Opinion ID: 2639069
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Individuals v. Institutions

Text: This case involves a religious organization and not an individual. Perhaps more importantly, it does not deal with the denial of a benefit because of a violation of existing law. Rather, it attempts to assess the constitutional implications of a law that requires a religious organization to provide a benefit despite its theological objections. These fundamental differences are simply ignored in the majority's analysis. Under Smith, the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability even if the law requires conduct that contravenes a religious belief, but [i]t does not follow ... that Smith stands for the proposition that a church may never be relieved from such an obligation. ( Catholic University, supra, 83 F.3d at p. 462.) The majority may have made an abortive attempt to deal with this obvious distinction by citing, and dismissing, the so-called ministerial exception. It is true, as the majority notes, that the ministerial exception is not directly at issue here. (See, e.g., Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago (7th Cir.2003) 320 F.3d 698 [ministerial exception to title VII]; E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh (4th Cir.2000) 213 F.3d 795 [same]; Combs v. Central Texas Ann. Conf of United Methodist Church (5th Cir.1999) 173 F.3d 343 [same].) Likewise, it is certainly debatable whether the legislative action challenged here invades the narrow domain labeled church autonomy. (See, e.g., Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 [state court impermissibly encroached on church autonomy]; Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral (1952) 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 [state statute impermissibly encroached on church autonomy].) And yet, the logic of these cases suggests that the constitutionally protected space for religious organizations is actually broader than these obvious categories. In short, the ministerial exception and the church autonomy doctrine are ways of describing spheres of constitutionally required protection, but these categories are not exhaustive. The court in Catholic University summarized the distinction it was making this way: We conclude from our review of the Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence that whereas the Free Exercise Clause guarantees a church's freedom to decide how it will govern itself, what it will teach, and to whom it will entrust its ministerial responsibilities, it does not guarantee the right of its members to practice what their church may preach if that practice is forbidden by a neutral law of general application. ( Catholic University, supra, 83 F.3d at p. 463.) In fact, the Legislature apparently takes a similar view of the breadth of Smith because it provided an exemption from the WCEA for churches.