Opinion ID: 1684647
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Thomason Affidavit

Text: Marshall next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to take Debra Thomason's testimony, requiring Marshall to file a successive motion for postconviction relief, and failing to expand the scope of the inquiry of the former jurors. Just as the trial court's conduct of juror interviews is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, the trial court's denial of Marshall's emergency motion to add Debra Thomason as a witness is subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review. See, e.g., Boyd, 910 So.2d at 178; Maler, 579 So.2d at 101; Shere, 579 So.2d at 94-95; cf. Way v. State, 760 So.2d 903, 916 (Fla.2000) (finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the testimony of witnesses was beyond the scope of the remand). Likewise, the trial court's failure to expand the scope of the inquiry of the remaining jurors based on the allegations in Debra Thomason's affidavit is also subject to an abuse of discretion standard of review, as is the trial court's determination that Marshall should file a successive motion for postconviction relief. Cf. Arbelaez v. State, 898 So.2d 25, 42-43 (Fla.2005) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion a trial court's rejection of a supplemental motion filed after an evidentiary hearing held on remand but before a ruling, because the motion raised arguments beyond the scope of this Court's remand); Huff v. State, 762 So.2d 476, 481 (Fla.2000) (stating that the standard of review for a trial court's determination regarding a motion to amend a postconviction motion is whether there was an abuse of discretion). We conclude that the trial court's refusal to take Debra Thomason's testimony at the May 19, 2004, hearing was not an abuse of discretion. The scope of the hearing was not just limited by the type of misconduct alleged in the Smith affidavit, it was also expressly limited by this Court's cautionary directions in Marshall II. As discussed above, we explicitly instructed the trial court that [t]he scope of the hearing on remand is limited to attempting to obtain the identity of the female juror who spoke to Mr. Smith, to interview that juror, and then to conduct further interviews only if the court determines that there is a reasonable probability of juror misconduct. Marshall II, 854 So.2d at 1253. The Thomason affidavit did not relate to the identity of the juror who contacted Ronald Smith but rather raised a separate issue of possible juror misconduct. In denying Marshall's motion, the trial court expressed concern about adhering to this Court's instructions about the scope of the hearing on remand. In light of our explicit instructions, we conclude the trial court's decision to restrict the hearing to finding that juror was not an abuse of discretion. Similarly, given this Court's explicit limitation about the scope of the hearing on remand, we conclude the trial court's attempt to adhere to our mandate by requiring Marshall to file a successive motion raising a new and separate issue of alleged juror misconduct was not an abuse of discretion. See Arbelaez, 898 So.2d at 42-43. We note the trial court did conduct a hearing on the new claim and questioned juror Thomason about the allegations in Debra Thomason's affidavit. Further, we find no error in the trial court's resolution of this claim given juror Thomason's responses to the court's questions and the absence of any other evidence to sustain the claim. Of course, the trial court could not have reasonably anticipated that Debra Thomason would die before a hearing on the successive motion could be held. Finally, we conclude the trial court's failure to expand the scope of the inquiry of the other former jurors to include the Thomason claim was not an abuse of discretion. Marshall argues that the court should have expanded the scope of the inquiry of the former jurors based on the allegations in Debra Thomason's affidavit. Significantly, Marshall did not seek to interview jurors, other than Coy Thomason, about the allegations contained in Debra Thomason's affidavit. Moreover, the Thomason affidavit did not explicitly allege that Coy Thomason spoke with other jurors about the media reports, prematurely deliberated Marshall's guilt with other jurors, brought articles into the jury room, or discussed any racial matters with other jurors. Finally, as we have repeatedly noted, the trial court's actions were specifically limited by this Court's directions on remand. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to take Debra Thomason's testimony, in requiring Marshall to file a successive motion for postconviction relief, and in not expanding the scope of the inquiry of the former jurors.