Opinion ID: 1179483
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: QUAERE: What Is the Function of an Inference and When Is an Inference Permissible?

Text: `Presumptions ... may be looked on as the bats of the law, flitting in the twilight but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts. ...' Bradley v. S.L. Savidge, Inc. 13 Wn.2d 28, 123 P.2d 780 (1942) (citing Beeman v. Puget Sound Traction, Light & Power Co., 79 Wash. 137, 139, 139 P. 1087 (1914) (quoting Paul v. United Rys. Co., 152 Mo. App. 577, 134 S.W. 3 (1911))). The basic notions upon which presumptions are grounded are simple. When fact A (the basic fact) is proved at a trial the courts will by rule assume that fact B (the presumed fact) exists for certain purposes and with certain limitations. This specific assumption or inference by application of a general rule is a presumption. 5 K. Tegland, Wash Prac., Evidence § 65, at 127 (2d ed. 1982). Most presumptions have come into existence primarily because the judges have believed that proof of fact B renders the inference of the existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of the fact A until the adversary disproves it. E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 343, at 969 (3d ed. 1984). We follow Bradley v. S.L. Savidge, Inc., supra , in quoting the definition of presumption as defined in Heidelbach v. Campbell, 95 Wash. 661, 668, 164 P. 247 (1917): A presumption is an inference, affirmative or disaffirmative, of the truth of a proposition of fact which is drawn by a process of reasoning from some one or more matters of known fact. The presumption arises from a want of knowledge of the truth of the proposition. It is in the nature of evidence, and if it be known whether the given proposition is true or false, there can be no presumption because the fact is established which the presumption tends to prove or disprove. [1] Presumptions are one thing; inferences another. Presumptions are assumptions of fact which the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts; inferences are logical deductions or conclusions from an established fact. Presumptions deal with legal processes, whereas inferences deal with mental processes. Lappin v. Lucurell, 13 Wn. App. 277, 284, 534 P.2d 1038, 94 A.L.R.3d 594 (1975). An inference is simply a logical deduction or conclusion which the law allows, but does not require, following the establishment of the basic facts. 5 K. Tegland, at 127-28. RCW 9A.52.040 creates an inference of intent as applied to burglary and trespass as follows: In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent. RCW 9A.52.040 is reflected in WPIC 60.05 to read: A person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein [unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the jury to have been made without such criminal intent]. This inference is not binding upon you and it is for you to determine what weight, if any, such inference is to be given. Both RCW 9A.52.040 and WPIC 60.05 permit the inference of one fact from another as a presumption. Burglary consists of two elements; entry or unlawfully remaining upon another's premises, and intent. RCW 9A.52.030. RCW 9A.52.040 provides that a burglary may be inferred (intent exists) if one either unlawfully remains upon another's premises or an entry occurs. Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding. It is often necessary for the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime  that is, an `ultimate' or `elemental' fact  from the existence of one or more `evidentiary' or `basic' facts. County Court of Ulster Cy. v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156, 60 L.Ed.2d 777, 99 S.Ct. 2213 (1979). The most common evidentiary device is the entirely permissive inference or presumption, which allows  but does not require  the trier of fact to infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor of the basic one and which places no burden of any kind on the defendant. Ulster Cy. Court, at 157. WPIC 60.05 provides for a permissive inference or presumption, which allows the trier of fact to either infer the elemental fact from proof by the prosecutor, or reject the inference. WPIC 60.05 does not apply to those attempting to enter or remain unlawfully unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 36, 23 L.Ed.2d 57, 89 S.Ct. 1532 (1969). See also Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 61 L.Ed.2d 39, 99 S.Ct. 2450 (1979). [2] For a trier of fact to draw inferences from proven circumstances, the inferences must be rationally related to the proven facts. State v. Jeffries, 105 Wn.2d 398, 442, 717 P.2d 722, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 922 (1986). A rational connection must exist between the initial fact proven and the further fact presumed. The jury is permitted to infer from one fact the existence of another essential to guilt, if reason and experience support the inference. Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467, 87 L.Ed. 1519, 63 S.Ct. 1241 (1943). For a criminal statutory presumption to meet the test of constitutionality the presumed fact must follow beyond a reasonable doubt from the proven fact. State v. Blight, 89 Wn.2d 38, 569 P.2d 1129 (1977). See also State v. Odom, 83 Wn.2d 541, 520 P.2d 152, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1013 (1974); State v. Rogers, 83 Wn.2d 553, 520 P.2d 159, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1053 (1974). [3] WPIC 60.05 may be given as a proper instruction in a burglary case. However, where the State pleads and proves only attempted burglary, as here, this instruction is improper. In State v. Bergeron, supra , the defendant signed a statement wherein he admitted that when he threw a rock through a window he intended to enter the premises. In Bergeron we reasoned that while intent may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of an act, intent may not be inferred from conduct that is patently equivocal. In order to give an instruction that an inference of an intent to commit a crime existed in a burglary case, there must be evidence of entering or remaining unlawfully in a building. The instruction on intent cannot be given without evidence to support it and that must place the defendant within a building. State v. Ogden, 21 Wn. App. 44, 49, 584 P.2d 957 (1978). [4] A presumption is only permissible when no more than one conclusion can be drawn from any set of circumstances. An inference should not arise where there exist other reasonable conclusions that would follow from the circumstances. Here the inferences are twofold: (1) attempted burglary or (2) vandalism or malicious destruction. Therefore, an inference cannot follow that there was intent to commit a crime within the building just by the defendants' shattering of the window in the door. This evidence is consistent with two different interpretations; one indicating attempted burglary, a felony; and the other malicious mischief, a misdemeanor.