Opinion ID: 52897
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Garcia’s Mitigating Evidence

Text: For the sake of clarity, we divide the mitigating evidence presented by Garcia at the sentencing hearing into three categories: (1) evidence of Garcia’s “good character”; (2) evidence of substance abuse; and (3) evidence of neglect and abuse during childhood.5 For evidence of good character, the jury could have considered Garcia’s claim that he was a born-again Christian and the fact that during previous incarcerations he had not been responsible for any serious disciplinary violations. The law on this issue is clear. Abdul-Kabir did not alter the Supreme Court’s ruling in Franklin v. Lynaugh that evidence of good character can be given sufficient mitigating effect by the second special issue. See Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1988); accord Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 466 (1993). The same cannot be said for Garcia’s evidence of substance abuse in light of Abdul-Kabir and Brewer. It is possible Garcia’s substance abuse could have been given some mitigating effect under the first special issue. Garcia claimed 5 Garcia also argues that his pedophilia may be considered mitigating of his moral culpability. We reject this argument. In contrast to the abuse Garcia himself suffered as a child, pedophilia is not a mitigating personal characteristic and does not meet even the low threshold of relevance set by Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284-85 (2004). 11 No. 03-11097 that he had a long history of substance abuse and often committed his sex crimes when he was high. It appears that Garcia was in a narcotic-induced, altered state when he murdered his victim. The jury could have found that the drugs prevented Garcia from having the deliberative state necessary for it to answer “yes” to the first special issue. Nevertheless, Garcia’s substance abuse might also have had “meaningful mitigating relevance beyond its tendency to disprove that [Garcia] acted deliberately.” Coble v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430, 447 (5th Cir. 2007). Likewise, the possibility that Garcia’s substance abuse might function as a “two-edged sword” in the minds of the jury renders the special issues insufficient. See Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1712 n.5, 1714. If the jury believed Garcia could stem his substance abuse, it could have found him to be less of a future danger under the second special issue. On the other hand, a jury convinced that Garcia’s habitual substance abuse made him all the more dangerous would be left without an alternate vehicle for considering whether it nonetheless made him less culpable. See Coble, 496 F.3d at 447-48. The same is true of Garcia’s evidence of his abused childhood. The Supreme Court has conclusively stated that childhood abuse cannot be given meaningful mitigating effect under the special issues. The sort of childhood 12 No. 03-11097 abuse in Garcia, if believed, has meaningful similarities to that suffered by Penry. In Penry I, the Court found that the Texas special issues did not permit the jury to give proper mitigating effect to the defendant’s “abused background.” 492 U.S. at 315. The Court described the evidence of this abuse as follows: “Penry’s sister testified that their mother had frequently beaten him over the head with a belt when he was a child. Penry was also routinely locked in his room without access to a toilet for long periods of time.” Id. at 309. The abuse described in Penry I is sufficiently similar in mitigating effect to Garcia’s such that the trial court, having the benefit of the Supreme Court’s recent Penry I opinion, should have given it independent mitigating effect. See also Brewer, 127 S. Ct. at 1712 n.5, 1714 (noting that evidence of an abused childhood could be “two-edged”). Further, the Penry I Court treated Penry’s history of abuse as something with independent mitigating effect: Penry argues that his mitigating evidence of mental retardation and childhood abuse has relevance to his moral culpability beyond the scope of the special issues, and that the jury was unable to express its “reasoned moral response” to that evidence in determining whether death was the appropriate punishment. We agree. Thus, we reject the State’s contrary argument that the jury was able to consider and give effect to all of Penry’s mitigating evidence in answering the special issues without any jury instructions on mitigating evidence. 13 No. 03-11097 492 U.S. at 322 (emphasis added). At no point in the opinion does the Court remark that it is only because Penry is mentally retarded that his past history of abuse was not given sufficient mitigating effect under the special issues. Abdul Kabir confirms this as the “clearly established” law enunciated by Penry I. In light of Penry I and II, Abdul-Kabir and Brewer, the state court’s ruling that the special issues in this case were constitutionally sufficient was contrary to the Supreme Court’s precedent or, alternatively, an unreasonable application of clearly established law. The original majority opinion in this case determined that Garcia could not avail himself of Penry-related arguments concerning his background because he did not argue to the jury for mercy and, in fact, foreswore seeking “mercy.” In light of the conclusiveness with which the Court has now rejected limitations on the Penry doctrine and has declared as “clearly established law” only those limitations embodied in the facts of specific cases,6 we must retract our earlier view. A juror who credited Garcia’s evidence of an abused background and believed that his childhood, or his substance abuse, made him less culpable could 6 See Abdul-Kabir, 127 S. Ct. at 1667-73 (recognizing limitations as stated in Franklin v. Lynaugh, 487 U.S. 164 (1988); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461 (1993); Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350 (1993)). 14 No. 03-11097 not, under Abdul-Kabir, have given effective voice to this conclusion through the special issues in this case. That this instructional error mandates reversal of the death sentence follows from Abdul-Kabir and our en banc decision in Nelson v. Quarterman, 472 F.3d 287 (5th Cir. 2006). Neither of those decisions, however, alters the basic rule that for “virtually all” other collateral challenges to state court convictions the appropriate standard of review is the “substantial and injurious effect” harmless error test found in Brecht v. Abrahamson. See Fry v. Pliler, 127 S. Ct. 2321, 2325 (2007) (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993)). Moreover, the question whether some types of Penry error might be subject to harmless error review has not been squarely decided by and remains unresolved by the United States Supreme Court. Smith v. Texas, 127 S. Ct. 1686, 1699 (2007) (Souter, J., concurring).