Opinion ID: 2322020
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Date of Awareness of the Injury and its Compensable Nature

Text: [¶ 19] S.D. Warren contends that the concept of mistake of fact is incompatible with the concept of a gradual injury because the date of a gradual injury is defined as the date the employee becomes aware of the injury and its compensable nature. It asserts that assigning a date of injury requires a determination that the employee is no longer mistaken as to the nature and cause of the injury as of that date. Jensen's leaving work on January 27, 2004, establishes that he was aware he had an injury as of that date. But his leaving work because of a perceived injury does not establish that Jensen was aware that the injury was work related and thus compensable. [¶ 20] Ross was the first case in which we addressed how the date of a gradual injury should be established. At issue was whether the date of a gradual injury fell after the effective date of a statutory amendment and whether the employee gave timely notice. 363 A.2d at 714. The employee in Ross worked for twenty-five years as a roll handler in a paper mill where he manually manipulated rolls of paper weighing from 150 to 3500 pounds. Id. at 713. He experienced numbness in his hands for a number of years and received treatment for the condition in the mill's first aid department several times before he was compelled to cease work on March 17, 1974. Id. He was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome, a compression neuropathy that occurs with chronic, reoccurring trauma of specific type to the heel of the hand. Id. [¶ 21] We noted in Ross that the practical problem of fixing a specific date for a gradual injury is generally handled by using the date on which the disability manifests itself. Id. at 714 (citing 1 a. Arthur Larson, Workers' Compensation Law § 39.50 (1976)). We concluded that March 17, 1974, was the date of injury, as it [was] undisputed that [on that date] the claimant was finally prevented from working inasmuch as the disability had fully manifested itself. Id. Thus, pursuant to Ross, the standard for determining the date of a gradual injury was the date on which the disability manifested itself, which in that case was the date the employee became disabled from work as a result of that injury. [¶ 22] Because March 17, 1974, was the time [the] compensable injury [became] apparent, we determined that the period for giving notice of the injury began to run from that date, and not from the first moment that he experienced pain. Id. at 716. [¶ 23] The date the disability manifested itself and the time the compensable injury became apparent coincided in Ross. That was not the case in Farrow v. Carr Brothers Co., 393 A.2d 1341 (Me.1978). In that case, the employee sought medical treatment on December 7, 1976, for what he had suspected was a work-related knee injury. Id. at 1342. Although his doctor confirmed the suspicion, the employee did not tell the employer immediately that the knee injury was work-related. Id. He worked until December 23, 1976, when he could no longer continue, in part due to the injury. Id. At the earliest, he notified the employer that the knee injury was work-related on January 14, 1977. Id. at 1343. The statute then in effect required employees to give notice of a work-related injury within thirty days of the date of injury. Id.; 39 M.R.S.A. § 63 (Supp.1977). The Commissioner determined that Farrow had not given timely notice of the claim, and we affirmed. 393 A.2d at 1342. [¶ 24] Farrow argued that he suffered a gradual injury and that pursuant to Ross, the thirty-day notice period commenced on his last day of work, which was the date his injury manifested itself to such an extent that [he] was compelled to cease work. Id. at 1343 (quoting Ross, 363 A.2d at 716). Ross actually holds, however, that the notice period begins to run from the time [the] compensable injury becomes apparent. 363 A.2d at 716. In distinguishing Farrow's circumstances from the facts presented in Ross, we stated: Our finding that Ross had suffered a gradual injury did not serve to suspend commencement of the thirty-day claim period until his last day on the job. Indeed, had there been reliable evidence indicating that Ross' injury and its compensable nature were apparent to him prior to his final day of work, a far different case would have been presented. 393 A.2d at 1343 (emphasis added). [3] Thus, in Farrow the thirty-day notice provision had been triggered on December 7, 1976, because on that date the employee was sufficiently aware (1) that he was injured, and (2) that his disability was of a compensable nature. Id. at 1343-44. [¶ 25] In subsequent gradual injury cases, we reiterated that the controlling factors in determining the date of injury are awareness of (1) an injury, and (2) its compensable nature. Upham v. Van Baalen Pac. Corp., 420 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Me.1980) (noting that the date employment ends does not necessarily control); Derrig, 1999 ME 162, ¶ 7, 747 A.2d at 582. In those later cases, however, we did not distinguish establishing the date of injury for the purpose of triggering the notice and limitations periods from establishing the date of injury for other purposes. [¶ 26] Reexamining our decisions, we conclude that Ross established the date of injury for the purpose of the application of the amendment allowing recovery for gradual injuries by using the date on which the disability manifests itself. Ross, 363 A.2d at 714. Ross also established that the date an employee is required to give notice of the gradual injury is the date the compensable injury becomes apparent. Id. at 716. Awareness of the compensable nature of the injury, therefore, was required only with respect to triggering the notice and limitations periods, and not to set a date of injury. It is in later cases that we merged the two concepts for the purpose of deciding the date of a gradual injury for all purposes. Wilson, 2008 ME 47, ¶ 4 n. 2, 942 A.2d at 1238; Derrig, 1999 ME 162, ¶ 6, 747 A.2d at 582; Upham, 420 A.2d at 1232. To avoid confusion of the two concepts, we return to our original holding, found in Ross, that the date of injury for a gradual injury is the date on which the injury manifests itself. The notice and limitations periods, however, may begin to run later, depending on the employee's awareness. [¶ 27] The hearing officer's determination in this case that the date of the gradual injury was the last day that Jensen worked for S.D. Warren, January 27, 2004, may be supportable if it is the date on which the injury manifested itself. Based on the hearing officer's findings, however, it is unclear whether the date the injury manifested itself actually coincided with Jensen's last day of work. We therefore vacate the hearing officer's decision and remand for reconsideration of the date of injury in light of this opinion. The hearing officer should first determine the date of injury, i.e., the date on which the injury manifested itself, and then examine whether the statutory notice and limitations periods commenced on that date or whether they commenced at a later date based on a mistake of fact.