Opinion ID: 3155939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: GINA Retaliation Claim

Text: Ortiz also argues that the district court erred in dismissing his claim for retaliation on the basis of GINA-protected activity. Borrowing from the Title VII context, the district court applied the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, which the parties appear to agree was appropriate. That framework requires a retaliation plaintiff to first make out a prima facie case by showing (1) that he engaged in protected activity, (2) that he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) “that a causal link existed between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Davis v. Fort Bend County, 765 F.3d 480, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2014). “If the employee establishes a prima facie case, 7 Case: 15-50341 Document: 00513276547 Page: 8 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 No. 15-50341 the burden shifts to the employer to state a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for its decision. After the employer states its reason, the burden shifts back to the employee to demonstrate that the employer’s reason is actually a pretext for retaliation.” Id. at 490 (citation omitted). Ortiz contends that he engaged in GINA-protected activity when he refused to comply with the Wellness Program at various times, and when he filed grievances regarding his placements on alternate duty. The district court concluded that all but one of these activities were not protected by GINA because Ortiz did not in those instances mention GINA or genetic information. This conclusion was not clearly or obviously wrong. See Riley v. Napolitano, 537 F. App’x 391, 392 (5th Cir. 2013) (“[O]ur court has consistently held that a vague complaint, without reference to an unlawful employment practice under [the relevant anti-discrimination statute], does not constitute protected activity.”). The district court found that Ortiz’s April 2012 EEOC complaint could constitute protected activity because it alleged discrimination on the basis of genetic information, and decided that Ortiz’s placement on alternate duty was an adverse employment action because he lost eligibility for overtime. But the district court concluded that there was no causal link between the protected activity and adverse action because Ortiz was placed on alternate duty for the second time as soon as he again refused to complete the mandated physical, and before his EEOC complaint was even filed. In the alternative, the district court concluded that the record demonstrated a legitimate reason for the administrate duty placements—Ortiz’s refusals to comply with a mandatory program designed to ensure that firefighters can perform their jobs safely and effectively—and that Ortiz had not created a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. The district court reasoned that the timeline of events and SAFD’s submitted evidence showed that SAFD’s actions were motivated by Ortiz’s 8 Case: 15-50341 Document: 00513276547 Page: 9 Date Filed: 11/18/2015 No. 15-50341 refusal to take a stress test, “not because he opposed practices protected under GINA.” These conclusions were not plainly erroneous.