Opinion ID: 2118728
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: facts

Text: The charges against defendant arose from an armed robbery of a restaurant on July 11, 2002. The case was tried before a jury. Before trial began, the court inquired of the State and defense counsel as to their preferences regarding recording of the voir dire of the jury: [THE COURT:] Counsel, what do you want to do relative to having a court reporter take the actual voir dire; do you wish to have it recorded or not? [Defense Counsel:] I don't need it recorded. [State:] No, People waive. THE COURT: Then the court reporter will be waived for the actual taking of the voir dire. [To the court reporter:] When I read the list of witnesses and put the 12 in the box, then you're free to go. [Defense Counsel:] Judge, subject to coming up THE COURT: That's right, she'll be available. Voir dire commenced without being recorded by the court reporter. The court went back on the record after the 12 jurors had been picked to indicate that at that point there was only one prospective juror remaining as a possible alternate. The court stated that it was too late in the day to request additional prospective jurors, so either the parties could agree to go to trial with a single alternate juror if the final prospective juror was acceptable, or return the following day, pick two alternate jurors and proceed at that point. Defense counsel and the State each indicated that it would be acceptable to go to trial with a single alternate juror. After confirming that this was acceptable to both parties, the court stated: Okay. And I take it you continue your waiving of the court reporter for the voir dire for the alternate? Defense counsel and the State each assented, and the court reporter was again excused. The alternate was apparently deemed acceptable, and the case proceeded to trial. At the close of evidence, the jury found defendant guilty of armed robbery. The trial court then set June 13, 2003, as the date for posttrial motions and sentencing. On April 24, 2003, defendant sent the court a handwritten pro se motion for a new trial, which the court received on April 28. In addition to pointing out alleged inconsistencies in the testimony that formed the basis of his conviction, defendant also complained regarding the composition of his jury. Specifically, defendant, who is African-American, wrote to the judge as follows: I know you tried to be fair as possible and you was but I felt a predjudice [ sic ] and discrimanating [ sic ] patter[n] going on with the jury. I'm not predjudice [ sic ] but I strong feel some of the jury was. I mean let's look at it eleven white people and one black person   . Defendant further alleged, in his pro se motion, that the lone African-American juror, a woman, stated during voir dire that she did not know defendant, but that defendant subsequently learned that this juror did in fact know him. Defendant alleged, in addition, that the prosecution wanted this person on the jury because her brother had recently been murdered. In defendant's view, she had strong feelings about guns and people being shot. On May 14, 2003, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial. In this motion, defense counsel stated, in relevant part: That of the twelve jurors in this cause, there was only one black and when the court asked said black lady    if she knew anyone, either the attorneys or any of the proposed witnesses or the Defendant[,] she stated she did not know the Defendant[,] but in reality said Defendant has subsequently learned that said black lady did know him. On June 13, 2003, the trial court held the previously scheduled hearing on the motion for a new trial. During this hearing, defense counsel emphasized, in particular, the allegation regarding the African-American juror who denied, in effect, that she knew anyone, any of the parties, the Court, or anyone else. The State responded that defendant never made this objection during voir dire. The State added that there were several peremptory challenges used, at least seven by the defense; I think six by the State. The trial court denied the motion for a new trial. In explaining this decision, the trial court specifically addressed the claim regarding the African-American juror who allegedly denied knowing defendant. The trial court ruled that there was no factual basis for this claim. After denying the motion for a new trial, the court conducted a sentencing hearing. During this hearing, the State acknowledged that, according to the evidence presented at trial, defendant was not the individual that was armed. The presentence investigation report indicated that defendant, who was born on November 15, 1984, left high school in 1999 when he was about 15 years of age. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced defendant to 20 years' imprisonment. Defendant appealed, and a divided appellate court affirmed his conviction and sentence. 363 Ill.App.3d 567, 300 Ill.Dec. 207, 843 N.E.2d 465. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to uphold defendant's conviction, found no reversible error in the fact that the voir dire was not recorded, and denied defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In her dissent, Justice McDade pointed to Supreme Court Rule 608(a)(9), which requires that court reporting personnel    take the record of the proceedings regarding the selection of the jury. 210 Ill.2d R. 608(a)(9). Justice McDade noted that the failure to record voir dire in the case at bar ran directly counter to Rule 608(a)(9), which, in Justice McDade's view, was mandatory. She stated: This is a rule of criminal procedure and, as is the case with all the supreme court's rules that fall into that category, it is mandatory; it is a rule of procedure, not a mere suggestion. (Emphasis in original.) 363 Ill. App.3d at 579, 300 Ill.Dec. 207, 843 N.E.2d 465 (McDade, J., dissenting). According to Justice McDade, the cause should have been remanded for a new trial.