Opinion ID: 733387
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Detention and Search of the April 12, 1994, Express Mail Package

Text: 14 Kozak claims that postal inspectors improperly detained the April 12, 1994, Express Mail package because they did not have a reasonable suspicion contraband was in the package. She further alleges the search warrant is invalid because the affidavit in support thereof did not establish probable cause. 15 In reviewing the district court's denial of a motion to suppress, we accept the court's factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous and consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the government. The ultimate question of whether a search and seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law reviewed de novo. United States v. Greenspan, 26 F.3d 1001, 1004 (10th Cir.1994). 16 In this Circuit, it is clear that [a] temporary detention of mail for investigative purposes is not an unreasonable seizure when authorities have a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. United States v. Lux, 905 F.2d 1379, 1382 (10th Cir.1990). Thus, the issue is whether the postal inspectors had a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity at the time they detained the package. A review of the magistrate's findings leads us to conclude that they did. 17 On April 12, 1994, Inspector Wilson learned that an Express Mail package addressed to Kozak had arrived in Salt Lake City. The package smelled strongly of coffee. Wilson testified and the district court found that the decision to detain the package was based on the following: 18 (1) his conversations with other postal inspectors and law enforcement agencies in Brigham City and Box Elder County concerning the express mail packages going to Kozak's post office box and Kozak's daughter's potential involvement in drug trafficking; (2) the fact that this package and most of the prior packages smelled like coffee; and (3) his research concerning the return addresses on the prior packages had revealed either fictitious names or addresses. 19 In light of the minimal intrusion occasioned by the detention, these considerations were sufficient to justify Wilson's decision to briefly detain the package for further investigation. 2 See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 252-53, 90 S.Ct. 1029, 1032-33, 25 L.Ed.2d 282 (1970). 20 Once Wilson returned to the office, inspectors noted several additional facts which led Schouten to conclude they should seek a search warrant. For instance, the package was relatively light and the cost to ship the package was $9.95. Based on his experience, Schouten believed that it would be unusual to mail such a small amount of coffee for such a large fee. He also learned that the designated sender of the package did not live at the listed return address and that the residents of the listed return address had not mailed an Express Mail package to Utah. Postal inspectors then submitted the receipts for the packages shipped to Kozak over the previous several months to Detective Jim Vaughn, a handwriting expert. Vaughn determined that several of the labels were written by the same person, even though different names and addresses were utilized. 21 Based on all of the information in the hands of the postal inspectors, we hold they were entitled to continue detaining the package until they could present an affidavit in support of a search warrant to a magistrate. See Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. at 253, 90 S.Ct. at 1032-33. Because there is no indication the postal inspectors did not act expeditiously in applying for a warrant, we find the investigatory detention of this package was in conformity with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment. See Lux, 905 F.2d at 1382; see also United States v. Banks, 3 F.3d 399, 403 (11th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1129, 114 S.Ct. 1097, 127 L.Ed.2d 410 (1994); Garmon v. Foust, 741 F.2d 1069, 1072 (8th Cir.1984). 22 Kozak argues that in validating the detention of the package, the district court improperly relied on a cumulative theory of reasonable suspicion. In deciding whether to detain the April 12th package, Kozak asserts that postal inspectors were obligated to exorcize from their minds any and all information not readily apparent from the surface of that particular package. Because the postal inspectors here relied on information that they developed during the course of an ongoing investigation in deciding to detain the package, Kozak asserts that the detention was improper. Kozak's view of reasonable suspicion is, at best, illogical. Law enforcement officers are not required to make decisions in a vacuum, without reference to any information other than that on the surface of the package. In fact, the exact opposite is true. See, e.g., United States v. Aldaz, 921 F.2d 227, 228-29 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1207, 111 S.Ct. 2802, 115 L.Ed.2d 975 (1991); United States v. Hillison, 733 F.2d 692, 695-96 (9th Cir.1984). 23 In addition to her arguments on cumulative reasonable suspicion, Kozak argues that the postal inspectors were obligated to immediately submit the package to a drug-detecting dog and to return the package to the mail stream if the dog did not detect the presence of drugs. Kozak relies on a line of cases holding that probable cause is established once a drug dog alerts on a package for the mistaken proposition that absent such an alert, officers are not entitled to detain the package any further. Contrary to Kozak's assertion, drug-detecting dogs have not supplanted the neutral and detached magistrate as the arbiter of probable cause. See United States v. Claps, 818 F.Supp. 1417, 1419 (D.Colo.1993). 3 24 Kozak next claims the affidavit in support of the search warrant contained little more than a recitation of Express Mail profile characteristics and that these characteristics are insufficient to support a finding of probable cause. The determination of whether there was a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed must be based on the totality-of-the-circumstances. United States v. Bishop, 890 F.2d 212, 215 (10th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1092, 110 S.Ct. 1164, 107 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1990). This court has recognized that a magistrate's 'determination of probable cause should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'  United States v. Martinez, 764 F.2d 744, 746 (10th Cir.1985) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 2331, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983)). Accordingly, a reviewing court must not conduct a de novo determination of probable cause, but should instead determine whether there is substantial evidence in the record supporting the magistrate's decision to issue a warrant. Massachusetts v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 728, 104 S.Ct. 2085, 2086, 80 L.Ed.2d 721 (1984); See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331. Applying these principles, the totality of the evidence contained in Schouten's affidavit substantially supports the conclusion that there was a fair probability that contraband would be found in the package. Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332. 25 Schouten, the affiant, began the affidavit with a recitation of his extensive experience in drug detection and interdiction. After setting out his experience and training, Schouten proceeded to compare the package at issue with the profile common to packages containing drugs, concluding that it was very likely drugs were in the package. This court has held that [a] magistrate is entitled to rely on the expert opinions of officers when supporting factual information is supplied in the affidavit. United States v. Cook, 949 F.2d 289, 292-93 (10th Cir.1991). Accordingly, the magistrate was entitled to rely on Schouten's expert opinion as to the characteristics associated with packages that contain illegal drugs. 26 After laying out the profile characteristics of the April 12, 1994, Express Mail package, Schouten informed the magistrate of his continuing investigation of the packages arriving at Kozak's post office box. For instance, Schouten averred that although a number of the packages sent to Kozak listed different senders, a police hand-writing expert believed several of the mailing certificates had been written by the same person. Furthermore, Schouten indicated officers of the Box Elder Sheriff's Office told him that confidential informants had told them that Kozak's daughters might be involved in the use of drugs. Finally, Schouten informed the magistrate that drug-detecting dogs had failed to alert on two prior packages. He indicated, however, that dogs could be fooled by the use of masking agents such as coffee and that as an experienced police officer, Kozak would be familiar with methods used to conceal controlled substances. 27 On appeal, Kozak asks us to review each piece of information contained in the affidavit to determine whether it, standing alone, supports a finding of probable cause. This court has specifically rejected the analytical method advocated by Kozak. See United States v. Cardall, 773 F.2d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir.1985); see also Upton, 466 U.S. at 733, 104 S.Ct. at 2088. Instead, the determination must be based on the totality of the information contained in the affidavit. Bishop, 890 F.2d at 215. Reviewing the affidavit as a whole, as we are obliged to do, we conclude that the information in the affidavit provided substantial grounds for believing that contraband could be found in the Express Mail package. Upton, 466 U.S. at 728, 104 S.Ct. at 2086; Gates, 462 U.S. at 236, 103 S.Ct. at 2331. Accordingly, the search of the package pursuant to the search warrant was proper.