Opinion ID: 1113193
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 38

Heading: 1978 law sentencing scheme.

Text: Defendant argues that the sentencing scheme under California's 1978 death penalty law is constitutionally flawed in numerous ways. We have routinely rejected identical claims. Thus, neither the 1978 law nor the instructions given in this case are defective for failing to make express distinctions between aggravating and mitigating circumstances. (See People v. Cox (1991) 53 Cal.3d 618, 674-675 [280 Cal. Rptr. 692, 809 P.2d 351].) There is no constitutional requirement of findings, let alone unanimous or written findings, that every aggravating factor weighed by the jury was true beyond a reasonable doubt, that specific aggravating factors were dispositive, that aggravation outweighed mitigation beyond a reasonable doubt, or that death is the appropriate penalty beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Id., at p. 692, and cases there cited.) It is permissible to allow consideration of age-related circumstances as sentencing factors ( People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d 259, 301-302), introduce unadjudicated prior crimes at the penalty trial ( People v. Balderas, supra, 41 Cal.3d 144, 204-205), and present the circumstances of prior violent criminal incidents which resulted in guilty pleas ( People v. Melton, supra, 44 Cal.3d 713, 755-756). A jury told it may sympathetically consider all mitigating evidence need not also be expressly instructed that it may exercise mercy. ( People v. Caro, supra, 46 Cal.3d 1035, 1067, cert. den. (1989) 490 U.S. 1040 [104 L.Ed.2d 414, 109 S.Ct. 1944].) The same underlying felony may be used to establish first degree murder, death eligibility, and aggravation warranting the death penalty. ( Lowenfield v. Phelps (1988) 484 U.S. 231, 241-246 [98 L.Ed.2d 568, 579-583, 108 S.Ct. 546]; People v. Marshall (1990) 50 Cal.3d 907, 945-946 [269 Cal. Rptr. 269, 790 P.2d 676].) The 1978 death penalty law does not deny equal protection insofar as it deprives capital defendants of the benefits of the Determinate Sentencing Act. ( People v. Williams (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1268, 1330 [248 Cal. Rptr. 834, 756 P.2d 221]; People v. Allen (1986) 42 Cal.3d 1222, 1286-1288 [232 Cal. Rptr. 849, 729 P.2d 115].)