Opinion ID: 1762379
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to Object to Prosecutor's Comments

Text: Sasser next argues that he is entitled to postconviction relief because his trial counsel failed to object to several comments made by the prosecutor during his arguments to the jury during both the guilt and penalty phases of the trial. He also suggests that postconviction relief would be warranted because the trial court failed, on its own motion, to admonish the jury or declare a mistrial. Sasser alleges that the prosecutor made several improper comments in his closing argument during the guilt phase. Sasser first argues that the prosecutor improperly indicated that if he thought that Sasser committed first-degree murder rather than capital murder, he would have considered doing something less. According to Sasser, that remark expressed the prosecutor's personal opinion about the crime for which Sasser should be convicted. Sasser next argues that the prosecutor improperly argued, apparently in response to the defense's argument that Jackie Carter's testimony was not relevant, that Ms. Carter wouldn't have been over here testifying yesterday if that evidence hadn't been ruled by the Court as relevant and probative of this guy's intent. Sasser contends that this remark was inappropriate because it bolstered the credibility of a State's witness and directly added the court's imprimatur to that testimony. Sasser also contends that the prosecutor inappropriately argued that Sasser failed to express remorse for causing Joanne Kennedy's death. Specifically, Sasser argues that both his right against self-incrimination and his right to a jury trial were violated when the prosecutor asked the jury the following rhetorical question: Did you hear any sign of remorse from him? None. Sasser argues that the prosecutor continued to make improper remarks in his closing argument during the penalty phase of the trial. Sasser alleges that the prosecutor again inappropriately emphasized Sasser's apparent lack of remorse for Ms. Kennedy's death. He also contends that the prosecutor erroneously declared to the jury that there is no role for mercy in the criminal justice system. In the portion of its order that deals with this claim, the Circuit Court first observes the following: Several of these remarks look worse on paper than they did in the courtroom. The prosecutor's statements that he would have charged the petitioner with something else if he had been guilty of anything else and his statement that mercy has no place in the criminal justice system were more a way of speaking than a flat statement and were understood as the prosecutor's opinion about the evidence that was presented, which is permissible. It was the prosecutor's opinion that the petitioner was guilty only of capital murder and that there was no room for mercy in this case. Contrary to the petitioner's argument, counsel are permitted to express their opinions within reason: Although it is not good practice for counsel to inject their personal beliefs into the closing arguments, mere expressions of opinion by counsel in closing argument are not reversible error so long as they do not purposely arouse passion and prejudice. Neff v. State, 287 Ark. 88, 696 S.W.2d 736, 740 (1985). As to the argument attacking the statement that the testimony of the previous victim was relevant and probative of the petitioner's intent because the court had ruled that it was, the statement was correct, ... and the evidence would not have been admitted had the court not so ruled. Further, the juror (sic) were instructed that they should accept without question the court's rulings on the admissibility of the evidence. If there was a valid objection to this remark, it was not that the remark was erroneous. Likewise, the Circuit Court found that the prosecutor's remarks during the penalty phase were also merely expressions of the prosecutor's opinion. The Circuit Court did find, however, the prosecutor's remarks about remorse to be technically objectionable, but suggested that they had little effect on the jury because the evidence was overwhelming, and only the degree of homicide was at issue. To the extent that Sasser argues that the trial court erred when it did not, on its own motion, seek to remedy the alleged prejudice caused by the prosecutor's remarks, we conclude that he cannot raise that argument for the first time in a Rule 37 proceeding. This is an allegation of trial error that should have been raised on direct appeal. As we explained above, such an error can only be raised for the first time under Rule 37 if it is so fundamental as to render the judgment void and subject to collateral attack. In Pitcock v. State, 279 Ark. 174, 649 S.W.2d 393 (1983) we held that a trial error involving a remark made by a prosecutor during closing argument was not fundamental. Accordingly, we may only consider Sasser's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to prosecutor's comments. Regarding the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim, the Circuit Court noted that during the postconviction hearing, Sasser's defense counsel testified that he typically does not object during closing arguments unless the comments are `absolutely outrageous' because to object to anything less only highlighted the comment and made the jury, which might not have understood the significance of the remark, pay attention to it. The Circuit Court then concluded that Sasser's attorney did not object to the prosecutor's comments as a matter of trial strategy, and therefore, did not render deficient performance. We conclude that the Circuit Court's denial of relief on the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim is not clearly erroneous. Catlett v. State, supra . Experienced advocates might differ about when, or if, objections are called for since, as a matter of trial strategy, further objections from counsel may have succeeded in making the prosecutor's comments seem more significant to the jury. Neff v. State, 287 Ark. 88, 696 S.W.2d 736 (1985). Because many lawyers refrain from objecting during opening statement and closing argument, absent egregious misstatements, the failure to object during closing argument and opening statement is within the wide range of permissible professional legal conduct. Cohen v. United States, 996 F.Supp. 110 (D.Mass.1998).