Opinion ID: 221722
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Case Law Analyzing DNA Collection Following Conviction

Text: As a starting point, it is useful to examine how the cases upholding DNA collection following conviction assessed the totality of the circumstances in concluding that such searches were reasonable. These cases analyzed challenges to the DNA Act and its state-law analogues brought by individuals who were incarcerated following convictions (prisoners) or by individuals on probation, parole, or supervised release (collectively, probationers). [16] In our case in this category, Sczubelek, we examine[d] ... the taking of the [DNA] sample under the ... Knights totality of the circumstances test and concluded that the taking of a DNA sample from an individual on supervised release is not an unreasonable search. 402 F.3d at 184. In conducting the Fourth Amendment balancing, we considered a number of factors. First, the intrusion of a blood test is minimal. Id. (citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 625, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989)). Second, while acknowledging that the slight intrusion [of a blood test] into an ordinary citizen's privacy [would be] unconstitutional, individuals on supervised release, like individuals on probation, `do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled.' Sczubelek, 402 F.3d at 184 (quoting Knights, 534 U.S. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (internal quotation marks & citations omitted)). Considering Sczubelek's status as an individual who had been convicted of a felony and who was on supervised release, we held that he ha[d] a reduced right to privacy  and in particular to privacy of identity.... Individuals on supervised release cannot reasonably expect to keep information bearing on their physical identity from government records. Id. at 184-85. Thus, in assessing the degree to which [the DNA collection] intrude[d] on [Sczubelek's] privacy, id. at 182 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted), we concluded that for criminal offenders the privacy interests implicated by the collection of DNA are minimal, id. at 185. On the other side of the scale, the degree to which [DNA collection] is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests, id. at 182 (internal quotation marks & citation omitted), we agree[d] with the government that it has a compelling interest in the collection of identifying information of criminal offenders, id. at 185. We reasoned that [a] DNA database promotes increased accuracy in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases and will aid in solving crimes when they occur in the future, help to exculpate individuals who are serving sentences of imprisonment for crimes they did not commit, and help to eliminate individuals from suspect lists when crimes occur. Id. As such, we concluded that [t]he interest in accurate criminal investigations and prosecutions is a compelling interest that the DNA Act can reasonably be said to advance. Id. Finally, we considered additional factors that contributed to the reasonableness of the search. Analyzing the prior version of the DNA Act, we held that the Act itself clearly delineates from whom a sample must be taken, leaving no discretion to probation officers. Id. at 187. Moreover, we reasoned, the DNA Act specifies permissible uses for the samples and punishes unauthorized disclosure of DNA samples. Id. It also provides for expungement of the DNA profile from CODIS upon reversal or dismissal of a conviction. Id. Assessing the totality of the circumstances surrounding the collection and analysis of DNA samples from probationers, we concluded: In view of the importance of the public interests in the collection of DNA samples from criminal offenders for entry into a national DNA database and the degree to which the DNA Act serves to meet those interests, balanced against the minimal intrusion occasioned by giving a blood sample and the reduced privacy expectations of individuals on supervised release, we conclude that the collection of DNA samples from individuals on supervised release, pursuant to the DNA Act, is not an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. Our sister circuits have engaged in a very similar analysis, relying in general on the same considerations that informed our decision in Sczubelek. The other circuits have identified some factors that we did not explicitly consider, such as the government's compelling interest in contribut[ing] to the solution of past crimes. Kriesel, 508 F.3d at 949. Ultimately, those courts likewise concluded that the collection of DNA samples from prisoners or probationers is a reasonable search consistent with the Fourth Amendment.