Opinion ID: 3188458
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant’s Claims for Declaratory Judgment

Text: a) PECF’s Corporate Status Appellant contends that the trial court was without authority to enforce the payment provision in the 2009-10 re-enrollment contract because PECF is not validly incorporated and therefore its actions, being ultra vires, have no legal effect. His argument is that because PECF was originally chartered by Congress for the purpose of “promot[ing] religion,” its government charter is prohibited by the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, and, a fortiori, Congress did not have the authority to create PECF. The trial court denied appellant‟s first motion for partial summary judgment, which sought to establish that PECF was not validly incorporated, and granted appellees‟ motion for summary judgment on that claim, concluding that no issue of material fact existed regarding PECF‟s incorporation status and that appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on that issue. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellees on the issue of PECF‟s incorporation status because the evidence of record establishes that PECF is properly incorporated as a nonprofit corporation under the law of the District of Columbia. There is therefore no need to address appellant‟s First 18 Amendment challenge, based on PECF‟s original congressional charter. Although PECF was originally chartered by Congress in 1893, Act of Jan. 6, 52 Cong. Ch. 20, 27 Stat. 414 (1893), the evidence of record is that it was re-incorporated in 1998 under the District of Columbia Nonprofit Corporation Act (Act), D.C. Code §§ 29-401 et seq. (2012 Repl.).5 The Act allows for the incorporation of nonprofit organizations for “any lawful purpose,” D.C. Code § 29-403.01, including religious organizations or organizations with religious purposes. D.C. Code § 29401.02 (4) & (32); -403.01.6 Once the articles of incorporation are filed, a business entity is incorporated under the Act. D.C. Code § 29-402.03 (b) (“The filing of the articles of incorporation . . . is conclusive proof that the incorporators satisfied all conditions precedent to incorporation . . . .”). Appellees submitted Parker‟s affidavit, dated April 28, 2010, which attested to PECF‟s incorporation under the Act in 1998 and attached PECF‟s Certificate of Acceptance of the terms of the 5 At the time PECF incorporated under District of Columbia law, the Act was codified at D.C. Code §§ 29-301.01 et seq. (2001 & 2007 Supp.). The Act has since been amended and recodified at D.C. Code §§ 29-401 et seq. (2012 Repl.). For ease of reference, we use the current codification where it is substantively unchanged with respect to the relevant provisions cited. 6 Appellant makes no argument that the Act‟s provisions for religious organizations violate the First Amendment‟s Establishment Clause. See Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653 (1980). (“[A] legislative enactment does not contravene the Establishment Clause if it has a secular legislative purpose, if its principal or primary effect neither advances nor inhibits religion, and if it does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.”). 19 Act.7 Appellant has not presented evidence controverting that PECF is incorporated under the Act. Consequently, the evidence of record supports that PECF is a valid District of Columbia nonprofit corporation. The trial court therefore properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellees because there was no disputed issue of fact regarding PECF‟s corporate status, and appellees were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the question of whether they may enter into and enforce contracts.8 See D.C. Code § 20-403.02 (2012 Repl.) (setting out that powers of nonprofit corporation are “the same powers as an individual to do all things necessary or convenient to carry out its affairs”). b. Harriet Lane Johnston’s Bequest Appellant contends that St. Albans School was required to permit choristers to attend the school without paying tuition, pursuant to the bequest of Harriet Lane 7 In 1998, the Act provided that upon the issuance of a Certificate of Acceptance, a corporation “shall be entitled to and be possessed of all of the privileges and powers and franchises and be subject to all of the provisions of this chapter as fully and to the same extent as if such corporation had been originally incorporated under this chapter. . . .” D.C. Code § 29-599.6 (1998) (repealed 2012). 8 We also question whether appellant has standing to challenge PECF‟s actions as ultra vires; appellees, however, have not made this argument. See D.C. Code § 29-403.04 (prohibiting challenges to validity of nonprofit corporation‟s actions as ultra vires except by certain specified individuals, e.g., the Attorney General, directors, members of the corporation). 20 Johnston that provided for the establishment of the School. Appellant contends that the 1903 Codicil to Ms. Johnston‟s Will requires the School to offer free education to all choir boys that serve the National Cathedral. The Codicil states: Whereas, by a codicil to my said will, the said codicil being dated June tenth, 1899, I have bequeathed to the Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation the sum of two hundred thousand dollars ($200,000.), upon certain trusts in said codicil set forth; Now I hereby modify said bequest by increasing the same to the sum of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.) and by these further provisions, namely: That not more than one half of the said sum, that is not exceeding one hundred and fifty thousand dollars ($150,000) shall be used for construction of the building, which is to be known as the “Lane Johnston Building” the site for which and the necessary appurtenant grounds for which are to be provided by the said Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation, and the balance of said sum of three hundred thousand dollars ($300,000.) not used for the construction of the said building shall be invested by said Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation as an Endowment fund to be known as the “Lane Johnston Fund” and the income to be used for the maintenance of said school for boys. While not restricting the general objects of said School it is my wish that the said school shall be so conducted and the said Fund so applied as specifically to provide for the free maintenance, education and training of Choir-boys, primarily those in the service of the Cathedral. Reposing special confidence in the discretion in this regard of the Rev. Philip M. Rhinelander, I further direct that he shall have charge and supervision of the selection of the site for and the construction of the said School building and of the organization and management of the School, but in the event of his death or inability or declination to act the whole of said matters are committed to the said 21 Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Foundation. (Emphasis added to highlight provision relied upon by appellant). The trial court denied appellant‟s motion for partial summary judgment, and granted appellee‟s motion, on the interpretation and effect of Ms. Johnston‟s Codicil, concluding that the language in the Codicil was precatory rather than mandatory. Appellant argues that the trial court‟s conclusion that the language of the Codicil was precatory misinterprets Harriet Lane Johnston‟s intent. To determine the testator‟s intent, the court looks first to the language of the document; it will consider extrinsic evidence only if the language is ambiguous. See Davis v. Davis, 471 A.2d 1008, 1009 (D.C. 1984) (holding that trial court properly construed the language of the will as unambiguous and that extrinsic evidence was therefore not necessary). The trial court considered only the language of the document and did not find it to be ambiguous. Therefore, no extrinsic evidence was considered. Appellant does not argue that the Codicil‟s language is ambiguous and extrinsic evidence should have been considered. Thus, as no issue was presented that required fact-finding by a jury, the matter was properly considered for summary judgment. See Davis, 471 A.2d at 1009. Interpretation of the language of a will within the four corners of the document, as with interpretation of a contract, is a question of law for the court. See Wyman v. 22 Roesner, 439 A.2d 516, 523 n.6 (D.C. 1981). Thus, we review the court‟s interpretation of the Codicil de novo. Generally, a court will interpret a provision addressed to the executor of a will as a mandatory directive concerning the disposition of the bequest, while language presented as a “wish” directed to the devisees is merely precatory (i.e., the expression of a preference rather than a mandatory directive or command) and does not control the disposition of the property. Davis, 471 A.2d at 1009; see also Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 464 A.2d 87, 91-92 (D.C. 1983) (noting that the nature of the language—whether it was mandatory or precatory—is a factor the court uses to determine if an individual intended to create a trust). We agree with the trial court that the Codicil is unambiguous and precatory with respect to Ms. Johnston‟s “wish” for the free education of choristers. As an initial matter, in the portion of the Codicil on which appellant relies (highlighted above) Ms. Johnston was addressing the devisee under the Will, PECF, rather than the executor. Moreover, this section of the Codicil states how Ms. Johnston “wish[es]” that the bequest be used by PECF in the operation of the school. The language of the Codicil itself demonstrates that Ms. Johnston was capable of distinguishing—and did distinguish—between precatory and mandatory language. In comparison to the surrounding language in the Codicil and the rest of the Will, 23 the provision in the Codicil that refers to free education for choir boys is precatory. For example, with regard to the increase in the bequest sum, the erection of the building, the establishment of the school, and selection of the supervisor for the building of the school, Ms. Johnston used clear mandatory language such as “shall” and “I direct.” By contrast, the language in the clause concerning the “free maintenance, education and training of Choir-boys” is preceded by the language “it is my wish” and is further conditioned (“[w]hile not restricting the general objects of said School”), signifying that PECF is to have discretion in how the bequested funds are used in the operation of the school. It is thus apparent that although Ms. Johnston‟s intent was to require that one half of the bequest be used to build the school and the other half to maintain and operate the school, she expressed a preference, if feasible in conjunction with the operation of the school, that choir boys be able to attend without paying tuition. Similarly, the language of the rest of Ms. Johnston‟s Will demonstrates measured and deliberate use of mandatory language, see, e.g., Johnston Will at 9 para. 569 (using “I charge” and “shall”); 9 para. 57 (using “I direct” and “shall”); 11 para. 67 (using “[i]t is my will” and “shall”), which contrasts with the use of other clearly conditional language in the Will, see, e.g., id. at 3 para. 21 (using “upon condition that”), and the “wish” 9 Like the trial court, we refer to the numbered pages in the version of the Will filed in the trial court, as well as the paragraph number, as counted by the trial court. 24 language in the Codicil. We agree with the trial court that the language of Ms. Johnston‟s bequest is unambiguous and does not mandate that choristers attend St. Albans School tuition-free. c. Promise of choral stipend Appellant‟s complaint alleged that “as an inducement to commit to the Chorister program” appellees promised to pay forty-five percent of tuition at St. Albans School if A.B.S. agreed to join the National Cathedral choir. The complaint sought a declaratory judgment that appellees were bound by their promise and had breached it when the chorister stipend was reduced to twentyeight percent in 2009-10. The trial court granted summary judgment to appellees on this claim, ruling that appellant had not presented evidence that created a question of fact as to whether such a promise was made and that the evidence appellant had presented would not support a jury verdict in his favor. Appellant contends that his affidavit suffices to defeat summary judgment. In the affidavit appellant states that the National Cathedral‟s Music Director Michael McCarthy promised a choral stipend at least in the amount of forty-five 25 percent of A.B.S.‟s tuition. The alleged promise took two forms, a letter dated February 28, 2008, and an oral statement. This evidence is insufficient, as a matter of law, to base a judgment for appellant. The letter to appellant from McCarthy concerned the 2008-09 school year, and did not constitute a binding promise; rather, McCarthy stated that, although the scholarship amounts had not been determined, the National Cathedral hoped that the stipend would amount to fortyfive percent of that year‟s tuition. (“At the time of writing this letter the value of the scholarship for 2008-2009 has not been confirmed. However, we are hopeful that you should expect somewhere between 43% - 45% of the annual fees for St. Albans School, as determined by the Cathedral.”). By its terms, McCarthy‟s letter did not create a binding promise—but expressed a “hope”—that National Cathedral would provide such a stipend, and made clear that the amount was yet to be “determined by the Cathedral.” A.B.S. did, in fact, receive a stipend in that range (forty-three percent) for the 2008-09 school year, and appellant makes no claim with respect to the 2008-09 stipend. As appellant states in his affidavit of July 28, 2010, the National Cathedral informed him in February of 2009 that the chorister stipend for the 2009-10 school year would be reduced to twenty-eight percent, which prompted appellant to apply for financial aid, which he received. Appellant‟s statement that McCarthy also made an oral promise does not fill the evidentiary gap. Appellant‟s affidavit of May 5, 2010, filed in opposition to appellees‟ first motion for partial summary judgment alleges that McCarthy told 26 him “in the summer and fall of 2007 and the spring of 2008. . . that the Chorister Stipend was presently 45% of the Defendant St. Albans School tuition and that it was likely to increase.” This alleged statement arguably could be interpreted as referring to future years. As with the letter, however, appellant‟s statement about what McCarthy allegedly said is not a promise but a guess (or hope) about the “likely” value of future stipends for choristers. Neither McCarthy‟s letter nor his statement, or both together, would permit a reasonable jury to find that appellees made a binding promise that A.B.S. would receive a stipend worth forty-five percent of tuition each year he was a chorister. We, therefore, agree with the trial court‟s grant of summary judgment to appellees on the claim of breach of promise.10