Opinion ID: 2529627
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pejorative Remarks

Text: Petitioners claim that this court overlooked that, at the March 1, 2005, meeting with Principal Runyan, Warning's and Wierzbicki's request that Runyan use the correct format to evaluate Warning arose solely out of the collective bargaining agreement and was an exercise of union activity. I agree. Rather than openly applying the clear provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement to the undisputed facts, my colleagues in the majority cast aspersions on Warning. In its recitation of the facts, the court disparaged Warning's and Wierzbicki's actions at the March 1, 2005, meeting as follows: Rather than discuss the evaluation, Warning and Beth took this opportunity to argue with Runyan about the evaluation form, itself. (Emphasis added.) 242 Ill.2d at 122, 351 Ill.Dec. at 249, 950 N.E.2d at 1077. In concluding their analysis, my colleagues again decried Warning as follows: And if Warning did not have a right to union representation, then Warning and the Association failed to prove that Warning was engaged in union activity when she insisted on having union representation at her evaluation conference and remediation meetings and when she chose to follow her representative's lead in taking an assertive and confrontational stance with regard to her evaluation and the administration's attempts to provide corrective instruction.  (Emphasis added.) 242 Ill.2d at 122, 351 Ill.Dec. at 258, 950 N.E.2d at 1086. Knowing the central importance of the relevant and fairly-bargained-for provisions of the collective-bargaining agreement, and knowing what Warning sought pursuant to that pact, this court's denouncement of Warning in its misapplication of the law to the facts seems inappropriate to me. The Board has recognized that give and take    may occur at a post-observation conference. See 242 Ill.2d at 142, 351 Ill. Dec. at 269, 950 N.E.2d at 1097 (Freeman, J., dissenting, joined by Theis, J.). This court surely could not have intended to suppress this vital, Board-recognized dialogue between teachers under remediation and their employers. Further, the court's apparent message was that Warning should not have stood up for herself, or should not have talked back to Runyan, but rather should have minded her place. However, such a message is itself circumstantial evidence of employment discrimination. See, e.g., Coburn v. PN II, Inc., 372 Fed.Appx. 796, 801 (9th Cir.2010) (unpublished opinion) (employer's comment to employee you don't talk back); Jones v. Forrest City Grocery Inc., No. 4:06cv00944, 2008 WL 2539851, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48193 (E.D. Ark. June 23, 2008) (other employees talked back to supervisor, while plaintiffemployee fired for insubordination); Fulmore v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., No. l:03-cv-0797-DFH-VSS, 2006 WL 839460, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22909 (S.D.Ind. Mar. 30, 2006) (same). This court surely could not have intended to condone potentially discriminatory conduct. Regrettably, my colleagues in the majority publicly deprecated Warning for exercising her legal right to question her evaluative procedure, and expressly chastised her for exercising her right. I believe that rehearing is warranted to remedy this.