Opinion ID: 1651956
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Counsel's Conflicts of Interest

Text: Echols's next three points involve allegations that his trial counsel, Val Price [4] , was burdened by conflicts of interest, such that his representation of Echols was adversely affected. Generally, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional, errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). An exception to the rule that the defendant must show probable effect upon the outcome is where the assistance of counsel has been denied entirely or during a critical stage of the proceeding. Id. But only in circumstances of that magnitude is the defendant relieved of the burden to show that counsel's inadequate performance undermined the reliability of the verdict. Id. at 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659, n.26, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984)). `[C]ircumstances of that magnitude' may also arise when the defendant's attorney actively represented conflicting interests. Id. at 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237. In Mickens , the defendant had been convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. He sought a writ of habeas corpus on the ground that his Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel had been violated, because one of his trial attorneys had previously represented the murder victim and the trial court failed to inquire into the potential conflict. He contended that this failure to inquire required an automatic reversal of his conviction, under the holdings in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978), and Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 101 S.Ct. 1097, 67 L.Ed.2d 220 (1981). The Court disagreed, holding that automatic reversal is only required where defense counsel is forced to represent codefendants over counsel's timely objection, unless the trial court has determined that there is no conflict. The Court explained that absent an objection at trial, a defendant must demonstrate an actual conflict of interest, which the Court defined as a conflict that affected counsel's performance as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237. See also Townsend v. State, 350 Ark. 129, 85 S.W.3d 526 (2002). The Court explained that a defendant who shows that a conflict of interest actually affected the adequacy of his representation need not demonstrate prejudice in order to obtain relief. Mickens, 535 U.S. at 171, 122 S.Ct. 1237 (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). Based on the foregoing principles, the Mickens Court denied the defendant's habeas claim, holding: Since this was not a case in which (as in Holloway ) counsel protested his inability simultaneously to represent multiple defendants; and since the trial court's failure to make the Sullivan -mandated inquiry does not reduce the petitioner's burden of proof; it was at least necessary, to void the conviction, for petitioner to establish that the conflict of interest adversely affected his counsel's performance. Id. at 173-74, 122 S.Ct. 1237. Following this holding, the Court expressly noted that the only issue before it was the effect of the trial court's failure to inquire upon the Sullivan rule that deficient performance of counsel must be shown. Thus, the Court voiced no opinion as to whether, in cases where the alleged conflict of interests does not involve representation of codefendants, the applicable test is the Sullivan adverse-effect test or the Strickland prejudice test. In Townsend, 350 Ark. 129, 85 S.W.3d 526, this court interpreted Mickens as holding that until it is shown that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, a defendant has not established the constitutional predicate for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. This court held: Thus, in the absence of an actual conflict, a defendant alleging counsel's performance was deficient due to a conflict must demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [ Mickens, 535 U.S. 162, 166, 122 S.Ct. 1237, 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674) ]. In other words, an analysis of a conflict of interest under Mickens requires the same kind of analysisand the same kind of demonstration of prejudicethat is required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), as opposed to the presumption of prejudice (and the consequent automatic reversal) that was explained in Holloway . Id. at 135, 85 S.W.3d at 528-29. This court then noted that the Court's holding in Mickens was consistent with this court's own holdings: [W]e additionally note that this Strickland -type determination of the existence of prejudice, required by Mickens , is in keeping with our own holdings. In Wilburn v. State, 346 Ark. 137, 56 S.W.3d 365 (2001), an attorney-disqualification case, we held that this court reviews a trial court's decision to disqualify an attorney under an abuse-of-discretion standard. There, this court first noted Supreme Court cases holding that where a constitutional right to counsel exists, there is a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest. In addition, the Wilburn court stated the following: The cornerstone principle in all conflict cases is whether prejudice will result to the client as a result of the conflict of interest. See Sheridan v. State, 331 Ark. 1, 959 S.W.2d 29 (1998). That prejudice must be real and have some demonstrable detrimental effect on the client and not merely be abstract or theoretical. See Simmons v. Lockhart, 915 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.1990); Sheridan v. State, supra . Wilburn, 346 Ark. at 143, 56 S.W.3d 365. Prejudice will be presumed from a counsel's conflict of interest only when the defendant demonstrates that counsel actively represented conflicting interests. Price v. State, 347 Ark. 708, 66 S.W.3d 653 (2002) (citing Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra ; Johnson v. State, 321 Ark. 117, 900 S.W.2d 940 (1995)). See also Davis v. State, 345 Ark. 161, 44 S.W.3d 726 (2001) (holding that prejudice is presumed from a conflict of interest only when the defendant demonstrates that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance ). In the absence of a showing of prejudice, we will find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to deny counsel's motion to withdraw. Townsend, 350 Ark. at 135-36, 85 S.W.3d at 529. As will be more fully demonstrated below, none of the alleged conflicts of interest offered by Echols involves trial counsel's representation of multiple codefendants. Thus, we apply the standard enunciated in Townsend and review these claims first to determine whether Echols has shown the constitutional predicate that counsel actively represented conflicting interests. If that showing is made, the remaining inquiry is whether the conflict adversely affected counsel's representation of Echols, under Sullivan . If it is not shown that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, the remaining inquiry is whether prejudice has been shown under Strickland . With these legal principles in mind, we review Echols's allegations of counsel's conflicting interests.
Echols first argues that Price labored under an actual conflict of interests as a result of a contract to film the trial that was entered into between Echols and Home Box Office (HBO). [5] To better understand this claim, some background information is helpful. Approximately one month after the crimes were committed and after Echols and his codefendants had been arrested, filmmakers Bruce Sinofsky and Joe Berlinger approached the defendants about making a documentary about the crimes and their trials. Sinofsky and Berlinger had a contract with HBO to produce the documentary, which would be shown on the cable television network. All three defendants agreed to allow Sinofsky and Berlinger to interview them for the film. In exchange, the defendants were each to be paid $7,500 for their interviews. Additionally, the parties agreed to allow the filmmakers to place cameras in the courtroom and film the trial of Echols and Baldwin. The film, Paradise Lost: The Child Murders at Robin Hood Hills, was not shown until after the trial. The trial court found that no actual conflict existed, because the contract was between the filmmakers and Echols, who was eighteen years old at the time, and because Echols and his family supported the filmmaking project. The trial court found further that both the contract and the film itself were beneficial to the defense. The court found that the contract benefitted the defense in two ways: (1) it provided a source of funds for the defense without the exposure of defense strategy to the prosecution; and (2) it provided trial counsel with tapes of the proceedings that could be viewed daily to assess the progress of the trial. The trial court found that the film benefitted Echols, in that funds have been and continue to be raised for his defense and that he now has the services of pro-bono attorneys of national recognition and mass publicity[.] Echols argues that the trial court's ruling is erroneous. He claims that even though the contract was between himself and HBO, Price was still conflicted because he advised Echols to enter into the contract and because the demands of the contract were at odds with Echols's interests. To support this claim, Echols argues that Price had a personal long-range pecuniary interest in the film's success. He alleges that Price was burdened by a desire to improve his legal business, which would apparently result from the personal notoriety that Price would gain from appearing in the film. He claims further that the conflict adversely affected his defense in three ways. First, he asserts that Price sacrificed time he could have spent preparing for the trial on the film, by staging a strategy meeting between himself, co-counsel, and the defense investigator. Second, he contends that Price relied on funds to be paid from the HBO contract, for such things as pretrial investigation, discovery, and expert witnesses, and thus did not seek available, and perhaps more abundant, funds from the trial court. Finally, he asserts that his defense was directly and adversely affected by Price's decision not to seek a continuance to allow publicity to die down from Misskelley's trial, which had taken place two weeks earlier in nearby Clay County. On this last point, Echols claims that Price did not want a continuance because he wanted to get the trial finished before the scheduled date for the film's release. The conclusion that Echols draws from this is that counsel was obviously placing the interests of the film and its makers over that of his client. The record does not support his contentions. During the Rule 37 hearings, Price testified he advised Echols to enter into the contract, and that Echols was very receptive to the idea. He stated that the contract benefitted Echols because it provided funds for his defense without exposing defense strategy to the prosecution. He explained that he and co-counsel, Scott Davidson, thought long and hard about the issue of do we need experts, what should we do about the money, is it possible to file anything under seal, or is there another source to get money from. They ultimately decided that they could use the money from the film contract to explore the idea of consulting experts without having to request funds from the trial court, and thereby potentially revealing their strategy to the prosecution. Moreover, Price testified that in addition to the funds, the relationship with HBO provided the defense with video tapes of the proceedings as they were unfolding, allowing the defense to view the tapes daily and assess the progress of the trial. When asked whether he had received any money from the contract, Price testified that he had been paid approximately $1,900 from the contract funds, but that the money was to reimburse him for expenses that he had paid out during the course of the trial and on appeal. As for the decision not to seek a continuance, Price testified that although there was a great deal of publicity stemming from Misskelley's trial, he felt that a continuance would not be in his client's best interest because he believed that the media interest would not have waned at all by continuing the case for a month or two. He stated further that there was a good chance that the opposite would occur, that the publicity would have increased. He also stated that although he could not recall whether he had consulted with Echols on this particular decision, he believed that he had consulted with his client about every major decision in the case. Price also voiced concern about delaying the trial beyond the scheduled release date for the film, not for benefit of the filmmakers or HBO, as Echols asserts, but because the release of the film may have influenced potential jurors against Echols. As for the staged strategy meeting, Price explained that he had agreed to recreate for the cameras a meeting between himself, co-counsel, and the defense investigator regarding the decision whether to call a certain witness. Price stated that he was not paid for his participation in this part of the film and that was the only part of the film that was recreated. Echols's attorney questioned Price about the entertainment value that such a staged meeting would add to the film, in an attempt to show that Price was interested in the movie's success so that he and his legal practice would benefit from the film's exposure. Apparently, it was Echols's theory that the more entertaining the film was, the more likely that it would find a large audience, and that Price would benefit financially from the exposure. During oral argument before this court, Echols's counsel claimed that the time Price spent in this staged meeting could have been spent more productively on preparing for trial. The problem with these allegations is that they are just that allegations, with no factual support. Echols failed to offer any evidence to the effect that the minimal time that Price spent recreating the strategy meeting, which apparently lasted only minutes, adversely affected the defense, i.e., because he forfeited an opportunity to interview a key witness or failed to attend a hearing before the trial court. The bottom line is that Echols cannot show any adverse effect that resulted from his agreement to allow HBO to film the trial and conduct interviews with himself and his trial counsel. Based on the foregoing, we conclude, as did the trial court, that Echols failed to show an actual conflict of interests, i.e., that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, involving the contract with HBO to make the documentary film. We further conclude that Echols has failed to show that he was in any way prejudiced by counsel's performance, as required under Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674. We agree with the trial court that the record shows that counsel acted in Echols's interest, and that his defense was aided, not impeded, by the film contract. We thus reject this claim for relief.
Echols next argues that Price had a conflict of interests because of his representation in a civil matter of a codefendant of John Mark Byers, the stepfather of one of the murder victims. During the Rule 37 hearing, Price testified that Byers and his wife were sued along with Price's clients for taking property from a jewelry store in which Price's clients were part owners. At some point in the proceedings, Byers and his wife were dismissed from the suit. Thereafter, at a bench trial, Byers testified on behalf of Price's clients. The civil trial was completed prior to Echols's trial, and the parties were merely awaiting a decision from the circuit court. Echols contends that this situation created a conflict of interests because Byers's testimony was necessary to Price's civil client's case. Echols argues that this conflict adversely affected his defense in that Price did not aggressively question Byers about his possible involvement in the murders. The evidence does not support Echols's allegation on this point. Indeed, we are hard pressed to see any actual conflict arising from Price's connection to Byers in the civil matter. Moreover, we cannot see how any alleged conflict prejudiced his defense. The trial record reveals that the issue of Byers's possible involvement in the murders was put before the jury. See Echols I, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509. Byers was called as a defense witness for the purpose of exposing prior inconsistent statements that he had made to police regarding the appearance of blood, which matched his and his son's blood-type, on a knife that he owned. Perhaps more significantly, Price cross-examined Officer Gary Gitchell about his interview with Byers and about the fact that the officer had read Byers his Miranda rights prior to interviewing him. Gitchell explained that he had considered Byers to be a possible suspect in the homicides. Echols has failed to demonstrate prejudice on this point.
Echols next contends that a conflict of interests existed as a result of Price's prior representation of Michael Carson on a juvenile matter. Carson was called as a witness for the prosecution against Echols's codefendant, Jason Baldwin. Carson testified that Baldwin had made a jailhouse confession about the murders. Carson testified as follows: I said, just between me and you, did you do it. I won't say a word. He said yes and he went into detail about it. It was just me and Jason [Baldwin]. He told me he dismembered the kids, or I don't know exactly how many kids. He just said he dismembered them. He sucked the blood from the penis and scrotum and put the balls in his mouth. Echols I, 326 Ark. 917, 941, 936 S.W.2d 509, 519-20. The record reflects that Echols's counsel did not cross-examine Carson, but Baldwin's counsel did so rigorously. The trial court found that Echols could have no complaint about Carson's testimony because it was not admissible against him, only his codefendant, Baldwin. The trial court also found significant Price's testimony that if he had cross-examined Carson, he may have inadvertently suggested to the jury a connection between Echols and Carson's testimony. Finally, the trial court noted that although Echols had the services of two court-appointed attorneys, he made no effort at all to discredit co-counsel, Scott Davidson, concerning his representation of Echols. These findings are supported by the record. During the Rule 37 proceedings, Price testified that the trial judge was aware of his former representation of Carson. Because of that situation, the defense team had agreed that Davidson would be the one to conduct any cross-examination of Carson. Subsequently, however, Price and Davidson decided not to cross-examine Carson for several reasons. First, Price stated that he had no impeaching evidence to add to Baldwin's counsel's cross-examination, as he had already supplied Baldwin's counsel with any potential impeachment material on Carson. Second, he relied on the trial court's ruling that, although Echols and Baldwin were tried as accomplices, Carson's testimony would only be admitted against Baldwin. Indeed, the trial court instructed the jury that Carson's testimony was only admissible against Baldwin. Lastly, Price felt that if he had cross-examined Carson, he would be running the risk of opening the door to a line of questioning that may influence the trial judge to change his mind about the applicability of Carson's testimony to Echols. Echols has failed to demonstrate that counsel actively represented conflicting interests. He has further failed to demonstrate that his defense was in any way prejudiced by the alleged conflict. We thus affirm on this point.