Opinion ID: 2639895
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Jurisdiction over mandamus

Text: As a preliminary matter, we observe that the Director's counsel alleged during oral arguments that the trial court did not have jurisdiction to address a mandamus action in a workers compensation matter. This issue was presented to the trial court, which found jurisdiction, but neither party briefed the issue to this court. Despite its late appearance before us, we consider the jurisdiction issue. Rivera v. Cimarron Dairy, 267 Kan. 865, 868, 988 P.2d 235 (1999) (An objection based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time.). The existence of jurisdiction is a question of law over which this court's scope of review is unlimited. In re Marriage of Wherrell, 274 Kan. 984, 987, 58 P.3d 734 (2002). During arguments, the Director's counsel cited Jones v. Continental Can Co., 260 Kan. 547, 920 P.2d 939 (1996), as support for her position. The issue in Jones was whether the 3-day mailing rule of Supreme Court Rule 1.05(c) (1995 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 5)  as provided by reference to K.S.A. 60-206(e)  could be applied to preclude the dismissal of the appeal sought under K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 44-556(a). This court held that it could not, stating: The Workers Compensation Act provides its own time limit for appeal without reference to Chapter 60 and in preemption of K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 77-613. The statutory basis for applying the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure to workers compensation appeals was removed by the legislature. This leads us to a strict application of the wording of K.S.A. 1995 Supp. 44-556(a) and the dismissal of this appeal as untimely. [W]e are back to the clear statement and rule of Bushman Construction Co. v. Schumacher, 187 Kan. 359, 362, 356 P.2d 869 (1960), which states: `Our decisions are replete that the Workmen's Compensation Act undertook to cover every phase of the right to compensation and of the procedure for obtaining it, which is substantial, complete and exclusive, and we must look to the procedure of the act for the methods of its administration. Rules and methods provided by the code of civil procedure not included in the act itself are not available in determining rights thereunder.' 260 Kan. at 557. In reply, the plaintiffs point out that the trial court ruled in their favor on the jurisdiction issue. The court stated: `In general, the changes to the workers compensation code were designed to shift the de novo review of the district court to the newly created Workers Compensation Board of Appeals. The appellate review of Board decisions was designed to be filed directly with the Court of Appeals.' Riedmiller v. Harness, 29 Kan. App. 2d 941, 946 (2001)[Citation omitted.]. However, Petitioners argue that their request is not an appeal, but rather a request for mandamus pursuant to K.S.A. 60-802(a). District courts clearly have jurisdiction over mandamus actions. Plaintiffs also observe, and the Director agrees, that they have no avenue to appeal the Director's determination on reimbursement to the Workers Compensation Board, whose decision could then be reviewed by the Court of Appeals under the Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions. See Riedmiller v. Harness, 29 Kan. App. 2d 941, 945, 34 P.3d 474 (2001). Under such circumstances, the plaintiffs argue mandamus is available as a remedy. We agree with the trial court's conclusion regarding jurisdiction. As support, we first look to State, ex rel., v. Unified School District, 218 Kan. 47, 542 P.2d 664 (1975). There, the apportionment of election expenses among subdivisions of government was covered by one act: K.S.A. 25-2201 through 25-2205. The Act provided that a subdivision aggrieved by the county election officer's decision regarding election expenses had a right of appeal to the state election board. The statute clearly provided that `[t]he determination of the state election board of any appeal under the provisions of this section shall be conclusive, and shall be the exclusive remedy in such cases.' 218 Kan. at 49. Notwithstanding this straightforward language, we held that [t]he state election board is . . . not the final arbiter of the statute, despite its language; if the board acts beyond its authority, hence `illegally,' it is subject to judicial review through a proper action. 218 Kan. at 50. These types of proper actions were described earlier in the court's opinion: In City of Kansas City v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 187 Kan. 701, 360 P.2d 29, while holding that no appeal would lie from the particular order of the board of tax appeals there challenged, we observed: `However, the courts are always open to hear meritorious complaints against illegal or oppressive acts of non-judicial public boards and officials, either at the instance of the state or of a private citizen especially aggrieved thereby; but not by appeal where no statute confers a right of appeal. In the absence of a statutory right of appeal, judicial redress for illegal, fraudulent or oppressive official conduct must be invoked through some appropriate extraordinary legal remedy recognized in our practice  injunction, mandamus or quo warranto. ' [Citations omitted.] (Emphasis added.) 218 Kan. at 50. Similarly, in Huser v. Duck Creek Watershed Dist. No. 59, 234 Kan. 1, 668 P.2d 172 (1983), the court addressed the Kansas Watershed District Act, K.S.A. 24-1201 et seq. The Act, like the Workers Compensation Act at issue in the instant case, made no provision for appeals to the district court from decisions of the watershed district board of directors. This court nevertheless held: In the absence of a statutory provision for appellate review of an administrative decision, no appeal is available. However, relief from illegal, arbitrary, and unreasonable acts of the district can be obtained using an extraordinary remedy like mandamus, quo warranto, or injunction. 234 Kan. at 4. The plaintiffs in the instant case argue, among other things, that the Director acted unreasonably and beyond her authority under the Act when she denied reimbursement. Accordingly, under the rules stated in Sanborn and Huser, the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the requests for mandamus relief.