Opinion ID: 2976812
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Delay in Prosecution

Text: The record indicates that the sentencing judge considered--and rejected--the delay in prosecution as a mitigating factor. At the sentencing hearing, the judge acknowledged receipt of the defendant’s “rather extensive” sentencing memorandum. JA 107. Defense counsel began his argument by stating that the most important aspect of the case was the two-year delay between the commission of the crime and Sylvester’s sentencing. JA 108. When the judge interjected, inquiring whether that circumstance was the most important factor, defense counsel answered in the negative. JA 108-109. After presenting the factor that he considered most important (i.e., that Sylvester had undergone significant change since the time the offense occurred), defense counsel returned to his argument that the delay in prosecution should be considered as a mitigating factor. JA 112. The judge observed that the defendant had not filed a motion to dismiss on this basis, and asked whether any legal grounds supported the defendant’s argument. Defense counsel answered: “It’s just a fact that we would ask that you would consider.” Id. When he pronounced Sylvester’s sentence, the district judge stated that he had considered the sentencing guidelines as one factor for determining a sentence that was sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of § 3553(a). JA 116. He concluded that the nature and circumstances of the underlying offense, the defendant’s previous contacts with law enforcement, and the defendant’s status a felon made the offense a serious one. Id. The judge indirectly acknowledged the delay in initiating prosecution when he stated that Sylvester’s “having a weapon and drug paraphernalia in a house some couple of years before having parole revoked” informed his 7 United States v. Sylvester 07-1251 understanding of the nature and circumstances of the underlying offense.5 Id. In light of the exchanges between the judge and Sylvester’s counsel during the sentencing hearing, and the judge’s explicit acknowledgment of the time that had elapsed between the conduct giving rise to the federal charge and the defendant’s sentencing, this Court finds no plain error in the district judge’s process as it concerns the defendant’s delay in prosecution argument.