Opinion ID: 612876
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Miami Tribe's Jurisdiction Over the Reserve

Text: The tribe's jurisdiction over the Reserve is a key threshold issue. The ILCA policy encouraging land consolidation between Indians and Indian tribes applies only to land the tribe has jurisdiction over. See 25 U.S.C. § 2216(a)(2) (encouraging consolidation of land ownership between Indians and the tribal government that exercises jurisdiction over the land ) (emphasis added). If the Miami Tribe exercises jurisdiction over the Reserve, the ILCA's policy would apply and substantially change the calculus of the BIA's decision. The tribe argues it has jurisdiction over the Reserve and the congressional directive to facilitate consolidation applies to Smith's gift to the tribe. The BIA did not apply this policy preference at first because it contends the tribe does not exercise jurisdiction over the Reserve. But, in the 2005 Order, the district court concluded the tribe had jurisdiction and therefore the policy preference in § 2216(a) served as the backdrop to the BIA's decision on remand. In our review of the BIA's decision, we consider the tribe's jurisdiction over the Reserve, first, to determine whether the BIA should have started with this policy preference or simply a clean slate with nothing tilting the decision either way. After a careful review of the history, applicable law, and our previous cases reviewing the tribe's connection to the Reserve, we can safely conclude the tribe does not have jurisdiction over the Reserve and therefore does not exercise jurisdiction for the purposes of § 2216(a). Congress passed the ILCA to address the problem of increasingly fractionated interests of Indian lands as well as to govern land conveyances between Indians and their tribes. In the ILCA, Congress stated It is the policy of the United States to encourage and assist the consolidation of land ownership through transactions  (1) involving individual Indians; (2) between Indians and the tribal government that exercises jurisdiction over the land; or (3) between individuals who own an interest in trust and restricted land who wish to convey that interest to an Indian or the tribal government that exercises jurisdiction over the parcel of land involved.... 25 U.S.C. § 2216(a) (emphasis added). To remedy the fractionation problem, the federal government favors consolidation of lands between Indians and tribes, but only regarding land where a tribe exercises jurisdiction. The ILCA does not define when a tribe exercises jurisdiction over the land. The district court found the tribe exercised jurisdiction over the Reserve for the purposes of the ILCA and therefore the policy encouraging land consolidation applied to Smith's gift. But the BIA argues we previously resolved the issue in Kansas v. United States, 249 F.3d 1213 (10th Cir. 2001) ( Miami IV ), finding the tribe lacked jurisdiction over the Reserve. In Miami IV, Kansas sought injunctive relief from a National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) determination that the Reserve's 35-acre parcel constituted Indian lands under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA). 249 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir.2001); see 25 U.S.C. § 2703(4) (defining Indian lands as all lands within an Indian reservation or restricted fee land held by a tribe or Indian over which an Indian tribe exercises governmental power). The district court concluded the NIGC's decision ignored the threshold question of whether the tribe exercised jurisdiction over the Reserve and granted a preliminary injunction against all gaming related activities on the Reserve. On appeal, we determined the NIGC put the cart before the horse when it decided Miami Tribe exercised governmental power over the Reserve without, first, determining whether the tribe had jurisdiction over the Reserve. Miami IV, 249 F.3d at 1229. We reasoned before a sovereign may exercise governmental power over land, the sovereign, in its sovereign capacity, must have jurisdiction over that land. Id. Any analysis of Indian lands under the IGRA must begin with the threshold question of the Tribe's jurisdiction,... [which] focuses principally on congressional intent and purpose, rather than recent unilateral actions of the Miami Tribe. Id. The tribe could not exercise governmental power over the Reserve without first having jurisdiction over the Reserve. Considering the jurisdiction issue, we found the most probative evidence of congressional intent and purpose ... is the language of the legislation and treaties regarding Miami Tribe and the Reserve. Id. The district court in Miami IV had already thoroughly analyzed the question of the tribe's jurisdiction over the Reserve and concluded that no lawful basis existed to suggest the Tribe presently had jurisdiction over the tract. Id. at 1230 (citing Miami Tribe of Okla. v. United States, 927 F.Supp. 1419, 1424-27 (D.Kan.1996) ( Miami I )). We agreed, finding Congress years ago ` unambiguously intended to abrogate the Tribe's authority of its lands in Kansas and move the Tribe to new lands in Oklahoma.' Id. (quoting Miami I, 927 F.Supp. at 1426). Among other events, in 1873, the tribe agreed to sell its land in Kansas and Congress expressly abrogated the tribe's jurisdiction over those Kansas lands. The tribe did not appeal the district court's findings regarding jurisdiction over the Reserve, and in Miami IV we found those conclusions to be res judicata. Rather than challenge the district court's conclusions, Miami Tribe also asserted its recent activities on the Reserve supported its claim for jurisdiction. We rejected this argument, finding that the tribe's recent connections to the Reserve (by adopting landowners as tribal members) did nothing to alter the fact that Congress had abrogated the tribe's jurisdiction over the Reserve long ago. The same analysis is true here. Congress abrogated Miami Tribe's jurisdiction over the Reserve over a century ago. Nothing changes the fact that in 1873, Congress expressly abrogated the Tribe's jurisdiction [over its former lands in Kansas], which was effective no later than 1924 when any members of the Tribe remaining in Kansas  and their heirs  became naturalized citizens. Miami IV, 249 F.3d at 1230 (quoting Kansas ex rel. Graves v. United States, 86 F.Supp.2d 1094, 1096 (D.Kan.2000) ( Miami III )). In addition to this clear abrogation by Congress, the Reserve was originally allotted to Maria Christiana DeRome, who was not a member of the Western Miamis. In fact, Miami Tribe was reimbursed by the United States for the value of the Reserve precisely because the land was erroneously taken from the tribe and allotted to a non-member. To be sure, the tribe is actively connected to the Reserve. For example, it has among other things (1) adopted the Reserve landowners as members of the tribe, (2) received consent from the Reserve landowners to assert tribal jurisdiction pursuant to a lease, and (3) developed the Reserve, including regularly maintaining it and providing security. The tribe contends these actions demonstrate it exercises jurisdiction over the Reserve. But these are the same activities we rejected as a basis for the tribe's claim of jurisdiction over the Reserve in Miami IV. Compare Miami IV, 249 F.3d at 1230-31 with 374 F.Supp.2d at 945. In Miami IV, we examined the tribe's recent activity within the Reserve, including the adoption of landowners as members, but stated None of these recent events, however, alters the conclusion that Congress abrogated the Tribe's jurisdiction over the tract long ago, and has done nothing since to change the status of the tract. An Indian tribe's jurisdiction derives from the will of Congress, not from the consent of fee owners pursuant to a lease under which the lessee acts. Miami IV, 249 F.3d at 1230-31. Similarly, here, Miami Tribe cannot exercise jurisdiction under § 2216(a) without a Congressional grant of jurisdiction over the Reserve. [16] In sum, the tribe lacks jurisdiction over the Reserve as required by the ILCA. Accordingly, the statutory policy in § 2216(a) encouraging consolidation does not apply to Smith's gift. Without that preference weighing in the tribe's favor, the decision to approve Smith's gift rests squarely within the BIA's discretion. [17]