Opinion ID: 2615014
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Ethical Standard for Frivolous Suits

Text: On appeal, respondent's first attack against all the counts alleging violations of E.R. 3.1 is that the commission incorrectly applied a subjective standard in determining that various claims were frivolous, rather than an objective standard of the reasonableness of his legal theories. E.R. 3.1 provides: A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. The Code Comparison to the rule notes that the test in E.R. 3.1 is an objective test. However, the Comment to E.R. 3.1 also provides: The action is frivolous, however, if the client desires to have that action taken primarily for the purpose of harassing or maliciously injuring a person or if the lawyer is unable to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. (Emphasis added.) Thus, although the objective reasonableness of a legal claim is the standard to determine whether it is frivolous under E.R. 3.1, the rule also requires a subjective good faith motive by the client [4] and a subjective good faith argument by the lawyer. See, e.g., In re Mulhall, 170 Ariz. 152, 153, 822 P.2d 947, 948 (1992) (counterclaim filed in bad faith establishes a violation of ER 3.1). Therefore, if an improper motive or a bad faith argument exists, respondent will not escape ethical responsibility for bringing a legal claim that may otherwise meet the objective test of a non-frivolous claim. In the context of civil sanctions, we have similarly utilized an objective test to determine whether an appeal is frivolous under Rule 25, Arizona Rules of Civil Appellate Procedure: [5] if the issues raised are supportable by any reasonable legal theory, or if a colorable legal argument is presented about which reasonable attorneys could differ, the argument is not objectively frivolous. See Arizona Tax Research Ass'n v. Department of Revenue, 163 Ariz. 255, 258-59, 787 P.2d 1051, 1054-55 (1989). However, under Rule 25 this objective definition of frivolous applies only [a]bsent an allegation of improper motive. Id. at 258, 787 P.2d at 1054. In imposing sanctions pursuant to Rule 25, our courts have analogized the Rule 25 duty to the duty under E.R. 3.1 to avoid claims for which there is no justification. See Johnson v. Brimlow, 164 Ariz. 218, 222, 791 P.2d 1101, 1105 (App. 1990). Similarly, Rule 11 of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure requires that [e]very pleading, motion, and other paper be certified that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law, or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; and that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. Rule 11(a), Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure (emphasis added). The objective standard of Rule 11 is analogous to the standard of E.R. 3.1. See, e.g., Smith v. Lucia, 173 Ariz. 290, 842 P.2d 1303 (App. 1992). Thus, a common theme in both our procedural and ethical rules is the examination of whether a claim is frivolous by considering both the objective legal reasonableness of the theory and the subjective motive of the proponent of the claim. Moreover, under the American Bar Association's Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions (1986) ( Standards ), a respondent cannot be suspended for violating E.R. 3.1 except upon a finding that he  knows that he is violating a court order or rule. Standards, Standard 6.22 at 42 (emphasis added). Knowledge is defined in the Standards as the conscious awareness of the nature or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose to accomplish a particular result. Standards, Definitions at 17. One commentary has analyzed this knowing requirement in relation to the previously quoted good faith argument requirement of E.R. 3.1: Although good faith argument is not a self-defining term, it has come to mean an argument that responsible lawyers would regard as being seriously arguable. Adoption of this standard does not mean that a lawyer's state of mind is irrelevant, for due process concerns dictate that a lawyer not be punished unless his conduct is knowing, and therefore culpable. On the other hand, an objective standard assumes that a genuinely frivolous claim will be known to be frivolous by most lawyers. Indeed, the definition of knowing set forth in the Terminology section of the Model Rules states that knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances. In many cases, therefore, it will be possible to infer from the circumstances of a frivolous litigation maneuver that the lawyer had actual knowledge of its frivolous character. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering: A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct 331 (Student Ed. 1985). Thus, the objective test to determine the frivolousness of a claim that would warrant suspension also incorporates both the requirement of a bad faith argument by the lawyer under E.R. 3.1 and a knowing violation under Standard 6.22. Although the committee inferred respondent's subjective motives from the evidence and commented upon them, it also found his claims lacking in merit and without good faith basis. In our opinion, in its thorough examination of this voluminous record, the committee did not err in considering respondent's subjective motives in determining whether he violated E.R. 3.1. E.R. 3.1 violations aside, in almost every count that alleged a violation of E.R. 3.1, respondent was also charged with violation of E.R. 4.4, which provides: In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person, .... Thus, even where respondent claims that an objectively arguable ground for a legal claim exists, his subjective purpose in bringing the action is relevant to whether a violation of E.R. 4.4 occurred. Therefore, we find no error in the commission's analysis of respondent's personal motives in bringing these claims in its consideration of whether he had violated E.R. 3.1 and 4.4.