Opinion ID: 1852436
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 11

Heading: Payton's proposed testimony regarding juror misconduct

Text: ¶ 125. In one of the affidavits Payton sought to introduce, Juror Langdon avers the following: several jurors indicated that they knew Mr. Britt ....[these jurors] indicated that Mr. Britt would not be with respect to his testimony concerning the robbers using the name Henry. (emphasis added). Payton argues this affidavit establishes that the jurors thought Britt would not lie. [15] Langdon said that these jurors indicated during deliberations that they knew Britt when asked about it during voir dire, but failed to so acknowledge. ¶ 126. During voir dire, juror Melba Jones did state that she knew Britt and all the tellers at the bank. Jones said that she knew that Britt was the one who was kidnaped. She said that knowing the tellers and Britt would not affect her if she sat on the jury. [16] ¶ 127. Payton claims that another juror, Sarah Annie May, would have testified that she knew the witness, Freeman, from working with him at a chicken factory. The jury panel was asked if they knew Freeman during voir dire. May did not indicate that she did. Payton has not submitted an affidavit from May. ¶ 128. Payton claims that a juror named Ms. White or Ms. Horn failed to reveal during voir dire that her mother worked at the jail and saw Payton and knew he was serving time on this case prior to trial. Payton points out that he asked if anyone was familiar with any other proceedings before trial and no one responded that they did. Payton has not submitted an affidavit from this juror. ¶ 129. Payton also argues that a juror, who was a fireman, informed other jurors, not during juror deliberation, that Payton had previously been convicted of arson and was serving time for that conviction. Payton argues that this juror was encouraging other jurors to vote guilty on the arson count because Payton would not have that much time to serve anyway. Payton claims that is in fact what one of the jurors did. Payton has not submitted any affidavit to this effect. ¶ 130. The judge found that, regarding the outside influences, the county was rural, and it was not unusual for potential jurors to know parties and witnesses in trials. The judge further found that he and both counsel for the State and for the defense asked the potential jurors if they knew the various parties and witnesses. Several responded that they did. The judge then asked those who responded if their familiarity would have any influence on their decision. Both counsel then questioned the jurors about that issue and all the jurors questioned stated that their familiarity with witnesses or parties would not affect their ability to be impartial. The judge excluded both affidavits and all testimony from the jurors. ¶ 131. A prospective juror's failure to respond to questions during voir dire does not warrant this Court granting a defendant/appellant a new trial unless the question propounded to the juror was (1) relevant to the voir dire examination; (2) ... unambiguous;... (3) ... the juror had substantial knowledge of the information sought to be elicited ... [and (4)] prejudice ... in selecting the jury could reasonably be inferred from the juror's failure to respond. Chase v. State, 645 So.2d 829, 847 (Miss.1994); Myers v. State, 565 So.2d 554, 558 (Miss.1990); Odom v. State, 355 So.2d 1381, 1383 (Miss.1978). ¶ 132. Assuming that the first three elements were met, Payton has not shown that he was prejudiced by the jurors' failure to respond during voir dire. Moreover, even if the jurors had revealed the information during voir dire, Payton would not necessarily have been entitled to a challenge for cause. This crime occurred in a rural community and had received a lot of publicity, finding jurors with no knowledge of the case or the parties would have been difficult. Moreover, the jurors were asked if they knew any of the witnesses, and several responded that they did. Those jurors assured the court and the attorneys that their familiarity with the witnesses would not influence their ability to be fair and impartial. ¶ 133. Jurors generally may not impeach their own verdict by testifying about motives or influences affecting deliberations. However, jurors may testify about misconduct in their presence or about outside influences on the jury panel. Fairman v. State, 513 So.2d 910, 915-16 (Miss.1987). See also M.R.E. 606(b) (juror can only testify on the question whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror). Further, M.R.E. 606(b) prevents a juror's affidavit or any evidence of a statement made by a juror concerning the jury's deliberation from being received into evidence. APAC-Miss., Inc. v. Goodman, 803 So.2d 1177, 1186 (Miss.2002). In the course of post-trial hearings, juror testimony is only admissible as to objective facts bearing on extraneous influences on the deliberation process. Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So.2d 407, 419 (Miss.1993). ¶ 134. All of Payton's proposed evidence relates to things that some jurors told other jurors during the deliberative process. This alleged information came from the jurors' own knowledge of the facts and witnesses. It in no way relates to extraneous information supplied from outside the jury room. The only allegations before the trial court were that the jurors themselves discussed matters outside the evidence at trial. There was no evidence that someone outside the twelve jurors did something to influence their deliberations. ¶ 135. Jurors cannot impeach their duly rendered verdict. Their affidavits introduced for such purpose will be disregarded. Index Drilling Co. v. Williams, 242 Miss. 775, 789, 137 So.2d 525, 530 (1962). In the absence of a threshold showing of external influences, an inquiry into the juror verdict is not required. Gladney v. Clarksdale Beverage Co., 625 So.2d at 419. Payton has made no such showing. Thus, this evidence cannot now be used to impeach the jury's verdict. It was within the trial judge's discretion as to whether the jurors' behavior warranted a new trial. Myers, 565 So.2d at 558-59. Payton has failed to demonstrate an abuse of that discretion. Public policy requires a finality to litigation. Martin v. State, 732 So.2d 847, 852 (Miss.1998).