Opinion ID: 2801462
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Weapon and Coconspirator Enhancements

Text: Finally, Boykin argues that the district court erred by applying a two-level enhancement for firearm possession. This Court reviews for clear error the district court’s factual determination that the firearm enhancement in U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) applies. United States v. Kelso, 942 F.2d 680, 681 (9th Cir. 1991). The defendant argues the district court never connected him to the handgun. However, Boykin misinterprets both the enhancement and his burden. The two-level sentencing adjustment is appropriate “unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 n. 3 (2010). The government “must prove possession by a preponderance of the evidence before the court can apply the two-level increase under § 2D1.1(b)(1).” United States v. Cazares, 121 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 350 (5th Cir. 1993)). This Court has defined “possession” broadly. United States v. Pitts, 6 F.3d 1366, 1372 (9th Cir. 1993). “To demonstrate constructive possession the government must prove ‘a sufficient connection between the defendant and the contraband to support the inference that the defendant exercised dominion and control over the [contraband].’” Kelso, 942 F.2d at 682 (quoting United States v. Disla, 805 F.2d 1340, 1350 (9th Cir. 1986)). Where a defendant is convicted of conspiracy, the firearm enhancement can be UNITED STATES V. BOYKIN 21 based on all of the offense conduct, not just the crime of conviction. United States v. Willard, 919 F.2d 606, 610 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 872 (1991). Here, agents recovered several firearms from the residence at 251 Wilbur Avenue, including a sawed-off shotgun with Boykin’s fingerprints. The evidence showed Boykin engaged in numerous drug transactions at 251 Wilbur Avenue. Thus, the court did not clearly err by finding Boykin possessed a weapon connected with the offense. See Pitts, 6 F.3d at 1372. Boykin also argues the district court failed to make a proper individualized assessment of his relevant conduct in the conspiracy. He argues his tenuous connection with the transaction of February 9, 2007 made that drug quantity unforeseeable to him. For reasons already discussed, the evidence was sufficient to convict Boykin of aiding and abetting the transaction of February 9, 2007. Therefore, the drug quantity attributed to him was foreseeable. See Willard, 919 F.2d at 610. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the sentence imposed by the district court.9 AFFIRMED. 9 Because Boykin may move the district court for relief under Amendment 782 to the Guidelines, the Court declines to remand the case on those grounds. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).