Opinion ID: 1491482
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Mr. Ellington and Ms. McAdams

Text: In his motion to disqualify Mr. Vaden as the attorney for Ms. McAdams and Mr. Ellington, Mr. McAdams contended that Mr. Vaden represented both McAdamses in preparing and filing the 1993 property settlement agreement and the annulment of the divorce decree. He also contended that Mr. Vaden accepted fees pursuant to that representation from both parties and was made custodian of the diamond ring at issue for a period of time. It was also alleged that Mr. Vaden acted as attorney for Ms. McAdams and Mr. Ellington in preparing and filing the real-property deed and represented Mr. Ellington and Ms. McAdams in other actions involving Mr. McAdams as a party. Attached to the disqualification motion were several exhibits including (1) the 1993 property settlement agreement, (2) the 1993 joint petition for annulment of decree of divorce which was submitted and signed by Mr. Vaden, (3) a letter from Mr. Vaden to Ms. McAdams indicating that he represented her in the annulment of the divorce, (4) a 1993 check written by Mr. McAdams to Mr. Vaden, (5) a 1994 warranty deed from Alma Lee McAdams to herself and Melvin Glenn Ellington with the words Prepared By Marcus Vaden written at the bottom, and (6) a 1995 letter from Mr. Vaden to Mr. McAdams enclosing a file-marked copy of Ms. McAdams's and Mr. Ellington's answer to Mr. McAdams's complaint. In his order denying Mr. McAdams's motion, the Chancellor simply stated that Mr. McAdams failed to show that a conflict existed. The exhibits to the motion for disqualification are sufficient for us to conclude that the Chancellor was in error. In Nance v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 316 Ark. 43, 870 S.W.2d 721 (1994), we stated that even though the Model Rules are designed to regulate the practice of law, and to provide a mechanism for disciplining attorneys and not to form the basis of substantive law decisions, we cite the Model Rules from time to time as having an effect on the outcome of litigation. Rule 1.9(a) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct states as follows: A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not thereafter represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter in which that person's interest are materially adverse to the interests of the former client unless the former client consents after consultation. The underlying question is whether the lawyer was so involved in the matter that the subsequent representation can be justly regarded as a changing of sides in the matter in question. Model Rule 1.9, cmt. 2. An attorney is disqualified from representing a party in an in an adversary proceeding when, (1) the moving party was previously represented by the attorney whose disqualification he now seeks; (2) the matters embraced within the pending suit are substantially related to the matters or the cause of action for which the attorney previously represented the moving party; and (3) the attorney is representing an adversary of the movant party in the pending suit. [Emphasis in original.] Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark. 422, 431, 706 S.W.2d 369, 374 (1986) (quoting Heathcoat v. Santa Fe Internat'l Corp., 532 F.Supp. 961 (E.D.Ark.1982)) (remanding to the chancellor with instructions to conduct a hearing to determine whether our statutes override the religious doctrine, polity or practice of the church as protected by the federal and state constitutions). See Gipson v. Brown, 295 Ark. 371, 749 S.W.2d 297 (1988) (dismissing the appeal on the basis that an examination of the issues on appeal resulted in the impermissible entanglement of this court in ecclesiastical matters). In Martindale v. Richmond, 301 Ark. 167, 782 S.W.2d 582 (1990), we upheld a determination of our Committee on Professional Conduct that Model Rule 1.9 was violated by an attorney who represented one party in a divorce proceeding that was ultimately dismissed and then later represented the other party in seeking an increase in child-support payments after the parties were divorced even though the attorney did not represent either party in the suit in which they were divorced. Mr. Vaden represented both Mr. and Ms. McAdams in their 1993 joint petition for the annulment of their divorce decree. There is also evidence to support Mr. McAdams's allegation that Mr. Vaden represented both parties in their 1993 property settlement agreement and divorce decree because Mr. Vaden is named as the custodian of personal property referred to in the agreement. Both the 1993 property settlement agreement and the subsequent divorce annulment are substantially related to the present lawsuit which concerns, in part, the parties' rights to personal property that was the subject of the 1993 agreement. The substantial relationship is also implicated in Mr. McAdams's argument that he has ownership rights in personal property at issue because he and Ms. McAdams later agreed to honor the 1993 property settlement agreement. Although Mr. McAdams's claim to the real property conveyed by Ms. McAdams to herself and Mr. Ellington is based on homestead and curtesy rights rather than the 1993 property settlement agreement, there is an appearance of impropriety in Mr. Vaden's representation of Mr. Ellington and Ms. McAdams against Mr. McAdams in this matter. Likewise, there is an appearance of impropriety in Mr. Vaden's representation of Ms. McAdams against Mr. McAdams's claim that she maliciously prosecuted him in retaliation for his posting of eviction notices to the tenants at the rental property that he claimed an interest in based on homestead and curtesy rights. There is no evidence of an intent on Mr. Vaden's part to use against Mr. McAdams confidences or information from the prior instances in which he represented both parties. Nevertheless, we cannot countenance the subsequent representation of Ms. McAdams by Mr. Vaden because of the appearance of impropriety. See Martindale v. Richmond, 301 Ark. 167, 782 S.W.2d 582; Berry v. Saline Memorial Hosp., 322 Ark. 182, 907 S.W.2d 736 (1995) (stating we continue to recognize the appearance of impropriety standard in disqualification cases). Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part. IMBER, J., not participating.