Opinion ID: 3022542
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of Hughey

Text: We have held that a criminal defendant may not call a witness for the sole purpose 5 To establish that a defendant was a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of section 922(g)(1), the government is required to prove the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) that the defendant previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; (2) that the defendant knowingly possessed a firearm; and (3) that the firearm had passed in interstate commerce. Dodd, 225 F.3d at 344. 9 of allowing the jury hear the witness invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege. See Nezowy v. United States, 723 F.2d 1120, 1124 n.6 (3d Cir. 1983) (noting “that a criminal defendant is not entitled to call a witness for the purpose of having the jury hear him ‘take the Fifth’”). Other courts of appeals similarly have held that “a witness should not be put on the stand for the purpose of having him exercise his privilege before the jury,” Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (en banc); accord United States v. Griffin, 66 F.3d 68, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Deutsch, 987 F.2d 878, 88384 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Vandetti, 623 F.2d 1144, 1148 (6th Cir. 1980); United States v. Harris, 542 F.2d 1283, 1298 (7th Cir. 1976); United States v. Johnson, 488 F.2d 1206, 1211 (1st Cir. 1973). This rule is well grounded as allowing a witness to testify for the purpose of invoking the Fifth Amendment “would only invite the jury to make an improper inference.” Bowles, 439 F.2d at 542. Furthermore, as the court explained in United States v. Klinger, 128 F.3d 705, 709 (9th Cir. 1997), “[t]he rationale for this rule is that the prosecution would be denied the opportunity to cross-examine the defendant’s witness if that witness were simply to invoke his or her Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to questions on non-collateral matters. Thus insulated from cross-examination, the witness’s testimony cannot be considered reliable.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). In this case we see no circumstances that could have justified the court to depart from the general rule set forth in Nezowy v. United States, 723 F.2d at 1124 n.6. Accordingly, we find that the district court properly refused to allow Reed to call Hughey 10 to testify for the sole purpose of having him invoke the Fifth Amendment in front of the jury.