Opinion ID: 2446427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Sentence Enhancement under RSA 651:2

Text: The defendant contends that the trial court erred when it imposed a mandatory minimum three-year sentence pursuant to RSA 651:2, II-g. The defendant argues that, for the enhanced sentence to apply, the jury must have been instructed to unanimously find that the defendant used a firearm as a deadly weapon. He claims [t]he facts of the case do not support that he used the gun as a deadly weapon because [t]here was no evidence that he fired a shot or said he would shoot Ms. Harris. RSA 651:2, II-g states, in pertinent part, that [i]f a person is convicted of a felony, an element of which is the possession, use or attempted use of a deadly weapon, and the deadly weapon is a firearm . . . [t]he person shall be given a minimum mandatory sentence of not less than 3 years' imprisonment for a first offense. We have held that this enhancement does not apply absent a specific finding by the jury that an element of the felony for which it convicted the defendant was possession, use or attempted use of a firearm. State v. Russell, 159 N.H. 475, 490, 986 A.2d 515 (2009) (quotation and brackets omitted). Here, the trial court found that under State v. Higgins, 149 N.H. 290, 821 A.2d 964 (2003), RSA 651:2, II-g applied. In Higgins, we upheld the trial court's application of RSA 651:2, II-g even though the trial court failed to obtain a specific finding that the deadly weapon used to criminally threaten the victim was a firearm. Higgins, 149 N.H. at 301-02, 821 A.2d 964. There, the trial court recited the criminal threatening charges in the indictments to the jury, which alleged that the defendant used a firearm as a deadly weapon. Id. at 300, 821 A.2d 964. Prior to deliberations, the trial court also instructed the jury that to convict it had to find that a deadly weapon was used to commit the crimes and provided the definition of deadly weapon under RSA 625:11, V. Id. at 301, 821 A.2d 964. Finally, the only weapon the State argued that the defendant used to commit the offenses was a firearm. Id. at 302, 821 A.2d 964. Based upon these factors, we concluded that: a reasonable jury would understand that the deadly weapon element of both criminal threatening charges exclusively referred to the use of a firearm. Therefore, the guilty verdicts reflect a unanimous conclusion that the defendant used a firearm, and no other object, as a deadly weapon to commit the crimes. Accordingly, we conclude that the constitutional mandate of unanimity [of the jury] . . . was fully satisfied in this case. We agree with the trial court that Higgins is instructive in this case. The trial court relayed to the jury the criminal threatening allegation that the defendant wav[ed] a forty-five caliber handgun, a firearm and deadly weapon pursuant to RSA 625:11[,] V at Christine Harris while telling Christine Harris to get off his property. The victim's testimony demonstrates that the defendant waved a handgun throughout their encounter and that he pointed the handgun toward her while yelling at her to get the F off my property. In light of the language of the indictment and the evidence presented at trial, we conclude that a reasonable jury would have understood that to find the defendant guilty it must find that the defendant used a firearm as a deadly weapon. Indeed, for the reasons stated above in section III, we reject the defendant's argument that the handgun could not have been used as a deadly weapon because he did not fire any shots. Therefore, we conclude that the guilty verdict reflects a unanimous finding that the defendant used the firearm as a deadly weapon in the commission of the crime. Accordingly, the trial court did not misapply RSA 651:2, II-g to enhance the defendant's sentence.