Opinion ID: 78553
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Strickland Performance

Text: As an initial matter, we will assume, for purposes of this appeal, that the state habeas court unreasonably applied Strickland by finding that Boyd's counsel performed adequately in preparing for and presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty phase of trial. We ground this assumption on the fact that counsel hinged their preparation mainly on the undirected essay of one family member, without following up on or seeking any of the many available public records about Boyd and his family, which would have materially furthered Boyd's approach at sentencing. As the record shows, before the penalty phase, Boyd's sister Cindy prepared, at counsel's request, a summary of Boyd's life that indicated a variety of childhood challengesincluding an absentee father, a disabled sister, an impoverished upbringing, school problems, difficulties with his mother's remarriage, a close grandfather's death, and alcoholic grandparents. However, counsel never dug deeper into any of these issues. Had counsel done so, either by asking family members or looking into social service records, relevant mitigating evidenceabout the Boyd children's destructive father, their violent stepfather, their ineffective mother, and the dangers their alcoholic grandparents exposed them towould have come to light. Yet for no apparent reason, counsel simply failed to investigate. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 525, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (finding counsel's failure to investigate mitigating evidence deficient where counsel uncovered no evidence in their investigation to suggest that a mitigation case, in its own right, would have been counterproductive, or that further investigation would have been fruitless). Evidence of abuse and other background details about Boyd would have supported the approach counsel took at sentencing both to humanize Boyd, and to demonstrate that Boyd felt remorse. See id. at 526, 123 S.Ct. 2527 (criticizing counsel for their failure to introduce details of Wiggins' history, when counsel put on a halfhearted mitigation case). Indeed, defense counsel Levinson expressly testified that he would have welcomed evidence for a mitigation case that Boyd grew up in a violent, abusive, or alcoholic home, but he did not investigate any of these issues. Also consonant with this lack of investigative follow-through, Boyd's counsel failed to prepare for or present any evidence at the sentencing hearing before the trial judge that followed the jury's verdict. According to Levinson, no one was in charge of this hearing: [W]e didn't put any evidence on at the sentencing hearing, if I remember correctly. The jury had recommended life without [parole]. . . . I think we felt that the job was essentially done. Vol. 16 at 129-30. Levinson said that counsel did not present additional evidence because [w]e stupidly thought that the judge would accept the jury's recommendation. Id. at 145. On this record and under our case law, the performance of Boyd's counsel likely was deficient. We need not, however, conclusively resolve this question, because as we determine below, Boyd has failed to satisfy Strickland 's prejudice prong. See Windom v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 578 F.3d 1227, 1248 (11th Cir.2009) (We need not determine whether counsel's limited investigation into Windom's background and mental health constituted deficient performance under the first prong of Strickland because we conclude that, even assuming counsel performed deficiently, Windom was not prejudiced thereby.); Hall v. Head, 310 F.3d 683, 699 (11th Cir.2002) ([A]lthough there is evidence in the record to support the district court's finding of deficient performance, we need not and do not `reach the performance prong of the ineffective assistance test [because we are] convinced that the prejudice prong cannot be satisfied.' Indeed, in order for Hall to obtain habeas relief under Strickland, he must establish not only that counsel's performance was deficient, but also that counsel's errors `actually had an adverse effect on the defense.' (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693, 104 S.Ct. 2052)).