Opinion ID: 789765
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: abrogation of immunity

Text: 60 Alternatively, Pace asks this en banc court to rule that Congress — acting under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment — in fact abrogated Louisiana's Eleventh Amendment immunity, leaving Louisiana subject to suit on Pace's ADA, Rehabilitation Act, and IDEA claims. As we hold that Louisiana waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to the Rehabilitation Act and the IDEA, it is not necessary for us to address Pace's contention that Louisiana's immunity to suit under those statutes was also abrogated. Neither is it necessary for us to consider whether Title II of the ADA abrogates Eleventh Amendment immunity in this case. First, the Supreme Court, in Tennessee v. Lane, 72 held that Title II abrogates sovereign immunity to the extent that it implicates the accessibility of judicial services, but refused to consider its application to other rights, including those considered to be fundamental under the Constitution. 73 Because (1) the Supreme Court has never before recognized access to public education 74 or freedom from disability discrimination in education 75 to be fundamental rights, and (2) it is unnecessary to address Pace's Title II claims given that its rights and remedies are identical to and duplicative of those provided in § 504, we do not address whether the holding in Lane extends to disability discrimination in access to public education. 61 Second, when ADA claims are directed at architectural barriers, as they are here, the rights and remedies are exactly the same as those provided under the Rehabilitation Act. This circuit, as well as others, has noted that, because the rights and remedies under both statutes are the same, case law interpreting one statute can be applied to the other. 76 The implementing regulations for § 504 and Title II are, in all material respects, the same. For example, both statutes' implementing regulations prohibit similar types of discrimination. 77 In addition, § 504 and Title II's regulations governing new construction and alterations are effectively the same. 78 The two statutes are interpreted to provide the same exception: No covered entity is obligated to make a fundamental alteration in its programs. 79 Finally, the remedies available under § 504 and Title II are one and the same. Specifically, § 203 of Title II states that [t]he remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in section 505 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 794a) shall be the remedies, procedures, and rights this title provides to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of section 202 [of the ADA]. 80 Section 505(a)(2) of the Rehabilitation Act, in turn, states that the remedies, procedures, and rights set forth in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ... shall be available for violations of § 504. 81 Thus, in Barnes v. Gorman, 82 the Supreme Court held that the remedies for violations of § 202 of the ADA and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act are coextensive with the remedies available in a private cause of action brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 83 For all intents and purposes, therefore, the remedies available to Pace under § 504 and Title II are the same. The sole difference between the statutes lies in their causation requirements. 84 This difference is not implicated, however, where, as here, the challenge is to architectural barriers. 62 In conclusion, we hold that for all the foregoing reasons, Louisiana is not entitled to assert sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment in this case. With that issue determined, we proceed to the question of issue preclusion.