Opinion ID: 2540917
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Applicable Standard of Review

Text: Generally, this Court's review of the sufficiency of the evidence is limited to whether the State has introduced sufficient evidence for any reasonable juror to have been convinced of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Bateman, 318 S.W.3d 681, 686-87 (Mo. banc 2010). This is not an assessment of whether the Court believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational factfinder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 687 (internal quotations omitted). In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, all evidence favorable to the State is accepted as true, including all favorable inferences drawn from the evidence. Id. All evidence and inferences to the contrary are disregarded. Id. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence supporting a criminal conviction, the Court does not act as a `super juror' with veto powers, but gives great deference to the trier of fact. State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 52 (Mo. banc 1998) (internal quotations omitted). [T]his Court will not weigh the evidence anew since the fact-finder may believe all, some, or none of the testimony of a witness when considered with the facts, circumstances and other testimony in the case. State v. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d 422, 425 (Mo. banc 2008) (internal quotations omitted). Nash, however, argues that these current standards of review do not accurately reflect the standard of appellate review this Court should employ in assessing the sufficiency of the evidence in his case. He argues that the standards expressed above differ from the standard of review for testing the sufficiency of the evidence for a 1982 case based on circumstantial evidence. He argues that in 1982 his case would have been held to a higher sufficiency of the evidence standard based on the circumstantial evidence rule, which at the time required: Where the conviction rests on circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances to establish guilt must be consistent with each other, consistent with the guilt of the defendant, and inconsistent with any reasonable theory of his innocence. See State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 405-07 (Mo. banc 1993) (discussing the historical purpose and application of the circumstantial evidence rule). In 1993, Grim abrogated the circumstantial evidence rule and rejected the use of the circumstantial evidence instruction. Id. at 407-08. Nash argues that failure to employ the circumstantial evidence rule in his case, as this Court would have done pre-Grim, will result in an ex post facto-type violation of [his] due process rights because his conviction will then be resting upon insufficient evidence according to standard appropriate in 1982. Nash argues that this Court's failure to apply the circumstantial evidence rule would result in the type of ex post facto violation described in Calder v. Bull as a law the alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the offender. 3 U.S. 386, 390, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.Ed. 648 (1798). But this Court's appellate review of the evidence through the lens of the present sufficiency of the evidence standards versus the circumstantial evidence rule does not alter what was required in order to convict Nash for Judy's murder. Ex post facto concerns exist where the government refuses, after the fact, to play by its own rules, altering them in a way that is advantageous only to the State, to facilitate an easier conviction. Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 533, 120 S.Ct. 1620, 146 L.Ed.2d 577 (2000). In Nash's case, the elements of the crime that the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt did not change from 1982 to the present. As such, Nash's concerns about the standard of appellate review used by this Court to assess the sufficiency of the evidence do not present ex post facto or due process concerns as there was no alteration in what the State was required to prove in order to convict Nash. [9] Use of the present sufficiency of the evidence standards to review Nash's case will not violate his constitutional rights. Cf. Freeman, 269 S.W.3d at 425 (employing post- Grim sufficiency of the evidence review standards to a crime that occurred pre- Grim but was not prosecuted until after Grim ).