Opinion ID: 1245036
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: authority to impose a service charge

Text: The Home Rule Act was passed in 1975 ... to comply with the mandate of the Constitution in Section 7 of Article VIII, which requires the General Assembly to provide by general law for the ... powers, duties, functions, and the responsibilities of counties. Act No. 283 of 1975. The intent of the constitutional mandate is stated in Knight v. Salisbury , 262 S.C. 565, 571, 206 S.E. (2d) 875, 877 (1974) as follows: It is clearly intended that home rule be given to the counties and that county government should function in the county seats rather than at the State Capitol. If the counties are to remain units of government, the power to function must exist at the county level. Quite obviously, the framers of Article VIII had this in mind. The extent of power intended for counties is made more explicit in Article VIII, Section 17: The provisions of this Constitution and all laws concerning local government shall be liberally construed in their favor. Powers, duties, and responsibilities granted local government subdivisions by this Constitution and by law shall include those fairly implied and not prohibited by this Constitution. S.C. Code Ann. § 4-9-30 (1991), which sets out the general powers which counties may exercise under the Home Rule Act, grants counties the power: (5)(a) to assess property and levy ad valorem property taxes and uniform service charges ... and make appropriations for functions and operations of the county, including... roads , ...; water, ....; sewage .... (emphasis added). Without ambiguity and by its express terms, this section provides counties with additional and supplemental methods for funding improvements. This is consistent with the intention of the drafters of the Home Rule Act to provide county government with the option of imposing service charges or user fees upon those who use county services in order to reduce the tax burden which otherwise would have to be borne by taxpayers generally. It is a settled rule of statutory construction that it is the duty of the court to ascertain the intent of the Legislature and to give it effect so far as possible within constitutional limitations. When a statute is a part of other legislation, designed as a whole to establish an expressed state policy, the court should strive to effectuate that policy. To aid in its construction, the statute must be read in the light of cognate legislation. Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query , 166 S.C. 117, 123, 164 S.E. 588, 590 (1931). The statute does not specify the amount of such fees or the persons upon whom they can be imposed. These limitations are governed by the requirements of equal protection and reasonableness. It is obvious that the legislature did not necessarily intend that uniform service charges, or such a road maintenance fee, would be imposed in every county. The uniformity contemplated by the Home Rule Act is the realization of complete local autonomy. Infinger v. Edwards , 268 S.C. 375, 234 S.E. (2d) 214 (1977). Implicit in the Act is the realization that different counties will have different problems which will require different solutions. To require all counties to use the same means of financing for local improvements would defeat the objective of achieving complete local autonomy. Robinson v. Richland County , 293 S.C. 27, 31, 358 S.E. (2d) 392, 395 (1987). Under Home Rule, a county can impose a service charge, as in the situation here, where it is a fair and reasonable alternative to increasing the general county property tax and is imposed upon those for whom the service is primarily provided.