Opinion ID: 1377985
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the right to chosen counsel

Text: While defendant's right to counsel of his own choice is an important right it is neither constitutionally ordained nor absolute. It must yield to weightier considerations when necessary to preserve judicial integrity and assure public respect for the administration of justice. Due process principles require that assistance of counsel must be  effective.  ( Reece v. Georgia (1955) 350 U.S. 85, 90 [100 L.Ed. 77, 83, 76 S.Ct. 167], italics added; see Glasser v. United States (1942) 315 U.S. 60, 70 [86 L.Ed. 680, 699, 62 S.Ct. 457].) Moreover, We have repeatedly held that constitutional and statutory guarantees are not violated by the appointment of an attorney other than the one requested by defendant. ( Drumgo v. Superior Court (1973) 8 Cal.3d 930, 934 [106 Cal. Rptr. 506 P.2d 1007], cert. den., 414 U.S. 979 [38 L.Ed.2d 223, 94 S.Ct. 272]; People v. Hughes (1961) 57 Cal.2d 89, 98-99 [17 Cal. Rptr. 617, 367 P.2d 33].) In reaching this conclusion courts have stressed two major values integral to the judicial system. An appellate court aptly observed recently: [T]he right of an accused to retain defense counsel of his choice is not absolute, there being other values of substantial importance which may also demand recognition.... One such value is the preservation of public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of our criminal justice system, and here it should prevail. ( People v. Municipal Court ( Wolfe ) (1977) 69 Cal. App.3d 714, 719-720 [138 Cal. Rptr. 235].) Emphasizing a second vital consideration, a federal opinion has noted: The right to effective representation by counsel whose loyalty is undivided is so paramount in the proper administration of criminal justice that it must in some cases take precedence over all other considerations, including the expressed preference of the defendants concerned and their attorney. ( United States v. Carrigan (2d Cir.1976) 543 F.2d 1053, 1058, conc. opn. Lumbard, J.) Defendant faces the most serious of criminal charges with the gravest of possible consequences. He requires counsel, not only of unquestioned professional competence ( People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 423-425 [152 Cal. Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859, 2 A.L.R.4th 1]), but also counsel whose allegiance to him is total and unalloyed, free of the subtle, opposing magnetic pull of self-interest or adverse pecuniary advantage. This, the majority refuses to assure.