Opinion ID: 1790102
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Defeasible Life Estate

Text: In the case of Morgan v. Christian, 142 Ky. 14, 133 S.W. 982, 983, the will, in substance, devised to testator's wife the home farm and 87 acres of other land, with the right to sell the 87 acres to his two sons, the property being hers so long as she remained a widow, but if she remarried, the 87 acres would be divided between the boys, and the testator's daughter would have the home farm. The lower court held that the widow took a fee in said land and this court reversed the judgment saying: The only question is: What estate passed to her by the will. She insists a fee. Appellants say a life estate, subject to be terminated or defeated by her marrying again. The intention of the testator, as gathered from the entire will, must control. Testator had three children. Two of them were then under age. If he intended his wife to have the fee, then the latter part of the will is meaningless. However, it is well to note here that the wife did in fact remarry and, therefore, the estate would have been defeated even if it had been in fee simple. In the case of Mouser v. Srygler, 295 Ky. 490, 174 S.W.2d 756, the will read: I, G. R. Tharpe of sound mind and disposing memory, do make publish and declare this as my last will and testament. I will, devise and bequeath all of my real and personal estate to my daughter Mrs. Maude Adcock Tharpe so long as she remains a widow, or until she remarries, then in that event to go to her daughter, Mary Adcock. I will and bequeath to Harvey Murray, my grandson, the sum of Five ($5.00) Dollars. The court held that the daughter took a life estate which terminated on her death or when she ceased to be a widow, the remainder over to testator's granddaughter on daughter's death or remarriage. The will presented in Thomas v. Stafford, 305 Ky. 559, 204 S.W.2d 940, devised the residue of testatrix' property to her daughter as long as she remained single, and expressed a wish that testatrix' husband and son should have a home on the realty devised so long as they lived together agreeably and did not marry, and provided for a division of property on the death of such daughter or son, between another daughter and granddaughter. The court held that the facts of the case, when considered with the language used, forced them to the conclusion that the testatrix did not intend for the first devisee to have complete power of disposition and that the first named daughter received only a life estate and not a defeasible fee simple interest in the realty.