Opinion ID: 341470
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: factual background and issues

Text: 2 The publication of the Pentagon Papers 5 in the summer of 1971 spurred the President to form a Special Investigations or Room 16 unit within the White House, whose purpose was to investigate the theft of the Pentagon Papers and prevent other such security leaks. Defendant Ehrlichman, who was the Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, exercised general supervision over the unit; Egil Krogh and David Young were charged with its operation. At the time, Krogh was an assistant to Ehrlichman; Young worked with the National Security Council. They sought, and received, Ehrlichman's approval to add G. Gordon Liddy, a former F.B.I. agent, and E. Howard Hunt, a former C.I.A. agent, to the unit. 3 Appellant's brief describes the activity of the unit, insofar as pertinent, as follows (Br. 6-8): The unit's principal enterprise seemed to be the acquisition of all files and source material on Daniel Ellsberg. There was a generalized concern over his motives for releasing classified materials (the Pentagon Papers). Young and Krogh instructed the CIA to do a psychological profile on Ellsberg. Since Dr. Fielding had refused an interview by the FBI on the ground of doctor/patient confidentiality, Hunt suggested examining Dr. Fielding's file on Ellsberg, and further suggested a black bag job (surreptitious entry) while noting that the FBI no longer engaged in such activities. When Young reviewed the psychological assessment on Ellsberg prepared by the CIA, he determined that it was superficial, and recommended that a covert operation be undertaken to examine all the medical files held by Ellsberg's psychoanalyst. The exhibit reflects Ehrlichman's approval of the recommendation with his addition: Provided that it is not traceable back to the White House. 6 4 The members of the unit were clear that the covert operation in question would be a surreptitious entry into Dr. Fielding's office. Ehrlichman's primary defense at trial, however, was that he was not apprised of, and thus did not authorize, such an entry. He testified that he thought he had approved only a conventional private investigation, involving no surreptitious search of Dr. Fielding's office. Considerable evidence was introduced on both sides of the question. The jury's guilty verdict on the conspiracy Count I reflected a finding that Ehrlichman had in fact authorized the search. 5 Krogh and Young insisted that no one employed by the White House was to effect the actual entry into Fielding's office. Hunt traveled to Miami in mid-August 1971 to enlist the assistance of Bernard Barker, who had worked under Hunt during the Bay of Pigs operation. Hunt was widely known and respected in Miami's Cuban-American community as a government agent who had been a leader in the fight to liberate Cuba. He did not identify the object of the search, but told Barker only that the operation involved a traitor who had been passing information to the Soviet Embassy. On the basis of this information Barker recruited two men, Eugenio Martinez and Felipe de Diego, for the operation. 6 Hunt and Liddy met Barker, Martinez, and de Diego in Los Angeles on 2 September 1971. The Miamians were informed their mission was to enter Dr. Fielding's office, that Dr. Fielding was not himself the subject of the investigation, but that they were to photograph the file of one of his patients (they were not told Ellsberg's name until minutes before the break-in) and return the file to its place. On 3 September Barker and de Diego, dressed as deliverymen, delivered a valise containing photographic equipment to Dr. Fielding's office, enabling them at the same time to unlock the door to facilitate subsequent entry. Later that evening they and Martinez, contrary to expectations, found both the building and Dr. Fielding's office locked. The Miamians forced their way into the building, broke the lock on the office door, and used a crowbar on Dr. Fielding's file cabinets. As instructed if this became necessary, they spilled pills and materials about the office to make it appear that the break-in was the work of a drug addict. Throughout the operation surgical gloves were used to avoid fingerprint detection. In spite of all efforts, Ellsberg's records eluded them. 7 After relating the details of the entry and their lack of success to Hunt, Barker, Martinez, and de Diego returned to Miami. Hunt and Liddy returned to Washington, where they reported the failure of the operation to Krogh and Young. Krogh relayed that information to Ehrlichman. 7 8 White House involvement in the break-in remained unknown for almost two years. When the facts about the operation began to surface, however, on 14 March 1973 Ehrlichman was called before the grand jury to testify about his knowledge of the affair. He stated that he had not been aware prior to the break-in that the Room 16 unit was looking for information with which to compose a psychological profile of Ellsberg, and had had no advance knowledge that an effort was to be made to get such information from Dr. Fielding. One year later he was indicted, subsequently tried and convicted, for his role in authorizing the break-in and for his efforts to conceal his involvement by lying to the grand jury. 9 Ehrlichman raises on appeal two substantive challenges to his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 241 of conspiracy to violate the Fourth Amendment rights of Dr. Fielding. The first is that the break-in, although conducted without a judicial warrant, did not violate the Fourth Amendment, because it was undertaken pursuant to the President's delegable constitutional prerogative in the field of foreign affairs to authorize such a search. The second argument is that even if the search was unjustified in either law or fact and thus illegal, the Special Prosecutor failed to meet his burden under section 241 of proving Ehrlichman acted with a specific intent to interfere with Dr. Fielding's constitutional rights. As we interpret the case law surrounding section 241, the first issue that of the applicability under these circumstances of the foreign affairs exemption to the warrant requirement is bound up in the second. They will be discussed together in Part II below. 10 Ehrlichman does not challenge his conviction of two counts of perjury on substantive grounds relating particularly to those counts or to the law of perjury. He does, however, attack his conviction as a whole both for conspiracy and for perjury on a number of grounds relating to the fairness of the trial and certain of the District Court's procedural rulings. His principal argument is that he was denied a fair trial, in the light of prejudicial pre-trial publicity, when the court failed to dismiss the indictment, continue or change the venue of the trial, or conduct a voir dire adequate to eliminate possibly prejudiced jurors. Our close examination of the procedures followed by the trial judge has satisfied us that he properly made the determinations required of him under the controlling decisions of this court. 8 11 Subsidiary arguments advanced by Ehrlichman against the conduct of the trial are levelled at the District Court's decision not to sever Ehrlichman's prosecution from that of his co-defendants, the court's refusal to order certain discovery Ehrlichman claimed was important to his defense, and the court's failure to require then-President Nixon to testify or to respond to detailed interrogatories propounded by Ehrlichman. 9 These issues we take up in Part III. 12