Opinion ID: 1256193
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Elements of Murder in the Commission of Kidnapping

Text: {72} We next review the evidence used to prove each element of the aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of kidnapping. See § 31-20A-5(B). The trial court instructed the jury on the following elements of this aggravating circumstance: 1. The crime of kidnapping was committed; 2. [The victim] was murdered while defendant was committing the kidnapping; 3. The murder was committed with the intent to kill. This jury instruction is patterned on UJI 14-7015 NMRA 1999. {73} As noted in the committee commentary to UJI 14-7015 and in Henderson, 109 N.M. at 661, 789 P.2d at 609, the aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of kidnapping does not follow automatically from a guilty verdict on the underlying offenses of kidnapping and murder. [E]stablishing the elements of an aggravating circumstance is not the same thing as establishing the elements of a crime. Id. at 661, 789 P.2d at 609. {74} It would be possible to read Henderson as holding that Section 31-20A-5(B) requires not only an intent to kill but also an intent to kill[ ] in the commission of a kidnapping. 109 N.M. at 661, 789 P.2d at 609. However, we reject any inference in Henderson that Section 31-20A-5(B) requires proof of a specific intent for the aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of kidnapping. See Henderson, 109 N.M. at 665, 789 P.2d at 613. (Ransom, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). The statutory reference was not an attempt to confine the aggravating circumstance of kidnapping to situations in which a jury could find a defendant had formed the specific intent to kidnap and then murder the victim. Rather, in addition to proving that the crime of kidnapping was committed, the aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of kidnapping requires proof that the murder was committed with intent to kill and was committed in the commission of ... [kidnapping]. Section 31-20-A-5(B); accord UJI 14-7015. Even if the jury has found the defendant guilty of a felony murder in the commission of a kidnapping, it must also find that the murder was committed with an intent to kill in order to find this aggravating circumstance. UJI 14-7015 committee commentary. {75} We conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of the aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of kidnapping. The fact that all of the elements of the crime of kidnapping were satisfied before the murder occurred does not preclude a finding that the victim was murdered in the commission of kidnapping because, in this case, the evidence substantially supports a finding that the kidnapping continued throughout the course of [D]efendant's other crimes and until the time of the victim's death. McGuire, 110 N.M. at 309, 795 P.2d at 1001. In addition, a finding that Defendant committed the murder with the intent to kill can be inferred from the same evidence of intent upon which the jury relied to find Defendant guilty of first degree murder under Section 30-2-1(A)(1), which requires a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing. Defendant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence that the killing was willful, deliberate and premeditated, and we find no reasonable basis for doing so. Cf. Rojo, 1999-NMSC-001, ¶ 24, 126 N.M. 438, 971 P.2d 829 (reasoning that evidence concerning the method and motive for a killing was sufficient to support a finding that the defendant acted with deliberate intent). {76} Finally, we address Defendant's reliance on the doctrine of fundamental error as it applies to the essential elements in the jury instructions. Defendant asserts that there is fundamental error in the trial court's instructions to the jury regarding the aggravated circumstance of murder in the commission of a kidnapping because these instructions did not clearly inform the jury that it would have to find the kidnapping to be factually distinct from the attempted CSP and the murder. We disagree. Our past cases have applied the doctrine of fundamental error to the omission of a disputed essential element of an offense. See, e.g., Osborne, 111 N.M. at 662, 808 P.2d at 632. In this case, the jury was instructed on all of the elements of the aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of kidnapping in accordance with UJI 14-7015 and Section 31-20A-5(B). The instruction requested by Defendant for the first time on appeal is not an essential element of this aggravating circumstance. Rather, it is a definitional instruction. [A] failure to give a definitional instruction is not a failure to instruct on an essential element. Crain, 1997-NMCA-101, ¶ 11, 124 N.M. 84, 946 P.2d 1095. {77} We review Defendant's claim of instructional error to determine whether the instructions given were so ambiguous as to create fundamental error. Fundamental error may be resorted to if the question of guilt `is so doubtful that it would shock the conscience to permit the conviction to stand.' Osborne, 111 N.M. at 662, 808 P.2d at 632 (quoting Clark I, 108 N.M. at 297, 772 P.2d at 331). Ambiguous instructions are those that are capable of more than one interpretation. State v. Parish, 118 N.M. 39, 42, 878 P.2d 988, 991 (1994). When a jury instruction is ambiguous, then we look to see if the jury instructions as a whole cure the ambiguity. See id. In this case, the definitions of murder, kidnapping, and attempted CSP already were given to the jury in the essential elements instructions for those offenses, and each of those offenses contains distinct elements. Thus, we conclude that the jury instructions as a whole were sufficient to prevent a reasonable juror from becoming confused or misdirected to an extent that would amount to fundamental error. We are satisfied that the jury understood the factual distinctions necessary to find the aggravating circumstance of murder in the commission of a kidnapping without more precise definition from the court.