Opinion ID: 179034
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jury finding on mental retardation

Text: Citing Ring v. Arizona, Esparaza also contends that he is entitled to obtain a jury finding on the issue of whether he is mentally retarded. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In Ring, the Supreme Court held that because a death sentence was authorized only if an aggravating factor was present, the Sixth Amendment required that the aggravating factor must be proved to a jury. Id. at 603–09. This Court has rejected the instant claim, explaining that neither Ring nor Atkins “render the absence of mental retardation the functional equivalent of an element of capital murder which the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Johnson, 334 F.3d 403, 405 (5th Cir. 2003); see also Woods v. Quarterman, 493 F.3d 580, 585 n.3 (5th Cir. 2007). Moreover, contrary to Esparza’s argument, the holding in Ring cannot be applied retroactively on collateral review. As a general matter, the Supreme Court has explained that “Ring announced a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already final on direct review.” Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004). Although Esparza recognizes that holding, he nonetheless contends that the decision should be revisited. We, of course, are bound by the Supreme Court’s decision. United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir. 1998). Further, this Court has rejected his precise contention in the context of a claim of mental retardation, explaining that this “claim does not meet the requirements of § 2244(b) because the claim that a jury must determine mental retardation does not rely upon a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive by the Supreme Court.” In re Woods, 155 F. App’x 132, 134 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, we are constrained to find that this 14 Case: 10-70009 Document: 00511289378 Page: 15 Date Filed: 11/09/2010 No. 10-70009 claim is not debatable among reasonable jurists. We DENY his motion for a COA as to this claim.