Opinion ID: 201453
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Retaliatory Hostile Work Environment: Cognizability.

Text: 42 We turn now to the cognizability of the retaliatory harassment claims. Both Title VII and chapter 151B contain provisions that make it unlawful for employers to retaliate against persons who complain about unlawfully discriminatory employment practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 4(4). To engage the gears of either statute, a plaintiff must show that (i) she undertook protected conduct, (ii) she suffered an adverse employment action, and (iii) the two were causally linked. See Dressler v. Daniel, 315 F.3d 75, 78 (1st Cir.2003) (Title VII); Sullivan v. Raytheon Co., 262 F.3d 41, 48 (1st Cir.2001) (chapter 151B). 43 Here, there is no dispute that the plaintiff engaged in protected activity by filing a complaint. The parties instead spar over the second and third elements, which in this instance collapse into a single question: did the plaintiff sustain an adverse employment action in the form of a hostile work environment based on retaliation for filing a sexual harassment complaint against Ortiz? 44 Typically, an adverse employment action involves a discrete change in the terms and conditions of employment (say, a discharge, demotion, or reduction in pay). This case is more nuanced. In order for the plaintiff to survive summary judgment on this record, she must show that, as a legal matter, the creation and perpetuation of a hostile work environment itself can constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action. She also must show that, as a factual matter, her coworkers' actions furnished a sufficient basis to ground a finding that a hostile work environment actually existed. 45 As to the legal point, the plaintiff maintains that a hostile work environment may constitute an adverse employment action for purposes of both Title VII and chapter 151B. The city demurs. It notes that the plaintiff has not been cashiered, demoted, denied promotion, stripped of meaningful duties, or otherwise materially disadvantaged in the terms and conditions of her employment. Thus, the city argues, she cannot be said to have suffered an adverse employment action. 46 This precise question — whether a hostile work environment can constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action — has never been fully addressed either by this court (with regard to Title VII) or by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (with regard to chapter 151B). We look at the federal and state claims separately. 47 1. Title VII. The weight of authority supports the view that, under Title VII, the creation and perpetuation of a hostile work environment can comprise a retaliatory adverse employment action under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). See, e.g., Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 864-65 (4th Cir.2001); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1244-45 (9th Cir.2000); Morris, 201 F.3d at 791; Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 446 (2d Cir.1999); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State Coll., 152 F.3d 1253, 1264 (10th Cir.1998); Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir.1998); Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334-35 (7th Cir.1996). That view has engendered a circuit split. The Fifth Circuit has held that a hostile work environment cannot constitute a retaliatory adverse employment action; instead, retaliation requires an ultimate employment decision ... such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating. Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir.1997); see also id. at 709. The Eighth Circuit also requires an ultimate employment decision, Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir.1997), but defines that term somewhat more elastically, see, e.g., Scusa v. Nestle U.S.A. Co., 181 F.3d 958, 968-69 (8th Cir.1999). 48 Although this court has never fully analyzed the question, our case law tilts noticeably toward the majority view. The pertinent decisions form a totem pole. At the base of the pole is Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13 (1st Cir.1994) (per curiam), where, in dictum, we cited a treatise for the proposition that toleration of harassment by other employees might amount to an adverse employment action. Id. at 15-16 (citing 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Employment Discrimination § 87.20 (1994)). That led to a series of epibolies: in Hernandez-Torres v. Intercontinental Trading, Inc., 158 F.3d 43, 47 (1st Cir.1998), we paraphrased the Wyatt dictum; in White v. New Hampshire Department of Corrections, 221 F.3d 254, 262 (1st Cir.2000), we noted the Hernandez-Torres paraphrase with approbation; in Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 26 (1st Cir.2002), we approvingly cited White's reference; and in Che v. Massachusetts Bay Transportation Authority, 342 F.3d 31, 40 (1st Cir.2003), we made a bow in the direction of Marrero. This totem pole is highly suggestive. Today, we cap it off and hold explicitly that a hostile work environment, tolerated by the employer, is cognizable as a retaliatory adverse employment action for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). This means that workplace harassment, if sufficiently severe or pervasive, may in and of itself constitute an adverse employment action sufficient to satisfy the second prong of the prima facie case for Title VII retaliation cases. 49 This conclusion is compelled by the statutory text and comports with congressional intent. The operative provision of Title VII makes it unlawful to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's ... sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Given Congress's intention to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women in employment, which includes requiring people to work in a discriminatorily hostile or abusive environment, Harris, 510 U.S. at 21, 114 S.Ct. 367 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted), it makes sense to construe the qualifier (regarding compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment) broadly. On that basis, the verb discriminate, as used in section 2000e-2(a)(1), logically includes subjecting a person to a hostile work environment. See Morris, 201 F.3d at 791-92. 50 We move next to Title VII's anti-retaliation provision. That provision directs an employer not to discriminate against any employee because [the employee] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). Here, the term discriminate appears without the qualifier. A familiar canon of construction teaches that [a] term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each time it appears. Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143, 114 S.Ct. 655, 126 L.Ed.2d 615 (1994). We apply that canon here. The result: the verb discriminate in the anti-retaliation clause includes subjecting a person to a hostile work environment. See Morris, 201 F.3d at 792; see also Knox, 93 F.3d at 1334 (Nothing indicates why ... retaliating against a complainant by permitting her fellow employees to punish her for invoking her rights under Title VII ... does not fall within the statute.). 51 Our interpretation of the statutory text is shared by the EEOC, which finds the lack of any qualifier on the term discriminate in the anti-retaliation context to evince a purpose to prohibit any discrimination that is reasonably likely to deter protected activity. EEOC Compl. Man. (CCH) ¶ 8005, § 8-II.D.3 (2004). This is important because an administrative interpretation of a federal statute by the agency charged with its enforcement, while not controlling upon the courts, constitutes an informed judgment to which some deference ordinarily is due. 3 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986). 52 If more were needed — and we doubt that it is — this capacious reading of section 2000e-3(a) is consonant with its purpose of [m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). Harassment by coworkers as a punishment for undertaking protected activity is a paradigmatic example of adverse treatment spurred by retaliatory motives and, as such, is likely to deter the complaining party (or others) from engaging in protected activity. Ray, 217 F.3d at 1245; Wideman, 141 F.3d at 1456. Reading the statute to provide a remedy for retaliatory harassment that expresses itself in the form of a hostile work environment thus furthers the goal of ensuring access to the statute's remedial mechanisms. 53 2. Chapter 151B. As for the state-law claim, we believe that, were the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) squarely presented with the question, it would find a retaliatory hostile work environment to be an adverse employment action cognizable under chapter 151B, § 4(4). Several factors enter into this determination. 54 First and foremost, the statute's anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions are very similar to the counterpart provisions contained in Title VII. Where such linguistic similarity exists, the SJC frequently looks to federal court interpretations of Title VII for guidance. See Wheatley v. AT & T Co., 418 Mass. 394, 636 N.E.2d 265, 268 (1994) (It is our practice to apply Federal case law construing the Federal anti-discrimination statutes in interpreting [chapter] 151B.); College-Town, Div. of Interco, Inc. v. MCAD, 400 Mass. 156, 508 N.E.2d 587, 591 (1987) (describing federal precedents as helpful). We are, therefore, confident that the SJC, if confronted with this precise question, would quite likely interpret the anti-retaliation provision of chapter 151B exactly as we have interpreted the counterpart provision of Title VII. 55 Second, to the extent that any ambiguity lurks in the statutory language, Massachusetts law explicitly directs that the provisions of chapter 151B shall be construed liberally for the accomplishment of its purposes. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 151B, § 9. As with Title VII, the purpose of the anti-retaliation provision in chapter 151B is to allow parties to seek redress for allegations of discrimination without fear of retaliation for or interference with the exercise of that right. Sahli v. Bull HN Info. Sys., Inc., 437 Mass. 696, 774 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (2002). Construing chapter 151B' s text to protect complaining employees from retaliatory harassment that results in the creation and perpetuation of a hostile work environment advances that purpose. 56 Third, although the SJC has not spoken directly to the subject, the Appeals Court has recognized a claim of retaliatory harassment based on a hostile work environment. See Clifton, 815 N.E.2d at 618, 624. While this holding is not indisputably authoritative — the highest court of a state is, after all, the final arbiter of state-law questions, Acadia Ins. Co. v. McNeil, 116 F.3d 599, 604 (1st Cir.1997) — the decision of an intermediate appellate court of the state generally constitutes a reliable piece of evidence. See West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 237, 61 S.Ct. 179, 85 L.Ed. 139 (1940); Fortini v. Murphy, 257 F.3d 39, 49 (1st Cir.2001); Losacco v. F.D. Rich Constr. Co., 992 F.2d 382, 384 (1st Cir.1993). This evidence seems all the more compelling in this case because the MCAD — whose decisions construing chapter 151B are ceded some deference by the SJC, Cuddyer, 750 N.E.2d at 938 — has interpreted chapter 151B's anti-retaliation language to include retaliatory harassment culminating in a hostile work environment. See MCAD Sexual Harassment in the Workplace Guidelines IX.B (2002) (An employer takes adverse action under § 4(4) when it materially disadvantages the complainant with regard to any of the terms or conditions of her employment. The term `adverse action' can encompass ... hostile or abusive workplace treatment.); Wareing v. New Bedford Sch. Dep't, No. 99-BEM-3363, 2004 WL 2361016, at  (MCAD Oct. 6, 2004) (Retaliation may... take the form of hostile or abusive workplace treatment.). 57 To say more on this topic would be to paint the lily. For the reasons elucidated above, we hold that, under Massachusetts law as under Title VII, subjecting an employee to a hostile work environment in retaliation for protected activity constitutes an adverse employment action (and, thus, triggers the statutory prophylaxis).