Opinion ID: 167914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Plaintiffs’ C laim

Text: Plaintiffs com plain that wom en have been the victim s of discrim ination in the assignm ent of overtim e at Boeing’s W ichita facility, being offered and receiving less than their proportionate share. They have raised both disparatetreatment and disparate-im pact claims relating to overtim e. The sum m ary judgm ent disposed of only their disparate-im pact claim . “An unlawful employm ent practice based on disparate im pact is established . . . only if . . . a com plaining party dem onstrates that a respondent uses a particular em ploym ent practice that causes a disparate im pact on the basis of . . . -17- sex . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). The first step in raising a disparateim pact claim is to identify the specific employm ent practice allegedly causing the discrim inatory im pact. See W ards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (“[A] plaintiff m ust demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employm ent practice that has created the disparate im pact under attack.”); M aldonado v. City of Altus, 433 F.3d 1294, 1304 (10th Cir. 2006). The specific practice identified by Plaintiffs is that “B oeing supplies no guidance to m anagers on how to choose among eligible employees, and there are no centralized rules for how to choose am ong equally eligible m ale and fem ale employees.” R. Doc. 340 at 23 (Plaintiffs’ M em. in Opp’n to Boeing’s M ot. for Sum m . J.); see also Aplt. Br. at 26. (In the sum m ary-judgm ent proceedings below, and on appeal, Plaintiffs have also claim ed discrim inatory im pact from Boeing’s failure to m onitor m anagers or hold them accountable for the gender im pacts of their overtim e decisions. That allegation was not addressed by the district court. Plaintiffs’ appellate briefs, however, contain no further elaboration of this claim , so we will not specifically address it. See Gross v. Burggraf Constr. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[I]t is insufficient merely to state in one's brief that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without advancing reasoned argum ent as to the grounds for appeal.” (internal brackets and quotation m arks om itted)). In any event, our discussion of their claim that -18- supervisors w ere given inadequate guidance in overtime assignm ents w ould likely also be dispositive of this claim .) “U nder the disparate im pact theory, a plaintiff m ust first m ake out a prim a facie case of discrim ination by showing that a specific identifiable employm ent practice or policy caused a significant disparate im pact on a protected group.” M urphy v. Derwinski, 990 F.2d 540, 544 (10th Cir. 1993) (internal quotation m arks om itted). In other words, a plaintiff must “show that there is a legally significant disparity between (a) the [gender] composition, caused by the challenged em ploym ent practice, of the pool of those enjoying a job or job benefit; and (b) the [gender] com position of the qualified applicant pool . . . [, i.e.,] the pool from which potential qualified applicants m ight come.” Crum v. Alabama (In re Em ployment Discrimination Litig. Against Ala., 198 F.3d 1305, 1312 & n.11 (11th Cir. 1999). The court compares the gender composition of those who are subject to the challenged em ploym ent practice with the gender com position of those enjoying the benefit for w hich the practice selects. In assessing whether a plaintiff has established a prim a facie case, it is, of course, irrelevant what happens to those who do not qualify for consideration. See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 650-51 (“The proper comparison is between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and the racial composition of the qualified population in the relevant labor m arket.” (emphasis added; internal quotation m arks, brackets, and ellipsis om itted)). -19- Plaintiffs’ claim rests on the assertion that supervisors are exercising their discretion (intentionally or subconsciously) to award m ales a disproportionate share of available overtim e assignm ents. To establish a prim a facie case, it is not enough for Plaintiffs to show sim ply that m ore overtim e assignm ents go to m en than to wom en, or even that men get a higher percentage of those assignm ents than their percentage in the work force. They must compare qualified m en to qualified wom en. That is, they m ust show that am ong m en and wom en who are eligible for overtim e assignm ents, a disproportionate share of overtim e assignm ents go to m en. The qualifications for overtim e assignm ent are established in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Boeing and the International Association of M achinists and A erospace W orkers AFL-CIO. The CBA provides: 6.10(b) O vertim e Scheduling P rocedures for Extended W orkday or W orkw eek. (1) The norm al practice for the advance scheduling of overtim e within the shop and shift will be to: (a) First, ask the employee regularly assigned to either the m achine, job, crew, or position providing the em ployee is in attendance when the overtim e is being assigned . . . . (b) Then, ask other qualified employees in the same job classification who are in attendance when the overtim e is being assigned. (c) If sufficient volunteers are not obtained, the Com pany may designate any em ployee to satisfy remaining requirem ents. (2) M anagem ent m ay exclude an em ployee from overtim e, even if the em ployee is in attendance when the overtim e is being assigned, if: (a) The em ployee has been absent during the week . . . . -20- (b) An employee is asked to work overtim e (Saturday and/or Sunday) and is subsequently absent due to illness or bereavem ent leave on the workday preceding the overtim e day. (c) Two (2) consecutive weekends have been worked by the employee. (d) One hundred forty-four (144) overtim e hours have been worked in the budget quarter. (e) Eight (8) overtim e hours have been worked on the Saturday or the Sunday. (f) A n em ployee’s schedule perform ance or work quality is currently docum ented as being deficient. Rep. Aplts. Supp. App. Vol. 1 at 10-11. (This provision is from the September 2, 1999, CBA. The 1995 CBA m ay be applicable to a portion of the class period, which runs from April 2, 1999. Plaintiffs acknowledge, however, that the overtim e provisions did not change m aterially during the class period.) Plaintiffs do not dispute that the CBA applies to the challenged overtim e assignm ents. Their claim is that the discretion exercised by managers in “choos[ing] among employees who worked in the area where overtim e was required and wanted the extra pay” has created a disparity betw een sim ilarly situated m en and wom en. A plt. Br. at 26. Boeing for its part does not dispute that supervisors have som e m easure of discretion within the term s of the CBA. It argues, however, that Plaintiffs have failed to m ake a sufficient showing that this discretion has been exercised in a manner adverse to wom en. On appeal Plaintiffs contend that their statistical evidence of disparate impact suffices to preclude sum m ary judgm ent. (In district court Plaintiffs also presented a variety of anecdotal evidence to support this claim . But because on -21- appeal they do not rely on that evidence in challenging summary judgment, we will consider only the statistical evidence.) They rely on a study by their expert, Dr. Bernard Siskin. Dr. Siskin perform ed a regression analysis that compared the overtime worked by m ale and fem ale em ployees w hom he defined as “sim ilarly situated.” R. Doc. 346 (Decl. of Bernard P. Siskin, Ph.D. in O pp’n to Boeing’s M ot. for Sum m . J. (hereinafter “Siskin Study”)) at 22. The Siskin Study exam ined overtime assignm ents from April 2, 1999 (the beginning of the liability period for this claim ) through June 20, 2002, using Boeing’s electronic daily payroll records. For weekday overtime the Siskin Study defined sim ilarly situated employees as those who “[w]orked that day and are in the same job, grade, budget code and shift.” Id. at 23. Similarly situated em ployees w ith respect to weekend overtim e w ere defined as those w ho “[w ]orked Friday and are in the same job, grade, budget code and shift.” Id. For each cohort of sim ilarly situated employees, the Siskin Study calculated three measures for m en and wom en: (1) the likelihood of working any overtim e; (2) the average number of overtime hours w orked; and (3) the average num ber of overtime hours paid (overtim e is paid at either 1.5 or 2 tim es a normal hour). It then computed a shortfall num ber for fem ales that described how m uch greater each m easure would be were females represented in proportion to their percentage representation in each cohort. “That is, if fem ales were 25 percent of the cohort, -22- they should be 25 percent of those working overtim e and receive 25 percent of the overtim e hours and pay.” Id. at 22. The Siskin Study concluded that “[h]ourly fem ale em ployees who are sim ilarly situated to m ales with respect to job, grade, shift, departm ent, and budget code are consistently and highly statistically significantly less likely to work overtime, to w ork less overtime, and to receive less overtime pay. This pattern is consistent across tim e.” Id. at 3. It observed that “[c]learly, som ething in the overtim e process consistently results in m ales obtaining m ore overtim e and working m ore overtim e than females.” Id. at 23. There is no dispute that “som ething” causes m en to work proportionately m ore overtim e than wom en at Boeing. The district court said that the following sum m ary was uncontroverted for purposes of sum m ary judgm ent: Between April 2, 1999, and Decem ber 31, 2001, disparities in overtim e adverse to w om en ranged between a low of 17.06 standard deviations and a high of 38.03 standard deviations. For the last period for which Dr. Siskin has analyzed data, ending June 20, 2002, the disparities w ere 10.23 standard deviations for w eekday overtim e and 7.95 standard deviations for weekend overtim e. Rep. Aplts. App. Vol.1 at 280. Boeing concedes that these differences are statistically highly significant. The Supreme Court has recognized that a disparity of m ore than two or three standard deviations in a large sample makes “suspect” the contention that the differential occurs random ly. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 -23- U.S. 299, 308 n.14 (1977); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 496 n.17 (1977). Several circuit courts have adopted a similar level of significance in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 196 F.3d 358, 366 (2d Cir. 1999); Brown v. Philip M orris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 809 (3d Cir. 2001); Lewis v. Bloomsburg M ills, Inc., 773 F.2d 561, 568-69 (4th Cir. 1985) (five to eight standard deviations); Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414, 424 (7th Cir. 2000). But despite recognizing that the statistics show that m en have worked proportionately m ore overtim e than wom en, Boeing claim s that the Siskin Study nonetheless fails to establish a prim a facie case. It contends that the Siskin Study does not show that the “som ething” causing m en to work m ore overtim e than wom en is the manager discretion that Plaintiffs have identified as the challenged em ploym ent practice. Boeing’s argum ent appears to be that the “som ething” is a variable other than those that the Siskin Study included in the statistical m odel— nam ely, job, grade, budget code, and shift. According to Boeing, other variables affecting overtim e assignm ents— such as the CBA criteria and potential differences in the rates at which men and wom en volunteer for overtim e— are not controlled for in the Siskin Study and could be responsible for the observed disparities. The district court agreed with Boeing that a statistical study could not establish a claim without considering such variables and granted Boeing’s m otion for sum m ary judgm ent on that basis. Before addressing Boeing’s argum ents, with -24- which we agree in part, we review the legal framework for the use of statistical evidence in Title VII cases.