Opinion ID: 2451
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Graymail

Text: As emphasized above, Arar invokes Bivens to challenge policies promulgated and pursued by the executive branch, not simply isolated actions of individual federal employees. Such an extension of Bivens is without precedent and implicates questions of separation of powers as well as sovereign immunity. This, by itself, counsels hesitation; there is further reason to hesitate where, as in this case, the challenged government policies are the subject of classified communications: a possibility that such suits will make the government vulnerable to `graymail,' i.e., individual lawsuits brought to induce the [government] to settle a case (or prevent its filing) out of fear that any effort to litigate the action would reveal classified information that may undermine ongoing covert operations, or otherwise compromise foreign policy efforts. Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 11, 125 S.Ct. 1230, 161 L.Ed.2d 82 (2005). We cast no aspersions on Arar, or his lawyers; this dynamic inheres in any case where there is a risk that a defendant might disclose classified information in the course of a trial. United States v. Pappas, 94 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir.1996). This is an endemic risk in cases (however few) which involve a claim like Arar's. The risk of graymail is itself a special factor which counsels hesitation in creating a Bivens remedy. There would be hesitation enough in an ordinary graymail case, i.e., where the tactic is employed against the government, which can trade settlement cash (or the dismissal of criminal charges) for secrecy. See Tenet, 544 U.S. at 11, 125 S.Ct. 1230; Pappas, 94 F.3d at 799. But the graymail risk in a Bivens rendition case is uniquely troublesome. The interest in protecting military, diplomatic, and intelligence secrets is located (as always) in the government; yet a Bivens claim, by definition, is never pleaded against the government. See, e.g., Malesko, 534 U.S. at 70, 122 S.Ct. 515. So in a Bivens case, there is a dissociation between the holder of the non-disclosure interest (the government, which cannot be sued directly under Bivens ) and the person with the incentive to disclose (the defendant, who cannot waive, but will be liable for any damages assessed). In a rendition case, the Bivens plaintiff could in effect pressure the individual defendants until the government cries uncle. Thus any Bivens action involving extraordinary rendition would inevitably suck the government into the case to protect its considerable interests, andif disclosure is orderedto appeal, or to suffer the disclosure, or to pay. This pressure on the government to pay a settlement has (at least) two further perverse effects. First, a payment from the Treasury tends to obviate any payment or contribution by the individual defendants. Yet, [ Bivens ] is concerned solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers by extracting payment from individual wrongdoers. Malesko, 534 U.S. at 71, 122 S.Ct. 515. When the government elects to settle a Bivens case which is susceptible to graymail, the individual wrongdoer pays nothing and the deterrent effect is lost. Second, the individual defendant in such a case has no incentive to resist discovery that imperils government interests; rather, discovery induces the government to settle. So in the extraordinary rendition context, there is a risk (or likelihood) that the government effectively becomes the real defendant in interest, and the named defendants become proxies that the government cannot control. Precisely because Bivens has never been approved as a Monell -like vehicle for challenging government policies, this factor also counsels hesitation in extending a private damages action in this context. [12] In the end, a Bivens action based on rendition isin all but namea claim against the government. [13] It is not for nothing that Canada (the government, not an individual officer of it) paid Arar $10 million dollars.