Opinion ID: 402058
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Inapplicability of the Substantial and Material Question of Fact Test

Text: 30 The second reason given by the Commission to justify the denial of the requested hearing under section 316 was that appellant had failed to raise a substantial and material question of fact which would require a hearing. J.A. at 136. We reject this justification for two reasons: (1) it is premised on an erroneous legal standard and (2) it finds no substantial support in the record in this case. 31 In ruling that no hearing was required because appellant failed in its written pleadings to raise a substantial and material question of fact, the Commission has employed a legal test that is not authorized by section 316. What the Commission has done is to limit appellant's rights under section 316 by resort to a standard imported from section 309(d)(2) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 309(d)(2) (1976). This latter section states, in part, that, with respect to a petition to deny any application, 32 (i)f the Commission finds on the basis of the application, the pleadings filed, or other matters which it may officially notice that there are no substantial and material questions of fact and that a grant of the application would be consistent with subsection (a) of this section, it shall make the grant, deny the petition, and issue a concise statement of the reasons for denying the petition, which statement shall dispose of all substantial issues raised by the petition. 33 No such provision appears in section 316. See note 5 supra. Thus, while the Commission may properly dispose of a petition to deny without a hearing under section 309, no comparable authority exists with respect to claims raising legally cognizable issues under section 316. 34 It is undisputed that many claims arising under section 316 also may be covered by section 309. However, the former section is more narrow in scope, limited to cases involving only modifications of station licenses or construction permits. In this limited category of cases, Congress has made it plain that affected licensees shall, upon request, have an opportunity to show cause by public hearing why an order of modification should not issue. To follow the test enunciated by the Commission in this case, allowing for summary disposition whenever it appears that there are no substantial and material questions of fact, would be to nullify the clear mandate of section 316. This we will not do. 35 Furthermore, on the facts of this case, we do not understand how the Commission could conclude that there were no substantial questions of fact to be resolved. In support of its petition, appellant submitted engineering statements prepared by the firm of Hatfield and Dawson. See J.A. at 19, 88. Intervenor then offered engineering reports prepared by Jules Cohen & Associates to dispute appellant's claim of additional interference attributable to the proposed new antenna site. See J.A. at 48, 105. The Commission, relying on the methodology set forth in 47 C.F.R. § 73.313 (1980), stated that it agree(d) with KSRF's predictions. 79 F.C.C.2d at 951. The Commission also added that it was unable to determine the reasons for KOCM's (engineering) miscalculations. Id. 10 36 There are at least two obvious flaws in the Commission's analysis. First, the Commission's reliance on the calculation methodology specified in 47 C.F.R. § 73.313, to the exclusion of appellant's engineering studies, was misplaced. By its terms, section 73.313 indicates that the calculation methodology set forth therein is to be used for predictions of coverage ... without regard to interference and only for the same purposes as relate to the use of field strength contours as specified in § 73.311. 11 Appellant's engineering reports explained that although the section 73.313 methodology is relatively easy to apply, it makes no allowances for differences in propagation resulting from variations in terrain, and it fails to take into account unique conditions such as the line of sight (free space) conditions in the present case. Based on their own method of calculation, appellant's engineers concluded that additional interference would in fact occur if KSRF were permitted to move its transmitter. 37 Second, in relying solely on the methodology set forth in section 73.313, the Commission not surprisingly concluded that it was unable to determine the reasons for KOCM's (alleged engineering) miscalculations. 79 F.C.C.2d at 951 (emphasis added). The Commission obviously understood that KOCM (was claiming) that a new method of predicting potential interference must be utilized in this case; the Commission nevertheless concluded that no hearing was required because appellant had failed to adequately document this different method. J.A. at 136. It is difficult to comprehend the Commission's reasoning. One of the purposes of the hearing requirement under section 316 would be to permit a party to explain and verify engineering calculations with respect to claims of alleged modifications. It is no answer for the Commission, in the face of highly disputed factual questions, to summarily dismiss a claim that otherwise raises a legally cognizable issue under section 316 merely because the Commission remains puzzled by the claim. See note 10 supra. 38 If anything, this case highlights rather well the reasons why a hearing should have been held: the contesting parties have relied on factual assertions that are flatly contradictory; there are difficult and confusing technical issues to be resolved; there is a serious dispute over the proper methodology to be used in measuring interference; and the Commission has openly admitted to being confused with respect to appellant's claim. The confusion expressed by the Commission in this case very likely would have been cured if a hearing had been held as required under section 316 and appropriate findings had been made on the issues in dispute. 39