Opinion ID: 754217
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver of Appeal by Garcia and Danziger

Text: 15 Initially, we consider the Government's contention that Garcia and Danziger, in their plea agreements, have waived their right to appeal their sentences. The form of waiver used in this case is significantly different from other appeal waivers that we have encountered. Usually, the form of waiver states that the defendant will not appeal a sentence within (or below) a specified guideline sentencing range. See, e.g., United States v. Chen, 127 F.3d 286, 288 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Maher, 108 F.3d 1513, 1531 (2d Cir.1997); United States v. Ready, 82 F.3d 551, 554 (2d Cir.1996); United States v. Yemitan, 70 F.3d 746, 747 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Stevens, 66 F.3d 431, 436 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Jacobson, 15 F.3d 19, 23 & n. 1 (2d Cir.1994); United States v. Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d 51, 51 (2d Cir.1993); United States v. Rivera, 971 F.2d 876, 896 (2d Cir.1992). 16 By contrast, our case involves a form of waiver in which the defendant waives a sentencing appeal if the sentence is within or below whatever guideline range is determined by the District Court to be applicable. We first encountered this form of sentence appeal waiver in United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 99 (2d Cir.1997). Noting that this agreement assured the defendant only that he could appeal an upward departure but denied him the opportunity to appeal the correctness of any applicable guideline range determination made by the sentencing judge, we characterized the waiver as an unorthodox agreement that presents grave dangers and implicates both constitutional questions and ordinary principles of fairness and justice. Id. 17 Rosa noted that one consequence of this unusual form of waiver was that it implicates the 'knowing and voluntary' inquiry to an even greater extent than does the standard plea [agreement]. Id. at 100. We had previously made clear that a waiver of appellate rights must be knowing and voluntary. Ready, 82 F.3d at 557; Stevens, 66 F.3d at 437; Salcido-Contreras, 990 F.2d at 51. Indeed, we have stated that a waiver of the right to appeal should only be enforced by an appellate court if the record 'clearly demonstrates' that the waiver was both knowing (in the sense that the defendant fully understood the potential consequences of his waiver) and voluntary. Ready, 82 F.3d at 557 (citing United States v. Schmidt, 47 F.3d 188, 190 (7th Cir.1995)). 18 Our approach to ascertaining whether a waiver of appeal is knowing and voluntary has varied. Sometimes we have enforced the waiver without any explicit inquiry as to whether the appellate waiver was knowing and voluntary. See Maher, 108 F.3d at 1531; Rivera, 971 F.2d at 896. Sometimes we have simply noted the absence of any dispute as to whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary. See Rosa, 123 F.3d at 102 n. 11 (waiver issue deemed waived); Yemitan, 70 F.3d at 747. Sometimes we have examined the Rule 11 plea allocution and determined that the appellate waiver was not adequately or accurately explained. See Chen, 127 F.3d at 290; Ready, 82 F.3d at 557. Sometimes we have examined the record and noted that it contained an inadequate basis to determine whether the waiver was knowing and voluntary, and we therefore remanded for fact-finding. See Stevens, 66 F.3d at 437. 19 In the pending case, the Government contends that the waiver issue has been waived because it was not raised until the filing of the appellants' reply brief. To this, the defendants reply in kind by pointing out that the Government, rather than filing a motion to dismiss the appeal, sought to invoke the appellate waiver for the first time in its main brief on the appeal, after which the defendants timely challenged the effectiveness of the waiver in their reply brief. We think the issue of the effectiveness of the waiver has not been waived. 20 In this case, the record fails to demonstrate the effectiveness of the waiver. At the plea allocution there was no colloquy concerning appellate waiver. The waiver was mentioned at the sentencing hearing, but at that time, the Judge told the defendants that they did have a right to appeal, and then, when the Government mentioned the waiver, Chief Judge Sifton said, There [are] still substantial issues, I assume, as to whether I got the right guidelines which I assume is not covered by an agreement assuming the validity of an agreement.... 21 In the absence of any adequate indication that the defendants understood and knowingly agreed to this unusual form of appellate waiver, we conclude that it is ineffective. That conclusion requires us to consider an appropriate remedy, an issue on which we sought and have received briefs from the parties. There are three choices: 22 1. The Government urges us to proceed to decide the merits of the appeals of Danziger and Garcia, and, if we were to deem them entitled to any relief, only then face the issue of the consequence of the appellate waiver. In the Government's view, at that point we would afford the Government the option of (a) letting the District Court amend the sentences to conform to our reversal or (b) vacating the plea agreement. 23 That remedy is clearly unacceptable. We will not issue what might become an advisory opinion on the merits in order to help the Government make up its mind. 24 2. A second, and more plausible, possibility is to structure a series of choices whereby the Government would first be given the choice of forgoing the appellate waiver provision of the plea agreement or electing to have the plea agreement vacated in its entirety, and then, if the Government chose to have the plea agreement vacated, the defendants would have the choice of permitting the waiver provision to be enforced (i.e., withdrawing their appeal) or having the plea agreement vacated. The idea of a structured sequence of choices is not new in this Court. See United States v. Showerman, 68 F.3d 1524, 1529 (2d Cir.1995). And we have previously ruled that, where a defendant's success on appeal might expose him to unsatisfactory consequences, the defendant should have the option of withdrawing his appeal, rather than have exposure to such consequences forced on him. See United States v. Bohn, 959 F.2d 389, 392 (2d Cir.1992). Many defendants would much prefer to accept part of the benefits of a plea bargain, even if they lose some anticipated benefit. They should not necessarily be forced into an all or nothing choice. 25 3. The defendants urge us simply to sever the waiver provisions and proceed to adjudicate the merits of their sentencing issues. That is what we did in Chen, 127 F.3d at 290-92, and Ready, 82 F.3d at 560. Other courts have done the same thing. See, e.g., United States v. Buchanan, 59 F.3d 914, 918 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1353 (11th Cir.1993); United States v. Baty, 980 F.2d 977, 979 (5th Cir.1992); United States v. Wessells, 936 F.2d 165, 168 (4th Cir.1991). 26 Appellants contend that severance is warranted because the appellate waiver is an unconscionable provision that should be severed as a matter of contract law. See, e.g., N.Y.U.C.C. § 2-302(1) (McKinney 1993). Though the waiver provision is unusual and fraught with dangers, as we pointed out in Rosa, we ultimately ruled that this form of waiver was not unfair in the circumstances of that case. In this case, however, there is an aggravating circumstance that weighs in favor of severance. Our decision on the merits of Martinez's appeal accords him the benefit of a deduction in calculating his personal tax liability to reflect the amount of the corporate tax that his corporation should have paid (in essence, a reduction of imputed income). Since Garcia and Danziger are deemed liable for participating in Martinez's scheme, and their tax losses are calculated on the basis of his tax loss, it would be unduly harsh to enforce the waiver and deny them the corporate tax offset we are giving him. Under these circumstances, we will sever the ineffective waiver provision and proceed to the merits. We select the severance option only because the waiver is of the unusual form used in Rosa and the merits of the claims of Garcia and Danziger are so closely related to that of Martinez.