Opinion ID: 6351647
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Original Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Text: ¶9 We have sole discretion to exercise our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21(a)(1). Because an original proceeding under Rule 21 “is an extraordinary remedy[, it] is limited both in its purpose and availability.” Rademacher v. Greschler, 2020 CO 4, ¶ 20, 455 P.3d 769, 772. Relief under Rule 21 is generally appropriate when there would be no adequate remedy available on appeal, when a party may suffer irreparable harm absent relief under Rule 21, or when a case “raise[s] issues of significant public importance that we have not yet considered.” Id. (quoting Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 194 (Colo. 2001)). ¶10 Stepfather argues that exercising our original jurisdiction is appropriate here because the appellate remedy would be inadequate given the immediate harm that will result to both Stepfather and E.K., a minor close to the age of majority. We agree. The length of the regular appeals process would likely cause Stepfather to suffer irreparable harm if E.K. reaches the age of majority before he is given the opportunity to establish his rights as a psychological parent. Accordingly, we conclude that our exercise of jurisdiction over this case pursuant to C.A.R. 21 is warranted. ¶11 We review the district court’s interpretation of section 14-10-123(1) and its legal conclusions as to standing de novo. In re B.B.O., 2012 CO 40, ¶ 6, 277 P.3d 818, 820; In re D.T., 2012 COA 142, ¶ 6, 292 P.3d 1120, 1121. However, we employ 7 clear error review in considering a trial court’s findings of jurisdictional fact. Springer v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000). B. Nonparent Standing Under Section 14-10-123(1)(c) ¶12 Stepfather first contends that the district court erred by dismissing his petition for an APR under section 14-10-123(1)(c) for lack of standing. We agree. ¶13 “Standing is a jurisdictional prerequisite that can be raised at any time during the proceedings,” and once a court finds that it does not have standing, it must dismiss the case. People v. Shank, 2018 CO 51, ¶ 9, 420 P.3d 240, 243. Standing, in the context of the commencement, jurisdiction, and enforcement of APR proceedings, is governed by section 14-10-123 of Colorado’s UDMA. ¶14 As outlined within subsection (1) of that statute, nonparents maintain standing to seek an APR under certain circumstances. Here, Stepfather filed the APR proceeding pursuant to section 14-10-123(1)(c) of the UDMA. Subsection (1)(c) permits the commencement of an APR petition “[b]y a person other than a parent who has had the physical care of a child for a period of one hundred eighty-two days or more, if such action is commenced within one hundred eighty-two days after the termination of such physical care.” § 14-10-123(1)(c). ¶15 On its face, subsection (1)(c) permits any person, other than a parent, to petition for an APR so long as they meet the physical care and time requirements; 8 the subsection contains no other qualifying language. See In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 553–55 (Colo. App. 2004) (concluding that the partner of a child’s adoptive mother had standing to petition for an APR because the partner had acted as a coparent with the child’s mother, both living with and supporting the child). It is this narrow focus on a nonparent’s physical care of the child and the amount of time spent with or apart from that child that controls whether the nonparent has standing. ¶16 Despite this narrow focus, the district court, in finding that Stepfather did not meet the standing requirements as outlined in section 14-10-123(1)(c), read into that provision an exclusivity requirement and a consent requirement, both of which this court has rejected. See, e.g., B.B.O., ¶ 20, 277 P.3d at 824. In the district court’s view, Stepfather could not satisfy the physical care component of the statute because he was not E.K.’s primary care provider. This characterization, however, conflates “physical care” with “primary care” and misconstrues what “physical care” means under section 14-10-123(1)(c). 1. Section 14-10-123(1)(c) Does Not Require Exclusive Physical Care ¶17 Colorado courts have consistently interpreted the term “physical care” literally, meaning the “actual, physical possession” of a child as opposed to a legal term of art. See In re Custody of C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d 246, 253 (Colo. 1995) (adopting 9 the literal definition of physical custody or care).2 This literal construction sufficiently takes into account “the amount of time a child has spent in the actual, physical possession of a non-parent,” as well as “the psychological bonds nonparents develop with children” who have been in their care for a substantial amount of time. B.B.O., ¶ 11, 277 P.3d at 821 (quoting C.C.R.S., 892 P.2d at 253). When determining whether a nonparent, who shares physical care of a child with a parent, has standing under section 14-10-123(1)(c), courts consider “the nature, frequency, and duration of the contacts” taking place between the child and nonparent and the child and the parent. D.T., ¶ 10, 292 P.3d at 1122. Importantly, however, these contacts need not be exclusive. See E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d at 555 (“[S]ubsection (1)(c) applies even where the nonparent’s physical care of the child is not exclusive of the parent’s.”). This is in contrast with subsection (1)(b), which grants standing only if the child is not in the physical care of one of the child’s parents. See § 14-10-123(1)(b) (permitting the filing of a petition for an APR “[b]y a person other than a parent, . . . only if the child is not in the physical care of one of the child’s parents”). 2 Prior constructions of this statute referred to physical custody rather than physical care. See Ch. 310, sec. 3, § 14-10-123, 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws 1376, 1377. However, this court has continued to apply this definition to the term physical care. See, e.g., B.B.O., ¶ 11 n.2, 277 P.3d at 821 n.2. 10 2. Section 14-10-123(1)(c) Does Not Require Parental Consent ¶18 Also wrapped up in Respondents’ contention and the district court’s order is the notion that the child’s parents must consent to the nonparent assuming or sharing responsibility over the child’s physical care, an approach, as noted above, this court has expressly rejected. See B.B.O., ¶ 20, 277 P.3d at 824. ¶19 In B.B.O., this court held that a minor child’s half-sister had standing as a nonparent under section 14-10-123(1)(b) to petition for an APR and that, despite the mother’s contention to the contrary, the half-sister did not need to show parental consent to establish nonparent standing. B.B.O., ¶ 19, 277 P.3d at 823. In that case, prior to her father’s death, B.B.O. had been residing with her father and half-sister for approximately six years. Id. at ¶ 3, 277 P.3d at 819. B.B.O. continued to live with her half-sister, exclusively, for another two months before the halfsister petitioned for an APR. Id. at ¶ 4, 277 P.3d at 819. We concluded that the half-sister had standing to file a petition for an APR under subsection (1)(b), but we left the question of subsection (1)(c) standing for another day. See id. at ¶ 19 n.8, 277 P.3d at 823 n.8. We did, however, clarify as a general matter that a nonparent need not prove parental consent to have standing; rather, the nonparent standing analysis should focus on the time the nonparent and child spent together and the psychological bonds that may have formed during that time. See id. at ¶ 18, 277 P.3d at 823. 11 ¶20 Moreover, this court has previously grappled with the question of whether we must read a parental consent requirement into section 14-10-123(1)(c) as a means of protecting fit parents’ fundamental liberty interests in the care, custody, and control of their children. See B.B.O., ¶ 17, 277 P.3d at 822–23 (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (plurality opinion)). We determined that because our statute is constructed rather narrowly—significantly limiting the class of nonparents who may petition for an APR—and because the best interest of the child standard, see § 14-10-124, C.R.S. (2021), is codified separately from the standing provision in our statutes, see § 14-10-123, we need not apply the Troxel plurality’s best interest of the child presumption to our nonparent standing analysis, see B.B.O., ¶¶ 17–18, 277 P.3d at 822–23. The presumption under Troxel, and the question of whether Stepfather should be awarded any parental rights, is ultimately a question for the trial court on remand. Cf. In re M.W., 2012 COA 162, ¶ 15, 292 P.3d 1158, 1161 (outlining a three-part test for trial courts to employ in nonparent APR proceedings in light of Troxel’s fit parent presumption). ¶21 With these principles in mind, we now apply the law to the facts of this case.