Opinion ID: 3011736
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: WRGSB's Appeal

Text: Before reaching WRGSB's main argument, we review three inadequately supported claims that WRGSB raises in the footnotes of its opening brief. These ar guments are: (1) that the magistrate judge erred in allowing Insignia to call Goedken as its expert witness because Insignia never identified Goedken as its expert witness as r equired by the Court's pre-trial rulings . . . , see Appellant's Br. at 18 n.1; (2) that the magistrate judge erred in deter mining that WRGSB was a possessor of the premises at the time of the accident, see id. at 45 n.11;1 and (3) that the magistrate _________________________________________________________________ 1. We recognize that WRGSB develops this argument more fully in its response to Insignia's cross-appeal. However, because the argument could have been raised as an issue for review in WRGSB's opening brief 6 judge erred in concluding that the riser height discrepancy constituted a structural defect instead of being a consequence of normal wear and tear, see id. at 47 n.13. WRGSB has not presented any of these holdings as a basis for its appeal, and WRGSB does not mention these arguments in its statement of the issues for r eview, as required by Rule 28(a)(5) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Appellant's Br. at 3-4. We therefore will not reach any of these arguments. See T ravitz v. Northeast Department ILGWU Health and Welfare Fund, 13 F.3d 704, 711 (3d Cir. 1994). But, even if we wer e to reach WRGSB's arguments, we could not decide them on their merits since they are poorly briefed and deserve mor e development than passing mention in a footnote for us take them seriously. As a result, we will not examine whether the magistrate judge erred in allowing Insignia to call Goedken as its expert witness. Further, we accept the magistrate judge's finding that WRGSB possessed the building at the time of the accident and that the riser height discr epancy constituted a structural defect. WRGSB's remaining arguments can all be r educed to one claim: that Insignia should be responsible for the entire settlement amount because the property management agreement obligated Insignia to discover and correct defects in both the stair risers and the handrail. Both parties agree that Insignia was solely responsible for r epairing the defective handrail.2 Ther efore, our discussion focuses _________________________________________________________________ --which would have required that WRGSB include the issue in its statement of issues for review and fully develop an argument in the argument portion of its brief--we will not address it. See FDIC v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169 (3d Cir. 2000) (issues not raised in opening brief on appeal are waived). However, even if we were to entertain WRGSB's appeal of the magistrate's factual determination, we would do so under a clearly erroneous standard of review. See A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria's Secret Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 197, 201-02 (3d Cir. 1999). And, contrary to WRGSB's contention, we have found nothing in the record to indicate that the magistrate committed clear err or in determining that WRGSB was a possessor of the stairwell in which Kirchbaum was injured at the time of the accident. 2. Insignia stipulated to its responsibility for maintaining and repairing the handrail in the district court, see Kirschbaum v. WRGSB Associates, 7 primarily on which party must accept responsibility for the injuries arising out of the riser height discr epancy. As owner of the GSB building, WRGSB is charged with the following duty: A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees3 by a condition on the land if, but only if, he: (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of har m to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to pr otect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable car e to protect them against the danger. Restatement (Second) of Torts S 343 (adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120, 123 (1983)) (footnote added). Thus, WRGSB is obligated to discover and repair the riser height discrepancy that caused Kirschbaum's fall if, by the exer cise of reasonable care, WRGSB is capable of discovering the defect, and WRGSB should expect that Kirschbaum would not discover the defect himself. The magistrate judge determined that WRGSB met these requirements, and WRGSB does not dispute this finding except to argue that the riser height discr epancy is a trivial defect--an argument that is related to WRGSB's ability to discover the riser height discrepancy. In support, WRGSB cites several older Pennsylvania cases where approximately _________________________________________________________________ No. 97-5532, slip op. at 10, P 36 (E.D. Pa.filed Dec. 14, 1999), and admits in its reply brief that it has long since accepted responsibility for this liability. Appellee's Br. at 25. As discussed below, however, Insignia does not believe that it ought to pay for any liability arising out of its failure to repair the handrail because it believes that, under the agreement, WRGSB's insurance should cover the liability. 3. The parties do not dispute that Kirschbaum was an invitee on WRGSB's premises. 8 1.5 inch sidewalk and roadway discrepancies were found to be trivial. See, e.g., Bosack v. Pittsburgh Railways Co., 189 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1962); German v. City of Mckeesport, 8 A.2d 437 (Pa. Super. 1939). While the riser defect here was only 5/8 inch, it occurred on a stair riser, a place where the defect is likely to be far less obvious than on aflat surface such as a road (and thus more difficult to protect against). Relatedly, discrepancies of this kind ar e far more common (and therefore foreseeable) on a sidewalk than on a flight of stairs. Indeed, Insignia's expert witness--whom the district court found more credible than WRGSB's expert witness-- testified that a 5/8 inch discrepancy cr eated a foreseeable risk of falling. As such, the district court did not err in determining that WRGSB was requir ed to discover and remedy the riser height discrepancy. While WRGSB is thus charged with the duty to discover and repair the riser height discrepancy, WRGSB argues that its relationship to Insignia is such that Insignia is primarily liable to Kirschbaum for the injury he suf fered as a result of the riser height discrepancy. As a result, WRGSB believes that it is entitled to indemnification fr om Insignia, a right that enures to a person who, without active fault on his own part, has been compelled, by reason of some legal obligation, to pay damages occasioned by the initial negligence of another, and for which he himself is only secondarily liable. Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (Pa. 1951). WRGSB maintains that it is only secondarily liable--and Insignia primarily liable--for the damage to Kirschbaum because the agreement between itself and Insignia obligated Insignia to corr ect not just the broken handrail, but the riser height discr epancy as well. Accordingly, we must look to the agreement between WRGSB and Insignia in order to determine which party assumed the primary obligation for discovering and correcting the riser height discrepancy. As noted, we interpret the contract in accordance with standards dictated by Illinois law. Under Illinois law, a contract's express provisions govern when the contract is unambiguous. See Wright v. Chicago T itle Ins. Co., 554 N.E.2d 511 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). If a contract's language cannot be interpreted in more than one way, [a] court 9 must construe the meaning of [the] contract by looking at words used and cannot interpret the contract in a way contrary to the plain and obvious meaning of these words. J.M. Beals Enterprises, Inc. v. Industrial Har d Chrome, Ltd., 551 N.E.2d 340, 342 (1990). Unless the contract clearly specifies its own meanings, the court must interpr et the words or language of the contract with their common and generally accepted meanings. Id. at 342-43. Further, the court must place the meanings of words within the context of the contract as a whole. Id. at 343. On appeal, WRGSB bases its argument primarily on S 2.4 of the agreement, which reads in r elevant part: [Insignia] shall . . . maintain the buildings, appurtenances and common areas of the [GSB Building] in good condition according to local standards for comparable properties in the immediate market area surrounding the Property, and, in any event, in accordance with the standards and conditions specified by [WRGSB Associates] from time to time. Maintenance and repair items shall include, but shall not be limited to, interior and exterior janitorial services, exterior grounds and landscaping services, repairs and alterations to existing impr ovements, plumbing, parking areas, electrical systems[,] painting, carpentry, maintenance and repair of mechanical systems and such other maintenance and r epair work as is reasonably necessary. Appx. at 233 (emphasis added). WRGSB also cites two other sections of the agreement as evidence of Insignia's alleged obligation to correct the riser height discrepancy. Section 2.9 of the agreement states that Insignia must use due care in the selection and supervision of its on-site personnel. See Appx. at 237. In addition,S 2.13 of the agreement requires Insignia to use its best efforts to ensure that the GSB Building is kept in compliance with applicable building codes. See Appx. at 240. WRGSB ar gues that these contract provisions clearly transfer to Insignia the building owner's duty to discover and remedy all hazar dous conditions on the premises. As an initial matter, WRGSB's reliance on sections 2.9 (requiring due care in the selection of on-site personnel) 10 and 2.13 (requiring compliance with applicable laws and building codes) is misplaced. WRGSB has simply failed to produce any evidence that Kirschbaum's accident is due to Insignia's negligently hiring on-site personnel. Neither has WRGSB shown that Kirschbaum's accident resulted from Insignia's failure to maintain the GSB building in accordance with applicable building codes. Consequently, neither S 2.9 nor S 2.13 of the agr eement aids WRGSB's argument. We also disagree with WRGSB's reliance on S 2.4 of the agreement, for WRGSB appears to confuse Insignia's obligation to maintain and repair the building with an obligation to discover structural defects, such as the riser height discrepancy. That the agreement does not require Insignia to discover latent structural defects is apparent from the language of S 2.4, which r epeatedly emphasizes Insignia's duty to undertake maintenance andrepairs. The two bases of liability at issue in this case--the defective handrail and the riser height discrepancy--pr ovide a perfect example of how maintenance and r epairs should be interpreted: fixing a defective handrail is clearly an act of maintenance and repair, while discovering and mending a riser that has likely been defective since the building was constructed is not. That maintenance and repairs do not include the obligation to discover latent structural defects is also supported by the meaning commonly ascribed to these words. Maintenance is defined by Webster's New World Dictionary 854 (2d College Ed. 1979), to includethe work of keeping a building . . . in a state of good r epair. Repair is defined as to put back in good condition after damage, decay, etc. Id. at 1204. These definitions both point to the act of fixing a deteriorated part of the building, which though originally sound, has fallen into disr epair. The definitions do not contemplate fixing a part of the building that was originally defective. Indeed, a finding that the agreement required Insignia to discover the riser height discrepancy would necessarily include a finding that Insignia is not only responsible for measuring every stair riser in the GSB building, but also responsible for other acts that are clearly not contemplated by the agreement, 11 such as inspecting the building's foundation. W e therefore conclude that the agreement failed to delegate unambiguously the duty to discover the riser height discrepancy to Insignia. WRGSB's confusion regarding the dif ference between ordinary maintenance and repair and thefixing of latent structural defects extends to WRGSB's argument that the magistrate judge failed to apply the law of the case when apportioning liability between the two parties. In its June 28, 1999 Memorandum and Order, the district court stated that Insignia was obligated under its agreement with WRGSB to maintain the stairway and handrails. WRGSB argues that the magistrate judge failed to adhere to this determination because he found that WRGSB was responsible for discovering the riser height discrepancy. As is apparent from our discussion, however , the district court's finding that Insignia was responsible for maintaining the stairway in no way contradicts the magistrate judge's finding that WRGSB was r esponsible for discovering the riser height defect. WRGSB's argument that it cannot be held to a greater duty of care than Insignia fails for the same r eason. The Restatement (Second) of Torts S 324A (adopted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Cantwell v. Allegheny County, 483 A.2d 1350 (Pa. 1984)) imposes a duty of reasonable care on parties (like Insignia) who render services for the protection of a third party (like Kirschbaum). From this, WRGSB argues that any duty of reasonable care it possessed by virtue of Restatement (Second) of Torts S 322 was delegated to Insignia by the agreement because Insignia assumed a duty of r easonable care under Restatement (Second) of T orts S 324A when it entered into the Agreement. WRGSB might have a valid argument had it delegated its duty to discover the riser height discrepancy to Insignia. However , WRGSB did not do so. Consequently, it retained the duty to inspect for and discover the riser height discrepancy and cannot shift liability for its failure to do so to Insignia. In an attempt to revise the agreement's unambiguous terms, WRGSB seeks to have us recognize the testimony of Insignia's on-site property manager, on-site chief engineer 12 and on-site engineer. WRGSB believes that this testimony will shed new light on what the parties truly intended when they entered into the agreement. However , under Illinois law, extrinsic evidence--such as oral testimony--is not permitted as a means of clarifying an unambiguous contract. See Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill. 1999). Because much of WRGSB's proffered testimony derives fr om depositions that are such extrinsic evidence, we will not consider this testimony. However, even if we were to consider all of the testimony, it would do little to aid WRGSB's argument. Each of Insignia's employees stated only that Insignia was responsible for the inspection, maintenance and repair of the stairway. The testimony of Kelly Buechler , a senior legal assistant and assistant secretary at Insignia, as well as Insignia's Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 30(b)(6) designee, is illustrative. She testified as follows: Q: As part of the Property Management Agr eement what is it that Insignia Commercial Group provided with regard to the GSB Building what did they do? A: They maintained, leased, and managed the property on behalf of the owner.