Opinion ID: 1743864
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: whether the lower court erred in appointing a court appointed expert to prepare valuations in this matter.

Text: ¶ 23. Roger next cites the chancellor's appointment of an expert witness as error. Jo Ann filed a motion requesting that the chancellor appoint an expert witness to value the marital estate as of December 31, 1992. Roger opposed the motion, arguing that it would only assist Jo Ann in proving her case. Roger further opposed the hearing on the motion because counsel for Roger could not be present on the day of the hearing. On the day of the hearing Roger's counsel telephoned the court administrator who informed counsel that the motion was still set to be heard. Roger's counsel asked to participate by phone. The court administrator told counsel that she would call back if the hearing took place. Counsel was not contacted by the court administrator. The chancellor held the hearing on the motion, granted the motion and appointed Donald Tackett and Associates to prepare a valuation of the marital estate. ¶ 24. In Bryant v. Horton, 124 Miss. 1, 86 So. 642 (1921), this Court reversed the trial court for hearing and granting a motion to dismiss without notice to opposing counsel or without giving opposing counsel the opportunity to be heard. This Court stated [w]e think the proper practice in such a case is to give notice to opposing counsel when action is to be taken by the court, so that he may appear and be heard, or remedy the trouble urged against his case. Id. at 643. ¶ 25. In the case sub judice, Roger's counsel was noticed that the motion was to be heard on February 5, 1998. Counsel immediately notified the court that he could not attend the hearing and asked that it be rescheduled. Counsel received no reply from Jo Ann's counsel or the chancellor. When counsel attempted to participate in the hearing telephonically, the court administrator never called counsel to advise him of the hearing time as she had promised. In effect, counsel was not noticed because the court administrator failed to notify counsel when the hearing began. ¶ 26. Furthermore, it is the chancellor's duty and responsibility to make sure that every person who has a legal interest in a proceeding or his counsel is given full right to be heard according to law.... Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3(A)(4). Neither Roger nor his counsel was given any right at all to be heard at this proceeding. ¶ 27. While we cannot say that the chancellor would not have appointed the expert witness if Roger had attended the hearing, we can say that Roger was possibly harmed by this appointment. The chancellor instructed the expert to value the marital estate as of December 31, 1992. The expert testified that he used a January, 1998, balance sheet to begin his evaluation. Indeed his report stated that he was to determine the marital estate's current value. ¶ 28. Because this is a domestic relations case, we will review the decision of the chancellor to appoint an expert under the manifest error, abuse of discretion standard applied in domestic relations cases. Clark, 754 So.2d at 458. ¶ 29. M.R.E. 706 states in pertinent part: (a) Appointment. The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection.... M.R.E. 706 clearly authorizes the appointment of an expert upon the motion of a party. As the Court of Appeals correctly noted, [t]he appointment of an expert by the court under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 706 is done sparingly, and then only in exceptional cases involving complex issues where the expert's testimony would be helpful to the trier of facts. M.R.E. 706. Trilogy Communications, Inc. v. Thomas Truck Lease, Inc., 733 So.2d 313, 317 (Miss.Ct.App.1998). ¶ 30. The chancellor did not abuse his discretion in appointing an expert. The mechanics of this case are extremely complicated. Involved in this case is the valuation of a partnership that was in bankruptcy at the time of the divorce in 1992. As of 1998, the partnership had ended the bankruptcy and had begun rebuilding the farming operations. The parties had lived in a home allegedly paid for and owned by the partnership. Living expenses for the parties had been paid by the partnership. Because of the complexity of the financial matters in this case, it cannot be said that the chancellor abused his discretion in appointing an expert. ¶ 31. As stated earlier, though, Roger was possibly harmed by the appointment of the expert witness. Specifically, Roger should have been allowed input on matters such as the date to be used in the valuation and the method of selecting the expert. Upon remand, Roger should be given an opportunity to be heard with regard to the expert witness.