Opinion ID: 3062114
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Duffey’s Testimony

Text: -7- During direct examination, the prosecutor asked Duffey what indicators he had before the search that Defendant and Moreno-Ceron were engaged in criminal activity. Duffey testified as follows: The first indicator that I had noticed was the elevated level of nervousness prior to stopping the vehicle. It’s unusual to see driver and passenger conversing and then as they pass me, the passenger acts like he’s going to sleep, or that he went to sleep, or that he is asleep. That was very unusual to me. The second indicator I observed was the hands shaking of Mr. [Figueroa-]Cruz. And when I had asked him if he was alright he stated that he was just nervous; however, he could not give me a reason as to why he was nervous. The passenger also had a high level of nervousness. When he handed me the documents to the vehicle and his driver’s license, his hands were also shaking and his breathing was very deep and rapid. I observed multiple cellular phones in the vehicle, one of which being a boost mobile phone. Drug couriers often use multiple cellular phones when trafficking narcotics and especially boost mobile phones due to the fact that they’re virtually untraceable and if encountered by us they can discard them easily and not be detected. In talking to the passenger, they had stated that they were going to Kansas City to look for work; however, they didn’t know where they were going in Kansas City. They stated they were just going to look. And I can’t—I couldn’t believe that somebody would invest that time and money to purchase a car and travel to Kansas City and not have anything lined up without first looking on the internet or making any phone calls or anything of that nature. The passenger had stated that the vehicle was his. And then it was registered through the—the Notice of Transaction registered to Lorenzo Ramos Oveth, which [sic] wasn’t present. I had asked the passenger about that. He had stated that a friend had registered it for him because he couldn’t afford to register it at the time. I asked him what his friend’s name was and he stated that he didn’t know. R., Vol. 3 at 73–75. Defendant contends that this testimony was not admissible because (1) it violated Fed. R. Evid. 704(b), which prohibits testimony that the -8- defendant had the requisite mens rea; and (2) any relevance of the testimony was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, see Fed. R. Evid. 402, 403. Defendant’s sole objection to this testimony at trial was, “This isn’t a motion to determine whether there was probable cause.” R., Vol. 3 at 73. This was certainly not adequate to present an objection under Rule 704(b); and we think it was inadequate to alert the court why the evidence was irrelevant or unfairly prejudicial. We therefore review for plain error. See United States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 2009). Consequently, to obtain relief, Defendant “must show ‘(1) [an] error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, [this] court may then exercise its discretion to notice [the] forfeited error, but only if (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 467 (1997) (brackets, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)). “Because all four requirements must be met, the failure of any one will foreclose relief and the others need not be addressed.” United States v. Gantt, 679 F.3d 1240, 1246 (10th Cir. 2012).
Under the language of Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) in effect at the time of Defendant’s trial, “[T]estimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be -9- decided by the trier of fact.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(a) (2011) (amended Dec. 1, 2011). But Rule 704(b) provides an exception: No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for the trier of fact alone. Id. 704(b) (2011) (amended Dec. 1, 2011). The rule is limited in scope. “Rule 704(b) only prevents experts from expressly stating the final conclusion or inference as to a defendant’s actual mental state. The rule does not prevent the expert from testifying to facts or opinions from which the jury could conclude or infer the defendant had the requisite mental state.” United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 854–855 (10th Cir. 1992). By this standard, Duffey’s testimony was not improper. He merely stated facts from which a jury could infer that Defendant knew of the cocaine in the trunk. The first requirement of the plainerror test—the existence of error—is not satisfied.
Defendant argues that much of Duffey’s “indicators” testimony was inadmissible because any relevance was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (irrelevant evidence is inadmissible); id. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if “its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of . . . unfair prejudice.”) To assess this argument, we -10- must consider testimony by Duffey earlier in the trial—testimony not challenged on appeal. Near the outset of his testimony, Duffey was asked to discuss the “types of things” he looks for during traffic stops to “indicate . . . that a crime is being committed or about to be committed.” R., Vol. 3 at 47. The direct examination continued as follows: [Duffey:] We look generally at the demeanor of the occupants, the driver, if there is a passenger. We see the level of nervousness, whether it’s more so than what a normal traffic stop would consist of. We look at travel plans. We look at— [Prosecutor:] Let me back you up just a minute. When you say travel plans, what do you mean? [Duffey:] Just in general we ask—we try to ask where are you headed to, where are you coming from, things of that nature. Just through general conversation, try to see what they have to say about their travel plans. [Prosecutor:] Well, if somebody says, for example, I’m going to St. Louis to see my grandmother, what would that tell you about and how would that fit into this continuum of an interdiction stop and whether or not you believe a crime is being committed? [Duffey:] Just by if they’re going to see their grandmother, there would be followup questions after that that would help corroborate their story. [Prosecutor:] Such as? [Duffey:] When was the last time you were in St. Louis to see your grandmother? What part of St. Louis does your grandmother live in? Things of that nature. Are you originally from St. Louis? [Prosecutor:] And, for example, if the person said I don’t know where my grandmother lives, would that mean something in particular to you? -11- [Duffey:] That would be a red flag, yes. [Prosecutor:] Does the ownership of the car or non-ownership of the car figure in to your study or what you’ve learned in making interdiction stops? [Duffey:] Yes, it does. Through training and experience, third party vehicles have been notorious for being part of a crime. [Prosecutor:] Does it make any difference in the interdiction world as to the presence of or number of cell phones? [Duffey:] Yes. [Prosecutor:] Why is that? [Duffey:] Generally, multiple cellular phones in the vehicle. Narcotics dealers often use multiple cellular phones and especially boost mobile phones because of the fact they know they are virtually untraceable and can be easily discarded if encountered by law enforcement. [Prosecutor:] Does the presence of a valid driver’s license or the absence of a valid driver’s license figure into this continuum of interdiction stops and you beginning to wonder about the existence of a crime? [Duffey:] Yes. [Prosecutor:] And how is that? [Duffey:] If they have a valid driver’s license, that just indicates that someone had found a valid driver to transport the narcotics in this vehicle. I f they don’t have a valid driver’s license, that’s just something else that we have to factor in or rule out. [Prosecutor:] For example, if someone has a valid driver’s license, for the Ladies and Gentleman, what do you do when you do a stop if someone has a valid driver’s license? -12- [Duffey:] As far as? [Prosecutor:] Well, let me rephrase it. If I’m stopped and you ask for my driver’s license; is that correct? [Duffey:] Yes. [Prosecutor:] And you would do that to assure I could drive, I take it? [Duffey:] Yes. [Prosecutor:] Do you do anything else with that driver’s license? [Duffey:] That driver’s license is run through our dispatch. We run the driver’s license number to ensure validity and to check for any wants or warrants on the subject. [Prosecutor:] So that if someone gave you an invalid driver’s license, you couldn’t check on their past, could you? [Duffey:] That’s true. That’s correct. R., Vol. 3 at 47–50. Thus, much of the challenged “indicators” testimony merely repeated factual observations by Duffey and previous expressions of opinion regarding drug traffickers. Essentially what was added amounted to argument, applying the opinions to the facts of the case. In our view, such argument should be reserved for the prosecutor; but even if this component of Duffey’s testimony was improper, Defendant fails to show prejudice. The prosecutor (properly) argued the same points in closing; and most or all of them would have been obvious to the jurors in any event. Because Defendant has not shown the third requirement -13- for plain-error relief—that admission of the evidence “affect[ed] [Defendant’s] substantial rights,” Garza, 566 F.3d at 1200 (internal quotation marks omitted)—we decline to reverse on this ground.