Opinion ID: 1918224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Opinion Evidence

Text: At trial, Officer Robert Badessa, a twenty-five year veteran of the Providence Police Department and a seven-year member of its Bureau of Criminal Identification Unit (the BCI Unit), [5] testified about his investigation of the crime scene and his collection and documentation of evidence. On appeal, and for the first time, defendant attempts to challenge Officer Badessa's qualifications to testify about the dissipation of gunshot residue from articles of clothing. During the trial, Officer Badessa testified that the recovery of trace evidence of gunshot residue from clothing is affected by: [j]ust the movement of the clothing, just the movement of somebody's hands and firing the weapon, all of them movement [sic], and the, you know, just air around you as you're waving an arm, swinging. It dissipates very quickly. The defendant at no time voiced objection to that testimony at trial. We often have repeated that a basic rule of our appellate practice is that this [C]ourt will not review objections that were not raised at trial. State v. Morris, 744 A.2d 850, 859 (R.I.2000) (quoting State v. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d 1101, 1107 (R.I.1999)). `Consequently, allegations of error committed at trial are considered waived if they were not effectively raised at trial, despite their articulation at the appellate level.' Id. (quoting Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1107-08). However, assuming, arguendo, that the issue had been raised below, the defendant's appeal on this issue would be unavailing. The qualification of an expert is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the trial justice, and the exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal absent abuse. Bettencourt, 723 A.2d at 1112 (quoting DeChristofaro v. Machala, 685 A.2d 258, 267 (R.I.1996)). Rule 702 permits a witness who is qualified `by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education' to testify as an expert. Id. Prior to the admission of expert testimony, a trial justice must consider whether the testimony sought is relevant, within the witness's expertise, and based on an adequate factual foundation. Id. (quoting Rodriquez v. Kennedy, 706 A.2d 922, 924 (R.I.1998) (per curiam)). As a rule of thumb, expert testimony should be permitted on nearly every subject so long as it is beyond the understanding of laypersons of ordinary intelligence. State v. Lyons, 725 A.2d 271, 274 (R.I.1999) (citing State v. Bryant, 670 A.2d 776, 782 (R.I.1996)). Our review of the record indicates that even if the defendant had objected, the trial justice would not have abused his discretion in admitting the disputed testimony. At trial, Officer Badessa testified that he had been a member of the Providence Police Department for twenty-five years, and of that, he had spent the previous seven years as a member of the BCI unit. During the latter period, he handled approximately thirty homicides, had training with respect to bullet holes and impact, and had experience in the testing of gunshot residue on clothing. In addition, his testimony was limited to the general characteristics of clothing that has been exposed to gunshot residue evidence. At no point did he form an opinion about the actual clothing that the defendant was wearing on the night of the murder. [6] Furthermore, in light of the fact that Prof. Dennis C. Hilliard, the director of the state crime laboratory and a prominent and acknowledged expert in forensic laboratory testing, had testified without objection00485B about the same opinion evidence, namely, the dissipation of gunshot residue from articles of clothing, even if the admission of Officer Badessa's opinion testimony had been error, it would be harmless error beyond any reasonable doubt since the same opinion evidence also had been presented to the jury by Professor Hilliard and without any objection by defense counsel