Opinion ID: 1915326
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Separation of Powers Amendments

Text: In November of 2004, the electorate of the State of Rhode Island approved the so-called separation of powers amendments. These amendments ushered in four fundamental changes to the Rhode Island Constitution and, for the first time in Rhode Island's history, clearly and explicitly established three separate and distinct departments of government. Those fundamental changes may be summarized as follows: (1) Article 3, section 6 was amended to preclude legislators from serving on state boards, commissions, or other state or quasi-public entities that exercise executive power; (2) Article 5 was amended to provide that the powers of the Rhode Island government are distributed into three separate and distinct departments; (3) Article 6, section 10, which had vested broad continuing powers in the General Assembly, was repealed; and (4) Article 9, section 5 was amended to give the Governor appointment power with respect to members of any state or quasi-public entities exercising executive power, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate. The doctrine of separation of powers, which is now expressly established in the Rhode Island Constitution, declares that governmental powers at the state level are divided among three separate and distinct departments. [3] In practice, this doctrine operates to confine legislative powers to the legislature, executive powers to the executive department, and judicial powers to the judiciary, precluding one branch of the government from usurping the powers of another. [4] R.I. Const. art. 5. While there can be no doubt that the separation of powers amendments constitute an important recalibration of the system of checks and balances within our state government, we do not view the amendments as effectuating a wholesale reallocation of power among the executive and the legislative departments. We emphasize, however, that the pendulum has not now swung to the opposite extreme with the adoption of the 2004 constitutional amendments. While the formal incorporation of the doctrine of separation of powers into the Constitution has established a somewhat different balance of power among the departments from that which existed previously, it would be overly simplistic and patently erroneous to view the amendments as somehow subordinating the role of the legislative branch to that of the executive. It is incontestably true that, for most of its history, the Rhode Island General Assembly enjoyed significantly more power than did the legislatures of most of our sister states. See generally City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 44 (R.I. 1995); Kennedy v. State, 654 A.2d 708, 710-11 (R.I.1995); Nugent v. City of East Providence, 103 R.I. 518, 525-26, 238 A.2d 758, 762 (1968). [5] A few years prior to the adoption of the separation of powers amendments, in In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Rhode Island Ethics Commission Separation of Powers), 732 A.2d 55 (R.I.1999), four justices of this Court discussed at some length the rather unique history of our colonial and state governance. They noted that, as of that time (1999), the Legislature continued to exercise substantial executive functions by electing all judicial officers as well as many officers who might be considered part of the executive branch, and they concluded that Rhode Island's history is that of a quintessential system of parliamentary supremacy. Id. at 64. The justices also observed, however, that only the people of Rhode Island may change the structure of their government, and they further observed that the sole and proper procedure for restricting legislators from serving on or appointing [other persons] to executive boards and commissions is through an amendment to the constitution approved by the electorate   . Id. at 72. As previously noted, in November of 2004 the electorate of Rhode Island approved four such amendments. As a result, separation of powers is now a principle that is firmly established within our state's organic law, whereby the fundamental powers of government are distributed among its three coordinate branches. We are also mindful, however, of Mr. Justice Jackson's exegetical comment with respect to the Constitution of the United States: While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635, 72 S.Ct. 863, 96 L.Ed. 1153 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). This Court has said that, in construing constitutional amendments, our chief function is to give effect to the intent of the framers. State ex rel. Webb v. Cianci, 591 A.2d 1193, 1201 (R.I.1991); Bailey v. Baronian, 120 R.I. 389, 391, 394 A.2d 1338, 1339 (1978) (citing In re House of Representatives, 45 R.I. 289, 120 A. 868 (1923)). In doing so, we rely on the well-established rule of constitutional construction that, when words in a constitution are free from ambiguity, they are to be given their plain, ordinary, and usually accepted meaning. Davis v. Hawksley, 119 R.I. 453, 455, 379 A.2d 922, 923 (1977). When the language at issue is clear, we need look no further. In the lapidary words of a distinguished federal appellate court: Statutory construction begins with the plain text, and, `where the statutory language provides a clear answer, it ends there as well.' Raila v. United States, 355 F.3d 118, 120 (2d Cir.2004) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999)); see also Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54, 112 S.Ct. 1146, 117 L.Ed.2d 391 (1992); State v. Martini, 860 A.2d 689, 691 (R.I. 2004); State v. Benoit, 650 A.2d 1230, 1232 (R.I.1994). [6] The proponents and drafters of the constitutional amendments, which were designed to bring about a greater degree of separation of powers in Rhode Island's governmental structure, manifestly carried out their task with precision. Certain powers of the General Assembly were explicitly curtailed, while others were left largely or entirely unaffected by the amendments. For example, one of the proposals ultimately approved by the electorate was the abolition of the venerable continuing powers provision of the Constitution (article 6, section 10); that provision expressly allowed the General Assembly to continue to exercise any power that it had possessed prior to the 1986 constitutional convention unless expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The continuing powers conferred by article 6, section 10 were characterized by this Court as plenary. City of Pawtucket, 662 A.2d at 44. It is clear that those continuing powers have now been explicitly and definitively repealed. In contrast, the separation of powers amendments did not, either explicitly or implicitly, [7] limit or abolish the power of the General Assembly in any other area where we have previously found its jurisdiction to be plenary. [8] Such areas include the General Assembly's duty to provide for the state's natural environment (article 1, section 17); its regulatory power over lotteries (article 6, section 15); and its duty with respect to education and public library services (article 12, section 1).