Opinion ID: 1949728
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Should We Impose a Greater Sanction?

Text: In this case, the Board and Bar Counsel are not seeking the imposition of identical reciprocal discipline. The Board acknowledges that the discipline it recommendsa five-year suspension with a requirement to prove fitness prior to reinstatementhas the same practical effect as disbarment. [7] Although Ditton must meet certain conditions before he may resume his practice in Virginia, those conditions are different in kind from, and far less onerous than, a fitness showing in the District. Compare Va. S.Ct. R. 6:4-13(I)(8)(c) with In re Cater, 887 A.2d 1, 6 (D.C.2005). If we add a requirement that respondent demonstrate his fitness to practice law before he may be reinstated, we will be imposing a greater sanction than was imposed in Virginia. The `authority of the Board to recommend greater discipline, and of this court to impose it, is well established' in reciprocal disciplinary proceedings. In re Jacoby, 945 A.2d 1193, 1197 (D.C.2008) (quoting In re Demos, 875 A.2d 636, 641 (D.C. 2005)). [O]ur authority to deviate from imposing identical discipline resides in § 11(f)(2) of D.C. Bar Rule XI. In re Drury, 638 A.2d 60, 62 (D.C.1994). These deviations may result in either greater or lesser sanctions than those imposed in the foreign jurisdiction. Jacoby, 945 A.2d at 1198 (citing In re Coury, 526 A.2d 25, 26 (D.C.1987)). However, as a prerequisite, the attorney or Bar Counsel must demonstrate, or this court must find on the face of the record on which discipline is based, by clear and convincing evidence, that one or more of the enumerated subsection (c) exceptions applies. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(f)(2); Jacoby, 945 A.2d at 1198; In re Spann, 711 A.2d 1262, 1263 (D.C.1998) (Pursuant to [§ 11(f)(2)], the Board can recommend a different sanction where it believes an exception applies.). In this case, the Board did not find, nor has Bar Counsel argued, that any of the § 11(c) exceptions applies. Thus, they seem to agree that the findings in Virginia would not support the substantially different discipline of a fitness requirement. Instead, both the Board and Bar Counsel have recommended that we impose the additional sanction based on the standard applied in original proceedings. We see nothing in our rules that would preclude this pairing of reciprocal and original discipline. Indeed, that appears to be the practical consequence of augmenting the record on which reciprocal discipline is based. See Maxwell, 798 A.2d at 529-31; Zilberberg, 612 A.2d at 835. However, we have not yet been presented with a record and findings that justify the imposition of a fitness requirement as an original matter. See Cater, 887 A.2d at 24 (record must contain clear and convincing evidence that casts a serious doubt upon the attorney's continuing fitness to practice law). [8]