Opinion ID: 1875320
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Equal Opportunity

Text: The court of appeals focused primarily on the equal opportunity element, holding that Big Stone County HRA's residency policy did not disadvantage Hinneberg in comparison to a non-resident, non-disabled applicant. Hinneberg, 2004 WL 2986536, at -4. In this context, Hinneberg takes issue with the court of appeals' reliance on Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 105 S.Ct. 712, 83 L.Ed.2d 661 (1985), because, she argues, Alexander was only a disparate impact case, and thus inapposite. We agree with the court of appeals that Alexander is controlling, but disagree with the court of appeals' conclusion that Big Stone County HRA's residency policy treats disabled nonresidents the same as nondisabled nonresidents. In Alexander, Tennessee Medicaid recipients challenged a policy by state Medicaid directors that reduced from 20 to 14 the number of inpatient hospital days that would be covered under the plan. 469 U.S. at 290, 105 S.Ct. 712. The plaintiffs argued that this policy constituted unlawful discrimination in violation of Section 504 of the federal Rehabilitation Act of 1973 which prohibits disability discrimination in programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance. 469 U.S. at 290, 105 S.Ct. 712. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because the same benefit of 14 days of health coverage was equally accessible to both handicapped and nonhandicapped persons. Id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 712. Although Hinneberg is correct that Alexander was primarily a disparate impact case, the Supreme Court did discuss whether meaningful access under the Rehabilitation Act required Tennessee to modify its policy and single out the handicapped for more than 14 days of coverage. Id. at 302-03, 105 S.Ct. 712. The Court also treated meaningful access and reasonable accommodations as being equivalent as applied. Id. at 301, 105 S.Ct. 712. Thus, the holding in Alexander on meaningful access is fully applicable to reasonable accommodations claims made under the ADA and FHAA. Under Alexander, the first step in an equal opportunity analysis is to determine the relevant benefit. The Supreme Court in Alexander rejected the plaintiffs' reasonable accommodations argument as simply unsound because their argument presumed that the relevant benefit is the amorphous objective of `adequate health care.' Id. at 303, 105 S.Ct. 712. Instead the Court characterized the relevant benefit as being more specific: 14 days of inpatient coverage. Id. The Court then applied the equal opportunity element to this relevant benefit holding that because [t]he State has made the same benefit    equally accessible to both handicapped and nonhandicapped persons, the State is not required to assure the handicapped `adequate health care' by providing them with more coverage than the nonhandicapped. Id. at 309, 105 S.Ct. 712. The relevant benefit that Hinneberg seeks is portability of her housing voucher. The issue thus is whether Big Stone County HRA's residency policy affords equal access to such portability. Both parties confirmed at oral argument that the residency policy requires physical residency within Big Stone County before an applicant can be admitted to the program and continued residency in the county for 12 months before vouchers become portable. If a nonresident applicant does not establish residency in Big Stone County, she will not be admitted to the program and cannot ever use the Big Stone County HRA voucher elsewhere. As thus interpreted, Hinneberg does not have equal opportunity to enjoy the portability of her voucher because her disability prevents her from moving to Big Stone County to establish residency. A nondisabled, nonresident applicant would theoretically have the ability to move to Big Stone County to establish residency and could thereby obtain both the immediate benefit of the use of the voucher and the ultimate benefit of the portability of the voucher. Thus, Hinneberg's proposed accommodation is necessary to afford [her] equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(3)(B).