Opinion ID: 1878419
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the evidence relating to the victim's alleged propensity for violence should have been admitted in this murder trial.

Text: ¶ 21. Jackson argues that the trial court erred by excluding evidence of the victim's alleged propensity for violence. Jackson attempted to call Charles Blackmon, Andre Randall, and Jimmy Boone to testify to specific acts involving the violent nature of the victim. Jackson argues that the testimony should have been admitted since he asserted a self-defense theory. ¶ 22. The trial court found that there has been no evidence at this time that the victim was in any way attempting to seek out the defendant in order to do him any serious bodily harm at the time thethe shooting may have occurred. The State argues that the trial court did not altogether preclude the testimony regarding the victim's violent nature but rather insisted that Jackson could not introduce evidence of specific acts until he presented evidence of self-defense. The State's interpretation of the ruling appears to be accurate. Jackson never raised the issue for consideration by the trial court thereafter. ¶ 23. An examination of M.R.E. 404(a)(2) and 405(a) is helpful in resolving this issue. Regarding Rules 404 and 405, this Court has stated: The general rule is that character evidence may not be admitted to prove action in conformity therewith. Rule 404, M.R.E. However, Rule 404(a)(2) specifically authorizes inquiry by a criminal defendant into a victim's character. This exception enables defendants to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor and that the defendant acted in self-defense. Comment, Rule 404, M.R.E. Once Rule 404 has been satisfied, character evidence in the form of opinion or reputation evidence is admissible without further restriction. Rule 405(a), M.R.E. However, when character evidence passes through Rule 404(a)(2), and is offered in the form of specific instances of conduct, it is admissible only on cross-examination. Rule 405(a).    However, specific instances of conduct in cases where character or the trait of character is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense ... are admissible whether on cross or direct examination. Rule 405(b). According to Heidel v. State, 587 So.2d 835 (Miss. 1991), past acts are admissible in cases where a defendant alleges self-defense, concluding that the character trait of violence was an essential element of the defense under 405(b).    Rule 405(b) allows specific instances of conduct to be admitted if its restriction is satisfied, without regard to whether it was first admissible under Rule 404. Rule 405(a) begins, In all cases in which evidence of character or a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by testimony as to reputation.... Hence, 405(a) is connected to 404; but, since 405(b) has no such qualifying clause, it admits evidence independently of Rule 404, even though the overlap may yield mirrored results. Newsom v. State, 629 So.2d 611, 613-14 (Miss.1993). ¶ 24. Jackson cites Newsom in support of his proposition that the testimony regarding the victim's propensity for violence should have been admitted. In Newsom the defendant claimed that he shot and killed the victim in self-defense. Id. at 612. A defense witness testified that he had seen the victim in a number of previous fights. Id. at 613. The trial judge excluded this testimony, and this Court held the judge in error for doing so. Id. at 613-14. However, this Court found the error harmless since the victim's violent nature was admitted through other testimony including that of the defendant. Id. at 614. A similar situation is presented in the case sub judice. ¶ 25. Assuming arguendo that Jackson has a legitimate claim of self defense, one finds that testimony regarding specific instances of the victim's violent nature should have been admitted in accordance with Rule 405(b). However, as was the case in Newsom, the trial court's error, if present, was harmless. ¶ 26. A denial of a substantial right of the defendant must have been affected by the [erroneous] evidentiary ruling before reversal is required. Id. [I]n this case, that right is the accused's right to a fair trial. Id. (citing Ponthieux v. State, 532 So.2d 1239, 1248 (Miss.1988); M.R.E. 103(a)). When the right to a fair trial is involved, reversal is required unless on the whole record, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hoover v. State, 552 So.2d 834, 840 (Miss.1989). ¶ 27. Examining the record as a whole, this Court finds that the alleged error by the trial court was harmless. Proof of the victim's violent nature was ultimately admitted. ¶ 28. Jackson testified regarding two previous occasions where the victim had threatened him with a gun. According to Jackson's testimony, the victim had a reputation in the community for bullying folks, and every time you see him, he's got a pistol in his pocket talking crazy. Jackson had never seen the victim pull a gun on anyone else. ¶ 29. Furthermore, Andre Randall and Charles Blackmon were allowed to testify as to the victim's reputation as to violence, though no specific instances were introduced. Randall testified that the victim wasn't that peaceful at all to me. He stated that the victim liked to keep a pistol and talk crazy. Charles Blackmon testified that the victim was not really a violent person. He never really did anything to me. As to the victim's reputation for peacefulness, Blackmon stated, Well, that could go both ways. Some people he helped, and some he didn't. ¶ 30. This evidence was presented to the jury. Testimony from Blackmon, Randall, and Boone regarding the victim's specific acts of violence would have added little to Jackson's case. Exclusion of such testimony was not reversible error. Therefore, we find no merit to this argument.