Opinion ID: 2536409
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Exxon's Misrepresentations

Text: First, there is ample evidence in the record to support the trial court's finding that Exxon misled plaintiffs into believing the waste pits had been cleaned in conformance with regulatory standards. Prior to 1991, Claude Breaux, acting on behalf of both the Marin plaintiffs and the Breaux plaintiffs, repeatedly asked Exxon to close the pits and conduct necessary remediation. Exxon's attempted remediation ceased in 1991. The majority concedes Exxon conducted two additional environmental assessments after the 1991 remediationone in 1993, one in 2001and both of these assessments revealed contamination exceeding regulatory limits. Since at least 1986, Exxon was aware that the produced water on the property included radioactive material, including measurable amounts of radium 226 and 228, yet did not report this to the DEQ as required by state regulations. In short, Exxon knew the property was significantly more contaminated than either plaintiffs or the state believed, yet purposefully covered up this contamination. [2] It is well settled that contra non valentem applies in cases involving acts of fraud and misrepresentation intentionally committed by defendants (or their representative) designed to hinder, impede or prevent plaintiffs from asserting their cause of action or lull them into a false sense of security. Plaquemines Parish Commission Council v. Delta Development Co., Inc., 502 So.2d 1034, 1056-57 (La.1987); Nathan v. Carter, 372 So.2d 560, 563 (La.1979). This species of contra non valentem is simply a specific example of the general legal principle that a party cannot take advantage of his own wrongful act. Nathan, 372 So.2d at 562. Yet that is precisely what the majority opinion allows Exxon to do. Over a period of several years, Exxon repeatedly told plaintiffs the property was cleaned up within regulatory standards. In 1991, Exxon sent a letter stating You will find that all parameters including salt are well below accepted standards and state regulations. Plaintiffs, perhaps naively, trusted Exxon's representations and chose not to sue. Exxon, a highly sophisticated party, was in a far better position than the plaintiffs to assess the level of contamination, and knew that plaintiffs relied on it to perform the relevant testing and remediation. Exxon used its superior position to mislead plaintiffs and prevent them from timely filing suit. This is precisely the kind of fraudulent activity which triggers the application of contra non valentem. Exxon also misled the plaintiffs by repeatedly telling them it would fix any issues on the property, then failing to do so. As Claude Breaux testified, Exxon employees said we will address [the remediation issues] and get back to you. That stopped untileven when suit was filed, I was reluctant to file suit because Exxon had convinced me they were still coming back. I still thought Exxon was coming back to fix my pit sites (Emphasis added). This is the very definition of lulling a plaintiff into a false sense of security to prevent him from filing suit. The majority's holding would be bad enough if this Court were acting as the finder of fact with discretion to make judgment calls and weigh the evidence. We are not. Instead, we are required to give great deference to the trial court's factual findings, and may upset its ruling only upon a finding of manifest error. Stobart v. State Dept. of Transportation and Development, 617 So.2d 880, 882 (La.1993). Incredibly, the majority opinion simply skims past the manifest error doctrine, which is a fundamental precept of appellate review. [3] There is nothing in the record suggesting that the trial court's finding of fraud and misrepresentation by Exxon was objectively unreasonable or that the trial court manifestly erred. The majority opinion admits Exxon misled plaintiffs by not disclosing the extent of the contamination, but excuses this fraud by noting Exxon did nothing to prevent plaintiffs from investigating the cause of the sugarcane loss for themselves. In essence, the majority does not castigate Exxon for lying, but finds fault with plaintiffs for believing the lies. Permitting Exxon to profit from its own misrepresentations is both extraordinarily inequitable and contrary to established law. [4]