Opinion ID: 8448411
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Malicious Use of Process

Text: In his first § 1983 claim, Dunne asserts that Gilchrist’s issuance of the traffic summonses constituted malicious use of civil process by a state actor in violation of his due process rights. 3 We have held that “a claim of malicious use of process may state a Section 1983 claim if it includes the elements of that common law tort as it has developed.” McArdle v. Tronetti, 961 F.2d 1083, 1088 (3d Cir.1992). Accordingly, we are guided by the relevant decisions of the New Jersey state courts, which hold that a plaintiff asserting a malicious use of process claim must show that: (1) a[n] ... action was instituted by this defendant against this plaintiff; (2) the action was motivated by malice; (3) there was an absence of probable cause to prosecute; ... (4) the action was terminated favorably to the plaintiff; ... [and (5) ] the plaintiff has suffered a special grievance caused by the institution of the underlying civil claim. LoBiondo v. Schwartz, 199 N.J. 62, 970 A.2d 1007, 1022-23 (2009). After meticulously examining the record and drawing all inferences in favor of Dunne, the District Court determined that he had not established a “special grievance” and that his claim therefore failed. 4 We agree. New Jersey courts have held that “the mere cost of defending against litigation” does not amount to a special grievance; rather, the key inquiry is whether the underlying action “interfered with one’s liberty or property.” Id. at 1026 (citation and internal quotations omitted). Dunne has failed to allege, let alone demonstrate, that he suffered any such special grievance. Nor could he, as it is undisputed that he was never restrained, arrested, jailed, or otherwise deprived of his liberty or property. Consequently, the lack of a special grievance is fatal to his malicious use of process claim. 5