Opinion ID: 857341
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Enablement and Anticipation

Text: Morsa also renews his argument that the PMA is not enabling. In particular, he identifies specific defects in the PMA’s disclosure, including a lack of operational structures and features of HelpWorks, Web Edition, the way those features and structures interact together, and the specific steps that HelpWorks, Web Edition uses to match users to benefits. Morsa also contends that a press release containing only 117 words of disclosure may be considered non-enabling on its face. The Board rejected Morsa’s arguments by stating that he failed to present any declarations or affidavits to establish the reference as not enabling and, citing In re INRE: STEVE MORSA 9 Pearson, 494 F.2d 1399, 1405 (CCPA 1974), concluded that argument alone cannot take the place of evidence. In its decision on Morsa’s first request for rehearing, the Board relied on our decision in Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 314 F.3d 1313, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2003), holding that a patent cited as prior art is presumed enabling, for this same argument. The Director, in opposition here, updated this argument to reflect our holding in In re Antor Media Corp., 689 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 2 In Antor, we held that publications used as prior art by the PTO are presumed enabling. Id. at 1288. The court then examined whether Antor had succeeded in rebutting this presumption. Id. at 1289-93. In answering this question, the court examined the language of the prior art references, the declarations of Antor’s experts, and Antor’s attorney argument about the forward looking nature of the prior art’s disclosure. Id. Although the court ultimately found Antor’s argument to be without merit, our decision in Antor cannot be read to require an applicant to submit affidavits or declarations to challenge the enablement of prior art references. The presumption in Antor is a procedural one— designed to put the burden on the applicant in the first instance to challenge cited prior art; the PTO need not come forward with evidence of enablement before it may 2 Relying on Amgen, the Board decided Morsa’s first request for rehearing on December 6, 2011, before this court’s decision in Antor. The Director updated this argument to rely on Antor because Antor expands the presumption of enablement established in Amgen to include all printed publications, such as the PMA in this case. See Antor, 689 F.3d at 1288; Amgen, 314 F.3d at 1354. 10 INRE: STEVE MORSA rely upon a prior art reference as grounds for a rejection. Id. at 1288. Once an applicant makes a non-frivolous argument that cited prior art is not enabling, however, the examiner must address that challenge. While an applicant must generally do more than state an unsupported belief that a reference is not enabling, and may proffer affidavits or declarations in support of his position, we see no reason to require such submissions in all cases. When a reference appears to not be enabling on its face, a challenge may be lodged without resort to expert assistance. Here, Morsa identified specific, concrete reasons why he believed the short press release at issue was not enabling, and the Board and the examiner failed to address these arguments. Despite the less than illuminating nature of the PMA, the Director also argues that the court should consider the PMA enabling because it is “at least as enabling” as Morsa’s application. We are not persuaded. First, an examiner must determine if prior art is enabling by asking whether a person of ordinary skill in the art could make or use the claimed invention without undue experimentation based on the disclosure of that particular document. See 35 U.S.C. § 112. While reference to the patent application is appropriate for purposes of determining what the claimed invention is, i.e., what falls within the scope of the claims, the anticipation exercise must assess the enabling nature of a prior art reference in light of the proposed claims. To the extent the Director argues that a head to head comparison between the disclosures in the documents is appropriate moreover, the PTO’s description of the application is inaccurate. The level of detail and disclosure in the application far exceeds that in the PMA. Absent a finding that the application’s disclosures are unrelated to the invention actually claimed, we cannot agree that the enabling nature of the two documents the PTO seeks to compare are, in fact, comparable. INRE: STEVE MORSA 11 Since both the Board and the examiner failed to en- gage in a proper enablement analysis, we vacate the finding of anticipation and remand claims 271 and 272 for further proceedings.