Opinion ID: 662459
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Gibbs Test and the Origins of Section 1367

Text: 23 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 (1966), broadly authorized the federal courts to assert jurisdiction over state law claims when [t]he state and federal claims ... derive from a common nucleus of operative fact, the claims are such that a plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one judicial proceeding, and the federal issues are substantial[ ]. Id. at 725, 86 S.Ct. at 1138. These three factors confer power on the federal courts under Article III to hear the entire constitutional case. See id. The Court added critically, however, that: 24 [Such] power need not be exercised in every case in which it is found to exist. It has consistently been recognized that pendent jurisdiction is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff's right. Its justification lies in considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants. 25 Id. at 726, 86 S.Ct. at 1139 (footnote omitted). Applying this standard, the Court listed several situations in which declining pendent jurisdiction would be appropriate: (1) when [n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided; (2) when the federal claims are dismissed before trial, or, during the course of a case, when it appears that a state law claim constitutes the real body of a case, to which the federal claim is only an appendage; (3) when state issues substantially predominate, whether in terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the comprehensiveness of the remedy sought; and finally (4) when there are reasons independent of jurisdictional considerations, such as the likelihood of jury confusion in treating divergent legal theories of relief. Id. at 726-27, 86 S.Ct. at 1139. 26 Gibbs subsequently was interpreted as conferring significant discretion on the federal courts to decline or assert jurisdiction over pendent state law claims, limited only by the values of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity. See, e.g., Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, 108 S.Ct. 614, 619, 98 L.Ed.2d 720 (1988) (As articulated by Gibbs, the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction thus is a doctrine of flexibility, designed to allow courts to deal with cases involving pendent claims in the manner that most sensibly accommodates a range of concerns and values. (emphasis added)); see also id. at 351, 108 S.Ct. at 619 ([G]ibbs establishes that the pendent jurisdiction doctrine is designed to enable courts to handle cases involving state-law claims in the way that will best accommodate the values of economy convenience, fairness and comity, and Gibbs further establishes that the Judicial Branch is to shape and apply the doctrine in that light. (emphasis added)). Numerous lower court decisions illustrate this broad view of discretion. See, e.g., Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d 203, 205-06 (9th Cir.1991) (emphasizing the importance the Court in Gibbs and Carnegie-Mellon placed on the values of economy, convenience, fairness, and comity). See generally 13B Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 3567.1, at 122-127 & nn. 13-16 (1984) (citing cases); id. at 26-27 nn. 13-16 (Supp.1992) (same). 27 As noted by many commentators, the primary deficiency of Gibbs was that it blurred the question of the power of the federal courts to entertain pendent claims under Article III with the question of congressional statutory authorization of such jurisdiction. See generally Paul M. Bator, Daniel J. Meltzer, Paul J. Mishkin & David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 1044-52 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter Hart and Wechsler]. The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989), highlighted the problems of an absence of firm statutory authority, for the Court refused to find the assertion of jurisdiction over pendent parties permissible absent congressional authorization even when federal jurisdiction was exclusive, see id. at 549-56, 109 S.Ct. at 2006-10. 28 Prior to Finley, a number of lower federal courts had permitted pendent-party jurisdiction as long as Congress had not expressly or by implication negated its existence, Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 2422, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976). See generally 13B Wright & Miller, supra, Sec. 3567.2 at 30-32 & n. 44 & Supp.1992 at 36 nn. 34-35 (collecting cases). Finley, however, appeared to articulate the opposite presumption: that unless Congress affirmatively conferred pendent-party jurisdiction, it would not be permitted. Indeed, a number of courts interpreted Finley as putting an end to [pendent-party] jurisdiction, id. Sec. 3567.2, at 30; see also id. at 32-33 n. 49 (citing cases), as well as threatening aspects of ancillary jurisdiction, see id. Sec. 3567.2, at 30. As a result, Finley evoked severe criticism. See generally Hart and Wechsler, supra, at 134-36 (Supp.1993); Richard B. Freer, Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life after Finley and the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 Emory L.J. 445, 464-68 (1991). In response, the Federal Court Study Committee, established by Congress in 1988, made an express recommendation to provide a statutory basis for pendent, ancillary, and pendent-party jurisdiction in a supplemental jurisdiction statute. See Report of the Federal Court Study Committee 47-48 (Apr. 2, 1990) [hereinafter FCSC Report]. Subsequently, Congress enacted such a statute, 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1367 (1993), as part of the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub.L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089. 3 29