Opinion ID: 2171377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: was due process required to determine the nature of patterson's termination and, if so, did patterson receive due process?

Text: This review concerns the board of regents' determination that it had no jurisdiction over the dispute between Patterson and Chancellor Fort and that the record established that Patterson was not discharged from his position as a tenured instructor at the UW Center-Barron county campus. Under sec. 36.09, Stats., concerning the university system, the primary responsibility for governance of the system is vested in the board of regents. Therefore, the board functions as the administrative agency in the university system. We note that the original dispute began in December of 1977, when Patterson was notified of the steering committee's investigation and evaluation of his work. Therefore, sec. 227.20, Stats. 1975, applies to this review of the board's action. Because Patterson alleges that he was not afforded a proper hearing by the university's handling of this matter, the relevant section pertaining to this review is sec. 227.20(4), which states, The court shall remand the case to the agency for further action if it finds that either the fairness of the proceedings or the correctness of the action has been impaired by a material error in procedure or a failure to follow prescribed procedure. This court has recognized that the appellate court's scope of review of an administrative board's action is identical to that of the circuit court. Boynton Cab Co. v. ILHR Department, 96 Wis. 2d 396, 405, 291 N.W.2d 850 (1980), and Scharping v. Johnson, 32 Wis. 2d 383, 145 N.W.2d 691 (1966). Patterson has taken the position that he was deprived of due process because he was not given a hearing on the issue of whether his termination was due to a discharge or resignation. He argues that the meeting which took place on March 8, 1979, among Dr. Hartmann, Associate Chancellor VanEyck, Dean Meggers, and Patterson was virtually meaningless, since Chancellor Fort had already made a decision to treat Patterson's actions as a resignation. Patterson maintains that if Chancellor Fort's decision is allowed to stand, the university can circumvent the safeguards of sec. 36.13(5), Stats., by treating every termination of a tenured faculty member as a resignation. The board, on the other hand, argues that Patterson was afforded sufficient due process through repeated warnings from the chancellor that his continued absences would be treated as a resignation and the subsequent meeting with Chancellor Fort's subordinates. Initially, we note that sec. 36.13, Stats., entitled Faculty tenure and probationary appointments, provides in part, (1) DEFINITIONS. In this section: (a) Tenure appointment means an appointment for an unlimited period granted to a ranked faculty member by the board upon the affirmative recommendation of the appropriate chancellor and academic department or its functional equivalent within an institution. . . . (5) PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES. Any person having tenure may be dismissed only for just cause and only after due notice and hearing. Any person having a probationary appointment may be dismissed prior to the end of the person's contract term only for just cause and only after due notice and hearing. The action and decision of the board in such matters shall be final, subject to judicial review under ch. 227. The board and its several faculties shall develop procedures for the notice and hearing which shall be adopted by rule under ch. 227. The relevant portions of UWS ch. 4, Wis. Admin. Code, read as follows: UWS 4.01 Dismissal for cause. (1) Any faculty member having tenure may be dismissed only by the board and only for just cause and only after due notice and hearing.... UWS 4.05 Adequate due process. (1) A fair hearing for a faculty member whose dismissal is sought under section UWS 4.01 shall include the following: (a) Service of written notice of hearing on the specific charges at least 10 days prior to the hearing; (b) A right to the names of witnesses and of access to documentary evidence upon the basis of which dismissal is sought; (c) A right to be heard in his/her defense; (d) A right to counsel and/or other representatives, and to offer witnesses; (e) A right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; (f) A verbatim record of all hearings, which might be a sound recording, provided at no cost; (g) Written findings of fact and decision based on the hearing record; (h) Admissibility of evidence governed by 227.10, Wis. Stats. We also note that in State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis. 2d 672, 677, 242 N.W.2d 689 (1976), this court stated that due process is a requirement only where state action is involved. In the instant case, it is clear that the university is a creature of the state, as set forth in secs. 36.01 (1) and 36.03, Stats. [3] The United States Supreme Court has recognized that `[d]ue process, unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances.' Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (citation omitted). [D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). The Mathews decision set forth three factors to be considered when identifying the specific dictates of due process in a given situation. They are: (1) The private interest that will be affected by the state action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest through the procedures utilized and the probable value of added or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the state's interest, which includes the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the added or substitute procedural requirements would impose. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 334-35. Therefore, we begin our analysis with a consideration of the private interest which would be affected by the action in this case. From the face of sec. 36.13 (1) (a), Stats., it is clear that because Patterson had received a tenure appointment, he had a statutory entitlement to his position which could only be taken from him for cause. This court recognized in the decision of State ex rel. DeLuca v. Common Council, 72 Wis. 2d at 678, that when an individual's property interest is one conferred by the law of the state, it is protected by the due process provisions of both the Wisconsin and federal constitutions. See also, Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573 (1975); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. at 576-77; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); and Johnson v. Board of Regents of University of Wis. Sys., 377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974). Consequently, we find that Patterson's employment status as a tenured professor constituted a property right and must be afforded due process safeguards before he can be deprived of this status. Next, we must consider the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest, which may have resulted from the procedures utilized in this case by the university through Chancellor Fort's actions, and the probable value of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. When we review the record in the instant case, we find that the associate chancellor notified Patterson twice by letter that unless he reported for work on January 23, 1979, his unexcused absences would be treated as a resignation. We also find that Patterson responded by letter twice, stating in the first letter that he refused to accept any duties besides teaching until all charges against him had been cleared and the alternate duties approved by the geography department and, in the second letter, that he could not work on the Barron county campus while the charges against him remained unresolved. Patterson's second letter also indicated that he was willing to take an unpaid leave of absence while the necessary proceedings took place. He also met with the dean to discuss his assignment and how he thought the project might be accomplished. Subsequently, Chancellor Fort notified Patterson that he (Patterson) had constructively resigned. We find the risk of an erroneous deprivation which may have resulted from the procedure utilized by the university to have been inordinately high. Clearly, there was some conflict between Patterson and the university concerning his treatment by the university, as was evidenced by his letters to the chancellor. Patterson evidently felt that he was unable to carry out the duties assigned to him while this conflict remained unresolved, and he therefore refused to perform his assigned duties. Whether or not he was justified in reacting in this manner, and ultimately whether or not his actions amounted to a constructive resignation, is not before us. However, we agree with the court of appeals that once the dispute arose as to whether Patterson's actions constituted a resignation, it should have been resolved through an evidentiary hearing affording procedural safeguards and not through a series of letters between Patterson and Chancellor Fort, which ultimately led to Fort's determination that Patterson had resigned. This is because if Patterson was justified in refusing to perform his duties until his dispute with the university was resolved, Chancellor Fort's initial characterization of Patterson's termination as a resignation could have effectively deprived Patterson of a protected property interest without his having been afforded due process. Therefore, we find that this situation is one which mandates the due process requirements of an evidentiary hearing in order to avoid the high risk of an erroneous deprivation. The Mathews decision pointed out that when considering the risk of an erroneous deprivation of a property interest which may have resulted from the procedures utilized, the fairness and reliability of the existing pretermination procedures should be considered because procedural due process rules are shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process .... Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343-44. We note that the Supreme Court in the decision of Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269 (1970), stated that written submissions are a wholly unsatisfactory basis for decision. [4] [W]ritten submissions do not afford the flexibility of oral presentations; they do not permit the [person being deprived of a property interest] to mold his argument to the issues the decision maker appears to regard as important. Id. Similarly, we find the use of letters by Chancellor Fort to be totally unsatisfactory as a means of assuring fairness of the procedures. Chancellor Fort's use of Patterson's letters did not afford the flexibility of oral presentations, and it did not allow Patterson the opportunity to mold his argument to the issues which Fort may have considered important and upon which he chose to base his decision. Id. Rather, it merely allowed Patterson to state his position that he did not intend to resign, but instead protested the university's treatment of him. The Goldberg decision also observed that secondhand presentations to the decision maker are unsatisfactory, since presentation of the side of the person being affected by the termination is left to the party reporting to the decision maker. Id. For this reason, we find that the meeting on March 8, 1979, at which Patterson presented his side of the controversy without the presence of Chancellor Fort, was lacking in reliability and fairness. It was also lacking by virtue of the fact that Fort had made the determination that Patterson had resigned prior to the March 8 meeting. Consequently, we find the potential value behind the additional safeguards in the form of an evidentiary hearing to be great. The additional safeguards already exist in UWS sec. 6.02, Wis. Admin. Code, which deals with grievances and provides for a hearing in order to resolve such grievances or recommend solutions to the board. [5] As the Mathews decision stated, This Court consistently has held that some form of hearing is required before an individual is finally deprived of a property interest. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 333. The Supreme Court has also held that due process requires an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965). A UWS sec. 6.02 grievance hearing would provide the party disputing the form of a termination with a meaningful opportunity to be heard, before the decision to deny him or her a tenured job is made. Further, the party hearing the dispute would then be able to make a factual determination as to the nature of the termination. If the termination is found to be a discharge, then sec. 36.13 (5), Stats., and UWS sec. 4.01, Wis. Admin. Code, mandate a finding that it was for cause. Finally, we must consider the state's interest in providing a hearing, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional procedural requirement would impose. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 335. To begin with, we note that UWS sec. 6.02 already provides a system whereby grievances on the part of a faculty member may be heard. Therefore, we find no particularly heavy fiscal or administrative burden would be imposed by requiring the additional hearing. The Mathews Court characterized this final factor when considering the specific dictates of due process as one involving public interest. Id. at 347. We find that treating this dispute as a grievance for hearing purposes is consistent with the policy behind ch. 36, Stats., addressing the University of Wisconsin System, as set forth in sec. 36.01(2): The mission of the system is to develop human resources, to discover and disseminate knowledge, to extend knowledge and its application beyond the boundaries of its campuses and to serve and stimulate society by developing in students heightened intellectual, cultural and humane sensitivities, scientific, professional and technological expertise and a sense of purpose. Inherent in this broad mission are methods of instruction, research, extended training and public service designed to educate people and improve the human condition. Basic to every purpose of the system is the search for truth. The language of sec. 36.13, regarding tenured professors, has been set forth above. Section 36.13(5) contains procedural protections surrounding the dismissal of a tenured faculty member, providing that a person having tenure may be dismissed only for just cause and only after due notice and hearing. UWS sec. 4.05, Wis. Admin. Code, provides the procedures to be followed for such a dismissal. The obvious purpose behind sec. 36.13 is that tenured professors may only be dismissed for cause, in order to assure that faculty members are guaranteed freedom as teachers in order that the goals set forth by the legislature in sec. 36.01(2) are achieved. As Professor Emerson has stated, The chief device for assuring the faculty member freedom as a teacher, scholar and citizen is his right to tenure.... The institution of tenure is designed to guard the faculty member against dismissal for political or other inadmissible reasons, a fact often hard for him to prove, and to assure him economic security in which he can carry on his search for truth in his teaching and research. Other protective devices are embodied in the concept of `academic due process.' The principles of academic due process, still in the stage of growth, entitle the faculty member to certain procedural rights in dismissal or disciplinary proceedings, including a determination of the issues, at least in the first instance, by a tribunal of his peers. T. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 594-95 (1970). Accordingly, we find that providing a tenured faculty member with an evidentiary hearing prior to termination when the member alleges that the termination is actually a discharge promotes the policies behind ch. 36, Stats. Providing such an evidentiary hearing is also consistent with the purposes behind the legislature's establishment of a tenure system. This also protects the public from the ultimate loss of qualified, talented faculty members whose actions may have been erroneously considered to have constituted resignation. We believe this situation is similar to that set out in Watkins v. Milwaukee County Civil Service Comm., 88 Wis. 2d 411, 276 N.W.2d 775 (1979), where this court treated resignation by coercion as a discharge and ordered the Milwaukee county civil service commission to conduct a hearing in order to determine whether the petitioner's resignation had been coerced. The court noted that, Treating coerced resignations as discharges for purposes of hearings under sec. 63.10, Stats., fits well with the policies of security of tenure and impartial evaluation which underlie the civil service system. Id. at 420. The same rationale applies in the instant case, although we do not go so far as to treat this dispute as a discharge. Rather, allowing an evidentiary hearing and fact findings concerning the nature of the faculty member's termination promotes the public interest.