Opinion ID: 600370
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Submissions of the Parties on Appeal

Text: 24 Because of the novelty of the issue presented, we shall set forth, in more detail than customary, the position of each party in this appeal. 25
26 The State's Attorney emphasizes the strong policy embodied in the Younger doctrine that the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions. Younger, 401 U.S. at 45, 91 S.Ct. at 751. It is necessary, submits the State's Attorney, for the applicant to show a bad faith prosecution, harassment, or some other unusual or extraordinary circumstance that would call for equitable relief. Id. at 54, 91 S.Ct. at 755. 27 The State's Attorney first argues that this case does not involve a bad faith prosecution. There is no prosecution based on impermissible criteria such as race or religion. Nor is there any indication that the state has failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards. Turning to the district court's analogy to plea bargains, the State's Attorney suggests that the situation before us is significantly different. In a plea bargain, continues the State's Attorney, the defendant relinquishes all the protections concomitant with the right to trial. Here, the only protection implicated is the right against self-incrimination, a right that is coextensive with the protections provided by a direct grant of use immunity. The Illinois courts have already suppressed that testimony and thus protected Mr. Arkebauer's right against self-incrimination. Therefore, at the time that Mr. Arkebauer asked the district court to grant injunctive relief, there was no federal right in jeopardy and the federal court could not, under the strictures of Younger, enter an injunction. 28 Relying on United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 839, 109 S.Ct. 106, 102 L.Ed.2d 81 (1988), the State's Attorney argues that this court has never recognized the concept of equitable immunity. Nevertheless, he continues, such a doctrine still would not preclude prosecution in this case. Like the defendant in United States v. Andrus, 775 F.2d 825 (7th Cir.1985), the only thing given up by Mr. Arkebauer, his right against self-incrimination, has been protected by the state court's suppression of the statements; he is in no worse position than he was before he spoke with the Macon County State's Attorney. 29 Finally, the Shelby County State's Attorney argues that Mr. Arkebauer is in effect arguing for transactional immunity, an immunity that the Macon County State's Attorney could not, as a matter of state law, confer without the approval of the court. Mr. Arkebauer, submits the State's Attorney, is charged with the responsibility of knowing the limits of the authority of the state officials with whom he deals. In any event, the State's Attorney for Shelby County ought not be equitably bound by the actions of another government official whose actions he could not control.
30 As one might expect, Mr. Arkebauer's position tracks, in large measure, the opinion of the district court. Mr. Arkebauer contends that the pendency of the criminal charge against him, despite the assurances of the Macon County State's Attorney, constitutes the threat of great and irreparable injury that justifies the use of the federal injunctive power despite the strictures of Younger. Having been granted absolute immunity from prosecution, he is entitled, he submits, to be free not only from the possibility of loss of liberty in the case of conviction but also from the anxiety, fear, frustration and expense of being prosecuted. Appellee's Br. at 17. It is, he continues, the very prosecution that jeopardizes [his] due process rights. Id. He stresses that this court has emphatically stated that any agreement made by the government, including a grant of immunity from prosecution, must be scrupulously performed and kept. United States v. Brimberry, 744 F.2d 580, 587 (7th Cir.1984) (quoting United States v. Lyons, 670 F.2d 77, 80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136, 102 S.Ct. 2965, 73 L.Ed.2d 1354 (1982)), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1039, 107 S.Ct. 1977, 95 L.Ed.2d 817 (1987). The mere suppression of his statements, he argues, does not give him the benefit of his bargain with the government--freedom from prosecution through transactional, not use, immunity. 31 The prosecution is not only being brought in bad faith, continues Mr. Arkebauer, but it also constitutes extraordinary circumstances as that term is used in Younger. Relying on Judge Thornberry's concurring opinion in Rowe, Mr. Arkebauer submits that the injunction is necessary not only to protect what the Illinois Appellate Court deemed to be his objectively reasonable expectations but also to protect his actual subjective expectations. Public policy concerns, he suggests, also support the enforcement of his bargain because promises of immunity are important weapons in the fight against crime. See Palumbo, 897 F.2d at 246. II