Opinion ID: 576719
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appellants' Rights

Text: 35 In applying strict scrutiny to the instant case, the threshold question is whether the appellees' exclusion of Duke from the Georgia Republican presidential primary ballot burdens rights of the appellants protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The majority identifies two particular rights that appellants allege were burdened by the state's action: the right of Duke to associate with the Republican Party, and the right of the voters to vote for Duke in the Republican primary. I agree with the majority that Duke does not have a right to associate with those who do not wish to associate with him. I disagree, however, with the majority's analysis of the other rights asserted by the appellants. 36 The majority errs on two levels. First, it mischaracterizes the rights appellants allege were infringed by the state's action, understating the scope of the right to vote and ignoring other related First Amendment rights directly implicated in the case. Second, it overlooks the significant burdens placed by the state on the exercise of these rights. 37
38 The majority maintains that the specific right alleged to be infringed in this case is not the right to vote but the right to vote for a particular candidate as a Republican in the presidential primary, and that such a right is at best attenuated. Although the absolute right to vote is not implicated in this case, the state's action implicates a series of equally fundamental First Amendment rights, raising questions of both free speech and equal protection. 39 The right to vote embraces not only a voter's access to the ballot, but also his access to alternative viewpoints and positions presented on that ballot. 4 As the Supreme Court noted in Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct. 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702 (1974), the right to vote is 'heavily burdened' if that vote may be cast only for one of two candidates in a primary election at a time when other candidates are clamoring for a place on the ballot. It is to be expected that a voter hopes to find on the ballot a candidate who comes near to reflecting his policy preferences on contemporary issues. 415 U.S. at 716, 94 S.Ct. at 1320. See also Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31, 89 S.Ct. 5, 11, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 793-94, 103 S.Ct. at 1572-73. 40 The First Amendment rights of a candidate and his or her supporters to associate for the advancement of their shared beliefs are also affected by the state's restriction of access to a primary ballot: 41 [T]he voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both and it is this broad interest that must be weighed in the balance. The right of a party or an individual to a place on the ballot is entitled to protection and is intertwined with the right of voters. 42 Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. at 716, 94 S.Ct. at 1320. See also Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 143, 92 S.Ct. at 855-56; Bellotti v. Connolly, 460 U.S. at 1062, 103 S.Ct. at 1513 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 43 Further, a candidate's individual right to seek party nomination or political office is implicated by the action of the state in this case. Although the Supreme Court has declined to recognize the right to candidacy as fundamental, see Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957, 102 S.Ct. 2836, 73 L.Ed.2d 508 (1982), the Court emphasized that state action affecting candidate ballot access rights deserves heightened scrutiny where the restriction unfairly or unnecessarily burdens 'the availability of political opportunity.'  Clements, 457 U.S. at 964, 102 S.Ct. at 2844 (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. at 716, 94 S.Ct. at 1320). 44 Where, as here, the state determines availability of political opportunity on the basis of ideology, such heightened scrutiny is appropriate. The state action in this case not only affects First Amendment freedoms but also the right to equal protection of those freedoms. See Police Department of the City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96-98, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 2290-2291, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972). [Q]ualification requirements that implicitly exclude controverted political positions are ... the most suspect. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 13-19 at 1100 n. 13. Similarly, the exclusion of Duke from access to the primary ballot on the explicit basis of his political philosophy and that of his adherents implicates the most cherished constitutional freedoms. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. at 143-144, 92 S.Ct. at 856 (holding that primary ballot access restrictions possessing a patently exclusionary character must be closely scrutinized). 45
46 Given the fundamental First Amendment rights affected by the state's action in this case, the next question is whether these rights are significantly burdened by the challenged state action. The majority holds that no such burden exists. I disagree. 47 The majority's analysis rests on the belief that because the appellant voters may support Duke as a third-party or write-in candidate in the primary election, or as a third-party, independent or write-in candidate in the November general election, they have alternate channels through which to exercise their First Amendment rights, and consequently are only incidentally burdened by the state's exclusion of Duke from the Republican primary ballot. This belief is erroneous in view of the restrictions placed on access to the primary system by Georgia law and controlling Supreme Court precedent. Georgia law provides as follows: 48 [A]s provided in this article, a presidential preference primary shall be held ... for each political party or body which has cast for its candidates for President and Vice President in the last presidential election more than 20 percent of the total vote cast for President and Vice President in the state.... 49 O.G.C.A. § 21-2-191. In view of the realities of our two-party system, the state restricts participation in the primary system to those individuals who qualify for the Republican and Democratic primaries. 50 Admittedly, Duke could run as a write-in candidate for the Republican nomination. The Supreme Court, however, has recognized that the opportunity to run as a write-in candidate is not an adequate substitute for having one's name printed on the ballot. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. at 799 n.26, 103 S.Ct. at 1575 n.26; accord, Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. at 719 n.5, 94 S.Ct. at 1321 n.5 ([A candidate] relegated to the write-in position would be forced to rest his chances solely upon those voters who would remember his name and take the affirmative step of writing it on the ballot.). 51 Thus, in light of the foregoing state law restrictions on primary participation, Duke's access to the primary process is effectively foreclosed by the state's exclusion of his name from the Republican ballot. 5 It is therefore indisputable that the appellants' rights to free political association and equal political opportunity have been burdened significantly by the state's action.