Opinion ID: 1654187
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Courts Lack the Authority Under Kentucky Law to Engage in a Post-Submission Juror Substitution.

Text: Kentucky precedent clearly holds that a trial court errs by replacing a juror with an alternate juror, who has been previously discharged, once the jury has begun deliberating. We believe that precedent is sound. In a case decided by our predecessor court, the jury had been deliberating for an unspecified amount of time when the trial court, over the defendant's objection, discharged one juror in order to permit that juror to attend his father's funeral, then substituted a thirteenth juror ( i.e., an alternate juror) in the discharged juror's place. [8] Our predecessor court held that the court had no right after the jury began its deliberations to substitute the thirteenth juror[,] even though the then-applicable Criminal Code of Practice permitted the selection and qualification of a thirteenth juror. And when the case has been finally submitted to the jury, the function of the thirteenth juror ceases and he should be discharged. [9] Our predecessor court did not address whether that erroneous juror substitution was a harmless error, perhaps because the Commonwealth had conceded on appeal that the substitution was a reversible error. [10] The Court of Appeals confronted a similar situation in Thurman . In that case, an alternate juror heard all of the evidence but was discharged after closing arguments. [11] Shortly after the discharge of the alternate, one of the jurors fell ill and needed to be hospitalized. The trial court called the discharged alternate juror back to the judge's chambers. In a notable departure from the present case, the trial court and counsel questioned the alternate juror about his activities and whereabouts since his discharge. [12] Over the defendant's objections, the trial court returned the discharged alternate to the jury. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the substitution of the discharged alternate juror was erroneous because the discharging of [the alternate juror] released him from his oath and relieved him of his responsibilities as a juror. [13] Although the Court of Appeals expressed empathy to the trial court's quandary, it found no procedure for augmenting a jury to increase its number to that required by law once the jury has begun deliberating. [14] The Court of Appeals recognized that Woods was based upon the former Criminal Code of Practice but believed that the then-applicable Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure (RCr) 9.32, which required the clerk randomly to reduce the number of jurors to the number required by law before the jury retired to consider its verdict, was an embodiment of the Woods holding.... [15] So [o]nce [the alternate juror] was discharged from the panel he could not be recalled[,] meaning that [t]he trial court should have granted Thurman's motion for mistrial. [16] The Court of Appeals, however, did not engage in any analysis of whether the erroneous substitution could have been a harmless error. RCr 9.32, the rule upon which Thurman was based, was abolished in 1981; and we have not enacted a similar provision in our Rules of Criminal Procedure. But Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 47.02 contains an express provision analogous to the former RCr 9.32. Since there is no criminal rule to the contrary, CR 47.02 applies to criminal cases. [17] Under CR 47.02, a trial court may empanel up to two additional jurors. Significantly, that rule provides only for a pre-submission substitution of an alternate. CR 47.02 provides that [i]f the membership of the jury exceeds the number required by law, immediately before the jury retires to consider its verdict the clerk, in open court, shall ... reduce the jury to the number required by law, whereupon the jurors so selected for elimination shall be excused. In the case now before us, the trial court's decision to order a post-submission juror substitution finds no support in CR 47.02. We are aware that when the trial court discharged the alternate juror and allowed him to leave the courtroom after closing arguments, it admonished the alternate juror not to discuss the case with anyone or to make any ultimate conclusions about the case. But this admonition to the discharged alternate was not effective for replacement purposes. Thurman specifically holds that discharging an alternate juror relieves him of his responsibilities as a juror. [18] Likewise, CR 47.02 requires the jury to be reduced to twelve members before retiring to consider its verdict, whereupon any additional jurors ( i.e., alternates) shall be excused. So when the twelve jurors retire to deliberate, any alternate jurors are necessarily discharged from further jury service regardless of any limiting oral instruction from the trial court. Even if we assume for argument that the juror had not been fully discharged from service because of the trial court's parting admonition, the trial court erred by simply permitting that juror to join the other eleven jurors without undertaking any colloquy with the returning alternate to ensure that he had not discussed the case with anyone or otherwise encountered any circumstance after leaving the courtroom that might have affected his ability to serve as an impartial juror. [19] The third and most recent time this post-deliberation substitution problem has been addressed by Kentucky's appellate courts was in our recent unpublished decision in Holland. [20] In Holland, the jury had deliberated for about two hours when a school principal notified the court that one of the juror's children had suffered a seizure and was in the hospital. The trial court then discussed its options with counsel, and defense counsel suggested substituting the dismissed alternate juror for the juror whose child had fallen ill. The trial court ultimately agreed, and the alternate juror was recalled and substituted. [21] On appeal, the appellant relied upon Thurman for the proposition that the post-deliberation substitution was erroneous. Nevertheless, we refused to reverse, instead holding that the appellant had waived the issue. [22] More specifically, we observed that defense counsel had expressed her support for recalling the alternate juror and that it was simply impermissible ... for defense counsel to advocate one course of action at trial, then appeal the trial court's decision to follow that very recommendation. [23] Admittedly, Woods , Thurman , and Holland are distinguishable in many respects. But we find nothing in any of the three cases that would authorize the post-submission substitution of a juror. Similarly, we find nothing in our procedural rules or statutes to authorize a post-submission substitution of a juror. CR 47.02 requires the alternate jurors to be excused immediately before the jury retires to consider its verdict.... We must conclude that a trial court simply lacks the authority under Kentucky law to order a juror substitution after the jury has begun deliberation. The trial court attempted to justify its decision to recall the alternate juror by discussing an unnamed federal case. But the trial court erred by relying upon federal law on this point for two reasons. First, as previously discussed, Kentucky law specifically forbids post-submission juror substitutions. Second, federal law specifically permits the post-submission substitution of a juror. [24] Similarly, other states have court rules or statutes that would permit post-submission juror substitutions. [25] In contrast, under Kentucky law, there must be twelve jurors in trials in circuit court; [26] but the parties may stipulate that the jury shall consist of any number less than twelve (12), except that no jury shall consist of less than six (6) persons. [27] However, such a stipulation can only be made at any time before the jury is sworn.... [28] So, unlike the law in federal court or the law in some other states, Kentucky's trial courts have no authority to force the parties to accept the verdict of a jury composed of less than twelve members or unilaterally to order the post-submission substitution of a juror. Reasonable minds could perhaps differ about whether we should provide a mechanism for the post-submission substitution of a juror. After all, we are empathetic to the quandary faced by trial courts and the parties who have invested time and resources in a jury trial only to discover during deliberation that a juror must be excused. But current Kentucky law does not authorize such post-submission substitutions.