Opinion ID: 774546
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Search of the Residence and Car

Text: 11 We examine the factual findings underlying the district court's denial of the motion to suppress for clear error and review de novo the ultimate question of whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. United States v. Nation, 243 F.3d 467, 469 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Probable cause exists if there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place. Id. We will uphold a judicial determination of probable cause if we believe that there was a substantial basis for concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Id. at 470-71. We emphasize that probable cause is to be determined under a totality-of-the-circumstances approach. United States v. LaMorie, 100 F.3d 547, 553 (8th Cir. 1996). 12 Rankin first argues that the search warrant was not based on probable cause because the information was stale when the warrant was executed. He bases this argument on a statement made by the confidential informant after the warrant had been issued to the effect that Rankin had moved most of his... crack out of the residence. Rankin argues that Detective Williams received this information before the search and thus was aware that the warrant was stale. The government responds that Detective Williams received that information after December 9, 1999, that even had it been made known to the detective before the warrant was executed there was still sufficient evidence of Rankin's continuing drug-related activity at the residence, and that, in any event, the residence could lawfully be searched for paraphernalia. 13 We agree with the district court that the warrant was supported by probable cause. Detective Williams's affidavit supporting the warrant, even when read in the light of the additional information from the confidential informant, would give a reasonable person reason to suspect that items relating to the distribution of crack cocaine would be found at 4949 Plover. Detective Williams had information from a reliable informant, who had seen Rankin cook and sell drugs, that Rankin was selling drugs from the residence. Detective Williams had also surveilled the residence and observed many short-term visits consistent with drug trafficking and numerous transactions he believed to be drug-related. See LaMorie, 100 F.3d at 554 (time factors relevant but must be viewed in the context of a particular case and ongoing nature of the crime charged). Whatever the timing of the statement that most of the drugs had been moved, the informant indicated only that most, not all, of drugs had been moved. Thus, the information did not render the warrant stale. Cf. United States v. Williams, 10 F.3d 590, 594-95 (8th Cir. 1993) (eight-day delay not unreasonable when informant testified that one shipment of drugs was gone but new would be arriving; better practice is to get new warrant but search valid given ongoing nature of crime). When viewed in the light of the totality of the circumstances, there was a substantial basis for concluding that a search of the residence would uncover evidence of cocaine trafficking. 14 We next turn to Rankin's argument concerning the suppression of the evidence found in the trunk of his vehicle. The district court found that the officers lawfully seized the vehicle for asset forfeiture because Detective Williams had observed its involvement in a drug transaction. The court concluded that the subsequent search of the vehicle was a valid inventory search. 15 In light of our affirmance of the district court's ruling on the search of the residence, Rankin's argument that his post-seizure admission should have been suppressed fails, as does his argument that his car should not have been seized. At oral argument, Rankin additionally contended that the record contains no evidence regarding the particularized police procedures followed when the car was searched. Because this argument was neither raised in the district court nor in the briefs on appeal, we decline to consider it. 16 Rankin's car was lawfully seized. Vehicles used to facilitate drug transactions are forfeitable to the United States. United States v. Walker, 900 F.2d 1201, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam). To support forfeiture, the government must establish probable cause amounting to more than a mere suspicion to believe the property was used to facilitate drug transactions. Id. Detective Williams personally observed Rankin conduct a drug transaction from his vehicle, which Rankin later confirmed. 17 Once the car was legally seized... the arresting officers were entitled to inventory the contents of the car and take possession of the items found therein. O'Reilly v. United States, 486 F.2d 208, 210 (8th Cir. 1973); see also Walker, 900 F.2d at 1205 (warrantless search may be conducted on vehicle seized for forfeiture purposes). The central inquiry in determining whether such an inventory search is reasonable is a consideration of the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Marshall, 986 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1993). [I]nventory searches conducted according to standardized police procedures, which vitiate concerns of an investigatory motive or excessive discretion, are reasonable. Id. 18 We conclude that the district court did not err in its finding that the search of Rankin's vehicle was a valid inventory search. Detective Williams testified that he seized and towed the vehicle pursuant to department guidelines on asset forfeiture. There is no indication that the search was a subterfuge for a general rummaging for incriminating evidence. See id. at 1175 (citation omitted). Accordingly, the district court did not err in allowing the items from the trunk to be admitted into evidence. 19 Because we have affirmed the district court's admission of the evidence seized from Rankin's residence and car, Rankin's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence fails.