Opinion ID: 448863
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Decisions of the ALJ and the Board

Text: 15 On the basis of these facts, the ALJ found that Prill was discharged because of his safety complaints and his refusal to drive an unsafe vehicle in accordance with Department of Transportation regulations. 20 Relying on the rationale of Alleluia Cushion Co., 21 the ALJ held that Prill's actions were concerted activities for ... mutual aid or protection under section 7 of the NLRA, and thus protected, because they inured to the benefit of all employees. 22 In order to understand this conclusion, it is necessary briefly to review the development of the Board's doctrine of constructive concerted activity. 16 During the past 25 years, the Board has gradually extended the concept of concerted activities under section 7 to include certain types of actions taken by individual employees. For example, under the so-called Interboro doctrine, the Board has long held that the assertion by a single employee of rights derived from a collective bargaining agreement is protected under section 7, on the reasoning that such an act is an extension of the concerted action that produced the agreement and that it affects the rights of all employees covered by the agreement. 23 In addition, in a series of cases since 1959, the Board developed the position that section 7 protects complaints made by an individual, even absent authorization by other employees, if the matter at issue is of moment to the group of employees complaining and if that matter is brought to the attention of management by a spokesman, voluntary or appointed for that purpose, so long as such person is speaking for the benefit of the interested group. 24 17 In Alleluia Cushion Co., 25 the Board extended the doctrine of constructive concerted activity to include an individual employee's efforts to invoke state and federal laws regulating occupational safety. In Alleluia an employee was discharged for notifying the California Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of unsafe conditions at his plant. Observing that [s]afe working conditions are matters of great and continuing concern for all within the workforce, and that filing the OSHA complaint was an action taken in furtherance of guaranteeing Respondent's employees their rights under the California Occupational Safety and Health Act, the Board held that 18 [i]t would be incongruous with the public policy enunciated in such occupational safety legislation ... to presume that, absent an outward manifestation of support, Henley's fellow employees did not agree with his efforts to secure compliance with the statutory obligations imposed on Respondent for their benefit. Rather, since minimum safe and healthful employment conditions for the protection and well-being of employeeshas been legislatively declared to be in the overall public interest, the consent and concert of action emanates from the mere assertion of such statutory rights. Accordingly, where an employee speaks up and seeks to enforce statutory provisions relating to occupational safety designed for the benefit of all employees, in the absence of any evidence that fellow employees disavow such representation, we will find an implied consent thereto and deem such activity to be concerted. 26 19 The rationale of Alleluia thus was composed of two stands: (1) the Board's familiar view that an individual's activity should be protected if it relates to a matter of mutual concern to employees, and (2) a more specific rationale that concert may be presumed when an individual asserts rights under a statute enacted for the benefit of employees. 27 20 Applying the principles of Alleluia and its progeny, 28 the ALJ in the instant case held Prill's conduct protected under section 7. He reasoned that Prill's refusal to drive the vehicle was mandated by Department of Transportation regulations that reflected a concern for the safety of particular drivers as well as for that of the general public, and that [a]n employee who complains about the safety of a particular truck speaks for the safety of any employee who may drive that truck. 29 The ALJ also held that Prill's complaints prior to the accident were clearly concerted because they were joined by driver Gove, who had made similar complaints to supervisor Dave Faling in Prill's presence. 30 Therefore, the ALJ ruled that Prill's discharge violated section 8(a)(1). 21 The Board disagreed and dismissed the complaint. Overruling Alleluia and its progeny, the Board argued that activity could be concerted only if it in fact involved some kind of group action, and criticized Alleluia as inconsistent with the statute because it allowed group support to be presumed rather than proven. 31 Claiming to return to the standard on which the Board and courts relied before Alleluia, 32 the Board announced the following test for protected concerted activity: 22 In general, to find an employee's activity to be concerted, we shall require that it be engaged in with or on the authority of other employees, and not solely by or on behalf of the employee himself. Once the activity is found to be concerted, an 8(a)(1) violation will be found if, in addition, the employer knew of the protected nature of the employee's activity, the concerted activity was protected by the Act, and the adverse employment action at issue (e.g., discharge) was motivated by the employee's protected concerted activity. 33 23 Applying this standard, the Board held that Prill had acted alone and solely on his own behalf when he refused to drive the truck and contacted the Tennessee Public Service Commission. 34 As to whether Prill's complaints prior to the accident were joined by Gove, the Board found that the record was clear that Prill merely overheard Gove's complaint while in the office on another matter. 35 Stating that the most that can be inferred from this scenario is that another employee was individually concerned ... about the truck's condition, the Board ruled that [t]aken by itself, ... individual employee concern, even if openly manifested by several employees on an individual basis, is not sufficient evidence to prove concert of action. 36 Although the Board admitted to being [o]utraged ... by a respondent who--at the expense of its driver and others traveling on the nation's highways--was clearly attempting to squeeze the last drop of life out of a trailer that had just as clearly given up the ghost, it nevertheless concluded that it did not believe that section 7, framed as it was to legitimize and protect group action engaged in by employees for their mutual aid and protection, was intended to encompass the case of individual activity presented here. 37 Therefore, the Board held that Prill's discharge did not violate his rights under section 7. 38