Opinion ID: 77301
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Supreme Court's Decision in Free Speech Coalition

Text: 17 In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 23 the Supreme Court struck down as unconstitutionally overbroad the two above-referenced subsections of the CPPA's definition of child pornography. The first defined child pornography as any visual depiction, including a computer-generated depiction that is, or appears to be, of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 24 The second, CPPA's pandering provision, defined child pornography as a visual depiction [that] is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct. 25 The Court held that these definitions reached more than what could constitutionally be banned as unprotected speech under current obscenity law. 26 18 The first definition was deemed overbroad because it prohibited speech (virtual or computer depictions, artistic works, or cinematic depictions of youthful actors) that was not obscene under Miller, and which recorded no crime and created no victims through its production, as did the real child pornography in Ferber. 27 The second definition, the pandering provision, was deemed overbroad because it defined as child pornography materials that had been promoted convey[ing] the impression that sexually explicit depictions involving minors would be found within the material, even when, in fact, there were no such scenes. This subsection thus criminalized downstream possession of material described, or pandered, as child pornography by someone earlier in the distribution chain even if no minors were actually involved in the production. Finding the government's evidence insufficient to show any harm in material merely pandered as containing child pornography, the Court criticized the provision because it criminalized speech based solely on how the speech is presented rather than on what is depicted. 28 19 Although the Court found the CPPA inconsistent with Miller and lacking support in Ferber, the government attempted to justify the definitions in other ways. The government argued that virtual child pornography can be used to seduce children into participating in sexual activity, and that such materials also whets the appetites of pedophiles, encouraging them to engage in illegal conduct. 29 The Court rejected these arguments, noting that other laws, such as those that prohibit unlawful solicitation of a minor, more closely regulate the unsavory use of virtual child pornography; and that the government may not prohibit speech on the grounds that it may merely encourage, and not incite, pedophiles to engage in illicit conduct. 30 20 The government next argued that its objective of eliminating the market for real child pornography necessitates a prohibition on virtual images as well because, since they are often indistinguishable and traded in the same market, the synthetic images promote the trafficking of works produced through the exploitation of real children. 31 The Court rejected this market deterrence theory, noting that, [i]n the case of the material covered by Ferber [depictions of actual minors engaged in sexual acts], the creation of the speech is itself the crime of child abuse; the prohibition deters the crime by removing the profit motive. 32 In other words, because no crime underlies the production of virtual child pornography, the production-based rationale set forth in Ferber does not apply to synthetic images. 21 Finally, the Court rejected the government's argument that, since advanced technology makes it difficult to tell whether pictures were made with real children or computer imaging, thus thwarting prosecutorial efforts, both kinds of images must be banned. The Court stated that the argument, that protected speech may be banned as a means to ban unprotected speech .... turns the First Amendment upside down. 33