Opinion ID: 1524402
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: designation and interchange of trial judges

Text: We begin our analysis of the authority of the trial judge to render judgment in this case by an examination of the legislative statutes which grant judges the authority to act. Interchange of trial judges is authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated, § 17-2-201, which provides that circuit judges may interchange with each other or with judges of special courts for one or more courts,... when causes exist making an interchange necessary, or for mutual convenience; and, in the absence of the judge of any circuit, his death, or inability to hold court, any circuit judge may hold court in his stead. Such interchange may be for the entire circuit, a single term, a part thereof, or for a special case. Elms v. State, 29 Tenn. 128 (1849). There is no requirement that application be made to the Chief Justice for assignment of a judge to a particular case. State ex rel. Stall v. City of Knoxville, 211 Tenn. 271, 364 S.W.2d 898 (1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 914, 83 S.Ct. 728, 9 L.Ed.2d 721 (1963). The judge interchanging has the same power and jurisdiction as the judge he or she replaced. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-2-206. Designation of special trial judges is authorized by Tennessee Code Annotated, §§ 17-2-109 and -110, which provide for appointment of special judges by the Chief Justice to relieve delay in the disposition of litigation, or upon the certification of a trial judge of his or her inability to try a case. Tennessee Code Ann. § 17-2-109(c) provides that [n]othing herein shall be construed to interfere with the appointment of special chancellors or judges as provided elsewhere by statute. (Emphasis added.) Tennessee Code Annotated, § 17-2-101, provides that even where a trial judge is otherwise incompetent, that trial judge may preside by consent of all parties. An objection to a judge's competence cannot be made for the first time on appeal; the objection should come before trial is had on the merits. See Rowe v. Greer, 32 Tenn. 172 (1852); Hilton v. Miller & Co., 73 Tenn. 395 (1880); Obion County ex rel. Houser Creek Drainage District v. Coulter, 153 Tenn. 469, 284 S.W. 372 (1926). Moreover, Tenn. Code Ann. § 16-2-502 provides that any judge or chancellor may exercise by interchange, appointment, or designation the jurisdiction of any trial court other than that to which such judge or chancellor was elected or appointed. We conclude that both Judge Goodall and Judge Loser had concurrent authority, by interchange and designation respectively, to preside over this case. Judge Goodall's earlier exercise of that authority, without objection by either party, was valid under the interchange statute. Therefore, we hold that the defendant's appearance in Judge Goodall's court without objection was a waiver of the defendant's right to challenge Judge Goodall's authority. For these reasons, that portion of the Court of Appeals' order dismissing the appeal and remanding is reversed. Typically at this point, we would remand to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the plaintiff's appeal on the merits. In this case, however, the Eastern Section of the Court of Appeals has already concluded that the tort of alienation of affections should be abolished, but that as an intermediate appellate court it was without the power to do so. See Lentz v. Baker, 792 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. App. 1989). The Court of Appeals urged the Legislature and this Court to abolish the torts. [1] Under these peculiar circumstances and for reasons of judicial economy, we find that a remand to the Court of Appeals would be inappropriate. Therefore, we exercise our discretion pursuant to Tenn.R.App.P. 13(a), to consider the viability of alienation of affections actions in Tennessee.