Opinion ID: 2960871
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Military Retirement Decisions

Text: Military retirement benefits may be available for distribution as marital property under a complex federal framework. Because the parties’ various arguments to the superior court were not always consistent with the applicable federal law, we provide legal background before analyzing their dispute.
Generally a uniformed service member may request to retire and receive longevity retirement benefits after completing 20 years of creditable service.10 Longevity 7 Young v. Kelly, 334 P.3d 153, 157 (Alaska 2014) (citing Frost v. Ayojiak, 957 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska 1998)). But see Heber v. Heber, 330 P.3d 926, 930 (Alaska 2014) (explaining denials of Rule 60(b)(4) motions seeking relief from void judgments are reviewed de novo because “validity of a judgment is strictly a question of law” (quoting Leisnoi, Inc. v. Merdes & Merdes, P.C., 307 P.3d 879, 884 (Alaska 2013))). 8 Watega v. Watega, 143 P.3d 658, 663 (Alaska 2006). 9 Lee v. Konrad, 337 P.3d 510, 518 (Alaska 2014) (footnote omitted). 10 See 10 U.S.C. § 3914 (“[A]n enlisted member of the Army who has at least 20, but less than 30, years of service . . . may, upon his request, be retired.”). -11- 7050 retirement benefits awards are a function of retired base pay11 and 2.5 times the member’s creditable years of service.12 But if a member suffers a physical disability during service and as a result is unfit to perform Army duties, the Army may retire the member with disability retirement pay.13 We refer to this latter form of retirement as Chapter 61 disability retirement.14 When a member receives a Chapter 61 disability retirement, the disability rating is stated as a percentage — e.g., 70% disabled.15 A member retired from the Army for permanent physical disability may determine monthly retirement as a function of retired base pay and either the disability rating percentage or the creditable years of 11 Retired base pay is the member’s average monthly salary earned during the member’s highest 36 months. See 10 U.S.C. § 1407(b) (“[T]he retired pay base or retainer pay base of a person under this section is the person’s high-three average.”); 10 U.S.C. § 1407(c) (“[T]he total amount of monthly basic pay to which the member was entitled for the 36 months . . . for which the monthly basic pay to which the member was the highest, divided by . . . 36 . . . .”). 12 The member’s high 36 month salary is multiplied by a percentage — 2.5 times the member’s creditable years of service stated as a percentage — in order to determine monthly retired pay. See 10 U.S.C. § 1401(a);10 U.S.C. § 1409(b) (“[T]he percentage to be used . . . is the product (stated as a percentage) of . . . [2.5] and . . . the member’s years of creditable service . . . .”). 13 See 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (“Upon a determination . . . that a member . . . is unfit to perform the duties of the member’s office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical disability incurred while entitled to basic pay . . . , the Secretary may retire the member with retired pay computed under [10 U.S.C. § 1401] . . . .”). 14 See 10 U.S.C. ch. 61 §§ 1201-1222. 15 See 10 U.S.C. § 1216a. -12- 7050 service percentage.16 The member “is entitled to be paid under the applicable formula that is most favorable.”17 Chapter 61 disability retirement is not the only form of disability payment available to veterans. Members who are disabled as a result of an injury suffered or aggravated in the line of duty also are entitled to Department of Veteran Affairs disability (VA disability).18 A member’s entitlement to VA disability does not depend on a Chapter 61 decision to retire the member for permanent physical disability.19 Unlike the member’s Chapter 61 disability rating — a rating based on the member’s ability to perform Army duties20 — the member’s VA rating covers all disabilities suffered in the line of duty and may differ from the Chapter 61 rating.21 A member’s VA disability 16 10 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1204). When computing retirement as a function of the member’s disability rating, the disability percentage used may not exceed 75%. Id. 17 10 U.S.C. § 1401(b). For example, a member retiring after 22 years of service would be entitled to 55% of the member’s retired base pay (22 x 2.5 = 55). If that member had been retired by the Army due to a permanent physical disability and had received a 60% disability rating, then the member w ould be entitled to receive 60% of retired base pay. See 10 U.S.C. § 1 401(a) (citing 10 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1204). And if that same member were retired by the Army due to a permanent physical disability with a 40% disability rating, then the member would still be entitled to 55% of retired base pay because payments are calculated using the formula that is most favorable to the member. See 10 U.S.C. § 1401(b). 18 38 U.S.C. § 1110 (2012). 19 See id. See also 38 U.S.C. § 1114 (compensation table). 20 10 U.S.C. § 1201. 21 38 U.S.C. § 1110. See also Myers v. United States, 50 Fed. Cl. 674, 690 n.41 (Fed. Cl. 2001). -13- 7050 payment is a function of the member’s VA disability rating and the member’s number and type of dependents.22 Historically a member’s receipt of VA disability payments was contingent on the member waiving an equal amount of retired pay.23 But two programs now provide for concurrent receipt or repayment of waived retired pay.24 Combat-related special compensation (CRSC) allows veterans disabled in combat to receive compensation in lieu of retirement payments up to the amount waived to receive VA disability benefits.25 Concurrent retirement and disability pay (CRDP) is a phase-in program allowing qualifying disabled veterans to receive VA disability pay while waiving incrementally smaller amounts of retirement pay and providing for receipt of full retirement for all qualified disabled veterans pay by 2014.26 Both programs include exceptions for 22 38 U.S.C. §§ 1114-1115. 23 38 U.S.C. §§ 5304-5305. Members have incentive to waive retired pay for VA disability payments because VA disability payments are not taxed. 26 U.S.C. § 104(a)(4). 24 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1413a-1414. 25 See 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(a) (“The Secretary concerned shall pay to each eligible combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree who elects benefits under this section a monthly amount for the combat-related disability of the retiree determined under subsection (b).”); § 1413a(b) (“[T]he monthly amount to be paid an eligible combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree under subsection (a) for any month is the amount of compensation to which the retiree is entitled under title 38 for that month, determined without regard to any disability of the retiree that is not a combatrelated disability. . . . The amount paid to an eligible combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree for any month . . . may not exceed the amount of the reduction in retired pay that is applicable to the retiree for that month under sections 5304 and 5305 of title 38.”). 26 See 10 U.S.C. § 1414(a) (“[A] member or former member of the uniformed (continued...) -14- 7050 members retired by the Army under Chapter 61, limiting CRSC to an amount equal to the member’s longevity retirement27 or requiring waiver of concurrent retired pay exceeding the amount the member would have received from a longevity retirement.28
The Uniformed Services Former Spouses Protection Act (USFSPA) provides that state courts “may treat disposable retired pay payable to a member . . . either as property solely of the member or as property of the member and his spouse in accordance with the law of the jurisdiction of such court.”29 USFSPA defines disposable retired pay: 26 (...continued) services who is entitled for any month to retired pay and who is also entitled for that month to veterans’ disability compensation for a qualifying service-connected disability . . . is entitled to be paid both for that month without regard to sections 5304 and 5305 of title 38. During the period beginning January 1, 2004, and ending on December 31, 2013, payment of retired pay to such a qualified retiree is subject to [a phase-in schedule] . . . .”). 27 See 10 U.S.C. § 1413a(b)(3)(A) (“In the case of an eligible combat-related disabled uniformed services retiree who is retired under chapter 61 of this title, the amount of [CRSC] . . . for any month may not, when combined with the amount of retired pay payable to the retiree after any such reduction under sections 5304 and 5305 of title 38, cause the total of such combined payment to exceed the amount of retired pay to which the member would have been entitled under any other provision of law based upon the member’s service in the uniformed services if the member had not been retired under chapter 61 of this title.”). 28 See 10 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1) (“The retired pay of a member retired under chapter 61 of this title . . . is subject to reduction under sections 5304 and 5305 of title 38, but only to the extent that the amount of the member’s retired pay under chapter 61 of this title exceeds the amount of retired pay to which the member would have been entitled under any other provision of law based upon the member’s service in the uniformed services if the member had not been retired under chapter 61 of this title.”). 29 10 U.S.C. § 1408(c)(1) (emphasis added). -15- 7050 [T]he total monthly retired pay to which a member is entitled less amounts which — .... (B) are deducted from the retired pay of such member as a result of forfeitures of retired pay ordered by a courtmartial or as a result of a waiver of retired pay required by law in order to receive compensation under title 5 or title 38; (C) in the case of a member entitled to retired pay under chapter 61 of this title, are equal to the amount of retired pay of the member under that chapter computed using the percentage of the member’s disability on the date when the member was retired . . . .[30] In Mansell v. Mansell the United States Supreme Court applied USFSPA to retired pay waived in order to receive VA disability benefits, holding that USFSPA “does not grant state courts the power to treat as property divisible upon divorce military retirement pay that has been waived to receive veterans’ disability benefits.”31 We applied Mansell in Clauson v. Clauson, noting that state courts do not have any power to “equitably divide veterans’ disability benefits received in place of waived retirement pay.”32 But we clarified that “neither the USFSPA nor prior Supreme Court decisions require our courts to completely ignore the economic consequences of a military retiree’s decision to waive retirement pay in order to collect disability pay.”33 We therefore considered “the economic consequences of a decision to waive military pay in order to receive disability pay” — in Clauson the member’s former spouse was barred from 30 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4) (emphasis added). 31 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989). 32 831 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Alaska 1992). 33 Id. at 1263. -16- 7050 receiving an agreed upon share of the military retirement benefits — and affirmed the superior court’s decision to grant the spouse’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion reopening the parties’ property settlement agreement.34 We finally explained that when reopening a property distribution trial courts may not “simply shift an amount of property equivalent to the waived retirement pay from the military spouse’s side of the ledger to the other spouse’s side. . . . Disability benefits should not, in either form or substance, be treated as marital property subject to division upon the dissolution of marriage.”35 In Young v. Lowery we affirmed our Clauson decision and held that “a court may not equitably divide total retired pay; it may equitably divide only the amount of retired pay remaining after the court deducts waived retired pay and the cost of purchasing survivor benefits.”36 We also held that “the trial court may expressly order [the service member] not to reduce his disposable retired pay and require [him] to indemnify [the former spouse] for any amounts by which her payments are reduced below the amount set on the date the amended qualified order is entered.”37
In the superior court the parties may have been confused about the nature of Juan’s retirement benefits and whether they were divisible in whole or in part. The undisputed evidence in the record establishes the following: Juan was Chapter 61 retired for permanent physical disability under 10 U.S.C. § 1201; the Army rated Juan’s permanent disability at 70%; because Juan’s 70% disability rating exceeded his 34 Id. at 1261-64. 35 Id. at 1264. 36 221 P.3d 1006, 1011 (Alaska 2009). 37 Id. at 1012-13. -17- 7050 retirement pay multiplier38 Juan was entitled to have his Chapter 61 disability retirement pay calculated using his disability rating;39 Juan’s retirement base pay was $6,355, and his gross Chapter 61 retirement pay was $4,449.40 Juan also received at least $3,213 in monthly VA disability payments, and his monthly VA waiver was $1,424.41 4. The superior court’s retirement benefits rulings The master’s report explained that Juan’s retirement “is completely classified as disability pay. Disability pay is not [divisible] by the court as it is not a marital asset.” And the superior court explained that “[b]ecause of [Juan’s] disability, the government classifies all of his retirement as disability pay, leaving zero disposable retirement pay for a state court to distribute in a divorce.” Pamela asserts that the superior court is incorrect because “based on Juan’s own pay statement, it appears that at least a portion of Juan’s pay was divisible and that 38 Juan’s exact retirement pay multiplier is not clear from the record, but based on 23 years of service it could not have exceeded 57.5%. And Juan testified that he took a career service bonus in 2004 that paid him $30,000 but decreased his retirement pay multiplier by 10% to 47.5%. 39 See 10 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (“If a person would otherwise be entitled to retired pay computed under more than one formula . . ., the person is entitled to be paid under the applicable formula that is most favorable to him.”). Based on approximately 23 years of service Juan’s longevity-based retirement pay multiplier could not have exceeded 57.5%, but Juan’s 70% disability rating provided for his receipt of 70% of his retired base pay. See 10 U.S.C. § 1401(a). 40 Juan’s Chapter 61 pay was based on his 70% disability rating — $6,355 x .70 = $4,449. 41 Juan had to waive a portion of his Chapter 61 disability because Chapter 61 payments may only be received concurrently with VA disability payments up to “the amount of retired pay to which the member would have been entitled under any other provision of law based upon the member’s service in the uniformed services if the member had not been retired under chapter 61 of this title.” 10 U.S.C. § 1414(b)(1). -18- 7050 Pamela would be receiving some of these funds if the trial court had issued a qualifying order.” Pamela specifically argues that Juan received CRDP42 and that “CRDP is divisible upon divorce.” But CRDP does not change the nature of Juan’s Chapter 61 retirement benefit. Juan’s benefits come from two sources — Chapter 61 disability retirement and VA disability payments. Neither source is divisible upon divorce. USFSPA excludes from disposable retired pay all Chapter 61 retirement benefits “equal to the amount of retired pay . . . computed using the percentage of the member’s disability.”43 And as we held in Clauson v. Clauson, state courts have no power to equitably divide VA disability benefits.44 VA disability benefits are not retired pay and do not fall within USFSPA’s definition of disposable retired pay.45 Juan’s Chapter 61 retirement payments were computed using the percentage of his disability rating and are not divisible: Juan was 70% disabled, and his gross retired pay was 70% of his retired base pay. And contrary to Pamela’s assertion that “CRDP is divisible upon divorce” — Juan was receiving $1,789 CRDP — the CRDP portions of Juan’s Chapter 61 payments are not divisible.46 CRDP provides for concurrent receipt of VA disability benefits and military retirement pay.47 If the concurrently received retirement payments are disposable retired pay under USFSPA, 42 See supra note 26 (explaining CRDP). 43 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(C). 44 831 P.2d 1257, 1264 (Alaska 1992). 45 Id. at 1262-64; 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(B). 46 See 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(C). 47 10 U.S.C. § 1414. -19- 7050 then the retirement payments are divisible. Chapter 61 disability retirement payments computed based on a member’s disability percentage are not disposable retired pay under USFSPA — even when received concurrently with VA disability.48 DFAS recognized that Juan received no disposable retired pay and notified Pamela that “[t]he entire amount of the member’s retired/retainer pay is based on disability, thus there are no funds available for payment under the USFSPA.” Because Juan’s military benefits consist entirely of Chapter 61 retirement and VA disability, the superior court did not err when concluding that none of Juan’s military benefits were disposable retired pay. 5. Pamela’s requested presumption Pamela argues that we “should establish a presumption that military qualifying orders shall contain indemnity provisions, to protect the former spouse from a post-decree waiver of military retired pay.” Pamela correctly notes that we have approved the use of indemnity clauses in QMROs.49 But we have only approved the use of indemnity clauses to reimburse spouses for reductions in disposable retirement pay 48 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4)(C). 49 See Glover v. Ranney, 314 P.3d 535, 543 (Alaska 2013) (“Rather than improperly dividing waived benefits, the order awards [the wife] her time rule percentage of disposable retirement pay while requiring [the husband] to indemnify [her] for any subsequent unilateral actions to decrease the total monthly pension payout amounts. The superior court did not err — the order complies with [USFSPA] and our precedent.”); Young v. Lowery, 221 P.3d 1006, 1012-13 (Alaska 2009) (“But the trial court may expressly order [the husband] not to reduce his disposable retired pay and require [him] to indemnify [the wife] for any amounts by which her payments are reduced below the amount set on the date the amended qualified order is entered.”). -20- 7050 due to members’ unilateral waiver of disposable retirement benefits in exchange for VA disability payments.50 In this case, despite Pamela’s contrary assertions, Juan did not unilaterally waive any disposable retired pay. Juan asserted that he took “no such action to convert or change any portion of his military benefits.” The record supports Juan’s assertion. When Juan was Chapter 61 retired by the military, the military had to find that Juan was “unfit to perform the duties of [his] office, grade, rank, or rating because of physical disability.”51 Juan was retired with a 70% disability rating and was awarded 70% of his retirement base pay despite Juan’s years of service otherwise entitling him to no more than 57.5% of his base pay. As explained above, the entirety of Juan’s retirement pay was based on his Chapter 61 disability rating and on his VA disability, and under USFSPA this money is not considered disposable retired pay.52 Unlike VA disability which a member may elect,53 a member does not unilaterally choose to become Chapter 61 retired. Rather, Chapter 61 retirement for permanent disability is based on the Army’s determination that the member’s permanent injuries are so severe that the member is unfit to perform Army duties.54 And when a member waives a portion of Chapter 61 disability pay to receive VA disability, it is not a waiver of disposable retired 50 See Glover, 314 P.3d at 543; Young, 221 P.3d at 1012. And in Clauson v. Clauson, we focused on the “military retiree’s decision to waive retirement pay in order to collect disability.” 831 P.2d 1257, 1263 (Alaska 1992). 51 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a). 52 See supra Part IV.A.4. 53 See 38 U .S.C. § 5100 (“[T]he term ‘claimant’ means any individual applying for, or submitting a claim for, any benefit under the laws administered by the Secretary.”). 54 10 U.S.C. § 1201(a). -21- 7050 pay. Rather it is a waiver of one type of payment that is not considered disposable retired pay — Chapter 61 disability — in exchange for another — VA disability. Pamela fails to recognize the distinction between a member unilaterally deciding to waive disposable retired pay in exchange for VA disability benefits, and a member receiving only two types of nondisposable retired pay after the member is Chapter 61 retired by the Army. The majority of cases Pamela cites supporting her indemnification argument explicitly address waiver of disposable retired pay for VA disability — as opposed to a member receiving and waiving a Chapter 61 disability retirement — and they assert that indemnification is proper because it would be unfair to let the member unilaterally waive disposable retired pay.55 55 See, e.g., Danielson v. Evans, 36 P.3d 749, 751, 755 (Ariz. App. 2001) (addressing “non-disability retirement” pay “waived in order to receive disability benefits”); Surratt v. Surratt, 148 S.W.3d 761, 767 (Ark. App. 2004) (“[The member] could not, by later waiving those benefits in order to receive disability payments, unilaterally deprive [his former spouse] of her property.”); Blann v. Blann, 971 So. 2d 135, 137 (Fla. App. 2007) (“[T]he trial court erred in concluding that there was no authority to enforce the consent final judgment by ordering the former husband to indemnify the former wife after he waived a portion of his military retirement pay so that he might receive veteran’s disability benefits.”); In re Marriage of Neilsen & Magrini, 792 N.E.2d 844, 849 (Ill. App. 2003) (“Based on the foregoing persuasive authority, we believe that a party’s vested interest in a military pension cannot be unilaterally diminished by an act of a military spouse . . . .”); Bandini v. Bandini, 935 N.E.2d 253, 264 (Ind. App. 2010) (“For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a military spouse may not, by a post-decree waiver of retirement pay in favor of disability benefits or CRSC, unilaterally and voluntarily reduce the benefits awarded a former spouse in the dissolution decree.”); Dexter v. Dexter, 661 A.2d 171, 175 (Md. Spec. App. 1995) (“We hold that the voluntary waiver of appellant’s Army retirement pension was under Maryland law a breach of contract, for which the measure of past damages is the amount the receiving spouse would have received had the appellant not committed the breach.”); Krapf v. Krapf, 786 N.E.2d 318, 325 (Mass. 2003) (“While not dispositive on this matter of first impression in Massachusetts, we note that many other State appellate courts have (continued...) -22- 7050 We do not adopt an indemnification presumption in this case because waiver of Chapter 61 retirement benefits is not waiver of disposable retired pay. Requiring indemnification when a member is Chapter 61 retired is akin to an unacceptable division of retirement benefits which are not disposable retired pay — a division foreclosed by USFSPA, Mansell, and Clauson.56 6. The superior court’s QMRO ruling Pamela argues that “the trial court erred when it declined to enter a qualif[ied] order apportioning Juan’s military retirement benefits.” She notes that granting a QMRO is a ministerial act that gives effect to a court-approved property settlement. Pamela also argues that if the court had issued a QMRO then she might have received retirement payments. She finally argues that even if the court correctly 55 (...continued) ordered similar relief against military retirees who waive the military retirement benefits pledged to a former spouse under a separation agreement in order to obtain VA disability payments.”); Megee v. Carmine, 802 N.W.2d 669, 682 (Mich. App. 2010) (“We hold that a military spouse remains responsible to compensate [a] former spouse . . . when the military spouse makes a unilateral and voluntary postjudgment election to waive the retirement pay in favor of disability benefits contrary to the terms of the divorce judgment.”); Shelton v. Shelton, 78 P.3d 507, 508 (Nev. 2003) (“Roland elected to waive all his military retirement benefits for an equivalent amount of tax-exempt disability pay as federal law allows.”); Hisgen v. Hisgen, 554 N.W.2d 494, 496 (S.D. 1996) (“We consider whether a court may require a former spouse to pay as part of a property division an amount equivalent to one-half of a military retirement entitlement when such spouse has waived retirement benefits to receive a corresponding sum in veteran’s disability payments.”); Johnson v. Johnson, 37 S.W.3d 892, 897 (Tenn. 2001) (“We hold that when an [agreement] divides military retirement benefits, the non-military spouse has a vested interest in his or her portion of those benefits . . . . That vested interest cannot thereafter be unilaterally diminished by an act of the military spouse.”). 56 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4); Mansell v. Mansell, 490 U.S. 581, 594-95 (1989); Clauson v. Clauson, 831 P.2d 1257, 1264 (Alaska 1992). -23- 7050 concluded that she would receive no direct payments from DFAS, the failure to issue a QMRO was still reversible error. We have explained that a qualified order “simply enforces a court order calling for division of retirement benefits.”57 As Juan notes, the record establishes that a QMRO would not have resulted in any payments to Pamela directly from DFAS because Juan’s benefits were entirely based on his disability. And as explained in the previous subsection, requiring Juan to directly indemnify Pamela because he was Chapter 61 retired by the Army violates USFSPA, Mansell, and Clauson.58 We therefore conclude that the superior court did not err when refusing to issue an ineffectual order.59 7. The superior court’s Rule 60(b) ruling Pamela argues that the superior court “erred when it declined to provide [her] with any offset for the benefits she lost due to Juan’s receipt of disability benefits.” Although she asserts that this case is not governed by Rule 60(b) because she “was still seeking . . . issuance of the qualifying military order,” she also argues that she was entitled to an “adjustment to the property division, following Juan’s waiver of retirement pay” and that the “failure to address Pamela’s loss of all interest in the retirement benefits constituted an abuse of discretion.” At one point Pamela had asked the superior court for a spousal support award in lieu of Juan’s military benefits. Pamela, at the time 57 Zito v. Zito, 969 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Alaska 1998). 58 10 U.S.C. § 1408(a)(4); Mansell, 490 U.S. at 594-95; Clauson, 8 31 P.2d at 1264. 59 The provision that Pamela requested below required indemnification when “the Service M ember takes actions that reduce[] his disposable retired pay and thereby reduces payments to the Former Spouse.” But Juan’s Chapter 61 retirement is a result of the Army’s determination regarding his ability to perform his duties, and not based on any unilateral waiver of retired pay. Thus the specific QMRO Pamela sought would not have resulted in her receipt of any of Juan’s military retirement benefits. -24- 7050 litigating pro se, thus appears to have attempted to request a modification of the parties’ dissolution agreement, and we consider this a request for Rule 60(b)(6) relief from judgment.60 Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision, justifying relief from property settlement agreements under extraordinary circumstances.61 In the context of a property division pursuant to a divorce, four “extraordinary circumstances” may justify relief under Rule 60(b)(6): (1) the fundamental, underlying assumption of the dissolution agreement has been destroyed; (2) the parties’ property division was poorly thought out; (3) the property division was reached without the benefit of counsel; and (4) the property in dispute was the parties’ principal asset.[62] The four factors “are not strictly necessary conditions but, rather, are particular instantiations of the equitable factors required to overcome the principle that, at some 60 See O’Link v. O’Link, 632 P.2d 225, 227-28 (Alaska 1981) (treating request to modify divorce decree “as requests for relief from judgment under Civil Rule 60”). We consider Pamela’s request for spousal support a Rule 60(b)(6) motion in spite of Pamela’s own lawyer’s contrary assertions on appeal and Pamela’s statements to the superior court. Pamela was pro se when she requested spousal support, and she was pro se when she informed the superior court that she did not want to “reopen the entire property.” We interpret the pleadings of pro se litigants leniently. DeNardo v. Calista Corp., 111 P.3d 326, 331 (Alaska 2005). It is clear that Pamela requested spousal support in the event she was unable to receive her agreed upon share of Juan’s military retirement. It is not clear that Pamela understood her statements to the superior court to mean she was relinquishing her request for spousal support in lieu of Juan’s military retirement. 61 Sandberg v. Sandberg, 322 P.3d 879, 888-89 (Alaska 2014). 62 Cook v. Cook, 249 P.3d 1070, 1084 (Alaska 2011). -25- 7050 point, litigation must be brought to an end.”63 “Trial courts should use these factors when appropriate, but should also bear in mind the flexible nature of Rule 60(b)(6), keeping in mind that ‘[t]he broad power granted by clause (6) is not for the purpose of relieving a party from free, calculated, and deliberate choices he has made . . . .’ ”64 The superior court applied the Rule 60(b)(6) factors and initially concluded that relief was warranted because: (1) [Juan’s] retirement was a fundamental, underlying assumption of the Guerreros’ dissolution agreement and it is destroyed, (2) the parties’ property division was poorly thought out because it entirely failed to dispose of [Juan’s] retirement, (3) neither party had legal counsel when they entered into the dissolution agreement, and (4) [Juan’s] retirement was the parties’ principal asset. But the superior court later reversed its initial Rule 60(b)(6) ruling “because upon further review [the court] does not find that a fundamental underlying assumption of the dissolution agreement is destroyed.” The superior court noted “had the Court not reversed its [Rule] 60(b) order, the Court would have reconsidered the entire 2009 property distribution.” The record establishes that both parties believed Pamela was entitled to receive some portion of Juan’s military benefits. While Juan disputed the total amount of his benefits Pamela would receive, Juan consistently recognized Pamela should receive some portion of his military benefits. Thus it was error to determine that a fundamental underlying assumption of the parties’ agreement had not been destroyed. Due to Juan’s Chapter 61 retirement by the Army he received no disposable retired pay, 63 Sandberg, 322 P.3d at 889 (quoting Clauson, 831 P.2d at 1261). 64 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting O’Link, 632 P.2d at 229-30). -26­ 7050 and this destroyed the parties’ expectation that Pamela would receive some portion of Juan’s military benefits. The superior court’s earlier analysis of the other factors also is persuasive. The property division was poorly thought out. Despite knowing that Juan was seriously injured in 2007, the parties failed to recognize the possibility that Juan would receive no disposable retired pay, operating under the assumption that Pamela would be able to receive Juan’s military benefits. And neither party was represented by counsel when they dissolved their marriage and settled their property. Finally, Juan’s retirement was the parties’ principal asset.65 Juan argues that the superior court concluded “that the property distribution was still equitable, despite the non-divisibility of retirement pay, considering that the 2009 dissolution was exceptionally favorable to Pamela.” But as Pamela correctly notes, the superior court “never engaged in an equitable division analysis,” and without taking additional testimony regarding marital property and property values the court had insufficient evidence to conduct such an analysis. Because it was an abuse of discretion to refuse to reopen the property settlement agreement and conduct a full equitable division analysis, we reverse the Rule 60(b)(6) decision and remand for further proceedings and a marital property distribution. We reiterate our Clauson holding that on remand the superior court may not “simply shift an amount of property equivalent to the . . . retirement pay from the military spouse’s side of the ledger to the other spouse’s side.”66 But we note that Juan’s and Pamela’s financial conditions, including Juan’s receipt of his military disability 65 The parties’ 2009 dissolution agreement was not detailed and did not reveal the equity, if any, in their real property. But in 2009 Juan was very close to 20 years of service and a guaranteed Army retirement, a valuable asset. 66 Clauson, 831 P.2d at 1264. -27- 7050 retirement benefits, must be considered when equitably dividing the marital estate and when deciding whether to require alimony.67