Opinion ID: 2799555
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Washington’s Case

Text: Washington argues that the mistrial was not supported by manifest necessity, and thus, his retrial would result in a double jeopardy violation. According to Washington, any premature deliberations regarding Birch’s testimony likely constituted only a brief departure from the “proper process for jury decisionmaking,” and the district court’s stated willingness to proceed with the recall of Birch contradicted the finding that the deliberations had been irreparably corrupted. 8 Case: 14-15219 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 Page: 9 of 11 Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Washington’s motion to dismiss the indictment based on double jeopardy grounds because there was sufficient justification, in the record as a whole, for finding that a mistrial was a manifest necessity. 3 While the record does not indicate the extent to which the jurors actually had deliberated among themselves about the government’s case, the jurors’ discussion of Birch’s testimony and his manner of speaking constituted premature discussions on some level. And a district court is undoubtedly vested with broad discretion to determine that a mistrial is manifestly necessary when faced with internal trial errors, such as those caused by premature deliberations. See Dominguez, 226 F.3d at 1246-47. Moreover, it is clear from the record that the district court also took time to consider the issue, inquired of the parties’ positions, and carefully considered potential alternatives to mistrial. But there were problems with each of the alternatives proposed by the parties. While it may well have been permissible for the district court to allow the government to recall Birch, the district court cannot be faulted for honoring a defendant’s objection to the recall. Furthermore, any of the potential options, short of declaring a mistrial, would have required the district 3 Although disputed by the parties, it is unnecessary to parse the exact amount of discretion accorded to each reason articulated by the district court for its decision. We look to the record as a whole in determining whether the district court properly found that a mistrial was a manifest necessity. See Therve, 764 F.3d at 1298. 9 Case: 14-15219 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 Page: 10 of 11 court to proceed with the case when at least six of the jurors had engaged in premature discussions. See United States v. Yonn, 702 F.2d 1341, 1345 n.1 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Any discussion among jurors of a case prior to formal deliberations certainly endangers that jury’s impartiality.”). There is no doubt that Washington has a strong interest in having his case decided by his chosen jury. But that right cannot predominate over the public interest in a fair determination of the case, particularly where only one witness had testified and there is no indication that Washington would have been particularly inconvenienced by the mistrial. See Therve, 764 F.3d at 1298 (explaining that “district courts are permitted to declare a mistrial and discharge a jury only where, taking all the circumstances into consideration, there is a manifest necessity for the act, or the ends of public justice would otherwise be defeated”) (quotation marks omitted). Finally, Washington’s two procedural arguments are without merit. First, the district court did not err by failing to specifically address Washington’s right to have his case decided by a single jury panel, or by failing to expressly find a mistrial to be a manifest necessity until the mistrial already had been declared. See Washington, 434 U.S. at 516-17, 98 S. Ct. at 836 (holding that a district court is not required to make a specific finding of manifest necessity or “articulate on the 10 Case: 14-15219 Date Filed: 05/08/2015 Page: 11 of 11 record all the factors which informed the deliberate exercise of [its] discretion[,]” as long as the record as a whole provides sufficient justification for the ruling). Second, the district court’s failure to inquire further into the exact extent of the premature deliberations did not constitute reversible error, in light of the record as a whole. See United States v. LaSpesa, 956 F.2d 1027, 1033 (11th Cir. 1992) (stating that a district court possesses broad discretion to determine the appropriate method of investigation when faced with an allegation of juror misconduct).