Opinion ID: 2120717
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Reasonable Duty To Disclose

Text: ¶ 89. The majority opinion interprets the introductory sentence of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1) as creating an absolute duty to disclose certain materials and information, if it is within the possession, custody or control of the state. An absolute duty to disclose disregards any circumstance in which the prosecutor and the prosecutor's agents do not realize that they have the materials or information, or do not realize the significance of the materials and information they have. [6] An absolute duty will lead occasionally and inevitably to unintentional breaches of the prosecutor's discovery obligation. ¶ 90. The law ought to take into account the reasonableness of a duty to disclose information just as it takes into account the reasonableness of a duty to find information. The statute must either create a reasonable duty to disclose on the front end or tolerate a reasonable breach of that duty on the back end. A prosecutor's unintentional breach of an absolute duty to disclose should not be treated the same as a prosecutor's deliberate withholding of requested information. ¶ 91. The prosecutor's duty to disclose can be made reasonable when the defendant designates the information sought and indicates in which it can be obtained. This is alluded to in Jones, where the court quotes commentary on the ABA Standards Relating to Discovery to explain why a defendant is sometimes required to designate information [w]here the existence of . . . information is known to the prosecutor but its quality as matter which he is obligated to disclose is not apparent to him. Jones, 69 Wis. 2d at 350 (quoting American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, sec. 2.4 at 83-84 (Approved Draft, 1970)). ¶ 92. The facts here show that an absolute duty to disclose information is not reasonable. DeLao's attorney drafted a discovery demand on June 16, 1999, and filed it with the district attorney on June 30, 1999. The discovery demand arrived two days after the Prioletta-DeLao interview. It asked the prosecutor to furnish a written summary of any oral, written or recorded statements of the defendant, but not limited to those statements which the state intends to use in the course of the trial. Although this discovery demand was broad enough to encompass the DeLao interview at the point when the substance of that interview was in the possession, custody or control of the state, it went well beyond the obligations of Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1)(a) and (b), did not designate the June 28 interview, and could not have contemplated that interview because it was drafted 12 days before the interview took place. [7] ¶ 93. Although it is not clear when the prosecutor answered DeLao's discovery demand, it is likely that the prosecutor answered the demand within a reasonable time before trial, as required by Wis. Stat. § 971.23(1). This would have been before Sunday, July 25, the date Chaussee first learned about the DeLao interview. Consequently, if the new information about the interview had to be disclosed, it would have had to be disclosed under subsection (7): If, subsequent to compliance with a requirement of this section, and prior to or during trial, a party discovers additional material or the names of additional witnesses requested which are subject to discovery, inspection or production under this section, the party shall promptly notify the other party of the existence of the additional material or names. Wis. Stat. § 971.23(7). ¶ 94. The prosecutor disclosed the interview information to the defense as soon as she learned about it. For his part, Chaussee advised the prosecutor about the information as soon as he could after he realized its relevance. [8] Chaussee said he realized its relevance at about 12:30 a.m. on July 28, 1999. He said his epiphany occurred at home, shortly after midnight, as he was thinking about the case. This was after he heard the defendant's opening statement and had a chance to ruminate about it. ¶ 95. The circuit court accepted Chaussee's version of events. The court understood that Chaussee did not have a written report of the DeLao interview until the noon hour on July 28. Prioletta had to be asked to write up that report during the trial. The court also recognized that Prioletta never talked to DeLao about the events of June 7. Prioletta discussed conversations that DeLao overheard before June 7. In the interview, DeLao never told Prioletta that she was afraid of Desmond Stalsberg. [9] Rather, she discussed her relationship with Stalsberg and his friends. Thus, it was largely DeLao's description of her relationship with Stalsberg and her silence about her alleged fear of him that were used to rebut her defense. ¶ 96. As a result, the significance of the DeLao interview for trial was not immediately apparent to Chaussee. [10] Information from the interview was not relevant in proving the charges against DeLao. It was helpful only in rebutting DeLao's defense which she did not make clear until trial. Moreover, Investigator Chaussee did not know before trial that DeLao would testify. ¶ 97. The prosecutor disclosed information about the DeLao interview as soon as its relevance was recognized. The majority holds that this was not good enough. It quotes Martinez, 166 Wis. 2d at 260, to the effect that, an investigative police agency which holds relevant evidence [is] an arm of the prosecution. Majority op. at ¶ 23. Thus, the majority says, the prosecutor was charged with knowledge of information in the possession of the investigating police agency (Mount Pleasant), on and after July 25, and she violated the discovery statute by failing to disclose that information to the defense before trial. ¶ 98. This conclusion does not square with a reasonable dutywith the reasonable diligence expected from a prosecutor or an investigator working with a prosecutor. Imposing an absolute duty to disclose information will not withstand close scrutiny over time.