Opinion ID: 166091
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Nexus Between KMD and the Racketeering Activity

Text: 66 Mr. Smith argues that the jury was prevented from acquitting him because the District Court refused to instruct the jury that the enterprise was conducted through the pattern of racketeering activity and to define the term through. The District Court's refusal to issue a particular jury instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Edwards, 69 F.3d at 433. Moreover, if the charge as a whole adequately states the law, the refusal to give a particular instruction is not an abuse of discretion. United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 473 (10th Cir.1990). 67 Here, the jury charges, taken in their entirety, adequately reflect the law. The District Court first instructed the jury that Mr. Smith was charged with conspiring to violate § 1962(c), which makes it a crime to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity. The District Court went on to charge the jury that [t]he first element that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that KMD was an `enterprise' engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity. These two instructions sufficiently related to the jury that they must find a nexus—that is, a relation —between the racketeering activity and the affairs of the enterprise. Killip, 819 F.2d at 1549. The District Court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in refusing to issue Mr. Smith's proposed instruction.