Opinion ID: 1985427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Extraneous Information

Text: [15, 16] ¶ 50. Juror impartiality may also be undermined when extraneous information reaches one or more juror's prior to a jury's verdict. See generally, Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d 254, and Broomfield, 223 Wis. 2d 465. In Messelt, we explained that whether extraneous information that reaches a juror constitutes prejudicial error requiring reversal of a verdict was a question of law. [6] Messelt, 185 Wis. 2d at 281-82. As such, where a circuit court must consider whether the extraneous evidence was prejudicial, its prejudicial effect is considered only from an objective bias standard. See id. at 282 (citing State v. Poh, 116 Wis. 2d 510, 523-25, 343 N.W.2d 108 (1984)(the analysis will focus on whether there is a reasonable possibility that the information in [the juror's] possession would have a prejudicial effect upon a hypothetical average juror.). The appropriate analysis under the test for extraneous, prejudicial information does not include considerations of subjective bias. While the test for extraneous, prejudicial information was explained in Messelt, the defendant's failure to sufficiently satisfy the circuit court that any extraneous information reached a juror ended the inquiry into prejudicial error prior to the analysis for objective bias. [7] ¶ 51. In Broomfield, our most recent jury bias decision, we did reach the bias inquiry. The defendant in Broomfield established that the challenged juror's testimony was competent for purposes of impeaching the verdict in his case, and that clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence demonstrated that the juror had received extraneous information which was potentially prejudicial: namely overhearing two people talking about a prior hung jury involving the defendant, and other bad acts allegedly committed by the defendant. We then considered whether either piece of extraneous information that the juror had overheard about the defendant was prejudicial and concluded that the information in the juror's possession did not constitute prejudicial error because the information would not have a prejudicial effect upon a hypothetical average juror. With the terminology adopted today, the information in the juror's possession was not sufficient to establish that the juror was objectively biased.