Opinion ID: 624812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: .wagner's testimony

Text: The majority first concludes that the district court erred by excluding testimony from Vogel's sister, Yvon Wagner, regarding statements made by Vogel (who was deceased before trial). [1] Wagner would have testified regarding Vogel's thoughts and beliefs during the dress-out procedure based on statements Vogel purportedly madeafter the factto Wagner. The majority finds that the district court erred, apparently as a matter of law, no matter whether the standard of review is de novo or abuse of discretion. The majority erroneously concludes that Wagner's testimony was not offered to prove what Vogel asserted.
The Estate argues that Wagner's testimony was not hearsay, because it was not offered to prove the details of the dress-out procedure (i.e., that Vogel was actually raped). Instead, the Estate argues that Wagner's testimony was offered to show Vogel's state of mind following the dress-out procedure and the lasting impact the event had on Vogel following his release. The majority asserts that Wagner was not asserting the truth of anything that Vogel said had happened to him in jail. Maj. Op. at 980. I disagree with both. Wagner's testimony was offered to prove the truth of the matter assertedi.e., that Vogel believed the events he described happened. The district court did not incorrectly construe or apply the hearsay rule. Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). The majority agrees that, if Wagner's testimonyincluding Vogel's statements that (1) he was forcibly undressed by detention officers, (2) he was dressed in pink underwear and slippers, (3) the officers manhandled him on the floor of his jail cell, and (4) he called out to other inmates for helpwere offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it would be hearsay. Even if this information were consistent with other evidence in this case, it could not be proven by Wagner using hearsay evidence. However, the Estate and the majority assert that Wagner's testimony is not offered to prove the truth of anything that Vogel said had happened to him in jail. Maj. Op. at 980. That assertion may be true, but it is not focused on Wagner's statements. For example, Wagner testified that Vogel (1)  felt he was being raped, (2)  felt one of the officers attempted to put his penis in his mouth, (3)  believed he was being raped, and (4)  believed the pink underwear was used to put him in [a] vulnerable position with these officers. Wagner's testimony is offered to prove the truth of what Vogel assertedi.e., that he believed what he described occurred. A statement is hearsay if offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Focusing on Wagner's statements, they are hearsay, because they were offered to show that Vogel actually believed the facts asserted. 30B Michael H. Graham, Federal Practice & Procedure § 7044 (interim ed.2000) (explaining that second-hand statements of belief are hearsay, but may be admissible under Rule 803(3)'s exception to the hearsay rule). Further, the statements are hearsay, because it must be proven that Vogel believed the matters asserted were true for the Estate's mental state argument to succeed. Id. § 7006 (If the declarant must believe the matter asserted to be true for any inference to logically flow, . . . the hearsay risks of sincerity and narration are present. Such statements are thus properly classified as hearsay.). The Estate never made an offer of proof to demonstrate that the proffered testimony complied with the hearsay rule. Therefore, the district court's determination (that Wagner's testimony was hearsay) was not erroneous and the district court did not misconstrue the hearsay rule.