Opinion ID: 1742573
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: local v. general act

Text: The first issue with which we are confronted is whether the Act before us can be categorized as one of general or local application, as defined in § 110, Article 4, Constitution of Alabama 1901. A general law within the meaning of this article is a law which applies to the whole state; a local law is a law which applies to any political subdivision or subdivisions of the state less than the whole; a special or private law within the meaning of this article is one which applies to an individual, association, or corporation. On an initial reading, the distinction between these two types of legislation seems quite lucid. As we shall presently see, however, any presupposed degree of clarity becomes only superficial in the light of our case law, which is perplexing at times in its ratio decidendi. Nevertheless, this distinction is a critical one since a local law can only become valid through compliance with § 106 of the State Constitution, which prescribes that notice of such law must be published in the county affected by its passage. Otherwise stated, should it be determined that the Act before us is in actuality a local law passed under the guise of a general law, and thus would require publication to initially ensure its contitutionality, then the entire Act must be struck down as unconstitutional since here there was no publication. Appellants, in support of the Act's constitutionality, maintain that Act No. 546 purports to be, and is, what has come to be known as a general act of local application. With this contention we cannot agree. By § 1 of the Act, it is made applicable only in counties having a population of more than 500,000 § 3 contains additional classifications which render its impact different with respect to municipalities having a population of more than 5,000 as compared to municipalities having a population of 5,000 or less. The record amply demonstrates that Act No. 546 was a measure intended to meet the specific needs of the Jefferson County Board of Health. Like most comparable legislation, it wound its way through the legislative process as a local act, being presented to the Jefferson County legislative delegation as a matter of its local concern. As such, it would appear to run afoul of both the letter and the spirit of the standard established by this Court in State ex rel. Covington v. Thompson, 142 Ala. 98, 38 So. 679 (1904): ... a law which is general in its terms, and is in good faith so framed that all parts of the state may come within the circle of its operation, is a general law. Yet its contravention of the subsequent and now widely accepted test established in Reynolds v. Collier, 204 Ala. 38, 39, 85 So. 465, 467 (1920), is not nearly so clear, that test being: ... The effect of all of our decisions, in short, has been that where there is a substantial difference in population, and the classification is made in good faith, reasonably related to the purpose to be effected and to the difference in population which forms the basis thereof, and not merely arbitrary, it is a general law, although at the time it may be applicable to only one political subdivision of the state; but that if the classification bears no reasonable relation to the difference in population, upon which it rests, in view of the purpose to be effected by such legislation, and clearly shows it was merely fixed arbitrarily, guised as a general law, and, in fact, is a local law, it is then in plain violation of the Constitution and cannot be upheld. [Our emphasis.] There, and in subsequent cases, this Court recognized a larger field of operation for the so-called general act of local application in heavily populated urban areas. The trend has been to accept the open-ended population classification applicable to Jefferson County only. Even here, however, our holdings do not present an altogether clear standard for determining whether a logical relationship exists between the classification employed and the purposes of the act. On this point, the line of demarcation between our recent decisions in Masters et al. v. Pruce et al., 290 Ala. 56, 274 So.2d 33 (1973), on the one hand, and Duncan v. Meeks, 281 Ala. 452, 204 So.2d 483 (1967), or McDowell et al. v. Columbia Pictures Corporation et al., 281 Ala. 438, 203 So.2d 454 (1967), on the other, is neither black nor white, but essentially gray. Our decisions, therefore, require a case by case determination. As we have previously indicated, such determination is here pretermitted, however, because of our treatment of the aspect of double classification of Act 546. When an act contains a scheme of double classification which eliminates its prospective application or which destroys the reasonable relationship with its subject matter, it cannot be considered as a general act. Opinion of the Justices, 277 Ala. 630, 173 So.2d 793 (1965). See also, Opinion of the Justices, 275 Ala. 465, 156 So.2d 151 (1963). The case of State ex rel. Saltsman v. Weakley, et al., 153 Ala. 648, 45 So. 175 (1907) furnishes an excellent explanation of double classification, and its authority is compelling here both because of its clear analysis of the problem and the striking similarity that its fact situation bears to the one at hand. In Saltsman, an act was passed which provided for the establishment of police commissions in cities of 35,000 or more in counties of 125,000 or more, a classification in which only Jefferson County and the City of Birmingham could fit. The act was challenged as to its constitutionality on the grounds that it was actually a local law guised as a general one for which the required notice was not published. The Court, agreeing with this contention and referring to such as a double classification, said at 153 Ala. 653, 45 So. 176: The act in question was in no sense a classification of counties, as its manifest object is to create a police board in cities, and pertains in no way to the regulation of counties. Nor is it a bona fide classification of cities, as it expressly excludes cities of the same class, unless located in a county of a certain size. While there are cities in Alabama other than Birmingham with the necessary population, Birmingham is the only one located in a county with a population of 125,000. The substance of the act is for the sole purpose of regulating conditions in Birmingham, although the act is disguised in the garb of a general law. While we do not wish to recede from our former decisions on this subject, and do not intend by this opinion to give the backing signal, we do think the subject and occasion appropriate for an application of judicial brakes, else section 110 of the Constitution will be absolutely emasculated. The act in question being local, although under the attempted guise of a general law, is repugnant to section 106 of the Constitution, for the reason that no notice was given of the intention to apply for the enactment of same. The similarity between the above and the present situation is readily apparent. The object of Act 546 is to assess the cities within Jefferson County, and pertains in no way to such regulations and assessments in other counties around the state. For where, as here, a classification within a classification has the effect of simply designating, rather than classifying, cities within Jefferson County and thereby governing the Act's application to such cities, the challenged Act comes within the influence of the following rule as stated in the Opinion of the Justices, supra, 277 Ala. at p. 633, 173 So.2d at p. 796 (1965). Our cases make it clear that classification on a population basis cannot make an act general instead of local where the act presents a double classification or other limitations hedging it about so as to prevent its operation in all cities now or hereafter coming within the population classification or where future legislation is required to make the classification applicable to all cities. It follows that Act 546 was a local act and could not validly have been enacted without compliance with the advertising requirements included in § 106. That section sounds the death knell for any such legislation by providing in specific and rather extraordinary language: The courts shall pronounce void every special, private, or local law which the journals do not affirmatively show was passed in accordance with the provisions of this section. It follows from our conclusion on this point that the double classification was constitutionally impermissible. Affirmed. HEFLIN, C. J., and MERRILL, COLEMAN, HARWOOD, BLOODWORTH, McCALL and FAULKNER, JJ., concur. MADDOX, J., concurs in result.