Opinion ID: 729205
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: galaviz's testimony

Text: 11 Jose Galaviz testified at trial that Murillo had told him that he had shot a man whom he suspected of breaking into his house and stealing nine ounces of cocaine. 1 J.A. at 367. The shooting apparently occurred sometime during the spring of 1993. Supp.J.A. at 19 p 26 and p. 23. Murillo argues that this testimony should have been excluded as inadmissible evidence of other crimes and as unfairly prejudicial, under FED.R.EVID. 404(b) 2 and 403, respectively. 12 Under Rule 404(b), a court may admit evidence of a defendant's prior bad acts or crimes only if the evidence is probative of a relevant fact other than the defendant's 'character' or 'propensity' to commit bad acts. United States v. Clemis, 11 F.3d 597, 600 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 1858 (1994). See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 686 (1988) (The threshold inquiry a court must make before admitting similar acts evidence under Rule 404(b) is whether that evidence is probative of a material issue other than character.). We have construed the relevancy requirement to exact a showing by the proponent of the other crimes evidence that the tendered evidence relates to a matter that is 'in issue' in the case on trial. United States v. Bakke, 942 F.2d 977, 982 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 2114 (1994). See United States v. Zelinka, 862 F.2d 92, 99 (6th Cir.1988) (holding that district court erred by admitting similar-acts evidence without requiring the prosecutor to show its relevance and the necessity for its admission) (citation omitted). We review de novo whether the district court correctly determined that the evidence was admissible for a legitimate purpose. United States v. Comer, --- F.3d ----, 1996 WL 476269 at  4 (6th Cir. Aug. 23, 1996) (citing United States v. Gessa, 971 F.2d 1257, 1261-62 (6th Cir.1992) (en banc)). 3 13 The government, asking the district court to admit the statement, stated that 14 the indication [is] he shot the person in retaliation[.] I think when there's a gun charge and a denial that he had--that he, you know, used guns or anything like that, I think that's the essence of the denial on Count 2, that's evidence from his own mouth of a contrary situation. 4 15 J.A. at 355. The government never suggested that the shooting was done in furtherance of the conspiracy, or involved any members of the conspiracy apart from Murillo himself. The court responded by noting, 16 It seems to me it is relevant because there is a gun charge here concerning which the government is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the firearm was used during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. This evidence certainly bears directly upon the defendant's state of mind and the use of any firearm that might have been possessed or in the grasp of the defendant. 17 Id. at 356. The court went on after a recess to find that the evidence was, first, 18 relevant to the issues that are before this court and which must be decided by the jury. Secondly, the court [found] that the testimony is not only relevant but that it has substantial probative value in regard, particularly, to the charge against the defendant using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking offense. 19 Id. at 365. Finally, the court found the potential prejudice did not outweigh the probative effect. Id. It is thus clear that the government's and the district court's rationale for admitting the evidence was that it was relevant to the weapons count, not to the conspiracy count. 20 Admitting the statement under this theory was an error. Count Two of the superseding indictment charges Murillo with using a firearm on or about November 18, 1993. Evidence that he had used a gun in the spring of that year, also in connection with drug trafficking, is probative of nothing but character or propensity. The district court's vague statement that the evidence bears directly upon the defendant's state of mind serves only to reinforce this conclusion: the most plausible interpretation of this statement is that, since the defendant used a gun to defend his drugs before, he probably intended to do the same several months later. See United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1007 (6th Cir.1975) (intent exception does not apply where the requisite criminal intent would normally be inferred from the criminal act and the defendant has not asserted the defense of an innocent state of mind) ( quoted in United States v. Johnson, 27 F.3d 1186, 1191 (6th Cir.1994), cert. denied, 115 S.Ct. 910 (1995)). It is precisely this use of prior acts evidence which Rule 404 expressly forbids. 21 The government argues on appeal that the evidence at issue could well lead a reasonable person to believe that Murillo was a cocaine dealer who took care of business and would discipline anyone who would frustrate his pursuit of that trade.... The evidence was relevant and probative of Murillo's involvement in the charged conspiracy. Appellee's Br. at 20. The evidence may well have been relevant and probative: a reasonable person might conclude that a person who would shoot a man for stealing his drugs would have few qualms about using similarly unsavory methods to protect his business. The drafters of Rule 404, and the common law judges who preceded them, however, have forbidden this line of reasoning. See Kenneth S. Broun, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 190 at 797-98 (evidence of other acts which suggests that defendant's character is bad must be excluded despite relevance and probativeness) (citing pre- and post-rules cases). 22 Rule 404(b) does allow the admission of bad-acts evidence for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. FED.R.EVID. 404(b). The government, however, has never indicated that the evidence was offered to prove any of thse issues, or any other specific element of the conspiracy charge. See J.A. at 355-57, 364-66; Appellee's Br. at 19-20. Nor has the government ever argued that any of these issues were relevant to the gun charge. When the government does not offer a specific reason to admit other-acts evidence, the evidence must be excluded. Zelinka, 862 F.2d at 99 (where government did not specify which 404(b) exception applied, court of appeals will not infer an argument for admissibility). 23 The First Circuit's opinion in United States v. Williams, 985 F.2d 634 (1st Cir.1993), is instructive on this issue. Williams, like Murillo, stood accused of conspiring to distribute cocaine and of using a gun during the conspiracy. At trial, the government elicited testimony that Williams had claimed to have killed a couple of people, arguing on appeal that the testimony was evidence of his plan to establish and operate a cocaine distribution business by means of his modus operandi of intimidation. Id. at 637. It then tried to fit this into the language of the rule, nothing that modus operandi is often relevant to showing identity, one of the 404(b) exceptions. Id. The First Circuit found this argument disingenuous, writing that [i]n essence, the government offered the evidence so they the jury would infer that, because Williams was or claimed to be a murderer, he was more likely than not also to be a cocaine trafficker who uses guns in his business.' Id. The case at bar is similar: here, too, the government failed to place the evidence into any context, other than temporal, related to the development or operation of the drug conspiracy, and the evidence should not have been admitted. Id. at 638. 24 That the trial court erred does not, however, mean that Murillo is entitled to a new trial. The error was harmless. As the district court noted, the testimony was neither gruesome nor detailed, and there was no suggestion that the victim died; the witness did not even know whether the shooting had actually taken place. Furthermore, there was ample evidence both of Murillo's use of guns and his guilt of the drug charges. As the district court noted, the evidence was massive, the case was not a close call for the jury. J.A. at 616. Thus, we can say with fair assurance that, had the improper other-acts evidence been excluded, the jury would have returned the same verdict. United States v. Heater, 63 F.3d 311, 325 (4th Cir.1995).