Opinion ID: 2257788
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Mill Act

Text: [¶ 9] The private right to operate a dam and flood the property of upstream waterfront landowners, to the extent that it still exists, arises from the Mill Act, 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 651-59, 701-28 (1989), which has its genesis in the early statutory law of the Province of Massachusetts Bay. At common law, a dam that flooded the lands of upstream landowners was a private nuisance that rendered its owner vulnerable to an action in tort for damages arising from the dam's erection, an equitable order for abatement, and successive actions for yearly damages. See Jones v. Skinner, 61 Me. 25, 26 (1872). In 1714, however, the Province of Massachusetts Bay, in recognition and support of the public good and benefit provided by mills, enacted a law providing riparian landowners with the free liberty to establish mills on their property and limiting their liability to injured upstream landowners to the assessment and payment of yearly damages. See Id. at 27 (quoting Acts of 1714, ch. 111, Ancient Laws 404-5). In 1796, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts replaced the provincial law with An Act for the support and regulation of mills[,] the first section of which stated: [T]hat where any person hath already erected, or shall erect any water Mill on his own land, or on the land of any other person by his consent legally obtained, and to the working of such mill, it shall be found necessary to raise a suitable head of water, and in so doing any lands shall be flowed not belonging to the owner of such mill, it shall be lawful for the owner or occupant of such mill to continue the same head of water to his best advantage in the manner and on the terms herein after mentioned. Mass.Gen.Laws ch. 76, § 1 (1796). The remaining sections of that Act also limited the remedy available to the injured upstream landowner to the recovery of yearly damages. See Jones, 61 Me. at 27. [¶ 10] Upon achieving statehood, Maine in 1821 enacted its own Mill Act, virtually identical to the 1796 Massachusetts law both in the language of its first section and in its limitation of remedies to the recovery of yearly damages. See P.L.1821, ch. 45, §§ 116. With the exception of an 1881 amendment that expanded the available remedies to include, at the election of the mill owner, the one-time recovery of damages in gross, see P.L.1881, ch. 88, §§ 1-3, Maine's Mill Act has survived to this day in essentially the same substantive form. See 38 M.R.S.A. §§ 651-659, 701-728 (1989). Specifically, section 651 of the current Act provides that [a]ny man may on his own land erect and maintain a watermill and dams to raise water for working it, upon and across any stream not navigable;... upon the terms and conditions and subject to the regulations hereinafter expressed. Id. § 651. Section 655 provides a cause of action for damages for [a]ny person whose lands are damaged by being flowed by a milldam[.] Id. § 655. And, finally, sections 711, 706, and 721, respectively, provide for the primary remedy of yearly damages, the alternative remedy of damages in gross, and a ban upon all other remedies otherwise available at common law. See id. §§ 711, 706, 721. [¶ 11] The Mill Act is not only in derogation of common law riparian rights, [8] it also constitutes a state-sanctioned form of private eminent domain, whereby upstream landowners' rights relative to their waterfront property are taken, with compensation in the form of limited damages, for the public good and benefit provided by the otherwise private mill. As early as 1855, however, this Court questioned the necessity and constitutionality of the Act's privatized eminent domain, but nonetheless accepted the Mill Act as constitutionally valid because of its great antiquity, and the long acquiescence of our citizens in its provisions. Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317, 323-24 (Me.1855). This act ... arose out of the necessities of the people in the early days, when small water mills of various kinds were essential to the very existence of the settlers, but is now regarded somewhat as a legal anomaly, because at the present day, and under modern industrial conditions, its effect is the acquisition of property rights from one individual or corporation against their will for the benefit of another individual or corporation, by the mere payment of damages. Were it a new proposition, its constitutionality might well be doubted. But it has been so long acquiesced in as the policy of the State, and so constantly upheld by judicial decisions, that its validity is no longer debatable. Opinions of the Justices, 118 Me. 503, 516-17, 106 A. 865, 873 (1919) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Due to unique nature of the Mill Act, we construe its provisions strictly, declining to extend [those] peculiar provisions by implication. Jordan, 40 Me. at 324. [9] [¶ 12] Because the intent of the Mill Act was to permit industrial use and control of the water flow, [10] the flowage rights arising from the Act are directly tied to the ownership of the mill land, and are in the nature of an easement appurtenant, benefiting the mill site as dominant tenement and burdening the upstream landowners, collectively, as servient tenement. [T]he riparian proprietor ... can build dams upon his own land to develop power for milling and manufacturing purposes, subject to the provisions of the Mill Act and to the payment of damages for all flowage caused thereby; but the flowage rights thus acquired become property rights in the nature of an easement appurtenant to the manufacturing plant. Id. at 507, 106 A. at 869 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). [A]n easement that is appurtenant is incapable of existence separate and apart from the particular messuage or land to which it is annexed, there being nothing for it to rest upon. Ring v. Walker, 87 Me. 550, 558, 33 A. 174, 176 (1895); see also Gilder v. Mitchell, 668 A.2d 879, 881 (Me.1995) (An appurtenant easement is created to benefit the dominant tenement and runs with the land.). Consistent with this description of flowage rights and with the language of the Mill Act, only the owner of the land upon which the dam is erected and maintained may be held liable for the damage caused by the flooding of upstream lands. See Stevens v. King, 76 Me. 197, 200 (1884); Nelson v. Butterfield, 21 Me. 220, 232 (1842).