Opinion ID: 1967970
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: duty and proximate cause

Text: While we all agree that the duty question is solely for the court to decide, [4] the specific standard of care is not part of that question. The elements of an action for negligence are (i) duty, (ii) general standard of care, (iii) specific standard of care, (iv) cause in fact, (v) legal or proximate cause, and (vi) damage. Duty comprehends whether the defendant is under any obligation to the plaintiff to avoid negligent conduct; it does not include  where there is an obligation  the nature of the obligation: the general standard of care and the specific standard of care. Dean Prosser observed: It is quite possible, and not at all uncommon, to deal with most of the questions which arise in a negligence case in terms of `duty.' Thus the standard of conduct required of the individual may be expressed by saying that the driver of an automobile approaching an intersection is under a duty to moderate his speed, to keep a proper lookout, or to blow his horn, but that he is not under a duty to take precautions against the unexpected explosion of a manhole cover in the street. But the problems of `duty' are sufficiently complex without subdividing it in this manner to cover an endless series of details of conduct. It is better to reserve `duty' for the problem of the relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the benefit of the other, and to deal with particular conduct in terms of a legal standard of what is required to meet the obligation. In other words, `duty' is a question of whether the defendant is under any obligation for the benefit of the particular plaintiff; and in negligence cases, the duty is always the same, to conform to the legal standard of reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk. What the defendant must do, or must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct required to satisfy the duty.  Prosser, Torts (4th ed), § 53, p 324 (emphasis supplied). The statement in my colleague's opinion that the defendants did not owe plaintiff minor the asserted duty not to manufacture, distribute and sell slingshots combines the separate questions of duty, general and specific standard of care and proximate cause: whether in marketing a product a manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer are under any legal obligation to a bystander (duty); the nature of that obligation (general standard of care: reasonable conduct in the light of the apparent risk); whether marketing slingshots directly to children is reasonable conduct (specific standard of care); whether marketing slingshots directly to children is so significant and important a cause [of loss resulting from such marketing] that the defendant should be legally responsible [5] (proximate cause, a policy question often indistinguishable from the duty question). Combining in one statement these different questions obscures the functions of the court and jury. While the court decides questions of duty, general standard of care and proximate cause, the jury decides whether there is cause in fact and the specific standard of care: [6] whether defendants' conduct in the particular case is below the general standard of care, including  unless the court is of the opinion that all reasonable persons would agree or there is an overriding legislatively or judicially declared public policy  whether in the particular case the risk of harm created by the defendants' conduct is or is not reasonable. Duty is essentially a question of whether the relationship [7] between the actor and the injured person gives rise to any legal obligation on the actor's part for the benefit of the injured person. Proximate cause encompasses a number of distinct problems including the limits of liability for foreseeable consequences. [8] In the Palsgraf [9] case, the New York Court of Appeals, combining the questions of duty and proximate cause, [10] concluded that no duty is owed to an unforeseeable plaintiff. The questions of duty and proximate cause are interrelated because the question whether there is the requisite relationship, giving rise to a duty, and the question whether the cause is so significant and important to be regarded a proximate cause both depend in part on foreseeability  whether it is foreseeable that the actor's conduct may create a risk of harm to the victim, and whether the result of that conduct and intervening causes were foreseeable. It is well established that placing a product on the market creates the requisite relationship between a manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer and persons affected by use of the product giving rise to a legal obligation or duty to the persons so affected. A manufacturer owes the consumer an obligation to avoid negligent conduct. [11] The obligation extends to persons within the foreseeable scope of the risk. In Piercefield v Remington Arms Co, Inc, 375 Mich 85; 133 NW2d 129 (1965), a bystander, injured when his brother's shotgun barrel exploded, was permitted to maintain an action against the manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer of allegedly defective shotgun shells. [12] A manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer of slingshots can be expected to foresee that they will be used to propel pellets and that a person within range may be struck. Moning, as a playmate of a child who purchased a slingshot marketed by the defendants, was within the foreseeable scope of the risk created by their conduct in marketing slingshots directly to children. Moning was a foreseeable plaintiff. The defendant manufacturer, wholesaler and retailer were under an obligation for the safety of Moning. The question of proximate cause, like the question of duty, is essentially a problem of law. [13] Most proximate cause problems are not involved in this case. [14] Alfono's conduct in using the slingshot to propel pellets was to be anticipated. If the intervening cause is one which in ordinary human experience is reasonably to be anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the particular circumstances, he may be negligent, among other reasons, because he has failed to guard against it; or he may be negligent only for that reason. Prosser, supra, § 44, p 272. By marketing slingshots directly to children, the defendants effectively created the risk that Alfono would use the slingshot. Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk, or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which he has subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are within the scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant's negligence. The courts are quite generally agreed that intervening causes which fall fairly in this category will not supersede the defendant's responsibility. Id, p 273. [15] Alfono's shooting pellets toward a tree and a ricochet into Moning's eye was within the recognizable risk of harm created by marketing slingshots directly to children. [16] The ricochet was a normal consequence of the situation created by the defendants' conduct. [17]