Opinion ID: 1038217
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: conclusion

Text: As plaintiffs have not been aggrieved by a Louisiana continuing tort, they have failed to bear their burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction. We therefore affirm the district court and leave for another day and another case the question whether, by continuing the accrual of a claim brought under the FTCA, a continuing tort may delay the commencement of that statute’s limitations period. trespass”—cases in which “prescription did not run until the trespass was abated”—the Cooper court held that prescription would not run until the flooding had subsided. Here, and unlike in Cooper, there has been no permanent flooding or any alleged drainage-related damage in the thirty years since the 1983 flood. The support that Cooper finds in Louisiana trespass cases does nothing to help plaintiffs here. 27 See Pracht v. City of Shreveport, 830 So. 2d 546, 550-51 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2002) (concluding that separate instances of flooding caused by the negligent maintenance of a drainage canal did not constitute a continuing tort); Roberts, 577 So. 2d at 311 (“[R]epeated instances of flooding caused by the negligent alteration of drainage are separate and distinct events which do not serve to interrupt prescription.”). 28 See Delaney v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22076, -10 (E.D. La. Mar. 4, 2011) (finding Louisiana’s continuing-tort doctrine inapplicable, as railroad’s negligent design and maintenance of a drainage ditch and culverts were not “overt, persistent and ongoing acts[,]” and the resulting instances of flooding were “merely the ill effects of the original, allegedly wrongful act”). 9