Opinion ID: 2639270
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Superior Court Applied the Correct Standard for Reviewing the CID.

Text: Tesoro contends that the superior court inappropriately reviewed the breadth and scope of the CID under a deferential prosecutorial discretion standard. [24] Tesoro argues that deference to prosecutorial discretion is not warranted because this case raises no issues of separation of powers or unique regulatory expertise. The State responds that important policy considerations support granting broad investigatory power to the attorney general and interpreting the attorney general's antitrust subpoena powers consistently with Alaska Civil Rule 26(b): [25] If the scope of the attorney general's antitrust subpoena power is any less than that allowed by Civil Rule 26(b), the attorney general will be put in the untenable position of having to decide whether to file suit first to get adequate information. The language of the statute provides the appropriate starting point for analysis. Alaska Statute 45.50.592(c)(2) provides that a CID may not contain a requirement that would be unreasonable or improper if contained in a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the state. (Emphasis added.) Civil Rule 45(b)(1), which governs subpoenas duces tecum, permits courts to void or modify the subpoena if it is unreasonable or oppressive. [26] We have not yet had an opportunity to explain in detail when a CID should be held unreasonable, improper, or oppressive. The State argues that our decision in Matanuska Maid, Inc. v. State [27] should control this analysis. There, we adopted the three requirements that federal courts use to examine CIDs: [I]t is sufficient for fourth amendment purposes that the subpoena is issued pursuant to lawful authority, relevant to the inquiry for which it is issued and contains adequate specification of the documents to be produced. [28] But in Matanuska Maid, we considered CIDs issued under AS 45.50.495 and former AS 45.50.200 [29] in light of constitutional provisions prohibiting unreasonable search and seizure. [30] The reasonableness standard set forth in Matanuska Maid therefore pertains to search and seizure, but not necessarily to the statute and Civil Rule 45. Federal courts have adopted the same standard described in Matanuska Maid for judicial review of CIDs and other administrative subpoenas as well. [31] In re Sealed Case involved a motion to compel the production of documents pursuant to an administrative subpoena duces tecum. [32] The Circuit Court for the District of Columbia applied a standard of review almost identical to the Matanuska Maid standard: Our role in a subpoena enforcement proceeding is limited to determining whether the inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the information sought is reasonably relevant. [33] Federal courts have shown deference to administrative agencies when reviewing administrative subpoenas for relevance. [34] The In re Sealed Case court explained that courts must defer to the agency's appraisal of relevancy, which must be accepted so long as it is not `obviously wrong' [35] For federal courts, an inquiry must be reasonably relevant to the general purposes of the agency's investigation. [36] The government agency may define the boundaries of the investigation quite generally. [37] When an agency claims the information sought is relevant, federal courts require the party challenging the investigation to bear the burden of demonstrating that the information sought is irrelevant. [38] This deference in establishing relevance is appropriate because [a]t the investigatory stage, the Commission does not seek information necessary to prove specific charges; it merely has a suspicion that the law is being violated in some way and wants to determine whether or not to file a complaint. [39] The deferential approach to establishing relevance is sound. It is also supported by our holding in Matanuska Maid that the respondent bears the burden of proving whether a CID is reasonable. [40] We therefore hold that when a trial court reviews a CID under AS 45.50.592, it should examine whether the subpoena is [1] issued pursuant to lawful authority, [2] relevant to the inquiry for which it is issued and [3] contains adequate specification of the documents to be produced. [41] We adopt the federal courts' deferential reasonable relevance standard to determine whether the subpoena is relevant to the inquiry for which it is issued. We disagree with Tesoro that the superior court applied a criminal law-based prosecutorial discretion standard. We look to the superior court's written decision to ascertain the standard applied. [42] That decision explained: Given the scope of the Attorney General's authority under the statute, and the deference given to agencies with statutory investigative powers, the Court finds that the CIDs are not unreasonable. This statement reflects the permissive relevance standard outlined above. We conclude that the superior court applied the correct standard of review for a CID.