Opinion ID: 2610235
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Both want of probable cause and malice must be proved in an action for damages resulting from a wrongful attachment of a debtor's property.

Text: The principal problem in this case arises from plaintiff's contention that this is an action for wrongful attachment and that in such an action the plaintiff is not required to prove either malice or want of probable cause. This contention is denied by defendant, which contends that there is no separate action for wrongful attachment, but that the remedies for a wrongful attachment are limited to (1) an action on the attachment bond, (2) an action for abuse of process, and (3) an action for malicious prosecution, in which malice and want of probable cause must both be proved. [2] Plaintiff relies primarily upon our previous decision in Mills v. Liquidators, 206 Or. 212, 288 P.2d 1060 (1956), in which we said (at p. 217, 288 P.2d at p. 1063): An action for wrongful attachment is in the nature of an action in trespass for conversion of personal property; `malice and want of probable cause are not essential elements of an action for damages for wrongful garnishment,   '. Indeed, plaintiff's counsel frankly stated on argument that he must stand or fall on that case. [3] Admittedly, the law on this subject in Oregon is in a state of confusion and plaintiff was justified in his reliance on Mills. In that case, however, the wrongful attachment was not made upon property of the debtor, but upon property belonging to a third person  the plaintiff in that case. Although it does not appear from the opinion in that case, it appears upon reading the briefs submitted by counsel that plaintiff in Mills was relying upon authorities to the effect that when an attachment is levied upon property which does not belong to the party sued, the remedy of conversion was available in such a case, citing 91 A.L.R. 922 (at pp. 934-936), and Sabin v. Chrisman, 90 Or. 85, 175 P. 622 (1918), in which the remedy of conversion had been recognized in such a case (at p. 88, 175 P. 622). [4] In Mitchell v. Silver Lake Lodge, 29 Or. 294, 45 P. 798 (1896), plaintiff's complaint alleged that an attachment of his property by defendant was wrongful and without probable cause, but did not allege malice. This court reversed a judgment for plaintiff, holding (at p. 304, 45 P. at p. 800) that in an action for damages resulting from a wrongful attachment it was necessary to allege and prove that the attachment was malicious. In arriving at that result the court discussed at length the authorities on this subject and held (at pp. 300-301, 45 P. at p. 799) that in the absence of statute, malice and want of probable cause are the gist of the action to recover damages for the wrongful attachment of property. Perhaps the principal reason for the adoption of such a rule in Mitchell appears from the following statement by this court in that case (at pp. 296-297, 45 P. at pp. 798-799): Courts are ever open to litigants for the adjudication of their rights, and, although a party may have been induced by malice to institute an action, so long as he does not cause the arrest of the defendant, or his property to be attached, the costs awarded upon the dismissal of the proceedings are deemed by the legislative assembly suitable compensation for the injury suffered by the defendant in consequence of the action, and the law affords him no other remedy,   . If, however, the defendant has been arrested, or his property attached in an action which terminates in his favor, he has sustained a special injury, which cannot be compensated by the costs and disbursements prescribed by statute, and, if such action were instituted through malice, and prosecuted without probable cause, upon the common-law theory that wherever there is an injury there is also a remedy, the defendant may maintain an action of malicious prosecution to recover the damages sustained. This court subsequently approved its prior decision in Mitchell in McKinney v. Nayberger, 138 Or. 203, 209, 2 P.2d 1111, 6 P.2d 228, 229 (1931), and Carnation Lbr. Co. v. McKenney, 224 Or. 541, 544, 356 P.2d 932 (1960), although Mitchell was held not applicable to those cases, which did not involve wrongful attachments. Apparently, however, Mitchell was not called to the attention of the court in Mills, although that case involved attachment of property which did not belong to the party sued (the debtor), as previously pointed out. In Alvarez v. Retail Credit Ass'n, 234 Or. 255, 381 P.2d 499 (1963), defendant, a collection agency, had levied execution on plaintiff's wages under a default judgment for a bill which plaintiff had denied that he owed. After that action had been dismissed and the money returned to plaintiff, he filed an action for malicious prosecution against the collection agency, alleging malice and demanding both actual and punitive damages. This court reversed a jury verdict and judgment of $1,152.45 for the plaintiff on the ground that malice had not been proved. In so holding, this court said (at p. 262, 381 P.2d at p. 502): Equal in importance to a plaintiff's proof of a want of probable cause in a case of this character is the necessity that he prove malice on the part of the defendant.   . The court did not, however, discuss the question whether an action for wrongful attachment was an independent remedy in which neither malice nor probable cause are essential elements. No such contention was made by the plaintiff in Alvarez and the Mills case was not cited to the court. After reviewing our prior decisions on this subject and after also considering the law in other jurisdictions, we reaffirm what we previously held in Mitchell and Alvarez to the effect that in an action for damages against a creditor resulting from a wrongful attachment of a debtor's property, both want of probable cause and malice must be pleaded and proved. [5] We also hold that these elements are required in such an action whether an action for wrongful attachment be regarded as an independent common law action or as a common law action for malicious prosecution. [6] It follows that since the first cause of action as pleaded in plaintiff's third amended complaint makes no attempt to allege either want of probable cause or malice, plaintiff is not entitled to recovery under that cause of action. Plaintiff's second cause of action, however, is claimed to allege a cause of action for malicious prosecution and alleges both that the attachment was levied without probable cause and that defendant's conduct was malicious. Thus, contrary to defendant's contentions, we also hold that plaintiff's second cause of action sufficiently alleged a want of probable cause. Drake v. Anderson, 215 Or. 291, 295, 334 P.2d 477 (1959), leaving for consideration defendant's further contention that the evidence of lack of probable cause and malice was not sufficient to take the case to the jury.