Opinion ID: 449763
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Availability of Psychiatric Evidence

Text: 32 In discussing this issue, it is important to note what is not involved. In the first place, the trial court was not faced with the right of a defendant to ask for successive appointments at state expense of psychiatrists in order to obtain the kind of report that would be favorable to him. Cf. United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 73 S.Ct. 391, 97 L.Ed. 549 (1953); McGarty v. O'Brien, 188 F.2d 151 (1st Cir.1951). As stated by the district court: 33 However in the present case, this court does not find only objection to a particular psychiatrist or to use of publicly employed psychiatrists per se. Similarly, petitioner does not advance any demand for multiple opinions in the face of already abundant evidence. Here, it appears that no expert opinion at all was received on the central issue of petitioner's mental state at the time of the alleged crime. It further appears that almost no lay opinion on this critical issue was received.... (emphasis added.) 34 The second thing not involved in the issues here is the burden of proof. Neither party here discusses the question as to who has the burden of proving the defendant's mental condition at the time of the commission of the act. The state, therefore, seems to concede that the defendant in such a case where the issue of sanity is fairly raised is entitled to have an adequate psychiatric evaluation of his state of mind, contending only that the defendant here got what he was entitled to by the time the trial was completed. 35 Third, since we conclude upon a careful reading of the record, that even after the cross-examination of the psychiatric witness at the trial, he was still unable to give an opinion as to the sanity of the defendant, we are not faced with the issue of the correctness of a decision that the defendant was sane. 36 Finally, the state makes no contention that there was either a failure to exhaust state remedies or that petitioner was barred from relief because of a procedural default. 7 37 Then, what is before us for decision is whether the defendant was denied a federal constitutional right to at least one psychiatric examination and opinion developed in a manner reasonably calculated to allow adequate review of relevant, available information, and at such a time as [would] permit counsel reasonable opportunity to utilize the analysis in preparation and conduct of the defense. 38 In approaching this question, we must remember that the confession contained the statement by Blake in another way I did right, in light of the psychiatrist's answer to the following questions at trial: 39 Q. If when the defendant dropped the child from the bridge and he thought he was doing something right but knew full well that he was dropping child off a bridge, would that be temporary insanity? 40 A. I say so. 41 Q. You think so? 42 A. Yes. 43 Q. In his own mind, you said that he felt that he was doing right? 44 A. I believe so. 45 We must also remember that in the letter not furnished to Dr. Bosch, written by Blake several days after the incident, he made the statement that Tiffany came to me and said she wanted me now so I must go because I promised Tiffany and I love her. That we'll be together on the other side. So you see and understand that I never lost her cause she is waiting for me and further, I will go to her now. It hardly seems likely that a psychiatrist would not also have stated that if Blake in fact believed that Tiffany had come to him after her death this would be equally strong evidence of at least temporary insanity. We also must bear in mind the fact that Blake did actually attempt suicide, and was thereafter kept under constant surveillance while in jail to prevent a further attempt by him on his own life. 46 We, of course, do not know whether the psychiatrist, if he had these statements before him and an opportunity further to question the accused, would have found them accurately to state Blake's belief and, if so, whether he would have determined that Blake was insane at the time of the act. We hold, however, that the statements at least raise sufficient question as to Blake's sanity that they should have been presented to the psychiatrist early enough to allow adequate consideration of them in preparation of his evaluation. As stated by the district court: 47 Moreover, it is obvious that the state made little or no effort to supply Dr. Bosch and apparently Mr. Haupt as well with such information as the defendant had already voluntarily provided. The state's failure to produce the transcript of November 15, 1975 was hardly cured by events at trial. Careful analysis of the defendant's statement would surely require more than a single reading. Yet this one reading was apparently the only expert analysis of the petitioner's obviously quite bizarre account of the incident that has ever occurred. The court finds such analysis wholly inadequate, especially where there is little or no indication that serious efforts were made to obtain petitioner's own firsthand statement after the initial interview had failed. Given petitioner's willingness to discuss the incident on many other occasions, there is no obvious basis for believing that such efforts would have been futile. 48 The court finds that, in this case, reasonable efforts were not made to examine the petitioner with respect to his sanity at the time of the alleged crime. The court further concludes that, even were it impossible to interview the petitioner directly with respect to the incident, reasonable efforts were not made to provide Dr. Bosch with alternative means for consideration of the petitioner's condition. Consistent with this determination, the court must also conclude that Mr. Haupt was not provided with adequate expert assistance in the preparation of his case. Apparently, he was afforded no professional opinion on the question of Mr. Blake's sanity at the time of the incident until Dr. Bosch's comments were received on the witness stand at trial. At this point, with the presentation of evidence more than half complete and the theory of his defense already outlined for the jury, it was obviously too late for any significant benefit. 49 In sum, we conclude that on the facts of this case, Blake had the constitutional right posed by the above question and we agree with the district court that the right was denied him. 50 This conclusion is fully supported by the most recent Supreme Court decision dealing with the state's obligation in a criminal case to assure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his defense. Ake v. Oklahoma, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). In Ake a defendant in a murder trial had demonstrated bizarre conduct on arraignment and the trial court had him sent to a state psychiatric hospital for a determination as to his ability to stand trial. He was placed on medication and sent back for trial after several months. Thereupon Ake noted his defense to be that of insanity at the time of the commission of the killings. At no time had any psychiatrist made any inquiry into Ake's sanity at the time of the acts he was charged with, although his counsel moved for appointment of a psychiatrist. 51 The court, after discussing the potential help that might be provided by a psychiatrist, stated: 52 We therefore hold that when a defendant demonstrates to the trial judge that his sanity at the time of the offense is to be a significant factor at trial, the state must, at a minimum, assure the defendant access to a competent psychiatrist who will conduct an appropriate examination and assist in evaluation, preparation, and presentation of the defense. This is not to say, of course, that the indigent defendant has a constitutional right to choose a psychiatrist of his personal liking or to receive funds to hire his own. Our concern is that the indigent defendant have access to a competent psychiatrist for the purpose we have discussed, and as in the case of the provision of counsel we leave to the states the decision on how to implement this right. 53 --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1097 (emphasis added). 54 The habeas court associated the effect of the actions by the state court, the prosecution and the psychiatric witness with the issue of effectiveness of counsel. The court cited United States v. Edwards, 488 F.2d 1154 (5th Cir.1974), stating that the courts have long recognized a particularly critical interrelation between expert psychiatric assistance and minimally effective assistance of counsel. 488 F.2d at 1163. The same concept has been stated in a state case: In McCollum v. Bush, 5 Cir.1965, 344 F.2d 672, we affirmed a decision holding that a state's action in adjudicating an indigent defendant guilty without honoring his request for the assistance of psychiatric experts denied [him] both a fair trial and the effective assistance of counsel. Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383, 1396 (5th Cir.1979). 8 55 So, too, does the Supreme Court seem to equate the need for psychiatric aid to assistance of counsel. --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 1093, citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963); Evitts v. Lucey, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985); and Strickland v. Washington, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). 56 We note that the Supreme Court has recently provided guidance in the resolution of a criminal defendant's claim of ineffectiveness of counsel. In United States v. Cronic, --- U.S. ----, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984), the Court held that unless the surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of effectiveness, the inquiry must focus on counsel's actual performance at trial in order to ascertain whether counsel failed to function adequately as the government's adversary. 104 S.Ct. at 2048. 57 In a companion case, Strickland v. Washington, supra, the Court announced a two-pronged test to be applied in ascertaining whether errors committed by a defendant's counsel amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel: 58 First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable. 59 104 S.Ct. at 2064. 60 In Cronic, the Court concluded that a determination of whether counsel's actual performance was constitutionally deficient requires an examination of specific errors in light of the test set forth in Washington. Cronic, 104 S.Ct. 2051 n. 41. 61 In this part of the habeas corpus petition, the appellee is not alleging acts on the part of his counsel which fell below constitutionally acceptable standards. Thus, Washington, which focuses on allegations of substandard representation, does not directly apply. Rather he is alleging actions on the part of the state which made it impossible for his counsel to render meaningful assistance on the issue of the appellee's sanity. Our inquiry must therefore begin by focusing on the effect of the challenged actions upon the adversary process: did they so completely deprive Blake of the right to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing, Cronic, 104 S.Ct. at 2047, as to make the outcome of the trial presumptively unreliable. 9 62 We believe that it did. Blake's sanity at the time of the alleged crime was fairly in question. Indeed, it was the only material issue presented to the jury on the question of guilt. At counsel's request the trial judge ordered a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant as to both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. Dr. Bosch interviewed the defendant and stated that he could reach no conclusion on the question of sanity at the time of the offense, largely because in the interview Blake could not remember anything about the crime. Thus, although Dr. Bosch was under a court order to express an opinion as to Blake's sanity at the time of the offense, he had no factual information on which to base such an opinion, other than that provided in the police report, which he found insufficient. At the same time the police possessed two pieces of evidence--the tape of the confession and the suicide note--which Dr. Bosch later, at trial, indicated were highly relevant, or psychiatrically significant, on the question of Blake's sanity. Nevertheless, neither of these pieces of evidence was made available to defense counsel until the day before the trial, or to Dr. Bosch until he testified. 10 Meanwhile, the trial court had made it clear to Blake's attorney that any motions for further psychiatric evaluation in order to obtain an opinion about Blake's sanity at the time of the offense would not be entertained. 63 Thus, Blake and his attorney were left with virtually no evidence on which to base a defense of insanity until the day before trial, though highly significant evidence relevant to that issue had been in the hands of the police since shortly after Blake's arrest. Under these circumstances, we do not hesitate to find that the state so materially interfered with the defendant's ability to require the prosecution's case to survive the crucible of meaningful adversarial testing as to raise a presumption that the defendant's counsel could not have been able to provide effective assistance as required by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Cronic, 104 S.Ct. at 2047. Moreover, we do not believe that the extreme prejudice caused by the state's actions was cured by the opportunity given to defense counsel to cross-examine Dr. Bosch on the basis of the confession and the letter. This was hardly an adequate substitute for a psychiatric opinion developed in such a manner and at such a time as to allow counsel a reasonable opportunity to use the psychiatrist's analysis in the preparation and conduct of the defense. 64