Opinion ID: 201815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Count 6: Conditions of Confinement (O'Mara).

Text: 54 A pretrial detainee's claim that he has been subjected to unconstitutional conditions of confinement implicates Fourteenth Amendment liberty interests. The parameters of such an interest are coextensive with those of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. See Burrell v. Hampshire County, 307 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2002). In order to establish a constitutional violation, a plaintiff's claim must meet both objective and subjective criteria. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994). First, the plaintiff must establish that, from an objective standpoint, the conditions of his confinement deny him the minimal measure of necessities required for civilized living. Id. Second, the plaintiff must show that, from a subjective standpoint, the defendant was deliberately indifferent to inmate health or safety. 5 Id. Deliberate indifference, in this sense, is a mental state akin to criminal recklessness. Id. at 836-37, 114 S.Ct. 1970. 55 Here, the plaintiff sued Superintendent O'Mara in his official capacity. A suit against a public official in his official capacity is a suit against the governmental entity itself. Wood v. Hancock County Sheriff's Dep't, 354 F.3d 57, 58 n. 1 (1st Cir.2003); Nereida-Gonzalez v. Tirado-Delgado, 990 F.2d 701, 705 (1st Cir.1993). The claim against O'Mara is, therefore, a claim against the county (which operates the jail). 56 In order to hold the county liable, the plaintiff must prove a constitutional violation resulting from a policy statement, ordinance, regulation or decision officially adopted and promulgated by those in charge of the jail. Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). A custom or practice may suffice to show such a policy if it is so widespread or pervasive that the policymakers must have had actual or constructive notice of it, yet did nothing to modify it. 6 Wood, 354 F.3d at 64. 57 O'Mara attempts to contest the jury's verdict on two main fronts. He claims, first, that the conditions of the plaintiff's confinement, objectively speaking, were not draconian enough to violate the Constitution; and second, that the conditions complained of did not stem from a policy, custom, or practice attributable to the jail itself (and, by extension, the county). He also argues, albeit perfunctorily, that the record contains no evidence that he personally exhibited deliberate indifference to the conditions of the plaintiff's confinement. Because none of these claims was properly preserved — like his fellow defendants, O'Mara made no timeous motion either for judgment as a matter of law or for a new trial — the scope of appellate review is circumscribed. See Faigin, 184 F.3d at 76; La Amiga del Pueblo, 937 F.2d at 691. 58 We start with the conditions of confinement themselves. Although the parties hotly dispute the conditions that actually obtained in Unit 2B, we must view the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict, consistent with record support. See Correa, 69 F.3d at 1188. At a minimum, the evidence supported findings that the plaintiff, while on AH status and three-day rotation, was in around-the-clock segregation, save only for a five-minute shower break every third day; that the prison withheld all hygienic products from him; that he had access to water (including the ability to flush his toilet) only at the discretion of individual prison guards; and that he was subjected daily to multiple strip searches that required him to place his unwashed fingers into his mouth. The case law as to whether any one of these conditions, by itself, might be serious enough to work a constitutional violation is in some disarray. Compare, e.g., DeSpain v. Uphoff, 264 F.3d 965, 974-75 (10th Cir.2001) (holding that inmate's exposure to bodily waste in inoperative toilets states an actionable Eighth Amendment claim); Keenan v. Hall, 83 F.3d 1083, 1089-91 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that denial of all out-of-cell exercise time and denial of personal hygiene items states an Eighth Amendment claim); and Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.2d 351, 363 (3d Cir.1992) (requiring prisoner to request permission to wash hands, receive toilet paper, or drink water states an Eighth Amendment claim), with, e.g., Smith v. Copeland, 87 F.3d 265, 269 & n. 3 (8th Cir.1996) (finding no violation when prisoner was confined to cell with overflowed toilet for four days); and Harris v. Fleming, 839 F.2d 1232, 1234-36 (7th Cir.1988) (holding that prisoner did not state a claim when prison officials denied him exercise time for twenty-eight days, negligently deprived him of toilet paper for five days, and negligently deprived him of soap, toothbrush, and toothpaste for ten days). Here, however, the cited conditions are present in combination, and the scope of review is narrowed by O'Mara's failure properly to preserve his objection. Under those circumstances, we cannot say that the jury verdict finding constitutionally deficient conditions of confinement was a clear and gross injustice. Cf. Rivera Castillo v. Autokirey, Inc., 379 F.3d 4, 12 (1st Cir.2004) (explaining that inconclusive nature of available precedents precludes a finding of plain error). 59 O'Mara also argues that however egregious the conditions of confinement may have been, their duration was so brief that no reasonable jury could find that they violated the Constitution. We agree that duration may affect the Eighth Amendment calculus. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 687, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978) (noting that unpleasant conditions of confinement might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks and months). In this case, however, the period of pre-hearing confinement — approximately three weeks — is not so brief as to alter our conclusion. 60 O'Mara's claim that the record contains no evidence to show that he himself was deliberately indifferent to the conditions of the plaintiff's confinement is a red herring. O'Mara, sued in his official capacity, is merely a proxy for the county. See Nereida-Gonzalez, 990 F.2d at 705. The county's liability is contingent on a constitutional violation by any county official acting pursuant to the interdicted policy, custom, or practice. See Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 26 (1st Cir.2005). Thus, the crucial consideration is whether the evidence allowed the jury to find that any prison official imposed the challenged conditions upon the plaintiff with the requisite scienter, pursuant to a policy, custom, or practice. See Wilson v. Town of Mendon, 294 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir.2002). 61 The record here contains a sufficient quantum of evidence to ground such a finding. Scienter often will have to be proven by circumstantial evidence. In the context of claims based on conditions of confinement, the Supreme Court has explained that a factfinder may conclude that a prison official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious. Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970. The conditions of confinement here were apparent to all and their risks were readily evident. Applying the Farmer standard, the jury in this case reasonably could have inferred that the jailers knew that the combination of near-continuous confinement, denial of exercise time, water, and items of personal hygiene, exposure to bodily waste, and forced insertion of inmates' unwashed fingers into their mouths up to five times per day posed an intolerable health and safety hazard. 62 To be sure, O'Mara challenges the very existence of the interdicted policy, custom, or practice. Proving the existence of a policy, custom, or practice normally entails questions of fact. See Baron, 402 F.3d at 237. Because this claim of error was not properly preserved, we ask only whether any evidence exists to support a finding that the execution of a governmental policy, custom, or practice caused the injury. See Faigin, 184 F.3d at 76; La Amiga del Pueblo, 937 F.2d at 691. 63 There is ample evidence to undergird a finding that the challenged conditions were imposed pursuant to recognized prison policy, custom, or practice. Captain Dionne's testimony adequately established that water restrictions and the withholding of personal hygiene items were part and parcel of prison policy. The unsanitary searches were largely derivative of this policy and, in any event, the plaintiff testified that senior officers supervised the searches and knew of the manner in which they were administered. Finally, Dionne testified that the three-day rotation and the other restrictions had been in place for several years. Although he insisted that inmates on three-day rotation were to be given one hour of out-of-cell recreation time every three days, that claim was belied not only by the inmates' testimony as to the jail's actual practice but also by Dionne's deposition testimony, put before the jury on cross-examination, in which he acknowledged that a three-day rotation inmate's only time out of his cell is once every three days for a shower. 64 To say more anent this issue would be to paint the lily. Given the evidence in the record, we discern no clear and gross injustice sufficient to warrant judgment notwithstanding the verdict on count 6. 65