Opinion ID: 2268995
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Second motion to compel

Text: We turn to Sam's second motion to compel, filed while his first was pending. Both were decided the same day, some three months after Sam filed the second motion; the court denied the second as redundant, and later awarded Kathleen full fees as to it because she never should have been put to the expense of defending [against] the [second] motion at all. In response to a question from this court at oral argument, Sam's lawyer agreed that the second motion was redundant. But we note that the second motion addressed only the Azalea items (not the road fabric or fuel claims), and that it elaborated on the Azalea items request legally and factually, in asserting that most of the items were personal to Sam's family and were owned by Sam before the marriage, and that the remaining items were attached to his military career. It was also accompanied by Sam's affidavit, which explained the provenance of many of the disputed items. The second motion was filed April 18, 2008, several days before Kathleen filed her opposition to Sam's first motion. No doubt many or all of the contentions advanced in Sam's second motion to compel and its supporting papers could or should have been raised in the first. Kathleen therefore might have been awarded enhanced fees for having to address the Azalea items twice, initially in opposing the first motion, and then in addressing the expanded contentions in the second. But even though both motions sought the same 28-some items, the second motion and the supporting affidavit helpfully clarified the potential merit in Sam's request. Mere redundancy, under the circumstances, does not justify awarding full reasonable fees as to the second motion. Moreover, the heirloom order established that at least some of the claims made in Sam's second motion had merit. And because Sam filed the second motion before the heirloom order granted him partial relief on his first motion, bad faith cannot be inferred from his effort to refine his as-yet unresolved contentions. Our comments about Sam's first motion to compel and the Rule 82(b)(3)(F), (G), (H), and (K) findings apply equally to his second motion to compel. We therefore conclude that Kathleen was not entitled to full fees on Sam's second motion to compel.