Opinion ID: 1839639
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Validity of the Applicable Restrictions in this Case

Text: Because the Amended Restrictions contain a severability clause [6] , we can presume that the Amended Restrictions would still have been adopted even without the provisions increasing or adding restrictions. Thus, the invalidity of certain provisions of the Amended Restrictions does not invalidate the Amended Restrictions in their entirety. The Amended Restrictions that are the same as the Original Restrictions are valid because these do not create new building restrictions. The provisions of the Amended Restrictions that contain new or increased restrictions are invalid because they were not established with the unanimous consent of the landowners. Therefore, we now turn to whether the restrictions in the Amended Restrictions that Jones has violated are new or increased restrictions and thus invalid.
Although Brier Lake Estates claims in its brief that Jones violated the provision in the Amended Restrictions that states that all plans for fences must be submitted to the Environmental Control Committee and that the same restriction existed in the Original Restrictions, another provision in the Amended Restrictions specifically governing fences is actually more restrictive than the specific reference to fences in the Original Restrictions. The Original Restrictions state that fences may be no more than seven (7) feet high, and Jones' fence meets that requirement. However, the Amended Restrictions state that except for special use fences, fences can be no higher than five (5) feet. Jones' fence is clearly not a special use fence, thus his fence violates this increased requirement. [7] Because this restriction regarding fence height was increased without the unanimous consent of the landowners under Article 780, it is invalid. Thus, Jones should not have been ordered to remove his fence.
Brier Lake claims that Jones violated the Amended Restrictions' provision requiring that all plans for carports be submitted to the Environmental Control Committee for approval. As stated above, this same requirement existed in the Original Restrictions. We have found no more burdensome or new restriction in the Amended Restrictions regarding carports that Jones has allegedly violated. Thus, because the restrictions in the Amended Restrictions were not increased, they are valid. The lower courts were correct in ordering Jones to remove his carport.
There are likewise no increased or new restrictions in the Amended Restrictions regulating satellite dishes. Brier Lake claims that both the Amended Restrictions and the Original Restrictions require submission of plans to build satellite dishes as satellite dishes are aerials. We find that the lower courts were not manifestly erroneous in finding that Jones violated the Amended Restrictions by failing to have his plans for a satellite dish approved. Thus, the lower courts were correct in ordering Jones to remove the satellite dish.
The trial court ordered Jones to pay $20,000 in attorneys' fees as required by the new provision in the Amended Restrictions providing that [a]ny interested person who successfully enforces in court any of the provisions hereof (except as set forth in Article V, Section 4) shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees and all costs. The court of appeal found this amount to be excessive and reduced the award to $15,000. The court of appeal also awarded an additional $1,500 for legal fees incurred by Brier Lake in connection with the appeal. This provision in the Amended Restrictions is entirely new as there was absolutely no provision in the Original Restrictions allowing the recovery of attorneys' fees. Thus, this new provision is invalid because it was not adopted with the unanimous consent of all landowners under Article 780. Furthermore, attorneys' fees are not allowed in Louisiana except where authorized by statute or contract. Quealy v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 475 So.2d 756, 763 (La.1985). As no statute or other contract authorizes the recovery of attorneys' fees, Jones is not liable for these attorneys' fees.
Jones has not paid assessments since January of 1991. This suit was filed on May 4, 1993. The Amended Restrictions increased the maximum amount of assessments due and increased the amount of interest, attorneys' fees and costs. In its First Supplemental and Amending Petition filed on April 14, 1994, Brier Lake Estates alleged that Jones owes $1,086.00 in assessments due from January 1, 1991, plus thirty-five percent (35%) of that amount for reasonable attorneys' fees based on the Amended Restrictions. Jones claims that assessments are building restrictions and subject to the two-year prescriptive period of Article 781. Thus, he alleges that the petition for collection of any dues and assessments that have accrued for more than two years prior to the filing of the plaintiff's suit are perempted. The court of appeal found that assessments are a personal obligation and thus subject to the ten-year prescriptive period of Article 3499 relying on Mariner's Village Master Ass'n, Inc. v. Continental Properties, 93-1530 (La.App. 1st Cir. 5/20/94), 639 So.2d 1188 and Village Square Shopping Center Ass'n v. Nelson, 522 So.2d 163 (La.App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 526 So.2d 793 (1988). In Mariner's Village, certain individuals purchased property in which the Act of Sale specifically acknowledged the recorded building restrictions applicable to the property. These building restrictions included the duty to pay assessments. These individuals then sold the property to other individuals who, by counter-letter, stated that the property was purchased for the account of a partnership of which the buyers were the general partners. The partnership refused to pay assessments claiming that the partnership was not a member of the association. The appellate court concluded that by purchasing Parcel J-1 subject to the Master Deed [containing the building restrictions] defendants bound themselves personally for the assessments. (639 So.2d 1188, 1196). In Village Square, the court found that the [p]roperty in the subdivision was sold subject to building restrictions which included provisions for the Association to assess.... 522 So.2d 163, 164. There is no indication that these were not valid building restrictions. The court pretermitted the question of whether the provisions in the restrictions for the assessments is a building restriction, and found the obligation to pay assessments to be a personal obligation with a ten year prescriptive period as a matter of contract law. Id. at 168. There is no doubt that Jones has an obligation to pay assessments as such assessments were provided for in the Original Restrictions signed by the developer of Brier Lake Estates. As stated earlier, [p]rovisions that each purchaser of a lot in a subdivision shall automatically become a member of a corporation formed to provide maintenance of the common grounds, and that each member shall be subject to an annual assessment, have been enforced as reasonable and necessary. Yiannopolis, Predial Servitudes, § 196 at pp. 519-520 (2nd> Ed.1997). In addition, the duty to pay assessments has been characterized as an affirmative duty that may be imposed by a building restriction. Comment, Some Observations on Building Restrictions, 41 La. L.Rev. 1201, 1208 (1984). This obligation has also been recognized by the legislature in La. R.S. 9:1145 which establishes a procedure for recording a privilege on the immovable for which assessments are delinquent. [8] However, Jones' obligation cannot be classified as a personal obligation. See Tall Timbers Owners' Ass'n v. Merritt, 376 So.2d 586 (La.App. 4th Cir.1979) (obligation to pay assessments is a real obligation); see also La. C.C. art. 1764 [9] ; Yiannopolis, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1975-1976 Term-Property, 37 La. L.Rev. 317, 329-330 (1977) (questioning whether the duty to pay assessments can be classified as a personal obligation without an express stipulation to that effect). Jones' property was, by virtue of the recordation of the validly enacted Original Restrictions, subject to the Original Restrictions requiring the affirmative duty of paying assessments, not to exceed $180.00 per year. We hold that this obligation is properly characterized as a building restriction and is subject to the two-year prescriptive period of La. C.C. art. 775 and is not a personal obligation under La. C.C. art. 3499. To the extent that Mariner's Village, supra, and Village Square, supra, held otherwise, they are overruled. Thus, Jones is not obligated to pay assessments that were due over two years when suit was filed. Brier Lake Estates filed suit on May 4, 1993, claiming assessments due since January 1, 1991. The assessments due from January 1, 1991, through May 1, 1991, are prescribed. Thus, Brier Lake Estates is entitled to assessments due from May 4, 1991 through June of 1995, at the rate of fifteen dollars ($15.00) per month, plus interest and costs, and twenty percent (20%) reasonable attorneys' fees. [10] We calculate that amount to be $735.00, plus interest, costs and twenty percent (20%) attorneys' fees.