Opinion ID: 1959794
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Evidence of Later Bad Acts

Text: This case is factually similar to Milligan, which, as previously noted, was decided after Cobb's trial. In Milligan, the defendant was alleged to have engaged in two separate acts of unlawful sexual contact. The first occurred in Delaware and the second occurred five days later in Maryland. Accordingly, the State prosecuted Milligan only on the first charge, but sought to introduce the later uncharged Maryland incident under Delaware Rule of Evidence 404(b). [5] One of the theories of admissibility was that the Maryland incident was inextricably intertwined [6] with the late reporting of the earlier Delaware incident. The Milligan court questioned why the late reporting evidence in that case was included in the State's case-in-chief. The Court observed that late reporting bore no reasonable relationship to an ultimate fact to be proved in the State's case-in-chief. [7] Therefore, admission of the bad acts evidence was premature until such time as the defense actually brought up late reporting in rebuttal. [8] Under this analysis, admission of the bad acts through late reporting evidence was also premature in this case. As we stated in Milligan: Any conclusion that the `late reporting theory' was so `inextricably intertwined' with the later bad acts that evidence of those later bad acts had to be admitted in order to meet the `late reporting' defense related to the admissibility of rebuttal evidence and should not have been reached before the State's case-in-chief. [9] Of course, it is not in every situation that the State must wait until rebuttal to introduce 404(b) evidence. As we have held, the State may introduce bad acts evidence that is material to an issue or ultimate fact in dispute in the case as part of its case-in-chief if it demonstrates the existence, or reasonable anticipation, of such a material issue. [10] In this case, unless the defense had actually raised late reporting, there was no material issue that would justify introducing the alleged 1997 incident of which Cobb had been acquitted. Furthermore, even in cases where there is a late reporting defense, the relevance of the later bad act to the phenomenon of delayed reporting is tenuous. The fact that the later bad act may have triggered the complaining witnesses' report of the 1995 incident does not explain to the jury why the complaining witness waited roughly one and half years to make the report. As a logical matter the triggering incident does not allay an appearance of superficial inconsistency [11] associated with late reporting. Our holding in Wheat v. State is that the State may use expert testimony in its case-in-chief in order to explain a complainant's late reporting of intrafamily sexual abuse. [12] Wheat permitted the admission of expert testimony to explain the psychology of complainants who display behavior or make statements which, to average lay people, are superficially inconsistent with the occurrence of sexual abuse and which are established as especially attributable to intrafamily sexual abuse. [13] Wheat does not stand for the proposition that non-expert testimony concerning later bad acts is admissible.