Opinion ID: 2975952
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Errors in the Unfair Prejudice Determination

Text: The errors of the district court and the majority are not limited to the probative value side of the Rule 403 balance; they also pervade the determination of unfair prejudice. While I concede that Stout’s prior conviction is prejudicial, it is not unfairly so. 1. Prior Bad Acts Need Not be Less Disturbing than the Charged Offense Aside from mistakenly placing the government’s need for the evidence on the unfair prejudice side of the scale, the court erred by stating that Stout’s prior act was unfairly prejudicial because it involved a more disturbing crime than those charged in the instant case. According to the district court, this case is unlike other decisions where prior bad acts were admitted because there the “prior bad acts evidence was evidence of a similar or lesser crime (or even a less disturbing noncriminal behavior) than the crime charged,” whereas here “the prior bad acts evidence is more disturbing and, frankly, creepier than the actual crime charged.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 11. I find the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Sebolt to be particularly instructive on this point. The defendant in Sebolt was charged with possession of child pornography and the district court admitted the following prior bad acts to prove knowledge and intent: (1) his prior molestation of a young relative; (2) his trip to Wisconsin to have sex with another minor; (3) his failed attempts to molest other children; and (4) his possession of young boy’s underwear. Sebolt, 460 F.3d at 914. On appeal, the Sebolt court found no abuse of discretion in the admission of defendant’s prior actual molestations and attempted molestations because such a history “provided strong evidence of his motive to advertise child pornography online.”2 Id. at 917. The court further explained that while the “motive to molest children does not completely overlap with the propensity to possess, transport, or advertise child pornography . . . the conceptual gap between molestation and child pornography is not so wide as to induce the jury to decide the case on an improper basis . . . .” Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted); see also United States v. Burt, 495 F.3d 733, 734, 741 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, ___S.Ct.___, 2007 WL 3235066 (2007) (finding no abuse of discretion under Rule 403 where the district court admitted testimony that defendant had repeatedly molested a child as evidence of his intent in a child pornography prosecution). I can conceive of no principled reason why evidence of actual child molestation and attempted child molestation is less prejudicial and admissible in a child pornography prosecution, while surreptitiously videotaping—but never touching or attempting to touch a child—is unfairly prejudicial and inadmissible. Given that the evidence of prior molestations admitted in Sebolt was more disturbing than the charge of child pornography it was offered to prove, I believe that it undercuts the position taken by the district court and the majority. I agree with the Sebolt court and 2 While it found the introduction of the prior actual and attempted molestations not to be an abuse of discretion, the Sebolt court did rule that the young boy’s underwear should have been excluded under Rule 403. No. 06-6353 United States v. Stout Page 11 would hold that a prior bad act is not unfairly prejudicial simply because it is more lurid or “creepier” than that charged in the instant case. See generally United States v. Cummins, 969 F.2d 223, 226 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding no abuse of discretion under Rule 403 where the district court admitted evidence of defendant’s prior drug dealing in his trial for suborning perjury even though drug dealing is a more severe crime than inducing one to lie). 2. Failure to Consider Alternative Means of Reducing Prejudicial Effect Next, the district court erred by failing to consider the use of a limiting instruction to reduce any unfair prejudice resulting from the defendant’s prior conviction. Throughout the district court’s opinion, it addressed the admissibility of Stout’s prior conviction as a zero-sum game; admit the evidence in toto or exclude it in toto. Such an attitude is reflected in the district court’s statements that the prior bad act will “predominate this trial,” Dist. Ct. Op. at 8, and improperly become “a focus point of the case.” Dist. Ct. Op. at 11. At no point before excluding the evidence did the district court consider its ability to reduce any unfair prejudice by the use of a limiting instruction under Rule 105. As the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 403 indicates, before excluding evidence on the grounds of unfair prejudice “consideration should be given to the probable effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of a limiting instruction.” Fed. R. Evid. 403, advisory committee’s note; see also Fed. R. Evid. 105, advisory committee’s note (explaining that the potential efficacy of a limiting instruction “must be taken into consideration in reaching a decision whether to exclude for unfair prejudice under Rule 403.”). In this case, a properly crafted limiting instruction informing the jury that Stout’s prior conviction should only be considered as evidence of his knowledge and intent to possess and receive child pornography—and not for propensity purposes—would militate against any danger of unfair prejudice.3 At the very least, the district court should have indicated why a limiting instruction would have been insufficient to protect against the danger of unfair prejudice. See generally S.E.C. v. Peters, 978 F.2d 1162, 1172 (10th Cir. 1992) (finding an abuse of discretion where the district court excluded prior bad acts evidence under Rule 403 without first considering the ability of a limiting instruction to reduce the danger of unfair prejudice).