Opinion ID: 2642187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Preclusion of Marie Lunde’s Testimony

Text: We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Boyce v. Soundview Tech. Grp., Inc., 464 F.3d 376, 385 (2d Cir. 2006). An evidentiary ruling that is an abuse of discretion is, however, only reversible if it also affects a party’s substantial rights. See Fed. R. Evid. 103(a). This occurs when, for example, a district court excludes a party’s primary evidence in support of a material fact, and failure to prove that fact defeats the party’s claim. Id. (citing O’Neal v. Esty, 637 F.2d 846, 848 (2d Cir. 1980)). In order to preserve a claim of error, a party must make an offer of proof as to the content of the excluded evidence where “the significance of the excluded evidence is not obvious” or “it is not clear what the testimony of the witness would have been.” Henry v. Wyeth Pharms., Inc., 616 F.3d 134, 151-52 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Fortunato v. Ford Motor Co., 464 F.2d 962, 967 (2d Cir. 1972)); see also Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). For excluded evidence, an offer of proof is sufficient if, at the very least, “a party informs the court of its substance.” Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(2). 2 Here, we conclude that Robinson failed to preserve any claim of error related to the magistrate judge’s decision to preclude Lunde’s testimony at trial because Robinson did not make a sufficient offer of proof as to the content of Lunde’s possible testimony. While Robinson made several generalized and speculative statements prior to trial suggesting that Lunde may have heard or witnessed at least part of the alleged incident, those statements were inadequate to inform “the court of its substance.” In addition, Robinson has not shown that the magistrate judge’s ruling affected his substantial rights because there is no indication, aside from Robinson’s speculative assertions, that Lunde’s testimony, if it had been allowed, would have benefitted Robinson’s case. Considering these circumstances, in addition to those cited in the magistrate judge’s October 28, 2011 order, we conclude that the decision to preclude Lunde’s testimony at trial was not an abuse of discretion.