Opinion ID: 1577466
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Cohn's Other Arguments

Text: Cohn makes several other arguments against the imposition of discipline, including questioning this Court's jurisdiction and raising constitutional claims. We address those issues briefly. First, Cohn argues that under the doctrine of res judicata, this Court has no authority to order disgorgement in closed bankruptcy cases because those cases are final federal court orders. The doctrine of res judicata bars a second suit between the same parties or their privies on the same cause of action with respect to all issues which were or could have been litigated in the former suit. Richardson v. Tennessee Bd. of Dentistry, 913 S.W.2d 446, 459 (Tenn.1995) (quoting Goeke v. Woods, 777 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tenn.1989)). The doctrine does not apply here. Neither claim preclusion nor issue preclusion bar the Board's action against Cohn because the Board was not a party to the bankruptcy court proceedings, and the bankruptcy court cannot be said to have been in privity with the Board. See, e.g., Harris v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., 726 S.W.2d 902, 905 (Tenn.1987). In addition, although the bankruptcy court's approval of a settlement as to the attorney's fee dispute in In re Phillips is a final judgment, it does not preclude the Board of Professional Responsibility, under the authority of this Court, from ordering disgorgement in those cases. We have stated many times that this Court has inherent authority to regulate the practice of law pursuant to Article VI, section 1 of the Tennessee Constitution. Doe v. Board of Prof'l Responsibility, 104 S.W.3d 465, 469 (Tenn.2003); see also Brown v. Board of Prof'l Responsibility, 29 S.W.3d 445, 449 (Tenn.2000); Petition of Burson, 909 S.W.2d 768, 772-73 (Tenn.1995); Petition of Tennessee Bar Ass'n, 532 S.W.2d 224, 228-29 (Tenn.1975); Belmont v. Board of Law Exam'rs, 511 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Tenn.1974). In furtherance of our duty to regulate the practice of law in Tennessee ... when appropriate, [we] discipline attorneys who violate the rules governing the legal profession. Doe, 104 S.W.3d at 470. In short, orders of disgorgement in a bankruptcy case are sanctions upon an attorney, not a modification of a debtor's discharge. Next, Cohn argues that the Board cannot appeal a decision of a hearing panel. We also find this argument to be without merit. Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 9, section 6.1 provides that this Court shall appoint one hearing committee within each disciplinary district. The rule further provides that disciplinary charges shall be decided by a hearing panel, which is a three-member subset of the hearing committee. Id. § 6.4. The rules also provide that [t]he respondent or the Board may have a review of the judgment of a hearing committee.... Id. § 1.3. The Board is not appealing its own decision, as Cohn argues, but is appealing the decision of a separate entity, the hearing committee. See also Tenn.Code Ann. § 27-9-101 (2000) (providing that [a]nyone who may be aggrieved may appeal a judgment). Third, Cohn argues that the hearing panel's failure to bifurcate the issue of his punishment and the issue of whether he had committed ethical violations infringed his right to due process. Cohn argues that because his four previous reprimands were private, rather than public, sanctions, neither the fact of the reprimands nor their substance should be disclosed to the hearing panel. Cohn has cited to us no authority requiring that hearing committee proceedings be bifurcated, and we have found none. Although private reprimands are indeed intended to be a matter between the attorney and the Board, former misconduct must remain a part of the professional record to be considered as part of the evidence of professional fitness or unfitness. Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Ass'n, 58 Tenn.App. 636, 436 S.W.2d 296, 309 (1968). Accordingly, we find no error in this regard either before the hearing panel or the trial court. Finally, Cohn raises several additional vague due process arguments, citing no authority and offering little argument to support his contentions. We therefore conclude that there is no merit to his contentions and that he is not entitled to relief on those grounds.