Opinion ID: 1952443
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the instructions on the elements of second degree murder

Text: Moorhead's final argument is that the Superior Court's instructions to the jury regarding the elements of murder in the second degree were confusing and erroneous as a matter of law. As a result, Moorhead claims that he was denied a fair trial and that his conviction must be overturned. This Court will uphold the instructions given by the trial court if they were such as to enable the jury to intelligently perform its duty in returning a verdict. Storey v. Castner, Del.Supr., 314 A.2d 187, 194 (1973); Riley v. State, Del.Supr., 585 A.2d 719, 724 (1990), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2840, 115 L.Ed.2d 1008 (1991). It is well established that: [A] trial court's instructions will not be the basis for reversible error if they are reasonably informative and not misleading, judged by common practices and standards of verbal communication. Haas v. United Technologies Corp., Del. Supr., 450 A.2d 1173, 1179 (1982), appeal dismissed, 459 U.S. 1192, 103 S.Ct. 1170, 75 L.Ed.2d 423 (1983) (quoting Baker v. Reid, Del.Supr., 57 A.2d 103, 109 (1947)). When judging the propriety of a jury charge, the entire instruction is considered with no statement to be viewed out of context. Haas, 450 A.2d at 1179. Thus, a single instruction to a jury must not be judged in artificial isolation, but must be viewed in the context of the overall charge. Cupp v. Naughten, 414 U.S. 141, 146-47, 94 S.Ct. 396, 400-01, 38 L.Ed.2d 368 (1973). Moorhead's first claim of error regarding the Superior Court's instructions to the jury is that the explanation of the required state of mind for second degree murder was so confusing and inadequate as to constitute reversible error. Specifically, Moorhead contends that the inclusion of both willfully and not deliberate in the following portion of the jury instruction was contradictory and improper: If the act was voluntary and willfully done and had a direct tendency to destroy the life of another, and was not deliberate, if it was done without justification or adequate provocation, that it can be said that such act manifested a cruel, wicked and depraved indifference to human life. Defendant's Appendix at A-177 (emphasis added). We do not find the instruction to be contradictory or improper as Moorhead claims. The phrase voluntary and willfully done clearly refers to the nature of the defendant's act. By contrast, the phrase not deliberate applies not to the act, but to the consequence of the act (i.e., the destruction of a human life). Thus, the act causing the murder must have been intentionally performed, but the homicidal result need not be deliberate. Although it would have been preferable if the instruction to the jury had contained a more detailed explanation of the meaning of not deliberate, this Court has recognized that some inaccuracies and inaptness in statement are to be expected in any charge. Baker, 57 A.2d at 109. Because the descriptive phrase voluntary and willfully done follows immediately after the act in contrast to the phrase not deliberate which follows the description of the consequence of the act (the tendency to destroy the life of another), we conclude that the instruction correctly stated the law and posed little risk of confusion. Moorhead's other challenges to the Superior Court's jury instructions relate to apparent misstatements by the trial judge. First, in describing the type of recklessness that is necessary for murder in the second degree, the trial court stated: A cruel, wicked and depraved indifference to human life can be found if the act of the defendant is so fraught with danger that it would be likely to cause death or serious bodily injury to another. (Defendant's Appendix at A-177) (emphasis added). Although Moorhead is correct that the reference to serious bodily harm was erroneous because the type of recklessness being described pertains to murder in the second degree, the remainder of the instruction indicates little risk that the jury would have been misled or confused. In particular, the trial judge instructed the jury that in order to convict a defendant of murder in the second degree, you must find that the defendant was aware of and consciously disregarded the risk that the conduct would cause death.... Defendant's Appendix at A-176 (emphasis added). When read in context, therefore, the Superior Court's instructions regarding the type of recklessness required for murder in the second degree were not misleading. Cf. Probst v. State, Del.Supr., 547 A.2d 114, 119-20 (1988) (holding that a jury instruction was misleading where the erroneous language was repeatedly stated, thereby creating a likelihood of jury confusion). Second, the trial judge mistakenly interjected second degree murder when he summarized the elements of manslaughter. This inadvertent reference evidently was not detected by defense counsel, who did not object to it at trial, nor by anyone else who was present. After reviewing the entire instruction regarding manslaughter, we find virtually no risk that the jury was confused by the trial judge's misstatement. The Superior Court began the manslaughter charge by telling the jury: In order to find the defendant guilty of manslaughter, you must find that all of the following elements have been established by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant's Appendix at A-180 (emphasis added). After setting forth the elements of manslaughter, and immediately following the inadvertent reference to second degree murder, the Superior Court concluded: If, after considering all of the evidence, you find that the State has established beyond a reasonable doubt that [the elements of the crime occurred] ... you should find the defendant guilty of manslaughter. If you do not so find, or if you have reasonable doubt as to either element of this offense, you must find the defendant not guilty of manslaughter. Defendant's Appendix at A-181-82 (emphasis added). Any possible confusion from the erroneous reference to second degree murder was manifestly cured by this concluding passage. See Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 581 A.2d 1078, 1107 (1990) (holding that a trial judge's misstatement in a jury instruction was harmless error because there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury would misinterpret the accurate instructions that were subsequently given), vacated and remanded on other grounds, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1093, 117 L.Ed.2d 309 (1992). Accordingly, we find the Superior Court's instructions to be adequate when viewed in their entirety. See Haas, 450 A.2d at 1179. Although Moorhead has pointed out certain minor errors in the instructions, none of these posed a material risk of confusion among the jury. Therefore, to the extent the trial judge committed any errors in the instructions, they were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.