Opinion ID: 2780783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Lewis argues that the transcript of his waiver and the subsequent argument he made in his motion for a new trial show that his waiver was not voluntary because he believed that as an African-American, he would not face a jury of his peers in Johnson County and, thus, not receive a fair trial. Accordingly, he alleges that he mistakenly believed that the only way to receive a fair trial was to waive his right to a jury trial and proceed with a bench trial. Lewis contends that the district court should have corrected his mistaken belief by informing him that defense counsel could make challenges under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 88-89, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986), during voir dire if it appeared that the State was purposely striking African-Americans from the potential jury. A criminal defendant may waive the fundamental right to a jury trial if the court and State agree to the waiver. K.S.A. 22-3403 (defendant can submit felony case to court instead of jury with consent); State v. Irving, 216 Kan. 588, 589, 533 P.2d 1225 (1975). But this court has said that jury trial waivers should be strictly construed to ensure the defendant has every opportunity to receive a fair and impartial trial by jury. 216 Kan. at 589. The test for determining a waiver's validity is whether it was voluntarily made by a defendant who knew and understood what he or she was doing. Whether that test is satisfied depends upon the particular facts and circumstances in each case. Irving, 216 34 Kan. at 589; see also State v. Clemons, 273 Kan. 328, 340, 45 P.3d 384 (2002) (determination of knowing and voluntary jury trial waiver must be based upon facts and circumstances in each case); State v. Fisher, 257 Kan. 65, 73-74, 891 P.2d 1065 (1995) (no error in waiver because defendant spoke with counsel prior to decision, was informed of constitutional right to jury trial and effect of bench trial, and showed desire to have bench trial). A waiver will not be presumed from a silent record. Irving, 216 Kan. at 589. In Irving, the court cited the American Bar Association's (ABA) standards for accepting a jury trial waiver, which the court adopted as the accepted procedure in Kansas. 216 Kan. at 589-90. Those standards are the same today. See 3 American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury, Standard 15-1.2(b) (2d ed. 1980). Fashioned from the ABA's recommendation, the Irving court stated: [F]or a criminal defendant to effectively waive his right to a trial by jury, the defendant must first be advised by the court of his right to a jury trial, and he must personally waive this right in writing or in open court for the record. 216 Kan. at 590. Lewis' contention that his waiver was not knowingly made because the district court judge should have informed him of his attorney's ability to make Batson challenges is not supported by our caselaw. In Beaman, this court, relying on the standard enunciated in Irving, rejected the defendant's argument that his jury trial waiver was not knowingly made because the judge failed to inform him that a 12-person jury would need to unanimously agree in order to convict him. Beaman, 295 Kan. at 862; see also Clemons, 273 Kan. at 340-41 (same). If that type of general information about jury function does not need to be conveyed to a defendant before he or she can validly waive the right to a jury trial, it does not follow that specific details regarding jury composition via Batson be required before a jury trial waiver can be considered knowingly made. 35 There is no dispute that Lewis' waiver occurred in open court. The only issue is whether that waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. In the judge's initial statement to Lewis, the judge informed Lewis that he had a right to have his case heard by a jury of his peers and if he waived that right, his case would be decided by the judge. After Lewis indicated that he wanted to waive his right to a jury trial, the judge then asked Lewis if he had any questions. Lewis did not ask any questions but expressed his reason for wanting to proceed with a bench trial: because he felt that a jury comprised of Johnson County residents would not consist of his peers and, thus, would not treat him fairly. Notably, Lewis never explained who he considered to be his peers and, thus, qualified to serve on his jury. Regardless, the judge proceeded to explain to Lewis that he had a constitutional right to have his case decided by a jury of his peers and gave an overview of the system used to assemble 12 impartial jurors to hear his case. After giving this explanation, the judge asked Lewis if he was still comfortable with waiving his right to have his case heard by a jury. Lewis said yes and indicated he was aware that there were pros and cons to having his case decided by either a jury or a judge. After indicating to the judge that he had considered his options and discussed the matter with his attorney, Lewis acknowledged that he wanted to waive his right to jury trial and proceed with having his case heard by the judge. The transcript of the waiver hearing indicates that Lewis knew and understood that he had a right to a jury trial and that he voluntarily waived this right so his case could be decided by the district court judge. Accordingly, we conclude that Lewis' jury trial waiver was valid. MOTION TO DISMISS Next, Lewis argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges against him based on the State's alleged destruction of exculpatory evidence. 36 In cases where the State fails to preserve potentially useful evidence, there is no due process violation unless the defendant shows bad faith on the part of the State. State v. LaMae, 268 Kan. 544, 550, 998 P.2d 106 (2000). The determination of the question of bad faith turns on the officers' knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at the time it was lost or destroyed, and the question of bad faith is a question of fact. 268 Kan. at 551. Accordingly, the district court's factual findings regarding the presence or absence of bad faith are reviewed under a substantial competent evidence standard. Its conclusions of law based on those facts are subject to unlimited review. See State v. Finley, 273 Kan. 237, 241, 42 P.3d 723 (2002). Applicable Facts After law enforcement discovered Tyler's body inside his Escalade on the morning of April 4, 2010, they conducted a search of the Escalade for forensic evidence. After the search was conducted, the Escalade was transported to the Johnson County Crime Lab where a second search for forensic evidence was conducted. In November 2010, John Stirling, the lead detective assigned to the Tyler murder, spoke with Tyler's brother, Elliott, about the investigation. During their discussion, Elliott mentioned that his brother had a security system installed on the Escalade that could take video footage of the interior of the vehicle. Elliott told Stirling that a car alarm and audio store in Kansas City, Kansas, had installed the system in the Escalade. Stirling and Mark Phillips, a deputy with the Johnson County Sheriff's Office who works in the criminalistics lab and specializes in video footage, went to the car alarm and audio store. They spoke with a representative of the store about whether the store sold any car alarm systems with video capabilities. The store rep said they did not. The officers looked around the store and noticed a particular system for sale—a ScyTek 37 VisionGuard—and asked about the system. The store rep told the officers that the system could not store video but had the ability to store 10 still images. The officers asked the store rep whether the store had installed such a system in Tyler's Escalade, but the store rep could not recall ever doing so. As a result of their visit to the store, in December 2010, the officers, pursuant to a search warrant, searched the Escalade. The officers noticed a small antenna attached to the rearview mirror and a wire coming out of the back of the mirror. It appeared that the wire fed into the rearview mirror. Upon further investigation, however, the officers discovered that the wire did not feed into the mirror but was loose and had the appearance of being pulled out of something. The officers discovered that another wire ran from the antenna and underneath the headliner, down the A-pillar, and then back behind underneath the dash, and back behind the steering column. After removing the covering underneath the steering column, the officers discovered a black box with the designation VG8000 on it which contained the electronic components of the security system. The officers learned that the wire which appeared to feed into the rearview mirror should have fed into a small camera. The officers, however, did not find a camera inside the car. The wire that fed into the camera had a jagged look to it, indicating to the officers that the wire had been jerked out of the camera. Attached to the windshield, the officers discovered a mounting bracket that should have held the missing camera. The officers determined that the system was a ScyTek VisionGuard 8000—the same system they saw at the car alarm and audio store. Phillips contacted the company who manufactured the security system and learned that if the vehicle's battery was allowed to die, any images saved on the system would be lost. 38 The officers placed a charger on the battery and charged it before starting the car. Once the car was started, it was placed on a tow truck and hauled to the crime lab. Once at the lab, the officers continued to charge the battery and then followed the protocol the engineers from ScyTek described for downloading the images from the system's antenna to a key fob that was on Tyler's key ring (the fob had a 1 inch by half-inch screen which displayed black and white images). The officers determined that there were no images saved on the system. Prior to trial, Lewis filed a motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, requesting sanctions based on law enforcement's failure to preserve pictures that may have been taken by the security system installed in Tyler's Escalade. Lewis argued that the security system may have taken photos of Tyler's murderer and, thus, could have constituted exculpatory evidence. Notably, in making his argument, Lewis stated: In the present case, while it certainly could be concluded that the officers' lack of timely checking the security system of the vehicle was ignorance or negligence, rather than bad faith, that really is irrelevant to the determination of whether the prosecution is irreparably flawed by virtue of allowing the battery to go dead and, therefore, the unavoidable destruction of the strongest piece of evidence that the defendant could hope to receive. (Emphasis added.) At the motion hearing, Stirling was shown a photo of the Escalade taken on April 4, prior to Tyler's body being removed from the vehicle. The photo depicted the front windshield seen from the perspective of the driver's seat. On the rearview mirror, there can be seen a small antenna that has a wire coming out of it. Stirling testified that without further investigation, the wire appeared to feed directly into the rearview mirror. Upon seeing it, he thought that it was some component of the Escalade's alarm system. Stirling also stated that at the crime scene, he remembered seeing the mounting bracket attached to the windshield and that he had discussed the bracket with crime scene 39 personnel. Stirling said that they were not sure what the bracket was at the time they saw it and thought that it may have been a type of windshield sensor for the Escalade's alarm system. Stirling said that prior to speaking with Tyler's brother, he had no information to indicate that the ScyTek system was even installed in the Escalade. Stirling stated that had he known about the system back in April 2010, he would have attempted at that time to download any photos that might have been saved on the system. On cross-examination, Stirling said that in April 2010, he had heard of automobile security systems with photographic capabilities. He conceded that the key fob that went with the security system identified it as a ScyTek VisionGuard and that the fob was visible to the investigating officers back on April 4. He also conceded that an investigation of the key fob could have potentially alerted officers to the fact that the security system had photographic capabilities. Phillips testified that the camera on the ScyTek system was a small 1 inch by 1 inch camera. Phillips believed that the camera did not have flash capabilities for taking photos in darkness. Phillips stated that the camera would record two images within 5 seconds of the car alarm activating. The system would also take a still image if two buttons on the key fob are pressed. The photos are then stored on the system's antenna. If battery power to the vehicle is lost, any images stored on the antenna are lost. Phillips said he spoke to ScyTek engineers who told him that any images saved on the system could only be viewed with the key fob; the images could not be downloaded to a computer. Phillips noted that the security system's camera was never recovered. 40 Phillips said that unless the alarm system is set off or the camera is operated manually by pushing the two buttons on the key fob, the system would not have taken any photos. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district court held that even assuming the security system recorded images at the time of the murder, there was no evidence that law enforcement acted in bad faith in failing to preserve those images. Accordingly, the court denied Lewis' motion to dismiss.