Opinion ID: 1791
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defense Counsel's Failure to Call Lydia Ceruti as a Witness

Text: With respect to the claim that English's trial attorney was ineffective for failing to call Ceruti as a witness, we hold that the district court erred when it granted English habeas relief. To the extent that English's claim here revolves around defense counsel's ultimate decision not to call Ceruti, we must limit our review (of this claim) to the actual decision not to call her as a witness. Although there were several good reasons to call Ceruti to the witness stand under the circumstances, we cannot say that it was an unreasonable application of Strickland for the state court to find that English failed to rebut the presumption of reasonableness with respect to his attorney's decision here. In its decision denying post-conviction relief, the Michigan Court of Appeals seemingly provided two grounds for its finding. First, it stated that it agree[d] with the trial court that [Ceruti's] testimony is cumulative to defendant's own testimony. English, 2004 WL 1292789, at . Second, the court held that the decision was a reasonable trial strategy in light of the fact that 1) Ceruti was not a neutral witness because of her involvement with English and past history with Higdon, and 2) the elicited testimony of Lamont and Whitehouse regarding Ceruti's threats that made her an unattractive choice as a defense witness. Id. We disagree with the state court's first justification for its ruling; Ceruti's testimony can hardly be considered cumulative to English's testimony. Arguably, whether the witness's testimony would have been cumulative goes to prejudice under Strickland, not deficiency. But even assuming arguendo that cumulativeness can inform the deficiency analysis, the state court's argument is still contrary to the facts in the record. Although it is true that Ceruti would merely have corroborated English's version of events, the court failed to recognize that the trial was essentially a swearing match, with the prosecution offering the eyewitness testimony of the victim and Daniel Lamont in opposition to English's testimony. Undoubtedly, the testimony of a second person to corroborate the Defendant's version of the events would not have been cumulative, but rather could have critically added to the strength of the defense's case. See, e.g., Bigelow v. Williams, 367 F.3d 562, 574-75 (6th Cir.2004) (finding multiple alibi witnesses not cumulative to defense despite fact that one other witness already testified to same facts); see also Washington v. Smith, 219 F.3d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 2000) (Evidence is cumulative when it `supports a fact established by existing evidence,' BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 577 (7th ed.1999), but Washington's whereabouts on the day of the robbery was far from established-it was the issue in the case.). The court's second rationale on its own, however, is a reasonable application of Strickland. The court noted three significant problems with Ceruti testifying at trial. First, there was testimony at trial that Ceruti tried to influence Lamont's testimony by threatening him with harm if he did not change his story. English, 2004 WL 1292789, at . Second, there was testimony at trial that Ceruti tried to influence Kevin Whitehouse's testimony, including the allegation that she threatened to send someone to his home to harm him. Id. Finally, the court noted that Ceruti would have been subject to substantial impeachment given Ceruti's failed relationship with Higdon precipitated by her romantic relationship with defendant. Id. It is a reasonable trial strategy to conclude that these circumstances made Ceruti a bad witness, and that it would consequently be a bad idea for the defense to associate with this witness by having her testify on its behalf. Accordingly, the state court's decision was a reasonable application of Strickland. Indeed, contrary to the district court's opinion, we think that this conclusion is confirmed by counsel's testimony at the evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, defense counsel provided four distinct reasons for his decision not to call Ceruti as a witness: 1) Lamont's testimony about Ceruti's threats; 2) Whitehouse's testimony about Ceruti's threats; 3) Lamont's testimony that Ceruti planted a knife near Higdon; and 4) counsel's suspicion at trial that Ceruti's story was manufactured and that she would commit perjury if she testified. As noted above, the testimony regarding the threats provides a reasonable basis for counsel's election not to call Ceruti to the witness stand. The remaining rationales provide yet additional bases for finding that it was a reasonable trial strategy not to associate with this witness any more than necessary and to instead rely solely on the testimony of English, whose credibility had not been called into question like Ceruti. The district court makes much of the fact that many, if not all, of the potential issues with Ceruti's testimony could have been identified by English's attorney before trial commenced and before he promised Ceruti as a witness. But the attorney's failure to investigate is a separate habeas claim, one that is discussed below and should not affect the analysis of whether the ultimate decision not to call Ceruti was within the wide range of reasonable and adequate professional assistance. The district court also refers to the fact that the adverse testimony regarding Ceruti's alleged threats had already been received by the jury and was likely prejudicing English. According to the court, the only reasonable thing to do once this testimony came out was to have Ceruti testify notwithstanding the risks in order to refute the adverse testimony. While we do not disagree with the district court's position, we note that our concern is not to decide, using hindsight, what we think would have been the best approach at trial. Instead, we must only consider if the approach ultimately taken was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance given the circumstances. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052. For the aforementioned reasons, we think that it was.