Opinion ID: 1763781
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jurors who should have been excused for cause.

Text: In Kentucky, the right to an impartial jury is protected by Section 11 of the Kentucky Constitution, as well as the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the [United States] Constitution. Fugett v. Commonwealth, 250 S.W.3d 604, 612 (Ky.2008); see also Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931, 939 (Ky.1999). RCr 9.36(1) provides that the trial judge shall excuse a juror [for cause] when there is reasonable ground to believe that the prospective juror cannot render a fair and impartial verdict. Smith v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 437, 444 (Ky.1987) ( quoting Peters v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.2d 764, 765 (Ky.1974)). We have: long recognized that `a determination as to whether to exclude a juror for cause lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless the action of the trial court is an abuse of discretion or is clearly erroneous, an appellate court will not reverse the trial court's determination.' Fugett, 250 S.W.3d at 613 (quoting Pendleton v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 522, 527 (Ky.2002)); see also Soto v. Commonwealth, 139 S.W.3d 827, 848 (Ky.2004). That determination, however, is based on the totality of the circumstances ... [and] not on a response to any one question. Fugett, 250 S.W.3d at 613. This must be so where the duty of the trial court is to `evaluate the answers of the prospective jurors in context and in light of the juror's knowledge of the facts and understanding of the law.' Id. (quoting Stopher v. Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 796 (Ky.2001)). If an abuse of discretion is found in failing to strike a juror for cause, the trial court will not be reversed unless the party had to use a peremptory challenge to strike the juror and, in fact, used all his peremptory challenges. Fugett, 250 S.W.3d at 613 (citing Stopher, 57 S.W.3d at 796). We have held that this requirement exhausting one's peremptory challenges is predicated on the idea that peremptory strikes are a substantial right given to the defendant because, if the defendant had to use all of his peremptory strikes to remove a juror that should have been stricken for cause, a juror that he otherwise would have stricken would have been impaneled on the jury. King v. Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 270, 279 (Ky.2009) {citing Shane v. Commonwealth, 243 S.W.3d 336, 341 (Ky.2007)). For this reason, the jury could never be completely fair to the defendant since he was not able to effectively exercise his right to choose jurors. Id. The established test for determining whether a juror should be stricken for cause is `whether ... the prospective juror can conform his views to the requirements of the law and render a fair and impartial verdict.' Thompson v. Commonwealth, 147 S.W.3d 22, 51 (Ky. 2004) ( quoting Mabe v. Commonwealth, 884 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Ky.1994)). [T]he party alleging bias bears the burden of proving that bias and the resulting prejudice. Cook v. Commonwealth, 129 S.W.3d 351, 357 (Ky.2004) ( citing Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 405, 407 (Ky.1982)). Where there is such a showing, [t]he court must weigh the probability of bias or prejudice based on the entirety of the juror's responses and demeanor. Shane, 243 S.W.3d at 338; Walker v. Commonwealth, 288 S.W.3d 729, 736-37 (Ky. 2009). Hunt contends that the trial court erred by failing to sustain his challenge to remove Juror 87 [10] and Juror 60 for cause because they expressed an inability to consider mitigating evidence. In promulgating KRS 532.025(2) the legislators of Kentucky recognized the dire necessity of having jurors consider mitigating circumstances when the death penalty might be imposed. Smith v. Commonwealth, 845 S.W.2d 534, 539 (Ky.1993). Hunt alleges that Juror 87 expressed an inability to consider Hunt's prior record and emotional state as mitigating circumstances. However, in both instances, when initially asked the question of whether he could consider these factors, Juror 87 responded yes. Defense counsel then followed up with the question would it make any difference to you?; and the juror responded No. Accordingly, his answers were ambiguous. Juror 87 otherwise stated that he could consider mitigating evidence and could impose the minimum twenty-year sentence on the murder charge. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge. Hunt contends that the trial court erred in denying his challenge to Juror 60 because he expressed that a person's life history should not be considered in mitigation and that he would not so consider it even if instructed by the court to do so. A review of the video transcript, however, again demonstrates that the question and juror's response were ambiguous and that the juror did not flatly state that a person's life history should not be considered in mitigation. On the other hand, Juror 60 testified that he could consider anything to do with the case, and that he could consider the full range of penalties. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the challenge. Hunt next contends that the trial court erred by failing to excuse Juror 39 and Juror 42 for cause on the basis that they both expressed that they would be biased against a defendant who did not testify. In voir dire questioning, Juror 39 was asked if he could think of a situation in which he would require a defendant to put on evidence; and he responded to the effect that if the defendant was innocent, he would think he would present a defense. Upon follow-up questioning, however, the juror acknowledged that he would not hold it against a defendant if he did not testify at trial. When asked about a defendant not putting on evidence, the juror stated that it would be their choice, although he personally would if he could. He also stated that it would be easier if a defendant put on evidence if he had any but that he would understand why a defendant may not put on a defense. The juror also stated that he would follow the trial court's instructions. Upon examination of the voir dire as a whole, Juror 39 did not express that he would hold it against a defendant if he did not testify and present evidence. In fact, to the contrary, he expressed that he would not hold it against the defendant. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Hunt's challenge to Juror 39. During his voir dire questioning, Juror 22 was asked if the defendant did not put on evidence, would that tend to make him think the defendant might be guilty. Juror 22 responded it would put a thought in my mind anyway, as to why he would not try to defend himself. After the trial court explained the concepts of presumption of innocence and burden of proof, however, the juror stated that he would follow the trial court's instructions and place the burden of proof on the Commonwealth. Despite the juror's initial statement, once set straight on the basic principles at issue, he committed himself to not holding the failure of a defendant to put on evidence against him. Hunt also challenges Juror 22 on the grounds that the juror said he could be fair but not impartial because he had read or heard about the case. A review of the voir dire, however, discloses that the juror had merely remembered hearing about the case and reading about it in the newspaper. He stated that he had not formed an opinion about the case; that if he were on the jury, he would be fair and impartial; and that he could put aside anything he had read and would follow the court's instructions. Mere exposure to pretrial publicity does not automatically disqualify a prospective juror. Maxie v. Commonwealth, 82 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Ky.2002). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by failing to strike Juror 22 for cause based upon his voir dire answers.