Opinion ID: 2624500
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Evidence of Defendant's Confession Offered at First Trial

Text: At defendant's first trial, Steven Thomas testified that on January 24, 1980, he had a conversation with defendant about defendant's case when they were both inmates at the San Diego County Jail. As recited in Hamilton I, He asked defendant, `Who are you trying to convince, Hamilton, me or yourself?' Defendant replied, `Well, I did it but they'll never prove it.' ( Hamilton I, supra, 41 Cal.3d at p. 416.) During cross-examination, the jury in the first trial learned Thomas had been convicted of murder, robbery, forgery, burglary and escape, and was in the federal witness protection program against organized crime, but had not received any money under that program. ( Ibid. ) The prosecution read to the jury defendant's testimony at the first trial, including defendant's denial of making a confession to Thomas: `Counsel: Did you have a conversation with Mr. Thomas about this case? `Defendant: Not about this case, no. [¶] ... [¶] `Counsel: Did you hear Mr. Thomas testify that you told him that you did this murder but that they'd never prove it, or words to that effect? `Defendant: Yeah, I heard him. `Counsel: Is that true, did you tell him that? `Defendant: No, I didn't tell him like that. `Counsel: Did you have any conversation about this case at all with Mr. Thomas? `Defendant: No I didn't. Wouldn't have. `Counsel: Did he talk to you about this case at all? `Defendant: No. He made comment [ sic ] that he had either overheard the deputies or he had heard about me in the newspaper or something. The newspaper was being brought in the cell every day to him.' Thomas did not testify at the penalty retrial, and the jury heard none of his testimony from the first trial. After the entirety of defendant's testimony from the first trial was read to the jury without objection, the court expressed concern that in hearing evidence of defendant's denial that he had confessed to Thomas, the penalty retrial jury inferentially learned of Thomas's testimony asserting defendant had confessed to the murder. The jury never heard any other evidence about the context of the alleged confession or Thomas's cross-examination. Both the prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that the above quoted portion of defendant's testimony should not have been read to the jury and could have been edited out, but could not agree to a remedy. The prosecutor and the court suggested it would be best not to draw further attention to Thomas's statement. The prosecutor stated he never intended to call Thomas as a witness in the penalty retrial and would just pass over it in his argument, in part because he had learned from the defense after the first trial that Thomas had some mental problems of some sort, and in part because it would be difficult to find a federally protected witness. The court suggested the cure might be worse than the problem and to mention it might be worse than just to let it go at this point. Defense counsel disagreed, arguing that the bell had been rung and evidence of an alleged confession was before the penalty retrial jury. He sought to impeach Thomas's credibility with unspecified evidence that Thomas suffered from a mental problem. The court denied the request under Evidence Code section 352, ruling that any probative value of the proffered evidence would be outweighed by the efforts involved in trying to impeach a witness who was not before the jury in the penalty retrial. Defendant now argues that even though Thomas did not appear in person at the penalty retrial, his allegations that defendant confessed to the murder of Eleanore Buchanan were before the jury, and, because evidence of a confession would severely undermine his lingering doubt defense, the court denied him due process in not allowing him to impeach Thomas's credibility. We disagree. (18) In order to impeach Thomas's credibility, the evidence would have to establish Thomas suffered from a mental illness that, at the time of the first trial, affected his capacity to perceive, recollect, or communicate. (See Evid. Code, §§ 210, 780.) The record reveals the proffered evidence was an undefined report that defendant asserted showed Mr. Thomas was found to be ... literally crazy at some point. Standing alone, this is insufficient to call into question Thomas's credibility at the time of trial, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding it. (19) Defendant further argues the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in allowing Thomas's testimony to be read even though he knew he would not be calling Thomas as a witness in the penalty retrial. Defendant did not object on these grounds at trial and therefore failed to preserve this claim for appeal. ( People v. Lewis (2008) 43 Cal.4th 415, 503 [75 Cal.Rptr.3d 588, 181 P.3d 947].) In any event, this claim has no merit. A prosecutor's conduct violates a defendant's constitutional rights when the behavior comprises a pattern of conduct so egregious that it infects `the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process. [Citation.]' ( Darden v. Wainwright (1986) 477 U.S. 168, 181 [91 L.Ed.2d 144, 106 S.Ct. 2464].) The focus of the inquiry is on the effect of the prosecutor's action on the defendant, not on the intent or bad faith of the prosecutor. ( People v. Crew (2003) 31 Cal.4th 822, 839 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 733, 74 P.3d 820].) Conduct that does not render a trial fundamentally unfair is error under state law only when it involves ``the use of deceptive or reprehensible methods to attempt to persuade either the court or the jury.' [Citation.]' ( People v. Mendoza (2007) 42 Cal.4th 686, 700 [68 Cal.Rptr.3d 274, 171 P.3d 2].) The prosecutor acknowledged he should have edited out this portion of defendant's testimony and agreed with the court that the best remedy was to make no further mention of it. In light of the fact that the prosecutor did not refer to Steven Thomas or defendant's alleged confession in his closing argument or at any other time during trial, and did not rely on the alleged confession when he urged the jury to vote for the death penalty, we cannot see that the prosecutor's failure to redact that portion of defendant's prior trial testimony infected the retrial with unfairness or constituted deceptive or reprehensible methods of persuasion.