Opinion ID: 317581
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: kircher

Text: 16 At Kircher's trial, Hennen testified about the meetings between himself, Walde and White. He testified that on September 20, he got the car and the marked $20 bills from Walde, picked up White, drove to the 7-Eleven, where White left in the car, and then returned later with some heroin. He testified that he had never met Kircher. 17 Walde then testified that on September 20, he had the dealings with Hennen described above. He also testified that on September 20, he observed that Kircher was arrested by the local police for a traffic violation, and was taken to a house at 4921 N.W. 13th Street in Lauderhill. The house was searched pursuant to a warrant, and one of the $20 bills Walde had given Hennen was found in the bedroom of the house. After being advised of his right to remain silent, Kircher at first denied that the $20 bill was his, but then admitted that it belonged to him. Walde also testified that some narcotics paraphernalia were found in the house. 18 Finally, counsel for the government and the defense stipulated that had Agent McDonald been at the trial, he would have testified that on September 20 a person who may or may not have been White drove up to the residence at 4921 N.W. 13th Street in Lauderhill, got out of the car White had been driving, went into the house and stayed for about 15 minutes, and then left. 19 The correct test to use in reviewing a district court's action with respect to a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal has been stated in several different ways. Recently, this court used the following test: 20 On a motion for judgment of acquittal, the test is whether, taking the view most favorable to the Government, a reasonably-minded jury could accept the relevant evidence as adequate and sufficient to support the conclusion of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Jeffords, 491 F.2d 90 (5th Cir. 1974) (March 18, 1974, No. 73-2535). 21 We also said recently, 22 The standard utilized by this Court is not whether in our opinion the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than guilty, but whether the jury might so conclude. Odom v. United States, 5 Cir. 1967, 377 F.2d 853, 855. 23 United States v. Polite, 489 F.2d 679 (5th Cir. 1974) (February 13, 1974, No. 73-2500). Last year, we stated the test this way: 24 If the evidence is such that a reasonable person may have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt, the case should be submitted to the jury. On the other hand, a trial judge should not permit a case to go to the jury if the evidence is so scant as to allow the jury merely to speculate or to conjecture as to the defendant's guilt. In other words, a motion of acquittal must be granted when the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Government, is such that a reasonably minded jury must have a reasonable doubt as to the existence of any of the essential elements of the crime charged. 25 United States v. Stephenson, 474 F.2d 1353 (5th Cir. 1973). 26 We are inclined to think that the differences between these various formulations may be merely verbalistic. United States v. Warner, 441 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1971), but no matter what view of them is taken, we think the evidence presented against Kircher fails to qualify under any correct formulation of the test. There were simply too many 'loose ends' in the government's case as it was presented at Kircher's trial. On the basis of the evidence presented by the government, we hold that a jury could not reasonably have concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that Kircher committed all the elements of the crimes charged. 27 For these reasons, the conviction of White is affirmed, and the conviction of Kircher is reversed.