Opinion ID: 1110135
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: applicable procedures

Text: Having concluded that the Legislature did not intend to require a hearing in conformance with the Baker Act, we are left with the thornier question of what procedures should apply before a court orders a dependent child placed in a residential psychiatric treatment facility against the child's wishes. As expressed by the Legislature, one of the purposes of Chapter 39 is the intent: To provide judicial and other procedures to assure due process through which children, parents, guardians and other interested parties are assured fair hearings by a respectful and respected court or other tribunal and the recognition, protection and enforcement of their constitutional and other legal rights.... § 39.001(1)( l ). The Department assures us that the laws regulating dependency proceedings in Chapter 39 provide ample protections for children. [32] Because placing a child in a locked mental health facility is not ordinary care, see M.W., 722 So.2d at 969, the Department agrees that court approval is necessary before such treatment can be administered to a dependent child. However, despite the myriad of reviews by a variety of individuals involved, no statute or rule specifically sets forth the procedures that the Department should follow in order to obtain court approval of residential treatment, which it concedes is required. We are thus concerned that, although there are various procedures in Chapter 39, that could be construed to require a hearing before a trial court orders a commitment, neither Chapter 39 nor our own procedural rules adequately address whether an attorney for the child should be appointed before a commitment to a residential facility takes place, [33] what type of hearing is required, what standard of proof should apply and whether the child should have the right to put on evidence before the court orders a placement in a residential psychiatric facility. [34] Although the parties agree that the decision to place a dependent child in a residential psychiatric treatment facility must be included in the case plan, which must be approved by the dependency court, they disagree as to what procedures the court must follow before allowing an amendment to the case plan and when the amendment must take place. Thus, while the Department agrees that an amendment to the case plan would be required to place M.W. in a residential facility, it also argues that the evidentiary hearing that was scheduled in this case, six weeks after M.W. was placed in Lock Towns, complies with this requirement. [35] In contrast, the amicus Legal Aid Society of Palm Beach County argues that because placement in a residential facility for mental health treatment requires an amendment to the case plan, M.W. could not be committed to a residential mental health facility without prior notice and a judicial determination following a hearing that competent evidence supported the need to amend the case plan. We are convinced that the procedures and protections for the child should be explicitly spelled out when the Department is seeking this type of commitment, even on a temporary basis. An order approving the placement of a fifteen-year-old dependent child in a locked residential facility against the wishes of that child deprives the child of liberty and requires clear-cut procedures to be followed by the dependency court judge. We contrast this dearth of procedural guidance with the specific rules governing the procedures for taking children into custody, shelter petitions and hearings, adjudicatory hearings, disposition hearings, the initial approval of case plans and judicial reviews. See Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.300, 8.305, 8.330, 8.340, 8.410, 8.415. Even rule 8.410(c), which governs amendments to case plans, does not specify what type of hearing should be held and what type of evidence should be received before the court approves an amendment to a case plan not agreed to by the parties. While the child's best interests may in fact be paramount in the eyes, minds and hearts of every participant in the dependency proceeding, it is important that our procedures in dependency cases ensure that each child is treated with the dignity to which every participant in a dependency proceeding should be entitled. It is true that the dependency court, a citizen review panel, the Department and multiple psychiatrists and psychologists were involved in M.W.'s case and all were concerned with his best interests. However, of paramount concern is the question of whether M.W. perceived that anyone had his best interests at heart when he was placed against his wishes in a locked psychiatric facility without the opportunity to be heard. Indeed, the issue presented by this case extends beyond the legal question of what process is due; rather, this case also presents the question of whether a child believes that he or she is being listened to and that his or her opinion is respected and counts. See generally Gary B. Melton, et al., No Place to Go: The Civil Commitment of Minors 146-47 (1998) (stating that children obtain psychological benefit from procedural protections prior to being placed in psychiatric treatment facilities); cf. Amendment to Fla. Rule of Juv. Pro. 8.100(a), 753 So.2d 541 (Fla. 1999) (Lewis, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that audio-video detention hearings reduce juveniles' perception that they are receiving a fair hearing). This question is particularly important when the child is an adolescent like M.W., who was fifteen years of age when he was placed in Lock Towns. Whether or not an evidentiary hearing is constitutionally mandated, our legal system at the very least should afford the child, through his or her attorney and/or guardian ad litem, a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The ultimate goal of any procedure should be to balance the flexibility and informality characteristic of dependency proceedings with the need for procedural safeguards prior to placing a dependent child in a residential psychiatric treatment facility, which may constitute a temporary or prolonged loss of liberty. In striking this balance, the judicial system must recognize the individuality and dignity of the children who find themselves inside the courtroom solely as a result of their parents' abuse or neglect. [36] The Guardian Ad Litem Program of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit asks this Court in resolving the issue in this case to find that the Baker Act procedures are not incorporated into the statute because dependency courts are already bursting at the seams, lacking the time and resources to accomplish the procedures that are already statutorily required. This harsh reality only highlights what this Court has repeatedly stated: reasonable workloads are essential to the proper functioning of dependency courts in performing the multiple important reviews and hearings required of them by law and necessary for the best interests of the children. See In re Certification of the Need for Additional Judges, 755 So.2d 79 (Fla.2000); In re Certification of the Need for Additional Judges, 728 So.2d 730, 734 (Fla.1999). Last year, in our certification opinion, we detailed the increased burdens on the judiciary corresponding to the increases in statutorily mandated dependency hearings. See In re Certification, 728 So.2d at 734. The fact that the dependency court judge in this case said that she could not hold an evidentiary hearing for six weeks after the order of commitment is a graphic example of this problem. However, we have recognized the obligation of the Judicial Branch to join with the Executive and Legislative Branches to give priority to our state's most precious resourceour children. Id. Thus, we cannot eschew the necessity for a hearing before a dependent child is placed in residential treatment against his wishes simply because other statutorily mandated hearings are already required or because it would otherwise burden our dependency courts.