Opinion ID: 6358387
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Fisher's testimony in the trial of the prior homicide

Text: Brown next contends that Attorney Fisher's testimony violated his constitutional rights, and argues that his trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to raise the issue. Brown's Brief at 77. The testimony at issue was as follows: [Commonwealth]: Can you tell the jury a little bit about the facts that came out during the trial? [Attorney Fisher]: Absolutely. The murder occurred on January the 19 th , 2003, somewhere between 6:00 and 6:30 p.m. The plan was actually hatched at the house of Jamaar and James Richardson, which was about a block away from the Rite Aid store. The Rite Aid store was located at 12 th and Girard. The planning took place about an hour or so, maybe a little bit more than that, before the robbery. Involved with the planning was Jamaar, James; a fellow by the name of Ronald Vann was there; Kiana Lyons to a lesser extent - it's a young woman by a, a young woman; I guess she was about 17, 16, 17 at the time - Chris Kennedy; and [Brown] (indicating). Jamaar Richardson provided basic information about the Rite Aid store. He worked there. He was hired several months prior to the murder. He was hired by Michael Richardson, as a matter of fact, prior to the murder.    [Brown], however, assigned the tasks and made the general outline or plan for the robbery.... [T]he general plan was that they'd go up to the store; they would go inside the store; take whatever hostages were inside the store; lock the store; keep anybody from leaving or calling the police. And then, specifically, Lavar told James Kennedy that he was  the one to deal with the manager. And they'd ask him specifically at that time of the planning, did he know what the manager looked like. [Brown] told ... Chris Kennedy to shoot [the store manager] in the leg to loosen him up so that he'd open the safe .... [An] hour later they walk up to the store ... as a very loose group. Plan goes somewhat awry at this point. Chris Kennedy goes into the store first. Now, [Brown] ... James Richardson, and ... Ronald Vann are supposed to come in later and take care of the door, watch the hostages, keep them inside, keep them in control. Before they can get into the store, Kennedy found Michael Richardson, boom, shoots him in the leg. After the shot's fired, everybody exits the store. I mean, they run out: The security guard, everyone runs out of the store with the exception, of course, of Michael Richardson and Chris Kennedy. [Brown] (indicating), Mr. Vann, and ... James Richardson, they leave. They leave. Meanwhile, inside the store, after Kennedy shoots ... Michael Richardson in the leg, his leg -- it has a compound fracture on it; he can't walk; he drags him to the safe, to the area where the safe is. Mr. Richardson opens up the safe. They take the money out of the safe. It's put in a bag. Kennedy then sticks the gun into ... Michael Richardson's ear and ... kills him, pulls the trigger. Kennedy is caught on the scene. There is an investigation that goes on for a while. And I ... don't recall ... how long it went on. N.T., 6/1/2005, at 64-68 (emphasis added). Brown contends that trial counsel should have challenged Attorney Fisher's testimony on two grounds. First, he argues that it was error to allow the Commonwealth, merely for the purpose of establishing an aggravating circumstance, to admit inflammatory and prejudicial testimony detailing the underlying facts of the other murder conviction. Brown's Brief at 79. He asserts that it violated his constitutional rights to due process and to confront and cross-examine witnesses. Second, he claims that trial counsel failed to object to inaccuracies in Fisher's testimony. Id. at 79-80. With respect to the constitutional arguments, they are entirely undeveloped. Brown claims that the United States Supreme Court addressed the same issue he raises here in Old Chief v. United States , 519 U.S. 172 , 117 S.Ct. 644 , 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997). While it is true that the Supreme Court in Old Chief held that a federal district court erred in admitting detailed testimony regarding a prior crime that formed the predicate for a subsequent weapons violation, id. at 190-91 , 117 S.Ct. 644 , it did so based upon its analysis of the requirements of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. It did not conduct any constitutional analysis or base its decision on the violation of any constitutional rights. Id. Notably, on direct appeal in this case, this Court took precisely the opposite view on the admissibility of Attorney Fisher's testimony, based upon our analysis of Pennsylvania law. Brown , 987 A.2d at 711 . In concluding that the Commonwealth properly introduced the facts underlying Brown's prior second-degree murder conviction, the Court relied upon the following reasoning from Rios : [A] capital sentencing hearing is not a sanitized proceeding limited only to evidence of aggravating circumstances. Rather, it must, by necessity, inform the jury of the history and natural development of the events and offenses with which the appellant is charged, as well as those which he has been convicted, so that the jury may truly understand the nature of the offenses and Appellant's character. The jury simply cannot perform  its function in ignorance of the facts of the crime for which Appellant is being sentenced, or the crimes for which he has previously been convicted, to the extent that those crimes may properly support the existence of aggravating circumstances provided in Section 9711(d). Brown , 987 A.2d at 711 (quoting Rios , 920 A.2d at 814-15 ) (emphasis omitted). The remainder of Brown's constitutional claim in this regard is even less developed, as he merely refers to Fisher's testimony as hearsay and cites to two Supreme Court decisions dealing (generally) with federal constitutional rights to due process and to confront witnesses. Brown's Brief at 79. As he offers no explanation, legal analysis or argument, these claims are waived. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. LaCava , 542 Pa. 160 , 666 A.2d 221 , 235 (1995). With respect to his argument regarding trial counsel's lack of objection to inaccuracies in Fisher's testimony, Brown asserts that his trial counsel failed to correct false testimony from Attorney Fisher, who told the jury that there was evidence at [Brown's] 2004 homicide trial that Brown told his codefendant in that case to shoot the victim in the leg. Brown's Brief at 80. The PCRA court properly rejected this argument because the record from the 2004 jury trial supported Attorney Fisher's testimony. Specifically, the PCRA court recounted the 2004 trial testimony of Commonwealth witness Kiana Lyons, who testified that prior to the robbery and murder, she heard [Brown] and his cohorts giving out orders. [T]hey ordered Christopher Kennedy to go in and give the cashier a  'leg shot.'  Rule 907 Notice, 4/7/2016, at 56 (citing Commonwealth Exhibit E; N.T., 7/19/2004, at 113-14). Additionally, the PCRA court reasoned that Detective David Baker read Lyons' police statement at the 2004 jury trial, in which Lyons informed the police that Brown was the one giving out orders of who was to do what. Id. (citing Commonwealth Exhibit E, N.T. 7/26/2004, at 63). The PCRA court determined that the 2004 record supported Attorney Fisher's testimony; therefore, trial counsel had no reason to object, and appellate counsel had nothing to challenge on direct appeal. The PCRA court's determination is supported by the record and is free of legal error. Because trial counsel could not have been ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim, Commonwealth v. Wright , 599 Pa. 270 , 961 A.2d 119 , 149 (2008), no relief is due.