Opinion ID: 2330825
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Exclusion of Proffered Testimony.

Text: The defendant argues the exclusion of certain testimony of Dr. Lambert and three defense witnesses was erroneous. We agree. On direct examination by the State, Dr. Lambert testified as to his training and experience with the treatment and diagnosis of child injuries, his training under Dr. Kempe, an international specialist and author of a treatise on The Battered Child Syndrome, and the acceptance of the battered child syndrome as a diagnosis not only in Franklin County, but in the State of Maine. Dr. Lambert also testified as to the nature and extent of Tina Easler's injuries and his diagnosis of Tina as an abused battered child. On cross-examination the doctor testified Patricia Easler told him it was she who had injured Tina. The defendant, out of the presence of the jury, through testimony of Dr. Lambert, then made an offer of proof that Patricia Easler had also told Dr. Lambert she had been an abused child, the details of such abuse, and the doctor's opinion that, consistent with his experience and the teachings and treatise of Dr. Kempe, abused children often become abusive parents. The trial justice deemed this testimony inadmissible as violative of M.R.Evid. 404(a). [3] The court also ruled inadmissible the testimony of three defense witnesses who, in offers of proof, indicated they would testify they were former neighbors of Patricia Easler and had seen her physically abuse her two older children. The court cited M.R.Evid. 404(a) as grounds for exclusion of this evidence. The defendant argues the exclusion of this testimony prevented him from pursuing a defense strategy of showing that Patricia Easler's confession had been true, and her later recantation false. We have previously recognized the right of a criminal defendant in appropriate circumstances ... to introduce evidence to show that another person committed the crime or had the motive, intent, and opportunity to commit it. State v. Le-Clair, 425 A.2d 182, 187 (Me.1981), citing Commonwealth v. Graziano, 368 Mass. 325, 329, 331 N.E.2d 808, 811 (1975); 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence §§ 139-142 (Tillers rev. 1983). The trial court also has discretion to exclude such evidence if it is too speculative or conjectural or too disconnected from the facts of the case against the defendant. LeClair, 425 A.2d at 187. See also State v. Ledger, 444 A.2d 404, 416 (Me.1982). In other words, evidence tending to implicate another person, and deflect guilt from the defendant, must be admitted if it is of sufficient probative value to raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's culpability. As we stated in LeClair, [T]he court should allow the defendant `wide latitude' to present all the evidence relevant to his defense, unhampered by piecemeal rulings on admissibility. 425 A.2d at 186. The presiding justice erred in his determination that M.R.Evid. 404(a) prohibited the introduction of this testimony. The medical testimony concerning battered child syndrome, and the eyewitness testimony of Patricia Easler's three former neighbors cannot fairly be called character evidence within the meaning of the rule. Field & Murray, Maine Evidence describes character as a generalized description of one's disposition, or of one's disposition in respect to a general trait, such as honesty, temperance, or peacefulness. § 406.1 at 75. The rationale behind the rule limiting inquiry into the character of a witness is to ensure the trial remains focused on the guilt or innocence of the accused, and avoids surprise, waste of time, and confusion, and makes the task of being a witness somewhat less unpleasant. M.R.Evid. 608 advisors' note. Such considerations supporting the rule make it obvious that it is not the rule's purpose to preclude the introduction of evidence such as here offered by the defendant. Patricia Easler told the jury she had confessed, then retracted that confession when faced with the loss of her children in the subsequent District Court proceeding; she also told the jury she had been indicted with the defendant, and was allowed to plead guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for her later testimony against the defendant; Detective Lesson's testimony informed the jury that Patricia Easler had herself been an abused child. In these circumstances, any evidence the defendant could adduce which would tend to prove the truthfulness of Easler's confession, and thereby raise a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's own guilt, should have been admitted for the jury's consideration. [4] The medical testimony of the State's expert witness concerning battered child syndrome, offered after the jury had heard evidence that Patricia Easler had been an abused child, tended only to rehabilitate her retracted confession. In State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892 (Me.1981), we held the trial court abused its discretion in excluding testimony concerning battered wife syndrome, offered by the defendant to support her claim of self-defense. We decided testimony as to how the syndrome may have been manifested in the defendant's behavior may have given the jury reason to believe that her conduct was consistent with her theory of self-defense. Id. at 894. Similarly, in the instant case, a description of battered child syndrome and the likelihood that Patricia's own history of child abuse would predispose her to abuse her own child, would have allowed the jury to weigh the credibility of Patricia's confession against the credibility of her later retraction. The defendant was improperly denied the opportunity to have the jury consider the credibility, based on all available evidence, of Patricia Easler's recantation of her confession to the crime with which the defendant was charged. We need not discuss the other issues on appeal because of the unlikelihood of their recurrence. The entry is: Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with the opinion herein. NICHOLS, ROBERTS and VIOLETTE, JJ., concurring.