Opinion ID: 2054052
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fleming's Consecutive Sentence for Attempted Murder

Text: Fleming most vigorously contends that the court violated the consecutive sentencing statute when it imposed his sentence. The statute provides that: A defendant may not be sentenced to consecutive terms for crimes arising out of the same criminal episode when . . . [o]ne crime consists only of a conspiracy, attempt, solicitation, or other form of preparation to commit, or facilitation of, the other. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B) (1983). Fleming argues that he intended to murder his victim when the criminal episode began and therefore the attempted murder of his victim facilitated her rape, and the statute precludes a consecutive sentence for that conviction. The sentencing court, however, found as fact that the attempted murder was a separate criminal act from the kidnapping and gross sexual assault. That finding is not clearly erroneous. See State v. Tellier, 580 A.2d 1333, 1336 (Me.1990) (kidnap of the victim facilitated the rape, but aggravated assault after the rape did not); State v. Walsh, 558 A.2d 1184, 1188 (Me.1989) (armed terrorization of rape victim to discourage her from reporting the crime did not facilitate the rape); State v. Cormier, 535 A.2d 913, 918 (Me.1987) (cutting victim's ear off after robbery did not facilitate the robbery); State v. Winchenbach, 501 A.2d 1282, 1287 (Me. 1985) (passing roadblock and eluding police officer did not facilitate burglary and car theft). Nor is the finding illogical in light of the fact that the kidnapping and rape were unnecessary predicates to the attempted murder. Fleming in fact attempted to murder his victim to cover up his earlier crimes. The consecutive sentencing statute authorizes consecutive sentences when the seriousness of the criminal conduct ... require[s] a sentence of imprisonment in excess of the maximum available for the most serious offense. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(2)(D) (1983). Based on the court's finding that Fleming's efforts to kill his victim were separate from the gross sexual assault, the limiting provision of section 1256 does not apply to Fleming. 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1256(3)(B) (1983). The court's decision to impose consecutive sentences on Fleming for gross sexual assault and attempted murder was therefore authorized by the statute.