Opinion ID: 505524
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vessel Negligence v. Exclusive Remedy--Sec. 5(b) and The

Text: Principle of Equal Treatment 24 This case is complicated somewhat by an important and longstanding feature of the law of admiralty. Admiralty involves ships, and, in courts of admiralty, ships are treated as having an existence separate and apart from their owners. In admiralty one may generally sue the vessel owner, but one may always sue the vessel itself. 15 LHWCA 5(b), 33 U.S.C. Sec. 905(b), codifies this common law principle. 16 25 Vessels and vessel owners frequently employ their own longshoremen. When this is the case, the action against the vessel creates an alternative route for placing liability on the shoulders of the employer, and thereby seemingly conflicts with the principle of exclusive remedy. 26 The Supreme Court has conclusively determined, however, that when Congress enacted LHWCA Sec. 5(b) they intended to continue to treat vessels as third parties, even when the vessel is owned by the longshoreman's employer, or is the longshoreman's employer. In Jones & Laughlin, the Supreme Court noted that, Most longshoremen who load and unload ships are employed by independent stevedores, who have contracted with the vessel owners to provide such services. 462 U.S. at 528, 103 S.Ct. at 2546. Therefore, [I]n the typical tripartite situation, the longshoreman is not only guaranteed the statutory compensation from his employer; he may also recover tort damages if he can prove negligence by the vessel. Id. at 530, 103 S.Ct. at 2547. However, 27 The second sentence of Sec. 5(b) makes it clear that such a separate action is authorized against the vessel even when there is no independent stevedore and the longshoreman is employed directly by the vessel owner. That sentence provides: If such person was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If Sec. 5(a) had been intended to bar all negligence suits against owner-employers, there would have been no need to put an additional sentence in Sec. 5(b) barring suits against owner-employers for injuries caused by fellow servants. 28 Id. at 530-31, 103 S.Ct. at 2547 (emphasis added). 29 The legislative history demonstrates that the rationale for this decision was a desire that longshoremen employed by independent contractors and longshoremen employed directly by the vessel be treated equally. The House Report states that The Committee's intent is that the same principles should apply in determining liability of the vessel which employs its own longshoremen ... as apply when an independent contractor employs such persons. Id. (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 92-1441, pp. 7-8 (1972)). This principle of similar treatment for independent contractor employed longshoremen and vessel employed longshoremen was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 99 S.Ct. 2753, 61 L.Ed.2d 521 (1979). In Edmonds, the Court said that all longshoremen are to be treated the same whether their employer is an independent stevedore or a shipowner-stevedore and that all stevedores are to be treated the same whether they are independent or an arm of the shipowner itself. Id. at 266, 99 S.Ct. at 2759. We therefore seek to apply the law so as to avoid a liability structure that favors longshoremen employed by independent contractors over longshoremen employed by the vessel. 30