Opinion ID: 50627
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: a reasonably direct relationship existed

Text: between the defendant’s occupation, business, or profession and the conduct relevant to the offense of conviction; and (2) imposition of such a restriction is reasonably necessary to protect the public because there is reason to believe that, absent such restriction, the defendant will continue to engage in unlawful conduct similar to that for which the defendant was convicted. (b) If the court decides to impose a condition of probation or supervised release restricting a defendant’s engagement in a specified occupation, business, or profession, the court shall impose the condition for the minimum time and to the minimum extent necessary to protect the public.13 The purpose behind an occupational restriction is not to punish the defendant, but to prevent the defendant’s continued or repeated illegal activities while avoiding a bar to employment that exceeds that needed to achieve the result.14 Emerson contends that the second and third special conditions (i.e., access to where children congregate and employment where children congregate) are impermissible 13 U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5 (emphasis added). 14 Mills, 959 F.2d at 519. 11 occupational restrictions. This contention is based on the “reasonably direct relationship” language of § 5F1.5(a)(1). Emerson asserts that, as his offense of conviction was possessing a firearm while under a restraining order, these two prohibitions are not reasonably related to his firearm conviction. Rather, he insists, these occupational restrictions were sought because of his prior sexual assault conviction and are reasonably related only to that offense. Thus, contends Emerson, § 5F1.5 disallows the second and third special conditions imposed by the district court. We disagree. Emerson glosses over the fact that § 5F1.5 only applies to prohibiting a defendant from engaging in “a specified occupation, business, or profession, or limiting the terms on which the defendant may do so.”15 A “specified occupation” as used in § 5F1.5 is one that is the defendant’s primary means of supporting himself, not any endeavor from which the defendant has merely earned some money.16 Neither is § 5F1.5 concerned with whether a special condition might possibly deprive the defendant of a potential occupational opportunity in the future. Rather, its 15 U.S.S.G. § 5F1.5 (emphasis added). 16 United States v. Paul, 274 F.3d 155, 171 n.18 (5th Cir. 2001) (providing that if the defendant’s “primary means of supporting himself” were involved, then he would entitled to the higher degree of scrutiny for occupational restrictions under § 5F1.5). 12 focus is on whether a defendant would be deprived of his preexisting primary occupation. These conclusions are supported by the purpose of § 5F1.5. Conditions that would impose occupational restrictions are held to a higher standard because Congress did not want to deprive defendants of their livelihoods without significant justification and thereby mete out additional punishment.17 By the same token, nothing suggests that Congress had any intention of imposing a higher standard on the imposition of restrictions with merely speculative future occupational opportunities or any activities that might incidentally involve a future occupational opportunity. Otherwise, Congress would have unwittingly and inevitably transformed all space and time restrictions into occupational restrictions, necessitating the application of the higher standard. This cannot be what Congress intended. According to the PSR, Emerson is a medical doctor, but he has not practiced since December 1998 because of poor health. Although restricting Emerson’s access to and employment at places where children congregate could place some tangential hardship on his ability to practice medicine, it does not prevent him from pursuing his present primary means of support. 17 Mills, 959 F.2d at 519. 13 In addition, Emerson has not shown with any specificity how the two relevant special conditions will restrict his ability to serve as a medical doctor.18 Emerson has offered nothing more than raw speculation and conclusional statements to support his claim that these special conditions will affect his livelihood. Thus, the two relevant special conditions are not occupational restrictions for purposes of § 5F1.5, and thus are not entitled to a higher standard. As Emerson does not contend that the imposition of the special conditions violated the requirements of § 3583, we conclude the district court did not err in imposing the second and third special conditions at issue. Moreover, even if it had, we still would not have found an abuse of discretion.