Opinion ID: 2304011
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Authority of Belknap Deputy County Attorney Coull

Text: The defendant argued in his motion to quash that Coull had to be appointed by the trial court under RSA 7:33 in order to prosecute him on the instant charges. The trial court denied the motion as without basis in law. In his request for interlocutory appeal the defendant argued, in the alternative, that Coull had to be appointed under RSA 661:9, III in order to prosecute him. The trial court again denied the motion. On appeal, the defendant contends that, absent appointment under one of these statutes, Coull was essentially a private citizen engaging in a private prosecution, and, thus, under State (Premo Complainant) v. Martineau, 148 N.H. 259, 808 A.2d 51 (2002), the trial court was divested of its jurisdiction. We disagree. Resolution of this issue requires that we interpret RSA 7:33 and RSA 661:9, III. In matters of statutory interpretation, we are the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole. State v. Gallagher, 157 N.H. ___, ___, 951 A.2d 130, 131 (2008). We first examine the language of the statute, and, where possible, we apply the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. Id. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did not see fit to include. State v. Langill, 157 N.H. 77, 84, 945 A.2d 1 (2008). We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Franklin v. Town of Newport, 151 N.H. 508, 510, 861 A.2d 777 (2004). Moreover, we do not consider the words and phrases in isolation, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Grand China v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 156 N.H. 429, 431, 938 A.2d 905 (2007). RSA 7:33 states, in pertinent part: There shall be a county attorney for each county, ... elected biennially by the voters of the county. If the county attorney is absent at any term of court or unable to discharge the duties of the office, the superior court, acting as a body, shall appoint a county attorney, who shall be a member of the New Hampshire bar, for the time being and allow said appointee such compensation for his or her services as set by the county delegation. The defendant asserts that, due to the perceived conflict of interest and consequent inability to prosecute the case, the Merrimack County Attorney was absent at a term of court, requiring appointment of a replacement by the trial court. The defendant misinterprets the statute. Read in its entirety, RSA 7:33 concerns the office of county attorney, providing that it shall exist in every county, that it shall be an elected position, when that election shall take place, and how the office shall be filled, should it become vacant. To that end, the statute requires that the trial court appoint a county attorney when the elected county attorney is absent at any term of court or unable to discharge the duties of the office. RSA 7:33. The defendant suggests that an absence is created, and a failure to discharge the duties of office occurs, whenever a county attorney is not able to prosecute a particular case. Focusing upon the legislature's use of the phrase any term of court, the defendant contends that a term of court could consist of a single trial, and, thus, the Merrimack County Attorney's unavailability in this case constitutes an absence. We disagree. Read in the context of the statute as a whole, the plain meaning of this language demonstrates an intent to fill the office of county attorney in the event the office becomes vacant, and the county is without a county attorney. Contrary to the defendant's assertion, the legislature's use of the plural duties indicates the inability to discharge all duties, not simply a single duty in the prosecution of a single case. Likewise, the term absent is generally understood to mean not present, see Webster's Third New International Dictionary 6 (unabridged ed.2002), and suggests something more than a county attorney who is unavailable for one case, but otherwise present in office. The heading of the statute, Election; Temporary Vacancies, also supports our interpretation. While the title of a statute is not conclusive of its interpretation, it provides significant indication of the legislature's intent in enacting the statute. See Greenland Conservation Comm'n v. N.H. Wetlands Council, 154 N.H. 529, 534, 913 A.2d 776 (2006). Here, the heading of RSA 7:33 strongly indicates that the legislature intended this statute to apply to actual vacancies in office, rather than instances involving disqualification from a single case. Reading RSA 7:33 in light of the entire statutory scheme further supports our interpretation. Although not addressed by the trial court, it appears that another statute under this chapter, RSA 7:33-g (2002), may apply in the event of a county attorney's disqualification from a particular case. RSA 7:33-g provides: The county attorney may appoint, with the approval of the attorney general, special assistant county attorneys to assist with criminal cases when the county attorney believes it expedient to do so. Special assistant county attorneys shall act under the supervision, direction, and control of the county attorney and shall serve without compensation at the pleasure of the county attorney. The State argues Coull was in fact appointed in this manner. However, we decline to address whether Coull was properly appointed pursuant to RSA 7:33-g, as it was not raised before the trial court. We note only that RSA 7:33-g appears to be better suited to addressing instances where a county attorney has a conflict of interest than RSA 7:33. The defendant next argues that the trial court was required to appoint Coull under RSA 661:9, III. RSA 661:9, III provides that if a county attorney becomes temporarily absent or incapacitated, the superior court may, upon application of the county attorney or county commissioners, declare a temporary absence and fill the same for a limited period of time expressed in the appointment. Although the State asserts that this argument is not properly before us, see State v. Duquette, 145 N.H. 374, 376, 761 A.2d 520 (2000) (issues not raised before the trial court are not preserved for appeal), we will assume, without deciding, that it was properly preserved for our review. Contrary to the defendant's argument, we do not interpret temporary absence or incapacitation to include disqualification based upon a conflict of interest. The title of chapter 661, Vacancies Among Public Officers Elected at State Elections, provides significant indication of the legislature's intent in enacting this statute. See Greenland Conservation Comm'n, 154 N.H. at 534, 913 A.2d 776. As was the case with RSA 7:33, the legislature's use of the term vacancy in the title of this chapter strongly indicates that RSA 661:9, III was intended to apply when the office of county attorney becomes wholly unoccupied, rather than when a county attorney is unable to prosecute a single case. While the better practice may be a more formalized appointment process than the one followed in this case when a perceived conflict of interest arises, we conclude that disqualification from a particular case does not create the type of vacancy contemplated under either RSA 7:33 or RSA 661:9, III. The trial court was therefore not required to appoint a county attorney under the circumstances of this case. Because we uphold the trial court's decision under the aforementioned statutes, we decline to address the defendant's jurisdictional argument under Martineau.