Opinion ID: 2599993
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The concept of attendant circumstances

Text: ¶ 28 The majority's fundamental error is to ignore the difference between a person's conduct and the circumstances surrounding that conduct. In criminal law, liability is often predicated on a combination of mental state, conduct, the conduct's results, and attendant circumstancesthe facts surrounding the conduct. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.2(c), at 12 (1986) (The totality of these various itemsconduct, mental fault, plus attendant circumstances and specified result when required by the definition of a crime may be said to constitute the `elements' of the crime.). The majority is right that criminal liability usually does not attach when the conduct is involuntary. But the same is not true for attendant circumstances. ¶ 29 This point is illustrated by a different statute. RCW 46.20.342(1) makes it a crime for any person to drive a motor vehicle in this state while that person is in a suspended or revoked status. The conduct is the act of driving. An attendant circumstance is a suspended or revoked license. Rarely will a person voluntarily have his or her license suspended or revoked. The Department of Licensing usually does this against the licensee's will. But that does not matter. Criminal liability flows from the conduct of driving at the same time that the attendant circumstance a suspended or revoked driver's license is present, even though the attendant circumstance is usually involuntary. ¶ 30 Sentence enhancements typically relate to attendant circumstances. As the majority observes correctly, The purpose of sentencing enhancements is to provide legislative guidance to courts in calibrating the appropriate punishment for crimes based on relevant circumstances surrounding the underlying conduct.  Majority at 707 (emphasis added). And as the Court of Appeals noted in its opinion, a sentence enhancement is not a separate sentence of a separate substantive crime. State v. Eaton, 143 Wash.App. 155, 160, 177 P.3d 157 (2008). Instead, an enhancement statute presupposes the defendant committed a crime involving conductin this case, possession of methamphetamineand increases the sentencing range when an attendant circumstance is present. See State v. Barnes, 153 Wash.2d 378, 385, 103 P.3d 1219 (2005). ¶ 31 RCW 9.94A.533(5) follows this pattern. To the contrary of what the majority suggests, RCW 9.94A.533(5) does not deal with conduct, namely the act of entering a particular area. Rather, RCW 9.94A.533(5) describes a circumstancethe offender's locationattending the conduct prohibited by another statute. When a person violates RCW 69.50.4013(1) by possessing a controlled substance while in a county jail or state correctional facility, the legislature requires the sentencing court to impose a sentence enhancement of 12 months to the standard sentence range. RCW 9.94A.533(5). In this way, RCW 9.94A.533(5) provide[s] legislative guidance to courts in calibrating the appropriate punishment for crimes based on relevant circumstances surrounding the underlying conduct. Majority at 707. The statute indicates that possession of illegal drugs is already culpable, but it becomes even more culpable when done at a given location. RCW 9.94A.533(5) is unconcerned with how a person got to jail. Rather, RCW 9.94A.533(5) provides additional punishment for a person's voluntary misconduct once there. ¶ 32 In this case, although Eaton did not bring about the attendant circumstance defined in RCW 9.94A.533(5), the underlying criminal conduct of possessing drugs is a justifiable basis for criminal liability. Possession is a continuing offense lasting as long as the act of possession does, 1 Wayne R. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.1(d), at 430 n. 46 (2d ed.2003), and Eaton voluntarily continued his possession. This case would be very different if Eaton were arguing that his possession became involuntary due to the arrest or transport of him to jail. But he does not make that argument, and Eaton does not contest his conviction under RCW 69.50.4013(1). So the majority is wrong to suggest that Eaton was punished for involuntary conduct. ¶ 33 The majority claims that Eaton did not have the requisite ability to choose. Majority at 709. But criminal liability was still within Eaton's control; he could have simply ceased possessing drugs. Eaton did not choose to enter the Clark County Jail, but he had a choice about his course of conduct upon his arrival. By continuing his possession while he was in jail, rather than relinquishing the methamphetamine beforehand, Eaton subjected himself to the 12-month enhancement provided in RCW 9.94A.533(5). The location of the offense was an attendant circumstance triggering additional punishment for the predicate crime.