Opinion ID: 1160456
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Trial Court Properly Refused to Instruct the Jury on Sexual Assault in the Fourth Degree.

Text: When jury instructions or the omission thereof are at issue on appeal, the standard of review is whether, when read and considered as a whole, the instructions given are prejudicially insufficient, erroneous, inconsistent, or misleading. State v. Robinson, 82 Hawai`i 304, 310, 922 P.2d 358, 364 (1996), (citing State v. Knight, 80 Hawai`i 318, 324, 909 P.2d 1133, 1139 (1996)). The court is not obligated to charge the jury with respect to an included offense unless there is a rational basis in the evidence for a verdict acquitting the defendant of the offense charged and convicting the defendant of the included offense. HRS § 701-109(5) (1993). Buch argues that, [i]n not giving defendant's lesser included jury instruction[,] the court stated that sexual assault in the fourth degree is not a lesser included offense with respect to sexual assault in the third degree because to so rule would require that the state prove [an] extra element; i.e., that of compulsion. This conclusion of law was erroneous because it misapplied the State v. Kupau [63 Haw. 1, 620 P.2d 250 (1980)] test. That is, there was sufficient evidence adduced at trial that if believed could have led the jury to acquit defendant of the sexual assault in the third degree charge and yet convict him of the lesser included offense of sexual assault in the fourth degree. Buch contends that his testimony that the complaining witness appeared to be between the ages of fourteen and sixteen at the time of the assault provides a rational basis for acquitting Buch of sexual assault in the third degree and convicting him, instead, of sexual assault in the fourth degree. Buch apparently fails to recognize that he is not entitled to have the jury instructed on an offense other than the charged offense unless (1) that offense is a lesser included offense of the charged offense as defined in HRS § 701-109(4) (1993), and (2) the instruction is warranted by the evidence. In this case neither condition is satisfied.
An offense is included in the charged offense when [i]t is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged[,] HRS § 701-109(4)(a), or [i]t differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a different state of mind indicating lesser degree of culpability suffices to establish its commission. HRS § 701-109(4)(c). [3] Buch was charged with sexual assault in the third degree, in violation of HRS § 707-732(1)(b). To establish the charged offense, the prosecution was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant: (1) knowingly (2) caused sexual contact (3) with a person less than fourteen years of age. HRS § 707-732(1)(b). Sexual assault in the fourth degree, as defined by HRS § 707-733(1)(a), requires proof that the defendant: (1) knowingly (2) caused sexual contact (3) by compulsion. Because sexual assault in the fourth degree requires proof of an additional fact  compulsion  it may not be established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish sexual assault in the third degree in violation of HRS § 707-732(1)(b). Therefore, it is not an included offense as defined by HRS § 701-109(4)(a). Nor is sexual assault in the fourth degree included in sexual assault in the third degree, as charged in this case, under HRS § 701-109(4)(c). The injury proscribed by HRS § 707-733(1)(a) is not less serious than the injury proscribed by HRS § 707-732(1)(b); both offenses require proof of the same injury  sexual contact  to establish their commission. Moreover, the state of mind required to establish sexual assault in the fourth degree  knowingly  does not indicate a lesser degree of culpability than that required to establish sexual assault in the third degree under HRS § 707-732(1)(b)  knowingly with respect to the result and, as discussed infra, strict liability with respect to the attendant circumstance of the victim's age. Therefore, we hold that sexual assault in the fourth degree is not included in the charged offense as defined by HRS § 701-109(4).