Opinion ID: 625002
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Standards applicable to relief sought

Text: The legal standards for these three types of relief are related. An alien who cannot establish membership in a particular social group resulting in persecution (either past or feared-future persecution) is ineligible both for asylum and for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1235 (considering whether a proposed particular social group exists “within the meaning of the INA,” which includes both asylum and withholding provisions). For those applicants who are able to establish membership in a particular social group or who seek asylum or withholding of removal on a political opinion basis, if they cannot establish a well founded fear of persecution under asylum standards, their claims will necessarily fail to meet the higher burden of proof required for withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) or CAT standards. Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. C. Escamilla’s claim of eligibility for asylum based on his membership in three proposed particular social groups 1. Escamilla’s proposed group “Salvadoran men believed to be gang members of a rival gang” fails for lack of visibility. The IJ relied on the BIA’s decision in Matter of S-E-G- to reject this proposed social group. In Matter of S-E-G-, the BIA rejected a social group consisting of “Salvadoran youth who have been subjected to recruitment efforts by MS-13 and who have rejected or resisted membership in the gang based on their own personal, moral, and 18 religious opposition to the gang’s values and activities,” because it lacked visibility. The BIA first noted that “gangs have directed harm against anyone and everyone perceived to have interfered with, or who might present a threat to, their criminal enterprises and territorial power. The respondents are therefore not in a substantially different situation from anyone who has crossed the gang, or who is perceived to be a threat to the gang’s interests.” Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 579. The BIA determined that, due to the gangs’ tendency to attack anyone presenting a threat to their power, “it is difficult to conclude that any “group,” as actually perceived by the criminal gangs, is much narrower than the general population of El Salvador. . . . [W]e have no reason to believe . . . that the general societal perception would be otherwise.” Id. at 588. The BIA determined that the proposed group, therefore, lacked the social visibility required to be recognized as a particular social group. In this case, the BIA and IJ extended that reasoning to conclude that Salvadoran men believed to be gang members of a rival gang are not in a substantially different situation from anyone else who is perceived to be a threat to the gangs’ interests, and thus these men would not be perceived as a group by the general Salvadoran society. In contrast, Escamilla points to Matter of E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591 (BIA 2008), which considered a social group composed of “young persons who are perceived to be affiliated with gangs.” That decision observed that the proposed group does “entail some ‘social visibility,’” then rejected the proposed group because of a Ninth Circuit decision that held that an alien’s present or past membership in a criminal gang could not 19 constitute membership in a particular social group because the court could not conclude “that Congress, in offering refugee protection for individuals facing potential persecution through social group status, intended to include violent street gangs.” Id. at 596 (citing Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 945–46 (9th Cir. 2007)). While recognizing that “the respondent in th[e] case is not, and has never been, a member of any criminal gang,” the BIA held that “[n]evertheless, because we agree that membership in a criminal gang cannot constitute a particular social group, the respondent cannot establish particular social group status based on the incorrect perception by others that he is such a gang member.” Id. Escamilla argues this is an “irrational leap,” Pet. Br. at 27, and we agree. The concerns expressed by the Ninth Circuit simply are not present for aliens who have never been a part of a gang yet are perceived as gang members. Thus, we reject the BIA’s reasoning in Matter of E-A-G- that the group of people perceived to be gang members who are not actually gang members is categorically barred from recognition as a particular social group. Escamilla argues that he is a member of the group “Salvadoran men believed to be gang members of a rival gang,” which differs slightly, but significantly, from the proposed group in Matter of E-A-G-. The “rival gang” language means that Escamilla’s proposed grouping is defined not by society’s perception of the group, but by the perceptions of the group by gangs who perceive themselves to be “rival gangs.” The first prong of the social visibility test requires that citizens of the applicant’s country generally 20 would consider individuals with the pertinent trait to constitute a distinct social group, not just that members of opposing groups would consider individuals with the pertinent trait to constitute a distinct social group. Matter of S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 579. The group “Salvadoran men believed to be gang members of a rival gang” is defined by the view of other gangs, not of society at large, and thus fails the first prong of the social visibility test. This proposed social group cannot serve as a particular social group for asylum or withholding of removal purposes. 2. Escamilla’s membership in two particular social groups did not result in Escamilla’s persecution or in Escamilla’s well founded fear of future persecution, so he cannot claim refugee status or seek withholding of removal on the basis of his membership in those groups. a. Escamilla’s membership in the group of Salvadoran men who are family of well-known, high-ranking gang members did not result in Escamilla’s persecution or in Escamilla’s well founded fear of future persecution. Membership in a particular social group alone is not enough. Escamilla must also show that such membership resulted in his persecution or in his well founded fear of future persecution. This requires both a showing of persecution or a well founded fear of future persecution and a showing that such persecution resulted or would result from membership in the social group. “In this circuit, the ultimate determination whether an alien has demonstrated persecution is a question of fact, even if the underlying factual circumstances are not in dispute and the only issue is whether those circumstances qualify as persecution.” Vicente-Elias, 532 F.3d at 1091 (citing Nazaraghaie v. INS, 102 F.3d at 463 n.2). This part of the test is very difficult to satisfy for young people from countries like El Salvador, where gang violence seems to touch nearly everyone. In the present 21 case, assuming that Escamilla could show persecution or a well founded fear of future persecution, Escamilla still cannot show that such persecution resulted from his membership in the family of a well-known, high-ranking gang member. Neither the BIA not the IJ directly addressed whether Escamilla’s membership in this group resulted in his persecution or a well founded fear of future persecution, because neither found that the group constituted a particular social group. Even if we were to disagree with the conclusion pertaining to familial membership as membership in a particular social group, we would not remand as a result. In the present case, remand to the BIA would be a mere formality, given that the BIA would remand to the IJ, and the IJ has already considered this issue.5 Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 453 F.3d 99, 107 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[R]emand to the BIA is futile . . . whenever the reviewing panel is confident that the agency would reach the same result upon a reconsideration cleansed of errors.”). The IJ reviewed the abuse Escamilla suffered at the hands of the gangs, and noted that much of it came before Escamilla’s uncle became a high-ranking gang member. He also noted that both MS-13 and M-18 targeted Escamilla for reasons not related to recruitment, but based on general criminal motivations. His conclusion, that “the respondent was not singled out [for gang violence] because of that relationship,” CAR at 205, is “supported by reasonable, substantial and probative evidence considering the record as a whole.” Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150. Escamilla’s claim for refugee status based on his membership 5 The IJ drew his conclusion in assessing whether this group was a particular social group, not in determining whether Escamilla’s membership in the group resulted in his persecution or would result in his well founded fear of future persecution, but that does not vitiate the IJ’s finding. 22 in this familial group fails for lack of evidence of persecution or a reasonable fear of persecution based on group membership. b. Escamilla’s membership in the group Salvadoran men who are HIV positive did not result in Escamilla’s persecution or in Escamilla’s well founded fear of future persecution. Both the BIA and the IJ focused on whether Escamilla could show a well founded fear of future persecution based on his HIV-positive status. The BIA concluded, “[t]he respondent did not establish that he has a well-founded fear . . . of persecution . . . . The [IJ] properly concluded that any inadequacies [in] the health care for HIV-positive men in El Salvador cannot be construed as intent by the government to persecute . . . HIV-positive men.” CAR at 4 (citing Ixtlilco-Morales v. Keisler, 507 F.3d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that alien failed to establish that inadequacies in health care for HIV-positive individuals in Mexico was an attempt to persecute those with HIV)). The IJ also noted that Escamilla’s fiancé (now wife) has testified she would attempt to assist Escamilla with acquiring medication, should it become necessary, further alleviating concerns related to his medical treatment. The evidence presented does not compel a conclusion that the Salvadoran government does or will persecute HIV-positive men. Hang Kannha Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1233. The IJ also discussed potential non-governmental persecution of HIV-positive men in El Salvador, concluding that there was not “a reasonable possibility . . . that he will be harmed if he is required to return to El Salvador.” CAR at 210. The IJ found that the discrimination and violence against HIV-positive men in El Salvador did not rise to the 23 level required to establish persecution. “The type of fear and discrimination described by the respondent and by the expert witness do not rise to the level of persecution as set forth by the Board of Immigration Appeals and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals as defined in particular by Sidabutar v. Gonzales.” Id. at 214 (citations omitted). Finally, the IJ concluded, “[t]he behavior complained of in this case is reprehensible certainly, but the Court simply concludes it does not rise to the level of persecution.” Id. at 214. We review this determination under the deferential substantial evidence standard, and under that standard we conclude that the evidence in the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. Hang Kannha Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1233. D. Escamilla’s claim of past persecution and a well founded fear of future persecution based on his political opinion Escamilla’s claim of persecution on the basis of his political opinion also fails. Escamilla claims that he was and will be persecuted on the basis of his political opinion, which he identified as resistance to “gang initiation on general principles and religious grounds.” Pet. Br. at 43–44. “Coercive efforts by a gang to recruit new members are not necessarily persecution on account of political opinion.” Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1228. To show persecution on account of political opinion, a gang target subject to coercion would have to show that the gangs “persecute him because of that political opinion, rather than because of his refusal to fight with them.” Elias–Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483; see also Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1228. In Barrientos, the record reflected some evidence that the petitioner “was assaulted on account of her vocal opposition to gangs.” 658 F.3d at 1228. Despite that evidence, 24 we determined it “equally likely that she was attacked on account of her refusal to join.” Id. In the present case, Escamilla has not presented any evidence of his own strong negative opinion of gangs; he dated and associated with gang members, although he refused to join a gang himself. Escamilla claims that he was and will be persecuted on the basis of his resistance to “gang initiation on general principles and religious grounds.” Pet. Br. at 43–44. Further, he claims that “gangs have attributed an opinion to him that he is supportive of rival gangs.” Pet. Br. at 44. Finally, Escamilla argues that gangs may initially target recruits for violence in order to coerce them to join, but that, when met with refusal, the gangs target those who refuse on the basis of their opinion of the gang. In contrast to Escamilla’s contentions, the record reveals that the gangs generally harassed Escamilla in an effort to get him to join. His interactions with the gang do not appear to be based on any political opinion he held. The IJ concluded that “the gangs attempted to recruit individuals to fill their ranks and not to target them for a belief or opinion that they held.” CAR at 206.6 The evidence in the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. Hang Kannha Yuk, 355 F.3d at 1233. E. CAT protection Protection under the CAT requires Escamilla to show “that it is more likely than 6 The BIA did not explicitly discuss the political opinion argument, instead agreeing with the IJ’s broad finding that “the harmful circumstances that the respondent endured in the past and fears he will again suffer in the future in El Salvador at the hands of the Mara 18 and MS-13 gangs were not on account of a cognizable particular social group or ground enumerated in the definition of ‘refugee.’” Thus, we turn to the IJ opinion for a “more complete explanation of those same grounds.” Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at 1204. 25 not that” 1) he would be tortured if removed to the proposed country of removal, and 2) that the torture would be “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. § 208.18(a)(1) (2011). CAT protection does not require that Escamilla be tortured on the basis of a statutorily protected ground (i.e. because of his political opinion or membership in a particular social group). Cruz-Funez, 406 F.3d at 1192. In the present case, Escamilla argues that he would be tortured by gangs and on account of his HIV-positive status. The analysis by the IJ and the BIA in this case summarily assumes that Escamilla might be tortured and focuses instead on the question of whether the government would acquiesce in any torture that might occur.7 The BIA concluded that “[t]he record supports the Immigration Judge’s finding that the Salvadoran government will not acquiesce in any torture perpetrated by criminal gangs.” CAR at 4. The IJ’s decision provides a more complete explanation with respect to torture by gangs. In considering the potential gang torture, the IJ relied on the BIA’s holding in Matter of S-E-G- that “the government had difficulty controlling gangs in total in El Salvador, but had certainly not acquiesced to torture by gang members.” CAR at 205. Because the 7 In rejecting Escamilla’s CAT effort to avoid deportation, the IJ found that Escamilla’s evidence did not show the Salvadoran government had the specific intent to inflict torture. Id. at 206–07. This is an impermissibly high standard; the government need only acquiesce to the torture, not have any specific intent to inflict it. The BIA corrected this error on the appeal, noting that “[t]he respondent did not establish that the Salvadoran government would torture or acquiesce to the torture of the respondent for any reason,” and that “respondent did not suffer any past torture during his encounters with gangs.” Id. at 3–4. 26 government had not acquiesced, the violence by the gangs against the S-E-G- petitioner did not meet the definition of torture under the CAT. The same is true in this case. The government of El Salvador does not acquiesce in gang violence. The record supports this conclusion. While Escamilla did allege that people wearing police uniforms were sometimes involved with the gangs when they attacked him, he was not sure that the people wearing the uniforms were actually police officers. Escamilla was shot once by police officers who were not involved in gang activity, but the officers who shot him mistook Escamilla for someone else. Such a mistaken-identity shooting does not rise to the level of torture on behalf of the government. The national government in El Salvador has made reduction of gang activity a primary goal, and it is working to mitigate gang violence. While the government’s track record in reducing gang violence is weak, we cannot say that the government has acquiesced in gang activity. The BIA opinion on HIV-related torture does not require bolstering from the IJ opinion. The BIA held that “[t]he respondent did not show that the government will more likely than not instigate, consent or acquiesce to torture of the respondent on account of his HIV status.” CAR at 4. This conclusion is supported by the record; El Salvador has laws against discrimination against HIV-positive individuals, although they are not broadly enforced. HIV carries a heavy social stigma in El Salvador, and the record reflects that this stigma sometimes results in violence against HIV-positive individuals, but the record does not indicate that the government acquiesces in this violence as a 27 general matter. The BIA’s conclusion is supported by “reasonable, substantial and probative evidence considering the record as a whole,” and thus we do not disturb it. Elzour, 378 F.3d at 1150.