Opinion ID: 76334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Necessary Interstate Commerce Nexus

Text: 24 Drury first argues that the government failed to adduce sufficient evidence at trial to establish the jurisdictional element of 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). Specifically, Drury contends that the government did not show that he used a facility in interstate commerce with the intent to commit a murder-for-hire, as required by the statute. Although Drury concedes that each of the calls that he made to Valoze's cellular phone were routed through VoiceStream's Jacksonville, Florida switching center, he nonetheless contends that such contacts are insufficient to satisfy § 1958(a)'s interstate commerce requirement. 25 The government argues that it was only required to prove that Drury used a means of communication capable of traveling interstate to impose liability under the statute. Alternatively, the government argues that even if the statute requires that a facility actually be used in interstate commerce, Drury's call, which was routed through another state, satisfies that requirement. Thus, we are called upon to interpret and apply 18 U.S.C. § 1958, 2 which provides as follows: 26 Use of interstate commerce facilities in the commission of murder-for-hire. 27 (a) Whoever travels in or causes another (including the intended victim) to travel in interstate or foreign commerce, or uses or causes another (including the intended victim) to use the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce, with intent that a murder be committed in violation of the laws of any State or the United States as consideration for the receipt of, or as consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of pecuniary value, or who conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both; and if personal injury results, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned for not more than twenty years, or both; and if death results, shall be punished by death or life imprisonment, or shall be fined not more than $250,000, or both. 28 (b) As used in this section and section 1959— 29 (1) anything of pecuniary value means anything of value in the form of money, a negotiable instrument, a commercial interest, or anything else the primary significance of which is economic advantage; 30 (2) facility of interstate commerce includes means of transportation and communication; and 31 (3) State includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, and any commonwealth, territory, or possession of the United States. 32 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (emphases supplied). 33 The statute finds its origins in the Interstate Travel in Aid of Racketeering Statute (the Travel Act). See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1961), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1952A (1984). The Travel Act federalized the prosecution of organized crime and racketeering offenses that cross state borders. It originally covered unlawful activity associated with organized crime ( e.g., gambling, prostitution, liquor, and narcotics), but did not include murder-for-hire as a distinct offense. 3 See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811, 91 S.Ct. 1056, 28 L.Ed.2d 493 (1971) (Legislative history of the [Travel] Act is limited, but does reveal that § 1952 was aimed primarily at organized crime and, more specifically, at persons who reside in one State while operating or managing illegal activities located in another.). 34 In 1984, Congress passed the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, which amended the Travel Act to include the crime of murder-for-hire. 4 See 18 U.S.C. § 1952A (1984), amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1988). The interstate nexus requirement set forth in § 1952A closely mirrored the language used in the original version of the Travel Act under § 1952. 35 In 1988, Congress passed the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, which, inter alia, recast § 1952A as § 1958. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1988). The text of § 1958 is identical to the previous version under § 1952A, save for the addition of the phrase or who conspires to do so after the words pecuniary value. 5 36 We begin our analysis with the text of the statute. We must first discern the burden that § 1958(a)'s jurisdictional element imposes upon the government and then judge whether the government met this burden.
37 Our analysis begins with an examination of the language of the statute itself. See RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. United States, 955 F.2d 1457, 1460 (11th Cir.1992). We must determine whether the language at issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the case. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 340, 117 S.Ct. 843, 136 L.Ed.2d 808 (1997). The plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. Id. at 341, 117 S.Ct. 843. When discerning a statute's plain meaning, courts must endeavor to give effect to all statutory provisions and construe related provisions in harmony with each other. See Borgner v. Brooks, 284 F.3d 1204, 1209 (11th Cir.) (citation omitted), cert. denied sub nom. Borgner v. Florida Bd. of Dentistry, 537 U.S. 1080, 123 S.Ct. 688, 154 L.Ed.2d 580 (2002); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 290, 93 S.Ct. 1614, 36 L.Ed.2d 251 (1973) ([D]ifferent provisions of the same statute normally should be construed consistently with one another.). 38 Two clauses in § 1958 are central to the instant case. The first, reduced to the relevant text, is [w]hoever ... uses ... any facility in interstate ... commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a). The second is `facility of interstate commerce' includes means of transportation and communication. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(b)(2). While one might expect that the harmonization of two such seemingly manageable clauses would be fairly easy to achieve, there is disagreement in our sister circuits as to § 1958's proper reach. Compare United States v. Weathers, 169 F.3d 336 (6th Cir.) (finding that § 1958 requires that the facility actually be used in interstate commerce), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 838, 120 S.Ct. 101, 145 L.Ed.2d 85 (1999); United States v. Paredes, 950 F.Supp. 584, 590 (S.D.N.Y.1996) (same), aff'd, 162 F.3d 1149 (2nd Cir.1998) (table), with United States v. Marek, 238 F.3d 310 (5th Cir.) (finding that using a facility capable of interstate commerce is sufficient), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 813, 122 S.Ct. 37, 151 L.Ed.2d 11 (2001). 6 At least two components of § 1958 contribute to this confusion. 39 First, it is unclear from the terms of subsection (a) whether the phrase in interstate... commerce, 7 modifies the spatially proximate noun facility, see Marek, 238 F.3d at 316, or the more remote verb use. See id. at 324-25 (Jolly, J. dissenting). If the former is the case, then § 1958's use of a `facility in interstate commerce' is synonymous with the use of an `interstate commerce facility.' See id. at 313. As such, the focus of subsection (a)'s jurisdictional element would be on the type of facility used, not the manner in which it is used. Conversely, an interpretation focusing on the term uses suggests an alternative conclusion. If the phrase modifies use, then the statute clearly requires that the particular use be `in interstate or foreign commerce.' Id. at 325 (Jolly, J. dissenting) (emphasis supplied). See also Paredes, 950 F.Supp. at 587 (noting that there are at least two grammatically cognizable interpretations — one stressing `use' and the other stressing `facility.'). 40 Second, it is notable that while § 1958(a) utilizes the prepositional phrase in interstate... commerce, § 1958(b) employs the conceptually distinct phrase of interstate commerce. A plain reading of the phrase in interstate ... commerce would seem to stress the manner in which the facility is used ( i.e., a use that actually implicates interstate commerce), whereas a similar evaluation of the phrase of interstate commerce implicates the type of facility that is used. This distinction is important. Under the former interpretation, the jurisdictional element of § 1958(a) could only be satisfied if the government proves that the defendant actually used the facility in interstate commerce. Given the facts in this case, a construction that stresses the manner in which a facility is used would require that the government show that Drury placed a telephone call that actually traveled outside the state of Georgia. In contrast, under the government's view, an interpretation that stresses the type of facility used would dictate only that the means of communication utilized be capable of interstate commerce. The government, therefore, argues that it is only required to demonstrate that Drury used a telephone to solicit his wife's murder. It is unclear from the distinct prepositional phrases employed in § 1958(a) and § 1958(b) which of these very different definitions conveys the appropriate reach of the statute's jurisdictional nexus. 41 In short, the structure and language of 18 U.S.C. § 1958 make it impossible to discern a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to [§ 1958]. Robinson, 519 U.S. at 340, 117 S.Ct. 843; see also Paredes, 950 F.Supp. at 587 (The phrase `use ... any facility in interstate or foreign commerce' is inherently ambiguous.). As a consequence, we must resort to alternative canons of statutory interpretation. See United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 611, 109 S.Ct. 2657, 105 L.Ed.2d 512 (1989). 42
43 A basic premise of statutory construction is that a statute is to be interpreted so that no words shall be discarded as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage. United States v. Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1991). It is our duty `to give effect, if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.' United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39, 75 S.Ct. 513, 99 L.Ed. 615 (1955) (quoting Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U.S. 147, 152, 2 S.Ct. 391, 27 L.Ed. 431 (1883)). Avoiding circumscription in our reading of the murder-for-hire statute requires that the two clauses at issue here be harmonized so that neither is rendered meaningless. 44 The government argues that the phrase facility of interstate commerce in § 1958(b)(2) simply defines the phrase facility in interstate ... commerce in § 1958(a). This tactic assumes that Congress intended for the words in and of to be used interchangeably. But this deceptively simple construction is inherently problematic. Despite the convenience of equating the word in with the word of, it is clear that the two terms are different. As a consequence, this approach runs counter to the very principle that it seeks to effect by discard[ing] as being meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage § 1958(a)'s use of the word in. 8 Canals-Jimenez, 943 F.2d at 1287. Moreover, it distorts the meaning of the word uses in the phrase: Whoever ... uses ... any facility in interstate ... commerce. 45 To avoid the shortcomings of equating two plainly different terms, we read § 1958(b)(2) in harmony with § 1958(a). An accord between the two subsections is achieved by recognizing that § 1958(b) merely provides examples of what might constitute a facility under the statute. This makes sense because § 1958(b)(2) does not even purport to be definitional, but rather explicitly uses language making it exemplary. See 18 U.S.C. § 1958(b). Unlike other statutes that clearly designate a definitions section, § 1958 simply states that, [a]s used in this section ... `facility of interstate commerce' includes means of transportation and communication. Id. (emphasis supplied). Because it is not intuitive that a  facility of interstate commerce would include things such as a telephone or a passenger car, this provision does not accomplish[] absolutely nothing, as the concurrence claims, but rather includes telephones in the types of facilities of interstate commerce that must be used in interstate commerce to satisfy § 1958(a). Read in this way, § 1958(b) does not conflict with § 1958(a), as it neither equates two different terms nor defines a phrase not present in subsection (a). Id. Thus, a faithful application of the dual principles that (1) a statute should not be read in a manner that renders its terms mere surplusage and (2) courts should try to harmonize distinct provisions in a statute lends support to the conclusion that § 1958 applies solely to facilities that are actually used in interstate commerce. 9 Other interpretive guides counsel the same result.
46 Particularly relevant to the instant case is the precept that if Congress intends to alter the `usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so `unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.' Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (quoting Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242, 105 S.Ct. 3142, 87 L.Ed.2d 171 (1985)). [T]he clear statement rule ... ensure[s] that attempts to limit state power [are] unmistakable, thereby structuring the legislative process to allow the centrifugal forces in Congress the greatest opportunity to protect the states' interests. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 706 n. 4, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (Powell, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Laurence H. Tribe, Inter-governmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 Harv. L.Rev. 682, 695 (1976)). To apply the clear statement rule, we must first determine whether § 1958 generates federalism concerns and, if so, assess whether Congress made its intention to alter the federal-state balance clear in the text of the statute. 47 We find that § 1958 impinges upon the traditional powers of the states. As the Supreme Court has stated, [w]hen Congress criminalizes conduct already denounced as criminal by the States, it effects `a change in the sensitive relation between federal and state criminal jurisdiction.' United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 n. 3, 115 S.Ct. 1624, 131 L.Ed.2d 626 (1995) (quoting United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411-12, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379 (1973)). Murder, whether by one's own hand or for hire, is a quintessential example of a crime traditionally considered within the States' fundamental police powers. Accordingly, § 1958's federalization of murder-for-hire crimes necessarily engenders a shift in the federal-state balance. 10 See id. 48 In enacting § 1958, however, Congress failed to use unmistakably clear language that would signal its intent to alter this balance. Instead, as discussed supra Part I(A)(1), the statute is ambiguous with regard to its jurisdictional nexus requirement. In the absence of a clear statement of congressional design, the Supreme Court has refused to interpret ambiguous federal statutes in a manner that disrupts the delicate balance between state and federal power. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460-64, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991). Rather, the Court has instructed that when faced with two plausible interpretations of an ambiguous federal criminal statute, courts should generally apply the alternative that does not impute an intention upon Congress to invoke its full commerce power to regulate conduct traditionally controlled by the States. See Enmons, 410 U.S. at 411-12, 93 S.Ct. 1007; United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349-50, 92 S.Ct. 515, 30 L.Ed.2d 488 (1971); Rewis, 401 U.S. at 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056. Given the ambiguity in § 1958, the plain statement rule directs us to construe the statute in a manner that minimizes the federal intrusion on state police powers. 11 See Bass, 404 U.S. at 350, 92 S.Ct. 515. This aim is accomplished through a narrow interpretation of § 1958's jurisdictional element to require that the facility in question must actually be used in interstate commerce. 12 See id.
49 The rule of lenity is also applicable to our inquiry into the intended scope of § 1958's jurisdictional element. It states that when there are two rational readings of a criminal statute, one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60, 107 S.Ct. 2875, 97 L.Ed.2d 292 (1987); see also Scheidler v. National Organization for Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 123 S.Ct. 1057, 1068, 154 L.Ed.2d 991 (2003) (applying the rule of lenity to the Hobbs Act). Two vital functions are served by the rule: 50 First, a fair warning should be given to the world in language that the common world will understand, of what the law intends to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far as possible the line should be clear. Second, because of the seriousness of criminal penalties, and because criminal punishment usually represents the moral condemnation of the community, legislatures and not courts should define criminal activity. 51 Bass, 404 U.S. at 348, 92 S.Ct. 515 (internal quotation, citations, and a footnote omitted). Given ambiguity in a criminal statute, the rule of lenity counsels us to construe it more narrowly. Id. at 347, 92 S.Ct. 515; see also Rewis, 401 U.S. at 812, 91 S.Ct. 1056 (In short, neither statutory language nor legislative history supports such a broad-ranging interpretation of [the Travel Act]. And even if this lack of support were less apparent, ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.) (citing Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955)). Applied to § 1958, this rule instructs that § 1958(a)'s jurisdictional element should be interpreted to include only the use of facilities that are actually engaged in interstate commerce.
52 Finally, although we do not find it necessary to rely on legislative history to resolve the question before us, a review of § 1958's legislative history persuades us that the aforementioned interpretive guides lead to the correct conclusion. As stated previously, the modern federal murder-for-hire statute derives from the Travel Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1961). The Travel Act originated in a bill forwarded to Congress by Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy on April 6, 1961. Letter from Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General, to the Vice President (Apr. 6, 1961), S.Rep. No. 87-644, at 4 (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2664, 2666 (Attorney General Letter of 1961); see also United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 685 (2d Cir.1973). This letter proposed a statute of limited scope aimed at combating organized crime and racketeering: 53 Because many rackets are conducted by highly organized syndicates whose influence extends over State and National borders, the Federal Government should come to the aid of local law enforcement authorities in an effort to stem such activity. 54 Attorney General Letter of 1961 at 4. Attorney General Kennedy made clear that the proposed bill was intended to combat organized crimes that cross state or national borders: 55 The bill which I submit to the Congress would impose criminal sanctions upon the person whose work takes him across State or National boundaries in aid of certain unlawful activities. 56 Id. Thus, an interstate nexus was central to the proposed legislation and justified the federalization of the subject crimes. See also United States v. Nardello, 393 U.S. 286, 290, 89 S.Ct. 534, 21 L.Ed.2d 487 (1969) (quoting Kennedy's statement to the Committee that the Act would assist prosecution where the `top men' of a given criminal operation resided in one State but conducted their illegal activities in another). 57 Beyond Attorney General Kennedy's letter and testimony before Congress regarding the foundational Travel Act, the main substantive historical source for the current murder-for-hire statute is found in a 1984 Senate Subcommittee Report on the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. 13 See S.Rep. No. 98-22 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3484. This report contains language conveying the intended scope of the statute's jurisdictional element. 58 For example, the report states that the drafters sought to ensure that the new murder-for-hire statute [would be] used in appropriate cases to assist the states rather than to allow the usurpation of significant cases by federal authorities that could be handled as well or better at the local level. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3484; see also Paredes, 950 F.Supp. at 588 ([T]his brief quotation from the legislative history confirms that even before the mushrooming of interstate communication technology such as beepers, cellular phones and email, Congress was concerned that the murder-for-hire statute would allow federal `usurpation' of essentially local cases.). In this regard, the committee [noted its] aware[ness] of the concerns of local prosecutors with respect to the creation of concurrent federal jurisdiction in an area, namely murder cases, which has heretofore been the almost exclusive responsibility of state and local authorities. 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3484. As the report explicitly states, the committee fully appreciate[d] that many state and local police forces and prosecutor offices are quite capable of handling a murder-for-hire case notwithstanding the presence of some interstate aspects. Id. Thus, while the report notes that the proposed statute allows that the option of federal investigation and prosecution should be available when a murder is committed or planned as consideration for something of pecuniary value and the proper federal nexus ... is present, id., this does not mean, nor does the committee intend, that all or even most such offenses should become matters of federal responsibility. Id. Rather, to the extent that federal jurisdiction is sought over crimes with an interstate component, it  should be asserted selectively based on such factors as the type of defendants reasonably believed to be involved and the relative ability of the federal and state authorities to investigate and prosecute. Id. (emphasis supplied). These passages from the Senate Subcommittee report indicate that the drafters intended § 1958(a)'s jurisdictional element to require at least some interstate aspects beyond the mere intrastate use of a car, telephone, or other facility capable of interstate commerce. 59 Further support for a narrow reading of the murder-for-hire statute is found in the examples that the report provides of the requisite jurisdictional nexus. The report states that: 60 an interstate telephone call is sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction, as it is under the [International Traffic in Arms Regulations, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-130.17 (1990)] statute. Both the person who ordered the murder and the hit man would be covered by the new section provided the interstate commerce or mail nexus is present. 61 Id. (emphasis supplied). This passage makes plain that the Subcommittee contemplated federal jurisdiction only over cases where the participants used facilities in the course of interstate commerce. Indeed, it would make little sense for the Subcommittee expressly to indicate that an interstate telephone call is sufficient to trigger federal jurisdiction if it intended that all phone calls — regardless of origin or destination ( i.e., even intrastate calls) — could achieve this end. 14 Id. 62 In sum, the report demonstrates that the Senate Subcommittee did not intend to federalize murder-for-hire schemes with merely tenuous links to interstate commerce. Instead, only crimes with interstate features were to be prosecuted federally. Id. The very notion [t]hat a defendant who never travelled from one state to another, conducted an interstate transaction, or communicated across state lines could now be prosecuted under this Act because of the evolution in communications technology runs against the grain of the statute's legislative history. Paredes, 950 F.Supp. at 588; see also Archer, 486 F.2d at 685 (Both the legislative history summarized in our opinion and the additional extracts relied on in the Government's petition show that the overriding Congressional purpose was to permit the federal government to act against members of organized crime whose activity crossed state lines when local law enforcement officers were unable or unwilling to do so....). Accordingly, we conclude that the legislative history strongly suggests that Congress intended § 1958(a)'s interstate nexus provision to be read narrowly rather than broadly; that is, the facility in question must actually be used in an interstate manner rather than simply be capable of such use. 63
64 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 1958(a)'s jurisdictional element requires that a defendant must actually use a facility in a manner that implicates interstate commerce, not just that the facility itself possess the capability of affecting interstate commerce. With that issue decided, we now turn to the question of whether the government presented sufficient evidence at trial to demonstrate that Drury's telephone calls actually moved in interstate commerce.