Opinion ID: 6107835
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: analysis

Text: McFadin relies on Los Campeones, Inc. v. Valley International Properties, Inc. , in asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to order him to pay under the bond. Los Campeones, Inc. v. Valley Int'l Prop., Inc. , 591 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ). There, the appeals court determined that the trial court's order requiring the return of a cash supersedeas bond when the original judgment did not involve a monetary award went beyond the appellate court's mandate, and thus beyond the ministerial authority vested in the trial court to give effect to the appellate court's judgment. Id. at 313 . Los Campeones does not accord with the decisions of this Court and other courts of appeals. We explained in Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi that [t]he modern direction of policy is to reduce the vulnerability of final judgments to attack on the ground that the tribunal lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Dubai Petroleum Co. v. Kazi , 12 S.W.3d 71 , 76 (Tex. 2000) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 11 ( AM. LAW INST. 1982) ). And although we have held that trial courts erred in the manner by which they enforced appellate court mandates, we have not indicated that those erroneous actions implicated their jurisdiction. See, e.g. Tex. Workers' Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer , 34 S.W.3d 909 , 912 (Tex. 2000) (concluding that the court of appeals did not have discretion to assess costs contrary to this Court's earlier mandate); Cook v. Cameron , 733 S.W.2d 137 , 139 (Tex. 1987) (holding that the trial court erred in not enforcing [this Court's] judgment as rendered). A court's subject matter jurisdiction depends on the nature of the matter before it. And although a trial court abuses its discretion if it fails to properly enforce the mandate of an appellate court, it is not a matter of jurisdiction. Madeksho v. Abraham, Watkins, Nichols & Friend , 112 S.W.3d 679 , 685-86 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied). The trial court's addressing of issues necessary to effect the mandate of the court of appeals, including issuing an order concerning the supersedeas bond, was part and parcel to the trial court's effectuating the original judgment and carrying out the appellate court's decision. It had jurisdiction to do so. That conclusion brings us to McFadin's contention that the court of appeals had jurisdiction over his appeal.
Unless specifically authorized by statute, Texas appellate courts have jurisdiction only to review final judgments. 3 TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.014 ; see Stary v. DeBord , 967 S.W.2d 352 , 352-53 (Tex. 1998). A judgment is final for purposes of appeal if it disposes of all pending parties and claims. Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191 , 195 (Tex. 2001). Although language like a Mother Hubbard clause indicates that the trial court intended a judgment to be final and appealable, no particular title, form, or language is required to make a judgment final. Id. Rather, whether it is final depends on both the language in it and the record. Id. If a judgment disposes of every remaining issue in a case, it does not lack finality for purposes of appeal merely because  it recites that it is partial, refers to only some of the parties or claims, or lacks Mother Hubbard language. Id. at 200 . On the other hand, when a final judgment exists, a subsequent order that has no effect except to enforce provisions of the judgment does not qualify as another final judgment subject to appeal. Wagner v. Warnasch , 156 Tex. 334 , 295 S.W.2d 890 , 893 (1956). An order to pay the amount of a money judgment out of funds deposited to function as a supersedeas bond has been described as interlocutory and nonappealable because ordering payment from the bond is consistent with and does not work a material change in the adjudicative portions of the original judgment; it merely effectuates the judgment. See 4 TEX. JUR. 3D Appellate Review § 71 (2018) ; see also Myers v. Myers , 515 S.W.2d 334 , 335 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ dism'd) (The court's order to pay the judgment out of funds deposited pursuant to a supersedeas bond was ancillary to the cause on the merits. It was not a final judgment for purposes of appeal.). But if a post judgment order imposes obligations in addition to or in excess of those in the judgment, an appeal from the post judgment order is permissible, provided the order disposes of all pending issues and parties. See Allen v. Allen , 717 S.W.2d 311 , 312 (Tex. 1986) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds , 860 S.W.2d 568 , 570 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ denied). Coffeehouse cites Jack M. Sanders Family Ltd. Partnership v. Roger T. Fridholm Revocable, Living Trust as support for its argument that the payment order was not a final order so as to be appealable and that relief for McFadin is only attainable via mandamus. Jack M. Sanders Family Ltd. P'ship v. Roger T. Fridholm Revocable, Living Tr. , 434 S.W.3d 236 , 239 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (For anything other than what could properly be characterized as a final judgment, mandamus is the proper form to obtain review of a trial court's post-judgment orders.) (quoting Transam.Life Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Inc. , No. 01-11-00240-CV, 2011 WL 5428974 , at  (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2011, no pet.) ). We do not disagree with the general proposition that a non-final order or judgment, under appropriate circumstances, is challengeable by mandamus. But we disagree with Coffeehouse's position that the order directing McFadin to pay under these circumstances is not a final, and therefore appealable, order. As a result of the hearing on Coffeehouse's post judgment motions, the trial court appointed a receiver to sell the property as was required by the 2014 judgment; ordered payment of the same amount of attorney's fees as were awarded in the judgment; and ordered the full amount of the supersedeas bond paid to Coffeehouse and the Trust. But the 2014 judgment did not require McFadin to pay any amount of money to Coffeehouse and the Trust beyond attorney's fees and interest, which Coffeehouse does not contend would have been payable under terms of the supersedeas bond. 4 Thus, the order requiring McFadin to pay the amount of the bond went beyond the provisions of the 2014 judgment and afforded Coffeehouse recovery in addition to that in the judgment rather than merely requiring compliance with the judgment's terms. And, Coffeehouse does not contend that  any matters remained to be decided after that hearing and the trial court's orders pursuant to it. The effect of the payment order was to make McFadin liable for monetary obligations that he was not liable for under the judgment. As noted, the judgment provided for the property to be partitioned by sale as well as the termination of the partnership, and specified the amount of attorney's fees to be recovered through appeal. Those provisions were effectuated by the post appeal order. The court of appeals' determination that the payment order did not award new or additional damages is flawed because the court mistakenly equated evidence presented to set the bond amount (in 2014) with evidence needed to order payment, if any, on the bond (in 2016). 542 S.W.3d at 670 (stating that evidence was presented in 2014 supporting the bond payment order). But, the evidence presented at the hearing setting the bond amount was evidence of what damages the appeal might cause Coffeehouse if its judgment were not immediately enforced, not what damages the appeal actually did cause it. Thus, while the bond was related to the 2014 judgment, the order requiring payment of amounts pursuant to the bond went beyond provisions of the judgment. We conclude that the trial court's order requiring payment of the amount of the supersedeas bond was an appealable order and the court of appeals had jurisdiction to consider the merits of McFadin's appeal.
McFadin contends that the trial court's order requiring payment of the amount of the bond absent evidence of damages to Coffeehouse results in a deprivation of his property without due process of law. However, he raises his due process concern for the first time in this Court. That being so, he has not preserved the issue for our review. In re K.M.L. , 443 S.W.3d 101 , 119 (Tex. 2014) (citing D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. , 405 U.S. 174 , 185, 92 S.Ct. 775 , 31 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972) (Due process rights to notice and hearing prior to a civil judgment are subject to waiver.)).