Opinion ID: 2070966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: dss tried to assist mother, but mother uncooperative and refused job offers thereafter claiming poverty as a defense

Text: Mother lastly advocates State placed her in a situation which predetermined termination of her parental rights. She accuses State of hinging return of her children upon her obtaining suitable employment and home environment and then making no active efforts to enable her to achieve those goals. Mother claims her core problem is poverty which is not a sound basis for termination of parental rights, concluding that reversal is warranted. We disagree. Parental rights may be terminated if proffered State services are unaccepted or unsuccessful. S.D., 402 N.W.2d at 352 (citing In re M.S.M., 320 N.W.2d 795, 799 (S.D.1982)). See T.H., 396 N.W.2d at 148; In re J.S.N., 371 N.W.2d 361, 364 (S.D. 1985); In re S.S., 334 N.W.2d 59, 62 (S.D. 1983). However, [t]ermination of parental rights is not conditioned on exhaustion of every possible form of assistance, In re J.S.N., 371 N.W.2d 361, 364 (S.D.1985) (citing In re C.L., 356 N.W.2d 476 (S.D.1984)), and where reasonable efforts to aid or counsel parents by the use of social services proves unavailing, termination of parental rights is justified. In re J.S.N., 371 N.W.2d at 364 (quoting In re S.S., 334 N.W.2d 59, 62 (S.D. 1983)). S.D., 402 N.W.2d at 351. The record amply reflects Mother received reasonable offers of assistance from DSS. Poverty, we hold, was not the basis for termination of parental rights. She would not attend parenting classes (these were free). Mother was encouraged to seek employment at Job Services and through private agencies. She obtained a part-time position selling Avon products which position lasted approximately four months. She did not obtain a suitable home for her sons. Mother missed psychological evaluation appointments and cancelled scheduled visits with her children. The psychological evaluations were proffered to help her and would not have cost her a dime. Mother failed to appear at the December 17, 1985 Adjudicatory Hearing, the May 19, 1986 Interim Dispositional Hearing, and the July 14, 1986 Dispositional Hearing. In addition, at the time of Mother's December 21, 1984 bad check arrest, the record indicates Mother and her three sons were living in an automobile. Moreover, Mother arrived late to the hospital where D.H. was to have ear surgery, upset him by describing the risk of the operation and then caused a companion surgery, designed to fully restore her son's hearing, to be cancelled. This service was to be paid by Medicaid, as the child was in the State's custody and eligible for this financial service. The circuit court found Mother made no demonstrable efforts to secure return of the children and has shown a lack of concern for the children demonstrated by her actions. As the evidence clearly supports the circuit court's findings, we refuse to overrule it. See S.M., 384 N.W.2d at 673. We also have carefully reviewed the briefs and cannot find argument, on behalf of Mother, that the findings of fact in this case are clearly erroneous. We are overwhelmed by the evidence that this Mother would not reform her conduct/living style and provide a decent environment for these boys. She absolutely refused to accept the services which were proffered to her which would, essentially, take her down the path of acceptable motherhood. Poverty cannot be used as a crutch, under all the circumstances of this case, to frustrate the sound decision of the trial court. In affirming, we express that a child is God's opinion that life should go on. We hold that the lives of these three boys go onproductively and with an opportunity to be well-rounded citizens in the future for this Republic. These boys cannot grow and flourish where they are raised in a car, with their Mother in jail, and without decent meals or clothes or medical attention or an education. And their opportunity to flourish is for naught where the proffered services are unavailing/refused. In such instances, parental rights may be terminated. M.S.M., 320 N.W.2d 795; In re R.Z.F., 284 N.W.2d 879 (S.D.1979). Many writings in this Court have advanced concepts and rules, but one state statute is our beacon; SDCL 26-8-2 expresses the primary purpose of dependency and neglect actions: This chapter shall be liberally construed in favor of the state for the purposes of the protection of the child from neglect or omission of parental duty toward the child by its parents.... We affirm. WUEST, C.J., and MORGAN and MILLER, JJ., concur. SABERS, J., concurs in result.