Opinion ID: 2029756
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Nitcher's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Text: Nitcher claims original and substitute counsel did not render effective assistance as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Iowa Constitution. Claims involving the ineffective assistance of counsel have their basis in the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and thus are examined de novo. State v. Wills, 696 N.W.2d 20, 22 (Iowa 2005). Although these claims are typically preserved for postconviction relief actions, we will address such claims on direct appeal when the record is sufficient to permit a ruling. Id. Nitcher claims his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the warrantless search of the residence. He argues there is no applicable exception to the warrant requirement permitting Carroll and Fountas to enter the residence without a warrant. He concludes that because the warrantless search cannot be justified, the evidence obtained pursuant to the search warrant is tainted and inadmissible. In order for a defendant to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty and (2) prejudice resulted. Id. In order to satisfy the first element, `counsel's performance is measured against the standard of a reasonably competent practitioner with the presumption that the attorney performed his duties in a competent manner.' State v. Doggett, 687 N.W.2d 97, 100 (Iowa 2004) (citations omitted). Prejudice exists where `there is a reasonable probability that, but for the counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' Wills, 696 N.W.2d at 22 (citations omitted). The Fourth Amendment assures [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV. The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution makes the Fourth Amendment binding on the states. State v. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Iowa 2005). In addition, article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution guarantees [t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable seizures and searches shall not be violated. Iowa Const. art. I, § 8. Nitcher has not asked us nor have we found a basis to distinguish the protection afforded by the Iowa Constitution from that afforded by the federal constitution under the facts of this case. Therefore, our analysis of the search issue will apply equally to both the state and federal constitutional grounds raised by Nitcher. State v. Simmons, 714 N.W.2d 264, 271 (Iowa 2006). Initially, it is necessary to decide if Nitcher had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises searched, both subjectively and objectively. State v. Lovig, 675 N.W.2d 557, 562-63 (Iowa 2004). We have said it is apparent the Fourth Amendment protects the physical entry of a person's home. Id. at 563. We have acknowledged a legitimate expectation of privacy may extend to protect an overnight guest in the host's home, but we have also found no legitimate expectation of privacy if a guest is there simply to conduct a business transaction. Id. Nitcher had been staying at the residence for a few days because of an argument he had with his girlfriend. As Nitcher and the State agree, Nitcher had a legitimate expectation of privacy in view of his status as an overnight guest at the residence. Because a legitimate expectation of privacy existed, absent a recognized exception to the search warrant requirement, searches and seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable. Freeman, 705 N.W.2d at 297. These exceptions include `searches based on consent, plain view, probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances, searches incident to arrest, and those based on the emergency aid exception.' Id. (citation omitted). The State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that such a recognized exception applies. Id. In making this determination, we must assess a police officer's conduct based on an objective standard. Id. The State claims the officers had probable cause coupled with exigent circumstances to enter the property near the garage area. There is probable cause to conduct a search if, under the totality of the circumstances, a person of reasonable prudence would believe that evidence of a crime might be located on the premises to be searched. State v. Davis, 679 N.W.2d 651, 656 (Iowa 2004). Carroll knew ether is one of the necessary ingredients to make methamphetamine. The detection of the odor of ether coming from the residence gave Carroll and Fountas reason to approach the door of the residence to investigate the smell. See State v. Dickerson, 313 N.W.2d 526, 532 (Iowa 1981) (stating officers conducting an investigation did not invade the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy by going to a door that various members of society may use to call on the home in their personal or business pursuits). After knocking and identifying themselves as police officers, the officers heard the person at the door shuffle away from the door and run toward the garage. Only then did Carroll proceed to the area by the garage. Although Carroll walked across the property to get to the garage area, under these circumstances it was reasonable for him to do so in order to make contact with the person he heard at the door run toward the garage, in case that person attempted to exit the residence through a door near the garage. Cf. State v. Lewis, 675 N.W.2d 516, 527 (Iowa 2004) (stating [i]f the officer had attempted to contact [the defendant] at his front door and received no response, the invasion of the curtilage may not have violated [the defendant's] Fourth Amendment rights); State v. Breuer, 577 N.W.2d 41, 49 (Iowa 1998) (noting some courts have found if no one responds to an officer's knock, it does not violate the Fourth Amendment for the officer to walk around the residence to look for another door to interview a person). While walking toward the garage, Carroll detected the distinct odor of anhydrous ammonia and heard the shuffling of a person or persons in the garage. After Pierce opened the door, the officers detected a strong odor of ether in the entryway. They felt it was so strong that it was unsafe to enter the residence without wearing their respirators. They also noted Pierce appeared anxious and denied the obvious presence of the chemical odor. Pierce also told the officers other persons were in the residence, including his wife and children. Under the totality of the circumstances, which included the odors of ether and anhydrous ammonia, the sound of a person running from the front door, the shuffling of the person or persons in the garage, Pierce's anxiousness, and his denial of the obvious presence of chemical odors, the officers had probable cause to believe the occupants of the residence were engaged in criminal activity related to the manufacture of methamphetamine. See Simmons, 714 N.W.2d at 273 (stating [b]ased on [an officer's] training and experience, coupled with the distinct odor of anhydrous ammonia and the lack of household uses for it, we find the officers had probable cause to believe the occupants of the apartment were engaged in criminal activity); see also Kleinholz v. United States, 339 F.3d 674, 677 (8th Cir.2003) (explaining law enforcement's detection of the odor of ether, a substance known to be used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, may alone establish probable cause). Exigent circumstances usually include `danger of violence and injury to the officers or others; risk of the subject's escape; or the probability that, unless taken on the spot, evidence will be concealed or destroyed.' State v. Holtz, 300 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Iowa 1981) (citation omitted). In Simmons, we noted an exigency posing a threat of danger to others allows officers to perform a limited search to remove the immediate risk. 714 N.W.2d at 273. We found [t]he volatile nature of and the dangers created by methamphetamine labs can be exigent circumstances justifying an immediate limited search of premises harboring such a lab, and we recognized various cases have upheld such searches to eliminate these potential hazards where officers had probable cause to believe an ongoing methamphetamine lab existed. Id. ; see also Kleinholz, 339 F.3d at 677 (explaining the volatile nature of methamphetamine labs presents exigent circumstances justifying an immediate limited search where law enforcement smelled ether). The record demonstrates exigent circumstances existed to allow the officers to do a limited search of the premises to eliminate the dangers associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine and to determine if other persons were on the premises who might be exposed to those dangers. The level of the chemical odor not only required the officers to wear respirators while inside the residence, but also caused them to call the fire department to the scene. When the officers entered the residence, they did so only to see if any dangers associated with the manufacture of methamphetamine were present and to make sure no other persons were still in the residence. They only searched areas big enough to hold a person. They did not open any drawers or search any areas where a person would not fit. They left the residence when they were satisfied no immediate danger existed and no more persons were in the residence. Thus, Carroll and Fountas's limited search of the residence was justified based on probable cause and exigent circumstances. The applicability of this exception to the warrant requirement means Nitcher's trial and substitute counsel were not ineffective for failing to challenge the warrantless entry. See Wills, 696 N.W.2d at 24 (finding trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise an issue with no merit). Accordingly, Nitcher's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must fail. See State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 809 (Iowa 2003) (recognizing failure to prove either a breach of an essential duty or prejudice is fatal to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims).