Opinion ID: 1737782
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Failure to timely render, issue and sign judgments in a timely manner and failure to report a case as under advisement

Text: In addition to the requirement of Canon 3 A(7), La. R.S. 13:4207 contains specific timeliness requirements relative to cases under advisement. La. R.S. 13:4207 provides in pertinent part: The district judges and the judges of the city courts, shall render judgments in all cases under advisement by them, within thirty days from the time the cases are submitted for their decision. Supreme Court Rule General Administrative Rule G, § 2 provides in pertinent part: (a) When submitted. A case or other matter shall be considered as fully submitted for decision to the trial judge, and should be decided, immediately upon the conclusion of trial or hearing, and judgment signed expeditiously thereafter. . . . If the court, in an exceptional case, orders post-trial or post-hearing briefs, or orders the transcript prepared, plaintiff shall be allowed a maximum of twenty days within which to file a brief; defendant shall be allowed a maximum of twenty days from the filing or lapse of time for filing plaintiff's brief (whichever occurs sooner) within which to file a brief. If the defendant timely files a brief, plaintiff shall be allowed a maximum of ten days to file a rebuttal brief. When briefs are so ordered, the case or matter shall be considered fully submitted on the day following the day of the latest timely filing of a brief or, at the latest, the day following the last day for filing of briefs. The judge may extend the time for filing a brief for a reasonable period not to exceed the original time granted. . . . (b) Reports. Each judge of a district, juvenile, family, parish, city municipal or traffic court shall report to this court, through the office of Judicial Administrator, on or before the tenth day of each month, all cases which have been fully submitted and under advisement for longer than thirty days, together with an explanation of the reasons for any delay and an expected date of decision. The Commission found, relative to Formal Charges II and IV, that Judge Emanuel failed to timely render, issue and sign judgments in two cases, Patterson v. City of Shreveport and Whitman v. Young. Judge Emanuel stipulated that in Patterson, involving liability in a road defect case, a trial was concluded on December 5, 1995, the last post-trial brief was filed on March 22, 1996, and the judgment was not rendered until June 5, 1997. Judge Emanuel stipulated that in Whitman, the case was submitted on June 5, 1996, and judgment was not rendered until July 1, 1997. He claims that this personal injury case involved lengthy medical reports. In Formal Charge III, Judge Emanuel stipulated that he did not report the Patterson case as under advisement until his August 1996 report. However, he claims that he thought the parties were filing additional briefs and when he found out in April of 1996 that they were not, he sent counsel a letter in June of 1996 informing them that the case would now be considered as submitted, and thus, the 30-day reporting period was not triggered until the August 1996 report. We held that decisional delays amount to sanctionable misconduct in In re Tuck, 96-1444 (La.11/25/96), 683 So.2d 1214. Judge Tuck was charged with decisional delays in two cases and failing to report the two cases as under advisement. One case was under advisement for two years before the judge rendered a judgment, which he never reported as under submission, because the judge inadvertently neglected the case. In the other case which Judge Tuck also failed to report, the judge allowed the parties to submit briefs long after the period allowed by Supreme Court Rule G, General Administrative Rules, § 2, and the plaintiff died while the case was still under advisement. In Tuck, we held that although the case involved only a small number of delayed decisions, but particularly long delays, Judge Tuck's conduct amounted to a violation for which the minimum sanction was warranted. Id. We noted that the delay in the case which Judge Tuck inadvertently neglected did not amount to sanctionable misconduct. However, in the other case, while Judge Tuck did not have any dishonest motive, he did allow the lawyers to abuse the decision-making process by allowing them numerous extensions in which to file briefs. We held that decisional delay is a prevalent problem in the litigation arena, and the judge, especially at the trial level, must accept the responsibility of requiring lawyers to meet briefing schedules by refusing unjustified extensions or by simply deciding the case. Id. While noting that the delays alone might not constitute sanctionable misconduct, his failure to report accurately that the cases were under advisement increased the violation to the level of sanctionable misconduct. Id. The facts in the case at bar are similar. There are only two cases of decisional delay charged by the Commission, each involving delays of approximately one year. We find these delays to be indefensible in that they were due to Judge Emanuel's own inefficiency or neglect. Likewise, Judge Emanuel failed to report one case as under advisement. Although the last brief was filed on March 22, 1996, Judge Emanuel did not report the case as under advisement. He claimed that he thought the parties were filing additional briefs, and in his answer, alleged that he discovered they were not filing additional briefs in April of 1996. Further, he alleges that the case was not under submission until June of 1996 when he sent the attorneys a letter stating that the case was now considered submitted. We do not agree. Supreme Court Rule G, General Administrative Rules, § 2 requires that a matter is considered fully submitted on the day following the day of the last timely filing of a brief and sets limits on the allowable length of an extension of time to file a brief. After extensions were granted, the last brief was filed on March 22, 1996. The matter was fully submitted on that date, or, arguably, at the latest, in April when Judge Emanuel discovered that the parties would be filing no more briefs. Thus, the matter should have absolutely been reported in the June and July of 1996 reports as required by Supreme Court Rule G, General Administrative Rules, § 2(b). Judge Emanuel did not report the matter until August of 1996. Judge Emanuel's one-year delays in deciding the Patterson and Whitman, cases, and his failure to report the Patterson case as under advisement constitute sanctionable misconduct violative of Canons 3 A(7) and 3 B(1). See In re Judge Paul R. Wimbish, 98-O-2882 (La.4/13/99), 733 So.2d 1183 (handed down by this Court today in which we publicly censured Judge Wimbish for decisional delays and failure to report cases under advisement). We conclude from the overall record that Judge Emanuel's conduct violated Canons 3 A(7) and 3 B(1) of the Code of Judicial Conduct, as well as Supreme Court Rule G, General Administrative Rules, § 2(b), and constituted willful misconduct relating to his official duty, willful and persistent failure to perform his duty, and persistent and public conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute, all in violation of La. Const. art. V, § 25(C).