Opinion ID: 2827389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: July 28 Search

Text: Long claims Officer Spargur violated the Fourth Amendment by entering the OC Store without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment protects individuals “against unreasonable searches and seizures” conducted by government officials, U.S. Const. amend. IV, and under certain circumstances, we exclude evidence obtained in violation of its strictures, see United States v. Davis, 760 F.3d 901, 903 (8th Cir. 2014). The critical issue here is “whether [Long] ha[d] ‘a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of privacy’” in the OC Store sufficient to trigger the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Long “‘has the burden of showing both a subjective expectation of privacy and that the expectation is objectively reasonable; that is, one that society is willing to accept.’ Whether [Long] had a subjective expectation of privacy is a question of fact,” which this court reviews for clear error. United States v. Perry, 548 F.3d 688, 691 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting United States v. McCaster, 193 F.3d 930, 933 (8th Cir. 1999)). Long enjoyed some expectation of privacy in the OC Store on July 28. See New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 699 (1987) (“The Court long has recognized that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to commercial premises, as well as to private homes.”); Dow Chem. Co. -7- v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986) (“Plainly a business establishment or an industrial or commercial facility enjoys certain protections under the Fourth Amendment.”).5 Even so, “[a]n expectation of privacy in commercial premises . . . is different from, and indeed less than, a similar expectation in an individual’s home,” Burger, 482 U.S. at 700, and a business owner or operator does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the portions of a business open to the public, at least during normal business hours. See Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 469 (1985) (“[R]espondent did not have any reasonable expectation of privacy in areas of the store where the public was invited to enter and to transact business. . . . The officer’s action in entering the bookstore and examining the wares that were intentionally exposed to all who frequent the place of business did not infringe a legitimate expectation of privacy.”). When a commercial property is not open to the public, a reasonable expectation of privacy may exist. See United States v. Swart, 679 F.2d 698, 701 (7th Cir. 1982) (“[T]he officers knew the business was closed. Commercial establishments do not extend an implicit invitation to enter during non-business hours or when there are no employees on the premises.”); cf. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 (1967) (holding the state cannot punish a business owner for refusing to authorize a warrantless administrative search of his commercial premises “not open to the public”). 5 Long maintains he clearly manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy in the OC Store because he also used part of the store as a dwelling. Although Long was sleeping in a back room when Officer Spargur arrived and kept a number of personal items in the back room, the district court found the OC Store was not Long’s residence. That finding was not clearly erroneous, especially as to the front of the store and concession area Officer Spargur entered—clearly a public sales area. See, e.g., United States v. Cannon, 703 F.3d 407, 413-14 (8th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing between the portions of a car dealership “open for business” and the locked back rooms used as an employee’s residence). Indeed, the testimony shows Long had a separate residence where Officer La Mons found and questioned him on August 6. -8- Here, the parties dispute whether the store was open or closed when Officer Spargur entered, and the facts plausibly could support either conclusion. The music, lights, unlocked doors, type of convenience store, and the fact that one of the juveniles claimed to have “just” bought fireworks at the store all suggested the OC Store was open. The dim lights, the initial lack of visible employees or customers, and the time of night suggested the store was closed.6 Ultimately, the burden to show a reasonable expectation of privacy is on Long. See Perry, 548 F.3d at 691. Yet Long presented no evidence of the store’s operating hours, how the store typically looked when closed, or even that the store was in fact closed when Officer Spargur entered. After reviewing the testimony, and noting the closeness of the question, the district court concluded “Long . . . failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the OC Store was closed and thus that Long had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the OC Store at the time of the entry.” “Absent a showing of clear error it is not our role to second guess the district court’s factual determinations.” Lowder v. United States, 831 F.2d 785, 787 (8th Cir. 1987). Under the circumstances existing at the time Officer Spargur entered the store, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in determining Long failed to prove the store was closed. See United States v. Almeida-Perez, 549 F.3d 1162, 1173 (8th Cir. 2008) (“[W]here there are two permissible views of the evidence, the fact-finder’s choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous.”). The district court thus did not err in concluding Long had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the public areas of the 6 Officer Spargur was not certain whether the store was open or closed, knocking and announcing his presence twice. The Fourth Amendment requires reasonableness, not certainty. -9- OC Store where the evidence was left in plain view because the store was open to the public when Officer Spargur entered. See Macon, 472 U.S. at 469.
Long challenges Officer Spargur’s subsequent search of the OC Store claiming the telephonic warrant did not conform with tribal and federal law because, among other things, the warrant itself was never read to Judge Miner and the telephone conversation was not recorded. The district court refused to suppress evidence obtained during the post-warrant search of the store however, concluding the goodfaith exception articulated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), protected Officer Spargur’s actions. We review the application of the good-faith exception de novo. See United States v. Jackson, 784 F.3d 1227, 1231 (8th Cir. 2015). Assuming, without deciding, the warrant was deficient, we agree with the district court that the Leon good-faith exception applies. Under the good-faith exception, evidence is not excluded “‘when an officer acting with objective good faith has obtained a search warrant from a judge or magistrate and acted within its scope,’ even if the warrant is subsequently invalidated.” Cannon, 703 F.3d at 412 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920). We have recognized four circumstances that preclude a finding of good faith: “(1) when the affidavit or testimony supporting the warrant contained a false statement made knowingly and intentionally or with reckless disregard for its truth, thus misleading the issuing judge; (2) when the issuing judge wholly abandoned his judicial role in issuing the warrant; (3) when the affidavit in support of the warrant is so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable; and (4) when the warrant is so facially deficient that no police officer could reasonably presume the warrant to be valid.” -10- Id. (quoting United States v. Fiorito, 640 F.3d 338, 345 (8th Cir. 2011)). In evaluating a search under Leon, we “must look at the objectively ascertainable question of whether a reasonably well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite a judge’s issuance of the warrant.” Jackson, 784 F.3d at 1231. Long first claims Judge Miner’s personal biases led her to “wholly abandon[] her judicial role.” In addition to being a tribal judge, Judge Miner was also a member of a tribal judicial committee involved in promoting legislation that criminalized synthetic marijuana on the reservation. Judge Miner also routinely included as a condition of release for arrestees released on bond, “Defendant shall not enter OC Novelties or any other business where synthetic marijuana or synthetic stimulants are sold, offered for sale or possessed.” Long thus claims Judge Miner was not a neutral magistrate because she had “actively lobbied” for the passage of the resolution outlawing synthetic marijuana and had already made “the determination that the OC Store was selling synthetic drugs.” We have explained that a judge abandons her judicial role when she “does not serve as a neutral and detached actor, but rather as a ‘rubber stamp for the police’ and ‘an adjunct law enforcement officer.’” United States v. Carpenter, 341 F.3d 666, 670 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 914). Judge Miner testified at length about her role on the judicial committee and her prior knowledge of Long and the OC Store. Based on this testimony, the district court concluded Judge Miner was not a strident proponent of synthetic marijuana prosecution, nor was she biased against Long. The district court also credited Judge Miner’s testimony, finding “she issued the warrant solely on the information contained in the affidavit and not on a preconceived notion of Long’s guilt,” and we will not disturb that credibility finding. See United States v. Robbins, 682 F.3d 1111, 1115 (8th Cir. 2012) (explaining “‘credibility findings are -11- well-nigh unreviewable’” on appeal (quoting United States v. Jones, 254 F.3d 692, 695 (8th Cir. 2001))). We further agree with the district court that Judge Miner’s knowledge of and involvement in the small tribal community is not the type of conduct that constitutes abandoning her role as a neutral and detached magistrate. See United States v. Heffington, 952 F.2d 275, 279 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing “to disqualify small-town judges on demand” merely because “judges and police officers in rural counties often know more about the local criminal recidivists [than do] their more urban colleagues”); see also, e.g., United States v. Scroggins, 361 F.3d 1075, 1084 (8th Cir. 2004) (declaring a judge abandons her neutral role when she is so involved in the issuance of a search warrant she “essentially becom[es] a police officer in a robe”). Long also asserts Judge Miner “wholly abandoned her judicial role” by failing to have Officer Spargur read her the full text of the search warrant. Assuming the warrant was not read, this failure does not suggest Judge Miner “acted as a rubber stamp” for law enforcement. United States v. Decker, 956 F.2d 773, 777 (8th Cir. 1992) (affirming the lower court’s conclusion that a judge abandoned his judicial role because the judge did not read the warrant and “failed to note both that the prosecutor had not signed the warrant and that the warrant did not list the property to be seized” (footnote omitted)). Here, Officer Spargur read Judge Miner the application and affidavit—portions of which are reproduced in the warrant itself—and Judge Miner testified she would have questioned Officer Spargur if the information he provided was not sufficient. Long does not dispute that Judge Miner was given enough information to establish probable cause to search, nor does he contend Judge Miner or Officer Spargur acted in bad faith. Under these circumstances, any failure to have Officer Spargur read the full text of the warrant was not a departure from Judge Miner’s neutral judicial role. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 916 (“[T]he exclusionary rule is -12- designed to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges and magistrates.”). Finally, Long asserts Leon’s good-faith exception does not apply because the procedure used to obtain the warrant was so deficient no reasonable officer would have relied on the warrant. Officer Spargur read Judge Miner the application and “the meat” of the affidavit verbatim, giving Judge Miner enough information to establish probable cause to search, and at the end of the long conversation Judge Miner approved the warrant. Officer Spargur was reasonable in believing the warrant was valid. See United States v. Stonerook, 134 F. App’x 982, 983-84 (8th Cir. 2005) (unpublished per curiam) (affirming the denial of a motion to suppress evidence obtained through a telephonic warrant and rejecting the defendant’s claim “that no reasonable police officer could have relied in good faith on the validity of [a] search warrant” issued in violation of state “law regarding telephonic search warrants”); United States v. Hessman, 369 F.3d 1016, 1018, 1022-23 (8th Cir. 2004) (applying the good-faith exception to a technically deficient warrant obtained by fax); United States v. Richardson, 943 F.2d 547, 548, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1991) (refusing to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a telephonic warrant that had not met all requirements).
Long also challenges the officers’ search of the Blazer parked in the OC Store’s public parking lot. “Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously.” United States v. Barragan, 379 F.3d 524, 529 (8th Cir. 2004). “To mount a successful motion to suppress, an accused must first establish that he personally has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the object that was searched.” United States v. Stringer, 739 F.3d 391, 396 (8th Cir. 2014). Long admits he did not own the Blazer, and Long has provided no evidence suggesting he had any constitutionally protected connection to the vehicle or its contents. See, e.g., United States v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609 (8th Cir. 2010) (deciding a defendant who -13- “neither owned nor drove the [searched vehicle] and was only an occasional passenger therein” could not challenge the search of the vehicle). Long thus has shown no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Blazer and cannot now contest the search of the vehicle. See id. But Long proposes the officers violated his reasonable expectation of privacy in searching the Blazer because the vehicle was parked in what he describes as his business’s curtilage. We are not convinced. Cf. United States v. Reed, 733 F.2d 492, 501 (8th Cir. 1984) (concluding defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the “open back parking lot” of his business). Long cites no authority for the proposition that a business owner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in all the vehicles parked in his store’s public parking lot. Thus, Long had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the Blazer and cannot challenge its search.