Opinion ID: 627152
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Subsection 399b(a)(1)

Text: We first turn to 399b(a)(1), the restriction on paid advertisements for goods and services on behalf of for-profit corporations. As in the Turner cases, we hold that there was substantial evidence  including substantial evidence in the record before Congress  to support Congress's conclusions that: a) the harm posed by advertising by for-profit entities on public broadcast stations was real, not merely conjectural, and b) banning advertising by for-profit entities does not burden substantially more speech than necessary to further the government's legitimate interest. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 664-65, 114 S.Ct. 2445. Prior to the enactment of § 399b in 1981, Congress considered eliminating all advertising restrictions on public broadcast stations. Congress's decision to continue regulation of promotional advertising  at least by for-profit entities  on public broadcast stations was supported by substantial evidence presented to Congress that advertising would harm the educational mission of public broadcast stations. Congress heard testimony by a senior vice president from National Public Radio (NPR), who testified that an internal study conducted by NPR had shown that on-air advertising would hold little or no promise for public radio, because public radio stations broadcast precisely what commercial stations choose not to broadcast because of insubstantial income potential. (emphasis added). Congress also heard testimony from John C. DeWitt, from the American Foundation for the Blind, who testified that he was concerned a commercialization of public broadcasting would focus public broadcast programming towards the lowest common denominator, rather than diverse audiences, including minorities, women and the print handicapped. Finally, Congress had before it written testimony by the Association of Independent Video and Filmmakers, which stated unequivocally: commercialization will make public television indistinguishable from the new commercial or pay culture cable services. And public television will fail. In addition to the evidence which was before Congress in 1981, the government submitted a report from Roger G. Noll, an emeritus professor at Stanford University, who had written several books on the economics of the television industry. Noll's report concluded that because advertisers wish to air commercials on television programs with high numbers of viewers, [a] competitive, advertiser-supported television system leads to an emphasis on mass entertainment programming. Advertiser-supported television provides few programs that serve a small audience, even if that audience has an intense desire to watch programs that differ from standard mass entertainment programs. Commercial television stations, for example  which are primarily reliant on advertising  offer children's programming only if it can be used to market products to children, despite parents' desire to have their children watch educational television programming. The government buttressed Noll's report with a declaration from Lance Ozier, the former president of a nonprofit organization which operates a number of public broadcast television stations in Massachusetts. Ozier stated that the educational programs on public broadcast stations do not attract sufficient viewership to attract substantial advertising revenue. Thus, subjecting non-commercial stations to the same commercial pressures faced by commercial stations would make it economically impossible to provide such programming. Minority urges us to discount the evidence before Congress in 1981 as the opinions, predictions and wishes of the witness[es] unencumbered by any evidence. Minority is correct that Congress had no empirical data  statistics, academic studies, or otherwise  to support its 1981 conclusion that allowing commercial advertising on public broadcast stations would undermine niche programming on those stations. But we are unaware of any authority which requires a particular type of evidence in the record before Congress. Indeed, Turner I reminds us that [s]ound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future events and to anticipate the likely impact of these events, Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445. We do not normally substitute our judgment for the reasonable conclusion of a legislative body. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 211, 117 S.Ct. 1174. Moreover, Congress is not obligated, when enacting its statutes, to make a record of the type that an administrative agency or court does to accommodate judicial review. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 666, 114 S.Ct. 2445. We thus decline Minority's invitation to second-guess Congress as to the quality of the evidence before it as to the probable effect commercial advertising by for-profit firms would have on program content. In light of the deference we afford to Congress's legislative judgments, we conclude that Congress's conclusion that paid promotional messages by for-profit entities pose a threat to extinguish public broadcast stations' niche programming was supported by substantial evidence, including substantial evidence in the record before Congress. Turner II, 520 U.S. at 211, 117 S.Ct. 1174. Moreover, all of the evidence which was before Congress  and which was submitted by the government to the district court  evinces a strong connection between the harm recited and the prevalence of commercial advertising. Thus, we cannot conclude that § 399b(a)(1) burden[s] substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. Turner I, 512 U.S. at 665, 114 S.Ct. 2445.