Opinion ID: 1195594
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Other Penalty Phase Issues

Text: A. Non-Statutory Aggravating Factors. After listing the statutory aggravating factors, the FDPA provides that the jury may consider whether any other aggravating factor for which notice has been given exists. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c). In this case, the government gave notice, the district court submitted, and the jury found three non-statutory aggravating factors: obstruction of justice, other criminal conduct, and victim impact. Bolden appeals these findings on various grounds. We review the district court's evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion, Allen, 247 F.3d at 778, and Bolden's constitutional contentions de novo, Purkey, 428 F.3d at 761. [10] (1) Obstruction of Justice. During the penalty phase, the government presented evidence that Bolden lied to police after being arrested, threatened Price and Edwards if they spoke about the crime, wiped prints off and hid the murder weapon, and told Edwards to change his appearance. The government argued that this aggravating factor was established by evidence that Bolden killed Ley to prevent him from identifying Bolden and then obstructed the investigation by lying to the police and other post-offense conduct. The jury found as a non-statutory aggravating factor that Bolden obstructed a criminal investigation and that this factor supported imposition of the death penalty. Bolden argues his post-offense conduct lacked sufficient relevance to whether he should be sentenced to death. We disagree. Other courts have approved use of an obstruction of justice non-statutory aggravating factor based upon post-offense conduct. See, e.g., United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 322-23 (4th Cir.2003) (disposing of murder weapon, destroying physical evidence, and directing witnesses to lie); United States v. Edelin, 134 F.Supp.2d 59, 76-77 (D.D.C.2001) (threatening witnesses). This is consistent with the treatment of obstruction under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The district court did not err in submitting this non-statutory factor based in part on Bolden's post-offense conduct. Bolden further argues that basing this factor on the killing of Ley renders it unconstitutionally vague because all murders eliminate a witness and therefore the factor is only a rational aggravator if the witness is eliminated after the suspect's arrest. Again we disagree. The government presented evidence that, after immobilizing Ley with the initial shot, Bolden paused a few seconds before firing the fatal shot into Ley's head, evidence the murder was motivated in part to prevent Ley from identifying Bolden. Thus, the district court did not err in submitting this non-statutory aggravating factor. Its relative weight was solely for the jury to decide. (2) Other Criminal Conduct. At closing argument, the government argued that the jury should find other criminal activity as a non-statutory aggravating factor based on Bolden's conviction of non-capital offenses during the guilt phase  conspiracy to commit bank robbery and being a felon-in-possession of a firearm  and on his 1993 Michigan conviction for resisting and obstructing a police officer. The jury found this aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt and that it supported imposition of the death penalty. It is well-established that the government may offer evidence of other criminal acts as a non-statutory aggravating factor. See Allen, 247 F.3d at 789 and cases cited. Bolden argues that this non-statutory factor allowed the government to submit the same evidence to support multiple aggravating factors, creating the risk that the jury would give too much weight to the aggravating factors, thereby skewing its weighing of the aggravating and mitigating factors in deciding whether to impose the death penalty. Though the concern is legitimate, see Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 232-33, 112 S.Ct. 1130, 117 L.Ed.2d 367 (1992), the Supreme Court has never held that aggravating factors could be duplicative so as to render them constitutionally invalid. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 762, quoting Jones v. United States, 527 U.S. 373, 398, 119 S.Ct. 2090, 144 L.Ed.2d 370 (1999) (plurality opinion). The government based the pecuniary gain statutory factor on Bolden's desire to rob the bank. It based the obstruction of justice non-statutory factor on his motive to kill Ley to eliminate a witness. And it based the other criminal activity non-statutory factor in part on his possession of a firearm while conspiring to rob the bank. [T]he same facts can support different inferences that form different aggravators. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 762. The district court properly instructed the jurors that in weighing the aggravating and mitigating factors, they were not simply to count each factor and reach a decision based on which number is greater; rather, they should individually consider the weight and value of each factor before deciding whether a sentence of death is justified. There was no unconstitutional duplication. Bolden further argues that, other than the conspiracy conviction, these crimes lacked sufficient relevance to the decision. He cites no authority supporting the assertion that the district court should have struck the other convictions on this ground. The district court did not allow the government to introduce less relevant aspects of Bolden's criminal history, such as misrepresentations to his landlord and employer, improperly received unemployment benefits, and multiple driving violations. He argues that the Michigan convictions were too remote and allowed the jury to consider unadjudicated drug trafficking. The record does not support this assertion. The court struck testimony regarding drug sales in 1994 that were well before Bolden's 1995 Michigan conviction. [11] The government did not argue that the Michigan drug offenses or their underlying conduct supported this non-statutory factor, and the jury was instructed that these convictions could not constitute other crimes for purposes of this factor. Moreover, in Lee, 274 F.3d at 494-95, we affirmed admitting evidence of various unadjudicated offenses. (3) Victim Impact Evidence. [T]he Eighth Amendment erects no per se bar to the admission of victim impact evidence and to prosecutorial argument on that subject. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991). In the FDPA, Congress provided that the government may introduce as a non-statutory aggravating factor victim impact evidence including oral testimony, a victim impact statement that identifies the victim of the offense and the extent and scope of the injury and loss suffered by the victim and the victim's family, and any other relevant information. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a). Evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family is relevant to the jury's decision as to whether or not the death penalty should be imposed [and t]here is no reason to treat such evidence differently than other relevant evidence is treated. Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597. However, admission of evidence so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair violates the Due Process Clause. Id. at 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597. Bolden contends that the district court erred by allowing sixteen victim impact witnesses to testify during the penalty phase. He argues the testimony was cumulative, unfairly prejudicial, and left the jury one small step removed from actual attendance at the victim's memorial service. He notes that sixteen witnesses far exceeded the number this court has previously approved, [12] and that their testimony took up over 80% of the government's penalty phase case-in-chief. Acknowledging that no appellate court has vacated a federal death sentence on this ground, Bolden asserts that no appeal has presented the voluminous amount and prejudicial quality of impact evidence concerning a single victim. Bolden cannot challenge the victim impact testimony by Ley's parents and relatives. See Payne, 501 U.S. at 827, 111 S.Ct. 2597. He contends that allowing Ley's friends, coworkers, and pastor to testify about Ley's relationship with his girlfriend, career aspirations, and the affect of Ley's death on his parents inflamed the jury, leaving it unable to fairly weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors. However, Ley's aspirations and relationships and the impact of his death on his family were highly relevant to establishing this non-statutory factor. Though portions of this testimony overlapped, we agree with the district court it was not so cumulative as to confuse the issues or create unfair prejudice. [13] Qualitatively, this evidence was similar to the victim impact evidence we upheld in United States v. Johnson, 495 F.3d 951, 977 (8th Cir.2007); United States v. Nelson, 347 F.3d 701, 713-14 (8th Cir.2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 978, 125 S.Ct. 486, 160 L.Ed.2d 355 (2004); Allen, 247 F.3d at 778-79; and Simmons v. Bowersox, 235 F.3d 1124, 1135 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 924, 122 S.Ct. 280, 151 L.Ed.2d 206 (2001). Bolden's additional challenges to specific victim impact evidence are without merit. Numerous witnesses read passages they wrote in a memorial journal. This was probative of Ley's character, not inflammatory, and substantially similar to evidence deemed proper in other cases. See, e.g., Johnson, 495 F.3d at 976-77; Chanthadara, 230 F.3d at 1274. The government played the tape of a 911 call from Ley's girlfriend requesting a police escort to the hospital on the afternoon he was killed. The probative value of this evidence outweighed the risk of unfair prejudice because it best captured the emotional impact of Ley's death on his loved ones. Admission of a collection of photographs taken at a memorial service held by the bank where Ley worked, plus resolutions in Ley's honor from the Missouri House of Representatives and the St. Louis Board of Alderman, were relevant to Ley's uniqueness as a human being and the impact of his death, Payne, 501 U.S. at 823-27, 111 S.Ct. 2597, and not so unduly prejudicial as to render the trial fundamentally unfair. Finally, a co-worker who ran to assist Ley when he was shot graphically described Ley's condition and the impact that experience had on the witness's life. This was clearly admissible as the most probative evidence of the effect of Bolden's crime on his victim. It was undoubtedly prejudicial, but not unfairly so. The district court placed few limits on Bolden's mitigating evidence; he argued thirty-two mitigating factors to the jury. See Paul, 217 F.3d at 1002. The number of victim impact witnesses alone does not establish unfair prejudice. After the sixteen testified on Monday afternoon, Tuesday morning, and Wednesday morning, the jury heard closing arguments and instructions on Thursday. After the court's cautionary instructions regarding victim impact testimony and a recess on Friday, the jury began deliberations the following Monday. It returned the verdict on Tuesday, finding all five aggravating factors and many of the thirty-two mitigating factors. This timing does not suggest that the sentence was the product of passion rather than careful, reasoned judgment. B. Mitigation Issues. The FDPA defines mitigating factors to include factors in the defendant's background, record, or character or any other circumstance of the offense that mitigate against imposition of the death sentence. 18 U.S.C. § 3592(a)(8). Here, the district court submitted thirty-two distinct mitigating factors, twenty-one of which were found to exist by at least one juror. Bolden argues that the court erred by refusing to submit three additional factors: (a) The execution of Robert Bolden may not necessarily alleviate the victim's or victim's family suffering. (b) Robert Bolden's execution will cause his family great emotional pain and distress. (c) The sentence of life in prison without the possibility of release is an adequate harsh alternative punishment that will protect society from further risk of criminal conduct by Robert Bolden. The court ruled that the record lacked evidence to support the submission of these three factors. As to the first proposed factor, the government was precluded from eliciting testimony concerning the Ley family's desires for punishment. Parker v. Bowersox, 188 F.3d 923, 931 (8th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1038, 120 S.Ct. 1534, 146 L.Ed.2d 348 (2000), and cases cited. Thus, there was no evidence about the effect of Bolden's execution on the Ley family's suffering. As to the second, Bolden elicited substantial testimony from his children about his positive impact on their lives, and the district court submitted seven mitigating factors related to Bolden's positive impact on his family and their love for him. Any additional instruction would have been duplicative. As to the third, it was the province of the jury to decide whether life in prison was an adequate harsh punishment for Bolden's crimes. The government did not submit Bolden's future dangerousness as a non-statutory aggravating factor, which obviated any need for a mitigating instruction whether life in prison would adequately protect society from the risk of future criminal conduct. Special instructions are necessary when the jury could not otherwise give meaningful effect to a defendant's mitigating evidence. Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 127 S.Ct. 1654, 1668 n. 14, 167 L.Ed.2d 585 (2007) (emphasis in original). Here, in addition to submitting thirty-two factors, the district court instructed the jurors to consider any mitigating factors whether or not specifically argued by defense counsel which are established by a preponderance of the evidence. There was no abuse of the court's substantial discretion to fashion appropriate instructions. Bolden further argues that the district court placed unconstitutional limits on his mitigation evidence. Prior to trial, the district court granted the government's motion in limine to prevent Bolden from introducing unsworn allocution evidence during the penalty phase without being subject to cross-examination. During the penalty phase, he notified the government that mitigation witness John Wilson would testify that he helped Bolden prepare a statement of accountability to explain his remorse to Ley's family and friends. The government objected, and the district court ruled that Bolden could not introduce the statement nor have Wilson testify about assisting Bolden in preparing it, as both constituted unsworn allocution. Bolden argues the court abused its discretion because this ruling contravened the Eighth Amendment by preventing him from introducing relevant mitigation evidence. The FDPA permits introduction of relevant mitigating evidence even if inadmissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence, but this does not mean that the defense has carte blanche to introduce any and all evidence that it wishes. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 756. Among other limitations, the defendant does not have a statutory right to make statements to a jury during the penalty phase of an FPDA trial without being subject to cross-examination. Id. at 761. Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding an unsworn, unsigned, undated statement lacking any indicia of reliability unless the government could cross examine Bolden about its creation. We also note that Bolden elicited testimony about his post-offense remorse from another mitigation witness. C. Penalty Phase Evidentiary Issues. (1) Bolden argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing the government to use a styrofoam head to illustrate the trajectory of the bullets as they hit Ley during the testimony of a forensic pathologist. Because the head was inflexible, he contends, it provided an arbitrary basis for the jury to determine whether the shots were fired intentionally or accidentally. After obtaining assurances that the pathologist would limit her use of the demonstrative exhibit, the court ruled that use of the skull would not be unfairly prejudicial and, alternatively, that any prejudice was outweighed by the probative value of this evidence. There was no abuse of the court's substantial evidentiary discretion. United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543, 555 (8th Cir.) (en banc) (standard of review), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 909, 126 S.Ct. 266, 163 L.Ed.2d 239 (2005). (2) Bolden argues the district court abused its discretion by allowing the government to ask mitigation witness Mona Muhammad if she was biased against the government because her son was convicted of first degree murder following an investigation by two case agents who investigated Bolden. Cross exam of a penalty phase mitigation witness for bias is proper. Purkey, 428 F.3d at 760. Moreover, Rule 611(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly allows cross exam concerning matters affecting the credibility of the witness. We grant broad deference to the district court's determination of the appropriate scope of cross exam. United States v. Crenshaw, 359 F.3d 977, 1002 (8th Cir.2004). Here, the inquiry did not create a risk of unfair prejudice, confuse the issues, or mislead the jury. See § 3593(c). (3) During cross exam, the government asked Bolden's aunt if she was aware Bolden attempted to sell his daughters back to their mother for $5,000. Bolden objected before the witness could answer. After a sidebar conference, the district court sustained the objection and instructed the jury to disregard the question. On appeal, Bolden argues the question was improper. As the district court granted the relief he requested, no issue was preserved for appellate review. D. Penalty Phase Instruction Issue. Bolden first argues that the district court's preliminary instruction at the start of the penalty phase concerning the possible penalties for his conviction on the felon-in-possession count misled the jury into believing he might not serve the rest of his life in prison if not sentenced to death. This contention is frivolous. The court's thorough final instructions at the conclusion of the penalty phase accurately stated the law and unambiguously instructed, with respect to the bank robbery count: if you determine that death is not justified. . . you must record your determination that the defendant be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release, as 18 U.S.C. § 2113(e) mandates. Bolden next argues that the district court erred in refusing to give a proffered instruction reflecting his contention that, under § 3593(e), the jury is never required to impose a sentence of death, even if it has found that the aggravating circumstances sufficiently outweigh the mitigating circumstances to justify a death sentence. We have rejected this contention in many cases. See, e.g., Allen, 247 F.3d at 779-82; Purkey, 428 F.3d at 762-63. The district court's instructions were consistent with the FDPA as construed in these decisions. Moreover, the court's instruction adequately incorporated Bolden's contention that the jury was not required to impose a death sentence: If you unanimously conclude that the aggravating factor or factors . . . sufficiently outweigh the mitigating factor or factors . . . and that therefore death is the appropriate sentence. . . you must record your determination that a sentence of death shall be imposed (emphasis added). E. The Mental State Gateway Issue. The FDPA provides that, for the defendant to be eligible for a death sentence, the jury must find that he (A) intentionally killed the victim; (B) intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury that resulted in the death of the victim; (C) intentionally participated in an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken or intending that lethal force would be used . . . and the victim died as a direct result of the act; or (D) intentionally . . . engaged in an act of violence, knowing that the act created a grave risk of death . . . such that participation . . . constituted a reckless disregard for human life and the victim died as a direct result of the act. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2). Over Bolden's objection, the district court submitted and the jury found that Bolden had acted with all four mental states in committing both capital offenses. Bolden argues that this enhanced the risk that jurors would inflate the weight of mental state evidence during the penalty phase. We disagree. Numerous decisions have approved submission of multiple mental states in FDPA cases. See United States v. Jackson, 327 F.3d 273, 300-01 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1019, 124 S.Ct. 566, 157 L.Ed.2d 434 (2003); United States v. Webster, 162 F.3d 308, 323-24 (5th Cir.1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 829, 120 S.Ct. 83, 145 L.Ed.2d 70 (1999); United States v. Cheever, 423 F.Supp.2d 1181, 1199-1200 (D.Kan. 2006); Natson, 444 F.Supp.2d at 1308-09. We agree with these decisions. Here, as in Webster, the court instructed the jury to weigh the aggravating and mitigating factors with no mention of the gateway element of intent. [14] Moreover, the verdict form segregated the mental state inquiry from the aggravating and mitigating factors and made clear the sequential nature of the process. Webster, 162 F.3d at 324. Not every capital crime may support the submission of all four mental states, but the district court did not err in concluding that the evidence warranted submitting all four in this case. F. The Government's Summation. Bolden argues that the government's incendiary penalty phase closing argument denied him a fair trial. He objects to many portions of the argument, but none of the arguments made on appeal were preserved with contemporaneous objections in the district court. Accordingly, our review is for plain error. United States v. Robinson, 110 F.3d 1320, 1326 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 975, 118 S.Ct. 432, 139 L.Ed.2d 331 (1997). To obtain relief, Bolden must show that an error occurred, that it was plain, that it affected his substantial rights, and that it seriously affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. To show that an error affected his substantial rights, he must demonstrate[ ] a reasonable probability that he would have received a more favorable sentence with the . . . error eliminated. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 551. Most of the arguments Bolden challenges were not improper. For example, Bolden notes that the prosecutor repeatedly de-emphasized and belittled his proposed mitigating factors, but as long as the jurors are not told to ignore or disregard mitigators, a prosecutor may argue, based on the circumstances of the case, that they are entitled to little or no weight. Johnson, 495 F.3d at 978. The prosecutor did improperly ask the jury to impose the death penalty on behalf of the Ley family, an argument for which there was no supporting evidence. Rather than object, Bolden later requested an instruction that the jury not speculate about the family's wishes. The district court gave that instruction. After careful review of all the challenged comments, we conclude they were isolated and insubstantial in context and far less egregious than statements we have deemed harmless in other capital cases. See e.g., Johnson, 495 F.3d at 979-80; Ortiz, 315 F.3d at 903. We conclude there was no plain error and, alternatively, that Bolden has failed to establish plain error that substantially affected his rights. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.