Opinion ID: 411710
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The automobile stop

Text: 18 Our inquiry is not terminated by our holding that the search warrant for the Avenue 320 premises was invalid because not supported by probable cause. The government argues that regardless of the validity of the Avenue 320 residence search warrant, the stopping of appellants' automobile was supported by reasonable suspicion and the search warrant for the white van was supported by probable cause; thus the district court's failure to suppress evidence seized in the search of the residence was harmless error. 19 An officer may stop an automobile without a warrant if he has a reasonable or founded suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants are subject to seizure for violation of law. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1401, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979). See United States v. Emens, 649 F.2d 653, 656 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Post, 607 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir.1979). [T]he police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the intrusion. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879-1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); United States v. Emens, 649 F.2d at 656. 20 The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the government, and this court's review is limited to determining whether the district court's findings are clearly erroneous. United States v. Post, 607 F.2d at 849. We find clear error in the district court's determination that reasonable suspicion supported the automobile stop. 21 At the time defendants' station wagon was pulled over, the government was in possession of the following facts. McLaughlin had received an anonymous telephone call stating that the odor of ether was emanating from the residence on Avenue 320, and that between three and five black men were using a white van on the premises. McLaughlin confirmed that the odor of ether was present near the residence when he drove past the house at 10:00 p.m. on July 12, the evening before the defendants' arrest. Miller noted the odor of cyclohexanone at 3:30 a.m. on July 13. Both ether and cyclohexanone are necessary precursors to the manufacture of PCP. These facts appear sufficient to direct some attention to the Avenue 320 residence, but there is no indication that defendants or the station wagon were at the premises when these events took place at 10:00 p.m. or at 3:30 a.m. or at any time between these hours. Neither McLaughlin during his drive-by, nor Miller who had the residence under surveillance during the early morning hours of July 13, noted their presence or departure. 22 The unknown informer described a white Dodge van being utilized on the premises. However, defendants apparently arrived at the Avenue 320 residence shortly after 5:00 a.m. in a station wagon. Several black men, some wearing gloves, were seen carrying containers about near the shed and the station wagon. Miller could not state that containers were either taken from or brought to the station wagon. He also testified that he had on earlier occasions noted farmers in the area wearing gloves and carrying containers in the predawn hours. There is no evidence of record that indicates that gloves are relevant in any way to the manufacturing process of PCP. 23 Three quarters of an hour after they had been first seen, the defendants entered the station wagon and drove from the premises. Investigating officers followed the vehicle for some five miles from the Avenue 320 residence, apparently noticing no suspicious conduct on the part of either car or driver. They then stopped the automobile. 24 We hold that the vehicle stop constituted an unreasonable seizure. The investigators lacked reasonable suspicion that the vehicle or its occupants were subject to seizure for violation of law. Thus the arrest of the defendants and the subsequent search violated the defendants' fourth amendment rights. 25 The identification of ether and cyclohexanone odors at the residence occurred some time before either the defendants or the station wagon arrived on the scene. There are no specific and articulable facts linking either the defendants or the vehicle to the manufacture of PCP up to the time the station wagon was stopped; defendants' behavior was entirely consistent with an innocent course of conduct and did not suggest criminal activity. A mere hunch on the part of investigators is not sufficient to justify an automobile stop, even if that hunch turns out to have been a good one. 26 Miller testified that he stopped the vehicle in order to serve the defendants with the search warrant for the Avenue 320 residence. We have held that warrant to be invalid. Were the warrant valid, however, it could not legitimize an otherwise unreasonable automobile stop. The warrant did not describe the station wagon or any other vehicle as an area to be searched. The execution of a search warrant does not require that it be served on the owner or occupant of the premises to be searched. This was not a warrant of arrest and a search warrant does not authorize the arrest of any persons associated with the premises to be searched, when neither on nor near the premises, for the purpose of conveying them to the scene of the search. Cf. Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 69 L.Ed.2d 340 (1981) (police may detain person in the act of leaving premises where police have a proper warrant to search premises for contraband).