Opinion ID: 159292
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 10 This court cannot exercise jurisdiction absent a timely notice of appeal. United States v. Smith, 182 F.3d 733, 734 (10th Cir. 1999). The deadline for filing a notice of appeal in a civil case expires 30 days after the judgment or order appealed from is entered. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A) (setting out the general rule and cross-referencing certain exceptions not applicable here). The three required elements of notice are: (a) a specification of the party or parties taking the appeal; (b) a designation of the judgment, order, or part thereof being appealed; and (c) the name of the court to which the appeal is taken. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(1). An appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal. Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4). 11 The Supreme Court has interpreted these rules, taken together, to mean that notice of appeal requirements should be liberally construed. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992). In that case, the appellant, who was a state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a brief within the time limits of Rule 4, but not a separate notice of appeal. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dismissed his appeal for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for a determination of whether the brief was the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. Id. at 250. The Court explained that the purpose of a notice of appeal is to ensure that the filing provides sufficient notice to other parties and the courts. Id. at 248. Therefore, the notice afforded by a document, not the litigant's motivation in filing it, determines the document's sufficiency as a notice of appeal. Id. at 248. A document filed within the time specified by Rule 4 [which] gives the notice required by Rule 3 . . . is effective as a notice of appeal. Id. at 249. 12 Applying the Smith v. Barry standard in habeas cases, this court has often permitted an application for a certificate of probable cause or a certificate of appealability to serve as a notice of appeal. See Ray v. Cowley, 975 F.2d 1478, 1479 (10th Cir. 1992); Knox v. Wyoming, 959 F.2d 866, 867-68 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Williamson, No. 99-3120, 1999 WL 1083750, , n.2 (10th Cir. Dec. 2, 1999) (unpublished); United States v. Gonzalez, No. 98-3106, 1998 WL 847638,  (10th Cir. Dec. 8, 1998) (unpublished). Generally, the application identif[ies] the parties to the appeal and the district court order appealed from, and consequently meets the requirements of Rule 3(c). Knox, 959 F.2d at 867. 3 13 The appellants in these previous cases were proceeding pro se. In recognition of their pro se status, this court noted that a literal reliance on the title of the document [would be] inconsistent with the liberal construction afforded to pro se papers and would permit the district court to arbitrarily deny appellate jurisdiction that is otherwise proper under the rules announced in Smith [v. Barry] and Knox. Ray, 975 F.2d at 1479. 14 The principles outlined in Smith v. Barry, however, are not confined to the filings of pro se appellants. In analyzing the issue, the Court did not remark upon the appellant's pro se status or cite to the well-established body of case law providing for a liberal view of papers filed by pro se litigants, see, e.g., Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972). Instead, it looked to its long-established practice of liberally construing court rules. See Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. at 248 (quoting Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co, 487 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) for the proposition that a filing 'technically at variance with the letter of [Rule 3],' may satisfy the rule if it is 'the functional equivalent of what the rule requires'); see also Torres, 487 U.S. at 316 (noting that 'mere technicalities' should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits) (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 181 (1962)). 15 Other circuit courts of appeal have not hesitated to construe a counseled application for certificate of probable cause as a notice of appeal. See Ortberg v. Moody, 961 F.2d 135, 137 (9th Cir. 1992) (determining that either a counseled or pro se request for a certificate of probable cause can serve double duty as notice of appeal). The Seventh Circuit has explicitly stated that whether a petitioner has a lawyer does not make[] a difference. Bell v. Mizell, 931 F.2d 444, 445 (7th Cir. 1991). Although that court did not condone the failure of [petitioner's] attorney to file a formal notice of appeal in timely fashion--and trust[ed] there will be no repetition of the oversight by members of the bar, it determined that the omission did not deprive [petitioner] of his appellate rights. Id.; see also Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int'l, Inc., 6 F.3d 614, 617-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (analyzing filings under Smith v. Barry in counseled civil case); Kotler v. American Tobacco Co., 981 F.2d 7, 11 (1st Cir. 1992) (same). 4 16 We conclude that, for notice of appeal requirements, the filings of counseled habeas petitioners should be given the same liberal construction as those of pro se petitioners. A document, such as an application for a certificate of probable cause or certificate of appealability, is the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal if it contains the three elements of notice required by Rule 3(c). If such a document is timely filed under Rule 4, the jurisdiction of this court is properly invoked. 17 Here, it is uncontested that Rodgers' designated notice of appeal was filed thirteen days late. His motion for a certificate of probable cause and motion for a certificate of appealability, however, was filed within thirty days of the order denying his habeas petition and contained the required elements of notice. This court has jurisdiction to review the merits of appeal number 98-8111.