Opinion ID: 1992848
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Instructions on mitigating factor c(5)(a)

Text: Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the trial court's instruction with respect to mitigating factor c(5)(a). That factor provides: The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance insufficient to constitute a defense to prosecution. N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(a). Defense counsel requested that the trial court instruct the jury on the mitigating factor in conformity with the model jury charge. The trial court agreed to include the requested language, specifically that this mitigating factor may be present even though the defendant had neither a mental disease [n]or [a] mental defect. However, prior to charging the jury, the trial court informed counsel that it had made some minor changes to the model jury charge and that the court planned to omit the language in the model charge that specifically instructed the jury that the finding of a mental disease or defect is not necessary for finding the c(5)(a) factor. Defendant objected, but the trial court decided not to alter the planned charge. On appeal, defendant argues that the omission impermissibly restricted the jury's consideration of the c(5)(a) mitigating factor. Proper jury instructions are critical to the penalty-phase of a capital proceeding. See Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. at 456-57, 550 A. 2d 1172; State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287, 430 A. 2d 914 (1981). While a trial court is not bound to instruct a jury in the language requested by a party, a defendant is entitled to a fair charge. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 292, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting Thompson, supra, 59 N.J. at 411, 283 A. 2d 513). In determining whether a charge is proper, a reviewing court will examine the charge as a whole and will attempt to determine whether the challenged language was prejudicial. When the contested instruction concerns a mitigating factor, we similarly examine the instruction in its entirety, focusing on whether there is a `reasonable likelihood that the jury had applied the challenged instruction in a way that prevents the consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence.' Martini I, supra, 131 N.J. at 304, 619 A. 2d 1208 (citation omitted). Considering the trial court's instruction in its entirety, we find that the court's instruction on the c(5)(a) mitigating factor properly conveyed to the jury that it could conclude defendant suffered from extreme mental disturbance even if it did not conclude that defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect. Indeed, the trial court specifically mentioned that this mitigating factor is established by evidence showing that defendant was suffering from an extreme mental or emotional disturbance and that such disturbance influenced him to commit the murder. The court then defined disturbance as agitation, confusion, or violent change. Although the jury charge did not contain the precise language in the model jury charge, the instruction in no way suggested that the c(5)(a) factor could not be found absent mental disease or defect. We also note that defense counsel's explanation of the c(5)(a) mitigating factor during summation was consistent with the instruction given.