Opinion ID: 2584054
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The preference of the child's biological parents

Text: Constance and Clark also contend that the trial court attached insufficient weight to the placement preference of the biological parents. They argue that parental preference is an ICWA factor that has previously been given effect by this court in Adoption of N.P.S. [29] and In re Adoption of F.H., [30] but that in those cases the parental preference resulted in the placement of Indian children with non-Indian parents, which they argue cannot be consistent with the purposes of the ICWA. Ruth and John contend that the ICWA states that parental preference is to be considered [w]here appropriate [31] and that Linda's preference was properly given less weight because Linda was a demonstrably incompetent parent with little history of genuine concern for her children's care. A DFYS investigator had testified that Linda had really put [her older] children into emotional turmoil when she told them that she would regain their custody and take them away from their foster parents. This allegedly occurred when Constance and Clark allowed Linda to have unauthorized contact with the children. Constance and Clark reply that we have previously held that the fact of the preference is more significant than the reasoning behind it under the ICWA, [32] and that it is factually unfounded to say that they will give Linda improper access to the children in the future. We agree with the special master that in this case, parental preference does not shed light on what the best living situation for Bernard is and should not overcome the importance of continuity of care. Moreover, Constance and Clark's argument about a policy of ratifying the parental preference only for non-Indian placements is irrelevant to this case, because both parties include a partner who shares Bernard's tribal affiliation. We find no abuse of discretion on this point.