Opinion ID: 1543739
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: career criminal program

Text: Appellant first contends, generally, that he was denied due process and equal protection of the laws by the inclusion of his case in Philadelphia's Career Criminal Program. In addition to his general challenge to the program, appellant contends specifically that the program improperly interfered with his right to a non-jury trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101, and that the Commonwealth failed to establish that his case was appropriate for inclusion in the program.
Appellant's general challenge to career criminal programs is vague and conclusory. He argues that programs such as Philadelphia's, which involve not only the special allocation of prosecutorial resources but also the designation of certain common pleas court judges to hear career criminal cases, should have no place in the administration of criminal justice. (Appellant's Brief at 61). We find no reason to reconsider, as appellant requests, the numerous prior decisions of this Court rejecting various constitutional challenges to Philadelphia's Career Criminal Program. See Commonwealth v. Barnes, 388 Pa.Super. 327, 565 A.2d 777 (1989); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 388 Pa.Super. 271, 565 A.2d 481 (1989); Commonwealth v. Vinson, 361 Pa.Super. 526, 522 A.2d 1155 (1987); Commonwealth v. Stinnett, 356 Pa.Super. 83, 514 A.2d 154 (1986); Commonwealth v. Carter, 347 Pa.Super. 624, 501 A.2d 250 (1985), allocatur denied 517 Pa. 591, 535 A.2d 81 (1987); Commonwealth v. Kellum, 339 Pa.Super. 513, 489 A.2d 758 (1985); Commonwealth v. Hailey, 332 Pa.Super. 167, 480 A.2d 1240 (1984).
Appellant also contends more specifically that the assignments of his case to the career criminal program infringed upon his right to a non-jury trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Goodman, 454 Pa. 358, 311 A.2d 652 (1973) and Commonwealth v. Jones, 259 Pa.Super. 103, 393 A.2d 737 (1978), in support of his argument that recusal must be granted if the trial judge becomes aware of inadmissible evidence of prior convictions or other seriously prejudicial evidence during pre-trial proceedings. Appellant concludes that assignment of career criminal cases to particular judges improperly infringes upon his qualified right to a non-jury trial pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101 as set forth in Commonwealth v. Sorrell, 500 Pa. 355, 456 A.2d 1326 (1982), by making him choose between a jury trial and a bench trial before a judge tainted with knowledge of his prior record via the fact of his inclusion in the career criminal program. [1] This contention has been fully addressed and unequivocally rejected previously. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, supra, 565 A.2d at 483; Commonwealth v. Stinnett, supra, 514 A.2d at 161; Commonwealth v. Carter, supra, 501 A.2d at 252-53; Commonwealth v. Kellum, supra, 489 A.2d at 759-61 & nn. 1-3; Commonwealth v. Hailey, supra, 480 A.2d at 1243. The only possible distinction between those cases and this, is that here appellant's entire prior criminal record consisted of juvenile delinquency adjudications which ordinarily could not be used for impeachment purposes at trial. See Commonwealth v. Case, 322 Pa.Super. 24, 469 A.2d 162 (1983), aff'd 513 Pa. 299, 520 A.2d 1373 (1987) ( per curiam ). This factual distinction does not compel a different result. A party seeking recusal of the trial judge bears the burden of establishing the grounds for recusal. Commonwealth v. Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. 514, 522, 513 A.2d 1041, 1044 (1986). Participation of the trial judge in an earlier stage of proceedings or in a separate matter involving the same defendant does not, by itself, establish grounds for recusal. Commonwealth v. Sirbaugh, 347 Pa.Super. 154, 167, 500 A.2d 453, 459 (1985). Even the fact that the trial judge may have been made aware of improper evidence does not require recusal; because, a trial judge is presumed to be capable of disregarding improper evidence, including evidence of prior criminal acts. Commonwealth v. Davis, 491 Pa. 363, 371-72, 421 A.2d 179, 183 (1980); Commonwealth v. Stinnett, supra, 514 A.2d at 161; Commonwealth v. Carter, supra, 501 A.2d at 252-53. It is only when the evidence brought to the attention of the trial court is both inadmissible and highly prejudicial that recusal may be required. Commonwealth v. Lewis, 314 Pa.Super. 298, 303-04, 460 A.2d 1149, 1151-52 (1983). This Court has held on several occasions that, absent exceptional circumstances, a trial court must grant a recusal motion following the withdrawal of a guilty plea. Commonwealth v. Simmons, 335 Pa.Super. 57, 483 A.2d 953 (1984) (collecting cases); Commonwealth v. Casella, 312 Pa.Super. 375, 458 A.2d 1007 (1983) (illustrating exceptional circumstances). Similarly, this Court held in Commonwealth v. Jones, supra , that a new trial was required based upon the specific prejudice arising from particular inferences which the trial court expressly drew from inadmissible prior conviction evidence considered by the trial court. 393 A.2d at 740. However, broader statements in Goodman and Jones, suggesting the desirability or propriety of recusal in cases not involving a risk of specific prejudice, are plainly dicta which has not been followed in subsequent cases where the issue was squarely presented. See Commonwealth v. Davis, supra ; Commonwealth v. Stinnett, supra . Thus, despite reservations regarding the potential for prejudice in circumstances like those presented in Simmons and Jones, there is still a strong presumption that a trial judge will ordinarily be capable of ignoring inadmissible evidence. See generally Commonwealth v. Batty, 482 Pa. 173, 178, 393 A.2d 435, 438 (1978) (explaining the rationale for this presumption). Moreover, in Commonwealth v. Sorrell, supra , our Supreme Court affirmed, as being within the sound discretion of the trial court, the trial court's decision to deny defendant Smith's motion for a non-jury trial based upon the fact that the trial court doubted its own impartiality following its exposure to the defendant's prior record during pre-trial proceedings. 456 A.2d at 1329. If, as appellant argues, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101 was intended to confer a right to a non-jury trial before a trial judge free from any possible taint arising from knowledge of the defendant's prior record, then the appropriate course would have been for the trial court to recuse itself rather than to deny the motion for a non-jury trial. Our Supreme Court's approval of the denial of the motion for a non-jury trial under those circumstances exposes the fundamental flaw in appellant's contention. Succinctly, there was no right to a non-jury trial with which the career criminal program could improperly interfere. See Commonwealth v. Hailey, supra, 480 A.2d at 1242-43.
Finally, appellant contends that even if the program itself is constitutional, the assignment of his case to the program was not, as the prosecution failed to establish that his case properly fell within the program selection criteria. Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Sorrell, supra , and Commonwealth v. Carter, supra , in support of his argument that the Commonwealth is required to disclose the specific selection criteria applicable to the program and must establish that the case meets those criteria whenever a defendant challenges the assignment of his or her case to the program. We cannot agree. Initially, we note and reemphasize this Court's previous declaration that an accused has no substantive right in the less aggressive prosecutorial effort which is commonly afforded criminal defendants not prosecuted under career criminal programs. Commonwealth v. Stinnett, supra, 514 A.2d at 160. Appellants prosecuted under the program retain the right to be heard by themselves and counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against them, to meet the witnesses face to face, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in their favor, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of their peers. They cannot be compelled to give evidence against themselves, nor can they be deprived of life, liberty or property, unless by the judgment of their peers or the law of the land. Pa. Const.Art. 1, sec. 9. None of these rights are in the least encroached upon by career criminal programs, nor has appellant asserted any such encroachment. Indeed, by reducing unnecessary continuances and ensuring accelerated and enhanced prosecutorial preparation, the assignment of a case to the career criminal program provides added protection to the accused's speedy trial right, which crowded dockets and logistical difficulties often deny other criminal cases. Rather, appellant's constitutional challenge sounds solely under equal protection grounds, and presents no substantive or procedural due process challenge. Appellant's criminal record speaks for itself. On June 24, 1983, appellant was adjudicated delinquent on charges of burglary, criminal trespass and conspiracy. In November 1983, appellant was adjudicated delinquent on charges of burglary, theft, criminal trespass and conspiracy. In both instances he received probation. On October 26, 1984, appellant was adjudicated delinquent on charges of robbery, aggravated assault, reckless endangerment, terroristic threats and conspiracy. He was then referred to the juvenile facility at Glen Mills. On March 26, 1985, appellant was adjudicated delinquent on charges of robbery, aggravated assault, theft, and terroristic threats. He was again referred to the Glen Mills facility. Twenty-eight days after his release from the Glen Mills facility, appellant committed the instant armed robbery offense. Thus, in the two year period preceding this offense, appellant was adjudicated delinquent on charges involving serious criminal offenses four times. Despite appellant's claim at sentencing that he had been railroaded, and his incredible assertion that despite his juvenile record he was a typical teenager (N.T. 1/11/88 at 46-47), there can be little doubt that the label career criminal aptly fits appellant, notwithstanding his youth. [2] In Commonwealth v. Sorrell, supra , our Supreme Court contrasted Pa.R.Crim.P. 1101 and its provision for an impartial judicial determination as to whether a non-jury trial should be permitted, with 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104(c) which vested discretion in the prosecution as to whether a non-jury trial would be permitted without any provision for accountability, i.e. without requiring disclosure of the reasons for denial on the record. 456 A.2d at 1329. This comparison was intended to demonstrate our Supreme Court's reason for promulgating a procedural rule which denied prosecutors the equivalent of a veto power over non-jury trials which 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104(c) purported to convey. In Commonwealth v. Carter, supra , a panel of this Court expressed its belief that the policy of Sorrell mandates that the District Attorney be accountable in administering this [career criminal] program. 501 A.2d at 253. (Emphasis in original). The panel further stated: Although appellant has not argued this issue on appeal, inherent in our holding is the requirement that the prosecutor exercise good faith in assigning to the program only those defendants who truly fit the criteria for inclusion, and that the criteria be reasonably adapted to effectuate the stated policy of more effectively prosecuting recidivists. It is imperative that the District Attorney not be permitted to administer this program capriciously, lest Sorrell's policy against prosecutorial unaccountability be undermined. 501 A.2d at 253-54. (Emphasis added). Though plainly dicta, we agree that the constitutional mandates of due process and equal protection preclude capricious or discriminatory administration of the career criminal program. However, we find no basis for appellant's assertion that accountability interests discussed in Sorrell and Carter require that we impose a burden of proof upon the prosecution to establish that appellant's inclusion in the program was not capricious or discriminatory whenever a defendant challenges the inclusion of his or her case in the program. Cf. Commonwealth v. Simmons, supra, 565 A.2d at 486-487. (Beck, J., concurring). Ordinarily, a party challenging prosecutorial conduct as capricious or discriminatory bears the burden of establishing the capricious or discriminatory nature of the act challenged. See Commonwealth v. Covert, 322 Pa.Super. 192, 469 A.2d 248 (1983). In cases where the discretionary or confidential nature of the act challenged has prevented direct proof of the alleged capricious or discriminatory nature of the act, a preliminary showing establishing a likelihood that the act may have been capricious or discriminatory has been required before the prosecution was required to provide a justification for its action on the record. See e.g. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) (alleged discriminatory use of peremptory challenges); Texas v. McCullough, 475 U.S. 134, 106 S.Ct. 976, 89 L.Ed.2d 104 (1986) (alleged prosecutorial vindictiveness); Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 98 S.Ct. 2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978) (alleged impropriety regarding use of confidential informants to support warrant applications); see also Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 519 Pa. 236, 546 A.2d 1101 (1988); Commonwealth v. Miller, 513 Pa. 118, 518 A.2d 1187 (1986); Commonwealth v. Rocco, 375 Pa.Super. 330, 544 A.2d 496 (1988). When the preliminary showing is made, a response must be made in rebuttal; nonetheless, when a response is made, the ultimate and dispositive question remains whether caprice or discrimination was established, and the burden of persuasion rests on the party asserting misconduct. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 98 & nn. 20-21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724 & nn. 20-21, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88-89 & nn. 20-21; cf. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-58, 101 S.Ct. 1089, 1091-1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 207, 215-17 (1981); Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corporation v. Commonwealth, Human Relations Commission, 516 Pa. 124, 129-31, 532 A.2d 315, 317-18 (1987). Here, appellant contends that his conviction must be reversed because the Commonwealth failed to prove that the inclusion of his case in the career criminal program was not unconstitutional. We reject appellant's allocation of a burden of production and the ultimate burden of proof on the Commonwealth. Rather, appellant's claim must fail as appellant has failed to establish even a preliminary showing that the inclusion of his case in the program was likely to have been capricious or discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional. To the contrary, the record plainly reveals that the assignment of appellant's case to the career criminal program was neither capricious nor discriminatory. Appellant argues specifically that because his delinquency adjudications did not meet the assignment criteria last publically announced for the Philadelphia Career Criminal Program in 1983, the inclusion of his case in the program must be deemed capricious. This contention rests upon two erroneous assumptions, i.e. that the selection criteria could only be altered by a publicly announced revision to the program, and that the selection criteria must be narrowly construed. We reject both of those assumptions. The career criminal program model designed by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (and adopted in Philadelphia) [3] was designed to meet different needs in different communities through (among other things) variation in the selection criteria. See generally Gay, Targeting Law Enforcement Resources: The Career Criminal Focus, at 25-30 (U.S.Dept.Just., NIJ 1985) (discussing policy and administrative aspects of the choice of selection criteria); Williams, Selection Criteria for Career Criminal Programs, 71 J.Crim.L. & Crim. 89, 89-93 (1980) (discussing the crime reduction through incapacitation aspects of developing appropriate selection criteria); see also The National Directory of Career Criminal Programs, passim (INSLAW 1980) (listing career criminal programs known to be operating in 1980 and their selection criteria, demonstrating the variability of selection criteria used). Similarly, changing needs within a community were to be accomodated by modification of the selection criteria as the program evolved. See Gay, supra at 27-30 (noting changes in selection criteria in New York and Maryland programs as those programs developed). Peter Greenwood of the Rand Corporation explained succinctly, . . . as time passes, the career criminal concept will continue to evolve. Selection criteria will be modified, and new procedures will be tested. Greenwood, Career Criminal Prosecution, 71 J.Crim.L. & Crim. 85, 88 (1980). Adjustment to the selection criteria was to be based upon general research relating to the career criminal program model and continuous collection and analysis of program and local crime statistics. Memorandum, supra at n. 2 (stating the selection criteria as revised in 1983); Concept Paper, supra at n. 2, at 4-5 (the original model specifically envisioned such revisions and provided for a Joint Crime Analysis Team to make reports and offer recommendations to the program's Coordination and Management Team regarding such revisions); see also Career Criminal Briefing Paper No. 4: Monitoring and Evaluation, passim (LEAA undated, post 1978) (discussing the importance of monitoring, evaluation, and revision generally). While public disclosure of any changes in the selection criteria might help allay any suspicions of capricious or discriminatory administration of the program, we find no constitutional mandate for such candor by the district attorney regarding his policy decisions. Cf. Commonwealth v. Simmons, supra (Beck, J., concurring). Rather, justification for the assignment of a particular case to the career criminal program is only constitutionally required when the defendant has made a preliminary showing that there is a likelihood that the assignment was capricious or discriminatory. See Batson v. Kentucky, supra ; Texas v. McCullough, supra ; Franks v. Delaware, supra . Moreover, though the precise terms of the career criminal program as currently administered by the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office are not set forth in the record, it is readily apparent that juvenile delinquency adjudications are considered among other factors in determining whether assignment criteria are met. The Commonwealth's brief to this Court clearly indicates that it is the policy of the Philadelphia District Attorney to consider prior juvenile delinquency adjudications as well as prior convictions in deciding whether to assign a particular case to the career criminal unit. (Commonwealth Brief at 21-22). It is important to note in this respect that appellant does not argue that his prior delinquency adjudications were treated differently than those of other defendants, rather he complains that the district attorney has violated his constitutional rights by considering juvenile delinquency adjudications at all. Moreover, we find no indication, whatsoever, in the record that appellant's juvenile record was treated differently than the juvenile records of similarly situated defendants. [4] There is no reason why the Philadelphia District Attorney could not include prior juvenile delinquency adjudications among his career criminal program selection criteria. In Commonwealth v. Ebert, 369 Pa.Super. 318, 535 A.2d 178 (1987), this Court held that a district attorney may properly consider juvenile delinquency adjudications in exercising his or her discretion to grant or deny ARD. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Woodward, 368 Pa.Super. 363, 534 A.2d 478 (1987), this Court held that juvenile delinquency adjudications may properly be considered in determining the convict's prior record score under the sentencing guidelines. Cf. Commonwealth v. Darden, 366 Pa.Super. 597, 531 A.2d 1144 (1987) (juvenile delinquency adjudications may properly be considered as aggravating factors at sentencing when they are not otherwise incorporated in the sentencing guidelines prior record score provisions). We can see no reason, then, why the prior juvenile delinquency adjudications could not be considered in deciding whether to assign a case to the career criminal program. Indeed, consideration of prior juvenile delinquency adjudications may greatly enhance the crime prevention effects of the selective incapacitation which the career criminal program is intended to produce. Studies have indicated that younger criminals commit crimes more frequently than older criminals. [5] In evaluating the original career criminal program model, commentators noted that by requiring multiple prior adult felony convictions, the program targeted career criminals who were already statistically likely to be committing crimes less frequently than the younger career criminals who had not yet been convicted of the requisite number of designated felonies. [6] Commentators specifically recommended that this defect in the career criminal program model be cured by including prior juvenile delinquency adjudications among the selection criteria. [7] From the record in this case it appears that the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office has embraced this recommendation and has adjusted case assignment policies accordingly. [8] It is not clear from this record whether a formal revision of the selection criteria was made or whether existing criteria were merely construed liberally to include adjudications as well as convictions. Regardless, we are of the opinion that appellant's four juvenile delinquency adjudications criminal offenses involving burglary and/or robbery within two years of the current armed robbery offense could reasonably be considered the substantial equivalent of two robbery convictions (the assignment threshhold under the 1983 guidelines) for the purpose of the initial case selection screening procedures. We see no reason why the district attorney's office could not liberally construe its own guidelines to effectuate the purposes of its own program. Appellant's reliance upon the presumptive difference between the terms conviction and adjudication when used in legislative enactments ( see Commonwealth v. Case, supra ) is misplaced. We deal here with the question of whether an executive authority has reasonably applied general guidelines promulgated by the executive authority itself to govern the exercise of its legitimate discretionary authority, and not with a question of statutory construction. Moreover, the program model adopted in Philadelphia specifically envisioned sufficient flexibility to permit the Career Criminal Unit to reject some cases that met the strict selection criteria, and accept some cases which did not meet the strict selection criteria. See Concept Paper, supra at n. 2, at 8. [9] While general internal guidelines may be appropriate to prevent capricious or discriminatory exercises of prosecutorial discretion in assigning cases to career criminal programs, broad prosecutorial discretion must necessarily remain. Consequently, we reject appellant's request that we strictly construe the Philadelphia District Attorney's career criminal program case assignment selection criteria. The due process and equal protection clauses proscribe capricious or discriminatory exercises of prosecutorial discretion; they do not command rigidity. In summary, we find no reason to doubt that the current selection criteria of Philadelphia's Career Criminal Program were applied in good faith, and the criteria themselves have been appropriately adapted to effectuate the stated policy of the program. Cf. Commonwealth v. Carter, supra . Hence, appellant's constitutional challenge to the inclusion of his case in the career criminal program based upon alleged capriciousness is found to be without merit.