Opinion ID: 2546870
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the supplemental order

Text: ¶ 43 As described above, on July 10, 2002, the district court entered a supplemental order rendering the Duncan individuals and entities liable for BYU's judgment against SoftSolutions. The order identified Kenneth W. Duncan, Alvin S. Tedjamulia, and Lee A. Duncan as officers of Tremco and STC and named KWD Associates, AST Associates, and Julee Associates as limited liability companies that received proceeds from the sale of STC's stock. The order extended liability for BYU's judgment against SoftSolutions to the Duncan individuals and entities based on Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 17(d) and 69(s), section 16-10a-1408 of the Utah Code, Murphy v. Crosland, 915 P.2d 491 (Utah 1996), and Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872 (Utah 1995). The Duncan individuals and entities were neither served with process nor made parties to the case prior to issuance of the supplemental order. ¶ 44 After the supplemental order was issued, SoftSolutions objected and moved for relief pursuant to rules 52(b), 59(a), 59(e), and 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The Duncan individuals and entities moved to intervene in the proceeding. They also moved to vacate and set aside [the order] in its entirety and to grant a new trial, or in the alternative, to amend the [f]indings and [o]rder. That motion was similarly made pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 52(b), 59(a) and (e), and 60(b). The premise of the motion filed by the Duncan individuals and entities was that no order affecting their assets and liabilities could be entered without their first having been served with process and made parties to the action. They argued that due process entitles them to their day in court and to the right to respond and litigate, after receiving properly alleged claims that they, or their assets, are subject to execution and collection by BYU. ¶ 45 The district court held a hearing on July 22, 2003, in which it orally denied the motion to intervene filed by the Duncan individuals and entities on the basis that their interests were adequately represented by SoftSolutions. The district court also orally denied the motions to vacate or amend the supplemental order, finding that no due process violations had occurred. For reasons never adequately explained by the parties to this appeal, the district court failed to document its oral rulings in a written order. BYU accordingly argues on appeal that we do not have jurisdiction to review the supplemental order because Tremco, SoftSolutions, and the Duncan individuals and entities filed their notices of appeal prior to a final disposition of their postjudgment motions. Despite our serious concerns regarding the validity of the supplemental order, we agree with BYU that we lack jurisdiction to review it. ¶ 46 We see, however, an even more fundamental jurisdictional problem with the Duncan individuals and entities' appeal than the timing of their notices of appeal, namely, that they are not parties to this proceeding. BYU never filed a complaint naming any of the Duncan individuals or entities and none of them were ever served with process. Although the supplemental order of July 10, 2002, provides that BYU's judgment against SoftSolutions may be enforced against assets of the Duncan individuals and entities, none of those individuals or entities were parties to the district court proceedings. As nonparties, they cannot appeal the supplemental order. [7] See State v. Sun Sur. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 74, ¶ 9, 99 P.3d 818 (noting that [a] surety cannot bring a direct appeal in a criminal case because it is not a party to the criminal case). Where an appeal is not properly taken, this court lacks jurisdiction and we must dismiss. Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000 UT 50, ¶ 8, 5 P.3d 649. ¶ 47 We similarly conclude that we lack jurisdiction over SoftSolutions' appeal of the supplemental order. Unlike the Duncan individuals and entities, SoftSolutions is a party to this proceeding, but we agree with BYU that SoftSolutions filed its only notice of appeal prior to a final disposition of its postjudgment motions directed to that order. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that [a] notice of appeal filed before the disposition of [a postjudgment motion under rule 50(b), 52(b), or 59] shall have no effect. Utah R.App. P. 4(b). In Transamerica Cash Reserve, Inc. v. Hafen, 723 P.2d 425 (Utah 1986) (per curiam), we stated that [a] notice of appeal filed before the disposition of a proper post-judgment motion is ineffective to confer jurisdiction upon this Court. Finality of a judgment is suspended upon timely filing of a post-judgment motion ..., and the time for appeal does not commence until final disposition of that motion. Id. at 426 (citations omitted). Because SoftSolutions filed its notice of appeal of the supplemental order prior to the district court's disposition of its motion to vacate, amend, or alter that order, the notice of appeal failed to confer jurisdiction on this court. [8]