Opinion ID: 597393
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Reimposition of the Restitution

Text: 15 At the probation revocation hearing, and again in its Order Clarifying Sentence, the district court reaffirmed the restitution that had been ordered at the appellant's initial sentencing. The appellant contends that the district court reimposed the restitution payments without considering his destitute financial situation. 7 16 The record does not support the appellant's contention that his financial situation was not considered. As this court noted in Rogat, [a] restitution order will be upheld if the evidence indicates a defendant has some assets or earning potential and thus possibly may be able to pay the amount ordered. 924 F.2d at 985. The record in this case is sufficient to support such a conclusion. During the probation revocation hearing, the court was informed that the appellant: (1) had nearly $7,000 in an account that he was waiting to be freed up; (2) had employment prospects and was self-employed at the time of his arrest; and (3) had made partial restitution payments and satisfied the special assessments from prison. Contrary to the appellant's contention, the judge need not specifically recite his findings regarding [the defendant's financial condition]. Rogat, 924 F.2d at 986. 17 The appellant raises two additional arguments regarding his restitution order for the first time in his reply brief. 8 The appellant first claims that his original restitution order was invalid because it provided for repayment beyond his term of probation in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3579(f)(2)(A). 9 If the original term of restitution payment was in violation of the law, the appropriate remedy would be for this court to remand for the imposition of a shorter term. However, the appellant is no longer on probation, and the claim is therefore moot. The order arising out of the probation revocation hearing imposed a term of imprisonment and pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3579(f)(2)(B) the court can allow up to five years after a term of imprisonment to make restitution. The order requiring restitution before November 9, 1993, is clearly within this time limit. [Order Clarifying Sentence at 5] 18 The appellant makes the related claim in his primary brief that according to the sentence imposed at the probation revocation hearing he is forced to pay the entire restitution amount in just over a year. [Appellant's Brief at 12]. We find this objection to be disingenuous; the court merely reasserted the time limitation of the original order. The appellant signed the Conditions of Probation on November 14, 1988, which acknowledged his obligation to pay restitution within five years. He had been out of prison for several years before he was arrested in Florida and was apparently self-employed. In light of these factors we do not see any hardship in the district court's order. 19 For the first time in his reply brief, the appellant also challenges the authority of the court to reimpose the restitution order at the probation revocation hearing. He argues that the court initially invoked the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3651, which allows restitution to be imposed as a condition of probation. He next contends that, when the court revoked his probation, its power to impose restitution vanished and that it cannot now invoke another provision to reimpose the restitution. We disagree. 20 Under 18 U.S.C. § 3653, the court upon revocation of probation may impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed. At the original sentencing, restitution could clearly have been imposed on the appellant under the restitution provisions of the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3579-3580. See United States v. Hill, 798 F.2d 402, 404 (10th Cir.1986). Therefore the court properly invoked the provisions of the VWPA in its restitution order.