Opinion ID: 755786
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Removal of the Hard Item in Swann's Sock was Within

Text: 21 the Legitimate Scope of the Terry Frisk 22 Swann's main contention is that because the officer who seized the credit cards did not himself believe the item in the sock to be a weapon, the seizure exceeded the permissible scope of a Terry frisk. Because [t]he sole justification of the search in [such a] situation is the protection of the police officer and others nearby, the frisk must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments for the assault of the police officer. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29, 88 S.Ct. 1868. An officer is not justified in conducting a general exploratory search for evidence under the guise of a stop-and-frisk. See Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 378, 113 S.Ct. 2130, 124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 65-66, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). 23 We begin the evaluation of the scope of the search by asking whether Officer Martin used the Terry frisk as an excuse to search for evidence, by continuing to search after having concluded that Swann was unarmed. Once an officer has patted down a suspect for weapons and determined that he is not armed, that officer exceeds the permissible scope of a Terry frisk if he continues to search the suspect. See Dickerson, 508 U.S. at 378-79, 113 S.Ct. 2130. 1 An officer's squeezing, sliding and otherwise manipulating the contents of [a] defendant's pocket, if the officer knows the pocket contains no weapon, is prohibited. Id. at 378, 113 S.Ct. 2130. Swann contends that Officer Martin violated this rule by removing the hard item he found in Swann's sock, despite the asserted fact that Officer Martin did not suspect that the item was a weapon. 24 The only evidence regarding Officer Martin's subjective belief comes from two colloquies, one on direct examination and one on cross-examination. The direct examination went as follows: 25 Q. What, if anything, did you find on Mr. Swann? 26 A. Okay. As I patted down, I got down to, I believe, his left sock, and I felt an object in his left sock. I thought that was kind of abnormal, and it felt kind of hard. 27 Q. What did it feel like? Can you describe it? 28 A. I couldn't tell you what it was, because it just, you know-- 29 Q. Not what it was. Could you tell us what it felt like? 30 A. It felt like a hard object. 31 Q. Could you identify it at that point? 32 A. No. The testimony on cross-examination was: 33 Q. Okay. Now, when you were patting him down, it did not feel like any kind of weapon that you knew of, did it? 34 A. I didn't know what it was at the time. 35 Although Swann perhaps exaggerates when he asserts that the officer did not suspect that the item was a weapon, it is true that there is no evidence in the record suggesting that the officer did suspect the item to be a weapon. Rather, the evidence is entirely ambiguous whether Martin suspected or did not suspect a weapon. The purpose of a frisk is to allow an officer to assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him. Terry, 392 U.S. at 23, 88 S.Ct. 1868. Because Officer Martin did not know what the hard object in Swann's sock was, he was not assured that it was not a weapon, and he removed it to find out. Dickerson's rule, that a frisk violates the Fourth Amendment if it continues after the officer has determined that the suspect is unarmed, is therefore not implicated. 36 Nevertheless our inquiry must go further. Having detected the presence of an unknown, potentially dangerous object on a suspect during a frisk, the test for whether an officer may search farther and seize the item is an objective one. Officer Martin need not himself have been absolutely certain that the individual [was] armed; the [only question] is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would [have been] warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 986 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868) (alteration in original). That is, would a reasonable officer in those circumstances have believed that the item could likely be a weapon? 37 In various contexts, the Fourth Circuit has stressed that the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard is an objective one. In United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726 (4th Cir.1993), we adopted a purely objective standard for evaluating whether an officer's allegedly pretextual traffic stop comported with the Fourth Amendment, id. at 730. Such a standard relies solely on the objective facts and circumstances surrounding the stop, and disregards the subjective motivations of the officer. Id. In Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863 (4th Cir.1988), we stated:The standard of reasonableness under the fourth amendment is wholly objective; the question is whether the officer's actions are objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him, without regard to his own subjective intent or motivation. Subjectively bad intentions on the part of the individual officer will not make a constitutional violation out of an otherwise reasonable seizure; nor will subjectively good intentions render an objectively unreasonable seizure constitutional. 38 Id. at 869 (citations omitted). 39 The Supreme Court has consistently evaluated officers' actions by an objective standard. In Terry v. Ohio, itself, the Supreme Court stressed that it is imperative that the facts be judged against an objective standard. 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868. More recently the court reaffirmed that the Fourth Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness' allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent of the acting officers. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). It should by now be perfectly clear that [w]hether a Fourth Amendment violation has occurred 'turns on an objective assessment of [Officer Martin's] actions in light of the facts and circumstances confronting him at the time,' and not on the officer's actual state of mind at the time the challenged action was taken. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S.Ct. 2778, 86 L.Ed.2d 370 (1985) (quoting Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 136, 98 S.Ct. 1717, 56 L.Ed.2d 168 (1978)) (citation omitted); see also, e.g., Scott, 436 U.S. at 138, 98 S.Ct. 1717 (We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that action.). Application of an objective standard is important because in administering the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment through the exclusionary rule, we establish the boundaries of security and privacy that individuals may rely upon in all cases, regardless of the subjective beliefs of any one particular officer. 40 In Swann's case, the seizure was proper because, even though Officer Martin may not actually have decided that the item was a weapon, a reasonable officer in his circumstances could justifiably have believed that item was a weapon. 2 Officer Martin was confronted with two nervous and edgy men who matched the descriptions of the thieves for whom he was looking. Upon being addressed by the officer, one of the men circled around him in a potentially threatening manner. After calling for backup, Officer Martin frisked the men and felt a hard rectangular object in Swann's sock. As the magistrate judge observed, the object in Swann's sock was approximately the same size and shape as a box cutter with a sharp blade, which is often used as a weapon. 41 The location of the object in the sock, as well as its hard character and its shape, made it suspicious. A similarly shaped hard object in Swann's pocket certainly would have raised no alarms, as there could be innumerable innocent explanations for it. And a hard rectangular object in one's sock might not be suspicious on a jogger or someone similarly dressed. But these men were both fully dressed, and Swann's pants had pockets that could have contained an item of that size and shape. 42 Given all the circumstances, it was objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that this particular hard object could likely be a weapon and to seize the item to satisfy himself that it was not something that could be used to inflict harm. Officers making Terry stops must make quick decision[s] as to how to protect [themselves] and others from possible danger. Terry, 392 U.S. at 28, 88 S.Ct. 1868; accord Stanfield, 109 F.3d at 983. Were we to disapprove of Officer Martin's actions, we would require an officer to allow a suspicious object to remain within easy reach of demonstrably nervous and potentially aggressive suspects. Our respect for the privacy rights of citizens does not require such an increase in the danger that police officers must face. The removal of the object from Swann's sock was properly within the scope of the Terry stop-and-frisk. 43 Although the district court focused on the subjective beliefs of Officer Martin, we may affirm the district court's judgment for any reason supported by the record, even if it is not the basis that the district court used. See Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1315 (4th Cir.1996) (en banc ). Having reached the conclusion that the seizure of the item from Swann's sock was proper, we do not resolve whether the inevitable discovery doctrine should be so extended as to lead to the same result, a holding about which we have grave doubts. 44 The judgment of the district judge accordingly is 45 AFFIRMED.