Opinion ID: 1085312
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Reasonable Jury Standard

Text: “We review . . . the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction or the denial of a defendant’s motion for judgment of acquittal de novo.” United States v. Apperson, 441 F.3d 1162, 1209 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). We “tak[e] the evidence—both direct and circumstantial,” and reasonable inferences drawn from that evidence—“in the light most favorable to the government” and ask “only whether . . . a reasonable jury could find [the defendant] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United -22- States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242, 1263 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotations omitted); see also United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199, 1203 (10th Cir. 2011). “[W]e may not weigh evidence or consider credibility of witnesses.” United States v. Renteria, 720 F.3d 1245, 1253 (10th Cir. 2013); see also United States v. Cui Qin Zhang, 458 F.3d 1126, 1128 (10th Cir. 2006). “[T]he evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, must be substantial, but it need not conclusively exclude every other reasonable hypothesis and it need not negate all possibilities except guilt.” United States v. MacKay, 715 F.3d 807, 812 (10th Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted). Nevertheless, “[w]e will not uphold a conviction . . . that was obtained by nothing more than piling inference upon inference . . . or where the evidence raises no more than a mere suspicion of guilt.” United States v. Rahseparian, 231 F.3d 1257, 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (quotations omitted). “[R]easonable inferences supported by other reasonable inferences . . . may warrant a conviction,” but “[a] jury will not be allowed to engage in a degree of speculation and conjecture that renders its finding a guess or mere possibility.” United States v. Michel, 446 F.3d 1122, 1127-28 (10th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). 2. The Reasonable Jury and Proof beyond a Reasonable Doubt The key parts of our sufficiency-of-the-evidence standard of review are (1) whether a reasonable jury could find guilt (2) beyond a reasonable doubt. The first sets a high bar for a defendant challenging a criminal conviction on appeal. The second recognizes the prosecution’s high burden to prove its case. Both are critical to our -23- review. An appellate court must consider the burden of proof in its sufficiency-of-theevidence analysis. The test is not whether some evidence could have reasonably supported a guilty verdict, but whether a rational jury could have found each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979).5 The test is not whether a rational jury could decide that guilt was more likely than not, but beyond a reasonable doubt.6 The evidence “must be substantial, raising more than a mere suspicion of guilt.” United States v. Smith, 133 F.3d 737, 742 (10th Cir. 1997). As explained below, the issue here is not whether Mr. Rufai aided Mr. Ohaka’s fraud, but whether he knew he was doing so.7 The government’s case was weak, but not bereft of circumstantial evidence. We must reconcile the highly deferential “reasonable jury could find” appellate review standard with the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. Compounding our challenge is the substantial evidence that Mr. Ohaka committed Medicare fraud combined with the weak evidence of Mr. Rufai’s knowledge, 5 “[T]he critical inquiry on [appellate] review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” 443 U.S. at 318-19. 6 Charles Allen Wright said over 50 years ago that “federal courts do not seem ever to have distinguished between civil and criminal cases in considering appellate power to order a new trial.” Charles Alan Wright, The Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 Minn. L. Rev. 751, 761 n.47 (1957). Whether or not that observation applies today, it is useful admonition. 7 Although “[t]he standard for finding that a defendant aided or abetted a crime is not a high one,” United States v. Burks, 678 F.3d 1190, 1198 (10th Cir. 2012), proof of knowledge often requires, as here, an inference from circumstantial evidence. -24- posing a risk of imputing knowledge to him from the strong evidence of wrongdoing by non-defendant Ohaka. 3. Sufficiency of the Evidence and Plain Error Review Mr. Rufai failed to raise the mens rea argument as to the aiding and abetting theory of liability on the health care fraud charges in his Rule 29 motion, and he failed to renew the Rule 29 motion altogether after the close of evidence. When a defendant does “not raise [a] specific argument in his Rule 29 motion,” United States v. DeChristopher, 695 F.3d 1082, 1091 (10th Cir. 2012), or fails to renew the motion after introducing evidence in his own defense, see United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007), we review only for plain error. To establish plain error, [the appellant] must demonstrate the district court (1) committed error, (2) the error was plain, and (3) the plain error affected her substantial rights. If these factors are met, we may exercise discretion to correct the error if (4) it seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Story, 635 F.3d 1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “[A] conviction in the absence of sufficient evidence of guilt,” however, almost always meets the first three factors of plain error review. Kaufman, 546 F.3d at 1263. Moreover, it is only in a rare case when the absence of sufficient evidence will not meet the fourth factor of plain error review. See United States v. Goode, 483 F.3d 676, 682 (10th Cir. 2007). Thus, “review under the plain error standard in this case and a review of sufficiency of the evidence usually amount to largely the same exercise.” United -25- States v. Duran, 133 F.3d 1324, 1335 n.9 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Goode, 483 F.3d at 681 n.1.