Opinion ID: 2327039
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Redacted Hearsay Statement and Appellants' Motions for Severance

Text: The government moved to allow appellants' neighbor, Carol Jeffries, to testify to a redacted form of a statement that she overheard appellant Brown make a few days after the shooting. As Ms. Jeffries walked by a group of men (that did not include appellant Bishop), appellant Brown said, Man, we punished them niggers, coming on our turf. In order to avoid a Bruton issue, the government proposed a redacted version of the statement. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). Jeffries would replace the plural pronouns, we and our with the singular pronouns I and my to avoid prejudice against appellant Bishop, who could not cross-examine Brown (who did not take the stand) and could not be imputed with admission by silence because he was not present at the time Brown made the statement. At trial, immediately after Jeffries testified to the redacted version of Brown's statement, the trial judge instructed the jury that it could not use the statement in any way in determining the guilt or innocence of appellant Bishop. Bishop objected to the admission of the statement and moved for severance, which the trial court denied. It is well established that this court will reverse the denial of a motion for severance only upon a clear showing that the broad discretion accorded the trial court in this regard has been abused. See Payne v. United States, 516 A.2d 484, 489 (D.C.1986) (citation omitted). Even where evidence against one defendant is greater than that against the other, severance is not required if the evidence against the other is substantial and compelling. See Sweet v. United States, 438 A.2d 447, 452 (D.C.1981) (citation omitted). We disagree with Bishop's argument that the trial court erred in denying his motion for severance given that the evidence against him was de minimis when compared to the evidence against his co-defendant because he was not present when appellant Brown made the inculpatory statement. The evidence against Bishop was not de minimis. Bishop was identified by Williams, who testified that Bishop ran into the parking lot and was the first to begin shooting with a revolver. A second witness (Jones) who identified appellant Brown as one of the shooters, testified that he saw a second man stand side by side with him and described how they both left the area together. Finally, Jeffries testified that she knew Bishop from the neighborhood and described how he and Brown ran into her apartment immediately after the shooting. Jeffries saw Brown, who was very emotional and very nervous, hide a gun under her sofa, while Bishop looked shocked and ran out the front door. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Bishop's motion to sever because the evidence against him was not de minimis. Appellant Brown also contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion for severance because, under the rule of completeness, he was entitled to present the statement in its true form given that the redacted version of the statement was highly prejudicial to him. We disagree that the redaction was unfair to Brown. The rule of completeness is violated . . . only where admission of the statement in its edited form distorts the meaning of the statement or excludes information substantially exculpatory of the declarant. Butler v. United States, 614 A.2d 875, 882 (D.C.1992) (quoting United States v. Kaminski, 692 F.2d 505, 522 (8th Cir.1982)). This court has made clear that the denial of a request to introduce additional portions of a statement under the rule of completeness should be reversed only if the trial court has abused its discretion. Id. (citation omitted). Brown argues that the redaction distorted his statement's meaning because the original statement's reference to we and our is ambiguous while the redacted version, Man, I punish these niggers for coming on my turf, is an unambiguous admission of culpability. In denying appellant's motion for severance, the trial court reasoned that: The we implies . . . that [appellant Brown] is still present, and I would note that the statement was made allegedly in the same area of the murder scene. I don't think that changing it to I on reflection significantly alters his role when you consider the quantum of proof of the Government against Mr. Brown individually as one of the shooters . . . I am satisfied that whether you use we or I, that it clearly shows that he is present, and it is an admission on his part even if he used the term we. It is certainly inculpatory under those circumstances either way. Although we recognize that by changing the pronoun we to I, the statement more clearly inculpates Brown, nothing in the redacted portions of the statement substantially exculpat[es] him, id. [5] , and because introduction of the unredacted statement would have infringed on his co-defendant's rights, we find no abuse of discretion in the redaction.