Opinion ID: 1812470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Implied Consent to Modify Leases

Text: It is uncontroverted that Harvester did not obtain written or express consent before subletting the premises and converting it to a parking garage. The court of appeal, however, found that Illinois Central, by its silence and inaction, had impliedly assented to the sublease and altered use of the premises. The intermediate court's treatment of the issue raises the question of whether a lessor's mere silence in the face of proposals and actions contrary to the lease contract by his lessee constitutes assent to the modification of the contract. Every contract or modification of a previously concluded agreement requires the concurrence of the consent of the parties. La.C.C. arts. 1766, 1779(2), 1798. Consent results from a free and deliberate exercise of the will of each party where the intent has been mutually communicated or implied, La.C.C. art. 1819, and accepted by the party to whom a proposal is made. La.C.C. arts. 1798, 1800. Consent may be given either expressly or by implication, La.C.C. arts. 1780, 1811, but the cases in which consent is implied are particularly determined by law. La.C.C. art. 1781. According to the civil code, consent may be implied in the following instances: . . . when it is manifested by actions, even by silence or by inaction, in cases in which they can from the circumstances be supposed to mean, or by legal presumption are directed to be considered as evidence of an assent. La.C.C. art. 1811.    [W]hen [actions without words] are done under circumstances that naturally imply a consent to such contract. . . . La.C.C. art. 1816. See also, La.C.C. art. 1817. Thus, except in those instances in which the statutory law creates a legal presumption, the mere silence of an offeree should not, in principle, be considered as involving acceptance on his part. His consent can result from silence, however, when combined with other facts or acts so as to imply or indicate his consent unequivocally. 1 Civil Law Translations Aubry & Rau, Obligations, § 343, p. 307 (1965). See, Governor Claiborne Apartments, Inc. v. Attaldo, 256 La. 218, 235 So.2d 574 (1970). In cases where the law does not expressly create a legal presumption of consent from certain facts, it is left to the discretion of the judge to determine if consent is to be implied from the particular circumstances of the case. La.C.C. art. 1818; Pooler Bldg. Mats. Inc. v. Hogan, 244 So.2d 62 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971). The civil code and statutes do not provide that any legal presumption of consent shall arise from a lessor's silence and acceptance of rent. Compare, e. g., La.C.C. arts. 2295, 2688-89, 2933, 3145-46. Accordingly, the question to be resolved in this part of the case is essentially factual, i. e., whether the judge exercised sound discretion in determining that Illinois Central's consent to a modification of the lease contract was not unequivocally implied from its silence and inaction under the particular circumstances of the instant case. In his brief dictated reasons for judgment the trial judge found that there had been no showing of consent to the sublease and that Illinois Central's objections and attempts at amicable settlement negated its consent to allow the premises to be used as a parking garage. We agree with the trial judge's conclusions. There is no showing that Illinois Central unequivocally consented to modify the leases so as to permit a sublease to 1601 Poydras Corporation or to allow the operation of a parking garage on the premises. On the contrary, Illinois Central declined Harvester's proposal for such an amendment of the leases and offered instead to cancel the leases. Harvester's requests for Illinois Central's permission, followed by Harvester's alternative offer to cancel the leases for a cash payment, show that the will of the parties had not united on a modification of the leases. The acceptance of rentals and delay in filing eviction proceedings by the railroad company were not necessarily inconsistent with an intent to enforce the leases as written. Although disputed, there is evidence of record that Illinois Central had no definite knowledge until shortly before filing suit that Harvester had entered a sublease. The fact that Illinois Central, like Harvester, was a large corporation headquartered in Chicago, with extensive national real estate holdings tends to indicate that its delay was due to lack of information and inattention rather than its assent to a modification of the leases. Illinois Central presented testimony from its officers that there was never an intention to accept any modification of the contracts permitting a sublease to 1601 Poydras Corporation or the operation of a parking business on the premises. They attributed the railroad company's lengthy delay and silence to a combination of factors including changes in corporate management, the large number of leases under management, and the desire to avoid litigation. The trial judge apparently found these witnesses to be credible. Considering that he heard and saw the witnesses and that the other circumstances of the case do not unequivocally indicate that the railroad consented to a modification of the leases, we conclude that the trial judge exercised sound discretion in finding that Illinois Central's consent was not to be implied from the evidence of the case. Harvester has cited a number of decisions in support of its argument that Illinois Central condoned its violations of the lease contracts by accepting rent for many months after learning of the parking garage operation on the premises. Arms v. Rodriguez, 232 La. 951, 95 So.2d 616 (1957); Canal Realty & Improvement Co. v. Pailet, 217 La. 376, 46 So.2d 303 (1950); Trichel v. Donovan, 138 La. 985, 71 So. 130 (1916); Blanchard v. Shrimp Boats of Louisiana, Inc., 305 So.2d 748 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1974); Moore v. Bannister, 269 So.2d 291 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1972); Major v. Hall, 251 So.2d 444 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1971); Jourdan v. Randall, 190 So.2d 469 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1966). In these cases the appellate courts made factual determinations that the lessor either impliedly consented to a modification of the lease or forgave a breach of the lease. However, a factual determination relating to a party's intention or consent in a particular case, even by an appellate court, does not establish a rule of law for other cases. We interpret the authorities relied upon by Harvester as holdings based on the same legal principles as the instant opinion but reaching different results founded upon different evidentiary records. The appellate opinions in those cases, and the opinion in the instant case, should not be construed as creating legal presumptions of consent beyond those set forth in the civil code or other statutes. It is the function of the legislature to formulate new legal presumptions. The proper role of the court, in cases where statutory legal presumptions are not applicable, is to determine if consent is to be implied from the particular circumstances of the case. La.C.C. arts. 1811, 1818. Accordingly, we conclude that the court of appeal erred in reversing the trial court's finding of fact with respect to whether the lessor impliedly consented to the sublease or the change in use of the premises.