Opinion ID: 1955855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Deposition Evidence

Text: Frank Jahner contends that under Rule 32(a)(3), NDRCivP, the trial court erred in allowing the evidentiary use of the deposition of Paul Richter, who had been the executive officer and majority stockholder of the Bank. Rule 32(a)(3), NDRCivP, says: The deposition of a witness, whether or not a party, may be used by any party for any purpose if the court finds: (A) that the witness is dead; or (B) that the witness is at a greater distance than 100 miles from the place of trial or hearing, or is out of the state, unless it appears that the absence of the witness was procured by the party offering the deposition; or (C) that the witness is unable to attend or testify because of age, illness, infirmity, or imprisonment; or (D) that the party offering the deposition has been unable to procure the attendance of the witness by subpoena; or (E) upon application and notice, that such exceptional circumstances exist as to make it desirable, in the interest of justice and with due regard to the importance of presenting the testimony of witnesses orally in open court, to allow the deposition to be used. FDIC sought to use only a small portion of the deposition to show that Frank had signed the disputed guaranty. After the trial court allowed that evidence, both parties caused additional parts of the deposition to be read into the record. We deem significant only the deposition testimony that Frank signed the guaranty. Frank Jahner contends that Richter's deposition was inadmissible because FDIC did not prove any of the circumstances listed in NDRCivP 32(a)(3). Counsel for FDIC told the trial court that Richter was in South Dakota and unavailable as a witness. Counsel for Frank argued: I don't think the Court can take a statement of Counsel as evidence. You have to have an attempt to subpoena him. Nevertheless, the trial court admitted the deposition. The admission of deposition testimony lies within the trial court's discretion, and reversal is appropriate only upon a clear showing that the trial judge abused his discretion. Alfonso v. Lund, 783 F.2d 958, 961 (10th Cir.1986). Frank now contends that, at the time of trial, Richter was in Regent, North Dakota, less than 100 miles from the place of trial. Yet, when FDIC counsel represented at trial that Richter was in South Dakota, Frank did not dispute that representation, but argued that the trial court could not accept a statement of counsel as evidence. Ikerd v. Lapworth, 435 F.2d 197, 205 (7th Cir.1970), upheld a trial court's admission of a deposition when the proffering counsel represented that the Indiana deponent was in California and could not be present for trial, opposing counsel said they would independently try to verify the representation, and the court advised opposing counsel that, unless they established to the contrary, [the] deposition would be accepted upon the representation made that [the witness] was outside the jurisdiction of the court. The North Dakota Rules of Professional Conduct, at Rule 3.3(a), direct: A lawyer shall not: (1) Make a statement to a tribunal of fact or law that the lawyer knows to be false; ... Moroever, the Comment to that rule explains that an assertion purporting to be on the lawyer's own knowledge, as... in a statement to the tribunal, may properly be made only when the lawyer knows the assertion is true or believes it to be true on the basis of a reasonably diligent inquiry. A trial court does not abuse its discretion in relying on a procedural representation of counsel that is not contradicted by opposing counsel. Moreover, Richter's deposition testimony that Frank signed the disputed guaranty was cumulative of the testimony of Francis Jahner and Mandan Police Chief Dennis Rohr that Frank signed it. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing evidentiary use of Richter's deposition testimony.