Opinion ID: 2623326
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to give requested pinpoint instruction

Text: Defense counsel proposed, but the trial court declined to give, this jury instruction: If you have a reasonable doubt whether the defendant had the intent to steal at the time the unlawful killing took place, you must find him not guilty of first degree murder. Defendant contends the trial court committed reversible error in failing to give this requested instruction because the omission left the jury with no guidance on the requirement of a unified temporal relationship between the perpetration of a felony and the killing of a victim for purposes of establishing felony murder. He asserts the refusal to so instruct the jury amounted to a failure to instruct on the defense theory of the case in violation of the Sixth Amendment, and denied him the rights to due process, fair trial, fundamental fairness and a reliable verdict. [5] To prove first degree murder based on a felony-murder theory, the prosecution must establish that the defendant intended to commit one of the felonies enumerated in section 189 either prior to or during the commission of the acts which resulted in the victim's death. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 34, 73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942.) Conversely, when the killer forms the intent to commit an independent felony only after delivering the fatal blow to the victim, the felonymurder doctrine does not apply. ( People v. Jeter (1964) 60 Cal.2d 671, 676-677, 36 Cal.Rptr. 323, 388 P.2d 355; see also People v. Gonzales (1967) 66 Cal.2d 482, 486, 58 Cal.Rptr. 361, 426 P.2d 929 [jury properly instructed that intent to rob formed after infliction of mortal wounds is insufficient to support finding of first degree felony murder].) Here, the relevant principles concerning the timing of the requisite intent to steal were adequately covered by the instructions given, CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 9.40 (formerly No. 9.10), defining first degree felony murder and robbery, respectively. [6] ( People v. Hayes (1990) 52 Cal.3d 577, 625-626, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376; People v. Hendricks (1988) 44 Cal.3d 635, 642-643, 244 Cal.Rptr. 181, 749 P.2d 836.) Defendant acknowledges that in People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d 577, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376, we rejected an identical claim, finding no error in the trial court's refusal to give two jury instructions requested by the defense that related to the formation of intent to steal because the pattern instructions defining first degree felony murder and robbery that were given in the case, CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and former 9.10 (now No. 9.40), adequately covered the issue. ( People v. Hayes, supra, at pp. 625-626, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376.) He asserts, however, that Hayes is not dispositive of his claim because the wording of CALJIC No. 8.21 as given here was fundamentally different from the version given in Hayes. He points out that while the Hayes jury was instructed that felony murder requires a finding the unlawful killing occurred `as a result of the commission of the crimes of robbery and burglary' ( People v. Hayes, supra, at p. 626, fn. 9, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376, quoting CALJIC No. 8.21, italics added), the jury here was told that to convict of felony murder it must find the killing occurred during the commission, or attempted commission of robbery and burglary. The differing language represents two options appearing in a bracketed portion of CALJIC No. 8.21, a standard instruction. Which one is given depends on whether the victim's death occurred close in time to the commission of the predicate felony or at a later period. (See Use Note to CALJIC No. 8.21 (6th ed.1996) p. 392.) Under both variations of the standard instruction, however, the jury is properly informed that first degree felony murder applies if it is proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant formed the intent to steal before or contemporaneously with, rather than after, the killing. Here, as in People v. Hayes, supra, 52 Cal.3d 577, 276 Cal.Rptr. 874, 802 P.2d 376, the trial court did not err in refusing to give the requested instruction elaborating on CALJIC Nos. 8.21 and 9.40.