Opinion ID: 799598
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Citizenship Claim under Section 201(g) of the Nationality Act

Text: Section 201(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940 provides, in relevant part, that the following shall be nationals and citizens of the United States at birth: [a] person born outside the United States and its outlying possessions of parents one of whom is a citizen of the United States who, prior to the birth of such person, has had ten years' residence in the United States or one of its outlying possessions, at least five of which were after attaining the age of sixteen years, the other being an alien. . . . [1] Guzman argues that the district court erred in analyzing his 201(g) claim by: (1) applying the rational basis test, rather than intermediate scrutiny, to find that the citizen-parent's age requirement is constitutional; and (2) fail[ing] to reject interpretations of the statute that produce an unjust, unreasonable, or absurd result.
The parties do not dispute that the plain language of the statute requires that Guzman's United States citizen mother must have been physically present in the United States for five years after the age of sixteen and prior to Guzman's birth in order for him to derive citizenship through her under section 201(g). Instead, Guzman argues that the statute is unconstitutional because the age-based requirement for the United States citizen parent violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court, under the rational basis test, found that this requirement is constitutional because it is rationally related to Congressional intent to foster ties between the foreign-born child and the United States. Guzman challenges the district court's rational basis finding, and argues that the district court should have applied intermediate scrutiny to analyze whether the age-based requirement is unconstitutionally discriminatory toward children of young parents. The role of the courts in analyzing an equal protection challenge to a federal immigration statute is limited to determining whether the statute at issue is conceivably related to the achievement of the federal interest. Almario v. Att'y Gen., 872 F.2d 147, 152 (6th Cir.1989) (internal quotation marks omitted). The Supreme Court's long-acknowledged deference to Congress with respect to immigration law has led this court to uphold statutory distinctions between classes of aliens if predicated on a rational basis. Hamama v. INS, 78 F.3d 233, 237 (6th Cir.1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even in the non-immigration context, [s]tates may discriminate on the basis of disability or age as long as the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. Coleman v. Ct. App. of Md., ___ U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1349, 182 L.Ed.2d 296 (2012). [W]hen conducting rational basis review we will not overturn such government action unless the varying treatment of different groups or persons is so unrelated to the achievement of any combination of legitimate purposes that we can only conclude that the government's actions were irrational. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L.Ed.2d 522 (2000) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court did not err in applying the rational basis test to this claim. The district court also did not err in finding that section 201(g)'s age-based requirement is constitutional; section 201(g) is rationally related to Congress's interest in achieving the legitimate purpose of ensuring that the citizen parent has developed adult ties to the United States sufficient to pass along these ties to the child. See, e.g., Ruiz v. INS, 410 F.2d 382, 383 (6th Cir.1969) (per curiam) (reviewing Board of Immigration Appeals' findings under section 201(g)); United States v. Perez-Toledo, 259 Fed.Appx. 915, 916 (9th Cir.2007) (same).
In matters of statutory interpretation, we look first to the text and, if the meaning of the language is plain, then `the sole function of the courtsat least where the disposition required by the text is not absurdis to enforce it according to its terms.' Wysocki v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 607 F.3d 1102, 1106 (6th Cir.2010) (quoting Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 534, 124 S.Ct. 1023, 157 L.Ed.2d 1024 (2004)). Interpretations of a statute which would produce absurd results are to be avoided if alternative interpretations consistent with the legislative purpose are available. Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 261 (6th Cir.2009) (quoting Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 575, 102 S.Ct. 3245, 73 L.Ed.2d 973 (1982)) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The district court found that Guzman was not eligible for citizenship under section 201(g) because his mother had not lived in the United States for at least five [years] after attaining the age of sixteen years, which was her age at Guzman's birth. Guzman argues that the district court erred in interpreting section 201(g) to mean that foreign-born children of United States citizens younger than twenty-one years old cannot themselves be deemed United States citizens at birth. Guzman claims that the district court's interpretation of the statute is oppressively harsh and utterly absurd. The district court's interpretation of section 201(g) is not absurd, unreasonable, or unjust. The language of the statute is plain: it provides that a foreign-born individual is a United States citizen at birth under section 201(g) if his or her United States citizen parent lived in the United States for ten years, at least five of which were after the parent turned sixteen, prior to the individual's birth. First, under the above analysis, this result is not absurd because it is rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. Second, because naturalization is a privilege, not a right, Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 131, 63 S.Ct. 1333, 87 L.Ed. 1796 (1943), it is not absurd to require one parent to have adulthood ties to the United States prior to granting the privilege of citizenship to his or her child. The district court did not err in finding that section 201(g) does not produce an absurd result. While Guzman is not presently faced with an immigration action against him, we note that his ability to defend against such an action by establishing citizenship through alternate routes may be in question because his entry to the United States at age two was not recorded. It seems unduly harsh for a two-year-old to be punished for his teenage mother's lack of diligence. This issue, however, is left to future determination if Guzman chooses to raise such a claim.