Opinion ID: 1192077
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Overlap of Claims

Text: Defendants also argue that the district court committed reversible error in submitting plaintiffs' Equal Protection Clause claims separately to the jury, when those claims substantially overlapped with plaintiff's claims under the First Amendment. Specifically, defendants characterize plaintiffs' main claim, under the First Amendment, as being that because of their political affiliation, plaintiffs were investigated and then fined for sharing commissions, an activity for which no other insurance agent or broker had been investigated or fined. This claim, defendants contend, substantially overlaps with plaintiffs' Equal Protection Clause claim. Defendants argue that submitting both claims to the jury was prejudicial as it likely resulted in duplicative recovery. Defendants, however, offer no explanation as to why it was impermissible to submit both theories to the jury. While their brief cites, without analysis, two of our cases, Rosenfeld v. Egy, 346 F.3d 11, 15 (1st Cir.2003) and Custodio, 964 F.2d at 45, we fail to see how either of these cases support their position. Custodio involved the dismissal, on summary judgment, of plaintiffs' Equal Protection claim premised on a local planning board's discretionary decision to deny them a land use permit, which we affirmed, finding that an equal protection clause claim was not stated. See 964 F.2d at 44. In affirming summary judgment, we also cited the policy dangers of allowing challenges to discretionary local permitting decisions to proceed on an Equal Protection theory and noted the overlap, in any event, between that plaintiff's Equal Protection and First Amendment theories. Id. at 44-45. Rosenfeld similarly involved a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, a police officer, on plaintiff's Equal Protection claim premised on the officer's discretionary decision to deny plaintiff's firearm permit renewal application. See 346 F.3d at 15. We affirmed the dismissal, reasoning that Rosenfeld ha[d] not presented sufficient evidence to show that he was treated differently than similarly situated individuals. Id. We then, citing the policy problems described in Custodio of permitting disgruntled applicants subjected to a discretionary permit denials to proceed under an Equal Protection theory, explained that in any event, the plaintiff's Equal Protection claim substantially overlap[ped] with his stronger First Amendment claim, which we also held to be not substantially supported. Id. at 15, 18. First, the language in Custodio and Rosenfeld regarding overlap is expressly limited to the discretionary benefit denial claim context, which is not presented here. Second, even if overlap were present, we see nothing in these cases that precludes a court from submitting to a jury First Amendment and Equal Protection claims that are both substantially supported. See, e.g., Torres-Torres v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir.2003) (noting that although ballot-access cases typically involve both First Amendment and Equal Protection claims and the two claims often overlap, it is sometimes appropriate to analyze them separately under different standards of review). It is, of course, true that a plaintiff is entitled to only one full recovery, no matter how many different legal grounds may support the verdict. Freeman v. Pack. Mach. Co., 865 F.2d 1331, 1345 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Borden v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 935 F.2d 370, 383 (1st Cir.1991) ([R]ecovery against a defendant under one tort theory precludes any duplicative recovery for the same damages under some other tort theory.). But in this circuit, the primary mechanisms to avoid impermissible duplicate awards for damages [on possibly overlapping claims] are the jury instructions and the structure of the verdict form. Valentín-Almeyda v. Municipality Of Aguadilla, 447 F.3d 85, 102 (1st Cir.2006). Furthermore, assuming that plaintiffs' First Amendment and Equal Protection claims did overlap, defendants have not shown that they suffered prejudice, i.e., any duplicative damages, as a result of the submission of both to the jury. While defendants allege, without elaboration, that the damage amounts awarded by the jury were most probably [] duplicated under a wrong impression that an amount in compensatory and punitive damages was warranted for each of the two overlapping claims, we find no basis for concluding that excessive recovery was in fact awarded. First, the verdict form called for one single damages award against Contreras on all four separate claims under the First Amendment and Equal Protection theories, which is the precise format that we described as proper practice for avoiding impermissible duplicate awards. See Acevedo-García v. Vera-Monroig, 351 F.3d 547, 569 (1st Cir.2003) (To the extent that a jury award on both claims would be duplicative, the proper practice is to ensure that the verdict form is structured so as to allow the jury to recompense the plaintiff['s] injuries just once.); see also Britton v. Maloney, 196 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir.1999) (explaining that when multiple claims exist but separate damages on each would be partly or wholly duplicative and parties agree that damages should be the same on each claim, the verdict form should identify separate bases for liability but have only a single line for damages). Second, the court gave [jury] instructions clearly directing the jury to compensate the plaintiff's injuries just once. Valentín-Almeyda, 447 F.3d at 102. Specifically, the court instructed the jurors that they must arrive at a sum of money that will justly, fairly and adequately compensate the plaintiffs for the actual pain, suffering and emotional distress [it] find[s] that they endured as a direct result of any constitutional deprivation, defamation, invasion of privacy or negligence. It further explained that [t]he damages that [it] award[s] must be fair compensation for all the plaintiffs' damages, no more or no less. Thus, even if the jury found that the same unlawful conduct and injury supported two theories of liability, there is no basis for assuming that the jury believed it was required to award plaintiffs a separate amount of damages for each claim. With no basis for concluding that duplicative recovery was awarded, there is no prejudice, and, as a result, no ground for disturbing the judgment. [26]