Opinion ID: 702303
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Law of the Flag

Text: 214 The nationality of the vessel's flag is the single most important factor in the Jones Act choice-of-law analysis. The Supreme Court stated in Lauritzen that the most venerable and universal rule of maritime law relevant to our problem is that which gives cardinal importance to the law of the flag. 345 U.S. at 584, 73 S.Ct. at 929. With respect to this factor, the district court found that the diving vessel flies the flag of St. Lucia. Neely v. Club Med Sales, Inc., No. 91-7416, 1992 WL 398378, at  3 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 31, 1992). Neely maintains that there was no evidence presented before or during trial to establish that the vessel Long John actually flies the flag of St. Lucia. However, the defendants point out that the finding of the district court was based on the pre-trial declaration of vessel owner, Joseph LeMaire (LeMaire), which was submitted in support of his successful motion to dismiss the third-party complaint against him. LeMaire stated that the Long John is registered in St. Lucia, and his sworn declaration has not been contradicted. 215 Defendants argue that registration of a vessel in a particular country is equivalent to flagging the vessel. Although no authority explicitly states that registration and flagging a vessel are one and the same, there is authority which indicates that [a] ship navigating the seas may sail only under the flag of the nation in which it is registered.... 1 Thomas J. Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law Sec. 2-21, at 46 n. 1 (2d ed. 1994) (citation omitted). Thus, since the Long John was registered in St. Lucia, it was required to fly a St. Lucian flag. 216 Because the plaintiff bears the burden of proving the flag as well as law of the flag, cf. Maj. op. at 193, it would even be insufficient if Neely proved that the Long John was not flying a St. Lucian flag. The plaintiff still has the additional hurdle of proving that the vessel was flying a United States flag in order for this factor to weigh in favor applying United States law. Since the only evidence pertaining to law of the flag adduced in the district court indicates that the vessel was a St. Lucian flagged vessel, I conclude that this factor weighs heavily against applying United States law to this controversy. 217 The majority maintains that the law of the flag is less important in non-traditional maritime contexts and concludes that the vessel Long John was involved in a non-traditional maritime activity. Maj. op. at 192-93. In support of this proposition, it relies on a number of cases from other courts of appeals which hold that law of the flag should not be given controlling weight when dealing with a vessel engaged in nontraditional maritime activity. See Zipfel v. Halliburton Co., 832 F.2d 1477, 1483 (9th Cir.1987) (law of the flag accorded less weight when vessel was a floating oil drilling rig which was unable to move under its own power, had to be towed by other vessels when moved, and had remained for long periods of time prior to the accident at only a few drilling locations); 9 Cuevas v. Reading & Bates Corp., 770 F.2d 1371, 1373, 1379 (5th Cir.1985) (same, involving a semi-stationary, jack-up drilling ship); Koke v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 730 F.2d 211, 213, 219 (5th Cir.1984) (same, concerning a semi-submersible platform that: rested on columns attached to floatation chambers; performed its work while anchored; and although it could move under its own power, was towed to its current location and remained there for a year before the incident). The majority has unhesitatingly adopted the reasoning set forth in the aforementioned cases while failing to ask whether the vessel Long John (a sixteen metric ton vessel capable of plying the high seas, Maj. op. at 192), was engaged in activity more akin to a floating/semi-submersible/semi-stationary oil drilling rig or more akin to an ocean-going vessel. It borders on the incredible to suggest that this case which involves an ocean-going marine craft should be governed by cases which involve semi-stationary oil drilling rigs. 218 In support of its assertion that the Long John was engaged in non-traditional maritime activity, the majority also notes that the Long John maneuvered from beach to reef, and not from sea to sea. Maj. op. at 191. I am intrigued by the new sea to sea/beach to reef dichotomy created by the majority, because it is the clearest indication of how the majority has misapplied the Lauritzen test in arriving at its result that American law should be applied to this controversy. The majority must acknowledge that the cases upon which it relies to downplay the importance of the law of the flag factor do not involve vessels that travel from beach to reef. Rather, those cases involve vessels that are engaged in activity so far removed from any shipping context that it defies reality to even refer to them as vessels or to consider their activity maritime in nature. Thus, to complete the majority's analogy, we must not only consider sea to sea and beach to reef, but we must also consider oil drilling platforms. 10 The majority implicitly holds that the law of the flag factor should be accorded little or no weight because the vessel Long John engaged in activity more analogous to that of an oil drilling platform. I cannot agree. 219 Further, I am puzzled by the majority's conclusion that the vessel Long John was engaged in non-traditional maritime activity in light of the majority's earlier assertions to the contrary. In assessing whether jurisdiction existed in the district court to entertain this suit, the majority notes that the accident involving Neely and the Long John is the kind of incident that has a potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce. Maj. op. at 179 quoting Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1043, 1051, 130 L.Ed.2d 1024 (1995). Next, the majority concludes that although the Long John made voyages of relatively short distances, nonetheless, the general character of the activity giving rise to the [accident] shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity. Maj. op. at 179 (quoting Grubart, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1051). See also Grubart, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1052 (The substantial relationship test is satisfied when at least one alleged tortfeasor was engaging in activity substantially related to traditional maritime activity.). Because the majority adopts inconsistent positions when discussing the traditional or nontraditional character of the activity in which the Long John was engaged, I find no reason to downplay the importance of law of the flag in this case. 220 The majority concedes that plaintiff has failed to prove that the Long John flies a United States flag. Maj. op. at 50. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that this factor does not subtract from the plaintiff's argument because the defendants failed to prove what flag the Long John flew. As stated above, I believe there is ample, credible, uncontradicted evidence to suggest that the Long John was a St. Lucian flagged vessel. Moreover, the district court made a specific factual finding that the Long John flies the flag of St. Lucia, see Neely, 1992 WL 398378, at  3, and this finding cannot be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. 11 In addition, because the plaintiff must prove that United States law applies, see discussion supra part I, the majority is incorrect in concluding that this factor is insignificant and should be accorded little weight.