Opinion ID: 66386
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Mediation Order

Text: Beazley also contends that it is entitled to a writ of mandamus ordering the district court to vacate its order directing Beazley to mediate before Judge Isgur. According to Beazley, Judge Isgur violated a federal statute 43 and the Southern District of Texas’s local rules 44 that prohibit the disclosure of 40 See In re Volkswagen, 545 F.3d 304, 311 (5th Cir. 2008) (en banc) (emphasizing that even if the other two requirements for relief are met, “‘the issuing court, in the exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is appropriate under the circumstances.’” (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 380–81 (2004))). 41 Id. at 319. 42 Cf. id. at 319. 43 See 28 U.S.C. § 652(d) (“[E]ach district court shall, by local rule . . . provide for the confidentiality of the alternative dispute resolution processes and to prohibit disclosure of confidential dispute resolution communications.”). 44 S.D. Tex. Local Rule 16.4I (“All communications made during ADR proceedings (other than communications concerning scheduling, a final agreement, or ADR provider fees) are confidential, are protected from disclosure, and may not be disclosed to anyone, including the Court, by the provider or the parties.”). 14 No. 09-20005 communications made during mediation. Beazley specifically objects to Judge Isgur’s statement that Beazley “did not negotiate in good faith.” Beazley alleges that Judge Isgur’s impartiality is questionable and that he should be disqualified from conducting further mediation in the instant case.45 The Plaintiffs respond that Judge Isgur violated no rule because the rules protect only the confidentiality of “communications,” of which Judge Isgur disclosed none. The Plaintiffs further urge that, under Beazley’s interpretation, — in the absence of the parties’ consent — a mediator would not even be permitted to report to the district court on the progress of mediation. We cannot grant Beazley extraordinary relief on the basis it seeks. Beazley points to no precedent demonstrating that a court has ever granted a writ of mandamus to protect a petitioner’s asserted right not to attend nonbinding mediation. This is for good reason. We repeat, a writ of mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary remedy reserved for really extraordinary causes”;46 and, there is nothing extraordinary about requiring Beazley to attend mediation at which it would control its own destiny, viz, any resolution would be voluntary. Additionally, even if Judge Isgur did err by making an unauthorized disclosure to the district court, his action was far from that which would compel drastic and extraordinary relief. Beazley’s petition on this ground is meritless, and we have no occasion to venture further into the applicable three-pronged mandamus analysis on this issue.