Opinion ID: 6330226
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Length of delay and reason for delay.

Text: Baker entered his guilty plea on November 4, 2019 and filed his first pro se motion to withdraw on December 13, 2019—39 days later. Our caselaw does not provide particularly strong guidance on the length of this delay. We have twice suggested that a 30-day delay weighs in the 7 Case No. 21-3159, United States v. Baker defendant’s favor. See United States v. McCoy, 155 F. App’x 199, 203 (6th Cir. 2005) (30-day delay weighed in defendant’s favor); United States v. Jannuzzi, No. 07-4521, 2009 WL 579331,  (6th Cir. Mar. 6, 2009) (slip opinion) (same). But we have also suggested that delays not too far outside of that time period weigh in the government’s favor. See United States v. Spencer, 836 F.2d 236, 239 (6th Cir. 1987) (36-day delay weighed in government’s favor); United States v. Jackson, 238 F. App’x 45, 48 (6th Cir. 2007) (40-day delay weighed in government’s favor). Nonetheless, the district court did not consider the length of delay in isolation. Instead, the court considered the 39-day delay in the context of Baker’s reason for failing to move for withdrawal earlier. Baker testified that he immediately regretted his plea and expressed a desire to withdraw to his mother, friend, and counsel within one or two days afterwards. His mother and counsel testified to the same. Baker complained that his attorney never filed a motion to withdraw. Counsel confirmed that he would not file a motion to withdraw given the fact that he represented Baker at the plea colloquy and affirmed the voluntariness of Baker’s plea at that colloquy. Based on these representations, the court determined that the first two factors weighed in favor of Baker. The government contends that the district court could not act on Baker’s intentions alone and Baker’s frequent pro se filings demonstrate that he could have filed sooner. However, a review of the record shows that the district court repeatedly admonished Baker for filing pro se motions while represented by counsel. In fact, the court initially struck the December 13 motion to withdraw because “[Baker] was still represented by counsel and hybrid representation is prohibited.” Under these circumstances, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in finding that the first two factors weighed in favor of Baker. However, our inquiry does not end here. “Regardless . . . of the weight given to the timeliness factor, a defendant must demonstrate that the remaining relevant factors viewed as a 8 Case No. 21-3159, United States v. Baker whole weigh in his favor to be entitled to relief.” United States v. Goodloe, 393 F. App’x 250, 254 (6th Cir. 2010).