Opinion ID: 561353
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Consideration of Factors by the Commission

Text: 20 Whether the Commission adequately considered the identified circumstance is a question of law, reviewed de novo. United States v. Leake, 908 F.2d 550, 554 (9th Cir.1990) (citing United States v. Lira-Barraza, 897 F.2d 981, 985 (9th Cir.), rehearing granted, en banc, 909 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir.1990)). A determination that the Commission has not adequately considered the identified circumstance means that the Commission has not intended to foreclose the district court from departing from the Guidelines. Lira-Barraza, 897 F.2d at 985. 21 Concerning the district court's first stated reason for departure, appellant points out that the guidelines already account for the remoteness of a prior conviction. Sec. 4A1.2(e) states in pertinent part, Any prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month that was imposed within fifteen years of the defendant's commencement of the instant offense is counted. 2 22 Appellant makes a similar argument concerning the district court's second stated reason. Sec. 4A1.2(k) states in pertinent part, Revocation of probation, parole, supervised release, special parole, or mandatory release may affect the points for Sec. 4A1.1(e) in respect to the recency (sic) of last release from confinement. Therefore, the Commission adequately considered the remoteness of a prior conviction and the effects of a parole violation, and the district court was in error to rely upon them in order to depart. 23 The district court also reasoned that departure was appropriate because the sentence seemed unusually high compared to those the court had seen for similar cases and crimes. While this third reason might suggest that departure was apropos, it is not in itself a sufficient justification. The district court must identify the reason for the disparity. Only if it resulted from a factor not adequately taken into account by the Commission is departure proper; if the disparity was contemplated, the district court may not depart simply because it is unusual. 24 Concerning the district court's fourth stated reason, appellant argues that the guidelines already consider whether drug use plays a role in the offense and reject such use as a ground for departure. Appellant cites Sec. 5H1.4 which states in pertinent part: 25 Physical condition is not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines or where within the guidelines a sentence should fall. However, an extraordinary physical impairment may be a reason to impose a sentence other than imprisonment. 26 Drug dependence or alcohol abuse is not a reason for imposing a sentence below the guidelines. Substance abuse is highly correlated to an increased propensity to commit crime. 27 (Emphasis added). 28 In United States v. Richison, 901 F.2d 778 (9th Cir.1990), this court, in vacating an upward departure based upon the defendant's drug dependency, stated that the relevant part of Sec. 5H1.4 suggests that the Commission meant to foreclose consideration of dependency ... as a ground for downward departure. Id. at 781. More recently this court, in United States v. Page, 922 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.1991), upheld the district court's finding that it lacked discretion to depart downward based upon the defendant's extreme alcoholism. See also United States v. Deigert, 916 F.2d 916, 919 n. 2 (4th Cir.1990) (per curiam) (drug abuse may not, under even extraordinary circumstances, ... support a downward departure); United States v. Pharr, 916 F.2d 129, 133 (3rd Cir.1990) (We read policy statement [Sec. ] 5H1.4 to mean that dependence upon drugs, or separation from such a dependency, is not a proper basis for a downward departure from the guidelines). 29 Appellee points out that the district court was referring to a drug addiction to opiates which resulted from legally prescribed drugs administered for medical treatment. Appellee argues that his was not a drug dependence in the traditional sense, that his physical condition was extraordinary. However, appellee fails to reconcile the district court's downward departure with the language of Sec. 5H1.4, mandating that if the court finds an extraordinary physical condition it should impose a sentence other than imprisonment. (Emphasis added). Therefore, Sec. 5H1.4 does not apply to appellee's drug use. 30 Nevertheless, while Richison, Page, Deigert, and Pharr apparently foreclose consideration of dependency ... as a ground for departure, Richison, 901 F.2d at 781, what is strikingly absent from those decisions is any mention of Sec. 5K2.13. That section states: 31 If the defendant committed a non-violent offense while suffering from significantly reduced mental capacity not resulting from voluntary use of drugs or other intoxicants, a lower sentence may be warranted to reflect the extent to which reduced mental capacity contributed to the commission of the offense, provided that the defendant's criminal history does not indicate a need for incarceration to protect the public. 32 Sec. 5K2.13 permits a court to depart downward if the defendant suffered from diminished capacity that resulted from involuntary drug use, so long as the offense was nonviolent. 33 However, there is no evidence in the record that appellee in fact had diminished capacity. Furthermore, it appears that appellee's crimes were violent, making departure inappropriate. As we explained in United States v. Borrayo, 898 F.2d 91 (9th Cir.1990): 34 Because non-violent offense is not defined in the guidelines, we defer to the definition of crime of violence in the federal criminal statutes, which is used elsewhere in the guidelines. See Guidelines, Sec. 4B1.2. We find no basis for a conclusion that the Commission intended any other meaning. A crime of violence is defined as an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 16(a). Borrayo's acts are included in this definition because he threatened physical force. See also Guidelines, Sec. 4B1.2 commentary (robbery is a crime of violence). As a result, Sec. 5K2.13 is not available to Borrayo to support a departure. 35 898 F.2d at 94 (footnote omitted). 36 In the instant action appellee has pled guilty to four counts of unarmed bank robbery. The indictment refers to each count as occurring by force, violence, and intimidation. At the time of pleading the district court repeatedly asked appellee if he understood that he was pleading guilty to robbing by force and violence, and the appellee always responded in the affirmative. 37 Indeed, appellee's alleged modus operandi in the bank robberies was to hand a teller a threatening note. In one instance the note stated, This is a robbery. Give me all your money. Don't say anything. Don't stall!; in another instance the note stated, Do not do anything. This is a robbery! I want all your cash. Don't do anything rash. Don't pull any alarm, and the teller was told to keep quiet about it!; and in a third instance the teller was told not to press the silent alarm button or other people in the bank would be hurt. These threats are particularly relevant in light of the Sixth Circuit's holding that an unarmed bank robbery may fall within the definition of a crime of violence where an ordinary person in the teller's position reasonably could infer a threat of bodily harm. United States v. Maddalena, 893 F.2d 815, 819 (6th Cir.1989) (quoting United States v. Higdon, 832 F.2d 312, 315 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1075, 108 S.Ct. 1051, 98 L.Ed.2d 1013 (1988)). 38 Therefore, we find that appellee's offenses were sufficiently violent such that Sec. 5K2.13 does not apply. Since Sec. 5H1.4 is also inapplicable to appellee, his drug use should not have resulted in departure. Consequently, three of the four reasons stated by the district court were improper bases for downward departure because they were adequately considered by the Commission. The remaining reason given--that the sentence seemed out of line with those the judge had seen in similar cases--might have suggested that departure was appropriate, but did not in itself provide an adequate justification for departure. We therefore remand so that the district court may identify the reason for the disparity and determine whether it was a factor not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission.