Opinion ID: 770594
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: dismissal of claim for prospective relief

Text: 103 Lastly, we consider the plaintiffs' cross-appeal of the district court's dismissal of their claim for declaratory and injunctive relief. The HUD officials moved for dismissal on the alternative grounds of standing and mootness. Because standing and mootness both pertain to a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction under Article III, they are properly raised in a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), not Rule 12(b)(6). See, e.g. , Bland v. Fessler, 88 F.3d 729, 732 n.4 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Gemtel Corp. v. Community Redevelopment Agency, 23 F.3d 1542, 1544 n.1 (9th Cir. 1994)). We review a Rule 12(b)(1) order of dismissal de novo. Virgin v. County of San Luis Obispo, 201 F.3d 1141, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000) (citing Crist v. Leippe, 138 F.3d 801, 803 (9th Cir.1998)). 104 Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attacks can be either facial or factual. See 2 James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice P 12.30[4], at 12-38 to 12-41 (3d ed. 1999). Here, the officials' facial attack on the plaintiffs' amended complaint fails. The plaintiffs alleged their desire to continue to be vocal opponents of government housing projects; the planning of other housing projects involving groups protected under the FHA against which the plaintiffs wished to advocate; and the continued efforts of HUD officials to pursue and regulate protected speech in the manner that occurred with respect to the Bel Air project. These allegations established a likelihood of future injury sufficient to give the plaintiffs standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief. See Hodgers-Durgin v. De La Vina, 199 F.3d 1037, 1044 (9th Cir. 1999). 105 With a factual Rule 12(b)(1) attack, however, a court may look beyond the complaint to matters of public record without having to convert the motion into one for summary judgment. Gemtel Corp., 23 F.3d at 1544 n.1 (citing Mack v. South Bay Beer Distribs., Inc., 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986)). It also need not presume the truthfulness of the plaintiffs' allegations. Moore's Federal Practice, supra , P 12.30[4], at 1238. 106 In evaluating the officials' factual attack here, the district court considered the following items: (1) a memorandum issued by Roberta Achtenberg, Assistant Secretary for FHEO, dated April 3, 1995, and titled Substantive and Procedural Limitations on Filing and Investigating Fair Housing Act Complaints That May Implicate the First Amendment (Achtenberg memorandum); (2) a press release and statement dated September 2, 1994, announcing HUD's distribution to employees of specific guidelines on speech and activities protected by the First Amendment; and (3) a field handbook for FHEO staff dated September 1995 incorporating the substance of the Achtenberg memorandum. The press release stated that HUD had moved to develop  its guidelines in response to its investigation of plaintiffs White, Deringer, and Graham. This investigation, the release stated, had resulted in a finding that the trio's activities in opposition to the project had not violated the Fair Housing Act because they were protected free speech under the Constitution's First Amendment. 107 The Achtenberg memorandum prohibits HUD officials from accepting for filing or investigating any complaint involving public activities that are directed toward achieving action by a governmental entity or officials and do not involve force, physical harm, or a clear threat of force or physical harm to one or more individuals. It lists examples of protected speech activity and provides that any investigation which may be necessary to obtain information about the extent to which the First Amendment may be applicable should be prompt, narrowly tailored to gather sufficient preliminary data to allow such a decision to be made, and conducted in close consultation with counsel. It prohibits document requests that seek membership lists, fundraising information or financial data of an organization that is or may be engaging in protected speech activities, and the preparation or transmission of conciliation proposals that would circumscribe the First Amendment rights of any party to the complaint. The Achtenberg memorandum also states that a lawsuit which is frivolous can be a violation of the Act. While it does not define this standard or discuss the First Amendment concerns involved with respect to the filing of nonfrivolous suits, the memorandum provides that given the sensitivity and complexity of the issues relating to such litigation, all situations involving claims that litigation amounts to a violation of [S 3617 of the FHA] must be cleared with Headquarters before the complaint is filed. More broadly, the memorandum states that where FHA concerns intersect with First Amendment protections, HUD officials must defer to the latter: the Department chooses to err on the side of the First Amendment. 108 The HUD officials argue that in light of these materials, the district court erred in declining to dismiss the plaintiffs' request for injunctive relief on the ground of standing. We disagree. Standing is examined at the commencement of the litigation. See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Servs., Inc., _______ U.S. _______, _______, 120 S. Ct. 693, 698-99 (2000). At the time the plaintiffs' filed their complaint, the Achtenberg memorandum had been in effect for only a month and was scheduled to expire in less than a year. The recent implementation of such a temporary policy was insufficient to eliminate the plaintiffs' standing to seek prospective relief. As this case has progressed, however, the policy has become entrenched. It was therefore appropriate for the district court to analyze the officials' factual Rule 12(b)(1) challenge as a question of mootness, not standing. 109 The Supreme Court has made clear that the standard for proving that a case has been mooted by a defendant's voluntary conduct is stringent: 110 A case might become moot if subsequent events made it absolutely clear that the allegedly wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur. United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass'n, 393 U.S. 199, 203 (1968). The heavy burden of persua[ding] the court that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to start up again lies with the party asserting mootness. Id. 111 Friends of the Earth, 120 S. Ct. at 708 (citations modified). See also United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 63233 (1953). The Court specifically observed that a government agency's moratorium that by its terms was not permanent would not moot an otherwise valid claim for injunctive relief. Friends of the Earth, 120 S. Ct. at 709. Here, however, it is clear that the Achtenberg memorandum represents a permanent change in the way HUD conducts FHA investigations, not a temporary policy that the agency will refute once this litigation has concluded. The memorandum is broad in scope and unequivocal in tone. It is fully supportive of First Amendment rights. Further, it addresses all of the objectionable measures that HUD officials took against the plaintiffs in this case, and even confesses that this case was the catalyst for the agency's adoption of the new policy. HUD has renewed the Achtenberg memorandum on a yearly basis, 25 and since its implementation the agency's officials have not engaged in conduct similar to that challenged by the plaintiffs here. 26 112 Because HUD has met its heavy burden of proving that the challenged conduct cannot reasonably be expected to recur, we agree that the plaintiffs' claim for prospective relief is moot. 27