Opinion ID: 2976260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reduction In Force Claim

Text: To establish employment discrimination, a plaintiff must either present direct evidence of discrimination or introduce circumstantial evidence that would allow an inference of discriminatory intent. Anthony v. BTR Auto. Sealing Sys., Inc., 339 F.3d 506, 514 (6th Cir. 2003). The burden-shifting approach under McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which was later refined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981), applies to the present case. Under this framework, Mynatt faces the initial burden of presenting a prima facie case of discrimination. The establishment of a prima facie case creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination and requires LMES to articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for taking the challenged action. LMES’s burden is one of production only, not persuasion. Gray v. Toshiba Am. Consumer Prods., Inc., 263 F.3d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253). The ultimate burden of persuasion remains with Mynatt. Ibid. If LMES produces legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating him, Mynatt must prove that LMES’s reasons are a pretext for discrimination. This same burden-shifting framework applies to both Title VII and § 1981 claims. See Newman v. Federal Express Corp., 266 F.3d 401, 406 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 186 (1989)).
Absent direct evidence of discrimination, to establish a prima facie case in a wrongful - 12 - Mynatt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. No. 06-6319 termination case, the plaintiff must establish: (1) that he is in a protected class; (2) that he was terminated; (3) that he was qualified for the job; and (4) that a similarly-situated person who was not in the protected class received the job. Barnes v. GenCorp, Inc., 896 F.2d 1457, 1465 (6th Cir. 1990); see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. In a RIF case, like this one, the fourth element of the prima facie case is modified to require the plaintiff to submit “additional direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence tending to indicate that the employer singled out the plaintiff for discharge for impermissible reasons.” Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 F.3d 544, 547 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 350 (6th Cir. 1998)). Modification of the fourth element in a RIF situation is required because “[w]hen an employer is forced to reduce its staff for economic reasons, the most common legitimate reason for the discharge is the RIF itself.” Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus., Inc., 123 F.3d 890, 896 (6th Cir. 1997) (citing Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465). It is undisputed that a RIF, in which “business considerations cause an employer to eliminate one or more positions within the company,” occurred in this case. Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465. The district court held that Mynatt had “failed to present any evidence that his RIF selection was made because of his race.” Mynatt argues that the failure to include Buck in the RIF peer group and the failure to terminate Corey indicate that racial animus motivated his termination. Mynatt also argues that the Buck email shows that he was chosen for termination because of his race. Mynatt’s arguments are without merit. The fact that Buck, who is white, was not included in the peer group does not suffice to show racial animus in this case. It is true that Buck and Mynatt were both titled “Media Producer II”; - 13 - Mynatt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. No. 06-6319 however, Buck spent 60% of his time on video teleconferencing and was a different salary grade. Under LMES’s RIF policy, differences in job duties are a legitimate reason to exclude someone from a peer group. See McGrath v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 48 F. App’x 543, 554 (6th Cir. 2002) (explaining that plaintiff could be placed in a one-person peer group because of his special skills). Moreover, a difference in salary grade suffices to define a peer group. See Messner v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 126 F. Supp. 2d 502 (E.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that plaintiff failed to make prima facie case when peer group was based on job skills and salary grades); Shapira v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 88 F. Supp. 2d 813, 824-25 (E.D. Tenn. 1998) (same). Thus, the failure to include Buck in the peer group does not provide any evidence that Mynatt was singled out because of his race. Moreover, Mynatt’s arguments that Corey should have been terminated are unavailing. A plaintiff’s contention that he was better qualified than the workers who were retained is insufficient to establish a prima facie case. See LaGrant v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co., Inc., 748 F.2d 1087, 1091 (6th Cir. 1984). Moreover, an employee’s evaluation of his own performance or qualifications is irrelevant as a matter of law. Wrenn v. Gould, 808 F.2d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 1987) (stating that a plaintiff’s “perception of his competence, and the incompetence of those competing against him, is irrelevant”). As one district court has noted, “it is the manager’s motivation that is the key factor, not the employee’s perception . . . .” Shapira, 88 F. Supp. 2d at 829. Thus, the fact that Mynatt believes Corey should have been terminated cannot establish a prima facie case. Mynatt also points to the email from Buck to Dr. Friedman as evidence of racial animus. However, the email contains no reference to race whatsoever. Contrary to Mynatt’s counsel’s - 14 - Mynatt v. Lockheed Martin Energy Systems, Inc. No. 06-6319 protestations at oral argument, the mere supposition that Caucasian workers apply race-based stereotypes to their African-American coworkers cannot create a triable issue of fact that Mynatt was targeted because of his race. Such unsupported suppositions merely assume societal stereotyping and cannot overcome a complete lack of direct, circumstantial, or statistical evidence that Mynatt was treated differently because of his race. Accordingly, Mynatt has failed to meet the prima facie burden established for RIF cases. See Barnes, 896 F.2d at 1465.
Our holding that Mynatt failed to meet his prima facie burden is sufficient to affirm the district court’s ruling. Thus, we need not address Mynatt’s failure to show pretext.