Opinion ID: 2168718
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: public policy precludes the gritzners' claim for negligent failure to warn

Text: ¶ 28. We first consider the Gritzners' claim that Bubner negligently failed to warn them of Michael's propensity to abuse Tara. In Kelli T-G., the court of appeals determined that public policy considerations barred a somewhat similar claim. Kelli T-G., 198 Wis. 2d at 130-31. A closer look at Kelli T-G. is helpful to understanding our determination that public policy concerns should bar the Gritzners' claim. ¶ 29. After Kelli T-G. was sexually abused by Gerald Charland, Kelli's mother and guardian ad litem filed suit against Charland's ex-wife, Patricia Neubauer, on the basis that Neubauer breached her duty to warn Kelli's mother about Charland's pedophilia. Id. at 125-26. ¶ 30. Neubauer and Charland were married in 1985 and had a daughter, Geri. Id. at 126. The couple separated approximately eight months after their marriage, and Neubauer filed for divorce a few months later. Id. Neubauer did not learn about Charland's convictions for sexually assaulting children until after the couple separated. Id. ¶ 31. Immediately following the couple's divorce, Charland was not allowed to have unsupervised visitation with Geri. Id. By approximately January 1991, Charland had completed counseling and probation for his prior convictions and was allowed unsupervised visitation. Id. ¶ 32. In April or May 1991 Neubauer became aware that Geri's friend Kelli sometimes played with Geri at Charland's home. Id. Neubauer was concerned about the risk that Charland might sexually abuse Kelli and intended to say something about it to Kelli's mother. Id. at 127-28. Neubauer testified that she asked Kelli's mother to call her at home, but that she did not take the affirmative step of telling Kelli's mother about Charland's convictions. Id. On July 15, 1991, Charland sexually abused Kelli. Id. at 125. ¶ 33. Neubauer moved for summary judgment against Kelli's claim, arguing that Wisconsin law imposes no duty to warn a third party about another person's dangerous propensities in the absence of a special relationship, and that no such special relationship had been established. Id. at 128. The trial court agreed. Id. ¶ 34. In its review, the court of appeals first noted that Wisconsin law is in conflict regarding what kind of relationship is necessary to establish a duty to warn about the dangerous propensities of third parties. Id. at 129. However, in a unanimous opinion, the court determined that it did not need to resolve that issue because the issue in this case is clearly resolved on public policy grounds. Id. We quote the court's discussion of the relevant public policy considerations in full: [R]ecovery [against Neubauer] would enter a field not only with no definable, sensible stopping point, but no sensible starting point as well. Slight variations on the facts of this case illustrate the virtual impossibility of defining a sensible starting or stopping point. Would Neubauer's duty to warn depend on whether she knew of Charland's progress in counseling or compliance with probation? Would her duty depend on her assessment of whether the criminal justice system had adequately addressed the dangers Charland posed? Would Neubauer's duty have varied if she had been a mental health or criminal justice professional? If so, would her duty have further varied according to her opinion about the appropriateness and adequacy of the probation and conditions ordered by the criminal court? If Charland had been charged but never convicted of child sexual abuse, and if Neubauer believed, nonetheless, that Charland was a pedophile, would she still have had a duty to warn? And if Neubauer had been wrong in her forecast of Charland's potential danger, would she have been liable to Charland for warning Carolyn T.? Moreover, who would Neubauer have a duty to warn? Neubauer answers that she would have a duty to warn only those where foreseeability of harm is clear . . . and where the foreseeable victim is known. Would that extend to the next door neighbor? Would that include every one of Kelli's close friends or classmates? To protect herself from potential liability, would Neubauer need to remain as ignorant as possible of Charland's activities and associations so that she would not come to know of his foreseeable victims? If so, ironically, any moral duty to warn that Neubauer otherwise might have felt would be undermined by potential liability for the legal duty she no longer could avoid. Tragically, sexual abuse has brought devastating consequences to countless children and their families. Sadly, our society has discovered that many pedophiles elude the control of the criminal justice system. Many seem unchanged despite psychotherapeutic intervention and the rehabilitation efforts of corrections, probation, and parole. As pedophiles sexually abuse children again and again, some state legislatures, in a desperate effort to locate new methods to stop the assaults, debate whether to enact neighborhood notification laws to warn citizens of paroled child molesters living in their communities. Thus, legislatures debate the appropriate scope of government's duty to warn and they struggle to define sensible starting and stopping points. For government, the struggle is extremely difficult as a matter of public policy. For an individual citizen, the struggle is extremely difficult as a matter of morality, and virtually impossible as a matter of law. Id. at 130-132. ¶ 35. In essence, the court of appeals determined that allowing recovery would impose liability for failure to warn in situations in which the decision whether to warn is fraught with difficulty and in which no just and sensible legal guidelines are available to limit liability. ¶ 36. For similar reasons, we conclude that in this case there are no just and sensible guidelines for defining liability for negligent failure to warn. Indeed, allowing recovery for failure to warn in this case would create liability with far fewer limiting guidelines than were available in Kelli T-G.. ¶ 37. To begin with, Charland was an adult who had been convicted of three offenses of sexually assaulting children and was known to possess child pornography. Michael, on the other hand, is a ten-year-old child who had previously engaged in unspecified inappropriate sexual acts with one or more children including his half-sister. It is not alleged that Michael was adjudicated delinquent based on his previous conduct. [5] If Bubner's knowledge that Michael had previously engaged in an unadjudicated, inappropriate sexual act with another child is sufficient to support a claim for failure to warn, it is difficult to imagine what level of knowledge would be insufficient to support liability. ¶ 38. Worse yet, allowing recovery in this case would extend a duty to warn to a much larger group of people than in Kelli T-G.. Unlike Charland, Michael is a child himself and is therefore in near-constant contact with other children. If liability for failure to warn is recognized under the facts alleged by the Gritzners, the same liability would extend to any child with whom Michael might play unsupervisedhis classmates at school, children at a birthday party, children at family gatherings, or children on a playground. There is no just or sensible reason to allow Tara to recover but to limit liability for these other children. [6] The practical effect would be to require any adult who cared for a child who had previously engaged in any conduct that could be characterized as an inappropriate sexual act to stigmatize this child in all of his or her relations with other children. We are greatly hesitant to impose such a limitless duty to warn. ¶ 39. The Gritzners urge that there are just and sensible stopping points for liability in this case because (1) Wis. Stat. § 48.01 (1997-98) [7] establishes an overriding public policy in favor of protecting a child from sexual abuse over protecting an adult from liability, and (2) Wis. Stat. § 48.981 authorized Bubner to report to the local Department of Human Services that Tara was at risk of being abused. According to the Gritzners, a common law cause of action for negligent failure to warn would further the public policies embodied by these statutes. ¶ 40. Although Wis. Stat. § 48.01 codifies a general public policy in favor of protecting children from all forms of abuse, it does not provide the just and sensible stopping points that are necessary before a civil cause of action in negligence may be recognized in Wisconsin. Similarly, although Wis. Stat. § 48.981 [8] authorizes private parties to report about abuse and the risk of abuse, it provides no basis for civil liability in this case. Section 48.981(2) requires that certain professionals in positions of authority, such as health professionals, teachers, childcare workers, and law enforcement personnel, report suspected abuse of a child. Persons who are subject to this mandatory reporting requirement may be fined and imprisoned for failure to report. Wis. Stat. § 48.981(6). All other persons may report abuse, but are not required to do so, and are not subject to any penalties for failure to report. §§ 48.981(2) and (6). Thus, § 48.981 does not provide a basis for a civil cause of action for negligent failure to warn. ¶ 41. Furthermore, requiring that adults give such broad warnings about a child seems contrary to the policy established in Children's Code provisions, which provide that juvenile law enforcement and court records are held confidential and may only be released by court order. See Wis. Stats. §§ 48.396, [9] 48.78; State ex rel. Herget v. Waukesha County Cir. Ct., 84 Wis. 2d 435, 450-52, 267 N.W.2d 309 (1978). Confidentiality of juvenile records is considered to be essential to the goal of rehabilitation. Id. at 451. These confidentiality concerns weigh against the Gritzners' claim. ¶ 42. We also note that the Wisconsin Legislature has confronted the issue of the need to warn the public about sex offenders in the community and has specifically provided for circumstances under which public protection outweighs confidentiality concerns. The State of Wisconsin maintains a sex offender registry and provides notice and access to information about sex offenders as necessary for public protection. See 1993 Wis. Act 98 § 116; 1995 Wis. Act 440; Wis. Stats. §§ 301.45 and 301.46. [10] These provisions apply not only to adult sex offenders but also to juvenile offenders who have been adjudicated delinquent. See Wis. Stat. §§ 301.45(1g)(a) [11] and 301.46; In the Interest of Jason J.C., 216 Wis. 2d 12, 18, 573 N.W.2d 564 (Ct. App. 1997)(rejecting a juvenile's argument that courts are empowered to expunge juvenile records because having to register as a sex offender under § 301.45 will have a stigmatizing effect). However, none of these provisions establishes a procedure under which the state issues warnings about a juvenile's unadjudicated acts of inappropriate sexual conduct, and none of these provisions imposes a duty to warn on private individuals. We would decline to impose such an obligation judicially. ¶ 43. Many courts have struggled with whether and under what conditions individuals may be held liable for failing to warn other individuals about the sexually abusive propensities of third parties. [12] We would not foreclose the possibility that under different circumstances a plaintiff could recover based on negligent failure to warn about a known risk of sexual abuse. We would merely hold that under the circumstances of this case, liability for failure to warn is barred by public policy. ¶ 44. In reaching this conclusion, we are very mindful of the permanent and devastating consequences of child sexual abuse. Nonetheless, we determine that a cause of action for negligent failure to warn should not provide a remedy under the circumstances of this case. Because allowing recovery would enter a field in which there are no just and sensible stopping points for liability, we would hold that the Gritzners' claim for negligent failure to warn is barred as a matter of law.