Opinion ID: 2599880
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motions for Mistrial (Lewis, Oliver)

Text: Defendants claim the trial court erred under state law by failing to grant three mistrial motions during the guilt phase. Oliver asserts related violations of his due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, of his Sixth Amendment rights generally, of his Eighth Amendment right to a reliable penalty determination, and of his rights under parallel provisions of the state Constitution. Lewis claims the trial court violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process, his Sixth Amendment right to conflict-free counsel, and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Lewis further complains about the court's failure to control all proceedings during the trial under section 1044. Except for due process, the constitutional claims and the section 1044 claim are forfeited. ( Partida, supra, 37 Cal.4th 428, 435, 35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765.) No state law error occurred. Oliver faults the trial court for denying two mistrial motions he made on a single day, January 28, 1993, during the prosecution's case-in-chief. The first one followed testimony by Vivian Worthen, the mother of murder victim Patrinella Luke. As Worthen left the witness stand, she made a disparaging comment to Oliver. William Turner, Oliver's counsel, heard her call him a dirty black dog or you mad dog. From five feet away, Richard Leonard, Lewis's counsel, heard her call Oliver you mad dog. The bailiff said he thought Worthen had called Oliver a dog. Oliver's counsel moved for a mistrial because he assumed the jury heard the comment and would be prejudiced against Oliver. Counsel also asked the court to inquire of the jurors whether they had heard Worthen's comment. A motion for mistrial should be granted only when a party's chances of receiving a fair trial have been irreparably damaged. ( People v. Ayala (2000) 24 Cal.4th 243, 284, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.) We review a ruling denying a motion for mistrial for abuse of discretion. ( Id. at p. 283, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 532, 6 P.3d 193.) None appears here. The trial court reasonably found that the comment added nothing to what the jury knew  that Worthen scorned Oliver because she saw him gun down her daughter in church. In addition, the court and the prosecutor both said they had not heard Worthen's comment. The court was closer to Worthen at the time than was the jury. Richard Leonard opined that he did not think the jury heard the comment. The court could reasonably conclude that the jury never heard the comment. Oliver maintains the court should have asked the jury about the effect of the comment. However, such an approach might have highlighted the incident, which was otherwise quite minor. We find no abuse of discretion. Oliver personally (and not through counsel) made a second mistrial motion on January 28, 1993. He blurted out the word mistrial after another prosecution witness, Louise Holt, testified that he was uglier than he used to be. At the time, Holt was answering a defense question about changes in Oliver's appearance since the crimes. Holt insisted that she meant what she said, and that she was not deriding Oliver gratuitously. However, counsel never requested any relief based on Holt's remark. The court's failure to address Oliver's spontaneous personal reaction was not unreasonable. In any event, Holt's remark did not concern Oliver's criminal culpability or moral character. It did not risk an unfair trial, or warrant a mistrial. Next, both defendants claim the trial court erred in not granting their motion for mistrial on February 2, 1993, the day after they assaulted counsel in court and disrupted the prosecution's case. In the alternative, Oliver suggests the trial court should have excused multiple jurors because the incident had turned them against him. We disagree. In People v. Williams (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1127, 245 Cal.Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901, we affirmed the judgment in the face of a claim that disruptive courtroom conduct had prejudiced the jury. ( Id. at pp. 1155-1157, 245 Cal.Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901.) As a matter of policy, a defendant is not permitted to profit from his own misconduct. ( Id. at p. 1156, 245 Cal.Rptr. 635, 751 P.2d 901.) We adhere to that commonsense view here. Defendants may not complain on appeal about the possible effect on jurors of their own calculated misdeeds. ( People v. Arias, supra, 13 Cal.4th 92, 148, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 770, 913 P.2d 980; People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th 195, 253-254, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 643, 244 Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836; see People v. Hines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 997, 1054, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 938 P.2d 388; see also People v. Gomez (1953) 41 Cal.2d 150, 162, 258 P.2d 825.) Defendants' reliance on Fain v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 46, 84 Cal.Rptr. 135, 465 P.2d 23 is misplaced for reasons Fain itself explains. A defendant should not be permitted to disrupt courtroom proceedings without justification [citation] and then urge that same disruption as grounds for a mistrial. ( Id. at p. 53, 84 Cal.Rptr. 135, 465 P.2d 23.) [20] Defendants also assert that the trial court failed to adequately probe for juror bias, erred in retaining one juror, L.S., who at one point said he was unsure he could continue to be unbiased, and improperly told jurors to avoid discussions with outsiders by lying about having seen the assault. As to the last point, defendants failed to object to the comment and thus have forfeited the claim. ( People v. Monterroso, supra, 34 Cal.4th 743, 759, 22 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 101 P.3d 956.) Overall, the remedial steps taken by the court adequately addressed defendants' concerns. The court accommodated defendants' request to ask jurors whether they could be fair or had heard press accounts. Examinations were conducted of individual jurors who thought the incident might have affected them. At defendants' request, the court excused the one juror injured when the courtroom was hastily evacuated. Defendants did not seek to remove L.S., whose answers showed that he fundamentally remained impartial and would not be more inclined to find defendants guilty or to prejudge penalty. Indeed, the court said of L.S., [f]or the record, [he] is a young Black male. He strikes me as being very honest and if he says he can put it aside, I believe him. This record gives us no reason to doubt the court's conclusion.