Opinion ID: 4103821
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Custody During the 9:52 p.m. Interview

Text: During the state court proceedings, Sorto claimed that the state trial court should have suppressed statements he made before the police warned him of his constitutional rights under Miranda at 11:21 p.m. He contended that he was subjected to custodial interrogation prior to receiving that warning. On appeal, this Court must determine whether reasonable jurists would debate whether the state court’s holding that Sorto was not in custody was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the U.S. Supreme Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). In Miranda, the Supreme Court explained that “custodial interrogation” means “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 384 U.S. at 444. According to case law elaborating on Miranda, “‘custody’ is a term of art that specifies circumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion.” Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 1189 (2012). “Two discrete inquiries are essential to the determination [of whether a defendant was in custody]: first, what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, given those 7 Case: 16-70005 Document: 00513780048 Page: 8 Date Filed: 12/01/2016 No. 16-70005 circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995) (footnote omitted). A court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including (1) “the length of the questioning”; (2) “the location of the questioning”; (3) “the accusatory, or non-accusatory, nature of the questioning”; (4) “the amount of restraint on the individual’s physical movement”; and (5) “statements made by officers regarding the individual’s freedom to move or leave.” United States v. Wright, 777 F.3d 769, 774–75 (5th Cir. 2015) (cataloguing relevant cases). In light of the facts presented, it does not appear that the state court’s decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 665 (2004). In Alvarado, the Supreme Court suggested that the facts that the interview was conducted at the police station, the interview lasted for two hours, and Alvarado was not told he was free to leave all weighed in favor of the view that Alvarado was in custody. Id. at 665. However, given that Alvarado arrived at the station voluntarily, the officers did not threaten him or suggest he would be placed under arrest, and the officers twice asked Alvarado if he wanted to take a break, the Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the state court had not unreasonably applied the custody standard. Id. at 664–65. Similarly, in the instant case, Sorto notes that the interview lasted over an hour before he was read his rights; it was conducted at a police station; and at least after the oral swab was taken, the officers considered him a suspect. However, during the suppression hearing in state court, the government presented evidence suggesting that Sorto came to the homicide office on his own and without pressure; the police never handcuffed Sorto throughout the interviews that night or the following morning; Detective Ortiz never told Sorto he could not leave; and the officers never locked the door to the interview room. 8 Case: 16-70005 Document: 00513780048 Page: 9 Date Filed: 12/01/2016 No. 16-70005 These facts suggest that Sorto made his statements voluntarily and in a noncoercive atmosphere. Because there was evidence suggesting Sorto was not in custody, we hold that reasonable jurists would agree that the state court did not unreasonably apply the Supreme Court’s custody standard. See Id. at 664– 65. Accordingly, we deny a COA with respect to Sorto’s Miranda claim. B. Ineffective Assistance on the Mitigation Special Issue Sorto also argues that he should be granted a COA for his claim that his trial attorneys provided ineffective assistance under Wiggins and Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). He claims that his trial counsel inadequately defended against a death sentence by failing to subpoena witnesses who were key to the mitigation special issue. Sorto suggests that testimony from these witnesses “very well could have influenced the jurors to answer the mitigation special issue differently and sentence Sorto to life in prison rather than to death.” In the proceedings below, the district court held that “[b]ecause the state courts procedurally barred Sorto’s attempt to expand his Strickland claim in the 2010 state habeas application, the only claims properly before the Court are the claims and evidence Sorto submitted in the 2005 state habeas application.” However, in the interests of justice, the district court considered the evidence presented in both the 2005 and 2010 applications. The district court held that, regardless of which application was reviewed, it was reasonable for the state court to conclude that counsel did not provide ineffective assistance. On appeal, Sorto contends that (1) the district court erred in concluding his 2010 IAC claim was procedurally barred and (2) it was unreasonable to conclude that counsel’s assistance was sufficient under Wiggins and Strickland. 9 Case: 16-70005 Document: 00513780048 Page: 10 Date Filed: 12/01/2016 No. 16-70005
“If a state court clearly and expressly bases its dismissal of a prisoner’s claim on a state procedural rule, and that procedural rule provides an independent and adequate ground for the dismissal, the prisoner has procedurally defaulted his federal habeas claim.” Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 420 (5th Cir. 1997). This Court has held that Article 11.071, Section 5(a) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes an independent and adequate state procedural ground for dismissal in the IAC context; therefore, an IAC claim is procedurally defaulted if the TCCA dismisses it under Section 5(a). Barrientes v. Johnson, 221 F.3d 741, 758–59 & n.10 (5th Cir. 2000); Nobles, 127 F.3d at 422–23; Emery v. Johnson, 139 F.3d 191, 195–96 (5th Cir. 1997). The TCCA clearly and expressly based its dismissal of Sorto’s 2010 IAC claim on Section 5(a). Ex parte Sorto, 2011 WL 1533377, at . Contrary to Sorto’s contentions on appeal, the TCCA’s specific reference to the relevant exception in Section 5(a) did not make the language of the order ambiguous— rather, it made clear that Sorto had failed to make the requisite showing under that exception. See id. (holding that “the application does not contain sufficient specific facts establishing that but for a violation of the United States Constitution, no rational juror would have answered one or more of the special issues in the State’s favor”). Accordingly, we hold that reasonable jurists would agree that the district court was correct in concluding that the IAC evidence raised in Sorto’s 2010 state habeas application was procedurally barred and thus that the district court could only consider the evidence raised in Sorto’s 2005 state habeas application. Sorto also argues that his 2010 IAC claim is procedurally viable under Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012), and Trevino v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013), because his state habeas counsel in 2005 was ineffective. “A prisoner 10 Case: 16-70005 Document: 00513780048 Page: 11 Date Filed: 12/01/2016 No. 16-70005 may obtain federal review of a defaulted claim by showing cause for the default and prejudice from a violation of federal law.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1316. In Martinez, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the ineffectiveness of a prisoner’s postconviction attorney in the initial state habeas proceeding can be used to establish cause for a procedural default. Id. at 1320; see also Trevino, 133 S. Ct. at 1921 (applying Martinez to Texas’s habeas framework). To meet this exception to the procedural default rule, however, the prisoner must show that (1) his postconviction attorney in the initial state habeas proceeding was “ineffective under the standards of Strickland” and (2) “the underlying ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit.” Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318. Here, the district court considered the evidence presented in Sorto’s 2010 state habeas application and concluded that the additional evidence did not establish that Sorto’s IAC claim had merit. As discussed below, the district court’s assessment of the merits of the 2010 expanded IAC claim was correct. Therefore, we hold that reasonable jurists would agree with the district court’s conclusion that Sorto has not shown the underlying IAC claim is substantial and therefore has not shown cause for the procedural default.
Generally, to prove an IAC claim, the defendant must show that (1) “counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and (2) “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687–88. With respect deficient performance, there is “a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689–90. With respect to prejudice, the “defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been 11 Case: 16-70005 Document: 00513780048 Page: 12 Date Filed: 12/01/2016 No. 16-70005 different.” Id. at 694. In federal habeas proceedings, our review of an IAC claim is “doubly deferential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009). The state court’s decision will be upheld if the state court had a reasonable basis for concluding that counsel satisfied Strickland’s deferential standard. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 105 (2011).
In his 2005 state habeas application, Sorto alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to adequately investigate and present evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and exposure to hazardous chemicals. Sorto provided only an affidavit from himself in support of his IAC claim. In response, Sorto’s trial counsel filed affidavits describing their efforts to develop evidence of Sorto’s PTSD and chemical exposure and explaining why they chose not to raise these issues during the sentencing phase. The state habeas court found that Sorto had failed “to demonstrate that witnesses or evidence were available to support [his] claims regarding PTSD and/or hazardous chemical exposure.” In addition, the state court found that “the defense team conducted extensive research and investigation regarding . . . chemical exposure,” including reviewing documents, consulting with people who knew Sorto, consulting with a university chemistry department, conducting a brain scan that revealed no evidence of organic disruption, and consulting with a psychiatrist. Considering the trial attorneys’ efforts, the evidence they collected, and the lack of evidence Sorto supplied in support of his IAC claim, the state court concluded that “trial counsels’ investigation of [Sorto’s] potential mitigating evidence was objectively reasonable and consistent with a coherent trial strategy.” In reviewing the state court’s decision, the district court aptly noted that “this is not a case where trial counsel ‘failed to pursue known leads’ or ‘ignored . . . useful information.’” See Skinner v. Quarterman, 576 F.3d 214, 12 Case: 16-70005 Document: 00513780048 Page: 13 Date Filed: 12/01/2016 No. 16-70005 220 (5th Cir. 2009). On the contrary, there is extensive evidence that trial counsel sought to develop defenses based on PTSD and chemical exposure but ultimately concluded there was insufficient evidence to support these defenses. Accordingly, we hold that reasonable jurists would agree that the state court had a reasonable basis for concluding that trial counsel’s assistance was sufficient under Wiggins and Strickland.
In his 2010 state habeas application, Sorto claimed his attorneys should have conducted a broader investigation into his background that would have revealed a “wealth of mitigating evidence,” including his PTSD, exposure to warfare, exposure to hazardous chemicals, intellectual disability, extreme poverty and malnutrition, forced child labor, and beatings and severe punishment. In support, Sorto provided affidavits from eight witnesses who were willing to testify in his 2003 trial. Although the TCCA did not reach the merits of Sorto’s 2010 claim, see Ex parte Sorto, 2011 WL 1533377, at , during the federal habeas proceedings, the district court reviewed Sorto’s expanded IAC claim de novo and concluded Sorto had failed to show deficient performance and prejudice. This Court “must be particularly wary of arguments that essentially come down to a matter of degrees. Did counsel investigate enough? Did counsel present enough mitigating evidence?” Skinner, 576 F.3d at 220 (quoting Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 743 (5th Cir. 2000)). When the unpresented evidence is not “shocking and starkly different than that presented at trial,” this Court has held that the IAC claim is not viable. Blanton v. Quarterman, 543 F.3d 230, 239–40 n.1 (5th Cir. 2008); Coble v. Quarterman, 496 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that the state court’s decision was not unreasonable where much of the evidence defendant argued should have been developed more effectively was nonetheless presented at trial). 13 Case: 16-70005 Document: 00513780048 Page: 14 Date Filed: 12/01/2016 No. 16-70005 Here, it appears that the evidence presented at trial was not starkly different from the evidence Sorto contends should have been presented. Sorto’s trial counsel called six witnesses who testified on his behalf during the punishment phase. Four family members testified regarding his childhood, including his exposure to the Salvadoran civil war, poverty and malnutrition, beatings and severe punishment, abandonment by his mother, poor academic record, and work fumigating crops. In addition, a forensic psychiatrist testified about Sorto’s background, including the beatings and sexual abuse Sorto experienced as a child, and discussed Sorto’s risk for future dangerousness. The evidence presented at trial touched on the same issues Sorto raised in his 2010 state habeas application, albeit not to the degree Sorto contends was warranted. Thus, it seems that Sorto’s 2010 IAC claim did not make a sufficient showing of deficient performance. In assessing prejudice, a court must “evaluate the totality of the available mitigation evidence—both that adduced at trial, and the evidence adduced in the habeas proceeding—in reweighing it against the evidence in aggravation.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397–98 (2000). The district court noted that the evidence suggested Sorto had engaged in a pattern of escalating offenses “from violent robberies, to the rape and murder of one woman, to the rape and murder of two women.” Given the severity of the offense and Sorto’s apparent pattern of criminal activity, we hold that reasonable jurists would agree Sorto has not shown any reasonable probability that the additional mitigating evidence would have swayed the jury to impose a lesser sentence. Thus, we deny a COA with respect to Sorto’s IAC claims.