Opinion ID: 1697147
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admission of joint confession

Text: Globe argues that the trial court erred when it denied his motion in limine in regard to Busby's statements during the joint confession. The trial court denied the motion [u]pon a finding that the recorded statements made by Andrew Busby were adopted by the Defendant as his own.

A trial judge's ruling on the admissibility of evidence will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. Blanco v. State, 452 So.2d 520 (Fla.1984).
In Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987), the Court reiterated the rule in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), and held that the introduction of a nontestifying codefendant's confession which is not directly admissible against the defendant violates the defendant's confrontation rights. The Court further held that although introduction of the defendant's own interlocking confession cannot cure the Confrontation Clause violation caused by the introduction of the nontestifying codefendant's confession, it might, in some cases, render that violation harmless. Cruz, 481 U.S. at 193-94, 107 S.Ct. 1714. Recently, in Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court receded from the Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980), indicia of reliability test and held that [w]here testimonial evidence is at issue, ... the Sixth Amendment demands what common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Crawford, 124 S.Ct. at 1374. We have previously recognized that admissions by acquiescence or silence do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. See Nelson v. State, 748 So.2d 237 (Fla.1999); see also United States v. Kehoe, 310 F.3d 579, 590-91 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that the Confrontation Clause did not guarantee the defendant the right to cross-examine a speaker whose statements were imputed to the defendant as adoptive admissions of a party opponent), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1048, 123 S.Ct. 2112, 155 L.Ed.2d 1089 (2003). In Nelson, we held that because the codefendant's statements were admitted as admissions by silence, there could be no Confrontation Clause violation. We presented several factors that should be present to show that an acquiescence to the codefendant's statements did in fact occur. These factors include the following: 1. The statement must have been heard by the party claimed to have acquiesced. 2. The statement must have been understood by [the defendant]. 3. The subject matter of the statement is within the knowledge of the [defendant]. 4. There were no physical or emotional impediments to the person responding. 5. The personal make-up of the speaker or his relationship to the party or event are not such as to make it unreasonable to expect a denial. 6. The statement itself must be such as would, if untrue, call for a denial under the circumstances. See Nelson, 748 So.2d at 242 (quoting Privett v. State, 417 So.2d 805, 806 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)). The essential inquiry thus becomes whether a reasonable person would have denied the statements under the circumstances. Id. (citing McCormick, Evidence, § 270 (2d ed.1972)). Florida has incorporated this rule into its Evidence Code as section 90.803(18)(b), Florida Statutes (2003), which expressly creates a hearsay exception for [a] statement that is offered against a party and is: ... [a] statement of which the party has manifested an adoption or belief in its truth.
In this case, Globe was present during Busby's statement and had a chance to contradict what Busby said. A review of the transcript in this case makes it clear that Busby's statements were adopted by Globe. Instead of contradicting Busby's statements, Globe verbally affirmed what Busby said and added significant details to Busby's statement. The statements were properly admitted as adoptive admissions [5] pursuant to section 90.803(18)(b). As we previously noted, statements admitted as adoptive admissions do not implicate the Confrontation Clause. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Globe's motion in limine.