Opinion ID: 2168806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurisdiction to Settle the Property Dispute

Text: The respondent argues that in the decree of May 16 the Family Court justice exceeded his statutory jurisdiction by settling a dispute over title to real property. The respondent thus seeks to vacate that part of the decree which said that petitioner owned an interest in the property concurrently with him. The property in question was conveyed to the parties in 1963 by a quitclaim deed which granted the estate for consideration paid to Robert D. Cavanagh and Violet M. Cavanagh, of Little Compton, Rhode Island, husband and wife as tenants by the entirety    On February 12, 1973, when the Family Court declared the marriage void, it appointed two receivers to manage and control the estate during the litigation, but said nothing in its decree about the respective rights of the parties in the real estate. It is clear, however, that since the marriage was void, a tenancy by the entirety never existed. 4 Thompson, Real Property § 1786 at 66 (Grimes repl.1961) After a number of motions were filed by the receivers and by petitioner to sell the property, the court, in July 1974, heard arguments on its jurisdiction to partition real estate and on the rights of each party in the Little Compton estate. Memoranda were filed and on February 7, 1975, the decision was filed. As discussed above, the court concluded, among other things, that petitioner owned a share of the property as a tenant in common with respondent. As previously stated, this decision was embodied in the decree of May 16, 1975, which is presently on appeal. The respondent assigns as error the court's assumption of jurisdiction to determine that petitioner was entitled to a share in the property as a cotenant. He contends that the limited jurisdiction given to the Family Court in § 8-10-3 does not include the power to try title or to reform or cancel deeds. He argues that before Family Court can proceed to partition the land, the question of title must be decided in Superior Court. On this record the Family Court had jurisdiction to order partition of the subject property. Under § 8-10-3, as amended by P.L.1972, ch. 30, § 1, that court had the authority, when this petition to partition was filed,    to hear and determine all petitions for divorce from the bond of marriage and from bed and board; all motions for allowance, alimony, support and custody of children, allowance of counsel and witness fees, and other matters arising out of petitions and motions relative to real and personal property in aid thereof, including, but not limited to, partitions, accountings, receiverships, sequestration of assets, resulting and constructive trusts, impressions of trust, and such other equitable matters arising out of the family relationship, wherein jurisdiction is acquired by the court by the filing of petitions for divorce   . It is clear from the record in this case that title to the real estate in question was incidental to and subordinate to the divorce action which had been brought by the parties. In these circumstances the Family Court had jurisdiction. As the court said in Butler v. Butler, 377 Pa. 388, 390-91, 105 A.2d 62, 63 (1954): The fact that ejectment might lie to settle title to real estate does not necessarily oust the jurisdiction of equity. In Sears v. Scranton Trust Co., 228 Pa. 126, at page 136, 77 A. 423, at page 427, Justice Moschzisker (later Chief Justice), said: `   Whatever may be the prayer of a bill, if the kernel of the controversy is the legal title to land, then equity cannot be invoked; but, where the question of the legal title is incidental and subordinate to other elements which call for the exercise of equitable remedies, equity will take and retain jurisdiction.   .' Such other elements were present in the case at bar and, therefore, as previously stated the Family Court did not lack jurisdiction to order the partition. Accord, Potts v. Rader, 215 Ark. 160, 162, 219 S.W.2d 769, 770 (1949). [5]