Opinion ID: 221342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The First Amendment Right of Access to Government Proceedings

Text: Courts and commentators have long recognized the centrality of openness to adjudicatory proceedings: `Without publicity, all other checks are insufficient: in comparison of publicity, all other checks are of small account.' In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 271, 68 S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682 (1948) (quoting 1 Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evidence 524 (1827)). While the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a ... public trial to the accused, U.S. Const. amend. VI, the value of openness for the defendant has not always been strictly distinguished from its value to the public and to the adjudicatory proceeding itself. The knowledge that every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. at 270, 68 S.Ct. 499. In Oliver, seemingly Sixth Amendment public access was seen as a guarantor of fairness, accuracy, and correct procedure  as much because these further democratic values and help adjudicators reach correct results as because they protect defendants. The distinction in protected values was drawn clearly in Gannett Co., Inc. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 99 S.Ct. 2898, 61 L.Ed.2d 608 (1979), which held that the Sixth Amendment guaranteed only the right of the accused to have his trial held before the public and did not protect the right of the public to observe the proceeding. A year later, however, a plurality of the Court found this public right to be implicit in the guarantees of the First Amendment. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814, 65 L.Ed.2d 973 (1980) (plurality opinion). It stated that without the freedom to attend such trials, ... important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated. Id. (internal quotation marks and footnote omitted). [6] Free speech, the plurality opinion noted, carries with it some freedom to listen. Id. at 576, 100 S.Ct. 2814. The First Amendment's guarantees of freedom of speech and the press entail that `the government [be prohibited] from limiting the stock of information from which members of the public may draw.' Id. (quoting First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978)). Public access to trials helps give meaning to those explicit guarantees of freedom of speech and the press  guarantees that protect the right to speak and to publish concerning what takes place at a trial, and that would lose much meaning if access to observe the trial could ... be foreclosed arbitrarily. Id. at 575, 576-77, 100 S.Ct. 2814. As this implies, the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is not absolute. It does not foreclose the possibility of ever excluding the public. What offends the First Amendment is the attempt to do so without sufficient justification. This right, incidentally, is also consistent with the rights of the accused. As Gannett made clear[,] ... although the Sixth Amendment guarantees the accused a right to a public trial, it does not give [her] a right to a private trial. Id. at 580, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (citing Gannett, 443 U.S. at 382, 99 S.Ct. 2898). And the presumptive First Amendment right of access precludes a judge or a defendant, or both together, from arbitrarily closing a criminal proceeding. [7] Justice Brennan's concurrence in Richmond Newspapers offered two helpful principles to guide courts in determining whether a qualified right of access attaches to a given government proceeding. Id. at 589, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (Brennan, J., concurring). First, courts should inquire into experience (history) and consider[] whether the place and process have historically been open to the ... public. Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S.Ct. 2735, 92 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986) ( Press-Enterprise II ) (internal quotation marks omitted). Second, courts should consider logic (functionality) and ask whether public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular process in question. Id. Courts apply this experience and logic test to determine whether a qualified right of public access attaches to a given government forum. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 605, 102 S.Ct. 2613; Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 94-95 (2d Cir.2004). Reading Richmond Newspapers broadly, the Supreme Court has subsequently held that the First Amendment safeguards a qualified right of access not only to criminal trials but to related proceedings such as witness testimony, Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 608-10, 102 S.Ct. 2613; the transcripts of voir dire proceedings, Press-Enterprise v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 505-10, 104 S.Ct. 819, 78 L.Ed.2d 629 (1984) ( Press-Enterprise I ); and preliminary hearings, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-15, 106 S.Ct. 2735. Our circuit has further held that the presumption of access applies to other aspects of criminal trials as well, including judicial records such as videotapes of defendants, In re Application of Nat'l Broad. Co. ( United States v. Myers), 635 F.2d 945, 952 (2d Cir.1980); pretrial suppression hearings, In re Application of the Herald Co. ( United States v. Klepfer), 734 F.2d 93, 99 (2d Cir.1984); plea agreements and plea hearings, United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 86-87 (2d Cir.1988); information on the payment of court-appointed counsel, United States v. Suarez, 880 F.2d 626, 630-31 (2d Cir.1989); bail hearings, United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 323-24 (2d Cir.2004); live voir dire proceedings, ABC, Inc. v. Stewart, 360 F.3d 90, 100 (2d Cir. 2004); and sentencing hearings, United States v. Alcantara, 396 F.3d 189, 191-92 (2d Cir.2005). We have also held that the public's right implies that particular individuals may not be summarily excluded from court. Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 83-84 (2d Cir.2005). [8] Most relevant for the present case, we have concluded that the First Amendment guarantees a qualified right of access not only to criminal but also to civil trials and to their related proceedings and records. Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 22 (2d Cir.1984); see also Hartford Courant, 380 F.3d at 93 (civil and criminal docket sheets). Significantly, all the other circuits that have considered the issue have come to the same conclusion. See, e.g., Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846 F.2d 249, 253-54 (4th Cir.1988); In re Continental Ill. Secs. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus., Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1070 (3d Cir.1984); In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir.1983); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 801 (11th Cir.1983). [9] This recognition of the right to attend civil trials derives from the fact that the First Amendment, unlike the Sixth, does not distinguish between criminal and civil proceedings; nor does it distinguish among branches of government. Rather, it protects the public against the government's arbitrary interference with access to important information. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 583, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (Stevens, J., concurring). As the district court below aptly noted, [o]nce unmoored from the Sixth Amendment, there is no principle that limits the First Amendment right of access to any one particular type of government process. NYCLU, 675 F.Supp.2d at 431 (internal quotation marks omitted). However, neither our Court nor the Supreme Court has had occasion to consider under what conditions, if at all, a qualified right of access attaches to non-trial civil proceedings like the administrative adjudication at issue here. It is to that question that we now turn.
The NYCTA would have us forgo the Richmond Newspapers test: it argues that administrative proceedings are never subject to a presumption of public access and that Richmond Newspapers and its progeny apply only to courts. The NYCTA argues that, since administrative proceedings were rare, if not nonexistent, in the early Republic, they are totally different from either criminal or civil trials, which enjoyed centuries of open access, dating back before the Founding. The First Amendment, the NYCTA claims, could not possibly guarantee a right to access something that barely existed at the time of the Founding. Instead, the NYCTA suggests, the issue of public access to administrative proceedings is one for the legislature or the administrative agency itself to decide, free from judicial supervision. This argument fails for several reasons. The Supreme Court has not specified how courts should determine whether the experience and logic test applies to administrative proceedings. But we have good reason to think that this determination does not involve asking whether the proceedings in question have a history of openness dating back to the Founding. As the Sixth Circuit has stated, the Supreme Court effectively silenced this argument in Press-Enterprise II, where the Court relied on exclusively post-Bill of Rights history in determining that preliminary hearings in criminal cases were historically open. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 700 (6th Cir.2002) (citing Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 10-12, 106 S.Ct. 2735). More importantly, the NYCTA's claim is refuted by the reasoning of the public access cases themselves. These focus not on formalistic descriptions of the government proceeding but on the kind of work the proceeding actually does and on the First Amendment principles at stake. [T]he First Amendment question cannot be resolved solely on the label we give the event, i.e., `trial' or otherwise, particularly where the [proceeding] functions much like a full-scale trial. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 7, 106 S.Ct. 2735. In extending the right of public access from the criminal trial to its components and on to civil trials, the Supreme Court and the circuits have emphasized the importance of access to public participation and to government accountability  values, the courts have emphasized, that are central to democracy. [T]he First Amendment ... has a structural role to play in securing and fostering our republican system of self-government, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (Brennan, J., concurring). And public access serves to ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to self-government. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604, 102 S.Ct. 2613. There is little cause to think that this reasoning has significantly less force in the administrative context. And this is especially so when the administrative process at issue so closely resembles that of the courts. See Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 710 (A government operating in the shadow of secrecy stands in complete opposition to the society envisioned by the Framers of our Constitution.). Of course, widespread administrative adjudication is a relatively new phenomenon. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 755, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002) (noting that formalized administrative adjudications were all but unheard of in the late 18th century and early 19th century). But changes in the organization of government do not exempt new institutions from the purview of old rules. Rather, they lead us to ask how the new institutions fit into existing legal structures. If, as the NYCTA suggests, government institutions that did not exist at the time of the Framers were insulated from the principles of accountability and public participation that the Framers inscribed in the First Amendment, legislatures could easily avoid constitutional strictures by moving an old governmental function to a new institutional location. Immunizing government proceedings from public scrutiny by placing them in institutions the Framers could not have imagined, as the NYCTA urges, would make avoidance of constitutional protections all too easy. Two other circuits have considered a similar question, and they have likewise concluded that  Richmond Newspapers is a test broadly applicable to issues of access to government proceedings, North Jersey Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 208-09 (3d Cir.2002), and especially to quasi-judicial administrative proceedings, because there is a limited First Amendment right of access to certain aspects of the executive and legislative branches, Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 695. As a result, these circuits have each applied the experience and logic test in the administrative context. See id. at 705 (holding that the experience and logic test applies to removal proceedings and that the public has a qualified right of access to those proceedings); North Jersey Media Group, 308 F.3d 198 (holding that the experience and logic test applies to removal proceedings and that the public lacks a qualified right of access to those proceedings). The fact that, in applying this test, the circuits differed on how the test played out in no way counters their holdings, with which we agree, that the test applies to administrative trials. Similarly, albeit in a different line of cases, the Supreme Court has recognized that the adjudicatory work of administrative agencies can be sufficiently like that of the courts to warrant requiring the agencies to follow principles that apply to courts. For instance, Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978), which extended the absolute immunity enjoyed by Article III judges to administrative law judges, noted that judicial immunity stems from the characteristics of the judicial process rather than its location within one or another branch of government. Id. at 512, 98 S.Ct. 2894. And, the Court determined, adjudication within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of the judicial process to render the work of the modern federal hearing examiner or administrative law judge within this framework... functionally comparable to that of a judge. Id. at 512-13, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (internal quotation marks omitted). More recently, Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority concluded that states retained the sovereign immunity they enjoyed in court when they were subject to an administrative adjudicatory proceeding that `walks, talks, and squawks very much like a lawsuit.' Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 535 U.S. at 757, 122 S.Ct. 1864 (quoting South Carolina State Ports Authority v. Fed. Mar. Comm'n, 243 F.3d 165, 174 (4th Cir.2001)). Such cases recognize that the principles governing adjudication do not lose validity when the adjudication moves to another branch of government. Indeed, as the Supreme Court has stated, when governmental agencies adjudicate or make binding determinations which directly affect the legal rights of individuals, it is imperative that those agencies use the procedures which have traditionally been associated with the judicial process. Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442, 80 S.Ct. 1502, 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960). In the present case, the TAB acts as an adjudicatory body, operates under procedures modeled on those of the courts, and impose[s] official and practical consequences upon members of society. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 595, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (Brennan, J., concurring). When a neutral adjudicator determines whether public transit users have violated a Rule, that determination has the force of law and, like the criminal trial for which it substitutes, it is a genuine governmental proceeding. Id. at 596, 100 S.Ct. 2814. The TAB and the court serve similar functions, in similar ways, and have a similar effect on the parties before them. In so holding, we need not, and should not, make any broad pronouncement about the right of access to administrative processes generally. Given the wide variety of proceedings that characterize the administrative state, that would be as foolhardy as it is unnecessary. But we have no trouble concluding that the First Amendment guarantees a presumptive right of access at least to this administrative forum. We therefore proceed to examine the experience and logic of open access to the TAB's proceedings. [10]
Our inquiry is considerably simplified by the jurisdiction the TAB shares with the Criminal Court. The fact that an alleged violator may be subject either to a court or to a TAB proceeding at the total discretion of the police officer, rather than by reference to any alleged conduct, suggests that the two forums are functionally comparable. Butz, 438 U.S. at 513, 98 S.Ct. 2894 (internal quotation marks omitted). The Richmond Newspapers test looks not to the formal description of the forum but to the historical experience in that type or kind of hearing throughout the United States. El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147, 150, 113 S.Ct. 2004, 124 L.Ed.2d 60 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in the original). While the TAB's relaxed procedures and administrative placement differentiate it somewhat from the Criminal Court, the jurisdictional overlap and shared function of the two forums render them in important ways the same  type or kind of hearing. Id. Because of this, how the experience and logic inquiry comes out with respect to the Criminal Court largely determines how it comes out for the TAB as well. And, since access to criminal court hearings is the core of the entire Richmond Newspapers line of cases, a similar result for the TAB seems almost foreordained. The government cannot simply dress up a criminal trial in the guise of an administrative hearing and thereby evade the well-established requirement that criminal proceedings be open to the public. Even without the functionally equivalent Criminal Court as a guide, however, we would come to the same conclusion. The NYCTA argues that because there is no history of open access to the TAB dating back to the First Amendment, TAB proceedings cannot be presumptively open under that amendment. But the Supreme Court has instructed us to ask not whether the First Amendment was formulated with some particular forum in mind, but whether the place and process have historically been open. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 2735. If we understood this instruction to require us to look to the physical location and institutional proceeding at issue, we might conclude, as the NYCTA urges, that the offices of the TAB and its hearings have been subject to the current access policy for the TAB's entire brief history. To take this view, however, would be to rely on precisely the kind of formalism that the Richmond Newspapers line of cases eschews. [11] The process that goes on at TAB hearings is a determination of whether a respondent has violated a Transit Authority Rule. And that process was presumptively open from the inception of the Rules system in 1966, when such proceedings were heard only in open criminal courts. [12]
Our answer to the logic part of the inquiry is, again, guided by the logic of access to the Criminal Court, which has been well established. As with the experience prong, however, looking just to the TAB itself yields the same result. The logic prong of the inquiry essentially asks whether openness enhances the ability of the government proceeding to work properly and to fulfill its function. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 2735. This inquiry requires an understanding of what the function of a particular process is and an evaluation of the role of openness in it. [13] Court trials, which serve both as a mechanism for judicial factfinding, [and] as the initial forum for legal decision making, Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 596, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (Brennan, J., concurring), have been held to depend on publicity as a check that enhance[s] the fairness of the trial itself, United States v. Doe, 63 F.3d 121, 126 (2d Cir.1995). TAB proceedings similarly serve an adjudicatory function that determines respondents' rights. As a proceeding that, like a trial, involves both factfinding and legal decision making, the TAB hearing is subject to the same dangers  whether willful or accidental  as a trial, dangers that can be reduced significantly by the kind of [p]ublic scrutiny ... [that] enhances the quality and safeguards the integrity of the factfinding process. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. 2613. Furthermore, in a TAB proceeding, individuals confront the power of their government to judge and penalize their actions; like a trial, it is a part of the general administration of justice that is central to government authority. Doe, 63 F.3d at 126. In this sense, like a trial, one of the TAB's functions is to maintain the public perception of government as a legitimate authority that satisfies the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the system. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508, 104 S.Ct. 819. And it is this appearance of fairness that has been held to be enhance[d] by open access. Id. at 508, 509, 104 S.Ct. 819. Finally, because the TAB, like other administrative agencies, forms a part, albeit small, of a larger web of government authority, [f]ree access [to it] ... informs the populace of the workings of government and fosters more robust democratic debate, Doe, 63 F.3d at 126, thereby serv[ing] to insure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and contribute to our republican system of self-government, Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 604, 102 S.Ct. 2613. The NYCTA has not argued that public access would not enhance the TAB's functioning in these ways. Rather, it suggests that the possibility that some respondents would be dissuaded from contesting their notices of violation in person suffices to outweigh any potential benefits of publicity. But far from showing that this danger is real, the NYCTA has offered no empirical support for th[is] claim. Id. at 609, 102 S.Ct. 2613. Like the Sixth Circuit, we do not believe speculation should form the basis for ... a ... restriction of the public's First Amendment rights. Detroit Free Press, 303 F.3d at 709. To the extent that a particular defendant or witness has a legitimate interest in excluding the public from a specific proceeding before the TAB, the NYCTA retains the authority to close the hearing room on an ad hoc basis, provided that its decision complies with the requirements set out in Williams v. Artuz, 237 F.3d 147 (2d Cir.2001), and delineated below. Accordingly, because public access plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the [TAB] process, Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8, 106 S.Ct. 2735, we hold that TAB proceedings are subject to a public right of access under the First Amendment.
The First Amendment right of access is always qualified. Just as a government may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions upon the use of its streets in the interest of such objectives as the free flow of traffic, so may a trial judge, in the interest of the fair administration of justice, impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 581 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 2814 (plurality opinion) (internal citation omitted). The same, of course, applies as to other government proceedings subject to the right of access. The Supreme Court has stated, however, that the State's justification in denying access must be a weighty one, Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606, 102 S.Ct. 2613, and that [c]losed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be rare and only for cause shown, Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509, 104 S.Ct. 819. The Globe Newspaper Court, for instance, held that even the State's interest in shielding minor victims of alleged sex crimes from further trauma and embarrassment and encourag[ing]... such victims to come forward and testify, 457 U.S. at 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, was insufficient to justify a statute requiring an across-the-board, mandatory closure of a court whenever such minors testified. Rather, Globe Newspaper made the trial court determine the necessity and propriety of closure on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 608, 102 S.Ct. 2613. The standard for exclusion, as stated by the High Court, is that there be an overriding interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. The interest is to be articulated along with findings specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure order was properly entered. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510, 104 S.Ct. 819; see also Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606-07, 102 S.Ct. 2613 (Where, as in the present case, the [government] attempts to deny the right of access in order to inhibit the disclosure of sensitive information, it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.). The same standard applies whether the defendant is seeking or objecting to closure, and whether the motion is made under the Sixth Amendment or the First. Doe, 63 F.3d at 128. In our circuit, a government proceeding subject to a qualified First Amendment right of access may be closed if four factors are satisfied: `[1] the party seeking to close the hearing must advance an overriding interest that is likely to be prejudiced, [2] the closure must be no broader than necessary to protect that interest, [3] the trial court must consider reasonable alternatives to closing the proceeding, and [4] it must make findings adequate to support the closure.' Williams, 237 F.3d at 152 (quoting Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48, 104 S.Ct. 2210, 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984)); [14] see also Doe, 63 F.3d at 127 (Given the presumption of openness, `proceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on the record findings are made demonstrating that closure is essential to preserve higher values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.') (quoting Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13-14, 106 S.Ct. 2735) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Accordingly, we have recognized that a person's physical safety as well as the privacy interests of individuals such as witnesses, third parties, and those investigated in connection with a legal violation, may warrant closure. Doe, 63 F.3d at 127. Thus, we have allowed a court to exclude the public from proceedings during the testimony of police officers whose undercover work was ongoing, Ayala v. Speckard, 131 F.3d 62, 72 (2d Cir.1997) (en banc); to exclude the public from part of voir dire, where the trial judge had made on-the-record findings that the risk of juror dishonesty about racial bias in a highly publicized case sufficed to warrant keeping in camera voir dire transcripts sealed until after a jury had been impaneled, United States v. King, 140 F.3d 76 (2d Cir.1998); and to limit the entrance of new observers to a trial during the testimony of a key witness in order not to distract the jury, Williams, 237 F.3d at 152. The TAB's access policy, however, does not come close to meeting our standard for justifying closure. A respondent need not articulate any interest prejudiced by public access; the closure is total for that respondent's hearing; and the hearing officer neither considers alternatives nor makes any findings regarding the relative weight of the interests at stake. See Williams, 237 F.3d at 152. Indeed, the TAB's policy resembles one explicitly addressed by the Supreme Court in a case that struck down a local court rule allowing [preliminary criminal] hearings to be closed upon the request of the defendant, without more. El Vocero de Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. at 150, 113 S.Ct. 2004. That case and others have made clear that the government may not arbitrarily close its proceedings to the public when, as in the case before us, it does so by allowing private parties to wield the arbitrary power.