Opinion ID: 4514993
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Negligent Product Liability

Text: Farkas’s negligent products liability claim fares no better. “For products liability to be founded in negligence, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a duty, the defendant’s breach thereof, and proximately caused damages.” Morrison v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 891 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994). We hold that Farkas failed to show that Addition owed him a duty under Missouri law. -7- “The extent and limits of the duty of a manufacturer of a product dangerous because of the use to which it is to be applied depend upon the nature and character of the defect and of plaintiff’s knowledge thereof.” Stevens v. Durbin-Durco, Inc., 377 S.W.2d 343, 347 (Mo. 1964). [T]he manufacturer of a product which is potentially dangerous when used in its intended fashion . . . is under a duty to the user to exercise ordinary care in its manufacture, and is liable to a user injured thereby if the injury results from a latent defect bespeaking lack of ordinary care in producing the product. Morrison, 891 S.W.2d at 426 (emphasis added) (citing Stevens, 377 S.W.2d at 346). Important here is the latent defect requirement. “[T]he manufacturer may be held liable if the defect or danger is latent or concealed, but where the danger is open, obvious and apparent, or the user has actual knowledge of the defect or danger, there is no liability on the manufacturer.” Stevens, 377 S.W.2d at 347. “No defect can be considered latent which is discoverable by the exercise of due care or reasonable diligence.” Edwards v. Springfield Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 495 S.W.2d 489, 497 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (cleaned up). In Stevens, the Supreme Court of Missouri faced the question of whether a load binder—a device which takes the slack out of chains that secure loads on trailers—was negligently manufactured. 377 S.W.2d at 344–46. The binder operated by moving a lever back and forth between an open and closed position, which tightened the chain. Id. at 344. The court noted that “[t]he perilous nature of the product was obvious and apparent to plaintiff; its lack of a safety ratchet was plain to be seen.” Id. at 348. Further, “[i]ts use created no danger not known to and appreciated by plaintiff, an experienced trucker who had used load binders for years and knew and appreciated full well their dangerous characteristics and propensities.” Id. Because of that, the court found that the plaintiff could not recover from the manufacturer. Id. -8- We have previously applied the Stevens rationale. See Kerber v. Am. Mach. & Foundry Co., 411 F.2d 419 (8th Cir. 1969). There, a machine had an opening that exposed the chains and sprockets of a conveyor belt. Id. at 420. Reaching through that opening to adjust misplaced dough, the plaintiff’s hand was mangled. Id. We found that “reasonable men could [not] differ in finding that the danger was not latent or concealed, but . . . was open, obvious and apparent to all who used it, particularly the plaintiff who had . . . actual knowledge of the danger.” Id. at 421. The Missouri Court of Appeals has also applied Stevens. In Morrison, the plaintiffs brought a claim on behalf of an individual who died when a tractor that lacked roll-over protection rolled on him. 891 S.W.2d at 423–24. The court found no latent defect because a lack of roll-over protection “is something open and obvious which is readily revealed merely by looking at a tractor.” Id. at 427. In addition, the decedent was aware of the dangers of driving without roll-over protection. Id. Morrison thus indicates that a manufacturer is only liable if the danger is latent. See id. at 427–28. The Missouri Court of Appeals discussed what constitutes a latent danger in Edwards, 495 S.W.2d at 497. There, an exploding soda bottle injured a woman. Id. at 491–92. The woman essentially argued that the shelves where the bottle was placed were improperly designed because there was no place to store individual bottles. Id. at 493. The court ultimately concluded that the plaintiff failed to plead a design defect but noted that “even if . . . the display unit . . . might be said to have been designed with some ‘defect’ . . . plaintiff’s firm position that there was ‘a latent defect’ cannot be honored.” Id. at 497. Farkas failed to establish a latent defect. The danger was not concealed. Rather, the absence of guarding was visible and obvious. As in Morrison, where the lack of roll protection was obvious, the lack of guarding was apparent here. And the dangers associated with it were apparent. In Kerber, the danger was obvious where the -9- plaintiff placed his hand into the part of the machine where the conveyor belt’s chains and sprockets were located. Here, Farkas placed his hand into the point of operation of a machine that bent metal. In short, Farkas has not offered evidence that the danger of a tube forming machine to the user’s hand was anything but “open, obvious, and apparent.” The defect, therefore, is not latent under Missouri case law. Consequently, there is not a material issue of fact regarding his negligence claim.