Opinion ID: 2585220
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the redistricting plan is unconstitutional

Text: We find L66 violative of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause requires states to make an honest and good faith effort to construct [legislative] districts . . . as nearly of equal population as is practicable. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 577, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1390, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 536 (1964) (interpreting U.S. Const.amend. 14). A redistricting plan that deviates more than 10% in population between the districts constitutes a prima facie case of discrimination under the equal protection clause. Brown v. Thomson, 462 U.S. 835, 842-43, 103 S.Ct. 2690, 2696, 77 L.Ed.2d 214, 221-22 (1983). The ultimate inquiry then, after a prima facie case of discrimination has been shown is `whether the legislature's plan `may reasonably be said to advance [a] rational state policy' and, if so, `whether the population disparities among the districts that have resulted from the pursuit of this plan exceed constitutional limits.' Id. at 843, 103 S.Ct. at 2696, 77 L.Ed.2d at 222 (quoting Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 328, 93 S.Ct. 979, 987, 35 L.Ed.2d 320, 332 (1973) (emphasis added)). The Idaho Supreme Court has previously been called upon to determine the constitutionality of a redistricting plan in the Hellar line of cases, although these cases concerned earlier statutes that vested redistricting in the legislature. The first two times the Idaho Supreme Court heard arguments on the issues, it remanded for further proceedings. Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 104 Idaho 858, 664 P.2d 765 (1983) ( Hellar I ); Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571, 682 P.2d 524 (1984) (Hellar II ). In Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 586, 588, 682 P.2d 539-541 (1984) ( Hellar III ) the Idaho Supreme Court was again asked to determine the constitutionality of a newly adopted redistricting plan. The Court began its equal protection / representation constitutional analysis by observing that an apportionment plan with a total population deviation of less than 10% is presumptively constitutional. Id. at 589, 682 P.2d at 542 (citing Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 418, 97 S.Ct. 1828, 1839, 52 L.Ed.2d 465, 475-476 (1977); White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 764, 93 S.Ct. 2332, 2338, 37 L.Ed.2d 314, 323 (1973). A plan with larger disparities in population, however, creates a prima facie case of discrimination and therefore must be justified by the State. Hellar III, 106 Idaho at 589, 682 P.2d at 542 (citing Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444, 87 S.Ct. 569, 572, 17 L.Ed.2d 501, 504-505 (1967)) (emphasis added)). The Hellar III Court held that although it had noted in dicta in Hellar II that deviations of up to 41.3% would not necessarily be unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause, if adopted because of unique circumstances (such as to preserve county boundaries), the plan in question violated the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution because there were other plans available that accomplished the same unique objectives and had total population deviations of less than 10%. Hellar III, 106 Idaho at 590, 682 P.2d at 543. In the present case, it is not disputed that L66 deviates in population 10.69% between districts, slightly over the 10% limit, constituting a prima facie case of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause. Moreover, the State has not presented any evidence that the reason(s) for the population disparity result from advancement of a rational state policy. Therefore, the presumption of discrimination applies and L66 is unconstitutional in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Because we hold that L66 is in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, we need not consider the remainder of Petitioners' claims.
While we deem it appropriate only to hold that L66 is unconstitutional, `[w]here an appellate court reverses or vacates a judgment upon an issue properly raised, and remands for further proceedings, it may give guidance for other issues on remand.' Urrutia v. Blaine County, 134 Idaho 353, 359, 2 P.3d 738, 744 (2000) (citation omitted). In the present case there will need to be further proceedings in order to adopt a legislative redistricting plan that will pass constitutional muster and we thus set forth the following to guide in that process. First, we note that Idaho Code § 72-1501(2) provides: A commission formed pursuant to paragraph (1)(b) of this section shall be reconvened if, prior to the next general election, a court of competent jurisdiction orders the plan adopted by that commission to be revised. I.C. § 72-1501(2) (2000) (emphasis added). The plain meaning of the word reconvene is that the same commission that adopted L66 should be responsible for adopting an alternative plan prior to the next general election. This also makes it appropriate for this Court to address one of Petitioners' other claims that Dean Haagenson was not eligible to serve on the Commission because they argue he was a lobbyist and is thus precluded from service by Idaho Code § 72-1502. This code section, however, only prohibits registered lobbyists from serving on the Commission for one year from the time that he or she was a registered lobbyist. When statutory language is clear, the courts must interpret the statute as written. In re Permit No. 36-7200 v. Higginson, 121 Idaho 819, 824, 828 P.2d 848, 853 (1992). As evidenced by an affidavit of Ben T. Ysursa, Chief Deputy Secretary of State, Haagenson has not been a registered lobbyist for over one year, so he is not prohibited from serving on the Commission when it reconvenes.