Opinion ID: 1146557
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: GNIC's Interest In The Subject Matter Of The Pending Action

Text: One claiming intervention of right must also show that he has an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of the action. Rule 24(a)(2), Miss. R.Civ.P. GNIC claims that it has such an interest in that it has written a liability insurance policy covering Rail Water and that failure to disturb the default judgment against Hardin will move Guaranty a major step toward having to pay that judgment. This is said to be so in the context of Pittman's allegation that at the time of the accident in question Hardin was operating under Rail Water's ICC permit. The Circuit Court, however, found GNIC's interest inadequate and stated: This court is still uncertain as to what interest GNIC claims relating to the subject matter of this suit. It certainly does not admit coverage, in any shape, form or fashion. Additionally, this court is satisfied, notwithstanding the coverage issue, that since GNIC could not have been sued directly in this cause, it could not have been allowed in intervene in any pre-judgment proceedings; therefore, this court finds no compelling reason to now allow GNIC to intervene in any post-judgment proceedings. In the life of Rule 24 intervention both in the place of its birth, the federal court system, and subsequently in the courts of states which have adopted the rule, insurers from time to time have sought leave to intervene in litigation against their putative insureds. Several early federal cases appear to have allowed such intervention. Knapp v. Hankins, 106 F. Supp. 43 (E.D.Ill. 1952); United States v. C.M. Lane Lifeboat Co., 25 F. Supp. 410, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1938), aff'd. 118 F.2d 793 (2d Cir.1941). More recently, however, some courts have labeled such insurer interests contingent and have held those interests insufficient to meet the interest requirement of Rule 24(a)(2). [4] See, e.g., Restor-A-Dent Dental Laboratories, Inc. v. Certified Alloy Products, Inc., 725 F.2d 871, 874-76 (2d Cir.1984); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Adams, 485 So.2d 720, 721-22 (Ala. 1986); Donna C v. Kalamaras, 485 A.2d 222, 223-24 (Me. 1984); 3B Moore's Federal Practice § 24.07[2], pp. 24-59 (2d ed. 1985); but see Su Duk Kim v. H.V. Corporation, 688 P.2d 1158, 1161 (Hawaii App. 1984); and Lawrence v. Burke, 6 Ariz. App. 228, 431 P.2d 302, 310 (1967). The question is one of first impression in this state, one we face without clear guidance from the federal judiciary or our sister states. Indeed, the Supreme Court's most recent signals  two decades ago  are quite conflicting. Contrast Cascade Natural Gas Corporation v. El Paso Natural Gas Company, 386 U.S. 129, 87 S.Ct. 932, 17 L.Ed.2d 814 (1967) with Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 91 S.Ct. 534, 27 L.Ed.2d 580 (1971). The wording of Rule 24, in our view, calls for an interpretation based in common sense and practicality. Legalistic formalism and mechanical jurisprudence simply do not fit the language or philosophy of the rule. All that is necessary is that GNIC establish an interest in the rights that are at issue in the litigation. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company v. Crider, 58 F.R.D. 15, 18 (N.D.Ill. 1973). GNIC has written a liability insurance policy by virtue of which it may be called upon to pay Pittman's damages. Back on June 26, 1986  as today  whether the Pittman judgment against Hardin stood made quite a difference to GNIC. This gave GNIC an interest in the transaction which is the subject matter of the pending action adequate to the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2).