Opinion ID: 1192172
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: First Did the trial court err in finding the defendants guilty of negligence?

Text: This question is answered in the negative. As stated in King Soopers, Inc. v. Mitchell, 140 Colo. 119, 342 P.2d 1006, 1009, a landowner is subject to liability for harm caused by a natural or artificial condition, if (a) he knows or by exercise of reasonable care, could discover the condition; (b) has no reason to believe that condition will be discovered; (c) invites entry upon the land without (1) making the conditions safe, or (2) giving a warning. The case quotes from Restatement of the Law of Torts, Sec. 343, p. 939, as follows: Such a visitor is entitled to expect that the possessor will take reasonable care to discover the actual condition of the premises and either make them safe or warn him of dangerous conditions. The opinion then continues: Our cases also recognize that the landowner, in discharging his duty to a business visitor, is obligated to exercise reasonable care to discover perils. (Citations) This duty of discovery is not satisfied by the simple expedient seemingly followed here of ignoring the hazard. In the instant case, defendants admitted that Karen was a business visitor, or an invitee at the motel and to the swimming pool, but assert that plaintiff failed to prove notice, either actual or constructive, of the presence of the float in the water; and even assuming such notice, plaintiff failed to prove that defendants should have realized that it (the float) involved a risk to the patrons. Considering the first point, the following quoted portions of the testimony of defendant, Robert Tucker, dispenses with this argument: Q. When the pool was cleaned, about July 21, what was done with the hose? A. The way we have done for years, we leave the hose on the bank and floats are put downstairs. Q. But at this time, it was your common practice to leave the hose and the float attached to it, right at the pool? A. Right.       Q. Since the accident where have you been keeping these two floats? A. At the same place they are supposed to be. Q. Beside the pool? A. Yes.       Q. Did you ever see one in the water? A. That is what I said, that could have happened two or three times. Q. But you said if you found them in the water you would then take them out and put them away? A. Yes, sir. Karen's father testified: Q. Did you have any conversation with Robert Tucker? A. He was there just a few minutes, as I remember. He went over to the pool and took the floats out of the pool. Q. Who did that? A. Mr. Tucker. Q. Did he have any conversation with you? A. Yes, he saidit was three years ago I can't quote the exact words. Q. Just tell the conversation as you remember. A. He said, `The kids are always taking the floats off the hose.' There was evidence that the elapsed time between Karen's first entry into the pool and the time of the accident was approximately fifteen minutes, and defendants' counsel argues that this was insufficient time to give notice to defendants of its presence in the water. However, from the quoted testimony of defendant Tucker, it is apparent that by leaving the cleaning equipment near the swimming pool defendants could reasonably anticipate that the floats would be detached and placed in the water at any time. Defendants cite and rely on Webb v. Thomas, 133 Colo. 458, 296 P.2d 1036, 1039, and other cases, to sustain their contention that they are not liable unless there is proof that they knew or should have known that the presence of the float in the water constituted a hazard to patrons of the pool. In the Webb case it is stated: While the proprietor of premises is not an insurer, nevertheless it is his duty to use reasonable care and be diligent in furnishing and maintaining the premises in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which it is designed and to which it is adapted.  And further: It is to be noted that the comparative knowledge of the parties is the test of liability,that is to say, the knowledge of the defendant as opposed to the knowledge of the person injured. Two conditions must concur, if the possessor of the land is to be held liable: (1) a realization that the condition constitutes an unreasonable risk to the patron; and (2) the absence of reason to believe that the condition will be discovered by the patron or the risk realized by him.    In the Webb case the plaintiff sustained injuries when he dived into the shallow end of a pool. There, nothing the defendants did was remotely connected with plaintiff's injuries. In the instant case, Tucker admitted on cross-examination that the floats were not playthings furnished for the amusement of the patrons, but were part of the cleaning and maintenance equipment; he was fully cognizant of the size, weight and hardness of the float in question and was fully aware of the customary uses for which the floats were designed and adapted and that they had, on other occasions, been detached and thrown into the pool. Karen, however, had no knowledge of the physical properties of the float prior to the accident, nor was it shown that she had the remotest idea of its normal use or of the danger of striking it. All she had observed was two or three boys playing with an unknown object in the pool without apparent harm.