Opinion ID: 848685
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The Role of Federal Law

Text: Through the Commerce Clause, the United States Constitution grants the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over relations with Indian tribes. US Const. art. I, § 8, cl 3. The clause gives Congress the power [t]o regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes. Id. The so-called Indian Commerce Clause places relations with Indian tribes within the exclusive province of federal law. Oneida Co. v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U.S. 226, 234, 105 S.Ct. 1245, 84 L.Ed.2d 169 (1985). Given the existence of the Indian Commerce Clause, state law generally is not applicable to Indians on tribal reservations unless Congress has specifically made it applicable. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm., 411 U.S. 164, 170-171, 93 S.Ct. 1257, 36 L.Ed.2d 129 (1973). In recognition of this principle, the United States Supreme Court has held that, if state gambling policy is regulatory rather than prohibitory, then state law is inapplicable to Indian gaming on Indian lands. California v. Cabazon Band of Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 209, 107 S.Ct. 1083, 94 L.Ed.2d 244 (1987). If state law allows gaming but seeks to regulate it, the state is not authorized to enforce that law on Indian reservations. The Cabazon Court made clear that regulation of Indian gaming is fundamentally the province of federal law. Tribes retain the exclusive right to regulate gaming on their lands in states where all gaming activity is not prohibited. Id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. 1083. In response to the Cabazon decision, Congress passed the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA), 25 USC 2701 et seq. With this act, Congress has provided a comprehensive federal regulation of tribal gaming. This framework allows state regulation only to the extent that it is negotiated into the terms of a tribal-state compact. Such a compact must set forth the parameters under which an Indian tribe will establish and operate casino-style gaming facilities. 25 USC 2710(d)(3). IGRA provides that Indian tribes may engage in class III gaming only if conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.... 25 USC 2710(d)(1)(C). Because it is not classified as class I or class II style gaming, the casino-style gambling at issue in this case involves class III gaming. 25 USC 2703(8). By allowing the states to play a role through the compacting process, IGRA extends to the States a power withheld from them by the Constitution. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996). IGRA does not furnish states with the ability to unilaterally regulate tribal gaming. Rather, it provides them an opportunity to oversee tribal gaming. The role of the state is limited to the terms the state is able to negotiate with a tribe. IGRA requires a tribe to obtain a compact with a state in order to engage in casino-style gambling. A compact is [a]n agreement or contract between persons, nations or states. Commonly applied to working agreements between and among states concerning matters of mutual concern. A contract between parties, which creates obligations and rights capable of being enforced, and contemplated as such between the parties, in their distinct and independent characters. [Black's Law Dictionary (6th ed).] States cannot prevent tribal gaming by refusing to negotiate or by demanding unreasonable conditions. They must negotiate in good faith upon a request by the tribe for such negotiation. 25 USC 2710(d)(3)(A). While Seminole held that Eleventh Amendment immunity protects states from suit by Indian tribes, it did not eliminate a state's duty to negotiate in good faith. If a state refuses to engage in good-faith negotiations, it can lose its ability to influence the regulation of casino gaming on tribal land. The Seminole Court expressly refused to comment on substitute remedies tribes might seek for a state's failure to negotiate in good faith. Seminole, supra at 76 n. 18, 116 S.Ct. 1114. [12] According to IGRA: Indian tribes have the exclusive right to regulate gaming activity on Indian lands if the gaming activity is not specifically prohibited by Federal law and is conducted within a State which does not, as a matter of criminal law and public policy, prohibit such gaming activity. [25 USC 2701(5).] Michigan allows various forms of gambling. They include horse racing, [13] a state lottery, [14] and voter-approved casino gambling in the city of Detroit. [15] It cannot reasonably be argued that Michigan prohibits, rather than regulates, gambling. Therefore, Michigan's direct power with respect to gambling in Indian country is the bargaining power given to it by the federal government through IGRA. Relying on Blank, Justice Markman argues that the subject of the compacts, state oversight of tribal gaming, can be achieved only through legislation. This misconstrues the state's ability to pass laws applicable to Indians. It is a unique situation. State law is generally not applicable to Indian affairs within the territory of an Indian tribe, absent the consent of Congress. Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, § 5.A. The Michigan Gaming Control and Revenue Act [16] recognized this principle and provided that, in the future, Congress could delegate to the state jurisdiction over Indian gaming on Indian lands. But until or unless that occurs, the only way the parties can authorize Indian gaming is by mutually agreeing to a compact. Were this untrue, the Legislature could simply amend the gaming control act to unilaterally regulate gaming on tribal land. Plaintiffs argue that 18 USC 1166 gives the state a regulatory role in tribal gaming without the need for a negotiated compact in which the tribe has ceded jurisdiction. Plaintiffs misconstrue 18 USC 1166. This federal statute provides that state laws with respect to gambling apply in Indian country in the same manner in which they apply throughout the rest of the state. 18 USC 1166(a). At 18 USC 1166(d), it provides that [t]he United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions of violations of State gambling laws that are made applicable under this section to Indian country, unless an Indian tribe pursuant to a Tribal-State compact approved by the Secretary of the Interior ... has consented to the transfer to the State of criminal jurisdiction with respect to gambling on the lands of the Indian tribe. Section d retains federal jurisdiction over Indian gaming unless a tribe negotiates it away in a compact. Without a compact, a state has no jurisdiction over gaming on Indian land. Hence, 18 USC 1166 does nothing more than adopt state law as the governing federal law for purposes of Indian gaming. United Keetoowah Band of Cherokee Indians v. Oklahoma, 927 F.2d 1170, 1177 (C.A.10, 1991). Plaintiffs' arguments to the contrary are misguided. IGRA allows tribes to engage in some forms of gambling. However, in recognition of the state's interest in the issue, IGRA requires a tribe to have a valid tribal-state gaming compact in place before it can engage in class III gambling. In exchange for giving states this power, IGRA requires the states to negotiate with tribes in good faith. While IGRA provides for the negotiation of tribal-state compacts, it does not specify the manner in which a state must approve a compact. Therefore, one must consult state law to make this determination.