Opinion ID: 1703842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Eugene's Prior Convictions

Text: Prior to trial, Eugene filed a motion in limine requesting of the trial court an order precluding the use by the prosecution . . . of any reference to or questions upon any previous convictions ... of the defendant. The day of the trial, prior to selecting the jury, the trial court determined, in light of the entire Rule 609(a) and (b), N.D.R.Ev., that evidence of certain prior convictions two convictions for burglary, one conviction for forgery, and a conviction of two counts of possession of stolen propertywould be admissible for the purpose of attacking Eugene's credibility if he chose to testify. A prior negligent homicide conviction was deemed inadmissible. Eugene subsequently testified on his own behalf and on direct examination, prompted by the State's anticipated impeachment, admitted the prior convictions. The trial court's ruling on the admissibility of the prior convictions is assigned as error. We deem it necessary to address, initially, the State's contention that any error in the trial court's denial of Eugene's motion in limine is harmless because the only testimony elicited at trial concerning prior convictions was that on direct examination of Eugene by defense counsel. The State refers us to our decision in State v. Boushee, 284 N.W.2d 423, 433-35 (N.D.1979), wherein we stated that the trial judge in that case was not required to make a 609(a) ruling because the defendant introduced his prior conviction in evidence on direct examination as a matter of trial strategy. In Boushee, supra, the defendant contended that the trial court's refusal to make an advance ruling on the admissibility of his prior conviction had a significant effect on his trial strategy. He contended he was entitled to such a ruling at a time prior to his being sworn in as a witness. We held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial judge to deny the defendant's request for the ruling; however, we deemed it better policy to make a ruling on the admissibility of a prior conviction, where the witness is the accused, at some time prior to his decision to take the stand because it does have an impact on the trial strategy involved. Advance rulings on admissibility are preferable because [c]ounsel need to know what the ruling will be on this important matter so that they can make appropriate tactical decisions. 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ¶ 609[05], at 609-82 (1982). We believe the factual circumstances surrounding our statement in Boushee, supra, render it inapplicable to the instant case. In this case, an advance ruling was made prior to trial. A defendant does not waive his objection to an adverse ruling on a motion in limine by introducing his prior convictions on direct examination. Any rule to the contrary would be inconsistent with our decision to encourage (although not require) advance rulings on the admissibility of prior convictions where the trial court, in its discretion, finds them appropriate. [4] Thus, we proceed to the merits of Eugene's contentions as to the admissibility of his prior convictions. Rule 609(a), N.D.R.Ev., governs the admissibility of evidence of prior convictions for impeachment purposes. It reads as follows: For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting his evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant, or (2) involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. Rule 609(a) represents a restriction upon the admissibility of prior convictions, as compared to prior North Dakota case law which allowed evidence of any criminal conviction for impeachment purposes. See Dugas v. Felton, 249 N.W.2d 215, 216 (N.D. 1976). Rule 609(a) divides criminal convictions into two categories: convictions involving dishonesty or false statement, and convictions for crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of one year [if] the court determines the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. Evidence of prior convictions for crimes of dishonesty or false statement, having the greatest probative value on the issue of veracity, are automatically admissible for impeachment purposes under Rule 609(a)(2). State v. Anderson, 336 N.W.2d 123, 125 (N.D.1983). An examination of the transcript of the hearing on Eugene's motion in limine reveals the following colloquy between the parties and the trial court: THE COURT: . . . Some convictions of the defendant are more than ten years old and therefore are inadmissible as provided by Rule 609(b) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence. Evidence of other convictions should be excluded upon the basis of Rule 609(a) of the North Dakota Rules of Evidence because the prejudicial effect of such evidence to the defendant would outweigh the probative value of such evidence which would create a danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury. [This was a reading of Eugene's motion in limine. ]       [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . The information provided in this case, indicates that some of the convictions of Mr. Eugene are more than ten years old, and we would want all of thatany information on those convictions to be excluded. Also, we feel that there are other convictions that are listed that should also be excluded because it would create an unfair prejudice against Mr. Eugene. . . [STATE]: . . . [Defense Counsel] I think has misread Rule 609(a). That Rule provides that those convictions may be admitted involving dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment. I think that you can also exclude the prejudice factor. We have copies of judgments which indicate that Mr. Eugene was convicted of forgery in 1979, he was also convicted in 1979 of burglary, he was convicted of two counts of possession of stolen property in 1981, he was also convicted of negligent homicide in 1981. In addition, there was a burglary in 1975 which also we think should be admitted. THE COURT: All right. Did all of those result in convictions? [STATE]: All resulted in a conviction and a sentence, Your Honor. All were felonies and they were all within the past ten years. Certainly forgery and possession of stolen property involves dishonesty or false statements, and it is clearly admissible. THE COURT: In light of the entire Rule 609(a) and (b), I believe prior convictions within a ten year period of time and crimes of dishonesty or false statements, would be admissible and the Court would let you use them. As to the negligent homicide, I don't think that would qualify, so I will prohibit the state from using the negligent homicide conviction. The remainder of the convictions that you have mentioned, the Court will permit you to use them for attacking the credibility of the witness should he testify. [Emphasis added.] Eugene's specific contentions are that the trial court did not make a determination pursuant to Rule 609(a)(1) whether or not the probative value of admitting the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. He contends further, in the alternative, that if we deem that a proper determination was made, the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that evidence of Eugene's prior burglary conviction was admissible because burglary is not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, and because his two prior convictions for burglary were identical to the offense charged. Eugene has misconstrued Rule 609(a). Under Rule 609(a)(1), evidence of prior convictions need not necessarily be for a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, and under Rule 609(a)(2) the trial court need not consider the seriousness of punishment or the prejudicial effect of such evidence as it must if prior convictions are offered under Rule 609(a)(1). Anderson, supra, 336 N.W.2d at 125-26. We deem it necessary to consider the admissibility of Eugene's prior convictions under Rule 609(a)(2) first, because a conviction which may not automatically be admitted as a crime involving dishonesty or false statement may still be admitted in the court's discretion if it meets the criteria of Rule 609(a)(1). We recently discussed, but left unresolved, what constitutes a crime involving dishonesty or false statement for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2). See Anderson, supra . At first glance, the question seems easily resolved in light of the common meaning of the term dishonesty. See United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 845 (7th Cir.1977). We note that dishonesty includes, by definition, any breach of honesty or trust, as lying, deceiving, cheating, stealing or defrauding. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 650 (1971). It does not necessarily follow, however, that this broad definition of dishonesty should be employed in delineating the scope of Rule 609(a)(2). North Dakota Rule 609, although taken from the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974), is quite similar to its counterpart in the Federal Rules of Evidence. This is so because the Uniform Rules of Evidence were conformed to the Federal Rules of Evidence for purposes of uniformity between State and Federal evidence law. Thus, the provisions of each are almost identical. 13 Uniform Rules of Evidence (U.L.A.) pp. 209-13. In interpreting state procedural rules derived substantially from Federal analogues, we have consistently deemed it appropriate to consider, although we are not bound by, the construction and interpretations placed upon the Federal Rules by the Federal courts. See State v. Forsland, 326 N.W.2d 688, 692 (N.D.1982). Federal decisions have interpreted the words dishonesty or false statement, as contained in the Federal counterpart to Rule 609(a)(2), to apply only to those crimes that bear directly upon the accused's propensity to testify truthfully. See, e.g., United States v. Ortega, 561 F.2d 803, 805-06 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Hayes, 553 F.2d 824, 827 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 867, 98 S.Ct. 204, 54 L.Ed.2d 143 (1977); United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348, 356-66 (D.C.Cir.1976). The Federal rationale for this limited applicability of Rule 609(a)(2) is grounded in the complex legislative history of Federal Rule 609, which illustrates that the rule constitutes a carefully considered legislative compromise growing out of a series of vigorous debates in committees and on the floor of both Houses of Congress. United States v. Jackson, 405 F.Supp. 938, 940-42 (E.D.N.Y.1975) (Weinstein, J.). See generally 3 Weinstein's Evidence, pp. 609-02 to 609-54 (1982). Rule 609(a), as it was ultimately enacted, was worked out by a conference committee as a compromise between differing House and Senate formulations of the rule. In its report, the Conference Committee defined crimes of dishonesty or false statement as follows: By the phrase `dishonesty and false statement' the Conference means crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, or false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimes falsi, the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused's propensity to testify truthfully. H.R.Conf.Rep. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1974, pp. 7098, 7103, reprinted following Fed.Rules Evid. 609, 28 U.S.C.S. This language from the Conference Committee Report is the basis for the Federal Court's narrow interpretation of the words dishonesty or false statement in Rule 609(a)(2). Possession of stolen property and burglary were not crimes specified by the report. The remaining category, offenses in the nature of crimen falsi was defined in United States v. Smith, supra, 551 F.2d at 362-63: Even in its broadest sense, the term `crimen falsi' has encompassed only those crimes characterized by an element of deceit or deliberate interference with a court's ascertainment of truth. State jurisdictions have had occasion to interpret the words dishonesty or false statement, contained in similar state adaptations of Rule 609(a) of the Federal Rules or Uniform Rules of Evidence, with differing results. See, e.g., State v. Malloy, 131 Ariz. 125, 639 P.2d 315, 316-19 (1981) [conviction for burglary not admissible under 609(a)(2); does not necessarily involve element of deceit or falsification]; Floyd v. State, 278 Ark. 86, 643 S.W.2d 555, 556-57 (1982) [burglary and theft are crimes involving dishonesty; no discussion]; People v. Spates, 77 Ill.2d 193, 32 Ill.Dec. 333, 395 N.E.2d 563, 568 (1979) [conviction for theft admissible under judicially adopted Rule 609(a)(2); limitation to crimen falsi offenses too restrictive]; Hall v. Oakley, 409 So.2d 93, 96-97 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) [conviction for petit larceny not admissible; crime must involve element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification]; State v. Ellis, 208 Neb. 379, 303 N.W.2d 741, 751-52 (1981) [conviction for petit larceny not admissible as crime involving dishonesty in absence of showing that offense involved deceit or deception]; State v. Butler, 626 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Tenn.1981) [shoplifting is crime involving dishonesty; no discussion]; State v. Burton, 33 Wash.App. 417, 655 P.2d 259, 260 (1983) [theft is crime involving dishonesty; no need to examine Federal legislative history when rule not ambiguous]; State v. Zibell, 32 Wash.App. 158, 646 P.2d 154, 155-58 (1982) [conviction for possession of stolen property not admissible under 609(a)(2); not directly probative of whether defendant would or would not testify truthfully]. [5] After examining the history and purpose of Rule 609, we agree with those courts that limit the phrase dishonesty or false statement to those crimes that bear directly upon the accused's propensity to testify truthfully, that is, crimes that involve some element of misrepresentation or other indicium of a propensity to lie and not to those crimes which, bad though they are, do not carry with them a tinge of falsification. Ortega, supra, 561 F.2d at 806. As we indicated in Dugas v. Felton, supra, 249 N.W.2d at 217, forgery is a crime involving dishonesty or false statement for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2). [6] See also United States v. Field, 625 F.2d 862, 871 (9th Cir.1980); State v. Kruse, 302 N.W.2d 29, 31 (Minn. 1981). We conclude that evidence of Eugene's prior convictions for burglary is not an indicium of a propensity toward testimonial dishonesty, and was not automatically admissible under 609(a)(2). See United States v. Glenn, 667 F.2d 1269, 1272-74 (9th Cir.1982) [crimes of violence, theft crimes, and crimes of stealth do not involve `dishonesty or false statement'; convictions for burglary and grand theft not admissible under 609(a)(2) ]; United States v. Seamster, 568 F.2d 188, 190-91 (10th Cir.1978) [burglary ordinarily considered to be dishonest but not within provisions of Rule 609(a)(2) ]; United States v. Hayes, supra, 553 F.2d at 827 [crimes of force, such as armed robbery or assault, or crimes of stealth, such as burglary not automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2)]. [7] Likewise, Eugene's conviction for possession of stolen property is not directly probative of whether he would or would not testify truthfully. [8] We conclude that this conviction is not one which bears directly upon the accused's propensity to testify truthfully and as such is not a crime involving dishonesty or false statement for purposes of Rule 609(a)(2). Many Federal courts have recognized that when a prior conviction by its definition is not included within Rule 609(a)(2), the prosecution may invoke the automatic admissibility provision by demonstrating that a particular prior conviction rested on facts warranting the dishonesty or false statement description. See United States v. Mehrmanesh, 689 F.2d 822, 833 n. 13 (9th Cir.1982); Glenn, supra, 667 F.2d at 1273; United States v. Whitman, 665 F.2d 313, 320 (10th Cir.1981); United States v. Dorsey, 591 F.2d 922, 935 (D.C.Cir.1979); Papia, supra, 560 F.2d at 847; Hayes, supra, 553 F.2d at 827-28. The record here does not reveal, however, that Eugene utilized fraudulent or deceitful means in committing the prior crimes of burglary and possession of stolen property. If a prior conviction is not automatically admissible under Rule 609(a)(2) as a crime involving dishonesty or false statement, it may still be admissible in the trial court's discretion if it meets the criteria of Rule 609(a)(1). Rule 609(a)(1) is absolutely clear and explicit in requiring the trial court, before admitting evidence of a prior conviction, to make a determination that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the defendant. Anderson, supra, 336 N.W.2d at 126. The prosecution bears the burden of persuading the court that the probative value of admitting evidence of a prior conviction outweighs its prejudicial effect. United States v. Lipscomb, 702 F.2d 1049, 1055, 1063 (D.C.Cir.1983); Accord Hayes, supra, 553 F.2d at 828; United States v. Mahone, 537 F.2d 922, 929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1025, 97 S.Ct. 646, 50 L.Ed.2d 627 (1976). The defendant is then permitted to rebut the prosecution's presentation, pointing out the potentiality for unfair prejudice from admission of the evidence. Mahone, supra . Eugene contends that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior convictions because no determination was made, as required by Rule 609(a)(1), that the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. We do not agree. The record reveals that the trial court relied on the entire Rule 609(a) and (b) as its basis for admitting evidence of Eugene's prior convictions. As we indicated in Anderson, supra, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Mahone, supra, urged trial judges to make determinations exercising their discretion under Rule 609(a)(1) after a hearing on the record and to explicitly find whether or not the prejudicial effect of the evidence to the defendant will be outweighed by its probative value. Some of the factors which the Mahone Court indicated should be considered by the trial judge in making the determination include: (1) The impeachment value of the prior crime. (2) The point in time of the conviction and the witness' subsequent history. (3) The similarity between the past crime and the charged crime. (4) The importance of the defendant's testimony. (5) The centrality of the credibility issue. 537 F.2d at 929. This list does not exhaust the range of possible factors that a trial judge may consider, but it does outline the more basic concerns relevant to the balancing under Rule 609(a)(1). See United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1209 (D.C.Cir.1980). We also express our preference, as did the Seventh Circuit in Mahone, that trial judges explicitly articulate their balancing process on the record to avoid the unnecessary raising of the issue of whether the judge has meaningfully invoked his discretion under Rule 609(a)(1). This will simplify this Court's task of determining whether or not the trial judge followed the strictures of Rule 609(a)(1) in making the balancing determination. While the trial court was not as explicit as it could have been in identifying and weighing the relevant indicia of probative value and prejudice, we cannot say, in view of the record, that the trial court failed to meaningfully exercise the discretion given it by Rule 609(a)(1). The trial court's ruling permitting the admission of evidence based [i]n light of the entire Rule 609(a) indicates implicitly that, in line with the rule, it weighed the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect to Eugene. Mahone, supra . The record before the trial court consisted of argument by defense counsel as to this very matter. Furthermore, Eugene's motion in limine containing Eugene's contentions concerning the prejudicial effect of the prior convictions was read aloud by the trial court in the presence of the parties at the outset of the hearing. Eugene contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing admission of evidence of his prior convictions for burglary because those convictions were for a crime identical to the crime charged. We find no abuse of discretion. The prior burglary convictions were for a crime which, although not involving dishonesty or false statement for Rule 609(a)(2) purposes, still reflected adversely, in a general sense, on Eugene's honesty and integrity. See United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1029 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Oaxaca, 569 F.2d 518, 527 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 926, 99 S.Ct. 310, 58 L.Ed.2d 319 (1978). As such they were relevant to the question of Eugene's credibility which, in light of the contradictory testimony of Eugene and Officer Schulz, was a key issue in the case. Prior convictions are not inadmissible per se on the issue of credibility merely because the offense involved is identical to that for which the defendant is on trial. See United States v. Callison, 577 F.2d 53, 55 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 873, 99 S.Ct. 209, 58 L.Ed.2d 187 (1978); Oaxaca, supra ; United States v. Ortiz, 553 F.2d 782, 784 n. 6 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 897, 98 S.Ct. 277, 54 L.Ed.2d 183 (1977). As was stated by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ortiz, supra : The fact that the prior conviction is for the same offense requires particularly careful consideration of all the factors by the trial judge before permitting its use, but does not mandate its exclusion. We find no error on the part of the trial court in admitting the evidence of Eugene's prior convictions.