Opinion ID: 1723898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the trial judge erred in granting Instruction S-3 which allowed the jury to consider `depraved heart' type murder [4] when the appellant was originally indicted for deliberate design murder, deprived the defender of a fair manslaughter consideration, and denied him equal protection of law?

Text: Through this unartfully-framed issue, Otis presents two contentions. He contends that Instruction S-3, a depraved heart murder instruction, should not have been granted: (1) because it (Instruction S-3) amounted to a denial, or substantial diminishing of a manslaughter consideration; and (2) because it was not supported by the facts. [5] 1. Specifically, Instruction S-3 provides: The Court instructs the Jury that, if you believe from the evidence in this case, beyond a reasonable doubt, that on the 26th day of June, 1985, in Kemper County, Mississippi, the deceased, Albert Thurston Calvert, was a living person, and the Defendant, Otis Lee Windham, did wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously act in a manner eminently dangerous to Albert Thurston Calvert and others, evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, by beating Albert Thurston Calvert with a Hammer which resulted in the death of Albert Thurston Calvert, then you shall find the Defendant guilty of murder. Vol. I, at 61. Otis contends that this instruction should not have been granted because it amounted to a denial, or substantial diminishing of a manslaughter consideration. At the trial level, Otis phrased his objection accordingly: I object to S-3 ... [because it] is designed to deprive the defendant of manslaughter  or any manslaughter or any excusable homicide instruction. In essence, Otis' contention is that the crime of depraved-heart murder as defined by Section 97-3-19(1)(b) is indistinguishable from culpable-negligence manslaughter as defined in Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-3-47. Instruction S-3 derives its authority specifically from statutory law, which provides in part: (1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be murder in the following cases: (b) When done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual... . MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (1991 Supp.) (emphasis added). The familiar manslaughter statute, which Otis contends is diminished by Instruction S-3, provides: Every other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without authority of law, not provided for in this title, shall be manslaughter. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-47 (1972). Countering Otis' contention, the State asserts that § 97-3-47 specifically excludes homicides falling under § 97-3-19(1)(b). Therefore, the State concludes, depraved-heart murder and culpable-negligence manslaughter are mutually exclusive; by the express terms of the Mississippi Code, they do not overlap. Otis' contention is unpersuasive. Depraved-heart murder and culpable-negligence manslaughter are distinguishable simply by degree of mental state of culpability. In short, depraved-heart murder involves a higher degree of recklessness from which malice or deliberate design may be implied. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW §§ 30 & 70 (1972); United States v. Browner, 889 F.2d 549, 552 (5th Cir.1989). In sum, Instruction S-3 did not amount[] to a denial, or substantial diminishing, of a manslaughter consideration by the jury. This conclusion is consistent with this Court's decision in at least one other case in which a depraved-heart murder instruction and a culpable-negligence manslaughter instruction were properly granted. See Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1139-40 & 1148 (Miss. 1985); accord State v. Smith, 415 A.2d 562 (Me. 1980) (depraved-heart and culpable-negligence instructions given in this case involving death from brutal and senseless beating); State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268 (Me. 1979) (same). Thus, Otis' contention is deemed devoid of merit. 2. Next, Otis contends that Instruction S-3 should not have been granted because it was not supported by the facts. Otis' contention is devoid of merit. The evidence clearly establishes the existence of actual or implied malice or deliberate design. More specifically, the evidence establishes the possibility that Otis could have killed Calvert while acting in a manner eminently dangerous to others [ i.e., the Calverts] and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of human life. Compare with Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136, 1139-40 (Miss. 1985). In Johnson v. State, an unknown individual summoned police officers to Christine Johnson's apartment. There, they found the bruised and cut body of Christine's 3 1/2-year-old son. Christine claimed that her son died from an accidental fall. An autopsy, however, revealed that her son died from extensive blows to the head. At the Coahoma County Circuit Court, a jury convicted Christine of murdering her son under the depraved-heart statute. Affirming the conviction, this Court stated: It has long been the case law of this state that malice aforethought, premeditated design, and deliberate design all mean the same thing. See Dye v. State, 127 Miss. 492, 90 So. 180 (1921); Hawthorne v. State, 58 Miss. 778 (1881); McDaniel v. State, 8 Smed. and M. 401 (Miss. 1847). Furthermore, in Talbert v. State, 172 Miss. 243, 159 So. 549, 551 (1935), the Court had under consideration two jury instructions, one of them being in the precise language of the depraved heart murder statute. The Court, referring to the forerunner of § 97-3-19(1)(a) (sec. 985 subds. (a) and (b) of the Code of 1930), said the following: This statute but epitomizes the common law found.... Murder is the voluntary killing of any person of malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied by law; [6] the sense of which word malice is not only confined to a particular ill-will to the deceased [such as anger, hatred, and revenge], but is intended to denote ... an action flowing from a wicked and corrupt motive, a thing done malo animo, where the fact has been attended with such circumstances as carry in them the plain indications of a heart regardless of social duty and fatally bent upon mischief. [ And therefore malice is implied from any deliberate, cruel act against another, however sudden ]. 475 So.2d at 1139 (quoting Talbert v. State, 172 Miss. 243, 250, 159 So. 549, 551 (1935), and Commonwealth v. Webster, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 295, 304 (1850)). See also Fairman v. State, 513 So.2d 910, 913 (Miss. 1987) (holding that the evidence established that defendant acted in a manner eminently dangerous to another or others and evincing a depraved heart). The facts of Johnson are analogous to those of the case sub judice. In the case sub judice, Otis assaulted the Calverts with a hammer during a dispute over a debt he owed them but, according to Otis, he never intended to hurt no one. Lack of intent notwithstanding, his use of a hammer to assault a 79-year-old, one-armed man (who was running away) and his 78-year-old wife may, at the very least, be described as grave recklessness manifesting utter disregard or indifference to the resultant creation of eminent danger to the life of both Albert and Betty. This description alone fits within the modern view of the scope of depraved-heart murder. Under the traditional view, death which resulted from a reckless act directed toward a particular individual would not be deemed to be within the scope of depraved-heart murder statutes. To constitute depraved-heart murder, the act must have manifested a reckless indifference to human life in general. See F. WHARTON, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE § 129 (3rd ed. 1907). For example, an unjustified shooting at a passing train or into a house, which generally poses a risk to a group of individuals and which results in death, is a familiar example of traditional depraved-heart murder. See People v. Jernatowski, 238 N.Y. 188, 144 N.E. 497 (1924) (shooting into a room); Banks v. State, 85 Tex.Crim. 165, 211 S.W. 217 (1919) (shooting into caboose of passing train). The traditional view has since evolved. An act which poses a risk to only one individual and which results in that individual's death may also be deemed depraved-heart murder. For example, death which resulted from a beating has been deemed to be within the scope of depraved-heart murder statutes. See, e.g., People v. La Mountain, 155 A.D.2d 717, 547 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1989) (death resulted from repeated punching, kicking, and stomping); State v. Smith, 415 A.2d 562 (Me. 1980) (death resulted from beating and stabbing); DuBose v. Lefevre, 619 F.2d 973 (2d Cir.1980) (death resulted from beating); State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268 (Me. 1979) (death resulted from brutal and senseless beating); State v. Wardle, 564 P.2d 764 (Utah 1977) (death resulted from multiple blunt blows); see also Regina v. Ward, 1 Q.B. 351 (1956) (oft-cited case in which mother shook baby to death); Solomon v. Commissioner of Correctional Servs., 786 F. Supp. 218, 222 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (death from choke hold). More pertinent to the facts of the case sub judice, death which resulted from injuries inflicted through use of an object  including use of a hammer  has been deemed to be within the scope of depraved-heart murder statutes. See State v. McGranahan, 415 A.2d 1298 (R.I. 1980) (death from injuries inflicted through use of a bottle); State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166 (Me. 1979) (death from injuries to head inflicted through use of two-by-four piece of wood); People v. Rivera, 59 A.D.2d 675, 398 N.Y.S.2d 538 (1977) (use of belt buckle); State v. Day, 572 P.2d 703 (Utah 1977) (use of heavy wooden stick); see also People v. Boston, 153 A.D.2d 534, 545 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1989) (defendant convicted of attempted depraved-heart murder for nonfatal beating using a hammer), rev'd on other grounds, 555 N.Y.S.2d 27 (1990); Finnegan v. State, 33 Md. App. 251, 364 A.2d 124 (1976) (in affirming conviction for assault with intent to murder, court opined that defendant could have been convicted under various theories of murder  including depraved-heart murder  if victim had died from hammer blows); cf. Grassia v. Scully, 707 F. Supp. 1410 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (use of gasoline which ignited). In Johnson v. State, 475 So.2d 1136 (Miss. 1985), this Court left no question regarding the view to which Mississippi adheres. That is, this Court construed Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1)(b) (Supp. 1984)  the depraved-heart murder statute  in a manner which encompasses a reckless and eminently dangerous act directed toward a single individual. Indeed, this Court can perceive no rationale for characterizing a horrendously-violent act, like the one committed by Otis, as manslaughter rather than depraved-heart murder, simply because, under the traditional view, the act must have been directed toward human life in general as opposed to one individual in particular. A distinction between the risk of death to one particular individual and the risk of death to more than one individual is a senseless and outmoded one which this Court properly discarded six years ago in Johnson v. State. See R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 32 (1957) (Under the depraved-heart theory, a wanton and reckless disregard of an obvious human risk is with malice aforethought even if there was no actual intent to kill or injure.); cf. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 53 (1881) ([K]nowledge that the act will probably cause death ... is enough in murder as in tort.); Commonwealth v. Chance, 174 Mass. 245, 252, 54 N.E. 551, 554 (1899) (As Justice Holmes further explained: [I]t is possible to commit murder without any actual intent to kill or to do grievous bodily harm, and that, reduced to its lowest terms, `malice,' in murder, means knowledge of such circumstances that according to common experience there is a plain and strong likelihood that death will follow the contemplated act, coupled perhaps with an implied negation of any excuse or justification. `The criterion in such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the circumstances, have suggested a more circumspect conduct.') (quoting case law). 3. In sum, the judge granted instructions on various theories of culpability  including simple murder, depraved-heart murder, inexcusable manslaughter, and excusable manslaughter. The jury found Otis guilty of murder  which means the jury accepted a simple-murder theory or a depraved-heart murder theory. In either event, the evidence or facts justified an instruction on, and a finding of, depraved-heart murder. This conclusion is consistent with case law in this State as well as the modern view espoused in other jurisdictions. See generally Annotation, Validity and Construction of Statute Defining Homicide By Conduct Manifesting Depraved Indifference, 435 A.L.R.4th 311 (1983 & 1990 Supp.); see W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 70 (1972); R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 32 (1957). This Court therefore affirms on this issue.