Opinion ID: 3040134
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: wards of the court doctrine

Text: Huseman attempts to bolster his arguments as to equitable tolling and equitable estoppel by arguing that the court should take into consideration his special status as a seaman and a “ward of the court.” This argument is unavailing because the “wards of the court” doctrine, while extending special protections to seamen under certain circumstances, does not impose a fiduciary duty on ship owners to serve as legal advisors to their employees, requiring them to provide unsolicited explanation of the availability of federal claims. [9] The “wards of the court” doctrine was created to account for the “special circumstances attending [the seaman’s] calling,” because the “seaman, while on his vessel, is subject to the rigorous discipline of the sea and has little opportunity to appeal to the protection from abuse of power which the law makes readily available to the landsman.” Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 430-31 (1939). “The physical conditions under which the seaman labors are extremely hazardous.” Cal. Home Brands, Inc. v. Ferreira, 871 F.2d 830, 837 (9th Cir. 1989). [10] Invocation of the “wards of the court” doctrine is to be linked to the specific policy reasons for its creation. For example, in Socony, the Court declined to apply the common law rule of assumption of risk, and instead used the rule of comparative negligence, because it recognized that seamen HUSEMAN v. ICICLE SEAFOODS 19919 are often in the unusual position of having to make quick decisions under hazardous circumstances using whatever equipment they are given. See 305 U.S. at 431-32. [11] For similar policy reasons, courts have applied the “wards of the court” doctrine in construing seamen’s contracts, particularly when they involve the release of rights. “Notably, we reserve our highest scrutiny for agreements under which a seaman releases the vessel owner of liability because of the understandable concern that such releases may leave the seamen devoid of legal redress.” Thorman v. Am. Seafoods Co., 421 F.3d 1090, 1096 (9th Cir. 2005). This approach accounts for the typical inequality of bargaining power between seamen and ship owner: The analogy . . . between seamen’s contracts and those of fiduciaries and beneficiaries remains, under the prevailing rule treating seamen as wards of admiralty, a close one. Whether the transaction under consideration is a contract, sale, or gift between guardian and ward or between trustee and cestui, the burden of proving its validity is on the fiduciary. He must affirmatively show that no advantage has been taken; and his burden is particularly heavy where there has been inadequacy of consideration. The wardship theory has, as was recognized by the courts below, marked consequence on the treatment given seamen’s releases. Such releases are subject to careful scrutiny. “One who claims that a seaman has signed away his rights to what in law is due him must be prepared to take the burden of sustaining the release as fairly made with and fully comprehended by the seaman.” Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239, 247-48 (1942) (quoting Harmon v. United States, 59 F.2d 372, 373 (5th Cir. 1932)). 19920 HUSEMAN v. ICICLE SEAFOODS [12] For purposes of this appeal, Huseman acknowledges that the paragraph explaining benefits in the Terms of Employment is not a contractual release of his rights. Nor could the Terms of Employment be construed as any kind of waiver or release of rights. Neither are there any colorable claims that the Terms of Employment are invalid or that Icicle has taken advantage of Huseman. Thus, the special scrutiny typically reserved for release of rights in seaman’s contracts cannot be extended to the circumstances here. See Thorman v. Am. Seafoods Co., 421 F.3d at 1096 (reserving the highest scrutiny for contracts in which seaman relinquish their rights); Orsini v. O/S Seabrooke O.N., 247 F.3d 953, 958-59 (9th Cir. 2001) (applying the “wards of the court” doctrine to a contract in which a seaman released his rights). [13] Neither does the “wards of the court” doctrine create a general fiduciary duty to inform Huseman of all his potential federal causes of action. In Thorman, a seaman wage calculation case, we rejected an effort to expand the “wards of the court” doctrine “to encompass a full-blown fiduciary relationship” that would “envelop aspects of the seaman-vessel owner relationship far beyond the release context.” 421 F.3d at 1097. The seaman argued that vessel owners had an affirmative duty to explain their precise compensation methodology or to disclose their financial calculations. Id. at 1098. We disagreed, holding that “[d]espite a long line of cases that describe seamen as ‘wards of the court’ needing special protections from potentially overreaching ship owners, the scope of these special protections is not unlimited and nothing supports Thorman’s effort to invoke a fiduciary duty that requires American Seafoods to disclose its specific pricing methodology.” Id. at 1096 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). [14] This is a case of a plaintiff waiting too long to file suit. There is no overreaching ship owner taking advantage of an isolated seaman. Huseman offers no specific evidence that he was misled, either by the Terms of Employment or by Icicle’s HUSEMAN v. ICICLE SEAFOODS 19921 conduct. He had ample opportunity to inquire about the possibility of federal benefits and even about federal maritime causes of action, such as Jones Act and unseaworthiness claims. Following Thorman, we decline to impose a general, all-encompassing fiduciary duty on ship owners to inform seamen of all potential federal claims and benefits and the process for securing them when the employee fails to make even a threshold inquiry.