Opinion ID: 2630572
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admissibility of the Presentence Report

Text: ¶ 26 After being convicted of the robberies at his first trial, Maestas hand-wrote his version of the robberies on a Statement of the Offense form, which was then included as part of the presentence report. In his statement, Maestas admitted to robbing the restaurant and gas station. ¶ 27 After Maestas was granted a new trial in Maestas I, the prosecution sought to admit his statements from his presentence report during the new trial. Because the trial court concluded that nothing in the record suggest[ed] that defendant's written statement ... was not voluntary, the trial court ruled that the prosecution could admit the incriminating statements from this report as part of its case-in-chief. ¶ 28 Maestas appeals this ruling, raising several constitutional and statutory claims. In particular, Maestas contends that admission of the statements from his presentence report would violate (1) his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination; (2) his right to allocute and appeal; (3) subsection 77-18-1(5)(d) (1999) [3] of the Utah Code, which Maestas claims makes presentence reports unavailable for purposes other than sentencing; and (4) subsection 4-202.02(6)(C) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, which requires that presentence reports be treated as controlled judicial records. Because we conclude that section 77-18-1 and related statutes preclude admission of the presentence report, we focus exclusively on this aspect of Maestas's argument. ¶ 29 Section 77-18-1 delineates, inter alia, the preparation and disclosure requirements for presentence reports. Subsection 77-18-1(5) deals specifically with the Department of Corrections's responsibilities in preparing the report: (5) (a) Prior to the imposition of sentence, the court may, with the concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of the sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investigation report from the [D]epartment [of Corrections] .... (b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact statement.... (c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages .... (d) The contents of the presentence investigation report ... are not available except by court order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the department. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(5) (Supp.2001). Maestas relies on subsection 77-18-1(5)(d) to argue that his presentence report is available for purposes of sentencing only and thus inadmissible in the prosecution's case-in-chief. ¶ 30 As discussed below, Maestas overlooks the fact that the disclosure limitations specified in section 77-18-1(5)(d) are replaced by less stringent limitations once a presentence report has been completed and reviewed for accuracy. Subsection 77-18-1(5), as we have noted, deals with the preparation of the report. The fact that subsection (5)(d)'s strict disclosure limitation falls within a subsection focusing exclusively on the report's preparation indicates that the legislature intended that the limitation apply only to the preparation phase of the report. ¶ 31 Strict access control during the report's preparation apparently arose out of the legislature's concerns over releasing possibly inaccurate information. During the preparation phase, the parties have not had an opportunity to challenge the report's accuracy. This opportunity comes once the Department of Corrections completes its preparation of the report, as shown in subsection 77-18-1(6): (6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel, the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a determination of the relevance and accuracy on the record. (b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered to be waived. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (Supp.2001). ¶ 32 After completion of the review detailed in subsection 77-18-1(6), the information in a presentence report is presumptively accurate. The report is then used to inform the court's decision regarding the proper sentence. ¶ 33 Subsection 77-18-1(14) then addresses the disclosure limitations on the completed and presumptively accurate reports. Significantly, despite classifying the reports as protected under the Government Records Access and Management Act, subsection 77-18-1(14) lists five conditions under which the report may be disclosed for purposes other than sentencing: (14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections 63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the [D]epartment [of Corrections] may disclose the presentence investigation only when: (a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7); (b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of the offender; (c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole; (d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or subject's authorized representative; or (e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to statements or material provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime on the victim or the victim's household. Id. § 77-18-1(14) (emphasis added). ¶ 34 Of particular relevance to the trial court's order in this case is subsection 77-18-1(14)(a), which provides that the Department of Corrections may disclose presentencing reports when ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7). Id. Based on subsection 77-18-1(14)(a), Maestas's presentence report is subject to court-ordered disclosure if the order complies with subsection 63-2-202(7). ¶ 35 We thus turn to subsection 63-2-202(7) to determine whether the trial court properly ordered disclosure of Maestas's presentence report for use in the prosecution's case-in-chief. Subsection 63-2-202(7) of the Utah Code falls within a statute entitled, Access to private, controlled, and protected records. Utah Code Ann. § 63-2-202 (Supp.2001). Subsection 63-2-202(7) deals specifically with the conditions governing access to such records based on a court order signed by a judge from a court of competent jurisdiction. Id. § 63-2-202(7). ¶ 36 By its terms, subsection 63-2-202(7) places several conditions on court-ordered disclosure of presentence reports: (7) A government entity shall disclose a record pursuant to the terms of a court order signed by a judge from a court of competent jurisdiction, provided that: (a) the record deals with a matter in controversy over which the court has jurisdiction; (b) the court has considered the merits of the request for access to the record; and (c) the court has considered and, where appropriate, limited the requester's use and further disclosure of the record in order to protect ... privacy interests or the public interest in the case of other protected records; (d) to the extent that the record is properly classified . . . protected, the interests favoring access, considering limitations thereon, outweigh the interests favoring restriction of access; and (e) where access is restricted by ... statute ... referred to in Subsection 63-2-201(3)(b), the court has authority independent of this chapter to order disclosure. Id. § 63-2-202(7). ¶ 37 Since the trial court apparently was not made aware of subsection 78-1-18(15) or its reference to subsection 63-2-202(7), the court reached no conclusion with respect to subsection 63-2-202(7)'s conditions regarding court-ordered disclosure. In addition, neither Maestas nor the state advances any arguments with respect to these conditions. ¶ 38 Based on our analysis, we conclude that, as a matter of law, disclosure of the report does not satisfy the requirements of subsection 63-2-202(7). Specifically, the circumstances in this case meet only three of the five conditions enumerated in subsection 63-2-202(7): (1) Maestas's admissions concerning the robberies in his presentence report deal[] with a matter in controversy over which the [trial] court has jurisdiction. Id. § 63-2-202(7)(a); (2) by granting the state's request for disclosure, the court apparently considered the merits of the request for access to Maestas's statements in the report. Id. § 63-2-202(7)(b); and (3) although access to [the report] is restricted by a ... statute [i.e., section 77-18-1], subsection 77-18-15(a) allows for disclosure by court order and gives courts authority independent of ... chapter [2] to order disclosure. Id. § 63-2-202(7)(e). ¶ 39 We are not satisfied, however, that the two remaining conditions specified by section 63-2-202 are met. First, there is no evidence that the court considered and, where appropriate, limited the requester's use and further disclosure of the record in order to protect . . . privacy interests or the public interest. Id. § 63-2-202(7)(c). Indeed, rather than considering more limited uses of the report (e.g., disclosure only for impeachment purposes), the court ordered that the requester (i.e., the prosecution) could publicly disclose Maestas's statements during its case-in-chief. ¶ 40 Second, we conclude that even limited disclosure of the presentencing report is unwarranted. In particular, subsection 63-2-202(7)(d) requires that the interests favoring the permitted scope of access outweigh the interests favoring restriction of access before disclosure is ordered. We believe that the exclusion of the presentence report in the prosecution's case-in-chief is supported by the same concerns laid out hereafter in our analysis. Briefly, a defendant's statements repeated in a presentence report are functionally equivalent to his statements at sentencing in that they are both made pursuant to his right to petition the court for mercy. We conclude that any interest favoring access to the presentence report by the state are outweighed by Maestas's legislatively-recognized privacy interest in the records. ¶ 41 Under the circumstances, we hold that the interests favoring non-disclosure prevail. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order allowing the prosecution to admit in its case-in-chief Maestas's statements in his presentence report. Having determined that the Utah Code is dispositive of the issue, we need not reach Maestas's arguments under the federal or state constitution or the Utah Code of Judicial Administration.