Opinion ID: 626549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Design-defect claim

Text: The version of Ohio's products liability law that applies to the present case  a legal issue that the parties do not dispute, despite subsequent amendments to the statute  provides as follows: (A) ... [A] product is defective in design or formulation if either of the following applies: (1) When it left the control of its manufacturer, the foreseeable risks associated with its design or formulation as determined pursuant to division (B) of this section exceeded the benefits associated with that design or formulation as determined pursuant to division (C) of this section; (2) It is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Ohio Rev.Code § 2307.75(A) (2001) (amended 2004). This statute offers two alternative approaches for demonstrating a design defect: a risk-benefit test in subsection (A)(1), and a consumer-expectations test in subsection (A)(2). See Perkins v. Wilkinson Sword, Inc., 83 Ohio St.3d 507, 700 N.E.2d 1247, 1248 (1998) (explaining that these standards are not mutually exclusive, but instead constitute a single, two-pronged test for determining whether a product is defectively designed (internal quotation marks omitted)); see also Hisrich v. Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc., 226 F.3d 445, 454 (6th Cir.2000) (describing the tests as not fungible, and noting that a finding under one test does not imply a similar finding under the other test). A jury may consider either or both theories of liability. Perkins, 700 N.E.2d at 1248 ([I]f the jury concludes that one standard is not met, the jury may consider the other standard. (internal quotation marks omitted)); Hisrich, 226 F.3d at 454 (interpreting Ohio law to allow both theories in a case involving the safety of an automobile airbag that killed a six-year-old passenger after deploying during a low-speed collision). Under the risk-benefit theory, a court weighs the existing design's foreseeable risks against its benefits, as determined by a nonexclusive statutory list of factors. Clay v. Ford Motor Co., 215 F.3d 663, 669-70 (6th Cir.2000) (applying this test in a case involving a car accident where a sport utility vehicle rolled over). Newell concedes that Ohio law requires expert testimony where aspects of the defect or the proposed alternative designs are technically complex and outside the understanding of a lay juror. See Atkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 132 Ohio App.3d 556, 725 N.E.2d 727, 733 (1999) (explaining that expert testimony is often ... necessary, particularly where the product at issue is complex, but that such testimony was not necessary in a case where a van's side door closed on a passenger's hip because the product and the alleged defect were not overly complex); see also Aldridge v. Reckart Equip. Co., No. 04CA17, 2006 WL 2716696, at  (Ohio Ct.App. Sept. 19, 2006) (unpublished opinion) (per curiam) (relying on Atkins to reject the defendant's argument that expert testimony was required and to conclude instead that expert testimony may be required if the existence of a technically feasible alternative design is knowledge beyond that possessed by the average lay person). Under the consumer-expectations theory, a product may be defectively designed if [i]t is more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner. Ohio Rev.Code § 2307.75(A)(2) (2001) (amended 2004); Tompkin v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 362 F.3d 882, 901-02 (6th Cir.2004) (discussing the requirements of the consumer-expectations test in light of a jury-instruction challenge); Bouher v. Aramark Servs., Inc., 181 Ohio App.3d 599, 910 N.E.2d 40, 43 (2009) (rejecting a consumer-expectations claim alleging a design defect in a coffee maker that allegedly boiled water too hot). This test examines what would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases [the product], with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics. Hisrich, 226 F.3d at 454-55 (internal quotation marks omitted). [T]he determination of whether a product is more dangerous than an ordinary person would expect is generally a question of fact which does not require expert testimony. Id. at 455 (internal quotation marks omitted). Neither this court nor the Ohio state courts have required the consumer to have technical knowledge or a specialized background under the consumer-expectations theory, as long as the consumer has an expectation in the normal operation and safety of the product. See id. at 455, 456 ([T]he issue is not whether the consumer can determine the reasonable expectations for the technical operation of the product, but the consumer's reasonable ability to expect the performance of the product.). We have found no case holding that Ohio's consumer-expectations test is inapplicable to complex devices, and this court has previously been unpersuaded by such an argument. See id. at 456. But the Ohio Supreme Court has cautioned that a plaintiff might not succeed on a consumer-expectations theory if the relevant product is one about which consumers are ignorant. Id. at 455-56 (discussing Knitz v. Minster Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St.2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, 818 (1982)). Ohio caselaw is less than clear about the evidence needed to support a consumer-expectations claim at the summary-judgment stage. On the one hand, the plain language of the statute and Ohio's pattern jury instructions, as well as several cases applying Ohio law, seem to require that a plaintiff supply evidence depicting the expectations that consumers hold about the contested product. See Lawrence v. Raymond Corp., No. 3:09 CV 1067, 2011 WL 3418324, at  (N.D.Ohio Aug. 4, 2011) (unpublished opinion) (dismissing the plaintiffs' claim because they failed to present any evidence of the expectations of normal consumers (users) [of] any type of forklift); 3 Ohio Jury Instructions § 351.09(2)(C) (2002), as quoted in Tompkin, 362 F.3d at 902 n. 19. This evidence should demonstrate `whether ordinary consumers are aware of the [product's] alleged dangers,' not simply `what the [victim] would have expected.' Lawrence, 2011 WL 3418324, at  (brackets added, ellipses and emphasis omitted) (quoting Jordan v. Paccar, Inc., 37 F.3d 1181, 1184 (6th Cir.1994)) (determining that the plaintiffs could not rely solely on the victim's specific expectations or the expectations of the jury as general consumers). But other cases concurrently maintain that `evidence of unsafe, unexpected product performance is sufficient to infer the existence of a product defect' under... the consumer-expectation standard, even without further evidence. Hisrich, 226 F.3d at 455 (quoting State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 37 Ohio St.3d 1, 523 N.E.2d 489, 494-95 (1988), superseded by subsequent amendments to Ohio Rev.Code § 2307.75); see also Tompkin, 362 F.3d at 901-02 (concluding that the district court's refusal to instruct the jury on the consumer-expectations theory was harmless because the plaintiff's unexpected-performance argument was virtually indistinguishable from her implied-warranty claim, on which the court did provide instructions (internal quotation marks omitted)); Donegal Mut. Ins. Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 166 Ohio App.3d 569, 852 N.E.2d 215, 221 (2006) (holding that the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of unexpected performance where they alleged that their stove started a fire when set on the self-clean mode). But regardless of which standard of proof the court applies, the Ohio Court of Appeals has determined that the mere fact of injury  without evidence of errant performance or contrary consumer expectations  is insufficient to support a design-defect claim. Bouher, 910 N.E.2d at 43. In addition to meeting at least one of the two design-defect theories, Newell must show that the proposed alternative design would be reasonable in light of the full range of potential forklift accidents. See Francis v. Clark Equip. Co., 993 F.2d 545, 552 (6th Cir.1993). Francis involved a claim that the forklift in question should have had an operator-restraint system to hold operators in the vehicle in the event that it flipped over. Id. at 551-52. This argument, the court concluded, necessarily entails aspects of a risk-benefit analysis, despite the claim's origin under the consumer-expectations theory, because the factfinder was tasked with evaluating the allegedly reasonable alternatives. Id. at 551 (presuming that an alternative design would prevent some injuries, the court noted that the jury must also consider the feasibility and effectiveness of seat belts in light of other accidents that can occur in forklifts, which necessarily entails a discussion of whether the adoption of the alternative design would have affected the safety of the driver in [other types of] forklift accidents ... [or] adversely affected the driver's ability to perform his or her job. (brackets and ellipses added)). Finally, for Newell's claims to survive summary judgment, it must demonstrate that the allegedly defective condition was the most probable cause of [Hashman's] injuries or losses. See Donegal Mut., 852 N.E.2d at 221. Circumstantial evidence of causation is sufficient, and Newell need show only that its hypothesis is more probable than other potential causes. See Sigler v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 532 F.3d 469, 486 (6th Cir.2008) (holding, in a case based on Tennessee law, that the plaintiff's claim of design defect in an automobile airbag could withstand summary judgment based on circumstantial evidence alone); Donegal Mut., 852 N.E.2d at 221 (applying this rule to the causation element of a design-defect claim under Ohio law). Expert testimony about the exact nature of the defect is not necessary, as long as the evidence sufficiently points to the defective component in general as the cause of injury. Id. at 221 (determining that the expert did not need to testify about the exact part of the electrical switch that caused the fire because the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to conclude that the switch in general had been defectively designed).