Opinion ID: 2058657
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Fitness to Plead and Be Sentenced

Text: Defendant advances three arguments related to his fitness in support of his contention that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. First, defendant contends he must be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because he did not receive a fitness hearing before he entered his plea and because the hearing held during the course of his sentencing did not strictly conform with the requirements of section 104-10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (the Code) (725 ILCS 5/104-10 et seq. (West 1998)). He claims entitlement to a fitness hearing based on his assertion that the trial court, on remand, implicitly recogniz[ed] that [defendant] raised a bona fide doubt of his fitness at the time he pled guilty. We find no merit to defendant's claim that a bona fide doubt of his fitness ever existed. Consequently, defendant was not entitled to a fitness hearing. Every defendant is presumed to be fit to stand trial, or to plead, and be sentenced. 725 ILCS 5/104-10 (West 1998). If circumstances suggest that a defendant, because of physical or mental disability, is unable to understand the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him or to assist in his defense, the issue of defendant's fitness may be raised by the defense, the State, or the court. 725 ILCS 5/104-10, 104-11(a) (West 1998). If information made known to the court causes the court to believe that a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness exists, the court must suspend proceedings until the defendant can be examined and his fitness determined. 725 ILCS 5/104-11 (West 1998). Once a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness has been demonstrated, the State has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that defendant is fit before the proceedings may continue. 725 ILCS 5/104-11(c) (West 1998). This statutory scheme, which requires a fitness hearing only when a bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness is demonstrated, has been held constitutionally adequate to protect a defendant's right, guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment (U.S. Const., amend. XIV), to be prosecuted only when fit to stand trial. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 95 S.Ct. 896, 43 L.Ed.2d 103 (1975); People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d 312, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254 (2000). At the time defendant entered his plea of guilty, our legislature afforded a defendant taking psychotropic medication a statutory right to a fitness hearing. See 725 ILCS 5/104-21(a) (West 1994). Defendant never requested a fitness hearing pursuant to this statute because the psychotropic nature of the medication he was taking was not known at the time he entered his plea. The failure to receive a fitness hearing pursuant to section 104-21(a), defendant concedes, does not require automatic reversal. [3] In recognition of People v. Mitchell , defendant also acknowledges that the use of psychotropic medication is not equivalent to a bona fide doubt of his fitness. See People v. Mitchell, 189 Ill.2d 312, 245 Ill.Dec. 1, 727 N.E.2d 254 (2000). He claims, however, that, in this case, his use of psychotropic medication, when considered in conjunction with evidence of his suicide attempt and depression, and the additional evidence presented at the hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, established that at the time he entered his plea there was a bona fide doubt of his fitness which required a fitness hearing. Defendant also claims the presentation of evidence in the course of his sentencing proceedings was not a sufficient substitute for a fitness hearing in strict compliance with article 104 of the Code. In essence, defendant asks us to review the trial court's ruling on his fitness. A circuit court's ruling on the issue of fitness will not be reversed unless it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. People v. Haynes, 174 Ill.2d 204, 226, 220 Ill.Dec. 406, 673 N.E.2d 318 (1996); People v. Mahaffey, 166 Ill.2d 1, 18, 209 Ill.Dec. 607, 651 N.E.2d 1055 (1995). Our review of the record convinces us that defendant has not met this burden. The evidence presented to the trial court established that no bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness existed, with or without medication. The record shows that sometime in late December 1995 or early January 1996 the psychotropic nature of the medicine was discovered and defendant's fitness was placed in issue. At about the same time, section 104-21(a) was amended (see Pub. Act 89-428, § 605, eff. December 13, 1995 (amending 725 ILCS 5/104-21(a))) to state no hearing is required unless the court finds there is a bona fide doubt of the defendant's fitness. [4] Based on the unsettled nature of the law, neither the court nor counsel was certain of the proper procedure to follow. Nevertheless, an inquiry was made into defendant's legal competency while receiving psychotropic medication. Documentary and testamentary evidence was introduced during the course of defendant's sentencing hearing, which provided the court with information concerning defendant's ability to comprehend the nature and purpose of the proceedings against him and his ability to assist in his defense, as well as the impact, if any, that psychotropic medication had on defendant's fitness. Based on the evidence presented, the trial court explicitly ruled there was no bona fide doubt of defendant's fitness and that defendant had been fit at the time he entered his plea and throughout the sentencing proceedings. Defendant's ingestion of Sinequan, the trial court held, could not have impaired defendant's fitness to plead or be sentenced. On remand, the trial court reviewed its earlier proceedings and found that the post-plea inquiry into the matter of defendant's fitness, which was undertaken in the course of defendant's sentencing, had been sufficient to establish defendant's fitness with medication, in accord with our Burgess line of cases. See People v. Burgess, 176 Ill.2d 289, 223 Ill.Dec. 624, 680 N.E.2d 357 (1997); People v. Neal, 179 Ill.2d 541, 228 Ill.Dec. 619, 689 N.E.2d 1040 (1997); People v. Kinkead, 182 Ill.2d 316, 231 Ill. Dec. 136, 695 N.E.2d 1255 (1998). The trial court was unpersuaded by the additional evidence presented at the remand hearing and declined the invitation to depart from its earlier ruling that defendant had been fit. Contrary to defendant's assertions, the trial court's rulings are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence presented during the sentencing proceedings showed that defendant began receiving medication for his depression on July 25, 1995. The medication, along with the introduction of books on tape and other diversions, relieved some of the boredom defendant was feeling due to his blindness and improved defendant's mental health. Defendant was not considered a suicide risk at the detention facility. He attended Bible study sessions, wrote rap songs, and enjoyed witnessing his faith to fellow inmates. Furthermore, the medication he was taking actually appeared to improve defendant's clarity of thought. Testing showed that defendant's recall and memory were intact while taking medication. His attorney repeatedly acknowledged defendant's ability to understand, as well as his cooperation with his defense. Admittedly, defendant did not receive a fitness hearing in strict compliance with article 104 of the Code. However, the need for a fitness hearing is triggered by evidence which creates a bona fide doubt of a defendant's fitness. In the case at bar, the issue of defendant's fitness never was raised until it was learned that he was taking psychotropic medication. Once this became known, the court ascertained that defendant's use of this medication had no effect on his ability to plead or be sentenced. The evidence clearly supports that finding. The procedures followed by the trial court in this case were adequate to protect defendant's due process right to be tried only when fit. There is no basis shown for granting defendant relief from his guilty plea. We further determine that the additional evidence presented on remand was insufficient to overcome the presumption of fitness which had already been established. Defendant's testimony that his memory was clogged while on medication was belied by the copious evidence presented during his sentencing hearing which indicated that defendant's ability to recall was unaffected by the relatively small dosage of Sinequan he was taking. Also, the testimony of Dr. Lee, who never examined defendant or reviewed his medical records, does little to negate the clear and convincing testimony of Drs. Damera and Traugott, that defendant's ability to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense was unaffected by his ingestion of the Sinequan. In a related argument, defendant contends his counsel was ineffective because she did not insist that the trial court hold a fitness hearing and, instead, facilitated the court's finding of fitness by presenting the testimony of two psychiatrists who attested to defendant's fitness. To prevail on an ineffective-assistance claim, a defendant must show both deficient performance by his attorney and prejudice resulting from the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); People v. Albanese, 104 Ill.2d 504, 524-25, 85 Ill.Dec. 441, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (1984). In the case at bar, there are no grounds for finding defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel. The argument defendant presents here is similar to one advanced in People v. Burton, 184 Ill.2d 1, 234 Ill.Dec. 437, 703 N.E.2d 49 (1998). In Burton, defendant claimed he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his defense attorney stipulated to the testimony of two psychiatrists at a fitness hearing before the defendant entered his plea. We found trial counsel's performance was not per se deficient and that defendant had not shown any prejudice stemming from his counsel's conduct. Burton, 184 Ill.2d at 17, 234 Ill.Dec. 437, 703 N.E.2d 49. Here, as in Burton, defendant does not argue that he was prejudiced by his attorney's conduct, nor is he able to point to any information or argument that might have been offered to support a finding of unfitness. Without a showing of prejudice, the claim of ineffectiveness must fail. In another related claim, defendant argues that he should be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because his plea was not voluntary. He claims the decision to plead guilty was a product of his depression and the medication he was taking. Defendant cites one case in support of this claim, People v. Lego, 168 Ill.2d 561, 214 Ill.Dec. 264, 660 N.E.2d 971 (1995), which is distinguishable. In Lego, defendant waived his right to counsel and represented himself at trial. It became apparent at trial that defendant was ill-equipped to represent himself and it was later learned that two psychiatrists diagnosed defendant as suffering from a mixed organic disorder which included organic affective syndrome, organic brain syndrome, dementia and personality disorder. Defendant's mental deficiencies caused him to have a lack of judgment, inability to comprehend legal principles, and failure of memory. In light of defendant's deficiencies, it was determined that his waiver of representation could not have been knowingly or intelligently made. Lego, 168 Ill.2d at 576-77, 214 Ill.Dec. 264, 660 N.E.2d 971. Conversely, in the present case, all of the psychiatric evidence indicated that defendant, though he suffered from depression, was able to comprehend the consequences of his decision to plead guilty. Furthermore, additional evidence showed that defendant made a conscious choice to plead guilty, knowing that he would be eligible for the death penalty. Defendant told Dr. House he preferred the death penalty because he feared that, if he remained in jail, he would be victimized due to his blindness. The fact that defendant would no longer choose to plead guilty does not compel us to find his earlier decision to plead guilty was not voluntarily made.