Opinion ID: 554033
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Competency of Counsel

Text: 49 Zettlemoyer argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for not presenting competent psychological testimony on the issue of diminished capacity at the trial and not presenting psychological testimony or affirmative evidence at the sentencing hearing. We will address these contentions seriatim.
50 During the guilt phase of the trial, Zettlemoyer's counsel presented Dr. Stanley Schneider to testify to his diagnosis of Zettlemoyer's mental condition. Dr. Schneider is a clinical psychologist licensed in Pennsylvania who had been Director of the Department of Psychology at the Harrisburg State Hospital. App. at 114. Dr. Schneider interviewed and tested Zettlemoyer on three separate occasions, interviewed his paternal grandparents, parents, and one sister, and reviewed Zettlemoyer's school and police records. Id. at 126. During his meetings with Zettlemoyer, Dr. Schneider administered seven different psychological tests within three general categories; intellectual functioning, 7 personality, 8 and projected tests which gave Zettlemoyer the opportunity to project his own unique thoughts, ideas, anxieties, needs, [and] conflicts in response to certain relatively unstructured stimuli. 9 Id. at 128-30. The tests indicated that Zettlemoyer functioned in the average range of intelligence with some deficits in his common sense and practical judgment, particularly as it related to interpersonal relationships. Id. at 131. Zettlemoyer's intelligence was also weak when compared to his age group and the personality test revealed that he apparently distorted his responses to exaggerate his symptoms. Id. at 131-32. Dr. Schneider did not find any evidence of organic or physical involvement or any suggestion of trauma to the brain or central nervous system. Id. at 133. Dr. Schneider testified that the projected tests revealed that Zettlemoyer was not psychotic, but had limited ability to tolerate adversity, and that too much emotional stimulation caused a loss in his judgment. Id. at 134-35. Dr. Schneider concluded that Zettlemoyer was a paranoid personality with schizoid features and that Zettlemoyer had suffered this personality disorder for his entire life. Id. at 137-41. 51 At one point, Dr. Schneider testified that he was: 52 a pampered, doted upon, catered to, in simple terminology spoiled brat who figured out how to get what he wanted, either directly or by manipulating or controlling the situation to get what he wanted his entire life and I believe that faced with the number of stresses that he had to deal with that he could not cope with, and he decompensated [and] ... engaged in a variety of unproductive behaviors. 53 Id. at 143. 54 Zettlemoyer's counsel then asked Dr. Schneider: 55 I specifically want to direct your attention to October the 13th of 1980, to the early morning hours, I want to ask you with a reasonable degree of medical certainty, was the Defendant's mental illness of such an intensity at that time, at the time of the killing, that he was not mentally capable of fully forming the specific intent which is required for a willful deliberate and premeditated act? 56 Id. at 148. 57 The trial court sustained the district attorney's objection to this question and refused to permit Dr. Schneider to answer, stating at sidebar that assuming all these things are correct, [it] is no legal excuse for a crime. Id. at 149. The court reasoned that, notwithstanding Dr. Schneider's thorough examination of Zettlemoyer's personality, Dr. Schneider could not testify whether, at the time of the killing, Zettlemoyer could form a specific intent to kill because the testimony did not lay a proper foundation for that conclusion. Id. at 151-52. 58 Zettlemoyer does not contend that this ruling was incorrect, as he admits that Dr. Schneider was not qualified and competent to offer the opinion testimony for which he was called as a witness by [his] trial counsel. Brief at 13. Of course, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania upheld the ruling under state law on the direct appeal. Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. at 27, 454 A.2d at 943. 59 Rather, Zettlemoyer claims that his counsel was ineffective because he did not identify or secure a witness who could have provided competent opinion testimony on the defense of diminished capacity at the guilt phase of the trial. He also contends that trial counsel was ineffective because Dr. Schneider's key testimony was inadmissible and because the counsel produced negative personality testimony, without the ultimate conclusion that such factors reduced his culpability, thereby prejudicing his case. He also claims prejudice from the trial court's instruction to the jury, in which he maintains the court interjected its negative opinion of the core of [his] defense, suggesting that Dr. Schneider's testimony should be disregarded. Brief at 16. 60 The Supreme Court set forth the criteria for determining whether relief may be granted on the ground of ineffective assistance of counsel in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). A petitioner must show (1) that counsel made errors so serious that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) that such failure resulted in prejudice so as to deprive the petitioner of a fair trial, that is, a trial whose result is reliable. Id. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. However, 61 a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case, viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's function ... is to make the adversarial testing process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment. 62 Id. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066. 63 In order to resolve the ineffectiveness claim, we must consider Zettlemoyer's counsel's conduct within the context of Pennsylvania law regarding the defense of diminished capacity. Pennsylvania recognizes the defense to show that a defendant did not have the capacity to possess the state of mind required by the legislature to commit a particular degree of the crime charged. Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 220-21, 360 A.2d 914, 919-20 (1976). 10 Defendants invoking the defense of diminished capacity, however, concede general criminal liability and Zettlemoyer has done this. Id. Evidence of diminished capacity is admissible at the guilt phase of trial and a jury finding diminished capacity may not find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, but it may find the defendant guilty of third degree murder. Pennsylvania case law now establishes that, to prove diminished capacity, only expert testimony on how the mental disorder affected the cognitive functions necessary to form the specific intent is relevant and admissible. Commonwealth v. Terry, 513 Pa. 381, 393, 521 A.2d 398, 404, cert. denied, 482 U.S. 920, 107 S.Ct. 3198, 96 L.Ed.2d 685 (1987); Commonwealth v. Davis, 331 Pa.Super. 59, 64, 479 A.2d 1077, 1080 (1984) (personality disorders are irrelevant to show diminished capacity). But when Zettlemoyer was tried the law was slightly different, as a finding of diminished capacity depended on whether the defendant had a conscious intent to kill. Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, 492 Pa. 17, 31-32 n. 2, 422 A.2d 116, 123 n. 2 (1980); Commonwealth v. Brantner, 486 Pa. 518, 523, 406 A.2d 1011, 1014 (1979). 64 Evidence of specific intent to kill may disprove the defense of diminished capacity. See Commonwealth v. Tempest, 496 Pa. 436, 442, 437 A.2d 952, 955 (1981). In Tempest, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that evidence adduced at trial that showed the defendant planned the killing days in advance, considered various means to kill, persisted despite the victim's pleas, and repeated at various times her motive for the killing, sufficed to enable the trier of fact to reject the diminished capacity defense. Id. The defendant presented evidence that she suffered from chronic schizophrenia, acute type. Id. at 439, 437 A.2d at 954. The trial court had initially determined that the defendant was incompetent to stand trial but less than two years later, she was adjudged competent. Id. at 439-40, 437 A.2d at 954. Notwithstanding this evidence, the Supreme Court affirmed her conviction of first degree murder, concluding that the Commonwealth had adduced ample evidence to reject the diminished capacity defense and to prove that she possessed the specific intent to kill. Id. at 442, 437 A.2d at 955. 65 Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Davis, 331 Pa.Super. 59, 65, 479 A.2d 1077, 1080 (1984), the Superior Court upheld the trial court's rejection of the defendant's diminished capacity defense and affirmed his conviction of first degree murder. Id. The defendant had presented evidence that he had experienced a schizophrenic episode at the time of the murder. Id. The Superior Court noted that the trier of fact had evidence of specific intent to kill, including the defendant's shooting the decedent twice at close range, his prior threats to kill her, his threat to cut her throat while holding a knife to her neck, his breaking into her apartment in the early hours possessing a deadly weapon, and his firing shots at her as she fled the apartment. Id. at 64, 479 A.2d at 1080. In light of this evidence, the court concluded that the record showed ample support for the trial court's discrediting the psychological testimony of diminished capacity. Id. at 65, 479 A.2d at 1081. 66 After considering Pennsylvania law and the record here, we conclude that Zettlemoyer is not entitled to relief on his claim that his counsel was ineffective for calling Dr. Schneider, even though his testimony was not admissible on the issue of diminished capacity. The colloquy at sidebar after the Commonwealth's objection to Dr. Schneider's testimony clearly shows that defense counsel was familiar with the diminished capacity defense and its requirements. See App. at 149-50. Counsel referred the court to three diminished capacity cases, Commonwealth v. Sourbeer, 492 Pa. 17, 422 A.2d 116 (1980), Commonwealth v. Brantner, 486 Pa. 518, 406 A.2d 1011 (1979), and Commonwealth v. Walzack, 468 Pa. 210, 360 A.2d 914, in his attempt to persuade the court to permit Dr. Schneider to give his opinion on Zettlemoyer's mental capability to form specific intent to kill. App. at 149-50. It is obvious, therefore, that he had thoroughly researched the defense. The trial court rejected counsel's arguments by distinguishing these precedents on their facts. Id. at 149, 151 (distinguishing Sourbeer, 492 Pa. at 25-26, 422 A.2d at 119-20 (psychiatrist testified that defendant had passive-aggressive personality with antisocial tendencies); Brantner, 486 Pa. at 523, 406 A.2d at 1014 (psychiatrist testified that defendant had schizoid personality and was paranoid); Walzack, 468 Pa. at 215, 360 A.2d at 916 (defendant had undergone lobotomy)). Counsel cannot be deemed ineffective merely because he could not persuade the court to admit Dr. Schneider's opinion. He fully developed Dr. Schneider's testimony but it simply was not sufficient to lay a foundation for the opinion question. Yet there is nothing unusual in an attorney not being able to convince a court that evidence should be admitted. 67 Clearly, Zettlemoyer did have significant personality problems and it was reasonable strategy for counsel to bring them out in an attempt to convince the court to allow Dr. Schneider's testimony. A defense counsel cannot be deemed ineffective just because he is not successful. Finally, on this issue we point out that at the time of Zettlemoyer's trial, Pennsylvania law was in a state of flux regarding diminished capacity and even the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was having difficulty dealing with the defense. See Commonwealth v. Zettlemoyer, 500 Pa. at 27-31, 454 A.2d at 943-44. Thus, it is not surprising that a defense counsel did as well. 68 In any event, the evidence that Zettlemoyer had the specific intent to kill was overwhelming. Zettlemoyer was very heavily armed when police discovered him at the scene of the murder. See Transcript of Trial, Vol. II, at 383-431. The police testified that they found on Zettlemoyer's person forty-one rounds of .357 federal ammunition; twenty-four in strip packets with more deadly semi-jacketed hollow points, and seventeen loose, and that he was carrying a knife with a six-inch blade and sheath, wore a shoulder holster, two beltkeepers, and an ammunition pouch. Id. at 399, 406, 428, 429, 431. Zettlemoyer carried two handcuff keys and a canister of tear gas and was dressed in dark clothing and black gloves. Id. at 383, 406, 428-29. An inventory search of his van, parked near the site of the murder, revealed two sets of handcuffs; two spent .22 caliber casings; and a .22 caliber pistol with holster and clip. Id. at 452. Just outside the van, police found a .357 live round on the ground. Id. at 459. Zettlemoyer drove his van as far back as possible into the deserted area where the murder occurred, to a point where it could not be seen. Transcript of Trial, Vol. I, at 8, 9; Vol. II, at 388. Surely this irrefutable physical evidence demonstrated that he had extensively prepared for the crime and had a specific intent to kill. 69 But there is more. The victim, DeVetsco, lived and worked in Sunbury, Pennsylvania, approximately one hour's drive from where his body was found. He carried no identification; his license, car, and car keys were at his apartment in Sunbury, suggesting that he was not willingly travelling from Sunbury to the murder scene in Harrisburg. Transcript of Trial, Vol. II, at 513, 514. The jury heard testimony that Zettlemoyer dragged the handcuffed DeVetsco, who already had been shot and was bleeding, from the van to the spot where Zettlemoyer shot him twice more. Transcript of Trial, Vol. I, at 22. In total, DeVetsco suffered two wounds in the back from a .22 caliber weapon and two wounds in the base of the neck, behind his left ear. Transcript of Trial, Vol. II, at 465-66. Zettlemoyer fired these last two shots from approximately two feet away while the victim lay on the ground. Id. at 472, 474. Discharging a deadly weapon aimed at a vital part of the body demonstrates specific intent to kill. See Commonwealth v. Davis, 331 Pa.Super. at 64, 479 A.2d at 1080. 70 The testimony also showed that Zettlemoyer had a motive to commit the murder. One week before the murder, during the jury selection for a trial on the indictment against Zettlemoyer handed down by a Snyder County jury, the list of prospective witnesses which included DeVetsco was read in Zettlemoyer's presence. Transcript of Trial, Vol. II, at 530-32. The trial was scheduled to begin one week after the murder. Id. at 532. There is no escaping the fact that this was a vicious, cold-blooded, premeditated execution-style murder. 11 71 In light of this overwhelming evidence demonstrating Zettlemoyer's specific intent to kill DeVetsco, we conclude that Zettlemoyer was not prejudiced by Dr. Schneider's inability to testify to his cognitive functioning at the time of the murder. We cannot conceive that any expert opinion would have led the jury to disregard the compelling uncontroverted evidence of what actually happened and conclude that Zettlemoyer had a diminished capacity, predicated on a lack of a conscious or specific intent to kill. This crime was so carefully executed and reflective of specific planning that, it seems to us, a suggestion that Zettlemoyer had a diminished capacity, as that term is understood under Pennsylvania law, is nothing short of preposterous. Thus, even if counsel had been ineffective in failing to extract expert testimony to support a claim of diminished capacity, which he was not, Zettlemoyer is not entitled to habeas relief because the failure did not prejudice him by depriving him of a fair trial with a reliable result. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Likewise, Dr. Schneider's testimony regarding Zettlemoyer's personality, which characterized him as, inter alia, a spoiled brat, paled in comparison to the overwhelming evidence of his specific intent to kill. The testimony, while portraying Zettlemoyer in a less than flattering light, did not undermine the reliability of the result of the trial. There is no escape from the fact that the evidence in this case was overwhelming. 72 We recognize that Zettlemoyer maintains that counsel failed to call some other witness who might have presented testimony crucial to his defense of diminished capacity; however, he neither alleges nor offers evidence that any such testimony was forthcoming or available upon reasonable investigation. A witness cannot be produced out of a hat. Zettlemoyer cannot meet his burden to show that counsel made errors so serious that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on vague and conclusory allegations that some unspecified and speculative testimony might have established his defense. Rather, he must set forth facts to support his contention. See Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, 187 (3d Cir.) (petitioner's vague and general allegations and supporting materials fail to make sufficient showing to justify relief), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 946, 108 S.Ct. 336, 98 L.Ed.2d 362 (1987). Having failed to do so, he is not entitled to habeas relief on this claim. 12 Furthermore, even if the counsel had produced a second expert witness, that witness would have been confronted with the uncontroverted evidence of Zettlemoyer's actual conduct and would not have been able to explain it away.
73 The second aspect of Zettlemoyer's attack on his trial counsel relates to the sentencing phase of the trial. He claims that his counsel was ineffective in that he did not recall Dr. Schneider to testify at that hearing and did not present affirmative evidence during this phase. Rather, counsel called only one witness, Zettlemoyer's father, to testify about his son's mental and emotional health at the time of the murder. 74 We consider counsel's failure to recall Dr. Schneider in the context of Pennsylvania law. In Pennsylvania, a defendant has the burden to show mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence at the sentencing hearing. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. Sec. 9711(c)(1)(iii). The Commonwealth stipulated to the existence of two mitigating factors: that Zettlemoyer had no prior criminal convictions under section 9711(e)(1) and that he was 25 years old, an arguably youthful age within section 9711(e)(4). App. at 180. 75 Dr. Schneider was the last defense witness during the guilt phase; the jury heard his testimony less than 24 hours before the sentencing hearing. Transcript of Trial, Vol. II, at 690-745. The Commonwealth put on only a minimal rebuttal case. Id. at 747-70. In fact the trial was quite short as both the guilt and sentencing phases were completed within one week. Dr. Schneider testified that Zettlemoyer was unable ... to deal with the normal pressures, demands, [and] responsibilities of daily living. App. at 142. He stated that he believed that Zettlemoyer's reaction over this period of time resulted in, well, what I refer to as a pressure cooker syndrome, pressure mounting up. If you don't have a release valve it will blow and that's where I believe that the emotional disturbance, in addition to the personality disorder, may have resulted in the behavior. Id. He continued that this pressure cooker effect worsened in the two weeks before the murder due to the publicity surrounding the robbery for which Zettlemoyer was charged. Id. at 145. This testimony goes to the two mitigating factors of the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance pursuant to section 9711(e)(2), and whether Zettlemoyer's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct with the law were substantially impaired pursuant to section 9711(e)(3). 76 This testimony was reinforced at the sentencing phase by Zettlemoyer's father who testified that he had spoken with his son in the two weeks before the murder and that he could see the stresses building up in him. App. at 184. He further testified that, based on his observations and conversations with his son at that time, Zettlemoyer's capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law were substantially impaired. Id. at 185. He stated that, since his imprisonment, his son had shown considerable remorse and that he had taken to religion to some extent which is something he never did before. Id. at 184. 77 In his closing argument, counsel specifically asked the jury to consider the testimony on diminished capacity. Id. at 192. Relevant portions of the closing argument include: 78 [T]wo [mitigating circumstances] deal with the mental capacities of the defendant; extreme mental or emotional disturbance or the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. 79 .... 80 Now, if you did not believe the defense of diminished capacity then I certainly hope that at least you would consider it in regards to life or death. The District Attorney has agreed to incorporate all that testimony that we presented to you at trial and I want you to consider it. 81 Id. at 191-92. 82 Additionally, the trial court instructed the jury to consider whether Zettlemoyer was under extreme mental or emotional distress and his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law, factors which may be mitigating circumstances under section 9711(e)(2) and (3). App. at 203-04. It likewise instructed the jury to consider all evidence presented by both sides during both the guilt and sentencing phases in determining the penalty. Id. at 203-04. See supra at 293. 83 In the circumstances, we see no deficiency in counsel's decision not to recall Dr. Schneider, as the choice plainly was well within the range of a professionally reasonable judgment. Counsel presented evidence to support the relevant mitigating circumstances during the guilt phase of the trial and both counsel and the court asked the jury to consider this evidence in its sentencing decision. We cannot hold that counsel's action in not recalling Dr. Schneider to repeat his testimony at the sentencing phase of this short trial in which the testimony from the guilt phase was then still quite fresh satisfied the Strickland standard of ineffectiveness that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. There is not the slightest doubt that the jury had a very complete psychological picture of Zettlemoyer as an individual. 84 In view of the foregoing, we find the following statement in Zettlemoyer's brief to be inexplicable: 85 Indeed, the testimony of Dr. Schneider at the trial of Mr. Zettlemoyer's guilt or innocence demonstrates that his opinion testimony at sentencing would have been admissible, relevant of Mr. Zettlemoyer's intellectual capacity and emotional situation at the time of the murder, and thus of central importance to the jury's consideration of mitigation. 86 Brief at 18-19. 87 The difficulty with this argument is that inasmuch as the guilt phase testimony was incorporated into the sentencing phase, Dr. Schneider's testimony not only would have been admissible at the sentencing phase, it was admitted. Zettlemoyer then continues his argument stating that trial counsel's affirmative case at the sentencing phase consisted only of the evidence of Zettlemoyer's father and that [n]o use was made of Dr. Schneider. This statement is incomprehensible since the evidence from the guilt phase was incorporated into the sentencing phase. Indeed, in his closing argument at the sentencing phase, Zettlemoyer's counsel told the jury that: The District Attorney has agreed to incorporate all that testimony that we presented to you at trial and I want you to consider it. Shortly thereafter he asked the jury to consider Zettlemoyer's mental sickness. The attack on trial counsel for making only, in the word used in Zettlemoyer's brief, a perfunctory case for Zettlemoyer's life is completely unfounded. 88 Our result is informed by a recent case in which a similar claim regarding the failure to recall a professional witness was rejected. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit recently held that counsel was not ineffective for not recalling, during the sentencing hearing, a psychiatrist who testified during the guilt phase of a trial. Clozza v. Murray, 913 F.2d 1092 (4th Cir.1990). The court explained that counsel had been able to introduce at the guilt phase all the mitigating evidence that could have introduced at the penalty phase. Id. at 1102. During a hearing in the state habeas corpus proceedings, the psychiatrist testified that his testimony at sentencing would not have been different than his testimony at the guilt phase. Id. Additionally, the court of appeals noted that the doctor's testimony, which was based on the premise that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the offense, was vulnerable to impeachment on cross-examination because defendant testified that he was sober at the time. Id. The court concluded that counsel's decision not to recall the psychiatrist in light of the potential damage of his testimony was a reasonable tactical choice. Id. at 1102-03. 89 We also find that Zettlemoyer's claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to present other affirmative evidence during the sentencing phase is without merit. Counsel presented the stipulations, the testimony of Zettlemoyer's father, and incorporated the earlier testimony into the sentencing hearing. At the guilt phase Zettlemoyer's paternal grandmother and his mother described his conduct as a child and as a young man. In his brief, Zettlemoyer points to no evidence other than that of Dr. Schneider that might have been produced at the sentencing phase. Inasmuch as Dr. Schneider's evidence was before the jury as incorporated by reference, it is thus clear that Zettlemoyer has made no showing that counsel was not competent. He cannot rest on a conclusory allegation that he should have done more. Furthermore, the jury had information in support of a conclusion that four of the mitigating factors enumerated in section 9711(e) were present in this case. 13 90 We have not overlooked the fact that the district court did not order an evidentiary hearing on the claim of counsel's ineffectiveness at the sentencing phase. Rather, we find on the record of this case that it would have been improper to have such a hearing. The law on the point is familiar. Where the facts are in dispute in a habeas case, a federal court must hold an evidentiary hearing if the petitioner did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in state court, either at trial or in a collateral proceeding. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. at 312, 83 S.Ct. at 756-57. A district court must hold a hearing if the petitioner has alleged facts that, if proved, would entitle him or her to relief and an evidentiary hearing is necessary to establish the truth of those allegations. Smith v. Freeman, 892 F.2d at 338. However, bald assertions and conclusory allegations do not provide sufficient ground to warrant requiring the state to respond to discovery or to require an evidentiary hearing. Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d at 185. See also Barry v. United States, 528 F.2d 1094, 1101-02 (7th Cir.) (insufficiently detailed affidavit that did not demonstrate that petitioners had actual proof of allegations is patently insufficient to require hearing under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 2255), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 826, 97 S.Ct. 81, 50 L.Ed.2d 88 (1976). 91 We, of course, must only determine the reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct and we judge this matter on the basis of an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688, 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2064, 2066. Here, it is perfectly clear that counsel's conduct was reasonable, because counsel made a complete record in support of a plea for a life sentence by incorporating the record from the guilt phase into the sentencing phase of the case, and supplementing it with Zettlemoyer's father's testimony. 92 We also reiterate that although Zettlemoyer complains that counsel did not produce affirmative evidence during the sentencing hearing, he has failed to specify any evidence that was available to counsel that he did not present during either the guilt phase or the sentencing phase of trial. At oral argument before us, appellate counsel maintained that trial counsel could have brought out the facts of petitioner's childhood and his proclivity to use violence; however, these facts were presented during the guilt phase. Likewise, counsel presented evidence of petitioner's mental and emotional instability during the guilt phase. 93 We understand why an evidentiary hearing on the issue of counsel's competency might be required in a case in which a petitioner could point to specific significant mitigating evidence, available to counsel at the time of the trial, that was not produced at a sentencing phase and was not before the jury from the guilt phase. In such a case, the court might not be able to judge the objective reasonableness of counsel's conduct without the counsel's explanation of the underlying trial strategy. But we do not have that situation, for Zettlemoyer's assertion that other evidence should have been presented is merely a conclusory allegation. Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d at 185. He has not made a preliminary showing that mitigating facts available to counsel were not produced at the trial. Thus, there is no open factual matter requiring resolution at an evidentiary hearing. 94 We will not require an evidentiary hearing absent identification of some facts that support a contention of ineffectiveness, because to do so will encourage meritless petitions burdening judicial resources. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 690, 104 S.Ct. at 2066 (The availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness challenges. Criminal trials resolved unfavorably to the defendant would increasingly come to be followed by a second trial, this one of counsel's unsuccessful defense.). Litigation even in a death case must some day come to a conclusion. We reiterate that a district court must hold a hearing if a petitioner has alleged facts that, if proved, would entitle him or her to relief and an evidentiary hearing is necessary to establish the truth of those allegations. Smith v. Freeman, 892 F.2d at 338. But Zettlemoyer did not allege facts to satisfy this test and thus is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing. 14 We refuse to order an evidentiary hearing for the purpose of conducting an inquisition into how the case was tried. The only way on the record before us that we could require an evidentiary hearing on counsel's effectiveness at the sentencing hearing would be to hold that the mere charge of ineffectiveness per se entitles a petitioner to a hearing. That is not the law and we will not so hold. In sum, we conclude that Zettlemoyer has failed to meet his burden to show that he is entitled to habeas relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel. 15 95 While we have already explained why we will not order a hearing on the competency of counsel at the sentencing phase, in view of the interest at stake on this appeal it is especially appropriate to comment on the dissent from this aspect of our opinion. The dissent states that Dr. Schneider was testifying on the guilt phase on the diminished capacity defense and not to show mitigating circumstances, and that the jury did not hear his testimony from the perspective of whether Zettlemoyer's life should be spared. But Dr. Schneider completely described Zettlemoyer's mental condition and emotional state prior to the murder in the guilt phase, only hours before the sentencing phase and, though the purpose of that evidence somewhat changed between the phases, no one suggests that Dr. Schneider's evaluation of Zettlemoyer's mental condition and emotional state did. Furthermore, inasmuch as Dr. Schneider testified that Zettlemoyer's emotional disturbance, in addition to the personality disorder, may have resulted in the behavior, he actually used the statutory term for a mitigating circumstance, emotional disturbance, in describing the cause of Zettlemoyer's conduct. In the circumstances, it is clear why it was reasonable for counsel not to have the evidence repeated, even though it was originally presented on the diminished capacity defense. Of course, the petition for habeas corpus does not allege that Dr. Schneider withheld evidence at the guilt phase regarding Zettlemoyer's evaluation or his emotional state possibly helpful to Zettlemoyer in the sentencing phase. 16 96 The dissent also contends that a hearing should have been held to determine why Zettlemoyer's mother was not recalled at the sentencing phase and to explain why counsel would not have called Zettlemoyer's friends, co-workers, or his former fiancee to support the claim of overwhelming emotional disturbance. It further contends that a hearing should be held so that trial counsel could explain his complete failure to present evidence of catch-all mitigating circumstances, though it acknowledges that Zettlemoyer points to no specific significant mitigating evidence which it agrees is troubling. 97 But a decade has passed since this murder and Zettlemoyer has never alleged that he was deprived of the testimony which the dissent mentions, and we cannot by speculation supply a basis to remand a matter for a hearing to determine if counsel was incompetent in not producing this evidence when Zettlemoyer does not make a showing or even an allegation that it ever existed. Moreover, he does not assert that his mother should have been recalled. Except for Dr. Schneider, the petition for habeas corpus, which insofar as germane to the issue of competency of counsel at the sentencing phase we have set out in full, see note 14, supra, makes no reference to testimony of specific individuals who should have been presented at the sentencing phase and were not. 17