Opinion ID: 2634089
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Did the district court err in ordering the appellant to pay for the cost of impaneling the jury when the appellant failed to appear for a trial setting?

Text: [¶22] The sentence imposed upon the appellant in this case contained a requirement that he pay the Clerk of District Court $1,440.00 because he failed timely to appear for his first trial setting. This sanction, requested by the State, represented the appearance fee for 48 prospective jurors. No objection to the sanction was lodged at the time it was imposed. The appellant now contends, however, that the district court erred thereby. [¶23] The parties' briefs provide little guidance in resolving this issue. The appellant cites Capellen v. State, 2007 WY 107, ¶ 11, 161 P.3d 1076, 1079 (Wyo. 2007), for the proposition that this Court reviews sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. He then relies upon U.R.D.C. 501(b) and Johnson v. State, 532 P.2d 598, 601 (Wyo. 1975), for the additional proposition that jury fees may not be taxed as part of the costs of prosecution in a criminal case. [3] The State more accurately describes the $1,440.00 assessment as a sanction, rather than a cost, which may be imposed under U.R.D.C. 901 for the appellant's failure timely to appear for trial. [4] Because there was no objection below, the State espouses plain error review in this Court. That standard was set forth hereinabove. See supra ¶ 14. An error of law under the circumstances may be considered an abuse of discretion. In re CT, 2006 WY 101, ¶ 8, 140 P.3d 643, 646 (Wyo. 2006). [¶24] The State cites Travelers Insurance Company v. Palmer, 714 P.2d 765, 765-67 (Wyo. 1986), where this Court affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions under U.R.D.C. 901 against a party for failing to appear at a scheduled pretrial conference. Further, the State contends that U.R.D.C. 503(b) specifically authorizes the district court to impose jury fees as a sanction for causing a mistrial, which the State defines as [a] trial that the judge brings to an end, without a determination on the merits, because of a procedural error or serious misconduct occurring during the proceedings. See Black's Law Dictionary 1023 (8th ed. 2004). What neither party does, however, is point the Court to any precedent for the precise question of whether a court may require a criminal defendant to pay, as a sanction, the jury appearance fees for failing to appear at a scheduled trial. [¶25] Wyoming's case law is clear that institutional costs, including jury fees, may not be assessed against a criminal defendant as costs. Seaton v. State, 811 P.2d 276, 282-83 (Wyo. 1991); King v. State, 780 P.2d 943, 958 (Wyo. 1989); Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698, 703 (Wyo. 1987); Johnson, 532 P.2d at 601; Arnold v. State, 306 P.2d 368, 378 (Wyo. 1957). We are not satisfied, however, that this answers the question presently before us. Clearly, the reason for not allowing the assessment of jury fees against a criminal defendant is based upon the desire to protect the constitutional jury trial right. Arnold, 306 P.2d at 377-78. We are not convinced that this precept automatically insulates a criminal defendant against appropriate sanctions for failing to appear for a scheduled trial. There is a fundamental difference between paying the cost of the jury before whom one was tried, and paying the one-day appearance fees for a jury venire that was dismissed due to one's dereliction. [¶26] Several paths exist, or at least have not been foreclosed by this Court, for the imposition of sanctions in these circumstances: (1) the inherent power of a trial court to manage its docket and enforce its orders; (2) contempt of court; and (3) enforcement of U.R.D.C. 901 and 503(b). See Bi-Rite Package, Inc. v. District Court of Ninth Judicial Dist., 735 P.2d 709, 710-17 (Wyo. 1987); Jerrel v. State, 765 P.2d 982, 983-84 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988); 20 Am. Jur. 2d Costs § 109 (2005). We are not willing to follow any of those paths in this case because the record simply does not provide us with sufficient facts to determine which path, if any, is appropriate. The primary problem is the total lack of any evidence that the appellant's failure to appear was willful. No transcript of the aborted trial is provided. Neither is there any testimony from the appellant or his counsel as to his tardiness. The only information in the record is found in The Court's Order Resetting Jury Trial, wherein the district court states that the appellant thought the time for trial was at 10:00 A.M. not 9:00 A.M. This is an inadequate basis for the imposition of sanctions. Also lacking in the record is any evidence as to the computation of the $1,440.00, other than the district court's statement that such was what it cost the County. That portion of the judgment and sentence ordering payment to the Clerk of District Court is reversed.