Opinion ID: 780969
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Sentencing Phase Instructions

Text: 136 Mason claims that the trial court's instructions to the jury led to an unreliable sentencing determination. Petitioner's Br. at 135. Specifically, he argues that the trial court committed constitutional error by (1) failing to define mitigation or mitigating factor, (2) refusing to instruct the jury on residual doubt, and (3) failing to remove the death sentence from an allegedly deadlocked jury. On habeas review, errors on instructions are not reviewable unless they deprive a defendant of constitutional due process. Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 321 (6th Cir.2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S. 941, 121 S.Ct. 2577, 150 L.Ed.2d 739. The question before us is whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991) (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147, 94 S.Ct. 396, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973)).
137 Mason complains that the trial court failed to explain the meaning of mitigation or mitigating factor, leaving the jury to speculate throughout the trial as to what it was they were supposed to be considering. Petitioner's Br. at 135. We note as an initial matter that, contrary to Mason's claims, the Supreme Court precedent that existed prior to Mason's conviction did not clearly establish a defendant's due process right to a jury instruction on the definition of mitigation. 19 Mason's reliance on Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977), is unavailing. Although the trial court in that case did define mitigating circumstances as circumstances not constituting justification or excuse for the offense in question, but which, in fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of moral culpability or punishment, id. at 590-91, 97 S.Ct. 2861 (internal quotation marks omitted), the question before the Supreme Court was whether a sentence of death for the crime of rape was cruel and unusual punishment prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 586, 97 S.Ct. 2861. Indeed, the trial court gave the instruction pursuant to state statute. Id. at 589, 97 S.Ct. 2861. Coker therefore provides no support for the due process claim that Mason must successfully make for us to review a challenged jury instruction. 138 Mason also contends that the jury's discretion was not sufficiently guided under Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Petitioner's Br. at 137. Gregg, however, simply recommended that juries in death penalty cases be apprised of the information relevant to the imposition of [the death] sentence and provided with standards to guide its use of the information. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909. The trial court provided such guidance in this case; it instructed the jury of its duty to weigh aggravating circumstances against mitigating factors, the latter including, but not limited to, the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and background of the Defendant, and any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the Defendant should be sentenced to death. J.A. at 1288. We agree with the Ohio Supreme Court that the instructions, considered as a whole, adequately guided the jury and did not restrict its consideration of mitigating evidence. Mason, 694 N.E.2d at 953. We therefore deny habeas relief with respect to this claim.
139 Mason argues that he was denied due process by the trial court's refusal to give a proposed instruction on residual doubt. In Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 108 S.Ct. 2320, 101 L.Ed.2d 155 (1988), a majority of the Supreme Court agreed that capital defendants do not have a constitutional right to demand jury consideration of residual doubt during the sentencing phase. Id. at 173 & n. 6, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (plurality opinion); id. at 187-88, 108 S.Ct. 2320 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment); see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 320, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). Because Supreme Court precedent clearly establishes that Mason cannot support his residual doubt argument, we deny habeas relief with respect to this claim. 140
141 In Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 17 S.Ct. 154, 41 L.Ed. 528 (1896), the Supreme Court held that the trial court did not err in giving a supplemental instruction to a deadlocked jury. Id. at 501, 17 S.Ct. 154. The constitutionality of an Allen charge, sometimes referred to as a dynamite charge, turns on whether the charge in question was coercive. Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 241, 108 S.Ct. 546, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988). 20 An Allen charge must be reviewed in its context and under all the circumstances. Id. at 237, 108 S.Ct. 546 (quoting Jenkins v. United States, 380 U.S. 445, 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059, 13 L.Ed.2d 957 (1965) (per curiam)). Mason argues that the trial court's supplemental instruction to the jury during its deliberations at the penalty phase of the trial was an improper Allen charge. 142 The trial court gave the following preliminary instruction to the jury: 143 You shall recommend the sentence of death if you unanimously, all twelve jurors, find by proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating factors. 144 If you do not so find, you shall unanimously, all twelve, recommend either a life sentence with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment or a life sentence with parole eligibility after serving thirty years of imprisonment. 145 J.A. at 1290. The trial court then read the three verdict forms that the jury would consider, with the express instruction that the jury not attach significance to the order in which the forms were read. The first verdict form recommended a death sentence, the second recommended a life sentence with parole eligibility after twenty years, and the third recommended a life sentence with parole eligibility after thirty years. The jury began its deliberation in the penalty phase of the trial at 3:50 p.m. on Monday, June 27, 1994, and broke for the evening at 5:05 p.m. The jury returned to the courthouse to continue deliberations at 8:45 a.m. on Tuesday, June 28, 1994. After a lunch break from 12:00 noon to 1:30 p.m., the jury informed the trial court that it was unable to reach a unanimous decision on any one of the sentencing options. J.A. at 1311. After giving the jury a standard Allen charge, the trial court engaged in the following colloquy with the jury foreman: 146 The Court: Is there a possibility, Mr. McGuire, that after an additional period of time you may reach an agreement? And this instruction that I have given you, and considering that with the rest of the instructions? Mr. McGuire: No. 147 The Court: Would you wish to return to the jury room and discuss it, this instruction, with the jurors and then return and respond to that question? 148 Mr. McGuire: Yes. 149 The Court: Take the jury, please. 150 J.A. at 1313-14. Defense counsel objected to the supplemental instruction. The jury continued to deliberate until 5:15 p.m., when it broke for the evening. The jury returned to its deliberations at 8:35 a.m. on Wednesday, June 29, 1994. After fifteen minutes, the jury returned a unanimous recommendation that Mason be sentenced to death. The trial court then polled the jury, and each juror indicated agreement with that sentence. 151 Mason argues that the trial court's Allen charge forced a deadlocked jury to continue deliberation, in violation of his constitutional rights and contrary to Ohio law. The State of Ohio claims that the Allen charge was not unduly coercive. Furthermore, it contends that Ohio law did not preclude the supplemental instruction and that any violation of state law could not properly be raised in a habeas petition. 152 In evaluating the Allen charge, the Ohio Supreme Court first turned to State v. Springer, 63 Ohio St.3d 167, 586 N.E.2d 96 (1992), which requires a trial court to impose an appropriate life sentence in the event of an irreconcilably deadlocked jury. Id. at 100. The state supreme court explained: 153 No exact line can be drawn as to how long a jury must deliberate in the penalty phase before a trial court should instruct the jury to limit itself to the life sentence options or take the case away from the jury, as done in Springer. Each case must be decided based upon the particular circumstances. Here, after only four and one-half hours of deliberations, the trial court acted appropriately by giving a modified Howard charge [itself a modified Allen charge]. The circumstances show that the jury was not irreconcilably deadlocked, and the modified Howard charge did not coerce a death verdict. 154 Mason, 694 N.E.2d at 955. 21 The Ohio Supreme Court then reiterated its approval of using supplemental instructions urging jurors to continue deliberations to try to reach a unanimous penalty verdict and specifically stated that such instructions in a death penalty case would not violate due process. Id. (citing Lowenfield ). Noting that Lowenfield expressly approved the use of Allen charges in capital cases, the district court concluded that the trial court did not err in giving a single Allen charge. Mason, 95 F.Supp.2d at 772. 155 Under AEDPA, the scope of our review is limited to determining whether a state court's decisions are contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Because violations of state law are not within our purview, we will review Mason's Allen claim only to determine whether the trial court's supplemental instruction was coercive in its context and under all the circumstances. Jenkins, 380 U.S. at 446, 85 S.Ct. 1059. We hold that the Allen charge was not so coercive as to deny Mason his due process rights. 156 As a preliminary matter, we agree with the Ohio Supreme Court that the jury was not irreconcilably deadlocked. Mason, 694 N.E.2d at 955. The jurors in this case simply stated that they were unable to reach a unanimous decision on any one of the sentencing options, J.A. at 1311, and the trial court then gave the Allen charge. Although the foreperson initially dismissed the possibility of a unanimous agreement, we note that his subsequent discussion of the supplemental instruction with the jury was followed by almost four more hours of jury deliberation instead of his return to the trial court with a confirmation of the jury's inability to reach a unanimous decision. This fact persuades us that the trial court did not err in giving an Allen charge. 157 We also believe that the jury was not coerced into returning a unanimous death sentence. First, the trial court's instructions did not require the jury to reject the death penalty unanimously before considering the life sentences. Indeed, the content of the jury's note — which indicated lack of unanimity on any one of the sentencing options, J.A. at 1311 — strongly suggests that the jury discussed the three possible verdicts at the same time. Moreover, the trial court did not instruct the jury to continue deliberations, but to discuss whether it could do so. Finally, the jury deliberated for more than three hours after the trial court gave the Allen charge. The Lowenfield jury deliberated for only thirty more minutes. Given these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court's supplemental instruction was not impermissibly coercive. We therefore deny habeas relief with respect to this claim.