Opinion ID: 2569241
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Statutory Presumption of Abandonment

Text: The district court did not apply the statutory presumption of abandonment contained in NRS 128.012(2) in considering whether Raja and Hikmet abandoned the child. NRS 128.012 defines abandonment of a child as follows: 1. Abandonment of a child means any conduct of one or both parents of a child which evinces a settled purpose on the part of one or both parents to forego all parental custody and relinquish all claims to the child. 2. If a parent or parents of a child leave the child in the care and custody of another without provision for his support and without communication for a period of 6 months, ... the parent or parents are presumed to have intended to abandon the child. NRS 128.090(2) provides in relevant part that the district court shall in all cases require the petitioner to establish the facts by clear and convincing evidence and shall give full and careful consideration to all of the evidence presented. Talia and Sam introduced evidence that Raja and Hikmet had abandoned the child. The evidence showed that Raja and Hikmet left their child with Talia and Sam without any provision for support for over seven years. During that period, Raja saw the child only twice and Hikmet did not see the child at all. Talia and Sam also offered evidence that Raja and Hikmet spoke to the child on the telephone only once during this time. As stated previously, the district court did not apply the statutory presumption of abandonment in considering whether Raja and Hikmet abandoned the child. Once Talia and Sam introduced evidence that Raja and Hikmet left the child for six months without communication or provisions for support, application of the statutory presumption of abandonment shifted the burden to Raja and Hikmet to prove that they did not abandon the child. See NRS 47.180(1) (providing that [a] presumption, other than a presumption against the accused in a criminal action, imposes on the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its existence). We conclude that the district court erred in failing to apply the statutory presumption. This court has previously acknowledged that the application of the statutory presumption of abandonment contained in NRS 128.012(2) is not discretionary. See Gonzales, 113 Nev. at 331 n. 5, 933 P.2d at 202 n. 5.