Opinion ID: 546143
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Definition of Fetus

Text: 16 Application of the statute is triggered only when the remains of a human fetus that has reached a certain stage of development are the result of the abortion or miscarriage. Minn.Stat. Sec. 145.1621, subds. 2, 3. The district court was unable to determine whether microscopic slides used to determine whether fetal remains had reached the point of development that the statute applied would have to be disposed of in accordance with the statute. Planned Parenthood argues there is no agreement in the medical community on the meaning of cartilaginous structures, fetal parts, or skeletal parts. Thus, it contends practitioners will be routinely faced with uncertainty over the application of the statute's disposal requirements. 17 We again believe the district court applied an incorrect standard in striking down the disposal statute based on these concerns. The difficulties identified by the district court in cases of microscopic examinations are present in very few cases. The deposition testimony of pathologists established that only when the attending physician is uncertain whether a pregnancy existed, or the placenta or other material exhibit abnormal characteristics, is the aborted or miscarried material sent to a pathologist for further examination. 8 Generally, the attending physician is able to determine from a gross examination of the fetal remains 9 the existence of a normal pregnancy and cartilaginous structures, or fetal skeletal parts. 10 When the abortion or miscarriage occurs during the second or third trimester, the fetus has developed to the point that application of the statute can be assumed. Planned Parenthood, however, offers abortion services only during the first trimester of the pregnancy. Admittedly, application of the statute during this period may be difficult to determine. Planned Parenthood's argument, however, hypothesizes a worst case scenario to demonstrate the facial vagueness of the statute. However, this is not the standard for a facial vagueness attack. 18 The delicate power of pronouncing a [legislative act] unconstitutional is not to be exercised with reference to hypothetical cases.... [A] limiting construction could be given to the statute by the court responsible for its construction if an application of doubtful constitutionality were ... presented.     The strong presumptive validity that attaches to [a legislative act] has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are not automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language. 19 United State v. National Dairy Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32, 83 S.Ct. 594, 597, 9 L.Ed.2d 561 (1963) (quoting United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 22, 80 S.Ct. 519, 523, 4 L.Ed.2d 524 (1960)); see also Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745, 107 S.Ct. at 2100 (in a facial challenge to a statute, the challenge must establish that under no set of circumstances would the act be valid). 20 Here, it is obvious that application of the statute can be validly determined in many instances. First, some abortions will be performed at a stage of development where application of the statute is certain. Second, some abortions will be performed where the physician will be able to determine the need for compliance with the statute after performing a gross examination of the specimen, or based on medical knowledge of the characteristics of the fetus at that stage of development. 11 Third, some abortions will be performed where microscopic examination will determine whether compliance with the statute is necessary. 12 Undoubtedly, there will be cases in which the need for compliance with the statute will be difficult to determine. However, these marginal cases cannot defeat the statute. We acknowledge that this statute is not a model of clarity, and for some facilities, may pose compliance difficulties. However, we cannot say that the statute is impermissibly vague in all its applications such that it does not fairly warn of the conduct prohibited. 21 We therefore find that the statute is not unconstitutionally vague.