Opinion ID: 1328542
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Clergy-Communicant Privilege

Text: The defendant also assigns as error the trial court's admission of testimony allegedly violating the clergy-communicant privilege. During the suppression hearings in this matter, the Reverend Martin Rudolph testified that he visited the defendant, who was, at that time, confined in the Eastern Regional Jail. Reverend Rudolph related that he and the defendant spoke about the allegations that the defendant had sexually assaulted and/or abused male children who attended the defendant's church. While speaking of these charges, the defendant allegedly stated that he knew what was happening was wrong, [but he] couldn't quit. The Reverend also reported that the defendant gave him permission to use [their conversation in] any way that [the Reverend thought] it would be helpful to others. With regard to his conversation with Reverend Rudolph, the defendant testified that he believed that what I talked to [the Reverend] about would be between us. The defendant further admitted that he had never before sought spiritual guidance or forgiveness from Reverend Rudolph and that he, the defendant, did not confess[] to [the Reverend], as a communicant confesses to a priest when [he] talked to [the Reverend] that day. Lastly, the defendant conceded that he could not remember whether he gave Reverend Rudolph permission to disclose their conversation to others, but that he may have granted such permission. The circuit court found: [A]s a matter of fact, that Reverend Rudolph's professional capacity, with reference to his church, which does not have a course discipline required of it, that this was not a type of confessional and therefore that this conversation between these two people does not come within [ sic ] purview of 5739 [ sic ], and therefore is not prohibited by that statutory section. [21] On appeal, the defendant argues that his conversation with Reverend Rudolph is protected by the clergy-communicant privilege contained in W. Va.Code, 57-3-9 (1992). The defendant asserts that Reverend Rudolph is, in fact, a member of the clergy within the scope of this statute and that he spoke with the defendant in his professional capacity as a minister. Furthermore, the defendant believed the Reverend visited him for the sole purpose of providing comfort and strength during his confinement. Finally, the defendant, who holds this privilege, asserts that because he has not waived this privilege, the Reverend cannot reveal the contents of their conversation. The State replies that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting into evidence Reverend Rudolph's testimony as to his conversation with the defendant because the defendant has not satisfied the statutory elements of the clergy-communicant privilege. Although the Reverend is a member of the clergy, the defendant has failed to show that he spoke with the Reverend in his role as a professional counselor. In fact, the defendant admitted that he did not attend the Reverend's church and that he had never before confided in him as a pastor. More importantly, the State contends that the defendant expressly waived this privilege by granting permission for the Reverend to use the information in any way that [the Reverend thought] it would be helpful to others. To the extent the trial court's admission of evidence was based upon an interpretation of a statute or West Virginia Rule of Evidence, our standard of review is plenary. State v. Omechinski, 196 W.Va. 41, 45, 468 S.E.2d 173, 177 (1996); Gentry v. Mangum, 195 W.Va. 512, 466 S.E.2d 171 (1995). Our review of a trial court's ruling to admit or exclude evidence if premised on a permissible view of the law, however, is only for an abuse of discretion. Id. Although we do not agree entirely with the trial court's interpretation of the coverage of W. Va.Code, 57-3-9 (1992), in this instance, we do not find the trial court abused its discretion in ruling that the conversation between the defendant and Reverend Rudolph was admissible and not subject to the clergy-communicant privilege provided by the statute. The question of the sacredness of confessions made to a priest has frequently been a matter of judicial consideration. In general, the confessional seal, now referred to as the priest-penitent or clergyman-communicant privilege, has been recognized in many jurisdictions, although the privilege has no firm foundation in common law. See 1 Franklin D. Cleckley, Handbook on Evidence for West Virginia Lawyers § 5-4(F)(2) at 583 (3rd ed.1994); 8 John Henry Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2394 (John T. McNaughton rev.1961). The rationale in support of such a privilege seems to be the demands of religious liberty, the need for individuals to be able to disclose sinful acts to a spiritual counselor, and the desire to avoid confrontation with clergy who refuse to divulge communications they feel ethically and religiously obligated to keep secret. See Seward Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 Ohio St. L.J. 55 (1963). In West Virginia, the privilege in modern practice traces its existence to a West Virginia statute. W. Va.Code, 57-3-9 (1992), provides a privilege for communications between a clergy and a communicant: No priest, nun, rabbi, duly accredited Christian Science practitioner or member of the clergy authorized to celebrate the rites of marriage in this state pursuant to the provisions of article one [§ 48-1-1 et seq.], chapter forty-eight of this code shall be compelled to testify in any criminal or grand jury proceedings or in any domestic relations action in any court of this state: (1) With respect to any confession or communication, made to such person, in his or her professional capacity in the course of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious body to which he or she belongs, without the consent of the person making such confession or communication[.] Under West Virginia law, the privilege is designed to safeguard the clergy status as a secure depository for the confessant's confidences. As with most clergy-communicant statutes, the West Virginia statute prohibits the clergyman from disclosing the contents of a confidential communication without the consent of the person making the communication. Thus, we conclude that the communicant is at least one of the holders and owners of the privilege. Cf. Seidman v. Fishburne-Hudgins Educ. Found., Inc., 724 F.2d 413, 415 (4th Cir.1984) (holding that because Virginia statute does not require a clergyman to testify regarding any confidential information revealed to him in his professional, religious capacity without the consent of the person making such confession, only the clergyman, and not the penitent or lay communicant, holds the clergy-communicant privilege). Having determined that the defendant could properly assert the privilege, we must now decide whether the defendant met the other circumstances required by statute. We believe this statutory privilege must receive a construction consistent with its policy to carry out a long-standing public policy to encourage uninhibited communication between persons standing in a relation of confidence and trust, such as ... confessor and clergyman[.] People v. Shapiro, 308 N.Y. 453, 458, 126 N.E.2d 559, 561-62 (1955). See also Allen v. Lindeman, 259 Iowa 1384, 1390-91, 148 N.W.2d 610, 614-15 (1967). In this regard, we agree with the eloquent analysis of the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia: Sound policyreason and experience concedes to religious liberty a rule of evidence that a clergyman shall not disclose on a trial the secrets of a penitent's confidential confession to him, at least absent the penitent's consent. Knowledge so acquired in the performance of a spiritual function as indicated in this case is not transformed into evidence to be given to the whole world.... The benefit of preserving these confidences inviolate overbalances the possible benefit of permitting litigation to prosper at the expense of the tranquility of the home, the integrity of the professional relationship, and the spiritual rehabilitation of a penitent. The rules of evidence have always been concerned not only with truth but with the manner of its ascertainment. Mullen v. United States, 263 F.2d 275, 280 (D.C.Cir.1958). (Footnote omitted). Given the importance of the clergy-communicant relationship, we hold that such a communication will be privileged, in accordance with W. Va.Code, 57-3-9, if four tests are met: (1) the communication must be made to a clergyman; (2) the communication may be in the form of a confidential confession or a communication [22] ; (3) the confession or communication must be made to the clergyman in his professional capacity; and (4) the communication must have been made in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules of practice of the clergyman's denomination. The plain language of the statute leads us to conclude that the design of the statute is two-fold. It promotes the desirability of securing unhampered the exercise of the religious duty and discipline of confession, and it protects confidential communications of a communicant made to a clergyman in his or her capacity as clergyman. [23] Based on the record presented to us, we have no trouble determining that Reverend Rudolph was a clergyman within the contemplation of the statute and that the communication was in the form of a confidential confession at the time the statement was made. We have more trouble making a definitive decision as to whether the confession was made to Reverend Rudolph in the course of discipline enjoined by the church or other religious body to which he ... belongs. Nowhere in this record do we find evidence demonstrating one way or another that there was a course of discipline enjoined by Reverend Rudolph's church. Fortunately for us, we do not have to make a decision as to this aspect of the privilege on such an inadequate record. Rather, we hold that the defendant later consented to the testimony and therefore waived the confidentiality of the communication There is uncontroverted evidence in the record that shows that the defendant gave Reverend Rudolph permission to use [their conversation in] any way that [the Reverend thought] it would be helpful to others. We find this sufficient under the statute to constitute consent. Moreover, any error in the admission of the testimony was harmless. The evidence offered by Reverend Rudolph was merely cumulative and less damaging than the recorded confession of the defendant introduced by the State. Our cases consistently have held that nonconstitutional errors are harmless unless the reviewing court has grave doubt as to whether the erroneously admitted evidence substantially swayed the verdict. See State v. Guthrie, 194 W.Va. 657, 684-85, 461 S.E.2d 163, 190-91 (1995). This standard is the same as the fair assurance standard. Id. Therefore, we conclude that even if the testimony of Reverend Rudolph was improperly received, this testimony could not have tainted the verdict in light of the other, more damaging evidence of the defendant's guilt. C.