Opinion ID: 357403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pretrial Continuance.

Text: 31 The indictment against the defendant was returned on March 3, 1977. At arraignment on March 7, 1977, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty to the charges and the case was set for trial on April 4, 1977. Within the one week period designated for filing motions the defendant moved for a 60-day continuance because of the complexity of the case and the voluminous documentary evidence to be examined. In response to this motion the trial court delayed commencement of the trial until May 2, 1977, but refused to grant any further continuance. 32 Asserting that the trial judge misapplied the time limits set by the Speedy Trial Act without considering the factors recognized in the Act as possible bases for a decision to grant a continuance, 5 the defendant contends that the refusal to grant a further continuance was reversible error. He argues that due to the short time between indictment and trial he was unable to adequately examine the documentary evidence relevant to the case. The defendant further contends that because of the lack of adequate time for trial preparation, he was unable to interview a number of witnesses who could have aided his defense. In support of this contention the defendant urges that, due to publicity surrounding the case and the government's repeated references at trial to the $1,000,000 missing from the food stamp funds collected by Moneytown, the real issue in the jury's mind was the implication that he had stolen the money. Therefore, he argues, his inability to fully examine the financial records of Moneytown and explain where the money had gone was highly prejudicial. We are not convinced that the time allowed by the trial court was inadequate for the defendant to fully examine Moneytown's financial records. Furthermore, even if the defendant had been able to explain fully where the funds had actually gone, the FNS 250 forms which formed the basis for the indictment would be no less false with regard to the deposits listed. Our examination of the record indicates that the government's references to the amount of money missing, or the amount misstated on Moneytown's FNS 250 forms, were relevant to negate the defendant's contention that he merely made a good faith mistake as to the amount of money deposited and was totally unaware that deposits were not being made. 33 The rule is well established that the decision to grant a continuance rests in the sound discretion of the trial court, Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589, 84 S.Ct. 841, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964), and is reviewable only for an abuse of that discretion. See United States v. Little, 567 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sturgeon, 501 F.2d 1270, 1275 (8th Cir.), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1071, 95 S.Ct. 659, 42 L.Ed.2d 667 (1974); United States v. Leach, 429 F.2d 956, 963 (8th Cir. 1970), Cert. denied, 402 U.S. 986, 91 S.Ct. 1675, 29 L.Ed.2d 151 (1971). 34 The trial court's decision not to grant a further continuance in this case was based in part on the fact that defendant's counsel had represented him for 17 months prior to the return of the indictment, and that the defendant had been in possession of the documentary evidence in question for more than a year prior to trial. Although the defendant argues that he was unable to begin examining the documentary material until the indictment was returned since he had no idea what would be relevant, defense counsel had represented the defendant before the Missouri legislature in committee hearings regarding the missing food stamp funds and had some notice of possible federal charges through search warrants and grand jury proceedings connected with the investigation prior to indictment. Furthermore, the documentary evidence in this case consisted of the financial records of Moneytown, with which the defendant could be expected to have some familiarity. We find that the trial court acted within the limits of its discretion in concluding that the defendant had been afforded an adequate time to prepare his defense and in refusing to grant a second continuance. 35