Opinion ID: 1175559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: did the trial court err in granting summary judgment to plaintiff krebs on the issue of adverse possession?

Text: In order to acquire title by adverse possession, the claimant must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, Curran v. Mount, 657 P.2d 389, 391-92 (Alaska 1982), that for the statutory period his use of the land was continuous, open and notorious, exclusive and hostile to the true owner. Hubbard v. Curtiss, 684 P.2d 842, 848 (Alaska 1984). The statutory period in this case is ten years. [3] The central issue in this appeal concerns the appropriateness of the superior court's grant of summary judgment to Krebs on the basis that she had established all of the required elements of adverse possession as to the disputed parcel. [4] Smith based her motion for summary judgment in part on the affidavit of Roy Musgrove. In his affidavit, Roy Musgrove stated: 3. I remember the building of the meathouse in 1960. 3. [sic] At that time I would have been 14 years of age. 5. It was stated at that time that, although the meathouse was on our land, Mr. Krebs would be using it. 6. Although I cannot remember if Mr. Krebs made the statement that it was on our land, he did not disagree with it in any event. 7. I cannot remember Mr. Krebs, at any time, claiming to own the land upon which the meathouse was built. [5] Krebs' cross-motion for summary judgment was supported by the affidavit of Theta Musgrove, in which she stated that the Krebses had been using the land as their own since 1954 and that everyone understood that it was theirs. Theta Musgrove also declared that she and her husband had never given the Krebses permission to use any portion of Lot 8 because they believed that the Krebses owned the disputed parcel. The issue that was presented to the superior court by these motions for summary judgment was whether the Krebses' possession of any portion of Lot 8 was actually hostile or permissive. In determining whether the element of hostility has been satisfied, we have adopted an objective test. Peters v. Juneau-Douglas Girl Scout Council, 519 P.2d 826, 832 (Alaska 1974). The determinative question is whether or not the claimant acted toward the land as if he owned it. Id. However, the hostility requirement is not satisfied if the adverse claimant has the record owner's permission to use the property. Penn v. Ivey, 615 P.2d 1, 3 (Alaska 1980). There is a presumption that one who possesses or uses another's property does so with the owner's permission. Peters, 519 P.2d at 833. The adverse claimant may rebut this presumption by showing that he was not on the owner's land with permission, and that the record owner could have ejected him. Id. In our view, the affidavit of Roy Musgrove raises a genuine issue of material fact which goes to the issue of whether the Krebses' use of the disputed parcel was permissive. Given the existence of this genuine issue of material fact, the superior court inappropriately granted Krebs' motion for summary judgment. [6] The judgment of the superior court is REVERSED and the matter REMANDED to the superior court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. [7]