Opinion ID: 222704
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Challenges to Crimes of Conviction

Text: Benner asserts that his bribery conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) is void for vagueness because people of ordinary intelligence must guess whether any 3 offer to a bank officer is prohibited. A conviction under § 215(a)(1) requires proof of “corrupt[] . . . intent to influence or reward,” and the element of corrupt intent “does much to destroy any force in the argument that application of the [statute] would be so unfair that it must be held invalid, especially with regard to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.” United States v. Awan, 966 F.2d 1415, 1424 (11th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted); see also Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489, 499, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 1193 (1982) (“[A] scienter requirement may mitigate a law’s vagueness, especially with respect to the adequacy of notice to the complainant that his conduct is proscribed.”). Benner further argues that his offense conduct, bribing a bank officer to unfreeze a bank account, is not prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) because it did not involve a loan or the procurement of a loan. To the contrary, the plain language of § 215(a)(1) prohibits bribery “in connection with any business or transaction of [a financial] institution,” not merely bribery regarding loans. Although the title of 18 U.S.C. § 215, which originally stated in 1948 “Receipt of commissions or gifts for procuring loans,” was retained when the statute was substantially broadened in 1984,1 the retention of the original title has no legal 1 See Pub. L. No. 98-473, §1107, 98 Stat. 1837, 2145-46 (1984). 4 significance absent any ambiguity in the body of the statute. See United States v. Or. & C. R. Co., 164 U.S. 526, 541, 17 S. Ct. 165, 170 (1896) (“The title is no part of an act, and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or control the words of the act unless they are doubtful or ambiguous. The ambiguity must be in the context, and not in the title, to render the latter of any avail.” (internal citations omitted)). Because § 215(a)(1) is not ambiguous, its title does not limit the conduct criminalized by the body of the statute which plainly includes the bribe for which Benner was convicted. Benner’s reliance on the canon of strict construction of criminal statutes, also known as the rule of lenity, in cabining § 215(a)(1) to bribes involving loans is also without merit. The rule of lenity is invoked only if there is a “grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the statute.” Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 139, 118 S. Ct. 1911, 1919 (1998) (quotation omitted). Because there is no ambiguity in the terms of § 215(a)(1), the rule of lenity is inapplicable here. Benner next claims that his convictions for conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and bribery of a bank officer in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) on a theory of aiding and abetting are multiplicitous in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause. The Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended where each count of conviction “requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not.” 5 Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304, 52 S. Ct. 180, 182 (1932) (quotation omitted). Benner’s conviction for conspiracy in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 required proof of an agreement, whereas the bribery conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) based on a theory of aiding and abetting did not. See United States v. Toler, 144 F.3d 1423, 1426 n.4 (11th Cir. 1998). In addition, the bribery conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 215(a)(1) required proof of a gift, offer, or promise to give anything of value to a bank officer or employee, which is not required for a conspiracy conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 371. See United States v. Hasson, 333 F.3d 1264, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003). Because each count of conviction required “proof of an additional fact which the other d[id] not,” Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304, 52 S. Ct. at 182 (quotation omitted), there was no violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause for multiplicitous offenses. For the same reason, we reject Benner’s assertion that the charged offenses prejudicially suggested to the jury that he committed several crimes instead of only one. Cf. United States v. Smith, 231 F.3d 800, 815 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] multiplicitous indictment may improperly prejudice a jury by suggesting that a defendant has committed several crimes-not one.” (quotation omitted)). Accordingly, Benner’s challenges to the validity of the charges against him 6 are without merit.