Opinion ID: 1043968
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Second Denton Factor

Text: With respect to application of the Duchac factor, inconsistent analytical approaches have developed. This Court indicated in Denton, and has often repeated, [34] that addressing a double jeopardy argument requires an analysis, guided by the principles of Duchac, of the evidence used to prove the offenses. Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 381. Addressing the respective roles of the Blockburger and Duchac factors, the Denton Court stated: Blockburger . . . provides us with an initial test for determining whether two offenses are, in the abstract, the `same' for double jeopardy purposes. Duchac provides criteria by which we analyze each case to determine whether the offenses are, under the particular circumstances of that case, the same for double jeopardy purposes. Black directs that the analysis begin with Blockburger but also clearly requires that the analysis proceed to the circumstances of each individual case. Id. at 380-81. The Denton Court concluded that [b]ecause the evidence in this case consisted of a single attack by Denton on the victim, the State necessarily relied on the same evidence to establish both the aggravated assault and the attempted voluntary manslaughter. Thus, application of Duchac indicates that the two offenses are the `same' for double jeopardy purposes. Id. at 382. In practice, however, Tennessee Courts have not consistently applied the approach outlined in Denton when analyzing the Duchac factor. For example, in Barney, this Court, addressing the Duchac factor, stated: [T]o prove aggravated sexual battery the State must present evidence that the defendant intentionally touched the intimate parts of the child victim and that such touching was for the purpose of sexual gratification. Tenn.Code Ann. § 29-13-501, -504. In contrast, rape of a child can be proven solely by evidence of sexual penetration, regardless of the motivation for the act. Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 39-13-501, -522. Thus, different evidence is required to prove each offense, so the offenses are not the same under Duchac. Barney, 986 S.W.2d at 550. Rather than focusing upon the circumstances of the case, as Denton and Duchac require, the Barney Court focused on the statutory elements of the offenses. See also State v. Thornton, 10 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Tenn.Crim. App.1999) (conflating the analysis of the first and second Denton factors). In at least three other cases, Stephenson, [35] Goodwin, [36] and Beauregard, [37] this Court similarly conflated the analysis of the first and second Denton factors. Under the approach utilized in these cases, the Duchac factor became meaningless and merely redundant of the first Blockburger factor. More uncertainty than clarity has resulted when Tennessee courts have endeavored to apply the Duchac factor by reference to the evidence presented at trial, however. For example, in Denton, the Court addressed circumstances in which the defendant initially cut the victim with a knife-like object. 938 S.W.2d at 378. The defendant then stabbed the victim and tried to provoke the victim to fight him. Id. The defendant was convicted of aggravated assault and attempted voluntary manslaughter. Id. As charged and prosecuted, the State relied upon the defendant's use of a deadly weapon, rather than the victim's suffering of serious bodily injury, to establish aggravated assault. Id. at 382 n. 19. Applying the Duchac factor, the Denton Court stated simply that [b]ecause the evidence in this case consisted of a single attack by Denton on the victim, the State necessarily relied on the same evidence to establish both the aggravated assault and the attempted voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 382. The Court in Denton did not attempt to draw a distinction between the first cut the defendant inflicted upon the victim and the subsequent stabbing. Had such a distinction been drawn, the Denton Court arguably could have viewed the evidence of the stabbing and the defendant's attempt to provoke a fight with the victim as evidence different from that used to prove his attempted voluntary manslaughter conviction. The Denton Court did not separate the evidence in this manner, however. Similarly, the Court in Winningham refused to parse the evidence presented at trial when applying the Duchac factor. In Winningham, the Court addressed whether the defendant's convictions for arson and contempt by violating an order of protection that enjoined the defendant from coming about petitioner [his estranged wife] for any purpose and specifically from abusing, threatening to abuse petitioner, or committing any acts of violence upon petitioner upon penalty of contempt constituted multiple punishments for the same offense. 958 S.W.2d at 742. The State presented evidence at trial that, after the entry of the protective order, the defendant threatened to kill the victim, trespassed upon her property, shot at her car, and set fire to her house. Id. at 746. This Court concluded that the various acts upon which the contempt and arson convictions were based were inseparable, for purposes of the Duchac factor, weighing in favor of finding a double jeopardy violation. Id. In contrast to the approach applied in Denton and Winningham, this Court parsed the evidence and found support for multiple convictions in another case involving the violation of a protective order. In Cable, the defendant's former girlfriend declined to spend the night with him. As a result, the defendant: became angry, grabbed . . . her hair, and pushed her head against the car window. He then pulled a knife and threatened to kill her. [The victim] pulled to the side of the road and got out of the car. [The defendant] followed her out of the car and then kicked and stabbed the car. Cable, 36 S.W.3d at 41. However, the Court did not, as it had in Denton and Winningham, group these facts under the label of same evidence. Instead, applying the Duchac factor, the Court concluded that the circumstances of the case depicted three separate incidents, stating: [E]vidence to establish the first conviction occurred when an argument began and [the defendant] grabbed [the victim] and pushed her head against the car window. The evidence of the second conviction was that [the defendant] produced a knife and threatened to kill [the victim]. Finally, the evidence of the third conviction was that after [the victim] pulled over and fled from the scene, [the defendant] vandalized her car by kicking it and striking it with a knife. Cable, 36 S.W.3d at 43; see also State v. Lawrence, 995 S.W.2d 142, 145 (Tenn. Crim.App.1998) (applying the Duchac factor by parsing the evidence presented at trial). In addition to the difficulty courts have had in determining how precisely to parse the trial evidence, the Duchac factor has also generated two different approaches as to which evidence should be considered: conduct or non-conduct evidence. For example, in State v. Green, 947 S.W.2d 186, 187 (Tenn.Crim.App.1997), the defendant had been convicted of driving on a revoked license and driving while prohibited from doing so as a habitual traffic offender. According to the Court of Criminal Appeals, Officer Greg Branch, previously aware that the defendant had been declared an habitual offender, observed the defendant driving down a residential street. After the defendant turned into a driveway and got out of the driver's side of his car, Officer Branch arrested him. Id. at 190. In applying the Duchac factor, the Court of Criminal Appeals considered only the defendant's conductdrivingin finding that the same evidence had been used to establish both offenses. Id. The intermediate appellate court made no mention of the non-conduct, non-overlapping evidence of the two offenses in its analysis of the Duchac factor. Specifically, to establish the offense of driving on a revoked license, the State had to show that the defendant had been driving on a public highway: to establish the habitual offender violation, the State had to show a prior court order barring the defendant from driving. See id. at 189-90. Criminal trials often involve both conduct and non-conduct evidence. For example, in a prosecution for incest and another form of sexual assault, both offenses may be based on the same evidence with respect to the defendant's conduct. See Beauregard, 32 S.W.3d at 683. Nonetheless, the same evidence does not support both offenses because the incest conviction alone requires proof of the victim's statusthe victim's familial relationship to the defendant. Id. We know of no basis for disregarding such non-conduct evidence when applying the Duchac factor. As exemplified by the foregoing cases, application of the Duchac factor has fractured into at least three inconsistent approaches. First, the Duchac factor has been applied in a manner that merely replicates the Blockburger factor. Second, when considering the trial evidence, Tennessee courts have differed on whether the evidence should be reviewed broadly or narrowly. Third, Tennessee courts have differed on whether to consider only conduct evidence or both conduct and non-conduct evidence. In addition to the lack of analytical uniformity in its application, the foremost problem with the Duchac factor is its ineffectiveness in ascertaining legislative intentthe key consideration in multiple punishment cases. Albernaz, 450 U.S. at 344, 101 S.Ct. 1137; Hunter, 459 U.S. at 368, 103 S.Ct. 673; Denton, 938 S.W.2d at 379. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of how reviewing the evidence and circumstances of a particular criminal case aids a court in ascertaining legislative intent with respect to multiple punishments. See Commonwealth v. Vick, 454 Mass. 418, 910 N.E.2d 339, 354 (2009) ([J]udicial assessment of the evidence introduced in a single criminal trial of multiple offenses[] runs the risk of unnecessary intrusion into the legislative prerogative to define crimes and fix punishments. (internal quotation marks omitted)).