Opinion ID: 2343066
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Timeliness of the Motion to Vacate

Text: We must first determine whether this appeal is properly before the Court. Rule 32(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that [a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere may be made only before sentence is imposed or deferred or probation is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended. Once a defendant has entered a plea of guilty or of nolo contendere and sentence has been imposed, any issue relating to the validity of the plea must be raised by way of postconviction relief. State v. Desir, 766 A.2d 374, 375 (R.I.2001). Furthermore, [t]he proper avenue by which a defendant must proceed when attacking the voluntariness of a plea or when making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is an application for postconviction relief   . Id. This requirement is not merely a superfluous technicality: Unless a defendant complies with the procedure for postconviction relief, [this Court] shall not have the benefit of a full record and a decision of the Superior Court   . State v. Farlett, 490 A.2d 52, 54 (R.I.1985). It is undisputed in this case that defendant was sentenced on December 4, 2001, and that the motion to vacate his Alford plea was not filed, at the earliest, until December 13, 2001, well after defendant had been sentenced. [6] Nevertheless, defendant urges this Court to treat his untimely motion to vacate the Alford plea as an application for postconviction relief pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 9.1 of title 10. Although, admittedly, this Court previously has done exactly as defendant suggests, it was only when a complete record was available for appellate review. See State v. Williams, 122 R.I. 32, 36-37, 404 A.2d 814, 817 (1979) (treating a motion to set aside a guilty plea as an application for postconviction relief in part because the necessary record [was] before [the Court]). In the present case, the lack of a fully developed record from a postconviction relief proceeding is fatal. Without it, we are left with no way to ascertain whether defendant's counsel, in fact, made the omission defendant alleges or whether defendant actually did not know that, as a result of entering an Alford plea, he would be required to register as a sex offender for the duration of his probation. Instead, we would be forced to rely exclusively upon defendant's own self-serving averments made at the September 2003 hearing on his motion to withdraw the nolo contendere plea. Accordingly, we hold that defendant's appeal is not properly before this Court.