Opinion ID: 768474
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sixth Circuit Precedents

Text: 144 As we read the Establishment Clause jurisprudence of this circuit we find consistency with what we have said above. 145 In American Civil Liberties Union of Kentucky v. Wilkins, 895 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1990) and Doe v. City of Clawson, 915 F.2d 244 (6th Cir. 1990), we found nativity scenes not offensive to the Establishment Clause because the settings in which they were displayed were much like the setting of the Menorah in Allegheny, supra, i.e., part of a Christmas display. In Americans United for Separation of Church and State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538 (6th Cir. 1992), sitting en banc, we held that a menorah display erected during the Hanukkah season in a traditional public forum did not violate the Establishment Clause because it could not be seen as an endorsement of religion by a reasonable observer. The decision followed and explicated on Justice O'Connor's definition of a reasonable observer: 146 In attempting to define the reasonable observer, we must look to the guidelines established by precedents both from this court and the Supreme Court. Justice O'Connor, who first promulgated the endorsement test, has emphasized that, when adopting the perspective of the reasonable observer, courts must consider all of the facts presented in each case. Every government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion. She repeated this warning in Allegheny, noting that the endorsement test depends on a sensitivity to the unique circumstancesand context of a particular challenged practice . . . . 147 However, Justice O'Connor has also recognized that when a court analyzes a religious display, some facts should receive greater consideration than others. For example, certain religious practices that might otherwise be unconstitutional are valid if their history and ubiquity would convince a reasonable observer that such practices merely represent an acknowledgment of religion. Thus, because of their history and ubiquity, Justice O'Connor approved the constitutionality of legislative prayers such as those in Marsh v. Chambers. She has also stated that the Establishment Clause permits government declaration of Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of 'In God We Trust' on coins, and opening court sessions with 'God save the United States and this honorable court.' She repeated this reasoning in Allegheny: 148 It is the combination of the longstanding existence of practices such as opening legislative sessions with legislative prayers..., as well as their nonsectarian nature, that lead me to the conclusion that those particular practices, despite their religious roots, do not convey a message of endorsement of particular religious beliefs. 149 980 F.2d at 1544 (internal citations omitted). 150 In Chaudhuri v. State of Tennessee, 130 F.3d 232 (6th Cir. 1997), a college professor who followed the Hindu religion did not prevail on his challenge to a moment of silence, or prayer, at university functions because of the non-sectarian nature of the occurrence. There we said: 151 Any prayer has a religious component, obviously, but a single-minded focus on the religious aspects of challenged activities - which activities, in an Establishment Clause case, are religiously-oriented by definition - would extirpate from public ceremonies all vestiges of the religious acknowledgments that have been customary at civic affairs in this country since well before the founding of the Republic. The Establishment Clause does not require - and our constitutional tradition does not permit - such hostility toward religion. The people of the United States did not adopt the Bill of Rights in order strip the public square of every last shred of public piety. 152 Rejecting the label nonsectarian, Dr. Chaudhuri and amicus curiae (the National Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty) persist in labeling the prayers in question as Christian. The plaintiff and the Committee imply that TSU's purpose in allowing the prayers was to advance the cause of Christianity. But these prayers, lacking any explicit or implicit reference to Jesus Christ, do not strike us as overtly Christian. 153 130 F.3d at 236 (internal citations omitted). 154 In Hawle v. City of Cleveland, 24 F.3d 814, (6th Cir. 1994), we found that the lease of airport space for a chapel did not violate the Establishment Clause because: 155 . . . the chapel serves the secular purpose of accommodating the religious needs of travelers [sic] and providing them with a place for rest and comfort. Moreover, because a reasonable observer would not conclude that the city endorses religion by allowing the diocese to maintain the chapel, the chapel's lease and its authorizing ordinance do not constitute an endorsement of religion, and thus their primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits religion. We find, finally, that the chapel's lease and its authorizing ordinance also do not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion. 156 24 F.3d at 822. 157 Lastly, in our most recent exposition on the Establishment Clause, Coles v. Cleveland Board of Education, 171 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 1999), we found that the Cleveland Board of Education's practice of opening each meeting with a prayer violated theEstablishment Clause. In coming to this conclusion, we analyzed the practice under the three prong test of Lemon and found each of its criteria: secular purpose, primary effect, and entanglement, were present. We said: 158 Moreover, the content of the prayers delivered at the school board meetings clearly went beyond what was necessary to solemnize or bring a more businesslike decorum to such meetings. The prayers frequently called for divine assistance or affirmation, sometimes by using veiled references to the Bible. In addition, many prayers mentioned Jesus by name. The board could have used the inspirational words of Abraham Lincoln or, as in fact one speaker did, the speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. to achieve the same ends. Instead, the board relied upon the intrinsically religious practice of prayer to achieve its stated secular end. 159 171 F.3d at 384. We concluded: 160 . . . we do not mean to imply that religion must be kept entirely out of the public school system. Certainly students might themselves wish to pray during the time they spend at school. It is only when the government, through its school officials, chooses to introduce and exhort religion in the school system that Establishment Clause concerns take shape. That is what has happened in the present case, with the school board's involvement in promoting prayer crossing the line of constitutional infirmity. 161 171 F.3d at 385-86.
162 We also have had occasion to deal with situations in which public schools incorporated either a reference to Jesus, or the person of Jesus particularly, into a school activity. Because of the clearly sectarian nature of what was done, we have found a violation of the Establishment Clause. 163 In Stein v. Plainwell Community Schools, 822 F.2d 1406, 1410 (6th Cir. 1987), we dealt with the practice of the delivery of invocation and benedictions at public high school commencement ceremonies, holding invalid those that are framed and phrased so that they 'symbolically place the government's seal of approval on one religious view'-- the Christian view, (citing Marsh v. Chambers, supra at 792.) 164 In Washegesic v. Bloomingdale Public Schools, 33 F.3d 679 (6th Cir. 1994), we held unconstitutional the placing of a portrait of Jesus in the hallway of a public school. In so doing we rejected the argument that the picture has meaning to all religions and that it is not inherently a symbol of Christianity. On the authority of Lemon, supra, and Marsh, supra, we said: 165 But Christ is central only to Christianity, and his portrait has a proselytizing, affirming effect that some non-believers find deeply offensive. Though the portrait, like school prayers and other sectarian religious rituals and symbols, may seem de minimis to the great majority, particularly those raised in the Christian faith and those who do not care about religion, a few see it as a governmental statement favoring one religious group and downplaying others. It is the rights of these few that the Establishment Clause protects in this case. 33 F.3d at 684.