Opinion ID: 1089893
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the administrative law judge, as affirmed by the mississippi workers' compensation commission and the circuit court, acted arbitrarily and capriciously in going beyond the scope of the claimant's motion for medical treatment and deciding the workers' compensation case as a whole without the benefit of a full hearing.

Text: The administrative law judge erred as a matter of law when he specifically stated that the April 16, 1987, hearing was limited to whether Monroe was suffering from improper medical treatment or lack of medical treatment, and then proceeded to make findings on maximum medical recovery and apportionment. Further, the affirmance by the Compensation Commission and the circuit court was error that must be reversed. Monroe moved for a Commission Ruling under MWCC General Rule 9 for a hearing to consider the need for additional medical treatment at the employer's expense. [1] Monroe had been denied recent medical treatment and was in necessitous circumstances and desired a hearing at the earliest convenience of the commission. The purpose of the hearing was for a ruling under Rule 9. Following the hearing, the administrative law judge entered an order determining that Monroe was not entitled to further medical treatment and that Monroe had reached maximum medical recovery as of February 24, 1986. Monroe had sustained a permanent and total industrial loss of use of her right lower extremity. Fifty percent (50%) of the industrial loss was due to pre-existing conditions. The administrative law judge ordered the employer to pay Monroe permanent partial disability benefits in the amount of $126.00 per week beginning February 25, 1986, and continuing for a period of 87.5 weeks. We have held as a matter of guidance that there is general impropriety of the commission deciding a case ... without hearing all the facts. Scott Builders, Inc. v. Dependent of Layton, 244 Miss. 641, 145 So.2d 165 (1962). In the case sub judice, as in Day Detectives, Inc. v. Savell, 291 So.2d 716 (Miss. 1974), the administrative law judge led Monroe to believe that there would be further hearings on the claim, and Monroe received no notice to the contrary. This Court in Day Detectives reversed and held as follows: We have carefully considered the record in this case and are of the opinion that there was a clear abuse of discretion by the attorney-referee and the commission. After the conclusion of the initial hearing held on October 5, 1970, the claimant was led to believe by the attorney-referee that there would be further hearings with reference to this claim and did not receive any notice to the contrary. Day Detectives, 291 So.2d at 721. In the similar case of Abel v. Garan, Inc., 385 So.2d 618 (Miss. 1980), where the claimant filed for compensation based on multiple claims and one of those claims was decided, we enumerated the following: It is our conclusion that (1) the hearing then had did not preclude another and subsequent hearing on the other matters made subjects of controversy; (2) the hearing was on the narrow issue of double compensation or none; and (3) that the claimant is entitled to a hearing on the remainder of his claim. Abel, 385 So.2d at 619. In the case sub judice there was a rather complete medical record developed since the date of the injury. The administrative law judge took the completeness of the record and declared it final without notice to Monroe; this he cannot do. Monroe is entitled to be informed that the matter is being considered on the merits for final judgment so that she can determine if all proof has been offered that she desires to offer. The administrative law judge went beyond the announced scope of the hearing and beyond the scope of the motion after having stated, it's not a hearing on the merits of the claim. It's strictly a hearing on the motion for an immediate hearing, under Rule 9 to determine whether the Claimant is suffering from improper or lack of medical treatment. It is true that Monroe introduced copious amounts of evidence by deposition regarding matters other than the question of her required, immediate medical attention. It must be noted, however, that the depositions of Dr. Bishop and Dr. Haddad covered the period following the accident from July 25, 1984 to May 12, 1987. The testimony was taken for the purposes of her entire claim, so it is not unusual that the depositions would contain information on every aspect of the claim. These depositions were not necessarily final or the only depositions to be taken. The introduction of information on matters outside the subject matter of the hearing does not allow the administrative law judge to decide matters beyond the scope of the hearing. We have no way of knowing if there was further evidence to be offered by Monroe. The depositions offered by Monroe were thorough as to the historical and present condition of Monroe, but for the hearing purposes, the direct examination of Monroe (the only witness at the hearing) dealt almost entirely with the connection between the condition of her back and knee. Counsel for Monroe questioned Dr. Bishop solely on the condition of the back. Because Monroe's allegation is that her back was hurt in the same incident which resulted in her knee injury and that the treatment she received for her knee contributed to her back problem, surely the evidence and the testimony regarding the back injury and the knee injury are interrelated. We cannot know the extent of future evidence nor can we predict future testimony of witnesses, but we do know that Monroe was led to believe by the administrative law judge that this was a limited hearing and that there would be another day for additional proof to be considered. An administrative law judge may not announce a limited purpose of a hearing, require the litigants to argue under limitation, and then decide the whole of the case including time of maximum recovery apportionment and compensation. A claimant is entitled to know: This hearing is `it'; now is my time to put on my total case and expect a final decision. The ruling as rendered below assumes totality of evidence and finality of result and indeed leaves us unsure as to additional proof and additional dispositions. The Commission or administrative law judge might not perceive additional evidence or legal precedent, but we have a diligent and imaginative bar. Left unfettered, Monroe's case may be more completely developed than intended. Certainly, a claimant cannot be lead into a partial hearing and have the whole claim determined. Monroe did not waive error as suggested by the employer. The administrative law judge's change of direction was error. Monroe is entitled to a full hearing on her claim. The administrative law judge's finding that Monroe suffered a work-related injury to her knee and that Monroe reached maximum medical improvement regarding her right knee on February 24, 1986, were not questions at issue in the motion hearing. The administrative law judge was not required to look beyond the Rule 9 motion for additional medical treatment. We therefore reverse and remand for consideration of the original motion with a determination as to the merit and at an appropriate time consideration of the full claim on its merits. REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR PROCEEDINGS CONSISTENT WITH THIS OPINION. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and PRATHER, ROBERTSON, SULLIVAN, BANKS and McRAE, JJ., concur.