Opinion ID: 2023926
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Magistrate Bias & Prejudice

Text: Matheney claims that Magistrate T. Edward Page, to whom Judge Conroy referred the case for hearing, prejudged the facts and was therefore biased against him. He bases this allegation on certain comments made by the magistrate before the hearing. The first occurred in Magistrate Page's own office when he was meeting with Stephen Owens, a deputy public defender, and Kathleen Sullivan, a Lake County prosecutor, about a matter unrelated to Matheney's case. The magistrate's secretary handed him a motion that had just arrived via fax from Matheney's counsel requesting a stay of proceedings because Matheney was allegedly incompetent. Seeing the title of the motion, Magistrate Page stopped his conversation to read it, taking interest in the motion because of its nature and how close its arrival was to the hearing date. He stated that his interest peaked when he came to the affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Smalldon, a psychologist who supported the motion's allegations. Among other things, Smalldon asserted: My opinion that Mr. Matheney is not competent to assist his legal counsel is based on my assessment of his current mental status. Although there exists a factual basis for this opinion, I have been advised by Mr. Matheney's legal counsel not to disclose that basis for purposes of the current affidavit. (P.C.R. at 279 (emphasis in original).) I think any judge faced with making a difficult decision would understand my immediate frustration, the magistrate later stated. I looked up, and speaking to no one in particular, made the comment, `I don't believe this,' something to that effect. `They ask me to find him incompetent, but they don't tell me why.' (P.C.R. at 1186.) Owens testified that Magistrate Page said something like, `I can't believe the arrogance of those people. They want me to find Matheney incompetent but they won't even tell me why they think that.' (P.C.R. at 377.) [8] Magistrate Page's remarks show an understandable irritation with a motion that would readily frustrate any trier of fact, one which requests a hearing, but declines to disclose the facts on which the judge might base a decision to grant or deny that request. His remarks do not indicate a prejudgment of the motion, nor do they show bias against Matheney. [9] Matheney also claims that Magistrate Page engaged in ex parte communication with a potential witness. It appears that Kathleen Sullivan, after receiving a subpoena from Matheney's counsel regarding her presence in the magistrate's chambers when he allegedly made his injudicious remarks, reported to the magistrate that he had been accused of making injudicious remarks about death penalty post-conviction relief petitioners, Matheney in particular. If the magistrate replied in any way to Sullivan's statement, ( compare P.C.R. at 1191 with P.C.R. at 1195), it was to ask her if the information she was sharing was privileged. Thereafter, Page immediately contacted both the State's attorney and Matheney's attorney, pursuant to a prescheduled conference call, and asked whether it was wise for them to continue to hold pretrial meetings without the presence of a court reporter, given what the magistrate had just learned about a potential motion from Matheney's counsel regarding previous out-of-court statements Page had allegedly made. It was at this time that Matheney's counsel informed Page about the contents of affidavits from England and Owens. Matheney claims that this incident violated Indiana's Code of Judicial Conduct, which states, A judge shall not initiate, permit, or consider ex parte communications made to the judge outside the presence of the parties, concerning a pending or impending proceeding.... Ind.Judicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(8). We disagree. Magistrate Page did not seek out contact with a witness against Matheney. The witness in this instance merely shared with Page what she had heard about the nature of statements the magistrate, himself, had made. Matheney could not reasonably perceive Page as biased merely because the magistrate learned of a motion which Matheney's counsel was about to file against him before it was actually filed. Page immediately made both parties aware of what Sullivan had said to him. No appearance of impropriety or partiality arises from these facts. [10] Matheney also alleges that comments made by Magistrate Page at the beginning of the post-conviction hearing, and previously to other judges, show his bias against death penalty litigants in general. The specific statement by Page on which Matheney takes issue is as follows: [A]llegations of judicial bias and prejudice are, next to accusing a judge of being corrupt, are the most serious accusations you can make. They seem to be made casually in these petitions for post conviction relief regarding death penalty cases; and although I was assured by counsel last week, when the subject came up, that, oh, no, these are not routinely made and that they have only made it in this particular instance; and to their knowledge, they're not routinely made in death penalty cases. I find it interesting that in some discussions I had with judges at a conference last Friday, when they asked me how the hearing was going, and I mentioned how the hearing began with it being objected to, that I ought to disqualify myself because I was biased and prejudiced, to my being accused of being biased and prejudiced everytime [sic] I ruled on an objection against the petitioner.... The response from one judge who had handled death penalty PCRs before was, is that he had experienced the same thing. I have heard that from another judge, as well. (P.C.R. at 1183-84.) We agree with Matheney's characterization of these statements as mild comments, (Petitioner's Br. at 49). The articulation of observations by one judge to fellow judges concerning what the former perceives to be a trend on the part of defendants or post-conviction petitioners does not indicate bias. Matheney also argues that Magistrate Page denied him a fair hearing by misleading his counsel regarding briefing requirements and then ruling many of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims waived because of either Matheney's failure to provide cogent argument or his failure to plead specific facts in support of his allegations of error. We have carefully reviewed the facts surrounding this final allegation of bias, finding that either a misunderstanding on the part of Matheney's lawyers or a miscommunication on the magistrate's part, rather than a malicious plot by the magistrate, led to Matheney's inadequate post-conviction brief. We find no bias or prejudice against Matheney on the part of Magistrate Page.