Opinion ID: 2977670
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Enhancement for Being an Organizer or Leader

Text: The district court enhanced the sentence by four levels because Salem was an organizer or leader of the money laundering scheme, a finding that Salem challenges. Salem argues the four-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 is not warranted because the district court did not make a finding that the criminal activity involved five or more persons and there was insufficient evidence that Salem was an organizer or leader. At an evidentiary hearing, the testimony of Awwad Oweida, 26 United States v. Abdelsalam, 05-4063 a co-defendant, indicated that Salem was his boss in the conspiracy. Furthermore, another codefendant, Fadi Mardini, testified that Salem controlled the organization. Agent Barnhart testified Salem was the “boss” in the conspiracy, received the largest profits, and controlled the key decisions. Salem recruited multiple persons to join the organization. The conspiracy resulted in the indictment of 19 other persons. Given this evidence, the district court correctly determined that Salem was an organizer or leader of the money laundering scheme involving five or more persons. C. The Forfeiture and Money Judgments Imposed Upon Defendant Salem This court reviews the district court’s interpretation of federal forfeiture laws de novo. United States v. Jones, 502 F.3d 388, 391 (6th Cir. 2007). The government has the burden to prove forfeiture by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. “Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. The issue of whether those facts are sufficient to constitute a proper criminal forfeiture is reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing United States v. O’Dell, 247 F.3d 655, 679 (6th Cir. 2001)). Salem presents several arguments as to why the forfeiture money judgments in the amounts of $2,633,802.50 and $36,046.30 are not reasonable. He argues (1) the evidence was insufficient to establish he possessed assets sufficient to trigger the statutory “substitute assets” provisions of forfeiture laws, (2) the $2,633,802.50 money judgment is clearly erroneous, and (3) the district erred by failing to rule whether the money seized from Salem’s residence should be criminally forfeited and failed to order the return of certain jewelry as the parties had agreed. Salem argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that he possessed assets sufficient to trigger the statutory “substitute assets” provisions of forfeiture laws, which renders the money 27 United States v. Abdelsalam, 05-4063 judgments invalid. A forfeiture action can take the form of a money judgment, forfeiture of specific assets, or forfeiture of substitute assets. United States v. Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d 19, 42 (1st Cir. 1999) (citation omitted); 21 U.S.C. § 853(p)(1). A statute provides for forfeiture following a conviction in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956, one of the counts to which Salem pled guilty. See 18 U.S.C. 982(a)(1) (“The court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956 . . . of this title, shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such property.”) We agree with the First and Third Circuits that an in personam money judgment is authorized under the forfeiture statute. However, we also agree with those circuits that, because any future assets Salem obtains to satisfy such a money judgment will necessarily be substitute assets, the government must comply with the requirements of Section 853(p)(1). See Candelaria-Silva, 166 F.3d at 42; United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1084-88 (3d Cir. 1996). Salem argues the $2,633,802.50 money judgment, the amount of one of the loss calculations presented at the evidentiary hearing, is clearly erroneous and was not based on sufficient evidence. In its brief the government states, “The United States concedes that the Court should vacate that money judgment [the $2,633,802.50 money judgment] and remand this matter in order to have the district court make more definite factual findings to support a money judgment up to an amount of $2.5 million.” Given the district court’s finding that the amount of loss was between $1,000,000.00 and $2,500,000.00, this money judgment is clearly erroneous. We vacate the $2,633,802.50 money judgment and remand to the district court for factual findings under Section 853(p)(1) and a revised 28 United States v. Abdelsalam, 05-4063 figure of up to $2,500,000.00 should the government succeed in meeting its burden under the section. Salem argues the district erred by failing to rule whether the money seized from Salem’s residence should be criminally forfeited and failed to order the return of certain jewelry as the parties had agreed. Specifically, the plea agreement provided that the district court would determine whether money seized from Salem’s residence should be criminally forfeited to the United States and also provided that certain pieces of jewelry seized from his residence would be returned after sentencing. “A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Cleveland Branch, N.A.A.C.P v. City of Parma, Ohio, 263 F.3d 513, 530 (6th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). On August 17, 2005, the district court granted a default judgment and decree of forfeiture in the civil forfeiture action that covers the money seized from the residence, which renders the argument concerning the money seized from the residence moot. In its brief the government states, “On August 28, 2007, the United States Attorney’s Office notified Salem’s appellate defense counsel in writing of its willingness to make appropriate arrangements for the immediate return of the requested single item of jewelry seized from Salem’s residence as discussed in ¶ 9 of the Plea Agreement.” As the parties agree to the return of the item of jewelry, that issue also is moot.