Opinion ID: 2567023
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Other Theories of Liability

Text: The trial court, as noted, sustained defendants demurrer with leave to amend as to some of plaintiffs purported causes of action and without leave to amend as to the others. Plaintiff decided to appeal rather than amend his complaint. It is the rule that when a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend his complaint and elects not to do so, strict construction of the complaint is required and it must be presumed that the plaintiff has stated as strong a case as he can. ( Gonzales v. State of California (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 621, 635, 137 Cal.Rptr. 681; see also Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Great Western Financial Corp. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 305, 312, 70 Cal.Rptr. 849, 444 P.2d 481 [the plaintiffs failure to amend constrained [us] to determine only whether appellants state a cause of action, not whether they might have been able to do so].) Leave to amend further is properly denied when a plaintiff fails to amend to correct defects on the basis of which special demurrers to a previous complaint were sustained. ( Chicago Title Ins. Co., supra, at p. 327, 70 Cal.Rptr. 849, 444 P.2d 481.) Plaintiff concedes the Court of Appeal below correctly concluded he cannot amend the complaint to allege more specific facts respecting his causes of action denominated in the first amended complaint as conversion, negligence per se, negligence, violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq., declaratory relief, accounting, and injunctive relief. In his petition for review, however, plaintiff asked us to decide whether the Court of Appeal erred in denying him leave to amend his causes of action for unlawful deductions and for allegedly tortious violations of various Labor Code sections. We are not persuaded either court below erred. Whether to grant leave to amend a complaint is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. ( Campbell v. Regents of the University of Cal. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 320, 25 Cal. Rptr.3d 320, 106 P.3d 976.) On appeal, the burden of proving a reasonable possibility exists that a complaints defects can be cured by amendment rests squarely on the plaintiff. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318, 216 Cal.Rptr. 718, 703 P.2d 58.) We agree with defendants that plaintiff forfeited any further leave to amend by failing to request leave in the trial court or to argue in the Court of Appeal that the trial courts denial as to specific causes of action was error. Plaintiffs oblique comment at the hearing on the demurrer that I suppose we could state a common law fraud claim cannot fairly be interpreted as a request for leave to amend his complaint to include additional factual allegations. (See generally 5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (4th ed. 1997) Pleading, § 1132, p. 587.) Nor did plaintiffs assertion in his opening brief below that the standards set forth under section 216 (respecting, inter alia, false denial of wages) can be imputed to a fraud cause of action and the claim as stated should be interpreted as such, either raise or argue the amendment issue. As plaintiff concedes, not until he petitioned for rehearing did he present to the Court of Appeal any additional facts that were alleged, that could have been alleged, and could have been reasonably inferred. It is well settled that arguments, including insufficiency of the evidence, cannot be raised for the first time in a petition for rehearing. ( Gentis v. Safeguard Business Systems, Inc. (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1308, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 122.) In light of this record, we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sustaining defendants demurrer partially without leave to amend nor did the Court of Appeal err in affirming that ruling.