Opinion ID: 1839039
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Heading Rank: 2

Heading: constitutionality of section 701.1, code, 1966

Text: VIII. Defendant challenges the constitutionality of section 701.1, Code, 1966, which makes an attempt to produce an abortion a crime. The statute is challenged for vagueness and uncertainty and because it denies equal protection. In dealing with these two attacks we start from the premise that one who challenges a statute on constitutional grounds assumes the burden to negate every reasonable basis to sustain it. A statute will not be declared invalid unless it is clearly, palpably and without doubt unconstitutional. State v. McNeal (Iowa 1969) 167 N.W.2d 674, 677; Lee Enterprises, Inc. v. Iowa State Tax Commission (Iowa 1968) 162 N.W.2d 730, 737. IX. The first constitutional attack is predicated on People v. Belous (California 1969) 80 Cal.Rptr. 354, 458 P.2d 194. The Supreme Court of California in a 4 to 3 decision held the phrase unless the same is necessary to preserve her life is unconstitutionally vague and uncertain. Our statutory phrase unless such miscarriage shall be necessary to save her life is substantially similar. We are not persuaded by the majority opinion in People v. Belous, supra. The phrase found in the Iowa statute has been clear enough for satisfactory use for over 100 years. It should not now be the occasion for declaring the statute constitutionally invalid. This is the sense of two dissenting opinions in the California case. We agree. We need not attempt to elaborate on the dichotomy set forth in the California opinions. A note in 51 Iowa L.Rev. 883, 901 states: Only five jurisdictions in the United States have statutes which do not expressly allow abortions to save the life of the mother. In two of these states it has been held that the statute implied an exception to save life.   . To our knowledge no other state has seen fit to find the claimed offensive words vague and uncertain. We decline to do so now. X. The denial of equal protection argument is predicated on our decisions interpreting this statute. State v. Dunklebarger, 206 Iowa 971, 974, 221 N.W. 592, 594 states:    It follows also that, if a regular physician does make an examination, and does form an opinion, and does act upon it, he is entitled to the presumption of correct judgment and good faith, until the contrary be proven.   . But no such presumption applies in favor of a person not a physician. State v. Rowley, 198 Iowa 613, 199 N.W. 369. We again refer to the note in 51 Iowa L.Rev. at page 898: Section 701.1 does not distinguish abortions attempted by physicians from those attempted by laymen. However, the Supreme Court of Iowa has held that if a regular physician makes an examination, and acts upon it, he is entitled to the presumption of correct judgment and good faith, thereby falling under the therapeutic exception. If the defendant is not a physician, there will be no such presumption. This is a sound distinction because the absence of medical skill adds to the risk of injury.   . The legislature may make reasonable classifications between citizens affected by legislation. If the law operates equally upon all within the same class there is uniformity in the constitutional sense. Dickinson v. Porter (1949) 240 Iowa 393, 400, 35 N.W.2d 66, 72; State v. Wrenn (1922) 194 Iowa 552, 554, 188 N.W. 697, affirmed Wrenn v. State, 263 U.S. 688, 44 S.Ct. 228, 68 L.Ed. 507. The classification imposed on the statute by this court's interpretation is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. The cases noted do not make the statute unconstitutional.