Opinion ID: 2518586
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Propriety of Mistrial Declaration

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion when it failed to make sufficient inquiry into whether there existed legal necessity to declare a mistrial after the jury reached an impasse during the first penalty phase, and further erred in concluding the jury was deadlocked. Defendant additionally contends he did not consent to the mistrial, thereby rendering the penalty retrial a violation of his state and federal constitutional protections against double jeopardy. The Attorney General argues the defense impliedly consented to the mistrial and that, in any event, the trial court acted within its discretion in declaring the mistrial. As will appear, we agree legal necessity supported the trial court's action. The issue arose in the following context. About 2:00 p.m. on Friday, August 21, 1987, after closing arguments by counsel and instructions by Judge Sterry Fagan, who had presided over the evidentiary portion of the trial, the jury retired to deliberate as to the penalty. At 3:30 p.m., Judge Fagan excused the jury for the weekend, directing it to return the following Monday, August 24. The jury resumed deliberations that Monday morning, with Judge Eugene Long rather than Judge Fagan presiding. The jury took lunch from 12:00 p.m. to 1:45 p.m. and then resumed deliberations. At 4:00 p.m., the jury indicated it had reached a partial verdict; apparently without notifying counsel, Judge Long ordered the partial verdict sealed, excused the jury, and directed it to return the following morning. Jury deliberations resumed on Tuesday, August 25, with Judge Long again presiding. Sometime that morning, the foreperson of the jury sent the court a note advising that the jury was unable to reach a unanimous decision regarding the penalty of life in prison or death in Count II. After receiving the note, Judge Long called counsel for both sides into his chambers and asked for suggestions on how to proceed. Defense counsel suggested the court bring the jurors into the courtroom and ask them individually if any further deliberations would be productive. Mr. Carbaugh, a deputy district attorney standing in for the trial prosecutor questioned whether, given the length and complexity of the case, any inquiry was necessary at that point. Defense counsel reiterated his suggestion that the court determine whether the jury was deadlocked or whether further deliberations would be productive and proposed that, if the foreperson indicated they would not be productive, the jurors be polled on that point. Carbaugh agreed and suggested the jury additionally be asked about the number of ballots taken and the numeric breakdown of the various ballots. Defense counsel assented. Judge Long then asked: Assuming that you are satisfied after inquiry that they have taken enough polls and that they all unanimously agree that they are deadlocked and no further deliberations or assistance of the court by way of any further instructions or re-reading of the testimony, then what do you suggest, taking the verdict on [count] I and declare a mistrial as to [count] II? Carbaugh said he would probably want to be heard. . . . [¶] I'll simply wait and ask to approach side bar on that issue. The court noted it would be glad to hear what Carbaugh had to say, adding: Assuming we all agree that no further Carbaugh spoke: Then the procedure the court suggested is proper. The court clarified: Take the verdict on Count I and declare a mistrial on Count II and excuse the jury? Defense counsel and Carbaugh each assented. The court then called the jury into the courtroom, read aloud the jury's note, and asked whether the jury felt the court could do anything to assist it in further deliberations toward arriving at a verdict on count II. The foreperson answered in the negative. The court polled the jurors individually, asking whether each felt that with further deliberations they might arrive at a verdict on count II. All said no. Noting that the jury had been deliberating since Friday afternoon, the court asked how many ballots had been taken as to count II. The foreperson answered: [B]etween eight and ten. The court asked: Without telling me as to guilty or not guilty [ sic ], just the numerical count, has it changed much? The foreperson responded: No, it hasn't. The court probed further: What is it, again, without telling me the penalty, whichever way it was, the death or life, the numerical count, without telling me which was which, is it 6/6, 11/1, 10/2? The foreperson responded: It was 10/2 in one instance and ... 8/4. The court asked: Which was which, as you concluded? [¶] Where do you stand? The foreperson replied: The first, 10/2, was with regards to death; the 8/4 was regards to life. The court and counsel then conferred at sidebar. Carbaugh observed that the foreperson had not really answered the court's question as to where the jury stood as of the last ballot and suggested they get an answer to that question. The court said: I gather it stayed pretty much the same.... He said, apparently, they voted 10 to 2 for deathwe don't know which wayand 8 to 4 for life. Carbaugh argued: I don't care about death or life. I'm concerned about which way, away from the 8 to. 4 or away from the 10 to 2, and I think that's probably counsel's inquiry. Defense counsel agreed. The court asked what purpose further inquiry would serve. Carbaugh responded: To find out if there is some movement. The court said: They said, `No.' They have had eight to ten ballots. Carbaugh alluded to the interest in conserving judicial resources by avoiding another two-month trial if possible, and noted: [Apparently, there has been some movement. [¶] Again, we don't know which way, away from a verdict or towards a verdict. After the court again noted the balloting hasn't changed much, 10 to 2, 8 to 4, Carbaugh observed: Two votes. That's actually a fair change, considering the short period of time. Defense counsel said: One gets the impression they were 10 to 2 for death at one point and now 8 to 4 for life. The court noted: I'm just concerned about what may come blurting out. [¶] I get the impression they are deadlocked. Nevertheless, the court expressed willingness to send the jury back for further deliberations. Carbaugh said: That's agreeable, Defense counsel said: It's not agreeable with me, but that's why you are a judge and I'm an advocate. [¶] ... I think they are hung and they are not going any place. At defense counsel's suggestion, the court then asked the foreperson to elaborate on the numerical splits in the balloting that he previously had referred to. He responded: We went through the procedure and we carried on the discussion regarding the death penalty decision and were working with the death penalty decision by itself and took several ballots in regards to the death penalty, and I would say it was approximately six or eight ballots in that regard, and the numbers came out approximately the same. The court interjected: What you told me was 10 to 2. The foreperson continued: Then we decided, `Well, maybe it would be of some benefit to discuss life imprisonment,' and we took other ballots after more deliberations in that regard, and the ballots regarding that penalty came out approximately the same, 8 to 4. [¶] It was 7 to 5 at one time, 8 to 4the numbers were along those lines, yes, and the 8 to 4the last two ballots, as a matter of fact. The court asked: And the 10 to 2 was the last ballot on the several balloting as to death? The foreperson replied: That was about the last two or three, yes. The court then declared itself satisfied that further deliberations could not possibly lead to a verdict on count II. Accordingly, it took the verdict on count I, polled the jury as to that count, declared a mistrial as to count II, and discharged the jury. The federal and state Constitutions protect persons against being twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. (U.S. Const, 5th Amend.; Benton v. Maryland (1969) 395 U.S. 784, 794, 89 S.Ct. 2056, 23 L.Ed.2d 707 [applying 5th Amend. to states through 14th Amend, due process clause]; Cal. Const., art. I, § 15.) Retrial after discharge of a jury without manifest (in federal terminology) or legal necessity violates the protections afforded under both charters. Jury deadlock constitutes necessity for declaration of a mistrial and permits retrial of the defendant. ( United States v. Perez (1824) 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 579, 580, 6 L.Ed. 165; Paulson v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 1, 5, 22 Cal.Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641.) This principle is codified in section 1140, which prohibits discharge of the jury after the case is submitted to it until it has rendered a verdict, unless by consent of both parties or it appears there is no reasonable probability the jury can agree, and section 1141, which permits retrial under such circumstances. (See People v. Fields (1996) 13 Cal.4th 289, 300, 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 282, 914 P.2d 832; see also § 1160 [permitting the jury, in a trial of multiple charges, to return a verdict on the charge or charges on which they agree and permitting retrial of the charges on which they do not agree].) The determination whether there is a reasonable probability of agreement rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, based on consideration of all the factors before it. ( People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 546, 125 Cal.Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229.) The trial court here did not abuse its discretion in finding no reasonable possibility the jury could reach a verdict on count II. The jury so advised the trial court by written note; in open court, the foreperson confirmed that the jurors had considered and rejected the possibility that rereading of testimony or further instructions could assist them in reaching a verdict; after eight to 10 ballots taken over the course of some seven hours 40 minutes' deliberation spanning three days, the jury remained divided as to the penalty on count II; and each juror, when individually polled, expressed the view that further deliberations would not enable the jury to come to a verdict on that count. The record simply does not support an inference that a reasonable possibility existed that the jury could have arrived at a verdict if told to deliberate further. Defendant contends that because the duration of the jury's deliberations was not long for a capital case involving complex issues, and because some jurors apparently changed their votes during the course of the deliberations, the trial court had an obligation to question the jury further regarding the evident movement of the votes before declaring a mistrial. Defendant also observes that during the more than seven hours of deliberations preceding the mistrial declaration, the jury presumably discussed and reached a verdict on count I, the Ferguson murder count; thus, precisely how much time it spent discussing count II, the Perez murder count, is Unknown. While defendant acknowledges the period of deliberations is not determinative ( In re Chapman (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 806, 816, 134 Cal.Rptr. 760), he argues the trial court erred in concluding that the jury had deliberated sufficiently on count II. We disagree. Although apparently some members of the juryprecisely how many was unclearhad changed their votes over the course of deliberations, none indicated in response to the court's questioning that there was any prospect of achieving a unanimous verdict. Each affirmed there was nothing the court could do to assist them in arriving at a verdict. Under these circumstances, that an order to deliberate further would have resulted in a verdict is sheer speculation, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declaring a mistrial. In light of this conclusion, we need not address the Attorney General's argument that defense counsel impliedly consented to the mistrial declaration.