Opinion ID: 566300
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The District Court's Discovery and Evidentiary Rulings

Text: 60 The District Court acted within the broad discretion afforded trial courts when it limited the scope of discovery of non-party insured evidence. We may reverse the District Court's discovery and evidentiary rulings only if these rulings are an abuse of discretion. Viles v. Ball, 872 F.2d 491, 494 (D.C.Cir.1989); Brune v. IRS, 861 F.2d 1284, 1288 (D.C.Cir.1988). Thus, we review the court's discovery ruling to determine if the court's  'actions were clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful.'  Hull v. Eaton Corp., 825 F.2d 448, 452 (D.C.Cir.1987) (quoting Northrop Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 751 F.2d 395, 399 (D.C.Cir.1984)). 61 In the present case, appellants sought discovery of other policies issued by the defendant insurance carriers to other policy holders that contained asbestos-related exclusions. The District Court found these documents relevant, but concluded that the enormity of the discovery sought and the heavy burden such would impose on the defendants, Carey-Canada, 118 F.R.D. at 245, warranted restricting the scope of discovery. Consequently, the court limited appellants' discovery to documents relating to the policies defendants sold to non-party insureds that contain an asbestos-related exclusion and which were written or referred to by the underwriters of the policies at issue in the instant case prior to the issuance of the policies before the court. Id. at 245 (emphasis omitted). 62 On April 8, 1987, appellants again sought discovery of other policies. Appellants waited, however, until March 31, 1988--one month before the close of discovery and five years after the action commenced--to file a motion to compel. Thus, the District Court denied the motion on July 26, 1988, in part because appellants did not seek modification of the court's earlier order in a timely fashion. The Celotex Corp. v. Cal. Union Ins. Co., Civ. No. 86-1142, Memorandum Order (D.D.C. July 26, 1988). Against this background, we cannot conclude that the trial court's handling of discovery in this case was an abuse of discretion or clearly unreasonable. Accordingly, we hold the court's rulings reasonable and not arbitrary. 63 Appellants also claim that the District Court's refusal to allow them to introduce evidence within the scope of the court's discovery order at trial is reversible error. We do not address this question with respect to the 1979 National Union Policy and the Columbia Casualty Policy since we are remanding for further consideration and the District Court will want to determine anew the admissibility of the evidence in light of this opinion. Any error committed by the District Court when it prevented appellants from introducing evidence consistent with the court's discovery orders, 5 is harmless and thereby not reversible under this Circuit's precedents. See Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116, 132 (D.C.Cir.1986) (harmless error rule applies if defects do not affect parties' substantial rights); United States v. Hernandez, 780 F.2d 113, 119 (D.C.Cir.1986) (same). The test for determining whether a trial court's evidentiary ruling is harmless is clear: If (1) the case is not close, (2) the issue not central, or (3) effective steps were taken to mitigate the effects of the error, the error is harmless. Id. (citing Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1079 (D.C.Cir.1969)). Here, the District Court, after reviewing 1400 exhibits and hearing seven days of testimony, found clear and convincing evidence that all parties to these insurance contracts understood and interpreted them to exclude all asbestos-related disease claims. Carey Canada, 720 F.Supp. at 1026. Thus, the case is not close with respect to the 1977 National Union Policy.