Opinion ID: 1264720
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The EPA's Discretionary Certification of Completion

Text: We next address Goodrich's allegation that the EPA routinely delays issuing a certification of completion in order to thwart judicial review. We need not decide whether that allegation constitutes a collateral, procedural challenge, because we hold that Goodrich's claim is not ripe. As announced by the Supreme Court in CSS, and echoed in our cases, Proyecto San Pablo, 189 F.3d at 1138; Naranjo-Aguilera, 30 F.3d at 1113-14, even claims that are not barred by statute may be barred by the ripeness doctrine. In particular, the [p]laintiffs must have taken `the affirmative steps that [they] could take before the [agency] blocked [their] path.' Proyecto San Pablo, 189 F.3d at 1138 (last two alterations in original) (quoting CSS, 509 U.S. at 59, 113 S.Ct. 2485). Here, Goodrich fears that, once it has completed the work required by UAO 2003-11, the EPA will decline to certify completion. That claim is not ripe for adjudication because the feared harm has not yet been realized. See Immigrant Assistance Project, 306 F.3d at 859(The ripeness question is `whether the harm asserted has matured sufficiently to warrant judicial intervention.') (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 n. 10, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)). By Goodrich's own admission, it has not completed the work required by UAO 2003-11. That being so, it has not taken the affirmative steps that [it] could take before the [agency] blocked [its] path. Proyecto San Pablo, 189 F.3d at 1138(internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore conclude that Goodrich's claim is not ripe. We also observe that, when the claim does ripen, CERCLA provides Goodrich with judicial review. As explained by the Seventh Circuit in Employers Insurance of Wausau, 52 F.3d at 662, once Goodrich believes that it has completed the work, Goodrich has a claim under a standard reimbursement action brought under § 9606(b)(2)(B) and can argue in that action that the EPA's refusal to certify completion is in error. Critically, § 9606(b)(2)(A) authorizes a PRP to petition the government for reimbursement 60 days after completion of the required action  (emphasis added), not 60 days after the EPA certifies completion. The EPA's certification is not a prerequisite to bringing suit. As explained by the Seventh Circuit: If the party ordered to clean up a contaminated site claims to have completed the work, he has a claim for reimbursement, the reimbursement provision being available to any person who receives and complies with the terms of any Superfund clean-up order. § 9606(b)(2)(A). If the EPA turns down the claim on the ground that the clean-up has not been completed ..., the party has a right to sue and the agency can defend by showing that the clean-up has not been completed and thus that a condition of maintaining such a suit has not been fulfilled. The district court will adjudicate this ground for dismissal.... Employers Ins. of Wausau, 52 F.3d at 662. As soon as Goodrich believes that it has completed the UAO 2003-11 work, it can petition the EPA for reimbursement and, if the EPA refuses, bring an action in federal court. But it cannot now, or then, seek judicial review of the EPA's refusal to certify completion concerning other UAOs to which Goodrich has no connection. In summary, the district court correctly held that it lacks jurisdiction over this aspect of the pattern and practice claim.