Opinion ID: 2102153
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motions for Separate Trials

Text: Appellants first argue it was error for the trial court to deny their motions for separate trials pursuant to RCr 9.16. RCr 9.16 requires the trial court to grant severance if it appears that a defendant will be prejudiced by a joint trial. Skinner v. Commonwealth, 864 S.W.2d 290, 294 (Ky.1993). The standard of review when a trial court denies such a motion is abuse of discretion. Id. At the hearing on their motions, Appellants argued that separate trials were necessary to comply with the requirements of Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In Bruton, the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Confrontation Clause of the United States Constitution to admit unredacted out-of-court hearsay statements made by a non-testifying defendant at trial if those statements implicate a co-defendant unless that co-defendant has a fair chance for cross-examination. Id. at 125, 88 S.Ct. 1620. The Commonwealth argued that the incriminating out-of-court hearsay statements in this case constituted an exception to the Bruton rule because these statements contained particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. Citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980) and Gabow v. Commonwealth, 34 S.W.3d 63 (Ky.2000), the trial court agreed and accordingly, denied Appellants' motions for separate trials. Since the trial court's ruling on the above matter, the United States Supreme Court has overruled those portions of Ohio v. Roberts, supra , and Gabow v. Commonwealth, supra , which hold that out-of-court hearsay statements made by witnesses which are testimonial in nature may be admitted against a defendant if they (1) fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception or (2) bear particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 60-61, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 1369-70, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004). While the Supreme Court left for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of `testimonial,' it held that [w]hatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to ... police interrogations. Id. at 68, 124 S.Ct. 1354. The Commonwealth makes no attempt to distinguish this case on its facts or to argue that Crawford v. Washington, supra , does not function to abrogate the reasoning supporting the trial court's decision in this case. Furthermore, the Commonwealth does not dispute Appellants' contention that the statements considered by the trial court were testimonial in nature. Instead, the Commonwealth presumes error and argues that any error committed by the trial court was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. See Caudill v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Ky.1989) (applying harmless error analysis for Confrontation Clause errors). It urges this Court to consider the evidence they would have presented at trial in order to prove that the error was harmless in this case. Id. at 925 (must consider a host of factors which reflect on the overall strength of the prosecution's case in order to determine whether harmless error exists). We reject the Commonwealth's argument as misplaced. The harmless error doctrine does not apply to hypothetical trial scenarios. First, such an inquiry would be entirely too speculative to satisfy constitutional standards. Second, applying the doctrine outside of an actual trial would misconceive its purpose, which is to ensure that fair trials are not overturned on mere technicalities. See Quarels v. Commonwealth, 142 S.W.3d 73, 81 (Ky. 2004) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 307-09, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991)) (harmless error doctrine is meant to focus on errors which occurred during the presentation of the case to the jury). Since no actual trial was held in this case, we reject the Commonwealth's argument that the harmless error doctrine may be applied in this instance. Rather, the real question to be determined in this instance is whether the presumed error constituted an abuse of discretion. Gill v. Commonwealth, 7 S.W.3d 365, 369 (Ky.1999) (A trial court's decision to deny a motion for separate trials is reviewed for abuse of discretion.) While there is no doubt that the trial court ruled according to valid and accepted law at the time of its ruling, that law has been radically altered by Crawford v. Washington, supra . Since the trial court relied principally on reasoning which has been abrogated by a higher court, we must assume an abuse of discretion and vacate the trial court's sentence. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328, 107 S.Ct. 708, 716, 93 L.Ed.2d 649, 661 (1987) (newly declared constitutional rule in criminal cases is applied not only to prospective and pending cases, but also to those cases that are pending on direct appeal at the time of the change). Appellants shall be allowed to withdraw their guilty pleas pursuant to RCr 8.09 and upon such withdrawal, the trial court is ordered to reexamine its determination to deny separate trials or redact their statements in light of Crawford v. Washington, supra .