Opinion ID: 6317126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: PPD Benefits

Text: We next turn to the issue of whether the ALJ erred in enhancing Robbins’s PPD benefits by the two-times multiplier. Rev-A-Shelf argues that the ALJ erred in calculating Robbins’s post-injury weekly wage in order to qualify her for the two-times multiplier. KRS 342.730(1)(c)2 states, If an employee returns to work at a weekly wage equal to or greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury, the weekly benefit for permanent partial disability shall be determined under paragraph (b) of this subsection for each week during which that employment is sustained. During any period of cessation of that employment, temporary or permanent, for any reason, with or without cause, payment of weekly benefits for permanent partial disability during the period of cessation shall be two (2) times the amount otherwise payable under paragraph (b) of this subsection. This provision shall not be construed so as to extend the duration of payments. This subsection “applies without regard to whether the worker returns to the employment in which the injury occurred or to other employment.” Toy v. Coca Cola Enters., 274 S.W.3d 433, 435 (Ky. 2008). The parties do not dispute that upon Robbins’s return to work after her injury, she earned $1.00 per hour less than she had earned prior to her injury. Thus, if only her earnings from Rev-A-Shelf are considered, her weekly wage 11 post-injury was not “equal to or greater than the average weekly wage at the time of injury” to qualify her for the two-times multiplier in KRS 342.730(1)(c)2. However, several months after returning to work (but a few months before she ceased employment with Rev-A-Shelf), Robbins began working as a home health aide in addition to working for Rev-A-Shelf. In her home health aide position, she earned $140 each week. When her earnings as a home health aide were added to the wages she was earning from Rev-A-Shelf, Robbins was earning more than her average weekly wage at the time of her injury. We therefore must determine whether the ALJ erred in including Robbins’s earnings as a home health aide in her post-injury weekly wage for purposes of the two-times multiplier. Rev-A-Shelf argues that the ALJ erred by including Robbins’s home health aide earnings in calculating her post-injury weekly wage for two reasons: (1) because Robbins did not prove that Rev-A-Shelf had knowledge of her employment as a home health aide as required by KRS 342.140(5); and (2) because Robbins did not prove the income she earned as a home health aide was subject to the Act as required by Hale v. Bell Aluminum, 986 S.W.2d 152 (Ky. 1998).5 5 “[A] worker’s wages from a concurrent employment relationship are not to be included in the computation of the worker’s average weekly wage pursuant to KRS 342.140(5) when such employment has been specifically excluded from coverage under the Act.” Id. at 154 (citing Wright v. Fardo, 587 S.W.2d 269 (Ky. App. 1979); Carter, 536 S.W.2d 461). 12 Underlying Rev-A-Shelf’s first argument on this issue is the presumption, based on its interpretation of Ball v. Big Elk Creek Coal Co., Inc., 25 S.W.3d 115 (Ky. 2000), that KRS 342.150(5) applies to the calculation of Robbins’s postinjury wages. Because this presumption is incorrect, Rev-A-Shelf’s argument fails. In Ball, the claimant returned to work with a different employer following his injury. Id. at 116. In this post-injury employment, the claimant’s overtime and periodic bonuses fluctuated such that his weekly wage was only sometimes equal to or greater than his pre-injury average weekly wage. Id. The claimant argued that his weekly wage should be reviewed every week to determine if his wage that week was equal to or greater than his pre-injury average weekly wage. Id. This Court rejected that argument. Id. at 117. Instead, we held, The method which the legislature has chosen to determine a worker’s income from a particular employment is the average weekly wage, the computation of which is set forth in KRS 342.140. Rather than focusing upon a particular week which may or may not accurately reflect the worker’s earning capacity in the employment, KRS 342.140 requires the computation of an average of the worker’s earnings over a period of 13 consecutive calendar weeks. Id. at 117–18. Ball’s holding was limited to the method of computing a claimant’s wages. It held, in essence, that the claimant’s post-injury wage must be an average weekly wage. Ball clearly applies to parts of KRS 342.140. However, we decline to extend its holding to KRS 342.140(5). If we were to interpret Ball as 13 extending to KRS 342.140(5), we would run afoul of the plain language of the statute itself, as described below. KRS 342.140 explains how an employee’s average weekly wage at the time of injury is to be calculated. Under that statute, “[w]hen the employee is working under concurrent contracts with two (2) or more employers and the defendant employer has knowledge of the employment prior to the injury, his or her wages from all the employers shall be considered as if earned from the employer liable for compensation.” KRS 342.140(5) (emphasis added). By its plain language, KRS 342.140(5) only applies to pre-injury wages. It would be nonsensical to interpret it in any other way. It would be impossible for an employer to have “knowledge of the employment prior to the injury” in a situation such as the one before us today, where the concurrent employment did not arise until after the injury. The subsection, as written, provides no guidance as to how it would apply post-injury. We cannot, by judicial fiat, not only apply it post-injury but also determine the parameters by which to do so. Having determined KRS 342.140(5) does not apply to the calculation of post-injury wages, we now turn to Rev-A-Shelf’s argument that Robbins did not prove the income from her home health aide job came under the Act as opposed to being wages earned as an independent contractor. The ALJ made no findings regarding whether Robbins’s earnings from that employment were covered by the Act. Because of this, we are unable to determine whether it was supported by substantial evidence in the record. See City of Ashland v. Stumbo, 461 S.W.3d 392 (Ky. 2015). As such, we vacate the ALJ’s enhancement of 14 Robbins’s PPD benefits by the two-times multiplier and remand for further factual findings on this issue.