Opinion ID: 1154942
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Count 1: Delivery of a Controlled Substance

Text: The sufficiency of count 1 against Garibay presents a more difficult question. While the State concedes that guilty knowledge is an essential element of this offense, it argues that the presence of the term feloniously gave Garibay notice of the guilty knowledge element. Brief of Respondent, at 7-8. Count 1 stated in pertinent part: Defendant did feloniously deliver a Schedule II narcotic drug, to-wit: Cocaine ... to an undercover agent of the North Central Washington Narcotics Task Force. Clerk's Papers (Garibay) (Information), at 1. Without reaching the question whether feloniously standing alone is equivalent to guilty knowledge, we conclude the charging document as a whole was not deficient in this case. [12] In State v. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d 93, 812 P.2d 86 (1991), we adopted the federal 2-part test for applying the essential elements rule: (1) do the necessary facts appear in any form, or by fair construction can they be found, in the charging document; and, if so, (2) can the defendant show that he or she was nonetheless actually prejudiced by the inartful language which caused a lack of notice? Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 105-06. In determining whether the necessary facts are actually alleged in any given charging document, we analyze the language of the charging document from the perspective of a person of common understanding. See RCW 10.37.052; Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 110; State v. Davis, 60 Wn. App. 813, 818, 808 P.2d 167 (1991), aff'd, 119 Wn.2d 657, 835 P.2d 1039 (1992). As stated in State v. Royse, 66 Wn.2d 552, 403 P.2d 838 (1965), the information must state the acts constituting the offense in ordinary and concise language. (Italics ours.) Royse, at 557. Since the chief purpose of the essential elements rule is to notify the defendant of the charges, Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 101, it is necessary to evaluate the document from the perspective of a person of common understanding rather than that of a legal expert. The application of the test in Kjorsvik indicates the charging documents in this case were not deficient. In Kjorsvik, we held that the term unlawfully sufficed to convey the intent to steal element of robbery. Kjorsvik, 117 Wn.2d at 110. In reaching this conclusion, we examined all the language in the information, reading it as a whole and in a commonsense manner. Kjorsvik, at 110-11. Applying this approach to the various counts in this case mandates a similar result. The information charged Garibay not only with delivery of a controlled substance, but also with conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance and intent to deliver a controlled substance, and alleged facts to that effect. It is inconceivable that Garibay would not have been on notice that he was accused of knowing the substance in question was cocaine. Therefore, reading the information as a whole and in a commonsense manner, the failure to include guilty knowledge in count 1 does not render the information constitutionally inadequate. [4]