Opinion ID: 150480
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of Warnings

Text: In Miranda, the Supreme Court established certain procedural safeguards that require police to advise criminal suspects of their rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments before commencing custodial interrogation. Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 201, 109 S.Ct. 2875, 106 L.Ed.2d 166 (1989). In particular, Miranda prescribed the following four warnings: [A suspect] must be warned prior to any questioning [1] that he has the right to remain silent, [2] that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, [3] that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and [4] that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479, 86 S.Ct. 1602. Although these precise words do not have to be used, the warnings [must] reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.  Florida v. Powell, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 1195, 1204, ___ L.Ed.2d ___ (2010) (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). When Officer Janusczak arrested Treesh around 12:15 a.m. on August 28, 1994, he recited a full set of Miranda warnings. He then asked Treesh if he understood his rights. After Treesh failed to respond, Janusczak began to repeat the warnings, but Treesh interrupted him and said Yeah, yeah, I know. The Cleveland Police Department held Treesh in a cruiser at the scene of his arrest until the Euclid Police Department took over custody. Treesh was then transported to the Euclid City Jail, where he showered before being transported to the Eastlake police station around 1:30 to 2:30 a.m. When Treesh arrived at the station, he was immediately taken into a booking room where Lieutenant Doyle gave Treesh the following version of the Miranda warnings: You understand you're under arrest? You've been arrested before. Do you understand your Miranda rights? I'm going to ask you some questions over the next hour or so, two hours or three hours. You have a right to answer the questions that I ask, or you can stop me at any time. If you can't afford an attorney, one will be appointed. Do you understand me? Okay. According to Doyle, Treesh twice indicated during this interview that he understood his rights. He did not affirmatively request an attorney or invoke his right to remain silent. Instead, Treesh agreed to talk to Doyle and was then interrogated for approximately one hour and forty-five minutes. Sometime during the interview, Doyle asked Treesh if he remembered his rights: Q: Do you understand your Miranda rights? Okay, I told them to you before, right? Why don't you tell me. A: I have the right to remain silent. Anything I say can and will be used against me in a court of law, blase, blase, blase. Q: You have a right to an attorney. Okay. After this interview, Treesh was placed in a jail cell, but was awakened shortly before 7:00 a.m. and returned to the booking room. Doyle read the Miranda warnings to Treesh before beginning this interview: DOYLE: Before we start talking again, just as I told you before, you know your Miranda rights. You know I'm a police officer. You know you're under arrest, you're at the police station. I'm going to ask you some questions TREESH:rights before. DOYLE: Pardon? TREESH: You gave me the rights before. DOYLE: Okay, and I plan on continuing doing that. What I have to tell you, though, again, I'm going to ask you questions and you don't have to answer the questions. TREESH: Uh-huh. DOYLE: If you decide to answer the questions, you can stop me at any time. You have a right to an attorney. TREESH: I already know all my rights. DOYLE: Okay, but I'm going to tell you them. TREESH: Okay. DOYLE: If you can't afford one, one will be appointed for you. Then I've got to say, will you talk to me anyway? TREESH: Yeah. DOYLE: Do you understand your rights? TREESH: Yeah. Around 7:50 a.m., FBI Special Agent Alford advised Treesh, both orally and in writing, of his Miranda rights. The form Alford gave Treesh included all four required Miranda warnings. Treesh signed the form indicating that he waived those rights. Alford interviewed Treesh for about an hour to an hour and a half. At 10:40 a.m., Doyle interviewed Treesh again. During that interview, he again advised Treesh of his Miranda rights, both orally and in writing, and obtained a written waiver from Treesh. Around 2:00 p.m., Doyle interviewed Treesh and Brooks together. When Doyle told them that the store clerk was alive and had made a statement to police, they requested an attorney. This was Treesh's first request for an attorney since being arrested. [1] Treesh indicated that he would give a statement, but only if they assured him they would not seek the death penalty. When Doyle told him they would not make any deals, Treesh refused to give any statements regarding their involvement in the Vine Street News robbery and murder. However, Treesh and Brooks spoke about the involvement of others during the Eastlake murder and of crimes committed in other states. The Ohio Supreme Court concluded that the warnings that Treesh received from Doyle before and during his first interrogation were incomplete. Treesh, 739 N.E.2d at 764-65. Although Treesh testified that Janusczak did not read the Miranda warnings upon his arrest, the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's implicit conclusion that the arresting officer did recite all four Miranda warnings. Id. at 765 (Though the testimony at the suppression hearing conflicted as to whether the arresting officer actually recited the Miranda warnings, the trial court implicitly found the arresting officer's testimony about the arrest [to be] more credible than Treesh's.... We will not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on this issue. (internal citation omitted)). Treesh has not presented clear and convicting evidence to indicate that this factual conclusion was erroneous. See James, 470 F.3d at 643. The Ohio Supreme Court went on to conclude that Janusczak's full arrest warning, viewed in conjunction with the partial rewarnings at the interrogations, indicates that Treesh was sufficiently apprised of his Miranda rights. Treesh, 739 N.E.2d at 765. The question before us, then, is whether the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion that Doyle's incomplete warnings were sufficient to remind Treesh of the previously recited Miranda rights was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. We hold that it was not. In reaching its conclusion, the Ohio Supreme Court relied on Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982). Treesh, 739 N.E.2d at 764. The Supreme Court in Fields concluded that a suspect did not need to be readvised of his Miranda rights, which he had waived in writing before the initiation of a polygraph examination, because the circumstances [had not] changed so seriously that his answers no longer were voluntary and his waiver was still knowing and intelligent. 459 U.S. at 47-48, 103 S.Ct. 394. Since Fields, [t]he courts have generally rejected a per se rule as to when a suspect must be readvised of his rights after the passage of time or a change in questioners. United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 747, 751 (6th Cir.1997) (concluding that officers did not need to readvise suspect of his Miranda rights where he was read his rights upon his arrest, reminded of his rights during transport and again in the elevator before he was questioned) (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, we apply a totality-of-the-circumstances test when considering whether a delay between reading the Miranda warnings and custodial interrogation requires the interrogating officers to readvise the suspect of his Miranda rights. Id. at 751-52. Under Fields, additional warnings are only required if the circumstances seriously changed between the initial warnings and the interrogation. Fields, 459 U.S. at 47, 103 S.Ct. 394. Between Janusczak's warnings and Doyle's questioning of Treesh, he was taken first to the Euclid City Jail then to the Eastlake Police Department. However, only approximately two hours had passed between his arrest and his interrogation. Additionally, Doyle partially readvised Treesh of his Miranda rights, which alerted Treesh to the fact that he could still invoke those rights. Treesh's recitation of at least three of those rights during his interview also demonstrates that he was aware of his rights. Accordingly, the Ohio Supreme Court's conclusion that Doyle was not required to fully readvise Treesh of his Miranda rights was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of Fields, particularly in light of the application of Fields by our sister circuits. See, e.g., United States v. Clay, 408 F.3d 214, 222 (5th Cir.2005) (no need for rewarning where there was no evidence that suspect no longer understood the warnings or did not understand their applicability to interrogation that occurred two days after initial warning); United States ex rel. Patton v. Thieret, 791 F.2d 543, 547-48 (7th Cir.1986) ( Miranda rights did not need to be reread after forty minute lapse); Evans v. McCotter, 790 F.2d 1232, 1237-38 (5th Cir.1986) (rights voluntarily waived where suspect was twice advised of rights over a three-hour period notwithstanding change of interview locations); Stumes v. Solem, 752 F.2d 317, 320 (8th Cir.1985) (five-hour interval between first and second interviews did not invalidate suspect's waiver given before the first interview); Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1254 (11th Cir.1984) (change in interrogators and three-hour lapse did not render confession inadmissible); United States ex rel. Henne v. Fike, 563 F.2d 809, 814 (7th Cir.1977) (nine hours between warnings and waiver not too long).