Opinion ID: 773254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Pendent State Law Claims with Prejudice

Text: 44 Plaintiffs argue the district court abused its discretion in reaching their pendent state law claims of negligent misrepresentation and common law fraud, and then dismissing these claims with prejudice. Judge Wood was well within her discretion to reach these claims. The operative facts in the state and federal causes of action are the same, satisfying the Article III requirements for pendent jurisdiction. See Lyndonville Sav. Bank & Trust Co. v. Lussier, 211 F.3d 697, 704 (2d Cir. 2000) (discussing United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Nor was it error for the district court to reach the state law causes of action against defendants Rindahl, Capital, Holdings, and Securities after dismissing the federal securities claims against them. The standards governing the state and federal law causes of action are similar and, in addressing the latter, Judge Wood was obliged to explore fully the allegations in the complaint. Reaching the state law claims was entirely appropriate as an exercise of the district court's discretion. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1994); Wanamaker v. Columbian Rope Co., 108 F.3d 462, 467 (2d Cir. 1997) (finding no abuse of discretion in dismissing state age discrimination claims along with ADEA claim).