Opinion ID: 1472584
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Choice of Law Issue

Text: Appellant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint on the pleadings because he alleged all elements required to state a cause of action for defamation. Further, he contends that the trial court did not have before it sufficient facts to determine whether to apply the law of Nigeria or what that law is. Appellees argue that the trial court properly granted their motion to dismiss because appellant failed to plead with specificity the publication element of defamation and falsity of the statement. With respect to the choice of law issue, appellees contend that appellant waived the applicability of Nigerian law. Since the sufficiency of the complaint must be tested against the applicable law, we consider first appellant's claim that the law of Nigeria applies to at least the major portion of his claim. Appellees argue that appellant waived the application of Nigerian law because he did not raise the issue in his complaint or amended complaint. Appellant responds that he was not required to plead the application of Nigerian law in the complaint or amended complaint to preserve the issue. The applicable civil rule provides that [a] party who intends to raise an issue concerning the law of a foreign country shall give notice by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. The Court, in determining foreign law, may consider any relevant material or source, including testimony, whether or not submitted by a party or admissible under Rule 43. The Court's determination shall be treated as a ruling on a question of law. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 44.1 (2004). Thus, the rule does not provide that the assertion of the applicability of foreign law must be made in the complaint or amended complaint. It provides only that such notice must be by pleadings or other reasonable written notice. Id. The Advisory Committee (the Committee) notes to the comparable federal rule indicate that the issue of foreign law need not be included in the complaint. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1 (2004) (Advisory Committee note to 1966 adoption). [1] The Committee notes state, [t]he [previous] uncertainty under [Fed.R.Civ.P.] 8(a) (2004) [2] about whether foreign law must be pleaded ... is eliminated by the provision that the notice shall be `written' and `reasonable.' It may, but need not be, incorporated in the pleadings. Id. The Committee explains that: [i]n some situations the pertinence of foreign law is apparent from the outset; accordingly the necessary investigation of that law will have been accomplished by the party at the pleading stage, and the notice can be given conveniently in the pleadings. In other situations the pertinence of foreign law may remain doubtful until the case is further developed. A requirement that notice of foreign law be given only through the medium of the pleadings would tend in the latter instances to force the party to engage in a peculiarly burdensome type of investigation which might turn out to be unnecessary; and correspondingly the adversary would be forced into a possibly wasteful investigation. Id. The Committee also states that the rule was not intended to provide time limitations for notice, and in some circumstances, timely notice may be given even after the claim goes to trial. See id. In determining whether notice is reasonable, the Committee recommends that courts consider [t]he stage which the case had reached at the time of the notice, the reason proffered by the party for his failure to give earlier notice, and the importance to the case as a whole of the issue of foreign law sought to be raised.... Id. In the present case, Nigerian law is not mentioned in appellant's original complaint or the amended complaint. Given the allegations in these pleadings referring to acts that occurred in Nigeria, appellant should have known that there was a possibility that Nigerian law might apply. The Committee notes seem to encourage pleading such matters at an early stage when facts are known suggesting the applicability of foreign law. Appellant's failure to mention foreign law in his original complaint may be attributed to his pro se status at that time. However, there is no suggestion of an impediment to providing notification of an intention to rely on foreign law when the amended complaint was filed and he was represented by counsel. Although appellant could have provided earlier notification, the notice of his claim that foreign law applied still came reasonably early in the proceeding. It was sufficiently timely to alert appellees to the claim and to permit the court to consider the issue. Therefore, the timeliness factor that the Committee suggested for consideration in determining whether the notice was reasonable does not weigh strongly in favor of rejecting appellant's argument for the application of foreign law strictly on the basis that it came too late. However, that does not resolve the question of whether the notice was adequate or whether the trial court erred in applying local law. Generally, when parties do not raise the issue of the applicability of foreign law, a court is under no obligation to apply foreign law and may instead apply the law of the forum. Rymer v. Pool, 574 A.2d 283, 285 (D.C.1990). Even when a party fails to request the court to apply foreign law, however, the court may do so. Id. (citing Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 660 F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir.1981)). In Rymer, this court held that, under the circumstances presented, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint without engaging in a choice-of-law analysis to consider the law of other jurisdictions that had an interest in the case. Id. at 285-86. Rymer had sued Pool for fraudulent inducement to marry, unjust enrichment and fraudulently obtaining property from her. Id. at 285. We observed that virtually all transactions relevant to her claims occurred on a cruise ship in the Caribbean, in the U.S. Virgin Islands, or in the Dominican Republic. Id. Pool moved to the District after committing the alleged torts and mailed Rymer a letter admitting that he had fraudulently induced her to marry. Pool continued to live in the District where he could be served with process, and Rymer traveled here in an attempt to persuade him to maintain the marriage. Id. This court was persuaded that Rymer had not had a meaningful opportunity to address the choice-of-law question, and therefore, reversed the trial court's decision with instructions to make a choice-of-law decision. Id. In that regard, this court explained: If the [trial] court had requested that plaintiff file a reply to the answer (as the court could have done pursuant to Super. Ct. Civ. R. 7(a)), or if defendant had filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and plaintiff had responded to it, plaintiff would have had the opportunity to argue that she had a valid claim and could have focused the court's attention on the question of the applicability of foreign law. If such had been the case, we would have no reason to reverse the trial court's decision. Since this is not the case, we hold that it was error for the trial court to apply D.C. law without considering the choice-of-law problem. Id. In this case, unlike Rymer, appellant had an opportunity to raise the choice-of-law question and did so. In opposition to appellees' motion to dismiss, appellant first challenged appellees' arguments based on the law of the District of Columbia, citing local authorities for his position. At the end of the opposition, he asserted that the law of the District applied to Ms. Watts' first publication in front of a notary public here, but that the law of Nigeria applied to publication of the defamatory statements to Mrs. Oparaugo's brother in Nigeria. However, appellant did not provide any points and authorities as to what that law is. Similarly, in his motion for reconsideration, appellant argued that the major situs of the events involved was Nigeria. Again, he provided no information on the law of Nigeria. Rather, he appears to have claimed that the burden was on appellees to establish the law of Nigeria. Under the applicable rule, it is the party who intends to rely on foreign law who must notify the other parties of that intention. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 44.1. Appellees argue that appellant did not provide sufficient information for the court to decide the case in accordance with the law of Nigeria, and therefore, he cannot challenge the trial court's application of District of Columbia law. Appellant raised the issue but failed to provide the court with any authorities or information on the law of Nigeria and how it should be applied in assessing the sufficiency of his complaint. The court may consider any relevant material in determining foreign law, and its ruling thereon is considered as a ruling on a question of law. Super. Ct. Civ. R. 44.1. Thus, Rule 44.1 is said to have put to rest the idea that foreign law is a question of fact which has to be proven by the claimant in order to recover. Vishipco, supra, 660 F.2d at 859-60 (discussing Fed.R.Civ.P. 44.1). While the court is not limited to the materials presented by the parties in determining foreign law and can conduct its own research on the subject, the court is free to insist on a complete presentation by counsel. [3] Advisory Committee notes to the 1966 adoption of Rule 44.1. We have recognized that [w]hen both parties have failed to prove foreign law, the forum may say that the parties have acquiesced in the application of the local law of the forum. Rymer, supra, 574 A.2d at 285 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 136, cmt. h, at pp. 378-79 (1971)); see Vishipco, supra, 660 F.2d at 860 (deciding portion of the claim under local law where neither party invoked foreign law with respect to those claims); Commercial Ins. Co. v. Pacific-Peru Constr. Corp., 558 F.2d 948, 952 (9th Cir.1977) (stating that they apply the principle that where either no information, or else insufficient information, has been obtained about the foreign law, the forum will usually decide the case in accordance with its own local law) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS of LAWS § 136, cmt. h, at pp. 378-379). In the present case, appellant failed to provide any information on the elements of defamation under Nigerian law, and appellees contended that the law of the District applied. Since neither party presented any information on the law of Nigeria, it was permissible for the trial court to apply the law of the District of Columbia even though Nigeria may have had more significant contacts with the transaction. [4] See Vishipco, supra, 660 F.2d at 860. Where appellant had a meaningful opportunity to raise the foreign law issue, and he failed to provide information on what the applicable foreign law was, we find no error in the trial court's determination to apply the law of this jurisdiction under the circumstances presented. [5] See Rymer, supra, 574 A.2d at 285 (noting that if plaintiff had had the opportunity to argue that she had a valid claim under foreign law, this court would have had no reason to reverse the trial court for not engaging in the choice-of-law analysis).