Opinion ID: 896083
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression Denial

Text: [¶ 14] We explained our standard of reviewing an order denying or granting suppression of evidence in State v. Sabinash, 1998 ND 32, ¶ 8, 574 N.W.2d 827: We enunciated our standard of review of a court's disposition of a suppression motion in State v. Bjornson, 531 N.W.2d 315, 317 (N.D.1995): The trial court's disposition of a motion to suppress will not be reversed if, after conflicts in the testimony are resolved in favor of affirmance, there is sufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court's findings, and the decision is not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. State v. Zimmerman, 529 N.W.2d 171 (N.D. 1995); City of Fargo v. Thompson, 520 N.W.2d 578 (N.D.1994). That standard of review recognizes the importance of the trial court's opportunity to observe the witnesses and assess their credibility, and we accord great deference to its decision in suppression matters. State v. Brown, 509 N.W.2d 69, 71 (N.D.1993). We conclude the evidence here supported the trial court's denial of Danielle's motion to suppress. [¶ 15] Danielle argues the trial court erred in denying suppression of her statements to the police. Danielle concedes she understood and waived the Miranda rights read to her before her questioning at the police station. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473-74, 474, n. 44, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966)(If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. If an individual indicates his desire to remain silent, but has an attorney present, there may be some circumstances in which further questioning would be permissible. If the individual states that he wants an attorney, the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.). Danielle claims she invoked her right to remain silent and her right to counsel during the questioning, but the officers persisted with the interrogation. She argues the continuation of questioning violated her rights, and her statements after invok[ing] her rights should have been suppressed. [¶ 16] The State argues Danielle's repeated comments during interrogation (You can't make me say nothing. Do I need to get a lawyer?) were not assertions to remain silent or requests for counsel. Rather, the State contends Danielle's comments were ambiguous and did not satisfy the clear articulation rule set out in Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 (1994). In Davis at 459, 114 S.Ct. 2350 (quotation omitted), the United States Supreme Court held an effective request for counsel during interrogation must be unambiguous: Although a suspect need not `speak with the discrimination of an Oxford don,' ... he must articulate his desire to have counsel present sufficiently clearly that a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to be a request for an attorney. [¶ 17] The clear articulation rule of Davis has also been applied to requests to remain silent. State v. Ross, 203 Wis.2d 66, 552 N.W.2d 428, 429-30 (Wis.App.1996)(We hold that the United States Supreme Court decision in Davis v. United States ... which held that a criminal suspect must unambiguously request counsel before the police must cease questioning, also applies to a suspect's invocation of the right to remain silent.). See also United States v. Johnson, 56 F.3d 947, 955 (8th Cir.1995)(Statements `I don't need to make any statement. I don't need to say anything.' ... fall far short of a clear or unequivocal expression of the right to remain silent.); Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61, 63, n. 1 (2nd Cir.1996) (Statements `I think I want a lawyer ... Do you think I need a lawyer?' were not unambiguous assertions of the defendant's right to counsel.). [¶ 18] We agree with the trial court that Danielle did not unequivocally invoke her constitutional rights to counsel or to silence. Danielle's inquiry about an attorney was, at best, ambiguous. It could have been seeking advice from the officers, rather than a request for counsel. Similarly, her comments about not saying anything were equally unclear, especially since she continued to respond to the officers' questions. Considering all of Danielle's comments and their context, we are not convinced she made an unambiguous invocation of her rights. Therefore, the officers did not need to cease questioning, and they responded appropriately when they told her, that's up to you. The trial court did not err in denying Danielle's motion to suppress her statements during interrogation. [¶ 19] Danielle's counsel urges us to go beyond the rule in Davis, and follow State v. Hoey, 77 Hawai'i 17, 881 P.2d 504, 523 (1994), imposing a duty on officers to cease questioning and clarify any ambiguous requests. If Danielle's requests were ambiguous, her counsel argues, the officers should have stopped and clarified by asking, Are you requesting an attorney? [¶ 20] However, Hoey's sidestepping of the Davis clear articulation rule stemmed from the Hawaii Supreme Court's interpretation of its own state constitution. The Hawaiian court explained, by adopting a stop and clarify rule, we choose to afford our citizens broader protection under article I, section 10 of the Hawai'i Constitution than that recognized by the Davis majority under the United States Constitution. Hoey, 881 P.2d at 523. Here, Danielle's trial counsel did not rely on our state constitution. [1] [¶ 21] At oral argument, Danielle's counsel on appeal was unable to cite, nor have we been able to find, an alternative to the Davis rule that did not rely on a particular state's constitution. Because the North Dakota Constitution was not raised below, see e.g., State v. Woehlhoff, 473 N.W.2d 446, 448-49 (N.D.1991), we do not consider whether it accords a suspect greater rights than those recognized in Davis during police interrogation.