Opinion ID: 4543042
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hinkle’s First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Text: We now turn to Hinkle’s argument that Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights by supporting Sheriff Jay’s opponent in the 2012 election. Hinkle must establish three elements to show First Amendment retaliation: (1) that [he] was engaged in constitutionally protected activity; (2) that the defendant[s’] actions caused [him] to suffer an injury that would chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity; and (3) that the defendant[s’] adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to [his] exercise of constitutionally protected conduct. Worrell v. Henry, 219 F.3d 1197, 1212 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Deputy Estep and Sheriff Jay concede that for purposes of summary judgment, “Hinkle’s allegations . . . involving political support/association and suffrage [are] sufficient for the first element of ‘constitutionally protected activity.’” Appellees Scott Jay and Strider Estep’s Response Br. 19. They also agree that “an arrest or the publication of a press release regarding that arrest could satisfy 34 the second prong.” Id. Thus, Sheriff Jay and Deputy Estep limit their arguments to the third element. Hinkle’s First Amendment retaliation claim has two bases: (1) that Deputy Estep arrested him in retaliation for supporting Sheriff Jay’s election opponent, and (2) that Sheriff Jay posted a false press release and sanctioned criminal charges against Hinkle for the same reason.16
In addition to the three Worrell elements, a First Amendment retaliation claim based on a false arrest requires a separate “threshold showing”—generally, a plaintiff must show a false arrest. See Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715, 1727 (2019). Hinkle concedes that “[w]hen an unlawful arrest is at the heart of a First Amendment retaliation claim, such as here, a lack of probable cause must be shown.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 32 (citation omitted). And in Nieves, the Supreme Court recently explained that “[t]he plaintiff pressing a retaliatory arrest claim must plead and prove the absence of probable cause for the arrest.” 139 S. Ct. at 1724. The Nieves Court adopted this objective test of probable cause to avoid an unwelcome result of using an officer’s subjective state of mind: “[a]ny inartful turn of phrase or perceived slight during a legitimate arrest could land an officer in years of litigation.” Id. at 1725. A subjective-mindset test could subject officers to suit despite an arrestee’s legitimate 16 Thus, on appeal Hinkle does not contend that he was strip searched in retaliation for his First Amendment activity. 35 arrest and despite the Fourth Amendment’s “objective standard[] of reasonableness.” Id. (citations omitted). We have already concluded that Deputy Estep had probable cause to arrest Hinkle. So, under Nieves, Hinkle’s retaliatory-arrest claim must fail. And though Nieves carves out a narrow exception—that probable cause will not defeat a retaliatory-arrest claim if the plaintiff could show that officers would usually not arrest under similar circumstances, id. at 1727, Hinkle has not argued that officers would forego arrests under his circumstances.17
Hinkle also alleges that “Jay amped up the retaliation against Hinkle by overseeing the publication and dissemination of . . . false information through a Press Release detailing Hinkle’s arrest.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 35. As mentioned, Sheriff Jay has conceded that Hinkle established the first two Worrell elements for purposes of summary judgment; thus, the sole question before us is whether Sheriff Jay’s “adverse action was substantially motivated as a response to [Hinkle’s] exercise of constitutionally protected conduct.” Worrell, 219 F.3d at 1212 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The district court concluded that Hinkle had failed to demonstrate this was so. It noted that Hinkle had “not provided anything except suspicions and a 17 As an example, if officers have a practice of never arresting people for jaywalking but then do arrest a plaintiff for jaywalking after he or she has complained about the police, a possible retaliatory-arrest claim could survive, probable cause notwithstanding. Nieves, 139 S. Ct. at 1727. 36 chronological connection (as opposed to a causal connection) between [Hinkle’s] support of [the opponent] and issuance of the news release regarding [Hinkle’s] arrest.” Appellant’s App. vol. 6 at 1413. It also credited Sheriff Jay’s testimony that “the news release [w]as ‘part and parcel of law enforcement activity’ and ‘common practice.’” Id. Finally, the court concluded that Hinkle had presented “no specific evidence of [Sheriff Jay]’s culpable state of mind.” Id. at 1415 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). And even if he had, the court reasoned that Hinkle had not cited “support for the proposition that there exists a constitutional or statutory right to prevent one’s arrest information from being disclosed publicly.” Id. On appeal, Hinkle does little to contest the district court’s analysis. Hinkle claims that Sheriff Jay must have been targeting him because an “alleged theft of a trailer going back 10 years is hardly a ‘high profile’ crime spree deserving of being blasted out on the internet by the Sheriff via his website or to media at his direction.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 38. He also asserts that “the Press Release and its impact cannot be construed in a vacuum. An inference of retaliation via the release is certainly stronger in this case where a false Press Release follows immediately on the heels [of] an arrest without probable cause.” Id. Finally, he argues that this court has “opened the door for consideration” of evidence regarding past instances where Sheriff Jay may have retaliated against other political opponents. Id. at 39. We agree with Hinkle that we must consider surrounding circumstances in evaluating his retaliation claim. But doing so here shows an absence of retaliation: 37 the press release followed an arrest that was based on probable cause.18 Therefore, this case is not one in which “a false Press Release follows immediately on the heels [of] an arrest without probable cause.” Id. at 38. Second, Hinkle’s argument that this was not a high-profile matter fails to acknowledge his status as a former local police chief. Though the alleged crimes are not the most serious ones under Oklahoma law, an arrest of a former police chief is a high-profile arrest. Finally, Hinkle alleges that in Gehl Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1537 (10th Cir. 1995), implicitly overruled on other grounds by Currier v. Doran, 242 F.3d 905, 916 (10th Cir. 2001), this court “opened the door” for Hinkle to show that Sheriff Jay’s alleged retaliation against others supports his claim that Sheriff Jay retaliated against him as part of a larger pattern of harassing political adversaries. Appellant’s Opening Br. 38–39. Gehl Group does not support that assertion. In Gehl Group, the plaintiffs—two chapters of the Fraternal Order of Police, their solicitation agent, and their regional manager—argued that certain law-enforcement officials and other local officials “filed baseless criminal charges against them and selectively and vindictively prosecuted them” because they were “soliciting charitable contributions 18 As mentioned, Hinkle actually alleges that the press release was somehow posted on May 9, 2013—a day before his arrest. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. Because the press release is written in the past tense, we believe that the press release must have been posted sometime after his arrest. If it had been written and posted after Sheriff Jay knew that Hinkle had been exonerated—and after probable cause had dissipated—we would consider this some evidence that Sheriff Jay intended to retaliate against Hinkle. But Hinkle has not presented such a theory. 38 in the Boulder area.” 63 F.3d at 1530. We rejected that contention because the plaintiffs had not “identif[ied] a pattern of harassment from which we might be able to infer [the] [d]efendants’ retaliatory motivations.” Id. at 1537 (citing W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of Am. v. Clark, 389 U.S. 309, 312–13 (1967) (per curiam)). That was because they had been “subject[ed] to only a single prosecution.” Id. And there, we concluded that the prosecution “was supported by probable cause.” Id. Likewise, here, Hinkle was arrested once, his arrest was supported by probable cause, and the press release merely reported the details of that lawful arrest. So Gehl Group does not support Hinkle’s argument—it undermines it. Nor does it support Hinkle’s argument that other instances of Sheriff Jay’s possible retaliation against others was evidence that he retaliated against Hinkle. See id. (considering whether the defendants had treated other groups “in a different manner” to determine if they had “singled [the plaintiffs] out for prosecution”).
The district court dismissed Hinkle’s First Amendment retaliation claim against the County because it had already ruled that Sheriff Jay and Deputy Estep had not violated Hinkle’s First Amendment rights. See Trigalet v. City of Tulsa, 239 F.3d 1150, 1155–56 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he City cannot be held liable where, as here, the officers did not commit a constitutional violation.”). Because neither Sheriff Jay nor Deputy Estep violated Hinkle’s First Amendment rights, the district court properly dismissed Hinkle’s First Amendment claim against the County. 39 IV. Hinkle’s Fourteenth Amendment Stigma-Plus Claim Hinkle argues that he has also raised a “defamation plus” claim based on the press release and Sheriff Jay’s “sanction[ing] of criminal charges.” Appellant’s Opening Br. at 35–36 (capitalization and emphasis removed). Hinkle alleges that, even though his “defamation plus claim was briefed, it was not analyzed by the district court.” Id. at 36. We do not fault the district court for not considering this claim, because Hinkle’s briefing—both here and in the district court—overlays his First Amendment retaliation analysis with his Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus analysis.19 But those analyzes are distinct. See, e.g., Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 521 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999) (explaining that First Amendment retaliation cases differ from defamation cases under the Fourteenth Amendment). Unlike First Amendment retaliation claims, Fourteenth Amendment stigma-plus claims require a plaintiff to prove “that the government has violated the Due Process Clause by damaging its reputation.” Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Kan. Dep’t of Transp., 810 F.3d 1161, 1184 (10th Cir. 2016). Thus, the stigma-plus doctrine exists within the procedural-due-process framework. See Al-Turki v. Tomsic, 926 F.3d 610, 614, 617 (10th Cir. 2019). And courts “ask two questions” when considering procedural- 19 Moreover, Hinkle’s Amended Complaint does not clearly raise a proceduraldue-process claim. Nonetheless, “Count III” of Hinkle’s Amended Complaint is titled, “FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT VIOLATION . . . DUE PROCESS.” In addition, Hinkle alleges that the press release “exposed [him] to public hatred, contempt, ridicule, and disgrace.” Am. Compl. ¶ 106. We will assume that by using this language, Hinkle intended to raise a stigma-plus procedural-due-process claim. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) (“Pleadings must be construed so as to do justice.”). 40 due-process claims: “(1) Did the plaintiff possess a protected property or liberty interest to which due process protections apply? And if so, (2) was the plaintiff afforded an appropriate level of process?” Id. at 614 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In the stigma-plus context, we have recently provided guidance on what a plaintiff must show to satisfy the first element—i.e., a deprivation of a protected property or liberty interest. In Al-Turki, 926 F.3d at 617, we said that “[w]hat is needed in addition to stigma . . . is some change in legal status.” That “change in status must be ‘significant[].’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 711 (1976)). We ruled that to satisfy the first procedural-due-process element through stigma, plaintiffs must meet two sub-elements: “that (1) the government made a false statement about [the plaintiff] . . . that was sufficiently derogatory to injure his reputation, and that (2) [the plaintiff] experienced a governmentally imposed burden that significantly altered his status as a matter of state law.” Id. at 618 (alterations and omission in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gwinn v. Awmiller, 354 F.3d 1211, 1224 (10th Cir. 2004)). As actions sufficient to satisfy the second sub-element, we have included “the state’s taking away the right to operate a vehicle or revoking parole.” Brown v. Montoya, 662 F.3d 1152, 1167 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 711). And in Gwinn, we concluded that a plaintiff had satisfied the “‘stigma-plus’ standard” by alleging that the government had falsely labeled him as a sex offender and further required him “to register as a sex offender.” 354 F.3d at 1224 (citing Paul, 424 U.S. at 710– 41 11). Registration as a sex offender is “a governmentally imposed burden that ‘significantly altered [his] . . . status as a matter of state law.’” Id. (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Paul, 424 U.S. at 710–11). Even if we were to conclude that Sheriff Jay defamed Hinkle, Hinkle would still need to satisfy the second sub-element: that he suffered a “governmentally imposed burden that significantly altered his status as a matter of state law.” AlTurki, 926 F.3d at 618 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In his opening brief, Hinkle states that “the press release was false, and it was coupled with the imminent sanction of Hinkle being subjected to criminal charges.” Appellant’s Opening Br. 36 (some capitalization removed). Hinkle argues that the collateral hardships defendants face during criminal trials—“humiliation, damage to reputation and a concomitant harm to future employment practices”—are similar to those he faced from having the press release posted on the Beckham County Sheriff’s Office’s website. Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, as we understand him, Hinkle argues that his “governmentally imposed burden” was humiliation, an injured reputation, and difficulty obtaining future employment.20 20 Hinkle’s assertion that the press release “was coupled with the imminent sanction of Hinkle being subjected to criminal charges” is temporally inaccurate. Hinkle was, as we have concluded, lawfully arrested and charged before Sheriff Jay issued the press release. Further, as discussed, nothing in the record indicates that Sheriff Jay directed Deputy Estep to investigate and arrest Hinkle. Thus, as to the “plus” of Hinkle’s stigma-plus claim, we will consider only those alleged deprivations we have identified above—humiliation, an injured reputation, and difficulty obtaining future employment. 42 That is not enough. See, e.g., Paul, 424 U.S. at 711 (“[T]he interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in this action in federal court is quite different from the ‘liberty’ or ‘property’ [right protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.]”); Martin Marietta Materials, 810 F.3d at 1184 (“Damage to reputation alone, however, is not sufficient.” (citing Gwinn, 354 F.3d at 1216; Paul, 424 U.S. at 711–12)); Krainski v. Nevada ex rel. Bd. of Regents, 616 F.3d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[A]llegations of ‘psychological trauma’ are not sufficient to satisfy Paul’s ‘stigma-plus’ test.” (citing Rolon v. Henneman, 517 F.3d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 2008))); Jensen v. Redev. Agency of Sandy City, 998 F.2d 1550, 1559 (10th Cir. 1993) (“Damage to prospective employment opportunities is too intangible to constitute deprivation of a liberty interest.” (citation omitted)); Phelps v. Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F.2d 1262, 1269 (10th Cir. 1989) (“[E]ven if defendants’ actions made plaintiff less attractive to employers or clients, that is insufficient to state a deprivation of a liberty or property interest under Section 1983.” (citation omitted)). As discussed, Hinkle must show a significant, material change in a legal status—such as losing the right to drive a car or being wrongfully registered as a sex offender. He has failed to do so.