Opinion ID: 736976
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Expenses Were Necessary Expenses

Text: 29 Defendant further claims that plaintiff failed to establish entitlement to expenses in the amount awarded. Section 307.50 provides for payment of all necessary expenses of pursuing and returning the person so charged, or so much of such expenses as seems just. In this case, plaintiff submitted, supported by affidavit, the expenses it incurred in providing medical treatment and other related services to Hild. Defendant first argues, without supporting authority, that as a matter of law the phrase necessary expenses is limited only to travel costs associated with transporting a felon back from the foreign state. In construing a statute, absent a definition otherwise, we apply the plain meaning of the language. E.g., White v. Clinton County Bd. of Comm'rs, 76 Ohio St.3d 416, 667 N.E.2d 1223, 1228 (1996). While travel costs would certainly be reasonably construed to be included among necessary expenses, there is nothing limiting that term to travel expenses. In addition, the language's reference to expenses of pursuing a fugitive suggests that more than transportation costs would be included. We also note that similar language under the Federal Extradition Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3181, et seq., referring to costs or expenses incurred in any extradition proceeding in apprehending, securing, and transmitting a fugitive shall be paid by the demanding authority, id. § 3195, has been interpreted to include medical expenses incurred while holding a fugitive for extradition. See County of Monroe v. State of Florida, 678 F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir.1982) (characterizing medical expenses and guard services incurred during extended hospitalization of fugitive as expenses of apprehending, securing and delivering up the fugitive). 2 30 The use of the terms necessary and so much ... as seems just as appear in § 307.50 do impose an element of reasonableness as to the expenses incurred. In that regard, defendant claims that a reasonable jury could have arrived at a different award amount.... As the Supreme Court explained in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986), the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. at 2510 (emphasis in original). A fact is material when it is capable of affecting the outcome of the suit under governing law; a dispute about a material fact is genuine ... if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. The Court concluded that this standard was equivalent to that governing a directed verdict under FED.R.CIV.P. 50(a). Id. at 250, 106 S.Ct. at 2511. As a result, [i]f the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Id. (citations omitted). Under this standard, the question for the court is whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. 31 In light of the fact defendant offered no challenge to the reasonableness of plaintiff's expenses at the summary judgment proceeding, we conclude the district court correctly resolved the issue of reasonableness. 32