Opinion ID: 1133528
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Circuit Court Reversibly Erred By Failing To Instruct The Jury Regarding The Intentional State of Mind Requisite To Proving, Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, The Valuation Element Of The Offense Of Theft In The Second Degree.

Text: In State v. Mitchell, 88 Hawai`i 216, 965 P.2d 149 (App.1998), the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) analyzed the elements of theft in the second degree as follows: Generally, under HRS § 708-830 (1993): Theft. A person commits theft if the person does any of the following: (1) Obtains or exerts unauthorized control over property. A person obtains, or exerts control over, the property of another with intent to deprive the other of the property. (Emphasis added.) Pursuant to HRS § 702-207 (1993), [5] the state of mind of intent applies to each material element of the offense. See also HRS § 702-204 (1993) (providing that a person is not guilty of an offense unless the person acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense); HRS § 702-205 (1993) and commentary (providing that the state-of-mind element specified for the offense applies to the conduct, attendant circumstances, and results of conduct). The elements of second degree theft [as charged in the present case] are outlined in HRS § 708-831, in relevant part, as: Theft in the second degree. (1) A person commits the offense of theft in the second degree if the person commits theft: (a) Of property from the person of another; (b) Of property or services the value of which exceeds $300;.... The material elements of theft in the second degree [as charged in the present case] are, therefore, that the defendant intended to: (1) obtain or exert unauthorized control over the property of another, HRS § 708-830(1); (2) deprive the other of his or her property, id; and (3) deprive another of property that exceeds $300 in value (valuation element). HRS § 708-831(1)(b). The State must prove each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt in order to make a prima facie showing of theft. HRS § 701-114 (1993); [6] State v. Gaylord, 78 Hawai`i 127, 136, 890 P.2d 1167, 1176 (1995) (holding the same in regards to HRS § 708-830(6)(a) (1993)). .... In regard to the third, valuation element, the defendant's state of mind is critical. Under Hawai`i theft provisions, which follow the Model Penal Code (MPC), see HRS § 708-830-833 commentary, the defendant's state of mind with regard to the value of the property determines the grade of the offense, and thus also determines the sentencing that will be imposed upon him or her. Id.; MPC § 223.1(3)(a) and (c) comment on grading of theft provisions (Official Draft 1980). As the MPC notes, The amount involved in a theft has criminological significance only if it corresponds with what the thief expected or hoped to get. To punish on the basis of actual harm rather than on the basis of foreseen or desired harm is to measure the extent of criminality by fortuity. MPC § 223.1(3)(c) comment on grading of theft provisions (emphasis added). This is primarily because: Putting a ceiling on punishment of petty theft accords with the almost universal present practice and with popular feeling. The ordinary individual feels lesser repugnance to the taking of smaller rather than larger amounts. Thus, the petty thief evinces a lesser departure from normal standards from respect for others' property; he [or she] is presumably not as hardened or dangerous. Shorter sentences should be sufficient to deter those who have not as much to gain. On the other hand, longer sentences are called for in the case of offenders who realize greater sums. Escalation of penalty according to amount stolen decreases the incentive for crime that greater profits might induce. Id. at § 223.1(3)(a) comment on grading of theft provisions. In order to establish a defendant's culpability for second degree theft, therefore, the State must prove that a defendant intended to steal the statutorily defined value, in this case $300, of the alleged property or services. Id. at 222-23, 965 P.2d at 155-56 (some footnotes in original and some omitted) (some emphasis added and some in original). We adopt the ICA's analysis. The language of HRS § 708-830 is plain and unambiguous. [7] In this connection, and notwithstanding the circuit court's mistaken belief that the legislative intent in shoplifting ... was not to apply the state of mind to value, the terms of HRS § 708-830 contrast sharply with the statute at issue in State v. Buch, 83 Hawai`i 308, 926 P.2d 599 (1996), in which a majority of this court held that HRS § 707-732(1)(b) (1993) imposed strict liability with respect to the attendant circumstance of the age of a victim of a sexual assault in the third degree. Id. at 316, 926 P.2d at 607. That statute provides in pertinent part that [a] person commits the offense of sexual assault in the third degree if ... [t]he person knowingly subjects to sexual contact another person who is less than fourteen years old or causes such a person to have sexual contact with the person. Thus, analogously to the statute at issue in the instant matter, HRS § 707-732(1)(b) does not expressly specify the requisite state of mind with respect to the relevant attendant circumstance. Id. at 317, 926 P.2d at 608. However, the legislative history unequivocally indicated that where the age of the victim [wa]s an element of a sexual offense, the specified state of mind [wa]s not intended to apply to that element. Id. at 316, 926 P.2d at 607. Accordingly, relying on HRS § 702-207, which, as we have indicated supra at note 5, provides that [w]hen the definition of an offense specifies the state of mind sufficient for the commission of that offense, without distinguishing among the elements thereof, the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears, (emphasis added), the Buch majority held that, in view of the clearly stated legislative purpose, knowledge of the age of the victim was not an element of sexual assault in the third degree. Id. at 317-20, 926 P.2d at 608-11. By contrast, in the present matter, the legislative history specific to HRS ch. 708, pt. IV, entitled Theft and Related Offenses, appears to be silent as to what state of mind the legislature intended to require with regard to the valuation element of the offense of theft. However, a reading of HRS §§ 708-830(8)(a) and 708-831(1)(b) in pari materia, see HRS § 1-16, supra section II.B, with HRS §§ 708-801(4) and (5) (1993 & Supp.1998), against the backdrop of HRS §§ 702-204, 702-205, and 702-206 (1993), sheds some light on the subject. HRS § 702-205 provides: Elements of an offense. The elements of an offense are such (1) conduct, (2) attendant circumstances, and (3) results of conduct, as: (a) Are specified by the definition of the offense, and (b) Negative a defense (other than a defense based on the statute of limitations, lack of venue, or lack of jurisdiction). (Emphasis added.) In this connection, value... which exceeds $300, for purposes of HRS § 708-831(1)(b) (the second degree theft statute under which Cabrera was charged and of which he was convicted), is an attendant circumstance of the conduct i.e., the concealment or taking possession of the goods or merchandise of any store or retail establishmentproscribed by HRS § 708-830(8)(a), which defines the form of theft with which Cabrera was charged and of which he was convicted; put differently, value in excess of $300.00 is the attendant circumstance element of the second degree theft offense, within the meaning of HRS § 702-205. And by virtue of HRS § 702-204, the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or negligently, as the law specifies, with respect to each element of the offense, including any specified attendant circumstance. HRS § 708-801 provides in relevant part: Valuation of property. Whenever the value of property or services is determinative of the class or grade of an offense, or otherwise relevant to a prosecution, the following shall apply: .... (4) When acting intentionally ... with respect to the value of property or services is required to establish an element of an offense, the value of property or services shall be prima facie evidence [8] that the defendant believed ... the property or services to be of that value.... (5) When acting intentionally ... with respect to the value of property or services is required to establish an element of an offense, it is a defense, which reduces the class or grade of the offense consistent with the defendant's state of mind, that the defendant believed the valuation of the property or services to be less.... (Emphases added.) In this regard, HRS § 702-206(1)(b) provides that [a] person acts intentionally with respect to attendant circumstances when he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or believes or hopes that they exist. (Emphases added.) Accordingly, pursuant to the statutory canon of construction of in pari materia, as codified in HRS § 1-16, see supra section II.B, the express terms of HRS §§ 708-801(4) and (5) would seem to establish that the legislature intended unambiguously that the requisite state of mind regarding the attendant circumstance of value, for purposes of HRS §§ 708-830(8)(a) and 708-831(1)(b), see supra note 1, is intent. Moreover, even if there were some doubt or ambiguity with respect to the requisite state of mind, we have recognized that [a]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity. [ Busic v. United States, 446 U.S. 398, 406, 100 S.Ct. 1747, 1752-53, 64 L.Ed.2d 381 (1980).] This policy of lenity means that the [c]ourt will not interpret a [state] criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what [the legislature] intended. Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 914, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1978). State v. Soto, 84 Hawai`i 229, 248-49, 933 P.2d 66, 85-86 (1997) (quoting State v. Kaakimaka, 84 Hawai`i 280, 292, 933 P.2d 617, 629 (1997))(some brackets added and some in original). Hence, insofar as HRS § 708-830(8)(a) expressly recites that intent to defraud (emphasis added) is the state of mind requisite to the commission of theft by shoplifting, and in light of HRS § 702-207, which provides in relevant part that the specified state of mind shall apply to all elements of the offense, unless a contrary purpose plainly appears, see supra note 5, it would follow, in any event, that the intentional state of mind attaches to all of the elements of the offense, including the attendant circumstance of the value of the property taken. This is precisely the conclusion that the Mitchell court reached with respect to second degree theft, in violation of HRS §§ 708-830(1) and 708-831(1)(b). 88 Hawai`i at 222-23, 965 P.2d at 155-56 (Pursuant to HRS § 702-207 (1993), the state of mind of `intent' applies to each material element of the offense.... In order to establish a defendant's culpability for second degree theft, therefore, the [prosecution] must prove that a defendant intended to steal the statutorily defined value, in this case $300, of the alleged property or services. (Footnote omitted.)). Accordingly, we hold that, in order to convict a defendant of theft in the second degree, in violation of HRS §§ 708-830(8)(a) and 708-831(1)(b), the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to steal property or services valued in excess of $300.00. The circuit court's instructions in the present matter did not adequately so instruct the jury. While it is true that the only state of mind about which the jury was instructed was intentional, the facial application of that state of mind in Jury Instruction No. 19 exclusively to the intent to defraud portion of the charged second degree theft offense may well have misled the jury into believing that the prosecution was not required to prove the same requisite state of mind with respect to the value of the stolen property. Inasmuch as there is a reasonable possibility that this error contributed to Cabrera's conviction of second degree theft, the judgment against him must be vacated and the matter remanded for a new trial.