Opinion ID: 2229929
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Trial Court's Excusal of Venireman Hodgdon

Text: During jury selection the trial court excused venireman Hodgdon because he had expressed reservations about the death penalty. Citing to People v. Brisbon, 106 Ill.2d 342, 88 Ill.Dec. 87, 478 N.E.2d 402 (1985), defendant argues that by excusing Hodgdon, the trial court denied defendant his right to rehabilitate those who have expressed personal objections to the death penalty but who have not indicated that they would refuse to follow the law and the court's instructions regarding the death penalty. The pertinent portion of Hodgdon's voir dire follows: THE COURT: Are your feelings about the death penalty such that you would refuse to consider the imposition of the death penalty in any case where the defendant has been convicted of murder? A. Yes. Q. Do you have any religious or moral scruples, either for or against the death penalty, that would interfere with your duty to follow the law and sign a proper verdict? A. Yes. Q. Are your beliefs such that regardless of the facts or the background of the defendant, that if the defendant were found guilty as charged of the offense of murder, that you would automatically vote either to impose or not to impose the death penalty? A. I think I understand that. Can I have you read that again. I'm sorry. Q. Sure. [The question was repeated.] A. Yes. Q. Now, you had indicated before that there was something in there that would prohibit you. Are you indicating that under any circumstances you could not vote to impose the death penalty? A. That is correct. MR. MARKESE [defense counsel]: I would like to approach. THE COURT: Take him out in the hall just one moment. (Juror Hodgdon exits courtroom.) MR. MARKESE: I want the opportunity to address the juror and try to rehabilitate him. THE COURT: That's denied. MR. MARKESE: Judge you have to give us that opportunity. THE COURT: No, I don't. He has made an unequivocal statement with regards to the fact that he would not impose it, and he has answered that way in every way that I have asked the question. If you think you are going to sit there and say if Hitler were on trial, could you give it to him? MR. KIELIAN [defense counsel]: Or Mark Furman, let me throw that in, to be current. THE COURT: Do you have a question you would like me to ask him? Do you want to pose a question to him? MR. MARKESE: No, I want to talk to him. THE COURT: Okay. That's denied. Bring him back in. A prospective juror in a capital case can be excused for cause when the juror's views on capital punishment would ` prevent or substantially impair [his ability to perform his duty] as a juror in accordance with [the law] and his oath.` [Citations.] People v. Simms, 168 Ill.2d 176, 187-88, 213 Ill.Dec. 576, 659 N.E.2d 922 (1995). In addition, a trial court's decision to exclude a juror is entitled to deference since it is in the best position to weigh a prospective juror's responses to voir dire Simms, 168 Ill.2d at 188, 213 Ill.Dec. 576, 659 N.E.2d 922. Venireman Hodgdon unequivocally stated that his beliefs would interfere with his duty to follow the law and sign a proper verdict, and further stated that he could not impose the death penalty under any circumstances. Also, the trial court offered to ask Hodgdon any question which defense counsel wished to have asked. Defense counsel declined to give the trial court a question. Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not err in excusing venireman Hodgdon.