Opinion ID: 782294
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Errors Relating to the Indictment and Trial

Text: 10 Brown argues that the indictment was in violation of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because it did not specifically reference the penalty provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Apprendi requires that all facts that increase the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory maximum be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Based on Apprendi, Brown argues that the penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) are essential elements of the offense, and, therefore, must be explicitly alleged in the indictment. There is no support in Apprendi for requiring an indictment to reference the penalty provisions of § 841(b) where the indictment properly sets forth specific drug quantities and puts the defendant on notice of all the elements of the offense that would increase the penalty for the crime beyond the statutory maximum. Therefore, there is no Apprendi error.
11 At trial, it became known that one of the government's witnesses, Donnell Simpson, had sent a letter to DEA Agent James Doby regarding the possibility of providing information concerning this case in exchange for a reduction in his sentence. This letter was lost by the government. Courtney claims that the failure of the government to produce this letter requires reversal of his conviction under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) (holding that suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution). See also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985) (holding that Brady applies to impeachment evidence). We review the denial of a Brady claim de novo. United States v. Corrado, 227 F.3d 528, 538 (6th Cir.2000). 12 In order to succeed on a Brady claim, the defendant must show that the evidence was material either to guilt or punishment. Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Evidence is material where there is a reasonable probability that it would have produced a different result. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375; Kyles v. Whitney, 514 U.S. 419, 434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). Courtney does not make any attempt to demonstrate the materiality of the letter, and there is no obvious indication that the contents of the letter would have produced a not-guilty verdict. Moreover, we have held that there is no Brady violation where the evidence is available from another source. See United States v. Clark, 928 F.2d 733, 738 (6th Cir.1991). Both Agent Doby and Donnell Simpson testified and were cross-examined regarding the contents of the letter. Although it may be true, as Courtney argues, that the letter itself would have been more valuable as impeachment evidence, this marginal comparative benefit is even less likely to have produced a different verdict. Therefore, there is no Brady error. 13 Just before oral argument, Brown filed a supplemental argument in support of a new trial. Brown's supplemental argument alleges: (a) that the government failed to disclose that it was filing motions under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35 to reduce Ronald and Donnell Simpson's sentence in exchange for their assistance in Brown and Courtney's trial; (b) that these motions were filed more than one year after the Simpsons' sentences were imposed; (c) that the government was not permitted to file such a motion more one year after sentence was imposed; and (d) that, therefore, the government's failure to disclose its intent to file these motions was Brady error because Brown might have been able to convince the Simpsons to change their testimony on cross-examination if Brown had been able to tell them that the Rule 35 motions were in error. The logic of this argument fails on several levels. First, the trial transcripts clearly reveal that Brown was aware that the Simpsons were being offered Rule 35 motions in exchange for their testimony. Second, Brown makes no showing of a reasonable probability that this information would have produced a different result. Finally, we note that Rule 35 has since been amended to ease the one-year filing requirement. 14
15 During the course of the trial, the jurors were exposed to a non-evidentiary document concerning drug prosecutions, not relating to the trial. That document was an article entitled, Why Low Level Black Drug Offenders Go To Prison; Why the War on Drugs is Failing. In response, the district court conducted an individual voir dire of each juror to determine if the article had caused any taint. The district court found that there was no improper influence on the jury. No party objected to the voir dire or to the district court's conclusion that the jury was untainted. 16 Exposure of the jury to prejudicial literature concerning the trial can be grounds for a mistrial. See, e.g., Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S. 310, 79 S.Ct. 1171, 3 L.Ed.2d 1250 (1959). The literature in this case did not concern the trial itself, and Courtney does not explain how it was prejudicial. Rather than challenge the document itself, Courtney alleges that the manner in which the district court conducted the voir dire encouraged the jury to believe that the defendants had deliberately left the article in the jury room in order to improperly influence the jury. 17 Because Courtney failed to raise this objection in the district court, we are confined to plain error review. Fed. R.Crim.P. 52(b). To establish plain error, a claimant must show: (1) error, (2) that is plain, (3) that affects the defendant's substantial rights, and (4) that seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781, 152 L.Ed.2d 860 (2002); Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997); United States v. Owusu, 199 F.3d 329, 339 (6th Cir.2000). Having cited no evidence that the voir dire caused any juror to believe that the defendants were responsible for planting the article, and no cases indicating that such a voir dire is improper, Courtney has not demonstrated any plain error.
18 In relation to the conspiracy count, the district court instructed the jury as follows: Count One of the first superceding indictment accuses the defendants of a conspiracy to commit the crime of distribution of cocaine and cocaine base in violation of federal law.... For you to find any one of these defendants guilty of the conspiracy charged in Count One, the Government must prove each and every one of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt. 19 First, that two or more persons did conspire or agree to commit the crime of distribution of cocaine and cocaine base. In other words, the conspiracy, itself, has to be proven first, or the agreement.... 20 With regard to the first element — I want to put some flesh on the bone. With regard to the criminal agreement, the Government must prove that two or more persons conspired or agreed to cooperate with each other — to cooperate with each other to commit the crime of possession with intent to distribute or to distribute. 21 Brown argues that the district court violated the Fifth Amendment by referring to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute when the indictment only charged him with conspiracy to distribute. He claims that the added reference to possession with intent substantially prejudiced him by constructively amending the indictment. 22 Because Brown failed to object to this instruction in the district court, we are again confined to plain error review. Cotton, 535 U.S. at 631, 122 S.Ct. 1781. The Fifth Amendment protects defendants from being convicted of an offense different from that which was included in the indictment. United States v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 142, 105 S.Ct. 1811, 85 L.Ed.2d 99 (1985) (holding that a conviction cannot stand if based on an offense that is different from that alleged in the grand jury's indictment). We have held that a constructive amendment to the indictment violates that Fifth Amendment right; [a] constructive amendment occurs when the terms of an indictment are in effect altered by the presentation of evidence and jury instructions which so modify essential elements of the offense charged that there is a substantial likelihood that the defendant may have been convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment. United States v. Hathaway, 798 F.2d 902, 910 (6th Cir.1986). 23 In order to prevail, Brown must show that the jury instruction created a substantial likelihood that he was convicted of an offense separate and distinct from the ones charged in the indictment. At least one circuit has held that the crime of possession with intent to distribute is distinct from the crime of distribution. See United States v. Carter, 576 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir.1978). Even assuming that this is good law, Brown's argument fails because he cannot show a substantial likelihood that he was convicted of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, rather than conspiracy to distribute. First, the district court stated three times that the underlying offense of the conspiracy was distribution. Second, the special verdict form specifically indicated that the jury voted to convict of conspiracy to distribute. The court even walked the jury through the form, line by line. Third, the indictment clearly indicated that the conspiracy was only related to distribution, and the jurors were given a specific instruction to limit their verdict to crimes charged in the indictment. 24 These facts are clearly distinguishable from the case which Brown cited, United States v. Solis, 841 F.2d 307 (9th Cir.1988). In Solis, the defendants were charged with the crime of distribution, but the jury was given an additional instruction that it could convict for the uncharged offense of possession with intent to distribute. Id. at 308. The jury merely returned a verdict of guilty as to count 4. Id. at 309. Although count 4 was distribution, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the verdict as stated was unenlightening as to whether the jury was under the impression, due to the additional instructions, that they could convict on count 4 if they found possession with intent to distribute. Id. In the instant case, considering the instructions as a whole and the specificity of the special verdict form, there is very little chance that the jury mistakenly convicted Brown of the wrong conspiracy. Therefore, there is no Fifth Amendment violation or, certainly, no plain error affecting substantial rights.
25 In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); United States v. Jones, 159 F.3d 969, 979 (6th Cir.1998).
26 Defendants argue that there was not sufficient evidence to prove that they specifically intended to join the conspiracy. Specific intent to join is an essential element of the crime of conspiracy. United States v. Elder, 90 F.3d 1110, 1120 (6th Cir.1996). Proof of knowledge is satisfied by proof that the defendant knew the essential object of the conspiracy .... Every member of a conspiracy need not be an active participant in every phase of the conspiracy, so long as he is party to the general conspiratorial agreement. United States v. Christian, 786 F.2d 203, 211 (6th Cir.1986) (quoting United States v. Cuni, 689 F.2d 1353, 1356 (11th Cir.1982)). A defendant's guilty knowledge and voluntary participation may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. Id. However, mere association with conspirators is not enough to establish participation in a conspiracy. United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159, 162 (6th Cir.1990). 27
28 There is sufficient evidence to support a jury's finding that Courtney specifically intended to join the conspiracy. Donnell Simpson testified that he bought cocaine from Courtney, that Courtney was responsible for counting money and measuring dope for co-conspirators Shawn McKinney, Richard Simpson and Roy Wells, that he saw Courtney selling kilos of cocaine at his mother's house with Richard Simpson and Roy Wells, and that all three men had guns and were wearing bullet proof vests. As Donnell put it, one would take the money, one weighed the stuff up. And that's how they did it. Ronald Simpson testified that Courtney would pick up and deliver kilos of cocaine for him, McKinney, Wells, and Richard Simpson, that Courtney would occasionally sell powder cocaine for Richard Simpson, and that Courtney was Simpson's right hand man. He also testified that the co-conspirators cooked powder cocaine into cocaine base at Courtney's home. Sondra Jackson testified that she saw Courtney cook cocaine into crack cocaine for distribution, that Courtney approached her on three occasions about making trips to Miami to purchase cocaine for the conspirators, and that before one of those trips he placed over $100,000 of Richard Simpson's money on her body. This provides ample evidence that Courtney specifically intended to participate in the conspiracy. 29
30 The evidence overwhelmingly establishes Brown's role as a source of drugs and money for the conspiracy. Both Donnell Simpson and Ronald Simpson testified that they bought powder cocaine from Brown, and later processed that powder cocaine into cocaine base for distribution. Donnell Simpson testified that Shawn McKinney was with Brown on at least one of those occasions. Ronald Simpson also testified that Brown was a source of Shawn McKinney's cocaine, which Brown gave to McKinney on consignment so that McKinney and others could re-sell it. 31 Brown raises two arguments relating to his specific intent to join: (1) that Brown's relationship to the other conspirators was nothing more than a buyer-seller relationship; and (2) that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that Brown was involved in a conspiracy to distribute crack, rather than merely powder cocaine. 32 A mere buyer-seller relationship alone is insufficient to establish a conspiracy. United States v. Anderson, 89 F.3d 1306, 1310 (6th Cir.1996). However, evidence of repeat purchases provides evidence of more than a mere buyer-seller relationship. Id. (quoting United States v. Baker, 905 F.2d 1100, 1106 (7th Cir.1990)). Moreover, [a] large volume of narcotics creates an inference of conspiracy. United States v. Bourjaily, 781 F.2d 539, 545 (6th Cir.1986). The evidence at trial established that the conspirators had a regular arrangement with Brown to purchase very large quantities of powder cocaine. This goes beyond a mere buyer-seller relationship and provides sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict. 33 Brown is right to point out that no witness specifically testified that he knew the conspirators cooked some of the cocaine into crack. However, the government did not need to prove that Brown actively participated in the cooking of powder cocaine into crack, and guilty knowledge and voluntary participation may be inferred from surrounding circumstances. Christian, 786 F.2d at 211. Given the close relationships among the conspirators and the repeated transactions, there was sufficient circumstantial evidence for a rational jury to infer that Brown knew the general gist of the conspiracy when he chose to participate.
34 The crime of conspiracy carries a five year statute of limitations. 18 U.S.C. § 3282. The indictment was filed on January 20, 1999. In order to carry its burden at trial, the government had to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the specific conspiracy Brown and Courtney joined was on-going after January 20, 1994. See United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10, 14, 115 S.Ct. 382, 130 L.Ed.2d 225 (1994); Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 397, 77 S.Ct. 963, 1 L.Ed.2d 931 (1957). Such a showing establishes a presumption of continuity and attaches liability to Brown and Courtney for the subsequent acts of their co-conspirators. See United States v. Mayes, 512 F.2d 637, 642 (6th Cir.1975) (holding that where a conspiracy contemplates a continuity of purpose and a continued performance of acts, it is presumed to exist until there has been an affirmative showing that its has terminated). 35 There was no evidence at trial indicating any overt act by either Brown or Courtney within that period. However, there was evidence of overt acts within that period by other co-conspirators. Specifically, Joseph Simpson testified that Richard Simpson asked him to drive to Florida to buy cocaine in 1994, and that the government seized two kilograms of cocaine from Richard Simpson and Michael Moore in 1998. 3 The crucial question is whether a rational jury could have found that the overt acts undertaken by Defendants co-conspirators during the statute of limitations period were in furtherance of the general conspiratorial agreement entered into by Defendants. Given that the timely acts of the co-conspirators share the same character and purpose of the general conspiracy for which Defendants were indicted, we cannot say that there was insufficient evidence to support the presumption of continuity. 36 The presumption of continuity does not carry the same force for every member of a conspiracy. This is particularly true in large scale drug conspiracies where levels of participation vary greatly among the conspirators. Where a conspirator is deep in the general business of the `ring', the presumption of continuity is the strongest. See United States v. Reina, 242 F.2d 302, 305-06 (2d Cir.1957). At least one other circuit has suggested that, at some point, the lack of evidence of participation in a conspiracy by a low-level drug conspirator for a substantial period of time suffices to extinguish the presumption of continuity. See United States v. Borelli, 336 F.2d 376, 384 (2d Cir.1964) (noting that however reasonable the so-called presumption of continuity may be as to all the participants of a conspiracy which intends a single act, such as the robbing of a bank ..., its force is diminished as to the outer links — buyers indifferent to their sources of supply and turning from one source to another, and suppliers equally indifferent to the identity of their customers). We cannot say in this case, however, that either Defendant was enough of an outer link to make it irrational for a jury to apply the presumption of continuity and convict. 37 The presumption of continuity can also be extinguished by the affirmative defense of withdrawal. United States v. Lash, 937 F.2d 1077, 1083 (6th Cir.1991). The defendant carries the burden of proving withdrawal, and must show that he took affirmative action to defeat or disavow the purpose of the conspiracy. Id. Without such action, liability continues for all actions in furtherance of the conspiracy by other conspirators. [A] full confession to authorities or a communication by the accused to his co-conspirators that he has abandoned the enterprise and its goals would be evidence sufficient to show affirmative action. United States v. Juodakis, 834 F.2d 1099, 1102 (1st Cir.1987). Mere cessation of activity is not sufficient. Lash, 937 F.2d at 1083. Neither Brown nor Courtney raised a defense based on withdrawal at trial. Therefore, the evidence presented to the jury was sufficient to support the verdict.
38 In its supplemental Bill of Particulars, the government stated that Ronald Simpson would testify that he purchased cocaine from Brown in both 1993 and 1994. The government based this information on an interview with Ronald Simpson. The record does not contain any transcript of or notes regarding this interview. On January 26, 2000, five days after the second Bill of Particulars was filed, the government re-interviewed Ronald Simpson. This time, Simpson stated that he purchased cocaine from Brown dating back to 1993. The government disclosed the report of their second interview to defense counsel. At trial, Ronald Simpson testified that he was not sure of the dates on which he purchased cocaine from Brown. It appears from the record that Ronald Simpson's testimony was the only evidence on which the government based its claim that Defendant Brown committed any overt acts within the five-year statute of limitations period for conspiracy. 39 Brown argues that the prosecutor deliberately lied when, in the second Bill of Particulars, he stated that Ronald Simpson would testify to transactions as late as 1994. Brown asserts that there was absolutely no evidence in the record to support this fact, and that the prosecutor's assertion was maliciously designed to circumvent the statute of limitations. 40 Brown must show actual prejudice. United States v. Griffith, 756 F.2d 1244, 1249 (6th Cir.1985). Brown alleges prejudice in that he was prevented from raising a defense based on the statute of limitations. There is no reason that the alleged misconduct of the prosecutor prevented Brown from raising this defense at trial. 4 Thus, there is no prejudice. 41 Brown and Courtney also allege that the prosecutor committed misconduct by failing to instruct the grand jury that it must find evidence of specific acts within the limitations period. We cannot reverse on this basis in any case since errors of this nature by the prosecution before the grand jury are per se harmless where the defendant is subsequently convicted by the petit jury. United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 106 S.Ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986); United States v. Cobleigh, 75 F.3d 242, 251 (6th Cir.1996).