Opinion ID: 215914
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Other Arguments in Support of a New Trial

Text: In support of their arguments for a new trial, Persico and DeRoss advance other contentions that do not require extended discussion. Principally, they contend that the government violated its Brady obligations, and that they were denied the right to compulsory process by the high cost of producing a witness they wished to have testify for the defense.
At trial, Cardinale testified on cross-examination that after her father's disappearance, her mother found [a] little over a million dollars hidden in the vents of their home and that that money was not turned over to the government. (Tr. 410.) Peggy Cutolo testified that she had found $1.65 million, that she had disclosed that fact to the government, and that the government had not required her to forfeit the money or to pay taxes on it. ( See id. at 624, 696-98.) Defendants contend that the government violated its Brady obligation to disclose this impeachment evidence because it made no formal disclosure of these facts until after trial. (Persico brief on appeal at 44.) They contend that without a formal disclosure, they had every reason to believe that [Peggy's] testimony was falseand that the corroborative testimony of an FBI agent was also false ( id. )and hence they were deprived of the opportunity to argue to the jury that the government's allowing Peggy to keep $1.65 million made all of her testimony unworthy of belief. It is well established that the government has an obligation under the Due Process Clause to disclose to the defendant evidence that is material. See, e.g., Brady, 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194. Evidence is material, however, only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). These principles apply both to information going to the heart of the defendant's guilt or innocence and to information that might well alter the jury's evaluation of the credibility of a significant prosecution witness. See, e.g., Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763; Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959). However, where the undisclosed evidence merely furnishes an additional basis on which to challenge a witness whose credibility has already been shown to be questionable or is subject to extensive attack by reason of other evidence, the undisclosed evidence may properly be viewed as cumulative, and hence not material, and not worthy of a new trial. See, e.g., United States v. Avellino, 136 F.3d 249, 257, reh'g denied, 136 F.3d 249 (2d Cir.1998); United States v. Helmsley, 985 F.2d 1202, 1210 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Petrillo, 821 F.2d 85, 90 (2d Cir.1987). In sum, undisclosed impeachment evidence is not material in the Brady sense when, although possibly useful to the defense, it is not likely to have changed the verdict. Giglio, 405 U.S. at 154, 92 S.Ct. 763 (internal quotation marks omitted). The district court, in rejecting defendants' posttrial motions for a new trial on the ground of the alleged Brady violation, found, inter alia, that, for several reasons, the timing of the disclosure did not cause defendants any prejudice. The court noted that the facts were disclosed on the fourth day of a trial that continued for some six or seven weeks thereafter, and it concluded that the Defendants had more than ample time to assimilate the evidence and to effectively use it at trial. District Court 2008 Order at 40. We agree. Cardinale was the second of the government's 31 trial witnesses (the first being the mechanic who left Cutolo at 92nd and Shore on May 26); Cardinale's revelations as to the large sum of money found and retained came during her cross-examination by the defense. The third witness at trial was Peggy Cutolo, who had actually found and been allowed to keep the money. The government brought out during its direct examination of Peggy that she had found $1.65 million, that she had disclosed that fact to the government, and that she had been allowed to keep the money. ( See Tr. 624.) Thus, the government affirmatively elicited from Peggy the information that defendants wish they had used in arguments attacking her credibility. As the district court noted, the relevant testimony was given early in the trial. After that point, it cannot be said that the Brady material was undisclosed; and the defense had another six weeks to use it. Defendants' complaint that there was no formal disclosure until after the trial provides no basis for a new trial. Later in the trial, FBI Special Agent Gary J. Pontecorvo was called as a witness for the defense; he testified that the Cutolos had advised him in early 2001 that they were in possession of some $1.6 million in cash, which Pontecorvo assumed had been amassed from Cutolo's illegal activities. ( See id. at 5292-94.) Pontecorvo testified that, after being so advised, he promptly informed the United States Attorney's Office (USAO); thereafter Peggy Cutolo or her attorney dealt directly with the USAO with regard to those funds, to determine whether some or all had to be forfeited or whether she would have to pay taxes on it ( see id. at 5294-96). Although defendants argue here that [t]hroughout the trial, the defense labored under the misimpression that Mrs. Cutolo and Agent Pontecorvo were testifying falsely (Persico brief on appeal at 45), they made that assumption at their peril. Nothing in the Constitution gives defendants the right to assume that the government has deliberately elicited or countenanced false testimony and then to seek a new trial on the basis that they did not know the testimony was true. The district court also concluded that the evidence that Peggy Cutolo was allowed to keep the $1.65 million was immaterial, given that defendants possessed and usedother grounds to attack her credibility. Those grounds included Peggy's manifest antipathy toward Persico and DeRoss because she believed they had ordered her husband's death, and her internally inconsistent testimony as to precisely where she found the money. Indeed, while Persico argues that belated disclosure of the information that Peggy found and was allowed to keep $1.65 million significantly impaired defense counsel's ability to impeach the credibility of the key prosecution witness (Persico brief on appeal at 48), he also acknowledges that even without impeachment on the basis of the retained money, Mrs. Cutolo was anything but a credible witness. As the trial court noted, her testimony varied `from one day to the next ... on very critical things' ( id. at 23 (quoting Tr. 5488)). The district court further noted that the testimony of Peggy Cutolo and Cardinale was only a small portion of the evidence that led to Defendants' convictions, and it concluded that the evidence as to the money Peggy found and was allowed to keep most certainly would not have damaged the credibility of the virtual parade of other witnesses that testified against the Defendants, nor invalidated the circumstantial evidence on which the jury most certainly relied. District Court 2008 Order at 40-41. The court concluded that there was virtually no probability that disclosure of this information at an earlier time would have changed the outcome of this case. Id. at 40. Our review of the record persuades us that the conclusions of the district court were correct and that defendants' contentions that they should be granted a new trial on account of the alleged Brady violation were properly rejected.
After Vitale testified that Persico told him and Massino, in discussing Cutolo in the latter part of 1999, that a person can't take what's not his (Tr. 2866), thereby informing them that Cutolo had been killed because of his desire to usurp Persico's position as boss of the Colombo Family, Persico informed the government that he wished to call Massino as a witness. Massino was then in the Witness Security Program, and Persico was informed that the cost of transporting Massinowhich Persico was expected to paywould be some $40,000 ( see Persico brief on appeal at 48). In light of the expense, Persico's counsel suggested that she be allowed to question Massino by video conferencing, a suggestion that the government rejected for reasons of security; after objecting that the expense was prohibitive, Persico decided not to call Massino. ( See Tr. 3739, 3915-16, 4281.) On appeal, Persico, joined by DeRoss, contends that the requirement that Persico pay an exorbitant price to bring a witness to court (a price he declined to pay) unduly burdened his compulsory process rights. (Persico brief on appeal at 48.) Given the present record, we disagree. A defendant in a criminal trial has a Sixth Amendment right ... to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor. U.S. Const, amend. VI. To establish a violation of that right, the defendant must demonstrate that he was deprived of the opportunity to present a witness who would have provided testimony that was `both material and favorable to his defense.' Howard v. Walker, 406 F.3d 114, 132 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982)). To meet this standard, the defendant need not render a detailed description of [the] lost testimony, Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 873, 102 S.Ct. 3440; but he must make a plausible showing that the testimony would have been material and favorable, id. In addition, he must show that `there is a reasonable likelihood that the testimony could have affected the judgment of the trier of fact.' United States v. Ginsberg, 758 F.2d 823, 831 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 874, 102 S.Ct. 3440). Generally, financially able criminal defendants must bear the cost of bringing their own witnesses to the trial. United States v. Garmany, 762 F.2d 929, 934 (11th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1062, 106 S.Ct. 811, 88 L.Ed.2d 785 (1986). However, a defendant can have the government bear the cost if he persuades the court that he is unable to pay and shows the necessity of the witness's presence for an adequate defense. Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(b). Nothing in the present case supports the contention that these defendants were deprived of the right to compulsory process. First, the reason the cost of having Massino brought to the trial was so high was that Persico waited until late in the trial to inform the government that he wanted to call Massino as a witness. Defendants had been notified in mid-October 2007weeks before the trial beganthat Vitale would be called as a government witness and would testify to a conversation in which `Persico advised [him] that Persico had killed Cutolo because Cutolo had attempted to take over the crime family from Persico' (Persico brief on appeal at 48-49 (quoting a government memorandum to the district court dated October 19, 2007)). The government, by letter dated October 17, 2007, had asked that Persico inform the government by October 26, 2007 of any cooperating witnesses the defense may call, pointing out that the United States Marshal Service requires significant advance notice for production of such witnesses. Persico did not inform the government of his desire to call Massino until more than six weeks later, on November 30. The district court noted that the high cost of bringing Massino to the trial involved first-class air travel for Massino and four or five marshals because there was no advance notice. (Tr. 3916.) Second, at no point has Persico suggested that he lacked the ability to pay the cost of bringing Massino to the trial. Had Persico been unable to pay, he could have applied to the district court for relief under Rule 17(b); he did not. Finally, Persico has not made any showing that Massino's testimony would have been material or favorable to his defense. He supposes that because the government itself did not call Massino to testify, Massino likely did not recall the Persico conversation, described by Vitale, indicating that Persico had had Cutolo killed; and he argues that Massino's testimony that he had no such recollection would have gone far to demonstrate that no such conversation had occurred (Persico brief on appeal at 54). This argument piles speculation upon supposition and falls far short of providing a basis for a new trial.