Opinion ID: 1611761
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: future uncertainty

Text: ¶ 116. The majority concludes that Douglas's story, although offensive and distasteful, unquestionably is protected by the First Amendment. Majority op. at ¶ 41. Having made this determination, the majority should provide reasonable guidance to school officials, law enforcement authorities, and the courts about how to deal with future threats in a school setting. For instance, if Douglas had written essentially the same story, including passages regarded as jokes, but had Dick use a concealed Colt .45 caliber semi-automatic handgun to terminate Mrs. [C.], would the court have reached the same result? Suppose Douglas's story had unmistakably alluded to one or more of his eighth-grade classmates, making them Dick's target, in place of his teacher. Would the court have reached the same result? What makes the threat in A.S. a true threat as opposed to the threat here? ¶ 117. To reassure school authorities, the majority announces an important principle of constitutional law. It writes that the First Amendment prohibits law enforcement officials from prosecuting protected speech but does not prohibit school officials from disciplining the same protected speech. Majority op. at ¶ 42. [16] ¶ 118. The proposition that protected speech may lose its protection when uttered in a different context of time or place is well understood. The proposition that speech uttered in the exact same contextsame speaker, same words, same time, same placeis fully protected by the First Amendment against some state action but not against other state action, is less established. To give speech a dual character (protected/unprotected) depending upon who is seeking to punish it or how severe the punishment may be, will eliminate certainty in the law and create a chilling effect upon both speech and discipline. ¶ 119. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), the Supreme Court stated that: First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506. At the same time, the Court emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the school. Id. at 507. ¶ 120. The Court distinguished the students' use of black armbands in Tinker direct, primary First Amendment rights akin to `pure speech'from aggressive, disruptive action. Id. at 508. The Court then stated: A student's rights...do not embrace merely the classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects...if he does so without materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school and without colliding with the rights of others. But conduct by the student, in class or out of it, which for any reasonwhether it stems from time, place, or type of behaviormaterially disrupts classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. Id. at 512-13 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). ¶ 121. Since 1969, the Court appears to have stepped back somewhat from the position set out in Tinker. In Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 266 (1988), the Court said that the First Amendment rights of students in public schools `are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings.' Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). They must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Id. (citing Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506). The Court said bluntly: A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its `basic educational mission,' even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266 (citation omitted). ¶ 122. These Supreme Court decisions appear to draw a distinction between First Amendment rights in public schools and First Amendment rights elsewhere, implying that the First Amendment treats speech in public schools different from speech outside public schools because of the special educational environment in public schools. ¶ 123. The majority opinion asserts that some speech in public schools is protected from criminal prosecution but may be suppressed by rules and punished through internal school discipline. When? Are school officials expected to know the answer by instinct? The majority's untested thesis deserves authority and additional discussion.