Opinion ID: 1265019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Title VII and PHRA Claims

Text: Brown contends that the District Court erred in concluding that she was an independent contractor of Craftmatic, rather than an employee, and therefore not protected by Title VII or the PHRA. [1] The term employee is defined in Title VII as an individual employed by an employer. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). In Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden, a case arising under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the Supreme Court construed an identical provision to incorporate traditional agency law principles. 503 U.S. 318, 323, 112 S.Ct. 1344, 117 L.Ed.2d 581 (1992); see also Walters v. Metro. Educ. Enters., Inc., 519 U.S. 202, 211-12, 117 S.Ct. 660, 136 L.Ed.2d 644 (1997) (citing favorably Darden in a Title VII case). [2] Thus, the question of whether an individual is an employee turns on the hiring party's right to control the manner and means by which the product is accomplished. Darden, 503 U.S. at 323, 112 S.Ct. 1344 (quotation omitted). As the Court summarized in Darden: Among the other factors relevant to this inquiry are the skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the hired party. Id. at 323-24, 112 S.Ct. 1344 (quotation omitted). Brown contends that a number of these factors suggests that she was an employee of Craftmatic. However, we conclude that the District Court correctly determined that Brown was an independent contractor, not an employee. Although Brown notes that Craftmatic's standard practice was to assign appointments to its sales representatives, such representatives could also schedule their own appointments. Brown also notes that Craftmatic made recommendations to its sales representatives regarding appropriate statements to prospective customers, but Craftmatic merely barred its representatives from making false or misleading statements. Otherwise, Craftmatic provided only recommendations regarding how the sales process should proceed and not a canned script. App. at 373. We agree with the District Court that these controls were the minimum that a corporation needs to maintain the quality of its product and services, and consistency in its business practices, and therefore should not be sufficient to transform Brown into an employee. App. at 13. Moreover, the Darden factors in their totality suggest that Brown was not an employee of Craftmatic. Brown had to provide her own equipment for sales appointments (except for a massage demonstration tool and a DVD for which she was required to pay a deposit), her own office supplies, and her own means of transportation to appointments. Craftmatic provided Brown with no office space and paid her on a commission basis only. Brown was also required to pay for her own expenses, including liability insurance, and was responsible for payment of all taxes arising from her work. Brown was permitted to negotiate price on her sales (within certain limits) and to solicit customers on her own. Finally, Craftmatic could only assign Brown sales appointments and no other work. Our conclusion that Brown was not an employee of Craftmatic is reinforced by the terms of the parties' Independent Contractor Agreement, which clearly provided that the sales representative was an independent contractor. The agreement, while not dispositive of the plaintiff's employment status, is strong evidence that she was an independent contractor. Holtzman v. World Book Co., Inc., 174 F.Supp.2d 251, 256 (E.D.Pa.2001); see also Adcock v. Chrysler Corp., 166 F.3d 1290, 1293 (9th Cir.1999). In sum, Brown was not an employee of Craftmatic for purposes of Title VII or the PHRA. Therefore, her termination did not fall within the protections of either statute.