Opinion ID: 5648768
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: issue #6: jury instructions

Text: Cunningham has procedurally defaulted his argument that the trial court neglected to instruct the jury that it must determine Cunningham’s personal culpability before imposing a death sentence. We cannot review this claim. Under Ohio Supreme Court Rule of Practice 11.06(A), capital defendants may apply to reopen their case within ninety days of the Ohio Supreme Court’s issuance of a mandate. Those who show good cause are exempted from the ninety-day deadline. See OHIO S. CT. PRAC. R. 11.06(A). In his 2006 federal habeas petition, Cunningham asserted for the first time that the trial court violated the Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), line of cases by failing to instruct the jury that Cunningham must possess the requisite personal responsibility to be eligible for the death penalty. R. 19-10 (Habeas Pet. at 123, 144–45) (Page ID #190, 211–12). On April 23, 2007—as federal habeas proceedings unfolded—the Ohio Supreme Court appointed counsel to apply to reopen Cunningham’s case under Rule 11.06(A). See R. 51 (1/11/07 Mot.) (Page ID #644); R. 55 (2/8/07 Order at 1–2) (Page ID #738–39); R. 59-1 (Reopen App.) (Page ID #749). Nos. 11-3005/20-3429 Cunningham v. Shoop Page 45 Cunningham reasserted that the jury instructions violated Apprendi and its progeny. R. 59-1 (Reopen App.) (Page ID #866–69). Cunningham conceded that he had surpassed the ninety-day deadline, but he argued that his applying to reopen his case within ninety days of appointment of counsel satisfied good cause. Id. at 2 (Page ID #750); Appellant’s Br. #1 at 44. In a singlesentence order, the Ohio Supreme Court rejected Cunningham’s application, reasoning that Cunningham failed to comply with the rule’s ninety-day filing deadline. The state high court said nothing about good cause. State v. Cunningham, 872 N.E.2d 946 (Ohio 2007) (Table). Cunningham has procedurally defaulted this claim. The Ohio courts have firmly established the meaning of “good cause” and regularly follow the ninety-day deadline. Wogenstahl v. Mitchell, 668 F.3d 307, 322 (6th Cir. 2012).15 Thus, Rule 11.06(A) constitutes an independent and adequate state ground for procedural default, which the Ohio Supreme Court enforced in this case. See Maupin v. Smith, 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1986). Cunningham correctly points out that postconviction counsel’s ineffective performance can establish cause to excuse a procedural default in certain circumstances. See Appellant’s Br. #1 at 48; Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 13–14 (2012); Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413, 417 (2013). But Cunningham has not explained why his postconviction counsel was deficient or prejudicial. See Appellant’s Br. #1 at 49. We have nothing to base an ineffective-counsel decision on. To that end, we cannot excuse Cunningham’s procedural default, and we cannot review this claim.