Opinion ID: 887107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Separation and Neutrality

Text: ¶ 62 The tension, or incompatibility, as we called it in Chase, ¶ 14, between the non-establishment and the free exercise mandates of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses are best illustrated by the United States Supreme Court's separation and neutrality holdings. The general framework of this analysis can be understood from four landmark decisions: Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing (1947), 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711; Engel v. Vitale (1962), 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601; School Dist. v. Schempp (1963), 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844; and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604. Everson is the first modern Religion Clause case. There, the Court considered the constitutionality of a New Jersey statute that paid bus fares for children traveling to and from school, regardless of whether those schools were government-run or parochial. In upholding the statute, the Court stated the following: New Jersey cannot consistently with the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment contribute tax-raised funds to the support of an institution which teaches the tenets and faith of any church. On the other hand, other language of the amendment commands that New Jersey cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. While we do not mean to intimate that a state could not provide transportation only to children attending public schools, we must be careful, in protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general State law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16, 67 S.Ct. at 512, 91 L.Ed. at 724. This passage from Everson sowed the seeds of what would become two prominent tracks of Religion Clause inquiry, separation and neutrality.
¶ 63 The primary purpose of the Establishment Clause is to separate government from religion. Separation seeks to ensure that government and religion each operate freely in their own separate spheres, uninhibited by regulation or control by the other. Frederick Gedicks, A Two-Track Theory of the Establishment Clause, 43 Boston College Law Rev. 1071, 1072 (2002). The concept of separation is perhaps best illustrated by the school prayer cases, Engel v. Vitale (1962), 370 U.S. 421, 82 S.Ct. 1261, 8 L.Ed.2d 601, and School Dist. v. Schempp (1963), 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844. In Engel, the United States Supreme Court struck down New York's state-approved prayer which was required to be recited daily in public schools. The Court stated that [t]he Establishment Clause ... stands as an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its `unhallowed perversion' by a civil magistrate. Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-32, 82 S.Ct. at 1267, 8 L.Ed.2d at 608. The next year, the Court in Schempp invalidated actions by Pennsylvania and the City of Baltimore, Maryland, which required the public schools to begin each day with a Bible reading, holding: The place of religion in our society is an exalted one, achieved through a long tradition of reliance on the home, the church and the inviolable citadel of the individual heart and mind. We have come to recognize through bitter experience that it is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 226, 83 S.Ct. at 1573-74, 10 L.Ed.2d at 860-61. ¶ 64 Thus, religious belief and doctrine are subjects with which the government may not engage, whether to advance or diminish.
¶ 65 In contrast, the primary purpose of the Free Exercise Clause is to ensure government neutrality regarding the religious choices and practices of its citizens, or lack thereof. Indeed, [n]eutrality requires that government regulate its interactions with religious individuals and institutions so that it neither encourages nor discourages religious beliefs or practices. Gedicks, 43 B.C. L.Rev. at 1072. Further, the guarantee of neutrality is respected, not offended, when the government, following neutral criteria and evenhanded policies, extends benefits to recipients whose ideologies and viewpoints, including religious ones, are broad and diverse. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va. (1995), 515 U.S. 819, 839, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2521, 132 L.Ed.2d 700, 722. The neutrality analysis has typically been applied in cases of religious groups or individuals seeking benefits equal to those afforded other groups within a school or school system. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch. (2001), 533 U.S. 98, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700; Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet (1994), 512 U.S. 687, 114 S.Ct. 2481, 129 L.Ed.2d 546; Widmar v. Vincent (1981), 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440; Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711. ¶ 66 The distinction between separation and neutrality was highlighted in the recent case of Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002), 536 U.S. 639, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604. In Zelman, the Court considered the constitutionality of Cleveland's government-funded voucher system, which provided students with tuition aid to attend the school of their choice, public or private. The Court acknowledged that the Establishment Clause prevents a State from enacting laws that have the `purpose' or `effect' of advancing or inhibiting religion, Zelman, 536 U.S. at 648-49, 122 S.Ct. at 2465, 153 L.Ed.2d at 614, but, despite the fact that a majority of the voucher participants selected sectarian schools, the Court concluded that the program was entirely neutral with respect to religion because it provided benefits directly to a wide spectrum of individuals, defined only by financial need and residence in a particular school district and it permitted such individuals to exercise genuine choice among options public and private, secular and religious. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662, 122 S.Ct. at 2473, 153 L.Ed.2d at 623. Thus, neutrality seeks not to segregate government and religion so much as it enables  and requires  the government to act neutrally in the face of a citizen's exercise of his or her religion.
¶ 67 We are left with competing mandates under the Religion Clauses. On the one hand, neutrality requires that states use neutral criteria in determining eligibility for government benefits that pay no regard to the applicants' religious beliefs. On the other hand, the separation principle requires that, if the application of neutral criteria leads to a question of religious doctrine, then the state is prevented from interpreting that religious doctrine. The United States Supreme Court has stated that there is room for play in the joints between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, Cutter v. Wilkinson (2005), ___ U.S. ___, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 2117, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020, 1029 (quotation marks omitted), but it has made clear that the Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union (1989), 492 U.S. 573, 594, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3101, 106 L.Ed.2d 472, 495 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, in this case, if the government's examination of resources available to the Claimants requires delving into the religious beliefs of the Claimants or the tenets of their religion  thereby taking a position on questions of religious belief or making adherence to a religion relevant to the Claimants' standing in the political community  separation must take precedence over the application of neutral criteria. In short, separation trumps neutrality if neutrality leads to a governmental interpretation of religious doctrine. ¶ 68 The Court, in ¶¶ 40 and 41, disagrees with this proposition, stating that the Department's application of neutral criteria in the face of a citizen's exercise of his or her religion is as it should be. See ¶ 41. However, the law does not permit the inquiry to stop there. Neutral criteria is not the universal solution to all Religion Clause issues: Establishment Clause doctrine provides a minimum level of church-state separation against even religiously neutral government actions. In other words, not only has the separation of church and state not been eclipsed by religious neutrality, but separation is actually the more fundamental Establishment Clause value. As such, separation remains a necessary check on interactions between religion and government that pass muster under neutrality analysis. Gedicks, 43 B.C. L.Rev. at 1076 (emphasis added). Thus, the neutrality principle alone, though it may have resolved the issue before the United States Supreme Court in Zelman, as the Court notes, cannot alone resolve the very different issue here. ¶ 69 DPHHS was thus entitled to examine the Claimants' resources in the same manner as it would those of any other applicant. Because that includes looking to resources available to the applicants under a trust, DPHHS was correct to inquire whether a trust existed, whether KCR was the trustee, and what provisions governed the trust. DPHHS explains that, in doing so, it evaluated King Colony Articles of Incorporation, the King Colony By-Laws, the Constitution of the Hutterian Brethren Church and Rules as to Community of Property, statements of Hutterite leaders, and federal and state statutes. However, DPHHS also explains that it evaluated the teachings and tenets of the Hutterite Church as set forth in various religious and scholarly writings.... The Religion Clauses require that we carefully scrutinize this action.