Opinion ID: 2995128
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deficiencies of the Indictment

Text: Gilliam’s second contention on appeal is that the indictment upon which he pled guilty was defective. Count I of the indictment charged Gilliam with violating 21 U.S.C. sec.sec. 841(a)(1) and 846. That indictment did not identify the exact quantity of drugs to be used against Gilliam for purposes of charging factors. According to Gilliam, the district court’s decision to sentence him to a term greater than the statutory maximum set forth in sec. 841(b)(1)(C) thus resulted in a violation of the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)./2 Because Gilliam did not raise this Apprendi claim at the time he was sentenced, our review is only for plain error. See Nance, 236 F.3d at 824. As we noted above, this means we must determine (1) whether there was error at all, (2) if so, whether it was plain, (3) whether the error affected Gilliam’s substantial rights, and (4) whether it seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceedings. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 466-67. As with most unpreserved Apprendi claims presented to this court, Gilliam fails to establish the fourth prong of the plain-error test. See United States v. Robinson, 250 F.3d 527, 529 (7th Cir. 2001). Thus, we proceed to examine whether the indictment’s failure to state the relevant drug quantity affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. When applying the fourth prong of the plain error test to Apprendi cases, we ask whether it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that a rational jury would have found the defendant guilty absent the error. Nance, 236 F.3d at 825 (internal citation omitted). In practical terms, we analyze whether there was overwhelming evidence that seven and a half to nine kilograms of cocaine was involved in Gilliam’s conspiracy. As in Robinson and United States v. Patterson, 241 F.3d 912 (7th Cir. 2001), the evidence surrounding Gilliam’s charge is overwhelming. At no point during the proceedings has Gilliam asserted that less than seven and one half to nine kilograms of cocaine were involved in his conspiracy. Gilliam acknowledged as much when he agreed to a base level of 32 in his plea agreement. Additionally, Gilliam did not challenge the amount of seven and a half to nine, as specifically contained in the PSR. At Gilliam’s change of plea hearing, agent Baker testified that Gilliam, by virtue of multiple trips from Los Angeles to Indianapolis, had transported seven and a half to nine kilograms of cocaine. After Baker had completed his testimony, Gilliam confirmed the veracity of Baker’s statements. Finally, we note that the plea agreement, the PSR, and the district court, specified that the statutory sentence for a violation of Count I of the indictment was a minimum of ten years and a maximum of life imprisonment. Gilliam’s sentence of 262 months was well within that range. Under these circumstances, we believe that the indictments’s failure to state the relevant drug quantity cannot be said to have affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. We note in passing that Gilliam likewise maintains that Count II of the indictment was deficient. Specifically, Gilliam asserts that while he was charged in Count II with violating 21 U.S.C. sec. 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. sec. 2, the indictment fails to incorporate any language of willfulness or aiding and abetting, as contained in 18 U.S.C. sec. 2. Perhaps we would look more favorably upon Gilliam’s challenge were it not the fact that Count II of the indictment was dismissed pursuant to the agreement between Gilliam and the government. However, as the Count was dismissed, Gilliam cannot challenge a deficiency contained therein, or earnestly assert that he was harmed in any way by the failure of the indictment to contain the language at issue.