Opinion ID: 1625527
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: state search warrant

Text: In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, Morrison argued, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that there were misleading omissions in the affidavit for the state search warrant because the affidavit stated that all 2,064 hits of LSD were to be delivered to Morrison's address, when in fact over 1,800 hits had been removed, and of the remaining 200 hits, 100 had been affixed to the inside of the package. Thus, Morrison argues that the Douglas County Court judge was misled by the statement in the affidavit that the drugs mailed to Morrison could be easily destroyed by flushing them down a toilet or sink. A trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress will be upheld on appeal unless the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. State v. Ellington, 242 Neb. 554, 495 N.W.2d 915 (1993). In reviewing a trial court's findings on a suppression motion, an appellate court recognizes the trial court as the finder of fact and takes into consideration that the trial court has observed the witnesses testifying in regard to such motion. Id. A defendant who seeks to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant has the burden of establishing that the search warrant is invalid so that evidence secured thereby may be suppressed. State v. Thomas, 240 Neb. 545, 483 N.W.2d 527 (1992). The role of an appellate court is to determine whether the affidavit used to obtain a search warrant, when supplemented by the omitted material, would provide a magistrate or judge with a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed for the issuance of the warrant. State v. Utterback, 240 Neb. 981, 485 N.W.2d 760 (1992). The suppression hearing record reflects that Morrison failed to meet his burden of proving that the search warrant was invalid. Sanchelli's affidavit requesting a state search warrant stated that the Express Mail package containing the 2,064 hits of LSD will be delivered to Morrison at his home address. At the suppression hearing, Sanchelli acknowledged that he assisted in the removal of 1,863 hits from the package and preserved those hits as evidence. Had this information, omitted from the affidavit, been presented to the magistrate, there would still have been probable cause to issue the search warrant based on the 200 hits of LSD delivered to Morrison. Whether there were 200 LSD hits or over 2,000 LSD hits in the package to be delivered is not crucial to the issuance of the state search warrant. Possession of either number of hits is illegal, and either amount would constitute circumstantial evidence of Morrison's intent to deliver the LSD. See State v. Hernandez, 242 Neb. 78, 493 N.W.2d 181 (1992). No evidence was presented at the suppression hearing that 100 hits were affixed to the inside of the package to prevent easy disposal of the drug. Implicit in the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress is its finding that Morrison could indeed have easily destroyed the 200 hits of LSD delivered to him. In fact, the Nebraska Supreme Court has taken judicial notice that substances such as LSD may be easily and quickly disposed of by merely flushing them down a toilet or drain. State v. Meyer, 209 Neb. 757, 311 N.W.2d 520 (1981). Had Morrison destroyed the 200 hits, he could not have been charged with possession of LSD because he at no time possessed the 1,863 hits of LSD which had been removed by police. As previously stated, evidence that 100 LSD hits were taped to the inside of the package was not presented at the suppression hearing. By the time Morrison renewed his motion to suppress, evidence had been received, without objection, that when the police arrested Morrison minutes after the package was delivered, all 200 hits of LSD that had been in the Express Mail package were found in the pocket of the bathrobe Morrison was wearing. It is noted that the sheets containing 100 LSD hits each were absorbent and smaller than a square of toilet tissue. In view of this crucial evidence, it cannot be said that the trial court, as the finder of fact, was clearly wrong in denying Morrison's motion to suppress based on omissions from the affidavit. Morrison also claims that a no-knock search warrant was unjustified because officers could have arrested Morrison at the door when the package was delivered and, thus, the manner of serving the warrant was a pretext for searching the entire premises. This argument is without merit. Officers had a search warrant which authorized them to search Morrison's apartment for LSD ... its derivatives and administering instruments whether homemade or manufactured, all monies used to conduct an illegal narcotics operation, items of venue such as letters, documents and keys which would identify persons residing at or in control of [Morrison's address]. Armed with a valid search warrant, officers did not need a pretext to search Morrison's residence. Furthermore, an arrest at Morrison's front door would have required either a lone officer acting in a potentially dangerous situation or a number of officers to be present when Morrison came to the door, which would have served to alert Morrison to the situation and lessen the chance that the door would be voluntarily and peacefully opened. Morrison did not directly attack the validity of an anticipatory search warrant in his motion to suppress, nor at the suppression hearing or the trial. Nonetheless, on appeal, he assails the validity of such a warrant. This court has not addressed the question of the validity of an anticipatory search warrant, which is one that is issued before the item to be seized has arrived at the place to be searched. U.S. v. Tagbering, 985 F.2d 946, 949 (8th Cir. 1993). In Tagbering, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted that at least six other circuits have upheld such warrants, and quoted with approval U.S. v. Garcia, 882 F.2d 699 (2d Cir.1989), cert. denied, Grant v. U.S., 493 U.S. 943, 110 S.Ct. 348, 107 L.Ed.2d 336, which stated that `the fact that the contraband is not presently located at the place described in the warrant is immaterial, so long as there is probable cause to believe that it will be there when the search warrant is executed.' 985 F.2d at 950. In this case, the district court was not clearly wrong in upholding the validity of the anticipatory search warrant. Morrison's argument is without merit. Morrison's assignment of error that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress is without merit.