Opinion ID: 3216831
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Garrido’s Reference to Cuevas as “Mincho”

Text: Throughout the trial, the Government alleged, and Cuevas denied, that Cuevas was the FARC’s prominent cocaine manufacturer known as “Mincho.” After two witnesses had identified Cuevas as Mincho, the Government called Garrido to testify about Cuevas’s extradition. The following exchange occurred: Q: When did you first encounter Mincho, or the defendant Cuevas Cabrera that day? A: I went inside that area while he was being processed by the Colombian authorities. I went in. I asked, “Are you Mincho?” He said, “Yes.” I verified his name. Erminso Cuevas Cabrera. Cuevas objected to the testimony on the ground that Cuevas’s alleged statement to Garrido had not been disclosed during discovery, and he requested that the testimony be stricken. The court sustained the objection and issued the following instruction to the jury: Ladies and gentlemen, Agent Garrido mentioned that when he spoke to Mr. [Cuevas] Cabrera, he 41 asked him if he was Mincho, and he said, yes, I am Mincho. I am going to strike that testimony. That was not previously announced as evidence in the case about any statements that Mr. Cabrera may have made that he was Mincho. So I am going to strike that from the testimony, have you disregard that statement by—allegedly made by Mr. Cabrera. Cuevas nevertheless moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. Cuevas now argues the denial was error because the testimony was highly prejudicial and because the court’s curative instruction, by repeating the offending testimony and by implying its exclusion was due only to a technicality, exacerbated rather than mitigated the prejudice. A “mistrial is a severe remedy—a step to be avoided whenever possible, and one to be taken only in circumstances manifesting a necessity therefor.” United States v. McLendon, 378 F.3d 1109, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The district court’s principal consideration in ruling upon a motion for mistrial is the extent of prejudice suffered by the defendant, and we review the district court’s denial only for abuse of discretion. Id. In this case, it is not obvious why Garrido’s stricken testimony was prejudicial considering that at least two other witnesses previously had identified Cuevas as “Mincho,” and the evidence established that “Mincho” is a common nickname for Erminso. Further, whatever harm may have been done by the testimony was promptly undone by Judge Hogan’s curative instruction. “We normally presume that a jury will follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence inadvertently presented to it, unless there is an overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to follow the court’s instructions.” Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 42 756, 766 n.8 (1987) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Neither Judge Hogan’s repetition of the offending testimony (which was necessary to specify the objectionable content for the jury after numerous intervening questions) nor his stated reason (which was no more technical than any other evidentiary ruling) created such an “overwhelming probability” here.