Opinion ID: 3018620
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gunter’s Step Three: Guidelines Variances

Text: 16 In Cooper, we set out the standard by which we will review the reasonableness of a district court’s post-Booker exercise of discretion when imposing a criminal sentence: The record must demonstrate the trial court gave meaningful consideration to the § 3553(a) factors.[7] The court need not discuss every 7 The factors set out in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) are:
and the characteristics of the defendant;
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense; (B) to afford adequate deterrence; (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and (D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;

established for— (A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines ...; 17 argument made by a litigant if an argument is clearly without merit. Nor must a court discuss and make findings as to each of the § 3553(a) factors if the record makes clear the court took the factors into account in sentencing. Nor will we require district judges to routinely state by rote that they have read the Booker decision or that they know the sentencing guidelines are now advisory. On the other hand, a rote statement of the § 3553(a) factors should not suffice if at sentencing either the defendant or the prosecution properly raises “a ground of recognized legal merit (provided it has a factual basis)” and the court fails to address it. As the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explained, “we have to satisfy ourselves, before we can conclude that the judge did not abuse his discretion, that he
the Sentencing Commission . . . that . . . is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced[;]
disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct; and
of the offense. 18 exercised his discretion, that is, that he considered the factors relevant to that exercise.” 437 F.3d at 329 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 379 (7th Cir. 2005)). In a footnote immediately following this discussion, we said: “On this issue, we disagree with the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Scott, [426 F.3d 1324, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 2005),] where the court held [that] a district court’s statement that it considered both the defendant’s arguments and the § 3553(a) factors at sentencing is by itself sufficient for Booker purposes.” Cooper, 437 F.3d at 329 n.6. Instead, the record must show a true, considered exercise of discretion on the part of a district court, including a recognition of, and response to, the parties’ non-frivolous arguments. See United States v. Charles, No. 05-5326, slip op. at 8–12 (3d Cir. Nov. 9, 2006). Jackson argues that the District Court here failed to consider adequately the § 3553(a) factors and to explain how it determined Jackson’s sentence in light of those factors and his counsel’s arguments relating to them. He claims that had the Court properly done so, it would have chosen to vary from the recommended Guidelines range when imposing his sentence. The rote recitation of the § 3553(a) factors at the outset of the sentencing hearing, claims Jackson, does not show that the Court truly weighed his arguments in light of those factors. This point of error implicates Gunter’s third step. 19 If the record revealed only what Jackson contends, he would be correct. Merely reciting the § 3553(a) factors, saying that counsel’s arguments have been considered, and then declaring a sentence, are insufficient to withstand our reasonableness review. See id. at 329 & n.6. In Jackson’s case, however, the District Court in fact addressed both of the arguments his counsel raised in support of a variance from the Guidelines: their over-representation of his criminal history and Jackson’s difficult childhood and resultant drug addiction. Immediately prior to sentencing Jackson to 37 months’