Opinion ID: 2600070
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Heading: Constitutionality of death qualification process

Text: Defendant contends that California's procedure for selecting jurors in capital cases violates his rights under the federal and state Constitutions. As explained below, many of defendant's contentions are similar to those we have previously rejected, and we find no grounds for revisiting our prior holdings. As to those assertions we have not previously addressed, none casts doubt on the constitutionality of California's death qualification process. (3) Under the due process clause of both the federal and state Constitutions, a capital defendant is entitled to an impartial jury at the guilt and penalty phases of trial. ( People v. Martinez (2009) 47 Cal.4th 399, 425 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 732, 213 P.3d 77]; People v. Blair (2005) 36 Cal.4th 686, 741 [31 Cal.Rptr.3d 485, 115 P.3d 1145].) To achieve the constitutional imperative of impartiality, the law permits a prospective juror to be challenged for cause only if his or her views in favor of or against capital punishment `would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his [or her] duties as a juror' in accordance with the court's instructions and the juror's oath. [Citations.] ( Blair, supra, at p. 741.) Death qualification in a capital case is thus an inquiry into whether the prospective juror's views and attitudes would interfere with his or her ability to `faithfully and impartially apply the law in the case.' ( People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 498 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 526, 161 P.3d 58].) As defendant acknowledges, both this court and the United States Supreme Court have concluded that death qualification and the removal of prospective jurors who would automatically vote for death or for life do not violate the constitutional right to an impartial jury. (See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 956-957 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214]; Lockhart v. McCree (1986) 476 U.S. 162, 176-177 [90 L.Ed.2d 137, 106 S.Ct. 1758].) Defendant contends, however, that current empirical studies conclusively establish that death qualification results in a jury that is more prone to convict and to vote for death, thus undermining the reasoning of those prior decisions. We have previously considered the studies defendant cites and found them inadequate to warrant disturbing our precedent. ( People v. Lenart (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1107, 1120 [12 Cal.Rptr.3d 592, 88 P.3d 498]; People v. Jackson (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1164, 1198-1199 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254]; see also Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 173 [assuming for purposes of the opinion that empirical studies adequately establish death qualification produces more conviction-prone juries, but upholding the constitutionality of death qualification nonetheless].) We reach the same conclusion here. We also follow our prior decisions in rejecting defendant's contention that death qualification violates his right to a jury selected from a representative cross-section of the community. ( People v. Avena (1996) 13 Cal.4th 394, 412 [53 Cal.Rptr.2d 301, 916 P.2d 1000]; see also Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 173-177.) And we reject defendant's further assertion that death qualification violates his right to a representative jury because empirical studies show that the process results in a disproportionate number of ethnic minorities, women, and religious individuals being removed from capital juries. As the high court explained in rejecting a defendant's claim of an unrepresentative jury, unlike the impermissible removal of ethnic minorities or women from jury service,  `[d]eath qualification' . . . is carefully designed to serve the State's concededly legitimate interest in obtaining a single jury that can properly and impartially apply the law to the facts of the case at both the guilt and sentencing phases of a capital trial. There is very little danger . . . that `death qualification' was instituted as a means for the State to arbitrarily skew the composition of capital-case juries. ( Lockhart v. McCree, supra, at pp. 175-176, fn. omitted.) (4) None of defendant's remaining challenges to the death qualification process requires extended discussion. Contrary to defendant's assertion, the prosecution did not violate his constitutional rights by using peremptory challenges against death qualified prospective jurors who had expressed skepticism about the death penalty. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 557-559 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076]; People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 230 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643].) Nor does death qualification provide prosecutors an impermissible advantage by obtaining conviction-prone juries. ( See Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at pp. 175-176 [finding it unlikely that death qualification skews the composition of capital juries in the state's favor].) Defendant's Eighth Amendment challenge to death qualification is in essence a restatement of his claims under other constitutional provisions, which, as in People v. Johnson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1183, 1212-1213 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 702, 842 P.2d 1], we find lacking in merit. We likewise find flawed the premise underlying defendant's assertion that death qualification, by eliminating the segment of the community that opposes the death penalty, skews the data courts typically rely on to determine evolving standards of decency for Eighth Amendment purposes. Through the death qualification process, individuals may be excused not only for their unyielding opposition to capital punishment but also for their intractable support of it. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 482 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947]; People v. Blair, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 741.) We reject defendant's contention that death qualification is irrational because it disqualifies individuals based on their moral beliefs when the penalty phase determination is `inherently moral and normative.' ( People v. Prieto (2003) 30 Cal.4th 226, 263 [133 Cal.Rptr.2d 18, 66 P.3d 1123], quoting People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 779 [230 Cal.Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113].) Disqualified jurors are properly excused for cause, not on the basis of their personal, moral beliefs regarding the death penalty, but because of their inability to temporarily set aside their own beliefs in deference to the rule of law. ( Lockhart v. McCree, supra, 476 U.S. at p. 176; see People v. Stewart (2004) 33 Cal.4th 425, 446 [15 Cal.Rptr.3d 656, 93 P.3d 271] [a juror's personal opposition to the death penalty is not a permissible basis for excluding him from a capital case jury].)