Opinion ID: 317124
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Miscellaneous Contentions by Murray

Text: 55 1. Relevance of heroin seized at airport. The grand jury alleged that the over-all narcotics conspiracy extended from a date to the grand jury unknown, to February 5, 1969. The evidence showed that the husband and wift team of Robert and Helen Hernandez was engaged in a narcotics smuggling operation from as early as December, 1964. On December 16, 1968, the operation came to a virtual standstill when Lannom and Wright, who were active in that venture, fled from Mexico to the United States. More than seven months prior to that event, on April 2, 1968, approximately ninety-one grams of heroin were found in a garment bag in Murray's possession at the San Francisco International Airport. 56 The validity of the search which led to the seizure of this heroin has been considered in section III of this opinion. In addition to questioning the lawfulness of that seizure, Murray also argues that it should not have been received in evidence (exhibit 512) as there was no proof that this heroin had anything to do with the alleged over-all conspiracy to import heroin from Mexico, and to sell, conceal, and facilitate the transportation and concealment of such drugs after such importation. 57 In answer to this contention, the Government argues that, assuming this heroin had no connection with the alleged conspiracy, it is admissible to show intent, knowledge and identity relevant to the over-all conspiracy charge, and as tending to corroborate the testimony of Wright. 58 One element of the conspiracy count is that, after participating in the knowing importation of heroin from Mexico, the defendants conspired to sell, conceal, and facilitate the transportation of such narcotic drugs. The fact that Murray was caught with ninety-one grams of heroin at the San Francisco airport on April 2, 1968, did not prove that this particular heroin had been imported from Mexico as part of the conspiracy operation or otherwise. But it did tend to show that Murray had the knowledge and modus operandi which would enable him to conceal and transport substantial quantities of heroin. 6 In our opinion, the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding, in effect, that the relevance and probative value of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect as evidence of a separate crime. 7 59 2. Relevance of other items of evidence. Murray argues that since he offered to stipulate that he was acquainted with Lauderdale, the reception in evidence of Murray's picture and a piece of paper with Murray's telephone number on it, found in Lauderdale's home, 'can only be construed as an attempt to prejudice the jury by lending an illicit nature to what was never proven to be a conspiratorial relationship.' 60 When the photograph was offered in evidence, Murray objected to its relevancy. But he then made no complaint that the jury might draw invidious inferences from the presence of the photograph in Lauderdale's house. In any event, we think the photograph was relevant and probative on the factual question of Murray's identification as the 'Lonnie' referred to in the Hernandez 'customer book,' and that Murray's post-trial fear that the jury might be prejudiced against him because Lauderdale had his photograph is somewhat fanciful. 61 Similar to this argument is Murray's contention that the trial court should have stricken from a worksheet prepared by Wright, introduced as exhibit 415, the name 'Lonnie.' This evidence was relevant to the issue of the nature of the conspiracy. Murray does not specify how he was unfairly prejudiced by the admission of the worksheet, and we conclude that its admission, without adjustment, was not error. 62 Murray additionally contends that he was unduly prejudiced by the reception in evidence of exhibit 400, consisting of ten and eight-tenths pounds of heroin. Murray contends that this heroin was totally unconnected to him in time or place. 63 This heroin, as explained in our opinion in the Group I appeals, was taken from 'Emma,' a smuggler for the Hernandez operation, when she crossed the border on December 16, 1968. This heroin was relevant and probative evidence pertaining to the question of the general nature of the Hernandez narcotics conspiracy. This factual question was involved in the Government's case against each defendant, including Murray. The trial court did not err in receiving this exhibit in evidence. 64 3. Seizure of address book. Murray argues that the seizure and use in evidence of his address book and entries therein violated his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Murray relies primarily upon an observation by Justice Bradley in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), to the effect that the seizure of a person's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is not substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. 65 Boyd involved a self-incrimination problem because the defendant was required by court order to produce a selfincriminating invoice. No such circumstance is present here. Actually, Murray's address book could have been seized as an instrumentality of the crime under the law as it existed prior to Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967), which overturned the 'mere evidence' rule. Hayden, of course, liberalized the rule as to what items may be seized. 66 In Hayden, however, the court reserved the question of whether, in a search and seizure otherwise valid, the authorities could, in view of the privilege against self-incrimination, take items which are 'testimonial' or 'communicative' in nature. See Hayden, at 302-303, 87 S.Ct. 1642. But in United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888, 896 (2d Cir. 1969), the Second Circuit held that such items can be taken during a lawful search and seizure and are admissible. 8 We agree. 67 In Blackford v. United States, 247 F.2d 745, 753-754 (9th Cir. 1957), this court held that the privilege against self-incrimination protects one only against testimonial compulsion, and does not apply to real evidence taken from the person of the accused. The Second Circuit held to the same effect in Bennett. See also, United States v. Kee Ming Hsu, 424 F.2d 1286, 1290 (2d Cir. 1970). While Murray cites several other authorities in addition to Boyd, we find nothing therein which supports his position. 68 The address books were properly admitted in evidence. 69 4. Sufficiency of indictment. Murray contends that both counts of the indictment are defective in that they fail to state with particularity the crime with which he is charged and the facts thereof. 70 Prior to this appeal Murray did not question the sufficiency of the indictment. Where this is the case an indictment will ordinarily be held sufficient unless it is 'so defective that by no reasonable construction can it be said to charge the offense for which the defendant (was) convicted.' Muench v. United States, 96 F.2d 332, 335 (8th Cir. 1938). 71 With regard to count one, charging that Murray participated in a general narcotics conspiracy, Murray complains that there is nothing stated that pertains specifically to his own conduct. He points out that the date Murray is alleged to have joined the conspiracy is not stated in the count, nor does that count list any overt acts specifically attributable to him. 72 The statute in question, 21 U.S.C. 174, sets forth all of the essential elements of the offense. Count one is substantially in the words of the statute; but it also provides additional information. The indictment recited that the conspiracy began at a date to the grand jury unknown, and continued to about February 5, 1969. Six overt acts were alleged, none of which named Murray. 9 73 Since all of the necessary elements of the offense charged are expressly set forth in 21 U.S.C. 174, the indictment is sufficient if it charges the offense substantially in the words of the statute. Brown v. United States, 222 F.2d 293, 296 (9th Cir. 1955). This rule is applicable to conspiracy counts. Grene v. United States, 360 F.2d 585, 586 (5th Cir. 1966). Under a 21 U.S.C. 174 conspiracy charge it is not necessary to allege any overt acts. Hopkins v. United States, 405 F.2d 770, 772, n. 2, (9th Cir. 1969); Ewing v. United States, 386 F.2d 10, 15 (9th Cir. 1967); Leyvas v. United States, 371 F.2d 714, 717 (9th Cir. 1967). 74 We hold that count one of the indictment was entirely adequate to charge the conspiracy offense in question. 75 Count two of the indictment charges the substantive offense, under 18 U.S.C. 1403(a), of knowingly using telephone, wire, and other means of communication in San Diego County in facilitating the commission of, and attempting to commit, the importation, concealment, and sale of heroin and cocaine, the penalty for which offense is provided in 21 U.S.C. 174. Murray complains that, aside from referring to the use of communication facilities to facilitate the importation of drugs, count two 'gives no other clues as to the facts behind the indictment . . ..' Murray also notes that the count does not allege that the communication facilities were used in interstate or foreign commerce, and does not give the date and place of the alleged telephone calls. 76 Count two is also substantially in the language of the statute, except that additional details are provided, such as the date of the communications ('on or about December 1, 1968'), and the state and county in which the communication facilities were used (San Diego County, California). The statute, 18 U.S.C. 1403(a), does not require that the communication facilities be used in interstate or foreign commerce. This aspect of the federal offense is met by the element, here adequately alleged, that the communication be pursuant to the commission, or attempt to commit, an offense proscribed by 21 U.S.C. 174. United States v. Roviaro, 379 F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1967), cited by Murray, does not require that the exact date and precise location of the telephone call be set forth in the indictment. 77 We conclude that count two of the indictment is not defective. 10 78 5. Failure to record grand jury proceedings. Murray argues that the indictment should have been dismissed because no record was kept of the grand jury proceedings that resulted in the indictment. 79 In all of the cases cited by Murray in support of this contention, a grand jury transcript was available which could have been supplied to the defendant. In our case, the grand jury proceedings were not reported and hence no transcript could be supplied. 80 Absent a request in advance that grand jury proceedings be recorded (see United States v. Thoresen, 428 F.2d 654, 666 (9th Cir. 1970)), the failure to record such proceedings is not a ground for dismissal of an indictment or reversal of a conviction. See United States v. Jackson, 448 F.2d 963, 971 (9th Cir. 1971), and cases there cited. 81 6. Submission of indictment to jury. Murray urges that the trial court committed prejudicial error in submitting 'the entire indictment' to the jury for consideration. Murray states that the judge submitted the indictment with fifty names on it to the jury at the conclusion of the trial. According to Murray, there were many named individuals about whom no evidence was submitted at this Group II trial. Murray argues that since the jury members were not permitted to take notes during the trial, they may have assumed 'that the size of the criminal operation was bigger than the testimony at their particular trial had revealed.' This prejudice, Murray asserts, could not have been cured by a cautionary instruction, citing United States v. DeDominicis, 332 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1964). 82 Murray's factual premise for this argument is somewhat faulty. It is true that the indictment was read to the jury and sent to the jury room. However, the specific names, but not the docket numbers, pertaining to indicted co-conspirators were omitted. The trial court's ruling that the jurors should not take notes was at the unanimous request of the defendants, and was opposed by the Government. In any event, this is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. Toles v. United States, 308 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1962); Harris v. United States, 261 F.2d 792, 796 (9th Cir. 1958). We find no abuse of discretion here. 83 Murray made no objection at the trial to the submitting of the indictment to the jury. Ordinarily an appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised below, absent a showing that the attainment of fundamental justice is at stake. Hormel v. Helvering, 312 U.S. 552, 556-560, 61 S.Ct. 719, 85 L.Ed. 1037 (1941). See also Rule 52(b), Fed.R.Crim.P. In our view the submission of the excised indictment to the jury did not deprive Murray of fundamental justice or constitute plain error. 84 We have nevertheless examined the point on the merits. Whether an accusatory pleading should be permitted to go to the jury room is a matter within the discretion of the trial judge. Souza v. United States, 304 F.2d 274, 280 (9th Cir. 1962). Both counts of the indictment named Murray and hence the entire indictment was relevant in connection with his prosecution. We perceive no abuse of discretion in permitting this indictment, with names of other co-conspirators not involved in this trial eliminated, to go to the jury. 85 The DeDominicis case on which Murray relies is distinguishable on the facts. That indictment contained 2,553 counts, but DeDominicis was charged in only twenty-nine counts. His case was severed and he was tried on the twentynine counts. The jury was furnished with only these twenty-nine counts, but they were numbered 3 and 1244-1271. The court held that this may have left the jury with the impression that this defendant was an integral part of an enormous criminal operation, whereas this was not the case. In our case, on the other hand, Murray was charged as a co-conspirator in the entire Hernandez operation, as described in the first count of a two-count indictment. Thus, there was no possibility that the jury would assume a larger criminal operation than that with which Murray was charged. 86 7. Recording of Wright-Cohn telephone conversation. A conversation between Wright and Cohn, which occurred on December 14, 1968, was recorded without Cohn's knowledge. A tape recording of that conversation was played in court and was introduced in evidence as exhibit 474. In the course of that conversation, the name 'Lonnie' was mentioned. Murray contends that the recording of this telephone conversation by Wright at a time when he was a Government informer violated his right of privacy under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments. 87 Since Murray was not a party to this conversation, there was no invasion of his privacy. Murray has no standing to complain of the breach of Cohn's privacy. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-174, 89 S.Ct. 961, 22 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). 88 Murray also advances one argument pertaining to the recording of this conversation, concerning which his standing cannot be questioned. This contention is that the divulgence of this telephone conversation was prohibited by that part of 47 U.S.C. 605 which forbids any person not authorized by the sender from intercepting any radio communication and divulging or publishing the message to any person. However, the communication here in question was not a 'radio' communication, and it was not intercepted. 11