Opinion ID: 2627593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Willful

Text: ¶ 17 The estate claims that the Court of Appeals erred by holding intentionally and designedly was the proper definition of willful under the slayer statute. Instead, the estate argues that the definition of willful contained in the criminal code encompasses willful as it is used in RCW 11.84.010(1), a civil statute. The criminal code states that a requirement of willfulness is satisfied by acting knowingly with respect to the material elements of the offense. RCW 9A.08.010(4). A person acts knowingly when: (i) he is aware of a fact, facts, or circumstances or result described by a statute defining an offense; or (ii) he has information which would lead a reasonable man in the same situation to believe that facts exist which facts are described by a statute defining an offense. RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b). The estate argues that because Hoge subjectively knew he was killing human beings he acted willfully as that term is defined in the criminal code. But we are mindful that the slayer statute is not a criminal statute. Its origins are in equity. Equity should not be used to work an injustice, either by allowing a person to benefit from an unlawful act or by depriving an innocent (such as a subsequent heir or a victim) of a source of recovery. ¶ 18 We previously interpreted the meaning of willful in the context of the slayer statute in Jones. Donna Jones killed her husband but pleaded guilty to a charge of felony murder based on the predicate crime of assault in the second degree. Jones, 86 Wash.2d at 45, 541 P.2d 989. New York Life Insurance Company had issued a policy on the life of the decedent. Id. The question in Jones was whether a defendant convicted of second degree felony murder could be considered, as a matter of law, a slayer under RCW 11.84.010. Jones, 86 Wash.2d at 46, 541 P.2d 989. We held that willful under the slayer statute was to be given its ordinary, everyday meaning and what it was understood to have meant at common law. Id. at 47, 541 P.2d 989. We therefore concluded that willful meant intentionally and designedly. Id. Jones' plea to second degree murder neither established the requisite intent nor prevented that intent from being established in a civil trial. ¶ 19 The estate argues that the criminal code definition of willful was adopted after our decision in Jones and that the definition codified by the legislature must apply. We disagree. While the legislature has defined willful, it has done so only in the criminal context. RCW 11.84.010, as noted above, is a civil statute subject to its own standards and burdens of proof. The Court of Appeals was correct in holding that the trial court should have applied the definition we established in Jones. ¶ 20 The estate argues that Hoge still had the requisite level of willfulness regardless of which definition we apply. We agree. Certainly, Hoge could have been so delusional that he did not intend or even know that he was killing a human being. Not every homicide committed by the criminally insane is willful and deliberate. But the trial court made very specific findings of fact and conclusions of law and determined that Hoge acted with premeditated intent when he killed his mother. CP at 146. And Hoge himself stipulated in the criminal proceeding that his actions were intentional and premeditated. CP at 16. The evidence clearly shows that Hoge acted intentionally and designedly and therefore willfully when he killed his mother and stepbrother. We hold that on the record before us, the estate has established the requisite state of mind to invoke the slayer statute.