Opinion ID: 1376095
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: application of the law of affray to the instant case

Text: The undisputed evidence presented at the hearing showed that the juvenile fought with a fellow juvenile resident on the grounds of the Home where the two were living in August 2001. As indicated supra, the evidence satisfies the first element of affray, that there was, in fact, a fight, and we therefore need not consider this element further. We will accordingly examine the hearing judge's ruling that the fight at issue occurred in a public place, the second element necessary to prove an affray. As neither party offered any evidence showing, or even suggesting, that the fight took place on the first type of qualifying localea place generally considered public by the nature of its use or intended usethis type of public place has no bearing on the instant case. We therefore confine our examination of the public place requirement to the second qualifying type: private property that is situated near enough to public thoroughfares that individuals using such thoroughfares could bear witness to the altercation. This Court must determine if there is ample evidence showing that the site of the altercation occurred in a place, although private property, that qualifies as a public place for purposes of proving the offense of affray. The key to resolving the public place question in the case sub judice hinges less on the evidence actually presented than on potential evidence that was not introduced at the district court hearing. There are simply too many relevant questions regarding the public place element of affray that are unanswered by the evidence presented at the hearing. For instance, where precisely did the altercation take place? The record shows that the incident originated on or near a walkway on the grounds of the group Home. The record also shows that the altercation originated more than one hundred feet from the Home and continued as the combatants moved toward the front steps of the Home. However, no evidence was offered estimating the overall size of the property, describing the general characteristics of its terrain, or depicting the distance and characteristics of its surrounding properties. From hearing testimony, the most we can ascertain about the Home's grounds is that it extends over one hundred feet from one of the Home's structures and that there is a hill area located in front of the property. Another pertinent unanswered question is whether the altercation was within earshot or view of individuals who were or could have been present on adjacent public lands or thoroughfares. However, there is no way to discern this information because there is no evidence in the record indicating how far the property extended beyond the location of the altercation or if the property's terrain and fixtures precluded individuals not on the property from witnessing the altercation. As a consequence, we conclude that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the fight occurred in a public place. Therefore, there was insufficient evidence to establish the second element of affray. Concluding that the State has failed to satisfy one essential element of the offense in question would normally end our examination as to whether there is sufficient evidence to convict a defendant of that offense. However, proof of the third element of affray that the fight in question caused terror to the peoplemay, in certain narrowly defined circumstances, satisfy the second element, that is, the fight occurred in a public place. A fight that occurs on private property, beyond the view and earshot of the general public, may nevertheless be witnessed by individuals who happen to be on the property and who are subject to the terror of the altercation. If so, the establishment of the third essential element of affraythat terror to the public occurredsatisfies the second element that the fight happened in a public place. We therefore examine whether there was sufficient evidence to establish that the altercation in question caused terror to the people, in order to provide clarity to our jurisprudence regarding the common-law offense of affray. Thus, this Court must evaluate whether the State's evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the witnesses to the fight were members of the public who were, in fact, frightened by the fight. Our examination of the record indicates there were no individuals passing by the property who were within view or earshot of the altercation. Thus, the question of whether the third elementterror to the people was established is limited to determining if any or all of the four individuals who actually witnessed the event were subject to terror. As discussed supra, our state's appellate courts have yet to classify precisely those persons who may be subject to the terror of an apparent affray that occurs on private property. A comprehensive 200-year survey of case law of North Carolina and other states yields no standard for adequately classifying witnesses who may or may not require protection from the terror associated with fights that occur on private property. An examination of affray-related cases reveals a series of decisions suggesting a standard akin to what United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart candidly referred to as an I know it when I see it mind-set concerning the terror element. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197, 84 S.Ct. 1676, 1683, 12 L.Ed.2d 793, 804 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). In some cases, courts are persuaded by the number of witnesses, while in others, the courts have deemed the number of witnesses irrelevant. Yet, in other cases, the courts' paramount consideration is the relationship between the witnesses and the combatants, while others do not consider that relationship a factor for consideration. In Fritz, 133 N.C. at 728, 45 S.E. at 958, the case that has been cited as the definitive North Carolina affray case, this Court held a century ago that the actual presence of seven spectators to a fight placed them in harm's way and, therefore, rendered them subject to the fight's terror. The analysis of the opinion, however, did not identify the relationship, or lack thereof, between the combatants and the terrorized witnesses. In an opinion predating Fritz, the Alabama Supreme Court held that where two among just three persons fight in a field surrounded by a forest that is situated a mile from any highway or other public place, the third person witnessing the event was not a qualifying member of the public for purposes of experiencing the terror associated to an affray. Taylor v. State, 22 Ala. 15, 16 (1853). Similar to our Court's holding in Fritz, Florida's court of appeals held that the number of witnesses, without even considering their relations to the combatants, can sometimes satisfy the terror element for purposes of determining whether an affray occurred on private property. D.J. v. State, 651 So.2d 1255, 1256 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1995) (per curiam) (holding that the presence of approximately one-hundred witnesses to a fight on private property is enough to show potential for terror). Georgia's Supreme Court, however, concluded that the presence of not more than a dozen or fifteen people who witnessed a fight among six others on private property were not among those members of the public who could be terrorized by the fight. Gamble v. State, 113 Ga. 701, 703, 39 S.E. 301, 302 (1901). Thus, when it comes to numbers, seven spectators can be enough, Fritz, 133 N.C. at 728, 45 S.E. at 958, and one hundred spectators is certainly enough, D.J., 651 So.2d at 1256, but fifteen witnesses is inadequate, Gamble, 113 Ga. at 703, 39 S.E. at 302, and so is one, Taylor, 22 Ala. at 16, reflecting a state of inconsistency among the various jurisdictions. Regardless of jurisdiction, the current state of the law provides no definitive criteria or examples by which to judge the terror element of a fight that occurs on private property. Our review of the above and other cases not cited herein has led us to conclude that the correct analysis in evaluating whether a fight caused terror to the people is to examine the associations between combatants and witnesses, rather than arbitrarily relying upon the number of spectators. The Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Gamble provides a semblance of circumstances most analogous to the case at issue. We conclude that the analysis in Gamble is most persuasive and is enhanced with a compendium of law addressing factors to consider when deciding if spectators to a fight on private property were subject to the fight's terror. In Gamble, 113 Ga. at 702, 39 S.E. at 302, a fight arose at a dance party held at a private home. The court in Gamble first determined there was insufficient evidence showing that the fight occurred within view or earshot of a public thoroughfare. Id. at 703, 39 S.E. at 302. The court then examined whether the other guests qualified as members of the public for purposes of the terror element of an affray and ultimately concluded they did not qualify. In the Georgia court's view, while a private locale may be rendered public when people are afforded the privilege of being there without invitation, such a place is not made public when it hosts an assemblage of persons at a social party by express invitation. Id. As a consequence, the court concluded that the party guests who witnessed the altercation could not be included among those members of the public who could be terrorized by the fight. Id. at 703-04, 39 S.E. at 302-03. In the instant case, we note that the spectators to the fight at issuetwo adult employees of the Home and two juvenile residents of the Homewere associates of the combatants. In addition, the two adults were employed by the Home; regularly spent time there; and assisted in the Home's daily operations, including assessing and supervising its residents. The two resident witnesses lived at the Home along with the two combatants and other juvenile residents. None were social guests of the Home, at least not within the context of the holding in Gamble. However, we are aware of no precedent that would serve to distinguish the status of the four witnesses from that of invited guests. Our research shows that the presence of employees who are witnesses to a fight at a private facility has not been assessed for purposes of the terror element of an affray, nor has the presence of witnesses who live among combatants who fight at such a place. Nevertheless, two of the four witnesses were present at the facility by virtue of their employment, and the others were present by virtue of having been assigned to live there. Consequently, none of the four individuals was there by happenstance. Id. As a result, these four witnesses do not qualify as persons who might transform the facility from a private place into a public place. Both in our legal analysis and in a practical sense, we can find no justification for qualifying the four on other grounds. These four individuals had strong ties to the facility and either lived with the combatants or were employed at the facility. In our view, their presence is akin to that of family members who bear witness to a fight between siblings on the grounds of the family residence. Such altercations, put simply, cannot cause terror to the people within the meaning of the law of affray. As a consequence, we conclude that the fight in the instant case fails to present one of those narrowly defined circumstances in which the second element of affray (that the fight occurred in a public place) is established by proof of the third element (that the fight caused terror to the people). Therefore, there was insufficient evidence to establish the second element of the common-law offense of affray. We hold that the State failed to meet its burden to produce evidence sufficient to support either the second element of affray (that the fight occurred in a public place) or even the third element of affray (that the fight caused terror to the people) in its case against the juvenile. Thus, we conclude that the hearing judge erroneously denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated herein, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. AFFIRMED.