Opinion ID: 305627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Violation of 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1653(f) and 23 U.S.C. Sec. 138

Text: 18 Plaintiffs contend that defendant acted beyond the scope of his authority in his approval of the aforementioned 4(f) submission. Plaintiffs contend that defendant's approval was a clear error of judgment because based on a clear misstatement of numerous factors. Plaintiffs also contend that the standard employed by defendant was improper and that defendant failed to apply the standards of the Supreme Court decision of Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971). 19 Section 138, Title 23 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part that 20 [a]fter the effective date of the Federal- Aid Highway Act of 1968, the Secretary shall not approve of any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park . . . of national, State, or local significance as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof . . . unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park . . . resulting from such use. 21 Section 49 U.S.C. Sec. 1653(f) provides in part that 22 [a]fter August 23, 1968, the Secretary [of transportation] shall not approve any program or project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park . . . of national, State, or local significance as determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof . . . unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such park . . . resulting from such use. 23 The ultimate standard of review by this court of defendant's findings is a narrow one, and this court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of defendant. E.g., Overton, supra, 91 S.Ct. at 824. 24 In the Environmental Statement and Determination formulated by Turner and ultimately approved by Volpe, Turner found that no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of the Park was available since any alignment satisfying the purpose of the Expressway would have to cross the St. Mary's River and the adjacent Park. Turner also found that all possible planning to minimize harm to the Park had been carried out, and specified such steps. 25 From the evidence presented by both parties during the hearing on the motion, the court finds no substantial showing of probable success on the merits with regard to the defendant's approval of the 4(f) submission. Defendant was not required to make formal findings. Overton, supra 91 S.Ct. at 820. Plaintiffs have not shown that defendants' approval was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A). Nor have plaintiffs shown that defendant failed to meet constitutional, procedural, or statutory requirements. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2) (A)(B)(C)(D). The court further finds that defendant could reasonably have believed that no feasible alternatives existed or that alternatives to the present location of the Expressway involved unique problems. See Overton, supra 91 S.Ct. at 823. 26 Plaintiffs also contend that DOT Order 5610.1, issued by defendant Volpe on October 7, 1970, required defendant to make formal findings when he approved the use of the Park for highway construction. It is apparent from paragraph (6) of DOT Order 5610.1, Implementing Instructions, that regulations and internal instructions to implement the Order were not in existence on October 7, 1970; instead, Operating Administrations were instructed to begin implementation of the procedures in the Order to the extent possible pending finalization of the implementing Instructions. Such instructions were to be drafted and submitted within two weeks after the effective date of the Order by each Operating Administration for review. 27 Although Turner's approval of the 4(f) submission was dated June 29, 1970, prior to the DOT Order, Volpe's approval was entered on October 15, 1970, subsequent to the Order. However, Volpe's approval was entered prior to the time when drafts of implementing instructions were to be submitted. Even if the DOT Order could arguably apply to the 4(f) submission in this case, the court would still be unable to find that procedures in the Order were not carried out to the extent possible in the absence of implementing instructions. 28