Opinion ID: 2338449
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Alaska Court of Appeals

Text: In Gallmeyer v. State [65] an intoxicated Gallmeyer struck his wife, threatened her with a firearm, and forcibly expelled her from their home. The wife ran to a neighbor's house and called the police, asking for help removing the couple's 15-month-old daughter from the home. Two officers were dispatched, but highway delays substantially slowed their arrival. The wife called again, insisting she needed immediate help. The wife then approached her home and asked Gallmeyer to bring their daughter outside she told him that in exchange, she would not ask the police to enter the house once they arrived. Gallmeyer complied, leaving the infant on the front porch; the wife did not remove the child. Once the officers arrived, the wifespeaking hysterically and with a bloody mouthasked them to retrieve the child. She informed the officers that Gallmeyer was drunk, described the domestic violence, and warned them that he possessed several handguns. One of the officers approached the home. Fearing for both his and the child's safety, the officer decided to speak with Gallmeyer first rather than immediately remove the baby from the porch. Gallmeyer acknowledged the officer, who then entered the home. The officer immediately noticed Gallmeyer had a gun in his pants waistband and reached to remove it. Gallmeyer reached for another firearm nearby and a fight broke out. The officer subdued Gallmeyer without injury and arrested him for possession of a firearm while intoxicated. After an investigation revealed Gallmeyer had a prior felony conviction, he was indicted for being a felon in possession of a firearm. [66] He moved to suppress evidence of his firearms as the product of a warrantless entry into and search of his home. [67] The superior court denied Gallmeyer's motion on the ground that the police entry was solely investigative in nature and was meant to assure the safety of the officer and the Gallmeyers' baby. [68] Gallmeyer was convicted and he appealed. [69] On appeal the State argued the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement justified the police entering Gallmeyer's home. [70] The court of appeals noted the emergency aid doctrine has been uniformly recognized as an exception to the warrant requirement, referenced Schraff 's recognition and Stevens ' appli[cation] of the doctrine, and pointed to the Barone statement of the doctrine as [p]erhaps the most commonly cited statement of the doctrine. [71] It then looked to Mitchell to set out the emergency aid doctrine elements: (1) the police must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance in the protection of life or property; (2) the search must not be primarily motivated by the intent to arrest a person or to seize evidence; and (3) there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched. [72] The court of appeals first acknowledged that it must accept the superior court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous and must view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the superior court's decision. [73] The court then considered whether there were reasonable grounds for the officers' belief that an emergency existed at the Gallmeyers' home. [74] The court described this first prong of the test as an objective standard, [75] designed to determine whether the evidence would have led a prudent and reasonable officer to perceive an immediate need to take action in order to prevent death or to protect against serious injury to persons or property. [76] Gallmeyer argued that because he was the house's only occupant, no risk of death or harm to anyone justified police intrusion. [77] Taking a broad view of the facts and drawing all favorable inferences on factual findings in favor of the State, the court rejected Gallmeyer's argument, noting: the wife's two emergency calls requesting immediate assistance, the wife was obviously upset at the scene, the wife was bloody and had recently been struck, Gallmeyer had reportedly brandished a weapon, Gallmeyer possessed weapons inside, and the wife had not attempted to secure her daughter without the police. [78] The court concluded it was apparent that [the police officers] had ample cause to fear that [Gallmeyer] posed an immediate threat of inflicting serious and potentially fatal injury to his wife, his daughter, or the officers. [79] Only after concluding the officers had an objectively reasonable basis to believe an emergency existed did the court passingly mention the true necessity concept: In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful that emergency aid ordinarily requires true necessitythat is, an imminent and substantial threat to life, health or property. [80] The court did not indicate whether this true necessity requirement clarified, modified, or simply reiterated its earlier description of the first element under Mitchell a situation leading a prudent and reasonable officer to perceive an immediate need to take action to avert death or serious injury. [81] But the court did state that true necessity does not require absolute proof that injury would necessarily have occurred without emergency intervention: in determining necessity, the probability and potential seriousness of the threatened harm must be viewed objectively and balanced against the extent to which police conduct results in a violation of privacy interests. [82] The court ultimately found the second and third prongs of the test satisfied, [83] noting the superior court's findings on the officer's subjective motivations were amply supported by the evidence and conclusively showed the officers were not motivated primarily by a desire to arrest Gallmeyer or search for incriminating evidence. [84] As to the scope of the entry and search, the court further found the record supports the conclusion that [the officer] was justified in believing an emergency reasonably precipitated his entry into Gallmeyer's home. [85] The court emphasized granting officers great flexibility in responding to reasonably perceived emergencies when it analyzed this third element: [O]nce the existence of an emergency has been determined, and once it has been found that an officer's conduct was motivated by the apparent need to render assistance . . . officers must be allowed a broad scope of judgment in the precise manner of dealing with emergency situations. [86] Speaking more particularly to cases of domestic violence, the court added that: situations such as the present one, where officers are called upon to intervene in episodes of domestic violence, are often particularly hazardous. . . . Thus, when officers responding to a call involving domestic violence encounter objective factors sufficient to indicate an imminent danger of death or serious injury . . . it is particularly appropriate for courts to be flexible in assessing the reasonableness of the particular manner chosen to deal with the emergency.[ [87] ] The court affirmed Gallmeyer's conviction. [88]