Opinion ID: 2369775
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The denial of Clark's motion to suppress tangible evidence.

Text: Shortly after he shot Ms. Harrison, Clark called his daughter, Elaine Hicks, and reported that I have just killed Helen. Ms. Hicks, her mother and her mother's friend promptly came to Clark's apartment. Within minutes of their arrival, Mrs. Clark telephoned the police and reported an accidental death. Clark also spoke with the dispatcher during the initial call. Police officers arrived at the apartment at approximately 9:50 p.m. Officer Cole walked into the bedroom where the shooting had occurred and observed in plain view the decedent's body, a handgun (later identified as the weapon with which the decedent was shot) and an ammunition clip containing an unspent bullet. One of the officers asked what had happened, and Clark responded that he was guilty. Clark was arrested and transported to the police station. At approximately 10:20 p.m., a police evidence technician arrived at the apartment. He observed the body, the handgun and the clip, and he also located a slug which was lying on the floor. [19] He seized the weapon, clip, and slug and photographed the body and the scene. He also prepared a diagram. At 11:05 p.m., the officers were notified that Clark had signed a written consent to the search of his apartment. [20] A thorough search was conducted, but no additional evidence was seized. Clark filed a motion to suppress the tangible evidence against him, all of which was seized prior to his execution of the consent, and all of which was discovered in plain view. After an extensive evidentiary hearing, the trial judge denied the motion, observing that all the crime scene search officer did was to merely do that which the first officer could have done if he had the material with him when he walked into the room. The scope and duration of a warrantless search must be circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Horton v. California, ___ U.S. ___, 110 S.Ct. 2301, 2309, 110 L.Ed.2d 112 (1990). Clark maintains that this requirement has not been satisfied. He acknowledges that the initial entry by the police was justified by the need to respond to an emergency situation in order to ascertain whether anyone was in need of immediate aid or whether a killer remained on the premises. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). He also concedes that the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Id. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413; citing Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 509-10, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1949-50, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). In Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 22, 105 S.Ct. 409, 412, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984) (per curiam), a decision on which Clark places heavy reliance, the Court reiterated that police officers who enter a dwelling after having been requested to respond to an emergency would be justified ... in seizing evidence under the plain-view doctrine while they were in petitioner's house to offer her assistance. We think that the seizure in this case was permissible under Tyler, Mincey and Thompson. In Tyler, firefighters entered a building and extinguished a fire. Several hours later, they returned and seized evidence inculpating the defendant. No warrant had been secured. The Court rejected the apparent view of the Supreme Court of Michigan that the exigency justifying a warrantless entry to fight a fire ends, and the need to get a warrant begins, with the dousing of the last flame. Tyler, supra, 436 U.S. at 510, 98 S.Ct. at 1950. Noting that fire officials are charged not only with extinguishing fires but with finding their causes, and that immediate investigation may be necessary to preserve evidence, the Court held that officials need no warrant to remain in a building for a reasonable time to investigate the cause of a blaze after it has been extinguished. Id. Although police officers and fire fighters do not have identical responsibilities, [21] it is significant that in Mincey the Court cited Tyler as authority for the proposition that police may seize without a warrant items which are in plain view during an emergency. Clark relies on Douglas-Bey v. United States, 490 A.2d 1137 (D.C.1985). In that case, Officer Hennessy monitored a police radio broadcast reporting a shooting at a four-unit apartment complex. When he arrived at the building, he observed from the hallway, through an open apartment door, a black sandal, a set of false teeth and a pool of blood, all located in one of the apartments. He entered the apartment and saw signs of a struggle. A bloodsoaked athletic bag was in plain view. After a brief check to determine if a victim or suspect was present, Hennessy left but called for a crime scene search officer. Subsequently, two police lieutenants entered the apartment, soon to be followed by the crime scene search officer. The latter seized certain physical evidence, including bullets which Hennessy had not seen, and photographed other items, including bullet holes and bullet markings. The trial judge denied Douglas-Bey's motion to suppress physical evidence. On appeal, however, this court reversed. Recognizing that Hennessy would have had the right to seize those items which he saw in plain view under the emergency search exception to the warrant requirement, 490 A.2d at 1138, the court nevertheless rejected both the government's contention that the second and third entries were justified under that exception and its alternative argument that the crime scene search officer was Hennessy's alter ego for purposes of the seizure of the evidence. Id. at 1138-39. There are two principal differences between Douglas-Bey and the present case. First, the court noted in Douglas-Bey that Hennessy did not see bullets, bullet holes or bullet markings, which were apparently a principal focus of the suppression motion; in the present case, Officer Cole saw the pistol and the clip (although, as we note below, he did not notice the slug). Second, in Douglas-Bey, officers made a second entry into the apartment after Hennessy had left; here, the officers who had responded to the call regarding the death of the decedent, and who had made a concededly legal emergency entry, were still on the scene when the crime scene search officer arrived, seized and photographed evidence, and drew diagrams. [22] In Tyler, the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless seizure from the premises where the fire occurred even though the firefighters left after extinguishing the flames at about 4 a.m. and returned in daylight a few hours later. Rejecting the notion that their departure had the effect of ending the emergency, the Court remarked that [l]ittle purpose would have been served by their remaining in the building, except to remove any doubt about the legality of the warrantless search and seizure later that morning.  436 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 1951 (emphasis added). The underscored language suggests that where, as in the present case, the responding officers remained on the premises for a reasonable time and were still there when the crime scene search officer seized the items in plain view, the legality of the seizure cannot reasonably be questioned. [23] The government relies on Brooks v. United States, 367 A.2d 1297, 1311 (D.C. 1976). We there held that evidence which was discovered in plain view during an emergency warrantless entry may properly be seized thereafter without a warrant. Clark does not vigorously argue that Brooks is distinguishable from the present case, but claims that Brooks is inconsistent with the Supreme Court's subsequent decisions in Mincey and Thompson and is therefore no longer good law. Brooks was not cited or discussed in Douglas-Bey, and it may be fair to say that the opinions of the court in the two cases, if reconcilable with one another at all, are not in perfect spiritual harmony. Arguably, Brooks is more compatible than Douglas-Bey is with the Supreme Court's approach in Tyler, which approach was apparently reaffirmed in Mincey. [24] See also W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.5(e), at 694-96 (2d ed.1987) (collecting authorities which permit warrantless seizure of items in plain view at the scene of a homicide). A holding that even though Officer Cole had the right to seize the pistol, clip and slug [25] and to photograph the scene, his colleague acted unlawfully in doing so would improvidently exalt form over substance. If we were to adopt Clark's position, the result would appear to turn on fortuities such as whether a crime scene search officer happened to be in Officer Cole's patrol car or otherwise immediately available. We decline to extend Douglas-Bey to reach so unrealistic a result. Accordingly, we hold that Clark's motion to suppress evidence was properly denied. [26]