Opinion ID: 201905
Heading Depth: 6
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Deception of the Court

Text: 132 The district court had a separate set of concerns — that the prosecution provide it with accurate information for sentencing purposes, both during the hearing on the plea and at sentencing after the trial. The court was disturbed because during the plea bargaining process no mention was made to it or to the probation office of the firearm in Olivero's bedroom. 21 Of course, it was both the prosecution and the defense which kept silent. 133 The district court felt its position was justified by the Guidelines Policy Statement on Stipulations set forth at § 6B1.4, which provides: 134 (a) A plea agreement may be accompanied by a written stipulation of facts relevant to sentencing. Except to the extent that a party may be privileged not to disclose certain information, stipulations shall: 135 (1) set forth the relevant facts and circumstances of the actual offense conduct and offender characteristics; 136 (2) not contain misleading facts; and 137 (3) set forth with meaningful specificity the reasons why the sentencing range resulting from the proposed agreement is appropriate. 138 U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4; see also Green, 346 F.Supp.2d at 278 n. 69 (citing U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(a)(2) & cmt.); id. at 328 n. 363 (same). 139 It is likely that the policy statements in Chapter Six of the Guidelines Manual, like those in Chapter Seven, are advisory, not mandatory. See Ellis v. U.S. Dist. Court ( In re Ellis ), 356 F.3d 1198, 1214-15 (9th Cir.2004) (en banc) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (arguing that the policy statements in Chapter Six of the Guidelines Manual are only hortatory, in part because Chapter Six, like Chapter Seven, is made up entirely of policy statements and their commentary and contains no guidelines); United States v. O'Neil, 11 F.3d 292, 301 n. 11 (1st Cir.1993) ([W]e today join six other circuits in recognizing Chapter 7 policy statements as advisory rather than mandatory.). Treating the policy statement as advisory recognizes the difficulty of enforcement of any such rule. In any event, the policy statement provides no justification for a court to sentence a defendant on any basis other than the facts before it, much less does it provide a justification for a court to disregard the facts before it as a remedy for the government's earlier failure to provide all the facts. 140 The proposition, implicit in the court's view, that sentencing would be better if there were utter candor and complete disclosure as to all points by the prosecution is itself problematic. Counsel should not affirmatively misstate the material facts at sentencing. See United States v. Casas, 425 F.3d 23, 39-41 (1st Cir.2005). Still, there is a line, admittedly ambiguous, between an affirmative misrepresentation of facts presented at sentencing and how prosecutors (and defendants) handle unclear or less provable facts. See Gardner & Rifkind, A Basic Guide to Plea Bargaining Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 Crim. Just. 14, 16 (Summer 1992) (The stipulation cannot contain misleading facts.... Where facts are unclear or unascertainable, the parties may agree on some form of them without further justification or explanation to the court. (citation omitted) (citing U.S.S.G. § 6B1.4(a)(2))). 141 Even if the prosecutor knew and could prove a gun enhancement at the time of the plea bargain, that fact would not make a difference to our analysis. No misrepresentation was made; rather, there was an omission, helpful to the defendant, which was an implicit part of the bargain. Rule 11(c)(1)(B) expressly contemplates that the attorney for the government can agree with the defendant's request that a sentencing factor does or does not apply, though this is not binding on the court. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1)(B). It was under that rule that Olivero's plea was tendered. If the defendant and the government have agreed on a sentence free of a possible enhancement, there is a significant question as to why they should be burdened with an obligation to disclose the evidence supporting the enhancement at a plea hearing. The obligation imposed by the Rule is to disclose the plea agreement. Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(2). 142 A system of mandatory disclosure of all possible information at a plea hearing would not usually help defendants. Moreover, the costs of monitoring compliance with such a mandatory disclosure system are high, and many of the efficiencies created by plea bargaining would be lost. It would also lead to the blurring of roles. After all, the federal rules prohibit involvement by a trial judge in plea bargaining. This is true whether through the front door or the back. See Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(1) (An attorney for the government and the defendant's attorney ... may discuss and reach a plea agreement. The court must not participate in these discussions.); cf. 1A C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 175.1 (3d ed. 1999) (That the defendant has accepted a bargain proposed by the prosecutor creates no constitutional right to have the bargain specifically enforced. `A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance ....' (quoting Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08, 104 S.Ct. 2543, 81 L.Ed.2d 437 (1984))). In short, what happened here involved the artifacts of a system which is well accepted. While Congress and the Supreme Court could have chosen to structure matters differently, they have not. 143 The district court was correct to condemn any deception of the court. 22 But here, no claim of deception of the court is possible. The court, at the time of sentencing, did have all the facts before it on which to impose a sentence, and Olivero had fair notice of the issues. The prosecution had put on evidence at trial showing Olivero's ownership of the gun; Olivero in turn had pointed the finger at another defendant. The evidence was reviewed in the post-conviction presentence report, with Olivero objecting to the suggestion that he owned the gun and the probation office defending its stance. At sentencing, ownership of the gun was discussed yet again. The same abundance of evidence and debate characterized the issue of Olivero's role in the offense, culminating in the court's conclusion that Olivero was assuredly not some bit player or casual hanger-on, but rather was in with these people. There can be no suggestion that at the time of sentencing, the government was deceiving the court by hiding evidence of any sort, whether inculpatory or exculpatory. 23 The prosecution does not argue that it has a right to lie to a court and it did not do so here. 144