Opinion ID: 1902219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Life Without Parole Option

Text: The next claimed error is that the trial judge improperly refused to submit to the jury, in addition to life imprisonment or death, a third sentencing option of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. At the time of Irvin Bronstein's murder, there was no such sentence. The General Assembly added the third option to death sentencings by Chapter 237 of the Acts of 1987. Chapter 237 also required the State to give written notice to the defendant thirty days before trial of intent to seek life without parole. [7] See  412(b)(2). Chapter 237 took effect on July 1, 1987. 1987 Md. Laws ch. 237,  2. In Collins v. State, 318 Md. 269, 568 A.2d 1, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 3296, 111 L.Ed.2d 805 (1990), we held that the life without parole sentencing option is only available for offenses occurring after the effective date of the provision, July 1, 1987. Id. at 298, 568 A.2d at 15. Collins also rejected the argument that the lack of the third option unconstitutionally limited the jury under Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 100 S.Ct. 2382, 65 L.Ed.2d 392 (1980). 318 Md. at 298, 568 A.2d at 15. At sentencing, Booth argued that Collins is distinguishable because principalship was not really an issue in Collins. Before this Court Booth has nominally revived that argument. He contends that the failure of the State to offer a third sentencing option violated the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution under Beck v. Alabama, supra . Beck held that states could not force a jury to decide between death-eligible murder and acquittal when the evidence warranted an instruction on a lesser included offense. On the other hand, California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1007-09, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 3456-57, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983), held that the rule of Beck was not applicable in the penalty phase of a capital case. Booth argues that Ramos is distinguishable because Booth's sentencing jury decided an issue of guilt ÔÇö principalship ÔÇö and therefore this case is closer to Beck than Ramos. We reject this argument because in Maryland capital cases principalship is not an issue of guilt; it is an issue of sentencing. See supra Part II. Booth concentrates more on a second argument, which he makes before this Court for the first time, claiming that 1989 amendments to  412 made the life without parole option applicable to his capital offense. Chapter 677 of the Acts of 1989 disallowed imposition of the death penalty on any person who was mentally retarded at the time of the murder. See  412(f)(1). [8] This was the only substantive change to  412 made by Chapter 677. Section 2 of the legislative bill made this Act apply retrospectively to individuals who are awaiting trial or sentencing by the courts of this State on July 1, 1989 and prospectively to any individual sentenced on or after July 1, 1989. Booth argues that Section 2 has changed the result in Collins and made the life without parole provisions of  412 and  413 apply retrospectively. Failure to raise this argument below is a basis for rejecting it. See Maryland Rule 8-131(a). Using our discretion under Rule 8-131(a), however, we shall address the argument. There is no indication in Chapter 677 or its legislative history that the General Assembly intended to make retroactive anything other than the defense of mental retardation. The life without parole option, unlike the mental retardation defense, is governed by  413 as well as  412. In particular, it is  413 that provides for the specific sentencing options. See  413(k). Had the Legislature intended to make the life without parole option retroactive, undoubtedly it would also have made retroactive the relevant subsections of  413 somewhere in Chapter 677, and not limited its express statement of retrospectivity to the provisions of this Act. 1989 Md. Laws ch. 677,  2.