Opinion ID: 6318081
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Shootings

Text: “A police officer may not seize an unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead.” Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). When an officer uses deadly force, that force is unreasonable unless “the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others.” Id. “[T]he threat factor is ‘a minimum requirement for the use of deadly force.’” Jacobs, 915 F.3d at 1040 (quoting Mullins, 805 F.3d at 766). “We have authorized the use of deadly force ‘only in rare instances.’” Id. (quoting Sample, 409 F.3d at 697). When considering whether an officer reasonably believed that a person posed an imminent threat of serious bodily harm, courts must consider the totality of the circumstances. Here, certain factual considerations are particularly relevant, though none is dispositive and this list is not exhaustive: (1) why the officer was called to the scene, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; (2) whether the officer knew or reasonably believed that the person was armed, see Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 891 n.5 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1051–62 (6th Cir. 1996)); (3) whether the person verbally or physically threatened the officer or disobeyed the officer, see Wright, 962 F.3d at 868 (quoting Smith, 874 F.3d at 945); (4) how far the officer was from the person, see Zulock v. Shures, 441 F. App’x 294, 302 (6th Cir. 2010); (5) the duration of the entire encounter, see Untalan v. City of Lorain, 430 F.3d 312, 316 (6th Cir. 2005); (6) whether the officer knew of any ongoing mental or physical health conditions that may have affected the person’s response to the officer, see Roell, 870 F.3d at 482; and No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 15 (7) whether the officer could have diffused the situation with less forceful tactics, see Thomas, 854 F.3d at 366–67. After weighing these factors, we conclude that Defendants cannot prevail at the summary judgment stage because a reasonable jury could find that Johns used excessive force when he first shot at Palma. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
When officers respond to an ongoing crime, or set out to arrest a suspect, they may have some reason to fear for their safety or the safety of others based on the nature of the crime. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (courts must consider “the severity of the crime at issue”). But Johns was not responding to a past or ongoing crime. When officers are called for wellness checks or other non-criminal calls, this Court looks at what the officer learned and observed about the situation before the officer even engaged with anyone on the scene. Compare Woodcock v. City of Bowling Green, 679 F. App’x 419, 423 (6th Cir. 2017) (factor did not support use of lethal force when nobody accused the person of threatening or violent behavior before police arrived), with Simmonds, 682 F.3d at 444–446 (factor supported use of lethal force when officers responded to call about a drunk and possibly suicidal man who was threatening to kill his exgirlfriend’s family and officers knew the man owned guns). Although Johns seemingly believed that he was walking into a volatile situation—indeed he unholstered his gun even before arriving on the scene—this subjective belief was not factually supported. Johns responded to a call about an unwanted person on the Palma property who had gotten into a fight with his sister over the TV remote.2 Johns was not responding to a crime. Before arriving, Johns saw Palma’s driver’s license and knew that Palma was the unwanted person. When he arrived, Johns saw Palma standing outside of the house by himself. Even if Johns believed that removing an unwanted person may involve some inherent danger, the unwanted person—Palma—was already isolated and away from the home. Thus, the facts do not support Johns’ belief that he was walking into a high-risk situation. This factor therefore cuts against Johns’ argument that Palma posed an imminent threat of serious physical harm. See Woodcock, 679 F. App’x at 423. 2 While Defendants describe Palma’s prior mental health hospitalizations and run-ins with police, none of these facts were known to Johns and are thus irrelevant here. See Simmonds, 682 F.3d at 445. No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 16
“[A]n officer need not face the business end of a gun to use deadly force.” Jacobs, 915 F.3d at 1040 (citing Thomas, 854 F.3d at 366). The stronger the evidence showing that a person is armed, the more likely the use of lethal force is reasonable. See Bouggess, 482 F.3d at 891 n.5 (citing Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1051–62). When the evidence is weak, this factor cannot justify the use of lethal force. See id. On the one hand, officers are often justified in shooting a person who is visibly armed and aiming at officers. See DeMerrell v. City of Cheboygan, 206 F. App’x 418, 429 (6th Cir. 2006). However, even if a person is visibly armed, lethal force may still be unreasonable. E.g., Thomas, 854 F.3d at 366 (“To be clear, we do not hold that an officer may shoot a suspect merely because he has a gun in his hand.”). Although an officer may reasonably believe that a person was armed even if it turns out that the person was, in fact, unarmed, the officer’s belief must have been reasonable based on the circumstances. See id. at 365. For example, in Simmonds, 682 F.3d at 445, we found that officers reasonably used lethal force when responding to a 9-1-1 call about a man threatening to kill his family because, even though the man was, in fact, unarmed, the caller said that the man owned guns, the man threatened officers saying “I have a gun,” and the man brandished a “silver object” that he pointed at officers. Nobody told Johns that Palma was armed. Melissa allegedly told Johns that Palma was unarmed—though the record does not indicate whether she said this before or after the shooting. Dispatch did not tell Johns that Palma might be armed or was threatening to use a weapon, even though dispatch otherwise gave Johns several details about the scene at the Palma house—a sibling dispute over a TV remote control and a mentally ill person on the premises. While these facts do not require the conclusion that Johns knew Palma was unarmed, a jury could reasonably infer that, had there been any reason to believe Palma was armed at the time, the 9-1-1 caller would have disclosed this fact and that dispatch would have shared this information. Once on the scene, Johns admits that he never saw Palma holding any object, let alone a firearm or other weapon. As it turned out, Palma was unarmed. But Johns may not have known this, and, at the time, Johns was “concerned” that he could not see Palma’s hands. (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #744.) Our decision in Woodcock is instructive here. 679 F. App’x 419. No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 17 In that case, the officers responded to the scene after a man, Harrison, called 9-1-1 and said that he wanted to kill his brother. Id. at 420. The officers found Harrison standing on a railroad track with his left hand reaching into the rear waistband of his pants. Id. at 421. Officers repeatedly told Harrison to show his hands, but he did not acknowledge or comply with the order. Id. After warning Harrison that they would shoot, Harrison still refused to comply, and officers shot him. Id. We found that this disobedience and suspicious hand placement did not give the officers probable cause to believe that Harrison posed an imminent threat because, while the officers “may have thought that Harrison had a gun, . . . Harrison never gave [the officers] reason to think that he would use it imminently.” Id. at 424–25. Like the officers in Woodcock, Johns’ only reason to suspect that Palma may have been armed was that he had his hands in his pockets and refused to show them. The fact that Johns could not see Palma’s hands would not lead a reasonable officer to believe he was in imminent danger. See id. As we explained in Woodcock, even if the person’s hands are not visible—and even if he appears to be suspiciously reaching for something in his clothing—these facts would not lead a reasonable officer to believe that the person posed an immediate threat of serious harm. Id.; see also Graves v. Malone, 810 F. App’x 414, 417, 422– 23 (6th Cir. 2020) (unreasonable to shoot man who initially refused to show his hands even after he suddenly raised his fist while holding a small black object); Bouggess, 482 F.3d at 891 n.5 (officer’s “mere hunch that [the person] had a firearm cannot be enough to meet his burden” (citing Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1051–62)). There are equally plausible, but far more innocent explanations for Palma’s behavior. For one, it was early February in northern Ohio; as Johns admits, “[i]t was cold.” (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #738.) Moreover, Johns saw at least one of Palma’s hands when Palma pulled out the taser probes, well before Johns decided to shoot. Johns did not see a weapon or any other object in Palma’s hand. Thus, this factor does not support Johns’ qualified immunity defense.
When a person does not act “aggressive[ly]” towards an officer, that fact undermines the officer’s claim that the person presented an immediate threat of serious bodily harm. Stewart v. City of Euclid, 970 F.3d 667, 673–74 (6th Cir. 2020). Additionally, “the mere failure of a No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 18 citizen—not arrested for any crime—to follow the officer’s commands does not give a law enforcement official authority to put the citizen in handcuffs,” let alone to use lethal force against him. Wright, 962 F.3d at 868 (quoting Smith, 874 F.3d at 945). Many undisputed facts show that Palma was not acting aggressively towards Johns. Johns admits that Palma “wasn’t walking at a fast pace” when Palma approached him. (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #776.) Palma was silent throughout the entire encounter, and he never verbally threatened Johns. Nor did Palma ever make any physically threatening gestures, like raising his fists. On the other hand, the parties agree that Palma walked towards Johns at different points during the encounter and agree that Palma refused to comply with several orders to stop and show his hands. Although Johns says that Palma walked toward him in an “aggressive” and “determined” fashion, (id.; Johns Aff., R. 46-2, Page ID #571, #574), Palma’s parents never characterized Palma’s walk in this way. If there were ironclad evidence controverting the Palmas’ version of the facts, perhaps we could accept Johns’ characterization of Palma’s walk as aggressive. See Mitchell v. Schlabach, 864 F.3d 416 (6th Cir. 2017) (granting summary judgment only because dashcam footage undisputedly showed suspect aggressively charging at the officer after crashing his car during a high-speed car chase). But because we lack the undisputed dashcam footage that uncontrovertibly established the sequence of events in Mitchell, for the purpose of deciding a summary judgment motion, we must believe the Palmas’ characterization of the events of the day. The dissent incorrectly believes that Mitchell should decide this case. The suspect in Mitchell, however, presented an objectively greater risk of harm. After leading officers on a high-speed car chase through residential neighborhoods, the suspect exited the car and “began to charge” at the officer “at more than a walking pace.” Mitchell, 864 F.3d at 421–22. And, as the suspect charged at the officer, he shouted that the officer would “have to ‘f---ing shoot him.’” Id. at 422. Even if this case were on point, the Court in Mitchell noted that its only basis for affirming summary judgment was the dashcam footage that showed “most of the relevant events from a helpful angle.” Id. at 424. Had the “case turned on [the officer’s] after-the-fact testimony,” rather than the video footage, then “summary judgment would likely have been inappropriate.” Id. No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 19 Moreover, as Mitchell itself made clear, deadly force is not justified “whenever a suspect charges at an officer or defies an order.” Id. In the instant case, a jury could reject Johns’ characterizations and conclude that Palma’s walk was neither aggressive nor threatening. See Jacobs, 915 F.3d at 1041 (we do not have to “accept the officers’ subjective view of the facts” on summary judgment). And even Johns admitted that Palma “wasn’t walking at a fast pace.” (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #776.) Recognizing this problem, Johns contends that “the way that one describes how [Palma] was walking or advancing at Johns is immaterial.” (Defs.’ Br. at 17.) Simply stated, according to Johns, merely walking towards an officer while defying orders gives the officer probable cause to fear for his safety and justifies the use of deadly force. We have expressly rejected this argument. See Mitchell, 864 F.3d at 424. Johns also says that Palma was walking towards him when he first shot Palma, but Melissa saw Johns shoot at Palma while both Palma and Johns were stopped. Even if Palma were walking when Johns shot, this would not necessarily give Johns probable cause to believe Palma posed an imminent threat. See id. And if Palma was not walking towards Johns when Johns fired the first shots, as we must accept at this stage, then this factor shows that Palma did not pose an imminent threat at the moment Johns decided to shoot.
While the distance between the officer and the person is less significant when the person is armed and aiming a firearm at the officers, see DeMerrell, 206 F. App’x at 429, the distance is relevant when the officer is afraid of a hand-to-hand confrontation with the person, see Zulock, 441 F. App’x at 302 (likely unreasonable to shoot man armed with a knife when officers were eighteen to twenty feet away); Rucinski v. Cnty. of Oakland, 655 F. App’x 338, 342 (6th Cir. 2016) (reasonable to shoot man who approached officer and got within five feet while wielding a knife). Johns said he was concerned that Palma would “physically reach him, assault him, and perhaps obtain [his] weapon.” (Johns Aff., R. 46-2, Page ID #576.) According to Johns, Palma got within six or seven feet of Johns. But, according to Melissa, Palma never got close enough to reach Johns. She said that Palma and Johns were always ten to fifteen feet apart. If Palma No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 20 was ten to fifteen feet away from Johns, and was not moving when Johns shot him, then Palma did not pose an imminent threat of harm, especially because Johns never saw a weapon.
“The fact that a situation ‘unfolds quickly’ is not alone sufficient to justify the application of deadly force, but it is a factor that weighs in favor of a finding of reasonableness when it accompanies a credible threat to the safety of an officer or the public.” Mitchell, 864 F.3d at 423 (citing Mullins, 805 F.3d at 766–67). The record in this case does not clearly show how long Johns was on the scene before he shot Palma. Dispatch records indicate that only two-and-a-half minutes passed between the time Johns arrived at the Palma house, a few seconds before 3:37 P.M., and the time he reported shooting Palma just after 3:39 P.M. However, Johns admitted that the arrival time recorded by dispatch “is often delayed,” (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #832), meaning the dispatcher’s timeline could be wrong. In contrast, Salvatore indicated that the incident lasted much longer because Palma was on the ground for several minutes after Johns tased Palma. And Melissa said the entire encounter lasted eight to ten minutes. If the incident lasted eight to ten minutes, then the amount of time Johns had to react to Palma would not justify his use of lethal force. See Untalan, 430 F.3d at 316 (indicating that deadly force is less reasonable when officers have ten minutes to assess and react to a situation). Admittedly, officers often face rapidly evolving situations where they must make “split-second judgment[s].” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. However, nothing in the record indicates that Johns had to make a split-second decision in response to rapidly changing circumstances. If Palma steadily approached Johns at a normal walking speed—and Johns continued to back away—for eight to ten minutes, then there was no immediate threat. See Kirby v. Duva, 530 F.3d 475, 482– 83 (6th Cir. 2008). Whether Johns shot Palma several minutes after he called for backup or only eighteen seconds later, the alleged threat that Palma presented remained the same.3 If Johns had 3 To be clear, even if Johns shot Palma eighteen seconds after he called for backup, that short amount of time would not automatically justify his use of force as a split-second judgment. Lethal force may have been justified only if the encounter lasted eighteen seconds and if the undisputed facts suggested that Palma’s behavior constituted a threat at that time. No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 21 eight to ten minutes to assess and respond to a situation that never rapidly escalated, the use of lethal force would be unreasonable. See id. at 483.
When assessing an excessive force claim, “[t]he totality of the circumstances includes ‘the fact that at the time of the . . . struggle, the defendant officers had reason to believe that [the person] was . . . mentally unstable.’” Roell, 870 F.3d at 482 (quoting Landis v. Baker, 297 F. App’x 453, 465 (6th Cir. 2008)). While true that this factor is only relevant if Johns knew about Palma’s mental illness, see Simmonds, 682 F.3d at 445, the district court erroneously found that “the dispatcher did not advise Johns of [Palma]’s serious mental condition,” Palma, 2021 WL 798405, at . In fact, the dispatcher specifically told Johns that Palma was a “Code 76”— meaning Palma suffered from mental health issues. (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #732, #823.) Johns was “therefore required to take into account [Palma]’s diminished capacity before using force” against him. Roell, 870 F.3d at 482 (citing Champion v. Outlook Nashville, Inc., 380 F.3d 893, 904 (6th Cir. 2004)). As Johns correctly point outs, an officer is not absolutely barred from using lethal force on mentally ill individuals. See Reich, 945 F.3d at 979. But only in extreme cases have we found that an officer reasonably used lethal force against a mentally ill person. In every case that Johns cites, the officers used lethal force against a mentally ill person who was armed and threatening officers. See Gaddis, 364 F.3d at 772–73, 776–77 (reasonable to shoot mentally ill man who attacked police officers with a knife and stabbed an officer before officers shot him); Rucinski, 655 F. App’x at 339–42 (reasonable to shoot schizophrenic man who pulled a switchblade on officers, yelled “bring it on” or “here we go,” and began walking towards officers with the knife in hand); see also Summerland v. Cnty. of Livingston, 240 F. App’x 70, 72, 77 (6th Cir. 2007) (reasonable to shoot mentally ill man who posted a sign in his yard saying, “no police you be shot” and charged at officers with either an axe or a gun). The district court pointed to one other unpublished district court opinion, see Palma, 2021 WL 798405, at , but even that case involved a mentally ill man who “charged at [the officers] with a knife,” Johnson v. Combs, No. 04-cv-19, 2005 WL 2388247, at  (W.D. Ky. Sept. 27, 2005). No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 22 Johns knew that Palma was a “Code 76,” meaning he was mentally ill, and he knew that he was responding to a domestic dispute over a remote control. (Johns Dep., R. 50-1, Page ID #823.) A reasonable officer would take these facts into account when assessing whether Palma posed a threat. If a person who is not suffering from mental illness acts in a way that is objectively threatening, an officer may believe that the person poses an imminent danger because their actions—under normal circumstances—convey hostility towards the officer. But if the officer knows that person is suffering from some mental illness, the officer must consider this fact and respond accordingly. See Gambrel, — F.4th —, 2022 WL 369348, at  (citing Studdard v. Shelby Cnty., 934 F.3d 478, 480–82 (6th Cir. 2019)). Stated differently, behavior that ordinarily seems threatening may present a lower risk of harm if the officer has reason to believe that the behavior is a symptom of a mental condition. See generally Graves, 810 F. App’x at 417, 423 (lethal shooting unreasonable even when mentally ill man ignored officers’ commands and continued “staring vacantly ahead”). Here, Palma’s unresponsiveness was consistent with his mental illness, thus undermining Johns’ belief that it was threatening. This is especially true because Palma was silent and made no physically threatening gestures. The dissent agrees that officers can and should consider a person’s mental state when analyzing the amount of risk that they face. But the dissent says that this factor will always support the use of force. It believes that people with known mental illnesses inherently “pose[] a heightened risk,” therefore giving officers probable cause to believe that they face a risk of imminent harm, and goes as far as to say that the use of force, including lethal force, is more easily justified even if officers are merely conducting a wellness check because “a mentally ill individual in the midst of a psychotic break will not respond to reason, or to anything other than force.” (Infra Dissent at 43 (emphasis in original) (quoting Vos v. City of Newport Beach, 892 F.3d 1024, 1043 (9th Cir. 2018) (Bea, J., dissenting in part)).) But police routinely respond to non-criminal mental health calls and wellness checks. See Black’s Law Dictionary, What is a Police Welfare Check?, available at https://thelawdictionary.org/article/what-is-a-police-welfare-check/. Accordingly, under this Court’s precedent, officers should use their training and expertise in crisis management to determine whether and how to de-escalate a situation before resorting to force. See Martin, No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 23 712 F.3d at 958–59 (denying qualified immunity because a reasonable officer “would try to deescalate the situation and reduce the level of force needed to gain control”). Officers must use this experience to assess the level of risk in light of a person’s mental illness. We are not saying, as the dissent suggests, that officers may never use force against mentally ill persons. We have recognized many cases finding reasonable uses of force against mentally ill persons. See Reich, 945 F.3d at 979. In reality, mental illness may mitigate the risk in one situation and aggravate the risk in another. Therefore, we cannot simply defer to an officer’s post hoc use of mental illness as a justification for using force. Rather, if a jury could find that a reasonable officer would not perceive an imminent threat of danger—or would use other de-escalation tactics— then qualified immunity is unwarranted. See Martin, 712 F.3d at 958–59; Johnson v. City of Philadelphia, 837 F.3d 343, 353 (3d Cir. 2016). Based on the undisputed facts that Johns knew Palma was mentally ill and that Palma was unresponsive but not threatening throughout the entire encounter, mental illness in this case was a mitigating factor showing that Palma did not pose an immediate threat. See Graves, 810 F. App’x at 417, 423. Furthermore, Palma’s mental illness is relevant when considering whether Johns used excessive force. “The diminished capacity of an unarmed [person] must be taken into account when assessing the amount of force exerted.” Roell, 870 F.3d at 482 (quoting Champion, 380 F.3d at 904) (emphasis added). While we have found that using a taser or pepper spray on a mentally ill person was reasonable, see id. (likely not excessive to repeatedly tase a man suffering from a psychotic break after he “aggressive[ly]” approached officers with a garden hose and physically resisted arrest); Estate of Erwin, 861 F. App’x at 5 (reasonable to tase a mentally ill women who yelled at officers to leave and approached them while holding a rake above her head), we have never held that shooting a mentally ill person was reasonable when the officers had little reason to suspect that the person was armed.4 A jury is best positioned to balance these considerations. 4 Only twice have we said it was reasonable to shoot a mentally ill person who turned out to be unarmed. In both instances, however, officers had ample reason to believe that the suspect was armed with either a gun or an explosive device. Thus, these cases are more akin to those involving lethal force against a visibly armed mentally ill person. First, in Beans v. City of Massilon, 706 F. App’x 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2017), we held that officers reasonably used lethal force in a hostage situation when officers raided the crime scene and found the mentally ill suspect trying to “ignite [a] lighter and cause an explosion.” Though perhaps not armed in the traditional sense, this case is more No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 24
Plaintiffs argue that “Johns failed to use readily available alternatives to avoid the encounter with [Palma] and avoid shooting and killing him.” (Pls.’ Br. at 8.) Specifically, they argue that Johns had the opportunity to use less than lethal force—his baton—and that Johns could have easily removed himself from the situation. Generally, an officer is not precluded from using deadly force even if his own “poor planning or bad tactics” unnecessarily escalated the situation. Reich, 945 F.3d at 978 (citing Livermore, 476 F.3d at 407). However, “[s]ometimes, the time or space available to an officer may mean that the reasonable thing to do is monitor the suspect, issue a warning, or take cover.” Thomas, 854 F.3d at 366–67 (citing Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1163); see also Mitchell, 864 F.3d at 423 (indicating that failure to use alternatives—if officers had the time and opportunity to use them—may render use of deadly force unreasonable); Gaddis, 364 F.3d at 784 (Clay, J., dissenting) (finding use of lethal force likely unreasonable when officers failed to use “tactically more appropriate” measures first). This factor is particularly important in cases involving mental health crises, where officers should use the least force necessary to subdue the person. See Estate of Hill, 853 F.3d at 313–14. As the Third Circuit has stated: Depending on the severity and immediacy of the threat and any potential risk to public safety posed by an officer’s delayed action, it may be appropriate for an officer to retreat or await backup when encountering a mentally disturbed individual. It may also be appropriate for the officer to attempt to de-escalate an encounter to eliminate the need for force or to reduce the amount of force necessary to control an individual. Johnson, 837 F.3d at 353 (citing Martin, 712 F.3d at 958). When Johns arrived on the scene, the threat of the unwanted person was neither severe nor immediate. See id. While Johns apparently thought that he was walking into a volatile situation—so much so that he preemptively unholstered his gun while driving to the scene—this akin to those involving an armed mentally ill person. Similarly, in Simmonds, 682 F.3d at 445, we affirmed the district court’s decision finding that the officers had qualified immunity after they shot and killed a mentally ill man because officers had ample reason to believe the man was armed: he was threatening to kill his family members, his family told officers he owned multiple guns, the man shouted “I have a gun,” and the man pulled out a “silver object” and pointed it towards officers. Although the man in Simmonds was actually unarmed, officers had every reason to believe he had a gun. See id. No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 25 was hardly the scene he found when he arrived. By that time, Palma was already outside of the home and isolated from the rest of his family. According to the dissent, the situation on the scene was so dire that any failure to intervene or await backup would have amounted to a “dereliction of duty.” (Infra Dissent at 44.) In its view, had Johns not taken immediate action, he would have been “leaving the family to fend for themselves” against “an unwelcome intruder.” (Id.) This was hardly the case. When Johns pulled into the driveway, he saw Palma standing alone on the front porch with his hood up and his hands in his pockets. With Palma—the unwanted person—already having departed from the house, no one was in immediate danger and Johns had time to further assess the scene. It must be remembered that the police were called to the scene only because of a family dispute over a TV remote control. Johns should have waited for backup before engaging with a mentally ill man who posed no immediate threat to anyone. Even after engaging with Palma, Johns still could not use force that was “grossly disproportionate to the need.” Martin, 712 F.3d at 961 (quoting Simpson v. Hines, 903 F.2d 400, 401 (5th Cir. 1990)). After tasing Palma, Johns had the opportunity to subdue him using other, non-lethal methods such as handcuffs or his baton. Indeed, Johns pulled out his baton, extended it, and raised it above his head ready to strike Palma. Ultimately, Johns abandoned any attempt to use the baton after Palma turned back towards Johns. If an officer reasonably unholsters his gun during an encounter, it may be unreasonable to expect him to swap out the gun for a less lethal tool. See Mitchell, 864 F.3d at 423. But the opposite happened here; Johns unholstered his gun even though a less deadly alternative was already in his hands. Furthermore, if the entire encounter lasted eight to ten minutes, Johns may have been able to safely pursue other options such as getting into his patrol car and awaiting backup.
While each of these factual considerations is distinct, none can be considered standing alone. Altogether, the facts, viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, raise a triable issue as to the reasonableness of Johns’ decision to use lethal force. Defendants focus primarily on Palma’s disobedience; Palma purportedly kept walking towards Johns and refused to show his No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 26 hands. But equally important is that Johns knew Palma was mentally ill; Palma did not commit any crime before Johns arrived; he did not threaten Johns; he did not make any threatening gestures, like raising his fists; and he did not visibly brandish a weapon. Palma walked towards Johns at a normal pace—and it is the jury’s job to decide whether this was “aggressive,” as Johns said. After tasing Palma, Johns saw one of Palma’s hands, but still did not see any weapons. According to Melissa, the encounter lasted eight to ten minutes and, even while approaching Johns, Palma never got within ten to fifteen feet of Johns. Under these circumstances, Johns lacked probable cause to believe that Palma posed an imminent threat of serious bodily harm. Defendants point to an Eleventh Circuit opinion that they believe is “directly on point.” (Defs.’ Br. at 27 (citing Martinez v. City of Pembroke Pines, 648 F. App’x 888 (11th Cir. 2016).) In Martinez, multiple officers responded to a mental health emergency and found the plaintiff pacing, yelling, and waving his hands around. Martinez, 648 F. App’x at 889–90. As officers tried to handcuff him, the plaintiff swung his arms around and hit an officer in the head causing him to bleed profusely. Id. at 891. The plaintiff got away from the officers but turned around and took two steps towards the officers while he was only ten to twelve feet away. Id. Officers then shot the plaintiff once before using a taser to subdue the plaintiff as officers handcuffed him. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found the shooting reasonable and affirmed summary judgment in the officers’ favor. Id. But this case is not “directly on point” at all. While officers were similarly responding to a mental health crisis, the plaintiff in Martinez physically resisted when officers tried to restrain him, and he seriously injured one of the officers in the process. See id. at 893. If Palma had violently resisted in this manner and injured Johns before approaching him again, this would be a different case. But those are not the facts presented here. In fact, we have found triable issues as to the officer’s reasonableness even when officers faced more threatening situations. For example, in Bouggess, we held that the officer was not entitled to summary judgment because the officer “offered only a hunch, a crack deal, a hand-tohand struggle, and a ‘look in [the person’s] eyes’ to support his claim that his choice to shoot [the person] . . . was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 482 F.3d at 892. In Jones v. Sandusky County, 541 F. App’x 653, 655–56, 665–66 (6th Cir. 2013), we found a triable issue as to the officers use of deadly force when officers shot an armed suspect who had threatened to kill No. 21-3315 Palma, et al. v. Johns, et al. Page 27 his family because, just before the officers shot, they detonated a flash bang that would have made it hard to see whether the suspect was poised to use the firearm against the officers. And in Zulock, 441 F. App’x at 302, we found that officers were not entitled to summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds when the officers shot a man who was armed with a kitchen knife, did not respond to the officers’ orders, and repeatedly cursed at officers. Here, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, a police officer unreasonably shot a mentally ill man who was not verbally threatening the officer, was not making any threatening movements or gestures, and gave the officer little reason to suspect that he was armed or dangerous. Thus, Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment on this theory of excessive force. See Jacobs, 915 F.3d at 1041 (quoting O’Malley v. City of Flint, 652 F.3d 662, 677 (6th Cir. 2011)).