Opinion ID: 78396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Police Officers

Text: Sarras claims the district court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to cross-examine law enforcement officers about the Sheriff Office's financial interest in the forfeiture of Sarras's house. [28] Sarras argues that the jury should have been allowed to learn that the Seminole County Sheriff's officethe agency these witnesses worked forstood to gain a significant amount of money should Mr. Sarras be convicted and the forfeiture be successful. [29] The extent to which a witness may be cross-examined for the purposes of showing bias rests on the sounds discretion of the trial judge. Howell v. Am. Live Stock Ins. Co., 483 F.2d 1354, 1357 (5th Cir. 1973). [30] The task of the trial judge is to balance the probative value of the evidence sought to be introduced against the risks its admission may entail. Id. (explaining that [t]he potential risks may include . . . the possibility of misleading or confusing the jury); see United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1006 (11th Cir.2001) (stating that a defendant is only entitled to cross-examine a witness if `the information sought to be elicited [is] relevant' (alteration in original) (citations and quotations marks omitted)). In Howell, we concluded that the trial court properly limited the impeachment of a witness because of [t]he possibility that the trial would become involved in a lengthy wrangle over a side issue. 483 F.2d at 1358. [W]hile we [were] not prepared to say that we [found] the proferred evidence wholly irrelevant,. . . we [were] unable to say that the district judge roamed beyond the bounds of his discretion in ruling as he did. Id. In this case, the district court likewise did not abuse its discretion. First, Sarras proffered no evidence showing any officer-witness had a direct or personal financial interest in the case. In fact, the officers' alleged interest in the case is best described as just the opposite: indirect, impersonal, and tenuous. This case is about child pornographynot forfeiture. To suggest that the officers were biased because the Sheriff's Office that employed them may have benefitted from a forfeiture is rank speculation. Such testimony had little, if any, probative value as to bias. Rather, such testimony had the potential to confuse the jury and distract it from the central issues, warranting the district court's exclusion. Sarras's reliance on United States v. Williams, 954 F.2d 668, 672 (11th Cir. 1992), is misplaced. That case involved a witness with a direct, personal, and substantial financial interest in the case. In Williams, the district court allowed the government informant to testify about how long he was a paid informant, the percentage (25%) he received of the seized assets, and the amount of money he was paid in that case. Id. at 671. However, the district court excluded testimony detailing the total amount of money the informant had received for his work as an informant because the sum was outrageous and therefore prejudicial. Id. at 671, 672 n. 3. That evidence included the fact that the informant had received $450,000 in reward money, including 25% of a $1,258,000 seizure (i.e.$314,500). We reversed, stating that the district court erred in excluding this evidence because [t]he jury has the right to know what may be motivating a witness, especially a government paid, regularly employed, informant-witness. Id. at 672. We noted that large and outrageous payments may be just the kind that are of the most help to the jury in arriving at the truth. Id. In reversing, this Court also emphasized that at trial, the informant testified that he did not expect to receive twenty-five percent of the possible $7.2 million involved in the transaction, which somewhat misled the jury in calculating his compensation. Id. Here, the law enforcement officers did not have a direct or personal financial interest in this case. If anything, Williams shows that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow defense cross-examination of the officers as to the forfeiture.