Opinion ID: 1619312
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Venireperson Gulley

Text: The state also challenged venireperson Gulley for cause because she expressed some concern about being able to impose the death penalty and because the prosecutor believed that the proceeding was a bit overwhelming for her. On appeal, Barnett's sole point is that the record refutes that Ms. Gulley expressed some concern about being able to impose the death penalty. However, this contention, even if true, is a different contention than that Barnett raised in the motion for new trial. There, Barnett's point was that the state's reason for the strike that Ms. Gulley worked in educationwas pretensive because the state did not strike a similarly situated venireperson. The point now made was not preserved for appeal and therefore is waived. State v. Hubert, 923 S.W.2d 434, 437 (Mo.App. 1996); see State v. Morrow, 968 S.W.2d 100, 106 (Mo. banc 1998) (To preserve an objection to evidence for review, the objection must be specific, and the point raised on appeal must be based upon the same theory.). 2. Strike for Cause Barnett next argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it upheld the state's strike for cause of venireperson Darris. The basis of the strike was that Ms. Darris could not consider the death penalty and follow the law. The test for determining whether venirepersons should be excused for cause during the death-qualification phase of voir dire is whether their views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as jurors in accordance with the instructions and their oath. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985). This Court will not disturb the trial court's ruling on juror qualification matters unless it is clearly against the evidence and amounts to a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Kinder, 942 S.W.2d 313, 324 (Mo. banc 1996). During voir dire, Ms. Darris initially indicated that she would not impose the death penalty [n]o matter what the evidence would show, even after they've made a finding of murder in the first degree ... no matter what the evidence is in the second stage. Later, under questioning by defense counsel, Ms. Darris indicated that she could consider both life imprisonment and the death penalty. However, in response to a follow-up question by the prosecutor, [w]ould you really be able to vote for the death penalty if that was what you were presented with?she stated, I don't think so. Given Ms. Darris' initial and final responses, the trial court did not commit a clear abuse of discretion. Point denied.