Opinion ID: 2576430
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Inherent Appointment Power

Text: ¶23 Our case law has long acknowledged that courts possess inherent powers to ensure the pursuit of a just process and result. For example, in Peterson v. Evans, we stated that it has always been held, regardless of express statutory authority, that courts of general jurisdiction have the inherent power to make and enforce all necessary rules and orders calculated to enforce the orderly conduct of their business and secure justice between parties litigant. 188 P. 152, 153 (Utah 1920). That language is in accord with the contemporaneous conclusion of the United States Supreme Court in Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300, 312 (1920), that [c]ourts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate instruments required for the performance of their duties. See also id. at 313 (stating that courts possess the authority to seek aid in carrying out judicial duties and that [w]hether such aid shall be sought is ordinarily within the discretion of the trial judge); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204, 227 (1821) ([All] Courts of justice are universally acknowledged to be vested, by their very creation, with the power to impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence, and submission to their lawful mandates and . . . to preserve themselves and their officers from the approach and insults of pollution.). The principle represented by the above-quoted language has been repeatedly reaffirmed by this court. See, e.g., Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, ¶ 39, 100 P.3d 1177 (Defendants erroneously assume that the sole source of the court's power is rule 53 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. However, . . . the trial court has broad equitable power . . . .); Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ¶ 13, 985 P.2d 255 (`It is undoubtedly true that courts of general and superior jurisdiction possess certain inherent powers not derived from any statute. Among these are the power to . . . direct and control its officers, including attorneys as such . .. .' (quoting In re Evans, 130 P. 217, 224-25 (Utah 1913))). ¶24 Although its analysis is centered on the federal justice system, Bothwell v. Republic Tobacco Co., 912 F. Supp. 1221 (D. Neb. 1995), provides a helpful and thorough examination of the inherent authority possessed by courts and the manner in which that general authority relates specifically to the appointment power. The Bothwell court commences its analysis by outlining three separate categories of inherent judicial authority: (1) powers necessary to maintain independence from other branches of government, (2) powers necessary to exercise all other vested powers, and (3) powers to ensure `the pursuit of a just result.' Id. at 1226 (quoting Eash v. Riggins Trucking Inc., 757 F.2d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 1985)). [5] After identifying the three general categories of inherent authority possessed by courts, the Bothwell court concluded that, although the power to appoint counsel falls most readily into the third category, the appointment power actually furthers all of the functions covered by the three identified categories. Id. at 1227. Having so concluded, the Bothwell court then made the broad pronouncement that, while there may not be a constitutional right to counsel in the context of a civil dispute, counsel nevertheless may be necessary in a particular civil proceeding to ensure fairness and justice in the proceeding and to bring about a fair and just outcome. Id. (citing Merritt v. Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 764 (7th Cir. 1983)); see also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996) ([I]n some exceptional cases, the public and private interests at stake are such that the administration of justice may best be served by appointing a lawyer to represent an indigent civil litigant.); Cache County v. Lauritzen, 810 P.2d 494, 498 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing the inherent authority of courts to appoint counsel when the need arises). ¶25 TDC correctly points out that the majority of decisions discussing the propriety of appointment of counsel in the civil context expressly mention indigency as a primary factor justifying such an appointment. In fact, even those cases that do not expressly mention indigency when commenting on the scope of the appointment power implicitly rely on indigency as a key factor justifying the appointment of counsel. See id. (citing Wash. County v. Day, 447 P.2d 189, 191 (Utah 1968) (discussing the inherent appointment power and strongly implying that indigency is a critical factor in appointment decisions)). However, we are unaware of any authority that circumscribes the appointment power such that it can only operate to remedy the obvious inequities present when an indigent civil litigant seeks access to the courts. Significantly, the language courts use when discussing the inherent appointment authority is broadly cast and typically unadorned with equivocations or limitations, evincing a recognition that the existence of a broad, necessarily amorphous power is essential to the effective pursuit of the judicial obligation to provide justice. See, e.g., Bothwell, 912 F. Supp. at 1227 ([C]ounsel . . . may be necessary in a particular civil proceeding to ensure fairness and justice in the proceeding and to bring about a fair and just outcome.); Gibson v. Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tex. 2003) (stating that the Texas Supreme Court has not addressed any limits to the courts' discretionary authority to appoint counsel other than holding that appointment is acceptable when exceptional circumstances exist); Lauritzen, 810 P.2d at 498 (counsel can be appointed when the need arises); cf. Eash, 757 F.2d at 563 (stating that inherent judicial powers derived from necessity are necessary only in the sense of being highly useful in the pursuit of a just result). We have been referred to no language, and we have discovered none, that purports to identify or set limits to the appointment authority implicated here; we are certainly unaware of any language expressing the position that courts lack appointment power until the possibility of indigency is raised. See Eash, 757 F.2d at 561 (the concept of inherent judicial powers has been described as nebulous and its bounds as `shadowy'). ¶26 Given the above discussion, we conclude that appointment of counsel for a nonindigent civil litigant is not excluded per se from the sphere of a district court's authority. Even so, TDC and Burke still question whether the appointment of counsel for an absent litigant is acceptable because, they argue, appointed counsel will necessarily violate the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct simply by complying with the appointment order. We do not discount the gravity of such a question. It is of paramount importance that judges wield their appointment power wisely and judiciously and that judges avoid leading officers of the court down a path that runs counter to ethical principles. ¶27 However, unlike TDC, we believe that Burke is able to obey the district court's appointment order without running afoul of the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct. For example, although we recognize it is a remote possibility, Burke may be able to locate Drezga and assume normal lawyer-client relations, which would dissipate all of the concerns raised by both Burke and TDC. Failing that outcome, we are nevertheless of the opinion that the rules of professional conduct are flexible enough to allow Burke to serve Drezga's interests in the most effective manner permitted by the unusual circumstances of this case. The reasoning behind this conclusion is outlined below.