Opinion ID: 1678072
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: whether the mayor's veto is an action of the governing authorities from which the shankses may appeal

Text: ¶ 9. The City of Madison contends that the Mayor's veto of the Board's decision is not an action which may be appealed. It argues that the Mayor's veto voids any action taken by the Board and thus, there is no action from which to appeal. The City claims, A Mayor's veto of a Board action does not result in an action by a municipality; instead, the veto nullifies the action of the Board. Once the Mayor has exercised her veto, the matter stands as if no action whatsoever had been taken. Therefore, there is nothing for the Shankses to appeal. ¶ 10. Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (1972) describes the manner in which appeals are taken from judgments or decisions of the board of supervisors or municipal authorities of a city, town, or village: Any person aggrieved by a judgment or decision of the board of supervisors, or municipal authorities of a city, town, or village, may appeal within ten (10) days from the date of adjournment at which session the board of supervisors or municipal authorities rendered such judgment or decision, and may embody the facts, judgment and decision in a bill of exceptions which shall be signed by the person acting as president of the board of supervisors or of the municipal authorities.... (emphasis added). The issue in the present case is whether the mayor is a municipal authority whose actions may be appealed under Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (1972). Both the statute and relevant case law suggest that this question should be answered affirmatively. ¶ 11. The source of the mayor's veto power is Miss.Code Ann. § 21-3-15 (1990) which provides: Ordinances adopted by the board of aldermen shall be submitted to the mayor. The mayor shall, within ten (10) days after receiving any ordinance, either approve the ordinance by affixing his signature thereto, or return it to the board of aldermen by delivering it to the municipal clerk together with a written statement setting forth his objections thereto or to any item or part thereof. No ordinance or any item or part thereof shall take effect without the mayor's approval, unless the mayor fails to return an ordinance to the board of aldermen prior to the next meeting of the board, but no later than fifteen (15) days after it has been presented to him, or unless the board of aldermen, upon reconsideration thereof on or after the third day following its return by the mayor, shall, by a vote of two-thirds (2/3) of the members of the board, resolve to override the mayor's veto. Miss.Code Ann. § 21-3-15 (1990). ¶ 12. A mayor's power to approve or veto actions of a municipal legislative body is legislative in nature. MCQUILLIN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 16.42 (3rd ed.1989). As one court has explained, [t]he mayor's veto, like the veto of the President or a state governor, is undeniably a part of the legislative process. It differs only in that it takes place on the local level. When the mayor exercises his veto power, it constitutes the policy-making decision of an individual elected official. It is as much an exercise of legislative decision-making as is the vote of Congress, a state legislator, or a city councilman. Bryant v. Nichols, 712 F.Supp. 887, 891 (M.D.Ala.1989) (emphasis added). ¶ 13. There exists no Mississippi case law on point which explicitly holds that a mayor's veto is an appealable action of a municipal authority as contemplated by § 11-51-75(1972). [2] However, there is case law which suggests that a mayoral veto is subject to judicial review. In Robinson v. Utilities Comm'n, 487 So.2d 827, 829 (Miss.1986), this Court held that the Utilities Commission of the City of Columbus was not a municipal authority within the meaning of Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (1972). An employee of the Utilities Commission of the City of Columbus brought suit in the Lowndes County Justice Court arguing that he was entitled to three weeks of vacation rather than two. Id. at 827. The justice court dismissed the suit without prejudice and the employee appealed to the Circuit Court of Lowndes County which entered an order dismissing the cause. Id. at 828. The circuit court found that because the Utilities Commission was a municipal authority as contemplated by Miss.Code Ann. § 11-51-75 (1972), the employee was required to appeal the justice court's decision within ten days. Id. This Court reversed, explaining that [i]n sections under Title 21, Miss. Code Ann. (1972), the references to `municipal authority' mean the mayor and board of aldermen, city council, or other such form of government. Id. at 829. Accordingly, because the Utilities Commission was not a municipal authority, the failure to appeal within ten days did not warrant dismissal. Id. at 830. ¶ 14. Though the City argues that there is no final order from which the Shankses may appeal, [t]his Court has said that any act is appealable. It does not have to be an order or formal judgment. Benedict v. City of Hattiesburg, 693 So.2d 377, 380 (Miss.1997). Mississippi cases have referred to `actions' of counties and municipalities as appealable events. South Cent. Turf, Inc. v. City of Jackson, 526 So.2d 558, 561 (Miss.1988). ¶ 15. This Court has identified the following as municipal authorities within the meaning of § 11-51-75: the mayor and board of aldermen, city council, or other such form of government. Robinson, 487 So.2d at 829. Because the mayor is a municipal authority, it follows that her actions are subject to review. Moreover, this Court has given a broad interpretation to § 11-51-75 (1972), writing, [w]e are of the opinion that any act of a county or municipality leaving a party aggrieved is appealable under § 11-51-75 where ... all issues of the controversy are finally disposed of by Order of the City Council. Garrard v. City of Ocean Springs, 672 So.2d 736, 738 (Miss.1996). A finding that the mayoral veto is subject to review is consistent with both Robinson and the liberal construction consistently afforded the statute.