Opinion ID: 883677
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress as an Independent Cause of Action

Text: In Shiplet v. First Sec. Bank of Livingston (1988), 234 Mont. 166, 762 P.2d 242, the plaintiffs had borrowed large sums of money from defendant bank and, because of the bank's conduct regarding these loans, attempted to recover for negligent infliction of emotional distress in an independent tort action and as direct victims. We affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment stating that [n]egligent infliction of emotional distress is a narrowly-defined tort in Montana, citing Versland and its bystander rule. Shiplet, 762 P.2d at 247. We stated that the body of the count and subsequent argument by the plaintiffs used language from Johnson, which was a parasitic damages case, not a case which addressed negligent infliction of emotional distress as a separate cause of action. We held that because we were affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment on all counts, we would not reach any damages issues. In Niles v. Big Sky Eyewear (1989), 236 Mont. 455, 771 P.2d 114, Niles pled negligent infliction of emotional distress as a cause of action. We approved of this claim, citing Johnson, and stating that [w]here there is evidence of substantial invasion of a legally protected interest which causes a significant impact upon the person of the plaintiff, emotional distress is compensable without showing of physical or mental injury. Niles, 771 P.2d at 119. We reviewed evidence from the plaintiff, her husband and a clinical psychologist, who all testified that Niles had suffered emotional distress from being falsely accused of a crime. We held that the District Court did not err in denying the defendant's motions on the cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Chronologically, the last case we review is Lence v. Hagadone Inv. Co. (1993), 258 Mont. 433, 853 P.2d 1230. Lence brought an action for damages arising from libel, false light invasion of privacy, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and negligence and the District Court entered summary judgment in favor of the defendant Inter Lake Publishing Company. We reiterated in Lence that in order to recover damages for infliction of emotional distress, [t]he victim must show that the defendant's tortious conduct resulted either in physical or mental injury or in `a substantial invasion of a legally protected interest,' and that it `caused a significant impact,' including emotional distress `so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it.' Lence, 853 P.2d at 1237. We further stated that: Even if Lence could legitimately plead emotional distress, the Daily Inter Lake articles would have had to be more than merely hurtful or offensive; they would have had to be so outrageous ... as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency. The newspaper's truthful publication that Semenza had lodged a complaint with the Commission, and its report of the building code dispute, hardly constitute outrageous conduct that goes beyond all possible bounds of decency. In the past we have characterized emotional distress as an element of damages rather than a distinct cause of action. Even if considered only for the purpose of establishing damages, however, Lence's deposition testimony demonstrates the absence of any genuine issue of material fact concerning the severity of his alleged emotional distress. Lence, 853 P.2d at 1238. (Citations omitted.) As is readily apparent, the case law demonstrates that negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort action is a thorny issue with which this Court has struggled. The cases also illustrate the difficulties involved in developing a cohesive approach to determining whether a given factual situation should give rise to recovery for emotional distress, and the necessity to create artificial exceptions to avoid the harsh general rule. Clearly, the traditional approach to the tort of emotional distress has proven, at best, cumbersome. However, other courts have addressed problems with the general rule and exceptions carved from the rule, and their decisions provide guidance for our further examination and clarification of this issue. Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (Cal. 1980), 616 P.2d 813, 819, places the quandary surrounding the tort of emotional distress in perspective by stating that [a]lthough we recognize a need to guard against fraudulent claims, we are not persuaded that the presently existing artificial lines of demarcation are the only appropriate means of attaining this goal. Moreover, in Rodrigues, cited above, the Hawaii Supreme Court addressed one of the major policy conundrums at issue in the emotional distress debate by concluding that any concern over the ability of courts to recognize the genuineness of claims could be dispensed with by requiring that only severe mental distress be compensated. The Rodrigues court stated that: [c]ourts which have administered claims of mental distress incident to an independent cause of action are just as competent to administer such claims when they are raised as an independent ground for damages. In judging the genuineness of a claim of mental distress, courts and juries may look to the quality and genuineness of proof and rely to an extent on the contemporary sophistication of the medical profession and the ability of the court and jury to weed out dishonest claims. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 519-20. (Citation omitted.) The Rodrigues court also addressed concern about the issue of unlimited liability of defendants by stating that concerns over the significance of the mental distress can be considered by the jury which can apply a standard of serious mental distress based upon the reaction of `the reasonable man.' Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520. The court concluded that serious mental distress could be found where a reasonable man, normally constituted, would be unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520. Finally, having dispensed with the policy arguments which have served as the major impediments to recovery for emotional distress and having established the parameters for the recognition of emotional distress as an independent tort action, the court stated: [h]aving established these standards, we do not find the considerations which favor limiting the defendant's liability to the exclusion of the plaintiff's claim of decisive weight. Furthermore, we are faced with a multiplication of psychic stimuli as society becomes more complex and people are crowded together and with increasing widespread knowledge of the debilitating effect mental distress may have on an individual's capacity to carry on the functions of life. The force which compels recognition of an element of damages, once parasitic, as an independent basis of liability is social change. It can no longer be said that the advantages gained by the courts in administering claims of mental distress by reference to narrow categories outweigh the burden thereby imposed on the plaintiff. We recognize that the interest in freedom from negligent infliction of serious mental distress is entitled to independent legal protection. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520. (Citation omitted.) The Rodrigues court stated that it would rely upon general tort principles to determine whether a defendant was liable to the plaintiff in particular cases. Thus a further limitation on the right of recovery, as in all negligence cases, is that the defendant's obligation to refrain from particular conduct is owed only to those who are foreseeably endangered by the conduct and only with respect to those risks or hazards whose likelihood made the conduct unreasonably dangerous. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 521. Based upon the logic and analysis in Rodrigues, Molien, the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment j, which is discussed later, and the state of our prior case law, we conclude that it is appropriate to clarify the existing law on negligent infliction of emotional distress and to delineate a better approach to such claims. We recognize that negligent infliction of emotional distress as an independent tort action under the narrow Versland analysis is archaic and does not fully address all plaintiffs who are deserving of relief. Therefore, we adopt the following standard for determining whether a plaintiff has demonstrated a cause of action for the negligent infliction of emotional distress. A cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress will arise under circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent act or omission. Concern over a floodgate of claims for emotional distress, particularly fraudulent claims, is alleviated by the necessity to prove that the emotional distress suffered is severe or serious. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 519-20. Concern over seeming unlimited liability for defendants is alleviated by the necessity of demonstrating that plaintiff's serious or severe emotional distress was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of defendant's negligent act or omission. Rodrigues, 472 P.2d at 520-21. Furthermore, the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides assistance in delineating the respective roles of the court and the jury in deciding emotional distress cases. It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe [serious] emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment j at 78. The requirement that the emotional distress suffered as a result of the defendant's conduct be serious or severe ensures that only genuine claims will be compensated. We conclude that a jury is capable of determining whether the emotional distress claimed to have been sustained is serious or severe. As stated in Molien, citing Rodrigues: In cases other than where proof of mental distress is of a medically significant nature, [citations] the general standard of proof required to support a claim of mental distress is some guarantee of genuineness in the circumstances of the case. [Citation.] (472 P.2d at p. 520.) This standard is not as difficult to apply as it may seem in the abstract. As Justice Traynor explained in this court's unanimous opinion in State Rubbish Collectors Assn. v. Siliznoff, supra, 38 Cal 2d [330] at page 338, 240 P.2d 282, the jurors are best situated to determine whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct caused emotional distress, by referring to their own experience. In addition, there will doubtless be circumstances in which the alleged emotional injury is susceptible of objective ascertainment by expert medical testimony. Molien, 616 P.2d at 821. (Citation omitted.) Moreover, in Versland, we noted that with today's more advanced state of medical science, technology and testing techniques, evidence of physical injury was not necessary to adequately determine whether a party had suffered emotional distress. Versland, 671 P.2d at 588. There is simply no justification for maintaining the traditional rule that emotional distress is not recoverable when claimed as an independent cause of action; the concerns underlying maintaining the traditional rule no longer weigh heavily enough to merit its continuation. Furthermore, because we have concluded that the plaintiff must prove that the emotional distress suffered is serious or severe in order to warrant recovery on the claim, we also conclude that it is appropriate to define serious or severe emotional distress by employing the Restatement (Second) of Torts definition of severe or serious emotional distress. (We note that, although the Restatement definition addressed the definition of serious emotional distress in the context of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress, we conclude that it is also appropriate to use that same definition in connection with negligent infliction of emotional distress.) The Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment j at 77-78 defines serious emotional distress as: Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquillity is seldom attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe that no reasonable [person] could be expected to endure it. The intensity and the duration of the distress are factors to be considered in determining its severity. Severe distress must be proved.... The distress must be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, and there is no liability where the plaintiff has suffered exaggerated and unreasonable emotional distress, unless it results from a peculiar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor had knowledge. We conclude that the above test comports with well reasoned authority from other jurisdictions as well as the gradual evolution of Montana case law on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress. We hold that an independent cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress will arise under circumstances where serious or severe emotional distress to the plaintiff was the reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's negligent act or omission, and, as indicated above, we will employ the definition of severe or serious emotional distress from the Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46, comment j at 77-78. With respect to the District Court's order granting summary judgment for Dighans in the instant case, while it is unclear as to the precise legal basis for the court's decision, it appears that the court grounded its decision on Versland. Even absent our adoption of the new test discussed above, granting summary judgment on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress in this case on the basis of Versland is error as a matter of law. The decisions of this Court involving negligent infliction of emotional distress handed down since Versland was decided, while not entirely consistent, at the very least, nevertheless, demonstrate a development of the law beyond the holding of that case as well as this Court's willingness to recognize negligent infliction of emotional distress in a broader context. Accordingly, we hold that, the District Court erred in granting Dighans' motion for summary judgment on the issue of negligent infliction of emotional distress, and we remand for further proceedings consistent with the new standard enunciated above.