Opinion ID: 1794946
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alternative Grounds

Text: Although not raised in the Second District, Hartford argues that it obtained a valid assignment of Ryan's rights under the CGL policies through the General Indemnity Agreement (GIA) entered into between Hartford and Ryan in 1994. [7] We have authority to consider alternative grounds for affirming the decision below that were not raised by the parties. See Radio Station WQBA, 731 So.2d at 644. However, after examining the language of the 1994 GIA, we conclude that it does not constitute an assignment of the rights of the principal to sue its insurer for insurance coverage after the dispute arose. Hartford also asserts that it is entitled to an award of fees under the statute based on an implied assignment, similar to the one we recognized under the unique circumstances in All Ways Reliable Building Maintenance, Inc. v. Moore, 261 So.2d 131 (Fla.1972). In that case, a house repair company brought suit against both the owner and the insurance company that covered the owner's house for fire damage. Id. at 131. The owner filed a cross-claim arguing that the insurer was responsible because the insurer's agent had preapproved All Ways' estimate for the repairs. Id. The trial court awarded judgments in favor of All Ways and the owner and approved an award of attorney's fees to both parties. Southern Am. Fire Ins. Co. v. All Ways Reliable Bldg. Maint., Inc., 251 So.2d 11, 13 (Fla. 4th DCA 1971). In approving the trial court's award, this Court determined that a contract between All Ways and the insurance company arose by implication. All Ways, 261 So.2d at 132. This implied contract logically included an assignment of the owner's claim against the insurer. Id. We stated that [u]nder such circumstances it is highly technical and unrealistic to take the view that [the statute] does not authorize an attorney's fee for All Ways Reliable. All Ways Reliable was found by implication of the related circumstances to be the assignee of the insured Elsie Moore's loss claim against the insurance company; and, having successfully sued the insurance company which denied the claim for the amount representing the fire loss, was entitled concomitantly to the attorney's fee. Id. We held that, despite being neither a named insured nor a named beneficiary under the policy, All Ways was entitled to an award of its attorney's fees based on an implied assignment from the owner. Id. The circumstances justifying the implied assignment in All Ways are distinguishable from the facts in this case. Hartford did not perform under the bond as a result of the insurers' determination that the damage was covered by the CGL policies. To the contrary, the insurers maintain that they disputed liability from the beginning, even before Hartford settled the underlying litigation. Moreover, Hartford had a duty to perform under the surety bond regardless of whether the CGL policies covered the damage. Hartford does not, and simply cannot, allege that it detrimentally relied, as the repair company did in All Ways, upon an approval from the insurers prior to performing under the bond. Therefore, there are no circumstances that would justify the existence of either an implied contract or implied assignment between the surety and insurers in this case. To the extent that our decision in All Ways appears to recognize an equitable basis for recovering attorney's fees under section 627.428, we limit that case to its unique facts. Hartford lastly argues that a denial of fees to the Surety would lead to the Contractor's responsibility to indemnify the Surety for payment of its fees without the possibility of reimbursement from the Primary Insurer and the Excess Insurer. Continental, 910 So.2d at 301. Essentially, the argument is that a denial of fees to Hartford would exalt form over substance, because Ryan is liable for Hartford's fees regardless of the outcome of this appeal. Id. Continental and Lumbermens do not agree that the contractor, as principal, would be liable under the GIA for the surety's attorney's fees in the underlying coverage dispute. We do not interpret the GIA, agreement. Even assuming that Hartford is correct, it is outside this Court's purview to correct a potential inequity by interpreting a statute contrary to its plain language. Our conclusion does not rest on whether it is sound public policy to allow a surety to recover its attorney's fees from the insurer under these circumstances. If there is an injustice that requires the expansion of the statutory class of entities entitled to recover attorney's fees under section 627.428, that argument is one best addressed by the Legislature. See Parker v. Parker, 950 So.2d 388, 394 (Fla.2007); Dowell v. Gracewood Fruit Co., 559 So.2d 217, 218 (Fla.1990).