Opinion ID: 1057653
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Warrantless Searches of Convicted Defendants Serving Sentences May Be Reasonable

Text: The basic rule against warrantless searches is also relaxed if the person being searched has been convicted of a criminal offense and is serving a sentence. The Supreme Court has recognized that a criminal conviction subjects the offender to a continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). An offender's place on this continuum alters what is reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. For instance, incarcerated felons have no legitimate expectation of privacy in their prison cells. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) (holding that society is not prepared to recognize as legitimate any subjective expectation of privacy that a prisoner might have in his prison cell and ..., accordingly, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell); State v. Williams, 690 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Tenn.1985) (recognizing that an expectation of privacy is not justified in a jail cell); State v. Dulsworth, 781 S.W.2d 277, 284 (Tenn.Crim.App.1989) (recognizing that, under Palmer, a prisoner's expectation of privacy under the Fourth Amendment is severely curtailed). Probationers [3] rest further along the continuum. Accordingly, probationers' privacy interests under the Fourth Amendment are also reduced, but are not so far diminished as those of incarcerated felons. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 119, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). In Knights , the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the warrantless search of a probationer's home. The defendant had accepted as a condition of his probation that he would [s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or without a search warrant, warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any probation officer or law enforcement officer. Id. at 114, 122 S.Ct. 587. Applying the totality of the circumstances test, of which the defendant's probation search condition was a salient circumstance, id. at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587, the Court analyzed the reasonableness of the search by balancing `the degree to which it intrudes upon an individual's privacy [against] the degree to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests.' Id. at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999)). The Court specifically determined that the defendant's status as a probationer subject to a search condition informs both sides of that balance. Id. In first assessing the degree of intrusion upon a probationer's privacy interest, the Court recognized that [i]nherent in the very nature of probation is that probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled. Just as other punishments for criminal convictions curtail an offender's freedoms, a court granting probation may impose reasonable conditions that deprive the offender of some freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court concluded that the search condition would further the two primary goals of probationrehabilitation and protecting society from future criminal violations. Id. As a result of the search condition, the probationer's reasonable expectation of privacy was significantly diminished. Id. at 119-20, 122 S.Ct. 587. Turning to the governmental interest side of the balance, the Court reasoned as follows: it must be remembered that the very assumption of the institution of probation is that the probationer is more likely than the ordinary citizen to violate the law. The recidivism rate of probationers is significantly higher than the general crime rate. And probationers have even more of an incentive to conceal their criminal activities and quickly dispose of incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal because probationers are aware that they may be subject to supervision and face revocation of probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings in which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt, among other things, do not apply. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The Court recognized that states have a dual concern with a probationer. On the one hand is the hope that he will successfully complete probation and be integrated back into the community. On the other is the concern, quite justified, that he will be more likely to engage in criminal conduct than an ordinary member of the community. Id. at 120-21, 122 S.Ct. 587. The Court then concluded that the balance of these considerations requires no more than reasonable suspicion to conduct a search of [the] probationer's house. Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct. 587 (emphasis added). Because the search at issue in Knights was supported by reasonable suspicion, the search passed Fourth Amendment muster. Id. at 122, 122 S.Ct. 587. Significantly, the Court left open the question whether the probation condition so diminished, or completely eliminated, [the probationer defendant's] reasonable expectation of privacy... that a search by a law enforcement officer without any individualized suspicion would have satisfied the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 120 n. 6, 122 S.Ct. 587 (emphasis added). [4] A search unsupported by any individualized suspicion came before the Court in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250 (2006).