Opinion ID: 181436
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fourth Continuance (March 11, 2008, to May 13, 2008)

Text: On March 5, 2008, the district court granted Mr. Larson's motion to continue his March 11, 2008, trial date and continued his trial until May 13, 2008. Aplt.App. at 45-46 (Dist. Ct. Order, dated Mar. 5, 2008). The district court noted that defense counsel had stated that he required additional time to prepare for trial and that defense counsel ha[d] recently been appointed to two capital cases which have required immediate and substantial work. Id. at 45. The court consequently found that [t]he ends of justice required by the granting of a continuance of the case outweigh the best interest of the public and the Defendant in a speedy trial and ordered that the period of the continuance is excluded from the Speedy Trial Act time requirements for reasons consistent with the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)[7]. Id. at 45-46. We conclude, however, that the district court's findings are insufficient to exclude this period of time in the ends of justice; thus, the delay resulting from this continuance must be counted under the Speedy Trial Act. See Zedner, 547 U.S. at 508, 126 S.Ct. 1976. The district court failed to discuss how much time defense counsel needed to prepare for trial and what preparations he had already made. Without this information, the district court could not adequately determine whether denying the continuance would deprive defense counsel of the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of due diligence,  18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(B)(iv) (emphasis added), let alone whether the purported reasons for granting the continuance outweighed the best interests of the public and [Mr. Larson] in a speedy trial. Gonzales, 137 F.3d at 1435. Simply identifying an event, and adding the conclusory statement that the event requires more time for counsel to prepare, is not enough. Toombs, 574 F.3d at 1271-72.