Opinion ID: 527780
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: publicity and juror bias

Text: 128 Defendants Cartagena and Alvarez claim that the district court erred in denying their motions for mistrial based upon the prejudicial effect pretrial and trial publicity had upon the jury. Specifically, they assert that the jury was tainted by television and newspaper stories that: (1) disclosed a prior settlement that had been reached between Margarita Oquendo and the Justice Department of Puerto Rico; and (2) revealed that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico would indemnify Cartagena and Alvarez from any damages awarded against them and referred to the Commonwealth as the deep pocket. As stated in their written motion requesting mistrial, this claim is based on the seventh amendment right to a civil trial by an impartial jury. 129 In reviewing the district court rulings, we keep in mind that [m]otions for mistrials are directed primarily to the discretion of the trial court, United States v. Pappas, 611 F.2d 399, 406 (1st Cir.1979), and 'will not be reversed absent abuse of discretion,' id. at 406, citing United States v. Sclamo, 578 F.2d 888, 891 (1st Cir.1978). United States v. Chamorro, 687 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1043, 103 S.Ct. 462, 74 L.Ed.2d 613 (1982). We will rarely find an abuse of discretion where the district court has undertake[n] an adequate inquiry into whether the alleged tainting incident occurred and whether it was prejudicial. United States v. Corbin, 590 F.2d 398, 400 (1st Cir.1979) (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954) and collected First Circuit cases); see also United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 733 (1st Cir.) (The trial court's determination as to the impartiality of jurors may be set aside only for manifest error.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 966, 108 S.Ct. 458, 98 L.Ed.2d 397 (1987). 130 After reviewing the record, we are convinced that the district court was vigilant in guarding against the improper effects of trial publicity. The trial judge questioned the jurors on several occasions to discover if any of them were aware of or tainted by publicity discussing the trial. In the initial polling of the prospective jurors on February 29, 1988 the judge queried: 131 Do you know anything about the facts of this case or have you heard or read anything about this case from any source? 132 Do you have any reasons which could affect your impartial consideration of the case to be presented to you as a juror? 133 None of the prospective jurors admitted to knowledge of the case or to an inability to be impartial. 134 After this first polling, counsel for defendants claimed that publicity concerning settlement of Margarita Oquendo's action would make it impossible to find an impartial jury. Because of potential prejudice from the jury's knowledge of the settlement between her and the Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, the judge questioned the jury panel more specifically: 135 I have a question here. Have any of you here today read an article that appeared in El Vocero in today's edition on page 13 where it says Ante De La Corte Federal? 136 One prospective juror--who was later excluded from the petit jury--admitted to having read the headline but not the article itself. The judge admonished all of the prospective jurors that [i]f during the course of this trial there is an article that appears in the newspaper or on television or on the radio that has anything to do with this case, turn it off. Turn it off. 137 After the petit jury was selected, the judge repeated this instruction: As I mentioned previously to you, you should avoid reading any newspaper articles that might be published about the case and should also avoid seeing or hearing any television or radio comments about this trial. 138 On March 1, 1988, defendants made an oral motion for mistrial and a continuance, alleging that plaintiff and members of his family mentioned the Oquendo settlement in a press conference. As a result of this claim, the judge told plaintiff's father, who was a member of the press, that if one of the jurors became biased as a result of publicity, he would have to grant a mistrial. In an in camera session, the judge then questioned each juror individually about whether they had read or heard anything about the case on radio or television. All answered in the negative. 139 Another oral motion for mistrial was made on March 2, 1988. Defendants complained about a newspaper article that named the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as a party in the lawsuit and suggested that the story was the result of plaintiff's father talking to the press. The judge again warned the parties about the specter of mistrial. 140 On March 3, 1988, defendants again moved for mistrial because of publicity. As opposing counsel pointed out in response, however, the newspaper article that was the basis of the motion merely detailed the defendants' complaints about publicity that were made in open court the day before. Nevertheless, the jurors were summoned individually to the judge's chambers for questioning. This time, in addition to asking if the jurors had read or heard anything concerning the case, the judge also asked if they were making efforts to avoid publicity related to the case. Following the questioning, the judge said, I think they're making an effort, honestly. 141 A final oral motion for mistrial was made on March 10, 1988, on the basis of repeated reports in newspaper articles that any award against Cartagena and Alvarez would be paid out of public funds. The judge again questioned each juror individually as to what they had read, seen, or heard in the media; their responses, as before, were negative. The court then received the assurances of the jurors that they would base their decision only upon the evidence presented at trial in light of the jury instructions. 142 None of the jurors admitted reading anything about the case in the newspapers, except for a lone juror who stated that he reads the headlines but then turns the page. It is significant that none of the headlines to the articles at issue refer in any way to the Oquendo settlement or to indemnification. The reading of a bare headline thus provides no basis for a claim of juror bias. 143 We find that the actions of the court in response to defendants' claim that publicity was tainting the impartiality of the jury constitute more than the adequate inquiry required by the case law. See Corbin, 590 F.2d at 400. The judge was conscientious in his efforts to resolve any doubts about whether the jury was being influenced by publicity. Each time defendants raised their concerns about the effects of publicity, the trial judge undertook a detailed, individual interrogation of each juror. He warned them to avoid contact with the media and was satisfied that they were honestly trying to comply. The district judge expressed confidence in the jurors' impartiality and the record supports his judgment. The district court was well within its discretion in denying defendants' motions for mistrial. 13