Opinion ID: 4553228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Safety’s Duty to the Plaintiffs

Text: We begin our analysis with Safety’s cross-appeal, in which Safety challenges whether the Alex Parties presented sufficient evidence at trial to show that the oral contract between Safety and E-K created a duty that Safety owed to the plaintiffs to ensure the safety of the construction site. If there is not a sufficient evidentiary basis for the existence of this duty, the Alex Parties’ contribution action against Safety is doomed. Under Illinois law, “the negligent performance of contractual duties causing physical injury can give rise to tort liability regardless of whether privity of contract exists between the plaintiff and the defendant, and the scope of the defendant’s duty is dependent on the terms of the contract.” Unger v. Eichleay Corp., 614 N.E.2d 1241, 1245 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (citations omitted). In many contexts, Illinois courts have noted that a contract defines the scope of a duty between a contractor and the general public. See Thompson v. Gordon, 948 N.E.2d 39, 51– 52 (Ill. 2011) (contract between a general contractor and engineering firm defined the scope of the engineering firm’s duties to the general public); Ferentchak v. Vill. of Frankfort, 475 N.E.2d 822, 825–26 (Ill. 1985) (civil engineer had no duty to homeowner to set foundation grades because his contract with the land developer did not require him to do so); Block v. Lohan Assoc., Inc., 645 N.E.2d 207, 224 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (structural engineer did not a have a duty to ensure safety to the employees of the general contractor where the contract 8 Nos. 19-2414 & 19-2395 with the general contractor was limited to design conformance); O’Brien v. Musfeldt, 102 N.E.2d 173, 178 (Ill. App. Ct. 1951) (contract between engineering firm and the state created a duty to the general public to install warning signs). Indeed, contractors have “a duty to protect members of the public from injuries in connection with construction work on highways,” in particular. Mora v. State, 369 N.E.2d 868, 871– 72 (Ill. 1977) (collecting cases). 2 Where a negligence action derives from a contractual obligation, “[t]he question of whether a duty exists … is determined by the terms of the contract, and the duty, if any, will not extend beyond that described in the contract.” Winters v. Fru-Con Inc., 498 F.3d 734, 746 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Putman v. Vill. of Bensenville, 786 N.E.2d 203, 208 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003)); see also Melchers v. Total Elec. Constr., 723 N.E.2d 815, 818 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). Ordinarily, the determination of whether a duty exists is a question of law. Ward v. K Mart Corp., 554 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ill. 1990). But the terms of an oral contract, along with whether it exists, its conditions, and the intent of 2 Safety cites a handful of cases purporting to contradict the proposition that a contract can establish and define a duty between a contractor and the general public, but none of them refute this statement of the law. Indeed, in two of the cases Safety cites, the court held that a contract did not create a duty to protect the general public from intervening criminal acts specifically. See Sanchez v. Wilmette Real Estate & Mgmt. Co., 934 N.E.2d 1029, 1037 (Ill. App. Ct. 2010) (apartment complex did not undertake a duty to protect tenants from harm by a third-party attacker); Chelkova v. Southland Corp., 771 N.E.2d 1100, 1110 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002) (holding that a franchisee was not liable to an employee who was assaulted on the premises, despite the franchisee undertaking to provide certain security measures). This key factual difference distinguishes those cases from the one we address today. Nos. 19-2414 & 19-2395 9 the parties, are questions of fact for the jury to determine. Otto v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 134 F.3d 841, 848 (7th Cir. 1998) (citing Mulliken v. Lewis, 615 N.Ed.2d 25, 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); In re Estate of Kern, 491 N.E.2d 1275, 1280 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986)). If the contract is ambiguous, the parties may introduce extrinsic evidence to help the factfinder interpret the contract. Kurti v. Fox Valley Radiologists, Ltd., 464 N.E.2d 1219, 1226 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984). Here, there was sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude that Safety entered into an oral agreement to provide E-K general safety services, beyond those strictly pertaining to workers’ compensation matters. The jury heard evidence that Safety prepared and submitted a Site Specific Safety Plan to the Illinois Department of Transportation designating Sicking as the site Safety Director, making him responsible for “dayto-day safety issues,” and committing to keeping traffic control in compliance with Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) mandates and the MUTCD. The Alex Parties also put forth evidence that Safety offered in-service training about safety hazards in its proposal for $1,400 a month, and that E-K paid that $1,400 a month. Sicking also testified that if he saw an employee engaged in an unsafe practice, such as improper flagging procedures, he had the authority to stop that practice. And the jury heard that Sicking had committed to devising safety procedures and performing monthly audits to monitor compliance. All of this amounted to a legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a jury to conclude that the terms of the oral contract obligated Safety to ensure the flaggers executed their duties in accordance with appropriate safety standards, through training, creation of proper procedures, and monitoring. 10 Nos. 19-2414 & 19-2395 Safety raises two additional arguments, neither of which succeeds. First, it argues that the Alex Parties failed to prove that its settlement with the plaintiffs released Safety, which the Alex Parties must do to prevail on their contribution claim. But Safety and the Alex Parties stipulated that the settlement released all claims against Safety, and Safety therefore cannot contest this point on appeal. Second, Safety argues that the district court erred in denying Safety’s motion for judgment as a matter of law because the Alex Parties alleged in their third-party complaint that Safety had failed to train and supervise its own employees and never amended their complaint to allege a failure to train E-K’s employees. Although Safety raised this argument before the district court, it did so belatedly: the argument appears only in Safety’s posttrial motion. Safety’s argument therefore came too late, and Safety has waived it. Anderson v. Flexel, Inc., 47 F.3d 243, 247 (7th Cir. 1995) (“We have repeatedly stated that post-judgment motions cannot be used to raise arguments or legal theories that could have been and should have been brought before judgment.”).