Opinion ID: 1058506
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Due Process Violation: Inconsistent Theories & Evidence

Text: In his October 2000 motion for a new trial, the defendant alleged his Due Process rights had been violated because the theory of guilt presented by the prosecution at the October 1999 trial of co-defendant Phillips was fundamentally inconsistent with and inherently contradictory to evidence and argument presented by the prosecution at his November 1998 trial. [11] The trial judge who presided at the various trials and plea colloquies related to this murder rejected the defendant's claim. The trial court noted that although the evidence did not absolutely establish the identity of the leader at this meeting, there was ample evidence that the Defendant was a leader at that meeting. The fact that Prentiss Phillips, a co-defendant was also identified as a leader at this meeting does not render the finding that this Defendant was a leader invalid. The defendant renewed his Due Process claim in the Court of Criminal Appeals. After announcing that the claim was a question of first impression in Tennessee, the Court of Criminal Appeals adopted the analysis of the United States Court of Appeals in Smith v. Groose, 205 F.3d 1045, 1052 (8th Cir.2000). Consistent with the Eighth Circuit's approach, the Court of Criminal Appeals explained that, in separate trials against co-defendants for the same crime, the prosecution violates Due Process by pursuing factually contradictory theories that are at the core of the prosecution's case. The intermediate appellate court explained that to obtain relief under this approach, a defendant must establish not only a core inconsistency, but also a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent the inconsistency. Applying this test, the intermediate appellate court found that, during the separate trials of the defendant and co-defendant Phillips, the prosecution presented some proof and arguments which were inconsistent, contradictory, and factually irreconcilable regarding the relative rank of the defendant and Phillips. The Court of Criminal Appeals nonetheless concluded that the defendant had failed to establish a reasonable likelihood that absent these prosecutorial inconsistencies the jury's verdict in the guilt phase would have been different. However, finding a reasonable likelihood that the jury would not have imposed a sentence of death absent the inconsistencies, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that the defendant's sentence of death should be reversed on this ground alone. In this Court, the State initially argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals erred in recognizing an independent Due Process bar to the prosecution's reliance and pursuit of inconsistent theories at separate trials involving the same crime. The State concedes that a prosecutor clearly deprives a defendant of Due Process by knowingly using false evidence or argument to obtain a conviction or sentence. [12] However, citing cases from other jurisdictions, the State points out that the law is less clear as to whether Due Process precludes a prosecutor's use of factually inconsistent or contradictory theories where there is no known falsity. See, e.g., People v. Sakarias, 22 Cal.4th 596, 94 Cal. Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152, 174 (2000) (Less clear is whether, knowing falsity aside, a prosecutor oversteps constitutional limits by asserting, in separate trials of different defendants, factually inconsistent or contradictory theories of criminal events.) The State also maintains that this Court need not definitively clarify the law in this case because the prosecution neither pursued inconsistent theories nor presented contradictory evidence at these separate trials. In contrast, the defendant argues that the Court of Criminal Appeals correctly recognized the Due Process claim, appropriately adopted the Eighth Circuit's analysis of such claims, and accurately found a Due Process violation in this case. Nonetheless, the defendant challenges the Court of Criminal Appeals's conclusion that the Due Process violation did not affect the jury's verdict at the guilt phase of his trial. Having thoroughly reviewed the defendant's extensive trial record, the supplemental record consisting of transcripts from the separate trials or plea colloquies of co-defendants Antonio Jackson, Prentiss Phillips, Jarvis Shipp, and Kevin Wilkins, and the very lengthy appellate briefs, we are not persuaded the prosecution pursued inconsistent theories or offered contradictory proof at the separate trials of these co-defendants. [13] As previously detailed, the prosecution offered proof at the defendant's trial to establish that the defendant, as chief of security, ranked third in the city-wide hierarchy of the Memphis Gangster Disciples. Witnesses testified the defendant ordered other gang members to snatch up the victim, and that the defendant himself beat the victim at the apartment. Proof also showed that the defendant ordered others to take the victim upstairs and detain him. Witnesses testified that the defendant ordered Wilkins and Phillips to select gang members to take the victim fishing. But, the jury also heard proof to show that Phillips was coordinator for the Hurt Village Gangster Disciples. When asked who had the higher rank, Phillips or the defendant, Shipp indicated the defendant ranked higher, but Shipp emphasized that the murder occurred on Phillips's turf in Hurt Village and that Phillips and the defendant were kind of on the same level in terms of authority. James was not asked about the defendant's rank, did not attribute a rank to the defendant, and stated he had never seen the defendant before April 30, 1997. However, James testified that Phillips held the rank of coordinator within the Hurt Village Gangster Disciples and it was Phillips whom the victim asked to stop the assault. Moreover defense counsel emphasized through cross-examination that Shipp and other prosecution witnesses had initially given statements to the police implicating Phillips as the ranking Gangster Disciple responsible for the orders that resulted in the victim's murder. Indeed, both James and Shipp were closely questioned about their failure to initially implicate the defendant, and in particular, defense counsel emphasized that Shipp did not implicate or mention the defendant in his initial statement to the police but had instead named and implicated Phillips. Both Shipp's and James's testimony conveyed Phillips's leadership role in Green's kidnapping and murder. Testimony indicated that Phillips announced the Hurt Village Gangster Disciples were going to retaliate against the Vice Lords and step up the violence to another level and that Phillips and Shipp called the aid and assist meeting. Testimony also showed that Phillips posted gang members as lookouts at the door of the apartment and in an upstairs bedroom, that Phillips accused the victim of being a lookout for the Vice Lords, and that the victim asked Phillips, rather than the defendant, to tell them folks to stop. Furthermore, the testimony indicated that Phillips announced James would be punished for failing to aid Shipp in the fight with the Vice Lords and selected gang members to inflict the punishment. In addition there was proof that Phillips met with the defendant and Kaos. A defense witness said he heard Phillips and Shipp discussing Green's fate; and testimony indicated that Phillips, at the defendant's direction, selected three of the gang members who removed Green from the apartment. Finally, there was testimony that Phillips escorted James home and told Shipp to take a six day vacation. At Phillips's subsequent trial the State argued and presented evidence to show that Phillips, as coordinator, was the ranking member of the Hurt Village Gangster Disciples, called the aid and assist meeting, and gave orders to others during the meeting. There was testimony that Phillips reported the victim was outside and that Phillips stated the victim would have to be killed. The proof showed that Phillips picked other gang members, including his number two man Shipp, to be part of the group that removed Green from the apartment and killed him. However, the proof at Phillips's trial also showed that the defendant, answering Phillips's call, attended the aid and assist meeting, ordered others to snatch up the victim, met with Phillips in the kitchen, ordered the victim taken upstairs after the victim had been beaten. The jury at Phillips's trial also heard evidence that the defendant was Kaos's chief of security with authority to carry out orders from Kaos, that the defendant ordered the victim taken from the apartment, and that the defendant and Phillips each picked three gang members to take the victim from the apartment. As should be apparent from these brief summaries, the prosecution did not pursue inconsistent theories or present inconsistent proof at these separate trials. As the State points out, the focus in each trial was upon each defendant's culpability, but the theory remained the same. At Phillips's trial, the prosecution focused on Phillips's culpability for the kidnapping and murder, and much of this proof related to Phillips's position as coordinator of the Hurt Village Gangster Disciples. Witnesses at Phillips's trial were familiar with Phillips's coordinator rank, but had never seen the defendant before the evening of April 30, 1997. The defendant makes much of the fact that the prosecution at Phillips's trial argued that Phillips, as coordinator of the Hurt Village Gangster Disciples, had an additional reason for participating in the victim's kidnapping and murder, stating: [P]art of this ... was a personal situation. This wasn't entirely a Gangster Disciple matter. It was personal. It was a personal affront to this man's ego, this man, the coordinator of Hurt Village. An altercation had happened on his turf between the Vice Lords and the Gangster Disciples and it diminished his power. And he wasn't going to stand for it. The prosecution did not make this argument at the defendant's trial. And, given that this argument was completely unrelated to the defendant, the prosecution's failure to press this argument is logical. However, this argument is entirely consistent with testimony at the defendant's trial indicating that Phillips was very upset after the skirmish with the Vice Lords and called the aid and assist meeting because he wanted to step up the violence and retaliate against the Vice Lords. Thus, from our thorough review of the record and the briefs, we conclude that the prosecution did not pursue inconsistent theories at these separate trials. By so stating, we do not intend to imply the evidence at these separate trials was identical. It was not  discrepancies exist. But these discrepancies were isolated and immaterial when taken in context and certainly do not give rise to a Due Process violation. As a practical matter, discrepancies are commonly unavoidable when several individuals are prosecuted in separate trials for the same offense. Indeed, such trials present challenges because the truth is clouded by secret and elaborate gang rituals; the use of two and three code names for gang members; and the commission of crimes by groups. State v. Phillips, 76 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001). Furthermore, as the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals noted, evidence of criminal conspiracies hardly ever comes from ministers and civic leaders. Anderson v. State, 354 So.2d 1156, 1159 (Ala.Cr.App.1977). This case well-illustrates that point. James and Shipp were themselves gang members, and Shipp was an accomplice to these crimes. The Court of Criminal Appeals has described James as a rather inarticulate witness who was prone to cryptic responses. State v. Jackson, 52 S.W.3d 661, 667 (Tenn.Crim.App.2001). This description is entirely accurate. James appeared to contradict himself while testifying at both the defendant's trial and Phillips's trial, but the prosecution did not encourage him to do so. Rather, the record suggests the prosecutors were sometimes themselves surprised or confused by his answers. At the defendant's trial, James was not asked and did not ascribe a rank to the defendant but indicated that Phillips and Shipp followed the defendant's directions without hesitation. At Phillips's trial, James first said Phillips outranked the defendant but later testified the defendant, not Phillips, had been calling the shots in the apartment. The prosecutors did not adopt this testimony to argue that Phillips outranked the defendant. Instead, the prosecution's evidence, argument, and theory focused upon Phillips's own statements and actions and upon Phillips's rank and authority as coordinator of the Hurt Village Gangster Disciples. We also are not troubled, as was the Court of Criminal Appeals, by the prosecution's decision to call Shipp as a witness at the guilt phase of the defendant's trial while offering his testimony at only the sentencing phase of Phillips's trial. As previously explained, Shipp initially gave a statement to the police implicating Phillips and attributing to Phillips many of the actions he attributed to the defendant at the defendant's trial. Had Shipp been called by the prosecution as a witness at Phillips's trial and then provided testimony consistent with his initial statement to the police, the prosecution's proof at the separate trials would have been inconsistent. By choosing not to call Shipp during the guilt phase of Phillips's trial, and offering his testimony on a narrow point at the sentencing phase, the prosecution avoided even the potential for inconsistencies. Furthermore, unlike the Court of Criminal Appeals, we do not find the prosecution's failure to question James about the defendant's rank at the defendant's trial unusual. James testified he had never seen the defendant prior to April 30, 1997, and had been a member of the East Village Gangster Disciples only three or four months at that time. Given this testimony, the prosecution had no reason to believe James knew anything about the defendant's rank. Moreover, James illustrated his lack of knowledge or uncertainty on this issue at Phillips's trial where James testified inconsistently when questioned about the relative ranks of Phillips and the defendant. In short, the prosecution presented a consistent theory at these separate trials. The prosecution at each trial sought to establish each defendant's criminal responsibility for first degree murder and especially aggravated kidnapping by showing that each defendant held a leadership position in the gang, either citywide chief of security or Hurt Village coordinator, and that, acting in his leadership role, each defendant ordered and otherwise directed gang members to kidnap and murder Vernon Green. Accordingly, we do not agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals's conclusion that the prosecution presented factually inconsistent theories and evidence at the defendant's and Phillips's separate trials. Reversal of the defendant's death sentence on this basis, therefore, is not warranted. The defendant's sentence of death is reinstated.