Opinion ID: 2654917
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coconspirator Hearsay

Text: Both appellants challenge the introduction of parts of the recorded jail calls under the coconspirator hearsay exception. While the statements made by each defendant were admissible against that same defendant under the separate exception for party admissions,11 the government invoked the coconspirator exception to introduce against each defendant statements made by the other declarants (including the co-defendant). Israel complains, primarily, of the admission of Jenkins‟s statements against him, while Jenkins mainly objects to the admission of Pierre Chaney‟s comments. The trial court admitted these statements without a limiting instruction under the coconspirator exception after finding that “the totality of the evidence proffered constitute[d] . . . fairly overwhelming evidence” of a conspiracy that included at least Israel, Jenkins, and Pierre Chaney. An out-of-court statement is hearsay, and hence must come within an exception to the rule against hearsay to be admissible, if it is offered for the truth of 11 See Comford v. United States, 947 A.2d 1181, 1185 (D.C. 2008) (“[O]ur cases continue to treat party-admissions as an exception to the rule against hearsay.”); Chaabi v. United States, 544 A.2d 1247, 1248 n.1 (D.C. 1988) (“We have traditionally considered admissions to be exceptions to the hearsay rule.”). 16 the matter asserted, but not if it is offered for another (“non-hearsay”) purpose.12 As we shall see, the statements in the recorded phone calls were admissible as nonhearsay, insofar as they were, regardless of their truth, verbal acts probative of the existence of the conspiracy and the identity of its members. To that extent, the statements did not need to come within the coconspirator (or any) hearsay exception to be admitted in evidence. However, the trial court‟s ruling permitted the government to urge the jury to accept as true what the hearsay declarants asserted: specifically, that Jenkins and the Chaney brothers were out looking for Evans between March and August 2006; that Jenkins confronted him in Adams Morgan; and that Jenkins expected to find and confront Evans the weekend that Evans was killed. To the extent that the statements were thus introduced, at least in part, for their truth, we must consider whether the requirements of the coconspirator exception were satisfied. 12 Cox v. United States, 898 A.2d 376, 380 (D.C. 2006) (Trial court erred in ruling that statements were inadmissible hearsay where “[a]ppellant sought admission of the statement not for the truth of what he said but for the fact that the statement was made.”); Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 542, 545 n.9 (D.C. 1992) (“[I]f a statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, it is not hearsay.”); Fed. R. Evid. 801 advisory committee note (“If the significance of an offered statement lies solely in the fact that it was made, no issue is raised as to the truth of anything asserted, and the statement is not hearsay.”). 17 This court set forth the requirements in this jurisdiction for introducing hearsay statements made by alleged coconspirators in Butler v. United States.13 In that case we adopted the exception contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 801 (d)(2)(e) and held that a coconspirator‟s out-of-court assertions may be admitted for their truth only if the judge finds it more likely than not that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the defendant had a connection with the conspiracy, and (3) the coconspirator made the statements during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy.14 Butler also considered what evidence the judge is allowed to consider in making those findings—specifically, “whether all proffered evidence may be regarded, or whether only independent nonhearsay evidence may be considered” in determining the availability of the coconspirator exception.15 The court found support for the latter view, under which the judge may not consider the alleged coconspirators‟ statements themselves, in the Supreme Court‟s decision in 13 481 A.2d 431 (D.C. 1984). 14 Id. at 439-41. 15 Id. at 439. 18 Glasser v. United States,16 but that decision predated the Federal Rules of Evidence and (at the time of our decision in Butler) the federal circuit courts were divided over whether Federal Rule of Evidence 104 (a) overruled Glasser on this point.17 Acknowledging the split of federal authority, we elected in Butler, “as a matter of state law, [to] adhere to the requirements of Glasser.”18 Accordingly, we held that, in determining the availability of the coconspirator exception, the judge is prohibited from considering the alleged coconspirators‟ statements themselves and 16 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942) (“[S]uch declarations are admissible over the objection of an alleged co-conspirator, who was not present when they were made, only if there is proof aliunde that he is connected with the conspiracy. . . . Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence.”); see also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974) (“Declarations by one defendant may also be admissible against other defendants upon a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among one or more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in furtherance of that conspiracy.”). 17 Butler, 481 A.2d at 439. Rule 104 (a) allows judges to consider hearsay and other inadmissible evidence in ruling on questions of admissibility. Although this court has not “adopted” Rule 104 (a) in any formal sense, the principle it states is one we generally have followed outside the coconspirator hearsay context. See, e.g., Roberson v. United States, 961 A.2d 1092, 1096 & 1096 n.11 (D.C. 2008). 18 Butler, 481 A.2d at 440 n.14. 19 may rely “only” on “independent nonhearsay evidence.”19 We identified two policy reasons for choosing to retain this requirement derived from Glasser: (1) it “ensures the reliability of coconspirator‟s statements admitted at trial by determining that sufficient corroborating evidence of a conspiracy exists,” and (2) it “guards against the danger of „bootstrapping,‟ i.e., using hearsay evidence to justify its own admission.”20 Not long after Butler was decided, the Supreme Court resolved the split in federal authority. In Bourjaily v. United States, the Court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 104 (a) prevailed over Glasser and authorized federal judges deciding the admissibility of hearsay under the coconspirator exception to consider the hearsay itself along with other, independent evidence of the conspiracy. 21 Finding this 19 Id. at 439-40 & 440 n.14. Glasser, it should be noted, did not require that a court consider only non-hearsay in ruling on the admissibility of coconspirator hearsay. The Butler court‟s rationale for adding this condition is not entirely clear. The court acknowledged that at least one federal circuit court had approved “consideration of all evidence, regardless of its hearsay nature, except the specific hearsay evidence for which admission is sought.” Butler, 481 A.2d at 439 n.13 (citing United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 580-81 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc)). The court rejected such a rule, saying only that it “presents a task more complicated than necessary for the trial judge without, in our view, compensating advantages.” Id. 20 Id. at 440 (citing Glasser, 315 U.S. at 74-75). 21 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987). 20 result compelled by the clear language of the Rule, the Court dismissed the concern that it would “allow courts to admit hearsay statements without any credible proof of the conspiracy.”22 On the contrary, the Court had “little doubt that a co-conspirator‟s statements could themselves be probative of the existence of a conspiracy and the participation of both the defendant and the declarant in the conspiracy,” especially if the statements are corroborated by other evidence.23 In the years since Bourjaily was decided, we have deferred consideration of its effect on our holding in Butler.24 We are obliged to answer that question now, however, because it is, in part, outcome-determinative.25 We conclude that Butler remains controlling authority in the local courts of the District of Columbia. This conclusion is not to be understood as resulting from disagreement with Bourjaily or as expressing a preference for Butler over 22 Id. at 179. 23 Id. at 180. 24 See Ward v. United States, 55 A.3d 840, 849 n.7 (D.C. 2012); Bellanger v. United States, 548 A.2d 501, 502 n.4 (D.C. 1988). 25 Following oral argument, we directed the parties and invited the Public Defender Service as amicus curiae to argue the issue in supplemental briefing, which we have received. 21 Bourjaily on the merits. Rather, as a division of this court, we have no power to overrule Butler; only the court sitting en banc can do so.26 The holding of Butler is, therefore, binding on us unless we determine that it has been overruled or, at a minimum, that its “philosophical basis” has been “substantially undermined” by subsequent decisions of the Supreme Court (i.e., by Bourjaily).27 Clearly, Butler has not been overruled. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern proceedings in the local courts of the District of Columbia (except to the extent that this court, on a case-by-case basis, has chosen or chooses in the future to adopt a specific Rule as local law). Bourjaily‟s construction of Rule 104 (a)—a Rule we have not formally adopted, though it accurately states the rule of evidence we generally follow—therefore cannot be said to constitute an overruling 26 See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971) (holding that “no division of this court will overrule a prior decision of this court”). 27 Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 n.27 (D.C. 1979) (“We do not believe . . . that M.A.P. v. Ryan . . . obliges us to follow, inflexibly, a ruling whose philosophical basis has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions.”); see also Smith v. United States, 984 A.2d 196, 200-01 (D.C. 2009). 22 of Butler‟s “state law” holding.28 It likewise cannot be said that Bourjaily “substantially undermined” Butler‟s “philosophical” underpinnings. The Butler court made a deliberate decision to adopt an independent evidence requirement for proceedings in our local court system after considering the disparate views of the federal circuits and rejecting the position ultimately approved in Bourjaily. We did so not with the goal of conforming to the Federal Rules of Evidence or federal law, but as a matter of local evidentiary policy to ensure the reliability of coconspirator hearsay introduced at trial and guard against the danger of “bootstrapping.” That Bourjaily recognized countervailing considerations and concluded that “[a] per se rule barring consideration of [coconspirator hearsay] during preliminary factfinding is not therefore required”29 reinforces what we already knew: that there are two sides to the issue. Perhaps it supports doubts about the rationale and wisdom of the policy choice made in Butler, as the government argues. This is not enough, however, to undercut the substantial legitimacy of Butler‟s policy decision in favor of an independent evidence requirement for the admission of coconspirator 28 While we often look to federal law for guidance, “this court is the final authority for establishing the evidentiary rules for the Superior Court of the District of Columbia.” Laumer v. United States, 409 A.2d 190, 195 n.7 (D.C. 1979) (en banc). 29 483 U.S. at 180. 23 hearsay—a requirement, we note, that courts in a number of other jurisdictions also have chosen to adopt.30 Applying Butler, therefore, to the present case, we are constrained to conclude that there was insufficient independent, non-hearsay evidence of the conspiracy to support the trial court‟s ruling. It is true, as the government argues, that there was independent, non-hearsay evidence that Evans witnessed the 30 Hillard v. State, 53 So. 3d 165, 168 (Ala. Crim. App. 2010) (“In order for the extrajudicial statement of a coconspirator to qualify under the coconspirators‟ exception . . . the existence of the conspiracy must be shown by independent evidence.”); People v. Wolf, 772 N.E.2d 1124, 1132 (N.Y. 2002) (According to New York law, determination that there was a conspiracy for the purposes of admitting coconspirator hearsay determination “must be made without recourse to the declarations sought to be introduced.”); State v. Batchelder, 740 A.2d 1033, 1036 (N.H. 1999) (noting that New Hampshire law requires that existence of a conspiracy for the purpose of admitting coconspirator hearsay be demonstrated by independent evidence and “declin[ing] to consider whether [that rule] should be interpreted as the State suggests in accordance with Bourjaily.”); State v. Hansen, 562 N.W.2d 840, 848 (Neb. 1997) (“[T]he rule is well established that before the trier of fact may consider testimony under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, a prima facie case establishing the existence of the conspiracy must be shown by independent evidence.”); People v. Steidl, 568 N.E.2d 837, 849 (Ill. 1991) (coconspirator statements “are admissible against all conspirators upon an independent, prima facie evidentiary showing of a conspiracy.”) (emphasis in original); State v. Clausell, 580 A.2d 221, 241 (N.J. 1990) (Before admitting coconspirator statements a trial court must find that “a fair preponderance of evidence independent of the hearsay statements supports the existence of the conspiracy and of defendant‟s relationship to it.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); Romani v. State, 542 So. 2d 984, 986 (Fla. 1989) (As a matter of state law, the Florida Supreme Court “decline[s] to adopt the federal approach laid out in Bourjaily.”). 24 Columbia Road shootings; that he was rumored to be cooperating with the police; that Israel was told he was a suspect; that Jenkins was Israel‟s cousin and visited Israel at the D.C. Jail shortly before Evans was murdered; and that Jenkins was the last person seen with Evans, only three hours before the murder. Outside of the jail calls themselves, however, there is no substantial non-hearsay evidence that Jenkins plotted or contrived with Israel to kill Evans; no evidence, in other words, that there was a conspiracy involving Israel. Whether and to what extent appellants were prejudiced by the erroneous admission of hearsay for its truth under the coconspirator exception, and hence are entitled to relief, is another question. In considering this question, we must take into account the fact that the statements at issue were relevant for a non-hearsay purpose, for which they did not have to meet Butler‟s requirements to be admitted against each appellant.31 Statements between alleged coconspirators can be relevant wholly apart from their truth or falsity because the very act of plotting is itself compelling proof 31 See Walker v. United States, 982 A.2d 723, 737 (D.C. 2009) (citing Butler, 481 A.2d at 438 n.10 (holding that a directive between coconspirators did not fall under the coconspirator hearsay rule as it was not introduced for its truth and so was not hearsay)). 25 of the existence of the conspiracy.32 For this purpose, the veracity of the plotters‟ assertions is not the point; rather, the statements are non-hearsay verbal acts that manifest the conspiratorial agreement.33 (Moreover, as the jury found in this case, the communications between conspirators also can constitute overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy, and this is so without regard to whether they are true.) Israel‟s recorded plotting with Jenkins and the Chaneys thus was admissible simply to demonstrate that the four speakers were engaged in a conspiracy; and for 32 See, e.g., United States v. Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1226 (10th Cir. 2006) (“Statements by coconspirators are commonly introduced at trial simply because the statements themselves are part of the plotting to commit a crime.”); citing United States v. Lim, 984 F.2d 331, 336 (9th Cir. 1993); New York v. Hendrickson Bros., Inc., 840 F.2d 1065, 1075 (2d Cir. 1988); United States v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1270 n.4 (6th Cir. 1982); United States v. Burke, 495 F.2d 1226, 1232 (5th Cir. 1974). See also People v. Caban, 833 N.E.2d 213, 217-18 (N.Y. 2005) (statements of agreement and planning are relevant even if untrue, for the mere fact that they were uttered is relevant to prove a conspiracy); State v. Henry, 752 A.2d 40, 46-47 (Conn. 2000) (statement between defendant and coconspirator that they would shoot victim was not admitted for truth but to show conspiratorial agreement); Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 726 N.E.2d 959, 964 (Mass. 2000); State v. Ross, 573 N.W.2d 906, 916 (Iowa 1998); State v. Lobato, 603 So. 2d 739, 746 (La. 1992); State v. Brooks, 655 P.2d 99, 106-07 (Idaho 1982). 33 Puma v. Sullivan, 746 A.2d 871, 876 (D.C. 2000) (“Although the statement was made by an out-of-court declarant, it is not hearsay, because Ewoldt‟s offer is not an assertion; it is a verbal act. In other words, the offer is non-hearsay under the general definition, because it is not being used for the truth of the matter it asserts; it simply is being used to prove Ewoldt spoke the words of an offer.”); see also David S. Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Coconspirator Exception in Criminal Prosecutions: A Functional Analysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1398-99 (1972). 26 that purpose it makes no difference whether, for example, Jenkins was telling the truth or lying when he said he had been looking for Evans, had found him in Adams Morgan, and expected to catch him again over the coming weekend. Thus, despite the Butler error, it was permissible for the jury to consider the recorded statements as non-hearsay proof of the existence of the alleged conspiracy without regard to the truth of the statements.34 Consequently, the focus of our harmlessness inquiry is narrowed. Neither Israel nor Jenkins can claim to have been prejudiced by the Butler error unless the jury may have relied on the truth of another putative conspirator‟s statements in finding him guilty on a particular count. We readily rule out that possibility with respect to Israel‟s convictions of the charges relating to the shootings on Columbia Road. Even assuming that the recorded statements evidencing Israel‟s involvement in a conspiracy to eliminate a witness helped prove Israel‟s commission of the Columbia Road shootings by revealing his consciousness of 34 It may seem paradoxical that conspirators‟ statements are admissible as non-hearsay to prove the existence of the conspiracy to the jury, but simultaneously may not be considered by the judge for purposes of the coconspirator exception. But that is the import of Butler‟s independent evidence requirement. See Caban, 833 N.E.2d at 217-19 (holding conspirators‟ statements admissible as verbal acts to prove existence of conspiracy but not, absent independent evidence of the conspiracy, for their truth). 27 guilt, this probative value depended only on the fact of the plotting, not on the truth of anything Israel‟s fellow plotters said to him. Similarly, we see no reason to suppose that the jury relied on the truth of the conspirators‟ statements in convicting appellants of conspiracy to obstruct justice. The existence of the conspiratorial agreement and the four overt acts found by the jury were proved by non-hearsay evidence—the conspirators‟ recorded statements, considered simply as verbal acts manifesting the conspiracy, and the eyewitness testimony of the witnesses who were present when Jenkins and Evans met at the parking lot shortly before Evans was killed.35 That leaves the obstruction of justice count. We conclude that the Butler error was harmless with respect to Jenkins‟s conviction on that count. Jenkins complains only about the admission of Pierre Chaney‟s statements to the effect that “they” had been looking for “that girl,” whom Chaney called “Charlie.”36 In view 35 So, too, we are confident that the jury did not rely on coconspirator hearsay to convict Jenkins of CPWL; however, as we discuss below, we reverse his conviction of that offense on other grounds, namely, the insufficiency of the government‟s proof. 36 Jenkins does not object to the admission against him of anything said by Israel. Israel‟s comments during the calls were minimally probative of Jenkins‟s guilt. This is not surprising, as Israel knew all his calls were being recorded. Israel demonstrated his keen awareness of this when, at one point, he warned Jenkins not to “even talk on the phones, you hear me.” 28 of Jenkins‟s own recorded statements implicating himself in the conspiracy and the other substantial evidence of his involvement in Evans‟s murder, we are confident that the admission of Chaney‟s statements did not “substantially sway” the jury‟s verdict that Jenkins obstructed justice by killing Evans.37 We reach a different conclusion with respect to Israel‟s conviction for obstruction of justice. Under the principle that a conspirator is liable for crimes committed by his coconspirators in furtherance of the conspiracy,38 the verdict against Israel on the obstruction count rested, in part, on the evidence the jury relied on to convict Jenkins of obstruction. That evidence may have included Jenkins‟s recorded hearsay statements, considered by the jury for their truth. We are not prepared to discount the importance of Jenkins‟s incriminating hearsay to the jury‟s finding that he, and hence Israel, obstructed justice. We therefore cannot find the Butler error harmless with respect to Israel‟s conviction for that offense. 37 Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). 38 See Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 840 (D.C. 2006) (en banc) (“[A] co-conspirator who does not directly commit a substantive offense may nevertheless be held liable for that offense if it was committed by another coconspirator in furtherance of the conspiracy and was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the conspiratorial agreement.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 29