Opinion ID: 1060912
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Counsel's Compensation, Services, and Time to Prepare for Trial

Text: In his next issue, the appellant contends that his trial counsel was not given the compensation, time, or services necessary to provide an adequate defense pursuant to the United States and Tennessee constitutions. Specifically, the appellant claims that the trial court erroneously denied motions for continuances, denied motions for compensation, denied motions for appointment of co-counsel, and denied motions for the provision of expert services. The State contends that the trial court acted properly and within the confines of the law. A brief summary of the pre-trial proceedings is helpful in reviewing this issue. The indictment was returned against the appellant on August 9, 1993. The appellant retained counsel, and his retained counsel appeared before the court for the arraignment of the appellant on August 24, 1993. Although originally scheduled for November 30, 1993, the trial was continued until February 1, 1994. On January 27, 1994, the court again continued the trial until May 3, 1994. On that same day, the court granted the appellant's motion for a declaration of indigency, but denied counsel's motion for compensation. The court stated that it was under a duty to appoint the public defender before appointing or compensating private counsel. [11a] However, there was neither a motion for the appointment of the public defender nor a motion for withdrawal of private counsel before the court at that time. The public defender was not appointed until April 8, 1994. During an ex parte hearing on January 27, 1994, the court denied the appellant's motion for a jury statistician and a mitigation specialist. The court held that the Constitution does not require the appointment of either expert, and the court noted that the investigator already appointed could perform the same kind of work as a mitigation specialist. On January 28, 1994, the court authorized $3,000 for the investigative services of Terry W. Sweat and Gail Hedrick, and $3,000 for the psychological services of Dr. Gillian Blair. [12a] On the same day, the court denied a request for a neuropharmacologist, a statistician, and a forensic expert, because the appellant failed to indicate who would be performing these services and how much compensation would be required. On April 8, 1994, the court authorized an additional $1,500 for the investigative services of Terry W. Sweat. On May 27, 1994, the court granted the appellant's motion for $3,000 for the services of Dr. Chris Sperry, an expert pathologist. On May 3, 1994, the trial court continued the trial until May 31, 1994. The court, however, denied motions for further continuances on May 13, May 18, and May 31, 1994. The trial court also denied the appellant's motion for a continuance following the State's presentation of proof at the sentencing phase of the trial.
The appellant claims that his counsel was not afforded adequate time to prepare for trial. Primarily, he contends that co-counsel (i.e. the public defender) was not appointed until less than two months prior to trial, that lead counsel and co-counsel were unable to sufficiently discuss the case, that lead counsel planned a vacation the week before the trial, and that counsel did not have time to prepare for the sentencing phase of the trial. The granting or denial of a continuance is a matter left to the sole discretion of the trial court. State v. Morgan, 825 S.W.2d 113, 117 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1992). An appellate court may reverse a conviction only if the denial of the continuance was an abuse of discretion, and a different result might reasonably have been reached had the continuance been granted. State v. Dykes, 803 S.W.2d 250, 257 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1990). We can find nothing in the record which suggests that the trial court abused its discretion, thereby prejudicing the appellant. Although the court denied three motions by defense counsel for continuances just prior to trial, he had earlier granted several such motions. As already noted, although the trial was originally scheduled for November 30, 1993, it began on May 31, 1994. In other words, the trial court postponed the trial date by approximately six months. With respect to the appellant's argument that co-counsel did not have adequate time to prepare for trial, we note that lead counsel had been representing the appellant since August, 1993. Thus, by the time co-counsel was appointed, lead counsel had invested well over seven months in the case. This scenario is quite similar to the one presented in State v. Dillingham, 03C01-9110-CR-319, 1993 WL 22155 (Tenn. Crim. App. at Knoxville), perm. to appeal denied, (Tenn. 1993). In Dillingham , the public defender was only afforded one month to prepare for a case with which a previous attorney had been involved. Id. Finding no abuse of discretion, this court declined to interfere with the trial court's denial of the motion for continuance, because the public defender had the benefit of prior counsel's preparations and efforts. Id. Co-counsel in the instant case was appointed in early April, 1994, somewhat less than two months before trial. [13] Although a capital case will clearly require more preparation by defense counsel than a non-capital case, we conclude that co-counsel was afforded adequate time to familiarize himself with the facts and assist in the appellant's defense. The appellant also argues that lead counsel and co-counsel did not have sufficient opportunities to meet and discuss the case. On this same note, the appellant argues that lead counsel's pre-planned vacation interfered with counsel's trial preparations. The trial court is not responsible for counsel's time management. Furthermore, there is no evidence in the record indicating that just under two months was not adequate time for the attorneys to meet and prepare for trial. As counsel acknowledged during pre-trial hearings, the more important aspect of this particular trial was the sentencing phase. The appellant argues that he was not appointed expert services in time to adequately prepare a mitigation case. However, the record reflects that the court authorized investigative services on January 28, 1994, and, again, on April 8, 1994. [14] Moreover, although the trial court did not authorize funding for a pathologist until a little over a week before trial, time limitations apparently did not impede that expert's testimony in any way. This witness was able to testify that, in his opinion, the initial blows to the victim's head probably rendered her unconscious. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse his discretion nor was the appellant prejudiced by the denial of additional continuances. This issue is without merit.