Opinion ID: 182257
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Substantive Due Process and Equal Protection Claims

Text: Byrd did not strenuously press his substantive due process and equal protection claims during the en banc argument. In fact, Byrd's counsel candidly acknowledged that there was a basis for the panel's affirmance of the district court's decision to dismiss Byrd's equal protection claim for failure to state a claim. We review this basis for dismissal de novo, and may affirm the dismissal for any reason supported by the record. See Thompson v. Paul, 547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir.2008). A peripheral equal protection issue was in the air because of the text of Maricopa County's Contraband Control Policy (Contraband Policy) distinguishing between male and female inmates when a frisk search is involved. According to the Contraband Policy, [m]ale inmates may be frisk searched by either male or female officers[,] but [f]emale inmates will only be searched by female officers, absent exigent circumstances. However, there are two considerations that counsel against delving too deeply into the equal protection issue. The first is Byrd's concession of a basis for the ultimate dismissal of his equal protection claim. The second is the lack of a factual record to properly analyze the equal protection claim. It is important to note that Byrd did not challenge the Contraband Policy on which Maricopa County relied in its opposition to Byrd's claims. Rather, Byrd's equal protection claim was couched generally in terms of the treatment of male inmates, without reference to the policy. In any event, the Contraband Policy does not establish the reasonableness of the search. The Contraband Policy expressly provides that [s]trip searches will be conducted by an officer of the same sex as the inmate. . . . Under the Contraband Policy a strip search is defined as a visual scan of the inmate's skin after all clothing has been removed. Maricopa County seizes on this definition to argue that the search performed on Byrd was not a strip search because Byrd was wearing very thin boxer shorts. Rather, Maricopa County maintains that Byrd was subjected to a frisk search. The Contraband Policy defines a frisk search as [c]arefully examining an inmate by inspecting his clothing, and feeling the contours of his clothed body . . . (emphasis added). The Contraband Policy provides that [t]he inmate's shoes and socks may be removed . . . However, no mention is made of the removal of other clothing as part of a frisk search. In sum, the search was not properly conducted as a strip search under the Contraband Policy because it was not conducted by staff of the same gender, and it was not limited to a visual inspection of Byrd's body. The search was not properly conducted as a frisk search under the Contraband Policy because Byrd was not clothed as contemplated in the policy. The particular search conducted in this case simply does not fall within the contours of the Contraband Policy. Therefore, no basis exists for concluding that the provisions of the Contraband Policy defeat Byrd's equal protection claim. The district court dismissed Byrd's equal protection claim as one premised on the disparate treatment of prisoners and found, without acknowledging the gender element, that prisoners are not a suspect class. However, given the existence of a facially discriminatory contraband policy, an equal protection claim based on the disparate treatment of male and female prisoners was viable. See Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging a male inmate's equal protection claim based on prison grooming regulations that did not apply to female inmates); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1231 (9th Cir.1994) (recognizing disparate treatment of male and female prisoners, but declining to reach the equal protection question); Roubideaux v. N.D. Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 570 F.3d 966, 974 (8th Cir.2009) (applying heightened review standard to statutes containing a gender-based classification on their face); Pitts v. Thornburgh, 866 F.2d 1450, 1453 (D.C.Cir. 1989) (same for prison policies). Although the Contraband Policy was part of the record before the district court, Byrd's complaint made no reference to it and his equal protection allegation largely repeated the facts that formed the basis of his other claims. Even construing Byrd's pro se complaint liberally, the allegations failed to state an equal protection claim because they asserted only allegedly harmful treatment and mentioned nothing about disparate treatment, much less about the specific jail policy or gender classification in general. See Weilburg v. Shapiro, 488 F.3d 1202, 1205 (9th Cir.2007) ( Pro se complaints are to be construed liberally . . .); see also Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 471 (9th Cir.1992) as amended (noting that a liberal interpretation of a pro se civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled . . .). For that reason, we do not take issue with the ultimate ruling dismissing Byrd's equal protection claim. As for the substantive due process claim, Byrd failed to allege or produce evidence that O'Connell or Arpaio expressed an intent to punish Byrd or that the search was unrelated to a legitimate governmental objective. Bell, 441 U.S. at 538-39, 99 S.Ct. 1861 (explaining that the critical inquiry is whether particular restrictions and conditions accompanying pretrial detention amount to punishment in the constitutional sense of that word and that, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective, it does not, without more, amount to punishment) (footnote reference and internal quotation marks omitted). In the alternative, punitive intent may be inferred. See id. ([I]f a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate goalif it is arbitrary or purposelessa court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment that may not be constitutionally inflicted upon detainees qua detainees. (citation and footnote omitted)). It is undisputed that the search in this case was prompted by several recent fights and suspicion of contraband. Because a search premised on such security concerns is reasonably related to legitimate goals of detention officials, see, e.g., Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 F.2d 328, 333 (9th Cir.1988), no basis exists to draw an inference of intent to punish Byrd. In the absence of evidence of an intent to punish, or evidence that Maricopa's actions were unrelated to a legitimate governmental objective, the district court properly granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of O'Connell and Arpaio on Byrd's Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim. Bell, 441 U.S. at 539 n. 20, 99 S.Ct. 1861 ([I]n the absence of a showing of intent to punish, a court must look to see if a particular restriction or condition, which may on its face appear to be punishment, is instead but an incident of a legitimate nonpunitive governmental objective.) (citations omitted).