Opinion ID: 2585503
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Rejection of Pinpoint Instructions

Text: Defendant contends the trial court violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, as well as to analogous state constitutional provisions, by erroneously rejecting a series of proposed pinpoint penalty phase instructions. They read: You may consider any other circumstance which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though it is not a legal excuse for the crime and any sympathetic or other aspect of Mr. Brown's character or record that he offers as a basis for a sentence less than death, whether or not related to the offense for which he is [on] trial. These include, but are not limited to: ... Whether or not Mr. Brown was properly treated for any physical cruelty or abuse you feel he suffered, or medical condition he had, and the effect of any lack of care on his development. Whether or not Mr. Brown's educational needs were neglected by the schools he attended. Whether or not Mr. Brown has borderline intelligence. Whether or not Mr. Brown was raised in a violent, and negative community environment, and the effect of that environment on him. Whether or not Mr. Brown was exposed to violence in his household as an infant and a child and the effect of this upon him. Evidence of neglect or abuse in a defendant's background are relevant in our law because of a long-held belief in our society that people who commit criminal acts that are attributable to a disadvantaged background, or who suffered neglect, abuse, or mental limitation, may be less morally culpable than those who have not. Mercy, or compassion you feel based on the evidence is appropriate for you to consider in deciding whether to sentence Mr. Brown to death. We find no error. We previously have explained that the standard CALJIC penalty phase instructions `are adequate to inform the jurors of their sentencing responsibilities in compliance with federal and state constitutional standards.' [Citation.] Moreover, the general rule is that a trial court may refuse a proffered instruction if it is an incorrect statement of law, is argumentative, or is duplicative. ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) The jury was instructed with CALJIC No. 8.85, which explains the various aggravating and mitigating factors. In particular, it was instructed with section 190.3, factor (k), which is essentially duplicated by the first paragraph of the rejected instruction. [23] The trial court thus did not err in refusing this proposed instruction, and we reject defendant's contention that his proposed instruction should have been repeated for the jury as a preface to the other rejected instructions. ( Gurule, supra, at p. 659, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224 [court need not give duplicative instructions].) Defendant also claims the court should have instructed the jury to consider any physical cruelty or abuse he suffered, or medical condition he had. The court essentially gave this instruction, informing the jury that it could consider physical abuse or cruelty suffered [by defendant] during his formative years. (See, ante, fn. 23.) This instruction was also duplicative. ( People v. Gurule, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 659, 123 Cal.Rptr.2d 345, 51 P.3d 224.) Many of the other instructions the trial court rejected (concerning lack of medical care, educational neglect, borderline intelligence, violent childhood community and household, neglect and abuse) attempted to highlight selected portions of the evidence and were thus properly rejected as argumentative. `[A] court may properly refuse an instruction that is argumentative' [citation] or that `single[s] out only a partial list of potential mitigating factors for the jury's consideration.' ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 678, fn. 21, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Although the final proposed instruction concerning mercy and compassion was not argumentative, we nevertheless find the trial court did not err in refusing it. As defendant himself admits, we have held that `a jury told it may sympathetically consider all mitigating evidence need not also be expressly instructed it may exercise mercy.' [Citations.] ( People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 344, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 412, 956 P.2d 374.) Because defendant's jury had been instructed in the language of section 190.3, factor (k), we must assume the jury already understood it could consider mercy and compassion; accordingly, the trial court did not err in refusing the proposed mercy instruction.