Opinion ID: 195222
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: other challenges to the conviction

Text: 34 Appellant stages two other offensives in his campaign to overcome the jury verdict. Neither offensive gains him any ground. 35
36 Appellant asserts that the prolonged series of undercover operations mounted by the postal inspectors constituted misconduct so fundamentally unfair as to violate the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In terms, this assertion bears a family resemblance to appellant's assault on the failure of the judge and jury to find entrapment. It fares no better. 37 Government agents run awry of the due process clause if, and to the extent that, their investigative conduct violates fundamental fairness and is shocking to the universal sense of justice. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423, 432, 93 S.Ct. 1637, 1643, 36 L.Ed.2d 366 (1973). We recently stated that, in theory, the government's active participation in a criminal venture may be of so shocking a nature as to violate a defendant's right to due process, notwithstanding a defendant's predisposition to commit the crime. United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1272 (1st Cir.1990) (citations omitted). Yet, we cautioned in virtually the same breath that this court had never encountered a situation where that sort of government involvement crossed the constitutional line. Id. The case before us does not break the string. 38 We do not see a need for exegetic comment. Despite the fact that undercover operations by their nature involve elements of furtiveness, duplicity, and manipulation, we have never held that such initiatives are per se unfair. To the contrary, we think that the Executive Branch is free, within broad limits, to set such snares for unwary criminals. See United States v. Santana, 6 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir.1993); United States v. Connell, 960 F.2d 191, 194, 196 (1st Cir.1992); see also United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir.1990) (upholding reverse sting operation in child pornography case), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 906, 111 S.Ct. 1686, 114 L.Ed.2d 81 (1991). In this connection, it is important to understand that the fairness of employing a particular form of undercover operation is in part a function of the crime under investigation. See United States v. Osborne, 935 F.2d 32, 37 (4th Cir.1991); see also Santana, 6 F.3d at 7 (outlining considerations relevant to assessing the outrageousness vel non of an undercover officer's conduct in a reverse sting operation). 39 We cannot say that, here, the postal inspectors lacked a rational basis for mounting a long-running series of undercover operations in an effort to curb unlawful trafficking in child pornography. 13 See Osborne, 935 F.2d at 37 (concluding that undercover operations provide a [lawful] means by which participants in the clandestine child pornography industry can be detected). And, moreover, fundamental fairness is not compromised in a child pornography case merely because the government supplies the contraband. See, e.g., Mitchell, 915 F.2d at 526; United States v. Musslyn, 865 F.2d 945, 947 (8th Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 443, 126 L.Ed.2d 376 (1993); United States v. Driscoll, 852 F.2d 84, 86 (3d Cir.1988); cf. Santana, 6 F.3d at 8 (holding that DEA's actions in supplying a large amount of heroin to suspected drug dealers did not warrant dismissal). 40 In this instance, the government's strategy seems fairly calculated to combat the spread of child pornography by putting consumers of forbidden depictions at warranted risk. The postal inspectors' communiques do not strike us as possessing the capacity to overbear a guileless recipient's will. They were, instead, neutral tests designed to assay a recipient's willingness to order contraband. In the same vein, the government's promotional literature, read as a whole, was not unfairly deceptive; although the Fetco brochure indicated on its face that the goods offered for sale did not contain child pornography, it was within the jury's province to conclude that appellant must have realized from the circular's contents that this was an apocryphal disclaimer. Nor does the temporal span of the government's undercover operation make it vulnerable to appellant's attack. Although the sting ultimately stretched over four years, appellant placed a mail order for illicit materials within a year after first being contacted by the postal inspectors. The government's decision to continue its investigation of appellant under such circumstances is far removed from outrageous conduct. See, e.g., Musslyn, 865 F.2d at 946 (upholding undercover sting operation that lasted nearly five years); United States v. Goodwin, 854 F.2d 33, 35-36 (4th Cir.1988) (similar; operation lasted nearly four years). 41 In a nutshell, nothing in this record distinguishes the government's actions in any material respect from the numerous sting operations that we, and other courts, have upheld in case after case after case. See Santana, 6 F.3d at 4 (collecting cases); United States v. Moore, 916 F.2d 1131, 1139 (6th Cir.1990); Panitz, 907 F.2d at 1272-73 (collecting cases); United States v. Thoma, 726 F.2d 1191, 1199 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1228, 104 S.Ct. 2683, 81 L.Ed.2d 878 (1984). There is no point in retracing footsteps that have beaten a well-marked path. The district court did not err in rejecting appellant's claim of outrageous governmental misconduct. 42
43 Appellant next asserts that the statute of conviction, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2252(a)(2), quoted supra note 1, is unconstitutional on its face. Because the issue presented poses an unadulterated question of law, appellate review is plenary. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 978 F.2d 750, 757 (1st Cir.1992); Stauble v. Warrob, Inc., 977 F.2d 690, 693 (1st Cir.1992). 44 Appellant claims that section 2252(a) fails to pass constitutional muster because it does not require proof that the accused knew that the persons depicted in the described materials were under age. This claim is premised upon the holding in United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 982 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1992), petition for cert. filed (Nov. 5, 1993) (No. 93-723). The conclusion of the two-judge X-Citement Video majority rested on a single base, having two components. First, the court decided that the term knowingly, as employed in section 2252(a)(2), modifies only the word receives, and not the phrase visual depiction[s] involv[ing] the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; and, second, the court decided that this syntax renders the statute constitutionally infirm because, by failing to predicate guilt on actual knowledge of the materials' contents, particularly the age(s) of the persons depicted, the statute allows a person to be convicted without proof of the requisite scienter. See X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1289-92; see also Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 112-15, 110 S.Ct. 1691, 1697-99, 109 L.Ed.2d 98 (1990) (discussing constitutional requirement that prohibitions on child pornography include some element of scienter); see generally New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 3358, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982) (explaining that child pornography statutes must contain some element of scienter to survive constitutional attack). 45 The X-Citement Video opinion is something of a pariah. With regard to the first component of its holding, every other appellate court that has read section 2252(a) has determined that the provision imposes a scienter requirement vis-a-vis the contents of an interdicted mailing. See, e.g., United States v. LaChapelle, 969 F.2d 632, 638 (8th Cir.1992); Osborne, 935 F.2d at 34 & n. 2; United States v. Duncan, 896 F.2d 271, 277-78 (7th Cir.1990); United States v. Marchant, 803 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir.1986); United States v. Garot, 801 F.2d 1241, 1246-47 (10th Cir.1986). Indeed, we, ourselves, albeit in a civil case, advocated just such a construction of section 2252(a). See Rodriguez v. Clark Color Lab., Inc., 921 F.2d 347, 349 (1st Cir.1990). 46 Though these opinions predate X-Citement Video, district courts outside the Ninth Circuit that have been asked to follow X-Citement Video uniformly have declined to do so. See, e.g., United States v. Edwards, 1993 WL 453461, at  5 (N.D.Ill.1993) (declaring that notwithstanding X-Citement Video 's contrary view, the language of Sec. 2252 imposes a scienter element as to the nature of the proscribed visual depictions); United States v. Prytz, 822 F.Supp. 311, 321 (D.S.C.1993) (noting that, though the X-Citement Video court's rendition may be correct grammatically, it is not reasonable nor consistent with principles underlying constitutional interpretation of statutes and the courts' obligation to construe statutes to avoid unconstitutionality if possible); United States v. Long, 831 F.Supp. 582, 586 (W.D.Ky.1993); United States v. Kempton, 826 F.Supp. 386, 388-89 (D.Kan.1993). No court has expressed support for the conclusion reached in X-Citement Video. 47 We agree with the near-unanimous view, and with the relevant segment of Judge Kozinski's dissent in X-Citement Video, 982 F.2d at 1296-97. In our opinion, section 2252(a) incorporates a paragraph-wide scienter requirement. We read the term knowingly, as used in the statute, to modify not only receives but also the entire paragraph, including age and conduct. Cf. United States v. Marvin, 687 F.2d 1221, 1226 (8th Cir.1982) (interpreting knowingly in 7 U.S.C. Sec. 2024(b) as modifying the entire remainder of the clause in which it appears), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1081, 103 S.Ct. 1768, 76 L.Ed.2d 342 (1983). 48 With regard to the second component of the X-Citement Video holding, we respectfully decline to follow the panel's determination that the Constitution demands that a defendant must have had actual knowledge of the minority of at least one of the performers. We hold instead that the appropriate constitutional requirement is one of recklessness, that section 2252 satisfies it, and that, therefore, the statute's scienter requirement is constitutionally adequate. The statute's legislative history makes it pellucid that Congress intended to include a scienter requirement, and did not intend strict criminal liability. See H.R.Rep. No. 910, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5952, 5956 (discussing 1986 amendments to Secs. 2251, 2252, and explaining that [t]he government must prove that the defendant knew the character of the visual depictions as depicting a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct but need not prove that the defendant actually knew the person depicted was in fact under 18 years of age or that the depictions violated Federal law). This statutory architecture passes constitutional scrutiny, for the Constitution does not require that an accused possess actual knowledge of the performers' ages. Rather, the scienter requirement imposed by section 2252(a) regarding the receipt of child pornography is satisfied if the prosecution can show reckless disregard of the obvious. See Osborne, 495 U.S. at 115, 110 S.Ct. at 1699 (holding that recklessness plainly satisfies the requirement laid down in Ferber that prohibitions on child pornography include some element of scienter). 49 To sum up, our determination that section 2252(a) survives appellant's constitutional challenge comports with the better-reasoned cases and, at the same time, honors the prudential principle that, where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitutional problems, [courts should] construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress. Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575, 108 S.Ct. 1392, 1397, 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988).