Opinion ID: 1060398
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Parental Rights in Custody Cases

Text: At the heart of this case, in my view, is the principle that government should not unduly interfere with the decisions of fit parents in the upbringing and care of their children. The United States Supreme Court has recognized this right as part of the constitutional liberty interest guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573-74, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925) (holding that the government may not unreasonably interfere[] with the liberty of parents ... to direct the upbringing and education of [their] children); see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 442, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) (recognizing a private realm of family life which the state cannot enter). Perhaps more important here, this Court has recognized that Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution fully protects the right of parents to care for their children without unwarranted state intervention. Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 579 (Tenn.1993). Assuredly, the parental right is not unlimited, for a parent must create a linkage between parental duty and parental right by taking steps to establish a parental relationship with the child. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 257-58, 103 S.Ct. 2985, 2991, 77 L.Ed.2d 614 (1983); Petrosky v. Keene, 898 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn.1995). Where a parent has invoked constitutional protections by making efforts to create such a relationship, however, the parental right is of considerable weight, and we should not abandon it lightly. This Court described the magnitude of the parental right over 80 years ago in In re Knott : The relations which exist between the parent and child are sacred ones and have their foundation in nature, and the affection existing between them is stronger and more potent, and affords a greater protection to the child, than any relation which could be created by association merely. The right to the society of the child exists in its parents; the right to rear it, to its custody, to its tutorage, the shaping of its destiny, and all of the consequences that naturally follow from the relationship are inherently in the natural parents, and they cannot be deprived of these rights without notice, and upon some ground which affects materially the future of the child. 138 Tenn. 349, 197 S.W. 1097, 1098 (1917). Because of this fundamental right, guaranteed by the Tennessee Constitution and by the United States Constitution, the courts of Tennessee should not superimpose their will over that of a fit parent in child custody disputes with a non-parent, without compelling justification. In my view, when considering a dispute between a parent and a non-parent, the parental right should be deemed paramount. As this Court held in In re Adoption of Female Child : [I]n a contest between a parent and a non-parent, a parent cannot be deprived of the custody of a child unless there has been a finding, after notice required by due process, of substantial harm to the child. Only then may a court engage in a general best interest of the child evaluation in making a determination of custody. 896 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tenn.1995). Thus, the parent should prevail unless the child would face a danger of substantial harm if placed in the parent's custody. The majority suggests that this superior parental right analysis is inconsistent with, and in this case should be rejected in favor of, an examination of the best interests of the child. Such an assertion is flawed, however, because it fails to acknowledge the widely-accepted presumption that fit parents act in the best interests of their children. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 68, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 2061, 147 L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). As the United States Supreme Court succinctly stated in Parham v. J.R .: The law's concept of the family rests on a presumption that parents possess what a child lacks in maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making life's difficult decisions. More important, historically it has recognized that natural bonds of affection lead parents to act in the best interests of their children. 442 U.S. 584, 602, 99 S.Ct. 2493, 2504, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979) (emphasis added); see also Busa v. Busa, 24 Conn.App. 426, 589 A.2d 370, 371 (1991) (discussing Conn. Gen.Stat. Ann. § 46b-56b, which recognizes a presumption, in custody disputes between a parent and a nonparent, that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent). Legal scholars too have asserted that placement with a fit parent is in the child's best interest in many instances. See, e.g., Carolyn Wilkes Kaas, Breaking Up a Family or Putting It Back Together Again: Refining the Preference in Favor of the Parent in Third Party Custody Cases, 37 Wm. and Mary L.Rev. 1045, 1097, 1130 (1996) (recommending that a legal preference be given to a parent seeking to regain custody from a non-parent, even when the child's parent ... voluntarily placed the child with the nonparent, or consented to such placement). Indeed, even some proponents of granting psychological parents rights equivalent to those enjoyed by biological parents recognize that where the parents have maintained contact with the child, or the child has retained strong emotional ties to the biological parents, return to the biological parents is generally best. See Carolyn Curtis, The Psychological Parent Doctrine in Custody Disputes Between Foster Parents and Biological Parents, 16 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Probs. 149, 169 (1980). The majority posits that the constitutional right of parents, however fundamental, inviolable, and well-established in law it may be, should be extinguished in cases where the parent has voluntarily relinquished custody or a valid court order has placed custody with a non-parent. The majority opinion suggests, in such cases, that the parent and non-parent essentially stand on equal footing, so that whatever custody arrangement is perceived by the courts as best serving the interests of the child should prevail. Superimposed upon that best-interest analysis is the requirement that the parent prove that there has been a substantial and material change in circumstances since the court order. I firmly believe, however, that the position espoused by the majority ignores the bedrock principle that the biological and emotional connection between a fit parent and a child bestows upon each the right to live as a family undisturbed by and immune from the interference of courts and well-meaning relatives. Only in cases where the otherwise fit parent has failed to develop a responsible relationship with the child [1] should the analysis proposed by the majority be considered, for only in those cases may the parental right truly be deemed relinquished. Where a parental relationship has been established and nurtured, however, the law should recognize the liberty interests of both parent and child to live together, where possible, as a family. [2] In short, I would adhere to the principle that a child is, presumptively, better placed with a fit parent than with a fitter non-parent. Only the danger of substantial harm to the child justifies intrusion into the almost sacred and assuredly constitutionally protected relationship of parent and child. Besides, the majority's decision to deny superior rights to a parent who voluntarily surrenders custody to a non-parent will forever penalize parents whose decision to surrender custody was made with the best interests of the child as the paramount factor. For example, in many cases, a parent may relinquish legal custody because of severely acute financial problems. In others, a parent may be too immature to bear the responsibility of caring for a child. In some cases, such as the one under submission, the parent's relationship may be such that the parent decides, at least initially, that it would be better for the child to live with the non-parent. In all of these cases, however, the parent may continue to make extraordinary efforts to cultivate and strengthen the pre-existing loving bond with the child. Also, by supporting the child financially or emotionally, or both, the parent may nurture the natural expectation of reunification with the child once circumstances change. Sound policy considerations dictate that such choices should be encouraged-not curtailed. As one commentator writes, A preference approach tells the parents that they get a second chance. Hopefully, this standard will encourage parents with problems to seek help and strive to rehabilitate themselves. The preference should also reassure a parent that he need not fear placing his child with a good and loving caretaker. If a parent believes that he has no chance to compete with the caretaker under the best interests approach, he may be less apt to agree voluntarily to recognize his problems and settle his child with someone capable and familiar to the child. Alternatively, if the court removes the child, the parent who faces an unfavorable comparison with the caretaker may be inclined to give up any hope of reunification and lose the drive to keep up contact with his child. Kaas, supra, at 1097. The majority's holding converts sincere efforts by well-meaning parents into forfeitures. What they are forced in this context to forfeit is the constitutional protection accorded to their status as parents. It may well be that the majority's decision ultimately will undermine the best interests of children in Tennessee, for parents now will be deterred from making choices that otherwise would benefit the child. Another untoward consequence of the majority's holding is that parents in many cases may make custodial decisions without fully understanding the legal ramifications of their choice. I find it troubling that a parent who intends to further the interests of the child may lose important constitutional rights in that effort. Courts must affirmatively exercise their obligation to ensure that the parent understands the legal effect of the transfer of custody. Such a trap for the unwary should never confront a Tennessee citizen. In order to give full voice to the constitutional rights of parents, and in order to fully recognize that the best interests of the child are most effectively served by placement with a fit parent, I would hold that a child should be returned to the parent's custody when that parent demonstrates that the child will not be substantially harmed as a result. This would be more consistent with the substantial harm standard we have applied in initial custody determinations between a parent and non-parent. See In re Askew, 993 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tenn.1999) (The magnitude of a parent's constitutional right to rear and have custody of his or her children ... [necessitates] a clear finding of substantial harm.). Notably, the burden of proof shifts to the parent in subsequent petitions to modify custody because of res judicata principles [3] and because, after a child has been removed from the parent's custody, it is reasonable to obligate the parent to prove that the reason for the initial removal no longer exists. Beyond this burden shifting, however, I see no justification why the constitutionally protected rights of a parent, which we hold so fundamental in initial custody determinations, should be deemed to evaporate whenever there is a prior order granting custody to a non-parent. Cf. Stubblefield v. State ex rel. Fjelstad, 171 Tenn. 580, 587, 106 S.W.2d 558 (1937) (The court cannot lightly, and without good cause, invade the natural right of the parent to the custody, care, and control of his ... child.). As the majority correctly notes, it is well-established that parental rights are superior to the rights of others and continue without interruption unless a biological parent consents to relinquish them, abandons his or her child, or forfeits his or her parental rights by some conduct that substantially harms the child. O'Daniel v. Messier, 905 S.W.2d 182, 186 (Tenn.Ct.App.1995). None of the factors which might interrupt the superior parental right, however, are present in the case under submission. Blair has not conducted himself in a manner which would substantially harm Joy, nor has he abandoned her. [4] And despite the majority's assertions, Blair's initial agreement that Badenhope should have custody of Joy does not constitute an agreement to forfeit his parental rights. Had Blair agreed to terminate his parental rights, as might have been done, such a forfeiture would occur, but the agreement here, that Blair would enjoy generous visitation while surrendering custody to Badenhope, indicates a genuine desire not to terminate parental rights. The majority's decision to disregard Blair's rights as a parent is an unwarranted revision of our prior law. Accordingly, in my view, the best interests standard applied by the majority is not the proper analysis.