Opinion ID: 733
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tortious Interference (Count III)

Text: Count III of Cole's complaint alleges a claim for tortious interference with contracts and business expectancies. Under Missouri law, a tortious interference claim requires that a plaintiff prove: `(1) a contract or a valid business expectancy; (2) defendant's knowledge of the contract or relationship; (3) intentional interference by the defendant inducing or causing a breach of contract or relationship; (4) absence of justification; and (5) damages resulting from defendant's conduct.' Horizon Mem'l Group, LLC v. Bailey, 280 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Mo.Ct.App. 2009) (citation omitted). Cole claims that Homier tortiously interfered with Cole's dealer relationships by selling directly to Cole's dealers in violation of the Distributor Agreement. The district court dismissed this claim, finding that because the dealership agreements were not preexisting, but arose out of the agreements with Homier, Cole could not state a claim for tortious interference. We agree. Under Missouri law, a plaintiff need not have an existing contract with a third party to maintain a claim for tortious interference. Stehno v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P., 186 S.W.3d 247, 251 (Mo.2006). It is sufficient that a plaintiff have a probable future business relationship that gives rise to a reasonable expectancy of financial benefit. Id. However, when a contract alone creates a business expectancy, [a] plaintiff cannot bring a claim for interference with a business expectancy against a party to that contract. BMK Corp. v. Clayton Corp., 226 S.W.3d 179, 191 (Mo. Ct.App.2007); see also Kelly v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 218 S.W.3d 517, 525 (Mo.Ct.App.2007); Jurisprudence Wireless Commc'ns, Inc. v. CyberTel Corp., 26 S.W.3d 300, 302 (Mo.Ct.App.2000). This rule does not mean that a party may not have a valid business expectancy in a preexisting and independent business relationship just because the preexisting relationship relies upon a third-party supply contract to furnish the subject of their agreement. BMK, 226 S.W.3d at 191. The critical issue in this case, then, is whether Cole had independent business relationships with its dealers predating its agreement with Homier. The complaint demonstrates that Cole had no such relationships. There are two relevant sets of agreements: the ColeHomier Distributorship Agreement, under which Cole became a licensed Farm Pro distributor, and the Coledealership agreements, under which Cole distributed Farm Pro products to its dealerships. The Coledealership agreements are the agreements with which Cole alleges Homier interfered. But Cole had no business relationship with the dealerships prior to the Distributorship Agreement. Cole's relationship with its dealers arose only because it entered into the Distributorship Agreement with Homier. As Cole stated in its complaint, Cole did not begin to establish these dealerships until after it became a licensed Farm Pro distributor. Cole has thus failed to articulate any independent business relationship with its dealers that predated its agreement with Homier. Without this, we must dismiss Cole's claim for tortious interference. Cole's reliance on American Business Interiors, Inc. v. Haworth, Inc., 798 F.2d 1135 (8th Cir.1986) and BMK does not persuade us to the contrary. Cole argues that these cases, both of which permitted claims for tortious interference, are materially indistinguishable from the facts of the instant case. In both cases, however, the plaintiff had a legitimate expectancy arising out of a prior business relationship. See Am. Bus. Interiors, 798 F.2d at 1143-44 (noting plaintiff's extensive prior dealings); BMK, 226 S.W.3d at 190-192 (noting that plaintiff had a preexisting business relationship wholly separate from its relationship with the defendant). Therefore, American Business and BMK are not supportive of Cole's position, and we affirm the district court.