Opinion ID: 202700
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Third-Party Entrapment After Bradley

Text: 55 In this circuit, Bradley is the leading case on third-party entrapment. Like the district court, the government now believes that Bradley controls this case. We examine Bradley's facts and reasoning in greater detail. 56 The government agent in Bradley was a prison inmate named Constanza. In exchange for a reduced sentence, Constanza agreed to identify drug dealers for the government to assist in undercover operations and prosecutions. See Bradley, 820 F.2d at 5. Constanza told the government about an individual named Brenner, and then he threatened Brenner with physical harm if Brenner did not engage in a cocaine deal with an undercover agent. Id. at 5. Brenner in turn appealed to his friend, defendant Bradley, for assistance in obtaining the cocaine. Id. at 6. Though Bradley initially refused, Brenner explained that his physical safety was in jeopardy. Id. Upon hearing this, Bradley decided to assist Brenner. Id. 57 It should now be clear that Bradley presented a narrow fact pattern: it was a case of vicarious entrapment. That is, Brenner merely informed Bradley of a threat that had been made against Brenner, not one that had been made against Bradley. Although the Second Circuit's Valencia opinion had recognized that such a vicarious entrapment defense could be viable, we considered and rejected that position. See id. at 8. At the same time, however, we rejected the government's argument that a defendant can never be entrapped by a third party. See id. at 6-8. 58 Bradley reached these conclusions by weighing a variety of policy considerations as applied to the facts of the case. On the one hand was the fact that the crime would not have happened but for the government's involvement. See id. at 6. On the other hand were several factors. First, the government's role in ensnaring Bradley was attenuated because the agent's threat neither ordered Brenner to seek assistance nor expected it. Id. at 7. Second, Bradley acknowledged the practical difficulties for the prosecution when it is forced to refute a defendant's claim of entrapment in a scenario where the only two witnesses — the defendant and the intermediary — are likely to be hostile to the government. 11 See id. Third, Bradley observed that the defendant did commit a crime, exhibiting socially inappropriate behavior. See id. at 6. Finally, Bradley noted the fact that undercover investigations are often needed to prosecute drug crimes. See id. 59 The Bradley court ultimately held that it would not extend the [entrapment] defense to a remote defendant without, at least, a showing that pressure had been put upon him by the intermediary at the instruction of the government agent. Id. at 8. The government reads instruct to mean command, such that Previte is not responsible for Merlino's threats against Luisi unless Previte had commanded Merlino to order Luisi into the cocaine deal. Luisi reads instruct to mean convince or inform. But the dispute about the use of particular language in Bradley is largely beside the point. Bradley was a case in which the government agent neither commanded, convinced, nor informed the middleman (Brenner) to target Bradley. Indeed, it was the lack of any government targeting of Bradley whatsoever on which Bradley relied. See id. at 7. Here, unlike in Bradley, the government's actions were specifically designed to pressure Luisi, and the government in fact expected that Luisi would be pressured. Bradley thus had no occasion to consider the fact pattern at hand. 12 60 In United States v. Rogers, 102 F.3d 641 (1st Cir.1996), we considered a fact pattern that was more on point. In Rogers, the defendant did not move quickly to complete a drug transaction that an undercover agent had attempted to facilitate. Id. at 645. In an isolated statement, the government agent told the middleman to put some heat on [the defendant]. Id. The agent had thus specifically targeted the defendant to receive an inducement, and Rogers relied on Bradley to conclude that the government would have been responsible if the agent had told the middleman to apply the pressure or inducement later deemed improper. Id. (emphasis added) (italics removed). However, Rogers factually did not involve an agent's suggestion that improper pressure be applied to the defendant because putting on some heat was not improper. Rogers distinguished the more sinister suggestion of putting the arm on someone, a phrase that implied threatened force. Id. at 645-46. 61 Thus after Rogers, the law in this circuit permits an entrapment instruction involving a middleman when there is evidence that (1) a government agent specifically targeted the defendant in order to induce him to commit illegal conduct; (2) the agent acted through the middleman after other government attempts at inducing the defendant had failed; (3) the government agent requested, encouraged, or instructed the middleman to employ a specified inducement, which could be found improper, against the targeted defendant; (4) the agent's actions led the middleman to do what the government sought, even if the government did not use improper means to influence the middleman; and (5) as a result of the middleman's inducement, the targeted defendant in fact engaged in the illegal conduct. 13 62 The government reads Rogers differently. It contends that the word told in Rogers must mean an imperative equivalent to the government's interpretation of instruct in Bradley. It also reads Rogers to state a requirement that the agent have improperly induced the middleman. 63 We disagree. First, we think that the government's argument is contrary to the plain meaning of told, and we see nothing in the context of Rogers that overrides this. Indeed, in concluding that the agent had not told the middleman to improperly induce the defendant, Rogers pointed out that nothing in the record show[ed] that [the agent] urged, suggested or was even aware of the middleman's improper inducement. See 102 F.3d at 645 (emphases added). Urging and suggesting are hardly equivalent to ordering, nor do they by themselves necessarily constitute improper inducement. Second, if the Rogers court had in fact read Bradley the same way as the government does, we do not see how the Rogers court could have considered it an open question whether the government can be responsible for an agent's mere knowing tolerance of improper inducement by a middleman. 14 See id. 64 Moreover, the policy concerns discussed in Bradley support our reading of Rogers. Bradley thought it important that the government's role was attenuated in that case because the agent had not attempted to ensnare the defendant. Bradley, 820 F.2d at 7. But in a case where the government agent specifically targets the defendant, and then causes the middleman to take a specifically contemplated action (that is arguably improper pressure) with the goal of ensnaring the defendant, the government's role is hardly attenuated. Additionally, Bradley worried about the fact that the government had turned a potentially innocent person into a criminal, see id. at 6, though it ultimately decided that this concern was outweighed by other issues. But in Bradley the government had never attempted to induce defendant Bradley directly. Bradley's concern for potential innocents weighs heavier when the government has tried — and failed — to induce the defendant without the use of a middleman. 65 In light of our understanding of the law, we think a properly instructed jury could conclude that the government was responsible for Merlino's order to Luisi. Indeed, such a jury could decide that: (1) Previte specifically requested that Merlino order Luisi to engage in the cocaine deal; (2) Previte's request came after earlier government efforts to ensnare Luisi, without a middleman, had not been fruitful; (3) Previte, as an LCN captain, understood that the order he requested from Merlino would contain an implied threat of death, physical harm, or serious retribution if Luisi failed to comply; (4) Merlino's order to Luisi was exactly what Previte had requested; and (5) Merlino would not have given the order if Previte had not encouraged him to do so. 15 As a result, we think that the district court incorrectly answered the jury's question. 66 This result is supported by a Fifth Circuit case. In United States v. Anderton, 629 F.2d 1044 (5th Cir.1980), the Fifth Circuit allowed the entrapment defense in a case where law enforcement officers specifically targeted the defendant, and then put unspecified pressure on the unwitting middleman to bring the defendant into a pre-designed criminal scheme. Id. at 1045, 1047. Without discussing whether the middleman had been improperly induced, the court found it important that the criminal design originated from the government itself. See id. at 1046-47. 67 Our conclusion is also supported by the D.C. Circuit's analysis in Washington. In Washington, an undercover FBI agent posed as a drug lord and recruited a corrupt police officer to help him. See 106 F.3d at 990-91. After paying the officer for his services, the agent asked [the officer] . . . to recruit as many new officers as he could. Id. at 991. The corrupt officer agreed, see id., but then recruited the defendants with an inducement not contemplated by the undercover agent. See id. at 992, 994-95. The Washington court rejected the derivative entrapment instruction on the facts of the case. Id. at 995. Importantly, however, it held that the entrapment defense is available where the government does contemplate the improper inducement given to the defendant, and causes the middleman to give that inducement as a result of a government agent's `instruction or direction.' Id. at 993 (quoting United States v. Layeni, 90 F.3d 514, 520 (D.C.Cir.1996)); see also id. at 995. 16 68 The government cites to other cases, but none presented the fact pattern at issue here. See, e.g., Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1200-02, 1204-05; United States v. Hodges, 936 F.2d 371, 371-72 (8th Cir.1991); United States v. Pilarinos, 864 F.2d 253, 254-56 (2d Cir.1988). 17 The Seventh Circuit has even intimated that the defense might be available when a government agent specifically targets the defendant, and then encourages the middleman to induce that defendant. See Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d at 1204 (citing, inter alia, Bradley ). 69 Thus we conclude that the district court erred in answering the jury's question in a way that excluded Merlino's order from the jury's consideration. We do not suggest that a jury would necessarily have concluded that Luisi was entrapped through Merlino. We hold only that the defendant was entitled to have a properly instructed jury consider the issue.