Opinion ID: 2208288
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: D.C.Code

Text: As already discussed, the right to a jury trial in a will contest must either be guaranteed under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or given by statute. D.C.Code § 20-305 (2001) provides the process for challenging the validity of a will and is the statute governing whether or not there is a statutory right to a jury trial in a will contest. Except as provided in section 20-353(b), any person may file a verified complaint to contest the validity of a will within 6 months following notice by publication of the appointment or reappointment of a personal representative under section 20-704. The person filing the complaint shall give notice to all interested parties. D.C.Code § 20-305 (2001). Appellant concedes that the current version of the Code is silent as to whether the determination of a will lies with the court or a jury. However, the appellant alleges that when examining the legislative history, it is clear that the D.C. Council intended to preserve the right to a jury trial in a will contest. As a threshold matter, we acknowledge the often stated axiom that `the words of [a] statute should be construed according to their ordinary sense and with the meaning commonly attributed to them.' E.R.B. v. J.H.F., 496 A.2d 607, 609 (1985) (quoting Davis v. United States, 397 A.2d 951, 956 (D.C.1979)). When the plain meaning of the statutory language is unambiguous, the intent of the legislature is clear, and judicial inquiry need go no further. District of Columbia v. Gallagher, 734 A.2d 1087, 1091 (D.C.1999). However, the literal meaning of a statute will not be followed when it produces absurd results and whenever possible, the words of a statute are to be construed to avoid obvious injustice. Peoples Drug Stores, Inc. v. District of Columbia, 470 A.2d 751, 754 (D.C.1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Since the statute's silence is not ambiguous and reading the statute as it is plainly written will not produce an absurd result or result in obvious injustice, we are constrained to read the statute as it is plainly written and need not examine the legislative history. As such, we can only conclude that there is no statutory right in the District of Columbia to a jury trial in a will contest. Accordingly, we must now determine whether such a right exists under the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution.