Opinion ID: 2982191
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Brady and its progeny

Text: In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment . . . .” 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963). Under Brady, a defendant must show “(1) suppression by the prosecution after a request by the defense, (2) the evidence’s favorable character for the defense, and (3) the materiality of the evidence.” Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794 (1972). Brady imposes a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence “even though there has been no request by the accused.” Stickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 280 (1999) (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 107 (1976)). Impeachment evidence is also encompassed within the Brady rule because a jury’s reliance on the credibility of a witness can be decisive in determining the guilt or innocence of the accused. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). A defendant’s right to exculpatory evidence must, however, be reconciled with the “longestablished policy that maintains the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings in federal courts.” Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 869 (1966). Grand jury proceedings, though traditionally cloaked in secrecy, can be used to impeach a witness’s testimony. Id. at 869. Trial courts can reveal - 23 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda grand jury testimony, or relevant portions thereof, if a defendant shows a “particularized need” to impeach a witness, to refresh his recollection, or to test his credibility. Id. at 870. Applying Brady and Dennis, we find no violation of clearly established Supreme Court precedent. Ross argues that he is entitled to the grand jury testimony to show inconsistencies in the victims’ trial testimony. Speculating that the grand jury testimony contained impeachment evidence, he claims that not divulging the transcripts prejudiced the outcome of his trial. His suspicions were aroused when the bill of particulars included accusations of anal penetration or attempted anal penetration. From here, Ross leaps to the conclusion that the bill of particulars is “only explicable” if the victims testified about anal sex before the grand jury. If such accusations were made before the grand jury, Ross argues that it was “manifestly unfair” to prevent him from using the testimony to cross-examine the victims. Ross’s conclusion is flawed. The bill of particulars states that Ross engaged in sexual behavior that “include[d], but was not limited to, oral sex being performed on the victim, the victim performing oral sex on the defendant and/or anal sex performed on the victim.” This wording, according to the state court, suggested that anal sex was “a possible form of sexual conduct.” But the evidence adduced at trial did not establish this offense, nor did the trial court instruct the jury on anal rape. As the court of appeals accurately observed, because the probability that anal rape had been mentioned in the grand jury was slim, Ross did not demonstrate a particularized need for disclosure and was not deprived of a fair trial. - 24 - No. 11-3454 Ross v. Pineda