Opinion ID: 627346
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Remaining Claims--Counts I, III, and V

Text: 23 In their initial memorandum in support of their motion for summary judgment, the defendants did not request that judgment be entered in their favor on all counts as they limited their argument to the three specific issues we paraphrased above. But as we have indicated, at oral argument on their motion the defendants challenged Count IV on the procedural grounds that a wrongful death action could be brought only by the baby's personal representative. Then, in their supplemental memorandum filed after the hearing on the motion, they expanded their argument to contend that if Counts II and IV were dismissed, the court should dismiss at least a portion of the remaining claims as derivative of those two counts. In particular, they argued that Count I, which charged Dr. Callender with malpractice, could not be maintained because wrongful delivery by itself does not establish a cause of action which merits any legal remedy. They urged that the result of the allegedly wrongful delivery was a wrongful death and the Abdallahs have surrendered that claim. Seemingly, the defendants could have made the same argument as to Count III, which charged the Government with malpractice, but they did not. Instead, they argued that Count III should be dismissed because the notice of claim did not satisfy the requirements of the Tort Claims Act. V.I.Code Ann. tit. 33, Sec. 3410. 24 We address these arguments separately. First, we discuss whether Counts I and III are simply derivative claims that rise and fall with Counts II and IV. 8 We find that they are not. Then, we consider whether Count III is jurisdictionally barred because the Abdallahs did not comply with the notice provisions of the Tort Claims Act. 9 We will remand this issue for consideration by the district court. Finally, we conclude that Count V, Mr. Abdallah's loss of consortium claim, should be reinstated because it is derivative to Counts I and III.
25 While the defendants contended in their supplemental brief in support of their motion for summary judgment that the Abdallahs have no cause of action absent their wrongful death claim, they cited no case law to support this argument. On appeal, the defendants have ignored this point. Instead, they inexplicably have defended the summary judgment on the wrongful death action even though the Abdallahs do not seek a reversal of that summary judgment. 10 We consider only the matters which the Abdallahs actually have raised. 26 Clearly it cannot reasonably be argued that Count I in all respects must be related to the wrongful death claim, for the Abdallahs charged in that count that Dr. Callender's malpractice caused Mrs. Abdallah to suffer a ruptured uterus. We can perceive of no reason why this claim cannot be pursued without regard for the stillbirth. Thus, we must vacate at least partially the summary judgment on Count I. 27 The more difficult issue relates to the Abdallahs' claims in Counts I and III for severe mental and emotional distress by reason of the stillbirth. While we have not found any Virgin Islands cases discussing whether a woman has an independent action against her doctor for malpractice resulting in the stillbirth of her child, cases from other jurisdictions clearly support the existence of such an action. In some jurisdictions a mother can maintain a malpractice action for the stillbirth of her child even though she has not suffered an independent physical injury. In Giardina v. Bennett, 111 N.J. 412, 545 A.2d 139 (1988), for example, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated 11 : 28 Medical malpractice causing a stillbirth results in infliction of a direct injury to the mother as well as to her unborn child. Even without any permanent physical harm, the mother suffers severe and genuine injuries in the form of emotional distress and mental anguish occasioned by her baby's stillbirth. This suffering is experienced, also, by the father of the infant. Id. 545 A.2d at 140. 29 Thus, the court suggested, Parents under such facts would be entitled to claim compensatory damages based on their emotional distress and mental anguish proximately caused by the negligent conduct of their doctor that results in the stillbirth of their baby. Id. at 143. Accord Burgess v. Superior Court, 2 Cal.4th 1064, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197 (1992) (noting that mother could recover for her emotional distress by reason of physical injuries to fetus caused by negligence during delivery, even absent physical injury of mother); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 832-33 (Iowa 1983) (noting right of recovery in parents for damages done to unborn fetus under Iowa law); Modaber v. Kelley, 232 Va. 60, 348 S.E.2d 233, 236-37 (1986) (noting right of mother to recover for injury to unborn child in womb and for emotional distress caused by death of fetus that was still part of her). The New Jersey Supreme Court recently affirmed this principle in Carey v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 622 A.2d 1279 (1993), holding that parents may recover for severe emotional distress suffered for medical malpractice resulting in the premature birth and death of their baby, without attempting to prove that they suffered physical injuries. The Carey court relied heavily on Giardina. But see id. (Handler, J., concurring) (stating that court ignored holding in Giardina by requiring parents to prove severe emotional distress). 30 Nevertheless, other jurisdictions apparently require the mother to suffer physical injury before allowing her to recover for the severe emotional distress arising from her fetus's death. For example, in Coughlin v. George Washington University Health Plan, Inc., 565 A.2d 67 (D.C.1989), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a pregnant woman has an action for malpractice against her doctor where the miscarriage resulted in her physical injury. Id. at 70-71 (citing cases from New York and North Carolina). The court noted that the mere fact that the doctor also may owe a duty of care to the baby does not extinguish the duty of care owed to the mother. See also Brown v. Green, 767 F.Supp. 273, 275 (D.D.C.) (following Coughlin to find a cause of action on behalf of mother irrespective of cause of action in baby), order vacated on reconsideration, 781 F.Supp. 36 (D.D.C.1991); accord Prado v. Catholic Medical Center of Brooklyn & Queens, Inc., 145 A.D.2d 614, 536 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (1988) (noting that in New York, mother cannot recover for stillbirth absent physical injuries extending beyond normal pain and suffering associated with childbirth). 31 We, however, at least at this time, need not choose between the two lines of cases because Mrs. Abdallah suffered from a ruptured uterus, a direct physical injury beyond the normal pain associated with childbirth. 12 Therefore, we believe that in most jurisdictions Mrs. Abdallah would be able to recover for the severe emotional distress that she suffered due to the stillbirth of her child. Because the common law as generally understood and applied in the United States applies in the Virgin Islands absent a statute or Restatement rule to the contrary, see V.I.Code Ann. tit. 1, Sec. 4 (1967), Mrs. Abdallah has stated an independent basis for relief in Counts I and III. Accordingly, the district court erred in granting the defendants summary judgment on Counts I and III as they exist independently of Counts II or IV. 32 We also must consider Mr. Abdallah's claims in Counts I and III for his own severe emotional and mental distress. The cases quite naturally tend to focus on the severe emotional and mental distress to a mother suffering a stillbirth. Nevertheless we conclude that a father should have his own claim if he experiences that distress, provided he stands in an intimate family relationship to the mother and the fetus, contemporaneously observes the malpractice and the effect on the mother, and is shocked by the results. See Carey v. Lovett, 622 A.2d at 1290. 13 33
34 The defendants argued in their supplemental memorandum on their motion for summary judgment, that Count III should be dismissed because the Abdallahs did not comply with the requirements of the Tort Claims Act in V.I.Code Ann. tit. 33, Secs. 3409, 3410. The defendants did not ask for that ruling in their initial memorandum, although they did state that Counts I, II, and V should be dismissed for this reason. The district court did not rule on this argument; rather, it dismissed Counts I, III, and V as being derivative of Counts II and IV. 14 Section 3410 states in relevant part: 35 The claim shall state the time when and the place where such claim arose, the nature of same, and items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained and the total sum claimed. The notice of intention to file a claim shall set forth the same matters except that the items of damage or injuries and the sum claimed need not be stated. 36 A review of the Abdallahs' notice of claim reveals that it met all the requirements of section 3410, at least for a notice of intention to file a claim. Their notice of claim recites the time and place of the incident as well as that their claim stemmed from the stillbirth of their child. It further lists the damage and injuries suffered and the minimum amount claimed. This information satisfies the requirements of section 3410 for a written notice of intention to file a claim, for it provides enough information to enable the government to make an investigation in order to determine if the claims should be settled without suit. McBean v. Government of Virgin Islands, 19 V.I. 383, 388 (Terr.Ct.1983). However, we express no opinion as to whether the information was sufficient to satisfy section 3410's requirements for a claim. 15 Inasmuch as the district court did not rule on the defendants' argument under the Tort Claims Act, we will remand the case so that this argument may be considered by that court in the first instance on a full record. 37
38 Lastly, we address Mr. Abdallah's loss of consortium claim. The district court granted the defendants' summary judgment on this claim because it regarded it as derivative of Counts II and IV, on which it had granted summary judgment to the defendants. But as we have rejected the district court's holding that Counts I and III are derivative of Counts II and IV, Count V must be reinstated as well. We note, however, that to the extent that Mr. Abdallah seeks to recover for loss of consortium for the results of the battery, his claim remains barred. Instead, he may recover derivatively only through Counts I and III which allege injuries to his wife. 16