Opinion ID: 2624133
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the wrongful death claim is precluded by the law of the case doctrine

Text: ¶ 25 In Worsham I one of the issues before the COCA was whether Defendants [could] be held liable for [decedent's] suicide. 2004 OK CIV APP 2, ¶ 1, 83 P.3d at 882. Worsham I, in effect, dealt with two potential exceptions to the general rule that suicide is considered an intervening force breaking the chain of causation from a defendant's wrongful conduct to the death and therefore a defendant will not normally be civilly liable for the death. Id., 2004 OK CIV APP 2, ¶¶ 11-24, 83 P.3d at 884-887. ¶ 26 The two potential exceptions are 1) where the suicide is a foreseeable event to the defendant [ id., 2004 OK CIV APP 2, ¶¶ 13-20, 83 P.3d at 884-886] and 2) when the wrongful conduct of a defendant actually brings about delirium or insanity in the decedent for which a defendant would be liable and the decedent, while delirious or insane commits suicide, if the delirium or insanity a) prevents him from realizing the nature of the suicidal act and the certainty or risk involved therein or b) causes an irresistible or uncontrollable urge to commit suicide. Id., 2004 OK CIV APP 2, ¶¶ 21-24, 83 P.3d at 886-887. Worsham I decided the suicide itself was not a foreseeable event by Defendants  or really by Scroggs  [ id., 2004 OK CIV APP 2, ¶ 20, 83 P.3d at 886] and that it was not Scroggs' conduct that brought about any delirium or insanity decedent might have been suffering from when he committed suicide. Id., 2004 OK CIV APP 2, ¶ 23, 83 P.3d at 887. Thus, Worsham I held Defendants could not be held liable for the suicide, i.e., they were not subject to liability in a wrongful death action. Id., 2004 OK CIV APP 2, ¶ 24, 83 P.3d at 887. ¶ 27 This Court has stated: The settled-law-of-the-case doctrine bars relitigation of issues that have been settled by a previous appellate opinion in the same case. Generally, all issues resolved by an appellate decision either expressly or impliedly become the law of the case and are not subject to review in a subsequent appeal. Shoemaker v. Estate of Freeman, 1998 OK 17, ¶ 15, 967 P.2d 871, 875. (citations omitted). The law of the case doctrine is recognized as needed to insure an end to litigation and without it, appellate courts would spend inordinate amounts of time going over ground previously covered. Matter of Estate of Severns, 1982 OK 64, 650 P.2d 854, 856. ¶ 28 In their two appellate briefs to this Court (March 14 and May 18, 2005), Plaintiffs do not respond to the law of the case ruling of the trial court nor does either brief cite any authority supportive of the proposition an exception to application of the doctrine is warranted in regard to the wrongful death claim disposed of in Worsham I. In light of the failures to respond to the law of the case ruling or to cite any authority supporting an exception to application of the doctrine, we believe we would be warranted in determining that Plaintiffs have waived any attack as to the trial court's ruling as to the reassertion on remand of the wrongful death claim, i.e., that the claim was foreclosed in view of the decision in Worsham I and the law of the case doctrine. See DLB Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n, 1991 OK 5, 805 P.2d 657, 659 n. 6 (issues not briefed are waived) and Anderson v. Dyco Petroleum Corp., 1989 OK 132, 782 P.2d 1367, 1379 (issues not supported by argument and authority are waived). ¶ 29 However, we realize that both of Plaintiffs' appellate briefs, in essence, attempt to persuade us the Worsham I decision was mistaken in its ruling on the wrongful death claim. An exception to application of the law of the case doctrine is recognized by our jurisprudence when the prior decision is palpably erroneous and this Court is convinced failure to reverse the earlier decision will result in a gross or manifest injustice. Tibbetts v. Sight `n Sound Appliance Centers, Inc., 2003 OK 72, ¶ 16, 77 P.3d 1042, 1050. We must note that such an exception to the law of the case doctrine is one of limited application and we do not view it as license to review otherwise final appellate decisions, except in the most extreme circumstances. ¶ 30 Assuming Plaintiffs have not waived challenge to the trial court's law of the case ruling on the wrongful death claim, our review of Worsham I, the record presented in this matter and the appellate briefs submitted do not show the decision in Worsham I as to the wrongful death claim is palpably erroneous. Further, nothing has been presented for our review that convinces us a gross or manifest injustice will result by allowing Worsham I's decision foreclosing the wrongful death claim to stand. The wrongful death claim is, thus, foreclosed by the law of the case doctrine and the trial court did not err in so ruling. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR BY EXCLUDING THE TESTIMONY OF PLAINTIFFS' EXPERT AS TO THE ISSUE OF FACTUAL PROXIMATE CAUSE, WITHOUT WHICH PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO SHOW ANY DAMAGES FOR PRE-SUICIDE EMOTIONAL DISTRESS SUFFERED BY EITHER DECEDENT OR RAE WERE PROXIMATELY CAUSED BY ANY WRONGFUL CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS ¶ 31 In Manley v. Brown, 1999 OK 79, 989 P.2d 448, the elements necessary to be shown in a legal malpractice case are set forth as follows: The plaintiff in a legal negligence action must prove (1) the existence of an attorney-client relationship, (2) breach of a lawyer's duty to the client, (3) facts constituting the alleged negligence, (4) a causal nexus between the lawyer's negligence and the resulting injury (or damage) and (5) but for the lawyer's conduct, the client would have succeeded in the [underlying] action. Manley, 1999 OK 79, ¶ 8, 989 P.2d at 452. (footnote omitted; emphasis deleted). In the First Syllabus by the Court in the case of Collins v. Wanner, 1963 OK 127, 382 P.2d 105, the Court stated: [t]o authorize a recovery in damages against an attorney for negligence, not only must negligence be established, but it must also appear that injury resulted to the plaintiff from such negligence. Where the client claims the attorney was negligent in connection with litigation, the client must generally carry the burden to show that but for the negligence complained of the client would have been successful in the action in question. See Sutton v. Whiteside, 1924 OK 189, 222 P. 974. Sutton recognized that in an action against an attorney by a former client for negligence in failing to perfect an appeal to this Court in the underlying action, a replevin suit, it must be adequately shown that had the appeal been properly perfected from an adverse judgment against the former client in the replevin suit, this Court would have reversed the adverse judgment. ¶ 32 A finding of proximate cause must be based on something more substantial than mere speculation and conjecture. See Gillham v. Lake Country Raceway, 2001 OK 41, ¶ 8, 24 P.3d 858, 860. A legal malpractice/professional negligence case is no exception to this requirement. As to the proffered testimony of Dr. Smith, Plaintiffs sought its presentation as to the but for consequences of Defendants' acts and/or omissions, i.e., the cause in fact prong of proximate cause. [9] As succinctly stated in Hardy v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 1996 OK 4, 910 P.2d 1024: While absolute certainty is not required, mere possibility of causation is insufficient. When the matter is one of pure speculation or conjecture or the probabilities evenly balanced, it is the duty of the court to direct a verdict for defendant because a party will not be permitted to recover from another whose acts, however wrongful, are not the proximate cause of the injury suffered. Id., 910 P.2d at 1027. [10] ¶ 33 Plaintiffs' position in the trial court was, in effect, that to show factual proximate cause it was unnecessary to prove that it was more probable than not that decedent would have been entitled to some type of court order prohibiting the perceived workplace harassment had such a case been filed on decedent's behalf by Defendants. In other words, Plaintiffs, through the testimony of Dr. Smith sought to sidestep or bypass having to carry the burden to prove that decedent would have been entitled to some type of TRO, preliminary/temporary injunction and/or permanent injunction to stop the perceived harassment from co-workers to make out a case for the recovery of damages for the emotional distress of either decedent or Rae allegedly suffered pre-suicide and arising from the continuation of the harassment. In a brief entitled Plaintiffs' Supplemental Trial Brief Responding to Defendants' Supplemental Brief Regarding Contract Damages, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, and the Effect of Plaintiff's [sic] Settlement of the PSO Civil Suit, filed in the trial court on May 12, 2004 (Original Record-pp. 679-689) at pp. 5-6 thereof Plaintiffs made their position clear by stating the following: Plaintiffs' proof is that the mere filing of the civil suit to stop the harassment would have been sufficient to accomplish this purpose. Plaintiffs do not contend that it would have been necessary to completely adjudicate the civil case and, consequently, the Plaintiffs do not rest their claims on the outcome of that civil case (had one been filed). ¶ 34 We have no doubt that normally in a legal malpractice case based upon the former client's assertion that the purpose of the representation was to assist in stopping alleged workplace harassment, i.e., assistance in obtaining some form of prohibitory or injunctive-type relief for the client, to recover damages for the lawyer's acts or omissions in breach of the lawyer's duty to the client, it must be shown through the presentation of expert witness testimony that it was more probable than not that some form of injunctive-type relief would have been obtained in a court proceeding, but for the attorney's failings. See Colucci v. Rosen, Goldberg, Slavet, Levenson & Wekstein, P.C., 25 Mass.App.Ct. 107, 515 N.E.2d 891, 895-896 (expert testimony necessary to show causation element in legal malpractice case in form of showing that clients probably would have been entitled to TRO under certain statutory criteria to prohibit labor picketing of restaurant where the pertinent malpractice alleged was abandonment by lawyers of attempt to obtain TRO unless clients paid an additional $1,000). [11] In our view, the opinion testimony of Dr. Smith fell short of being a substitute for such evidence and the trial court did not err by ruling, in substance, that Dr. Smith's testimony was unreliable. ¶ 35 Plaintiffs' challenge to the ruling excluding Dr. Smith's testimony is, in essence, that the trial court mistakenly and rigidly applied the four factors listed in Christian v. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 8, 65 P.3d 591, 597-598 and taken from Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993), that Plaintiffs assert are appropriate for gauging the reliability of scientifically-based expert testimony, but not expert testimony of someone like Dr. Smith that based his conclusions/opinions on personal knowledge and experience in the human resources field. [12] The four factors as set out in Gray are: 1. Can the theory or technique be, or has it been, tested; 2. Has the theory or technique been subjected to peer review and publication; 3. Is there a `known or potential rate of error . . . and the existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation;' and 4. Is there widespread acceptance of the theory or technique within the relevant scientific community. Id., 2003 OK 10, ¶ 8, 65 P.3d at 597-598, citing and quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-594, 113 S.Ct. 2786. ¶ 36 In Gray, of course, we made it clear that the Daubert factors were intended to be flexible and were not intended to be a rigid standard applicable to every case. In Gray is found the following: In Kumho Tire Co., [Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 119 S.Ct. 1167, 143 L.Ed.2d 238 (1999)], the [United States Supreme] Court explained that a trial court has some latitude in applying the Daubert factors of reliability: `Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are, or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.' Kumho, 526 U.S. at 153, 119 S.Ct. 1167. . . . Thus, the Daubert factors are not a rigid standard applicable in every case. The Daubert factors `may' bear on a judge's gatekeeping determinations, however. The four Daubert factors `may or may not be pertinent'; it will all depend `on the nature of the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony.' Determining which factors are indicative of reliability in a particular case cannot be accomplished solely by a[sic] categorical a priori characterizations about the particular field in question. The Court explained: `Engineering testimony rests upon scientific foundations, the reliability of which will be at issue in some cases. . . . In other cases, the relevant reliability concerns may focus upon personal knowledge or experience.' In all cases, a court must exercise its gatekeeping obligation so that the expert, whether relying on `professional studies or personal experience,' will, when testifying, employ `the same level of intellectual rigor' that the expert would use outside the courtroom when working in the relevant discipline. Federal Judicial Center, Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 19 (2d ed.2000), quoting, Kumho, supra . A trial court must thus make a determination of the appropriate factors of reliability for the particular controversy before it based upon the nature of that controversy. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 13, 65 P.3d at 600. We also recognized in Gray: The [United States Supreme Court] has stated that a trial court must make a determination of the reliability of an expert's evidence when it is sufficiently challenged. And where such testimony's factual basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called sufficiently into question, . . . the trial judge must determine whether the testimony has `a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of [the relevant] discipline.' Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. at 149 [119 S.Ct. 1167], . . . quoting, Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592, 113 S.Ct. 2786. . . . Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 11, 65 P.3d at 599. ¶ 37 Thus, Gray makes clear that in all cases where the reliability of an expert's testimony is sufficiently challenged, the trial court, in its gatekeeping role, must make a determination as to whether such evidence has sufficient indicia of reliability to be admitted for jury consideration, although the four Daubert factors may or may not be pertinent depending upon the nature of the issue at hand, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his testimony. We made it clear, however, that a trial court has a responsibility to insure that an expert's opinion on causation is something more than ipse dixit, i.e., a bare assertion resting on the authority of an individual. See Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 36 and n. 19, 65 P.3d at 607 and n. 19, quoting Black's Law Dictionary, 961 (4th ed.1951). In our view, notwithstanding that Dr. Smith was not a scientific expert, the trial court still had a gatekeeping role to play to gauge his testimony for reliability and the bases upon which that testimony was grounded. ¶ 38 In the instant case, at the evidentiary hearing held immediately before the scheduled trial, Dr. Smith was questioned concerning and testified to the bases underlying his ultimate opinion or conclusion. Although the trial court did attempt to gauge the reliability of Dr. Smith's testimony using, in part, the four factors listed in Daubert, review of the transcript of the hearing convinces us the trial court did not too rigidly apply the four Daubert factors and that ultimately the testimony was excluded as speculative and unreliable, and not based upon sufficient intellectual rigor that would have been used outside the courtroom in the human resources field. ¶ 39 A clear abuse of discretion standard applies as to appellate review of the admissibility of expert testimony. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 42, 65 P.3d at 608. In Cities Service Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 1999 OK 14, 980 P.2d 116, cert. dismissed, 528 U.S. 1014, 120 S.Ct. 523, 145 L.Ed.2d 404 (1999) we stated: A trial judge's decision to exclude evidence will not be overturned absent a clear abuse of discretion. `Abuse of discretion' is the applicable standard of review regardless whether the excluded testimony is outcome-determinative. It is incumbent upon a trial judge in his/her role as the `gatekeeper' of the evidentiary process to screen evidence, i.e., to determine its relevance and reliability. Cities Service Co., 1999 OK 14, ¶ 32, 980 P.2d at 132. (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original). In Gray [2003 OK 10, ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 608, citing Fent v. Oklahoma Natural Gas Co., 2001 OK 35, ¶ 12, 27 P.3d 477, 481], this Court stated, [a]n abuse of discretion occurs when a court bases its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for the ruling. This standard, thus, may include both review of fact and law issues. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 608. As to the factual part of the equation, abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's factual exercise of discretion is clearly against reason and the evidence, or based on untenable grounds or is manifestly unreasonable. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 44, 65 P.3d at 609, quoting Patel v. OMH Medical Center, Inc., 1999 OK 33, ¶ 20, 987 P.2d 1185, 1194, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1188, 120 S.Ct. 1242, 146 L.Ed.2d 100 (2000). As to the legal part of the equation an abuse of discretion would occur if the trial court is deemed to have erred with respect to a pure, simple and unmixed question of law. Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 608, quoting Jones, Givens, Gotcher & Bogan, P.C. v. Berger, 2002 OK 31, ¶ 5, 46 P.3d 698, 701. A de novo review standard applies when the error is claimed to be one of law, such as whether the trial court applied a correct legal standard in ruling on a matter. See Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 43, 65 P.3d at 608, citing Scoufos v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 2001 OK 113, ¶ 1, 41 P.3d 366, 367. ¶ 40 Dr. Smith has a PhD in consumer resource studies from Oklahoma State University (OSU), a master's degree from OSU in psychology and a bachelor's degree in sociology and communications from East Central State University. He worked for ONEOK for about twenty (27) years in the HR field and at the time of trial was employed by OSU, Okmulgee as a vice-president of student affairs and employment and/or enrollment management. To reach his opinion in the matter, in addition to his experience in the HR field, Dr. Smith reviewed portions of the suit that had been brought against PSO, the deposition of Rae Worsham and the deposition of a psychologist, who apparently treated decedent prior to his suicide. He spoke with no witnesses. ¶ 41 In effect, Dr. Smith's ultimate opinion was that there is a universal standard or procedure that HR departments follow in companies large enough to have a HR department when they are threatened with suit by an attorney or when suit is filed against such companies where the claim involves workplace harassment or hostile work environment. His view is that the universal standard is implemented primarily for the protection of the company, which might be determined negligent if the universal standard is not followed after being notified of claimed harassment. He opined that PSO would have followed the universal standard had Scroggs threatened it with suit or actually filed suit. ¶ 42 Boiled down, Dr. Smith described the universal standard or procedure as containing three steps that would be taken in the following order: 1) insulate or isolate the employee to guard the company against a claim of retaliation by putting him/her on some type of leave status or placing the employee in a different department away from the situation, 2) investigate the matter and 3) turn the results of the investigation over to legal counsel for the company. This universal standard was the way Dr. Smith was taught and it was the way the ONEOK HR department handled workplace harassment situations with the legal counsel they had. Dr. Smith also indicated the universal standard was discussed when he attended meetings, training and continuing education sessions attended by other HR professionals and he never heard any HR professional disagree that the first order of business was to insulate or isolate an employee as described above. In fact, he testified that about six or seven years prior to the trial while he was attending a meeting of the Tulsa Area Human Resources Association, some unnamed person or persons from PSO (presumably someone employed by the PSO HR department) gave feedback that PSO handled the situation like every other company did, although he admitted the discussion was fairly general and, as we understand his testimony, that no one from PSO directly told him that PSO follows the universal standard he described. Dr. Smith also testified to a belief there is a standard that companies the size of PSO would follow when an employee complains of harassment, even without a lawsuit being filed. The standard would be to insulate the employee as described above, investigate the situation and then come to an intra-company disposition of the matter. ¶ 43 Our review of the testimony of Dr. Smith convinces us the trial court did not abuse his discretion by excluding the testimony as unreliable. Dr. Smith admitted he did not know what official with PSO would make the decision to isolate or insulate an employee as he described once a lawsuit was filed. Although, in effect, he thought it would be the vice-president of HR, he admitted that PSO HR personnel might only play an advisory role in the process. He did not know how many times PSO had been sued for harassment or how it actually handled such cases. Dr. Smith also understood from his review of materials (apparently from either the instant case or the PSO litigation) that an investigation had actually been done by PSO as to the harassment situation, an understanding at odds with Rae's testimony that she was aware of no investigation conducted by PSO into the workplace harassment situation. That Dr. Smith himself testified to his understanding that an investigation had been done by PSO also seems to severely undercut his view that the first order of business is to insulate or isolate the involved employee from the claimed offending co-workers, rather than the first order of business being an investigatory stage for the company to make determinations concerning the credibility of the employee's claims and to make an initial assessment on how best to respond to the situation and claims. ¶ 44 Dr. Smith could point to no articles giving statistics or data as to how companies the size of PSO actually handle employment harassment cases. Nor had he read any studies in relation to the universal standard he espoused. He also testified his opinion as to the universal standard need not be based on any statistics or studies because that standard is the responsible approach and the universal approach. Further, although Dr. Smith attended meetings, seminars and continuing education where the universal standard he espoused was discussed, we do not view his testimony as indicating that he actually had any personal knowledge or experience, in a hands on way, of how other large companies handled harassment situations upon being threatened with suit or upon the filing of suit. In other words, his purported knowledge essentially came from the aforesaid meetings, etc., and his experience with ONEOK over the twenty-seven (27) years he was employed with that company. ¶ 45 Also, the evidence here further shows that the situation concerning decedent had already been brought to the attention of PSO officials by both decedent and Rae, but the situation, according to Plaintiffs, did not improve, a result seemingly at odds with Dr. Smith's belief of a standard followed by companies the size of PSO when the employee himself/herself complains of harassment, even without a lawsuit being filed. As also previously noted, the prior opinions in Scroggs I and Worsham I indicate that PSO had been informed by decedent he had retained counsel in regard to the matter and that a suit had been or was about to be filed regarding the workplace situation. Still apparently, the perceived workplace harassment continued, even though for some period of time decedent was placed on a paid leave of absence. ¶ 46 We simply cannot say on the record presented to us in this matter that the trial court abused his discretion in excluding, as unreliable, the testimony of Dr. Smith or that the decision was based either on an erroneous conclusion of law or has no rational basis in the evidence presented on the question. The record here is clear that Dr. Smith does not know who within the hierarchy of PSO makes the final decision as to how to handle threats of suit or actual suit. He also admitted that the HR department of PSO might simply play an advisory role in such a situation. He also impliedly recognized that the legal department might become involved. His testimony also seemed to be based on his view that the universal standard he discussed was somewhat of an aspirational standard in the HR field that he viewed as the responsible approach companies should follow. ¶ 47 Without the testimony of Dr. Smith we can find no evidence presented at the non-jury trial of this matter that any act or omission of Defendants can be said to have proximately caused any pre-suicide emotional distress suffered by either decedent or Rae. Plainly, no evidence was there presented or sought to be presented to show that it was more probable than not that decedent would have been entitled to some type of court-ordered injunctive relief to show that Defendants failures were the but for cause of any emotional distress so suffered prior to decedent's suicide. To say that the mere threat of suit or the mere filing of suit would have accomplished the desired result, the testimony sought to be presented through the testimony of Dr. Smith, because large companies seek to protect themselves from claims that they have been negligent is, in our view, devoid of sufficient indicia of a reliable methodological basis and too slender a reed to replace what would normally have to be shown in a case such as this, to wit: that the employee would have been entitled to some type of court-ordered injunctive relief prohibiting the alleged harassment. ¶ 48 When the question for review is whether there is a complete absence of evidence to support the causation element of an action, the issue is reviewed de novo and, of course, if there is an entire absence of evidence as to factual proximate causation, a defendant is entitled to a verdict or judgment in his or her favor. See Gray, 2003 OK 10, ¶ 44 and n. 21, 65 P.3d at 609 and n. 21. In sum, we do not find error in the trial court's ruling to exclude the opinion testimony of Dr. Smith and without that evidence Plaintiffs failed to carry their burden to show that Defendants acts or omissions were the proximate cause of any pre-suicide emotional distress damages of either decedent or Rae. The trial court's judgment as to such claim to damages is, therefore, affirmed. [13] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FORECLOSING RAE WORSHAM'S INDIVIDUAL CLAIM, BASED ON FRAUD, TO RECOVER EMOTIONAL DISTRESS DAMAGES ALLEGEDLY SUFFERED BY HER UPON LEARNING OF APPARENT FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF DEFENDANT SCROGGS CONCERNING THE LEGAL REPRESENTATION ¶ 49 The trial court also precluded evidence sought to be submitted by Plaintiffs that arguably would have supported the recovery of damages for emotional distress allegedly suffered by Rae in her individual capacity upon learning in or about September 1998 that Scroggs had allegedly engaged in a course of misrepresentation-type conduct concerning the legal representation for which he was hired. As we understand the record, the trial court ruled that Plaintiffs' counsel waived this claim by representations either orally or in one or more written submissions in the trial court. ¶ 50 In our view, the waiver appears partially to have been perceived by the trial court through communicatory discord between the parties and the trial court involving Plaintiffs' counsel's representation that no damages were requested in the instant suit for Scroggs' actual failure to file the wrongful death case against PSO prior to Defendants' termination in September 1998. Also, Plaintiffs' counsel's lack of precision in detailing this damage claim and a failure to describe or detail it at an oral argument proceeding on May 5, 2004 in part concerning the PSO settlement motion in limine matter, more than likely had a hand in leading the trial court to view the claim as waived. Our review of the record convinces us that no representation of counsel, either in written form or orally, constituted a knowing waiver of the claim. Plainly, the claim was raised well in advance of the trial and at the trial through offer of proof. We are also convinced from review of the record that Defendants were provided with adequate notice concerning the claim. Thus, the trial court erred by viewing the claim as waived. We, therefore, must briefly discuss the claim's viability and the effect thereon of the PSO settlement. ¶ 51 In Mashunkashey v. Mashunkashey, 1941 OK 113, 113 P.2d 190 the Court stated: [M]ental pain and suffering alone will ordinarily constitute but an element of damages. The latter is seldom a sufficient basis upon which to predicate an action. Usually it is compensable only when made an element of damages in an action based upon a wrong which in itself is actionable. But mental pain and suffering may constitute the basis of an independent action in cases of wilful wrong of the character where mental suffering is recognized as the ordinary, natural and proximate result of such wrong. Id., 113 P.2d at 191. (citations omitted). Mashunkashey held that fraudulently induc[ing] one to enter into a bigamous marriage contract would constitute such a wrong, and the resulting mental pain and suffering would support an independent action for damages. Id. ¶ 52 In the instant case, in view of the fairly unique and unusual circumstances involved here, where Defendants are not claimed to have been initially hired to recover any pecuniary (i.e., monetary) relief for decedent or Rae Worsham, but to assist in preventing a claimed ongoing wrong that was resulting in mental pain and anguish, and then Scroggs is alleged to have engaged in a course of fraudulent conduct to cover up his failures in regard to the representation for which Defendants were asserted to have been hired, a trier of fact may be warranted in viewing the situation as one where the ordinary, natural and proximate result of Defendants' claimed wrongdoing would be one where Rae Worsham would suffer compensable emotional distress upon learning of the fraudulent conduct. Further, as we view this claim it seeks recovery for Rae's emotional distress additional to, separate from and different than that claimed against PSO for the wrongful death of decedent or for the pre-suicide emotional distress of either Rae or decedent resulting from the workplace harassment. The claim is based on the purported wilful conduct of Scroggs which is separate from any claim that might have been involved in the PSO litigation or settlement thereof. Therefore, the amount recovered from PSO would not, in our view, be admissible at trial to somehow reduce the amount of damages recoverable by Rae in regard to this fraud claim. ¶ 53 Although the PSO settlement recovery in regard to the above fraud claim of Rae in her individual capacity does not appear to fit neatly into our previous cases concerning the collateral source doctrine or rule, we believe that, at a minimum, by analogy the PSO settlement may not be used at trial to reduce the damages recoverable for such claim, should Rae adequately show entitlement thereto. The collateral source doctrine in its basic form was set out by this Court in Denco Bus Lines, Inc. v. Hargis, 1951 OK 11, 204 Okla. 339, 229 P.2d 560 as follows: Upon commission of a tort it is the duty of the wrongdoer to answer for the damages wrought by his wrongful act, and that is measured by the whole loss so caused and the receipt of compensation by the injured party from a collateral source wholly independent of the wrongdoer does not operate to lessen the damages recoverable from the person causing the injury. Id., 229 P.2d at 561 (Second Syllabus by the Court). See also Kimery v. Public Service Co. of Okla., 1977 OK 60, 562 P.2d 858 (evidence of a surviving spouse's remarriage inadmissible at trial to mitigate damages in a wrongful death action). As to Rae's individual fraud claim the PSO settlement recovery would, in our view, constitute compensation independent of the alleged wrongdoers, i.e., Defendants, and, in fact, as noted above, is separate from and different than the damages sought by Rae's individual fraud claim, such claim itself being separate from any claim involved in the PSO litigation. Thus, even if one assumes it is not the collateral source doctrine that would bar the admissibility of the PSO settlement in an effort to somehow reduce the amount of damages potentially recoverable by Rae in regard to this fraud claim, the separate nature of the claim and the damages sought therefore would lead to the same result as would applicability of the collateral source doctrine. In other words, the PSO settlement would not be admissible at trial to reduce the damages potentially recoverable as to the claim.