Opinion ID: 2823792
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Dismissal of Ms. D.

Text: Â¶15Â Â Â Â Â Â Without asking the prosecutor to explain striking Ms. D., the trial court dismissed her because Rodriguez did not demonstrate a pattern of racially motivated strikes. The trial court was correct that a pattern of strikes is relevant to the existence of a prima facie case, but it erred by finding the absence of a pattern dispositive at step one. 5 See Snyder, 552 U.S. at 478; Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902. Any evidence that supports an inference of discrimination can form the basis for a prima facie case under Batson, and the court should consider all relevant circumstances. Valdez, 966 P.2d at 589â90. In this case, the prosecutor used his first peremptory challenge to excuse Ms. D., so there was no way Rodriguez could use a pattern of racially motivated strikes to raise an inference of discrimination. Â¶16Â Â Â Â Â Â Nevertheless, âjust as âoneâ is not a magic number which establishes the absence of discrimination,â the fact that the prosecutor struck a minority veniremember âdoes not, in itself, raise an inference of discrimination.â Vasquez-Lopez, 22 F.3d at 902. Here, Rodriguez argued only that the prosecutor struck a member of a cognizable racial group who, he contended, was a suitable juror. Then, instead of offering a race-neutral explanation for excusing her, the prosecutor argued that a successful Batson objectionÂ requires a pattern. The court agreed and ended its inquiry. From this record, it is impossible to conclude whether Rodriguez satisfied his burden at step one. Further factual findings are necessary to decide whether Rodriguez presented enough evidence to raise an inference that the prosecutor struck Ms. D. because of her race and require the trial court to proceed to step two of the Batson analysis. 6