Opinion ID: 1549002
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Objectively Baseless

Text: Section 9-33-2(a)(1) defines objectively baseless as meaning that no reasonable person exercising the right of speech or petition could realistically expect success in procuring the government action, result, or outcome   . It is worth noting that this Court has had several occasions to address this definition, and we never have held that a defendant's actions were objectively baseless. In Cove Road Development v. Western Cranston Industrial Park Associates, 674 A.2d 1234, 1239 (R.I.1996), we held that an appeal by landowners and industrial park members of a zoning amendment that was beneficial to a residential real estate developer that could have negatively impacted the industrial park operations was not objectively baseless, in that an objective litigant could reasonably have expected a successful outcome. In Hometown Properties, Inc., 680 A.2d at 58-59, 64, we held that letters and statements made to the Department of Environmental Management and other state and federal agencies opposed to a proposed landfill were not objectively baseless because, in part, they were grounded in scientific reports and studies. In Global Waste Recycling, Inc. v. Mallette, 762 A.2d 1208, 1210-13 (R.I.2000), we affirmed the grant of conditional immunity under the anti-SLAPP statute to neighbors who made statements to a newspaper that were critical of the handling of flammable materials at a waste recycling plant after a fire broke out at the plant, because the statements were based on personal knowledge and publicly available information, and, therefore, were not objectively baseless. Most recently in Alves, 857 A.2d at 754, this Court determined that letters to the editor of a newspaper that addressed an issue of public concern that was currently under consideration by the local government were not objectively baseless because they were a reasonable attempt to petition the government to address the defendant's concerns. Indeed, only once, in Pound Hill Corp. v. Perl, 668 A.2d 1260, 1264 (R.I.1996) ( Pound Hill ), has this Court determined that there were genuine issues of fact that required the denial of summary judgment and remand to the Superior Court for trial on the issue of whether a defendant's petitioning activities constituted a sham. In Pound Hill, a landowner protested a town council's vote to rezone a parcel of land even though the council vote clearly met the ordinances requirement of a three-fifths majority to rezone land. Id. at 1262. Additionally, the landowner in that case filed an action in the Superior Court to enjoin the town council from taking further action after the time for filing an appeal had expired, and also sought a further administrative appeal that lacked substantive merits, and an appeal to the Superior Court that was untimely. Id. at 1262, 1264. We vacated a grant of summary judgment on the ground that genuine issues of fact remained about whether the landowner's actions were objectively baseless and utilized the process itself rather than the intended outcome in order to hinder and delay plaintiff. Id. at 1264, 1264-65. Here, the motion justice determined that Pardee's actions were objectively baseless because she ruled that Pardee had no right to appeal Weston's letters. She reasoned that the letters were purely informational and nonbinding, because such letters were statutorily restricted to be for guidance or clarification only. Reasoning that Pardee had not been aggrieved by a decision, and that only an aggrieved party can appeal to the board, the motion justice ruled that Pardee's attempt to appeal lacked a legal basis and was thus objectively baseless. Before this Court, Pardee argues that even if there was no clear right to appeal Weston's letters under the zoning ordinance, his appeal was not objectively baseless because the board, as well as the motion justice who heard the 1997 motion for summary judgment, agreed that Pardee had the right to appeal from Weston's letter. In other words, he asks how his appeal can be categorized as objectively baseless if the board granted it and the motion justice overruled the Board only because she said the appeal was untimely. In his appeal, Karousos embraces the 2003 motion justice's rationale that Pardee's actions were objectively baseless because Pardee had no statutory right to appeal from any of Weston's letters. Because we agree with the motion justice's ruling that Pardee's appeal to the zoning board of review did not meet the second prong of the sham exception in that it was not subjectively baseless, we need not, and do not reach the issue of whether his efforts were objectively baseless.