Opinion ID: 2710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether the Evidence Was Sufficient to Prove Leung's State of Mind

Text: 14 Lombardozzi argues that the government's evidence was insufficient to prove Leung's requisite state of mind. We disagree. [T]he inquiry [into the victim borrower's state of mind] should be whether the record as a whole discloses a reasonable basis upon which the borrower[ ] might have predicated [his] fear that default or delinquency might result in harm to [himself] or [his] famil[y]. Annoreno, 460 F.2d at 1309. A finding that the record discloses such a reasonable basis does not necessarily depend on evidence of explicit threats made by the creditor, and the victim borrower's requisite state of mind can be inferred. See, e.g., id. (Our review of the record compels the conclusion that the nature of these transactions, in which oral, unsecured loans were made at rates of interest often 30 times the commercial rates with provision for nefarious repayment at such places as street corners, taverns, pool halls and closed barber shops, would inform the average borrower . . . that the loans were extortionate in nature.). In our analysis, the component of our standard of review that requires us to draw all reasonable inferences in the government's favor is significant because even though Leung did not testify as to any specific threats or discuss his state of mind in detail, his state of mind can be inferred from the evidence offered at trial. 15 First, the jury could infer from several portions of Leung's trial testimony his understanding that violence or criminal harm would result if he defaulted on his loans. Leung testified that he was introduced to Lombardozzi through Marino, someone he knew was a wiseguy . . . . involved with the mob, who engaged in racketeering and loansharking. See United States v. Madori, 419 F.3d 159, 169 (2d Cir.2005) (upholding the admission of evidence that the debtor believed the creditor was connected to organized crime . . . to show the debtor's belief that the [creditor] would use, or had a reputation for using, extortionate means to collect extensions of credit (citing United States v. Gigante, 729 F.2d 78, 83 (2d Cir.1984))). Regarding the loans he took out on behalf of his friend Wong, Leung testified that he sought money from other sources in order to repay the loans [b]ecause when the time come[s], the day to collect, I have got to have the money ready, because they are not going after [Wong], they are going after me. With regard to making payments in general, moreover, Leung testified that he was very nervous . . . because every morning when I wake up, it's this money, that money. And I have a business, I cannot run away, and I don't want anything to happen to the business. In describing a telephone conversation with Isoldi about making payments, Leung explained that in telling Isoldi [i]f you can help me with that, I would be deeply appreciat[ive], he meant that he wanted Isoldi to hold off Lombardozzi. Indeed, he testified that I just don't want them to do anything, you know—you know, I'm a little scared, so that's why I'm just telling him to hold off, hold off [Lombardozzi]. Finally, on cross examination, Leung testified that when he was having trouble making payments, Lombardozzi told him that he had better take care of it. Although this statement does not necessarily rise to the level of an explicit threat, it at least permits the inference of an implied threat from which Leung's fear of harm can be reasonably inferred. See Madori, 419 F.3d at 169 (upholding the admission of evidence of veiled threats to prove the victim borrower's state of mind) (citing Gigante, 729 F.2d at 83). 16 Leung's understanding that extortionate means would be used to collect on any default can also reasonably be inferred from his testimony regarding the terms of the loan, i.e., 104% interest, the delivery of the money in a paper bag in Leung's wine cellar, and his statement to FBI Agent Christopher Bryceland that Isoldi acted as a runner for Lombardozzi (giving Leung the actual cash and collecting payments on Lombardozzi's behalf). See Annoreno, 460 F.2d at 1309. Leung also testified that he sold his assets, sought loans from friends, and borrowed money from other loansharks at interest rates of more than 250% in order to repay his loan to Lombardozzi on time, all evidence from which the jury could permissibly infer that Leung feared the consequences of non-payment. 17 Finally, the testimony of Agent Bryceland and tape-recorded conversations between Isoldi and Leung constitute additional evidence from which the jury could infer Leung's understanding that delays in making payments could result in violence or other criminal harm. Specifically, Agent Bryceland testified that Leung told him that Leung believed Lombardozzi was involved with organized crime and that he would be dead if he talked to the FBI. Leung also informed Agent Bryceland that he was concerned for his safety and that Isoldi and another associate have muscle and . . . would do harm to him personally or to his restaurant if he did not make timely payments. In a telling exchange with Agent Bryceland, Leung initially denied knowing either Lombardozzi or Isoldi and lied about the loans, likely out of fear for his own safety, and from the taped conversations in evidence, the jury could infer that Leung was scared and nervous. See, e.g., United States v. Wills, 346 F.3d 476, 499 (4th Cir.2003) (noting that it is reasonable for a jury to conclude, based on recorded conversations, that the victim was in fear). 2 18 Based on the foregoing proof and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Leung understood that delay or default in making repayment could result in violence or other criminal harm. 19