Opinion ID: 1619636
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Perceived Disability Claim.

Text: Howell claims the ICRA protects an employee discharged based upon a perceived disability. Our civil rights act prohibits the discharge of any employee because of the employee's disability, unless the discharge was based upon the nature of the occupation. Henkel Corp. v. Iowa Civil Rights Comm'n, 471 N.W.2d 806, 809 (Iowa 1991); accord Iowa Code § 216.6(1)(a) (1995). Pursuant to Iowa Code section 216.2(5), disability means the physical or mental condition of a person which constitutes a substantial handicap. The administrative rules define a substantially handicapped person as any person who has a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more major life activities, has a record of such an impairment, or is regarded as having such an impairment. Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-8.26(1) (emphasis added). Iowa Administrative Code rule 161-8.26(5) defines is regarded as having an impairment to include individuals perceived as having a mental or physical impairment. [3] We have looked to the ADA and cases interpreting its language when considering disability discrimination claims under our civil rights act because of the similarity of legal principles and analytical framework. See Fuller v. Iowa Dep't of Human Servs., 576 N.W.2d 324, 329 (Iowa 1998); Bearshield v. John Morrell & Co., 570 N.W.2d 915, 918 (Iowa 1997). We did not have the benefit of the guidance of the ADA in Annear, as Annear was decided prior to the ADA's enactment. Under the ADA, the term disability specifically embraces individuals regarded as having mental or physical impairments. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1995). Accordingly, the federal courts have recognized discrimination claims based upon perceived disabilities. See Wooten v. Farmland Foods, 58 F.3d 382, 385 (8th Cir.1995). Our statutory definition of disability is similar, see Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 918, and our administrative rule 161-8.26(1), which encompasses perceived disabilities within the definition of substantially handicapped person, essentially mirrors the ADA's definition of disability. Compare Iowa Admin. Code r. 161-8.26(1) with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). Although we agree with the conclusion of the district court that Annear should not be overruled, we believe that the court misinterpreted the extent to which Annear rejected the concept of perceived disability. There is no indication in that decision that perceived disability as such is an unwarranted extension of our disability discrimination laws. As we subsequently recognized in Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 922-23, there are strong public policy reasons for recognizing perceived disability claims. Inclusion of such claims under our civil rights act prevents adverse employment consequences based upon prejudices, ignorance, and stereotypes regardless of whether the individual has an actual physical or mental disability. [4] Our opinion in Annear only identified one situation that we concluded bears no relationship to the purposes of the perceived disability doctrine. The situation to which Annear spoke was a disagreement between the employer and the employee as to whether a particular injury had healed sufficiently to enable the employee to return to work. Annear held that, if the employer makes an ad hoc decision based on circumstances relating to the particular injury, it may not be found guilty of disability discrimination simply because its decision was demonstrably wrong. We continue to agree with our Annear holding because the employer's decision in that case was based on an individualized assessment and in no way rested on myths, fears, or stereotypes, the situations at which the perceived disability doctrine is aimed. See Bearshield, 570 N.W.2d at 923 (holding ICRA generally requires an individualized assessment of the employee's ability to perform the job). In the present case, however, a fact finder could determine, based on the matters presented to the district court in deciding the summary judgment motion, that Merritt's decision to terminate Howell was based in part on a perception of disability associated with her use of the TENS device. That justification does suggest a reliance on stereotypes rather than an ad hoc evaluation of Howell's physical condition.