Opinion ID: 1200331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of NRS 48.045(2)

Text: Mortensen argues that Brady's prior bad acts, primarily two incidents reported to the internal affairs division of the police department, should have been admitted notwithstanding NRS 48.045(2): Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. (Emphasis added.) Mortensen asserts that NRS 48.045(2) applies only to an accused and not to a witness; that the prior bad acts tend to identify Brady as the shooter; and that the prior bad acts show a pattern of hot-headed, impulsive and brutish behavior by Brady. We hold that no abuse of discretion was shown with regard to the district court's exclusion of references to Brady's prior bad acts. The admissibility of prior bad acts evidence is within the discretion of the trial court, whose decisions will not be disturbed on appeal unless manifestly wrong. Crawford v. State, 107 Nev. 345, 348, 811 P.2d 67, 69 (1991). The plain language of NRS 48.045(2) uses the term person, rather than defendant, or accused. In Nevada, words in a statute should be given their plain meaning unless this violates the spirit of the act. McKay v. Board of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986). Had the legislature intended NRS 48.045(2) to apply only to an accused, the word person would not have been used. For example, NRS 48.045(1) specifically uses the terms accused, NRS 48.045(1)(a), victim, NRS 48.045(1)(b) and witness, NRS 48.045(1)(c). This choice of words demonstrates that, had the legislature intended NRS 48.045(2) to apply only to an accused, it would have clearly stated so. [4] Moreover, the identity exception to NRS 48.045(2) generally involves situations where a positive identification of the perpetrator has not been made, and the offered evidence establishes a signature crime so clear as to establish the identity of the person on trial. See Canada v. State, 104 Nev. 288, 756 P.2d 552 (1988); Mayes v. State, 95 Nev. 140, 591 P.2d 250 (1979). [5] NRS 48.045(2) clearly states that evidence of other acts is not admissible to prove the person acted in conformity with those acts. Yet, by offering the evidence to establish that Brady is hot-headed, impulsive and brutish, this is exactly what Mortensen attempted to do. Mortensen cannot offer evidence of Brady's prior bad acts to show that Brady acted in conformity with that type of behavior on the night of the shooting. We conclude that the probative value of this evidence on the issue of identity is marginal at best and is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Thus, the district court properly refused to allow the introduction of Brady's prior bad acts to show a pattern of behavior. [6]