Opinion ID: 1119472
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mrs. Moore's Former Testimony

Text: Moore argues that, under HRE Rule 804(b)(1), the admission of Mrs. Moore's former testimony was erroneous and violated his right to confrontation under the United States and Hawai`i Constitutions. The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 14 of the Hawai`i Constitution guarantee an accused the right to confront adverse witnesses. The confrontation clause provides two types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify against him [or her], and the right to conduct cross-examination. State v. Apilando, 79 Hawai`i 128, 131, 900 P.2d 135, 138 (1995) (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1017, 108 S.Ct. 2798, 2801, 101 L.Ed.2d 857 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted). While a literal interpretation of the confrontation clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statements when the declarant is unavailable, this Court has rejected that view as unintended and too extreme. Rather, we have attempted to harmonize the goal of the Clauseplacing limits on the kind of evidence that may be received against a defendantwith a societal interest in accurate factfinding, which may require consideration of out-of-court statements. State v. McGriff, 76 Hawai`i 148, 156, 871 P.2d 782, 790 (1994) (quoting Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182, 107 S.Ct. 2775, 2782, 97 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). Following Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), this court has repeatedly recognized that the confrontation clause restricts the range of admissible hearsay in two ways. First, the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, a declarant whose statement it wishes to use against a defendant. Second, upon a showing that the witness is unavailable, only statements that bear adequate indicia of reliability are admissible. Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 555-56 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, 100 S.Ct. at 2538-38); see also McGriff, 76 Hawai`i at 156, 871 P.2d at 790; Apilando, 79 Hawai`i at 131, 900 P.2d at 139-40. A showing of the declarant's unavailability is necessary to promote the integrity of the fact finding process and to ensure fairness to defendants. Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 362, 845 P.2d at 556. In Ortiz, we described the requirements for establishing unavailability of a declarant: To demonstrate the unavailability of a declarant at trial, the prosecution must show that it made a good faith attempt to secure his or her presence. To establish this good faith attempt, the prosecution must confirm on the record at the time of trial both the declarant's unavailability and that vigorous and appropriate steps were taken to procure the declarant's presence at trial. Id. at 363, 845 P.2d at 556-57 (citing State v. Rodrigues, 7 Haw.App. 80, 86, 742 P.2d 986, 990 (1987)). In State v. White, 65 Haw. 286, 288, 651 P.2d 470, 472 (1982), we held that the unavailability requirement was satisfied, for purposes of the confrontation clause, where the prosecution confirmed on the record that it had assigned an investigator to locate a witness with no known job, address, or telephone number, and the investigator contacted the witness's mother and had other officers check locations where the witness was thought to have once resided. We have also held that unavailability was established where the prosecution: (1) attempted four times to serve a subpoena; and (2) subsequently assigned an investigator, who (a) checked the witness's driver's license number and motor vehicle registration, (b) ran checks on voter registration records and phone listings, (c) contacted the witness's last known residence and work place, and (d) interviewed his former neighbors, who indicated that the witness may have moved to Alaska. State v. Bates, 70 Haw. 343, 346, 771 P.2d 509, 511 (1989). Where the prosecution failed to establish on the record at trial that it had made a good faith effort to secure the presence of the declarant at trial, we have held that the admission of a hearsay statement, even if under an exception, was a violation of the defendants' rights to confrontation. In State v. Beyer, 72 Haw. 469, 473, 822 P.2d 519, 521 (1991), we recognized that it is true that mere absence of the complaining witness, where there have been vigorous and appropriate steps to procure the complaining witness'[s] presence at trial, does not necessarily constitute a violation of the right of confrontation if the out-of-court statements of the complaining witness have been made in such circumstances as to be so reliable that cross-examination does not appear necessary or there has been an opportunity for cross-examination[.] Id. at 473, 822 P.2d at 521 (citation omitted). We held, however, that [m]ere service of a subpoena on the complaining witness did not establish [the witness's] unavailability, id., and that the witness's out-of-court statements were not admissible where they did not come within a hearsay exception and were not sufficiently trustworthy as to eliminate the need for cross-examination. Id.; see also Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 363, 845 P.2d at 556-57 (admission of declarant's statement under hearsay exception violated defendant's right to confrontation where prosecution failed to issue a trial subpoena and failed to make showing of declarant's unavailability); State v. Kim, 55 Haw. 346, 350, 519 P.2d 1241, 1244 (1974) (prosecution did not sufficiently establish unavailability by showing that witness had forwarding address in another state where no attempt made to secure witness's presence); Rodrigues, 7 Haw.App. at 87-88, 742 P.2d at 991 (defendant's right to confrontation violated where prosecution established at hearing, on the eve of trial, that witness was unavailable despite efforts to secure the witness's presence, but failed to reaffirm unavailability on record at trial). The record in this case reveals that the prosecution established, through direct and cross-examination, Mrs. Moore's unavailability and its good faith efforts to secure her presence. Mrs. Moore was under subpoena for trial beginning November 22, 1993. The prosecutor spoke with Mrs. Moore in the preceding week, and she acknowledged that she was under subpoena and would testify. Nonetheless, an investigator for the prosecution had made seven attempts to serve another subpoena over the weekend before Mrs. Moore was to testify. After the investigator was informed by the Moores' nanny that Mrs. Moore had left the state, the prosecutor began calling names from the defense's witness list in an attempt to locate her. He learned that she had been at her brother-in-law's home in California, but had left earlier the same day, December 5, 1993, without disclosing her destination. Moore urges, citing United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 1023 (D.C.Cir.1974), that the prevailing standard is that to establish the prosecution's reasonable efforts to secure the presence of the declarant will require a search equally as vigorous as that which the government would undertake to find a critical witness if it has no prior testimony to rely upon[.] We do not disagree with this standard; however, we believe that it has been met. Mrs. Moore was under subpoena to appear at trial and, shortly before the trial date, told the prosecutor that she would testify. She fled the jurisdiction after jeopardy had attached, and the prosecution's motion for a continuance, opposed by Moore, was denied. Moore argues that the prosecution had known for months that Mrs. Moore, was a recalcitrant witness and, thus, should have requested a material witness order. [20] As the circuit court properly noted in its ruling, however, where Mrs. Moore had indicated that she would be present to testify, the prosecution would have been acting in bad faith had it stated in an affidavit in support of a request for a material witness order that it had reasonable cause to believe [that Mrs. Moore would] not be ... responsive to a subpoena at a time when [her] attendance [was] sought. HRS § 835-2(a)(2) (1993). We hold that the prosecution established, on the record at trial, that Mrs. Moore was unavailable and that it had made a good faith effort to secure her presence. The second factor in the Roberts analysis, after unavailability is shown, is the reliability of the statement. Reliability is shown `if the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception' or `upon a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' Ortiz, 74 Haw. at 361, 845 P.2d at 556 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539). Generally, the introduction of prior testimony does not violate the confrontation clause if there is sufficient proof of the unavailability. State v. Lincoln, 71 Haw. 274, 279, 789 P.2d 497, 500 (1990) (citing Kim ). We thus examine whether Mrs. Moore's testimony at the supervised release hearing was admissible as former testimony under HRE Rule 804(b)(1), which excludes such testimony from the hearsay rule when the declarant is unavailable. See supra note 7. Moore argues that the former testimony was inadmissible because it was given at a bail hearing which involved fundamentally different motives and interests from those at trial and there was no cross-examination on the statement. The argument, however, is not persuasive. The primary issue at the January 7, 1993 supervised release hearing was whether Moore presented a danger to Mrs. Moore, particularly because it was a one-witness case and there were no terms or conditions to protect that witness. Mrs. Moore testified in support of Moore's motion that she did not believe that Moore presented a danger to her. On cross-examination, the prosecution asked, Mrs. Moore, on January 7, 1992, it was your husband who shot you five times; is that correct? Mrs. Moore responded [f]our or five, I'm not certain. Defense counsel did not attempt to rebut the statement through redirect examination. As the circuit court ruled, Moore's identity as the shooter was obviously an issue in both the supervised release hearing and at trial. Moore had every motive to rebut Mrs. Moore's testimony. If he could establish through Mrs. Moore, the victim and only witness other than Moore himself, that it was in fact someone else who had shot her, his chances for release would have been greatly enhanced. HRE Rule 804(b)(1) does not require that the former testimony have been developed by direct, cross, or redirect examination, but only that the party against whom the testimony is later offered had the opportunity and motive to do so. The circuit court rightly concluded that the requirements of Rule 804(b)(1) were satisfied. Accordingly, we hold that the admission of Mrs. Moore's testimony from the supervised release hearing did not violate Moore's right to confront his accuser under the United States or Hawai`i Constitutions. Finally, Moore argues that the court's refusal to admit a related statement from the supervised release hearing violated HRE Rule 106 (1993), which provides that, [w]hen a writing or recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require him [or her] at that time to introduce any other part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in fairness to be considered contemporaneously. The court made clear that the only testimony from the supervised release hearing that it found admissible is the fact that it was Mr. Moore who shot Mrs. Moore. Moore sought to introduce Mrs. Moore's direct testimony from the same hearing that, [o]ver a period of time, a long period of time, I did finally come to the conclusion that Bob Moore, the person I knew, was not the person that shot me that night. Defense counsel argued that the statement should be admitted because it goes to identity. The court denied the request, stating: It's my position that I read this to be very clear that what Mrs. Moore is talking about is an emotional or psychological example. I think it's clear, when I look at the whole context of it, and that's why I'm denying it. Because if I allow that portion in, I'll have to allow the whole transcript in so the jury can get the full flavor of what's being testified to. And the record will bear me out. The record, indeed, bears out the trial court's ruling. The statement was properly excluded. The statement was offered in isolation; yet, read in context, Mrs. Moore never disputed that Moore shot her; she asserted only that his conduct at that time was so different from his ordinary behavior that it was as though he was a different person. Fairness did not require that the statement be considered contemporaneously with the statement introduced by the prosecution.