Opinion ID: 151874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Appellate Resentencing

Text: According to the court, the question presented is whether Irey's sentence is reasonable. Ante at 1180 In determining whether the sentence is reasonable, the court unabashedly explains that its job is to take the facts found by the district court and any others it finds in the record, and then make its own findings for each § 3553(a) factor. Id. at 1189-90. After making its own findings, the court reweighs the § 3553(a) factors and determines for itself what range of sentences is reasonable. Id. at 1189 (In order to determine whether that has occurred, we are `required to make the [sentencing] calculus ourselves' and to review each step the district court took in making it.) (quoting United States v. Pugh, 515 F.3d 1179, 1191 (11th Cir.2008)). By reasonable, the court means the sentencing range that it thinks is objectively correct to satisfy the sentencing purposes of § 3553(a). The court even goes so far as to declare, incorrectly and without any support, that the weight of facts under § 3553(a) presents a question of law. Id. at 1190 ([T]he importance of facts in light of the § 3553(a) factors is not itself a question of fact but instead is an issue of law.) (emphasis added); id. at 3491 n. 33 (justifying the court's new finding on the need for specific deterrence in sex crime cases because [n]o member of this Court ... has ever before suggested that in determining the law we ought to confine ourselves to the decisions that were cited in the district court) (emphasis added). [85] In reaching this conclusion, the court disregards the Supreme Court's analysis in Gall. See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. at 56-57, 128 S.Ct. at 600-02, (reversing the Eighth Circuit because [a]lthough [it] correctly state[ed] that the appropriate standard of review was abuse of discretion, it engaged in an analysis that more closely resembled de novo review of the facts presented by, for example, concluding that the district court gave too much weight to Gall's withdrawal from the conspiracy) (quotations omitted); United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d 800, 808 (10th Cir.2008) (reversing precedent as inconsistent with Gall that had reviewed  de novo the weight assigned to various § 3553(a) sentencing factors because we considered this weighing process to be a question of law). It also ignores this circuit's precedentwe have repeatedly held that [t]he weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is within the sound discretion of the district court and we will not substitute our judgment in weighing the relevant factors. E.g., United States v. Amedeo, 487 F.3d 823, 832 (11th Cir.2007); United States v. Gardner, 363 Fed.Appx. 688, 690 (11th Cir.2010) (unpublished); United States v. Pertil, 344 Fed.Appx. 569, 573 (11th Cir.2009) (unpublished). [86] Whatever the case, because questions of law are reviewed de novo even under the abuse of discretion standard, [87] the court does not giveor even think it owes deference to the district court's § 3553(a) analysis. See ante at 1183-84 (Section 3553(a) plays a critical role in appellate review of sentences, just as it does in the initial sentencing decision and the court of appeals must apply those same factors in determining whether a sentence is reasonable.) (emphasis added). The court purports to apply abuse of discretion because it will give some deference to a district court's conclusion. Specifically, the court notes that [a] district court's sentence need not be the most appropriate one, it need only be a reasonable one and because we are to vacate the sentence if, but only if, we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors. Id. at 1190, 1191 (quotation omitted). But the line between unreasonable and most appropriate blurs. And it blurs quickly when the court conceives of its role as to conduct the § 3553(a) inquiry for itself and identify the range of sentences the district court could have reasonably imposed (as opposed to reviewing the district court's reasoning from its § 3553(a) factfindings to its conclusion). Once the court of appeals has independently identified what it believes is the range of permissible sentences (explicitly or implicitly), appellate review becomes an inquiry into whether the district court's sentence falls within the range of sentences it, the court of appeals, would have imposed. This approach amounts to de novo review in the guise of abuse of discretion. See Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Gen. Electric Co., 446 U.S. 1, 10, 100 S.Ct. 1460, 1466, 64 L.Ed.2d 1 (1980) (instructing that when conducting abuse of discretion review, the role of appellate courts is not to reweigh the equities or reassess the facts but to make sure that the conclusions derived from [the district court's] weighings and assessments are judicially sound and supported by the record). [88] What is worse, the court does not confine its new analysis of the § 3553(a) factors to the evidence, arguments, and objections offered to the district court. [89] In so doing, the court ignores well-established rules of appellate procedure and implicitly overrules United States v. Jones, 899 F.2d 1097, 1102 (11th Cir.1990), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Morrill, 984 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir.1993) (en banc). [90] In Jones, this court explicitly ruled out considering new arguments and evidence in sentencing appeals. Thus, without explanation or apology, the court works a revolution in the rules governing the scope of review. The court's willingness to do so underscores that its conception of substantive reasonableness review bears no resemblance to traditional abuse of discretion review. [91] Instead, the court conducts a free-wheeling inquiryconjuring new arguments and citing new evidence. With respect to § 3553(a)(1), for example, the court creates for the first time an argument that the district court's view of Irey as a victim permeated and tainted the court's weighing of the § 3553(a) factors, although the prosecutor never objected to the characterization of Irey as a victim. Ante at 1199-200. [92] The court also argues, for the first time, that the district court clearly erred when it found that Irey's misconduct was not purely volitional, and that even accepting the district court's finding on volition, the case would still fall in the heartland because almost all pedophiles are child molesters. [93] Id. at 1201-02. To prove both of these points, the court cites to expert evidence never offered to the district court. [94] See id. at 1200, 1202 (citing Bruce J. Winick, Sex Offender Law in the 1990s: A Therapeutic Jurisprudence Analysis, 4 Psychol. Pub. Pol'y & L. 505, 524 (1998), and Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensic Issues, 82 Mayo Clinic Proc. 457, 458 (2007)). Nor did the Government ever argue, as the court does, that the district court clearly erred in finding that Irey had good character and had contributed positively to his family and community. See id. at 1203-05 (contending that, categorically, anyone who commits the crime Irey committed and causes his family to lose its business and home cannot be a good family man and have good character). Nor did the Government argue to the district court that it should not have considered Irey's old age in his favor because to do so would reward him for evading detection and it is unreasonable to do that. Id. at 1206. Similarly, in reweighing each of the § 3553(a)(2) purposes, the court conjured new arguments and cited new evidence never heard by the district court. Regarding the need for punishment, the Government never argued, as the court does, that the good behavior credit would reduce Irey's sentence to 15.5 years, which amounts to less than four months for each of [his] 50 victims. Id. at 1208. Nor did the Government argue that Irey's sentence does not reflect the seriousness of the offense because he received only 2.5 years longer than the 15 years he would have served had he taken one lewd picture of a 17-year-old girl. Id. at 1209. With respect to general deterrence, the court's entire analysis would be new to the district court. The Government never argued that the need for general deterrence is especially compelling in the child pornography context. But see id. at 1210-12. The Government never pointed to Supreme Court cases underscoring that importance, or to appellate cases reversing district courts for questioning the logic of general deterrence when pedophilia was involved. But see id. The Government completely ignored specific deterrence at the sentencing hearing. [95] The Government never questioned, as the court does today, the district court's finding that a 65-year-old male would be too old for sexual activity from a physiological standpoint. But see id. at 1213. Obviously then, the Government did not cite to published opinions involving sex offenders over age 60 to make this point. But see id. at 1213-14. Nor did the Government enter expert evidence about the comparatively high recidivism rates of older sex offenders. But see id. at 1214 (citing Mark Motivans & Tracey Kyckelhahn, Federal Prosecution of Child Sex Exploitation Offenders 2006, Bureau Just. Stat. Bull., Dec. 2007, for the proposition that 7.3% of all sex offenders are over 60, and Ryan C.W. Hall & Richard C.W. Hall, A Profile of Pedophilia: Definition, Characteristics of Offenders, Recidivism, Treatment Outcomes, and Forensics Issues, 82 Mayo Clinic Proc. 457 (2002), for the proposition that up to 44% of pedophiles were in the older adult range (age 40 to 70 years) and that pedophiles offend in their later years at a greater rate than other sexual offenders). Still on specific deterrence, the Government never argued that a lifetime of supervised release would be insufficient to protect the public by pointing to Bureau of Justice statistics, other expert evidence, and cases demonstrating that it is possible to recidivate when under supervision. But see id. at 1214-16 (citing Bureau of Justice Statistics, Dep't of Justice, Federal Criminal Justice Trends, 2003, (2006); Loretta J. Stalans, Adult Sex Offenders on Community Supervision: A Review of Recent Assessment Strategies and Treatment, 31 Crim. Just. & Behav. 564 (2004); James L. Johnson, Sex Offenders on Federal Community Supervision: Factors that Influence Revocation, Fed. Probation, June 2006; Patrick A. Langan et al., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Sex Offenders Released from Prison in 1994 (2003); 2009 Annual Report of the Director: Judicial Business of the United States Courts (forthcoming spring 2010); Protecting Our Nation's Children from Sexual Predators and Violent Criminals: What Needs to Be Done?, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 30 (2005) (statement of Fred S. Berlin, M.D., Associate Professor, Johns Hopkins University)). Finally, with respect to § 3553(a)(6), the Government never argued that Irey's sentence would produce unwarranted disparity. Obviously, then, it never cited twelve cases for the proposition that the defendants in those cases committed a less serious crime than Irey but received a more serious sentence. Id. at 1219-21. If the court's analysis leaves any doubt that the court has assumed the role of resentencer, its conclusion removes it. After conducting the functional equivalent of a new sentencing hearing, the court concludes that [n]othing less than the advisory guidelines sentence of 30 years, which is the maximum available, will serve the sentencing purposes set out in § 3553(a). Id. at 1222. Accordingly it vacates Irey's sentence and remands the case with the instruction that the district court impose a sentence of 30 years' confinement. Id. at 1224-25. With this unprecedented step, it is indisputable that the court has resentenced Mr. Irey. [96]    After today's opinion, it is the law of this circuit that a party who is disappointed by the sentence the district court has imposed may apply to this court for resentencing. [97] Except for live testimony, the disappointed party can brief evidence never offered and arguments never articulated to the district court. From its new vantage point, this court will then second-guess the district court's sentence. We will determine the range of objectively correct sentences based on the new facts and new arguments; if the sentence handed down by the district court falls outside of that range, we will reverse. Sometimes, that range could be a single point. Here, the court holds that any sentence other than 30 years' imprisonment would constitute an abuse of discretionif the district court had sentenced Irey to 29 years, 11 months, and 29 days, it would have abused its discretion as a matter of law. [98] The court is not taking the abuse of discretion standard seriously.