Opinion ID: 1163403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 32

Heading: Adult Criminal Convictions.

Text: Brett argues admittance of his prior criminal convictions, while constitutionally valid, is not statutorily authorized because Washington's death penalty statute does not expressly refer to nonstatutory aggravators. See Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 77 L.Ed.2d 235, 103 S.Ct. 2733 (1983) (Georgia death penalty statute provides for statutory aggravators and aggravators otherwise authorized by law). See also Geralds v. State, 601 So.2d 1157 (Fla. 1992); Wike v. State, 596 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 1992) (similar Florida death penalty statute interpreted to exclude prior criminal convictions as nonstatutory aggravating circumstances). Brett contends this court improperly held prior criminal convictions were admissible as nonstatutory aggravators in the penalty phase. See Bartholomew I; Bartholomew II. Washington's death penalty statute, however, authorizes the jury to consider a defendant's prior criminal history in the penalty phase. RCW 10.95.070(1) provides: In deciding the question posed by RCW 10.95.060(4), the jury ... may consider any relevant factors, including but not limited to the following: (1) Whether the defendant has or does not have a significant history, either as a juvenile or an adult, of prior criminal activity[.] [43] We find no support for Brett's contention this provision may only be used as a shield to rebut an assertion that the defendant lacks a significant criminal history, not as a sword when the defendant makes no such assertion. The statute expressly states the jury may consider a defendant's criminal history in determining whether there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. See Bartholomew II, at 642-43; Lord, 117 Wn.2d at 896-97. We also are not persuaded admission of prior convictions must be subject to a balancing test under ER 403 and 404. We have previously indicated and now establish that admission of prior convictions does not necessitate a balancing test because such evidence is reasonably objective and reliable. Bartholomew I, at 196. We adhere to our decisions in Bartholomew I and Bartholomew II.