Opinion ID: 1428299
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Bias or Prejudgment

Text: {39} U S West also contends that its constitutional right to due process was violated because the Commission's decision to order an interim rate reduction was tainted by bias and prejudgment on the part of Commissioner Pope and the Commission's counsel, Mr. Kaufman. We first address the allegations of prejudgment that pertain to Commissioner Pope. These allegations arise from the publication of an article in the May 11, 1998, issue of the Albuquerque Journal that quoted Commissioner Pope as saying that: The Commission is trying to get the phone rates reduced for the consumer without it costing the state or U S West a whole lot of money in a full-blown rate case. The Journal article also paraphrased Commissioner Pope's remarks as reflecting a belief that a rate reduction was warranted. {40} We have instructed the Commission that comments by a Commissioner which constitute prejudgment may constitutionally taint any subsequent hearing so as to invalidate the ensuing order of the Commission. Mountain States 1982, 99 N.M. at 7, 653 P.2d at 507 (interpreting language in N.M. Const. art. XI, § 8 that requires the Commission to determine no question nor issue any order... until after a public hearing). We have also stated that prehearing statements [indicating an absence of fairness and impartiality] reflect poorly on the rate setting process. Id. We do not retreat from those admonitions today. {41} Nevertheless, we recognize that not all allegations of bias or prejudice are of the type that render a proceeding fundamentally unfair or require the disqualification of a decisionmaker. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 550, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994) (Not all unfavorable disposition[s] towards an individual (or his case) [are] properly described by the words bias or prejudice.); see also In re J.P. Linahan, Inc., 138 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir.1943) (Impartiality is not gullibility.); Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters, 1997-NMCA-031, ¶ 24, 123 N.M. 239, 938 P.2d 1384, (listing types of bias and their relationship to disqualification under the framework established in 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 19:1, at 371-72 (2d ed.1980)). We also recognize that in addition to its quasi-judicial role, an administrative body may carry out executive or legislative functions that require it to be open and responsive to its constituency. Board of Educ., 106 N.M. at 132, 740 P.2d at 126; see also Krieger, supra, at 1036-37 (noting that ratemaking may involve a mixture of legislative and adjudicative procedures). Thus, we cannot invalidate all administrative decision-making simply because a member of an administrative body has communicated with his or her constituents through the media. {42} In determining whether a commissioner's remarks constitute prejudgment sufficient to violate U S West's constitutional right to due process, [t]he inquiry is not whether the [commission]ers are actually biased or prejudiced, but whether, in the natural course of events, there is an indication of a possible temptation to an average [person] sitting as a judge to try the case with bias for or against any issue presented to him [or her]. Reid, 92 N.M. at 416, 589 P.2d at 200. This inquiry measures allegations of bias or prejudice by an objective standard that is in essence a paraphrase of a federal statute governing the disqualification of judicial branch judges, see 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1994) (A judge shall disqualify himself [or herself] in any proceeding in which his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be questioned.), as well as New Mexico's Code of Judicial Conduct dealing with disqualification of state judges, see [Rule 21-400(A) NMRA 1999] (A judge is disqualified and shall recuse himself or herself in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned ....). Chavez, 1997-NMCA-054, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 428, 941 P.2d 509 (alteration in original); see also Liteky, 510 U.S. at 543-48, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (recounting history of federal recusal statutes). {43} Applying this objective standard, we determine that U S West's allegations of prejudgment by Commissioner Pope do not amount to a violation of U S West's constitutional right to due process. Unlike the decisionmaker in Reid, 92 N.M. at 415, 589 P.2d at 199, Commissioner Pope did not admit to making the statements quoted and paraphrased in the Journal article. Rather, he noted that the article did not accurately present my thinking on the issues in this case. I had reached no definite conclusions concerning this case at that time. Moreover, the statements attributed to Commissioner Pope were made after U S West's hearing, not before it. {44} Interpreting the federal statute quoted in Chavez, 941 P.2d 509 1997-NMCA-054, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 428, the United States Supreme Court has reasoned: [O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of the trial that are critical or disapproving of, or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147; cf. Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters, 1997-NMCA-031, ¶ 23, 123 N.M. 239, 938 P.2d 1384 (directing against an inference that a member of a tribunal is necessarily disqualified whenever prior conduct of the member indicates a view that would favor one party or the other). Under this reasoning, the remarks attributed to Commissioner Pope do not require his disqualification. U S West has not shown that these remarks were based on information obtained by Commissioner Pope outside the course of the proceedings, and the timing of the remarks would suggest that they were based on the evidence and arguments that he gleaned from the April 21 hearing. Further, the remarks do not suggest a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. Thus, we will not vacate the Commission's order because of the remarks attributed to Commissioner Pope in the Albuquerque Journal. {45} We also conclude that the allegations of bias on the part of the Commission's counsel, Mr. Kaufman, are too tenuous to support the conclusion that U S West's constitutional right to due process was violated. U S West alleges that Mr. Kaufman influenced the Commission in a biased manner because he accepted an offer of employment from one of U S West's competitors, e.spire Communications, Inc., during the pendency of the proceedings. According to an affidavit filed by Mr. Kaufman, he was offered employment by e.spire Communications, Inc. on May 7, 1998, but did not participate personally or substantially in any matters in which e.spire was a party while negotiating for employment with e.spire or after his acceptance of the company's offer. {46} With respect to Mr. Kaufman's employment negotiations with e.spire, U S West alleges a type of bias that may warrant disqualification. An offer of employment carries with it an economic incentive that may place its recipient in a position where he or she `stands to gain or lose by a decision' affecting the future employer. See Las Cruces Prof'l Fire Fighters, 1997-NMCA-031, ¶ 24, 123 N.M. 239, 938 P.2d 1384 (quoting 3 Davis, supra, § 19:1, at 371). Although disqualification is not limited to instances where a lawyer has violated an ethical or specific court rule, see Sanders v. Rosenberg, 1997-NMSC-002, ¶¶ 8, 10, 122 N.M. 692, 930 P.2d 1144, the Rules of Professional Conduct governing conflicts of interest may provide examples of the types of bias that may warrant disqualification, see, e.g., Rule 16-111 NMRA 1999 (governing successive government and private employment of lawyers); Rule 16-112 NMRA 1999 (governing future employment of judges, other adjudicative officers, arbitrators and law clerks); State v. Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 15-16, 125 N.M. 739, 965 P.2d 323 (interpreting Rule 16-111(C) and Rule 16-109 NMRA 1999 to determine grounds for disqualification of an attorney). {47} In determining whether Mr. Kaufman's relationship with e.spire had the effect of depriving U S West of its right to due process, we find the authorities addressing bias or prejudice in the context of employment negotiations by a judge's law clerk to be instructive. See Hamid v. Price Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1416-17 (9th Cir.1995); Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Selas Corp. of Am., 902 F.2d 703, 714 (9th Cir.1990); Hunt v. American Bank & Trust Co., 783 F.2d 1011, 1015-16 (11th Cir.1986); Hall v. Small Bus. Admin., 695 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir.1983). We note that these authorities use the familiar objective standard for determining bias or prejudice that New Mexico courts have employed for many years. Compare Chavez, 1997-NMCA-054, ¶ 16, 123 N.M. 428, 941 P.2d 509 (noting that New Mexico's standard is in essence a paraphrase of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a)), with Hamid, 51 F.3d at 1416 (applying 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) to allegations of bias arising from employment negotiations of a judge's law clerk), and Milgard Tempering, Inc., 902 F.2d at 714 (same). Also, for purposes of argument, we will assume that like a judge's law clerk, Mr. Kaufman may have acted as a sounding board for the commissioners' tentative opinions and a legal researcher who sought the authorities that would affect their decisions. See Hall, 695 F.2d at 179. {48} Given these duties, [a] reasonable person might be concerned whether a law clerk's advice to a judge would be biased in favor of the position taken by a firm, if the law clerk had worked there before his clerkship, was on a leave of absence, and planned to work there after his clerkship. Hamid, 51 F.3d at 1416-17. But cf. Rule 16-112(B) (A lawyer serving as a law clerk to a judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator may negotiate for employment with a party or attorney involved in a matter in which the clerk is participating personally or substantially, but only after the lawyer has notified the judge, other adjudicative officer or arbitrator.). For the same reason, a reasonable person might question Mr. Kaufman's impartiality with respect to a firm for which he agreed to work after completing his duties with the Commission. {49} On the other hand, [w]e do not believe that a law clerk's acceptance of future employment with a law firm would cause a reasonable person to doubt the judge's impartiality so long as the clerk refrains from participating in cases involving the firm in question. Milgard Tempering, Inc., 902 F.2d at 714 (quoting Hunt, 783 F.2d at 1016). For the same reason, we do not believe that Mr. Kaufman's acceptance of future employment with e.spire would cause a reasonable person to doubt the Commission's impartiality so long as Mr. Kaufman refrained from participating in cases involving his future employer. {50} The question, then, is whether the present case is one that involves Mr. Kaufman's future employer. We conclude that it is not. The question of bias is one of whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. It is not a question of whether a line can be drawn connecting a person within chambers to a person or firm related, no matter how remotely, to a party in the case. Hamid, 51 F.3d at 1417. In this case, U S West draws a line between Mr. Kaufman and e.spire and then alleges an adverse or competitive relationship between e.spire and U S West. Because e.spire is not a party to this case, and U S West fails to show a substantial relationship between this case and any other case in which e.spire was a party during the relevant time period, we determine that the relationship among e.spire, Mr. Kaufman, the Commission, and U S West is too remote to place the Commission's impartiality in question here. Cf. Barnett, 1998-NMCA-105, ¶¶ 16-22, 125 N.M. 739, 965 P.2d 323 (discussing factors relevant to determining whether a government attorney represented a party adverse to a former client in the same or a substantially related matter in violation of Rule 16-109 NMRA 1999). In sum, none of U S West's challenges to the sufficiency of the notice it was given, or the adequacy of its opportunity to be heard, or the Commission's impartiality, persuade us that the company was deprived of the process it is due in this case. Therefore, we affirm the Commission's order.