Opinion ID: 677894
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The DeVolls' Breach of Promise Claim

Text: 12 The DeVolls argue that Burdick breached a promise he made at the August 9, 1990 meeting (and relied upon by Robert) to provide his workers with health benefits comparable to benefits they were then receiving under the Fund. The district court held that this claim, based on state contract law, was preempted by Sec. 514 of ERISA. Section 514 provides that ERISA supersedes any and all state laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan ... 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1144(a). 13 The DeVolls argue that the district court erred for a number of reasons. First, they contend that, even though this Circuit has held that certain state contract law claims are preempted by ERISA, a larger and growing body of out-of-circuit authority has held that state law claims based on promissory estoppel are not preempted. 3 Second, they argue that, because this Court has held that claims based on equitable estoppel are not preempted by ERISA, it would be inconsistent to hold that a claim based on the very similar theory of promissory estoppel is preempted. 4 Third, the DeVolls claim that, even if a state law claim based on promissory estoppel is preempted, Congress contemplated that the courts would develop a federal body of common law under ERISA; and this Court, in the interest of justice, should recognize promissory estoppel as a valid claim under ERISA. 14 The Supreme Court has repeatedly declared the sweep of ERISA preemption to be broad: 15 The pre-emption clause is conspicuous for its breadth. Its deliberately expansive language was designed to 'establish pension plan regulation as exclusively a federal concern.'  The key to Sec. 514(a) is found in the words relate to. Congress used those words in their broad sense, rejecting more limited pre-emption language that would have made the clause applicable only to state laws relating to the specific subjects covered by ERISA. 16 Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138, 111 S.Ct. 478, 482, 112 L.Ed.2d 474 (1990) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we have also endorsed a broad view of ERISA preemption. The Ninth Circuit has held that ERISA preempts common law theories of breach of contract implied in fact, promissory estoppel, estoppel by conduct, fraud and deceit, and breach of contract. Ellenburg v. Brockway, Inc., 763 F.2d 1091, 1095 (9th Cir.1985) (citing Blau v. Del Monte Corp., 748 F.2d 1348, 1356-57 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 865, 106 S.Ct. 183, 88 L.Ed.2d 152 (1985)). We are not free to revisit Ellenburg on this score, and agree with the district court that ERISA preempts the DeVolls' state law claim. We ha[ve] recognized that federal equitable estoppel principles can, in certain circumstances, apply to some claims arising under ERISA. Greany v. Western Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 973 F.2d 812, 821 (9th Cir.1992). However, we have limited these claims to situations where an employee relied to his detriment on representations made in regard to ambiguous language in an employee benefits plan. Id. at 821-22. 17 The DeVolls' common law claim relates to an ERISA-qualified employee benefits plan, yet does not fall under the narrow exception that we have carved out for claims based upon equitable estoppel. Nor may we imply a promissory estoppel remedy as a matter of filling an interstitial gap in ERISA, as the DeVolls suggest. See Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., --- U.S. ----, ----, 113 S.Ct. 2063, 2070, 124 L.Ed.2d 161 (1993) (The authority of courts to develop a 'federal common law' under ERISA is not the authority to revise the text of the statute.) (citations omitted); Watkins v. Westinghouse Hanford Co., 12 F.3d 1517, 1527-28 (9th Cir.1993) (rejecting a claim for damages cast as an equitable estoppel claim under ERISA); Olson v. General Dynamics Corp., 960 F.2d 1418, 1423 (9th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 2968, 119 L.Ed.2d 588 (1992) (declaring that any such gap is the concern of Congress.).