Opinion ID: 1942966
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Curtis Circulation Co., Inc. (hereinafter Curtis)

Text: Curtis is a corporation with offices in New Jersey and Pennsylvania. It is not registered to do business in New Hampshire and has not appointed an agent to receive service of process here. The indictment entered against Curtis charges that it did purposely sell obscene material by the conduct of another for whom it is accountable, in that the defendant's conduct of distributing the said obscene material resulted in the sale of this material within the State of New Hampshire.... A copy of this indictment and a notice to appear was served on the managing agent of Curtis in New Jersey. Additionally, substituted service was made on the New Hampshire Secretary of State pursuant to RSA ch. 300. On January 7, 1977, Curtis sought abatement of the proceedings, claiming the court lacks criminal jurisdiction. This plea was denied after hearing. Curtis' contentions are similar to those of Penthouse: it challenges the court's in personam and territorial jurisdiction. The record contains testimony from defendant's witness, the circulation manager of Penthouse, that Curtis' representatives visit the local wholesalers in this area, although not at any regular, set time.... Apparently these agents solicit, or are in some way involved with, wholesale orders of the magazine. Curtis makes up shipping labels for Penthouse, indicating which wholesalers are to receive specified numbers of copies of Penthouse. The record does not reveal the precise nature of the New Hampshire activities of Curtis' agents, but Curtis does admit, in a brief filed with this Court, that [t]he evidence in the transcript is to the effect that Curtis was the national distributor and distributed locally to Manchester News, which, in turn, distributed to Luv. [12] We hold that when a defendant knowingly distributes an allegedly obscene magazine in New Hampshire and sends its agents into this State to facilitate said distribution, it is subject to the in personam jurisdiction of our courts if prosecuted for complicity in the subsequent retail sale of the magazine. See Commonwealth v. Beneficial Finance Co., supra at 227-28, n.8, 275 N.E.2d at 56-57, n.8 (1971); Roy v. North American Newspaper Alliance, Inc., 106 N.H. at 96-97, 205 A.2d at 847-48 (1964). That its agents enter the State only sporadically is not dispositive. Id. Curtis' objection to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction was therefore properly denied. Curtis' challenge to our exercise of territorial jurisdiction over the offense is two-fold. First, Curtis argues that it comes within the saving clause of RSA 625:4 and therefore is protected from prosecution. Second, Curtis argues that it could not be found legally accountable for Luv's conduct under RSA 626:8. [13] As for Curtis' first argument, we agree that RSA 625:4 II(b) applies not only to Luv's alleged conduct (which occurred in New Hampshire) but also to Curtis'. Thus, to the extent the State wishes to rely on Curtis' out-of-State activities in the present proceeding the State must prove that there exist statutes in the States in which Curtis' alleged activities occurred that proscribe distribution of obscene materials. The State may prove this by showing that there are statutes in those other States directly criminalizing distribution of obscene materials. Alternatively, the State may meet its burden under RSA 625:4 II(b) by showing that there are statutes in those States criminalizing the sale of obscene materials and that Curtis by its activities would be subject to criminal penalties as an aider or abettor of, or as legally accountable for, such sale. [14] As indicated above, legal counsel for Penthouse testified on behalf of all defendants as an expert witness on New York and New Jersey law. He stated that under New Jersey law Curtis would have been subject to criminal prosecution had the ultimate sale in this case taken place in New Jersey. We hold that this testimony supports the trial court's implied finding that RSA 625:4 II(b) does not insulate Curtis from prosecution for its New Jersey activities. Curtis is located in Pennsylvania as well as in New Jersey, but there was no testimony about whether any of Curtis' Pennsylvania activities would be criminal under Pennsylvania law had the ultimate sale in this case occurred in Pennsylvania. We remand for a determination of whether the State intends to rely on any of Curtis' Pennsylvania activities in this prosecution. If the State intends to do so, it must first prove that Pennsylvania law proscribes the distribution of obscene materials. See RSA 519:32. [15] As for Curtis' argument that it is not subject to our territorial jurisdiction because it is not legally responsible for Luv's conduct under New Hampshire law, we think that our discussion of Penthouse's accomplice liability supplies an a fortiori answer to Curtis. Curtis knows that the New Hampshire wholesaler whose orders it solicits and/or receives will distribute Penthouse to such retailers as Luv. Circulating magazines is Curtis' business; it may be found to have intended and attempted to facilitate and promote the retail sale of Penthouse, among other magazines. It therefore comes within the scope of RSA 625:4 and ch. 626, and so is subject to our territorial jurisdiction in regard to its New Hampshire activities. See Direct Sales Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 703 (1943); United States v. Sherpix, Inc., 512 F.2d 1361, 1372 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (distributor of film, as an aider and abettor, was accountable for the conduct of another charged with the offense of knowingly screening the allegedly obscene film); Note, Falcone Revisited: The Criminality of Sales to an Illegal Enterprise supra. We of course say nothing about the merits of the present proceeding. All we hold is that our courts possess jurisdiction to hear this prosecution. It should also be remarked, as we pointed out above, that our resolution of this appeal would have been facilitated by a more specific indictment. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Exceptions overruled in part; remanded.