Opinion ID: 406501
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Heading: Is a split sentence permissible under the YCA?

Text: 7 The general probation statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3651, gives district courts power to impose a split sentence on a defendant convicted of a non-capital offense punishable by imprisonment for more than six months but less than life. More precisely, section 3651 allows the court to sentence such a defendant to a term: 8 in excess of six months and provide that the defendant be confined in a jail-type institution or a treatment institution for a period not exceeding six months and that the execution of the remainder of the sentence be suspended and the defendant placed on probation for such period and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems best. 9 The Supreme Court has stated that one section of the YCA, 18 U.S.C. § 5023(a), 4 incorporates by reference the authority conferred under the general probation statute, Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 549, 98 S.Ct. 849, 853, 55 L.Ed.2d 14 (1978), and was intended to preserve to sentencing judges their powers under the general probation statute when sentencing youth offenders to probation. Id. at 551, 98 S.Ct. at 854. It would seem to follow that section 5023(a) engrafts the split sentence provision of section 3651 onto the YCA, so that a court placing a youth offender on probation under the YCA would have the power to require the offender to serve up to six months of confinement before his probationary period commenced. 10 There is, however, a strong argument against that conclusion. The split sentence authorization was added to section 3651 eight years after the enactment, in 1950, of the YCA, including section 5023(a). 5 Hence, in 1950 when Congress sought to ensure that the YCA would leave the power of the court to grant probation ... undisturbed, 6 federal courts had no power to impose a split sentence at all. 7 11 The crucial issue, therefore, is whether Congress intended section 5023(a) to incorporate into the YCA the specific provisions of section 3651 as of 1950, or whether it intended that subsequent changes in the general probation authority of federal courts would apply in the YCA context as well. The answer is by no means self-evident, 8 and reasons can be given in support of either conclusion. We believe, however, that the more persuasive reasons are those indicating an intent that post-1950 amendments to the probation statute should apply to YCA sentencing. 12 This is not to deny that some factors do suggest the contrary conclusion. For example, the Durst Court, as noted above, spoke of section 5023(a) as designed to preserve in YCA proceedings the authority of courts under section 3651-a term that suggests specific incorporation of section 3651 as it existed when the YCA was passed. Also, Durst relied in part on explicit legislative history manifesting a Congressional intent to allow fines to be imposed as part of YCA sentences. Durst, supra, 434 U.S. at 552-53, 98 S.Ct. at 854-55. There is no corresponding legislative history indicating an intent to allow split sentences under the YCA. 9 Indeed, the use of a split sentence involving incarceration for a determinate period of at most six months is arguably inconsistent with the general sentencing scheme of section 5010, under which the sentencing court may only order an indeterminate sentence for six years or longer, Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1372 (10th Cir. 1981). See United States v. Jackson, 550 F.2d 830, 831 (2nd Cir. 1977). 10 Such a sentence is also seemingly at odds with the literal language of section 5010(a), which makes probation an option (i)f the court is of the opinion that the youth offender does not need commitment. 11 13 Nevertheless, these factors are outweighed by those which suggest that courts sentencing youth offenders are meant to enjoy whatever powers are conferred by section 3651 as amended since 1950. Despite the Durst Court's characterization of section 5023(a) as incorporat(ing) by reference the authority conferred under the general probation statute, Durst, supra, 434 U.S. at 549, 98 S.Ct. at 853, section 5023(a) does not appear to be a statute of specific reference-i.e., one that literally adopts or incorporates a pre-existing statute. If section 5023 were a statute of specific reference, the usual canons of statutory interpretation would counsel us to read it as incorporating the probation statute as of 1950, unaffected by the 1958 amendment, unless there is some very clear indication to the contrary. See Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 314, 58 S.Ct. 559, 564, 82 L.Ed. 858 (1938); Pearce v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 603 F.2d 763, 767 (9th Cir. 1979). But section 5023(a) is not designed to adopt by reference the general probation statute and mak(e) it as much a part of the later act as though it had been incorporated at full length. Engel v. Davenport, 271 U.S. 33, 38, 46 S.Ct. 410, 412, 70 L.Ed. 813 (1926). Rather, it merely provides that the YCA is not to be construed in any wise to amend, repeal, or affect the provisions of the probation statute. Providing, in this manner, that the YCA not be read as affecting section 3651 actually emphasizes that these are distinct statutes, and certainly exhibits no intent to make section 3651 an integral part of the YCA. Thus the canon of construction applicable to statutes of specific reference is inapplicable here. Rather, section 5023(a) indicates a congressional intent that whatever powers the probation statute grants courts generally-including powers added by subsequent amendments-should be available in the YCA context as well. 12 14 Most importantly, we believe that reading the YCA as allowing courts to impose split sentences on youth offenders is the more appropriate interpretation in view of the policies that the YCA is designed to advance. It is proper, and indeed essential, to interpret the words of a statute in the light of the purposes Congress was seeking to serve. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600, 608, 99 S.Ct. 1905, 1911, 60 L.Ed.2d 508 (1979). Here, permitting split sentences is consistent with the Supreme Court's emphasis that the YCA strongly endorses the discretionary power of a judge to choose among available sentencing options, Ralston v. Robinson, --- U.S. ----, 102 S.Ct. 233, 237, 70 L.Ed.2d 345 (1981), and was meant to enlarge, not restrict, the sentencing options of the federal trial courts. Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 436, 94 S.Ct. 3042, 3049, 41 L.Ed.2d 855 (1974). This policy of flexibility and the grave responsibility that district courts bear in deciding what course of treatment will be most likely to bring about the elusive goal of rehabilitating youthful offenders argue strongly for resolving any doubts in favor of maximizing the sentencing options available to district judges. 15 Our result supports the rehabilitative goals of the YCA. A court convinced that a particular youth offender merited a split sentence and YCA treatment, rather than straight YCA probation or an adult split sentence, will be able to impose such a sentence under the YCA, and thereby still permit the youth to have his conviction set aside under section 5021(b) upon discharge from the split sentence probation. 13 Moreover, if a court finds that straight YCA probation would be too lenient, it will have an alternative other than the more severe sanctions available under section 5010(b) or 5010(c). Cf. United States v. Oliver, 546 F.2d 1096, 1099 (4th Cir. 1976) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914, 98 S.Ct. 1466, 55 L.Ed.2d 504 (1978) (to hold that fines could not be imposed as a condition of probation under the YCA might diminish the liberal use of the probation alternative). 16 Having considered the factors set out above, we conclude that split sentences, as authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 3651, are permissible under the YCA. 17 (II) Must youth offenders who receive split sentences under the YCA be segregated from adults during confinement? 18 We have concluded that Congress's 1958 authorization of split sentences is applicable to youth offenders placed on probation under the YCA. Nevertheless, Congress did not contemplate the possibility of a split sentence for youth offenders when it enacted the YCA in 1950. Consequently, it did not address the question whether youth offenders incarcerated pursuant to such a sentence must be segregated from adult prisoners and confined in separate institutions. Nor has Congress addressed that question explicitly since enacting the split-sentence authorization. 19 Thus the YCA, as it stands, contemplates only two categories of incarcerated youth offenders: those committed for treatment under section 5010(b) or (c), and those sentenced as adults under section 5010(d). Congress clearly intended that youth offenders in the former category be separated from adult prisoners and confined in separate institutions, 14 and made such separation mandatory (absent special circumstances) in section 5011. 15 Youth offenders sentenced to imprisonment as adults, on the other hand, need not be segregated from adults. 16 We must decide, in light of the overall scheme and rehabilitative purpose of the YCA, into which of these two categories youth offenders incarcerated for up to six months under section 5010(a) are most appropriately placed. 17 20 The youth offenders who Congress believed did not require segregation from adults are those sentenced as adults under section 5010(d)-those whom the sentencing court has specifically found will not derive benefit from treatment. No such finding precedes the imposition of probation (with or without a split sentence) under section 5010(a). Indeed, probation itself is a form of treatment under the YCA, which in section 5006(f) defines treatment quite broadly as corrective and preventive guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting the antisocial tendencies of youth offenders. Probation clearly satisfies this definition, for it is aimed at correcting the antisocial tendencies of the probationer through an individualized program supervised by a probation officer who seeks to guide the probationer into improving his conduct and becoming a law-abiding citizen. United States v. Glasgow, 389 F.Supp. 217, 220-22 (D.D.C.1975). 21 Since youth offenders who are given split sentences are thus receiving treatment under the YCA, they merit the separation from hardened adult criminals that Congress believed essential to the operation of a successful rehabilitative treatment program. Durst v. United States, 434 U.S. 542, 545, 98 S.Ct. 849, 851, 55 L.Ed.2d 14 (1978). (T)he legislative history (of the YCA) makes it clear that Congress viewed separation of youth offenders from older, more sophisticated inmates as the crucial initial step in preventing transformation of the youths into hardened criminals. Watts v. Hadden, 651 F.2d 1354, 1365 (10th Cir. 1981). Congress thus believed exposure to adult criminals posed an unacceptable risk of corrupting those youth offenders who require potentially lengthy commitment under section 5010(b) or (c) in order to be treated. It would be illogical indeed to suppose, then, that Congress would have countenanced such exposure for youth offenders who merit the less onerous split sentence. 18 22 We conclude that youth offenders who receive split sentences under the YCA must be kept segregated from adult inmates during their confinement, and must be incarcerated, insofar as practical, in separate facilities. 19 23 The judgments of the district courts are REVERSED insofar as they purported to impose determinate minimum sentences under the Youth Corrections Act and insofar as they failed to specify segregative confinement, and are in all other respects AFFIRMED. The cases are REMANDED for resentencing in accordance with this opinion. 20 24