Opinion ID: 1801524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Resignation and Discharge of Sidney Strange

Text: The defendant claims error by the trial court when Sidney Strange, one of defendant's attorneys, was refused permission to resign and defendant was denied permission to discharge him, based on Mr. Strange's determination that he had a conflict of interest due to the addition of Kenneth Dahl as a state's witness. The defendant asserts that the court's refusal to permit Mr. Strange's resignation, or in the alternative to permit defendant to discharge him, constituted a denial of the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. One day before the trial was to begin, the state moved for permission to add Kenneth Dahl as a prosecution witness. This motion was granted over defendant's strong objection. Immediately thereafter, Mr. Strange moved to be relieved as counsel for the defendant due to a prior attorney-client relationship that had existed between him and Mr. Dahl. Mr. Strange concluded that he could not effectively cross-examine Mr. Dahl due to the existence of privilege and further advised the court that it was quite possible that he could be called to testify in rebuttal to Mr. Dahl's testimony. The court denied this motion. Defendant then attempted to summarily discharge Mr. Strange, contending Mr. Strange would quite possibly become a defense witness. This request was also denied by the trial court. It appears that Mr. Strange was appointed to prosecute an appeal for Mr. Dahl in August of 1974. Mr. Strange continued to represent Mr. Dahl in his appeal until either December of 1974 or January of 1975, at which time Mr. Dahl discharged him. It is therefore apparent that the attorney-client relationship was fully terminated prior to Mr. Strange's appointment to serve as defendant's counsel in the instant case. On October 27, 1975, the trial judge conducted a thorough examination of Mr. Dahl concerning his apparent intention to waive the attorney-client privilege between himself and Mr. Strange. The examination extends through some fifty-seven pages, and at the close of such examination the court declared the waiver effectuated and the trial to the court began on November 3, 1975. The fact that an attorney once represented a client who subsequently becomes a witness in another trial does not automatically give rise to a per se conflict of interest, nor a Sixth Amendment violation. United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1066, 96 S.Ct. 805, 46 L.Ed.2d 656. Further, once Mr. Dahl had waived the attorney-client privilege it was no longer possible for Mr. Strange to assert it. The right of privilege is personal to the client, and after an effectual waiver the privilege disappears and the barrier is removed. [6] In the final analysis, it is for the trial court to examine all of the circumstances in order to determine whether counsel's undivided loyalties reside with his current client. United States v. Jeffers, supra. In reviewing defendant's claim here, it is necessary to refer back to the written record. In doing so, it is plain to see that Mr. Strange left no stone unturned in his cross-examination of Mr. Dahl. Mr. Strange was obviously benefitted by the information he had received from Mr. Dahl while representing him, since the cross-examination conducted by him can be characterized only as a searching, vigorous and completely comprehensive examination. It is said that any inference of prejudice to an appellant is forcefully mitigated by the attorney's vigorous cross-examination of his former client, and his exhaustive attack on the former client's credibility. Olshen v. McMann, 378 F.2d 993 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert. denied 389 U.S. 874, 88 S.Ct. 165, 19 L.Ed.2d 157. We find that such was the case here and that defendant suffered no prejudice under the court's ruling. We hold that some specific instance of prejudice, some real conflict of interest resulting from the dual representation, must be shown before it can be said effective assistance of counsel was denied. [7] Defendant, however, further claims that his case was prejudiced because the trial court failed to allow Mr. Strange to resign or be fired by defendant so that Mr. Strange could be called as a witness for the defendant in order to rebut or impeach Mr. Dahl's testimony. The difficulty here is that other than defendant's bald conclusory statement he was prejudiced, there is nothing in this record to support such a claim. To obtain relief in this court the defendant must surely present facts upon which it might be concluded that his case was prejudiced, as he claims. Defendant, both in his brief and on oral argument, asserts that this claim must be accepted on its face in view of the fact that the trial court refused to permit him to elaborate on this claim. We are of the opinion, however, that having been rebuffed by the court, defendant was obliged to make an offer of proof. Even though the trial judge stated that he did not want to hear Mr. Strange's statement as to the content of possible rebuttal testimony, defendant could not have been prevented by the trial court from making an offer to prove exactly what that testimony would be. Had Mr. Strange done so, this court would now be in a position to properly evaluate his claim of error under this heading. As the record presently stands, this court has nothing on which it can fairly determine the issue of prejudice claimed by the defendant. We therefore hold that by failing to make such an offer of proof defendant failed to properly preserve his record on this appeal. [8]