Opinion ID: 1702294
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: law i. compensable disability

Text: As we stated in Fought: Today's case arises in an area that has not been without controversy. Many would deny compensability of mental or psychological injuries altogether, as they are difficult to prove both in experience and work connection. As proof is difficult, feigning and malingering are thought easy, thus opening the system to fraud. 523 So.2d at 317. When a worker seeks compensation benefits for disability resulting from a mental or psychological injury, he must not only prove a (1) disability that is (2) work-related, but also, (3) and again as we stated in Fought: Furthermore, to be compensable, a mental injury, unaccompanied by physical trauma, must have been caused by something more than the ordinary incidents of employment. (Emphasis added) 523 So.2d at 318. Also, as in Fought, this appeal turns in the end on the Commission's finding of fact. 523 So.2d at 318. As we have stated upon numerous occasions, the Commission is the trier and finder of facts and will not be reversed if its findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. Dunn, Mississippi Workers' Compensation, §§ 284, 286, 288, 289 (3rd ed. 1982); Fought, 523 So.2d at 317. The claimant Fought sought, as did Eskridge, workers' compensation benefits for psychological disability unaccompanied by any physical trauma. The significant difference between Fought and this case is that in Fought the Commission found as fact that Fought had failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that: (1) there was a connection between her work and disability, and also (2) that her mental disability was attributable to a pre-existing personality disorder. In this case, the administrative law judge found that Borden's course of conduct aggravated Eskridge's pre-existing condition. The Commission, however, found that Eskridge's mental disability was caused by a deliberate course of conduct by his employer, and that there was nothing in his psychological background to suggest a pre-existing personality disorder. There is substantial credible evidence to support the Commission's findings, and we are not persuaded by Borden's argument to the contrary. Dr. Levitch, a reputable board certified psychiatrist who treated Eskridge for over two years, testified that Eskridge was psychologically disabled and his work played a significant part in causing it. Testimony from Eskridge and his wife, corroborated in part by fellow employees, established a protracted pattern by Kinard to put pressure and stress upon Eskridge. It takes no extraordinary discernment to detect in a man of Eskridge's age, skill and one-industry training, ample reason for a normal person to be under stress and pressure because of an inability, through no fault of his own, to please his employer and a prospect at advanced middle age of joining the ranks of the unemployed. In fairness, we add that there was substantial credible evidence to support the opposite conclusion. Unfortunately for Borden, the Commission as fact finder, as in Brown & Root Const. Co. v. Duckworth, 475 So.2d 813 (Miss. 1985), found a compensable mental disability, and under our standard of appellate review, we are not at liberty to reverse this finding. The Commission obviously found, contrary to its finding in Fought, 523 So.2d at 318, that stresses to which Eskridge was subjected were more than the ordinary incidents of employment, and were untoward events or unusual occurrences culminating in his blackout on January 28, 1983, and subsequent disability.