Opinion ID: 1390030
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The State Court Legal Determinations Also Enjoy Heavy Deference

Text: Because each of Petitioner's claims have been raised in the California Supreme Court and denied on the merits, this Court must apply the highly deferential standard set forth in AEDPA. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Title 28, United States Code, section 2254(a), sets forth the following scope of review for federal habeas corpus claims: The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge, or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). The standard provides: (d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). To obtain federal habeas relief, Petitioner must satisfy either § 2254(d)(1) or § 2254(d)(2). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 403, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). The threshold question is whether the rule of law was clearly established at the time petitioner's state court conviction became final. Id. at 406, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of this Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state court decision. Id. at 412, 120 S.Ct. 1495; see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71, 123 S.Ct. 1166, 155 L.Ed.2d 144 (2003). Ninth Circuit case law may be persuasive authority for purposes of determining whether a particular state court decision is an `unreasonable application' of Supreme Court law, and also may help us determine what law is `clearly established.' Duhaime v. Ducharme, 200 F.3d 597, 600 (9th Cir.2000). Only after the clearly established federal law is identified can the court determine whether the state court's application of that law resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of that clearly established federal law. See Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 71-72, 123 S.Ct. 1166. This Court must identify the relevant United States Supreme Court authority and then apply that law to the record in the light most favorable to the state court decision. Such an approach embodies the longstanding principle that unarticulated findings that are necessary to the state court's conclusions of mixed questions of fact and law are presumed correct. See Marshall, 459 U.S. at 433, 103 S.Ct. 843(application of presumption to credibility determination which was implicit in rejection of defendant's claim). Moreover, anything less deferential would undermine the law that federal courts avoid attributing constitutional error to the state court. Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 854 (9th Cir.2003); see also Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24, 123 S.Ct. 357, 154 L.Ed.2d 279 (2003). The contrary to and unreasonable application clauses contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) have distinct meanings. Williams, 529 U.S. at 404, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A decision is contrary to United States Supreme Court authority if it fails to apply the correct controlling authority, or if it applies the controlling authority to a case involving facts materially indistinguishable from those in a controlling case, but reaches a different result. Id. at 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495. A decision is an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law when the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle, but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of that case. Id. at 407, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Under Williams, an application of federal law is unreasonable only if it is objectively unreasonable. Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. Although the Ninth Circuit previously analyzed habeas cases for clear error, the Supreme Court disapproved this approach. Lockyer, 538 U.S. at 75, 123 S.Ct. 1166(rejecting Van Tran v. Lindsey, 212 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir.2000)). Rather, when a petitioner does not challenge the state court's determination of the evidence, he may receive relief only if he establishes that the state court decisions were contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States. See Price v. Vincent, 538 U.S. 634, 640-41 n. 2, 123 S.Ct. 1848, 155 L.Ed.2d 877 (2003). When there is a federal question but no controlling Supreme Court authority on point, a state court's merits determination is not contrary to any decision within the meaning of the AEDPA. Mitchell v. Esparza, 540 U.S. 12, 17, 124 S.Ct. 7, 157 L.Ed.2d 263 (2003). In the absence of controlling authority, federal courts should defer to a state court's reasonable interpretation of the Constitution. Id. at 17-18, 124 S.Ct. 7; Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 795, 121 S.Ct. 1910, 150 L.Ed.2d 9 (2001) (holding that a Texas court's decision was not unreasonable where there was no squarely controlling authority). An unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law. Williams, 529 U.S. at 410, 120 S.Ct. 1495; Clark v. Murphy, 331 F.3d 1062, 1067(9th Cir. 2003). A federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the state court decision is wrong. See Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698-99, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Williams, 529 U.S. at 411, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The state court decision must be affirmed unless it is objectively unreasonable. Bell, 535 U.S. at 699, 122 S.Ct. 1843; Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24, 123 S.Ct. 357. Where a state court finds a constitutional error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, a federal court may not grant relief unless the state court's harmless error decision is objectively unreasonable. Mitchell, 540 U.S. at 12, 124 S.Ct. 7. A state court's decision based on a factual determination will not be overturned on factual grounds unless objectively unreasonable in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding. Miller, 537 U.S. at 340, 123 S.Ct. 1029 (2003); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 528, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). Even if the state court fails to cite or acknowledge United States Supreme Court authority, a federal court may not grant habeas relief unless the state court's reasoning or result contradict clearly established United States Supreme Court precedent. Early, 537 U.S. at 8, 123 S.Ct. 362. The Ninth Circuit has held that where there is no reasoned state court decision on one or more issues raised in the federal petition, the federal court must conduct an independent review of the record to determine whether the state court decision was contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, controlling United States Supreme Court precedent. Delgado v. Lewis, 223 F.3d 976, 982(9th Cir.2000). A federal court must presume, of course, that state courts `know and follow the law'[.] Himes v. Thompson, 336 F.3d 848, 853 (9th Cir.2003) (citing Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24, 123 S.Ct. 357.) De novo review of a state court's adjudication is not appropriate. Id. at 854 n. 3. The deference accorded to state court decisions by AEDPA is intended to prevent federal habeas retrials and ensures that state court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law. Bell, 535 U.S. at 693, 122 S.Ct. 1843; see Clark, 331 F.3d at 1067. The AEDPA deference standard demands that federal courts give state court decisions the benefit of the doubt. Woodford, 537 U.S. at 24, 123 S.Ct. 357.