Opinion ID: 1791277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: are the defendants immune from this suit?

Text: McFadden alleges that the defendants committed an intentional tort by their willful, wanton and reckless actions. Although his Complaint does not specifically state what the intentional tort is, he alleges that he suffered mental and emotional anguish, which we interpret to mean that he is asserting a claim for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. He also outlines what he contends is the duty of the defendants, the breach of the duty, and the injury he has suffered as a result of a direct and proximate result of the defendants' actions, which are the elements of an action for negligence. McFadden v. State, 542 So.2d 871 (Miss. 1989), considered the question of the immunity of prison officials. Under Mississippi law, the State and its agencies cannot be sued unless they consent to be sued. See Miss. Code Ann. § 11-46-6 (Supp. 1990). However, where persons working for the State have been named in a civil suit in their individual capacities, they are not given absolute immunity but only qualified immunity. Qualified immunity acts to protect prison officials only when they were performing a discretionary function as opposed to a ministerial function. The distinction between the two is that [if] the duty is one which has been positively imposed by law and in a manner or upon conditions which are specifically designated, the duty to perform under the condition specified, not being dependent upon the officer's judgment or discretion, the act and discharge thereof is ministerial. McFadden, 542 So.2d at 877. Where prison officials have been sued for damages in a civil action, they will have no immunity if they have breached a legal duty causing injury and (1) that duty is ministerial in nature, or (2) that duty involves the use of discretion and the governmental actor greatly or substantially exceeds his authority and in the course thereof causes harm, or (3) the governmental actor commits an intentional tort. Grantham v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 225 (Miss. 1988). An action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress occurs [w]here there is something about the defendant's conduct which evokes outrage or revulsion, done intentionally  ... the results being reasonably foreseeable  ... even though there has been no physical injury. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Devers, 405 So.2d 898, 902 (Miss. 1981). In such an action, the damages awarded are dependent on the nature of the act rather than on the result. McFadden has failed to allege conduct which is so outrageous that the defendants are liable for the intentional infliction of emotional distress. His claim of negligence must also fail since the duties involved in this action are discretionary in nature. Summary judgment was proper on these issues. AFFIRMED AS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE ISSUES OF VISITATION AND TORT LIABILITY; REVERSED AND REMANDED AS TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON HE ISSUES OF TRANSFERRAL FROM ONE PRISON FACILITY TO ANOTHER AND JOB REASSIGNMENT. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, PITTMAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur.