Opinion ID: 1122968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: constitutionality of oregon's death penalty statutes

Text: Finally, defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling his demurrer to the indictment, which challenged the constitutionality of Oregon's death penalty statutes upon several different grounds. We address only one of defendant's constitutional arguments here, concerning post-verdict judicial review of the jury's decision to impose the death penalty. [19] In defendant's view, Oregon's death penalty statutes do not allow for meaningful judicial review of a jury's decision to impose the death penalty. He specifically focuses upon the fourth question[w]hether the defendant should receive a death sentenceand contends that, because that question merely asks the jury's opinion, neither the trial nor the appellate court is able to review a jury's determination under that question. Defendant contends further that such a lack of opportunity for judicial review violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. [20] As we shall explain, because we conclude that judicial review of a jury's determination under the fourth question is available, we reject defendant's constitutional argument. [21] We begin by discussing the nature of post-verdict judicial review generally available in criminal cases. In addition to the type of review available through direct appeal or a post-conviction relief proceeding, a criminal defendant may, through a motion for a judgment of acquittal, request judicial review of a guilty verdict in order to determine whether sufficient evidence supported that verdict. See State v. Stroup, 290 Or. 185, 204-05, 620 P.2d 1359 (1980) (rejecting a defendant's insufficient-evidence challenge because the defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal was based upon other grounds). In criminal cases, [t]his court reviews questions of the sufficiency of the evidence    by examining the evidence in the light most favorable to the state to determine whether a rational trier of fact, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have found the essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.    This court's decision is not whether we believe that defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether the evidence is sufficient for the jury to so find. State v. Cunningham, 320 Or. 47, 63, 880 P.2d 431 (1994), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 115 S.Ct. 1317, 131 L.Ed.2d 198 (1995) (internal citation omitted). The United States Supreme Court has determined that the rational juror standard, such as that quoted above, satisfies the commands of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791-92, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Indeed, the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson is the genesis for the rational juror standard applied to criminal cases in Oregon. See State v. Harris, 288 Or. 703, 721, 609 P.2d 798 (1980) (discussing application of that standard in the light of Jackson ). [22] The rational juror standard applies to a jury's decision to impose the death penalty, as well as to criminal convictions. See Wagner I, 305 Or. at 169, 752 P.2d 1136 (concluding that, from the decisions of the [United States] Supreme Court[,]    our review must be to determine whether there was evidence from which the jury could have found affirmative answers to [the first] three questions and whether the jury acted according to the law,  including the reasonable doubt requirement for those three questions (emphasis added)); see also Montez I, 309 Or. at 608, 789 P.2d 1352 (stating that [t]he scope of appellate review in death penalty cases is the same as in all other criminal cases). For example, in response to a sufficiency-of-evidence challenge to any one of the first three questions set forth in ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A), (B), or (C), a court must determine whether, based upon the evidence presented, a rational juror could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant acted deliberately, or would be dangerous in the future, or acted in response to provocation by the victim. The issue here is whether the rational juror standard is applicable to the fourth question, which, unlike the first three questions, is not subject to a burden of proof. See ORS 163.150(1)(d) (setting forth the burden of proof requirements for the first three questions); Guzek II, 322 Or. at 255, 906 P.2d 272 (noting that neither party bears any burden of proof on the fourth question). We first emphasize that the fourth question does not carry a burden of proof, because it does not present an issue subject to proof in the traditional sense, rather[,] it frames a discretionary determination for the jury. State v. Wagner, 309 Or. 5, 18, 786 P.2d 93, cert. den. 498 U.S. 879, 111 S.Ct. 212, 112 L.Ed.2d 171 (1990) ( Wagner II ) (emphasis added). Indeed, the legislature enacted the fourth question in order to comply with the requirements of the Supreme Court's decision in Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 327-28, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 2951-52, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989), which concluded that the Eighth Amendment limits a state's ability to narrow jury discretion in considering mitigating evidence. State v. Stevens, 319 Or. 573, 581, 879 P.2d 162 (1994) ( Stevens II ). See generally Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 359-62, 113 S.Ct. 2658, 2664-66, 125 L.Ed.2d 290 (1993) (discussing the Supreme Court's case law concerning the Eighth Amendment and the requirement of guided jury discretion in determining whether to impose the death penalty). In short, the fourth question asks the jury to make a discretionary determination to answer the question whether a defendant should receive the death sentence. It is significant, however, that the jury is guided by the following requirement set forth in ORS 163.150(1)(c)(B): In determining the issue [under the fourth question], the court shall instruct the jury to answer the question `no' if one or more of the jurors find there is any aspect of the defendant's character or background, or any circumstances of the offense, that one or more of the jurors believe would justify a sentence less than death. As that instruction makes clear, a jury's discretionary determination under the fourth question must be based upon the evidence presented at trial. See also Moen, 309 Or. at 93, 786 P.2d 111 (stating that the jury properly was instructed to make a reasoned resolution of the statutory questions based solely on the aggravating and mitigating evidence before [the jury]). In our view, judicial review of a jury's decision to impose the death penalty is not foreclosed by the discretionary nature of the fourth question, nor by the absence of a burden-of-proof requirement for that question. As the preceding paragraph demonstrates, although the fourth question is discretionary and not subject to a burden of proof, a jury's decision under that question still must be based upon the evidence presented at trial. Consequently, we conclude that a court may review a jury's decision under the fourth question in order to determine whether, in view of the evidence, a rational juror, accepting reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have concluded that the defendant should be sentenced to death. That standard recognizes the role of juror discretion in imposing the death penalty, while also providing for judicial review to ensure that a jury's decision rationally is based upon the evidence presented. Because such judicial review is available, defendant's due process argument, which depends upon the lack of opportunity for judicial review, is without foundation. We also reject defendant's assertion that, in the light of the Supreme Court's decision in Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 114 S.Ct. 2331, 129 L.Ed.2d 336 (1994), we must conclude here that Oregon's death penalty statutes unconstitutionally preclude post-verdict judicial review. In Oberg, the Supreme Court held that, as applied to punitive damages awards, Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because the amount of a punitive damages award was not subject to judicial review under Article VII (Amended), section 3, if any evidence supported awarding punitive damages. 512 U.S., at ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2334. Defendant contends that  Oberg    provides criminal defendants with a compelling argument that they are entitled to post-verdict excessiveness review of jury-imposed criminal sanctions. For the reasons that follow, we disagree. First, Oberg concerned an entirely different issuepunitive damagesfrom the issue here. Indeed, the Supreme Court specifically focused upon Oregon's departure from traditional procedures of reviewing punitive damages awards in concluding that Oregon's lack of judicial review violated due process. See Oberg, 512 U.S. at ___ - ___, 114 S.Ct. at 2335-39 (discussing traditional procedures for reviewing punitive damages awards and contrasting Oregon's statutory approach). Secondly, on remand from the Supreme Court, this court concluded that the appropriate post-verdict standard of review of punitive damages awards, under Article VII (Amended), section 3, was to determine whether the award [was] within the range that a rational juror would be entitled to award in the light of the record as a whole. Oberg v. Honda Motor Co., 320 Or. 544, 549, 888 P.2d 8 (1995), cert. den. ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1847, 134 L.Ed.2d 948 (1996). That standard is similar to the standard that we have concluded applies in this case: Whether a rational juror, considering all the evidence, could conclude that a defendant should be sentenced to death. Thirdly, as we already have discussed, Oregon's rational juror standard of review in criminal cases is not grounded in Article VII (Amended), section 3, which was the provision at issue in Oberg. Rather, that standard derives from the Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Virginia . Finally, we note that, unlike in the context of punitive damages, the United States Supreme Court never has held that the Due Process Clause requires excessiveness review in death-penalty cases. In short, we disagree with defendant's assertion that Oberg compels a different outcome here. Our final step in addressing defendant's assignment of error is to apply the rational juror standard of review, as set forth above, to the jury's decision to impose the death penalty in this case. We first note that, although defendant raised the constitutional issue discussed above, he did not raise the issue whether the evidence in this case was insufficient to support the jury's answer to the fourth question. Despite defendant's failure to preserve that issue, however, we conclude, after reviewing the evidence, that a rational juror, accepting all reasonable inferences and reasonable credibility choices, could have concluded that defendant should receive the death penalty. Accordingly, we reject defendant's contention in this assignment of error that we should vacate his sentence of death.