Opinion ID: 1160484
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Wendy Mow-Taira

Text: At trial, the circuit court qualified Wendy Mow-Taira, Executive Director of the Hawaii Crises Shelter, Inc., as an expert in domestic violence. Mow-Taira, who had not interviewed either Diana or Clark and who testified that she was entirely unfamiliar with the facts underlying Clark's prosecution, offered no opinion on whether Diana was a victim of domestic violence or whether Diana's trial testimony was credible; rather, she testified with respect to domestic violence and domestic violence victims generally. In particular, Mow-Taira testified that it is not uncommon for victims of domestic violence to recant allegations of abuse after they have been victimized in order to protect the abuser. Mow-Taira's testimony thus offered the jury a possible explanation for Diana's recantation. Expert testimony in Hawai`i is governed by HRE Rule 702, which provides: Testimony by experts. If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. In determining the issue of assistance to the trier of fact, the court may consider the trustworthiness and validity of the scientific technique or mode of analysis employed by the proffered expert. Expert testimony assists the trier of fact by providing a resource for ascertaining truth in relevant areas outside the ken of ordinary laity. State v. Batangan, 71 Haw. 552, 556, 799 P.2d 48, 51 (1990) (Citation and quotation marks omitted). On appeal, Clark terms Mow-Taira's testimony junk science. Furthermore, Clark complains that, because there was no evaluation of Diana by a qualified expert to determine if Diana was suffering from a recognized diagnosis of some sort of domestic violence victim's syndrome, her testimony was nothing more than unproved generalizations which served only to suggest to the jury that it should speculate as to whether or not Diana would lie under oath because she was a victim of domestic violence. Contrary to Clark's contention, Mow-Taira's testimony is not junk science. Substantially similar testimony was presented in State v. Cababag, 9 Haw.App. 496, 850 P.2d 716, cert. denied, 74 Haw. 652, 853 P.2d 542 (1993). In Cababag, the defendant was convicted of abuse of family and household members. The victim in that case, the defendant's live-in girlfriend, told the police on the day of the incident that the defendant had beaten her. The victim repeated her allegation in a written statement made that same day. At trial, the victim admitted to being visited by the police on the morning of [the incident], being contacted by the police that afternoon, and writing and signing her statement, but testified that she `made up' the story she told in her written statement. Id. at 500-01, 850 P.2d at 719. Over defendant's objection, the trial court then permitted an expert in domestic violence to testify that victims of domestic violence commonly recant their allegations against their abuser. On appeal, the Intermediate Court of Appeals held: At the trial of an alleged male batterer of a woman with whom he is living, where the woman recants her pretrial accusations that she was battered by the male, an expert's testimony that one reasonable explanation for the recantation is the battered housemate/spouse syndrome is relevant specialized knowledge that was unknown to the average juror and will aid the average juror in determining the credibility of the woman's testimony. Id. at 496-97, 850 P.2d at 716. Clark makes no attempt to distinguish Cababag and, accordingly, we hold that Mow-Taira was properly allowed to testify regarding the effects of domestic violence and, in particular, that victims of domestic violence often recant allegations of abuse. Clark's contention that Mow-Taira's testimony regarding the recantation phenomenon of domestic violence was irrelevant, absent a determination by an expert that Diana was in fact suffering from symptoms associated with domestic violence, is similarly without merit. Expert testimony regarding the effects of domestic violence and how it may explain a victim's recantation of abuse is not evidence that the victim suffers from a specific medical or psychological condition  or even that the victim's behavior as observed by the experts was consistent with the behavior of women suffering from such a condition. It is simply testimony, based on the witnesses' experience in cases of domestic violence, that women with a history of domestic abuse often exhibit common traits, among them denial and a tendency to recant accusations of abuse. State v. Schaller, 544 N.W.2d 247, 253 (Wis. Ct.App.1995), review denied by, State v. Schaller, 546 N.W.2d 469 (Wis.1996). In the present case, therefore, it was appropriately left to the jury to determine whether Diana's behavior was consistent with the behavior described by Mow-Taira.