Opinion ID: 754754
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Charge's Placement of the Burden of Proof

Text: 87 The County contends that the instructions submitted to the jury improperly placed upon it the burden of persuading the jury that the reasons that it proffered for Molina's failure to rehire the Plaintiffs were not pretextual. The jury instruction provided in relevant part as follows: 88 In order to find that R. George Molina intentionally violated Plaintiffs' rights under the First Amendment, you must find by a preponderance of the evidence that such speech and/or association activities were a substantial or motivating factor in his decision not to rehire them. To prove that their speech and/or association activities were a substantial or motivating factor in R. George Molina's decision not to rehire them, the plaintiffs do not have to prove that their speech and/or association activities were the only reason R. George Molina decided not to rehire them. Plaintiffs need only prove that their speech and/or association activities were a substantial consideration that made a difference in or influenced R. George Molina's decision not to rehire them. 89 ... 90 If you find that plaintiffs have established each element of their claims, you must then decide whether the defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that R. George Molina would have elected not to rehire the plaintiffs for other reasons even if plaintiffs had not engaged in their protected speech or association activities. If you find that R. George Molina would have elected not to rehire the plaintiffs for reasons wholly apart from the speech or association activity, then your verdict should be for the defendant. 91 This jury instruction accurately reflects the holding of the Supreme Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977). In that case, the Court held that a plaintiff claiming that a public employer retaliated against him for the exercise of his First Amendment right to free expression bears the burden of proving that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a 'substantial factor'--or, to put it in other words, that it was a 'motivating factor'  in the defendant public employer's adverse employment action. Id. at 287, 97 S.Ct. 568 (footnote omitted). If the plaintiff carries this burden, the defendant public employer may nonetheless avoid liability if the trier of fact concludes that the defendant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision [regarding the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff] even in the absence of the protected conduct. Id. 92 The County argues that Mt. Healthy does not dictate the appropriate allocation of the burden of proof in this case because it applies only in mixed motive cases--that is, cases in which both legitimate and illegitimate factors motivated the defendant's adverse employment action. It contends that this is a pretext case--that is, a case in which the plaintiff contends that the defendant's adverse employment action was motivated by only illegitimate factors and that the legitimate factors proffered by the defendant as motivating its action are merely pretextual. In pretext cases, 'the issue is whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, were the true motives behind the decision.'  Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 260, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989) (White, J., concurring) (quoting NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 400 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 2469, 76 L.Ed.2d 667 (1983)). The County claims that the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973), therefore provides the appropriate allocation of the evidentiary burdens in this case. The County's argument fails for several reasons. 93 First, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework constitutes the proper order and nature of proof in actions under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 793-94, 93 S.Ct. 1817; see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993). The County has cited no authority for the proposition that the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework is applicable to patronage dismissal and free-speech retaliation cases. 11 94 Second, the Supreme Court developed the McDonnell Douglas framework as a means of allowing Title VII claimants to prove up claims of unlawful discrimination in the absence of direct evidence of such discrimination. As such, the Court has indicated that the framework is applicable in the Title VII context only when the plaintiff's proof of discrimination is circumstantial; it is inapplicable where the plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121, 105 S.Ct. 613, 83 L.Ed.2d 523 (1985); see also Rizzo v. Children's World Learning Ctrs., Inc., 84 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir.1996) (The district court improperly analyzed this case. This is not a circumstantial evidence case, where we apply the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework; rather, this is a direct evidence case.); Moore v. USDA, 55 F.3d 991, 995 (5th Cir.1995) (In the rare situation in which the evidence establishes that an employer openly discriminates against an individual it is not necessary to apply the mechanical formula of McDonnell Douglas to establish an inference of discrimination. (internal quotation marks omitted)). As indicated in Part III.D, infra, in this case, the Plaintiffs presented direct evidence that their protected political activity motivated Molina not to rehire them. Specifically, they offered testimony from a number of witnesses that Molina admitted to them that he failed to rehire the Plaintiffs because of their political activity. See Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n, 989 F.2d 858, 861 (5th Cir.1993) (Direct evidence is evidence which, if believed, proves the fact without inference or presumption.). Thus, assuming that the McDonnell Douglas framework has potential application in patronage dismissal and free-speech retaliation cases, it can have no application here. 95 Third, the Mt. Healthy framework actually benefits defendants such as the County. Contrary to the County's contention, the Mt. Healthy framework does not improperly shift to the defendant the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that it did not take an adverse action against the plaintiff based at least in part on an improper motive. See Transportation Management, 462 U.S. at 400 n. 5, 103 S.Ct. 2469 ; Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (White, J., concurring). This point is demonstrated by the language of the jury instruction at issue here. The second paragraph of the instruction clearly indicates that the County did not need to establish that Molina would not have rehired the Plaintiffs even absent their protected conduct unless the Plaintiffs carried their burden of proving that their political activity in support of Hillegeist was constitutionally protected and that this activity was a substantial or motivating factor in Molina's decision not to rehire them. 96 In essence, Mt. Healthy may be properly construed as creating an affirmative defense because it allows the defendant to avoid liability once the plaintiff has carried his burden of proving that an improper consideration was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant's adverse employment action by proving that it would have taken the same adverse action even in the absence of the improper consideration. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 246, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (plurality opinion) ([T]he employer's burden [under the Mt. Healthy framework] is most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense: the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder on one point, and then the employer, if it wishes to prevail, must persuade it on another.); Mooney v. Aramco Serv. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1216 (5th Cir.1995) (Although Price Waterhouse [, which held that the Mt. Healthy framework is applicable in certain Title VII cases,] can be characterized as a method to prove discrimination, the mixed-motives theory is probably best viewed as a defense for an employer.). As the district court observed in addressing the County's objection to its jury instruction, the instruction could in no way prejudice the County because it did nothing to diminish the Plaintiffs' burden of proving that their political activity in support of Hillegeist constituted a substantial or motivating factor in Molina's decision not to rehire them. Rather, this portion of the instruction aided the County by creating the possibility that the jury could conclude that the County was not liable even if it was persuaded that the Plaintiffs' political activity in support of Hillegeist was a substantial or motivating factor in Molina's decision not to rehire them. 12 We therefore reject the County's contention that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the evidentiary burdens applicable to the Plaintiffs' First Amendment claim. 97