Opinion ID: 1742113
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the court violated thomas' rights under the double jeopardy clause when he was found guilty of conspiracy.

Text: ¶ 13. Thomas urges this Court to reverse and render his conviction for conspiracy, as this conviction violates his double jeopardy rights. He asserts that the charge of conspiring to distribute a controlled substance was subsumed by the charges of transfer, sale, or distribution of a controlled substance. Thomas argues that the State should not have been allowed to proceed with the conspiracy charge given the directed verdicts on what he calls the substantive charges. ¶ 14. Double jeopardy embodies three separate constitutional protections. `It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal. It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction. And it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.' White v. State, 702 So.2d 107, 109 (Miss. 1997) ( quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. at 2076-77, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969) (footnotes omitted)). ¶ 15. This Court recently addressed the issue of double jeopardy in Cook v. State, 671 So.2d 1327 (Miss. 1996): The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads as follows, nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb. U.S. Const. amend. V. This proscription has been applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. McNeal v. Hollowell, 481 F.2d 1145, 1149 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951, 94 S.Ct. 1476, 39 L.Ed.2d 567 (1974) (citations omitted). Double jeopardy protection applies to successive prosecutions for the same criminal offense. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 694, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2855, 125 L.Ed.2d 556 (1993). The Supreme Court has also held that: In both the multiple punishment and multiple prosecution contexts, this Court has concluded that where the two offenses for which the defendant is punished or tried cannot survive the same-elements test, the double jeopardy bar applies... . The same-elements test, sometimes referred to as the  Blockburger  test, inquires whether each offense contains an element not contained in the other; if not, they are the same offence and double jeopardy bars additional punishment and successive prosecution. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 696, 113 S.Ct. at 2856 (citations omitted). In Dixon, the Court recognized that in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), it adopted an additional test that a subsequent prosecution must satisfy a `same-conduct' test to avoid the double jeopardy bar. Id. at 697, 113 S.Ct. at 2856. However, the Court concluded that  Grady must be overruled... . Grady lacks constitutional roots. The `same conduct' rule it announced is wholly inconsistent with earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law understanding of double jeopardy. Dixon, 509 U.S. at 704, 113 S.Ct. at 2860. Thus, as the Supreme Court has articulated, the rule is again the  Blockburger  or same-elements test. Id. at 1331. ¶ 16. `Conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to accomplish a lawful purpose unlawfully, the persons agreeing in order to form the conspiracy.' Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-1 (1972). Conspiracy is a complete offense in itself, distinct from the commission of the crime contemplated by the conspiracy and does not become merged with that crime... . The offense is complete without showing an overt act in the furtherance of the conspiracy. State v. Thomas, 645 So.2d 931, 933 (Miss. 1994)( quoting Davis v. State, 485 So.2d 1055, 1057-58(Miss. 1986)). As to the crime of transfer our statute states: (a) Except as authorized by this article, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly or intentionally: (1) To sell, barter, transfer, manufacture, distribute, dispense or possess with intent to sell, barter, transfer, manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance; ... Miss. Code Ann. § 41-29-139 (1993). Thomas' agreement with Clark, Vortice, and Fontroy to possess and transfer a controlled substance, a conspiracy, clearly embodies elements which are not contained in the transfer statute, and vice versa. ¶ 17. Since double jeopardy bars prosecuting a person for the same crime twice, and because conspiracy and transfer of a controlled substance have been shown to be separate crimes, supra, the necessary conclusion is that Thomas does not have a valid double jeopardy claim. In this case the crime of conspiracy was complete when Thomas agreed with Clark, Vortice, and Fontroy to unlawfully possess and transfer a controlled substance. This assignment of error is clearly without merit.