Opinion ID: 1752176
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Insanity and Diminished Responsibility

Text: We consider these defenses as they apply to both murders. The thrust of the defendant's argument is that the State's experts were permitted to testify to matters which were not the proper subject of expert opinion testimony and that without this evidence the State failed to prove defendant's sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. More particularly, defendant objects because Dr. Loeffelholz was allowed to say a hypothetical person having certain characteristics attributable to defendant would have had sufficient mental capacity to know and understand the nature and quality of his acts and to distinguish right from wrong. These same questions were asked and answered, over timely objection, with reference to each of the two murders. Substantially the same questions were put to Dr. Michael Taylor, again over defendant's objection, with substantially the same answers. Section 701.4, The Code 1979, provides: No person shall be convicted of any crime if at the time such crime is committed the person suffers from such a diseased or deranged condition of the mind so as to render the person incapable of knowing the nature and quality of the act he or she is committing or incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in relation to that act. Insanity need not exist for any specific length of time before or after the commission of the alleged criminal act. At the outset it should be noted that the trial court refused to permit the psychiatrists to give an opinion that defendant was sane at the time of the murders. They were, however, allowed to answer questions concerning the particular matters referred to in section 701.4 which go to the issue of sanity. Our general rule is that opinion evidence should be received if it will aid the factfinder and is based on special training, experience or knowledge with respect to an issue in controversy. State ex rel. Leas in re O'Neal, 303 N.W.2d 414, 420 (Iowa 1981). We maintain a liberal policy toward the reception of opinion testimony and reverse only for abuse of trial court discretion. Id. We have consistently adhered to the policy of allowing expert opinion on the issue of defendant's sanity. See, e.g., State v. Hahn, 259 N.W.2d 753, 758 (Iowa 1977) (expert testified defendant recognized the difference between right and wrong); State v. Lass, 228 N.W.2d 758, 678 (Iowa 1975) (expert concluded defendant was sane at the time he killed his wife); State v. Harkness, 160 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Iowa 1968) (expert unable to say whether defendant was sane or insane); State v. Arthur, 160 N.W.2d 470, 473 (Iowa 1968) (expert testified that defendant knew the difference between right and wrong); State v. Drosos, 253 Iowa 1152, 1156, 114 N.W.2d 526, 528 (1962) (neither [of defendant's experts] testified that defendant was unable to comprehend the nature and consequences of [defendant's] act or that he was unable to distinguish right from wrong); State v. Berry, 241 Iowa 211, 221-22, 40 N.W.2d 480, 486 (1950) (expert testified that defendant was insane at the time of the alleged murder). Other authorities agree with this general rule. E.g., 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence § 609, at 173-74 (13th ed. 1973); 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1937 (J. Chadbourn rev. 1978) (recognizing distinction between testimony on sanity and testimony on capacity); 31 Am.Jur.2d Expert & Opinion Evidence § 86, at 598 (1967); 23 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 867(c) (1961). Defendant argues this has all been changed now because our acceptance of the M'Naghten rule as the definition of insanity has recently been codified in section 701.4, The Code 1979. State v. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Iowa 1979). Thus, defendant says this testimony runs afoul of this principle announced in Grismore v. Consolidated Products Co., 232 Iowa 328, 361, 5 N.W.2d 646, 663 (1942): No witness should be permitted to give his opinion directly that a person is guilty or innocent, or is criminally responsible or irresponsible, or that a person was negligent or not negligent, or that he had capacity to execute a will, or deed, or like instrument .... [Such matters] are mixed questions of law and fact. When a standard, or a measure, or a capacity has been fixed by law, no witness whether expert or non-expert, nor however qualified, is permitted to express an opinion as to whether or not the person or the conduct, in question, measures up to that standard. On that question the court must instruct the jury as to the law, and the jury must draw its own conclusion from the evidence. The Grismore rule has since been applied in a variety of cases under widely differing circumstances. E.g., Kooyman v. Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co., 315 N.W.2d 30, 37 (Iowa 1982) (witness not permitted to say defendant's conduct amounted to bad faith); State v. Nimmo, 247 N.W.2d 228, 230 (Iowa 1976) (witness not permitted to say that marijuana found on defendant would be quite a bit more than a person would have on hand for personal use); State v. Swartz, 244 N.W.2d 553, 555 (Iowa 1976) (witness not permitted to say that marijuana was in the [defendant's] home to be sold or delivered by defendant and his wife because it conveys conclusion of legal guilt); State v. Ogg, 243 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Iowa 1976) (witness not permitted to say forty-six tablets of LSD far exceeds what one might possess for personal use because statement expressed opinion of guilt); Speed v. State, 240 N.W.2d 901, 911 (Iowa 1976) (witness could testify that physician failed to use ordinary skill, but could not testify that doctor was negligent); State v. Johnson, 224 N.W.2d 617, 622 (1974) (expert on tilltapping not allowed to say crime of tilltapping had occurred); State v. Galloway, 167 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 1969) (polygraph expert could testify to defendant's lack of veracity but was not permitted to say that defendant was involved in the shooting); M. Capp Mfg. Co. v. Hartman, 260 Iowa 24, 28-29, 148 N.W.2d 465, 468 (1967) (building inspector prohibited from testifying that the building's structure violated zoning ordinance); In re Ransom's Estate, 244 Iowa 343, 371-72, 57 N.W.2d 89, 104-05 (1953) (witness not permitted to say whether testator was competent to make will because the inquiry involved a mixed question of law and fact and was a direct inquiry as to the testator's testamentary capacity). We do not agree that the enactment of section 701.4 has had the far-reaching effect defendant claims. We hold that the law on this matter remains as it was prior to the statute. The cases upon which defendant relies are all cases in which the testimony went to establish an element of the crime charged. In the instant case we do not deal with an element of murder; rather we are concerned with insanity, which is a defense. Hamann, 285 N.W.2d at 182. Thus cases like Ogg, Nimmo, and Johnson are distinguishable. Furthermore, defendant's mental condition is peculiarly a matter of expert evaluation and analysis. It is a question upon which factfinders need more than ordinary assistance from witnesses trained by education and experience to recognize mental disorders. In testifying on these issues, the expert expresses no opinion on the conduct of the defendant nor on his guilt or innocence. He testifies only as to a mental condition. This should be no different than testifying to a physical condition. Testimony as to a defendant's mental status does not become a mixed question of law and fact simply because the statute now delineates what the rule has always been. Significantly the statute does not attempt to define what the terms there used mean. It does no more than designate a condition of mind which will render one immune from criminal responsibility. Whether this condition exists in a particular case remains a question of fact, dependent of necessity to a great extent on expert opinion testimony. In the present case both the State's expert witnesses stated in great detail the facts upon which the opinion was based. The recent case of People v. Drossart, 99 Mich.App. 66, 297 N.W.2d 863 (1980) discussed this question and reaches a result which we believe is the correct one. We set out the portion of that opinion which applies to the instant case: It is important to note, therefore, that a qualified witness may testify that the accused is suffering from a mental condition involving substantial disorder of thought or mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope with the ordinary demands of life, M.C.L. § 330.-1400a; M.S.A. § 14.800 (400a). In addition, the opinion rule does not prevent that witness from concluding that, as a consequence of the above mental condition, the accused lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law. M.C.L. § 768.21a(1); M.S.A. § 28.1044(1)(1). Id. at 74, 297 N.W.2d at 868. Defendant argues Drossart did not address the objection raised herethat this was not a proper subject for expert testimony. We believe, however, the Michigan court did decide that very question in deciding the testimony was not an improper legal conclusion invading the provinces of the judge and jury. 96 Mich.App. at 82, 297 N.W.2d at 871. We find no error in the trial court's ruling. One other issue remains concerning the expert opinion evidence. Defendant complains because the trial court did not permit his experts to testify about defendant's mental inability to entertain malice, although they did express their opinions on his ability to distinguish right from wrong and to understand the nature and quality of his acts. The trial court relied on State v. Gramenz, 256 Iowa 134, 142-43, 126 N.W.2d 285, 290 (1964). Defendant argues that State v. Barney, 244 N.W.2d 316 (Iowa 1976), undercuts Gramenz, if indeed it does not inferentially overrule that case. This claim is without merit. Barney, in fact, cites Gramenz with apparent approval. We believe what we said in Gramenz is controlling here. There was no error in the trial court's ruling.