Opinion ID: 1192780
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Denial of McGee's Motion to Adjourn Trial Because of the Superseding Indictment

Text: We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of McGee's motion to adjourn trial by reason of the filing of the superseding indictment a few days before the start of trial. See United States v. Pascarella, 84 F.3d 61, 68-69 (2d Cir.1996). To prevail, McGee must establish both that the denial of the adjournment was arbitrary, and that it substantially impaired the presentation of his case. Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 148 (2d Cir.1998); see also id. at 147-48 (noting that [w]e are particularly solicitous of a district court's ruling on a motion to adjourn the scheduled start of a trial proceeding.). The court's ruling was not arbitrary and did not prejudice McGee by depriving him of adequate opportunity to prepare. The only change made by the superseding indictment was to expand the time frame of the alleged illegal possession of the firearms. Whereas the original indictment charged McGee with illegal possession of the three firearms found in his house [o]n or about the 9th day of January 2005, the superseding indictment charged him with the same offense committed [o]n or about and between the 1st day of December 2004 and the 9th day of January 2005. Considering all the circumstances, the change in the allegations was not of a significance that required giving the defendant additional time to prepare. Where an indictment charges an offense using the on or about formulation to allege the date, the government is not required to prove that the crime occurred on exactly the date named, but only that it occurred on a date that is reasonably near to the date stated. United States v. Nersesian, 824 F.2d 1294, 1323 (2d Cir.1987). Long before the filing of the superseding indictment, McGee had been aware that the government had seized, and presumably would introduce, a photograph manually dated December 1, 2004, which showed him holding a gun. McGee, furthermore, made no showing of any reason why the broadening of dates alleged created a need for additional preparation. McGee seeks support from the Speedy Trial Act, which provides that without the defendant's consent, the trial shall not commence less than thirty days from the date on which the defendant first appears. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(2). He contends on that basis that the court acted illegally in violation of the statute by denying the continuance he requested. However, in United States v. Rojas-Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 236, 106 S.Ct. 555, 88 L.Ed.2d 537 (1985), the Supreme Court ruled that this provision did not categorically mandate a thirty day continuance following the filing of a superseding indictment, but rather left the need for a continuance in those circumstances within the trial judge's discretion to be decided in accordance with the ends of justice, as authorized by § 3161(h)(8). We find neither error nor abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling.