Opinion ID: 2607459
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Deadlock and Readback Issues

Text: Defendant bases three arguments  all of which we find unmeritorious  on the following events: On April 27, 1987, after about eight full days of penalty deliberations, the jury apparently assembled at its usual 9:30 a.m. time to continue deliberating. Around 11 a.m., the court called the jury, counsel, and defendant into the courtroom and read a note it had received from the jury. The note, signed by Foreman Spangler, asked that the jurors be individually polled on penalty because they were unable to reach a unanimous verdict at this time. When the court asked Spangler to confirm whether the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict, he replied, Yes, your honor. We have been at 11-to-1 since the second day of deliberations. The court directed Spangler not to disclose any details of the vote or deliberations, and asked whether further instruction or reading of testimony would assist the jury in reaching a verdict. Spangler essentially replied that instruction on a juror's general ability to impose death under any circumstances might be warranted because one particular individual seemed to be having difficulty in this regard. The court then asked each juror whether it was reasonably probable a verdict might be reached if they continued deliberating. One juror was unsure, two jurors were somewhat hopeful, and the remaining nine were doubtful. The court announced it was not prepared to declare a mistrial at this time. It does not appear to me that the jury has come to a hopeless deadlock, counsel. Based upon the responses, I am going to ask the jury to continue their deliberations, and I would appreciate it if you would continue trying. Deliberations resumed. At some point the same day (April 27), the jury asked for a reading of virtually all penalty phase testimony and closing arguments of counsel. With counsel's approval, the court granted the portion of the request concerning testimony, but deferred any decision on closing argument. The readback of testimony occurred over the course of the next two days (April 28 and 29). As stipulated by the prosecutor and defense counsel, it was conducted pursuant to the same procedure used at the guilt phase, i.e., with only the reporter and jury present. Meanwhile, on April 28, the court and counsel discussed the jury's request for a readback of closing arguments. Defense counsel said, among other things, that no prejudice would result as long as the jury was reminded that arguments were not evidence. However, the court ruled that closing arguments would not be read for reasons stated below. During the same exchange between the court and counsel, defense counsel asked the court to reconsider its earlier decision refusing to grant a mistrial. The defense insisted that the jury was deadlocked and that resumption of deliberations placed undue pressure on the minority juror. After the readback ended April 29, deliberations apparently resumed at 9:30 a.m. on May 4. At 11:15 a.m. that day, the jury informed the court of its verdict. 1. Alleged coercion of deadlocked jury (44) Defendant first suggests it is necessarily coercive to refuse to discharge the jury after the court learns about an 11-to-1 vote favoring a death sentence. Not so. ( People v. Sheldon (1989) 48 Cal.3d 935, 959-960 [258 Cal. Rptr. 242, 771 P.2d 1330].) The court may ask jurors to continue deliberating where, in the exercise of its discretion, it finds a reasonable probability of agreement. (§ 1140; People v. Breaux (1991) 1 Cal.4th 281, 319 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 81, 821 P.2d 585]; People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d 935, 959; People v. Rodriguez (1986) 42 Cal.3d 730, 775 [230 Cal. Rptr. 667, 726 P.2d 113]; People v. Rojas (1975) 15 Cal.3d 540, 546 [125 Cal. Rptr. 357, 542 P.2d 229, 92 A.L.R.3d 1127].) [25] Any claim that the jury was pressured into reaching a verdict depends on the particular circumstances of the case. (See, e.g., People v. Breaux, supra, 1 Cal.4th 281, 319-320; People v. Sheldon, supra, 48 Cal.3d 935, 959-960; People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 775-776.) Defendant emphasizes that the jury deliberated for more than an entire week, that the vote apparently remained at 11 to 1 for most of that time, and that Foreman Spangler publicly suggested the minority juror was breaching his or her duty to impose the appropriate penalty. Defendant insists that by ordering deliberations to continue under these circumstances, the court implied it agreed with Spangler's assessment. Defendant is mistaken. The court avoided any comment on the status of the vote and strongly suggested it was irrelevant. The jury was never told it must reach a verdict, nor were any other constraints placed on their deliberations. A few days earlier, the court had reread the instruction describing the individual nature of the penalty determination. Moreover, given the length and complexity of the trial, the direction to continue deliberations could only have been perceived as giving jurors an opportunity to enhance their understanding of the case, rather than as pressure to reach a verdict. ( People v. Rodriguez, supra, 42 Cal.3d 730, 775.) Prior and subsequent events support this conclusion. Spangler's deadlock note simply said the jury was unable to reach a verdict at this time. Two jurors told the court they believed a verdict might be reached, and no juror said unanimous agreement was impossible. Once deliberations resumed, the jury requested a reading of testimony and was obviously still focused on the evidence. We hold the court did not coerce a verdict or abuse its discretion under section 1140. 2. Requested readback of closing arguments (45) Defendant contends the court erred by denying the jury's request for counsel's summations. Contrary to defendant's argument at trial and on appeal, section 1138 does not compel a contrary result. [26] This section gives a deliberating jury the right to rehear evidence and instruction on request, but does not extend to argument of counsel. ( People v. Gordon (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1223, 1259-1260 [270 Cal. Rptr. 451, 792 P.2d 251].) While defendant correctly observes Gordon concerned a request by the guilt jury, he incorrectly argues section 190.3 compels a different result at the penalty phase. As noted by the trial court in this case, section 190.3 does not concern jury attempts to have argument repeated. [27] The court properly concluded it had discretion to deny such a request. We also reject defendant's claim that the court abused its discretion. Here, as in Gordon, the court expressed appropriate concern over diverting the jury's attention from proper consideration of the evidence and instructions. It observed that any defects in counsel's argument might be compounded by repeating it. We reject defendant's suggestion that the court was required to review counsel's argument, to anticipate any defects that might surface on appeal, and to excise them in order to grant the jury's request. No error occurred. 3. Defendant's presence at readback of testimony Defendant claims various federal constitutional provisions were violated when the court permitted penalty testimony to be read to the jury outside the presence of defendant and his counsel without a personal waiver by defendant. Defendant raised the same argument in conjunction with the reading of testimony during guilt deliberations. As before, we reject the claim on grounds counsel duly consented to the procedure. (See discussion, ante. ) Moreover, defendant effectively waived his presence when he personally asked to be excused from the entire penalty phase. (See discussion, ante. )