Opinion ID: 784922
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Suppression of the Wiretap Surveillance Evidence

Text: 12 In approving the government's application to conduct wiretap surveillance, the district court exercised its discretion to require the government to submit progress reports to the court detailing its progress and need for further surveillance. 5 The district court's order required the government to submit progress reports on or about the tenth, twentieth, and thirtieth days following the Date of this Order ... showing what progress has been made toward achievement of the authorized objectives and the need for continued interception. The government's wiretap surveillance ran from October 26 until November 14, with the last recorded phone calls on November 10. The government filed its tenth day progress report on November 5, the tenth day after the district court's October 26 order. 6 The government never filed a report on the twentieth day after the district court's order, November 15, because it discontinued the wiretap surveillance on November 14 and filed a sealing application with the district court on that day. 13 Thomas and Vaughn argued that the government was required to file its twentieth day report on November 14 and its failure to do so violated both the court's order and the statutory requirement that [s]uch reports shall be made at such intervals as the judge may require. Therefore, defendants asserted, suppression of the wiretap evidence was required. The district court found the government sufficiently complied with the court's order, given its discontinuation of the wiretap surveillance and filing of a sealing application, and rejected defendants' motion to suppress. 14 We review a district court's decision to admit evidence obtained from wiretap surveillance for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir.2002). Putting aside the date controversy, 7 the district court had discretion to require the progress reports in the first place, In re DeMonte, 674 F.2d 1169, 1174 (7th Cir.1982), and to find that a twentieth day report was not necessary in light of the government's sealing application which indicated that the wiretap surveillance had been discontinued. Cf. United States v. Iannelli, 477 F.2d 999, 1002 (3d Cir.1973) (The sufficiency of these reports was a matter for the supervising judge, and the breadth of his discretion must be viewed in light of the fact that he could under 18 U.S.C. § 2518(6) have dispensed with progress reports entirely.). Moreover, even if the district court had found that the government failed to properly comply with its progress report order, suppression of the wiretap evidence is not the automatic remedy, and such a decision is similarly within the district court's discretion. See United States v. Scafidi, 564 F.2d 633, 641 (2d Cir.1977) (While these reports should have been timely filed, the sanction for failure to do so is surely not automatic suppression of the tapes.); see also DeMonte, 674 F.2d at 1174 (Even if the appellant's claim that the reports were not timely filed is true, that does not automatically render the surveillance invalid.). 8 Because the district court was satisfied that the government sufficiently complied with its order, we cannot say it was an abuse of discretion for the court to deny defendants' motion to suppress the wiretap evidence.