Opinion ID: 4513027
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application in This Case.

Text: We now turn to whether the information charging Anderson with aggravated assault with a deadly weapon alleged all statutory elements of reckless driving. “Reckless driving” is defined in section 316.192(1)(a), Florida Statutes (2014), which states that “[a]ny person who drives any vehicle in willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property is guilty of reckless driving.” Florida’s standard jury instructions provide the following instruction for a violation of section 316.192(1)(a): To prove the crime of Reckless Driving, the State must prove the following beyond a reasonable doubt: (Defendant) drove a vehicle in Florida with a willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property. See Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 28.5. Obviously, driving is an essential element of the crime of reckless driving. The information in this case alleged that Anderson “did unlawfully and intentionally make an assault upon [Anderson’s girlfriend] with a motor vehicle, a deadly weapon[,] without intent to kill, contrary to [s]ection 784.021(1)(a), Florida Statutes.” Anderson, 247 So. 3d at 682. Although a reader might infer from this language that Anderson was driving the vehicle, the information does not actually -8- make that allegation. Instead, consistent with the elements of the aggravated assault charge,3 the information simply alleges that Anderson made “an assault upon” the victim “with a motor vehicle.” Id. Because the information charging aggravated assault did not allege driving, an essential element of reckless driving, we readily conclude that the trial court correctly denied Anderson’s request for an instruction on reckless driving as a permissive lesser-included offense, and that the First District correctly affirmed as to this issue.