Opinion ID: 1240701
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Agency Issue.

Text: A minor portion of trial court's ruling is devoted to its alternative conclusion that Harder was liable to Chariton Feed under the law of agency. The burden of proving an agency is upon the party asserting its existence. Ioerger v. Schumacher, 203 N.W.2d 572, 575 (Iowa 1973); Martin v. Jaekel, 188 N.W.2d 331, 333 (Iowa 1971). Although whether an agency exists ordinarily is a fact question, there must be substantial evidence on the question to generate a jury question; a scintilla is not enough. Martin, 188 N.W.2d at 333. `An agency results from the manifestation of consent by one person, the principal, that another, the agent, shall act on the former's behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.' Ioerger, 203 N.W.2d at 575-76 (emphasis added) (quoting Pay-N-Taket, Inc. v. Crooks, 259 Iowa 719, 724, 145 N.W.2d 621, 624 (1966)); Martin, 188 N.W.2d at 333; Vischering v. Kading, 368 N.W.2d 702, 710-11 (Iowa 1985); Restatement (Second) of Agency § 1 (1958). Much of our rationale in the prior divisions relating to control applies here. Clearly the farm lease before us cannot be utilized as a source of agency. Paragraphs eleven and twelve, quoted above, vest full management control in Davidson. The parties plainly intended for Davidson to conduct the farm operation independently of any control by Harder. This reading of the lease is consonant with the fact that Harder was living and working some 800 miles from the farm. It is true that the stock-share lease contemplated purchases of feed by Davidson, and placed him in complete control of that, along with all other operations on the farm. The lease requirement that Harder pay one-half of the feed expense, however, is not sufficient basis for a supplier's cause of action against Harder. The authorities hold that such an agreement is personal to the landlord and tenant and cannot be held to give supplier a cause of action against the landlord. Johnson v. Francis, 179 Neb. 342, 344, 138 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1965) (The agreement of a landlord contained in a written lease to pay one-half of the purchase price of the fertilizer gives a third party no cause of action against the landlord for half of the fertilizer sold to a tenant.); Schultz v. Williams, 207 Wis. 122, 126, 240 N.W. 844, 846 (1932) (A farm tenant may not thus bind his landlord, even though the landlord has agreed to furnish one-half of the feed and seed, in the absence of an original agreement between the landlord and a third party, or of facts giving rise to an estoppel.). Nor is there substantial evidence relating to the conduct of the parties at the relevant times to generate a fact question on agency. The record discloses Davidson consistently exercised what was solely his contractual right to have full management control in what feed to buy, where to buy the feed, and how much feed to buy. There is no evidence Harder ever sought to control Davidson's activities in this regard. Although early in the lease term Davidson bought some of the feed in Harder's name, Davidson unilaterally terminated the practice long before buying any feed from Chariton Feed, and testified without contradiction that he intended from that time on to be solely responsible for the feed bills. It also is clear that Davidson was not acting on behalf of Harder in purchasing the feed, as required by the above definition of agency. The evidence was overwhelming that he was acting solely in his own interests and against the interests of Harder. We hold Harder was not liable on the basis of agency for the feed Davidson purchased from Chariton Feed.