Opinion ID: 852224
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Everling Was Denied His Right to an Impartial Judge

Text: Everling challenges his convictions arguing that he did not receive a fair trial before an impartial judge. (Appellant's Br. at 11, 14.) A trial before an impartial judge is an essential element of due process. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., ___ U.S. ___, ___, 129 S.Ct. 2252, 2259, 173 L.Ed.2d 1208 (2009) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S.Ct. 623, 99 L.Ed. 942 (1955)); Marcum v. State, 725 N.E.2d 852 (Ind.2000). The impartiality of a trial judge is especially important due to the great respect that a jury accords the judge and the added significance that a jury might give to any showing of partiality by the judge. Cook v. State, 734 N.E.2d 563 (Ind.2000). As Justice Hunter wrote for this Court, the jurors' customary respect for the judge can lead them to accord great and perhaps decisive significance to the judge's every word and intimation. It is therefore essential that the judge refrain from any actions indicating any position other than strict impartiality. Kennedy v. State, 258 Ind. 211, 226, 280 N.E.2d 611, 620-21 (1972). In assessing a trial judge's partiality, we examine the judge's actions and demeanor while recognizing the need for latitude to run the courtroom and maintain discipline and control of the trial. Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243 (Ind.1997). Even where the court's remarks display a degree of impatience, if in the context of a particular trial they do not impart an appearance of partiality, they may be permissible to promote an orderly progression of events at trial. Id. at 256 (quoting Rowe v. State, 539 N.E.2d 474, 476 (Ind.1989)). Bias and prejudice violate a defendant's due process right to a fair trial only where there is an undisputed claim or where the judge expressed an opinion of the controversy over which the judge was presiding. Smith, 770 N.E.2d at 823 (citing Resnover v. State, 507 N.E.2d 1382, 1391 (Ind.1987)). Adverse rulings and findings by a trial judge from past proceedings with respect to a particular party are generally not sufficient reasons to believe the judge has a personal bias or prejudice. Voss v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1211 (Ind.2006). In Brannum v. State, 267 Ind. 51, 366 N.E.2d 1180 (1977), the appellant Mary Brannum claimed that the judge presiding over her trial improperly imposed himself into the proceedings and deprived her of a fair trial. The judge made comments during voir dire before prospective jurors criticizing one of them (whom the prosecution had already challenged for cause), because the juror had stated he could not sentence someone to life imprisonment. Id. at 52-53, 366 N.E.2d at 1181-82. During the trial the defense called the sheriff to show that he had tried to influence another witness. The court sua sponte made a lengthy statement that he would not allow the sheriff to testify because he had been in and about the courtroom during the testimony of several witnesses. Id. In this statement, the judge also analyzed the testimony of the witness. Id. at 54-55, 366 N.E.2d at 1183. Finally, when the jury had some questions during deliberations, both attorneys agreed that the judge would read the instructions without comment to the jury. After doing this, the judge gave the jury additional instructions emphasizing that there were no lesser included offenses in the felony murder charge, essentially commenting on the defense's final argument. Id. at 57, 366 N.E.2d at 1184. We held that the judge in Brannum violated his duty to refrain from imposing himself and his opinions on the jury, that he overstepped into the province of the jury by analyzing a witness's testimony, and that giving an additional instruction sua sponte tended to tell the jurors what they ought to do and violated the statutory order of proceedings. [4] Id. at 53-58, 366 N.E.2d at 1182-85. We noted that there were other incidents throughout the trial of which the defendant complains, in which the court imposed himself by interrupting defense witnesses and defense counsel, but that the seriousness of those mentioned was sufficient. Id. at 59, 366 N.E.2d at 1185. We concluded: [I]n order for the criminal justice system to survive, our courts must be forums in which all parties can receive a fair and impartial trial. Impartiality insures that persons guilty of crimes be convicted and punished, and that innocence be likewise determined. The trial judge must thus preside over the case in a strictly impartial manner to be able to determine that the facts and the law are being properly presented and so reach a proper legal result. The conduct and strategy of the parties are to be left to them. The ultimate decision is to be left to the jury. We feel the trial judge did not properly act in accordance with these principles here, and we reverse the conviction of appellant in order that she be given a new trial. Id. at 59-60, 366 N.E.2d at 1185. In Dewey v. State, 264 Ind. 403, 345 N.E.2d 842 (1976), a criminal defendant contended he was entitled to a mistrial because after the State objected to a question to one of the victims, the judge made the following comment: You know, with all these objectionsthere's no law against the truth creeping into the record, you know. Let's just see if we can hear some evidence now. Go ahead and ask the question. Id. at 409, 345 N.E.2d at 846-47. We held that the comment was clearly improper but found no error because the jury was properly admonished and the defendant was thus not prejudiced. Id. at 409, 345 N.E.2d at 847. In Smith, 770 N.E.2d at 823, we concluded that Smith had not carried his burden of proof that the judge was biased or prejudiced. The imposition of the maximum sentence, a reference to the Bible, and comments on the heinous nature of the crime did not express the court's opinion on the merits of his sentence. Smith, 770 N.E.2d at 823-24. Unfortunately, this is not the first case in which Judge Spencer made inappropriate declarations in a criminal trial. In Abernathy v. State, 524 N.E.2d 12 (Ind. 1988), a case very similar to this one, the defendant asserted Judge Spencer abandoned his position of impartiality by intervening with comments and questions throughout the proceedings. Judge Spencer asked witnesses questions like Ma'am, don't you go to church?, You're not in the habit of telling things that aren't true, are you?, and You were making it all up, is that what you're saying? Id. at 14. We held that the judge did not maintain a position of neutrality, impeached or discredited witnesses, and indicated his opinion of the witness' credibility. Id. at 15. In that case, these comments suggested that the judge disbelieved witnesses who suggested the sexual intercourse at issue was consensual, which was the fulcrum of the defense's case. Id. We reversed and remanded for a new trial. The conduct to which Everling points as showing the court's partiality can be categorized as comments to counsel, comments in front of the jury, uneven tolerance of late filings, and erroneous rulings. Everling asserts that while Judge Spencer's individual actions may not raise an issue of partiality separately, when looked at as a whole, it becomes clear that the Trial Court lacked impartiality in its treatment of Mr. Ali and Steven's case as a whole. (Appellant's Br. at 21.) The State responds that the criticisms of Everling's attorney showed no personal bias against either the defendant or counsel and that the court's rulings were within its discretion. (Appellee's Br. at 15.) It characterizes any questionable conduct as isolated incidents and maintains that Judge Spencer's criticisms of Mr. Ali's tactics certainly do not show a personal bias against [Everling]. (Appellee's Br. at 15-16.) Judge Spencer made the most damaging comments outside the presence of the jury. The weightiest of these is the comment that Ali had done unethical things in court. (App. at 383; Tr. at 394.) The State again characterizes these comments as isolated and states that they communicate the court's conclusion that some of defense counsel's tactics in this proceeding and others [were] problematic. (Appellee's Br. at 15.) Wishing that it were otherwise, we conclude that taken together, Judge Spencer's comments and procedural rulings demonstrate a lack of impartiality. As for comments in front of the jury, Everling claims that the comment that Ali should not have agreed to the limitation of cross-examination gave the jury the impression that Ali was not properly representing Steven and that evidence was being kept from the jury. (Appellant's Br. at 18.) Regarding the comments about knife fights, the State responds that Everling did not suffer prejudice from these because a knife or a gun is a deadly weapon under Indiana law, so the jury would convict him of the class A felony child molesting count in any case. (Appellee's Br. at 16.) What matters here is not the legal question but the general demeanor taken with defense counsel. These comments were adversarial if not condescending, and they certainly communicated to the jury that Ali was a less than competent attorney. They were improper and most likely gave the jury an unfavorable impression of the defense. Everling claims that Judge Spencer's mistaken statement that Everling keeping K.P. home from school was not in dispute invaded the jury's role. (Appellant's Br. at 20.) The State argues this did not show bias and that whether Everling was the only reason K.P. ever was truant is irrelevant to whether he ever kept her home. (Appellee's Br. at 17.) Again, this comment was undeniably mistaken. Had it been the only negative comment made by Judge Spencer, it may not have been prejudicial. Because it was one of several, however, it added to the overall effect of the court's unnecessary commentary. Everling also points out that the court regularly assisted the prosecution in making and responding to objections. (Appellant's Br. at 19-20, citing App. at 374-75, 384, 388-89, 406, 461-62.) The State characterizes these as isolated incidents clarifying the State's objections and argues they did not show bias. (Appellee's Br. at 17.) While the court's interventions may have made the proceedings somewhat more efficient, their context and one-sidedness convince us they were improper and gave an impression of partiality. We cannot ignore the cumulative effect of disparaging comments throughout the course of proceedings, both in front of and away from the jury, simply because each of them would otherwise not suffice to reverse. The State does not persuade us that these numerous incidents were each isolated incidents. The court's comments reveal a prejudice against Ali and his client. Everling further claims that the court's treatment of witnesses was inconsistent and shows bias. (Appellant's Br. at 16.) The State points out that Everling ignored the court's orders to submit witness and exhibit lists, arguing that its amended witness lists and information exhibited good faith on its part calling for different treatment. (Appellee's Br. at 15.) Everling attempted to call twenty-two excluded witnesses. Ali did not submit a notice of alibi witnesses twenty days ahead of trial as required. See Ind.Code § 35-36-4-1 (2008). The alibi witnesses were coworkers, clients, and a leader of a Head Start program. They would have testified that Everling generally was not home in the mornings. Because none of them would have been able to directly counter K.P.'s allegations, we think their exclusion did not by itself work to prejudice Everling. The witnesses who would testify as to K.P.'s reputation for not telling the truth included classmates, family members, and teachers. They would contribute to the defense's theory that K.P. was lying about Everling. The court excluded all these witnesses because Ali did not notify the State that there would be anybody who is going to testify as to her reputation for truthfulness. (Tr. at 48-49, 51, 57-58.) It is fairly clear that both attorneys knew about these witnesses, but the State maintained that Ali did not characterize any of them as challenging K.P.'s truthfulness. (Tr. at 48.) Attacking her truthfulness was a central part of Everling's case. While K.P.'s truthfulness did come up in the defense's questioning of other witnesses, they very well could have convinced the jury to doubt her creditability. Their exclusion was therefore prejudicial. The remaining witnesses to K.P.'s truthfulness were Heather McClain and Tami Biele. They would both testify about interviews they had with K.P. McClain, a member of the Anderson Police Department who interviewed K.P., was listed on the State's first information. The court mulled over whether to admit her testimony, but seemed to lean toward excluding it as hearsay before moving on to warn Ali about statements to the jury. (Tr. at 52-54, 58-59.) The court excluded Biele, who would have testified that K.P. had not mentioned Everling's conduct when she discussed another sexual partner, by granting her employer's motion to quash. (App. at 112.) Finally, Dr. Merk's testimony was perhaps the most important to Everling's case. Because Merk would have presented an alternative explanation for physical evidence of the crime, it is the most specific challenged testimony. (Tr. at 118.) While the State did not know of Merk until the eve of trial, it had not yet begun its case-in-chief. Its opening statement could have been altered, and a short continuance would have remedied any surprise. Because Merk's testimony would have been so important and Ali's illness excuses his delay to a great extent, we conclude excluding him was an abuse of discretion. We also note that a continuance would have solved the problems Judge Spencer sought to address with exclusions by giving the State time to learn more from Everling's witnesses. Judge Spencer commented that Ali had asked the trial to be set in January rather than in October. (App. at 333.) In light of Ali's illness and the court's last-minute indication that K.P.'s sexual history might not be categorically excluded, a continuance of thirty days may have made a world of difference. Further, although Everling did not submit his witness list until days before trial, the State conceded that it had spoken to some of those listed. (App. at 311.) The cumulative result of Judge Spencer's comments, exclusions, and general demeanor toward the defense was a trial below the standard towards which Indiana strives.