Opinion ID: 2977281
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Irrational Classification

Text: Molina argues that § 1502(c), which exempts certain state and local employees from the prohibitions of § 1502(a)(3), creates an unconstitutional classification between first-time electiveoffice seekers and those who already hold elective office. Exempted employees under § 1502(c) include the Governor or Lieutenant Governor of a state, the mayor of a city, “a duly elected head of an executive department of a State or municipality who is not classified under a State or municipal merit or civil-service system,” and “an individual holding elective office.” Thus, exempt employees are elected officials holding a partisan office, while non-exempt employees are those holding appointed positions. If a statutory classification “neither proceeds along suspect lines nor infringes fundamental constitutional rights,” the classification “must be upheld against equal protection challenge if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.” FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993); TriHealth, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, Hamilton County, Ohio, 430 F.3d 783, 790 (6th Cir. 2005). Further, the government “may make reasonable classifications . . . provided the classification is not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious.” Gilday v. Bd. of Elections of Hamilton County, Ohio, 472 F.2d 214, 217 (6th Cir. 1972). As previously discussed, because the right of candidacy is not a fundamental right, the Act does not impinge on Molina’s First Amendment rights. Further, the Hatch Act does not create a suspect classification, such as a classification based on race, gender, or national origin. See Doe v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 490 F.3d 491, 503 (6th Cir. 2007). Accordingly, rational-basis review is appropriate, and Molina must show that no conceivable basis could support the Act’s classification. We agree with the district court that “Congress could have reasonably believed that exempting . . . elected officials from the reach of § 1502(a)(3) was rational, even though the official duties of these types of elected positions involve, in part, the administration of federal funds.” Crespo, 486 F. Supp. 2d at 694. Through § 1503(a)(3), the federal government seeks to eliminate the appearance of partisan influence in the administration of federal funds by politically neutral appointed officials by banning such officials from becoming candidates while serving in their appointed positions. With respect to officials holding elective office, however, restricting candidacy does not eliminate the suggestion of partisan influence because the official is already serving in a partisan office. Thus, although the positions exempted from § 1502(a)(3) might involve the administration of federal funds, prohibiting the officials in those positions from declaring candidacy would not remove the appearance of partisan influence because the elected officials would continue to be partisan officials administering federal funds. The legitimate interest in preventing partisan influence in administering federal funds provides a rational basis for the Act’s classification distinguishing between appointed and elected officials and, accordingly, the Act does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. See Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313.