Opinion ID: 1130864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence Code Section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) Applies in Juvenile Proceedings

Text: (1) Minor questions the application of Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) in juvenile proceedings. He notes that when section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) was enacted, Welfare and Institutions Code section 203 provided (and continues to provide) that [a]n order adjudging a minor to be a ward of the juvenile court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose, nor shall a proceeding in the juvenile court be deemed a criminal proceeding. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203.) Based on this language, he urges that the Legislature must have been aware of the difference between criminal and juvenile proceedings and must have intended that section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) not apply to the latter. Although it is true that procedural safeguards guaranteed to adult criminal defendants have not been applied ipso facto in delinquency matters ( Robert S. v. Superior Court (1992) 9 Cal. App.4th 1417, 1423 [12 Cal. Rptr.2d 489]), we cannot agree that this is an instance in which differing rules should govern. As we observed in Joe Z. v. Superior Court (1970) 3 Cal.3d 797, 801 [91 Cal. Rptr. 594, 478 P.2d 26] ( Joe Z. ), the `civil label-of-convenience' ( In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 50 [18 L.Ed.2d 527, 558, 87 S.Ct. 1428]) cannot obscure the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile proceedings, involving as they often do the possibility of a substantial loss of personal freedom. In Joe Z. we determined that trial courts should have the same degree of discretion over discovery in juvenile proceedings as in adult criminal matters. ( Joe Z., supra, 3 Cal.3d at p. 801.) Since that decision, discovery practice in delinquency proceedings generally has been derived from, and parallels, that in adult criminal cases. ( Robert S. v. Superior Court, supra, 9 Cal. App.4th at p. 1422.) Although Evidence Code section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) does not expressly refer to juvenile proceedings, we believe the same considerations that operate to protect the confidentiality of peace officer personnel records from disclosure in the adult context similarly govern their disclosure in delinquency cases. The Legislature's aim in enacting Senate Bill No. 1436 manifestly was to protect such records against fishing expeditions conducted by defense attorneys following the Pitchess decision ( supra, 11 Cal.3d 531). Peace officers' privacy interests do not vary with the age of the accused who seeks personnel records. Indeed, discovery has been granted pursuant to Evidence Code section 1043 in other reported juvenile cases. (See, e.g., Larry E. v. Superior Court (1987) 194 Cal. App.3d 25 [239 Cal. Rptr. 264]; Pierre C. v. Superior Court (1984) 159 Cal. App.3d 1120, 1122-1123 [206 Cal. Rptr. 82] [ordering issuance of writ of mandate to compel in camera hearing to determine discoverability of certain police personnel files in proceeding under Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602]; see also Kelvin L. v. Superior Court (1976) 62 Cal. App.3d 823 [133 Cal. Rptr. 325] [ Pitchess discovery before enactment of Evid. Code, § 1043].) Accordingly, we conclude that section 1045, subdivision (b)(2) applies in juvenile proceedings as well as in adult criminal matters.