Opinion ID: 4457543
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether Constitutional Rights Were Violated

Text: This appeal hinges on whether qualified immunity shields Brock from Soto’s procedural due process claim. First, we must determine whether Brock’s actions violated Soto’s due process rights. “The interest of prisoners and their correspondents in uncensored communication by letter, grounded as it is in the First Amendment, is plainly a ‘liberty’ interest within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment even though qualified of necessity by the circumstance of imprisonment.” Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 418 (1974), overruled on other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989). Therefore, when a letter has been rejected, both senders and addressees are entitled to procedural due process protections, including notice and an opportunity to be heard. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 417–19. The Supreme Court has approved of procedural due process safeguards requiring that “an inmate be notified of the rejection of a letter written by or addressed to him, that the author of that letter be given a reasonable opportunity to protest that decision, and that complaints be referred to a prison official other than the person who originally disapproved the correspondence.” Id. at 418– 19; see also Prison Legal News v. Livingston, 683 F.3d 201, 224 (5th Cir. 2012) 4 Case: 18-40568 Document: 00515207543 Page: 5 Date Filed: 11/20/2019 No. 18-40568 (stating that senders and addressees of personal letters that are censored by a prison are entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard). Moreover, this is not a situation in which the recipient is prohibited from receiving mail. We have explained that minors in boot camps are “not free to leave” and thus are afforded constitutional protections applicable to prisoners. Austin v. Johnson, 328 F.3d 204, 208–09 (5th Cir. 2003). Brock acknowledged that the boot camp was a “post-adjudication secure correctional facility,” which Texas law defines as “[a] secure facility administered by a governing board that includes construction and fixtures designed to physically restrict the movements and activities of the residents . . . .” 37 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 343.100(48). Here, A.M.S. was detained in a correctional facility, which triggered a liberty interest in A.M.S.’s mail subject to due process protections. See Martinez, 416 U.S. at 418. Soto alleges that his letter to A.M.S. was rejected under Brock’s direction without clear notice as to why it was rejected. Soto was not given an opportunity to respond or appeal Brock’s determination to another official at the boot camp. Accordingly, Soto did not receive the requisite due process. That Soto is incarcerated for a sexual offense is undisputed and a matter of public record. However, in the cases cited by Brock intimating that a sex offender’s right to access children can be restricted, the offenders were subject to sex offender registration laws and their rights were adjudicated in the original criminal proceeding. See Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 858 F.3d 348, 352–53 (5th Cir. 2017); United States v. Rodriguez, 558 F.3d 408, 417–18 (5th Cir. 2009) (upholding a court-imposed condition restricting the offender from unsupervised access to children). There is no evidence showing that sex offender registration laws or the criminal court prevented Soto from contacting his son based on his status as a sex offender. Accordingly, Brock has failed to 5 Case: 18-40568 Document: 00515207543 Page: 6 Date Filed: 11/20/2019 No. 18-40568 demonstrate that the district court erred by holding that Soto had a due process interest in communicating with his detained son. Brock also argues that the State did not interfere with Soto’s right to due process because A.M.S.’s mother signed a form that did not authorize Soto to contact his son, and Brock was simply following policy. However, the district court found fact disputes in the summary judgment evidence based upon Soto’s mother’s statements in her affidavit that supported the claim that Brock had interfered with Soto’s rights. Specifically, among other things, Soto’s mother averred that Brock stated that she was responsible for making decisions about who could send mail. This undercuts Brock’s contention that she was simply following the boot camp’s policy and supports a conclusion that Brock had discretion as to whether Soto could contact his son. At this stage in the litigation, we cannot review the district court’s conclusion that genuine factual disputes exist. See Meadours v. Ermel, 483 F.3d 417, 422 (5th Cir. 2007). In sum, analyzing the facts favorable to Soto supports his contention that he did not receive the procedural protections that due process requires. Additionally, Brock has failed to show that Soto’s status as a sex offender or the existence of A.M.S.’s Cadet Contact Authorization form should alter the due process interest that Soto had in writing his son.