Opinion ID: 1642530
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: waiver of the right to demand arbitration

Text: We also agree with the result of the Court of Appeals regarding the defendants' waiver of their arbitration rights. Campbell, supra, pp 559-560. Our court rules require that affirmative defenses be stated in a party's responsive pleading, and they provide that defenses not asserted in the responsive pleading are waived. MCR 2.111(F). While it is true that an arbitration agreement is not among the defenses enumerated in MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a), the inclusion of the words such as in that subsection indicates that the enumerated defenses were not intended to form a closed class, but were included by way of illustration only. See also FR Civ P 8(c) (enumerated defenses are not exclusive). We first note our agreement with the observation in Hendrickson that an arbitration agreement is in the nature of a release or a statute of limitations, narrowing a party's legal rights to pursue a particular claim in a particular forum. Hendrickson, supra, p 298. Releases and statutes of limitation are among the enumerated defenses in MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a). Moreover, the arbitration agreement is not a negative defense which goes to the merits of the plaintiff's claim; instead, by asserting the agreement, a defendant seeks to foreclose the plaintiff from continuing a civil action for reasons unrelated to the plaintiff's prima facie case. [4] Therefore, in our judgment, an arbitration agreement is properly regarded as an affirmative defense. Even if we were to interpret subsection MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a) restrictively, other language in MCR 2.111(F)(3) suggests that it was incumbent upon the defendants to assert the arbitration agreement in their responsive pleadings. MCR 2.111(F)(3)(c) requires the inclusion of a ground of defense which would be likely to surprise the adverse party. While the instant plaintiff may or may not have been surprised in fact by the existence of the arbitration agreement, personal representatives of patients who die following the signing of an agreement generally may be quite likely to be taken by surprise by the existence of such a document. Finally, the broad language employed in MCR 2.111(F), coupled with case law recognizing the existence of affirmative defenses not specifically set forth in MCR 2.111(F)(3)(a) [5] provides adequate warning to the practitioner that defenses which go beyond rebutting the plaintiff's prima facie case, other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, [6] should be stated in the responsive pleading, lest they be deemed to have been waived. Defendant-appellant Rourke has not preserved his right to rely on the arbitration agreement because of his failure to assert that defense in his first responsive pleading. Defendant-appellant Gregory asserted arbitration as an affirmative defense, but, as noted by the Court of Appeals, it is unclear from the record if the trial court decided whether Dr. Gregory's participation in circuit court proceedings and his delay in raising a motion for summary disposition on the basis of the arbitration agreement waived his rights under the agreement and the MAA. This issue is not before us, and the circuit court shall make this determination on remand as directed by the Court of Appeals. [7]