Opinion ID: 1258630
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Exclusion of Evidence of Victim's Prior Sexual Conduct

Text: In his second assignment of error, the Appellant alleges that the trial court erred when it denied his request to present evidence of the alleged victim's sexual relationship with another perpetrator and her alleged misrepresentations to law enforcement regarding that relationship which he sought to introduce as evidence of the alleged victim's possible motive to fabricate charges against him. [11] Because the Appellant failed to make an adequate proffer to the circuit court at the evidentiary hearing, we find that the circuit court correctly excluded such evidence. [12] Concerning our standard of review of the circuit court's exclusion of the evidence at issue, we note that [t]he action of a trial court in admitting or excluding evidence in the exercise of its discretion will not be disturbed by the appellate court unless it appears that such action amounts to an abuse of discretion. Syl Pt. 1, State v. Calloway, 207 W.Va. 43, 528 S.E.2d 490 (1999). With this standard of review in mind, we now consider the issues before us. Specifically, Appellant alleges that the proffered evidence was admissible for the following reasons: 1) the proffered evidence does not fall within the scope of the rape shield statute pursuant to State v. Quinn, 200 W.Va. 432, 490 S.E.2d 34 (1997); and 2) even if the proffered evidence falls within the scope of the rape shield statute, it is still admissible under two exceptions to the general rule enunciated in State v. Guthrie, 205 W.Va. 326, 518 S.E.2d 83, that being Rule 404(a)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence and Appellant's Sixth Amendment rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Constitution of the United States and/or his due process right to a fair trial. Appellant first cites to State v. Quinn, 200 W.Va. 432, 490 S.E.2d 34, and contends that although the rape shield statute, West Virginia Code § 61-8B-11(b) (1986), generally bars the introduction of evidence concerning specific instances of a victim's prior sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant in a sexual assault prosecution, if the trial court finds that there is a strong probability that the alleged victim of a sexual offense has made false statements of being the victim of sexual misconduct, evidence relating to those statements may be considered by the Court outside of the scope of the rape shield law. Syl. Pt. 4, in part, State v. Quinn, 200 W.Va. 432, 490 S.E.2d 34. We find the Quinn test inapplicable to the set of circumstances now before us. In Quinn, the Appellant was convicted of sexual misconduct by a custodian of a five year old child. The issue to be decided was whether the rape shield law applied to bar the victim's other false statements of abuse by other perpetrators. The Appellant sought to use this evidence to prove that the victim had falsely accused others in the same fashion she falsely accused him. The Appellant argued that the rape shield law did not apply to the victim's statements because they were false, and therefore were not evidence of the child's sexual conduct. Rather, they were evidence of the child's false statement of sexual abuse when there had been none. This Court created a test in Quinn to determine whether such evidence fell outside of the scope of our rape shield law. Therein, we held that like many other jurisdictions which have faced this issue, we believe that [r]equiring strong and substantial proof of the actual falsity of an alleged victim's other statements is necessary to reasonably minimize the possibility that evidence which is within the scope of our rape shield law, W. Va.Code, 61-8B-11 (1986) and West Virginia Rules of Evidence 404(a)(3)(1994), is not erroneously considered outside of its scope. Id. at Syl. Pt. 2. If the trial court finds that there is a strong probability that the alleged victim of a sexual offense has made other statements which are false about being the victim of sexual misconduct, evidence relating to those statements may be considered by the court outside of the scope of our rape shield law, W. Va.Code 61-8B-11 (1986) and West Virginia Rules of Evidence 404(a)(3)(1994). Id. at Syl. Pt. 4. In the instant case, Appellant does not seek to introduce evidence that the victim lied to police officers by falsely accusing others in the same fashion she falsely accused him, as in Quinn. Rather, Appellant simply seeks to show that the victim initially lied to police officers in order to possibly conceal her illicit relationship with another adult, Jonathon Lewis, and thus prove not only that another perpetrator committed a sexual assault on the victim which could account for marks on her body, but also that the victim had a motive to improperly accuse the Appellant. There can be no question that the facts of instant case do not meet the circumstances required to apply the Quinn test. We find that the evidence at issue herein is actually inapposite to Quinn, falling squarely within the confines of our rape shield statute. Accordingly, because we find Quinn inapplicable, we continue with our analysis of Appellant's second argument to determine if Appellant's proffered evidence meets one of the exceptions to the rape shield statute. West Virginia's rape shield statute provides, in pertinent part: In any prosecution under this article evidence of specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant, opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct and reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct shall not be admissible: Provided, That such evidence shall be admissible solely for the purpose of impeaching credibility, if the victim first makes his or her previous conduct an issue in the trial by introducing evidence with respect thereto. W. Va.Code § 61-8B-11(b). We have held that: West Virginia Code § 61-8B-11(b)(Repl.Vol.1997) provides an exception to the general exclusion of evidence of prior sexual conduct of a victim of sexual assault. Under the statute, evidence of (1) specific instances of the victim's sexual conduct with persons other than the defendant, (2) opinion evidence of the victim's sexual conduct and (3) reputation evidence of the victim's sexual conduct can be introduced solely for the purpose of impeaching the credibility of the victim only if the victim first makes his or her previous sexual conduct an issue in the trial by introducing evidence with respect thereto. Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Guthrie, 205 W.Va. 326, 518 S.E.2d 83. Additionally, in State v. Guthrie, 205 W.Va. 326, 518 S.E.2d 83, we held that: [r]ule 404(a)(3) of the West Virginia Rules of Evidence provides an express exception to the general exclusion of evidence coming within the scope of our rape shield statute. This exception provides for the admission of prior sexual conduct of a rape victim when the trial court determines in camera that evidence is (1) specifically related to the act or acts for which the defendant is charged and (2) necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Id. at Syl. Pt. 3. A defendant seeking to introduce evidence of a victim's sexual history must offer an evidentiary proffer which affords that trial court a meaningful opportunity to balance the interests of the state, as embodied in the rape shield statute, against the interests of the defendant. The good faith basis does not have to be admissible evidence, but it must be something that persuades the trial judge the question is proper, such as an affidavit, a reliable record, or a potential live witness. Cleckley's Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers § 6-8(B)(2)(c) (4th Ed.2000). A proffer requiring the court to speculate is insufficient. See Quinn v. Haynes, 234 F.3d 837, 850 (4th Cir.2000)(stating that West Virginia's rejection of simple denial testimony as proof of falsity is not arbitrary or disproportionate to the interests the rape shield law was designed to serve). In the case sub judice, Appellant contends that he sought to introduce direct and circumstantial evidence that someone other than the Appellant committed the sexual acts alleged in the indictment, and that the evidence was specifically related to the act for which he was charged and its admission was necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Appellant alleges that the third party witness's testimony referenced in the affidavit would provide direct substantive exculpatory evidence that is absolutely necessary for the Appellant to prove his defense. He also alleges that the evidence he intended to introduce at trial supported his theory that the victim fabricated her claim against the Appellant to conceal her relationship with Jonathon Lewis. In reviewing the record before us, we find that the circuit court correctly denied Appellant's motion to offer such evidence. The circuit court specifically permitted the Appellant to present impeachment evidence regarding the victim's credibility by allowing the unnamed defense witness to testify about seeing hickeys on the alleged victim's body the day before the alleged assault, provided that the alleged victim first indicated that all the hickeys came from the activities of Lonzo Smith and Joshua C. Wears. However, with respect to Appellant's intent to provide substantive exculpatory evidence that Jonathon Lewis was specifically responsible for the victim's hickeys, the Appellant did not present sufficient evidence specifically related to the acts for which he is charged, nor did he prove that the evidence was necessary to prevent manifest injustice as required by State v. Guthrie, 205 W.Va. 326, 518 S.E.2d 83. First, the affidavit submitted by the Appellant consisted of nothing more than his own counsel's assertions of what an unsworn, unidentified witness might be expected to testify to at trial. The allegations contained in the affidavit were vague in nature and called for speculation. The proffer of this affidavit provided no proof of the unnamed witness's competency, opportunity to observe, or ability to perceive. Because the unidentified witness did not sign the affidavit or present testimony to the court, the Appellant offered nothing more than mere argument at the evidentiary hearing. Neither the State nor the Court were given a necessary opportunity to assess the witness's credibility or bias. Second, even if the affidavit had been signed and sworn by a properly identified witness, the witness' expected testimony would not exclude the Appellant from the assault. The circuit court correctly concluded that even if Jonathon Lewis may have given the victim hickeys on that Sunday, such fact was not evidence specifically related to the separate sexual acts for which the Appellant was charged. The presentment of this evidence would not have excluded the Appellant, nor would it have proven that he was not involved in the assault the following day. [13] At the hearing, the Appellant also informed the circuit court that he intended to call Detective Shawn Johnson, State Trooper Gonzalez, and former prosecutor Dan Holstein as witnesses to testify regarding the victim's prior inconsistent statements regarding her sexual relationship with Jonathon Lewis. [14] However, none of these witnesses corroborated the vague allegations of the unnamed witness contained in the affidavit offered by the Appellant, nor would any of these witnesses testify that Jonathon Lewis was specifically responsible for the victim's hickeys. Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding such evidence. Furthermore, concerning the issue of motive, the circuit court correctly made a conditional ruling to exclude evidence of motive at that time, because the proffer was simply insufficient. Appellant's counsel did not prove that the victim had kept her relationship with Jonathon Lewis a secret to hide it from her parents. Instead, Appellant sought to bootstrap supposition and conjecture with mere possibilities and vague assertions. Although the Appellant presented a letter from Dan Holstein stating that the victim told him that she lied to the police officers about her sexual relationship with Jonathon Lewis, the letter alone simply does not establish the Appellant's theory that the victim had a motive to falsely accuse the Appellant in order to conceal her relationship with Mr. Lewis. To establish motive, the fact that the victim's parents would have disapproved of her relationship with Mr. Lewis would have, at a minimum, needed to have been proven. It was not. The record shows that defense counsel was asked what other evidence Appellant intended to present regarding motive, and counsel admitted that he did not know what the victim's parents were going to say if questions were posed in regard to that relationship. MR. PEYTON: Yes. About [J.L.]. Now I don't know what [the victim's] parents will say if questions are posed in regard to that relationship [between the victim and J.L.] Obviously, if they said they knew it was going on and consented to it, then I don't have that argument with them any longer. I don't think they will. THE COURT: Well, the problem is I'm going to have to exclude it a[t] this point because I'm supposed to have a hearing in camera, which was set for here today. All I have is argument. I have no witnesses to take evidence of other than I have a letter, which the Court will take record of as truth, that Mr. Holstein represented to defense counsel that the child lied, I don't have  everything else is just speculation of argument of what it is. Without something more  I do have the affidavit, but that doesn't go to the issue of Mr. Wears and the issue of J.L. and the victim's liaison as it relates to what this alleged motive for lying would be. That would be purely speculation. So at this point I'm going to exclude that matter unless it can be shown to the Court otherwise. Indeed, the victim's prior relationship, if true, had nothing to do with the Appellant's guilt or innocence unless it suggested that the victim had a motive to lie. Because Appellant did not present sufficient evidence establishing such a motive, the proffer was inadequate to prove that the evidence was specifically related to the acts for which the Appellant was charged and necessary to prevent manifest injustice. Finally, with respect to Appellant's argument that the circuit court's exclusion of evidence of the victim's sexual conduct with Jonathon Lewis violated his due process right to a fair trial and/or his Sixth Amendment rights to confrontation, we find that the Appellant simply did not provide sufficient evidence for the court to conduct the balancing test enunciated in syllabus point 6 of State v. Guthrie, 205 W.Va. 326, 518 S.E.2d 83. [15] In Guthrie, we held that: [t]he test used to determine whether a trial court's exclusion of proffered evidence under our rape shield law violated a defendant's due process right to a fair trial is 1) whether that testimony was relevant; 2) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect; and 3) whether the State's compelling interests in excluding the evidence outweighed the defendant's right to present relevant evidence supportive of his or her defense. Under this test, we will reverse a trial court's ruling only if there has been a clear abuse of discretion. [16] In this case, the record demonstrates that three separate evidentiary hearings were held, wherein the circuit court offered the Appellant more than ample opportunity to make a sufficient proffer to the court and to articulate how the evidence could be deemed admissible in order to allow the court to conduct a balancing test weighing the Appellant's constitutional interests against the interests of the State. The circuit court correctly determined that a sufficient showing had not been made, and because of that, a balancing test was impossible at that juncture. Accordingly, the circuit court did not commit an abuse of discretion. A defendant's right to confront witnesses is not absolute. This interest may bow to competing and legitimate state interests. See Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973); See also Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 20, 106 S.Ct. 292, 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1985)(confrontation clause guarantees opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defendant might wish). Trial courts retain wide latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The evidence must be factually strong and substantial, both qualitatively and quantitatively, to permit cross-examination of any child victim regarding her prior sexual conduct. Without such a strong and substantial showing, permitting the Appellant to cross-examine the minor victim about her sexual conduct would defy the letter and spirit of our rape shield statute. This is not to say that evidence could not be offered to rebut an inference that the defendant's conduct caused the hickeys on the victim's body. Indeed, we believe that when an appropriate and adequate proffer is made, a defendant is entitled to introduce evidence regarding a child's prior sexual conduct to rebut such types of inferences. However, in this case, because an inadequate proffer was presented, we find no abuse of discretion below. The circuit court correctly excluded such evidence.