Opinion ID: 1059140
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Failure to Dismiss the Capital Murder Indictment

Text: In his sixth and seventh assignments of error, Powell contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the capital murder indictment against him. This was the principal issue addressed by the parties during oral argument before this Court. The various positions under which Powell asserts that he was not subject to trial under the capital murder indictment can be generally summarized as follows: (1) The opinion and mandate of this Court from Powell's first trial limited his retrial for the killing of Stacey Reed to a charge no greater than first degree murder on any indictment. (2) Even if retrial on a charge of capital murder was not barred under a new indictment, Powell had been acquitted, either actually or by implication, of the attempted rape of Stacey Reed in his first trial and, thus, the law of the case doctrine barred his being tried for capital murder based upon the attempted rape of Stacey as the gradation offense. (3) Principles of double jeopardy bar his retrial for a violation of Code § 18.2-31(5) because the indictment in his first trial did not specify the victim of the gradation offense. Effect of Prior Opinion and Mandate We recognize the principle of the mandate rule, stated by the Court of Appeals of Virginia in a different context, that: A trial judge is bound by a decision and mandate from [an appellate court], unless [the court] acted outside [its] jurisdiction. A trial court has no discretion to disregard [a] lawful mandate. When a case is remanded to a trial court from an appellate court, the refusal of the trial court to follow the appellate court mandate constitutes reversible error. Rowe v. Rowe, 33 Va.App. 250, 257-258, 532 S.E.2d 908, 912 (2000); see also Frank Shop, Inc. v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 264 Va. 1, 6, 564 S.E.2d 134, 137 (2002) (holding that a trial court cannot permit what this Court . . . [has] said is unlawful in a mandate reversing the trial court's prior judgment and remanding the case). Relying on this principle, Powell contends that the trial court was without authority to retry him on a new indictment charging him with the capital murder of Stacey Reed. Powell's reliance, however, is misplaced. It is self-evident that while the opinion of an appellate court, under the doctrine of stare decisis, applies to all future cases in the trial courts, the mandate, which is the directive of the appellate court certifying a judgment in a particular case to the court from which it was appealed, speaks only to that case. Moreover, the mandate is controlling only as to matters within its compass. Sprague v. Ticonic National Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 168, 59 S.Ct. 777, 83 L.Ed. 1184 (1939). Thus, while the directive of this Court's mandate binds the circuit court, that court is not thereby prohibited from acting on matters not constrained by the language of the mandate, construed in light of the appellate court's opinion. The mandate rule is merely a `specific application of the law of the case doctrine,' [and] in the absence of exceptional circumstances, it compels compliance on remand with the dictates of a superior court and forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly decided by the appellate court. United States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir.1993) (quoting United States v. Bell, 988 F.2d 247, 251 (1st Cir.1993)). Undoubtedly, had the trial court permitted the Commonwealth to retry Powell for capital murder on the original amended indictment invalidated by our decision in reviewing his first conviction, this would have been violative of our mandate and reversible error. Similarly, had the Commonwealth dismissed that indictment and sought a new indictment charging Powell with the capital murder of Stacey Reed prior to the rape of Kristie Reed, it would have been error for the trial court to permit that indictment to stand. However, nothing in our opinion or mandate from Powell's first appeal required the Commonwealth to retry Powell on the original indictment, abridged to cure the defects found by this Court to charge only first-degree murder. To the contrary, the directive of the mandate expressly stated that Powell was to be retried on that indictment based on the record that was before this Court at that time, only if the Commonwealth be so advised. Nor did our opinion or mandate expressly preclude the possibility of trying Powell on a new indictment charging capital murder premised on a different gradation offense after dismissal of the former, defective indictment. Powell's October 21, 2001 letter to the Commonwealth's Attorney in which he revealed that he had attempted to rape Stacey before he killed her is an exceptional circumstance that merits a narrow application of the mandate rule. We recognize that, generally, serial prosecutions are not permitted where the Commonwealth deliberately refrains from bringing criminal charges arising out of the same act or transaction while prosecuting others in order to gain the advantage of having multiple trials. See, e.g., Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 444, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970). Such was not the case here, however, given the unexpected and possibly unique circumstance of evidence of an uncharged offense that was not previously known or available coming to light after the conclusion of the first trial in the form of the defendant's voluntary confession. Accordingly, we hold that the trial court correctly ruled that the opinion and mandate of this Court from Powell's prior appeal did not bar the Commonwealth from dismissing the indictment against him and bringing a new indictment charging him with capital murder premised upon a gradation offense not previously charged by the Commonwealth and based upon evidence that was not previously known or available to the Commonwealth at the time of his first trial.