Opinion ID: 2121781
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: One Injury or Two?

Text: We first address the issue of whether Susanne suffered one injury or two, and, correspondingly, whether defendant, Zieba, and Ford are joint tortfeasors. We conclude that the trial and appellate courts were correct in finding that Susanne suffered two distinct injuries for which she could have received two separate recoveries, and that defendant is not a joint tortfeasor with Zieba and Ford. This court addressed a similar issue in Gertz v. Campbell (1973), 55 Ill.2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40. In Gertz, the plaintiff was injured by the defendant, who drove his car into plaintiff, causing an injury to the plaintiff's leg. The plaintiff was brought to the hospital and later had his leg amputated. The plaintiff filed suit against the defendant seeking recovery for all damages, and the defendant filed suit against the treating doctor, alleging the doctor's negligence in treating the plaintiff had caused the plaintiff to lose his leg. The defendant sought indemnification from the doctor only in the amount of damages caused by the doctor as the result of the new injury, or aggravation of the existing injury. This court allowed the defendant in Gertz to file suit for indemnification against the doctor because two separate injuries existed: [t]he wrongful conduct and the injuries sustained were at different times. ( Gertz, 55 Ill.2d at 89, 302 N.E.2d 40.) This court further noted that the defendant was liable for damages not only from the injury due to the accident, but from the injury due to any negligence of the doctor. However, the doctor was liable only for any injury plaintiff may have suffered due to the doctor's negligence, and was not liable for the first injury from the accident. This court further noted that the defendant and the doctor were not joint tortfeasors. Gertz, 55 Ill.2d at 89, 302 N.E.2d 40. This court again addressed this issue in Borowski v. Von Solbrig (1975), 60 Ill.2d 418, 328 N.E.2d 301. In Borowski, the plaintiff was injured in a car accident and subsequently brought to a hospital. The plaintiff eventually had his leg amputated and brought suit against the driver of the car that hit him, as well as the doctor and hospital which treated him for the injuries. Prior to trial, the plaintiff settled with the driver of the car for $30,000. The plaintiff then went to trial against the doctor and hospital and received an award of $200,000. The trial court reduced the amount of the award by the $30,000 the plaintiff had received from the driver. On appeal, the appellate court reversed because of improper jury instructions, which would have allowed the jury to find the driver and doctor and hospital to be joint tortfeasors. The appellate court then noted that had the award been made with proper jury instructions, the award should not have been reduced by the amount plaintiff settled with defendant. Borowski v. Von Solbrig (1973), 14 Ill.App.3d 672, 690, 303 N.E.2d 146. On appeal from the appellate decision, this court affirmed and cited with approval the appellate court's holding: `Since we have determined that the cause of action against the doctor and the cause of action against the auto driver are separate and distinct causes, each resting on its own elements of causation, if plaintiff had received a verdict against the doctor by using proper instructions, it would then have been improper to reduce that verdict by the amount received from the original tortfeasor. The plaintiff would have received two recoveries for two separate causes of action, and the reduction of one by the amount received from the successful conclusion of the other could not be sustained on any logical theory. Plaintiff would not have been compensated twice for the same injury because the recoveries would have represented compensation for two separate injuries.' 14 Ill.App.3d 672, 690 [303 N.E.2d 146]. Borowski, 60 Ill.2d at 431-32, 302 N.E.2d 40. The same is true here, as two separate injuries existed: (1) the injury from the accident; and (2) the injury from defendant's negligent treatment of the first injury. Defendant is a successive tortfeasor, not a joint tortfeasor, and as such is liable only for the second injury, while Zieba and Ford are liable for both injuries. We note briefly that both Gertz and Borowski were decided before contribution existed in Illinois. Thus, it was possible for the successive tortfeasors there to be held liable for the entire amount of damages for the second injury while the first tortfeasors were held liable for only the first injury. With contribution, however, damages from the second injury may now be apportioned amongst the first and successive tortfeasors. Defendant argues, however, that Susanne suffered only one injury, wrongful death, and relies on this court's decision in Burke v. 12 Rothschild's Liquor Mart, Inc. (1992), 148 Ill.2d 429, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522. In Burke, this court adopted comment i to the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 433A: `Certain kinds of harm, by their very nature, are normally incapable of any logical, reasonable, or practical division.    By far the greater number of personal injuries, and of harms to tangible property, are    single and indivisible. Where two or more causes combine to produce such a single result, incapable of division on any logical or reasonable basis, and each is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, the courts have refused to make an arbitrary apportionment for its own sake, and each of the causes is charged with responsibility for the entire harm.' Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A, Comment i, at 439-40 (1965). ( Burke, 148 Ill.2d at 438-39, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522.) Defendant relies on this comment to the Restatement adopted in Burke and argues that only one injury occurred, a wrongful death, which is a single injury, incapable of division. In Burke, this court noted the following. Where a plaintiff's original injury can be distinguished from a physician's aggravation of that injury, separate and distinct injuries exist and defendants cannot be held jointly liable. However, where defendants, albeit sharing no common purpose or duty, and failing to act in concert, nevertheless acted concurrently to produce an indivisible injury to the plaintiff, the defendants are joint tortfeasors. Burke, 148 Ill.2d at 438, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522. In Burke, the plaintiff was injured by the first tortfeasor, and such injury was exacerbated and/or he received an additional injury from the second tortfeasor. However, there was no clear medical evidence to show either that Burke's irreversible quadriplegia came about solely through negligence of [the first tortfeasor] or that the paralysis caused by [the first tortfeasor] was a temporary condition capable of reversal absent [the second tortfeasor's] misconduct. Either injury or both injuries could have caused plaintiff's lasting condition. ( Burke, 148 Ill.2d at 439, 170 Ill.Dec. 633, 593 N.E.2d 522.) Here, however, Susanne's injuries are divisible. As the appellate court noted, the evidence at trial revealed that Susanne would not have died from the first injury if defendant had properly treated her. Defendant also argues that Gertz and Borowski are distinguishable because, in those two cases, the doctors mistreated pre-existing injuries. Defendant overlooks the fact that when Susanne was brought to the hospital, she too had a pre-existing injury, which defendant failed to properly diagnose and treat.