Opinion ID: 2654990
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: James Taylor’s Removal

Text: D.C. Code § 20-526, governing the removal of a personal representative, states: (a) Cause for removal. -- A personal representative shall be removed from office upon a finding by the Court that such representative: (1) misrepresented material facts in the proceedings leading to the appointment; (2) willfully disregarded an order of the Court; (3) is unable, for any reason, to discharge the duties and powers effectively; (…continued) giving at least 15 days written notice to all interested persons of intention to resign. . . . The resignation of a personal representative shall be effective upon approval by the Court.”). 9 (4) has mismanaged property; or (5) has failed, without reasonable excuse, to perform any material duty of such office; provided, that the Court may continue the personal representative in office following a finding in accordance with paragraph (5) if the Court finds that such continuance would be in the best interests of the estate and would not adversely affect the rights of interested persons or creditors. (b) Hearing. -- The Court shall conduct a hearing prior to the removal of a personal representative. Such hearing may be held on the Court‟s own motion, on motion of the Register, or on the written petition of any interested person. The Register shall give notice of such hearing to all interested persons and the Court shall conduct the hearing within a reasonable time thereafter. Upon receipt of such notice, the personal representative may exercise only the powers of a special administrator, as provided in by section 20-533. Preliminarily, we disagree with Smoak‟s argument, citing Super. Ct. Prob. R. 86 and its Comment,7 that the removal of a personal representative is not a final 6 (a) Generally. Any person who is aggrieved by a final order or judgment of the Probate Division of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and who participated in the determination of that order or judgment may file an appeal therefrom to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. (continued…) 10 order. D.C. Code § 11-721 (a)(1) (2012 Repl.) provides that this court has jurisdiction over “all final orders and judgments of the Superior Court.” Section (…continued) ... (c) When Allowed—Decedents‟ Estates. . . . [A]ll orders and judgments of the court determining rights of any interested person or party in any proceeding in the administration of the estate of a decedent shall be deemed final with respect to matters provided for in subsections (1) through (6) of this section as follows: (1) Order granting or denying probate; (2) Order construing the decedent‟s will; (3) Order determining heirs or legatees; (4) Order determining title to assets; (5) Order determining that property should be sold; (6) Order approving a final account. Super. Ct. Prob. R. 8. 7 [Super. Ct. Prob. R. 8] recognizes that, in the context of a decedent‟s estate, an order approving the final account is generally the only order that disposes of all the issues as to all the parties. Examples of probate orders that are not final absent an express determination by the Court include (but are not limited to) orders appointing or removing fiduciaries . . . . Super. Ct. Prob. R. 8 cmt. 11 11-721 is modeled after 28 U.S.C. § 1291, which states that “[t]he courts of appeals . . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States . . . .” We rely on our statute, which trumps Probate Rule 8, because “absent express statutory authorization, „no rule of court can enlarge or restrict jurisdiction.‟” Ford v. ChartOne, Inc., 834 A.2d 875, 879 (D.C. 2003) (quoting Washington-Southern Navigation Co. v. Baltimore & Philadelphia Steamboat Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635 (1924)). Applying the language of the jurisdiction statute, we hold that the order removing James Taylor was final and therefore appealable. Collins v. Miller, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 143, 144-46, 198 F.2d 948, 950-51 (1953) (“The order [removing the administrator of a will] was not a mere step toward final judgment in which it would merge. On final distribution of the estate it will be too late effectively to review the order, and the rights conferred by the Code to prompt and proper administration of the estate will be lost, probably irreparably. We think that like the order in . . . [Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.] . . . , the order in the instant case is appealable because it was a final disposition of the claimed right, not an ingredient of the administration of the estate itself and not requiring 12 consideration with it.”);8 cf. Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (“But this order of the District Court did not make any step toward final disposition of the merits of the case and will not be merged in final judgment. When that time comes, it will be too late effectively to review the present order and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applicable, will have been lost, probably irreparably. . . . This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.” (emphasis added)). With respect to the merits of the claims asserted, we begin by assuming, without deciding, that James Taylor had notice of his removal proceedings and a hearing was properly held,9 we turn to the grounds for his removal. 8 M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971) (“With respect to decisions of the United States Court of Appeals [for the District of Columbia Circuit] rendered prior to February 1, 1971, we recognize that they, like the decisions of this court, constitute the case law of the District of Columbia.”). 9 Although there may have been no notice and no proper hearing, our decision to remand effectively provides James Taylor with notice of a future hearing on this issue. 13 Because the court has no discretion, but is statutorily bound to remove the personal representative if it finds that []he committed one of the enumerated infractions, we review only the determination of whether an infraction has been committed. In re Estate of Delaney, 819 A.2d 968, 1002 (D.C. 2003). We review the trial court‟s conclusions of law de novo, and we may set aside any decisions insofar as they rest on an erroneous view of the law. D.C. Code § 17-305 (a) (2001); Moshovitis v. The Bank Companies, 694 A.2d 64, 67 (D.C. 1997). We may not set aside a judgment of a trial court in a matter tried without a jury except for errors of law unless it appears that the judgment is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. See In re Estate of Delaney, supra, 819 A.2d at 1002. In re Estate of Bates, 948 A.2d 518, 524 (D.C. 2008) (emphasis added). The language of Section 20-526 (a) is clear that “[a] personal representative shall be removed from office upon a finding by the Court that such representative” committed one of the acts enumerated. Neither the hearing transcript nor the order removing James Taylor expressly states the grounds for his removal. In the absence of such findings, we cannot properly review the Probate Division‟s decision. However, Smoak argues that the Probate Division “essentially” found James Taylor to have violated Section 20-526 (a)(2) (willfully disregarding a court order), 14 (a)(3) (“unable . . . to discharge the duties and powers effectively”), and (a)(5) (failing to perform any material duty without a reasonable excuse). We cannot agree that the trial court implicitly made those findings. Judge Campbell did state that he believed James Taylor was “torpedo[ing]” the co-personal representative relationship and administration‟s progress was moving at a “glacial pace.” Neither of these statements, however, clearly indicates that Judge Campbell believed James Taylor willfully disregarded an order, was not discharging his duties effectively, or failed to perform any specific duties as a co-personal representative. In absence of reviewable findings in Judge Campbell‟s September 13, 2012, order, remand is necessary for the trial judge to conduct a hearing on this issue and state the grounds for James Taylor‟s removal, if such grounds are found to exist.