Opinion ID: 161717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Jury Instruction Concerning Evidence of Alcohol Consumption

Text: Jury Instruction No. 6 stated as follows: 41 I have previously allowed you to hear evidence relating to alcohol use. However, it is now clear that alcohol consumption is irrelevant and plays no part in the issue for you to resolve. The issue that you must resolve is whether the lawn tractor was unreasonably dangerous when it left the manufacturer's control. Alcohol use is completely irrelevant to this determination. Therefore, you are instructed to eliminate from any phase of your deliberations any reference to alcohol. 42 Defendants makes two arguments concerning Instruction No. 6. Defendants first claim that, even assuming it was proper to grant Plaintiff a directed verdict on causation, 6 Instruction No. 6 was error because it instructed the jury that the only issue it needed to resolve was whether the lawn tractor was unreasonably dangerous when it left the manufacturer's control. Thus, Defendants reason, the jury did not have to find that a defect existed in Defendants' mower at the time it left the manufacturer, retailer, or supplier's control. See Alexander, 90 F. Supp. 2d. at 1232. 43 This court reviews Jury Instruction No. 6 under the following standard of review: 44 To determine whether the jury was adequately instructed on the applicable law, we review the instructions in their entirety de novo to determine whether the jury was misled in any way. The instructions as a whole need not be flawless, but we must be satisfied that, upon hearing the instructions, the jury understood the issues to be resolved and its duty to resolve them. 45 Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 552 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). Reviewing the instructions in their entirety, this court cannot say the jury was misled. Jury Instruction No. 7 properly stated that Plaintiff had the burden of proving the lawn tractor was defective at the time it was manufactured or sold by the defendants or left [the] defendant's control. In addition, the Oklahoma Court of Appeals has noted products liability cases from other jurisdictions in which a product was deemed defective because it was unreasonably dangerous and in which the terms defective condition and unreasonably dangerous were considered essentially synonymous. Spencer v. Nelson Sales Co., 620 P.2d 477, 481-82 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980). Thus, under the circumstances of this case, it was not reversible error for the district court to instruct the jury that [t]he issue that you must resolve is whether the lawn tractor was unreasonably dangerous when it left the manufacturer's control. 46 Defendants also claim that Instruction No. 6 was erroneous because it told the jury to disregard evidence of alcohol consumption. 47 At trial, Defendants presented testimony that Black had a blood alcohol content of 0.07 percent weight per volume in the femoral blood. 48 Because of the evidence of Black's blood alcohol content, Defendants requested that the trial judge give a misuse instruction. In Oklahoma, misuse of a product is an affirmative defense to a products liability claim and occurs when the plaintiff uses the product in a manner which the manufacturer did not intend or reasonably anticipate. See Treadway v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 766 P.2d 938, 941 (Okla. 1988). The district court refused to give a misuse instruction, however, concluding that Black's alcohol consumption was evidence of contributory negligence and not misuse. In Oklahoma, use of a product for a proper purpose but in a careless manner is merely contributory negligence, which is not a defense to a products liability suit. See id. 49 Defense counsel objected to the district court's decision, stating: 50 It's my position, and the defense's position, that the issue of alcohol and his impairment is material and relevant to the issue of causation and the jury should be instructed on that issue. But it is admissible but limited to the purpose of causation. And it could certainly be the sole cause of the accident, the direct cause of the accident, it and the way he was operating the mower at the time of the accident, close to the edge. 51 The district court rejected defense counsel's argument. At the close of Plaintiff's case, Defendants abandoned their request for the misuse instruction and thus have not appealed the district court's refusal to give the instruction. Rather, Defendants have argued that Instruction No. 6 was improper because evidence of Black's alcohol consumption at the time of the accident was relevant to (1) impeach Plaintiff's witnesses who testified that Black was a safe individual, to (2) demonstrate that Black would not have been wearing a seatbelt, and to (3) demonstrate that Black's inattention and conduct of driving . . . the mower off the steep embankment was the sole cause of his injuries and death, as opposed to a defect in the mower. 52 Plaintiff contends that Defendants did not raise the first two arguments before the trial court. Aside from the objection quoted above, Defendants' only other objection to Instruction No. 6 was as follows: I object to [Instruction No. 6] being given for the reasons that it's our position that the evidence of alcohol goes to the issue of causation and there is evidence that it's not reasonably foreseeable that someone would use this mower while impaired through alcohol. 53 Defendants attempt to avoid a waiver of their first two arguments by stating that these arguments are ultimately causation issues. Defendants reason that impeaching Plaintiff's witnesses on Black's safety habits is relevant to the causation issue of whether Black would have purchased a ROPS. Similarly, Defendants maintain that whether Black would have been wearing a seatbelt with his ROPS is relevant to the causation issue of whether a ROPS would have protected Black. 54 Defendants' cursory trial objection to Instruction No. 6 on causation grounds cannot be read to preserve their first two theories on why Instruction No. 6 was erroneous. There is simply no way the trial judge could have understood Defendants to be advancing these two theories as to why alcohol evidence was relevant. To the contrary, Defendants' first two theories appear to be an appellate attempt to craft a theory for the admissibility of the alcohol evidence. It was Defendants' responsibility to clarify to the district court, however, the exact theory of admissibility on which they thought the alcohol evidence was relevant. See United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d 1384, 1394 (10th Cir. 1991); Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Tels., Inc., 931 F.2d 655, 660 (10th Cir. 1991). Trial judges should not be required to seek after the purpose of the evidence or to imagine some admissible purpose for it without regard to the actual state of mind, motives, and purposes of the proponent. Willie, 941 F.2d at 1394. Because Defendants did not articulate to the district court the first two arguments made on appeal, we review these arguments only for plain error. See id. Even assuming that Defendants' first two arguments render the alcohol evidence relevant, the district court's failure to sua sponte contrive these theories on behalf of Defendants does not constitute plain error. 55 Defendants also argue that evidence of alcohol consumption was relevant to show that Black's inattention and conduct of driving . . . the mower off the steep embankment was the sole cause of his injuries and death, as opposed to a defect in the mower. Defendants preserved this argument by making it to the district court, and this court thus reviews the district court's rejection of the argument for an abuse of discretion. See Allen v. Minnstar, Inc., 97 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating that evidentiary decisions and decisions concerning whether to give a particular jury instruction are reviewed for an abuse of discretion). 56 Defendants' argument is misdirected because it presumes that evidence of Black's consumption of alcohol is relevant to show that Black's negligence was the sole legal cause of his injuries. While evidence of Black's alcohol consumption might be probative of whether Black's negligence was a cause of his injuries, that issue is not material. As previously noted, contributory negligence is not a defense to a products liability suit in Oklahoma. See Treadway, 766 P.2d at 941. Thus, it is simply irrelevant whether Black's injuries would not have occurred but for his own negligence. It is only relevant that Defendants' defective product was a cause of Black's injuries. 57 Defendants correctly note that the Oklahoma Supreme Court has held that alcohol consumption can be a defense in a products liability case if the defendant can show that the plaintiff's intoxication caused the injury. See Kirkland v. GMC, 521 P.2d 1353, 1366 (Okla. 1974); Fields v. Volkswagen of Am., 555 P.2d 48, 57 (Okla. 1976). The manner in which the Oklahoma Supreme Court contemplated the use of alcohol evidence in Kirkland and Fields, however, is far different from the manner in which Defendants in this case sought to use the evidence. 58 In both Kirkland and Fields, plaintiffs brought products liability suits claiming that a defect in their automobiles had caused them to be in accidents and thereby sustain injuries. See Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1356-57; Fields, 555 P.2d at 52. In both cases, the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated that the plaintiff could not recover if the plaintiff's intoxication, rather than a defect in the car, caused the accident and the resultant injuries. See Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1366; Fields, 555 P.2d at 57. 59 In Kirkland and Fields, the intoxication of the plaintiff was entirely an alternative theory as to how the accident, and thus the resultant injuries, occurred. The plaintiff in Kirkland claimed that her accident and injuries occurred because her seat had collapsed while she was driving. See Kirkland, 521 P.2d at 1356. The defendant denied having a defective product, however, and instead asserted that the accident and injuries had been caused by the plaintiff's drunken driving. See id. at 1356-57. The Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that the defendant could present evidence of the plaintiff's intoxication to show that the accident and injuries had been caused solely by the plaintiff's drunk driving, not a defect in the seat. See id. at 1366. Thus, evidence of plaintiff's intoxication was relevant to show that the seat had not collapsed before the accident. Although the Oklahoma Supreme Court spoke in terms of causation, the gist of its ruling was that evidence of the plaintiffs' intoxication was probative of whether there was any defect at all. 60 In this case, Plaintiff does not claim that a defect in Defendants' mower caused the accident; rather, Plaintiff claims Defendants' mower was defective because it was not crashworthy in the event of an accident, and that this defect caused Black's death. Thus, it is irrelevant that Black's consumption of alcohol might have caused the accident because that evidence does not rebut Plaintiff's evidence that Defendants' defective product caused Black's injuries. Defendants might be correct to argue in a vacuum that but for Black's alcohol consumption, the accident and thus the injuries to Black would not have occurred. The evidence of alcohol consumption, however, does not address the pertinent issue of whether a defect in Defendants' product was a cause of the injuries. 61 In a products liability case in which contributory negligence is not a defense and misuse is not an issue, the only relevant causation issue is whether a defect in the defendant's product was a cause of the injury. In both Kirkland and Fields the evidence of the plaintiffs' intoxication rebutted the plaintiffs' theories that a defect in the defendants' product had caused the injuries; the evidence of Black's consumption of alcohol, on the other hand, does not address Plaintiff's theory that Black's injuries would not have occurred if a ROPS had been present on Defendants' product. Because evidence of Black's use of alcohol would not rebut the material question of whether a defect in Defendants' product was a cause of Black's injuries, but would merely establish that Black's carelessness was also a cause of the injuries, the evidence was relevant only if contributory negligence was a defense. It was thus properly excluded by the district court's Instruction No. 6. 62 D. Exclusion of Testimony from Defendants' Expert that a ROPS Would Not Have Protected Black 63 Defendants challenge the district court ruling which excluded their expert, Bobby Clary, from testifying that a ROPS would not have protected Black from death or serious injury. Dr. Clary has a degree in agricultural engineering and a Ph.D. in engineering. In his expert report prepared pursuant to Rule 26(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Dr. Clary gave the following opinion: 64 While the results of the same accident with a similar mower equipped with a ROPS frame may have resulted in a somewhat different accident, there is no reason to believe that the ultimate outcome of the accident would have been different. Considering the elevated blood alcohol level, the nature of the accident cite, and the interference of the mower with the steel culvert underneath the roadway the greatest likelihood is that Mr. Black would have been thrown from the operator's station into the path of the on-coming mower. The considerable time that elapsed between the accident and when efforts were made to find Mr. Black also weigh against ROPS changing the outcome of the accident. . . . It is only speculation that Mr. Black would not have been killed if a ROPS had been present on the mower. 65 In granting Plaintiff's motion in limine to prevent Dr. Clary from testifying as to whether a ROPS would have prevented Black's injuries, the district court reasoned: 66 I agree that there is not sufficient foundational bases for these opinions, and I glean that from Clary's written report and from the deposition wherein he says what he hasn't done in support of these conclusions. He was not aware that it was a four-post rather than a two-post ROPS. He had made no tests or calculations to support his conclusions regarding what amount of energy it would absorb or could withstand and what would have happened. He simply renders an opinion without any basis whatsoever. 67 In support of this opinion, he also concludes that the time that elapsed between the accident and when Mr. Black was found bear on the causation and results and there is no qualification apparent from his credentials that would permit him to make that conclusion. There's also no explanation of how that affects this conclusion. 68 In reviewing the district court's exclusion of Dr. Clary's opinion, this court follows the general framework established by the Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). Once this court concludes that the district court correctly applied the Daubert analysis, we review the exclusion of Dr. Clary's testimony for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Call, 129 F.3d 1402, 1405 (10th Cir. 1997). 69 In Daubert, the Supreme Court described a trial judge's gatekeeping role in determining whether expert scientific testimony meets the requirements for admissibility under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-95. The Court stated that a trial judge must focus on the reasoning and methodology of the expert in arriving at the conclusion. See id. Thus, an expert's scientific opinion must rest on a reliable foundation. Id. at 597, 113 S. Ct. 2786. While Dr. Clary's proposed testimony might more properly be characterized as technical [] or other specialized knowledge as opposed to scientific . . . knowledge, the Daubert analysis still controls. See Berry v. City of Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342, 1350 (6th Cir. 1994) (Although, as indicated, Daubert dealt with scientific experts, its language relative to the 'gatekeeper' function of federal judges is applicable to all expert testimony offered under Rule 702.). 70 The district court concluded that because Dr. Clary had not conducted any tests regarding his conclusion that a ROPS would not have prevented the harm to Black, and because Dr. Clary was not even aware that Plaintiff's claim was focused on the lack of a four-post, as opposed to a two-post, ROPS, the opinion was without any basis whatsoever. Because the district court properly applied the Daubert analysis and focused on the foundation of Dr. Clary's opinion, this court reviews the district court's conclusion deferentially for an abuse of discretion. See Call, 129 F.3d at 1405. 71 This court cannot say the district court abused its discretion in refusing to admit the testimony of Dr. Clary that a ROPS would not have prevented the injuries to Black. The district court properly noted that Dr. Clary had not conducted any tests or calculations to support his opinion. Defendants' note that Dr. Clary had the requisite background to be able to testify that a ROPS would not have prevented the fatal injuries to Black. The district court did not, however, exclude the testimony because of Dr. Clary's lack of qualifications. Instead, it excluded the evidence because Dr. Clary had not based his conclusion on the results of tests or calculations specific to Black's accident. The decision to exclude Dr. Clary's testimony that a ROPS would not have saved Black's life was thus not an abuse of discretion. 72 E. Judgment as a Matter of Law for Plaintiff on Whether a ROPS Would Have Protected Black 73 The district court granted Plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of whether a ROPS would have protected Black. Defendants challenge that ruling under Rule 50 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 74 Plaintiff asserted two theories in support of her claim that the mower was defective and unreasonably dangerous: the lack of a ROPS and the lack of adequate warnings about the need for a ROPS. In order to prevail on either of these theories, Plaintiff had to establish that a ROPS would have prevented the death of her husband. See Alexander, 90 F. Supp. 2d. at 1232. 75 In order to support a finding of causation, Plaintiff presented the expert testimony of Dr. Jeffrey Ketchman, an engineering consultant. Ketchman testified that a ROPS would have prevented the death of Black. Ketchman's opinion that a ROPS would have protected Black was apparently based on two publications of the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health reporting that less than one percent of tractor rollovers with a ROPS have resulted in fatalities. 76 In addressing Plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law, the district court stated: 77 Well, I don't think there is any evidence that the ROPS would not have protected the plaintiff. That is specifically the evidence I excluded in ruling on the motion in limine regarding your expert [Dr. Clary] who was prepared to testify that the ROPS would have not protected in a fall of that kind. He didn't, wasn't permitted to, and, as a result, there is no evidence to contradict [Plaintiff's] evidence that ROPS would have saved his life, I think. Now, is there--can anybody offer me any evidence that would contradict that conclusion? 78 Defense counsel responded: No. Based upon your ruling, that's true, when you excluded the evidence; that's right. The court then granted Plaintiff's motion, concluding that the only issue for the jury to decide was whether the lawn tractor was unreasonably dangerous when it left the manufacturer's control. The court acknowledged its ruling was exceptional: I think it's difficult for all of us to think of causation as established . . . . 79 This court reviews a district court's decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standard applied by the district court. See Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 542, 547 (10th Cir. 1996). A motion for a judgment as a matter of law is cautiously and sparingly granted and then only when the court is certain the evidence conclusively favors one party such that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Id. (quotation omitted). When the party with the burden of proof has moved for judgment as a matter of law, the motion may be granted only where [the movant] has established his case by evidence that the jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve. Hurd v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 734 F.2d 495, 499 (10th Cir. 1984). 80 The trial court erred in directing a verdict for Plaintiff on causation. The only evidence that a ROPS would have saved Black, the testimony of Ketchman, was not of a character that prohibited the jury from discrediting it. See Hurd, 734 F.2d at 499. Ketchman's testimony was based only on statistics and not dictated by undisputed facts surrounding Black's accident. 81 The district court applied the wrong standard by asking whether Defendants had presented any evidence on the causation issue. Instead, the district court should have asked whether Plaintiff had established [her] case by evidence that the jury would not be at liberty to disbelieve. Hurd, 734 F.2d at 499. Because the jury could reasonably have rejected Plaintiff's only evidence that a ROPS would have prevented the injuries to Black, it was error for the district court to grant Plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law. 82 F. Judgment as a Matter of Law on Punitive Damages 83 The district court granted Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages and refused to give a jury instruction on punitive damages, concluding that the evidence offered by Plaintiff did not permit an award of punitive damages under Oklahoma law. As explained above, this court reviews a district court's decision on a motion for judgment as a matter of law de novo, applying the same standard applied by the district court. See Weese, 98 F.3d at 547. In order to affirm the grant of judgment as a matter of law, this court must be certain that the evidence conclusively favors one party such that reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict. Id. (quotation omitted). This court must construe the evidence and inferences most favorably to the non-moving party, the Plaintiff. See Davis v. United States Postal Serv., 142 F.3d 1334, 1339 (10th Cir. 1998). 84 Punitive damage awards in Oklahoma are governed by Section 9.1 of Title 23 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Section 9.1 delineates three circumstances under which punitive damages may be awarded in a products liability case: (1) when the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant was guilty of reckless disregard for the rights of others; (2) when the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted intentionally and with malice towards others; or (3) when the jury finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant acted intentionally and with malice towards others, and the court finds that there is evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant acted intentionally and with malice and engaged in conduct life-threatening to humans. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, 9.1. The amount of punitive damages that may be awarded depends on the defendant's mental culpability. See id. 85 Plaintiff does not contend that Defendants acted intentionally and with malice, but insists that a punitive damages instruction was proper because Defendants acted with reckless disregard for the rights of others. Id. Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction No. 5.6 states that 86 [t]he conduct of [Defendant] was in reckless disregard of another's rights if [Defendant] was either aware, or did not care, that there was a substantial and unnecessary risk that [his/her/its] conduct would cause serious injury to others. In order for the conduct to be in reckless disregard of another's rights, it must have been unreasonable under the circumstances, and also there must have been a high probability that the conduct would cause serious harm to another person. 87 Okla. Unif. Civil Jury Instruc. 5.6, available at http://www.oscn.net/ applications/oscn. There is evidence in the record, discussed supra section III(A), that Defendants' decision not to provide a ROPS or warn about its need was unreasonable under the circumstances . . . [with] a high probability that the conduct would cause serious harm to another person. Okla. Unif. Jury Instruc. No. 5.6. This evidence was also relevant to whether the mower was unreasonable under the circumstances . . . [with] a high probability that the conduct would cause serious harm to another person. Id. 88 There is also record evidence that Defendants were aware, or did not care, that there was a substantial and unnecessary risk that [its] conduct would cause serious injury to others. Id. In October of 1990, almost a year before Black bought the mower, Sevart wrote a letter to Defendants which stated as follows: Enclosed please find a copy of an advertisement which I recently ran across. Please be advised that you need a ROPS on your mower. I have enclosed several papers which we have written on the subject of ROPS for small tractor mowers. 7 In addition, the trial court allowed Sevart to testify as to two studies concerning other rollover accidents for the purpose of showing notice to Defendants of the need for a ROPS. 8 Finally, the jury could have construed the testimony of Defendants' former president to indicate that Defendants were aware of a rollover problem on the mower model in question. 89 Plaintiff had an elevated burden: proof by clear and convincing evidence that Defendants were guilty of reckless conduct. See Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 23, 9.1. Nevertheless, a reasonable juror could have resolved that Plaintiff met this burden with the evidence presented. 9 See Weese, 98 F.3d at 547. It was thus error for the district court to grant Defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law on the issue of punitive damages.