Opinion ID: 187302
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Retention of a Daily Standard for All Coarse PM

Text: In their challenge to the EPA's decision to maintain a daily NAAQS for allnot just urbancoarse PM, the industry petitioners make two arguments, one contesting the EPA's authority to regulate nonurban coarse PM and the other contesting its evidence of coarse PM's dangerousness. First, the industry petitioners contend that, to promulgate a NAAQS for nonurban PM coarse, the EPA must show that such particles present a significant risk to public health. Industry Reply Br. 4. To support this contention, the petitioners rely on 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1), which states: For the purpose of establishing national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards, the Administrator shall... publish, and shall from time to time thereafter revise, a list which includes each air pollutant(A) emissions of which, in his judgment, cause or contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. On the basis of this section, the petitioners argue that the EPA lacks authority to establish a NAAQS for coarse PM that includes nonurban coarse PM unless the agency first makes a finding that such nonurban coarse PM may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare. Id. The petitioners misunderstand § 7408(a)(1). Under that section, the EPA must make a dangerousness finding in order to place a pollutant on the list of pollutants regulated by NAAQS. But that requirement to find dangerousness does not apply when the EPA sets the NAAQS for a pollutant already on the list. At issue in this review is not the listing of PM, but rather the review and revision of the PM NAAQS that was mandated by § 7409(d)(1). See id. § 7409(d)(1) (Not later than December 31, 1980, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Administrator shall complete a thorough review of the criteria published under section 7408 of this title and the national ambient air quality standards promulgated under this section and shall make such revisions in such criteria and standards and promulgate such new standards as may be appropriate in accordance with section 7408 of this title and subsection (b) of this section). In ATA I, this court confirmed that the establishment of an indicator for PM2.5 was not a new listing under § 7408(a)(1) because PM2.5 had previously been regulated as part of the PM10 indicator. ATA I, 175 F.3d at 1055. Similarly, nonurban PM10 has been regulated under the general PM10 standard, and therefore the EPA's continued regulation of all PM10 is not a new listing that would require an endangerment finding under § 7408(a)(1). The industry petitioners also seek support for their lack-of-authority claim in the Supreme Court's opinion in Whitman. In particular, they argue that Whitman's citation of Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 100 S.Ct. 2844, 65 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1980), a case that addressed a provision of the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Act of 1970, means that a NAAQS is `requisite' to protect public health only if EPA has made a threshold showing of real and significant risk. Industry Br. 16. But Whitman compared the specificity of the CAA to that of the OSH Actciting Industrial Union in the course of that comparisonsolely for the purpose of deciding whether the CAA violated the nondelegation doctrine, Whitman, 531 U.S. at 473-74, 121 S.Ct. 903, a purpose not relevant here. It did not suggest that Industrial Union has any implication for the EPA's exercise of its authority under section 109 of the CAA. The industry petitioners' contention that the EPA lacks authority to regulate nonurban PM10 therefore lacks merit. The industry petitioners' second argument against the EPA's regulation of nonurban coarse is that scientific evidence shows that nonurban coarse PM is not associated with adverse health effects. Industry Br. 17. Drawing on statements in the final rule, the petitioners argue that the scientific evidence shows danger only from urban coarse, and not from nonurban coarse. See 2006 Final Rule, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,185-86. The petitioners argue both that scientific evidence demonstrates that nonurban coarse PM is not dangerous and that the EPA's cautious approach is unlawful absent evidence of nonurban coarse PM's dangerousness. Industry Br. 17-22. In assessing the scientific evidence, the petitioners have mistakenly equated an absence of certainty about dangerousness with the existence of certainty about safety. The petitioners selectively quote from the final rule to bolster their argument that nonurban coarse is not dangerous, see id. at 19, but they ignore passages that weaken the force of their contention. For example, the petitioners note that studies of exposure to coarse PM from dust storms do not show significant health effects. 2006 Final Rule, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,186; Industry Br. 18. But the petitioners ignore the EPA's qualifier on the dust storm studies: people in such situations may practice avoidance behavior and limit their exposure to the dust. 2006 Final Rule, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,191. The petitioners similarly quote the portion of the final rule that discusses the lack of health impacts observed in studies focusing on volcanic ash from Mt. St. Helens, id.; Industry Br. 19, but omit the subsequent discussion of possibilities for toxic contamination in more typical nonurban coarse PM.2006 Final Rule, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,191. By contrast, the EPA has provided evidence that suggests nonurban coarse PM likely is not safe. The EPA points to dosimetric, toxicological, and occupational exposure studies that all indicate danger from nonurban coarse. EPA Br. 95-97. Dosimetric evidence shows that all types of coarse PM can deposit in the sensitive regions of the lung of most concern, the tracheobronchial and alveolar regions. 2006 Final Rule, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,197. Toxicological evidence demonstrates that all types of coarse can be contaminated by motor vehicles and industrial emissions, molds, fungi, endotoxins, polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), and resuspended fine PM. Id. at 61,189-92. Some rural coarse, such as that found in dry lakebeds, may also be highly contaminated with metals, salts, and other toxic constituents. Id. at 61,191. The EPA notes that contamination means there is not a clear division between urban and nonurban coarse; rather there is a continuum of sources and contamination, so that the difference between them is a question of degree. EPA Br. 96. In addition, occupational studies showing health effects from nonurban coarse at occupational exposure levels lend[] further support to a cautious approach in considering revisions to the standards affording protection from thoracic coarse particles. 2006 Final Rule, 71 Fed.Reg. at 61,191. Although the evidence of danger from coarse PM is, as the EPA recognizes, inconclusive, id. at 61,193, the agency need not wait for conclusive findings before regulating a pollutant it reasonably believes may pose a significant risk to public health. The evidence in the record supports the EPA's cautious decision that some protection from exposure to thoracic coarse particles is warranted in all areas. Id. As this court has consistently reaffirmed, the CAA permits the Administrator to err on the side of caution in setting NAAQS. Lead Indus., 647 F.3d at 1155; see also ATA III, 283 F.3d at 369 (The [Clean Air] Act requires EPA to promulgate protective primary NAAQS even where, as here, the pollutant's risks cannot be quantified or `precisely identified as to nature or degree' (quoting 1997 Final Rule, 62 Fed.Reg. at 38,653)); Am. Petroleum Inst. v. Costle, 665 F.2d 1176, 1186 (D.C.Cir.1981) (In setting margins of safety the Administrator need not regulate only the known dangers to health, but may `err' on the side of overprotection by setting a fully adequate margin of safety). This court's role is limited to determining if the Administrator made a rational judgment and is not to weigh the evidence anew and make technical judgments. Am. Petroleum Inst., 665 F.2d at 1185. On the basis of the evidence in the record, we find the Administrator's decision to regulate all coarse PM to be rational and therefore deny the industry petitioners' claims on this issue.