Opinion ID: 2009468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Aggravating Circumstances Double Counting in Weighing Process

Text: Ferguson contends that during the weighing process of the penalty phase, the jury was improperly permitted to double count aggravating circumstances. According to Ferguson, the statutory aggravating circumstances that (1) the murder was committed during a robbery and (2) the murder was committed for pecuniary gain are duplicative, because a murder committed during a robbery is necessarily committed for pecuniary gain. See Provence v. State, Fla.Supr., 337 So.2d 783 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969, 97 S.Ct. 2929, 53 L.Ed.2d 1065 (1977). Consequently, Ferguson argues it was error not to instruct the jury that, if it found that both robbery and pecuniary gain were extant statutory aggravating circumstances, it should regard them only as a single aggravating factor during the weighing process. Ferguson did not raise this claim before the Superior Court. Therefore, we review his contention for plain error. Wainwright v. State, Del.Supr., 504 A.2d 1096, 1100, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 869, 107 S.Ct. 236, 93 L.Ed.2d 161 (1986). This Court initially rejected a similar argument in Flamer v. State, Del.Supr., 490 A.2d 104, 125-26, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865, 104 S.Ct. 198, 78 L.Ed.2d 173 (1983), and cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 185, 88 L.Ed.2d 154 (1985), and subsequently in Deputy v. State, Del.Supr., 500 A.2d 581, 600-01 (1985), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 940, 107 S.Ct. 1589, 94 L.Ed.2d 778 (1987). Ferguson has cited no intervening, controlling legal precedent subsequent to Flamer and Deputy in support of his contention. In Flamer, this Court noted that the United States Supreme Court has affirmed a sentence of death in which these same two allegedly duplicative aggravating circumstances were presented to the jury without an instruction to treat them as a single factor. Flamer v. State, 490 A.2d at 125 (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976)). Therefore, this Court determined that the question of whether these aggravating circumstances are duplicative is a matter of statutory construction, rather than an issue of constitutionality. See Deputy v. State, 500 A.2d at 600-01. This Court then held, in Deputy, that the language of the Delaware death penalty statute clearly anticipates that duplicative statutory aggravating circumstances may be considered by the jury. Id. at 600. See 11 Del.C. § 4209(e)(2). Furthermore, Ferguson's argument that robbery and pecuniary gain are always duplicative factors is contrary to the explicit language and commentary of the applicable statutes. The Delaware Criminal Code has expanded the common law concept of robbery and now defines that crime as forcible theft. Del.Crim.Code With Commentary 257 (1973). Delaware's definition of theft, which is also broader than the common law definition, now encompasses two separate concepts: [T]he actor may intend to deprive the owner of the property, or his mind may be focused rather on gain to himself or another not entitled thereto. Del.Crim.Code With Commentary 270 (1973) (emphasis added). Consequently, in Delaware, since not all robberies are ipso facto committed for pecuniary gain, those two factors are not always duplicative. Moreover, even when a murder occurs during a robbery which was being committed for pecuniary gain, those two factors are not entirely duplicative. Robbery, as an aggravating factor, focuses on the means of accomplishing the crime, i.e., force. Pecuniary gain, as an aggravating factor, focuses on the motive for the crime, i.e., either gain or owner deprivation. Accordingly, there is a rational basis for the General Assembly's decision to identify each factor as a separate statutory aggravating circumstance. The 1991 amendments to the Delaware death penalty statute reflect no legislative intent to change this Court's construction in Flamer and Deputy of the identical, unamended statutory language. In fact, those 1991 amendments undermine Ferguson's argument. The function of the jury in the Delaware's capital sentencing process is now advisory. State v. Cohen, Del.Supr., 604 A.2d 846, 851-52 (1992). Pursuant to the present Delaware death penalty statute, the weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances is not simply a mechanical process devoid of judgment. Id. at 849. The imposition of a sentence of death or life imprisonment is not to be determined by a mere counting process. Id. The weighing of aggravating and mitigating circumstances involves a qualitative rather than a quantitative consideration of the circumstances to determine the appropriate punishment. Id. That qualitative process requires that the jury and the judge carefully consider the specific facts of each case and, when appropriate, not to give one or more aggravating factors independent weight. [8] Most importantly, in this appeal, Ferguson acknowledges that the trial judge, who is the ultimate sentencing authority after the 1991 amendments, specifically stated that in reaching his sentencing decision, he considered the robbery and pecuniary gain statutory aggravating circumstances as one factor during the weighing process and placed no independent weight on the pecuniary gain aggravator. [9] The State acknowledges that, in Ferguson's case, the Superior Court judge was completely within his statutory sentencing authority to attach no independent weight to the pecuniary gain aggravator during the weighing process. Accord Dawson v. State, Del.Supr., 637 A.2d 57, 66 (1994). [10] Ferguson has failed to demonstrate plain error. [11]