Opinion ID: 1454621
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Admission of a Copy of Defendant's Letter to Avette Barrett

Text: (32) The trial court admitted into evidence a copy of a letter sent by defendant to Avette Barrett in early October of 1985 and signed, Your husband, Bruce. The copy was made by jail authorities who reviewed her mail. Barrett destroyed the original. Defendant challenges the trial court's ruling, claiming that the admission of the letter violated the best evidence rule and Evidence Code section 352. Neither contention has merit. Defendant failed to object in the trial court to admission of the letter on best evidence grounds and has, therefore, waived that objection on appeal. (Evid. Code, § 353.) In any event, the objection was not well taken. Evidence Code section 1501 provides that a copy is not made inadmissible if the writing is lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent of the evidence. (Italics added.) The prosecution was the proponent of the evidence. But Barrett destroyed the original of the letter and there is no evidence that the prosecution contributed to her decision to do so. The loss or destruction of an original letter by an inmate addressee does not render a copy inadmissible. ( People v. Garvey (1979) 99 Cal. App.3d 320, 324 [160 Cal. Rptr. 73].) Defendant also argues that a page was missing from the letter, rendering it inadmissible as an altered document under Evidence Code section 1402. As the proponent of the document, the prosecution had the burden of showing its authenticity, including the absence of any material alteration. (Evid. Code, §§ 403, subd. (a)(3), 1400-1402.) The trial court was required to admit the document in evidence if the trier of fact was presented with sufficient evidence to support a finding of authenticity. ( Ibid. ; 2 Jefferson, Cal. Evidence Benchbook (2d ed. 1982) § 30.1, pp. 1049-1051.) There was more than sufficient evidence here. Barrett testified that the prosecution's exhibit was a true and accurate copy of the letter she received and destroyed. Although a handwriting expert acknowledged the possibility of a missing page based on certain features of the letter, Barrett testified that defendant had often written fragmented letters. In short, the trial court was amply justified in rejecting defendant's view that the copy was altered or incomplete. (See Richardson v. Suiter (1946) 74 Cal. App.2d 682, 685 [169 P.2d 252]; Meyer v. Lovdal (1907) 6 Cal. App. 369, 375 [92 P. 322].) Defendant made no Evidence Code section 352 objection to the letter, although he did challenge its relevance. The letter was plainly relevant. Defendant's own handwritten admission that he had killed someone for Barrett with a rock pertains directly to his guilt or innocence. It also contradicts his testimony that Barrett and Eckstrom had killed Van Zandt and his prearraignment statement that he had intended only to knock Van Zandt unconscious. It is true, as defendant observes, that his letter contains references to possible future violent conduct on his part, such as, I'll kill again if I have to, for you, and, if defendant were denied the opportunity to visit Barrett, then someone will get hurt, and I mean that, bad! I've killed once for you, and if I have to I'll do it again!!! And you know that I can  you know that I can, and I don't need a rock to do it with either. But defendant did not argue the potential for prejudice in these portions of the letter or ask the trial court to exise these passages. Therefore, he has waived any appellate challenge by failing to advance a clear and specific ground for objection in the trial court. (Evid. Code, § 353.) Moreover, the allegedly irrelevant references were so intermingled with the probative admissions as to make their excision practically impossible. In nearly every sentence of the letter, defendant combines references to his past killing for Barrett with references to his intention to kill for her in the future. Both sets of references show a strong and continuing motivation for his conduct (i.e., his willingness to kill for Barrett or at her request because of his intense feelings toward her) that might be viewed as contrary to defendant's trial testimony as well as his pretrial statements. Such evidence is pertinent on the issue of intent and for impeachment. We cannot reasonably disallow the use of statements subscribed by defendant himself that go directly to the central issues of who committed the crime and why, merely because defendant was overzealous in expressing his propensity for violence. There was no error in the admission or consideration of the letter. (See, e.g., People v. Thompson (1988) 45 Cal.3d 86, 124-125 [246 Cal. Rptr. 245, 753 P.2d 37]; People v. Hendricks, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 594; People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 111 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].)