Opinion ID: 2658283
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony about the Meaning of Drug Slang

Text: This Court reviews preserved challenges to rulings on the admission of lay and expert testimony for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless error analysis.1 We review forfeited evidentiary objections only for plain error.2 1 United States v. El-Mezain, 664 F.3d 467, 511–12 (5th Cir. 2011). 2 United States v. Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d 453, 462 (5th Cir. 2013). 5 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515
Edwards, Akins, Shawn Perkins, and Marco Perkins challenge the district court’s denial of their objection under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 to the lay testimony of Secret Service Agent Darrell Lyons concerning the meaning of code words used by the conspirators on wiretapped recordings. Because this objection was preserved at trial, at least by counsel for some appellants, we review for abuse of discretion, subject to harmless error analysis. Lyons, the lead investigator of the conspiracy, testified as a lay witness about his understanding of the meaning of code words recorded in wiretapped conversations. Counsel objected on various grounds at trial, including that Lyons was testifying to an ultimate fact issue, that he was not qualified as an expert, and that defense counsel had not been given advance notice that he would be testifying as an expert. The district court sustained the objection on the ground that the Government had not provided defense counsel with proper notice to qualify Lyons as an expert, and prohibited Lyons from testifying on the meaning of drug slang because it required specialized knowledge. The following day when Lyons was recalled, defense counsel renewed their objection to Lyons’ continued testimony about how he interpreted coded words on wiretapped calls. The court clarified that as a lay witness under Fed. R. Evid. 701, Lyons could testify about his understanding of the meaning of coded conversations if his testimony was rationally based on Lyons’ own perception–here, his reading of the wiretap transcripts and involvement in this particular investigation–and not on specialized knowledge from his broader experience. Counsel’s repeated objections to Lyons’ interpretations of code words on the recordings were overruled on the grounds that the interpretation was based on knowledge gathered from the investigation of this case. Lyons proceeded to give extensive testimony about what coded conversations “mean[t] to [him]” or what he “believed” the speakers were saying, and confirmed in 6 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 7 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 response to questioning that his understanding of the code words was based on his investigation of this case. On appeal, Edwards, Akins, Marco Perkins, and Shawn Perkins urge that the district court erroneously allowed Lyons to testify as an expert on this drug jargon despite the court’s earlier instruction that Lyons could testify only as a lay witness. Although we question that the demarcation between drug slang knowledge based on Lyons’ expertise and that based on his investigation of this conspiracy could have been as clean as Lyons’ proffered justifications suggested, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the testimony. In United States v. McMillan,3 this Court addressed the argument appellants raise here. In that case, appellants argued that the trial court “violated its role as gatekeeper for expert evidence by allowing three fact witnesses . . . to give opinions based on Louisiana’s statutory accounting rules.”4 This Court denied appellants’ claim, holding that the witnesses’ testimony properly was confined to the conclusions and observations the witnesses gathered from their investigation in the case at issue.5 “A witness who provides only lay testimony may give limited opinions that are based on the witness’ perception and that are helpful in understanding the testimony or in determining a fact in issue, but the witness may not opine based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.”6 Although the witnesses defined certain legal terms in the course of their testimony, they provided factual information about the circumstances of the case, their observations, and the conclusions they reached. “To the extent that some of the witnesses’ testimony may have implicated specialized 3 600 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2010). 4 Id. at 455. 5 Id. at 456. 6 Id. 7 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 8 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 knowledge by defining certain accounting terms,” this Court concluded, “the error in allowing the testimony, if any, was harmless because in the context of the entire trial [there was] no reasonable basis to find an effect on the jury’s verdict.”7 This Court has recognized that in the context of drug conspiracies, “[d]rug traffickers’ jargon is a specialized body of knowledge, familiar only to those wise in the ways of the drug trade, and therefore a fit subject for expert testimony.”8 But we have not limited drug slang testimony to experts in all cases. Rather, we have recognized that testimony about the meaning of drug code words can be within the proper ambit of a lay witness with extensive involvement in the underlying investigation. In United States v. Miranda,9 the appellant maintained that an FBI agent, who had not been designated as an expert witness, testified about the meanings of various code words heard on intercepted phone calls and thereby “crossed the line” from lay to expert opinion testimony. In rejecting that argument under the facts presented there, we held that the agent’s testimony was permissible under Fed. R. Evid. 701 because the agent’s “extensive participation in the investigation of this conspiracy, including surveillance . . . and the monitoring and translating of intercepted telephone conversations, allowed him to form opinions concerning the meaning of certain code words used in this drug ring based on his personal perceptions.”10 Similarly, in United States v. El-Mezain,11 we acknowledged that some of the facts presented by testifying agents would not be known to an average lay 7 Id. at 457. 8 United States v. Griffith, 118 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997) (finding no error in a drug investigator’s testimony on her “expertise” in drug jargon where the court and parties treated the witness “in substance as an expert” even though the court failed formally to qualify her). 9 248 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2001). 10 Id. at 441. 11 664 F.3d at 514. 8 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 9 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 person. But we held that the district court did not err by admitting the testimony because “the agents’ opinions were limited to their personal perceptions from their investigation of this case.”12 We noted that “[b]y explaining the meanings of terms as used in the conversations and documents, as well as the relationships between the people they were investigating, the agents provided the jury with relevant factual information about the investigation.”13 And we clarified that “[t]estimony need not be excluded as improper lay opinion, even if some specialized knowledge on the part of the agents was required, if it was based on first-hand observations in a specific investigation.”14 We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in admitting Lyons’ testimony. Lyons was extensively involved in the investigation of the conspiracy. As the lead investigator on the case, Lyons had conducted surveillance on a number of participants in the drug organization, and claimed to have reviewed every wiretapped phone call, reviewed every transcript offered into evidence, listened to “every second” of all relevant conversations, and spoken with a number of informants, co-conspirators, and the defendants themselves. Lyons repeatedly explained how this investigation led him to deduce the meaning of drug code words.15 The district court was clear, to counsel and to the jury, that “as long as [Lyons’] conclusions about what the language means in the calls is based, in part, on his investigation and not rooted in his 12 Id. 13 Id. 14 Id. 15 Lyons explained, for example, that he knows “three zones” is “three ounces” because he heard the speakers on the intercepted calls use the terms interchangeably; that“kinfolk” means the defendants from Paris because he investigated where the license plates are registered; that a “nine” referred to nine ounces of cocaine because the quoted price was consistent with that amount in the investigation here; and that “we know from the search and seizure that [a “bi”] is approximately 4-1/2 ounces of crack cocaine.” 9 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 10 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 expertise,” the court would allow the testimony. Although Lyons may have drawn in part from his law enforcement experience, it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to rule that Lyons’ conclusions were largely based on first-hand observations in this specific investigation. We hold, furthermore, that any error of the district court in admitting Lyons’ testimony was harmless. To the extent that certain portions of Lyons’ testimony at times crossed the line into drawing exclusively on his expertise, it was cumulative of other testimony and therefore harmless.16 A careful review of the trial record convinces us that Lyons’ interpretations overwhelmingly were consistent with those provided by Styron and by Stacy Bellamy, a cooperating co-conspirator. Liggins, Walters, and Akins also challenge Lyons’ testimony on the grounds that it was unqualified, that he testified as a summary witness, and that he gave impermissible personal “impressions” of the intercepted conversations. We hold that the trial judge did not err in accepting Lyons’ personal observations of this investigation as the basis for his lay testimony. This Court has recognized that the meaning of drug code words can be within the proper ambit of the testimony of a lay witness with extensive involvement in the underlying investigation.17 Nor is there merit in appellants’ contention that Lyons’ “dual role as case agent and unqualified expert/lay opinion witness” allowed him to serve as a summary witness that impermissibly relayed his “impressions” to the jury. We are satisfied after a close review of the record that Lyons neither testified as a “summary witness” within the meaning of this Court’s precedent nor served to 16 See United States v. Griffin, 324 F.3d 330, 348 (5th Cir. 2003) (“We find any error that occurred from the district court allowing Stiner to testify as to the meaning of the law was harmless because her testimony was cumulative of other witnesses’ testimony.”). 17 United States v. Miranda, 248 F.3d 434, 441 (5th Cir. 2001). 10 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 11 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 “merely tell the jury what result to reach.” In United States v. Nguyen,18 we held that the district court committed harmless error in allowing an investigator to provide a summary of her investigation along with a summary chart, testify as to the ultimate issue of the defendant’s mental state by referring to her as a coconspirator, and premise her summary testimony on out-of-court statements that had not previously been presented to the jury. While summary witnesses “may be appropriate for summarizing voluminous records, as contemplated by Rule 1006,” they may not distill the jury’s ultimate conclusions from a body of evidence.19 Similarly, in United States v. Fullwood,20 we held that “limits [] may well have been exceeded” (but did not rise to reversible plain error) where an agent, as a final rebuttal witness before jury deliberations, “simply recap[ped] substantial portions of the Government’s case-in-chief.” Lyons did not testify as a “summary witness” within the meaning of this precedent. Lyons’ interpretation of the wiretapped recordings came only after they were admitted into evidence and played before the jury. We find no point in the record at which Lyons recapped portions of the Government’s case-inchief. To the contrary, the Government called Lyons to the stand fifteen times to describe various aspects of his investigation, ensuring that his testimony came only as the evidence was presented. Lyons’ explanation that his interpretation of some drug code words was based on what he learned from this investigation as a whole is a virtue for his role as a lay witness testifying from personal perception, not a vice that equates to summarizing the Government’s case-inchief within the meaning of Nguyen and Fullwood. We are satisfied that Lyons’ testimony neither drew conclusions as to the significance of particular evidence in the case, nor reached ultimate legal conclusions about the appellants’ guilt. 18 504 F.3d 561, 571 (5th Cir. 2007). 19 Id. at 572 (quoting United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 414 (5th Cir. 2003)). 20 342 F.3d 409, 413–14 (5th Cir. 2003). 11 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 12 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 Rather, Lyons testified about his interpretation of coded drug slang conversations, as this Court has recognized he may do under the facts presented here.
Edwards, Akins, and Marco Perkins argue that the district court erred by allowing DEA Group Supervisor Mark Styron to testify about the meaning of certain drug-code words as an expert witness under Fed. R. Evid. 702. The basis for counsel’s objection at trial to Styron’s testimony was unclear, but emphasized that Styron failed to qualify as an expert on the subject of drug slang because Styron could point to no reliable sources that corroborate his interpretations of the slang words. The court overruled the objection and denied counsel’s motion to strike, finding that Styron’s twenty-three years of experience as a DEA agent qualified him to testify to the meaning of drug slang. We review this preserved evidentiary objection for abuse of discretion21 and find none. Importantly, appellants do not argue on appeal that Styron lacks inherent expert qualification to testify regarding drug slang. Nor do they argue that the initial Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) disclosure that Styron would be designated as an expert on drug slang is inadequate, or irrelevant because it was not filed with the court. Rather, they point only to a Supplemental Expert Witness Notice that offered Styron as an expert on firearms, and omit reference to the initial notice that submitted Styron as an expert on drug slang, in arguing that Styron’s testimony about drug slang was outside his designated area of expertise. On April 19, 2013, the Government filed a motion to supplement the record on appeal with an Expert Witness Notice that was sent to defense counsel before trial, on October 18, 2010, but was not filed with the court at that time. This Court granted the motion on May 1, 2013. That Notice shows that the Government informed defense counsel, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 21 Perez-Solis, 709 F.3d at 462. 12 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 13 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 16(a)(1)(G), that it would call Styron as a “Drug Distribution Expert” at trial, and specified that “based on [Group Supervisor] Styron’s experience and training,” he intended to testify on subjects including “slang or code terms [that] are commonly used in the narcotics underworld to help maintain the secret nature of the business” and that he “is familiar with some commonly used terms.” A summary of Styron’s qualifications was attached. Four days later, on October 22, 2010, the Government filed with the court, and provided to defense counsel, a “Supplemental 404B and Firearm Expert Witness Notice.” That Notice stated that the prosecution would call Styron as an expert witness to testify regarding the role of guns in drug distribution, and that “Styron’s qualifications have been previously provided to you.” The trial record confirms that defense counsel received the initial notification that Styron would provide expert testimony about slang used in narcotics distribution, as defense counsel quoted from it in colloquy with the judge. But now on appeal, Edwards, Akins, and Marco Perkins mention only the “Supplemental Expert Witness Notice” to argue that, in testifying about the meaning of drug slang terms, Styron testified outside of his designated firearms expertise. Fed. R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(G) of the provides that “[a]t the defendant’s request, the government must give to the defendant a written summary of any testimony that the government intends to use under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal Rules of Evidence during its case-in-chief at trial.” Rule 16(a)(1)(G) contains no explicit requirement that the notice be filed with the court at the time it is provided to defense counsel in order for a trial judge’s later designation of the witness as an expert on a topic to be valid. Because we hold that the district court committed no error in designating Styron as an expert on drug slang and defense counsel received proper notification, we find no merit in appellants’ claim. Finally, Edwards, Akins, Marco Perkins, and Walters contend that the district court violated their Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights by 13 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 14 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 allowing Styron to testify about the basis for his expert opinions concerning the meaning of certain drug code words. We review “Confrontation Clause objections that were properly raised at trial [] de novo, subject to harmless error analysis.”22 The appellants’ objection here is two-fold. First, they argue that because Styron’s drug-slang testimony was outside his designated area of expertise, he essentially testified as both an expert (on guns) and a lay/fact witness (on drug slang). They claim this hampered defense counsel’s ability to cross-examine Styron because a failed attempt to impeach Styron as an expert could backfire to enhance his credibility as a fact witness. They point to a Second Circuit case, United States v. Dukagjini,23 which raised concerns where the case agent who testified about the facts of a drug conspiracy investigation also provided expert testimony about the meaning of drug slang. There, the Second Circuit explained that while not categorically impermissible, the use of a case agent as both a fact and expert witness presents a heightened risk that the “expert testimony will stray from applying reliable methodology and convey to the jury the witness’s ‘sweeping conclusions’ about appellants’ activities,” impinging on the role of the jury.24 But having concluded that Styron’s testimony about drug slang was within his designation as an expert, we find no indication in the record that Styron testified as both an expert and a fact witness, nor that counsel’s vigorous crossexamination was hampered in any way. Unlike Lyons’ testimony, Styron’s testimony was general information about the drug trade and law enforcement learned over a long career, not fact testimony about this investigation. Indeed, defense counsel made this distinction clear for the jury multiple times during 22 United States v. Pryor, 483 F.3d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 2007). 23 326 F.3d 45, 53–54 (2d Cir. 2003). 24 Id. at 54. 14 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 15 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 cross-examination, emphasizing that Styron was explaining the general process of conducting a DEA investigation but not giving specific testimony about the defendants. On review of the record we do not find Styron to have served as a fact witness, and Styron clarified multiple times that his testimony was based on his understanding of common terms used throughout the drug distribution industry–not from the facts of this investigation. The concerns raised by the Second Circuit about a case agent serving dual roles as fact witness regarding the investigation and as expert witness are thus inapplicable here, where Styron’s testimony properly was confined to his areas of expertise. Second, appellants argue that to the extent Styron explained that his expertise on the meaning of drug slang terms is based, in part, on what he heard other conspirators say in other drug investigations over the course of his career, he relayed impermissible hearsay to the jury in violation of the Confrontation Clause. Appellants urge this Court to adopt the Second Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. Mejia,25 which found that expert testimony violated the Confrontation Clause where the expert simply transmitted testimonial hearsay statements–there, the custodial interrogations of other gang members in the same conspiracy–without “form[ing] his own opinions by applying his extensive experience and a reliable methodology to the inadmissible materials.”26 But we hold that Mejia is inapplicable to the non-testimonial bases of Styron’s expert opinion presented here. Appellants point to no testimonial statements within the meaning of Crawford v. Washington,27 or any impermissible hearsay at all, relayed by Styron’s testimony. When asked how he came to form his opinions about the interpretation of coded drug slang, Styron explained that over the course of his career, he “listened to thousands of 25 545 F.3d 179 (2d Cir. 2008). 26 Id. at 197 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 27 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 15 Case: 12-40515 Document: 00512575405 Page: 16 Date Filed: 03/27/2014 No. 12-40515 conversations on telephones and [was] part of hundreds of investigations,” including talking to cooperating individuals and other agents in unrelated investigations, and became familiar with the common drug jargon of many organizations. Fed. R. Evid. 703 allows an expert witness to “base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed,” as well as inadmissible evidence “if experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject[.]” Styron’s testimony suggests only that he based his opinion on the types of information that an agent with extensive experience investigating drug conspiracies reasonably would rely, and we hold that no Confrontation Clause violation occurred here.