Opinion ID: 1099300
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Careless, Reckless or Negligent Manner

Text: A crime is conduct legislatively defined as criminal. La.Rev.Stat. 14:7. Louisiana criminal statutes generally include a requirement of either specific or general criminal intent within the definition of a particular crime. However, criminal conduct may also consist of an act or failure to act that produces criminal consequences without a requirement of criminal intent. La.Rev.Stat. 14:8(2). Nevertheless, La. Rev.Stat. 14:11, in distinguishing crimes requiring criminal intent from those in which no intent is required, provides that [s]ome crimes consist merely of criminal negligence that produces criminal consequences. (emphasis added). From these provisions under the section entitled Elements of Crimes, one could reasonably conclude that criminal conduct normally requires either criminal intent or criminal negligence, which is defined by La.Rev. Stat. 14:12 as: Criminal negligence exists when, although neither specific nor general criminal intent is present, there is such disregard of the interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances. [4] The court of appeal, in interpreting legislative intent, focused on the absence of the modifier criminally before the word negligent in La.Rev.Stat. 34:851.6 and on the lesser penalty as compared to the penalty in the negligent homicide statute in the Criminal Code. The court noted that the lesser penalty in the watercraft statute was strongly indicative that the Legislature intended to proscribe a lesser degree of negligence. There are, however, other factors to be considered. In State v. Jones, 298 So.2d 774 (La. 1974), this court equated the term recklessness with criminal negligence and gross negligence. See also State v. Dean, 154 La. 671, 98 So. 82 (1923). In Jones, the defendant was charged with negligent homicide, defined by La.Rev.Stat. 14:32 as the killing of a human being by criminal negligence. This court, referring to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500(g) (1934) to distinguish reckless misconduct from negligent misconduct by the degree of the risk, noted that reckless misconduct consists of an intentional reckless act which the actor knows or should know creates a strong probability that harm may result, while negligent misconduct consists of mere inadvertence, incompetence, unskillfulness or a failure to take precautions to enable the actor to cope adequately with a possible or probable future emergency. Id. at 775. Stating that the prosecutor is required to show more than a mere deviation from the standard of ordinary care, the court held that the defendant's loss of control, in moving back into the driving lane during a passing maneuver on a two-lane highway upon seeing an approaching vehicle, did not constitute criminal negligence when the evidence showed that the defendant was not intoxicated and was traveling within the posted speed limit. The Legislature, in enacting La.Rev.Stat. 34:851.6, provided that one means for commission of that crime was by causing a death while operating a watercraft in a careless, reckless or negligent manner. Viewed in the legislative and jurisprudential context discussed above, the Legislature's parallel use of the three adjectives, after this court had equated recklessness with criminal negligence in Jones, indicates an intention to proscribe conduct more offensive than mere inadvertence. [5] Significantly, the Legislature did not specifically express an intent to depart from its well-established pattern of proscribing only criminal negligence. If the Legislature had intended to change the established connotation of recklessness and negligence, it could have spoken with much more certainty rather than simply omitting the modifier criminally when using the term negligent in parallel with the term reckless, the meaning of which had been established in State v. Jones, 298 So.2d 774 (La.1974). In the absence of a clear legislative intent to the contrary, the three adjectives should be construed in a similar fashion to require the prosecutor to prove a degree of carelessness or negligence equivalent to recklessness, which involves such a disregard of the interest of others that the offender's conduct amounts to a gross deviation below the standard of care expected to be maintained by a reasonably careful man under like circumstances. La.Rev.Stat. 14:12. Had the Legislature intended to make criminal any death produced by mere carelessness or ordinary negligence, the term reckless would not likely appear in the context in which it is found in this statute. [6] Additionally, the crime of negligent homicide in the Criminal Code prohibits a broad range of killings by criminal negligence such as by reckless operation of a vehicle, reckless use of a firearm, and the like. See La.Rev.Stat. 14:32, Reporter's Comment. The broad penalty range of the negligent homicide statute in the Criminal Code is consistent with the broad range of prohibited conduct. On the other hand, La.Rev.Stat. 34:851.6 focuses on the much narrower problem of homicides caused by operation of a watercraft, which is subject to a much lesser degree of governmental control (such as posted speed limits, prohibition of specific conduct such as crossing the center line and the like) than is operation of motor vehicles. The narrower penalty range in the watercraft statute is consistent with the narrower scope of the statute. This conclusion is also consistent with the placement of the crime definition under the Title of the Revised Statutes on watercraft, rather than in the Criminal Code. The decision on rehearing in this case is also consistent with the approach taken by this court in State v. Taylor, 463 So.2d 1274 (La.1985). The Taylor decision interpreted the vehicular homicide statute so as to include the requirement that the alcohol-influenced condition of the accused caused the fatal accident. Although the statute literally could have been interpreted to apply whenever a homicide occurred during the accused's alcohol-influenced operation of his vehicle, regardless of whether or not any fault on his part contributed to the causation of the death, we declined to attribute to the Legislature an intent to impose criminal liability based solely on the coincidental fact that the fatal accident occurred (without fault on the part of the accused) while the accused was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol. See also State v. Brown, 389 So.2d 48 (La.1980) (the statute prohibiting possession of pentazocine impliedly requires knowledge by the accused of the nature of the substance possessed, since a contrary interpretation would offend principles of due process). The underlying rationale of Taylor and Brown suggests that this court should not interpret a criminal statute so as to eliminate a criminal mental element in the absence of express legislative intent to do so. Arguably, the Legislature may define as criminal conduct the mere inadvertent act or omission during the operation of a watercraft which results in a death. [7] However, the Legislature did not expressly do so in enacting La.Rev.Stat. 34:851.6, and we decline to ascribe to the Legislature such an intent in the absence of a clear expression. We therefore conclude that La.Rev.Stat. 34:851.6 requires criminal negligence as an essential element of the crime committed by the careless, reckless or negligent operation of a watercraft and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jurors that they could return a verdict of guilty if they found simply that defendant did an act which an ordinarily careful, prudent man under like circumstances would not do.... See footnote 3.