Opinion ID: 1841961
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Owner's Compensation

Text: The plaintiff is entitled to recover the difference[, if any,] between the fair market value of the property before the easement was taken and its fair market value after the easement was taken. In addition, the plaintiff is entitled to recover (his, her, its) reasonable abstracting expenses. The instructions given in this case regarding the method of determining condemnees' damages is contained in instruction No. 2, under C. Burden of Proof. This instruction states: The Condemnees are entitled to recover the difference between the fair market value of it's [sic] property before the easement was taken, and it's [sic] fair market value after the easement was taken. A review of the record shows that condemnees objected to instruction No. 2 on only two grounds. First, condemnees requested that the word immediately be added before the phrase after the easement was taken. Condemnees also objected to the language found in instruction No. 2 relating to the purpose for the condemnation, which is not an issue in this case, and requested that its proposed jury instruction No. 2 be used instead. However, jury instruction No. 2 given by the trial court was the appropriate instruction. In Ward v. Nebraska Electric G. & T. Co-op., Inc., 195 Neb. 641, 240 N.W.2d 18 (1976), we held that the measure of damages for the taking of an easement is the difference in the reasonable market value of the property before and after the taking of the easement. See, also, Fulmer v. State, 178 Neb. 664, 134 N.W.2d 798 (1965). We conclude that instruction No. 2 with regard to the measure of damages correctly states the law, was not misleading, and adequately covered the issue. See, Maxwell v. Montey, 262 Neb. 160, 631 N.W.2d 455 (2001); Springer v. Bohling, 259 Neb. 71, 607 N.W.2d 836 (2000). The trial court's failure to record the jury's question requires us to speculate as to which jury instruction or instructions may have been implicated, if at all, by the jury's question. It is, however, condemnees' contention that the central issue on appeal relates to the jury's failure to award condemnees remainder or severance damages. The instructions to the jury regarding calculation of damages are found in jury instruction No. 2 given by the court. We have already determined that instruction No. 2 comports with NJI2d Civ. 13.06, which sets forth the method of calculating damages in an action involving condemnation of an easement. Therefore, rereading the instructions in this case, as the trial court directed the jury to do, would produce a jury properly instructed. Condemnees contend that if they had been notified of the jurors' question, they could have requested a supplemental instruction. A supplemental instruction is one which would have been proper in the first charge. Hofrichter v. Kiewit-Condon-Cunningham, 147 Neb. 224, 22 N.W.2d 703 (1946). In the instant case, however, we have already determined that the instructions given to the jury in the first charge were the correct instructions. The complaining party bears the burden of proving both that an unauthorized private communication occurred and that the complaining party suffered prejudice as a result. See In re Estate of Corbett, 211 Neb. 335, 318 N.W.2d 720 (1982) (concluding communication between court and jury was harmless error where appellant failed to show prejudice). As previously stated, we have concluded that an unauthorized communication occurred in this case. We now determine that the condemnees failed to meet their burden of establishing that they were prejudiced by the trial court's errors noted above. Because condemnees failed to meet their burden of proving prejudice, the trial court's decision on restated assignment of error No. 2 was not an abuse of discretion.