Opinion ID: 626354
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Companion's Cross-Appeal

Text: Companion cross-appeals the district court's order declining to amend the judgment to impose an award of prejudgment interest on a portion of the damages, as well as the original judgment so unamended. The jury awarded Companion a total of $1,043,509 in contract damages, [23] an amount greater than Companion had argued it suffered in lost profits. The district court therefore imposed prejudgment interest only on the portion of the award that Companion had requested, or a total of $957,429. [24] Companion moved to amend the judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(a), which allows a district court to correct a clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission whenever one is found in a judgment, order, or other part of the record. A Rule 60(a) motion may only be granted where the judgment failed to reflect the court's intention. Bowen Inv., Inc. v. Carneiro Donuts, Inc., 490 F.3d 27, 29 (1st Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, Companion argues that Massachusetts state law provides for prejudgment interest on the full amount of damages awarded. See Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6C. However, the district court found that the damages awarded above and beyond the lost profits requested amounted to an award for attorney's fees, and therefore intentionally awarded prejudgment interest on only part of the award. The district court's determination that Companion was not entitled to prejudgment interest on damages above and beyond the amount requested for lost profits was a deliberate choice of the district judge reflect[ing] an interpretation of law which, even if erroneous, cannot be corrected under Rule 60(a). Elias v. Ford Motor Co., 734 F.2d 463, 466 (1st Cir.1984). However, although styled as a motion under Rule 60(a), a post-judgment motion made within ten days of the entry of judgment that questions the correctness of a judgment is properly construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). Global Naps, Inc. v. Verizon New Eng., Inc., 489 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir.2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore consider the motion to have been filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) and review the district court's denial for abuse of discretion, reversing only where the original judgment evidenced a manifest error of law . . . or in certain other narrow situations. Id. We also review the district court's determination regarding the award of prejudgment interest in the initial judgment for abuse of discretion, but legal issues relating to the prejudgment interest award are reviewed de novo. Analysis Grp., Inc. v. Cent. Fla. Inv., Inc., 629 F.3d 18, 24 (1st Cir.2010). Under Massachusetts law, in most circumstances, prejudgment interest is not awarded for attorney's fees, even where the attorney's fees are provided for in a contract. See Interstate Brands Corp. v. Lily Transp. Corp., 256 F.Supp.2d 58, 63 & n. 3 (D.Mass.2003) (noting that Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 231, § 6C does not impose prejudgment interest where attorneys' fees . . . are not really an element of `damages' flowing from breach but rather an additional right of recovery incident to that breach which vests when a party successfully takes action to enforce its rights). This is exactly the situation which presents itself here, and is in contrast to a context where, for example, an insurance company violates a contract based on its failure to perform its duty to defend, such that attorney's fees are part and parcel of `damages' for breach of contract. Id. at 63 (citing Sterilite Corp. v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 397 Mass. 837, 494 N.E.2d 1008 (1986)). Because the district court considered the damages awarded in excess of the amount demanded by Companion to be attorney's fees, there was no error of law in declining to award prejudgment interest on that portion of the award, and therefore no abuse of discretion. We decline to disturb the ruling of the district court on prejudgment interest.