Opinion ID: 1726281
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: ¶ 16. A motion for a directed verdict and a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict challenge the sufficiency of the evidence. Bush v. State, 895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss.2005). When reviewing a case for sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Bush, 895 So.2d at 843 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). The evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that accused committed the act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense existed; and where the evidence fails to meet this test it is insufficient to support a conviction. Bush, 895 So.2d at 843 (quoting Carr v. State, 208 So.2d 886, 889 (Miss.1968)). If, keeping in mind the reasonable-doubt standard, reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different conclusions on every element of the offense, the evidence will be deemed to have been sufficient. Bush, 895 So.2d at 843 (quoting Edwards v. State, 469 So.2d 68, 70 (Miss.1985)). ¶ 17. Harris argues that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction of aggravated assault. He argues that the alleged victim never apprehended any danger, as Grant never saw him point or fire a weapon at him. ¶ 18. Harris has confused the common law definition of assault in tort, which requires the element of apprehension, with the statutory definition set forth in Mississippi Code Section 97-3-7(2)(a) (Rev.2006). Under the common law, assault occurs where a person . . . acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other . . . or an imminent apprehension of such a contact. Webb v. Jackson 583 So.2d 946, 951 (Miss.1991) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965)); see also Robert A. Weems and Robert M. Weems, Mississippi Law of Torts, § 2:1 (2002) (the cause of action for the tort of assault protects a person's interest in being free from an imminent apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily contact). The criminal statute, on the other hand, does not require an apprehension of danger; a person can be convicted of aggravated assault if he is found to have attempted to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury purposely, knowingly, or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life. Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-7(2)(a) (Rev.2006). ¶ 19. The defendant admitted to discharging his weapon with the intent to scare Grant, and aggravated the conditions of the crime by employing a deadly weapon. There were discrepancies in the testimony as to whether Harris intended to harm Grant. Harris testified that he shot into the air at an angle, intending only to scare Grant. However, Cassandra and Katrina both testified that from their vantage point within the home, Harris appeared to be shooting directly toward Grant, not away from him. ¶ 20. [W]here the physical facts and circumstances in evidence materially contradict the defendant's version of what happened, the circuit court is not required to direct a verdict. . . . Rather, the matter then becomes a question for the jury. Watts v. State, 717 So.2d 314, 321 (Miss.1998) (quoting Wetz v. State, 503 So.2d 803, 809 (Miss.1987)). It is well established that the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of the witness. Gathright v. State, 380 So.2d 1276, 1278 (Miss.1980). [W]hen the evidence is conflicting, the jury will be the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight and worth of their testimony. This wise rule applies with equal force to the state's witnesses and the appellant's witnesses, including the appellant himself. Id. ¶ 21. Because there was evidence that Harris attempted to cause serious bodily injury to Grant, this argument is without merit. We also find that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction of simple assault against Davis. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying the motion for a directed verdict.