Opinion ID: 624771
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Claim

Text: Hinojosa first appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to dismiss, which was based on the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial and Fifth Amendment due process grounds. On or around May 24, 2003, a few days after Elizondo’s murder, Hinojosa left the United States and went to Mexico. The State of Texas issued a warrant for Hinojosa’s arrest on April 5, 2004. Hinojosa returned from Mexico sometime in December 2005, but went to Alabama, knowing that there had been a warrant issued in Texas for his arrest. He was arrested by state authorities in Alabama on May 4, 2006, and extradited to Texas to face state charges. 4 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 Hinojosa was indicted on the federal charges at issue in this case on March 27, 2007. Following his indictment, Hinojosa agreed to continuances until August 28, 2008. However, on December 17, 2008, Hinojosa opposed a codefendant’s motion for a continuance. Hinojosa subsequently opposed all other motions for continuances. On March 20, 2009, Hinojosa filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him on speedy trial grounds. Hinojosa later filed a supplemental motion to dismiss, again on speedy trial grounds, urging the court to carry out a due process inquiry. On July 24, 2009, the district court held a hearing regarding Hinojosa’s motion to dismiss. The court found that Hinojosa was not prejudiced by any delay and denied his motion to dismiss. Hinojosa now appeals this denial. In challenging the district court’s decision, Hinojosa argues that the delay between the filing of charges and the trial harmed him in several ways. First, Hinojosa argues that because of the delay, witnesses who could have assisted him with his defense have either died, gone missing, or have become estranged from him and refuse to testify. Second, Hinojosa alleges that physical evidence, such as bullet holes at the murder scene, may have been lost due to the delay.1 We review Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims and Fifth Amendment due process claims de novo for legal conclusions, while we review underlying factual findings for clear error. United States v. Bishop, 629 F.3d 462, 465–66 (5th Cir. 2010). “Under the clear error standard, we defer to the findings of the district court unless we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 441 (5th Cir. 2004) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 1 Hinojosa also argues that he was denied access to “federal counsel” because of the delay, resulting in him making incriminating statements to federal officers. These statements were excluded from the cases because of a Miranda violation and so Hinojosa was unharmed by them. 5 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039
The Sixth Amendment right “to a speedy and public trial,” U.S. CONST. amend. VI, “attaches when the defendant has been formally indicted or actually restrained accompanying arrest.” United States v. Jackson, 549 F.3d 963, 971 (5th Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). With this right, “‘[a] prior state arrest . . . , even if based upon the same operative facts as a subsequent federal accusation, does not trigger the [S]ixth [A]mendment right to a speedy trial.’” United States v. Green, 508 F.3d 195, 201 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Gomez, 776 F.2d 542, 549 (5th Cir. 1985)). Accordingly, Hinojosa’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial attached when he was indicted on March 27, 2007. “A defendant’s Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim is evaluated pursuant to a four-factor balancing test considering: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) the defendant’s diligence in asserting her Sixth Amendment right; and (4) any prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.” Bishop, 629 F.3d at 465 (citing Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530–33 (1972)).2 On appeal, Hinojosa reiterates arguments he made before the district court, and they remain unpersuasive. Even if the first factor cuts in Hinojosa’s favor, see United States v. Bergfeld, 280 F.3d 486, 488 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining that a delay of over a year is generally sufficient to trigger a Barker inquiry), the other three go against him. On the second factor—the reason for the delay—Hinojosa joined in or requested at least eight continuances over a period of a year and a half from the return of the indictment. Furthermore, the Government’s case was legitimately complex, involving multiple defendants 2 The first three factors in this test are weighed to see if prejudice against the defendant should be presumed. United States v. Frye, 372 F.3d 729, 736 (5th Cir. 2004). If the defendant fails to show that these first three factors tip in his favor, then he must show actual prejudice. Id. 6 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 accused of serious crimes. “‘[T]he delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge’ such as th[is] one . . . .” United States v. Bieganowski, 313 F.3d 264, 284 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Barker, 407 U.S. at 531); see also id. (“This was a complex case, and we hesitate to say that the reasons for the delay were unreasonable. The volume of discovery and the number of defendants involved justified some delay . . . .”). Indeed, even if “the delay [were] wholly unexplained[, which it is not], this factor [would] weigh[] in [Hinojosa]’s favor, but the advantage that [would] accrue[] to him is small.” Amos v. Thornton, 646 F.3d 199, 207 (5th Cir. 2011) (footnote omitted). Finally, Hinojosa has provided no evidence that any delay was “made to hamper the defense and gain some impermissible trial advantage” for the Government. Bishop, 629 F.3d at 467 (citing Doggett v. United States, 461 U.S. 647, 656 (1992)). Likewise, the third factor—Hinojosa’s diligence in asserting his Sixth Amendment right—cuts against him. This factor “requires a showing that [Hinojosa] ‘manifest[ed] his desire to be tried promptly.’” United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 432 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 2007)). “An assertion of [this] right is a demand for a speedy trial, which will generally be an objection to a continuance or a motion asking to go to trial.” Frye, 489 F.3d at 211. By this standard, Hinojosa only began to demand his Sixth Amendment right roughly a year and a half after the Government brought charges against him. Under similar circumstances, the Fifth Circuit, “lookin[ing] to the totality of proceedings,” has found that the third factor weighs against a defendant. See United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2007). The fourth and final factor—prejudice against Hinojosa resulting from the delay—also militates against his claim. To prevail on this factor, Hinojosa must show “actual prejudice.” Frye, 372 F.3d at 739. An analysis of Hinojosa’s claims 7 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 reveal that he is unable to do this. First, none of the witnesses that Hinojosa refers to in his brief could have helped him. Hinojosa claims that the delay cost him the testimony of his wife. However, according to his own testimony, Hinojosa and his wife left for Mexico on May 24, 2003, while the Elizondo murder occurred on May 19, 2003. Hinojosa’s wife could not, therefore, have provided him with an alibi for the Elizondo murder. Furthermore, in its November 8, 2008, superseding indictment, the Government dropped all drug charges against Hinojosa. Similarly, Hinojosa refers to Sammy Buentello, a Texas Department of Criminal Justice employee who allegedly worked with Hinojosa to end his participation in the Texas Syndicate. However, Hinojosa last had contact with Buentello sometime before 2003, and Hinojosa never actually explains the value of Buentello’s testimony. Hinojosa also refers to “[a] Texas Syndicate member who knew Mr. Hinojosa refused to kill . . . Elizondo and was running from Texas Syndicate orders to commit crimes was dead.” Apparently, Hinojosa was referring to Marcelino Rodriguez, a Texas Syndicate member whom Galindo killed, but could not further explain what kind of testimony Rodriguez would have offered. Hinojosa also mentions Ms. Elizondo in his brief claiming that “she changed her testimony several times.” However, Ms. Elizondo testified at trial, and was available for cross-examination, which Hinojosa did in fact conduct. Finally, Hinojosa claims that because of the delay the memory of Elia Torres, one of only two witness called by Hinojosa at trial, had faded. However, Torres never indicated that her memory had faded during her testimony, and the district court rejected Hinojosa’s argument as “speculation.” Hinojosa also claims that the delay cost him the opportunity to gather valuable physical evidence, as the house had changed ownership and subsequent repairs removed any remaining bullet holes and bullets. Hinojosa says little more than this and, as the district court observed, there was no indication as to 8 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 whether these repairs were done during the 2003 to 2006 period prior to Hinojosa’s indictment or afterwards. Hinojosa also does not explain with any specificity what kind of evidence he would have obtained in the absence of delay or its probative value. Thus, because Hinojosa cannot show actual prejudice or even the second and third Barker factors, we reject his Sixth Amendment claim.
“[U]nder Fifth Circuit law, [to make out a Fifth Amendment due process claim] the defendant bears the burden of proving that the pre-indictment delay caused ‘substantial, actual prejudice’ and was ‘intentionally undertaken by the government for the purpose of gaining some tactical advantage over the accused . . . .’” Jackson, 549 F.3d at 969 (quoting United States v. Gulley, 526 F.3d 809, 820 (5th Cir. 2008)). As the discussion above shows, Hinojosa has failed to demonstrate that he suffered any prejudice due to the delay. See Jackson, 549 F.3d at 970 (rejecting Fifth Amendment due process claim because defendant’s “three proffered examples of prejudice are nothing more than mere speculation of lost witnesses, faded memories or misplaced documents and do not demonstrate an actual loss of evidence that would have aided the defense”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, he has not presented any evidence of bad faith or dilatory tactics on the part of the Government. The case’s substantial complexity constituted an adequate non-oppressive reason for the delay. Hinojosa offers nothing to rebut this conclusion and, in fact, the record shows that Hinojosa’s absconding to Mexico and then Alabama played a significant role in delaying the indictment. We find, therefore, that Hinojosa is not entitled to relief under the Fifth Amendment.
9 Case: 11-40039 Document: 00511778997 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/06/2012 No. 11-40039 Hinojosa has failed to make out a viable argument on any of his speedy trial claims.3 We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of his motion.