Opinion ID: 625859
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disclosure of the CS's Identity

Text: The defendants contend that the prosecutor improperly disclosed the CS's identity at trial and the district court erred in denying their motion for a new trial based on that disclosure. When considering allegations of prosecutorial misconduct, we first determine whether the prosecutor's conduct was improper. Freeman, 650 F.3d at 683; United States v. Moore, 641 F.3d 812, 818 (7th Cir.2011). If so, we evaluate the conduct in light of the entire record to determine if the conduct deprived the defendants of a fair trial. Moore, 641 F.3d at 818-19. The government had no legal duty to disclose the CS's identity before trial. Smith had sought disclosure, and the government opposed it, claiming the informant's privilege; and the district court ruled in favor of the government. The defendants have not identified any specific disclosure obligation or other rule that was violated. Rather, they appeal to fundamental fairness, claiming that if the government is going to disclose the CS's identity to the jurors at trial, it should be required to disclose it to the defense before trial, and if the government is going to withhold the CS's identity from the defense before trial, then it shouldn't be allowed to use it at trial. The defendants assert that the prosecutor has a duty to ensure that a defendant receives a fair trial, see, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935) (a prosecutor's interest ... is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done); Freeman, 650 F.3d at 680 (A prosecutor has a special duty ... to assure that defendants receive fair trials. (quotation and citation omitted)), which is true. However, [t]he ultimate question is whether the comment `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Moore, 641 F.3d at 819 (quoting United States v. Hale, 448 F.3d 971, 986 (7th Cir.2006)); see also Freeman, 650 F.3d at 683. The district court did not make an explicit finding that the prosecutor's conduct was improper, but characterized the disclosure of Pedro Flores's name as tardy, a surprise, and something that suggests a troubling degree of gamesmanship and made a claim of unfairness ... justifiable. We are equally critical of the way the government hid behind the informant's privilege leading up to trial and then sprung the CS's identity on the defense and jury mid-trial. At oral argument the government did not offer a good explanation for why it proceeded in this way. It seems to us that the district court treated the disclosure as improper conduct. And we, too, shall do the same. But a prosecutor's improper conduct alone is not sufficient to warrant a new trial. We evaluate whether the improprieties impacted the outcome of the trial, and we will reverse only if there is a reasonable probability that, in the absence of the improprieties, the defendant would have been acquitted. United States v. McGee, 408 F.3d 966, 984 (7th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Boyd, 55 F.3d 239, 241 (7th Cir.1995)); see also Freeman, 650 F.3d at 681 (framing the standard for a new trial as whether the district court clearly erred when it determined that there was any reasonable likelihood that [the improper conduct] affected the verdict). It is here that the district court made a misstep. It thought the decision to grant a new trial turned on whether pretrial disclosure would have changed the result. [2] Missing from the formulation used by the district court is the reasonable probability or reasonable likelihood language that is required. See, e.g., McGee, 408 F.3d at 984. Thus, the court applied the wrong, and a heightened, legal standard in denying the motions for a new trial. See Stanley v. Bartley, 465 F.3d 810, 813 (7th Cir.2006) (To show a reasonable probability of a different outcome is a less demanding burden than to show that the outcome would have been different.); cf. United States v. Williams, 81 F.3d 1434, 1440 (7th Cir.1996) (reviewing district court's denial of a motion for new trial and differentiating having to show a `reasonable probability of a different result' with having to show that the defendants would in fact have been acquitted). Although application of the wrong standard may require a remand in some cases, it is not required here because even under the correct, more lenient standard, the defendants are entitled to no relief. We are convinced that the government's disclosure of the CS's identity did not so infect the trial with unfairness as to deprive the defendants of due process. Any effect that the government's disclosure that the CS was Pedro Flores may have had on the verdict was insignificant. The government's evidence of the defendants' guilt, including Aguilera's testimony about his dealings with Smith and Baker, Torres's testimony about his cocaine transactions with Baker, the audiotape recordings in which Smith arranged with the CS for the delivery of cocaine to Baker, and Baker's appearance at the contemplated cocaine transaction with $260,190 and a vehicle equipped with a hidden compartment, was overwhelming. There is no reasonable probability that the trial's outcome would have been different absent the disclosure. Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial. In addition, the defendants knew from the government's pretrial disclosures that it alleged they were involved as customers in a drug trafficking organization run by the Flores brothers. The defendants also knew of the CS's existence: The government provided them with the audiotapes of the recorded conversations long before trial; the transcripts were provided before trial as well. In one recorded conversation. Smith acknowledges a past relationship with the CS, saying he had been trying to get in touch since the weekend; and when the source says that he will work it out and make you happy this time, Smith says you tell me that all the time man. The defendants should have been able to discern the CS's identity based on the recorded conversations. This, of course, assumes that Smith was the other participant in six of the conversations. He disputes that he was, but the jury apparently believed that he was the speaker. Baker does not contest that he was the person speaking with the CS in one of the recorded conversations. Baker should have known the identity of the person with whom he was speaking less than two hours before his arrest. Even if the defendants didn't know the CS's identity, they should have known that the CS was their supplier. In one conversation, the CS told Smith that he would send him like 20, 25 ... I'll get them together today, that he might give [Smith] a little cheaper number ... see maybe if [Smith] can move them a little faster, which at the very least suggests the CS's role is that of a drug supplier. There can be no question that the defendants knew the charges against them included a cocaine conspiracy and attempted possession of cocaine on December 5, 2008. They had the transcripts that reflected that the recorded calls occurred from December 3 to 5. Given this information, they should have understood in advance of trial that the CS was their supplier. And that's not all. In opening statement, the government repeatedly referred to the cooperating source as the defendants' supplier and stated in reference to and leading up to the December 5, 2008, transaction that Smith had spoken by phone with his supplier. Furthermore, Baker's defense was that he didn't know he was in the middle of a drug transaction. Smith defended on the ground that the voice on the recorded conversations was not his. The district court offered the defense an opportunity to articulate, outside the government's presence, how the disclosure affected their trial strategy. The court also offered the defendants a brief recess of a day or so to prepare their defense in response to the disclosure, but they didn't take the court up on its offer. All of this strongly suggests that the defendants have not shown prejudice due to the disclosure. See Moore, 641 F.3d at 821 (the defendant's failure to assert a need for a cautionary instruction directly following the [alleged improper question about gang affiliation], or at the close of evidence, in spite of the court's clear willingness to consider it, undermines his current argument that any comment or reference regarding gang affiliation denied him due process); United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 506 (1st Cir.2010) (defendant showed no prejudice from belated disclosure of alleged Brady materials where defendant identified no plausible strategic option that the delayed disclosure hampered or foreclosed, he was not prevented from asserting his defense theories at trial, and he rejected the court's offer of a continuance); see also United States v. Cruz-Velasco, 224 F.3d 654, 665 (7th Cir.2000) (stating that a new trial is warranted for a discovery violation only if the remedy offered by the district court was inadequate to provide the defendant with a fair trial) (quotation omitted). Smith and Baker argue that they did not request a delay at the close of the government's evidence because at that point there was nothing they could do to mitigate the damage that had already been done. They assert prejudice because their counsel allegedly lost credibility with the jury by failing to address in opening statements that Pedro Flores was the speaker in the recorded conversations. But they have not indicated how they would have addressed the fact that the CS was Pedro Flores. And they have not asserted that their defense theories would have been different had they only known the government would disclose the CS's identity. We do not see how knowledge that the CS was Pedro Flores would have changed the defense theories or could have impacted those theories. Nor can we tell how such knowledge would have caused the defense to conduct further investigation, call witnesses, or present evidence. The defendants allege that their Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is implicated. The harmlessness of the disclosure leads to the conclusion that there was no prejudice for purposes of the right to counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial based on the government's disclosure of the CS's identity at trial.