Opinion ID: 3151014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Search Warrant and the Second Search

Text: Clay argues the second search was illegal because the warrant was invalid. “[N]o Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. “A finding of probable cause is a legal conclusion that the Court reviews de novo.” United States v. Neal, 577 F. App’x 434, 439 (6th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Martin, 526 F.3d 926, 936 (6th Cir. 2008)). To demonstrate probable cause, the application for a warrant must include an affidavit that “indicate[s] a fair probability that evidence of a crime will be located on the premises of the proposed search.” United States v. Dyer, 580 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Jenkins, 396 F.3d 751, 760 (6th Cir. 2005)). “Probable cause is defined as reasonable grounds for belief, supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion.” United States v. Bennett, 905 F.2d 931, 934 (6th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. One 1984 Cadillac, 888 F.2d 1133, 1135 (6th Cir. 1989)). We consider whether probable cause exists in light of the totality of the circumstances. Dyer, 580 F.3d at 390. In addition, [W]hen the majority of the information in the affidavit comes from confidential sources, . . . courts must consider the veracity, reliability, and the basis of knowledge for that information as part of the totality of the circumstances. While independent corroboration of the confidential informant’s story is not a sine qua non to a finding of probable cause, in the absence of any indicia of the informants’ reliability, courts insist that the affidavit contain substantial independent police corroboration. 13 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay Id. at 390–91 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Even a known informant’s information may require corroboration if an affidavit supplies little information concerning that informant’s reliability. United States v. Woosley, 361 F.3d 924, 927 (6th Cir. 2004). The warrant application in the present case was prepared primarily by investigating officer Sergeant Quire. After describing the premises and the van described by Mitchell, Sergeant Quire listed evidence to be seized, including drugs. In his account, Sergeant Quire included the following information: Officers of the Frankfort Police Department investigated a domestic violence complaint at [the apartment’s address]. The investigation led to the complainant of the domestic violence complaint advising that CLAY, Dono Demil was involved in trafficking in controlled substances from the subject premises. The complainant, who lives in the apartment with Dono Demil Clay and has done so since February, 2013, gave consent to search the premises, and officers entered the premises and observed a locked closet in the rear bedroom. There was no key available for this locked closet. The complainant also advised that Clay usually keeps a firearm in the closet and cocaine in the top dresser. The security of the premises has been maintained until the same can be searched pursuant to a search warrant. It is reasonably believed based on the foregoing that search of the subject premises will result in the collection of evidence of drug trafficking. Affidavit, R. 23-2 (emphasis added). Sergeant Quire also reported Clay’s criminal history. As stated above, Clay argues that because the first search was illegal the underlined text of the quoted Affidavit must be excluded from consideration. However, because the initial search was valid, the fruits of that search are also valid; therefore, the information gained therefrom remains in the Affidavit. Accordingly, our review starts with whether the Affidavit, as 14 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay written, contained sufficient information to permit the issuing judge to make an independent determination of probable cause. Clay argues that “[t]he information presented to the state court judge was only a generalized representation by an unnamed person whose veracity the police had no cause or capacity to affirm or corroborate.” Appellant Br. at 15. Clay claims that Mitchell was a “completely unidentified” informant and that there was no indication of her reliability, but concedes that the underlined provisions “provided some corroboration to that [information] provided by [Mitchell] and buttressed her credibility.” Id. at 16–17. Clay’s position that Mitchell was “completely unidentified” is misplaced. An affidavit need not name a confidential informant but need only provide indicia of the informant’s reliability to raise that person’s status above that of an anonymous, unidentified source. See Dyer, 580 F.3d at 392 (“Because the informant witnessed the illegal activity on the premises searched and was known to the officer writing the affidavit, there were sufficient indicia of reliability without substantial independent police corroboration.”). In this case, while Mitchell is not named in the Affidavit, the Affidavit contains indicia of her reliability, such that she rises above an anonymous, unidentified source. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 233–34 (1983) (“[I]f an unquestionably honest citizen comes forward with a report of criminal activity—which if fabricated would subject him to criminal liability—we have found rigorous scrutiny of the basis of his knowledge unnecessary.”). It is commonsensical to assume that when a person files a domestic violence complaint and provides the officers with her address that the officers at the very least know that person’s identity. The Affidavit states that the informant filed a domestic violence complaint and gave the police what purported to be her address, i.e. the address of the 15 No. 14-5946, United States v. Clay apartment. R. 23-2 (“[t]he Complainant, who lives in the apartment . . .”); see United States v. Johnson, 351 F.3d 254, 258 (6th Cir. 2003) (“Courts should review the sufficiency of the affidavit in a commonsense, rather than hypertechnical manner.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, it is apparent that Mitchell was not an anonymous source. Beyond this, the Affidavit contains information that corroborates Mitchell’s testimony. While an address does not alone suggest criminal activity, see United States v. Hammond, 351 F.3d 765, 773 (6th Cir. 2003), more was provided here. The Affidavit contains information that relayed to the reviewing