Opinion ID: 378905
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Joinder; Severance

Text: 2 Pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.P. 14, appellant requested that he be tried separately from Reynolds. Appellant wanted Reynolds to testify on his behalf. Reynolds did not take the stand. Appellant contends that the district court erred in not granting severance because Reynolds might have elected to testify were this not a joint criminal trial. Brief for Appellant at 8. 3 In order to succeed on a Rule 14 motion, the defendant must show specific and compelling prejudice. United States v. Wolford, 614 F.2d 516, 517 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 138 (5th Cir. 1976). Where the motion is based on the defendant's asserted need for a co-defendant's testimony, we have a more detailed test. First, the defendant must demonstrate: (1) a bona fide need for the testimony; (2) the substance of the testimony; (3) its exculpatory nature and effect; and (4) that the codefendant will in fact testify if the cases are severed. United States v. Butler, 611 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364, 1369 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 434 U.S. 954, 98 S.Ct. 479, 54 L.Ed.2d 312 (1977); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d at 135. 4 If the defendant makes such a showing, the district court must: (1) examine the significance of the testimony in relation to the defendant's theory of defense; (2) assess the extent of prejudice caused by the absence of the testimony; (3) pay close attention to considerations of judicial economy; and (4) give weight to the timeliness of the motion. United States v. Butler, 611 F.2d at 1071; United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d at 1369; United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d at 135. 5 Appellant argues that Reynolds was in a unique position to provide exculpatory evidence and might have elected to testify had separate trials been held. Brief for Appellant at 7-8. Presented with such generalized, vague and speculative assertions, the trial court's decision to deny the request for severance was entirely appropriate. 6 Appellant also contends that it was improper to join the perjury count with the count charging a willful violation of Land's civil rights. 7 Under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, separate offenses may be joined in a single indictment when they are based on the same act or transaction. Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a). The statements upon which the perjury count is based were made during the grand jury's inquiry into the Land incident. The statements concerned Reynolds' involvement and may properly be said to have been part of the same transaction. Joinder of the perjury count with the count charging a violation of Land's civil rights was therefore proper. See McElroy v. United States, 164 U.S. 76, 79-81, 17 S.Ct. 31, 32-33, 41 L.Ed. 355 (1896); United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 135-36 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 955, 98 S.Ct. 1586, 55 L.Ed.2d 806 (1978); United States v. Gill, 490 F.2d 233, 238 (7th Cir. 1973).