Opinion ID: 178775
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exclusion of 404(b) Evidence

Text: Next, Wright argues that the district court erred in precluding evidence that Wright's roommate, Shawn Dittfurth, had motive, opportunity, knowledge, and the ability to obtain, view, and possess child pornography. Wright wanted to introduce evidence showing that Dittfurth had a sexual attraction to minor boys and was proficient with computers. Wright claims that the district court precluded this prior act evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) because Dittfurth did not testify. The government raises two arguments in response. First, the government claims that Wright never actually offered any such evidence and therefore the district court did not preclude it. Second, the government argues that, assuming the district court did exclude the evidence, it was proper to do so, though on alternative grounds. On January 27, 2006, Wright filed a Notice of Intent To Present Other Act Evidence under Rule 404(b). Wright sought to introduce four different pieces of evidence with respect to prior acts of his roommate, Dittfurth. First, Wright intended to introduce records from Mount Saint Mary College in Newburgh, New York, showing Dittfurth received a computer competency waiver from Saint Mary's, as well as an A in Computer Literacy. Wright's theory for admission was that Dittfurth's computer competency would show Dittfurth had the knowledge necessary to commit the charges. He intended to call a custodian of records from Saint Mary's to testify. Second, Wright intended to introduce, through Wright's testimony at trial, that Dittfurth lived with Wright during the relevant time period and that Dittfurth was often alone in the apartment, where he had access to Wright's desktop computer. According to Wright, such testimony would show that Dittfurth had the opportunity to commit the alleged offenses. Third, also through Wright's testimony, Wright intended to introduce evidence that after Wright's apartment was searched on February 13, 2003, Dittfurth encouraged Wright to sign over to Dittfurth power of attorney to Wright's property and businesses, and suggested that Wright flee the country before charges were filed against him. Wright theorized that this evidence would show Dittfurth had the motive, intent, plan, and preparation to commit the offenses. Finally, Wright would testify that Dittfurth visited the site gay.com, where his online identity was Presumed Innocent. Wright argued that this evidence would show Dittfurth's identity and knowledge and that Dittfurth's on-line identity is ironic in light of this case. Argument on Wright's motion took place nearly a year later, on January 22, 2007. Wright's counsel indicated that the government agreed to allow Wright to testify that Dittfurth lived with Wright during the relevant time period. However, the government contested the other three pieces of evidence, which defense counsel proceeded to address in her argument to the district court. As to each piece of evidence Wright sought to introduce, the district court asked defense counsel how the evidence was relevant should Dittfurth not testify at trial. See District Ct. Docket No. 374: Transcript of Motion Hearing dated Jan. 22, 2007 at 14 (concerning Dittfurth's computer literacy); id. at 17 (power of attorney); id. at 19 (Presumed Innocent screen name). Likewise, the government assumed that the only way in which any of the evidence could be introduced was if Dittfurth testified. At the close of argument, the district court indicated that it agreed that evidence about Dittfurth's computer knowledge and the statements Dittfurth allegedly made requesting Wright give Dittfurth power of attorney were both relevant; not so with respect to the Presumed Innocent screen name. The minute entry from the January 22 hearing contains the following entry: Further 404B on Shawn Dittfurth; if he testifies, the Court finds evidence regarding testing out of computer class, and his statement to have defendant Wright turn over power of attorney to property in Mexico relevant; his use of on-line screen name of `presumed innocent' is not relevant. Appellant's Excerpts of Record (ER) at 35 (emphasis added). In later hearings with the court, defense counsel also discussed the possibility of calling Dittfurth's co-worker, Holly White, to testify to his credibility (since law enforcement interviewed him when they searched Wright's apartment) and to establish Dittfurth's interest in teenage boys. White would testify that when she worked at a skate shop with Dittfurth, he made passes at boys around the ages of 12-15. Defense counsel also discussed calling Nick Shorb, a 12-13 year old boy who worked with Dittfurth at the skate shop who would testify that Dittfurth made passes at him and showed him pornography. Both White and Shorb later appeared on Wright's list of witnesses for trial. There was no further discussion of whether the 404(b) evidence would be coming in until the first day of trial on January 17, 2008. During her opening statement, defense counsel discussed Dittfurth at some length, including references to his knowledge of computers from his days at Saint Mary's College, and that he encouraged Wright to go to Mexico following execution of the search warrant. After the court recessed the jury for the day, the government objected to defense counsel referring to individuals who would be testifying about Dittfurth, arguing that none of that evidence should come in unless Dittfurth testified. The government pointed out that neither it nor the defense would be calling Dittfurth to testify. The district court initially expressed its skepticism as to whether the evidence could be admitted absent Dittfurth testifying. However, the court never explicitly precluded such evidence. Rather, the district court left it to defense counsel to provide the court with a legal basis for introducing the evidence. Indeed, the district court judge stated numerous times that he was not sure if the evidence could come in without Dittfurth's testifying, but that it was up to defense counsel to convince him otherwise. See ER at 52 (responding to the prosecutor's statement that the evidence was not relevant without Dittfurth testifying, saying: I haven't crossed that road yet, either, so I'm sure Ms. Williams is going to provide some sort of legal basis to allow that to come in without Mr. Dittfurth.); id. (I'm having trouble seeing that, I don't see how they're relevant without [Dittfurth], but I'm sure Ms. Williams will show me some book if it says they are.); id. at 53 (I'll still [sic] having trouble seeing how they come in without having Mr. Dittfurth called as a witness in some fashion. Not in some fashion, being called as a witness. I don't know see how I can cross that bridge, Ms. Williams, but we'll see.). The court then recessed for the day. The trial continued the following day. At the conclusion of the day's proceedings, after the court recessed the jury, defense counsel apologize[d] to the Court. She told the court that she went back and checked the minute entry from the earlier January 22 hearing and realized that [t]he Court had permitted me to get into the St. Mary's records as well as the power of attorney and going to Mexico if Mr. Dittfurth testified, and, as I explained yesterday, I was under the impression until yesterday morning that Mr. Dittfurth was going to testify. [11] Defense counsel also told the court that she realized that she would also be precluded from calling Holly White and requested that White be released from her subpoena. The district court then asked defense counsel to clarify whether she intended to call White, to which she responded, Absolutely not, Judge. The issue lies in our review of the record. On one hand, it seems as though the district court never actually precluded 404(b) evidence related to Dittfurth. Rather, the district court expressed some skepticism as to whether the evidence could come in, but left it to defense counsel to provide the court with legal authority to do so. At the end of the first day of trial, the parties informed the court that Dittfurth was not being called to testify, and the court invited defense counsel to provide a basis for introducing the evidence. However, defense counsel never accepted the district court's offer. Instead, rather than realizing that the district court was open to the possibility of allowing the evidence as long as it had some legal basis to do so, counsel withdrew her motion. Defense counsel therefore neglected to argue to the district court that Dittfurth's presence at trial was not a prerequisite to introducing the evidencethe argument Wright advances to us on appeal. Thus, the evidence was not introduced solely because defense counsel failed to provide the court with a reason for allowing it, not because the district court excluded it. Alternatively, it may be said that the district court ruled that the evidence was not admissible unless Dittfurth testified. One interpretation of the record is that the district court told defense counsel that it was not going to allow the evidence to come in since Dittfurth was not testifyingunless defense counsel could prove to the district court that such a ruling was erroneous. The best support for this view is the district court's January 22 minute entry, which again provided: Further 404B on Shawn Dittfurth; if he testifies, the Court finds evidence regarding testing out of computer class, and his statement to have defendant Wright turn over power of attorney to property in Mexico relevant. Thus, the district court conditioned the evidence's admissibility on Dittfurth testifying. Although it had been decided by that point that Dittfurth was not going to testify, defense counsel indicated in her opening statement that she intended to introduce the evidence. The government then objected to its introduction at the conclusion of the first day of trial, and the district court agreed that defense counsel would not be permitted to introduce the evidence absent Dittfurth testifying. The issue is confounded by the fact that some of our prior cases suggest that a lawyer's failure to state the grounds for the admissibility of evidence, and the district court's subsequent failure to rule based on those grounds, precludes us from considering the issue. See United States v. Tafollo-Cardenas, 897 F.2d 976, 980 (9th Cir.1990) (declining to consider whether defendant's statements were admissible under the general hearsay exception where the prosecutor did not raise the exception until introducing its amended jury instructions and the district court made no finding on its applicability). Other case law suggests that [a]bsent a ... definitive ruling by the district court that the evidence is admissible, a party does not preserve the issue of admissibility for appeal absent a contemporaneous objection, such that this court's review is only to prevent a manifest injustice. United States v. Archdale, 229 F.3d 861, 864-65 (9th Cir. 2000). We need not resolve whether the district court actually precluded the 404(b) evidence. Under any reading of the record, Wright never argued that the testimony should come in regardless of whether Dittfurth testifiedthe issue now presented on appeal. Thus, our review is for plain error. See United States v. Chang, 207 F.3d 1169, 1176 (9th Cir.2000) (reviewing for plain error where the theory of admissibility was not apparent from the context of [the defendant's] testimony); United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir.1980) (The presentation of additional evidentiary theories on appeal is inconsistent `with the salutary purpose of the timeliness requirement to allow the trial judge to make an informed ruling based on the issues as framed by the parties before the evidence is ... excluded.' (ellipsis in original) (quoting United States v. Lara-Hernandez, 588 F.2d 272, 274 (9th Cir.1978))). The exclusion of the Dittfurth-related 404(b) evidence in this case did not amount to plain error. For there to be plain error, Wright must demonstrate that: (1) there is an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute; (3) the error affected the appellant's substantial rights, which in the ordinary case means it affected the outcome of the district court proceedings; and (4) the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Marcus, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2159, 2164, 176 L.Ed.2d 1012 (2010) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). First, assuming without deciding that the district court actually precluded the introduction of the 404(b) evidence because Dittfurth did not testify, it was error to do so. The government concedes that Rule 404(b) applies to nonwitnesses, under our decision in United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir.1991). See also United States v. Cruz-Garcia, 344 F.3d 951, 955 n. 3 (9th Cir.2003). However, it argues that the district court should be affirmed on other groundsnamely that the proffered evidence was forbidden propensity evidence. The only case the government cites for its propensity argument is a Nebraska Court of Appeals case agreeing with McCourt that 404(b) permits introduction by the accused of a third-party's prior acts, but holding that there the evidence was properly excluded based on propensity grounds. See State v. Gardner, 1 Neb.App. 450, 498 N.W.2d 605, 609-10 (1993). In Gardner, the defendant was convicted of sexual assault of a child and sought to introduce evidence that since the victim's father had molested a child once before, he was the guilty party. Id. at 610. This is classic propensity evidence. By contrast, Wright was not seeking to introduce evidence that Dittfurth had committed prior acts involving child pornography images. Rather, Wright wanted to establish that Dittfurth had the kind of computer knowledge necessary to obtain child pornography (through introduction of the Saint Mary's college records), that Dittfurth knew that Wright's computer contained illegal imagesan element of Counts 2 and 3(through testimony that following the FBI's search Dittfurth encouraged Wright to sign over power of attorney to Dittfurth and told Wright to flee the country), and that Dittfurth had the intent to commit the crimes alleged (through testimony that he was sexually interested in underage boys). Cf. United States v. Kapordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1313 (11th Cir.2009) (Evidence that Defendant traveled abroad in order to engage in sexual trysts with underage boys in Prague was, thus, admissible under 404(b) as `proof of ... knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident' and intent with regard to his travel with his cousin and his former patient during which sexually explicit images of the boys were created and with regard to his collection of pornographic images of children. (ellipsis in original)); United States v. Sebolt, 460 F.3d 910, 917 (7th Cir.2006) (Prior instances of sexual misconduct with a child victim may establish a defendant's sexual interest in children and thereby serve as evidence of the defendant's motive to commit a charged offense involving the sexual exploitation of children.). Moreover, the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers similar acts evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as when a prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword. United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911 (2d Cir.1984) (discussed with approval in McCourt, 925 F.2d at 1234, explaining that  Aboumoussallem is exemplary of a number of cases in which courts have admitted similar acts evidence for defense purposes). [12] However, though we find error, we are not convinced that any such error prejudiced Wright under the plain error standard. Wright's principal defense was that Dittfurth was responsible for possession of the child pornography images. Practically all of the defense's case was directed at explaining ways in which Dittfurth could have been the responsible party. For example, the defense argued that Wright's desktop computer and the laptop computer Wright purchased for Dittfurth to use were networked; that there was an icon on Wright's desktop for a program called pcAnywhere, which allows one computer to access another; that one of the files charged in Count 3 was modified while Wright was at a business trade show (inferring it had to be Dittfurth who viewed the image); that Dittfurth was often alone in the apartment; and that the seven CDs containing child pornography found in Wright's briefcase were placed there by Dittfurth. Wright's 404(b) evidence would have shown that Dittfurth was computer proficient, had a history of making passes at adolescent boys, and told Wright to flee to Mexico following the search (which Wright argued indicated that Dittfurth knew there was contraband on the computer). Thus, even without the 404(b) evidence, the defense presented the jury with a significant amount of evidence that Dittfurth was the culpable party. Indeed, it seems like the jury shifted at least some of the blame to Dittfurth because it acquitted Wright of the possession charges with respect to the CDs. Of the additional testimony Wright did not present, only the evidence concerning Dittfurth's penchant for adolescent boys had even the potential to affect the jury's verdict; the jury knew that Wright ran several online business, and therefore had significant computer knowledge himself, and that Dittfurth told Wright to flee to Mexico is weak evidence of Dittfurth's knowledge of contraband. Considering all the evidence the jury knew about Wright and Dittfurth, excluding this additional testimony did not amount to plain error. See United States v. Vallejo, 237 F.3d 1008, 1023-24 (9th Cir.2001) (finding exclusion of third-party culpability evidence not harmless where defendant was not permitted to provide an answer to the question of who committed the crime, if not the defendant); United States v. Crosby, 75 F.3d 1343, 1347 (9th Cir.1996) (same). Wright put on the Dittfurth did it defense. He presented the jury with myriad ways in which Dittfurth could have been responsible for the offense. Any additional evidence concerning Dittfurth would have been merely cumulative.