Opinion ID: 883894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the denial of a preliminary on-site hearing

Text: After Utah officials refused to continue the supervision of Hardy's probation, he was extradited and returned to Montana for his probation revocation hearing. Prior to his return, however, he was denied a preliminary on-site hearing. He asserts that this denial violated his rights pursuant to (1) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and (2) § 46-23-1103, MCA. We will address both of these alleged violations separately.
In Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a parolee's liberty involves significant values entitled to the protection of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and that termination of that liberty requires an informal hearing to insure that the finding of a parole violation is based on sufficient facts to support the revocation. In Gagnon v. Scarpelli (1973), 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, the U.S. Supreme Court extended and applied the principles announced in Morrissey to probation revocation proceedings. In State v. Howell (1986), 222 Mont. 136, 720 P.2d 1174, we analyzed the due process requirements established by Morrissey and Gagnon in the context of a Montana probation revocation proceeding. Howell was a Montana probationer under supervision in Idaho when he was arrested and jailed for assault. A petition to revoke probation was filed, and he was returned to Montana. He later claimed that the failure to conduct a preliminary on-site hearing in Idaho denied him due process as required by Morrissey and Gagnon. We rejected his claim, and held that he was not deprived of a liberty interest by the failure of the authorities to provide for him a preliminary or on-site hearing. Howell, 222 Mont. at 140, 720 P.2d at 1177. We based our holding on our determination that: [T]he purpose of the on-site preliminary hearing and the eventual full-blown hearing on revocation is to provide due process to the parolee, and to protect his liberty interest at the time. In this case, Howell did not have a liberty interest at the time of the proceedings against him for the revocation of his parole. He was at the time under arrest in Idaho by reason of a charge against him for assault. His transfer by the Idaho authorities to the Montana authorities while he was still under arrest did not deprive him of any liberty interest since his detention by the Idaho authorities was at all times lawful. Howell, 222 Mont. at 139-40, 720 P.2d at 1176. Hardy was charged with three offenses in Utah. He entered pleas of no contest, was convicted of each charge, and was sentenced accordingly. He was serving that sentence at the time the Montana revocation proceedings were initiated. At the time he was extradited to Montana, he was detained in the Salt Lake County Jail, pursuant to his one-year sentence for the Utah convictions. Nothing in the record suggests that he was or would have been released from jail in Utah had it not been for his extradition and transfer to Montana authorities. Based on our prior holding in Howell, therefore, Hardy's right to due process was not infringed upon by his extradition to Montana and the commencement of the revocation proceedings in Montana. Accordingly, a preliminary hearing was not required. We hold that the District Court was correct when it concluded that the failure to conduct a preliminary on-site hearing did not violate Hardy's due process rights pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment.
Section 46-23-1103, MCA, provides as follows: (1) Where supervision of a ... probationer is being administered pursuant to the interstate compact for the supervision of ... probationers, the appropriate judicial or administrative authorities in this state shall notify the compact administrator of the sending state whenever in their view consideration should be given to retaking or reincarceration for a ... probation violation. (2) Prior to the giving of any such notification, a hearing shall be held in accordance with this part within a reasonable time unless such hearing is waived by the ... probationer. Following termination of any such hearing, the appropriate officer or officers of this state shall, as soon as practicable, report to the sending state, furnish a copy of the hearing record, and make recommendations regarding the disposition to be made of the ... probationer by the sending state.... When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, the statute speaks for itself and no further interpretation is required. In re Estate of Langendorf (1993), 262 Mont. 123, 125, 863 P.2d 434, 436. The language of § 46-23-1103(2), MCA, plainly and unambiguously requires a preliminary on-site hearing. Despite the statute's clear mandate, Hardy was denied a hearing, and his rights pursuant to the statute were, in fact, violated. The District Court, therefore, erred in 1992 when it did not require an on-site hearing prior to Hardy's return to Montana. However, for reasons that follow, the District Court's failure to require a preliminary on-site hearing was not prejudicial to Hardy's rights, and therefore, did not constitute reversible error. See § 46-20-701(1), MCA. For that reason, the District Court's refusal to grant post-conviction relief on the ground that Hardy was denied a preliminary on-site hearing in contravention of § 46-23-1103(2), MCA, must be affirmed. See Rule 61, M.R.Civ.P. Our holding today should not be interpreted as diminishing the importance of § 46-23-1103(2), MCA. In fact, most probation revocation proceedings initiated pursuant to §§ 46-23-1101 to -1106, MCA, the Interstate Compact, will require a preliminary on-site hearing. Preliminary on-site hearings are necessary to allow a probationer to contest the reasons for the revocation of his or her probation, and to develop a record when the evidence is fresh and when it is readily available. For example, in Fisher v. Crist (1979), 182 Mont. 124, 594 P.2d 1140, we held that the failure to provide Fisher with a preliminary on-site hearing violated his rights pursuant to § 46-23-1103, MCA. Fisher was a Montana probationer under the supervision of the State of Washington. Montana authorities sought to revoke his probation based on: (1) his failure to report to his Washington probation officer; and (2) his failure to cooperate with the Seattle Indian Alcohol Program. We determined that Fisher should have received a preliminary on-site hearing because, [h]e was told that he was charged with two violations, both of which he contested and should have been the subject of a probable cause hearing in Seattle where he could have had the opportunity to present witnesses and, perhaps, refute the allegations. Fisher, 182 Mont. at 128, 594 P.2d at 1142. In this case, however, a preliminary on-site hearing would have contributed nothing to a determination of whether Hardy had violated the terms of his probation. Unlike Fisher, Hardy's probation violations (which were the basis for revocation) were not disputed, and probable cause for the initiation of revocation proceedings clearly existed. Essential to our holding is the fact that Hardy pled no contest to three offenses in Utah. Additionally, he wrote letters to the District Court which corroborated his guilt; and, during his probation revocation hearing, he admitted the allegations in the State's petition. He had, as evidenced by his no contest pleas and admissions, indisputably violated the conditions of his probation, and a preliminary on-site hearing could not have led to any other finding. Based on the facts of this case, the failure to provide Hardy with a preliminary on-site hearing did not prejudice his substantial rights. Accordingly, we hold that the District Court was correct when it concluded that Hardy is not entitled to post-conviction relief.