Opinion ID: 2075762
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Supreme Court Caselaw

Text: H.R. contends he has a substantial liberty interest under the due process clause in developing a parental relationship with his son. I agree. The Supreme Court has long recognized that state intervention in the relationship between a parent and child is subject to constitutional oversight, see Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399-401, 43 S.Ct. 625, 626-27, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923). And, of course, fifty years ago in Stuart the United States Court of Appeals identified the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing and education of their children as a constitutional right. 72 App.D.C. at 396, 114 F.2d 825. More recently, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the relationship of love and duty in a recognized family unit is an interest in liberty entitled to constitutional protection. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257, 103 S.Ct. at 2991. The Court, however, in discussing the interests of unwed fathers in preventing termination of their relationships with their children, has treated differently the claims of fathers who have had custodial relationships with their children by the time of the termination proceeding and those who have not. In Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 31 L.Ed.2d 551 (1972), the state placed the children of unwed parents in guardianship after their mother's death over objection of their natural father, who had lived with and supported them all their lives. The Court held, as a matter of due process and equal protection, that the state could not deprive the father of custody without notice, hearing, and proof of his unfitness for parenthood. Several years later, moreover, in Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 99 S.Ct. 1760, 60 L.Ed.2d 297 (1979), the Court struck down a New York statute that permitted consent to adoption exclusively by the mother of a child born out-of-wedlock. As in Stanley, the natural father had lived with his two children and their mother, and supported them, for several years. After the mother had left with the children, remarried, and gained legal custody, the mother's new husband sought to adopt the children over the natural father's objection. The New York courts applied the statute and granted the adoption. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that, by permitting such adoption without consent of the father, the statute imposed a gender-based discrimination that did not bear a substantial relation to some important state interest, in violation of the equal protection clause. The Court eschewed discrimination against unwed fathers ... when their identity is known and they have manifested a significant paternal interest in the child. The facts of this case illustrate the harshness of classifying unwed fathers as being invariably less qualified and entitled than mothers to exercise a concerned judgment as to the fate of their children. Id. at 394, 99 S.Ct. at 1769. In contrast, in Quilloin v. Wolcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255, 98 S.Ct. 549, 554, 54 L.Ed.2d 511 (1978), where the unwed father had not at any time, had, or sought, actual or legal custody of his child, the Court upheld an adoption decree terminating the father's parental rights under Georgia's best interests of the child standard and granting legal custody to the eleven-year-old child's mother and stepfather. In upholding the adoption, the Court stated that due process would no doubt be violated if the state were to attempt to force the breakup of a natural family on the basis of the children's best interest without some showing of parental unfitness. Id. (quoting Smith v. Organization of Foster Families For Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 862-63, 97 S.Ct. 2094, 2119, 53 L.Ed.2d 14 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)). But, the Court noted, the result of the adoption was to give full recognition to a family unit already in existence. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255, 98 S.Ct. at 555. The Court implied that the outcome would have been different if the proposed adoption had placed the child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Id. Read together, these cases say that an unwed natural father who has had a custodial relationship with his child cannot be ousted as a parent at the mother's behest absent a showing of his unfitnessin favor of a foster parent ( Stanley ) or an adoptive stepfather ( Caban ), but that an unwed father who has not developed a custodial relationship, though fit to be a parent, can lose his parental rights to an adoptive stepfather when the best interests of the child preclude disruption of a family unit already in existence ( Quilloin ). [23] What, then, is to occur if an unwed father (1) has never had a relationship with his child but (2) seeks custody when a proposed adoption would place the child with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived? Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 255, 98 S.Ct. at 555. The Court addressed that questionat issue in this casein Lehr. Basically, the Court concluded the answer turns on how early and persistently the natural father pursues his interest in taking custody of the child so as to justify keeping the father presumptively first in line, so to speak, when the natural mother elects to put the child up for adoption. According to the Court in Lehr, when an unwed father demonstrates a full commitment to the responsibilities of parenthood by `com[ing] forward to participate in the rearing of his child,' Caban, 441 U.S. at 392, 99 S.Ct. at 1768, his interest in personal contact with his child acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 261, 103 S.Ct. at 2993. The Court noted that the mere existence of a biological link does not merit equivalent constitutional protection. Id. But, [t]he significance of the biological connection is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of responsibility for the child's future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and make uniquely valuable contributions to the child's development. Id. at 262, 103 S.Ct. at 2993 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court has characterized the unwed, noncustodial father's protectible liberty interest as an opportunity he must grasp[]. Courts and commentators accordingly have relabelled this particular liberty interest of a natural father as his opportunity interest. See In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 459 (1987); Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 313, 351-53 (1984) [hereinafter Buchanan, Constitutional Rights ]. It follows that a noncustodial, unwed father who has grasped his opportunity interest will, as a matter of substantive constitutional right, be in the same position as the custodial father in Stanley: entitled to an individualized hearing on fitness. 405 U.S. 645, 657 n. 9, 92 S.Ct. 1208, 1215 n. 9. See Buchanan, Constitutional Rights, at 354, 373. Because a noncustodial father may not grasp the opportunity to develop a relationship with his child in a timely, meaningful manner, his eventual assertion of his opportunity interest may be too late and thus not entitled to the constitutional protection available to a custodial father. In Lehr, for example, the Court upheld against a due process challenge an adoption decree granting legal custody to the child's mother and stepfather, even though the natural father had not been notified of, or allowed to participate in, the adoption proceeding. By the time the petition for adoption was filed, Lehr had failed to establish a parental relationship with his two-year-old daughter attributable in large part to the mother's desire to prevent contact between them. Significantly, however, Lehr also had failed to submit his name to New York's putative father registry, an action that would have guaranteed he received notice of any action to terminate his parental rights. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-52, 103 S.Ct. at 2987-89. The Supreme Court concluded that, under the circumstances, the New York statutory scheme, designed to protect the unmarried father's interest in assuming a responsible role in the future of his child, provided sufficient process by guaranteeing putative fathers who have never developed a relationship with the child the opportunity to receive notice simply by mailing a postcard to the putative father registry. Id. at 262 n. 18, 103 S.Ct. at 2993 n. 18. Because Lehr did not have a significant custodial, personal, or financial relationship with his child at the time notice would have been sent, id. at 263, 103 S.Ct. at 2994, and because he had failed to take advantage of his statutory right to establish a legal tie, the Court concluded there was no due process violation in terminating his parental rights without advance notice. Id. at 265, 103 S.Ct. at 2995. According to the Court, Lehr's failure to avail himself of state statutory protections meant that he was not entitled to notice. The Constitution does not require either a trial judge or a litigant to give special notice to nonparties who are presumptively capable of asserting and protecting their own rights. Id. at 265, 103 S.Ct. at 2995. In short, the Supreme Court concluded that the putative father registry scheme afforded Lehr the minimum notice Stanley required, see Lehr, 463 U.S. at 263-64 & n. 20, 103 S.Ct. at 2994-95 & n. 20, and that the proposed adoption was responsive to Quilloin's support for recognition of a family unit already in existence. Id. at 262 & n. 19, 103 S.Ct. at 2994 & n. 19. Lehr, therefore, limits the situations in which the state must take account of a father with only an opportunity interest. Buchanan, Constitutional Rights, at 354. But Lehr implies that an unwed father who does grasp his opportunity interest may be as constitutionally protected as the custodial father in Stanley. See Buchanan, Constitutional Rights, at 373.