Opinion ID: 197041
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act

Text: 4 We first outline the pertinent law, and then turn to the interpretation of the statutes in question.
5 At the center of this case sits the Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse. In that gender bias decision, the Court confronted a case in which the adverse employment decision resulted from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate motives. Settling a dispute among the circuits over how to deal with such mixed motive cases, see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 238 n. 2, 109 S.Ct. at 1784 n. 2, the Court determined that an employer shall not be liable if it can prove that, even if it had not taken gender into account, it would have come to the same decision regarding a particular person. Id. at 242, 109 S.Ct. at 1786. As the trial court in this case noted, [p]ut another way, the Court held that it was an affirmative defense to a charge of unlawful intentional discrimination to show that the employer would have made the same decision even in the absence of an unlawful motive. Memorandum and Order, at 3. 6 Although Price Waterhouse was a gender case under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2, the Supreme Court stated that its analysis extended to the other unlawful employment practices listed in section 2000e-2(a), namely, discrimination based on race, religion, or national origin. Id. at 244 n. 9, 109 S.Ct. at 1787 n. 9. Subsequent cases have extended the Price Waterhouse analysis to a series of other discrimination contexts, including retaliation claims. See Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1039-41 (2d Cir.1993) (analyzing Title VII retaliation claim under Price Waterhouse ); Griffiths v. CIGNA Corp., 988 F.2d 457, 468 (3d Cir.) (noting that Price Waterhouse applies to mixed motive retaliation claims), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 865, 114 S.Ct. 186, 126 L.Ed.2d 145 (1993), overruled on other grounds, Miller v. CIGNA Corp., 47 F.3d 586, 596 n. 8 (3d Cir.1995); Kenworthy v. Conoco, Inc., 979 F.2d 1462, 1470-71 (10th Cir.1992) (applying Price Waterhouse to Title VII retaliation claim). Indeed, at least one court has analyzed retaliation claims in terms of Price Waterhouse even subsequent to the passage of the 1991 Act. See Veprinsky v. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 87 F.3d 881, 893 (7th Cir.1996). However, neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has held that Price Waterhouse applies to retaliation cases. 7 However, Congress partially overruled Price Waterhouse in the 1991 Act by allowing a finding of liability and limited relief to plaintiffs in mixed motive cases. See Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, ----, 114 S.Ct. 1483, 1489, 128 L.Ed.2d 229 (1994). First, section 107(a) of that Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), determines that an employment practice is unlawful even if there are legitimate, as well as illegitimate, motivations for it. 2 Next, section 107(b) of the Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), establishes that if the plaintiff proves a violation of section 107(a), but the defendant demonstrates that it would have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor, id., the court may grant declaratory and injunctive relief as well as attorney's fees, although it cannot grant other damages, such as monetary relief or reinstatement. 3 Thus, where Price Waterhouse would have held there was no liability and so would not have allowed any damages, the 1991 Act enables an employee in at least some mixed motive cases to receive certain limited relief.
8 Tanca argues that the new mixed motive damages provision applies to all forms of employment discrimination cases, including his own retaliation claim, and we should allow him the liability finding and remedies under section 107(b) the statute permits. We are accordingly faced with an issue of statutory interpretation: do the mixed motive provisions of section 107(b) extend to Title VII retaliation claims brought under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3? 9 As always, we begin our analysis with the plain language of the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Ramrez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d 1131, 1136 (1st Cir.1996). By doing so, we immediately encounter Tanca's fundamental problem: as a retaliation claim, his suit was brought under section 2000e-3, 4 and although section 107(b) specifically addresses section 107(a), it makes no mention of section 2000e-3. Indeed, section 107(b) plainly states that it applies to a claim in which an individual proves a violation under § 2000e-2(m) [107(a) ]. Section 107(a), in turn, specifies that an unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor. 5 There is no reference to section 2000e-3 or retaliation claims in either provision. As the district court found, nothing in the 1991 Act would appear to change any rule with respect to retaliation claims which existed prior to its enactment. Memorandum and Order, at 8; cf. Sunshine Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 33 F.3d 106, 116 (1st Cir.1994) ([A] legislature's affirmative description of certain powers or exemptions implies denial of nondescribed powers or exemptions.). On its face, then, the statute seems to express an intent not to preclude application of Price Waterhouse in the context of mixed-motive retaliation cases. See Riess v. Dalton, 845 F.Supp. 742, 744 (S.D.Cal.1993) (rejecting application of section 107(b) to Title VII mixed motive retaliation claim as contrary to the plain meaning of the statute). 10 Tanca argues otherwise. He maintains that reliance on the plain meaning of the statute would be inappropriate, because the clear legislative history demonstrates that Congress intended that other employment statutes modeled after Title VII adopt its new mixed motive analysis. 6 See Greenwood Trust Co. v. Massachusetts, 971 F.2d 818, 825 (1st Cir.1992) ([A] court must always hesitate to construe words in a statute according to their apparent meaning if to do so would defeat Congress's discovered intendment.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1052, 113 S.Ct. 974, 122 L.Ed.2d 129 (1993). 11 First, he argues that, because we must presume that Congress knows of prior judicial or executive branch interpretations of a statute when it ... amends a statute, Ramrez-Ferrer, 82 F.3d at 1137, we must presume that Congress knew of the judicial practice of borrowing the order and allocations of burdens of proof developed under Title VII and applying them to retaliation cases and other employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Griffiths, 988 F.2d at 468. Therefore, the argument goes, Congress' failure to amend all other employment discrimination statutes at the same time that it amended section 2000e-2 can mean that Congress presumed that the courts would continue to borrow and apply Title VII concepts, including the newly minted mixed motive damages provision. Indeed, there is some arguable support in the legislative history for his position. The House Report from the Judiciary Committee states that 12 [t]he Committee intends that ... other laws modeled after Title VII be interpreted consistently in a manner consistent with Title VII as amended by this Act. For example, disparate impact claims under the ADA should be treated in the same manner as under Title VII. 13 H.R.Rep. No. 40(II), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697. 14 Assuming arguendo that Congress did intend the section 107 model to apply beyond Title VII, Tanca's argument still fails. Simply put, Tanca is not arguing that we borrow a Title VII concept and use it to interpret another statute, such as the ADA. Rather, he wants us to read one Title VII provision into another. He contends that Congress wanted us to do such borrowing, but it seems just as likely that because Congress knew of the judicial borrowing, in order to avoid such borrowing it specified which particular aspects of Title VII would be affected by referencing 107(a) in section 107(b). Tanca cites no legislative history that suggests otherwise. 15 This interpretation gains additional support from the fact that  '[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 300, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972)). Section 102 of the 1991 Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, provides for compensatory and punitive damages and specifies that its provisions will apply to complaining parties who bring an action under section 2000e-3--the retaliation section at issue here--as well as 2000e-2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1). Thus, because Congress addressed the retaliation section elsewhere in the 1991 Act, but chose not to do so in section 107(a) or (b), it would seem that where Congress intended to address retaliation violations, it knew how to do so and did so expressly. 7 Riess, 845 F.Supp. at 745. 16 Second, Tanca cites a series of additional passages from the legislative history in arguing that Congress intended that no part of the prior Price Waterhouse mixed motive analysis should remain in effect. As Tanca argues, statements such as the following could be read to support the premise that the 1991 Act should be read liberally as regards mixed motive cases: 17 If Title VII's ban on discrimination in employment is to be meaningful, victims of proven discrimination must be able to obtain relief, and perpetrators of discrimination must be held liable for their actions. Price Waterhouse jeopardizes that fundamental principle. 18 H.R. Rep. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 47 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 585 (Education and Labor Committee Report). 19 We need not enter into his argument in detail, however, as our review of this and the other passages of the legislative history on which Tanca seeks to rely leads us to the conclusion that Congress' intent remains unclear regarding the application of the 1991 Act to Title VII mixed motive retaliation claims. Indeed, such claims are never directly addressed in the cited legislative history.  'Absent a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary [the] language [of a statute] must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.'  Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835, 110 S.Ct. 1570, 1575, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990) (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108, 100 S.Ct. 2051, 2056, 64 L.Ed.2d 766 (1980)). Therefore, as the plain meaning of the statute is clear, and this is not a statute whose meanings ... take on different colorations when read in their legislative and historical context, Greenwood Trust Co., 971 F.2d at 826, we conclude that the mixed motive provisions of section 107 of the 1991 Act do not apply to Title VII retaliation claims brought under section 2000e-3. 20 We are conscious that our decision in this case goes against those of some federal courts that have looked at this issue. However, examination of the cases Tanca cites as support for his argument reveals that, although all of them would apply section 107(b) to Title VII mixed motive retaliation claims, and some of them examined the legislative history in drawing that conclusion, none of them weighed the plain language of the statute prior to borrowing the provision. See Beinlich v. Curry Dev., Inc., 54 F.3d 772 (table), No. 94-1465, 1995 WL 311577 (4th Cir. May 22, 1995) (unpublished disposition) (citing sections 107(b) and 2000e-3(a), without applying them, in retaliation claim); Woodson, 898 F.Supp. at 304-06 (pretext case); Hall v. City of Brawley, 887 F.Supp. 1333, 1345 (S.D.Cal.1995); Jones-Bell v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Sec., No. 95 C 948, 1995 WL 692321, at  6- 7 (N.D.Ill. Nov.20, 1995). 8 Indeed, the only case we found that examined the statute under traditional statutory interpretation methods supports our conclusions here. See Riess, 845 F.Supp. at 744-45. Nothing in the cited cases or others we have examined leads us to question our conclusion. We also believe that the Price Waterhouse rule does apply to mixed motive retaliation claims. Accordingly, we weigh the remainder of Tanca's arguments under Price Waterhouse.