Opinion ID: 2519742
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Miranda/Harris: admission of defendant's extrajudicial statement regarding his acquisition of Jones's van for impeachment purposes

Text: During defendant's cross-examination, the prosecutor stated that he desired to question defendant about a statement he made at the hospital after invoking his Miranda rights ( Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694) while being questioned about Stopher's killing. The prosecutor identified defendant's statement as, I rented the van from a guy by the name of Edwin. The prosecutor acknowledged the statement was inadmissible in his case-in-chief, but argued it should be admissible for the limited purpose of impeaching defendant pursuant to this court's decision in People v. May (1988) 44 Cal.3d 309, 243 Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307 ( May) , implementing the holding of Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 ( Harris ), since defendant had testified on direct examination that he had found the van with Jones's body in it in the motel parking lot. Upon defendant's objection, the court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of the statement pursuant to Evidence Code section 402, subdivision (b). Richard Spady, the physician who treated defendant at Riverside General Hospital on November 3, 1986, the date defendant made the statement, testified defendant had undergone an operation two days earlier, was in stable condition, and was having a normal postoperative recovery with normal mental functioning. Nurses' reports for the date in question reflected defendant was awake, alert, and fully oriented. He was on antibiotics and pain medication, but they would not be expected to appreciably affect his mental functioning. Dr. Spady testified there was nothing he observed that would suggest defendant was not able to make a free and voluntary statement on the afternoon of the date in question. Detective Stroup testified he attempted to interview defendant at the hospital at 5:30 p.m. on November 3, 1986. Defendant was coherent, although obviously in pain. When advised of his Miranda rights, defendant indicated he understood them. Detective Stroup asked defendant if he was willing to talk about the Stopher murder. At the time, the detective was unaware of Jones's murder or who owned the van defendant was driving upon his arrest. Defendant indicated he would talk a little bit, as much as he could without a lawyer being present. When asked about the murder of Stopher, defendant would not answer and indicated he should probably have a lawyer before answering such questions. Detective Stroup terminated the questioning. He then began a second interview of defendant to determine where the van had come from and from whom defendant had acquired it. Detective Stroup was not aware at that time that the owner of the van was, in fact, deadhis report just indicated police needed to know who the owner of the van was and how defendant had obtained the vehicle. The report further reflected that he told defendant during the second interview that anything he would say would not be used in court against him, and that this was over and above his Miranda waiver. When asked by the court what he meant by that advisement, Detective Stroup explained, That I was there to talk to him about the death of Mr. Stopher. And hehe'd advised me he didn't want to discuss that. And this was not dealing with Mr. Stopher. Detective Stroud testified that at that time he had no intention of using any information defendant gave him about how he obtained the van against him in court. Defendant told the detective he had rented the van from an individual by the name of Edwin, that he did not know where the owner of the van was, and that he did not want to say anything else. Detective Stroup terminated the questioning. The trial court ruled that the statement was obtained in violation of Miranda because it had been made during continued questioning after defendant had invoked his Miranda rights. The court nevertheless found the statement admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment under May, supra 44 Cal.3d 309, 243 Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307, and concluded that its probative value for that purpose outweighed any possible prejudice to defendant. On rebuttal, Detective Stroup testified he contacted defendant at the hospital at approximately 5:30 p.m. on November 3, 1986, asked him about the van, and that defendant stated he had rented it from a person named Edwin and did not know the whereabouts of the van's owner. Defendant challenges the admission of the statement on a number of grounds. He emphasizes that his statement that he rented the van from a person named Edwin obviously was untrue, although he concedes the extrajudicial statement conflicted with his direct testimony at trial that he found the van in the motel parking lot with Jones already strangled inside. Defendant argues the statement was not relevant for admissibility under the May and Harris test because the statement was not incriminating in the required sense. By this he means the statement was not impeaching because it was untrue, was not inculpatory, and was contrary to both the prosecution's and the defense theories of the case as presented to the jury. First, there is no requirement that extrajudicial statements ruled inadmissible under Miranda must be truthful in order for them to be available for the limited purpose of impeachment under Harris. The Harris court held that statements made to police under circumstances rendering them inadmissible under Miranda in the prosecution's case in chief could be admitted for purposes of impeachment of a testifying defendant whose trial testimony was inconsistent with the earlier statements. ( May, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 315, 243 Cal.Rptr. 369, 748 P.2d 307; see Harris, supra, 401 U.S. at p. 226, 91 S.Ct. 643.) Here, the impeachment value of defendant's extrajudicial statement, whether true or not, was that it contradicted his testimony at trial and thereby bore upon the credibility of that testimony. In his closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to find that because defendant lied when he told police he rented the van from a man named Edwin, his conflicting story at trialthat he was involved in an attempted drug buy with Jones at a motel, and that he found the van in the motel parking lot with Jones's already strangled body insideshould likewise be disbelieved. Defendant's remaining claims respecting the admissibility of the statement for impeachment purposes are likewise unavailing. He argues that his statement was involuntary and thus excludable for all purposes, including impeachment. (See Michigan v. Harvey (1990) 494 U.S. 344, 350-351, 110 S.Ct. 1176, 108 L.Ed.2d 293.) We have independently reviewed the record and find that the prosecution proved that the statement was voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Badgett (1995) 10 Cal.4th 330, 348, 41 Cal. Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. Thompson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 134, 166, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857.) Detective Stroup's representation to defendant that the statement would not be used against him in court for any purpose complicates the matter somewhat, because the statement was ultimately used for impeachment. Regarding the question of whether the detective's representation rendered defendant's statement involuntary, the trial court found that Detective Stroup was simply being truthful, in that he was unaware at the time that Jones was the van's owner, much less that she had been killed and her body secreted in the van. The court found it significant that since Detective Stroup was investigating the Stopher murder, and since defendant had halted the questioning about that crime in the first interview, the detective was simply conveying to defendant that any information defendant furnished about the van would not be used against him in the Stopher case, in which questioning had just been terminated at defendant's request. Although Detective Stroup may not have harbored a subjective belief that any statement defendant made would be used against him in a prosecution for the murder of Jonessince the detective had no knowledge of Jones's murder at the time the voluntariness inquiry is, of course, concerned with defendant's subjective state of mind at the time of the questioning, not that of Detective Stroup. In that regard, defendant was plainly told that his statement would not be used against him in court for any purpose. The legal circumstance that the statement ultimately was used against him in court for the limited purpose of impeachment under Harris and May does not bear directly on the inquiry of whether the statement was voluntary at the time it was made. It is the fact that defendant was told any information he furnished about the identity or whereabouts of the van's owner would not be used against him in court, and his possible reliance on that representation in making the statement that he rented the van from a person named Edwin, that does, of course, bear on the voluntariness inquiry. The matter is further complicated because we know in hindsight that the information defendant furnished about the van's owner, in actuality, was not true, a matter conceded by defendant. In short, from the standpoint of voluntariness, Detective Stroup's representation to defendant, that any information he furnished about his acquisition of the van would not be used against him in court, did not motivate defendant to reveal truthful and incriminating information, thereby possibly rendering such disclosures involuntary. In sum, although we disagree with the trial court's specific conclusion that Detective Stroup's state of mind in making the representation to defendant precludes a finding of involuntariness, the circumstance that the statement was ultimately and lawfully admitted against defendant in court for the limited purpose of impeachment does not alter our conclusion that the prosecution proved the voluntariness of the statement by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Badgett, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 348, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 635, 895 P.2d 877; People v. Thompson, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 166, 266 Cal.Rptr. 309, 785 P.2d 857.) In any event, even assuming arguendo it was error to admit the statement for impeachment purposes given Detective Stroup's representation at the time it was made that it would not be used in court, the error was clearly harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Cahill (1993) 5 Cal.4th 478, 487, 509-510, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 582, 853 P.2d 1037; see Arizona v. Fulminante (1991) 499 U.S. 279, 306-312, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302.) Defendant concedes that the statement that he rented the van from a person named Edwin was not true; neither was it a confession, an incriminating admission, or other substantive evidence of guilt. The only possible prejudice would flow from the impeachment value of the statement, but defendant's credibility was already in serious question at trial. Defendant testified, I was lying throughout the trial proceedings of my son; he testified he lied to his brother-in-law Lostanau; he testified he initially lied to Joseph about his intentions in going to Hesperia; he testified he lied to Officer Dunavent when stating upon being stopped that he was on his way home; and he testified he had lied to his second wife, Rose V., about his relationship or affair with Jones. There was strong physical evidence pointing to defendant as Jones's murderer, including that a garrote he admittedly made was found wrapped around her neck; that he secreted her body in the van and drove the vehicle across county lines; that he had a motive for the killing (use of Jones's van to accomplish the Stopher murder and Rose V. kidnapping); and that after his arrest he made an admission of awareness that he had killed two persons (i.e., Stopher and Jones). On this record it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that impeachment with defendant's extrajudicial statement that he rented the van from a person named Edwin did not prejudice his conviction of Jones's murder. Defendant also complains that the giving of CALJIC No. 2.13, which instructs the jury, inter alia, that it can consider a prior inconsistent statement, not only for impeachment, but also as evidence of the truth of the facts as stated by the witness on such former occasion, permitted the jury to consider the statement for other than mere impeachment, in contravention of the Miranda ruling below. The short answer is that a limiting admonition was never requested, nor was the trial court under a sua sponte obligation to give one. (See Evid.Code, § 355; People v. Torrez (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1088, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 712.) In any event, since the statement was neither a confession nor an admission and defendant concedes the statement was not true, there was no substantive, much less prejudicial, use to which the jury could have put the statement, even had the jury improperly applied CALJIC No. 2.13. Since use of the statement for impeachment or any other purpose could not in logic have prejudiced defendant's conviction of Jones's murder, his related claims of prosecutorial misconduct and ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the admission of the statement and the giving of CALJIC No. 2.13 without a limiting instruction must likewise be rejected.