Opinion ID: 2548554
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Suggesting judicial approval

Text: The Court of Appeal found Herzog's argument was misconduct for a second reason. Relying on Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co. (1951) 36 Cal.2d 812, 228 P.2d 557 ( Sanguinetti ), the appellate court concluded Herzog had committed misconduct by arguing the Cassims' asserted misrepresentations in their claims of losses and living expenses were equivalent to the misrepresentations the trial court condoned when it authorized jurors to claim credit for days when no court sessions took place. As the Court of Appeal majority reasoned: Here, in a case where fraud in an insurance claim was a primary issue in the case, counsel for plaintiff[s] went right to the fact that the jurors had been essentially cheating their employers. When counsel made reference to the fact that some of the jurors might be accused of cheating[,] there was no question he was letting the jurors know that the court had no objections to the procedure. When the objection was [not] sustained there was nothing else [defense] counsel could do except object again which would have had the effect of drumming home to the jury that the court thought a little cheating was permissible. (Fn.omitted.) As the appellate court recognized, Sanguinetti, supra, 36 Cal.2d 812, 228 P.2d 557, provides a useful precedent. In that case, the plaintiff sued to recover for injuries he suffered while working on the defendant's tugboat. At the close of the plaintiff's case, his attorney moved in the presence of the jury to increase the prayer for damages from $50,000 to $75,000. After argument by the parties outside the jury's presence, the trial court granted the motion. The defendant then moved for a mistrial, claiming the plaintiff's counsel had committed misconduct by moving to increase the damages in front of the jury. The trial court denied the motion. After both sides rested, the trial court instructed the jury that damages could not be in excess of $75,000. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the amount of $75,000. ( Id. at pp. 815-816, 228 P.2d 557.) This court reversed and remanded for a new trial. While admitting that no direct California authority prohibited the practice, we held that moving before the jury, after the production of evidence, to increase the prayer for damages should be unhesitantly condemned and stricken down. ( Sanguinetti, supra, 36 Cal.2d at p. 819, 228 P.2d 557.) We explained that if the trial court grants such a motion, the implied message is that the trial court believes the increased damages are warranted by the evidence. Because the trial court's views would necessarily have undue weight with the jury, implying the trial court approves of some portion of a litigant's case is improper. (Cf. People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 353, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708 [trial court commits misconduct if, by its remarks, it create[s] the impression it is allying itself with the prosecution].) The Court of Appeal in Neumann v. Bishop, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 451, 130 Cal.Rptr. 786, cited Sanguinetti, supra, 36 Cal.2d 812, 228 P.2d 557, with approval. In closing argument in Neumann, the plaintiff's attorney suggested the superior court would not have accepted his lawsuit for filing unless the amount of damages prayed for had qualified for the monetary jurisdiction of the court. ( Neumann, supra, at p. 486, 130 Cal.Rptr. 786.) In addition, counsel implied that the trial court had approved or endorsed the testimony of his expert witnesses; in fact, the court had simply approved his right to present such experts. ( Ibid. ) The appellate court found the plaintiff's counsel had committed misconduct in his argument because it is improper and misconduct for counsel to argue that his case or some aspect thereof has judicial approval. ( Id. at p. 485, 130 Cal.Rptr. 786.) The court then found any misconduct was harmless on the facts of the case. The reasoning of Sanguinetti, supra, 36 Cal.2d 812, 228 P.2d 557, and Neumann v. Bishop, supra, 59 Cal.App.3d 451, 130 Cal. Rptr. 786, suggests plaintiffs' counsel may have ventured into improper argument by implying the trial court had endorsed the Cassims' alleged misrepresentation in presenting Allstate with reconstructed and allegedly inflated receipts for their living expenses. Such endorsement could be inferred, Herzog arguably implied, because any misrepresentation by the Cassims was analogous to the court-approved practice of jurors falsely signing in for jury service. However, we need not decide whether Herzog improperly suggested his clients' actions had judicial approval because, as we explain below, even if he did commit misconduct, [5] it was harmless.