Opinion ID: 4561955
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Impermissible Applications

Text: Our analysis of the impermissible applications of the Statutes continues to counsel against overbreadth, as well. We previously reasoned that the Statutes impermissibly apply to (1) producers of sexually explicit depictions exclusively showing individuals who are clearly adults, FSC II, 787 F.3d at 156, and (2) adults who share sexually explicit images between themselves for purely private purposes, id. at 163 & n.14. As to the first, we explained that applying the Statutes when depictions show an individual who is clearly an adult “does nothing” to further the Government’s interest in protecting children. Id. at 156. As to the second, the Government had not tried to defend the constitutionality of applying the Statutes to purely private sexually explicit depictions shared between consenting adults. Id. at 163 n.14. The plaintiffs do not contest our prior weighing of these two invalid applications against the Statutes’ vast legitimate sweep. Based on the evidence presented at trial, the plaintiffs showed “to a limited degree, a universe of sexually explicit images that depict only clearly mature adults,” and a “universe of private sexually explicit images not intended for sale or 34 trade.” Id. at 164. Even so, without reducing our inquiry into a purely numerical comparison, we concluded that the scope of the two invalid applications of the Statutes “pale[s] in comparison” to the Statutes’ legitimate sweep, which “counsels against holding the Statutes facially invalid.” Id. Rather than challenge that evaluation of the record, the plaintiffs assert that our balancing of the Statutes’ invalid applications against their valid applications should come out differently now because the District Court found the Statutes invalid as applied in a third circumstance: to secondary producers who play no role in the creation of sexually explicit content. In their view, adding that additional unconstitutional application “magnifie[s]” the Statutes’ “overreach.” D.I. 246 at 17.10 We are not convinced. The plaintiffs have not carried their heavy burden of showing that we should resort to the “strong medicine” of the overbreadth doctrine to facially invalidate the Statutes, a tool to be used “sparingly and only as a last resort.” Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613 10 To the extent the plaintiffs argue that a content-based regulation must be narrowly tailored to survive an overbreadth challenge, see, e.g., Pls. Reply Br. 14–15, we disagree. “Although overbreadth and narrow tailoring are related, the Supreme Court has rejected the . . . assertion that [a law] must precisely target the acts it was passed to remedy.” Turco v. City of Englewood, 935 F.3d 155, 171 (3d Cir. 2019) (footnote omitted) (citing Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 730–31 (2000) (“The fact that the coverage of a statute is broader than the specific concern that led to its enactment is of no constitutional significance”)). 35 (1973). We assume without deciding that applying the Statutes to secondary producers violates the First Amendment. Nevertheless, missing from the plaintiffs’ argument is any specific explanation regarding how much larger this makes the swath of invalid applications and why this particular application should tip the overbreadth scale in their favor. For example, the plaintiffs have not argued how widely the universe of secondary producers extends as compared to the Statutes’ legitimate sweep. And the plaintiffs make no effort to show how many producers of sexually explicit depictions are exclusively secondary producers. That is significant because “[t]he same person may be both a primary and a secondary producer.” 28 C.F.R. § 75.1(c)(3). Excluding from the Statutes’ coverage those secondary producers who occupy a dual role, then, would do little, if anything, to reduce the Statutes’ supposed overreach because those secondary producers would still need to comply as primary producers. These omissions doom the plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim. At bottom, the plaintiffs have failed to prove “from actual fact” that the Statutes’ application to secondary producers renders the Statutes substantially overbroad. Virginia, 539 U.S. at 122 (quotation marks omitted). 3. Nature of the Government’s Interest and of the Activity Targeted Last, when we rejected the plaintiffs’ overbreadth claim previously, we underscored the “‘surpassing importance’ of the Government’s compelling interest” in protecting children from sexual exploitation by pornographers and the nature of the activity that the Statutes aim to regulate. FSC II, 787 F.3d at 166 (quoting New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 36 (1982)). Those factors still counsel against invalidating the Statutes for overbreadth. “Child pornography harms and debases the most defenseless of our citizens,” Williams, 553 U.S. at 307, and “[t]he sexual abuse of a child is a most serious crime and an act repugnant to the moral instincts of a decent people,” Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 244 (2002). And the Statutes aim to “stem the tide of child pornography only after” Congress found “direct prohibitions” on child pornography to be “insufficiently effective.” FSC II, 787 F.3d at 166. “The financial benefits accruing to producers from using youthful models as well as the financial benefits those models themselves enjoy, together with the difficulty of differentiating youthful adults from minors, all combine to increase the risks of children being exploited.” Id.