Opinion ID: 2160119
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionally-Based Privilege for Petitions to the Government for Redress of Grievances

Text: As indicated earlier, the Court of Special Appeals concluded that Novotny's brutality complaint was protected by an absolute privilege provided by the Petition Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. In so doing, the court followed the interpretation of the Petition Clause developed in its recent decisions in Sherrard v. Hull, 53 Md. App. 553, 456 A.2d 59, aff'd per curiam, 296 Md. 189, 460 A.2d 601 (1983), and Bass v. Rohr, 57 Md. App. 609, 471 A.2d 752, cert. dismissed, 301 Md. 641, 484 A.2d 275 (1984). The central issue addressed in Sherrard was whether allegedly defamatory remarks made during an open meeting of a board of county commissioners were absolutely privileged under the Petition Clause. In an opinion which we later adopted, the Court of Special Appeals carefully surveyed the relevant case law and concluded that the question of whether the petitioning privilege should be absolute or qualified had resulted in a split of authority. Following what it viewed as [t]he modern, better reasoned cases, 53 Md. App. at 572, 456 A.2d 59, the court held that remarks made by an individual in the course of petitioning for a redress of grievances before a legislative body are absolutely privileged under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. So long as the individual's comments are not part of a sham and are relevant to his petition and thus are uttered as a part of or in conjunction with it, he may not be held liable in damages for defamation. Id. at 555, 456 A.2d 59. This absolute privilege was held in Bass to extend as well to the contents of a consumer's complaint filed with the Maryland Home Improvement Commission, the administrative agency charged with the licensing of home improvement contractors. 57 Md. App. at 619-21, 471 A.2d 752. The recent decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in McDonald v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 2787, 86 L.Ed.2d 384 (1985), necessitates our reappraisal of the interpretation of the Petition Clause set forth in Sherrard and Bass. McDonald was a libel action brought by an unsuccessful candidate for the position of United States Attorney. The defendant allegedly had written several letters containing defamatory statements disparaging the candidate's performance of his duties as a Superior Court judge. Copies of the letters had been mailed to the President and other federal government officials. Although acknowledging the vital role of the right to petition in our system of self-government, the Court concluded that the framers of the Petition Clause never intended it to provide absolute immunity from defamation liability: To accept petitioner's claim of absolute immunity would elevate the Petition Clause to special First Amendment status. The Petition Clause, however, was inspired by the same ideals of liberty and democracy that gave us the freedoms to speak, publish, and assemble.... These First Amendment rights are inseparable, ... and there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional protection to statements made in a petition to the President than other First Amendment expressions. ___ U.S. at ___, 105 S.Ct. at 2791 (citations omitted). In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Supreme Court first recognized a constitutionally-mandated qualified privilege in the field of defamation law. The qualified privilege identified in New York Times, which was applied in that case to protect defamatory statements concerning the official conduct of a public official, was held to arise from the First Amendment freedoms of speech and press. 376 U.S. at 264, 84 S.Ct. at 717. The contours of this privilege have been expanded and refined in a line of subsequent Supreme Court decisions, which we have reviewed at length on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Capital-Gazette Newspapers, Inc. v. Stack, 293 Md. 528, 537-40, 445 A.2d 1038, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 989, 103 S.Ct. 344, 74 L.Ed.2d 384 (1982); Berkey v. Delia, 287 Md. 302, 314-22, 413 A.2d 170 (1980); Jacron Sales Co. v. Sindorf, 276 Md. 580, 584-94, 350 A.2d 688 (1976); A.S. Abell Co. v. Barnes, 258 Md. 56, 58-70, 265 A.2d 207 (1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 921, 91 S.Ct. 2224, 29 L.Ed.2d 700 (1971). In light of McDonald, the qualified privilege recognized in New York Times and its progeny constitutes the extent of the constitutionally-mandated protection of the First Amendment right to petition the government for redress of grievances. To the extent that they are inconsistent with McDonald and this opinion, Sherrard and Bass are no longer authoritative rulings.