Opinion ID: 1690067
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: whether there existed a conflict of interest and ineffective assistance of counsel violating sharp's right to due process of law.

Text: ¶ 23. Sharp's final argument suffers from the same deficiencies as his instructions argument. This issue was not raised in Sharp's first brief, was contained in an improper pro se supplemental brief, and was not supported by any relevant authority. This entire argument is procedurally barred. Edwards, 737 So.2d at 295. However, to insure fairness, it will be discussed briefly. ¶ 24. Sharp first alleges that Kesler was representing him under a serious conflict of interest. The presence of actual conflict is difficult to ascertain, but the gist of Sharp's allegation is that Kesler had a role in prosecuting one of Sharp's former convictions. In fact, there is some evidence in the trial transcript that this charge is true. The situation is unusual and a bit curious, but Sharp failed to raise the issue until now and took no other action. Regardless, Sharp pled guilty to that offense, and there is no other evidence of bias or conflict. [P]rejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel `actively represented conflicting interests' and that `an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance.' Smith v. State, 666 So.2d 810, 812-13 (Miss.1995) (citing Cabello v. State, 524 So.2d 313, 316 (Miss.1988)). Also, possible conflict does not continue to bar the attorney from representing [Sharp] in a later and unrelated case. McCaleb v. State, 743 So.2d 409, 411 (Miss. Ct.App.1999). Since Sharp failed to show how Kesler's alleged conflict of interest affected his case, Sharp failed to prove that a conflict denied him due process. ¶ 25. Sharp also alleges ineffective assistance of counsel for a number of actions or inactions by Kesler, including no closing argument and lackluster cross-examination. To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the client must prove that his counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the defense of the case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Gary v. State, 760 So.2d 743, 756 (Miss.2000); McCaleb, 743 So.2d at 411. Sharp failed to demonstrate either; he merely listed where he felt Kesler was lacking and left the matter alone. Thus, there is no proof that Sharp was denied due process of law.