Opinion ID: 2589798
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Alleged Error in Admitting Defendant's Statement

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his August 12, 1989, statement to police because it was purportedly obtained and admitted at trial in violation of his right to remain silent, to the assistance of counsel, and to due process. On August 10, 1989, approximately 9:45 p.m., defendant was taken into custody. Approximately 11:00 p.m., after being advised of and waiving his Miranda rights, he was interrogated by Detectives Grant Raybould and Pat Ruffner. This interrogation, including breaks, lasted approximately four hours. Defendant made several inconsistent statements regarding his activities on August 9, the day of the murders. Defendant ultimately acknowledged he was at the house with Flores, and said he had hit Chandler with a baseball bat after Flores initiated a violent confrontation with Chandler. He also expressed a willingness to take a polygraph exam. Defendant does not challenge the admission of this statement. Detective Raybould testified at the hearing on defendant's motion to suppress his second statement made to police on August 12, 1989. According to Raybould, on August 12, 1989, approximately 10:10 a.m., he went to the county jail to give defendant a polygraph test. Defendant was brought from his cell and taken to the interview room. Raybould told defendant he was there to reinterview him and do the previously discussed polygraph exam. Defendant said an attorney had told him not to speak with anyone. Raybould told defendant he was not aware there was an attorney involved. Defendant said, No, that's okay. Just go ahead and advise me of the rights. Raybould had explained to defendant he would have to advise him of any rights prior to this interview and polygraph. Raybould told defendant he was not certain what his obligation was at that point, since an attorney had come over to visit him. Defendant told him he had not hired an attorney or signed any papers for an attorney; an attorney had come over and left a card with him. Raybould asked defendant if he wanted to consult with that attorney prior to any further questioning, and defendant said no. I had a tape recorder with me, and I asked him if we could put on tape the essence of the conversation we were having. He was reluctant to put it on tape. Raybould told him it was for everyone's benefit. During the taped portion of the interview, which began at 10:20 a.m., Raybould stated, When I came in here ... I came over and told you that I wanted to talk to you some more and that, that we may want to do a polygraph today and that I was going to admonish you of your rights. You told me that your lawyer told you not to talk to anyone. And I told you that I didn't know you had an attorney and that that sort of brought some new rules into what we were allowed to do. I told you that I, in my opinion, I didn't think that I would be able to interview you or do a polygraph if you had an attorney without me first going through that attorney. Tell me again about the attorney and whether he's representing you or what you consider his role to be at this point because I'm not real clear on that and I'd like to get that on tape. Defendant answered, He didn't, I didn't call him. My parents didn't call him. He came down the day after I was put into jail. He gave me his card and said `I'll be,' I mean `Get in touch with me or I'll be back in touch with you.' And that was pretty much it. I didn't sign any papers saying that he was my attorney or anything but he said, `Try not to talk to anyone that'll get you into any more trouble than you already are.' Or whatever, something like that. Raybould inquired, Okay. Let me just ask you, first of all, do you consider him to be your attorney, representing you? No. Not yet. No. Okay. Do you want me to admonish you of your rights Yes. [A]nd ask you questions that I'd like to clarify and also explain things Yes. [T]hat I've learned since I last talked to you? Yes. Do you want to do this without the presence of that attorney Yes. [0]r any other attorney? Yes. You don't have to do this, Chris. I know. I know. I want this to be free and voluntary on your part. Okay. Raybould then told defendant he was going to admonish him of his rights and that defendant could turn the tape recorder off whenever he wished. After giving defendant his Miranda rights, Raybould asked, Do you understand each of these rights that I have explained to you? Yes. Having in mind and understanding your rights as I have told you are you willing to talk with me? Yes. Raybould began to speak again, and defendant turned off the tape recorder. The interview continued untaped for more than an hour. Defendant at no time said he did not want to speak with Raybould. During the hearing on the motion to suppress, Raybould testified his purpose in asking defendant further questions about the attorney was that [i]t wasn't clear to me whether he was being represented or not. As a result of this questioning, it was clear to Raybould defendant was not invoking his right to have counsel present during questioning. Defendant also testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress. After initial pleasantries, Raybould said that he wanted to ask me some questions about my previous testimony to him. Defendant replied, I don't want to talk to you. Raybould asked, Why? [A]n attorney told me not to talk to anyone else. Three times defendant told Raybould he did not want to talk to him. When defense counsel inquired at the hearing why defendant had not mentioned on tape that on three occasions you had told Detective Raybould that you did not want to speak to him? defendant replied, I didn't think it mattered. The trial court found Raybould's version of events credible and denied the motion to suppress. In considering a claim that a statement or confession is inadmissible because it was obtained in violation of a defendant's rights under Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, the scope of our review is well established. `We must accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. [Citations.] However, we must independently determine from the undisputed facts, and those properly found by the trial court, whether the challenged statement was illegally obtained.' ( People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1033, 60 Cal. Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544.) We apply federal standards in reviewing defendant's claim that the challenged statements were elicited from him in violation of Miranda. (Ibid. ) Once a suspect receives Miranda warnings, he is free to exercise his own volition in deciding whether or not to make a statement to the authorities. ( Oregon v. Elstad (1985) 470 U.S. 298, 308, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222.) If he thereafter requests counsel, `the interrogation must cease until an attorney is present.' ( Edwards v. Arizona (1981) 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at p. 474, 86 S.Ct. 1602.) If a suspect's request for counsel or invocation of the right to remain silent is ambiguous, the police may continue talking with him for the limited purpose of clarifying whether he is waiving or invoking those rights. ( People v. Johnson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1, 27, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673; see Davis v. United States (1994) 512 U.S. 452, 461, 114 S.Ct. 2350, 129 L.Ed.2d 362 [police may seek to clarify suspect's ambiguous reference to counsel].) The state must demonstrate the voluntariness of a confession by a preponderance of the evidence. ( People v. Bradford, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 1033, 60 Cal.Rptr.2d 225, 929 P.2d 544; see Colorado v. Connelly (1986) 479 U.S. 157, 168, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473; Lego v. Twomey (1972) 404 U.S. 477, 489, 92 S.Ct. 619, 30 L.Ed.2d 618.) Here, the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and its evaluations of credibility are substantially supported by Officer Raybould's testimony and the taped portion of the interview. Accepting this version of events, as we must, defendant's statement to Raybould that either an attorney or his attorney had told him not to speak with anyone was ambiguous as to whether defendant was invoking either the right to remain silent or the right to counsel. As such, Raybould was justified in clarifying whether defendant was exercising these rights, and did so exhaustively. Defendant's motion to suppress was properly denied.