Opinion ID: 2369367
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Asserted failure to determine racial bias of jurors

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred by failing to determine whether any of the prospective jurors might be biased against him due to his race. As noted, defendant is African-American, his victims were not, and at the time of his trial, Riverside County was populated primarily by Caucasians. The juror questionnaire did not expressly ask the jurors about any potential racial biases they might have, although one question did ask if there was anything about defendant's appearance that might cause a prospective juror to be biased. No prospective juror answered in the affirmative. During voir dire, defense counsel did ask the first group of prospective jurors whether any of them would be affected by the differences in race between defendant and the victims, and, again, no prospective juror responded in the affirmative. As we have held repeatedly and as defendant implicitly acknowledges, he cannot complain on appeal about the trial court's failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless he has requested specifically such an inquiry. ( People v. Rogers (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1136, 1152-1153 [95 Cal.Rptr.3d 652, 209 P.3d 977].) Defendant participated in drafting the juror questionnaire, questioned potential jurors but asked only one question during voir dire about differences between his race and the race of the victims, and does not justify his failure to request or conduct a more thorough inquiry. As such, defendant's reliance on People v. Taylor (1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1299 [7 Cal.Rptr.2d 676] is unavailing because in that case, unlike here, the trial court controlled the voir dire and did not permit the attorneys to ask questions directly. Consequently, this claim is forfeited. Citing People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619 [63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213] ( Holt ), defendant nonetheless contends the trial court was required to propound specific questions designed to reveal racial prejudice. Not so. In Holt, we ruled a trial court could not prevent counsel from asking such questions (see id. at pp. 660-661), but Holt in no way obligates a trial court to undertake such an inquiry. Similarly, in Ristaino v. Ross (1976) 424 U.S. 589, 597, footnote 9 [47 L.Ed.2d 258, 96 S.Ct. 1017], another case on which defendant relies, the high court ruled that voir dire questioning directed to racial prejudice was not constitutionally required .... When race is inextricably bound up with the issues to be tried, however, a trial court might be required to make such an inquiry on its own initiative. ( Id. at p. 597.) But other than the bare fact of the difference between the races of defendant and the victims, nothing about the circumstances of this crime suggests race played any role. (See ibid.; cf. Ham v. South Carolina (1973) 409 U.S. 524 [35 L.Ed.2d 46, 93 S.Ct. 848] [inquiry into racial prejudice was relevant as the defendant was a civil rights activist who claimed he had been framed by law enforcement personnel].) Even were we to agree that the interracial nature of this crime required further voir dire, we would find no reversible error. Unless the voir dire by a court is so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair, the manner in which voir dire is conducted is not a basis for reversal. [Citation.] ( Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 661; see People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 620-623 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363].) Defendant had the opportunity to further examine potential jurors about possible racial bias, either directly or indirectly through the juror questionnaire, but defense counsel apparently found no need to do so; moreover, defense counsel did not exhaust his allotment of peremptory challenges. (See People v. Taylor (2010) 48 Cal.4th 574, 607-610 [108 Cal.Rptr.3d 87, 229 P.3d 12] ( Taylor ).) Consequently, defendant's trial was not fundamentally unfair.