Opinion ID: 751714
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Safekeeping Coverage

Text: 70 Koenig, again relying on documents other than the Film House complaint, 12 also contends that Massachusetts Bay had a duty to defend arising from the disputed policy's coverage for any customer's 'auto' ... left with [Koenig's] 'garage operations' for ... safekeeping. (R.1, Ex. A, Garage Coverage Form, at 1 (emphasis added).) Limiting our review to the complaint only, we find that its only even remotely relevant allegation reads, in pertinent part, Film House surrendered the vehicle under protest in order to avoid damage to the vehicle. To suggest, however, that this factual averment invokes the safekeeping coverage is simply preposterous. To leave property for safekeeping implies the voluntary delivery of a chattel by one individual to another. See Marshall v. United States, 352 F.2d 1013, 1014 (9th Cir.1965) ([T]he appellant voluntarily delivered possession and control of his briefcase to his landlady for safekeeping ....) (cited in United States v. Garrett, 371 F.2d 296, 299 (7th Cir.1966)). And as the complaint makes plain, Film House's relinquishment of the BMW automobile in the face of repossessory action was anything but voluntary. Even if we assumed that Film House did in fact leave the vehicle with Koenig, the question thus arises as to for whom it was to be kept safe--certainly not Film House. In short, the complaint does not create a duty to defend in Massachusetts Bay under the safekeeping coverage provision.