Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: testimony concerning burns' probation status and prior acts of violence

Text: Prior to trial, Burns filed a motion in limine to exclude, during the guilt phase of his trial, references to his probation status and to other offenses contained in his statements to law enforcement officials. He specifically objected to that portion of his statement to Gochenour where Burns stated that he had to keep good records, including receipts, because he was on probation. Burns also objected to the statement, attributed to him by Buckley, that he had done something worse than his drug runs, and it was worse than anything he had done. With regard to each statement, the Commonwealth argued that its probative value outweighed any prejudice to the defendant. The circuit court agreed, and so do we. Burns referenced his probation status in an effort to create an alibi for himself on the night of Cooley's murder. Similarly, his comment to Buckley reflects his awareness of the seriousness of the crime he had committed and the reason he needed her help to establish an alibi. The responsibility for balancing the competing considerations of probative value and prejudice rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. The exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 617, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 281, 112 L.Ed.2d 235 (1990) (citing Coe v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 83, 87, 340 S.E.2d 820, 823 (1986)). We find no abuse of that discretion with regard to this issue. Burns also argues that the court erred in allowing into evidence his wife's testimony concerning prior episodes of violence and threatening conduct, and Burns' tendency to become sexually aggressive when he consumed alcohol. However, the court allowed the evidence only for the purpose of showing why Penny left her residence on September 20th. Furthermore, the jury heard the court's ruling in open court, and Burns did not request the court to give the jury a more explicit cautionary instruction. See Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 40, 393 S.E.2d 599, 607 (1990). Thus, we find no error in the court's admission of this testimony. Its probative value to explain why Penny left her home on September 20th and took a circuitous route to a friend's house outweighed any prejudice to the defendant.