Opinion ID: 105004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: courts-martial. .....

Text: C. JURISDICTION. ..... ART. 15. NOT EXCLUSIVE.The provisions of these articles conferring jurisdiction upon courts-martial shall not be construed as depriving military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction in respect of offenders or offenses that by the law of war may be lawfully triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. 39 Stat. 651, 652, 653. [17] Article 15 thus forestalled precisely the contention now being made by petitioner. That contention is that certain provisions, added in 1916 by Articles 2 and 12 extending the jurisdiction of courts-martial over civilian offenders and over certain nonmilitary offenses, automatically deprived military commissions and other military tribunals of whatever existing jurisdiction they then had over such offenders and offenses. Articles 2 and 12, together, extended the jurisdiction of courts-martial so as to include all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . . [18] The 1916 Act also increased the nonmilitary offenses for which civilian offenders could be tried by courts-martial. [19] Article 15, however, completely disposes of that contention. It states unequivocally that Congress has not deprived such commissions or tribunals of the existing jurisdiction which they had over such offenders and offenses as of August 29, 1916. 39 Stat. 653, 670. See In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, and Ex parte Quirin, 317 U. S. 1. The legislative history strengthens the Government's position. During the consideration by Congress of the proposed Articles of War, in 1916, Judge Advocate General of the Army Crowder sponsored Article 15 and the authoritative nature of his testimony has been recognized by this Court. In re Yamashita, supra, at 19 note, 67-71. Before the Senate Subcommittee on Military Affairs he said: Article 15 is new. We have included in article 2 as subject to military law a number of persons who are also subject to trial by military commission. A military commission is our common-law war court. It has no statutory existence, though it is recognized by statute law. As long as the articles embraced them in the designation `persons subject to military law,' and provided that they might be tried by court-martial, I was afraid that, having made a special provision for their trial by court-martial, it might be held that the provision operated to exclude trials by military commission and other war courts; so this new article was introduced: . . . . It just saves to these war courts the jurisdiction they now have and makes it a concurrent jurisdiction with courts-martial, so that the military commander in the field in time of war will be at liberty to employ either form of court that happens to be convenient. S. Rep. No. 130, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 40. [20] The concurrent jurisdiction thus preserved is that which by statute or by the law of war may be triable by such military commissions, provost courts, or other military tribunals. (Emphasis supplied.) 39 Stat. 653, 41 Stat. 790, 10 U. S. C. § 1486. The law of war in that connection includes at least that part of the law of nations which defines the powers and duties of belligerent powers occupying enemy territory pending the establishment of civil government. [21] The jurisdiction exercised by our military commissions in the examples previously mentioned extended to nonmilitary crimes, such as murder and other crimes of violence, which the United States as the occupying power felt it necessary to suppress. In the case of In re Yamashita, 327 U. S. 1, 20, following a quotation from Article 15, this Court said, By thus recognizing military commissions in order to preserve their traditional jurisdiction over enemy combatants unimpaired by the Articles, Congress gave sanction, as we held in Ex parte Quirin, to any use of the military commission contemplated by the common law of war. [22] The enlarged jurisdiction of the courts-martial therefore did not exclude the concurrent jurisdiction of military commissions and of tribunals in the nature of such commissions. III. The United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany were, at the time of the trial of petitioner's case, tribunals in the nature of military commissions conforming to the Constitution and laws of the United States. Under the authority of the President as Commander-in-Chief of the United States Armed Forces occupying a certain area of Germany conquered by the allies, the system of occupation courts now before us developed gradually. The occupation courts in Germany are designed especially to meet the needs of law enforcement in that occupied territory in relation to civilians and to nonmilitary offenses. Those courts have been directed to apply the German Criminal Code largely as it was theretofore in force. (See Appendix, infra, pp. 362-371, entitled Chronology of Establishment of United States Military Government Courts and Their Jurisdiction Over Civilians in the United States Area of Control in Germany 1945-1950.) The President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, in 1945 established, through the Commanding General of the United States Forces in the European Theater, a United States Military Government for Germany within the United States Area of Control. Military Government Courts, in the nature of military commissions, were then a part of the Military Government. By October 20, 1949, when petitioner was alleged to have committed the offense charged against her, those courts were known as United States Military Government Courts. They were vested with jurisdiction to enforce the German Criminal Code in relation to civilians in petitioner's status in the area where the homicide occurred. September 21, 1949, the occupation statute had taken effect. Under it the President vested the authority of the United States Military Government in a civilian acting as the United States High Commissioner for Germany. He gave that Commissioner authority, under the immediate supervision of the Secretary of State (subject, however, to consultation with and ultimate direction by the President), to exercise all of the governmental functions of the United States in Germany (other than the command of troops) . . . . Executive Order 10062, June 6, 1949, 14 Fed. Reg. 2965, Appendix, infra, p. 367; Office of the United States High Commissioner for Germany, Staff Announcement No. 1, September 21, 1949, Appendix, infra, p. 368. Under the Transitional Provisions of Allied High Commission, Law No. 3, Article 5, 14 Fed. Reg. 7458, Appendix, infra, p. 369, preexisting legislation was applied to the appropriate new authorities. Finally by Allied High Commission, Law No. 1, Article 1, 15 Fed. Reg. 2086, Appendix, infra, p. 370, effective January 1, 1950, the name of the United States Military Government Courts for Germany was changed to United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany. They derived their authority from the President as occupation courts, or tribunals in the nature of military commissions, in areas still occupied by United States troops. Although the local government was no longer a Military Government, it was a government prescribed by an occupying power and it depended upon the continuing military occupancy of the territory. The government of the occupied area thus passed merely from the control of the United States Department of Defense to that of the United States Department of State. The military functions continued to be important and were administered under the direction of the Commander of the United States Armed Forces in Germany. He remained under orders to take the necessary measures, on request of the United States High Commissioner, for the maintenance of law and order and to take such other action as might be required to support the policy of the United States in Germany. Executive Order 10062, supra. The judges who served on the occupation courts were civilians, appointed by the United States Military Governor for Germany, and thereafter continued in office or appointed by the United States High Commissioner for Germany. Their constitutional authority continued to stem from the President. The members of the trial court were designated by the Chief Presiding District Judge as a panel to try the case. The volume of business, the size of the area, the number of civilians affected, the duration of the occupation and the need for establishing confidence in civilian procedure emphasized the propriety of tribunals of a nonmilitary character. [23] With this purpose, the Military Government Courts for Germany, substantially from their establishment, have had a less military character than that of courts-martial. [24] In 1948, provision was made for the appointment of civilian judges with substantial legal experience. The rights of individuals were safeguarded by a code of criminal procedure dealing with warrants, summons, preliminary hearings, trials, evidence, witnesses, findings, sentences, contempt, review of cases and appeals. [25] This subjected German and United States civilians to the same procedures and exhibited confidence in the fairness of those procedures. [26] It is suggested that, because the occupation statute took effect September 21, 1949, whereas the crime charged occurred October 20, 1949, the constitutional authority for petitioner's trial by military commission expired before the crime took place. Such is not the case. The authority for such commissions does not necessarily expire upon cessation of hostilities or even, for all purposes, with a treaty of peace. It may continue long enough to permit the occupying power to discharge its responsibilities fully. Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U. S. 260; Neely v. Henkel, 180 U. S. 109, 124; Burke v. Miltenberger, 19 Wall. 519; Leitensdorfer v. Webb, 20 How. 176; Cross v. Harrison, 16 How. 164. [27] IV. Petitioner and the offense charged against her came within the jurisdiction assigned to the court which tried her. Under United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31, August 18, 1948, Article 7, 14 Fed. Reg. 126, Appendix, infra, p. 365, the United States gave its Military Government District Courts criminal jurisdiction over all persons in the United States Area of Control except persons, other than civilians, who are subject to military, naval or air force law and are serving with any forces of the United Nations. It thus excepted from the jurisdiction of those occupation courts military men and women who were subject to military law but expressly gave those courts jurisdiction over civilian men and women who were subject to military law. Article of War 2 (d) further defined any person subject to military law as including all persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States . . . . [28] This included petitioner. Article 7 of United States Military Government Ordinance No. 31 further provided, however, that No person subject to military law of the United States shall be brought to trial for any offense except upon authorization of the Commander-in-Chief, European Command. 14 Fed. Reg. 126, Appendix, infra, p. 365. That authorization appears in the official correspondence relating to the case of Wilma B. Ybarbo. The correspondence includes a written endorsement from the proper authority, dated December 11, 1948, covering not only the Ybarbo case but also the case of any dependent of a member of the United States Armed Forces . . . . See Appendix, infra, p. 367. The applicability of the German Criminal Code to petitioner's offense springs from its express adoption by the United States Military Government. The United States Commanding General, in his Proclamation No. 2, September 19, 1945, stated that, except as abrogated, suspended or modified by the Military Government or by the Control Council for Germany, the German law in force at the time of the occupation shall be applicable in each area of the United States Zone of Occupation . . . . 12 Fed. Reg. 6997, Appendix, infra, p. 363. [29] Section 211 of the German Criminal Code accordingly was applicable to petitioner on October 20, 1949. The United States also expressly required that its civilians be tried by its occupation courts rather than by the German courts. United States Military Government Law No. 2, German courts, Art. VI (i) (c) and (d), 12 Fed. Reg. 2191, 2192, Appendix, infra, p. 364. United States Military Government Ordinance No. 2, Art. II (2) (iii), 12 Fed. Reg. 2190-2191, Appendix, infra, p. 363. The jurisdiction of the United States Courts of the Allied High Commission for Germany to try petitioner being established, the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the discharge of the writ of habeas corpus for petitioner's release from custody is Affirmed.