Opinion ID: 2709472
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Counts I and II: CERCLA Claims

Text: In Count I of their Complaint, the Trustees seek to recover funds which the Bankerts allegedly owe to the Third Site Trust pursuant to obligations created by the 1999 and 2002 AOCs. The Trustees characterize Count I as a claim for cost recovery under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), but the district court held: (1) that a § 9607(a) claim was unavailable to the Trustees; (2) that their claim must therefore be one for contribution under § 9613(f); and (3) that the limitations period for a contribution claim had run. Count II, seeking a declaratory judgment of liability, is essentially a derivative claim; once the Nos. 11-1501 and 11-1523 11 district court concluded that Count I was not timely, Count II had to be dismissed as well. We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment based on a statute of limitations de novo. Stepney v. Naperville Sch. Dist. 203, 392 F.3d 236, 239 (7th Cir. 2004). To the extent we are called upon to review the district court’s interpretation of the statute, the standard of review is likewise de novo. Storie v. Randy’s Auto Sales LLC, 589 F.3d 873, 876 (7th Cir. 2009). We are mindful, too, of the deference typically accorded to the summary judgment non-movant with respect to the resolution of factual issues, but note that this dispute is almost entirely a legal one, with the underlying facts undisputed: the Bankerts argue that the Trustees have advanced one type of CERCLA claim, and that it is barred by the statute of limitations; the Trustees argue that they have advanced another type of claim, and that it is not. They are both partially correct, but the net result is that the district court must be reversed with respect to Count I. That, in turn, is enough to revive Count II. Finally, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s denial of the Trustees’ motion to strike portions of the Bankerts’ summary judgment reply.
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675, in response to the serious environmental and health risks posed by industrial pollution. Burlington Northern and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 12 Nos. 11-1501 and 11-1523 556 U.S. 599, 602 (2009) (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998)). CERCLA is not known for its clarity, or for its brevity. Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986) (noting CERCLA provisions are “not . . . model[s] of legislative draftsmanship,” and its statutory language is “at best inartful and at worst redundant”). But its purpose, at least, is straightforward: the act was designed to promote the timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and to ensure that the costs of such cleanup efforts were borne by those responsible for the contamination. Burlington Northern, 556 U.S. at 602 (citing Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. UGI Util., Inc., 423 F.3d 90, 94 (2d Cir. 2005)); Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n. 13 (1994) (“CERCLA is designed to encourage private parties to assume the financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing them to seek recovery from others.”). Relevant to this case, two CERCLA sections—42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a) and 9613(f)—afford rights of action to private parties seeking to recover expenses associated with cleaning up contaminated sites. Actions under § 9607(a) and § 9613(f) are governed by different statutes of limitation, and we must decide under which section the Trustees’ CERCLA claim falls before determining whether it is time-barred. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), the first of the two sections in question, is the “cost recovery” provision of CERCLA. It identifies four categories of potentially responsible parties relative to any instance of contamination based on their relationship to the contaminated site. See § 9607(a)(1)-(4). When a release or threatened release of hazardous substances occurs, the PRPs are strictly Nos. 11-1501 and 11-1523 13 liable for “all costs of removal or remedial action 5 incurred by the United States Government or a State or 5 The terms “removal action” and “remedial action” represent the two primary forms of response contemplated by CERCLA: (23) The terms “remove” or “removal” means the cleanup or removal of released hazardous substances from the environment, such actions as may be necessary taken in the event of the threat of release of hazardous substances into the environment, such actions as may be necessary to monitor, assess, and evaluate the release or threat of release of hazardous substances, the disposal of removed material, or the taking of such other actions as may be necessary to prevent, minimize, or mitigate damage to the public health or welfare or to the environment, which may otherwise result from a release or threat of release.