Opinion ID: 1190385
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Good motives and for justifiable ends.

Text: There remains one further point asserted by Dworkin which we choose to address. She claims that under the language the truth, when published with good intent and [for] justifiable ends, shall be sufficient defense, as found in Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 20, these media defendants bear the burden of proving that the statements, even if true or constitutionally protected, were published with good motives and for justifiable ends. Again regrettably, she pursues this assertion in the same manner as she pursued her other contention that the subject constitutional provision precluded summary judgment in a libel action. Her assertion lacks constitutional analysis, legal authority, and cogent argument. We have carefully studied New York Times, Butts, and the subsequent United States Supreme Court cases that have consistently adhered to that doctrine since first announced in 1964. In particular, we find Garrison most informative on the point Dworkin raises. In that case, the Court applied its New York Times rule and struck down a Louisiana criminal libel statute which, like the language of this state's free speech/libel constitutional provision, conditioned the defense of truth on the presence of good motives and justifiable ends. Where the challenged statements criticize public officials or public figures in matters of public concern, the interest in private reputation is overborne by the larger public interest, secured by the Constitution, in the dissemination of the truth. Garrison, 379 at 73, 85 S.Ct. at 215, 13 L.Ed.2d at 132. Consequently, [t]ruth may not be the subject of either civil or criminal sanctions where discussion of public affairs is concerned. Garrison, 379 U.S. at 74, 85 S.Ct. at 216, 13 L.Ed.2d at 133. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the Garrison approach in a civil libel action in Farnsworth v. Tribune Co., 43 Ill.2d 286, 253 N.E.2d 408, 410 (1969). There, the court held that the good motives and for justifiable ends language of its free speech/libel constitutional provision was incompatible with the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of the first amendment guarantees of the Federal Constitution. See also, People v. Heinrich, 104 Ill.2d 137, 83 Ill.Dec. 546, 550-555, 470 N.E.2d 966, 970-71, 68 A.L.R.4th 1003 (1984). A few years later the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in a criminal libel action, relied on New York Times and Garrison to hold a similar provision in the Pennsylvania Constitution repugnant to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. Commonwealth v. Armao, 446 Pa. 325, 286 A.2d 626, 632 (1972). As recognized in our state constitution, [15] the United States Constitution is the supreme law of the land. We hold, therefore, that the phrase when published with good intent and [for] justifiable ends of Wyo.Const. art. 1, § 20, is repugnant to the guarantees of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution in libel actions in which the New York Times/Butts standard applies to public figures who have been criticized by a media defendant regarding matters of public concern. Consequently, the media defendants in this case do not bear the burden Dworkin would have them assume. We affirm the trial court's order granting summary judgment against all of the plaintiffs on all of the counts in the complaint.