Opinion ID: 218696
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Merely Descriptive

Text: A mark is merely descriptive “if it immediately conveys knowledge of a quality, feature, function, or characteristic of the goods or services with which it is used.” In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 963 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Bayer”) (citing In re Gyulay, 820 F.2d 1216, 1217 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). A mark may be merely descriptive “even if it does not describe the ‘full scope and extent’ of the applicant’s goods or services.” In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). It is well-established that “[d]escriptiveness of a mark is not considered in the abstract.” Bayer, 488 F.3d at 963-64. Instead, the mark must be “considered in relation to the particular goods for which registration is sought, the context in which it is being used, and the possible significance that the term would have to the average purchaser of the goods because of the manner of its use or intended use.” Id. at 964. Stated differently, “[t]he question is not whether someone presented with only the mark could guess what the goods or services are. Rather, the question is whether someone who knows what the goods or services are will understand the mark to convey information about them.” In re Tower Tech Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1314, 1316-17 (T.T.A.B. 2002). Evidence that a term is merely descriptive “may be obtained from any competent source, such as dictionaries, newspapers, or surveys.” Bayer, 488 F.3d at 964 (quoting In re Bed & Breakfast Registry, 791 F.2d 157, 160 (Fed. Cir. 1986)). A determination that a mark is merely descriptive is a factual finding that this court reviews for gardless of whether Dalton can raise this issue on appeal, we find no error in the Board’s analysis. DALTON v. HONDA MOTOR 12 substantial evidence. Bayer, 488 F.3d at 964. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Board’s factual findings were supported by substantial evidence. First, the Board looked to the dictionary definitions in the record which defined the term “dealer” as “one engaged in buying and selling.” Board Decision, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 358 at . The Board then considered documents in the record – including printed publications introduced as exhibits during Dalton’s discovery deposition – to determine the meaning of the term “dashboard.” Honda submitted evidence including dozens of examples of third parties who use the term “dealer dashboard” or “dashboard” to describe an Internet-based system that provides dealers with key performance indicators. As the Board noted, the record includes the following representative examples: • Denon Dealer Dashboard: “The Dealer Dashboard is the easiest way for Denon dealers to get the latest information on Denon products, events, company infor- mation and more. As a Denon dealer, the Dashboard provides you with all kinds of product related items such as downloads, Images, sell sheets, and more.” A168. • GoalLine Solutions: “Dealer Dashboard Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) pro- vide the dealer and service manager with visibility to the crucial numbers that drive the performance of the service [sic] De- partment. You have the ability to set tar- get goals for the average labor dollars per repair order, one line work order percent- ages and average hours per repair order and see the results by year, month, week 13 DALTON v. HONDA MOTOR or day. By comparing it to the prior year’s results, you have visibility to improve- ments in your department and more im- portantly areas of concern. By using our secure data extraction portal we provide daily updating on Labor sales, Repair or- der counts and total hours sold for all sales categories.” A176. • Using Siebel Dealer Dashboards (Dealer): “Siebel Dealer provides dealer employees with dashboards that allow them to view the most important information that they need for their work on one screen.” A165. Based on the third-party examples provided, and other evidence in the record, the Board found that the term “dashboard” “possesses a recognized meaning in the field of Internet-based business information tracking and presentation.” Board Decision, 2010 TTAB LEXIS 358 at . The Board further found that the terms DEALER and DASHBOARD have descriptive significance when used in connection with the services identified in Dalton’s application. Specifically, the Board found that a DEALER DASHBOARD “is the graphical display of sales, service and other information relating to businesses engaged in buying and selling goods, particularly automobiles.” Id. The Board concluded that DEALERDASHBOARD “merely describes, without conjecture or speculation, a significant characteristic or feature of applicant’s services, namely, that they provide Internet-based information regarding sales, service, and inventory or parts to automobile dealerships.” Id. As Honda correctly argues, although the combination of two descriptive words may, in some instances, create a DALTON v. HONDA MOTOR 14 distinctive mark, the combination of the two terms at issue here “does not diminish the common descriptive significance of Applicant’s mark: A DEALER DASHBOARD is a dashboard for dealers.” Appellee Brief at 20. See In re Petroglyph Games, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q.2d 1332, 1341 (T.T.A.B. 2009) (finding that, “because the combination of the terms does not result in a composite that alters the meaning of either of the elements, refusal on the ground of descriptiveness is appropriate”); In re Nat’l Shooting Sports Foundation, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 1018, 1020 (T.T.A.B. 1983) (internal citations omitted) (“Combinations of merely descriptive components have been found registrable if the juxtaposition of the words is inventive or evokes a unique commercial impression, or if the term has a bizarre or incongruous meaning as applied to the goods.”). Dalton does not argue that the combination of terms alters their meaning, and, even if he did, there is no evidence in the record to support that argument. 5 5 Dalton argues that there was no evidence that DEALERDASHBOARD was merely descriptive when he filed his application for registration in 2003. Informal Brief at 5. In response, Honda argues that, by 2003, the terms DEALER and DASHBOARD were descriptive “in connection with the applied-for services.” Appellee Brief at 19. According to Honda, the term “dashboard” was “commonly used to describe the presentation of managerial information and key financial indicators to businesses via the Internet well before 2003.” Id. In support of this argument, Honda points to a printed publication in the record entitled Information Dashboard Design: The Effective Visual Communication of Data, which discusses companies’ use of the term “dashboard” at least as early as 2003. Honda further argues that, to the extent Dalton claims to be the “first user” of DEALERDASHBOARD, there is no supporting evidence to that effect in the record. Even if there was, moreover, the “fact that an 15 DALTON v. HONDA MOTOR We find that substantial evidence supports the Board’s decision that DEALERDASHBOARD is merely descriptive. The dictionary definitions in the record, coupled with evidence of third parties that use the term “dealer dashboard” to describe services that are similar to those identified in Dalton’s application, support the Board’s descriptiveness finding. Accordingly, we find no error in the Board’s decision. As the Board recognized in its decision, Dalton’s application to register the mark DEALERDASHBOARD did not include a claim of acquired distinctiveness under Section 2(f). Nor did Dalton specifically assert acquired distinctiveness in his answer to the Notice of Opposition. Instead, Dalton merely alleged that his “exclusive and continuous use” of the mark DEALERDASHBOARD began in October 1999. Doc. 8, Answer at 1 (Jan. 6, 2007). He also claimed that he “invested extensive time and resources” making DEALERDASHBOARD a “source identifier” that has become “alternatively distinctive and famous within the automotive industry.” Id. at 5. The Board found that, even if Dalton’s statements in his answer were construed as a claim of acquired distinctiveness, he submitted no evidentiary support for such a claim. We agree. Because Dalton failed to establish that DEALERDASHBOARD acquired secondary meaning or distinctiveness “in the minds of the public,” we find no applicant may be the first and only user of a merely descriptive or generic designation does not justify registration if the only significance conveyed by the term is merely descriptive.” Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure § 1209.03(c) (7th ed. 2010). Because we find that the Board’s descriptiveness determination was supported by substantial evidence, Dalton’s unsupported arguments lack merit. DALTON v. HONDA MOTOR 16 error in the Board’s decision. See Dial-A-Mattress, 240 F.3d at 1347.