Opinion ID: 1418047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Domestic Violence Finding

Text: Appellant argues that the circuit court committed error in finding that domestic violence was proven on the facts of this case. Domestic violence is specifically defined by statute as requiring the commission of one or more of the following acts between family or household members: [12] (1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing physical harm to another with or without dangerous or deadly weapons; (2) Placing another in reasonable apprehension of physical harm; (3) Creating fear of physical harm by harassment, psychological abuse or threatening acts; (4) Committing either sexual assault or sexual abuse as those terms are defined in articles eight-b [§§ 61-8B-1 et seq. and 61-8D-1 et seq.] and eight-d, chapter sixty-one of this code; and (5) Holding, confining, detaining or abducting another person against that person's will. W.Va.Code § 48-27-202 (2001). Appellant maintains that none of the acts defined as constituting domestic violence applies in this case and, further, that the family court judge did not make a specific finding that any one of these qualifying acts was demonstrated by the evidence. The only finding contained in the protective order was that Respondent [Appellant] exceeded the bounds of propriety in attempting to discipline the parties' son, Adam, in the presence of Petitioner [Appellee] and the parties' other son, Derek. In response to Appellant's arguments that domestic violence was not shown, Appellee contends that the proffered evidence could be viewed as having demonstrated the occurrence of physical harm; that Adam was placed in reasonable apprehension of physical harm, and that Appellant had held, confined, or detained Adam against his will. See W.Va.Code § 48-27-202(1), (2), (5). Because there is no finding by the family court judge as to which definition of domestic violence he was relying upon to issue the protective order, we are without any basis from which to review his ruling other than to look at the statutory definitions to determine whether the evidence presented demonstrates an act which qualifies as domestic violence under the statute. See W.Va.Code § 48-27-202. To avoid this problem in the future and to allow proper judicial review, we hold that a family court judge who issues a domestic violence protective order is required to make factual findings which describe the acts of domestic violence that have been established by the evidence presented and to identify which statutory definition of domestic violence such facts demonstrate. For purposes of this appeal, we will examine the three definitions of domestic violence upon which Appellee relies to argue that the family court could have been relying upon in making its ruling. See W.Va.Code § 48-27-202(1), (2), (5). While Appellee views the record as conclusively demonstrating physical harm, based on photographs evidencing several scratch marks, we do not reach the same conclusion. We have carefully scrutinized the submitted photographs that Officer Limley took of Adam and we can barely discern the referenced scratch marks; we are completely unable to detect any red marks in the neck area. While we do not go so far as to hold that physical harm which does not require medical attention [13] cannot qualify as domestic violence under the statute, in this case we do not find sufficient evidence of physical harm to meet the definition of domestic violence. Moreover, there is no finding by the family court judge that physical harm was inflicted upon Adam. In similar conclusory fashion, Appellee makes the presumption that Adam was placed in reasonable apprehension of physical harm. W.Va.Code § 48-27-202(2). Based on Adam's plea for help from his father who was sitting in a vehicle in the driveway, Appellee argues that the requisite fear of harm was demonstrated. Appellant notes that Adam never told Officer Limley that he was afraid. [14] And, even the family court judge recognized that the fact that his [Adam's] father was there and he knew that his father would be supportive and in disagreement with his mother is a factor that is worthy of consideration. Dr. Moses testified that there had been no past incidents of physical harm involving Appellant with either of her children. [15] Without any testimony or statement from Adam that he was in fear of being harmed by his mother during this incident, we find the record devoid of evidence sufficient to meet the reasonable apprehension of fear definition of domestic violence under the statute at issue. See id. The final basis upon which Appellee relies to assert domestic violence is the most disconcerting. To suggest that Appellant's attempt to hold or detain her child while she was attempting to speak with him about the deceptive and disrespectful conduct she caught him in the midst of carrying out is tantamount to suggesting that every parent who attempts to temporarily restrain their child while in the course of discussing inappropriate behavior is committing domestic violence. [16] We do not think the Legislature intended that the statutory definition of holding, confining, [or] detaining be applied to everyday instances of parental discipline. [17] Upon reflection, the terms used to convey this definition of domestic violence suggests that a temporal component is involved in qualifying factual instances. In this Court's opinion, to constitute domestic violence under the statutory definition of holding, confining, detaining or abducting another person against that person's will within the meaning of West Virginia Code § 48-27-202(5), a parent's alleged act of domestic violence toward his or her child should, as a general rule, take place over a temporally significant period and not be the momentary act of a parent in the midst of attempting to control a child within the proper boundaries of parental control. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968) (recognizing that parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society). While there are clear exceptions to the broad authority afforded parents in rearing their children, such as those situations where a child's physical or mental health is jeopardized, the evidence presented in this case does not rise to that level. Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979). The Legislature was clear in its expression of the objectives underlying the enactment of the Domestic Violence statutes. [18] See W.Va.Code § 48-27-101. Significantly, there is no language set forth in those statutory provisions that seeks to abrogate the right of a parent to exercise control over his or her child in the context of child rearing. It is beyond dispute that the concerns which underlie the enactment of the Domestic Violence statutes are deserving of serious attention and consequently demand the highest protections the law can afford. What is equally true, however, is that the law cannot countenance an attempt to cloak as domestic violence acts that clearly were not contemplated by the Legislature to fall within the parameters of these statutes. We simply cannot accept Appellee's contention that the acts committed by Appellant on the date in question escalated into abuse. In addition to the questionable evidence of physical harm, there is no finding by the family court judge in the protective order of any act which qualifies as domestic violence. We cannot by any stretch of the imagination view the Family Court's finding that Appellant exceeded the bounds of propriety in attempting to discipline her child as sufficient to constitute an act of domestic violence under the provisions of West Virginia Code § 48-27-202. [19] Finding no statutory basis for the issuance of the domestic violence protective order, we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion in upholding the issuance of that order by the family court upon the facts of this case.