Opinion ID: 2616865
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: persons present in the grand jury room

Text: The respondents argue that unauthorized persons were present in the grand jury room, and hence, the indictments were void. RCW 10.40.070 provides in part: The motion to set aside the indictment can be made by the defendant on one or more of the following grounds, and must be sustained. ... (3) When any person, other than the grand jurors, was present before the grand jury when the question was taken upon the finding of the indictment, or when any person, other than the grand jurors, was present before the grand jury during the investigation of the charge, except as required or permitted by law. RCW 36.27.060 provides in part: The prosecuting attorneys and their deputies of class three counties and counties with population larger than class three counties shall serve full time and shall not engage in the private practice of law: ... The above-quoted section was enacted in 1969 and was effective at the time involved in this proceeding. Laws of 1969, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 226. Complaint is made of the presence in the grand jury room of two special deputy prosecuting attorneys, Evan L. Schwab and John B. Merritt. Both were capable and experienced attorneys who had connections with established law firms in the county. There is no contention that either failed to devote his full time and attention to the duties as special deputy prosecuting attorney while so serving, although  both had left that employment before the end of the grand jury. In the case of Mr. Merritt, there is no problem. He did no work other than in his public capacity while employed as a special deputy. He did not receive money from his law firm, but actually paid into the firm during that time. His check from the county was regularly endorsed and delivered to his firm. He received his usual pay from the firm which was less than the check from the county. Mr. Schwab presents a different situation. His regular pay from his firm was larger than the check from the county. He kept his check from the county and received from his firm an additional sum to make up the difference. He did some work evenings and weekends for the firm, but spent full time during customary working hours on his duties with the grand jury. There is no question Mr. Schwab was an honest, conscientious employee of the county of King and devoted his normal working hours exclusively to his employment as a special deputy of the prosecuting attorney. The problem is whether or not there was a violation of statute, and, if so, if such violation rendered the indictments void. The statutes involved here are RCW 36.27.060 and 36.27.040. There is no suggestion either of the special deputies received any fee or reward as prohibited by RCW 36.27.050, nor that they in any other way violated said section. RCW 36.17.020 is in no way applicable, it being a statute fixing the salary of the prosecuting attorney. The words who are forbidden under section 2 of this 1969 amendatory act to engage in the private practice of law are merely descriptive of certain prosecuting attorneys. RCW 36.17.010 is quoted by respondents. The essence of that section is to provide a county officer may not make extra profits from his official position. It has been construed to require a county clerk to pay naturalization fees into the county. Franklin County v. Barnes, 68 Wash. 488, 123 P. 779 (1912). The same section has also been held to prohibit a sheriff from keeping for his personal use the money received  for the keep of federal prisoners. King County v. Stringer, 130 Wash. 287, 227 P. 17 (1924). [10] RCW 36.27.040 is also quoted by respondents. It relates to the appointment of deputy prosecuting attorneys. Respondents seem to rely on those parts of the section which provide the deputies shall have the same power in all respects and shall have the same qualifications required of the prosecuting attorney. All of the quoted language is in the first part of the section. The latter part of the section relates to special deputy prosecuting attorneys to aid in grand jury matters. It is significant that the two parts of the section are on different subjects. The problem of the application of RCW 36.27.040 was submitted to the Honorable Stanley C. Soderland and he answered by a letter dated June 29, 1971, as follows: Dear Mr. Schwab: You have asked me whether RCW 36.27.060 applies to you as a special deputy prosecutor appointed for purposes of attending upon the grand jury. It appears quite clear to me that that statute does not apply. RCW 36.27.040 provides that a prosecuting attorney may appoint deputies who shall have the same power in all respects as he has. It further provides that the prosecuting attorney may appoint special deputy prosecuting attorneys to work with the grand jury. RCW 36.27.060 says that the prosecuting attorneys and their deputies in the larger counties shall serve full time and shall not engage in the private practice of law. That requirement that a deputy serve full-time and not engage in law practice quite obviously applies to a regular deputy who has the same power in all respects as the prosecuting attorney. It cannot apply to a special deputy prosecutor hired for a limited time to do a special job. If a special deputy prosecuting attorney had to be a full-time deputy not engaging in the private practice of law, there would be no purpose in the statute providing for special deputies. It would merely say that the attorney attending upon the grand jury must be a regular full-time deputy prosecuting attorney. Furthermore, the very purpose of the statute allowing the appointment of practicing attorneys from any county in the state as special  deputies for the grand jury is to allow the prosecutor to engage this special talent from the experienced, practicing lawyers rather than use the regular deputies on his staff who are often young, inexperienced men. To provide that such an experienced lawyer would have to give up his law practice completely and take employment as a regular deputy prosecuting attorney full-time would defeat the very purpose of the statute in allowing the appointment of special deputies. Section 2(2) of the Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971 recognizes and maintains this distinction between a regular and special deputy. Very truly yours, /s/ Stanley C. Soderland The statute clearly distinguishes a deputy from a special deputy. The deputy, mentioned in the first part of the section, Shall have the same qualifications and the same power in all respects as the prosecuting attorney. The special deputy, mentioned in the latter part of the section, has limited powers and duties. He functions only in connection with a grand jury. He is specifically required or permitted by law to present matters and testimony to a grand jury. Furthermore, the qualifications are different, the special deputy is not required to be a resident of the county. Manifestly, the requirement to have the same qualifications as the prosecuting attorney does not apply to the special deputy. In view of the foregoing, the special deputy prosecuting attorneys, therefore, were properly and lawfully functioning as such, and were in the grand jury room, as required or permitted by law. [11] In addition to the foregoing, there are two additional reasons why the contention there were unauthorized persons before the grand jury is not well taken. The violation of a statute such as here involved will not cause the prosecuting attorney to forfeit his office or be disqualified from performing the duties thereof. In Ray v. Hand, 225 Ga. 589, 170 S.E.2d 692 (1969), it was held an act prohibiting district attorneys from engaging in the private practice of law does not provide qualifications,  disqualifications, of conditions of eligibility for the office of solicitor general (now district attorney). In County of Madera v. Gendron, 59 Cal.2d 798, 382 P.2d 342, 31 Cal. Rptr. 302 (1963), it was held a district attorney might receive his salary regardless of the fact he violated a restriction against his engaging in the private practice of law. RCW 36.27.060 prohibits certain prosecuting attorneys and their deputies from engaging in the private practice of law. The statute, however, does not make such conduct a crime, nor does it provide for forfeiture of office or disqualification to assume the office. Under such a provision the forfeiture of a public office would not be presumed. [12] We hold Mr. Merritt and Mr. Schwab were de jure special deputy prosecuting attorneys. However, a person duly appointed to a public office is a de facto officer even if he is not a de jure officer. As such his official acts are not subject to collateral attack. State v. Britton, 27 Wn.2d 336, 344, 178 P.2d 341 (1947), was a case in which the Honorable Matthew W. Hill had been appointed as a judge of the superior court to replace the Honorable Malcolm Douglas while the latter was serving in the armed forces. The objection was made that the act under which Judge Hill was appointed was unconstitutional and void. The court said: We do not feel called upon to determine the constitutionality of chapter 201 of the session laws of 1941 in this proceeding. Judge Hill was appointed by Governor Langlie, and he held the position from December 28, 1944, through June 28, 1946. He held it by virtue of his appointment. There can be no question but that he was a de facto judge. Later in the same opinion there is quoted from 1 Bouvier's Law Dictionary (Rawle's 3d rev.) 761 the following: `An officer de facto must be submitted to as such until displaced by a regular direct proceeding for that purpose; ...'.