Opinion ID: 589967
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Ultimate Likelihood of Confusion

Text: 75 Having reviewed the district court's findings with regard to the Polaroid factors, we now engage in a de novo balancing of those factors in order to determine whether McNeil's use of the Tylenol PM trade dress is likely to cause confusion among consumers because of its similarity to the Excedrin PM trade dress. See Murphy, 923 F.2d at 928. 76 Although the overall trade dress of Excedrin PM strongly identifies the product with a particular source, it does so largely because the word Excedrin is emblazoned over almost half the package. The Tylenol PM trade dress differs significantly from the Excedrin PM trade dress in that it does not include the word Excedrin. The absence of the name Excedrin from McNeil's product is a significant difference. Additionally, that absence is replaced by a different prominent name. The origin-indicating name Tylenol appears at least as prominently on the Tylenol PM trade dress as does Excedrin on the Excedrin PM trade dress. McNeil did not appropriate the aspect of the Excedrin PM trade dress that most strongly indicates the origin of the product and McNeil supplied the Tylenol PM trade dress with a marking that strongly indicated that the product emanated from a different source. 77 Even McNeil's bad faith in adopting many elements of the Excedrin PM trade dress does not alter that conclusion. Absence of good faith, like the other Polaroid factors, is not by itself dispositive in any given case. See Centaur Communications, 830 F.2d at 1228 ( '[I]f comparison of the [marks] reveals no fair ... issue concerning the likelihood of confusion, then intent to copy, even if found from the proffered evidence, would not establish a Lanham Act violation.' ) (quoting Warner Brothers v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231, 247 (2d Cir.1983)). The prominent placement of the Tylenol name goes far toward countering any suggestion that McNeil intended to confuse its customers as to the source of its product. We believe that even low involvement consumers will have a hard time missing the famous names that form the most prominent feature of the trade dress in each case. It is thus not surprising that Bristol was unable to present any meaningful evidence of actual confusion between the two products. 78 We do not mean to intimate that the distinctive elements of any trade dress may be freely appropriated as long as the junior user clearly identifies the source of the goods. In many cases, the distinctive elements of a trade dress may themselves be eligible for trademark protection. In other cases the trade name may be a less dominant feature of the entire trade dress and thus have less force in countering other similarities between two trade dresses. Also, the junior user's trade name may less strongly identify a particular source than the Tylenol name at issue here. 79 In this case, however, the trade name is the most prominent and distinctive feature in each of the two trade dresses. The fact that they each are nationally prominent names and are different on the respective packages outweighs the evidence that tends to demonstrate a likelihood of confusion. 80 Because there is no likelihood of confusion between these two products resulting from any similarities in their overall trade dress, we are left with a  'definite and firm conviction,'  see Standard & Poor's, 683 F.2d at 708, that the district court erred in preliminarily enjoining McNeil from marketing Tylenol PM in the proposed trade dress. Thus we reverse the decision to grant preliminary relief on the Lanham Act claim.III. STATE UNFAIR COMPETITION CLAIMS 81 The district court also enjoined McNeil's use of its trade dress on the basis of New York and Florida common law of unfair competition. In order to prevail under New York law, a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of confusion between the two products. See Coach Leatherware, 933 F.2d at 169. Similarly, likelihood of confusion is a necessary element of an unfair competition claim under Florida law. See American Bank of Merritt Island v. First American Bank and Trust, 455 So.2d 443, 445-46 (Fla. Dist. Ct.App.), review denied, 461 So.2d 114 (Fla.1984). As we have determined with regard to the Lanham Act claim, there is no likelihood of consumer confusion arising from McNeil's use of the Tylenol PM trade dress. Therefore, Bristol is not entitled to relief under its common law unfair competition theory. 82 Bristol also claims on appeal that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction, notwithstanding absence of confusion, under New York state common law under a theory of misappropriation. Bristol seizes on our language in Flexitized, Inc. v. National Flexitized Corporation, 335 F.2d 774, 781-82 (2d Cir.1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 913, 85 S.Ct. 899, 13 L.Ed.2d 799 (1965), to the effect that New York law will prevent a party from misappropriating  'the results of the skill, expenditures and labors of a competitor.'  Id. at 781 (citations omitted). Bristol claims that the district court's finding of bad faith, without more, entitles it to relief under this theory. 83 We disagree. In Flexitized, we were faced with one party that had appropriated the name of another. Relief was unavailable under the Lanham Act because the name Flexitized was deemed descriptive and had not acquired secondary meaning. Because the appropriating party had exhibited bad faith and because the name had acquired some familiarity among the consuming public, we held that use of the name constituted unfair competition. We later clarified that this misappropriation theory still requires some confusion, if not as to source at least as to sponsorship or permission. See American Footwear Corp., 609 F.2d at 662. That type of confusion has not been demonstrated here. 84 More troubling is the application of New York law to Bristol's request to enjoin use of the PM mark. New York law, unlike federal law, does not conclusively presume that there is no likelihood of confusion if a descriptive mark has not acquired secondary meaning. See Coach Leatherware, 933 F.2d at 169. Although it may be very difficult to show a likelihood of confusion where the senior mark is not associated in the public mind with a particular producer, under New York law it is not impossible. The district court did not analyze the Polaroid factors with regard to the use of the PM designator and thus we can make no determination to that effect. We note only that, under New York law, an absence of secondary meaning in a descriptive mark does not necessarily result in defeat for the owner. The district court should consider this issue in the first instance.