Opinion ID: 76278
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Dismissal of Farese's Fees-Paid RICO Case

Text: 13 Farese argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his fees-paid RICO case consolidated with his IFP civil-rights case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 4 Farese contends that he paid the filing fee in his RICO action and disputes the district court's determination that because of the consolidation, he had been proceeding [IFP] in the RICO claim. While conceding that § 1915, which allows sua sponte dismissals, may apply to the civil rights action, he argues that this section does not govern his RICO claim and requests that his fees-paid RICO claim be reinstated. 5 14 We review the district court's findings of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Falken v. Glynn County, 197 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir.1999). The district court's interpretation of the PLRA is a statutory finding and constitutes a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1196 (11th Cir.2001). 15 Entitled Proceedings in forma pauperis, § 1915 governs IFP proceedings. Section 1915 allows prisoners to proceed in a suit without prepayment of fees or security therefor when the prisoner submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses [and] that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). A prisoner proceeding IFP must nevertheless pay a filing fee or a portion thereof as funds become available. Id. § 1915(b)(1). Section 1915(e)(2) provides: 16 Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that — 17 (A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or 18 (B) the action or appeal — 19 (i) is frivolous or malicious, 20 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or 21 (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 22 Id. § 1915(e)(2). Logically, § 1915(e) only applies to cases in which the plaintiff is proceeding IFP. 23 Here, the district court specifically found that Farese had not moved to proceed IFP in his RICO suit and had paid the filing and service-of-process fees in that action. The record also reflects that Farese did not proceed IFP in his RICO suit. Furthermore, the consolidation of Farese's cases did not alter the fees-paid status of his RICO case. See Johnson v. Manhattan Ry. Co., 289 U.S. 479, 496-97, 53 S.Ct. 721, 77 L.Ed. 1331 (1933); cf. Xaros v. U.S. Fidelity and Guar. Co., 820 F.2d 1176, 1180 n. 1 (11th Cir.1987) (Consolidation does not result in a merger of suits or parties such that federal jurisdiction in one case can be engrafted upon a case with which it is consolidated. Each suit must have an independent jurisdictional basis.). Thus, we conclude that the evidence does not support the district court's determination that Farese was proceeding IFP in his RICO suit. Therefore, because § 1915, which governs only IFP proceedings, does not apply to Farese's fees-paid RICO claim, the district court was not authorized to dismiss the RICO claim pursuant to § 1915. 24 Because Farese's RICO complaint was improperly reviewed and dismissed under an inapplicable statute, the district court erred in dismissing Farese's RICO claim. Accordingly, we vacate the district court's dismissal of Farese's RICO suit and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 6 25