Opinion ID: 773171
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Exclusion of African-American Juror

Text: 18 Hill next argues that the Government improperly used peremptory challenges to strike an African-American juror based on her race in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Under Batson, a party alleging the prosecution's racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges must first make a prima facie case of discrimination. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995). This can be done by showing circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference of racial discrimination. See United States v. Battle, 836 F.2d 1084, 1085 (8th Cir. 1987). The burden then shifts to the Government to articulate a race-neutral reason for the use of the challenge. Purkett, 514 U.S at 765. If the Government tenders such an explanation, the court must then determine whether purposeful racial discrimination has been proven or whether the prosecutor's explanation was mere pretext. Id. The district court's findings regarding pretext are findings of fact, which we review for clear error. Devoil-El v. Groose, 160 F.3d 1184, 1186 (8th Cir. 1998). 19 The Government used its peremptory challenges to remove two African- Americans from the jury pool. Hill did not challenge the removal of the first, since she had two brothers who were in prison. Hill did challenge the second removal. The prosecutor's reason for dismissing the juror was the juror's participation in church activities during her leisure time. The Government explained that the prosecutor believed that this juror might be overly sympathetic toward criminal defendants. The court concluded that the Government's actions were not discriminatory. Defendants did not argue to the district court that similarly situated white jurors were not challenged. The district court was in the best position to evaluate the truthfulness of the asserted explanation of the prosecutor, and Hill has not shown that the court clearly erred in rejecting his challenge. See United States v. Martinez, 168 F.3d 1043, 1047 (8th Cir. 1999) (prosecutor's dismissal of only minority juror not clearly erroneous when proffered reason was juror's marital status, age, and that her body position and eye contact during voir dire suggested an attitude unfavorable to the government.); United States v. Seals, 987 F.2d 1102, 1108-09 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding prosecutor's dismissal of potential juror because of extensive Bible reading in free time was an appropriate race-neutral explanation.).