Opinion ID: 612996
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Standard of Review for a Motion to Dismiss

Text: We review de novo the dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a claim. Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir.2007). The Supreme Court recently clarified the standard for granting a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) in Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Prior to these cases, courts followed the axiom that dismissal is only appropriate where it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). Observing that this language has been questioned, criticized, and explained away long enough, the Court concluded the Conley formulation has earned its retirement. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 562, 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955. In its place, the Court articulated a new, further refined standard: to withstand a motion to dismiss, a complaint must have enough allegations of fact, taken as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. The Court has explained that two working principles underlie this standard. First, the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949. Thus, mere labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice; a plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. And second, only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950. In other words, a plaintiff must offer sufficient factual allegations to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will... be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Thus, in ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court should disregard all conclusory statements of law and consider whether the remaining specific factual allegations, if assumed to be true, plausibly suggest the defendant is liable. For example, in Twombly, the Supreme Court found the plaintiffs' allegation of parallel conduct between two companies did not plausibly suggest a conspiracy in restraint of trade, because this behavior was as likely to have been the result of legal, unilateral action as the product of illicit collusion. 550 U.S. at 566, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ([T]here is no reason to infer that the companies had agreed among themselves to do what was only natural anyway.). Since the plaintiffs failed to make specific factual allegations plausibly suggesting an agreement between the two companies, the complaint failed to state an antitrust claim. Similarly, in Iqbal, the allegation that the FBI disproportionately detained Arab Muslim men as part of its investigation of the events of September 11, 2001 was consistent with the claim of invidious discrimination. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. But the allegation did not plausibly establish a wrongful purpose, as the disparate impact could equally be explained by a legitimate policy of seeking out individuals with a connection to the known perpetrators, who belonged to an Islamic fundamentalist group. Id. This pleading requirement serves two purposes: to ensure that a defendant is placed on notice of his or her alleged misconduct sufficient to prepare an appropriate defense, and to avoid ginning up the costly machinery associated with our civil discovery regime on the basis of `a largely groundless claim.' Pace v. Swerdlow, 519 F.3d 1067, 1076 (10th Cir.2008) (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Since these decisions, courts have struggled to apply the new pleading standard consistently. The primary source of confusion has been the meaning of the term plausibility. According to the Supreme Court, the plausibility standard ... asks for more than a sheer possibility of unlawful conduct: A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quotations omitted). Applying this standard, we have stated that plausibility refers to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs `have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.' Robbins v. Okla. ex rel. Dep't of Human Servs., 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The nature and specificity of the allegations required to state a plausible claim will vary based on context. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1104 (10th Cir.2009) (addressing an Eighth Amendment conspiracy); Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1185 (10th Cir.2010) (resolving a prisoner complaint). The Twombly standard may have greater bite in the context of a § 1983 claim against individual government actors, because they typically include complex claims against multiple defendants. Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1249. [I]t is particularly important in such circumstances that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him or her, as distinguished from collective allegations against the state. Id. at 1250. With these pleading standards in mind, we turn to Kansas Penn's complaint of an equal protection claim.