Opinion ID: 1788225
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Beard Evidence

Text: The first alternative person about whom Jones offered evidence was Beard. Jones offered the following evidence about Beard: (1) he resembled the sketch of the man the postal carrier claimed to have seen in the Jensens' driveway the morning of the murder; (2) he had called the Jensen home about two weeks before the murder and was upset about his visitation schedule with his son Joseph; (3) he was an early suspect, in part because Charles Jensen stated that Beard could be violent and was the only person he could think of who would kill Linda Jensen; (4) Eddie Mae Crockett, a former girlfriend of Beard's, stated that Beard repeatedly told her he had killed Linda Jensen and had threatened her by saying: if I [Crockett] ever messed up on him,    he'd do the same to me; (5) statements from Crockett that Beard had described how he had stabbed Linda Jensen in the abdomen, what the wound looked like, that Jensen had been raped, that there had been semen left in her body that was not his, and that there was a baby in the room at the time of the murder. Jones also proffered evidence that (6) Beard acknowledged that he knew where the Jensens lived and had been to the home; (7) no one could verify Beard's alibi for the morning of the murder; and (8) Beard was despondent for a period of time following the murder. In response, the state pointed out that Beard did not live within walking distance of the Jensen home, did not own a car, and his DNA did not match that found at the scene. In examining this proffered evidence, it becomes clear that, aside from the statement by Charles Jensen that Beard had a history of violence and the statement by Crockett that Beard threatened to kill her like he had Linda Jensen, none of the proffered evidence about Beard could arguably qualify as reverse- Spreigl evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court erred when it treated all of the Beard evidence as reverse- Spreigl evidence and determined its admissibility under the clear and convincing standard. Moreover, because this evidence was clearly not evidence of prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts, the court's error was plain error. Having concluded that the district court's error was plain, we must next evaluate whether the court's order excluding the Beard evidence affected Jones' substantial rights. Quick, 659 N.W.2d at 717. In order to determine whether substantial rights were affected by the court's erroneous classification of all of the offered testimony with respect to Beard as reverse- Spreigl evidence, we must determine whether the evidence would have been admissible had it been properly classified. If the proffered evidence was inadmissible even if it was properly analyzed, then the court's error had no effect, let alone an effect on Jones' substantial rights. Arguably, if the district court had properly classified Jones' proffered evidence about Beard and then applied the correct standard for admission, most, if not all, of the evidence would have been admitted. The first and second pieces of evidence testimony that Beard resembled the sketch and testimony that he had called the Jensen home two weeks before the murder and was upset about the visitation scheduleappear to be admissible. The third piece of evidence, that Beard was an early suspect and that Charles Jensen said Beard was the only person he could think of who would do this, also appears to be admissible, at least in part. The statement about Beard's violent history could arguably be classified as bad act evidence; [8] therefore, the court's classification of this statement as reverse- Spreigl evidence may not be plain error. It was, however, plain error to classify as reverse- Spreigl evidence the separate statement by Charles Jensen that Beard is the only one he could think of who would kill Linda Jensen. The fourth and fifth pieces of evidence Crockett's statementsare arguably the strongest pieces of evidence offered against Beard, but may be the most likely evidence to have been excluded on ordinary evidentiary grounds even if the district court had not excluded it as reverse- Spreigl evidence. The state argues that even if it the court had used the correct legal analysis, it still would have excluded Crockett's statements and the other proffered evidence about Beard as hearsay. But reaching such a conclusion requires us to speculate about what the court would have done had it not ruled the evidence inadmissible on erroneous grounds. Moreover, such speculation would deprive Jones of any opportunity to provide foundation evidence or even to argue against exclusion of the Crockett statements as hearsay. Therefore, we are unable to conclude on this record that Crockett's statements were inadmissible had they been properly analyzed. The ability of a defendant to present exculpatory evidenceevidence tending to establish the defendant's innocenceis fundamental to our system of justice. See California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (stating that fundamental fairness    require[s] that criminal defendants be afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.). Here, if the Crockett statements together with the other Beard alternative perpetrator evidence were admissible, exclusion of this evidence denied Jones the right to present exculpatory evidence to the jury. Therefore, we conclude that the district court's error in analyzing the Beard evidence affected Jones' substantial rights.