Opinion ID: 4423095
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 2d 372, 379 (2003)). In Dashiell, we cautioned:

Text: While this may be a factor in a totality determination of whether the officers possessed the requisite reasonable suspicion to fear for their safety, this, merely coupled with evidence of drug trafficking, normally will not be the determinative factor. Generally, this factor by itself would amount to nothing more than a “hunch” as described in Terry. Dashiell, 374 Md. at 101 n.4, 821 A.2d at 381-82 n.4. - 23 - fit a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random [searches and] seizures were th[is] Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case could justify a” frisk. See Sellman v. State, 449 Md. at 554, 144 A.3d at 788 (2016) (citation and internal quotations omitted). As such, we cannot say that the frisk was based on anything more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch that Petitioner possessed a weapon. Viewing the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that the officers did not have reasonable suspicion to lawfully frisk Petitioner. Petitioner was investigated concerning a minor traffic violation, and the officers outnumbered him three to one. Although Petitioner made allegedly “furtive movements” as the officers approached his vehicle, during the encounter, Petitioner was described as “laid back,” and he complied with the officers’ requests. Under these circumstances, the officers failed to particularize an objectively reasonable basis for believing that Petitioner was armed and dangerous. Indeed, the suppression court found that, during the exchange, the officers acted in a manner that was largely inconsistent with a genuine belief that Mr. Thornton was armed and dangerous. Accordingly, the frisk of Petitioner was based on an inchoate and unparticularized hunch that Petitioner possessed a weapon. The frisk was, therefore, not supported by the requisite quantum of suspicion to overcome the State’s burden of proving that the warrantless search was reasonable. We hold that the frisk violated Petitioner’s Fourth Amendment rights. Although Officer Zimmerman lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that Mr. Thornton was armed and dangerous, our analysis does not end there. We must next - 24 - determine whether the gun obtained as fruit of the unlawful frisk should be suppressed as evidence pursuant to the exclusionary rule. 2. Whether the Fruit of the Unlawful Frisk Should be Suppressed The exclusionary rule is the “principal judicial remedy” used to deter government actors from committing Fourth Amendment violations. Utah v. Streiff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2061, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691-92, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961)). Pursuant to the exclusionary rule, when evidence is obtained in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment right, ordinarily it will be inadmissible in a state criminal prosecution. Bailey, 412 Md. at 363, 987 A.2d at 80. Its application prohibits the admission of evidence found as a direct result of unconstitutional conduct in addition to what is known as “fruit of the poisonous tree,” meaning any evidence “discovered and found to be derivative of an illegality[.]” Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2058, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (citation omitted). “[T]he significant costs of this rule have led [the United States Supreme Court] to deem it ‘applicable only . . . where its deterrence benefits outweigh its substantial social costs.’” Id. at 2061 (citation omitted). Suppression is, therefore, “our last resort, not our first impulse.” Id. There are, of course, exceptions to the exclusionary rule.16 One such exception is the attenuation doctrine. “The attenuation doctrine evaluates the causal link between the 16 Some notable exceptions to the exclusionary rule include: 1) independent source doctrine (Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533, 108 S. Ct. 2529, 101 L.Ed.2d 472 (1988)), 2) inevitable discovery doctrine (Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 104 S. Ct. 2501, 81 L.Ed.2d 377 (1984)); (continued . . .) - 25 - government’s unlawful act and the discovery of evidence[.]” Id. The doctrine provides an exception to the exclusionary rule when “the connection between [the] unconstitutional police conduct and the evidence is remote or has been interrupted by some intervening circumstance, so that ‘the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained.’” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593, 126 S. Ct. 2159, 2165, 165 L.Ed.2d 56 (2006)). When a court is tasked with considering application of the attenuation doctrine, the reviewing court must analyze “whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963) (citation omitted). In Brown v. Illinois, the United States Supreme Court articulated three factors that courts should weigh when determining whether the attenuation doctrine applies. 422 U.S. 590, 603-04, 95 S. Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). These factors are: (1) the “temporal proximity” between the unlawful conduct and the discovery of the evidence, (2) the “presence of intervening circumstances,” and, (3) “particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct.” Id. Proper application of the Brown factors requires balancing each consideration, as “no single factor is dispositive on the issue (. . . continued) 3) attenuation doctrine (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 83 S. Ct. 407, 417, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)). - 26 - of attenuation.” Cox v. State, 421 Md. 630, 653, 28 A.3d 687, 700 (2011) (citations omitted). In Holt v. State, this Court was asked to decide whether, in applying the attenuation doctrine, a defendant’s commission of a new crime may constitute an intervening circumstance that, alone, purges the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation. 435 Md. 443, 457, 78 A.3d 415, 422-23 (2013). A majority of this Court, however, concluded that the law enforcement officers involved had reasonable suspicion to conduct a Terry stop of the defendant, and, thus, the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. Id. at 467-68, 78 A.3d at 429. As such, a majority of this Court did not reach the issue of the attenuation doctrine. Id. at 457, 78 A.3d at 423. Given that, in the present case, we have determined that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Petitioner, we must pick up where Holt left off. Similarly, in Holt, the dissenting opinion concluded that the officers involved lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the suspect. Id. at 468, 78 A.3d at 429 (Greene, J., dissenting). Therefore, the dissent addressed the issue of whether a suspect’s commission of a new crime would constitute an intervening circumstance that, alone, purged the taint of a Fourth Amendment violation. Id. at 468-71, 78 A.3d at 429-31. The dissent rejected the supposition that “a[ny] new [and distinct] crime, even if causally linked to illegal activity on behalf of law enforcement, is an intervening circumstance that attenuates the taint from that illegal activity[.]” Id. at 470-71, 78 A.3d at 431. The dissent asserted that such a holding would effectively eliminate the application of the Brown factors. Id. at 471, 78 A.3d at 431. In particular, it would eradicate the - 27 - application of the third Brown factor, which focuses on the flagrancy and purposefulness of governmental conduct. Id. Critically, the third Brown factor “cuts to the heart of the purpose behind the exclusionary rule: to provide[] an incentive for police to engage in lawful conduct.” Id. (quoting Cox, 412 Md. at 655, 28 A.3d at 701-02) (internal quotations omitted). “To ignore the third attenuation factor, then, would be to ignore the very purpose underlying the exclusionary rule, and would make the protections afforded to defendants by the Fourth Amendment obsolete.” Id. In the present case, we decline to undermine or obscure the Brown factors in a manner that would offend the exclusionary rule’s deterrent purpose. We hold that, where an individual attempts to flee from an unlawful Terry frisk, whether the individual’s act purges the taint of the Fourth Amendment violation must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis by balancing the factors set forth in Brown. See id. To hold otherwise would effectively create a bright line rule that would contravene Brown, and it would allow flagrant and purposeful police misconduct to go unchallenged. See id. Undoubtedly, there will be scenarios where an individual, subsequent to an unlawful police action, commits a new, distinct crime, and his or her actions purge the taint of the unconstitutional police action. Id. Each case, however, must be considered on its own facts to determine whether a balance of the three Brown factors favors attenuation or exclusion. Id. In any event, consistent with attenuation doctrine jurisprudence, the analysis must hinge upon “whether Petitioner’s actions were a new, distinct crime, which was ‘so attenuated from the evidence as to purge any taint resulting from said conduct.’” Id. (citation omitted). - 28 - By way of example, in United States v. Sprinkle, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a detainee’s intervening crime attenuated the taint of unlawful police conduct so as to render the challenged evidence admissible. 106 F.3d 613, 619-20 (4th Cir. 1997). There, two officers conducted an unlawful traffic stop, during which they told the passenger of the car, Carl Sprinkle, that they were going to frisk him for weapons. Id. at 615-16. One of the officers initiated the pat-down, and “[Mr.] Sprinkle pushed away and began to run.” Id. at 616. After running a short distance, Mr. Sprinkle pulled out a handgun from his pants and shot at one of the officers. Id. Eventually, Mr. Sprinkle surrendered and was arrested, and the officers seized his gun. Id. Mr. Sprinkle was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Id. The Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the gun was admissible in evidence against Mr. Sprinkle. Id. at 617. To reach its holding that the gun was admissible, the court explained that Mr. Sprinkle’s act of pushing, running away from, and firing his gun at the officers constituted a new crime for which the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Sprinkle. Id. at 619. When Mr. Sprinkle drew and fired his gun, he committed a new crime that “was distinct from any crime he might have been suspected of at the time of the initial stop.” Id. As a result, the officers had probable cause to arrest Mr. Sprinkle “because the new crime purged the taint of the prior illegal stop.” Id. Therefore, the officers could seize Mr. Sprinkle’s gun, “which was in plain view at the scene of the new crime.” Id. at 61920. To hold otherwise, the court explained, “would virtually immunize a defendant from prosecution for all crimes he might commit that have a sufficient causal connection to the police misconduct.” Id. at 619 (citation omitted). - 29 - On the other hand, in United States v. Gaines, the Fourth Circuit held that a detainee’s intermittent crime did not break the causal connection between the police misconduct and discovery of the challenged evidence. 668 F.3d 170, 171 (4th Cir. 2012). There, two officers conducted an unlawful stop of a vehicle. Id. at 172. The officers observed Travis Gaines “moving around in his seat and trying to climb over the front seats” of the vehicle. Id. at 171. One of the officers asked Mr. Gaines to step out of the car. Id. The officer began to frisk Mr. Gains, and he felt “the trigger guard and the handle of a firearm.” Id. Mr. Gaines struck the officer and began to run away. Id. Eventually, the officers arrested Mr. Gaines and recovered the firearm. Id. The Fourth Circuit reviewed whether the gun was admissible as evidence against Mr. Gaines, and ultimately held that it was not. Id. Looking to its holding in Sprinkle, the court explained that Mr. Sprinkle’s handgun was discovered before the new and distinct crime occurred. Id. at 174. In Gaines, however, Mr. Gaines’s crime of assault occurred after the discovery of the firearm. Id. at 173. Therefore, the court determined that Mr. Gaines’s crime was not an intervening circumstance. Id. As a result, the crime “did not purge the taint of the unlawful stop” and the causal connection between the officer misconduct and discovery of evidence was left intact. Id. at 173-75. In State v. Owens, Robert Owens was observed walking out from behind a school late at night in a high crime area. 992 N.E.2d 939, 940 (2013). He was also seen “throw[ing] something in his mouth and tuck[ing] something behind . . . the rear of his waistband,” and the odor of marijuana was detected around him. Id. An officer approached Mr. Owens and placed him in handcuffs, whereupon Mr. Owens admitted that he put a - 30 - blunt in his mouth. Id. Subsequently, the officer frisked Mr. Owens for weapons and discovered nothing. Id. at 941. Another officer eventually arrived on the scene and saw Mr. Owens “fishing about the rear of his pants [and] reaching his hands down inside his boxer shorts.” Id. Mr. Owens denied having anything in his pants. Id. One of the officers told Mr. Owens that “if [he] d[idn’t] want to admit to it,” he would be arrested, and the hidden item would be found. Id. When an officer attempted to grab Mr. Owens’s license, he “took off running.” Id. Mr. Owens was eventually apprehended and placed in handcuffs, but he continued to resist the officers. Id. He was “basically do[ing] every manner of resisiting he could while still in handcuffs” and “actively trying to grab whatever was in his shorts[.]” Id. At some point, one of the officers saw a bag of white powder in Mr. Owens’s hand, and upon attempting to grab it, the bag fell to the ground. Id. Mr. Owens was ultimately charged with crimes related to drug possession and distribution, along with battery of a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest, and obstruction of justice. Id. The Indiana Court of Appeals, Indiana’s intermediate appellate court, reviewed whether the bag of white powder, apparently identified as cocaine, was admissible as evidence against Mr. Owens. Id. at 942. After establishing that the initial stop of Mr. Owens was unlawful, the court specifically analyzed whether Mr. Owens’s voluntary criminal acts attenuated the taint of the unconstitutional stop. Id. at 942-43. Under the circumstances before it, the court held that Mr. Owens’s acts did not attenuate the taint of the unlawful stop. Id. at 943. The court explained: - 31 - Although the alleged cocaine was not actually discovered until after [Mr.] Owens’s attempted flight from and battery of the officers, the record clearly indicates that the decision to arrest [Mr.] Owens was made before his flight, rendering discovery of the evidence all but inevitable. Because the cocaine had all but been discovered before [Mr.] Owens’s flight, his actions cannot be said to have caused its discovery in any meaningful sense. Under the circumstances of this case, the causal connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery of the cocaine was not broken. Id. Therefore, given that the police misconduct made discovery of the cocaine all but inevitable, independent of Mr. Owens’s conduct, the court held that the cocaine must be excluded from evidence. Id. at 944. Moreover, the court reasoned that its holding was consistent with the attenuation doctrine’s rationale. Id. at 943. That is, suppressing the cocaine from evidence neither rewarded nor encouraged behavior that endangered the police, the suspect, or others; and it simultaneously balanced the right of the people to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the need to deter police misconduct. Id. Applying the attenuation doctrine to the facts of the case before us, we begin by evaluating the temporal proximity between the officers’ misconduct and the discovery of Petitioner’s handgun. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603, 95 S. Ct. at 2261-62, 45 L Ed. 2d 416. “The temporal proximity factor weighs against attenuation [and in favor of suppression] if there is no ‘substantial time’ between the ‘unlawful act and when the evidence is obtained.’” Sizer v. State, 456 Md. 350, 388, 174 A.3d 326, 348 (2017) (citations omitted). The State concedes that this factor weighs in favor of suppression. The parties agree that mere moments passed between the officers’ misconduct and the discovery of the handgun. See Utah v. Streiff, 136 S. Ct. at 2058, 136 L.Ed.2d 400 (2016) (concluding that a delay of “only minutes” favored suppression). Likewise, the suppression court found in the case at - 32 - bar that there was not a substantial length of time between the unlawful frisk and the discovery of Petitioner’s handgun. We conclude that the temporal proximity factor weighs in favor of suppression. Next, we review whether Petitioner’s attempt to flee constituted an intervening act that broke the causal connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery of the handgun. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04, 95 S. Ct. at 2262, 45 L Ed. 2d 416. Here, Petitioner was the subject of a traffic stop. Ordinarily, the purpose of a traffic stop “is to enforce the laws of the roadway, and . . . to investigate the manner of driving with the intent to issue a citation or warning.” Ferris v. State, 355 Md. 356, 372, 735 A.2d 491, 499 (1999). From the outset of their encounter with Petitioner, the officers acknowledged that this was not an “ordinary traffic stop,” and they did not treat it as such. The officers questioned Petitioner for a total of 30-40 seconds. In that time, they never asked for Petitioner’s license or registration, nor did they check for outstanding warrants or run his license plate number. See Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1611, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (2015) (explaining that “an officer’s mission during a traffic stop typically includes checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”). There is no indication in the present case that the officers ever informed Petitioner that they confronted him because he was parked illegally. According to the officers’ testimony, they immediately sought to search Petitioner. First, they asked for permission to search Petitioner’s car. Petitioner denied the officers’ request. Dissatisfied with that response, Officer Scott threatened to call a K-9 unit to the - 33 - scene—a tactic that was apparently employed as a bluff to gauge Petitioner’s reaction. See id. at 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d 492 (explaining that bringing in a K-9 is not “fairly characterized as part of the officer’s traffic mission.”). There is no indication that Petitioner’s “laid back” demeanor changed in reaction to Officer Scott’s bluff. Again, the officers persisted. Officer Zimmerman, at the direction of Officer Scott, ordered Petitioner out of the car. Petitioner complied, and Officer Zimmerman began to frisk Petitioner, prompting Petitioner to run away. An intervening act is one that “breaks the causal connection between the unlawful conduct and the derivative evidence.” Sizer, 456 Md. at 389, 174 A.3d at 349. Here, there was no such break in the causal chain. The officers’ conduct indicates that when they frisked Petitioner, the officers were executing their intended mission to recover evidence of guns, drugs, or other contraband. From the moment they confronted Petitioner, the officers sought to investigate Petitioner for evidence of a crime, regardless of whether they possessed the requisite quantum of suspicion to render a search of Petitioner reasonable. As a result, we cannot say, on the facts before us, that Petitioner’s attempt to flee caused the officers to discover the handgun in any meaningful sense. Not unlike in Owens, the officers here decided that they were going to search Petitioner for evidence of a crime— based on an unparticularized hunch that he may possess a weapon—before Petitioner’s flight. See 922 N.E.2d 939 (2013) (holding that the causal connection between unlawful police conduct and the discovery of evidence remained intact where officers decided to arrest the suspect before he ran away, and therefore the suspect’s flight did not cause the evidence’s discovery “in any meaningful sense[.]”). Thus, the discovery of Petitioner’s - 34 - firearm was not caused by his conduct; it was an imminent product of the officers’ own predisposition to locate and seize guns and contraband.17 Moreover, the officers’ persistence indicates “a quality of purposefulness” that invokes the exclusionary rule’s principal concern. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 604, 95 S. Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (internal quotations omitted) (noting that the exclusionary rule’s purpose is to deter police misconduct and that the “‘dissipation of the taint’ attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer jusitifies its cost.”). Despite the officers’ stated intention to address Petitioner’s parking infraction, their conduct reflects that their purpose was to investigate him for criminal activity. The frisk, both in design and execution, was investigatory. As we have described, from the very moment that they confronted Petitioner in his parked vehicle, the officers neglected to 17 The State contends, and the Court of Special Appeals concluded that, Petitioner’s attempt to run away from the officers violated the Transportation Article. As a result, they take the position that the officers had probable cause to arrest Petitioner and search Petitioner incident to the lawful arrest. The officers may, indeed, have had probable cause to arrest Petitioner for fleeing and eluding, as proscribed by the Transportation Article, and search him incident to arrest. Nonetheless, the handgun at issue was not discovered as a result of Petitioner’s flight. For reasons we have explained, the handgun was discovered by exploitation of the unconstitutional frisk. The causal connection between the illegal frisk and the discovery of the handgun was not broken. Therefore, the fact that the officers could have arrested Petitioner for fleeing and eluding does not render the unlawfully obtained handgun admissible as evidence against Petitioner in his prosecution for possession of a firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime. See State v. Owens, 992 N.E. 2d 939, 943 (2013) (explaining that evidence related to Mr. Owens’s intermittent act of fleeing from and battering police officers should not be suppressed, but the cocaine, as evidence of his drug-related charges, must be suppressed because the causal connection between the illegal police conduct and the discovery of the cocaine was not broken). - 35 - follow procedures typical for effectuating a traffic stop. Instead, based on a hunch that Petitioner might be armed, they persistently sought to search Petitioner for evidence of a crime. The officers confronted Petitioner without explanation, asked to search Petitioner’s vehicle, and threatened to call a K-9 unit to the scene. Despite Petitioner’s compliance with the officers’ directives and Petitioner’s “laid back” demeanor, Officer Scott ordered Officer Zimmerman to frisk Petitioner for weapons. Based on the officers’ conduct, it appears that they were looking to prompt a reaction from Petitioner and, perhaps, create probable cause or reasonable suspicion to search him. Accordingly, the officers “embarked upon this expedition for evidence in the hope that something might turn up.” Brown, 422 U.S. at 605, 95 S. Ct. at 2262, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (internal quotations omitted). We note that their investigation was fraught with the danger of “giv[ing] the appearance of having been calculated to cause surprise, fright, and confusion.” Id. This is precisely the sort of police misconduct in most need of deterrence, thereby appealing to the primary purpose behind the exclusionary rule. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2063, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (citing Davis, 564 U.S. at 236–26, 131 S. Ct. 2419, 180 L.Ed.2d 285 (2011)) (The purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter police misconduct that is “purposeful or flagrant.”). We emphatically do not condone Petitioner’s efforts to run away from the police officers. Regardless of whether Petitioner’s conduct violated the Transportation Article, it was improper for Petitioner to attempt to flee from the unlawful frisk. State v. Blackman, 94 Md. App. 284, 306, 617 A.2d 619, 630 (1992) (“Even if the frisk would have been unlawful . . . there was no right or privilege on the part of the appellee to resist it by using - 36 - force against the officer.”). Defendants facing these circumstances should resort to the courts, and not the streets, to resolve the constitutionality of searches and seizures. “There are strong public policy reasons why self-help, involving the use of force against a person, should not be condoned.” Jupiter v. State, 328 Md. 635, 645, 616 A.2d 412, 417 (1992). Nonetheless, we cannot overlook the reactive nature of Petitioner’s flight, in conjunction with the officers’ purposeful and intrusive conduct. See Miles v. State, 365 Md. 488, 525, 781 A.2d 787, 808 (“[T]he voluntariness of [the individual’s] actions in providing evidence or testimony should be considered as an intervening factor under the attenuation doctrine.”); see also Streiff, 136 S. Ct. at 2062, 195 L.Ed.2d 400 (concluding that the discovery of a valid warrant that “was entirely unconnected with the [unlawful] stop” constituted an intervening circumstance that weighed against suppression). Petitioner’s attempt to flee the situation created by the police was directly connected to and a result of the unlawful frisk. In the same vein, we are acutely aware of the non-violent, non-aggressive nature of Petitioner’s conduct. There is no evidence on the record to suggest that Petitioner deliberately or even incidentally caused harm or attempted to cause harm to either officer. Having reviewed the factors delineated in Brown in light of the circumstances before us, we hold that the officers’ discovery of the handgun in Petitioner’s possession was not so attenuated from the officers’ unlawful frisk so as to dissipate the taint of their unlawful conduct. Mere moments passed between the unlawful frisk and the discovery of the handgun. Even if Petitioner’s flight was improper, it did not constitute an intervening circumstance for purposes of the attenuation doctrine. The officers discovered the gun by - 37 - exploiting the illegal frisk and not by reason of Petitioner’s reactive conduct. Finally, the officers’ conduct was purposeful and calculated for investigatory purposes and was, thus, flagrant. Accordingly, a proper balance of the Brown factors renders application of the attenuation doctrine inappropriate in this case. Furthermore, the exclusionary rule’s deterrent purpose is served by applying the rule to the present case. Therefore, we hold that the gun removed from Petitioner should have been excluded as evidence.