Opinion ID: 2626390
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sequestration Issues

Text: Defendant insists the trial court erred by failing to conduct the entire death-qualifying voir dire individually and in sequestration as set forth in Hovey v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 1, 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301 ( Hovey ). He claims violations of his federal constitutional rights to due process and an impartial jury. Before jury selection, and on its own motion, the trial court determined that Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, did not apply. This ruling was correct. Defendant's trial occurred after voters approved Proposition 115, which added new section 223 to the Code of Civil Procedure. (See Tapia v. Superior Court, supra, 53 Cal.3d 282, 299-300, 279 Cal.Rptr. 592, 807 P.2d 434 [applying statute to proceedings held after Prop. 115 took effect on June 6, 1990].) Then, as now, the statute provided that the voir dire of prospective jurors in capital cases shall, where practicable, occur in the presence of the other jurors. (Code Civ. Proc., § 223.) [11] This provision had the intent and effect of abrogating the sequestration rule of Hovey, supra, 28 Cal.3d 1, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301, which was not constitutionally compelled. (See id. at p. 80, 168 Cal.Rptr. 128, 616 P.2d 1301 [invoking court's supervisory authority over California criminal procedure]; see also People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 490, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182; People v. Slaughter (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1187, 1199, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 477, 47 P.3d 262; People v. Box (2000) 23 Cal.4th 1153, 1180, 99 Cal.Rptr.2d 69, 5 P.3d 130; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 713, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46.) We reject defendant's contrary claim. [12] Defendant alternatively complains that to the extent the court decided that group voir dire was practicable (Code Civ. Proc., § 223), it applied statutory law in a manner that denied him due process and an impartial jury. Prospective jurors allegedly gave monosyllabic, unconsidered, and parroted answers that concealed their true views on capital punishment. The record does not support the claim. Initially, the trial court advised counsel of its intent to apply Code of Civil Procedure section 223, and of the procedures that would be used. Thus, the court said it would assume primary responsibility for conducting the oral examination, and that counsel would be allowed to ask appropriate follow-up questions. Prospective jurors, the court said, would be examined as a group in open court. However, the court made clear that many questions, including some involving capital punishment, would be asked at the bench on a select basis. Counsel were told to expect to approach the bench quite a bit, because the court planned to ask sensitive questions and to probe exotic answers in this private manner. Prospective jurors completed a 25-page questionnaire, which they signed under penalty of perjury. One sectionsix pages and 14 questionsconcerned capital punishment. To enhance questioning, the court gave counsel advance copies of the questionnaires in the same order in which each prospective juror would be orally examined. The court said it planned to make preparatory notes on every single one of its copies of the questionnaires. As promised, the court began death qualification by asking each prospective juror, in open court, four questions similar to ones appearing on the questionnaire. These questions sought to discover whether prospective jurors would automatically vote for a certain penalty ( Witherspoon v. Illinois (1968) 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776, fn. 21 ( Witherspoon ), italics omitted), and whether their views on capital punishment would `prevent or substantially impair' the performance of their duties in keeping with their oath and the court's instructions. ( Wainwright v. Witt (1985) 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 ( Witt ) [clarifying the Witherspoon standard].) [13] Depending upon the answers given either orally or in writing, the trial court often asked follow-up questions about the person's views on capital punishment. In many instances, such clarification occurred at the bench so that other prospective jurors could not hear the exchange. The court permitted counsel to ask additional questions, particularly as to matters discussed at the bench. Based on these facts, and as a threshold matter, it appears the defense had ample opportunity to object to the manner in which the trial court conducted group voir dire under applicable statutory law, and to propose individual sequestered voir dire as a solution to any perceived problems. Thus, as the Attorney General maintains, defendant's failure to raise any such complaint below forfeits the issue on appeal. ( People v. Vieira (2005) 35 Cal.4th 264, 287-288, 25 Cal.Rptr.3d 337, 106 P.3d 990.) The claim lacks merit in any event. Defendant is wrong insofar as he implies that no individual, sequestered examination on capital punishment occurred. We also cannot conclude that the trial court's decision to ask questions both in open court and at the bench produced meaningless, lockstep answers. Indeed, these procedures enabled counsel on both sides to challenge certain individuals for cause sometimes successfullybased on their death penalty views. Defendant provides no specific example of how questioning prospective jurors in the presence of other jurors prevented him from uncovering juror bias. ( People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th 458, 490, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182.) Thus, consistent with other post-Proposition 115 cases upholding similar limited sequestration procedures, we find no constitutional or other error. (E.g., People v. Waidla, supra, 22 Cal.4th 690, 713-714, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46 [same trial judge and procedures as in present case].)