Opinion ID: 3190115
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence Regarding Faye

Text: In what might be viewed as the inverse of the challenge above, Gemma also argues that the court erred in admitting evidence that he had previously prostituted and physically abused a woman named Faye. Gemma points to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), which provides that [e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character. 5Gemma alternatively asserts that, at a minimum, the district court should have reviewed the additional records in camera. But Gemma did not make that request before the district court and, for the same reasons articulated above, cannot show plain error on appeal. - 20 - This Court reviews a ruling that evidence was admitted consistent with Federal Rules of Evidence 404(b) and 403 for abuse of discretion. United States v. Moon, 802 F.3d 135, 144 (1st Cir. 2015). Only rarely--and in extraordinarily compelling circumstances--will we, from the vista of a cold appellate record, reverse a district court's on-the-spot judgment concerning the relative weighing of probative value and unfair effect. United States v. Baynard, 642 F.3d 59, 63 (1st Cir. 2011). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b), evidence of previous crimes or acts may be admitted for the purpose of proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident. In deciding whether to admit such evidence, [t]he court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence. Fed. R. Evid. 403. A critical factual dispute in this case was whether the relationship between Gemma and A.L. was that of a pimp and prostitute. Therefore, evidence that Gemma was in the prostitution business and exercised control over prostitutes other than A.L., sometimes by means of physical violence, was highly probative of Gemma's intent. See United States v. Jarrett, 956 F.2d 864, 86667 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding testimony by witnesses that defendant - 21 - approached them seeking to secure their services as prostitutes in his employ was admissible under Rule 404(b) to show knowledge and intent); United States v. Love, 449 F. App'x 338, 339-40 (5th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (holding evidence that defendant prostituted another female a year prior to crime admissible because defendant contested his intent to prostitute the victim). At trial, the district court permitted A.L. to testify that she knew Faye, that Faye was a girl who used to prostitute for Gemma, and that Gemma had an argument with Faye about prostitution and A.L. saw Gemma slap her. Unlike A.L.'s alleged prior prostitution activities, which shed relatively little light on the disputed issue of Gemma's intent, Gemma's prior acts as a pimp were highly probative of his intent in the instant case. Although Gemma contends that the introduction of this evidence carried an unacceptable risk that the jury would find him guilty because he was a bad person who deserved to be punished, we are hardly convinced that the court abused its discretion in admitting the evidence given its probative value in answering the central question of this case. To be sure, the similarity of other acts evidence simultaneously establishes its relevance and heightens the possibility that the jury will draw an unfair inference of propensity. United States v. Appolon, 715 F.3d 362, 374 (1st Cir. 2013). However, given the facts of this case and the notable similarity between the uncharged conduct and the basis - 22 - of [the defendant's] indictment, we find that the district court properly evaluated the 'risk of an improper criminal propensity inference . . . in light of the totality of the circumstances.' Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Varoudakis, 223 F.3d 113, 123 (1st Cir. 2000)).