Opinion ID: 1194858
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unitary Conduct

Text: 58 Cooper argues that the conduct that gave rise to his convictions for felony murder and aggravated battery was unitary because Marquez died during the struggle in which the battery occurred. The State counters that the battery was a distinct event from the struggle that resulted in Marquez's death. Cooper's arguments raise the question of whether battery is always a lesser included offense of second degree murder when the conduct that constitutes the battery is indistinguishable from the conduct that causes death. Cf. State v. Campos, 1996 NMSC 043, ¶ 23, 122 N.M. 148, 156, 921 P.2d 1266, 1274 ([I]t is impossible to commit second degree murder without committing some form of both aggravated assault and aggravated battery.). However, we will not address that issue because the facts of this case do not support Cooper's claim that the acts of battery and second degree murder were unitary. 59 Unitary conduct is often defined by what it is not. Thus, conduct is not unitary if the defendant commits two discrete acts violative of the same statutory offense, but separated by sufficient indicia of distinctness. Swafford, 112 N.M. at 13, 810 P.2d at 1233. The indicia of distinctness include the separation between the illegal acts by either time or physical distance, the quality and nature of the individual acts, and the objectives and results of each act. Id. at 13-14, 810 P.2d at 1233-34. Distinctness may also be established by the existence of an intervening event, the defendant's intent as evinced by his or her conduct and utterances, the number of victims, and the behavior of the defendant between acts. Herron v. State, 111 N.M. 357, 361-62, 805 P.2d 624, 628-29 (1991). The resolution of this question turns upon which version of the events Cooper's or the State'sis best supported by the evidence. 60 The record shows that Cooper applied force to Marquez with several deadly weapons: a metal pipe, a barbell, and a knife. See § 30-3-5(C) (application of force with a deadly weapon); UJI 14-322 (aggravated battery with a deadly weapon). Notwithstanding Cooper's statements that he only intended to knock out Marquez, forceful application with any of these weapons was capable of causing great bodily harm or death. Section 30-3-5(C). Thus, both of the alternative counts of aggravated battery are supported by the evidence. 61 However, the evidence shows that death was not the consequence of the initial act of battery. The first attack with one of the weapons was followed by a struggle. There is no suggestion in the record that Marquez was rendered even temporarily incapacitated by the first blow. As Cooper stated, Well, he was just supposed to knock out. He wasn't supposed to fight back. In other words, there is no evidence that, after the first act of battery, all the subsequent injuries with the pipe, the barbell, and the knife were inflicted upon a person who had died as a result of the initial application of force. The struggle was an intervening event between the initial battery and the acts that caused the death of Marquez. See Herron, 111 N.M. at 361-62, 805 P.2d at 628-29. This conclusion is supported by the fact that Marquez was injured by three different weapons. If the act of battery and the act of murder were simultaneous and indistinguishable, it is improbable that Cooper would have been driven to use several different weapons. 62 We thus find that Cooper's initial act of battery was distinguishable and separated by an intervening event from the acts that resulted in Marquez's death. The conduct that gave rise to Cooper's convictions for aggravated battery and felony murder cannot be characterized as unitary. We therefore affirm one of his convictions for aggravated battery.