Opinion ID: 2806120
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Force Offense Prong

Text: In Herrera–Alvarez, this Court held that a Louisiana conviction for aggravated battery qualifies as a crime of violence under the force offense prong of § 2L1.2, but only if the offense can be narrowed to exclude the poison alternative. See 753 F.3d at 139, 141. We first observed that § 14:34 is disjunctive because it “in effect criminalizes two distinct offenses—an aggravated battery committed by the intentional administration of poison or other noxious liquid or substance and an aggravated battery committed by 5 Case: 14-40321 Document: 00513069071 Page: 6 Date Filed: 06/05/2015 No. 14-40321 the intentional use of force or violence upon the person of another.” Id. at 140. Next, we reasoned that because the “force” required to make an offense a crime of violence under the force offense prong of § 2L1.2 is “synonymous with destructive or violent force,” id. at 138 (quoting United States v. Dominguez, 479 F.3d 345, 348 (5th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted), the administration of poison “does not necessarily entail the use of physical force” contemplated by § 2L1.2, id. at 139. As a result, we concluded that if § 14:34 could not be narrowed to exclude the possibility of an aggravated battery committed with poison, then a conviction for that offense could not qualify for the enhancement as a force offense. See id. at 139, 141. Because the record in that case contained a charging instrument—a Shepardcompliant document—reflecting that the defendant had committed the offense using a knife, we were able to rule out the poison alternative and in turn conclude that the conviction comprised a force offense. Id. at 140–41. Critically, this disposition enabled us to reserve judgment on the Government’s alternative enumerated offense argument. Id. at 142 n.5. The parties here agree that there are no Shepard-compliant documents to identify the subpart of the statute that formed the basis of Hernandez– Rodriguez’s conviction. Accordingly, unlike in Herrera–Alvarez, we cannot exclude the possibility that Hernandez–Rodriguez’s conviction was based on the administration-of-poison alternative within § 14:34—“the least culpable act” to violate the statute, Gonzalez–Ramirez, 477 F.3d at 316—and Hernandez–Rodriguez’s conviction thus cannot satisfy the force offense prong.