Opinion ID: 1707183
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 33

Heading: whether evans was denied the right of self-representation.

Text: ś 408. In his pro se' brief Evans raises two additional assignments of error. Relying on Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), Evans first argues that he was denied the right of self-representation. The essence of the issue before this Court is whether Evans' waiver of the right to represent himself was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. A review of the record is helpful. ś 409. On September 3, 1991, the trial court held a hearing on Evans' Motion to Dismiss Counsel. Evans requested the trial court to dismiss court-appointed counsel and allow him to proceed pro se with competent advisory counsel. The trial court ascertained Evans' level of education, prior experience with the legal system and prior employment experience in an effort to determine whether Evans was competent to waive his right to counsel. The trial judge also explained the risks involved in proceeding pro se and advised Evans that if he became disruptive the trial court could terminate his pro se status. After reviewing medical reports and the competency examination completed in conjunction with the federal plea, the trial court sustained Evans' motion and allowed him to proceed pro se with James Tucker as advisory counsel. ś 410. On October 4, 1991, Evans requested access to a law library in order to prepare pretrial motions and his trial strategy. Evans argued that the appointment of advisory counsel to perform research tasks circumvented his rights. Evans also argued that he was unable to prepare for his preliminary hearing without access to a law library. The State thereafter confessed the motion. However, during a second hearing on Evans' Motion on Access to Law Library, the trial court, relying on Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), denied Evans' motion and ruled that [t]he defendant's right of access to the courts have been fulfilled by the appointment of Mr. Tucker either as an advisory counsel or as standby counsel. ś 411. On October 19, 1991, Evans pled guilty to federal kidnapping charges and began serving a life sentence at the federal penitentiary in Marion, Illinois. On February 28, 1992, Evans filed a Motion to Withdraw and Waive Self-Representation pro se, with Request for Appointment of Counsel. Evans alleged that he was denied access to Mississippi law books while being held in the Harrison County Detention Center. Evans also alleged that standby counsel had been forced upon him and had not provided Evans with appropriate research. However, Evans' waiver was conditioned upon the trial court's revocation of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, a procedure by which a court brings a defendant into a particular jurisdiction for trial. ś 412. Evans filed an additional motion regarding access to a law library wherein he denounced the use of standby counsel to perform research tasks. Evans argued that he should be allowed to conduct his own research. During the motion hearing, Evans indicated that he could not proceed because he needed to subpoena witnesses on this issue. ś 413. On March 16, 1992, Evans filed a Motion to Withdraw Waiver of Ineffective Counsel wherein he maintained his right to proceed pro se and alleged that he had been denied access to the courts. Evans later filed a Motion to Dismiss Standby Counsel due to Obstructive Non-Performance, alleging that James Tucker failed to subpoena witnesses, respond to correspondence, and provide Evans with research materials. On March 23, 1992, Evans filed a Motion to Secure Self-Representation Rights. ś 414. During the motion hearing, the State requested that the trial court reconsider its decision to allow Evans to proceed pro se. The court did not reconsider, but did, however, remind Evans that his decision to represent himself carried with it some limitations. Evans argued that James Tucker had not provided him with a constitutionally adequate law library containing the last thirty years of criminal cases in Mississippi and all federal criminal cases. James Tucker was later allowed to withdraw from his representation of Evans. ś 415. On August 7, 1992, the trial court rescinded the September 13, 1991, order allowing Evans to proceed pro se. The trial court stated that this decision was based on the evidence introduced at the motion to withdraw; the record made since the indictment and the law governing the issue of pro se counsel; ineffective assistance of counsel; and the heightened standard of review in capital cases. The trial court concluded: While the defendant is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol, it is obvious from the record made to date, that this defendant lacks the necessary skills, training and experience to adequately represent himself in a death eligible case. In removing the defendant from pro se status the Court is not limiting his rights to be heard. The Court is simply finding that in death eligible cases, a defendant can better be heard with the guidance of a skilled, trained and experienced attorney. The trial court appointed Fred Lusk to represent Evans, however, Lusk subsequently withdrew from the case. Evans, however, indicated that he knew of no attorney in Mississippi that he could cooperate with. The trial court reminded Evans that he still had a right to be heard during the trial, but acknowledged if Mr. Evans wants to block this trial by confirming in my mind his pattern of conduct concerning my ruling on his pro se status he can go ahead and do that, and I'll do the best that I can to document his position on the matter. ś 416. The trial court appointed William S. Boyd, III and Woodrow Pringle to represent Evans. Pringle later withdrew and Donald Smith was appointed. Prior to trial, Evans filed two motions to plead guilty, but refused to enter a plea upon arrival in court. Evans stated that he refused to plead because his appointed attorneys would delay the sentencing process. Shortly thereafter, Evans escaped from custody. ś 417. The trial court repeatedly advised Evans that the revocation of his pro se status did not diminish his right to be heard. However, on January 21, 1993, Evans, through his attorney William Boyd, filed a Motion to Discharge Counsel and Allow the Defendant to Proceed pro se. Evans later filed motions in objection to the revocation of his pro se status which were denied by the trial court on August 9, 1993. ś 418. Evans argues that the trial court unconstitutionally revoked his right to proceed pro se. In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant has a Sixth Amendment right to conduct his own defense. There, the Court recognized that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel implicitly embodies a correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help. Id. at 814, 95 S.Ct. at 2530 (quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279, 63 S.Ct. 236, 241, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942)). The Court further held that [t]he Sixth Amendment does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accused; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his defense. Id. at 819, 95 S.Ct. at 2533. ś 419. The Mississippi Constitution of 1890, Article 3, section 26 provides that [i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or counsel or both. In Metcalf v. State, 629 So.2d 558, 562 (Miss.1993), this Court held that the refusal to permit defendant to argue his case is in direct violation of the above constitutional provisions and requires reversal. ( quoting Gray v. State, 351 So.2d 1342 (Miss.1977); cert. denied, 446 U.S. 988, 100 S.Ct. 2975, 64 L.Ed.2d 847 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 912, 101 S.Ct. 30, 65 L.Ed.2d 1174 (1980)). Moreover, the denial of the right to self-representation is not amenable to `harmless error' analysis. McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177 n. 8, 104 S.Ct. 944, 950 n. 8, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984), reh'g denied, 465 U.S. 168, 104 S.Ct. 944, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984). ś 420. Here, the trial court, relying on the evidence introduced at the motion to withdraw, the law governing the issue of pro se counsel and ineffective assistance of counsel, and the heightened standard of appellate review in death eligible cases, terminated Evans' right to proceed pro se. The trial court also heard evidence about Evans' conduct during the hearing on the motion to withdraw filed by James Tucker. For example, Evans wanted to challenge the entire proceedings because witnesses' travel expenses, the District Attorney and appointed counsel were not paid in gold and silver tender. Evans also wanted to observe an examination of the remains of the deceased child conducted in the courtroom. Tucker explained that Evans was irrational and flew into rages when his requests were not met and made unreasonable requests with regard to legal research. ś 421. In Faretta, the Supreme Court acknowledged that the trial judge may terminate selfrepresentation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct. 422 U.S. at 834 n. 46, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 n. 46 ( quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353 (1970)). Furthermore, this Court has held that a defendant who elects to proceed without counsel may not use this right to play a `cat and mouse' game with the court or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek to have the trial judge placed in a position where, in moving along the business of the court, the judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving the defendant of counsel. Metcalf v. State, 629 So.2d 558, 563 (Miss.1993)( quoting Evans v. State, 273 So.2d 495, 499 (Miss.1973)). ś 422. Here, however, the trial judge did not rely on Evans' obstructionist behavior when he revoked Evans' right to proceed pro se, but rather expressly stated in the order that the defendant is able and willing to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. The trial court stated: [I]t is obvious from the record made to date, that this defendant lacks the necessary skills, training and experience to adequately represent himself in a death eligible case. In removing the defendant from pro se status the Court is not limiting his rights to be heard. The Court is simply finding that in death eligible cases, a defendant can better be heard with the guidance of a skilled, trained and experienced attorney. ś 423. In Faretta, the Supreme Court clearly held that a criminal defendant's skill or expertise is not the relevant inquiry when determining whether the defendant will proceed without counsel. Specifically, the Court held: It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts. But where the defendant will not voluntarily accept representation by counsel, the potential advantage of a lawyer's training and expertise, can be realized, if at all, only imperfectly. To force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the law contrives against him. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own defense. Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of that respect for the individual which is the lifeblood of the law. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2541 (1975). ś 424. From the record and the order entered by the trial judge, there is serious doubt as to whether the trial court properly terminated Evans' right to proceed without counsel. Here, as in Faretta, Evans repeatedly declared that he wished to proceed without counsel and voiced objection to any appointment of counsel. Moreover, the trial court recognized that Evans was willing and able to abide by rules of procedure and courtroom protocol. Evans' technical legal knowledge, ... was not relevant to an assessment of his knowing exercise of the right to defend himself. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 836, 95 S.Ct. at 2541. ś 425. However, the second issue which arises is whether Evans' waived his right to self-representation after the hearing on the Motion to Determine Competency. In Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 401, 113 S.Ct. 2680, 2687-88, 125 L.Ed.2d 321 (1993), the Supreme Court held that there is a heightened standard for waiving the right to counsel. There, the Court held that [i]n addition to determining that a defendant who seeks to plead guilty or waive counsel is competent, a trial court must satisfy itself that the waiver of his constitutional rights is knowing and voluntary. Id. at 400, 113 S.Ct. at 2687. ś 426. In McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 182, 104 S.Ct. 944, 953, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984), the Court held that [o]nce a pro se defendant invites or agrees to any substantial participation by counsel, subsequent appearances by counsel must be presumed to be with the defendant's acquiescence, at least until the defendant expressly and unambiguously renews his request that counsel be silenced. ś 427. On August 10, 1993, following the hearing on the Motion to Determine Competency, the trial court, sua sponte, reminded Evans that he could invoke his Faretta rights and proceed pro se. Evans noted that the court would have to consider the issue of preparational time, however, the trial court stated that Evans had contributed to the lack of time when he escaped from jail. The following morning, after conferring with counsel, Evans announced that he wished to proceed with counsel. ś 428. However, after the jury was selected, Evans again renewed his request to proceed pro se. When questioned by the trial court, Evans stated that he did not intend to withdraw as pro se counsel after the competency hearing. This claim, however, is not supported by the record which indicates that Evans unequivocally stated that he elected to proceed with counsel. Prior to the sentencing phase, Evans again renewed his request to proceed pro se. However, upon further questioning by the trial court, Evans stated he was not waiving counsel, but only requesting effective assistance of counsel. ś 429. A thorough review of the record reveals that Evans repeatedly renewed his request to proceed pro se. However, each time his request was conditional and far from the unambiguous request as required in McKaskle. Moreover, further inquiry by the trial judge usually revealed that Evans' intentions were based on considerations other than his right to proceed pro se. Therefore, based on the record, Evans' conduct throughout the proceedings and the lack of a clear and unambiguous request, we hold that Evans' continued acquiescence in representation by counsel waived his Faretta rights. We also reiterate that a defendant who elects to proceed without counsel may not use this right to play a `cat and mouse' game with the court or by ruse or stratagem fraudulently seek to have the trial judge placed in a position where, in moving along the business of the court, the judge appears to be arbitrarily depriving the defendant of counsel. Metcalf v. State, 629 So.2d 558, 563 (Miss.1993)( quoting Evans v. State, 273 So.2d 495, 499 (Miss.1973)). ś 430. We also take this opportunity to address a repeated problem which arose during the proceedings in the case sub judice. Evans repeatedly requested access to a library and research materials in order to prepare for trial. The trial court, however, denied Evans' direct access to a library and delegated research tasks to Evans' standby counsel, James Tucker. Evans, however, objected to Tucker's role and demanded that he, like the District Attorney, have access to a law library. ś 431. In Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828, 97 S.Ct. 1491, 1498, 52 L.Ed.2d 72 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.  (emphasis added). See also Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996). Although Bounds involved prisoners in pursuit of post-conviction relief, the same reasoning may logically apply to a pro se criminal defendant facing trial. See Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1047 (9th Cir.1989). ś 432. Judge Vlahos provided Evans with an attorney to perform research. Despite Evans' complaints, there is no indication that Tucker failed to satisfy reasonable requests by Evans. However, Evans continued to demand that he personally be provided with access to a law library. Clearly, the trial court was under no obligation to allow an inmate who was serving a life sentence for kidnapping, facing trial for capital murder, and with a prior escape attempt to have unfettered access to a law library. With the appointment of Attorney Tucker, Evans' right to meaningful access to the courts was satisfied.