Opinion ID: 2690702
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Business First Article

Text: {¶ 81} Business First, a newspaper serving the corporate community, reported on the filing of the ACS lawsuit and the allegations made by ACS. The article, entitled “LeadScope, its founders sued by former employer,” contained a balanced report of both parties’ arguments and defenses. The alleged defamatory statements made by ACS’s outside counsel in the article pertained to ACS’s intent in filing the lawsuit: “Our motivation in filing suit is to acquire back the protected information that they took from us.” {¶ 82} Business First gave the parties an opportunity to comment on the case and, in fact, both parties took advantage of that opportunity. The first sentence of the article states that ACS is “alleging [that Leadscope and its founders] used proprietary information to form and operate their business.” Thus, a reasonable reader would understand that ACS’s counsel’s statements were a quick summary of the case and ACS’s allegations. 35 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 83} For its part, Leadscope stated that the lawsuit “has no merit.” The article also contained extrajudicial statements by Leadscope’s counsel that “[t]he timing of this lawsuit speaks volumes as to its invalidity” and Leadscope’s intention to file a counterclaim. Leadscope’s counsel stated that even though ACS had been aware of the fact that “Leadscope ha[d] been working up its new products for about four or five years [and] ha[d] acquired about $10 million in venture capital,” ACS did not “utter[] a peep for four or five years.” {¶ 84} From the views presented in the article, the average reader would learn that the suit had been filed and could easily understand the gist of the claims and defenses from the brief quotes that the parties provided regarding their opinions about the lawsuit. {¶ 85} Moreover, the lawsuit was not under seal, and the complaint was available to the public. The public has a legitimate, constitutionally protected interest in judicial proceedings, and the article provided information to educate and inform the public about the case. {¶ 86} Considering the article as a whole and the fact that the article contained a true and accurate summary of the legal proceedings at the time, we hold that the statements in the article are, as a matter of law, not defamatory. Thus, we must reverse the judgment of the court of appeals to the extent it held otherwise. {¶ 87} Even though we hold that the statements published in Business First are not defamatory as a matter of law, we must also address the significance of the fact that ACS was held liable for statements made by its outside counsel to the media. Client liability for an attorney’s statements is an issue of first impression for this court. {¶ 88} Although we have not confronted the discrete issue here, courts outside of Ohio have done so. The better reasoned opinions hold that a client may be vicariously liable for its attorney’s torts only if the client authorized or ratified 36 January Term, 2012 the conduct. See, e.g., Givens v. Mullikin, 75 S.W.3d 383, 394-396 (Tenn.2002) (an insurer and an insured may be held vicariously liable for the tortious acts or omissions of an attorney hired to defend the insured if the attorney’s tortious actions were directed, commanded, or knowingly authorized by the insurer or by the insured); Chisler v. Randall, 124 Kan. 278, 259 P. 687, 690 (Kan.1927) (“The client is not responsible for unauthorized defamatory communications made by his attorney”); Green Acres Trust v. London, 142 Ariz. 12, 18-19, 688 P.2d 658, (Ariz.App.1983), vacated in part on other grounds, 141 Ariz. 609, 688 P.2d 617 (1984) (a client was not liable for defamation when there was an absence of any evidence of either authorization or ratification of the attorneys’ statements); Arigno v. Murzin, Conn.Super.Ct. No. CV960474102S, 2001 WL 1265404,  (Oct. 2, 2001) (a client was vicariously liable for an attorney’s statements that went beyond reading charges against the opposing party because the client apparently authorized the statements). {¶ 89} We agree. Based on the foregoing authority, we hold that a client is vicariously liable for its attorney’s defamatory statements only if the client authorized or ratified the statements. To hold otherwise would wreak havoc on the bench and bar, as well as clients. {¶ 90} We make clear that Ohio law imposes no blanket prohibition on an attorney’s communications to the media. Attorneys and their clients retain a panoply of First Amendment rights and are free to speak to the public about their claims and defenses provided that they do not exceed the contours of protected speech and ethical rules that impose reasonable and necessary limitations on attorneys’ extrajudicial statements. See Prof.Cond.R. 3.6 (“A lawyer who is participating or has participated in the investigation or litigation of a matter shall not make an extrajudicial statement that the lawyer knows or reasonably should know will be disseminated by means of public communication and will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding in the 37 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO matter”). Thus, while we do not muzzle an attorney representing a party in a proceeding, attorneys are not given carte blanche to defame others under the guise of litigation. {¶ 91} In this case, the jury was given only an instruction on the law of defamation. It was not instructed to determine whether ACS was vicariously liable for its attorney’s statements. And there was no evidence before the jury that ACS had endorsed or ratified its counsel’s statements. Thus, the verdict against ACS could not stand even if its attorney’s statements could be held to be defamatory. We caution trial courts that, in the future, they must instruct the jury regarding client authorization or ratification in cases in which claims for defamation are predicated on extrajudicial statements made by the client’s attorney.