Opinion ID: 1223896
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Trial Court's Discretion

Text: 25. The balance that must be achieved in implementing the statute and rule and protecting the rights of a defendant is delicate. See Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 526 (Utter, J., dissenting) ([T]he statute requires a delicate balancing of society's interest in preventing a heinous crime and the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.). Notwithstanding the approach taken by a jurisdiction in enacting rape shield legislation, the trial court plays an important role in preserving the delicate balance to which Justice Utter refers. The trial court often plays that role following an in camera hearing. See generally Johnson v. State, 332 Md. 456, 632 A.2d 152, 160 (1993) (describing the responsibility for balancing as entrusted in the first instance to the trial court and suggesting the importance of showing special relevance, considering necessity and potential for prejudice). In that role, the court must consider probative value not only in order to identify a theory of relevance, but also in order to evaluate the consequences of either admitting the evidence or excluding it. The prejudice to which the rule speaks most directly is prejudice to the necessary fact-finding. [A]fter assessing the legitimate probative value of the evidence, the court should consider the effect of excluding such evidence on defendant's right to a fair trial and balance that effect against the potential prejudice to the truthfinding process itself ... to determine whether the introduction of the victim's past sexual conduct may confuse the issues, mislead the jury, or cause the jury to decide the case on an improper or emotional basis. Fishman, supra, at 726 (quoting Hudlow, 659 P.2d at 521). Notwithstanding the particular approach taken by a jurisdiction in enacting rape shield legislation, there are common concerns arising out of a defendant's constitutional right of confrontation that provide particular guidance to trial courts in discharging their responsibilities. See generally Herndon, 426 N.W.2d at 360 (describing a five-pronged federal test). 26. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals has provided an extensive analysis of several states' approaches to rape shield laws and of the balance struck between the defendant's right to confront witnesses and the state's interests in its own evidentiary rules. Id. at 351-60. Wisconsin's rape shield law expressly prohibited the admission of prior sexual conduct evidence regardless of the purpose except in three carefully circumscribed situations: (1) [E]vidence of the complaining witness's past conduct with the defendant; (2) [E]vidence of specific instances of sexual conduct showing the source or origin of semen, pregnancy or disease, for use in determining the degree of sexual assault or the extent of the injury suffered; (3) [E]vidence of prior untruthful allegations of sexual assault made by the complaining witness. Id. at 358-59 n. 85. If a defendant wished to introduce evidence falling into one of these exceptions, the statute mandated that the trial court conduct a hearing to assess whether the evidence was admissible under the exceptions and whether its probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial nature, but the statute did not permit a hearing on the probative nature of the evidence unless it fell within one of the three exceptions. See id. 27. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that application of the balancing test solely to situations involving the three circumscribed exceptions contained in the statute was too restrictive and hence unconstitutional. Relying on Davis, the court expanded the scope and application of this test. Herndon, 426 N.W.2d at 362-63. The court noted that where the evidence to be admitted is probative of the complainant's bias or prejudice, shows that she has a motive to fabricate, or shows a continuing pattern of conduct, the trial court must balance the probativeness of the evidence against its prejudicial nature. Id. at 362. The court further articulated a six-pronged test trial courts must use to evaluate the admissibility of such evidence: (1) whether there is a clear showing that the complainant committed the prior acts; (2) whether the circumstances of the prior acts closely resemble those of the present case; (3) whether the prior acts are clearly relevant to a material issue, such as identity, intent, or bias; (4) whether the evidence is necessary to the defendant's case; (5) whether the probative value of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect; and (6) whether the prior acts evince a pattern of conduct rather than a single past act. Id. at 360; see also id. at 363. 28. Two years after the Herndon decision, the Wisconsin Supreme Court overruled the holding in Herndon that Wisconsin's rape shield law is unconstitutional, but upheld the use of the five-pronged federal test in evaluating the admissibility of prior sexual conduct. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 333. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin identified the standard it would follow in resolving questions pitting a state's interest in its evidentiary rules against a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence and concluded that there must be compelling state interests to overcome the defendant's constitutional rights. Id. at 334. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the first five of the six Herndon tests, the federal test, establish a constitutional right to present evidence otherwise excluded by a state evidentiary rule. Pulizzano, 456 N.W.2d at 334. We agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a defendant's constitutional right to present evidence does not make our statute and rule unconstitutional. That right informs the trial court's exercise of discretion under the statute and rule. We also agree with the Wisconsin Supreme Court that a showing sufficient under the five-pronged federal test establishes a constitutional right to present evidence otherwise excluded by our statute. There may be other showings that are equally sufficient. We do not intend to limit the trial courts in the exercise of discretion under the rule and statute, but rather to suggest a possible framework for exercising that discretion.