Opinion ID: 3065093
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jurisdiction over the Asylum Claim

Text: The government argues that this court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s determination that Khan is statutorily ineligible for asylum because he engaged in terrorist activity. We have jurisdiction to determine whether jurisdiction exists. Flores-Miramontes v. INS, 212 F.3d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir. 2000). KHAN v. HOLDER 12771 [3] Section 1158(b)(2)(D) provides, “There shall be no judicial review of a determination of the Attorney General under subparagraph (A)(v).” Section 1158(b)(2)(A)(v), described above, bars aliens who engage in a terrorist activity from eligibility for asylum. In Bellout v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2004), we held that this provision stripped the court of jurisdiction to review the IJ or the BIA’s determination that a petitioner was ineligible for asylum because he engaged in terrorist activity. Id. at 977. However, after we decided Bellout, Congress passed the REAL ID Act, which revised this jurisdictional bar. Section 1252(a)(2)(D) provides that “[n]othing . . . in any other provision of this chapter (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.” The chapter referred to in § 1252(a)(2)(D) includes § 1158(b)(2)(D), the jurisdiction-stripping provision upon which we relied in Bellout. In Fernandez Ruiz v. Gonzales, 410 F.3d 585 (9th Cir. 2005), we held that the REAL ID Act restored appellate review over all “constitutional claims or questions of law.”1 Id. at 587. In Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646 (9th Cir. 2007), we held that this principle extended to mixed questions of law and fact. Id. at 648. Mixed questions of law and fact are those in which “the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of law is undisputed, and the issue is whether the facts satisfy the statutory standard.” Id. at 656-57 (quotation omitted). We held in Ramadan that whether undisputed facts constituted “changed circumstances” in a country, as 1 We heard Fernandez-Ruiz en banc and vacated the panel opinion. Fernandez-Ruiz v. Gonzales, 466 F.3d 1121 (9th Cir. 2006). In our en banc opinion, we adopted the portion of the panel opinion addressing jurisdiction over questions of law. Id. at 1124. 12772 KHAN v. HOLDER defined by the immigration laws, is a mixed question of law and fact over which we have jurisdiction. Id. Where the facts are undisputed, we have extended Ramadan to other jurisdiction-stripping provisions. See, e.g., Ramos Barrios v. Holder, ___ F.3d ___, 2009 WL 1813469, at  (9th Cir. June 26, 2009) (holding that question of whether petitioner had satisfied threshold requirements to qualify for special rule cancellation was mixed question over which we have jurisdiction); Husyev v. Mukasey, 528 F.3d 1172, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that question of whether “extraordinary circumstances” exist to justify a delay in the filing of an application for asylum is a mixed question over which we have jurisdiction); Ghahremani v. Gonzales, 498 F.3d 993, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that question of whether petitioner established “due diligence” in discovering deception, fraud, or error in motion to reopen context is a mixed question over which we have jurisdiction). Additionally, we have held that even when facts are in dispute we have jurisdiction to review a mixed question so long as under any view of the factual record the petitioner has satisfied the relevant legal standard. Khunaverdiants v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 760, 765 (9th Cir. 2008). Therefore, § 1158(b)(2)(D) does not completely deprive this court of jurisdiction to review the IJ’s holding that Khan is ineligible for asylum on account of his engaging in terrorist activities. [4] We have jurisdiction to determine the scope and meaning of the statutory terrorism bar, including the definition of “terrorist organization” and “terrorist activity,” as these present purely legal questions. We also have jurisdiction to determine whether the JKLF meets this standard. This is a mixed question, because the nature of JKLF’s activities is undisputed by the parties, and the question is whether these undisputed facts as found by the IJ meet the legal standard of “terrorist organization.” Finally, because the IJ found Khan’s testimony credible, whether Khan reasonably should have known of the JKLF’s terrorist activity presents a mixed quesKHAN v. HOLDER 12773 tion of law and fact over which we have jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating that “what a reasonable person should have known” presents mixed question); Colleen v. United States, 843 F.2d 329, 331 (9th Cir. 1987) (same).