Opinion ID: 504692
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Caldwell Issue

Text: 31 Petitioner contends that statements made by the prosecutor and by the trial court misled the advisory jury as to its critical role in the sentencing process in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). 10 32 In Caldwell the prosecutor urged the jury not to view itself as determining whether defendant would die, because the Supreme Court of Mississippi automatically reviewed a death sentence for correctness. The Supreme Court of the United States found that this statement made the jury's determination that death was the appropriate punishment unreliable, and thus inconsistent with the eighth amendment. The Caldwell Court held that it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been lead to believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant's death rests elsewhere. Id. at 328-29, 105 S.Ct. at 2639. 33 In Caldwell the prosecutor's remarks were inaccurate and misleading, thus shifting the sense of responsibility for imposing the death sentence from the jury to the appellate courts. The prosecutor made affirmative statements designed to give the jury the idea that their role in the sentencing process was not a serious responsibility. These statements violated defendant's constitutional rights and entitled him to a new trial. 34 The relevant question under Caldwell is whether remarks made at trial lessened the jury's sense of responsibility toward its role of determining whether the death penalty is appropriate. Although certain language in Caldwell could be interpreted broadly, we must consider such language in light of the facts of Caldwell. We believe the Supreme Court intended that a Caldwell violation should include some affirmative misstatement or misconduct that misleads the jury as to its role in the sentencing process. Caldwell does not mandate reversal if an advisory jury is told that its role is to advise or to recommend. 35 In Adams v. Wainwright, 804 F.2d 1526 (11th Cir.1986), we held that Caldwell mandates the reversal of a conviction where an advisory jury is misled as to the importance of its role. [T]he jury's role in the Florida sentencing process is so crucial that dilution of its sense of responsibility for its recommended sentence constitutes a violation of Caldwell. Adams, 804 F.2d at 1530. It is vital that the advisory jury fully understand the gravity of its sentencing decision. The trial court in Adams incorrectly led the jury to believe that the responsibility for imposing the death sentence rested solely upon himself. The trial judge instructed the jury that he could disregard the jury's recommendation, even if the jury recommended life imprisonment. This was incorrect. Florida law allows for an override of the jury's recommendation of life imprisonment only upon a clear and convincing showing that it was erroneous. 11 Furthermore, the trial court told the jury that: [T]his conscience part of it as to whether or not you're going to put the man to death or not, that is not your decision to make. That's only my decision to make and it has to be on my conscience. It cannot be on yours. Adams, 804 F.2d at 1528. Caldwell prohibits such attempts to shield the jury from the full weight of its advisory responsibility. 36 Under Florida's death penalty statute the jury's role is advisory. After receiving the jury's recommendation, the trial judge must independently weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and render sentence. 12 Therefore, emphasizing the advisory role of the jury, or the fact that the jury is making a recommendation to the judge, does not support the Caldwell claim. 13 Such statements are neither inaccurate nor misleading. 14 37 In the instant case, petitioner contends that the remarks made by the prosecutor and judge improperly diluted the jury's sense of responsibility for their sentencing decision in violation of the Eighth Amendment. [Specifically, the prosecutor told the jury during voir dire that its sentencing decision was a recommendation and that the court pronounces whatever sentence it sees fit.] Trial Transcript, Vol. I, at 74-75. 15 38 The trial court made several similar statements during the guilt/innocence phase. Before the trial began, the court told the jury that it is the jury's duty to determine guilt or innocence, but that it is the judge's job to determine what a proper sentence would be if the defendant is guilty. Id. at 178. In its instructions to the jury at the end of the guilt phase, the court repeated the above statement, Trial Transcript, Vol. II at 732, and also noted: 39 I will now inform you of the maximum and minimum possible sentences in this case. The penalty is for the court to decide. You are not responsible for the penalty in any way because of your verdict.... 40 Id. at 735-36. 41 The trial court returned to this theme in the sentencing phase. Before the state began its case, the court told the jurors the following: 42 As I advised you, when the charge of the law was given you at the conclusion of the case, the punishment of this crime is either death or life imprisonment without possibility of parole for twenty-five years. The final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed rests solely upon the judge of this court. However, the law requires that you, the jury, render to the court an advisory sentence as to what punishment should be imposed upon the defendant. 43 Id. at 754-55 (emphasis added). The court then told the jurors that their decision should be based on their balancing of the mitigating and aggravating circumstances in the case. After the evidence was presented, the court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows: 44 Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, it is now your duty to advise the Court as to what punishment should be imposed upon the Defendant for his crime of first-degree murder. As you have been told, the final decision as to what punishment shall be imposed is the responsibility of the Judge; however, it is your duty to follow the law which will now be given to you by the Court and render to the Court an advisory sentence, based upon your determination as to whether sufficient aggravating circumstances exist to justify the imposition of the death penalty and whether sufficient mitigating circumstances exist to outweigh any aggravating circumstances found to exist. 45 Your advisory sentence should be based upon the evidence which you have heard while trying the guilt or innocence of the Defendant and the evidence which has been presented to you in these proceedings. 46 Trial Transcript, Vol. II, at 914.] 813 F.2d at 1098-99. 47 We do not believe that the challenged comments misled the jury as to the importance of its advisory role. These statements did not create the intolerable danger that the advisory jury's recommendation of the death sentence was unreliable. Neither did they minimize the role of the jury. The statements explained to the jury their role with respect to the judge. The judge also instructed the jury to listen to the evidence, weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and render an advisory opinion as to the applicability of the death penalty in this case. Neither the prosecutor nor the trial judge implied that the jury's recommendation was superfluous. The fact that the jury knew they were making a recommendation did not detract from the importance of their decision. 48 We agree with the Supreme Court of Florida that comments which accurately explain the respective functions of the judge and jury are permissible under Caldwell as long as the significance of [the jury's] recommendation is adequately stressed. Pope v. Wainwright, 496 So.2d 798, 805 (Fla.1986), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 1617, 94 L.Ed.2d 801 (1987). After examining the record, we conclude that the court and prosecutor adequately communicated the seriousness of the jury's advisory role. We cannot say that this jury felt anything but the full weight of its advisory responsibility. As a result, petitioner's Caldwell claim must fail. 16