Opinion ID: 4442257
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver Doctrines

Text: Plaintiffs‐appellees first invoke the doctrine that a litigant waives the work product protection by voluntarily disclosing privileged material to its adversary. Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d 230; see also SEC v. Gupta, 281 F.R.D. 169, 171 (S.D.N.Y 2012) (“Work product protection . . . may be waived if the work product is voluntarily disclosed.”); In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. 11, 2001, No. 03‐MDL‐ 1570, 2013 WL 2641383, at  (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (work product protection is waived upon disclosure to an adversary or disclosure to a non‐adversary that “materially increases the likelihood that an adversary can gain access to that information”); Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. v. Allegheny Energy, Inc., 229 F.R.D. 441, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Generally speaking, the work product privilege should not be deemed waived unless disclosure is inconsistent with maintaining secrecy from possible adversaries.”) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); In re Sealed Case, 676 F.2d 793, 817 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[A] party waives its work product protection in civil litigation if it discloses the privileged material to anyone without common interests in developing legal theories and analyses of documents.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 28 In the FOIA Exemption 5 context (where adversaries often do not exist), this doctrine provides that public disclosure of specific details from an otherwise privileged agency memorandum waives the work product protection with respect to those facts. The D.C. Circuit, for example, has previously evaluated in an Exemption 5 case whether selective quotation of privileged documents in a non‐privileged document waived the work product protection with respect to the privileged document. Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 235 F.3d 598, 605 (D.C. Cir. 2001). Here, of course, we must evaluate the impact of verbal statements describing the content of privileged memoranda, rather than actual disclosure of the memoranda themselves. But we see no reason not to apply the same inquiry. We have previously looked to “common sense” to “define the limits of the work product doctrine,” Steinhardt Partners, 9 F.3d at 235 (2d Cir. 1993), and common sense suggests that verbal description of the contents of a document, if sufficiently specific, is as “inconsistent with the maintenance of secrecy,” Rockwell, 235 F.3d at 605 (quoting United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1299 (D.C. Cir. 1980)), of that document as would be disclosure of the document itself. 29
This Court has also held that a party waives the work product protection over a document by placing that document “at issue” or by making “testimonial use” of that document. Specifically, “in certain circumstances a party’s assertion of factual claims can, out of considerations of fairness to the party’s adversary, result in the involuntary forfeiture of privileges for matters pertinent to the claims asserted.” John Doe Co. v. United States, 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). We have said that this kind of unfairness may arise when “a party[] advance[es] a claim to a court or jury (or perhaps another type of decision maker) while relying on its privilege to withhold from a litigation adversary materials that the adversary might need to effectively contest or impeach the claim.” Id. at 303; see also United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 239‐40; In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2000) (“[I]mplied waiver may be found where a privilege holder ‘asserts a claim that in fairness requires examination of protected communications.’”) (quoting United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1292) (1991)). The archetypal example of a situation where this doctrine applies is that of United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225 (1975). There, the Supreme Court identified 30 a “testimonial” use of work product by a criminal defendant that would be sufficiently unfair to the prosecution so as to waive the privilege. At the underlying trial, the prosecution had called two eye witnesses who identified the defendant as the perpetrator of a bank robbery. Before trial, an investigator for the defense had interviewed these two witnesses, elicited statements that seemed to undermine their credibility, and memorialized these statements in a written report. When the defense sought to call this investigator to testify at trial, the government demanded that the investigator’s written report be produced. Id. at 227‐30. The defense objected, citing the work product privilege. Id. at 236‐40. But the Supreme Court agreed with the government, holding that the defendant “can no more advance the work product doctrine to sustain a unilateral testimonial use of work product materials than he could elect to testify in his own behalf and thereafter assert his Fifth Amendment privilege to resist cross‐examination on matters reasonably related to those brought out in direct examination.” Id. at 239‐40; see also John Doe Co., 350 F.3d at 303 (discussing Nobles). As the plaintiffs‐appellees note, we have sometimes “used broad language in describing [this] doctrine, such as generalizing about the incompatibility of using . . . assertions as a ‘sword’ while using privileges attaching to related 31 matter as a ‘shield.’” John Doe Co., 350 F.3d at 302. We have subsequently clarified, however, that implied waiver of the work product privilege based on the “fairness” or “at‐issue” doctrine is not nearly so broad. To find implied waiver, we look for specific instances of unfairness that undermine the adversarial process, and this is inherently a case‐by‐case determination. Id. (citing In re Grand Jury, 219 F.3d at 193).