Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted inadequacy of the record on appeal

Text: Defendant contends his rights under section 190.9 and the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution to a record adequate to permit meaningful appellate review were violated by the trial court's failure to order that the in-chambers discussions regarding juror hardship be reported. Defendant contends an adequate record would demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his constitutional rights by improperly granting hardship excuses. We are not persuaded. It was defense counsel who initially suggested having off-the-record discussions of hardship questionnaires followed by on-the-record excusals. The court and the prosecutor agreed. [11] Accordingly, defendant waived any claim the trial court erred in failing to transcribe these proceedings ( People v. Gaston (1978) 20 Cal.3d 476, 485, 143 Cal. Rptr. 205, 573 P.2d 423 [stipulation that no reporter's transcript of portion of proceedings was needed waived complaint of inadequate record on appeal]; see also People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1333, fn. 70, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1) and may not complain on appeal ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612, 667, 286 Cal. Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84 [failure to object in trial court forfeits claim of inadequate appellate record of juror excusals]). In any event, state law entitles a defendant only to an appellate record adequate to permit [him or her] to argue the points raised in the appeal. ( People v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1165-1166, 5 Cal.Rptr.2d 268, 824 P.2d 1315.) Federal constitutional requirements are similar. The due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require the state to furnish an indigent defendant with a record sufficient to permit adequate and effective appellate review. ( Griffin v. Illinois (1956) 351 U.S. 12, 16-20, 76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891; Draper v. Washington (1963) 372 U.S. 487, 495-496, 83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899.) Similarly, the Eighth Amendment requires reversal only where the record is so deficient as to create a substantial risk the death penalty is being imposed in an arbitrary and capricious manner. ( Stephens v. Zant (5th Cir. 1980) 631 F.2d 397, 403, rehg. den. and opn. mod. (1981) 648 F.2d 446, cert. den. 454 U.S. 1035, 102 S.Ct. 585, 70 L.Ed.2d 480.) The defendant has the burden of showing the record is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate review. ( People v. Scott (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1188 1203-1204, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 240, 939 P.2d 354.) Defendant fails to do so here. Defendant contends a more complete record would permit him to show the trial court abused its discretion by improperly granting hardship excusals, resulting in more than half the prospective jurors being excused for hardship. Defendant asserts the unwarranted granting of hardship excusals systematically excluded wage earners in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment and state constitutional rights to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community. ( Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27 [impartial jury requirement of Sixth Amendment]; Duren v. Missouri (1979) 439 U.S. 357, 363-370, 99 S.Ct. 664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 [fair cross-section requirement of Sixth Amendment]; People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258, 272, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 [Sixth Amendment and article I, section 16 of the California Constitution]; see also People v. White (1954) 43 Cal.2d 740, 278 P.2d 9 [exclusion of wage earners].) He further contends allowing jurors too easily to opt out of serving on the present capital case resulted in a jury unconstitutionally skewed in favor of the death penalty, in violation of his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable penalty determination. To establish a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment's fair cross-section requirement, defendant would have to demonstrate: (1) the group allegedly excluded was a distinctive group in the community; (2) the representation of that group in the venire from which his jury was selected was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the community; and (3) the underrepresentation was due to systematic exclusion of that group in the jury selection process. ( Duren v. Missouri, supra, 439 U.S. at p. 364, 99 S.Ct. 664; People v. Stansbury (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1017, 1061, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 174, 846 P.2d 756, revd. on other grounds in Stansbury v. California (1994) 511 U.S. 318, 114 S.Ct. 1526, 128 L.Ed.2d 293.) He also would have to show he preserved the claim for appeal by objecting to the excusals on fair cross-section grounds below. (See People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 73, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 906-907, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 663-665, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) Defendant is unable to make either showing. The questionnaires, along with the clerk's minutes of the proceedings and the on-the-record excusals of 133 of the prospective jurors whose hardship questionnaires were discussed in chambers, have been made part of the record on appeal. This record is adequate to establish that defense counsel stipulated or agreed to all but one [12] of these 133 excusals. The record thus is adequate to show that defendant has waived any claim of error  including his federal constitutional claims  predicated on these 132 excusals. (See People v. Ervin, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 73, 91 Cal.Rptr.2d 623, 990 P.2d 506; People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 906-907, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93; People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 663-665, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84.) As for the one prospective juror whom he did not stipulate to excuse  Carol K.  defendant fails to demonstrate how a reporter's transcript of the in-chambers discussions would aid him in establishing a fair cross-section violation. The exclusion of one prospective juror from the venire  even if erroneous  could not demonstrate a distinctive group was systematically or regularly excluded, resulting in a venire that did not fairly represent the community. What we have said above holds true as well for defendant's argument that the lack of an adequate record has impaired his ability to present his Sixth-Amendment-impartial-jury and Eighth-Amendment-reliability claims. The premise of these claims is that the improper granting of hardship excusals resulted in a volunteer jury. Defendant, however, forfeited any claim of an inadequate record by agreeing to hold discussions of juror hardship off the record, and in any event the record is adequate to show defendant stipulated or agreed to every off-the-record excusal except that of Carol K. Finally, the excusal of that prospective juror  even if improper  would not establish that the jury venire was composed of volunteers in violation of defendant's federal constitutional rights. Defendant contend the voir dire of additional jurors that occurred on the record, after the in-chambers hardship discussions, lends support to the inference that systematic exclusion occurred during the off-the-record discussions of hardship excuses. The record, however, again shows defendant stipulated or consented to 131 of the 137 hardship excusals that were granted during on-the-record voir dire. As for the remaining six excusals of which defendant complains, they do not establish a pattern of overly generously granting hardship excusals. [13] Rather, the trial court used its practical experience and made pragmatic evaluations ( People v. Mickey, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 666, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801, 818 P.2d 84) of the hardship the prospective jurors would experience should they be required to serve during a lengthy trial. The court did not excuse the six jurors simply because they did not wish to serve, but rather evaluated each potential juror's particular situation before excusing him or her. The on-the-record voir dire of these jurors lends no support to defendant's claim that a more complete record would enable him to demonstrate lack of a fair cross-section or other error. Defendant further claims the trial court's failure to transcribe the in-chambers discussions in violation of section 190.9 is reversible per se, and urges us to reconsider our decision in People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at page 1333, footnote 70, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1, rejecting such a claim. We decline to do so. Defendant next contends the trial court's failure to adhere to the requirements of section 190.9 arbitrarily denied him a state statutory entitlement in violation of his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law. ( Hicks v. Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346, 100 S.Ct. 2227, 65 L.Ed.2d 175.) As we observed above, this claim was forfeited by defendant's agreement to the procedure followed. Defendant finally asserts that if (as it appears) defense counsel improperly stipulated to systematically and intentionally exclude wage earners from jury service . . . he may have been acting as ineffective counsel, which prejudiced defendant by denying him the right to a representative jury under the Sixth Amendment, a fair trial under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and a reliable verdict under the Eighth Amendment. Defendant fails to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. (See Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 693-694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674.) Here, nothing in the record suggests it is reasonably probable a jury that included more wage earners would have found defendant did not commit the crimes charged against him or would have voted to sentence him to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole rather than death. (See Thomas v. Borg (9th Cir.1998) 159 F.3d 1147, 1152 [counsel's failure to raise and preserve a fair cross-section claim at trial did not prejudice defendant, because the evidence, both testimonial and physical . . . was so overwhelming that it is hard to believe that any reasonable juror, black or white, would have voted to acquit him]; see also People v. Freeman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 450, 487, 34 Cal.Rptr.2d 558, 882 P.2d 249 [defendant failed to show prejudice from counsel's failure to employ peremptory challenges to excuse prospective jurors, because [n]othing in the record suggests . . . it is reasonably probable a different jury would have been more favorably disposed towards defendant].)