Opinion ID: 3186185
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Scope of Restriction and Reverter

Text: The next question is the scope and applicability of the Restriction, and thus, of the Reverter. The superior court determined that the Restriction applies to all three parcels, and so it does. The construction of a deed which is unambiguous is to be handled like any other contract, that is, it is a matter for determination by the court, and its meaning and effect are questions of law for the court. Turk v. Jeffreys-McElrath Mfg. Co., 207 Ga. 73, 75 (2) (60 SE2d 166) (1950). The construction of a contract involves three steps: first, the court must determine whether the language therein is clear and unambiguous, and if it is, the contract is to be enforced according to its clear terms; the contract alone is looked to for its meaning; next, if the contract is ambiguous in some respect, the court must apply the rules of contract construction to resolve the ambiguity; and finally, if the ambiguity remains after applying the rules of construction, the issue of what the ambiguous language means and what the parties intended must be resolved by the trier of fact. City of Baldwin v. Woodard & Curran, 293 Ga. 19, 30 (3) (743 SE2d 381) (2013). 7 As the superior court noted, the Deed is not ambiguous as to the application of the Restriction and the Reverter to all three parcels of the Property. The physical layout of the brief one-page Deed itself, which conveys the three parcels simultaneously supports this conclusion. So too does the fact that the parcels are conveyed pursuant to and as part of a single charitable gift. The legal descriptions also make plain that the parcels adjoin each other so as to comprise a continuous tract of land. Other clear language used in the Deed likewise compels the conclusion that the Restriction and the Reverter are to apply equally to Parcels 1, 2, and 3. The words in a deed, like in other contracts, carry their ordinary meanings. Lafarge Bldg. Materials, Inc. v. Thompson, 295 Ga. 637, 640 (2) (763 SE2d 444) (2014). And, so they should in this case. Such clear language begins with the sole Granting Clause, which plainly applies to the Property in toto, and states that the conveyance is “for the purposes herein set forth”; the only purpose set forth is that the Property be used for specified aspects of education, i.e., the Restriction on use. The Restriction itself expressly states that it applies to the “above property”; the Restriction does not distinguish among the three parcels in any way, or use any terminology 8 suggesting a parsing of the Property. And, it could easily have done so.4 As to the conditional language following the legal description of Parcel 1, it does not insulate the tract from the Restriction and the Reverter or alter the nature of the ultimate estate in the Property which is conveyed by the Deed. The language constitutes nothing more than an easement in gross in favor of the named individual. An easement in gross is a mere personal right in the land of another, and inasmuch as it is an interest in land, the Deed properly contains its express grant; this would include language sufficient to designate with reasonable certainty the land over which the easement extends. Dyer v. Dyer, 275 Ga. 339, 340-341 (1) (566 SE2d 665) (2002). It does not alter the applicability of the Restriction and the Reverter. Nor does the easement in gross for the purpose of the residence of the named employee on Parcel 1 of the Property conflict in any way with the expressed intent that the Property be used for educational purposes. The fact that a structure on the real estate of a college campus serves, at least for a time, as a residence for a college employee fosters rather than defeats such a purpose, and is in keeping with the reality of 4 As CAU suggests in its brief, “above” could have been slightly modified such as “some of the above,” “immediately above,” “adjacent to,” etc. 9 dormitory and other student and faculty residence facilities on many college campuses. As for the use of the word “premises” instead of the word “property” in the Deed’s Habendum Clause, this in no manner alters, much less diminishes, the plain meaning and scope of “property” as used in the Restriction and the Reverter. The term “premises” is merely customary and boilerplate language in a Habendum Clause. See 2 Daniel F. Hinkel, Pindar's Ga. Real Estate Law & Procedure § 19:29 (7th ed., updated April 2015) (explaining that such language actually serves no useful purpose and could be omitted entirely). And, in deeds, the terms “premises” and “property” may be used interchangeably to refer to the same real estate. See, e.g., Statham v. Kelly, 276 Ga. 877 (584 SE2d 246) (2003) (“As a part of the consideration for this transfer it is expressly stipulated that should the grantees herein ever fail to use the premises described herein for their personal residence the property shall revert to the grantor and any interest held by the grantees herein shall be terminated.” (Emphasis supplied and emphasis omitted.)) This Court has long acknowledged that the words may be synonymous in regard to a use restriction and reversionary interest. See Wills 10 v. Pierce, 208 Ga. 417 (67 SE2d 239) (1951). Even if the Deed was found to be ambiguous in regard to the reach of the Restriction and the Reverter, the same construction results. In construing a deed, the paramount consideration and overriding goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the parties. Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Inc. v. Lollar, 282 Ga. 721, 724-725 (2) (653 SE2d 462) (2007); Moore v. Wells, 212 Ga. 446, 449 (1) (93 SE2d 731) (1956). And, in general, the parties’ intent is to be determined from the deed's text alone, and extrinsic evidence will be used to interpret the deed only when its text is so ambiguous that its meaning cannot be determined through application of the ordinary rules of textual construction. Second Refuge Church of Our Lord Jesus Christ, Inc. v. Lollar, supra at 724-725 (2). Furthermore, the deed must be examined in its entirety in order to determine the parties’ intent and to be given a construction which is consistent with reason and common sense. Woodbery v. Atlas Realty Co., 148 Ga. 712 (98 SE 472) (1919). Each provision of the Deed is to be given effect and interpreted so as to harmonize with the others. Horwitz v. Weil, 275 Ga. 467 (569 SE2d 515) (2002). So too, the circumstances and purpose of 11 the Deed must be given due weight. Id. at 468. Application of these rules of construction compels the conclusion that the Restriction and the Reverter are intended to apply to all three parcels. As has been detailed, the structure and language of the Deed reflects the parties’ clear intent that the Property, in toto, comprise a donation to MBC of a unified tract of land for the one and only purpose expressed in the Deed, i.e., for the particular aspects of education set forth therein.5