Opinion ID: 1801680
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Claims of Juror Misconduct

Text: Defendant contends that during the penalty phase deliberations the jury foreperson engaged in prejudicial misconduct when he read to the jury a note sent to him by a friend. Six days after the return of the penalty verdict and six weeks before defendant's sentencing, the jury foreman described the contents of that note in an article he authored, entitled Condemned: How 12 men and women decided Richard Allen Davis should die, which was published in the August 11, 1996, edition of the San Jose Mercury News. In that article, the foreperson explained: I read a note to the jury in deliberations that had been mailed to me by a friend before we reached a verdict. It read: `I wanted to send you this note of thanks before the jury reaches a verdict so that you know whatever decision is reached doesn't matter. You know how I feel about jury duty and the importance of it in our society. You and the other members have accepted a long and difficult assignment and done it well. As a body you have done much to restore faith, confidence, and integrity in the jury system. I'm sure I'm not alone in that thought.' Before his sentencing, defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that this article constituted evidence of prejudicial juror misconduct. The trial court denied the motion without a hearing. We conclude the motion was properly denied under either state or federal law. (43) It is, of course, misconduct for a juror to introduce any extrinsic material into the jury room. ( People v. Mincey (1992) 2 Cal.4th 408, 483 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 822, 827 P.2d 388], citing § 1137.) Juror misconduct or a nonjuror's contact or communication with a sitting juror ordinarily raises a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. ( In re Hamilton, supra, 20 Cal.4th at p. 295.) (44) The trial court has the discretion to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth or falsity of allegations of jury misconduct, and to permit the parties to call jurors to testify at such a hearing, but such a hearing is not a matter of right. ( People v. Avila (2006) 38 Cal.4th 491, 604 [43 Cal.Rptr.3d 1, 133 P.3d 1076].) Rather, it should be held only when the defense presents evidence indicating `a strong possibility that prejudicial misconduct has occurred' and the court concludes a hearing is `necessary to resolve material, disputed issues of fact.' ( Ibid., quoting People v. Hedgecock (1990) 51 Cal.3d 395, 419, 415 [272 Cal.Rptr. 803, 795 P.2d 1260].) On appeal, `[a]ny presumption of prejudice is rebutted, and the verdict will not be disturbed, if the entire record in the particular case, including the nature of the misconduct or other event, and the surrounding circumstances, indicates there is no reasonable probability of prejudice, i.e., no substantial likelihood that one or more jurors were actually biased against the defendant.' ( People v. Mendoza, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 196.) We perceive no reasonable probability of prejudice in this case. Although the foreman should not have read to the jury a note sent to him by a nonjuror, we agree with the trial court that the note was not prejudicial by any stretch of imagination. The note did not refer to any extraneous evidence and did not contain any inflammatory rhetoric. As the trial court succinctly noted, the note was simply a pat on the back for the jury's service on this case, and it could not have biased any juror against defendant in any way. Because the parties did not demonstrate the existence of any factual dispute regarding the note, the trial court's decision to deny the motion without holding a hearing was well within its discretion. (See People v. Page (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1, 58-59 [79 Cal.Rptr.3d 4, 186 P.3d 395]; People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 294 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451]; People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 582 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 145, 73 P.3d 1137].)