Opinion ID: 2792379
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: “the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party

Text: against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified” or the excluded evidence would have been offered; (2) “the ability of that party to cure the prejudice”; (3) the extent to which allowing such witnesses or evidence would “disrupt the or- derly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases in the court”; (4) any “bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court’s order”; and (5) the importance of the excluded evidence. ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 298 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Ass’n, 559 F.2d 894, 904–05 (3d Cir. 1977)). “The importance of the evidence is often the most significant factor.” Id. (citing Sowell v. Butcher & Singer, Inc., 926 F.2d 289, 302 (3d Cir. 1991) and Pennypack, 559 F.2d at 904). A decision to exclude testimony should be disturbed only if there is “‘a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment.’” Id. at 293 (quoting In re TMI Litig., 193 F.3d 613, 666 (3d Cir. 1999)). Here, we do not have such a definite and firm conviction for several reasons. We agree with the district court’s assessment of the relevant Pennypack factors as being either neutral or favoring plaintiffs. The district court had ample basis to find prejudice to the plaintiffs as plaintiffs, on the eve of trial, would have had to prepare arguments explaining the differences between European and United States’ patent law and the significance of the statements in the prior proceedings. There is also no indication of how plaintiffs would have been able to cure that prejudice. Thus, the first two factors favor plaintiffs. INSITE VISION INCORPORATED v. SANDOZ, INC. 19 The third factor, disruption of trial, is neutral at best. Likewise, the fourth factor, bad faith, is neutral, given the fact that the district court made no finding either way on the question of bad faith. “Making no finding on the question of bad faith (which is what the district court did) is quite different from finding that there was no bad faith.” Konstantopoulos v. Westvaco Corp., 112 F.3d 710, 720 n.7 (3d Cir. 1997). As for the fifth factor, relating to the importance of the excluded evidence, the district court was correct to at least question the relevance and probative value of the EPO file history under United States law. The situation here is thus notably different from the facts of ZF Meritor, where the exclusion of testimony “clear[ly]” foreclosed plaintiffs’ suit, despite the fact that they had won at the liability stage. 696 F.3d at 299. This factor, like the others, does not favor Sandoz. In view of the totality of evidence, we do not have a definite and firm conviction that the district court abused its discretion and have no reason to disturb the district court’s decision to exclude the EPO file history.