Opinion ID: 537726
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jury impartiality

Text: 40 Defendant Gennaro Angiulo, joined by various codefendants, argues that in two respects, his sixth amendment right to a fair trial by an impartial jury was violated. We consider each of his arguments in turn.
41 Gennaro's first argument is that the district court committed constitutional error in denying his repeated motions for a change of venue due to extensive prejudicial pretrial publicity. There can be no dispute that extensive publicity surrounded this case from the moment of the defendants' indictment. There also can be little dispute that jurors in the venire, including some of those ultimately selected for the trial, were exposed to this publicity to one extent or another. The issue is whether this publicity was so extensive and so prejudicial as to require a change of venue. 42 We begin by noting the fundamental principle that the right to jury trial guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors, Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722, 81 S.Ct. 1639, 1642, 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961), and that a change of venue may be granted if the court determines that there exists in the district 'so great a prejudice against the defendant that he cannot obtain a fair and impartial trial.'  United States v. Drougas, 748 F.2d 8, 29 (1st Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Gullion, 575 F.2d 26, 28 (1st Cir.1978)). It is also established that a motion for change of venue is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion. Id.; see also United States v. Kelly, 722 F.2d 873, 881 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1070, 104 S.Ct. 1425, 79 L.Ed.2d 749 (1984). 43 In determining whether sufficient prejudice existed to require a change of venue, we must conduct two inquiries: 1) whether jury prejudice should be presumed given the facts before us; or 2) if prejudice should not be presumed, whether the jury was actually prejudiced. Although courts often blend the two inquiries, we will endeavor to keep them distinct. See generally Harris v. Pulley, 885 F.2d 1354, 1359-65 (9th Cir.1988) (distinguishing between presumed prejudice and actual prejudice), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 854, 107 L.Ed.2d 848 (1990).
44 There are two factors that could call for a presumption of prejudice. First, prejudice may properly be presumed where  'prejudicial, inflammatory publicity about [a] case so saturated the community from which [the defendant's] jury was drawn as to render it virtually impossible to obtain an impartial jury.'  United States v. McNeill, 728 F.2d 5, 9 (1st Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 250 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 846, 103 S.Ct. 102, 74 L.Ed.2d 92 (1982)); see also Harris, 885 F.2d at 1361. To justify a presumption of prejudice under this standard, the publicity must be both extensive and sensational in nature. If the media coverage is factual as opposed to inflammatory or sensational, this undermines any claim for a presumption of prejudice. See, e.g., Murphy v. Florida, 421 U.S. 794, 802, 95 S.Ct. 2031, 2037, 44 L.Ed.2d 589 (1975); United States v. Medina, 761 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir.1985); McNeill, 728 F.2d at 9; see also Harris, 885 F.2d at 1362. 45 After examining the volumes of newspaper clippings and television news transcripts submitted by the defendants in support of their motions for a change of venue, we find that the media coverage was not so inflammatory or sensational as to require a presumption of prejudice. Although the news coverage was extensive, it largely was factual in nature, summarizing the charges against the defendants and the alleged conduct that underlay the indictment. We acknowledge that frequent references were made to reputed crime figure Gennaro Angiulo, mafia boss Angiulo, or reputed leader of Boston underworld. We find, however, that such references, although not phrased in the most genteel or flattering manner, fall significantly short of the type of emotionally charged, inflammatory, sensationalistic coverage needed to support a presumption of prejudice. 46 A second factor that could support a presumption of prejudice is a more indirect measure that looks at the length to which the trial court must go in order to select jurors who appear to be impartial. Murphy, 421 U.S. at 802, 95 S.Ct. at 2037. Where a high percentage of the venire admits to a disqualifying prejudice, a court may properly question the remaining jurors' avowals of impartiality, and choose to presume prejudice. See id. at 802-03, 95 S.Ct. at 2037-38; United States v. Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d 725, 734 (1st Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 966, 108 S.Ct. 458, 98 L.Ed.2d 397 (1988). In Moreno Morales, twenty-five percent of the venire admitted believing that defendants were guilty. We found this percentage to be too low to require a presumption that the jurors actually seated at trial--all of whom proclaimed impartiality--were indeed prejudiced. See Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 735. 47 The defendants here do not point to any indicia of prejudice as strong as those that were rejected by us in Moreno Morales. At most, they claim that jurors in the venire were familiar with the Angiulo name, and some associated it with the Mafia. Mere knowledge or awareness of a defendant's past, however, is not sufficient to presume prejudice. More must be shown, such as the actual existence of a present predisposition against defendants for the crimes currently charged. See Murphy, 421 U.S. at 800 & n. 4, 95 S.Ct. at 2036 & n. 4. The defendants point to no such indications of prejudice in the venire, and we therefore decline to draw any presumptions of prejudice on the part of the jurors seated at trial.
48 The next question is whether the jurors seated at trial demonstrated actual partiality that they were incapable of setting aside. See Harris, 885 F.2d at 1363. In pursuing this inquiry, special deference is due the trial court's determination that the jurors were impartial. As we stated in United States v. McNeill: 49 If the trial judge, who conducted the voir dire and who could develop a contemporaneous impression of the extent and intensity of community sentiment regarding the defendant, believed that he had impanelled a jury of twelve open-minded, impartial persons, then we will set aside his action only where juror prejudice is manifest. 50 728 F.2d at 9; see also Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1032, 1038, 104 S.Ct. 2885, 2889, 2892, 81 L.Ed.2d 847 (1984); Moreno Morales, 815 F.2d at 733; Medina, 761 F.2d at 20. 51 The defendants rest their allegations of actual prejudice on the extensive pretrial publicity that existed and the jurors' exposure to that publicity. In particular, they emphasize that of the 18 jurors impanelled for trial, only 3 had not been exposed to the Patriarca-Angiulo names, and of the 12 jurors that returned verdicts, only one had not been so exposed. They also note that a number of jurors drew an association between the Angiulo name and the Mafia. 52 To meet the standards of the sixth amendment and due process, however, it is not mandated that each and every juror's mind be a blank slate with respect to the defendant. See, e.g., Medina, 761 F.2d at 19-20; see also Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 303, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2303, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). The relevant question is whether the jurors had such fixed opinions that they could not judge impartially the guilt of the defendant. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1035, 104 S.Ct. at 2891. As the Supreme Court articulated in Irvin v. Dowd: 53 It is not required ... that the jurors be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. In these days of swift, widespread and diverse methods of communication, an important case can be expected to arouse the interest of the public in the vicinity, and scarcely any of those best qualified to serve as jurors will not have formed some impression or opinion as to the merits of the case. This is particularly true in criminal cases. To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court. 54 366 U.S. at 722-23, 81 S.Ct. at 1642-43. Thus, the mere fact that a majority of the impanelled jurors had been exposed to the Patriarca-Angiulo names, or that some linked the Angiulo name with the Mafia, is not sufficient to support a finding of actual prejudice. The defendants have put forth nothing to warrant a conclusion that the jurors were unable to lay aside any implications associated with the Angiulo name and reach a verdict based only on the evidence presented at trial. 55 The defendants' position is further weakened by the exhaustive procedures employed by the trial court below to screen prospective jurors and impanel an impartial jury. The court examined 260 prospective jurors, requiring each to answer comprehensive written questionnaires and respond to oral questions regarding, among other things, their exposure to pretrial publicity, their knowledge of the case or familiarity with any of the parties, their attitude towards organized crime, and the like. Those who indicated partiality were excused for cause, and the 18 jurors ultimately impanelled stated that they had formed no opinions or conclusions about the case and could render an impartial verdict based on the evidence at trial. Although we do not blindly accept such avowals of impartiality, to justify disregarding them there must be solid evidence of distinct bias. See Medina, 761 F.2d at 20 (reviewing, with approval, extensive voir dire procedures employed by the trial court); McNeill, 728 F.2d at 10. We have found none. In light of the thorough voir dire procedures employed by the trial court, and the repeated assurances of impartiality given by the impanelled jurors, we find that no actual prejudice tainted the jury. This determination, when combined with our rejection of the claim of presumed prejudice, leads us to hold that no constitutional error resulted from the trial court's denial of the motion for change of venue.
56 The defendants also contend that their constitutional right to an impartial jury was violated due to the trial court's failure to dismiss several jurors on the grounds of bias and misconduct arising from three distinct incidents. We first summarize the three incidents that allegedly fostered juror bias, and then analyze defendants' constitutional claims. 57 The first incident involved a juror who requested that the court excuse him from the jury due to his girlfriend's extreme fears that his service on the jury would lead to retribution by the Mafia. The juror notified the court that he had spoken with three other members of the jury about his girlfriend's fears. In response, the district court excused the juror and then questioned individually the three jurors with whom the juror had spoken to ascertain what they had been told and whether any difficulties had arisen with respect to their continued ability to remain impartial. The three jurors assured the court that they had merely been told of the girlfriend's fears and that this would have no effect on their ability to remain impartial. In light of these responses, the court retained the three jurors on the jury, and informed the rest of the jury that the first juror had been excused for personal reasons. The court also asked each of the remaining jurors separately whether anything had occurred to affect his or her impartiality, and all responded in the negative. 58 The second incident occurred during closing arguments when a juror informed the court that a friend of hers had relayed to her a bribe offer from third parties to vote not guilty. She told the court that she had rejected the offer, and had not spoken with any other jurors about the bribe attempt. After an examination of this juror, the court excused her, and notified the remaining jurors that she had been excused for personal reasons. The court also notified the jurors that they would be sequestered for the remainder of the trial. 59 Not surprisingly, this story was reported in the press almost immediately. Subsequent questioning of each juror by the court revealed that four jurors had been exposed, in varying degrees, to the news coverage. 60 Juror # 37 said that while on the subway she had seen a newspaper headline reporting that a juror had been threatened. She admitted that she was concerned by the story, had tried to read more, but was unable to do so. Juror # 68 reported that juror # 37 had told her of this newspaper headline. Juror # 25 also reported seeing a newspaper headline about a juror being approached, but had read no more of the article. Finally, juror # 4 reported overhearing two people talking about the case and the fact that somebody had talked to a juror. 61 In response to individual questioning, each of these jurors assured the court that he or she had not formed any conclusions about the case as a result of exposure to the news coverage, and would be able to render a verdict impartially based only on the evidence introduced at trial. Over the defendants' objections, all of these jurors were retained. 62 The third and final incident occurred at the outset of the jury's deliberations when juror # 104 approached a United States marshal and handed him two newspaper articles concerning the case that had been found in the jury room. In response to questioning, juror # 104 stated that he had seen juror # 64 pull the articles from an exhibit box, and had seized the articles from juror # 64 immediately because he knew the articles were not supposed to be there. Juror # 104 admitted glancing through approximately the first third of each article, but stated that he had not read the articles in their entirety. The limited portions of the articles that he could recall summarized past incidents involving certain Angiulo jurors, reporting that one juror had been dismissed because he feared for his safety; that another had been dismissed after being approached by a neighbor; and that a friend of a third juror had reported that some of the jurors had made up their minds as to the defendants' guilt or innocence prior to deliberations. Juror # 104 also said that juror # 37 may have seen the articles. 63 Juror # 64 then was questioned and acknowledged finding the articles between two exhibit boxes in the deliberation room. He stated, though, that he saw one line at most before juror # 104 seized the articles from him. He also acknowledged that juror # 37 may have observed the articles, but he was not completely sure that she had. 64 Juror # 37 was questioned and denied seeing any part of the articles. Finally, both juror # 104 and juror # 64 assured the court that their exposure to the news coverage had not affected their ability to remain impartial and render a verdict based solely on the evidence introduced at trial. All three jurors were retained. 65 Defendants raise allegations of juror bias and misconduct with respect to each of these three incidents. We consider each incident in turn.
66 The threshold question with respect to this incident is whether or not the girlfriend's expressions of fear about possible Mafia retaliation should be analyzed under the standard governing ex parte contacts with jurors. In Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954), the Supreme Court stated that any private communication, contact, or tampering, directly or indirectly, with a juror during a trial about the matter pending before the jury is ... deemed presumptively prejudicial. Id. at 229, 74 S.Ct. at 451. The burden then shifts to the government to show that the contact was harmless to the defendant. Id. The paradigmatic example of such an ex parte contact with a juror is a threat, bribe, or statement containing prejudicial information made directly to a juror by a third party stranger. 67 The situation before us differs in notable respects from this paradigm. First, the contact, if it can be called that, was initiated by an intimate relation of a juror, rather than by a third party stranger. Second, direct contact was limited solely to the girlfriend and her boyfriend juror; the other affected jurors only learned indirectly of the situation through the boyfriend. Third, the contact involved only subjective expressions of fear, rather than the traditional threat, bribe, or statement containing prejudicial substantive information. These facts raise a real question as to whether this incident is properly governed by the standards that apply to true ex parte contacts. Because the resolution of defendants' allegation does not turn on the answer to this question, however, we will assume without deciding that the standards governing ex parte contacts do apply and that, under Remmer, the girlfriend's conduct raised a presumption of prejudice that shifted the burden to the government to show that the contact was harmless. 68 In an effort to avoid the ensuing burden were we to apply such a presumption, the government states in a footnote in its brief that the Supreme Court abandoned Remmer 's presumption of prejudice standard in Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 102 S.Ct. 940, 71 L.Ed.2d 78 (1982), and Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 104 S.Ct. 453, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983), and instead placed the burden on the defendant to establish actual prejudice. See Brief for the Government at 91 n. 106. Although the government is careful to cite the two circuit opinions that have accepted, in whole or in part, this abandonment theory, see United States v. Madrid, 842 F.2d 1090 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 269, 102 L.Ed.2d 256 (1988); United States v. Pennell, 737 F.2d 521 (6th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1158, 105 S.Ct. 906, 83 L.Ed.2d 921 (1985), it neglects to cite to any of the many circuit opinions that resoundingly have rejected this abandonment theory. See, e.g., Stockton v. Virginia, 852 F.2d 740, 744 (4th Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1354, 103 L.Ed.2d 822 (1989); United States v. Butler, 822 F.2d 1191, 1195 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1987) (listing the Sixth Circuit as the only circuit court that has accepted the abandonment theory, and citing the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits as continuing to apply Remmer ); United States v. Littlefield, 752 F.2d 1429, 1431-32 (9th Cir.1985); see also United States v. Hornung, 848 F.2d 1040, 1044 (10th Cir.1988), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 1349, 103 L.Ed.2d 817 (1989); United States v. Caporale, 806 F.2d 1487, 1503 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1021, 107 S.Ct. 3265, 97 L.Ed.2d 763 (1987); United States v. Robinson, 756 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir.1985). 69 Because we find that the government has made an adequate showing to overcome any presumption of prejudice, however, we have no occasion to decide today whether the girlfriend's conduct triggers a Remmer-type presumption. In reaching this determination, we have found several factors regarding the incident to have dispositive significance. First, the girlfriend's conduct did not provide any juror, either directly or indirectly, with substantive extra-judicial information going to the question of defendants' guilt or innocence. Courts frequently examine the nature of the information provided through a challenged ex parte contact and are more likely to deem the contact harmless if the content of the communication does not pertain to substantive matters involved in the trial. See, e.g., Butler, 822 F.2d at 1196; Sher v. Stoughton, 666 F.2d 791, 794-95 (2d Cir.1981). This refutes the defendants' claims of prejudice, because the girlfriend's conduct merely involved her own subjective expressions of fear, rather than furnishing any information touching upon substantive matters at issue in the trial. 70 Second, we note with approval the immediate and thorough steps taken by the district court to ascertain the extent of any juror prejudice. The trial court quickly excused the juror whose girlfriend expressed the fear. The court also thoroughly questioned the three jurors who indirectly learned of the girlfriend's fears to determine whether their impartiality had been compromised. These jurors assured the court that their impartiality had not been affected and that they would base their deliberations solely on the evidence introduced at trial. 71 We can find no fault with the actions taken by the district court and his decision to retain the three jurors in light of their assurances of impartiality. Substantial deference is due the trial court's exercise of its discretion in handling situations involving potential juror bias or misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Aiello, 771 F.2d 621, 629 (2d Cir.1985); United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 338 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 2340, 85 L.Ed.2d 855 (1985); United States v. Kelly, 722 F.2d 873, 881 (1st Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1070, 104 S.Ct. 1425, 79 L.Ed.2d 749 (1984). Because the trial court's determination regarding continued juror impartiality is a question of fact, this enhances the deference due its ultimate finding on the issue. See, e.g., Rushen v. Spain, 464 U.S. 114, 120, 104 S.Ct. 453, 456, 78 L.Ed.2d 267 (1983); Aiello, 771 F.2d at 630; United States v. Williams, 737 F.2d 594, 612 (7th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003, 105 S.Ct. 1354, 84 L.Ed.2d 377 (1985). 72 Here, the trial court was persuaded of the three jurors' continued impartiality after individually questioning each one. He properly could rely on their assurances of impartiality, given in response to his questions. See, e.g., Aiello, 771 F.2d at 630; Williams, 737 F.2d at 612; Sher, 666 F.2d at 795. We cannot say the court erred in declining to dismiss the three jurors challenged by the defendants.
73 There can be little dispute that the juror who was offered the bribe would be presumed, under Remmer, to have been prejudiced. This juror, however, was immediately dismissed, and thus our inquiry turns to the four other jurors who learned of the incident. Of these four jurors, two learned of the bribe offer from glimpses of newspaper headlines; the third learned of it from one of the first two, and the fourth overheard two strangers talking, apparently, about the same newspaper coverage. Directly or indirectly, therefore, all four jurors learned of the incident because of the news coverage. Consequently, the most appropriate standard for us to apply in considering this incident is the standard we have articulated in cases where jurors were exposed to potentially prejudicial publicity during the course of trial. 74 In United States v. Porcaro, 648 F.2d 753 (1st Cir.1981), we set forth a three-prong standard for courts to apply to determine whether publicity during the course of a trial has prejudiced the jury. First, a court should determine whether the news coverage is prejudicial. Second, if it is, the court should determine whether any jurors were exposed to the coverage. Third, if exposure did occur, the court should examine the exposed jurors to determine if this exposure compromised their impartiality. See id. at 757; see also United States v. Gaggi, 811 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929, 107 S.Ct. 3214, 96 L.Ed.2d 701 (1987). As with ex parte contacts, a trial court's finding of continued jury impartiality despite exposure to news coverage should be upheld absent abuse of discretion. See Gaggi, 811 F.2d at 51. 75 Applying this standard, we reject defendants' challenges to the four jurors. Although there can be no dispute that the jurors were exposed to the news coverage (prong two of the standard), the defendants cannot succeed on the other two prongs of the test. First, we have substantial reservations about whether the minimal news coverage to which the jurors were exposed can truly be deemed prejudicial. The jurors were exposed, directly or indirectly, to no more than a brief newspaper headline reporting that a juror had been approached. They were not exposed to any substantive information about issues at trial or about the defendants' guilt with respect to the charges against them. See id. at 52. The coverage also was factually oriented rather than sensational in nature. See Porcaro, 648 F.2d at 758. 76 Furthermore, with respect to the third prong of the standard, we note that the trial court individually questioned each of the four jurors about their continued impartiality and accepted their assurances of impartiality as credible. In light of the prompt action by the trial court, the nonsensational nature of the minimal amounts of coverage to which the jurors were exposed, and the jurors' avowals of continued impartiality, we find that the trial court's retention of the four challenged jurors on the jury was not error. See United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 559 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 109 S.Ct. 493, 102 L.Ed.2d 530 (1988); Gaggi, 811 F.2d at 51-53; see also United States v. Maceo, 873 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 125, 107 L.Ed.2d 86 (1989).
77 Defendants' final jury challenge pertains to the incident involving the newspaper articles in the jury room at the outset of the jury's deliberations. As with the bribe attempt, defendants' argument alleges juror exposure to prejudicial news coverage. Thus, Porcaro's three element standard governs our consideration of this incident as well. 78 For essentially the same reasons articulated in our discussion of the bribe attempt coverage, we find that defendants cannot succeed under Porcaro 's three-prong test. At the outset, we note that prong two has been satisfied: there was juror exposure to news coverage. Specifically, juror # 104 admitted to glancing at portions of the articles found in the deliberation room. As with the bribe attempt incident, however, defendants fail on the other two elements of the test. First, we have doubts about whether the articles to which at least juror # 104 was exposed were prejudicial within the meaning of the three-prong standard. The articles were factually oriented accounts of incidents allegedly involving certain jurors. They do not appear to have been sensational in nature. Nor did the articles contain extra-judicial substantive information about issues at trial or the defendants' guilt with respect to the charges against them. 79 In addition, as it did in the other incidents, the district court thoroughly questioned each of the challenged jurors to ascertain the extent of their exposure and their continued ability to judge the defendants impartially. Each juror assured the court of his continued impartiality, and the court was satisfied with these assurances. In light of the deference due the district court's determinations, we find no error in its retention of the challenged jurors on the jury. See Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d at 559.