Opinion ID: 3058194
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Suspicion to Detain Rendon

Text: “The Fourth Amendment prohibits ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ by the Government, and its protections extend to brief investigatory stops of persons or vehicles that fall short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). A police officer may stop, detain and briefly question a citizen if the officer “observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1964). A court must look at the “‘totality of the circumstances’ of each case to see whether the detaining officer has a ‘particularized and objective basis’ for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273. At the hearing on Rendon’s motion to suppress, Cox testified to several pieces of information gathered during the commercial vehicle inspection which he asserted supported his reasonable suspicion that Rendon was engaged in illegal activity. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, we find there was 5 sufficient information to conclude that Cox had a “particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal wrongdoing. Although we agree with Rendon that his presence in areas alleged to be sources of drug trafficking and his nervous demeanor are not sufficient, either separately or together, to raise an objectively reasonable suspicion that warrants further detention, see United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 971 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. Ballard, 573 F.2d 913, 916 (5th Cir. 1978),2 there were sufficient additional reasons that Cox identified that, when considered in their totality, adequately give rise to reasonable suspicion. Those facts include: (1) Rendon’s lack of knowledge of the number of pallets in his load even though most owneroperators know this information; (2) Rendon’s lack of knowledge of the location of his final delivery; (3) Rendon’s inability to explain the inconsistency in his statements about where he loaded the onions. He originally stated he did so in Pharr, Texas as his log books indicated, but later when asked about the reason for the amount of down time in Ganado, Texas, he responded that it took a long time to load the onions; (4) despite having been off duty for an entire day and a half in 2 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), the Eleventh Circuit adopted as binding precedent all Fifth Circuit decisions handed down prior to the close of business on September 30, 1981. 6 Edinburg, Texas, prior to loading the onions in Pharr, Texas, and then driving only four hours, Rendon claims to have stopped for ten hours of rest, even though he could have continued driving for an additional four hours; (5) Cox’s experiential knowledge that most owner-operators drive for as many hours as possible once they have loaded their trucks because that is how they make money; (6) Rendon’s numerous apparently unexplained stops, even prior to loading the onions, in areas in south Texas known for drug trafficking.3 Accordingly, in light of the totality of the specific circumstances in this case, we conclude that Cox’s continued detention of Rendon following the conclusion of the commercial vehicle inspection was lawful for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.