Opinion ID: 2576193
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Does Marital Status Involve Personal Characteristics

Text: As to the first prong of the Harris analysis, plaintiffs contend that marital status involves a personal characteristic like those categories already covered by the Unruh Act. BHCC, however, contends that marital status is nothing more than a legal status conferred by the state that does not involve personal characteristics. We agree with plaintiffs. We did not define the phrase personal characteristic in Harris, but we indicated that, at minimum, it encompassed both the categories enumerated in the Act and those categories added to the Act by judicial construction. ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1160-1161, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873.) Thus, the list would include sex, race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, disability, or medical condition (Civ.Code, § 51, subds. (b),(c)), and unconventional dress or appearance, family status and sexual orientation ( Harris, supra, at p. 1161, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873) but not financial status or capability. ( Ibid. ) What those categories have in common is not immutability, since some are, while others are not, but that they represent traits, conditions, decisions, or choices fundamental to a person's identity, beliefs and self-definition. (See id., at p. 1160, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873 [unlike economic status, enumerated categories involve personal characteristics like a person's geographical origin, physical attributes and personal beliefs].) Under this standard, marital status is more like the existing categories to which the Act applies than it is to economic status. The kinds of intimate relationships a person forms, and the decision whether to formalize such relationships implicate deeply held personal beliefs and core values. Indeed, marriage itself is defined as a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a woman . . . . (§ 300.) Similarly, the decision whether to enter into a domestic partnership is motivated by personal values and beliefs. This point was recognized by the Legislature in its characterization of these relationships in the Domestic Partner Act as lasting, committed, and caring, and undertaken by two individuals to share lives together, participate in their communities together, and [for] many [to] raise children and care for other dependent family members together. (Stats.2003, ch. 421, § 1, subd. (b).) Thus, contrary to BHCC's argument, the decision to marry or to enter into a domestic partnership is more than a change in the legal status of individuals who have entered into marriage or domestic partnership. In both cases, the consequences of the decision is the creation of a new family unit with all of its implications in terms of personal commitment as well as legal rights and obligations. BHCC also relies on the analysis of Harris set forth in Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exchange (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1455, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593 ( Beaty) . Beaty is the only appellate decision that has considered whether marital status discrimination is cognizable under the Unruh Act. On the first prong issue, Beaty found that marital status, like the economic status involved in Harris, is a category that the Unruh Act was simply not intended to reach. As noted, in Harris we determined that economic status was fundamentally different than the categories enumerated in the Act as a reason to exclude it from coverage under the Act ( Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1161-1162, 278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873). Similarly, in Beaty, the Court of Appeal concluded that the strong public policy favoring marriage categorically precluded recognition of marital status discrimination under the Act. Since Beaty is critical to the parties' arguments, we discuss it at some length. Beaty involved a male couple. The two men had lived together for 18 years and had taken various legal steps to create a common life, including jointly owning many of their assets, among them their residence, and naming one another as each other's primary beneficiary for estate and life insurance purposes. The defendant insurer had issued them joint homeowners and automobile insurance policies, but refused to issue them an umbrella policy for a single premium because such policies were available only to married couples. ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1458, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593.) The plaintiffs sued, alleging that the defendant's refusal to issue the umbrella policy constituted sexual orientation and marital status discrimination in violation of the Unruh Act. Their action was dismissed after the trial court sustained the defendant's demurrer without leave to amend. The Court of Appeal cited Harris for the proposition that future expansion of prohibited categories should be carefully weighed to ensure a result consistent with legislative intent. [Citations.] ( Beaty, supra, 6 Cal.App.4th at p. 1462, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, the court observed: In light of Harris, we decline plaintiffs' invitation . . . to include `marital status' as an additional category of prohibited discrimination. There is a strong policy in this state in favor of marriage [citations], and in the context here presented that policy would not be furthered (and in the case of an unmarried heterosexual couple, would actually be thwarted) by including marital status among the prohibited categories. It is for the Legislature, not the courts, to determine whether nonmarital relationships such as that involved in this case `deserve the statutory protection afforded the sanctity of the marriage union.' ( Id. at pp. 1462-1463, 8 Cal.Rptr.2d 593.) Unquestionably, there is a strong public policy favoring marriage. ( Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 1, 9, 192 Cal.Rptr. 134, 663 P.2d 904.) This policy serves specific interests not based on anachronistic notions of morality. The policy favoring marriage `is rooted in the necessity of providing an institutional basis for defining the fundamental relational rights and responsibilities of persons in organized society.' ( Laws v. Griep (Iowa 1983) 332 N.W.2d 339, 341.) Formally married couples are granted significant rights and bear important responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by those who cohabit without marriage. ( Elden v. Sheldon (1988) 46 Cal.3d 267, 275, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582; Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660, 684, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 [observing that the structure of society itself . . . depends upon the institution of marriage].) [5] There are also practical interests served by the policy favoring marriage. For purposes of determining entitlement to rights and benefits, a marriage license provides a readily verifiable method of proof. ( Norman v. Unemployment Ins. Appeals Bd., supra, 34 Cal.3d at p. 10, 192 Cal.Rptr. 134, 663 P.2d 904.) By contrast, a claim for such rights and benefits made by an unmarried couple presents numerous problems of standards and difficulties of proof regarding the depth and stability of the nonmarital relationship that create a potential for intrusions into rights of privacy and association. ( Ibid.; Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d at pp. 275-276, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582.) A related interest supporting the public policy of promoting marriage is to minimize the risk of third parties who provide services or benefits from loss or fraud. ( Harrod v. Pacific Southwest Airlines (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 155, 158, 173 Cal.Rptr. 68 [upholding denial of cause of action for wrongful death to surviving partner of unmarried couple under former Code of Civil Procedure section 377 because an action based on a meretricious relationship presents greater problems of proof and dangers of fraudulent claims than an action by a spouse or putative spouse].) These policy considerations cannot justify denial of Unruh Act protection to domestic partners, whatever their application to other unmarried individuals and couples. To couples who meet the requirements of establishing a domestic partnership under the Domestic Partner Act and who have registered under that law, the Legislature has granted legal recognition comparable to marriage both procedurally and in terms of the substantive rights and obligations granted to and imposed upon the partners, which are supported by policy considerations similar to those that favor marriage. (§ 297.5, subd. (a).) Thus, under the Domestic Partner Act, domestic partners, like [f]ormally married couples, have been granted significant rights and bear important responsibilities toward one another which are not shared by couples who cohabit or who have not registered as domestic partners. ( Elden v. Sheldon, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 275, 250 Cal.Rptr. 254, 758 P.2d 582.) Furthermore, as explained in the next part, the practical considerations served by the policy favoring marriage are now also promoted by the Domestic Partner Act. The Declaration of Domestic Partnership provides a readily verifiable method of proof for determining eligibility for services and benefits. Additionally, the mutual obligations undertaken by domestic partners, comparable to those of spouses, minimizes any economic risk to third parties that extend such services and benefits to domestic partners. Thus, in creating domestic partnerships, the Legislature has also created a policy favoring such partnerships similar to the policy favoring marriage. Additionally, the Legislature has made it abundantly clear that an important goal of the Domestic Partner Act is to create substantial legal equality between domestic partners and spouses. As noted above, subdivision (f) of section 297.5 states: Registered domestic partners shall have the same rights regarding nondiscrimination as those provided to spouses. We interpret this language to mean that there shall be no discrimination in the treatment of registered domestic partners and spouses. This reading comports with the Legislature's statement that the Domestic Partnership Act shall be construed liberally in order to secure to eligible couples who register as domestic partners the full range of legal rights, protections and benefits, as well as all of the responsibilities, obligations, and duties to each other, to their children, to third parties and as to the state, as the laws of California extend to and impose upon spouses.  (Stats. 2003, ch. 421, § 15, italics added.) Of special relevance to the Unruh Act issue presented here, the Legislature has found that expanding the rights and obligations of domestic partners would reduce discrimination on the bases of sex and sexual orientation in a manner consistent with the requirements of the California Constitution. ( Id., § 1, subd. (b).) In light of this legislative action, we conclude that the policy favoring marriage is not served by denying registered domestic partners protection from discrimination under the Unruh Act. To the contrary, permitting a business to discriminate against registered domestic partners by denying them benefits or services it extends to spouses violates the comparable public policy favoring domestic partnership. We conclude that, consistent with the first prong of the Harris analysis, discrimination against registered domestic partners in favor of married couples is a type of discrimination that falls within the ambit of the Unruh Act.