Opinion ID: 1126466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Only those persons required to submit ballot measure statements are subject to a civil penalty of $1,000 per offense.

Text: A violation of the disclosure laws required by the Elections Code in either case constitutes a misdemeanor. (Elec. Code, §§ 11624, 12053, 12055.) A violation of Government Code section 3750, providing for the disclosure of candidate contributions in excess of $500, may constitute either a misdemeanor or a felony (Gov. Code, § 3754), and any person who falsely verifies a disclosure statement is guilty of perjury and exposes himself to a possible felony conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 118, 118a, 126). Moreover, the only civil liability provided is in connection with ballot measures. (Elec. Code, § 11890.) It is manifest from the foregoing exposition that there are overall differences in disclosure requirements and penalties in the case of candidates on the one hand and ballot measures on the other. Defendants, ballot measure opponents, principally complain of a greater burden in identifying contributors and the amounts of individual contributions, in identifying distributees and the amounts of individual receipts, in the number of and times at which statements must be made, and in the exposure to penalties for noncompliance. (4) Statutory differences which require a greater measure of disclosure of financial information relative to a ballot measure election than in the case of a candidate election are not legally significant on considerations of equal protection unless in totality there is a resulting invidious discrimination against those required to make the ballot measure disclosures. (See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co. (1955) 348 U.S. 483 [99 L.Ed. 563, 75 S.Ct. 461]; Day Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri (1952) 342 U.S. 421 [96 L.Ed. 469, 72 S.Ct. 405]; Otsuka v. Hite (1966) 64 Cal.2d 596 [51 Cal. Rptr. 284, 414 P.2d 412].) (5-7) [T]he burden of establishing the unconstitutionality of a statute rests on him who assails it, and ... courts may not declare a legislative discrimination invalid unless, viewed in the light of facts made known or generally assumed, it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that the classification rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of the legislators. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside as the denial of equal protection of the laws if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it. ( Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co. v. Brownell (1935) 294 U.S. 580, 584 [79 L.Ed. 1070, 1072-1073, 55 S.Ct. 538].) Whatever their nature and substance, the differences in the pertinent financial disclosure laws arise, in large part, out of their differing legislative histories. The first financial disclosure law was enacted as a part of other election regulatory provisions in 1893. (Stats. 1893, ch. XVI, pp. 12-16, §§ 1-5.) It related only to candidate elections as, at that time, there was no constitutional provision for initiative and referendum measures. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1.) In 1921, 10 years after the Constitution was amended to provide for the initiative and referendum, the first disclosure provisions governing election campaigns for and against ballot measures were enacted. The following year a special committee of the Senate was appointed to investigate matters relating to the receipt and expenditure of sums of money in excess of $1,000 to secure the passage or defeat of measures appearing on the ballot at the general election in November 1922. It examined and found deficient the disclosure provisions which related to ballot measures. (See Report of Special Committee, Sen. Daily J., p. 1780 et seq., May 14, 1923.) The report of the special committee contained a study of seven such measures, and the committee concluded that in each instance particular financial interests were able to exert sufficient influence to be determinative. The outstanding features disclosed by the committee's investigations were [s]tartlingly large campaign expenditures, and campaign methods and practices that constitute a menace to our electoral system. Practices which were particularly found to have the effect of misleading and deceiving the voter where the use of high sounding, patriotic names under which the real identity of the interested parties and actual proponents or opponents is disguised, the undercover employment as campaign workers of commercial, labor, social, and other leaders who occupied positions from which they might be able to influence large groups of persons who were unaware of the employment, and the commitment of some campaign workers to lend support both for and against particular propositions. The special committee concluded that the danger is not in the amount that may be spent, but withholding from the voters the knowledge that it is being spent and by whom and through what channels. The voter can be depended on to properly discount propaganda and to appraise, at its real value, hired opinion if he can only know that it is hired and have the means of distinguishing the disinterested civic worker, lodge member or club leader from the one under political employment. The committee recommended more thorough disclosure requirements in order to cure what it deemed to be evils of ballot measure elections. The recommendations were adopted by the Legislature through amendments in 1923 (Stats. 1923, ch. 391, p. 487 et seq.), and these provisions have remained substantially the same since that time. It is of no consequence that the disclosure provisions for ballot measure elections were enacted at different times and under different circumstances from those required in the case of candidate elections. (8) The Legislature may rationally enact reform measures one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. ( Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., supra, 348 U.S. 483, 489 [99 L.Ed. 563, 573].) The crux of the question is whether it has acted rationally. (9) Consistent with the concerns expressed by the special committee there are many sound reasons for according different treatment to ballot measure elections to overcome evils which can be cured, in part at least, by more stringent financial disclosure requirements although we do not concede that the requirements are more severe in one case than in the other. It is common knowledge that in the majority of cases a candidate for public office has been nominated or endorsed by a political party, the policies of which are widely known. Voters may become aware of the candidate's qualifications, in part, through their long-standing knowledge of the candidate's party and of politically oriented personalities who endorse the candidate. A ballot measure, on the other hand, is presented to voters without a historical background of established political support, and voters are unable to make the same quality judgment without knowledge of established persons or entities who or which are the real advocates or opponents of the measure. Essential to any fairly presented election issue is the public discourse for and against the candidate or measure. The political party system in candidate elections is some assurance that the issues and the candidate's views on the same will be fully exposed. But in the case of a ballot measure there is little assurance that the issues will be exposed should particular advocates or opponents be so under-financed that they are unable to meet the challenge of their well-financed adversaries. The disclosure of financial contribution information prior to the election concerning those favoring and those opposing the measure rationally and significantly affect voter evaluation of the proposal. A candidate represents a personality who hopefully attempts to persuade voters to support him as the result of virtues which he exposes to the public view. A ballot measure is devoid of personality and voters who seek to judge the merits of issues by reliance on the personality of those supporting different points of view can do so only if they are made aware, prior to election, of those who are the real advocates for or against the measure. Voters who may well be able to understand and judge candidates may not always be able to comprehend and determine the merits of ballot measures which frequently are cast in language, the precise meaning of which often is confusing and perhaps on occasion intentionally so. (See dissenting opinion of White, J., in Mulkey v. Reitman (1966) 64 Cal.2d 529 [50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 413 P.2d 825], relative to different meanings which might be accorded to a ballot measure.) A voter may reasonably seek to judge the precise effect of a measure by knowledge of those who advocate or oppose its adoption, and he may gain such knowledge only through pre-election disclosure requirements of the nature here involved. The foregoing and other rational grounds for imposing somewhat varying financial disclosure requirements on those advocating points of view on ballot measures as distinguished from candidates, were legitimate considerations for the Legislature in enacting the challenged provisions, particularly in view of the report of the special committee in 1923. The matters of which defendants particularly complain are all pertinent to the elimination of the evils which threaten the electoral system through an uninformed electorate faced with ballot measure propositions. Thus, the Legislature may well provide for a greater identity of proponents and opponents, including addresses, and the amounts of individual contributions to or receipts from campaign funds, in order to insure that voters are aware of those persons who advocate or oppose a particular measure and the nature and the extent of their involvement. It is obvious, too, that this information must be available to the voter during the campaign and before the election if he is to utilize it in the formation of his decision. (10) It follows that the requirement of earlier and more frequent disclosures is entirely reasonable. The imposition of verification requirements and civil penalties for failures to make required disclosures provide greater assurance that accurate and timely disclosures will be made in the interest of greater voter awareness of matters rationally bearing on an informed exercise of the franchise. Contrary to defendants' contention, the differences in disclosure requirements of which they complain thus bear a close relationship to the purposes and objectives sought to be achieved by the ballot measure provisions. (Cf. Zeilenga v. Nelson (1971) 4 Cal.3d 716, 721 [94 Cal. Rptr. 602, 484 P.2d 578]; Parr v. Municipal Court (1971) 3 Cal.3d 861, 863-864 [92 Cal. Rptr. 153, 479 P.2d 353]; In re Antazo (1970) 3 Cal.3d 100, 110 [89 Cal. Rptr. 255, 473 P.2d 999].) It is noted that an invidious discrimination is more likely to be found in those instances where some fundamental right is impermissibly restricted or threatened to be restricted as, for instance, the right to vote. (See Reynolds v. Sims (1964) 377 U.S. 533, 561-562 [12 L.Ed.2d 506, 526-528, 84 S.Ct. 1362]; Castro v. State of California (1970) 2 Cal.3d 223, 235 [85 Cal. Rptr. 20, 466 P.2d 244].) (11) In order to justify such legislation it must be determined that the restriction complained of is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. ( Kramer v. Union School District (1969) 395 U.S. 621, 626-627 [23 L.Ed.2d 583, 588-590, 89 S.Ct. 1886].) In the instant case, however, the challenged legislation is not designed to restrict, but rather to promote an intelligent exercise of the franchise. (See Canon v. Justice Court (1964) 61 Cal.2d 446, 451-454, 459-460 [39 Cal. Rptr. 228, 393 P.2d 428].) Even assuming arguendo that a fundamental right is here somewhat limited, there is a compelling state interest being served which would justify such limitation. In Canon, supra, Elections Code section 12047, which required a disclosure of persons who distributed circulars attacking candidates for public office, was challenged on First Amendment grounds. Relevant to the issues in the instant case, it is stated in Canon: The purpose of the statute is clear. It requires identification so that (1) the electorate may be better able to evaluate campaign material by examination of the competence and credibility of its source, (2) irresponsible attacks will be deterred, (3) candidates may be better able to refute or rebut charges  so that elections will be the expression of the will of an undeceived, well-informed public. It is clear that the integrity of elections, essential to the very preservation of a free society, is a matter `in which the State may have a compelling regulatory concern.' (61 Cal.2d at pp. 452-453.) [7] (12) The manifest purpose of the financial disclosure requirements to insure a better informed electorate likewise promotes a compelling state interest. Defendants have failed to demonstrate wherein the differing disclosure requirements in the case of ballot measure and candidate elections are of any real substance or, in any event, constitute an invidious discrimination against those who must make and file the ballot measure statements. If significant distinctions do exist, they are justified by the greater disclosure needs in the case of ballot measures. These needs are clearly established by a consideration of the circumstances under which ballot measures are presented to the electorate, resulting in its failure to obtain information which is objective and untainted. The report of the special committee establishes that the Legislature's enactment of the challenged laws is rationally designed to correct the evils it found to exist. (See Canon v. Justice Court, supra, 61 Cal.2d 446.) (13-15) It thus infringes neither the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor article I, sections 11 and 21, of our Constitution. (See Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner (1965) 62 Cal.2d 586, 588 [43 Cal. Rptr. 329, 400 P.2d 321].) Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the respondent court to vacate its orders dismissing the action and sustaining the demurrer, to overrule the demurrer and to permit defendants reasonable time to answer or otherwise plead.