Opinion ID: 184743
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Significance of the Union Lawsuit

Text: The Board, in contending that the Union's filing of thelawsuit did not taint the representation election, does notdeny that the Union provided free legal services to voters; nor does it suggest that the filing of the suit may not haveaffected the outcome of the election. Instead, invoking itsown prior decision in Novotel New York, 321 N.L.R.B. 624(1996), the Board contends that the Act permits a union tosue an employer on behalf of its employees prior to anelection because such conduct is relevant to the criticalquestion facing employees in the election: namely, whetherthe union can improve working conditions. The Board alsoargues that a contrary holding would discourage unions from engaging in activity protected both by the Act and by theFirst Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 1.Bearing of a Lawsuit upon the Merits of an Election The Board's primary claim is that the Union's filing of thesuit demonstrated the vigor with which it would defend therights of Freund's employees and therefore enabled thoseemployees to cast more informed votes. Even more to thepoint, according to the Board, the suit gave Freund's employees an opportunity to evaluate the Union's ability to improvethe terms of their employment: Such assistance can demonstrate that the union knows how to improve working conditions in the plant, is capable of doing so, and is willing to doso. We agree that a union's willingness to prosecute a suitdesigned to insure that the wages paid to potential membersare legally adequate is at least relevant to the questionwhether its election would benefit the employees. See NLRBv. L & J Equip. Co., 745 F.2d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 1984) ([A]nemployee's vote should be governed ... by consideration ofthe advantages and disadvantages of unionization in his orher work environment). Indeed, in the abstract we supposethat anything a union does or has done--its track record, soto speak--may be relevant to the merits of a representationelection insofar as it helps employees to evaluate the likelihood that representation by a particular union will improvethose conditions. This only shows, however, that the Board's reasoningproves too much: It is equally applicable to any number ofother gratuities that a union might want to give employees inthe pre-election period, including the specific medical and lifeinsurance benefits, the gift of which the Board has held isforbidden by the Act. Like free legal services, medical andinsurance benefits are at least relevant to the union's claimthat it is willing and able to provide the employees with moredesirable working conditions. Nonetheless, although a unionis free to advertise the benefits for which its members areeligible, it may not give voters free samples of health orinsurance benefits before an election. See, respectively, Mailing Servs., 293 N.L.R.B. at 565-66, and Wagner, 167N.L.R.B. at 533. The Board's attempt to distinguish freelegal services therefore fails. Moreover, filing a lawsuit prior to an election is hardly, byitself, probative on the question whether the union knowshow to improve working conditions in the plant, is capable ofdoing so, and is willing to do so. Indeed, the lawsuit may bemeritless, even frivolous, for all one can tell merely from itshaving been filed. In the Nestle case, for example, the preelection suit was dismissed (after the election) for failure tostate a claim. When the union filed an amended complaintand the employer again moved to dismiss and added arequest for sanctions, the union agreed to withdraw its complaint with prejudice in exchange for the employer's withdrawing its motion for sanctions. See 46 F.3d at 580. Weexpress no view upon the merits of the union-sponsoredlawsuit involved in this case, of course: Like Freund's employees, we are in no position to make any informed judgmenton the subject. Our point is only that the Board's firstreason for rejecting Freund's objection does not withstandscrutiny. 2.Section 7 The Board next suggests that a union's suit against anemployer on behalf of voters in a representation election isboth protected by s 7 of the Act and consistent with labor'shistorical role of helping employees to improve their workingconditions. As the Board points out, unions frequently (anduncontroversially) file unfair labor practice charges againstemployers in the pre-election period; indeed, in some casesthey may even recover money for the employees as a result. Furthermore, according to the Board, a union's effort toadvance the interests of employees through litigation deserves special solicitude because it is among the core activities protected by s 7. The Board's argument here misses the point being pressedby Freund. Although the Board is certainly correct that aunion may file an unfair labor practice charge against anemployer during the critical period before an election, the purpose of such a charge is to prevent an employer's unfairlabor practice from inhibiting employees in the exercise oftheir right freely to vote for or against union representation. The ensuing litigation is not the cause of the problem; it isthe cure. GAF Corp., which the Board itself cites in thisregard, is a good example. There the employer had canceleda planned pay increase when the union began its campaign toorganize the employees. See 488 F.2d at 307-08. The unionfiled an unfair labor practice charge and the Board (whichwas later upheld by the court of appeals) ordered the employer to restore the status quo ante by granting the planned payincrease. See id. at 308-09. The Union had to initiatelitigation in order to prevent the employer from plac[ing] theonus on the Union for the loss of the increase and therebyinterfering with the employees' electoral choice. Id. at 309. Litigation necessary to protect the electoral process, however,cannot be equated with litigation intended improperly toinfluence the voters. The same point answers the Union's argument that theservice it rendered by filing the suit is no different from otherlegal services unions are unquestionably allowed to provide toemployees in the critical period before an election, such aspresent[ing] a case in support of the petitioned for bargaining unit and ... respond[ing] to the employer's objections tothe election results. Like a charge that an employer isconducting an unlawful campaign against union representation, such issues often have to be resolved before a validelection can take place: If the bargaining unit is not definedcorrectly, for instance, some employees may be improperly(dis)enfranchised. Unlike an unfair labor practice charge,however, the lawsuits at issue here and in the Nestle casewere not integral to the conduct of a fair election. Nor is there weight to the Board's argument that theUnion's lawsuit is unobjectionable because suing an employeris at the core of the activity protected by the Act. No partyto this case has expressed any doubt that a union may,pursuant to s 7, file a lawsuit in its representative capacity. Cf. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 565-66 (1978) ([I]thas been held [by the lower courts and by the Board] that the 'mutual aid or protection' clause protects employees fromretaliation by their employers when they seek to improveworking conditions through resort to administrative and judicial forums). The issue here is whether the Union improperly influenced the impending election by gratuitously bringingsuch a suit on behalf of employees it did not yet represent. Under the Act contestants in a representation election areroutinely prevented from exercising certain rights during thebrief time when their exercise might interfere with the voters'free choice. For example, although an employer may inordinary circumstances increase its employees' pay at will, itmay not grant a previously unscheduled raise during thecritical period prior to an election. See St. Francis Fed'n ofNurses and Health Professionals, 729 F.2d at 850-51. Similarly, while the s 7 right of employees to engage in ...concerted activities for the purpose of ... mutual aid orprotection would appear to cover a union's provision ofmedical and insurance services even to non-member employees, see Harvest Communications, Inc., 321 N.L.R.B. 40, 42(1996), as we have seen, the Board has nevertheless held thata union may not give such services to voters during thecritical pre-election period. See Mailing Servs., 293 N.L.R.B.at 565-66; Wagner, 167 N.L.R.B. at 533. It does not follow,therefore, that because a union ordinarily has the right unders 7 to sue an employer, it must have the right to do so in anyand all circumstances. Because the Board's undifferentiatedview of a union's right to sue on behalf of non-memberemployees ignores the employees' and the employer's countervailing interest in a free and fair representation election-- an interest the Board has zealously protected in analogoussituations--its decision cannot be upheld under s 7. 3.The First Amendment Though it stops short of arguing that the Constitutionforbids it from limiting in any way a union's ability to file apre-election lawsuit on behalf of non-member employees, theBoard does suggest that overturning the election in this casewould have first amendment implications, to which it mustbe sensitive. See Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983). In support of this argument, theBoard points to NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), inwhich the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a state antisolicitation law that would have severely limited the ability ofthe NAACP to help potential litigants, including personsunaffiliated with the organization, file school desegregationlawsuits. See id. at 420, 428-29. We shall assume arguendo that the Union had a firstamendment interest in filing the suit against the Company-- although the Union itself does not assert such an interest inthis case. As Freund points out, the Board again, as it did inits s 7 argument, fails utterly to come to grips with theproposition that, because of the need for an atmosphereamenable to rational decisionmaking, the parties to a representation election do not retain their full panoply of rightsduring the critical period. For instance, an employer unquestionably has a right, protected by the first amendment, toexpress inflammatory views on social issues, such as racerelations. When it expresses those views shortly before arepresentation election, however, the Board may concludethat this otherwise protected activity impermissibly interfered with the employees' right to a free and fair vote. SeeSewell Mfg. Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 66, 69-72 (1962); see alsoNLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 617 (1969) (Anyassessment of the precise scope of employer expression ...must be made in the context of its labor relations setting. Thus, an employer's rights cannot outweigh the equal rightsof the employees to associate freely, as those rights areembodied in [the Act]). So, too, a union organizer, whoordinarily has a constitutional right to speak to employeesregarding the benefits of unionization, see Thomas v. Collins,323 U.S. 516, 532 (1945), may not engage in a prolongeddiscussion with a voter in the polling area. See Milchem,Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 362-63 (1968). Without disavowing its earlier decisions that limit muchexpressive activity in the period prior to a representationelection, the Board here argues that one form of such activity--the filing of a pre-election lawsuit by a union on behalf ofnon-member employees--cannot be compromised even where the effect is to confer upon voters an otherwise unlawfulgratuity. This selective reasoning is, to say the least, notpersuasive.