Opinion ID: 76815
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Claim under Clemons v. Mississippi

Text: 23 Under the Supreme Court's ruling in Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725 (1990), when a state appellate court determines a death sentence is based on an invalid or improperly defined aggravating factor, that court may reweigh the aggravating and mitigating evidence, conclude the error was harmless, or remand for a new sentencing. Id. at 741, 754, 110 S.Ct. at 1444, 1451. 24 Herring contends that when the Florida Supreme Court struck the heightened premeditation aggravating circumstance but nevertheless affirmed his death sentence, it failed to conduct any of the three analyses set out as permissible in Clemons. In response, the State argues: (1) Herring's claim is procedurally barred; (2) Herring's claim alleges nothing more than an error of state law and therefore is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus; and (3) Herring received all the process he was due. The district court rejected Herring's claim on two bases, one of which was that the claim was procedurally barred. 25 Herring did not present any arguments pertaining to procedural bar in his initial brief. In his reply brief, however, Herring argues his Clemons claim is not procedurally barred because he did present his Clemons argument to the Florida Supreme Court during proceedings on his second 3.850 motion and the Florida Supreme Court reached the merits of his claim. 1 As we repeatedly have admonished, [a]rguments raised for the first time in a reply brief are not properly before a reviewing court. United States v. Coy, 19 F.3d 629, 632 n. 7 (11th Cir.1994) (citation omitted); see also United States v. Whitesell, 314 F.3d 1251, 1256 (11th Cir.2002) (Court need not address issue raised for first time in reply brief), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 951, 123 S.Ct. 2628, 156 L.Ed.2d 643 (2003); United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1289 (11th Cir.1999) (issue raised for first time in reply brief waived); United States v. Martinez, 83 F.3d 371, 377 n. 6 (11th Cir.1996) (declining to consider arguments raised for the first time in a reply brief). Although Herring's failure to present his procedural bar argument in his initial brief is determinative, we nevertheless briefly discuss procedural bar and the arguments Herring raises in his reply brief. 26 A state habeas corpus petitioner who fails to raise his federal claims properly in state court is procedurally barred from pursuing the same claim[s] in federal court absent a showing of cause for and actual prejudice from the default. Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299, 1302 (11th Cir.1999) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87, 97 S.Ct. 2497, 2506-07, 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977)). This procedural default arises in two situations: (1) where the state court itself correctly applies state law procedural bar principles to conclude a federal claim is barred; and (2) where a claim was never raised in state court, and it is clear the unexhausted claim would now be barred under state law procedural bar principles. Id. at 1302-03 (citations omitted). The State's argument is that Herring's Clemons claim falls within the second category. We agree. 27 Herring challenged the application of the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor in his direct appeal. 28 Herring again challenged the application of the aggravating factor in his initial brief appealing the denial of his second Rule 3.850 motion, and argued a new sentencing hearing should be conducted. In his reply brief to the Florida Supreme Court, Herring argued the jury's improper consideration of the heightened aggravating factor could not be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Herring further stated: 29 Indeed, because the procedure to be followed by the trial judges and juries is not a mere counting process of X number of aggravating circumstances and Y number of mitigating circumstances, Elledge, 346 So.2d at 1003, this Court has consistently ordered new sentencing hearings in similar cases.... The result here should be no different. Cf. Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 110 S.Ct. 1441, 108 L.Ed.2d 725, 58 USLW 4395, 4399-4400 & n. 5 (Mar. 28, 1990) (failure to remand to a sentencing jury violates the Constitution if the decision is made arbitrarily). 30 The Florida Supreme Court struck the challenged aggravating factor, but affirmed Herring's death sentence stating: 31 While the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravating factor no longer applies to the circumstances in Herring, we find that this is not a change that requires a new sentencing hearing in this case. None of the facts and circumstances that were before the jury regarding how Herring committed the murder are changed. If the aggravating circumstance of a conviction of a prior crime of violence had been eliminated, that would have changed the facts and circumstances before the jury. 32 The evidence before the jury established that Herring shot the clerk once in the head and again after the clerk fell to the floor and that the second shot was to prevent the clerk from being a witness against him. Given the other aggravating and mitigating factors that went into the weighing process in the sentencing phase of this case, we find that the result of the weighing process would not have been different had this aggravating circumstance not been articulated as a factor in the sentencing. We find that the elimination of this factor, under the circumstances of this case, does not compromise the weighing process of either the judge or jury. 33 Herring v. State, 580 So.2d 135, 138 (Fla.1991) (citations omitted). 34 In his motion for a rehearing, Herring made three arguments as to why the Florida Supreme Court's decision was incorrect. Herring first argued the court committed constitutional error in that it failed to apply its long-standing rule of remanding for a new sentencing hearing when it strikes one or more aggravating circumstances relied on at sentencing and mitigating circumstances are present. Herring cited Clemons in this section of his motion, including again a parenthetical stating that failure to remand to a sentencing jury violates the Constitution `if the decision is made arbitrarily.' In its response, the State pointed out that in Clemons, the Supreme Court established that state courts may conduct a harmless error analysis if an aggravating circumstance is stricken. Herring acknowledged as much in his second argument — that the Florida Supreme Court's finding of harmless error [could not] be squared with the facts of th[e] case. 2 Importantly, although Herring challenged the court's finding of harmless error, he did not assert the court failed to engage in harmless error analysis. Indeed, Herring asserted the Florida Supreme Court had engaged in harmless error review, but argued the court erred in its finding of harmlessness. Herring's third argument was that the court's opinion appears to announce a new rule that the erroneous application of a statutory aggravator may be deemed harmless where elimination of the circumstance does not alter the facts and circumstances regarding how the defendant committed the murder, and thereby calls into question the constitutionality, as applied, of Florida's capital sentencing scheme. 3 35 After reviewing Herring's state court filings, we conclude that, although Herring made many arguments pertaining to the cold, calculated, and premeditated aggravator, he did not preserve the argument he now makes — that the Florida Supreme Court erred in affirming his sentence after striking the factor without performing the analysis set out by the United States Supreme Court in Clemons — and the Florida Supreme Court did not consider such a claim. 36 In summary, we affirm the district court's denial of Herring's claim. The district court found Herring's claim to be procedurally barred. Herring failed to argue the procedural bar issue in his initial brief. Even if the arguments set out in Herring's reply brief had properly been presented in his initial brief, we would have rejected them. 4 37