Opinion ID: 2284361
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Paragraph 13 of the Separation of Practice Agreement

Text: Appellants contend that the handwritten amended paragraph 13 in the July 6, 1984 Separation of Practice Agreement embodied an agreement by all parties to conduct the post-dissolution accounting on a cash basis. They argue that, because the agreement for an out-of-court accounting provided for a cash basis methodology, it was error to conduct the in-court accounting using the accrual method. This contention lacks merit. The master was appointed by consent of the parties to determine the respective interests of each of the partners as of the date of dissolution, according to a profit-sharing formula set out in the partnership agreements and repeated in the reference order. The order appointing the master prescribed in detail the methodology for this accounting, and expressly provided for the use of accruals for some component items. [31] Appellants, in essence, would disregard the clear provisions of the consent order, which the parties drafted, and hold that the accounting should have been conducted pursuant to a prior agreement of the parties. We conclude that the consent order, not the agreement, should govern the in-court equitable proceeding. This is so not because the consent order constituted a waiver of any objection as to the methodology used in the accounting, [32] but because the Separation of Practice Agreement is not nearly as conclusive as appellants urge. Their assertions that the Superior Court ignored new paragraph 13 of the parties Separation of Practice Agreement which the parties wrote out in handwriting as their agreed accounting in lieu of `winding up', and that there is no dispute that this accounting was to be performed on a cash basis, are but variations of the same argument eventually resolved against them by the jury: that Farmer agreed to waive his rights in certain accounts receivable when he signed the agreement. Judge Weisberg did not err in declining to accept Beckman's interpretation of Paragraph 13. In relevant part it said no more than: Revenues and expenses will be accounted for with a closing date of May 31, 1984.... Although Beckman read this clause to mean that the partners intended the accounting to be limited to determining cash revenues received in the period January 1 through May 31, 1984, and cash expenses paid in that period, the trial judge was not obliged to accept that interpretation. When an accounting has been referred to a special master, the trial court is required to adopt the master's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous. See Rosendorf v. Toomey, 349 A.2d 694, 699 (D.C.1975); Super.Ct.Civ.R. 53(e)(2). The master's findings are presumptively correct, Case v. Morrissette, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 31, 38, 475 F.2d 1300, 1307 (1973), and the party excepting to them bears the burden of showing clear error. See Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 178 U.S.App.D.C. 278, 283, 547 F.2d 575, 580 (1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966, 97 S.Ct. 2923, 53 L.Ed.2d 1062 (1977). Once the trial court adopts the master's findings, moreover, they become those of the court, Super.Ct.Civ.R. 52(a); 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2615 (1983), reversible on appeal only if clearly erroneous. Rosendorf v. Toomey, supra, 349 A.2d at 699. Because Judge Weisberg was not clearly wrong in adopting the master's findings, which reflected the accrual method set out in the consent order, there is no basis on which to disturb the results of the accounting. [33]