Opinion ID: 1740628
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 18

Heading: Cumulative Photos

Text: Chavez claims that the trial court erred in admitting, over defense objection, cumulative gruesome photographs depicting the victim's remains. As stated by the Court in Henderson v. State, 463 So.2d 196, 200 (Fla.1985), [t]hose whose work products are murdered human beings should expect to be confronted by photographs of their accomplishments. Here, the medical examiner testified that the photographs showing injury to the organs, and specifically to the heart, were not cumulative. [39] The doctor also explained the difference between Exhibits 22 and 29, refuting the suggestion that these photographs were cumulative. Thus, the record supports admission of the photographs as relevant and not cumulative. In the Course of Kidnapping Aggravator The trial court here denied Chavez's requested instruction on doubling. Chavez asserts that the jury based its conviction for first-degree murder on the felony murder theory with kidnapping as the underlying felony; therefore, the penalty phase instruction regarding kidnapping allowed the jury to improperly double the same aspect of the crime. Additionally, Chavez maintains that the trial court erred in finding the in the course of a kidnapping aggravator in this case. Here, Chavez was charged in the indictment with the offense of kidnapping Jimmy Ryce. As provided in section 787.01(1)(a)(2)-(3), Florida Statutes (1995), [t]he term `kidnapping' means forcibly, secretly, or by threat confining, abducting, or imprisoning another person against her or his will and without lawful authority, with intent to ... [c]ommit or facilitate commission of any felony, or to [i]nflict bodily harm upon or terrorize the victim or another person. Further, under section 787.01(1)(b), [c]onfinement of a child under the age of 13 is against his will within the meaning of this subsection if such confinement is without the consent of his parent or legal guardian. In Faison v. State, 426 So.2d 963, 965 (Fla.1983), this Court adopted the test enunciated in State v. Buggs, 219 Kan. 203, 547 P.2d 720, 731 (1976), whereby, to sustain a conviction for kidnapping, the confinement (a) must not be slight, inconsequential and merely incidental to the other crime; (b) must not be of the kind inherent in the nature of the crime; and (c) must have some significance independent of the other crime in that it makes the other crime substantially easier of commission or substantially lessens the risk of detection. In Faison, applying that test, the Court held that the defendant's act of moving one victim to the rear of an office and another victim from the kitchen to the bedroom was sufficient for a kidnapping conviction. Here, the child victim was taken by an adult stranger at gunpoint to a remote trailer where his blood stains were later found. This conduct was obviously intended to facilitate the subsequent sexual battery, which could not have been so easily effected where Jimmy was abducted. Applying a Faison analysis, the jury could properly conclude that these facts were sufficient to support a kidnapping conviction. See also Ferguson v. State, 533 So.2d 763, 764 (Fla.1988) (recognizing that evidence that the victim was confined to make another crime substantially easier to commit is sufficient to support a kidnapping charge). Further, this Court's precedent has already resolved the doubling argument contrary to Chavez's position. See Hudson v. State, 708 So.2d 256, 262 (Fla.1998) (rejecting an argument that the murder in the course of a felony aggravator is an invalid automatic aggravator).