Opinion ID: 1710872
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Heading: As to the Divorce

Text: Each party charges the other with voluntary abandonment. Divorce on this ground is authorized by Code 1940, Tit. 34, Sec. 20, par. 3, as amended by Act No. 463, appvd. July 10, 1943, Gen. Acts Reg.Sess.1943, p. 425, which provides as follows: The circuit court in equity has power to divorce persons from the bonds of matrimony, upon bill filed by the aggrieved party, for the causes following:    3. For voluntary abandonment from bed and board for one year next preceding the filing of the bill.    The rule of our cases is that to constitute voluntary abandonment as a ground for divorce there must be a final departure, without the other party's consent, without sufficient reason therefor, and without the intention to return. Kidd v. Kidd, 246 Ala. 313, 20 So.2d 515; Perry v. Perry, 230 Ala. 502, 162 So. 101; Mayo v. Mayo, 199 Ala. 551, 552, 74 So. 971; Brown v. Brown, 178 Ala. 121, 122, 59 So. 48. On original consideration, we expressed the view that neither party was entitled to a divorce because we did not think there was present here a sufficient showing of absence without consent. On application for rehearing, we have again examined the evidence and have reached the conclusion, after most careful consideration and full discussion in consultation, that we were in error in denying the wife a divorce. Our first conclusion from the evidence was that the departure of the husband on September 6, 1951, and his sixteen months' absence thereafter, were acquiesced in by the wife and that such acquiescence constituted consent on her part, which, under the rule of our cases, would deny to her a divorce on the ground that her husband had voluntarily abandoned her. Kidd v. Kidd, supra; Perry v. Perry, supra; Mayo v. Mayo, supra; Brown v. Brown, supra. While there might be evidence to support an inference that the wife was not displeased by the husband's absence, we do not find any evidence that she consented or agreed to it. We perceive no duty on the part of the wife to make overt objections or protestations against the husband's departure nor to seek out the departed husband and to make overtures to him to return to her. In this case it was the husband, and not the wife, who withdrew from the established home. The cessation of cohabitation was complete for a period in excess of the prescribed year, without the performance of any marital duties, except that the husband continued to send to the wife the monthly payment of $120 due on the home mortgage executed by him. But, even if it be conceded that such payments on the husband's debt inured to the wife's benefit as owner of the home, this would not affect her right to a divorce on the ground of voluntary abandonment. We have held that the fact that the husband has furnished adequate support during separation does not bar the wife's right to divorce, if the ground therefor otherwise exists. Benton v. Benton, 214 Ala. 321, 323, 107 So. 827, 829. We find no evidence to support the husband's claim that the wife is the defaulting party. According to the husband's own testimony, he made no request that the wife join him in his changed residences; that he saw no reason to ask her as he knew she would not move with him.