Opinion ID: 2449541
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Offender Score

Text: ¶ 8 Mutch argues that his offender score was miscalculated and that the error invalidates the basis for his exceptional sentence. We review the calculation of an offender score de novo. State v. Parker, 132 Wash.2d 182, 189, 937 P.2d 575 (1997). Here, the State concedes that Mutch's offender score was miscalculated at his first resentencing hearing. Remand for resentencing with the correct offender score would typically be the appropriate remedy. Id. at 192-93, 937 P.2d 575. However, while review was pending in this court, on the State's motion, the trial court held a new resentencing hearing to remedy the conceded error. The trial court resentenced Mutch with a corrected offender score of 16, the total arrived at after extracting his prior conviction for federal bank robbery from the calculation and counting his two prior convictions for first degree robbery together. Compare Clerk's Papers (CP) at 9, with Suppl. CP at 166; see former RCW 9.94A.360(3), (6)(c) (1992), recodified as RCW 9.94A.525(3), (5)(a)(ii). At 16, the score is still well above 9, the high-end score on the sentencing grid. ¶ 9 Mutch argues that his offender score is still incorrect because the trial court did not consider his five counts of rape to be the same criminal conduct. We review the `trial court's determination of what constitutes the same criminal conduct . . . [for] abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law.' State v. Tili, 139 Wash.2d 107, 122, 985 P.2d 365 (1999) (quoting State v. Walden, 69 Wash.App. 183, 188, 847 P.2d 956 (1993)). Under the law in effect at the time of Mutch's conviction, multiple offenses were considered the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes if they involved the same criminal intent, were committed at the same time and place, and involved the same victim. Former RCW 9.94A.400(1)(a) (1990), recodified as RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Mutch argues that his five counts of rape meet these criteria and should therefore have been counted together in the offender score as a single offense. ¶ 10 Mutch advanced this argument pro se at his sentencing hearing, and the trial court rejected it without any analysis on the record. We note that a trial court's outright refusal to even consider the argument that crimes that are the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes may be error. [1] Here, although there was some argument at the resentencing hearing, the court's analysis is not evident in the record. Nevertheless, there is sufficient evidence in the trial court record to sustain a finding that the multiple rapes should be treated separately for sentencing purposes. We therefore affirm the trial court's calculation at the second resentencing hearing because it was not an abuse of discretion to count each rape separately in calculating the offender score. ¶ 11 In Tili, this court found that, while the unit of prosecution for rape is any penetration, 139 Wash.2d at 114, 985 P.2d 365, the multiple counts in that case constituted the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes, id. at 124-25, 985 P.2d 365. The Tili court distinguished State v. Grantham, 84 Wash.App. 854, 856-57, 859, 860-61, 932 P.2d 657 (1997), a Court of Appeals case that found that multiple counts of rape were not the same criminal conduct. Tili, 139 Wash.2d at 123-24, 985 P.2d 365. The critical difference between Tili and Grantham is that the defendant in Grantham `had the time and opportunity to pause, reflect, and either cease his criminal activity or proceed to commit a further criminal act,' so his `crimes were sequential, not simultaneous or continuous.' Id. (quoting Grantham, 84 Wash.App. at 859, 932 P.2d 657). The two rapes in Grantham occurred in the same evening, interrupted by threats and other physical assaults. Grantham, 84 Wash.App. at 856, 932 P.2d 657. In contrast, Tili 's three counts of rape occurred over approximately two minutes, so the court found it unlikely that Tili formed an independent criminal intent. Tili, 139 Wash.2d at 124, 985 P.2d 365. The distinction turned on the objective formation of criminal intent by the defendant between the multiple counts of rape. Id. at 123, 985 P.2d 365; see State v. French, 157 Wash.2d 593, 613, 141 P.3d 54 (2006). ¶ 12 Here, Mutch's criminal acts happened over the course of a night and the entire next morning. Between the last incident of rape and the previous four, Mutch slept, which certainly required him to form a new criminal intent once he awoke. Moreover, the fifth rape took place in another room of the house. Regarding counts one through four, Mutch emphasizes J.L.'s testimony that the same thing happened four times that night, referring to repeated episodes of oral and vaginal rape, broken by gaps of time with no assault where Mutch made her repeat things, including who's the king and who do you belong to. 2 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (Trial, Sept. 21, 1994) (VRP) at 178. Mutch argues that he barely paused, never changed his focus, and that he therefore did not form new intent. His argument is unpersuasive. ¶ 13 The facts of this case are more like those in Grantham than in Tili or other cases where the different counts of rape occurred within a very short time period. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, 95 Wash.App. 187, 190, 975 P.2d 1038 (1999). J.L. clearly testified that Mutch stopped between each of the episodes of rape and that the time between each rape episode during the night was around an hour or so. 2 VRP (Trial, Sept. 21, 1994) at 273. Given these substantial breaks between the different counts, Mutch clearly had time to pause, reflect, and either cease or continue. He objectively formed new criminal intent. ¶ 14 While the trial court should have done this analysis on the record, the trial record is sufficient to sustain the ultimate finding that Mutch's five rape counts are not the same criminal conduct for sentencing purposes. We therefore affirm the calculation of Mutch's offender score that was used at his second resentencing.