Opinion ID: 500657
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Venue (Counts 1, 2, and 3)

Text: 36 Appellant urges that his conviction on counts 1, 2, and 3 must be set aside because the district court erred in refusing to dismiss them for improper venue in the Northern District of Texas. These first three counts are all based in part on 21 U.S.C. Secs. 955a or 959. Both sections include the following venue provision: 37 Any person who violates this section shall be tried in the United States district court at the point of entry where such (Sec. 959) [or that (Sec. 955a) ] person enters the United States, or in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. 38 Section 955a(f), [now 46 U.S.C. Sec. 1903(f) ] and Sec. 959(c). Appellant argues that the shall language here is mandatory and bars jurisdiction by courts situated elsewhere. The district court denied his motion to dismiss on the basis of jurisdiction. The Government relies, instead, on the venue provision in 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3237(a): 39 Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or committed in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in which such offense was begun, continued, or completed. 40 Appellant urges that since he entered the United States at Houston, venue lies in either the Southern District of Texas or the District Court for the District of Columbia. 5 41 The core question here is whether the venue provisions of Secs. 955a and 959 were intended to be exclusive. The shall language might so imply, but 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3237(a) establishes venue as indicated except as otherwise expressly provided. United States v. Hankish, 502 F.2d 71 (4th Cir.1974), dealt with the question whether shall venue language in a stolen goods statute (18 U.S.C. Sec. 659) defeated venue under Sec. 3237. There the court held that the venue provision in the former was not intended to be an express exception to the provisions of Sec. 3237. Id. at 73. Section 659 provided: 42 [T]he offense shall be deemed to have been committed in any district into which such [stolen goods] shall have been removed or into which the same shall have been brought by the offender. 43 Id. at 73. 6 The court found that this venue provision was not couched in restrictive language, unlike 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1073, which reads: Violations of this section may be prosecuted only  in the specified district. Id. 44 There is significant difference between the phrases shall be tried and may be prosecuted only. We have previously held that another statute with shall language, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3238, is not to be construed as an express exception to the broad provision for venue under Sec. 3237(a). United States v. Williams, 589 F.2d 210, 213 (5th Cir.1979). The same reasoning applies here to uphold venue under Sec. 3237(a). In addition, a member of an alleged conspiracy may be tried in any district where an overt act takes place, even if he has never set foot there. United States v. Parrish, 736 F.2d 152, 158 (5th Cir.1984); United States v. Winship, 724 F.2d 1116, 1125 (5th Cir.1984). Count 1 charges conspiracy. Venue for counts 2 and 3 is specifically based upon 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3237. 45 We hold that the district court did not err in denying appellant's motion to dismiss counts 1, 2, and 3 for improper venue. 46 F. Merger of offenses rather than consecutive sentences under Secs. 955a and 959 (Counts 2 and 3). 47 Appellant contends that he was improperly sentenced to consecutive sentences for his convictions under counts 2 and 3, since both were based on a single transaction, viz., the shipment of a quantity of marihuana to Texas on December 8, 1981. Count 2 was grounded on 21 U.S.C. Sec. 955a(d)(1), possession with intent to import; count 3 was based on 21 U.S.C. Sec. 959(a)(1), distribution with intent to import. Appellant urges that it is unclear whether Congress intended to punish these offenses separately, and cites Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83-84, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955) for the proposition that doubt [should] be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses (the principle of lenity). He suggests that this Court is bound by our en banc decision in United States v. Hernandez, 591 F.2d 1019, 1022 (5th Cir.1979), in which we held that when the defendant sold heroin on a single occasion the offenses of possession with intent to distribute and distribution of drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C. Sec. 841(a)(1) merged into a single punishable offense. 48 Appellant cites numerous Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, including three by this Court, 7 holding that where a single act formed the basis for charges of both possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute and distribution of the same, only one sentence may be imposed. Appellant argues that even if he might be prosecuted for both offenses, he may be sentenced only for one of them under the Supreme Court's holding that separate punishments may be imposed for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single transaction only when each [statutory] provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S.Ct. 180, 182, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). See also Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 1672, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985). His claim is that possession of marihuana with intent that it be imported does not require proof of any element not also required to prove distribution of marihuana with intent that it be imported. 49 We conclude that Blockburger, Hernandez, and their progeny do not control separate punishment under counts 2 and 3 because we find in the record distinct and separate evidence with respect to each offense. We explicitly noted in Hernandez that our opinion there did not concern the situation where there is separate evidence of possession with intent to distribute and evidence of distribution in one or more different transactions. 591 F.2d at 1022. Since then, we have regularly held that consecutive sentences may be imposed for possession with intent to distribute and for distribution when there is independent evidence of the defendant's prior possession of the controlled substance before the actual time of the distribution, or when there is other separate evidence for each offense. United States v. Hernandez, 750 F.2d 1256, 1259-60 (5th Cir.1985); United States v. Berkowitz, 662 F.2d 1127, 1140-42 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Colmenares-Hernandez, 659 F.2d 39, 43 (5th Cir.1981); United States v. Rodriguez, 612 F.2d 906, 920-23 (5th Cir.1980) (en banc) aff'd sub nom. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981); United States v. Foundas, 610 F.2d 298, 301-02 (5th Cir.1980). See also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 392, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1284, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958). 50 There is record evidence on the basis of which the jury could have concluded that appellant or his co-conspirators accumulated marihuana for some period prior to December 8, 1981, the date it was flown from Belize to Texas. This evidence establishes prior possession with intent to distribute, separate and apart from the eventual actual distribution. See Berkowitz, 662 F.2d at 1141 n. 16. Record evidence shows that on December 8, 1981, appellant participated in the distribution by being involved in the process of loading the marihuana onto the aircraft destined for the United States. The district court did not err in upholding appellant's convictions on the separate counts of possession with intent to distribute [Sec. 955a(d)(1) ] and distribution with intent to import [Sec. 959(a)(1) ] or by sentencing him to consecutive five-year terms for each offense. 51 G. Conviction and consecutive sentences where one count includes the other (counts 5 and 6) 52 Appellant contends that his convictions under 21 U.S.C. Secs. 952(a) [count 5] and 957 [count 6] cannot both be sustained because they describe identical offenses. He contends further that he may not be subjected to consecutive sentences for each conviction, without transgressing the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy clause. 53 Section 952(a) makes it unlawful to import into the United States various scheduled controlled substances. Section 957(a) makes it unlawful for any person to import into the United States most of the same scheduled controlled substances, 54 unless there is in effect with respect to such person a registration issued by the Attorney General under section 958 of this title, or unless such person is exempt from registration under subsection (b) of this section. 55 Id. Appellant insists that consecutive sentences may not be imposed for these separate counts under the Blockburger standard, which, as we pointed out above, requires proof of some different fact in support of each offense when multiple offenses arise out of the same transaction. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. Appellant buttresses his contention by urging that the Supreme Court has subsequently re-affirmed Blockburger, holding that consecutive terms are permissible only on a clear indication of legislative intent so to provide: 56 The assumption underlying the [Blockburger ] rule is that Congress ordinarily does not intend to punish the same offense under two different statutes. Accordingly, where two statutory provisions proscribe the same offense, they are construed not to authorize cumulative punishments in the absence of a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. 57 Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 692-93, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1437-38, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980). More recently, the Supreme Court has re-affirmed that the Blockburger test is a rule of statutory construction as a means of discerning legislative purpose and, therefore, should not control where there is a clear indication of contrary legislative intent. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340, 101 S.Ct. 1137, 1143, 67 L.Ed.2d 275 (1981). See also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 105 S.Ct. 2407, 2412, 2419-20, 85 L.Ed.2d 764 (1985); Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366, 103 S.Ct. 673, 678-79, 74 L.Ed.2d 535 (1983). 58 The crucial question here, therefore, is whether Congress intended to create separate punishable offenses in Secs. 952(a) and 957(a) for a single episode. Both appellant and the Government concede that the legislative history is inconclusive. It is clear that Congress enumerated separate offenses, importation and importation without a requisite registration, under two separate sections of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. But both offenses were made punishable under 21 U.S.C. Sec. 960, which reads: Unlawful Acts 59 (a) Any person who-- 60 (1) contrary to section 952, 953, or 957 of this title, knowingly or intentionally imports or exports a controlled substance, ... 61 shall be punished as provided in subsection (b) of this section. Penalties 62 (b)(1) In the case of a violation under subsection (a) of this section with respect to a narcotic drug in schedule I or II, the person committing such violation shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years ... 63 21 U.S.C. Sec. 960(a)(1) and (b)(1). 64 We note that Congress did not refer to the possibility that more than one violation might be found under subsection (a), which subsection provides that a person who intentionally imports contrary to section 952 or section 957 shall be punished as provided in subsection (b). It could be that Congress simply overlooked such a possibility. On the other hand, if Congress had intended that offenses under Secs. 952 and 957 were to be subject to separate penalties, it could have readily so indicated by drafting Sec. 960(b)(1) to read: In the case of a violation or violations under subsection (a) of this section ..., the person committing such violation or violations shall be imprisoned not more than fifteen years for each violation ... It did not do so. We cannot conclude from the bare language of sections 952, 957, and 960 that Congress manifested clear legislative intent to authorize separate punishments for the offenses of importing and importing without a requisite registration when both occurred in a single transaction. Blockburger therefore controls. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 340, 101 S.Ct. at 1143; 8 Whalen, 445 U.S. at 692-93, 100 S.Ct. at 1437-38. 65 As noted above, the Supreme Court held in Blockburger that separate punishments may be imposed for multiple offenses arising out of the same transaction only when each offense requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Albernaz, 101 S.Ct. at 1141-42; Whalen, 100 S.Ct. at 1437; Blockburger, 52 S.Ct. at 182. We cannot perceive, nor has the Government brought to our attention, any additional fact required to prove that appellant imported marihuana into the United States [Sec. 952(a) ], which fact is not also required to prove that he imported the same marihuana into the United States without a requisite registration issued by the Attorney General [Sec. 957(a) ]. Consecutive sentences on counts 5 and 6 are therefore impermissible under Blockburger, since each offense does not require proof of an additional fact which the other does not. Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S.Ct. at 182. 66 The Government's only answer to the application of Blockburger is that it does not come into play when it is clear that Congress intended to create two wholly separate offenses. But the only proof of such intent put forth is that they are both contained in the statute. If this analysis were to prevail, there would be no Blockburger principle. To thwart Blockburger there must be a specific and clear showing that Congress intended the two different offenses to arise independently in a single transaction situation. We find no such manifestation of Congressional intent. 67 In Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 105 S.Ct. 1668, 84 L.Ed.2d 740 (1985), the Supreme Court addressed the implications of Blockburger where a defendant had been subjected to two convictions and consecutive sentences for the single transaction of receiving and possessing the same firearm. The Court held that the defendant could be prosecuted for both offenses, but could only be convicted and sentenced for one, and remanded to the district court to vacate one of the convictions. The Court concluded that Congress had not intended to subject persons in such situations to two convictions since proof of illegal receipt of a firearm necessarily includes proof of illegal possession of that weapon. '[W]hen received, a firearm is necessarily possessed.'  Id., 105 S.Ct. at 1672. Here, the offense of importation without requisite registration (count 6) necessarily encompasses the offense of importation (count 5). Ball requires vacating appellant's conviction on either count 5 or count 6. Vacating the conviction on count 5 is the proper choice because it removes any concern as to the relationship between counts 5 and 7. 9 We therefore vacate the count 5 conviction. Because we resolve this issue on the basis of statutory construction, we do not reach the Constitutional question concerning possible double jeopardy. 68 H. Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process and prosecutor's argument against absent witnesses' credibility 69 Appellant complains that although the penal statute under which he was convicted provided for extra-territorial application, he was not afforded extra-territorial service of compulsory process. He had subpoenas issued and served on twelve witnesses in Belize, but only three of them appeared at trial. His first contention in this connection is that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process. 10 70 This question is one of first impression in the Fifth Circuit. It is well established, however, that convictions are not unconstitutional under the Sixth Amendment even though the United States courts lack power to subpoena witnesses, (other than American citizens) from foreign countries. United States v. Greco, 298 F.2d 247, 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 369 U.S. 820, 82 S.Ct. 831, 7 L.Ed.2d 785 (1962); United States v. Wolfson, 322 F.Supp. 798, 819 (D.Del.1971), aff'd 454 F.2d 60 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 924, 92 S.Ct. 1792, 32 L.Ed.2d 124 (1972); United States v. Hofmann, 24 F.Supp. 847, 848 (S.D.N.Y.1938). 71 Appellant also contends that the district court erred by allowing the prosecutor, over objection, to read to the jury portions of the depositions of five of the absent witnesses indicating their unwillingness or in some instances their claimed inability to come to the United States to testify at trial. Appellant implies that he was prejudiced by the court's allowing the jury to hear these statements, and that if the witnesses had been compelled to appear so that the jury could have seen them, it would have taken a more positive view of their credibility and their exculpatory depositions on his behalf. The Government's position is that it was entitled to draw the jury's attention to the witnesses' statements respecting their inability or unwillingness to come to the United States so that the jury might draw its own conclusions concerning their credibility. We find the Government's position persuasive. Appellant may not offer only those portions of his witnesses' depositions that he finds favorable, and censor or bar admission of portions that might undermine the same witnesses' credibility. 72 Finally, appellant complains that the prosecutor suggested to the jury in closing argument that these five Belizian deponents were not worthy of belief because of their unwillingness to come to the United States to testify. The prosecutor's statement was as follows: 73 I would submit to you that you are entitled to consider their refusal to come here and look you in the eye and tell you what they told you during these depositions. You are entitled to weigh that when you're trying to decide how much weight to give to their testimony. Every one of them I tried to ask if they would come to the United States and give this testimony for your benefit, so you could look at them and judge them like any other witness so that you would have the opportunity to see them, see their demeanor, see their facial impressions [sic ], hear the inflexion in their voice and he[ar] directly from them what their testimony was. Not a single one of them would come up here and do that. 11 And you know they all had an excuse, and you have to decide for the benefit of yourself whether you think those excuses are valid or if there is some other reason that they wouldn't come up here. I have to take my medication. You can bring it with you. Well, I don't want to leave the country. You refuse to leave. Yeah, that's right. My boss, I'm not sure he'll let me go. Have you asked him? No. Do you intend to ask him? No. Every single one of them. Is that a coincidence that every single one of these people refused to come or do you believe there is some similarity there that's more than just a coinciden[ce]? 74 Appellant neither objected to nor asked the court to instruct the jury to disregard the prosecutor's statement. To prevail without the objection there must be a showing of plain error on the part of the district court. Appellant does not contend that the court committed plain error, and we do not find plain error in permitting the prosecutor's argument. 75 We conclude that appellant was not denied a constitutionally protected right of compulsory process, in that such right does not ordinarily extend beyond the boundaries of the United States; that the court properly allowed the jury to hear the absent witnesses' sworn statements indicating their unwillingness to come to the United States to testify; and that appellant cannot now be heard to object to the Government's closing statement advising the jury to consider these witnesses' statements and their absence in deciding how much weight to give to their depositions. 76 I. Jurisdiction over appellant allegedly acquired by kidnapping and in violation of law and treaties 77 The Government denies that its agents participated in the asserted kidnapping, other than as observers. The district court made no finding that Government agents were involved. Appellant does acknowledge that even though American officials kidnap a criminal defendant from a foreign jurisdiction, a federal district court has jurisdiction to try him if his extraterritorial acts were intended to have effect in the United States, unless governmental conduct is so outrageous or shocking to the conscience as to constitute a deprivation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment due process rights. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 72 S.Ct. 509, 511-12, 96 L.Ed. 541 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 7 S.Ct. 225, 30 L.Ed. 421 (1886); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 874 n. 17, 885 (5th Cir.1979); United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 64-66 (5th Cir.1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859, 860 (5th Cir.1974). See also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 865, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). 78 Appellant urges that international treaties which provide for extradition of foreign nationals deprive the courts of the United States of jurisdiction over individuals and property that would otherwise be subject to their jurisdiction, citing Postal, 589 F.2d at 874-75. In proceedings below, the magistrate determined that although certain treaties existed between the affected nations, neither the government of Guatemala nor that of Belize had filed protest or complained as to the facts or circumstances with respect to appellant's apprehension. Treaties are contracts between or among independent nations. The treaty provisions in question were designed to protect the sovereign interests of nations, and it is up to the offended nations to determine whether a violation of sovereign interests occurred and requires redress. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194, 8 S.Ct. 456, 458, 31 L.Ed. 386 (1888); Postal, 589 F.2d at 875; United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d at 67. Because neither Guatemala nor Belize protested appellant's detention and removal to the United States, appellant lacks standing to raise the treaties as basis for challenging the court's jurisdiction. 12 79 Appellant also claims that the Government violated the so-called Mansfield Amendment, 22 U.S.C. Sec. 2291(c)(1) which then read in relevant part: 80 Notwithstanding any other provision of law, no officer or employee of the United States may engage or participate in any direct police arrest action in any foreign country with respect to narcotic controlled activity. 81 Even if the district court had found that government agents were involved in appellant's arrest in Guatemala, Congress has not provided sanctions or penalties by way of relief for persons arrested in contravention of Sec. 2291(c)(1). We conclude that the district court had jurisdiction to try appellant under the indictment charged, even if he was abducted by government agents or others from Guatemala to the United States. 82 J. The requirement of Beechum-Robinson determinations 83 The most serious issue in this case is appellant's contention that the jury was permitted, over objection, to hear testimony by three witnesses as to several instances of drug smuggling by appellant which were not included in the indictment without a prior Beechum-Robinson determination that such testimony was admissible. 13 Appellant argues that this testimony was prejudicial, and that the district court erred by overruling his repeated timely objections and by failing to make the Beechum-Robinsonprior determinations with respect to the admissibility of such testimony. 84 In United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir.1978) (en banc), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 920, 99 S.Ct. 1244, 59 L.Ed.2d 472 (1979), we spell out a two-step analysis based upon Rule 403, Fed.R.Evid., for determining the admissibility of evidence of extrinic offenses under Rule 404(b), Fed.R.Evid. 85 First, it must be determined that the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character. Second, the evidence must possess probative value that is not substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice and must meet the other requirements of Rule 403. 86 Id. at 911. In United States v. Robinson, 700 F.2d 205, 213 (5th Cir.1983), we further held that on-the-record findings by the trial court as to its Beechum probative value/prejudice conclusions were required when requested by a party. Failure to make such findings necessitates remand unless the factors upon which the probative value/prejudice evaluation were made are readily apparent from the record, and there is no substantial uncertainty about the correctness of the ruling. Id. This record reveals that there was substantial uncertainty which the court itself recognized. 87 A thorough reading of the record shows that the district court failed to articulate its findings on the record with respect to extrinsic offenses, as mandated in Beechum and Robinson, either prior to admitting the challenged testimony, or afterwards. Despite the fact that appellant, through counsel, repeatedly drew the district court's attention to this Court's Beechum-Robinson standards before and during the course of trial, the court indicated doubt about the continuing vitality of the Beechum analysis and apparently remained unconvinced as to the Robinson requirement that it articulate its Beechum probative value/prejudice findings when requested. 14 The Beechum-Robinson Requirements 88 Beechum held that the court must first determine that the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant's character. 582 F.2d at 911. In doing so, the court must address initially the threshold question whether the defendant committed the alleged extraneous offense. 89 Obviously, the line of reasoning that deems an extrinsic offense relevant ... is valid only if an offense was in fact committed and the defendant in fact committed it. Therefore, as a predicate to a determination that the extrinsic offense is relevant, the Government must offer proof demonstrating that the defendant committed the offense. If the proof is insufficient, the judge must exclude the evidence because it is irrelevant. 90 Id. at 912-13. To be sure, the court need not be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the extrinsic offense, nor need the court require the Government to come forward with clear and convincing proof. 15 Rather, the standard for the admissibility of extrinsic offense evidence is that of Rule 104(b): the preliminary fact can be decided by the judge against the proponent only where the jury could not reasonably find the preliminary fact to exist. Id. at 913. Nevertheless, it is requisite under Beechum that the court make this threshold determination out of the presence of the jury before making its determination as to whether the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant. 16 The record indicates that the court did not do so with respect to any of the testimony presented as to the alleged extrinsic offenses prior to deciding relevance and allowing the testimony to come before the jury. 17 91 As to the question of relevance, the district court did make a latish determination--after permitting a substantial part of the testimony to go to the jury--that the extrinsic offense testimony offered by Mr. Tonjes, the Government's first witness, was relevant or probative as to issues other than the defendant's character. The testimony was found to be relevant to appellant's identity and also to showing a scheme or plan. Later in the trial, the court also determined (after the close of the Government's case-in-chief) that the extrinsic offense testimony of two other witnesses was relevant as to appellant's identity, his intent to import marihuana illegally into the United States, and the ongoing relationship of various persons involved tending to prove a plan or scheme. The court failed, however, to undertake this step-one Beechum determination when requested by appellant during the government's case and prior to admitting the challenged testimony of the two witnesses as required by Robinson, 700 F.2d at 213. Instead, when appellant objected to such testimony and requested the requisite Beechum determination, the court overruled the objections and allowed the testimony to continue. 18 But since the court had already determined the relevance of the extrinsic offenses testimony when considering that issue in relation to the first witness, we are not particularly concerned about this part of the Beechum requirement. The error was harmless. 92 The critical issue raised by this record is the court's failure to undertake the second step mandated by Beechum with respect to admissibility of extrinsic offense evidence. The trial court must determine that the proffered evidence possesses probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, and other requirements of Rule 403. 19 Under Beechum, the court's weighing of Rule 403 considerations is mandatory. The requirement is that the Beechum probative value/prejudice inquiry must be articulated on the record when requested by a party. Robinson, 700 F.2d at 213. Although requested, the court failed to articulate its assessment of the probative value as against the prejudicial harm of allowing Tonjes's extrinsic offense testimony to go to the jury. Instead, the court simply announced, I have made the balancing judgments that are called for in the Beechum opinion at pages 909 to 915. The court also made no on-the-record assessment of probative value/prejudicial harm in connection with the prospective testimony of the other two witnesses, since it simply overruled appellant's timely requests for such determination. 20 93 At the close of the Government's case-in-chief, the court partially addressed appellant's request for a Beechum determination of the probative value of the extrinsic offense testimony as against its potential prejudice. The court still did not undertake, however, to balance these considerations on the record. Instead, it construed Beechum to mean that in weighing probative value against potential prejudice the extrinsic evidence must be so prejudicial that it will inflame the jury's passions. 21 The court concluded, 94 I am not able to say on the basis of what I have heard here that I think the jury is likely to have its passions inflamed by the evidence that has come in concerning these other transactions. 95 The district court also incorrectly stated that we had held in Beechum that any problems resulting from the admission of 404(b) evidence could be handled by cautionary or limiting instructions to the jury. 22 96 The district court did not fully meet the requirements of our holdings in Beechum and Robinson. Once it has been determined that the extrinsic offense evidence is relevant under Rule 404(b), we have said that the evidence can be admitted unless it is substantially outweighed by prejudicial factors. The court must determine, however, whether the prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence outweighs its probative value. Robinson, 700 F.2d at 213; Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911. To do so, the court must identify and weigh the potentially prejudicial effect of the proffered evidence. Of critical importance is the fact that the court unduly restricted the scope and applicability of Rule 403. It is not at all limited to evidence that will inflame the jury's passions. The step two Beechum analysis requires the trial court to determine that the probative value of the extrinsic offense evidence will not be substantially outweighed by its unfair prejudice. Prejudice can result from any of the significant factors set out in Rule 403, of which inflamed passion is only one. 23 Beechum, 582 F.2d at 911, 917. 97 Among the 403 prejudice factors to be weighed, are the dangers of confusion of the issues and misleading the jury. As we stated in Beechum, 98 One of the dangers inherent in the admission of extrinsic offense evidence is that the jury may convict the defendant not for the offense charged but for the extrinsic offense.... This danger is particularly great where, as here, the extrinsic activity was not the subject of a conviction; the jury may feel that the defendant should be punished for that activity even if he is not guilty of the offense charged. 99 582 F.2d at 914. Beechum also teaches that the risk of prejudice is particularly great when the extrinsic offenses are similar to the crime charged: 100 [T]he more closely the extrinsic offense resembles the charged offense, the greater the prejudice to the defendant. The likelihood that the jury will convict the defendant because he is the kind of person who commits this particular type of crime or because he was not punished for the extrinsic offense increases with the increasing likeness of the offense. 101 Beechum, 582 F.2d at 915 n. 20. 102 Appellant Zabaneh was charged with a number of violations in connection with the importation of just one shipment of marihuana by airplane from Belize to the United States in December, 1981. Three extrinsic offenses described at length by various Government witnesses in the course of the trial consisted of other alleged importations of marihuana by airplane from Belize to the United States. We note various places in the record when it was not clear even to appellant's counsel that the Government was eliciting testimony as to extrinsic offenses until after considerable segments of such evidence had been presented before the jury. A substantial portion of the total volume of testimony before the jury concerned extrinsic offenses. One witness's testimony pertained in its entirety to such an offense. Although denying appellant's motion to strike this testimony, the court expressed concern about the possibility of jury confusion in view of the growing body of such testimony that was coming before the jury: 103 MR. ACKERMAN [counsel for appellant]: The only motion I have at the present time is first of all [that] the evidence be stricken for the government's failure to inform the Court it was going to be 404(b) and [thereby] give the Court the opportunity to make the findings [required] by Beechum, and I'll again ask for a mistrial. 104 THE COURT: Well, I'm not ready to do any of that at this point. So I'll overrule those motions at this time. I am concerned about the matter. And I may reconsider it at a later time. Let me ask both parties to be thinking about something that is bothering me now in light of the volume of 404(b) type testimony that we have had from Mr. Tonjes and Mr. Rutherford. We have not read or even summarized the indictment to the jury at this point. So I don't believe they understand at this point that the transactions we have heard so much testimony about are not those transactions charged in the indictment, and somehow we need to communicate that to the jury. 105 The district court itself commented, following the close of the Government's case, that only a fraction of the testimony the jury had heard specifically related to the offense charged in the indictment. 106 The court finally did explain to the jury which of the several transactions testified to was the one on which appellant was being tried, but not until after the Government had presented its entire case. Further, in his instructions to the jury upon submission the judge was clear in submitting only the crimes growing out of the single importation. But by the time the Government concluded its case, and again by the time the court instructed the jury, there could have arisen substantial concern as to whether members of the jury could clearly recall which testimony had impressed them as to appellant's guilt or innocence with respect only to the charged offenses. It follows that there was considerable likelihood of prejudice against appellant from the admission of the extrinsic offense testimony. It was not enough for the court to find that the evidence in question would not inflame the jury's passions--which never was an issue in the case--while ignoring the kinds of rule 403 concerns that were relevant to a proper Beechum determination. 107 In Robinson, we concluded that in the absence of an on-the-record articulation of a trial court's Beechum probative value/prejudice findings at the time of a party's request we must remand unless the factors upon which the probative value/prejudice evaluation was made were readily apparent from the record and there was no substantial uncertainty about the correctness of the ruling. 700 F.2d at 213. In the present case, we find that the court did not undertake to make the required on-the-record Beechum inquiry either before admitting the 404(b) testimony or afterwards, and it is clear that the factors in the evaluation are not readily apparent from the record. The uncertainty in the record requires a remand for further consideration by the trial judge. On remand, the judge must determine whether the evidence's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value and, if so, whether there is a reasonable possibility that this evidence affected the outcome of the case. This determination by the trial court on remand may be readily made, for the judge is cognizant of all necessary facts. Robinson, 700 F.2d at 214. The trial court did make careful limiting charges to the jury when the case was submitted. In reaching its conclusions on remand, therefore, the district court should also consider the extent to which its limiting instructions to the jury, both after the close of the Government's case and in its jury charge concerning extrinsic offense evidence already admitted, may have reduced the possible prejudicial impact of that evidence. As in Robinson, [t]he trial judge shall certify to us his findings and conclusions. The record shall be supplemented by the on-the-record determination herein prescribed, and by any materials submitted by the parties to the district court. Following such filing, the clerk will set a schedule for supplementary briefing and the matter will be returned to this panel for disposition. Id. at 214 n. 12.