Opinion ID: 2974831
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cruse Decision

Text: According to Colvin, Cruse supports her argument that the ALJ erred in finding that she was capable of performing as a cutting machine operator despite her “poor” ratings on the medical assessment form. Colvin Br. at 14. We disagree. At issue in Cruse was a medical assessment form similar to the one used in the case at bar. Cruse, 49 F.3d at 618. The form in Cruse used the term “fair” to mean “seriously limited but not precluded,” id.,whereas in the case at bar “poor” is so defined. The Tenth Circuit concluded that “fair” would normally connote that there was “no disabling impairment,” and that as a result, the ALJ “misinterpreted . . . Ms. Cruse’s abilities to the extent [the evaluating doctors] described those abilities as ‘fair.’” Id. Colvin makes much of the following language in Cruse: “The ALJ apparently considered ‘fair’ as being evidence of ability. As that term is defined on the medical assessment form, we hold it is evidence of disability.” Id. Colvin takes Cruse to stand for the proposition that a finding of “seriously limited but not precluded” in an area is tantamount to a finding that one is unable to perform in that area. But that interpretation can not stand. The plain meaning of “seriously limited but not precluded” is that one is not precluded from performing in that area. It defies logic to assert that a finding of “not precluded” actually means that one is precluded. Further, the medical assessment form used to evaluate Colvin’s abilities also contained the “none” option, which is defined as “[n]o useful ability to function in this area.” J.A. at 355 (Medical Assessment). If Colvin were completely precluded from functioning in an area, then Dr. Lu had the option of checking the “none” box on the medical assessment form, rather than checking the “poor” box. Instead, we adopt the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the Cruse holding set forth in its decision in Cantrell v. Apfel, 231 F.3d 1104, 1107 (8th Cir. 2000). The claimant in Cantrell made an argument similar to Colvin’s argument in this case. Id. The Eighth Circuit responded: The word “fair” is both a measure of ability and disability. It is on the balance between poor ability to function and greater ability to function. A physician’s use of the term “fair” does not, on its own, declare that the claimant cannot return to past No. 06-3517 Colvin v. Barnhart Page 5 work. Rather, the term “fair” requires a review of the entire record in order to judge whether the balance tips toward functional ability or toward disability. Id. at 1107-08. We believe that this is a common-sense definition, and because “poor” in the case at bar has the same definition that “fair” had in Cruse and Cantrell, we apply the interpretation in Cantrell to the facts of this case.