Opinion ID: 698663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Barnes' Bagley Claim: Cause and Prejudice.

Text: 55 Even if Barnes had procedurally defaulted his claim in state court, I would find that Barnes has amply demonstrated cause for the default. The majority's conclusion that Barnes' trial counsel made a tactical decision not to discover the location of the victim's handgun, op. at 977, is unsupported by the record. Neither the Commonwealth nor the majority has come forward with a single tactical reason why a defense attorney would not want to discover the location of a weapon possessed by a victim. Rather, trial counsel's uncontradicted testimony in the district court establishes that he concluded, based on statements made by the prosecution, that the victim's firearm was not at the immediate scene of the crime. 56 The statements by the prosecution included the stipulation offered by the prosecution which is quoted by the majority, and the prosecution's response to trial counsel's aforementioned request for any material or information which would tend to reduce the punishment of the defendant. It was reasonable for trial counsel to believe the prosecution's answer that there was no such material or information in its possession, rather than interviewing the police who had been at the scene. It was reasonable for trial counsel to busy himself preparing for Barnes' trial rather than attending the trial of Barnes' codefendant, Corey, which took place ten days before Barnes' trial. No more than  'a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim was not reasonably available to counsel,'  McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 494, 111 S.Ct. 1454, 1470, 113 L.Ed.2d 517 (1991) (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 2645, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)), is required. 57 In fact, had trial counsel's decision not to investigate further and to rely upon the assumed honesty of the prosecution's answer been unreasonable, then Barnes would have made a viable showing of the unreasonable performance prong of an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim for failure to investigate the location of the firearm. The majority wants to have it both ways, finding both reasonable performance as to Barnes' claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate the location of the gun, op. at 977, and lack of reasonable investigation as to Barnes' Bagley claim, op. at 977; I cannot concur in such inconsistent findings where, as here, there has been no showing of a tactical decision by trial counsel not to investigate the location of the gun, and the prosecution's failure to disclose the location of the gun was an objective factor external to Barnes' defense which impeded his counsel's efforts to raise the issue at trial. Cf. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488, 106 S.Ct. at 2645 (holding that ineffective assistance constitutes cause, but mere attorney tactical error is not necessarily cause, unless some objective factor external to the defense such as  'some interference by officials,' made compliance impracticable (internal citations omitted)). 58 However, for the same reasons that I do not find materiality shown as to Barnes' Bagley claim, see supra, if Barnes had defaulted the claim in state court, I would find that he was not prejudiced by the default. 59 F. Barnes' Ineffective Assistance Claim as to his Trial Counsel's Failure to Present Evidence of Mitigating Factors at Sentencing. 60 As to Part III, I concur in the majority's finding that Barnes has not shown that his attorney's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. I therefore find it unnecessary to reach the question of whether Barnes was prejudiced by his attorney's performance, and I do not join the majority's opinion to the extent that it discusses whether the outcome of Barnes' sentencing would have been different had his attorney's performance been different. However, again to respond to the conclusions made by the majority, I will discuss the prejudice prong of Barnes' ineffective assistance of counsel claim briefly. 61 The standard for showing prejudice is less than a preponderance standard; the petitioner must show merely that trial counsel's ineffectiveness undermine[s] confidence in the outcome. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2068, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Moreover, review of the district court's findings of prejudice on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is de novo. See Fields v. Attorney General of the State of Maryland, 956 F.2d 1290, 1297 n. 18 (4th Cir.1992) (listing standards of review applicable to habeas proceedings). 62 If it were necessary to decide the question, I would find that the failure to raise evidence of past abuse was not prejudicial, because past abuse has often been found by Virginia courts to have little mitigating weight. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 445, 423 S.E.2d 360, 371 (1992) (upholding death sentence in face of evidence of tragic upbringing of defendant), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1862, 123 L.Ed.2d 483 (1993); Correll v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 454, 352 S.E.2d 352, 360 (upholding death sentence in face of evidence of an unfortunate home situation and troubled childhood), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3219, 96 L.Ed.2d 705 (1987). However, I would find prejudicial the failure to raise evidence of Barnes' mental defects and his past responsiveness to a juvenile rehabilitation program. The majority states that evidence of mental defects could have led to a finding of dangerousness, and therefore the failure to present the evidence of mental defects was not prejudicial to petitioner. However, the evidence regarding Barnes' mental defects is that he has brain damage and lowered intellectual functioning, not some type of mental illness which might render him dangerous. Mental incapacity is a statutory mitigating factor in Virginia, see Va.Code Sec. 19.2-264.4(B), and the Commonwealth itself has admitted that, because of petitioner's limited criminal record, it was highly unlikely that future dangerousness would have been found. Reply Br. of Appellant at 21. If it was highly unlikely that future dangerousness would have been found with no evidence of Barnes' low intelligence and brain damage, then surely it still would have been unlikely that future dangerousness would have been found with the evidence of his mental defects. If this were not the case, all mental defects, whether mental illness or low intelligence, would be per se aggravating factors, not a mitigating factor. The majority does not state whether or not it believes that the failure to present evidence of potential for rehabilitation was prejudicial, but in light of Barnes' youth (he was 21 years old), I would find the failure to present the evidence was prejudicial. 63 Conclusion. 64 In sum, because Barnes has not shown materiality of the location of the victim's gun, and because he has not shown unreasonable performance by his trial counsel, I concur in the result reached by the majority, reversing the writ of habeas corpus and remanding with instructions to reinstate the death sentence. However, I also respectfully disagree with several assertions of law made by the majority, as I have noted throughout. I have been presented with many statements of dicta and alternative holdings which have led to the necessity of an attempt to rebut the erroneous statements which need not have been made in the first place.