Opinion ID: 394820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: elements of the prima facie case under title vii

Text: 22 We do not understand appellant to contend in this appeal that he asserted a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas standard. Rather, appellant argues that he stated a cause of action for unlawful reprisal, cognizable under a different standard, on which he was entitled to a decision, and to some form of relief, from the District Court. 48 We believe that appellant did state a cause of action under Title VII, the validity of which was implicitly recognized by both the administrative agency and the District Court in their conclusions that Smith was entitled to the remedy of having any legally wrongful records destroyed. Accordingly, we conclude that Smith must be considered a prevailing party eligible for attorney's fees under the statute. As we shall explain, we believe that this decision is mandated by the plain language of Title VII and that it is fully consistent with the Supreme Court decision in McDonnell Douglas.
23 The District Court apparently interpreted the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell Douglas as stating necessary conditions for establishment of a prima facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII. The court seems to have accepted the conclusion that appellant's supervisor, Bednar, had issued reports reflect(ing) an improper consideration of appellant's EEO duties. 49 Nonetheless, while recognizing the wrong, for which destruction of the appraisals (was) the appropriate remedy, 50 the court considered itself bound to hold that not even a prima facie case had been stated under Title VII, because the record indicates that even if his supervisory appraisals were free from improper consideration of his EEO activities, plaintiff would not have been among the best qualified for the positions sought. 51 24 We believe the District Court misconstrued McDonnell Douglas. Read in isolation certain portions of that decision might suggest that the Supreme Court intended to establish uniform guidelines for pleading and proof in Title VII cases. But the Court stated explicitly that the specification above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations. 52 A plaintiff, it said, may establish a prima facie case 53 by citing the four McDonnell Douglas factors. But the Court made clear that a plaintiff would not be required to do so in all cases. 54 We find this to be a case in which the McDonnell Douglas test would not be appropriate. 25 The McDonnell Douglas standard links the questions of statutory wrong and statutory remedy. 55 To state a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff must make a showing that he would have got a job or promotion but for an illegal act of discrimination. If he does so, he shifts to the employer the burden, not only of articulating a defense against the charge of discriminatory treatment, but of rebutting the prima facie case of entitlement to one or more of a particular set of remedies back pay, reinstatement, or preferential hiring or promotion. 56 The linkage of the questions of legal wrong and legal remedy is entirely appropriate in view of the facts of McDonnell Douglas and of similar cases typically cases in which a plaintiff claims that he was rejected for an employment vacancy on grounds of race or reprisal, that the harm he suffered was denial of the particular job sought, and that the appropriate remedy is back pay plus preferential hiring or promotion. 26 It is obvious, however, that a plaintiff may suffer harms from discrimination that fall short of demonstrable loss of a job or a promotion. An unfavorable employee assessment, placed in a personnel file to be reviewed in connection with future decisions concerning pay and promotion, could both prejudice the employee's superiors and materially diminish his chances for advancement. 57 27 Despite the linkage established in McDonnell Douglas, this court has recognized that the questions of statutory violation and appropriate statutory remedy are conceptually distinct. See Day v. Mathews, 530 F.2d 1083, 1084-1085 (D.C.Cir.1976) (per curiam ). An illegal act of discrimination whether based on race or some other factor such as a motive of reprisal is a wrong in itself under Title VII, regardless of whether that wrong would warrant an award of back pay or preferential hiring. 58 The goal of the statute is to bar all employer actions based on impermissible factors. In a case such as this the question must therefore be whether appellant has suffered an act of discrimination made unlawful under Title VII.
28 The decision of this court in Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., 595 F.2d 711, 720 (D.C.Cir.1978), clearly establishes that dissemination of adverse references for reasons condemned by Title VII constitutes an unlawful 'employment practice' within (the) contemplation of the statute. 59 In the proceedings below the District Court found as a fact that appellant suffered no discrimination on account of his race, and appellant does not challenge that finding for purposes of this appeal. 60 The District Court did, however, accept the administrative determination that the unfavorable supervisory evaluation submitted in conjunction with Smith's NAVSEA application, and apparently recorded in his NAVELEX personnel file, represented a wrongful reprisal against appellant for his EEO activities. 61 Because we accept the District Court's factual determinations regarding both claims, 62 the only remaining question is whether the improper evaluation found by the District Court to have occurred rested on reasons condemned by Title VII. Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., supra, 595 F.2d at 720. Only when a reprisal is based on factors specifically designated as illegal can the statute be invoked. Id. at 723. 29 In the present case we have no doubt concerning the statute's applicability. In order to encourage private efforts to enforce the law, the plain language of Title VII prohibits reprisals against employees for their participation in EEO activities. Under the statute it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees    because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter. 63 Smith's EEO work, performed pursuant to a designation by the Department of the Navy, plainly falls within the protective ambit of the statutory language. It is the explicit function of EEO officers to assist in investigation(s) and proceeding(s) under Title VII, and it is for work of this kind that Smith was penalized. This is not a case in which evidence suggests that Smith devoted excessive time to his EEO duties. 64 Thus we are not confronted with an argument that Smith was penalized for not devoting sufficient hours to his engineering work the 75 percent of his work time called for by his job description. 65 Rather, Smith was found to be the victim of an improper consideration of his EEO duties 66 ; he was, as we read the record from the District Court, wrongly criticized for performing functions given protected status under Title VII. Accepting the District Court's determinations of fact, we must therefore conclude that Smith established a legal claim, cognizable under Title VII, on which he was entitled to appropriate relief. 30 In reaching this conclusion we do little more than state explicitly the implicit logic of both the administrative agency and the District Court: both acknowledged the propriety of destroying any wrongfully compiled records as a remedy for the injury done in this case. We add only that this remedy represented an appropriate protection of a legal right guaranteed under Title VII, and that appellant had a valid cause of action to protect that right. It is inconceivable that Congress could have intended the wrong he suffered to lack for remedies under Title VII. As this court has stated before,  'To permit a covered employer to exploit circumstances peculiarly affording it the capability of discriminatorily interfering with an individual's employment opportunities with another employer    would be to condone the continued use of the very criteria for employment that Congress has prohibited.'  Shehadeh v. Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co., supra, 595 F.2d at 722 (quoting Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C.Cir.1973)). 31 In the context of the facts of this case, we agree with the implicit judgment of the District Court concerning the appropriate relief. The remedial purpose of Title VII is to make plaintiffs whole. See, e. g., Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 418-423, 95 S.Ct. 2362, 2372-2374, 45 L.Ed.2d 280 (1975); Day v. Mathews, supra, 530 F.2d at 1084-1085. Here, the findings of the District Court establish that appellant has so far suffered no financial loss as a result of the improper evaluation given by his supervisor. Maintenance of the prohibited assessment in Smith's personnel file would damage him by threatening his prospects for future promotions or merit awards. Because no financial harm has yet been shown to have occurred, however, appellant can be restored to where he would have been but for the discriminatory act by destruction of the offending appraisal. Although appellant argues that additional relief would be appropriate, partly to create a disincentive to employers to engage in similar violations, 67 we think further remedial measures are unwarranted by the facts here present. We do not, however, foreclose the possibility of monetary damages or other relief in a case revealing willful or repeated violation of the statutory standard.