Opinion ID: 2173484
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Substantially Affected the Proceeding

Text: Our research has turned up very little regarding the substantially affected component. The federal cases cited thus far have considered the rule only in the context of perjury before a grand jury. One court held that a presumption of substantial effect arises after the grand jury acts. Tucker, supra, at 613. The court in Crandall, supra, at 654-55, decided that perjury which resulted in a two-month delay of a grand jury indictment was substantial enough to deny the defendant the benefit of his retraction. The instant case, of course, involves falsification in a regular court proceeding. The district court determined that the substantially affected language prohibited use of the defense only when the false testimony influenced the outcome of the case in which the testimony was given. We cannot agree that the defense is so broadly available. Circumstances are imaginable where false testimony has not yet altered the final result in a case but where, nonetheless, the proceedings have been substantially affected. Precisely where the line ought to be drawn will inevitably be an ad hoc, case-by-case decision. While we do not concur in the district court's construction of this part of the statute, we do affirm its conclusion that Hanson should be allowed the retraction defense. The probate court was not greatly hampered in the conduct of its business. One additional witness was called to discredit Hanson's false testimony and another was questioned at greater length than would otherwise have been necessary. The probate judge stated that Hanson's testimony involved a very minor part of the case. Furthermore, he received notice the day after she testified that she had disavowed her earlier story, and thus his deliberations were not tainted. These facts do not indicate Hanson's mendacity seriously obstructed the proceeding. Perjury should not, of course, be lightly overlooked. Yet the statute excuses it on conditions which, we conclude, are met here. The dismissal of the case is affirmed. ERICKSTAD, C. J., and PAULSON, SAND and VANDE WALLE, JJ., concur.