Opinion ID: 2157107
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Comparative Culpability Test

Text: Concluding from the salient-factors test that, at the very least, the vast majority of F-2 cases result in life sentences, precedent-seeking analysis should inform us whether Feaster was singled out unfairly for the death penalty, or whether he was truly among the most culpable of the F-2 defendants. A searching comparison of F-2 cases demonstrates that Feaster is far from the most culpable of the F-2 defendants. His case more closely resembles the large majority of cases that resulted in life sentences and his death sentence should accordingly be vacated. The precedent seeking analysis in the Court's opinion, as in all prior proportionality review opinions, is a subjective moral evaluation of Richard Feaster as opposed to the comparative analysis that is promised. The bulk of the precedent-seeking analysis is devoted to recounting defendant's crime and setting forth comparison case summaries. Scant attention is paid to the actual comparison of objective factors in each case. That analysis is exactly the kind of traditional, offense-oriented proportionality review that we have directly rejected. See, e.g., Marshall II, supra, 130 N.J. at 129-30, 613 A. 2d 1059. Without reference to comparison cases, the Court characterizes Feaster's level of moral blameworthiness as average to high by weighing his youth and lack of premeditation against the victim's vulnerability, lack of justification or excuse, and complete callousness. Ante at 275-76, 757 A. 2d at 275-76. The factors supporting the Court's average to high rating are illusory because they are factors present in nearly all death-eligible cases. The description of a completely callous crime committed against a vulnerable victim without justification or excuse can be applied to nearly every case in the death-eligible universe and certainly to all the cases in Feaster's comparison group. Calling a defendant a cold and calculating murderer may be fitting, but the descriptor is useless insofar as it is applicable to every person who commits a death-eligible crime. As such, it has no place in proportionality review. Harvey III, supra, 159 N.J. at 319, 731 A. 2d 1121. The Court's discussion of victimization and character suffer from similar problems of subjective, standardless evaluation. Ante at 406, 757 A. 2d at 276. Its determinations that victimization was average to low in Feaster's case and that Feaster's character demonstrated average to high culpability, ante at 406, 757 A. 2d at 276, are based solely on visceral reactions that imply nothing about Feaster's relative death-worthiness. The Court's discussion of the degree of victimization, in fact, directly contravenes our opinion in Loftin II. 157 N.J. at 338, 724 A. 2d 129. There, we analyzed a very similar execution-style shooting, but rather than labeling it as average to low victimization, we stated that [i]n comparison to other murder cases we have examined, this was not a particularly violent or brutal killing. Ibid. The Court also fails to explain how Feaster's lack of cooperation with authorities and allegedly callous comments to the jailhouse snitch [8] are so negatively probative in light of mitigating circumstances such as his minimal criminal record, capacity for rehabilitation, and the testimony that he cried and expressed remorse and disbelief when driving home on the night of the murder. Even more disturbing is the fact that in Loftin II, we characterized the facts of Feaster's case in a good light relative to moral blameworthiness to demonstrate that Loftin was more culpable than Feaster. See Loftin II, supra, 157 N.J. at 340-41, 724 A. 2d 129. In that opinion, we said that Feaster presented uncontroverted evidence that he suffers from a mental disease or defect, namely encephalopathy, an injury to the left frontal lobe region making him more violence prone. Id. at 340, 724 A. 2d 129. We also recognized in Loftin II that Feaster was relatively young at the time of the offense and still leading the life of a juvenile (e.g., living with his parents and lacking employment). Id. at 341, 724 A. 2d 129. We highlighted the facts that Feaster's parents were both alcoholics and that his father was abusive. That we can spotlight those facts in one case to portray Feaster as having relatively low culpability, and virtually ignore them in Feaster's own case demonstrates the hopelessly unstructured and unreliable nature of our precedent-seeking review.
Only eighteen of the thirty-three cases in Feaster's F-2 subcategory proceeded to the penalty phase. In those eighteen penalty trials, the jury sentenced three people other than Feaster to death: Morton (affirmed today), Hightower (two death sentences vacated), and Long (death sentence overturned, entered guilty plea to non-capital murder). Our duty in this portion of proportionality review is to ensure that the defendant has not been `singled out unfairly for capital punishment.' Cooper II, supra, 159 N.J. at 88, 731 A. 2d 1000 (quoting Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 47, 651 A. 2d 949); accord Chew II, supra, 159 N.J. at 210, 731 A. 2d 1070. For the purpose of precedent-seeking review, therefore, we determine whether the comparison life-sentenced cases render Feaster's death sentence disproportionate. It is important to note that that process is not a justifying one. It does not, in any way, attempt to deflect from the notion of murder as evil or imply that the death of the victim is anything other than horrific. Its focus is only to place a defendant's terrible crime on a continuum of other terrible crimes. That said, Feaster's case is notable for its relatively low victimization. The only aggravating factor in Feaster's case was that the murder was committed in the course of a robbery, and that factor is present in every F-2 case. Thus, it does not, in any way, distinguish Feaster as more culpable than any other F-2 defendant. Feaster is somewhat unusual, however, in that he fired a single shot and did not cause prolonged suffering to either the victim or any non-decedent victims. Donaghy died instantly, and there is no evidence that he was ever threatened, forced to take any action at gunpoint, or injured in any way other than the shooting itself. Again, to distinguish Feaster on the basis of relatively low aggravation is not meant to diminish the horrible impact of the crime on the victim, but to place Feaster on a scale of culpability relative to other murderers. The Court acknowledges that four life-sentenced cases are sufficiently similar to Feaster's to raise serious questions about the proportionality of Feaster's sentence. Ante at 410-12, 757 A. 2d at 278-79. I agree. The life sentences for Larry Jones, Rafael Slaughter, Aaron Stamps and Charles Williams are, as the Court states, more difficult to reconcile with Feaster's death sentence. Ante at 411, 757 A. 2d at 279. The Court also recognizes that Abdel Jaber Saleh's life sentence cannot readily be reconciled with [Feaster's] death sentence. Ibid. That is an understatement. The degree of victimization caused by Abdel Jaber Saleh is among the most serious in the F-2 subcategory. Saleh strangled his victim with a metal chain, bound and gagged him with duct tape and plastic ties, dragged his body across the floor, doused him with charcoal fluid, then set him on fire. The autopsy report indicated that the victim was still alive when Saleh set him on fire. In addition to the 4(g) aggravating factor, Saleh's jury found aggravating factor 4(f)that Saleh committed the murder to escape detection or apprehension. Like Feaster, Saleh was only 22 at the time of the offense, had no significant criminal history, and was uncooperative with law enforcement officers. Unlike Feaster, however, Saleh presented no evidence of any mental disease or defect, childhood trauma, brain damage, or intoxication at the time of the offense. Still, Saleh was given a life sentence. Jones, Williams, and Slaughter all harmed multiple victimsfive, four, and three, respectively. Although the 4(b) aggravating factor was only found in Jones's case, all three cases involved a serious risk of death to innocent bystanders as well as the use of threats and violence against non-decedent victims. Neither Jones nor Slaughter presented mitigating evidence as compelling as Feaster's mitigating evidence. Williams's evidence of sexual abuse and history of emotional disturbance are unusually tragic, but his criminal history is much more extensive than Feaster's; Williams spent all but 93 days of his adult life incarcerated. Williams's culpability is heightened by the fact that one of his surviving victims sustained serious brain damage while another was left disabled. Stamps's case resembles Feaster's quite closely. Stamps, who shot a security guard twice in the chest during a bank robbery, acted with co-defendants and did not cooperate with the authorities. Like Feaster, Stamps grew up in an unstable home, has a substance abuse problem, and has borderline intelligence. Stamps, however, had three prior armed robbery convictions. The major differences between the two casesFeaster's minimal criminal history, organic brain damage, and abuse at the hands of his alcoholic fatherunderscore Feaster's relatively lower culpability. Viewed side by side with those five life sentences that are either more aggravated, less mitigated, or both, Feaster's death sentence stands out as an anomaly. The Court curiously finds five other F-2 penalty phase cases that resulted in life sentences readily distinguishable from Feaster's case, despite their close similarity. Ante at 408, 757 A. 2d at 277. In distinguishing the life sentences given to John Downie, Craig Hart, Roger Hoyte, Joseph Wilson, and David Russo, the Court states that, unlike Feaster, those cases contain evidence of, (1) extreme mental or emotional disturbance, (2) youth, (3) diminished capacity at the time of the offense, and (4) lack of a significant criminal history. Ante at 409, 757 A. 2d at 278. Those distinctions cannot be reconciled with, (1) Feaster's uncontroverted evidence of organic brain damage and psychological problems; (2) Feaster's youth (he was as young as or younger than Downie, Hart, Russo, and Hoyte at the time of the offense, and only a few years older than Wilson); (3) Feaster's alcohol and cocaine intoxication on the night of the offense; and (4) his minimal prior record consisting of a single, unindictable conviction. The Court's conclusions are also difficult to reconcile with our opinion in Loftin II, in which we found Feaster to be relatively less culpable than similar cases specifically because of evidence that he suffered from a mental disease or defect and that his crime was mitigated by his youth and immaturity. 157 N.J. at 340-41, 724 A. 2d 129. In comparing Feaster to Downie, Hart, Hoyte, Wilson, and Russo, ante at 408-10, 424-25, 757 A. 2d at 277-78, 286-87, the Court also ignores Feaster's evidence of chronic child abuse that we found compelling in Loftin II. 157 N.J. at 340, 724 A. 2d 129. None of the comparison defendants suffered from the same pattern of abuse that Feaster did. Only Downie and Hoyte offered comparable evidence of unstable, violent, and dysfunctional childhood environments, but the offenses committed by Downie (shooting at a police officer as well as murdering a gas station attendant) and Hoyte (shooting and stabbing three taxicab drivers) are much more aggravated than Feaster's. Regarding the failure of the jury to find the 5(c)(age) and 5(d) (mental disorder or intoxication) mitigating factors in Feaster's case that were found for Downie, Hart and Wilson, we are free to go beyond a jury's conclusion in respect of a mitigating factor. Martini II, supra, 139 N.J. at 3, 651 A. 2d 949. Although we cannot say that the jury's findings regarding those factors are wrong, they are inexplicable in comparison to other penalty phase cases. Why would a jury, and the Court, find age a mitigating factor for Hart (age 25), Downie (age 24), and Hoyte (age 22), but not Feaster (age 22)? Ante at 409, 757 A. 2d at 278. In any case, Feaster's relative youth and immaturity should be considered in the case comparisons. The same logic applies to the 5(d) mitigating factor for intoxication. Although Feaster's jury did not find the 5(d) factor, the uncontroverted evidence was that he had consumed alcohol and cocaine on the night of the offense and that lowers his relative culpability in precedent-seeking review. In comparison with Hoyte and Downie, Feaster's case is not particularly aggravated. To be sure, Feaster did not cooperate with authorities as Hoyte did. On the other hand, Hoyte's cooperation was fueled by the opportunity he had to plead to a non-capital offense in return for testimony against accomplices. Thus, it is not revelatory, in any meaningful way, of better character. Moreover, because Downie and Hoyte shared other similar characteristics with Feaster, such as a lack of a significant criminal record, youth, and intoxication during the offense, there is no logical explanation for the discrepancy in sentencing. Russo's mitigating evidence (a minor criminal record, a history of substance abuse, no serious psychiatric history, a diagnosis of personality disorders, and evidence that he succeeded in controlled environments such as employment) is also similar to Feaster's, but his shooting of three gas station attendants is more aggravated than Feaster's offense. In comparison with Russo's life sentence, Feaster's death sentence is aberrant. Hart and Wilson are theoretically distinguishable from Feaster because there was a jury finding of the 5(c) mitigating factor for age and 5(d) mitigating factor for mental disease or defect or intoxication in each case. However, that distinction does not hold water. Feaster's age and intoxication at the time of the offense should be considered in precedent-seeking review despite the absence of a jury finding. In reality, Feaster's evidence of youth, immaturity, and intoxication was similar to Hart's and Wilson's. What is truly different about Hart and Wilson is that those defendants both threatened victims at gunpoint and Wilson's victim suffered a protracted death. Neither Hart nor Wilson grew up in the kind of violent and unstable home that Feaster did, and neither was affected by the brain damage that impaired Feaster's mental functioning. Viewing the cases in their entirety, Hart and Wilson are more culpable than Feaster and this their life sentences raise serious questions about the proportionality of Feaster's death sentence. Other comparison cases that did not proceed to a penalty trial, either because the defendant pled to a non-capital offense or was not capitally prosecuted, provide further support for the disproportionality of Feaster's death sentence. Four such cases involve serious injuries to non-decedent victims in addition to a homicide victim. Corey Washington shot an elderly store clerk in the head; Emmanuel Charles shot a restaurant manager three times; Harold Rodriguez shot a gas station owner six times; and Jose Soto shot a restaurant owner after his wife told Soto there was no money to steal. Except for Rodriguez, who is married with three children and suffers from AIDS, not one of those cases contains mitigating circumstances as significant as Feaster's. None suffered from child abuse, organic brain damage, severe depression, or the constraints of borderline intelligence. Rodriguez was much older than Feaster when he committed his offense, and Soto, Charles, and Washington were only a few years younger. Like Feaster, all have minimal prior records except for Charles, who has an extensive juvenile record including numerous thefts and assaults. It is true that we do not know as much about the mitigating circumstances of those defendants because they all pled to non-capital offenses (Washington and Rodriguez to murder; Charles to felony murder; Soto to aggravated manslaughter). However, unlike Feaster, those defendants have also benefitted from the AOC's coding procedures, under which Feaster would have been coded with the 5(d) and 5(f) mitigating factors. See Administrative Office of the Courts, Instructions for Screening Cases: Mens Rea, Own Conduct and Factors (Feb. 5, 1999) (directing 5(d) to be coded where record indicates serious head injury, brain damage or drug addiction, and 5(f) to be coded where defendant has no convictions for an indictable offense and less than four disorderly persons convictions). Timothy Harris presents yet another stark example of how anomalous Feaster's sentence is. Harris, acting alone, followed two people into a store, robbed them at gunpoint, and shot one victim in the head because she did not hand over all her money. The victim survived for hours in the emergency room before dying as a result of the gunshot wound. The only mitigating evidence in the record about Harris is that he was nineteen at the time of the offense, and that that was his first indictable offense as an adult. Accordingly, the AOC coded the 5(c) and 5(f) mitigating factors present. However, Harris had essentially led a life of crime as reflected in thirty-one juvenile complaints beginning when he was thirteen, for a variety of offenses including robbery, assault, and weapons offenses. Of the twenty-three comparison cases to Feaster, at least sixteen can be easily classified as more culpable than Feaster. Their offenses were either more aggravated, presented fewer mitigating circumstances, or both, yet resulted in a life sentence. To me, this entire exercise underscores the randomness of the death sentence process and reveals that Feaster's death sentence is disproportionate because it cannot be reconciled on a consistent, reasoned basis with the majority of life sentences imposed on similarly situated defendants. Accordingly, I dissent. For affirmance Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices O'HERN, STEIN, COLEMAN, and LaVECCHIA5.