Opinion ID: 2301860
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admissibility of Statements Made to Sergeant Kohler and EMT Sanders

Text: Upon arriving at the scene, Sergeant Kohler noticed appellant near the residence, breathing rapidly and appearing distraught. Kohler asked appellant if he was okay; appellant replied, No, I don't feel well. Id., at 111. Kohler asked appellant to come to his police cruiser to be medically examined; appellant agreed. While they were walking to the cruiser, appellant said, I know I'm in trouble because of all the bruises all over her body. I beat her yesterday pretty bad with a belt. Id., at 113. EMT Supervisor Sanders medically examined appellant in the back of the cruiser. During the examination, appellant asked how victim was doing. Sanders said they were doing everything possible for the child, and asked what happened to her. Appellant replied, I've been beating her. Id., at 148. Sanders asked, What do you mean?; appellant said, I'm sorry, I did it. Id. Sanders asked, What do you mean you did it? Id. Appellant explained, I have been hitting the child for the last two or three days. Id. Sanders then asked, Well, what did you use on the child? Appellant responded, A belt. Id., at 149. Appellant argues the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress the statements he made to Kohler and Sanders. He claims he was in custody when he made these statements, but had not been given Miranda [7] warnings. He further alleges Sanders was acting as an agent of the government when questioning him. Moreover, appellant contends he was medically distressed at the time; thus, he was not competent to waive his rights. The trial court held all of these statements were admissible. The court found appellant's statement to Kohler was a spontaneous utterance, not made in response to any police action. The court also determined Sanders did not act as an agent of the government, as the purpose of his questions was to provide medical treatment to appellant and obtain a medical assessment of victim. The court noted Sanders testified he was not instructed to acquire any information on behalf of law enforcement, and he shared no duties with police. In reviewing a suppression court's denial of a suppression motion, we may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the suppression court's factual findings are supported by the record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Commonwealth v. Jones, 605 Pa. 188, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (2003)). Nonetheless, we exercise plenary review over the suppression court's conclusions of law. Id. (citations omitted). We have held [a] person is in custody for Miranda purposes only when he `is physically denied his freedom of action in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by the interrogation.' Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 577 Pa. 421, 846 A.2d 75, 90 (2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 556 Pa. 216, 727 A.2d 1089, 1100 (1999)) (footnote omitted). The standard for determining whether an encounter with the police is deemed `custodial'... is an objective one based on a totality of the circumstances with due consideration given to the reasonable impression conveyed to the person interrogated.... Commonwealth v. Gwynn, 555 Pa. 86, 723 A.2d 143, 148 (1998) (citing Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 535 Pa. 210, 634 A.2d 1078, 1085 (1993)). The record shows appellant was not in custody when he made these statements. Appellant was walking of his own volition to the police cruiser; he was never physically restrained, and was free to refuse the offer of medical treatment. Further, appellant was not restrained while Sanders was examining him. He was free to decline treatment and leave the cruiser. Accordingly, the trial court properly held these statements were admissible. Furthermore, although appellant contends he was too mentally distraught to understand his Miranda rights or intelligently waive them, this is beside the point, as we have concluded appellant was not entitled to Miranda warnings because he was not in custody. Therefore, the trial court properly denied appellant's motion to suppress his statements to Kohler and Sanders.