Opinion ID: 786794
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Instructions, the Jury Interrogatories, and the Verdict

Text: 31 Prior to the submission of the case to the jury, Crossan and the City moved for judgment as a matter of law with respect to Kerman's claim of retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. Their attorney stated as follows: 32 It's the defendant's [ sic ] position that Rule 50 should be granted. We don't believe that certainly any reasonable juror could conclude, and in fact we do not believe that the law permits First Amendment violations [ sic ] for the specific acts that are complained of herein, at least insofar as it includes keeping plaintiff naked while in his apartment, refusing to allow plaintiff to medicate his cat, and sending him to one particular hospital rather than another particular hospital. We don't believe that certainly at the bare minimum, none [ sic ] of those could constitute a First Amendment retaliation claim no matter what plaintiff establishes. I don't believe any of those rise to the level. 33 (Tr. 666.) The district court reserved decision. 34 The jury was asked to return a general verdict and to answer 17 written interrogatories. The parties agreed on the following interrogatories, some of which repeated factual questions that were common to different legal claims. With respect to the federal claims and the claims of false imprisonment, the jury was asked whether Kerman proved that Crossan, personally or through his subordinates, intentionally or recklessly subjected Kerman to excessive force after he was placed in handcuffs (Question 1); if so, whether those acts were a proximate cause of injury to Kerman (Question 2); whether Crossan proved that, after completion of the search for a gun, probable cause existed to keep Kerman in custody and cause him to be taken to the hospital (Questions 3, 7, and 8); if so, whether the postsearch custody and hospitalization were a proximate cause of injuries to Kerman (Questions 4 and 9); whether Kerman proved that various listed acts by Crossan were motivated or substantially caused by Kerman's exercise of his free speech rights (Question 5); and if so, whether Kerman proved that those acts chilled his right to free speech (Question 6). As to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the jury was asked whether Kerman proved that Crossan's conduct toward him was so outrageous or shocking that it exceeded all reasonable bounds of decency (Question 10), or caused him severe emotional distress (Question 11); and whether Kerman proved that Crossan acted with the desire to cause him such distress (Question 12), or under circumstances that Crossan should have known would cause Kerman severe emotional distress (Question 13), or recklessly and with utter disregard of the possible consequences (Question 14). As to damages, the jury was asked [w]hat amount of damages do you find Plaintiff suffered as a result of defendants' actions (Question 15); if it found no such damages, whether it wished to award nominal damages of $1 or less (Question 16); and whether it wished to award punitive damages (Question 17). 35 To the extent pertinent here, the district court instructed the jury that, with respect to Kerman's Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful seizure and his state-law claims for false imprisonment, the elements were essentially the same. ( See, e.g., Tr. 756.) In describing these claims, the court stated: 36 [A] person may not be taken into custody and brought to the hospital without probable cause. In considering this element, you may consider New York Mental Hygiene Law, section 9.41, which states: Any ... police officer ... may take into custody any person who appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself or herself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to the person or others. 37 New York Mental Hygiene Law does not require that the threat of substantial harm to oneself or others be evidenced by an overt act, attempts or threats. The threat of harm can be evidenced by the behavior of the person or by neglect or refusal to care for oneself, as long as that behavior, neglect or refusal to care for oneself was likely to result in serious harm to himself or others. 38 (Tr. 749-50.) 39 In describing the nature of probable cause, the district court instructed that 40 [i]n order for a police officer to have probable cause to keep a person in custody and bring him to the hospital, the police officer must have information that would lead a reasonable police officer who possesses the same information as the officer to conclude that the person being taken into custody and brought to the hospital appears to be mentally ill and is conducting himself in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others. The officer making the decision should take into consideration all the evidence of plaintiff's mental condition available to him under the circumstances, whether it be favorable or unfavorable. 41 (Tr. 750 (emphasis added).) The court instructed the jury that the burden was on Crossan to prove the existence of probable cause for Kerman's detention and hospitalization. ( See Tr. 751.) 42 With regard to Crossan's defense of qualified immunity, the district court had stated in colloquy with counsel that there have to be findings put to the jury that relate not to the conclusion of the qualified immunity but to the facts underlying it, identifying the factual finding as whether Crossan had [p]robable cause to send [Kerman] to the hospital. (Tr. 465.) Agreeing with this view, Crossan asked the court to instruct the jury that [d]efendant Crossan claims that he had probable cause to keep plaintiff in protective custody and send plaintiff to the hospital for observation, and thereby had qualified immunity for the federal claims asserted. (Defendants' Requested Charge to the Jury, dated April 18, 2002, at 6 (emendations omitted).) The court instructed the jury accordingly, albeit without reference to the term qualified immunity (Tr. 676), reiterating virtually verbatim its prior instruction on the nature of probable cause, i.e., that 43 the police officer must have information that would lead a reasonable police officer who possesses the same information as the officer to conclude that the person being taken into custody and brought to the hospital appears to be mentally ill and is conducting themselves [ sic ] in a manner which is likely to result in serious harm to himself or others. 44 (Tr. 755.) The court followed with a virtually verbatim repetition of its earlier instruction that [t]his does not require that the threat of substantial harm be evidenced by an overt act, attempts or threats. Threat of harm can be evidenced by the behavior of the person or by neglect or refusal to care for oneself as long as that behavior, neglect or refusal to care for oneself was likely to result in serious harm to himself or others. ( Id. ) 45 On injury and proximate cause, the court instructed that 46 if you find that the defendant Crossan's action deprived plaintiff of his right to be free from unlawful seizure, you must consider whether plaintiff has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the deprivation of plaintiff's constitutional right to be free from unlawful seizure is the proximate cause of the injuries he is alleging. 47 (Tr. 751.) The court referred to Kerman's assertions of physical pain and mental suffering and to that amount of money which will fairly and reasonably make plaintiff whole or compensate him for the physical pain and suffering and/or the mental anguish that he has shown he sustained. (Tr. 760-61.) The court stated that 48 [c]ompensatory damages are damages which compensate the plaintiff for the injuries which the defendant wrongfully caused him. They are damages which fairly and reasonably compensate plaintiff for his medical expenses and the pain and the injury, including the emotional and mental anguish that he claims he sustained as a consequence of the defendant's violation of his constitutional rights or violation of state law. Plaintiff's right to recover damages is not limited by the fact that his injury resulted from an aggravation of a preexisting condition. 49 (Tr. 760 (emphasis added).) The court also instructed the jury that it could award Kerman nominal damages: 50 Nominal damages may be awarded when the plaintiff has been deprived of a right or [ sic ] has suffered no actual damages as a natural consequence of that deprivation. Therefore, if you find that the plaintiff has suffered no injury as a result of any of the defendant's conduct, other than the fact of the deprivation of a legal right, you may award, if you so choose, nominal damages not to exceed $1. 51 (Tr. 761.) However, the court instructed the jury that it should not reach the issue of damages at all unless it found that Kerman had carried his burden of proving liability: 52 If you find that the plaintiff carried his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated any of his constitutional rights, or that the defendant in this case violated New York State tort law, and that those acts were a proximate cause of damages to the plaintiff, then, but only then, must you consider the amount of damages which will fairly and reasonably compensate plaintiff for those injuries sustained as a result of that violation of his constitutional rights or a violation of New York State law. 53 .... Obviously, you need not reach the issue of damages, unless you determine that plaintiff has established liability on any one of his claims by a preponderance of the evidence. 54 (Tr. 759-60 (emphases added).) 55 The jury found that Kerman was entitled only to an award of nominal damages on his claims for unlawful seizure and false imprisonment. It rejected his claims (1) that Crossan's treatment of Kerman was motivated by Kerman's exercise of his free speech rights, (2) that Crossan personally or through the other officers subjected Kerman to excessive force after placing him in handcuffs, and (3) that Crossan intentionally and outrageously subjected Kerman to emotional distress. ( See Tr. 781-83.) However, as to both Kerman's Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful seizure after the completion of the search for a gun and his parallel state-law claims for false imprisonment, the jury found that Crossan had failed to prove that probable cause existed to keep Kerman in custody and cause him to be taken to the hospital. ( See Tr. 781, 783.) Nonetheless, with respect to the seizure and false imprisonment claims, the jury found that Kerman had not proven that his continued custody or involuntary hospitalization were a proximate cause of injuries. ( See Tr. 781, 783.) The jury found that Kerman should not be awarded compensatory or punitive damages ( see Tr. 783-84) but that he should be awarded nominal damages of one dollar or less (Tr. 784). 56 The district court, ruling that the jury ha[d] returned a verdict in favor of the defendants, entered judgment dismissing the complaint in its entirety. (Judgment dated April 23, 2002.)