Opinion ID: 901966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Consideration of the Evidence

Text: [¶ 21.] Once the presumption was rebutted, the Petitioners still had the ultimate burden of persuasion to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the property was not specially benefited. The City does not specifically challenge the circuit court's findings as clearly erroneous. But the City disagrees with how the circuit court considered and weighed the evidence. Specifically, the City takes issue with the circuit court's failure to give the City's testimony and evidence greater weight. The City also claims the circuit court erred when it failed to give separate consideration to the special benefit provided to each property, particularly the properties affected on Tyler and Dakota Avenues. The City claims that the circuit court erred by focusing on the testimony of the two property owners, Hubbard and Orsbon, and disregarding the evidence of a myriad of problems demonstrated by the City's exhibits showing the pre-replacement conditions of other properties. The City claims that [t]he before and after photographs of the affected properties are evidence in and of themselves of the significant benefits [the Petitioners] received by virtue of the improvements. [¶ 22.] The City called John Childs, the City Engineer, who testified that the primary reason for the City's project was to replace the water mains. Childs noted that the streets and curb and gutter were also replaced to meet current standards as part of the replacement project. He testified that the curb and gutter was a nonstandard configuration and had reached the end of its useful life in many areas. He indicated that the condition of the road pan could not be determined because it was covered with asphalt. The City estimated the condition of the pan based on the age and condition of the curb. The decision to replace all the curb and gutter on Grand Avenue, rather than just the defective sections as it had done on Tyler and Dakota Avenues, was to ensure an even and continuous flow line. Childs testified that the benefits of replacing the curb, gutter, and driveways was to provide[] proper drainage away from the properties and the streets to where there is not an opportunity for water to penetrate the subsurface and damage properties. Childs also admitted that the pictures taken by the City did not show the entire curb sections to be replaced. Instead, Childs testified that the photographs primarily show[ed] the defects. [¶ 23.] The circuit court noted that Child's key admission was that a uniform curb style throughout an area provides no more benefit to property owners than does a collective variety of curb styles. The circuit court also noted that Childs had difficulty specifying any area in any of the exhibits where the curb and gutter structure prior to replacement had damages or could damage the homeowner's property. This finding by the circuit court referred to the before and after photographs of the replaced curb and gutter segments. [¶ 24.] The City's mayor, Dennis Eisnach, also testified. He explained the difference in the three projects and why the piecemeal curb and gutter replacement was used on Tyler and Dakota Avenues and why total replacement was used on Grand Avenue. The Grand Avenue total replacement was done to direct the flow of storm water, create contour uniformity, and update aging curb. The mayor indicated that the decision to specially assess for curb, gutter, and driveway costs was due to a belief that the property owners individually benefited more than the City in general. The mayor acknowledged that the benefit may not increase the value of property, but there was an element of protecting the property, the private property as well as the City property. The mayor candidly admitted that the decision to impose special assessments for curb and gutter helps defray the City's cost for the total project and that it's always been done that way. [¶ 25.] The circuit court gave more weight to the Petitioners' testimony and evidence. The circuit court noted that it was undisputed that replacing the curb and gutter did not enhance the value of the abutting property. Recognizing that special benefits may accrue in other ways, the circuit court considered the City's claim that the new curb and gutter protected the property by providing proper drainage. The circuit court determined that the benefit of replacement curb and gutter was the same for the property owners as it was for the community at large and that many of the benefits only benefited the City. The circuit court analyzed the evidence as follows: The City and the property owners do enjoy the joint benefit of having old concrete curb and gutter replaced by new concrete, increasing its useful life and the lifespan of the streets. However, it is difficult to ascertain which properties benefited from this improvement since the old curb and gutter was installed anywhere from the mid-1930's up until 2006. Another benefit cited by the City is that the profile of the curb and gutter would be uniform throughout the City of Pierre. Since the profile of the curb has nothing to do with its functionality, this is a public benefit only. In addition, Petitioners in the historic district view the new profiles as detrimental to their neighborhood as it fails to match the architecture of the historic homes, and the lower profiles fail to protect their property as well as the older, higher curbs. The City has indicated that replacing the curb and gutter at the same time they replaced the streets was the most efficient and economical course to follow which is beneficial to the City and the taxpayers. Finally, another benefit cited by the City is that the property owners benefited by the individualized approach [taken] in addressing the needs of each property, which included utilizing driveway approaches when required. However, conforming the project to the adjoining property also benefits the City by insuring the functionality of the curb and gutter which in turn benefits the streets by protecting their integrity and increasing their lifespan. The circuit court concluded, based on the testimony and evidence, that replacing the curb and gutter and driveway approaches provided no actual, physical, material and quantifiable special benefits to the adjacent properties. It further determined that the special assessments were levied using `speculative and conjectural' methods, creating an alleged benefit in excess of the increase in specific monetary or extrinsic value conferred, for projects that provided significant benefits to the City and the community as a whole. The parties did not request the circuit court to examine individual property assessments in relation to accrued benefits. The focus was on the assessment as a whole. The circuit court found that, based on the evidence, the Petitioners had shown that replacement curb and gutter did not provide a measurable benefit to abutting property. [3] [¶ 26.] On review, this Court defers to the circuit court, as fact finder, to determine the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. On appeal, [t]he question is not whether this Court would have made the same findings the circuit court did, but whether on the entire evidence, `we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.' Wangsness v. Builders Cashway, Inc., 2010 SD 14, ¶ 9, 779 N.W.2d 136, 139 (quoting New Era Mining Co. v. Dakota Placers, Inc., 1999 SD 153, ¶ 7, 603 N.W.2d 202, 204). This Court resolves conflicts in evidence in favor of the circuit court's determinations. See Baun v. Estate of Kramlich, 2003 SD 89, ¶ 21, 667 N.W.2d 672, 677 (citing In re Estate of Till, 458 N.W.2d 521, 523 (S.D. 1990)). This Court has said: [t]he credibility of the witnesses, the import to be accorded their testimony, and the weight of the evidence must be determined by the trial court, and we give due regard to the trial court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and examine the evidence. Id. [¶ 27.] The City claims the circuit court incorrectly weighed the evidence and should have given more weight to the City's testimony and evidence. It is not our role on appeal to retry this case or substitute our judgment as to credibility and weight of the evidence. This Court defers to the circuit court because of its ability to observe the witnesses. The circuit court was persuaded by the credibility and weight of the Petitioners' evidence. The circuit court was unable to conclude from the evidence that the replaced curb, gutter, and driveways provided actual, physical, material and quantifiable special benefits to the property assessed. The most that could be determined from the City's evidence was that replacing the curb and gutter extended its useful life by varying estimates and in some cases may have improved the flow of water away from the property. The City's quantification of the benefits, however, was ambiguous and conclusory in that the City assumed the benefits equaled the cost. The circuit court determined that the Petitioners' evidence demonstrated that the replaced curb, gutter, and driveway did not provide a benefit above and beyond or differing from the benefit enjoyed by the rest of the community. Because the circuit court's findings of fact are based on the evidence and not clearly erroneous, we decline to substitute our judgment as to the weight and credibility of the evidence, as urged by the City. The circuit court applied the correct law regarding the question whether the special assessments were constitutional. The circuit court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law that the special assessments were unconstitutional. Thus, the City has not shown that the circuit court erred. [¶ 28.] We note that this opinion should not be read broadly to mean that as a matter of law special assessments cannot be used for replacement curb and gutter. Whether special assessments are constitutional depends heavily on the nature and character of the project and the facts of the individual case. Additionally, we decline to address whether enjoining the entire assessment role was the appropriate remedy. That issue was neither raised to the circuit court nor preserved for appeal. [4] [¶ 29.] The circuit court is affirmed. [¶ 30.] GILBERTSON, Chief Justice, and KONENKAMP and SEVERSON, Justices, and GIENAPP, Circuit Court Judge, concur. [¶ 31.] GIENAPP, Circuit Court Judge, sitting for ZINTER, Justice, disqualified.