Opinion ID: 1130071
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The PTD Benefits Claim

Text: Unocal argues, in line with the Board's holding, that Meek cannot claim PTD benefits after requesting reemployment benefits. Nothing in the Act, however, implies that an employee must be less than permanently and totally disabled to be eligible for reemployment benefits, nor is it incongruous for an employee who has requested reemployment benefits to claim PTD benefits. The Act defines disability as incapacity because of injury to earn the wages which the employee was receiving at the time of the injury in the same or any other employment. AS 23.30.265(10). We have held that total disability means the inability because of injuries to perform services other than those which are so limited in quality, dependability or quantity that a reasonably stable market for them does not exist. J.B. Warrack Co. v. Roan, 418 P.2d 986, 988 (Alaska 1966). Under the odd-lot doctrine, which we have adopted, `total disability may be found in the case of workers who, while not altogether incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the labor market.' Olson v. AIC/Martin J.V., 818 P.2d 669, 674 (Alaska 1991) (quoting 2 Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation, § 57.51, p. 10-53 (Desk Ed. 1990)). The concept of total disability includes an education component. See Roan, supra; Vetter v. Alaska Workmen's Compensation Bd., 524 P.2d 264, 266 (Alaska 1974) (Factors to be considered in making [a finding that a person's earning capacity was decreased due to a work-related injury] include not only the extent of the injury, but also age, education, employment available in the area for persons with the capabilities in question, and intentions as to employment in the future.). Thus, a person's lack of education, as much as his physical injury, may be the handicap preventing him from obtaining all but odd-lot jobs. See generally 1C Arthur Larson, Workmen's Compensation Law § 57.51(d), p. 10-336 (1994) (A considerable number of the odd-lot cases involve claimants whose adaptability to the new situation created by their physical injury was constricted by lack of mental capacity or education.). If a lack of education can be overcome through vocational rehabilitation, then a disability that was once total may no longer be so. This is precisely what section .041 aims to do; its goal is to retrain and educate permanently impaired employees [1] so that they can attain remunerative employability. [2] Id. Reemployment benefits available under section .041 include on-the-job training, vocational training, academic training, and self-employment. AS 23.30.041(i). Through the rehabilitation process established by section .041, a person suffering from a total disability can gain the skills and education necessary to allow him or her to reenter the job market and attain remunerative employability. As this analysis makes clear, a claim for PTD benefits is not incompatible with a request for reemployment benefits. The Board therefore erred in holding that Meek could not claim PTD benefits after requesting reemployment benefits. [3]
AS 23.30.120(a)(1) [4] establishes a presumption of compensability which places the burden of producing evidence on the employer. Sokolowski v. Golden Lion Hotel, 813 P.2d 286, 292 (Alaska 1991). Unocal argues that AS 23.30.120(a)(1) only creates a presumption that an injury is work-related, and does not apply to an employee's claim that his or her disability fits within a particular category, such as PTD. However, [i]t is well established that the presumption [of compensability] goes far beyond the issue of whether an injury is work-related. Cluff v. Nana-Marriott, 892 P.2d 164, 170 n. 5 (Alaska 1995). We have held that the text of AS 23.30.120(a)(1) indicates that the presumption of compensability is applicable to any claim for compensation under the workers' compensation statute. Municipality of Anchorage v. Carter, 818 P.2d 661, 665 (Alaska 1991) (emphasis added). In Wien Air Alaska v. Kramer, 807 P.2d 471, 474 (Alaska 1991), we applied the presumption of compensability to a temporary total disability claim. We now hold that the pro-worker presumption in AS 23.30.120(a)(1), Nana-Marriott, 892 P.2d at 170, also applies to PTD claims. [5] On remand, the Board should apply the presumption of compensability to Meek's claim. Unocal may rebut the presumption with substantial evidence that Meek is not permanently totally disabled. [6] See Olson, 818 P.2d at 672. If Unocal produces such substantial evidence, the presumption will drop out, and Meek will then have the burden of proving all elements of his PTD claim. [7] Burgess Const. Co. v. Smallwood, 623 P.2d 312, 316 (Alaska 1981).
Unocal argues that once Meek agreed to participate in a reemployment plan, he was limited to receiving interim wages under AS 23.30.041(k). That provision speaks only to the employer's obligations when an employee's PPI benefits are exhausted, and does not limit an employee's benefits exclusively to subsection .041(k) interim wages. See AS 23.30.041(k) (If the employee's permanent impairment benefits are exhausted before the completion or termination of the reemployment plan, the employer shall provide wages equal to 60 percent of the employee's spendable weekly wages but not to exceed $525, until the completion or termination of the plan.). Subsection .041(k) contemplates the payment of other types of benefits during the pendency of a plan. See Id. (providing that an employee receiving TTD benefits before completion of a reemployment plan is entitled to PPI benefits once he or she reaches medical stability). Unocal's argument that Meek is limited to subsection.041(k) interim wages is without merit.