Opinion ID: 3165442
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: hebert’s eighth amendment challenge to his

Text: SENTENCE Hebert’s final challenge to his sentence is that his 92-year term is a cruel and unusual punishment that violates the Eighth Amendment because the term is an excessive sanction that is grossly disproportionate to the underlying crime. Hebert’s Eighth Amendment challenge wades partly into his other arguments against his sentence. He argues that his sentence is grossly disproportionate because he was convicted of violating three federal statutes, but his sentence was driven by a finding of murder, which was “a sentencing factor outside the facts of his conviction.” We have recognized that the Eighth Amendment “preclude[s] a sentence that is greatly disproportionate to the offense, because such sentences are ‘cruel and unusual.’” McGruder v. Puckett, 954 F.2d 313, 315 (5th Cir. 1992). Following this principle, in Eighth Amendment challenges, we “initially make a threshold comparison of the gravity of [the defendant’s] offenses against the severity of [the defendant’s] sentence.” Id. at 316. If we infer from this comparison “that the sentence is grossly disproportionate to the offense,” then we “compare the sentence received to (1) sentences for similar crimes in the same jurisdiction and (2) sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions.” Id. In determining whether a sentence is grossly disproportionate this court has frequently used the Supreme Court’s decision in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980), as a benchmark. See, e.g., United States v. Woods, 576 F. App’x 309, 309 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished); United States v. Gonzales, have long recognized that broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2163. 21 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 22 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 121 F.3d 928, 943–44 (5th Cir. 1997), overruled on other grounds by United States v. O’Brien, 560 U.S. 218 (2010). In Rummel, the Supreme Court upheld a mandatory life sentence under a Texas recidivist statute for a defendant convicted of three separate non-violent felony offenses, the last of which was a felony offense of obtaining $120.75 under false pretenses. Rummel, 445 U.S. at 284–85. In light of this framework, we have noted that “[o]ur review of Eighth Amendment challenges is narrow.” United States v. Parker, 505 F.3d 323, 330 (5th Cir. 2007). This is because “[o]n review . . . this court does not ‘substitute its judgment for that of the legislature nor of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence; it should decide only if the sentence is within the constitutional limitations.’” United States v. Thomas, 627 F.3d 146, 160 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Harris, 566 F.3d 422, 436 (5th Cir. 2009)). As a result, “[w]e have previously recognized, following guidance from the Supreme Court, that successful Eighth Amendment challenges to prison-term lengths will be rare.” Harris, 566 F.3d at 436 (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Looney, 532 F.3d 392, 396 (5th Cir. 2008)). When compared to the sentence in Rummel, Hebert’s 92-year term is not grossly disproportionate. Hebert’s sentence is, in fact, more proportionate to his underlying offenses than the sentence was in Rummel. Like the defendant in Rummel, Hebert’s 92-year sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment. But Hebert’s offense here is graver as Hebert murdered Bloch and committed identity theft and a series of bank frauds while abusing his authority as a sheriff’s deputy. 12 See United States v. Rogers, 551 F. App’x 174, Although Hebert suggests that there is an Eighth Amendment problem with Bloch’s 12 murder acting as the basis for Hebert’s sentence, he does not identify any law to support this 22 Case: 14-31405 Document: 00513320169 Page: 23 Date Filed: 12/23/2015 No. 14-31405 176 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (finding a sentence was not grossly disproportionate because “[t]he gravity of [the defendant’s] offense [was] greater, and the sentence less severe, than in Rummel”); see also Looney, 532 F.3d at 396–97 (finding that a 548-month sentence for non-violent drug and gun offenses, which was the functional equivalent of a life sentence for the defendant, was not grossly disproportionate). Moreover, Hebert’s 92-year sentence was within the statutory maximum of 153 years he could have received for the crimes to which he pleaded guilty. We have previously upheld sentences under the Eighth Amendment, like Hebert’s, that were the result of upward variances but still came within statutory limits. See United States v. Forester, 557 F. App’x 380, 381 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (unpublished) (“[W]e are unpersuaded that [the defendant’s] sentence of 81 months for a fraud crime with a maximum penalty of ten years was ‘grossly disproportionate.’”). 13 In light of the following and given our narrow review of Eighth Amendment proportionality challenges, we find that Hebert’s sentence is not grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment.