Opinion ID: 773520
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Clause 31 Is a Broad Arbitration Clause

Text: 28 Appellant maintains that clause 31 is a narrow arbitration clause, but provides scant support for this contention. No fixed rules govern the determination of an arbitration clause's scope; while very expansive language will generally suggest a broad arbitration clause, see, e.g., Collins, 58 F.3d at 18 (Any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this agreement shall be settled by arbitration.), we have also found broad clauses when examining phrasing slightly more limited, see, e.g., Abram Landau Real Estate v. Benova, 123 F.3d 69, 71 (2d Cir. 1997) (Contract Arbitrator shall have the power to decide all differences arising between the parties to this agreement as to interpretation, application or performance of any part of this agreement.). In the end, a court must determine whether, on the one hand, the language of the clause, taken as a whole, evidences the parties' intent to have arbitration serve as the primary recourse for disputes connected to the agreement containing the clause, or if, on the other hand, arbitration was designed to play a more limited role in any future dispute. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626 ([T]he first task of a court asked to compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to arbitrate that dispute. . . . [A]s with any other contract, the parties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.). 29 Clause 31 of the charter, although not unlimited, Rochdale Vill., 605 F.2d at 1296, is a broad clause. It mandates that [a]ny dispute arising from the making, performance or termination of this Charter Party be arbitrated. The clause contains two parts that bear upon the determination of its breadth, neither of which indicates that the parties intended to limit the scope of arbitration narrowly. The first part of the clause provides that it covers all disputes arising from the charter. In In re Kinoshita & Co., 287 F.2d 951, 953 (2d Cir. 1961), an early decision dealing with the scope of arbitration clauses under the Arbitration Act, we intimated that the use of the phrase arising under an agreement, in an arbitration clause, indicated that the parties intended the clause be narrowly applied. We have, however, since limited this holding to its facts, declaring that absent further limitation, only the precise language in Kinoshita would evince a narrow clause. S.A. Mineracao, 745 F.2d at 194 (holding that language of aris[ing] or occur[ring] under the agreement did not indicate a narrow arbitration clause) (alterations in original). The parties in this case did not utilize such precise language. To the extent a distinction exists between the present language of arising from and Kinoshita's language of arising under, we believe the distinction is more than just a semantic one, and only the latter phrase limits arbitration to a literal interpretation or performance of the contract. See Roby v. Corp. of Lloyd's, 996 F.2d 1353, 1361 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding relevant language indicated a broader forum selection clause, and stating that [w]e find no substantive difference in the present context between the phrases 'relating to,' 'in connection with' or 'arising from') (emphasis added); see also J.J. Ryan & Sons, Inc. v. Rhone Poulenc Textile, S.A., 863 F.2d 315, 321 (4th Cir. 1988) (holding that language of arising in connection with indicated a more expansive arbitration clause). 30 Neither does the language of the second part of clause 31, the making, performance or termination of this Charter Party, suggest an intention by the parties to limit the scope of the clause. While declaring that the overall tone of the arbitration clause controlled its scope, we held in Prudential Lines that [s]pecific words or phrases alone may not be determinative although words of limitation would indicate a narrower clause. 704 F.2d at 64; see also Cornell Univ., 942 F.2d at 140 (considering narrow arbitration clause that provided for arbitration of any matter involving the interpretation or application of this Agreement which alleges a violation of the rights of an employee or the Union under the terms of this Agreement); McDonnell Douglas Fin. Corp., 858 F.2d at 832 (holding that clause providing for arbitration in the case of disagreement over computation of the amount of the required indemnity payment or refund thereof is narrow). Dreyfus believes that because clause 31 contains what is alleged to be language of limitation, arbitration is limited to disputes directly under the charter. We do not adopt that view. 31 The charter governed a single shipment of soyabean oil aboard the vessel M.T. THORSFREDDY. It is difficult to perceive how the language used, i.e., the making, performance or termination of the charter could be construed as other than intending to cover all disputes connected to this lone voyage. See Coors Brewing Co. v. Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1515 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that language of arising in connection with the implementation, interpretation or enforcement of agreement was broad); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 850 F.2d 756, 760 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that language of [a]ny claim or controversy between [parties] concerning the interpretation, application or implementation of agreement was broad) (first alteration in original); Armada Coal Exp., Inc. v. Interbulk, Ltd., 726 F.2d 1566, 1568 (11th Cir. 1984) (parties admit that clause providing [a]ny dispute arising during the execution of the Charter Party is broad) (alteration in original). 32 The present language is sweeping, covering the full panoply of events, from the time of contracting (making), through execution under the terms of the charter (performance), until the eventual expiration of the agreement (termination). Contrary to appellant's argument, it is more likely these words were included to reflect the desire by the parties to ensure that the entire duration of the agreement be covered, especially since the issue of whether a clause covers an agreement's termination is a common source of litigation. See, e.g., Abram Landau Real Estate, 123 F.3d at 73; Rochdale Vill., 605 F.2d at 1296-97. We hold, accordingly, that clause 31 is a broad arbitration clause. 33