Opinion ID: 1144098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: ruling and instructions re irresistible impulse

Text: [Defendant contends that it was prejudicial error for the court to give CALJIC Instruction No. 806 on Irresistible Impulse. This reads: The law does not recognize the plea of irresistible impulse as a defense to crime. If a person is conscious of, knows and appreciates the nature and wrongfulness of his act, then he does the act at his peril, and the plea of irresistible impulse will not avail him. The counterpart of the instruction given, with no change in meaning, is now found in CALJIC (3d ed.) No. 4.05, and contains the caveat: This instruction is designed for use only in connection with the plea of `not guilty by reason of insanity.' It must not be used where there is a claim of diminished capacity. [The giving of this instruction at the guilt phase, while error, cannot be held prejudicial when considered under the compulsion of article VI, section 13, of the state Constitution which provides: No judgment shall be set aside ... in any cause, on the ground of misdirection of the jury, or of the improper admission or rejection of evidence ... unless, after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a miscarriage of justice.] The courts of this state have long refused to equate irresistible impulse with legal insanity or to accept it as a complete defense to a crime. ( People v. Hoin [(1882)] 62 Cal. 120, 122-123; People v. Hubert [(1897)] 119 Cal. 216, 223 [51 P. 329]; People v. Nash [(1959)] 52 Cal.2d 36, 45 [338 P.2d 416].) (15) Precisely for this reason, a defendant who raises the defense of diminished capacity at the guilt phase of the trial must be permitted to show by competent evidence his act was the [ ] [product] of an irresistible impulse and that the irresistible impulse was due to mental disease. (16) Under the Wells-Gorshen rule of diminished capacity, as amplified and clarified in the more recent cases of People v. Conley [(1966)] 64 Cal.2d 310 [49 Cal. Rptr. 815, 411 P.2d 911]; People v. Castillo, supra, 70 Cal.2d 264; and People v. Mosher [(1969)] 1 Cal.3d 379 [82 Cal. Rptr. 379, 461 P.2d 659], relevant evidence of an accused's diminished mental condition affecting intent, where intent is an element of the crime charged, is admissible at the trial of the guilt issue. As stated in People v. Wells [(1949)] 33 Cal.2d 330, 351 [202 P.2d 53], and repeated in People v. Nicolaus [(1967)] 65 Cal.2d 866, 881 [56 Cal. Rptr. 635, 423 P.2d 787]: `Evidence which tends to show legal insanity (likewise, sanity) is not admissible at the first stage of the trial because it is not pertinent to any issue then being litigated; but competent evidence, other than proof of sanity or insanity, which tends to show that a (then presumed) legally sane defendant either did or did not in fact possess the required specific intent or motive is admissible.' [ ] (17) Competent testimony to the effect the act of killing resulted from an irresistible impulse due to mental disease is relevant evidence bearing on the issues of intent to kill and malice aforethought. Since such testimony bore directly upon the accused's mental condition affecting intent and did not amount to proof of insanity, it follows it was admissible at the guilt phase of the trial. [For this reason also, the jury should have been instructed on the relevance of the irresistible impulse evidence to the defense of diminished capacity. The failure to do so, exacerbated by the error in giving former CALJIC Instruction No. 806, vitiated the jury's consideration of the prosecution's theory that the homicide was first degree murder because it was deliberate and premeditated. It is true the jury was correctly instructed on the prosecution's alternate theory, to wit, felony murder occurring in the perpetration of a violation of Penal Code section 288. (18) But In civil appeals it has been the invariable rule that reversal is required when it is impossible to determine whether the verdict was based on admissible evidence submitted under correct instructions, or on erroneous determination of questions improperly submitted to the jury. [Citations.] It is equally (if not more) important to grant the same benefit of the doubt to a defendant on trial for his life. ( People v. Robinson (1964) 61 Cal.2d 373, 406 [38 Cal. Rptr. 890, 392 P.2d 970].) [On the other hand, if there is no such doubt  i.e., if on the record it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury based its verdict on the theory supported by admissible evidence submitted under correct instructions  there is no miscarriage of justice and the judgment must be affirmed pursuant to article VI, section 13, of the Constitution. Such is the case before us. (19a) Essentially the sole evidence of diminished capacity was the testimony of the three psychiatric witnesses. If the jury did not believe that testimony, of course, the error was immaterial. If the jury did believe that testimony, the record, as we shall explain, compels affirmance of the judgment on the felony-murder theory. [Defendant emphasizes that the psychiatric witnesses were unanimous in concluding he was acting impulsively and without premeditation, deliberation, malice or intent to kill when he choked his victim to death. But the same witnesses were also unanimous in explaining this opinion on the ground that the choking was a panic reaction triggered by the boy's screams while defendant was performing a lewd sexual act on him. [3] And they were no less unanimous in concluding that at the time he engaged in that sexual act, defendant was not suffering from any diminished capacity whatever. [4] (20) [The value of an expert's opinion is dependent on the truth of the facts he assumes as the basis of that opinion. (Evid. Code, § 801; Owings v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1948) 31 Cal.2d 689, 692 [192 P.2d 1], and cases cited.) Here the assumed fact  that defendant was performing a lewd sexual act on his victim when the killing took place  is consistent with the only other evidence of the circumstances of the crime, i.e., defendant's uncontradicted and voluntary statements to his friend Stringer and to the police. Accordingly, we cannot believe the jury would have accepted the opinion of the psychiatrists that defendant suffered from diminished capacity at the time of the homicide without also accepting the truth of the assumed fact supporting that opinion. [5] [It follows that if the jury believed the psychiatrists' testimony on diminished capacity, defendant must nevertheless have been found guilty on the felony-murder theory. The evidence of diminished capacity related only to defendant's ability to premeditate and to harbor malice. These elements are eliminated by the felony-murder doctrine, and the only criminal intent required is the specific intent to commit the particular felony. (21) As we have seen, the evidence was undisputed that defendant had the mental capacity to intend to commit the felony denounced by section 288. [S]uch a killing is murder of the first degree by force of section 189 of the Penal Code, regardless of whether it was intentional or accidental. ( People v. Coefield (1951) 37 Cal.2d 865, 868 [236 P.2d 570].) (19b) The error on the subject of diminished capacity thus could not possibly have affected the jury's verdict, and no miscarriage of justice resulted.] The judgment is affirmed.