Opinion ID: 1427513
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: RAP 16.4(d)

Text: RAP 16.4(d) provides that [n]o more than one petition for similar relief on behalf of the same petitioner will be entertained without good cause shown. The State argues that petitioner seeks relief similar to that sought in his first petition, and that he has not demonstrated good cause. Therefore, the State urges, RAP 16.4(d) bars this second petition. The interpretation of RAP 16.4(d) urged by the State was adopted by this court in In re Haynes, 95 Wn.2d 648, 652, 628 P.2d 809 (1981), overruled in part in In re Haverty, 101 Wn.2d 498, 503, 681 P.2d 835 (1984), overruled on other grounds in In re Hews, 99 Wn.2d 80, 660 P.2d 263 (1983). In Haynes we interpreted RAP 16.4(d) as relating to the type of relief sought. Therefore because both petitions in that case sought relief from restraint, they were similar under the rule and, absent a showing of good cause, the second petition was barred. Haynes, at 653. Three years later, however, we reexamined RAP 16.4(d). In re Haverty, supra at 502. We concluded that the United States Supreme Court's construction of similar language in a federal statute was more consistent with recent decisions of this court. We noted the Supreme Court's conclusion that successive petitions are only to be dismissed where the grounds for relief had previously been heard and determined, or where there was an abuse of the writ or motion remedy. Haverty, at 503 (citing Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15, 17, 10 L.Ed.2d 148, 83 S.Ct. 1068 (1963)). Thus, in contrast to the analysis in Haynes, we interpreted our rule's similar relief language as relating to the grounds advanced in the first petition rather than the type of relief sought. Haverty, at 502-03. Because the issues raised in the second petition were not raised in Haverty's prior petition, we concluded that the petition was not barred by RAP 16.4(d). We indicated that our construction of RAP 16.4(d) was at least with respect to personal restraint petitions which allege prejudicial constitutional error affecting the trial's truth-finding function. Haverty, at 503. We expressly declined to decide whether the Haynes construction of the rule remained valid for petitions not alleging prejudicial constitutional error. Haverty, at 503 n. 1. [1] Now we resolve that issue, and hold that the construction of RAP 16.4(d) adopted in Haverty applies also to petitions advancing nonconstitutional issues. RAP 16.4(d) is simply a procedural rule, Haverty, at 504, and in light of other restrictions upon collateral attacks, imposed by recent legislation and by substantive burdens on personal restraint petitioners (see discussion below), there is no reason to interpret the rule differently in the context of personal restraint petitions based upon statutory challenges. Applying the analysis we used in Haverty requires that we determine whether petitioner's grounds for relief have been heard and determined in a previous petition and whether petitioner is abusing the personal restraint petition process. Petitioner's first personal restraint petition was based on grounds entirely different from those supporting this second petition. In his first petition he did not challenge his restraint as violating double jeopardy, but challenged the State's revocation without a hearing of his parole from a prior conviction, his competency at the time of a prior conviction, and the use of a prior conviction in his sentencing for the assault and aiding in a prisoner's escape convictions. His double jeopardy claim was not heard and determined in his first personal restraint petition and there is no evidence that petitioner is abusing the personal restraint petition process. Therefore, RAP 16.4(d) does not operate to foreclose consideration of this argument in a second petition.