Opinion ID: 2452008
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance

Text: Adams' last argument on this appeal is that the district judge erred in denying her motion for new trial based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel. A claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel presents mixed questions of law and fact requiring de novo review. Harris v. State, 288 Kan. 414, 416, 204 P.3d 557 (2009). When a district judge has held a full evidentiary hearing on the issue, this court determines whether the district judge's factual findings are supported by substantial competent evidence and whether those findings are sufficient to support the trial court's conclusions of law. See Bellamy v. State, 285 Kan. 346, 354-55, 172 P.3d 10 (2007). To establish reversible error, Adams must meet the two-pronged test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); see also Chamberlain v. State, 236 Kan. 650, 656-57, 694 P.2d 468 (1985) (adopting the Strickland holding). The test requires a defendant to show: (1) counsel committed serious errors that undermined the Sixth Amendment's guarantee to effective assistance, and (2) counsel's deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. 466 U.S. at 689-96, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Harris, 288 Kan. at 416, 204 P.3d 557. The first prong of the Strickland test requires a finding that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Chamberlain, 236 Kan. at 656-57, 694 P.2d 468. The sphere of permissible, reasonable professional conduct is broad, and courts are highly deferential in their assessment of attorney performance. There is a strong presumption that counsel's representation fell within the wide range of professional conduct. Harris, 288 Kan. at 416, 204 P.3d 557. Strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable, and strategic choices made after less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. State v. Gleason, 277 Kan. 624, 644, 88 P.3d 218 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91, 104 S.Ct. 2052). The burden is on a defendant to demonstrate that the alleged deficiencies were not the result of strategy. Gleason, 277 Kan. at 644, 88 P.3d 218 (citing Ferguson v. State, 276 Kan. 428, 446, 78 P.3d 40 [2003]). The second prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. Chamberlain, 236 Kan. at 656-57, 694 P.2d 468. Adams cannot meet either prong of the Strickland test. At the evidentiary hearing on Adams' motion for new trial, both she and her trial counsel testified about the alleged defects in his representation. Their testimony demonstrated that Newton's performance was well within the bounds of competent, professional representation. Indeed, his concession to several of the additional demands Adams placed on him would have been detrimental to her interests. In other words, he exercised exactly the judgment counsel is meant to exercise, including judgment designed to save the client from himself of herself. Under the circumstances presented here, the district judge's findings on Strickland 's first-prong were amply supported by substantial competent evidence and those findings were sufficient to support the judge's conclusions of law. The situation is likewise on the second prong of Strickland. Shymire's injuries were catastrophic. The State's case against her mother was powerful. Even if we perceived weakness in Newton's performance, which we do not, there was no prejudice flowing from it. There was virtually no chance the jury could have concluded other than it did. In view of all of the foregoing discussion, Adams' claims of error on this appeal are rejected, and her conviction of first-degree felony murder is hereby affirmed. DAVIS, C.J., not participating. PHILIP C. VIEUX, District Judge, assigned.