Opinion ID: 703157
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Federal Rehabilitation Act Claim

Text: 12 Rivera focuses first on the dismissal of her Rehabilitation Act claim because she did not introduce evidence that PRTC was a program ... receiving federal financial assistance. She insists that this question had never been placed in genuine dispute by PRTC, that the pretrial order denying PRTC's summary judgment motion (Laffitte, J.) had established this jurisdictional fact, and that she was caught off guard by the magistrate judge's decision to treat Judge Laffitte's pretrial order as non-dispositive. In these circumstances, she suggests, at the very least the court should have allowed her briefly to reopen and introduce the undisputed evidence that PRTC received FEMA disaster funds. 13 Trial court rulings on motions to reopen civil cases to permit additional evidence are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 331, 91 S.Ct. 795, 802, 28 L.Ed.2d 77 (1971); Hibiscus Assocs., Ltd. v. Board of Trustees of the Policemen and Firemen Retirement Sys., 50 F.3d 908, 917-18 (11th Cir.1995); Joseph v. Terminix Int'l Co., 17 F.3d 1282, 1285 (10th Cir.1994); Bradford Trust Co. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 805 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir.1986); Swartz v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 323 F.2d 713, 714 (7th Cir.1963). While the particular criteria that guide a trial court's decision to reopen are necessarily flexible and case-specific, it is generally understood that a trial court abuses its discretion if its refusal to reopen works an injustice in the particular circumstances. See Gas Ridge, Inc. v. Suburban Agric. Properties, Inc., 150 F.2d 363, 366 (5th Cir.1945). Among the material factors which should be assessed by the trial court are whether: (1) the evidence sought to be introduced is especially important and probative; (2) the moving party's explanation for failing to introduce the evidence earlier is bona fide; and (3) reopening will cause no undue prejudice to the nonmoving party. See, e.g., Joseph, 17 F.3d at 1285; see generally 6A James W. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice p 59.04, at 59-33 (2d ed. 1993).
14 Trial courts as a rule act within their discretion in refusing to reopen a case where the proffered new evidence is insufficiently probative to offset the procedural disruption caused by reopening. See, e.g., Joseph, 17 F.3d at 1285 (noting that new evidence would have been cumulative); Thomas v. S.S. Santa Mercedes, 572 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir.1978) (affirming denial of motion to reopen where new evidence would have provided little additional probative force). In the instant case, however, there can be no question that the proffered new evidence was critical to the Rehabilitation Act claim once it became clear that subject matter jurisdiction was contested; it was the only evidence on an essential element of the claim. See, e.g., Nathanson v. Medical College of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1380 (3d Cir.1991). Thus, this factor weighed heavily in favor of allowing the motion to reopen.
15 Trial courts likewise should consider whether the moving party offered a bona fide explanation for failing to introduce the evidence before it finally rested its case. See, e.g., Bradford Trust Co., 805 F.2d at 52-53 (upholding denial of motion to reopen after trial court repeatedly warned that movant would need to produce evidence on key issue); Air et Chaleur, S.A. v. Eliot Janeway, 757 F.2d 489, 495 (2d Cir.1985) (upholding refusal to reopen where trial court forewarned movant that omitted evidence would be essential). Moreover, the courts recognize that it may amount to an abuse of discretion for a trial court to decline to reopen in circumstances where the movant has demonstrated reasonably genuine surprise. Id. There are at least four compelling reasons for finding that the good faith factor weighed heavily in favor of allowing the motion to reopen in the instant case. 16 First, the record bears out the contention that Rivera refrained from introducing the undisputed evidence of PRTC's receipt of FEMA funds, not because she lacked proof but solely because she reasonably understood that the district court's subject matter jurisdiction had been settled prior to trial. In the statement of uncontested material facts accompanying its summary judgment motion, for example, PRTC admitted receiving a $9,765 check from FEMA, dated January 10, 1986, while [Rivera] was working as a Service Representative, as well as other FEMA payments during 1987, 1989 and 1990. 17 Notwithstanding these undisputed facts, PRTC presented the magistrate judge with two alternative theories for its narrowly focused legal contention that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction: (1) FEMA fund recipients are subject to the special anti-discrimination provisions of 44 C.F.R. Secs. 7.1 to 7.949 (1994), which do not proscribe employment discrimination by the recipient, and therefore PRTC was not subject to the more comprehensive anti-discrimination provisions of the Rehabilitation Act; or (2) the FEMA funds must be shown to have been received during the same time period in which the alleged discriminatory acts against the recipient's employee took place. 18 Judge Laffitte had rejected both these legal theories prior to trial: 19 [PRTC's] arguments do not carry the day. First, neither party contests the fact that after various hurricanes and heavy rains in Puerto Rico, PRTC applied for Federal financial assistance to receive reimbursement for expenditures paid to repair the damage caused by the disasters. Neither party contests the fact that PRTC either was receiving Federal funding or was awaiting the receipt of funding throughout the period of the alleged discriminatory conduct. The Court finds that in the context of the Rehabilitation Act, an employer receiving Federal financial assistance includes a qualified applicant who although approved to receive the funds is awaiting the receipt of them. Consequently, because PRTC was either receiving or expecting to receive Federal financial assistance throughout the period pertinent to plaintiff's claim, the Court finds that PRTC was receiving Federal financial assistance and is subject to the Rehabilitation Act for that period of time. 20 Rivera-Flores, 840 F.Supp. at 5 (emphasis added). 21 Normally, of course, the mere denial of a defendant's summary judgment motion does not relieve a claimant of the burden of introducing evidence at trial on every element essential to her claim, even though the factual predicate was not in genuine dispute at summary judgment. However, Civil Rule 56(d) establishes a procedural mechanism whereby a district court can ensure a more enduring effect for its summary judgment ruling, and, with the acquiescence of the parties, narrow the factual issues for trial: 22 If on motion under this rule judgment is not entered upon the whole case or for all relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 23 Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(d) (emphasis added). 24 The December 1993 order entered by Judge Laffitte fits well within the spirit, if not the letter, of Rule 56(d). Its language, see supra, belies PRTC's main contention that the district court order did not sufficiently specif[y]  the facts that were without substantial controversy. PRTC counters that an order can have no Rule 56(d) effect unless the court expressly announces its intention to enter a Rule 56(d) order, and then interrogates counsel concerning the appropriateness of such relief. 25 On the contrary, the language of the rule contemplates merely that the court, inter alia, interrogat[e] counsel [to] ascertain what material facts ... are actually and in good faith controverted.... Id. Rule 56(d) gives counsel no veto power over the decision to enter such an order. Although it is unquestionably advisable for the court to announce its intention to enter such an order, Rule 56(d) does not make it compulsory. 3 Thus, interrogation of counsel is a suggested means of determining facts not in substantial controversy, where the pleadings and other evidence before the court leave room for doubt. But it is the substance of the order that matters. 26 Second, in our view Rivera's reliance on the pretrial order seems justified in these circumstances since the fact not in substantial good faith controversy did not pertain exclusively to the merits of her claim. Unlike the three other elements of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 794, receipt of federal funds also directly implicates the district court's subject matter jurisdiction over a Rehabilitation Act claim. See Bentley v. Cleveland Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm'rs, 41 F.3d 600, 603-04 (10th Cir.1994). Contested factual matters relating to a court's subject matter jurisdiction are properly determined on pretrial motions to dismiss, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1); Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 776, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946) (court must assure its jurisdiction before reaching merits of claim), and even where the claim is set for jury trial, the court has great latitude to direct limited discovery and to make such factual findings as are necessary to determine its subject matter jurisdiction. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 735, 67 S.Ct. 1009, 1010-11, 91 L.Ed. 1209 (1947); see also Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). We need express no opinion concerning whether the Rehabilitation Act's jurisdictional element might properly be adjudicated on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion. 4 Rather, we note merely that Rivera in no sense acted unreasonably in treating Judge Laffitte's pretrial order as determinative of the jurisdictional findings therein contained. 27 Third, the record indicates that PRTC may have engendered further confusion concerning the intended import of Judge Laffitte's pretrial order. In the pretrial order, PRTC represented that Rivera's prima facie case required proof of three elements, omitting any reference to the fourth--the jurisdictional element. See Pretrial Order, at 13. 5 PRTC also represented that it [wa]s not a recipient of federal financial assistance within the meaning of [the Rehabilitation Act]. Arguably at least, this connoted that PRTC continued to challenge Judge Laffitte's legal rulings interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, but that it accepted the fact that proof of receipt of FEMA funds no longer remained in bona fide dispute for trial. Thus, Rivera presented a bona fide explanation for failing to introduce her evidence before resting at trial.
28 The third factor meriting consideration by the trial court was the degree to which an order allowing Rivera to reopen would prejudice PRTC. See, e.g., Joseph, 17 F.3d at 1285. First, we note that the motion to reopen was filed immediately after Rivera rested her case, upon learning that PRTC did not share her understanding of Judge Laffitte's pretrial order. Cf. id. at 1284 (upholding denial of motion to reopen, and noting logistical unfairness to defendant in allowing plaintiff to present new evidence after defendant had rested its case). Presumably, the documentary evidence demonstrating PRTC's receipt of FEMA funds, including a cancelled check attached as an exhibit to PRTC's own Rule 56 statement of undisputed material facts, constituted the only new evidence to be introduced. Unlike a reopening to permit extended testimony, cf. Hibiscus Assocs., Ltd., 50 F.3d at 918 (denying motion to reopen, for expert testimony, where evidence was type that could be proved without extensive expert testimony), the introduction of such readily obtainable documentary evidence could have entailed but minimal delay. Cf. Capital Marine Supply, Inc. v. M/V Roland Thomas, 719 F.2d 104, 107 (5th Cir.1983) (finding no abuse in granting motion to reopen where the missing testimony can be made available without undue delay). 29 In the final analysis, therefore, all three central factors weighed overwhelmingly in favor of reopening, whereas the summary ruling below afforded no apposite rationale for declining to reopen. For these reasons, we conclude that the refusal to reopen, resulting in dismissal of the Rehabilitation Act claim, constituted an abuse of discretion.