Opinion ID: 1059512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: Burns argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the jury's verdict finding him guilty of the offenses of capital murder, rape, forcible sodomy, and statutory burglary. He claims that, because he was allegedly intoxicated, and because the Commonwealth's evidence was in conflict regarding Burns' whereabouts on the night of Cooley's murder, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he committed a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder. He also claims that there was insufficient evidence of penetration to support his convictions for rape and forcible sodomy. Finally, Burns concedes that the evidence established that he broke into and entered Cooley's residence, but he asserts that the evidence failed to show that he did so with the intent to commit murder or rape. We do not agree with any of Burns' arguments regarding the sufficiency of the evidence. As we said earlier in this opinion, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and afford that evidence all reasonable inferences that are fairly deducible from it. Horton, 255 Va. at 608, 499 S.E.2d at 259. Under that standard of review, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court unless that judgment is without evidence to support it or is plainly wrong. Id. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the evidence showed that Burns had been drinking prior to Cooley's murder, but, as the circuit court noted in ruling on Burns' motion to strike the Commonwealth's evidence, Burns was not so intoxicated as to be unable to premeditate. He drove his vehicle to several different locations on the evening of the murder and even asked Buckley to help him establish an alibi. The alleged conflicts in the evidence regarding Burns' whereabouts on the evening of Cooley's murder were matters for the jury to resolve. As the fact finder, the jury was certainly free to reject Burns' self serving statements regarding his activities on that evening. As to the issue of penetration, Burns' position overlooks the fact that Burns' sperm were found on the vaginal and anal swabs taken from the victim. In Spencer v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 275, 284, 384 S.E.2d 775, 780 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1036, 110 S.Ct. 759, 107 L.Ed.2d 775 (1990), we found that the presence of sperm in the victim's vagina alone was sufficient to support a finding that penetration had occurred. Furthermore, Tontarski reported the presence of sperm cells on a sheet and pillowcase recovered from the bedroom where Cooley's body was found, on Cooley's lower denture found on the floor of the bedroom, on a washcloth found under Cooley's left thigh, and on several items recovered from Cooley's bathroom. As we have already stated, the jury was free to reject Burns' self-serving statements, especially the statement that he digitally inserted his semen into Cooley in order to cover up the crime. Finally, with regard to the statutory burglary conviction, the evidence already discussed along with the evidence detailing the circumstances of Cooley's murder and the wounds inflicted upon her are sufficient to establish Burns' intent to commit murder and/or rape when he broke into and entered Cooley's home. Intent is frequently shown by circumstances or by a person's conduct. Hargrave v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 436, 437, 201 S.E.2d 597, 598 (1974). Thus, we find sufficient evidence to support all the convictions in this case.

At Burns' request prior to trial, a subpoena duces tecum was issued to a regional director of the Virginia Department of Corrections. The subpoena sought documents or records describing the daily inmate routine, general prison conditions, and security measures at the Red Onion Correctional Center and Wallens Ridge State Prison, . . . . and videotapes of those facilities. The Commonwealth moved to quash the subpoena, and after a hearing on that motion, the circuit court granted the motion. [14] During the penalty phase of his trial, Burns attempted to introduce evidence concerning the conditions at those prisons in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of Burns' future dangerousness. Burns' counsel reminded the court that subpoenas had been issued to the wardens of those two so-called super-max prisons, but since the court had indicated that it would grant a motion to quash those subpoenas, counsel had obtained newspaper articles from the Internet that discussed the security and life of a prisoner at those facilities. Burns' counsel proffered those articles as what the testimony would show. The court adhered to its prior decision and did not admit the testimony. Recognizing that this Court held in Walker v. Commonwealth, 258 Va. 54, 70, 515 S.E.2d 565, 574 (1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1125, 120 S.Ct. 955, 145 L.Ed.2d 829 (2000), and Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 310, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 873, 120 S.Ct. 177, 145 L.Ed.2d 149 (1999), that evidence regarding the conditions of prison life in a maximum security prison is not proper mitigating evidence, Burns offered this evidence, not in mitigation, but in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of Burns' future dangerousness. Burns argues that, since the only possible sentence for an accused convicted of capital murder is either the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, the prison society is the only society to which such a defendant can ever pose a continuing serious threat. Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C). Thus, according to Burns, evidence regarding the quality and structure of an inmate's life in a maximum security prison, as well as the prison's safety and security features, is relevant evidence to rebut the Commonwealth's evidence that a defendant would commit criminal acts of violence in the future. Id. We do not agree. First, we have rejected the argument that a jury's determination, under Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C), regarding whether a defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society is restricted to a consideration of only the prison society. Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 497, 517, 537 S.E.2d 866, 879 (2000). Nevertheless, Burns contends that his proffered evidence should have been admitted to dispel the misconception that prison life includes such features as weekend furloughs, conjugal visits, and unrestricted work privileges. However, the Commonwealth offered no such evidence regarding the nature of prison life for a defendant convicted of capital murder or any other felony. Nor did the Commonwealth introduce evidence about the number of violent crimes committed in prison or the likelihood that a prisoner could escape. Instead, the Commonwealth's evidence concerning Burns' future dangerousness consisted of his prior criminal record and unadjudicated criminal acts. Thus, Burns' evidence was not in rebuttal to any evidence concerning prison life. Instead, Burns wanted to show, in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence of his future dangerousness, that his opportunities to commit criminal acts of violence in the future would be severely limited in a maximum security prison. However, in Cherrix, we reiterated the principle that the United States Constitution does not limit the traditional authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant's character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.' Cherrix, 257 Va. at 309, 513 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 n. 12, 98 S.Ct. 2954, 57 L.Ed.2d 973 (1978)). Thus, the relevant inquiry is not whether Burns could commit criminal acts of violence in the future but whether he would. Indeed, Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and -264.4(C) use the phrase would commit criminal acts of violence. Accordingly, the focus must be on the particular facts of Burns' history and background, and the circumstances of his offense. In other words, a determination of future dangerousness revolves around an individual defendant and a specific crime. Evidence regarding the general nature of prison life in a maximum security facility is not relevant to that inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness such as that presented in this case. We also note that the cases relied upon by Burns with regard to this issue, specifically Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977), Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 106 S.Ct. 1669, 90 L.Ed.2d 1 (1986), and Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (1994), are inapposite. In Gardner, the trial court imposed a sentence of death after reviewing the contents of a pre sentence report, part of which had not been disclosed to the defendant. Gardner, 430 U.S. at 353, 97 S.Ct. 1197. Skipper involved the trial court's refusal to allow the defendant to introduce evidence showing his good behavior in jail while awaiting trial. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4, 106 S.Ct. 1669. The Court in Skipper noted that the relevancy of that evidence was underscored . . . by the prosecutor's closing argument, which urged the jury to return a sentence of death in part because petitioner could not be trusted to behave if he were simply returned to prison. Id. at 5, 106 S.Ct. 1669. Unlike the evidence proffered by Burns, the evidence in Skipper was peculiar to that defendant's history and background. Finally, Simmons required the giving of an instruction regarding life without parole when a defendant is parole ineligible and future dangerousness is at issue. Simmons, 512 U.S. at 156, 114 S.Ct. 2187. Accordingly, we find no error in the circuit court's decision quashing the subpoena directed to the Department of Corrections and refusing to admit evidence about prison life in a maximum security prison in rebuttal to the Commonwealth's evidence in this case of Burns' future dangerousness.
During closing argument in the penalty phase of this case, the Commonwealth's Attorney argued that Cooley was a modest, private person who had an animal enter her life. At that point, Burns objected and the court stated, Hold on, Mr. Ebert [the Commonwealth's Attorney]. The following colloquy then occurred: MR. EBERT: Excuse me. A person acting like an animal. Excuse me. THE COURT: All right. MR. EBERT: A person acting with depravity of mind. MR. ALLEN [Burns' attorney]: I have a motion, Your Honor. And I will make the motion after he finishes. Note my objection at this time. THE COURT: All right. MR. EBERT: Excuse me, ladies and gentlemen. I don't mean to characterize him as an animal. But I will characterize him as a human being with a depravity of mind, a person who acted in a vile, horrible, inhumane way, to an innocent person. After the Commonwealth's Attorney concluded his closing argument, Burns argued that the reference to an animal was improper and prejudicial, and that a mistrial was required. He also complained because the court had not admonished the Commonwealth's Attorney at the time he made the statement. The court then explained that, although Burns had objected at the time, it had not admonished the Commonwealth's Attorney because he had corrected the statement. For the same reason, the court denied the motion for a mistrial. Burns assigns error to that ruling. Although the Commonwealth argues that Burns procedurally defaulted this assignment of error because he did not move for a mistrial at the moment when the objectionable words were spoken, Reid v. Baumgardner, 217 Va. 769, 774, 232 S.E.2d 778, 781 (1977), we are not inclined to agree. While Burns' counsel did not specifically move for a mistrial when the Commonwealth's Attorney said that an animal had entered Cooley's life, he did object and advised the court that he had a motion that he would make after the Commonwealth's Attorney finished his closing argument. While the better practice would have been to move for a mistrial at that very moment, we cannot say under the circumstances of this case that Burns' motion came too late. [15] Accordingly, we will address the merits of this assignment of error. In doing so, we are mindful of the principle that [a] trial court exercises its discretion when it determines whether it should grant a motion for mistrial. Beavers v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 268, 280, 427 S.E.2d 411, 420, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 859, 114 S.Ct. 171, 126 L.Ed.2d 130 (1993). When a motion for mistrial is made, based upon an allegedly prejudicial event, the trial court must make an initial factual determination, in the light of all the circumstances of the case, whether the defendant's rights are so `indelibly prejudiced' as to necessitate a new trial. Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 78, 95, 393 S.E.2d 609, 619, cert. denied, 498 U.S. 908, 111 S.Ct. 281, 112 L.Ed.2d 235 (1990) (quoting LeVasseur v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 564, 589, 304 S.E.2d 644, 657 (1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1063, 104 S.Ct. 744, 79 L.Ed.2d 202 (1984)). Unless we find that the trial court's denial of a mistrial is wrong as a matter of law, we will not disturb the court's decision on appeal. Spencer, 240 Va. at 95, 393 S.E.2d at 619. In the present case, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the circuit court erred in denying Burns' motion for a mistrial. By the time that Burns moved for a mistrial, the Commonwealth's Attorney had retracted the reference to Burns as an animal and had stated to the jury three times, Excuse me. Furthermore, despite the court's explanation why it did not admonish the Commonwealth's Attorney, we believe that the court's initial response to Burns' objection, i.e., Hold on, Mr. Ebert[,] was tantamount to an admonishment, which the jury heard. An admonition of [a] trial court in the presence of [a] jury [makes] it known to the jury that the court [is] not satisfied as to the propriety of [an] argument. Clanton v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 41, 54, 286 S.E.2d 172, 179 (1982). Thus, we conclude that Burns' rights were not indelibly prejudiced. LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 589, 304 S.E.2d at 657.
Prior to the commencing the penalty phase of the trial, Burns moved for an evaluation pursuant to Code § 19.2-300. The circuit court denied the motion on the basis that an evaluation under that section is to guide the trial judge, not the jury. The court advised Burns that he could renew his motion at the proper time. In pertinent part, Code § 19.2-300 provides, that, when any person is convicted for any criminal offense which indicates sexual abnormality, the trial judge ... shall upon application of the attorney for the Commonwealth, the defendant, or counsel for defendant . . . defer sentence until the report of a mental examination conducted as provided in § 19.2-301 of the defendant can be secured to guide the judge in determining what disposition shall be made of the defendant. Although Burns acknowledges that this statute provides for a mental evaluation to guide the judge, he claims that such an evaluation is equally valuable to a jury when it is deciding the sentence for a capital murder conviction. However, his argument overlooks the plain language of the statute. This provision authorizes a mental evaluation for the purpose of guiding the trial judge, not the jury. Furthermore, Burns renewed his motion for an evaluation under Code § 19.2-300 after the jury returned its sentencing verdicts, and the court granted it. Thus, Burns received all that he was entitled to under that statute. Accordingly, we will reject his claim.
Before the jury commenced its deliberations during the penalty phase of the trial, the court instructed the jurors that [t]he words `imprisonment for life' mean imprisonment for life without possibility of parole. In addition to this instruction, the court stressed to the jury that imprisonment for life does mean life without parole. Nevertheless, Burns now complains because the circuit court refused his proposed Instruction A, which instructed the jury that it could consider as a possible mitigating factor that a sentence of life in prison means that the defendant will never be eligible for parole[,] and his proposed Instruction C, which instructed the jury that, in determining the question of future dangerousness, it may consider the fact that if you set the defendant's punishment at life imprisonment, he will never be eligible for parole. We conclude that the circuit court properly rejected these instructions. Since the jury was instructed that imprisonment for life means life without the possibility of parole, both of Burns' proposed instructions were repetitious. See Gray, 233 Va. at 351, 356 S.E.2d at 178. Furthermore, we have consistently held that a defendant convicted of capital murder is not entitled to a jury instruction that emphasizes a particular mitigating factor. See e.g. George v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 264, 283, 411 S.E.2d 12, 23 (1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 973, 112 S.Ct. 1591, 118 L.Ed.2d 308 (1992); Gray, 233 Va. at 351, 356 S.E.2d at 178; LeVasseur, 225 Va. at 595, 304 S.E.2d at 661. [16]

Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(C)(1), we must determine whether the death sentence in this case was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or other arbitrary factors. Upon careful review of the record, we find no evidence that any such factor was present or influenced either the jury's or the circuit court's sentencing decision. However, Burns contends that his sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion and prejudice because the Virginia death penalty statute is unconstitutional; he was not allowed to introduce evidence from prison officials to rebut the Commonwealth's closing argument that, if Burns receives life imprisonment, he would pose a continuing danger to the prison staff and could escape from prison; [17] and the Commonwealth's Attorney referred to Burns as an animal and argued to the jury that their decision will send a message. We do not believe that any of these factors created an atmosphere of passion or prejudice that influenced the sentencing decision.
Code § 17.1-313(C)(2) requires us to determine whether the sentence of death in this case is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant. Pursuant to Code § 17.1-313(E), we have accumulated the records of all capital murder cases reviewed by this Court. The records include not only those capital murder cases in which the death penalty was imposed, but also those cases in which the trial court or jury imposed a life sentence and the defendant petitioned this Court for an appeal. Whitley v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 81, 286 S.E.2d 162, 171, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882, 103 S.Ct. 181, 74 L.Ed.2d 148 (1982). In complying with the statutory directive to compare this case with similar cases, we have specifically focused on cases in which a person was murdered during the commission of rape and/or forcible sodomy, and the death penalty was imposed upon both the future dangerousness and vileness predicates. See, e.g., Cherrix, 257 Va. 292, 513 S.E.2d 642; Pruett v. Commonwealth, 232 Va. 266, 351 S.E.2d 1 (1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 931, 107 S.Ct. 3220, 96 L.Ed.2d 706 (1987); Coleman v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 307 S.E.2d 864 (1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1109, 104 S.Ct. 1617, 80 L.Ed.2d 145 (1984); Mason v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091, 254 S.E.2d 116, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 919, 100 S.Ct. 239, 62 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979); Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 248 S.E.2d 135 (1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 967, 99 S.Ct. 2419, 60 L.Ed.2d 1074 (1979). We have also considered cases in which defendants received life sentences, rather than the death penalty, for capital murder during the commission of rape. See, e.g., Horne v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 339 S.E.2d 186 (1986); Keil v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 99, 278 S.E.2d 826 (1981). However, our proportionality analysis encompasses all capital murder cases presented to this Court for review and is not limited to these selected cases. Overton v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 599, 605-06, 539 S.E.2d 421, ___ (2000) (citing Boggs v. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 501, 522, 331 S.E.2d 407, 422 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1031, 106 S.Ct. 1240, 89 L.Ed.2d 347 (1986)). Our proportionality review also does not require that a given capital murder case equal in horror the worst possible scenarios yet encountered. Turner v. Commonwealth, 234 Va. 543, 556, 364 S.E.2d 483, 490, cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1017, 108 S.Ct. 1756, 100 L.Ed.2d 218 (1988). The defendant has argued that the sentence of death in his case is disproportionate because of his borderline range of intellectual functioning, [18] the physical and sexual abuse that he suffered as a child, his incompetence to stand trial at one time, his continued need for medications during the trial, and his symptoms of anxiety and depression. Burns, however, fails to address the fact that he broke into and entered the home of his elderly mother-in-law, raped and sodomized her, and killed her by breaking her ribs in 24 places and rupturing her heart. He also wants this Court to ignore his lengthy criminal record and his repeated attacks on Buckley. Finally, we have approved the imposition of the death penalty for a defendant with a significantly lower IQ than that of Burns. See Atkins v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 375, 387-89, 534 S.E.2d 312, 319-21 (2000) (defendant had IQ of 59). Thus, we do not find that any of the factors identified by Burns, when considered in light of his prior criminal history and the circumstances of this offense, distinguish him from other defendants who have received the death penalty. Accordingly, based on our review of this case and similar cases, we conclude that Burns' sentence of death is not excessive or disproportionate to sentences generally imposed in this Commonwealth for capital murders comparable to the defendant's murder of Tersey Elizabeth Cooley.