Opinion ID: 1358803
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unprotected Speech

Text: (7) There are four categories of speech that are held not entitled to First Amendment protection. These are fighting words ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) 315 U.S. 568 [86 L.Ed. 1031, 1034, 62 S.Ct. 766], obscenity ( Roth v. United States (1957) 354 U.S. 476 [1 L.Ed.2d 1498, 77 S.Ct. 1304]), defamatory falsehoods ( Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. (1974) 418 U.S. 323 [41 L.Ed.2d 789, 94 S.Ct. 2997]), and speech carrying a clear and present danger of incitement to violence ( Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) 395 U.S. 444 [23 L.Ed.2d 430, 89 S.Ct. 1827]). It has been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. ( Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, supra, 315 U.S. 568, 572 [86 L.Ed. 1031, 1035].) The City contends that fortunetelling falls in a category of speech that is not entitled to free speech protection: it is within the legislative body's power to determine that fortunetelling is inherently deceptive, and when as here the legislative body has done so, the speech is not protected. The City cites Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., supra, 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 [41 L.Ed.2d 789, 805]: Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. The City further directs our attention to In re Bartha, supra, 63 Cal. App.3d 584, 591: The ordinance need not necessarily be limited to cases involving an actual intent to defraud. It is within the police power of the municipality and province of the legislative body to determine that the business of fortune-telling is inherently deceptive and that its regulation or prohibition is required in order to protect the gullible, superstitious, and unwary. [4] (8) First it must be emphasized that the ordinary deference a court owes to any legislative action vanishes when constitutionally protected rights are threatened. The rational connection between the remedy provided and the evil to be curbed, which in other contexts might support legislation against attack on due process grounds, will not suffice. ( Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 531-532 [89 L.Ed. 430, 440-441, 65 S.Ct. 315]; see also N.A.A.C.P. v. Button (1963) 371 U.S. 415, 438-439 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 421, 83 S.Ct. 328]; Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist. (1967) 68 Cal.2d 51, 60 [64 Cal. Rptr. 430, 434 P.2d 982].) Thus we would abandon our constitutional duty if we took at face value the municipality's determination that fortunetelling is inherently deceptive and not protected by the state constitutional free speech protection. Fraudulent deceit, actionable as a tort, is defined in part by California Civil Code section 1710 as 1. The suggestion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who does not believe it to be true; [¶] 2. The assertion, as a fact, of that which is not true, by one who has no reasonable ground for believing it to be true. Predictions of the future have been characterized as expressions of opinion, not actionable unless the speaker knows the opinion is unwarranted or induces reliance on the opinion as if it were an expression of fact. ( Richard P. v. Vista Del Mar Child Care Service (1980) 106 Cal. App.3d 860, 865-866 [165 Cal. Rptr. 370].) It must be conceded that many persons practicing the art of fortunetelling are engaging in fraudulent activity. Many fortunetellers have no belief in their powers to predict the future. If such persons obtain consideration for their services, the activity could be deemed fraudulent; their statements would be false statements of fact, for they would not be expressing what they truly believe will happen in the future. However, it is also true that some persons believe they possess the power to predict what has not yet come to pass. When such persons impart their beliefs to others, they are not acting fraudulently; they are communicating opinions which, however dubious, are unquestionably protected by the Constitution. It must also be noted that there are many persons other than professional fortunetellers who purport to predict the future: e.g., astrology columnists in daily newspapers, economists who prognosticate interest rates and other business conditions, investment counsellors who forecast stock market trends, sportswriters and oddsmakers who predict the winners of athletic contests, horserace handicappers, pollsters who forecast election returns, and clergymen who describe the concept of a hereafter. The City maintains it is within the legislative province to prohibit fraudulent fortunetelling. This argument, however, does not save the ordinance. (9) It is true that a state may protect its citizens from fraud. ( Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940) 310 U.S. 296, 306 [84 L.Ed. 1213, 1219, 60 S.Ct. 900, 128 A.L.R. 1352]; Schneider v. State (1939) 308 U.S. 147, 164 [84 L.Ed. 155, 166, 60 S.Ct. 146]; Marks v. City of Roseburg (1983) 65 Ore.App. 102 [670 P.2d 201, 204].) Yet Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. [Citations.] Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms. ( N.A.A.C.P. v. Button, supra, 371 U.S. 415, 438 [9 L.Ed.2d 405, 421]; In re Primus, supra, 436 U.S. 412, 434 [56 L.Ed.2d 417, 436, 98 S.Ct. 1893]; Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville (1975) 422 U.S. 205, 217-218 [45 L.Ed.2d 125, 135-136, 95 S.Ct. 2268]; Morris v. Municipal Court, supra, 32 Cal.3d 553, 565.) Regulation, whether aimed at fraud or other abuses, must not trespass upon the domains set apart for free speech and free assembly. ( Thomas v. Collins, supra, 323 U.S. 516, 532 [89 L.Ed. 430, 441]; Young v. Municipal Court (1971) 16 Cal. App.3d 766, 769 [94 Cal. Rptr. 331].) A regulation is suspect, therefore, if it prohibits protected expression, even though it also guards the public from fraud. The justification for this rule is well recognized: when a statute or ordinance is overbroad, condemning protected as well as unprotected speech, communication of the protected speech is effectively chilled. It is not enough to say that the enactment is aimed at unprotected speech; there remains the real danger that a statute that also encompasses protected speech will be used to punish or prohibit its exercise. (See Thornhill v. Alabama, supra, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98 [84 L.Ed. 1093, 1099].) And it is irrelevant that much of the activity prohibited by the statute is unprotected. ( Near v. Minnesota, supra, 283 U.S. 707, 720 [75 L.Ed. 1357, 1369, 51 S.Ct. 625].) (10) The City assures us that the ordinance is aimed only at communications that purport to predict future events. Assuming that such a ban would be permissible, however, the ordinance contains no words to this effect. Thus the prohibition against spiritual reading could encompass Bible lessons, the bar against hypnotism could include hypnosis as an accepted technique of the psychotherapist, the banning of magic could prevent numerous popular theatrical performances, and the prohibition of prophecy could interfere with many religious services. The ordinance is clearly overbroad, applying to many activities that are protected by the California Constitution. Thus the ordinance cannot be saved as a valid regulation of unprotected speech. It remains to be determined whether the ordinance is a valid regulation of something other than the communicative element of speech, with only an incidental effect on that which is protected by the Constitution.