Opinion ID: 163773
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the Eighth Amendment Right Was Clearly Established

Text: 35 We next turn to the issue whether Smith has met her burden of showing that the violation of her Eighth Amendment right was clearly established. Harrington, 268 F.3d at 1186. In showing that the law was clearly established, the plaintiff does not have to show that the specific action at issue had been held unlawful, but that the alleged unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct must be apparent in light of preexisting law. Armijo v. Wagon Mound Public Schools, 159 F.3d 1253, 1260 (10th Cir.1998). In other words, [t]he contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. Id. A plaintiff may meet the burden of making this showing by pointing to a Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit opinion on point, or that his or her proposition is supported by the weight of authority from other courts. However, we do not require plaintiffs to produce a factually identical case, but allow some degree of generality in factual correspondence. Id. 36 It is clearly established that prison guards employed by the state can be liable under the Eighth Amendment for using excessive force against prisoners in the form of sexual abuse. See Barney, 143 F.3d at 1310 (Clearly plaintiffs' deprivations resulting from the sexual assaults are sufficiently serious to constitute a violation under the Eighth Amendment.); Hovater, 1 F.3d at 1068 (stating that an inmate has a constitutional right to be secure in her bodily integrity and free from attack by prison guards). In determining what state employees may act as prison guards, we employ a common-sense, self-evident definition: prison guards include those government employees who have among their official responsibilities supervisory or custodial responsibilities for prisoners. Indeed, Cochran himself equates the role of prison guard generally with being a prisoner's custodian, and he says that [a]s an inmate, Smith had a constitutional right under the Eighth Amendment to be protected by her custodian.  Aplt. B. at 10 (emphasis in original). 37 Moreover, persons to whom the state delegates its penological functions, which include the custody and supervision of prisoners, can be held liable for violations of the Eighth Amendment. Cf. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 299, 86 S.Ct. 486, 15 L.Ed.2d 373 (1966) ([W]hen private individuals or groups are endowed by the State with powers or functions governmental in nature, they become agencies or instrumentalities of the State and subject to its constitutional limitations.); West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 57, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988) (holding that a private doctor treating prisoners under a contract with state prison authorities acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit alleging Eighth Amendment violation); Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399, 412-13, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997) (holding that prison guards employed by a private prison are not entitled to qualified immunity from suits under § 1983, but that whether the private defendants acted under color of state law in violation of § 1983 was a matter to be determined by the district court); Dellis v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 257 F.3d 508, 512 (6th Cir.2001) (holding that plaintiff adequately stated claim under Eighth Amendment against a private prison and personnel employed there); Skelton v. Pri-Cor, Inc., 963 F.2d 100, 102 (6th Cir.1991) (holding that a private prison under contract with state acted under color of state law for purposes of § 1983 suit alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment); Ancata v. Prison Health Svcs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that a private medical service responsible for treating state prisoners engaged in state action subjecting it to suit under § 1983 because it performed a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state); Mauldin v. Burnette, 89 F.Supp.2d 1371, 1376 (M.D.Ga.2000) (holding the defendant, a private person to whom plaintiff, a prisoner, was entrusted on work release, potentially liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations because defendant was authorized by [the county]. . . to sign an inmate out of jail, supervise him throughout the week, maintain discretion and authority over his actions and behavior, and then return him to . . . jail [and that] all of these actions are custodial in nature). In his supervisory position over Smith, Cochran acted as the functional equivalent of a prison guard. He was an employee of the state who, pursuant to a contract with the Department of Corrections, was responsible for administering the conditions of Smith's confinement during her work day at the Northside center. Under the contract with the Department of Corrections, DPS was required to enforce the rules of conduct for prisoners and report violations, and at the time of the alleged sexual abuse, Cochran was the only DPS supervisor present at the Northside center. We hold that because Smith acted as the functional equivalent of a prison guard by virtue of the penological responsibility delegated to the DPS by the state, the alleged unlawfulness of the defendant's conduct [was] . . . apparent in light of preexisting law. Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1260. 5