Opinion ID: 1354187
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: (1) Under our state and federal equal protection provisions a statute may single out a class for distinctive treatment only if such classification bears a rational relation to the purposes of the legislation.

Text: Article I, sections 11 and 21 of the California Constitution guarantee to every person that [a]ll laws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation and that [no] citizen, or class of citizens, [shall] be granted privileges or immunities which, upon the same terms, shall not be granted to all citizens; the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution frames a similar commitment, mandating that no state may deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (2) This principle of equal protection preserved by both state and federal Constitutions, of course, does not preclude the state from drawing any distinctions between different groups of individuals ( In re King (1970) 3 Cal.3d 226, 232 [90 Cal. Rptr. 15, 474 P.2d 983]), but it does require that, at a minimum, persons similarly situated with respect to the legitimate purpose of the law receive like treatment. ( Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State of California (1969) 71 Cal.2d 566, 578 [79 Cal. Rptr. 77, 456 P.2d 645, 38 A.L.R. 3d 1194]; Darcy v. Mayor etc. of San Jose (1894) 104 Cal. 642, 645-646 [38 P. 500].) As the United States Supreme Court recently phrased the federal constitutional standard: The Equal Protection Clause ... den[ies] to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification `must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.' ( Reed v. Reed (1971) 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 [30 L.Ed.2d 225, 229, 92 S.Ct. 251], quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia (1920) 253 U.S. 412, 415 [64 L.Ed. 989, 990-991, 40 S.Ct. 560] (italics added); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) 405 U.S. 438, 446-447 [31 L.Ed.2d 349, 358-359, 92 S.Ct. 1029]; Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1972) 406 U.S. 164, 173 [31 L.Ed.2d 768, 777, 92 S.Ct. 1400].) (3, 4)(See fn. 2.) Thus, when a statute provides that one class shall receive different treatment from another, our constitutional provisions demand more than nondiscriminatory application within the class ... establish[ed].... [They] also [impose] a requirement of some rationality in the nature of the class singled out. ( Rinaldi v. Yeager (1966) 384 U.S. 305, 308-309 [16 L.Ed.2d 577, 580, 86 S.Ct. 1497]; Hayes v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 216, 223 [98 Cal. Rptr. 449, 490 P.2d 1137].) [2] (5) In determining the scope of the class singled out for special burdens or benefits, a court cannot confine its view to the terms of the specific statute under attack, but must judge the enactment's operation against the background of other legislative, administrative and judicial directives which govern the legal rights of similarly situated persons. As the United States Supreme Court recognized long ago: The question of constitutional validity is not to be determined by artificial standards [confining review within the four corners of a statute]. What is required is that state action, whether through one agency or another, or through one enactment or more than one, shall be consistent with the restrictions of the Federal Constitution. ( Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query (1932) 286 U.S. 472, 480 [76 L.Ed. 1232, 1238, 52 S.Ct. 631, 84 A.L.R. 831]; see, e.g., Hayes v. Superior Court (1971) 6 Cal.3d 216, 222-223 [98 Cal. Rptr. 449, 490 P.2d 1137]; James v. Strange (1972) 407 U.S. 128, 135-140 [32 L.Ed.2d 600, 607-610, 92 S.Ct. 2027].) With these basic constitutional principles in mind, we turn to the California guest statute. Vehicle Code section 17158 provides in relevant part: [3] [N]o person who as a guest accepts a ride in any vehicle upon a highway without giving compensation for such ride ... has any right of action for civil damages against the driver of the vehicle or against any other person legally liable for the conduct of the driver on account of personal injury to or the death of the ... guest during the ride, unless the plaintiff in any such action establishes that the injury or death proximately resulted from the intoxication or willful misconduct of the driver. In practical terms, this statute establishes three distinct levels of classification or discrimination. First, the provision generally treats automobile guests differently from paying automobile passengers, precluding most of those who ride without giving compensation from recovery for negligence, while permitting those who pay to obtain such recovery. Second, the enactment treats automobile guests differently from other social guests and recipients of generosity, withdrawing from such automobile guests the protection from negligently inflicted injuries generally enjoyed by guests in other contexts. Third, and finally, the statute distinguishes between different subclasses of automobile guests, withholding recovery from those guests injured while in a vehicle during a ride upon a public highway, but permitting recovery by auto guests injured in other circumstances. In analyzing the constitutionality of the guest statute's operation in light of the applicable state and federal protections, we must evaluate the rationality of this tripartite classification scheme in light of the purposes of the legislation; no prior case has adjudicated the present constitutional claim on such a basis. [4] Two justifications have traditionally been advanced in both judicial precedent and academic commentaries to support the guest statute's classification scheme. (See, e.g., Stephan v. Proctor (1965) 235 Cal. App.2d 228, 230 [45 Cal. Rptr. 124]; 2 Harper & James, Law of Torts (1956) § 16.15, p. 961.) First, the provision is said to promote hospitality by insulating generous drivers from lawsuits instituted by ungrateful guests who have benefited from a free ride. Second, it is suggested that the statute serves to eliminate the possibility of collusive lawsuits, in which a host fraudulently confesses negligence so as to permit his guest  presumably a friend or relative  to collect from the host's insurance company. As we explain below, however, neither of these justifications provides a reasonable explanation for the tripartite discrimination established by the statute and thus neither provides a rational basis to uphold the section against the present constitutional attack. We examine the hospitality rationale first.