Opinion ID: 801832
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: González's Challenges on Appeal

Text: González contends that the district court erred in denying his Rule 29 motions for judgment of acquittal based on the insufficiency of the evidence against him. He argues that the government's evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction because the witnesses' testimonies were uncorroborated, insubstantial, and incredible. We find otherwise. 11 Rivera contends that the same evidence does not pass muster under Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that Confrontation Clause bars admission of testimonial hearsay unless declarant is unavailable and accused had opportunity to crossexamine). The claim is without merit because [s]tatements made during and in furtherance of a conspiracy are not testimonial and are, therefore, not subject to Sixth Amendment concerns. United States v. Malpica-García, 489 F.3d 393, 397 (1st Cir. 2007) (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56); see also United States v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 92, 100 (1st Cir. 2006) (rejecting Crawford challenge and finding that statements at issue were nontestimonial because they were either co-conspirator statements made in furtherance of the conspiracy, or casual remarks not reasonably expected to be available for use at a later trial). We also reject Rivera's additional, overall assertion that the multiple evidentiary errors he argued, together, caused him prejudice. Since we rejected all of Rivera's claims of error, it necessarily follows that [his] trial was not tainted by cumulative error and reversal is not warranted. United States v. Brown, 669 F.3d 10, 28 (1st Cir. 2012). -25- Because González moved for a judgment of acquittal on sufficiency grounds, we review the district court's denial of the motion de novo. United States v. Troy, 583 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009). As noted earlier, we review the sufficiency of the government's evidence by examining both the direct and circumstantial proof, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, id., to determine 'whether that evidence, including all plausible inferences drawn therefrom, would allow a rational factfinder to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the charged crime,' id. (quoting United States v. CruzRodríguez, 541 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 2008)). To establish that the defendant is guilty of participating in a drug-trafficking conspiracy, the government must prove . . . that 'an agreement existed to commit the underlying offense, and that the defendant elected to join the agreement, intending that the underlying substantive offense be committed.' United States v. Paret-Ruiz, 567 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. GómezRosario, 418 F.3d 90, 105 (1st Cir. 2005)). To prove the underlying offense of possession with intent to distribute, the government must show that the defendants knowingly and intentionally possessed, either actually or constructively, a controlled substance with the specific intent to distribute. United States v. García-Carrasquillo, 483 F.3d 124, 130 (1st Cir. -26- 2007). Based on the totality of the evidence, we find that this standard is met in the case before us. The government's case against González was mainly based on the testimonies of Barreira and Rentas. Rentas, who described himself as a drug user from La Ferrán Ward, told members of the jury that he was a drug seller who also worked as a lookout and runner for the drug trafficking organization run by Martínez. He stated that he agreed to testify pursuant to a plea and cooperation agreement. Rentas described the role of enforcers in the organization and identified González as an armed enforcer of the same. He testified that he specifically remembered González arriving at the drug point, armed, and in the presence of another charged co-conspirator. Barreira, in turn, identified himself as a drug user and an admitted murderer, and told members of the jury that, aside from working as an enforcer, he had worked as a runner, seller, and processor of drugs within the organization. His testimony corroborated Rentas's account of what an enforcer's role was within the organization, pegged González as one, specified the kind of weapon that González typically carried, and indicated that González once handed him such a weapon. Barreira also testified that he saw González receive cocaine from co-conspirator Rodríguez during the time frame of the conspiracy, and that González once requested heroin from Barreira himself for distribution in the -27- Ponce Housing Project. Barreira's testimony in this regard was corroborated by Vidal, another government witness. This evidence is sufficient to support the jury's reasonable conclusion that González was in fact an enforcer for Martínez's organization and that he also participated as a distributor of both cocaine and heroin in furtherance of the charged conspiracy. In the past, similar evidence has been found sufficient to sustain a drug-related conspiracy conviction. See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d 581, 599-600 (1st Cir. 2010) (concluding testimonial evidence sufficient for jury to find that defendant participated in drug-trafficking conspiracy where testimony related to defendant's relationships with drug traffickers and his drug-supplying activities); United States v. Rodríguez–Lozada, 558 F.3d 29, 39 (1st Cir. 2009) (same). We have also found that evidence of even a single drug transaction, under circumstances that reflect the defendant's tacit agreement relating to the continuing drug-trafficking enterprise, can be sufficient to sustain a conviction for conspiracy to distribute narcotics. See United States v. Rivera-Ruiz, 244 F.3d 263, 269 (1st Cir. 2001) (agreeing with this proposition and citing cases). Here, testimony that González accepted drugs from Rodríguez for distribution, asked Barreira for additional drugs also for distribution, carried a weapon, and was a known enforcer for the operation who carried out his patrolling duties in the company of other charged co- -28- conspirators, are all facts supportive of the jury's determination that González was a member of the overall drug trafficking scheme. See Paret-Ruiz, 567 F.3d at 6 (An agreement between coconspirators may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and it may be tacit.); United States v. Concemi, 957 F.2d 942, 950 (1st Cir. 1992) ([A]n agreement . . . may be inferred from a development and collocation of circumstances.) (quoting United States v. Smith, 680 F.2d 255, 259 (1st Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). González contends that the government could not rest its case on the testimony of a government cooperator and serial killer (Barreira) and the minimal and inconsistent corroboration provided by Rentas, who was also a government cooperator and Barreira's brother.12 As to Rentas, González points to his initial inability to list González as one of the enforcers for the organization, and emphasizes that he was only able to identify González as an enforcer after the government's repeated questioning. As to 12 It is unclear from González's brief what significance we are asked to draw from the fact that the two witnesses were brothers, except perhaps the notion that they would be in cahoots to coordinate their respective testimonies in a bid to enhance their value to the government as witnesses. No such argument is articulated by González, however, and, in any event, this concern would be one for the jury to weigh as part of its credibility determination. Cf. United States v. Vázquez-Guadalupe, 407 F.3d 492, 499 (1st Cir. 2005) (deeming testimony of a government witness, a criminal defendant being paid by the government for his cooperation, admissible and noting the credibility of that testimony is left for the jury). -29- Barreira's testimony, González only contends that the same was stereotyped, general, and vague. We cannot agree with González that such alleged deficiencies in the testimonial evidence presented are enough to render the basis for his conviction insubstantial under the law. In conducting our sufficiency analysis, we are not called to 'assess the credibility of a witness, as that is a role reserved for the jury.' Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d at 596 n.6 (quoting Troy, 583 F.3d at 24); see also United States v. Calderón, 77 F.3d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1996) (It [is] well within the jury's province for it to choose to believe the testimony of [the defendant's] accomplices -- in the face of cross-examination of their characters and motives -- and to disbelieve [the defendant's] version of the story.). Furthermore, the uncorroborated testimony of a cooperating accomplice may sustain a conviction so long as that testimony is not facially incredible. United States v. Torres-Galindo, 206 F.3d 136, 140 (1st Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Rosario–Díaz, 202 F.3d 54, 67 (1st Cir. 2000)). We do not agree that the testimonies of Barreira and Rentas were facially incredible and, in fact, their testimonies, in combination with the testimony of Vidal, corroborated each other. Having rejected González's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, we now consider his argument against the district court's sentencing determination. -30-
González challenges the applicability to his case of the sentencing enhancement provided for in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), which allows a higher penalty for repeat drug offenders whose prior convictions have become final. The provision states, in pertinent part, that any person who violates subsection (a) of Section 841 shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years or more than life, except that [i]f any person commits such a violation after a prior conviction for a felony drug offense has become final, such person shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 20 years and not more than life imprisonment . . . . 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Prior to trial, the government filed an informational notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1)13 to establish González's prior conviction under the laws of Puerto Rico for a felony drug offense, that is, possession of a measurable amount of cocaine in violation of Section 404 of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico's Controlled Substances Law. After trial and the jury's finding of guilt under 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846, González moved to strike the government's informational notice, but the district court denied 13 This provision requires that the government provide pre-trial notice to a defendant of any previous convictions based upon which he or she might be sentenced to increased punishment for a conviction under the Controlled Substances Act. See Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, § 411(a)(1), 21 U.S.C. § 851(a)(1). -31- the request in a written order and González was sentenced pursuant to the enhanced penalty. On appeal, González reiterates the argument he made below, that the district court should not have applied the enhanced penalty provision based on the prior conviction because the same was not yet final, as required by Section 841(b)(1)(A), at the time of his arrest or the issuance of the indictment in the federal case. He requests that we set aside his sentence and remand his case to the district court for re-sentencing. As this argument presents a question of statutory interpretation, we review it de novo. United States v. Lino, 493 F.3d 41, 43 (1st Cir. 2007) (emphasis added); see also Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d at 608 (We review de novo questions of the proper interpretation of statutes, including whether prior convictions count for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 851.). For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court's determination. The following facts are relevant to González's sentencing appeal. On or about June 20, 2003 -- during the time frame and within the territorial limits of the conspiracy charged -- González was arrested in possession of a measurable amount of cocaine in violation of Puerto Rico's drug laws.14 On or about September 23, 14 This drug arrest was included as an overt act in the indictment in this case and the underlying evidence was duly produced by the government to the defense as part of its discovery obligations. For reasons not revealed in the record before us, however, the government did not introduce evidence of this incident at trial, -32- 2003, pursuant to Rule 247.1 of the Puerto Rico Rules of Criminal Procedure, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34 App. II, R. 247.1, and the provisions of the state diversionary disposition program known as T.A.S.C., González was placed on a probationary term of two years for the referenced state drug arrest.15 On or about March 31, 2005, González was put behind bars in the local system for events unrelated to this case. In May of 2005, González was arrested pursuant to the federal charges presently before us, and on December 1, 2005, he was indicted. Five months later, on or about May 2, 2006, the Superior Court of Puerto Rico held a hearing and revoked González's probationary term. The Superior Court then entered a judgment of guilty for the charged offense, and sentenced González to a two-year term of imprisonment. González argues that pursuant to our holding in Lino, [a] prior drug conviction that was based on one of the transactions that comprises the ongoing, overarching conspiracy at issue in the federal trial cannot constitute[] a 'distinct criminal episode' sufficient to trigger [the Section 841(b)] nor did it call the arresting officer to the stand. 15 This procedure allows the state court to place a defendant on probation for the charged drug offense without entering a judgment of guilt, subject to the revocation of the term of probation (and the pronouncement of judgment) in the event that any of its conditions are violated. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34 App. II, R. 247.1. Otherwise, the court, at its discretion, may exonerate the person and dismiss the charges against him at any time during the period of probation. Id. -33- enhancement unless the defendant continued to participate in drug activity after the conviction became final. 493 F.3d at 43 (quoting United States v. De Jesús Mateo, 373 F.3d 70, 74 (1st Cir. 2004)). González posits that a prior conviction in this sense is not final for purposes of a Section 841(b) enhancement until the time for taking a direct appeal on the same has expired. He so concludes by citing to United States v. Campbell, 980 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1992), wherein, he contends, the Fourth Circuit so held. Thus, González argues it was not until thirty days after the Superior Court of Puerto Rico revoked his probationary period and entered a finding of guilt against González, in May of 2006, that his state conviction became final for Section 841(b) purposes. See P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 34 App. II, R. 193 (providing that the jurisdictional term for filing a direct appeal from a conviction to the Puerto Rico Circuit Court of Appeals is thirty (30) days after judgment is rendered). In sum, González contends that his state conviction did not become final until approximately one year after his arrest in the present case, which renders the Section 841(b) enhancement inapplicable. González's reasoning is flawed for the following reasons. First, whether or not a prior criminal episode constitutes a conviction for purposes of a federal statutory scheme is determined under federal -- not state -- law. Rivera-Rodríguez, 617 F.3d at 609; see also id. (The Supreme Court and our circuit -34- indicate that federal law and not . . . Puerto Rico Rule of Criminal Procedure 247.1 determines whether [prior drug arrests that resulted in probationary terms] constitute prior convictions under 21 U.S.C. § 851.). Second, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Campbell does not stand for the holding that González ascribes to it. In that case, the Fourth Circuit held that the trial court had not erred in enhancing the defendant's sentence pursuant to Section 841 as a result of a prior conviction, where the defendant had been sentenced (under a similar Virginia drug diversionary program and statute) to a term of supervised probation without the imposition of a judgment of guilt prior to the offense date charged in the federal indictment. 980 F.2d at 249-50. In circumstances that parallel the case at hand, the defendant in Campbell violated his probation and the state court revoked the deferral and entered a final state conviction on a date after the indictment issued in his federal case, but prior to Campbell's federal trial and sentencing. The Fourth Circuit determined that [a] sentence of probation, though subject to expunction, constitutes a 'prior sentence' for purposes of sentence enhancement, since [t]he possibility of later 'expunction under state law does not alter the historical fact of the conviction.' Id. at 251 (quoting Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. -35- 103, 115 (1983)).16 Thus, Campbell holds that as a matter of federal law a defendant's deferred sentence under [] state law constitutes a prior conviction for purposes of section 841. Id. Our more recent decision in Rivera-Rodríguez addressed precisely the issue in controversy here and resulted in the same conclusion as reached by the Fourth Circuit (and the court below in this case) based on the same case law cited in Campbell. One of the defendants in the Rivera-Rodríguez appeal had been exposed to the enhanced sentence provision of Section 841(b)(1)(A) based on a prior sentence of probation and rehabilitation for the possession of narcotics, pursuant to Puerto Rico Rule of Criminal Procedure 247.1. 617 F.3d at 609. This defendant argued that the state sentence of probation could not be considered a prior conviction because (1) no appeal could have been taken from the imposition of probation in the absence of a finding of guilt, (2) his record was thereafter expunged by the Puerto Rico Superior Court, and (3) 16 In Dickerson, the Supreme Court had to decide the question whether firearms disabilities imposed by 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g) and (h) apply with respect to a person who pleads guilty to a state offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year, when the record of the proceeding subsequently is expunged under state procedure following a successfully-served term of probation. 460 U.S. at 105. The Court held that the statutory disabilities applied, reasoning that although there was no written adjudication of guilt and there was no formal pronouncement of a sentence of imprisonment for a specified term . . . [i]t was plainly irrelevant to Congress whether the individual in question actually receives a prison term . . . . [O]ne cannot be placed on probation if the court does not deem him to be guilty of a crime . . . . Id. at 113-14. -36- Puerto Rico Rule of Procedure 247.1 explicitly states that the sentence of probation shall not be deemed as a conviction. Id. Citing to both Dickerson and our decision in United States v. Bustamante, 706 F.2d 13, 14 (1st Cir. 1983), we first concluded that federal and not state law decided the question. RiveraRodríguez, 617 F.3d at 609. We then went on to hold that the defendant's prior incidents constituted convictions for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 851, and agreed with our sister circuits of appeals who ha[d] considered this § 841 question and counted prior felony drug convictions even where those convictions had been set aside, expunged, or otherwise removed from a defendant's record for policy reasons unrelated to innocence or an error of law. Id. at 609-10 (quoting United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, 911 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing cases from the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits). Here, González cannot even claim that his prior sentence of probation should not be counted because it was expunged from his record. Rather, the Puerto Rico Superior Court sentenced González to a term of probation (without an adjudication of guilt) prior to the date on which the federal indictment was returned, but later revoked it, entering a final order of conviction based on González's inability to refrain from criminal conduct thereafter. This confirms the notion that the offense date charged in González's federal indictment included criminal conduct occurring -37- both before and after the Puerto Rico sentence of probation was entered. Regardless of subsequent events, however, our case law requires that we consider the state court's imposition of a sentence of probation for the drug felony charged against González as a prior conviction for purposes of the Section 841 enhancement, whether or not it was subsequently revoked. Therefore, the district court properly applied the sentence enhancement in question.