Opinion ID: 1461215
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Radcliffe possessed a legally cognizable claim subject to the terms of the Release.

Text: Radcliffe next argues that the plain language of the Release does not encompass his qui tam claims against Purdue. Specifically, in paragraph 4 he released Purdue from  all liability to Employee for... claims ... which Employee ... ever had, may now have or hereafter can, shall or may have ... as of the date of the execution of this Agreement [August 1, 2005]. Response and Reply Br. of Appellant at 54. Radcliffe asserts that as of the date the Release was executed, he had no FCA claim against Purdue. As support for this proposition, he relies on the Supreme Court's statement in Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 773, 120 S.Ct. 1858, 146 L.Ed.2d 836 (2000), that [t]he FCA can reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim. In Radcliffe's view, no such assignment occurred until he filed his complaint under seal with the district court, which occurred after he signed the Release. We disagree. In Vermont Agency, the Supreme Court explained the three elements necessary to establish Article III standing. First, a plaintiff must establish that he suffered an `injury in fact' ... that is both `concrete' and `actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.' 529 U.S. at 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155, 110 S.Ct. 1717, 109 L.Ed.2d 135 (1990)). Second, he must establish causationa `fairly ... trace[able]' connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the defendant. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976)). Finally, he must demonstrate redressabilitya `substantial likelihood' that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 771, 120 S.Ct. 1858 (quoting Simon, 426 U.S. at 45, 96 S.Ct. 1917). Noting that in qui tam cases it is the government and not the relator that has sustained the injury-in-fact, the Vermont Agency Court held that a relator nonetheless possesses Article III standing to bring an FCA claim because the [FCA] `effect[s] a partial assignment of the Government's damages claim' and that assignment of the `United States' injury in fact suffices to confer standing on [the relator].' Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., ___ U.S. ___, 128 S.Ct. 2531, 2542, 171 L.Ed.2d 424 (2008) (quoting Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773, 774, 120 S.Ct. 1858). Thus, an adequate basis for the relator's suit for his bounty is to be found in the doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor. Vermont Agency, 529 U.S. at 773, 120 S.Ct. 1858 (emphasis added). In the course of its analysis the Supreme Court further explained that the statute gives the relator himself an interest in the lawsuit, and not merely the right to retain a fee out of the recovery. Thus, [the statute] provides that [a] person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government  § 3730(b). Id. at 772, 120 S.Ct. 1858. According to Radcliffe's own allegations, the government suffered an injury-in-fact caused by Purdue's deceptive marketing of OxyContin's 2:1 equianalgesic ratio from 1995 to 2005. Thus, once the government suffered an injury (and Radcliffe became aware of the fraud causing the injury), Radcliffe had a statutory claim, and the necessary legal standing as partial assignee, to file a qui tam lawsuit. [6] , [7] In short, he had an interest in the lawsuit regardless of when he opted to vindicate it. [8] The fact that Radcliffe chose not to file suit until after signing the Release does not negate the fact that he had the right to file suit beforehanda right he waived under the terms of the Release. See 6A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1545, pp. 351-353 (2d ed. 1990) ([W]hen there has been ... a partial assignment the assignor and the assignee each retain an interest in the claim and are both real parties in interest.). Because Radcliffe possessed a presently enforceable claim at the time he signed the Release, the plain terms of the Release encompassed his FCA claims.