Opinion ID: 686803
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Award Of Sanctions Under Section 1988

Text: 23 Defendants acknowledge that the district court erroneously awarded attorney's fees under Rule 11, but argue that the fee award should not be disturbed because they are prevailing parties under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. 7 We disagree. Section 1988 provides in relevant part: 24 In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of section[ ] ... 1983 ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as a part of the costs. 25 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1988. Despite its neutral wording, the purpose of Section 1988 was to encourage meritorious civil rights litigation by allowing prevailing plaintiffs to obtain an award of attorney's fees almost as a matter of course but prevailing defendants only if the suit was frivolous. Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 829 (7th Cir.1984). A plaintiff may be awarded attorney's fees as a prevailing party if he succeeds on  'any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit he sought in bringing suit.'  Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1939, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (quoting Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 278-79 (1st Cir.1978)). In contrast, a prevailing defendant must demonstrate that the plaintiff brought his action in subjective bad faith, or that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith. Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421, 98 S.Ct. 694, 700, 54 L.Ed.2d 648 (1978); Unity Ventures v. County of Lake, 894 F.2d 250, 253 (7th Cir.1990). Moreover, 26 In seeking to determine whether a suit is frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, courts have focused on several factors. Among those considered are whether the issue is one of first impression requiring judicial resolution; whether the controversy is sufficiently based upon a real threat of injury to the plaintiff; whether the trial court has made a finding that the suit was frivolous under the Christiansburg guidelines; and whether the record would support such a finding. 27 Unity Ventures, 894 F.2d at 253-54. Here, defendants claim that the suit was frivolous and they are entitled to Section 1988 fees because Judge Mueller's decision should have alerted plaintiff and his counsel that the complaint did not contain viable causes of action. (Appellees' Brief at 17). We disagree for the following reasons. 28 Judge Mueller's decision addressed the propriety of continuing the temporary injunction that had been entered against defendants. In considering that question, she considered whether the injunction was necessary to preserve the status quo, the lack of an adequate remedy at law, the probability of plaintiff's success on the merits, and the irreparable harm to plaintiff if the injunction did not issue. The judge quickly disposed of the state law claims after concluding that there was an adequate remedy at law for the breach of contract, and noting that Wisconsin did not recognize the tort of bad faith breach of an employment contract. She then noted that the critical question was whether Bisciglia had shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits of his due process claim under Section 1983. 29 In this regard, the judge determined that plaintiff's inadequate notice claim would no longer support a claim for denial of due process because of the intervening passage of time. The judge then explained that [t]he real crux of plaintiff's due process argument goes to the issue of whether certain members of the School Board are biased in some fashion prohibited by the due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment. (Appellant's Appendix at 32). After noting the presumption that the School Board would act with honesty and integrity, the judge correctly stated that Bisciglia would have to show a high degree of bias disqualifying the adjudicator. (Id. at 33). After careful review of the facts and the controlling law, Judge Mueller determined that the record did not reveal that degree of bias on the part of any member of the Board. Id. In reaching this conclusion, the judge noted: 30 While not insensitive to the concerns expressed by Mr. Bisciglia, this court does not possess a roving commission to do good. It must make a decision based upon the record and the law. And the law is clear that, at this stage of the proceedings and on this record, a temporary injunction may not issue to prohibit the defendants from meeting to take action on the plaintiff's employment status. 31 (Id. at 35). Although this decision was certainly supported by the law and the facts, unlike the district court, we are not persuaded that it should form the basis for an award of fees. 8 32 The judge merely denied plaintiff's motion for a temporary injunction, but properly acknowledged that there are situations in which the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 1464, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975). The decision alerted plaintiff to the fact that his affidavits regarding School Board members' public statements would be insufficient to overcome their presumption of honesty and to prevent the School Board from sitting as an unbiased tribunal as the complaint sought. However, by that time, plaintiff had achieved one of his objectives: time to prepare for the termination hearing. However, shortly thereafter, the case was removed to federal court, and the litigation continued. In fact, as the district court noted, defendants did not even move for summary judgment until three months after Judge Mueller's decision. Also, the motion for summary judgment was not filed until after it became clear that a newly reconstituted School Board would be considering Bisciglia's termination. Furthermore, the record indicates that settlement discussions ensued, and that the district court granted Bisciglia several extensions for his response based upon these events. On this record, it is not at all clear that plaintiff was required to voluntarily dismiss his removed federal court action based upon the state court judge's denial of a temporary injunction. Moreover, we find that Bisciglia's failure to immediately abandon his claims does not show subjective bad faith, or that the action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation such that an award of fees under Section 1988 is warranted.