Opinion ID: 2997557
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Hire for the Turbine Project Manager

Text: Position Cichon argues that summary judgment was improper on his claim that Exelon retaliated against him when not hiring him for the Turbine Project Manager position, and contends that he produced sufficient evidence to demonstrate a disputed issue of fact as to whether Exelon’s proffered reason for not hiring him for the position was pretextual. We agree with the district court’s determination that Cichon produced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case on the failure to hire portion of his retaliation claim when he demonstrated that: 1) he engaged in a statutorily protected activity by filing an FLSA lawsuit, see Sapperstein v. Hager, 188 F.3d 852, 857 (7th Cir. 1999); 2) he applied and had the technical qualifications required for the Turbine Project Manager position; 3) he was not hired for the position; and 4) a similarly situated individual who did not file a complaint under the FLSA was hired for the position (Tim Nolan). Volovsek v. Wis. Dep’t of Agric., Trade, & Consumer Prot., 344 F.3d 680, 692 (7th Cir. 2003); Stone, 281 F.3d at 644. Thus, the burden shifted to Exelon to offer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for not hiring Cichon for the Turbine Project Manager position. Millbrook v. IBP, Inc., 280 F.3d 1169, 1175 (7th Cir. 2002). We hold that Exelon did fulfill this burden by pointing out and providing evidence that 16 No. 03-3724 Cichon was not hired because the candidate selected, Tim Nolan, demonstrated that he was more qualified and possessed better overall leadership and behavioral skills when he achieved better scores than Cichon during the interview and rating process. Further, Tim Kelly, one of the individuals who interviewed both Cichon and Nolan for the position, stated that Nolan was hired instead of Cichon simply because of his higher score, and not because Cichon had filed an FLSA lawsuit against Exelon (Kelly explained that he had no knowledge of a lawsuit being filed until Cichon offered the information during the interview). In order for Cichon’s claim to advance beyond the summary judgment stage, it was his responsibility to offer the district court evidence that created “an issue of material fact as to whether [Exelon’s] proffered reasons [for not hiring him were] merely pretext for unlawful discrimination or retaliation,” Hudson v. Chicago Transit Auth., 375 F.3d 552, 561 (7th Cir. 2004), which he has failed to do. “To demonstrate pretext, [Cichon] must demonstrate that [Exelon’s] articulated reason for [not hiring him] either: 1) had no basis in fact; 2) did not actually motivate its decision; or 3) was insufficient to motivate its decision.” Grayson v. O’Neill, 308 F.3d 808, 820 (7th Cir. 2002). Cichon did not directly attack Exelon’s proffered reason for choosing Nolan as the more qualified candidate, i.e., that Nolan exhibited superior overall leadership and behavioral skills during the interviewing process. If Cichon had advanced such an argument, he would be facing an uphill battle in attempting to discredit Exelon’s statement that it hired Nolan because he was better qualified than Cichon as pretextual, even when considering that Exelon’s evaluation of the two applicants was based on subjective evaluation criterion such as the candidates’ “leadership and behavioral skills.” This is because “where an employer’s proffered nondiscriminatory reason for its employment decision is that it selected the most qualified candidate, evidence of the No. 03-3724 17 applicants’ competing qualifications does not constitute evidence of pretext ‘unless [the plaintiff’s case demonstrates that those qualifications] are so favorable to the plaintiff that there can be no dispute among reasonable persons of impartial judgment that the plaintiff was clearly better qualified for the position at issue.’ ” Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1180 (quoting Deines v. Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1999)) (emphasis added). Cichon failed to present any evidence that directly called into question the veracity of Exelon’s reason for hiring Nolan instead of himself. Instead, Cichon mounted an indirect attack on the integrity of the interviewing panel and its process that resulted in Nolan’s selection, by accusing one of his interviewers, Kelly, of manipulating his evaluation of Cichon in order that Nolan would be awarded the position. Without a scintilla of proof, evidence or substantiation of any kind to support his claim, Cichon alleges that Kelly, who had told Cichon before the interviewing process began that Cichon might be a “good fit” for the job, did an about-face after learning of Cichon’s FLSA lawsuit against Exelon and purposely gave him (Cichon) a lower score than Nolan to sabotage his prospects of being selected for the position. Cichon posits that such an allegation was sufficient to create a disputed issue of fact as to whether Exelon’s proffered reason for hiring Nolan was pretextual. We disagree. First of all, Kelly’s having told Cichon prior to the interviewing process that he was a “good fit” for the job does not ipso facto create an inference that Kelly’s assessment of Cichon following the interview was prompted by a retaliatory animus instead of Kelly’s forthright evaluation of Cichon’s leadership and behavioral skills. Kelly’s preinterview comment noting that Cichon was well-suited for the job was based on his knowledge of Cichon’s technical qualifications, but the interviewing process was designed to sort through the more technically-qualified candidates to 18 No. 03-3724 find the applicant who possessed the superior leadership as well as behavioral skills. Cichon’s “mere qualification [for the position] does not mean that [he] must get the job . . . . [a]nd in choosing between different candidates, all of whom are qualified, an employer may legitimately use subjective qualifications.” Perfetti v. First Nat’l Bank of Chicago, 950 F.2d 449, 458 (7th Cir. 1991). The opinion of one person in isolation that Cichon would be a “good fit” for the job is not persuasive evidence that Cichon was the most qualified person for the position, much less the person that would be hired. In addition, Kelly’s statement does not controvert Cichon’s poor performance in the other stages of the interview process. The decision that Nolan was a more attractive candidate than Cichon came at the end of a collaborative interview process that included input from a number of interviewers other than Kelly, and as this court has reiterated time and time again, “[w]e do not sit as a superpersonnel department that reexamines an entity’s business decision and reviews the propriety of that decision.” Stewart v. Henderson, 207 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2000) (citation removed). Second, Cichon failed to present evidence from which a rational decisionmaker could logically infer that, based on the fact that Kelly knew about Cichon’s FLSA lawsuit, Kelly was motivated by a retaliatory animus when he determined that Cichon did not possess the necessary leadership and behavioral skills to merit a higher score than Nolan in the interviewing process. See Eiland v. Trinity Hosp., 150 F.3d 747, 753 (7th Cir. 1998); Kearney v. Town of Wareham, 316 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2002). Cichon gave no logical explanation or reason as to why Kelly, who like Cichon was a management-level employee at Exelon, would take such umbrage to Cichon’s having filed an FLSA lawsuit against Exelon— protesting the company’s decision to cut overtime pay for management-level employees—that he would take it upon himself to sabotage Cichon’s chances of being awarded the No. 03-3724 19 Turbine Project Manager position. Indeed, accepting Cichon’s speculative theory that Kelly harbored a retaliatory motive when he interviewed him, and essentially acted as a pawn in Exelon’s alleged nefarious scheme, see Eiland, 150 F.3d at 752, would require us to also implicate some or all of the other three individuals who interviewed him in a conspiracy designed to thwart Cichon’s prospects of obtaining the Turbine Project Manager position. “We have typically been wary of allegations based on nothing [more than a bold statement in] an attempt to come up with a conspiracy theory and in particular where there is not a scintilla of evidence in the record before us to support [Cichon’s] theory.” Wells v. Unisource Worldwide, Inc., 289 F.3d 1001, 1007 (7th Cir. 2002); see also Perfetti, 950 F.2d at 453. And we are even more skeptical of Cichon’s conspiratorial retaliation allegations because he himself engineered this scenario by informing Kelly during the interviewing process that he had filed an FLSA lawsuit against Exelon—recall that before interviewing Cichon, Kelly had no knowledge of Cichon’s lawsuit and only learned about it when Cichon volunteered the information. Cichon has provided no evidence other than bald, selfserving assertions that would allow us to rationally infer that Kelly was motivated by a retaliatory animus to redirect the selection process for the Turbine Project Manager position to exclude Cichon. Indeed, there is no reason to believe Kelly’s evaluation of Cichon during the interviewing process was based on anything besides a fair and well-reasoned assessment of Cichon’s leadership and behavioral skills. Kelly flatly denied that his knowledge of Cichon’s lawsuit had any affect on his decisions during the interviewing process. Thus, the only way in which Cichon could prevail on his allegation of pretext would be to demonstrate that Kelly was not being truthful when he made this statement. Perfetti, 950 F.2d at 456. However, because Cichon has the ultimate burden of proof to demonstrate that Exelon engaged 20 No. 03-3724 in retaliatory conduct, see David v. Caterpillar, Inc., 324 F.3d 851, 858 (7th Cir. 2003), he cannot create a triable dispute of fact “ ‘if his only ‘evidence’ [is that Exelon’s] witnesses [are] not worthy of belief. That would [be] a no-evidence case, and such a case [Cichon] must lose, because he has the burden of proof.’ ” Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1181 (quoting EEOC v. G-K-G, Inc., 39 F.3d 740, 746 (7th Cir. 1994)). Put differently, it is impossible for Cichon to meet his burden of proof and demonstrate retaliatory conduct “by relying on the hope that the jury will not trust the credibility of [Exelon’s] witnesses.” Perfetti, 950 F.2d at 456. Without some shred of affirmative evidence to call into question Kelly’s credibility, Cichon must lose. Id.; see also Massey v. Blue Cross-Blue Shield of Illinois, 226 F.3d 922, 926 (7th Cir. 2000). As demonstrated above, Cichon has presented no such evidence. Accordingly “what this case really comes down to is . . . deciding which applicant is more qualified,” a decision that we leave to the employer. Millbrook, 280 F.3d at 1183. Filing a lawsuit under the FLSA does not immunize an employee from adverse employment actions, or prevent “the employer from exercising its business judgment.” Blackie v. Maine, 75 F.3d 716, 723 (1st Cir. 1996). Cichon’s indirect, insubstantial evidence fell far short of demonstrating that Exelon’s proffered reason for hiring Nolan was pretextual. See Perfetti, 950 F.2d at 452. We thus conclude that the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Exelon on Cichon’s claim that he was not hired for the Turbine Project Manager position in retaliation for filing an FLSA lawsuit was proper.