Opinion ID: 1425371
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Unauthorized Practice of Law (MRPC 5.5(a))The Flagship Violation

Text: Our research reveals six relatively recent cases dealing with attorneys whose flagship violations were of MRPC 5.5(a) (the prohibition against unauthorized practice of law). In five of those cases, the attorney was disbarred. See Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Johnson, 363 Md. 598, 770 A.2d 130 (2001); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 745 A.2d 1037 (2000); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harper and Kemp, 356 Md. 53, 737 A.2d 557 (1999); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 355 Md. 465, 735 A.2d 1027 (1999); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Kennedy, 319 Md. 110, 570 A.2d 1243 (1990). In the remaining case, Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harris-Smith, 356 Md. 72, 737 A.2d 567 (1999), the Court imposed a 30 day suspension. A review of these cases and a comparison with Respondent's case indicates that the present case has more in common with the cases that resulted in disbarment than the isolated result of the suspension in Harris-Smith. In addition, evidence of mitigation in this record, such as it is, is insufficient to suggest that disbarment is not the proper sanction here.
In Harris-Smith, we concluded that Harris-Smith violated MRPC 5.5(a), 356 Md. at 85, 737 A.2d at 574, but identified at least two factual considerations not present in the prior unauthorized practice cases where disbarment was the typical result: (1) Harris-Smith did not represent clients in Maryland state court proceedings, and (2) Harris-Smith, who was admitted to the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, made some effort to conduct her practice in Maryland within the practice limits associated with her admission to the federal court. Harris-Smith was admitted to the bars in Pennsylvania and Virginia, as well as the Maryland federal court, and specialized in bankruptcy law. Between 1993 and 1995, she shared a practice in Landover, Maryland, with three attorneys, two of whom were admitted to the Maryland Bar. The law firm promoted itself through radio and newspaper advertising. The radio advertisements targeted those listeners for whom filing for bankruptcy was likely to be appropriate, yet it [sic] did not state that [Harris-Smith's] practice was limited to bankruptcy law and [the Maryland federal court]. Harris-Smith, 356 Md. at 76, 737 A.2d at 569. Harris-Smith's role in the law firm was to prescreen (a term she used) prospective clients. When she determined that a client's matter involved bankruptcy law, she proceeded to represent the client without the supervision of a Maryland attorney. When representation in a State court was required, however, she would refer the client to one of the firm's other attorneys admitted in Maryland. Based on this conduct, we nonetheless found that Harris-Smith violated MRPC 5.5(a). In doing so, we rejected her defense that she pinpointed bankruptcy cases and therefore limited herself to federal legal matters. As we explained in a parenthetical, the unauthorized practice of law includes `[u]tilizing legal education, training, and experience ... [to apply] the special analysis of the profession to a client's problem.' Harris-Smith, 356 Md. at 83, 737 A.2d at 573 (alteration in original) (quoting Somuah v. Flachs, 352 Md. 241, 262, 721 A.2d 680, 690 (1998) (quoting Kennedy v. The Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, 316 Md. 646, 662, 561 A.2d 200, 208 (1989))). In addition, we noted that [t]here is a danger that lawyers in the position in which Smith placed herself `would be motivated to cant advice artificially in the safe direction,' Harris-Smith, 356 Md. at 84, 737 A.2d at 573 (quoting C.W. Wolfram, Sneaking Around in the Legal Profession: Interjurisdictional Unauthorized Practice by Transactional Lawyers, 36 S. TEX. L. REV. 665, 698 (1995)), and that the operation of the triage by the unadmitted attorney, from an office for the general practice of law in Maryland, might be used `as a shield behind which to conduct an unlimited-in-fact law practice.' Id. In our consideration of the appropriate sanction, we gauged the graveness of Harris-Smith's conduct against MRPC 8.4 generally ( see supra note 7) and concluded that her conduct did not reach the level of a violation of MRPC 8.4(b) and (c), both of which would be serious violations going to the attorney's integrity. Harris-Smith, 356 Md. at 90, 737 A.2d at 577. [15] Reasoning that Harris-Smith's unauthorized practice of law result[ed] from [her] attempt to practice within the limits of her admission to the bar of the federal district, we acknowledged that her attempt was unsuccessful solely at the beginning of the process, when [Harris-]Smith analyzed the problems presented by those who sought her services and advised them how to proceed. Id. Therefore, taking into account the fact that Harris-Smith subsequently moved her office from Maryland to the District of Columbia, we found that a 30 day suspension was sufficient to deter other unadmitted attorneys from undertaking a federal practice from an office in Maryland from which the non-admitted attorney would hold himself or herself out to the public as generally practicing law in order to identify cases that the attorney was authorized to handle. Harris-Smith, 356 Md. at 91, 737 A.2d at 577. In imposing the 30-day suspension, we noted that Harris Smith's admission to the Maryland federal court distinguished her case from two other cases, Harper and Kemp and James, where the violations of MRPC 5.5(a) resulted in disbarment because those cases presented purely a territorial issue with no federal overlay. Harris-Smith, 356 Md. at 91, 737 A.2d at 577. We also found implicitly the facts of Harris-Smith to be more similar to situations where a violation of MRPC 5.5(b) had occurred, involving attorneys admitted to the Maryland Bar who assist unadmitted lawyers or lay persons in the practice of law in Maryland. Thus, we explained that Harris-Smith's case, for purposes of the sanction, was analogous to Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Hallmon, 343 Md. 390, 681 A.2d 510 (1996), where an attorney was suspended for 90 days for failing to maintain a trust account, failing to respond to Bar Counsel, and assisting a lay person in the unauthorized practice of law. [16] Harris Smith, 356 Md. at 92, 737 A.2d at 578.
The significance of the federal overlay relied on in Harris-Smith is evident in Kennedy v. The Bar Ass'n of Montgomery County, 316 Md. 646, 561 A.2d 200 (1989). In Kennedy, the Bar Association of Montgomery County brought suit and obtained a permanent injunction directed at preventing continuation of the illegal conduct [(unauthorized practice of law)] in which the court found Kennedy to be engaged. Kennedy, 316 Md. at 668, 561 A.2d at 211. [17] Kennedy, who was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar and the Maryland federal court, had a law office in Silver Spring, Maryland. His partner, Edward Jasen, was a member of the Maryland and District of Columbia Bars. As we explained, Kennedy produced ninety percent of the business for the firm, and did eighty to ninety percent of the work done by the firm in the office.... Jasen and Kennedy almost always presented themselves together before the court. But Jasen rarely moved for Kennedy's pro hac vice admission.... Kennedy, 316 Md. at 653, 561 A.2d at 204. In modifying the broad injunction of the Circuit Court, we addressed Kennedy's claimed right to practice federal and non-Maryland law [in Maryland]. Kennedy, 316 Md. at 661, 561 A.2d at 207. While we acknowledged that the federal overlay permitted by Kennedy's admission to the federal court in Maryland enabled Kennedy to practice law before the local federal court, Kennedy, 316 Md. at 661, 561 A.2d at 208, we rejected Kennedy's contention that he was free to practice federal and non-Maryland law from his Silver Spring office. Stating that Kennedy's theory ... would ... permit the unadmitted attorney to advise the client concerning only a portion of the general legal spectrum but then prohibit the unadmitted attorney from advising as to the balance of the spectrum, Kennedy, 316 Md. at 662-63, 561 A.2d at 208, we further pointed out, similar to Harris-Smith, that [Kennedy] is not permitted to sort through clients who may present themselves at his Maryland office... because the very acts of interview, analysis and explanation of legal rights constitute practicing law in Maryland. Kennedy, 316 Md. at 666, 561 A.2d at 210. Even though we considered it practically impossible for Kennedy to maintain a principal office in Maryland exclusively for engaging in a practice before the courts to which he was admitted, Kennedy, 316 Md. at 667, 561 A.2d at 211, we suggested possible exceptions, indicating in a footnote that [f]or example, Kennedy might limit his practice from the Silver Spring office to Maryland federal and D.C. cases referred by other attorneys. Kennedy, 316 Md. at 668 n. 9, 561 A.2d at 211 n. 9.
As in Kennedy; Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Harper and Kemp involved an unadmitted attorney aligning himself with a Maryland attorney in order to cloak his unauthorized practice of law. Harper, who was admitted to the District of Columbia Bar, and Kemp, who was admitted in Maryland, established the law firm of Harper and Kemp in Baltimore in 1995 to assume the pending cases of two disbarred attorneys. [18] Harper also maintained an office in the District of Columbia. As a partner of Harper and Kemp, Harper signed retainer agreements between the firm and personal injury clients and drew fifty-five settlement checks, totaling $110,353.93, from the firm's escrow account. Harper also drew checks from the same account totaling $ 82,241.97, payable to cash, [19] to Harper personally, or to Harper and Kemp. Harper and Kemp, 356 Md. at 59, 737 A.2d at 560. We addressed three complaints from the firm's clients that resulted in the petition for disciplinary action against both Harper and Kemp. Finding that Harper violated MRPC 5.5(a), we also concluded that Harper violated MRPC 7.1 and 7.5 ( see supra note 4) in one of these complaints (the Foster/Anderson complaint). Harper and Kemp, 356 Md. at 67, 737 A.2d at 564. Regarding the MRPC 7.1 violation, we agreed with Bar Counsel that Harper had written a letter to the client, Anderson, that was materially misleading by implying that Harper had Anderson's file and could settle her claim. Harper and Kemp, 356 Md. at 68, 737 A.2d at 565. With regard to MRPC 7.5, we also agreed with Bar Counsel that two letters written by Harper to Anderson did not identify Kemp and identified Harper as licensed in the District of Columbia, thereby ... creating the false impression that, in addition to being licensed in D.C., Harper [was] licensed in Maryland. Id. In considering the appropriate sanction for Harper, we found his violation of MRPC 5.5(a) to be both deliberate and persistent. Harper and Kemp, 356 Md. at 70, 737 A.2d at 566. As we explained, [h]e set up an office for the general practice of law in Baltimore City in order to wring whatever value he could out of the inventory of pending cases of a disbarred lawyer who had practiced in Baltimore City. There is no reasonable basis on which Harper could have thought that his conduct was lawful. His motive in creating Harper & Kemp was greed. There is no mitigation. Other unadmitted attorneys must be deterred from attempting to practice law in violation of the statutory prohibition against unauthorized practice. Id. Therefore, we found that the appropriate sanction was disbarment. Johnson is the most recent case of an attorney whose unauthorized practice resulted in disbarment. Johnson, admitted in Virginia and the District of Columbia, opened a law practice in Silver Spring, Maryland, with an attorney admitted in Maryland. Although Johnson testified that he only handled Virginia and D.C. cases, leaving Maryland cases to his partner, we concluded that Johnson had violated MRPC 5.5(a) based on the hearing judge's finding that he `met with clients in a Maryland office and advised clients in that office.' Johnson, 363 Md. at 625, 628, 770 A.2d at 146, 148. We also noted the hearing judge's finding that he misled the public, as well as his clients, by not including his jurisdictional limitations on the firm's letterhead.... Johnson, 363 Md. at 625, 770 A.2d at 146. A substantial portion of our opinion in Johnson was dedicated to addressing Johnson's legal representation of a Maryland couple whose home he contracted to purchase. While the couple was living abroad, Johnson filed a bankruptcy petition on their behalf without their knowledge or consent, forging their signatures on the papers, as well as his partner's signature. We found that this conduct constituted violations of MRPC 8.4(a), (c) and (d), Johnson, 363 Md. at 631, 770 A.2d at 150, a litmus test that we used in Harris-Smith to assess what sanction was appropriate. We further justified disbarment by stating that Johnson repeatedly engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, and misrepresentation. Johnson, 363 Md. at 633, 770 A.2d at 151. Regarding MRPC 5.5(a) and the goal of deterrence in particular, we likened Johnson's case to Harper and Kemp, citing its earlier statement that `other unadmitted attorneys must be deterred from attempting to practice law in violation of the statutory prohibition against unauthorized practice.' Id. Of the MRPC 5.5(a) unauthorized practice cases, James certainly presents a most tenacious violator. James was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1971. At the time of his disbarment, he had been suspended three times previously. The first suspension, imposed in 1984, involved commingling of funds, for which he was suspended for two years. The second suspension, which involved the use of deception to circumvent a statutorily mandated procedure, was issued nine years later and was for a period of one year. We found, however, that James violated the terms of the one-year suspension by engaging in the practice of law during that period of suspension. Consequently, we reimposed the one-year suspension. Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 340 Md. 318, 666 A.2d 1246 (1995) ( James III ). That suspension expired 12 November 1996, but James failed to file a required affidavit that he `ha[d] complied in all respects with the term of the suspension.' Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. James, 355 Md. 465, 471, 735 A.2d 1027, 1030 (1999) ( James IV ). We concluded that James was suspended continuously since 12 January 1994. Id. In James III, we found that James held himself out as an attorney, and represented two clients (Romano/Orimogunje) during the period of his 1994-1995 suspension. James IV, 355 Md. at 477-78 n. 2, 735 A.2d at 1034 n. 2. Because James III was not a disciplinary hearing, [20] in James IV we upheld James's exception to the findings for purposes of whether a new sanction should be imposed. James IV, 355 Md. at 478-79, 735 A.2d at 1035. It found by clear and convincing evidence, however, that James had represented two additional clients (Wrubelski/Jackson) during the 1994-1995 period. James IV, 355 Md. at 485, 735 A.2d at 1038. In addition, we noted the testimony of another client, Bernice Roane, whom James assisted in three legal matters in 1997 and 1998. James IV, 355 Md. at 472-73, 735 A.2d at 1031. James argued, regarding Wrubelski and Jackson, that he neither requested nor received payment for the legal services he provided them. We rejected this proffered distinction, holding that `[a]lthough an agreement upon the amount of a retainer and its payment is rather conclusive evidence of the establishment of the attorney-client relationship, the absence of such an agreement or payment does not indicate conclusively that no such relationship exists.' James IV, 355 Md. at 476, 735 A.2d at 1033 (quoting Central Cab Co. v. Clarke, 259 Md. 542, 549-50, 270 A.2d 662, 666 (1970)). In mitigation, James produced evidence that he was an alcoholic and that his alcoholism had substantially impaired his judgment, resulting in his failure to comply with his suspension. James further produced evidence that, since July 1996, he had been sober. James IV, 355 Md. at 471-72, 735 A.2d at 1031. Referring to James' representation of Roane, we rebuffed James' claim, finding that James' asserted mitigation disintegrated ... with evidence that he was violating his suspension in 1997, after he had become sober. James IV, 355 Md. at 486-87, 735 A.2d at 1039. Furthermore, we concluded that [t]he result is a record that starkly reveals James' deliberate violation of the order of suspension that has continued since January 12, 1994. James IV, 355 Md. at 487, 735 A.2d at 1039. Briscoe was decertified three times as a practicing attorney in Maryland, each time for his failure to pay Client's Security Trust Fund dues. The last decertification was imposed in April of 1998, but in September 1998, while still decertified, he represented a client in a Maryland courtroom. This instance sufficed for us to find Briscoe in violation of MRPC 5.5(a). Briscoe, 357 Md. at 566, 745 A.2d at 1043. In disbarring Briscoe, we explained that he has consistently failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel, has practiced law when unauthorized to do so, and has entered into a contingency fee arrangement, but not reduced the same to writing. He has cashed checks from settlements for clients at a time when he did not maintain a trust account and failed to make the appropriate disbursements from those settlements, was unable or unwilling to produce records relating to some of the disbursements, and he failed to refund fees when required to do so. Briscoe, 357 Md. at 568, 745 A.2d at 1044. Although the latter violations involving the mishandling of clients' funds alone warrant[ed] disbarment, Id. (citing Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Milliken, 348 Md. 486, 519, 704 A.2d 1225, 1241 (1998) (citation omitted)), we also found that commingling and conversion of client funds, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, ordinarily warrants disbarment. Id. (citations omitted). Therefore, where [Briscoe] ha[d] presented nothing in mitigation, we disbarred him from the practice of law. Briscoe, 357 Md. at 568, 745 A.2d at 1044.