Opinion ID: 2612406
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Mental defenses.

Text: (41) Defendent claims trial counsel erred by failing to investigate and present evidence of organic brain damage at both the guilt and penalty trials. As support for the existence of an impaired mental state, the original petition proffered a report, dated September 25, 1981, of the psychiatric evaluation performed upon defendant's posttrial admission to San Quentin. The report indicated that defendant, though illiterate, displayed normal-range intelligence and did not exhibit either psychosis or severe neurosis. On the basis of certain test results, however, the report diagnosed atypical personality disorder, ... with neurological impairment. Such neurological damage, the report opined, may result in concrete thinking and impaired judgment. The supplemental petition presented a declaration, dated June 4, 1986, by Dr. David Stein, a private neuropsychologist. Confirming the prison diagnosis, Dr. Stein asserted that his own testing indicated an organic, possibly prenatal, defect in defendant's cerebral cortex. [40] This condition, Dr. Stein suggested, causes highly literal thinking, limits defendant's attention span, impairs his ability to perceive unfamiliar or fast-moving events accurately, and reduces his capacity to evaluate options and make good judgments under stress. Specifically, Dr. Stein opined that once [defendant] believed himself or others to be in danger from the officers' approach, he could not have responded accurately as the situation developed and could not have engaged in calculation or premeditation. Defendant urges that if counsel had conducted an adequate pretrial investigation, he would have learned from defendant's family that defendant's mother was seriously ill during her pregnancy, that defendant himself had lifelong medical problems, and that he suffered from severe learning disabilities. This, defendant asserts, should have led counsel to seek a pretrial psychiatric evaluation and to obtain available records of defendant's medical and psychological history. We concluded defendant had stated a prima facie case on this issue, and we therefore included it in our amended O.S.C. The original and supplemental returns include trial counsel's response to the petitions' claims of incompetence. Trial counsel asserted that although he knew mental defenses could be raised, his observations of defendant and his conversations with family members disclosed no hint of mental impairment. On the contrary, counsel asserts, defendant seemed normal and alert, and he participated knowledgeably in strategy discussions. Counsel indicates he attached little significance to defendant's illiteracy, because poor reading skills are common in low-income communities for reasons unrelated to mental ability. Finally, trial counsel declared, defendant adamantly refused to raise a mental defense or to submit to a psychiatric evaluation. Trial counsel's declarations in this regard are uncontroverted, and we find them dispositive without need for a reference. The constitutional standard of performance by counsel is reasonableness, viewed from counsel's perspective at the time of his challenged act or omission. ( Burger v. Kemp (1987) 483 U.S. 776, 789 [97 L.Ed.2d 638, 654, 107 S.Ct. 3114]; Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 688-690 [80 L.Ed.2d at pp. 647, 693-695].) To establish that investigative omissions were constitutionally ineffective assistance, defendant must show at the outset that counsel knew or should have known further investigation might turn up materially favorable evidence. ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d 883, 937.) Criminal trial counsel have no blanket obligation to investigate possible mental defenses, even in a capital case. ( People v. Williams, supra, 44 Cal.3d at p. 943; see People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 164 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) All our cases finding culpably deficient investigation of diminished capacity have involved initial facts known to counsel from which he reasonably should have suspected that a meritorious defense was available. (E.g., In re Sixto (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1247, 1257-1262 [259 Cal. Rptr. 491, 774 P.2d 164] [defendant claimed unconsciousness caused by alcohol and PCP intoxication; entire defense theory based thereon]; People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 193 [233 Cal. Rptr. 404, 729 P.2d 839] [counsel knew of defendant's long history of PCP and methamphetamine abuse]; People v. Mozingo (1983) 34 Cal.3d 926, 934 [196 Cal. Rptr. 212, 671 P.2d 363] [reports furnished to counsel pretrial contained significant indications of psychiatric problems]; Frierson, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 162-164 [pretrial information of PCP ingestion and long-term drug use; this was sole possible defense]; In re Saunders (1970) 2 Cal.3d 1033, 1036-1037 [88 Cal. Rptr. 633, 472 P.2d 921] [pretrial awareness from defendant's mother of his organic brain damage and long-standing psychological problems].) Though artfully drafted, the supplemental petition and its attached declarations do not indicate that the possibility of convincing mental evidence should have been reasonably apparent to a competent attorney. They do not recite a history of drug abuse; indeed, according to trial counsel's uncontroverted representation, defendant discounted such abuse as a basis for defense. They do not claim that defendant's alleged mental disabilities were obvious from his demeanor or conversation. [41] Nor do they suggest that family members volunteered any specific information about his history of learning difficulties which might trigger trial counsel's suspicion. Trial counsel was presumably aware, as evidence at the guilt and penalty trials implied, that defendant was respected in the neighborhood as a former youth gang leader. [42] Under the circumstances, we see no basis to conclude that any failure by trial counsel to pursue an investigation of mental defenses was unreasonable. Moreover, though trial counsel states he did consider such defenses in an abundance of caution, it is undisputed that defendant affirmatively refused to cooperate. Trial counsel cannot be faulted for failing to take steps that require cooperation his client declines to give. ( People v. Haskett (1982) 30 Cal.3d 841, 853 [180 Cal. Rptr. 640, 640 P.2d 776].) [43] Of course, where trial counsel has reason to believe that mental defenses may be available and advisable, the client's initial opposition does not excuse counsel from an investigation sufficient to present the client with an informed tactical choice. ( People v. Mozingo, supra, 34 Cal.3d 926, 934.) However, the instant petitions fail to show what reasonable steps trial counsel in this case could have taken without defendant's cooperation to determine the feasibility of the intricate organic-brain-damage theory now asserted. (See Burger v. Kemp, supra, 483 U.S. at pp. 794-795 [97 L.Ed.2d at p. 657].) The supplemental petition alludes vaguely to available records but does not attach or describe them. And the available family information about defendant's lifelong slowness, illiteracy, and medical problems such as asthma hardly seems an adequate basis for a professional opinion that a defense of organic mental impairment might succeed. Under all the circumstances, the pleadings fail to establish grounds for an inference that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance on this issue. (42a) We also reject any notion that the posttrial mental evaluations constitute newly discovered evidence warranting relief on habeas corpus. At the outset, defendant's refusal to undergo mental evaluation prior to trial prejudices any collateral attack based on posttrial evaluations. There are obvious difficulties with a claim that a defendant is entitled to a new trial because he himself prevented the diligent pretrial discovery of critical evidence. In any event, the proffered mental evidence does not meet the requirements for collateral relief based on newly discovered evidence. In contrast with ineffective assistance claims, [t]he high standard for newly discovered evidence claims presupposes that all the essential elements of a presumptively accurate and fair proceeding were present in the proceeding whose result is challenged. [Citation.] ... ( Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 694 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 697].) Thus, a criminal judgment may be collaterally attacked on the basis of newly discovered evidence only if the new evidence casts fundamental doubt on the accuracy and reliability of the proceedings. At the guilt phase, such evidence, if credited, must undermine the entire prosecution case and point unerringly to innocence or reduced culpability. ( In re Hall (1981) 30 Cal.3d 408, 417 [179 Cal. Rptr. 223, 637 P.2d 690]; In re Weber (1974) 11 Cal.3d 703, 724 [114 Cal. Rptr. 429, 523 P.2d 229].) By analogy, new evidence should not disturb a penalty judgment unless the evidence, if true, so clearly changes the balance of aggravation against mitigation that its omission more likely than not altered the outcome. (See Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at pp. 693-694 [80 L.Ed.2d at p. 697].) For several reasons, the posttrial evaluations here at issue do not rise to that level. First, general assertions that defendant exhibits concrete and distorted perception, naivete, bad memory, limited attention span, and poor ability to cope under stress do not conclusively and unerringly negate the elements of malice or premeditation. Nor, standing alone, are they compelling evidence in mitigation. They do not directly explain or extenuate the homicide. While they may arouse some general sympathy, the sentencer might also conclude that many nonmurderers have similar difficulties. Second, Dr. Stein's conclusion that defendant probably could not react properly once [he] believed himself or others to be physically threatened assumes the truth of defendant's disputed claim of honest fear. Thus, this evaluation cannot be deemed crucial to guilt or penalty. (43) Third, under the law applicable to any guilt retrial, Dr. Stein's opinion that defendant's brain damage rendered him incapable of making the reasoned cold and calculated judgment required for a finding of premeditated first degree murder is incompetent. The Penal Code now precludes an expert witness from testifying at the guilt phase as to whether the defendant had or did not have specific required mental states. (§ 29.) (44) This prohibition is procedural only, affects no due process or ex post facto rights, and thus applies to crimes committed before it was adopted. ( People v. Whitler (1985) 171 Cal. App.3d 337, 342 [214 Cal. Rptr. 610]; see People v. Jackson (1984) 152 Cal. App.3d 961, 968-970 [199 Cal. Rptr. 848].) (42b) Fourth, at both the guilt and penalty phases the prosecution presented direct evidence through Acker, and substantial circumstantial evidence through a number of other witnesses, that defendant did act with malice, premeditation, and the intent to kill a police officer. Acker said defendant admitted that, in order to protect his narcotics business, he deliberately bag[ged] a cop who had it coming. There were strong indications that defendant, an experienced gang leader, could not have believed he was under gang attack as he claimed. On their face, Dr. Stein's declarations do not eliminate or negate this evidence. The claim that organic brain damage prevented defendant from responding properly to the police raid states no concrete fact that can be verified by an assessment of Dr. Stein's credibility or by other objective means. However sincere and well-considered, Dr. Stein's assertions are but professional opinions of the kind which inherently generate expert debate. (See Evid. Code, § 801 et seq.; People v. Stoll (1989) 49 Cal.3d 1136, 1141, 1155-1159 [265 Cal. Rptr. 111, 783 P.2d 698].) Even if unrebutted by prosecution experts, they merely sharpen the existing dispute about defendant's state of mind. At most, they conflict with the trial evidence on that issue. While they might thus have presented more difficult questions for the guilt and penalty juries, they do not qualify as new evidence that fundamentally undermines the judgment. ( In re Wright (1978) 78 Cal. App.3d 788, 802 [144 Cal. Rptr. 535].)