Opinion ID: 2167081
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: analysis

Text: The issue in this case is whether the application filed by Gregory is an attempt to enforce or modify the terms of the divorce decree. We have ... consistently held that a property division in a dissolution of marriage decree from which no appeal is taken is not subject to modification, and ordinarily will not thereafter be vacated or modified as to such property provisions in the absence of fraud or gross inequity. Bokelman v. Bokelman, 202 Neb. 17, 21, 272 N.W.2d 916, 919 (1979). Thus, if the district court was correct in characterizing Gregory's application as one attempting to modify the divorce decree, it was also correct in finding that it had no authority to enter judgment in Gregory's favor for the value of the personal property awarded to him or for the marital debts. However, if Gregory's application is instead an attempt to enforce the divorce decree, the district court erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction over counts I and III of the application. A court that has jurisdiction to make a decision also has the power to enforce it by making such orders as are necessary to carry its judgment or decree into effect. Laschanzky v. Laschanzky, 246 Neb. 705, 523 N.W.2d 29 (1994). We first consider whether Gregory's request to order Juanita to pay him her share of the marital debts is an enforcement or modification of the decree. In Dennis v. Dennis, 6 Neb.App. 461, 574 N.W.2d 189 (1998), a divorce decree ordered the husband to make the payments on a home equity loan. He did not make the payments, and the wife was required to pay off the loan to avoid foreclosure on the home, which had been awarded to her. The wife filed an application to modify the decree in district court, praying that the husband be ordered to pay her the amount she had to pay to satisfy the loan. The Court of Appeals stated that the relief she sought, a judgment for the amount she paid ... was actually not in the nature of a modification, but, rather, a determination of amounts due under the decree and an award to her of said amounts. (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 463, 574 N.W.2d at 191. The court held: In sum, we view the action taken by the district court as nothing more and nothing less than enforcing that portion of the decree which obligated [the husband] to hold [the wife] harmless from the debt. As an example, and on a smaller scale, had the decree obligated [the husband] to pay a credit card debt of $2,000 holding [the wife] harmless on the debt and he failed to do so, resulting in a suit against [the wife] who, before judgment (or after for that matter) borrowed funds from a third person to pay the amount owing, there is little doubt that an order for [the husband] to reimburse that amount to [the wife] would be appropriate. Id. at 465, 574 N.W.2d at 192. Dennis is on point with one aspect of the case at bar. The final decree entered by the district court in this case ordered that all marital debts ... are deemed marital debts and each party shall pay 50% of those debts. (Emphasis supplied.) The particular relief sought by Gregory in his application is an attempt to enforce the precise obligation imposed on Juanita by the decree, that is, to pay 50 percent of the marital debts. Whether those payments are directed to Gregory or another is immaterial. As this request by Gregory is an attempt to enforce the decree, the district court erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction over count I of the application. We next consider whether an order that Juanita pay Gregory the value of the personal property awarded to him in the decree is an enforcement or modification of the decree. Juanita argues that this issue is controlled by Sturdevant v. Sturdevant, 5 Neb.App. 502, 560 N.W.2d 864 (1997). In Sturdevant, a divorce decree awarded the husband certain items of personal property and also ordered the husband to pay his wife a lump-sum alimony award. The husband later filed a motion for discharge of lump-sum alimony, alleging that his wife converted the property awarded to him to her own use. He asked the district court to apply the value of the lost property as a credit against the lump-sum alimony award. The district court found that the wife did not convert the property and declined to apply any amount as a credit against the alimony award. On appeal, the Court of Appeals concluded that the husband was attempting to modify the parties' decree and that [t]he district court was without authority to modify the decree in these proceedings under either Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-2001 (Reissue 1995) or its independent equity jurisdiction. Sturdevant, 5 Neb.App. at 506, 560 N.W.2d at 867. We decline to apply Sturdevant to the present case because Sturdevant is distinguishable from the present case. The Court of Appeals in Sturdevant found that the district court did not err in finding that the wife did not convert any of the husband's personal property. Here, Gregory presented unrefuted evidence that Juanita had converted to her own use the personal property awarded to him in the decree. In addition, Sturdevant was a case seeking to modify an award of alimony. It is well known that pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 42-365 (Reissue 1998), alimony orders may be modified or revoked for good cause shown. Bowers v. Scherbring, 259 Neb. 595, 611 N.W.2d 592 (2000). Gregory's request that he be awarded the value of the personal property awarded to him in the decree and converted by Juanita was an enforcement of the divorce decree. As such, the district court erred in finding that it had no jurisdiction over count III of the application. Finally, we consider Gregory's retirement benefits. The decree ordered that 27.5 percent of Gregory's Air Force retirement benefits be awarded to Juanita. Gregory has received $18,088.48 in retirement benefits to which he admits Juanita is entitled. The district court offset against this amount the child support debt of $6,314.54. Gregory requests that this net amount of $11,773.94 be set off against any amount owed to him and that 100 percent of the retirement benefits be awarded to him in the future until any amount owed to him by Juanita is satisfied. We determine that Gregory may offset the $11,773.94 owed to Juanita against the amount owed to him for Juanita's share of the marital debt and personal property. We decline to modify the property settlement agreement so as to change the payee from Juanita to the clerk of the district court as requested by Gregory. Gregory also assigns that the district court erred in failing to award prejudgment interest on the money which he paid out and on the value of the personal property. Prejudgment interest is available only when a claim is liquidated, that is, when there is no reasonable controversy either as to the plaintiff's right to recover or as to the amount of such recovery. There must be no dispute either as to the amount or as to the plaintiff's right to recover. Blue Tee Corp. v. CDI Contractors, Inc., 247 Neb. 397, 529 N.W.2d 16 (1995). We conclude that Gregory's claim is unliquidated. The district court did not err in failing to award prejudgment interest.