Opinion ID: 2541157
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: Roberts first argues that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree. He claims that Robin failed to prove, in accord with Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-12-307(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2008), that she resided in Arkansas for three (3) full months before the final judgment granting the decree of divorce. Roberts urges that the statute requires that one must prove residence in Arkansas for three full months immediately preceding the entry of a divorce decree. Robin does not reply via a responsive brief, but, instead, while the matter was before the court of appeals, filed a letter with the clerk, stating that she does not contest either of the appellant's two points on appeal and that she anticipates a reversal and remand of the case. As an initial matter, we must consider whether the instant argument was preserved for our review. Our review of the record reveals no objection, at any point during the divorce proceedings before the circuit court, by Roberts regarding the residency requirements. Despite failing to file any challenge before the circuit court either before or after entry of the divorce decree, Roberts now argues that Robin did not meet the residency requirements. Nonetheless, in Hingle v. Hingle, 264 Ark. 442, 572 S.W.2d 395 (1978), this court held that the question of residency in a divorce was jurisdictional and may be raised at any stage of the divorce proceeding. 264 Ark. at 444, 572 S.W.2d at 397. Accordingly, the issue is properly before this court. We turn then to the merits of Roberts's claims. In the instant case, this court is called upon to interpret Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-307(a)(1)(A). [1] The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. See Ward v. Doss, 361 Ark. 153, 205 S.W.3d 767 (2005). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. See id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. See id. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant. See id. Meaning and effect are given to every word in the statute if possible. See id. When a statute is ambiguous, we must interpret it according to the legislative intent. See id. The issue of residency, in a suit for divorce, deals directly with the authority, power, and right of the circuit court to act. See Hingle, supra . Section 9-12-307(a)(1)(A) provides that, in order to obtain a divorce, the plaintiff must prove, but need not allege, in addition to a legal cause of divorce: (1)(A) A residence in the state by either the plaintiff or defendant for sixty (60) days next before the commencement of the action and a residence in the state for three (3) full months before the final judgment granting the decree of divorce. Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-307(a)(1)(A) (Repl. 2008). [2] In addition, such proof must be corroborated. See Ark.Code Ann. § 9-12-306(c)(1) (Repl.2008). Because the question of residency is jurisdictional, it may be raised at any stage of the divorce proceeding. See Hingle, supra . Here, Roberts argues, in essence, that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction to enter the divorce decree because Robin had not resided in Arkansas for the three months immediately preceding the date the decree of divorce was entered. His argument is without merit. It is clear from the plain language of section 9-12-307(a)(1)(A) that a plaintiff seeking divorce must prove two residency requirements: (1) residence in the state by the plaintiff or defendant for sixty days next before the filing of the complaint for divorce; and (2) residence in the state for three full months before the entry of the divorce decree. [3] Most evident in examining the statute, however, is the General Assembly's distinction in the two requirements in that the former designates the sixty-days requirement to be next before, while the latter three-full-months requirement is simply before. [4] Before is defined as preceding; while next is defined as adjoining in a series: immediately preceding or following in order. Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary 197, 1524 (2002). With these definitions in mind and applying them to the instant legislation, it is clear that the General Assembly intended that a divorce plaintiff must prove residence in the state by either the plaintiff or defendant for sixty days immediately preceding, or next before, the filing of a complaint for divorce and, in addition, residence in the state for three full months preceding, or before, the entry of the divorce decree. Here, the General Assembly clearly sought to distinguish the two requirements, and the plain language of the statute evidences that intent. In this case, Robin testified that she had lived in Little Rock since 1998, she filed her complaint for divorce on November 16, 2005, and she testified that she continued to live in Arkansas until November 2006, almost one year after she filed her complaint for divorce. Kaye Lundgren corroborated this testimony when she testified that Robin had resided in Arkansas from 1999 until November 2006. [5] Because Robin clearly met and proved the residency requirements of section 9-12-306(a), which proof was corroborated, we hold that the circuit court in no way lacked jurisdiction to enter the instant divorce decree.