Opinion ID: 166896
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mr. Winsness

Text: 28 For different reasons, Mr. Winsness also lacks standing to pursue his constitutional challenge. Accepting the allegations of the Complaint as true and construing them in favor of the Plaintiffs, Mr. Winsness has identified two kinds of injury resulting from two distinct sources. First, he alleges that he was injured by county prosecutors because of the preliminary criminal proceedings he endured before the Salt Lake County Justice Court. Second, he alleges that he suffers a continuing injury from the citation and his resulting criminal record. Neither injury satisfies the requirements of Article III.
29 Initially, we consider Mr. Winsness's allegations that he suffered concrete injury because of the actions of Salt Lake County prosecutors. Our precedents establish that a criminal prosecution, even one that is swiftly abandoned, can confer standing. See Faustin v. City & County of Denver, 268 F.3d 942, 948 (10th Cir.2001); F.E.R. v. Valdez, 58 F.3d 1530, 1533 (10th Cir.1995). In Faustin, the plaintiff was cited for violating a city posting ordinance by displaying an anti-abortion banner over an overpass. Faustin, 268 F.3d at 946. The charge was dismissed after the city prosecutor determined that displaying the banner did not violate the ordinance because it was not affixed to anything. Id. Later, the prosecutor sent a memorandum to the chief of police advising that Ms. Faustin's actions were protected by the First Amendment. Id. This Court held that Ms. Faustin had standing to seek nominal damages and retrospective declaratory relief based on her prosecution. Id. at 948. 30 Like Ms. Faustin (and unlike Mr. Larsen), Mr. Winsness was briefly prosecuted as a result of his criminal citation. He was therefore put to the trouble of engaging a lawyer, appearing in court on several occasions, and filing a motion to dismiss. It is no answer to point out that the action against Mr. Winsness was dismissed before reaching trial. Even short-lived criminal prosecutions can cause concrete injuries. Cf. Quermbeck v. Hanson, 94 Utah 127, 75 P.2d 1027, 1029-30 (1938) (holding that damages for malicious prosecution, based on criminal charges dismissed immediately for lack of probable cause, can include damages to reputation, good name, and for humiliation as well as lost wages for discharge from employment). Ordinarily, wrongful criminal proceedings cause a judicially cognizable injury that, according to our precedents, may be redressed through nominal damages and retrospective declaratory relief. 31 Mr. Winsness, however, does not seek compensation for injuries sustained as a result of his criminal prosecution. He has abandoned any claim for money damages, including nominal damages. Aplt. Reply Br. 6 n. 2. Although he has requested a declaration that the flag abuse statute interferes with free expression as protected by the United States Constitution, App. 13, such a declaration would operate prospectively. We have noted that a declaratory judgment is generally prospective relief, and that we treat declaratory relief as retrospective only to the extent that it is intertwined with a claim for monetary damages that requires us to declare whether a past constitutional violation occurred. PETA v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198, 1202-03 n. 2 (10th Cir.2002) (construing F.E.R., 58 F.3d at 1533). That was the case in Faustin, where the plaintiff lacked standing to seek prospective injunctive relief but could pursue declaratory relief in conjunction with her request for nominal damages. See Faustin, 268 F.3d at 948. In contrast, Mr. Winsness makes no request for nominal damages, and the Complaint seeks equitable relief strictly to prevent future enforcement of the flag abuse statute. See App. 13 (requesting Declaratory and Injunctive Relief to Enforce [the] United States Constitution). Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the Plaintiffs acknowledged that Mr. Winsness has brought a separate action against the deputy sheriff under § 1983 seeking money damages based on his citation and prosecution. 32 We are left, then, with Mr. Winsness's request for prospective injunctive and declaratory relief, and in this regard Mr. Winsness finds himself in the same position as Mr. Larsen: faced with no credible threat of future prosecution. Prosecutors immediately scuttled the only known prosecution under the statute, against Mr. Winsness, without filing a criminal information. The Supreme Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson makes repeat prosecutions even more unlikely. Most importantly, Mr. Winsness has received sworn assurances from county prosecutors that the flag abuse statute will not be enforced against anyone. 33 To be sure, one of the Defendants briefly pursued criminal proceedings against Mr. Winsness in the past. The Supreme Court has noted that past wrongs are evidence bearing on whether there is a real and immediate threat of repeated injury. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 496, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974). Yet the fact of past injury does not confer standing to seek prospective injunctive relief without some credible threat of future injury. See City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 108, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983) (finding that although the plaintiff had been subjected to an unconstitutional chokehold during an arrest, it was no more than conjecture that police would regularly use such chokeholds in the future, and no more than speculation that the plaintiff would again be arrested and subjected to one). In Faustin, the plaintiff had faced criminal charges for violating a city posting ordinance, and sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance in the future on First Amendment grounds. Faustin, 268 F.3d at 946. We held that no credible threat of future prosecution existed after the charges were dismissed [i]n light of the city prosecutor's determination that Faustin was not violating the posting ordinance. Faustin, 268 F.3d at 948; see also D.L.S., 374 F.3d at 975 ([A]ssurances from prosecutors that they do not intend to bring charges are sufficient to defeat standing, even when the individual plaintiff had actually been charged or directly threatened with prosecution for the same conduct in the past.). 34 Similarly, in this case, Mr. Winsness's brief prosecution does not change the fact that he faces no credible threat of future prosecution. It is no more than speculation to predict that Mr. Winsness will again face criminal proceedings for altering the flag. Unlike his co-plaintiff, Mr. Winsness has alleged neither an intent nor a desire to violate the flag-abuse statute in the future. According to the police report, he did so this time because he was bored, and the Complaint states only that he may choose to alter another flag in the future. App. 12, 62. Even if he does, the Complaint itself suggests that prosecutions are unlikely because Mr. Larsen and Ms. Fratkin have publicly violated the flag abuse statute without facing criminal charges. Moreover, prosecutors promptly dismissed the citation against Mr. Winsness after concluding that he was engaged in protected speech. Under the reasoning of Faustin, Mr. Winsness lacks standing to seek prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. 35 Even if we assume that a credible threat of prosecution existed before this lawsuit was filed, the prosecutors' affidavits have rendered the controversy moot. For good reason, courts are reluctant to deem a controversy moot based merely on assurances from the defendants that they will not engage in unlawful activity again. See United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632, 73 S.Ct. 894, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953) ([V]oluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct does not deprive the tribunal of power to hear and determine the case, [in part because]. . . . [t]he defendant is free to return to his old ways.). Accordingly, the defendant bears the heavy, stringent, and formidable burden of demonstrating that it is absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 170, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000). 4 The standard is difficult to satisfy, but not impossible. See Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d 1277, 1291 (10th Cir.2004) (finding portions of a controversy moot because the City had submitted documents demonstrating that it had changed its practices to comply with federal law and [n]othing in the record suggests that Wichita Transit intends to resume its discontinued policies). 36 In this case, Mr. Blaylock has foresworn any intention to bring criminal charges against individuals who alter the flag for expressive purposes. His superior, Mr. Yocom, has gone further, categorically announcing that his office will bring no prosecutions under the statute. The veracity of these affidavits is bolstered both by the prosecutors' actions, quickly repudiating the citation against Mr. Winsness, and by Texas v. Johnson, which gives the prosecutors good reason to avoid initiating potentially futile prosecutions. The pleadings and affidavits provide no evidence, and the Plaintiffs have provided nothing but speculation, that the prosecutors will change their policies if this lawsuit is dismissed. We therefore find it absolutely clear that the threat of prosecution has been eliminated. Nothing in our case law prevents government actors from responsibly retreating from an ill-advised prosecution, in response to controlling Supreme Court authority. 37 With no request for damages or retrospective declaratory relief, no credible threat of further prosecution, and in the face of authoritative disavowals of any intention to enforce the statute, Mr. Winsness has not alleged any judicially cognizable injury as a result of actions by the prosecutors. 38
39 We next consider whether Mr. Winsness has standing based on allegations that he was issued a citation and has been harmed because he now has a criminal record for an alleged violation of the Statute. App. 12, 13. Unlike the brief criminal prosecution discussed above, a permanent criminal record could cause a continuing injury to Mr. Winsness. We assume for purposes of this appeal that Mr. Winsness has alleged a concrete injury as a result of the citation and criminal record. See Ambus v. Utah State Bd. of Educ., 800 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Utah 1990) (noting permissible uses of criminal records and emphasizing that, even in the absence of a criminal record, employers may independently check[] the background of employees to uncover evidence of arrests or convictions). 40 The citation and criminal record do not, however, provide Mr. Winsness with standing to sue these defendants. Standing requires not only a judicially cognizable injury, but a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of and a likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Phelps, 122 F.3d at 1326. These defendants did not issue the citation to Mr. Winsness and are not responsible for maintaining any record of it. 41 We confronted a similar issue in Nova Health Systems v. Gandy, 416 F.3d 1149, 1153-54 (10th Cir.2005), where an abortion provider sought to enjoin enforcement of an Oklahoma statute that imposed liability on abortion providers for any subsequent medical costs resulting from an abortion performed on a minor without parental consent or knowledge. The provider had alleged an adequate injury in fact because, as a result of the statute, it faced an imminent likelihood that it would lose some minor patients seeking abortions. Id. at 1155. Yet the provider brought suit against public officials who oversaw state medical facilities, none of which had actually sought to recover damages under the statute. Id. at 1157. Noting that a plaintiff must show that his or her injury is `fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court,' this Court found no causal connection between the actions of the defendants and the injury alleged by the provider. Id. at 1156-57 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130). Further, we found no substantial likelihood that declaratory or injunctive relief against the public officials would redress the provider's injury, as it would enjoin[] only these defendants from filing suit to recover damages under the statute. Id. at 1158-59 (emphasis in original). 42 Whatever injury Mr. Winsness has suffered as a result of the citation and criminal record, the Defendants in this case— the Governor, Attorney General, and Salt Lake County prosecutors—had nothing to do with it. The citation was issued by a sheriff's deputy without any prompting from the District Attorney's office. By operation of law, again without prosecutorial intervention, the citation became part of Mr. Winsness's criminal record. As in Nova Health Systems, no causal relationship exists between the actions of the Defendants and the alleged injury. Mr. Winsness therefore lacks standing to sue these defendants based on injuries resulting from the citation and criminal record.