Opinion ID: 698663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Barnes' Bagley Claim: State Procedural Default.

Text: 51 As noted above, I find that Barnes has not defaulted his Bagley claim in state court. Under Virginia state law, a habeas claim is procedurally defaulted if a petitioner had knowledge of the facts upon which the claim is based at the time of filing any previous habeas petition. Va.Code Sec. 8.01-654(B)(2). The majority misstates the law in this regard; Virginia law bars successive petitions where the facts were known to petitioner previously, not where the facts were available, op. at 975, to the petitioner previously. 7 Likewise, the majority's contention that McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 498, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1472, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991), provides the standard regarding procedural default for the state court reviewing a successive state habeas petition, op. at 975, is without merit. The United States Supreme Court in McCleskey announced the standard to be applied to successive federal habeas petitions; the United States Supreme Court is without authority to limit the ability of state courts to hear successive state habeas petitions. Rather, the law in Virginia restricts successive habeas petitions to those raising both new ground[s] for relief, see Hawks v. Cox, 211 Va. 91, 175 S.E.2d 271, 273 (1970), and facts not known to the petitioner at the time of filing an earlier habeas petition, Va.Code Sec. 8.01-654(B)(2). Both of those requirements were met here. 52 In the instant case, Barnes had filed a first state habeas petition raising, inter alia, ineffective assistance of counsel, but not raising nondisclosure of the gun's location. Barnes did not discover the location of the gun, and the nondisclosure, until after his first habeas petition had been denied. He then filed his second state habeas petition, raising for the first time in state court the nondisclosure issue. The Virginia Supreme Court held that the Virginia Code section cited above, Va.Code Sec. 8.01-654(B)(2), barred Barnes' petition, thus implicitly finding that Barnes had knowledge of the prosecutor's nondisclosure of the location of the gun at the time he filed his first state habeas petition. Although the state court's factual finding with regard to prior knowledge is entitled to a presumption of correctness from the federal courts, Clanton v. Muncy, 845 F.2d 1238, 1241 (4th Cir.1988), that presumption is rebutted when a federal court concludes that the finding is not 'fairly supported by the record.'  Demosthenes v. Baal, 495 U.S. 731, 735, 110 S.Ct. 2223, 2225, 109 L.Ed.2d 762 (1990) (quoting 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2254(d)(8)). 8 Here, the determination that Barnes knew about the Brady materials when he filed his first state habeas petition is not supported by the record, as the prosecution's knowledge of the location of the gun was not disclosed to Barnes until 1990, after his first state habeas petition had been denied. 9 53 In light of the finding that Barnes has not defaulted his Bagley claim in state court, I need not decide whether, if he had defaulted the claim, he has shown cause and prejudice for the default. However, in order to respond to the claims made by the majority in its alternate holdings, I discuss the issue briefly. 54