Opinion ID: 3011740
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Abdille's Firm Resettlement in South Africa

Text: It appears that the BIA, in reaching the conclusion that the firm resettlement bar precluded the INS from granting Abdille asylum from Somalia, relied in part on what it considered to be an offer made by the South African government to Abdille of some type of per manent resettlement. In seeking to make its prima facie showing of firm resettlement, the INS intr oduced evidence of two South African government documents approving Abdille's application for asylum in that country, both contained in the Certified Administrative Record. Thefirst record is a Certificate of Exemption entitling Abdille to asylum under South Africa's Aliens Control Act of 1991 for a two-year period of exemption commencing on June 25, 1998 and ending on June 24, 2000. The second is a letter fr om South Africa's Department of Home Affairs addr essed to Abdille discussing Abdille's obligations at the conclusion of this two-year refugee period: Please note, however, that if at the end of the period of exemption [i.e., June 24, 2000], you do not wish to leave [South Africa], the onus rests on you to contact the Department for the reviewal of your r efugee status or to otherwise legalise your continued stay in[South Africa] before the expiry date of your Certificate. Failure to do so may render you liable to prosecution in terms of the provisions of the Aliens Control Act, 1991 (Act 96 of 1991). Although the BIA acknowledged that the Certificate of Exemption conferring refugee status on Abdille would expire after a two-year term, it nonetheless concluded that the issuance of this certificate repr esented an offer of some type of permanent resettlement within the meaning of 8 C.F.R. S 208.15's firm r esettlement definition because, according to the BIA's reading of the Department of Home Affairs letter, Abdille's refugee status does not simply terminate at the end of the two-year exemption period. Looking at those two documents, the BIA deter mined that 17 the firm resettlement bar applied to Abdille, requiring the INS to deny Abdille's asylum application.9 We cannot say, however, that the two documents describing Abdille's refugee status under South African law constitute substantial evidence supporting the conclusion that the government of South Africa granted Abdille an offer of some other type of permanent resettlement. If anything, these records compel the contrary conclusion--i.e., that such an offer of resettlement was, by its terms, only temporary in nature. As is evident from the face of the Certificate of Exemption, South Africa's of fer to Abdille of asylum status (and Abdille's acceptance of that of fer) carried with it an explicit termination date: Abdille's legal right to reside in South Africa as a refugee exempt from certain provisions of the Aliens Control Act of 1991 would end on June 24, 2000. Furthermore, the Department of Home Affairs letter to Abdille makes clear that, absent further action on Abdille's part, he would be subject to prosecution under South African law should he choose to remain in South Africa after the expiration of the two-year exemption period on June 24, 2000. Given this plain language, we are hard-pressed to see how these documents lend support to the BIA's conclusion that Abdille's refugee status does not simply terminate on June 24, 2000, and was in fact of a more permanent natur e. We acknowledge, however, that we lack familiarity with the intricacies of South African immigration law. While the _________________________________________________________________ 9. The BIA's opinion mentions other non-of fer-based factors such as the fact that Abdille was issued a travel document granting him the right to re-enter South Africa after trips abroad; had the opportunity and ability to rent a private home in Cape Town; and had the opportunity to work as an electrician if certified. However, fr om the language of the BIA's decision, it does not appear that the BIA employed these factors in connection with its determination that Abdille had received an offer of some other type of permanent resettlement from South Africa. Rather, the BIA's opinion demonstrates that it employed these factors to conclude that South Africa did not substantially and consciously restrict the conditions of Abdille's residence, and thus to reject Abdille's attempt to rely on the firm resettlement exception contained in S 208.15(b). On appeal, Abdille does not challenge the BIA's finding with regard to that exception. 18 information contained in the Certificate of Exemption and the Department of Home Affairs letter to Abdille strongly suggests that the grant of refugee status for afixed term of two years is something short of an offer of some other type of permanent resettlement, it may be true that under the relevant provisions of South African immigration law, or the application of that law in practice, a refugee's two-year exemption period will often mature into a mor e permanent status. For instance, it may be that provisions of the Aliens Control Act ease the burden on an alien applying for official permanent resident status if that alien has already received asylum, or that, as a matter of immigration practice, twoyear refugees like Abdille routinely r eceive a form of permanent status if they apply for such status prior to the expiration of the two-year exemption period. The Certified Administrative Record is completely silent on these points, however, and at this stage, in the absence of further evidence, reliance on these contingencies would amount to nothing more than mere speculation. The BIA's decision in Matter of D-L- & A-M-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 409 (BIA 1991), is instructive in this r egard. In D-L- & A-M-, the BIA found that two Cuban natives seeking asylum from that country had firmly resettled in Spain, where they had spent six years prior to their entry into the United States. See id. at 414. In reaching this conclusion, the Board appropriately focused on the Spanish government's official recognition of the aliens' legal right to reside in that country. Specifically, the BIA noted that the aliens had received official temporary resident status that was renewable each year, and, importantly, that this temporary residency could be converted to permanent residency once one of the aliens obtained a work contract. See id. at 411, 414. This latter point was established through the crossexamination testimony of one of the aliens in hearings before the INS. See id. at 411. In the instant matter, the proceedings on remand may very well yield similar evidence of the likelihood that Abdille's fixed, two-year r efugee term in South Africa will be converted into a mor e permanent status. 19
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, pr oper resolution of the firm resettlement issue requires further information as to the content of South African immigration law and practice. Given the limited nature of the record before us on appeal, and the considerable defer ence we owe to the INS in immigration matters, we believe it improper for us to settle the firm resettlement question based on our hypotheses regarding the type of contingencies that could have occurred at the end of Abdille's two-year exemption period under the terms of the Aliens Contr ol Act or its practical applications.10 Accor dingly, we consider it necessary to grant Abdille's Petition for Review and to remand, so that the BIA may further investigate the content of South African immigration law and practice in general, and may resolve the specific question whether , under South African refugee law and practice, the issuance of a Certificate of Exemption granting an alien r efugee status for _________________________________________________________________ 10. Moreover, we do not believe that the circumstances are appropriate for us to take judicial notice of the content of South African law on this appeal. In general, foreign law is treated as a fact that must be proven by the parties. See, e.g., Black Diamond Steamship Corp. v. Robert Stewart & Sons, 336 U.S. 386, 397 (1949) ([T]he Court has adhered to the general principle that foreign law is to be proved as a fact.); Intercontinental Trading Co., Inc. v. M/V Zenit Sun, 684 F. Supp. 861, 864 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (No proof having been presented at trial as to Chilean law, the court cannot take judicial notice of the law of Chile . . . .). Although federal courts have discr etionary authority to judicially notice the laws of foreign countries pursuant to the fact-finding procedure contained in Fed. R. Civ. Pr o. 44.1, see 1 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein's Federal Evidence S 201.52[3][b], at 201-94 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 2000); see also Sidali v. INS, 107 F.3d 191, 197 n.9 (3d Cir. 1997), because such a procedure was not followed in the instant matter, we will r efrain from judicially noticing the content of South African refugee law. We did conduct a preliminary investigation into South African law, to see whether an issue existed with respect to the consequences that Abdille would experience under South African immigration law and practice upon the expiration of his two-year r efugee period. The information we obtained suggested that such an issue did exist, and we therefore concluded that remand to the BIA was the appropriate avenue for resolution of that issue. We did not use the information we gathered except in this preliminary fashion, and, as noted above, we decline to judicially notice it. 20 a fixed two-year term amounted to an of fer of some other type of permanent resettlement within the meaning of S 208.15. On remand, both Abdille and the INS should be afforded an opportunity to supplement the record by presenting evidence bearing on these issues. Of course, we express no opinion as to the proper r esolution of the question whether Abdille had firmly r esettled in South Africa.11