Opinion ID: 3025999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Waiver of Penalty Phase Jury (Claim 6)

Text: Taylor claims that he never knowingly and voluntarily waived his right under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(b) to have his sentence determined by a jury. The state’s failure to follow its own rules of criminal procedure, he argues, violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment due process rights under the federal Constitution. Because this claim has not been addressed on the merits by the state courts we review it de novo. A capital defendant does not have a federal constitutional right to be sentenced by a jury, and states are free to determine whether a judge or jury makes the ultimate sentencing decision. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 464-65 (1984). Section 9711(b) of Pennsylvania’s death penalty statute provides that [i]f the defendant has waived a jury trial or pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose unless waived by the defendant with the consent of the Commonwealth, in which case the trial judge shall hear the evidence and determine the penalty in the same manner as would a jury. . . . 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(b). Under Pennsylvania law, a waiver of rights under § 9711(b) must be on the record and “calculated to insure the defendant comprehends the nature and significance of the right being waived.” Commonwealth v. Fears, 836 A.2d 52, 70 (Pa. 2003). 53 Even assuming the state court failed to follow the law of Pennsylvania, in this federal habeas case, we are limited to deciding whether Taylor’s conviction and sentence “violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). It is well established that “a state court’s misapplication of its own law does not generally raise a constitutional claim. The federal courts have no supervisory authority over state judicial proceedings and may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional dimension.” Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877, 888-89 (3d Cir. 1992) (en banc) (quoted in Johnson v. Rosemeyer, 117 F.3d 104, 109 (3d Cir. 1997)). Taylor argues that the state court’s failure to obtain a knowing and voluntary waiver of his penalty-phase jury right was a federal due process violation under Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343 (1980). In Hicks, an Oklahoma trial court instructed a jury that if it found the defendant guilty of distributing heroin, it must sentence him to a 40-year term of imprisonment as an habitual offender. Id. at 344-45. But after the trial, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals declared the mandatory sentencing statute unconstitutional in an unrelated case. Id. at 345. On appeal, Hicks sought to have his 40-year sentence vacated in view of the unconstitutionality of the habitual offender provision. Id. The Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged that the provision was unconstitutional, but affirmed Hicks’s sentence nonetheless, reasoning that since it was within the range of punishment that could have been imposed by a new jury, he had not been prejudiced. Id. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case, explaining that Hicks had a “substantial and legitimate expectation that he w[ould] be deprived of his liberty only to the extent determined by the jury in the exercise of its statutory discretion, and that liberty interest is one that the Fourteenth Amendment preserves against arbitrary deprivation by the State.” Id. at 346 (internal citation omitted). Oklahoma had denied Hicks “the jury sentence to which he was entitled under state law, simply on the frail conjecture that a jury might have imposed a sentence equally as harsh as that mandated by the invalid habitual offender 54 provision.” 26 Id. “Such an arbitrary disregard of the petitioner’s right to liberty,” the Court held, “is a denial of due process of law.” Id. “Hicks involved an unusual situation which the Supreme Court concluded required due process treatment.” Johnson, 117 F.3d at 113. Thus, the Supreme Court has not applied Hicks to mean that “every error of state law affecting the outcome of a state criminal proceeding would be cognizable as a due process claim.” Id. If the Court did, “the district courts in habeas cases effectively would become state appellate courts one rung above the state courts of last resort.” Id. Importantly, in Hicks, the prejudice the defendant suffered because of the state’s error heavily influenced the Court’s decision: “[t]he possibility that the jury would have returned a sentence of less than 40 years is . . . substantial,” the Court explained, and “therefore, [the state court was] wholly incorrect to say that the petitioner could not have been prejudiced by the instruction requiring the jury to impose a 40-year prison sentence.” 447 U.S. at 346. Accordingly, when considering whether an error under state law implicates due process, “we require more than that the defendant simply be prejudiced . . . . The standard requires that the defendant be prejudiced in a very particular way.” Smith v. Horn, 120 F.3d 400, 416 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Smith, we required that “the erroneous jury instructions [must] have operated to lift the burden of proof on an essential element of an offense as defined by state law.” Id.; see also Hill v. Estelle, 653 F.2d 202, 205 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that error in minimum possible sentence did not implicate Hicks when actual sentence given was large enough to show that error did not prejudice defendant). Here, we agree with Taylor that we cannot presume, based on a silent record, that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his 26 Had the members of the jury been correctly instructed in Hicks, they could have imposed any sentence above a minimum of ten years. See id. (citing Okla.Stat., Tit. 21, § 51(A)(1) (1971)). 55 state law right to a penalty phase jury. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; Fears, 836 A.2d at 70. But we still must determine whether Taylor was prejudiced in a way that implicated his federal constitutional rights. Cf. Geschwendt, 967 F.2d at 888 (rejecting defendant’s claim of prejudice, and finding no federal due process violation even assuming state disregarded its own law). Critically, Taylor does not argue that having a judge determine his sentence prejudiced him any way that implicates his federal rights. Indeed, there were substantial strategic reasons not to elect a penalty-phase jury in this case, and Taylor has never asserted that he would have elected one, had he known of the option. And because Taylor does not suggest that he wanted a penalty-phase jury, he cannot support his ineffective assistance of counsel claim either, because he cannot show prejudice to satisfy Strickland’s second prong. Accordingly, we cannot hold on this record that the alleged state law error violated the Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution. VII. Taylor’s Penalty-Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims and Waiver Claims (Claims 7 and 8) Taylor’s next argument is that trial counsel failed to investigate, present, and argue mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, and his deficient performance prejudiced the defense. (Taylor Br. 76-84.) Specifically, he argues that counsel failed to: promptly investigate Taylor’s mental health; follow up on the Sadoff and Briercheck reports; develop life-history mitigation; develop and present evidence of substance abuse and dependence; or argue for a life sentence based on the mitigating evidence that was already in the record. Because of counsel’s failure to investigate, Taylor argues that his decision not to present mitigation evidence was not knowing and voluntary. A. State Court Proceedings on Counsel’s Assistance in the Penalty Phase and Standards of Review
At the hearing on his first PCRA petition, Taylor testified 56 that he had instructed counsel not to present any witnesses at the degree of guilt or penalty phases. He testified, however, that counsel should have taken “all authority and represented me . . . which he did not because he let me decide my fate. And I wasn’t really up to deciding nothing because of my—my stress I was under and—and the remorse I had for what I’ve done.” (App. at 254.) He testified, further, that at the time of his proceedings: “I wanted to plead guilty and—but mostly all—I just wanted to take my life.” (App. at 256.) In terms of specific mitigation evidence, Taylor testified that counsel should have called as witnesses “family members, friends, employees, [and] bosses,” who could have testified that he had a good home life with his wife and children, but that he also had a drug and alcohol problem. (App. at 254-55.) He admitted that counsel wanted to call some of these witnesses, but that he told counsel: “I didn’t want to put them under that pressure because . . . it’s a high profile case and I didn’t want to put my family through that, you know, whether it be from my family or my wife’s family. I didn’t want to . . . put them under all this pressure that was brought on.” (App. at 261.) When asked whether he had made telephone calls shortly before the hearing and told witnesses not to appear, Taylor replied: “I don’t recall that, no.” (Id.) On cross-examination, Taylor admitted that trial counsel wanted the hospital statements suppressed and to go to trial, but that he resisted this advice: “I just wanted to plead guilty and . . . [a]bout that time . . . I started serving God and found God in my life and I wanted to do . . . the right thing and I told him, no, I don’t want to go to trial, I’ll plead guilty to what I have done. . . .” (App. at 257.) The Commonwealth attorney asked Taylor whether counsel investigated Taylor’s mental health issues, and he replied: “The Court . . . brung a psychiatrist to see me and I think Evanick brought one, too, but he never told me the outcome of—of what they said.” (App. at 258.) The court then questioned Taylor about his decision not to present mitigating evidence. Taylor first described how on the night of the murders he consumed alcohol and cocaine, and afterwards, various household poisons in a suicide attempt. Taylor 57 explained that counsel had this information at the time of the guilty plea, but Taylor did not know whether the trial court was aware of it. The court then asked the following: THE COURT: Essentially you prevented him from presenting anything that would have caused the death penalty not to be imposed, did you not? You instructed him not to call witnesses on your behalf and not to present any evidence that would, is that what you’re indicating? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, because — THE COURT: And what you are saying today is that you were in a mental state such that you were incapable of making that decision, that Mr. Evanick told you that legally it was your choice and you had the final say, and that you accepted that and you told him not to do it? And you’re saying today that was the wrong decision and because of your mental state you weren’t capable of making that decision and Mr. Evanick shouldn’t have le[t] you make the decision? THE DEFENDANT: Right. THE COURT: Does that sum it up? THE DEFENDANT: Yes, something like that. (App. at 263-64.) Trial counsel testified next, and stated that, in his view, Taylor had been competent to make decisions and fully capable of understanding the proceedings. Counsel testified, further, that Taylor was adamant about not presenting witnesses, and even telephoned scheduled witnesses the night before the degree-of-guilt and penalty hearing, telling them not to appear. Counsel stated that he knew “a great deal about Paul’s background but Paul wanted none of that presented.” (App. at 270.) 58 When asked specifically about Dr. Sadoff’s evaluation, counsel explained that it was submitted to the trial judge, but counsel “read the report,” which “indicated that Paul was competent and that Paul had no apparent defense.” (App. at 272.)27 Counsel testified that he advised Taylor about Dr. Sadoff’s findings, and discussed with him the relevance of his cocaine use: “Paul told us about using cocaine before the murders occurred and during—while the murders were occurring. He mentioned the prior use to Dr. Sadoff. But Paul did not want to exercise any of his rights and testify or present that,” either as a defense or in mitigation. (App. at 273.) On cross-examination, counsel reiterated his belief that there “was nothing from what Paul was telling us that the cocaine caused him not to understand what he was doing or not to understand that it was wrong.” (App. at 275.) Based on Taylor’s and counsel’s testimony, the first PCRA court found the following facts bearing on effectiveness of counsel: The Court finds Mr. Taylor’s testimony today to be truthful. We believe that it is correct that he instructed Mr. Evanick not to present testimony, that he had discussed the possibility of having testimony by various friends, associates, employers, coworkers with Mr. Evanick and elected not to call them and, in fact, he made the phone calls to tell those witnesses not to come in. Also that there was discussion with Mr. Evanick about use of both alcohol and drugs and that Mr. Taylor made the decision not to present that testimony or any other testimony; that Mr. Evanick explained to Mr. Taylor his right to present testimony both by himself or by witnesses and that — but that he left it up to Mr. Taylor to make the final decision as to what witnesses would be called; and that Mr. Taylor acting out of remorse and being upset with what had occurred and wishing to receive 27 We note that the report actually is addressed to counsel. 59 the death penalty as being the only acceptable atonement for his actions decided not to call those witnesses and to proceed in the fashion that he did knowing and accepting the fact that it would lead directly to a death penalty. ... It’s clear that counsel has the obligation of explaining these matters to the Defendant and allowing him to make all of these decisions and that they’re the decisions of the Defendant not the decisions of counsel. (App. at 277-78.) The court then concluded that because Taylor was competent to make decisions about his case, and his remorse was not a legal impediment, it was appropriate for counsel to defer to Taylor’s wishes. Taylor II affirmed the first PCRA court’s dismissal of Taylor’s petition, discussing its prior decisions in Commonwealth v. Morales, 701 A.2d 516 (Pa. 1997), Commonwealth v. Beasley, 678 A.2d 773 (Pa. 1996), and Commonwealth v. Sam, 635 A.2d 603 (Pa. 1993), which held that defense counsel has no duty to introduce and argue evidence of mitigating circumstances where his client has specifically directed otherwise.28 718 A.2d at 744-45. Concluding that Taylor’s case was indistinguishable from Morales, Beasley, and Sam, the Court explained: [T]he record in this case clearly supports the PCRA court’s findings that Taylor made the decision not to present evidence in the penalty phase and that he did so contrary to the recommendations and advice of trial counsel. In addition to Taylor’s having had the benefit of the advice of trial counsel, the 28 The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has held that its analysis of ineffective assistance of counsel claims under these cases is identical to Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, and we agreed in Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 203 (3d Cir. 2000). 60 trial court in various colloquies also advised him of his rights and probed whether his decisions were rational and properly informed. Like trial counsel, the trial court specifically advised Taylor of his right to defend against imposition of the death penalty, including the right to present mitigating circumstances, and that the likely result of the failure to do so would be the imposition of a sentence of death. Under these circumstances, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to override Taylor’s decision not to present such evidence. Id. at 745.
The District Court determined that Taylor’s penalty-phase ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not considered on the merits by the state courts. We disagree and will therefore review these claims under § 2254(d). The state court record, which we recounted above, shows that the first PCRA court considered whether Taylor instructed counsel not to present mitigating evidence and whether Taylor was competent to make that decision. See, e.g., App. at 277-80; see also Taylor II, 718 A.2d at 744-45. The only exception is Taylor’s claim that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his right to present mitigation evidence. The state courts did not squarely address this issue. Without deciding whether this is truly an independent claim or, rather, an argument that Taylor should have raised when his competence was litigated before the first PCRA court, we will review the question de novo. We do so because under either standard of review, the claim lacks merit. See, e.g., Holloway v. Horn, 355 F.3d 707, 719 & n.6, 729 (3d Cir. 2004) (reviewing de novo and under AEDPA, noting that result would be the same under either standard). Moreover, because Taylor sought an evidentiary hearing before the District Court in order to present new mitigating evidence that trial counsel had failed to uncover, we must evaluate Taylor’s failure to establish the factual basis for his ineffective assistance claim under § 2254(e)(2). To the extent that the state 61 courts did make factual findings relevant to counsel’s assistance, they are binding unless Taylor can rebut “the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Appel, 250 F.3d at 210. B. Federal Standards: Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Penalty Phase We evaluate counsel’s assistance in the penalty phase of a death penalty case in light of the fundamental constitutional requirement that the fact-finder render a decision based upon full consideration of available mitigating evidence. Williams, 529 U.S. at 393; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 110-12 (1982). The “catch-all” provision of Pennsylvania’s death penalty statute, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(e)(8), permits the fact-finder to consider “[a]ny . . . evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.” To ensure this is a meaningful process, counsel has an “obligation to conduct a thorough investigation” for mitigating evidence. Williams, 529 U.S. at 396 (citing 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-4.1, commentary, p. 4-55 (2d ed. 1980)). The investigation must include “efforts to discover all reasonably available mitigating evidence,” including information about “medical history, educational history, employment and training history, [and] family and social history.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003) (quoting ABA Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, §§ 11.4.1(C), 11.8.6 (1989) (emphasis omitted)); accord Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 380-81 (2005). We evaluate counsel’s investigation under Strickland’s reasonableness standard, based on prevailing professional norms, such as those found in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice. See Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 417 (3d Cir. 2006). Applying these standards in Wiggins, the Supreme Court held that counsel’s decision not to expand his investigation of the defendant’s life history beyond the pre-sentence investigation report and Department of Social Services records fell short of 62 prevailing professional standards. The Court reasoned that prevailing norms of practice as reflected in the 1989 ABA standards were guides to determining what is reasonable, 539 U.S. at 522, and the pre-sentence report and records provided valuable leads that counsel unreasonably ignored: “[A]ny reasonably competent attorney would have realized that pursuing these leads was necessary to making an informed choice,” particularly given the absence of prior convictions or other negative information (such as a history of violence) in Wiggins’s background. Id. at 525. Similarly, the Supreme Court held in Rompilla, 545 U.S. 374, that “even when a capital defendant’s family members and the defendant himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase of trial.” Id. at 377. In Rompilla, further effort on counsel’s part would have unearthed school, medical, and prison records showing severe psychological deficits and evidence of a highly abusive home life. Id. at 390-93. The Supreme Court, however, recently distinguished Wiggins and Rompilla, in the situation in which a defendant prevents his attorney from presenting mitigating evidence. See Schriro v. Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. 1933, 1942 (2007). The defendant in Landrigan, Jeffrey Landrigan, was convicted of first degree murder. His counsel had two witnesses prepared to testify at the penalty phase (Landrigan’s mother and his ex-wife), but Landrigan asked them not to testify. Id. at 1937. In addition to his instructions to counsel, Landrigan had several outbursts in open court opposing counsel’s presentation of mitigation evidence. Id. at 1937-38. For example, when counsel attempted to explain some of the state’s aggravating evidence in a more mitigating light, Landrigan verbally attacked counsel, and made comments that made the state’s aggravating evidence sound even worse than the state’s presentation. Id. at 1938, 1941. When the trial judge asked Landrigan if he had instructed his lawyer not to present mitigating evidence, Landrigan responded affirmatively. Id. at 1941. And when the court asked whether there were mitigating circumstances 63 it should be aware of, Landrigan replied, “Not as far as I’m concerned.” Id. Despite his recalcitrance at trial, Landrigan later filed a federal habeas petition alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to investigate and present mitigation. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s grant of habeas relief because (1) the state courts’ factual findings that Landrigan instructed counsel not to present any mitigating evidence were reasonable; and (2) the state court reasonably concluded that a defendant who refused to allow the presentation of any mitigating evidence could not establish Strickland prejudice based on his counsel’s failure to investigate further. Id. at 1941-42; see also Shelton v. Carroll, 464 F.3d 423, 440 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that counsel’s reliance on defendant’s “deliberate and strategic determination that he ought not present mitigating evidence does not rise to the level of unreasonableness under Strickland”). Landrigan also argued that his decision to present mitigating evidence was not informed and knowing. Id. at 1942. The Supreme Court found this claim lacked merit as well, because the Court “ha[s] never imposed an informed and knowing requirement upon a defendant’s decision not to introduce evidence.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).29 C. Taylor’s Penalty-Phase Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims 29 Even assuming such a requirement, the Court held that Landrigan would not be entitled to relief for three reasons: (1) he had failed to develop the factual basis for this claim in the state courts; (2) the record showed that counsel had “carefully explained” the importance of mitigating evidence and the Court has “never required a specific colloquy to ensure that a defendant knowingly and intelligently refused to present mitigating evidence” and (3) it was apparent from Landrigan’s statements—“if you want to give me the death penalty, just bring it right on. I’m ready for it.”—that he clearly understood the consequences of asserting that were no mitigating circumstances. Id. at 1943. 64 As a threshold matter, we will assume that Taylor’s newly proffered mitigation evidence, showing that he was raised in an impoverished, alcoholic, neglectful, perverse, and physically violent home, could have influenced the state trial court to impose life sentences instead of death. Nevertheless, even if the District Court had held a hearing and determined that counsel’s failure to uncover this evidence fell below the standards set out in Wiggins and Rompilla, the Court still could not have granted the writ because, under Landrigan, Taylor cannot show Strickland prejudice. We agree with Taylor that he was not belligerent and obstructive in court like the defendant in Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at 1944, but the record shows that his determination not to present mitigating evidence was just as strong. Specifically, the first PCRA court reasonably determined that: (1) Taylor refused to allow the presentation of any mitigating evidence, and he called off witnesses that were scheduled to appear; and (2) he was competent to make those decisions. These factual determinations are supported by the record from the first PCRA hearing that we have recounted above, and also by Taylor’s and counsel’s statements on the record at the guilty plea hearing.30 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). Thus, whatever counsel could have uncovered, Taylor would not have permitted any witnesses to testify, and was therefore not prejudiced by any inadequacy in counsel’s investigation or decision not to present mitigation evidence. See Landrigan, 127 S. Ct. at 1941. Taylor further attempts to distinguish Landrigan, arguing that, in his case, the first PCRA court made no specific finding that 30 Without reiterating all of this testimony here, we note that Taylor admitted to the first PCRA court that he instructed counsel not to present any testimony. Morever, the first PCRA court’s decision to credit counsel’s testimony that Taylor called off witnesses, as well as the court’s competency determination, which we have already addressed, were both reasonable, based on the record. 65 he would have prevented presentation of the mental health evidence already available in the Sadoff and Briercheck reports. The record shows, however, that the sentencing court had reviewed the Sadoff report and was aware that Taylor had mental health issues.31 To the extent supplemental testimony would have been necessary at the penalty phase to elaborate on that report, Taylor’s decision not to present witnesses would have prevented it. And to the extent that Taylor’s newly obtained mental health evidence (new reports from Mr. Briercheck, Drs. Sadoff, Dudley, and Blair) would have made a difference, Taylor has no cognizable excuse for his failure to present this evidence to the first PCRA court, which heard testimony on Taylor’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). We are also satisfied that Taylor’s decision not to present mitigating evidence was informed and knowing. Counsel addressed the trial court and stated that he had discussed with Taylor the likelihood of a death sentence if no mitigating evidence was presented, and Taylor did not disagree that he had been so advised. It is clear from Taylor’s many colloquies with the trial court that he understood the consequences of not presenting mitigation evidence. In any event, the Supreme Court stated in Landrigan that it “ha[s] never imposed an informed and knowing requirement upon a defendant’s decision not to introduce evidence.” 127 S. Ct. at 1942 (internal quotation marks omitted). For all of these reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s denial of an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, denial of Taylor’s federal habeas claims based on ineffective assistance of counsel at the penalty phase, and denial of his claim challenging the validity of his 31 Dr. Sadoff’s original report discusses facts that were potentially mitigating under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9711(e)(2) (extreme mental or emotional disturbance) and § 9711(e)(3) (substantially impaired capacity). The trial court was aware from this report that, in one psychiatrist’s view, “the killings were a product of [Taylor’s] aberrant state of mind,” and that “he was responding to his mental disturbance.” (App. at 326.) 66 decision not to present mitigating evidence. VIII. Taylor’s Remaining Claims (Claims 9, 10 and 11) We have focused, thus far, on what we view as Taylor’s strongest claims. We have also carefully reviewed the record and the briefs with respect to Taylor’s three remaining claims: that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate, develop, and present the defenses of diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication (Claims 9 and 10), and that Taylor was denied effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal (Claim 11). We adopt and affirm the District Court’s careful analysis of these claims and agree that they are without merit.