Opinion ID: 1868643
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Procedural Complaints

Text: In Issue No. Three, Respondent argues that the Commission's findings with regard to L.B.'s complaint are unsupported by any live pleadings and are therefore void as a matter of law. The Commission amended its Notice of Formal Proceedings to include L.B.'s allegations on May 28, 2002. In its initial Findings of Fact issued on August 27, 2002, the Commission found that the Examiner had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that [i]n or around August 1995, during regular business hours, Respondent engaged in the inappropriate physical touching and kissing of [L.B.], his secretary, while in his chambers located in Alice, Jim Wells County, Texas. Respondent filed his Statement of Objections on September 25, 2002, in which he pointed out that there was no evidence in the record that alleged any misconduct in or around August 1995. Thereafter, the Commission amended its Findings of Fact with regard to L.B.'s complaint to read, In or around August 1996.... Respondent now complains that the amended finding is unsupported by the live pleading on which the Examiner proceeded to trial. The function of a pleading is to define the issues at trial. See Safety Cas. Co. v. Wright, 138 Tex. 492, 160 S.W.2d 238, 245 (1942) (op. on reh'g); Bader v. Cox, 701 S.W.2d 677, 686 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A petition must give fair and adequate notice of the facts upon which the pleader bases his claim so that the opposing party has information sufficient to enable him to prepare a defense. See Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 810 (Tex.1982); see also Tex.R. Civ. P. 45, 47. The pleadings and the evidence must coincide. Wright, 160 S.W.2d at 245. However, a variance between the pleadings and proof is fatal only if the divergence is substantial, misleading, and prejudicial. See Stone v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 554 S.W.2d 183, 186-87 (Tex.1977); see also 2 McDONALD TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 7.32[b] (rev. 1992). The term on or about means a date of approximate certainty, with a possible variance of a few days. See Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Vaughan, 792 S.W.2d 944, 945 (Tex.1990) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 564 (5th ed. 1979); State v. Metzger, 199 Neb. 186, 256 N.W.2d 691, 692 (1977)). Here, the variance was twelve months, which is a substantial difference. Upon Respondent's objection, the Commission should have not only amended its Findings, but should have also amended the formal notice, or moved for a trial amendment to the pleadings, to conform with the evidence presented as allowed by Rule 10(f). Tex.R. Rem'l/Ret. Judges, Rule 10(f). Accordingly, Issue No. Three is sustained. Given our disposition of Issue No. Three, we need not address Issues No. One, Two [10] and Five. In Issue No. Four, Respondent maintains that the Commission used an improper legal standard in arriving at its Findings, Conclusions and Recommendations. Respondent argues that the proper legal standard to be used in removal proceedings is the higher clear and convincing standard of proof following the Texas Supreme Court's decision in In re Laughlin, 153 Tex. 183, 265 S.W.2d 805, 809 (1954). Respondent further points out that the holding in Laughlin has never been expressly overturned, but rather, that it has simply been overlooked by the subsequent removal proceedings. Respondent contends that perhaps a preponderance standard is appropriate in judicial disciplinary proceedings where the sanction imposed is less than removal. Respondent notes that the In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. 1974) was the first removal proceeding instituted under the amended Section 1-a of Article V of the Texas Constitution. We are unconvinced by Respondent's argument. In re Laughlin has not simply been overlooked by the subsequent removal proceedings. Respondent himself pointed out that there was an amendment to the pertinent section of the Texas Constitution and that In re Brown was the first removal proceeding instituted under such amendments. It is therefore not a simple oversight on the part of the Supreme Court, or Review Tribunals, to have applied In re Brown as precedence to support the legal standard to be used in these proceedings. In this case the Court determined that the burden to establish the charges against Judge Brown was upon the Examiner, and those charges had to be established by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d at 319-20. Similarly, In re Thoma, the first proceeding to be reviewed by a Review Tribunal, established that the legal standard to be used in these proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence. 873 S.W.2d 477, 485 (Tex.Rev.Trib.1994) (citing In re Brown, 512 S.W.2d at 319-20). Subsequently, In re Barr and In re Lowery, both agreed with the Brown and Thoma decisions making the legal standard for review a preponderance of the evidence. See In re Barr, 13 S.W.3d at 525; In re Lowery, 999 S.W.2d 639 (Tex.Rev. Trib.1998). It is well settled law in the State that the legal standard for removal proceedings is a preponderance of the evidence standard rather than a clear and convincing evidence standard as Respondent argues. We agree with Respondent that removing a member of the judiciary and depriving the electorate of its choice of judge is a serious matter and it is for this reason that uniformity in the standard used should be preserved so as to not send mixed signals to subsequent proceedings. For the reasons set forth above, we find that the proper legal standard was used by the Examiner. Accordingly, Issue No. Four is overruled. In Issue No. Eight, Respondent asserts that he was unfairly denied discovery of potentially exculpatory telephone records, medical records, and information regarding pertinent conversations between complainants and witnesses. Respondent cites no authority as to how the court abused its discretion in overruling the motion to compel discovery of the telephone records. See Tex.R.App. P. 38.1(h); Leyva v. Leyva, 960 S.W.2d 732, 734 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1997, no writ) (failure to cite authority in support of point of error waives complaint). We note that while R.H. was ordered to produce various records at trial, she claimed that she could not locate any of the requested records. Nonetheless, Respondent acknowledges that at no time did he seek to subpoena the records in question. Furthermore, Respondent cites no authority to support his contention that R.H.'s medical records were clearly relevant and discoverable. Respondent wholly failed to make an offer of proof. Preservation of a complaint is a prerequisite for appellate review. TEX.R.APP. P. 33.1(a). Error may be predicated on a ruling that excludes a party's evidence only if the substance of the evidence was made known to the court by offer. Tex.R. Evid. 103; Ludlow v. DeBerry, 959 S.W.2d 265, 269-70 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no writ). The primary purpose of the offer of proof is to enable an appellate court to determine whether the exclusion was erroneous and harmful. GOODE, WELLBORN & SHARLOT, GUIDE TO THE TEXAS RULES OF EVIDENCE, § 103.3 at 21 (2nd ed. 1993). A secondary purpose is to permit the trial judge, or in this case the Commission, to reconsider his ruling in light of the actual evidence. Id. An offer of proof is sufficient if it apprises the court of the substance of the testimony and may be presented in the form of a concise statement. Chance v. Chance, 911 S.W.2d 40, 51-52 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 1995, writ denied). Excluded evidence also may be preserved for appellate review by a post-trial bill of exception. Tex.R.App. P. 33.2. Respondent never stated the relevance of the records he sought, failed to make an offer of proof, and failed to cite any authority to support his argument. Respondent has waived his complaint with regard to R.H.'s medical records. Accordingly, Respondent's Issue No. Eight is overruled in its entirety.