Opinion ID: 3038004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Okulitch, a clinical psychologist.

Text: According to Chaivoe, Weaver ultimately directed him “to 1 At an early point in the representation, Weaver found himself no longer able to pay for Chaivoe’s services. However, Chaivoe continued as counsel on the basis of a court appointment. WEAVER v. PALMATEER 7877 negotiate a plea with the district attorneys to get him the best deal possible.” Chaivoe negotiated an agreement, and on January 11, 1983, Weaver pled guilty in Clackamas County to one count of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree sodomy. On January 20, 1983, he pled guilty in Multnomah County, Oregon, to one count of first-degree rape and one count of first-degree attempted sodomy. The plea bargain included the agreement of prosecutors in the two Oregon counties and two counties in the State of Washington to forego any other charges against Weaver. In total, there were at least 19 other known victims upon whose testimony the authorities might have prosecuted Weaver. B On January 24, 1983, the Oregon State Hospital (“OSH”) Mental Health Division admitted Weaver for evaluation for sexual dangerousness and a recommendation of treatment. The OSH evaluation disclosed Weaver’s repeated admission that he had committed about 30 rapes. The report’s conclusion was that Weaver “poses an extreme sexual danger to the community without intensive treatment in a highly structured environment.” However, the report acknowledged that “[b]ecause of the seriousness of his multiple charges, it is unlikely that probationary treatment . . . will be deemed feasible.” The state circuit courts received the report on March, 17, 1983. The next day, according to the presentence report, Weaver “made the decision to fire his attorney, withdraw his plea and [was] considering entering pleas of not guilty by reason of insanity.” Weaver filed a motion to discharge Chaivoe as counsel on March 22. Before withdrawing, Chaivoe filed motions on Weaver’s behalf seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas or continue sentencing.2 2 Chaivoe served as Weaver’s attorney from late 1982 until April 1983. He died on September 23, 2000. 7878 WEAVER v. PALMATEER C Michael Clancy was then substituted as Weaver’s counsel. On May 24, 1983, Clancy filed an amended motion on behalf of Weaver to withdraw his guilty pleas on the ground that Chaivoe’s representation was constitutionally inadequate. The Clackamas County Circuit Court plea-withdrawal hearing took place on May 27, 1983, before Judge Patrick Gilroy. Weaver argued that Chaivoe coerced his original plea by threatening that otherwise Weaver would be prosecuted for all of the suspected rapes and would receive “a minimum of eighty years in the penitentiary.” Chaivoe described the steps he took while representing Weaver, and he indicated that he spent an unusually large amount of time on Weaver’s case “because of the nature and complexity of the problems that were involved.” Chaivoe claimed that he did not recommend, much less coerce, Weaver’s guilty pleas. Judge Gilroy denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Given that Weaver could have been charged with many more counts of rape, the judge held, inter alia, that the result obtained in the case evidenced the adequacy of Chaivoe’s representation. D Clancy also filed a motion to withdraw Weaver’s guilty plea in the Multnomah County Circuit Court. On June 30, 1983, Judge Robert P. Jones presided over a hearing on the motion. Weaver offered testimony from Patrick Birmingham and Robert R. Selander, two local defense attorneys, who suggested that Chaivoe’s representation of Weaver had been inadequate in several respects. Judge Jones denied Weaver’s motion to withdraw the guilty plea. The judge concluded that Chaivoe’s assistance was not ineffective because he was following Weaver’s directions. In WEAVER v. PALMATEER 7879 so finding, he credited the out-of-court statements offered by the State’s attorney and Chaivoe’s Clackamas County testimony with respect to the facts of his representation of Weaver. E On July 7, 1983, the Clackamas County court sentenced Weaver to two consecutive 20-year sentences with 10-year minimums for the rape and sodomy counts. On August 1, 1983, the Multnomah County court sentenced Weaver to 20 years for the first-degree rape count and 10 years for the firstdegree attempted rape count. The counts carried minimums of 10 and 5 years, respectively. The sentence for attempted rape was to run concurrently with a 10-year sentence for firstdegree attempted sodomy. The Multnomah County court decreed that its sentence would run consecutively to the Clackamas County sentence. Thus, the total sentence imposed was 70 years imprisonment with a minimum of 35 years. F In 1984, Weaver directly appealed both sentences. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court judgments without opinion. See State v. Weaver, 67 Or. App. 536, 678 P.2d 782 (1984). Weaver did not pursue an appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court. The convictions thus became final on May 3, 1984. See Or. R. App. P. 10.05 (1984). In 1991, Weaver filed a petition for post-conviction relief in the Circuit Court of Marion County, Oregon.3 Before Judge Pamela L. Abernethy, Weaver argued that Chaivoe provided 3 The petition was initially dismissed as untimely, but the State conceded this was error and the Court of Appeals remanded the petition for trial. State v. Weaver, 116 Or. App. 54, 838 P.2d 647 (1992). 7880 WEAVER v. PALMATEER ineffective assistance; that his guilty pleas were not knowing or voluntary; that the terms of the plea agreement had been violated; and that the district attorney had engaged in misconduct. Judge Abernethy denied Weaver’s petition on August 29, 1996. She noted that Judges Gilroy and Jones, many years earlier, had heard much of the same evidence then before her. The judge concluded that Judge Gilroy’s reasoning was per- suasive and that Weaver had failed to meet his burden of proving ineffective assistance of counsel. The Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed without opinion and the Oregon Supreme Court denied review. See Weaver v. Maass, 157 Or. App. 600, 972 P.2d 1231 (1998), rev. denied 328 Or. 365, 987 P.2d 511 (1999). G Weaver filed these petitions for writs of habeas corpus in the District of Oregon on July 23, 1999, challenging his guilty pleas in both the Clackamas and Multnomah County convictions.4 He alleged the denial of adequate assistance of counsel on several grounds, as well as other claims not relevant here.5 On July 28, 2003, United States Magistrate Judge Janice M. Stewart issued her Findings and Recommendation that Weaver’s petitions be granted and that he be retried. Subsequently, 4 The State does not raise the statute of limitations bar on AEDPA filings made beyond one year of a petitioner’s conviction in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). We note that Weaver’s convictions became final in 1984 and these petitions were not filed until July 23, 1999. We assume, without deciding, that Weaver’s post-conviction relief filings in various state courts tolled, equitably or otherwise, the statute sufficiently to permit a timely filing under AEDPA. 5 Weaver does not argue on appeal all of the issues raised in his habeas petition—namely, the claims of error by the trial court and misconduct by the prosecutor. We consider such claims to have been waived. WEAVER v. PALMATEER 7881 District Court Judge Garr M. King entered orders granting habeas relief based on the Magistrate’s Findings and Recommendation in both cases, ordering the State “to take Weaver to trial within 180 days or release him from custody.” The State filed timely notices of appeal and we consolidated both cases for argument and disposition.6 6 We review de novo the district court’s grant of habeas relief. Leavitt v. Arave, 383 F.3d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Of course, our review of the petition is guided by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”) and its prescription of deference to the final judgments of the state courts. See, e.g., Lounsbury v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 2004). Under AEDPA, a federal court may overturn a state conviction on a question of law or mixed question of law and fact only where the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 407-09 (2000). As to questions of historical fact, habeas relief is inappropriate unless the state court decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). We apply subsection (d)(2) because it pertains to an “intrinsic analysis” of the state court’s fact-finding process, i.e., “where petitioner challenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state record.” Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 2004). In Taylor v. Maddox, we observed that what § 2254(d)(2) “teaches us is that, in conducting this kind of intrinsic review of a state court’s processes, we must be particularly deferential to our state-court colleagues.” Id. at 999-1000 (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)); accord Lambert v. Blodgett, 393 F.3d 943, 972 (9th Cir. 2004). The burden of proof rests with the petitioner. Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002). In assessing Weaver’s habeas claims, we analyze the last reasoned state decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 803 (1991); Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1090 (9th Cir. 2005). Ordinarily, AEDPA contemplates review of a single state court opinion. However, Judge Abernethy’s 1996 decision substantially adopted the reasoning employed by Judges Gilroy and Jones in their 1983 decisions denying Weaver’s motions for withdrawal of the guilty pleas. Thus, we also consider those decisions to the extent they illuminate the basis for the 1996 decision. See Barker, 423 F.3d at 1093. 7882 WEAVER v. PALMATEER