Opinion ID: 1408898
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: language of the statute

Text: The trial court concluded that the board violated section 39606 by failing to consider the effects on the economy of standards to be adopted. The court construed the statute to require the board to consider the economic costs of compliance with the standards adopted. It relied upon the language of the section, which is not limited to health and safety but also includes welfare, and the history of air quality regulation in California as showing legislative intent that the costs of compliance were to be considered. The court reasoned that local districts could not consider the economic impact of the standard but only the most economical method of meeting the standard, and that unless the state board considered the economic impact of its regulations no agency would. In this connection the court stated: If the Legislature did not want [the board] to consider effects on the economy in carrying out the Legislature's directive, it could simply authorize [the board] to adopt standards prohibiting the presence of all deleterious pollutants in the atmosphere. Such Draconian measures would certainly give complete protection to the health of all human beings but at the same time it would be disastrous to our economy. The board does not claim that it considered the costs to the economy of complying with the standards it adopted. Its position is that it need not consider such costs. It urges that the effects on the economy it is required to consider by section 39606 are the effects of air pollution on the economy, not the effect of the board's standards. In construing a statute to determine the intent of the Legislature we turn first to the words themselves for the answer. ( Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764 [150 Cal. Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227].) The relevant portion of section 39606 provides that the board shall adopt standards of ambient air quality for each air basin in consideration of the public health, safety, and welfare, including, but not limited, to health, illness, irritation to the senses, aesthetic value, interference with visibility, and effects on the economy.  (Italics added.) The reference to public health, safety, and welfare is ordinarily a reference to the police power of the state, reflecting the breadth of matters to be considered by the board, and the public welfare has long been held to embrace regulations designed to promote the economic welfare, public convenience, and general prosperity of the community. (E.g., Graham v. Kingwell (1933) 218 Cal. 658, 659 [24 P.2d 488].) The use of such terminology can only be read as meaning that the Legislature intended the matters were to be considered in a broad rather than restrictive light. Indeed, in the discussion of safety margins, the majority recognize: The language of section 39606, directing the Board to adopt standards in consideration of the public health, safety, and welfare, reflects the breadth of matters to be considered by the Board. ( Ante, p. 516.) The view also finds support in the fact that the following clause is including but not limited to, again reflecting the breadth of the matters to be considered. Furthermore, the term effects on the economy grammatically relates to standards to be adopted rather than air pollution, a term not appearing in the section. The majority initially argue that because standards cannot cause illness, irritate the senses, interfere with visibility or be aesthetically displeasing, the Legislature intended to focus the board's attention on the effects of pollution. The majority then reason that the following term in the statute, effects on the economy, like its antecedents must be read to refer to the consequences of air pollution, rather than to the potential economic effects of air quality standards. There are a number of defects in this line of reasoning. First, it omits mention of the first of the specified terms, health. No one claims that air pollution causes health; the thought is absurd and the majority's categorization of the terms fails. This defect is alone obviously fatal to the majority's argument but there are other equally clear objections to the argument. Second, the majority's reasoning is an attempt to limit the plain language of the statute, and it should be entitled to little, if any, weight when we are construing a statute which grants broad quasi-legislative power to an agency to consider public health, safety, and welfare. Obviously, the term welfare in this context is intended to be expansive rather than limiting, and a limiting rule of construction or reasoning designed to limit should not be applied. Third, employment of the majority's rule of construction appears inappropriate when we are considering a statute which grants broad quasi-legislative power to adopt standards and speaks of the matters to be considered. Because quasi-legislative power is granted, it is to be anticipated that the agency will balance several factors in adopting regulations. But the limiting rule of construction tells us, as the majority illustrate today, that all factors must be read to point in the same direction. If so, there is nothing to balance. Under the majority's construction, it would seem to follow that the board which may employ safety factors and has nothing to weigh against the evils of air pollution should prohibit all air pollution, and it seems impossible to justify the standards adopted insofar as they permit any air pollution. Fourth, the majority overwork their rule of construction by using it to limit not only the term effects on the economy in the statute but also the word welfare. Even assuming that the term effects on the economy reasonably might be limited to economic effects of air pollution, this is not helpful to the majority. Limiting the term effects on the economy on the basis of its associates may not serve to also limit the term public ... welfare because the Legislature in no uncertain terms has told us that it may not. The wording of section 39606 is to adopt standards in consideration of the public health, safety, and welfare, including, but not limited to, ... effects on the economy. (Italics added.) Thus, even if we agree with the majority that effects on the economy must be limited to effects on the economy caused by air pollution, we may not use the restricted definition of effects on the economy to limit the meaning of the term public ... welfare, because the Legislature has expressly told us that effects on the economy does not limit the preceding words by stating, including, but not limited to. We are left then with the term public ... welfare unrestricted, and no citation of authority is required for the proposition that public welfare, absent limiting provision, encompases economic concerns generally. Fifth, the board is not merely an investigating agency but is a regulatory agency. Thus, it is not merely concerned with the effect of air pollution on such matters as health and the economy but ultimately must determine the effects, if any, of proposed standards so that it may choose the appropriate one. Finally, it appears to me that the majority position is internally inconsistent in its interpretation of section 39606. First, the majority tell of the breadth of matters to be considered by the board in concluding that the board may adopt safety margins. ( Ante, pp. 515-516.) There is no discussion of reasoning limiting the board to consideration of the effects of air pollution. The reasoning is only invoked as to economic effects. Obviously, safety margins are no more a cause of air pollution than are standards. Safety factors are no more associates of illness, irritation of the senses, interference with visibility or aesthetically displeasing than are the economic consequences of potential standards. The majority only appear to apply their reasoning when they find it convenient. I find it difficult to conceive of broader language that the Legislature might have used to describe matters that a state agency may consider than public health, safety, and welfare. Further, effects on the economy points directly to economic impact of the agency's work. Even if the latter words did not do so, they are prefaced by the familiar term including, but not limited to making it abundantly clear that the Legislature did not want the word welfare limited to succeeding terms. The language of the statute thus requires the board to consider the economic impact of proposed standards before adopting them.