Opinion ID: 169770
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Scope of the allegations raised in the EEOC charge

Text: The next step in determining whether a plaintiff has exhausted her administrative remedies is to determine the scope of the allegations raised in the EEOC charge because [a] plaintiff's claim in federal court is generally limited by the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination submitted to the EEOC. MacKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1274; see also Jones v. Sumser Ret. Vill., 209 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir.2000) ([T]he facts alleged in the charge must be sufficiently related to the claim such that those facts would prompt an investigation of the claim.). We liberally construe charges filed with the EEOC in determining whether administrative remedies have been exhausted as to a particular claim. See MacKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1274 (construing liberally a plaintiff's charge of discrimination based on the ADA); Foster v. Ruhrpumpen, Inc., 365 F.3d 1191, 1195 (10th Cir.2004) (noting that we liberally construe charges based on the ADEA). We emphasize, however, that our inquiry is limited to the scope of the administrative investigation that can reasonably be expected to follow from the discriminatory acts alleged in the administrative charge. In other words, the charge must contain facts concerning the discriminatory and retaliatory actions underlying each claim; this follows from the rule that each discrete incident of alleged discrimination or retaliation constitutes its own `unlawful employment practice' for which administrative remedies must be exhausted. Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1210 (10th Cir.2003) (quoting Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 L.Ed.2d 106 (2002)). Hence, any adverse employment actions occurring after Mr. Jones submitted his administrative charge on February 27, 2004, would not fall within the scope of his charge. But, as we explain below, his charge contains facts concerning allegedly retaliatory and discriminatory acts that occurred before he submitted his charge. Specifically, the charge contains facts underlying his claims that UPS discriminated and retaliated against him by not returning him to work after two doctors released him to return to work in February 2004. UPS contends, however, that Mr. Jones's charge cannot fairly be read to raise allegations of discrimination on the basis of disability. As support, UPS notes that Mr. Jones checked boxes on page two of the questionnaire indicating he was discriminated against on the basis of his race, color, and age, but he did not check the box for disability. The failure to mark a particular box creates a presumption that the charging party is not asserting claims represented by that box. See Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir.1998). The presumption may be rebutted, however, if the text of the charge clearly sets forth the basis of the claim. Id. UPS asserts that the text of Mr. Jones's charge does not support a disability claim, noting in particular that Mr. Jones did not mention disability in his response to the question: Why do you feel that the personnel action or other discrimination you have experienced was because of your ... disability? Instead, he simply wrote: Because of the way everything happened. We disagree with UPS's reading of the charge. Although Mr. Jones did not check the box on page two indicating disability as a basis for the alleged discrimination, he did check the box for disability on page three in response to the question: Are you aware of statements made by management officials showing prejudice toward you for any of the following reasons[?] In addition, the instructions at the bottom of page three directed Mr. Jones to complete Section C of the questionnaire if he believed that he was not hired because of a disability, and Mr. Jones filled out Section C. Furthermore, in the narrative portion of the form, Mr. Jones described the discriminatory conduct as follows: Injured on 10/6/03. On 12-4/-3 Dr. Stechschulte placed permanent restriction on me, On 2-3-04 Dr. Michael J. Poppa release[d] me to return to full duty, On 2-9-04 Dr. Legler release[d] me to return to full duty. After UPS contacted Dr. Legler, Dr. Legler changed restriction on 2/9/04. The charge therefore contains allegations that UPS interfered with a medical evaluation in order to ensure Mr. Jones was not released to return to full-duty work. We agree with the District Court that these allegations should have triggered an inquiry into whether UPS viewed Mr. Jones as disabled. In other words, an investigation into whether UPS did not return Mr. Jones to work because it regarded him as disabled can reasonably be expected to follow the charge. MacKenzie, 414 F.3d at 1274. Mr. Jones's claim of disability discrimination is therefore within the scope of the charge. Likewise, we agree with the District Court's conclusion that Mr. Jones exhausted his retaliation claim before the EEOC. Although Mr. Jones did not check the box for retaliation on page two of the questionnaire, he did check the box for retaliation as a basis for discrimination on page three of the questionnaire. Furthermore, as noted above, the text of the charge describes the conduct underlying Mr. Jones's claim that UPS did not return him to work because it regarded him as disabled. His retaliation claim is based on these facts as well. He claims that UPS acted with a retaliatory, as well as a discriminatory, motive when it did not permit him to return to work despite releases from two doctors. The facts contained in the charge therefore describe the conduct underlying both his discrimination and his retaliation claims. Thus, given the factual allegations contained in the charge and the fact that Mr. Jones checked a box for retaliation, an administrative investigation of Mr. Jones's retaliation claim can reasonably be expected to follow the charge of discrimination. Id. We do not agree, however, with the District Court's conclusion that Mr. Jones's failure-to-accommodate claim is within the scope of his administrative charge. Mr. Jones checked no in response to the question: Did you advise your employer that you needed an accommodation? Moreover, the text of the charge does not contain facts that would prompt an investigation of Mr. Jones's claim that UPS failed to accommodate him. Indeed, facts related to the alleged act of discriminationUPS's failure to consider accommodating his perceived disability are absent from the charge. Because an investigation into whether UPS failed to accommodate Mr. Jones cannot reasonably be expected to follow the charge, id., he has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies with respect to this claim. In addition, we do not agree with the District Court's decision that Mr. Jones's theory of pattern-or-practice discrimination is barred by his failure to raise a pattern-or-practice claim or allege facts supporting such a claim in his administrative charge. Mr. Jones seeks to introduce evidence that UPS routinely applies a 100%-healed policy, that is, a policy preventing an injured employee from returning to work unless the employee fully recovers from the injury. The District Court assumed that, in offering this evidence, Mr. Jones was asserting a pattern-or-practice claim, a particular kind of discrimination claim alleging an employer engaged in systemic discrimination against a protected class. See Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 359-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977) (discussing method of proof applicable to pattern-or-practice cases brought by the government or a class of plaintiffs). In concluding that Mr. Jones had not exhausted his administrative remedies for a pattern-or-practice claim, the District Court noted that Mr. Jones did not raise the claim or mention the 100%-healed policy in his administrative charge. If Mr. Jones were in fact raising such a claim, we might agree that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. [5] Pattern-or-practice claims utilize a different method of proof from the method applied to claims of individualized discrimination. See Thiessen v. Gen. Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095, 1106 (10th Cir.2001) ([T]he order and allocation of proof, as well as the overall nature of the trial proceedings, in a pattern-or-practice case differ dramatically from a case involving only individual claims of discrimination.). The initial inquiry in a pattern-or-practice case is whether unlawful discrimination is part of the employer's standard operating procedure, whereas the focus in a case of individualized discrimination is on the reason(s) for the particular employment decisions at issue. Id. at 1105-06. Here, however, we need not decide whether a pattern-or-practice claim is outside the scope of the charge because the record supports Mr. Jones's contention that he seeks to introduce evidence of UPS's allegedly discriminatory policy as proof that UPS was motivated by a discriminatory and retaliatory intent when it refused to return him to work. In other words, he attempts to prove his claim of individualized disability discrimination by proving that UPS routinely applies a 100%-healed policy that discriminates against disabled individuals. Evidence of such a policy is potentially relevant not only to the allegedly unlawful motivation behind UPS's refusal to return Mr. Jones to work, but also to a determination of whether UPS regarded him as disabled. See Henderson v. Ardco, Inc., 247 F.3d 645, 653 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that evidence of an employer's 100%-healed policy was relevant to the issue of perceived disability at the summary judgment stage). Although the evidence Mr. Jones asserts as proof of this discriminatory policy is not direct evidence, [6] he may offer circumstantial evidence to prove his claim under the burden-shifting framework commonly used to analyze individual claims of discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973) (noting that evidence of an employer's general policy and practice may be relevant circumstantial evidence of the discriminatory intent behind an individual employment decision); see also Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1227 n. 2 (10th Cir.2006) (noting that we have allowed evidence of a pattern and practice in individual cases of discrimination as circumstantial evidence of a defendant's discriminatory animus), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S.Ct. 2937, 168 L.Ed.2d 261 (2007). We therefore reverse the District Court's grant of summary judgment in UPS's favor to the extent it excluded from consideration Mr. Jones's theory of discrimination based on UPS's allegedly discriminatory policy. Because Mr. Jones's claim of disability discrimination is within the scope of the charge, his specific theory of discriminationthat UPS discriminated against him pursuant to its own employment policyis also within the scope of the charge. We emphasize, however, that, in holding that this theory is within the scope of the charge, we express no opinion regarding the admissibility of any particular evidence. [7]