Opinion ID: 1727217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Refusal to Recuse

Text: The Court of the Judiciary also found Judge Sheffield guilty of violating Canon 3 C(1) because he did not recuse himself from the Cox contempt hearing. Recusal is required under Canon 3 C(1) when facts are shown which make it reasonable for members of the public or a party, or counsel opposed to question the impartiality of the judge. Acromag-Viking v. Blalock, 420 So.2d 60, 61 (Ala.1982). See, also, Wallace, supra, at 1379. Specifically, the Canon 3 C(1) recusal test is: Would a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position knowing all of the facts known to the judge find that there is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality? Thode, The Code of Judicial Conduct The First Five Years in the Courts, 1977 Utah L.Rev. 395, 402. In the instant case, the Court of the Judiciary answered yes, and we agree. It is not unethical per se and a violation of Canon 3 C(1) for a judge to hear a contempt proceeding in which he or his court is the object of the contempt. Ex parte Pope, 26 Ala.App. 282, 283, 158 So. 767, 768 (1935); 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 174 (1969). As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, We cannot assume that judges are so irascible and sensitive that they cannot fairly and impartially deal with resistance to their authority or with highly charged arguments about the soundness of their decisions. Ungar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 584, 84 S.Ct. 841, 846, 11 L.Ed.2d 921 (1964). Therefore, Judge Sheffield's hearing a contempt proceeding in which he and his court were the objects of the contempt, without more, is not a violation of Canon 3 C(1). In some circumstances, however, it might appear to the reasonable man that a judge cannot hold the balance nice, clear and true between [the parties]. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532, 47 S.Ct. 437, 444, 71 L.Ed. 749 (1927). The present case is one involving such circumstances. We are firm in our resolve that a reasonable person could have questioned Judge Sheffield's ability to hold the balance. The alleged contempt in this case was an angry letter to the editor criticizing the judge's actions in what was, if not before the letter's publication, at least after its publication, a highly sensitive and much-discussed issue in the judge's circuit. The letter was an attempt by Ms. Cox to make the women in Henry and Houston Counties aware of what she perceived to be not only an abuse of judicial power by Judge Sheffield, but also social callousness on his part. Judge Sheffield stated to the Judicial Inquiry Commission that [t]he overall impression [of the letter] is that the court is kicking around a cancer victim that has got children that are dropping out of school, to support the family, and that the court has said that a man can do all these things, throw, give his money away and not support his family, that paints a pretty dim picture of the court, I think. Moreover, in his conversation with Mr. Lewis the night before the hearing, the judge said, I think it's pretty obvious who she is talking about. Everybody in Abbeville knows what she is talking about. Just because she doesn't name any names doesn't lessen what's been done. Thus, not only was the letter highly uncomplimentary, but it was also clearly directed toward Judge Sheffield. Under these circumstances, we find the evidence to be clear and convincing that the reasonable person would have questioned Judge Sheffield's impartiality, particularily in view of his initiation of the contempt proceeding; and we uphold the Court of the Judiciary's finding as to Canon 3 C(1). In so finding, we stress that it is not merely the publication of Ms. Cox's letter that creates the impression of impartiality, but, as is generally true in these cases, it is the totality of the facts that requires recusal. Wallace, supra, at 1379. Furthermore, we stress that the publication of Judge Sheffield's conversation with Mr. Lewis does not enter into our decision that the evidence supports a finding that the judge should have recused himself. The judge was unaware of Mr. Lewis's publication of their conversation until after the recusal motion was made and ruled on. Under the Canon 3 C(1) recusal test that we adopt today, only those facts known to the judge are relevant. Therefore, Mr. Lewis's article quoting the judge cannot be a consideration in our recusal finding. Nor does Judge Sheffield's erroneous contempt judgment against Ms. Cox enter into our decision that Canon 3 C(1) required recusal in the instant case. It is well-settled that [a]dverse rulings during the course of the proceedings are not by themselves sufficient to establish bias and prejudice. Hartman v. Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama, 436 So.2d 837, 841 (Ala.1983). [R]ulings on issues of law or attitudes concerning legal issues do not establish bias or prejudice requiring recusal unless those rulings or attitudes are the product of bias and prejudice of an extra-judicial source. Thode, supra, at 405. In this case, the evidence does not support a finding of any actual bias or prejudice on Judge Sheffield's part. We find only that Canon 3 C(1) mandated recusal because a reasonable person could question the judge's impartiality. Therefore, we find that recusal was required without considering the judge's erroneous legal ruling. Finally, we recognize that the reasonable person/appearance of impropriety test, as now articulated in Canon 3 C(1), in the words of the Supreme Court of the United States, may sometimes bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and who would do their very best to weigh the scales of justice equally between contending parties. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 625, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955). As stated in Canon 1 of the Code of Judicial Ethics, An independent and honorable judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society, and this requires avoiding all appearance of impropriety, even to the point of resolving all reasonable doubt in favor of recusal.