Opinion ID: 3038758
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Statutory Authority to Make Stop

Text: At the outset, we must determine whether Guam Customs officers have the statutory authority to stop an individual that they believe is violating Guam’s drug laws. If the officers lack the statutory authority to make such a stop, our cases suggest that the evidence obtained as a result of the stop might be suppressed. See, e.g., United States v. Juda, 46 F.3d 961, 968 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that dismissal of indictment or suppression of evidence might be appropriate remedy for statutorily unauthorized search, but declining to reach the issue); United States v. Peterson, 812 F.2d 486, 492-93 (9th Cir. 1987) (noting that suppression might be proper remedy for statutorily unauthorized search, but declining to reach the issue). [1] “Any [Guam] Customs Officer may: (1) arrest persons who violate a prohibition contained in Article 6 of Title 9 [Guam Code Annotated] Chapter 67; [and] (2) make seizures of any controlled substance imported into Guam in violation of Article 6 of Title 9 [Guam Code Annotated] Chapter 67 . . . .” 5 Guam Code Ann. § 73102(1), (2). Article 6, Chapter 67 is codified at section 67.600-.608 of title 9 of the Guam Code, and pertains to “Importation and Exportation” of controlled substances. Specifically, section 67.601 of title 9 makes it unlawful “to import into Guam any controlled substance in Schedule I or II of this Act,” subject to exceptions for approved medical and scientific imports. 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.601(a). Methamphetamine is a Schedule II substance. See 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.205 (defining Schedule II drugs as those listed in Appendix B); 9 Guam Code Ann. App. B(C)(2) (“methamphetamine”). It thus appears that Guam Customs officers are statutorily authorized to arrest persons and seize methamphetamine “imported into Guam.” 11298 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND The question then becomes whether methamphetamine arriving in Guam on a flight originating in Hawaii is “imported into Guam” within the meaning of the statutory scheme. This is a question of first impression.2 Rowland argues that drugs “imported into Guam” must arrive in Guam from a foreign country. Because his flight was a nonstop, domestic flight from Hawaii, Rowland argues that the Guam Customs officers lacked statutory authority to stop and question him about suspected violations of Guam’s drug laws. In support of this interpretation, Rowland offers four arguments: (1) that the plain meaning of “imported” does not include the authority to stop “domestic” trafficking of controlled substances; (2) that our decision in United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc), compels the conclusion that Rowland did not import drugs into Guam; (3) that our decision in United States v. Mendoza-Ortiz, 262 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), requires that the evidence be suppressed in the instant case; and (4) that other sections of the Guam Code support his interpretation of the statute. We find these arguments unpersuasive. [2] It is a fundamental canon of statutory construction that, “unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning.” United States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979)). Rowland thus argues that “domestic,” as set forth in section 67.601 of title 9 of the Guam Code, should be defined as “of or relating to a country’s internal affairs,” and that importation must therefore implicate non-domestic activities. The problem with Rowland’s argument is that he resorts to a common dictionary 2 We also observe that at least one of our decisions has assumed that produce sent from Hawaii to Guam is “imported” pursuant to Guam’s laws concerning agricultural pests, plant disease, and quarantine. See Guam Fresh, Inc. v. Ada, 849 F.2d 436, 436 (9th Cir. 1988). That decision did not address the “importation” question in any detail. UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11299 meaning before determining whether the term is “otherwise defined” in the statute. When a word is defined in a statute, “courts are not at liberty to look beyond the statutory definition.” Smith, 155 F.3d at 1057 (citation omitted). [3] In this case, the customs title of the Guam Code states that, “[f]or the purpose of this Article, the term import means, with respect to any article, any bringing in or introduction of any such article into any area on Guam.” 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.600. Thus, when the next subsection prohibits “import[- ing] into Guam any controlled substance,” see 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.601, it prohibits bringing any controlled substances into Guam, regardless of whether the substance comes from a foreign country or from the United States. Any article brought into Guam from outside of Guam is therefore “imported” within the meaning of Guam’s drug laws. Because Guam Customs officers are statutorily empowered to arrest individuals who “import” drugs into Guam, see 5 Guam Code Ann. § 73102(a), and because it is an act of importation to bring drugs to Guam from the United States, we hold that Guam Customs officers are statutorily authorized to stop and seize individuals they suspect of bringing drugs to Guam, even if the person arrived on a flight originating in the United States. [4] Even if we were not convinced by the plain language of the statute, we would reach the same conclusion based on the structure of Guam customs law. Guam is not part of the United States customs territory, and has its own customs zone. See 19 U.S.C. § 1401(h) (defining “United States” in the Tariff Act of 1930 as “all Territories and possessions of the United States except . . . Guam”); 19 C.F.R. § 7.2(a) (noting that Guam is “outside the customs territory of the United States”). Imports into Guam are not governed by the Tariff Act of 1930, and Guam has its own customs administration. See 19 C.F.R. § 7.2(b) (“The customs administration of Guam is under the Government of Guam.”). Thus, although Guam is geopolitically part of the United States, an item passing 11300 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND from the United States into Guam leaves one customs territory, and its administration, and enters another. See id. It therefore makes sense that, for purposes of Guam customs law, any item arriving in Guam from outside of Guam — even if coming from the United States — is subject to customs inspection.3 Rowland’s additional arguments in support of his interpretation cannot compete with the clarity of the statutory scheme. His reliance on our en banc decision in United States v. Cabaccang, 332 F.3d 622, is misplaced. In Cabaccang, we reversed a conviction for importation of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). The Cabaccang brothers caused large amounts of methamphetamine to be shipped on nonstop commercial airline flights from California to Guam. See Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 623-24. Federal law makes it unlawful “to import into the United States from any place outside thereof, any controlled substance,” see 21 U.S.C. § 952(a), and the Cabaccangs were convicted of violating that section, see Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 624. Our prior decisions had held that transporting drugs from one point in the United States to another through international airspace constituted importation. See Guam v. Sugiyama, 846 F.2d 570, 572 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled by Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 634-35; United States v. Perez, 776 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1985), overruled by Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 634-35. In Cabaccang, we sat en banc and overruled those cases, holding that drugs that pass through international airspace on a nonstop flight from one U.S. location to another are not from “outside” the United States for purposes of 21 U.S.C. § 952(a). See Cabaccang, 332 F.3d at 635. 3 Other sections of the customs title of the Guam Code support our conclusion. Within the customs title of the Guam Code, one section refers to “exportation to the United States” of animal products. See 5 Guam Code Ann. § 73106. If sending something to the United States is “exportation,” then receiving something from the United States is likely “importation.” UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11301 [5] The statute in Cabaccang prohibited transportation of drugs into the United States, and the critical question was whether passage through international airspace rendered drugs “imported.” Here, there has been no suggestion that the drugs were imported due to passage through international airspace; instead, we know that the drugs were “imported” because they were introduced “into any area on Guam” from outside of Guam. See 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.600. Because Guam has its own customs zone and a different definition of “imported,” importation into the United States under 21 U.S.C. § 952 and importation into Guam under Guam’s customs laws are not analogous. Guam is part of the United States for purposes of federal drug law, see 21 U.S.C. § 802(26), (28), but not for customs purposes. Cabaccang is inapposite to the case at bar. Rowland also argues that we must suppress the evidence in this case because of our prior decision in United States v. Mendoza-Ortiz, 262 F.3d 882. In that case, United States Customs officers inspected a truck entering the United States at Nogales, Arizona, and learned that it contained marijuana. See Mendoza-Ortiz, 262 F.3d at 884. Instead of seizing the drugs, the officers followed the truck to its point of delivery in Compton, California to arrest potential co-conspirators. See id. The officers surveilled the suspected contraband for four days, and watched as it was moved into a building. See id. The customs officers then entered the building without a warrant and arrested Mendoza-Ortiz. See id. We held that the motion to suppress should have been granted because the officers were required by statute to obtain a warrant. See id. at 885. Specifically, if a U.S. Customs officer believes that goods that violate customs laws are in a “dwelling house, store, or other building or place,” he is “required to seek a warrant” to enter such building. Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1595(a)). It was due to the statutory violation that the evidence was suppressed in that case. The instant case is distinct from Mendoza-Ortiz because the Guam Customs officer did not violate a statutory command. 11302 UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND Indeed, it appears that the officer was statutorily authorized to make the stop, as set forth above. We do not agree with Rowland that Mendoza-Ortiz compels us to order suppression in this case. Finally, Rowland argues that section 67.601 of title 9 of the Guam Code and section 73126 of title 5 of the Guam Code support his position. First, he argues that section 67.601 indicates that an item must come from a foreign country to be imported. That argument is squarely rejected by the broad definition of “import” in the preceding subsection, a subsection that Rowland does not address. See 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.600 (defining “import” as “any bringing in or introduction of any such article into any area on Guam”). Turning to his second argument, section 73126 empowers Guam Customs officers to conduct suspicionless searches of baggage arriving on flights originating outside of the United States. Rowland asserts that the corollary is that Guam Customs officers lack the statutory authority to conduct searches and seizures of passengers arriving on flights from the United States. We are not persuaded. That Guam’s legislature has empowered its customs authorities to inspect baggage arriving on international flights is irrelevant to the question whether customs authorities may stop persons they reasonably suspect of violating Guam’s drug laws. In conclusion, we think it is clear that Guam Customs officers have the statutory authority to stop and question an individual suspected of smuggling drugs into Guam, so long as the person is arriving from outside of Guam. It is immaterial whether the flight originated within the United States or in some other country: the statute prohibits “any bringing in” of drugs “into any area on Guam.” 9 Guam Code Ann. § 67.600. Because we conclude that the Guam Customs officer in this case was statutorily authorized to stop Rowland if he reasonably suspected that Rowland was trafficking in a controlled substance, we must next determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Rowland. UNITED STATES v. ROWLAND 11303