Opinion ID: 1795704
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 23

Heading: alleged erroneous rulings by trial court

Text: Related to Jackson's claim of prosecutorial misconduct is Jackson's postconviction request that the district court compel the State to produce (1) evidence the police might have found in the search of Hughes' jail cell and (2) records of Hughes' telephone calls and visitors while he was in the Douglas County Correctional Center. Jackson believes that this information may uncover evidence that Hughes called or was visited by the individual whom he hired to kill Thornton. If true, Jackson believes that such information might strengthen his claim of prosecutorial misconduct and ultimately lead to a new trial. [27] The State objected to Jackson's request on relevancy grounds, and the court overruled Jackson's motion. The trial court has broad discretion in granting discovery requests and errs only when it abuses its discretion. [44] Whether the court erred in denying Jackson's discovery request presents a more difficult issue than the propriety of the court's refusal to grant Jackson's request for a new trial. [28,29] We believe the information Jackson sought to discover is relevant. We stated in State v. Oliva [45] that evidence is relevant if it tends in any degree to alter the probability of a material fact. [46] In other words, relevancy requires only that the degree of probativeness be something more than nothing. [47] Evidence that Hughes may have been in contact with other individuals before Thornton was shot directly relates to the identity of the person he apparently hired to kill Thornton. Obviously, this is a material fact. Evidence that Hughes contacted other individuals makes it slightly more probable that one of those individuals was the shooter. More important, such evidence may well lead to other, more probative evidence. As such, this evidence is relevant. Nevertheless, a question exists as to whether Jackson can request this evidence. In State v. Thomas, [48] we questioned whether a defendant could request discovery in a postconviction motion. We stated that we knew of no precedent that permits a defendant, in a postconviction proceeding, to request additional discovery which would facilitate making that same postconviction claim. [49] This suggests that the Nebraska Postconviction Act merely gives a defendant the right to present evidence he already possesses. [50] If true, then Jackson's requests would be barred. But a procedural rule, which prevented prisoners from seeking any discovery at the postconviction stage, would make Nebraska unique among American jurisdictions. Numerous jurisdictions allow discovery requests at the postconviction stage so long as the request concerns relevant evidences [51] Other jurisdictions allow postconviction discovery more or less at the trial court's discretion. [52] A number of courts are more exacting and permit prisoners to seek discovery at the postconviction stage on a showing of good cause. [53] Montana and the federal government, by statute and rule, respectively, also require a showing of good cause for discovery at the postconviction stage. [54] [30,31] The Nebraska Postconviction Act looks unfavorably on any attempts to rehash issues at the postconviction stage which wereor could have beenraised and disposed of at trial or on direct appea1. [55] Thus, prisoners cannot seek discovery at the postconviction stage if the requested evidence could have been obtained at trial. But when a postconviction discovery request is for evidence that the defendant would not have known to request until after the trial, the postconviction stage is the prisoner's first opportunity to make such a request. Such a circumstance could exist when a prosecutor withheld evidence before trial that, although not exculpatory on its own, might have led to the defendant's discovery of exculpatory evidence. Perhaps there should be a limited exception to Thomas [56] for discovery requests concerning evidence which the prosecution withheld from the defendant at trial when there is a reasonable possibility that the requested evidence, if it exists, could have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Nevertheless, the district court properly overruled Jackson's discovery request even assuming such an exception to Thomas. The best that Jackson could hope for with his discovery request is evidence that Hughes had information for a different Mike who was known to do contract killings for Hughes. But even in this best-case scenario, such evidence would not be able to overcome the direct proofDNA evidence and eyewitness testimonylinking Jackson to these crimes. As such, Jackson's prosecutorial misconduct claim would not have undermined confidence in the outcome even if he obtained the evidence he sought from the prosecution. Therefore, while we might allow an exception to Thomas in the future, this is not the case.