Opinion ID: 2630479
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Instructions regarding foreseeability of third-party criminal acts

Text: Moyle argues that the jury was not correctly instructed regarding the foreseeability of third-party criminal acts. The following instructions were given by the circuit court: Business establishments that hold themselves open to the public, such as proprietors of bars and taverns and clubs where liquor is allowed or known to be on the premises, owe their customers a specific duty to exercise reasonable care to protect them from foreseeable injury at the hands of other patrons. A landholder only has a duty to protect against criminal acts of third persons if such acts are reasonably foreseeable. Under ordinary circumstances, criminal acts are not reasonably to be expected, and are so unlikely in any particular instance that the burden of taking continual precautions against them almost always exceeds the apparent risks. The instruction in the first paragraph was originally proposed by Moyle as Plaintiff's Proposed Instruction No. 5. The proposed instruction was given by agreement as modified by the circuit court, which removed the second paragraph: Such a duty is said to arise from a `special relationship' which such business establishments have with their public invitees, to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm, and to give them first aid after they know or have reason to know that they have been injured, and to care for them until they can be cared for by others. The instruction in the second paragraph was proposed by the circuit court as Court's Instruction A and was given by agreement. The instruction in the third paragraph, the Defendants' Requested Jury Instruction No. 3 [hereinafter, the criminal acts instruction], was given over Moyle's objection, which he elucidated thusly in the circuit court's chambers: [The court]: [The criminal acts instruction] will be given as modified over objection by [Moyle]. The modification is at the beginning[;] we're inserting three words, under ordinary circumstances. [Moyle]: The objection here is very clear under the Maguire[ v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 79 Hawai`i 110, 113-15, 899 P.2d 393, 396-98 (1995),] case. The way it [is] worded here begs the question. The issue here before the factfinder, the jury, is whether in the circumstances of this case[,] according to Maguire[,] it was reasonably foreseeable that this kind of criminal act might occur. This instruction starts off by assuming the negative of what is supposed to be decided by [the] trier of fact. It says under ordinary circumstances criminal acts are not reasonably to be expected. Well, it's the facts that will determine whether or not it's reasonably to be expected under the Maguire standard, and there is really no such thing as under ordinary circumstances now. The law with respect to a landowner's liability for the criminal acts of third parties is clear in Hawai'i. This court has generally declined to impose a duty on landowners to protect against the criminal acts of a third party, inasmuch as, under ordinary circumstances, criminal acts are not reasonably to be expected, and are so unlikely in any particular instance that the burden of taking continual precautions against them almost always exceeds the apparent risk. Doe v. Grosvenor Properties (Hawaii) Ltd., 73 Haw. 158, 162, 829 P.2d 512, 515 (1992). However, when there is a special relationship between a landowner and someone on its property, the landowner has a duty to protect the person from the criminal acts of third parties if those criminal acts are reasonably foreseeable. Id. at 163-65, 829 P.2d at 515-16; Maguire, 79 Hawai`i at 113-15, 899 P.2d at 396-98. One such special relationship between parties is that of the business visitor, one who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the possessor of the land. Grosvenor Properties, 73 Haw. at 164, 829 P.2d at 515-16 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 332 (1965)). The Respondents' retort to Moyle's contention that the above sequence of instructions, particularly the criminal acts instruction, were confusing and contradictory is to note that, inter alia, the criminal acts instruction is a correct statement of the law. And, in a vacuum, so it is. But, it is also an inapplicable statement of the law in this case, where Moyle was unquestionably a business visitor as defined by this court, and neither party has suggested anything to the contrary. See id.; Maguire, 79 Hawai`i at 113, 899 P.2d at 396. The criminal acts instruction articulates the rationale of the general rule regarding landowner liability for third-party criminal acts as set forth in Grosvenor Properties, which applies when there is no special relationship between the parties. 73 Haw. at 163, 829 P.2d at 515. Grosvenor Properties further held that status distinctions remain important in the decision to create exceptions to the general rule that it is unreasonable to impose a duty to anticipate and control the actions of third persons. . . . Exceptions to the general rule that there is no duty to protect may arise when justified by the existence of some special relationship between the parties. Id. at 163, 829 P.2d at 515 (citing, inter alia, Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 315 (1965)). Because there is no question that a special relationship existed between Moyle and the Respondents, the criminal acts instruction is misplaced in the present case insofar as it states the inapplicable general rule of Grosvenor Properties, as opposed to the relevant exception for special relationships. Furthermore, although the two instructions preceding the criminal acts instruction correctly articulated the scope of a landowner's duty to protect a business visitor from third persons, they did not cure the inconsistent and misleading criminal acts instruction, because the jury was not apprised that the existence of a special relationship is not an ordinary circumstance. Id.; Stanford Carr, 111 Hawai`i at 297, 141 P.3d at 470 (quoting Haili, 103 Hawai`i at 101, 79 P.3d at 1275). Accordingly, the instructions regarding the foreseeability of third-party criminal acts were prejudicially erroneous. Stanford Carr, 111 Hawai'i at 297, 141 P.3d at 470 (quoting Haili, 103 Hawai`i at 101, 79 P.3d at 1275), and the ICA erred in approving the circuit court's instructions. We therefore vacate the circuit court's judgment and remand the matter to the circuit court for a new trial. See State v. Eberly, 107 Hawai`i 239, 245, 112 P.3d 725, 731 (2005) (vacating and remanding due to improper jury instructions). [3]