Opinion ID: 2633881
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Asserted Insufficiency of the Evidence

Text: At the close of the prosecution's case-in-chief, defendant moved to dismiss, under section 1118.1, the charge of attempted forcible rape of Sorensen and the associated attempted-rape felony-murder charge and special circumstance allegation on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence. The trial court denied the motion. On appeal, defendant again contends the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions and the special circumstance finding. He is incorrect. Our role in reviewing such a challenge is limited. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and/or the due process clause of article I, section 15 of the California Constitution, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it discloses substantial evidencethat is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid valuefrom which a reasonable trier of fact could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1212, 17 Cal.Rptr.3d 532, 95 P.3d 811.) The appellate court presumes in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. ( People v. Kraft (2000) 23 Cal.4th 978, 1053, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 5 P.3d 68 ( Kraft ).) Defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence of the attempted rape of Sorensen consists primarily of viewing various items of evidence in isolation and arguing each could be viewed as pointing to his innocence of the charge rather than his guilt. Even if defendant's premise is correct, this is not persuasive on the issue we must address: whether no rational juror could have drawn the opposite inference from the evidence as a whole. Defendant also cites several past opinions in which we and the Courts of Appeal have found evidence insufficient to support a conviction for a crime involving sexual assault. Reviewing the sufficiency of evidence, however, necessarily calls for analysis of the unique facts and inferences present in each case, and therefore comparisons between cases are of little value. ( People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 516, 7 Cal.Rptr.2d 199, 828 P.2d 101.) Except as specifically mentioned below, the cases cited by defendant are not particularly helpful in reviewing the facts of the present case. Conviction of the crime of attempted forcible rape requires proof the defendant formed the specific intent to commit the crime of rape and performed a direct but ineffectual act, beyond mere preparation, leading toward the commission of a rape. (§ 21a; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 387, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708 ( Carpenter ).) The elements of the crime of forcible rape [27] are an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator ... [¶] ... [¶] [w]here it is accomplished against a person's will by means of force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another. (§ 261, subd. (a)(2).) [28] There is no dispute defendant and Sorensen were not spouses. The following evidence and the reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it are sufficient to prove the remaining elements of the crime and the special circumstance in question. [29] The incident occurred at night near a secluded highway exit in a rural area, beyond sight of passing motorists, a place and time defendant might attempt a rape more readily than in a place where discovery or intervention was a stronger possibility. The victim was a small 15-year-old girl, whereas defendant was a 21-year-old man who described himself as quite strong for his size, giving rise to a reasonable inference he knew that by physical force or threats of harm he could compel Sorensen to acquiesce in any demand he might make. In addition to the circumstances that defendant and Sorensen had first met that day and that Sorensen had a boyfriend, earlier that very evening in her telephone call to her boyfriend, Sorensen said she would not have sexual intercourse with him because she was menstruating. These facts lead to a reasonable inference that Sorensen would not have willingly agreed to have sexual relations with a relative stranger on a cold night, on the ground, near a highway exit. The victim was found nude and with her arms bound very tightly behind her back. Although, as we have stated in cases such as those cited by defendant, the circumstance of the victim's being found partially or wholly unclothed is not by itself sufficient to prove a rape or an attempted rape has occurred, such a fact is not irrelevant and is one of the relevant circumstances. Moreover, the combination of the nude state of Sorensen's body and the presence of physical restraint in this case provides stronger evidence that a forcible rape or attempted rape occurred than where the body simply is unclothed. Additionally, the jury reasonably could infer that the absence of signs of a strugglesuch as trauma to Sorensen's body or damage to her clothingwas the result of her surrender to defendant's demands in the hopes of surviving her ordeal, rather than proof she was a willing participant or was dead when she was undressed. Also, unlike several of the cases cited by defendant, here there was no evidence tending to show a sexual assault did not occur. When a victim is discovered a relatively short time after the crime, it is more likely the crime scene and the victim's body will show evidence of sexual assaultsuch as trauma to the body or sexual organs, or the presence of the perpetrator's bodily fluidsif such an assault occurred. An absence of such evidence in that type of case may be strong evidence the perpetrator did not have or intend to have sexual contact with the victim, which may tend to outweigh other facts and inferences, rendering the evidence of sexual assault legally insufficient. (See, e.g., People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 39, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673, overruled on another ground in Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 879, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 141 P.3d 135; People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 22, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942; People v. Craig (1957) 49 Cal.2d 313, 317, 316 P.2d 947.) Here, by contrast, the evidence did not tend to eliminate a sexual assault; it simply was inconclusive due to the nature of the crime scene and the advanced state of decomposition of Sorensen's body. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, defendant's own admissions support the conclusion there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier of fact to find he attempted to rape Sorensen. [30] Defendant told the officers he had sex with Sorensen and ultimately strangled her because he was scared. The jury reasonably could infer defendant was frightened because he just had forcibly raped Sorensen and feared being reported to the authorities. In addition, defendant told the officers that, while in a remote location at night, he had forced Garcia to have sex with him despite her resistance, and Garcia similarly later was found dead, nude, and with her hands tied behind her back. This was a significant prior act the jury could consider highly relevant in determining defendant also had the intent to rape Sorensen. (See Evid.Code, § 1101, subd. (b).) Defendant argues that even if the evidence adequately supports a finding he attempted to commit some sexual assault upon Sorensen, insufficient evidence existed for the jury to determine he specifically intended to have vaginal intercourse, which, as we stated in People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 676, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213 ( Holt ), is required for the commission of a rape. He relies upon our decision in People v. Raley (1992) 2 Cal.4th 870, 889-891, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 678, 830 P.2d 712 ( Raley ), in which we concluded the evidence was insufficient to sustain a guilty verdict on a charge of attempted forcible oral copulation. As mentioned above, however, the facts of other cases, such as Raley, are not particularly helpful in evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in this case. Here, the victim was found in a remote area, dead, nude, and bound; defendant admitted having had sex with her; evidence of the nature of the sexual assault was inconclusive due to the passage of time before her body was discovered; and defendant confessed to raping and killing another young woman in similar circumstances not long before this incident. (See, e.g., People v. Holloway (2004) 33 Cal.4th 96, 138-139, 14 Cal. Rptr.3d 212, 91 P.3d 164.) That defendant also may have had the intent to sodomize the victim, as one might surmise from his trial testimony, does not mean the jury rationally could not have inferred from the evidence as a whole that he had the specific intent to rape Sorensen and took a direct step beyond mere preparation toward effectuating his intent. Such a finding was not based upon suspicion and speculation, as defendant argues, but upon reasonable inferences from the evidence and, as such, was supported by legally sufficient evidence. Because sufficient evidence supported the jury's verdict of guilt of the attempted rape of Sorensen, we reject defendant's claim that the associated first degree murder conviction must be reversed and the attempted-rape special circumstance finding set aside.
Defendant next claims the evidence was insufficient to uphold the jury's first degree murder verdicts on a theory of premeditated and deliberated murder. We need not consider this claim since reversal is not necessary when the court can determine from the record that the verdict rested on a theory which is supported by sufficient evidence. ( People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 351, 253 Cal.Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289.) ( Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 671, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) We properly can, and do, make that determination here. The court correctly instructed the jury on theories of both first degree felony murder and premeditated, deliberated murder. We previously have concluded there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant attempted to rape Sorensen, and defendant has not challenged on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for attempting to rape Garcia. Indeed, the evidence of the latter crime, which is strikingly similar to that supporting the Sorensen verdict (and, in view of defendant's admissions to the officers, even stronger), is sufficient to support the verdict on the Garcia murder charge. In addition, adequate evidence existed for a rational jury to find the murders were committed during the commission of the attempted rapes, so as to support felony-murder convictions under section 189. (See People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 348, 253 Cal. Rptr. 199, 763 P.2d 1289 [the focus is on the relationship between the underlying felony and the killing and whether the felony is merely incidental to the killing, an afterthought].) Further, the jury's verdicts convicting defendant of first degree murder were accompanied by true findings on the special circumstance allegations that he committed the murders in the commission of the attempted rapes. Thus, the present case is similar to one in which the murder verdict did not indicate the theory on which the defendant was convicted, but the jury also returned special circumstances findings on rape.... (See also People v. Boyd (1985) 38 Cal.3d 762, 770, 215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782 [`Those [attempted-robbery special-circumstance] findings make it clear that whatever the jurors thought about premeditation, they agreed upon all of the elements necessary for a verdict of first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory. Consequently, any error in instructing on premeditation could not have prejudiced defendant.'].) ( Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 671, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) We therefore need not evaluate the sufficiency of the evidence of premeditation and deliberation to uphold the jury's first degree murder verdicts in this case. (See also Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at pp. 1177-1178, 24 Cal.Rptr.3d 112, 105P.3d 487.)