Opinion ID: 2331594
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alaska Law Protects A Criminal Defendant's Pre-Arrest And Post-Arrest Silence.

Text: Alaska law provides greater protection than federal law for a criminal defendant's right to remain silent both before and after arrest. Under the United States Constitution, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from cross-examining a defendant about his decision to remain silent after receiving Miranda warnings. [20] In Doyle v. Ohio , the United States Supreme Court concluded that while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. [21] The Doyle court thus held that it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. [22] In subsequent decisions, however, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the U.S. Constitution does not prohibit a state from cross-examining a defendant about his failure to give a statement prior to arrest or prior to receiving Miranda warnings. [23] In contrast, Alaska case law protects a criminal defendant's right to remain silent both before and after arrest. As we explain below, evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence is prohibited by the Alaska Constitution, and evidence of a defendant's pre-arrest silence will usually be inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403 due to its inherently low probative value and its high risk of unfair prejudice. Article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution provides in part that [n]o person shall be compelled in any criminal proceeding to be a witness against himself. Implicit in this right is the notion that when an accused person chooses to exercise his right to silence, such silence may not be commented upon. [24] And we have held that article I, section 9 prohibits the state from using a defendant's post-arrest silence for substantive or impeachment value, even if the defendant did not receive Miranda warnings. In a 1972 case, Davis v. State , we expressed our disapproval of any comment absent waiver by the prosecution on an accused's silence resulting from the exercise of his constitutional rights. . . . [A]n inference of guilt may not be drawn from a failure to speak or to explain when a person has been arrested. [25] A 1976 concurring opinion written by Chief Justice Boochever and joined by Justice Rabinowitz further explained that evidence of silence in the face of custodial interrogation by police is not properly admissible in a trial. [26] In Gunnerud v. State , a 1980 case, we reversed a conviction where the prosecutor had played a recording for the jury that included the defendant exercising her right to remain silent. [27] In that case the prosecutor used the tape during his case-in-chief, and it concerned silence after Miranda warnings had been administered. We observed that [i]t is well settled that prosecutorial comment on silence for substantive or impeachment value is constitutionally prohibited. [We have] specifically disapproved any comment upon a defendant's exercise of the right to remain silent. [28] Finally, one year after Gunnerud in Dorman v. State , we held that plain error occurred when the prosecutor told the jury in closing argument that they should infer guilt from the defendant's silence during the period after his arrest but prior to receiving Miranda warnings. [29] Neither this court nor the court of appeals has decided whether the Alaska Constitution prohibits the state from using evidence of a defendant's pre-arrest silence. [30] But we do not need to decide that question in this case for two reasons. First, at the very least, Alaska law protects a defendant's pre-arrest silence through the rules of evidence, and in this case, evidence of Adams's pre-arrest silence was inadmissible under Evidence Rule 403. Adams has shown that the admission of this evidence was plain error. [31] And second, in this case the prosecutor violated Adams's constitutional rights by commenting on Adams's post -arrest silence. Allowing the prosecutor's comments to be presented to the jury also amounted to plain error. [32] In Silvernail v. State , the court of appeals held that it was plain error for the trial court to admit evidence of the defendant's pre-arrest silence because the inherently low probative value of the defendant's silence was outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Evidence Rule 403. [33] Silvernail was charged with murder and testified on his own behalf, attempting to establish a defense of duress. [34] On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned Silvernail about why he did not explain his claim of duress when he was initially stopped by police. [35] Silvernail's counsel objected on Fifth Amendment grounds, but the trial court ruled that questions about Silvernail's pre-arrest silence were admissible. [36] The court of appeals held that although the trial court was correct in its reasoning that the federal constitution only prohibits evidence of post- Miranda silence, the trial court should have excluded the evidence of Silvernail's pre-arrest silence under Evidence Rule 403. [37] The court of appeals noted that despite the U.S. Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution, numerous state courts have continued to condemn evidence of pre- Miranda silence, relying on both state constitutional provisions and the rules of evidence. [38] The court of appeals further recognized that whether it is grounded in constitutional protections or evidentiary principles, the prohibition on using evidence of a defendant's silence is motivated by the same concerns: The underlying rationale of the constitutional bar against admitting evidence of a defendant's post-arrest silence is the concern that such evidence is only minimally probative, while possessing a high potential for prejudice to the defendant's case. This is the same basic concern expressed in Alaska Rule of Evidence 403. [39] The court of appeals reiterated that the Alaska Supreme Court and this court have both expressed distrust of silence as probative evidence of guilt. [Alaska courts] have previously recognized the low probative value of silence, as well as its concomitantly high potential for prejudice. [40] The court of appeals went on to discuss why the probative value of a defendant's silence is inherently low. The court of appeals observed that while silence can potentially be probative under circumstances in which it would have been natural for the accused to speak, there are many reasons why an accused's natural response would be to remain silent. [41] A defendant's silence might be motivated by fear or intimidation; a failure to understand the question or realize that a reply was necessary; an unwillingness to incriminate another; mistrust of law enforcement; or simply an awareness of his right to remain silent. [42] The court of appeals concluded that, given these various motivations for silence, distinctions between pre-arrest, post-arrest, and post- Miranda silence are of little significance when the issue is whether the accused's silence is probative of guilt. [43] The court of appeals noted that although Silvernail had not yet been arrested, he was engaged by the police in a plainly confrontational setting and was clearly not obligated to respond to the officers who stopped him. His silence may well have reflected nothing more than his awareness of and reliance on this right. [44] Reiterating that the potential prejudice from this line of inquiry is both obvious and substantial, the court of appeals held that evidence of Silvernail's pre-arrest silence was plainly improper under Alaska Rule of Evidence 403. [45] Silvernail's conclusion that there is little to distinguish between pre-and post-arrest silence when the issue is whether an accused's silence is probative of guilt is sound, and we adopt it. We recognize that Evidence Rule 403 is a balancing test and thus necessarily contemplates a case where evidence of pre-arrest silence is more probative than prejudicial. Given the numerous reasons that silence can be a natural response, in most cases an accused's pre-arrest silence will be ambiguous at best, and the high potential for unfair prejudice will require evidence of pre-arrest silence to be prohibited for substantive or impeachment value. Of course, any evidence of post-arrest silence, whether or not Miranda warnings were administered, remains prohibited under article I, section 9 of the Alaska Constitution.