Opinion ID: 1731448
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Violations of Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rights

Text: Jones argues that the prosecutor elicited testimony that police executed a DNA search warrant upon a suspect who had not consented to a search, and then elicited testimony from an officer that a DNA search warrant was also executed on Jones. Jones asserts that this testimony violated his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search and seizure, and unfairly implied to the jurors that his withholding of consent stemmed from his guilt. The State counters that no testimony was presented that Jones refused to consent to a search. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated. It is undisputed that requiring a defendant to provide a blood sample for DNA analysis constitutes a Fourth Amendment search. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-18, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (concluding that the taking of a blood, urine, or breath sample constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment); In re Welfare of J.W.K., 583 N.W.2d 752, 754-55 (Minn. 1998). Absent exceptions not applicable here, a warrant supported by probable cause is necessary to obtain a sample of an individual's DNA. See State v. Gilbert, 262 N.W.2d 334, 340 (Minn.1977) (noting that a search warrant is typically required for a sample of blood). The federal and state constitutions' guarantees of due process grant the accused the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); see Jones I, 678 N.W.2d at 15-16. Thus, Jones had the right to require a warrant before providing a sample of his DNA. It is a violation of the defendant's right to due process for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's failure to consent to a warrantless search. See United States v. Runyan, 290 F.3d 223, 249 (5th Cir.2002) ([T]he circuit courts that have directly addressed this question have unanimously held that a defendant's refusal to consent to a warrantless search may not be presented as evidence of guilt.); Jones I, 678 N.W.2d at 12 n. 3 (explaining that it is improper to use a defendant's refusal to consent to a search against the defendant). In this case, the district court had ruled before trial that the prosecutor could not comment on Jones's refusal to provide a saliva sample to law enforcement. Consequently, it would have been improper for the prosecutor to present direct evidence that Jones failed to consent to a search. But Jones makes no argument that the prosecution presented such evidence. Instead, Jones argues that, by the nature of the questions posed to the witnesses, the prosecutor invited an inference that Jones failed to consent to a search. Jones provides no authority to support his position that an inference is sufficient to constitute a violation of due process. Based on our review of existing law, we conclude that an inference based on little more than speculation is not sufficient to constitute a violation of due process. Thus, the prosecutor did not commit an error that was plain when he elicited the testimony. Jones next argues that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony that other individuals voluntarily produced samples of their DNA. The State argues that, because Jones defended the charges on the ground that the crime was committed by an alternative perpetrator, the testimony was necessary to exculpate the alleged alternative perpetrators. A defendant's right to due process includes the right to introduce evidence  known as alternative perpetrator evidence  that shows that someone else committed the crime. State v. Blom, 682 N.W.2d 578, 621 (Minn.2004); Jones I, 678 N.W.2d at 15-16; see State v. Hawkins, 260 N.W.2d 150, 158-59 (Minn.1977). But the alternative perpetrator defense opens the door for the prosecutor to present testimony exculpating the alleged alternative perpetrators. For example, in United States v. McNatt, 931 F.2d 251, 257-58 (4th Cir.1991), the Fourth Circuit concluded that, when a defendant claimed that incriminating evidence had been planted in the trunk of his car by law enforcement, the government was permitted to present testimony that the defendant failed to consent to a search of his trunk. As in McNatt, the prosecution in this case should be permitted to introduce testimony that potential perpetrators voluntarily provided DNA that exculpated them. We express reservations, however, with the prosecutor's emphasis on the fact that the DNA samples were voluntarily produced rather than simply stating that such samples had been produced and exculpated the suspects. [1] But even if introduction of the testimony was an error that was plain, we conclude that the State has demonstrated that the error was not prejudicial. The jury was informed that a warrant was acquired to search the Jensen residence, and that sometimes warrants are acquired to make certain a search is conducted legally and to prevent a later revocation of consent. Thus, the jury was aware that search warrants are acquired for reasons other than the invocation of one's constitutional rights. Because the jury was never informed that Jones had refused to consent to a search, the mere mention that other suspects did provide such consent would not have implicated Jones's failure to consent. On this record, we conclude that the evidence in question was not prejudicial and did not have a substantial effect on the jury verdict. Jones also argues that the prosecutor improperly used Jones's pre-arrest silence to imply his guilt in violation of his Fifth Amendment right against compelled self-incrimination. Initially he argues that the prosecutor improperly informed the jury that, during an interview with the police the day after the murder, Jones did not disclose that he knew Linda or that he observed suspicious activity at her home on the day of the murder. The Fifth Amendment provides that a defendant cannot be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. It guarantees the accused the right to remain silent during the criminal trial, and prevents the prosecution from commenting on the silence of a defendant who asserts that right. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 613-15, 85 S.Ct. 1229, 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965). In Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 100 S.Ct. 2124, 65 L.Ed.2d 86 (1980), however, the Supreme Court stated that `it has long been held that a defendant who takes the stand in his own behalf cannot then claim the privilege against cross-examination on matters reasonably related to the subject matter of his direct examination.' Id. at 236 n. 3, 100 S.Ct. 2124 (quoting McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L.Ed.2d 711 (1971)). The Court went on to conclude that the Fifth Amendment is not violated by the use of pre-arrest silence to impeach a criminal defendant's credibility. Id. at 238, 100 S.Ct. 2124. In Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605-06, 102 S.Ct. 1309, 71 L.Ed.2d 490 (1982), the Supreme Court noted that its decisions prohibiting use of a defendant's silence turned on the government's inducement of that silence by Miranda warnings or otherwise. But it is unsettled whether a prosecutor may elicit testimony of pre-arrest silence before a defendant testifies at trial. The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the question, and one Justice has indicated that the clear language of the Fifth Amendment is not implicated by mere silence, but by assertion of the privilege in the face of government compulsion to speak. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 243-44, 100 S.Ct. 2124 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). Further, this court has not determined on any previous occasion whether it is per se a violation of the constitutional right against self-incrimination for a prosecutor to elicit testimony of a defendant's pre-arrest silence before the defendant testifies at trial. [2] See State v. Morrison, 351 N.W.2d 359, 362 n. 1 (Minn. 1984); State v. Goar, 295 N.W.2d 633, 634 n. 1 (Minn.1980). Lastly, the federal circuits have split on whether it is constitutionally permissible for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's pre-arrest, pre- Miranda silence. See Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 282-83 (6th Cir.2000). Some circuits have concluded that the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit comment on pre-arrest silence. See, e.g., United States v. Oplinger, 150 F.3d 1061, 1065-67 (9th Cir.1998). But other circuits have concluded to the contrary. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1016-18 (7th Cir.1987). Under our plain error analysis, a defendant must establish an error that was plain before we will review the alleged misconduct. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 299; State v. Jackson, 714 N.W.2d 681, 690 (Minn.2006) (explaining that to satisfy the second prong of the plain error test the error must be plain at the time of the appeal). Because neither this court nor the federal courts have conclusively resolved this issue, we cannot say that the prosecutor contravene[d] case law, a rule, or a standard of conduct. Ramey, 721 N.W.2d at 302; see United States v. Whab, 355 F.3d 155, 158 (2d Cir.2004) (Certainly, an error cannot be deemed `plain,' in the absence of binding precedent, where there is a genuine dispute among the [courts].). Therefore, the prosecutor did not commit an error that was clear or obvious. Since Jones did not raise this objection at trial, it is not properly before us, and we decline to address it. [3] Jones alleges that the prosecutor improperly elicited testimony from law enforcement that they had contact with Jones at a car dealership and following a traffic stop, at which times Jones failed to mention anything about Linda's murder. While we question the relevance of this testimony, we conclude that the elicitation of this testimony did not constitute plain error. See Whab, 355 F.3d at 158; Jackson, 714 N.W.2d at 690. Jones also asserts that, during the State's opening statement, the prosecutor improperly referenced an incident in which Jones returned home unexpectedly, surprising his wife and causing her to fear that Linda's murderer was in the home. Jones argues that the prosecutor's statement unfairly burdened his decision whether to testify at trial. But during the opening statement, the prosecutor made no connection between the incident and Jones's pre-arrest silence. Thus, we see no plain error under the Fifth Amendment. [4] Also, the prosecutor cross-examined Jones regarding this incident and attempted to impeach him on his silence. While this incident has questionable relevance, it was permissible impeachment under Jenkins.