Opinion ID: 1788426
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the Tax Exemption Under Article VII, Section 3(a) Necessarily Applies to Municipal Telecommunications Facilities

Text: In putting this definition into practice, we focus on the word essential, which is generally defined as something basic, necessary, or indispensable. See Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 396 (10th ed. 1999). For example, an essential element is one on which proof is required in order to establish a legal claim or criminal offense. See, e.g., Rubano v. Dep't of Transp., 656 So.2d 1264, 1266 (Fla.1995) (Proof that the governmental body has effected a taking of the property is an essential element of an inverse condemnation action.); Randall v. State, 760 So.2d 892, 901 (Fla.2000) ([P]remeditation is the essential element that distinguishes first-degree murder from second-degree murder.). Thus, inherent in the word essential is the concept of great need or necessity. A thread of necessity also runs through the precedent concerning tax exemptions for municipal use of municipally owned property that we have discussed. In McDavid, which held a tax exemption for a public housing facility valid, the Legislature had declared that housing conditions were a menace to the health, safety, and morals of the people ... necessitat[ing] excessive expenditures for crime and fire prevention, health, and welfare, and that public safety  demand[ed]  replacement of slums by sanitary and better housing facilities. 200 So. at 101 (emphasis supplied). In upholding the tax exemption for property owned by a municipal power company located in another county in Saunders, we recognized that the Legislature was doubtless well aware of the need for light, heat and power by those areas outside of municipalities. 25 So.2d at 650. Similarly, in Ford, this Court held that the production of electricity by a municipality's power company served a municipal purpose. See 629 So.2d at 847. Such services are essential in that municipally owned power companies have legally protected monopolies within their territorial boundaries, and have traditionally provided these services. See § 366.11(1), Fla. Stat. (2004); City of Homestead v. Beard, 600 So.2d 450, 452 (Fla.1992). Finally, the tax-exempt status upheld in Mikos for vacant land held by a municipality to preserve natural open spaces or for future needs, 374 So.2d at 461, is consistent with the traditional municipal function of providing parks for the municipal population. Cf. City of Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So.2d 493, 495 (Fla.1953) (stating that [i]n all heavily populated municipalities the police power should be exercised by municipal officials to afford all of the people light, air, [and] an opportunity for recreation). Unlike electrical power and public parks, telecommunications services have historically been provided by the private sector. The Legislature's rationale for opening telecommunications services to competition by various entities including municipalities was to provide customers with freedom of choice, encourage the introduction of new telecommunications service, encourage technological innovation, and encourage investment in telecommunications infrastructure. § 364.01(3), Fla. Stat. (2004). However, under the law applicable to this case, municipalities may enter the market regardless of whether their participation furthers any of these goals. In other words, a municipality, using infrastructure advantages gained from its pre-existing utility operations, may enter a market in which a high level of service and competition already exists without introducing new levels of service, fostering innovation, or encouraging infrastructure investment. If that is the case, the municipal telecommunications company does not provide a service that is essential to the health, morals, safety, and general welfare of the people within the municipality. [13] Because this is a facial challenge to the constitutionality of legislation taxing municipal use of municipally owned property, we need not determine whether the specific services provided by the City pass this test. As stated above, in a facial constitutional challenge, we determine only whether there is any set of circumstances under which the challenged enactment might be upheld. See Bales, 343 So.2d at 11 ([A]ny legislative enactment ;carries a strong presumption of constitutionality, including a rebuttable presumption of the existence of necessary factual support in its provisions. If any state of facts, known or to be assumed, justify the law, the court's power of inquiry ends.) (citation omitted); Cashatt, 873 So.2d at 434 (A facial challenge to a statute is more difficult than an `as applied' challenge, because the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid.) We conclude that in a situation in which municipal telecommunications services do not promote any of the goals set forth above from section 364.01, Florida Statutes, for the benefit of the municipal population, property used to provide those services does not serve municipal or public purposes and therefore is not exempt from ad valorem taxation under article VII, section 3(a).