Opinion ID: 4680741
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecution’s Contribution to Delay

Text: Gelfuso instructs that we must also consider “the extent to which the prosecution bears responsibility for the delay that has ensued.” 838 F.2d at 359. Torres does not dispute that the prosecution bears no responsibility for the delay in his case. The first two continuances were stipulated to for the benefit of Torres’s counsel to adequately prepare his case and the remainder of the continuances were a direct result of the COVID-19 pandemic.11 This factor weighs against finding a due process violation. 11 Torres briefly contends that in the event this court determined in United States v. Olsen, __ F.3d __, No. 20-50329 (9th Cir. 2021) that the Central District “knowingly and willfully” made “a 24 3. Evidence Supporting Detention under Bail Reform Act In addition to the length of detention and the fault of the prosecution, many of our sister circuits and district courts within this Circuit also consider the strength of the evidence supporting the defendant’s detention under the Bail Reform Act factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). See, e.g., United States v. Ailemen, 165 F.R.D. 571, 581 (N.D. Cal. 1996) (collecting cases). We agree these factors are instructive.12 They include: (1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged . . .; (2) the weight of the evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the person, including—[as relevant here] the person’s . . . history relating to drug or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning appearance at court proceedings; and . . . whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under Federal, State, or local law; and (4) the nature and seriousness of the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by the person’s release. . . . 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g). Here, the district court consistently found that Torres has a documented history of substance abuse, clear access to ammunition, a significant criminal history substantive policy decision to suspend the constitutional rights of . . . every . . . defendant unwilling to waive time,” then this factor should weigh in favor of Torres. See United States v. Infelise, 934 F.2d 103, 104–05 (7th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the defendant “must show that either the prosecution or the court has unnecessarily delayed in bringing the case to trial”) (emphasis added). This Court did not reach such a conclusion in Olsen and therefore need not determine the relevance court-caused delays have in the due process inquiry. 12 We do not read Gelfuso to hold that the two factors mentioned—length of delay and prosecution’s fault—are the only factors that may be considered in this due process analysis. 25 including violent offenses, and a history of failing to appear. These findings, coupled with the strength of the government’s case in light of Torres’s Mirandized confession, and the seriousness of Torres’s current charges, support the conclusion that the Bail Reform Act factors weigh strongly against a due process violation. Torres all but concedes this assessment of the Bail Reform Act factors is correct. 4. Balance of Factors On balance, we conclude that Torres’s twenty-one-month detention does not yet violate due process, but we caution that the length of Torres’s detention is approaching the limits of what due process can tolerate. The length of Torres’s pretrial detention is significant under any metric and is deeply troubling. But the lack of any prosecutorial contribution to the delay and the strength of the evidence supporting Torres’s detention lead us to conclude that Torres’s detention is rationally connected to a regulatory purpose—preventing danger to the community and ensuring Torres will appear as required. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 747 (noting that “preventing danger to the community” is a regulatory interest supporting pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act); see also United States v. Millan, 4 F.3d 1038, 1043–44 (2d Cir. 1993) (including assurance that a defendant will not flee before trial as a regulatory interest supporting pretrial detention). However, all parties agree that at some point, regardless of the risks associated with Torres’s release, due process will require that he be released if not tried. See Briggs, 697 F.3d at 103 26 (“There is no bright-line limit on the length of detention that applies in all circumstances; but for every of set of circumstances, due process does impose some limit.”). And if Torres is not tried by his current trial date of May 25, 2021, the district court and the prosecution must consider whether further prolonging Torres’s pretrial detention crosses the line from regulatory to punitive detention.