Opinion ID: 3134430
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Aggravating factors include:

Text: First, the defendant committed murder during the course of an aggravated criminal sexual assault, armed robbery, and robbery, and the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created an unreasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom.” Defendant contends that in weighing and considering the felony- murder aggravating factors at the final phase of the sentencing hearing, the jury was misguided concerning these factors in aggravation and this influenced the determination for death. Although there was no objection raised at trial and the claim of error was not preserved in defendant's post-trial motions, defendant contends that waiver does not apply because this alleged error falls within the purview of the plain error doctrine. However, defendant fails to satisfy either prong of the plain error doctrine. As stated, the evidence in this proceeding was not closely balanced. Further, we determine that the error alleged by defendant was not so fundamental and of such magnitude as to deny defendant a fair trial. See Miller , 173 Ill. 2d at 191-92. After having found defendant eligible for the death penalty, the jury was free to consider, during the second phase of the sentencing hearing, the circumstances of the defendant's offense. People v. Todd , 154 Ill. 2d 57, 76 (1992). This court has repeatedly held that during the second phase of the hearing, the jury is free to consider any relevant and reliable evidence in aggravation and mitigation. Todd , 154 Ill. 2d at 76; People v. Terrell , 132 Ill. 2d 178, 225 (1989). Thus, even if the jury were “misguided,” as defendant urges, concerning the three felony-murder aggravating factors, defendant raises no claim that inadmissible evidence was before the jury during its sentencing deliberations or that defendant had been precluded from adducing relevant mitigating evidence. See Zant v. Stephens , 462 U.S. 862, 887, 77 L. Ed. 2d 235, 256, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 2748 (1983). The record discloses no support for defendant's claim that the jury's deliberations were improperly influenced by the instructions given to the jury. Defendant's Attempted Waiver of All Sentences Other Than Natural Life in Prison Defendant contends that his rights to due process and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the trial court refused to allow defendant to waive lesser prison sentences and face only the alternative of natural life in prison if the jury should determine that he was not eligible for death. Defense counsel offered the trial court a written waiver, signed by defendant, to any sentence less than natural life in prison, and argued that upon acceptance of such a waiver the jury could be instructed, under this court's ruling in People v. Gacho , 122 Ill. 2d 221 (1988), that the only alternative to a sentence of death would be a sentence of natural life in prison without parole. In defendant's brief to this court, defendant states that he “perceived the Gacho natural life instruction as a positive advantage in his effort to defeat the death penalty. To make that instruction valid, he would have to waive all lesser sentences. This he was willing to do.” In rejecting defendant's proffered waiver, the trial court judge ruled that “[defendant] can't waive himself into a specific sentence.” Defendant asserts that the trial court's ruling constitutes reversible error. We are not persuaded by defendant's arguments. In People v. Simms , 168 Ill. 2d 176, 198 (1995), the defendant argued, as does defendant in the matter at bar, that the trial court erred when it refused to instruct the jury that the defendant would be sentenced to natural life in prison if he did not receive a sentence of death. In Simms we rejected the defendant's argument and held that a natural life jury instruction is available only under the circumstances stated in Gacho , specifically, where the sentencing options for a particular defendant are limited to either natural life or the death penalty. Simms , 168 Ill. 2d at 199. Such an instruction is unavailable where, as here, the defendant is statutorily eligible for a sentence less than natural life in prison. Simms , 168 Ill. 2d at 199. Our ruling in the instant cause additionally comports with the general principle that sentencing is a matter within the sound discretion of the court. See People v. Wilson , 143 Ill. 2d 236, 250 (1991). In the cause at bar, if the jury had determined that death was not an appropriate sentence for defendant, the trial court would have possessed sole discretion in sentencing defendant to a term of imprisonment for the murder. Allowing defendant to execute a waiver would usurp the court's sentencing function, and defendant offers no rationale why he should be afforded the authority to remove the sentencing decision from the trial court. Further, we do not condone a defendant's attempt to choose a sentence that suits him, and, by so doing, manipulate the sentencing process in order to obtain a Gacho instruction. Finally, acceptance of such a waiver could engender additional litigation challenging the waiver's validity. Accordingly, the trial court did not violate defendant's constitutional rights nor did it abuse its discretion in refusing to accept defendant's tendered waiver of sentence. Defendant also contends that a jury's sentencing decision is denied the requisite level of constitutional reliability under the eighth amendment if the jury is unaware of other viable sentencing options. We have previously rejected this argument. People v. Simms , 143 Ill. 2d 154, 181-82 (1991) (“it is not error to refuse to instruct the jury of the possible terms of imprisonment which the defendant might receive if not sentenced to death”). In a related argument, defendant contends that his rights to due process, equal protection, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment were violated when the trial court denied his request to inform the sentencing jury that one of the sentences available was life imprisonment without possibility of parole. Defendant contends that he was constitutionally entitled to this instruction because the State argued that defendant's future dangerousness was a reason to impose a sentence of death. In support of this argument, defendant relies upon the 1994 United States Supreme Court decision in Simmons v. South Carolina , 512 U.S. 154, 129 L. Ed. 2d 133, 114 S. Ct. 2187 (1994), and argues that without such sentencing information, the jury could have considered him too dangerous for any sentence other than death, especially if the jury believed that defendant might, as an alternative to death, receive a parole-eligible prison sentence. At the outset, we note that defendant never argued his equal protection claim below. It is well established that “[o]bjections at trial on specific grounds waive all other grounds of objection.” People v. Miller , 173 Ill. 2d 167, 191 (1996). Therefore, defendant's equal protection challenge to the trial court's ruling has been waived. Defendant argues that the United States Supreme Court decision in Simmons compelled the trial court to instruct the jury on the alternative sentences the defendant could serve if he was not sentenced to death. As we held in People v. Simpson , 172 Ill. 2d 117, 152 (1996), the Simmons holding “addresses those situations where state law mandates that if the defendant is not sentenced to death, the only alternate sentence is natural life imprisonment.” Accordingly, the trial court did not err in its ruling. Challenge to Imposition of the Death Sentence Based Upon The “Totality of the Evidence” Regarding the Section 9–1(b)(11) Aggravating Factor Defendant next contends that the “totality of the evidence” at the sentencing hearing establishes that the murder was not “cold, calculated, and premeditated” within the meaning of section 9–1(b)(11), but rather that it resulted from a rage caused by defendant's personality structure and the victim's rejection of his request for consensual sex. Relying upon the testimony of Dr. Wahlstrom during the aggravation-mitigation phase of the sentencing hearing, defendant contends that he “disproved” the section 9–1(b)(11) factor in aggravation and therefore the jury improperly determined that there were no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence in regards to that aggravating factor. In determining whether a death sentence was properly imposed, this court assesses “the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.” Woodson v. North Carolina , 428 U.S. 280, 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961, 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976) (plurality opinion); People v. Johnson , 128 Ill. 2d 253, 277-78 (1989). We are also mindful that “each capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty.” Johnson , 128 Ill. 2d at 280. As we have extensively discussed in connection with our treatment of defendant's challenge to the jury's eligibility finding pursuant to section 9–1(b)(11), the evidence adduced at the sentencing hearing established beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed the murder in a “cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means.” 720 ILCS 5/9–1(b)(11) (West 1994). In addition, during the second phase of the sentencing hearing, the State presented 21 witnesses in aggravation, detailing defendant's extensive criminal record beginning in his early teenage years, as well as his conduct after his arrest for Maria's murder, including statements which continued to evidence his violent thoughts towards women and his lack of remorse. In contrast, defendant presented five witnesses in mitigation, two of whom were his parents, with the majority of the evidence presented by Dr. Wahlstrom. Under our statutory scheme, at the second stage of the sentencing proceedings the jury weighs and balances any mitigating factors against the aggravating factors to determine whether a death sentence is appropriate. E.g ., Munson , 171 Ill. 2d at 185. If the jury unanimously determines that there are no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death penalty, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. 720 ILCS 5/9–1(g) (West 1994). Upon careful consideration of the character of defendant and the circumstances of his crime, we conclude that the evidence presented during defendant's sentencing hearing supports the jury's decision that the penalty of death was appropriate. Constitutional Challenges to the Death Penalty Statute Defendant's constitutional challenge to the death penalty statute is confined to section 9–1(g) which provides that a defendant shall be sentenced to death if the capital sentencing jury determines that there are “no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposition of the death sentence.” 720 ILCS 5/9–1(g) (West 1994). Defendant contends that the Illinois statute violates both the eighth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution because an impermissibly high burden of proof is placed upon defendants to show that mitigating evidence outweighs aggravating evidence and because it precludes a jury from effectively considering mitigating evidence. Defendant also maintains that because the jury instructions given in his case tracked the language of the statute, they are likewise unconstitutional because the “language does not suggest that the sentencer should come to a subjective, discretionary, unfettered decision whether death should be imposed in a particular case but rather suggests that death should be imposed unless a particular standard of acquittal of death is met.” Defendant first argues that section 9–1(g) violates both the eighth and fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution because the statutory phrase “sufficient to preclude” unfairly places a burden on the defense to establish that death is not a possible sentence. Defendant contends that this language impermissibly requires a capital defendant to negate eligibility for death. In People v. Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d 489, 538 (1992), this court rejected an argument substantially identical to that presented by defendant at bar. We reiterate our conclusion in Strickland that “[t]he defendant's theory rests on a strained interpretation of the statutory language  the sentencing authority is asked only to determine whether death is the appropriate sanction in the particular case. [Citations.] The statutory language does not require the sentencer to find that the death penalty should be deemed `impossible.' ” Strickland , 154 Ill. 2d at 539; see also People v. Cole , 172 Ill. 2d 85, 114 (1996). We adhere to our previous rejection of defendant's contention, and decline to address this issue anew. Defendant additionally attacks section 9–1(g) on the basis that the text of the statute precludes full, meaningful, and effective consideration of the mitigating factors. We recently reiterated our rejection of the argument that the Illinois capital sentencing statute places a burden of proof on defendants that precludes a meaningful consideration of mitigating evidence. People v. Taylor , 166 Ill. 2d 414, 439 (1995); see also People v. Edgeston , 157 Ill. 2d 201, 247 (1993); People v. Ramey , 152 Ill. 2d 41, 76-77 (1992); People v. Hampton , 149 Ill. 2d 71, 116-17 (1992); People v. Simms , 143 Ill. 2d 154, 183-84 (1991); People v. Fields , 135 Ill. 2d 18, 76 (1990). Defendant presents no new and compelling argument for us to depart from our previous decisions. As a final matter, defendant attacks the constitutionality of one of the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions which was given to the jury. Defendant argues that because IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 mirrors the “sufficient to preclude” statutory language of section 9–1(g), this instruction likewise sets an impermissibly high standard for imposition of a sentence other than death. In light of our holding reaffirming the constitutionality of section 9–1(g), jury instructions which track section 9–1(g)'s language withstand a similar constitutional challenge. In a related argument, defendant contends that even if this court finds no constitutional infirmity in the language used in section 9–1(g), the instructions given to the sentencing jury violated his eighth amendment rights because the instructions: failed to provide adequate guidance to the jurors concerning their task in weighing the aggravating and mitigating evidence; misled the jurors in that the instructions do not suggest that the jury has unfettered discretion in making the death sentence determination; and incorrectly conveyed the standard under which the jury determines that the death penalty is inappropriate, because, according to defendant, the instruction “overstat[es] the mitigation required” by use of the phrase “sufficient to preclude.” In sum, defendant reiterates his argument concerning section 9–1(g) of the statute, and likewise contends that the jury instructions precluded the jury from giving full, meaningful and effective consideration to valid mitigation evidence. We reject defendant's argument. IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 tracks the language of section 9–1(g), which, as stated, contains no constitutional infirmity. In addition, in People v. Gilliam , 172 Ill. 2d 484, 520 (1996), this court determined that IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 accurately reflects the statutory provisions of section 9–1(g). Further, under Rule 451(a) (134 Ill. 2d R. 451(a)), “[w]henever Illinois Pattern Instructions, Criminal , contains an instruction applicable in a criminal case  and the court determines that the jury should be instructed on the subject, the IPI Criminal [3d] instruction shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.” Thus, the trial court was required to give IPI Criminal 3d No. 7C.05 and that instruction, which tracks the language of section 9–1(g), likewise contains no constitutional infirmities.