Opinion ID: 760360
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Unlawful Electioneering

Text: 36 Another of FSA's objections was that Union supporters and agents engaged in unlawful electioneering, coercion, intimidation and interference in the vicinity of the polling place during the election. J.A. at 45. We believe that the Board reasonably concluded that the electioneering at Bryant Street on the day of the election was within the permissible range. 37 The Board has repeatedly declined to impose a zero-tolerance rule on voting day electioneering. See Overnite Transp. Co. v. NLRB, 140 F.3d 259, 269 (D.C.Cir.1998) (citing Boston Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 259 N.L.R.B. 1118, 1118, 1982 WL 24165 (1982), enforced, 703 F.2d 876 (5th Cir.1983)); see also NLRB v. Duriron Co., 978 F.2d 254, 256 (6th Cir.1992) ( 'Laboratory conditions' are not always achieved in practice, and elections are not automatically voided whenever they fall short of perfection.). Instead, the Board considers a range of factors and circumstances in determining whether electioneering activity is sufficient to justify overturning an election. Overnite Transp., 140 F.3d at 269. The Board has considerable discretion to determine whether the circumstances of an election have enabled employees to exercise free choice in casting their ballots. Id. When prolonged conversations between representatives of any party to the election and voters waiting to cast ballots take place, Milchem, Inc., 170 N.L.R.B. 362, 362 (1968), the Board will order a new election. Cf. NLRB v. Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc., 823 F.2d 1135 (7th Cir.1987) (Milchem does not require new election when union representative spoke with employees lined up on sidewalk before polls open). 38 But where, as here, the electioneering did not involve union agents, the Board will overturn the election only if the electioneering 'substantially impaired the exercise of free choice.'  Overnite Transp., 140 F.3d at 270 (citing Del Rey Tortilleria, 823 F.2d at 1140 (citation omitted)). 39 The Board generally considers the nature and extent of the electioneering, whether it happened within a designated no electioneering area, whether it was contrary to the instructions of the Board's election agent, whether a party to the election objected to it, and whether a party to the election engaged in it. 40 Id. at 270. In this case, the Board agent did not designate a no-electioneering zone outside of the lunchroom. FSA urges us to consider Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of Petersburg, Inc. v. Local Lodge 10, 291 N.L.R.B. 578, 1988 WL 214192 (1988), in which the Board found that unlawful electioneering had occurred within a prima facie no-electioneering zone even though none had been established before the election. In Pepsi-Cola Bottling, however, the Board determined that this no electioneering zone existed where employees waited in line to vote. By contrast, as the Board correctly found in the instant case, employees did not wait outside the lunchroom to vote. There was thus no area where employees stood as a captive audience, waiting to cast their ballots, that should have been considered off-limits as a matter of law. Applying the other factors, the employees did not act contrary to any of the instructions of a Board agent, see Star Expansion Indus. Corp., 170 N.L.R.B. 364, 1968 WL 18777 (1968) (agent of union asked to leave no-electioneering zone three times). Nor does FSA contend that it objected to the activities of the Union's supporters at the time employees entered or exited the voting place. 41 Finally, the general nature and extent of the electioneering in this case did not substantially impair employees' ability to exercise free will at the ballot box. The Board reasonably found that the combined effect of the relatively brief interludes of electioneering by teachers as voters exited and entered classrooms 5 and 7/9, as well as Martinez' occasional comments as he sat outside the lunchroom waiting to vote, was not coercive. Compare Claussen Baking Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 111, 1961 WL 15136 (1961) (prolonged antiunion discussion between a leadman and several new employees within 15 feet of the poll in no-electioneering zone, with a plant manager standing nearby, and which was stopped only by intervention of the Board agent, required that election be set aside), with Duriron, 978 F.2d at 258 (no new election where pro-union employees gathered in hallways for an hour during voting period within 15 to 20 feet of polling place and discussed pro-union position with employees in their work areas); Boston Insulated Wire & Cable Sys. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d at 880-81 (no new election where union agents leafletted outside doors as employees entered building and proceeded down corridor to vote); and Southeastern Mills, Inc. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers', 227 N.L.R.B. 57, 1976 WL 7617 (1976) (no new election where pro-union employee sat for 20 minutes near employees waiting in line to vote, loudly predicted their votes and stated that he hoped they had voted right). That the classrooms were located just across the hall from the voting area is acknowledgedly troubling, because it allowed at least some voters to be subjected to pro-union campaigning up to the last moments before they cast their ballots. Similarly, the Union supporters' inquiries to voters leaving the polling place as to how they cast their ballots is not paradigmatic of sterile laboratory conditions. However, ultimately, we defer to the Board's reasoned conclusion that neither of these occurrences tend to intimidate voters in light of the fact that employees were not standing in line to vote as a captive audience to the union supporters' comments, there was no no electioneering zone, and further, that no evidence was adduced that voters were forced to contend with a constant barrage, as opposed to an intermittent sprinkling, of pro-union advocacy.