Opinion ID: 1124343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Judicial Misconduct Based on Contemptuous Treatment of Defense Counsel

Text: Defendant argues on appeal that he was deprived of a fair trial by the trial court's demeaning remarks toward defense counsel [16] in the presence of the jury. Defendant relies on seven specific incidents in which the trial court allegedly treated counsel contemptuously. In State v. Pokini, 55 Haw. 640, 526 P.2d 94 (1974), this court noted: An injudicious attitude held and expressed against an attorney is likely to color the judge's approach to matters in the case entrusted to his [or her] discretion as well as to impress the jury with the idea that he [or she] disfavors the attorney and, inferentially, the position the attorney represents. So serious is the danger to a fair trial posed by a judge's unwarranted remarks demeaning defense counsel in the presence of the jury, that the law considers them errors of constitutional proportions. The constitutional rights of the defendant compromised by such conduct include the rights to due process of law, assistance of counsel in a criminal prosecution, and trial by an impartial jury. Id. at 644-45, 526 P.2d at 101 (citations omitted). The question is whether the trial judge's conduct reveal[s] a deep and thorough-going bias against and contempt for the appellants' legal representation that is fundamentally at odds with his [or her] judicial responsibilities. Id. at 647, 526 P.2d at 102. However, a conviction need not be reversed if the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 645, 526 P.2d at 101. A crucial if not determinative consideration in assessing whether a constitutional error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt is the strength of the prosecution's case on the defendant's guilt. Id. (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22, 87 S.Ct. 824, 826, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)). In the present case, the transcripts of the incidents cited by Defendant and the record as a whole indicate that most of the exchanges between the trial court and defense counsel occurred either at bench conferences or during recesses. Indeed, the trial court appears to have made an effort to prevent such exchanges from occurring within the hearing of the jury. Furthermore, the transcripts reveal that the exchanges were generally triggered by the conduct of defense counsel. Defense counsel consistently behaved in an unacceptable manner. He refused to comply with the rulings of the court. He was disrespectful to the court, to opposing counsel, and to witnesses. [17] He argued objections in open court and before the jury without requesting to approach the bench. During conferences with the court and the other attorneys, he spoke out of turn. He continually made comments, exhibited facial expressions, and laughed in response to opposing counsel's questions and remarks. When the trial court attempted to correct his behavior, he responded by accusing the court of bias. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that the trial court occasionally used harsh language. However, on the whole, the trial court appears to have been motivated by a desire to maintain order and decorum during the proceedings rather than by any improper biases. [18] The vast majority of the incidents cited by the parties occurred outside the presence or hearing of the jury. The two incidents that did occur within the hearing of the jury cannot be considered judicial misconduct. On April 10, 1995, after Gladys Brandt testified, the trial court made a comment that was, at most, highly ambiguous and could simply have referred to the difficult examination the witness had endured from both sides. [19] The second incident, on April 18, 1995, was triggered by defense counsel's own improper conduct. Defense counsel himself subsequently acknowledged that his behavior was improper and apologized to the court and the jury. While the trial court could have used milder language, counsel's behavior was improper by his own admission. [20] Therefore, although these two incidents occurred within the hearing of the jury, they did not amount to judicial misconduct. In summary, it cannot be said that the trial court in the present case made unwarranted remarks demeaning defense counsel in the presence of the jury. Pokini, 55 Haw. at 644-45, 526 P.2d at 101. Because defense counsel's unacceptable conduct [21] triggered the trial court's remarks, those remarks were not unwarranted. Most of the remarks were made outside the presence or hearing of the jury, and those that occurred within the hearing of the jury did not constitute misconduct. Additionally, even if some of the trial court's remarks were excessive, they constituted harmless error. The Prosecution's case against Defendant was so strong that any influence exerted by alleged judicial impropriety was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.