Opinion ID: 399121
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Should the Commission Have Granted Fewer Than All of the

Text: 48 Applications? 49 In the Initial Decision, the ALJ stated that it would (be) folly to recommend even a partial denial of any of the applications in this proceeding. Initial Decision at 98. Appellants contend that this was error because, according to appellants, section 10922 of the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, 49 U.S.C. § 10922 (1981), and the National Transportation Policy, 49 U.S.C. § 10101 (1981), compel Commission consideration of whether to grant fewer than all of the applications. In other words, appellants would have us require the Commission, in multiple application cases, to quantify the amount of service needed and to dispense it to the corresponding number of applicants. 50 Initially, we note that appellants' argument, although premised on the statutory requirements, draws a confusing parallel to the judicially created Ashbacker doctrine. See Ashbacker Radio Co. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 66 S.Ct. 148, 90 L.Ed. 108 (1945). The Ashbacker doctrine requires the Commission, in cases of mutual economic exclusivity, to hear all competing applications together in order to decide which of them should be granted. Thus, (i)f the grant of one of several applications for a new route does, as a matter of economic necessity, preclude the grant of any other application, the Commission should hear the applications together. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB, 275 F.2d 632, 638 (D.C.Cir.1959). In this common sense manner, each applicant is assured a meaningful hearing on its application. 51 Appellants conceded at oral argument, though, that they do not rely on the procedural Ashbacker doctrine for their substantive claim. Rather, they rely on the statutory requirements for the Commission to further the public interest. As the Commission itself has noted, (o)nce a need has been proved by any one of several applicants seeking the same authority, or by all of them collectively, the public interest must control the determination as to which shall receive the operating right. Kroblin Refrigerated Xpress, Inc., Extension-Denison, Iowa, 96 M.C.C. 233, 238 (1964). The Commission has also established a list of criteria to be considered in making this determination. 11 52 But appellants' argument mistakenly assumes that the Kroblin method of quantifying the necessary amount of service must apply in all multiple application cases. In reality, the Kroblin criteria apply only where a need is shown for a new service and more than the necessary number of carriers proffer their services to meet such need. Id. at 237 (emphasis added). See Herrin Transportation Company Extension-Atlanta, Georgia, 114 M.C.C. 571, 601 (1971) (the Commission must decide among competing carriers when, inter alia, there is not, in (the Commission's) opinion, sufficient traffic to sustain all of the additional motor carrier operations here proposed). Thus, the Kroblin substantive criteria are used in situations similar to those requiring use of the Ashbacker procedure: in cases of mutual economic exclusivity, the competing applications must be consolidated according to Ashbacker, and the Commission must carefully choose among them according to Kroblin. See Western Gillette, Inc., Extension-Louisiana, 132 M.C.C. 325, 341-47 (1980). Because appellants' evidence did not show that the instant applications were in any sense mutually exclusive-and the entire record evidence showed that the applicants' services were needed by the present (and growing) shipping public 12 -the Commission did not have to dispense measured quanta of motor carrier services. 53 In fact, we are not certain that the Commission will have to use the Kroblin criteria at all under the more liberal new law. 13 The new law has altered the definition of the public interest so as to favor easier entry into shipping markets; it has also placed a clear burden on protestants to defeat such entry once a prima facie showing of need for new services has been made. These factors counsel for a more generous decisionmaking standard in multiple application cases. However, we find only that the Commission did not err under the old standard and that the new law could not require more.