Opinion ID: 203123
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reassignment to Career Position

Text: Generally, the First Amendment, as applied to the states and, in this case, Puerto Rico, through the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits the dismissal of a public employee solely on the basis of his or her political affiliation and beliefs. See Bd. of County Comm'rs, Wabaunsee County, Kan., v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 674-75, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996); Gómez v. Rivera Rodríguez, 344 F.3d 103, 109-10 (1st Cir.2003). One clear exception to this rule is in cases where political affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved. Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980). Given the need for elected officials to have a group of leaders and top subordinates who are responsive to their policy goals, the focus of our inquiry is whether the dismissed employee was in close working relationships with policymakers. Flynn v. City of Boston, 140 F.3d 42, 45 (1st Cir.1998) (recognizing that our cases have upheld dismissals on political grounds of mid- or upper-level officials or employees who are significantly connected to policy-making); cf. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976). In this case, the district court held that with respect to her demotion from Auxiliary Executive Director to Attorney III, Maymí had failed to establish a prima facie claim for either discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or for retaliation. In essence, the court concluded that because she was a trust employee, she was freely subject to removal from her position and, therefore, had no claim for adverse employment or violation of First Amendment rights to free speech. [4] We agree. There is no dispute that Maymí's appointment as Auxiliary Executive Director for Administration established her in a trust position. The job description states: This is executive work which participates and collaborates in the formulation and implementation of public policy of the agency. Pursuant to Puerto Rico law, she was a trust employee who is of free selection and removal. P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 3, § 1350. [5] Furthermore, her own actions belie any argument that she believed her position to be immune from political dismissal. Upon the appointment of Soto-Lacourt in April 2003, Maymí submitted a letter in which she expressed her desire to remain in the trust position, but recognized that she may be dismissed. Accordingly, Maymí was clearly not protected from partisan-based dismissal from her trust position. Maymí's next argument, that her dismissal was in retaliation for the exercise of her rights to free speech and association, is similarly unavailing. A government employee's First Amendment rights depend on a balance between the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ. of Township High Sch. Dist., 391 U.S. 563, 568, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968). Among those state interests which may be impaired by an employee's comments are discipline, promoting harmony among co-workers, interference with duties, and the interest in preserving a close working relationship for which personal loyalty and confidence is necessary. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987). The particular speech at issue in this case is Maymí's opposition to Soto-Lacourt's personnel decisions. [6] Maymí asserts that she was retaliated against for objecting to the dismissal of employees affiliated with the NPP, some of whom were career secretaries. According to Maymí, after explaining that the secretaries were excellent employees and could not be discriminated against and removed because of partisan affiliation, Soto-Lacourt responded: I cannot understand why you defend so much the NPP people. Later that same month, she was removed from her trust position and reinstated as a career attorney. Generally, we have recognized a reasonable working rule that where the employee is subject to discharge for political reasons under the Elrod and Branti cases, a superior may alsowithout offending the First Amendment's free speech guaranteeconsider the official's substantive views on agency matters in deciding whether to retain the official in a policy related position. Flynn, 140 F.3d at 47 (referring to Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 100 S.Ct. 1287, 63 L.Ed.2d 574 (1980)). Thus, even assuming for summary judgment that Maymí's statements challenging Soto-Lacourt's authority to terminate the secretaries' employment contributed to her dismissal, her position as a trust employee forecloses her claim. Here, Maymí's speech involved decisions regarding the hiring and firing of employees within the office. We have previously held that such speech is of the kind that may lead an employer reasonably to question the trust and confidence necessary to retain the employee: The issues about which [the plaintiffs] spokeand the speech to which they attribute their firingsrelated to the operation of the office (primarily to matters of hiring, firing and discipline). Yet it is issues of this kind, and the views of management employees about these issues, that are properly considered by the head of the office in deciding who is best suited to be her direct subordinates. Id. We are unpersuaded by Maymí's attempts to distinguish this case from. Flynn. Both cases involve claims brought by policymaking employees who were removed allegedly after expressing disagreement with partisan hiring and firing decisions within the office. In Flynn, the plaintiffs claimed that they suffered retaliation for disagreeing with the director's alleged desire to fire the entire central office staff and replace them with her own supporters and to fire those senior staff members who had worked for the previous director. Although the plaintiffs in Flynn were public servants honestly resisting very dubious behavior by a superior, we concluded that the alleged speech was not protected as it was an expression, of disagree[ment] with their superior on a number of policy and personnel issues before the agency [which they] (quite properly, based on their allegations) expressed . . . to her. Id. at 46. Likewise, in this case, Maymí expressed her disagreement with the defendants' alleged desire to terminate specific career employees on the basis of political affiliation. Importantly, she does not allege that she was required or ordered to carry out those allegedly illegal acts. In fact, much of her complaint and testimony indicates that she was excluded from human resource decisions and the dismissal process, generally. [7] Under Flynn, even if the plaintiff could prove at trial that her disagreement contributed to her firing, an employer is permitted to discharge an employee for insufficient trust and confidence on the basis of that disagreement. Accordingly, we conclude that any retaliation suffered as a result of the particular speech at issue here is unprotected by the First Amendment. [8]