Opinion ID: 2829038
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether Conditions of Removal Will Be Remedied

Text: Upon review of whether the conditions that resulted in removal will be remedied, this Court engages in a two-step analysis. In Re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642-43 (Ind. 2014) (citation omitted). “First, we identify the conditions that led to removal; and second, we determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied.” Id. at 643 (internal quotation and citation omitted). The second step of the analysis requires judgment of the parent’s fitness at the time of the termination hearing, “taking into consideration evidence of changed conditions.” Id. (quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 152). Changed conditions are balanced against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future neglect. In Re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 643 (internal quotations and citations omitted). Habitual conduct may include “criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment,” but the services offered to the parent and the parent’s response to those 4 “Because subsection (b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive . . . the trial court need only find one of the two elements by clear and convincing evidence.” Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (citing Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148 n.5). 8 services can also be evidence demonstrating that conditions will be remedied. A.D.S v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting A.F. v. Marion Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 762 N.E.2d 1244, 1251 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). K.E. was removed while Father was incarcerated. Thus, the primary condition for K.E.’s removal as to Father was Father’s inability to provide care and supervision for K.E. due to his incarceration. The trial court’s findings supporting the determination that Father would not remedy the conditions for removal include that: 1) Father has been unable to receive services from DCS due to his incarceration; 2) Father has a lengthy criminal history; 3) Father is currently incarcerated for his most recent offenses, was denied a sentence modification, and his current release date is not until September 19, 2016;5 4) “Father has no income, no employment, no place of residence suitable for caring for child,” and Father plans to live with his father (K.E.’s paternal grandfather) upon release; and 5) Father has a history of drug and alcohol use. (App. at 18-19.) First, we are not persuaded that there is any evidence in the record to contravene Father’s statements that upon his release he plans to live with his father (K.E.’s paternal grandfather) and work with him through Vectren. While Father did not substantiate this claim, DCS did not present any evidence to support a contradictive finding. No evidence indicates that Father was fabricating his plans for employment or that his father’s home is unsuitable for children.6 Father’s prior 5 Although the trial court findings also state that Father does not have a definite release date, the record demonstrates that Father’s release date at the time of the hearing was September 2016. Father’s release date is currently set for March 2016. 6 Although DCS argues that “Father was unable to show that he would be able to provide for Child after he was eventually released . . . ,” we reiterate that it is DCS’ burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that each of the elements provided in Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) are met. Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148 (internal citation omitted); (Appellee’s Br. at 29.) Moreover, Father’s living with relatives may be suitable when there is “no causal connection between Father’s living arrangements and any adverse impact those 9 unemployment is insufficient to show that he has no future plans for employment. Thus, the findings relating to Father’s lack of future employment and having no suitable home for K.E. are clearly erroneous. Second, the remaining factual findings are insufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Father cannot remedy the conditions for removal. It is not disputed that Father must obtain release from incarceration before he can provide care and support for K.E. Father’s release from incarceration is pending. Although at the time of the termination hearing Father’s possible release was still over two years away that alone is insufficient to demonstrate that the conditions for removal will not be remedied. Indiana courts have upheld parental rights of incarcerated parents who still had a year or more to serve before possible release, and we have not established a bright-line rule for when release must occur to maintain parental rights. For example, in In Re G.Y., this Court reversed the termination of a mother’s parental rights. 904 N.E.2d at 1266. The hearings on termination took place in January and February of 2008, and at the time of the hearing, Mother’s release date was May 30, 2010. Id. at 1259. Yet, Mother’s release from prison was still considered to be “imminent,” and this influenced the Court’s decision that termination was not in the child’s best interest. Id. at 1265. The Court also considered Mother’s completion of programs while incarcerated, her good-faith efforts to better herself, securing job placement after release, and working towards her degree. Id. at 1262. See also In Re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191, 194-96 (Ind. 2009) (affirming trial court’s denial of termination when hearing occurred January 8, 2008, Mother’s release date was April 2009, with possible release in May 2008, Father’s release date was January 2010, with possible release in January 2009, while arrangements may have on [the] [c]hild,” and where there are no findings to support that “the homes of Father’s relatives [are] unsuitable for a child.” Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 151. 10 also considering both parents’ participation in services while incarcerated, and establishment of a permanency plan after release), But cf. Castro, 842 N.E.2d at 370, 374 (termination affirmed on appeal where Father serving forty-year sentence, had been incarcerated entirety of child’s life, Father had served ten years of sentence, child was already nine years old and had adapted well to foster family, and Father still had over six years to serve before release, demonstrating that Father was “helpless to remedy those conditions [of removal] within a meaningful timeframe”). In each case, the release dates varied and served as only one factor considered by the court. In the current case, Father’s release is pending, and at this point, is less than a year away. However, as in the cases outlined above, the potential release date is only one consideration of many that may be relevant in a given case. We do not seek to establish a higher burden upon incarcerated parents based upon their possible release dates nor do we believe the burden of proof should be reduced merely because a parent is incarcerated. Because the release date alone is not determinative, we consider whether other evidence, coupled with this consideration, demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that Father would be unable to remedy the conditions for removal. Most significantly, Father has made substantial efforts towards bettering his life through programs that were available during his incarceration. Since Father’s incarceration, he has completed twelve programs, the majority of which were completed voluntarily and did not result in sentence reductions. These programs include: 1) The Spiritual Literacy Program: Reading the Sacred in Everyday Life; 2) Community Services (completing over 320 hours); 3) Prevention and Relationship Enhancement Program; 4) Developing a Winning Attitude; 5) Please Understand Me; 6) Financial Planning; 7) Safe People; 8) The Seven Habits of Highly Effective People; 9) Commitment to Change; 10) Responsible Parenting; 11) PLUS Core Values; and 12) Houses of Healing. Father also began attending Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous. These programs particularly targeted parenting and life skills, along with addressing substance abuse. Father also testified that he is prepared to be a good father, is done with drug use, and that he would 11 like to receive additional services from DCS upon his release. Father even expressed that if H.D. ultimately adopts K.E. and J.A.E. he hopes to remain in both of their lives as much as possible. In addition, H.D. brings both K.E. and J.A.E. to visit Father every other week for two to three hours. The DCS case manager testified that Father interacts well with the children during visitations, even though they occur in the secure environment of the prison. H.D. testified that both children have bonded with Father, and K.E. recognizes Father and knows who he is. Father also makes nightly phone calls to H.D.’s house to talk to K.E. and J.A.E. and tell them goodnight. The CASA testified that Father has made “great strides” since he has been incarcerated. (Tr. at 132.) Despite Father’s criminal and substance abuse history, his recent improvements at the time of the termination hearing were not balanced against his habitual patterns of conduct. Given the substantial efforts that Father is making to improve his life by learning to become a better parent, establishing a relationship with K.E. and J.A.E., and attending substance abuse classes, it was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that Father could not remedy the conditions for K.E.’s removal. As indicated in Judge Baker’s dissent, there is seemingly nothing else that Father could have been doing to demonstrate his dedication to obtaining reunification. Because there was insufficient evidence to establish this factor for termination, the findings cannot support the conclusion reached by the trial court, making the conclusion clearly erroneous. II. Whether Father Poses a Threat to K.E.’s Well-being It appears that the same evidence as outlined above was also relied upon in reaching the conclusion that Father poses a threat to K.E.’s well-being. See In Re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 221 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (explaining that evidence presented by DCS to demonstrate that parent posed a threat to child’s well-being was also used to support the conclusion that the mother was unable to adequately care for child and termination was in child’s best interest). Accordingly, we must determine whether the factual findings provide clear and convincing evidence that Father poses a 12 threat to K.E.’s well-being. Again, based upon Father’s recent improvements and the healthy bond that he has developed with K.E., we cannot find sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that, at the time of the termination hearing, Father posed a threat to K.E.’s well-being. “[A] trial court need not wait until a child is irreversibly influenced by a deficient lifestyle such that [his or] her physical, mental, and social growth is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship.” In Re E.S., 762 N.E.2d 1287, 1290 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (citation omitted). However, termination should not result “solely because there is a better home available for the children.” In Re K.S., 750 N.E.2d 832, 837 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (citing In Re