Opinion ID: 1331807
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Heading: Change of Venue Pretrial Publicity

Text: Mooney next argues that the trial court erred in denying his pretrial motions for a change of venue. He introduced in support of his motion some 30 articles from local newspapers, which were published from the time of discovery of the victim's body on August 30, 1977, to November 11, 1977. The trial was begun April 24, 1978, some five months after the last of these articles. The articles appeared prominently in the Athens Banner Herald, The Daily News, The Athens Observer, and the Red and Black. These papers apparently reach over 50 percent of the households in Clarke County. Several articles involved front page headlines. The content of the articles included the arrest of Florence; his statement to Reinhold implicating Mooney as the one who paid him to do the killing; speculation that Mooney had been seen buying an unregistered gun prior to the killing; the inception of a nation-wide alert for Mooney; speculation that Mooney had been expecting to be evicted by Harty from one of his restaurant locations; his subsequent arrest; the contents of the notes found in Mooney's luggage including an apparent plan for Florence to take the rap in return for Mooney's providing for Florence's family. Mooney also introduced scripts of radio news spots during September and October concerning the Harty murder, and an informal poll conducted by a local barber, who appears to have done a Saturday man in the barber chair inquiry, revealing that of 19 persons questioned, 16 had read something in the newspaper about the murder and appeared to the barber to think Mooney guilty, whereas three had more or less said they didn't care one way or another. Additionally, Mr. Tolley, one of Mooney's defense attorneys, testified that in his opinion an impartial trial could not be had in Clarke County. A further group of about four articles, published in January and April, 1978, were also introduced in support of the motion, but we see nothing objectionable in them. They merely reported pretrial motions, rulings made on them, and the date trial was to begin. It is provided in Code Ann. § 27-1201 that a trial judge may order a change of venue where an impartial jury cannot be obtained. The test on appeal is whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the change of venue. Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 76 (243 SE2d 510) (1978). Mooney first argues that his motion for change of venue should have been granted before voir dire, on the ground that an impartial jury could not be selected from the community. This invokes the concept of presumed prejudice, and is separate from the post-voir dire motion for change of venue considered later. He urges our adoption of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, Fair Trial and Free Press, Change of Venue, § 3.2 (1968). Those standards recommend granting the motion where because of the dissemination of potentially prejudicial material, there is a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of such relief, a fair trial cannot be had. (Emphasis supplied.) This standard has not been adopted in Georgia and we decline to do so today. We will follow the decisions of our court and of the United States Supreme Court. In Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794 (1975) the Supreme Court discussed Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U. S. 723 (1963), Estes v. Texas, 381 U. S. 532 (1965) and Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U. S. 333 (1966) in which the court found that pretrial publicity had so pervaded the proceedings that prejudice could be presumed. 421 U. S. at 798. Rideau involved a defendant who confessed on television; in Estes the press turned the trial into a circus atmosphere; and Sheppard accommodate[d] the public appetite for carnival... 421 U. S. at 799. Analyzing the facts before us, we find that this murder attracted inevitable newspaper attention; it involved a victim of local prominence; and the pretrial proceedings which were reported during September through November, 1977, referred to evidence against Mooney which was quite damaging. (We recognize that merely being indicted is damaging in the sense that we use the word.) We also find that, with variations only in minor details, the evidence referred to was that actually introduced at trial; these damaging articles did not appear within five months of the trial; and the articles were factual and not hysterical or inflammatory. Welch v. State, 237 Ga. 665, 668 (229 SE2d 390) (1976). These facts are quite different from those of Rideau, Estes and Sheppard. In Chenault v. State, 234 Ga. 216, 222 (215 SE2d 223) (1975) we found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's refusing to change venue where one of the victims is a well-known and highly respected person and substantial publicity surrounded the offense ... As the Eighth Circuit noted in United States v. McNally, 485 F2d 398, 403 (8th Cir. 1973) cert. den. 415 U. S. 978 (1974) (quoted in Coleman v. State, 237 Ga. 84, 87 (226 SE2d 911) (1976)), Just because, however, there has been widespread or even adverse publicity is not in itself grounds to grant a change of venue. It follows that on this evidence there was no reason to presume prejudice, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing Mooney's pre-voir dire motion to change venue. We find United States v. Herring, 568 F2d 1099 (5th Cir. 1978) distinguishable because the front page newspaper headlines involved there, reporting death threats against and heavy guard around a chief prosecution witness, appeared on the third morning of the trial when the jury was unsequestered, and the trial judge refused a defense motion to question the jury to determine the extent of their exposure to and response to the article. Considering whether Mooney's post-voir dire motion to change venue was correctly denied, we again find the test set out in Murphy v. Florida. The constitutional standard of fairness requires that a defendant have `a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors.' Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U. S. at 722 [81 SC at 1642]. Qualified jurors need not, however, be totally ignorant of the facts and issues involved. `To hold that the mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror's impartiality would be to establish an impossible standard. It is sufficient if the juror can lay aside his impression or opinion and render a verdict based on the evidence presented in court.' Id., at 723 [81 SC at 1642] At the same time, the juror's assurance that he is equal to this task cannot be dispositive of the accused's rights, and it remains open to the defendant to demonstrate `the actual existence of such an opinion in the mind of the juror as will raise the presumption of partiality.' Ibid. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. 794, 799-800 (1975). Despite Mooney's contention that 56 out of 66 jurors questioned had heard or read something about the case, our review of the voir dire transcript, which covers almost 700 pages, shows that the few who had formed opinions were excused and the remainder, including those who actually served on the jury, revealed nothing making their impartiality suspect. Compare Presnell v. State, 241 Ga. 49, 53 (243 SE2d 496) (1978) (39 of 46 jurors examined had read of or discussed the case). We have canvassed this general issue recently in Coleman v. State, 237 Ga. 84, 86-93 (226 SE2d 911) (1976), and Street v. State, 237 Ga. 307, 308-311 (227 SE2d 750) vacated on other grounds, 429 U. S. 995 (1976), modified, 238 Ga. 376 (1977). We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to change venue after voir dire, because Mooney had made no showing that the jury selection process showed actual prejudice to a degree that rendered trial fundamentally unfair. Murphy v. Florida, 421 U. S. at 799; Potts v. State, 241 Ga. 67, 76-77 (243 SE2d 510) (1978).