Opinion ID: 900396
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Bail Pending Appeal

Text: [¶ 14.] Burgers argues that the trial court abused its discretion by not setting bail pending appeal. SDCL 23A-43-16 states in part: On motion of a defendant who has been convicted of an offense, the court in which the conviction was had may release the defendant prior to the entry of judgment, pending the expiration of time for filing notice of appeal, and pending the outcome of the appeal. The court in determining the eligibility of the defendant for release shall consider the criteria as set forth in § 23A-43-4, the risk that the defendant will flee or pose a danger to any person or to the community, and in the case of an appeal, whether the appeal is frivolous or taken for purposes of delay.... If, however, the judgment imposes only a fine, conditional release under this section is a matter of right. (emphasis added). SDCL 23A-43-4 lists the factors the court shall consider in bail matters: In determining which conditions of release will reasonably assure appearance, a committing magistrate or court shall, on the basis of available information, take into account the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the weight of the evidence against the defendant, the defendant's family ties, employment, financial resources, character and mental condition, the length of his residence in the community, his record of convictions, his record of appearance at court proceedings or of flight to avoid prosecution or failure to appear at court proceedings, and the risk that he will flee or pose a danger to any person or to the community. [¶ 15.] First, § 23A-43-16 states that a court may release a person on bail pending appeal. With respect to legislative enactments, we have held that the word `may' in a statute should be construed in a permissive sense unless the context and subject matter indicate a different legislative intent. Person v. Peterson, 296 N.W.2d 537, 538 (S.D.1980)(per curiam) (citations omitted). Burgers makes no showing that there is any other context in which the word may should be considered. Second, at the sentencing hearing, Judge Srstka heard details on the pertinent factors listed in § 23A-43-4. We may presume, too, that the court was familiar with the file and thus knew the magistrate's earlier findings on the bond question. Because relevant evidence under § 23A-43-4 was presented to the judge, and § 23A-43-16 is a discretionary statute, we find no abuse of discretion in refusing bail pending the outcome of this appeal. [¶ 16.] Affirmed. [¶ 17.] MILLER, Chief Justice, and GILBERTSON, Justice, concur.