Opinion ID: 2156396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ms. Thompson's and Officer Armstead's Testimony

Text: Relying on Battle v. United States, 630 A.2d 211 (D.C.1993), Jenkins argues that, under the report of rape exception to the rule barring hearsay evidence, testimony by someone who repeats verbatim a child's complaint of sexual abuse is inadmissible unless the child herself also testifies and the verbatim hearsay is admitted to corroborate the child's testimony. According to Jenkins, if the child does not testify, any hearsay testimony by another witness who heard the child complain of sexual abuse must be limited to a bare statement of the fact that a complaint was made (quoting 2 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 272.1, at 223 (William Strong, 4th ed. 1992)). Therefore, Jenkins argues, defense counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by acceding to the trial court's view that I.J. was not required to testify as a condition for admitting a verbatim hearsay report of her complaint. That, however, is not what happened. Ms. Thompson testified that [I.J.] said Ronnie [Jenkins] had her in her mother's bedroom and he was sticking his fingers in her vagina. He had a pillow over her hips. Trial counsel, citing Battle, objected on the ground that I.J. had not testified, but the objection was overruled. Later, Officer Armstead testified, without objection, that I.J. told her that Jenkins had put his hand in her private parts. In each instance, the trial court gave a limiting instruction, informing the jury that the statement had been admitted not for its truth but for the limited purpose of demonstrating that I.J. had promptly reported the sexual assault. In his opening brief, Jenkins faults trial counsel, who initially objected to Ms. Thompson's testimony, for inexplicably conceding, before the judge ruled, that Battle did not require the complainant to testify as a precondition of admitting Ms. Thompson's detailed, report-of-rape hearsay testimony in evidence. In his reply brief, however, Jenkins acknowledges his mistake in arguing that trial counsel had made this concession. After reviewing the government's brief and the trial transcript, Jenkins realized that counsel had maintained his objection while merely conceding, in answer to a question by the trial judge, that Battle did not provide a clear holding on the issue. Therefore, even if the trial judge erred in admitting Thompson's and Armstead's detailed testimony under the report of rape exception when I.J. did not testify  an issue we need not decide [2]  Jenkins has acknowledged that trial counsel maintained his objection to the hearsay. As a result, Jenkins'ineffectiveness argument as to Ms. Thompson's and Officer Armstead's testimony has evaporated.