Opinion ID: 2520017
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Did the District Court Fail to Comply with This Court's Order on Remand?

Text: Grabow alleged that Rockefeller committed several breaches of his fiduciary duties, which we described in Rockefeller I as follows: The evidence submitted at trial could lead a jury to conclude that while Rockefeller was the Grabows' agent, he misrepresented to them the commission typical to the marketplace; took on the representation of a piece of property, the sale of which eventually depended upon winning a lawsuit against the Grabows; helped set up a means whereby Linn could afford to sue the Grabows; and shared information about the Grabows' bargaining position with Staten and Linn while keeping all information from Linn and Staten confidential. 136 Idaho at 647, 39 P.3d at 587. When we remanded the case to the district court for determination of the amount of the forfeiture of Rockefeller's development fee, we directed the district court to consider factors, including the ... timing of the violation and whether the agent completed a divisible portion of his contract duties before the breach occurred for which compensation can be determined. 136 Idaho at 643, 39 P.3d at 583. Those factors are significant in this case because the alleged breaches occurred at different times. The Agreement between Rockefeller and the Grabows had two divisible portions: the subdividing and development of the project for which Rockefeller was to be paid a development fee and the marketing and sales of the lots for which Rockefeller was to be paid a sales commission. The first alleged breach occurred before the Agreement was executed. The Grabows alleged that during the negotiations leading to the Agreement, Rockefeller, who was at the time already their agent, misrepresented that the sales commission typical in the marketplace was eight percent. The remaining alleged breaches occurred after Rockefeller had substantially completed the subdividing and development portion of the Agreement. If Rockefeller had committed the first alleged breach, it would have been before he had completed a divisible portion of his contract duties. If he had not, the breach would have been after he had substantially completed a divisible portion of his contract duties. On remand, the district court found that Rockefeller's statement regarding the typical sales commission in the marketplace was not a misrepresentation, and therefore the breach of fiduciary duty occurred after Rockefeller had substantially completed the subdividing and development portion of the Agreement. The Grabows contend that such finding violates the directive of our remand order and is barred by the law-of-the-case doctrine. They argue that, as a matter of law, the first breach should have been found to have occurred at the inception of the Agreement. When this Court, in deciding a case upon appeal, states in its opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the district court and upon subsequent appeal. Dachlet v. State, 136 Idaho 752, 40 P.3d 110 (2002). The law-of-the-case doctrine also prevents consideration on a subsequent appeal of alleged errors that might have been, but were not, raised in the earlier appeal, Bouten Constr. Co. v. H.F. Magnuson Co., 133 Idaho 756, 992 P.2d 751 (1999), and the challenging of factual findings that were affirmed in the earlier appeal, Insurance Assoc. Corp. v. Hansen, 116 Idaho 948, 782 P.2d 1230 (1989). One of the issues raised in Rockefeller I was whether the district court erred in submitting the issue of punitive damages to the jury. When addressing whether there was substantial evidence to submit that issue to the jury, we stated: The evidence submitted at trial could lead a jury to conclude that while Rockefeller was the Grabows' agent, he misrepresented to them the commission typical to the marketplace; took on the representation of a piece of property, the sale of which eventually depended upon winning a lawsuit against the Grabows; helped set up a means whereby Linn could afford to sue the Grabows; and shared information about the Grabows' bargaining position with Staten and Linn while keeping all information from Linn and Staten confidential. The evidence supporting these possible conclusions constitutes sufficient evidence from which a jury could decide Rockefeller purposefully favored Linn over the Grabows in order to earn a commission on the sale between Linn and Staten. The district judge properly submitted the issue of punitive damages to the jury. 136 Idaho at 647, 39 P.3d at 587. We stated that the evidence could lead a jury to conclude that Rockefeller had violated his fiduciary duty in the ways alleged. We did not state that the jury had concluded that Rockefeller had violated his fiduciary duty in all of the ways alleged by the Grabows. In this case, the jury rendered a general verdict, answering yes to the question, Did Rockefeller breach his fiduciary duty to the Grabows? The jury was not asked to determine whether Rockefeller had breached his fiduciary duty in each or all of the ways alleged by the Grabows. The verdict being general, it is impossible to determine the basis on which the jury arrived at it. Brown v. Hardin, 31 Idaho 112, 116, 169 P. 293, 295 (1917). A general verdict is not a determination that all of the claims or theories upon which it could be based have been proven. It is merely a determination that at least one of such claims or theories has been proven. Therefore, we will uphold a general jury verdict if there is any theory upon which it can be based. Fitzgerald v. Walker, 121 Idaho 589, 826 P.2d 1301 (1992). Thus, although we noted that a jury has now determined Rockefeller violated his fiduciary duties, 136 Idaho 648, 39 P.3d 588, we did not hold that his violation of his fiduciary duties included misrepresenting the sales commission typical in the marketplace. We remanded the issue of Rockefeller's development fee to the district court for a determination of whether Rockefeller should forfeit all, or just a portion, of his commission. Id. To do so, the district court was required to consider factors including the timing of the breach and whether Rockefeller had completed a divisible portion of his contract duties before the breach occurred. Because the general jury verdict was not a determination of the particular manner in which Rockefeller had breached his fiduciary duties, the district court could not properly consider these factors without first determining whether Rockefeller breached his fiduciary duties when he stated that the typical sales commission in the marketplace was eight percent. When doing so, the district court complied with this Court's order on remand.