Opinion ID: 2045025
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Particularity of Description of Place to Be Searched

Text: We first address whether the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity. Defendants argue that the warrant failed to describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity because the trailer searched was not Roger McCarty's, it was not the third trailer east of O'Leary Road, and it was not three-quarters of a mile from the intersection of Kinlou Road and O'Leary Road. In response, the State contends that the suppression hearing testimony demonstrated that McCarty resided at the trailer, that the trailer was either the third one on the private drive connected to O'Leary Road or the trailer Deputy Rose believed to be the third, and that, in any case, Deputy Rose knew which trailer was being described by the informant and went to that trailer when executing the warrant. Parenthetically, we note that defendants do not differentiate between the particularity of the warrant's description of the trailer and the particularity of the warrant's description of the camper. The clear implication of their position, however, is that the lack of particularity in the description of the trailer renders the entire warrant unconstitutional. Cf. People v. McCoy, 135 Ill.App.3d 1059, 1067, 90 Ill.Dec. 493, 482 N.E.2d 200 (1985) ([I]t is generally held that partial invalidity of a search warrant does not taint the whole warrant. [Citation.] A court will just sever the tainted part from the rest of the warrant. [Citation.]) Here, we need express no opinion on whether the warrant's description of the camper is severable from its description of the trailer, because as we shall explain, the latter was sufficiently particular. A search warrant's description is sufficient if it enables the officer executing the warrant, with reasonable effort, to identify the place to be searched. People v. Watson, 26 Ill.2d 203, 206, 186 N.E.2d 326 (1962); Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498, 503, 45 S.Ct. 414, 416, 69 L.Ed. 757, 760 (1925) (It is enough if the description is such that the officer with a search warrant can, with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended). This case does not involve a warrant that is deficient on its face. See, e.g., People v. Redmond, 43 Ill.App.3d 682, 682-83, 2 Ill. Dec. 227, 357 N.E.2d 204 (1976) (warrant said place to be searched was ground level apartment, but also described it as being reached by going up 12 steps). Rather, it involves a situation where the execution of a facially valid warrant revealed facts that called into question the precision of the warrant's description of the place to be searched. Here, we cannot say that the degree of imprecision that became apparent in retrospect with respect to the execution of the warrant was so great as to render the warrant's description unconstitutionally vague. In other words, based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the execution of the warrant, we cannot conclude that it did not set forth as sufficiently as possible a description which would enable a police officer using reasonable efforts to identify the area to be searched with the requisite degree of certainty. See People v. Curry, 56 Ill.2d 162, 171, 306 N.E.2d 292 (1973). In this case, the warrant did not list the specific postal address of the premises to be searched. Therefore, the confusion that occurred regarding the addresses of the various trailers subsequent to the execution of the warrant is inapposite. Instead, the warrant described the location to be searched with respect to three factors: (1) the identity of an individual, (2) the approximate mileage between an intersection and the property on which the trailer to be searched was located, and (3) the position of that trailer in relation to other trailers. The description was accurate with regard to the first factor, as it is undisputed that McCarty stayed regularly at the trailer that was searched, kept personal belongings there, and came and went from it as he pleased. Furthermore, McCarty's son lived there. Thus, while McCarty did not hold title to the trailer, he did exhibit numerous indicia of permanent occupancy. The description's reference to the second factor was similarly accurate. As the warrant noted, the three-quarters of a mile distance measurement was an approximation. This approximation was sufficiently specific to direct the officers executing the search warrant to the property on which the particular trailer to be searched was located, as it is undisputed that driving three-quarters of a mile south from the Kinlou Road-O'Leary Road intersection would, at a minimum, place an individual at the beginning of the private drive and, at a maximum, place him at the doorstep of the trailer that was searched. Finally, the description's reference to the third factor, the position of the trailer searched in relation to the other trailers, was also accurate. There unquestionably were four trailers located alongside the private drive. However, only three of those trailers were inhabited, and the appearance of the trailer that was not stood in marked distinction to the appearances of those that were. The uninhabited trailer still had wheels and a hitch, and it lacked underpinning. It was also positioned on a slight incline adjacent to a farm building. Furthermore, the testimony at the suppression hearing indicated that all of the other trailers were visible prior to the uninhabited trailer upon approaching the property from the Kinlou Road-O'Leary Road intersection. In cases such as this one, where the particularity of a warrant is called into question only upon its execution, and where the extent of the warrant description's inaccuracy is minimal, courts generally are receptive to a showing that the executing officer had some other information   , via the warrant affidavit or otherwise, which made it apparent which place was intended. 2 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 4.5(a), at 570 (4th ed.2004). We believe this to be a sensible approach and therefore make note in this case of the fact that Deputy Rose, the officer in charge of executing the warrant, had served papers at the trailer that was searched on a previous occasion and was therefore familiar with its location. See also People v. Burmeister, 313 Ill.App.3d 152, 158, 245 Ill.Dec. 903, 728 N.E.2d 1260 (2000) (Inaccuracies will not necessarily invalidate a warrant if the officer applying for the warrant also executed the warrant). This factor, coupled with those discussed above, persuades us to conclude that the warrant's description of the premises to be searched was sufficiently particular.