Opinion ID: 2459991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Testimony Describing Termination of Appellant's Interrogation

Text: Hutchison's second preserved point on appeal is that the trial court erred by permitting Bill Wegrzyn to testify that Hutchison stopped answering questions during interrogation and immediately thereafter shouted obscenities. Hutchison claims that this testimony violated his state and federal constitutional right to not have his silence at interrogation be used against him at trial. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). He also claims that the testimony regarding Hutchison's use of profanity was irrelevant and prejudicial. The testimony Hutchison complains of is as follows: Q: [By Prosecutor Selby] Now again, as an investigator on this case, did you interview Mr. Hutchison? A: Yes, I did.       Q. Did,And before talking to him, did you read him any sort of rights? A. Yes. We went over the Miranda rights with him real carefully and real thoroughly. Q. Did he indicate to you that he understood those rights? A. Yes, he did. Q. And after discussing those rights with him, did he indicate that he was willing to talk to you? A. He said he wanted to talk to us. He said he wasn't going to sign anything, but he wanted to talk to us.       Q. Initially, what kind of information did you elicit from Mr. Hutchison? A. His full name, his date of birth, his social security number, his address, a little bit of background information, and we told him what the interview was in reference to.       Q. Then you had mentioned that then you began asking some more questions about the actual events? A. Yes, sir. I did. Q. What did you ask him? A. I asked him specifically what he did the evening hours of December 31st and the early morning hours of January 1st. Q. And what was his response to that question or those questions? A. He said that he and Michael Salazar had gone to a party at Freddie Lopez's house in Verona, and at that party, they met two girls from Branson. One was a Lisa and one was a Barbara and they left that party and they went to Springfield. Q. And then did you ask him any further questions after he told you that? A. At that point, I asked him some details in reference to who those people were, what type of vehicle they went to Springfield in, what time they left the party, and what time they arrived in Springfield, and where they stayed when they went to Springfield. Q. You might speak up a little bit. And what was Mr. Hutchison's response toto those questions? A. He didn't answer any of those questions. It was at this point that he was curious and started asking me about the details in reference to the homicide in particular. Q. What was the defendant'swhat was your response to the defendant's questions? A. He wanted to know how they had been shot and I explained to him that it was a very brutal execution style killing and that the guys, the brothers, had beenhad been shot in the head, in the eyes specifically, and Mr. Hutchison's attitude changed. He shouted some obscenities and we ended the conversation. The testimony of Investigator Wegrzyn did not violate Hutchison's right to not have his silence used against him. Hutchison had waived his right to silence when he began answering Wegrzyn's questions. State v. Schnick, 819 S.W.2d 330, 336 (Mo. banc 1991). The record does not show that Hutchison reinvoked this right at the end of the interview. Instead, Hutchison simply started shouting obscenities and we ended the conversation. A defendant who voluntarily speaks after receiving Miranda warnings may be impeached not only with his own statements but also with his selective silence. State v. Antwine, 743 S.W.2d 51, 70 (Mo. banc 1987). See, Antwine v. Delo, 54 F.3d 1357 (8th Cir.1995). Hutchison also claims that the testimony that he shouted obscenities at Wegrzyn after Wegrzyn told Hutchison how the Yates brothers were killed is irrelevant and prejudicial and should have been excluded. Trial courts retain broad discretion over issues of relevancy and admissibility of evidence, and we will not interfere with those decisions unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Tokar, 918 S.W.2d 753, 770 (Mo. banc 1996), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 307, 136 L.Ed.2d 224 (1996). Evidence is relevant if it logically tends to prove or disprove a fact in issue. Id. It is not unreasonable to interpret a sudden change in a defendant's demeanor during a custodial interrogation as conduct showing consciousness of guilt. The trial court was within its discretion in determining that the probative value of this possible inference outweighed any prejudice that might befall Hutchison as a result of the jury hearing Wegrzyn's testimony. This point is denied.