Opinion ID: 618647
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Unreasonable Manner of Execution

Text: The Bravos also seek to hold the Santa Maria Defendants liable for the unreasonable manner in which the SBPD SWAT team served the warrant, arguing that the manner of execution was a natural consequence[] of SMPD's decisions to employ nighttime SWAT service. Lee v. Gregory, 363 F.3d 931, 935 (9th Cir.2004) (holding a police officer responsible for plaintiff's unlawful arrest even though he passed the warrant on to another officer); see also Liston, 120 F.3d at 981 n. 13 (noting that an officer's liability for the unlawful acts of those who execute a warrant he obtained by judicial deception is governed by traditional tort law principles (citing Van Ort v. Estate of Stanewich, 92 F.3d 831, 837 (9th Cir.1996))). The Santa Maria Defendants vigorously contest this claim, insisting they had no control or direction over the manner in which SBPD served the warrant on the Bravo residence. Because the district court determined that the search warrant was valid, it had no occasion to consider this question. Rather than address it now, we remand for the district court to consider in the first instance the extent to which the Santa Maria Defendants might be liable for the warrant's unlawful manner of execution, even though service was made by a different law enforcement agency acting in concert with the SMPD. We recognize that [t]ypically, of course, only one or a few officers plan and lead a search, but more perhaps many morehelp execute it. Motley, 432 F.3d at 1081 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, while the officers tasked with executing a warrant are generally entitled to rely on information obtained from fellow law enforcement officers so long as such reliance is objectively reasonable, id., [t]he officers who lead the team that executes a warrant are responsible for ensuring that they have lawful authority for their actions and cannot evade liability simply by delegating responsibility to others, id. The district court did consider and reject the Bravos' claim that the SMPD officers unlawfully detained them while continuing to search their home, even after learning that Javier Jr. was in custody, concluding that the temporary detention of the Bravos, while undoubtedly frightening and humiliating to them, was a routine detention of residents in a house while it was being searched for contraband pursuant to a valid warrant. To the extent the district court's holding regarding the lawfulness of the search rests on the premise that SMPD officers were acting pursuant to a valid warrant, it is remanded for further consideration in light of this Opinion. If a jury finds that Tanore intentionally or recklessly withheld information about Javier Jr.'s custody status from the issuing magistrate, the district court should apply traditional tort law principles to determine the extent to which the Santa Maria Defendants are liable for any constitutional injuries the Bravos may have suffered as a natural consequence[] of the judicial deception. Lee, 363 F.3d at 935 n. 3; see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 n. 7, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (rejecting an argument that the judge's decision to issue the warrant breaks the causal chain between the application for the warrant and the improvident arrest because the common law recognized the causal link between the submission of a complaint and an ensuing arrest); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) (Section [1983] should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his actions.), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978); Crumpton v. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir.1991) (observing that [t]he Supreme Court has sanctioned the resort to tort analogies in establishing the elements of a section 1983 cause of action); Liston, 120 F.3d at 981 n. 13; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 8A cmt. b (1965) (If the actor knows that the consequences are certain, or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.).