Opinion ID: 789574
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Midtrial Superseding Indictment

Text: 45 For two of the substantive counts against Milstein, ( i.e., Count Three alleging misbranding, and Count Four alleging the failure to have a state license), distribution in interstate commerce was an essential element of the offense. The indictment alleged such distribution in Count Three ( see Superseding Indictment ¶ 17 (alleging that Milstein, with intent to defraud, introduce[d] and deliver[ed] for introduction into interstate commerce drugs that were misbranded (emphasis added))); but Count Four contained no similar allegation. When this omission was brought to the attention of the Government and the court shortly after the commencement of trial, the Government obtained a superseding indictment that added the phrase in interstate commerce to the licensing count. 46 In order to facilitate that addition, the District Court employed a somewhat unprecedented procedure. The Court declared a theoretical... mistrial prompted by the manifest necessity of Milstein's motion for a judgment of acquittal because the count was jurisdictionally defective. The Government returned to the Grand Jury to secure an amendment of the aforementioned count to allege the omitted jurisdictional element. And then the District Court incorporated all the prior trial evidence nunc pro tunc. The trial continued, with but a brief interruption for Milstein's arraignment on the new indictment. Milstein claims that this procedure violated his rights under the Double Jeopardy Clause and the statute of limitations. We are not persuaded.
47 After jeopardy has attached, but before a verdict has been reached, the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not prevent retrial where a mistrial was required by `manifest necessity.' Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467-68, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973). The need to correct a jurisdictionally defective indictment presents one situation in which a mistrial is manifestly necessary. See id. at 468-69, 93 S.Ct. 1066. Therefore, at least where there is only minimal delay resulting from the mistrial and the Government is not thereby given the opportunity to strengthen its case, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prevent retrial in such cases. See id. at 469, 93 S.Ct. 1066. 48 Milstein nevertheless contends that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits the procedure employed by the District Court in this case. However, given that the Government could have proceeded before a new jury on a new indictment, we cannot agree that allowing his trial to continue before the same jury violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. Indeed, doing so prevented a waste of all parties'time, energy, and money, minimized almost completely any delay or potential prejudice to Milstein, and preserved his right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal — the very values underlying the Double Jeopardy Clause. See id. at 468-70, 93 S.Ct. 1066 (emphasis omitted). Therefore, allowing the prosecution to continue upon the midtrial return of a superseding indictment was appropriate in this case. 49 Milstein argues that this Court's decision in United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d 635 (2d Cir.2001), is to the contrary. In that case, however, the indictment was amended after the close of the Government's case, thus depriving the defense of the opportunity to cross-examine the Government's witnesses, thereby increas[ing] the burden on [the defendant]'s defense. Id. at 668; see also id. at 664 (noting that its holding was limited to the narrow circumstances of that case). Here, by contrast, the new indictment was returned well before the close of the Government's case, the defense was on notice that the indictment would be superseded even earlier, and no change in defense strategy was required by the addition of the jurisdictional element to Count Four, especially given that distribution in interstate commerce was alleged as an element of Count Three. Therefore, United States v. Dhinsa is inapposite, as Milstein was in no way prejudiced by the substitution of the superseding indictment.
50 Milstein also contends that the midtrial superseding indictment violated the statute of limitations, relying on United States v. Gillespie, 666 F.Supp. 1137 (N.D.Ill.1987). However, Gillespie is not the law of this Circuit. See United States v. Grady, 544 F.2d 598 (2d Cir.1976) ( Grady ); United States v. Drucker, 453 F.Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.1978). Once an indictment is brought, the statute of limitations is tolled as to the charges contained in that indictment. Grady, 544 F.2d at 601. Further, 51 [w]henever an indictment ... is dismissed for any reason after the period prescribed by the applicable statute of limitations has expired, a new indictment may be returned in the appropriate jurisdiction within six calendar months of the date of the dismissal of the indictment ..., which new indictment shall not be barred by any statute of limitations. 52 18 U.S.C. § 3288. Thus, a superseding indictment brought at any time while the first indictment is still validly pending, so long as it does not enlarge the first indictment's charges, cannot be barred by the statute of limitations. Grady, 544 F.2d at 601-02. 53 In the instant case, the District Court, in allowing the Government an opportunity to secure an amendment to Count Four, did not immediately dismiss the first superseding indictment but rather continued the trial proceedings under that indictment. The second superseding indictment did not broaden the charges against Milstein but merely added a jurisdictional allegation, and the trial continued, without hiatus, under the second superseding indictment. Plainly, the second superseding indictment was not barred by the statute of limitations.
54 Milstein's contention that counts other than Count Four should be dismissed because of the alleged impropriety in the midtrial amendment to Count Four is moot in light of our above discussion. In any event, even had that midtrial amendment been impermissible, it would have provided no basis on which to disturb Milstein's conviction on the remaining counts. [A]bsent a showing of prejudice, the erroneous amendment of one count does not destroy other counts of the indictment nor invalidate the judgment of conviction thereon. United States v. Dhinsa, 243 F.3d at 667 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Government's failure to allege the jurisdictional element in Count Four had no impact on any of the remaining counts, and Milstein has not shown any prejudice.