Opinion ID: 2976716
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The fourth prong

Text: Fuelling claims that the disciplinary actions taken against her and her eventual termination were discriminatory. The latter claim clearly fails because she was replaced by a white female. See Logan, 259 F.3d at 567. Her claim of discriminatory discipline also lacks merit because she failed 11 to assert any factual allegations whatsoever showing that she was similarly situated to the black employees who were purportedly not disciplined for the same conduct that Fuelling engaged in. This court has explained the showing that is required under the fourth prong of the prima facie test as follows: In order for two or more employees to be considered similarly-situated for purposes of creating an inference of disparate treatment in a reverse discrimination case, the plaintiff must prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation are nearly identical to those of the [] employee who he alleges was treated more favorably. Leadbetter v. Gilley, 385 F.3d 683, 691 (6th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “The similarities between the plaintiff and the [other] employee must exist in all relevant aspects of their respective employment circumstances. Differences in job title, responsibilities, experience, and work record can be used to determine whether two employees are similarly situated.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Fuelling has identified only one black employee, Kim Napier, who allegedly called Fuelling a derogatory name and was not disciplined. But even then, Fuelling provided no information about Napier—such as her position, job responsibilities, years of experience, length of tenure at New Vision, or disciplinary history—that would indicate whether Napier and Fuelling were similarly situated in all relevant aspects of their employment. See id. Apart from the Napier incident, Fuelling fails to identify any other black employee who was not disciplined for similar behavior. Fuelling states that she was disciplined by Ward for calling a patient a “stupid nigger,” and that Ward did not discipline black employees for using the same language. But Fuelling does not identify any of those black employees, cite any specific instances 12 in which black employees other than Napier used such language, or assert any facts indicating that black employees who were not disciplined were “similarly situated” to her. Zachary alleges in her affidavit that Ward yelled at a white employee for using the term “the shits,” but did not reprimand a black employee who, a few minutes later, used the “F” word. Neither employee is ever identified. The same is true of her allegations about an employee who called someone a “spic.” Even assuming that the speakers were not disciplined for making these comments, Fuelling fails to demonstrate how they were similarly situated to her. Turning to Brown’s affidavit, she alleged that Ward chose a black woman to fill a phlebotomist position even though the woman had “no special qualifications” compared to any other phlebotomist, and that only a black employee “was allowed” to take a class required for a job in outpatient services. With regard to the former allegation, Brown provides no evidence to substantiate her conclusory assertion about the black woman’s qualifications. The latter allegation is also unsupported by specific factual allegations. Brown does not identify the “several phlebotomists” who were allegedly denied access to the class or claim that they were nonblack individuals. But even assuming that they were all white, Brown fails to allege any facts indicating that the black woman who was “allowed” to take the class was similarly situated to those unidentified persons who were allegedly not allowed to take the class. The party opposing a motion for summary judgment “must present some ‘specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue [of fact] for trial,’” Moore v. Holbrook, 2 F.3d 697, 699 (6th Cir. 1993) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)), and affidavits submitted in support thereof “must be made on personal knowledge,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(1). Under this standard, Fuelling has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether she 13 was similarly situated to the black employees who were allegedly treated better than she was treated. See, e.g., Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 352 (6th Cir. 1998) (explaining that a plaintiff is “required to prove that all of the relevant aspects of his employment situation were nearly identical” to those of the employee who was allegedly treated more favorably in order to satisfy the fourth prong of the prima facie test (emphasis and internal quotation marks omitted)). That failure is fatal to her prima facie case.