Opinion ID: 151297
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant Travis Hawkins

Text: Hawkins raises four challenges to his sentence, arguing the district court erred in (1) imposing an enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1; (2) denying him a downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1; (3) imposing a 2-level enhancement for use of a minor under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4; and (4) applying the cross reference in U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1.
The sentencing guidelines provide for a two-level enhancement if the district court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that `the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice during the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the instant offense of conviction.' United States v. Molina, 172 F.3d 1048, 1058 (8th Cir.1999) (quoting U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1). Additionally, the obstructive conduct must relate to the defendant's offense of conviction and any relevant conduct, or a closely-related offense. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. For example, the enhancement may apply to a defendant who unlawfully influences a witness or suborns, or attempts to suborn, perjury. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. (n. 4(a) & 4(b)). We review the sentencing court's factual findings regarding obstruction of justice and acceptance of responsibility for clear error. We extend great deference to the sentencing court's decision to grant an enhancement for obstruction of justice.... United States v. Calderon-Avila, 322 F.3d 505, 507 (8th Cir.2003) (citations omitted). The district court imposed the obstruction enhancement for two independent reasons. First, the court found that during the investigation, Hawkins told law enforcement he attended a party the night of the robbery and lied to law enforcement about the time he left the party. Hawkins complains that such a statement could not be material to the investigation. However, the court also found that Hawkins gave his brother, who testified before the grand jury, false information about when he left the party. On these facts, the court concluded that Hawkins attempted to influence his brother into misrepresenting Hawkins's whereabouts during the robbery. The court found this conduct material to the offense of conviction because it provided Hawkins an alibi. The court viewed Hawkins's conduct as attempting to unlawfully influence a witness and attempting to suborn perjury. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, cmt. (n. 4(a) & 4(b)). Hawkins does not specifically challenge this reason for the enhancement. Upon review of the record, we conclude the district court did not clearly err. [4]
A sentencing court should decrease an offense level by two levels if the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. Whether the defendant accepted responsibility is a factual question that depends largely on credibility assessments made by the sentencing court. This Court gives great deference to the district court's denial of a request for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility and reviews the decision for clear error. United States v. Long Soldier, 431 F.3d 1120, 1122-23 (8th Cir.2005) (citations omitted). A defendant bears the burden of demonstrating entitlement to a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. Peters v. United States, 464 F.3d 811, 812 (8th Cir.2006). Where a defendant has obstructed justice, it is the extraordinary case where a defendant may receive an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. (n.4). The district court found that Hawkins had not met his burden to prove he accepted responsibility. The court recognized that Hawkins pleaded guilty but noted that Hawkins presented no evidence that he assisted the criminal investigation and did not admit his obstructive conduct, but rather maintained that he did not engage in any obstructive conduct. The court thus found that Hawkins did not present the extraordinary case in which a defendant may qualify for a reduction for acceptance of responsibility while at the same time being subject to an enhancement for obstruction of justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. (n.4). The court also found a second independent reason to deny Hawkins the adjustment: in his plea agreement he stipulated to the upward adjustment for use of a minor but then at sentencing argued that the enhancement should not apply. Hawkins contends that because the court erred giving the obstruction of justice enhancement, that enhancement cannot support denial of a reduction for acceptance of responsibility. But as previously explained, the court did not so err. Generally, conduct resulting in an enhancement for obstruction of justice indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. United States v. Waldner, 580 F.3d 699, 708 (8th Cir.2009). We agree with the district court that Hawkins's circumstances do not present an extraordinary case, see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. (n.4), warranting a reduction for acceptance of responsibility while at the same time warranting an enhancement for obstruction of justice. [5]
A sentencing court should increase a defendant's offense level by two levels if the defendant used or attempted to use a person less than eighteen years of age to commit the offense or assist in avoiding detection of, or apprehension for, the offense. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4. The commentary states that used or attempted to use includes directing, commanding, encouraging, intimidating, recruiting or soliciting. Id. § 3B1.4, cmt. (n. 1). A defendant must affirmatively involve or incorporate the minor into the commission of the offense. United States v. Mentzos, 462 F.3d 830, 841 (8th Cir.2006). We review de novo the district court's application of § 3B1.4, and its findings of fact for clear error. United States v. Paine, 407 F.3d 958, 963 (8th Cir.2005) (affirming application of U.S.S.G. § 3B1.4 against a father who asked his son to accompany him on a robbery). Here, the probation office determined the use-of-a-minor enhancement should not apply. But the district court disagreed. The court found that grand jury testimony established that Hawkins hatched the robbery plan, and actively recruited a minor who was not an equal partner in the offense. Hawkins contends that the use-of-a-minor enhancement is not warranted under the presentence report's recitation of facts. However, the district court did not rely on the facts in the presentence report, but rather on its own factual findings. Hawkins has not established that these findings are clearly erroneous. Next, Hawkins asks this court to follow the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Butler, 207 F.3d 839 (6th Cir. 2000), in which two judges on the panel held that the use-of-a-minor enhancement does not apply to defendants who committed their crimes when less than twenty-one years old (Hawkins was twenty years old when he committed this crime). Id. at 849. But in United States v. Ramirez, 376 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir.2004), this court expressly disagreed with Butler. See also United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d 1147, 1158-59 (10th Cir.2003) (disagreeing with Butler ); United States v. Ramsey, 237 F.3d 853, 855-858 (7th Cir.2001) (same); United States v. Murphy, 254 F.3d 511, 512-13 (4th Cir.2001) (same). Because our court has already disagreed with Butler, Hawkins's argument fails under the prior panel rule. See United States v. Lovelace, 565 F.3d 1080, 1085 (8th Cir.2009) (This panel is bound by Eighth Circuit precedent, and cannot overrule an earlier decision by another panel.).
Generally, U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 applies to defendants convicted of firearms charges. That guideline establishes a base offense level of 18. But where a defendant used or possessed a firearm ... in connection with the commission or attempted commission of another offense, § 2K2.1(c), directs sentencing courts to apply U.S.S.G. § 2X1.1 if the resulting offense level is greater than the offense level under § 2K2.1. Here, the district court determined that Hawkins used a firearm in connection with robbery. The base offense level for robbery is 20. U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1. Thus the district court concluded that under § 2X1.1, Hawkins's base offense level should be 20 instead of 18. Hawkins challenges the application of this cross-over provision of the guidelines by relying on the dissent in United States v. Smith, 997 F.2d 396, 398 (8th Cir.1993) (Bright, J., dissenting). This judge stands by his view expressed in Smith, but this dissenting view is not the law and the district court did not err in this respect. See Lovelace, 565 F.3d at 1085. In light of Hawkins's youth and lack of an extensive criminal history, Hawkins's sentence may be considered quite harsh. However, he initiated the plan to steal the diamond ring, and made possible entry into the victims' home by misuse of a security access code he acquired while dating the victims' minor daughter. At sentencing, the wife explained the impact of this crime on her family: sleepless weeks, taking additional mortgages to purchase extensive home security equipment, and living with bells and whistles going off all the time. Thus the nature of the crime and its effect on the victims justifies strong punishment.