Opinion ID: 2265444
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: wps

Text: Appellant's remaining claim concerns the liability of WPS, the employer of Robinson and Tate, for damages in connection with Tate's death. The trial court granted WPS' motion for summary judgment on the ground that the exclusive liability provision of the LHWCA limits appellants to their recovery under the Act and precludes them from recovering damages in a tort action. The LHWCA requires employers to provide compensation to employees who are disabled or killed in the course of their employment irrespective of fault. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (1976). The exclusive liability section of the Act states, in pertinent part: The liability of an employer prescribed in section 904 of this title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, ... and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in admiralty on account of such injury or death.... LHWCA § 905(a). Thus, the Act deprives employees and their representatives of the right to pursue common law tort suits, such as wrongful death actions, against their employers or co-workers if the injuries are covered by the Act. Harrington v. Moss, 407 A.2d 658, 660-61 (D.C.1979). Appellants emphasize that the restriction in § 905(a) does not reach actions where the employer specifically intended to injure the employee. [10] Houston v. Bechtel Associates Professional Corp., supra, 522 F.Supp. at 1096; 2A A. LARSON, supra, § 68.13, at 13-5, and cases cited at n. 11. Employer, in the context of a corporation, is a person who is realistically the alter ego of the corporation and not merely a foreman, supervisor or manager. 2A A. LARSON, supra, § 68.20, at 13-10. Appellants' theory in the trial court, and their contention on appeal is that while Robinson committed the actual shooting, it was the corporate officials of WPS who with actual, specific, and deliberate intent conspired to have Mr. Tate killed. According to appellants, the corporate hierarchy of WPS was involved in a narcotics ring operating out of the EPA building, and these officers conspired to kill Mr. Tate because Tate had discovered the existence of this operation. We have examined the pleadings, the record, and in particular the trial court's detailed memorandum and we concur with the trial court's conclusion that these allegations are totally lacking in merit. We agree with the trial court that upon the basis of the evidence proffered by plaintiffs in support of said allegation, no jury could reasonably conclude that WPS participated in any manner in the killing of Tate. In sum, appellants have failed to present any proof, other than conclusory allegations and innuendo, which would support a finding that WPS specifically intended to kill appellants' decedent. They have not offered any deposition testimony, affidavits, or other documents which substantiate any of their claims. Thus, we conclude that there are no remaining material facts in dispute with regard to appellants' claims against WPS. In light of appellants' recovery under the LHWCA, they are now precluded from maintaining a suit in tort against WPS, and accordingly, summary judgment was properly entered. Finding no disputed material issues with respect to appellants' claims against either appellee, and concluding that appellees are entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the trial court's orders granting summary judgment. Affirmed.