Opinion ID: 2050174
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: issues

Text: 1. Did the probate court have subject matter jurisdiction of the petition requesting relief from the July 1, 1975 order that denied admission to probate of the 1973 will of the decedent? 2. Did the alleged undisclosed interested persons referred to in Attorney Heft's petition have sufficient standing to allow the court to grant relief from the prior order denying probate to the purported 1973 will? 3. Did the court err when it denied admission to probate of the decedent's 1973 will because it only contained the signatures of the decedent and one witness, even though a second witness was present but failed to sign? Subject Matter Jurisdiction The appellants' petition in this case seeks relief only from the order of the probate court denying probate of the will dated July 24, 1973. Both the appellants and respondents are of the opinion that sec. 806.07, Stats., [2] of the new Code of Civil Procedure applies to this case and determines whether the court can grant relief as requested. The appellants cite sub. (1) (h) of 806.07, as the basis for their petition. [1, 2] Supreme Court Order, 67 Wis.2d 726 (1975) adopted the new Code of Civil Procedure, including sec. 806.07, Stats. Sec. 801.01 (3), sets out the effective dates of the new Code as follows: (a) Chapters 801 to 803 shall apply to all actions commenced on or after January 1, 1976. (b) Chapters 804 to 807 shall apply to all actions pending or commenced on or after January 1, 1976, except those actions in which trial has commenced prior to January 1, 1976, as to which the statutes and rules in effect prior to January 1, 1976, shall continue to apply. (Emphasis supplied.) Thus, sec. 806.07, Stats., would only apply to actions pending or commenced on or after January 1, 1976, and therefore it would be inapplicable to any actions terminated prior to January 1, 1976. The term action, as defined in sec. 801.01 (1), includes special proceedings, such as probate. See: Estate of Boerner, 46 Wis.2d 183, 174 N.W.2d 457 (1969). [3-6] Probate is a series of special proceedings, including the determination of whether to admit a decedent's will to probate. Those probate proceedings are terminated by orders rather than by judgments. Estate of Boerner, supra . The probate court in this case entered two orders on July 1, 1975, one denying probate to the decedent's 1973 will and the other admitting to probate the prior will of 1970. The two orders entered by the court on July 1st terminated the special proceeding with respect to determining which of the decedent's wills to admit to probate. Since these two orders disposed of the question concerning which of the decedent's wills should be admitted to probate they precluded further hearing on this matter, therefore, we hold them to be final orders of the court. Estate of Stoeber, 36 Wis.2d 448, 153 N.W.2d 599 (1967). As a result, any question concerning the probating of the will in Estate of Goldstein was terminated by the court as of July 1, 1975. Thus, sec. 806.07, Stats., referred to in both parties' briefs, would not apply to this case because the special proceeding was neither pending nor commenced on or after January 1, 1976. Prior to the adoption of sec. 806.07, Stats., the statutory provision dealing with the subject of relief from judgments and orders was sec. 269.46, Stats. 1973, which reads as follows: Relief from judgments, orders and stipulations; review of judgments and orders. (1) The court may, upon notice and just terms, at any time within one year after notice thereof, relieve a party from a judgment, order, stipulation or other proceeding against him obtained through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect and may supply an omission in any proceeding. In addition to the required affidavits, all motions to vacate a judgment entered upon default or cognovit and to obtain a trial upon the merits shall be accompanied by a proposed verified answer disclosing a defense. (2) . . . (3) All judgments and court orders may be reviewed by the court at any time within 60 days from service of notice of entry thereof, but not later than 60 days after the end of the term of entry thereof. (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 269.46(3), Stats., provided that a court has 60 days within which it may review, without statutory limitation, any of its judgments or orders. The 60-day time limit is measured from the date of service of notice of entry of judgments or orders or the end of the court's term in which the order or judgment was entered. On the other hand, sub. (1) of 269.46, allowed the court to grant relief within a year from judgments or orders where mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect were alleged and proven. The petition filed on May 28, 1976 did not qualify for review under the 60-day time limit of sec. 269.46(3), Stats., as it was filed some eleven months after the date of entry of the orderJuly 1, 1975. The petition also failed to fulfill the one year time limitation period of sec. 269.46(1), as interpreted in Estate of Sharp, 63 Wis.2d 254, 217 N.W.2d 258 (1973). In that case the court reasoned that: ... The power to grant relief from such a final order more than sixty days after the end of the term of the court at which it was rendered is limited solely to cases of mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. Loomis v. Rice (1875), 37 Wis. 262; Estate of Callahan (1947), 251 Wis. 247, 257, 29 N.W.2d 352; Glassner v. Medical Realty, Inc. (1964), 22 Wis.2d 344, 351, 126 N.W.2d 68; Tuszkiewicz v. Lepins (1968), 41 Wis.2d 102, 105, 163 N.W.2d 188. Since no such allegations were made, it was error to grant relief. Similarly, any action by the trial court under sec. 269.46(1), Stats., is limited to a period of one year after notice of the judgment or order. Tuszkiewicz v. Lepins, supra . After the passage of that period of time, the trial court is without subject matter jurisdiction to take any further action. [citations omitted]. Id. at 266. The petition for relief in this case fails to allege mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect as grounds for the relief sought. Thus, under the rationale of Estate of Sharp, supra , it would have been error, in this case, for the court to have reversed its prior ruling and granted relief from the order denying probate to the 1973 will. Therefore, we affirm the court's order dismissing the petition of Attorney Heft. [7] The court in Kellogg-Citizens National Bank v. Francois, 240 Wis. 432, 435, 3 N.W.2d 686 (1947) stated that under sec. 269.46, Stats., ... it is not enough that a motion be made within a year but the court must act within a year. [citations omitted]. In view of the holdings in Kellogg-Citizens National Bank v. Francois, supra and Estate of Sharp, supra , the probate court as of July 1, 1976 was without subject matter jurisdiction to even consider Attorney Heft's petition. In view of our holding, the probate court was without subject matter jurisdiction to grant appellants' petition for relief. Thus, we need not decide the remaining issues raised in this case. By the Court. The appeal from the judgment of April 27, 1977 is dismissed. The orders of July 1, 1975 are affirmed.