Opinion ID: 1163854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: 4a Fourth. Does section 987.8 of the Penal Code operate to deprive a defendant of property without due process of law?

Text: No. Notice which will satisfy the requirements of due process has been defined by the Supreme Court of the United States, as follows: An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. ( Mullane v. Central Hanover Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 [94 L.Ed. 865, 873, 70 S.Ct. 652].) Defendant was given notice which unquestionably met these requirements. She contends, however, that since section 987.8 does not require notice or a hearing on the fixing of counsel fees, it permits a taking of property without due process of law and is therefore unconstitutional. It should be noted, initially, that section 987.8 does not expressly sanction the taking of property without affording its owner prior notice and a hearing, as was the case in Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 [23 L.Ed.2d 349, 89 S.Ct. 1820]; Randone v. Appellate Department, 5 Cal.3d 536 [96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 488 P.2d 13]; Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal.3d 258 [96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 486 P.2d 1242, 45 A.L.R.3d 1206]; McCallop v. Carberry, 1 Cal.3d 903 [83 Cal. Rptr. 666, 464 P.2d 122]; and Cline v. Credit Bureau of Santa Clara Valley, 1 Cal.3d 908 [83 Cal. Rptr. 669, 464 P.2d 125]. The statutes there involved were held unconstitutional because of such defect. The statute here under consideration, however, although not providing by its express terms for prior notice and a hearing, does not sanction imposition of liability without the procedural requisites of due process. In People v. Vickers, 8 Cal.3d 451 [105 Cal. Rptr. 305, 503 P.2d 1313], this court recently had occasion to consider the question of whether due process requirements had been met in connection with a summary termination of probationary status in the case of an absconding probationer. We there discussed in detail the due process requirements mandated by Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 [33 L.Ed.2d 484, 92 S.Ct. 2593], and pointed out that the statutory provision applicable in Vickers (Pen. Code, § 1203.2) provides for some but not all of the minimum due process requirements necessary to conform such proceedings to Fourteenth Amendment proscriptions (p. 458) and fails to meet several of the mandatory requirements of due process as set out in Morrissey and as now held by us to be applicable in probation revocation proceedings (p. 459). Just as the Supreme Court of the United States in Morrissey did not hold the Iowa statute there involved unconstitutional on the ground that it did not expressly provide for notice or a hearing, we did not hold the statutory provision under consideration in Vickers unconstitutional on the ground that it did not specifically spell out all the requirements for due process thereunder. The important factor in each instance was determined to be whether the minimum requirements for due process had been satisfied  not whether they were statutorily required. (5) It is settled that [s]tatutes are to be so construed, if their language permits, as to render them valid and constitutional rather than invalid and unconstitutional ( Erlich v. Municipal Court, 55 Cal.2d 553, 558 [1] [11 Cal. Rptr. 758, 360 P.2d 334]) and that California courts must adopt an interpretation of a statutory provision which, consistent with the statutory language and purpose, eliminates doubt as to the provision's constitutionality ( In re Kay, 1 Cal.3d 930, 942 (5) [83 Cal. Rptr. 686, 464 P.2d 142]). (4b) Under the circumstances, since the proceedings against defendant comported with due process requirements, and the statute did not expressly sanction the taking of her property without compliance with such requirements, we hold that defendant was not deprived of her constitutional right to due process and that the fact that the statute does not expressly provide for notice and a hearing does not render it unconstitutional. Furthermore, not only may the requirements of notice and a hearing be implied from the due process clause, but, in addition, the rights to discovery, confrontation, cross-examination, and other procedural devices may likewise be implied. An objection has also been raised that section 987.8 of the Penal Code lacks adequate standards for the imposition of liability and is unconstitutionally vague. As pointed out in People v. Ferry, 237 Cal. App.2d 880, 887 [47 Cal. Rptr. 324], however, the standard to be applied in determining whether a defendant is indigent, and thus entitled to representation by the public defender, is flexible.