Opinion ID: 2446
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reasonableness of the BIA's paroling of aliens

Text: Because we uphold the BIA Rule, we must next address whether the agency acted unreasonably in paroling aliens into this countryinstead of granting them a post-arrival waiverin order to preserve its ability to fine the airlines. The district court found that the INS had acted within its authority in paroling aliens rather than waiving the visa requirement. We agree. As an initial matter, the airlines have presented no support for their claim that, in these cases, the INS first determined that the aliens were eligible for a waiver, and only then granted parole rather than a waiver. Though United points to its Rule 56.1 statement for support, its Rule 56.1 statement asserts only that when the aliens in question arrived in the United States, each gave an explanation for the absence of a visa or a passport of the sort usually accepted by the agency, but that each was granted parole rather than a waiver despite having presented such an explanation. The Rule 56.1 statement did not assert that the INS district director was satisfied that the alien's explanation constituted an emergency, 8 C.F.R. § 212.1(g), and the INS has not conceded that the agency first found the aliens eligible for a waiver and only then granted parole instead. The real question, therefore, is whether the INS abused its authority in employing its parole power rather than its waiver power so as to preserve its ability to fine the airlines. The airlines contend that the agency had an improper motive for its change in policy. We disagree. A 1994 policy directive stated that the agency's goal was to maximize revenues and create a deterrent against violations. Memorandum from George Wetteland, Acting APD, Immigration & Naturalization Serv., Change in Policy Regarding Carrier Fines when a Visa Waiver is Granted on Form I-193 (Aug. 24, 1994). Congress had recently given the INS power to retain the monies collected from fines, 8 U.S.C. § 1356; see also INS Fines Training Program, J.A. 105 (detailing INS policy on collecting fines under § 273), most assuredly knowing that the financial stake would influence the manner which the INS exercised its enforcement discretion. The resulting INS policy change of paroling aliens, versus granting waivers, is thus not an improper motive. However repugnant the idea of financial drivers may be to United, there is no authority for United's claim that such motives are improper or contrary to Congress's intent. United also argues that the INS's shift in its enforcement policy was a legislative act that required notice to carriers under the APA that the very same aliens it had been transporting since 1958 would no longer be admitted but paroled, but that claim is also meritless. Unless a statute constrains an agency's exercise of its enforcement powers, the agency possesses broad discretion in how it enforces statutory and regulatory law. See Ass'n of Irritated Residents v. EPA, 494 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that, because the statute did not give any indication that violators must be pursued in every case, or that one particular enforcement strategy must be chosen over another and provide[d] no meaningful guidelines defining the limits of [the agency's] discretion, the challenger had failed to rebut the presumption that the enforcement decision was committed to the discretion of the agency); cf. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 834-35 (1985) (If [Congress] has indicated an intent to circumscribe agency enforcement discretion, and has provided meaningful standards for defining the limits of that discretion, there is `law to apply' under [the APA], and courts may require that the agency follow that law; if it has not, then an agency refusal to institute proceedings is a decision `committed to agency discretion by law' within the meaning of [the APA].). Here, when making parole decisions, the INS exercises a broad discretionary power pursuant to [t]he unusually broad Congressional power over the admission of aliens into the United States. Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 1982). Those decisions must be viewed at the outset as presumptively legitimate and bona fide in the absence of strong proof to the contrary, a showing that poses a heavy [burden] for any alien challenging a parole decision. Id. at 212-13. Similarly, the waiver statute states only that the visa requirement  may be waived on the basis of an unforeseen emergency. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(4)(A) (emphasis added). It does not require a waiver or otherwise restrict the executive's exercise of its enforcement discretion. With respect to United Airlines, therefore, we reverse the district court's ruling declaring the BIA Rule invalid, but we affirm the district court's judgment in favor of the INS on the grounds that the agency permissibly chose from among the various enforcement mechanisms available to it when it paroled aliens into this country rather than granted them visa waivers.