Opinion ID: 1979848
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Your second question is:

Text: Is the Act a law necessary for the support of the government or its existing institutions and programs so that the emergency clause renders the Act effective as of the date of enactment pursuant to Article III, § 22 of the South Dakota Constitution? Under Article III, § 1, two classes of laws are exempted from referendum: (1) those necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety of the state, and (2) those necessary for the support of the government and its existing public institutions. Gravning v. Zellmer, 291 N.W.2d 751 (S.D.1980) citing Hodges v. Snyder, 43 S.D. 166, 178 N.W. 575 (1920). In H.B. 1388 as amended by H.B. 1389, the legislature declared that the Act was necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety. The legislature declared the Act was in support of state government and its existing institutions. As long as the law falls within one of the two classes excepted from referendum, the legislature may declare an emergency. Thus, for the emergency clause of the Act to be constitutionally effective pursuant to Art. III, § 22, we need only answer your first question. Culhane v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, 65 S.D. 337, 274 N.W. 315 (1937). Therefore, we decline to pass on your second question. Respectfully submitted this 29th day of April, 1986. JON FOSHEIM Chief Justice ROBERT E. MORGAN GEORGE W. WUEST RICHARD W. SABERS Associate Justices As noted in the advisory opinion, South Dakota Constitution Article V, § 5, provides, inter alia: The Governor has authority to require opinions of the Supreme Court upon important questions of law involved in the exercise of his executive power and upon solemn occasions. The advisory opinion states, however, that we will accommodate the Governor's request because of the financial plight of agriculture and the necessity to provide prompt financing therefor. As a native son of Hand County, and having experienced the rigors of the dirty thirties, I fully sympathize with the plight of South Dakota farmers and the plight of American farmers in general, but, these are not constitutional reasons for accommodating the request. On the contrary, this Court should accommodate a request only if we are justified under the Constitution and are being consonant with our duty thereunder. In re Opinion of the Judges, 58 S.D. 72, 74, 234 N.W. 671, 672 (1931). Otherwise, we should exercise extraordinary caution and conservatism when answering such questions. In re House Resolution No. 30, 10 S.D. 249, 251, 72 N.W. 892, 892 (1897). See also, In re Opinion of the Supreme Court, 87 S.D. 399, 402, 209 N.W.2d 668, 670 (1973); and In re Chapter 6, Session Laws of 1890, 8 S.D. 274, 276, 66 N.W. 310, 311 (1896). Under this advisory opinion, it appears that this Court could very well accommodate any serious statewide question, triggered by economic adversity of divers industry, which surfaces in the future. This is not a correct basis for answering the Governor's request. However, because I conclude an important question of law exists, which involves the exercise of executive power, I agree that we should answer the Governor's request. Before addressing the propriety of the emergency clause here in question, several legal concepts must be noted. First, regular legislative enactments take effect on the first day of July after its passage. SDCL 2-14-16. See also, South Dakota Constitution Article III, § 22. Second, legislative enactments containing a declaration of necessity and an emergency clause, become effective immediately or at such time as fixed by the legislature. Hodges v. Snyder, 43 S.D. 166, 175, 178 N.W. 575, 577 (1920). Third, the people have the right to refer any legislative enactment to a vote of the people except laws declared by the act to be necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety of the state, or for the support of the government and its existing public institutions. Baker v. Jackson, 372 N.W.2d 142, 144 (S.D.1985). See also, South Dakota Constitution Article III, § 1; Hodges, 43 S.D. at 174-75, 178 N.W. at 577; and Lowe, Restrictions on Initiative and Referendum Powers in South Dakota, 28 S.D.L. Rev. 53, 55-56 n. 16 (1982). And fourth, an unwarranted and void emergency clause cannot prevent the filing of a proper referendum petition and the validity of such an emergency clause can be challenged by the timely filing of a proper referendum petition. Kanaly v. State By & Through Janklow, 368 N.W.2d 819, 828 (S.D.1985); State ex rel. Richards v. Whisman, 36 S.D. 260, 266-67, 154 N.W. 707, 708-09 (1915), error dismissed, 241 U.S. 643, 36 S.Ct. 449, 60 L.Ed. 1218 (1916). Turning now to the propriety of this emergency clause, in In re Opinion of the Judges, 58 S.D. at 74, 234 N.W. at 672, this Court stated that an act which abolished the South Dakota Rural Credit Board and created a New Rural Board for the Management and Control of the System of Rural Credits, was not an act necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health, or safety, and was not an act necessary for the support of the state government. Thus, based on that case, it can be reasonably asserted that the present act in question is not necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health or safety or for the support of the state government. However, in Culhane v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc. of U.S., 65 S.D. 337, 342-43, 274 N.W. 315, 318 (1937), we held that a moratorium law on foreclosures, when crops were poor, prices low, and drought affected the state, was a law relative to the state's economy and society and that economy and society were equal to a declaration that the law was necessary for the immediate preservation of the public peace, health and safety. Thus, the Culhane case appears to be more closely aligned with the present scenario, and based thereon, the first question can be answered affirmatively. Justice Polley appears to have written In re Opinion of the Judges, 58 S.D. 72, 234 N.W. 671, but he dissented without opinion in Culhane. If this advisory opinion expressed that the Governor's multi-million dollar question involves an important question of law, and under the Constitution and our judicial duties thereunder, we are therefore required to answer it, I would be inclined to join it with a sharper appreciation. Nevertheless, I do join it upon the constitutional mandate of answering a most important question of law. And I do specially join itupon that basisemploying Culhane as an underpinning. FRANK E. HENDERSON Associate Justice