Opinion ID: 1355753
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The importance of reputation

Text: (25) The news media contend the threat of defamation actions has a chilling effect on their willingness to report the news. Stated conversely, the argument is that obstacles to recovery for defamation increase the media's ability to report the news. The need to avoid self-censorship by the news media is, however, not the only societal value at issue. If it were, this court would have embraced long ago the view that publishers and broadcasters enjoy an unconditional and indefeasible immunity from liability for defamation.... Yet absolute protection for the communications media requires a total sacrifice of the competing value served by the law of defamation. ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 341 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 806].) There must be a proper accommodation between the law of defamation and the freedoms of speech and press. ( Id., at p. 325 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 797].) The great rights guaranteed by the First Amendment carry with them certain responsibilities as well. ( Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders (1985) 472 U.S. 749, 764 [86 L.Ed.2d 593, 606, 105 S.Ct. 2939] (conc. opn. of Burger, C.J.).) Accommodation of the value of reputation is also required by this state's Constitution, which expressly provides that every person must be responsible for the abuse of the right of free speech. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 2, subd. (a).) In refusing to impose a malice standard on private persons, another state court eloquently explained the value of reputation: [T]he defamation action, properly limited, also plays an important role in a free society as it represents the individual's sole remedy against the occasional excesses of the print and electronic media which often have vast resources to inflict untoward damage upon an individual. Surely, a decent, open society cannot, in the name of press and speech freedom, so thoroughly undermine this remedy as to render it useless to those people who have been damaged by a defamatory falsehood negligently uttered in the mass media and have not in any way sought the public limelight. This small modicum of privacy for the average person deserves, in our view, protection under the existing law, particularly in a country such as ours which is dedicated to the preservation of the free individual.... It therefore seems neither sensible nor fair to push the parameters of free press and free speech to such an extent, as urged here, that we needlessly plow under other important individual rights. ( Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Ane, supra, 423 So.2d at p. 387.) We agree with the Florida court's observation. [T]echnology has immeasurably increased the power of the press to do both good and evil. ( Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, supra, 403 U.S. at p. 60 [29 L.Ed.2d at p. 321] (conc. opn. of White, J.).) News reporting has directly or indirectly led to grand jury and legislative investigations and the resignation or downfall of powerful public officials, including a President of the United States. Such power is considerable, especially when brought to bear on a private individual. A society in which men recognize no check upon their freedom soon becomes a society where freedom is the possession of only a savage few; as we have learned to our sorrow. (Hand, The Spirit of Liberty (Dillard 1st ed. 1952) p. 190.) A reasonable degree of protection for a private individual's reputation is essential to our system of ordered liberty. It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. (The Federalist No. 51 (J. Madison) (Cooke ed. 1961) p. 351.) The need to redress defamation is as important now as when the tort of defamation was first recognized, perhaps more so. In an organized and centralized society, where at least economic relationships are likely to be based on an impersonal or reputational level as opposed to the more decentralized and personal approach characteristic of a bygone era, how we are perceived takes on greater significance. For better or worse, in today's world, most of us are known by our images. ( Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek, supra, 398 N.W.2d 245, 264-265.) A tradesman in the 18th century defamed by a customer could rely on his good reputation with others and perhaps had a reasonable opportunity to present the truth to those who mattered to his livelihood. In today's business market, there is little realistic opportunity for self-help when a tradesperson, e.g., a contractor like plaintiff in this case, is disparaged to thousands of potential customers by a television program. The concern for individual reputation that led the high court in Gertz to reject a malice standard applicable against private individuals also weighs against adopting such a standard under the rubric of section 47(3). We agree with the high court's observation that, the individual's right to the protection of his own good name `reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being  a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.' ( Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. at p. 341 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 806], quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer (1966) 383 U.S. 75, 92 [15 L.Ed.2d 597, 609, 86 S.Ct. 669] (conc. opn. of Stewart, J.).) On a practical level, private individuals have less opportunity than public officials and public figures to effectively counteract false statements and are more vulnerable to injury. ( Id., at p. 344 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 808].) As Mark Twain observed, no one should get into a battle with those who use ink by the barrel. (26) As a general rule, public officials and figures can be said to have voluntarily exposed themselves to public scrutiny and must accept the consequences. Private individuals are thus more deserving of recovery. ( Id., at pp. 344-345 [41 L.Ed.2d at p. 808].) The public-interest privilege sought by defendants would be contrary, at least in spirit, to the concept of a public figure as developed by the courts since Gertz, supra, 418 U.S. 323. A person is not a public figure merely because he happens to be involved in a controversy that is newsworthy. ( Time, Inc. v. Firestone (1976) 424 U.S. 448, 452-455 [47 L.Ed.2d 154, 161-164, 96 S.Ct. 958].) [A] `public figure' plaintiff must have undertaken some voluntary act through which he seeks to influence the resolution of the public issues involved. As such, the mere involvement of a person in a matter which the media deems to be of interest to the public does not, in and of itself, require that such a person become a public figure for the purpose of a subsequent libel action. [¶] In sum, when called upon to make a determination of public figure status, courts should look for evidence of affirmative actions by which purported `public figures' have thrust themselves into the forefront of particular public controversies. ( Reader's Digest Ass'n. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d 244, 254-255, italics in original; Vegod Corp. v. American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 763, 768-769 [160 Cal. Rptr. 97, 603 P.2d 14].) A fairly high threshold of public activity is necessary to elevate a person to public figure status. (Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d ed. 1988) § 12-13, p. 881.) It would be anomalous to conclude that a person is not a public figure merely because he is involved in a matter of public interest and thus that he need not show malice, but to find that section 47(3) requires him to show malice in a news media communication because he is involved in a matter of public interest. As other courts have noted, a public-interest privilege would undercut the widely recognized distinction between public and private persons. (See, e.g., Troman v. Wood, supra, 340 N.E.2d 292, 297-298.) Interpreting section 47(3) to require a private person to prove malice might have another curious result. The distinction between public and private persons reflects a special solicitude for private reputation. Under a section 47(3) privilege, however, a private person might have to show a greater degree of culpability by the defendant than would a public person under the common law fair-comment defense and its constitutional-malice standard. (27) The reason is that, The malice referred to by the statute [section 47(3)] is actual malice or malice in fact, that is, a state of mind arising from hatred or ill will, evidencing a willingness to vex, annoy or injure another person. ( Agarwal v. Johnson, supra, 25 Cal.3d 932, 944.) Constitutional malice, although also often called actual malice, means only that, [T]he defendant in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication. ( St. Amant v. Thompson, supra, 390 U.S. 727, 731 [20 L.Ed.2d 262, 267].) The high court has distinguished traditional malice (ill will) from constitutional malice. ( Beckley Newspapers v. Hanks (1967) 389 U.S. 81, 82 [19 L.Ed.2d 248, 250-251, 88 S.Ct. 197].) Actual hatred or ill will is arguably a much greater degree of fault than mere doubt as to accuracy. If so, a private person subject to section 47(3) would have a greater burden in obtaining redress for a damaged reputation than the high court has seen fit to impose on public persons. [32] (28) Defendants contend a showing of malice is appropriate as a matter of policy under the California Constitution. They rely on observations by California courts that the California Constitution provides greater protection than its federal counterpart for freedom of speech and the press. ( Wilson v. Superior Court (1975) 13 Cal.3d 652, 658 [119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 532 P.2d 116]; Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center (1979) 23 Cal.3d 899, 910 [153 Cal. Rptr. 854, 592 P.2d 341], affd. (1980) 447 U.S. 74 [64 L.Ed.2d 741, 100 S.Ct. 2035]; Spiritual Psychic Science Church of Truth, Inc. v. City of Azusa (1985) 39 Cal.3d 501, 519 [217 Cal. Rptr. 225, 703 P.2d 1119].) None of the cases relied on by defendants involved the issue of the proper standard of liability in a defamation action. We have recently applied the federal constitutional requirements without suggestion that our state Constitution creates higher obstacles to recovery for defamation. ( McCoy v. Hearst Corp. (1989) 42 Cal.3d 835 [231 Cal. Rptr. 518, 727 P.2d 711]; Reader's Digest Ass'n. v. Superior Court, supra, 37 Cal.3d 244.) Article I, section 2, subdivision (a) of the California Constitution states, Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press. (Italics added.) This provision makes clear that the right to speech is not unfettered and reflects a considered determination that the individual's interest in reputation is worthy of constitutional protection. The federal Constitution, by contrast, contains no express provision imposing responsibility for abuse of the right of free speech. This difference refutes defendants' policy argument that our state Constitution weighs in favor of a standard of fault higher than that required under the federal Constitution. [33] Society's interest in the value of a private person's reputation weighs against the judicial creation of a privilege (whether by construing a statute or the common law) that would impose burdens greater than those already required under the federal Constitution. In a related defamation context, the high court refused to impose a malice standard on a private individual and thereby diminish the value of reputation without any convincing assurance that such a sacrifice is required under the First Amendment. ( Time, Inc. v. Firestone, supra, 424 U.S. 448, 456 [47 L.Ed.2d 154, 164].) We agree. There is no compelling evidence before us that there is a need for a statutory privilege that would effectively preclude recovery by a defamed private individual. Convincing assurance of the need for further restrictions on private persons can be obtained only after careful consideration of empirical data. As we have explained, such a task is for the Legislature, not this court. (See discussion at pp. 739-740, ante. )