Opinion ID: 2608568
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the first degree kidnapping charge.

Text: Petitioner argues that the trial court should have dismissed the first degree kidnapping charge (hereinafter kidnapping) asserting the elements of proof that would support a conviction under RCW 9A.40.010 and .020 are the same as those which would constitute first degree robbery (hereinafter robbery) under RCW 9A.56.190 and .200. It is urged that, at best, the kidnapping was only incidental to the robbery and thus the kidnapping charge was duplicitous. We do not agree with the contention and affirm the Court of Appeals. RCW 9A.56.190 and .200 define robbery as follows: 9A.56.190 ... A person commits robbery when he unlawfully takes personal property from the person of another or in his presence against his will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear of injury to that person or his property or the person or property of anyone. Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to prevent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is immaterial. 9A.56.200 ... (1) A person is guilty of robbery in the first degree if in the commission of a robbery or of immediate flight therefrom, he: (a) Is armed with a deadly weapon; or (b) Displays what appears to be a firearm or other deadly weapon; or (c) Inflicts bodily injury. RCW 9A.40.020 and .010 define kidnapping as follows: Kidnaping in the first degree. (1) A person is guilty of kidnaping in the first degree if he intentionally abducts another person with intent: ... (b) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter ... (Italics ours.) 9A.40.010 Definitions. The following definitions apply in this chapter: (1) Restrain means to restrict a person's movements without consent and without legal authority in a manner which interferes substantially with his liberty. Restraint is without consent if it is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation, or deception, ... (2) Abduct means to restrain a person by either (a) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly force ... (Italics ours.) A review of the foregoing statutes makes it clear robbery and kidnapping require different elements of proof. As applied to the facts of this case, robbery requires (1) a taking of personal property, (2) from the person or in one's presence, (3) by the use or threatened use of force, or violence or fear of injury, (4) such force or fear being used to obtain or retain the property, (5) while armed or displaying a deadly weapon. On the other hand, as applied to the facts of this case, kidnapping involves an abduction to facilitate a subsequent flight from the commission of a felony, said abduction involving: (1) a restriction of a person's movement, (2) without consent, by (3) secreting or holding the victim in a place where he is not likely to be found, or by (4) using or threatening to use deadly force. [1] In the instant robbery the force or fear was employed to obtain personal property ( i.e., the money) from Rodriguez. In the subsequent kidnapping the force was used to abduct the victim by secreting him in a place where he was not likely to be found ( i.e., lying flat in the back seat of a car) or to facilitate the flight from the scene of the robbery, thus unlawfully restraining or restricting the victim's movement by physical force or intimidation. Once the money had been obtained by force, the robbery was completed. Any incidental abduction or restraint occurring during this short period of time would merge into the robbery as a matter of law. State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 676, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979). [T]he mere incidental restraint and movement of a victim which might occur during the course of a [crime] are not, standing alone, indicia of a true kidnapping. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 227, 616 P.2d 628 (1980). A kidnapping which occurred thereafter would be a wholly separate event, however. Neither the flight from the scene of the robbery nor the means of flight therefrom was statutorily or logically a part of the robbery. We are aware of no case which supports the unique theory that a felon is entitled, as a part of the criminal act, to escape from the scene of the crime. Most certainly it is not an element of the crime of robbery. Thus, the kidnapping involved in the instant case was not incidental to, a part of, or coexistent with the robbery. The first crime (robbery) had come to an end before the second crime (kidnapping) began. We do not hold that under other facts a kidnapping may not be incidental to or merged with robbery or some other felony. [1] We hold only that under the facts of this case the kidnapping and the robbery occurred as separate events, albeit close in time, and that the subsequent kidnapping was neither incidental to nor merged with the robbery. We hold the trial court did not err by refusing to dismiss the kidnapping charge.