Opinion ID: 2994992
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Retroactive Application Of The MVRA

Text: Dawson’s second argument on appeal is that the district court retroactively applied the MVRA to her case, and in doing so violated the constitutional prohibition against imposition of ex post facto laws. Specifically, Dawson points out that the her acts of mail fraud were alleged to have transpired between June 13, 1990 and June 22, 1993, and that the fraud referenced in Count One of the indictment (to which Dawson pled guilty) occurred on May 23, 1993. At that time, the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) governed the district court’s authority to order restitution. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3663 (1993). Under the VWPA, district courts were authorized, but not required, to order restitution. See Newman, 144 F.3d at 537. Crucial to the discretionary decision was the defendant’s financial standing. Before a district court could order any restitution, the old Act required the court to determine how much, if any, restitution a defendant could make in light of ’the financial resources of the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the defendant’s dependents, and such other factors as the court deems appropriate.’ Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. sec. 3663(a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (1993)). Dawson does not dispute that the MVRA discarded this discretionary balancing system, directing that district courts shall order restitution. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3663A(a)(1) & (b). Under the MVRA, a defendant’s financial status is relevant only to fixing a payment schedule for the mandated restitution payments. See 18 U.S.C. sec. 3664(f)(1)(A) (In each order of restitution, the court shall order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.). At the time of Dawson’s sentencing, in October of 2000, the MVRA was in effect. Dawson suggests that the district court applied the MVRA in ordering restitution, and therefore did not analyze her financial condition prior to finalizing its order. Thus, she asserts that, in this instance, application of the MVRA has increased the punishment for her criminal conduct, thereby creating a violation of the prohibition against ex post facto laws. We review the district court’s decision to apply the MVRA to Dawson’s charged conduct de novo./1 See Newman, 144 F.3d at 538. Unfortunately for Dawson, the question of whether retroactive application of the MVRA constitutes a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause is a settled issue in this Circuit. In Newman, we extensively examined the prob lem, and concluded that the Clause was not violated when a district court imposed restitution pursuant to the MVRA for actions which occurred prior to the effective date of the law. See Newman, 144 F.3d at 537-42. In that decision, we acknowledged, and found unpersuasive, the arguments in favor of finding that the MVRA could not be applied retroactively without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause, as well as the fact that our decision was not in accord with those of other Circuits. See id.; see also United States v. Edwards, 162 F.3d 87, 89-90 (3d Cir. 1998) (collecting cases). Since that time, the holding of Newman has been affirmed by this Court in cases such as United States v. Grimes, 173 F.3d 634, 640 (7th Cir. 1999), United States v. Bach, 172 F.3d 520, 523 (7th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Szarwark, 168 F.3d 993, 998 (7th Cir. 1999). While Dawson has presented a bevy of reasons why retroactive application of the MVRA violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, we have expressly found those justifications unpersuasive in Grimes, Bach, Szarwark, and Newman. Thus, we find that Dawson has presented no compelling justification for us to revisit the holding of Newman and its progeny.