Opinion ID: 2521277
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prosecutorial Misconduct Biblical References

Text: In his argument to the second penalty phase jury, the prosecutor explained the factors the jury could consider in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. The prosecutor told the jury that the final factor, set forth in section 190.3 as factor (k), was a catchall provision that permitted the jury to take into consideration sympathy for the defendant [and] give him all the mercy that you want. The prosecutor attempted to persuade the jury, however, that the death penalty was the appropriate penalty in light of the circumstances of the offense, that there was no reason to have sympathy for defendant, and that defendant was entitled to the same mercy that he showed the victims in this case. He then described the circumstances of the offense in some detail. Near the end of his argument, the prosecutor made the following statements that defendant contends constituted prosecutorial misconduct. I want to briefly discuss a subject that I want to make very clear to you is not aggravating. It's not aggravating at all, and the only reason I bring it up is because in the event any of you have any reservations or any, I don't know if the right word would be hang-ups or not, but any problems in the area, the role that religion plays in a case like this, and again, it's not aggravating. The opponents of the death penalty cite passages from the Bible, as do the proponents, and you may have seen some TV programs where they have both sides and they go back and forth. The opponents say, `Thou shalt not kill.' In fact, we had a witness who sat here and said that God's the only one who can make that decision. And they say that we as a state or the government, we're doing the same thing that these people did. We're killing people. We can't do that. You shouldn't do that. Its not right. And they cite a passage in Romans in the Bible that says, `Vengeance is mine, saith the Lord. I will repay.' But if you go to the very next chapter, Paul goes on and says, `The ruler bears not the sword in vain for he is the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doeth evil.' He's talking about the government. You go back to the Old Testament, the first five books, I believe the Old Testament is the Jewish Torah. In any event, the Judeo-Christian ethic comes from the Old Testament, and in Genesis, the very first book of the Bible, the scripture says, `Adam, human being, whoever sheds the blood of man by man shall his blood be shed, for in his image did God make man.' There are two important concepts there. Capital punishment for murder is necessary in order to preserve the sanctity of human life and only the severest penalty of death can underscore the severity of taking life. There are several other passages in the Bible that talk about the death penalty or death, not referred to in the Bible as the death penalty, but the one that I find quite interesting is Exodus, chapter 21 verses 12 through 14. It says, `Whoever strikes another man and kills him shall be put to death. But if he did not act with intent, but they met by act of God, the slayer may flee to a place which I will appoint for you.' This is the Lord speaking, and he's saying, if you believe in that particular religion, he's saying, `If you didn't do this intentionally, there's a sanctuary for you where nobody can harm you.' I suppose its something like life without possibility of parole. But it goes on to say, `If a man has the presumption to kill another by treachery, you shall take him even from my altar, to be put to death.' In other words, there's no sanctuary for somebody that kills by treachery, an intentional, cold-blooded killer. You can take him from the altar and he shall be put to death. Now, again, I don't give that to you in aggravation because it's not. Just if you have any religious considerations at all that are bothering you or concerning you, that's just for your use. The prosecutor had made similar biblical references during his argument to the first penalty phase jury. Defendant did not object to any portion of the prosecutor's arguments at either penalty phase trial. Defendant contends the prosecutor's biblical references during his argument at the second penalty phase trial constituted prosecutorial misconduct and requires reversal of the judgment of death. The People concede that the prosecutor's biblical references were improper, but assert defendant forfeited the issue by failing to object and that any such error was harmless. We agree with the People that defendant forfeited this issue by failing to object at trial. ( People v. Wrest (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1105, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020.) Defendant had reason to anticipate that the prosecutor would refer to the Bible during his argument to the second penalty phase jury, because the prosecutor had made similar biblical references during his argument to the first penalty phase jury. And yet defendant did not seek to prevent the prosecutor from repeating these remarks at the second penalty phase (see People v. Marshall (1996) 13 Cal.4th 799, 854-855, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 347, 919 P.2d 1280 [the trial court retains discretion ... to ensure that argument does not stray unduly from the mark]), and did not object when the prosecutor again referred to the Bible during argument. Defendant asserts that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object. The record on appeal does not disclose defense counsel's reason for not objecting, and we are not convinced that there could be no valid tactical reason for choosing not to object. Defense counsel may have reasonably chosen not to object so that he could respond, as he did, by reminding the jury of the biblical proscription, Thou shalt not kill. [Competent counsel may often choose to forgo even a valid objection. `[I]n the heat of a trial, defense counsel is best able to determine proper tactics in the light of the jury's apparent reaction to the proceedings. The choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.' [Citation.] ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1197, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) We also note that the trial took place before we rendered our decision in People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1107, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020, in which we clearly condemned the practice of making such biblical references. Our review [of counsel's conduct] is deferential; we make every effort to avoid the distorting effects of hindsight and to evaluate counsel's conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. [Citation.] ( People v. Dennis (1998) 17 Cal.4th 468, 541, 71 Cal. Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035, italics added.) The record on appeal does not establish that defense counsel's conduct fell below the standard expected of reasonably competent counsel at the time of trial. In any event, we agree with the People that the biblical references, although improper, were harmless. In People v. Wrest, supra, 3 Cal.4th 1088, 1106, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020, the prosecutor referred during his penalty phase argument to Scripture and verse from the Old Testament that supports capital punishment. We held that the prosecutor's reference to Old Testament support for capital punishment was impropersuch an argument tends to diminish the jury's sense of responsibility for its verdict and to imply that another, higher law should be applied in capital cases, displacing the law in the court's instructions. [Citation.] ( Id. at p. 1107, 13 Cal.Rptr.2d 511, 839 P.2d 1020.) We concluded that this error was harmless, because it was merely a brief reference that was totally undeveloped in the course of the argument and because it came in the course of a long argument, the bulk of which was properly and specifically focused on the factors in aggravation and mitigation. ( Ibid. ) Although the prosecutor's biblical references in the present case certainly were not brief and undeveloped as in People v. Wrest , they similarly were part of a longer argument that properly focused upon the factors in aggravation and mitigation. We also found harmless the error discussed in People v. Sandoval (1992) 4 Cal.4th 155, 193, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862, affirmed on another ground sub nomine Victor v. Nebraska (1994) 511 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583, where the prosecutor paraphrased at length Romans 13:107 during his penalty phase argument. This argument was improper, because it invoked higher or other law as a consideration in the jury's sentencing determination and exhorted the jury to consider factors outside section 190.3 in making its penalty determination. ( People v. Sandoval, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 193, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862.) The error was considered harmless, however, because the jury engaged in lengthy deliberations before returning verdicts of life without possibility of parole on three of the counts and death on only one of the counts. ( Id. at p. 194, 14 Cal.Rptr.2d 342, 841 P.2d 862; cf. Sandoval v. Calderon (9th Cir.2000) 241 F.3d 765 [granting relief on habeas corpus].) In People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 836, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673, the prosecutor tried to explain why the biblical maxim `Vengeance is mine sayeth the Lord' should not dissuade the jury from imposing the death penalty, for the Bible also says `an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth.' [Fn. omitted.] This reference was found to be part of a pattern of serious, blatant and continuous misconduct at both the guilt and penalty phases of trial that, together with other errors, required reversal of the judgment. ( Id. at p. 844, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673.) Biblical references that rival in length those in the present case were found harmless in People v. Wash, supra, 6 Cal.4th 215, 261, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107, because after making the biblical references, the prosecutor embarked upon a lengthy and detailed argument devoted exclusively to the evidence in aggravation .... He did not return to the subject of God or religion, but instead urged a sentence of death based upon defendant's moral culpability for the crimes in light of the statutory factors. Thus, we do not believe the objectionable remarks could reasonably have diminished the jury's sense of responsibility, or displaced the court's instructions. [Citation.] There is no possibility that the jury would have reached a more favorable verdict had the misconduct not occurred. [Citation.] The same is true in the present case. The prosecutor's biblical references during his penalty phase argument were improper but harmless.