Opinion ID: 740542
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Government Witness Vouches for Credibility of Other Witnesses

Text: 92 Guerra also alleges that it was plain error to allow a government witness to vouch for the credibility of the coconspirators. Special Agent Gregory testified as follows: 93 Q. Mr. Price: Now, Special Agent Gregory, after these proffered statements were obtained, did you in fact advise my office that you were accepting the information, and that we wanted to work out some type of plea agreement with Mr. Cordova and Dianne Whyde? 94 A. Special Agent Gregory: Yes, sir-- 95 Q. Yes, I am sorry. 96 A. Based on the interview and the statements that they made, I believed them to be truthful and forthcoming with the information that they gave to us. 97 (Tr. 2-60 to 2-61). Government counsel may inquire as to the terms of a plea agreement with other codefendants. The test, of course, is relevancy. Agent Gregory's testimony was not responsive to government counsel's questions. We do not believe that the substantial rights of Guerra were prejudiced by this offhand remark. Swanson, 9 F.3d at 1357 (court need not consider if error was committed given that no substantial rights were prejudiced by the admission of the evidence). 98 We are nonetheless disturbed by the conduct of the prosecutor in this case. While he may not have crossed the line to prosecutorial misconduct, he certainly was on the line. Particularly in view of the sufficiency of the evidence, he need not have done so. Overzealous prosecutors sometimes forget that the prosecutor's special duty is not to convict, but to secure justice. United States v. O'Connell, 841 F.2d 1408, 1428 (8th Cir.1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1011, 109 S.Ct. 799, 102 L.Ed.2d 790 (1989) (citing United States v. Peyro, 786 F.2d 826, 831 (8th Cir.1986)). The cause of justice would be well served if prosecutors would heed the 1935 admonition by the Supreme Court: 99 He [she] may prosecute with earnestness and vigor--indeed, he [she] should do so. But, while he [she] may strike hard blows, he [she] is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his [her] duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. 100 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 633, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935).