Opinion ID: 153004
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Class Members' Disparate Treatment Claim

Text: Disparate treatment claims brought under the ADEA may involve an isolated incident of discrimination against a single individual, or . . . allegations of a `pattern or practice' of discrimination affecting an entire class of individuals. Palmer v. Shultz, 815 F.2d 84, 90 (D.C.Cir.1987). In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843, 52 L.Ed.2d 396 (1977), the Supreme Court created a framework for litigating pattern or practice claims. [5] Pattern or practice cases proceed in two phases. In the initial, or liability, phase of a pattern or practice lawsuit, the analysis focuses on whether unlawful discrimination has been the employer's regular or systemwide pattern or practice. Id. at 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843. In order to make out a prima facie case, the plaintiffs must prove more than the mere occurrence of isolated or `accidental' or sporadic discriminatory acts. Id. They must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that discrimination was the company's standard operating procedure[]the regular rather than the unusual practice. Id. In this phase, the plaintiffs need not show each individual member of the class was a victim of the employer's discriminatory policy, id. at 360, 97 S.Ct. 1843, since proof of the pattern or practice supports an inference that any particular employment decision, during the period in which the discriminatory policy was in force, was made in pursuit of that policy, id. at 362, 97 S.Ct. 1843 (explaining it is presumed that as a member of the class, each plaintiff has been the victim of the discriminatory conduct). Statistical evidence may suffice to establish a prima facie case if the disparities in treatment are significant. See, e.g., Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 578, 592 (D.C.Cir.1987); Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820 F.2d 1293, 1303 (D.C.Cir. 1987). In their amended complaint, the Aliotta plaintiffs alleged a persistent pattern or practice of discrimination spanning almost a decade. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 56-94. The recitation included allegations that remarks made by FDIC management were hostile to older employees as well as allegations that buyout offers and RIFs in 2002, 2003, and 2004 were specifically designed to reduce the number of older employees and that the complete sequence of events showed discrimination against employees over the age of 50 was the regular rather than the unusual practice at FDIC. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336, 97 S.Ct. 1843. It is nonetheless unclear (at least as to their allegations of disparate treatment) the pattern or practice claim survives on appeal because plaintiffs cannot raise on appeal claims they allege in their complaint but abandon at the summary judgment stage, see Road Sprinkler Fitters Local Union No. 669 v. Indep. Sprinkler Corp., 10 F.3d 1563 (11th Cir.1994) (declining to address a claim alleged in the complaint but not raised at summary judgment); Self Directed Placement Corp. v. Control Data Corp., 908 F.2d 462, 466 (9th Cir.1990) (same); see also Edmond v. U.S. Postal Serv., 949 F.2d 415, 422 (D.C.Cir. 1991) (stating that while [t]here is no bright-line rule to determine whether a matter has been properly raised in moving papers, . . . when a plaintiff's opposition is less than paradigmatic, . . . the question becomes one of sufficiency, i.e., whether in light of the policies behind the rule of waiver plaintiff sufficiently raised the issue below so that waiver should not apply). In their motion for partial summary judgment, class members focus only on the 2004-05 buyout and point to no policies or other employment decisions targeting or adversely affecting older employees. See Pls.' Summ. J. Mem. at 1-4, Aliotta v. Bair, No. 05-02325 (D.D.C. Feb.25, 2008). Nor do they argue there is a material dispute concerning an intentional pattern or practice of discrimination. More significantly, FDIC challenged the disparate treatment claim and argued it should be analyzed under the McDonnell Douglas framework applicable to individual discrimination claims, not the Teamsters framework, and class members' opposition did not dispute the Agency's position. See Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 22; Pls.' Opp'n. at 29 (citing Teamsters only once and for a general proposition applicable to both individual and pattern or practice claims); see, e.g., Muhammad v. Giant Food Inc., 108 Fed.Appx. 757, 764 (4th Cir.2004) (explaining a passing reference to pattern or practice allegations in plaintiffs' responses to defendant's summary judgment motions and a failure even to cite Teamsters were insufficient to preserve plaintiffs' arguments that Teamsters applied to their claims). The forfeiture debate seems largely beside the point. The class members' singular focus on the Teamsters analysis appears to hinge on a distinction without a difference. Once a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the employer to rebut the inference of discrimination by showing the employees' proof is either inaccurate or insignificant. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 360, 97 S.Ct. 1843. Failure to rebut the inference moves a pattern and practice case to the remedial stage where each class member must show individual harm. Id. at 361-62, 97 S.Ct. 1843. However, as we explain below, class members' flawed statistical evidence is fatal to their claims under either framework since it fails to establish any adverse effect on older employees. See Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1274 (D.C.Cir.1984) (noting plaintiffs' statistics must show a disparity of treatment, eliminate the most common nondiscriminatory explanations of the disparity, and thus permit the inference that, absent other explanation, the disparity more likely than not resulted from illegal discrimination). Under our decision in Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490, 493 (D.C.Cir.2008), at the summary judgment stage, once [an] employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason [for its challenged decision], the question whether the employee actually made out a prima facie case is `no longer relevant' and thus `disappear[s]' and `drops out of the picture.' See id. at 494 (explaining that once an employer asserts a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation, the district court need not and should not  decide whether the plaintiff actually made out a prima facie case); id. (describing the prima facie case at the summary judgment stage as a largely unnecessary sideshow); see also Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670, 678 (D.C.Cir.2009) (explaining `the question whether the employee made out a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework `is almost always irrelevant' because `by the time the district court considers an employer's motion for summary judgment . . . the employer ordinarily will have asserted a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged decision''). Thus, once an employer has submitted admissible evidence of a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its decision, any distinction between the burden-shifting frameworks becomes immaterial to the success of a discrimination case. Under either framework, the only relevant question is whether [the plaintiff] produced evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that the employer's stated reason was not the actual reason and that the employer intentionally discriminated against [the employee]. Brady, 520 F.3d at 495. Nonetheless, while Brady held that in an individual discrimination case, an employer's mere assertion of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation renders the question whether the plaintiff made out a prima facie case almost always irrelevant, id. at 493, our decision in Segar v. Smith requires more from an employer in a pattern or practice case. See Segar, 738 F.2d at 1269-70 (explaining that because the plaintiffs' initial offer of evidence [in a pattern or practice case] will have been so strong . . . the bare articulation of a nondiscriminatory explanation will not suffice to rebut it). Under Segar, in a pattern or practice case, the strength of the evidence sufficient to meet [an employer's] rebuttal burden will typically need to be much higher than the strength of the evidence sufficient to rebut an individual plaintiff's low-threshold McDonnell Douglas showing. Id. The Segar court, however, acknowledged that if an employer accused of a pattern or practice of discrimination satisfies its heightened rebuttal burden, the plaintiffs' prima facie case, as under Brady, becomes irrelevant. See id. at 1273 n. 20 (explaining that `[w]here the defendant has done everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant' since the district court `has before it all the evidence it needs [to make the ultimate determination]' (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 715, 103 S.Ct. 1478, 75 L.Ed.2d 403 (1983))); id. at 1270 n. 15 (noting that class actions often can be viewed as collapsing the prima facie and pretext stages of a suit involving an individual plaintiff); id. at 1267 (How far [the] prima facie showing will carry the plaintiff toward its ultimate burden of persuasion depends on both the strength of the plaintiffs' evidence and the nature of the defendant's response.). Because FDIC has done more than simply assert a nondiscriminatory explanation for the challenged actionsit also submitted evidence demonstrating that class members' statistics, after excluding the voluntary buyouts, failed to show even an insignificant disparity between older and younger employees Segar does not preclude us from applying the rule set forth in Brady. In Segar, the court concluded the rebuttal of the employer, the federal Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), failed as a matter of law because DEA submitted no admissible evidence to support its purported nondiscriminatory explanation. Id. at 1287-88. Here, FDIC sought to rebut class members' prima facie case in two ways. First, the Agency offered a legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for the RIF: it implemented the RIF to respond to decreased workload in DRR due to the improved health of the banking industry and to improve the Agency's responsiveness and efficiency. See Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. at 28. Unlike the employer in Segar, who presented no admissible evidence supporting its nondiscriminatory justification, FDIC submitted numerous communications between Agency officials and employees explaining its nondiscriminatory reasons for the RIF. See, e.g., E-mail from DRR Director Mitchell Glassman to DRR Employees (Aug. 19, 2004) (stating [r]ecord profitability and capital in the banking industry, [i]ndustry consolidation, [e]merging technology, and improved business processes had led to a declining workload and excess staff and would require some difficult decisions regarding the size and structure of DRR); E-mail from FDIC Chief Operating Officer John Bovenzi to FDIC Employees (Oct. 26, 2004) (explaining a RIF in certain divisions would likely be necessary since staffing levels [were] not justified by current or projected workloads). Class members did not, at the summary judgment stage, and have not, on appeal, pointed to any evidence refuting FDIC's claim the RIF targeted DRR because of the division's reduced workload caused by improved conditions in the banking industry. See Aliotta, 576 F.Supp.2d at 125. FDIC's rebuttal also included an attack on class members' statistical methodology. FDIC argued the buyout employees should not be included in class members' disparate impact analysis and submitted reports from its own statistical expert refuting their methodology, see Jeanneret Report at 6, 24; Jeanneret Rebuttal at 9-11. Unlike DEA's attack on the plaintiffs' statistical proof in Segar, 738 F.2d at 1272, FDIC's alternative statistical analysis demonstrated class members' statistics could not support an inference of discrimination. See Aliotta, 576 F.Supp.2d at 123 & n. 4, 125-26, 127-28 (holding the voluntary buyouts could not comprise any part of the employees' case and that, without the buyouts, the employees could show no adverse impact on older employees). FDIC satisfied its rebuttal burden, and class members' prima facie case is therefore irrelevant. In order for class members to succeed on their disparate treatment claims, they must have produced evidence sufficient to demonstrate FDIC's nondiscriminatory reason for the RIF was pretext and that FDIC intentionally discriminated against older workers. See Brady, 520 F.3d at 494. Neither class members' statistical nor their non-statistical evidence is sufficient. See infra Sections IV, V.