Opinion ID: 198473
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Smith's Award of $500,000

Text: 46 In light of the deference owed the jury award under this standard, we do not find that the $500,000 award to Smith is so excessive as to warrant a remittitur. The evidence of Smith's physical and emotional pain and suffering is abundant. There was evidence that Smith has been in near-constant pain since the blow to her head, neck and shoulders at approximately 11:00 a.m. on March 4, 1995. Smith stopped breathing and was unconscious for approximately forty seconds. She lost feeling on the left side of her body, causing her to fear paralysis. She was then rushed to the hospital in a cervical collar and given pain medication for a head trauma. Smith then experienced additional pain, numbness, difficulty speaking, and muscle limitations, causing her to visit several other doctors. Smith has been under various medications for pain and inflammation since her first visit to the hospital. Smith has experienced severe depression, anxiety, irritability, restlessness, sleeplessness, and short-term memory loss. Dr. Chinea testified that Smith will suffer from intermittent pain, muscle spasms, and decreased functioning of her cervical muscles for the rest of her life. Dr. Chinea also testified that these symptoms recur and aggravate whenever Smith engages in the simplest of physical activity, and will continue to do so. Smith has been diagnosed with PTSD, exhibiting the symptoms of nightmares, mood changes, major depression, sleeplessness, and impairment of relationships. While Kmart took steps to minimize this physical and emotional pain and suffering before the jury, we must now view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. Viewed in that light, we note that the record teems with evidence of Smith's past and future pain and suffering. 47 There was also substantial evidence presented regarding Smith's loss of enjoyment of life. Testimony by Smith and her doctors established that Smith was simply unable to engage in many of the physical activities she had enjoyed in the past, including dancing, walking, and taking aerobics classes. Smith testified that she is unable to drive a car or venture out beyond her house due to her fear of additional injury. Smith and Orth testified to the great strain that has been placed on their relationship and to the marked decrease in the amount of socializing with friends. If the jury believed this testimony--which it is entitled to do without judicial second-guessing of its credibility determinations--the jury was faced with a plaintiff who is virtually unable to leave her home, unable to perform any physical activity, and unable to maintain normal social relationships. Such limitations amount to a substantial loss of the opportunity to enjoy life as Smith had prior to the accident. 48 While we agree with Kmart that this award was certainly generous, we do not find it to be grossly excessive or shocking to the conscience, in light of the extensive evidence of the pain and suffering endured and yet to be endured by Smith and the limitations that her condition has placed on her ability to enjoy life. We have upheld awards for pain and suffering and lost enjoyment damages in the range of the damages awarded to Smith. See, e.g., Correa, 69 F.3d at 1198 (upholding: (1) a $200,000 award for the pain and suffering experienced by Carmen Gonzalez Figueroa for the few hours prior to her death, following the negligence of the hospital she appeared at complaining of dizziness and chest pains, and (2) a combined $500,000 award for the pain and suffering of Gonzalez' heirs); Hogan v. Bangor and Aroostook Railroad Co., 61 F.3d 1034, 1037-38 (1st Cir.1995) (upholding $200,000 award for emotional distress, inconvenience, mental anguish, and loss of enjoyment of life in the absence of any physical injury, when defendant refused to allow plaintiff to return to work, causing plaintiff to be depressed and to give up his usual activities); Havinga v. Crowley Towing and Transp. Co., 24 F.3d 1480, 1483 (1st Cir.1994) (upholding several awards for pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life ranging from $200,000 to $450,000 when evidence was presented that the plaintiffs suffered severe emotional and psychological injuries which significantly affected the quality of their lives and caused each to avoid activities in which he had previously engaged); Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 929 F.2d 31, 34-35 (1st Cir.1991) (upholding a past and future damages award of $350,000 when there was evidence that plaintiff was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and suffered a permanent partial disability, although a portion of the award could have represented lost future earnings). 49 In Anthony, we found a $566,765 award for pain and suffering to be so grossly disproportionate to the plaintiff's injury as to be unconscionable. See Anthony, 17 F.3d at 494. However, in that case, we based our finding of excessiveness on several factors. First, there was no evidence that the plaintiff's leg injury prevented him from engaging in any particular activities. See id. Second, there was no evidence that the injury otherwise interfered with the plaintiff's professional, recreational, or personal life. See id. Third, the physical injury was not particularly severe or painful and required no major medical treatment. See id. Finally, there was no evidence that the plaintiff's injury was permanent. See id. While each aggravating factor was absent in Anthony, each aggravating factor is present in Smith's case. Thus, our holding in Anthony is of little assistance. 50 Kmart offers a series of damage awards in various state courts ranging from $3,000 to $132,215 for what Kmart terms soft tissue injuries comparable to Smith's injuries. From this, Kmart argues that the award to Smith should be reduced to more closely match those awards. However, even if we could accept Kmart's belittling characterization of Smith's injuries, the existence of smaller damage awards in other jurisdictions, based upon different factual scenarios, does not render the present award grossly excessive. We do not disagree that the present award is generous in comparison to the awards given by Kmart as examples, but we have stated in the past that merely showing that the damage award is generous in comparison to other (hand-picked) cases is insufficient to warrant relief. See Correa, 69 F.3d at 1198 (citing Havinga, 24 F.3d at 1488-89). Thus, Kmart's tour of personal injury cases in courts from California to Maine does not dissuade us from finding that the evidence before the jury was sufficient to support the $500,000 award to Smith for past and future pain and suffering, emotional distress, and lost enjoyment of life.