Opinion ID: 1375473
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Intermediate Court of Appeals has addressed and rejected the concept of constructive discharge.

Text: In Ipsen, the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) rejected the concept of constructive dischargea concept similar to the doctrine of provoked discharge. In that case, Jody Ipsen submitted a resignation letter to her employer, complaining that her supervisor had treated her in an abusive, insulting, and impetuous manner. 80 Hawai`i at 484, 911 P.2d at 119. Specifically, Ipsen complained that her supervisor had doubted the sincerity of an ankle injury, which had caused her to miss over two weeks of work. After resigning, Ipsen applied for unemployment benefits. The claims examiner denied Ipsen unemployment benefits, determining that Ipsen voluntarily terminated her employment for personal reasons and without good cause[.] Id. at 485, 911 P.2d at 120. The claims examiner's decision was subsequently affirmed by both the appeals officer and the circuit court. On appeal, the ICA preliminarily addressed whether Ipsen voluntarily quit her employment or was discharged. Ipsen argued that, notwithstanding the fact that she resigned from her employment, her employer was the moving party in the termination of the employment relationship because her supervisor's actions were coercive to the point of compelling an involuntary resignation from her. Id. at 486, 911 P.2d at 121. The ICA rejected Ipsen's argument, explaining: [T]he question of whether a leaving was voluntary or involuntary may often overlap with facts related to whether there was good cause to leave. Thus, a leaving may be determined to be involuntary, based on facts also establishing good cause to leave. We are aware of cases employing the concept of constructive discharge, but whether a person has been constructively discharged also rests on the determination of dual issues of voluntariness and cause. Hence, the concept of a constructive discharge is not necessarily helpful in isolating the issue of whether an employee's leaving was voluntary. We believe it more fruitful from an analytical perspective and in light of HAR § 12-5-47(b) ..., to evaluate the issues of voluntariness and good cause separately. Consequently, we agree generally with the following statement: The notion of voluntary quitting without good cause involves two levels of volition: (1) the immediate circumstances of leaving must reflect a subjective intent of the employee to terminate; and (2) the act of leaving must be an exercise of free will and not the product of other compelling reasons or pressures forcing him [or her] to leave. It is the second level of volition that concerns the ultimate issue of whether or not the employee has quit for good cause. ... Thus, in determining whether [Ipsen] voluntarily quit, we are concerned with whether the circumstances reflect an intent on the part of the employee to terminate employment. On the other hand, the question of whether there were compelling reasons which forced an employee to leave is properly analyzed under the good cause prong of the statutory standard. This approach is consistent with HAR § 12-5-47(b) which was adopted to implement the statute. HAR § 12-5-47(b) states that an employment separation is considered a voluntary leaving when the facts and circumstances demonstrate that a claimant is the `moving party' in the termination of an employment relationship. Voluntary separation is to be contrasted with a discharge. Under HAR § 12-5-51(a), [a] discharge occurs when [conversely] an employer is the `moving party' in the termination of the employment relationship. Moving is the present participle of the verb move. The definitions of move include to change position or posture, to take action. Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 761 (10th ed. 1993). The word move from which moving is derived is very general and implies no more than the fact of changing position. Id. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted) (some brackets in original) (some brackets and emphasis added). Although Ipsen's decision to quit was motivated in part by what she believed to be harassment by her supervisor, the ICA noted that other factors contributed to Ipsen's decision to quit, e.g., the impending sale of the company, which caused Ipsen anxiety regarding her job security, and her ankle injury. Ultimately, the ICA determined that the circuit court's finding that Ipsen was the moving party in the termination of the employment relationship was not clearly erroneous, id. at 487, 911 P.2d at 122, and that Ipsen had not satisfied her burden of demonstrating that she left her employment for good cause. Id. at 489-90, 911 P.2d at 124-25. We agree with the ICA that whether a person has been constructively discharged... rests on the determination of dual issues of voluntariness and `cause'. Id. at 486, 911 P.2d at 121. We thus adopt the straightforward analysis applied by the ICA in Ipsen.