Opinion ID: 68137
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Guidelines Calculation

Text: Diaz contends that the district court improperly presumed that a sentence within the applicable Guidelines range was reasonable, citing a statement by the district court at sentencing that “the Fifth Circuit has stated that a guideline sentence that is properly calculated is presumptively reasonable.” In rendering a sentence, a district court may not rely on a presumption that a properly-calculated Guidelines sentence is reasonable, although an appellate court may apply a presumption of reasonableness when reviewing a properly-calculated Guidelines sentence. United States v. King, 541 F.3d 1143, 1144–45 (5th Cir. 2008); see also Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 128 S. Ct. 586, 596–97 (2007). Rather, the district court “‘must make an individualized assessment based on the facts presented.’” United States v. Cisneros–Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 766 (5th Cir. 2008) (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). Statements by a district court, however, that a Guidelines sentence would be “appropriate,” or that there is “no reason not to apply a Guidelines sentence,” are permissible and are not tantamount to a reasonableness presumption. King, 541 F.3d at 1145; see also United States v. Roberts, 270 F. App’x 349, 351 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished). When determining whether a district court has improperly applied a presumption of reasonableness, we have looked to the substance of the district court’s conduct instead of the particular words used. For example, in United 6 No. 07-10977 States v. Martinez-Davalos, 293 F. App’x 294, 295 (5th Cir. 2008) (unpublished), we declined to find an abuse of discretion where the district court stated that it was applying a presumption of reasonableness but also explained that it had discretion to depart from the Guidelines, allowed both parties to present their views on an appropriate sentence, and did not impose an improper burden of proof on the defendant. We held that regardless of the words the district court used, the “record rebut[ted] [the defendant’s] assertion that the district court . . . improperly applied the presumption of reasonableness in imposing [the] sentence.” Id. Likewise, in United States v. King, 541 F.3d at 1145, we cited the fact that the district court had not required the defendant to prove “extraordinary circumstances” in order to obtain a non-Guidelines sentence as evidence that the court had not applied a reasonableness presumption. Read in isolation, the district court’s statement in the present case that “the Fifth Circuit has stated that a guideline sentence that is properly calculated is presumptively reasonable” could be interpreted as a reference to the appellate presumption given to a district court’s within-range sentence. Or, as Diaz urges, the district court could have been stating that a district court may apply a presumption of reasonableness to a within-Guidelines sentence. The district court’s statement in the broader context of the sentencing hearing transcript, however, makes clear that the district court did not in fact apply a reasonableness presumption in calculating Diaz’s sentence. At the sentencing, the district court first calculated the sentencing range under the Guidelines and asked for any objections. None was raised. The court then explained that the Sentencing Guidelines are “advisory” but “do provide a frame of reference for the court,” that the court was required to consider the factors under 18 U.S.C. 7 No. 07-10977 § 3553(a), and that the court had discretion to depart from the Guidelines, which were “not mandatory.” The district court allowed both parties to present argument as to the appropriate sentence and never placed the burden on Diaz to rebut a presumption of reasonableness. After the statement at issue, the district court went on to add that after consideration of “all of the factors under 3553(a),” it had determined that a within-Guidelines sentence would be “fair and reasonable under the circumstances of this case.” If there was any error in the district court’s ambiguous statement about the reasonableness presumption, the error was not of the clear and obvious type required by the plain error standard. More importantly, given that the district court recognized that it had discretion to depart from the Sentencing Guidelines, considered the § 3553(a) factors and the totality of the circumstances, and did not require Diaz to rebut any presumption of reasonableness, there is no basis to conclude that the district court in fact applied a reasonableness presumption. The district court’s reference to a reasonableness presumption was not plain error.