Opinion ID: 3064738
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Adequate and Independent State Procedural Bar

Text: [1] Normally, a habeas petitioner carries the burden on appeal. Sometimes, however, the burden rests with the state. “Procedural default is an affirmative defense, and the state has the burden of showing that the default constitutes an adequate and independent ground” for denying relief. Insyxiengmay, 403 F.3d at 665 (emphasis added). Once the state meets that burden of proof, the burden on all remaining issues shifts to the petitioner. [2] To constitute an adequate and independent state procedural ground sufficient to support a state court’s finding of procedural default, “a state rule must be clear, consistently 6552 SCOTT v. SCHRIRO applied, and well-established at the time of petitioner’s purported default.” Lambright v. Stewart, 241 F.3d 1201, 1203 (9th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A state rule is considered consistently applied and well-established if the state courts follow it in the “vast majority of cases.” See Dugger v. Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 411 n.6 (1989). We find the State has not met its burden to prove the rule cited and relied upon by the Arizona post-conviction court—Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.6(d)—was clear, consistently applied, and well-established at the time the post-conviction court applied it to Scott’s case. The basis for the state court’s order denying Scott’s motions to vacate the denial of the first petition and allow the filing of an amended petition raising new grounds for relief was as follows: There is little doubt that this Court is Authorized [sic], upon a showing of good cause, to permit a defendant to amend a petition for post-conviction relief before a dispositive order issues. See Rule 32.6(d), A.R.Crim. P. Here, however, Defendant seeks an order vacating this Court’s order dismissing his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. . . . To grant the relief requested by Defendant would be contrary to the underlying purpose of Rule 32 and inconsis- tent with its procedures. [3] This language implies the court thought that, regardless whether Scott had shown good cause to excuse his failure to plead all his claims in his first petition for post-conviction relief, the court simply did not have authority to allow amendment to the petition because it was amended after the court had already denied his first petition. This conclusion is contrary to the plain language of Rule 32.6(d), which at the time of Scott’s post-conviction proceeding read: SCOTT v. SCHRIRO 6553 After the filing of a post-conviction relief petition, no amendments shall be permitted except by leave of court upon a showing of good cause. Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(d) (1996) (emphasis added). The only condition to amendment of a filed petition is the existence of good cause. Whether a court has or has not ruled on the original petition is not mentioned as a condition to amendment. [4] The post-conviction relief judge conducted no analysis as to whether Scott had shown good cause to amend his petition. Rather, it appears the judge relied on an earlier version of Rule 32.6(d), which prohibited a post-conviction court from allowing the filing of an amended petition after the first petition had been dismissed. Before 1992, Rule 32.6(d) read, “Amendments to pleadings shall be liberally allowed at all stages of the proceeding prior to entry of judgment.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.6(d) (1991) (emphasis added).6 The emphasized language from this prior version of the rule, restricting amendments to the time period “prior to entry of judgment,” was deleted by the legislature in 1992. Scott filed his proposed amendment in 1996. The Arizona courts have not consistently interpreted the 1996 version of Rule 32.6(d) to prohibit amended or supplemental petitions for post-conviction relief when such amendments or supplements are filed after the denial of the first petition. To the contrary, before the post-conviction court’s ruling in this case but after Rule 32.6(d) was amended in 1992, the Arizona Court of Appeals ruled in 1995 that a postconviction court has the authority to allow the filing of an 6 Arizona courts continue to construe Rule 32.6(d) as liberally allowing amendments, even though this language was also deleted in the 1992 revisions. See Canion v. Cole, 115 P.3d 1261, 1264 (Ariz. 2005) (holding “Rule 32.6(d), which permits a defendant to amend his petition ‘upon a showing of good cause,’ adopts a liberal policy toward amendment of [post-conviction relief] pleadings.”). 6554 SCOTT v. SCHRIRO amended petition upon a showing of good cause, even if the court has already dismissed the original petition. See Rodriguez, 903 P.2d at 640-41 (holding that good cause was shown under Rule 32.6 where a petitioner sought to file a petition pro se after the post-conviction court dismissed his first petition because his post-conviction counsel failed to file the necessary brief explaining is claims in a timely manner). Thus, Rodriguez, the only published case that had interpreted Rule 32.6(d) after the 1992 amendment but before Scott’s proceeding in 1996, was contrary to the post-conviction court’s ruling in this case.7 The Rodriguez case shows the post-conviction court did not rely on a rule of state procedure that is regularly followed or “consistently applied” by the Arizona state courts. As this court has held, “federal courts should not insist upon a petitioner, as a procedural prerequisite to obtaining federal relief, complying with a rule the state itself does not consistently enforce.” Siripongs v. Calderon, 35 F.3d 1308, 1318 (9th Cir. 1994). [5] Thus, given that neither the text of the 1992 version of Rule 32.6(d) nor any case construing that version of the rule state that a post-conviction court cannot grant a motion to amend the petition after the original petition has been dismissed, the state has not met its burden of proving Rule 32.6(d) is consistently interpreted as it was interpreted here. Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that Rule 32.6(d) constitutes an adequate and independent state proce- 7 Because the relevant inquiry is whether the rule was well-established or consistently applied “at the time of [the] alleged default to bar federal review,” cases decided after the purported procedural default normally should normally not be considered. See Lambright, 241 F.3d at 1203, n.2. Nevertheless, we note that after Scott’s trial, the Arizona Supreme Court followed the reasoning of Rodriguez and issued orders allowing defendants upon a showing of good cause to file amended or supplemental petitions after their first petitions had been denied. See Arizona v. Stokley, No. CV-97-0203-SA (1999); Arizona v. Kayer, No. CR-94-0694 (1998). SCOTT v. SCHRIRO 6555 dural bar to federal review on the merits and failing to rule on the merits of the proposed claims.