Opinion ID: 658545
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Restrictions on Defendants' Cross-Examinations

Text: 67 In addition, defendants contend that the trial court violated their Sixth Amendment confrontation rights and deprived them of a fair trial by limiting their cross-examinations of certain witnesses. Most of the rulings complained of were correct, and though a few were erroneous, we find no basis for reversal. 68 The trial judge has 'wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on ... cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, ... interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.'  United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d 934, 956 (2d Cir.1990) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1435, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986)), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2811, 115 L.Ed.2d 984 (1991). The scope and extent of cross-examination are generally within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the decision to restrict cross-examination will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Caming, 968 F.2d 232, 237 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 416, 121 L.Ed.2d 339 (1992); United States v. Maldonado-Rivera, 922 F.2d at 956; United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 195 (2d Cir.1984). Cross-examination is not improperly curtailed if the jury is in possession of facts sufficient to make a 'discriminating appraisal' of the particular witness's credibility. United States v. Roldan-Zapata, 916 F.2d at 806 (quoting United States v. Singh, 628 F.2d 758, 763 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1034, 101 S.Ct. 609, 66 L.Ed.2d 496 (1980)). Even if we conclude that the trial judge has improperly curtailed cross-examination in violation of the defendant's confrontation rights, we are not to reverse automatically but are to apply harmless-error analysis, in order to determine whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the cross-examination were fully realized, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 684, 106 S.Ct. at 1437. That is, we should not reverse if we conclude that the error was unimportant in relation to everything else the jury considered on the issue in question. Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, ----, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1893 (1991). 69 Most of the rulings of which defendants complain were not erroneous. For example, the court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence proffered as showing inconsistencies in testimony that was not inconsistent, or in barring the impeachment of a witness with his supposed inability to identify Organization spots from photographs during the Concepcion trial, when the photographs with identification numbers from the Concepcion trial were not available, thereby creating the likelihood of confusion. Nor was it an abuse of discretion to exclude evidence of certain types of acts such as rape and burglary as having an insufficient bearing on the witness's credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 578 F.2d 910, 912 (2d Cir.1978) (unlawful sex acts); United States v. Hawley, 554 F.2d 50, 53 n. 7 (2d Cir.1977) (attempted burglary). For example, with respect to the testimony of Jerson Ramos that he had managed Organization spots in East New York and had worked with Rosa following Melendez's arrest, it was not error to prevent Rosa from introducing evidence that Ramos had engaged in burglaries, for which he had never been arrested, on the theory that this was inconsistent with his testimony. As to crimes for which witnesses had been arrested, defendants were adequately allowed to bring out the witnesses' expectations of favorable treatment in exchange for their testimony. 70 We also reject the contention that the trial court erred when it barred the questioning of cooperating witnesses as to what effect the Guidelines would have on their sentences. The court permitted cross-examination of those witnesses as to their plea agreements, the statutory maximum sentences they faced, and the benefits they hoped to gain from cooperation. The court was well within its discretion in ruling that the vagaries of Guidelines calculations were not a proper subject for cross-examination. 71 We agree with defendants, however, that there were some errors. For example, Detective Peitler testified that an Organization runner identified in a November 1988 surveillance report as John Doe # 1 was in fact Lopez; another agent described an encounter with Lopez in May 1989, with respect to which the agent had filed a report referring to Lopez by name. Lopez sought to cast doubt on the testimony that he was the runner designated John Doe # 1 by recalling the second agent as a witness and offering, pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(8), the police report prepared by that witness. He sought to show that in the first report, Peitler referred to the observed runner only as John Doe # 1 even though Peitler had previously seen a photograph of Lopez; and that in the later report, Lopez was referred to by name without any indication that he had previously been identified as John Doe # 1. The trial court would not allow the reports to be introduced, stating, this is your witness. You put him on direct examination. The government didn't put him on. You put him on. You are bound by his testimony. (Tr. 4382; see also id. 4415 (You cannot put somebody on the witness stand and not get the answer you like and then take him upon his reports and try to impeach him.).) 72 These rulings were erroneous. Rule 607 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness. In certain other instances, the court may have erred in not allowing defendants, in cross-examining government agents as to various events they testified they had observed, to introduce written reports by the agents that did not mention those events. 73 Nonetheless, we cannot conclude that any of these exclusions constituted reversible error, for in all instances the defendants were given adequate leeway to bring out sufficient information to permit the jury to make an accurate assessment of the witnesses' credibility. For example, in cross-examining Peitler, Lopez elicited Peitler's inability at the time of his report to identify John Doe # 1 as Lopez notwithstanding having seen a picture of Lopez previously. In addition, Lopez extensively cross-examined several other agents on differences between their descriptions of John Doe # 1 and Lopez's appearance. In another instance in which the witness's report was excluded from evidence, defendants were allowed to elicit an oral admission that that report did not mention the event in question. In other instances, challenged testimony was so strongly corroborated by other officers participating in the same surveillance who testified to the same observation, that it was highly unlikely that the jury would have drawn any adverse inference from the absence of mention of the event in the first agent's written report. We are convinced that the admission of the excluded reports would not have affected the jury's verdict. 74 In sum, we are unable to conclude that any errors in the trial court's evidentiary rulings, either singly or in combination, had any effect on the outcome of the trial. 75