Opinion ID: 1348839
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Integrity of the judicial process

Text: The Court of Appeal opined that stipulated reversal would trivialize the work of the trial courts and undermine the integrity of the entire judicial process. This conclusion is based on the Court of Appeal's faulty premise that litigation is a search for legal truth, not simply a dispositional act. This puts the abstract cart before the practical horse. (3), (2b) The primary purpose of the public judiciary is to afford a forum for the settlement of litigable matters between disputing parties. ( Vecki v. Sorensen (1959) 171 Cal. App.2d 390, 393 [340 P.2d 1020].) We do not resolve abstract legal issues, even when requested to do so. We resolve real disputes between real people. ( Pacific Legal Foundation v. California Coastal Com. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 158, 170 [188 Cal. Rptr. 104, 655 P.2d 306].) This function does not undermine our integrity or demean our function. By providing a forum for the peaceful resolution of citizens' disputes, we provide a cornerstone for ordered liberty in a democratic society. The Court of Appeal's concern for the integrity of trial court judgments is flawed in other respects. First, the notion that such a judgment is a statement of legal truth places too much emphasis on the result of litigation rather than its purpose. In all civil litigation, the judicial decree is not the end but the means. At the end of the rainbow lies not a judgment, but some action (or cessation of action) by the defendant that the judgment produces  the payment of damages, or some specific performance, or the termination of some conduct. Redress is sought through the court, but from the defendant.... The real value of the judicial pronouncement  what makes it a proper judicial resolution of a `case or controversy' rather than an advisory opinion  is in the settling of some dispute which affects the behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff. ( Hewitt v. Helms (1987) 482 U.S. 755, 761 [96 L.Ed.2d 654, 661, 107 S.Ct. 2672], original italics.) Second, the Court of Appeal decision incorrectly suggests that a trial court judgment provides guidance to other courts and litigants. Not so. (4) [T]rial courts make no binding precedents. ( Fenske v. Board of Administration (1980) 103 Cal. App.3d 590, 596 [163 Cal. Rptr. 182]; 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Appeal, § 763, p. 730.) (2c) Third, a stipulated reversal does not trivialize or render meaningless a trial court's work. As explained above, the paramount purpose of litigation is to resolve disputes. If that goal is achieved, even after judgment, the trial court's essential function has been fulfilled. Fourth, a trial, like a settlement conference, may educate the litigants as to the true value of the case and prompt a settlement. If so, the case has been resolved, and the trial was not wasted. Resolution  whether decreed or agreed  is the ultimate object of the litigation process. Finally, a stipulated reversal is not an attempt to erase or rewrite the record of a trial. Everything that has happened to date in this litigation  including the jury verdict against defendants  is and will remain a matter of public record, even after a stipulated reversal. No one is proposing that the record in this case be destroyed or sealed. The record will reflect that the reversal was pursuant to a settlement and stipulation. There will be no inference that the jury or trial court erred. Whatever conclusions the public wishes to draw from the litigation can still be drawn after the reversal. To remove any possible doubt in a case of a stipulated reversal, the appellate court can explicitly state in its order that the reversal is pursuant to settlement and does not constitute either approval or rejection of the trial court's judgment.