Opinion ID: 1445031
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the superior court err in using the least intrusive standard?

Text: The superior court noted that the least intrusive standard must be implied as a rule of construction for the reasonable opportunity language of the 1986 state subsistence law. The State and Wilson argue that the written words of the subsistence law only mention reasonable opportunity in two places, and in neither location does the text mention least intrusive. The State also points to the relevant legislative history, and submits that, as the subsistence law was being developed, reasonable opportunity was explained twice. ( See Memorandum from Senate Resources Committee Staff to Senate Resources Committee Members (March 12, 1986); Address by Senator Vic Fischer to the Alaska State Senate (May 9, 1986)). However, on neither occasion was the least intrusive standard mentioned. The State further argues that the least intrusive standard is absent in the three logical places in the statute where the fish and game laws deal with the regulations of subsistence hunting and fishing. The State contends that the superior court's reliance on ANILCA is flawed. It bases this contention on the proposition that although the subsistence law was enacted in part to comply with ANILCA, each law is a separate piece of legislation with its own legislative history and distinct provisions. The State argues [t]he term that the superior court says is modified by the `least intrusive standard'  the `term reasonable opportunity'  does not even appear in the federal law. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 3111-3126 (1985). The State next argues that since state law is now out of compliance with ANILCA, the state is no longer implementing federal policy on federal public lands. Hence, the purpose statement of ANILCA (from which the superior court derived the least intrusive standard) should not affect the state's implementation of its own law on its own lands. The State further argues that the least intrusive standard applies to the use of land, and the use of land is addressed in a section of ANILCA (§ 3120) that is entirely separate from the sections of ANILCA that deal with the use of subsistence fish and game  16 U.S.C.A. §§ 3113-3117 (1985). The State's final argument is that the least intrusive standard would require a significant change in the method the boards use to adopt regulations. In this regard the State submits that since the boards are not required to provide for a certain style of hunting and fishing, there is nothing that can be intruded upon. Morry and Kwethluk argue that the least intrusive standard is the appropriate one for insuring board compliance with the law. They support this position by stressing that the subsistence law does more than merely direct the boards to take subsistence into account in the course of making regulations. The law mandates that those uses be given preference over all others. Morry and Kwethluk also assert that the State errs in looking to the statute for the words least intrusive, because the key word in the statute is preference. They submit that the question before the superior court, and the one presented here, is what standard the courts insist upon to insure that the mandatory preference is in fact being accorded. Morry and Kwethluk contend that the superior court drew the least intrusive standard from the overall structure and intent of the statute, from the judicial construction of the comparable provisions of ANILCA, and from analogous areas of law in which hunting and fishing rights are accorded a priority in law. They emphasize that the reasonable opportunity that the legislature requires is not merely some abstract opportunity; it is, rather, a priority opportunity. We find the State's arguments persuasive. The least intrusive standard is not explicitly mentioned in the text of our subsistence preference laws nor can such a standard be reasonably implied from the fact that the subsistence law accords a preference to subsistence users. As the State notes: The subsistence law, however, provides a preference only by giving subsistence users `reasonable opportunity' to harvest the resource. If this `reasonable opportunity' defined according to customary and traditional harvest levels, reasonable expectations, and access  cannot be furnished because of the demands of other user groups, then these other groups must be cut out. This is how the priority arises, not through Morry's elusive standard of judicial review.