Opinion ID: 1406689
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Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Legislature has recently repealed any statutory authority plaintiff school district may have enjoyed to dismiss defendant on the basis of his possession of marijuana conviction. Such a repeal applies to all pending actions and mandates the reversal of the trial court judgment.

Text: Plaintiff school board concedes, as it must, that its authority to dismiss defendant, a tenured certificated employee, rests solely on statutory grounds. Education Code section 13403 provides that: No permanent employee shall be dismissed except for one or more of a number of specifically enumerated statutory causes. Plaintiff maintains that the trial court judgment in the instant case is sustained by subdivision (h) of section 13403, which sanctions the dismissal of a permanent employee for conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude; the school board contends that the trial court properly found that defendant's 1971 possession of marijuana conviction constitutes a conviction of both a felony and a crime involving moral turpitude. In 1975 and 1976, however, the Legislature enacted an entirely new comprehensive statutory scheme to govern the treatment of marijuana offenses and offenders. (Stats. 1975, ch. 248, pp. 641-649; Stats. 1976, ch. 952, No. 5, Deering's Adv. Legis. Service, pp. 44-51.) Although the most publicized aspect of the new legislation was the significant reduction in the criminal penalty attaching to a conviction for possession of a small quantity of marijuana (Health & Saf. Code, § 11357, subd. (b) ($100 fine)), the new legislation, which evolved out of legislative hearings held over a number of years, worked significant changes over the entire range of governmental treatment of marijuana offenders. This comprehensive reform legislation represented a conscious and substantial modification of California's past public policy which frequently equated marijuana offenses with much more serious drug offenses. (See generally Sen. Select Com. on Control of Marijuana, Marijuana: Beyond Misunderstanding (1974).) The provisions of newly enacted Health and Safety Code section 11361.7 subdivision (b) are directly relevant to the present proceeding. [5] That section provides, in broad and sweeping language, that no public agency, including a school district, shall impose any sanction upon an individual on the basis of a possession of marijuana arrest or conviction, or on the basis of the facts or events leading to such an arrest or conviction,  on or after the date the records of such an arrest or conviction are required to be destroyed,[ [6] ] ... or two years from the date of such conviction or arrest without conviction with respect to arrests and convictions occurring prior to January 1, 1976.  (Italics added.) Defendant's 1971 marijuana conviction falls squarely within this section's reach. The purpose of section 11361.7 subdivision (b) could not be clearer. As the extensive committee reports leading to the enactment of the new marijuana law reveal, one of the most significant arguments advanced in favor of the reform of marijuana laws was that under prior statutes persons convicted of relatively minor marijuana offenses were subjected to disproportionately severe sanctions, both criminal and civil ; prime examples cited by the legislative committee included dismissal from employment and the loss of professional credentials. (See Sen. Select Com. on Control of Marijuana, Marijuana: Beyond Misunderstanding (1974) pp. 40-41.) In enacting section 11361.7 subdivision (b) the Legislature met this problem directly, providing in the broadest terms possible that public agencies may not impose any collateral sanctions on individuals on the basis of the possession of marijuana convictions or arrests encompassed by the statute. (1a) The enactment of Health and Safety Code section 11361.7, subdivision (b) has, of course, a direct effect on the statutory authority granted a school district by Education Code section 13403, subdivision (h). Even if we assume, as plaintiff maintains and as the trial court concluded, that section 13403 subdivision (h) previously authorized the school district to dismiss defendant on the basis of his possession of marijuana conviction, the new legislation by necessary implication has worked a direct repeal of such statutory authority. [7] (2) Although the new enactment does not specifically refer to section 13403, subdivision (h), and although repeals by implication are not favored (see Flores v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 171, 176 [113 Cal. Rptr. 217, 520 P.2d 1033]), when, as here, a subsequently enacted specific statute directly conflicts with an earlier, more general provision, it is settled that the subsequent legislation effects a limited repeal of the former statute to the extent that the two are irreconcilable. (See, e.g., County of Placer v. Aetna Cas. etc. Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 182, 189 [323 P.2d 753]; Rose v. State of California (1942) 19 Cal.2d 713, 723-724 [123 P.2d 505].) (1b) Accordingly, at present plaintiff school district enjoys no statutory authority to dismiss Mann on the basis of his past possession of marijuana conviction. (3) Plaintiff maintains, however, that even if the new marijuana legislation has repealed the district's current authority to dismiss an employee for such a conviction, the repeal should not affect the instant proceeding which was pending on appeal at the time the repealing legislation became effective. Invoking the traditional rule that statutory enactments are generally presumed to have prospective effect, plaintiff argues that the new legislation should not be applied in this case. A long well-established line of California decisions conclusively refutes plaintiff's contention. Although the courts normally construe statutes to operate prospectively, the courts correlatively hold under the common law that when a pending action rests solely on a statutory basis, and when no rights have vested under the statute, a repeal of such a statute without a saving clause will terminate all pending actions based thereon. ( Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra, 15 Cal.2d 1, 11-12.) As explained nearly 50 years ago in Callet v. Alioto (1930) 210 Cal. 65, 67-68 [290 P. 438]: It is too well settled to require citation of authority, that ... every statute will be construed to operate prospectively and will not be given a retrospective effect, unless the intention that it should have that effect is clearly expressed.... It is also a general rule, subject to certain limitations not necessary to discuss here, that a cause of action or remedy dependent on a statute falls with a repeal of the statute, even after the action thereon is pending, in the absence of a saving clause in the repealing statute. [Citations.] The justification for this rule is that all statutory remedies are pursued with full realization that the legislature may abolish the right to recover at any time. (See generally la Sutherland, Statutory Construction (4th ed. 1972) § 23.33, pp. 279-281.) This general common law rule has been applied in a multitude of contexts. Perhaps the rule's most familiar application is in the criminal realm, where our decisions have long recognized that under the common law the repeal of a penal law without a saving clause invalidates all prosecutions under the old law which have not become final as of the effective date of the repeal. (See, e.g., People v. Gill (1857) 7 Cal. 356, 357; Spears v. County of Modoc (1894) 101 Cal. 303, 304-306 [35 P. 869]; In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 746-747 [48 Cal. Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948]; People v. Rossi (1976) 18 Cal.3d 295 [134 Cal. Rptr. 64, 555 P.2d 1313].) Similarly, the doctrine has frequently been invoked to preclude the imposition of a forfeiture, or other statutory penalty, when the statutory basis therefor has been repealed prior to final judgment on appeal. (See, e.g., People v. Durbin (1966) 64 Cal.2d 474 [50 Cal. Rptr. 657, 413 P.2d 433]; People v. One 1953 Buick (1962) 57 Cal.2d 358, 362-363 [19 Cal. Rptr. 488, 369 P.2d 16]; Lemon v. Los Angeles T. Ry. Co. (1940) 38 Cal. App.2d 659, 671 [102 P.2d 387].) As a host of California cases demonstrate, however, the reach of this common law rule has never been confined solely to criminal or quasi-criminal matters. [8] The Court of Appeal decision in Weissbuch v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 41 Cal. App.3d 924 [116 Cal. Rptr. 479] illustrates the application of the doctrine in circumstances which closely parallel the instant case. In Weissbuch, a licensed physician was convicted of possession of marijuana in 1971, at a time when marijuana was statutorily classified as a narcotic drug. Under sections 2384 and 2390 of the Business and Professions Code, such a narcotics conviction was considered conclusive evidence of ... unprofessional conduct on the part of the physician, warranting the suspension or revocation of his license. The Board of Medical Examiners, acting pursuant to these sections, revoked Dr. Weissbuch's license. The doctor challenged the revocation by writ of mandate and during the pendency of his appeal the Legislature modified the governing statutory scheme by removing marijuana from the narcotic drug classification. (Stats. 1972, ch. 1407, § 3, p. 2989.) The Weissbuch court, relying upon the statutory revision, reversed the administrative revocation order, declaring: Since [the] mitigating amendment was enacted prior to the Board's decision becoming final (review by mandamus was pending at the time the amendment became effective), petitioner is entitled to the benefit thereof.... (41 Cal. App.3d at p. 929.) By parity of reasoning, the present trial court judgment in favor of the school district clearly cannot stand. The school district's authority to dismiss defendant rests solely on statutory grounds, and thus under the settled common law rule the repeal of the district's statutory authority necessarily defeats this action which was pending on appeal at the time the repeal became effective. As this court noted in Southern Service Co., Ltd. v. Los Angeles, supra, 15 Cal.2d 1, 12: `If final relief has not been granted before the repeal goes into effect it cannot be granted afterwards, even if a judgment has been entered and the cause is pending on appeal. The reviewing court must dispose of the case under the law in force when its decision is rendered.' Indeed, because of the unique dismissal procedure governing this case, the applicability of the new legislation is perhaps clearer here than in any of the previous decisions. As noted above, the Education Code sections pertinent to this case provide that a school board may not make its ultimate decision to dismiss a permanent employee until after it successfully obtains a final court judgment (former Ed. Code, § 13436, see Board of Education v. Swan, supra, 41 Cal.2d 546, 557; Board of Education v. Calderon (1973) 35 Cal. App.3d 490, 492 fn. 2 [110 Cal. Rptr. 916]); accordingly, the school board has not as yet been statutorily authorized to exercise its discretion to dismiss defendant. Thus, even if the new legislation were to be given purely prospective effect, the school board's future dismissal of defendant on the basis of his marijuana conviction would be barred. Accordingly, the trial court judgment, authorizing such dismissal, must be reversed.