Opinion ID: 2116413
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Did the City establish the act of God affirmative defense?

Text: The City contends that it is protected from liability under the act of God affirmative defense because there is no doubt that the flood was of extraordinary magnitude. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, contend that the act of God affirmative defense is not applicable to shield the City from liability because an act of God was not the sole proximate cause of their injury. Plaintiffs assert that there was something the City could have done, that is, close the railroad opening before the flood waters crested, and thus the act of God affirmative defense is not applicable.
In order to establish the act of God affirmative defense, a defendant must show (1) that the act of God in fact occurred; and (2) that the act of God was the sole proximate cause of plaintiffs' injuries. Dickman v. Truck Transp., Inc., 224 N.W.2d 459, 465 (Iowa 1974); Naxera v. Wathan, 159 N.W.2d 513, 517 (Iowa 1968). When neglect in the employment of a human agency is combined with an act of God, liability for damage results from such neglect. 78 Am.Jur.2d Waters § 216, at 663 (1975). In determining whether a flood should be characterized as ordinary or extraordinary, courts consider whether the flood's occurrence and magnitude should or might have been anticipated, in view of the flood history of the locality and the existing conditions affecting the likelihood of floods, by a person of reasonable prudence. Id. § 224, at 669. The burden of proof as to the character of a flood rests upon the party who asserts such character and relies thereon as a ground of his action or defense. Id. Whether the flood was an unprecedented one is a question for the jury. However, where the physical facts and conditions, as shown by all the evidence, are such that the minds of reasonable persons could not differ, it becomes a question of law for the court. Wm. Tackaberry Co. v. Simmons Warehouse Co., 170 Iowa 203, 219, 152 N.W. 779, 784 (1915); 78 Am.Jur.2d Waters § 224, at 669 (Whether a flood is or is not extraordinary, or is such as should have been anticipated and provided against, is ordinarily a question for the jury. ).
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, as we must, we conclude that the district court in the Keystone case erred in sustaining the City's summary judgment motion on the basis that the damage to plaintiffs' property was caused by an act of God. There is no doubt that the flood was extraordinary. However, as we previously noted, there is evidence in the record that some officials anticipated that the flood waters would reach an historical level and that these opinions were conveyed to Des Moines officials. Additionally, there was evidence of something the City could have done to prevent the water from flooding plaintiffs' property. That is, the City could have closed the railroad opening. Questions of whether the City should have been aware of the rapidly rising waters and taken action before they reached the railroad opening and whether closing the opening would have prevented the flood waters from reaching plaintiffs' property are questions of fact for the jury. We thus conclude that there was a material issue of fact whether the flood, as an act of nature or act of God, was the sole proximate cause of the injury to plaintiffs' property, or whether plaintiffs' injury was in part caused by the City's failure to close the opening in the levee. Therefore, it cannot be said as a matter of law that the City has established an act of God affirmative defense to any claims arising out its failure to close the railroad opening. Cf. Florida East Coast Ry. v. United States, 519 F.2d 1184, 1198-99 (5th Cir.1975) (United States was immune from liability for damage from flood under Federal Tort Claim Act provision giving United States immunity from floods, but Florida flood control district was not immune from liability; act of God defense did not shield flood control district from liability because there was evidence in record that washout of track and railroad was caused by negligent construction and operation of flood control project and not solely due to unprecedented rainfall.). The district court in the Keystone case erred in sustaining the City's motion for summary judgment and the court properly overruled the City's motion in the Merchants case on this issue.