Opinion ID: 665566
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c) Conviction--Ross

Text: 58 Ross was convicted on Count 5 of the indictment: use of eight firearms during and in relation to the drug trafficking crimes. Two of those guns were found downstairs in his house, and the other six were found in the attic crawl space. One of those six qualified as a short-barreled shotgun, which increased his mandatory sentence from five to ten years. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 924(c)(1). He argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to prove that the six attic guns were used in relation to the cocaine offenses of which he was convicted, and thus that his sentence under Sec. 924(c) should be reduced from ten to five years. 59 There is sufficient evidence to support a conviction if,  'reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 829 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original)). The essential elements of a Sec. 924(c) violation are that the defendant (1) knowingly used or carried a firearm (2) during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. United States v. Martinez, 967 F.2d 1343, 1346 (9th Cir.1992). The second requirement exists because Congress did not intend to penalize one who happens to have a gun in his possession when he commits an entirely unrelated offense. United States v. Moore, 580 F.2d 360, 362 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978). 60 The short-barreled shotgun and five other guns were found in an attic which could be reached only through an opening in the kitchen ceiling. Ross cites Agent Smith's testimony that he tried twice unsuccessfully to get up into the attic--once by lifting another agent on his shoulders, and once by standing on a chair. Only on the third try did Agent Smith manage to lift a second agent up far enough to reach into the attic and extract the guns. Ross argues that because the guns were not readily available, they could not possibly have been used during and in relation to the cocaine offenses. Ross's Opening Brief at 21. 61 We have previously rejected this argument: [w]hile we agree that the firearm must be available, we reject the notion that it must be readily available. United States v. Torres-Medina, 935 F.2d 1047, 1049 (9th Cir.1991). In Torres-Medina, the court upheld a Sec. 924(c) conviction where a handgun and cocaine were found together in a crawl space underneath defendant's house. Although defendant was a paraplegic and could not himself enter the crawl space, the court reasoned that one of his accomplices (who had admitted helping him in other respects) could remove the gun and the drugs for him. Since the gun was thus producible at his beck and call, even if not readily or quickly available, it emboldened him in the commission of his crime. Id. at 1050 (basing holding on United States v. Stewart, 779 F.2d 538, 540 (9th Cir.1985)). 62 Here, the guns were in a crawl space above, not below, the main level--but that is hardly a relevant difference. Perhaps Ross, like Torres-Medina, could not reach the guns alone; but as in Torres-Medina, he had accomplices who could have helped him (Falconer, in fact, was arrested with him in the house). Torres-Medina suggests that the fact that the guns were not readily available to Ross does not at all foreclose a factual finding that they emboldened him in the commission of his crime. 63 The only important difference between Ross's case and Torres-Medina is that there the drugs and gun were in the same spot, whereas here the drugs were in a bedroom closet. There is no requirement, however, that the guns and drugs be in the same room, or even in the same house. E.g., United States v. Torres-Rodriguez, 930 F.2d 1375, 1385-86 (9th Cir.1991) (.357 Magnum found under mattress in bedroom; heroin found elsewhere in house); Stewart, 779 F.2d at 539 (UZI rifle in trunk of car; defendant in front seat; car parked in front of house; drugs in house). 64 Ross has produced no evidence of an alternative use for the guns. Defendant Falconer's confession suggests that some of their customers pawned guns for cocaine; the guns might have been acquired in that way. Under United States v. Phelps, 877 F.2d 28 (9th Cir.1989), bartering a gun for drugs was held to fall outside the statutory definition of using it during and in relation to a drug offense. In Smith v. United States, 113 S.Ct. 2050 (1993), however, the Supreme Court foreclosed this argument by holding that bartering a firearm for drugs did indeed constitute a Sec. 924(c) violation. Id. at 2058-59. 65 In conclusion, there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could have concluded that Ross used the attic guns in connection with his drug trafficking activities. We therefore affirm his conviction. 6 66