Opinion ID: 852883
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Effect of Intervening Judgment

Text: Penn-America additionally contends that, aside from the relation-back issue, the cross-claim is not effective as against Penn-America because of the trial court's intervening determinations in separately granting Penn-America's motion for summary judgment against plaintiff Onyx. Penn-America argues that the trial court's express summary judgment findings regarding the relationship of Pollerts to Penn-America constitute res judicata and that issue preclusion thus foreclosed all of the theories presented in the Gills' cross-claim against Penn-America. This issue was raised in the Penn-America/GAB motion for summary judgment, Appellants' Appendix at 245, 254-256, but it was not discussed in the trial court's July 18, 2001, order granting summary judgment to Pollerts and Penn-America on statute of limitations grounds. Id. at 386-89. Although raised by Penn-America in its Brief of Appellee, the Court of Appeals did not address the issue because it found dispositive the cross-claim procedural question. We could remand to the trial court for resolution, but elect to address the issue here because it is a pure question of law and requires no determination of fact. Penn-America and GAB filed their motion for summary judgment on April 12, 2000, seeking summary judgment in the only action then pending against them  the complaint by Onyx. No relief was requested as against Centennial Hotel or the Gills. At that time, the Gills had not yet been formally substituted for Centennial Hotel as party defendants. [4] One month later, on May 9, 2000, Centennial filed its cross-claims against Pollerts and Penn-America, asserting that [a]ll of the activities that Fred Pollert did in this complaint were not only done individually but as ... an agent of Penn-America Insurance, Inc. Appellants' Appendix at 75; see also id. at 79, 80, 82. The cross-claim's allegations against Penn-America were based exclusively upon its alleged agency relationship with Fred Pollert. On October 23, 2000, the trial court separately granted summary judgment in favor of Penn-America and GAB as to all issues raised in plaintiff Onyx's complaint. Id. at 170. Among its conclusions of law, the trial court stated: As a matter of law, Fred Pollert individually and d/b/a Pollerts, Inc. was not a broker, special agent, or general agent for Penn-America Insurance company and/or GAB Robins North America, Inc. Id. In subsequently seeking summary judgment against the Gills, and in this appeal, Penn-America asserts that the October 2000 judgment is also determinative as to the Gills' cross-claim against Penn-America. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a judgment rendered on the merits is an absolute bar to a subsequent action between the same parties or those in privity with them on the same claim or demand. Sullivan v. American Cas. Co., 605 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind.1992). Res judicata does not apply here because the October 2000 judgment is not between the same parties on the same claim. Id. The Gills are not the same as, or in privity with, Onyx as to Onyx's claim that Penn-America was liable for the acts of Pollerts as its agent, which issue was determined by the October 2000 summary judgment. [5] We conclude that the issues determined in the trial court's grant of Penn-America's motion for summary judgment against Onyx are not res judicata as to the Gills' cross-claim against Penn-America. For this reason, and because we have determined that the cross-claim is deemed to have been filed within two years of the accrual of the Gills' alleged causes of action, and because it does not fail for failure of service, we reverse the summary judgment obtained by Penn-American against the Gills.