Opinion ID: 795700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Facial Challenge to the Mass Gathering Law and Injunctive Relief

Text: 27 [T]he constitutionality of a statute is a legal question subject to de novo review. United States v. Murphy, 979 F.2d 287, 289 (2d Cir.1992). [W]hen a licensing statute allegedly vests unbridled discretion in a government official over whether to permit or deny expressive activity, one who is subject to the law may challenge it facially without the necessity of first applying for, and being denied, a license. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 755-56, 108 S.Ct. 2138 (collecting cases). In order for a facial challenge to a content-neutral, time-place-manner permit law to succeed, the challenger must show that the statute does not contain adequate standards to guide the official's decision and render it subject to effective judicial review. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323, 122 S.Ct. 775, 151 L.Ed.2d 783 (2002). 28 [A] facial challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers. This is not to say that the press or a speaker may challenge as censorship any law involving discretion to which it is subject. The law must have a close enough nexus to expression, or to conduct commonly associated with expression, to pose a real and substantial threat of the identified censorship risks. 29 City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759, 108 S.Ct. 2138. 30 When evaluating a [facial] First Amendment challenge ... we may examine not only the text of the ordinance, but also any binding judicial or administrative construction of it. And we are permitted — indeed, required — to consider the well-established practice of the authority enforcing the ordinance. All of these are essential as we try to make our way through the Scylla of regulations that are so tightly worded that the flexibility needed for administration is lacking, and the Charybdis of language so loose that, as a practical matter, courts become the licensing bureau. 31 MacDonald v. Safir, 206 F.3d 183, 191 (2d Cir.2000); see also City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 2138 ([W]hen a state law has been authoritatively construed so as to render it constitutional, or a well-understood and uniformly applied practice has developed that has virtually the force of a judicial construction, the state law is read in light of those limits.). In the absence of state interpretation, 3 federal courts will presume any narrowing construction or practice to which the law is fairly susceptible. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770 n. 11, 108 S.Ct. 2138 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 32 Statutory construction ... is a holistic endeavor. Auburn Hous. Auth. v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 138, 144 (2d Cir.2002) (internal quotation marks omitted; alteration in original). In interpreting statutes, this Court reads statutory language in light of the surrounding language and framework of the statute. Id. `[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems,' we may `construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of [the Legislature].' Empire HealthChoice Assur., Inc. v. McVeigh, 396 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir.2005) (quoting Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988)). 33 Field Day argued, and the District Court found, that the catch-all provisions of the statutory/regulatory scheme — (i) ... when it appears that such gathering [may be held] without hazard to health or safety ... and (ii) ... such other matters as may be appropriate for security of life or health ... in PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(o), and (iii) ... such other matters as may be appropriate for security of life or health ... in Section 7-1.40(b) of the Sanitary Code — were untethered to any standards for determination, effectively giv[ing] the permit-issuing officials unconstitutionally unbridled discretion to deny a permit for any reason they see fit. The District Court found particularly troubling the fact that, unlike the regulation found constitutional in Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 316, 122 S.Ct. 775, the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code provisions did not limit a permitting official's concerns about health and safety and life or health to those that were reasonable. The State argues, conversely, that these provisions are constitutionally acceptable under Chicago Park District because the opportunity to engage in content regulation ... simply is not afforded by the provision[s'] plain language. Because each party argues that Chicago Park District supports its position, we begin our analysis with that case. 34 In Chicago Park District a facial challenge was brought against regulations governing the granting of permits for the use of public property in Chicago. Id. at 318, 320, 122 S.Ct. 775. The regulations provided that the Park District could deny an application for a permit only on one of thirteen specifically enumerated grounds. Among the permissible grounds for denial of a permit was that the use or activity intended by the applicant would present an unreasonable danger to the health or safety of the applicant, or other users of the park, of Park District Employees or of the public. Id. at 319 n. 1, 122 S.Ct. 775 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court held the at-issue regulations constitutional, as the Park District could deny a permit only for one or more of the reasons set forth in the ordinance.... These grounds are reasonably specific and objective, and do not leave the decision to the whim of the administrator. Id. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 35 Although the Supreme Court determined that the phrase unreasonable danger to the health or safety was reasonably specific and objective, it did not further elaborate upon a reasonableness standard. Given this omission, and in the absence of any express reasonableness limitation in the catch-all provisions in the Mass Gathering Law, each party in this case focuses its arguments on a particular part of the Mass Gathering Law's language. The State argues that health and safety and life or health is, per Chicago Park District, a constitutionally adequate standard — that the Supreme Court did not state or suggest that the Chicago Ordinance's express inclusion of the term `unreasonable' played any role in that Court's analysis. Field Day argues, conversely, that without the inclusion of such a reasonableness limitation the Mass Gathering Law and the Sanitary Code are devoid of any objective standards to guide the [permit-issuing] official's decision about what constitutes an objective and bona fide `hazard to public health and safety' sufficient to warrant a veto of the planned event. Because we determine that the phrases health and safety and life or health are capable of guiding a permitting official's decision and rendering that decision subject to effective judicial review, we hold that the catch-all provisions of the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code are constitutional on their face. 36 The phrases health and safety and life or health are, as an initial observation, less constitutionally suspect than language employed in statutes that have been found to be unconstitutional. In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969), the Supreme Court held unconstitutional an ordinance that permitted a municipal commission to refuse to issue a permit to hold a parade, procession or other public demonstration if in its judgment the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency, good order, morals or convenience require that it be refused. Id. at 149-50, 89 S.Ct. 935. The Court explained that a municipality may not empower its licensing officials to roam essentially at will, dispensing or withholding permission to speak, assemble, picket, or parade according to their own opinions regarding the potential effect of the activity in question on the `welfare,' `decency,' or `morals' of the community. Id. at 153, 89 S.Ct. 935; see also Nichols v. Vill. of Pelham Manor, 974 F.Supp. 243, 250 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y.1997) (declaring unconstitutional a municipal ordinance permitting the chief of police to deny a permit to solicit alms, or make any other solicitation or distribute handbills, tracts, literature or similar articles within the village when doing so would protect the health, comfort and convenience of village residents). 37 In City of Lakewood, the Supreme Court confronted an ordinance that provided that: [t]he Mayor shall either deny the application [for a permit], stating the reasons for such denial or grant said permit subject to the following terms ....' City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 769, 108 S.Ct. 2138 (internal quotation marks omitted). Among those terms was such other terms and conditions deemed necessary and reasonable by the Mayor. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Court determined that this ordinance not only placed no limits on the Mayor's discretion to deny a permit, but also that the ordinance placed no restraint on the conditions that the Mayor could impose on the granting of a permit. Id. at 769, 772, 108 S.Ct. 2138. Accordingly, the Court found the ordinance to be unconstitutional. 38 Similarly, in MacDonald, 206 F.3d 183, this Court held that two provisions of the New York City Administrative Code governing parade permits, unless constrained by administrative construction or by well-established practice, appear to afford the Commissioner exactly the sort of discretion that has been found to violate the First Amendment. Id. at 192. Those challenged provisions included, inter alia, that the police commissioner could deny a permit if he believes the parade `will be disorderly in character or tend to disturb the public peace' and that the police commissioner could grant a parade permit for any `occasion[ ] of extraordinary public interest, not annual or customary.' Id. The authority of a permit official to consider issues of health and safety and life and health, conferred by the Mass Gathering Law and the Sanitary Code, is much more specific and objective. Considerations of welfare, decency, morals, or convenience and comfort invite a public official to consider the content of speech in making permitting decisions. See Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992) (Listeners' reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for regulation.). An utter lack of guidance may permit a public official to consider the content of speech. See Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 323, 122 S.Ct. 775 (Where the licensing official enjoys unduly broad discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a permit, there is a risk that he will favor or disfavor speech based on its content. (citing Forsyth County, 505 U.S. at 131, 112 S.Ct. 2395)). By comparison, it is impossible to see how the consideration of health and safety or life and health interests would have any effect on the content of speech in the context of a scheme specifically designed to promote such interests. The phrases health and safety or life and health simply cannot be reasonably construed to give[ ] a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers. City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 759, 108 S.Ct. 2138. 39 That the terms health and safety or life and health do not establish with absolute certainty each and every concern or issue pertaining to life, health, and safety that a public official may raise before issuing a Mass Gathering permit does not render the statutory scheme unconstitutional. [P]erfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations that restrict expressive activity, and flexible standards granting considerable discretion to public officials can pass constitutional muster. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 794, 109 S.Ct. 2746. The catch-all provisions of the Mass Gathering Law and the Sanitary Code — health and safety and life or health — are reasonably specific and objective, and do not leave the decision to the whim of the administrator. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775. 40 Nevertheless, Field Day argues that the catch-all provisions are devoid of any objective standards to guide an official's decision whether to grant a Mass Gathering Permit. Specifically, Field Day complains that the Mass Gathering Law permits an official to use an unreasonable concern about life and health to deny a permit to a disfavored speaker. Although the specific health and safety concerns given in the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code are conditioned by an adequacy requirement (adequate and satisfactory water supply and sewerage facilities, adequate drainage, etc.), and adequate has been defined by the Sanitary Code to mean reasonable, see N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.1, no such adequacy conditions are explicitly placed on the catch-all provision — other matters as may be appropriate for security of life or health. 41 Given the concern that the lack of an objective standard might render the catch-all provision unconstitutional, and this Court's duty to interpret the statute, if possible, to avoid such concerns, see Empire HealthChoice Assur., 396 F.3d at 144-45, it is possible to interpret the catch-all provision as providing such an objective standard. Although not defined in the Mass Gathering law or in the Sanitary Code, the word appropriate is generally defined as suitable or proper. See e.g., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE, http://dictionary.oed.com/entrance.dtl (search for appropriate) ([s]pecially fitted or suitable, proper) (definition from the 2d ed.1989) (last visited July 19, 2006); Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary, 106 (1981) (specially suitable); The Random House College Dictionary, 66 (Revised Ed., 1980) (suitable or fitting for a particular purpose, occasion, person, etc.). Given the whole of the statutory scheme, see Auburn Housing Auth., 277 F.3d at 144, other matters are appropriate to secur[e] life or health only to the extent that adequate provision for that concern about life or health has not yet been provided. As set out above, the meaning of life or health is understood by reference to the remainder of the statute, and adequate is defined as sufficient to accomplish the purpose for which something is intended, and to such a degree that no unreasonable risk to health or safety is presented. N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.1. It therefore follows that allowing a public official to condition the granting of a mass gathering permit on other matters as may be appropriate for security of life or health allows the official only to consider whether a proposed mass gathering presents unreasonable risks to life or health. 42 The State further contends that the language in the first catch-all provision giving the permit official the power to decide what circumstances appear to present a hazard to health and safety does not render the permit scheme wholly subjective. The first clause of the Mass Gathering law provides: The sanitary code may ... authorize appropriate officers or agencies to issue such a permit when the applicant is in compliance with the established regulations and when it appears that ... such gathering [can be] held without hazard to health and safety .... N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 225(5)( o ). The State argues that this clause does not directly govern permitting officials, but rather serves as an enabling clause authorizing the State to promulgate the regulations authorizing appropriate officers to issue mass gathering permits, and therefore only the Sanitary Code sets forth the standards that [those officers] are to apply. We agree with this argument. 43 Moreover, as explained above, the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code establish an objective test for satisfaction of the conditions required to obtain a mass gathering permit — whether unreasonable risks to genuine issues of life or health are presented by the mass gathering. This inquiry requires a permit official to exercise his or her discretion in the first instance to determine if a risk to life or health is presented and, if so, whether that risk is or can be rendered reasonable through the actions of the applicant. It will appear[ ] to that official that a mass gathering can be held without hazard to health and safety when, in the exercise of that discretion, he or she has applied an objective standard and found no unreasonable risks that would give rise to genuine concerns for life or health. 44 Given the foregoing, this Court can find no meaningful difference between the catch-all provisions of the Mass Gathering Law and the Sanitary Code and the unreasonable danger to the health or safety provision found to be constitutional in Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 319 n. 1, 324, 122 S.Ct. 775. Although it is always possible for an official to violate an applicant's constitutional rights by misapplying the authority granted to him by the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code, that concern does not render a statute facially unconstitutional. See id. at 324-25, 122 S.Ct. 775 (Where a regulation permitted some level of appropriately bounded discretion abuse must be dealt with if and when a pattern of unlawful favoritism appears, rather than by insisting upon a degree of rigidity that is found in few legal arrangements.). In sum, the Mass Gathering Law and the Sanitary Code, including the catch-all provisions, are reasonably specific and objective, and do not leave the decision to the whim of the administrator. Id. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775. Accordingly, we must reverse that portion of the District Court's judgment declaring the catch-all provisions of the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code to be unconstitutional.
45 The District Court granted Field Day's motion for preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement against Field Day by the State, Suffolk County, and Riverhead of those sections of the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code that the District Court found unconstitutional. The District Court first determined, in accordance with its findings as to unconstitutionality, that Field Day had demonstrated that it was likely to succeed on the merits of [its] underlying challenge to the constitutionality of the Mass Gathering Law. The District Court, relying on Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976), also found that Field Day would be irreparably harmed absent the issuance of the injunction because the loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury. 46 This Court reviews a decision to grant a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. Mastrovincenzo v. City of New York, 435 F.3d 78, 88 (2d Cir.2006). The District Court abuses its discretion when (1) its decision rests on an error of law ... or a clearly erroneous factual finding, or (2) its decision — though not necessarily the product of a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding — cannot be located within the range of permissible decisions. Id. The injunction at issue in the case at bar is clearly a prohibitory preliminary injunction, — it stay[s] `government action taken in the public interest pursuant to a statutory or regulatory scheme.' Id. (quoting Plaza Health Labs., Inc. v. Perales, 878 F.2d 577, 580 (2d Cir.1989)). Prohibitory preliminary injunctions are permitted only when the moving party has demonstrated that (1) absent injunctive relief, he will suffer `irreparable injury,' and (2) there is `a likelihood that he will succeed on the merits of his claim.' Id. (citing Plaza Health Labs., 878 F.2d at 580). Injuries to First Amendment rights, if being threatened or currently occurring, will satisfy the irreparable injury requirement. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 373, 96 S.Ct. 2673; New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S.Ct. 2140, 29 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971). This Court has warned, however, that conjectural chill is not sufficient to establish real and imminent irreparable harm. Latino Officers Ass'n v. Safir, 170 F.3d 167, 171 (2d Cir.1999). 47 The District Court's findings as to both likelihood and injury were dependent on its finding of facial unconstitutionality. Because we have determined that the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code are not facially unconstitutional, we must reverse the preliminary injunction. Accordingly, the District Court's determination as to facial unconstitutionality is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the preliminary injunction must be dissolved.
48 Field Day, in its cross-appeal, argues that the District Court erred in three respects in determining that the remainder of the Mass Gathering Law was constitutional.
49 First, Field Day argues that the Mass Gathering Law is unconstitutional because it `authorizes' but does not require the issuance of a mass gathering permit to an applicant who has satisfied all of the permit requirements. Field Day also draws on the 1970 press release announcing the passage of the Mass Gathering Law, which stated that permits may be issued `when it appears that ... such gathering [can be] held without hazard to public health or safety.' (emphasis added). 50 The District Court determined that, although the Mass Gathering Law nowhere explicitly states that once an acceptable permit application is submitted, it must be approved, New York law generally provides that `mandatory words may be interpreted in a merely permissive sense or vice versa,' (quoting McKinney's Statutes § 171 cmt.) (footnotes omitted), and further determined that, to the extent the Mass Gathering Law was permissive and may be applied to favor certain speakers over others, a more reasonable approach than striking the entire law from the outset is to deal with such a pattern of abuse when it happens (citing Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. at 324-25, 122 S.Ct. 775). 51 As with the parties' disagreement about the meaning of appears, the resolution of this issue is rendered more difficult than it should be by the shortcomings of the Sanitary Code. The word authorize appears in the first clause of the Mass Gathering Law and merely qualifies what the Sanitary Code may do — in this case, authorize officers to issue a permit. See N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(o). If the Sanitary Code explicitly addressed a public official's duty to issue a mass gathering permit this would be a non-issue. The Sanitary Code, however, says nothing about a public official's duty, mandatory or discretionary, to issue (or deny) a permit. The Sanitary Code makes clear that no mass gathering may be held without a permit, provides the form and schedule for applying for a permit, dictates what additional information must be submitted with the application, and sets forth the conditions under which a mass gathering permit may be revoked — but nowhere does the Sanitary Code provide that a permit shall (or may) or shall not (or may not) be issued or under what circumstances. See N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.40(a), (b), and (d). 52 As previously noted, this Court must construe statutes, where necessary and possible, to avoid serious constitutional issues. See, e.g., Empire HealthChoice Assur., 396 F.3d at 144-45. Were the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code read to authorize an official to deny a mass gathering permit even where all statutory and regulatory requirements had been met and no unreasonable danger to life or health was present, the statutory/regulatory scheme would be of more than doubtful constitutional validity. See, e.g., City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770, 108 S.Ct. 2138 (A presumption that an official will act in good faith and adhere to standards absent from the regulation's face is undermined when the official is granted unbridled discretion); Dillon v. Municipal Court, 4 Cal.3d 860, 94 Cal.Rptr. 777, 484 P.2d 945, 952 (1971) (The Seaside ordinance is not only devoid of all standards but, to make matters worse, contains no guarantee that a permit will issue even if the application meets all of the five conditions of the section.). Although the Supreme Court has stated that it  will not write nonbinding limits into a silent state statute, City of Lakewood, 486 U.S. at 770, 108 S.Ct. 2138, the Court has also stated that limits may be explicitly provided by textual incorporation, binding judicial or administrative construction, or well-established practice. Id. 53 Here, although there is no specific language requiring the issuance of permits in the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code, New York law does generally require that licenses be issued if an applicant satisfies all statutory and regulatory requirements. See Bologno v. O'Connell, 7 N.Y.2d 155, 158 (N.Y. 1959), 196 N.Y.S.2d 90, 164 N.E.2d 389 (Refusal to issue a license would, of course, be arbitrary and in excess of reasonable discretion if based solely upon a ground which the Commissioner may not consider.); Picone v. Comm'r of Licenses of New York City, 241 N.Y. 157, 161 (N.Y. 1925), 149 N.E. 336 (If an applicant for a license can show that he is a fit and proper person to engage in a licensed business under the provisions of the licensing statute, the licensing officer may not arbitrarily impose limitations not contained in the statute upon his right to do business.). We read the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code as bound by this construction and interpret the permissive word authorize as mandatory. Accordingly, neither the Mass Gathering Law nor the Sanitary Code allows an official to deny a permit to an applicant who has otherwise satisfied the strictures of the statutory and regulatory requirements.
54 Second, Field Day argues that the last clause of the Mass Gathering Law, providing that in his review of such applications, as well as in carrying out his other duties and functions in connection with such a gathering, a permit issuing official may request and shall receive from all public officers, departments and agencies of the state and its political subdivisions such cooperation and assistance as may be necessary and proper, N.Y. PUBLIC HEALTH LAW § 225(5)(o), unconstitutionally permits such an official to refuse to request assistance, even where such assistance is both necessary and proper. As an example, Field Day posits that an official may capriciously demand[ ] that uniformed police officers provide security for the festival but then refuse[ ] to provide those officers. The State counters that Field Day badly misunderstand[s] the provision because the Mass Gathering Law does not provide for assistance to the speaker but, instead, to the permit-issuing official. According to the State, such assistance is limited to those duties of the permitting official — reviewing applications, granting permits, and revoking permits — established by the Sanitary Code. See N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.40. The State argues that the provision of security staff is expressly the duty of the mass gathering applicant. See N.Y. Comp. R. & Regs. tit. 10, § 7-1.40(e) (setting forth the [a]dditional duties of a permittee for a mass gathering, and requiring that [a] maintenance and internal security staff acceptable to the permit-issuing official shall be provided). The State also argues that New York law permits this Court to read permissive words as mandatory if such construction furthers legislative intent. See N.Y. STAT. § 171 cmt. 4 55 The answer to Field Day's challenge comes in two parts. First, in accordance with the comments to N.Y. STAT. § 171 and this Court's duty to read the statute as constitutional if possible, the most reasonable reading of the assistance provision is that a request for assistance must be made if the official determines that such assistance is necessary and proper. Second, because neither the Mass Gathering Law nor the Sanitary Code require a permitting official to provide assistance to an applicant by, for example, providing police officers as security personnel, it is not true that the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code permits an official to choose the events of favored speakers or favored speech that will receive public assistance or veto events by withholding assistance from disfavored speech or speakers. 56 In relation to this last point, we note once again that a finding of facial constitutionality does not foreclose as-applied challenges. In Chicago Park District the Supreme Court was presented with an ordinance which provided grounds on which the Park District may deny a permit rather than must deny a permit. Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 324, 122 S.Ct. 775. The plaintiffs argued that this provision allow[ed] the Park District to waive the permit requirements for some favored speakers, while insisting upon them for others. Id. The Supreme Court observed that such construction was certainly not the intent of the ordinance, which the Park District has reasonably interpreted to permit overlooking only those inadequacies that, under the circumstances, do no harm to the policies furthered by the application requirements. Id. at 324-25, 122 S.Ct. 775. The Supreme Court went on to explain that [g]ranting waivers to favored speakers (or, more precisely, denying them to disfavored speakers) would of course be unconstitutional, but we think that this abuse must be dealt with if and when a pattern of unlawful favoritism appears, rather than by insisting upon a degree of rigidity that is found in few legal arrangements. Id. at 325, 122 S.Ct. 775. Similarly, granting public assistance to favored speakers or favored speech in the manner that Field Day complains of would be unconstitutional. Such situations must be dealt with in as-applied challenges if and when they arise.
57 Finally, Field Day argues that the Mass Gathering Law is unconstitutional in its entirety because it denies an applicant effective review of the permitting decision. Field Day's argument is premised on the assertion that the statute lacks objective criteria on which to base an as-applied challenge. However, as explained in the foregoing, the Mass Gathering Law does provide such criteria. Under Chicago Park District, 534 U.S. at 321-23, 122 S.Ct. 775, because this is a content-neutral, time-place-manner restriction, that is all that is required. 58 Given the foregoing, this Court affirms the District Court's determination that these provisions of the Mass Gathering Law and Sanitary Code are constitutional. 59