Opinion ID: 483628
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nature of Alleged Injury

Text: 18 Under this factor, we must analyze the alleged injury to determine whether it is of the type that antitrust law was intended to forestall. Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 540, 103 S.Ct. at 909. 19 The crewmembers and the union argue that Associated General Contractors does not confine protection of antitrust statutes to consumers or to purchasers or to competitors or to sellers. Instead, the right to recover treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act extends to all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by whomsoever they may be perpetrated. Id. at 529-30 n. 19, 103 S.Ct. at 904 n. 19. This right to recover, they argue, extends to any employee (or any other group) that can prove damages with the requisite degree of directness and certainty. 20 This argument clearly ignores the case law that has limited the scope of the broad language of section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Supreme Court has held that antitrust laws were intended to protect competition as a whole, not individual competitors. Lucas, 800 F.2d at 843. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488, 97 S.Ct. 690, 697, 50 L.Ed.2d 701 (1977). The requirement that the alleged injury be related to anticompetitive behavior requires, as a corollary, that the injured party be a participant in the same market as the alleged malefactors. Bhan v. NME Hospitals, Inc., 772 F.2d 1467, 1470 (9th Cir.1985) (citing Associated General Contractors, 459 U.S. at 538, 539, 103 S.Ct. at 908, 909). In other words, the party alleging the injury must be either a consumer of the alleged violator's goods or services or a competitor of the alleged violator in the restrained market. Exhibitor's Services, 788 F.2d at 579. 21 In the present case, in order to be a participant in the relevant market, the class members must have been either buyers or sellers of raw tuna. Both sides agree that the class members were not buyers. The alleged malefactors (the canneries) were the buyers. Thus, in order for the alleged injury to be of the type that antitrust laws were intended to forestall, the class members must prove that they were sellers in the raw tuna market. The district court held that the crewmembers were neither consumers nor competitors in the relevant market because they did not directly sell or purchase the tuna. Instead, they were employees of the vessel owners who negotiated and set the prices for the fish. The crewmembers argue that the method by which they were compensated made them sellers. They contend that share crewmembers actually own a percentage of the fish caught on a fishing voyage and are thereby sellers along with the vessel owners. Furthermore, the method by which per tonnage crewmembers' wages and the union's dues were calculated was so intertwined with the selling process that they, too, should be considered at least indirect sellers. 22 The district court pointed out, however, after examining the union contract agreements between the union and fishing vessel owners, that: 23 [n]either the crew of any such vessel nor the union have any rights to control or direct the operation of said vessel or the selling price of fish caught by said vessel. The owner shall have the sole and exclusive authority to determine where and at what price and under what terms and conditions fish caught by said vessel shall be sold and where catches shall be delivered. 24 The crewmembers did not negotiate the prices with the canneries, the vessel owners did. The vessel owners are the requisite sellers in the relevant market, not the crewmembers or the union. Thus, the class members have not alleged the type of injury antitrust laws were intended to forestall, because the alleged anticompetitive conduct was directed at the vessel owners, not the crewmembers or the union.