Opinion ID: 1453499
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiple Prosecution Analysis

Text: The double jeopardy clause forbids prosecuting any person a second time for the same offense after either acquittal or conviction. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969), overruled on other grounds, Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 109 S.Ct. 2201, 104 L.Ed.2d 865 (1989). The rationale behind barring second prosecutions is that no one should be forced to run the gauntlet more than once. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190, 78 S.Ct. 221, 225, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957). As stated in Green: The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a continuing state of anxiety and insecurity.... Id. at 187, 78 S.Ct. at 223. Additionally, multiple prosecutions allow the state to hone its presentation, increasing the chance of conviction. Grady, 495 U.S. at 518, 110 S.Ct. at 2091-92. Defendant argued, and the court of appeals apparently agreed, that civil default judgments entered on speeding and unsafe turn charges barred a second prosecution for felonies involving the same conduct, i.e., the pending aggravated assault and criminal damage charges. We disagree, and conclude that defendant was not prosecuted for the civil speeding and unsafe turn citations.
Despite certain similarities between the two cases, Grady does not forbid defendant's prosecution for aggravated assault and criminal damage. In Grady, the defendant drove his automobile across a double yellow line and struck two oncoming vehicles, killing one passenger and injuring others. 495 U.S. at 511, 110 S.Ct. at 2087-88. He received two traffic tickets arising from the incident. Id. at 511, 110 S.Ct. at 2088. The first charged him with driving while intoxicated, a misdemeanor under New York law. N.Y.Veh. & Traf.Law § 1192(3) (McKinney 1986). The second charged him with failure to keep to the right of the median, an infraction under New York law. Id. §§ 1120(a) and 155. While prosecutors were gathering evidence for a homicide prosecution, defendant pleaded guilty to the two traffic tickets in Justice Court. Grady, 495 U.S. at 511-512, 110 S.Ct. at 2088. The court accepted his guilty plea. Id. Ultimately, defendant was sentenced to a $350 fine, a $10 surcharge, and had his license revoked for six months. Id. at 513, 110 S.Ct. at 2089. Approximately two months later, defendant was indicted for reckless manslaughter, vehicular manslaughter, negligent homicide and reckless assault. Id. The prosecution's bill of particulars revealed that the state would rely on defendant's intoxicated condition and failure to keep to the right of the median to prove the manslaughter and assault charges. Id. at 513-514, 110 S.Ct. at 2089. Justice Brennan, writing for a 5-4 majority, expanded the analytic framework to be used in resolving double jeopardy challenges to successive prosecutions. Prior to Grady, the Court employed the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). The Grady Court reiterated the test as follows: [T]he Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibits successive prosecutions for the same criminal act or transaction under two criminal statutes whenever each statute does not `requir[e] proof of a fact which the other does not.' Grady, 495 U.S. at 510, 110 S.Ct. at 2087 (citing Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182). The Grady Court held that Blockburger establishes the threshold inquiry, and that successive prosecutions surviving the test may still violate the double jeopardy clause under certain circumstances. Those circumstances, according to the Court, are implicated when the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted. Grady, 495 U.S. at 521-522, 110 S.Ct. at 2093. Based on the facts presented in Grady, the Court concluded that the double jeopardy clause barred the second prosecution. The Court reasoned that the state's bill of particulars would prove the entirety of the conduct for which Corbin was convicted  driving while intoxicated and failing to keep to the right of the median  to establish essential elements of the homicide and assault offenses. Id. at 523, 110 S.Ct. at 2094. The key element of Grady is the Court's underlying assumption that the initial proceedings were in fact a prosecution. Corbin was charged with a misdemeanor, entered a plea of guilty, and was subsequently sentenced. There is no indication in Grady that any party or the court contested that the proceedings resulting in guilty pleas in the Town Justice Court were anything but prosecutions. Defendant in the instant case contends that because Corbin was charged and sentenced for a traffic infraction (failure to keep right of the median) under New York law, the holding in Grady should be extended to criminal prosecutions following civil proceedings in Arizona. Whatever the relative merits of this foray into the intricacies of New York law, we believe that defendant and the court of appeals read Grady too expansively. Default judgment was entered against defendant on two civil traffic violations. The proceedings were not criminal in nature, and therefore not prosecutions for double jeopardy purposes. Grady is simply inapplicable to the present case. The Supreme Court's same conduct test was premised on the assumption that a prior prosecution occurred. Because we find that the resolution of civil traffic violations are not prosecutions, see infra, we hold that jeopardy did not attach when the trial court entered default judgment against the defendant. Moreover, we think it highly unlikely that the Supreme Court would depart from the well-settled principle, in multi-prosecution analysis, that the risk to which the [Double Jeopardy] Clause refers is not present in proceedings that are not `essentially criminal,' Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 528, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1785, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975) (quoting Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 398, 58 S.Ct. 630, 633, 82 L.Ed. 917 (1938)), without explicitly saying so. See also W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 24.1(b) (1984). Grady is a significant addition to double jeopardy jurisprudence, but, as we interpret it, applies only when the conduct at issue has been charged and tried in a prior prosecution.
Defendant and the court of appeals, however, do not rely solely on Grady. They also read Halper, which we discuss in greater detail in Section III of this opinion, as blurring the distinction between civil and criminal proceedings in a double jeopardy analysis. However, Halper, like Grady, does not provide any guidance on whether a particular proceeding is a prosecution. Indeed, the Halper Court states that: while recourse to statutory language, structure, and intent is appropriate in identifying the inherent nature of a proceeding, or in determining the constitutional safeguards that must accompany those proceedings as a general matter, the approach is not well suited to the context of the humane interests safeguarded by the Double Jeopardy Clause's proscription of multiple punishments. 490 U.S. at 447, 109 S.Ct. at 1901 (emphasis added). Thus, Halper does not reject the statutory interpretation approach for determining the criminal or civil nature of a proceeding. Rather, it distinguishes that inquiry from the analysis necessary to resolve a multiple punishment claim. The notion of punishment ... cuts across the division between the civil and the criminal law, and for the purposes of assessing whether a given sanction constitutes multiple punishment barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we must follow the notion where it leads. Id. (emphasis added). Halper did not involve a second prosecution, nor did it alter the traditional statutory interpretation analysis of what constitutes a criminal proceeding. Id. at 440, 109 S.Ct. at 1897. Halper holds only that a civil sanction may, in the rare case, constitute punishment proscribed by the double jeopardy clause. Id. at 449, 109 S.Ct. at 1902. Thus, neither Halper nor Grady support the conclusion that defendant was prosecuted for the civil traffic violations. Halper does, of course, establish that a defendant may receive punishment for double jeopardy purposes in a civil proceeding. It does not, however, establish when a particular proceeding, though nominally civil, is in reality a criminal proceeding, and thus a prosecution at which jeopardy attaches for purposes of the multiple prosecution protection. For the answer to that question, we must turn to United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 100 S.Ct. 2636, 65 L.Ed.2d 742 (1980).
Notwithstanding Grady and Halper, we believe that the test articulated in Ward is still applicable in determining whether a particular proceeding is civil or criminal in nature. See Purcell v. United States, 594 A.2d 527 (D.C.App. 1991) (adopting the Ward test to determine whether a traffic ticket proceeding was criminal). The Ward inquiry is twofold. We first inquire whether the legislature indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for a civil or criminal label. Ward, 448 U.S. at 248, 100 S.Ct. at 2641. Second, if the legislature has indicated that it intended to establish a civil penalty, we must determine if the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate that intention. Id. at 249, 100 S.Ct. at 2641. If so, then even a nominally civil proceeding will be treated as criminal in nature and will constitute a prosecution for double jeopardy purposes. However, only the clearest proof will establish that a statute fails the second part of the Ward test. Id. at 249, 110 S.Ct. at 2641 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1376, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435 (1960)). Applying the two-pronged Ward test, we conclude that the trial court's entry of default judgment against the defendant for the civil traffic tickets was not a criminal proceeding and therefore not a prosecution. With respect to the first Ward inquiry, we note that in 1983, the Arizona Legislature decriminalized most traffic offenses, including the two traffic offenses at issue here. Laws 1983, Ch. 271, § 49. Moreover, as Division One noted in State v. Walker: [T]he statutes that give rise to defendant's appearance in city court, A.R.S. §§ 28-1071 et seq., are designated Procedure for Adjudication of Civil Traffic Violations. These statutes specifically provide that [v]iolations of statutes relating to traffic movement and control ... shall be treated as civil matters.... A.R.S. § 28-1071(A). The burden of proof in these proceedings shall be by a preponderance of the evidence, A.R.S. § 28-1076(C), and the civil sanction shall not exceed $250. A.R.S. § 28-1076(E). Moreover, a person charged with a civil traffic violation is not entitled to a jury trial. A.R.S. § 28-1076(C). 159 Ariz. 506, 508, 768 P.2d 668, 670 (App. 1989). There can be no doubt that the legislature intended the proceedings and penalties for civil traffic violations, including speeding and unsafe turns, to be civil. Turning to the second Ward inquiry, we conclude that defendant has not provided the clearest proof that the purpose or effect of the statutory scheme is so punitive as to negate the civil label. We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion in Walker [1] that Arizona's Civil Traffic Violation statutes are not punitive in either purpose or effect. Walker, 159 Ariz. at 508, 768 P.2d at 670 (citing Ward ). These statutes, therefore, survive the second inquiry in Ward. We conclude, therefore, that proceedings involving civil traffic violations are civil in nature. They are not prosecutions at which jeopardy can attach. See Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1062, 43 L.Ed.2d 265 (1975) (quoting United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479, 91 S.Ct. 547, 554, 27 L.Ed.2d 543 (1971)) (jeopardy attaches when defendant is put to trial before the trier of facts....). See also Purcell, 594 A.2d at 528 (concluding that traffic offenses which had been decriminalized were civil in nature and not a prosecution). Cf. State v. Sheehan, 167 Ariz. 370, 807 P.2d 538 (App. 1991) (civil traffic violation does not constitute probation violation). Thus, entering civil default judgments for failure to appear at a pretrial hearing did not constitute a prosecution within the meaning of the double jeopardy clause. Accordingly, defendant's trial for aggravated assault and criminal damage does not constitute a second prosecution, and therefore does not violate the double jeopardy clause's multiple prosecution prohibition. Having concluded that defendant's trial for aggravated assault and criminal damage is not a second prosecution, we turn to defendant's argument that it constitutes a second punishment.