Opinion ID: 874358
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The District Court Properly Denied Van's Motion for Reconsideration

Text: Van contends that the district court erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of the court's protective order regarding the COMP contract because it was relevant to Van's claims of waste. PMC asserts that the COMP contract is irrelevant because Van's concerns regarding potential public waste have proven unfounded. PMC also points out that when it first filed its motion for a protective order, Van failed to object. It was not until six months later that Van filed his motion for reconsideration. PMC's motion for a protective order  which included Van's Request for Production of the COMP contract  was granted on March 16, 2007. Van did not oppose the motion, and the district court entered the order on the grounds that the requests were duplicative, burdensome, and irrelevant. On September 10, 2007, Van moved the district court to reconsider its order protecting the COMP contract from discovery. Van argued that the production of the COMP contract was not burdensome because the request was specific and limited in scope, it was not duplicative because its contents had not been discovered, and it was relevant because it related to his whistleblower claim that the COMP contract was a waste of taxpayer money. The district court heard both the motion for summary judgment and the motion for reconsideration at the same hearing, and dealt with both motions in the same decision. After discussing the issues presented in PMC's motion for summary judgment, the district court stated: This Court also DENIES [Van's] Motion for Reconsideration since [PMC] prevailed on the summary judgment motion, and [Van's] concerns regarding the COMP contract were unfounded. In its earlier discussion of Van's argument that PMC's failure to incorporate his recommendations into the COMP contract resulted in waste, the district court found that Van had presented no evidence demonstrating that the COMP contract had resulted in any actual waste. Therefore, the district court ruled that Van had failed to show a prima facie case on this part of his whistleblower claim. A decision of whether to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration made pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11(a)(2)(B) is left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M. & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 208, 212, 177 P.3d 955, 959 (2008). In reviewing whether a trial court abused its discretion, this Court applies a three-part test, which asks whether the district court: (1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of that discretion; and (3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id. Further, whether or not to grant a motion for a protective order is discretionary. Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 104, 996 P.2d 798, 804 (2000). While the district court did not expressly state it recognized that its decision on Van's motion for reconsideration was discretionary, the court nonetheless perceived the issue as such. Likewise, the district court acted within the outer boundaries of its discretion and reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Although the court based its decision on the substantive law  namely, whether or not Van's assertions regarding the COMP contract constituted a protected activity under the Whistleblower Act  the court's ruling effectively concluded that the COMP contract was irrelevant because it was not related to a protected activity. Production of the COMP contract would not establish facts proving that the COMP contract resulted in waste. The discussion above explains why Van's report regarding the COMP contract is not a protected activity under the Whistleblower Act and therefore the issue is irrelevant and the district court properly denied Van's motion for reconsideration.