Opinion ID: 2336583
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Cross-examination Regarding Circumstances of Offense

Text: The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 12 L.Ed.2d 653 (1964), provides that [n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. Likewise, article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution provides that a defendant shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself. The right against self-incrimination extends to capital sentencing proceedings. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462-63, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981); see also State v. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d 253, 265 (Tenn.1994). The United States Supreme Court held, in Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219, 222, 88 S.Ct. 2008, 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968), that [a] defendant who chooses to testify waives his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination with respect to the testimony he gives. . . . See also State v. Gilbert, 751 S.W.2d 454, 463 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1988) (holding that [w]hen the defendant elected to testify in support of his defense, and took the witness stand, he waived his constitutional rights, federal and state, against self incrimination). This flows from the general rule of evidence that [a] witness may be cross-examined on any matter relevant to any issue in the case. . . . Tenn. R. Evid. 611(b). However, cross-examination of a defendant during a capital sentencing hearing may be restricted due to the gravity of [the] proceeding and the constitutional mandate to ensure that all relevant mitigating circumstances be presented to a sentencing body. Cazes, 875 S.W.2d at 266. [I]n the limited sphere of a death penalty sentencing hearing, a capital defendant's testimony regarding mitigating factors that are wholly collateral to the merits of the charges against him does not operate as a complete waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination. Accordingly, a defendant has a right to limited cross-examination if he or she wishes to testify about only collateral mitigating circumstances at the penalty phase of a capital trial. Id. (footnote omitted). This does not eliminate all cross-examinationa defendant still may be completely cross-examined about all testimony given or fairly raised by the defendant on direct examination. Id. Riels argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to cross-examine him regarding the circumstances of the crimes, in violation of the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and article I, sections 9 and 13 of the Tennessee Constitution. Riels first argues that the court erred in ruling, sua sponte, that any testimony regarding his drug addition would open the door to cross-examination by the State regarding the circumstances of the offenses. Riels next argues that the court erred in ruling that his statements expressing remorse were statements denying responsibility, thereby opening the door for cross-examination. The State counters that Riels' statements that he did not intend to hurt the victims properly opened the door for cross-examination regarding the circumstances of the crimes because it raised the issue of his mental state. Prior to Riels taking the stand in his own defense, the trial court raised the question of whether the defendant planned to testify about his drug addition. The trial court indicated that if he did, it would rule that such testimony opened the door to cross-examination about the circumstances of the offense because the defendant's drug use went directly to his culpability for the offense and his actions. The court said that if the defendant wished just to express remorse, or something like that, then that would be fine. The trial court further indicated that any residual doubt evidence or testimony that the defendant did not know what he was doing would also open the door to cross-examination regarding the facts of the offense. The trial court indicated that it initiated this inquiry to assure itself that the defendant's decision to testify was knowing and intelligent. Riels took the stand and testified about his remorse and his relationship with his family. He also admitted that he had prior convictions for aggravated robbery and forgery. At the conclusion of this testimony, he addressed the family and friends of the victims: I'd like to say that I'm sorry for their loss. I didn't mean for any of this to happen. I didn't want to hurt anybody. If I could take it all back, I would. And I'd like to said to their family members and their friends that I am truly sorry for what I did. If there was ever anything that I could do, I would do it, but I don't know that there is. I would like to apologize for what I did. They didn't deserve any of this and there's no excuse for what I did. That's all I have to say about that. Following this testimony, the defense rested. The trial court sua sponte called a bench conference, at which time it ruled that the statements, I didn't mean for any of this to happen and I didn't want to hurt anybody had contradicted the defendant's confession and opened the door to cross-examination regarding the circumstances of the offenses. The Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed with the trial court's conclusion that the defendant opened the door to cross-examination about the circumstances of the offenses. The Court of Criminal Appeals was of the opinion that the defendant's statements were simply his attempt at expressing remorse to the victims' families and friends about the crimes that he had already admitted committing. The court found even more troubling the trial court's calling the parties to the bench and sua sponte announcing that the defendant opened the door for the cross-examination. At that time, the State had not yet raised the issue and might never have raised the issue. We agree. First, it is clear that the statements made by Riels, when taken in context, were not an attempt to deny responsibility, but were merely an attempt to express his remorse. He had already acknowledged that he had taken responsibility for the crimes. He also stated that I would like to apologize for what I did. They didn't deserve any of this and there's no excuse for what I did. Taking all of his statements together, those cited by the trial court, that I didn't mean for any of this to happen and I didn't want to hurt anybody, simply add to Riels' expression of remorse and his desire that [i]f [he] could take it all back, [he] would. Therefore, like the Court of Criminal Appeals, we conclude that the trial court erred in holding that Riels' statements opened the door for full cross-examination on the details of the murders. Riels was thus denied his right against self-incrimination, in violation of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the Tennessee Constitution. The trial court's actions raise an additional concern. We do not necessarily fault the trial court for reminding the defendant prior to his testifying that he might wish to limit his testimony if he did not want to run the risk of opening the door to unlimited cross-examination. However, we do fault the trial court for raising the issue sua sponte and concluding that the defendant had opened the door to unlimited cross-examination by making statements that the trial judge perceived to be a denial of criminal culpability. This is particularly troubling in light of the fact that the State never raised the issue nor argued its position on the issue once raised. This case serves as a reminder that trial judges should always use restraint and not interject themselves into a role in a trial which may be perceived as that of an advocate rather than an impartial arbiter. While we are confident that the trial judge in this case had no improper motives, nevertheless, his sua sponte ruling has led to reversible error. While the Court of Criminal Appeals held that the trial court's actions, though error, were harmless, we disagree and hold that the error is reversible. The trial court's error affected a constitutional right of the defendant. By finding that Riels' statements of remorse opened the door to full cross-examination on the circumstances of the crimes, the trial court violated Riels' right to avoid self-incrimination. While Riels had already admitted his culpability for the crimes charged by pleading guilty, he still had the constitutional right not to be a witness against himself. If the error is of a constitutional nature, as it is here, the burden shifts to the State to prove that the errorthe deprivation of the constitutional right was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Momon v. State, 18 S.W.3d 152, 167 (Tenn. 1999); State v. Harris, 989 S.W.2d 307, 314-15 (Tenn.1999). An error affecting a constitutional right is presumed to be reversible, and any such error will result in reversal of the conviction unless the State proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not affect the outcome of the trial. State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 725 (Tenn.2001) (citing Harris, 989 S.W.2d at 315). In concluding that the error was harmless, the Court of Criminal Appeals reasoned that the jury was not prejudiced by the detailed account of the attack or the State's request that Riels act out the attack because the jury had already heard Riels' confession read into the record which described the attack, had heard graphic testimony from the medical examiner concerning the victims' injuries, and had seen photographs of Ms. Cruchon and the crime scene. We hold, however, that the State has failed to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the trial court's error did not affect the outcome of the trial. While the evidence already before the jury gave them a fairly clear picture of what happened during the attack, hearing such details from third parties does not have nearly the same impact as hearing detailed, graphic descriptions from the defendant himself. This is compounded by the State's request that Riels act out for the jury how he attacked Ms. Cruchon with the hammer once she had already fallen to the floor. Such a visual demonstration was meant to, and surely would, inflame and prejudice the jury against the defendant. [4] For the reasons outlined above, we hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it ruled that Riels' testimony opened the door for unlimited cross-examination. Therefore, we remand this case to the trial court for a new capital sentencing hearing.