Opinion ID: 776136
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Woods's Criminal History Points

Text: 47 We review for clear error a district court's factual findings pertaining to a defendant's criminal history score. United States v. McAdams, 25 F.3d 370, 372 (6th Cir. 1994). 48 Section 4A1.1(e) of the Guidelines allows for an enhancement of two points for offenses committed less than two years after release from imprisonment on a sentence lasting at least sixty days. Section 4A1.2(d)(2) allows for an enhancement of two points for each juvenile sentence to confinement of at least sixty days if the defendant was released from such confinement within five years of his commencement of the instant offense. 49 Judge Smith found that Woods's three juvenile sentences in 1987, 1988, and 1989 were each committed within five years of his commencement of the conspiracy in 1991. He therefore added six points for each count under § 4A1.2(d)(2). In addition, Judge Smith added an additional two criminal history points under § 4A1.1(e) because the two juvenile sentences in 1990 and 1991 occurred less than two years prior to the 1991 commencement date. 50 Woods argues that the court erred because (1) there was insufficient evidence to show that he commenced the instant offense, namely, the conspiracy, in 1991; (2) his juvenile sentences were imposed due to constitutionally infirm guilty pleas, and (3) the government failed to file an information before trial of Woods's prior convictions as required by 21 U.S.C. § 851(a). 51 We reject the first argument. The district court found that 52 the defendant joined the conspiracy . . . at some time during 1991. Robert Dotson testified at trial that he first observed the defendant selling crack cocaine on a consistent basis in the Short North area in 1991. 53 Furthermore, Jeffrey Crockett testified that he sold crack cocaine to the defendant two or three times during the summer and winter of 1991. The defendant's drug trafficking in 1991 and his association with members of the Short North Posse raises the inference that the defendant had joined the conspiracy at that time. 54 Moreover, given the fact that the Short North Posse would not permit outsiders or non-members to sell in the Short North, the only way the defendant would have been permitted to sell crack in the Short North in 1991 is if he was a member of the conspiracy. 55 . . . . 56 The Court also notes that in his appeal to the Sixth Circuit in this case, the defendant argued that he could not be found to have joined the conspiracy until 1991. Therefore, he implicitly acknowledged that he was a member of the conspiracy in 1991. 57 A.J.A. at 515. 58 We agree with the reasoning of the district court. In sentencing we review the record for a preponderance of the evidence, not for evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. Woods bought and sold crack -- apparently without molestation -- in the boundaries staked out by the SNP in 1991. A.J.A. at 599-601, 1237-44. This fact, combined with testimony that Crockett fronted 5 Woods crack cocaine in 1991, A.J.A. at 1243, is sufficient to establish that Woods was a member of the conspiracy in 1991. 59 Defendant's second argument is also unavailing. The Supreme Court has held in Custis v. United States, 511 U.S. 485, 487 (1994), that defendants do not have the right to collaterally attack their state convictions at sentencing hearings, except for convictions obtained without the right to counsel. See also United States v. Pluta, 144 F.3d 968 (6th Cir. 1998). Woods makes no argument that he pleaded guilty without counsel, so we reject this argument. 60 We also reject Woods's third argument. We have held in United States v. Brannon, 7 F.3d 516, 521 (6th Cir. 1993), that 21 U.S.C. § 851 only applies to statutory sentence enhancements. Because this is an enhancement under the Guidelines, § 851 does not apply. 61 We therefore hold that the criminal history calculation for Woods was not in error.