Opinion ID: 1141245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: adequacy of guilty plea

Text: We review a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under an abuse-of-discretion standard. [2] The trial court's findings of fact made in conjunction with its decision will not be set aside unless they are clearly erroneous. [3] Because Blair's plea was taken prior to our decision in State v. Gibbons, [4] the rule announced in Gibbons that guilty pleas may be withdrawn if the trial court did not strictly comply with the rules concerning the taking of pleas does not govern. [5] Instead, we uphold a decision denying a motion to withdraw a guilty plea if `the record as a whole affirmatively establishes that the defendant entered his [or her] plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences and of the rights he [or she] was waiving.' [6] Blair alleges that he agreed to stay with his plea because he falsely believed, based on his attorney's representations, that he could be held liable for the crime just by being at the crime scene even though he professed no prior knowledge that Eastwood intended to kill Halsey. Moreover, although Blair concedes that the trial court followed the correct procedures for accepting his plea at the initial plea hearing on July 25, 1978, he claims that at the hearing on October 17, 1978, the trial court failed to inquire again whether Blair understood the elements to which he was pleading given the change in his story. Following the evidentiary hearing on the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, Judge Harding made specific findings that Blair entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily. Judge Harding found that defendant understood the elements of the crime, how those elements related to the facts, and that he entered his plea to avoid the possibility of the death penalty if the case went to trial. Judge Harding's conclusion that Blair understood the elements of the crime charged and the relationship between the law and facts is supported by the record. Under Utah's accomplice liability statute, section 76-2-202 of the Utah Code, a person is criminally liable for the acts of another if he or she, while acting with the mental state required for the commission of the offense, solicits, requests, commands, encourages, or intentionally aids another person to engage in conduct which constitutes an offense. [7] Blair claims that his plea was not knowing and voluntary because he never had the intent to kill Halsey and therefore could not be liable as an accomplice to first degree murder. However, as Blair's counsel informed him on several occasions, a jury would not necessarily believe that he lacked the intent to commit the murder. [8] A review of Blair's second version of events reveals that under that scenario, a jury could find that Blair knew that Eastwood intended to rob and kill Halsey and that Blair willingly acquiesced in the plan: Blair admitted that he knew Eastwood was planning to rob Halsey and take the victim's money, and he told Eastwood that he would go along with the plan. He also admitted loading Halsey into the truck while the victim was still alive and then dumping him on the side of the road to die. He removed Halsey's money from the wallet and aided Eastwood in disposing of evidence of the crime from Halsey's truck. Blair and Eastwood then proceeded to Green River, Utah, in the victim's truck, and Blair was still with Eastwood when the two were arrested the next day. Hence, even under the second version, a jury could have reasonably believed that Blair acted with the intent necessary to be found guilty of the crime despite his claims to the contrary. [9] Defense counsel informed Blair of this possibility on several occasions before the October 17 hearing. Based on that knowledge, Blair chose to maintain his original plea so that he could avoid the death penalty. We find no error with Judge Harding's conclusion that Blair understood the elements of the crime and the relation of the facts to the law. Blair's next assertion, that the trial court should have inquired more deeply into Blair's profession of innocence before accepting his guilty plea, also lacks merit. Upon learning that Blair had changed his story, the trial court called a special hearing for the sole purpose of allowing Blair to withdraw his plea if he so desired. At that hearing, the following colloquy took place: The Court: Now, then, you are back before this Court with your attorney for the purposes of having this Court determine whether or not you desire to change your position in any respect. Do you understand that? Blair: Yes, sir. The Court: No one should enter a plea of guilty to a criminal offense, and certainly not a criminal offense of first degree murder, which may be a capital offense, unless they are in fact guilty of that offense. Do you understand that? Blair: Yes, sir. The Court: And if you desire, and after consulting with your attorney, to withdraw your plea of guilty and enter your plea of not guilty, this Court will set the matter down for trial before a jury of 12 persons. Do you understand that? Blair: Yes, sir. The court then advised Blair that if he decided to withdraw his plea, the fact that he originally pleaded guilty would not be used against him in court. All the rights to which Blair would be entitled if he proceeded to trial were recited again. Nonetheless, Blair decided to maintain his guilty plea. The record indicates that the trial court gave Blair ample opportunity to withdraw his plea. However, Blair was intent on avoiding the death penalty and therefore determined that it was in his best interests to plead guilty. Moreover, Blair had several opportunities when he was before the court to apprise the court of his professed innocence. [10] Instead, he repeatedly accepted full responsibility for the shooting. Finally, we note again that a jury could have determined that Blair was guilty of first degree murder as an accomplice even if he did not pull the trigger. We therefore agree with Judge Harding's statement in the findings of fact that [Blair] has made no showing that he is an innocent man who has [pleaded] guilty to first degree murder. The trial court fulfilled its mandated mission to assure that Blair entered his plea with full knowledge and understanding of its consequences. We therefore affirm Judge Harding's conclusion that Blair's guilty plea was knowing and voluntary.