Opinion ID: 2315948
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 20

Heading: The Trial Court's Refusal to Ask Jurors on Voir Dire How They Would React to Evidence of Aggravating Factor N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a)

Text: The trial court refused to ask prospective jurors whether they could consider evidence in mitigation once they heard evidence that Biegenwald had been convicted of murdering another person in addition to Anna Olesewicz. I believe that the trial court had the discretion to refuse to ask that question. I also believe that even if the court should have allowed the question, any resulting error was harmless. Hence, I must disagree with the majority.
Jurors must not be asked categorically to prejudge their willingness to impose the death penalty in the case. State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 257, 524 A. 2d 188. Here, the proffered question comes dangerously close to doing exactly that. Obviously defense counsel would have liked to know the answer to that question; undoubtedly he could have more intelligently made peremptory excusals if he could have forced a response to that question. Those two observations themselves do not create a constitutional command. Mu'Min v. Virginia, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1904, 114 L.Ed. 2d at 504. Moreover, the prospect of uniformly requiring such a question troubles me. The Constitution does not always entitle a defendant to have questions posed during voir dire specifically directed to matters that conceivably might prejudice veniremen against him.    Thus, the State's obligation to the defendant to impanel an impartial jury generally can be satisfied by less than an inquiry into a specific prejudice feared by the defendant. [ Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589, 594, 96 S.Ct. 1017, 1020, 47 L.Ed. 2d 258, 263 (1976)]. As the United States Supreme Court has stated: a prospective juror cannot be expected to say in advance of trial whether he would in fact vote for the extreme penalty in the case before him. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777 n. 21, 20 L.Ed. 2d 776, 785 n. 21 (1968). Whether to allow this inquiry on voir dire is, and should remain, within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 357, 558 A. 2d 1259. I remind the majority that [t]he distinction between questions which ask jurors how they would decide issues of a case if and when such issues are presented and questions which merely inquire whether jurors can start the case without bias or prior inclination is not always crystal clear. Waters v. State, 248 Ga. 355, 363, 283 S.E. 2d 238, 247 (1981). That is precisely why we accord a sound measure of discretion to trial judges in the conduct of voir dire. State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 357, 558 A. 2d 1259. The written record may not only `conceal[] subtle nuances,' State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 260, 524 A. 2d 188 (quoting State v. Gilmore, supra, 103 N.J. at 547, 511 A. 2d 1150 (Clifford, J., dissenting)), but it may also permit overly-precise dictionary distinctions not appreciable in the discourse of the trial. This trial judge, after lengthy consideration of draft questions proposed by defense counsel, the prosecutor, and himself, rejected inquiries on this subject because it asked the ultimate question in the case. His reasons, detailed and thorough, showed no abuse of discretion. They covered roughly twenty-six pages of transcript and all the relevant statements of this Court and clearly indicated careful consideration. Moreover, they accord with the decisions of other jurisdictions that have decided the issue. I find no abuse of discretion and would accord this trial court's well-reasoned, competent, and conscientious decision the deference it deserves. Other states have voiced similar concerns and reached similar conclusions when faced with this issue. In Godfrey v. Francis, 251 Ga. 652, 308 S.E. 2d 806 (1983), the Georgia Supreme Court considered the propriety of the following question in a capital-resentencing hearing: Assume there's a murder, two murders with aggravating circumstances proved to your satisfaction, would you be    willing or able to consider a sentence less than death under those circumstances and follow the law that allows it. [ Id. at 667, 308 S.E. 2d at 819.] It held that the defendant cannot create error by eliciting responses to questions that solicit the juror's views on evidence not yet presented. Ibid. In this Georgia case even the dissent believed that mentioning two murders in the voir dire question was possibly objectionable, noting that questions incorporating facts yet to be proved are often quite improper. Id., 308 S.E. 2d at 822 (Gregory, J., dissenting). The Georgia Supreme Court has rejected similar questions in other cases. In Castell v. State, 250 Ga. 776, 783, 301 S.E. 2d 234, 243 (1983), the court rejected certain voir dire questions in a capital case because they might require [jurors] to prejudge the case. Similarly, in State v. Waters, supra, 248 Ga. at 363, 283 S.E. 2d at 247, another capital case, the court held that no question should require a response from a juror which might amount to prejudgment of the case. In all three cases the Georgia court carefully expressed its decision in terms (e.g., might require) that indicate its resolve to stay far clear of such areas on voir dire. Perhaps more importantly, the appellate court deferred to the sound discretion of the trial court in all three cases. See Godfrey v. Francis, supra, 251 Ga. at 667, 308 S.E. 2d at 819; Castell v. State, supra, 250 Ga. at 783, 301 S.E. 2d at 243; State v. Waters, supra, 248 Ga. at 363, 283 S.E. 2d at 247. The main thrust behind such resolve springs from a desire to avoid trying the case during voir dire. The jury should decide the ultimate issues of fact based on the evidence they all hear at trial, not the questions any one of them is asked on voir dire. The parties are furnished the opportunity to make proper inquiry, but they are foreclosed from trying their cases at the time of voir dire. State v. Jahnke, 682 P. 2d 991, 1003-1004 (Wyo. 1984). Even where the question itself does not seek an immutable commitment from the juror, it can result in a similar dynamic. The question was improper because it went to the ultimate issue of fact.    The question required the jury to speculate on evidence to be presented at trial. Furthermore, the question was designed to probe a juror's present impression of facts which were to be later developed at trial. Reynolds v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 157, 367 S.E. 2d 176, 183 (1986); see also State v. Montez, 309 Or. 564, 584, 789 P. 2d 1352, 1366 (1990) (a question may be improper even if it only asks the juror to comment in advance on how he would react to specific evidence). I find these cases, along with those of Georgia, soundly reasoned, employing an analysis comparable to that used by the trial court here. Today's majority believes that the question considered by the trial court merely sought to inquire about the impact that knowledge of other murder convictions would have on the ability of prospective jurors to credit or consider evidence in mitigation. Ante at 34, 594 A. 2d at 189. It views that question as reflecting a straight-edge distinction between responses that commit prospective jurors to accept a certain result and those that commit prospective jurors to consider a certain result. Ante at 34, 594 A. 2d at 189. Although in the proper case I agree that an adequate voir dire should incorporate the suggestions of Williams II and Moore, ibid., I do not believe the suggestions in those cases are applicable here. The accept/consider distinction often evaporates as a constraint on voir dire because it transforms the process into the selection of a jury as favorable to the party's point of view as indoctrination through the medium of questions or assumed facts and rules of law can accomplish. State v. Manley, supra, 54 N.J. at 281, 255 A. 2d 193 (emphasis added). We have never sanctioned that as a legitimate aim of voir dire. Voir dire should produce neither a final verdict nor an arbiter's nonbinding resolution. Moreover, the majority also believes that it can merely interchange another murder for rape for the purpose of analysis under State v. Williams, supra, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172. Ante at 31, 594 A. 2d at 187. It cannot. Although each establishes a statutory aggravating factor, the prior-murder factor is unique among the statutory aggravating factors. State v. Biegenwald, 110 N.J. 521, 538, 542 A. 2d 442 (1988). The distinction between these two aggravating factors is more than semantic. In State v. Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 412-13 n. 5, 550 A. 2d 1172, we approved of voir dire questions with hypothetical examples to probe how various factors might affect a person's decision-making process in the context of examining the effect of a victim's status or other non-statutory factors. We sought to ensure only that a jury remain focused on the defendant before it. As this Court has stated, the consideration of the individual characteristics of the offender and his crime is a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304, 96 S.Ct. 2978, 2991, 49 L.Ed. 2d 944, 961 (1976); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 2965, 57 L.Ed. 2d 973, 990 (1978) (an individualized decision is essential in capital cases). In sentencing, the jury must have before it all the possible relevant information regarding the individual characteristics of the defendant and his offense, including the nature and circumstances of the crime and the defendant's character, background, history, mental condition, and physical condition. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1006, 103 S.Ct. 3446 [3456] 77 L.Ed. 2d 1171, 1184 (1983); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276, 96 S.Ct. 2950, 2958, 49 L.Ed. 2d 929, 941 (1976). In sentencing a defendant in a capital murder case, it is extremely important that the jury, in determining whether a defendant should receive the death penalty or life imprisonment, know that the defendant has previously been convicted of one or more murders. [ State v. Biegenwald, supra, 110 N.J. at 538-39, 542 A. 2d 442.] Precisely because the determination of whether to inflict capital punishment on a given defendant is an individualized decision, Lockett, supra, 438 U.S. at 605, 98 S.Ct. at 2965, 57 L.Ed. 2d at 990, based on the character of the individual and the circumstances of the crime, Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 879, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2744, 77 L.Ed. 2d 235, 251 (1983), we stated that in accordance with our decisions in Williams II, Long, and Zola, voir dire should allow more open-ended questioning on the issue of the status of the victims as it relates to any prejudice or predisposition affecting the juror's ability to consider mitigating evidence in any penalty phase. [ State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 451, 585 A. 2d 864 (emphasis added).] By going beyond that rationale in this case, the majority fundamentally recasts this Court's understanding of the goal of voir dire under the guise of applying established law. Sympathy engendered by the victim's status must not infect the careful balancing of evidence `regarding the individual characteristics of the defendant and his offense.' State v. Biegenwald, supra, 110 N.J. at 539, 542 A. 2d 442 (quoting California v. Ramos, supra, 463 U.S. at 1006, 103 S.Ct. at 3456, 77 L.Ed. 2d at 1189). Despite the United States Supreme Court's recent decision in Payne v. Tennessee, ___ U.S. ___, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed. 2d 720 (1990), the propriety of introducing victim-impact evidence during any part of a capital case in New Jersey remains subject to the capital-sentencing jurisprudence of this state. Payne merely held that introducing victim-impact evidence is not a per se violation of the eighth amendment, and that state law may, but need not, allow the use of such evidence so long as such use conforms to the due process requirements of the federal constitution in any given case. Id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2608, 115 L.Ed. 2d at 735. However, the primary responsibility for defining crimes against state law [and] fixing punishments for the commission of these crimes    rests with States. Ibid. New Jersey has chosen, as it may under our constitutional system, id. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 2609, 115 L.Ed. 2d at 736, not to allow the introduction of victim-impact evidence unrelated to the substantive issue of guilt or the penalty to be imposed. State v. Williams, supra, 113 N.J. at 452, 550 A. 2d 1172; see also State v. Clausell, 121 N.J. 298, 341, 580 A. 2d 221 (1990) (citing Williams ); State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 566-67, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990) (same). Voir dire affords an important opportunity to inquire about potential victim-related biases. The questions suggested in Moore and Williams II involved cases in which a murder victim was raped or was a child or was the pregnant spouse of the defendant. A rape/murder is often, though not exclusively, a gynocide causing excessive, and deserved, sympathy for the victim. Likewise, infanticide, foeticide, and uxoricide have the potential to divert jurors from their duty to assess the defendant to their desire to avenge the victim. Voir dire questions, like this trial court's repeated inquiries regarding a venireperson's ability to decide after hearing evidence regarding the murder of a young woman, properly explore the effect of a victim's status on the prospective juror's decision-making process. Although the presence of evidence relating to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(c) (murder involved torture or aggravated assault resulting in pain in addition to that necessary to cause death), c(4)(g) (murder involved other crimes, like rape, committed against this victim and/or other victims), or c(4)(h) (murder involved killing a public servant) may raise heightened concerns that demand further voir dire to establish that the victim's status will not prejudice the jury, the other aggravating factors simply do not raise those concerns. In State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 586 A. 2d 85 (1991), we did not insist that voir dire examine the impact of evidence on N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(e) (murder involved paying another to kill). We have never suggested in any of our previous decisions in this case, see State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A. 2d 130, and State v. Biegenwald, supra, 110 N.J. 521, 542 A. 2d 442, that adequate voir dire must include questions on the impact of N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(4)(a) evidence. The difference between Marshall and the Biegenwald cases and those cases like Moore and Williams II is that the latter two contained evidence of aggravating factors that could easily be transformed from lenses through which the jury should examine the defendant into mirrors in which it saw the victim. When the reflection in such a mirror is not related directly to the circumstances of the crime, it has no place at trial and may be weeded out at voir dire. However, evidence of the c(4)(a) factor is non-reflective and could not implicate a victim's status in the way in which the facts and factors in Moore and Williams II could. I have one further reason for disagreeing with the majority's insistence that this type of question is a required part of an adequate voir dire. This question, if mandated in all future voir dire, promises to unravel much of the capital sentencing jurisprudence we have painstakingly developed. We have had to recast the New Jersey Capital Punishment Act numerous times to insure its constitutionally-satisfactory tone. See State v. Marshall, supra, 123 N.J. at 208, 586 A. 2d 85 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). That has rightly resulted from the application of our interpretative decisions in State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A. 2d 130 (1987); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 548 A. 2d 887 (1988) ( Bey II); and State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 549 A. 2d 792 (1988). We have had to reverse capital cases often for reasons with which the Legislature itself has concurred. See, e.g., State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. 13, 524 A. 2d 130 (burden is on State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that aggravating factors outweigh mitigating factors before sentence of death may be imposed); and see L. 1985, c. 178, § 2 (to the same effect); State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45, 548 A. 2d 846 (1988) ( Bey I) (sentence of death may not be imposed on juvenile offender); and see L. 1985, c. 478, § 1 (to the same effect). [ Ibid. ] However, the death penalty cannot continue to serve its purpose, consistent with our history and tradition, id. at 209, 586 A. 2d 85 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), unless it operates actually, consistently, and fairly. Today the majority undertakes an unnecessary recasting of the capital-punishment jurisprudence of this state. With but one exception, this Court professes to believe that conscientious prosecutors and capable courts and counsel can fairly try capital cases. Id. at 208, 586 A. 2d 85 (O'Hern, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). This case was fairly tried, in keeping with our major interpretative statements as well as with the limited holdings of State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. 420, 585 A. 2d 864, and State v. Williams, supra, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172. In insisting that it was not, the majority reaches well beyond established law in defining the requirements of what it understands as fairness. That in itself is unfair and could lead to the perception of an inconsistent application of capital punishment because [t]hese decisions do not justify today's decision. They merely prove how a hint becomes a suggestion, is loosely turned into dictum and finally elevated to a decision. [ United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 75, 70 S.Ct. 430, 439, 94 L.Ed. 653, 665 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).] The majority's reliance on Moore and Williams II is a progressive distortion, ibid., that giv[es] fair ground for the belief that Law is the expression of chance. Id., 339 U.S. at 86, 70 S.Ct. at 444, 94 L.Ed. at 670. Respect for continuity in law, where reasons for change are wanting, and where the change will produce uncontemplated results and confusion, demand that the court not extend the law as it has today. Ibid. This case, in many ways, is an easy one in which to introduce this type of voir dire question because it consisted only of a penalty phase. The intimation of a prior murder conviction during voir dire could not adversely influence the guilt/non-guilt determination. However, in the normal case, voir dire occurs before the determination of guilt. Unlike a case with an accompanying rape (in which the guilt-phase evidence will establish that the rape occurred or did not occur regardless of the questions asked during voir dire ), evidence of a prior murder conviction is unlikely to emerge in the evidence presented during the guilt phase. By hinting at it during voir dire, the inquiry invites wild speculation during the initial segment of the trial. The majority understands that this type of question, logically extended to its reasonable conclusion, most probably will mandate a two-jury system for all capital trials involving the c(4)(a) aggravating factor to ensure that juries' verdicts were not based on or influenced by such non-evidence. Ante at 44, 594 A. 2d at 194. However, the majority cannot simply pull that thread from our capital-sentencing jurisprudence. The momentum created by this decision pushes us inevitably toward a two-jury system in all capital cases, whatever the aggravating factors alleged. What we have rejected explicitly, see State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 253-54, 524 A. 2d 188, we should not now adopt implicitly. My fear that the majority's position will cause the unravel[ing] of much of the capital-sentencing jurisprudence we have painstakingly developed, supra at 94, 594 A. 2d at 223, gains strong support from the majority's problematic return to issues decided in our original examination of the death penalty. See id. The death-qualification process is a difficult one. Could an honest venireperson not answer yes when asked if evidence of a prior murder made it more likely that he or she would vote for death or that it would be very hard to find that mitigating evidence outweighed that aggravating factor? Yet, it would be difficult to say fairly that this juror was not as nearly impartial `as the lot of humanity will admit,' State v. Singletary, supra, 80 N.J. at 62, 402 A. 2d 203 (quoting State v. Jackson, supra, 43 N.J. at 158, 203 A. 2d 1), in a society where there is substantial unanimity    as to the validity of the [prior murder conviction aggravating] factor. Perhaps the majority of decisionmakers in the system, including penalty-phase jurors, believe that this factor, if it exists, ought to be the factual basis for the imposition of a death sentence. L. Bienen, N. Weiner, D. Denno, P. Allison, and D. Mills, The Reimposition of Capital Punishment in New Jersey: The Role of Prosecutorial Discretion, 41 Rutgers L.Rev. 27, 247 (1988). Certainly, the Legislature believed evidence of a prior murder conviction ought to provide the factual basis for the imposition of the death penalty: it made such a finding a statutory aggravating factor militating in favor of a death sentence. Aggravating factors are meant to sway jurors. The death-penalty statute spells out specific aggravating circumstances that one may legitimately rely on when considering the death penalty in a given case. When, without any previous acquaintance with the actual contents of the Capital Punishment Act, a prospective juror believes that evidence of a prior murder conviction would influence, perhaps strongly influence, his or her decision to impose the death penalty, that citizen merely adds unstated support to a society-wide consensus enacted into law by our Legislature. One may agree naturally and unwittingly with most of society, our Legislature, and our courts that a prior murder conviction provides a legitimate basis to support consideration of the death penalty in a given case. Such a shared sentiment, discovered by the court during voir dire or realized by a juror during the later trial, does not deprive a defendant of an impartial jury. I would defer to the trial court's field-tested wisdom.
Voir dire is not an end in itself but merely an effective means to select an impartial jury. State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 479, 575 A. 2d 435 (1990). I am convinced of the overall thoroughness of this voir dire. I am also convinced that the trial court's instructions and the jury's conduct vitiate any fear that this jury was biased or refused to consider evidence on mitigation. Therefore, I believe that this jury was impartial, or at least as nearly impartial `as the lot of humanity will admit.' State v. Singletary, supra, 80 N.J. at 62, 402 A. 2d 203 (citation omitted). Any error resulting from failure to ask the proffered questions was harmless. Like other cases with technical demerits directed at a voir dire where further questioning could have been helpful, see Mu'Min v. Virginia, supra, ___ U.S. at ___, 111 S.Ct. at 1904, 114 L.Ed. 2d at 504, the record here nonetheless assures me that the overall scope and quality of the voir dire was sufficiently thorough and probing to assure the selection of an impartial jury. State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 29, 524 A. 2d 130; see also State v. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 247, 593 A. 2d at 278 (the questioning was sufficiently calculated to produce a fair and unbiased jury); State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 354, 558 A. 2d 1259 (although voir dire may not have been perfect in all respects   , it was sufficient to enable counsel and the court to evaluate the juror's fitness to serve); State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 397, 548 A. 2d 1022 (citing State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 29, 524 A. 2d 130). The record also shows that the jury actually selected through this voir dire apparently proceeded in an impartial manner, even though they were not asked during voir dire how Biegenwald's prior conviction would affect them. Of course it may have been preferable for the trial court to have allowed the voir dire questioning requested by defense counsel with respect to the jurors' attitudes about the prior murder factor. See post at 105-106, 594 A. 2d at 229. (Stein, J., dissenting). We have repeatedly emphasized that Manley was never intended to freeze voir dire into a judicial straitjacket and that it is appropriate for the court or for counsel to have asked additional open-ended questions directed to any specific feelings that the jurors might have had about capital punishment in that case. State v. Moore, supra, 122 N.J. at 449-50, 585 A. 2d 864 (emphasis added) (citing State v. Long, supra, 119 N.J. 439, 575 A. 2d 435; Williams II, supra, 113 N.J. 393, 550 A. 2d 1172; and State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. 384, 548 A. 2d 1022). However, it does not follow that the discretionary determination by this trial judge fell so far from the mark as to constitute a due process violation or an infringement on fair trial rights. See post at 104, 594 A. 2d at 228 (Stein, J., dissenting) (the Court's holding attaches undue significance to the question the trial court refused to ask). I am comforted in that conclusion in this case by the fact that on those few occasions when jurors were asked the question (because they had disclosed their knowledge of the prior murders) the jurors evidenced no unwillingness to consider the mitigating evidence, even in light of the prior murders. For example, prospective juror Russo was asked: Q But even with another murder in your words, would you still be willing to listen and open to the possibility that the mitigating factors might still outweigh even that? A Oh, yes, I'd listen, yes. Q So even with another murder, it's possible, I think, from what you have said, you still could vote for life imprisonment with no parole for at least 30 years? A Yes. Q Depending upon what you hear? A Yes. And prospective juror McCormack was asked: Q Is there anything about what you have read about killings, plural, that you believe might affect your judgment in this case where essentially this case is the fact that he has been found guilty of a killing. Now we're going to decide the penalty. Do you think all that background information is going to have an effect on you? A No. Q You mean you'll just be able to listen to what you hear in the Court room? A Yes. Q And if it's different from what you read in the newspaper you'll forget all about what you read in the newspaper? A Yes. Throughout the voir dire, all of the jurors who were qualified agreed that they would consider the mitigating evidence proffered by the defendant in evaluating the statutory aggravating factors. This jury was not closed-minded. The majority states that [t]he refusal to permit questioning on the impact of other murder convictions during voir dire constitutes serious error. Such error, however, is not irremediable. Defendant's sentence may be upheld if the voir dire was otherwise so thorough and probing as to ensure that the jurors empaneled had the capacity to credit the evidence in mitigation, State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 123, 154 [548 A. 2d 887] (1988) ( Bey II), and the ability to perform their duties in accordance with the court's instructions and their oaths, see Adams v. Texas, supra, 448 U.S. at 45 [100 S.Ct. at 2526] 65 L.Ed. 2d at 589. [ Ante at 34-35, 594 A. 2d at 189.] In addition to the obvious strengths I found in my review of the overall voir dire, and to the comfort I find in the responses of jurors like Russo and McCormack, other evidence demonstrates that the Bey II and Adams demands were met and any error remedied. Defendant concedes that some venirepersons, unlike Russo and McCormack, whose understanding of the applicability of the death penalty was flawed and who indicated they would not be able to follow the law were properly excused for cause. Cf. State v. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 247, 593 A. 2d at 278 (Any of those who had preconceived notions of guilt were excused.). Venireperson Piccaci, for example, was excused for his belief that the only case in which he would not vote for a death sentence was negligence    something like a hit and run. Prospective juror Tulibacki was excused for his belief that capital punishment was appropriate for all murders except those committed either in anger or accidentally. Venireperson Luzzati was excused because he stated, if it was cold-blooded murder, I feel that his life should be taken, too, but [i]f it was an accident, that's something totally different. Those three venirepersons' answers about their death-penalty views were elicited through an initial, general, open-ended question by the trial court, followed by an invitation to the prospective juror to elaborate. Of the questions defense counsel requested, most were asked by the court. There were approximately six or seven times when the court refused to ask questions requested by defendant. Those refusals followed two related types of requests. First, when a venireperson indicated that he or she would vote for the death penalty under certain circumstances, defendant requested an inquiry into what those circumstances were. Closely allied to that request, counsel occasionally sought inquiry into whether the knowledge that defendant had two prior murder convictions would substantially impair the juror's ability impartially to decide defendant's sentence. Unlike Williams II, in which the questioning was woefully inadequate and marked by repeated defense objections and in which defense counsel had exhausted all his peremptory challenges, 113 N.J. at 404-05, 550 A. 2d 1172, here the questioning was adequate, there were few objections by defense counsel, and the defense used only thirteen of its peremptory challenges. Ante at 42, 594 A. 2d at 194. The majority agrees that the voir dire with respect to pretrial publicity was adequate. I also find that the voir dire was sufficiently probing to weed out any prospective jurors whose ability to determine defendant's proper sentence was impaired. See State v. Hunt, supra, 115 N.J. at 351, 558 A. 2d 1259; State v. Biegenwald, supra, 106 N.J. at 29, 524 A. 2d 130. As in State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 396, 548 A. 2d 1022, there were some areas in which more inquiry would have undoubtedly been of assistance, as in the questioning of some jurors who expressed the view that capital punishment would be appropriate in some cases but not in others. The Court indicated in Zola, however, that the critical information to be garnered through voir dire is that jurors be able to follow the law and to weigh the factors prescribed by the capital punishment act. Ibid. The voir dire in the present case appears to have accomplished that task. The jurors understood that the trial would provide the appropriate considerations for sentencing, and venirepersons who expressed their inability to conform to the process were excused. That is the aim of a proper and adequate voir dire, no more, no less. Those jurors professed to be fair, and we cannot forget their conscientious efforts. People will inevitably react to what [they] hear as [they] hear it. State v. LeFera, 42 N.J. 97, 108, 199 A. 2d 630 (1964). That fact of human nature should not lead us to assume that they were unequal to their oath to apply the law conscientiously and to find the facts. All those jurors said that they would leave their prejudices on the courthouse steps and decide [the] case on the merits alone. Id. at 110, 199 A. 2d 630. The record indicates that they did so. My confidence in the fairness of the outcome receives further support in the court's instructions, instructions that we must assume the jury followed: Under your oath you are obligated to accept [the law as I have explained it] and then use those principles in deciding the case.         If, in your deliberations, you should become confused as to the legal principles that I have defined and explained for you, simply frame a question in writing    and after reading it and discussing it with counsel, if necessary, we'll call you back into the jury box and I'll go over it again. We don't want you to decide the case in a state of uncertainty as to what the law is. Any problem with that, let me know.    It may well be that as you sit there now, each of you has a tentative conclusion in your mind as to how you are going to vote on the aggravating and mitigating factors, and how you intend to vote on the ultimate penalty that you will choose as appropriate to this case.         What would be wrong is if you were to blindly cling to that tentative conclusion despite persuasive arguments for considerations raised by your fellow jurors during the deliberative process. The jurors were also told that [i]n deliberating on whether one or more of the mitigating factors has been established, you will focus primarily on the testimony of Dr. Eshkenazi [Biegenwald's psychiatrist]. Armed with those instructions, this jury did not behave like a group that had foreclosed consideration of evidence in mitigation. It asked for read-backs of Dr. Eshkenazi's testimony, testimony going directly to the issue of mitigating factors. It did find two aggravating factors present. However, a number of the jurors concluded that two mitigating factors, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(5)(d) (impairment by mental disease or defect) and c(5)(h) (the catchall factor), also existed. Only after deliberating in this manner did this jury find unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating ones. The jurors who were chosen all agreed that they believed the death penalty was appropriate in some instances and not in others, that they could consider and weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors presented at trial and determine the sentence, that they could impose either life or death, that they could listen to and consider psychiatric testimony, and that they could follow the trial court's instruction on the law. See State v. Dixon, supra, 125 N.J. at 247-248, 593 A. 2d at 278. In sum, they were a jury that could `conscientiously apply the law and find the facts.' State v. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 293, 548 A. 2d 939 (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, supra, 469 U.S. at 423, 105 S.Ct. at 851, 83 L.Ed. 2d at 851). The overall thoroughness of the voir dire remedied the error, if any, occasioned by failure to expand voir dire to include a specific inquiry into the effect defendant's prior murder convictions would have on a venireperson's ability to credit and consider evidence in mitigation.