Opinion ID: 779125
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Introduction of the Civil Complaint

Text: 41 Hutchison argues that he was prejudiced when the prosecution introduced the civil complaint filed by Gaylor seeking to recover the proceeds of the $500,000 insurance policy to which Hutchison was named beneficiary. The complaint asserts that Plaintiff HUTCHISON is barred from recovering any proceeds of the policy because he was feloniously responsible for the death of the insured. J.A. at 629. 42 On direct appeal, the Tennessee Supreme Court found that the complaint was properly introduced to impeach Gaylor, but was inadmissible hearsay as to Hutchison. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d at 166. Nevertheless, the Tennessee Supreme Court found the introduction of the complaint to be harmless error because: 43 The complaint, filed long after Hutchison's indictment, cast blame for the murder on a known suspect, a likely person for anyone seeking insurance proceeds to blame. Thus, the complaint had little probative value regarding Hutchison's guilt. In addition, the substantive evidence at trial supported a finding of Hutchison's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 44 Id. at 167. 45 Hutchison argues that the denial of the severance and admission of the complaint violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser. He bases his constitutional claim on Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's confession which clearly implicated another defendant at a joint trial was a violation of the other defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause. Id. at 137, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Court noted that the nontestifying codefendant's confession added substantial, perhaps even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not subject to cross-examination, since [the codefendant] did not take the stand. Id. at 128, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Court reasoned that codefendant confessions that implicate another defendant are both devastating to the defendant and inherently untrustworthy given the recognized motivation to shift blame onto others. Id. at 136, 88 S.Ct. 1620. 46 However, the scope of the Bruton decision was limited in Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 91 S.Ct. 1723, 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971). In O'Neil, the prosecution elicited testimony about a codefendant's confession, which implicated another defendant. The codefendant testified at the joint trial and denied making the confession. Id. at 624, 91 S.Ct. 1723. The Court held that the defendant's rights were not violated by the admission of his codefendant's confession under those circumstances. The O'Neil Court explained that the holding of Bruton was limited to situations in which the codefendant does not testify at trial, thereby depriving the defendant the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant of the confession. Id. at 627, 91 S.Ct. 1723. The Court reasoned that there would be no Confrontation Clause problem where a codefendant takes the stand in his own defense, denies making an alleged out-of-court statement implicating the defendant, and proceeds to testify favorably to the defendant concerning the underlying facts. Id. at 629-30, 91 S.Ct. 1723. This is because the denial of the inculpatory confession generally is more favorable to the defendant than anything the defendant could elicit on cross-examination. Id. at 629, 91 S.Ct. 1723. 47 In light of O'Neil, we conclude that the state court's decision that the admission of the civil complaint was harmless error is not contrary to or an objectively unreasonable application of federal law. See T. Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-06, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. We assume, arguendo, that Gaylor's civil complaint is the functional equivalent of an inculpatory confession. See Vincent v. Parke, 942 F.2d 989, 991 (6th Cir.1991) (suggesting in dicta that an extra-judicial statement that is not a confession, but clearly implicates the defendant, may raise Sixth Amendment concerns). O'Neil instructs us that there is no constitutional violation if the codefendant testifies on behalf of the defendant. In this case, Gaylor testified favorably to Hutchison regarding the underlying facts. Gaylor stated that it was his lawyer's suggestion to attempt to recover under the insurance policy once Hutchison was indicted. Gaylor stated that he did not hold the belief that Hutchison killed Huddleston, and that he did not know how Huddleston had died. While Gaylor did not unequivocally disavow the contents of the civil complaint, but instead attributed the contents to his lawyer, we cannot conclude that this minor difference renders the state's refusal to find prejudice contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. See T. Williams, 529 U.S. at 406-07, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Hence, we find no reversible error.