Opinion ID: 2621092
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Claims Relating to the 1975 Murder of A.Z. Rogers

Text: As a factor in aggravation under section 190.3, factor (b), [8] the prosecution introduced evidence that in 1975, when defendant was about 13 years 9 months old, he murdered A.Z. Rogers. Defendant, along with his two friends, poured gasoline and threw a lighted match into the car in which Rogers was sleeping. After making inconsistent statements, defendant eventually confessed to detectives that he had set Rogers on fire. Because defendant was a minor, he was tried in juvenile court, which found defendant committed the second degree murder of Rogers and adjudged defendant to be a ward of the court. Defendant was subsequently committed to the CYA. Evidence of his juvenile adjudication was not submitted to the jury. Several witnesses testified regarding the circumstances of the 1975 murder. One witness testified she rescued the burning body of Rogers, who died from smoke inhalation and second and third degree burns over 95 percent of his body. A fire captain and a fire marshal who investigated the car fire both confirmed that the fire was not accidental, but that someone deliberately started it by using flammable fluid. Another witness said that she saw three people, including defendant, running away from the fire. Finally, Investigator Martin, who had interrogated defendant, testified that defendant confessed that he had thrown a lighted match into the car. At trial, defendant moved to exclude evidence of Rogers's murder on the ground that there was no clear proof that defendant knew the act's wrongfulness at the time he committed the act. Defendant also maintained that when he was interrogated he did not intelligently and knowingly waive his right to counsel, and that his confession was not voluntary. Denying defendant's motion to exclude the evidence, the trial court stated it was up to the jury to determine beyond a reasonable doubt whether defendant knew the wrongfulness of his act. However, the court granted defendant's request that it make a preliminary finding to determine whether defendant's 1975 confession was voluntary and thus admissible. (Evid.Code, § 402, subd. (b) [upon party's request in a criminal action, the court shall hear and determine the admissibility of defendant's confession outside the jury's presence].) The trial court determined that defendant's confession was voluntary, and that he had made an intelligent and knowing waiver of his right to counsel. Indeed, when the trial court subsequently denied defendant's automatic motion to reduce the death verdict (Pen.Code, § 190.4, subd. (e)), the court stated it was satisfied beyond any reasonable doubt that defendant knew the wrongfulness of Rogers's murder at the time he had committed it. On appeal, defendant argues that because there was no indication the juvenile court in 1975 found clear proof that defendant knew the wrongfulness of the murder, he lacked the capacity to commit the crime (Pen.Code, § 26); thus, evidence of Rogers's murder should not be considered criminal activity under Penal Code section 190.3, factor (b). As further support of his impaired understanding, defendant points out that at age 14 he was diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic with episodic violent behavior and borderline intelligence. Although the jury and trial court determined that defendant understood the wrongfulness of his act at the time of the 1975 murder, defendant maintains that it is inherently unfair and violates due process to make that determination nearly 16 years after the fact. Further, he argues that the trial court should have determined as a preliminary fact whether defendant knew the wrongfulness of his conduct before submitting evidence of Rogers's murder to the jury. (Evid.Code, § 403, subd. (a)(1).) Defendant also objects that the jury instructions were improper. We address each issue in turn. Although juvenile adjudications do not qualify as prior convictions under section 190.3, factor (c), and may not be admitted during the penalty phase, evidence of juvenile criminal conduct may be considered as an aggravating factor. Prior violent juvenile misconduct, regardless of conviction, may be admitted as evidence of criminal activity . . . which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence or the express or implied threat to use force or violence. (§ 190.3, factor (b); see also People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 862, 258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270.) Defendant, however, emphasizes the limitation of section 26. Section 26 provides in pertinent part: All persons are capable of committing crimes except those belonging to the following classes: [11] OneChildren under the age of 14, in the absence of clear proof that at the time of committing the act charged against them, they knew its wrongfulness. . . . (See In re Gladys R. (1970) 1 Cal.3d 855, 864, 83 Cal.Rptr. 671, 464 P.2d 127 [Section 26 embodies a venerable truth, which is no less true for its extreme age, that a young child cannot be held to the same standard of criminal responsibility as his more experienced elders].) However, the presumption of a minor's incapacity [may] be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence that the minor defendant knew the act's wrongfulness. ( In re Manuel L. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 229, 238, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 865 P.2d 718.) Although a minor's knowledge of wrongfulness may not be inferred from the commission of the act itself, the attendant circumstances of the crime, such as its preparation, the particular method of its commission, and its concealment may be considered. ( In re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 900, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.) Moreover, a minor's age is a basic and important consideration [citation], and, as recognized by the common law, it is only reasonable to expect that generally the older a child gets and the closer [he] approaches the age of 14, the more likely it is that [he] appreciates the wrongfulness of [his] acts. ( In re Cindy E. (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 393, 399, 147 Cal. Rptr. 812.) Defendant argued both at trial and on appeal that the juvenile file did not disclose the juvenile court's finding that defendant knew the wrongfulness of his conduct pursuant to section 26. Assuming that the juvenile court did not make an express on-the-record inquiry regarding the minor's knowledge of wrongfulness and that it was error not to do so, we find any error to be harmless. There was substantial evidence supporting the finding that defendant knew the wrongfulness of his conduct at the time of the 1975 murder. (See In re Paul C. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 43, 52, 270 Cal.Rptr. 369 [reviewing court views evidence in light most favorable to respondent and presumes the existence of every fact the trier may deduce from the evidence in support of juvenile court order].) Based on the circumstances that defendant was seen running away from the car, that defendant lied to Detective Lean about the cause of the fires on two occasions, and that defendant admitted to Investigator Martin that he struck a match and threw it in the car, the trial court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant appreciated the wrongfulness of his conduct. Defendant's flight from the scene and his conflicting statements to detectives constitute clear proof that defendant knew the wrongfulness of his act. ( In re Gregory S. (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 206, 212, 149 Cal.Rptr. 216.) Moreover, at the time of the murder defendant was nearly 14 years old, which makes it more likely that he understood the wrongfulness of his act. ( In re Cindy E., supra, 83 Cal.App.3d at p. 399, 147 Cal.Rptr. 812.) In view of the more stringent reasonable doubt standard the trial court used, we do not find persuasive defendant's unsupported contention that the trial court did not give due consideration to his mental illness and troubled past. (See In re Paul C, supra, 221 Cal.App.3d at p. 52, 270 Cal.Rptr. 369.) To the contrary, the trial court considered both as factors in mitigation. Indeed, we would find it difficult to conclude that a 13 year old would not know it is wrong to douse a man with gasoline and throw a lighted match. Noting that it is nearly impossible to recreate the mental state of a 13 year old 16 years later, defendant argues it is inherently unfair and violates due process that the jury and trial court here made this determination. We disagree. A trier of fact making a section 26 determination does not attempt to read the mind of the minor, but considers the objective attendant circumstances of the crime such as its preparation, the method of its commission, and its concealmentto determine whether the minor understood the wrongfulness of his or her conduct. ( In re Tony C, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 900, 148 Cal.Rptr. 366, 582 P.2d 957.) Reliance on circumstantial evidence is often inevitable when, as here, the issue is a state of mind such as knowledge. (Ibid.) Though deliberating nearly 16 years after Rogers's murder, the jury and trial court could ascertain the circumstances of the crime from the testimonial witnesses. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the trial court ensured that defendant received a fair hearing on this matter. The trial court submitted the question to the jury and also imposed a reasonable doubt standard, which is more stringent than a clear proof standard under section 26. { In re Manuel L., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 234, 27 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 865 P.2d 718.) The trial court itself also determined it was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant knew the wrongfulness of his conduct. We also reject defendant's related argument that the trial court should have determined that defendant's knowledge of wrongfulness was a preliminary fact that the trial court should have decided before submitting evidence of Rogers's murder to the jury. Assuming the trial court was required to do so, any failure by the court to make such finding as a preliminary fact, as defendant contends, was harmless because the trial court later determined that defendant had known the wrongfulness of the act. Defendant fails to point to any prejudice based on this evidentiary sequence. Indeed, a trial court has discretion to admit conditionally the proffered evidence . . . subject to evidence of the preliminary fact being supplied later in the course of the trial. (Evid.Code, § 403, subd. (b).) We reject defendant's unsupported claim that determining a minor's capacity under Penal Code section 26 should be considered the same as determining the admissibility of a confession as a foundational or preliminary fact. (Evid. Code, § 402, subd. (b) [upon a party's request, a court must first determine the admissibility of a confession or admission outside the presence and hearing of the jury].) Finally, we reject defendant's claim that the jury instructions were improper because they merely mirrored the language of section 26 and did not specifically instruct the jury to consider the attendant circumstances of the crime, or defendant's age, experience, and understanding. (See In re Marven C. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 482, 487, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 354.) The trial court instructed the jury to consider such things as flight after the crime, giving conflicting statements to investigating officers, and closeness to the age of 14. These considerations were entirely proper. { In re Gregory S., supra, 85 Cal.App.3d at p. 212, 149 Cal.Rptr. 216; In re Cindy E., supra, 83 Cal. App.3d at p. 399, 147 Cal.Rptr. 812.) Indeed, defendant did not request further amplification or explanation of these instructions. As such, defendant may not complain about these instructions on appeal. ( People v. Lang (1989) 49 Cal.3d 991, 1024, 264 Cal.Rptr. 386, 782 P.2d 627.) Although defendant failed to object at trial, he also contends the jury instruction was argumentative in the prosecution's favor. ( People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1067-1068, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388.) A jury instruction is argumentative when it is `of such a character as to invite the jury to draw inferences favorable to one of the parties from specified items of evidence.' [Citations.] (Ibid.) Although the instruction may have asked the jury to focus on evidence favorable to the prosecution, any error was harmless. Both the prosecution and defense counsel, during closing arguments at the penalty phase, emphasized factors beyond those enumerated in the instruction. For instance, defense counsel stressed defendant's troubled childhood, his diagnosis of paranoid schizophrenia, and his lack of parental guidance. In light of defense counsel's closing argument, which presented factors that defendant wanted the jury to consider, we do not find it reasonably likely that the jury applied the wrong criteria to determine whether defendant knew the wrongfulness of his conduct. (See People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 525-527, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.)
At defendant's request, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether defendant's 1975 confession to Rogers's murder was admissible. After hearing testimony from defendant and Detective Lean and Investigator Martin, who had questioned defendant in 1975 regarding Rogers's death, the trial court was satisfied that the Defendant made a voluntary, intelligent, and knowing waiver of his Constitutional rights, and that he voluntarily and intelligently and knowingly beyond a reasonable doubt consented to talk to the officers. Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to consider defendant's lack of education, lack of experience with the police, and his young age, which indicated defendant's confession was not a product of his free will and his intelligent and knowing waiver of his Fifth Amendment rights. Defendant also argues the failure to readvise him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (Miranda) during a subsequent interview renders his confession inadmissible under the Fifth Amendment. We will discuss each issue in turn by first beginning with the facts. On May 7, 1975, Detectives Lean and Christensen brought defendant and his friends Sylvester G. and Willis R.who were not arrested but under suspicion for Rogers's deathto the sheriffs department for questioning. Detective Lean testified that he advised defendant, without defendant's mother or an attorney present, of his rights under Miranda. Defendant waived his rights. Defendant then gave at least two inconsistent versions of what had happened. First, defendant told Detective Lean he last saw Rogers when Rogers was smoking a cigarette underneath the hood of his car. Defendant later found out from Sylvester G. that Rogers's car had caught on fire, presumably from Rogers's cigarette. During a second interview, after Detective Lean revealed that arson investigators determined the fire originated from inside the car and not from under the hood, defendant gave a different version of the facts. Defendant told Detective Lean that he and Sylvester G. were siphoning gas from Rogers's car when, while horsing around, defendant threw the gas can at Sylvester G., and it landed in Rogers's car. The car caught on fire after defendant accidentally knocked a cigarette out of Sylvester G.'s hand into the car. To better communicate with defendant, Detective Lean asked Investigator Martin, who was a Black male, to interview defendant. In the meantime, Detectives Lean and Christensen stepped out of the room. Detective Lean went out about 5:00 p.m. to get dinner for defendant and his friends. Investigator Martin did not readvise defendant of his rights because he was advised that the sheriffs office had already done that. After defendant gave another inconsistent version of the facts, Investigator Martin told defendant he did not believe that defendant was being honest. Investigator Martin emphasized that Rogers was a nice man and didn't deserve to die that way, and that this was something that was horrible and won't go away. Defendant then admitted that he threw gas into the back seat of Rogers's car where Rogers was sleeping, struck a match, and threw it into the car, igniting a fire. Afterwards, defendant went home and was feeling real bad. Defendant told Investigator Martin he did this because Rogers had slapped him after he had tried to take Rogers's watch. Detective Lean testified that after he read defendant his Miranda rights from a department-issued card, he asked whether defendant understood these rights and [h]aving these rights in mind, do you wish to talk to us now? Without any overt hesitation, defendant replied yes, and did not express any confusion over the rights read to him. Detective Lean also testified that before interviewing juveniles, he takes great care to ensure that they understand each right read; he tells them that he is open to questions, and that he will stop at any time they do not understand any wording and will explain it to them. Detective Lean took the same care before interviewing defendant. Defendant did not ask any questions, nor did he appear emotionally upset either before or during the interview. Detective Lean did not recall that defendant said he wanted to call his mother during the interview. Moreover, in his interview with defendant, Investigator Martin noted that defendant was mentally alert, relaxed, attentive, and that [i]t was obvious that he understood what was going on. Investigator Martin was not asked whether defendant had requested to call his mother during his interview with defendant. Defendant testified on his own behalf. He recalled telling detectives that Sylvester G. tried putting gas in Rogers's carburetor, but they both left after the car would not start. He also admitted he gave three or four different stories regarding what happened on April 28 because he was told Sylvester G. and Willis R. had made statements and he was confused. However, he denied telling detectives that he and Sylvester G. were splashing each other with gas, which landed in the car, or that he was wrestling with Sylvester G. and accidentally flipped a cigarette into the car, causing the fire. He also testified that he was afraid in the interviews; that although he was read his rights under Miranda, he did not know what Constitutional rights, exercising these rights, lawyer, and having a lawyer appointed meant. Defendant also asserted he did not know he was not required to answer the detectives' questions. Contrary to Detective Lean's testimony, defendant testified that he was denied his request to talk to his mother before and after he gave his statement.
A minor has a Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, which precludes admission of a minor's confession obtained without the minor's voluntary, intelligent, and knowledgeable waiver of his or her constitutional rights. ( In re Gault (1967) 387 U.S. 1, 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527; People v. Burton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 375, 383-384, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793.) To determine whether a minor's confession is voluntary, a court must look at the totality of circumstances, including the minor's age, intelligence, education, experience, and capacity to understand the meaning and consequences of the given statement. ( In re Charles P. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 768, 771, 184 Cal. Rptr. 707; see also hi re Eduardo G. (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 745, 756-757, 166 Cal.Rptr. 873.) The decision to confess cannot be of itself an indicium of involuntariness in the complete absence of coercive circumstances. ( In re Reginald B. (1977) 71 Cal.App.3d 398, 405, 139 Cal. Rptr. 465.) A court should look at whether the minor was exposed to any form of coercion, threats, or promises of any kind, trickery or intimidation, or that he was questioned or prompted by . . . anyone else to change his mind. ( In re Frank C. (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 708, 714, 188 Cal. Rptr. 68.) On appeal, a reviewing court looks at the evidence independently to determine whether a defendant's confession was voluntary, but will uphold the trial court's findings of the circumstances surrounding the confession if supported by substantial evidence. { People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576, 79 Cal.Rptr.2d 816, 967 P.2d 29; see also In re Anthony J. (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 962, 971, 166 Cal. Rptr. 238 [burden to establish whether accused's statements are voluntary is greater if the accused is a juvenile rather than an adult].) However, if there is conflicting testimony on whether a defendant waived his Miranda rights, we must accept that version of events which is most favorable to the People, to the extent that it is supported by the record. ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 300, 168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149.) We agree that defendant's confession was voluntary and followed a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda rights. Detective Lean's testimony, which the trial court clearly credited, supported the court's finding that defendant intelligently and knowingly waived his rights before voluntarily confessing. Indeed, neither Detective Lean's nor Investigator Martin's testimony was `inherently so improbable as to be unworthy of belief.' ( Flowers v. State Personnel Bd. (1985) 174 Cal.App.3d 753, 759, 220 Cal.Rptr. 139.) We find the record supports the trial court's finding that defendant intelligently and knowingly waived his Miranda rights before voluntarily confessing. We also reject defendant's contention that his young age and low intelligence precluded him from making a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver. `Neither a low I.Q. nor any particular age of minority is a proper basis to assume lack of understanding, incompetency, or other inability to voluntarily waive the right to remain silent under some presumption that the Miranda explanation was not understood.' ( In re Brian W. (1981) 125 Cal.App.3d 590, 603, 178 Cal. Rptr. 159 [15-year-old defendant had an IQ of 81 and the mental age of an 11 or 12 year old].) Although defendant was less than 14 years old (and subsequent to the interviews was diagnosed a paranoid schizophrenic), he participated in his conversations with detectives, and indeed was keen enough to change his story when Detective Lean revealed that the fire originated from inside the car. Both Detective Lean and Investigator Martin testified that defendant expressed no confusion either before or during the interview. Also, defendant's claim that the trial court failed to consider his lack of encounters with the police is undermined by the subsequent witness testimony that defendant received various citations and warnings from the police before 1975. Thus, apart from defendant's trial testimony, the record does not demonstrate that defendant failed to understand or waive his rights. We do not find persuasive defendant's claim that Investigator Martin, who is Black, was used to employ a Black cop/White cop (i.e., good guy/bad guy) tactic to elicit an incriminating statement from defendant. It is true that Detective Lean stated it would be helpful that as an older Black man, Investigator Martin might better communicate with the young Black defendant. However, nothing suggests that Investigator Martin unduly influenced defendant. Indeed, the trial court noted it was not impressed by the fact that Mr. Martin at one point questioned the witness. Thus, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that no extraordinary procedures were used in interviewing defendant.
Defendant argues that he requested to speak to his mother during the interview, thus asserting his Fifth Amendment right. ( People v. Rivera (1985) 41 Cal.3d 388, 394, 221 Cal.Rptr. 562, 710 P.2d 362; People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at pp. 383-384, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793; but see People v. Hector (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 228, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 469.) Defendant testified that he told a detective that he wanted to speak to his mother and that she did not have a phone, to which the detective replied, `Something to [sic ] it was around dinner time and I would have to wait.' Although Detective Lean testified that he did not recall defendant asking to call his mother, defendant maintains he made his request to Investigator Martin who performed a portion of the interview. Defendant has waived this claim by raising it for the first time on appeal. ( People v. Raley, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 892, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712.) Notions of fairness and practicality require that the prosecution be given an opportunity to argue this issue during trial. Without such objection, the parties could not develop the issue or further examine witnesses. Indeed, apart from defendant's self-serving testimony at trial, there was no evidence that defendant in fact requested to talk to his mother during the interview. Detective Lean testified that he did not recall that he or Detective Christensen told defendant he would have to wait before he called his mother. He also testified it was his custom and habit when juveniles requested to speak to their parents or any blood relative, that it was like asking for an attorney and we were to stop our interview at that point. However, he did not recall that being done. To the extent defendant's request was made to Investigator Martin, defendant did not question the investigator at trial whether defendant asked him if he could talk to his mother, nor did defendant testify that he made his request to Investigator Martin. Further, defendant inconsistently testified that he both did and did not continue to talk to the detective after he requested to talk to his mother, which tended to undermine his credibility on this issue. Indeed, as the Attorney General observes, the request that defendant allegedly made to Investigator Martin would have occurred after defendant had given several different versions of the events to detectives, i.e., when Detective Lean went to get dinner for the juveniles around 5:00 p.m. Given that defendant talked to detectives for an extended time without requesting to talk to his mother, [t]here is no indication . . . that appellant's request to see his mother, must `be construed to indicate that the minor suspect desire[d] to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege.' ( People v. Maestas (1987) 194 Cal.App.3d 1499, 1509, 240 Cal.Rptr. 360, quoting People v. Burton, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 384, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793.) In short, because defendant failed to raise his claim at trial that defendant's request to speak to his mother constituted an invocation of his Fifth Amendment right, we are left with an incomplete record. Thus, we cannot speculate to facts that would have given rise to defendant's claim.
Detective Lean read defendant his Miranda rights at 12:30 p.m. on May 7, 1975, and Investigator Martinwho was advised the sheriffs office had already read defendant his rightsdid not readmonish defendant approximately five hours later prior to conducting the interview in which defendant confessed. The trial court found that Investigator Martin was not required to readmonish defendant of his rights. Defendant claims a violation of his rights under Miranda, and the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution because he was not readvised of his rights prior to Investigator Martin's subsequent interrogation. If a defendant is subsequently interrogated, readvisement is unnecessary where the subsequent interrogation is `reasonably contemporaneous' with the prior knowing and intelligent waiver. [Citations.] The courts examine the totality of the circumstances, including the amount of time that has passed since the waiver, any change in the identity of the interrogator or the location of the interview, any official reminder of the prior advisement, the suspect's sophistication or past experience with law enforcement, and any indicia that he subjectively understands and waives his rights. [Citations.] ( People v. Mickle (1991) 54 Cal.3d 140, 170, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290 [readvisement unnecessary where defendant twice received and twice waived Miranda rights 36 hours before].) The approximately five hours that had elapsed did not reduce the effectiveness of defendant's initial waiver, particularly where defendant was mentally alert, spoke freely, and understood what was going on in the subsequent interrogation. Defendant also remained in the same room for the ongoing interviews with the detectives and investigator. Moreover, there was some evidence that defendant had prior experience with police based on citations and warnings he received from the police before 1975. Contrary to defendant's suggestion, the fact that defendant was a minor did not in and of itself require the police to readvise the defendant of his Miranda rights if the defendant had previously made a knowing and intelligent waiver. ( In re Frank C, supra, 138 Cal.App.3d at p. 714, 188 Cal. Rptr. 68 [on the record before us there is no reason to assume the minor did not understand [his Miranda rights] when first given to him or he had already forgotten the admonitions of an hour before or that he had invoked his rights or he did not understand he had already invoked them or he did not understand he was waiving them].) Moreover, although Detectives Lean and Christensen and Investigator Martin took turns interviewing defendant, this change in the identities of the interrogators does not alter the reasonably contemporaneous nature of the subsequent interrogation, which was part of an ongoing and cooperative process. Thus, we conclude that under the totality of the circumstances, the detectives were not required to readvise defendant of his Miranda rights in a subsequent interrogation which we find was `reasonably contemporaneous' with defendant's initial knowing and intelligent waiver. ( People v. Mickle, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 170, 284 Cal.Rptr. 511, 814 P.2d 290.)