Opinion ID: 479151
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: extended voluntary departure

Text: 55 The Attorney General enjoys broad latitude in enforcing the immigration laws. See 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1103(a) (authorizing Attorney General to establish such regulations and perform such other acts as he deems necessary to carry out his authority). The decision to grant or to withhold EVD falls within this broad mandate. On several occasions in the past, the Attorney General has granted EVD by temporarily suspending enforcement of the Act for a particular group of aliens. Letter of Attorney General to Congressman Lawrence J. Smith (July 19, 1983), Jt.App. tab 18, at 1. The Attorney General has determined that circumstances do not warrant granting EVD to Salvadoran aliens. This assessment was based upon: (a) the number of Salvadoran aliens already in this country; (b) the current crisis in which our country is experiencing a 'floodtide' of illegal immigrants; (c) the prospect of inducing further immigration by Salvadorans; (d) the effect of illegal immigration on the United States' finite law enforcement, social services, and economic resources, and (e) the availability of statutory avenues of relief, including application for asylum. Id. These factors correspond to the Secretary of State's description of the EVD process: the State Department invariably considers a number of factors in deciding whether to recommend the granting of EVD in any particular case, and the granting of EVD may meet different objectives in different cases. Letter from George P. Schultz to William French Smith (June 23, 1983), Jt.App. tab 17, at 1. 56 We have no doubt that the EVD issue was properly disposed of by summary judgment. Appellants argue that they were denied the opportunity to develop facts analogous to an administrative record to test the Attorney General's exercise of his discretion. This contention misses the point. Further factual development would not have sharpened the issues before the district court. The initial, and dispositive, issue was simply whether the court could review the Attorney General's discretionary withholding of EVD status. 57 The district court properly interpreted the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701 et seq. (1982), as barring judicial review of the Attorney General's decision not to grant EVD status in this case. An agency action is subject to review only if it is made reviewable by statute or if it is a final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. Id. Sec. 704. No statute subjects the EVD decision to review; the Immigration and Nationality Act does not even contain the words Extended Voluntary Departure. Moreover, the denial of EVD is not a final agency action. While the Attorney General's decision not to grant EVD to Salvadoran nationals as a group has been implemented and is ripe for review, his denial of EVD as to any individual is not yet a final agency action; the Attorney General may confer the status at any time prior to actual deportation. Even assuming that the Attorney General has rendered his final decision, Salvadorans still have an adequate remedy before deportation. Once an alien has exhausted administrative remedies in deportation proceedings, he may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals and thereafter to the courts of appeal. 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1105a(a); 8 C.F.R. Part 3. 58 Plaintiffs claim that a humanitarian standard has controlled the Attorney General's grants of EVD in the past, and that consistent application of this standard requires either a grant of EVD to Salvadorans or an explanation for the alleged departure from previous policy. We cannot agree that the presence of humanitarian concerns in past grants of EVD must control the disposition of this case. The district court correctly held that humanitarian concerns are not, nor could they be, the sole or overriding factor in an EVD determination. 594 F.Supp. at 508. In exercising his discretion, the Attorney General may take a number of factors into account; requiring him to grant EVD whenever humanitarian concerns are present would impermissably curtail the exercise of that discretion. 59 Finally, plaintiffs maintain that the Attorney General has acted arbitrarily, pursuing a wavering policy in granting discretionary relief available under a statute. They seek an order compelling him to consider granting EVD status to Salvadorans, on an individual basis, because he has granted EVD to nationals of other countries in the past. We think such a judicial order would be inappropriate. We agree that an agency may not arbitrarily grant or withhold statutorily created and defined remedies. See Sang Seup Shin v. INS, 750 F.2d 122 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Bureau of Immigration Affairs may not arbitrarily deny motions to reopen deportation proceedings); cf. Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (agency discharging its statutory mandate must provide reasoned explanation of change in course). An agency's exercise of inherent, extra-statutory discretion, however, is quite another matter. As the district court held, EVD describes the Attorney General's discretion in determining the circumstances of both foreign and domestic policy which may give rise to a discretionary decision to grant a temporary suspension of deportation proceedings to members of a particular class of illegal aliens. 594 F.Supp. at 505. Where Congress has not seen fit to limit the agency's discretion to suspend enforcement of a statute as to particular groups of aliens, we cannot review facially legitimate exercises of that discretion. 60 The separate opinion, while ultimately agreeing with our disposition of this issue, pursues a puzzling path. The opinion rests its finding of non-reviewability on the ground that the Attorney General's refusal to grant EVD is committed to agency discretion by law, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701(a)(2) (1982), because the court has no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's exercise of discretion. We agree that there is no meaningful standard in this case, but decline to insulate all decisions concerning EVD from review on the far-reaching theory that they are committed to agency discretion by law. That position would effectively insulate all EVD decisions, even ones that may be animated by illegal discriminatory animus, from review. Instead, as we have seen, decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration are subject to a narrow standard of review. See Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796, 97 S.Ct. 1473, 1480, 52 L.Ed.2d 50 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-82, 96 S.Ct. 1883, 1892, 48 L.Ed.2d 478 (1976).