Opinion ID: 2977007
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Brady

Text: At trial, the prosecution sought to demonstrate that Jells had randomly kidnapped Stapelton from the streets of Cleveland.8 The prosecution supported this theory by presenting witnesses at trial who testified that they saw Jells grab Stapleton from a street intersection and force her and Devon into his van sometime between 10:30 p.m. and 11:00 p.m, while Stapleton struggled and screamed. Instead, the withheld statement by Massingill, if credited, demonstrates that Stapelton was still voluntarily getting into and out of the van after the time of the altercation at the street intersection, as he was “certain” that Stapelton visited him at 11:00 p.m. “or a little after.” This statement obviously weakens any conclusion that the kidnapping occurred when Stapelton was forced into the van at the intersection, because it demonstrates that Stapelton was still voluntarily getting into and out of the van after the time of that incident. The withheld statements by Massingill and Smith also refute the prosecution’s theory of a random kidnapping, as the statements support a conclusion that Stapelton had been voluntarily riding with Jells the night of the murder—and was freely getting in and out of the van—both before and after the time of the incident at the intersection. Other withheld evidence impeaches the credibility of a witness who believed that the altercation was an abduction. At trial, Camilla Banks testified that she and her father witnessed Stapleton’s abduction, and she positively identified Jells as the abductor. However, a withheld document reveals that an anonymous caller, later identified as Camilla Banks, told police that she had witnessed the incident but that “she couldn’t see the male well.” 8 The State disputes that its theory at trial was that Jells had participated in a random kidnapping and murder. However, the prosecutor, Carmen Marino, detailed in his deposition the State’s theory of the case: A. There was no ransom note, there wasn’t a kidnapping for hire by some third party. It was a street assault on a woman for sex and she resisted. . . . Q. So the State’s theory was that this was about a man who the State alleged to be Reginald Jells who had kidnapped some woman off the street for the purpose of some improper purpose, is that correct? A. Right. The Ohio Supreme Court also seems to have credited this theory, stating that Jells “killed Ruby Stapleton after first kidnapping her and her child off the streets of Cleveland Ohio.” Jells, 559 N.E. 2d at 477. No. 02-3505 Jells v. Mitchell Page 21 Second, not all of the testifying witnesses believed that Jells was abducting Stapelton when he forced her into the car. The impeachment of Camilla Banks combined with the information from Smith and Massingill that Stapelton voluntarily accompanied the driver of the van much of the evening would have bolstered the credibility of Wright, a trained security guard who was working in the area when he witnessed the incident at the intersection. At trial, Wright testified that he did not notify the police because, based upon his observations, he thought Stapleton and the man knew each other. Wright reasoned that the incident was something like a “lover’s quarrel” and “nothing serious.” Wright further testified that while he heard the lady yell three times, she never yelled for anyone to help her, even though there were a few people around at the time. Wright testified that Stapleton was placed into the van on the driver’s side by the man, but that the door was not closed. Wright was uncertain how the victim moved over to the passenger side, but he observed her thereafter sitting straight up in the passenger’s seat “like a normal passenger” and she had stopped yelling. At the time of the trial, Wright’s testimony was in conflict with that of Owen and Camilla Banks, and the judges apparently found their testimony more credible. However, this balance could have shifted had Wright’s testimony been presented along with the information indicating that Stapleton was with Jells of her own volition earlier in the night, that Camilla Banks did not clearly see Jells on the night in question, that Stapleton’s boyfriend saw Stapleton around the time of or after the altercation, and that Stapleton was not under duress at that time. Finally, the evidence that Stapleton was intoxicated on the night of her murder undercuts the aggravating factors listed by the three-judge panel when it found it appropriate to impose the death penalty. Specifically, the court listed as an aggravating factor the “methodical manner in which the defendant deprived the victim of her freedom,” referencing Jells’s statement to Owen Banks that Stapleton was drunk and implying that the court did not believe Jells’s statement to be true. The withheld information indicates that the victim had been drinking and “was high,” providing a plausible non-methodical explanation for the statement made to Owen Banks. Lastly, at trial, Jells’s defense included a theory that there had been no kidnapping.9 Taken together, the withheld evidence is sufficient to undermine confidence in the trial court’s rejection of this theory. The “kidnapping” and the circumstances surrounding the “kidnapping” were weighed by the trial court when they determined that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors in sentencing Jells to death. Because of this, the withheld evidence that weakens the strength of the State’s kidnapping case is material for the purpose of Brady, as there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682. Under Ohio Revised Code § 2905.01, kidnapping requires more than just “restraining” someone. Instead, any restraining must be done for a specific purpose, such as “to terrorize, or to inflict serious physical harm on the victim or another.” O.R.C. § 2905.01. The withheld information suggests that Stapelton was voluntarily with Jells for much of the night, weakening an inference that any “restraint” of liberty at the intersection was done for the “purpose” of causing Stapleton harm. The withheld “favorable evidence could reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light as to undermine confidence in the verdict.” 9 The dissent argues that Jells presented only a theory of misidentification at trial. Dissenting Op. at 31, n.2. However, the record shows that Jells’s attorney argued that “there could be no kidnapping insofar as the parties had been riding around together for an hour to an hour and a half [following the alleged abduction.]” (Joint Appendix (“JA”) 62425.) In closing arguments, Jells’s attorney argued that “the reason no one called the police [at the time of the altercation in the intersection] is because they all believed it was a lover’s quarrel. . . . If it was, in fact a kidnapping, [Stapleton] had every opportunity to get out of the passenger side door. With the number of people standing around, if this was a kidnapping, you know she would say to someone, ‘I’m being kidnapped. Help me . . . I suggest the reason is because she wasn’t kidnapped.” (JA 615-16.) Jells’s attorney argued that the presence of Stapelton’s footprint in the van was further evidence that no kidnapping occurred, as it indicated that she was “riding along in this van” and had put her feet “up on the dash,” which was indicative of “being very comfortable with her surroundings.” (JA 617.) Lastly, Jells’s attorneys specifically “ask[ed] the Court to focus in on the kidnapping statute 2905.01 under which this defendant is charged, that the State has not met its burden as to the kidnapping.” (JA 624.) No. 02-3505 Jells v. Mitchell Page 22 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435 (1995).10 “[T]he question is not whether the State would have had a case to go to the jury if it had disclosed the favorable evidence, but whether we can be confident that the jury's verdict would have been the same.” Id. at 453. Here, there can be no confidence that all three judges would have determined that the aggravating factors listed in Ohio Rev. Code §2929.04(B) outweighed the mitigating factors had they been presented with the withheld information, and therefore there can be no confidence that the sentence would have been the same. See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 453. The dissent cites the Ohio Court of Appeals’ decision on direct appeal as support for her determination that there was overwhelming evidence of the aggravated circumstance of kidnapping at trial. Dissenting Op. at 30. However, this determination was made without consideration of the information withheld by the prosecution in violation of Brady. Further, in that court’s findings as quoted by the dissent, each of the references to kidnapping are either ambiguous or directly impacted by the information withheld in violation of Brady. First is the summary of Devon’s testimony that “he and his mother were either forced into [Jells]’ van by [Jells] or that they entered it voluntarily.” Dissenting Op. at 28 (quoting from Jells, 1989 WL 43401 ) (emphasis added). Next are the statements by the same court that there was an “abduction witnessed by Owen and Camilla Banks and Edward Wright,” id., and that five witnesses testified that the abduction was “intentional” or “deliberate and forceful.” Id. These conclusions discount Wright’s trial testimony that the dispute appeared to be a “lover’s quarrel”—i.e. not an abduction—and credit Camilla’s statement at trial that she could clearly see the abduction. However, the withheld statement by Stapelton’s boyfriend, if believed, means that whatever happened at the intersection, Stapelton was not abducted because she was still voluntarily getting into and out of the van after the time of the alleged abduction. Further, the withheld call-log from the night of Stapelton’s murder directly impeaches Camilla’s statement regarding her view of the alleged abduction. Lastly, the withheld statements of Massingill and Smith bolster Wright’s testimony at trial—completely ignored in the Ohio Court of Appeals decision—that no abduction occurred, given that evidence demonstrating that Jells and Stapelton knew each other would have bolstered his conclusion that the incident was “nothing serious” and like a “lover’s quarrel.” The remainder of the dissent’s challenge to the effect of the Brady violation goes to whether the evidence of Stapelton’s murder was undermined by the violation. However, because Jells was charged with felony murder based upon a kidnapping, we need not, and do not, find that the trial court might have reached a different conclusion as to Jells’s culpability as to the murder of Stapleton. Instead, it is sufficient for us to find, as we do, that the withheld Brady information refutes the prosecution’s weak presentation of evidence regarding whether a kidnapping occurred. VI. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PRIOR TO THE PENALTY PHASE A. State Court Decision On collateral review, the Ohio Court of Appeals rejected Jells’s claim that he was denied effective assistance of counsel prior to and during his trial: Petitioner asserts that his counsel informed him that a three judge panel would be best for him because of the pretrial publicity surrounding Stapleton’s death and because of Devon’s testimony. He further asserts that his counsel never 10 Jells also argues that the Brady evidence demonstrates that he is actually innocent of the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping. In order to demonstrate actual innocence, Jells must show that, more likely than not, a reasonable juror would not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995). Jells’s new evidence does not rise to the standard of establishing his actual innocence because a reasonable juror still could have found him guilty even after considering this new evidence. No. 02-3505 Jells v. Mitchell Page 23 informed him that, inter alia, the three judge panel would also hear the mitigation phase, that if the matter were tried to a jury, all twelve members of the jury would have to agree to convict and sentence him, that a reviewing court would apply a presumption of correctness when reviewing certain errors. He avers, however, that his attorneys “felt that a three judge panel would be best in my case because they felt that a three judge panel would not give me a sentence of death.” Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, Exhibit S. We find that this decision was a strategic choice. Accord State v. Woods (March 5, 1997), Medina App. No. 2589-M, unreported. Moreover, the court examined a similar argument in State v. Sowell (1991), 73 Ohio App.3d 672, 683, 598 N.E.2d 136, and stated: In his twenty-ninth cause of action, the only cause of action not heretofore addressed, Sowell challenges the knowing and intelligent nature of his waiver of a jury trial. Sowell offered in support of this contention his own affidavit, in which he averred that he executed the waiver upon trial counsel’s representation that a trial before a three-judge panel would not result in the imposition of the death penalty. Sowell’s “self-serving” affidavit is not, however, sufficient to rebut the record before us, which contains Sowell’s written waiver in which he stated that he “knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waive[d] and relinquish[ed] his right to a trial by Jury .” See Jackson, supra. Sowell was, therefore, not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the challenge advanced in his twenty-ninth cause of action when he failed to sustain his initial burden of demonstrating substantive grounds for relief. See State v. Kapper (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 36, 448 N.E.2d 823. Upon our determination that Sowell’s petition was subject to dismissal without an evidentiary hearing, we overrule the first assignment of error. In any event, petitioner has not demonstrated how this decision resulted in prejudice to him. He does not show, and we cannot say, that had this case been tried to a jury, the result would have been different. Accord State v. Woods, supra. Jells, 1998 WL 213175, at . While Jells argued before the state courts that his counsel made several errors prior to and during trial that constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, this Court granted a certificate of appealability only as to whether Jells was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel in making his decision to waive his right to a jury trial. On this issue, Jells argues that his counsel were ineffective because they failed to advise him properly of the consequences of his waiver. He argues that counsel failed to determine and inform the trial court that Jells was borderline mentally retarded, and that they did not fully advise Jells of his right to present to twelve jurors or any other juryrelated implications. Jells additionally argues that his counsel were ineffective when they allowed him to sign the waiver prior to the completion of the Competency Report, which subsequently indicated that Jells understood his possible sentence to be at most one of life. B. Analysis As explained above, this Court makes a two-part inquiry when reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See, e.g., Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. First, Jells must demonstrate that his counsel’s performance was deficient. Id. Second, Jells must demonstrate that any such No. 02-3505 Jells v. Mitchell Page 24 deficiency caused him prejudice. Id. “Unless a defendant makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction or death sentence resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result unreliable.” Id. Further, because the state courts reached the merits of this issue, AEDPA review applies to this claim. 1. Deficient Performance Jells correctly notes that his counsel had a professional duty to inform him of the nature of his right to a jury trial and the consequences of waiving it so that he could make an intelligent and informed waiver decision. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (1983). However, Jells has not presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that counsel failed in this duty. In United States v. Martin, the Court explained what level of knowledge of the jury trial right is required for a defendant to intelligently waive it: A defendant, therefore, should have both the mental ability and some knowledge of the jury trial right before he is allowed to waive it. A technical knowledge of the jury trial right, however, is not what is required. A defendant is sufficiently informed to make an intelligent waiver if he was aware that a jury is composed of 12 members of the community, he may participate in the selection of the jurors, the verdict of the jury must be unanimous, and that a judge alone will decide guilt or innocence should he waive his jury trial right. 704 F.2d 267, 273 (6th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted); accord Sowell v. Bradshaw, 372 F.3d 821, 832 (6th Cir. 2004); Spytma v. Howes, 313 F.3d 363, 370 (6th Cir. 2002). The Court has explained that, while “[k]nowledge of these essential attributes is generally sufficient to enable a defendant to make a knowing and intelligent decision,” Martin, 704 F.2d at 273, a defendant’s knowledge of these elements is not “constitutionally required.” United States v. Sammons, 918 F.2d 592, 597 (6th Cir. 1990). Rather, the dispositive inquiry is whether the defendant “‘understood that the choice confronting him was, on the one hand, to be judged by a group of people from the community, and on the other hand, to have his guilt or innocence determined by a judge.’” Sowell, 372 F.3d at 836 (quoting Sammons, 918 F.2d at 597). Despite Jells’s broad allegations, he has not produced any evidence to establish that counsel failed to inform him of the fundamental nature of the choice confronting him. While Jells’s affidavit indicates that he “does not recall” having been informed of the rights that go along with the right to a jury trial, the affidavit also indicates that he met with two of his attorneys to discuss whether the case should be tried to a jury or a three-judge panel. Jells further recalls that the attorneys told him that, in their opinion, a three-judge panel would be best because of the publicity surrounding the case, the potentially damaging testimony by Devon, and because they felt that a three-judge panel would not give Jells a sentence of death. Jells also submits the affidavit of one of his attorneys at the time, David Doughton, in support of his claim. However, this affidavit simply indicates that Doughten was not personally aware of whether Jells was informed of certain aspects of his right to a jury trial because he was out of town when the waiver was entered. Further, the affidavit confirms that the attorneys discussed with Jells which evidence would be presented to that particular three-judge panel and why the counsel thought it would be effective given that particular panel. The submitted affidavits show that Jells was advised that a three-judge panel would likely be a better decision-maker for both phases of his trial. Providing such advice does not constitute unreasonable performance by counsel. See Dickerson, 453 F.3d at 700 (“Counsel necessarily had to make a choice between the two modes of trial, and it was impossible to say at the time which would be better for his client. We find no professional norms that dictate how a lawyer and his No. 02-3505 Jells v. Mitchell Page 25 client should go about making this choice.”). Accordingly, Jells has not presented sufficient evidence to overcome the “strong presumption that counsel’s conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 2. Prejudice Even if Jells could show that his counsel’s performance was deficient, he would still need to demonstrate that he suffered prejudice as a result. To demonstrate prejudice, Jells “must show that there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Jells has not made such a showing. Jells merely argues that if counsel had adequately informed him of his right to a jury trial, he might not have waived the right and at least one member of the jury might not have sentenced him to death. Jells provides no evidence to support this claim, and thus fails to demonstrate prejudice under Strickland.