Opinion ID: 2092378
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Duty to Inquire

Text: Defendant next contends that the Chicago police had a duty to inquire of the Wisconsin authorities whether the defendant had asked for the assistance of counsel. We disagree. Defendant relies on Arizona v. Roberson (1988), 486 U.S. 675, 108 S.Ct. 2093, 100 L.Ed.2d 704, in support of his claim that the Illinois authorities had a duty to inquire of the Wisconsin authorities whether defendant had exercised his right to counsel in Wisconsin before transporting the defendant to Illinois. For reasons which will be indicated, we do not find Roberson controlling. In Roberson, the Supreme Court stated that custodial interrogation must be conducted pursuant to established procedures, and those procedures in turn must enable an officer who proposes to initiate an interrogation to determine whether the suspect has previously requested counsel. ( Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687, 108 S.Ct. at 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d at 717.) The Court also stated that whether the same or different law enforcement authorities are involved in the second investigation, the same need to determine whether the suspect has requested counsel exists. Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687-88, 108 S.Ct. at 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d at 717. In Roberson, however, there was a written report of the defendant's exercise of his right to counsel. This report was available to the second officer who interviewed the defendant. That officer, however, failed to review the report and was therefore unaware that the defendant had previously invoked his right to counsel. Significantly, there was no such written record of the defendant's exercise of his rights in the case before us. There was only the defendant's assertion of his rights to Wisconsin authorities; defendant does not claim that the Wisconsin authorities who transferred custody to the Illinois authorities possessed any record of defendant's request for counsel. Further, in Roberson the officer who conducted the second interrogation knew that the defendant was in police custody on a charge unrelated to the offense for which he wished to interrogate the defendant. That officer was apparently from the same State as the arresting officer to whom the defendant in Roberson communicated his request for counsel. He therefore knew or could reasonably have expected that the defendant had been questioned by the authorities on the unrelated charge and may have invoked his right to counsel. In the. instant case, however, the Chicago police officers who took custody of the defendant had no expectation that the defendant had been questioned by the Wisconsin authorities concerning an Illinois crime or that he might have exercised his right to counsel in Wisconsin. An extradition hearing is only a summary and ministerial procedure for returning a fugitive to the demanding State so that he may stand trial. It is not a judicial inquiry into the merits of the charge. Moreover, because this was an Illinois crime and an Illinois investigation, the Chicago police would have no reason to believe that the defendant had been questioned by Wisconsin authorities concerning the offense. In fact, there is no indication in the record that the defendant was ever questioned by the Wisconsin authorities. Given the nature of the extradition hearing and the fact that the police had no reasonable belief that the defendant had been questioned by Wisconsin authorities concerning an Illinois crime, the Chicago authorities, unlike the second interrogating officer in Roberson, could not reasonably have expected that defendant had exercised his right to counsel in Wisconsin. Because the second officer who interrogated the defendant in Roberson had access to a written report which indicated that the defendant had requested counsel, and because that officer had a reasonable expectation that the defendant may have exercised his right to counsel, we believe that Roberson is distinguishable from the instant case, where there was no written record of defendant's request for counsel and no reasonable expectation that defendant had invoked his right to counsel. Further supporting this belief is the fact that there is no reason to believe that the Wisconsin authorities who transferred custody of defendant to the Illinois authorities had any record or information of defendant's in-court invocation of his right to counsel in Wisconsin. Thus even if the Illinois authorities who took custody of defendant had inquired of the Wisconsin authorities whether defendant had exercised his right to counsel, there is no reason to believe that they would have been provided with that information. Short of having the Illinois authorities question every Wisconsin authority who came into contact with the defendant, imposition of a duty to inquire in this case would have been unavailing. Our conclusion is also supported by Alston v. State (Del.1989), 554 A.2d 304. In Alston, a defendant incarcerated in a pretrial detention facility signed a form provided by the public defender that indicated he did not wish to speak to any law enforcement authorities without a public defender present. Defendant retained one copy of the form, the second went to the public defender's office and the third went into a file for access by the detention facility's warden. Defendant was subsequently indicted and then taken to police headquarters for processing and further questioning. Defendant was read and waived his Miranda rights. Defendant then made incriminating statements. At trial, defendant motioned to suppress the statements, arguing that they were obtained after he had invoked his right to counsel by signing the form and therefore in violation of Edwards. The Delaware Supreme Court rejected defendant's argument that the execution of the form constituted notice to the interrogating officer that defendant had invoked his right to counsel. The court recognized that Roberson refused to recognize ignorance resulting from an officer's lack of diligence as a valid excuse. The court, however, stated that the police records contained no reference to the defendant's execution of the form. The court then stated that: We decline to view, as `constructively known to the police, records which are merely accessible to other State agents who function at the custodial level. Such a view places too heavy a burden on the police who acted in this case in good faith and without notice, actual or constructive, of Alston's [the defendant] pro forma claim to the assistance of counsel. Alston, 554 A.2d at 310. Although phrasing its analysis in terms of constructive knowledge, the court's reasoning is equally applicable to the case before us. In Alston there was a record of the defendant's request for counsel. This record was not readily available to the interrogating officer, as it was not in the immediate possession of the State agents who acted at the custodial level. Here, however, there is no claim that a record was made of defendant's assertion of his fifth and sixth amendment rights or that, if a record was made, it was in the possession of the Wisconsin authorities acting at the custodial level. We therefore conclude that in the circumstances confronting us there was no reasonable procedure for the Chicago authorities to determine whether defendant had asserted his fifth and sixth amendment rights in open court in Wisconsin. Although we believe no such reasonable procedure existed in the instant case, our analysis is not complete. In Edwards, as well as in Roberson, the focus was on the state of mind of the suspect, rather than the police. ( Roberson, 486 U.S. at 687, 108 S.Ct. at 2101, 100 L.Ed.2d at 717.) Defendant relies on the Edwards and Roberson focus to support his claim that Edwards' bright line rule should be applied in the instant case. He argues that once he had invoked his right to counsel in Wisconsin, all interrogation, even by police officers from another State who had no knowledge of the invocation, had to cease. The manner in which defendant asserted his right to counsel, however, does not support his conclusion. Defendant's counsel, in open court, advised the Wisconsin trial court and the Wisconsin Outagamie County sheriffs department of defendant's invocation of his fifth and sixth amendment rights. Defendant's counsel then asked the Wisconsin trial court to advise the Chicago authorities of defendant's invocation of his right to counsel. He further asked the court to enter an order directing the Wisconsin and Chicago authorities to refrain from questioning the defendant until counsel was present. We do not believe that it was the responsibility of the Wisconsin trial court to inform the Chicago authorities, or for that matter the Wisconsin authorities, of defendant's assertion of his right to counsel. Further, although members of Wisconsin's Outagamie sheriffs department were present when defendant asserted his right to counsel, the assertion was made to the court and not to the law enforcement authorities who were there only in their custodial capacity. Moreover, the record does not indicate that the order sought by the defendant was ever entered. Under these circumstances, we do not believe that defendant's assertion of his right to counsel should be afforded the protection of Edwards' bright line rule. Finally, defendant asserted his right to counsel at the extradition hearing in Wisconsin. Defendant did not directly inform the Chicago and Wisconsin authorities of his assertion of the right to counsel nor does he claim that he followed through on the order directing those authorities to refrain from questioning him. Further, the Wisconsin trial judge indicated at the time defendant asserted his right that he was unsure whether the order sought by defendant would be valid. Given these circumstances, we do not believe that defendant expected that he would be entitled to the protection of Edwards. Further supporting this conclusion is the fact that the Supreme Court has recognized two competing concerns that are implicated in custodial interrogations. One is the need for police questioning as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws and the second is the fact that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and therefore exacerbates the risk that police may exert constitutionally impermissible compulsion. ( Moran v. Burbine (1986), 475 U.S. 412, 426, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 1143, 89 L.Ed.2d 410, 424.) In Moran, the Supreme Court stated that Miranda attempted to reconcile these opposing concerns by giving the defendant the power to exert some control over the course of the interrogation. (Emphasis in original.) ( Moran, 475 U.S. at 426, 106 S.Ct. at 1143, 89 L.Ed.2d at 424.) There the Court held that defendant's waiver of his fifth amendment rights was valid despite police failure to inform defendant that counsel was attempting to contact him. The Court stated that holding otherwise would upset Miranda's reconciliation of the two opposing concerns in a manner that [was] both unnecessary for the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege and injurious to legitimate law enforcement. Moran, 475 U.S. at 427, 106 S.Ct. at 1144, 89 L.Ed.2d at 424. In the case before us, we realize that Roberson notes that Edwards' focus is on a defendant's state of mind. Nevertheless, we have concluded that no reasonable procedure existed to determine whether defendant had exercised his fifth and sixth amendment rights in Wisconsin and that defendant's assertion of his right to counsel was not effective in invoking the protection of Edwards. To alter our conclusion that Roberson and Edwards do not encompass the situation before us would, under the circumstances, be unnecessary for the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege and injurious to legitimate law enforcement. Moran, 475 U.S. at 427, 106 S.Ct. at 1144, 89 L.Ed.2d at 424.