Opinion ID: 844204
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Effect of antisympathy “instruction”

Text: Defendant contends that his death sentence must be reversed because the court‟s instruction misled the jury regarding the scope of its discretion in determining penalty. We conclude that the jury was not misled. The complained-of “instruction” was part of the court‟s introductory remarks to prospective jurors during voir dire. The court provided an overview of the 46 principles governing the guilt phase of the trial, such as the presumption of innocence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It also explained the rule that the jury determine the facts of the case based on the evidence received at trial, stating as follows: “It‟s a normal human reaction or a human emotion, you‟re going to be here during the course of this trial through the various phases, we get to all of those phases, for several weeks. . . . [Y]ou‟ll be seeing Mr. Rogers, Mr. Myles, every day,” and their friends or family might be in the courtroom. Likewise, the court pointed out, there might be friends or family of the victims, and a “normal human reaction would be to have some feelings of sympathy” for them. The court indicated, however, that “what we‟re going to be asking you to do as jurors is to set aside any of those feelings of sympathy or empathy or compassion on either side and make an objective decision based solely on the facts and the law that I give you.” (Italics added.) Emphasizing the italicized portion of the court‟s remarks, defendant contends that the jury was impermissibly instructed not to consider sympathy during the penalty phase. Specifically, he complains that by referring to “the course of this trial through the various phases,” and indicating that “we get to all of those phases,” the court led the jury to believe that its “no sympathy” admonition was not limited to the determination of guilt. He argues that because the directive was given before the presentation of any evidence in the case, including his penalty phase witnesses, the jurors would have disregarded critical mitigating evidence, which he was constitutionally entitled to have them consider. Having examined the record as a whole, including the court‟s instructions, we conclude that the jury was not misled into believing it could not consider sympathy when determining penalty. (See People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 1025; People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 433-434; People v. Hernandez (1988) 47 Cal.3d 315, 365-367.) At the penalty phase, before the presentation of 47 evidence, the court instructed the jury that it was “free to assign whatever moral or sympathetic value” it deemed appropriate to each of the statutory factors it was permitted to consider. Immediately after that, the court directed the jury to “disregard any jury instruction given to you in the guilt or innocence phase of this trial which conflicts with that principle.” The court made the same point again at the conclusion of trial, prior to closing arguments, this time adding a directive to disregard “any statements that may have been made during jury selection, where we talked generally about some of the guidelines and principles.” Even assuming for argument that at this juncture some jurors may have misunderstood the role of sympathy in their penalty determination, the court‟s further instruction left no doubt that it was a proper consideration. The court specifically informed the jury, “You were previously instructed at the guilt phase of the trial that sympathy or pity for the defendant should not influence your consideration of the evidence. In this, the penalty phase of trial, the jury may properly consider sympathy or pity for the defendant in determining whether to impose life in prison without the possibility of parole.” Defendant asserts that it is unreasonable to conclude that jurors could or would disregard the “no sympathy” instruction. We disagree. In the course of rejecting a claim similar to the one defendant raises here, we previously have concluded that statements made at the time of jury selection did not “create such an indelible impression” that jurors were unable to follow the court‟s subsequent, specific instructions. (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 662.) The same conclusion is warranted here.12 (See also People v. Silva (1988) 45 Cal.3d 604, 12 Respondent argues that defendant has forfeited his claim of error because he did not object below. Defendant counters that the forfeiture rule does not apply when, as here, the court gives an instruction that incorrectly states the law. (footnote continued on next page) 48 637 [jurors who were asked during voir dire whether they could set aside feelings of sympathy would not have remembered or been guided by that question two months later when making their penalty determination].)