Opinion ID: 1238399
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Departures related to the false-statements convictions

Text: The next two departures at issue in this case involve Arhebamen's convictions for making false statements to the United States Probation Office. We address each in turn.
The district court again employed § 5K2.0the general departure provision for acts of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commissionto further enhance Arhebamen's sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). According to the district court, Arhebamen's false statements to the Probation Department involved more than minimal planning within the meaning of § 1B1.1 cmt. n. 1(f), and a 2 level enhancement of [the false-statement convictions] is appropriate pursuant to § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A). This 2 level enhancement, however, does not adequately take into account the extensiveness and history of the planning that has gone into the Defendant's false claim to the identity of McMaine Allen O'Georgia, and an upwards departure is warranted. The § 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) enhancement applies in cases where the extent of planning is more ... than is typical for commission of the offense in its typical form, and is deemed present in any case involving repeated acts over a period of time. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1 cmt. 1(f) (defining more than minimal planning). According to the district court, the specific enhancement was insufficient to capture the full extent of Arhebamen's use of the O'Georgia alias, which lasted more than twenty years. The court thus added an additional one-level departure pursuant to § 5K2.0 because the degree of planning extended over such a long period of time. Arhebamen argues that the district court abused its discretion in invoking this one-level departure because [t]he fact that a defendant in a fraud type offense used an alias for a lengthy period of time is not extraordinary, and the district court failed to provide any evidence that this case should be so considered. We disagree. Because the district court is in the best position to compare a wide variety of cases over time, it has wide discretion to decide how much planning is extraordinary, such that the more than minimal planning enhancement is insufficient on its own. Arhebamen's multi-decade, elaborate attempt to take on his invented identity certainly involved an extraordinary number of repeated acts over a period of time. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by invoking this one-level departure pursuant to § 5K2.0. See, e.g., United States v. Kay, 83 F.3d 98, 102 (5th Cir.1996) ([T]he repetitiveness, intricacy, and sophistication of Kay's scheme were substantially in excess of that which ordinarily is involved in the crime of bank fraud, and ... this level of malfeasance was not accounted for by the `more than minimal planning' adjustment.).
The district court next employed U.S.S.G. § 5K2.9 to depart upward by two levels because Arhebamen falsely claimed that he had been born in Albany, Georgia on May 5, 1955 ... in order to conceal the commission of another offense i.e., his prior False Claim to U.S. Citizenship during the guilty plea before Judge Rosen. Section 5K2.9 states that [i]f the defendant committed the offense in order to facilitate or conceal the commission of another offense, the court may increase the sentence above the guideline range to reflect the actual seriousness of the defendant's conduct. Arhebamen argues that there is no evidence that he made false statements in order to conceal the commission of another offense, and that the consistent use of the O'Georgia alias for such a long period suggests a lack of such a purpose. The government responds by pointing out that Arhebamen's consistency in using his false identity in fact emphasizes his criminal purpose, noting that he did not accidentally adopt the identity of McMaine O'Georgia; rather, it was part of a deliberate and sophisticated plan for the purpose of conceal[ing] his true identity. Arhebamen has been subject to removal from the United States since the expiration of his visitor's visa in the late 1970s. The district court therefore reasonably concluded that Arhebamen did not call himself O'Georgia for two decades simply because he preferred the name, but rather because he wished to avoid removal from the United States. No abuse of discretion is apparent in the district court's determination that each time Arhebamen gave the name O'Georgiato the court, the Probation Office, or othershe did so at least in part for the criminal purpose of concealing his past commissions of identity fraud.