Opinion ID: 6494320
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Traditional Hawaiian Rights Under Article XII, Section 7

Text: Our proud legal tradition in this State of protecting Native Hawaiian rights is not of recent vintage, for even as far back as the days of the Hawaiian Kingdom, protections have been in place to ensure the continued exercise of traditional Hawaiian rights amidst the pressures exerted by countervailing interests of a changing society. See Pub. Access Shoreline Haw. v. Haw. Cty. Planning Comm’n (PASH), 79 Hawai'i 425, 437 n. 21, 903 P.2d 1246, 1258 n. 21 (1995) (discussing laws dating back to the era of the Hawaiian Kingdom with provisions that ensured protection of Native Hawaiian customs and traditions). In 1978, protection of traditional and customary Hawaiian rights was preserved within the Hawaii Constitution. Article XII, Section 7 embodies the resolute promise by the State to “protect all rights, customarily and traditionally exercised for subsistence, cultural and religious purposes and possessed by ahupua'a[ 1 ] tenants who are descendants of native Hawaiians who inhabited the Hawaiian Islands prior to 1778, subject to the right ... to regulate such rights.” Haw. Const, art. XII, § 7; see In re ‘Iao Ground Water Mgmt. Area High-Level Source Water Use Permit Applications (‘Iao), 128 Hawai'i 228, 247, 287 P.3d 129, 148 (2012). So robust is this promise that even though Article XII, Section 7 carves out for the State the power to regulate the exercise of customary and traditional Hawaiian rights, this court underscored that “the State is obligated to protect the reasonable exercise of customarily and traditionally exercised rights of Hawaiians to the extent feasible.” PASH, 79 Hawai'i at 450 n. 43, 903 P.2d at 1271 n. 43. The meaning of Article XII, Section 7 was first examined by this court in Kalipi v. Hawaiian Trust Co., 66 Haw. 1, 656 P.2d 745 (1982). In that case, the plaintiff sought “to exercise traditional Hawaiian gathering rights” on undeveloped lands within an ahu-pua'a on the island of Molokai. Id. at 3, 656 P.2d at 747. The plaintiff “assert[ed] that it ha[d] long been the practice of him and his family to travel the lands of the [defendants in order to gather indigenous agricultural products for use in accordance with traditional Hawaiian practices.” Id. at 3-4, 656 P.2d at 747. Chief Justice Richardson, wilting for the court, stated that “any argument for the extinguishing of traditional rights based simply upon the possible inconsistency of purported native rights with our modern system of land tenure must fail,” for the exercise of these traditional rights are protected pursuant to the express terms of the Hawaii Constitution. Id. at 4, 656 P.2d at 748. The Kalipi court held that “lawful occupants of an ahupua'a may, for the purposes of practicing native Hawaiian customs and traditions, enter undeveloped lands within the ahupua'a to gather those items enumerated in the statute.” 2 Id. at 7-8, 656 P.2d at 749. Ten years later, this court extended Kali-pi’s holding in Pele Defense Fund v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 837 P.2d 1247 (1992). There, the plaintiff maintained that its “native Hawaiian members were entitled under Article XII, § 7 to enter Wao Kele ‘O Puna and the Puna Forest Reserve to exercise traditional and customary rights” since they were tenants who resided in the ahupua'a abutting Wao Kele ‘O Puna. Id. at 616, 837 P.2d at 1269. This court disavowed any notion that traditional Hawaiian gathering rights may only be exercised within an ahupua'a and by the lawful occupants of the ahupua'a. Id. at 620-21, 837 P.2d at 1272. The Paty court reasoned that traditional Native Hawaiian gathering rights are not grounded only in land ownership but also in the practiced customs of Native Hawaiians. Id. And if those practiced customs indicate that traditional gathering was conducted in an area outside of, but abutting, an ahupua'a, then undeveloped portions of that area may be accessed by individuals of native Hawaiian descent for traditional gathering purposes. Id. In PASH, this court interpreted Kalipi ⅛ discussion of customary rights derived from the Hawaiian usage exception in HRS § 1-1 (2009) 3 and affirmed that “the reasonable exercise of ancient Hawaiian usage is entitled to protection under article XII, section 7.” 79 Hawai'i at 442, 903 P.2d at 1263. Further, the court declared that the regulatory power reserved for the State in Article XII, Section 7 does not equate to the authority to extinguish traditional and customary Hawaiian rights because they have become “inconsistent with generally understood elements of the western doctrine of ‘property.’ ” Id. Article XII, Section 7 was pronounced by this court in Ka Pa‘akai O Ka'Aina v. Land Use Commission, 94 Hawai'i 31, 7 P.3d 1068 (2000), as placing “an affirmative duty on the State and its agencies to preserve and protect traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights.” Id. at 45, 7 P.3d at 1082 (emphasis added). At the core of this affirmative duty, as explained by the Ka Pa'akai court, is the responsibility of the State and its constituent agencies to act only after “independently considering the effect of their actions on Hawaiian traditions and practices.” Id. at 46, 7 P.3d at 1083. The court also held that meaningful protection of Native Hawaiian rights pursuant to Article XII, Section 7 means that they must be enforceable through “an analytical framework [that] endeavor[s] to accommodate the competing interests of protecting native Hawaiian culture and rights, on the one hand, and economic development and security, on the other.” Id. The analytical framework crafted by the court required the State and its agencies “at a minimum” to make particularized findings and conclusions regarding the identity and scope of “ “valued cultural, historical, or natural resources’ in the petition area,” including (1) ... the extent to which traditional and customary native Hawaiian rights are exercised in the petition area; (2) the extent to which those resources— including traditional and customaiy native Hawaiian rights—will be affected or impaired by the proposed action; and (3) the feasible action, if any, to be taken by the [agency] to reasonably protect native Hawaiian rights if they are found to exist. Id. at 47, 7 P.3d at 1084 (format altered). Because the Land Use Commission in Ka Pa'akai did not render sufficient findings and conclusions addressing these essential considerations before reclassifying land in a conservation district to an urban district, this court was not able to determine whether the agency “discharged its duty to protect customary and traditional practices of native Hawaiians to the extent feasible.” Id. at 48, 7 P.3d at 1085. Thus, we concluded that the Land Use Commission “failed to satisfy its ... constitutional obligations.” Id. at 52, 7 P.3d at 1089. The Ka Pa'akai framework was later applied in the context of an agency’s amendment of an interim instream flow standards (IIPS) for certain streams on the island of Maui. ‘Iao, 128 Hawai'i at 247-48, 287 P.3d at 148-49. This court in ‘Iao determined that the agency failed to comply with the framework because, although the agency recognized that the amendment would limit “the native Hawaiian practices of kalo cultivation and gathering,” it did not make “findings or conclusions articulating the effect of the amended IIPS on the native Hawaiian practices” and the feasibility of protecting those practices. Id. at 248-49, 287 P.3d at 149-50. Thus, this court’s evolving jurisprudence concerning Native Hawaiian traditional and customary rights has conceived of a system in which the State and its agencies bear an affirmative constitutional obligation to engage in a meaningful and heightened inquiry into the interrelationship between the area involved, the Native Hawaiian practices exercised in that area, the effect of a proposed action on those practices, and feasible measures that can be implemented to safeguard the vitality of those practices. See id. at 247-48, 287 P.3d at 148-49; Ka Pa'akai, 94 Hawai'i at 47, 7 P.3d at 1084. When an individual of Native Hawaiian descent asserts that a traditionally exercised cultural, religious, or gathering practice in an undeveloped or not fully developed area would be curtailed by the proposed project, the State or the applicable agency is “obligated to address” this adverse impact in its findings and conclusions pursuant to the Ka Pa'akai framework. Ka Pa'akai, 94 Hawai'i at 46, 50, 7 P.3d at 1083, 1087. Consequently, if customary and traditional Native Hawaiian practices are to be meaningfully safeguarded, “findings on the extent of them exercise, them impairment, and the feasibility of them protection” are paramount. Ka Pa'akai, 94 Hawai'i at 50, 7 P.3d at 1087. To effectively render such findings, it is imperative for the agency to receive evidence and then make “[a] determination ... supported by the evidence in the record.” In re Haw. Elec. Light Co., 60 Haw. 625, 642, 594 P.2d 612, 623 (1979) (findings of basic facts “are required to be supported by the evidence in the record”); Finding of Fact, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Thus, the agency must act as a factfinder—to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties—in order to determine whether the exercise of Native Hawaiian rights will be limited to some extent. To fulfill this duty and to permit such findings to be made, the agency is obligated to conduct a contested case hearing before the legal rights of the parties are decided. 4 In this case, several individuals testified during the public hearings about the sanctity of Mauna Kea to Native Hawaiian culture. 5 Prior to the vote granting the permit, the Administrator of the Office of Conservation and Coastal Lands provided the Board with a background relating to UH’s application for the permit. His comments also informed the Board of the project’s potential for significant impacts on the exercise of Hawaiian cultural practices: Number one we acknowledge and discussed the importance of the ancient and contemporary cultural values and resources at Mauna Kea.... [W]e acknowledge concerns remain regarding the projectPls impact on the spiritual nature of Mauna Kea and on the cultural beliefs and practices of many— that is clear. Interpretation of the spiritual impact is based upon individual perception. For some no mitigation is possible and any development on the mountain would be sacrilegious.... At the end of the day what it comes down to is these values were identified—the wor-shipping, the placement of piko, the gathering of water, gathering of stones and burials were all identified. The [e]ffects of the project on these things were considered. What flowed from that is the third part of the Ka Pa‘akai analysis which is how do we mitigate the effect of the project on these values.... (Emphasis added). Thus, the Board was informed of multiple traditional Hawaiian cultural practices exercised in the project area and was aware of the project’s potential adverse impact on the “spiritual nature of Mau-na Kea” and the “cultural beliefs and practices of many.” Nonetheless, despite numerous requests for a contested case hearing, the Board proceeded to summarily approve the permit in contravention of its obligation to determine the extent of the impairment of Native Hawaiian cultural practices that would be caused by the proposed action and the feasibility of protecting such practices. The Board’s action was in clear derogation of its “affirmative duty” to fully and carefully assess evidence presented in a hearing, which is critical to making essential findings and conclusions pursuant to the Ka Pa‘akai framework. “The promise of preserving and protecting customary and traditional rights would be illusory absent findings on the extent of their exercise, their impairment, and the feasibility of their protection.” Ka Pa'akai, 94 Hawai'i at 50, 7 P.3d at 1087. Thus, the Board was required to conduct a heightened inquiry evaluating the requisite factors in a contested case hearing before reaching a determination on the permit application. Such a hearing would have enabled the Board to make the findings and conclusions that are essential to the Board’s determination of whether or not to grant the permit. Because such a heightened inquiry was not conducted, the Board had no basis for its decision, and “as a matter of law,” the Board “failed to satisfy its ... constitutional obligations” under Article XII, Section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution. Id. at 52, 7 P.3d at 1089.