Opinion ID: 1314057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: standard of admissibility

Text: In Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923), the court declined to admit the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, an early predecessor to the contemporary lie-detector test, designed to show if the defendant was telling the truth. The Frye court stated: Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs. Id. at 1014. By requiring the general acceptance of novel scientific evidence within the relevant scientific community, the Frye court sought to ensure that only reliable evidence was admitted. See United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786, 794 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 104, 121 L.Ed.2d 63 (1992). Although the Frye test has been criticized, see generally, Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 Colum.L.Rev. 1197 (1980) (hereinafter,  Frye a Half-Century Later ), it has a number of strengths, and remains the majority rule for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence. See Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 794 (describing Frye as the majority rule); State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365, 616 A.2d 483, 488-89 (1992) (Most courts that have considered the admissibility of novel scientific evidence have adopted the Frye test.). As one court has observed, the Frye test (1) permits disputes concerning scientific validity to be resolved by the relevant scientific community ...; (2) ensures that a minimal reserve of experts exist who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case, ...; (3) spares courts from the time-consuming and difficult task of repeatedly assessing the validity of innovative scientific techniques, ...; and (4) promote[s] a degree of uniformity of decisions. Vandebogart, 616 A.2d at 489 (citations omitted). We adopted Frye as the applicable standard for determining the admissibility of novel scientific evidence in People v. Anderson, 637 P.2d 354 (Colo.1981). We reiterated our adherence to Frye in People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo.1987), and again in Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1 (Colo.1991). Though Campbell and Hampton reaffirmed the applicability of the Frye test to novel scientific evidence, Frye was not applied in either of those cases because the evidence sought to be admitted did not fall within the traditional application of Frye. Consequently, the evidence in both Campbell and Hampton was analyzed under CRE 702. [11] In Hampton, we held CRE 702 was the proper standard for determining the admissibility of rape trauma syndrome evidence [12] noting that the evidence concerned only the reactions of rape victims generally; none of [the expert's] testimony concerned this particular victim. [The expert] did not interview or contact the victim.... Hampton, 746 P.2d at 951. Therefore, we concluded that CRE 702, rather than Frye, was the proper standard for governing the admissibility of this evidence. [13] Similarly, in Campbell we declined to apply the Frye standard in assessing the admissibility of evidence concerning the reliability of eyewitness identification and, instead, applied CRE 702, again noting that the traditional application of Frye did not encompass this evidence. Campbell, 814 P.2d at 8 ([T]he Frye standard of general acceptance within a particular scientific field has been employed as a special foundational requirement for novel scientific devices or processes involving the evaluation of physical evidence.... Here, however, we deal with no such scientific device or process.). DNA typing evidence, in contrast, is precisely the sort of scientific evidence which requires application of the Frye test. [14] See United States v. Porter, 618 A.2d 629, 633 (D.C.App.1992) (admissibility of DNA evidence presents the very kind of issue which the language from Frye was designed to address). For example, in Hampton we noted that [g]enerally, the Frye test is applied to novel scientific devices and processes involving the manipulation of physical evidence including lie detector tests, experimental systems of blood typing, voice prints, identification of human bite marks, and microscopic analysis of gun shot residue. Hampton, 746 P.2d at 950-51. See also Campbell, 814 P.2d at 8 (recognizing the same traditional application of Frye ). DNA typing requires a number of highly technical and sophisticated techniques in order to extract, isolate, and observe alleles contained in human DNA molecules. Moreover, because the potential of DNA typing technology for forensic purposes was first recognized in the mid-1980's, first applied in the late 1980's, and involves techniques which are continuously evolving, DNA typing is a novel scientific process. In short, DNA typing is, in the words of the Campbell and Hampton courts, a novel scientific ... process[ ] involving the evaluation of physical evidence. Id. That Frye is the appropriate standard for determining the admissibility of DNA typing evidence is not seriously disputed by the parties here. [15] They disagree, however, on what formulation of Frye is to be applied. This disagreement apparently arises from the fact that there is some dispute among courts whether it is the underlying theory or the techniques which produce novel scientific evidence, or both, that are relevant under Frye. See Frye a Half-Century Later, supra, at 1211-15; William C. Thompson & Simon Ford, DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests, 75 Va. L.Rev. 45, 55 (1989) (hereinafter DNA Typing: Acceptance and Weight of the New Genetic Identification Tests). The prior opinions of this court clearly indicate both the theory and techniques underlying novel scientific evidence must be generally accepted under Frye. For example, in Anderson we concluded that the scientific theory or technique of the polygraph is [not] sufficiently advanced to permit its use at trial as competent evidence of credibility. Anderson, 637 P.2d at 359. Similarly, in both Campbell and Hampton we observed that the Frye test has traditionally been applied to novel scientific devices and processes.... Campbell, 814 P.2d at 8; Hampton, 746 P.2d at 950-51. Numerous other courts apply this same two-pronged requirement under Frye. See, e.g., State v. Vandebogart, 136 N.H. 365, 616 A.2d 483, 489-90 (1992) (holding Frye test applies both to the underlying theory and process of novel scientific evidence and observing that this is the general rule); State v. Ford, 301 S.C. 485, 392 S.E.2d 781, 783 (1990) (same). A standard requiring acceptance of only one or the other could lead to the illogical admission of evidence because the theory underlying that evidence is generally accepted even though the techniques for implementing it are highly suspect or controversial. To avoid such an incongruous result, and help insure that only reliable evidence be admitted, we hold that under Frye, the admissibility of novel scientific evidence requires a showing of (1) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the underlying theory or principle, and (2) general acceptance in the relevant scientific community of the techniques used to apply that theory or principle. We now consider whether the underlying theory and techniques utilized in DNA typing were generally accepted at the time of trial. Our analysis focuses on the time at which this evidence was offered at trial because under Frye, a party need not prove the absolute validity of the techniques used in producing novel scientific evidence before it can be admitted. Such an exacting requirement would necessarily be based on conjecture and speculation for it would require witnesses to venture their opinions regarding events, theories or discoveries which may, or may not, arise in the future. Rather, Frye mandates that if scientific evidence is generally accepted at the time it is offered, then it is admissible. Frye requires nothing more. [16] Consequently, it is the task of an appellate court reviewing a Frye determination to assess whether novel scientific evidence was generally accepted in the relevant scientific communities at the time it was offered into evidence at trial. The evidentiary hearing in this case on the issue of DNA typing's admissibility was conducted in October of 1989, and therefore, our assessment of general acceptance is determined by reference to that time. [17]