Opinion ID: 1165790
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Tideland Statutes Subsequent to Statehood in 1889

Text: Since article 17 was a compromise of the various interests represented in the constitutional convention, it is not surprising to find tideland politics carried forward into subsequent legislative sessions. The early statutes provide for the survey, classification, and appraisal of state-owned tidelands [9] and set forth the method and manner of sale or lease thereof. Oyster beds were withdrawn and reserved from sale or lease for the purpose of establishing a natural oyster bed reserve. [10] A railroad was granted the right to maintain tracks and wharves on tidelands. [11] Although abutting property owners were given a preferential right to purchase tidelands, one having placed improvements thereon prior to March 26, 1890 had the exclusive right to purchase if used for commerce, trade, residence, or business. [12] Laws of 1899, ch. 83, § 1, p. 132 [13] was the first legislative recognition of accretion to tidelands. The statute provided: That any accretions that may be added to any tract or tracts of tide or shore lands heretofore sold or that may hereafter be sold by the state shall belong to the state, .... (Italics ours.) [1] The statute treats with accretion to tidelands heretofore sold or that may hereafter be sold by the state. The accretion belongs to the state. The statute does not purport to determine ownership of accretion when the tidelands have not been sold. See Strand v. State, 16 Wn.2d 107, 129, 132 P.2d 1011 (1943). We do not construe the statute in any sense to be a waiver by the state of its interest in tidelands. It is more logical to conclude that this is a legislative recognition of the state's claim to all accretion after 1889 whether the tidelands be sold or not. The statute is at least indicative of the legislative intent to claim accretion for the state under the limited circumstances identified. It was not until Laws of 1901, ch. 105, p. 217, and ch. 110, p. 225, that the public's interest in tide and shoreland received legislative recognition. Sections 1 and 2, chapter 110 (RCW 79.16.170, 171) provide: That the shore and beach of the Pacific Ocean, including the area or space lying, abutting or fronting on said ocean and between ordinary high tide and extreme low tide (as such shore and beach now are or hereafter may be ) from the Columbia river or Cape Disappointment on the south to a point three hundred feet southerly from the south line of the government jetty on Peterson's Point, State of Washington on the north, be and the same are hereby declared a public highway forever, and as such highway shall remain forever open to the use of the public. (Italics ours.) No part of said shore or beach shall ever be sold, conveyed, leased or otherwise disposed of. [2] The statute declares certain shore and tidelands a public highway forever. [14] It does not purport to reserve all state-owned tideland in the vicinity as a public highway. We point out that the public highway is not described as abutting upland property; it is defined as abutting or fronting on said ocean. Its seaward boundary is extreme low tide; its inland boundary is the line of ordinary high tide ... as such shore and beach now are [1901] or hereafter may be. Assuming that there had been accretion between 1889 and 1901, it does not follow that this statute disclaims state ownership therein. State-owned land may still remain between the inland boundary of the public highway (ordinary high tide as such shore and beach now are) and the 1889 line of ordinary high tide. It might, of course, be subject to sale to the abutting upland owner or others as the statutes provide. True, the boundaries of the reserved public highway may shift seaward because of accretion (a question we do not decide), but such move would in nowise affect the inland boundary of state-owned lands. It would simply preserve the prime portion of the beach for the public. Our interpretation of Laws of 1901 (RCW 79.16.170 quoted supra ) is fortified by Laws of 1929, ch. 78, which provides: The commissioner of public lands is hereby authorized to offer for sale and sell in the manner hereinafter provided, all, or any portion of, the following described lands: [described] lying above and on the land side of the inner boundary of the highway reservations made by chapter CV [ 105 ] and chapter CX [ 110 ], Laws of 1901, same being a line of ordinary high tide as the same is now located or as it may hereafter exist. (Italics ours.) Thus, the legislature recognized an inner boundary of the highway reservation and authorized the sale of lands lying inland of this inner boundary of the highway reservation. [15] A fundamental error of the trial court in the instant case is the application of the 1901 and 1929 statutory language to a line of ordinary high tide as the same now is or as it may hereafter exist  (italics ours) to a factual situation to which it has no application.