Opinion ID: 6337280
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law of the case and the remedy of prohibition

Text: {¶ 15} Generally, to demonstrate entitlement to a writ of prohibition, a petitioner must show (1) that a court has exercised judicial power, (2) that its exercise of judicial power is unauthorized by law, and (3) that denying the writ would result in injury for which no other adequate remedy exists in the ordinary course of law. See State ex rel. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs. v. O’Diam, 156 Ohio St.3d 458, 2019-Ohio-1676, 129 N.E.3d 393, ¶ 16. But a petitioner does not need to prove the third requirement—the lack of an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law—if he can show that the court patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to exercise its judicial power as it did. Id. at ¶ 26. This exception from the general rule comes into play in this case because the availability of a discretionary appeal from Durkin II (which John did not pursue) qualifies as an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, even though this court might have denied jurisdiction. See State ex rel. O’Malley v. Collier-Williams, 153 Ohio St. 553, 2018-Ohio-3154, 108 N.E.3d 1082, ¶ 14-15. Therefore, to be entitled to the requested writ, John must show that Judge Williams patently and unambiguously lacked jurisdiction to appoint a special master commissioner in the underlying case. 5 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 16} John predicates his prohibition claim on Judge Williams’s alleged “fail[ure] to comply with the appellate court’s mandate directed to [the probate] court.” He asserts that because “the appellate court’s decision in [Durkin I, 2018Ohio-2283,] is the law of this case,” it “governs any other court which subsequently considers this case.” The law-of-the-case doctrine states that “[a]bsent extraordinary circumstances, such as an intervening decision by the Supreme Court, an inferior court has no discretion to disregard the mandate of a superior court in a prior appeal in the same case.” Nolan v. Nolan, 11 Ohio St.3d 1, 462 N.E.2d 410 (1984), syllabus. Equally established is the principle that “ ‘a writ of prohibition is an appropriate remedy to prevent a lower court from proceeding contrary to the mandate of a superior court.’ ” State ex rel. Cordray v. Marshall, 123 Ohio St.3d 229, 2009-Ohio-4986, 915 N.E.2d 633, ¶ 32, quoting State ex rel. Crandall, Pheils & Wisniewski v. DeCessna, 73 Ohio St.3d 180, 182, 652 N.E.2d 742 (1995). {¶ 17} Although it is settled that the law-of-the-case doctrine may furnish the grounds for a writ of prohibition in a proper case, the court adjudicating the prohibition claim must determine whether the challenged action of the trial court in fact violates the earlier appeals-court mandate or whether the action fell within the lower court’s residual powers. The appellate court’s mandate establishes the law of the case on the legal questions involved in that appeal, State ex rel. Baker v. State Personnel Bd. of Rev., 85 Ohio St.3d 640, 642, 710 N.E.2d 706 (1999), meaning that the law-of-the-case doctrine “ ‘comes into play only with respect to issues previously determined,’ ” Giancola v. Azem, 153 Ohio St.3d 594, 2018-Ohio-1694, 109 N.E.3d 1194, ¶ 16, quoting Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 347, 99 S.Ct. 1139, 59 L.Ed.2d 358 (1979), fn. 18. Additionally, the law-of-the-case doctrine will not be applied to achieve unjust results. See Baker at 643. 6 January Term, 2022 B. The appellate court’s pronouncement in Durkin II regarding the mandate in Durkin I is not dispositive {¶ 18} In the context of dismissing John’s appeal from Judge Williams’s order appointing the special master commissioner, the appellate court stated: “We find nothing    in the mandate of the prior order of this Court that would conflict with appointment of a master commissioner by the trial court.” Durkin II, 2021Ohio-1076, at ¶ 10. Citing this pronouncement, Judge Williams argues that because the court of appeals “took no offense to [his] actions in hiring a Master Commissioner,” it is “inappropriate for [John] to obtain another ‘bite at the apple’ via this Writ of Prohibition.” {¶ 19} In the past, we have shown deference to appellate courts when those courts have determined the scope of their own mandate. Observing that the court of appeals is in the best position to determine whether a trial court has violated the appellate court’s mandate, this court has declined to find a patent and unambiguous lack of jurisdiction by the trial court when the court of appeals itself has found no violation of its mandate. State ex rel. Pyle v. Bessey, 112 Ohio St.3d 119, 2006Ohio-6514, 858 N.E.2d 383, ¶ 12; see also State ex rel. Jelinek v. Schneider, 127 Ohio St.3d 332, 2010-Ohio-5986, 939 N.E.2d 847, ¶ 14; but see State ex rel. Mullins v. Curran, 131 Ohio St.3d 441, 2012-Ohio-685, 966 N.E.2d 267, ¶ 10, 12 (reversing court of appeals’ decision granting a writ of prohibition to prevent a trialcourt judge from conducting a retrial on the claim of negligence, which the court of appeals held was in violation of its earlier mandate). {¶ 20} In this case, however, we decline to defer to the court of appeals’ pronouncement. In Durkin II, the appellate court dismissed John’s appeal because it found that Judge Williams’s order appointing the special master commissioner was not a final, appealable order. The only issue relevant to making that determination in Durkin II was whether John could effectively protect his right to enforce the mandate in a later appeal from a later order. Id. at ¶ 6. The violation- 7 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO of-mandate issue was not a basis for the court of appeals’ decision that the order was not final and appealable but instead constituted the substantive issue raised by John’s premature appeal. {¶ 21} By concluding that the order was not appealable, the court of appeals effectively ruled that it had no jurisdiction to decide whether the mandate had been violated. As a result, the appellate court’s substantive finding that the mandate had not been violated was a nullity. See Supportive Solutions, L.L.C. v. Electronic Classroom of Tomorrow, 137 Ohio St.3d 23, 2013-Ohio-2410, 997 N.E.2d 490, ¶ 10 (“An appellate court can review only final orders, and without a final order, an appellate court has no jurisdiction”); State v. Henderson, 161 Ohio St.3d 285, 2020Ohio-4784, 162 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 17 (a judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction “is a mere nullity”). We must therefore make an independent determination concerning the scope of the mandate. C. Whether appointing the special master commissioner violated the Durkin I mandate {¶ 22} The first step in evaluating John’s prohibition claim consists of closely inspecting his argument that appointing the special master commissioner violated the appellate court’s mandate in Durkin I, 2018-Ohio-2283. Although John attaches some importance to the court of appeals’ affirmance of Judge Williams’s decision not to remove him as executor, his main argument for finding a violation of the mandate lies in his observation that Durkin I “affirmed the probate court’s determination to close the record” by “overrul[ing] [Daniel’s] third and fifth assignments of error.” {¶ 23} John’s characterization of the probate court’s rulings, which were affirmed by the court of appeals in Durkin I, is correct: the probate court initially made rulings on the information before it, cut off further investigation, and all of its rulings merged into the final judgment that was affirmed in pertinent part by the court of appeals. See Navistar, Inc. v. Testa, 143 Ohio St.3d 460, 2015-Ohio-3283, 8 January Term, 2022 39 N.E.3d 509, ¶ 38 (“the [Board of Tax Appeals] hearing examiner’s [evidentiary] ruling has merged into the BTA’s decision and constitutes the law of this case, subject to challenge    in this appeal”). Specifically, the court of appeals affirmed the probate court’s order terminating further discovery when it overruled two of Daniel’s assignments of error. In overruling Daniel’s third assignment of error, the court of appeals held that the probate court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Daniel’s motion to compel discovery of information about John’s alleged abuse of his power of attorney before Virginia’s death. Durkin I at ¶ 16-19. And in overruling Daniel’s fifth assignment of error, the appeals court held that the probate court did not abuse its discretion by “entering judgment on the accounting of Virginia Durkin’s estate and denying [Daniel] a hearing despite his presentation of new evidence in his objections to the magistrate’s decision.” Id. at ¶ 25. {¶ 24} Accordingly, John presents a plausible argument that when, after remand, Judge Williams ordered an investigation into John’s actions, he reopened what the probate court had fully resolved in the earlier proceedings and thus violated the law-of-the-case doctrine because the probate court’s rulings had been affirmed by the court of appeals and were thereby incorporated into the appellate court’s mandate. {¶ 25} But the mere plausibility of John’s argument is not a sufficient basis for a writ of prohibition to issue. The necessary second step in evaluating John’s prohibition claim involves determining whether his argument so clearly establishes a violation of the mandate that Judge Williams’s lack of jurisdiction was patent and unambiguous. See Mullins, 131 Ohio St.3d 441, 2012-Ohio-685, 966 N.E.2d 267, ¶ 11. Because Mullins involved this court’s independent determination whether an appeals court’s mandate was violated, it provides us with guidance in deciding this case. 9 SUPREME COURT OF OHIO {¶ 26} In Mullins, the estate administrator brought a medical-malpractice action to recover damages in connection with the decedent’s death. A jury returned a finding of negligence and awarded damages, and the defendants appealed. In pertinent part, the defendants argued that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the possible contributory negligence of the estate administrator herself. The Seventh District Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in failing to give that instruction and in denying the defendants’ motion for a new trial. Mullins v. Comprehensive Pediatric & Adult Medicine, Inc., 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 07 MA 144, 2009-Ohio-1310, ¶ 74, 79, 81-82, 86, 87, 91, 102. On remand, the trial court set the case for retrial on both the negligence claim and the contributorynegligence issue. The estate administrator objected, asserting that the retrial should address only the issue of contributory negligence. {¶ 27} When the trial judge persisted, the estate administrator brought a prohibition action in the court of appeals. The appellate court held that retrying the negligence claim would violate its earlier mandate, and it therefore granted the writ. State ex rel. Mullins v. Curran, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 10 MA 76, 2011-Ohio1312. But on appeal, we reversed, holding that the trial-court judge “reasonably concluded from the court of appeals’ mandate    that a retrial of the wrongfuldeath case, including the negligence claim    was warranted.” Mullins, 131 Ohio St.3d 441, 2012-Ohio-685, 966 N.E.2d 267, ¶ 10. We observed: “The court of appeals’ mandate does not expressly restrict or otherwise limit the new trial to the contributory-negligence issue” and does not “specifically limit the retrial so as to preclude the jury’s consideration of the negligence claim.” Id. at ¶ 10, 12. {¶ 28} Mullins provides the test that we will use in this case: Did Durkin I, 2018-Ohio-2283, “expressly restrict” and “specifically limit the [proceedings]” on remand in a manner that precluded Judge Williams’s appointment of the special master commissioner to investigate Durkin’s use of the power of attorney? The answer is no. Any such restriction is at best implied, which is insufficient. Because 10 January Term, 2022 Durkin I did not clearly and explicitly restrict the probate court’s actions on remand regarding John’s use of the power of attorney, Judge Williams did not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction to appoint the special master commissioner to conduct further investigation. {¶ 29} Mullins also makes an important point concerning the need for an appellate-court mandate to be sufficiently clear. If a court of appeals’ order explicitly limits the trial court’s jurisdiction on remand, it enables the party aggrieved by the limitation to appeal that ruling. In Mullins, if the original court of appeals’ decision had explicitly ordered that the new trial address only contributory negligence, the defendants could have appealed that limitation. Mullins at ¶ 13. Similarly, if Durkin I had clearly and explicitly forbidden further investigation of John’s use of the power of attorney on remand, Daniel could have appealed that ruling. As in Mullins, we adhere in this case to the principle that the law-of-thecase doctrine will not be applied to achieve an unjust result. Id. at ¶ 14.