Opinion ID: 615771
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Wilderness Act Claim

Text: Wyoming's Wilderness Act claim asserts that the Roadless Rule constitutes a de facto designation of wilderness in contravention of the process established by Congress in the Wilderness Act of 1964. The district court agreed, holding that the Forest Service, through the promulgation of the Roadless Rule, designated 58.5 million acres of National Forest land as a de facto wilderness area in violation of the Wilderness Act, and therefore the rule was promulgated in excess of [the] Forest Service's statutory jurisdiction and authority. Wyoming, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1349-50. We conclude that the district court erred in finding that the Forest Service promulgated the rule in violation of the Wilderness Act.
Congress passed the Wilderness Act in 1964, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36, for the purpose of secur[ing] for the American people of present and future generations the benefits of an enduring resource of wilderness. Id. § 1131(a). The Wilderness Act established the National Wilderness Preservation System, which was to be composed of federally owned areas designated by Congress as `wilderness areas.' Id. Congress immediately designated certain areas as wilderness areas in the Act. See id. § 1132(a) (All areas within the national forests classified ... by the Secretary of Agriculture or the Chief of the Forest Service as `wilderness', `wild', or `canoe' are hereby designated as wilderness areas.). The Wilderness Act also established a process by which NFS lands could be designated as wilderness areas in the future. Id. § 1132(b). Under this process for designating wilderness in the future, the Secretary of Agriculture determines which NFS lands are suitable for preservation as wilderness and reports those findings to the President, who then submits recommendations to Congress as to which NFS lands should be regulated as wilderness areas under the Act. Id. Such lands actually become wilderness areas protected by the provisions of the Wilderness Act only if Congress enacts legislation to that effect. Id. Indeed, Congress explicitly stated that no Federal lands shall be designated as `wilderness areas' except as provided for in [the Wilderness Act] or by a subsequent Act. Id. § 1131(a). The Act defines wilderness as an area where the earth and its community of life are untrammeled by man, where man himself is a visitor who does not remain, as well as an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval character and influence, without permanent improvements or human habitation. Id. § 1131(c). Congress further defined wilderness as an area that (1) generally appears to have been affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work substantially unnoticeable; (2) has outstanding opportunities for solitude or a primitive and unconfined type of recreation; (3) has at least five thousand acres of land or is of sufficient size as to make practicable its preservation and use in an unimpaired condition; and (4) may also contain ecological, geological, or other features of scientific, educational, scenic, or historical value. Id. Areas designated as wilderness areas by Congress under the Act must be maintained so as to preserv[e] the wilderness character of the area and shall be devoted to the public purposes of recreational, scenic, scientific, educational, conservation, and historical use, unless an exception applies. Id. § 1133(b). In order to preserve the character of areas designated by Congress as wilderness, the Act prohibits a wide array of uses within such areas: [T]here shall be no commercial enterprise and no permanent road within any wilderness area designated by this chapter and, except as necessary to meet minimum requirements for the administration of the area for the purpose of this chapter (including measures required in emergencies involving the health and safety of persons within the area), there shall be no temporary road, no use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, no landing of aircraft, no other form of mechanical transport, and no structure or installation within any such area. Id. § 1133(c). The Act includes seven special provisions, which serve as exceptions to the general use prohibitions found in § 1133(c). See id. § 1133(d)(1)-(7). These special provisions allow, among other things, for (1) measures ... [for] control of fire, insects, and diseases, subject to such conditions as the Secretary deems desirable; (2) prospecting and activities carried out for the purpose of gathering information about mineral or other resources, if such activity is carried on in a manner compatible with the preservation of the wilderness environment; (3) certain development of water resources, if approved by the President; (4) grazing of livestock, but only if established before September 1964; and (5) [c]ommercial services ... to the extent necessary for activities which are proper for realizing the recreational or other wilderness purposes of the areas. Id. § 1133(d)(1), (2), (4), & (5). [12] Lastly, the Wilderness Act establishes that its provisions are declared to be within and supplemental to the purposes for which national forests ... are established and administered, id. § 1133(a), and therefore Congress made clear that [n]othing in [the Wilderness Act] shall be deemed to be in interference with the purpose for which national forests are established as set forth in the [Organic Act] (30 Stat. 11), and [MUSYA] (74 Stat. 215). Id. § 1133(a)(1).
As stated by the district court, the narrow issue presented by this claim is whether the Forest Service has usurped Congress'[s] power regarding access to, and management of, public lands by a de facto designation of `wilderness' in violation of the Wilderness Act of 1964. Wyoming, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1346. The district court held that the Roadless Rule established de facto wilderness areas and was therefore promulgated in violation of the Wilderness Act, which gives Congress the sole authority to establish wilderness areas. Id. at 1349-50. On appeal, the Forest Service first argues that the Wilderness Act did not repeal or in any way limit its broad authority to regulate NFS lands for conservation purposes, including wilderness, and therefore it was authorized to promulgate the Roadless Rule. In the alternative, even assuming, arguendo, that the Wilderness Act did repeal or limit the Forest Service's authority to regulate wilderness areas by administrative rule, the Forest Service and the Environmental Groups argue that the IRAs governed by the Roadless Rule are not de facto wilderness areas. Therefore, they assert that the Roadless Rule was a valid exercise of the authority granted under the Organic Act and MUSYA to manage NFS lands for an array of uses or combinations of use, including conservation uses that fall short of statutory `wilderness' designations. Forest Serv. Opening Br. at 32 (emphasis added). We agree with the latter argument viz., that the Forest Service did not usurp congressional authority because the Roadless Rule did not establish de facto wilderness areas and, therefore, conclude that the district court erred in holding otherwise. Accordingly, we need not address the first argument advanced by the Forest Service regarding whether it retains the authority under the Organic Act and MUSYA to regulate de facto wilderness areas by administrative rule.
The district court's conclusion that the Roadless Rule created de facto wilderness in violation of the Wilderness Act was based largely on its finding that wilderness areas governed by the Wilderness Act and IRAs governed by the Roadless Rule are essentially the same, and that [i]n fact, uses in [IRAs] are even more restricted than those permitted in congressionally designated wilderness areas. Wyoming, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1349. However, a comparison of the provisions of the Wilderness Act and the Roadless Rule demonstrates that IRAs and wilderness areas are not functionally equivalent or essentially the same. To the contrary, the two types of areas are distinct. In fact, such a comparison demonstrates that the scope of the Wilderness Act is broader than the scope of the Roadless Rule; that is, the Wilderness Act is more restrictive and prohibitive than the Roadless Rule. [13] As a general matter, the Roadless Rule restricts only two activitiesroad construction and commercial timber harvesting, unless an exception applies. See 66 Fed.Reg. at 3272-73 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 294.12-.13). On the other hand, although the Wilderness Act likewise prohibits permanent and temporary roads and commercial logging, it additionally prohibits all commercial enterprise, motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, all form[s] of mechanical transport, and any structure or installation, unless an exception applies. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). This rudimentary comparison of the general use prohibitions in IRAs and wilderness areas demonstrates that they are not the same; the uses prohibited in wilderness areas under the Wilderness Act are greater in number and scope than those prohibited in IRAs under the Roadless Rule. We acknowledge that the Wilderness Act and Roadless Rule do in fact overlap in coverage in many ways. However, the issue we are to consider is whether the IRAs governed by the Roadless Rule are de facto wilderness areas; that is, whether the Roadless Rule essentially mirrors the Wilderness Act by a different label. A closer examination of the precise differences between IRAs and wilderness areas further demonstrates that the Roadless Rule does not establish de facto wilderness. First, although the Wilderness Act prohibits permanent structures and installations, the Roadless Rule does not prohibit the construction of permanent or temporary structures or installations. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), with 66 Fed.Reg. at 3272-73 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. §§ 294.10-.14). Therefore, structures and installations that can be erected without the construction of a new roadfor example, through the use of an existing road are permitted in IRAs, but not in wilderness areas. Second, the Wilderness Act imposes significantly more stringent prohibitions on recreational activities. Under the Wilderness Act, any use of motor vehicles, motorized equipment or motorboats, ... landing of aircraft, ... [or] other form of mechanical transport is prohibited. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c). On the other hand, the Roadless Rule contains no prohibitions on the use of motorized vehicles or equipment, boats or aircraft, or other forms of mechanical transport. Therefore, many recreational uses allowed to continue under the Roadless Rulesuch as off-road vehicle use, biking, snowmobiling, and other motorized and mechanical activitieswould be prohibited under the Wilderness Act. See, e.g., 66 Fed.Reg. at 3245 (stating that unlike Wilderness, the Roadless Rule permits the use of mountain bikes, and other mechanized means of travel); id. at 3249 (The Roadless [Rule], unlike the establishment of wilderness areas, will allow a multitude of activities including motorized uses. . . .); id. at 3267 ([IRAs] provide a remote recreation experience without the activity restrictions of Wilderness (for example, off-highway vehicle use and mountain biking).). [14] Third, the Wilderness Act is more restrictive in terms of road maintenance, road construction, and use of existing roads. The Wilderness Act prohibits any permanent road or any temporary road, and road maintenance activities, subject to limited exceptions, [15] and prohibits any use of motor vehicles. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c); 36 C.F.R. § 293.6. On the other hand, the Roadless Rule allows all existing classified roadsdefined as roads wholly or partially within or adjacent to [NFS] lands that [are] determined to be needed for long-term motor vehicle access, including State roads, county roads, privately owned roads, National Forest System roads, and other roads authorized by the Forest Service, 66 Fed.Reg. at 3272 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.11)to be maintained. Id. at 3273 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(c)). [16] Therefore, unlike the Wilderness Act, the Roadless Rule permits unlimited maintenance of all existing roads and does not prohibit the use of motorized vehicles or other motorized transportation on such existing roads. Furthermore, the Roadless Rule provides broader exceptions for when new road construction or reconstruction can occur. For example, unlike in wilderness areas, a road may be constructed or reconstructed in an [IRA] . . . as provided for by statute or treaty, id. at 3272 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(b)(3)); [17] when needed to conduct a response action under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) or to conduct a natural resource restoration action under CERCLA, [§ ] 311 of the Clean Water Act, or the Oil Pollution Act, id. (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(b)(2)); or when the Secretary of Agriculture determines that a Federal Aid Highway project . . . is in the public interest or is consistent with the purposes for which the land was reserved or acquired, id. (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(b)(6)), among other instances. The Wilderness Act includes no exceptions of this kind to its prohibition of temporary and permanent roads. Fourth, the Roadless Rule is less restrictive in terms of grazing. Under the Wilderness Act's mandate that there shall be no commercial enterprise . . . within any wilderness area, 16 U.S.C. § 1133(c), commercial livestock grazing is prohibited. The Act includes a grandfather clause that permits the grazing of livestock . . . [that was] established prior to September 3, 1964, id. § 1133(d)(4)(2), more than four decades ago, but otherwise completely bars such activity. By contrast, the Roadless Rule does not explicitly prohibit any type of commercial enterprise, with the exception of commercial logging, and therefore permits commercial grazing within IRAs. The district court found this distinction meaningless because one could not meaningfully set cattle out to pasture in a roadless area with no way of rounding those cattle back up or trucking them in and out of the forest allotment, unless a new road was constructed. Wyoming, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1350. However, this conclusion does not take into account that all existing roadsas well as any roads constructed or reconstructed under exceptions to the Roadless Rulecould be used to facilitate commercial grazing. This would not be permitted in a wilderness areas due to the general prohibition on commercial enterprises (unless such grazing was established more than four decades ago), as well as the Act's prohibition on the use of motorized vehicles or equipment. Accordingly, the court's dismissal of this distinction was unfounded. Fifth, the Roadless Rule allows for mineral development to a greater extent than does the Wilderness Act. Although the Wilderness Act initially permitted mineral development under United States mining laws, wilderness areas governed by the Act are now closed to mineral-development activities. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(3). [18] On the other hand, the Roadless Rule imposes no general prohibition on mining or mineral-development activities, other than the limitations imposed through the road-building prohibition. Therefore, leasing activities not dependent on road construction, such as directional (slant) drilling and underground development, and mineral-leasing activities that could be carried out through utilization of existing roads, would not be affected by the prohibition. 66 Fed.Reg. at 3265; see also Wilderness Workshop, 531 F.3d at 1224-28 (affirming the district court's holding that the Forest Service and Bureau of Land Management had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or not in accordance with law in approving the installation of a natural-gas pipeline across an IRA protected by the Roadless Rule; the agencies' approval was based on the conclusion that there would be no violation of the Roadless Rule because the proposed [natural-gas] pipeline could be built within IRA's [sic] without road construction (internal quotation marks omitted)). The exceptions to the Roadless Rule's road-building prohibition would also permit new road construction or reconstruction for mineral development in certain situations. Under the exception for existing mineral leases, road construction is permitted in conjunction with the continuation, extension, or renewal of a mineral lease on lands that are under lease by the Secretary of the Interior as of January 12, 2001[,] or for a new lease issued immediately upon expiration of an existing lease. 66 Fed.Reg. at 3272-73 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(b)(7)). This exception extends indefinitely the timeframe for which roads can be constructed on areas currently under lease. Id. at 3265-66. In addition, under the exception permitting road construction as provided for by statute or treaty, id. at 3272 (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(b)(3)), [r]easonable access to conduct exploration and development of valid claims for locatable minerals (metallic and nonmetallic minerals subject to appropriation under the General Mining Law of 1872) would not be prohibited under the Roadless Rule. Id. at 3268. Reasonable access could involve some level of road construction that, depending on the stage of exploration or development, could range from helicopters, temporary or unimproved roads, more permanent, improved roads, or nonmotorized transport. Id. In sum, the Roadless Rule is less restrictive than the Wilderness Act in regard to mineral development. These distinctions clearly demonstrate that wilderness areas governed by the Wilderness Act and IRAs governed by the Roadless Rule are not only distinct, but that the Wilderness Act is more restrictive and prohibitive than the Roadless Rule. Accordingly, we conclude that the IRAs governed by the Roadless Rule are not de facto administrative wilderness areas; therefore, the district court erred by holding otherwise. In reaching the contrary conclusion that uses in [IRAs] are even more restricted than those permitted in congressionally designated wilderness areas, Wyoming, 570 F.Supp.2d at 1349, the district court relied heavily on one exception found in the Roadless Rule. The district court stated that a road could be constructed in a wilderness area to control fire, insects, and diseases, whereas a road could only be constructed in a roadless area in the case of an imminent flood, fire, or other catastrophic event that, without intervention, would cause the loss of life or property. Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(1) with 36 C.F.R. § 294.12(b)(1). Id. at 1349-50 (emphasis added). However, this distinction alone, when viewed in light of the numerous distinctions discussed above, does not demonstrate that the uses in IRAs are overall more restricted than those permitted in wilderness areas. [19] The district court's reliance on this single distinction in concluding that the Roadless Rule is more restrictive than the Wilderness Act was erroneous. In sum, we conclude that the Roadless Rule did not designate de facto administrative wilderness areas in contravention of the procedures set out in the Wilderness Act.