Opinion ID: 6500747
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: ADA/KCRA disability discrimination claim

Text: Sublett alleges that MHK discriminated against her on the basis of her disability, in violation of the ADA and the KCRA.1 The burden-shifting framework laid out in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), governs the use of circumstantial evidence in a disability discrimination case. See Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509, 522 (6th Cir. 2021). Where, as here, the plaintiff does not provide direct evidence of intentional discrimination, she bears the burden of proving a prima facie case of disability discrimination. See id. This consists 1 Kentucky courts interpret the KCRA parallel to federal law and rely on federal case law in interpreting the KCRA. See Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky. 2003) (“The Kentucky Civil Rights Act was modeled after federal law, and our courts have interpreted the Kentucky Act consistently therewith.” (citations omitted)). This Court will follow suit and discuss the alleged violations of both the ADA and the KCRA together. -5- Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. of proving: “(1) he or she is disabled; (2) otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) suffered an adverse employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of the plaintiff’s disability; and (5) the position remained open while the employer sought other applicants or the disabled individual was replaced.” Tennial v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 840 F.3d 292, 306 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Whitfield v. Tennessee, 639 F.3d 253, 258–59 (6th Cir. 2011)). Once this burden is met, the onus shifts to the defendant to provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for any demonstrated adverse employment action. See Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co., 946 F.3d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2019). If in turn the defendant meets this burden, the plaintiff bears the ultimate burden of demonstrating that “the proffered explanation is pretextual.” Id. (quoting Ferrari v. Ford Motor Co., 826 F.3d 885, 892 (6th Cir. 2016)). Here, while Sublett may have established a prima facie case of disability discrimination, she has not provided sufficient evidence of pretext such that a reasonable jury could rule in her favor.
Sublett asserts that she is disabled due to her diagnosis of emphysema, and that her over thirty years of service for MHK demonstrate that she is qualified for the Pillars Director and Miralea RSM positions. MHK does not challenge these claims. Sublett’s replacement after termination, Shannon Wolfe, is not disabled. Thus, we will assume that the first, second, and fifth prongs of the test are satisfied, leaving only the question of whether Sublett suffered an adverse employment action and whether MHK knew or had reason to know that she was disabled.
Adverse employment actions are “materially adverse change[s] in the terms and conditions of [a plaintiff’s] employment.” White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 795 (6th -6- Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. Cir. 2004) (en banc) (citation omitted). An adverse employment action must be more than a mere “bruised ego” or “inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities.” Id. at 797 (citation omitted). Adverse employment actions are usually denoted by a “significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.” Id. at 798 (quoting Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998)). Sublett proffers three potential adverse employment actions. First, she alleges that she was “severely underpaid” in comparison to her “non-disabled counterparts,” both as Pillars Director (compared to the Director salaries of Truax and her replacement, Just) and as Miralea RSM (compared to Truax’s previous salary as Miralea RSM). See Appellant’s Br. at 32–33. Regarding her Director salary, Sublett never alleges that her pay in that position changed at all after she was diagnosed with emphysema or after she told anyone at MHK about her diagnosis. Her Director salary thus cannot be considered an adverse employment action, as there was no “materially adverse change.” White, 364 F.3d at 795. Sublett’s argument that the Director salary disparity constitutes an adverse employment action fails for the additional reason that she has not provided evidence that a similarly situated, non-disabled employee was paid more for the same work. Sublett’s replacement at Pillars, Just, was hired with the intention of directing two combined facilities, and he instantly took on additional duties that Sublett did not perform. And while Sublett points to Truax’s salary in the RSM position as compared to hers, MHK provides evidence that Truax was not similarly situated, even if the roles were the same. Based on his past employment as Vice President of Therapy Services, Truax was considered an executive employee, whose salary did not change when he assumed the RSM role. Sublett has provided no counter evidence indicating that Truax is an apt comparator beyond sharing the same job title. -7- Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. Thus, Sublett has not sufficiently proved that the pay disparity in the RSM position constitutes an adverse employment action. Sublett also alleges that her involuntary transfer from Pillars Director to Miralea RSM constitutes an adverse employment action. She points to the fact that as RSM she was subordinate to the Miralea director, a position which Truax described as “on the same playing field” as her former Pillars Director position. See Appellant’s Br. at 33–36; R. 57-3 at PID 405. Truax attested that he considered the move from RSM to Director a promotion for himself. The district court determined that the transfer was not adverse, noting Sublett’s increase in salary, the substantially similar job duties, and the fact that the Pillars Director position was in the process of being eliminated.2 It is unclear whether Sublett’s transfer was an adverse action. Her salary did increase, indicating that the move was a promotion. But this Court has held that “[a] reassignment without salary or work hour changes . . . may be an adverse employment action if it constitutes a demotion evidenced by ‘a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular situation.’” White, 364 F.3d at 797 (quoting Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt., 97 F.3d 876, 886 (6th Cir. 1996)). However, because Sublett cannot demonstrate pretext, as described below, it is unnecessary to decide whether the transfer constitutes an adverse employment action. We therefore presume—without deciding—that the transfer was adverse. 2 The district court’s focus on the elimination of the Pillars Director position is slightly misplaced, as that fact speaks to the reasoning behind an adverse action, not the nature of the action itself. The elimination of a position can constitute an adverse employment action if the reasons behind the elimination are discriminatory. See, e.g., Schutter v. Harold Zeigler Auto Grp., Inc., 416 F. Supp. 3d 708, 718 (W.D. Mich. 2019) (“Conceivably, [the] elimination of [Plaintiff’s] corporate marketing manager position could constitute an adverse action.”). -8- Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. Finally, Sublett alleges that her termination constitutes an adverse employment action. As the district court correctly concluded, termination is a textbook adverse employment action, and MHK admits as much. See Appellee’s Br. at 21 (“The District Court correctly recognized that termination of employment is considered an adverse employment action.”). Thus, Sublett has provided sufficient evidence that she suffered an adverse employment action, satisfying the third prong of the prima facie case.
The district court concluded that, for the purposes of this motion, it must presume that MHK knew that Sublett was disabled. We agree. In establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the decisionmaker who instigated the allegedly discriminatory action knew or believed that the employee was disabled. See Burns v. City of Columbus, Dep’t of Pub. Safety, Div. of Police, 91 F.3d 836, 843 (6th Cir. 1996). In Sublett’s case, the alleged discriminators are Marsh and Judy, who decided to transfer Sublett to the RSM position, and Truax, who made the decision to fire her. Sublett alleges that she told Marsh of her emphysema (and asked for accommodations) prior to her transfer. She also alleges that she discussed her emphysema with Truax multiple times, both in the context of asking for accommodations and in regular conversation, the latter of which Truax admits. MHK presented evidence in response—namely, Truax’s testimony that he only spoke with Sublett informally regarding her emphysema, that he did not understand that her emphysema made her disabled, and that he did not think that her request to be relieved from waiting on the residents was due to disability. Both sides presented evidence on this issue chiefly in the form of testimony, and, at the summary judgment stage, “credibility judgments and weighing of the evidence are improper.” -9- Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. Hostettler v. College of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1038 (6th Cir. 2014)). Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Truax has admitted that he knew Sublett had emphysema and that he had a general understanding of what emphysema was. Thus, for the purposes of a motion for summary judgment, the district court was correct to assume that Sublett demonstrated knowledge of her claimed disability, and we do the same. Sublett has therefore established a prima facie case of disability discrimination. b. Legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale and pretext Once a plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendant must provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory rationale for the allegedly discriminatory actions. The burden then shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the provided rationale is pretextual. See Morrissey v. Laurel Health Care Co., 946 F.3d 292, 298 (6th Cir. 2019). A plaintiff can establish pretext in three ways: evidence “(1) that the proffered reasons had no basis in fact, (2) that the proffered reasons did not actually motivate the employer’s action, or (3) that they were insufficient to motivate the employer’s action.” Romans v. Mich. Dep’t of Human Servs., 668 F.3d 826, 839 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). MHK supplied evidence that Sublett’s transfer to RSM—which we have assumed constitutes an adverse employment action—was motivated by the elimination of her position, due to the merging of two facilities. This is a non-discriminatory rationale, meeting MHK’s burden. In response, Sublett points only to the fact that her successor, Just, did not actually assume management duties over both facilities until several months after her transfer. However, this contention does not rebut testimony from MHK employees that the merging of facilities and Just’s combined Director role were intended before Sublett was transferred and were the reason for that - 10 - Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. transfer. Just also immediately assumed additional duties to those performed by Sublett in the role. Sublett has therefore failed to provide evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the reason behind her transfer was pretextual, and that discrimination was the true motivating factor. MHK also supplied evidence that Sublett’s termination was motivated by her insubordination in refusing to sign a PIP addressing performance issues. This court has repeatedly found that “insubordination may constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for adverse action.” Fullen v. City of Columbus, 514 F. App’x 601, 606 (6th Cir. 2013) (collecting cases). Sublett argues that this justification is pretextual because: (1) the underlying events motivating the PIP are false, and the investigation into and documentation of those events was subpar and in violation of MHK’s own policies; (2) Truax rewrote the RSM job description after Sublett’s termination to include more physical activity; (3) Sublett’s behavior was not sufficient to motivate her termination; and (4) there was temporal proximity between “increased scrutiny” of Sublett’s behavior and disclosure of her disability. These contentions do not constitute sufficient evidence of pretext. First, the truth of the underlying events of the PIP is irrelevant in this case. The crucial factor is whether the individual who terminated her—Truax—honestly believed that the underlying events occurred, and whether he fired Sublett due to her refusal to sign the PIP addressing those events. As this Court has previously stated: “If an employer has an honest belief in the nondiscriminatory basis upon which it has made its employment decision (i.e. the adverse action), then the employee will not be able to establish pretext. . . . [W]hen an employer reasonably and honestly relies on particularized facts in making an employment decision, it is entitled to summary judgment on pretext even if its conclusion is later shown to be mistaken, foolish, trivial, - 11 - Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. or baseless.” Tingle v. Arbors at Hilliard, 692 F.3d 523, 530–31 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Sublett has provided no evidence beyond conjecture that Truax did not believe that the events motivating the PIP actually occurred. MHK also does not allege that she was fired for those acts alone, but chiefly for her refusal to sign the PIP addressing them. Sublett does not allege that that specific incident did not occur. Further, Sublett’s objections to the quality of the investigation and documentation are insufficient to establish that Truax acted unreasonably or unreasonably believed she was guilty of the offenses in the PIP. Employers are not required to conduct the most thorough investigation possible; rather, “the key inquiry is whether the employer made a reasonably informed and considered decision before taking an adverse employment action.” Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 807 (6th Cir. 1998) (“[W]e do not require that the decisional process used by the employer be optimal or that it left no stone unturned.”). While Sublett complains that Truax failed to interview a particular witness to one of the events, Truax interviewed Sublett and all other present witnesses, and otherwise relied upon a customer complaint. This investigation is reasonable in its scope. In addition, Sublett’s claims that Truax violated MHK’s internal policies during the disciplinary process are unhelpful to her here, as she has supplied no evidence that similarly situated, non-disabled employees were treated differently than she was (i.e., that the rules were followed for others and not for her). “[A]n employer’s failure to follow self-imposed regulations or procedures is generally insufficient to support a finding of pretext.” Miles v. S. Cent. Hum. Res. Agency, Inc., 946 F.3d 883, 896 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted); see also Gunn v. Senior Servs. of N. Ky., 632 F. App’x 839, 847 (6th Cir. 2015) (“An employer’s failure to follow internal disciplinary protocols is most probative when coupled with evidence that the employer followed - 12 - Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. the protocols for people outside of plaintiff’s protected class.”). While “failure to uniformly apply a progressive discipline policy can be evidence of pretext,” Miles, 946 F.3d at 896, Sublett has provided no such evidence of selective application. Sublett has therefore presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that Truax acted unreasonably. Second, Sublett’s evidence regarding the creation, after her termination, of an RSM job description which included significant physical activity, is insufficient to support a finding of pretext.3 Sublett offers no case law in support of her position that a job description created after an employee was fired is relevant to the intention behind the termination. Further, MHK provided testimonial evidence that Truax intended to evolve the RSM position after Sublett left for a nondiscriminatory reason—the opening of a new facility. Sublett has provided no evidence to counter that contention beyond testimony from one MHK employee that the job currently remains largely sedentary. However, that fact alone does not indicate that Truax did not honestly, at the time he wrote the description, intend to transform the job into a more physical one based on the opening of a new facility. The bare assertion that the change in job description indicates pretext is thus insufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could rely. Third, Sublett has failed to demonstrate that she did not commit an offense sufficient to motivate her termination. MHK provided clear evidence indicating that Sublett’s conduct immediately prior to her termination—refusing to sign her PIP or even read it in full—was a fireable offense under MHK policy. The MHK employee handbook states that level 3 misconduct—which calls for termination—includes “[w]illful failure to perform job duties . . . or act of insubordination.” R. 50-15 at PID 268, 271. By refusing to sign or interact with the PIP— 3 Sublett characterizes this action as Truax “modifying” a previous job description. See Appellant’s Br. at 26. However, the evidence indicates that the previous job description was for a different position, which was used as a base for the RSM description, which did not previously exist. - 13 - Case No. 21-5959, Sublett v. Masonic Homes of Kentucky, Inc. which did not require her to admit wrongdoing, but rather just to agree to work on her behavior— as her supervisor, Truax, requested her to do, Sublett acted insubordinately. Sublett has also not pointed to any employees who acted in a similar manner who were not fired, further damaging her claim. See Greene v. United States Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 605 F. App’x 501, 508 (6th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that “her conduct was insufficient to warrant her termination” as she could not show that “employees not in the protected class were not fired even though they engaged in substantially identical conduct”) (citation omitted)). Thus, Sublett’s argument that her behavior did not warrant dismissal fails. Finally, the temporal proximity argument, on its own, fails because “temporal proximity is insufficient in and of itself to establish that the employer’s nondiscriminatory reason for discharging an employee was in fact pretextual.” Skrjanc v. Great Lakes Power Serv. Co., 272 F.3d 309, 317 (6th Cir. 2001). As the other evidence marshalled by Sublett is either irrelevant or insufficient, temporal proximity is not enough to establish pretext in this case.