Opinion ID: 2540813
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: appointment of special judge

Text: Appellant filed the present CR 60.02 motion in Madison Circuit Court on January 5, 2005. During the pendency of the case a vacancy occurred on the Madison Circuit Court bench. On September 29, 2008, Chief Senior Status Judge Lambert appointed Senior Status Judge Payne to preside as a special judge over all matters pending before Madison Circuit Court. Judge Payne eventually issued the October 10, 2008 order denying Appellant's motion for post-conviction relief. Appellant alleges that Judge Lambert's appointment of Judge Payne was in violation of Kentucky Constitution § 110(5)(b) because only the Chief Justice of the Kentucky Supreme Court has the authority to appoint a special judge to preside over a particular case under that constitutional provision. ([The Chief Justice] shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the Commonwealth, active or retired, to sit in any court other than the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment necessary for the prompt disposition of causes.). Appellant further alleges that he did not have notice of Judge Payne's appointment to preside over his case until he received the order denying relief, and thus was denied his opportunity to challenge the appointment as provided by KRS 26A.020(1).
We first consider the constitutionality of the appointment by Chief Senior Status Judge Lambert of Judge Payne to preside over the Madison Circuit Court docket, including the present case. We begin by taking judicial notice that on June 27, 2008, Kentucky Supreme Court Chief Justice John Minton entered an order stating as follows: Pursuant to Section 110(5)(b) of the Constitution of Kentucky, and in accord with the orders adopting the Guidelines for the Senior Status Program for Special Judges and the Regional Administration Program Charter, the Honorable Joseph E. Lambert, retired Chief Justice of Kentucky and currently a Senior Status Judge, is hereby appointed as Chief Senior Status Judge for the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The duties and responsibilities of the Chief Senior Status Judge shall include assisting the Chief Justice with the administration and oversight of the Senior Status Program. The Chief Senior Status Judge shall be the designee of the Chief Justice with authority to assign Senior Status Judges or Retired Judges to sit in any court of the Commonwealth except the Supreme Court, and shall be subject to the supervision and complete control of the Chief Justice. This Order shall be effective upon entry, and until further Order. (emphasis added). By its plain terms, the Chief Justice's delegation of authority to Chief Senior Status Judge Lambert was broad, and included the authority to assign Senior Status Judges or Retired Judges to sit in any court of the Commonwealth except the Supreme Court. Accordingly, Judge Lambert's appointment of Judge Payne to preside over this case fell within the authority granted to him in the Chief Justice's commission appointing him to the office. The question is then narrowed to whether the Chief Justice had the authority to delegate his power to appoint Special Judges to sit and preside over cases in the lower courts of the Commonwealth. Kentucky Constitution Section 110(5)(b) gives the Chief Justice the power to delegate this authority. This constitutional provision provides, in relevant part, as follows: (b) The Chief Justice of the Commonwealth shall be the executive head of the Court of Justice and he shall appoint such administrative assistants as he deems necessary. He shall assign temporarily any justice or judge of the Commonwealth, active or retired, to sit in any court other than the Supreme Court when he deems such assignment necessary for the prompt disposition of causes. Id. (emphasis added); see also KRS 26A.020(1). Thus, while the section vests the Chief Justice with the constitutional authority to make appointments of special judges to sit in the lower courts, it also grants him the authority to appoint such administrative assistants as he deems necessary to carry out the functions of his office. The Chief Justice's appointment of a Chief Senior Status Judge as an administrative assistant to assist in the administration of the Senior Status Judge Program, including the appointments of Senior Judges to particular courts or cases, fits comfortably within this constitutional provision. For this reason, we hold that the Chief Justice properly delegated his appointive authority as it relates to the Senior Status Judge Program to Judge Lambert, and Judge Lambert, in turn, properly exercised his authority in appointing Judge Payne to preside over the Madison Circuit Court docket, including the present case.
In connection with this argument, Appellant also argues that because he had no knowledge of Judge Payne's appointment until he received the order denying his [CR 60.02] motion, he did not waive his right to challenge the appointment of Judge Payne as special judge by not objecting earlier. Significantly, Appellant does not allege that Judge Payne did not provide him a fair and impartial review of his CR 60.02 motion. His argument, rather, is limited to his claim that Judge Payne was unconstitutionally appointed to preside over his case. In order to implement the procedures contained in KRS 26A.020(1), reason would dictate that the parties should be notified of the appointment and given the opportunity to object. KRS 26A.020(1) provides as follows: When, from any cause, a judge of any Circuit or District Court fails to attend, or being in attendance cannot properly preside in an action pending in the court, or if a vacancy occurs or exists in the office of circuit or district judge, the circuit clerk shall at once certify the facts to the Chief Justice who shall immediately designate a regular or retired justice or judge of the Court of Justice as special judge. If either party files with the circuit clerk his affidavit that the judge will not afford him a fair and impartial trial, or will not impartially decide an application for a change of venue, the circuit clerk shall at once certify the facts to the Chief Justice who shall immediately review the facts and determine whether to designate a regular or retired justice or judge of the Court of Justice as special judge. Any special judge so selected shall have all the powers and responsibilities of a regular judge of the court. (emphasis added). Nevertheless, [s]ince at least 1860 it has been the rule that objection to one acting as special judge cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 947 S.W.2d 416, 418 (Ky.App. 1997) (citing Vandever v. Vandever, 60 Ky. 137, 138 (3 Mete. 137) (I860)); see also Salyer v. Napier, 21 Ky.L.Rptr. 172, 51 S.W. 10, 11 (1899) (Appellants participated in the trial of the action, filing many pleadings and introducing much proof, and this court will not now for the first time entertain the objection as to the authority of the special judge to render judgment.); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. South East Coal Co., 836 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Ky.1992) (Only after South East Coal Company received an unfavorable opinion did it voice any complaint [regarding the appointment of Special Judge Chenoweth]. We need not provide extensive authority for the proposition that a party must timely object or be deemed to have waived any such objection.). While it is true that the record does not disclose that Appellant received any notice of Judge Payne's appointment as Special Judge until the issuance of the October 10, 2008 order denying his CR 60.02 motion, obviously he at that point did have notice and yet failed to object to the appointment as he was allowed under KRS 26A.020(1) and CR 59. Moreover, in connection with Appellant's notice of appeal, Judge Payne signed the October 30, 2008 order permitting him to proceed in forma pauperis, again without objection. As such, we have doubts about whether Appellant properly preserved the notice issue by objecting to the appointment in the trial court. In any event, Appellant makes no argument that Judge Payne did not provide him a fair and impartial review. His grounds for raising the notice issue are solely directed toward his argument that Judge Payne's appointment was unconstitutional. As reflected above, we have fully considered the constitutional issue as raised by Appellant, and thus he has obtained the relief requested under his lack of notice argumentreview of the constitutionality of the appointment. We thus will not reverse the judgment based merely upon lack of notice prior to entry of the October 10, 2008 order.