Opinion ID: 822508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Transportation Clause

Text: Mr. Robertson argues that his transfer to the South Carolina treatment facility is barred by the transportation clause contained in the West Virginia Constitution, art. III, § 5, which states, “No person shall be transported out of, or forced to leave the State for any offence committed within the same[.]”10 The crux of Mr. Robertson’s argument is that he has been forcibly banished to South Carolina in violation of the transportation clause. We note that “banishment” is 10 Section 5 of article III of the West Virginia Constitution provides, Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted. Penalties shall be proportioned to the character and degree of the offence. No person shall be transported out of, or forced to leave the State for any offence committed within the same; nor shall any person, in any criminal case, be compelled to be a witness against himself, or be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty for the same offence. 13 generally defined as punishment by forced exile either for years or for life; [or] a punishment inflicted on criminals, by compelling them to quit a city, place, or country, for a period of time, or life. Historically, ‘banishment’ was inflicted principally upon political offenders, transportation being the word used to express a similar punishment of ordinary criminals. The transportation clause, as it presently exists in W.Va. Const. art. III, § 5, was first included in our Constitution that was adopted by the Constitutional Convention of 1872, held in Charleston. However, a detailed study of the proceedings of that 1872 convention offers little insight into the reason for the clause’s appearance. Ray v. McCoy, 174 W.Va. 1, 7, 321 S.E.2d 90, 96 (1984) (McHugh, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). This Court discussed the transportation clause in Ray v. McCoy, supra. Ray dealt with two West Virginia prisoners who were involuntarily transferred to California prisons. The prisoners argued that their forced transfers were not permitted under the transportation clause of the West Virginia Constitution. This Court agreed and held in Syllabus Point 1 of Ray that [t]he clause “[n]o person shall be transported out of, or forced to leave the State for any offense committed within the same,” of W.Va. Const. art. III, § 5, prevents a prisoner convicted under West Virginia law from involuntarily serving any portion of a state sentence beyond the West Virginia borders. Mr. Robertson states that the transportation clause is applicable to the present case because he is a “person” within the circuit court’s jurisdiction as a result of an offense he committed within the state. Mr. Robertson argues that like the two prisoners in Ray, he 14 did not consent to being transferred to an out-of-state facility. Ray is distinguishable from the present case, however, because it dealt with two prisoners who had been “convicted under West Virginia law.” Mr. Robertson has not been convicted of a crime, nor is he a prisoner of the state. Instead, Mr. Robertson is under the circuit court’s jurisdiction because he pled not guilty to arson by reason of mental illness. The circuit court has jurisdiction over Mr. Robertson pursuant to W.Va. Code § 27-6A-1, et seq. [2007]. W.Va. Code § 27-6A-4(e) states, in relevant part, “[t]he court shall commit the acquitee to a mental health facility designated by the department (DHHR) that is the least restrictive environment to manage the acquitee and that will allow for the protection of the public.” Ray is also distinguishable from the present case because of the reason for the transfer. In Ray, the prisoners were transferred to out-of-state facilities for punitive reasons. In the present case, Mr. Robertson was transferred to South Carolina to receive treatment. The transportation clause prevents a person from being forced to leave the state “for any offence committed within the same.” The circuit court stated “[w]e are not contemplating penalizing him [Mr. Robertson] for his criminal conduct.” Instead, the circuit court was following the recommendations of the DHHR, Dr. Clayman, and Ms. Bradstreet, who stated that the South Carolina facility was the best treatment option available to Mr. Robertson. Thus, Mr. Robertson was not transferred to South Carolina because of an offense he committed within the state, he was transferred to South Carolina to be treated for his mental illness. 15 For this reason, we also reject Mr. Robertson’s equal protection argument. Mr. Robertson asserted that “if a prisoner can refuse to consent to his transfer . . . no rational basis exists for treating a forensic patient any differently[.]” The difference between a forensic patient and a prisoner, in this instance, is that the forensic patient is being sent to an out-of-state facility for treatment purposes, whereas the prisoner is being sent out-of-state for punitive reasons. The circuit court determined that Mr. Robertson suffers from a mental illness, was a danger to himself and to others, that no facility in West Virginia could treat his mental illness,11 and that the South Carolina facility offered treatment that was unavailable in West Virginia. Because the circuit court transferred Mr. Robertson to the South Carolina facility for treatment purposes, rather than to punish him, we find no merit in Mr. Robertson’s equal protection argument. One final distinguishing factor between the present case and Ray is that Mr. Robertson was sent to the South Carolina facility for a limited period of time.12 The circuit court did not set a fixed period of time that Mr. Robertson would remain in South Carolina, however, two factors demonstrate that the transfer was plainly not intended to be permanent. First, the DHHR’s stated goal for Mr. Robertson is to “get him treatment and then meet with 11 The circuit court found that “[t]he Defendant suffers from an Axis 1 Psychosis, Not Otherwise Specified, as well as an Axis 2 Antisocial Personality Disorder.” While Mr. Robertson’s lawyer disputed this conclusion and argued that Mr. Robertson’s mental illness is in remission, we find that the circuit court’s conclusion is supported by the testimony of Dr. Miller, Dr. Clayman, and Ms. Bradstreet. 12 The prisoners in Ray were sent to California to serve the remainder of their sentences. 16 everyone here in West Virginia, [and] bring him back.” Second, in order to monitor Mr. Robertson’s treatment, the circuit court ordered that hearings be held every ninety days to keep the court informed of Mr. Robertson’s progress. Based on these factors, we are satisfied that Mr. Robertson was not sent to South Carolina to be “warehoused” indefinitely. By way of analogy, we note that a juvenile may be sent to an out-of-state facility to receive treatment when the DHHR is unable to locate an in-state facility that can treat the juvenile’s specific problem. In Syllabus Point 6 of State ex rel. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources v. Frazier, 198 W.Va. 678, 482 S.E.2d 663 (1996), the Court held, While a circuit court should give preference to in-state facilities for the placement of juveniles, if it determines that no in-state facility can provide the services and/or security necessary to deal with the juvenile’s specific problems, then it may place the child in an out-of-state facility. In making an out­ of-state placement, the circuit court shall make findings of fact with regard to the necessity for such placement. Before a juvenile can be sent to an out-of-state facility, “it is the duty of multidisciplinary treatment teams to provide courts with information that is necessary to make an informed decision as to which facility can best meet a juvenile’s needs.” E.H. v. Matin, 201 W.Va. 463, 468, 498 S.E.2d 35, 40 (1997). In the present case, Mr. Robertson had a multidisciplinary team that presented the circuit court with the information it needed to determine which facility offered the best treatment option for his mental illness. The circuit court found that no in-state facility was 17 available to treat Mr. Robertson’s mental illness and made findings of fact with regard to the necessity of placing Mr. Robertson in the South Carolina facility. Though not raised by either party, we note that the circuit court’s final order sending Mr. Robertson to South Carolina is consistent with the Interstate Compact on Mental Health,13 set forth in W.Va. Code § 27-14-1 [1957], which states, in relevant part, “[A]ny patient may be transferred to an institution in another state whenever there are factors based upon clinical determinations indicating that the care and treatment of said patient would be facilitated or improved thereby.” The testimony before the circuit court was that Mr. Robertson’s two placements in West Virginia psychiatric hospitals, as well as his community placement, had failed and that the South Carolina treatment facility offered treatment that was unavailable in West Virginia. 13 The Interstate Compact on Mental Health is a compact among forty-five states, including West Virginia and South Carolina. W.Va. Code § 27-14-1, art. I of the Compact sets forth the purpose of the agreement as follows: The party states find that the proper and expeditious treatment of the mentally ill and mentally deficient can be facilitated by cooperative action, to the benefit of the patients, their families, and society as a whole. Further, the party states find that the necessity of and desirability for furnishing such care and treatment bears no primary relation to the residence or citizenship of the patient but that on the contrary, the controlling factors of community safety and humanitarianism require that facilities and services be made available for all who are in need of them. 18 Finally, we observe that Justice Miller anticipated a scenario similar to the