Opinion ID: 176784
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: History of Fast-Track Programs

Text: Although much ink has already been used by this and other courts in describing the genesis of fast-track programs, we feel it necessary to provide an abridged history of these programs because the disposition of our cases today turns on the gloss that recent case law has placed on this background. Fast-track, or early disposition programs, were used in federal district courts as early as 1994. See Galicia-Cardenas, 443 F.3d at 555 ( citing Alan D. Bersin, Reinventing Immigration Law Enforcement in the Southern District of California, 8 Fed. Sentencing Rep. 254 (1996)). The programs emerged in states bordering Mexico in an effort to curtail overwhelming immigration case loads. See Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d at 542 ( citing United States v. Morales-Chaires, 430 F.3d 1124, 1127 (10th Cir.2005)). At the time, United States Attorneys used charge-bargaining as a mechanism to speed the disposition of these cases. In essence, they offered to recommend more lenient sentences in exchange for pre-indictment guilty pleas and waivers of appellate rights. Id.; see also United States v. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d 142, 145 (3d Cir.2009) ( citing U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Report to Congress: Downward Departures from the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, at 65 (Oct. 2003), available at http:// www.ussc.gov/departrpt03/departrpt03.pdf (hereinafter Sentencing Commission Report)). Almost ten years later, Congress formalized the practice by enacting the Prosecutorial Remedies and Tools Against the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 (PROTECT Act), Pub.L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003). The PROTECT Act was designed as part of an overarching initiative to respond to a purported increase in departures from the guidelines and provide meaningful appellate review of such cases. Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 145 (noting that the Act was passed pre- Booker ). In an amendment to a companion bill, the Child Abduction Prevention Actwhich was passed before the PROTECT Actthe House of Representatives attached a report expressing its intent for legislating in this area. According to the commentary, Congress sanctioned limited departures under structured early disposition programs, although such programs were to be reserved only for offenses whose high incidence within the district has imposed an extraordinary strain on the resources of that district as compared to other districts. H.R.Rep. No. 108-48, at 7 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d at 542. Congress also commented that the bill does not confer authority to depart downward on an ad hoc basis in individual cases. H.R.Rep. No. 108-48, at 7. Although the PROTECT Act did not specifically address the practice of charge-bargaining, Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d at 542, it nonetheless authorized the Attorney General to establish official fast-track programs on a district-by-district basis, United States v. Rodriguez, 527 F.3d 221, 223 (1st Cir.2008). It further directed the Sentencing Commission to develop a guideline `authorizing a downward departure of not more than 4 levels if the Government files a motion for such a departure pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General and the United States Attorney.' Martinez-Martinez, 442 F.3d at 542 ( quoting the PROTECT Act, § 401(m)(2)(B), 117 Stat. at 675). As a result, the Sentencing Commission created U.S.S.G. § 5K3.1, which provides: Upon motion of the Government, the court may depart downward not more than 4 levels pursuant to an early disposition program authorized by the Attorney General of the United States and the United States Attorney for the district in which the court resides. The Sentencing Commission also filed a report with Congress, which addressed the sentencing disparity paradigm created by § 5K3.1. Although this report is not binding here, it provides insight into the Sentencing Commission's perspective in enacting the guideline. In pertinent part, the report stated: The Department of Justice requested that the Commission implement the directive regarding the early disposition programs in section 401(m) of the PROTECT Act in a similar unfettered manner by merely restating the legislative language and leav[ing] to the sentencing court the extent of the departure under these early disposition programs. The Commission notes that implementation of the directive in this manner has the potential to create unwarranted sentencing disparity. . . . Defendants sentenced in districts without authorized early disposition programs, however, can be expected to receive longer sentences than similarly-situated defendants in districts with such programs. This type of geographical disparity appears to be at odds with the overall Sentencing Reform Act goal of reducing unwarranted sentencing disparity among similarly-situated offenders. Sentencing Commission Report, at 66-67 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The Second Circuit in United States v. Mejia, 461 F.3d 158, 163-64 (2d Cir.2006), a pre- Kimbrough case, and the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Gomez-Herrera, 523 F.3d 554, 561-62 (5th Cir.2008), made particular note that the Sentencing Commission appeared to reject the idea of non-fast-track districts compensating for the disparity with downward departures: Furthermore, sentencing courts in districts without early disposition programs, particularly those in districts that adjoin districts with such programs, may feel pressured to employ other measuresdownward departures in particular to reach similar sentencing outcomes for similarly situated defendants. This potential response by sentencing courts could undermine the goal of the PROTECT Act to reduce the incidence of downward departures. Sentencing Commission Report, at 67. But see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347-48, 127 S.Ct. 2456, 168 L.Ed.2d 203 (2007) (listing the Sentencing Commission's policy statements as one of the many non-binding factors to be taken into account by the district court when sentencing). The Sentencing Commission added that because little guidance was provided to sentencing courts, implementation of the fast-track guideline might lead to undesirable sentencing disparity. Accordingly, the Commission left the door open to a later examination of the impact of the programs: the Commission agrees with the Department of Justice's comment that `[i]t may be appropriate at some later date to review how these early disposition programs are actually being implemented and whether further guidance to the courts might be useful.' Sentencing Commission Report, at 67. Shortly after the Sentencing Commission released its report, then-Attorney General John Ashcroft distributed a memorandum setting forth the Department of Justice's policies and requirements for a district to obtain fast-track status: In order to obtain Attorney General authorization to implement a fast track program, the United States Attorney must submit a proposal that demonstrates that (A)(1) the district confronts an exceptionally large number of a specific class of offenses within the district, and failure to handle such cases on an expedited or fast-track basis would significantly strain prosecutorial and judicial resources available in the district; or (2) the district confronts some other exceptional local circumstances with respect to a specific class that justifies expedited disposition of such cases; (B) declination of such cases in favor of state prosecution is either unavailable or clearly unwarranted; (C) the specific class of cases consists of ones that are highly repetitive and present substantially similar fact scenarios; and (D) the cases do not involve an offense that has been designated by the Attorney General as a crime of violence. See 28 C.F.R. § 28.2 (listing offenses designated by the Attorney General as crimes of violence for purposes of the DNA collection provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act). Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft Setting Forth Justice Department's Fast-Track Policies (Sept. 22, 2003), 16 Fed. Sent'g Rep. 134, 134-35 (Dec. 2003) (hereinafter Attorney General Memorandum). The defendant in return must agree to the factual basis regarding the offense and waive certain pre-trial motions, the right to appeal, and the right to petition for a writ of habeas corpus, except on the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. Id. at 135. As noted by the district court in Sanchez-Gonzalez's case, the development of fast-track programs has been prolific. See United States v. Sanchez-Gonzalez, No. 08 CR 609, 2009 WL 310901, at  (N.D.Ill. February 9, 2009) (referencing United States v. Medrano-Duran, 386 F.Supp.2d 943, 948 (N.D.Ill.2005), which provided that early disposition programs were authorized in districts such as Oregon, Idaho, Nebraska, North Dakota, and the Western District of Washington); see also Thomas E. Gorman, Comment, Fast-Track Sentencing Disparity: Rereading Congressional Intent to Resolve the Circuit Split, 77 U. Chi. L.Rev. 479, 490-93 (2010). As of February 2008, the Attorney General has authorized fast-track programs in 20 districts, though only 16 of those have illegal reentry programs. . . . Arrelucea-Zamudio, 581 F.3d at 146. None of the districts in the Seventh Circuit are fast-track districts.