Opinion ID: 1819410
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Court's Refusal to Disqualify Rogina's Counsel and Their Law Firm

Text: Gilbert argues that the trial court committed reversible error by denying Gilbert's motion to disqualify Rogina's attorney, Chervis Isom, as well as Isom's firm, Baker, Donelson, Bearman, Caldwell & Berkowitz, P.C., from representing Rogina because of statements made by Isom in a letter and because of the possibility that he might be called as a witness at trial. In his brief, Gilbert states: It is apparent from the above two quotes that the letter of Mr. Isom contains material which is adverse to his client's interest. (Gilbert's brief, p. 17.) Although it is not exactly clear to which passages Gilbert is referring, it appears to be the following two quotes found in a section of his brief addressing another argument: The ground lease does not require Mr. Gilbert to provide a non-disturbance agreement to Rogina's subtenants. As a practical matter, this transaction cannot go forward unless O'Henry's can obtain a non-disturbance agreement from Mr. Gilbert. .... Hence the net return to Rogina will be $1500.00 per month. Besides stating that Isom made statements adverse to his client's interests, Gilbert in his brief quotes Rule 3.7, Ala. R. Prof. Cond., Lawyer as Witness, and cites Harkins & Co. v. Lewis, 535 So.2d 104 (Ala.1988), which construes DR 5-102, Alabama Code of Professional Responsibility, [3] and LeaseAmerica Corp. v. Stewart, 19 Kan.App.2d 740, 876 P.2d 184 (1994), which expounds upon Kansas's versions of Rule 3.7 and DR 5-102. Gilbert's claim regarding Isom, however, is not cognizable because we are unable to discern how Isom's words are adverse to his client. In his motion before the trial court seeking to disqualify Isom, Gilbert appears to argue that the language he quoted Isom's letter is contradictory to Rogina's claim in its complaint that Gilbert breached the lease agreement with Rogina by unreasonably withholding consent to the proposed modifications to the subject property. However, as Rogina noted both in its response to Gilbert's motion and in its brief before this Court, it never contended before the trial court that Gilbert breached the lease agreement by refusing to provide a nondisturbance agreement. As Rogina notes, evidence in the record indicates that O'Henry's was willing to continue with the transaction without a nondisturbance agreement. Instead, Rogina argued that Gilbert breached the lease agreement by unreasonably withholding consent for O'Henry's to make the desired alterations to the structure that formerly housed the Omelet Shoppe. In reviewing the ruling on Gilbert's motion to disqualify Isom, we are unable to find any argument as to how Isom's reference to a monthly net return of $1,500 was adverse to his client's interests. Considering the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court properly denied Gilbert's motion to disqualify Isom. [4]