Opinion ID: 2300624
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Jury Instructions, the Verdict, and the Posttrial Motions

Text: After the attorneys presented their closing arguments, the trial justice proceeded to instruct the jury. In their written requests for instructions that they submitted to the trial justice, plaintiffs had requested a spoliation charge. The plaintiffs contended that such an instruction was necessary because, without it, plaintiffs' inability to address primarily the issue of causation was impaired by the fact that [Mr. Almonte] never got the psych[iatric] evaluation that he was brought for. [19] The trial justice denied plaintiffs' request for an instruction on spoliation and added that she would have liked to have seen one case from any jurisdiction in this entire country that held that spoliation applied in situations such as this. The plaintiffs objected to the trial justice's decision not to give the requested instruction. Subsequently, the jury deliberated and, in due course, returned with a verdict that Dr. Kurl was not negligent in her treatment of Mr. Almonte. Thereafter, plaintiffs timely moved for a new trial and for judgment as a matter of law; and, on March 23, 2009, a hearing was held with respect to those motions. On the same occasion, defendants argued in support of their motion seeking reconsideration by the trial justice of her denial without prejudice of their Rule 50 motion. After considering the arguments with respect to plaintiffs' motion for a new trial and defendants' motion for judgment as a matter of law, the trial justice articulated the appropriate criteria as to each and proceeded to consider what the jury actually did with their verdict. The trial justice explained that the first question on the verdict form read as follows: Was the Defendant Dr. Kurl negligent in her treatment of Mr. Almonte? The trial justice explained that she had instructed the jury that, if it answered no to that question, their deliberations were at an end and the jury should not proceed to the other questions. She added that the jury should have reached the second question only if it had found Dr. Kurl to have been negligent. The second question on the verdict form read as follows: Was the negligence of Dr. Kurl a proximate cause of [Mr.] Almonte's suicide on September 5, 2000? The trial justice further explained that, despite answering question one in the negative (thereby finding Dr. Kurl not to have been negligent), the jury chose to continue to the second question and also answered that question in the negative. The trial justice concluded, however, that the jury's answering the second question was not a material inconsistency with [her] instructions. She elaborated that, by answering no to both questions, the jury was in effect rejecting the [plaintiffs'] liability claim. The trial justice continued her decision on the pending motions by summarizing the testimony as to what information was available to Dr. Kurl on September 4, 2000; she specifically cited the following facts: that Mr. Almonte had said that he had been playing with guns; that a family member apparently had been concerned that he would harm himself; that Mr. Almonte had a history of depression and had been treating with Prozac; that he had a history of alcoholism; that he was intoxicated; that he had been brought by rescue after the police had intervened and taken a firearm away from him; that there had been a scene at the family home involving that firearm; and that he had made a telephone call while he was in the emergency room with his mood changing considerably after that telephone call. The trial justice additionally stated that she was not impressed by the credibility of Dr. Kurl with respect to her testimony regarding her reasons for not considering Mr. Almonte at imminent risk of harm to himself or others. The trial justice accordingly concluded that, in her view, the jury had misconceived the evidence  because it was her judgment that Dr. Kurl had indeed been negligent in her care of Mr. Almonte. The trial justice then turned to Question Number 2 on the verdict form  viz., Was the negligence of Dr. Kurl a proximate cause of [Mr.] Almonte's suicide on September 5, 2000? The trial justice stated that the issue of causation troubled [her] in light of the applicable law and the absence of an opinion by a medical professional, a psychiatrist[,] social worker, [or] any person who was qualified to offer an opinion on proximate cause. The trial justice proceeded to review the language of § 40.1-5-7 [20] (concerning which statute the trial justice noted that the jury had been instructed). She determined that Dr. Kurl should have applied to a mental health facility for the purpose of having a psychiatrist certify Mr. Almonte on an emergency basis. The trial justice further found that, pursuant to § 40.1-5-7, Dr. Kurl should have requested that a police officer take custody of Mr. Almonte in order to bring him to such mental health facility as she might designate. The trial justice continued her review of the statute by noting that, once the mental health facility receives an application, it has certain obligations under the law. She explained as follows the requirements of § 40.1-5-7: Following the receipt of the physician's application for certification as soon as possible, but in no event later than 24 hours after reception, a psychiatrist must begin a preliminary examination and evaluation of the person, and the preliminary examination and evaluation shall be completed within 72 hours from its inception by a psychiatrist. It can be completed earlier.    It's got to be started at least in 24 hours, no later than 24 hours. It's got to be completed no later than 72 hours. It can be started earlier. It can be completed earlier. The trial justice then stated that the record is devoid of any expert opinion that the    decedent would not have been discharged within 36 hours after his arrival at a mental health facility. The trial justice noted the position of plaintiffs  that an expert opinion on the issue of what would have happened had [Dr. Kurl] filed an application for certification would have been unavailable because one can only speculate as to what a psychiatrist would have found. The trial justice disagreed with that position; it was her view that there existed enough information about the history of [Mr. Almonte], including the fact that he was intoxicated in the emergency room, so that an expert opinion could have been obtained. The trial justice stated that some form of expert opinion could have been presented; she said that such an opinion could have been based on information available, made available to the witness, or based on a hypothetical question. As a result, the trial justice concluded that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence with respect to proximate cause. Accordingly, in view of the lack of proof of proximate causation, the trial justice granted defendants' Rule 50 motion. Thereafter, plaintiffs filed a timely notice of appeal.