Opinion ID: 145260
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The district court retained jurisdiction to consider and grant Gall's motion.

Text: Just as it did in Gentry, the Commonwealth argues that the district court no longer has habeas jurisdiction because Gall has been released from the custody of the Kentucky prison. And just as it was in Gentry, the Commonwealth is incorrect. In support of its argument, the Commonwealth cites Gentry for the proposition that when a state meets the terms of the habeas court's condition, thereby avoiding the writ's actual issuance, the habeas court does not retain any further jurisdiction over the matter. (Appellant's Br. at 9 (citing Gentry, 456 F.3d at 692).) The Commonwealth proceeds to argue that it met the terms of Gall's conditional writ by releasing him to the state of Ohio, so the habeas court lost jurisdiction at that time. In relying upon this statement, the Commonwealth reveals a misreading of Gentry [6] and a fundamental misunderstanding of the concept of conditional writs of habeas corpus. As we explained in Gentry, the sole distinction between a conditional and an absolute grant of the writ of habeas corpus is that the former lies latent unless and until the state fails to perform the established condition, at which time the writ springs to life, and, thus, [c]onditional grants of writs of habeas corpus are final orders ... exactly like absolute grants, and they ordinarily and ideally operate automatically, that is, without the need for the district court to act further. 456 F.3d at 692. An absolute writ immediately provides the petitioner the right to relief from all direct and collateral consequences of the unconstitutional conviction. A conditional writ places a hold on that right pending the state's exercise of the option allowed by the conditional writ but, if the state does not exercise the option, the conditional writ converts into an absolute writ, complete with the right to relief from all direct and collateral consequences. Id. The federal court retains jurisdiction to afford that relief until the unconstitutional judgment is gone. Eddleman v. McKee, 586 F.3d 409, 413 (6th Cir.2009). In Gentry, as in the case of most conditional writs, the option was for the state to retry the defendant. Because it failed to exercise that option, the writ became absolute. [7] The same is generally true in this case, the only difference being the nature of the condition placed on the writ. The option provided the Commonwealth by the conditional writ was to initiate involuntary commitment proceedings. When it failed to exercise that option, the writ became absolute. Thus, as in Gentry, the federal court retains jurisdiction to effectuate and enforce the judgment encompassed by the now-absolute writ provided that all other requisites for federal jurisdiction, such as a live case or controversy, are also present.