Opinion ID: 1291295
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Prove Robbery

Text: Defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to prove robbery, first degree murder on a robbery-murder theory, or the special circumstance of murder in the commission of robbery. The pivotal question he poses is whether there was substantial evidence to show that the `requisite intent to steal arose either before or during the commission of the act of force.' ( People v. Marshall [(1997)] 15 Cal.4th [1,] 34 [61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262].) Relying also on People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843, overruled on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543-544, fn. 5, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527, defendant argues the evidence he took personal property (credit and telephone calling cards) from Viivi's person is insufficient to show the fatal assault was committed with the intent to steal. Unlike People v. Marshall, supra , where the only property taken from the victim was a letter of no clear value to the defendant (15 Cal.4th at pp. 34-35, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262), and People v. Morris, supra , where no evidence was presented of a preexisting intent to steal and the circumstances were as consistent with a taking by stealth or a consensual payment as with a taking by force (46 Cal.3d at pp. 20-21, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843), here there was ample evidence that defendant and Waidla planned before the killing to steal from the Piirisilds, did steal from the Piirisilds before the killing, and then took additional property by force when Viivi arrived home. In urgent need of money, defendant and Waidla stole a radio telephone from the Piirisilds' Crestline cabin, pawning it in Van Nuys on July 11. While at the cabin they decided to frighten Viivi into giving them the pink slip for the car, which they could then sell for money. On July 12, on the way to the North Hollywood house, they were planning, according to defendant's taped statement, to get some money for food. When they broke into the house they were going to take something from the house and get away. Before Viivi came home they did, in fact, take some of her jewelry, which they sold to a pawnshop later that day. When Viivi arrived home from the dentist, Waidla, later joined by defendant, attacked and killed her, and took her credit and telephone cards, which she kept in her purse. From this and the entirety of other evidence presented, a rational juror could find it proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant attacked Viivi with the intent of taking property from her person or immediate presence, and did take such property. (See People v. Millwee (1998) 18 Cal.4th 96, 132, 74 Cal.Rptr.2d 418, 954 P.2d 990; People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 578-579, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) Again citing People v. Morris , defendant also contends the evidence was insufficient to establish the robbery-murder special circumstance because it did not show the murder was committed during the commission of a robbery, i.e., that the robbery was not merely incidental to the killing. ( People v. Morris, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 21, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843; see People v. Marshall supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 40-41, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262 [current § 190.2, subd. (a)(17), which requires the murder be committed while the defendant was engaged in the felony, is not satisfied where robbery is merely incidental to murder].) Again, we disagree. The present record, unlike that in People v. Morris , contains substantial evidence of a preexisting intent to steal items of value, from which a rational juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt the robbery was not merely incidental to the murder.