Opinion ID: 2344665
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Estoppel for Plaintiff's Retaliation and Scope of Employment Arguments

Text: The City argues that the plaintiff was estopped as a matter of law from making arguments about Lafond's motivation and whether she was acting within the scope of employment. The City advances a judicial estoppel argument and hints at a collateral estoppel argument. The former is that the plaintiff is estopped from now arguing a contrary position with regard to Lafond's retaliation; the latter suggests a conclusion at the first trial that Lafond acted outside the scope of employment. The doctrine of judicial estoppel is as follows: [W]here a party assumes a certain position in a legal proceeding, and succeeds in maintaining that position, it may not thereafter, simply because its interests have changed, assume a contrary position. Kelleher v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 152 N.H. 813, 848, 891 A.2d 477 (2005) (quotation, brackets and ellipsis omitted). While the circumstances under which judicial estoppel may be invoked vary with each situation, the court considers the following three factors: (1) whether the party's later position is clearly inconsistent with its earlier position; (2) whether the party has succeeded in persuading a court to accept that party's earlier position; and (3) whether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped. Id.. Here, the plaintiff's position was not inconsistent as a matter of law. At both trials he contended that Lafond used her supervisory authority in a tortious way to advance the City's interests. As noted above, acts that are even expressly forbidden may still be carried out within the scope of authority if Lafond's intent was to serve the master. Because we find no contradiction in the position taken on this issue, we do not consider the remainder of the judicial estoppel inquiry. Judicial estoppel was not a reason for a grant of summary judgment to the City. Inasmuch as the City has failed to undertake a collateral estoppel analysis, or to develop its legal argument, we decline to review it. See Gulf Ins. Co. v. AMSCO, 153 N.H. 28, 40, 889 A.2d 1040 (2005). For this same reason we also decline to review the City's assertion that the trial court should have followed the general rule, which is that a municipality is not liable for the intentional torts of its officers.