Opinion ID: 721339
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Appropriate Constitutional Standard

Text: 17 The district court analyzed the comprehensive scheme established by the three ordinances as a time, place, and manner restriction on speech. It therefore asked whether they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, [whether] they are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and [whether] they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 3069, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984). 18 The City argues that the district court should have applied the test for restrictions on commercial speech to the first two ordinances, which addressed only commercial signs, and should have reserved the time, place, and manner analysis for the final ordinance, which included non-commercial signs. The test for purely commercial speech, as articulated in Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of New York, 447 U.S. 557, 561, 100 S.Ct. 2343, 2348-49, 65 L.Ed.2d 341 (1980), indicates that commercial speech is protected only if it concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. If the speech is protected, then the government may regulate it only if the government has a substantial interest, if the regulation directly advances that interest, and if the regulation is no more extensive than necessary to serve that interest. Id. The City insists that the district court erred by refusing to apply this commercial speech test to the first two ordinances. 19 We conclude that this issue is moot. By the time trial took place, the first two ordinances no longer operated independently because the final ordinance had created a regulation restricting both commercial and non-commercial yard signs. Indeed, in its brief before this court, the City described the three ordinances as a comprehensive sign ordinance which applies even-handedly to all types of signs found in residential neighborhoods. We conclude that use of the commercial speech test would be inappropriate, as well as unhelpful, and we therefore decline to invoke it for purposes of deciding the constitutional issues presented in this case.