Opinion ID: 2613151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mistyped instruction

Text: Pinero next claims that jury instruction number 26 omitted, due to a typographical error, information regarding reckless manslaughter. Instruction number 26 should have provided the emphasized language: If you find the defendant acted in self-defense, then you must find him not guilty. If you find he did not act in self-defense, then you must find him guilty of either Murder in the First Degree or Manslaughter, (due to extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is a reasonable explanation), or manslaughter based on reckless conduct, depending on your determination of his state of mind. The instruction as read and provided to the jury in writing for their deliberation omitted the clause concerning reckless manslaughter. Without the emphasized language, instruction number 26 was incomplete and failed to adequately inform the jury that they could find the defendant guilty of Manslaughter in two different ways. Pinero claims that he was prejudiced by this omission because had the jury wished to exercise leniency on Pinero's behalf, it was precluded from considering reckless manslaughter as a conviction option. The omission went unnoticed during the trial and Pinero raises it for the first time on appeal. Ordinarily, instructions to which no objection was made at trial may not be raised as error on appeal. Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 30(e). [4] An appellate court may presume that an instruction correctly stated the law if no objection to the allegedly erroneous instruction was made at trial. In State v. McNulty, 60 Haw. 259, 266, 588 P.2d 438, 444 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961, 99 S.Ct. 2406, 60 L.Ed.2d 1066 (1979), we held that: appellant would have been entitled, upon proper request, to have the trial court specifically instruct the jury that the prosecution's burden of persuasion included proving that appellant had not acted in self-defense at the time of the alleged crime. However, because he failed to object at trial, appellant is now precluded from raising the failure of the court to give such an instruction as a ground for reversal on appeal, and the court's general burden of proof instruction will be deemed sufficient to cover the issue of self-defense. Where an erroneous instruction affected the substantial rights of a defendant, however, we may notice the error as plain error and remand for corrective action. HRPP Rule 52(b); State v. Kelekolio, 74 Haw. 479, 515, 849 P.2d 58, 74-75 (1993); State v. Agrabante, 73 Haw. 179, 184, 830 P.2d 492, 495 (1992); State v. Fox, 70 Haw. 46, 55-57, 760 P.2d 670, 675-76 (1988). Although we review Pinero's complaint that the typographical omission rendered the jury instruction misleading, we conclude that the trial court did not commit plain error because the omission did not prejudice Pinero. In determining the sufficiency of a particular instruction, or part of a charge, it is not to be considered apart from its context, or the rest of the charge. Both in civil and in criminal cases the instructions of the court must be read together as one connected whole, to ascertain whether they correctly declare the law. The omissions or inaccuracies of one instruction may be cured by the contents of the other instructions, or some of them, and if, when the instructions of the court are considered as a whole, they correctly state the law and are not inconsistent or misleading, the fact that a particular instruction or isolated paragraph may be objectionable, as inaccurate or misleading, will not constitute ground for reversal. State v. Travis, 45 Haw. 435, 438, 368 P.2d 883, 886 (1962) (quoting Ciacci v. Woolley, 33 Haw. 247, 261-62 (1934)). Where instructions were not objected to at trial, if the appellant overcomes the presumption that the instructions correctly stated the law, the rule is that such `[e]rroneous instructions are presumptively harmful and are a ground for reversal unless it affirmatively appears from the record as a whole that the error was not prejudicial.' Pinero, 70 Haw. at 527, 778 P.2d at 716 (quoting Turner v. Willis, 59 Haw. 319, 326, 582 P.2d 710, 715 (1978) (trial court neglected to inform jury about mental element of one of the crimes for which defendant could have been found guilty)); State v. Napeahi, 57 Haw. 365, 556 P.2d 569 (1976) (instruction taking question of fact away from jury was clearly prejudicial and not cured by another instruction which, although correctly stating law concerning that question of fact, did not call attention to erroneous instruction). In the instant case, even assuming that instruction number 26 incorrectly stated the law, the instructions, verdict forms, and the record as a whole show that Pinero was not prejudiced by the erroneous instruction. The instructions given before and after instruction number 26 clearly informed the jury that it was obligated to consider the elements of reckless manslaughter (instructions 21, 23, and 30) and that a separate count of manslaughter had to be considered apart from manslaughter based on emotional distress. The judge's instructions to the jury as to the elements of the crimes for which Pinero could possibly be convicted were in pertinent part: [Instruction No. 16] The Defendant is charged with the offense of Murder in the First Degree. A person commits Murder in the First Degree if he intentionally or knowingly causes the death of a peace officer arising out of the performance of official duties. There are four elements to this offense, each of which must be proven by the prosecution beyond a reasonable doubt. These four elements are: 1. The Defendant intentionally or knowingly caused the death of David Ronk. 2. David Ronk's death arose out of the performance of his official duties as a police officer. A police officer is a peace officer under the law. 3. The Defendant knew that David Ronk was a police officer. 4. The Defendant's conduct was not justifiable as self defense. . . . . [Instruction No. 21 (part) ] If you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of Murder in the First Degree, or Manslaughter based upon extreme mental or emotional disturbance or you are unable to reach a unanimous verdict as to these offenses, then you must determine whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the offense of manslaughter based upon reckless conduct. A person commits the offense of manslaughter based upon reckless conduct if he recklessly causes the death of another person. There are two material elements of this offense, each of which the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. These two elements are: 1. That the defendant caused the death of David Ronk; and 2. That the defendant did so recklessly. The prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant caused the death of David Ronk and that he did so recklessly. If the prosecution has done so, then you must return the verdict of guilty of Manslaughter based upon reckless conduct. If the prosecution has not done so, then you must return a verdict of not guilty. . . . . [Instruction No. 23 (part)] In order to find the defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree or Manslaughter (due to extreme mental or emotional disturbance) or reckless Manslaughter, you must determine whether or not the defense of Self Defense applies.