Opinion ID: 2045902
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: summary judgment on implied easement

Text: The district court determined that an implied easement existed and that O'Connor had not abandoned this easement. The Kaufmans dispute this determination in their first three assigned errors. An easement by implication from former use arises only where (1) the use giving rise to the easement was in existence at the time of the conveyance subdividing the property, (2) the use has been so long continued and so obvious as to show that it was meant to be permanent, and (3) the easement is necessary for the proper and reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tract. O'Connor I; Hillary Corp. v. United States Cold Storage, 250 Neb. 397, 550 N.W.2d 889 (1996). As explained in O'Connor I, in order to determine whether an implied easement from former use was created, we look to the time of the conveyance subdividing the property. The relevant time is therefore January 29, 1975, when Ledingham, Inc., subdivided the property at issue. In the instant case, both O'Connor and Carnesecca averred that William Ledingham and Jerry Ledingham used the well on parcel D to supply water for parcel A in 1975, when Ledingham, Inc., subdivided these parcels. William Ledingham's longtime neighbor, Carl Stratton, similarly stated in his affidavit that the well on parcel D supplied water to parcel A up to and through 1975. This evidence demonstrates that there is no dispute and thus no question of fact that the use giving rise to this easement was in existence in 1975, which is the time of the conveyance subdividing the property. Regarding the second element, the Kaufmans contend that questions of fact exist as to the intent of William Ledingham to create or reserve an implied easement. They point to Carnesecca's supplemental affidavit in which she discusses the use of the original well on parcel A, which provided the domestic water supply on parcel A until the well on parcel D was drilled. The well on parcel A continued to be an alternative water supply for parcel A. Carnesecca also avers that William Ledingham never indicated any intention to create an easement. Carnesecca's affidavit, however, does not create a question of fact regarding William Ledingham's intent. It does not necessarily follow that because an alternative water supply existed on parcel A and William Ledingham never verbally expressed his intent, he had no intent to create an easement for use of water from the well on parcel D. His continuous use for over 25 years, from the time the well was drilled in 1949 up to 1975 when the property was divided, clearly expresses his intent to create a permanent easement. In essence, William Ledingham's actions speak louder than Carnesecca's words. The use of the easement has been so long continued and so obvious as to show that it was meant to be permanent, thus satisfying the second element. The Kaufmans argue that the use of water from the well on parcel D was a mere convenience and not reasonably necessary for the enjoyment of parcel A. They assert that because there was an alternative source of water on parcel A, which met the original domestic needs of the homestead, in addition to the fact that this well on parcel A was capped while in good working order create a question of fact as to the necessity of using the water from the well on parcel D. The Kaufmans, although they couch their argument in reasonable necessity language, are actually arguing that the use of the well was not strictly necessary. The degree of necessity required to prove the existence of an implied easement from former use is reasonable necessity. Hillary Corp. v. United States Cold Storage, 250 Neb. 397, 550 N.W.2d 889 (1996). The rule of strict necessity is applied to easements that arise by necessity and implied reservations, but not to easements from former use. Id. Reasonable necessity means that the easement is `necessary for the proper and reasonable enjoyment of the dominant tract.' (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 411, 550 N.W.2d at 898, quoting Hengen v. Hengen, 211 Neb. 276, 318 N.W.2d 269 (1982). In Hillary Corp., we also noted that the degree of necessity is such merely as renders the easement necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of the property as it existed when the severance was made, and that it should not be absolutely necessary for the enjoyment of the estate granted. (Emphasis omitted.) 250 Neb. at 411, 550 N.W.2d at 897-98, quoting Christensen v. Luehrs, 133 Neb. 50, 273 N.W. 839 (1937). The Kaufmans concede that the reason William Ledingham diverted water from the well on parcel D to parcel A was because that well produced more water. Because reasonable necessity and not strict necessity need be established, there is no question of fact that the use of the well on parcel D was reasonably necessary for the convenient and comfortable enjoyment of parcel A. The Kaufmans also argue that if an implied easement existed, this easement was abandoned through subsequent actions of the landowners. Specifically, the Kaufmans point to the contractual language of the 1975 Carnesecca-Ledingham contract in which Jerry Ledingham agreed that he would continue to have the right to use the well on parcel D in consideration for maintaining the pump and sharing the operating costs with Carnesecca. The Kaufmans further assert as indicative of this purported abandonment that the deed record does not contain an expressly reserved easement, that O'Connor's tenant Derr paid Kaufman a fee for using the well on parcel D, and that O'Connor proposed to the Kaufmans that she lease or buy the property so as to secure her use of the water. An easement may be abandoned by unequivocal acts showing a clear intention to abandon and terminate the right, or it may be done by acts in pais without deed or other writing. Mueller v. Bohannon, 256 Neb. 286, 589 N.W.2d 852 (1999). The intention to abandon is the material question, and it may be proved by an infinite variety of acts. It is a question of fact to be ascertained from all the circumstances of the case. See Hillary Corp. v. United States Cold Storage, supra . The Carnesecca-Ledingham contractual provision, the absence of an expressly reserved easement, Derr's payment of a use fee to the Kaufmans, and O'Connor's efforts to secure her use of the water are, however, insufficient to constitute unequivocal acts indicating an intent to abandon. The contractual provision, Derr's use fee, and O'Connor's efforts reveal an intent to preserve a right in the property through legal, rather than equitable channels. Additionally, O'Connor offered to buy the land surrounding the well on parcel D only after the Kaufmans had capped the well. As the district court noted, the use of the easement did not stop because O'Connor willed it, but, rather, because the Kaufmans capped the well and shut off her domestic water supply. The absence of an expressly reserved easement does not amount to abandonment, because an implied easement is, by definition, not express. We determine that there are no questions of fact in the record before us which preclude summary judgment. We therefore affirm the order of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of O'Connor on the implied easement from former use theory.