Opinion ID: 807595
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Seibert Claim

Text: Jones attempts to raise a second claim under Missouri v. Seibert. That case created an exception to the Elstad rule, discussed above, by holding that police may not use a deliberate two-step procedure to circumvent Miranda. See Seibert, 542 U.S. at 621 12 The precise relationship between § 2254(d)(2) and (e)(1) is an unresolved question. See note 4, supra. On this point, Jones would not succeed under either standard, so we need not decide the question. 35 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment) (“When an interrogator uses [a] deliberate, two-step strategy, predicated upon violating Miranda during an extended interview, postwarning statements that are related to the substance of prewarning statements must be excluded absent specific, curative steps.”).13 Jones contends that the police employed such a deliberate two-step procedure here, rendering his post-warning confessions inadmissible. Because Jones did not present this argument to the state courts, however, this Court may not consider it.14 Under AEDPA, a prisoner in custody pursuant to a state court judgment must generally exhaust state court remedies before seeking federal habeas corpus review. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); see also Carvajal v. Artus, 633 F.3d 95, 104-05 (2d Cir. 2011). Moreover, “[i]f a habeas applicant fails to exhaust state remedies by failing to adequately present his federal claim to the state courts so that the state courts would deem the claim procedurally barred, we must deem the claim procedurally defaulted.” Carvajal, 633 F.3d at 104 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted); see also Aparicio v. Artuz, 269 F.3d 78, 90 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[W]hen the petitioner failed to exhaust state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred, federal habeas 13 Seibert did not elicit a majority opinion. However, our Court has clarified that Justice Kennedy’s opinion, which provided the fifth vote for the result in the case, is controlling. See United States v. Carter, 489 F.3d 528, 535-36 (2d Cir. 2007) (joining several Circuits in adopting this view); see also United States v. Capers, 627 F.3d 470, 47577 (2d Cir. 2010) (recounting evolution of Seibert claims within this Circuit). 14 Indeed, Jones did not raise this claim in his habeas petition to the district court, alluding to it for the first time in an untimely reply brief below. 36 courts also must deem the claims procedurally defaulted.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “An applicant seeking habeas relief may escape dismissal on the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim only by demonstrating ‘cause for the default and prejudice’ or by showing that he is ‘actually innocent’ of the crime for which he was convicted.” Carvajal, 633 F.3d at 104, quoting Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 90. Jones makes several arguments that his Seibert claim is not barred. The first and most substantial is that he presented essentially the same claim in his Connecticut Supreme Court appeal. Jones notes that “citing chapter and verse of the Constitution” is not necessary to exhaust a claim before the state courts. Daye v. Att’y Gen. of State of N.Y., 696 F.2d 186, 194 (2d Cir. 1982) (en banc). Jones argues that his Seibert claim was “fairly presented,” Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275, 278 (1971), to the state courts when Jones made other, similar arguments about his Miranda rights. We are not persuaded. In the Connecticut Supreme Court, Jones did argue that his confession was involuntary. But his brief did not so much as cite Seibert, nor did he in any way articulate the core of a Seibert claim – that the police had employed a deliberate two-step procedure to circumvent Miranda. Instead, Jones contended that the trial court had erred in its factual determinations, and, citing State v. Pinder, 736 A.2d 857, 878 (Conn. 1999), requested that the high court conduct its own “scrupulous examination of the record.” Furthermore, Jones’s failure to alert the government and the state courts to this claim is not a mere technicality. This is not a case in which the habeas petitioner has simply 37 applied a slightly different label to what is essentially the same claim. Adjudicating a Seibert claim would require factual findings that were never made by the trial court, based on evidence that was never adduced in the state courts – for example, evidence of the subjective intent of the officers. See United States v. Williams, 681 F.3d 35, 43 (2d Cir. 2012) (stating that in assessing a Seibert claim, “a court should review the totality of the objective and subjective evidence surrounding the interrogations” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, Jones’s failure to raise the claim prevented the development of a proper record for assessing it. Connecticut law is clear that “rights of constitutional magnitude may be waived,” State v. Paige, 40 A.3d 279, 284 (Conn. 2012), and the Connecticut Supreme Court has declined to consider similar arguments in similar procedural postures. Cf. State v. Mullins, 952 A.2d 784, 795-97 (Conn. 2008) (declining to consider claim that confession was coerced because defendant had not objected below and record was inadequate to review the claim). We are confident that “the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.” Aparicio, 269 F.3d at 90 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because “the state courts would deem the claim procedurally barred, we must deem the claim procedurally defaulted.” Carvajal, 633 F.3d at 104 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).15 15 We note that Seibert had not been decided at the time of Jones’s pretrial suppression hearing or his trial. However, because Seibert was decided before Jones’s appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, the Seibert rule was retroactively applicable to his case under 38 Jones makes two additional arguments that his Seibert claim is preserved, but neither is persuasive. First, he notes that although he did not raise the claim in his initial § 2254 petition below, he attempted to make the claim in a reply brief that the district court rejected as untimely. This argument is irrelevant – it addresses a separate default, namely Jones’s failure to raise the claim below, in the federal district court, to preserve it for this federal appeal. Second, Jones notes that this Court’s certificate of appealability mentioned Seibert. But the purpose of a certificate of appealability is only to provide jurisdiction for appeal, see 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c), not to determine the merits of claims or investigate whether those claims were properly presented in state proceedings. Finally, Jones does not attempt to show cause and prejudice or actual innocence, which are necessary to raise a defaulted claim. See Carvajal, 633 F.3d at 104. Thus, we cannot reach Jones’s argument that the police interrogation violated Seibert.