Opinion ID: 241507
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Necessary Concomitant.

Text: 52 But there is another, and possibly the most significant reason, why this court must refuse to modify existing law. Many observers implicitly assume in their criticism of present law that if the accused is set free on the criminal side that he will be confined on the civil. Unfortunately, that is not the case. If it were, this court might be much more disposed to alter its current views. The choice today in this jurisdiction is not between confinement and commitment, but rather between confinement and freedom. 30 53 This, however, is not the situation in the District of Columbia, nor was it at the time Durham was decided. In fact, Judge Bazelon carefully noted that the decision would not set Durham free. Under the then existing D.C.Code provision, Sec. 24-301, if the jury found the accused not guilty solely by reason of insanity, it was required to so state. The statute further provided that the court 'may' then have him committed. Congress, however, was obviously concerned that commitment was discretionary, and so by an amendment passed on August 9, 1955, commitment was made mandatory. 54 Unlike the District of Columbia, and the procedure in some State courts, there is no similar provision governing the conduct of trials in other Federal courts. The defense of insanity comes under the 'not guilty' plea, and the jury is not required to state specifically its grounds for acquittal. 31 Thus there is no way for the Government to determine the basis of the jury verdict. It therefore sets the accused free. As a case in point, consider the instant matter. One could hardly find a factual situation in which there is less dispute as to what transpired. Yet if the jury found the appellant not guilty, how could the court, the Government or anyone ever know that it was because of insanity, or because the jury believed he lacked the necessary specific intent at the time he entered the bank? 55 Dr. Miller testified in this case that appellant suffers from an epileptic condition characterized by grand mal seizures, petit mal episodes, and psychomotor episodes. However, he stated that appellant did not suffer an attack from this condition while committing the offense charged. Dr. Miller also stated that appellant has a mental disorder which he termed a schizophrenic reaction of the hebephrenic type. In essence, this means that the individual is silly, has poor control of his emotional responses, and poor reasoning power. He was of the opinion that appellant is a passive dependent personality, and that such a person 'finds it rather difficult to make decisions regarding their adult responsibilities. They don't handle adult problems very well.' He testified that appellant has a 'dependent' and 'inadequate' personality, and he recommended that appellant be institutionalized. Yet, if the jury acquitted appellant on the ground of insanity, there is no provision in the United States Code which would authorize the Government to have appellant committed. 32 That a regrettable void exists in the law today in this respect is readily apparent. As Judge Brosman stated in Smith, supra, at p. 322: 56 'The authority to determine who shall be committed as insane should in practice be linked with the determination of who shall be acquitted as mentally irresponsible-- since in the ordinary case, a person properly acquitted by reason of insanity requires treatment in a mental institution. Yet, unless commitment procedures are integrated with the administration of criminal law, there is more than a fair risk that an accused may avoid both the jail and the asylum.' 57