Opinion ID: 2025372
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Additional Charges Following Post-Conviction Relief

Text: In April 1982, McBroom pled guilty to the murder of Ott. The trial court accepted the plea and imposed a thirty-year sentence. Following a hearing in 1985, a post-conviction court vacated the conviction because McBroom had been inadequately advised before his plea. The State refiled the murder charge and filed two additional charges: criminal confinement and robbery. The jury found McBroom not guilty of robbery but convicted him of murder and confinement. McBroom contends his conviction and sentence for criminal confinement should be vacated because the sentence violates Rule PC 1, § 10, Ind. Rules of Procedure for Post-Conviction Remedies. When McBroom filed his petition in December 1984, the rule read: (a) If prosecution is initiated against a petitioner who has successfully sought relief under this Rule and a conviction is subsequently obtained, or (b) If a sentence has been set aside pursuant to this Rule and the successful petitioner is to be resentenced, then the sentencing court shall not impose a more severe penalty than that originally imposed.... [1] McBroom argues that the confinement conviction is an additional penalty the State sought because he obtained post-conviction relief. Although the twenty-year sentence for confinement is to run concurrently with the thirty-year sentence for murder, he maintains that two sentences are greater than one sentence even if they are concurrent. Section 10 implements fundamental notions of due process. Linthicum v. State (1987), Ind., 511 N.E.2d 1026. It assures petitioners that they will not be punished for seeking post-conviction relief. Ballard v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 482, 318 N.E.2d 798. The language of the rule prohibits a trial court from imposing a more severe penalty than that originally imposed. The issue in this case is whether a concurrent twenty-year sentence for the additional confinement conviction is a more severe penalty. In the double jeopardy context, this Court has held a second conviction is an additional punishment even if that conviction results in a sentence which runs concurrent with the first conviction. Hall v. State (1986), Ind., 493 N.E.2d 433. In that case, the Halls received concurrent terms of five years for reckless homicide and two years for child neglect. We held that the conviction for child neglect violated the double jeopardy clause because it punished the Halls twice for the same continuous pattern of deprivation that resulted in reckless homicide. Id. at 436. Section 10 applies not only to the offense for which the defendant was initially charged, but also to other crimes flowing from the occurrences that gave rise to the initial charge. Bates v. State (1981), Ind., 426 N.E. 404; Ballard, 262 Ind. at 502, 318 N.E.2d at 810. [2] McBroom's criminal confinement charge arose from the same circumstances that gave rise to the murder charge. The State accepted McBroom's plea to murder and did not pursue the confinement charge. The prosecutor testified that he reviewed the case before retrial and decided to file the confinement charge even though he was not aware of any new facts. Section 10 prohibits the State from adding a charge after a post-conviction action. We hold that the concurrent twenty-year sentence for the criminal confinement conviction is a more severe penalty within the meaning of Rule PC 1, § 10. The conviction and sentence for confinement must be vacated.