Opinion ID: 1684647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Examination of Coy Thomason

Text: Marshall next argues that the trial court erred by not allowing counsel to question former juror Coy Thomason before the hearing and by thereafter limiting the manner and scope of the questioning of Thomason. As discussed above, a trial court's decision whether to allow an interview of jurors after trial is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Boyd, 910 So.2d at 178; Maler, 579 So.2d at 101; Shere, 579 So.2d at 94-95. Moreover, a trial court's decision regarding the manner and scope of questioning of jurors also is subject to review for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Melrose Nursery, Inc., 832 So.2d at 892-93; Sconyers v. State, 513 So.2d 1113, 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (If the trial court finds that a further interview of a juror or jurors is warranted, then it should conduct such interview(s), in its discretion, as would be necessary to determine the merits of appellant's allegations.). Marshall asserts that the trial court abused its discretion because parties may engage in prehearing discovery relating to a postconviction motion. In support of this argument, Marshall cites our decision in State v. Lewis, 656 So.2d 1248, 1249-50 (Fla.1994). Contrary to Marshall's implication, Lewis does not suggest that parties have an unqualified entitlement to engage in prehearing discovery relating to a postconviction motion. Rather, the availability of discovery in a postconviction case is a matter firmly within the trial court's discretion. See id. at 1250. Marshall also suggests that because different rules govern informal juror interviews by counsel [3] and formal juror interviews by a court, [4] the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing counsel to informally interview Coy Thomason. However, Marshall did not file a notice of intent to interview juror Coy Thomason; Marshall filed a motion to interview Thomason and cited to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.431(h) in support of the motion. [5] Importantly, the trial court's order granting the motion in part clearly states that the interview would be conducted by the court pursuant to rule 1.431(h). Rule 1.431(h) provides that [i]f the interview is permitted, the court may prescribe the place, manner, conditions, and scope of the interview. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.431(h). Furthermore, this Court and other courts have found it to be within a court's discretion to conduct the interview itself. See Kelley v. State, 569 So.2d 754, 762 (Fla.1990) (explaining that the Court had previously relinquished jurisdiction to permit the judge to interview the jurors); Sconyers, 513 So.2d at 1117 (remanding for the trial court to conduct juror interviews). We directed in Marshall II that the trial court may wish to conduct most or all of the questioning of the jurors, thereby ensuring that unnecessarily intrusive questions will not be asked of the jurors and to prevent questioning on matters that inhere in the verdict. 854 So.2d at 1253. The trial court expressed a desire to adhere to this suggestion when it denied Marshall's request to informally interview Coy Thomason. For all these reasons, we conclude the trial court's decision to deny Marshall an informal interview of Thomason was not an abuse of discretion. Marshall also contends that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting the scope of the questioning of Thomason. In an attempt to restrict the scope of the hearing on remand but allow for a more thorough examination of Coy Thomason based on the allegations in Debra Thomason's affidavit, the trial court conducted a multipart interview of Thomason. In light of the rather delicate nature of juror interviews in general (in order to avoid matters that inhere in the verdict) and in light of this Court's cautionary language about the narrow scope of the hearing on remand in this specific case, we conclude the trial court's decision was not an abuse of discretion. In addition to asking the questions posed to the other jurors, the trial court asked Thomason two questions apparently proposed by the State. The court first asked, While you were a juror trying the Matthew Marshall case, did you ever discuss the case with your ex-wife Debra Thomason or any people at your place of work? Next, the court asked, Did you ever read any newspaper articles regarding the Matthew Marshall case while you were a juror on the case? Thomason replied in the negative to both questions. Both questions focused on the specific allegations in Debra Thomason's affidavit. Marshall's counsel proposed five additional questions for the court to ask Coy Thomason. The State did not object to the first question, so the court asked Thomason, First . . . did you at anytime carry a briefcase with you containing articles of the Matthew Marshall case? Thomason replied that he did not. Like the earlier question asked by the court to Thomason, this question focused on a specific allegation in Debra Thomason's affidavit. The court also asked Thomason a question which was a rephrased version of a question originally proposed by Marshall: Did anyone tell you or have you read any newspaper articles or heard anything on radio or television about why you were being called here today? Thomason responded in the negative. Although this question did not focus on the allegations in the Debra Thomason's affidavit, it did concern Thomason's awareness of the ongoing inquiry into the allegations of juror misconduct. The court also sustained objections to other questions proposed by Marshall. While the questions may not have improperly inquired into matters which inhere in the verdict, they related to matters not specifically alleged in Debra Thomason's affidavit. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the questions raised issues that were not presented. In sum, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing counsel to informally interview former juror Coy Thomason or by limiting the manner and scope of the questioning of Thomason.