Opinion ID: 2816856
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Gang Expert’s Testimony

Text: Defendants’ final challenge is to the admission of several statements by the government’s proffered gang expert, Shane Webb, who had focused on gang activity as an officer of the Dodge City Police Department. They argue that these statements involved no expertise at all, but rather were merely “parrot[ed]” testimonial hearsay in violation of their Confrontation Clause rights. United States v. Kamahele, 748 F.3d 984, 1000 (10th Cir. 2014). We review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the Confrontation Clause. See United States v. Torrez-Ortega, 184 F.3d 1128, 1132 (10th Cir. 1999). The admission of evidence barred by the Confrontation Clause requires reversal of the conviction unless the admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Summers, 414 F.3d 1287, 1303 (10th Cir. 2005). 1. Gang-Expert Testimony and the Confrontation Clause The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees the right of the accused “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. It bars 29 “admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for crossexamination.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004). Testimonial statements include “those in which state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial.” Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1155 (2011). The statements may or may not be hearsay excluded under Federal Rule of Evidence 802. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51. Special considerations arise under the Confrontation Clause in the context of expert testimony. Federal Rule of Evidence 703 allows an expert to “base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed”; and “[i]f experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted” (emphasis added). In particular, the rule could allow an expert to rely on testimonial hearsay. Of course, Rule 703 cannot override the Confrontation Clause, but we have held that the Rule and the Clause can be reconciled if the expert exercises “independent judgment” in assessing and using the hearsay (and other sources) to reach an expert opinion. Kamahele, 748 F.3d at 1000; see also United States v. Pablo, 696 F.3d 1280, 1288 (10th Cir. 2012). As the Fourth Circuit reasoned: “As long as [an expert] is applying his training and experience to the sources before him and reaching an independent judgment, there will typically be no Crawford problem. The expert’s 30 opinion will be an original product that can be tested through cross-examination.” United States v. Johnson, 587 F.3d 625, 635 (4th Cir. 2009). The independent-judgment requirement under the Confrontation Clause will generally be satisfied if the testimony by the expert satisfies the Rule 702 requirement that the expert testimony assist the jury because of the value of the witness’s expertise. See Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221, 2241 (2012) (plurality opinion) (“[T]rial courts can screen out experts who would act as mere conduits for hearsay by strictly enforcing the requirement that experts display some genuine ‘scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge [that] will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.’” (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 702(a))). On the other hand, if “[t]he jury [is] every bit as qualified to analyze” a piece of mundane evidence as the purported expert, the expert provides no added value on which to be cross-examined. United States v. Benson, 941 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir. 1991) (expert “had nothing to offer on this question that would assist the jury’s understanding of the issue”), mandate recalled and amended, 957 F.2d 301 (7th Cir. 1992). In this case we apply the above analysis to testimony by a gang expert. We have long recognized the usefulness of such testimony “because the average juror is often innocent of the ways of the criminal underworld.” United States v. Vann, 776 F.3d 746, 758 (10th Cir. 2015) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). Expert testimony about a gang’s history, territory, colors, hand signs, graffiti use, naming practice, tattoos, structure, membership rules, and similar sociological evidence can assist the jury in 31 understanding and evaluating evidence concerning the specific crimes charged. See United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1294–95 (10th Cir. 2013); United States v. Robinson, 978 F.2d 1554, 1561–63 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Hartsfield, 976 F.2d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mejia, 545 F.3d 179, 187 (2d Cir. 2008). But there is no sociological expertise in testifying to gang members’ specific travels, specific uses of gang funds, or commission of specific crimes. See Mejia, 545 F.3d at 194–95; see also Benson, 941 F.2d at 605 (admission of IRS agent’s testimony an abuse of discretion when “[t]here was no complex transaction that had to be broken down so the jury could understand it, no tax law concept or accounting principle to explain”). When the expert’s testimony on such matters is not based on personal knowledge but on testimonial hearsay, the testimony violates not only the rules of evidence but also the Confrontation Clause. We have repeatedly cautioned about the impropriety of permitting an “expert” witness to “parrot[]” testimonial hearsay. Kamahele, 748 F.3d at 1000. As we said in Pablo, “If an expert simply parrots another individual’s out-of-court statement, rather than conveying an independent judgment that only incidentally discloses the statement to assist the jury in evaluating the expert’s opinion, then the expert is, in effect, disclosing that out-of-court statement for its substantive truth; the expert thereby becomes little more than a backdoor conduit for an otherwise inadmissible statement.” 696 F.3d at 1288; see United States v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 394 (4th Cir. 2004) (expert not permitted to “channel[]” statements from nontestifying witnesses). 32 An important consideration in distinguishing proper testimony from parroting is the generality or specificity of the expert testimony. As stated in Mejia, when gangexpert testimony descends to a discussion of specific events recounted by others, the expert is merely adding “unmerited credibility” to the sources, 545 F.3d at 192 (internal quotation marks omitted), and summarizing evidence in a way that should be reserved for the government’s closing argument. The court explained: If the officer expert strays beyond the bounds of appropriately “expert” matters, that officer becomes, rather than a sociologist describing the inner workings of a closed community, a chronicler of the recent past whose pronouncements on elements of the charged offense serve as shortcuts to proving guilt. As the officer’s purported expertise narrows from “organized crime” to “this particular gang,” from the meaning of “capo” to the criminality of the defendant, the officer’s testimony becomes more central to the case, more corroborative of the fact witnesses, and thus more like a summary of the facts than an aide in understanding them. Id. at 190. When an expert’s bailiwick is only “internal expertise” of the investigation at hand and the expert does no more than “disgorge . . . factual knowledge to the jury,” the expert is “no longer aiding the jury in its factfinding [but is] instructing the jury on the existence of the facts needed to satisfy the elements of the charged offense.” Id. at 191; cf. United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 59 (2d Cir. 2003) (pre-Crawford opinion holding that expert testimony violated Confrontation Clause when gang expert “was not translating drug jargon, applying expert methodology, or relying on his general experience in law enforcement,” but rather “was relying on his conversations with nontestifying witnesses and co-defendants”). Such a witness cannot be distinguished from 33 any other witness conveying hearsay, and the parroting by the “expert” may violate the Confrontation Clause. 2. The Gang Expert’s Statements These principles in hand, we turn to the facts of this case. The government called Webb as its first witness at trial. Defendants take issue with five of his statements.1
Webb testified about the DV’s home-invasion robberies of Guatemalan immigrants. He was asked, “And is there anything about the stature of Guatemalans that, according to DV gang members, make them an attractive target?” Ramirez R., Vol. III at 982. He replied, “Yes. I’ve been told that they are small. They’re also scared about their immigration status and . . . they’re afraid if they call law enforcement that they will be deported.” Id. Defendants contend that admission of the answer was error. The hearsay is readily apparent from the exchange. Webb was asked for his opinion about whether Guatemalans’ stature makes them attractive targets “according to DV gang members.” Id. (emphasis added). His answer relayed at least one out-of-court statement: “I’ve been told that they are small.” Id. (emphasis added). And that 1 Defendants identify eight allegedly problematic statements in their briefing, but at trial they objected on Confrontation Clause grounds to only five of them. On appeal they do not argue that the admission of the other three statements was plain error, so we will not review them. See United States v. McGehee, 672 F.3d 860, 873 (10th Cir. 2012) (“[W]here a defendant has forfeited an issue in the district court, in order to prevail in an appellate challenge regarding that issue, a defendant must make a sufficient showing of error under the plain-error standard.”). 34 statement was offered for its truth (not that Guatemalans are small, but why DV gang members target them). Webb indicated that the source of his information was investigative interviews, and the government has not suggested that the hearsay he relied on was other than testimonial. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (statements gathered from “formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for trial” are testimonial). The government cannot plausibly argue that Webb applied his expertise to this statement. It involves no interpretation of gang culture or iconography, no deciphering of coded messages, no calibrated judgment based on years of experience and the synthesis of multiple sources of information. He simply relayed what DV gang members told him. Admission of the testimony violated the Confrontation Clause. Still, we must decide whether in light of the whole record Webb’s testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Factors for determining harmless error include “the importance of the witness’[s] . . . testimony in the prosecution’s case, the cumulative nature of the testimony, the presence or absence of corroborating or contradictory testimony, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case.” Summers, 414 F.3d at 1303 (internal quotation marks omitted). We conclude that the testimony was harmless. The “expert opinion” that DV members targeted Guatemalans added little to the other evidence on the matter. Jesus Flores and the victims gave first-hand testimony that Defendants participated in a home35 invasion robbery of Guatemalans. DV member Galindo testified that he and other gang members were involved in about 20 robberies of Guatemalan immigrants, whom they targeted because they would hold their money in cash rather than deposit it in banks. And Webb testified at length without objection (at trial or on appeal) that Norteñoaffiliated gangs committed home-invasion robberies of Guatemalan immigrants.
Webb was next asked: “And do you have experience, Agent Webb, where Guatemalan immigrants have been the victims of these robberies and lost sizable amounts of money, currency?” Ramirez R., Vol. III at 982. He answered, “Yes.” Id. This testimony, too, is presumably based upon testimonial-hearsay statements of DV members and Guatemalan victims to the police. Cf. Mejia, 545 F.3d at 194–95 (no expertise needed to testify to compilation of crimes allegedly committed by gang). Nevertheless, it was harmless for the same reason that admission of the previous statement was harmless.
Webb testified about Defendants’ “status,” meaning seniority or respect, in the DV gang: Q. . . . [D]o you know Pedro Garcia and Gonzalo Ramirez to be people, gang members, that were considered to have status within the DV gang? A. Yes. Q. . . . Tell us how you know that. A. Through debriefing other gang members that have cooperated with us. Ramirez R., Vol. III at 989. This testimony is quintessential parroting. 36 But Webb’s statement about Defendants’ status was harmless. At trial, Worthey agreed that Defendants “had a great deal of status,” id. at 1481, to the point of “the ultimate respect,” id. at 1493. Wright testified that Defendants were the type of gang members who “ha[d] heart,” meaning they would go with him if he was going to fight or do something of that nature, id. at 1256, and that gave Defendants “status,” id. at 1257. Torres testified that Garcia received more respect than other gang members, that Ramirez was viewed the same way, and that Ramirez’s “status within the gang” was one of respect. Id. at 2102. Given this testimony from fellow gang members, we are convinced that Webb’s reference to Defendants’ status was harmless.2
Webb testified that DV gang members had told him that they were “jumped in,” meaning physically assaulted, as their initiation into the gang. Id. at 1007. This evidence, too, was harmless. The statement does little to inculpate Defendants in any meaningful way. And several gang members testified about their own and others’ jumpins. The testimony was so cumulative that by the third day of testimony the court instructed the government to move more quickly when questioning witnesses about jump-ins. Webb’s testimony on jump-ins did not contribute to the guilty verdicts. 2 It may be that Webb’s testimony about status was based solely on what he was told by persons who testified at trial. Because the trial witnesses were subject to crossexamination, the use of their hearsay statements would not violate the Confrontation Clause. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 n.9 (“[W]hen the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial statements.”). 37
Finally, Webb testified about a ledger that recorded payments made by gang members at gang meetings. He was asked: “And you know this was a gang roster and . . . this was a ledger of monies being paid for meetings attended, you know that how?” Id. at 1012. He replied: “From two—debriefing of two different individuals that described that.” Id. This is parroting. There is no application of experience or judgment; Webb simply repeated in court what two persons had told him about the ledger. Even so, the statement was harmless. The apparent point of this testimony was to demonstrate that there were “rosters of DV gang members and proof that there [were] meetings being held by the DV.” Id. But the jury also heard about the DV enterprise from no fewer than seven self-avowed gang members. And Worthey provided far more detail about the ledger, testifying that the DV gang held meetings and that at those meetings the members made monthly payments toward the gang, which he recorded in the ledger; another gang member, Juan Torres, corroborated this testimony. Webb’s statement about the ledger, like his other contested statements, was harmless.