Opinion ID: 663689
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Ancient Grand Jury Secrecy Principle

Text: 47 The movants opposing disclosure raise a second objection to release even more weighty than their first. As they note, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, embodying the ancient principle of grand jury secrecy, declare that an attorney for the government ... shall not disclose matters occurring before the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in these rules. FED.R.CRIM.P. 6(e)(2). As the Supreme Court has emphasized, [g]rand jury secrecy ... is 'as important for the protection of the innocent as for the pursuit of the guilty.'  United States v. Sells Eng'g. Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424, 103 S.Ct. 3133, 3137, 77 L.Ed.2d 743 (1983) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 503, 513, 63 S.Ct. 1233, 87 L.Ed. 1546 (1943)). Supreme Court decisions have catalogued additional reasons for preserving grand jury secrecy: (1) disclosure of pre-indictment proceedings would make many prospective witnesses hesitant to come forward voluntarily, knowing that those against whom they testify would be aware of that testimony; (2) witnesses who did appear would be less likely to testify fully and frankly, as they would be open to retribution as well as to inducements; and (3) there would be the risk that those about to be indicted would flee or would try to influence individual grand jurors to vote against indictment. Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 218-19, 99 S.Ct. 1667, 1672-73, 60 L.Ed.2d 156 (1979).