Opinion ID: 1818600
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: The second deed of trust was procured through fraud and misrepresentation.

Text: ¶ 23. Ballard alleges that the trial court erred in dismissing his claims of fraud and misrepresentation. Ballard submits that the trial court incorrectly relied on the rule that a person is charged with knowledge of a written instrument, regardless of whether they read it. In response, the Bank states that Ballard is bound as a matter of law by what he signed, that an essential element of any claim of fraud or misrepresentation is reasonable reliance, and that the Bank had no duty to advise Ballard with regard to the deeds of trust, as it had no fiduciary relationship with Ballard. ¶ 24. Numerous Mississippi cases support the Bank's contention that Ballard is bound as a matter of law by what he signed. See, e.g., Oaks v. Sellers, 953 So.2d 1077, 1082 (Miss.2007); Andrus v. Ellis, 887 So.2d 175, 180 (Miss.2004) (`[i]n Mississippi, a person is charged with knowing the contents of any document that he executes'; `[a] person cannot avoid a written contract which he has entered into on the ground that he did not read it or have it read to him'); Bailey v. Estate of Kemp, 955 So.2d 777 (Miss.2007); Carter v. Citigroup, Inc., 938 So.2d 809 (Miss. 2006); Alliance Trust Co. v. Armstrong, 185 Miss. 148, 163, 186 So. 633, 635 (1939) (To permit a party when sued on a written contract to admit that he signed it but to deny that it expresses the agreement he made or to allow him to admit that he signed it but did not read it or know its stipulations would absolutely destroy the value of all contracts.). ¶ 25. The Bank next notes that even consumer debtors alleging fraud have failed as a matter of law to escape their obligations despite claims of fraudulent inducement, as an essential element of any claim of fraud or misrepresentation is reasonable reliance. Franklin v. Lovitt Equipment Co., Inc., 420 So.2d 1370, 1373 (Miss.1982). As a matter of law, one may not reasonably rely on oral representations, whether negligently or fraudulently made by the lender, which contradict the plain language of the documents. See Rankin v. Brokman, 502 So.2d 644, 646 (Miss.1987) (A plaintiff's reliance on an allegedly fraudulent representation, concealment, or non-disclosure is not reasonable as a matter of law if the representation is contradicted by the written terms of a written contract he signed.). [A] person is under an obligation to read a contract before signing it, and will not as a general rule be heard to complain of an oral misrepresentation the error of which would have been disclosed by reading the contract. Godfrey, Bassett & Kuykendall Architects, Ltd. v. Huntington Lumber Co., Inc., 584 So.2d 1254, 1257 (Miss.1991). ¶ 26. Ballard's burden with respect to his claims of fraud and misrepresentation is a heavy one-one seeking to invalidate a deed of trust must produce clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Haygood v. First Nat'l Bank of New Albany, 517 So.2d 553 (Miss.1987); Haynes v. Avco Sec. Corp., 299 So.2d 198 (Miss.1974). See also, Thomas v. B. Rosenberg & Sons, 153 Miss. 314, 120 So. 732 (1929) (deeds of trust are presumed valid; cancellation of deeds of trust for fraud involves extraordinary power not to be exercised except in clear cases). ¶ 27. We find that the chancellor correctly held that the aforementioned authorities render irrelevant Ballard's rhetorical question: ... [W]ho reads all the fine print and all junk? Nobody. I never did. Like anyone else, Ballard is charged by law with knowing the contents of any documents that he signs. This is particularly true given that Ballard, by his own admission, had an opportunity to read the first deed of trust before signing, and that he signed the second deed of trust without reading it and in the presence of his grandson and a notary. Just as no one prevented Ballard from reading the documents which he signed, no one coerced him to sign the documents. ¶ 28. The facts support holding Ballard responsible for reading the instruments that he clearly signed. At the time he signed the first deed of trust, Ballard was sixty-eight years old. At the time he signed the second deed of trust, he was seventy-one. While Ballard did suffer from heart problems, he had no mental impairment. According to Ballard's deposition testimony, he still used a fax machine to transact business every day and had a computer for internet access and online trading. [5] While Ballard's widow and son, at trial, both denied that Ballard used either the fax machine or the internet, they did concede that Ballard acted competently when he signed a bill of sale for a $20,000 Lexus automobile on November 26, 2003; when he signed a deed conveying a remainder interest in the Chickasaw County land to Richard's son, Dane, in 2004; when he filed this lawsuit in 2004; when he served responses to the Bank's interrogatories on June 27, 2005; and when he gave his deposition on June 7, 2006. In addition, Ballard was never under a conservatorship, nor were steps ever taken to place him under a conservatorship. ¶ 29. Furthermore, Ballard was both educated and experienced, and was no stranger to commercial loan transactions. By his own account, Ballard had borrowed millions, and millions, and millions from other commercial lenders over the years, and also had considerable experience with lines of credit and deeds of trust. ¶ 30. Finally, according to Ballard, a claim for fraud can be based on a party's failure to disclose a fact, if he was under a duty to disclose that fact. See Holman v. Howard Wilson Chrysler Jeep, Inc., 972 So.2d 564 (Miss.2008). ¶ 31. As noted earlier, it is the Bank's position that it had no fiduciary relationship with Ballard and thus had no duty to advise him or make disclosures with regard to the deeds of trust. Numerous Mississippi cases support the Bank's position. See, e.g., MS Credit Ctr. v. Horton, 926 So.2d 167 (Miss.2006) (Duties to disclose or to act affirmatively, such as explaining the terms of a contract, do not arise in arm's length transactions or under an ordinary standard of care. Rather, they arise only in fiduciary or confidential relationships.); Turner v. Terry, 799 So.2d 25, 36 (Miss.2001) (parties to an arms-length transaction are charged with a duty to read what they sign; failure to do so constitutes negligence.). ¶ 32. In his final judgment, the chancellor agreed with the Bank in holding that [t]he Bank had no duty to explain things to Mr. Ballard or to protect him from his own grandson, who was not the Bank's agent. There is in any event no evidence that Mr. Ballard ever requested an explanation from the Bank. See, e.g., EquiFirst Corp.v. Jackson, 920 So.2d 458, 463 (Miss. 2006) (nothing indicates that anyone prevented [the borrowers] from reading the documents or asking any questions, rejecting contention that lender's closing attorney had an obligation to explain the contracts to them.). ¶ 33. We find, therefore, that the chancellor's dismissal of Ballard's claims of fraud and misrepresentation was proper and supported by the evidence.