Opinion ID: 765610
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Auch's Remaining Contentions

Text: 11 At oral argument, Auch conceded that he failed to preserve the remaining issues for appeal by making contemporaneous objections at trial. Absent such objections, we review a defendant's claims for plain error. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732-37, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1776-79 (1993) (describing the plain error standard); United States v. Wihbey, 75 F.3d 761, 770 & n.4 (1st Cir. 1996). We will not reverse a conviction on plain error review unless the error affects the substantial rights of the defendant. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). We cannot find that an error has affected the defendant's substantial rights unless it is clear that the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. See Olano, 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S. Ct. at 1777-78. Given our conclusion above that the government's evidence against Auch was overwhelming and even the prosecutor's serious error could not have affected the outcome of the trial, Auch's remaining allegations of error do not merit reversal under our more limited plain error review. Nevertheless, to the extent Auch has raised issues of substance, we will catalog and discuss his claims to reemphasize our teachings on these issues and to deter future prosecutorial misconduct. 9 See generally United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506-07, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1979 (1983) (prosecutorial misconduct that does not affect the defendant's substantial rights may not permit the guilty to go free simply to deter future misconduct).
12 A prosecutor may not place the prestige of the government behind a witness by making personal assurances about the witness'[s] credibility; nor may the prosecutor indicate that facts outside the jury's cognizance support the testimony of the government's witnesses. United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1207 (1st Cir. 1994). Auch argues that the prosecutor engaged in several instances of improper vouching during his closing argument, particularly with reference to Tracy, the government's primary witness. 13 First, Auch correctly points out that the prosecutor improperly injected his personal opinion of the evidence into his closing argument. See United States v. Smith, 982 F.2d 681, 684 & n.2 (1st Cir. 1993) (prosecutor's use of I think during closing argument was improper). The prosecutor in this case told the jury that [t]he only way I can even imagine ever acquitting this man of any of the charges is if you totally disbelieve Mr. Tracy as to everything he said about Mr. Auch. Although the prosecutor did not use the prohibited I think, language, the statement nonetheless conveyed a personal opinion to the jury and, therefore, was improper. 14 Second, Auch argues that the prosecutor's statements that Tracy had told the truth, that he had acted like an honest man, and that Tracy's life would be over if he had lied during the trial, constituted further illegal vouching. To the extent that the prosecutor's arguments referred to Tracy's motives to tell the truth, the argument falls within the accepted bounds and was entirely proper. See United States v. Dockray, 943 F.2d 152, 156 (1st Cir. 1991); United States v. Martin, 815 F.2d 818, 821-23 (1st Cir. 1987). The prosecutor's introduction of Tracy's plea agreement and his commentary on the dire consequences Tracy would face if he committed perjury during Auch's trial, therefore, do not constitute improper vouching. 15 Beyond that, however, many of the prosecutor's remarks may have crossed the line. The government concedes that the prosecutor's repeated statements to the effect that Tracy had acted like an honest man and had testified truthfully at least entered a gray area of impropriety. See United States v. Innamorati, 996 F.2d 456, 483 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting a hazy line between legitimate argument and improper vouching). Although some of the challenged statements fall into this gray area, assertions to the effect that Tracy had told the truth run afoul of the long-standing decisions of this court. See Wihbey, 75 F.3d at 772 (prosecutor's comment that government witness testified truthfully was improper); United States v. Meja-Lozano, 829 F.2d 268, 273 (1st Cir. 1987) (same). 10 We acknowledge that Auch's strategy at trial was to characterize Tracy and Connolly as witnesses who had lied to curry favor with the government and that the prosecutor's remarks came in response to defense counsel's attempts to portray the government's witnesses in the worst light. 11 See Meja-Lozano, 829 F.2d at 274 (giving the prosecutor greater leeway when improper vouching came in response to defense counsel's inflammatory statements). Nevertheless, a trespass by the defense [does not] give[] the prosecution a hunting license exempt from ethical restraints on advocacy. Capone, 683 F.2d at 586 (quoting Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314, 321 (1st Cir. 1968)). 16 Finally, Auch challenges the prosecutor's comments to the effect that if Tracy was willing to lie about Auch's involvement in the robbery to curry favor with the government, he would have concocted a more damaging story. 12 We found this type of comment to be beyond the bounds of proper argument in United States v. Manning, 23 F.3d 570 (1st Cir. 1994). In that case, the prosecutor said that if the government's witness really wanted to lie, there were a million little ways they could have given it to the Defendant but argued that the government's witnesses could not lie or exaggerate because they were bound by their oaths and the truth. Id. at 572. We held that this improper vouching, in combination with a number of additional prosecutorial missteps during closing arguments, required reversal. Id. at 575. We acknowledge that Manning is distinguishable because the relatively sparse evidence of the defendant's guilt on the charges at issue in Manning led us to question whether the prosecutor's misconduct had swayed the jury. Nevertheless, we find the comments at issue in this case indistinguishable from those in Manning in their impropriety, and prosecutors in this circuit should consider themselves well advised to strike such commentary from their repertoires. 17
18 A prosecutor must refrain from attempting to deflect the jury's attention from the narrow issue of the defendant's guilt or innocence; any attempt to foist onto the jury responsibility for the extra-judicial consequences of a not-guilty verdict is improper. United States v. Whiting, 28 F.3d 1296, 1302 (1st Cir. 1994). Auch contends that the prosecutor committed such a transgression by arguing that a not guilty verdict would result in the biggest day of Auch's life and that he would laugh all the way to the bank. 13 19 The government candidly admits that the prosecutor did not choose his words carefully in this portion of the closing argument. We find the prosecutor's lack of discretion particularly troubling in this instance because the comments came towards the end of the government's rebuttal and, as the last words that the jury heard from the trial attorneys, had great potential to cause prejudice. See Manning, 23 F.3d at 575 (emphasizing the significance of the timing of improper remarks to the jury). 20 Nevertheless, the prosecutor's ill-advised rhetoric or pained attempt at humor appears to have been relatively harmless in this instance. The majority of our cases that address a prosecutor's references to the extra-judicial consequences of a jury's verdict involve more sweeping arguments. Typical examples include a prosecutor's attempt to enlist the jurors in the war on drugs, see Arrieta-Agressot v. United States, 3 F.3d 525, 527 (1st Cir. 1993) ([T]he defendants are not soldiers in the army of good. They are soldiers in the army of evil, in the army which only purpose [sic] is to poison, to disrupt, to corrupt.), or a demand that the jury prevent the defendant from harming other victims, see Whiting, 28 F.3d at 1302 (exhort[ing] . . . the jurors not to 'let other kids be succored [sic] in by [the defendant's] flash, that cash, that deception'). In this case, the prosecutor's remarks were confined to how Auch would react if the jury rendered a verdict of not guilty. Although the remarks may have been calculated to excite the jury, invite a partisan response, and distract its attention from the only issue properly presented by this case: whether the evidence established [Auch's] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F.3d at 529-30, the prosecutor's remarks were not as far afield as those requiring reversal under the plain error standard.