Opinion ID: 2973931
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Poindexter’s Cross-Appeal

Text: Poindexter argues that trial counsel were ineffective for improperly conceding his guilt during closing argument. Both the state courts and the district court denied Poindexter’s claim on this basis. Perrino made the following comments during closing: In this case, you have got serious charges. Every one of them are very serious charges. What I am arguing to you, because I am arguing for a lesser degree, doesn’t mean I am arguing for innocence. And you are not to consider, ladies and gentlemen, the sentencing in this matter. What I am arguing to you is consistent with the law. .... You say, “If we find him guilty of aggravated burglary, do we necessarily have to find him guilty of aggravated murder?” And the answer to you is, “No, you do not.” And I think that is going to be the logic. .... . . . You understand, you have to, if it is not incompatible, ladies and gentlemen, to find the defendant guilty of Count 3, and still not guilty of aggravated burglary, you still can find him guilty of murder. Do you understand? Nos. 01-3250/3300 Poindexter v. Mitchell Page 14 The thing is, you have elements of murder, you know. You have got murder here. If I argued against that, I would be a fool I would be a fool [sic]. The Judge is going to charge you on murder. He is going to charge you on that, and it is not that difficult, actually. “The purposeful causing the death of another,” and you also know what happened. It is as simple as that, you know, so if you find him guilty of aggravated murder, that is not inconsistent. It is not inconsistent at all. .... So, what I say to you, ladies and gentlemen, in the first count, very compatible. There is no question. You have murder, the elements of murder. Possible elements of aggravated murder. No doubt about it. But they are not inconsistent. Not inconsistent. The fact that you find him guilty, if you find all the other elements of aggravated burglary, doesn’t necessarily mean you have to find him guilty of aggravated murder. The state trial court ruled that trial counsel did not improperly admit guilt, that the comment merely indicated that the State had proved a murder, not an aggravated murder, and did not identify Poindexter as the perpetrator. The state trial court also held that even if counsel had conceded Poindexter’s guilt, the verdict would have been the same. In denying Poindexter’s claim, the district court stated: The Court has read the closing arguments of Petitioner’s counsel and finds no concession of guilt. While counsel made certain remarks that were tantamount to acknowledgments that the jury was likely to conclude that Petitioner had killed Kevin Flanaghan, they never conceded guilt with respect to the aggravated murder charge or the death penalty specifications. The evidence that Petitioner Poindexter killed Kevin Flanaghan was overwhelming. To the extent that counsel’s acknowledgment that a finding of guilt with respect to that killing was likely constituted deficient assistance, Petitioner’s defense was not prejudiced by virtue of that deficiency. A review of trial counsel’s closing argument reveals that trial counsel’s defense strategy was to argue that the State must prove each and every element of the charges presented in the indictment and that they failed to do so. First, counsel argued that the State did not prove aggravated burglary, because Poindexter had two children and a wife at the apartment and could have just “lost his key.” Counsel also argued that Poindexter did not have the calculated design to kill at the time he “broke” into the apartment. Similarly, counsel asserted that the State had not proven kidnaping, and the jury should consider a lesser charge of abduction. Counsel also argued, “I don’t feel this is a case of aggravated murder. I don’t feel that the evidence, along with the law, is one of aggravated murder. You have got to decide that.” Counsel’s comments were logical in light of the evidence presented and the fact that the trial court instructed the jury on the lesser-included offense of murder. Cf. Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 189 (2004) (trial counsel’s strategic decision to concede guilt at the guilt phase of a capital trial did not automatically render counsel’s performance deficient). Poindexter’s reliance on United States v. Swanson, 943 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1991), and Lindstadt v. Keane, 239 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001), is misplaced. In Swanson, the Ninth Circuit held that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial counsel told the jury during closing argument that the evidence against his client was overwhelming. Swanson, 943 F.2d at 1074-75. In Lindstadt, the court found ineffective assistance based upon counsel’s gratuitous Nos. 01-3250/3300 Poindexter v. Mitchell Page 15 comment that the petitioner would testify only if the prosecution had “made their case.” Lindstadt, 239 F.3d at 202. Thus, by mounting the witness stand in his defense, the petitioner conceded that the prosecution had “proven their case.” Id. By contrast, counsel in this case argued that the crime charged by the State, aggravated murder, had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that the jury must consider a lesser-included offense. In any event, assuming counsel conceded guilt, given the overwhelming evidence that Poindexter was guilty of aggravated murder, there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different absent counsel’s statements. Thus, the district court did not err in denying Poindexter’s claim on this basis because there was no prejudice.
Poindexter argues that the district court erred in finding his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim to be procedurally defaulted. Poindexter further argues that his appellate counsel were ineffective for failing to allege that the trial court erroneously instructed the jury on all of Ohio’s statutory mitigating factors, instead of only those which Poindexter had argued.
Generally, federal courts may not consider habeas claims not considered by state courts due to procedural default. Seymour v. Walker, 224 F.3d 542, 549-50 (6th Cir. 2000). This Court applies the familiar test of Maupin v. Smith to determine whether a claim is procedurally defaulted: For the doctrine to apply, there must be a state procedural rule that the petitioner failed to follow, that the state courts actually enforced, and that constitutes an adequate and independent state ground to foreclose review of the federal constitutional claim. 785 F.2d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1985). However, the petitioner may excuse the default if he can show cause for failure to follow the rule and prejudice resulting therefrom. Id. In this case, the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed Poindexter’s conviction and sentence on direct appeal on December 24, 1986. He first raised his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim on July 26, 1989, in a petition for post-conviction relief in the trial court. The trial court refused to hear the claim, and the Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed that ruling in December 1991. On February 19, 1992, the Ohio Supreme Court issued State v. Murnahan, 584 N.E.2d 1204 (Ohio 1992). On April 17, 1992, Poindexter filed an application for delayed reconsideration in the Ohio Court of Appeals, relying on Murnahan. On December 1, 1992, the Ohio Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal as untimely. The court stated in pertinent part: Appellant has failed to demonstrate good cause pursuant to App. R. 14(B) to justify the delay in applying for reconsideration beyond the time permitted by App. R. 26. In view of the settled law in this district with respect to the pursuit of claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, see, e.g., State v. Rone (Aug. 31, 1983), Hamilton App. No. C-820640, unreported, we specifically reject, under the circumstances of this case, the proposition that good cause for the delay is provided by the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Murnahan (1992), 63 Ohio St. 3d 60, 584 N.E.2d 1204. The district court found that Poindexter’s ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim was procedurally defaulted. The district court held that although prior to Murnahan, the procedure in Ohio for raising claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel was unsettled, in 1983, the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County, the same court to which Poindexter appealed his conviction and sentence, decided Rone. In Rone, the First District suggested alternatives to a post-conviction relief petition by which a petitioner could challenge the effectiveness of his appellate counsel. Because Rone was available to Poindexter, yet he availed himself of none of the suggested remedies, Nos. 01-3250/3300 Poindexter v. Mitchell Page 16 the district court concluded that Poindexter’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim was procedurally defaulted unless he could show cause and prejudice or actual innocence to excuse the default. Our decision in Hicks v. Collins, 384 F.3d 204 (6th Cir. 2004), is controlling. There, as in this case, the petitioner incorrectly asserted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in his petition for post-conviction relief, and the court dismissed the claim pursuant to the rule in Rone. Id. at 212. Thereafter, the Ohio Supreme Court adopted the rule in Murnahan, and the petitioner waited seven months after that decision to file a delayed reconsideration application. Id. The Ohio Court of Appeals denied the application for reconsideration because the petitioner had failed to show good cause to justify his delay in filing the reconsideration motion. Id. The Hicks court held that an adequate and independent state ground barred the federal court from considering the petitioner’s claim. Id. (citing Coleman v. Mitchell, 244 F.3d 533, 539-40 (6th Cir. 2001)). Here, Poindexter likewise initially filed his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel pursuant to a state post-conviction petition prior to the Murnahan decision and did not file a petition for delayed reconsideration in the state court of appeals until nearly two months after Murnahan was decided. Similarly, the appeal was filed in Ohio’s First District Court of Appeals, which had in place since 1983 the procedure dictated by Rone. Thus, as in Hicks, we are constrained to conclude that Poindexter had procedurally defaulted his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, because the rule of Rone was “well settled” by the time he filed the claim and was, therefore, an adequate and independent state ground. See Hicks, 384 F.3d at 212; see also Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 827 n.2 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Rone); Coleman, 244 F.3d at 540 (holding that “[b]efore the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in Murnahan, it was well established in [Hamilton County], the appellate district in which Coleman’s appeal was heard, that claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel were to be raised in a delayed motion for reconsideration and were not cognizable in state post-conviction proceedings”); cf. Franklin v. Anderson, 434 F.3d 412, 43132 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding there was no procedural bar where the petitioner filed his petition for post-conviction relief containing an ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim after Murnahan had issued; distinguishing Hicks on the grounds that the petitioner in that case first raised his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in his state post-conviction petition prior to the Murnahan decision). In sum, we hold that the district court’s ruling was correct.
Even if Poindexter were able to present an appropriate excuse for failing to bring his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim in a proper and timely manner, the claim is meritless. In support of his merits argument, Poindexter relies on State v. DePew, 528 N.E.2d 542 (Ohio 1988), which held that “it is the defendant who has the right to present and argue the mitigating factors,” and that the prosecution may not comment on any factors not raised by the defendant. Id. at 557; see also Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269, 291-92 (6th Cir. 2000) (stating that under Ohio law, trial court’s instruction on all seven statutory mitigating factors in the penalty phase constituted error, where the defendant had raised only two; instructing the state court not to repeat the error upon likelihood of retrial of the petitioner). The district court held that the claim was procedurally defaulted. Assuming that Poindexter’s claim was properly preserved for review, it is rejected. Poindexter’s direct appeal merits brief was filed in January 1986. DePew, upon which Poindexter relies, was not issued until August 31, 1988. At the time counsel prepared Poindexter’s brief on direct appeal, this issue was not “significant and obvious”; although there was no contrary authority, there was also no supporting authority. See Mapes v. Coyle, 171 F.3d 408, 427-28 (6th Cir. 1999) (including in list of factors to be considered in evaluating appellate counsel’s competence whether the omitted issues were “significant and obvious,” and whether there was “arguably contrary Nos. 01-3250/3300 Poindexter v. Mitchell Page 17 authority on the omitted issues”). Moreover, the Ohio Supreme Court in DePew found error but not prejudicial error because the trial court merely read all the factors but made no comment on the factors that were not presented by the defendant. DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 557-58; see also State v. Hutton, 797 N.E.2d 948, 957-58 (Ohio 2003) (noting that the Ohio Supreme Court had never reversed a death sentence on the ground that the trial court gave the jury an instruction that neutrally listed all statutory mitigating factors, even though the list included factors the defense had not presented; characterizing such errors as either harmless or not plain error). Given the relative merit of the claim as compared to those that counsel did raise, Poindexter cannot overcome the presumption of effective assistance. As we observed in Coleman, “‘[g]enerally, only when ignored issues are clearly stronger than those presented, will the presumption of effective assistance of counsel be overcome.’” 268 F.3d at 430 (quoting Gray v. Greer, 800 F.2d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 1986)). Furthermore, in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Supreme Court held that professional judgment of appellate counsel includes the determination of which colorable claims to raise on appeal, and that appellate counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise every colorable claim. Jones, 463 U.S. at 753-54; see also, Coleman, 268 F.3d at 430-31 (citing Jones). Poindexter has not presented any facts to lend particular importance to this claim. See Coleman, 268 F.3d at 431. Thus, Poindexter has not established cause or prejudice sufficient to warrant issuance of the writ.
Poindexter asserts that the prosecutor violated his due process rights by referencing statutory mitigating factors to the jury that Poindexter did not raise or argue during sentencing. During his closing argument during the mitigation phase, the prosecutor listed all nine factors for the jury and argued why they were not present in Poindexter’s case. The district court ruled that this issue was procedurally defaulted because it was not presented to the Ohio Supreme Court on direct appeal. This Court granted a certificate of appealability on this issue. As noted above, we have recognized that reference by the prosecutor or the trial judge to all statutory factors, including factors not presented by the defendant, impermissibly focuses the jury’s attention on the absence of those mitigating factors and is, therefore, improper under Ohio law. Combs, 205 F.3d at 292 (citing DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 557). Such an error does not warrant habeas relief, however, because the instructions deal with Ohio law and do not raise constitutional concerns. Hill v. Mitchell, 400 F.3d 308, 333 (6th Cir. 2005); Byrd v. Collins, 209 F.3d 486, 527 (6th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, the prosecutor’s comments were made in response to the defense attorney’s statement to the jury, “Please make sure that you decide these cases in the mitigation part, especially, and his Honor will charge you on the mitigation part, and in that charge he is going to tell you all the elements. . . . There are eight or nine elements of mitigation. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the allegedly improper comments “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974); Hill, 400 F.3d at 333; cf. DePew v. Anderson, 311 F.3d 742, 749-50 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that prosecutor’s inadmissible, inflammatory, and misleading comments during the penalty phase, which were designed to undercut the defendant’s sole mitigation theory, effectively denied the defendant fair jury consideration of mitigating evidence in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights). In any event, because we are remanding for resentencing, the state court can easily apply the correct state standard. Cf. Combs, 205 F.3d at 291-93 (briefly discussing state trial court errors identified by state supreme court, including DePew issue, since the petitioner would in all probability be retried).
Poindexter also argues that the State failed to disclose Hurt’s prior inconsistent statement to his attorneys, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The district court rejected this claim in part based upon its determination that, as an issue of fact, at least one of Poindexter’s trial Nos. 01-3250/3300 Poindexter v. Mitchell Page 18 attorneys reviewed the statement before trial. Specifically, the district court noted that trial counsel Pandilidis testified by deposition in the federal proceedings that he thought he had seen the transcript of Hurt’s statement previously. The district court also held that co-counsel Perrino’s testimony that he did not recall seeing the transcript of the recorded statement did not contradict Pandilidis’s statement and was not evidence that the State failed to disclose it. Under Brady, a defendant’s due process rights are violated if the government suppresses evidence favorable to the accused “where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady, 373 U.S. at 87; Armstrong v. Morgan, 372 F.3d 778, 781 (6th Cir. 2004). Evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that had it been disclosed, “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” United States v. Bagley, 473 F.3d 667, 682 (1985); Armstrong, 372 F.3d at 781. “A Brady violation, however, only occurs if the prosecution failed to disclose the evidence to the defense.” Armstrong, 372 F.3d at 781. As the district court found, Poindexter has not established that the State failed to disclose the material. Furthermore, the statement was not “material” in the sense that it created a reasonable probability of a different result. As discussed supra, whether standing or kneeling, it is not disputed that Poindexter fired a shot at Hurt’s head that was close enough to leave powder burns on his face. In short, the district court’s ruling was not in error.
Poindexter complains that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process when the trial court improperly instructed the jury on statutory mitigating factors that he did not assert. Poindexter cites DePew and Combs in support. The Supreme Court has ruled that “the fact that [a jury] instruction was allegedly incorrect under state law is not a basis for habeas relief.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 71-72 (1991); Roe v. Baker, 316 F.3d 557, 564 (6th Cir. 2002). On habeas review, such errors are reviewable only if they deprived the petitioner of constitutional due process. Gall v. Parker, 231 F.3d 265, 321 (6th Cir. 2000); see also Baker, 316 F.3d at 564. Thus, “[t]he only question for us is ‘whether the ailing instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process.’” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 72 (quoting Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 147 (1973)). The trial court’s instructions listing all of Ohio’s statutory mitigating factors was error under state law, as defined in DePew, and not federal constitutional law. In any event, DePew itself did not find reversible error because the trial court merely stated the factors without commenting on those factors that were not presented by the appellant. See DePew, 528 N.E.2d at 558. In this case, the trial court did not comment on factors not presented by Poindexter in mitigation, and expressly noted that “[t]he statute provides certain ‘mitigating factors,” some of which may not apply to this hearing.” (emphasis added). In short, Poindexter cannot meet the Estelle standard for establishing constitutional error on a claim that his jury instructions violated state law. Although the state trial court read all the statutory mitigating factors of Ohio Rev. Code § 2929.04(B), it did not comment on the factors not presented by Poindexter and did not otherwise instruct the jury that the lack of evidence on a particular mitigating factor should be weighed against Poindexter. Petitioner has not established a constitutional violation on this basis.