Opinion ID: 1122950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jury instruction regarding deliberateness

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of deliberateness. In the penalty-phase proceeding, the first question that the jury must answer is [w]hether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately. ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A). In the guilt-phase proceeding for aggravated murder, the state must prove that defendant committed the murder intentionally. ORS 163.095, 163.115(1)(a). Defendant claims that there is a legal distinction between the elements of deliberately and intentionally in this context because ORS 163.150(1)(b)(A), which governs the penalty-phase proceeding, requires the showing of a different and greater culpable mental state than that of intentionally. Wagner I, 305 Or. at 147, 752 P.2d 1136. Defendant argues that the trial court should have explained that difference to the jury and argues that the trial court's failure to do so lessened the standard of proof for an affirmative finding on the first question. Finally, the defendant argues that the trial court's failure to draw the distinction created a substantial likelihood that the jury relied on the aggravated murder conviction to conclude that the defendant acted deliberately. The trial court reasoned that drawing a distinction between the requisite mental states was unnecessary, because the jury for the second penalty-phase proceeding was not the same jury that served for the guilt phase of defendant's trial. The trial court stated that instructing the jury that deliberately means something different from intentionally would not have assisted the jury in its determination of the first question. Instead, according to the trial court, such an instruction may have confused the jury because the trial court had not instructed the jury on the meaning of the term intentionally in the first place. The trial court also instructed the jury that defendant's prior conviction of aggravated murder did not answer the question whether he acted deliberately. We conclude that the trial court's instruction was proper. The court instructed the jury on the meaning of deliberateness. The court's additional instructionthat the jury should not rely on defendant's prior conviction to determine the deliberateness issuesatisfies all defendant's other arguments supporting this assignment of error. That additional instruction served the same purpose that defendant's requested instruction would have served, because it ensured that the jury would not return a yes answer on the first question simply because defendant previously had been found guilty of aggravated murder. It is not error for a trial court to refuse to give a requested instruction if the instruction given by the court adequately addresses the subject of the requested instruction. State v. Tucker, 315 Or. 321, 332, 845 P.2d 904 (1993). We conclude that, in this case, the trial court did not err in refusing to give defendant's requested instruction.