Opinion ID: 815314
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Common Issue: Voir Dire

Text: Mr. Tavares and Mr. Jones each have nicknames. Mr. Tavares’s is “Stallion” or “Young Stallion”; Mr. Jones’s is “Young Indian.” These nicknames were included on the docket sheet posted outside of the courtroom during jury selection. Voir dire of the prospective jurors lasted three days. At the beginning of the proceeding, the district court informed the jurors of the nature of the charges. The court then made some general inquiries to ascertain if any member of the venire had read or seen anything about the case or if any member was related to or knew the attorneys or witnesses. The court then pointedly admonished the prospective jurors that they were “under an order not to talk about the case” and not to “guess what the case is about beyond what” the court had told them.3 The court then undertook an individual examination of each prospective juror. Counsel were permitted an allotted time to question each prospective juror. During that questioning, defense counsel often inquired about the jurors’ views of pimps and prostitutes, and the relationship between the two. Defense counsel questioned some prospective jurors concerning their views about 3 R.292 at 23. -6- prostitutes who were minors. During this process, three prospective jurors reported that some members of the jury pool had discussed the district court’s instructions about the case and the significance of Mr. Tavares’s and Mr. Jones’s nicknames in the jury room. They also said that there had been speculation about the nature of the case. They reported that several prospective jurors had laughed and joked about the nicknames, including one comment that the nicknames might indicate gang membership. After listening to the jurors’ accounts and considering the argument of counsel, the district court denied Mr. Tavares’s motion to disqualify all jurors who had been in the jury room since the first report of discussion about the case and the nicknames. Mr. Tavares and Mr. Jones then asked to question prospective jurors who already had been preliminarily qualified. This request also was denied; the district court stated that it was not going to order the return of all preliminarily qualified jurors for additional questioning. It then explained that it was “fairly confident[] that all that was involved was speculation about what [the court’s] instructions were and speculation about what [the defendants’] nicknames meant.”4 The court also noted that, in any event, the nicknames would be revealed at trial and that the early revelation of the nicknames “pales [in comparison] to what [defense 4 R.294 at 75. -7- counsel] told the jurors” about the defendants’ work as pimps.5 When subsequent prospective jurors were called for examination, the district court asked each potential juror whether he or she had discussed the case. One prospective juror, who admitted to joking about the nicknames, was challenged for cause and dismissed. After empaneling the jury, the court gave a general instruction to the jurors not to discuss the case with anyone, including each other, until all evidence was presented. However, no specific instruction was given about the nicknames or the earlier discussions. Mr. Tavares and Mr. Jones submit that the district court’s response to the discussion of the defendants’ nicknames was inadequate. They maintain that the court committed reversible error when it refused to permit questioning of the entire jury pool. Alternatively, they contend that, upon learning of the discussion, the court should have dismissed the entire jury pool. The parties variously cast the problem presented here as one of juror taint on the theory that prospective jurors were exposed to material outside the record, or of premature deliberation because prospective jurors speculated among themselves about the significance of facts that eventually would be before them, if they were selected for service on the chosen jury. Neither of these characterizations is a precise description of the 5 Id. at 76. -8- rather unique situation that confronted the district court. In any event, choosing between these characterizations is not an essential part of the analytical task facing a district court, or this court, when dealing with juror misconduct. Our cases make clear that when faced with a non-frivolous allegation of any sort of juror misconduct, the district court must engage in a two-step analysis. See United States v. Diaz, 597 F.3d 56, 62-63 (1st Cir. 2010); United States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 52 (1st Cir. 2007). First, the court must determine whether misconduct occurred. If no misconduct occurred, no further action is required. “[M]isconduct allegations that are frivolous . . . do not trigger any duty of inquiry and do not require that a hearing be held.” United States v. Mikutowicz, 365 F.3d 65, 74 (1st Cir. 2004) (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, if any misconduct did occur, the court must proceed to “assess[] the magnitude and extent of any prejudice caused” and, if necessary, take remedial measures. Tejeda, 481 F.3d at 52. If no curative measures appear adequate, the court may grant a timely motion for mistrial. Id. We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s handling of juror misconduct. Diaz, 597 F.3d at 62.6 The 6 We cannot accept Mr. Tavares’s contention that the standard of review is de novo under United States v. Jadlowe, 628 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2010). Jadlowe involved review of the district court’s instruction to the jury, not its response to potential juror misconduct. Id. at 15. -9- fact-specific and often delicate task of assessing such situations, which often requires the assessment of witness credibility, counsels that a district court must “enjoy broad discretion in addressing potential juror misconduct.” Id. Therefore, “normally we will not reverse unless the judge’s choice among the various avenues available was patently unreasonable.” United States v. Lemmerer, 277 F.3d 579, 591 (1st Cir. 2002). Here, our colleague in the district court followed the process of assessment prescribed by our case law. The court undertook an examination of the rather unique circumstances surrounding the incident. The court realized that the misconduct took place at a very early stage of the proceedings and also gave appropriate weight to the fact that the defendants’ nicknames would indeed be before the yet-to-be selected jury as evidence during trial. Finally, the court determined that any harm caused by the discussion of the nicknames had been negated significantly by defense counsel’s own statements to jurors about Mr. Tavares’s and Mr. Jones’s activities. Having made this assessment, the district court determined that admonishing the empaneled jury not to discuss the case or to form ultimate conclusions until all evidence had been presented was the appropriate course. On the basis of our study of the trial transcript, we cannot accept the contention that the district court was obliged to conduct a more extensive inquiry. While not protracted, the -10- inquiry here was measured but sufficiently thorough. The court observed and evaluated firsthand the potential jurors’ reports of the jury-room discussions. It took note of the conversations’ content, the point in the proceeding when they took place and the fact that the matter discussed by the prospective jurors would be covered thoroughly at trial. The court then concluded that any harm from the violation of its initial instruction not to speculate about the trial could be cured by an appropriate cautionary instruction. This approach was certainly well within the options from which a thoughtful district court could be expected to choose, and we shall not second-guess the course taken by the court here.