Opinion ID: 1115282
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: prosecution based on the sole witness who later recants a credibility, fact and circumstance standard

Text: The case which defines and highlights the conceptual problem directly involved here is People v. Minnick, 214 Cal. App.3d 1478, 215 Cal. App.3d 293A, 263 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1989). That court first recognized discretion and a requirement that each case be examined on its own facts and then answered by absolute rejection of the contention of the state that the trial court is required to determine whether the witness's recantation is true or false in ruling on a motion for new trial. If false, the motion must be denied; if true, it must be granted. Id. 263 Cal. Rptr. at 318. The court emphatically chose a different standard justified in basic jury fact finding concepts: The role of the trial court in deciding a motion for new trial based upon a witness's recantation is to determine whether the new evidence is credible, i.e., worthy of belief by the jury. That determination is made after a consideration of all the facts pertinent to the particular issue. The trial court is not the final arbiter of the truth or falsity of the new evidence. Once the trial court has found the recantation to be believable, it must then decide whether consideration of the recantation would render a different result on retrial reasonably probable. Id. (emphasis added). For an identically stated standard, see Lombardo v. State, 172 Conn. 385, 374 A.2d 1065 (1977); State v. James, 490 So.2d 616, 620 (La. App. 1986); and State v. Volpato, 102 N.M. 383, 696 P.2d 471 (1985). See also Solis v. State, 262 So.2d 9, (Fla.App.) cert. denied 265 So.2d 372 (Fla. 1972), which was superseded by Mollica v. State, 374 So.2d 1022 (Fla. App. 1979), cert. denied 386 So.2d 639 (Fla. 1980) on the issue of exercised discretion. This is precisely the standard that existed in Wyoming prior to the intervention of the present majority opinion which now enlarges trial court decisional discretion with a fact finding requirement of truthfulness. The statement of this confined factual situation rule involving principal witness recantation is provided in 4 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, § 601 at 189 (12th ed. 1976) (footnotes omitted): Ordinarily, a new trial will be granted where the conviction was based primarily on the testimony of such prosecuting witness [who recanted]; a new trial will be refused where the conviction was sufficiently supported by other evidence, where the recantation was obtained by coercion, or where the recantation was subsequently repudiated. The principal case presently cited and directly attacked in this majority is State v. York, 41 Wash. App. 538, 704 P.2d 1252 (1985). Perhaps the misunderstanding by this majority of the York sole witness rule for a new trial after the witness recants comes from confusion of the subject and its intrinsic factors. First is that the recanted testimony process provides reasonable credibility (e.g. not double recant or Fifth Amendment refusal to testify at hearing). Secondly, the recanted testimony must be essentially the basis of the original conviction and other collaboration and supporting evidence was not available to now adversely test credibility of the recanted posture taken. Brown II now provides a classical York case where there was no supporting evidence to demonstrate that the criminally charged act ever occurred; the sole witness recanted testimony under oath at a hearing and the witness provided an established history of consistency since trial in asserting that the trial testimony was false. Similarly, York was an indecent liberties case, there was no supporting evidence the offense had ever occurred and the complaining witness recanted shortly after trial and maintained the same position through sworn testimony at a new trial hearing. In reversing the trial court denial of a new trial, the Washington court stated five preliminary criteria and conclusionary effect creating the recanted witness test: We now address whether the court erred in finding that defendant's conviction was based solely upon the recanting witness' trial testimony, and refusing to find whether this witness had perjured herself at the trial. On a motion for a new trial based upon newly discovered evidence, the following five requirements must be met before a new trial will be granted: (1) the evidence must be such that the results will probably change if a new trial was granted; (2) the evidence must have been discovered since the trial; (3) the evidence could not have been discovered before the trial by exercising due diligence; (4) the evidence must be material and admissible; and (5) the evidence cannot be merely cumulative or impeaching. State v. Williams, 96 Wash.2d 215, 223, 634 P.2d 868 (1981); State v. Davis, 25 Wash. App. 134, 138, 605 P.2d 359 (1980).    Where independent evidence corroborates the testimony that a witness later seeks to recant, the grant of a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. State v. Rolax, 84 Wash.2d 836, 529 P.2d 1078 (1974); State v. Hayden, 28 Wash. App. 935, 627 P.2d 973 (1981). However, [w]hen a defendant is convicted solely on the testimony of the now recanting witness, this court has squarely held that it is an abuse of discretion not to grant a new trial. State v. Rolax, 84 Wash.2d at 838, 529 P.2d 1078, citing State v. Powell, 51 Wash. 372, 98 P. 741 (1909). Here, in granting the motion for new trial, the trial court found that defendant's conviction rested solely upon the testimony of Louise and that her recantation met all of the five criteria of State v. Williams, supra ; State v. Davis, supra . York, 704 P.2d at 1254-55 (emphasis in original). The precise principle is also to be found in Mullins, 375 S.W.2d 832 and Shepherd, 101 S.W.2d 918. Actually what is sometimes called the York rule in Washington state law should more properly be designated the Powell principle derived from State v. Powell, 51 Wash. 372, 98 P. 741, 742 (1909), where it was stated: Outside of the evidence of this girl there is no evidence of the offense to submit to the jury. The court then said: The jury at the trial did not have the fact before it that the witness had made sworn statements contrary to her testimony. The witness made such sworn statements afterwards. It is true she testified that she had stated when not under oath that she had never had sexual intercourse with the appellant, but it is not uncommon for persons to deny such things when not under oath, and afterwards, when they are on oath, admit the fact. Such witnesses may be worthy of belief, but it is rare that any person will testify to a truth and subsequently testify that such testimony was false. The evidence of such witnesses uncorroborated in essential facts ought to be received with caution, to say the least, and a man ought not to be sent to the penitentiary until a jury has had an opportunity to pass upon it, which has not been done here. No injustice can be done upon a new trial. New trials have frequently been granted upon the showing made in this case. Bussey v. State, 69 Ark. 545, 64 S.W. 268; Mann v. State, 44 Tex. 642; Bates v. State (Miss), 32 South. 915; Dennis v. State, 103 Ind. 142, 2 N.E. 349; State v. Moberly, 121 Mo. 604, 26 S.W. 364. Id. 98 P. at 742. An abuse of discretion was found and the trial court denial of a new trial was reversed in following Powell to a somewhat similar effect in State v. Rolax, 84 Wash.2d 836, 838, 529 P.2d 1078 (1974). Non-dispositive recanted testimony provided a different result in State v. Hayden, 28 Wash. App. 935, 627 P.2d 973 (1981) and State v. Letellier, 16 Wash. App. 695, 558 P.2d 838 (1977). York and other Washington cases were followed and cited in Robinett v. State, 494 So.2d 952, 955 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986), where the court stated disposition that [t]he victim may be able to recant his own testimony, but the fact remains that he cannot recant appellant's confession to this crime. Corroboration was found in the defendant's confession. The rule recognized and then found not applicable because of the confession was when a defendant is convicted solely on the testimony of the now recanting witness, it would be an abuse of discretion not to allow a new trial. Id. at 955. Robinett and York were completely consistent in concept and controlling features. Com. v. Mosteller, 446 Pa. 83, 284 A.2d 786 (1971) initiated the Annotation, Recantation by Prosecuting Witness in Sex Crime as Ground for New Trial, 51 A.L.R.3d 907 (1973). The issue presented by Mosteller is identical with York and now here in Brown II. In Brown II, there was no corroboration that the sexual offense had ever occurred. In Mosteller, Justice Roberts of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognized from Com. v. Krick, 164 Pa.Super. 516, 520, 67 A.2d 746, 749 (1949): In the absence of sworn evidence impeaching the girl's retraction, a new trial should have been granted.       In the present case, not only is there nothing to contradict Frieda's recantation, there is evidence from her great aunt that Frieda admitted a month prior to trial that she had fabricated the story. Additionally, Frieda persisted in her retraction despite having been informed that she was thereby subject to criminal charges for perjury and a substantial prison term. This was a clear declaration against interest entitled to considerable credibility, unlike the normal retraction by a co-conspirator who is already in prison and realistically has little to lose by attempting to free his partner. Mosteller, 284 A.2d at 789. It is obvious that the case of Com. v. McCloughan, 279 Pa.Super. 599, 421 A.2d 361 (1980) did not supersede the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision in Mosteller where differentiated facts, including specifically significant corroboration of the offense, were provided in testimony. Likewise, differentiated in McCloughan, there was a total lack of credibility and the conclusion of the trial court was found to be justified where the recanting testimony was replete with inconsistencies and contradictions and was incredible. McCloughan, 421 A.2d at 365. Brown II is not factually comparable to McCloughan. Mosteller was cited with approval in Com. v. Gaddy, 492 Pa. 434, 424 A.2d 1268, 1270 (1981), when abuse of discretion was not found and the recantation was totally lacking in credibility. Gaddy, as a consequence, is identically postured with our most recent case of Lacey v. State, 803 P.2d 1364 (Wyo. 1990), and in factual relevance is directly contrary to our present decision emplaced in requiring or providing for a trial court determination of truth. See likewise Com. v. Floyd, 506 Pa. 85, 484 A.2d 365 (1984). Overtly and emphatically, the Pennsylvania cases provide no precedential support for this majority decision. This case, as an argued underpinning for this majority's decision, lacks any substantive support in either rule or fact. State v. Scanlon, 108 Ariz. 399, 499 P.2d 155 (1972), as authority on the subject, is consistent within its facts with York in recognition that both corroboration and confession existed to justify affirmance of the discretional denial of a new trial. Scanlon is not comparable in any factual regard to Brown II where here no question of the actual occurrence of the crime exists beyond the recanted testimony. Cf. State v. Hickle, 133 Ariz. 234, 650 P.2d 1216 (1982), where a trial court decision granting a new trial on the basis of recanted testimony in the murder case was affirmed on appeal. Credibility was the absolute criteria and validity and determined truthfulness was not in issue under the Arizona recanted testimony standard. See likewise State v. Scott, 113 Ariz. 423, 555 P.2d 1117 (1976), where the issue was again credibility and a new trial was not granted. Borgess v. State, 455 So.2d 488, 491 (Fla. App. 1984) is inapplicable because there were two victims, only one of whom recanted. The distinction and effect is recognized by Chief Judge Ervin in special concurrence: If the conviction of the appellant depended solely on the testimony of the minor prosecuting witness, I would be inclined to the view that a denial of a motion for new trial would constitute an abuse of discretion under the circumstances presented. Yet, there was a second victim who neither recanted her testimony, nor maintained close family ties with the defendant. Her testimony paralleled and indeed corroborated much of the other witness's trial testimony. Given this additional evidence I am unprepared to say that the court's denial of the motion was an abuse of discretion. Id. at 492 (emphasis in original). A more appropriate authority can be found in Solis, 262 So.2d 9, where reversal came with recantation of the sole witness by appellate court reversal. The trial judge, apparently assuming that his function at such hearing was to determine the truth vel non of her recanting testimony, found that she was then and there telling a lie and had theretofore told the truth at trial. Herein lies the error.    It is not within the province of the trial judge at that juncture to determine on which of the two occasions the witness was telling the truth. To do so would be preempting the function of a trial jury. Stated otherwise, the controlling point is that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that a jury had to believe the first testimony and could not, as the trial judge undertook to do, believe the second if it were before them, or consider it at all as it might bear on a possible reasonable doubt concerning the truth of the first. Id. at 10-11 (emphasis in original and footnote omitted). See similarly the Florida concept invoked in the interest of justice requiring a new trial, Jackson v. State, 416 So.2d 10 (Fla.App. 1982); Hanson v. State, 187 So.2d 54 (Fla.App. 1966); Lowe v. State, 154 Fla. 730, 19 So.2d 106 (1944); and Fuller v. State, 92 Fla. 873, 110 So. 528 (1926). Jackson and Hanson were cited by Judge Ervin in his special concurrence in Borgess, 455 So.2d 488. State v. Rogers, 703 S.W.2d 166 (Tenn. Cr.App. 1985) again provides no authority since the victim was wired by the police and obtained incriminating statements. Following the sexual charge by his daughter, the father was convicted of both rape and incest. The trial court reversed the rape charge and the appellate court affirmed the incest conviction on the basis that the victim could effectively recant the rape charge but not the incest charge which was supported by the father in the tape recording. Rogers is consistent with York and Dunbar v. State, 522 P.2d 158 (Alaska 1974) follows. With citation of the Annotation, supra, 51 A.L.R.3d 907, the Alaska court found the record insufficient to determine whether there was an abuse of discretion and remanded for a factual hearing regarding the recanting affidavits in contrast to their trial testimony. Dunbar, 522 P.2d at 160. In considering recantation of trial testimony, particularly in sex crimes, there is no hard and fast rule from which it can be determined whether a new trial is called for. There are a considerable number of cases on this subject, but the most that can be gathered from them is that each case depends upon its own particular facts. Id. at 160. Dunbar was clearly a fact and circumstance credibility analysis. There is only one jurisdiction found, Indiana, which in some cases absolutely rejects the sole evidence recanted testimony rule personified by York-Powell. Some Indiana intermediate court cases reject the single witness recanted principle, but even so do not reject the broader issue of credibility. Best v. State, 418 N.E.2d 316 (Ind. App. 1981) is such a case but see, however, on probable cause for search warrant, Snyder v. State, 460 N.E.2d 522 (Ind. App. 1984). These cases, of all of the authorities cited in the majority, are the only cases which provide support for this present decision on this specific question of the sole witness recanted testimony where the initial testimony was uncorroborated by other significant evidence. However, Indiana law on either the narrow sole evidence issue or the broad judge or jury decision question cannot be simplistically resolved by review of only those two cases. As far back as 1885, the Indiana Supreme Court reversed a death penalty in Dennis v. State, 103 Ind. 142, 2 N.E. 349 (1885), where the principal witness recanted. That court, after recognizing the jurisdiction of the jury for fact finding, stated: The evidence of the third confession is something more than impeaching evidence, because, if believed by the jury, its tendency will be to defeat a verdict for the state on the indictment in this case. The materiality of the evidence of the third confession cannot be doubted or denied, and it is impossible for the courts to tell how this third confession, in connection with Coffey's previous confessions, might affect the jury; and, in such a case, we understand the rule to be that a new trial should always be granted. Especially should this rule prevail in our state, where, by the fundamental law, it is expressly declared that in all criminal cases whatever the jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts. Rev.St. 1881, § 64; Grah. & W. New Trials, 1043, 1044; Lindley v. State, 11 Tex. Ct. App. 283; Greene v. State, 17 Fla. 669. By his third confession, Coffey says, in substance and effect, that he had perjured himself in each of his previous confessions, and in his testimony on the trial of this cause. We are met, therefore, with this question: Ought we to permit the appellant, who has been convicted upon confessedly false and perjured testimony, to suffer the extreme penalty of death? With a just sense, we hope, of our official duty, we answer this question in the negative. Id. 2 N.E. at 355. The same approach was restated in another sole witness case, Key v. State, 235 Ind. 172, 132 N.E.2d 143 (1956). The established evidentiary insufficiency and impeaching character of the changed testimony in Thompson v. State, 492 N.E.2d 264 (Ind. 1986) follows Dennis and Key in adopting the stated rule. Chupp v. State, 509 N.E.2d 835 (Ind. 1987) was not an uncorroborated witness case nor was the testimony decisive. In O'Connor v. State, 529 N.E.2d 331, 333 (Ind. 1988), there was no valid evidence that the principal witness ever recanted and what was said by a third party was fabricated itself. Strain v. State, 560 N.E.2d 1272 (Ind. App. 1990) provides a conflicting evidence credibility case as did the most recent circuit criminal case in the state, Thomas v. State, 562 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. App. 1990), where a co-participant guilty plea did not provide credible evidence to exonerate the defendant. At best, the testimony was cumulative and impeaching and not exculpatory with the suspect credibility of the process itself. Again, the Indiana cases provide no persuasive support for this court's present discussion and certainly not for its decision. Dennis, 2 N.E. 349. Identical authority where reversal occurred with principal witness recantation over a considerable scope of jurisdictions and extended time would include: Ledet v. United States, 297 F.2d 737 (5th Cir.1962); Martin v. United States, 17 F.2d 973 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 275 U.S. 527, 48 S.Ct. 20, 72 L.Ed. 408 (1927); Myers v. State, 111 Ark. 399, 163 S.W. 1177 (1914), the nine quarts of whiskey consumed by the jury in a three day session with two abstainers added a basis for a new trial requirement; Bussey v. State, 69 Ark. 545, 64 S.W. 268 (1901); State v. Bassett, 93 N.H. 62, 35 A.2d 388 (1943); Martin v. State, 34 Okl. Cr. 274, 246 P. 647 (1926); Krick, 67 A.2d 746; Morgan v. State, 136 Tex.Crim. 347, 125 S.W.2d 558 (1939); and Mann v. State, 44 Tex. 642 (Tex. 1876). Recanted testimony, and particularly when found in criminal cases, has not been missed in analysis, case collections and journal reviews. The statement provided by 4 Wharton's Criminal Procedure, supra, at 188 (footnotes omitted) may not necessarily be accurate in every separate jurisdiction, but realistically outlines the subject: The question whether a new trial will be granted, on the ground that a prosecuting witness claiming to have been the victim of a sex offense on the part of the defendant, has recanted prior testimony, is addressed to the discretion of the trial judge. Ordinarily, a new trial will be granted where the conviction was based primarily on the testimony of such prosecuting witness; a new trial will be refused where the conviction was sufficiently supported by other evidence, where the recantation was obtained by coercion, or where the recantation was subsequently repudiated. Resource material includes Annotation, Statements by Witness After Criminal Trial Tending to Show That His Testimony Was Perjured, as Ground for New Trial, 33 A.L.R. 550 (1924), as supplemented by Annotation, Recantation of Testimony of Witness as Grounds for New Trial  Federal Criminal Cases, 94 A.L.R. Fed. 60 (1989); Annotation, What Standard, Regarding Necessity for Change in Trial Result, Applies in Granting New Trial Pursuant to Rule 33 of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for Newly Discovered Evidence of False Testimony of Prosecution Witness, 59 A.L.R.Fed. 657 (1982); Annotation, Standard for Granting or Denying New Trial in State Criminal Case on Basis of Recanted Testimony  Modern Cases, 77 A.L.R.4th 1031 (1990); Annotation, supra, 51 A.L.R.3d 907; Annotation, Statements by a Witness After Criminal Trial Tending to Show That His Testimony was Perjured, as Ground for New Trial, 158 A.L.R. 1062 (1945); Annotation, Statement by Witness After Criminal Trial Tending to Show That His Testimony Was Perjured as Ground for New Trial, 74 A.L.R. 757 (1931); Comment, supra, 35 Emory L.J. 969; Comment, Rethinking the Standard for New Trial Motions Based Upon Recantations as Newly Discovered Evidence, 134 U.Pa.L.Rev. 1433 (1986); Comment, Criminal Law and Procedure. Ninth Circuit Adopts Berry Standard for New Trial Based Upon Perjured Testimony, 11 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. 153, 171 (1981); Note, I Cannot Tell a Lie: The Standard for New Trial in False Testimony Cases, 83 Mich.L.Rev. 1925 (1985); and Development, Criminal Procedure: Minnesota Adopts the Larrison Standard for Granting a New Trial Because of Newly Discovered Evidence. State v. Caldwell, 67 Minn.L.Rev. 1314 (1983). There are only a few cases that combine the Larrison validity review and the Berry probability effect which is the composite standard now adopted by this majority in contradistinction to our historical approach of rejecting Larrison and maintaining Opie as the standard. Lacey, 803 P.2d 1364. The only possible justification for the present majority decision is to move from Opie which rendered a new trial grant difficult to essentially now provide an unlimited trial court discretional veto. It should not be for the trial judge nor for this court to determine the ultimate question of the defendant's guilt or innocence. Minnick, 263 Cal. Rptr. 316; Powell, 98 P. 741. In essence, this court's rules for a new trial are rescinded when applied to newly discovered evidence. The restructured principle is unjustified by logic or precedent if justice is in reality the search for truth. This decision provides the most abusive character of indiscriminate judicial legislating, now done without benefit of briefing, argument or applied precedent. McCleskey v. Zant, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 113 L.Ed.2d 517, reh'g denied ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2841, 115 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1991), Marshall, J., dissenting.