Opinion ID: 2799240
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Criminal Charges

Text: Jackson next argues the district court erred by excluding evidence that no criminal charges were filed with respect to the fire.6 As a general rule, evidence that criminal charges were not brought is inadmissible in a civil case arising out of the same events as the criminal charges. Goffstein v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 764 5 We also reject Jackson's contention that evidence regarding the use of historical cell phone data to identify the geographic area in which a phone was located at a given time is inherently unreliable. Federal courts have regularly admitted expert testimony regarding this type of evidence. E.g., United States v. Evans, 892 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2012); United States v. Benford, No. 2:09CR86, 2010 WL 2346305, at -3 (N.D. Ind. 2010). Furthermore, Jackson never raised a Daubert challenge with respect to the scientific validity of the principles and methodology underlying [Levy's] testimony, and there is no evidence that the district court clearly erred by allowing Levy's testimony into the record. McKnight v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 36 F.3d 1396, 1407 (8th Cir. 1994) (citing Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-94 (1993)). 6 The record indicates, however, that in response to a juror's question, the district court informed the jury that no criminal charges had been filed but instructed the jurors that they were not to consider this evidence during their deliberations. -15- F.2d 522, 524 (8th Cir. 1985). Jackson acknowledges this general rule, but she contends the evidence should have been admitted under the doctrine of curative admissibility. The doctrine of curative admissibility allows a trial judge, in his discretion, to admit otherwise inadmissible evidence in order to rebut prejudicial evidence which has already been erroneously admitted. Id. (quotation omitted). Jackson contends the doctrine of curative admissibility is applicable here because Baker's investigation was so biased and unreliable that the district court erred by admitting evidence related to the investigation. However, having closely reviewed the record, we conclude that Baker's investigation was thorough and that he had sufficient grounds to investigate Jackson as an arson suspect. Accordingly, because the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Baker's testimony, Jackson has failed to meet the prerequisites for curative admissibility. Id. at 525. D. Motions for JAML and Sufficiency of the Evidence Jackson next challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. Specifically, Jackson contends that, because the jury returned a general verdict in favor of Allstate on its intentional acts defense, it is possible that the jury found that Jackson personally burned her home despite there being no evidence in the record to support such a finding. Jackson also asserts the district court erred by denying her pre-verdict motions for JAML with respect to the issue of whether she personally burned her house. However, we decline to consider either argument because Jackson failed to preserve these issues for appeal. Although Jackson twice moved for JAML before the case was submitted to the jury, her failure to file a renewed motion for JAML after the entry of judgment in favor of Allstate precludes our review of her challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the verdict. If the trial court does not grant a motion for JAML made under Rule 50(a) the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. No -16- later than 28 days after the entry of judgment . . . the movant may file a renewed motion for [JAML]. Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(b). The requirement of a timely application for judgment after verdict is not an idle motion but an essential part of [Rule 50]. EEOC v. S.W. Bell Tel., L.P., 550 F.3d 704, 710 (8th Cir. 2008) (internal quotations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that when a party fails to file a renewed motion for JAML under Rule 50(b), there [is] no basis for review of [the party's] sufficiency of the evidence challenge in the Court of Appeals. Unitherm Food Sys., Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc., 546 U.S. 394, 407 (2006); see N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Cement Co., 761 F.3d 830, 840 (8th Cir. 2014) (A party cannot challenge the sufficiency of the evidence if it failed to file a postverdict motion under Rule 50(b) after the district court denied its Rule 50(a) motion.). Our precedent also establishes that Jackson's failure to file a Rule 50(b) motion precludes our review of the district court's denial of her pre-verdict motions for JAML because they too were based on a sufficiency of the evidence argument. S.W. Bell Tel., 550 F.3d at 709-10. We thus conclude that [Jackson's] failure to file a Rule 50(b) motion after the entry of judgment leaves us without a basis to review [her] sufficiency of the evidence challenges. Id. at 711. E. Motions Related to Allstate's Payment of Jackson's Mortgage Jackson next argues the district court erred in denying her motion to require Allstate to pay her mortgage company, Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, and for an indicative ruling regarding the amount Allstate is required to pay. Jackson also contends she is entitled to a twelve percent statutory penalty and attorney's fees with respect to any payments Allstate makes to Nationstar. We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and [its] legal rulings de novo. Native Am. Council of Tribes v. Weber, 750 F.3d 742, 748 (8th Cir. 2014) (alteration in original) (internal quotation omitted). We review a denial of indicative relief for abuse of discretion. Dice Corp v. Bold Techs., 556 Fed. App'x 378, 384 (6th Cir. 2014). -17- Some additional factual background is helpful in evaluating the various issues Jackson raises with respect to her mortgage. Jackson's policy imposes a duty on Allstate to pay Nationstar to the extent of [its] interest (i.e., the mortgage) in Jackson's house, and it is undisputed that this duty was not relieved by the jury's determination that Jackson was responsible for the fire. We also note, however, that the policy requires Nationstar to establish its right to recovery by furnishing a proof of loss. The record indicates that, before Jackson filed suit, Allstate acknowledged its duty to pay her mortgage and, consistent with the terms of her policy, requested a proof of loss from Jackson's mortgage company. Prior to finally receiving a proof of loss from Nationstar in January 2014, nearly two years after the fire occurred, Allstate made at least ten additional attempts to obtain this information. In the proof of loss, Nationstar claimed its interest in Jackson's property was $203,164.41, and Allstate promptly issued a check to Nationstar in this amount. However, Nationstar has been unable to process this payment because Jackson has refused to consent to Nationstar's use of the funds to pay her mortgage. At the time this case was submitted, Allstate had not paid Jackson's mortgage. With respect to Jackson's motion for an indicative ruling, she has presented no evidence or legal argument suggesting that her policy requires Allstate to pay Nationstar a sum greater than Nationstar claimed in its proof of loss. We thus hold the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Jackson's motion for an indicative ruling regarding the amount Allstate owes Nationstar. Similarly, because Jackson alone is responsible for Nationstar's delay in processing Allstate's payment, we affirm the district court's denial of her motion to require Allstate to pay Nationstar. We also reject Jackson's argument that she is entitled to a statutory penalty and attorney's fees with respect to the amount Allstate ultimately pays to Nationstar. Jackson's claim for a statutory penalty and attorney's fees arises from § 23-79208(a)(1) of the Arkansas Code, which states: -18- In all cases in which loss occurs and the [casualty insurance company] shall fail to pay the losses within the time specified in the policy after demand is made, the [company] shall be liable to pay the holder of the policy . . ., in addition to the amount of the loss, twelve percent (12%) damages upon the amount of the loss, together with all reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution and collection of the loss. Ark. Code Ann. § 23-79-208(a)(1). This provision is penal in nature and is therefore strictly construed in favor of the party sought to be penalized. It should not be held to apply except in cases that come clearly within the statute. Primerica Life Ins. Co. v. Watson, 207 S.W.3d 443, 448 (Ark. 2004) (citations omitted). The purpose of this provision is to inhibit the unwarranted delaying tactics of insurers. Id. In light of this purpose, the Arkansas Supreme Court has consistently declined to apply § 23-79208(a)(1) in circumstances where the insurer's delay in payment was justified. Id. at 449-50; see Clark Center, Inc. v. Nat'l Life & Accident Ins. Co., 433 S.W.2d 151, 152-53 (Ark. 1968) (holding untimely payment was justified where insurer consistently acknowledged its duty to pay under policy and insured failed to furnish proper and necessary information despite insurer's good faith attempts to obtain it); see also Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Ark. v. Shaw, 600 S.W.2d 432, 435 (Ark. Ct. App. 1980) (affirming trial court's award of statutory penalty and attorneys' fees to insured where insurer's payment to mortgagee was untimely and insurer provided no justification for the delay). Here, it is clear that Allstate's delay in paying Jackson's mortgage was initially caused by Nationstar's failure to furnish proper and necessary information,and later by Jackson's refusal to consent to the payment. Clark Center, 433 S.W.2d at 152-53. In addition, Allstate made numerous good faith attempts to acquire the information it needed to pay Jackson's mortgage, and there is no evidence suggesting that Allstate engaged in any unwarranted delaying tactics. Watson, 207 S.W.3d at 448. Accordingly, because Allstate's delay in paying Nationstar is justified, we find no error in the district court's denial of Jackson's motion for a statutory penalty and attorney's fees. Finally we reject Jackson's remaining contentions as being without merit. -19-