Opinion ID: 2595070
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the District Court Err by Dismissing the Firearm Enhancement with Respect to the Burglary Charge?

Text: Idaho Code § 19-2520 provides that any person who displayed, used, threatened, or attempted to use a firearm or other deadly weapon while committing or attempting to commit any of certain specified crimes, including aggravated assault and burglary, shall be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment computed by increasing the maximum authorized sentence by fifteen years. The State charged this firearm enhancement with respect to both the aggravated assault and burglary charges. Prior to the trial, the district court dismissed the firearm enhancement with respect to the burglary charge, relying upon Idaho Code § 19-2520E, which provides: [A]ny person convicted of two (2) or more substantive crimes ..., which crimes arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct, may only be subject to one (1) enhanced penalty. In doing so, the district court erred. That statute prohibits imposing more than one enhanced penalty where a person is convicted of two or more substantive crimes that arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct. It does not prohibit charging more than one enhanced penalty even if the crimes charged all arose out of the same indivisible course of conduct. If, in that circumstance, a defendant is convicted of more than one crime for which an enhanced penalty is charged, then at sentencing the court may only impose one enhanced penalty. The Defendant argues on appeal that it was not error to dismiss the firearm enhancement with respect to the burglary charge because there was no evidence that he displayed, used, threatened, or attempted to use a firearm ... while committing or attempting to commit the burglary. Burglary is defined as follows: Every person who enters any house, room, apartment, tenement, shop, warehouse, store, mill, barn, stable, outhouse, or other building, tent, vessel, vehicle, trailer, airplane or railroad car, with intent to commit any theft or any felony, is guilty of burglary. IDAHO CODE § 18-1401 (1997). The Defendant asserts that the burglary was committed when he entered the barn with the intent to commit a theft and that there is no evidence that he displayed, used, threatened, or attempted to use a firearm while entering the barn. We addressed a similar issue in State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1986), and State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993). In State v. Fetterly , the defendant and his girlfriend entered the victim's home with the intent to steal his personal belongings. They remained in the home until the following day when the victim returned. They ultimately killed the victim and took his car, pickup truck, and other personal items. The defendant was convicted of felony murder under a statute that provided: Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, ... burglary ... is murder of the first degree. IDAHO CODE § 18-4003(d) (1997). On appeal, he argued that he was erroneously convicted of felony murder because the burglary was complete before the victim arrived home. This Court rejected that argument, stating: As the state points out in its brief, The narrow construction Fetterly urges upon the Court would deprive [the felony murder rule] of any validity unless the victim was killed while the burglar had one leg over the windowsill or one foot across the threshold. We agree with the state's position. Grammer's death was part of a stream of events which began the evening Fetterly and Windsor entered Grammer's home and ended the following day when Grammer's possessions were removed from the home. 109 Idaho at 771-72, 710 P.2d at 1207-08 (brackets in original). In State v. Pratt , the defendant and his brother entered a residence to steal money and then committed a robbery and assaulted several people while in the residence, took a hostage to facilitate their escape when law enforcement officers arrived, led the officers on a car chase and then a foot chase, and finally engaged in a shoot-out with the pursuing officers, killing one of them. The defendant was convicted of felony murder of the officer on the ground that the murder occurred in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate the burglary, robbery, and kidnapping. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was wrongly convicted of felony murder because the burglary, robbery, and kidnapping had occurred earlier at the residence and were completed before the killing of the pursuing officer. This Court rejected that argument, stating: In the present case, the trial court properly held that Brent Jacobson's death was also part of the stream of events which began when the Pratt brothers entered the residence of Louise Turner for the purpose of stealing money, were suddenly caught in the middle of the act by police officers, took a hostage to facilitate their escape, led the pursuing officers on a car and foot chase, and ended the following day when the Pratts finally surrendered to the pursuing police officers. 125 Idaho at 558, 873 P.2d at 812. Both State v. Fetterly and State v. Pratt were based upon the meaning of the phrase in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate. The word perpetration is synonymous with the word commission, which means the act of committing, performing, or doing (as a crime, misdeed, or other offense). WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1684, 457 (Philip Babcock Gove ed., G. & C. Merriam Co.1971). The phrase in the perpetration of a crime in Idaho Code § 18-4003(d) is synonymous with the words while committing a crime in Idaho Code § 19-2520. In the instant case, there was evidence that the Defendant discharged a firearm in the direction of Mr. Hossley while still on the Hossley's property and while attempting to escape from the scene of the burglary. Under those circumstances, there was evidence that the Defendant used a firearm while committing a burglary. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 873 P.2d 800 (1993); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 766, 710 P.2d 1202 (1986). Therefore, the district court erred in dismissing the firearm enhancement in connection with the burglary charge.