Opinion ID: 4246843
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Riley/Wurie

Text: In 2014, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in two cases involving the warrantless search of a cell phone – one involving a smartphone and one involving a flip phone – to determine “whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.” Riley/Wurie, 134 S. Ct. at 2480. In Riley, police arrested the defendant for possessing concealed, loaded firearms. Police seized a smartphone from the defendant incident to his arrest and accessed the phone without a warrant. Observing notations in his [J-55-2017] - 12 contact list that signified gang involvement, the arresting officer turned the phone over to a detective specializing in gangs, who further examined the contents of the phone. The videos and photographs observed on the phone resulted in Riley being charged in connection with an earlier shooting, for which he was ultimately convicted and given an enhanced sentence because the crimes were committed for the benefit of a gang. In Wurie, police seized a flip phone from the defendant incident to his arrest for drug delivery. The phone, which was already powered on, received repeated calls from a number identified in the phone as “my house” on the phone’s external viewing screen. Id. at 2481. Without first obtaining a warrant, police opened the phone and observed that the wallpaper of the phone was a photograph of a woman and a baby. Police then accessed the phone’s call log with the press of a button, and pressed another to discern the phone number assigned to “my house.” Id. Police then used the phone number to search a web-based phone directory to identify the address associated with that number. The police went to that address and observed a woman through the window who resembled the woman in the photograph on the wallpaper of Wurie’s phone. The police then obtained and executed a warrant to search the residence, which resulted in the discovery and seizure of a large amount of drugs, paraphernalia, a firearm, ammunition and money. The United States Supreme Court held that although the warrantless seizure of the cell phones from Riley and Wurie was permissible as the result of a search incident to arrest, the subsequent searches of their phones was not. Instead, the Court held that to lawfully search a cell phone, police must first obtain a warrant. Id. at 2485, 2493. The Court explained that although cell phones contain information that is, in substance, [J-55-2017] - 13 the same as physical items that are permissibly searched incident to an individual’s arrest pursuant to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence (e.g., an address book, a wallet or a purse), the quantity and quality of data that can be stored on cell phones place them in an entirely different class for purposes of a search. Id. at 2488 (“That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping them together.”) The Riley/Wurie Court reasoned that the privacy concerns related to the search of a cell phone far exceed any such concerns related to the search of these other physical items, as cell phones “place vast quantities of personal information literally in the hands of individuals,” all in one place. Id. at 2485, 2489 (referring to the name “cell phones” as a “misleading shorthand,” as they “could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers”). The variety of information that can be stored, the details about a person’s life that the information can convey, and the length of time the information can remain catalogued in a cell phone, which are carried by the great majority of people, led the Court to conclude that data stored on a cell phone is entirely distinguishable from any physical evidence counterpart. Id. at 2489-90. Notably, the high Court rejected the government’s reliance on Smith and FloresLopez, the very cases upon which the trial court in the case at bar relied to explain its authorization of the warrantless search of Fulton’s phone. The Riley/Wurie Court explained that unlike the use of a pen register (which the Court in Smith held was not a search and thus did not require a warrant), accessing the call logs on a cell phone was unquestionably a search – one that yields not only phone numbers, but whatever other [J-55-2017] - 14 identifying information the cell phone owner attaches to that number (e.g., names, nicknames, photographs, addresses, etc.). Id. at 2492-93. Further, the Court disagreed with the government’s argument that the search of a cell phone for information that police could have obtained from a pre-digital counterpart was permitted without a warrant. Id. at 2493. The Riley/Wurie Court noted the holding of Flores-Lopez as stating, “[i]f police are entitled to open a pocket diary to copy the owner’s address, they should be entitled to turn on a cell phone to learn its number,” id. (citing Flores-Lopez, 670 F.3d at 807), but found that decision to be in error: [T]he fact that a search in the pre-digital era could have turned up a photograph or two in a wallet does not justify a search of thousands of photos in a digital gallery. The fact that someone could have tucked a paper bank statement in a pocket does not justify a search of every bank statement from the last five years. And to make matters worse, such an analogue test would allow law enforcement to search a range of items contained on a phone, even though people would be unlikely to carry such a variety of information in physical form. In Riley's case, for example, it is implausible that he would have strolled around with video tapes, photo albums, and an address book all crammed into his pockets. But because each of those items has a pre-digital analogue, police under California's proposal would be able to search a phone for all of those items – a significant diminution of privacy. Id. Concerned that “an analogue test would launch courts on a difficult line-drawing expedition to determine which digital files are comparable to physical records,” the Court precluded a case-by-case approach to determining whether the search of a cell phone required a warrant. Id. Instead, the Court held that in all cases, “even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest,” the search of a cell phone requires a warrant. Id. In short, the high Court summarized its holding with a simple rule: when police want [J-55-2017] - 15 to search a cell phone, “get a warrant.” Id. at 2495. The Court was unanimous on this point. In the lone minority opinion authored in the case, Justice Alito stated, “The Court strikes [the balance between law enforcement and privacy interests] in favor of privacy interests with respect to all cell phones and all information found in them,” and agreed that there is no “workable alternative” to this blanket holding. Id. at 2467 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasis added).