Opinion ID: 835641
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: on-premises and off-premises signs

Text: We now turn to petitioner's contention that the OMIA violates Article I, section 8, on its face by exempting on-premises signs from the permit and fee requirements. Petitioner argues that, under this court's decision in Robertson, the legislature may not enact restrictions that focus on the content or subject matter of expression unless the scope of the restraint is wholly confined within a recognized historical constitutional exception. By requiring permits for off-premises signs, but not for on-premises signs, petitioner asserts, the OMIA restricts expression on the basis of content or subject. Thus, petitioner argues that, under the OMIA, a sign above a gas station visible from a highway may, without a permit, carry the message Gas for Sale, but it may not carry the message Eat at Joe's: 10 Miles Ahead. Petitioner also argues that no historical exception permits the state to restrict off-premises signs in circumstances where it does not restrict on-premises signs. Before turning to the state's response, we note that the scope of the issue here is not as broad as petitioner suggests. Petitioner's brief uses, as additional examples of signs that it contends are prohibited by the OMIA, signs that in fact might not be prohibited by that law. Petitioner asserts that signs expressing the message Pray for Peace or the message Keep Abortion Legal always would require permits because they necessarily would be outdoor advertising signs rather than on-premises signs. Arguably, however, if the first message were displayed on the property of a church or the second message on the property of a facility offering abortion services, those signs would inform the public about activities conducted on the premises on which the sign is located, ORS 377.710(22), and thus be considered on-premises signs not subject to the OMIA's permit requirement. Moreover, a plausible argument can be made that a sign with the message Pray for Peace on a residential lot is about activity on the premises, namely that the owner of the residence prays for peace and exhorts others to do the same. As we noted previously, 340 Or. at 282 n. 6, 132 P.3d at 9 n. 6, none of the present cases requires us to interpret the scope of the phrase activities conducted [or not conducted] on the premises on which the sign is located in the statutory definitions of on-premises sign and outdoor advertising sign. See ORS 377.710(22), (23) (defining on-premises sign and outdoor advertising sign). However, the example in the previous paragraph (describing the signs Gas for Sale and Eat at Joes: 10 Miles Ahead) is sufficient to demonstrate that, in many circumstances, the OMIA will permit one message on a highway sign while prohibiting a different message, and that difference squarely presents petitioner's constitutional claim. The state responds that the on-premises/off-premises distinction is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation. The state first asserts that Article I, section 8, does not bar the state from imposing reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on expression. It then argues that the on-premises/off-premises distinction is not a restriction on the content or subject of expression, such as the restrictions that this court considered  and rejected  in Robertson, Tidyman, and similar cases. [11] The state's primary point is straightforward: Any message can be an on-premises one, and any message can be an off-premises one. Therefore, in the state's view, the OMIA suppresses no message and no viewpoint. The state contrasts this case with other cases in which an apparently neutral regulation had the effect of restricting certain categories of speech. In Fidanque, for example, a law that required registration fees for lobbyists was held to violate Article I, section 8, because it focused on only one category of speech  political speech. 328 Or. at 8 n. 4, 969 P.2d 376. Here, however, the state asserts that, unlike recognized categories of speech such as political speech or commercial speech, the distinction between on-premises and off-premises speech has no meaning in terms of the content of the speech; the only distinction is the relationship between the message on the sign and its location. The state argues: Simply put, a distinction between categories of speech cannot be truly `content-based' if any speech could fit into either category depending on its location only. (Emphasis in original.) We agree, as we have explained above, with the state's view that Article I, section 8, does not prohibit reasonable time, place, and manner regulation of speech imposed for reasons apart from the message of the speech. We also understand that the state is asserting that there is a constitutionally meaningful difference between the OMIA and laws that focus directly on categories of speech that are familiar from First Amendment cases, such as obscenity, political speech, and commercial speech. However, unlike the dissent, we do not find the state's argument persuasive. As noted, the OMIA would allow a sign with the message Buy Gas Here, but prohibit the same sign from carrying the message Eat at Joe's: 10 Miles Ahead. As we explain at greater length below, such a restriction, on its face, prohibits certain speech based on its content. The OMIA's different treatment of on-premises and off-premises speech therefore violates Article I, section 8. Although we recognize the differences between the OMIA and the statutes that we have considered in prior cases, our analysis is similar. As we have described above, for more than two decades, this court's consideration of challenges under Article I, section 8, to statutes that restrict speech has been guided by the framework laid out in Robertson, in which this court considered a statute criminalizing coercion. This court there held that Article I, section 8, prohibits lawmakers from enacting restrictions that focus on the content of speech or writing, either because that content itself is deemed socially undesirable or offensive, or because it is thought to have adverse consequences. 293 Or. at 416, 649 P.2d 569. This court followed Robertson in a series of cases holding unconstitutional legislative restrictions on certain categories of speech. In Henry, 302 Or. 510, 732 P.2d 9, the court held that a statute prohibiting the possession of obscene materials violated the free expression guarantee of Article I, section 8, because it was directed, by its terms, at a category of expression. In Tidyman, the court struck down a city ordinance that restricted certain expressive activity  the sale of adult books  because of the content of the speech in question. This court also has held invalid a statute that prohibited the use of automatic telemarketing devices to solicit the purchase of realty, goods, or services, but not when used to solicit funds for charitable or political organizations. Moser v. Frohnmayer, 315 Or. 372, 845 P.2d 1284 (1993). That statute restrict[ed] expression because it [was] directed at a specific subject of communication, excluding some speech based on the content of the message, and therefore violated Article I, section 8. Id. at 376, 845 P.2d 1284. In each of those cases, this court applied the framework established in Robertson and considered whether the statute or ordinance restricted the content of speech because that speech was deemed socially undesirable or offensive, or because it [was] thought to have adverse consequences. Robertson, 293 Or. at 416, 649 P.2d 569. The state argues that the on-premises/off-premises distinction does not focus on the content of speech that the government seeks to restrict because that speech is undesirable, offensive, or may have adverse consequences. Rather, in the state's view, the on-premises/off-premises distinction is a content- and viewpoint-neutral regulation that focuses instead on secondary effects in an effort to advance the state's interests as set out in the OMIA, including promoting highway safety and preserving the natural beauty and aesthetic features of [state] highways and adjacent areas. See ORS 377.705 (statement of purpose of OMIA). The state also points out that the OMIA is designed to ensure compliance with federal highway statutes, particularly the HBA. See, e.g., ORS 377.715 (prohibiting erection or maintenance of signs that fail to comply with federal requirements). The state's argument suffers from two related flaws. First, it is not accurate to say that the on-premises/off-premises distinction is content neutral. That distinction allows a sign owner without a permit to display one narrowly defined category of message  a message related to activity conducted on the premises where the sign is located  but not to display any message respecting any other subject. The OMIA thus treats signs differently on the basis of the content of their message. [12] Second, the state's reliance on the legitimate safety and aesthetic goals of the OMIA does not justify a prohibition of speech based on its content. This court faced a similar issue in Moser, where the legislature sought to prevent the harmful effects of automatic telephone solicitation, but prohibited only commercial solicitation, while allowing charitable and political solicitation. This court rejected that effort because the restriction was directed at speech itself, not towards the prevention of an identified actual effect or harm. Moser, 315 Or. at 379, 845 P.2d 1284. The state may prohibit signs and other structures that interfere with safe driving, and it may limit the total number of signs or structures for the purpose of preserving views and scenery. However, this court's opinions demonstrate that the state may not, consistently with Article I, section 8, prohibit some expression, while permitting other expression simply because the latter concerns a different subject. On-premises signs, which do not require a permit, and off-premises signs, which do require a permit, can pose the same risk to safety and have the same adverse effect on scenic beauty. The legislature's decision to limit one of those types of expression more stringently than the other because of its content is an impermissible restriction on the subject of expression under Article I, section 8. As to the state's effort to comply with the HBA through enactment, and enforcement of the OMIA, we are sympathetic to the state's arguments, recognizing the possibility that the failure to enforce restrictions such as those in the OMIA might result in a reduction in federal highway funds. See 23 USC § 131(b), (c) (HBA allows exemption for on-premises signs; state's failure to provide effective control of outdoor advertising signs may cause state to lose 10 percent of federal highway funds). Nevertheless, this court's Article I, section 8, cases consistently have held that the state may not enact restrictions that focus on the content of speech, and this restriction does just that. We also find unpersuasive the state's arguments that are based on cases from other jurisdictions. Some courts and commentators have concluded that the distinction between on-premises and off-premises signs is not content-based, e.g., Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043, 1067 (3d Cir.1994), or, if technically content-based, is not worthy of constitutional protection because it is very unlikely that the government would use it to control speech or that it would distort public debate. Mark Cordes, Sign Regulation After Ladue: Examining the Evolving Limits of First Amendment Protection, 74 Neb. L. Rev. 36, 77 & n. 257 (1995); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983) (analyzing policy reasons for prohibiting content-based restrictions). Whatever the merits of those conclusions as matters of appropriate policy towards expression or as interpretations of the First Amendment, however, they offer little guidance in interpreting the Oregon Constitution. The words of Article I, section 8, and this court's consistent interpretation of those words expressly forbid the enactment of laws that restrict otherwise permissible speech because of its subject. See Bank of Oregon v. Independent News, 298 Or. 434, 439, 693 P.2d 35, cert. den., 474 U.S. 826, 106 S.Ct. 84, 88 L.Ed.2d 69 (1985) (There is no basis under the Oregon Constitution to provide more protection to certain non-abusive communication based upon the content of the communication.). In Ciancanelli, this court reassessed and reaffirmed its Article I, section 8, jurisprudence. Examining the text of that constitutional provision, this court stated: Turning our focus to the first clause of Article I, section 8, one is struck by its sweeping terms, both with respect to the legislative power (` [n]o ' law shall be passed restraining    or restricting) (emphasis added) and the kinds of expression protected (`   the free expression of opinion, or    the right to speak, write, or print freely on any subject whatever ') (emphasis added). In fact, the words are so clear and sweeping that we think that we would not be keeping faith with the framers who wrote them if we were to qualify or water them down[.] 339 Or. at 311, 121 P.3d 613 (emphases and omissions in Ciancanelli ). The broad sweep of Article I, section 8, compels us to conclude that the provision was not intended only to prevent content-based restrictions that are motivated by an intent to censor offensive, disruptive, or potentially harmful speech. Although the dissent appears to accept that limited reading of Article I, section 8, in our view, Article I, section 8, prohibits laws that distinguish among messages because of what they say, even if some may view the basis for the distinction as benign. The OMIA does distinguish between messages on the basis of what they say: It permits a sign owner to display one message, but not to display a different message solely because of the content of the message. For that reason, we conclude that the OMIA's different treatment of on-premises and off-premises signs is a restriction on the content of speech for purposes of Article I, section 8. [13] The Robertson framework next asks whether the scope of the content-based restraint is wholly confined within some historical exception, in which case it may be permitted notwithstanding Article I, section 8. Robertson, 293 Or. at 412, 649 P.2d 569. In this context, that aspect of Robertson would require the state to demonstrate that restrictions on sign messages that distinguished between messages related to activities occurring on the property where the sign is located and messages related to activities elsewhere were well established when `the first American guarantees of freedoms of expression were adopted.' Moser, 315 Or. at 378, 845 P.2d 1284 (quoting Robertson, 293 Or. at 412, 649 P.2d 569). The state has offered no argument as to any such historical exception, and we are aware of none. See Moser, 315 Or. at 378, 845 P.2d 1284 (state failed to show that restrictions on advertising or commercial solicitations came within historical exception). For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that the OMIA's on-premises/off-premises distinction  more particularly, the exemption from the OMIA's permit and fee requirements for on-premises signs, ORS 377.735(1)(c)  is, on its face, an impermissible restriction on the content of speech.