Opinion ID: 1472683
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: the unreasonableness of the proposed accommodation

Text: Although it has prudently eschewed the division's notion that the trial judge's exercise of discretion regarding the qualifications of Sutton and Byrd was manifestly erroneous, the en banc majority, viewing the record in the light most favorable to Ms. Douglas, holds that there was sufficient evidence to permit an impartial jury to find that Ms. Douglas was suffering from a mental handicap within the meaning of the Act. I acknowledge that, given the applicable light most favorable standard, this may fairly be termed a somewhat close call, and as I have previously noted, I am prepared to assume, in this opinion, that counsel for Ms. Douglas presented enough evidence to raise a jury question. Nevertheless, some additional comment is in order, for the nature of Ms. Douglas' condition affects both the harm done to the landlord and to the other tenants and the reasonableness vel non of the proposed accommodation. Although the point has not been addressed by the parties or in either opinion in the division, there is considerable question whether, on this record, Ms. Douglas is a qualified handicapped person who is entitled to protection under the Act. To paraphrase a passage from the decision of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts in Andover Hous. Auth., [t]he term qualified handicapped person is not used in ... the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(2).... However, it is used in § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794, to which [the Fair Housing Act] [is] analogous.... We see little reason not to consider whether a plaintiff is a qualified handicapped person in the context of a housing discrimination claim because many of the issues that arise in the `qualified' analysis also arise in the context of the `reasonable modifications' or `undue burden' analysis. That is, if more than reasonable modifications are required of an institution in order to accommodate an individual, then that individual is not qualified for the program. Bercovitch v. Baldwin Sch., Inc., 133 F.3d 141, 154 (1st Cir.1998). In the public housing context, a qualified handicapped individual is one who could meet the authority's eligibility requirements for occupancy and who could meet the conditions of a tenancy, with a reasonable accommodation or modification in the authority's rules, policies, practices, or services.... Cf. Whittier Terrace Assoc. v. Hampshire, 26 Mass.App.Ct. 1020, 1020-1021, 532 N.E.2d 712 (1989). Here, the tenant [] made no showing that, even if eviction proceedings were withdrawn or delayed, [ she ] could comply with the terms of [ her ] lease by not [ harming her ] neighbors. The evidence plainly suggested otherwise. 820 N.E.2d at 823-24 (emphasis added; citations to state law omitted). In my opinion, the foregoing analysis, and especially the last two italicized sentences, can be readily applied to the present case. [16] The conditions in and near Ms. Douglas' unit have already created an undue burden on her landlord and fellow-tenants, and she has proffered no realistic prospect that the danger to health and safety would disappear if her eviction were briefly delayed. Aside from the reasoning of Andover Hous. Auth., I think it important to emphasize another issue with which the majority, in my view, does not come to grips. The practical consequence of finding Ms. Douglas to be mentally handicapped for purposes of the Act is to excuse her, at least for some time (and in this case, she has already been excused for a very long time) from the basic obligation of any tenant, under the lease and under the law, to maintain her apartment in a decent and sanitary condition and to avoid any threat to the health and safety of others. [17] Because of this, reasonable accommodation comes to mean at least temporary preferential treatment and, necessarily, the tolerance, in Ms. Douglas' case, of unsanitary conditions that would warrant the immediate eviction of another tenant. [18] Mental impairment is a handicap under the Act, but not all handicaps have the same consequences. If a deaf tenant is permitted to have a hearing dog notwithstanding a no pets clause in the lease, see Bronk v. Ineichen, 54 F.3d at 428-29, this does not seriously affect the living conditions of his or her fellow-tenants. Similarly, if a tenant who suffers from multiple sclerosis is provided with a parking place close to the entrance to the building, Shapiro v. Cadman Towers, Inc., 51 F.3d 328, 336 (2d Cir.1995), any inconvenience to tenants who are able to walk is trivial. Mentally handicapped tenants may also be entitled to accommodations comparable to those in Bronk and Shapiro. One court has held, for example, that a mentally ill patient might be permitted to retain his cat, in contravention of the landlord's no pet policy, where, according to a psychiatrist's affidavit, the tenant needed the pet in order to deal with his depression and anxiety. Crossroads Apts. Assocs. v. Le Boo, 152 Misc.2d 830, 578 N.Y.S.2d 1004, 1005-07 (City Ct. Rochester, N.Y. 1991). [19] In that case, too, however, any possible consequences for other tenants were minimal. Ms. Douglas' request for what she calls a reasonable accommodation, on the other hand, is dramatically different. Her counsel's proposal would require the landlord and the other tenants to countenance the continuation of unsanitary, unhealthy, and unlawful conditions that, in this case, have existed for a very long time. In my opinion, the legislators who voted for the Act as amended would be startled to learn that the statute that they had enactedthe Fair Housing Amendments Actwas being relied upon to prolong, even briefly, the right of any tenant, whether black or white, [20] female or male, alcoholic or sober, mentally ill or mentally healthy, to remain on the premises notwithstanding the kinds of prolonged and extensive violations of the lease and of the Housing Regulations disclosed by this record. All of this goes to whether the requested accommodation was reasonable, and points unerringly to a negative answer to that question. Taking into consideration Ms. Douglas' overall behavior and refusal to cooperate, there is simply no evidence in the record, nor any realistic proffer, that intervention by the District government could promptly remedy the conditions in and near Ms. Douglas' unit. Even if giving a tenant with Ms. Douglas' alleged affliction additional time to come into compliance with the lease and the housing regulations could be viewed as a reasonable accommodation in the abstract, it cannot fairly be so viewed in this case, given the extent and duration of the violations, the length of time that Ms. Douglas had already been given, and her counsel's failure to provide any specifics in his proposed accommodation, even on the trial date. [21]