Opinion ID: 3171468
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence of a Prior Uncharged Act

Text: Fama challenges the district court’s grant of the Government’s pretrial motion to admit evidence relating to a prior uncharged act. The evidence at issue is the testimony of Mannino, who became a cooperating witness and testified against Fama at trial. Mannino testified that he and Fama committed the bank robbery, and he provided details about the events preceding, during, and following the robbery. Specifically, Mannino recounted that on the day of the robbery, while he and Fama were in his car deciding whether to rob a bank, Fama suggested the Capital One Bank because it did not “have a [bulletproof glass] window,” and because “he robbed that bank previously some years back and it was successful. He got caught but he got away with it.” Trial Tr. 448-49. Mannino further testified that Fama also explained how the robbery should proceed: “He told me as we go into the bank, he was going to hold everyone down with the gun and I was going to jump over the counter. And he says, [a]s I’m running in they’re probably going to lock the drawers, the teller drawers, and for me to just ask them to open them.” Trial Tr. 449. As Mannino testified, the two then proceeded to rob the Capital One Bank in that manner. The Government filed a motion seeking, in relevant part, to admit Fama’s statement to Mannino that he had robbed the same physical bank in the past “and had ‘gotten away with it.’”1 A25. Fama opposed the motion partly on the basis that evidence of a prior uncharged bank robbery by Fama constituted impermissible propensity evidence. The district court granted the Government’s motion, reasoning that “the statement explain[ed] why Fama would have chosen 1 Fama was a suspect in the investigation of the January 18, 2000, robbery of a Greenpoint Savings Bank branch that was located at the site of the present-day Capital One Bank. The execution of a search warrant at Fama’s home on January 26, 2000, in connection with that investigation, resulted in the recovery of firearms that Fama, as a convicted felon, could not lawfully possess. Fama was charged and convicted with the unlawful possession of these weapons, but was never charged with the robbery of the Greenpoint Savings Bank. While incarcerated for the firearms offense, Fama met Mannino, who at the time was serving a twelve-year sentence for bank robbery. 3 to rob the Capital One Bank as opposed to any other bank.” A55. It demonstrated his “motive and intent to rob this particular bank” and not another bank in the vicinity. A55-56. To that end, the statement showed Fama’s “knowledge of the physical layout of the bank, including entrances and exits.” A55. Last, the court also determined that the statement “tend[ed] to show opportunity in that he previously robbed the bank and believed he could do it again.” A56. On appeal, Fama contends that the district court abused its discretion by admitting Mannino’s testimony into evidence. Fama argues that the testimony was inadmissible for a purpose other than to show a propensity to commit the charged bank robbery, that the probative weight of the testimony did not outweigh the danger of unfair prejudice, and that the district court’s limiting instruction did not abate the risk that the jury would use the testimony for an improper purpose. The Government argues, inter alia, that this Court can affirm on an independent ground: that the testimony was admissible because “‘it arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense, [and] is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense, or . . . necessary to complete the story of the crime on trial.’” Gov’t Br. 35 (quoting United States v. Alvarez, 541 Fed. App’x 80, 85 (2d Cir. 2013) (summary order)). This Circuit reviews a district court’s evidentiary rulings with deference and reverses only if it finds an abuse of discretion. United States v. Cuti, 720 F.3d 453, 457 (2d Cir. 2013). A district court abuses its discretion if its evidentiary rulings are “based on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or if its decision cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions.” Id. We have explained that evidence of uncharged criminal conduct, if it is “‘inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged 4 offense,’” is not evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” under Rule 404(b). United States v. Quinones, 511 F.3d 289, 309 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989)). Rather, if it “‘complete[s] the story of the crime on trial,’” id. (quoting Towne, 870 F.2d at 886), then the evidence of the uncharged act is properly “treated as ‘part of the very act charged,’ or, at least, as proof of that act,” id. (quoting United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 392 (2d Cir. 1992)). We may affirm on any ground so long as it is clearly supported in the record. Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 154 (2d Cir. 2001). In this case, the record is clear that Mannino’s testimony is “inextricably intertwined” with the evidence supporting the Government’s case for the charged offenses. Mannino’s testimony about Fama’s comments to him (which was the only evidence related to Fama’s participation in the earlier bank robbery that the jury heard) explained the robbers’ choice of which bank to rob. Fama made the comments, in fact, immediately before the commission of the crime while the two were planning the robbery. Mannino’s testimony also shed light on why the two men went to the Capital One Bank in particular—because Fama knew that it did not have bulletproof glass teller windows, based on the previous successful robbery—and how they came to agree on how to commit the upcoming robbery (in which Fama was to hold everyone down with the gun, and Mannino would jump over the counter). Indeed, drawing on Fama’s past experience, Fama and Mannino proceeded to commit the robbery at the Capital One Bank in precisely the manner on which they had agreed. In such circumstances, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the testimony into evidence. The brief testimony “‘complete[d] the story of the crime on trial.’” Quinones, 511 F.3d at 309 (quoting Towne, 870 F.2d at 886). And the district court properly instructed that the evidence could not be used “as proof that the defendant has a 5 criminal personality or bad character.” G.A. 95. Thus, the district court did not err in permitting the jury to consider it.