Opinion ID: 2082577
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Search Pursuant to the Warrant Obtained After the Warrantless Entry

Text: Appellant also raises the issue of whether the trial court erred in denying appellant's Motion to Suppress as it related to items seized pursuant to a search warrant. A judge issued the warrant after the police had initially entered appellant's residence and conducted a preliminary search. Appellant argues that the warrant was the product of the forced, warrantless entry. The State counters that sufficient independent probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search warrant. After the warrantless entry, the police officers conducted a protective sweep of appellant's residence. While conducting the sweep, the officers encountered, in plain view, small quantities of cocaine and marijuana. After this cursory search, Officer Swarm wrote a probable cause affidavit, in order to obtain a judicially-approved search warrant. The probable cause affidavit, omitting the mere formal parts, read: The confidential informant went up to the residence at 623 N. Grande, and was let inside the residence by Ernest Esquerdo h/m. Inside the residence Ernest Esquerdo sold to the informant a quantity of cocaine. The transaction was monitored and recorded. During the entire transaction the residence was kept under constant surveillance and no person other than the [confidential informant] entered or exited the residence... . Entry to secure the residence was made into the residence at that time by assisting narcotic detectives due to the fact the [confidential informant] stated that Esquerdo was possibly leaving and because this affiant thougt [sic] that Esquerdo observed the assisting detectives and might be destroying or leaving with the evidence. Upon entering the residence Det. Tudor and assisting detectives found a Ernest Esquerdo h/m, Cynthia White w/f, David Hornsby w/m inside the residence with both suspected cocaine and marijuana in plain view in the living room and kitchen area. Also recovered was the money used in the cocaine transaction. Officers Tudor and Hoenstine went to a local judge to obtain a search warrant. They later returned with a warrant, and conducted a thorough search of appellant's residence. The police discovered large quantities of cocaine and marijuana on the premises. The state and federal constitutions guarantee that a court will not issue a search warrant without probable cause. U.S. CONST. amend IV; IND. CONST. Article 1, § 11. Probable cause to search premises is established when a sufficient basis of fact exists to permit a reasonably prudent person to believe that a search of those premises will uncover evidence of a crime. Utley v. State (1992), Ind, 589 N.E.2d 232. The decision to issue the warrant should be based on the facts stated in the affidavit and the rational and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom. Id. When seeking either a search or an arrest warrant, the police must follow the warrant statute, I.C. § 35-33-5-2 (West supp. 1994), which specifies the minimum information necessary to establish probable cause. [3] The State contends that evidence of the controlled buy established probable cause to search appellant's residence. The police officers possessed evidence of the commission of a felony, dealing cocaine. The hearsay testimony of an eyewitness, the confidential informant, could have justified the issuance of the warrant. In fact, the police officers did rely on this evidence when seeking the judicial warrant. Based on the information presented in the affidavit, it was reasonable for the judge to have found probable cause to issue the search warrant. However, in the probable cause affidavit, the officers also disclosed to the issuing judge the existence of evidence that was discovered in the warrantless search of appellant's premises. As we have already held above, this warrantless entry and search were improper, and the evidence gathered in this search was impermissible at trial. Appellant argues that presentation of this evidence to the judge tainted the warrant, making the warrant a fruit of the poisonous tree. The question before us is whether evidence, obtained illegally and presented as evidence of probable cause, can taint a probable cause determination, and thus invalidate a search warrant. The case at bar is substantially similar to Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796, 104 S.Ct. 3380, 82 L.Ed.2d 599 (1984). In Segura, federal agents entered Segura's apartment without a search warrant and arrested Segura. The agents conducted a limited security check of the apartment to ensure that no one else was there who might pose a threat to safety or destroy evidence. While conducting this check, the agents observed numerous items related to drug trafficking. The federal agents subsequently obtained a search warrant, and conducted a thorough search pursuant to the warrant. The agents discovered cocaine, cash, and records of narcotics transactions. At trial, the initial, warrantless search was held illegal. However, the court admitted the evidence discovered during the warrant-authorized search, over Segura's objection. Segura argued that the drugs seized under the warrant were fruits of the poisonous tree. In Segura, the question for the Supreme Court was whether the challenged evidence, which had been obtained pursuant to the search warrant, was uncovered by exploitation of the initial illegality (the warrantless entry and search), or instead by another means, sufficiently distinguishable from the bad actions to be purged of the primary taint. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, allowing use of this evidence, holding that the search was made pursuant to a properly issued warrant. The Court noted: None of the information on which the warrant was secured was derived from or related in any way to the initial entry into [Segura's] apartment; the information came from sources wholly unconnected with the entry and was known to the agents well before the initial entry. No information obtained during the initial entry or occupation of the apartment was needed or used by the agents to secure the warrant. Segura, 468 U.S. at 814, 104 S.Ct. at 3390, 82 L.Ed.2d at 614. In Segura, the federal agents had an independent source of probable cause for the warrant under which the evidence was seized, and did not rely upon any evidence gathered during the initial illegal entry to secure the warrant. The federal agents' illegal entry upon private premises did not require suppression of evidence subsequently discovered at those premises when executing a search warrant obtained on the basis of information wholly unconnected with the initial entry. In the present case, the police officers did rely upon evidence gathered during the warrantless entry to secure the warrant. In the probable cause affidavit, the officers made known to the issuing judge that they had gathered small amounts of cocaine and marijuana during the warrantless entry, an entry we have held to be in violation of the Fourth Amendment and Article I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution. We recognize that the issuing judge did rely upon this information when issuing the warrant, as the face of the warrant allowed the officers to search specifically for both cocaine and marijuana. The officers learned of the presence of the marijuana only after entering appellant's residence and conducting the warrantless search. The confidential informant did not reveal the existence of marijuana to the police at any time. We believe that the police officers' misconduct lead directly to the discovery of evidence that was crucial to the State's case against appellant. The officers entered and conducted an initial search of appellant's premises without a search warrant. No circumstances existed to justify a warrantless entry, and the State could not prove that the police's actions fit within an exception to the warrant requirement. The police discovered cocaine, marijuana, and paraphernalia during that search. Later, the officers sought judicial approval to search appellant's home. To convince the magistrate to issue a warrant, the officers submitted an affidavit that informed the judge about evidence the police would not have had, but for the illegal entry. To allow use of the bad evidence would give the police incentive to enter the a residence, without a judicially-issued warrant, and search for evidence to bolster any evidence supporting probable cause that the police already possess. This is plainly what the constitutional protections against unreasonable searches restrict against.