Opinion ID: 2623595
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Coffman: Asserted Defects in Principal Penalty Phase Instructions

Text: Coffman contends the trial court's failure to instruct the jury that certain sentencing factors could only be considered in mitigation might have confused the jury as to the scope of its sentencing discretion and constituted error under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. She argues the introduction of the various sentencing factors by the phrase whether or not could have led the jury to conclude that the absence of such factors constituted aggravation. She also asserts the failure to explicitly designate aggravating and mitigating factors violated state and federal guarantees of equal protection inasmuch as, in noncapital sentencing, the factors are separately designated. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 421, 423.) We have repeatedly held that sentencing factors need not be labeled as mitigating or aggravating, and we see no reasonable likelihood the jury would have misunderstood any mitigating factor as aggravating (see, e.g., People v. Maury (2003) 30 Cal.4th 342, 443-444, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1; People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 801-803, 276 Cal. Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330), or that the absence of a mitigating factor was itself an aggravating one ( People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 315, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 554, 73 P.3d 433). Further, we see no merit in Coffman's equal protection argument, for capital and noncapital defendants are not similarly situated for purposes of the choice among sentencing options. Coffman challenges a number of other aspects of the standard sentencing instruction. She contends CALJIC No. 8.88, in its use of the terms so substantial and warrants, was vague and misleading as to the jury's duty to return a death verdict only if aggravating circumstances outweighed those in mitigation, and only if it found death to be the appropriate sentence. We have held to the contrary. ( People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 315-316, 3 Cal.Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585.) She also faults the instruction for failing to inform the jury that if the aggravating circumstances did not outweigh those in mitigation, a sentence of life without the possibility of parole was mandatory. As she acknowledges, we have rejected this argument. ( People v. Tuilaepa (1992) 4 Cal.4th 569, 593-594, 15 Cal. Rptr.2d 382, 842 P.2d 1142; People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 978, 281 Cal.Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131.) Nor, contrary to Coffman's argument, was the instruction constitutionally defective for not informing the jury that even if it found the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating ones, it still could return a verdict of life without the possibility of parole. ( People v. Beeler (1995) 9 Cal.4th 953, 997, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 607, 891 P.2d 153.) Coffman further contends the instruction unconstitutionally failed to inform the jury that in order to reach a death verdict, it had to find that aggravating circumstances outweighed mitigating ones beyond a reasonable doubt and that death was the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. We have rejected these contentions. ( People v. Medina (1995) 11 Cal.4th 694, 782, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) Contrary to Coffman's further contention, the instruction was not defective for failing to inform the jury as to which side bore the burden of persuading it of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of a death verdict in this case. ( People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 643, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) Nor was the instruction defective for failing to require the jury to make unanimous separate findings on each of the aggravating circumstances or to render a statement of reasons for its death verdict. ( People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 701, 3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748; Medina, supra, at p. 782, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 165, 906 P.2d 2.) We decline to reconsider these holdings. Finally, Coffman contends the instructions improperly suggested to the jury that it must unanimously agree on the presence of mitigating factors â in particular, the alleged duress or domination by Marlow â before it could consider them in determining her sentence. As we explain, there is no reasonable likelihood the jury so interpreted the court's instructions. ( People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 801, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) The issue arose in the following context. During a conference among the court and counsel to select jury instructions to govern the penalty phase deliberations, Marlow asked that the jury be instructed that in order to consider any aggravating factor, all 12 jurors were required to agree that the factor had been proven. Although the court initially denied the request, it later reversed itself and instructed the jury that [a]ll twelve jurors must agree as to the existence of any aggravating factor before it may be considered by you. [ļ] If the jury does not unanimously agree that the existence of an aggravating factor has been proved, no juror may consider it in reaching their personal penalty decision. After reading the jury the list of sentencing factors found in section 190.3, factors (a) through (k), the court said: I have previously read to you the list of aggravating circumstances which the law permits you to consider if you â if you found that any of them is established beyond a reasonable doubt by the evidence. [44] Coffman contends the jury would have understood the court's reference to the list of aggravating circumstances to encompass mitigating circumstances, noting the instructions did not specifically advise the jury that no unanimity was needed as to the latter. She contends further that the prosecutor, in his summation, essentially characterized the manipulative and exploitive way Marlow used Coffman as an aggravating circumstance within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (a). Because the jury could not believe Coffman had acted under duress or substantial domination without also believing Marlow had engaged in such duress or domination, she reasons the instructions would have led the jury to believe it must unanimously find the factual underpinning to the mitigating factor of section 190.3, factor (g), contrary to the rule of McKoy v. North Carolina (1990) 494 U.S. 433, 439-444, 110 S.Ct. 1227, 108 L.Ed.2d 369. We disagree. Nothing in the instructions told the jurors to consider any mitigating factor only if they unanimously found it to be supported by the evidence; the unanimity requirement was explicitly directed to aggravating factors. Nor did anything in the prosecutor's comments on Coffman's duress defense suggest that Marlow's exploitation of Coffman should be weighed against her as a factor in aggravation. [45] To the extent the prosecutor suggested that Coffman exploited Marlow, we presume the jury, as instructed, weighed in aggravation only the factors specifically defined as aggravating, namely (as relevant to Coffman) the circumstances of the offense (factor (a)) and other violent criminal conduct (factor (b)). Finally, contrary to Coffman's argument, California's sentencing process remains constitutionally valid after Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 and Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556. ( People v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 139, 8 Cal.Rptr.3d 271, 82 P.3d 296.)