Opinion ID: 895007
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal for Lack of a Public Necessity

Text: In its motion to dismiss, FKM also contended that the University did not have a public necessity for taking the smaller tract. There was no evidence introduced at the hearing on FKM's motion, but evidence filed in support of and in opposition to the University's motion for summary judgment was before the court. [7] The trial court is allowed to conduct a hearing on a plea to the jurisdiction or motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in a manner similar to how it hears a summary judgment motion, and may consider affidavits and other summary judgment-type evidence. See Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 227 (Tex.2004). If the evidence presents a fact question on the jurisdictional issue, the motion should be denied. See id. at 228. Here there was evidence before the trial court that the University had a public necessity for the taking. Education Code section 111.38, specifically applicable to the University, provides that [t]he board [of the University] has the power of eminent domain to acquire for the use of the [U]niversity any land necessary and proper for carrying out its purposes as a state-supported institution of higher education. FKM claimed that the reason stated in the minutes of the February 19, 1998 Board meeting for the condemnation  that the property was needed to obtain a right-of-way over State Highway 35  was false because the University had already obtained such right-of-way. However, the University offered evidence that (1) the Board agenda for this item also provided that the acquisition of the larger tract in conjunction with two others in the same area will complete the acquisition of the east campus areas, and (2) the Board met and approved the acquisition of the property for multiple reasons, including not only the right-of-way, but also as part of an established Master Plan, the need to address a campus parking shortage, and the University's need for the tract as a future building site. FKM claimed that Ron Shoup, the University's director of campus planning and real estate, stated in a memorandum that the property was not needed, but the University offered the affidavit of a higher-ranking official, Vice Chancellor Harris, who stated that Shoup was not authorized to speak for or bind the University on this matter. The University further submitted the affidavit of Shoup himself, who attested that his statement had been misinterpreted, that it was made in the context of an earlier proposal for FKM to develop the property for retail use, and that based on his knowledge of the University's needs, the acquisition of the FKM property constituted a public necessity in that it provided the University with land upon which to construct needed buildings, was needed to enable the closure of a busy thoroughfare, i.e., Calhoun Road, and enabled the University to establish an architecturally and aesthetically desirable eastern border to its campus. [8] We further note that the Shoup memorandum was equivocal, stating at one point that the University did not need the FKM property, but then qualifying that statement by stating [t]his is not to say it could not be utilized. Shoup testified in his deposition that the FKM tract was part of an ongoing eastward expansion project, that properties were acquired as part of this plan for future expansion and future growth of the University and very wisely so, and that the plan for the FKM tract was that it would be landscaped with parking and potentially an entrance there. A memorandum from an associate vice chancellor stated that the tract was needed to provide a clearly bounded eastern edge to the campus. The Board's determination that the University needed the larger tract for a legitimate university purpose raised a fact issue regarding FKM's motion to dismiss. Where a statute vests a governmental agency with discretionary authority to condemn property, we have held that the agency's determination of public necessity is presumptively correct, absent proof by the landowner of the agency's fraud or proof that the condemning authority acted arbitrarily or capriciously. See Hous. Auth. of City of Dallas v. Higginbotham, 135 Tex. 158, 143 S.W.2d 79, 88 (1940) (The law is well established in this state that where the power of eminent domain is granted, a determination by the condemnor of the necessity for acquiring certain property is conclusive in the absence of fraud.) [9] FKM does not challenge this standard. FKM's motion to dismiss and evidence before the trial court in connection with that motion were not conclusive proof that the University's determination of public necessity was fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious. FKM argues that the suit was properly dismissed because the University failed to offer any proof that its governing board had declared a public necessity for the taking of the five-foot wide strip of property sought. We agree with FKM that Education Code section 111.38 requires the Board to authorize condemnation of property, since section 111.38 only grants the power of eminent domain to the Board itself. [10] FKM points out that at the hearing on its motion to dismiss the University's counsel conceded that the board did not pass a separate resolution specifically authorizing condemnation of the smaller tract. We do not agree with FKM, however, that a separate Board resolution is necessary every time a condemnor decides to acquire less property than it originally sought. FKM does not reference a statutory or procedural requirement for its position, and a resolution authorizing condemnation of a whole tract of land necessarily authorizes condemnation of the separate parts that comprise the whole. We see no reason that the Board could not vote to condemn a tract of land for public use then depend on and allow its agents, subject to the Board's supervision and approval, to determine that less than the whole tract would suffice to fulfill the Board's purposes or would fit within the University's budget. And if the Board does so, then it could reasonably depend on the agents to negotiate for less than the whole tract or, if suit has been filed as in this case, amend its condemnation petition to seek a smaller tract. There is no indication in this record that the Board has ever disavowed the actions of University officers and attorneys handling the condemnation proceeding. The University's counsel represented to the trial court at the hearing on the motion to dismiss that the court would hear testimony that at some point the Board of Regents made the determination that they couldn't afford the risk [of seeking the whole tract] because of the rapidly increasing numbers put on the property by FKM. The Board resolution authorizing condemnation of the larger tract, together with the other evidence described above, is evidence that condemnation of the smaller portion of the property was necessary and proper for carrying out the purposes of the University of Houston System as a state-supported institution of higher education under section 111.38 of the Education Code. And we have noted, `[w]hen the use is public, the necessity or expediency of appropriating any particular property is not a subject of judicial cognizance.' Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d at 89 (quoting Imperial Irrigation Co. v. Jayne, 104 Tex. 395, 138 S.W. 575, 587 (1911)); see also Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403, 406, 25 L.Ed. 206 (1878). If a landowner can establish that the ultimate taking of a smaller tract of land that comprised part of a larger tract originally sought to be condemned is fraudulent, without a true public purpose, and intended solely to avoid fully dismissing the entire condemnation proceeding so as to avoid paying the landowner's expenses under statutory provisions, then the landowner could be entitled to dismissal. But the evidence before the trial court at the time it heard FKM's motions did not conclusively establish these matters so as to warrant dismissal of the proceeding.