Opinion ID: 1499650
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Necessity for Hearing

Text: Jascalevich asserts that the materials subpoenaed in the present case are relevant to his defense, and hence non-disclosure will deprive him of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights to a fair trial. It is of course axiomatic that a statute cannot be applied so as to abridge an individual's constitutional rights. However, if the materials are ordered turned over for in camera inspection in order that a determination be made as to their relevance to Jascalevich's defense, appellants' statutory privilege of non-disclosure will be eviscerated. How to deal with this state of affairs? It is submitted that an almost identical situation was faced by the Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039 (1974), and that the Court's solution to the problem in that case should serve as a guide to the case at hand. In Nixon, the production of subpoenaed presidential material was resisted on grounds of executive privilege. Disclosure of the data was sought by presidential aides who were criminal defendants as well as by the prosecutors. In the course of its opinion, the Court noted that before the weighty interest in confidentiality was undermined by even in camera disclosure, those desirous of obtaining the information were required to make a threshold showing as to the relevance, materiality and necessity of the data to the conduct of the trial. In that case, the Special Prosecutor had met this threshold burden. In the words of the lower court, he had made a lengthy and detailed showing of [the Government's] need for the subpoenaed items and their relevance. United States v. Mitchell, 377 F. Supp. 1326, 1328 aff'd sub nom. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S.Ct. 3090, 41 L.Ed. 2d 1039 (1974). See also Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E. 2d 429 (S.Ct.), cert. den. 419 U.S. 966, 95 S.Ct. 229, 42 L.Ed. 2d 182 (1974); State v. St. Peter, 132 Vt. 266, 315 A. 2d 254 (S.Ct. 1974). The need to impose such a threshold burden upon a criminal defendant is at once manifest. Absent such a requirement, nothing prevents any person accused of a crime from embarking upon fishing expeditions into a news media's files. Such rummaging of a newspaper's records cannot be permitted. See Brown v. Commonwealth, supra ; State v. St. Peter, supra . Case law demonstrates that a criminal defendant's Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights will be undermined only if subpoenaed data are relevant, material and necessary to the defense. If the information is irrelevant or immaterial or unnecessary to Jascalevich's defense, or if alternate sources of this information exist, then non-production will not impair his constitutional rights; hence, disclosure cannot be mandated. See Brown v. Commonwealth, supra ; State v. St. Peter, supra . This cause must therefore be remanded for a hearing prior to a decision regarding appellants' obligation to disclose the subpoenaed materials. At this hearing, evidence can be adduced relating to: (1) the applicability of the Media Privilege to the information sought to be obtained by Dr. Jascalevich; (2) the existence of a waiver of that privilege; and (3) the relevance, materiality and necessity of the subpoenaed data to Jascalevich's defense. The latter inquiry will, of course, encompass a determination as to the existence of alternate sources of information. Since the Media Privilege Act prohibits even compelled in camera disclosure, such disclosure should not be ordered, as in Nixon, unless and until Jascalevich has made a threshold showing that the materials are relevant, material and necessary. The majority suggests that a hearing can be dispensed with, or that its outcome will be foreordained, in every case in which a reporter possesses considerable knowledge of [a criminal] case. See ante at 278. Such a conclusion nullifies the provisions of the Media Privilege Act. In effect, the majority has ruled that Shield Law protection will be withdrawn from reporters who perform their jobs competently  that is, those who gain considerable knowledge concerning a criminal case. A hearing as to relevance, materiality, and necessity must be conducted in all cases in which the privilege is invoked. Compelled in camera disclosure must be prohibited unless and until the defendant has met his threshold burden in accordance with the procedures to be discussed below. Those procedures  which will apply to all who may be similarly situated  should be as follows: (1) The person claiming the privilege should be required to make a prima facie showing that he is a newsperson and that he obtained the subpoenaed materials in the course of his newsgathering duties. This is subject to rebuttal by Dr. Jascalevich; Jascalevich may also show waiver of the privilege. (2) If the judge finds that the privilege is arguably applicable, then the burden should shift to Dr. Jascalevich to make a threshold showing (a) that the data are relevant, material and necessary to his defense and (b) that no less intrusive means of gaining the information are extant. This showing must demonstrate what the materials are expected to show with sufficient specificity to allow the trial judge to make an independent judgment thereon. Appellants Farber and the Times should then be given an opportunity to rebut Jascalevich's showing. If the judge finds that any or all of the requested data are irrelevant, unnecessary or immaterial, he must quash the subpoena as to such materials. (3) If the judge finds that Jascalevich has made a threshold showing with respect to any of the subpoenaed materials, he should order these materials  and only these materials  produced for in camera inspection. In order that appellants' rights be infringed to the least extent possible, appellants should be permitted to delete the names of informants and any other identificational indicia during this stage of the proceedings. (4) After the judge has inspected the material, he should make a determination as to whether any portion is relevant, material and necessary to Dr. Jascalevich's defense. He must also decide whether that material will probably be admissible at trial. United States v. Nixon, supra, 418 U.S. at 714, 94 S.Ct. 3090. If these criteria are satisfied, then that portion of the material should be released to Jascalevich. All other material must be returned to appellants. Counsel should have an opportunity to be heard. (5) Then judge must make findings of fact and conclusions of law at each stage of the proceedings. (6) Either party may seek leave to appeal the judge's decision as to in camera inspection or release of information after inspection. Throughout all stages of the proceeding, the judge should constantly keep in mind the strong presumption against disclosure of protected materials. All doubts concerning disclosure should be resolved in favor of non-disclosure. I am mindful that this inquiry will take place in the context of an ongoing murder trial and that delays are undesirable. Therefore, I do not expect that this hearing will be drawn out. The trial judge possesses sufficient powers to ensure that the hearing proceeds expeditiously. It must be emphasized that such a hearing is to be conducted only in cases in which a criminal defendant asserts that privileged data are necessary to his defense. In all other situations in which the News Media privilege is invoked, no constitutional concerns will exist. Hence, given the absolute nature of the statutory privilege, compelled disclosure is forbidden. No such hearing was held prior to the trial judge's order that the subpoenaed materials be produced for in camera inspection. The majority admits as much. See ante at 277. However, instead of remanding the cause, it invokes its original jurisdiction under R. 2:10-5 in a patchwork attempt to make findings of fact essential to its disposition of this controversy. In view of the importance of the questions presented and the state of the record below, this venture into the province of the trial judge is both unwarranted and unwise. An appellate court should rarely engage in original factfinding; its distance from the proceedings below makes factual judgments very difficult. It is not rational to expect that a Court so removed will adequately perform this function. When the issues are of constitutional magnitude, such an undertaking is especially undesirable. A decision whose impact will be felt by many persons in many places should not be the product of an incomplete record. Even were I to agree that original factfinding is appropriate, I could not sanction the manner in which the majority has found its facts. The trial judge's conclusions upon which the majority places so much reliance were not the product of a hearing below in which appellants were allowed to participate. Rather, these conclusions derive solely from the judge's examination of a handful of newspaper articles. See State v. Jascalevich, 158 N.J. Super. 488, 493 (Law Div. 1978). The further support upon which the majority bases its findings of fact, see ante at 278-281, does not even derive from the trial judge. Instead, the majority's findings are taken substantially verbatim from conclusory allegations contained in the statement of facts section of the brief for Dr. Jascalevich. This amalgam of post-hoc, ex parte, and newspaper article factfinding is not my idea of what a Shield Law hearing is all about.