Opinion ID: 793418
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Defendants' Use of Force Against Rick Cortez

Text: 43 We take Plaintiffs' allegations as true, and view the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, as we must in reviewing the district court's denial of qualified immunity. See Thornton v. City of Macon, 132 F.3d 1395 (11th Cir.1998). It appears that Defendants (1) grabbed Rick Cortez by the arm and pulled him from the doorway of his home; (2) handcuffed him; and (3) placed him in the back seat of a locked squad car—all in the middle of the night. 44 As we discussed above, when Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true, it appears that Rick Cortez was arrested. See Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626, 631, 123 S.Ct. 1843, 155 L.Ed.2d 814 (2003) (A . . . boy was awakened . . . at three in the morning by at least three police officers. . . . He was taken out in handcuffs, without shoes, dressed only in his underwear in January, placed in a patrol car, driven to the scene of a crime and then to the sheriff's offices, where he was taken into an interrogation room and questioned. This evidence points to arrest. . . .); Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 212-13, 99 S.Ct. 2248, 60 L.Ed.2d 824 (1979) (describing a situation where an individual was, inter alia, taken from a neighbor's home to a police car as analogous to an arrest). 45 Because it also appears, when the evidence is construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, that Defendants lacked probable cause for this arrest, we held above that Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' claim that Rick Cortez was seized unreasonably. Our holding on qualified immunity does not resolve conclusively the question of whether Rick Cortez was seized unreasonably, however, for that is a question that must be decided after adversarial testing of Plaintiffs' allegations. Indeed, such adversarial testing might result in a determination that Rick Cortez was (1) unreasonably arrested; (2) unreasonably subjected to an investigative detention; (3) reasonably arrested; or (4) reasonably subjected to an investigative detention. 46 This range of potential outcomes complicates our analysis of whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez, because under each potential outcome on the seizure issue the analysis of whether Plaintiffs have established that Defendants' use of force violated Rick Cortez's rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments differs slightly. While the nature of the inquiry does not differ, see Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865, the benchmark for what is reasonable does differ. But cf. United States v. Merritt, 695 F.2d 1263, 1274 (10th Cir.1982). This is in part because police have historically been able to use more force in making an arrest than in effecting an investigative detention. Cf. United States v. Perdue, 8 F.3d 1455, 1464 (10th Cir.1993) ([H]istorically, the maximum level of force permissible in a standard Terry stop fell short of placing the suspect in `custody' for purposes of triggering Miranda. ). We analyze the excessive force issue under each potential outcome in turn. 47
48 Assuming for the sake of argument that Rick Cortez was subjected to either an otherwise unreasonable arrest or an otherwise unreasonable investigative detention— that is, an arrest unsupported by probable cause or an investigative detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion— Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez should not survive Defendants' summary judgment motion because Plaintiffs could not recover separately on an excessive force claim. Thus, it appears that the district court erred by denying Defendants' summary judgment on these grounds. See (Aplt.App.190.) (If there was no legal justification to detain Plaintiffs in the first place . . . the County Defendants cannot rely on . . . authorities [stating that officers may use force to effect a legal arrest or investigative detention] to justify their use of force in effecting that detention.). 49 The district court is not the only court to have suggested that any force used in effecting an unlawful seizure is per se excessive. See Schiller v. Strangis, 540 F.Supp. 605, 617 (D.Mass.1982) ([T]he use of force occurred during commission of other constitutional violations, including an unlawful arrest, an unlawful entry into the home, and unlawful searches of plaintiff's person, wallet, and car. In the circumstances of this case, the use of any force by [the law enforcement officer] was excessive since the arrest and the searches were themselves unlawful.). 50 The Eleventh Circuit, however, has taken a different approach, noting that a claim that any force in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in the illegal stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive force claim. Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir.2000). This is because if a stop or arrest is illegal, then there is no basis for any threat or any use of force, and an excessive force claim would always arise but only collaterally from the illegal stop or arrest claim. Id.; see also Williamson v. Mills, 65 F.3d 155, 158-59 (11th Cir.1995) (per curiam). 14 51 Under the Eleventh Circuit's approach, a plaintiff may not recover on an independent excessive force claim merely because force was applied during an unlawful seizure. See Motes v. Myers, 810 F.2d 1055, 1059 (11th Cir.1987) (stating that [i]t is obvious that if the jury finds the arrest unconstitutional, the use of force and the search were unconstitutional and they become elements of damages for the § 1983 violation). If force was applied during a lawful seizure, however, a plaintiff may recover on an independent excessive force claim. See Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1197 (11th Cir.2002) (Once summary judgment is granted in [the officer]'s favor on the wrongful arrest claim, [the plaintiff]'s claim that the officer used excessive force must be analyzed independently.). 52 We find the Eleventh Circuit's approach persuasive. Any force that law enforcement officers apply in order to effect a seizure is, by definition, excessive if the seizure is unlawful. Therefore, when an excessive force claim rests solely on an allegation that the force was excessive because the underlying seizure itself was unlawful the excessive force claim is derivative: it necessarily exists as a result of the unlawful seizure, and does not constitute a separate claim for relief. To permit a jury to award damages on both claims individually would allow a plaintiff to receive double the award for essentially the same claims. Moreover, it would be nearly impossible for a jury to apportion damages between an unlawful seizure claim and an excessive force claim, when the excessive force claim is based solely on the unlawfulness of the seizure. Therefore, it is most proper to allow no more than one recovery under such circumstances, with the level of force used in effecting the unlawful seizure playing a role in the calculation of damages for that seizure. 53 Thus, in this case, if Rick Cortez was subjected to an unlawful arrest or an unlawful investigative detention, Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez should not survive Defendants' summary judgment motion because Plaintiffs could not independently recover on that excessive force claim.
54 Assuming for the sake of argument that Rick Cortez was subjected to an otherwise lawful arrest—that is, an arrest supported by probable cause—Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez should not survive Defendants' summary judgment motion because Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that Defendants' use of force against Rick Cortez could be considered excessive in the context of a lawful arrest. 55 Rick Cortez was suspected of committing a violent felony, a severe crime. Cf. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. As we discuss more fully below, Rick Cortez does not appear to have posed an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, or to have been attempting to resist or evade arrest, cf. id., but the force used by Defendants nonetheless was not excessive if the underlying arrest was supported by probable cause. After all, when arresting a person suspected of committing a violent felony, law enforcement officers generally may (1) grab the arrestee by the arm; (2) handcuff him or her; and (3) place him or her in the back seat of a locked squad car—all without the force used being excessive, whether the actions are undertaken at night or during the day. Cf. Soares v. State of Conn., 8 F.3d 917, 921 (2d Cir.1993) ([H]andcuffing will be the reasonable course in many, if not most arrest situations.. . .); Rodriguez v. Farrell, 280 F.3d 1341, 1351 (11th Cir.2002) (The evidence, in the light most favorable to plaintiff, shows that [the officer] grabbed plaintiff's arm, twisted it around plaintiff's back, jerking it up high to the shoulder and then handcuffed plaintiff. . . . Plaintiff was placed in the rear of [the officer]'s patrol car, kept handcuffed behind his back and transported to the police station. The handcuffs were removed minutes after arrival at the police department. The handcuffing technique used by [the officer] is a relatively common and ordinarily accepted non-excessive way to detain an arrestee.). 15 56 Moreover, the precise manner in which Defendants undertook these actions does not support Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez. Plaintiffs do not criticize the manner in which Defendants grabbed Rick Cortez's arm or the manner in which Defendants placed Rick Cortez in the back of the squad car. Cf. Thornton, 132 F.3d at 1398 (addressing excessive force claim based on officers' grabbing the plaintiff on his arms and around his neck, throwing the plaintiff to the floor, handcuffing him, picking him up by his arms, and dragging him outside to throw him into a police car). 57 Plaintiffs allege that Defendants used excessive force in applying handcuffs too tightly to Rick Cortez. The record, however, presents little evidence of any damage to Rick Cortez's wrists. The only evidence of damages in the record is his affidavit that the handcuffing left red marks that were visible for days afterward. (Aplt.App. at 88.) This is insufficient, as a matter of law, to allege excessive force if the use of handcuffs is otherwise justified. Cf. Hannula v. Lakewood, 907 F.2d 129, 132 (10th Cir. 1990) (upholding—under a substantive due process standard, rather than a Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard— a grant of qualified immunity to officers accused of fastening handcuffs too tightly on a plaintiff when there was no evidence of contusions, lacerations or damage to the bones or nerves of her wrists . . . . [and][t]he evidence establishe[d] nothing more than that the handcuffing caused her pain). But cf. Lambert v. City of Dumas, 187 F.3d 931 (8th Cir.1999). 16 58 Indeed, neither the fact that Defendants took certain actions, nor the manner in which Defendants took those actions, appears problematic in connection with an otherwise lawful arrest. Therefore, if Rick Cortez was lawfully arrested, Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez should not survive Defendants' summary judgment motion because, even taking Plaintiffs' allegations as true and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs, Plaintiffs have not established that Defendants' use of force against Rick Cortez violated Rick Cortez's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force. In other words, the Defendants would be entitled to qualified immunity on Rick Cortez's excessive force claim.
59 Assuming for the sake of argument that Rick Cortez's seizure is determined to be only a lawful investigative detention, Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez should survive Defendants' summary judgment motion. When Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that Defendants' use of force against Rick Cortez violated Rick Cortez's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force in the context of an investigative detention, and this right was clearly established at the time of Defendants' actions. 60 Since police officers should not be required to take unnecessary risks in performing their duties, they are `authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect their personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of a Terry stop.' Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1462 (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235, 105 S.Ct. 675, 83 L.Ed.2d 604 (1985)) (alterations omitted). While Terry stops generally must be fairly nonintrusive, officers may take necessary steps to protect themselves if the circumstances reasonably warrant such measures. Id.; see also Gallegos v. City of Colorado Springs, 114 F.3d 1024, 1030-31 (10th Cir.1997) (As long as the precautionary measures employed by officers during a Terry stop are reasonable, they will be permitted without a showing of probable cause. In determining whether the precautionary measures were reasonable, the standard is objective—would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.) (quotations, citations, and alteration omitted). 61 In many cases, law enforcement officers effecting an investigative detention permissibly may grab a free citizen by the arm. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 7, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (upholding officer's grabbing of suspect based only on reasonable suspicion). In a significantly smaller set of cases, officers may also handcuff the citizen and place him in the back seat of a locked squad car. As we noted in Perdue, a number of courts of appeals, including the Tenth Circuit, have determined that officers' use of handcuffs or ordering suspects to the ground during a Terry stop does not necessarily turn a lawful Terry stop into an arrest. Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463; see United States v. Merkley, 988 F.2d 1062, 1064 (10th Cir.1993). [W]hen circumstances reasonably indicate that the suspects are armed and dangerous, courts have been willing to rely on the `officer safety' rationale of Terry and authorize the use of handcuffs, the placing of suspects in police cruisers, the drawing of weapons, and other measures of force more traditionally associated with the concepts of `custody' and `arrest' than with `brief investigatory detention.' Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1464. 62 In this case, Defendants' grabbing Rick Cortez by the arm is not problematic for excessive force purposes. See Gallegos, 114 F.3d at 1030 (We believe [an officer]'s actions were reasonably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the stop. [The officer] grabbed [the plaintiff]'s arm in an effort to briefly detain [the plaintiff] and confirm or dispel his suspicions. Although [the officer] grabbed [the plaintiff's] arm three separate times, his actions consisted of a relatively minor application of force that did not exceed the amount allowable under the circumstances.); Smith v. City of New Haven, 166 F.Supp.2d 636, 643 (D.Conn.2001) (granting an officer qualified immunity from a plaintiff's excessive force claim because the officer had merely placed his arm on the plaintiff as he escorted the plaintiff to the police car). Defendants' handcuffing Rick Cortez and placing him in the back seat of a locked squad car is, however, more troubling. 63 There is no indication in the record that Rick Cortez actively resisted seizure or attempted to evade seizure by flight. Cf. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865. Rick Cortez opened the door of his residence to police voluntarily. (Aplt.App.96.) Although Rick Cortez briefly asked Defendants what was going on before complying with their commands by moving to exit his residence, this does not amount to resistance. (Aplt.App.87.) Rick Cortez was cooperating with Defendants, which suggests that Defendants did not need to use force beyond that traditionally used in a Terry stop in order to effectuate the purpose of the stop. Cf. United States v. Patterson, 648 F.2d 625, 633 (9th Cir.1981) (Proscription of excessive force is merely the corollary to our holding that an `officer attempting to make an investigatory detention may properly display some force when it becomes apparent that an individual will not otherwise comply with his request to stop.') (quoting United States v. Thompson, 558 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 1977)). 64 Nor is there any indication in the record that Rick Cortez posed an immediate threat to the safety of Defendants or others. Cf. Muehler, 125 S.Ct. at 1470-71 (terming inherently dangerous circumstances in which a warrant authorizes a search for weapons and a wanted gang member resides on the premises); Perdue, 8 F.3d at 1463 (In the present case, the officers were justified in displaying some force. The officers knew that guns were found on the property where marijuana was being cultivated. This fact alone justifies any concern the officers had for their personal safety.). For example, there is no evidence in the record to support a reasonable suspicion that Rick Cortez was armed. (Aplt.App.87.) (I went to the front door, wearing only shorts. . . .). 65 Defendants argue that officer safety concerns informed their treatment of Rick Cortez. It is established that: 66 Whatever might qualify as reasons of safety and security. . . the requisite justification cannot rest upon bald assertions. . . that law enforcement officers were in fact prompted to act on such reasons. 67 United States v. Acosta-Colon, 157 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir.1998); see also Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir.1991) (Material factual disputes cannot be resolved at summary judgment based on conflicting affidavits. To come within the protection of this rule, however, the nonmovant's affidavits must be based upon personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence; conclusory and self-serving affidavits are not sufficient.) (footnote and citation in original omitted). In this case, the government has failed to explain what threat one man wearing only shorts posed to the four armed law enforcement officers who detained him outside his home in the middle of the night. 68 Therefore, if Rick Cortez was lawfully subjected to an investigative detention, when Plaintiffs' allegations are taken as true, Plaintiffs have established that Defendants' use of force against Rick Cortez violated Rick Cortez's Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force because that use of force was not reasonable under the circumstances. In addition to being a violation of Rick Cortez's constitutional right, the right to be free from excessive force during an investigative detention was clearly established at the time that Defendants seized Rick Cortez, for Perdue and Gallegos are on point and were decided well before that time. See Medina, 960 F.2d at 1498. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez should survive Defendants' summary judgment motion if Rick Cortez was subjected to an investigative detention. 69 Based on the foregoing analysis, it is apparent that there is but one way that Rick Cortez could recover damages on the basis of a discrete excessive force claim. That is the situation where it is determined that (1) Rick Cortez's seizure was an investigative detention, and not an arrest; (2) the investigative detention was justified on the basis of articulable suspicion; and (3) the force used to accomplish the investigative detention was excessive. There is evidence in the summary judgment record before us that would authorize all three of these findings if the case were to proceed to trial. Accordingly, summary judgment for Defendants against Rick Cortez on his excessive force claim is not justified. We therefore affirm the district court's denial of summary judgment to Defendants as to Plaintiffs' claim that Defendants used excessive force against Rick Cortez. 70