Opinion ID: 1882055
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the trial court committed reversible error by refusing to grant an informant instruction which Moore requested.

Text: ¶ 13. Moore contends that, because Andre Bully was a jailhouse informant, the trial court should have instructed the jury to review more closely Bully's testimony by granting jury instruction D-24, which stated: The Court instructs the jury that the law looks with suspicion and distrust on the testimony of an alleged informant, and requires the jury to weigh same with great care and suspicion. You should weigh the testimony from alleged informant, and passing on what weight, if any, you should give this testimony, you should weigh it with great care and caution, and look upon it with distrust and suspicion. ¶ 14. The State is correct in its assertion that in Manning v. State, 735 So.2d 323, 335 (Miss.1999), and Gray v. State, 728 So.2d 36, 72 (Miss.1998), this Court held that where informants do not receive favorable treatment in exchange for testifying, a trial court's refusal to grant an informant instruction is not necessarily error. Under the facts of the present case, this Court cannot confidently say that Bully received nothing in exchange for his testimony. Bully, who was facing aggravated assault charges, was released on his own recognizance after cooperating with the State in Moore's case. Bully's attorney testified that Bully probably would not have been released without providing a statement to the State. Six months after making his statement, Bully received an order of nolle prosequi based upon insufficient evidence upon which to obtain a valid conviction. The fact remains, however, that Bully did receive the benefit of being released on his own recognizance the day after he signed a statement against Moore. We hold this to be sufficient evidence of favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony to support the granting of the requested cautionary instruction. ¶ 15. Regarding this sort of jail-house snitch testimony, we have stated that it is becoming an increasing problem in this state, as well as throughout the American criminal justice system. McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d 151, 158 (Miss.1989). In Sherrell v. State, 622 So.2d 1233, 1236 (Miss. 1993), we held that the trial court did not err in allowing the testimony of a jail-house informant. We qualified this holding, though, stating: Although the trial judge allowed the testimony of [the informant] into evidence, he made certain that a cautionary instruction was given to the jury.... The jury was instructed to view his testimony with caution and suspicion in light of [his] criminal conviction. The judge also reminded the jurors that they should consider the rest of the physical evidence presented during the trial and not judge the case based on the alleged confession... No evidence was presented which showed that [the informant] would benefit in any way for testifying against Sherrell. Id. at 1236 (emphasis added). Sherrell indicates the importance of cautionary instructions when such snitch testimony is offered. In Gray, this Court reiterated that it does not view inmate testimony favorably. Gray, 728 So.2d at 72. There, the Court upheld the admission of two jailhouse informants' testimony because the evidence in the record before the Court does not establish the inmates received anything in exchange for their statements. Id. Ironically, the State argued that Gray could have submitted an instruction requiring the jury to weigh an informant's testimony with caution and suspicion, the very same type of instruction proposed by Moore. Id. Likewise, in Manning, this Court affirmed the denial of a cautionary instruction based partly on the fact neither informant had received any preferential treatment in exchange for their testimony. Manning, 735 So.2d at 335. ¶ 16. The trial judge refused Moore's requested instruction based on his view that instruction C-2 would cover any witness. Instruction C-2 stated: Each person testifying under oath is a witness. You have the duty to determine the believability of a witness. In performing this duty, you must consider each witness's intelligence, the witness's ability to observe and accurately remember, the witness's sincerity, and the witness's demeanor while testifying. You must consider also the extent the witness is either supported or contradicted by other evidence; the relationship the witness may have with either side; and how the witness might be affected by the verdict. In weighing a discrepancy by a witness or between witnesses, you should consider whether it resulted from an innocent mistake or a deliberate falsehood, and whether it pertains to a matter of importance or an unimportant detail. You may reject or accept all or any part of a witness's testimony and you may reject part and accept other parts of a witness's testimony. After making your own judgment, you will give the testimony of each witness the credibility, if any, as you may think it deserves. Jury instruction C-2 did not advise the jury to weigh Bully's testimony with caution and suspicion. In view of our position on the unreliability of jailhouse informant or snitch testimony, we do not agree that instruction C-2 adequately instructed the jury on the weight to be given to Bully's testimony. For the foregoing reasons, this Court finds that the trial court erred in refusing jury instruction D-24 and that it was an abuse of discretion to deny Moore a cautionary instruction in the face of evidence that Bully may have received favorable treatment in exchange for his testimony.