Opinion ID: 2977399
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Removal Proceedings and IJ Decision

Text: On June 13, 2002, the former Immigration and Naturalization Service (now the Department of Homeland Security), initiated removal proceedings against Win by issuing a Notice to Appear and 4 charging Win under Section 212(a)(6)(A)(i) of the INA, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien present in the United States without being admitted or paroled, or an alien who has arrived in the United States at a time or place other than designated by the Attorney General. Removal proceedings were held on several dates in 2002, 2005, and 2006. At the 2002 and 2005 proceedings, Win, who was represented by counsel, admitted the allegations of facts alleged against him, except for his date of entry into the United States, and conceded the charge of removability. The IJ informed Win that it would be his burden to establish the date of his entry into the United States, that the one-year bar was at issue, and that it was Win’s burden to show exceptional circumstances so as to establish an exception to that one-year bar. Despite Win’s counsel’s request and the IJ’s grant of permission to supplement Win’s application for asylum, no supplement or amended application was filed.1 The IJ issued an oral decision and written order on March 28, 2006, denying Win’s application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT, and ordered Win removed to Burma.
Win’s asylum claim was denied on three alternative grounds. First, the IJ found that Win had not shown, by clear and convincing evidence, that he had first arrived in the United States on May 11, 2001 and thus had not shown that his application for asylum had been filed within one year of 1 Two minor changes were made to the Win’s application. First, the date political parties were allowed to compete in the upcoming Burma national election was changed from 1989 to 1988. Second, a correction was made to reflect Win was severely mistreated during his three arrests; not two. 5 the date he first arrived in the United States. Win had not argued or presented evidence that either changed or extraordinary circumstances caused him to miss the one-year deadline. Accordingly, the IJ concluded that Win was statutorily barred from obtaining the asylum relief he sought. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). Second, the IJ concluded that, even if Win’s asylum claim were not statutorily barred, it would be denied on the merits. Observing that an applicant for asylum must demonstrate that he is a “refugee” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A), the IJ found that Win’s claims of past persecution and fear of future persecution lacked credibility. Because he was found not to be a credible witness, the IJ concluded that Win had not shown that he was a “refugee” as defined by § 1101(a)(42)(A). The IJ stated specific reasons in support of her adverse credibility finding, relying on (1) inconsistencies between Win’s testimony and written application that were created by omissions in one or the other, (2) inconsistencies between Win’s testimony and affirmative statements in his written application, (3) the lack of reasonable or plausible explanations for those inconsistencies and omissions, (4) the lack of corroborating evidence that was reasonably available to Win, and (5) corroborating evidence presented by Win that failed to support his claims of past persecution. Lastly, the IJ concluded that, even if Win’s asylum claim were not statutorily barred and he was found to be credible, his asylum claim would be denied on the merits for another reason. The relief of asylum is discretionary, and the IJ concluded that Win was not entitled to a favorable exercise of discretion because, among other reasons, Win had spent approximately two years in a 6 refugee camp in Thailand and six months in South Korea, both safe havens, but never requested asylum. After providing reasons for denying Win’s asylum claim, the IJ addressed Win’s claims for withholding of removal under the INA and protection under the CAT.
The IJ first observed that, unlike asylum, the grant of withholding of removal under Section 241(b)(3) of the INA is not discretionary. To obtain this relief, however, Win must show that it is “more likely than not” that he would be persecuted on one or more of the statutorily protected grounds. The IJ concluded that Win failed to meet that burden and denied his request for a grant of withholding of removal under the INA because Win was found not to be a credible witness. The IJ also concluded that, even if Win was found to be credible, his claim for withholding of removal would be denied because Win had not shown “a clear probability” that he would be persecuted if he was removed to Burma. The IJ based this conclusion on the fact that (1) Win remained unharmed in Burma from August 1989 until May 26, 1996, a period of almost seven years, even though he admitted that he was politically active, and (2) Win remained unharmed in Burma from May 1997 until September 1998, even though Win continued his political activity in prodemocracy efforts in Burma, albeit more secretly than in the past.
Win’s request for withholding of removal under the CAT was also denied based on the IJ’s adverse credibility finding. The IJ also concluded that, even if found to be credible, Win’s claim for protection under the CAT would be denied because Win had not shown that it was “more likely than 7 not” that he would suffer the torture he fears if removed to Burma. Citing Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533 (6th Cir. 2003), the IJ concluded that generalized descriptions of human rights violations in Country Condition Reports prepared by the State Department were insufficient to show that it is more likely than not that Win would be tortured for his political opinions if returned to Burma.