Opinion ID: 2441888
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hardy's statement qualified as a request to discharge his counsel.

Text: At the outset, we address the threshold question of whether Hardy's statement regarding thinking about changing [his] attorney or something qualifies as a request to discharge counsel. We have observed that any statement by the defendant from which the court could reasonably conclude that the defendant desire[s to discharge his counsel is] sufficient for the court to consider that statement as a request to discharge counsel. Snead v. State, 286 Md. 122, 127, 406 A.2d 98, 101 (1979). There is no talismanic phrase that a defendant must utter to make such a request, Leonard v. State, 302 Md. 111, 124, 486 A.2d 163, 169 (1985); rather, the defendant need only indicate reasonably to the court a desire to discharge his or her counsel in order to engage the requirement that the court consider the defendant's motion. State v. Campbell, 385 Md. 616, 631, 870 A.2d 217, 225 (2005); see also Snead, 286 Md. at 130, 406 A.2d at 102 (noting that former rule governing procedure for requests to discharge counsel is triggered when a defendant indicates a desire or inclination to waive counsel (emphasis added)). A defendant makes such a request even when his or her statement constitutes more a declaration of dissatisfaction with counsel than an explicit request to discharge. See, e.g., Campbell, 385 Md. at 632, 870 A.2d at 226 (finding request to discharge counsel when defendant stated I don't like this man as my representative.... We had conflicts way before this ever started); Fowlkes v. State, 311 Md. 586, 607, 536 A.2d 1149, 1160 (1988) (treating as request to discharge counsel defendant's statement that [i]f possible I would rather get rid of her [my attorney], get new [sic] attorney); Leonard, 302 Md. at 125, 486 A.2d at 170 (declaring request to discharge counsel obvious where defendant said can I get appointed another counsel? ... Well, he's not representing me then); Snead, 286 Md. at 131, 406 A.2d at 103 (finding request to discharge counsel when defendant said I don't want no attorney then). Hardy's statement here was hardly talismanic, but it communicated nevertheless his unhappiness (albeit a passing state of mind at the time) with his trial counsel clearly enough to constitute a request to discharge counsel. Although not worded as a decisional motion, Hardy's declaration that he was thinking about changing the attorney or something reasonably should have led a trial judge to conclude that Hardy wanted, or at the very least was inclined, to discharge his counsel. That is all that Maryland law requires in order for a court to consider his statement a request to discharge counsel and address the matter accordingly. As in Campbell, Fowlkes, Leonard, and Snead, Hardy's statement was an indication of dissatisfaction with his lawyer, and, likewise, Hardy's statement qualifies as a request to discharge defense counsel. [8]