Opinion ID: 796234
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alrefae's Motion to Rescind the In Absentia Order of Removal

Text: 13 Although Alrefae claimed that he had not received notice of his removal hearing because his friend lost his mail, the IJ found that Alrefae had failed to rebut the presumption of delivery that applies to notices of removal hearings. The IJ also concluded that because of this presumption, Alrefae had failed to establish that exceptional circumstances prevented him from appearing for his removal hearing. Although, as we will explain, there is a presumption of receipt when notice of a removal hearing was properly sent, the IJ erred by failing to explain why he found that the evidence Alrefae submitted did not rebut this presumption. Moreover, the IJ erred by not analyzing Alrefae's claim of exceptional circumstances independently of his claim of nonreceipt. 14 With exceptions not relevant here, to prevail on a motion to rescind an in absentia removal order, the movant must show either that the failure to appear was because of exceptional circumstances or that he or she did not receive notice in accordance with paragraph (1) or (2) of section 1229(a). 7 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C). Exceptional circumstances are defined as circumstances (such as battery or extreme cruelty to the alien or any child or parent of the alien, serious illness of the alien, or serious illness or death of the spouse, child, or parent of the alien, but not including less compelling circumstances) beyond the control of the alien. Id. § 1229a(e)(1). The BIA's standard for exceptional circumstances appears fairly stringent, both in terms of the required severity of the circumstances and the proof required to establish a claim. See, e.g., In re B-A-S-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 57, 58-59 (B.I.A.1998) (Where an alien argues that his failure to appear resulted from a `serious illness,' we normally would expect specific, detailed medical evidence to corroborate the alien's claim.); In re J-P-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 33, 34-35 (B.I.A.1998) (rejecting a claim of exceptional circumstances because a common headache would not constitute a serious illness and, even if a serious headache would qualify, the alien's perfunctory statement regarding his headache included no detail regarding the cause, severity, or treatment of the alleged illness). 15 With regard to claims of nonreceipt under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii), there is a presumption that aliens receive notices of removal hearings that were properly mailed, and aliens who move to reopen claiming that they did not receive notice must rebut this presumption. When an alien fails to appear for removal proceedings, an in absentia removal order shall be entered if the government establishes by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that . . . written notice was . . . provided and that the alien is removable. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A) (emphasis added). When an alien seeks to rescind the removal order, however, claiming that he did not receive notice of the hearing, [a]s the use of the word `receive' [in 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(C)(ii)] establishes, when considering the motion to reopen, the central issue no longer is whether the notice was properly mailed (as it is for the purpose of initially entering the in absentia order), but rather whether the alien actually received the notice. 8 Lopes v. Gonzales, 468 F.3d 81, 84 (2d Cir.2006) (per curiam). 16 The BIA has stated that where service of a notice of a deportation proceeding is sent by certified mail through the United States Postal Service and there is proof of attempted delivery and notification of certified mail, a strong presumption of effective service arises. Matter of Grijalva, 1995 WL 314388, 21 I. & N. Dec. 27, 37 (B.I.A.1995). This presumption can be overcome by the affirmative defense of nondelivery or improper delivery by the Postal Service, but only if the alien presents substantial and probative evidence such as documentary evidence from the Postal Service, third party affidavits, or other similar evidence demonstrating that there was improper delivery. Id. Although we have recently held that this exacting standard is inapplicable where, as in Alrefae's case, notice of delivery was sent by regular rather than certified mail, 9 the BIA may apply a less stringent, rebuttable presumption to notices of removal hearings if the record establishes that the notice was accurately addressed and mailed in accordance with normal office procedures. Lopes, 468 F.3d at 85. Although the BIA in Grijalva spoke in terms of a presumption of delivery, we have held that it is presumed not only that delivery to the alien's mailing address was effective, but also that the alien personally received the notice. See id. When an alien seeks to rescind an in absentia removal order claiming nonreceipt, the IJ must consider all relevant evidence, including circumstantial evidence, offered to rebut th[e] presumption. Id. at 86. 17 In his motion to rescind, Alrefae appears to have sought relief based on both exceptional circumstances and nonreceipt of notice, and the IJ referred to both of these grounds in his decision. We therefore assume, without deciding, that an alien who claims nonreceipt of notice of his or her removal hearing could also claim that exceptional circumstances prevented him or her from receiving the notice. We focus here on the adequacy of the IJ's explanations for denying Alrefae's claims for rescission. 10 18 Although the IJ did not cite Grijalva, he invoked a presumption of delivery in rejecting Alrefae's claim of nonreceipt, explaining that [s]aid notice of hearing was not returned to the court file[,] giving rise of [sic] a presumption of delivery. We need not decide whether the IJ intended to invoke the Grijalva standard, which we have rejected for notices sent by regular mail, or instead a less stringent presumption, because in either case the IJ erred in rejecting Alrefae's claim of nonreceipt by failing to explain why Alrefae had not rebutted the presumption of receipt. Alrefae submitted a notarized letter attesting that he had not received notice because his friend Mansour lost his mail, and he offered a police report as support for his claim that he began receiving his mail at Mansour's home after his own home was burglarized. Although the IJ was correct that there was no evidence of misdelivery — indeed, Alrefae claimed that his mail was lost after it was delivered to his mailing address — Alrefae attempted to show that he had not personally received the notice. The IJ was by no means required to find Alrefae's assertions sufficient to rebut the presumption, but he should have addressed them in his decision. See Lopes, 468 F.3d at 85-86 (Although an affidavit of non-receipt might be insufficient by itself to rebut the presumption, it does raise a factual issue that the BIA must resolve by taking account of all relevant evidence . . . .). 19 We note several additional facts in the record that, on remand, the IJ might weigh in determining whether Alrefae rebutted the presumption of receipt. First, Alrefae appeared voluntarily to register for the NSEERS program, which may indicate a general willingness to comply with U.S. immigration laws and may suggest that he would not have knowingly failed to appear for his removal hearing. Cf. id. at 86 (noting that promptly notifying the INS of a change of address may indicate at least arguably that the alien is not an absconder). Second, Alrefae filed his motion to rescind and reopen within a few months of his scheduled removal hearing, and less than a month after receiving his divorce judgment, which also may provide some indication that he would have attended his removal proceeding had he received notice of it. Finally, the IJ might consider, on the other side of the scale, whether Alrefae's assertion that he began receiving his mail at his friend's address only after his own home was burglarized is contradicted by the fact that Alrefae gave his friend's address as his own mailing address when he appeared for NSEERS registration more than a month before the burglary. See supra note 5. 20 The IJ also concluded, without further explanation, that Alrefae had not made out a claim of exceptional circumstances because he failed to rebut the presumption of delivery. Because exceptional circumstances and nonreceipt are independent bases for rescission, it was error for the IJ not to assess Alrefae's exceptional circumstances and nonreceipt claims separately. We do not decide here whether a third party's misplacement of an alien's notice of hearing constitutes exceptional circumstances under BIA precedent, or, if it does, whether the evidence Alrefae submitted was sufficient to establish his claim. On remand, the IJ should assess Alrefae's claim of exceptional circumstances independently of his claim of nonreceipt and explain whether Alrefae is entitled to rescission on this ground on the basis of his claim that he did not receive notice because his friend lost his mail. In doing so, the IJ may consider the totality of the circumstances presented by Alrefae's case. See Kaweesa v. Gonzales, 450 F.3d 62, 68-69 (1st Cir.2006); Romero-Morales v. INS, 25 F.3d 125, 129-31 (2d Cir.1994). After considering all the relevant facts in the record, the IJ may decide that it is necessary to hold an evidentiary hearing to evaluate fully either or both of Alrefae's claims. If, however, the IJ determines that he can reach a decision on Alrefae's claims on the basis of the current record, he is not required to hold such a hearing. 21