Opinion ID: 76461
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Special Factors Removing $125 Fee Cap

Text: 51 The district court alternatively concluded that even if § 2412(d) applied, special factors existed justifying a departure from the $125 hourly limitation in § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). Specifically, § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) provides that attorney fees shall not be awarded in excess of $125 per hour unless a court determines that an increase in the cost of living or a special factor, such as the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved, justifies a higher fee. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). The district court relied on two special factors: (1) the government's concession that an attorney's fees award was appropriate under the Hyde Amendment; and (2) its finding that the government's prosecution of the Aisenbergs was vexatious and in bad faith. In addition to those two factors, the Aisenbergs rely on two more factors, which are: (3) the delay caused by the government litigating meritless positions; and (4) the limited availability of qualified attorneys. 23 52 Much of the EAJA case law defines special factor in § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) of the EAJA by what it is not. In Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 573, 108 S.Ct. 2541, 2554, 101 L.Ed.2d 490 (1988), the Supreme Court stated that special factors in the context of § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) do not include [t]he novelty and difficulty of issues, the undesirability of the case, the work and ability of counsel, and the results obtained, nor factors applicable to a broad spectrum of litigation including the contingent nature of the fee. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, in Pollgreen v. Morris, 911 F.2d 527, 537 (11th Cir.1990), this Court noted that special factors in the context of § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) do not include the motivations of the attorneys in bringing the case, the pro bono nature of the case, the fact that the litigation served to `vindicate public rights,' and the hardships experienced by counsel in departing from the statutory hourly rate. Id. (citing Jean v. Nelson, 863 F.2d 759, 775-76 (11th Cir. 1988)). 24 This Court in Pollgreen further stated that [a] delay that occurred because the government litigated a position that lacked substantial justification is not a permissible special factor because any litigation eligible for EAJA fees, by definition, involves the government's pursuit of an unjustified position. 911 F.2d at 538. 53 Turning to the special factors asserted by the Aisenbergs, we first conclude that the government's concession that the Hyde Amendment applied does not supply a special factor warranting a fee cap departure. Neither the unprecedented nature of the concession, nor the magnitude of the underlying error that the concession impliedly suggests, can be a special factor. As the government points out, finding otherwise would create perverse incentives that discourage useful settlements and encourage protracted litigation. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 568, 108 S.Ct. at 2552 (observing, in award of attorney's fees under EAJA § 2412(d), that government's willingness to settle as proof that its position was not substantially justified would not only distort the truth but penalize and thereby discourage useful settlements); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 437, 103 S.Ct. 1933, 1941, 76 L.Ed.2d 40 (1983) (stating that [a] request for attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation). 54 Similarly, the district court's independent finding in its attorney's fees order that the government's position was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, does not provide a special factor. The Hyde Amendment requires that all successful applicants show that the government's position was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith. As such, a district court's determination that the government's prosecution was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith does not justify a fee cap departure because every successful application under the Hyde Amendment would then be subject to a fee cap departure. 25 55 The Aisenbergs also emphasize the delay between the Aisenbergs' fee application in March 2001 and ultimate recovery of fees in 2003. In Pollgreen, this Court held that the government's delay in litigating a case is a permissible special factor only when the motivation for the delay was improper or the length of the delay itself was inappropriate. 911 F.2d at 537. The government's litigation over the amount of attorney's fees due, after conceding liability, does not constitute the special factor of improper purpose. Specifically, the government's position that § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) limits attorney's fees to $125 per hour under the Hyde Amendment is supported by the statutory language, as well as other circuits' case law. As such, we conclude that the government's motivation for litigating the amount of attorney's fees was not the result of an improper purpose. 26 56 Finally, the Aisenbergs argue on appeal that the limited availability of qualified attorneys for the proceedings involved[] justifies a higher fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii). The district court made no such finding, and there is no evidence to support any such finding in this record. To the contrary, the record shows ten lawyers in Cohen, Jayson & Foster, P.A. in fact worked on this criminal case. 57 The Aisenbergs also claim that their lawyers incurred a substantial economic detriment in representing unpopular clients and in handling the complex legal, factual, and professional obstacles in this case. Although this practice is commendable, the Supreme Court and this Court already have addressed this issue under § 2412(d) and have held that such hardship does not qualify as a special factor. See Pierce, 487 U.S. at 573, 108 S.Ct. at 2554 (stating that special factors in the context of § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) do not include [t]he `novelty and difficulty of issues,' `the undesirability of the case,' the `work and ability of counsel,' and `the results obtained' nor factors applicable to a broad spectrum of litigation, including `the contingent nature of the fee') (internal citations omitted); Pollgreen, 911 F.2d at 537 (stating that special factors in the context of § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii) do not include the motivations of the attorneys in bringing the case, the pro bono nature of the case, the fact that the litigation served to `vindicate public rights,' and the hardships experienced by counsel in departing from the statutory hourly rate) (citation omitted). 58 In sum, we conclude that no special factors exist in this record to justify a departure from the $125 hourly limitation provided in § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii), as incorporated by the Hyde Amendment. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in departing above that $125 hourly limitation. 59 As discussed earlier, the government does not contest on appeal the number of attorney hours or the litigation expenses of $195,670.32. Thus, when the $125 fee is applied to those 11,251.70 hours, the attorney's fee due is $1,298,980, plus litigation expenses of $195,670.32, for a total of $1,494,650.32 due the Aisenbergs.