Opinion ID: 1547232
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interpretation of the Perjury Statute

Text: Three of Sivo's issues on appeal focus on the interpretation of Rhode Island's perjury statute, § 11-33-1. The defendant argues that the indictment is constitutionally inadequate and could not be cured by a bill of particulars. Count 658 of the indictment states that in March of 1996: John Sivo    did commit the crime of perjury by falsely, knowingly, maliciously, willfully and corruptly testifying under oath before the Providence Superior Court to a material fact, to wit the whereabouts of Louis Marchetti on the evening of August 4, 1995, in violation of § 11-33-1 and § 11-33-2   . Sivo argues that the crime of perjury has four elements: (1) that the accused testified under oath; (2) and knowingly made a false declaration; (3) about a material fact; and (4) knowing it was false when he or she uttered the statement. Sivo asserts that the indictment is insufficient since it fails to allege that, at the time he made the statement, he knew it to be false. The pertinent portion of the statute, § 11-33-1(a), provides: Every person under oath or affirmation who knowingly makes any false material declaration or makes or uses any other information, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing it to contain any false material declaration, shall be deemed guilty of perjury. (Emphases added.) Contrary to Sivo's contention, the state argues that the language knowing it to contain any false material declaration    applies only to nontestimonial evidence, including any book, paper, document, record, recording, or other material, knowing it to contain any false material declaration. Therefore, the state maintains, one who knowingly makes a false material declaration under oath as well as a person who makes use of a false document, knowing the document is false, is guilty of the crime of perjury. Thus, the crime of perjury can occur by one or both alternative means; but each requires actual knowledge that the testimony or documentary evidence is false. When reviewing a decision on a motion to dismiss an indictment, this Court accords great weight to a trial justice's    findings; we will not set them aside `unless they are clearly erroneous or fail to do justice between the parties.' State v. Reed, 764 A.2d 144, 146 (R.I.2001) (quoting State v. Aponte, 649 A.2d 219, 222 (R.I.1994)). According to Rule 7(c) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure, an indictment: shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement of the offense charged.    [The indictment] shall be sufficient if the offense is charged either (1) by using thename given to the offense by common law or by statute, or (2) by stating the definition of the offense   . In denying Sivo's motion to dismiss the indictment, the trial justice found that the indictment provided him with adequate notice of the offense. He also concluded that the state went beyond the requirements of the indictment by describing the perjurious testimony as having been given falsely, knowingly, maliciously, willfully and corruptly. Furthermore, the trial justice observed that Sivo had the opportunity to move for a bill of particulars, to obtain greater factual detail, but failed to do so. See State v. Mollicone, 654 A.2d 311, 319, 325 (R.I.1995); see also Rule 7(f). [3] We are satisfied that defendant's argument is without merit. The language of the statute is clear and unambiguous, and Sivo's interpretation is simply incorrect: when a defendant knowingly has made a false material declaration under oath, he or she has committed the crime of perjury. To hold otherwise would result in attributing a nonsensical and awkward meaning to the statute. Furthermore, the indictment was sufficiently definite on its face to afford Sivo notice and an opportunity to defend. Therefore, we hold, the trial justice did not err in denying the motion to dismiss.
At the conclusion of the state's case, Sivo moved for judgment of acquittal in accordance with Rule 29 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure and later renewed this motion incorporating the arguments he made earlier. Sivo argued to the trial justice and again to this Court that subsection (c) of the perjury statute, § 11-33-1, requires proof of two contradictory statements to establish guilt, but the state only proved that Sivo made one allegedly inaccurate statement. Section 11-33-1(c) provides in pertinent part: In any prosecution under this section, the falsity of a declaration set forth in the indictment or information shall be established sufficient for conviction by proof that the defendant on oath or affirmation made irreconcilably contradictory declarations material to the point in question. (Emphasis added.) The state argues that § 11-33-1(a) [4] stands on its own and sets forth in very strong and clear terms, that every person who knowingly makes any false material declaration under oath shall be deemed guilty of perjury, thereby refuting defendant's argument that two statements are necessary to establish guilt. The state further contends that subsection (a) of § 11-33-1 does not contain reference to or depend upon subsequent subsections to establish what constitutes perjury. Most persuasive, however, is the state's argument that if Sivo's interpretation were correct, the statute would enable one to repeatedly and knowingly testify falsely under oath with impunity as long as the declarations were not irreconcilably contradictory. We are satisfied that such an interpretation amounts to an absurd and manifestly unintended construction of the statute. On review of a judgment of acquittal, we apply the same standards as the trial justice and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state, without weighing the evidence or assessing the credibility of the witnesses, while drawing all reasonable inferences consistent with the guilt of the accused. State v. Forbes, 779 A.2d 637, 640-41 (R.I.2001). In addition, this Court consistently has held that statutes must be interpreted to avoid absurd or unjust results. New England Expedition-Providence, LLC v. City of Providence, 773 A.2d 259, 262 (R.I.2001) (citing LaPlante v. Honda North America, Inc., 697 A.2d 625, 628 (R.I.1997)). Here, the trial justice properly found that section (c) is not the only means of establishing the falsity of the statements in question. Rather, it addresses the quantum of proof required to prove perjury if the state had contended that defendant uttered two irreconcilably contradictory declarations that were material to the issue in question. The trial justice observed that the mere fact that the state had not proven a contradictory statement was not fatal to the prosecution. He concluded that one false statement given under oath is sufficient to constitute the crime of perjury if it was material and uttered with the knowledge that it was false. He also recognized that, if believed, Rossi's testimony could establish that Sivo intended to fabricate an alibi for Marchetti by creating a scenario that included Marchetti in Sivo's activities on the evening of August 4, 1995, and thus establish that Sivo did with knowledge, corruptly and willfully commit the crime of perjury. We agree, and hold that one false statement given under oath can be sufficient to constitute the crime of perjury. Therefore, we affirm the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal.
Sivo next contends that the court erred in denying his request to supplement the court's perjury instruction with language from § 11-33-1(c) after the jury requested that the court read back the legal definition of perjury during deliberations. After the jury had deliberated a number of hours, a communication from the foreperson was received by the trial justice that included a request for the court to [r]eview the legal definition of perjury. The trial justice called the jury into the courtroom and had the stenographer reread the court's instruction defining perjury: Perjury is defined as the giving of a false oath in a judicial proceeding in regard to a material matter. A false oath is a willful and corrupt, sworn statement made with knowledge that it is false. The testimony assigned as perjury must be false and must be given willfully and corruptly and with full knowledge that the testimony was false for the purpose of having that false testimony believed by another.    That is, he must have believed that what he swore to was false and he must have had the intent to deceive.    Untrue testimony may be given by mistake or defect of memory without guilt of perjury or any other crime. Although Sivo did not object when the court initially gave the instruction, following the read-back, the defense objected to the court's omission of the last sentence of § 11-33-1(c), namely: It shall be a defense to an indictment or information made pursuant to this subsection that the defendant, at the time he or she made each [irreconcilably contradictory] declaration, believed the declaration was true. In response to the objection, the prosecution argued that the case did not deal with irreconcilably contradictory declarations as the defense previously argued. The trial justice declined defendant's request to supplement the instruction. We deem this ruling to be correct. In reviewing a trial justice's charge to a jury, we have held that the instructions need only adequately cover [] the law. See State v. Hanes, 783 A.2d 920, 925 (R.I. 2001). We refrain from isolating single sentences in the instructions; instead, we examine the challenged portion in the context in which it was delivered to ascertain how a jury composed of ordinary, intelligent lay people would have understood the instructions. Id. We are satisfied that the trial justice's charge was more than adequate. The instruction as given presented no danger of prejudicing Sivo or of misleading the jury. The court clearly instructed that to return a verdict of guilty, the jury must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that Sivo had knowledge that his statement was false at the time he testified at the bail hearing.