Opinion ID: 1981209
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: exclusion of testimony as hearsay.

Text: The prosecution called accountant, John Myron, as a witness. On direct examination, Myron testified extensively concerning accounting work which he had done for Johnson and Midwestern in 1971 and 1972. He stated that late in October, 1971, John Weber (of the Wisconsin Department of Revenue) assisted Johnson in filling out and filing new WT-6 forms (forms which reflected the total amount of income tax withheld from employees and due to the state) because the original WT-6 forms filled out by Myron had never been filed. In response to the question, Did Mr. Johnson pay any amount at that time? Myron answered, Well, I know he didn't because later on he told me he hadn't. Defense counsel did not object to Myron's testimony. On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Myron if he specifically remembered any conversations with Mr. Johnson about his financial condition. The prosecution objected that to the extent that Myron's answers would involve statements of the defendant, they would be hearsay. The trial court sustained the objection. Defense counsel acknowledged that the statements, if made by the defendant, would be self-serving and stated in his offer of proof: . .. Well, Your Honor, we would show that this man that the statements were that he did instruct Mr. Johnson to pay these taxes and that Mr. Johnson indicated that he did not and we can ask the question of the witness and that he did not and that he was very concerned about it and it shows that he did not. But he indicated and expressed he did not control the funds. And he could not pay them and he was very disturbed about it. The trial court subsequently ruled that there would be no valid objection if Myron testified that based on his observations of the defendant during discussions of the question of the tax liability, and in his opinion, the defendant was concerned about making payments; but that Myron could not testify as to what was said by the defendant in that such statements that were self-serving would be inadmissible. Defendant contends that after a witness is called by the prosecution and testifies as to conversations with the defendant, the full substance of those conversations, as well as the substance of other conversations, elicited on cross-examination, between defendant and the witness which are favorable to defendant are not excludable as hearsay. The defendant argues that this court in Boller v. Cofrances (1969), 42 Wis.2d 170, 166 N.W.2d 129, buried forever the beyond the scope of direct examination objection to cross-examination and adopted the wideopen rule of cross-examination; and further that such rule is now expressed in sec. 906.11 (2), Stats. The extent of the holding in Boller and the nature of the objection of the prosecution to the testimony which was attempted to be elicited from Myron on cross-examination is misconceived. [1] The court in Boller, supra, removed the artificial and meaningless rule that only served to complicate and lengthen litigation by excluding all evidence simply because it was beyond the scope of direct examination. In an effort to insure the orderly presentation of evidence, this court in Boller placed the matter of the scope of cross-examination squarely within the sound discretion of the trial court. [2] That did not mean, however, that once a given area was opened up on direct examination, all matters related thereto, directly or indirectly, were admissible on cross-examination. The court, in Boller, recognized some restrictions on evidence admissible in cross-examination, stating at page 181: . . . If the question is relevant and is otherwise admissible and the information solicited is within the knowledge of the witness, it should be within the sound discretion of the trial judge to determine whether or not questions on cross-examination prevent an orderly and cogent presentation of the evidence. . . . Thus, under the rule of Boller, supra . the evidence sought to be elicited must still be otherwise admissible. No matter how wide-open cross-examination may be, there cannot be admitted evidence which is otherwise not admissible. That was exactly the nature of the prosecution's objection. The prosecution did not object to the scope of cross-examination; rather it objected to Myron's testimony as hearsay and the trial court sustained the objection on that ground. Thus, the prosecution's objection was that the evidence was not otherwise admissible in that it was hearsay. [3] Even if the evidence had been otherwise admissible, it still could have been excluded in the discretion of the trial judge if its harmful effects on the legal process outweighed its probative value. See Nimmer v. Purtell (1975), 69 Wis.2d 21, 230 N.W.2d and Neider v. Spoehr (1969), 41 Wis.2d 610, 165 N.W.2d 171. The question becomes whether the testimony of Myron, sought to be elicited on cross-examination was otherwise admissible. Johnson makes two arguments: First that that testimony was not hearsay; and second, that since Johnson's admissions against interest were admitted, then he should have a correlative right to introduce beneficial admissions on cross-examination. The Wisconsin Rules of Evidence were adopted by this court on June 5, 1973, effective January 1, 1974, 59 Wis.2d Rp. Hearsay is defined in sec. 908.01 (3), Stats., as . . . a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Sec. 908.02 provides that Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules adopted by the supreme court or by statute. The testimony sought to be elicited by the defendant was clearly hearsay. As appears from the offer of proof, the questions at issue would have elicited testimony from Myron that Johnson had stated that he was concerned about his failure to pay the withholding taxes but that he did not control the funds from which such payment could be made. The testimony was hearsay and Johnson, neither here, nor at the trial, has argued any exception to the hearsay rule under which the testimony might be admitted. Johnson argues that since admissions against interest were admitted, there should be a correlative right to introduce beneficial admissions on cross-examination. The Rules of Evidence do not allow for such symmetry in this case. Both the prosecution and the defense misconceive the nature of evidence elicited from Myron on direct examination. The testimony of Myron that Johnson stated that he had not paid the withholding tax, did not constitute hearsay, nor could it be classified as an admission against interest as that term is used by the parties. It was specifically excluded from the definition of hearsay under the provisions of sec. 908.01 (4) (b) 1, Stats., which states: (4) STATEMENTS WHICH ARE NOT HEARSAY. A statement is not hearsay if: (a) . . . . (b) Admission by party opponent. The statement is offered against a party and is: 1. His own statement, in either his individual or a representative capacity, . . . [4] The testimony of Myron on direct examination constituted evidence of an admission of the defendant, a party to this action, which was offered against the defendant, and it was admissible on this basis, not on the basis of any exception to the hearsay rule. [1] It appears that both the prosecution and the defense have confused admission [s] which are excluded from the definition of hearsay under sec. 908.01 (4) (b) 1, Stats., with STATEMENTS AGAINST INTEREST which are hearsay, but which are exceptions to the hearsay rule, under the provisions of sec. 908.045 (4). In Wisconsin Rules of Evidence, supra, R241, in the judicial council committee's notes, the observations by McCormick, sec. 240, [sic] [2] point out the problems of confusing the two:  `A type of evidence with which admissions may be confused is evidence of Declarations against Interest. Such declarations, coming in under a separate exception to the hearsay rule, to be admissible must have been against the declarant's interest when made. No such requirement applies to admissions. . . . Of course, most admissions are actually against interest when made, but there is no such requirement. Hence the common phrase in judicial opinions, admissions against interest is an invitation to confuse two separate exceptions to the hearsay rule. Other apparent distinctions are that admissions must be statements of a party to a lawsuit (or his predecessor or representative) and must be offered, not for, but against him, whereas the Declaration against Interest need not be and usually is not made by a party or his predecessor or representative, but by some third person. Finally the Declaration against Interest exception admits the declaration only when the declarant, by death or otherwise, has become unavailable as a witness, whereas obviously no such requirement is applied to admissions of a party.' In the same commentary at page R240, a rational basis for excluding such admissions from the definition of hearsay was set forth: . . . The reasons for the hearsay rule are not applicable. There is no need for a party to cross-examine himself nor should he be heard to require that his own statements be under oath. . . . The defendant's argument can have no merit when the Rules of Evidence state that one form of evidence, i.e., admissions offered against a party, under sec. 908.01 (4) (b) 1, Stats., shall not be hearsay, and another, i.e., self-serving statements of a declarant offered through another witness to prove the truth of the matter asserted, shall be hearsay. [5] The testimony sought to be elicited from the witness-Myron on cross-examination concerning self-serving statements made by the defendant was clearly hearsay and was properly excluded by the trial court. [6] Even if the trial court had committed error in excluding such testimony, it would not have been prejudicial. Johnson sought to elicit testimony that he was concerned about his failure to pay the withholding taxes and that he did not control the funds from which such payment could be made. Such testimony was subsequently given on the direct examination of Johnson himself, as well as on further cross-examination of Myron, and thus was properly before the jury.