Opinion ID: 2633564
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: True Waiver

Text: ¶ 28 True waiver is the most common method by which defendants forsake their right to counsel. True waiver typically occurs when a defendant affirmatively requests permission to proceed pro se. [16] In State v. Bakalov, we required that defendants clearly and unequivocally request self-representation in order to waive their right to counsel. [17] ¶ 29 When a defendant requests to proceed pro se, his waiver will be valid only if he acts knowingly and intelligently, being aware of the dangers inherent in self-representation. [18] The most reliable way for a trial court to determine whether a defendant is aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation is to engage in a colloquy on the record. At times, however, we have found a waiver of the right to counsel absent a colloquy. For example, in State v. Frampton , we found that a defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel when he affirmatively requested to proceed pro se despite the fact that the trial court had not engaged in a colloquy. [19] We reasoned that the defendant should have realized the value of counsel because he was represented by counsel in a prior trial. [20] Additionally, we concluded that he must have realized the seriousness of the charges filed against him because the judge had appointed standby counsel over his objection [21] and the judge had explained the charges, including the maximum penalty associated therewith, in two prior trials involving the same charges. [22] ¶ 30 True waiver does not apply in this case because Pedockie never expressed a desire to represent himself. To the contrary, the record is replete with instances of Pedockie insisting that he want[ed] adequate counsel and that he was not going to represent [himself].