Opinion ID: 1537919
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Alleged Interference with Right to Testify

Text: The next alleged error that Mr. Larngar attributes to his trial counsel concerns an ex parte chambers conference during which Mr. Larngar's counsel informed the trial justice that Mr. Larngar would commit perjury if he were to testify on his own behalf. Mr. Larngar contends that, by failing to inform him that the chambers conference had occurred, his counsel created an inherent conflict of interest. Mr. Larngar argues that he was prejudiced by this conflict of interest and that, in his view, at the moment when the conflict of interest was created, his trial counsel no longer had his informed consent to represent him. Consequently, Mr. Larngar contends that his counsel's representation of him was invalid and ineffective, thereby violating the [client's] rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment[s] to the United States Constitution and [a]rticle [1,][s]ections 2 and 10 of the Constitution of the State of Rhode Island. Mr. Larngar also argues that his trial counsel impermissibly interfered with his right to testify by threatening to withdraw from the case if Mr. Larngar continued to insist upon testifying on his own behalf. Mr. Larngar's trial counsel testified that she and Mr. Larngar discussed at length his account of the events on the night in question. She said that, at some point during the course of her representation of Mr. Larngar, he expressed a desire to testify at trial; at that juncture, he gave her what she characterized as an entire[ly] different story from the one he had previously told her. Because of that inconsistency, trial counsel believed that Mr. Larngar's proposed testimony would be perjurious, and she attempted to dissuade him from testifying. Mr. Larngar testified that, when he continued to express his desire to testify, his trial counsel told him that, if he insisted on testifying, she would file a motion to withdraw from the case. It was trial counsel's recollection that, when Mr. Larngar insisted upon taking the stand and giving what she believed would be perjurious testimony, she became alarmed and went to speak with the trial justice ex parte in chambers. According to trial counsel, she explained her concerns to the trial justice in chambers and asked him whether she should withdraw from the case and move for a mistrial, and he responded by telling her to proceed with the case. Mr. Larngar's trial counsel testified at the postconviction-relief hearing that it was her belief that, if Mr. Larngar took the stand, he would be committing another felony and, as his lawyer, she would be supporting him in doing so. She further testified that it was her understanding of the law that in those circumstances she had a duty to bring her ethical and legal concerns to the attention of the trial justice. Because she wanted to avoid the adverse consequences to her client that she believed could stem from raising her concerns about Mr. Larngar's testimony in front of the prosecutor, trial counsel thought it best to speak with the trial justice ex parte in chambers. Mr. Larngar's trial counsel could not recall whether she discussed that chambers conference with Mr. Larngar either before or after it occurred. She testified, however, that it was her belief that, under the circumstances, the attorney-client privilege was not in [e]ffect. She further testified that she did not recall making any threat to Mr. Larngar that she would withdraw from the case if he continued to insist on testifying. In rendering his decision on Mr. Larngar's application for postconviction relief, the hearing justice recalled that the conversation between himself and Mr. Larngar's trial counsel in chambers lasted no more than two to three minutes and that it did not strike him as something that should have been brought to the attention of the state. The hearing justice further stated that [a]t no time did Mr. Larngar's trial counsel give him any indication [as to] what the content or what any prospective testimony may be from Mr. Larngar. The hearing justice also noted that he had engaged in a lengthy colloquy with Mr. Larngar on the record in open court during which (1) the trial justice emphasized to Mr. Larngar that he had an absolute right to testify and (2) Mr. Larngar expressly stated that he had made the decision on his own not to testify. An attorney's duty with respect to how he or she should proceed when faced with what the attorney believes to be the prospect of perjury by a client is not entirely a matter of black letter law; this particular area in the field of professional ethics is notoriously difficult, and the pertinent standards are not as definitive as would be desirable. In his decision denying Mr. Larngar's application for postconviction relief, the hearing justice quite correctly stated that debate still continues about an attorney's obligation when put in this very position. [19] Mr. Larngar contends that, pursuant to Article V, Rule 3.3 of the Supreme Court Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney's duty as an officer of the court to disclose potential perjury is subordinate to a criminal defendant's constitutional rights. Mr. Larngar also argues that, by threatening to withdraw in the middle of trial, his trial counsel impermissibly interfered with his right to testify on his own behalf. It is our opinion that, in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157, 106 S.Ct. 988, 89 L.Ed.2d 123 (1986), Mr. Larngar's argument is unconvincing. In that case, after having been convicted of murder, the defendant petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, arguing that his trial counsel, who had threatened to withdraw if the defendant insisted on giving what the trial counsel believed would be perjurious testimony, had thereby interfered with the defendant's right to present a defense and his right to effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 162-63, 106 S.Ct. 988. The Supreme Court ultimately held that the defendant's constitutional rights had not been violated by his trial counsel's actions. Id. at 171, 106 S.Ct. 988. In so holding, the Supreme Court reasoned that [w]hatever the scope of a constitutional right to testify, it is elementary that such a right does not extend to testifying falsely.  Id. at 173, 106 S.Ct. 988. The Court also stated that, when a defendant proposes to resort to perjury or to produce false evidence, one consequence is the risk of withdrawal of counsel. Id. at 174, 106 S.Ct. 988. The Court held that trial counsel's admonitions to his client in Nix did not impermissibly interfere with the defendant's right to present a defense. Id. at 173, 106 S.Ct. 988. The Supreme Court in Nix also cautioned that the Strickland standard should not be applied overbroadly, stating that, when determining whether an attorney's conduct amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel, a court must be careful not to narrow the wide range of conduct acceptable    so restrictively as to constitutionalize particular standards of professional conduct   . Nix, 475 U.S. at 165, 106 S.Ct. 988. The Court held that whether [or not] seen as a `threat' to withdraw from representation and disclose the illegal scheme, [the attorney's conduct fell] well within accepted standards of professional conduct and the range of reasonable professional conduct acceptable under Strickland.  Id. at 171, 106 S.Ct. 988. In the instant case, Mr. Larngar's trial counsel first attempted to dissuade Mr. Larngar from taking the stand at trial and giving what she believed would be perjurious testimony. When Mr. Larngar continued to insist on testifying, his trial counsel requested an ex parte conference with the trial justicean action that she believed she was obliged as an officer of the court to take. The hearing justice noted that he did not consider the conversation with Mr. Larngar's trial counsel to be of any great moment. After reviewing the record, it cannot be said that trial counsel's actions in this respect fell outside the range of reasonable professional conduct acceptable under Strickland. D