Opinion ID: 3013983
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Admission of Prior Uncharged Conduct

Text: Chen next argues that the District Court erred in permitting the introduction of evidence concerning his prior acts of violence against Zheng. Chen did not object at trial, 5 and therefore we review the District Court’s admission of the evidence for plain error. See United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 346 n.24 (3d Cir. 1992). “[P]lain error occurs only when there is ‘egregious error or a manifest miscarriage of justice.’” United States v. Tsai, 954 F.2d 155, 161 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting United States v. Thame, 846 F.2d 200, 204 (3d Cir. 1988)). Chen asserts that the admission of evidence of his prior violent acts against Zheng was plain error because it was introduced to show his bad character and propensity to commit crime. Evidence of other crimes may be admitted for the purposes of proving, among other things, motive, opportunity and intent. Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). Although evidence of other crimes can be relevant, it may be “excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury . . . .” Fed. R. Evid. 403. In this case, the District Court allowed counsel for Zheng to introduce evidence of Chen’s prior assault to establish her intent pursuant to Rule 404(b). Zheng was seeking to prove that she did not intend to participate in the kidnapping, was merely present, and did not try to stop Chen or leave because she was afraid of him due to past domestic violence. This evidence was not introduced to impugn the character of Chen, but rather to establish Zheng’s defense of mere presence at the kidnapping. See, e.g., United States v. McGlory, 968 F.2d 309, 325 (3d Cir. 1992). The admission of Zheng’s intent evidence was thus in accord with Rule 404(b). 6 Furthermore, any potential prejudice or jury confusion that may have been caused by the introduction of evidence of Chen’s prior assault on Zheng was addressed by the District Court’s instructions to the jury that it could consider Zheng’s defense of mere presence, but “not consider evidence that a defendant may have committed an act at one time . . . to determine that a defendant acted in conformity with that act in this case.” Chen App. at 292. These instructions direct the jury to consider evidence of Chen’s prior assault on Zheng only as it relates to Zheng’s intent and presence during the kidnapping. Therefore, any prejudice that may have resulted from admitting evidence of Chen’s prior assault was cured by the jury charge. C. Jury Instructions Regarding Character Evidence At trial, Chen did not properly object to the District Court’s jury instructions on the use of character evidence. We therefore review the District Court’s jury charge for plain error. See United States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 542-543 (3d Cir. 2002). Chen contends that the District Court plainly erred in failing to instruct the jury that good character evidence, standing alone or with other evidence, may create a reasonable doubt as to a defendant’s guilt. Our decision in United States v. Spangler, 838 F.2d 85 (3d Cir. 1988), is dispositive of this issue. In Spangler, we held that a jury charge on character evidence must only call the jury’s attention to its duty to take character evidence into account with all other evidence in deciding whether the government has proved its charge beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 86-87. However, district courts are 7 not required to instruct a jury that character evidence, standing alone, is sufficient to create a reasonable doubt. Id. at 87. In the present case, the District Court charged the jury on character evidence as follows: You have heard testimony that a defendant has a good reputation in his community for being honest and law-abiding. You may consider such evidence, along with all other evidence in the case, in reaching your verdict. Evaluate such character evidence, along with all of the other evidence in this case, in deciding whether the government has proved the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. Chen App. at 291-92. This charge clearly drew the jury’s attention to its duty to properly consider character evidence and largely mirrors the jury charge that we upheld in Spangler. The District Court’s jury instruction on the use of character evidence was not clearly erroneous.