Opinion ID: 2576140
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The legislature clearly intended to punish a defendant multiple times if the defendant uses a firearm in the commission of a felony.

Text: a. 1990 legislative history In 1990, the legislature amended HRS § 134-6 as follows (bracketed material deleted, new material underlined): § 134-6 Possession or use of firearm in the commission of a felony; [Place] place to keep firearms; loaded firearms; penalty. (a) It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly possess or intentionally use or threaten to use a firearm while engaged in the commission of a felony, whether the firearm was loaded or not, and whether operable or not. .... [(c)] (d) Any person violating this section by possessing, using or threatening to use a firearm while engaged in the commission of a felony shall be guilty of a class A felony. 990 Haw. Sess. L. Act 195, § 2 at 422 (footnote omitted). In section 5 of the same bill, the legislature also amended language in HRS § 706-660.1.1990 Haw. Sess. L. Act 195, § 2 at 423-24. While the amendments to the mandatory minimum statute are not relevant (because they involve semi-automatic firearms) the fact that the legislature amended HRS § 134-6 in the same bill that contained the mandatory minimum sentence statute, HRS § 706-660.1, shows that the legislature was aware of both punishments and intended to punish a defendant who committed a felony while using a firearm multiple times. b. 1993 legislative history In 1993, the legislature amended HRS § 134-6 as follows (deleted material bracketed; new material underlined): § 134-6 [Possession] Carrying or use of firearm in the commission of a separate felony; place to keep firearms; loaded firearms; penalty. (a) It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly [possess] carry on the person or have within the person's immediate control or intentionally use or threaten to use a firearm while engaged in the commission of a separate felony, whether the firearm was loaded or not, and whether operable or not[.]; provided that a person shall not be prosecuted under this subsection where the separate felony is: (1) A felony offense otherwise defined by this chapter; (2) The felony offense of reckless endangering in the first degree under section 707-713; (3) The felony offense of terroristic threatening in the first degree under section 707-716(a), 707-716(b), and 707-716(d); or (4) The felony offenses of criminal property damage in the first degree under section 708-820 and criminal property damage in the second degree under section 708-821 and the firearm is the instrument or means by which the property damage is caused. (b) It shall be unlawful for a person to knowingly possess a firearm with the intent to facilitate the commission of a felony offense involving the distribution of a controlled substance, whether the firearm was loaded or not, and whether operable or not. 1993 Haw. Sess. L. Act 239, § 1 at 418. The House Judiciary Committee stated that this amendment was to clarify that HRS § 134-6 was not intended to apply to certain felonies which already have enhanced penalties for identical conduct. Hse. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 472, in 1993 House Journal, at 1163. This amendment is significant, because while the legislature amended the statute to exempt certain felonies, it did not exempt the present situation, where the defendant is convicted of a separate felony (to which the mandatory minimum is attached) and use of a firearm. [21] c. 1999 legislative history In 1999, the legislature amended HRS § 134-6 as follows (new material underlined): (e) Any person violating subsection (a) or (b) shall be guilty of a class A felony. Any person violating this section by carrying or possessing a loaded firearm or by carrying or possessing a loaded or unloaded pistol or revolver without a license issued as provided in section 134-9 shall be guilty of a class B felony. Any person violating this section by carrying or possessing an unloaded firearm, other than a pistol or revolver, shall be guilty of a class C felony. A conviction and sentence under subsection (a) or (b) shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any conviction and sentence for the separate felony; provided that the sentence imposed under subsection (a) or (b) may run concurrently or consecutively with the sentence for the separate felony. 1999 Haw. Sess. L. Act 12, § 1 at 12. The legislature made this amendment to clarify the law after this court issued Jumila, where we held that a defendant could not be punished for use of a firearm and a separate, underlying felony. The Senate Judiciary Committee stated that: The purpose of this bill is to clarify that any conviction or sentence for carrying or use of a firearm in the commission of a separate felony shall be in addition to and not in lieu of any conviction and sentence for the separate felony.... Your Committee believes that stronger and more certain penalties should be instituted to discourage the use of firearms in the commission of a felony and to provide a deterrent effect against such use. Your Committee finds that clarification in the law is necessary due to a recent Hawaii Supreme Court case, State v. Jumila, 87 Hawai`i 1, 950 P.2d 1201 (1998), in which the Court held that the offense of carrying or using a firearm in the commission of a felony was not punishable as a separate offense from the underlying felony. In Jumila, the majority and the dissent agreed that the legislature could, if desired, permit the conviction and sentencing for both offenses. However, the majority and dissent disagreed as to whether the legislature had done so. The majority found that there was insufficient legislative history to conclude that the legislature had intended separate convictions and sentencing. The dissent disagreed, citing prior case law and language in committee reports indicating that carrying or using a firearm in the commission of a felony could be charged in addition to the underlying offense. Your Committee agrees with the dissent. Senate Standing Committee Report No. 1217 (1993 Senate Journal at 1210) clearly states [A]n offender who uses a firearm in the commission of a felony can be charged with, in addition to the underlying offense a class A felony under section 134-6(a) and therefore be subject to enhanced penalty. (Emphasis added.) At the same time, your Committee recognizes and seeks to address another shortcoming in the law, as pointed out by the Jumila dissent. The dissent noted that there was insufficient legislative intent to permit cumulative sentencing under section 134-6(a) and section 706-660.1 (sentence of imprisonment for use of a firearm in a felony). Your Committee believes that when the application of both statutes is based upon the same underlying felony, cumulative punishment is permissible. Sen. Stand. Comm. Rep. No. 843, in 1993 Senate Journal, at 1296 (Emphases added, third emphasis in original). This legislative history clearly shows that the legislature intended to punish defendants multiple times for both the underlying, separate felony (with a conviction and a mandatory minimum) and with a conviction for use of a firearm. We note that our recent decision in State v. Vellina, 106 Hawai`i 441, 106 P.3d 364 (2005), and the recent decision of the ICA in State v. Coelho, 107 Hawai`i 273, 112 P.3d 759 (2005), are consistent with, but distinguishable from, our decision in this case. [22] In Vellina, the defendant allegedly stole two firearms from an apartment. Vellina, 106 Hawai`i at 445, 106 P.3d at 368. The defendant entered a plea of no contest to the charges against him, which included two counts of theft in the first degree. Id. at 444, 106 P.3d at 367. The prosecution requested, and the court granted, mandatory minimum terms of imprisonment (pursuant to HRS §§ 706-660.1(1)(c) and 706-660.1(3)(c)) as to both of the theft counts. Id. We stated: Vellina did not possess, use, or threaten the use of a firearm while engaged in the commission of the felonies of theft of a firearm and a semi-automatic firearm. Vellina's theft of a firearm was the entire felony; in other words, there was no underlying felony that Vellina committed while possessing or using a firearm. Id. at 447-48, 106 P.3d at 370-71. In Coelho, the defendant was a felon who was on probation; one of the terms of the defendant's probation was that he was not to possess any type of firearm. While executing a search warrant, police officers recovered a firearm from the trunk of the defendant's vehicle. The defendant was convicted of prohibited possession of a firearm and sentenced to a ten-year term of imprisonment. The trial court also imposed a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for the possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Based upon statutory construction and Hawai`i case law, the ICA concluded that the trial court could not convict the defendant for possession of a firearm and sentence him for a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment based upon the same possession of a firearm because the legislature did not intend that the mandatory minimum term be applied where the entirety of the felonious conduct is the use or the possession of a firearm. Vellina and Coelho are thus both distinguishable from the present case. In the present case, the mandatory minimum sentence was attached to a separate (from use of a firearm) felony  attempted murder; in contrast, in Vellina and Coelho, there was no separate felony and the trial courts improperly attached the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment to the use or possession of a firearm conviction. [23]