Opinion ID: 2024671
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Heading: comparative fault and strict liability

Text: In Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, this court eliminated the need for privity of contract or proving the negligence of the manufacturer and instead imposed strict liability in tort as set out in Restatement (Second) of Torts section 402A (1965): (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if (a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and (b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold. (2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although (a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and (b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller. In adopting strict liability in tort, this court said: [P]ublic interest in human life and health, the invitations and solicitations to purchase the product and the justice of imposing the loss on the one creating the risk and reaping the profit are present and as compelling in cases involving motor vehicles and other products, where the defective condition makes them unreasonably dangerous to the user, as they are in food cases. 32 Ill.2d 612, 619. But imposition of strict liability was not meant to make the manufacturer an absolute insurer. ( Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool Co. (1975), 62 Ill.2d 77, 85; Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, 623.) The plaintiff must prove that the injury or damage resulted from the condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one, and that the condition existed at the time the product left the manufacturer's control. ( Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co. (1980), 79 Ill.2d 26, 31; Rios v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1974), 59 Ill.2d 79, 83; Suvada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill.2d 612, 623.) Moreover, the court has heretofore followed the reasoning of the Restatement concerning the available defenses to a strict liability action. It has been held that a manufacturer can assert a user's negligence as a complete bar to recovery when it rises to the level of misuse of the product, or assumption of the risk; but contributory negligence is not a defense. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Williams Machine & Tool Co. (1975), 62 Ill.2d 77, 81; Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill.2d 418; Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 402A, comment n (1965). Traditionally in negligence actions, however, any contributory negligence by the plaintiff was an absolute defense which barred recovery. ( Mueller v. Sangamo Construction Co. (1975), 61 Ill.2d 441, 446; Maki v. Frelk (1968), 40 Ill.2d 193, 195.) In response to the harshness of this doctrine, the court adopted comparative negligence in Alvis v. Ribar (1981), 85 Ill.2d 1, and indicated that this concept produced a more just and socially desirable distribution of loss and was demanded by today's society. (85 Ill.2d 1, 17.) In Alvis, we adopted the pure form of comparative negligence, reasoning that it is the only system which truly apportions damages according to the relative fault of the parties and, thus, achieves total justice. 85 Ill.2d 1, 27. In the instant case, defendant argues that Alvis requires the adoption of a comparative fault system in strict products liability cases. Defendant maintains total justice can only be achieved where the relative fault of all the parties is considered in apportioning damages. To illustrate its argument, defendant points to the anomalous situation where, in a single case with alternate counts of negligence and strict liability, the identical conduct by the plaintiff which amounts to an assumption of the risk will completely bar recovery in the strict liability count, yet, as a result of Alvis, will only reduce his award under the negligence count. Moreover, if the plaintiff is only contributorily negligent, he recovers all his damages under strict liability, but his recovery is diminished under the negligence count. Defendant argues that common sense mandates an approach which is consistent in its treatment of all the parties to an action, whether founded on common law negligence or strict liability. We are not the first to consider the impact of comparative negligence upon strict liability. Some jurisdictions have declined to apply comparative negligence or fault principles in strict liability actions: Colorado Kinard v. Coats Co. (1976), 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835; but see Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 13-21-406 (Supp. 1982), as interpreted in Welch v. F.R. Stokes, Inc. (D. Colo. 1983), 555 F. Supp. 1054. Nebraska Melia v. Ford Motor Co. (8th Cir. 1976), 534 F.2d 795 (applying Nebraska law). Oklahoma Kirkland v. General Motors Corp. (Okla. 1974), 521 P.2d 1353 (comparative negligence statute not applicable to products liability). Rhode Island Roy v. Star Chopper Co. (1st Cir.1978), 584 F.2d 1124, cert. denied (1979), 440 U.S. 916, 59 L.Ed.2d 466, 99 S.Ct. 1234 (applying Rhode Island law). South Dakota Smith v. Smith (S.D. 1979), 278 N.W.2d 155. The vast majority, though, have found comparative negligence theory applicable in strict liability cases. Alaska Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc. (Alaska 1976), 555 P.2d 42. Arkansas Ark. Stat. Ann. secs. 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1979). California Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978), 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380. Florida West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (Fla. 1976), 336 So.2d 80. Idaho Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp. (D. Idaho 1976), 411 F. Supp. 598 (applying Idaho law). Kansas Kennedy v. City of Sawyer (1980), 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788. Maine Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, sec. 156 (1964). Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. sec 600.2949 (Supp. 1982). Minnesota Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc. (Minn. 1977), 262 N.W.2d 377. Mississippi Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (5th Cir.1975), 512 F.2d 276 (applying Mississippi law). Montana Zahrte v. Sturm, Ruger & Co. (D. Mont. 1980), 498 F. Supp. 389 (stating Montana law). New Hampshire Reid v. Spadone Machine Co. (1979), 119 N.H. 457, 404 A.2d 1094; Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1978), 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843. New Jersey Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co. (1979), 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140. New York N.Y. Civ. Prac. Law sec. 1411 (McKinney 1976). Oregon Wilson v. B.F. Goodrich (1982), 292 Or. 626, 642 P.2d 644; Baccelleri v. Hyster Co. (1979), 287 Or. 3, 597 P.2d 351. Utah Mulherin v. Ingersoll-Rand Co. (Utah 1981), 628 P.2d 1301. Washington Wash. Rev. Code Ann. secs. 4.22.005 to 4.22.015 (Supp. 1982). Wisconsin Dippel v. Sciano (1967), 37 Wis.2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55. In the case at bar, plaintiff argues that applying comparative fault principles in strict liability actions would raise the conduct of the product user to a position equal to that of the manufacturer in regard to the prevention of injury; and that it would thereby give undue advantage to the manufacturer. The Illinois Trial Lawyers Association, in their amicus curiae brief, assert that comparative fault applied in this instance would undermine the policy basis that led to the imposition of strict liability. Further, they argue that reducing a plaintiff's recovery according to his fault would lessen the manufacturer's incentive to design and market a defect-free, safe product. As authority for their position, plaintiff and amicus curiae rely primarily on Smith v. Smith (S.D. 1979), 278 N.W.2d 155, Seay v. Chrysler Corp. (1980), 93 Wash.2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382, Kinard v. Coats Co. (1976), 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835, and the dissenting opinions in Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978), 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380. We find this authority unpersuasive. In Smith v. Smith (S.D. 1979), 278 N.W.2d 155, the issue before the court was which defenses were available to a manufacturer in a strict products liability action. Following the traditional analysis set out in section 402A, comment n of the Restatement, the court held that contributory negligence was not a defense, but misuse and assumption of the risk would bar recovery. In a footnote, without extended discussion, the court summarily rejected applying comparative fault principles, indicating it would negate the underlying basis of strict liability and present unworkable problems for the jury. In Kinard v. Coats Co. (1976), 37 Colo. App. 555, 553 P.2d 835, the court refused to extend the concept of comparative fault found in the Colorado comparative negligence statute (Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 13-21-111 (1973)) to actions sounding in strict liability. However, the recent enactment of a comparative fault provision in Colorado's product liability statute (Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 13-21-406 (Supp. 1982)) renders this case of little precedential value to the issue at bar. See Welch v. F.R. Stokes, Inc. (D. Colo. 1983), 555 F. Supp. 1054. Similarly, the court in Seay v. Chrysler Corp. (1980), 93 Wash.2d 319, 609 P.2d 1382, held that the Washington comparative negligence statute did not apply to strict liability cases. A recent Washington statute, however, has been interpreted as mandating that comparative fault be applied in strict liability cases as a damage-reducing factor. See South v. A.B. Chance Co. (1981), 96 Wash.2d 439, 635 P.2d 728. We believe that application of comparative fault principles in strict products liability actions would not frustrate this court's fundamental reasons for adopting strict products liability as set out in Suvada. The plaintiff will still be relieved of the proof problems associated with negligence and warranty actions. Privity and a manufacturer's negligence continue to be irrelevant. Nor would comparative fault lessen the manufacturer's duty to produce reasonably safe products. The manufacturer's liability remains strict; only its responsibility for damages is lessened by the extent the trier of fact finds the consumer's conduct contributed to the injuries. Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978), 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380. Further, the risk associated with the product defect is still spread among all consumers. Only that portion due to plaintiff's own conduct or fault is borne by the plaintiff. Where the allocation of losses properly can be apportioned, we see no reason to spread the cost of the loss resulting from plaintiff's own fault on to the consuming public. See Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978), 20 Cal.3d 725, 737-38, 575 P.2d 1162, 1169, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 387; D. Fischer, Products Liability  Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L. Rev. 431, 433 (1978). Plaintiff and amicus curiae next argue that the comparison of the plaintiff's fault with the defendant's defective product is a comparison of noncomparables, an attempt to compare apples and oranges, and that this comparison cannot be applied logically and consistently in strict products liability cases. See Daly v. General Motors Corp. (1978), 20 Cal.3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (Jefferson and Mosk, JJ., dissenting). Although it appears theoretically difficult to balance the defendant's strict liability against the user's negligence, other courts and their juries have been able to do so. In this regard, Professor Schwartz said: It is true that the jury might have some difficulty in making the calculation required under comparative negligence when defendant's responsibility is based on strict liability. Nevertheless, this obstacle is more conceptual than practical. The jury should always be capable, when the plaintiff has been objectively at fault, of taking into account how much bearing that fault had on the amount of damage suffered and of adjusting and reducing the award accordingly. Triers of fact are apparently able to do this, and the benefits from the approach suggest that it be applied in all comparative negligence jurisdictions. V. Schwartz, Comparative Negligence sec. 12.7, at 208-09 (1974). A manufacturer is under a nondelegable duty to produce a product which is reasonably safe. ( Anderson v. Hyster Co. (1979), 74 Ill.2d 364, 368; Rios v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works (1974), 59 Ill.2d 79, 85.) Defendant contends that when a manufacturer breaches this duty and places a defective product on the market, he is at fault. Correspondingly, it argues, the plaintiff has a duty to exercise ordinary care in using the product; breach of this duty creates his fault. Defendant maintains that these two types of fault should not be compared against each other in determining liability. Rather, they should be compared in terms of the causative role each played in producing the total damages sustained. Defendant postulates that once plaintiff has established his prima facie case and after defendant is found strictly liable, then plaintiff's recovery should be reduced by that amount which his fault contributed to the damages. The court in Murray v. Fairbanks Morse (3d Cir.1979), 610 F.2d 149, came to a similar result. The court there said the key conceptual distinction between strict products liability and negligence is that in strict liability the plaintiff need not prove faulty conduct on the part of the defendant in order to recover. The focus is on the condition of the product. In applying comparative negligence to strict products liability, the court stated a direct comparison of the defective product with the plaintiff's negligence is both conceptually and pragmatically inappropriate. [T]he only conceptual basis for comparison is the causative contribution of each to the particular loss or injury. In apportioning damages we are really asking how much of the injury was caused by the defect in the product versus how much was caused by the plaintiff's own actions. 610 F.2d 149, 159. See also Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc. (Alaska 1976), 555 P.2d 42, 47 (Rabinowitz, J., concurring); Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc. (Minn. 1977), 262 N.W.2d 377; Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1978), 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843. In Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. (1977), 70 Ill.2d 1, cert. denied (1978), 436 U.S. 946, 56 L.Ed.2d 787, 98 S.Ct. 2849, this court resolved the issue of contribution between concurrent tortfeasors under the principles of comparative negligence. There it was said that governing equitable principles require that ultimate liability for plaintiff's injuries be apportioned on the basis of the relative degree to which the defective product and the employer's conduct proximately caused them. 70 Ill.2d 1, 14. Similarly, we believe that equitable principles require that the total damages for plaintiff's injuries be apportioned on the basis of the relative degree to which the defective product and plaintiff's conduct proximately caused them. Accordingly, we hold that the defense of comparative fault is applicable to strict liability cases. Amicus curiae argues that, if comparative fault is to be applied in strict products liability cases, we should not reduce a plaintiff's award if he merely fails to inspect, discover, or guard against a defective product. Butaud v. Suburban Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc. (Alaska 1976), 555 P.2d 42, 46; Busch v. Busch Construction, Inc. (Minn. 1977), 262 N.W.2d 377, 394; Thibault v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. (1978), 118 N.H. 802, 395 A.2d 843; Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co. (1979), 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140. Following the Restatement, this court, in Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. (1970), 45 Ill.2d 418, adopted misuse and assumption of the risk as complete defenses to a strict products liability action. But, at the same time, it was said there that [c]ontributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence. (45 Ill.2d 418, 423.) We adhere to this statement. We believe that a consumer's unobservant, inattentive, ignorant, or awkward failure to discover or guard against a defect should not be compared as a damage-reducing factor. As the court in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. (Fla. 1976), 336 So.2d 80, 92, said: The consumer or user is entitled to believe that the product will do the job for which it was built. However, the defenses of misuse and assumption of the risk will no longer bar recovery. Instead, such misconduct will be compared in the apportionment of damages. Specifically, we hold: Once defendant's liability is established, and where both the defective product and plaintiff's misconduct contribute to cause the damages, the comparative fault principle will operate to reduce plaintiff's recovery by that amount which the trier of fact finds him at fault. Thus, the defendant remains strictly liable for the harm caused by its defective product, except for that part caused by the consumer's own misconduct.