Opinion ID: 1953260
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether the trial court erred in allowing the defendant/appellee to make an offer of proof regarding alleged race neutral basis for defendant/appellee exercise of peremptory challenges to prospective jurors in the trial of this case.

Text: Brown argues that the court erred in allowing Blackwood at the post-trial hearing to proffer information regarding the race-neutral reasons for his peremptory strikes of black jurors. Brown argues that in Scott, this Court refused to utilize the procedure outlined in Williams v. State, 507 So.2d 50 (Miss. 1987), whereby a hearing is conducted for the judge to determine whether racial discrimination occurred in the use of peremptory challenges. In Scott, we explained that it would be neither fair nor satisfying to ask the judge and lawyers to resurrect from memory some Batson -approved basis for the peremptory challenges two years after trial. 595 So.2d at 853. Brown argues that under such logic, this Court should give no credence to the race-neutral reasons proffered by Blackwood. Blackwood argues that in light of the fact that Brown failed to make a Batson objection to the peremptory strikes at trial, and did not raise such objection until after the trial, it was proper for the judge to permit his proffer of race-neutral reasons at the hearing. Blackwood distinguishes this case from Scott on the grounds that the plaintiffs in that case raised a Batson objection at the proper time. Further, Blackwood notes that in Scott, this Court stated that in some cases, judicial economy would be better served by a Williams procedure, rather than reversal and a new trial; Blackwood argues that this is such a case. [15] Finally, Blackwood submits that if this Court does consider Brown's untimely Batson objection, then it was error for the trial court to refuse him the opportunity to offer proof as to his race-neutral reasons, and that the case should be remanded for the sole purpose of allowing him to adduce such evidence. This is just such a case, as imagined by this Court in Scott, in which judicial economy would better be served by a Williams procedure than by reversal and retrial. In fact, such procedure has already occurred, and Blackwood has proffered his race-neutral reasons. As to Brown's assertion that the judge erred in allowing Blackwood's proffer, it may be asked how else, other than by review of the proffer, might this Court assess Brown's own Batson claims? Brown's argument that the proffer should have been refused is without merit. In sum, we hold that under the facts of this case, the Williams -type procedure at which Blackwood proffered his race-neutral reasons for peremptory challenges adequately protected the rights of both parties.