Opinion ID: 430880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Massachusetts Statute, Mass.Gen.Laws Ann. ch. 272, Sec. 99 F(1)

Text: 8 We need not dwell long on basic presuppositions--that the objectives of federal legislation controlling electronic surveillance are to protect privacy, to establish uniform standards not only on a federal level but in a state or county governing the authorization of interceptions, and to ensure adherence to these standards through centralizing responsibility in top level state and county prosecutors who can be held accountable for departures from preestablished policy; and that, so long as federal standards are not jeopardized or eroded, state regulation is not proscribed but rather is specifically contemplated. 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(2). 9 The specific dispute in these appeals deals with ways of achieving the required centralized accountability. It arises from a perceived disparity of verbs employed in the federal statute and the implications of such disparity on the verb used in the Massachusetts statute. The pertinent federal provisions deal with both federal and state officials. As to the former, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(1) states: 10 The Attorney General, or any Assistant Attorney General specially designated by the Attorney General, may authorize an application to a Federal judge of competent jurisdiction for ... an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire or oral communications .... 11 As to state officials, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2516(2) states: 12 The principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision thereof, ... may apply to [a state court] judge for ... an order authorizing, or approving the interception of wire or oral communications .... 13 Appellants urge that we note the verbal difference between these two provisions: allowing the United States Attorney General or a specially designated Assistant Attorney General to authorize applications to a judge, while allowing principal state prosecuting attorneys (a state's attorney general or district attorney) merely to apply for an intercept order. The thought advanced is that, given the immensity of the jurisdiction of the United States Attorney General, he or his specially designated assistant must be allowed leeway by way of having other officials do the actual work of making application, while state attorneys general and the top prosecutors in each county need not have such assistance and must themselves be the applicants for intercept orders. Given this difference between authorize and apply, the Massachusetts statute, ch. 272, Sec. 99 F(1), must be seen as illegally expanding the federal statute, for it provides: 14 The attorney general, any assistant attorney general specially designated by the attorney general, any district attorney, or any assistant district attorney specially designated by the district attorney may apply ex parte to a judge of competent jurisdiction for a warrant to intercept wire or oral communications. 15 In short, argue appellants, the federal law recognizes only one applicant, the district attorney; the state statute would allow a second applicant, as here, the assistant district attorney. 16 If this were the complete statutory framework, appellants' argument would have formidable force: we would be confronting a state statute that gave an assistant district attorney power equal to that of a district attorney in initiating a request for court authority to intercept a telephonic communication. Such an expansion would run counter both to Sec. 2516(2), reposing application responsibility in one state official, and to the ample legislative history underscoring the need for centralization of policy relating to electronic surveillance in one top prosecutor at county and state levels. See infra, S.Rep. No. 1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, at 2187. 17 But we do not confront a Sec. 99 F(1) standing alone and vulnerable. It has been fortified by the carapace of deliberate judicial interpretation and supplementary requirements imposed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 327 N.E.2d 819 (1975). In that case the court not only subjected the Massachusetts statute to close scrutiny to determine whether or not it was in substantial compliance with the federal law, id. at 230, 327 N.E.2d 819, but added a detailed judicial gloss in the nature of a set of required procedures. It held that the procedures it mandated for the special designation by a district attorney of an assistant district attorney to apply for a warrant to intercept comport with the Federal enabling authority. Id. at 254, 327 N.E.2d 819. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Judicial Court imposed the following specific requirements: 18 1. It interpreted specially designated to mean that an assistant district attorney ... must bring the matter for examination before his senior officer, the district attorney; id. at 256, 327 N.E.2d 819. 19 2. [T]he district attorney is to determine whether a particular proposed use of electronic surveillance would be consistent with the overall policy. Id. This determination requires not a cursory but full examination by the district attorney of the application. Id. at 256 n. 16, 327 N.E.2d 819. 20 3. The district attorney must authorize each such application in writing, id. at 232, 256, 327 N.E.2d 819; the special designation of [an] ... assistant district attorney must be on a case by case basis with written authorization, id. at 257 n. 17, 327 N.E.2d 819. This satisfies the federal requirements even if they are read to require that the district attorney himself must apply for the warrant, but the court reads the federal requirements as being satisfied if the chief prosecuting officer has centralized authorizing power. Id. 21 The Supreme Judicial Court also recommended, [T]he better procedure is that the ... district attorney should cosign the application for the warrant with the designated assistant. Id. at 232, 327 N.E.2d 819. 22 The panel's decision, we now conclude, did not sufficiently take into account the extent to which Sec. 99 F(1) has been thus undergirded by Vitello. Unlike a situation where a state court interpretation might impose requirements less stringent than federal requirements, United States v. Marion, 535 F.2d 697, 702 (2d Cir.1976), the procedure mandated by the Supreme Judicial Court calls for far more protection than a mere form letter of designation, which would amount to nothing more than a standing order frustrating the twin congressional objectives of policy uniformity and political accountability, and would constitute an abdication of responsibility. The detailed review by a district attorney of every application for a proposed use of electronic surveillance on a case by case basis, and his written special designation of an assistant to submit and prosecute the application before a justice, would seem to satisfy fully the congressional objectives. Indeed, insofar as the Massachusetts procedures restrict the district attorney to designating only an assistant district attorney to apply for a warrant, it is narrower than the federal procedure. 23 All of this is consistent with what the Congress was trying to achieve. The Senate report relating to Sec. 2515(2) contains unmistakable clues to the meaning of apply, indicating its equivalence with authorize. It begins by saying that: 24 Section 2516 of the new chapter authorizes the interception of particular wire or oral communication under court order pursuant to the authorization of the appropriate Federal, State, or local prosecuting officer. S.Rep. No. 1097, reprinted in 1968 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2112, 2185. It continues with a sentence stating: 25 Paragraph (2) provides that the principal prosecuting attorney of any State or the principal prosecuting attorney of any political subdivision of a State may authorize an application to a State judge of competent jurisdiction, as defined in section 2510(9), for an order authorizing the interception of wire or oral communications. Id. at 2187. 26 The following sentence states that the issue of delegation by that officer would be a question of State law. Id. If all this sentence meant was merely that state law could permit an office messenger to deliver a district attorney's wiretap application to the superior court, it would seem clearly an exercise in supererogation. 27 The debate in the Congress confirms the Senate report. Senator McClellan, the bill's sponsor, repeatedly indicated that what was contemplated by the legislation was approval or authorization by the chief prosecuting attorney. 114 Cong.Rec. 11,208 (1968); 114 Cong.Rec. 11,231 (1968); 114 Cong.Rec. 14,469 (1968). 28 Appellants, as we understand them, do not contest the accuracy of this capsule summary of legislative history. They make their stand on the proposition that the words of the federal statute speak so clearly that recourse to legislative history is impermissible. They take the position that Sec. 2516(2) in authorizing a state district attorney to apply differs significantly from Sec. 2516(1), which authorizes the United States Attorney General or his specially designated assistant to authorize an application. Were these two words precise and antipathetic, we would agree; but they are not. Apply seems to us to range from the ministerial act of filing a paper with someone, to the more significant act of signing the paper that is filed, and to the most significant act of deciding that there should be a paper prepared, signed, and filed. Moreover, Sec. 2518(1)(a) states that each wiretap application shall include the identity of the investigative or law enforcement officer making the application, and the officer authorizing the application. Does apply apply to both categories? The answer would not seem so clear as to preclude resort to legislative history. 29 Finally, we are admonished that, when issues of preemption are involved, we must look at the relationship of state and federal laws as they are interpreted and applied, not merely as they are written. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 526, 97 S.Ct. 1305, 1310, 51 L.Ed.2d 604 (1977). We are to look for an unambiguous Congressional mandate, Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 147, 83 S.Ct. 1210, 1219, 10 L.Ed.2d 248 (1963), and to consult legislative history. Id. at 148-50, 83 S.Ct. at 1220-21. We have accordingly been sensitive to the claims of Congressional intent in approaching preemption claims. Grinnell Corp. v. Hackett, 475 F.2d 449, 454-57 (1st Cir.1973); Chrysler Corp. v. Rhodes, 416 F.2d 319, 323 (1st Cir.1969). 30 We therefore deem it both permissible and sensible to consider this clearly expressed intent of the Congress. As we have indicated, we are of the view that Sec. 99 F(1), as glossed by Vitello, is entirely consistent with the intent of Congress. We note that this holding places us in agreement with the Second Circuit in United States v. Tortorello, 480 F.2d 764 (1973) (though New York statutes defined applicant as a district attorney, it was sufficient if the district attorney approved an application prepared by his assistants) and in Alexander v. Harris, 595 F.2d 87, 89 (1979) (holding that a New Jersey statute allowing the district attorney to authorize in writing applications by investigative personnel was in conformity with Sec. 2516(2)); and with the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554 (1974) (holding that a Florida statute directing that the governor authorize initial applications was consistent with federal law). 31