Opinion ID: 504646
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mail Fraud and Mail Fraud Conspiracy

Text: 28 In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of mail fraud and conspiracy to commit mail fraud, Rubin argues that there was no evidence of a conspiracy and no evidence that Wagner and Robles were precluded from doing Assembly work. His first argument is untenable; his second misconceives the charges against him. 29 The fundamental element of a conspiracy is unlawful agreement. United States v. Wardy, 777 F.2d 101, 107 (2d Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053, 106 S.Ct. 1280, 89 L.Ed.2d 587 (1986); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d 121, 154 (2d Cir.1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 907, 100 S.Ct. 1833, 64 L.Ed.2d 260 (1980). The government's proof of an agreement does not require evidence of a formal or express agreement; it is enough that the parties have a tacit understanding to carry out the prohibited conduct. United States v. Wardy, 777 F.2d at 107; United States v. Swarek, 656 F.2d 331, 336 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1034, 102 S.Ct. 573, 70 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981). Both the existence of the conspiracy and the intent to commit the underlying substantive offenses may be proven by circumstantial evidence. United States v. Turcotte, 515 F.2d 145, 150 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1032, 96 S.Ct. 564, 46 L.Ed.2d 406 (1975); United States v. Barnes, 604 F.2d at 161-62. 30 Taken in the light most favorable to the government, the evidence adduced at trial supports the conclusion that Rubin had the requisite understanding with others to defraud the State of funds that he used to compensate his secretaries for private law-practice work. The evidence included proof that Cohen and Lipshutz put Wagner and Robles on their payrolls at the behest of Rubin; that Wagner and Robles regularly submitted false certifications that they were performing specified Assembly jobs; that Cohen submitted certificates and vouchers affirming that Wagner and Robles were providing the services called for in the designated positions; that Cohen, at best, never knew whether Wagner (who worked directly across the hall from Cohen's office in Queens) ever did any Assembly work; that Lipshutz submitted certificates and vouchers affirming that Robles was performing work for certain Assembly committees; and that though Lipshutz had complained to Rubin that she felt uncomfortable about making her certifications, she had gone along because Rubin told her she should not complain because the QDO had been good to her. Wagner and Robles testified that, notwithstanding their own affirmations of services performed and the certifications provided by the Assembly members, they spent, respectively, only 1% and 2% of their time on Assembly work. Though Rubin argues that their testimony was not credible and that it permitted the inference that Wagner and Robles did sufficient Assembly work that the State was not defrauded of its funds, the decision whether, and to what extent, to believe any of the witnesses lay within the province of the jury, and we will not overturn its evident decision to credit Wagner and Robles. Taking all of the testimony in the light most favorable to the government, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit a rational juror to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Rubin had conspired with Cohen, Lipshutz, Wagner, or Robles, or with all of them, to cause the State to pay substantial sums for non-Assembly work. 31 Finally, Rubin's argument that there was no evidence that he conspired to preclude Wagner and Robles from doing Assembly work misses the mark. Rubin was charged with, and convicted of, having fraudulently obtained State moneys to pay for his private secretaries' performance of his private law work. The government adduced proof that the secretaries received some 50% of their compensation from the State while spending only 1-2% of their time on State matters. It had no obligation to prove that there was any agreement to preclude their doing Assembly work.