Opinion ID: 1933198
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The judge's authority under the divorce statutes.

Text: Although the divorce case was consolidated with the neglect proceeding against the father, the trial judge's award of custody. to the grandmother was primarily grounded on the judge's authority, as she understood it, in the divorce proceeding between the mother and the father. Specifically, the judge's order was entered in response to the father's motion to modify the 1992 consent order placing custody of the children with the mother. As the judge stated in her order, this matter came before the Court ... on the Plaintiff's Motion for Modification of Custody Decree. The mother claims that the divorce statutes do not authorize the trial judge to award custody of the children to their grandmother, especially where the grandmother has not consented. We agree. The authority of the Superior Court to award custody in a divorce proceeding is governed by D.C.Code § 11-1101 (1995) and §§ 16-911, -914 (1997). In our view, these provisions authorize the court to determine custody only as between the parties to the proceeding, ordinarily the parents of the child or children. These statutes do not authorize the court to award custody to a non-party. Consequently, the divorce statutes do not include the procedural safeguards to which a parent is entitled before custody can be taken from the parent and awarded to a non-parent. The District's child neglect statutes, on the other hand, do provide such safeguards, and any attempt to remove a child or children from the custody of a parent on account of the parent's abuse or neglect must therefore be effected in a neglect proceeding rather than in a suit for divorce. The Superior Court is vested with jurisdiction over actions for divorce ... including proceedings ... for support and custody of minor children. D.C.Code § 11-1101(1). The court may determine who shall have the care and custody of a minor child or children pending the [divorce] proceeding[]. D.C.Code § 16-911(a)(5). The court also retains continuing jurisdiction regarding custody [a]fter the issuance of a decree of divorce. D.C.Code § 16-914(a)(1). The trial judge held that these provisions grant the court the authority to order custody of the children in a third party. Although the statutory language does not conclusively resolve the issue, we believe that the provisions that we have cited contemplate an award of custody only as between parents who are parties to the divorce proceeding. Section 11-1101 authorizes the court to decide the custody of minor children in proceedings incidental to actions for divorce. D.C.Code § 11-1101(1). An award of custody to a non-parent third party, based on a parent's alleged neglect, cannot fairly be characterized as incidental to a divorce proceeding. Other provisions relating to divorce likewise appear to have been drafted upon the assumption that any custody dispute before the court is between the parents, and does not involve persons who are not parties to the divorce proceeding. The statute provides, for example, that a custody determination may not be based on the race, color, national origin, political affiliation, sex, or sexual orientation ... of a party.  D.C.Code §§ 16-911(a)(5), -914(a)(1) (emphasis added). Where a parent is found to have committed an intrafamily offense, the court may grant custody or visitation to the abusive parent  under certain conditions, and may permit visitation by an abusive parent if the child and the custodial parent  can be adequately protected. D.C.Code §§ 16-911(a-1), -914(a-1) (emphasis added). The court is authorized to designate the parent who will make the major decisions concerning the health, safety, and welfare of the child that need immediate attention. D.C.Code § 16-911(a-2)(2)(C) (emphasis added). The court may also modify or terminate custody on the motion of one of the  parents,  or on the court's own motion. D.C.Code § 16-911(a-2)(4)(A) (emphasis added). The focus of these provisions on the party or the parent suggests that an award of custody to a non-party was not within the contemplation of the legislature. There are also practical reasons for concluding that the divorce statutes authorize the award of custody only to a parent who is a party to the proceeding. The parties to an action are properly before the court. Ordinarily, one parent has initiated the proceeding, while the other has been served with process. The court will thus have no difficulty in enforcing its orders. The situation is quite different with respect to non-parties. In the present case, for example, there is no evidence that the grandmother has been served, and she is not represented by counsel. The divorce statutes contain no provision under which the court could enforce its orders against a non-party who has not submitted herself to the jurisdiction of the court. This is particularly true where, as in this case, the non-party  the maternal grandmother  has explicitly declined to accept legal custody of the children. In awarding custody to the grandmother, the trial judge relied on § 16-911(a-2)(1)(E), which authorizes any other custody arrangement the court may determine is in the best interest of the child. In our view, however, when read as a whole, § 16-911(a-2)(1) will not bear the construction that the judge placed on its last few words. In its entirety, this provision states that [a] custody order may include (A) sole legal custody; (B) sole physical custody; (C) joint legal custody; (D) joint physical custody; or (E) any other custody arrangement the court may determine is in the best interest of the child. § 16-911(a-2)(1). The most reasonable construction of this provision is that the court may award joint or sole legal or physical custody to one or both parents, but that the court may also adopt any other custody arrangement between the parents. Reading the statute in context, there is no reason to believe that the drafters had in mind a custody arrangement not involving either parent. We do not suggest that a trial judge presiding over a divorce proceeding is powerless to act in the event that both parents appear to be unfit custodians. In such circumstances, the judge may bring his or her concerns to the attention of the Director of Social Services or of the Corporation Counsel; the latter may then institute proceedings pursuant to the child neglect statutes. See D.C.Code § 16-2305(a). [2] The judge's authority under the divorce law, however, does not permit her to conduct a de facto neglect proceeding without invoking the procedures prescribed by the legislature for cases of this kind. [3]