Opinion ID: 175076
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Correia's testimony on cross-examination

Text: Correia contends that the district court erred in permitting a line of questioning by Feeney's attorney during his cross-examination of Correia. He claims that the testimony was admitted over his objection and served only to prejudice the all-white jury against him, framing him as a minority, an immigrant, and an interloper, a freeloader, a deadbeat, [and] an opportunist. Correia argues that the cross-examination testimony carried so significant a potential for prejudice that the district court should have excluded it under Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Unfortunately for Correia, he himself set the stage for the admission of the evidence that he now seeks to challenge. Udemba v. Nicoli, 237 F.3d 8, 14 (1st Cir.2001). On direct examination, Correia answered several questions from his counsel establishing background information about him. The line of questioning revealed that Correia is a native of Cape Verde; has resided in the United States since 1978; has been a citizen since 1981; speaks little English; was injured in the workplace within five years of residing in the United States; and now owns and manages five multifamily properties that he rents to Section 8 housing recipients. On cross-examination, Feeney's counsel pursued further some of the background information disclosed by Correia: Q. ([defense counsel]). You worked briefly when you got [to the United States], about five years? A. (MR. CORREIA). Yes. Q. You went out on disability. You've been on disability since, correct? A. Yes. Q. So you've been claiming since 1982 that you've been unable to work because of some type of shoulder injury, as I understand it, is that correct? A. Yes . . . . . . . . Q. So you can do things with your right hand, right? Write, drive, do everything you can with your right hand, right? A. Write? I don't write because I don't know how to write. But I can drive. Q. Okay. So in your claim for your injury from 1982, you got money because you sued someone? A. No, I didn't sue anyone. I got disability but they didn't give me the money all at once. They gave me pension. Q. So you have been getting money every week or every month since 1982? A. Yes. Q. . . . Through the amount of money that you've been receiving, you've acquired five pieces of property, multi-family houses, right? A. Not correct. I bought them with a bank, with credit from the bank. . . . . Q. Okay. And you rent these to people. . . who have a Section 8 certificate who get their rent paid for by the government, right? A. Yes. Q. And that's a good thing because you can count on regular payment of the rent through the federal government, correct? A. Not only that. . . . Q. And the rent gets paid by the federal government; is that not correct? [COUNSEL FOR CORREIA]. Objection, your Honor, to the line of questioning. It's irrelevant. THE COURT. Overruled. Defense counsel continued to press Correia on his English skills, presumably seeking to counter Correia's claim that because of his limited English skills he had not understood Feeney's directions when he pulled into the parking space by his house. Before reaching the merits of Correia's claim, we must determine what standard of review applies. We have described as a bedrock rule the principle that a party who unsuccessfully objects to the introduction of evidence on one ground cannot . . . raise an entirely new ground of objection on appeal without forfeiting the usual standard of review. Udemba, 237 F.3d at 14-15; see also Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1) (establishing that a court's error may not be predicated upon a ruling admitting evidence unless a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context. . .). When Correia objected below to the line of questioning, he argued that it was irrelevant. In so objecting, he suggested that the testimony had no probative value and thus was inadmissible pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 402. By contrast, Correia's appeal is based on the testimony's prejudicial nature under Rule 403, which applies only to relevant evidence. Thus, he attempts to appeal the district court's evidentiary ruling on a ground that the court below had no opportunity to consider. Where, as here, the grounds for appeal have not been preserved, we review the district court's admission of evidence for plain error. See United States v. Mardirosian, 602 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir.2010). Under plain error review, we will consider a forfeited objection only if: (1) an error was committed; (2) the error was `plain' (i.e. obvious and clear under current law); (3) the error was prejudicial (i.e. affected substantial rights); and (4) review is needed to prevent a miscarriage of justice. Smith v. Kmart Corp., 177 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir.1999). To merit reversal, there must be a demonstration that justice has miscarried or that the trial's basic fairness has been compromised. United States v. Hadfield, 918 F.2d 987, 995 (1st Cir.1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 936, 111 S.Ct. 2062, 114 L.Ed.2d 466 (1991). In direct examination, Correia's counsel asked him questions about an injury that he experienced in the workplace, properties that he owns, and his limited capacity to speak English. Thus, Correia made such background information relevant through his own testimony. To the extent that the cross-examination raised concerns of undue prejudice under Rule 403, Correia never lodged such an objection. Under these circumstances, he cannot establish that any error in the allowance of the cross examination, or some portions of it, was sufficiently grave to satisfy plain error review. Affirmed.