Opinion ID: 1293219
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defendant's Absence at Reading of Testimony

Text: (24a) Defendant asserts he was deprived of his right to be personally present during the reading of some guilt phase testimony. (25) The right to presence and the companion right to confront and cross-examine witnesses are embodied in the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the federal Constitution. ( Bustamante v. Eyman (9th Cir.1972) 456 F.2d 269, 272.) As defendant observes, he has a constitutional right to be present at trial under the state Constitution (Cal. Const., art. I, § 15). The application of the statutory implementation (§§ 977, 1043) and decisional law that provide a right to presence in California are summarized in People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 309-310 [168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149], in which the defendant was absent from an in-chambers hearing on a motion for mistrial: The cases which have interpreted sections 977 and 1043 uniformly have held that the accused is not entitled to be personally present either in chambers or at bench discussions which occur outside of the jury's presence on questions of law or other matters in which defendant's presence does not bear a `reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' [Citations]. Stated in another way, `[W]hen the presence of the defendant will be useful, or of a benefit to him and his counsel, the lack of presence becomes a denial of due process of law.' [Citations.] The burden is upon defendant to demonstrate that his absence prejudiced his case or denied him a fair and impartial trial. ( Ibid. ; see also People v. Hovey (1988) 44 Cal.3d 543, 585 [244 Cal. Rptr. 121, 749 P.2d 776].) The day after deliberations began, the jury requested the court to read the testimony of Lee (who testified about introducing victim Kreuger to defendant), Akers (an alibi witness who claimed to have spoken to defendant between 5 and 6:30 a.m. on the day of the murders), Tieffer (who rebutted Akers's testimony) and Hemmer (who was called as a defense witness and testified regarding his efforts to locate Kreuger). Defendant was not present at the reading, although defense counsel was present. (24b) As the People observe, defendant cannot demonstrate that his absence during the reading of the above testimony prejudiced his case or denied him a fair trial. ( Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 585.) Defendant claims his presence would have ensured the reading was accurate and detected whether any distortion of the testimony occurred in the jury room. Defendant also argues that had he been present, his knowledge of the facts of the case would have aided counsel in presenting a factual argument that the reporter's reading did not accurately reflect the testimony [and that] he could have advised his counsel on the differences between the testimony as filtered through the court reporter's reading and the testimony as originally given. Finally, defendant argues that had he been present the jury might have drawn conclusions from [his] demeanor during the testimony that it could not have drawn in his absence. After considering the nature of the matter and reviewing the record, we find defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. ( Hovey, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 585.) Like Hovey, the record here merely shows the court reread the testimony of four witnesses to the jury (two prosecution and two defense witnesses), and defendant does not argue that anything else, in addition to the rereading, took place that would have prejudiced his right to a fair and impartial trial. As we stated in Hovey, The rereading of testimony ordinarily would not be an event which bears a substantial relation to the defendant's opportunity to defend, and nothing in the present record indicates that defendant's personal presence would have assisted the defense in any way. Defendant's suggestion that the jury might have been favorably influenced by defendant's reactions to the reread testimony ... is entirely speculative and fails to carry his burden of establishing prejudice. (44 Cal.3d at p. 585.) Finally, defendant argues that counsel could not waive his right to be present at the reading of testimony. Although we can only surmise from this record that counsel indeed waived defendant's presence, defendant's absence, even without waiver, was not prejudicial because the reading of testimony did not have a reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of defendant's opportunity to defend against the charge. ( People v. Garrison, supra, 47 Cal.3d 746, 782-783; People v. Rich (1988) 45 Cal.3d 1036, 1105 [248 Cal. Rptr. 510, 755 P.2d 960].)