Opinion ID: 2164543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Burden of Proof Regarding the Insanity Defense

Text: In State v. Burnham, Me., 406 A.2d 889 (1979), decided after defendant's conviction below, this court reaffirmed the constitutionality of Maine's statutory provision relating to the defendant's burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he lacks criminal responsibility as described in subsection 1. [2] 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(3) (Supp.1979); see State v. Burnham, supra at 892. We also noted the well-established rule that the State is constitutionally required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of a mental state that is an essential element of the crime charged. Id. at 893-95; In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Defendant concedes that this allocation of the burdens of proof does not violate due process of law in a case where a person may specifically intend to commit a crime even though he may suffer from a mental disease or defect which causes him to formulate such an intent. State v. Buzynski, Me., 330 A.2d 422, 429-30 (1974). He claims, however, that in a case such as this where his particular brand of mental defect by definition precludes the capacity to intend to kill, the requirement that he prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence has the effect of placing upon him the burden of disproving intent, in violation of the principles declared in Winship. Contrary to defendant's contention, we recognized and answered this very question in State v. Burnham, supra . There we stated that a problem arises only when the mental disease or defect, rather than causing the formation of a culpable state of mind, destroys the defendant's capacity to form the intention required for the crime. Id. at 894 (emphasis in original). In such cases the factfinder, in either a unitary or a bifurcated trial, must consider any evidence of mental abnormality in order to determine whether a reasonable doubt exists as to the defendant's culpable state of mind at the time of the crime. Id. at 894-96. The burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt on the existence of the requisite mental state rests with the State; it never shifts to the defendant. It is only when and if the State has met its burden of proving each and every element of the offense, including the necessary mens rea, that the factfinder then has to determine whether defendant has met his burden of proving by a preponderance that he was not criminally responsible because of mental disease or defect. See 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(1). Defendant additionally argues that because the trial was held prior to our decision in Burnham, the Superior Court justice failed to consider evidence of mental disease or defect in evaluating whether the State had established beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing of Diane Bridges was done intentionally or knowingly. The record clearly refutes defendant's argument. After finding defendant guilty the Superior Court justice, in making detailed findings, considered, as required by 17-A M.R.S.A. § 58(1-A) and later elucidated by Burnham, the psychiatric and psychological testimony in determining whether there existed a reasonable doubt of the existence of an intentional or knowing state of mind. Examining the justice's conduct of the trial under the guidelines of Burnham, we find no inappropriate findings or conclusions.