Opinion ID: 584537
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Multiple Counts on Making Building Available as a Crack House

Text: 26 Cooper was convicted on ten counts 7 (each alleging a different date) of making a building available for the purpose of unlawfully distributing and using crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). 8 He contends that his indictment is multiplicious. 9 Using analogy to case law addressing the existence of a single, ongoing gambling business, 10 Cooper asserts that he violated § 856 only once and that the indictment unfairly converted his single, continuing offense into multiple crimes. He states that this produces great harm because, while these sentences run concurrently, multiple § 856 convictions allow the government to obtain multiple firearm convictions pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924, sentences which run consecutively. 27 Congress establishes and defines the offenses in a statute. See Sanabria v. United States, 437 U.S. 54, 70, 98 S.Ct. 2170, 2182, 57 L.Ed.2d 43 (1978) (Whether a particular course of conduct involves one or more distinct 'offenses' under a statute depends on ... congressional choice.) (footnote omitted). Contrary to Cooper's assertion, the double jeopardy clause imposes no restraints on the power of Congress to define the allowable unit of prosecution and punishment where all the charges are brought in one suit. United States v. McDonald, 692 F.2d 376, 377 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 1531, 75 L.Ed.2d 952 (1983). Thus, in deciding whether the district court could properly impose multiple sentences, we must determine the allowable unit of prosecution in § 856. United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952). Our task is to discern Congress' intent by looking first to the plain language of the statute and then to legislative history and the overall statutory scheme of which it is a part. See United States v. Anderez, 661 F.2d 404, 406 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981) (stating that [o]ur starting point in interpreting statutes must be the language of the statutes themselves); United States v. Davis, 656 F.2d 153, 158 (5th Cir.1981) (in addressing a multiplicity claim, stating that [w]e are bound, however, to review all sources from which legislative intent may be gleaned), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 930, 102 S.Ct. 1979, 72 L.Ed.2d 446 (1982). See also 1 C. Wright, at 476-78. 28 We begin with the language of the statute itself. Section 856(a)(2) provides: 29 [I]t shall be unlawful to ... manage or control any building, room, or enclosure, either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, or mortgagee, and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, or make available for use, with or without compensation, the building, room, or enclosure for the purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a controlled substance. 30 According to the government, section § 856(a)(2) indicates that Congress has defined the allowable unit of prosecution by reference to the number of times the defendant rents, leases, or makes available a building for drug-related activities. In essence, if the defendant makes the building available once, independent of the length of time, he has committed only one crime. If he makes the building available on more than one occasion, however, the defendant has committed multiple crimes. Thus, Cooper's analogy to those cases interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1955, a statute which expressly defined the unit of prosecution in terms of an illegal gambling business, is inapposite. The government also posits a policy argument--if this Court adopts the single business theory Cooper urges, drug offenders will lack incentive to stop their operations even after they are caught; they would be subject only to one conviction regardless of the number of times their business was reopened. 31 But to the contrary, Cooper urges that 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) contains no statement in terms evidencing intent to make each managing, controlling, renting, leasing or making available a separate offense, and therefore separately punishable. Consequently, Cooper asks this Court to invoke the doctrine of lenity 11 for the proposition that the indictment in each count of making available the use of the building should not have constituted separate offenses. 12 The doctrine of lenity, however, does not control in all instances. Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 596, 81 S.Ct. 321, 326, 5 L.Ed.2d 312 (1961) ([The rule of lenity] as is true of any guide to statutory construction, only serves as an aid for resolving an ambiguity.... The rule comes into operation at the end of the process of construing what Congress has expressed, not at the beginning as an overriding consideration of being lenient to wrongdoers.). 32 We conclude that the rule is inapplicable here. First, the Supreme Court precedents which develop the rule as it applies to multiple sentencing generally involve situations where a single, uninterrupted criminal act led to multiple convictions and sentences. McDonald, 692 F.2d at 379 (footnote omitted). 13 33 Second, the rule of lenity merits application only if after a review of all applicable sources of legislative intent the statute remains truly ambiguous. Id. See also Davis, 656 F.2d at 158 (the 'touchstone' of the rule of lenity is 'statutory ambiguity'  and should not be utilized to 'destroy the spirit and force of the law which the legislature intended to enact' ) (citations omitted). 34 Moreover, when asked to interpret an earlier drug law, the Supreme Court stated that Congress has manifested an attitude not of lenity but of severity toward violation of the narcotics laws. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 391, 78 S.Ct. 1280, 1284, 2 L.Ed.2d 1405 (1958). It is a fair assumption that this attitude has not diminished. See, e.g., H.R. 5484, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess., 132 Cong. Rec. S27161, 27161 (September 30, 1986) (Sen. DeConcini) ([T]his legislation sends the clear message to those who decide to make their living in the insidious business of drug trafficking that we are no longer going to tolerate their activities. H.R. 5484 contains extremely stiff penalties for possessing, manufacturing, importing, or distributing drugs.). 35 In its goal to curtail the threat of illegal narcotics, Congress appeared particularly concerned about the impact of crack cocaine. See, e.g., 132 Cong. Rec. S26433, 26447 (September 26, 1986) (Sen. Chiles) ([The bill] will help our law enforcement officials by strengthening criminal penalties for drugs like crack cocaine. This is an absolutely essential first step. Current law makes it very difficult to arrest and convict crack dealers and traffickers.); id. at 26435 (Sen. Chiles) (We have enhanced the penalties for drugs, but especially for crack cocaine.). Finally, Congress specifically sought the curtailment of crack houses. Id. at 26447 (Sen. Chiles) (Police also have difficulty arresting the operators of crack houses, the places where users congregate to purchase and use crack. When police raid these crack houses, the dealers and users can easily dispose of the drugs, thus avoiding arrest. This bill makes it a felony to operate such a house, to be present at the house.) (Sen. Chiles); id. at 27180 (September 30, 1986) (stating that the bill recognizes crack's insidious impacts on neighborhoods by outlawing crack houses). 36 We conclude that the maintenance of a crack house constitutes a separate offense each day it is continued. This Circuit has upheld multiple convictions, as long as they encompass separate transactions, even if motivated by a single financial scheme. See, e.g., United States v. Guzman, 781 F.2d 428, 432 (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (concluding that false name on two different documents in same transaction constitutes two separate offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which prohibits the knowing and willful false representation of material fact to a United States agency), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1143, 106 S.Ct. 1798, 90 L.Ed.2d 343 (1986); United States v. McDonald, 692 F.2d. 376, 378 (5th Cir.1982) (finding that two separate physical deliveries of a controlled substance on two different days, all part of a single financial scheme involving the same buyer and sellers, constituted separate criminal acts subject to consecutive sentences under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1073, 103 S.Ct. 1531, 75 L.Ed.2d 952 (1983); United States v. Thompson, 624 F.2d 740, 742 (5th Cir.1980) (upholding the conviction of a physician on three separate counts of dispensing a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), for writing three separate prescriptions to the same undercover investigator at the same time and in exchange for the same payment). 37 Cooper's actions did not represent a single impulse, as Cooper would have us find, but successive impulses, meriting separate indictments. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302, 52 S.Ct. 180, 181, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932) (citation omitted) (finding  'successive impulses ... even though all unite in swelling a common stream of action'  and holding that each of several successive sales of narcotics, even if made to same person, constitutes a distinct offense, regardless of how closely sales follow each other). Significantly, on at least six occasions, narcotics officers legally searched the club, seized all drugs and firearms, arrested the suspects, and effectively closed down the crack house. Nonetheless, after each raid, Cooper and his accomplices returned to the Lounge, further fortified it, and resumed its operation. 38 We conclude that Section 856 is properly interpreted to provide that each unlawful making available of a building is a distinct offense. Cooper committed a separate offense every day he made the building available. 39 The cumulative punishments were properly imposed on the facts of this case. We adhere to the government's decision to dismiss counts 10-13, and find that Cooper's convictions on counts 3, 5, 7, 9, 14, and 16 should be upheld. 40 We have considered carefully Cooper's remaining contentions and found them to be without merit. They do not raise issues serious enough to justify discussion. 41 We affirm the decision of the district court in all respects. 42 AFFIRMED.