Opinion ID: 1453368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Town's Leasing of Water Rights and Statutory Forfeiture

Text: In May 1964, tests showed that the water from the spring area was contaminated, and the Town discontinued its general culinary use of the water. The Town apparently did not resume the use of the water in its culinary water distribution system until 1984, when it constructed a new water collection system. The trial court found, however, that between 1964 and 1984 the Town's water continued to be delivered to two homes for culinary use and that the remainder was leased to one Elmer Matthews for irrigation. The Eskelsens assert that by discontinuing general culinary use of the spring water, the Town lost a part of its water right under the terms of section 73-1-4 of the Utah Code and article XI, section 6 of the Utah Constitution, leaving that water open for appropriation by another user. [9] The relevant language of the Utah Code provides that a water right not used for five years ceases unless the appropriator files an application for an extension of time with the state engineer. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4. [10] At the same time, the Utah Constitution provides that a municipal corporation may not directly or indirectly, lease, sell, alien or dispose of any ... water rights. Utah Const. art. XI, § 6 (emphasis added). In Nephi City v. Hansen, 779 P.2d 673 (Utah 1989), this court held that despite the language of article XI, section 6, a municipal corporation can lose its water rights through statutory forfeiture. We held that there is no conflict between article XI, section 6 and section 73-1-4 because the constitution prohibits only the voluntary, intentional disposition of water rights, whereas a forfeiture under section 73-1-4 is involuntary. Id. at 674-75. Although relevant, Nephi City does not address the specific question presented here, i.e., whether a municipal corporation forfeits its water rights under the terms of section 73-1-4 of the Utah Code if it leases, sells, alienates, or disposes of its water rights in contravention of article XI, section 6 of the Utah Constitution. In this case, there is evidence to support the trial court's factual finding that part of the Town's water right was leased and used for irrigation between 1964 and 1984. The trial court failed, however, to make a legal conclusion regarding the impact of article XI, section 6 on its finding. Under the plain language of that constitutional provision and our decision in Nephi City, the Town's leasing of its water rights was prohibited, but we still must determine the effect of the prohibited lease on the Town's long-term interest in the water right. An appropriative water right depends on beneficial use for its continued validity. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state.); Mt. Olivet Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 65 Utah 193, 235 P. 876, 878 (1925) (The lapse of 30 years' time during which no beneficial use of water has been shown forecloses the claim of the city to the use of [the water]. (emphasis added)). In Utah, [t]he state is ... vitally interested in seeing that none of the waters are allowed to run to waste or go without being applied to a beneficial use for any great number of years. Deseret Live Stock Co. v. Hooppiania, 66 Utah 25, 239 P. 479, 481 (1925). To protect this state interest, the legislature has provided that a water right can be lost for nonuse or abandonment. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4. The judicial role in maintaining the system of beneficial use, and implicitly the place of water in the economy of our state, is to require strict adherence to the statutory sanctions. Baugh v. Criddle, 19 Utah 2d 361, 431 P.2d 790, 791 (1967). We have held that a departure from this principle of strict adherence is justified only in a rare and highly equitable case. Id. 431 P.2d at 791-92. The facts in this case do not present an obvious instance of statutory forfeiture for abandonment and nonuse. Although the Town's leasing of its water right violated the state constitution, it does not follow that the action should work a statutory forfeiture of the Town's water right. The statute provides that a water right ceases when the appropriator ceases to use it. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-4. In this case, the Town did not cease to use the water; instead, it used the water for an unconstitutional purpose. The constitutional violation, however, does not necessarily or logically satisfy the statutory requirements for forfeiture, which are concerned with entirely different policy considerations. The water in this case was continuously applied to a beneficial use from which the Town also benefitted, even though it violated the constitution in acquiring the benefit. [11] Therefore, without modifying our general principle of strict adherence to the statutory sanctions requiring forfeiture for the nonuse of a water right, we affirm the trial court's conclusion that there was no statutory forfeiture of the Town's water rights on the facts of this case. In conclusion, we affirm the trial court's decree to the extent it concludes that (1) the Eskelsens and Norman have no interest in water rights claimed pursuant to Ruby Davis's 1957 notice of diligence claim, and (2) the Eskelsens' 1983 application to appropriate water rights is valid but subject to a senior right in the Town to 1/3 second foot of water and subject to the conditions of the state engineer's memorandum decision dated April 27, 1984. [12] The question of the status of the 1974 application is remanded for a specific factual determination consistent with this opinion. HALL, C.J., HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEWART and ZIMMERMAN, JJ., concur.