Opinion ID: 1797621
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: lower court judgments

Text: After a six day judge trial held in September of 1991, the trial judge rendered judgment on February 27, 1992 in favor of the landowners. The trial judge found all of the land should be valued as developable at the time of the taking, despite its nonpermitted wetland status, based on either of two theories: (1) even if the property was devalued at the time of the taking, the devaluation was caused by the hurricane levee project; thus the value of the property at the time of the expropriation should not include this devaluation; or (2) the land was actually developable at the time of the expropriation because there was no legal impediment to its development at that time. Accordingly, the trial judge awarded $2,849,000.00 to BDF, $1,480,000.00 to Coast Quality, and $975,000.00 to the Isaacs for compensation for the land actually expropriated by the District for the construction of the levee. Regarding severance damages, the trial judge also found the placement of a levee along alignment E rendered previously developable land now located on the unprotected side of the levee undevelopable. Therefore, he also awarded the landowners severance damages in the amounts of $14,478,000.00 to BDF, $703,000.00 to Coast Quality, and $1,194,000.00 to the Isaacs. Finding the levee alignment selection process had been long and controversial such that the landowners had suffered a substantial delay, the trial judge also awarded delay damages at the rate of 10% per year from September 21, 1979, the date BDF's permit application was denied, calculated on the value the various properties had on that date. The judge therefore awarded $15,642,664.00 to BDF, $1,685,935.00 to Coast Quality, and $1,654,145.00 to the Isaacs for delay damages. Pursuant to La.R.S. 38:387(E), the trial judge also awarded attorney's fees in the amount of 25% of the difference between the amounts deposited into the registry of the court and the amounts he awarded in the judgment. This amounted to $8,189,114.00 to BDF, $963,969.00 to Coast Quality, and $949,605.00 to the Isaacs. [16]
The District appealed to the fifth circuit court of appeal. The court of appeal affirmed the amount of damages awarded for the land expropriated and the amount given for severance damages. [17] The court first held the expropriation suits filed in 1989 by the District destroyed the market value of the land and [u]ntil then, the real possibility of a change in the landowners favor existed.... [T]he Levee District took action which forever foreclosed the possibility of development. West Jefferson, supra, 620 So.2d at 333. The court then held that even if it were to agree the land had only nominal wetland value, it would still hold the District liable for a value based on the assumption the land was developable, because the inability to get a permit or develop the land prior to the takings was wholly the result of governmental (all of the entities which combined to halt the project) control and in no way the result of landowner action. It was governmental action which arguably devalued the property, which was developable except for the interference of the levee project. The landowners' dreams of development were shattered, not by the expected or everyday risks of property ownership, but by a factor within the exclusive control and discretion of the governmental entities involved in the levee project. It is patently unfair and unconstitutional to penalized [sic] the landowners for the effect of these governmental restrictions by refusing to compensate them for this injury to the full extent of their loss. Id. Regarding the award of delay damages, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that the landowner had suffered an unreasonable delay since September 21, 1979, the date the Corps denied BDF's permit. However, because the District did not take over responsibility for the project until September 11, 1985, the court held it could only be held liable for delay damages, calculated at 10% per year simple interest, from that date. Because it amended the award of delay damages, the court also amended the award of attorney's fees to 25% of the difference between the amounts deposited in the registry of the court and the amounts the court of appeal was awarding under its decision. [18] The District sought review from this court, and we granted its writ application to determine the correctness of the judgments below. [19]