Opinion ID: 543684
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Hill's Hospital Admission

Text: 9 In October 1986, Hill voluntarily admitted himself to the psychiatric wing of a hospital, informing the hospital staff that he had an acute problem with drug and alcohol abuse. Hill testified in camera, however, that he had made up the drug addiction story, and had in fact checked into the hospital because his wife had just left him, he was kind of crazy and didn't know what to do, and thought maybe [he] would get some sympathy. Blood and urinalysis tests taken by the hospital turned up negative for illegal drugs. Hill had used cocaine and marijuana in the past, however, by his own admission and, apparently, according to other evidence. Hill left the hospital without checking out later on the same night he was admitted. 10 The defendants make a threefold argument against the district court's exclusion of this evidence. First, the defendants contend that it constituted psychiatric evidence bearing on Hill's mental capacity. Nothing in the defendants' proffer, however, suggested that Hill had ever suffered from any mental illness as such, aside from drug or alcohol abuse, and the proffered evidence certainly did not suggest that he suffered any mental disorder at the time of the November 1987 interrogation which might have impaired his ability to perceive events. Cf. United States v. Partin, 493 F.2d 750, 762 (5th Cir.1974) (evidence admissible concerning witness's mental incapacity at a time about which he proposes to testify); accord United States v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1163 (11th Cir.1983) (admissibility of a history of psychiatric disorders ... having specific relevance to the facts at issue ) (emphasis added). 11 Second, the defendants contend that Hill's prior drug use was admissible impeachment evidence. Hill denied, however, and the defense could proffer no evidence, that he had used illegal drugs during the year prior to November 1987. There was certainly no evidence that he was under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of the interrogation. Because of the extreme potential for unfair prejudice flowing from evidence of drug use, this Court has held that such evidence may properly be limited to specific instances of drug use [during] relevant periods of trial and the transaction charged in the indictment. United States v. Holman, 680 F.2d 1340, 1353 (11th Cir.1982); accord Jarrett v. United States, 822 F.2d 1438, 1446 (7th Cir.1987) (A witness's use of drugs may not be used to attack his or her general credibility, but only his or her ability to perceive the underlying events and testify lucidly at the trial.). Furthermore, prior instances of drug use are not relevant to truthfulness for purposes of Fed.R.Evid. 608(b). See United States v. Rubin, 733 F.2d 837, 841-42 (11th Cir.1984). 12 Third, the defendants contend that they were entitled to cross-examine Hill under Rule 608(b) concerning his admission that he lied to the hospital staff. This isolated untruth, however, which was apparently motivated by extreme emotional distress, would seem to have little if any conceivable relevance to his credibility at trial. See United States v. Fortes, 619 F.2d 108, 118 (1st Cir.1980) ([T]he district court is not bound to allow examination into every incident, no matter how remote in time and circumstance, that may possibly bear upon the witness' veracity.). We note that Rule 608(b) provides that specific instances of prior conduct may ... in the discretion of the court, if probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination. (Emphasis added.) 13 For these reasons, there was no abuse of discretion as to this item. 14