Opinion ID: 1645418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: whether in the absence of a will and immediately upon mazie's death, connie inherited clear title to the property which she could effectively convey to any third party willing to accept it.

Text: ¶ 9. The Faulkners argue that the chancellor and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the death of an owner of land creates a gap in the chain of title which renders it unmerchantable until there is an administration of the estate or an adjudication of heirship. They assert that in the absence of a will, title to the real estate immediately vested in Connie, as the sole heir, under the laws of descent and distribution. The Faulkners state that they had no reason to know or suspect that a will existed; and that a title examination would not have revealed any more information than they already knew. This Court has stated [i]t would appear that there is no requirement that a suit to establish heirship must be brought at all. Such an interpretation seems reasonable when one remembers that title to the decedent's property automatically vests in his lawful heir or heirs upon his death without instituting any legal proceedings. In re McLeod; Craft v. Price, 506 So.2d 289, 291 (Miss.1987). When any person shall die seized of any estate of inheritance in lands, tenements, and hereditaments not devised, the same shall descend to his or her children, and their descendants, in equal parts.... Miss.Code Ann. § 91-1-3 (Rev. 2004). Absent a will, Connie would have taken title to the property via intestate succession, and a title examination would not have revealed anything more to the Faulkners. ¶ 10. The Faulkners also argue that they acted reasonably in relying on Connie's apparent ownership, since all they knew was that Connie was Mazie's sole heir and that no estate had been opened, nor will admitted to probate, in the twelve years since Mazie's death. They further assert that the doctrines of laches and estoppel bar Thomas Karl from probating the will twelve years after Mazie's death and after they changed their position in reliance on the fact that Mazie died intestate. As a matter of public policy and at common law a person in possession of a will, after testator's death, has a duty to produce and file it with the proper parties or court. In re Stoball's Estate, 211 Miss. 15, 50 So.2d 635, 639 (1951). In Stoball's Estate, Stoball's neighbor, Prather, concealed the existence of Stoball's will after his death. When Prather later attempted to probate the will, this Court held: Prather's wilful concealment of the will and its terms, and his failure to record his deeds from the devisees were the causes of the change of position by Mullins in reliance on the misleading, fraudulent, and wrongful acts of Prather. Prather is estopped under these facts from probating the will, and, since Prather claims the entire interest devised under the will, the estoppel extends to any rights which might accrue under it. The elements of equitable estoppel must be considered in the light of all the peculiar circumstances of this case, and of a balancing of the equities of the respective parties. Id. at 639-40. Although our case law provides that there is no statute of limitations on probating a will, Belt v. Adams, 125 Miss. 387, 87 So. 666, 668 (1921), a will proponent may be estopped from procuring probate where there was fraudulent conduct or long delay in propounding the will for probate during which property of the estate was transferred to subsequent purchasers for value and without notice of the will. Id. at 640, 87 So. 666. See Logan v. Smith, 229 Miss. 513, 516-517, 91 So.2d 707 (1956) (one daughter of the testator estopped to probate will where she and her siblings previously gave sworn testimony that they were heirs-at-law and no will existed). ¶ 11. When considering, inter alia, the sworn affidavits of Hilda Denne and Alvin Roy Wright, Jr., the sworn deposition testimony of Thomas Karl, Connie, Lonnie Faulkner and Zachary Faulkner, real estate tax receipts, and the will and the deeds, all of which were submitted as part of the summary judgment proceedings, it becomes readily apparent that the chancellor erred in granting summary judgment when there were genuine issues of material fact, such as the delay in probating the will; whether Thomas Karl should be estopped to probate the will twelve years after Mazie's death; whether Connie had actual knowledge of the will and its provisions; whether the Faulkners acted reasonably in relying on Connie's apparent ownership; whether the will created a trust and/or conveyed a life estate to Connie; whether Connie had the capacity to execute a deed; whether Connie was under undue influence at the time she executed the deed; and, whether the conduct of any of the parties was fraudulent. For all of these reasons, we find this issue to have merit.