Opinion ID: 2001496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Background of IGRA

Text: Necessary to our determination is an analysis of the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 (25 USC §§ 2701-2721; 18 USC §§ 1166-1168). Contrary to plaintiffs' assertion, IGRA has preempted the field in the area of Indian gaming but permits states to negotiate with tribes to regulate gaming. IGRA was enacted, in part, to promote the self-sufficiency and economic development of Indian tribes ( see 25 USC § 2701 [4]; § 2702 [1]). Congress determined that Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity (25 USC § 2701 [5]). IGRA separates the types of gaming into three classes  classes I, II and IIIeach subject to a different degree of regulation. Class I gaming consists of social games solely for prizes of minimal value or traditional forms of Indian gaming engaged in by individuals as a part of, or in connection with, tribal ceremonies or celebrations (25 USC § 2703 [6]; see also 25 CFR 502.2). This type of gaming is solely within the jurisdiction of the tribes and is not subject to IGRA ( see 25 USC § 2710 [a] [1]). Class II gaming includes bingo, lotto and certain types of card gamesspecifically excluding banking card games such as baccarat ( see 25 USC § 2703 [7] [A], [B]; 25 CFR 502.3 [a]-[c]). Class II activity is permissible on Indian land, [2] subject to the tribe's jurisdiction, if located in a state that otherwise permits such gaming for any purpose and if the Indian tribe passes a resolution that is approved by the Chair of the National Indian Gaming Commission ( see 25 USC § 2710 [b] [1]). Class III gaming includes all remaining types of gaming not within class I or II ( see 25 USC § 2703 [8]). This type of gaming is the most highly regulated. In addition to the requirements for class II gaminga Chair-approved tribal ordinance and location in a state that otherwise permits such gamingthe class III gaming must also be conducted according to a valid tribal-state compact ( see 25 USC § 2710 [d] [1] [C]). A tribe seeking to conduct class III gaming on Indian land must request that the state negotiate with the tribe in an attempt to develop a tribal-state compact to regulate gaming activity ( see 25 USC § 2710 [d] [3] [A]). Upon receiving such a request, the State shall negotiate with the Indian tribe in good faith to enter into such a compact (25 USC § 2710 [d] [3] [A]). Any such compact is subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior ( see 25 USC § 2710 [d] [3] [B]). Prior to the enactment of IGRA, the United States Supreme Court addressed the applicability of state law to Indian gaming within the state of California ( see California v Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 US 202 [1987]). Cabazon dealt with a federal statute giving California, along with certain other states, criminal and limited civil jurisdiction over Indian land within the state. California sought to enforce a penal statute prohibiting bingounless conducted by certain charitable organizationsagainst two Indian tribes. The Court observed that Indian tribes retain `attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory' and that `tribal sovereignty is dependent on, and subordinate to, only the Federal Government, not the States' ( Cabazon, 480 US at 207 [citations omitted]). However, the Court also noted that, if authorized by Congress, state laws would be applicable to tribal lands. In determining whether the law at issue could be enforced on Indian land, the Supreme Court recognized a distinction between whether the law was prohibitory or regulatory in nature ( see Cabazon, 480 US at 209). If the purpose of the law is to prohibit specific conduct, it is considered prohibitory and can be enforced on Indian land. If, on the other hand, the law allows the conduct subject to regulation, the law is regulatory and not enforceable on Indian land ( see Cabazon, 480 US at 209). The shorthand test is whether the conduct at issue violates the State's public policy ( Cabazon, 480 US at 209). Because the State allowed a substantial amount of gambling activity, including bingo, the Court determined that the statute at issue was regulatory rather than prohibitory ( see Cabazon, 480 US at 211). The Court then went on to decide that California's interest in regulating bingo was insufficient as compared with the significant tribal interests. Congress enacted IGRA in response to Cabazon ( see S Rep No. 100-446, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1988 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 3071). The legislative history indicates that Congress intended that unless a tribe affirmatively elects to have State laws and State jurisdiction extend to tribal lands, the Congress will not unilaterally impose or allow State jurisdiction on Indian lands for the regulation of Indian gaming activities (S Rep No. 100-446, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, at 5-6, reprinted in 1988 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 3075). The tribalstate compact was designed as a way to reconcile tribal and state interests concerning class III gaming ( see S Rep No. 100-446, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, at 6, reprinted in 1988 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 3076). Significantly, IGRA was intended to expressly preempt the field in the governance of gaming activities on Indian lands. Consequently, Federal courts should not balance competing Federal, State, and tribal interests to determine the extent to which various gaming activities are allowed (S Rep No. 100-446, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, at 6, reprinted in 1988 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 3076). Congress expected that the courts would apply the prohibitory/regulatory distinction when deciding whether gaming was permitted in a state, but in a different way than it was applied in Cabazon ( see S Rep No. 100-446, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, at 6, reprinted in 1988 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 3076). Specifically, rather than determining the degree to which a state's laws would apply to Indian lands, the courts will consider the distinction between a State's civil and criminal laws to determine whether a body of law is applicable, as a matter of Federal law, to either allow or prohibit certain activities (S Rep No. 100-446, 100th Cong, 2d Sess, at 6, reprinted in 1988 US Code Cong & Admin News, at 3076). [3] Following the enactment of IGRA, the Second Circuit addressed a similar situation to that presented here ( see Mashantucket Pequot Tribe v State of Conn., 913 F2d 1024 [2d Cir 1990]). The court determined that since Connecticut allowed certain class III gamingalthough it was highly restricted by statutethe State only regulated rather than prohibited this type of gaming ( see Mashantucket, 913 F2d at 1031-1032; see also Northern Arapaho Tribe v Wyoming, 389 F3d 1308, 1312 [10th Cir 2004]). [4]