Opinion ID: 1988100
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the tennessee securities act of 1980

Text: Laws regulating securities and transactions involving securities can be traced back to 1285 during the reign of Edward I. Robert F. Miller, Procedures Under the Tennessee Securities Laws, 28 Tenn. L.Rev. 303, 303 (1961) (Miller). The modern state laws regulating securities and transactions in securities originated in 1911 when Kansas enacted the first of what is now commonly referred to as blue sky laws. [18] James M. Bartos, United States Securities Law: A Practical Guide § 3.7.1, at 120 (2006); 2 Jerry W. Markham, A Financial History of the United States 59 (2002). Tennessee's first blue sky law was enacted in 1913. [19] Every state has now enacted a blue sky law. [20] The Tennessee General Assembly replaced virtually all of the 1913 blue sky law when it enacted the Securities Act of 1955. [21] The 1955 blue sky law was a modified version of a uniform law promulgated in 1951 by the Investment Bankers Association of America. Miller, 28 Tenn. L.Rev. at 304. It preceded by one year the adoption by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws of its first Uniform Securities Act in 1956. [22] The language of Section 101 of the 1956 Uniform Securities Act defining the practices prohibited by the Act was drawn largely from Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5, [23] which, in turn, was based on Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933. [24] However, Section 101 differed from Section 17(a) and Rule 10b-5 in one significant respect  it covered the purchase as well as the sale of any security. 1956 Uniform Securities Act § 101 cmt, 7C U.L.A. 749. The General Assembly modernized Tennessee's blue sky law again when it enacted the Tennessee Securities Act of 1980. [25] In doing so, the General Assembly declared that the law should be so construed to effectuate its general purpose to protect investors, to coordinate the interpretation and administration of this Act with related federal and state regulation, and to require full and fair disclosure in all securities transactions. Act of Apr. 16, 1980, ch. 866, § 25, 1980 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1170, 1228. The Tennessee Securities Act of 1980 contains many of the provisions found in the Securities Law of 1955. Its sections defining the violations of the statute contain language similar to the 1956, 1985, and 2002 versions of the Uniform Securities Act, as well as Section 17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, [26] and Rule 10b-5. Both parties have undertaken to link the private rights of action in Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-2-122 either to the federal Securities Act of 1933 or to the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and its implementing regulation, Rule 10b-5. The purpose of these efforts is clear. Edna Green desires to link Tenn.Code Ann. § 48-2-122 to the Securities Act of 1933 because persons pursuing private claims under this Act, to the extent that private claims are permitted, are not required to prove that they relied on the defendant's representation or omission. [27] On the other hand, Wesley Green asserts that Tenn. Code Ann. § 48-2-122 should be equated to the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5 because the judicially created private rights of action under these provisions require the plaintiff to prove reliance on the defendant's representation or omission. [28] As interesting as these arguments are, they are not the proper beginning point for construing either Tenn.Code Ann. § 48-2-121 or Tenn.Code Ann. § 48-2-122. We must begin with the words of the state statutes. Waldschmidt v. Reassure Am. Life Ins. Co., 271 S.W.3d 173, 176 (Tenn.2008). Our goal is to ascertain and to give the fullest possible effect to the General Assembly's intent and purpose. Auto Credit of Nashville v. Wimmer, 231 S.W.3d 896, 900 (Tenn.2007); State ex rel. Pope v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co., 145 S.W.3d 529, 534-35 (Tenn.2004). We must (1) give these words their natural and ordinary meaning, (2) consider them in the context of the entire statute, and (3) presume that the General Assembly intended that each word be given full effect. Lanier v. Rains, 229 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tenn.2007); State v. Flemming, 19 S.W.3d 195, 197 (Tenn.2000). When a statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we need not look beyond the statute itself, State v. Strode, 232 S.W.3d 1, 9-10 (Tenn.2007); Corum v. Holston Health & Rehab. Ctr., 104 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Tenn.2003), but rather, we must simply enforce it as written. Wausau Ins. Co. v. Dorsett, 172 S.W.3d 538, 543 (Tenn. 2005); Miller v. Childress, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 320, 321-22 (1841).