Opinion ID: 2363126
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Analysis of the Circuit Court's Exercise of Discretion.

Text: The abuse of discretion standard of review is premised, at least in part, on the concept that matters within the discretion of the trial court are much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts. . . . Wilson, 385 Md. at 198-99, 867 A.2d at 1084; In re Adoption/Guardianship No. 3598, 347 Md. at 312-13, 701 A.2d at 118-19; Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd., 195 Md. 421, 436, 73 A.2d 461, 467 (1950). So long as the Circuit Court applies the proper legal standards and reaches a reasonable conclusion based on the facts before it, an appellate court should not reverse a decision vested in the trial court's discretion merely because the appellate court reaches a different conclusion. See North, 102 Md.App. at 14, 648 A.2d at 1031-32; Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 195 Md. at 436, 73 A.2d at 467; see also Kern v. TXO Production Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 971 (8th Cir.1984) (The very concept of discretion presupposes a zone of choice within which the trial court may go either way [in granting or denying a motion for voluntary dismissal].); Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir.2005) (Discretion means the district court has a range of choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.) (quoting Guideone Elite Ins. Co. v. Old Cutler Presbyterian Church, Inc., 420 F.3d 1317, 1324 (11th Cir.2005)). The Court of Special Appeals's reversal of the trial court's refusal to dismiss without prejudice was based primarily on two incorrect positions: (1) that Judge Berger found only one factor weighing against dismissal without prejudice, yet nevertheless denied Respondents' motion; and (2) that Michael Skevofilax's minority status compelled dismissal without prejudice. It is clear from the transcript of the 21 December 2004 hearing that the trial judge considered all the relevant factors, including Michael's minority status. The Court of Special Appeals even acknowledged that Judge Berger carefully considered all the proper factors for a determination of whether voluntary dismissal was appropriate. He referred to the relevant factors, and gave a statement of reasons for denying the motion. Compare with Conafay, 793 F.2d at 352-53 (In the specific factual and legal setting, . . ., we find ourselves unable to resolve [whether the trial court acted properly within its discretion in denying the motion dismiss without prejudice] without the benefit of a statement of the reasons by the [trial court] for its decision denying the motion.). He did not abuse his discretion in this regard.
Several courts interpreting FRCP 41(a)(2) or its state analogues, including the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland, have denied motions for voluntary dismissal in circumstances not substantially different from the present situation. For example, in Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Costa Lines Cargo Services, Inc., 903 F.2d 352, 361 (5th Cir. 1990), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the district court to deny a voluntary dismissal without prejudice when the case had been removed to federal court for nearly ten months, the court had convened on several occasions to resolve various disputes regarding the litigation, extensive discovery had been conducted, summary judgment had been entered in favor of one defendant, and trial had already been set for the remaining defendants. In Andes, 788 F.2d at 1036-37, the Fourth Circuit held that the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland had not abused its discretion in refusing to dismiss, without prejudice, a lawsuit where the defendant incurred significant expense in responding to the complaint, filing motions for summary judgment and supporting memoranda, deposing witnesses, producing documents, and obtaining expert opinions pertinent to the case. [22] We find particularly persuasive the Superior Court of Pennsylvania's decision in Gray v. Magee, 864 A.2d 560 (Pa.Super 2004). In that case, a minor, through his parents and next friends, filed a complaint on 21 December 1998 alleging medical malpractice. Prior to filing the complaint, Eli Wayne, M.D., was retained by the plaintiffs in order to give expert testimony in support of the claims. Dr. Wayne died during the pendency of the litigation. Gray, 864 A.2d at 562. The case remained inactive on the docket until the trial court conducted a pre-trial conference on 20 August 2003, at which time the court set 11 December 2003 as the deadline for the plaintiffs' filing of expert reports. Approximately 3 months after the scheduling conference, plaintiffs requested an extension, explaining that their expert, Dr. Wayne[,] had passed away after filing his expert report and that their new expert (who was not named in the request) had not yet had time to file his expert report. Id. The trial court granted the plaintiffs' request, and extended expert discovery to 11 January 2004. In early January 2004, the plaintiffs had not identified yet their replacement expert, and requested another extension. Id. Even though the trial court granted this request, the plaintiffs were unable to comply with the amended scheduling order. On 11 February 2004, plaintiffs filed a petition for voluntary discontinuance (the Pennsylvania analogue to voluntary dismissal without prejudice), and the defendants responded with a motion for summary judgment. Gray, 864 A.2d at 563. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of [the defendant] and dismissed the case with prejudice due to [the plaintiffs'] failure to produce an expert report after being granted two 30-day extensions of time to produce the expert report. Id. On appeal, the Superior Court, Pennsylvania's intermediate appellate court, commented first upon the underlying plaintiff's minority status. Specifically, the court held that any trial court must consider the interests of the minor in additional to the unreasonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expense, or prejudice suffered by the defendants in the event of voluntary discontinuance. Gray, 864 A.2d at 565; see also Fancsali v. Univ. Health Ctr. of Pittsburgh, 563 Pa. 439, 761 A.2d 1159, 1163 (2000) ([I]t is clear that in deciding whether to allow the discontinuance of an action involving a minor, the court must give some consideration to the interests of the minor in considering unreasonable inconvenience, vexation, harassment, expense and prejudice.). Despite the minority status of the injured plaintiff, the Superior Court nevertheless held that the trial judge had not abused its discretion by granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment in lieu of plaintiffs' petition for voluntary continuance. The court reasoned that after numerous attempts to procure an expert witness and the trial court's repeated extensions of the discovery period, [plaintiffs] have failed to procure an expert witness to testify regarding their theory of liability in this case. Accordingly, [plaintiffs] have already experienced unreasonable convenience and expense in having to retain counsel and undertake discovery to defend themselves in a cause of action for which [plaintiffs] could not provide evidentiary support during the previous five years. Gray, 864 A.2d at 565. Although not directly on point with the present case, Gray, Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., and Andes underscore that we should not upset the circuit court's ruling here because a reasonable trial judge could have adopted the view that dismissal without prejudice was inappropriate. Similar to the circumstances in Gray, it is clear from this record that the trial court endeavored to accommodate Respondents while they attempted to formulate medical evidence to support their claims. In denying Respondents' Rule 2-506(b) motion, the trial court expressly commented upon the three extensions granted, at Respondents' request, in order to allow them to develop Dr. Bradstreet's expert testimony. The Circuit Court's decision to deny Respondents' motion was not so clearly against logic or beyond the fringe of what the courts deem minimally acceptable that it constituted an abuse of discretion. Wilson, 385 Md. at 198-99, 867 A.2d at 1084.