Opinion ID: 2127245
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Maintain and Support.

Text: ICVA challenges the conclusion that it is maintained and supported in part at public expense, claiming that the trial court and the Court of Appeals improperly focused on the status of the payor (the CIB) as a governmental entity, and the amount of the payments from the CIB to ICVA, rather than examining the wording of the contract between those parties and the circumstances under which the payments were made with reference to the contract. ICVA asserts that its relationship with the CIB is strictly a fee-for-service arrangement. INI counters that the evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that ICVA was maintained and supported at public expense because the monies received from the CIB by ICVA were in the nature of a grant. The words maintained and supported used in IND. CODE § 5-11-1-16(e) are not defined in the statute. Thus, we turn to the rules of statutory construction to determine the meaning of these words. The guiding principles of statutory construction are well known: we are to construe a statute with the act's purpose and scope in mind, Ind. Dept. of Rev. v. Indpls. Public Trans. Corp. (1990), Ind., 550 N.E.2d 1277, 1278; statutes are to be examined and interpreted as a whole, giving words their common and ordinary meaning and not overemphasizing a strict, literal or selective reading of individual words, Spaulding v. Int'l. Bakers Services, Inc. (1990), Ind., 550 N.E.2d 307, 309. ICVA asserts that the commonlyunderstood meaning of maintain and support is to subsidize or to keep in existence, which definition does not include a situation where there is a bargained-for exchange like the fee-for-services arrangement that ICVA contends existed between ICVA and the CIB. We agree with ICVA that a private entity is not maintained or supported by public monies within the meaning of IND. CODE § 5-11-1-9 merely because public monies make up a certain percentage of its revenue. If the relationship is, in fact, a fee-for-services (or goods) agreement then, clearly, an entity is not maintained or supported by public funds. Otherwise, any entity who performed any service or provided any good for any governmental entity would find its business records available for public inspection under the Public Records Act. We do not perceive this to be the legislature's intent in passing the Public Records Act. Here, however, we are not convinced that the evidence leads unerringly to the conclusion that the relationship between ICVA and the CIB is a fee-for-services arrangement. Over the years, ICVA and the CIB have entered into four contracts. In 1967, the contract obligated ICVA to solicit and book conventions and obligated the CIB to pay it for such services. In 1978, an agreement required ICVA to solicit and book conventions to be held in the Convention-Exposition Center and required the CIB to pay ICVA for such services. In 1985, the CIB was audited by the State Board of Accounts. At the conclusion of the audit, the State Board of Accounts recommended that the CIB and ICVA enter into a written contract which memorialized the money being paid to ICVA by the CIB. Pursuant to that recommendation, a written agreement was executed. The preamble to the agreement declared that the CIB has financially supported the ICVA by allocating a portion of receipts from the hotel-motel tax and by furnishing offices, meeting space, furniture and equipment without cost. The contract also provided that the CIB [shall] pay to the ICVA annually a portion of the receipts from the Hotel-Motel Tax as determined by the CIB in its annual budget. Thus, the amount of money paid by the CIB to ICVA was tied to the CIB's receipt of revenues from the hotel-motel tax. Before and after the 1985 contract, the annual allocation amounted to approximately 20% of the receipts from the hotel-motel tax. The amount given to ICVA did not depend on whether it booked a specific number of conventions, filled a set number of hotel rooms or convention days, or on any other objective measure of ICVA's performance. In fact, whether ICVA received more or less money under the contract in any given year was totally dependent on the amount of the hotel-motel tax collected by the CIB. ICVA receives from the CIB an amount agreed upon at the beginning of each year. The payments are made in monthly installments. The first eleven installments are computed as 1/12 of the allotted portion of the projected receipts from the hotel-motel tax. The final installment is adjusted upward or downward to reflect the actual tax receipts in a given year. ICVA claims that the sole conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that ICVA works on a fee-for-services basis. It claims that the payments are not gratuitous contributions for the general maintenance of ICVA, and that the monies received are not an unrestricted general grant because they must be used to generate tourism and convention business in Marion County. Contrary to ICVA's assertions, we find substantial evidence to support the trial court's findings and conclusions that ICVA was maintained and supported by the CIB. There is no dispute here that the CIB is a public agency within the meaning of the Public Records Act, and that the monies paid by the CIB to ICVA are public funds. The contract recited that the CIB has financially supported ICVA by allocating tax receipts and by furnishing other business-related needs without cost. ICVA's federal tax returns describe the monies received from the CIB as indirect public support under the headings of contributions, gifts, grants and similar amounts received. None of the documents from the CIB or ICVA described the payments as fees for promotional or booking services. There is no reference in the minutes of the CIB's meetings that the payments to ICVA were for promotional and booking services. ICVA receives payments each month regardless of whether it books any conventions in that month and regardless of the amount of time spent by its employees encouraging tourism in Marion County. The payments are purely a function of the amount of tax collected by the CIB. There is no direct relationship to the amount of services performed by ICVA. Once the CIB commits to pay ICVA a certain amount of money for the year, ICVA's performance (or lack thereof) does not directly affect the amount it receives. No effort is made to allocate to ICVA that portion of the hotel-motel tax which its activities helped to generate. The amount of the payment was not negotiated. The CIB determined what percentage of the hotel-motel tax would be paid to ICVA. Finally, itemized claims for the payments, required by IND. CODE ANN. § 36-10-9-9(d) (West Supp. 1990), were not submitted by ICVA. We do not agree with ICVA that the contractual requirement that ICVA shall report to the CIB semiannually on its promotional activities satisfies the requirements of this statute. ICVA points to Kneeland v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Assoc. (1988), 5th Cir., 850 F.2d 224, in support of its argument that the arrangement between CIB and ICVA did not transform a private corporation into a public entity merely because it received tax dollars. Kneeland involved a suit by various broadcasters and newspapers against the NCAA and the Southwest Athletic Conference to compel disclosure of information relating to alleged misconduct by member institutions. The Fifth Circuit held that neither entity was a governmental entity and, therefore, neither was subject to the Texas Open Records Act. 850 F.2d at 231. Although the entities received public funds, their members received a quid pro quo in sufficiently identifiable and measurable quantities of services for any public fund expenditures. 850 F.2d at 230. The court in Kneeland acknowledged that these cases are fact sensitive and we agree. Here, however, unlike in Kneeland, the CIB was contractually obligated to support ICVA with a fixed percentage of money without regard to ICVA's performance under the contract. The amount of money ICVA received did not depend on the performance of ICVA, but rather depended on the amount of tax collected by the CIB. ICVA warns of far-reaching negative consequences if we allow public access to their business records. ICVA warns that finding it subject to the Public Records Act means that any company which does business with a governmental entity will find its records and meetings open to the public, and that this will impose a detriment on those businesses because its competitors will now have access to private information such as marketing information. We do not agree that such a result is mandated by our decision today. First, a company will not, merely because it does business with a governmental entity, be automatically subject to the Public Records Act. In situations involving a quid pro quo, that is, measured goods or services given in exchange for payment based on identifiable quantities of goods or services, a private entity would not be transformed into a public entity because it would not be maintained and supported by public funds. ICVA asserts that its right to privacy will be violated by our decision because it will be put at a competitive disadvantage (its competitors will have access to its marketing information) and because the public's need to know is minimal. We do not agree with ICVA. The Legislature has, by passing the Public Records Act, indicated that the public is entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and has stated that the act shall be liberally construed to implement this policy. IND. CODE § 5-14-3-1. Nevertheless, the holding today is that only those entities which are maintained and supported by public funds as defined by this opinion will have their records subject to public review. ICVA also argues that our interpretation of the statute renders it void for vagueness because it did not have adequate notice that it was subject to its terms merely by virtue of contracts with the governmental bodies. It claims that the line of demarcation between those entities which are subject to the Public Records Act and those which are not is not sufficiently delineated. We find no evidence in the record to support this claim. ICVA also challenges the conclusion that it provides a benefit to the public. IND. CODE § 5-11-1-16(e) requires that the entity be a provider of goods, services or other benefits. ICVA argues that the inclusion of the word other shows an intention by the Legislature to limit the meaning of the terms goods and services to a type of benefit traditionally provided by government. ICVA claims it is not such a provider of traditional benefits because it is not providing social services such as assistance to the poor or the infirm. We find no cases having previously interpreted this term. We conclude that because ICVA's admitted function was to generate revenue through the hotel-motel tax and to attract conventions to the convention center and the Hoosier Dome, that the public benefit of this activity is obvious. Clearly, ICVA provided services and benefits as contemplated by IND. CODE ANN. § 5-11-1-16(e) (West Supp. 1990).