Opinion ID: 2611426
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Inadequate instructions concerning NRS 200.033(9), the random and without apparent motive aggravator.

Text: The jury was presented with three aggravating circumstances to consider in the penalty phase of this trial, whether the murder was committed during the commission of or attempt to commit a robbery, whether the killing was done to avoid arrest or effect an escape, and whether the murder was committed at random and without apparent motive. The jury rejected the first two aggravators, but found that the killing was done at random and without apparent motive. The jury's rejection of the murder in the course of a robbery and murder to flee aggravators and finding the random and motiveless aggravator was unusual considering the facts. There is abundant evidence to demonstrate that the killing was done to facilitate a robbery or escape, and had the jury found either aggravator, this would be a routine affirmance. By the brutal, execution-style killing, Nika has proven that he in general qualifies for the death penalty. But, when the jury returned only the one random and motiveless aggravator, we are compelled to determine whether the legal instructions given the jury were adequate for this case and if the facts presented support this sole aggravator. To put it simply, we must determine whether Nika's execution can be sanctioned by the rules with the facts as found by the jury. The jury obviously considered whether NRS 200.033(9), the aggravating circumstance alleging that the murder was committed at random and without apparent motive, had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The only assistance the jury received in considering this aggravator was the instruction that it could find that NRS 200.033(9) had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt if it concluded that the killing was not necessary to complete a robbery. (Emphasis added.) This instruction was derived from our opinions in Bennett v. State, 106 Nev. 135, 143, 787 P.2d 797, 802 (1990), and Paine v. State, 107 Nev. 998, 999-1000, 823 P.2d 281, 282 (1991). [3] Since the jury rejected the murder in the course of a robbery aggravator, it seems logical to assume that the above instruction would be inapplicable since it dealt with a killing accompanying a robbery. This left the jury with only the language of NRS 200.033(9), a murder committed at random and without apparent motive. We have never required that the random and without apparent motive aggravator be defined beyond stating to the jury the aggravator as defined in NRS 200.033(9). See, e.g., Greene v. State, 113 Nev. 157, 163, 931 P.2d 54, 58 (1997); Geary v. State, 112 Nev. 1434, 1445-46, 930 P.2d 719, 726 (1996). However, in this and several other cases, this court has struggled with the meaning of those terms and the application of those terms to the facts of a particular case. The facts of this case are not those that come to mind when you first think of a random and motiveless crime, as does the shooting of people from a rooftop or driving indiscriminately into pedestrians on a sidewalk. Here, Nika obviously had just met the good samaritan who apparently stopped to help him, and Nika killed him in the course of robbing him, or because the samaritan called him a foul name, or to aid his escape, or for no reason at all. The jury concluded Nika killed for no apparent reason at all, and it was the jury's prerogative to so conclude even if the other reasons may seem more plausible. It is much more difficult to see how the jury concluded that Nika killed the samaritan at random. He obviously had just met the samaritan who stopped to help him, and it is not at all apparent to me how Nika's killing could be classified as at random even if done without apparent motive. Perhaps the jury believed that it was uncertain who might stop to help Nika, and this was sufficient to provide the randomness element needed to find the aggravator. However, this is not the randomness I believe that the legislature contemplated when approving this aggravator. This case seems closer to the factual situation presented in Geary where we held that the random and without apparent motive aggravator was constitutional; however, we reversed Geary's death penalty conviction because the evidence presented at trial indicated that the killing was neither random nor motiveless because the killing was directed at a specific individual and was done for a specified reason. Geary, 112 Nev. at 1446, 930 P.2d at 727. I see little difference between the situation presented in Geary and that in the present case. What all this demonstrates to me is that we need to define the terms used in this aggravator to better assist the jury in its difficult task of applying this aggravator to the facts of cases like this one. Defining the terms random, apparent, and motive will give the jury guidance and genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death penalty. Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 2742, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983). We began this process in Geary v. State, 112 Nev. 1434, 1446-47, 930 P.2d 719, 727 (1996), but did not provide concrete definitions. The word random means either lacking a definite plan, purpose or pattern, or relating to a set whose elements have equal probability of occurring. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 974 (9th ed.1985). NRS 200.033(9) states that the murder must be committed upon one or more persons at random and without apparent motive, and I believe that the statute is properly understood to mean that the victim must be selected at random and the crime must be committed on that randomly selected victim without apparent motive. Apparent means or has been stated to mean open to view or clear or manifest to the understanding. Webster's Ninth New collegiate Dictionary 96 (9th ed. 1985); see also State v. Moore, 250 Neb. 805, 553 N.W.2d 120, 128 (1996) (Apparent means that which is readily perceptible); Black's Law Dictionary 96 (6th ed. 1990) (That which is obvious, evident, or manifest. . . . That which appears to the eye or mind; open to view; plain; patent.) Motive has been defined as the emotional urge which induces a particular act. 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law § 100, at 118-19 (2d ed. 1988); see also 21 Am.Jur.2d Criminal Law § 133, at 267 (1981) (motive may be defined as that which leads or tempts the mind to indulge in a criminal act, or as the moving power which impels to action for a definite result); United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 912 n. 15 (5th Cir.1978) (motive . . . has been defined as `the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent' (quoting Slough & Knightly, Other Vices, Other Crimes, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 325, 328 (1956))). According to these definitions, any emotional urge or passion which prompts a person to act will qualify as a motive. Commonly understood motives for murder include avarice, revenge, jealousy, fear, preventing discovery of a crime, evading arrest or prosecution, and conduct of the deceased in opposing or trying to injure the defendant. 1 Witkin & Epstein, Cal.Criminal Law § 100, at 119 (2d ed. 1988); Wigmore, Principles of Judicial Proof § 96, at 193 (2d ed. 1931). Being insulted can also be a motive for murder. See State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. 771, 664 P.2d 969, 973 (1983) (concluding that evidence existed to support a theory that the deceased had insulted the defendant's prison gang and the insult was the defendant's motive for the killing). I believe that defining the words used in this aggravator will assist juries in determining whether the facts fit this aggravator and it will increase our confidence that the correct factual determination was made when reviewing the case on appeal. I conclude that failing to give definitions of the critical words used in this aggravator left the jury with unreasonably vague guidelines when confronted with the facts of this case and that this case should be reversed and retried for that reason.