Opinion ID: 782341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Background of the Right of Publicity

Text: 180 The right of publicity was born out of the common law right to privacy 2 when Circuit Judge Jerome Frank explicitly recognized the right of publicity as an independent action in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.1953). There, Judge Frank opined that 181 in addition to and independent of that right of privacy ..., a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and that such a grant may validly be made `in gross,' i.e., without an accompanying transfer of a business or of anything else. Whether it be labelled a `property' right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag `property' simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has pecuniary worth. 182 This right might be called a `right of publicity.' For it is common knowledge that many prominent persons (especially actors and ball-players), far from having their feelings bruised through public exposure of their likenesses, would feel sorely deprived if they no longer received money for authorizing advertisements, popularizing their countenances, displayed in newspapers, magazines, busses, trains and subways. The right of publicity would usually yield them no money unless it could be made the subject of an exclusive grant which barred any other advertiser from using their pictures. 183 Id.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. b, 529 (1995) (noting the origins behind the right of publicity, and the historical connection between publicity rights and the right to privacy). Up until the time that Judge Frank labeled what he viewed as the right to control commercial use of human identity as the right of publicity, the law seemed unable to accommodate the claims of those whose identity was already public — i.e, the famous. See MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 1:7 (2d ed.2000). In other words, until the right of publicity was recognized, it appeared counterintuitive for a famous individual to base his claim that his identity was being used commercially without permission on the right of privacy. The right to privacy is premised upon the right to left alone, and the famous person had already become well known commercially. However, it was the commercial nature of the person's identity which was precisely at issue; that is, it was not the desire to be left alone, but the desire to control the use of and be compensated for the use of one's persona. See id. And thus was born the concept of a property right in the commercial value of every person's identity. Id. (emphasis in original) 184 Although the right of publicity grew out of the right of privacy, the right of publicity has within it characteristics of other rights such that it has been described as a ` sui generis mixture of personal rights, property rights, and rights under unfair competition.' See id. (quoting S.J. Hoffman, Limitations on the Right of Publicity, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 111, 112 (1980)). In addition, principles from various other areas of the law have been looked to and borrowed from when deciding right of publicity matters such as the law of copyright, trademark, and misappropriation. See id. Because of its inception in the law of privacy, and because of the various legal principles from other areas incorporated within it, the right of publicity remains a cause of action wherein the law is far from settled. 185 That notwithstanding, since Haelan, [t]he right of a person, whether or not termed `right of publicity,' to control the commercial value and exploitation of his or her name and likeness has received wide recognition by the courts. Estate of Elvis Presley v. Russen, 513 F.Supp. 1339, 1353 n. 6 (D.N.J.1981) (collecting cases). This Court has spoken on the right of publicity as follows: 186 The right of publicity has developed to protect the commercial interest of celebrities in their identities. The theory of the right is that a celebrity's identity can be valuable in the promotion of products, and the celebrity has an interest that may be protected from the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that identity. In Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.1980), we stated: The famous have an exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the commercial use of their name and personality. Id. at 957. 187 Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir.1983) (analyzing right to publicity claim brought under Michigan common law). However, it should also be noted that other courts and commentators as well have found that non-celebrities should also be permitted to recover upon proof that the appropriated identity possessed commercial value. RESTATEMENT, supra § 46 cmt. d, 538; see MCCARTHY, supra § 4:3 ([T]he basic possession of a right of publicity should have nothing to do with `celebrity' status. Rather, `celebrity' status will only be relevant to the economic value of a plaintiff's identity and persona.) (footnote omitted); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity v. The First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 55-56 (1994) (noting that the right of publicity has the potential for safeguarding from unauthorized use any marketable and publicly recognizable attribute of any individual, regardless of whether that person is a celebrity) (footnote omitted); see also Vinci v. Am. Can Co., 9 Ohio St.3d 98, 459 N.E.2d 507, 510 (1984) (finding that the degree of notoriety is relevant to damages rather than liability). 188 At the present time, a majority of states recognize a right of publicity through common law, by statute, or both. See MCCARTHY, supra § 6:3 (noting that at the time of this writing, under either statute or common law, the right of publicity is recognized as the law of twenty-eight states); RESTATEMENT, supra § 46 statutory note (listing California, Florida, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and Wisconsin as those states recognizing a statutory right of publicity). Ohio recognizes the right of publicity as a part of the state's common law, see Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 433 U.S. 562, 572, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977), and has recently codified that right. 3 See Ohio Rev. Code § 2741.01 and § 2741.02 (defining persona to mean an individual's name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, or distinctive appearance, if any of these aspects have commercial value; and making the unauthorized use of an individual's persona for a commercial purpose during the individual's lifetime or for a period of sixty years after the individual's death, a violation of the statute). 189 Although the wide recognition of the right of publicity among the states is a clear indication of its acceptance in the jurisprudence of society today, the differences between the various state statutes has led to confusion such that there is a large body of opinion advocating that a uniform preemptive federal law be adopted. See Symposium, Rights of Publicity: An In-Depth Analysis of the New Legislative Proposal to Congress, 16 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 209, 210 (1998) ([O]ur Task Force has ... initiated a discussion aimed at producing its own federal right of publicity statute.... The subcommittee generally believes that a uniform body of law is desirable in this area, compared to the patchwork quilt with which the people of the United States are now afflicted.)(comments of Steven M. Getzoff, then Chair of the American Bar Association Joint Task Force on federalizing the right of publicity); see also Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 477 (1999) (recognizing that [t]here appears to be a general consensus that a uniform right of publicity is sorely needed, and that [i]t also appears that most advocates of uniformity believe that preemptive federal law, rather than a uniform code or model state statutes, would more readily achieve that goal). 190 Aside from the confusing development of the right of publicity, and aside from the many differences associated with the various state statutes in effect, the point of confusion most associated with the right of publicity law is its interplay with the First Amendment. Each doctrine advances its own set of societal interests which often are in tension with one another. Those societal interests advanced by the right of publicity have been suggested to be that of fostering creativity, safeguarding the individual's enjoyment of the fruits of her labors, preventing consumer deception, and preventing unjust enrichment. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Right of Publicity v. The First Amendment: A Property and Liability Rule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47, 54 (1994) (footnotes omitted); see also Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L.REV. 127, 178-79 (1993) (suggesting that the main justifications for the right of publicity are moral arguments (the right of individuals to reap the fruits of their labors)); economic arguments (needed incentive to stimulate creative growth); and consumer protection (protects consumers from deception and related marketplace harms). Two of the most frequently cited justifications for First Amendment free speech guarantees in this regard are the advancement of knowledge and search for the truth by fostering a free marketplace of ideas necessary to a democratic society, as well as the fulfillment of the human need for self-expression. Id. at 65-66. The tension between these interests is self-evident: while we want a free marketplace of ideas and expression, we wish to insure that any commercial value gained from that expression is not unjustly obtained through another's labors. See Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576, 97 S.Ct. 2849 (No social purpose is served by having the defendant [in a right of publicity case] get free some aspect of the plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would normally pay.). 191 Measures aimed at striking the appropriate balance between these competing interests have been the subject of much legal commentary. See, e.g., Haemmerli, supra at 383-84 (proposing to balance the right of publicity as an autonomy-based property right and the First Amendment values of freedom of expression); Kwall, supra at 48, 63-113 (exposing the massive confusion surrounding the conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment, while proposing to resolve the conflict by applying a property and liability rule framework). Yet another commentator has expressed concern that the right of publicity frustrates the principles behind the First Amendment. See Madow, supra at 127 (arguing that private, centralized ownership and control of celebrity images poses a more serious threat to cultural pluralism and self-determination than is sometimes realized). The argument goes that as a society, we freely monitor the comings and goings, missteps and heartbreaks of celebrities, along with attempting to copy or emulate their mannerisms, their styles, their modes of conversation and their modes of consumption; however, [b]y virtue of what is now widely known as the `right of publicity,' the `commercial' value of a celebrity's name, likeness, and other identifying characteristics is her private property, which she may enjoy and exploit, transfer and bequeath, as she alone thinks best. Id. at 128, 130 (footnotes omitted). This, it is maintained, leads to a potential right of censorship on the part of the celebrity thereby limit[ing] the expressive and communicative opportunities of the rest of us. Id. at 145-46. 192 Despite the various commentary and scholarship assessing the virtues and drawbacks to the right of publicity when compared to First Amendment principles, the fact remains that the right of publicity is an accepted right and striking the balance between an individual's right of publicity against the speaker's First Amendment right is not an easy one. Bearing in mind the principles justifying the two rights, it is clear why Woods' right of publicity does not bow to Defendant's First Amendment rights in this case. 193