Opinion ID: 202332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Carjacking Statute

Text: 7 The statute to which the defendants pled guilty, 18 U.S.C. § 2119, reads: 8 Whoever, with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm takes a motor vehicle that has been transported, shipped, or received in interstate or foreign commerce from the person or presence of another by force and violence or by intimidation, or attempts to do so, shall ... 9 (3) if death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years up to life, or both, or sentenced to death. 10 Contrary to the suggestion of the government, this statute is not a felony murder analog. 1 See United States v. Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d 54, 63 (1st Cir.2000) ([C]arjacking is a specialized offense, requiring a specific criminal act and a narrow mens rea.). Even if death results, the statute requires intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. A felony murder statute is defined by the absence of any such intent element. 2 Consequently, the carjacking charges against the defendants required the government to prove not only that the defendants committed a carjacking and that they killed the victim, but also that they acted with intent to cause death or serious bodily harm. 3 11
12 In Holloway, the Supreme Court confronted the meaning of the phrase with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm in the carjacking statute. The question in Holloway was whether that phrase requires the government to prove that the defendant had an unconditional intent to kill or harm in all events, or whether it merely requires proof of an intent to kill or harm if necessary to effect a carjacking. 526 U.S. at 3, 119 S.Ct. 966. The Court answered that question as follows: 13 The specific issue in this case is what sort of evil motive Congress intended to describe when it used the words with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm . . . . More precisely, the question is whether a person who points a gun at a driver, having decided to pull the trigger if the driver does not comply with the demand for the car keys, possesses the intent, at that moment, to seriously harm the driver. In our view, the answer to that question does not depend on whether the driver immediately hands over the keys or what the offender decides to do after he gains control over the car. At the relevant moment, the offender plainly does have the forbidden intent. 14 Id. at 6-7, 119 S.Ct. 966. In short, if this case had gone to trial, the government would have had to prove that the defendants a) took or attempted to take the victim's car through force and violence or by intimidation, b) that they acted with conditional or unconditional intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, and c) that death resulted. 15
16 We have encountered cases, including this case, where a carjacking defendant is accused of stealing a car, taking its driver as a hostage, and later killing or harming the driver even though the defendant already was in control of the car. See, e.g., United States v. Lebrón-Cepeda, 324 F.3d 52, 56-57 (1st Cir.2003) (concerning a defendant who argued that his intent to seriously harm or kill the victim had not developed until after he had seized control of the victim's car and realized that the victim was a police officer); United States v. Evans-Garcia, 322 F.3d 110, 112-13 (1st Cir.2003) (same). In these cases, defendants have suggested that they were not guilty of carjacking because their intent to harm or kill the victim did not exist at the beginning of the carjacking. See id. at 114. In other words, these defendants contend that they could not be found guilty of carjacking if a jury finds that their intent to kill or seriously harm the driver developed only after the car had been taken. This interpretation of the carjacking statute stems from the several references in Holloway, as in the quotation above, to the carjacking defendant's intent as of the moment of a carjacking. The Court summarized its holding as follows: 17 The intent requirement of § 2119 is satisfied when the Government proves that at the moment the defendant demanded or took control over the driver's automobile the defendant possessed the intent to seriously harm or kill the driver if necessary to steal the car (or, alternatively, if unnecessary to steal the car). 18 Holloway, 526 U.S. at 12, 119 S.Ct. 966 (emphasis added). 19 The defendants contend that we have interpreted the above-quoted language in Holloway to mean that a defendant is not guilty of carjacking if his intent to kill or seriously harm the driver develops only after he has stolen the driver's car and taken the driver as a hostage. See Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d at 63 ([T]he mental state required by the statute (`intent to cause death or serious bodily harm') is measured at the moment that the defendant demands or takes control of the vehicle.). Other circuits addressing this issue have decided that intent in a carjacking case must be measured at the precise moment [the defendant] demanded or took control over the car. United States v. Harris, 420 F.3d 467, 478 (5th Cir.2005) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Applewhaite, 195 F.3d 679, 685 (3d Cir.1999) ([T]he statute directs the factfinder's attention to the defendant's state of mind at the precise moment he demanded or took control over the car.). See also Hornby, Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for the District Courts of the First Circuit, 2005 Revisions, 157, available at http://www.med.uscourts.gov/practices/Criminal_Jury_ Instructions.pdf (last visited July 6, 2005) (citing Rosario-Díaz, 202 F.3d at 63 for the requirement that the carjacking defendant intended to cause death or serious bodily harm at the time [he/she] demanded or took control of the motor vehicle). 20 The government takes a different view, arguing that the statute applies as long as the proscribed intent existed at any time while the defendants had control over the victim and his car. To that end, the government urges us to adopt a position set forth in a concurring opinion by a member of our court: that Holloway should not be read to limit the jury's focus to the commencement of the carjacking in cases like this one, which ... involve takings [of hostages] that occur over some period of time. Lebrón-Cepeda, 324 F.3d at 63 (Howard, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 4 21 As we will explain, the facts of this case, like those in Lebrón-Cepeda, do not require us to resolve the question whether the intent element for carjacking must be measured at the commencement of a prolonged carjacking. Accordingly, we will simply assume without deciding that the defendants' view of the issue is correct. 22