Opinion ID: 361249
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: References to Workmen's Compensation.

Text: Or.Rev.Stat. § 656.595(2) provides: 14 (2) In any third party action brought pursuant to ORS 656.001 to 656.794, the fact that the injured worker or his beneficiaries are entitled to or have received benefits under ORS 656.001 to 656.794 shall not be pleaded or admissible in evidence. 15 Small and Abbott cite a number of cases applying Oregon law in which reference to workmen's compensation coverage constituted reversible error. 5 They rely particularly on Strandholm v. General Construction Co., 235 Or. 145, 382 P.2d 843 (1963), to excuse their failure to object promptly to statements regarding workmen's compensation. 16 In Strandholm, plaintiff's counsel failed to object to statements elicited by defense counsel regarding workmen's compensation coverage until the end of trial. The trial court had specifically warned defense counsel not to introduce such evidence. Upon plaintiff's belated motion, the trial court granted a new trial. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. 17 Apart from the factual differences that distinguish that case from this, Strandholm does not support appellants' position. The Oregon court in that case merely confirmed a trial court's discretion to order a new trial even in the absence of an objection. 18 An appellate court applies a much different standard for ordering a new trial. Language from an earlier Oregon case cited by the court in Strandholm makes clear the distinction: 19 In respect to the necessity of there having been a ruling in the lower court and an exception taken which is requisite to a reversal upon appeal, there is a clear and well-recognized distinction between the power of the trial court on the one hand to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial, and the power of the Supreme Court to reverse a judgment upon appeal, for it has been repeatedly held by this court that it is not error alone, but error legally excepted to, that constitutes grounds for reversal. (Citation omitted.) 20 235 Or. at 153, 382 P.2d at 846 (citing Timmins v. Hale, 122 Or. 24, 32, 256 P. 770, 773 (1927)). This is consistent with Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1), which requires a timely objection to preserve an assignment of error. 21 There was no timely objection here to references regarding workmen's compensation coverage. Small and Abbott did not object to the opening statement of Van Egdom's counsel, to Van Egdom's direct testimony, or to his cross-examination by defense counsel. There was no immediate objection to the cross-examination of Dr. Knox. Only later on the second day of trial did they object. 22 Although the trial court, in its discretion, could have overlooked the untimeliness of the objection and ordered a new trial, it was not required to do so. 23 Small and Abbott assert that the denial of their motions for mistrial and a new trial was plain error. Fed.R.Evid. 103(d) permits an appellate court to tak(e) notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights, even in the absence of an objection. 24 Or.Rev.Stat. 656.595(2) prohibits references to the fact that The injured work(man) or his beneficiaries are entitled to or have received benefits under workmen's compensation. (Emphasis added.) In each of the cases cited by appellants, reference was made at trial to the fact that the plaintiff-appellant had received benefits. Further, in each instance, defense counsel deliberately introduced statements regarding workmen's compensation without prior reference to the subject by plaintiffs. 25 Here, appellants are objecting to statements regarding receipt of benefits by Egdom. No statements were made concerning their own coverage under or receipt of payments from workmen's compensation. The subject was raised by co-plaintiff's counsel and pursued in his direct examination of Van Egdom. Defense counsel, who could justifiably believe that the subject had been legitimately opened, referred to workmen's compensation briefly in his cross-examination of Van Egdom and Dr. Knox. 26 The trial judge and a reviewing district judge found no prejudice to appellants by the statements. Apparently, Small and Abbott also were not fearful that the statements would affect the jury on the liability issue, 6 but only on the question of damages, which the jury never reached. We agree that the statements did not prejudice appellants and find no plain error affecting their substantial rights. 27