Opinion ID: 1779414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Hales's Testimony

Text: ¶ 16. The issue raised on appeal that merits reversal is the trial court's decision to strike the video-taped testimony of the defense's toxicologist, Shan Hales. Not only was the trial court's reasoning to strike the testimony flawed, the denial of the toxicologist's testimony constitutes reversible error as Hales's testimony is central to the entire case. ¶ 17. On appeal, Myles does not dispute that Jarrod's BAC was .11% nor does she contest how the blood and fluids were drawn. In fact, Myles heavily relies on GM's exhibit GM-4, the Mississippi Crime Laboratory report, which tested Jarrod's BAC level and determined that Jarrod's BAC was .11% to support the exclusion of Hales's videotape testimony. The exhibit contained the toxicology report prepared by Hales. [5] [6] On appeal, Myles states in her brief that, [t]he trial court appropriately determined since the report of Mr. Myles stating his blood alcohol level was .11% and the drug Cylert was not in Mr. Myles['s] system [was admitted into evidence], the [testimony of the] Defendant's toxicologist will not [be] of any assistance to the jury. Myles further states in her brief that the [trial] court subsequently struck Mr. Hales's testimony in its entirety because Mr. Hales could only testify to what was in his toxicological report, and since the report had already been admitted into evidence, the testimony of Mr. Hales would have been cumulative. ¶ 18. At trial, Hales was not challenged for lack of qualifications as an expert. Hales testified that he was employed at the Mississippi Crime Laboratory as a forensic toxicologist. Hales stated that he had testified in court approximately 30 times. ¶ 19. Instead of challenging Hales's qualifications, Myles argued, and the trial court agreed, that Hales's opinions were not offered in the proper form, to a reasonable degree of probability. Hales examined Jarrod's blood and vitreous fluid for the presence of alcohol. [7] The blood and vitreous fluid contained .11% ethyl alcohol. The National Medical Service, routinely used by the crime lab, prepared a report finding the presence of ethyl alcohol at a level of 108 milligrams per deciliter or the equivalent of a BAC of 0.10 percent. [8] ¶ 20. Jarrod's blood was also tested for the presence of any drugs by the National Medical Service which did not detect any drugs other than ethyl alcohol. Hales testified that the drug screen would have detected the presence of the drug Cylert or Pemoline. Therefore, the National Medical Service's test did not detect any narcolepsy medication. However, Hales's testimony was challenged for not stating his opinion as to the effect of the BAC level and the lack of Cylert in Jarrod's system on whether that caused or contributed to the accident. The trial court struck the entire testimony based on the challenge. ¶ 21. The trial court's reasoning is flawed. While Hales's response did not used the words within a reasonable degree of probability, the question proposed to Hales was phrased in that form. ¶ 22. When deposed by GM's attorney as to the effect of the consumption of alcohol in connection with also suffering from the condition of narcolepsy on a person's driving ability, the record reflects: Mr. Berry: If you would, do you know what the effects of an alcohol level in the blood of greater than .10 would have on the driving ability of an individual? Mr. Hales: Yes, I do. Mr. Berry: All right. If you would explain that to us. Mr. Hales: Any individual with a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or greater would have impaired judgement. They would also have impaired decision making ability. They would have impaired divided attention abilities, which is the ability to do more than one task at one time, which is what is required when driving a motor vehicle. They would also have increased reaction time. In other words, it would take them longer to react to a stimulus. Mr. Berry: Do you know whether a lack of sleep could have an affect on a person's driving ability if they had consumed alcohol in excess of the legal limit? Mr. Hales: If an individual had experienced a lack of sleep, they could possible already be impaired in their ability to drive simply due to their loss of sleep. That, in addition to a blood alcohol concentration of .10 percent or greater, would definitely add to the degree of impairment of an individual. Mr. Berry: What about a person who suffers from the condition of narcolepsy? If they had consumed alcohol in excess of the legal limit, what affect would that have on their driving ability? Mr. Hales: In my opinion it would probably also be exacerbated by the presence of .10 percent or greater blood alcohol. As with a lack of sleep a tendency to fall asleep or the presence of a condition such as narcolepsy, that would also add to the degree of impairment. (emphasis added). ¶ 23. However, on cross-examination by Myles's attorney, Hales again testified as to his opinion regarding whether an individual with a BAC of .11% would have a possible impairment that would contribute to an accident. In phrasing the question, Myles's attorney asked for Hales's opinion within a reasonable degree of probability. In fact, the record reflects: Mr. Northington: Do you have an opinion as to whether the blood alcohol content of Jarrod Myles that you found had any relationship to the accident that he was involved in October 3, 1998? Mr. Hales: It's my opinion that an individual with this blood alcohol concentration would be impaired, and that it would certainly be possible that that impairment would contribute to an accident. Mr. Northington: But to a reasonable degree of probability, do you have an opinion as to whether it is related to the accident? Mr. Hales: It's my opinion that if an accident occurred and an individual had a blood alcohol concentration of.11 that, yes, the alcohol would be a contributing factor to the accident. (emphasis added). ¶ 24. M.R.E. 702 provides for the admission of testimony by experts, stating: If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case. ¶ 25. The admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Whitten v. Cox, 799 So.2d 1, 13 (Miss.2000). Where error involves the admission or exclusion of evidence, this Court `will not reverse unless the error adversely affects a substantial right of a party.' Id. at 13 (citing Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 749 So.2d 110, 113 (Miss. 1999)). ¶ 26. As previously stated, Hales's testimony was not challenged for lack of qualifications as an expert or his expertise to give his opinion. This Court has addressed the use of a toxicologist's testimony concerning causation. Thompson v. Carter, 518 So.2d 609, 613-14 (Miss.1987). ¶ 27. In Thompson, Michael Hughes was offered as an expert witness in the fields of pharmacology and toxicology. Id. at 613. The issue raised was whether Hughes's proffered testimony should have been admitted concerning causation or the medical standard of care with respect to use and administration of drugs despite the fact that he did not possess a medical degree. Id. at 614. In reaching its decision, the Court relied on Sonford Products Corp. v. Freels, 495 So.2d 468 (Miss.1986), overruled on other grounds, Bickham v. Dep't of Mental Health, 592 So.2d 96 (Miss.1991). In Sonford, the Court recognized that medical causation is no more than causation in fact. 495 So.2d at 472. ¶ 28. In applying the Sonford rationale, the Court held that, [a] pharmacology/toxicologist would be at least equally competent to testify concerning what effect a certain drug would have on the human body. Thompson, 518 So.2d at 613-14. The Court further found that Hughes was also qualified to deliver expert testimony, notwithstanding his lack of a medical degree, on the issue of a physician's standard of care in the use and administration of this drug. Id. at 615. ¶ 29. Likewise, in O'Neal v. Roche Biomedical Laboratories, Inc., 805 So.2d 551, 552 (Miss.Ct.App.2000), Michael Weaver, a toxicologist at the Mississippi State Crime Laboratory, provided testimony that the decedent has a blood alcohol level of 0.26% and the effect that would have on the decedent's abilities. Weaver testified that the decedent's ability to walk, see and perceive things around him would have been significantly diminished by his intoxication. Id. While the court did not address Weaver's testimony as an issue, the court discussed Weaver's testimony in connection with the issue addressed by the court of whether or not the trial court erred in failing to give a jury instruction for a specific form of a verdict in a comparative negligence case. Id. at 554. ¶ 30. In the case sub judice, the trial court's decision to exclude and strike Hales's entire testimony requires reversal and remand. Hales's testimony was crucial to GM's theory of defense at trial and critical to GM's central disputes as to how the accident occurred and what caused the accident and Jarrod's resulting fatal injuries. ¶ 31. This Court has held that it constitutes reversible error to restrict an expert's testimony about the main issue in the case. Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Lumpkin, 725 So.2d 721, 733-34 (Miss. 1998). In Lumpkin, a case involving a negligence action brought by the mother, Leslie Lumpkin, of the passenger, Kristen Black, against the utility company and the driver of the vehicle, Randy Tackett, that struck the utility pole. Id. at 722. The Court was faced with the trial court exclusion of MP & L's expert witness's, Bob Marsh, testimony. Id. at 733. MP & L tendered and the trial court accepted Marsh as an expert in the field of engineering. Id. Marsh testified that the power line in question, in his opinion, met the National Electrical Safety Code. Id. at 726. However, Lumpkin's attorney objected, as follows, to the questioning of March as to his opinion as being a discovery violation: Q. Do you have an opinion as to whether or not prior to November 23rd, 1989, it was reasonablyfrom an engineering standpoint, it was reasonably foreseeable that an out-of-control vehicle would strike this pole? MR. LISTON: We object, Your Honor. That's not one of the opinions that this witness said to have in the discovery. Id. at 733. ¶ 32. The trial court sustained Lumpkin's objection, and MP & L made its proffer to the trial court. This Court found that the trial court committed reversible error, stating: Foreseeability was clearly the main issue in the case about which Lumpkin was prepared to and did offer expert testimony. There was no time needed for further preparation. Lumpkin does not even claim actual surprise or prejudice if this testimony was admitted. Under these circumstances it is a clear abuse of discretion to exclude the testimony. This error requires reversal. Id. at 734 (emphasis added). ¶ 33. Therefore, we find that here the trial court erred in excluding and striking Hales's entire videotape testimony. Exclusion of Hales's testimony constitutes reversible error. Hales's opinion and testimony regarding Jarrod's intoxication and lack of the prescription drug Cylert and the effect on causing or contributing to Jarrod's accident is crucial to the main issue and central to GM's defense.