir. 2015). Similarly, we may find that an agency decision is “supported by substantial evidence even though a plausible alternative interpretation of the evidence would support a contrary view.” Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 176 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Robinson v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd., 28 F.3d 210, 215 (D.C. Cir. 1994)). Appellant’s objections to the Navy’s decision to revoke his certification largely center around two interrelated arguments. First, he claims that the Navy failed to take seriously his contention that information submitted by the Principal of Pearl River High School that accused Appellant of failing to adequately perform his duties was due to “bad blood” between the two. Br. for Appellant at 23. Second, Appellant claims that the Navy abused its discretion in failing to consider evidence submitted by him at various points 21 throughout the decertification process, including: a polygraph test taken by Appellant; the results of an investigation conducted by his counsel’s private investigator; his explanation that he fell asleep in class due to a recently prescribed medication; a positive evaluation of his work in his new teaching position; and a finding by the Louisiana Department of Labor that he had not been discharged from his position for misconduct connected with his employment. Br. for Appellant at 23–26. These arguments do not hold water. The Navy was not required to credit Appellant’s claim that the Principal’s assessment of his performance was attributable to a disagreement between the two men, nor did it need to “explain away every point raised” or piece of evidence contained in Appellant’s submissions. Crooks, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 100 (citing Fla. Gas Transmission Co. v. FERC, 604 F.3d 636, 645 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). At every proceeding in which the Navy considered whether to revoke Appellant’s certification, it informed Appellant that the officials responsible for reviewing his case had considered the entire record before them, including the evidence submitted by Appellant that he now claims was overlooked or improperly weighed. See JA 122, 183, 219. The fact that the Navy did not draw the inferences that Appellant might wish when examining this evidence does not render its decision arbitrary and capricious or unsupported by substantial evidence. Under well-established law, the Navy was only required to review relevant information and articulate a satisfactory explanation establishing “a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 724 F.3d 243, 249 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43)). As the District Court’s opinion carefully lays out, “the 22 evidence [that Appellant] presented to the Boards was available for their consideration, but the Boards articulated, based on other solid evidence” – including the facts that the Appellant had deviated from the NJROTC curriculum, interacted inappropriately with cadets, and was found to be either sleeping during, or absent from, class – “a rational explanation for a decision against the [Appellant].” Crooks, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 102. We agree. Therefore, we have no grounds to second-guess the judgment reached by the Navy.