Opinion ID: 201306
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Availability of the food fishing proviso defense

Text: Appellants have a second string to their bow. They argue that by electing to charge under § 1382 instead of § 3, the government denied them the right to assert a valid jurisdictional defense since § 3 entitles them to a mandatory evidentiary hearing on whether promulgation of a danger zone would unreasonably interfere with or restrict the food fishing industry. 33 U.S.C. § 3 (the food fishing proviso). Appellants are mistaken. As we pointed out in Zenón-Rodríguez, 289 F.3d at 35, since 1993 the authority to promulgate danger zone regulations has resided in both 33 U.S.C. § 1 and 33 U.S.C. § 3, since 33 C.F.R. § 334.3(b) contains a food fishing proviso substantially identical to that in 33 U.S.C. § 3. 3 33 C.F.R. § 334.3(b) applies to 33 C.F.R. § 334.1470. Id. For purposes of the application of the food fishing proviso, it is therefore immaterial whether the charge is under § 3 or § 1382. Appellants sought an evidentiary hearing in the district court on the issue of whether the designated danger zone unreasonably interfered with or restricted the food fishing industry in the area, offering extensive evidence. 4 The district court denied the hearing. Appellants now contend that this was error requiring that the convictions be vacated. 1 The district court reasoned that Zenón-Rodríguez disposed of appellants' claim, stating that 2 the Court of Appeals has held that 33 C.F.R. § 334.1470 would have been validly promulgated under either 33 U.S.C. § 1 or 33 U.S.C. § 3, because the existence of 33 C.F.R. § 334.3(b) ensures that the requirements of the food fishing proviso will be applicable to the danger zone established in 33 C.F.R. § 334.1470, regardless of whether it was promulgated under 33 U.S.C. § 3 or 33 U.S.C. § 1.... Given the First Circuit's recent decision regarding the very issue raised before the Court by Defendants, we must find that we need not remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the food fishing proviso issue. 3 Zenón, 285 F.Supp.2d at 114. The district court misapprehended the holding of Zenón-Rodríguez. That case rejected a challenge to prosecution under § 1382 on the ground that the danger zone regulation had been promulgated under 33 U.S.C. § 1, which lacked a food fishing proviso limiting the discretion of the Secretary of the Army, and not under 33 U.S.C. § 3, which contained such a proviso. 289 F.3d at 35. It did not reach the question whether the defendants were entitled to an evidentiary hearing under the food fishing proviso, the court having found that the appellants had forfeited the issue. 4 We addressed this issue squarely in Saade I, in which we held that defendants were entitled to challenge the validity of the danger zone regulation under the food fishing proviso, stating that the district court had an obligation to ascertain whether the Secretary had complied with the proviso when issuing the regulation. 652 F.2d at 1134. We remanded for further proceedings to determine whether 33 C.F.R. § 204.234 unreasonably interfered with the food fishing industry. On remand, the district court declined to hold an evidentiary hearing and decided the case in favor of the government on the administrative record. On appeal, we again remanded, stating: 5 It is plain to us that the district court erred in refusing to hold the evidentiary hearing that the defendants requested. We remanded for that very purpose.... We recognize that, in recent years, parties challenging the validity of a regulation often do so at the time it is issued, on the basis of the administrative record. But, an older and still valid legal tradition allows a party to wait, challenging the regulation's validity when the agency seeks to enforce the regulation. Then, if the claim of invalidity requires an evidentiary hearing, the court may permit the creation of an appropriate factual record. That is what we ordered. We therefore reiterate that appellants may present evidence designed to show that the regulation unreasonably interfered with the food fishing industry. 6 United States v. Saade ( Saade II ), 800 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir.1986) (Breyer, J.) (citations omitted). 7 Saade II remains good law. Indeed, far from undermining the decision by repeal of its regulations, the Army Corps of Engineers has since amended the relevant regulations, see 33 C.F.R. § 334.3(b); 58 Fed. Reg. 37,607 (July 12, 1993), clarifying and reinforcing the application of the food fishing proviso to all danger zone and restricted area regulations. 58 Fed.Reg. 37,607 (July 12, 1993); see Zenón-Rodríguez, 289 F.3d at 35 (stating that the added provision changed the regulatory context ... significantly).