Opinion ID: 2211727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Intent requirement for common-law arson

Text: We now turn to the mental state required for common-law arson. [3] Under the common law, the act of purposefully creating conditions that cause a dwelling to burn satisfies the elements of arson. The Court of Appeals majority posited that common-law arson requires proof of an intentional act of ignition on the implicit assumption that common-law arson is a specific intent crime. The Court of Appeals may have relied for that mistaken view on CJI2d 31.2(4). That instruction states that arson requires proof that the defendant intended to set a fire, knowing that this would cause injury or damage to another person or to property. A footnote to the instruction also refers to arson as a specific intent crime, without distinguishing various statutory offenses with specific intent components from common-law arson. CJI2d 31.2 does not accurately reflect Michigan law regarding common-law arson. No Michigan case has ever held that common-law arson is a specific intent crime. Accordingly, the cases cited in the commentary to CJI2d 31.2 in support of the specific intent instruction are inapposite for purposes of analyzing common-law arson. For example, in People v. McCarty, 303 Mich. 629, 6 N.W.2d 919 (1942), the defendant was convicted of the statutory offense of wilfully burning insured personal property with the intent to injure and defraud the insurer, 1931 PA 328, § 75, now codified at M.C.L. § 750.75; MSA 28.270. Obviously, the statutory language at issue in McCarty included a specific intent requirement. But McCarty never held that common-law arson is a specific intent crime. [T]he distinction between specific intent and general intent crimes is that the former involve a particular criminal intent beyond the act done, while the latter involve merely the intent to do the physical act. People v. Beaudin, 417 Mich. 570, 573-574, 339 N.W.2d 461 (1983). [4] Because virtually every reported Michigan case involves a statutory arson offense, see Reeves, supra, our cases do not discuss common-law arson. Const. 1963, art. 3, § 7 states: The common law and the statute laws now in force, not repugnant to this constitution, shall remain in force until they expire by their own limitations, or are changed, amended or repealed. Thus, to the extent that it is consistent with our state and federal constitutions and statutes, the common law has been adopted into our jurisprudence. In re Lamphere, 61 Mich. 105, 108, 27 N.W. 882 (1886); Lorman v. Benson, 8 Mich. 18 (1860); Stout v. Keyes, 2 Doug. 184 (Mich., 1845). Common-law arson is a general intent crime. [T]he enduring common law definition of the mental element of arson is that the burning be done maliciously and voluntarily. Poulos, The metamorphosis of the law of arson, 51 Mo. L.R. 295, 319 (1986). A malicious burning occurs when the defendant either intentionally or wantonly burns property without justification or excuse. Id., p. 403. Wanton arson required an intentional act which created a very high risk of burning a dwelling house, which risk was known by the actor and disregarded when the actor performed the risk taking act. Id., p. 408. [T]he word `willfully' adds nothing to the common law concept of malice .... Id., p. 404. The common law defines arson as the performance of any act resulting in the burning of a dwelling house that was done with malice. Perkins, Criminal Law (2d ed.), ch. 3, § 2, pp. 216-219. Common-law malice requires either: 1) an actual intent to commit the actus reus, or 2) an intent to act with a heedless disregard that the prohibited harm is a plain and strong likelihood. Id., ch. 7, § 4, pp. 766-768, and n. 25. Arson, in the common-law sense, usually results from a deliberate intent to burn the dwelling of another and without doubt this intent was at one time assumed to be an ingredient of the crime, which explains the use of the word voluntary or wilful, as mentioned above, in many of the definitions. Either word, however, lost all meaning in this definition when it became established that by fiction an intent to burn might be recognized in law when it did not exist in fact. Thus Lord Coke, writing in the early 1600's said that the law doth sometime imply, that the house was burnt maliciously and voluntarily, giving as an illustration the instance of a fire spreading and causing damage beyond that actually intended. It is not common-law arson for a dweller to burn his own dwelling, and this has given rise to the outstanding example of unintentional arson; for if such a fire obviously creates an unreasonable fire hazard for other nearby dwellings, and any of these is actually burned, common-law arson has been committed even if the wrongdoer did not actually intend the consequence and may have hoped it would not happen. An intentional act creating an obvious fire hazard to the dwelling of another, done without justification, excuse or mitigation, might well be characterized as wilful (a word of many meanings), and would certainly be malicious, but as the law has developed it is a mistake to assume that the phrase wilful and malicious, when found in the definition of common-law arson, adds some distinct requirement not included in the word malicious alone. [ Id., ch. 3, § 2, pp. 217-218.] 4 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 222 (1769), states that common-law arson requires a malicious burning. Blackstone stated: As to what shall be said a burning, so as to amount to arson: a bare intent, or attempt to do it, by actually setting fire to a house, unless it absolutely burns, does not fall within the description of incendit et combuffit; which were words necessary, in the days of law-latin, to all indictments of this sort. But the burning and consuming of any part is sufficient; though the fire be afterwards extinguished. Also it must be a malicious burning; otherwise it is only a trespass: and therefore no negligence or mischance amounts to it. [ Id. ] See also United States v. Acevedo-Velez, 17 MJ 1, 2-3 (1983). We have previously discussed the definition of malice in the context of murder. The malice required to prove murder requires either: 1) an intent to kill, 2) an intent to cause great bodily harm, or 3) wanton and wilful disregard that the natural tendency of the defendant's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm. People v. Aaron, 409 Mich. 672, 714, 299 N.W.2d 304 (1980). The same level of criminal culpability exists regardless whether a defendant wantonly and wilfully disregards the consequences of his actions or intends to cause the prohibited harm. Like murder, common-law arson is a crime against the person and manifests a contempt for human life. 3 Torcia, Wharton's Criminal Law (15th ed.), § 334, pp. 325-326, and n. 5, citing State v. McGowan, 20 Conn. 245 (1850). We thus treat arson no differently than murder for purposes of defining malice. Accordingly, the required mental state for arson is either: 1) an intent to burn the dwelling house of another, or 2) doing an act in circumstances where a plain and strong likelihood of such a burning exists. Perkins, supra, ch. 3, § 2, pp. 219-220. [5] Proof of common-law arson does not require a specific intent to cause injury to a particular person or damage to particular property. To establish that a defendant acted wilfully or maliciously and voluntarily, the prosecution must prove one of the following: 1) that the defendant intended to do the physical act constituting the actus reus of arson, i.e., starting a fire or doing an act that results in the starting of a fire (intentional arson); or 2) that the defendant intentionally committed an act that created a very high risk of burning a dwelling house, and that, while committing the act, the defendant knew of the risk and disregarded it (wanton arson). The first type of malice should not be confused with a specific intent requirement. The discussion in People v. Langworthy, 416 Mich. 630, 331 N.W.2d 171 (1982), of malice in the murder context provides a useful analogy. While the intent to kill and the intent to cause great bodily harm sound suspiciously akin to the traditional language of specific intent, Langworthy, p. 651, 331 N.W.2d 171, neither intent is a necessary element of second-degree murder. [A] wanton and willful disregard of the likelihood that the natural tendency of a person's behavior is to cause death or great bodily harm may also satisfy the malice requirement. Id., pp. 650-651, 331 N.W.2d 171. Similarly, while an intent to start a fire may sound like the language of specific intent, this intent is simply one possible means of proving malice in an arson case. Such an intent is not a necessary element of arson. The wilful and wanton commission of an act that creates a very high risk of burning a dwelling house is an alternative method of proving malice.