Opinion ID: 3157590
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: âReasonablenessâ Is a Finding of Ultimate Fact

Text: Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Â TECDA permits a school board to terminate a teacher for âinsubordinationâ but does not define the term. Â§ 22-63-301. This court has defined it as âa willful or intentional refusal to obey a reasonable order of a lawful superior on a particular occasion.â Ware v. Morgan Cty. Sch. Dist. No. RE-3, 748 P.2d 1295, 1300 (Colo. 1988) (emphasis added). Because it is undisputed that Ritzert intentionally refused to comply with the Districtâs order, whether her conduct amounted to insubordination turns onÂ whether the order was âreasonable.â The hearing officer found that the order was not reasonable. The Board disagreed and concluded that it was. Because a school board is bound by a hearing officerâs evidentiary but not ultimate findings of fact, Flaming, 938 P.2d at 157, we begin our analysis by determining into which category of fact reasonableness falls. In this context, under TECDA, we conclude that reasonableness is a finding of ultimate fact. Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The line between ultimate facts and evidentiary facts is sometimes blurry. See id.; State Bd. of Med. Examârs v. McCroskey, 880 P.2d 1188, 1193 (Colo. 1994). In the context of teacher dismissals, we have stated â[a]n ultimate finding may be and usually is mixed with ideas of law or policy . . . . âThe ultimate finding is a conclusion of law or at least a determination of a mixed question of law and fact.ââ Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1118 (quoting 2 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise Â§ 16.06 (1958)); see also McCroskey, 880 P.2d at 1193 (stating that ultimate findings âinvolve a conclusion of law, or at least a mixed question of law and factâ). An ultimate finding âsettle[s] the rights and liabilities of the parties.â McCroskey, 880 P.2d at 1193. Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, detail factual and historical findings on which an ultimate fact rests. Flaming, 938 P.2d at 157; Blair, 582 P.2d at 672 n.13. Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Here, the hearing officerâs determination whether the Districtâs order was reasonable did not merely detail a factual and historical finding but instead required the application of his understanding of District policy to the events that he found had occurred, creating a mixed question of law and fact. See Flaming, 938 P.2d at 158 (concluding that determination whether the teacherâs conduct was reasonable was aÂ finding of ultimate fact because it ârequired the hearing officer to apply his interpretation of school district policy to the events that he found to have occurredâ). Â¶32Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Furthermore, this court has previously determined that insubordination is a finding of ultimate fact, see Ware, 748 P.2d at 1300, which is âthe exclusive prerogative of elected school boards,â Ricci, 627 P.2d at 1118. In Flaming, we held that school boards âshould be accorded . . . deference when defining appropriate and reasonable behavior for teachers.â 938 P.2d at 158. We therefore agree with the Board that the reasonableness of the Districtâs order was an issue of ultimate fact and one that the Board was free to disregard, provided it was not arbitrary or capricious in doing so.