Opinion ID: 165234
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Does This Court Have Jurisdiction Under the Collateral Order Doctrine?

Text: 20 The government argues that we lack jurisdiction over both of the appeals at hand because neither of the district court's orders were final under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We disagree and find that both orders fall under the collateral order doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949). 21 Section 1291 provides for appeal from all final decisions of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The Supreme Court has repeatedly interpreted § 1291 to mean that an appeal ordinarily will not lie until after final judgment has been entered in a case. Cunningham v. Hamilton County, Ohio, 527 U.S. 198, 203, 119 S.Ct. 1915, 144 L.Ed.2d 184 (1999). Typically, a judgment is not final unless it ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment. Id. at 204, 119 S.Ct. 1915 (quotations omitted). This final judgment rule serves several purposes, including allowing the trial judge to do his or her job without interlocutory appellate interference, reducing obstructions to just claims and avoiding the harassment and cost of separate appeals, and promoting judicial administration. Id. at 203-04, 119 S.Ct. 1915. 22 However, in Cohen, the Supreme Court interpreted the term `final decision' in § 1291 to permit jurisdiction over appeals from a small category of orders that do not terminate the litigation. Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 204, 119 S.Ct. 1915 (citing Cohen, 337 U.S. at 545-47, 69 S.Ct. 1221). That small category includes only decisions that are conclusive, that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action. Id. (quotation omitted). The Cohen Court explained this collateral order doctrine 5 as follows: 23 This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine claims of right separate from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated. The Court has long given this provision of the statute this practical rather than a technical construction. 24 Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221; see also Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 713, 116 S.Ct. 1712, 135 L.Ed.2d 1 (1996); Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978). The Tenth Circuit has formulated a three-part test reflecting these considerations, stating that the order is appealable under the collateral order doctrine when it: (1) conclusively determines the disputed question; (2) resolves an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action; and (3) is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1217-18 (10th Cir.2001). 25 Denials of claims of immunity from suit are typically found to be immediately reviewable under the collateral order doctrine. For example, in Nixon v. Fitzgerald , the Supreme Court held that orders denying claims of absolute immunity are appealable under the Cohen criteria. 457 U.S. 731, 742, 102 S.Ct. 2690, 73 L.Ed.2d 349 (1982). In Mitchell v. Forsyth , the Court extended the collateral order doctrine to orders denying claims of qualified immunity. 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The Mitchell Court first summarized the reasoning behind immediate appeal of absolute immunity cases: When a district court has denied a defendant's claim of right not to stand trial ... we have consistently held the court's decision appealable, for such a right cannot be effectively vindicated after the trial has occurred, and thus an order denying a claim of absolute immunity is a collateral order. Id. at 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806. [T]he essence of absolute immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to answer for his conduct in a civil damages action. Id. The Court then concluded that because qualified immunity is also an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability, it would be similarly lost if a case is erroneously permitted to go to trial. Id. at 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (emphasis omitted). Additionally, the Court held that an immunity claim is separate from the underlying merits of the case and that the district court had conclusively determined the immunity issue. Id. at 527, 105 S.Ct. 2806. Therefore, the Court held, all of the Cohen requirements had been met. Id. at 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806. 26 The Tenth Circuit has similarly extended the collateral order doctrine to denials of absolute or qualified immunity. For example, in Chavez v. Singer , we held that a claim of absolute immunity, like a claim of double jeopardy, 27 should be determined before a trial on the merits. In each situation a defendant contests a plaintiff's right to hale him into court. The district court here conclusively determined the immunity question. Immunity is important and collateral to the merits of the action. The right to immunity is a question of law and is arguably lost once the trial is held. 28 698 F.2d 420, 421 (10th Cir.1983); see also Malik v. Arapahoe County Dep't of Social Servs., 191 F.3d 1306, 1313 (10th Cir.1999) (Our jurisdiction to consider [the officer's] appeal of the court's denial of her absolute immunity defense is not in doubt under Cohen ); Kamplain v. Curry County Bd. of Comm'rs, 159 F.3d 1248, 1250 (10th Cir.1998) (same); Stewart v. Donges, 915 F.2d 572, 575 (10th Cir.1990) (holding that denial of qualified immunity was immediately appealable under collateral order doctrine). 29 Many circuits have likewise held that denials of FTCA immunity are immediately appealable collateral orders. For example, in Taboas v. Mlynczak , the Seventh Circuit held that the denial of the United States' motion for substitution in this context is effectively a denial of immunity for the defendant employee, and the collateral order doctrine therefore applies with as much force in this context as it does to other claims of qualified or absolute immunity. 149 F.3d 576, 579 (7th Cir.1998) (citation omitted). Therefore, the court held, [a] denial of the United States' motion for substitution under the Westfall Act 6 [creating FTCA immunity] is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Id. 30 Similarly, in Aliota v. Graham , the Third Circuit held that because [a]n order granting resubstitution effectively denies a federal employee's claim to absolute immunity, it is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. 984 F.2d 1350, 1354 (3d Cir.1993). The district court's order also represented its final word on the resubstitution and the question of resubstitution is completely separate from the merits of the ... action. Id. at 1353. Therefore, the court held that the order denying FTCA immunity was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Id. at 1354. The approach of these two cases is not controversial; in fact, every circuit court follows the same route of analysis in dealing with collateral order appeals of FTCA immunity denials. 7 31 In this case, the government argues that this weight of authority regarding the immediate appealability of FTCA immunity denials does not save our jurisdiction because Appellants in this case do not present colorable claims of immunity. The Supreme Court has explicitly added a colorability requirement in the context of double jeopardy claims under the collateral order doctrine. See e.g., Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 322, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 82 L.Ed.2d 242 (1984) ([W]e have indicated that the appealability of a double jeopardy claim depends upon its being at least `colorable.'); see also United States v. McAleer, 138 F.3d 852, 857 (10th Cir.1998) (Although the denial of a pretrial motion to dismiss an indictment on double jeopardy grounds falls within the collateral order exception, only `colorable' double jeopardy claims may be appealed before final judgment. To be colorable, a claim must have some possible validity.) (citation, footnote omitted). Although the Court has not been as explicit in requiring colorability in the context of other collateral orders, it has at least stated that requiring an official with a colorable immunity claim to defend a suit for damages would be peculiarly disruptive of effective government, in concluding that this freedom from suit would be effectively lost if review were delayed until final judgment. Digital Equip., 511 U.S. at 871, 114 S.Ct. 1992 (quotation omitted; some emphasis omitted). 32 Other courts have similarly mentioned that only the denials of colorable immunity claims are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. For example, in Powell v. Ridge, the Third Circuit explained that a  colorable claim of legislative immunity could be appealed as a collateral order. 247 F.3d 520, 524 (3d Cir.2001) (emphasis added). However, in that case, the court noted that the claim of immunity was not colorable; rather, the legislators had buil[t] from scratch a privilege that does not exist, and thus interlocutory was denied. Id. at 525; see also Malina v. Gonzales, 994 F.2d 1121, 1124 (5th Cir.1993) (The denial of a motion to dismiss raising a colorable claim of [judicial] immunity is appealable under the collateral order exception to the finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.) (emphasis added); Durning v. Citibank, N.A., 950 F.2d 1419, 1422 (9th Cir.1991) ([W]e have held that a denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity, if colorable, is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine[.]) (emphasis added). We have also declined to find jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine where, inter alia, there is no merit whatsoever to the motion denied below. United States v. Valenzuela, 584 F.2d 374, 378 (10th Cir.1978). 33 Indeed, a requirement of colorability may be found in the Cohen requirement that the asserted right on interlocutory appeal be too important to be denied review. Cohen, 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. 1221. An interlocutory appeal that does not even assert a colorable right would not, almost by definition, be asserting a right sufficient important to justify Cohen interlocutory review. See Powell v. Ridge, 247 F.3d at 525. 34 In the instant case, although we ultimately conclude on the merits that Appellants are not entitled to FTCA immunity, they at least presented a colorable claim for immunity. They were providing services requested by the government, and they pointed to statutory language that arguably supported their immunity claim. Additionally, this is not a situation where Appellants created an immunity out of whole cloth — if they were indeed federal employees, they would have been entitled to an existing immunity. Finally, there exists no precedent directly on point regarding the question of whether the Indian Health Care statute at issue expanded FTCA coverage. Therefore, Appellants' claim to immunity is at least colorable, meaning that the claim has some possible validity, even though it is ultimately unsuccessful. McAleer, 138 F.3d at 857. 35 If we wait until final judgment to hear this appeal, the right not to be burdened by trial will have been irreparably lost. Additionally, the district court conclusively determined this issue, 8 and the issue itself is completely separate from the merits of the underlying medical negligence action. Therefore, we properly exercise jurisdiction over these appeals pursuant to the Cohen collateral order doctrine. See Cunningham, 527 U.S. at 204, 119 S.Ct. 1915; Yousef, 254 F.3d at 1217-18. 36