Opinion ID: 589109
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Guilty Plea/Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

Text: 8 Briles contends that his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because his counsel withdrew an allegedly meritorious motion suppressing the marijuana evidence. This contention lacks merit. 9 To comport with the guarantees of due process, a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); United States v. Butcher, 926 F.2d 811, 817 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 2273 (1991). The accused must be aware of the nature and elements of the charges against him, the constitutional rights he is waiving by pleading guilty, and the possible punishment he faces. Boykin, at 242-43. In assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, solemn declarations made by a defendant in open court contemporaneously with his plea carry a strong presumption of verity. Chizen v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir.1987); see also United States v. Mims, 928 F.2d 310, 312-13 (9th Cir.1991) ([w]e attach substantial weight to contemporaneous on-the-record statements in assessing the voluntariness of pleas). 10 A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel may be used to attack the voluntariness and hence the validity of a guilty plea. United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir.1990). To establish such a claim, Briles must show that counsel's conduct fell below an objective standard of attorney competence, and that there is a reasonable probability that in the absence of counsel's unprofessional errors, he would not have pled guilty and insisted on going to trial. See Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58-59 (1985); see also Donagiere v. United States, 914 F.2d 165, 167 (9th Cir.1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 1398 (1991). 11 At the plea hearing, the district court covered all the requirements for entry of a valid guilty plea set forth in Boykin. In addition, Briles stated that he understood by pleading guilty that he waived his right to contest any illegality in the search and seizure of his vessel. He also twice stated that it was in his best interest to plead guilty rather than go to trial. Finally, he stated that he was satisfied with the representation provided by his counsel. 1 12 Because Briles testimony at the plea hearing was entitled to greater weight than his allegations in his section 2255 motion, the district court did not err by determining that his plea was voluntary, see Mims, 928 F.2d at 313; Chizen, 809 F.2d at 562, and that he was provided with effective assistance of counsel, see Hill, 474 U.S. at 58; Donagiere, 914 F.2d at 168. 2