Opinion ID: 2352739
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Failure to Refute Evidence of Robbery and Burglary

Text: Appellant also alleges that his lawyer was deficient in failing to refute evidence of robbery and burglary. First, Appellant points out that his lawyer failed to tell the jury that the bottle of pills found in his home was not the most recent bottle ordered by the victim at his pharmacy, and that other pill bottles had been found in the attic of Appellant's home and were left over from when the victim's children lived in the house. It is unlikely, however, that this evidence would have swayed the jury. The fact that the victim refilled his prescription before the murder does not prove that Appellant legally acquired the bottle he was accused of stealing. Furthermore, the bottle was found under Appellant's bed, and not in the attic. Appellant's wife also testified that she had never seen the bottle before. Therefore, Appellant's allegation fails to overcome the strong presumption that counsel represented him in a reasonable manner. Second, Appellant argues that counsel did not tell the jury that the change purse found under his bed was given to him by Danny Bartello. Appellant points out that Bartello's testimony about the change purse would have contradicted the testimony of Terry Sutherland, who identified the purse found under Appellant's bed as belonging to the victim. Though we cannot know whether the jury would have believed Bartello over Sutherland, at first glance, the failure even to contact Bartello in the investigation leading up to trial seems profoundly unreasonable in light of what Appellant now claims about Bartello. This is especially true because Bartello talked extensively with Appellant a few hours before the murder and allegedly gave him the moonshine responsible for his intoxication. The trial court dismissed this claim by noting the Appellant did not file an affidavit of Bartello. As noted above, such extrinsic evidence of a factual claim is not necessary in an RCr 11.42 motion. We note, however, that in dismissing this claim, the trial court also stated that Appellant did not say why he did not know about this before trial, and did not say whether he even told his trial attorney about Bartello. This more properly gets to the essence of Appellant's claim. Even though Appellant makes this allegation about Bartello in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, his RCr 11.42 motion did not allege that he had told his lawyer about Bartello or that his lawyer knew or even had reason to know about Bartello. Appellant was in the best position to give this information to his lawyer (and, we note, he cannot claim he was too intoxicated to remember because it was Bartello who on the same day allegedly gave Appellant the moonshine that he claims led to his intoxication on the night of the murder, thus he was allegedly given the change purse before he became intoxicated and suffered the claimed blackout). As such, Appellant's motion did not make a sufficient factual claim in this regard to show that his trial lawyer's performance was deficient, and the trial court was correct in denying both relief and an evidentiary hearing as to this claim. Appellant also claims that his attorney's failure to investigate and address the presence of various keys around the victim's property, including Appellant's residence, and the possibility that the keys found in Appellant's yard were left by the victim's grandchildren was ineffective assistance because one of the prosecution's claims is that the keys found in Appellant's yard had been stolen from the victim. It is unlikely that such evidence would have changed the result at trial, thus this claim fails the second prong of the Strickland test.
Appellant also claims that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to his allegations of judicial misconduct. Appellant claims that the trial judge committed misconduct in four ways: by failing to correct Sam Shepherd's alleged misstatements on the stand, by failing to recuse despite his alleged extra-judicial knowledge of Appellant's background, by allegedly conducting a meeting with the jurors in Appellant's case after they rendered their verdict, and by allowing certain police officers who participated in the investigation to act as bailiffs during the trial.
As to this first claim, Appellant claims that Shepherd testified incorrectly about the status of his own case, which was pending before the trial judge. Appellant points out that Shepherd gave an inconclusive answer when asked whether charges against him had been concluded when, in fact, his charges were still pending. He fails, however, to prove that Shepherd's misstatement was material to the outcome of his trial. Shepherd's potential bias was clearly presented to the jury by way of testimony about his plea bargain in his own case and his admission that he is not generally an honest man. The fact that entry of judgment had been delayed in Shepherd's case would not have caused a reasonable jury to evaluate his testimony differently. Appellant also alleges that the trial judge violated judicial ethics by conducting an independent investigation into the facts surrounding the allegation regarding Shepherd. He points out that the judge's order rejecting Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion cited the videotape in the Shepherd trial wherein the judge noted that he would postpone sentencing so that Shepherd would be available to testify in Appellant's trial. It was not error for the judge to take notice of proceedings in his own court. The reference to the videotape in the order was simply to provide the parties with a means to verify the truth of his statement about the reason why he withheld entry of judgment in Shepherd's case. This allegation was not sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing.
Next, Appellant alleges judicial misconduct in Judge Messer's failure to recuse himself even though he allegedly had knowledge of Appellant's juvenile record. The law on this issue is recounted above in Part III(A)(1)(i). The judge's knowledge of Appellant's prior record, however, is insufficient to require him to recuse himself in the absence of some other evidence of bias or animosity. [69] Appellant offers no such evidence and does not allege facts sufficient to show bias. Furthermore, absent bias, recusal is required only where the trial judge's knowledge as to a particular issue pertains to a disputed evidentiary fact that is material to the proceedings, which is not the case here. [70] Given the lack of evidence of actual bias, the trial judge acted properly in refusing to recuse himself.
Appellant next alleges that the trial judge met with the jurors after they recommended the death sentence. He claims that the judge's failure to disclose the substance of this alleged discussion constituted judicial misconduct. The only evidence Appellant offers for his theory that there was a meeting is the hearsay statement of Ellen Benzing, the judge's former law clerk. Benzing worked with the Department of Public Advocacy after her clerkship. During that time, she spoke with the attorney who was handling Appellant's direct appeal and who worked in a nearby office, and indicated that after the jury in Appellant's trial had returned the death verdict, they had refused to leave until they had a chance to speak with the judge. The next day, the trial judge entered an order prohibiting the attorneys from contacting the jurors. Appellant's direct appeal attorney testified as to these matters by avowal at a recusal hearing. The trial judge disposed of this claim by noting that it was clearly refuted by the record. The record reflects that after the jurors returned their verdict, they were excused and left the courthouse with a police escort. A few minutes later, a bailiff spoke with the police escort via radio and notified the judge that the jurors had safely made it to their cars. Only then did the judge recess the case and leave the courtroom. While it is conceivable, as Appellant alleges, that the jurors could have changed their minds in the parking lot, returned to the courthouse and located the judge, this theory is pure speculation. Appellant does not even claim that this is what happened; rather, he claims only that he deserves an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth. Again, discovery is not allowed in RCr 11.42 proceedings. A movant must allege in the verified RCr 11.42 motions sufficient facts to require reversal. Appellant failed to do so with regard to his claim, and as such, Judge Messer acted properly in dismissing this claim.
Finally, Appellant alleges misconduct in the trial judge's failure to remove two officers from duty as bailiffs. Deputies Grey and Bolton were among the officers who arrested Appellant, and both were present at the time of his confession. Both also served as bailiffs during Appellant's trial. Deputy Bolton testified for the prosecution during the hearing on Appellant's motion to suppress his videotaped confession, but neither deputy testified at trial. In Turner v. Louisiana, [71] two arresting officers served as bailiffs during appellant's murder trial, and there was evidence that both fraternized extensively with the jurors. [72] Both also testified for the prosecution, contradicting crucial aspects of appellant's story so that the credibility which the jury attached to their testimony must inevitably have determined whether they sentenced appellant to death. [73] The Supreme Court reversed appellant's conviction, noting that the fact that the officers both testified for the prosecution and served as officers of the court would have significantly bolstered their credibility, thus undermin[ing] the basic guarantees of trial by jury. [74] The role of the bailiffs here does not rise to the level found to be prejudicial in Turner. First, neither bailiff testified in front of the jury, thus the neutral role of the court was never called into serious question. Second, there is no evidence that the bailiffs fraternized with the jurors here. Third, nothing the two deputies saw when they arrested Appellant was in direct conflict with any part of Appellant's story at trial. Appellant has therefore failed to establish convincingly that the trial court should have removed the bailiffs.
We believe, however, that the trial court improperly dismissed some of Appellant's claims, without holding an evidentiary hearing, on the grounds that the claims were speculative and/or unsupported by extrinsic evidence. Appellant's brief raises several of these issues multiple times under various subject headings (e.g., under both the ineffective assistance claim and under the prosecutorial misconduct claim). Because we hold that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing on these issues, we are simply grouping those claims based on the facts alleged. We leave it to the trial court to resolve any factual ambiguities.
Appellant's weightiest claims of ineffective assistance of counsel were that his trial lawyer had failed to adequately present what we have described as an alleged alternative perpetrator or aaltperp theory, [75] i.e., the theory that another person had killed the victim, and that his lawyer failed to ask for exculpatory material pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, [76] which would have included evidence as to the possibility that another person killed the victim. Appellant reiterates these allegations under his claim of prosecutorial misconduct, alleging that the Commonwealth had a duty to turn over this information. For support of these claims, Appellant discusses various factual allegations in the RCr 11.42 motion, including the following: (1) that the victim's relatives engaged in drug dealing and other criminal activity on his property; (2) that the victim's girlfriend had threatened to kill him and was looking for someone to commit murder on her behalf; (3) that someone broke into the victim's house after his death and tampered with his belongings; (4) that Appellant's house, which was owned by the victim and which contained property, including illegal drugs, belonging to the victim's children, was burned down only one week after his arrest; (5) that there was evidence, in the form of empty bank bags and money wrappers, that a large amount of money had been stolen from the victim; (6) that weapons other than Appellant's pocket knife had been used to kill the victim; (7) that a drug report existed that showed that Appellant had benzodiazepine in his blood; (8) that fingerprint results from the victim's home were inconclusive; (9) that the victim was in dire need of a large amount of money to pay his taxes; (10) that the victim's family members had threatened to kill him and his girlfriend; and (11) that a bloody note was found on the victim's dining room table and that the note had the address of a woman named Anna Matthews, who Appellant claims has a long criminal history, who was allegedly at the victim's house the day he was murdered, and who left the state shortly after the crime. Perhaps the most troubling bit of evidence that Appellant discusses is an audiotape that he claims was made by the police at the time of his arrest before they made the videotape of his confession. Appellant claims that this recording contains his statement to the police that someone else went to the victim's house with him on the night of the murder. Appellant's attorney knew of this audiotape and asked that it be turned over. The prosecutor asked the police to procure the tape and turn it over, but they appear to have never followed through. The tape was not presented at trial. Appellant claims that many of these facts were learned from Eddie Mott, a private investigator who had been hired by the victim's family to look into the crime. Appellant states that Mott knew the victim's family had doubts about Appellant's involvement in the murder, that the victim's family had the tape recording of Appellant made at the scene, that Mott had played the tape for the police, that the police never provided a copy of the tape to Appellant's trial lawyer, and that the trial lawyer knew about the tape but did not try to get a copy of it. Appellant also claims that he has no memory of the night of the murder because he was experiencing an alcohol-induced blackout. The trial court dismissed most of these claims by noting that they were speculative or unsupported by other evidence. With regard to the audiotape, the trial court specifically noted: This is apparently the same tape Mills claimed earlier in his RCr 11.42 motion had been given to Detective Partin by Mott. Here, Mills says Detective Partin never got the tape, although it was `clearly exculpatory.' Mills has not provided this Court a copy of the tape or a transcript of the tape. Mills has not provided Eddie Mott's report or an affidavit of Eddie Mott. This claim is speculative. The trial court addressed Appellant's Brady claim by noting that his claims ... are not based on information in the record. If Appellant's factual claims about the evidence regarding another possible killer, especially the claims regarding the motives and identities of specific persons, are correct, then it is likely that Appellant's lawyer's performance was not reasonably effective. It is also reasonably likely that if such evidence existed and had been presented at trial, then the outcome would have been different. Furthermore, presentation of an aaltperp theory implicates the fundamental right to a fair opportunity to present a defense [77] implicit in the Due Process Clause, which we have noted includes the right to introduce evidence that someone other than the accused, i.e., an alleged alternative perpetrator (`aaltperp') committed the crime. [78] As such, Appellant sufficiently pled ineffective assistance of counsel both as to his lawyer's failure to pursue such a theory and failure to request Brady material. Furthermore, if such Brady material was in the hands of the prosecution, then another constitutional violation occurred. Appellant's factual claims in this regard were more specific than many of the other claims, and, by their very nature, could not be disproved by the record. The trial court admitted as much by requiring in many of these instances that Appellant prove his contentions with extrinsic evidence, e.g., in the form of a report or an affidavit, rather than disproving his claims with facts in the record. In doing so, however, it appears that the trial court, [i]nstead of examining whether the record refuted the allegations raised, ... focused on whether the record supported the allegations, which is the incorrect test when addressing the question of whether an evidentiary hearing to resolve issues raised in an RCr 11.42 motion is required. [79] This is not to say that Appellant's claims necessarily require reversal of his conviction. After all, Appellant did confess to the killing on video. And we recognize that [e]ven in a capital case, an RCr 11.42 movant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary hearing. [80] But given the facts that Appellant has alleged, under the two-part test as to the necessity of an evidentiary hearing, i.e., a showing of entitlement to relief and an issue of fact that cannot be determined on the face of the record, we must hold that Appellant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to his alternate killer and Brady material ineffective assistance of counsel claims and his prosecutorial misconduct claims. If the trial court is correct that Appellant's claims are speculative, then he will not be able to prove his claims at the evidentiary hearing, and the trial court can address them summarily. But if there is any truth to the aaltperp theory, or even if another person was present (and possibly was the primary perpetrator of the crime), there is a reasonable probability that presentation of such evidence to the jury could have changed the outcome, at least in regard to sentencing. We also note that although Appellant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the trial court is not required to allow a retrial in the context of that hearing. Appellant is not even allowed to engage in discovery. [81] Appellant will be allowed to prove his claims not disposed of in this opinion and nothing more.
Appellant also argues that his lawyer was deficient in failing to present compelling mitigation evidence in the penalty phase. Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion also alleges that his lawyer made his first preparations for the penalty phase when the jury was considering the guilt phase verdict, even though he had previously asked for a continuance of the case because his contract with DPA did not include capital cases. The lawyer's preparation for the penalty phase consisted of asking only a few questions that he had hastily written by hand on the back of his copy of the jury instructions. The lawyer asked those few questions of Appellant's sister, whose testimony was limited to describing her relationship with Appellant, the size of their family, how far Appellant went in school, the fact that he had accidentally shot himself in the leg before, that he was married and had children, that his mother was still living, that his father had drowned about eleven years before, and that Appellant had a problem with alcohol. Her direct testimony lasted less than three minutes. Appellant's RCr 11.42 motion points to a variety of other evidence that could have been presented in mitigation, including, among other things, the huge impact the death of Appellant's father had on him, further evidence of Appellant's mental limitations (including that he had been in special education classes and had a low IQ), the poverty and hardship he suffered during childhood, and that he suffered from severe depression and had actually been attempting suicide when he shot himself in the leg. As we noted in Hodge v. Commonwealth: [82] `An attorney has a duty to conduct a reasonable investigation, including an investigation of the defendant's background, for possible mitigating evidence.' [83] In determining this issue, the trial court must determine if a reasonable investigation would have uncovered the mitigating evidence and then whether the failure to present this evidence to the jury was a tactical choice. [84] Though Appellant's lawyer did present some mitigating evidence during the penalty phase and, as the trial court noted, some of this evidence was hinted at in the guilt phase, its brevity and lack of detail likely rendered it all but useless. And when combined with the lawyer's last minute preparation for the penalty phase, the failure to present other mitigating evidence certainly raises questions as to whether the lawyer's performance in this regard was reasonably effective. However, [b]efore any possible mitigating evidence can be weighed in a meaningful manner, that evidence first must be determined and delineated. This is the proper function of an evidentiary hearing. [85] As such, we follow the ruling in Hodge and note that [a]n evidentiary hearing must be held in this case to determine whether the failure to introduce mitigating evidence was trial strategy, or an abdication of advocacy. [86]