Opinion ID: 2994670
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Motion to Strike Answers to Requests to

Text: Admit Ms. Kalis also takes issue with the district court’s failure to consider her belated answers to Colgate’s requests for admissions. As with other discovery matters, we review the district court’s decision on this issue for an abuse of discretion. See American Auto. Ass’n (Inc.) v. AAA Legal Clinic of Jefferson Crooke, P.C., 930 F.2d 1117, 1119 (5th Cir. 1991). In November 1997, Colgate served on Ms. Kalis requests that she admit that (1) she did not have any knowledge of the substance of any written representations on the packaging of the product; (2) she had no knowledge of any documentation provided with a container of Sterno fondue fuel used in 1986; (3) she did not possess a photograph of the container of the Sterno fondue fuel that was used in April 1986; and (4) her expert had never examined the container in which the Sterno fondue fuel was contained. Ms. Kalis failed to respond to these requests, and, therefore, according to Rule 36, they were deemed admitted. Seven months later, Ms. Kalis served a response to the requests to admit that incorporated Mrs. Kalis’ recent memory concerning the fondue fuel container. [T]he proper procedural vehicle through which to attempt to withdraw admissions made in these circumstances is a motion under Rule 36(b) to withdraw admissions. United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1349 (7th Cir. 1987). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36(b) provides in relevant part that [a]ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission. Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b) (emphasis added). Ms. Kalis never filed a motion to withdraw admissions under Rule 36(b), and, therefore, the district court’s decision to strike her belated answers to Colgate’s requests was not an abuse of discretion. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in disregarding Mrs. Kalis’ affidavit or the belated answers to the requests to admit. It further did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Kalis’ additional discovery or in declining to compel Colgate to answer discovery requests when those issues were not brought before the court in a timely fashion. Without the additional documents and discovery, Ms. Kalis cannot establish a connection between Colgate and the product that caused her injuries. Consequently, the district court properly entered summary judgment for Colgate./7 D. Magistrate Judge’s Authority to Enter Summary Judgment Finally, Ms. Kalis argues that the magistrate judge did not have the authority to enter a summary judgment order. We find this argument completely devoid of merit. All parties signed a consent form that indicated that, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. sec. 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 73, the magistrate judge may conduct any and all further proceedings, including trial and entry of final judgment. See R.24. Furthermore, the authorizing statute, 28 U.S.C. sec. 636(c), clearly allows a magistrate judge to conduct any or all proceedings . . . and order the entry of judgment when all parties have consented./8 Consequently, the magistrate judge had the authority to enter summary judgment.