Opinion ID: 1094888
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Juror Bias in Favor of the Death Penalty

Text: Taylor contends that he should receive a new trial, because, he claims, his right to due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution was violated when the trial judge failed to strike for cause three prospective jurors that Taylor claimed were fixed in their opinion that death would be the only appropriate sentence if he were found guilty. Taylor also claims that one of the three prospective jurors should have been struck for another cause, claiming that that prospective juror viewed Taylor's young age, a statutory mitigating factor, as an aggravating factor in determining the appropriate sentence. Taylor argues that because he was forced to use preemptory strikes to remove these prospective jurors from the jury, he was not able to freely strike a jury from a body of impartial prospective jurors, and that this situation violated the requirements of Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 112 S.Ct. 2222, 119 L.Ed.2d 492 (1992); Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985); and Ex parte Beam, 512 So.2d 723 (Ala.1987). In response, the State contends that these three prospective jurors were impartial and did not have a fixed opinion regarding death as the proper sentence in this case, but, rather, only stated that they thought death would be the appropriate sentence, given the hypothetical facts provided to them by defense counsel on voir dire examination. The State argues that the trial court was not required to strike these prospective jurors for cause, because each of them stated that he would be able to render a verdict based on the evidence presented and would consider any mitigating factors. Citing Thomas v. State, 539 So.2d 375 (Ala.Crim.App.), affirmed, 539 So.2d 399 (Ala.1988), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 910, 109 S.Ct. 3201, 105 L.Ed.2d 709 (1989), the State notes that under Alabama law, a trial court's ruling on challenges for cause will be accorded great weight and will not disturbed on appeal unless shown to be an abuse of discretion, which, the State says, Taylor has not shown. In reviewing this issue, we first keep in mind that [n]o right of an accused felon is more basic than the right to `strike' a petit jury from a panel of fair-minded, impartial prospective jurors. Ex parte Beam, 512 So.2d at 724. In Morgan, the United States Supreme Court held that a capital murder defendant has the constitutional right to conduct voir dire examination of prospective jurors to inquire whether they would unwaveringly impose death after a finding of guilt. 504 U.S. at 732, 112 S.Ct. at 2232. The trial judge allowed Taylor such an opportunity, and he acted upon it; Taylor's counsel extensively questioned the prospective jurors regarding their views on sentencing. Thus, the focus here is on the specific statements made by the three prospective jurors in response to that questioning. We must determine whether the views expressed by those prospective jurors required that they be struck for cause. As to whether the three prospective jurors were impermissibly biased in favor of the death penalty, we note that the applicable standard was explained by the United States Supreme Court in Morgan: A juror who will automatically vote for the death penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as the instructions require him to do. Indeed, because such a juror has already formed an opinion on the merits, the presence or absence of either aggravating or mitigating circumstances is entirely irrelevant to such a juror.... Even if one such juror is empaneled and the death sentence is imposed, the State is disentitled to execute the sentence. 504 U.S. at 727-31, 112 S.Ct. at 2229-30 (emphasis added). Under that standard, a prospective juror is disqualified if he is so biased in favor of the death penalty that he would automatically vote to impose it in every case, regardless of the evidence presented and the trial court's instructions to consider both aggravating and mitigating factors. [1] We find it critical that, before questioning each panel of prospective jurors, Taylor's counsel presented in extensive detail the evidence he believed would be presented at trial. Only after providing a nightmarish description of the murders and asking the prospective jurors to assume that Taylor was a thousand percent guilty did defense counsel question them on what they believed Taylor's punishment should be.
The record shows that the following colloquy occurred during voir dire examination of the panel of prospective jurors of which prospective juror Mr. Nance was a member: [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Let me go a little farther now and I'm going to get into the particular facts of this case.... The evidence in this case is going to be that Mr. and Mrs. Moore were killed. We anticipate the State of Alabama will introduce photographs in this case of the victims. Gruesome photographs. Going to be gory. Going to be bloody. They're going to be something like you might see in a horror movie. They're going to be as gory and gruesome and awful as you've ever seen in your life. The kind of photographs that might give some people nightmares. . . . . Okay. Let me tell you, ladies and gentlemen, what I think the facts are. I'm going to tell you what the facts are going to be in this case. The facts in this case are going to be, Mr. and Mrs. Moore, who lived up on the mountain, are a fine, old retired couple. Outstanding people. Got a fine son. Salt of the earth kind of people. They deserved to live their life, be left alone. They did not deserve what happened to them in any way whatsoever. On the other hand, we expect the evidence to show you that Michael Taylor is from a very good family. His mother and daddy are some of the finest people that have ever been in this county. His mother is the church secretary in the church they attend. Very devout, religious woman. They raised their son as well as they know how. Until this happened, Michael Taylor was just a normal, average kid. He played church basketball. He played basketball for Emma Sansom [High School] where he attended school. He played tennis on the tennis team at Emma Sansom. There will be people who will come who have known him most of his life as friends, school teachers, Sunday school teachers, who will tell you that as far as they know he's never even had a fight in his life, that there is absolutely no history of violence at all in his past, that there's no significant history of any prior criminal activity in his life. But the evidence is going to show you that in November of 1991 Michael Taylor went to the home of Mr. and Mrs. Moore. He knew these people. They had been his friends. He had cut their grass. He had with him a metal bar. And he took that metal bar and he beat them to death. He repeatedly raised his arm and struck them over and over, until Mr. Moore was dead. Mrs. Moore was mortally wounded, but she did not die. She lingered on for several days. The family became concerned and contacted a neighbor and asked that they go check on the Moores. At that point, a neighbor came to the house, found that Mr. Moore was dead, Mrs. Moore was still alive. She was taken to a local hospital where she died some several days later. The deaths are horrible. They're cruel. They're inexcusable. And there's nothing I'm going to say to you through the course of this trial that's going to try to justify what happened. Ladies and gentlemen, having heard the information that I have given to you, I want you to assume now for these questionsI want you to assume that all I told you is true and all that I told you will be introduced into evidence in this case. I'd like to ask you, based on that information, are there any of you on the jury now who will say that, well, if that's the evidence, then the only alternative for me as a punishment is death in the electric chair? . . . . [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Ladies and gentlemen, assume all the facts that I've just given you. Also assume that in the sentencing phase of this case there will be evidence introduced in what we call mitigation. There will be evidence that at the time of this crime, Michael Taylor was approximately nineteen years of age, that he has no prior significant history of criminal activity, that he has absolutely no prior history of any kind of violence, that he's from a very good family. As I told you, all that will be introduced into evidence in this case as mitigation. My question to you is, of all you on the jury here, can you tell me now that regardless of the mitigation information that I've just mentioned to you, that you already know now in your mind the only punishment that you think would be proper would be that Michael be sentenced to death in the electric chair? . . . . [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Mr. Nance, I'm going to ask you the same question. Could you even consider the mitigation evidence or the lack of prior criminal history, the age, the good family, no prior acts of violence? Could you even consider those as mitigation or is your mind made up that death is the only solution? [MR. NANCE]: No, sir. My mind is not made up until I hear all the testimony that's to be presented to us, but [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: I'm asking you for the purposes of these questions, now, that that's all the evidence that's going to be. I want you to assume that he's guilty beyond any doubt at all. [MR. NANCE]: If it's a hundred percent? [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: It's a thousand percent. [MR. NANCE]: It's a thousand percent that he's guilty? [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: I'm telling you that as his lawyer, he is. [MR. NANCE]: I don't see to put him in jail and keep him the rest of his life. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: What you're saying is that your only vote could beyour only recommendation to the judge would be death? [MR. NANCE]: Be death. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: And you feel like you just could not consider his age? In other words, the factors of his age and lack of prior criminal activity and the good family, you just couldn't put any weight on those? [MR. NANCE]: No, sir, I couldn't. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Okay. Well, again, Ithat's what we're trying to do, is find out if you [MR. NANCE]: I say, best of his interest, if he was put to death at his age, put in prison for the rest of his life, because there's no life in prison. So, for the benefit of the taxpayers and his, I'd say death. . . . . [PROSECUTOR]: Some of you have indicated to Mac, now, that based on what he said he thinks the evidence is going to show that you wouldn't consider mitigating. You told me earlier you would, at least, look at it. I don'tI'm not asking you how much weight you'll give it. I'm just asking you whether or not you'll do what the law requires you to do and you'll at least consider it. That's all you've got to do, is consider it. . . . . [PROSECUTOR]: Now, Mr. Nance, will you consider it? [MR. NANCE]: Yes, sir, I'll consider it and weigh it out. But like I said . . . . [PROSECUTOR]: The only thing I'm asking, if the judge charges you that if that evidence is presented, you've got to consider it. Now, you might give it a lot of weight, you might give it a little weight, you might give it no weight, but at least will you look at it and consider it? [MR. NANCE]: Yes, sir. . . . . [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: I guess, Mr. Nance, the same thing again. The judge is going to tell you about mitigation and aggravating, but if in your mind you've already said to yourself, `Hey, I don't care what he says, those things don't mean anything to me, I'm not going to give them any weight. I'm not even going to consider them.' If that [MR. NANCE]: You said when you was up at the stand before that he's a thousand percent guilty. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Yes, sir, he is. We're talking about what we're going to do with him. In other words, we've got him convicted [MR. NANCE]: I've done weighed it out, because you've said he was a thousand percent guilty. I have done weighed it out. I have done thought about it. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Okay. [MR. NANCE]: And I said death penalty. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Well, is that still your answer? When [the prosecutor] was up there you seemed to say to him, well, I'll consider this other stuff [MR. NANCE]: I have considered it when you said he was a thousand percent guilty. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: So, you're saying you have considered it and your answer now is death is the only alternative for you? [MR. NANCE]: I'd say yes.
Before questioning prospective jurors Maise and C. Lasseter, Taylor's defense counsel also described in great detail the evidence that he expected to be presented at trial. Thereafter, the following colloquy occurred involving Maise and C. Lasseter: [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: You would consider the mitigating? You don't have a fixed opinion at this point? . . . . [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Mr. Maise? [MR. MAISE]: You're asking me to make a judgment now or asking all of us to make a judgment now, and I'd just have to be honest with you and tell you that I don't think his age nor his background would have any bearing on the fact that I think he's guilty and worthy of the death penalty. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: I guess, Mr. [C] Lasseter, what would your answer be at this point to this questionto this issue? [Mr. C. LASSETER]: I'd say death penalty. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Would itCould you consider or put any weight in his age or no significant criminal history or no prior felony acts of violence against anyone before this happened? Would thatWould that change your mind? [MR. C. LASSETER]: If there was enough something there to prove something, there would be a bearing, but if not [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Can you tell me what you mean, if there's enough there to prove. Those mitigation or what did you mean by [MR. C. LASSETER]: Well, I mean, you know, you hear all the time `Kids nowadays' and I'm saying, when I was nineteen I was already working. They don't have nothing to do. You know, it's a lot of things. From what I've heard so far, well, I would still go with the death penalty. I mean, age, good family or not. I mean [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Okay. [PROSECUTOR]: You might not put any stock in it, but would you consider his age and consider any prior criminal history or lack of it he had, even if you don't Like I mentioned earlier, you decide how much weight you give to it. You might not put any to it, but would you at least consider it? . . . . [PROSECUTOR]: You, Mr. [C] Lasseter, would you consider it even if you gave it no weight at all? [MR. C. LASSETER]: No weight at all? [PROSECUTOR]: You might decide, yeah, I'll consider it but I'm not going to count it for anything. All I want to know is, will you consider it? [MR. C. LASSETER]: I would consider it. .... [PROSECUTOR]: Mr. Maise, would you look at it, even if you gave it no weight? [MR. MAISE]: His age? [PROSECUTOR]: Yes. [MR. MAISE]: It's already been revealed and I've already considered it. .... [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: When [the prosecutor] said on his turn if you would consider it even though you gave it no weight at all, what was your answer? Who did he talk to [MR. C. LASSETER]: Me. I said I would consider it. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Was the question to you even though you gave it no weight at all and you said, yes, I'd consider it, is that the question he asked you? [MR. C. LASSETER]: He asked me would I consider it, whether I gave it no weight at all. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: What did you mean by that answer? [MR. C. LASSETER]: That I would consider it. .... [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Mr. [C] Lasseter, would that change what you told me earlier, that you still believe that Michael Taylor would deserve the death penalty? [MR. C. LASSETER]: Considering the weight? [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Considering the age. Considering the age, would that change your opinion that even considering the age you would vote ratheryou know, that you would vote for the death penalty? Your individual vote. [MR. C. LASSETER]: I would probably still vote for the death penalty. .... [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Let me askI guess, let me ask if Mr. [C] Lasseter, if you would ever consider voting for life without parole in any capital case? [MR. C. LASSETER]: Depending on the circumstances. I mean, I  That's like asking if it's going to rain tomorrow. I don't know. I can't tell you that without knowing some kind of evidence or background or something about what's going to happen. [COUNSEL FOR TAYLOR]: Your Honor, I don't have any more questions.
Under Alabama's capital murder sentencing statute, the jury is required to weigh both the aggravating and the mitigating factors that have been proved during the penalty phase of the trial. The weighing of these factors is a process by which circumstances relevant to sentence are marshalled and considered in an organized fashion for the purpose of determining whether the proper sentence in view of all the relevant circumstances in an individual case is life imprisonment without parole or death. Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-5-48. The possible aggravating factors are limited to those listed in § 13A-5-49. Mitigating factors are listed in § 13A-5-51, but that list is not exclusive. A juror is not required to give a set weight to any particular factor, and one aggravating factor may outweigh several mitigating factors and vice versa. See Magwood v. State, 548 So.2d 512 (Ala.Crim.App.), affirmed, 548 So.2d 516 (Ala.1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 923, 110 S.Ct. 291, 107 L.Ed.2d 271 (1989). However, a juror may not arbitrarily ignore any applicable mitigating or aggravating factor. See Whisenhant v. State, 482 So.2d 1225 (Ala.Crim.App.1982), affirmed in part and remanded, 482 So.2d 1241 (Ala.1985). We must first decide whether juror Nance, juror Maise, or juror C. Lasseter was so biased in favor of the death penalty that he could not impartially perform the duties of a juror in rendering an advisory sentence, as described above. As to this issue, the Court of Criminal Appeals concluded: Our review of the record convinces us that veniremembers Maise, [C] Lasseter, and Nance would not automatically impose the death penalty in every capital case, and that their indication that they would impose it in this case was based on the facts provided by defense counsel on voir dire. In effect, these veniremembers were stating that they would consider any mitigating factors but based upon the facts provided by counsel on voir dire examination they would recommend death if they had to make a decision at that time. Taylor, 666 So.2d at 47 (emphasis original). We agree with that conclusion. Taylor's counsel provided each panel of prospective jurors with an exhaustive description of the murders, describing photographs they would be shown of the murder scene as gory, bloody, and gruesome. Defense counsel then described Taylor and his family background. Instructing the prospective jurors to assume that the facts just provided to them were true and that Taylor was guilty of the murders, his counsel then asked them whether they would consider the mitigating factors of Taylor's youth and lack of prior criminal history in determining their recommended punishment. Each of the prospective jurors that Taylor argues should have been struck for cause repeatedly stated that he would consider the mitigating evidence. What Taylor now takes issue with is that the three went further and stated that, based on the facts Taylor's counsel had instructed them to assume were true, they had considered the mitigating factors and, given the nature of the murders, had accorded the mitigating factors little or no weight and believed death to be the appropriate sentence. We believe Taylor's counsel went a step beyond questioning whether prospective jurors Nance, Maise, and C. Lasseter would automatically vote for the death penalty in every case, as was recognized in Morgan as one of a defendant's due process rights. In effect, defense counsel forced prospective jurors to make an immediate decision on Taylor's sentencing based solely on the facts presented during voir dire. We find it quite telling that upon continued questioning by defense counsel, prospective juror Maise stated, You're asking me to make a judgment now or asking all of us to make a judgment now. (Emphasis added.) Thus, rather than simply attempting to identify those jurors who were not impartial and who would vote for the death penalty in every case regardless of the facts, Taylor's counsel sought to identify any prospective juror who would vote for death under the facts of this particular case and then to eliminate that prospective juror by using strikes for cause. The due process protections recognized in Morgan do not extend that far. Accordingly, we conclude that Nance, Maise, and C. Lasseter were impartial prospective jurors who would not automatically vote for the death penalty in every case. The trial court did not err in refusing to strike them for cause on that basis. Taylor also asserts another basis for arguing that prospective juror Nance should have been struck for cause. Taylor claims that on voir dire Nance revealed that he viewed Taylor's young age as a aggravating factor rather than as a mitigating factor, in direct violation of Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-5-51(7). It is true that prospective juror Nance stated during voir dire that he believed there was no life to be lived in prison and that it would be in Taylor's best interest for him to be sentenced to death rather than to spend the rest of a natural life in prison. However, `the test to be applied is whether the juror can set aside [his or] her opinions and try the case fairly and impartially, according to the law and evidence.' Hunter v. State, 585 So.2d 220, 222 (Ala.Crim.App. 1991), quoting Knop v. McCain, 561 So.2d 229, 232 (Ala.1989). Moreover, the statement cannot be viewed in isolation; in reviewing a trial court's decision on a challenge for cause, this Court must review the voir dire questions and answers as a whole. Morrison v. State, 601 So.2d 165 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992); Hunter, supra. The qualification of prospective jurors rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Morrison, 601 So.2d at 168. A trial judge's ruling on a challenge for cause is accorded great weight and will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous and represents an abuse of discretion. Morrison, supra; Hunter, supra. After examining the entire record of the voir dire as it involved prospective juror Nance, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refusing to strike Nance for cause. As a whole, the record reflects that Nance indicated he was willing to follow the law and the instructions given to him by the trial judge. Accordingly, there was no reversible error in the trial judge's refusal to strike prospective juror Nance for cause.