Opinion ID: 2090688
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: We have not previously addressed the issue of whether the overruling of a motion to dismiss criminal charges on speedy trial grounds is a final, appealable order where the statutory right to a speedy trial is derived from §§ 29-3801 to 29-3809. However, we have held that an appeal could be taken from such an order where the asserted right is based upon the Nebraska speedy trial act, §§ 29-1207 and 29-1208, reasoning that a ruling on a motion for absolute discharge based upon an accused criminal's nonfrivolous claim that his or her speedy trial rights were violated is a ruling affecting a substantial right made during a special proceeding and is therefore final and appealable. State v. Gibbs, 253 Neb. 241, 245, 570 N.W.2d 326, 330 (1997). See, also, State v. Jacques, 253 Neb. 247, 570 N.W.2d 331 (1997). In State v. Williams, 253 Neb. 619, 573 N.W.2d 106 (1997), we applied the same reasoning in holding that an order denying a motion to dismiss based upon the alleged denial of an accused's speedy trial rights under the interstate Agreement on Detainers, Neb.Rev.Stat. § 29-759 (Reissue 1995), was a final, appealable order. For the same reasons, we conclude that the denial of a speedy trial claim governed by §§ 29-3801 to 29-3809 is a final, appealable order.