Opinion ID: 159537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Right of Free Speech

Text: 35 In support of his protected speech argument, Dr. Lighton suggests Ms McCreary and Dr. Ehleringer failed to make a good faith effort to resolve his First Amendment concerns and in fact, violated his First Amendment rights by requiring him to remain silent on a matter of public concern regarding Dr. Fielden's unauthorized use of equipment. 13 36 It is well established a government employer, such as the University or its officials, cannot condition public employment on a basis that infringes the employee's constitutionally protected interest in freedom of expression. Lytle v. City of Haysville, 138 F.3d 857, 863 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation marks and citation omitted). In evaluating a protected, freedom of speech argument, we rely on the Supreme Court's balancing test, first articulated in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The Pickering balancing test has developed into a four-step analysis, under which we must determine: 1) if Dr. Lighton's speech is of public concern; 2) if it is, we must balance the interest of his freedom of expression with the University's interest in preventing disruption of official function and promoting the efficiency of public service through its employees; 3) if the balance tips in Dr. Lighton's favor, he must prove the speech was substantial or a motivating factor in the detrimental employment decision; and 4) finally, we must give the University, or in this case, Ms. McCreary and Dr. Ehleringer, an opportunity to prove the same decision would have been reached, even absent the protected conduct. See Gardetto v. Mason, 100 F.3d 803, 811 (10th Cir. 1996). 37 In order for Dr. Lighton to succeed, the first step of the Pickering balancing test must be established. In other words, we need not go further if we determine Dr. Lighton's speech, in accusing Dr. Fielden of unauthorized use of equipment, does not rise to a matter of public concern. We have defined matters of public concern as those of interest to the community, whether for social, political, or other reasons. Lytle, 138 F.3d at 863. In analyzing whether speech constitutes a matter of public concern, we may focus on the motive of the speaker and whether the speech is calculated to disclose misconduct or merely deals with personal disputes and grievances unrelated to the public's interest. See McEvoy v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 466 (10th Cir. 1989) (relying on Conaway v. Smith, 853 F.2d 789, 796 (10th Cir. 1988)). For example, when the identified speech focuses on disclosing a public official's malfeasance or wrongdoing, it is most likely a matter of public concern. See Schalk v. Gallemore, 906 F.2d 491, 494 (10th Cir. 1990). Conversely, it is generally not [considered] protected speech if [its] aim is simply to air grievances of a purely personal nature. Id. 38 In applying these principles, it does not appear Dr. Lighton's speech about Dr. Fielden's alleged unauthorized use of property rose to that of public concern, but as the district court said was more of a vendetta. The record discloses Dr. Lighton knew about Dr. Fielden's alleged unauthorized use of the equipment, but did not report it until nine months later immediately after Dr. Fielden raised sexual harassment and retaliation charges against him. 14 Under these circumstances, we are persuaded Dr. Lighton did not disclose the information concerning the equipment for the principal aim or Good Samaritan purpose of disclosing government misconduct, but for his own personal reasons for either getting even with, or using leverage against, Dr. Fielden. 15 39 As to Dr. Lighton's characterization of Dr. Ehleringer's letter as placing a gag order on his free speech, 16 we disagree. Long before Dr. Ehleringer's May 14, 1995 letter demanding Dr. Lighton not make disparaging remarks about Dr. Fielden, Dr. Lighton twice expressed an interest in an agreement which included a provision preventing third-party disclosures. With respect to Dr. Lighton's reporting unauthorized equipment use, the same letter simply demanded Dr. Lighton go through the proper channels by reporting it to the University, rather than the National Health Institute. In the event Dr. Lighton did not understand this distinction or the topics that might trigger disciplinary proceedings, he certainly should have understood them by the next day when his attorney acknowledged his understanding the sanction provision of the letter did not extend to Dr. Lighton's reporting Dr. Fielden's alleged misconduct to the University, or even to the National Institute of Health. In addition, the settlement allowed Dr. Lighton to disclose information about Dr. Fielden to third parties, provided he simultaneously notifies her, through her attorney, of such disclosure. Under the circumstances, we cannot say this constitutes a gag order. Having determined Dr. Lighton's speech on Dr. Fielden's actions did not rise to that of a matter of public concern, we need go no further to conclude his free speech argument lacks merit.