Opinion ID: 2323084
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Constitutional Right to Present a Defense

Text: The Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a meaningful opportunity to call witnesses in order to present a complete defense. [20] The right is grounded in the Sixth Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause [21] and is a component of the due process of law required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. [22] But though the right is fundamental, it is not unlimited. In the first place, [t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence, [23] and well-established rules of evidence permit trial judges to exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by certain other factors such as unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or potential to mislead the jury. [24] Evidentiary rules excluding evidence from criminal trials violate the constitutional right to present a defense only if they infringe upon a weighty interest of the accused and are arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve. [25] A trial court's improper application of a constitutionally valid evidentiary rule to exclude relevant and competent defense evidencethe type of problem we confront in the present casealso may violate a defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. [26] Not every such error will do so, however. [27] Rulings excluding (or admitting) evidence ordinarily are within the ambit of the trial court's discretion and are subject to review only for abuse of that discretion under the Kotteakos standard of harmlessness. It is the rare case in which a trial court's application of a rule of evidence is so erroneous and unfair as to deprive a defendant of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. [28] Only when the error deprives a defendant of a fair trial does it amount to a constitutional violation. [29] Thus, the Supreme Court has described the Sixth Amendment guarantee as the accused's right to call witnesses whose testimony is `material and favorable to his defense.' [30] A materiality requirement is implicit in the right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense, just as it is in other constitutional rights to obtain and utilize evidencein particular, the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process to secure defense witnesses and the due process right to the disclosure by the prosecution of exculpatory evidence in its possession. [31] At a minimum, this means a defendant must demonstrate that the excluded evidence was important to his defense in order to show that the error was of constitutional magnitude. [32] The materiality inquiry therefore focuses on prejudice with respect to the fairness of the trial as a whole. [33] Our cases have evinced that focus. [F]or example, we stated in Clark v. United States , an error is of constitutional magnitude if it wholly deprived the defendant of any opportunity to present evidence on a central issue in the case. [34] In contrast, we observed, [i]f the issue is merely collateral, or where ample cross-examination has already been allowed or evidence admitted on a particular issue, trial court curtailment of the defendant's presentation does not implicate the defendant's Sixth Amendment rights even if the excluded evidence is favorable to the defendant. [35] Clark thus identified the two ends of the materiality spectrum, as it were. Subsequent decisions have held that the erroneous exclusion of defense evidence may violate the accused's constitutional right even if the accused is not wholly deprived of the opportunity to present a defense, so long as the excluded evidence is sufficiently critical to the defense. [36] The present case also involves a less-than-total interference with the presentation of defense evidence on a central issue at trial (namely, the reliability of the eyewitness identifications of appellant). But while our past cases envision the possibility of a constitutional challenge in these circumstances, they have not articulated a standard of materiality to use in judging when an erroneous evidentiary ruling resulting in exclusion of defense evidence rises to the level of a constitutional violation. The standard of materiality implicit in our cases is amorphous and unclear. [37] It is desirable to clarify the standard so that we may resolve the question in this and future cases on a principled, rational, and proper basis. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has taken the lead in developing an objective materiality test [t]o isolate those few situations in which erroneous evidentiary rulings unconstitutionally restrict the accused's ability to present a defense. [38] Borrowing the materiality standard set forth in United States v. Agurs [39] for determining whether a prosecutorial failure to turn over exculpatory evidence to the defense violates due process (a so-called  Brady violation [40] ), the Second Circuit holds that whether an erroneous exclusion of defense evidence violates the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense depends upon whether `the omitted evidence [evaluated in the context of the entire record] creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist.' [41] The test adopted by the Second Circuit has much to recommend it. [42] It reflects the purpose of the constitutional guarantee to enable the defendant to put before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt. [43] We think it appropriate, however, to clarify and rephrase the test in one important respect. The test cannot literally be whether the appellate court finds that the omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt. Except in the clearest of cases, such a finding is the province of a jury (or other trier of fact) that considers the live testimony and other evidence placed before itnot of an appellate court that has only a cold paper record to assess. Normally the most an appellate court can say, with a greater or lesser degree of conviction, is that the excluded evidence could have given the jury a reason to doubt. Moreover, to state that materiality depends on whether the excluded evidence affected the outcome of the trial does not establish a standard of materiality because it does not indicate what quantum of likelihood there must be that the undisclosed evidence would have affected the outcome. [44] The lack of a principled, workable materiality test is the problem that has plagued prior cases. For all the foregoing reasons, we think it necessary to reformulate the Second Circuit's test of unconstitutionality to reflect how likely it must be that the erroneously excluded evidence would have given the jury an otherwise-nonexistent reasonable doubt. Our choices are limited. As discussed above, it is well established that not every erroneous exclusion of evidence favorable to the defendant violates the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. And in other contexts involving comparable claims of interference with the ability to present a defense, the Supreme Court has held that a defendant cannot establish a constitutional violation simply by demonstrating that an alleged trial-related error could or might have affected the jury. [45] Thus, the bare possibility of prejudice cannot suffice to show that the defendant actually was deprived of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. At the opposite extreme, we cannot demand certainty that the excluded evidence would have generated a reasonable doubta simply unknowable proposition. Even to require a showing that the evidence more likely than not would have led to an acquittal is too rigorous and unrealistic, in our view. As the Supreme Court has held in addressing Brady violations and ineffective assistance of counsel claims, a preponderance of the evidence standard is inadequate to ensure that the defendant received a fair trial. [46] In the end, we are hard-pressed to come up with a better standard than the intermediate one required in the Brady context by the Supreme Court's post- Agurs decisions. Under the Court's reformulation of Agurs's materiality requirement, evidence withheld by the prosecution is material for due process purposes only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. [47] In other words, it must be reasonably probable (and not merely possible) that the jury would have harbored a reasonable doubt regarding the defendant's guilt if the evidence had not been suppressed. Yet the reasonable probability standard of materiality is not as demanding as a preponderance-of-the-evidence test: The question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. A `reasonable probability' of a different result is accordingly shown when the government's evidentiary suppression `undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial.'[ [48] ] Notably, the reasonable probability standard is also the test of materiality the Supreme Court has employed for a violation of the Compulsory Process Clause, [49] to which the constitutional right to present a defense is closely related. We think it most sensible to incorporate the reasonable probability standard into the Second Circuit's test. We hold, therefore, that whether an erroneous exclusion of defense evidence violates the defendant's constitutional right to present a defense depends upon whether there exists a reasonable probability that the omitted evidence, evaluated in the context of the entire record, would have led the jury to entertain a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. Where such a reasonable probability exists, it makes sense to say the erroneous evidentiary ruling deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense. But if there is no reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different, we are prepared to conclude that the error was not so grave as to deprive the defendant of the meaningful opportunity guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and the Due Process Clausein other words, it was not constitutional error. Although the proposition is not self-evident, the Supreme Court has stated that the reasonable probability standard of materiality would recognize reversible constitutional error only when the harm to the defendant was greater than the harm sufficient for reversal under Kotteakos  for errors that do not implicate constitutional rights. [50] If an evidentiary error in the exclusion of defense evidence is harmless under Kotteakos, it therefore cannot be material enough to amount to an error of constitutional magnitude. Conversely, if the error is sufficiently prejudicial to require reversal under Kotteakos, there seldom if ever will be any need for this court to consider on direct appeal whether a constitutional violation occurred. In other words, the Kotteakos analysis will be dispositive. [51]