Opinion ID: 3021413
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mests

Text: To determine whether the Mests exercised reasonable diligence, we must examine 1) whether the Mests exercised reasonable diligence before the 1982 Penn State study, 2) whether, under Debiec, the Mests were reasonable in relying on the Penn State study to relieve their suspicions that their injuries were caused by Cabot, and 3) if so, whether, in light of their reliance on the Penn State study, they exercised reasonable diligence. Before consulting the experts at Penn State, the Mests consulted several other experts. As described above, upon first noticing his cows’ symptoms, Mest consulted his veterinarian, agricultural extension agent, and nutritionist. Mest was told that the problem was with his cows’ digestive systems, and he was advised to attempt nutritional solutions. Mest followed this advice and, when he did not see favorable results, he consulted new experts at Penn State. After extensive testing, the experts concluded that fluoride was not the cause of the cows’ illness, but they were unable to provide a definitive diagnosis as to what the cause was. We conclude that a reasonable juror could find that the Mests’ actions leading up to the Penn State study constituted reasonable diligence. We next consider the Mests’ contention that they were reasonable in relying on the Penn State study ruling out fluorosis to overcome their initial suspicions that fluorosis might be the cause of their cows’ symptoms. As explained above, in Debiec we held that, although the statute of limitations begins to run when a plaintiff suspects he has an injury caused by another, a negative diagnosis ruling out the speculative injury may be sufficient to overcome that suspicion. Debiec, 352 F.3d at 132. Thus, a diagnosis ruling out the possibility that the plaintiff’s injury was caused by another may, in effect, toll the statute of limitations under the discovery rule because it may lead the plaintiff to reasonably believe that his injury was not caused by the defendant. 12 The plaintiffs argue that, under Debiec, the Penn State study may have led them to reasonably believe that their cows did not suffer from fluorosis caused by the Cabot Facility. Therefore, the plaintiffs argue, there is at least a material issue of fact as to whether the Mests exercised reasonable diligence in ascertaining the cause of their injury after they received this diagnosis. We agree with the plaintiffs. Here, as in Debiec, the Mests noticed their injury and suspected that the defendants’ actions were to blame. As in Debiec, the Mests sought the advice of medical experts, who, after performing tests, assured the Mests that the suspected culprit was not the cause of the cows’ symptoms. As explained above, the Mests allege that they never received the subsequent letter from Penn State notifying them that fluoride might be the cause of future problems, and there is evidence in the record that this letter was not correctly addressed to them. (JA at 143, 777, 2006, 2172.) Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we accept as true the Mests’ contention that they never received this letter and that they were therefore left with the diagnosis that fluoride was not the cause of their cows’ symptoms. A reasonable juror could find that the plaintiffs acted reasonably in turning their inquiry elsewhere. We find unconvincing the distinctions the District Court drew between this case and Debiec. The District Court noted that Debiec’s reliance on her personal physician’s diagnosis was inherently more reasonable than the plaintiffs’ reliance on the diagnoses of veterinarians or scientists because a personal physician has a stronger relationship of trust with a patient than a veterinarian or scientist has with a farmer. Mest, 2004 WL 945131, at . The distinction between a patient’s relationship with her doctor and a farmer’s relationship with a veterinarian or scientist is irrelevant for the purposes of demonstrating reasonable reliance under Debiec where, we held, the reliance was reasonable “as long as the plaintiff retains confidence in the doctor’s professional abilities.” Debiec, 352 F.3d at 132. In the context of this case, a veterinarian or animal scientist plays the same role as a doctor by using professional medical and scientific expertise to interpret symptoms and diagnose a cause. In fact, farmers arguably rely more on the professional abilities of veterinarians and animal scientists than patients rely on their doctors because farmers can only observe the objective symptoms of their animals and must rely 13 on veterinarians and animal scientists to interpret those objective symptoms, whereas human patients know what they are experiencing and can describe it to their doctors.8 We also disagree with the District Court’s finding that Debiec is inapplicable to this case because here there was no definitive diagnosis of the cows’ illness. The important point in Debiec was not that the doctor diagnosed the wrong disease, but that the doctor ruled out the actual disease that would have implicated the defendant. See Debiec, 352 F.3d at 132 (stating that statute of limitations may be tolled where “a doctor affirmatively tells a claimant that she does not have a certain disease and therefore that the defendant was not the cause of her injury”). The District Court also distinguished this case from Debiec by noting that the Mest herd involved numerous different cows throughout the period the herd demonstrated symptoms, and therefore the Mests could not have reasonably relied on a negative diagnosis at one particular time. The fact that the herd consisted of different cows with the same symptoms throughout the years after the 1982 negative diagnosis does not imply that the Mests were unreasonable in continuing to believe that fluoride was not the cause of the cows’ symptoms. A reasonable juror could conclude that the Mests made the fair assumption that, because their new cows showed symptoms identical to those of their old cows, there existed a common cause to these symptoms. Such a reasonable juror also could conclude that, having ruled out fluoride as the cause, the Mests reasonably directed their search toward other chronic problems on the farm that might have caused these 8 Moreover, the District Court’s reliance on the close and lengthy relationship between patients and doctors would exclude those patients who do not have the opportunity to form such a relationship with a doctor. Patients do not always form a long-term and close relationship with specialist doctors in particular due to, for example, the fact that patients may seldom need to see specialists or lack adequate insurance coverage to see them regularly. Yet, because of their expertise, these specialists are the very doctors in whom patients must often place the most trust. The District Court’s reasoning would appear to find this trust inherently unreasonable, a conclusion that we cannot support. 14 symptoms. The District Court also appears to have found the Mests’ reliance on the Penn State study unreasonable because of evidence that, despite the results of the study, Merrill Mest continued to suspect his cows had fluorosis. Mest, 2004 WL 945131, at . The District Court based this conclusion on Betty Mest’s deposition testimony that Merrill told her that there was fluoride contamination on the property two to three years after the results of the Penn State test. Id. However, the nature of Betty Mest’s testimony is in dispute; later in the deposition she corrected herself and stated that her husband did not make that statement, and that she had been confused by the question. (JA at 782-86.) While the credibility of Betty Mest’s retraction may be disputed, on a motion for summary judgment we must look at all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Morton Int’l, 343 F.3d at 680. Therefore, we cannot, as the District Court did, assume that Merrill Mest suspected fluoride contamination on his farm after the Penn State study based on Betty Mest’s contradictory testimony. Given that, under Debiec, the Mests may have reasonably relied on the 1982 Penn State study to alleviate their suspicions that their cows had fluorosis, we consider next whether the Mests’ actions after 1982 constituted reasonable diligence in light of their reliance on the Penn State study. As we have held, a misdiagnosis does not relieve a patient of all responsibility in pursuing the cause of her symptoms, and continued reliance on a misdiagnosis in the face of contrary evidence may be unreasonable. Bohus, 950 F.2d at 930 (holding that doctor’s assurances that plaintiff does not have particular injury may toll statute of limitations until that “point in time when a patient’s own ‘common sense’ should lead her to conclude that it is no longer reasonable to rely on the assurances of her doctor”); see also Debiec, 352 F.3d at 131-32 (citing Bohus). Given that the Mests did not receive a definitive diagnosis and continued to experience problems with their herd, they would not have exercised reasonable diligence had they simply ended their inquiry after the 1982 Penn State study. The Mests, however, did not end their inquiry with the Penn State study. On the contrary, Mest continued to consult his nutritionist, veterinarian, and agricultural extension agent on a weekly or monthly basis to determine the cause of the symptoms, 15 and he routinely tested the cows for infections. He sought help twice from a state laboratory. He had his water and feed tested by both PADER and the EPA. This careful investigation demonstrates that the Mests continued to exercise what a reasonable juror might determine to be reasonable diligence in light of the Penn State study up until the 1999 diagnosis of fluorosis. In sum, we hold that a material issue of fact exists as to whether the Mests exercised reasonable diligence sufficient to toll the statute of limitations under the discovery rule until the 1999 diagnosis by Dr. Krook.