Opinion ID: 1793148
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: appellant's out-of-court statement

Text: Appellant alleges error in the trial court's exclusion of a statement in a police officer's report, attributed to the appellant, that she had the gun in her hand and it went off. The statement was excluded as hearsay. Appellant relies on Unif.R.Evid. 801(d): Statements which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if: (1) Prior statement by witness. The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is ... (ii) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper influence or motive ... Rule 801 does not sustain the argument, as the proffered statement does not come within the exception. For the rule to apply, the prior consistent statement must be made before a motive to falsify has arisen: [I]f the attacker has charged bias, interest, corrupt influence, contrivance to falsify, or want of capacity to observe or remember, the applicable principle is that the prior consistent statement has no relevancy to refute the charge unless the consistent statement was made before the source of the bias, interest, influence or incapacity originated. McCormick on Evidence, § 49 (1984). The same principle has been explained in other words: Some decisions also mention that the consistent statement should have been made before the witness would foresee its effect upon the fact issue. Id., n. 24. In Brown v. State, 262 Ark. 298, 556 S.W.2d 418 (1977), the defendant made the same argument. Brown testified that he was in Memphis at the time of the robbery. A witness was called to testify that Brown telephoned her that evening and said he was in Memphis. The statement was excluded as hearsay, Rule 801 having no application to the case, because Brown, if guilty, had the same motive for fabrication when he made the alleged telephone call as he had when he testified in the case. We further stated in Kitchen v. State, 271 Ark. 1, 607 S.W.2d 345 (1980), the statements were not admissible because the motive for fabrication was as great when the first statement was made as when the testimony was given. Similarly, appellant's motive in describing the shooting as an accident at the time of arrest was the same as it would be when giving that testimony at trial. The court was correct in excluding the testimony as hearsay.