Opinion ID: 2379526
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appeal of Raymond Hamm

Text: Raymond Hamm argues that the trial court erred (1) in denying his motion for a change of venue; (2) in refusing his motion for a mistrial when the prosecutor referred to the members of the jury as Mr. and Mrs. law and order; and (3) in limiting all defendants to a single set of peremptory challenges. Raymond Hamm also argues a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial because of delay in sentencing. There is no merit in these issues. Raymond Hamm's request for a change of venue was based on the fact that five years before his trial, a brother had been arrested, tried and convicted for the murder of two Chester County policemen. [10] Whether to grant a change of venue is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed absent an abuse of that discretion. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 496 Pa. 428, 432, 437 A.2d 948, 950 (1981); Commonwealth v. Daugherty, 493 Pa. 273, 276, 426 A.2d 104, 105 (1981); Commonwealth v. Keeler, 302 Pa.Super. 324, 328, 448 A.2d 1064, 1065-1066 (1982); Commonwealth v. Ralph Smith, 289 Pa.Super. 356, 364, 433 A.2d 489, 493 (1981). There was no abuse of discretion in refusing to change venue because of notoriety attaching to charges against a relative five years before. See: Commonwealth v. Bachert, 499 Pa. 398, 453 A.2d 931 (1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1043, 103 S.Ct. 1440, 75 L.Ed.2d 797 (1983); Commonwealth v. Melvin Robinson, 494 Pa. 372, 431 A.2d 901 (1981); Commonwealth v. Rigler, 488 Pa. 441, 412 A.2d 846 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 3004, 69 L.Ed.2d 387 (1981); Commonwealth v. Casper, 481 Pa. 143, 392 A.2d 287 (1978); Commonwealth v. Weakland, 273 Pa.Super. 361, 417 A.2d 690 (1979). Counsel for Raymond Hamm made a pre-trial request that each defendant be given the statutorily mandated, seven peremptory challenges. The court denied this request and, instead, allowed an aggregate of seven challenges between the two defendants. Raymond Hamm contends that the court's ruling denied him equal protection of the law. It had been provided by statute at the time of the instant trial that in noncapital felony cases the Commonwealth and the accused were each entitled to seven peremptory challenges. Act of October 7, 1976, P.L. 1089, No. 217, 19 P.S. § 811(a) (repealed). However, in trials involving more than one defendant, the defendants were entitled only to the maximum number any one of them would have received if tried separately. Act of March 31, 1860, P.L. 427, No. 375, § 40, 19 P.S. § 785. [11] There is no constitutional requirement that an accused be permitted to exercise peremptory challenges. See: Commonwealth v. Davis, 267 Pa.Super. 370, 376, 406 A.2d 1087, 1089-1090 (1979); Commonwealth v. Kubacki, 208 Pa.Super. 523, 528, 224 A.2d 80, 83 (1966); Commonwealth v. Cohen, 203 Pa.Super. 34, 69, 199 A.2d 139, 156, cert. denied, 379 U.S. 902, 85 S.Ct. 191, 13 L.Ed.2d 176 (1964). Consequently, the statutory limitation imposed upon the number of peremptory challenges available to a defendant did not violate due process. Similarly, it was not a violation of due process to require that peremptory challenges allowed to the defense be shared by and between joint defendants. Appellant's contention that a different, more liberal right to exercise peremptory challenges available to joint defendants in civil trials [12] rendered the greater restriction on peremptory challenges in criminal cases a violation of equal protection is lacking in merit. The hallmark of an equal protection violation is a classification by government which results in unequal treatment of persons similarly situated. See generally: Kaelin v. Warden, 334 F.Supp. 602, 608 (E.D.Pa. 1971); Commonwealth v. Kramer, 474 Pa. 341, 346, 378 A.2d 824, 826 (1977); Commonwealth v. Webster, 462 Pa. 125, 130, 337 A.2d 914, 917, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 898, 96 S.Ct. 201, 46 L.Ed.2d 131 (1975). Joint defendants in criminal cases are not situated similarly to joint defendants in civil cases. In criminal cases, the other party and principal adversary is usually the Commonwealth. In civil cases, however, the interests of a defendant may as readily be in conflict with the interests of other defendants as they are in conflict with the interests of the plaintiff. To recognize this difference and to allow a court in the exercise of its discretion in civil cases to remove potential prejudice in the sharing of a lesser number of peremptory challenges is entirely proper. Principles of equal protection do not command that peremptory challenges in criminal cases be precisely the same in number as those in civil trials or that they be divided in precisely the same manner between joint defendants. The Pennsylvania statutory requirement pertaining to the number of peremptory challenges to prospective jurors in joint criminal trials has withstood repeated attacks of varying types and degrees. See: Commonwealth v. Weeden, 457 Pa. 436, 322 A.2d 343 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937, 95 S.Ct. 1147, 43 L.Ed.2d 414 (1975); Commonwealth v. Norman, supra ; Commonwealth v. Phillips, 267 Pa.Super. 526, 407 A.2d 35 (1979); Commonwealth v. Kubacki, supra ; Commonwealth v. Vecchiolli, 208 Pa.Super. 483, 224 A.2d 96 (1966); Commonwealth v. Cohen, supra ; Commonwealth v. Giambrone, 183 Pa.Super. 283, 130 A.2d 254 (1957); Commonwealth v. Antico, 146 Pa.Super. 293, 22 A.2d 204 (1941). See also: Anno., Jury: Number of Peremptory Challenges Allowed in Criminal Case Where There Are Two or More Defendants Tried Together, 21 A.L.R.3d 725 (1968). There is no good reason for holding the requirement invalid in these proceedings. [13] During summation, the prosecuting attorney told the jurors that each of them was truly Mr. and Mrs. law and order. A motion for a mistrial by counsel for Raymond Hamm was denied by the trial court. He now contends that this was error. [C]omments by the district attorney do not constitute reversible error unless the unavoidable effect of such comments would be to prejudice the jury, forming in their minds fixed bias and hostility toward the defendant so that they could not weigh the evidence objectively and render a true verdict. Commonwealth v. Tabron, 502 Pa. 154, 160, 465 A.2d 637, 639-640 (1983) (citations omitted). See: Commonwealth v. Anderson, 501 Pa. 275, 282, 461 A.2d 208, 211 (1983). The remark in question was not improper. A prosecutor, it has been held, is permitted within proper limits to state to a jury its role in the achievement of law and order. See: Commonwealth v. Tabron, supra, 502 Pa. at 160-61, 465 A.2d at 640; Commonwealth v. Gwaltney, 497 Pa. 505, 511, 442 A.2d 236, 239 (1982); Commonwealth v. Nesbitt, 276 Pa.Super. 1, 12, 419 A.2d 64, 70 (1980); Commonwealth v. Boone, 287 Pa.Super. 1, 8, 429 A.2d 689, 692 (1981); Commonwealth v. Youngkin, 285 Pa.Super. 417, 434, 427 A.2d 1356, 1365 (1981); Commonwealth v. Lee, 261 Pa.Super. 48, 52, 395 A.2d 935, 938 (1978). Raymond Hamm also contends that he should be discharged because a twenty-nine month delay in imposing sentence following conviction constituted a violation of his constitutional right to a speedy trial. This issue was not raised at the time of sentencing, even though the sentencing court gave appellant the right to speak. It was raised for the first time in a P.C.H.A. petition which Raymond Hamm filed after the instant direct appeal had been taken. That P.C.H.A. petition remains presently undecided. This issue, therefore, is not properly before us. Similarly, the averment that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to permit Raymond Hamm to call this delay to the attention of the sentencing court can best be determined in the P.C.H.A. proceedings still pending in the court in Chester County. Because we find no merit in the issues properly raised by appellants in their direct appeal, the judgments of sentence will be affirmed. Affirmed. SPAETH, J., concurs in the result.