Opinion ID: 2640970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Guilty Plea/Factual Basis

Text: [¶ 18] In his third and final issue on appeal, Jones claims that because he was not adequately informed at his change of plea hearing about the definition of the term deadly weapon used in § 6-2-502(a)(ii), he could not have given an adequate factual basis regarding that element of the crime to insure that his plea was given intelligently and voluntarily. [¶ 19] We review this claim under a de novo standard of review. We quote here portions of what was so thoroughly stated in Maes v. State, 2005 WY 70, ¶ 9, 114 P.3d 708, 710-11 (Wyo.2005) (internal citations omitted): We review claims that a guilty plea was not voluntary de novo. Based upon the totality of the circumstances, we determine whether the district court sufficiently described the nature of the charges, including the possible penalties; informed the defendant of the right to representation; informed the defendant of the rights waived by a guilty plea; and obtained a factual basis for the plea. A guilty plea is valid where the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that a defendant made a voluntary and intelligent choice to plead guilty from alternative courses of action available to him and understood the consequences of his plea. We also stated in Maes that in reviewing a claim that there was not a sufficient factual basis for a guilty plea, our review is governed by W.R.Cr.P. 11(f), which states: (f) Determining accuracy of plea. Notwithstanding the acceptance of a plea of guilty, the court should not enter a judgment upon such plea without making such inquiry as shall satisfy it that there is a factual basis for the plea. [¶ 20] Also, This provision does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads is actually guilty; the rule's standard is much lower. Rule 11(f) merely requires the court to satisfy itself that a factual basis exists for the guilty plea before accepting the plea. Maes, ¶ 10, 114 P.3d at 710-11. [¶ 21] To begin our analysis of whether Jones' plea was voluntary, we restate our test used in making that determination: [A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes). Maes, ¶ 16, 114 P.3d at 713 (quoting Rodriguez v. State, 917 P.2d 172, 175 (Wyo.1996)). In Wyoming, this test is fulfilled when the requirements of W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1) are followed. Before accepting a plea of guilty, this rule requires the district court to advise a defendant regarding the following: The nature of the charge to which the plea is offered, the mandatory minimum penalty provided by law, if any, and the maximum possible penalty provided by law and other sanctions which could attend a conviction including, when applicable, the general nature of any mandatory assessments (such as the surcharge for the Crime Victim Compensation Account), discretionary assessments (costs, attorney fees, restitution, etc.) and, in controlled substance offenses, the potential loss of entitlement to federal benefits. W.R.Cr.P. 11(b)(1). The intent of the procedural requirements of Rule 11 is to prevent the individual charged with a crime from being misled into a waiver of substantial rights. Mehring v. State, 860 P.2d 1101, 1106 (Wyo.1993). In some circumstances, a simple reading of the information and allowing a defendant to ask questions satisfies the requirements of Rule 11; however, in other situations: [I]t may be necessary to explain the elements of the crime and define complex legal terms. The actions required of the district court in any particular case depend largely on whether the elements of the offense are difficult to understand, considering both their complexity to the average person with no legal training and the sophistication of the individual defendant. Peper v. State, 768 P.2d 26, 29 (Wyo.1989) (citations omitted). [¶ 22] At the change of plea hearing, the district court read to Jones each count of the amended information, including the appropriate portion of the habitual offender statute that had been agreed upon pursuant to the plea agreement. Additionally, the court also gave Jones the appropriate admonitions regarding maximum terms and fines associated with each count, the imposition of court costs, the Crime Victims' Compensation surcharge, restitution, and repayment of public defender fees. Furthermore, Jones was advised, among other things, that he could lose certain civil rights, that he was giving up his right to challenge any errors or omissions in the charging documents, and that he was waiving any defenses and the presumption of innocence. Jones was asked by the court if he had discussed his choice to plead guilty with his attorney and whether he was doing so voluntarily. All of Jones' answers indicate that he knew full well what he was doing, that he was not under the influence, and that there existed no other factor that would affect his ability to understand the charges. [¶ 23] Though Jones' answers indicate that he was fully aware of the proceedings and their consequences, he nevertheless argues that a sufficient factual basis regarding the deadly weapon element of his crime was lacking. This Court has explained that: The intent of the procedural requirement of a factual basis is to prevent the individual charged with a crime from being misled into a waiver of substantial rights. Sami v. State, 2004 WY 23, ¶ 9, 85 P.3d 1014, ¶ 9 (Wyo.2004). A sufficient inquiry to obtain a factual basis includes a determination that the defendant understood his conduct, in light of the law, to be criminal. Id. However, the factual basis for accepting a plea may be inferred from circumstances surrounding the crime and need not be established only from the defendant's statements. Id. W.R.Cr.P. 11 does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant who pleads guilty is actually guilty nor does it require complete descriptions of the elements. Id. Maes, ¶ 21, 114 P.3d at 714. [¶ 24] Here, the district court began the factual basis portion of the hearing by asking Jones what conduct he engaged in on March 10, 2007, that was a violation of the law. After Jones briefly spoke, the court began to ask more pointed questions. The Court: All right. Let's talk about the charges here. Just very briefly tell me what you did that was a violation of the law on March 10th. Jones: Well, I came home and I only did just a little bit of drinking and I hit her and I tore up the house. What I did wasn't right and I shouldn't have done it. The Court: Now, who did you hit? Jones: My wife. The Court: What did you hit her with? Jones: I pushed her. She hit her head. The Court: She hit her head on what? Jones: The cabinet or something, I don't know, in the bathroom, bed, or something. I don't know what it was. The Court: The charge said that you attempted to cause Jones: I think I threw a chair too, I don't know. I did a lot of stuff that I can't remember. The Court: Okay. Well, to have a factual basis there has to be a deadly weapon involved at some point. Now, it doesn't have to be a gun or knife but it could be something else. Jones: Yeah, I threw a chair. The Court: You threw a chair at her? All right. You said you then trashed the place. Was that the word you used? [¶ 25] The prosecutor also made an offer of proof to the court regarding what evidence would have been presented had the case gone to trial. I guess, Your Honor, [the] only other thing that I would add to the factual basisand I think that the exhibits speak for themselves, but were Mr. Jones' wife to testify she would have testified that she was struck with a chair. That she had her head rammed through a door. That she was struck with a bed rail or some similar object. That there was material lit in her presence with a lighter at the same time she was told she was going to die and that all of those things in there that were used would have been deadly weapons in this case. The following exchange then occurred: The Court: All right. Mr. Wolfe, do you have any comments or concerns on the factual basis or other items I've covered with your client? Mr. Wolfe: No, Your Honor. Court: Mr. Jones, is there any reason the court should not accept your guilty pleas? Jones: No, Your Honor. [¶ 26] Given the facts and circumstances of the crime, the prosecutor's statement and Jones' statement, we conclude that the district court was presented with a sufficient factual basis to accept the guilty plea. The district court made no error in its determination that this was so.