Opinion ID: 509511
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Apportionment of loss of consortium damages

Text: 45 (a) The jury and the district court found Mrs. Simeon's loss of consortium damages to be $80,000. Smith is partly responsible for causing these damages as a matter of fact. However, as stated in part V, supra, Smith has been acquitted of unseaworthiness under general maritime law. Accordingly, Smith's only basis for liability in this case is negligence, and, as Smith is seaman Simeon's employer, it has no negligence liability to him under the general maritime law but only under the Jones Act, and a Jones Act employer is not liable for loss of consortium damages to the spouse of the employee seaman. E.g., Beltia v. Sidney Torres Marine Transport, Inc., 701 F.2d 491, 492-93 (5th Cir.1983); Cruz v. Hendy International Co., 638 F.2d 719, 723 (5th Cir.1981). 46 (b) As a general maritime law defendant which is not the injured seaman's employer, Lumar is liable for loss of consortium damages based on its negligence, see American Export Lines, Inc. v. Alvez, 446 U.S. 274, 100 S.Ct. 1673, 64 L.Ed.2d 284 (1980); Tullos v. Resource Drilling, Inc., 750 F.2d 380, 385-86 (5th Cir.1985), and the district court ordered Lumar to pay Mrs. Simeon $72,000, an amount representing all her loss of consortium damages, less a ten percent deduction for Simeon's contributory negligence. 14 Based on our holdings in part IV, supra, we reject Lumar's claim that it should not be liable for as much as ninety percent of Mrs. Simeon's loss of consortium damages, since it was only thirty-two percent at fault. For the same reasons, we decline to follow the dissent's theory that Lumar should only be liable for 32/42nds of Mrs. Simeon's loss of consortium damages. 47 (c) We also hold that Lumar is not entitled to contribution from Smith in respect to Lumar's loss of consortium liability to Mrs. Simeon. The traditional view is that there can be no contribution between concurrent tort-feasors unless they share a common legal liability toward the plaintiff. F. Harper, F. James, O. Gray, 3 The Law of Torts Sec. 10.2 at 46 (2d ed. 1986); W. Prosser & P. Keeton, supra, Sec. 50 at 339-40. The contribution action arises from the original obligation that the party cast in contribution owed to the plaintiff. If there was never any such liability, as where the contribution defendant has the defense of family immunity, assumption of risk, or the application of an automobile guest statute, or the substitution of workers' compensation for common law liability, then there is no liability for contribution. W. Prosser & P. Keeton, supra, Sec. 50 at 339-40. E.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 886A, comment g (1979); Green v. United States Dept. of Labor, 775 F.2d 964, 971 (8th Cir.1985); Fischbach & Moore International Corp. v. Crane Barge R-14, 632 F.2d 1123, 1125 (4th Cir.1980); Jones v. Schramm, 436 F.2d 899, 901 (D.C.Cir.1970); Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 181 F.2d 626 (D.C.Cir.1950); see Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2765 n. 2, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 15 48 In this case, we follow the traditional view. To allow Lumar an action in contribution against Smith would be inconsistent with our cases holding that the Jones Act employer is not responsible for loss of consortium damages. See Beltia, supra; Cruz, supra. Somewhat analogous is Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 72 S.Ct. 277, 96 L.Ed. 318 (1952), which held that the shipowner cast in liability for all damages had no right of contribution from the plaintiff longshoreman's employer, who was also allegedly at fault. See also Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Erie Lackawanna R. Co., 406 U.S. 340, 92 S.Ct. 1550, 32 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972) (same); Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 94 S.Ct. 2174, 2177-79, 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974) (explaining that Halcyon and Atlantic Coast prohibited contribution because the employers in those cases were protected from a direct claim by the LHWCA). See also Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 2757, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979) (same). 49 Sometimes a concurrent tort-feasor who is immune from the plaintiff's direct action and thus immune from a traditional contribution claim, owes the other concurrent tort-feasor some independent duty, or has made some express or implied promise to that tort-feasor so that a contribution action is permissible. This type of contribution does not arise because of an obligation running from the contributing tort-feasor to the plaintiff; it rather arises because of the relationship directly between the concurrent tort-feasors themselves. See Weyerhaeuser Steamship Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 597, 83 S.Ct. 926, 10 L.Ed.2d 1 (1963); Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic Steamship Corp., 350 U.S. 124, 76 S.Ct. 232, 100 L.Ed. 133 (1956) (permitting indemnity claim by shipowner against LHWCA employer on grounds that employer had breached its contractual obligation running to shipowner); Lockheed Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 460 U.S. 190, 103 S.Ct. 1033, 74 L.Ed.2d 911 (1983) (holding that the exclusive liability protection afforded the United States by Federal Employees' Compensation Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 8101 et seq., would not bar an indemnity claim by a concurrent tort-feasor, provided there was some substantive law of indemnity on which the claim could be based); Travelers Insurance Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 881, 886 (3d Cir.1974) (discussing Weyerhaeuser ). In this case, no party has sought to prove the existence of any such obligation running directly from Smith to Lumar. Therefore, we apply the traditional view of no contribution as exemplified by cases such as Halcyon, and deny Lumar contribution from Smith respecting Mrs. Simeon's loss of consortium.