Opinion ID: 1451999
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: the applicability of the hawaii administrative procedure act

Text: In State v. Gustafson, 54 Haw. 519, 520, 511 P.2d 161, 162 (1973), the same case which is before us now, this court held that proceedings to revoke a driver's license for drunken driving where a driver refuses to take a `breath or blood test' under the implied consent statute is treated as a hearing before an administrative officer. (Emphasis added). That holding was necessary to support our appellate jurisdiction under HRS § 286-157, which provides for appeals from license suspension or revocation orders entered pursuant to HRS § 286-155, in the manner provided in [HRS §] 286-129. HRS § 286-129, in turn, allows appeals to the circuit court by applicants who are denied licenses by the examiner of chauffeurs, and declares that the decision of the circuit court on review shall be final except as otherwise provided in [HRS ch.] 91. Finally, section 91-15 of HRS ch. 91 (the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act) provides in part that [a]n aggrieved party may secure a review of any final judgment of the circuit court under this chapter by appeal to the supreme court. In the process of tracing our appellate jurisdiction directly through the only section expressly providing for review of suspension or revocation orders, HRS § 286-157, we concluded that the legislative intent in enacting HRS §§ 286-155 to 156 was to treat hearings held pursuant to those sections as administrative in nature. Of course, district judges are judicial officers, and as such may not constitutionally or statutorily sit as administrative officers created by and under the authority of the legislative or executive branches. [1] However, it is within the province of the legislature to provide for the formulation of procedural rules by which proceedings before a judicial officer sitting as such are to be regulated. See Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9, 61 S.Ct 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941). The first Gustafson case stands for the proposition that a district court hearing under HRS §§ 286-155 to 156 is reviewable under procedures established for the review of administrative proceedings. In my opinion, the reasoning of that case also extends to the procedures applicable at the district court hearing itself, and therefore I would hold that HRS § 91-9, which sets out the rules for conducting administrative adjudications, likewise establishes the procedural norms by which hearings under HRS §§ 286-155 to 156 are to be held. I am drawn to this conclusion for several reasons. First, the contours of the hearing outlined in HRS § 286-156 are wholly substantive, and that section is silent as to the procedures to be employed by the district judge. [2] Since it is doubtful that the Hawaii District Court Rules of Civil Procedure apply to license suspension or revocation hearings under section 286-156, [3] the procedures set out in HRS § 91-9 appear to be a natural source from which the legislature could have intended that the district court draw its procedural guidelines, especially in view of the highly administrative nature of the task which the district judge performs under HRS §§ 286-155 to 156. [4] Second, proof of a defendant's refusal to submit to a breath or blood test is admissible only in a hearing under section 286-156 or appeal thereof and ... not ... in any other action or proceeding, whether civil or criminal  HRS § 286-159 (emphasis added), indicating a legislative intention to draw a distinction between a section 286-156 hearing and all other action[s] or proceeding[s]. Third, and finally, by providing for appeals of section 286-155 orders in the manner of appeals from the clearly administrative determination of the examiner of chauffeurs, HRS § 286-157, the legislature intentionally created a parity between the two decision-making processes which in logic extends beyond the correlation solely of procedures for their review. See State v. Gustafson, supra, 54 Haw. at 520, 511 P.2d at 162. Although the term agency is defined in HRS § 91-1(1) to exclude members of the judicial branch, this alone does not dissuade me from the view that the hearing requirements of HRS § 91-9 extend to adjudications under sections 286-155 to 156. The appeals provision of chapter 91, HRS § 91-15, is made applicable to such adjudications by virtue of HRS § 286-157 & § 286-129 notwithstanding the fact that by its terms section 91-15 operates only to secure a review [by the supreme court] of any final judgment of the circuit court under this chapter  (emphasis added), ( i.e., the final judgment of a circuit court with respect to an agency hearing). Furthermore, as I indicated previously, the legislature is free to make specific procedures applicable to judicial determinations, even though those procedures apply also to administrative agency adjudications, so long as the constitutional independence of the courts is left intact in all other respects. Turning to the procedural requirements of HRS § 91-9, a prerequisite to a hearing under that section is the provision of reasonable notice to the parties. The term reasonable notice is defined in section 91-9(b) to include, among other things, [a]n explicit statement in plain language of the issues involved and the facts alleged by the agency in support thereof; provided, that if the agency is unable to state such issues and facts in detail at the time the notice is served, the initial notice may be limited to a statement of the issues involved, and thereafter upon application a bill of particulars shall be furnished. (Emphasis added). This section provides individuals whose legal rights are adjudicated in an administrative proceeding as complete a forewarning as possible of the issues they must meet and the facts alleged against them. Unless the agency is unable to do so, the notice must in function constitute a bill of particulars  i.e., it must reveal the facts and circumstances at the heart of the proceeding. Its objective is clearly to provide for basic procedural fairness, as that concept was expounded by this court in Silver v. Castle Memorial Hospital, 53 Haw. 475, 497 P.2d 564 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048, 93 S.Ct. 517, 34 L.Ed.2d 500 (1972), reh. denied, 409 U.S. 1131, 93 S.Ct. 936, 35 L.Ed.2d 264 (1973). In the context of license suspension or revocation hearings under HRS §§ 286-155 to 156, the requirements of section 91-9 are of particular importance. The inquiry of the district judge in such hearings is channeled exclusively towards a determination of the truth and correctness of [the arresting officer's] affidavit. The district judge in this case treated the hearing as involving solely the issue of the veracity of the affidavit, and in doing so refused to admit evidence supporting the existence of probable cause for appellant's arrest which went beyond the affidavit. In view of the importance of this document as the focal point of the hearing, I cannot agree with the unspoken conclusion of the majority that HRS § 91-9, in providing for the pre-hearing divulgence of facts alleged against a party, does not require that a copy of it should have been served on the appellant sufficiently anterior in time to the hearing to enable him properly to prepare a defense. Compare K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 8.05 (1958). Moreover, the facts of this case do not bear out the reasoning of the majority that the provisions of HRS § 286-155 make it clear to the appellant what the affidavit must necessarily state, and therefore that he need not have been served with it prior to the hearing. The affidavit against appellant reads as follows: I, Gary T.S. Au, police officer, being first duly sworn on oath, do depose and say: 1. That I arrested Robert T. Gustafson at 2315 o'clock P.M. on June 2, 1972 on KINAU STREET approx. 1/10 mile Ewa of WARD AVE. 2. I had reasonable grounds to believe that Robert T. Gustafson had either been driving or was in actual physical control of a motor vehicle on a public highway; to wit: a 1971 Datsun, 4 dr. sedan, green in color, license #8C-3112. Vehicle being operated by the above named person, Robert T. Gustafson, while under the influence of intoxicating beverage. Gustafson, while headed in the kokohead direction on Kinau Street, veered off the right side of the road and struck a fixed object, a telephone pole #6. 3. At the time I arrested Robert T. Gustafson, I had reasonable grounds to believe he was under the influence of alcohol; to wit: upon confronting him, there was a smell of intoxicating liquor upon his breath, his speech was slurred, and he was very unsteady on his feet. 4. I informed Robert T. Gustafson that he had a choice of chemical tests to take to determine the amount of alcohol contained in his blood. He could either take a blood or breath test, and if he refused to take a blood or breath test, any operator's or chauffeur's license, instruction permit or non-resident driving privilege which he possessed may be revoked for six months by a magistrate after a hearing. 5. After I informed Robert T, Gustafson of his choice to take a blood or breath test and of a possible revocation of his driving privileges, he refused to take any chemical tests. Although the affidavit was prepared on a mimeographed form, that form leaves numerous blank spaces, into which the italicized portions quoted above were individually typed by officer Au. As is evident from an examination of these portions of the affidavit, significant facts are revealed which are unique to appellant's case and which are impossible to glean from the bare language of section 286-155. These facts could well have provided appellant with the leads necessary to establish with greater forcefulness his chief defense that officer Au was unwarranted in drawing the conclusion that he was intoxicated. [5] Since appellant saw the affidavit only a few minutes before trial, this opportunity was lost to him. It follows that the hearing by which his license was suspended might well have had a different outcome if proper procedures as detailed in HRS § 91-9 had been followed. Accordingly, I would reverse the order suspending appellant's license, on the ground of non-compliance by the district court with the procedures contained in the aforementioned statute in failing as a matter of course to provide appellant with the arresting officer's affidavit, and would remand the case for a new hearing.