Opinion ID: 1934362
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: sufficiency of evidence of parental abandonment

Text: At all times relevant to this action, § 43-292(1) specified as an independent basis for termination of parental rights the circumstance in which [t]he parents have abandoned the juvenile for six months or more immediately prior to the filing of the petition. We have defined abandonment in this context as a parent's intentionally withholding from a child, without just cause or excuse, the parent's presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and the opportunity for the display of parental affection for the child. In re Interest of C.K., L.K., and G.K., 240 Neb. 700, 484 N.W.2d 68 (1992); In re Interest of A.G.G., 230 Neb. 707, 433 N.W.2d 185 (1988). The question of abandonment is largely one of intent, to be determined in each case from all the facts and circumstances. In re Interest of K.M.S., 236 Neb. 665, 463 N.W.2d 586 (1990); In re Interest of C.A., supra ; In re Interest of A.G.G., supra . A significant and uncontroverted fact relevant to Laura's intent to fulfill her parental responsibilities is her voluntary absence from this state after the children were removed from her home. The record reflects that while Laura has traveled extensively throughout the country, she has not returned to Nebraska, where her children reside, since July 1997, and that she did not appear at the termination hearing. We have stated that if a parent voluntarily, but unreasonably or unjustifiably, departs from the state of residence of the parent's child or children, such departure may constitute parental abandonment of the child or children. In re Interest of C.K., L.K., and G.K., supra ; In re Interest of A.G.G., supra . See In re Interest of C.A., 235 Neb. 893, 457 N.W.2d 822 (1990). For example, in In re Interest of C.K., L.K., and G.K., supra , a mother was absent from Nebraska for over 3½ years, during which time she had 30 different addresses while in 6 different states. She did not return to Nebraska until 1 month prior to the termination hearing, claiming that protracted unemployment rendered her financially unable to return sooner and that she was helping her former common-law husband search for his children. When she did return, she intended to stay only a few weeks before leaving for Minnesota, but then decided to stay longer and resume some visitation with her children when the petition to terminate her parental rights was filed. Further, the mother did not comply with the court-ordered rehabilitation plan, failing to attend numerous therapy sessions, parenting classes, and review hearings. The mother's psychotherapist stated that the mother remained resistant to participating in therapy and had difficulty understanding why she should be involved. Noting that the mother had elected to remain separated from her children while pursuing other interests, we held that the mother had abandoned her children pursuant to § 43-292(1), justifying termination of her parental rights. We concluded: The mother's somewhat nomadic existence left little hope for parentally produced stability in the lives of her children, and her prolonged absence from Nebraska, coupled with her unwillingness to attend to the needs of her children, as demonstrated by her rejection of parenting classes and counseling sessions, demonstrates the mother's disregard for the basic needs of her young children. At a time in the lives of the children when they most needed their mother, there was only maternal itinerancy, not interest. 240 Neb. at 713, 484 N.W.2d at 75. The same can be said of Laura's relationship with her children. We are not persuaded by the argument made on Laura's behalf that notwithstanding her voluntary separation from her children, she has not abandoned them because she inquires about their health during her regular telephone calls to Hopkins; has sent them small gifts; and has stated, in telephone conversations with Hopkins, that she wanted to continue to be a mother to her children. Brief for appellant at 10. As we have frequently stated, `[a]bandonment is not an ambulatory thing the legal effects of which a parent may dissipate at will by token efforts at reclaiming a discarded child.' In re Interest of K.M.S., 236 Neb. 665, 670, 463 N.W.2d 586, 591 (1990). Parental obligation requires a continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with that child. In re Interest of E.G., 240 Neb. 373, 482 N.W.2d 17 (1992); In re Interest of K.M.S., supra . Small tokens of parental affection for a child are an inadequate substitute for parental presence in a child's life. See In re Interest of C.A., 235 Neb. 893, 457 N.W.2d 822 (1990). Stated another way, the obligation which a parent owes to his or her children is not something which can simply be phoned in. Based upon our de novo review of the record, we conclude that for a period exceeding 6 months prior to the filing of the supplemental motion to terminate Laura's parental rights, Laura has intentionally, and without just cause or excuse, withheld her presence, care, love, protection, maintenance, and opportunity for display of parental affection from her three children. She has not seen them, furnished them with material or emotional support, or expressed interest in any aspect of their well-being and growth other than their physical health. She has quite clearly chosen to advocate her cause instead of raising her children and has given no indication that she ever intends to do more than periodically inquire about their health. Thus, there exists clear and convincing evidence to support a finding that Laura abandoned her children within the meaning of § 43-292(1).