Opinion ID: 4536272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cell phones as “property” under Condition 4

Text: ¶9 Lietzau argues the court of appeals erred by finding that “property” in Condition 4 includes cell phones. He does not dispute that a cell phone constitutes “property” under the plain meaning of the word. See Property, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “property” as “the rights in a valued resource such as land, chattel, or an intangible”). Rather, he relies on the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley to argue that the term “property” in Condition 4 necessarily excludes cell phones. ¶10 The Court in Riley recognized that cell phones are “minicomputers” that hold “a digital record of nearly every aspect of [people’s] lives—from the mundane to the intimate” and are thus unlike the types of property carried in one place by people living before the digital age. Riley, 573 U.S. at 393–95. As such, the Court concluded that a warrant is generally required to search a cell phone, and such devices are not subject to the search incident to arrest exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. Id. at 401–03; see also Peoples, 240 Ariz. at 248–49 ¶¶ 11–16 (discussing Riley). ¶11 Lietzau argues that after Riley, just as a warrant is generally required to search an arrestee’s cell phone, a warrant is generally required to search a probationer’s cell phone. Because the trial court was 4 STATE V. LIETZAU Opinion of the Court presumptively aware of Riley before placing Lietzau on probation, and the court could not impose an illegal condition, he asserts that Condition 4 necessarily excludes cell phones from its reach. Cf. Polk v. Hancock, 237 Ariz. 125, 129 ¶ 10 (2015) (concluding the trial court erred by imposing illegal probation term despite the defendant’s agreement because “parties cannot confer authority on the court that the law proscribes”). ¶12 We disagree that Riley prohibits probation conditions authorizing warrantless searches of cell phones. Simply put, the Court did not address that issue. Conversely, it has recognized that supervising probationers “permit[s] a degree of impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large” to “assure that the probation serves as a period of genuine rehabilitation and that the community is not harmed by the probationer’s being at large.” Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987). To that end, it has found that “a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens,” including a condition requiring the probationer to “[s]ubmit his . . . person, property, place of residence, vehicle [and] personal effects” to a warrantless search. United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 114, 119 (2001); see also State v. Montgomery, 115 Ariz. 583, 584 (1977) (“[A] probationer who has been granted the privilege of probation on condition that he submit at any time to a warrantless search may have no reasonable expectation of traditional Fourth Amendment protection.” (quoting People v. Mason, 488 P.2d 630, 633 (Cal. 1971)). Nothing in Riley suggests that the substantial privacy concerns attendant to warrantless cell phone searches of arrestees, who have not been convicted of a crime, foreclose warrantless searches of probationers’ cell phones pursuant to a probation condition, assuming the search is otherwise reasonable. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873, 876 (requiring a warrantless search of a probationer’s home to be “reasonable” to comply with the Fourth Amendment). ¶13 Lara, relied on by the trial court, does not persuade us to exclude cell phones from the reach of Condition 4. Lara’s probation conditions authorized warrantless, suspicionless searches of his “person and property, including any residence, premises, container or vehicle under [his] control.” Lara, 815 F.3d at 607. Probation officers searched text messages on Lara’s phone and found evidence ultimately leading to a criminal conviction. Id. at 608. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by not suppressing that evidence because the cell phone search was unreasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 612, 614. Significantly, for our 5 STATE V. LIETZAU Opinion of the Court purposes, the court concluded that the word “property” in Lara’s probation conditions did not unambiguously include cell phone data. Id. at 611. It pointed out that although the examples given in the condition “refer to physical objects that can be possessed,” cell phone data cannot be physically possessed and much information accessible through a phone, such as banking and medical records, are possessed by third parties and are thus not “under [Lara’s] control” as provided in the condition. Id. ¶14 Lara is distinguishable and, to the extent it is not, we reject its reasoning. Condition 4 authorizes a warrantless search of Lietzau’s “property” without qualifying examples, making it broader than the condition in Lara. Regardless, we disagree with Lara that the inability to physically possess digital data means it is not property when displayed on a cell phone. Whether we consider digital data to be merged with the cell phone displaying it, much like information written on paper, or treat it as intangible, digital data constitutes “property.” See Property, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra (including “chattel” and something “intangible” in the definition of “property”). ¶15 In sum, the plain meaning of “property” in Condition 4 includes a cell phone. Riley does not vary that meaning. The trial court erred by concluding otherwise.