Opinion ID: 1833738
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Assignments 8, 10 & 11

Text: Before argument to the jury, the defense submitted several requests for special charges. The trial judge declined a special charge by the defense which read: I further charge you that if you find that defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he was insane at the time of the commission of the offense charged, then I instruct you that you must return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity unless the state has proven sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. To the trial court's refusal to give the charge, defense counsel objected and filed assignment 8. Assignment 10 refers to the denial of a motion for a new trial. The motion alleged that the guilty verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence because there was proof that defendant was insane and unable to distinguish between right and wrong at the time of the offense. Assignment 11 pertains to the refusal of the motion for a new trial based upon the refusal of the judge to give the jury requested special charge number 2 quoted above. Initially it is noted that assignment of error 10 is without merit. This Court's appellate review is limited in criminal cases to questions of law, La.Const. art. V, § 5(C) (1974). A claim that the verdict is contrary to the law and the evidence because the evidence proved defendant's insanity is a question of fact for the jury. When the trial judge refused to give defendant's requested special charge number 2, defendant did not object to the ruling, instead he waited until the jury retired to deliberate. The State contends it was then too late to object because the judge could not then correct his ruling and thereby avoid a possible error and a new trial. To support its contention the State cites State v. Beard, 312 So.2d 278 (La. 1975), where we held that a defendant waived his objection to a charge by not objecting when the charge was given, but objecting only after the jury was retired for deliberation. The Beard case did not involve a requested special charge. The decision was based upon the failure to object contemporaneously to the judge's general charge. Earlier in State v. Fink, 255 La. 385, 231 So.2d 360 (1970), we held that when the defense failed to request a special charge on entrapment, objection to the failure to charge entrapment could not be raised for the first time on a motion for a new trial. The decisions in both the Beard and the Fink cases were based upon Article 841 and both are correct because no written requests for special charges by defendant were involved. However, the case at bar is distinguishable. Here the defendant submitted a request for special written charges as required by Article 807 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. As amended in 1974, Article 841 of the Code no longer requires an objection to the court's ruling on any written motion. Although special written charges are not referred to as motions in the code, they have many of the indicia of such; and, insofar as providing a proper basis for appellate review, written charges furnish the same information. The language of Article 841 that an objection is not required to the Court's ruling on any written motion was undoubtedly designed to relax the former rule which made few exceptions to the requirement that a bill of exceptions must be reserved to any ruling complained of. In this light, the State's contention would require a construction of Article 841 which is not warranted under these circumstances. La.Code Crim.Pro. arts. 2, 3. Considered on its merits the requested charge need not have been given for it requires qualification, limitation or explanation; and, those portions of the charge not requiring qualification are included in the general charge. La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 807. A universally accepted principle in criminal prosecutions requires that if the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility. La.Rev.Stat. 14:14. On the other hand, a presumption exists that a defendant is sane and responsible for his actions. By statute in Louisiana this presumption relieves the State, in whose favor it exists in a criminal prosecution, from the necessity of any proof. La.Rev.Stat. 15:432. The burden falls, therefore, on the defendant to overcome this presumption and establish his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. La.Code Crim.Pro. art. 652; State v. Clark, 305 So.2d 457 (La.1975); State v. Toon, 172 La. 631,135 So. 7 (1931); State v. Seminary, 165 La. 67, 115 So. 370 (1928); State v. Scott, 49 La.Ann. 253, 21 So. 271 (1897). Constitutionality of the presumption of sanity and the defendant's burden to overcome that presumption has been settled by the highest authority. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790 (1952). See also Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 95 S.Ct. 1881, 44 L.Ed.2d 508 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concurring). The State's traditional burden of proof is to establish beyond a reasonable doubt all necessary elements of the offense. Once this rigorous burden of proof has been met, it having been shown that defendant has committed a crime, the defendant should bear the burden of establishing his defense of insanity in order to escape punishment. The State is not required to produce countervailing proof of sanity; the question whether defendant has affirmatively proven his insanity and should not be held responsible for his actions is one for the jury. The trial judge correctly charged the jury as follows: . . . In this case the accused has entered a dual plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. As a consequence of such a plea, you must first determine whether or not the accused committed a crime such as the ones named when I instructed you as to the responsive verdicts that you may return in the case. If you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did commit any of these crimes, any one of these crimes, then you must proceed to a determination of whether he was sane at the time the crime was committed and thereby criminally responsible for committing it. Preliminarily, I instruct you that the law presumes every person to be sane. This presumption continues to exist until it is overcome or outweighed by evidence to the contrary. Under the law of this state, insanity at the time of the commission of a crime exempts the offender from criminal responsibility. And Article 14 I've already read to you. It provides as follows: If the circumstances indicate that because of a mental disease or mental defect the offender was incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong with reference to the conduct in question, the offender shall be exempt from criminal responsibility. A person is legally insane if his mind is so impaired or deranged, whether from nature or by accident or disease, as to render him incapable of planning and acting, or of having knowledge of the nature and quality of the act he is doing; incapable of realizing his responsibility to society and to others; in sum, incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong. While the state has the burden of proving beyond any reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty, the accused has the burden of proving insanity at the time of the crime. However, the accused does not have to prove his insanity beyond a reasonable doubt; the law requires that the defense of insanity at the time of the crime be established by a preponderance of the evidence. By preponderance of the evidence is meant that superior weight of evidence, which, while not enough to wholly free the mind from a reasonable doubt, is yet sufficient to incline a reasonable and impartial mind to one side of the issue rather than to the other. Preponderance of the evidence has reference to quality of evidence and not quantity or number of witnesses. With particular reference to the issue of the sanity or insanity of an accused as of the time of the commission of an offense, it is not determinable on the testimony of the medical experts alone when there is other proof. Consideration must be given by the jury to all of the admissible evidence bearing on such mental condition, the testimony of the individual doctors who made up the sanity commission, the opinions of other experts and of lay witnesses, the conduct and actions of the accused, and the like. Subnormal intelligence or weakness of mentality does not in and of itself constitute legal insanity. The test, as I have previously stated, is whether the person urging the defense of insanity can distinguish between right and wrong. If you acquit the accused on account of insanity at the time of the crime, your verdict should so state, that is, the form of your verdict would be, not guilty by reason of insanity. Whether the accused was sane or insane at the time of the alleged crime is an issue for you, the jury, to decide. Assignments 8 and 11 are without merit. The substance of contentions raised by assignments 9, 12 and 13 have been considered under assignments 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 and found to be without merit. For the reasons assigned, the conviction and sentence are affirmed. DENNIS, J., concurs, disagreeing with the statement in treatment of assignment no. 7 that the amendment abolishing the directed verdict was purely procedural.