Opinion ID: 2967883
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Indictment Clause

Text: The Indictment Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that [n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury. U.S. Const. amend. V. Its purpose is to ensure that a defendant’s jeopardy is limited to offenses charged by a group of his fellow citizens acting independently of either prosecuting attorney or judge. Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212, 218 (1960). In con- junction with the notice requirement of the Sixth Amendment,4 the Indictment Clause provides two additional protections: the right of a defendant to be notified of the charges against him through a recitation of the elements, and the right to a description of the charges that is sufficiently detailed to allow the defendant to argue that future proceedings are precluded by a previous acquittal or conviction. See Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1962); see also Hamling 4 The Sixth Amendment provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation. U.S. Const. amend. VI. UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 13 v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974) ([A]n indictment is sufficient if it, first, contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense); United States v. Carrington, 301 F.3d 204, 209-10 (4th Cir. 2002) (same). In this case, we are presented with the question of whether Higgs’s federal indictment sufficiently alleged the nine murder and kidnapping counts as deatheligible, capital offenses — an inquiry that places us squarely within the arena of Apprendi and its progeny. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). In Apprendi, the defendant was convicted of second-degree possession of a firearm, punishable by a term of imprisonment of between five and ten years. However, he was sentenced to twelve years imprisonment under New Jersey’s hate crime law, which authorized an enhanced sentence of between ten and twenty years if the sentencing judge found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the crime was motivated by racial animus. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the Sixth Amendment mandated that, other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 490. A similar mandate flows from the Fifth Amendment’s Indictment Clause: In federal prosecutions, such facts must also be charged in the indictment. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 627 (2002); see also United States v. Promise, 255 F.3d 150, 156-57 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (holding that, when applying Apprendi to a federal prosecution, a fact that increases the maximum penalty must be treated as an element of an aggravated . . . offense, i.e., charged in the indictment and proved to the jury beyond a reasonable doubt (footnote omitted)); id at 157 n.6 (rejecting argument that a fact that increases the maximum penalty must be treated as an element for purposes of some rights guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment (e.g. the right to a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt) but not others (e.g., the right to indictment by a grand jury)). These cases stand for the settled proposition that, with the exception of the fact of a prior conviction, a defendant may not be exposed 14 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS to a penalty exceeding the [statutory] maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict alone. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483. In determining whether a particular fact is to be treated as an element of the offense, as opposed to a sentencing factor, the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect — does the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict? Id. at 494. In Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), the Supreme Court had occasion to consider the effect of Apprendi’s holding upon Arizona’s capital sentencing scheme, which allowed the trial judge alone to determine the presence of aggravating factors required for imposition of the sentence of death. Overruling its prior decision in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990),5 the Court struck down the scheme, holding that the Sixth Amendment mandates that [c]apital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants, . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment. Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. If a State makes an increase in a defendant’s authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact . . . must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. A defendant may not be exposed to a penalty exceeding the maximum he would receive if punished according to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone. Id. at 602 (internal citation, quotation marks and alterations omitted). Because Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense, the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury. Id. at 609 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Arizona sentencing scheme at issue in Ring did not directly implicate the Fifth Amendment Indictment Clause. See Ring, 536 U.S. at 597 n.4 (noting that Ring does not contend that his indictment was constitutionally defective and that the Fourteenth Amend- 5 In Walton v. Arizona, the Court had held that Arizona’s sentencing scheme did not run afoul of the Sixth Amendment because the aggravating factors were not element[s] of the offense of capital murder. 497 U.S. 639, 649 (1990). The Ring Court concluded that this holding was irreconcilable with Apprendi’s reasoning. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 589 (2002). UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 15 ment has not been construed to include the Fifth Amendment right to presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted)). Thus, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the precise issue of whether, and to what extent, the Indictment Clause requires that the intent and aggravating factors be charged in the indictment. Higgs asserts that the principles of Apprendi and Ring dictate that any factor required to be submitted to the jury must be included in the indictment. We agree. Higgs’s indictment charged him with three counts each of premeditated murder, murder committed in the perpetration of a kidnapping, and kidnapping resulting in death. Like the Arizona criminal statutes at issue in Ring, the federal statutes setting forth these offenses provide that the offender shall be punished by either death or life imprisonment.6 6 Section 1111 of Title 18 provides as follows: (a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnapping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed is murder in the first degree. .... (b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1111 (emphasis added). Section 1201 of Title 18 provides that: (a) Whoever unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away and holds for ransom or reward or otherwise any person, except in the case of a minor by the parent thereof, when — 16 UNITED STATES v. HIGGS A defendant does not become eligible for the death penalty, however, unless the jury finds at least one statutory intent factor, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3591(a)(2), and at least one statutory aggravating factor, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 3592(c). See Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 376-377 (1999); see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593. Because a defendant may be sentenced only to life imprisonment unless the jury finds the existence of at least one intent factor and one statutory aggravating factor, we have little trouble concluding that such factors increase the penalty for the crimes of first-degree murder and kidnapping resulting in death beyond the otherwise maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Accordingly, with the exception of the fact of prior convictions, those intent and aggravating factors which the government intends to rely upon to render a defendant death-eligible under the FDPA are the functional equivalent of elements of the capital offenses and must be charged in the indictment, submitted to the petit jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. We reject, however, Higgs’s claim that the Indictment Clause requires that nonstatutory aggravators relied upon by the government at trial be included in the indictment. The finding of a nonstatutory aggravator alone will not support imposition of the death penalty. Rather, the purpose of nonstatutory aggravators is to aid the factfinder in selecting the appropriate sentence from the available options, i.e., death or life imprisonment. Thus, the sentencer determines whether a defendant eligible for the death penalty should in fact receive that sentence. What is important at the selection stage is an individualized determination on the basis of the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime. Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, ... (2) any such act against the person is done within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States; ... shall be punished by imprisonment for any term of years or for life and, if the death of any person results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1201(a)(2) (emphasis added). UNITED STATES v. HIGGS 17 972 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jones, 527 U.S. at 376-379 (discussing the FDPA decisionmaking process and the distinction between the eligibility decision and the selection decision); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878-79 (1983) (discussing difference between eligibility and selection factors); cf. United States v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861, 893-94 (4th Cir. 1996) (discussing the decisionmaking process under the analogous death sentencing proceedings of 21 U.S.C. § 848). Because nonstatutory aggravating factors do not increase the available punishment to which a defendant might be subjected, they are not required to be alleged in the indictment.