Opinion ID: 2621639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Rejection of Proposed Jury Instructions

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court, by refusing certain defense requests for jury instructions, erred under state law and violated defendant's rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and parallel provisions of the state Constitution.
The defense requested the following special instruction (Special Instruction No. 17) on aggravating and mitigating circumstances: The factors set forth in subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) above are the only factors that can be considered by you as aggravating factors. However, you may find one or more of these factors to be (a) mitigating factor(s). You are not required to find that any of these factors are aggravating. It is up to you to determine whether these factors exist, and if they do exist, whether they are mitigating or aggravating. The factors set forth in subparagraphs (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), and (i) [ sic ] below can only be considered by you to be mitigating factors. The absence of a mitigating factor is not, and cannot be considered by you as, an aggravating factor. The trial court refused the request, explaining that the subject matter of proposed Special Instruction No. 17 was adequately covered by the instructions the court proposed to give. We have consistently held that a trial court in a capital case need not instruct the jury on whether any of the various statutory penalty factors is potentially aggravating or mitigating. ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 271-272, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Earp (1999) 20 Cal.4th 826, 899, 85 Cal.Rptr.2d 857, 978 P.2d 15; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1026-1027, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183.) As we explained in People v. Jackson [(1980)] 28 Cal.3d [264] at page 316 [168 Cal.Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149], with respect to the 1977 death penalty law, `the aggravating or mitigating nature of these various factors should be self-evident to any reasonable person within the context of each particular case.' ( People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 675, 280 Cal.Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351.) Likewise, a trial court need not instruct that the absence of a mitigating circumstance is not itself an aggravating circumstance. ( People v. Prieto, supra, at p. 276, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123; People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 1041, 108 Cal.Rptr.2d 291, 25 P.3d 519.) We recently found no error in a trial court's refusal of a proposed instruction identical to defendant's Special Instruction No. 17. ( People v. Carter (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1166, 1230 & fn. 26, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 553, 70 P.3d 981; see also People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 704-705, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640.) Defendant here does not persuade us to reconsider these decisions.
The defense requested the following special instruction (Special Instruction No. 4) on prior felony convictions: There has been no evidence presented that the defendant has been convicted of any prior felony. This circumstance should therefore be viewed as a circumstance in mitigation. The trial court did not use Special Instruction No. 4, commenting that the point was covered in a different way by the instructions the court proposed to give. We have concluded in prior decisions that a trial court need not instruct that the absence of prior felony convictions is necessarily mitigating. ( People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1124, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359; People v. Lucero, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 730, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; see also People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 313-314, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890.) We reasoned that a jury instructed that it may consider the absence of prior felony convictions ( People v. Lucero, supra, at p. 730, 97 Cal.Rptr.2d 871, 3 P.3d 248; People v. Jones, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 314, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 793, 949 P.2d 890) and any `aspect of the defendant's character or record that the defendant offers as a basis for a sentence less than death' ( Jones, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 1124, 135 Cal.Rptr.2d 370, 70 P.3d 359) will necessarily understand that it may consider in mitigation a defendant's lack of prior felony convictions. Defendant does not persuade us to reconsider these decisions. In argument to the jury, the prosecutor stated that, because defendant had no prior felony convictions, section 190, factor (c), was not applicable. Defense counsel argued, to the contrary, that this factor was mitigating. Defendant now contends that his proposed Special Instruction No. 4 was necessary to resolve this dispute in defendant's favor. We have never decided whether factor (c) can only be a factor in aggravation or whether, instead, it can be either aggravating or mitigating. (See People v. Clark, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 1038, 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 689, 857 P.2d 1099 [suggesting that factor (c) may be mitigating]; see generally People v. Davenport, supra, 41 Cal.3d at pp. 289-290, 221 Cal.Rptr. 794, 710 P.2d 861.) But even if we assume for the sake of argument that factor (c) can be mitigating, nothing in the trial court's instruction here suggested otherwise. The trial court expressly instructed the jury, twice, to consider the presence or absence  (italics added) of prior felony convictions by defendant involving the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force or violence. Because the absence of prior felony convictions by a capital defendant could not be aggravating, the jury would necessarily understand that, depending on the evidence, it could regard the absence of prior felony convictions as mitigating.
The defense requested the following special instruction (Special Instruction No. 16) on victim impact evidence: Although you have heard testimony from the family and neighbors of Earl and Doris Garcia and you may consider such testimony as a circumstance of the crime, you must not be influenced by passion, prejudice, or sympathy in that regard. The trial court declined to use Special Instruction No. 16, commenting that the point was covered by the instructions the court proposed to give. The proposed instruction misstated the law in asserting that the jury, in making its penalty decision, could not be influenced by sympathy for the victims and their families engendered by the victim impact testimony. Although a jury must never be influenced by passion or prejudice, a jury at the penalty phase of a capital case may properly consider in aggravation, as a circumstance of the crime, the impact of a capital defendant's crimes on the victim's family, and in so doing the jury may exercise sympathy for the defendant's murder victims and for their bereaved family members. ( People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 831-832, 42 Cal.Rptr.2d 543, 897 P.2d 481.) The instruction was properly refused as incorrect.