Opinion ID: 2594806
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Competency Trial Issues

Text: Prior to trial, defense counsel questioned defendant's competence to stand trial. The trial court, in accordance with section 1368, suspended criminal proceedings and appointed Dr. Alfred Fricke, a psychologist, and Dr. Jeffrey Weiner, a psychiatrist  Fricke to assess defendant's competence and Weiner to assess the effects on defendant of the psychotropic medications he was taking. [3] Over defendant's objections, the trial court also ordered him to submit to a competency examination by Dr. James Missett, who was retained by the prosecution. A total of four experts testified at defendant's competency trial. The defense expert, Dr. Kormos, testified that defendant was suffering from schizophrenia and, as a result, was so impaired he was unable to assist rationally in his own defense. Kormos opined that defendant was not malingering. The two court-appointed experts, Drs. Fricke and Weiner, each testified that while they initially had believed that defendant was not competent to stand trial based on their first examinations of him, subsequent examinations changed their assessment. Dr. Fricke testified that, after his second examination of defendant, he concluded that defendant was competent to stand trial and that without a doubt defendant was malingering. Dr. Weiner testified that, after his subsequent examination of defendant, there was insufficient data as to whether defendant was competent. Weiner testified further that he had observed evidence that made him strongly suspicious that defendant was malingering. Finally, the prosecution's expert, Dr. Missett, testified that defendant was competent to stand trial and was malingering. The jury found defendant competent. Defendant contends that the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and his Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel by requiring him to submit to competency examinations by the two court-appointed evaluators and by an evaluator designated by the prosecution. Alternatively, he contends that these rights were violated by requiring him to submit to examination by the prosecution's evaluator alone. In general, the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination applies to competency examinations. ( Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359.) In California, the protection ... afforded by application of the Fifth Amendment is in fact provided by a judicially declared rule of immunity applicable to all persons whose competency to stand trial is determined at a section 1368 hearing. ( Baqleh v. Superior Court (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 478, 496, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673.) This rule of immunity was first declared in Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61. In that case, the Court of Appeal concluded that a psychiatrist appointed to examine a defendant for competency could not testify later on the question of defendant's sanity. The court reasoned that, because a defendant may not invoke his right against compelled self-incrimination in a competency examination, neither the statements of [the defendant] to the psychiatrists appointed under section 1369 nor the fruits of such statements may be used in trial of the issue of [the defendant's] guilt, under either the plea of not guilty or that of not guilty by reason of insanity. ( Id. at p. 470, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61.) We adopted the judicially declared rule of immunity in People v. Arcega (1982) 32 Cal.3d 504, 522, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338 (see People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876, 959-960, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103 [noting the rule in Arcega ]). Defendant argues that the immunity granted in Arcega inadequately protects a defendant's Fifth Amendment interest against self-incrimination because it does not prevent nonevidentiary derivative uses of statements obtained from a defendant during the competency examination. Such derivative uses, he postulates, might include gain[ing] insight into the relationship between the defendant and his attorneys, or insight into tactical decisions or considerations by the defense, or a myriad of other articulable and inarticulable matters that ... could be helpful to the opponent in dictating his choice of actions or tactics. We reject defendant's argument for two reasons. First, the premise of defendant's claim  that the immunity conferred in Arcega is not coextensive with Fifth Amendment protections  is wrong. From its inception, this immunity has applied to a defendant's statements to the competency evaluator and to any fruits of the mental competency examination. ( People v. Weaver, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 959-960, 111 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 29 P.3d 103; People v. Arcega, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 518, 186 Cal.Rptr. 94, 651 P.2d 338 [There is a rule of immunity for all statements and fruits of a mental competency examination which prevents their use at the guilt trial]; Tarantino v. Superior Court, supra, 48 Cal.App.3d at p. 470, 122 Cal.Rptr. 61.) The judicially declared rule supplants the Fifth Amendment, because the scope of that rule is coextensive with the scope of the Fifth Amendment privilege. ( Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 501, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673.) Thus, the immunity granted in Arcega fully protects a defendant against any nonevidentiary uses of statements obtained from the defendant during the competency hearing to the same extent he or she is protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. Second, defendant fails to demonstrate that, in this case, the immunity described in Arcega failed to fully protect his Fifth Amendment interests. His assertion that the prosecution may have gained some nonevidentiary insight into defense tactics via the competency examinations conducted by the court-appointed experts or the prosecution's expert is unsupported by citation to the record and exists only in the realm of speculation. Indeed, none of the experts who testified at the competency trial testified at any other phase of the trial, nor does it appear that their reports or observations were used by the prosecution at trial. [4] Defendant's Sixth Amendment claim is equally unpersuasive. Preliminarily, we agree that [t]he right to counsel clearly applies to the type of competency proceedings with which we are here concerned. ( Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at p. 503, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673.) However, in this case, the record reveals that defendant was fully represented by counsel during the competency proceedings from the time that defense counsel first raised the issue of defendant's competency through the jury trial at which defendant was ultimately found to be competent. Indeed, as defendant's appellate counsel acknowledged during argument, defense counsel was even given the opportunity to be present at the examination of defendant by Dr. Missett, the prosecution's expert, but counsel declined. Moreover, although defendant adverts to a right to refuse to submit to a competency evaluation as part of his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, there is no indication on the record that he did so, even with respect to Dr. Missett. On this record, therefore, we reject defendant's argument that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel to the extent that his claim is based on an assertion that he was denied counsel. Thus, this case is easily distinguishable from those decisions cited by defendant in which the reviewing court found a Sixth Amendment violation where, in essence, the defendants were allowed to represent themselves despite doubts regarding their competency. ( United States v. Klat (D.C.Cir.1998) 156 F.3d 1258; Appel v. Horn (3d Cir.2001) 250 F.3d 203.) Defendant fares no better to the extent that his Sixth Amendment claim is based on the same ground as his Fifth Amendment claim  that the immunity described in Arcega was inadequate to protect against nonevidentiary uses of the competency evaluation by the prosecution. Defendant asserts that the possibility the prosecution may have gained some nonevidentiary advantage from its examination of defendant constituted an improper intrusion into the attorney-client relationship in violation of the Sixth Amendment. ( People v. Zapien (1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 1012, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 122, 846 P.2d 704 [A defendant's right to the assistance of counsel free from unreasonable government interference is protected by the Sixth Amendment].) The predicates of this argument are that the immunity described in Arcega fails to protect a defendant against nonevidentiary uses of statements obtained during the competency evaluation, and that in this case the prosecution gained such advantage and exploited it. As we have already concluded, in rejecting defendant's Fifth Amendment argument, both predicates are false. For these reasons, then, we also reject defendant's Sixth Amendment claim. Finally, defendant contends that, even if his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights were not violated by compelled competency evaluations by the court-appointed experts, Drs. Fricke and Weiner, then, at minimum, these constitutional protections prohibited the competency evaluation by the prosecution's expert, Dr. Missett. We disagree. The constitutional interests are the same, whether the competency evaluation is undertaken by court-appointed experts or an expert retained by the prosecution and those interests are adequately protected in either case by the immunity granted by Arcega. ( Baqleh v. Superior Court, supra, 100 Cal.App.4th at pp. 502-503, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 673; but see Bishop v. Caudill (Ky.2003) 118 S.W.3d 159, 163-164.) Here, moreover, Dr. Missett did not testify at either phase of defendant's trial nor does defendant demonstrate that the prosecution made any use of Dr. Missett's testimony, report, or observations outside of the competency proceedings.
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 and violated his due process rights by admitting at the competency hearing, over his objection, the tape recording he made in which he described, in graphic and brutal detail, the string of murders he committed between April 22 and April 27, 1991. The tape had been seized upon defendant's arrest in Kansas. Prior to his competency hearing, the defense moved to exclude the tape as more prejudicial than probative. (Evid.Code, § 352.) In opposition, the prosecution argued that the tape was relevant to its theory that defendant was malingering to avoid punishment for his crimes. As the prosecutor explained, the portrait of defendant painted for purposes of the competency hearing was that he speaks gibberish, ... cannot remember the names of three simple objects. That his memory is barely intact. In other words, an extremely low level of functioning. The tape, however, in the prosecutor's estimation, supported the prosecution's theory that defendant was feigning his mental illness to avoid the death penalty because it demonstrates that this defendant has a remarkable memory for detail, remembering things that occurred over the last four days in chronological sequence, in rich detail. [¶] So it shows no memory problems. It shows a person who's not stumbling over his words. Who is not, as Dr. Fricke in his report says, stumbling and barely able to concentrate. It shows a person whose concentration is good. [¶] For those reasons I think the jury is entitled to hear it so they can compare that with the level of functioning that he experiences now. The trial court agreed that the tape was highly probative and directly relevant to the issue of whether the defendant is feigning incompetence now to avoid a trial and possible punishment. Accordingly, the court admitted the tape. [A]n appellate court applies the abuse of discretion standard of review to any ruling by a trial court on the admissibility of evidence, including one that turns on the relative probativeness and prejudice of the evidence in question [citations]. Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative (see Evid.Code, § 352) if, broadly stated, it poses an intolerable `risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome' ( People v. Alvarez [(1996)] 14 Cal.4th [155], 204, fn. 14, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365). ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) The admission of relevant evidence will not offend due process unless the evidence is so prejudicial as to render the defendant's trial fundamentally unfair. ( People v. Falsetta (1999) 21 Cal.4th 903, 913, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182.) We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the tape nor did the admission of the tape violate due process. The question in a competency proceeding is whether, as a result of mental disorder or developmental disability, the defendant is unable to understand the nature of the criminal proceedings or to assist counsel in the conduct of a defense in a rational manner. (§ 1367, subd. (a).) Defendant acknowledges that the Kansas tape, even though it was made two years before his competency trial, to the extent it established a rational capacity to recall and communicate, had some relevance on the issue of his present competence to stand trial. (Cf. People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 504, 174 Cal.Rptr. 684, 629 P.2d 485 [defendant's confession, obtained one year before competency proceeding, had some probative value in determining his present competency but, in relation to other evidence, was not highly probative and reversal of competency finding was required].) Nonetheless, he maintains the evidence should have been excluded because its probative value was weak in comparison with its potential to prejudice the jury against him. In this connection, he argues that the tape was cumulative of other, far less sensational evidence that would also have established his capacity for rational behavior. Specifically, he points out that Dr. Missett's report listed a number of reasons for his conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial, including past evidence of rational behavior that did not involve criminal conduct. In addition, defendant notes, the trial court was aware of the proposed testimony of percipient witnesses to defendant's behavior in the period between his release from prison and commission of the crimes which would have made the same point regarding defendant's ability to function as the prosecution sought to make with the tape recording. We do not agree that the tape recording was cumulative to the testimony of other witnesses regarding defendant's capacity to act rationally. The tape, in defendant's own voice, sequentially recounting the circumstances of his crimes in great detail when he had no motive to feign mental illness, was not only highly probative of whether he was malingering but also uniquely probative in a way that neither Dr. Missett's report nor the testimony of other witnesses could be. We conclude, therefore, that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the tape recording. Defendant argues, however, that the effect of the evidence was to invoke an emotional bias against him on the part of the jury that impelled the jury to punish defendant, presumably by finding him competent. As the Attorney General points out, the jury was instructed that its sole function was to determine the defendant's competence to stand trial, not whether he was guilty of a crime; apprised that it was not to consider the consequences of a finding either of competence or incompetence in rendering its verdict; and admonished that it was not to be influenced by pity for the defendant or prejudice against him, nor by sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public feeling or public opinion. Defendant asks us to presume that the tape recording evidence rendered the jury incapable of following these instructions but, absent some indication in the record, we must presume that jury understood and applied these instructions. ( People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 728, 274 Cal.Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215.) In short, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. We conclude further that the admission of the evidence did not violate defendant's due process by rendering the trial fundamentally unfair. ( People v. Falsetta, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 913, 89 Cal.Rptr.2d 847, 986 P.2d 182.)
Defendant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to discharge a juror who informed the court that she had received a telephone call from someone whose voice she did not recognize, but who identified himself as Carl. The juror explained that the only reason she brought the matter to the court's attention was her concern about whether defendant  whose middle name is Carl  had access to her telephone number. Upon being assured by the court that defendant did not have such access, she agreed that the call was likely a crank call. When asked by the court whether she was confident she could be a fair and impartial juror, the juror answered affirmatively. After the juror left the courtroom, the defense requested that she be discharged. The request was denied. Section 1089 provides in part: If at any time, whether before or after the final submission of the case to the jury, a juror dies or becomes ill, or upon other good cause shown to the court is found to be unable to perform his or her duty, ... the court may order the juror to be discharged.... Before an appellate court will find error in failing to excuse a seated juror, the juror's inability to perform a juror's functions must be shown by the record to be a `demonstrable reality.' The court will not presume bias, and will uphold the trial court's exercise of discretion on whether a seated juror should be discharged for good cause under section 1089 if supported by substantial evidence. [Citation.] ( People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 659, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 141, 121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988.) The record before us does not show that the juror was unable to fulfill her functions as a demonstrable reality. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to retain the juror.
Defendant contends that California's standard for competence, as embodied by CALJIC No. 4.10, fails to meet the standard articulated for federal due process purposes in Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824. In Dusky, the court stated that the test of a defendant's competency to stand trial is whether the defendant has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding and whether he has a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. ( Ibid. ) Consistent with CALJIC No. 4.10, the jury was instructed that a person charged with a criminal offense is deemed mentally competent to be tried for the crime charged against him, if [¶] 1. He is capable of understanding the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him; [¶] 2. He comprehends his own status and condition in reference to such proceedings; and [¶] 3. He is able to assist his attorney in conducting his defense in a rational manner. Defendant maintains that a person who is able to assist an attorney in conducting his defense in a rational manner does not necessarily have sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding as required by Dusky. He asserts that, while assisting demands only the minimal passive rationality required to answer an attorney's question as to some aspect of the case, consulting denotes an active participation and exchange between attorney and client rather than the passive assent of the client to the attorney's promptings. Thus, he argues that the capacity to consult rationally imports a higher level of cognition and judgment than that required to assist. We have previously observed that the language of section 1367, from which CALJIC No. 4.10 is drawn, does not match, word for word, that of Dusky. But as the Court of Appeal noted in James H. v. Superior Court (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 169, 177 [143 Cal.Rptr. 398], `To anyone but a hairsplitting semanticist, the two tests are identical.' ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 816, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481; accord, People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 893, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494.) Indeed, as the Attorney General points out, the United States Supreme Court has itself used a formulation similar to California's to describe the standard of competency. ( Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 402, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 [Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to understand the proceedings and to assist counsel (italics added)].) We reject defendant's claim that California's formulation of the competency standard fails to comport with federal due process requirements.
At defendant's competency trial, all the experts agreed that defendant appeared to suffer from impaired memory. Therefore, at the prosecution's request, the jury was instructed: The inability to recall facts or information does not in and of itself render a defendant incompetent to stand trial; however, it is a factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant is incompetent to stand trial. Defendant contends the instruction was erroneous because it might have led the jury to disregard evidence of defendant's inability to recollect as proof that he was incompetent. We think not. The source of the instruction was People v. Amador (1988) 200 Cal.App.3d 1449, 246 Cal.Rptr. 605. In Amador, the court expressed doubts about defendant's competence and appointed a psychologist to conduct a competency evaluation. The psychologist opined that defendant was incompetent because he suffered permanent amnesia regarding the events surrounding the offense. The trial court concluded that amnesia did not, in and of itself, render defendant legally incompetent to stand trial. On appeal, the Court of Appeal agreed. The amnesic defendant is no worse off than the defendant who cannot remember where he was on a particular day because of the passage of time, or because he was drunk, drugged, unconscious or asleep at the time of the crime. Moreover, amnesia does not inhibit discussion between attorney and client as to tactical decisions concerning the trial. [Citation.] [¶] Amnesia as to the alleged offense does not totally incapacitate the defense and a defendant is still free to assist counsel in numerous other ways. ( Id. at p. 1454, 246 Cal.Rptr. 605.) Regarding the propriety of the instruction, the Attorney General argues that if, in Amador, complete and permanent amnesia was found insufficient, by itself, to render defendant incompetent to stand trial, a fortiori the mere inability to recall would not justify a finding of incompetence. Defendant contends that the instruction was incorrect because it may have led the jury to disregard evidence of failure to recall as proof of a mental disorder, like schizophrenia or posttraumatic stress disorder, that did render him incompetent. To the extent that defendant is arguing that memory impairment, in and of itself, establishes a mental disorder that renders a defendant incompetent, we agree with Amador that such impairment does not, standing alone, establish incompetency. To the extent defendant is arguing that the instruction was inadequate because it did not specifically instruct the jury that impaired memory function could be evidence of a mental disorder that established incompetency, it was incumbent upon defendant to have requested elaboration or clarification of the instruction. ( People v. Dunkle, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 894, 32 Cal.Rptr.3d 23, 116 P.3d 494; People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 122, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 710, 96 P.3d 30.) In any event, there is no reasonable likelihood that a jury would have given the instruction the gloss placed on it by defendant. ( Estelle v. McGuire (1991) 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385.) The instruction did not tell the jury that the inability to recall cannot be considered in assessing competency, but only that it is not dispositive; indeed, the instruction states that the inability to recall is a factor to be considered in determining whether a defendant is incompetent to stand trial.
Defendant contends that the cumulative effect of errors at his competency trial requires reversal. However, because we have concluded that defendant failed to show any error at his competency trial, necessarily he cannot show cumulative prejudice arising from such error.