Opinion ID: 354019
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Travel Act Violations

Text: 66 Evans and Gent also attack their convictions for violations of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1952, which makes interstate or foreign travel or transportation in aid of racketeering enterprises illegal. 33 Count sixteen charged that Tate and Evans, aided and abetted by Gent and Foley, had used a commercial airline flight in interstate commerce to facilitate bribery and attempted bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 201. Gent maintains that the evidence was insufficient to show that he aided and abetted the commission of an offense. It is true that (m)ere association with a criminal, standing alone, is not enough to convict, nor is mere presence at the scene of a crime, with nothing more, evidence that one is an aider and abetter. United States v. Martinez, 555 F.2d 1269, 1271 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Joiner,429 F.2d 489, 493 (5th Cir. 1970). 67 In order to aid and abet another to commit a crime it is necessary that a defendant in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he participate in it as in something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by his action to make it succeed. 68 Nye & Nissen Corp. v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 769, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1948), quoting, United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401, 402 (2d Cir. 1938). 69 We conclude that there was ample evidence of Gent's purposive participation to sustain the jury's conclusion that he assisted with the requisite criminal intent. 34 Gent himself admitted that he had been instrumental in encouraging Evans to accept the Las Vegas trip which took place at the same time Gent and Tate were contemplating obtaining Evans' assistance in procuring a government contract for FISL collections, in the event of the passage of proposed legislation. This congruence, in the context of his overall participation in the criminal venture established on the record as a whole, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence of Gent's mens rea. See United States v. Martinez, supra, 555 F.2d at 1271-72. 70 We likewise find no merit in Evans' challenge to his conviction under count sixteen, which he urges is fatally inconsistent with the jury's verdict on count eleven. Regarding count eleven, Evans was not exonerated of all wrongdoing during the Las Vegas trip, but was found guilty of accepting an unlawful gratuity in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 201(g). Count sixteen charged that the purpose of the interstate travel to Las Vegas was bribery and attempted bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 201, without mention of a specific subsection. Thus, there was no logical inconsistency. 35 IV. SUFFICIENCY OF THE INDICTMENT 71 Gent alone contends that the indictment was so vague and ambiguous that it failed adequately to apprise him of the conspiracy offense with which he was charged. 36 He argues that the indictment falls short of the requirement that it be sufficiently detailed that the accused can plead former jeopardy if he is later charged with some other offense arising out of the same facts. United States v. Tallant, 547 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1977); Hermansen v. United States, 228 F.2d 495 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 924, 76 S.Ct. 781, 100 L.Ed. 1455 (1956). We disagree. 72 A conspiracy indictment is sufficient if it sets out the essential elements of the charge and lists overt acts committed in furtherance of the conspiracy. Anderson v. United States, supra, 417 U.S. at 227 n.13, 94 S.Ct. 2253; United States v. Scallion, 533 F.2d 903, 911 (5th Cir. 1976). The elements of the offense are an unlawful agreement and the commission of at least one overt act by at least one of the conspirators. 18 U.S.C.A. § 371. 37 As we have noted, the conspiracy, rather than the accomplishment of its underlying objectives, is the gravamen of the offense. Therefore, it is not necessary that the object of the conspiracy be described in the detail which would be required to charge a violation of the substantive offense. United States v. Fischetti, 450 F.2d 34, 40 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016, 92 S.Ct. 1290, 31 L.Ed.2d 478 (1971) (citations therein). 73 The conspiracy charged in this case was described in great detail. The indictment set forth the duration of the conspiracy, the names of the participants, two objects which were violations of federal law and extensive background information, including the names of sixty-three schools from which federal funds were allegedly embezzled before February 6, 1975. The conspiracy charge alleged, in specific terms, the commission of twenty-six overt acts, including the offenses charged in the fifteen substantive counts of the indictment. Gent was named in thirteen of the overt acts, including various substantive counts. Additional factual detail was properly made available to Gent through the government's compliance with his partially granted motion for a bill of particulars. See United States v. Debrow, 346 U.S. 374, 378, 74 S.Ct. 113, 98 L.Ed. 92 (1953). Gent does not contend, nor could he successfully contend, that there was error in the court's denial of the motion insofar as it pertained to evidentiary detail and matter otherwise available through discovery. United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51, 70-71 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945, 94 S.Ct. 3067, 41 L.Ed.2d 664 (1974). We must conclude that the conspiracy count of the indictment, read with the whole indictment, was sufficiently particularized to inform Gent of the offense and apprise him of the charge he faced. See United States v. London, 550 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Beasley, 550 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 193 (5th Cir. 1976).