Opinion ID: 6105748
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Request to hear from defendant

Text: As previously mentioned, the court learned on the second day of deliberations that the jury was deadlocked. At a hearing conducted at the end of that  court day, seven members of the deadlocked jury indicated they believed there might be something the court or the parties could do to assist them in their stalled deliberations. The judge asked the jury to resume deliberations the following morning, and to identify what would assist them, such as a rereading of certain testimony, additional argument by the parties on a particular issue, or clarification of any of the court's instructions. The next day, the jury responded to the court's invitation to identify what would help its deliberations by submitting two Jury Request forms. One of the forms asked to hear from Donald Brooks. Defense counsel moved for mistrial based on that request, arguing that the jury had disobeyed the court's guilt phase instruction not to discuss or consider defendant's failure to testify. (CALJIC No. 2.60.) 11 The court denied the mistrial motion, but accepted defense counsel's suggestion to simply  indicate to the jury that its request was denied, without further instruction or explanation regarding defendant's right not to testify. Defendant argues that the jury's request to hear from him was serious misconduct, which established that his failure to testify was part of the jury's deliberative process and its decision to return a verdict of death, in violation of his state and federal constitutional rights to silence and a reliable penalty verdict. Defendant's claim does not ultimately succeed, as explained below. We can infer from the jury's request to hear from defendant that, contrary to the court's directive, the jurors discussed the fact of defendant's failure to testify. This was misconduct, which gives rise to a presumption of prejudice. ( People v. Holloway (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1098 , 1108, 269 Cal.Rptr. 530 , 790 P.2d 1327 .) To find the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted, there must be either an affirmative evidentiary showing of no actual bias, or a determination by the reviewing court after considering [a]ll pertinent portions of the entire record, including the trial record ... ( In re Carpenter (1995) 9 Cal.4th 634 , 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ), that there is  'no substantial likelihood'  of actual harm to the defendant from the misconduct. ( Id . at p. 654, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 ; see id . at p. 657, 38 Cal.Rptr.2d 665 , 889 P.2d 985 .) Here, there is no affirmative evidentiary showing that no juror was actually biased. We can conclude from the trial record, and the record as a whole, however, that the jury drew no adverse inferences from defendant's failure to take the witness stand, and thus there was no substantial likelihood the  jury's misconduct in discussing defendant's failure to testify actually harmed  defendant. (See People v. Leonard (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1370 , 1425, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368 , 157 P.3d 973 [purpose of prohibiting jurors from considering a defendant's failure to testify is to prevent the jury from drawing adverse inferences against the defendant].) Indeed, an examination of the record as a whole strongly suggests that the jury's request to hear from defendant was a request for evidence in mitigation that would help the defense case. When the court asked the jurors to indicate what would assist them in their stalled deliberations, their response included a request to hear from defendant. But it cannot be inferred from that request that the jurors had considered defendant's failure to testify as evidence in aggravation or for the purpose of allaying any lingering doubt regarding his guilt. The jurors were already aware of highly damaging evidence against defendant. Their struggle to reach a penalty verdict under these circumstances raises a strong inference that the jury's request to hear from defendant meant it was seeking evidence in mitigation that would help defendant's case. The inference that the jury's request amounted to a plea to hear additional mitigating evidence is even stronger when viewed in light of the jury's question, following the court's denial of the request to hear from defendant, whether a single factor in mitigation could outweigh multiple factors in aggravation to justify a sentence of life without the possibility of parole. We observe, furthermore, that the defense presented an extensive case in mitigation; five witnesses testified regarding defendant's upbringing in an environment of alcohol-fueled domestic violence, his good character, and his dedication to his children. The case in mitigation therefore did not hinge on defendant's version of events, and it was not undermined by his failure to testify. The jury's penalty determination was a normative decision, not a  he said, she said choice in which a jury might be likely to construe the defendant's failure to testify as further evidence of his guilt. The jury's request to hear from defendant in this case, was  'not the same as punishing [defendant] for not testifying.'  ( People v. Leonard, supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 1425, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368 , 157 P.3d 973 .) The record discloses moreover that the jury's request to hear from defendant was made in response to the court's inquiry asking the jurors to identify what the court could do to assist them in their stalled deliberations. Significantly, any improper discussion among the jurors regarding defendant's failure to testify occurred, not during the jury's deliberative process, but rather while the jury was preparing its response to the court's request. The jurors had no reason in that context to draw an adverse inference from the fact defendant had not testified at trial. Finally, the record also shows that the court's request that the jury identify what would assist its deliberations came at the end of the court day, and that  the jury responded soon afterward on the following morning. Any discussion of defendant's failure to testify was likely to have been brief and innocuous. (Cf. People v. Loker (2008) 44 Cal.4th 691 , 749, 80 Cal.Rptr.3d 630 , 188 P.3d 580 [jurors' comments on defendant's failure to testify were brief and had no impact on their penalty determination].) Pointing to what he describes as substantial factors in mitigation, defendant argues that the jurors' improper consideration of his failure to testify pushed the jury over the edge to a death verdict. This argument ignores the prosecution's compelling evidence of defendant's controlling, possessive behavior that induced sustained and palpable fear in the victim in the months leading up to the murder, and the grisly circumstances under which the murder occurred. Defendant further asserts that because the jury's request to hear from him was refused, the jury likely held defendant's failure to testify against him when deciding penalty. Nothing in the record supports the inference defendant asks us to draw, however, as explained above. Defendant contends finally that the court's comments during its post-verdict ruling denying the automatic motion for modification of the death sentence support his argument that he was prejudiced by the jury's  misconduct in considering his failure to testify. The court observed that when it invited the jurors to indicate what would help them in their stalled deliberations, they said they would like to hear from defendant. What the jury wanted, the court believed, was to know what was the defendant's motivation when he set that car on fire. In the court's view, the answer to that question could very clearly have changed the jury's thinking about this case. The court remarked that knowing the answer to that question would have made its ruling on the motion to modify more difficult, but observed that such evidence had not been presented to the jurors for their consideration. Defendant's argument notwithstanding, the court's comments support the conclusion that the jury's misconduct did not prejudice defendant because it can be inferred that, by requesting to hear from him, the jurors were expressing the view that his testimony might have assisted [them] in understanding him better. ( People v. Leonard, supra , 40 Cal.4th at p. 1425, 58 Cal.Rptr.3d 368 , 157 P.3d 973 .) Fairly read, the court's remarks simply acknowledged that such testimony might have provided the jury with additional mitigating evidence helpful to defendant's case. Those comments do not support defendant's  argument that the jury drew adverse inferences from his failure to offer such evidence by taking the witness stand. Having considered the relevant portions of the record as a whole, we conclude that there was no substantial likelihood defendant suffered actual  harm from the jury's request to hear from him during the penalty phase, and that the presumption of prejudice has been rebutted.