Opinion ID: 1406050
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Danger of Arbitrary Enforcement

Text: The appellants also argue that subsection (6)(a) is unconstitutionally vague because it creates the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. They point out that the exemption under subsection (6)(a) applies only when the health care provider determines that a particular patient qualifies for a waiver. As such, they argue, the determination of whether a health care provider has complied with subsection (6)(a) depends on the subjective sensibilities of the health care provider rather than any objective standard. The determinations under subsection (6)(a) depend on the individual sensibilities of the health care provider. Yet no one is in a better position than the health care provider to determine the immediate health needs of a given patient. Similarly, a health care provider is often called upon to evaluate the ability of his or her patients to pay for treatment. Nevertheless, statutes phrased in terms of individual sensibilities are susceptible to attack on vagueness grounds because of the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. See, e.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 613, 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1687-88, 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971). If at all feasible, however, a statute must be construed so as to accomplish the purposes for which it was enacted. Schubert v. People, 698 P.2d 788, 793 (Colo.1985). Where that legislative purpose can be accomplished through a limiting construction that will make the terms of the statute constitutional, we will do so. See May v. People, 636 P.2d 672, 675-76 (Colo.1981); Bolles v. People, 189 Colo. 394, 398, 541 P.2d 80, 83 (1975). In this case, whatever constitutional infirmity may be created by the requirement under subsection (6)(a) that the health care provider determine the patient's need for immediate care and his or her ability to pay can be rectified by narrowly construing the word determines as reasonably determines. Under that interpretation, the issue of whether a particular health care provider violates subsection (6)(a) will be decided by comparing the conduct in question to the conduct of a reasonably prudent health care provider under the circumstances. Subject to this qualification, we conclude that the exemption contained in subsection (6)(a) does not create the danger of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and, for that reason, is not unconstitutionally vague.