Opinion ID: 2002109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Federal and State Anti-Discrimination Laws.

Text: The Public Advocate also contends that the occupancy preference, because of the disproportionately-low minority-resident and-worker population in the six municipalities, has the effect of favoring eligible white households as occupants of the newly-constructed affordable-housing units and virtually excluding minorities from the units eligible for the preference. The Public Advocate asserts that the occupancy preference's discriminatory impact on minorities violates federal and state anti-discrimination statutes. Using the Borough of Bloomingdale to illustrate its contentions, the Public Advocate notes that although African-Americans and Hispanics constitute only 1.5% of Bloomingdale's population, they comprise 20.9% of the residential population of the Northeast region. In the aggregate, African-American and Hispanic households constitute 50.5% of the region's low- and moderate-income housing population, and are approximately 3.7 times as likely as white households to be categorized as eligible for low- and moderate-income housing. Bloomingdale's fair share of the region's prospective and reallocated present need is 117 units, which is to be satisfied by rezoning land to permit the development of 118 units of low- and moderate-income housing. Fifty-nine units will be eligible for the occupancy preference. Because COAH did not conduct an evidentiary hearing on the issue, the record does not reveal the number of minority workers in Bloomingdale eligible for low- and moderate-income housing, but the Public Advocate asserts that virtually all workers in Bloomingdale are residents. Accordingly, the Public Advocate assumes that because of the extremely small number of African-American and Hispanic residents and workers in Bloomingdale, all or nearly all of the fifty-nine units eligible for the occupancy preference will be allocated to white households. The Public Advocate observes that if those units were not subject to an occupancy preference and were allocated to minority households, in the same proportion as such households are represented in the region's eligible low- and moderate-income population (50.5%), approximately thirty of the fifty-nine units would be occupied by minority households. Based on the current average size of Bloomingdale households, minority occupancy of those thirty units would represent an increase of approximately 81% in Bloomingdale's minority population. The Appellate Division addressed the Public Advocate's contentions in its Warren Township opinion, supra, 247 N.J. Super. at 174-77, 588 A. 2d 1227, focusing primarily on whether the occupancy preference violated the federal Fair Housing Act, which prohibits discrimination in the sale or rental of housing because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status or national origin. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a). The Appellate Division reasoned that the federal Act does not deal with a preference for government sponsored housing which is extended on the basis of present residence or place of employment. Therefore, unless an occupancy preference for government sponsored housing is adopted as a subterfuge for discrimination on the basis of race or another ground proscribed by 42 U.S.C.A. § 3604(a), which is not alleged in this case, it does not violate the federal Fair Housing Act. [247 N.J. Super. at 176, 588 A. 2d 1227.] Moreover, because the Appellate Division had determined that the municipalities had legitimate reasons for granting the occupancy preference, that court concluded that even if disparate racial impact had been established, the occupancy preference would violate neither the federal Fair Housing Act nor the Law Against Discrimination, N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -42. The Appellate Division observed that the occupancy preference furthers a `legitimate, bona fide governmental interest' and the Public Advocate has failed to suggest any alternative provision which `would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect.' Id. at 177, 588 A. 2d 1227 (quoting Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F. 2d 926, 936 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15, 109 S.Ct. 276, 102 L.Ed. 2d 180 (1988)). The Public Advocate contends that the Appellate Division's application of the federal Fair Housing Act to the occupancy preference erroneously requires proof of a racially-discriminatory purpose, noting that proof of a racially-disparate impact is sufficient to establish a violation of the Act. Moreover, the Public Advocate asserts that the Appellate Division improperly relied on governmental justifications for the occupancy preference, observing that the alleged justifications had never been the subject of an evidentiary hearing and the Public Advocate had been given no forum in which to rebut their validity. The governmental justifications on which the Appellate Division relied were: (1) the interest of municipalities in providing affordable housing for existing residents who encounter financial downturns; (2) the desire to preserve a municipality's social fabric by providing affordable housing for residents with roots in the community; (3) the desirability of encouraging adoption of fair-share plans likely to meet with approval by community residents, thereby promoting voluntary compliance with the Act. Warren Township, supra, 247 N.J. Super. at 172-73, 588 A. 2d 1227. The Public Advocate contends that the governmental justifications cited by the Appellate Division are factually unsupported and legally insufficient. We note the possible parallel or overlap concerning the governmental justifications that may be relevant to whether the occupancy preference results in impermissible discrimination and the factors that determine whether such preferences can be reconciled with the Fair Housing Act and Mount Laurel doctrine. However, our disposition of these appeals will focus essentially on the grounds implicating the State's affordable-housing policy and will not rest primarily on the alleged violation of Title VIII. Further, the ultimate resolution of federal and State discrimination issues requires, in our view, a broader and more detailed record than that before the Court. Consequently, we choose not to delve extensively into the federal case law that has applied the provisions of Title VIII to a diverse variety of allegations of discrimination in the provision of housing. A summary of the prevailing principles, however, is instructive. The cases interpreting Title VIII uniformly hold that a facially-neutral law or policy that results in a discriminatory effect on the sale or rental of housing will establish a prima facie violation of Title VIII, even if unaccompanied by evidence of discriminatory intent. See, e.g., Familystyle of St. Paul v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 923 F. 2d 91, 94 (8th Cir.1991); Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F. 2d 1215, 1223 (4th Cir.1989); Huntington Branch NAACP, supra, 844 F. 2d at 933-36; Betsey v. Turtle Creek Assocs., 736 F. 2d 983, 986-87 (4th Cir.1984); Smith v. Town of Clarkton, N.C., 682 F. 2d 1055, 1065 (4th Cir.1982); Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F. 2d 1032, 1036-38 (2d Cir.1979); Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F. 2d 126, 146-48 (3d Cir.1977), cert. denied sub nom. Whitman Area Improvement Council v. Resident Advisory Bd., 435 U.S. 908, 98 S.Ct. 1457, 55 L.Ed. 2d 499 (1978); Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Arlington Heights, 558 F. 2d 1283, 1288-90 (7th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025, 98 S.Ct. 752, 54 L.Ed. 2d 772 (1978); United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 508 F. 2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 95 S.Ct. 2656, 45 L.Ed. 2d 694 (1975). The Second Circuit's opinion in Huntington Branch, supra, appears to reflect the dominant view of the prevailing standards of proof in Title VIII cases. The Huntington Branch of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), Housing Help, Inc. (HHI), and two African-American residents of Huntington had instituted suit alleging that Huntington had violated Title VIII by restricting private construction of multi-family housing to a narrow urban-renewal area in which fifty-two percent of the residents were minority, and by refusing to rezone a parcel in a virtually all-white neighborhood where plaintiffs wished to build multi-family housing. 844 F. 2d at 928. HHI had intended to sponsor a racially-integrated project, and had determined that because ninety-five percent of Huntington's residents were white, the project could achieve racial integration only if it were located in a white neighborhood. Id. at 929-30. The Town Board of Huntington rejected the rezoning request based on an alleged lack of public transportation, the potential creation of traffic hazards, and the threatened disruption of residential patterns in the neighborhood, and recommended that the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development reject HHI's request for funding. Id. at 932. Reversing the district court, which had applied an intent-based standard for the disparate impact claim, 668 F. Supp. 762, 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), the Second Circuit relied on the legislative history of Title VIII, the parallel between Title VIII and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and what it termed practical considerations to conclude that proof of discriminatory impact alone can sustain a violation of Title VIII. 844 F. 2d at 934-35. Observing that an intent requirement would strip the statute of all impact on de facto segregation, the court noted that the Third Circuit in Rizzo, supra, had found significant the rejection by the Senate of an amendment requiring proof of discriminatory intent to succeed in establishing a Title VIII claim. 844 F. 2d at 934 (quoting Rizzo, supra, 564 F. 2d at 147). The court also noted that both Title VIII and Title VII were part of a coordinated scheme of federal civil rights laws enacted to end discrimination   , 844 F. 2d at 935 (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-36, 91 S.Ct. 849, 852-56, 28 L.Ed. 2d 158, 163-67 (1971), as authority for the principle that proof of discriminatory effect is sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of Title VII). 844 F. 2d at 935. (Although the United States Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 109 S.Ct. 2115, 104 L.Ed. 2d 733 (1989), significantly eviscerated the holding in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., supra , the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, overruled much of the diluting effect of Wards Cove, and section 105(a) of that Act amends Title VII specifically to provide that disparate impact discrimination is an unlawful employment practice. Cuello Suarez v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth., 798 F. Supp. 876, 883 n. 5 (D.P.R. 1992); see Charles Sullivan et al., Special Release on the Civil Rights Act of 1991 22 (1992) (supplementing Employment Discrimination 2d ed.)). Finally, the Second Circuit expressed the practical concern that facially-neutral rules bear no relation to discrimination upon passage, but develop into powerful discriminatory mechanisms when applied. 844 F. 2d at 935. The Eighth Circuit also acknowledged that concern in City of Black Jack, supra, in recognizing that the arbitrary quality of thoughtlessness can be as disastrous and unfair to private rights and the public interest as the perversity of a willful scheme. [508 F. 2d at 1185 (quoting Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401, 497 (D.D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F. 2d 175 (D.C. Cir.1969) ( en banc )).] In its assessment of the strength of the plaintiffs' proofs of discriminatory impact, the Huntington court distinguished between adverse impact on a particular minority group and harm to the community generally by the perpetuation of segregation, 844 F. 2d at 937, and concluded that the Town's refusal to amend its zoning ordinance to permit privately-built multi-family housing at the proposed site significantly perpetuated segregation in Huntington. Id. at 938. Having determined that the proof of discriminatory impact was sufficient to establish a prima facie case, the court adopted the Third Circuit's formulation in Rizzo, supra, requiring defendant to prove that its actions furthered    a legitimate, bona fide governmental interest and that no alternative would serve that interest with less discriminatory effect. Id. at 936 (citing Rizzo, supra, 564 F. 2d at 148-49). The court also expressed its agreement with the principle that in weighing the governmental justification against the discriminatory impact, the balance should be more readily struck in favor of the plaintiff when it is seeking only to enjoin a municipal defendant from interfering with its own plans rather than attempting to compel the defendant itself to build housing. Id. at 940 (citing Arlington Heights, supra, 558 F. 2d at 1293). The court concluded that the strong demonstration of discriminatory impact substantially outweighed the Town's justifications for refusing to rezone, id. at 940-41, and entered judgment directing the Town to rezone the plaintiff's proposed site for multi-family housing. The Public Advocate asserts that the occupancy preference also violated the LAD, which prohibits racial discrimination in the provision of housing. N.J.S.A. 10:5-4, -12. We often have observed that the LAD `is aimed at fulfilling provisions of the state constitution guaranteeing civil rights.' Andersen v. Exxon Co., 89 N.J. 483, 492, 446 A. 2d 486 (1982) (quoting Goodman v. London Metals Exch., 86 N.J. 19, 30-31, 429 A. 2d 341 (1981)); accord Jones v. Haridor Realty Corp., 37 N.J. 384, 392-93, 181 A. 2d 481 (1962); Levitt & Sons v. Division Against Discrimination, 31 N.J. 514, 524, 158 A. 2d 177, appeal dismissed, 363 U.S. 418, 80 S.Ct. 1257, 4 L.Ed. 2d 1515 (1960). Although our disposition of these appeals does not require that we decide the issue, our precedents persuasively suggest that proof of discriminatory impact alone, without proof of discriminatory intent, would be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the LAD. See, e.g., Countiss v. Trenton State College, 77 N.J. 590, 595, 392 A. 2d 1205 (1978); Lige v. Montclair, 72 N.J. 5, 11, 367 A. 2d 833 (1976); Giammario v. Trenton Bd. of Educ., 203 N.J. Super. 356, 361, 497 A. 2d 199 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 102 N.J. 336, 508 A. 2d 212 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1141, 106 S.Ct. 1791, 90 L.Ed. 2d 337 (1986); cf. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 329, 443 A. 2d 148 (1982) (upholding Camden requirement that 40% of all public works contract employees be city residents as consistent with objectives of LAD, but observing that underlying legislative purpose would have been frustrated if minority population of Camden were less than that of surrounding area), rev'd on other grounds, 465 U.S. 208, 104 S.Ct. 1020, 79 L.Ed. 2d 249 (1984). We also take note of the Public Advocate's contention that the occupancy preference violates article 1, pars. 1 and 5 of the New Jersey Constitution, and the view of the dissenting member of the Appellate Division that the occupancy preference not only lacked statutory authority, 247 N.J. Super. at 183, 588 A. 2d 1227, and disserv[ed] the purposes of our Mount Laurel holdings, id. at 186, 588 A. 2d 1227, but also violated the fundamental freedom to travel protected under the federal constitution, id. at 183-86, 588 A. 2d 1227 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S.Ct. 1322, 22 L.Ed. 2d 600 (1969)). In view, however, of our disposition of these appeals on other grounds, we decline to resolve or address those issues.