Opinion ID: 1709729
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The decision to consult with legal counsel.

Text: Policy 902.5 provides: Legal Counsel The Board of Directors at the annual meeting held in July shall appoint an attorney to represent the corporation and advise the Board. The attorney shall be paid on a time or retainer basis as determined by the Board in accordance with an annual contract. Upon request of the Superintendent or President of the Board, the primary and/or secondary general partner (or in the event of their unavailability such other member of the firm as the Superintendent or President shall request) shall attend regular or special meetings of the Board of Directors or committees thereof to render advice and opinions on such matters as may be requested. The line of communication concerning legal consultation and advice from the attorney shall be through the Board of Directors' President in the case of board members and through the Superintendent of Schools in the case of administrators. (Emphasis added.) As policy 902.5 shows, once a year the school board decides who will represent the school district concerning school district matters for the upcoming year. The superintendent then has authority to decide when to consult with private legal counsel concerning school district matters. The Board appointed the law firm of Lane & Waterman to represent the school district for the 1994-95 school year, which is the year relevant to the present dispute. Rathmann agrees with the Board's right to designate an attorney or law firm to represent the school district. However, Rathmann contends that policy 902.5 is illegal because it impermissibly delegates discretionary authority to the superintendent to decide when to consult with or retain private legal counsel concerning a specific issue. Rathmann asserts that the decision to consult or retain private legal counsel is discretionary because it involves the exercise of judgment and discretion. Because such a decision is discretionary, Rathmann asserts that it is one that must be decided by a vote of the board at a public meeting. In other words, Rathmann claims that the full board must vote its approval every time the superintendent deems it necessary to consult with legal counsel concerning a particular issue. [8] Because the full Board was not consulted prior to hiring attorney Anderson of Lane & Waterman to develop policy 306.5, Rathmann therefore contends that policy 306.5 is invalid. In Gabrilson, we reiterated the rule that a school board cannot abrogate its power to regulate school district affairs to the superintendent. Gabrilson, 554 N.W.2d at 276. We also noted that a school board cannot delegate the exercise of any discretionary power conferred on it by law to another member or officer. Id. We concluded in Gabrilson that the decision whether to allow a school board member to see school district records is a discretionary decision, not ministerial or administrative, and that this is the type of discretionary decision that the legislature empowered the school board to make. Id. We conclude that the district court properly determined that a school district superintendent has authority under Iowa law to decide when to seek legal advice and that such decision does not need to be presented to the whole board each time. First, we find that giving the superintendent the authority to decide when to seek legal advice does not involve an impermissible delegation of a discretionary function. The school district, as a corporation, must act through its officers. Here, the superintendent is the officer who has the responsibility of deciding when to seek legal advice from the legal counsel designated by the school board for that particular year. While the decision whether to seek legal advice is an exercise of discretion on the part of the superintendent, we do not believe that it is the type of decision that the legislature intended for only the Board to make. Second, Rathmann's suggestion that the full board be consulted each time the school district wishes to consult with legal counsel on a particular issue is simply impractical. Many times situations arise in a school district that demand immediate action and consultation with legal counsel cannot always be delayed until after the next school board meeting without risking serious adverse consequences for the school district. We also point out that the Board has the authority to later ratify or invalidate actions taken by the superintendent in response to legal advice provided by counsel for the school district. Additionally, we believe that a school district's authority to employ an attorney to represent the school corporation as necessary for the proper conduct of the legal affairs of the school corporation found in Iowa Code section 279.37 is further support for our conclusion that a superintendent may seek legal advice without consulting the whole board. Cf. Bishop v. Iowa State Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 395 N.W.2d 888, 893 (Iowa 1986) (school board has discretionary authority under section 279.37 to pay legal expenses of superintendent arising out of a challenge to his or her official actions in carrying out policies of school district). We conclude that the provision in policy 902.5, which grants the superintendent the authority to decide when to consult with private legal counsel, complies with Iowa law. The district court's ruling on this issue is affirmed.