Opinion ID: 160186
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Written Verdict

Text: 28 Whether Edward was entitled to be present at the trial court's rendering of the verdict is a more difficult question. Edward again cites Larson and Canady as supporting his position. In Larson, we held a criminal defendant has a due process right to be present for the rendition of a jury verdict, citing the same opportunity to assist counsel and influence the jury as mentioned in the closing argument context discussed above. See Larson, 911 F.2d at 395-96. The Second Circuit extended our logic one step further to require physical presence of a criminal defendant for the rendering of a verdict following a bench trial. See Canady, 126 F.3d at 361-62. Edward invites us to extend the logic further yet, and require the presence of juvenile defendants. We decline to do so. 29 In addition to our earlier-stated reluctance to adopt the Second Circuit's reasoning as applied to juvenile proceedings, we have a further reason for not extending Canady. The Second Circuit in Canady relied in part on the criminal defendant's right to an open public trial in holding the district court erred by issuing its verdict in written form. Id. at 362-63. As support for its position, the panel stated [t]here is a distinctly useful purpose in ensuring that the pronouncement of the defendant's guilt or innocence by the court is both face-to-face and public. It assures that the trial court is 'keenly alive to a sense of its responsibility and to the importance of its functions.' Id. at 361 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 46 (1984)) (alterations omitted). Waller is a case devoted to the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Waller, 467 U.S. at 43-44. In relying on Walker, Edward fails to appreciate the difference between a criminal trial and a juvenile proceeding. 30 We have not extended the public trial right to juvenile defendants. In McKeiver, the Supreme Court seemed to express disdain for the idea when it held the right to a jury trial did not apply to juvenile proceedings. The Court clearly insinuated the public trial right would be incompatible with the traditional nature of the juvenile proceeding when it stated: [I]f the jury trial were to be injected into the juvenile court system as a matter of right, it would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system and, possibly, the public trial. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550. Indeed, in Edward's case, the district court meticulously guarded the privacy of the proceedings, presumably to protect Edward's interests. When deciding whether due process requires application of certain constitutional rights to juvenile proceedings, the Supreme Court has focused on fundamental fairness with an emphasis on fact-finding procedures. See McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543 (stating emphasis on fact-finding led to applying [t]he requirements of notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-examination, and standard of proof to the juvenile setting, but rejecting right to jury trial because one cannot say that in our legal system the jury is a necessary component of accurate fact-finding). Given our view of Canady and the Supreme Court's emphasis on applying those rights related to fact-finding to juvenile proceedings, we see no justification for adopting a constitutional rule requiring the presence of juvenile defendants for the rendering of the verdict at the close of a bench trial. 31 Again, however, we point out we would affirm the district court regardless of our determination of the constitutional question because any perceived error in not reading the verdict in open court was harmless. In so holding, we note all but a limited class of fundamental constitutional errors are subject to harmless error analysis. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1999). That limited class includes a complete denial of counsel, biased trial judge, racial discrimination in selection of grand juries, denial of self-representation at trial, denial of public trial, and a defective reasonable doubt instruction. See id. at 8. These errors affect the framework within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply ... the trial process itself. Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Failing to announce the verdict in a juvenile court proceeding hardly rises to the level of the structural errors listed above because it does not necessarily render the proceeding fundamentally unfair or an unreliable vehicle for determining guilt or innocence. Id. at 9. In addition, we have previously applied harmless error analysis to the deprivation of a criminal defendant's right to be present at rendition of the verdict. See Larson, 911 F.2d at 396. 32 When we apply harmless error analysis, we require the beneficiary of a constitutional error to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967), quoted in Neder, 527 U.S. at 15. We are confident the district court's verdict was not impacted by the fact it was issued in written form, and not read in open court in Edward's presence. First, the district court explicitly concluded oral summation would not assist him in his decision. Second, the district court carefully reviewed the testimony, made supportable credibility determinations, and found Edward guilty. The court's own conclusion and thorough analysis convinces us the verdict would not have changed with a theoretical change in method of delivery. Therefore, we find any perceived error harmless. 9 33 Having reviewed the issues raised on appeal, we doubt the sagacity of Edward's constitutional and Rule 43 arguments as outlined in our discussion. However, we dispose of these issues on alternative grounds because any potential errors were either invited or harmless. In addition, we hold the district court did not error by admitting the testimony of Dr. Hoffman under Fed. R. Evid. 803(4). Accordingly, we AFFIRM.