Opinion ID: 895202
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Use of Immigration Status as Impeachment Evidence

Text: The court of appeals concluded, however, that the evidence of Rodriguez's immigration status was nevertheless admissible to impeach his contrary trial testimony. 224 S.W.3d at 897. This impeachment apparently related to Rodriguez's trial testimony that he never lied to get a driver's license and did not know whether he had a legal right to work in the United States. Id. at 897 n. 32. Relying on Texas Rule of Evidence 801(e)(2)(A), the court concluded that Rodriguez, as a party, could be impeached with evidence of his own prior verbal statements. Id. at 897. The court further concluded that, because the statements of a party are not hearsay, see id., it was unnecessary to address complaints that Rodriguez's immigration status was not relevant and was more prejudicial than probative. Id. at 897 n. 32. We fail to see the connection. Rule 801(e)(2)(A) provides that a party admission is not hearsay. Whether impeachment evidence is hearsay, however, has nothing to do with the relevancy requirement in Rules 401 and 402, or Rule 403's requirement that evidence should be excluded if its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs any probative value. See Bay Area Healthcare Group, Ltd. v. McShane, 239 S.W.3d 231, 235 (Tex.2007) (stating that, subject to other Rules of Evidence that may limit admissibility [citing, among other evidentiary rules, Rules 402 and 403], any statement by a party-opponent is admissible against that party); Willover v. State, 70 S.W.3d 841, 846 n. 9 (Tex.Crim.App.2002) (noting that non-hearsay still must meet other requirements for admissibility, such as relevance). Thus, the observation that Rodriguez's statements are not hearsay neither establishes their admissibility nor explains why other witnesses were permitted to be questioned about Rodriguez's immigration status, or why extrinsic evidence was admitted on the subject.