Opinion ID: 1251685
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Annette A. Matter

Text: In August 1978, Annette A. paid petitioner $250 to file a petition for dissolution of marriage. Petitioner advised her to file a petition in bankruptcy since she was heavily in debt and might lose her home. Petitioner filed the dissolution petition in September 1978, and obtained a temporary support order for Ms. A. the following February. In November 1978, Ms. A. gave petitioner $100 to pay the filing fee for her bankruptcy petition. Petitioner prepared a bankruptcy petition but never filed it. At the State Bar hearing, petitioner maintained that the $100 was only for his services in helping her to prepare the bankruptcy petition. It did not include a filing fee, as she was to file in propria persona. However, when Ms. A. wrote to him on November 27th to confirm that she had paid $100 for a bankruptcy filing fee, he did not correct her. He also failed to respond to a February 1979 letter urging him again to file the bankruptcy petition as she was being harassed by creditors. In May of 1979, petitioner referred her to another attorney to represent her in the bankruptcy. Early in 1979, Ms. A. was served with a complaint from Wells Fargo Bank. According to her testimony at the State Bar hearing, she sent petitioner a copy of the complaint, talked with him by telephone, and confirmed the conversation by letter in April. Petitioner failed to take any action, either to defend against the Wells Fargo suit or to file the bankruptcy petition which would have stayed the Wells Fargo matter. Ultimately, Wells Fargo obtained a default judgment against Ms. A. As the bankruptcy petition had not yet been filed, a lien was placed against her home for the judgment. Meanwhile, Ms. A.'s husband had fallen behind in his support payments. Petitioner failed to return any of her phone calls about this matter or to take any action after February of 1979. In July, Ms. A. retained a new attorney for the dissolution. The new attorney was unable to obtain petitioner's signature on a substitution agreement and ultimately obtained an order of substitution from the court. When Ms. A. went to petitioner's office to pick up her file, she found his door padlocked. The hearing panel found that petitioner performed minimal or no services on the dissolution case after February 5th. It found that he failed to execute the substitution and failed to return his client's file and documents. It also found that Ms. A. had paid petitioner to file  not merely to prepare  her petition in bankruptcy. As to both matters, the panel found that by failing to provide services or to communicate with Ms. A., petitioner had abandoned his client. It also found that petitioner refused to refund the $100 bankruptcy filing fee which Ms. A. had advanced him. The hearing panel found that Ms. A. provided petitioner with the legal pleadings in the Wells Fargo suit, that he had agreed to take care of it, that he had performed no services on her behalf, and failed to communicate reasonably with his client. These factual findings amply support the hearing panel's conclusion that petitioner violated (1) section 6067 in all three cases; (2) rule 2-111(A)(2) in the dissolution case; and (3) rule 6-101(2) in the bankruptcy and Wells Fargo cases. [6] Petitioner's major attack is on the finding that he promised to file a bankruptcy petition for Ms. A. Specifically, he contends that Ms. A. submitted to the State Bar an altered copy of the receipt which he gave her in November 1978 for the disputed $100 payment. He claims she typed the words Bankruptcy Filing Fee onto this receipt for the hearing. Petitioner has furnished this court with what he asserts is the original of the receipt which does not include the typed words. He states that he did not discover this original until after the hearing was concluded. [7] While this court may receive additional evidence under proper circumstances (Code Civ. Proc., § 909), it is not appropriate to do so here. The only justification which petitioner offers for his failure to present the original receipt at the time of the hearing is the disorganized state of his files  the very problem which apparently led to his disciplinary violations. Furthermore, the original receipt, without the typed words on it, does not substantially undermine the panel's finding that he did undertake to file Ms. A.'s bankruptcy petition. Petitioner himself testified that he originally agreed to file the petition, and later told Ms. A. that she should file it herself. The panel implicitly found that he did not communicate to Ms. A. his subsequent decision not to file the petition. This finding is amply supported by Ms. A.'s letters and petitioner's own conduct in referring her to another attorney to file for bankruptcy. The state of the original receipt does not contradict any of this evidence. (8) However, the hearing panel's finding that petitioner failed to return the $100 to Ms. A. on demand (rule 8-101(B)(4)) is not supported by the record. Although Ms. A. testified that petitioner had not refunded this money, she did not testify that she had asked him to do so. While the record could support a conclusion that petitioner's conduct amounted to a violation of rule 2-111(A)(3) [8] it does not indicate that he failed to [p]romptly pay or deliver to the client as requested by a client the funds ... which the client is entitled to receive. (Rule 8-101(B)(4).) Therefore, that finding must be set aside. Petitioner also challenges the finding that he failed to respond to the Wells Fargo complaint. Essentially he contends that Ms. A. did not notify him that a complaint had been filed. The hearing panel heard testimony from both Ms. A. and petitioner on this point. Evidently, it resolved the credibility contest in her favor. (2b) Findings which rest primarily on testimonial evidence are to be accorded deference. ( Vaughn v. State Bar, supra, 6 Cal.3d at p. 852.) Accordingly, petitioner's simple assertion that Ms. A.'s testimony is untrue does not compel this court to set aside that finding. Petitioner also disputes the panel's findings on the dissolution matter. He argues that no action on the case was necessary between February and July of 1979. This argument is refuted by Ms. A.'s request for assistance in April of 1979, to enforce her temporary support order against her husband. Whether or not petitioner could have succeeded in obtaining additional support payments for Ms. A., the record indicates that he did not even consider attempting to do so. Even assuming that he did decide that efforts to enforce the order would be fruitless, this would not justify a failure to communicate his decision to Ms. A. or to cooperate with her new counsel. Even if Ms. A. were not actually prejudiced by petitioner's failure to communicate concerning the dissolution case, it is clear that she was seriously harmed by his refusal to speak with her about the bankruptcy and Wells Fargo matters. There can be no justification for his silence and inattention during these months. (9) As the court has held, [f]ailure to communicate with, and inattention to the needs of, a client are proper grounds for discipline. ( Spindell v. State Bar (1975) 13 Cal.3d 253, 260 [118 Cal. Rptr. 480, 530 P.2d 168, 80 A.L.R.3d 1231].) Thus, the State Bar's findings that petitioner failed to communicate reasonably with his client are supported by the record.