Opinion ID: 1738151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: issue #4: did the clause in the deed excepting and reserving the railroad right of way except the land beneath the right of way from the conveyance?

Text: An exception from a grant has been held to be something not granted and which does not pass at all from the grantor, while a reservation is the taking back of something which has been included in the grant. Traeger v. Traeger, 35 Wis.2d 708, 712, 151 N.W.2d 681 (1967). However, while this court has recognized that there is a distinction between those terms `it is also true that whether a particular clause in a deed will be considered an exception or a reservation depends not so much upon the words used as upon the nature of the right or thing excepted or reserved. . . . `. . . And the meaning can best be arrived at by ascertaining if possible the intention of the parties, as evidenced by the words of the deed, the object they had in view, and the circumstances under which the deed was executed.' Traeger, supra, 35 Wis.2d at 712-13. The deed by which Jane Tews conveyed her interest to Jake Cook said: There is excepted and reserved from this conveyance the right of way of the Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway as the same now crossess (sic) said premises. Even if the court were to rely on the distinction between the terms excepted and reserved, the meaning of the deed would not become any clearer since both terms are used. Thus, the court must ascertain the intention of the parties. Did Ms. Tews retain a fee simple interest in the land occupied by the railroad right of way, or was she merely giving notice to her grantee of the presence of the right of way? Haines v. McLean, 154 Tex. 272, 281, 276 S.W.2d 777 (1955) stated the rule that an exception of an easement from a conveyance conveys the fee to the entire parcel: An instrument of conveyance which conveys land definitely described in such instrument, and then excepts from such conveyance a road, railroad right of way, canal right of way, etc., as such, occupying a mere easement on, over, or across the land conveyed, conveys the fee to the entire tract, and the exception only operates to render the conveyance or grant subject to the easement. Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Ward, 100 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1939) stood for the proposition that exceptions are construed strictly against the grantor. The reason for this rule is to avoid a construction. . . . which would produce the unreasonable result of splitting into two pieces a tract of land, which existed as one tract, subject only to an easement, and which, in reason, must be considered to have been conveyed as such, and not to have been split into separate parts, with a thin wedge of land between. Shell Petroleum Corp., supra, 100 F.2d at 779. As then Circuit Judge William Howard Taft said in Paine v. Consumers' Forwarding & Storage Co., 71 F. 626, 632 (6th Cir. 1895): The evils resulting from the retention in remote dedicators of the fee in gores and strips, which for many years are valueless because of the public easement in them, and which then become valuable by reason of an abandonment of a public use, have led courts to strained constructions to include the fee of such gores and strips in deeds of the abutting lots. [9] We find the holdings of the cases above cited persuasive and conclude that Ms. Tews did not retain a fee interest in the land occupied by the railroad right of way when she conveyed the parcel to the Pollnows' predecessor in title. As a result, the conveyances to DNR did not give the DNR title to the land. Title to the former right of way reverted to the Pollnows. By the Court.  Judgment and order reversed and cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.