Opinion ID: 4562750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Bank’s Challenges to Verdict

Text: The bank argues that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We review the denial of judgment as a matter of law de novo. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of District of Columbia v. DiSalvo, 974 A.2d 868, 870 (D.C. 2009). Judgment as a matter of law is warranted “only if no reasonable juror, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, could have reached the verdict in that party’s favor.” Sullivan v. AboveNet Commc’ns, Inc., 112 A.3d 347, 354 (D.C. 2015) 9 (internal quotation marks omitted). We see no basis to grant judgment as a matter of law to the bank. First, the bank renews the argument that the operating agreement cannot reasonably be interpreted to permit the addition of Mr. Parker as a member after Mr. Bealer’s death, because as soon as only one member remained, the LLC could take no action other than winding itself down. In the first appeal, however, we held that the agreement was ambiguous on that issue, and we therefore remanded for trial on the issue. Parker, 30 A.3d at 154-55 (describing as reasonable Parkers’ position that agreement permitted addition of Mr. Parker after Mr. Bealer’s death, and remanding for factfinder to consider, among other things, “whether a valid transfer of one half of Ms. Parker’s interest to her husband and an election to continue operations were effected by the January 30, 2003 Amendment”). That ruling binds us as a division of the court. M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C. 1971). That being so, we need not consider whether the ruling also binds us under the law-of-the-case doctrine. Second, the bank argues that any purported addition of Mr. Parker was invalid, because adding a new member required the bank’s consent. In making that argument, the bank relies on D.C. Code § 29-1039 (2001 ed.; repealed 2011) 10 (“Unless otherwise provided in . . . an operating agreement, if a member who is an individual dies . . . , the [deceased] member’s executor . . . or other legal representative may exercise all the member’s rights for the purpose of settling such member’s estate or administering such member’s property, including any power the member had to transfer a membership interest.”). The problem with the bank’s argument is that the operating agreement in this case “otherwise provides,” stating in Paragraph 12(c) that “[t]he Company [and] each Member . . . need deal only with Members so named or so admitted; they shall not be required to deal with any other person or entity by reason of . . . the death or termination of a Member, except as otherwise provided in [the] Agreement.” The bank argues, however, that the operating agreement cannot possibly mean what it says on that point, because the agreement elsewhere provides that the LLC and its remaining members do have to deal in certain respects with a deceased member’s legal representative. Specifically, as previously noted, if an LLC continues after the death of a member, then “the estate or other legal representative of the [deceased] shall have the obligation to transfer the interest of the [deceased Member] to the Members who have elected to continue the Company.” Contrary to the bank’s suggestion, the agreement’s provisions fit together quite sensibly. After Mr. Bealer’s death, the LLC and its remaining member or members were not 11 required to deal with the bank, except (as specified in Paragraph 13 of the operating agreement) with respect to the purchase of Mr. Bealer’s interest in the LLC. In other words, when the bank dissolved the LLC and transferred the LLC’s properties to itself, the bank was not a member of the LLC, much less the managing member of the LLC. The consent of the bank therefore was not needed for Mr. Parker to be added as a member. Third, the bank argues that before Mr. Bealer’s death, when Mr. Parker and Ms. Parker jointly owned an interest in the LLC as tenants by the entirety, they were a single member, rather than two members. We need not address that argument. The jury apparently agreed with the bank on that point, rejecting the theory that Mr. Parker was a member of the LLC before Mr. Bealer’s death and instead resting the verdict on the conclusion that Mr. Parker became a member after Mr. Bealer’s death, when the Parkers divided their joint interest. Finally, the bank argues that the 2003 amendment did not actually reflect an election for Mr. Parker to become a member of the LLC. The operating agreement does not by its terms require that members be added by written agreement, however, and the Parkers testified that Mr. Parker was in fact added as a member. Moreover, 12 the 2003 amendment can reasonably be interpreted as reflecting the addition of Mr. Parker as a member of the LLC. In sum, we uphold the jury’s verdict finding the bank liable to the Parkers for breach of contract. The Bank does not separately contest the amount of damages awarded: a little over $1.3 million, based on the bank’s distribution to Mr. Bealer’s estate of money to which the jury determined the Parkers were entitled. We therefore affirm that award. We address in the next part of the opinion the Parkers’ claim that they should have been awarded additional damages.