Opinion ID: 1401004
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Claims Relevant to Both Stages

Text: Mr. Wilson alleges that his constitutional rights guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated because of the introduction of irrelevant, cumulative, and prejudicial evidence, including gruesome photographs, videos of the crime scene, and weapons. Federal habeas review is not available to correct state law evidentiary errors; rather, it is limited to violations of constitutional rights. Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257, 1275 (10th Cir.1999) (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1991)). When the habeas petitioner argues that evidence violated the Constitution, we consider whether the admission of evidence . . . so infected the sentencing proceeding with unfairness as to render the jury's imposition of the death penalty a denial of due process. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 12, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief when evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 825, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720 (1991) (citing Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 179-83, 106 S.Ct. 2464, 91 L.Ed.2d 144 (1986)).
We first address the photographs admitted during the trial's guilt phase. Specifically, Mr. Wilson argues that photographs of the victim's back and head in a pool of blood, a photograph of the victim's entire body face down on the floor, the back of the victim's shaved head, and an additional grotesque picture, were more prejudicial than probative. Pet. Br. at 48. The OCCA found that these photographs aided the medical examiner in his explanation of the wounds to the victim and manner of death and were relevant to show the cause of death and the intent of the attacker. Wilson I, 983 P.2d, at 468. The district court affirmed. Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at . Our role on habeas review is a limited one. The photographs, while gruesome, are relevant to the case. They allowed the examiner to show where the baseball bat caused various injuries. Additionally, these photographs, depicting the extent of the injuries, are probative of the attacker's intent to kill. See Willingham v. Mullin, 296 F.3d 917, 928-29 (10th Cir.2002) (photographs relevant to the critical element of intent to kill at the penalty phase). Though analyzed in a slightly different context, the Brown Court also found that these photographs were relevant. See Brown, 515 F.3d at 1084 (analyzed under prosecutorial misconduct). Finally, the evidence at the guilt phase was particularly strong. We have carefully reviewed the record and the arguments and conclude that the admission did not make the proceeding fundamentally unfair. See Thornburg v. Mullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1129 (10th Cir.2005) (Reviewing the record under AEDPA's constraints, and in light of the probative value of the pictures, the gruesome nature of the crime, and the other evidence incriminating [the defendant], the Court affirmed the OCCA's denial of relief.). Mr. Wilson also contends that evidence of the money found on his co-defendants was irrelevant, as the police found no money on him. We cannot agree. Mr. Wilson is charged with robbery, and the state's theory was that he acted in tandem with the other three defendants. The money was relevant evidence of the joint robbery.
Mr. Wilson argues that photographs introduced in the sentencing phase were unduly prejudicial, particularly photos of the victim's bruised knuckles and lacerated ring finger, and photos of the right and left sides of the victim's face. The OCCA found that these were probative of consciousness and were relevant to the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravating circumstance, and that none of the photos' prejudice was outweighed by their probative value. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 468. Mr. Wilson relies on Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215 (10th Cir.2003), to argue that the admission of the photographs in the sentencing phase unfairly persuaded the jury to sentence him to death. Spears is inapposite to this case. In Spears, the gruesome photographs were offered to prove conscious physical suffering; however, the evidence that the victim died or lost consciousness early in the beating was uncontroverted. Id. at 1227-28. [T]here was no logical connection between the photographs and the proposition they were offered to prove. Thornburg, 422 F.3d at 1129 (discussing Spears ). By contrast, most of the photographs offered at the sentencing phase here showed the defensive wounds on Yost's body, all which suggested that he experienced conscious suffering before his death. There was a logical connection between these photographs and the aggravator. The photographs of the right and left side of Yost's face, however, cannot be justified on these same grounds, as they do not depict defensive wounds. Regardless of whether they were improperly admitted, however, we cannot say that they rendered Mr. Wilson's trial fundamentally unfair. Unlike in Spears, where there was little evidence of conscious physical suffering, here, there was ample support for the jury to find the heinous, atrocious, or cruel aggravator. 343 F.3d at 1228 (Because the photographs were the primary aggravating evidence specifically presented at the second stage, they constitute a major part of the State's second-stage case.). The two photographs of Yost's face were not likely to misle[a]d the jury into finding this aggravator, and they did not render the trial fundamentally unfair. Id. Additionally, Mr. Wilson argues that the introduction of two guns at the sentencing phase was irrelevant and prejudicial. One gun was found during a traffic stop in 1995. Wilson was the driver and Brown the passenger; the gun was found under the passenger seat. The second gun was discovered by police when they stopped Mr. Wilson in connection with the 1994 drive-by-shooting. The OCCA held that the introduction of the weapons was proper because they supported the continuing threat aggravator. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 469. We agree and find no error here. During sentencing, the government introduced a post-autopsy photograph of the interior of the victim's skull. The OCCA found that the admission was error, stating that we fail to find the relevance of this photograph for second stage. Post-autopsy photographs generally are found to be inadmissible, for any probative value they have is substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect. Id. at 468. However, given the gory nature of the other photographs introduced at trial, which were properly admitted, the court found that any error was harmless. Id. at 469. We agree with the OCCA that the post-autopsy photograph was irrelevant, as it only demonstrated the medical examiner's work, and not any injuries from the defendant's attack. However, we also agree that the erroneously admitted photograph did not have a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 637, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). This was one photograph in a trial replete with gruesome evidence. Given our very limited role, we cannot conclude that the error was harmful. Thornburg, 422 F.3d at 1129; see also Brown, 515 F.3d at 1085.
Mr. Wilson also argues that the photographs and the crime scene video offered in both the guilt and sentencing phase were cumulative and irrelevant. He first argues that the photographic evidence depicting Yost's death was irrelevant because he did not inflict the wounds on Yost. This argument is meritless; even if he did not hit Yost himself, he was charged with felony murder. He also argues that the still photographs of the crime scene, the diagrams of the crime scene, the color photographs of the store aisles, of the handcuff on the floor, and of broken glass near the victim, were all cumulative of the crime scene video. The OCCA found that: [t]he still photographs taken from [the] video made it easier for witnesses to identify the defendants at the time certain events are taking place. Therefore, they were introduced for different purposes and are not cumulative. He claims that the diagrams and photographs of the scene were also cumulative of the crime scene video introduced during the second stage. The diagrams and the photographs of the scene were introduced to give the jury an idea of the layout of the store and different angles of the crime scene. The crime scene video gives the jury a walk through perspective of the crime scene. This information was relevant to prove the aggravating circumstances alleged by the State: that the murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel and that Wilson would commit future acts of violence which would constitute a continuing threat to society. The introduction of these separately did not result in the needless admission of cumulative evidence. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 468 (footnote omitted). After reviewing all the evidence, we agree that the photographs, crime scene video and diagrams all provided the jury with different perspectives of the crime scene and were used by witnesses to illustrate different aspects of their testimony. The evidence was not cumulative.
Mr. Wilson argues several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. He points to six episodes: (1) misstatements of facts made in closing statement; (2) demeaning and ridiculing him by calling him a psychopath; (3) improper attacks on defense counsel; (4) invocation of sympathy for the victim and the victim's family; (5) telling the jury it had a civic and moral duty to convict him; and (6) misstatements of the law. Mr. Wilson contends not only that each instance of misconduct is sufficient to violate his right to due process, but that even if each is harmless, the cumulative effect of the errors warrants relief. [N]ot every improper or unfair remark made by a prosecutor will amount to a federal constitutional deprivation. Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1129 (10th Cir.2000). Unless prosecutorial misconduct implicates a specific constitutional right, a prosecutor's improper remarks require reversal of a state conviction only if the remarks `so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.' Le v. Mullin, 311 F.3d 1002, 1013 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643, 94 S.Ct. 1868, 40 L.Ed.2d 431 (1974)). To determine whether a trial is rendered fundamentally unfair, we examine the entire proceeding, including the strength of the evidence against the petitioner, both as to guilt at that stage of the trial and as to moral culpability at the sentencing phase as well as any cautionary stepssuch as instructions to the juryoffered by the court to counteract improper remarks. Bland v. Sirmons, 459 F.3d 999, 1024 (10th Cir.2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). The ultimate question is whether the jury was able to fairly judge the evidence in light of the prosecutors' conduct. Id.
Mr. Wilson first complains that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence during his guilt phase closing argument when he stated that rolls of money were found in Mr. Wilson's car. The vehicle stopped by the police was not Mr. Wilson'she was only a passenger, and though rolls of money were found in the pockets of the three other occupants, none were discovered on Mr. Wilson. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 469. Because defense counsel failed to lodge a timely objection at trial, the OCCA reviewed the unpreserved claim for plain error. The OCCA agreed that this was a misstatement of fact, but held that, [i]n reviewing this misstatement of the facts in light of the totality of the evidence, we determine that this misstatement of fact by the prosecutor does not rise to the level of plain error. Id. The district court agreed. Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at . We agree with the OCCA's assessment. This was a minor misstatement in a trial where there was overwhelming evidence of Mr. Wilson's guilt on both the robbery and the first degree murder charge. Bland, 459 F.3d at 1024; Le, 311 F.3d at 1016. The prosecution introduced a videotape showing Mr. Wilson, along with the other three co-defendants, attacking Yost and dragging him into the back room. Mr. Wilson did not exit that room until after Harjo and Alverson retrieved the bat from the car. Additionally, several eye witnesses saw Mr. Wilson running the register at the QuikTrip during the time period in which the robbery and murder occurred. The prosecution also introduced Mr. Wilson's statement, albeit unrecorded, that the group had always planned on killing Yost. And finally, much of the evidence, including the baseball bat, was given to the police by Mr. Wilson's mother. This is more than ample evidence on which the jury could base a guilty verdict, notwithstanding the minor error. Mr. Wilson also claims that the prosecutor misrepresented Mr. Wilson's own statements about the planning of the crime. The prosecutor quoted Mr. Wilson as saying `[y]eah, we were going to kill him,' tr. trans. 2/14/97, at 17, and told the jury that Mr. Wilson confessed that the decision to kill Yost was made two weeks prior to the crime, id. at 18. Mr. Wilson contends that at no point during his recorded confession presented at trial did he make these statements. At trial, however, Detective Folks testified that Mr. Wilson made these statements during an unrecorded segment of the interview. The OCCA found that the prosecutor's statements were an accurate review of Folks' testimony and therefore not error. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 469. We agree with the OCCA that the prosecutor properly described Detective Folks' testimony.
During the sentencing phase closing argument, the prosecutor referred to Mr. Wilson as a psychopath, tr. trans. 2/20/97, at 46-47 and an animal, id. at 29, and suggested that he needed to be put. . . down to sleep. Id. The prosecutor also referred to Mr. Wilson as unadulterated evil and a psychopathic killer. Id at 46. Because defense counsel failed to object, the OCCA reviewed this claim for plain error. The OCCA held that use of the term psychopath was not error, as it was an accurate summary of trial testimony; as to the rest of the arguments, it held that though [t]he State should refrain from unwarranted personal criticism or name calling, the comments did not rise to the level of plain error. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 470. We agree with the OCCA that it was not error to call Mr. Wilson a psychopath. Dr. Reynolds, the defense mental health expert who testified at the sentencing phase, acknowledged that Mr. Wilson exhibited some characteristics of a psychopath, though he did not believe that Mr. Wilson precisely met this diagnosis. The prosecutor's comments were acceptable characterizations of Dr. Reynolds' concessions. As to the prosecutor's use of the terms animal and unadulterated evil to describe Mr. Wilson, we find the pejoratives unprofessional, inappropriate, and unworthy of an officer of the court. Nonetheless, there was ample evidence introduced by the state to support the three aggravators. The state incorporated all first stage evidence into the sentencing phase. Tr. trans. 2/18/97, at 102. It also introduced evidence that Mr. Wilson had prior convictions for transporting a loaded gun and an accessory after the fact to the 1994 murder, in which he also allegedly provided the ammunition for the homicide. Finally, the state introduced, through photographs of defensive wounds and video of the attack, evidence of the conscious physical and mental suffering experienced by Mr. Yost. When this evidence is juxtaposed against the minimal mitigating evidence offered by the defense, we agree with the OCCA that the name calling, however improper, did not rise to the level of plain error.
Mr. Wilson also alleges that the prosecutor improperly attacked defense counsel by asking a prospective juror during voir dire if he would let a smoke screen fool him, implying that it was defense counsel's job to trick the jury. Tr. trans. 2/5/97, at 133, 135. Defense counsel lodged a timely objection and requested a mistrial. The court denied the motion for a mistrial, sustained the objection and admonished the jury to disregard the statement as improper. Id. at 135. The OCCA found no error and held that [t]he prosecutor was merely asking the jury to use common sense to evaluate evidence and not be fooled by irrelevant information. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 470. Attacks on defense counsel can at times constitute prosecutorial misconduct. See, e.g., United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 9, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (counsel must not be permitted to make unfounded and inflammatory attacks on the opposing advocate.); United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 46 (1st Cir.1996) (The prosecutor is expected to refrain from impugning, directly or through implication, the integrity or institutional role of defense counsel.). While the prosecutor may have intended to implore the jury to use common sense, the comments were arguably disparaging and suggested that defense counsel intended to be untruthful. United States v. Procopio, 88 F.3d 21, 32 (1st Cir.1996) (prosecutor told the jury that defense arguments were illusions . . . a smoke screen aimed at creating . . . an illusion, which were arguably excessive belittlement). Even if the prosecutor's comments were improper, however, the trial court's admonition to the jury cured any error. And, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt discussed above, we do not believe that this single comment seriously affected the jury's deliberations. Id. at 32.
Mr. Wilson next argues that the prosecutor went too far when he invoked sympathy for the victim and the victim's family in his sentencing phase closing argument. The prosecutor asked the jury to put [themselves] in the victim's shoes. Each and every day you get up, you put on your clothes, and you go to work. You tie your shoes, you get offyou get off to work, you kiss your wife and your kids, if you have any, goodbye. And you don't know what the day might bring. You only have hope. And he left that particular night, on the 25th, hoping it to be just like an ordinary day in terms of what he would do. He didn't have the chance to tell Angela goodbye. He didn't have the chance to tell his two sons goodbye. . . . And if you find this man guilty, I submit to you he'll have more than 2 minutes and 11 seconds to ponder his death, much more than Richard Yost. Tr. trans. 2/20/97, at 30. Later on, in his rebuttal closing argument, the prosecutor stated I'm sorry that [Mr. Wilson's] mother has to wait 20 minutes to see him in jail. But you know what? Ms. Dorn right over there, guess how long she gets to wait to see her son [Mr. Yost] . . . [t]he rest of her life, she gets to wait to see Richard. Id. at 49. Mr. Wilson argues that these statements encouraged the jury to sentence him to death based on sympathy for the victim. Defense counsel failed to object to these statements, and so the OCCA reviewed for plain error. The OCCA held that [t]he State should not encourage the jury to impose the death penalty out of sympathy for the victims. This Court has specifically condemned many of the comments made in second stage, stating `[t]here is no reason for them and counsel knows better and does not need to go so far in the future.' No amount of mitigating evidence can counter this argument, and if the jury agrees they may not even consider mitigating evidence. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 470, (quoting Le v. State, 947 P.2d 535, 554-55 (Okla.Crim. App.1997) (alterations omitted)). However, while the OCCA found that the comments were error, they did not rise to plain error because Wilson has not shown that the jury improperly weighed the mitigating evidence in his case. Id. at 471. We do not condone prosecutorial remarks encouraging the jury to allow sympathy to influence its decision. Moore v. Gibson, 195 F.3d 1152, 1172 & n. 11 (10th Cir.1999) (prosecutor implored the jury to bring back a death verdict out of love for the [victims and parents] of the world and the future and the past victims of [petitioner]. (internal quotation marks omitted)). The jury should make decisions based on the strength of the evidence, and not on raw emotion, though we recognize that some emotional influence is inevitable. However, the OCCA's determination that these statements did not rise to the level of plain error was not an unreasonable application of clearly established law. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 470. The jury was instructed to consider only the evidence, and not sympathy, sentiment or prejudice in reaching its verdict. R. Vol. II, at 360, Jury Instruction 35. We assume, without more, that the jury followed this instruction. See Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n. 8, 107 S.Ct. 3102, 97 L.Ed.2d 618 (1987) (plurality opinion); see also Moore, 195 F.3d at 1173. Additionally, given the weak nature of the proffered mitigating evidence, we cannot say that the outcome would have been different had the prosecutor refrained from these inflammatory remarks. Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 795 (10th Cir.1998).
Mr. Wilson alleges that the prosecutor's remarks in his guilt phase closing argument encroached on the province of the jury by telling them they had a duty to convict Mr. Wilson. The prosecutor stated that Richard Yost, on the 26th day of February, 1995, was confronted with the fight of his life, and he lost. Sad, but true, he lost. He didn't have a choice. He had a judge, a jury, and executioner all in one. In the form of four individuals and a baseball bat. Now, it's your turn and you have a choice. You can deal with him accordingly. Find him guilty on Count 1, Murder in the 1st Degree and find him guilty on Count 2, Robbery with a Dangerous Weapon. Tr. Trans. 2/14/97, at 19-20. The prosecutor later argued that the jury process is [t]he great equalizer. This is where what was so unfair that night is now equalized. And he has to face the great equalizer that this system is. Because now, it's not four plus a bat on one. Now, it's one versus the justice the 12 of you can deliver to him in your verdict of guilty to murder. The great equalizer. Id. at 37. Defense counsel lodged timely objections to both statements. The OCCA held that [t]hese comments were tantamount to telling the jury that their job was to avenge the murder of Yost. The jury's duty is to determine the facts from the evidence, to follow the law, and to reach a verdict based upon the evidence. . . . The jury's duty is not to render a verdict out of a sense of vengeance or as `the great equalizer.' Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 471. Though the OCCA found that the comments were error, they were not so flagrant and of such a nature as to be prejudicial to the defendant. Id. It is improper for a prosecutor to suggest that a jury has a civic duty to convict. Thornburg v. Mullin, 422 F.3d 1113, 1134 (10th Cir.2005); see also Malicoat v. Mullin, 426 F.3d 1241, 1256 (10th Cir.2005); Spears v. Mullin, 343 F.3d 1215, 1247 (10th Cir.2003). Further, [i]t is of vital importance to the defendant and to the community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather than caprice or emotion. Bland, 459 F.3d at 1028 (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) (plurality opinion)). Appeals to the jury's emotion or sense of vengeance call[] into question the integrity of the criminal justice system by encouraging the jury to convict based on outrage, and not on the evidence. Id. Though we emphasize that these remarks were improper, we cannot find that the remarks deprived Mr. Wilson of a fundamentally fair trial because, as previously discussed, the evidence of guilt in this case was overwhelming. However, we remind the government that [p]rosecutors should be aware that arguments of this sort, while unnecessary to obtain a proper verdict, create grave risk of upsetting an otherwise unobjectionable verdict on appeal or on collateral review. It is time to stop. Id. Had this error occurred at the sentencing phase, for example, where the evidence in support of the aggravators was less overwhelming, the result might be different. But because we cannot find that the comments affected the outcome of the guilt phase, we find that the OCCA's judgment of harmless error was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Mr. Wilson's final complaint alleges that the prosecutor misstated law during voir dire and closing argument. During voir dire, the prosecutor, in front of the jury, objected to defense counsel's line of questioning, stating that [defense counsel's question implied] to the jurors that they personally are going to kill him. They'll be recommending a sentence. If we reach the punishment phase, they'll be recommending a sentence. Tr. Tran. 2/4/97, at 85. Mr. Wilson argues that this statement diminished the gravity of the jury's role in sentencing in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231 (1985). The OCCA held that this type of comment was not error. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 471. A death sentence is unconstitutional if the jury believes that the responsibility for deciding the appropriateness of the [death penalty] lies elsewhere. Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 329, 105 S.Ct. 2633. [T]o establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law. Romano v. Oklahoma, 512 U.S. 1, 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The OCCA has held that state law requires the jury to recommend a death sentence. See Humphreys v. State, 947 P.2d 565, 570 (Okla.Crim.App. 1997); Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 390 (Okla.Crim.App.1993) aff'd, 512 U.S. 1, 114 S.Ct. 2004, 129 L.Ed.2d 1 (1994). Therefore, the prosecutor's remarks did not improperly describe[ ] the role assigned to the jury by local law. Romano, 512 U.S. at 9, 114 S.Ct. 2004 (internal quotation marks omitted); compare with Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 330-33, 335-36, 105 S.Ct. 2633 (prosecutor suggested that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence rested with the appellate court that later reviewed the case; [that] argument ... cannot be said to be either accurate or relevant to a valid state penological interest.). Mr. Wilson next argues that the prosecutor misstated the law regarding who could be considered a principal to a crime. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked whether an individual that's present during the commission of a crime where an individual is killed ... is guilty of murder. Tr. Tran. 2/4/1997, at 54. He later questioned [i]f you have an instance where two people are involved in a crime, and one person is actually the person that hits the victim, let's say in the head, while the other one stands by and watches. Is the person that stands by and watches, in your mind, just as guilty as the person that actually hits the person? Id. at 164-65. The OCCA found that some of these statements were cured when the court sustained defense counsel's objections; the others did not give rise to plain error. The OCCA's decision was not contrary to clearly established federal law. The jury was properly instructed, at the close of trial, as to the requisite involvement a party must have to be responsible for felony murder. R. Vol. II, Box 2, Jury Instruction 25, 26, CR 2-4, CR 2-6, at 350-51 (Merely standing by, even if standing by with knowledge concerning the commission of a crime, does not make a person a principal to a crime.). Assuming, arguendo, that these remarks were erroneous, they did not so infect Mr. Wilson's trial with prejudice as to render it fundamentally unfair.
Mr. Wilson has two cumulative error arguments: first, he claims that the prosecutorial misconduct errors, in the aggregate, deprived him of a fair trial at either the guilt or sentencing phase; second, he argues that all errors during the guilt and sentencing phase deprived him of a fair trial. We analyze them together, and hold that the prosecutorial misconduct claims, combined with any other remaining errors, were not so prejudicial as to warrant relief. Cumulative error is present when the cumulative effect of two or more individually harmless errors has the potential to prejudice a defendant to the same extent as a single reversible error. Duckett v. Mullin, 306 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir.1990) (en banc)). A cumulative-error analysis merely aggregates all the errors that individually have been found to be harmless, and therefore not reversible, and it analyzes whether their cumulative effect on the outcome of trial is such that collectively they can no longer be determined to be harmless. Id. (quoting Rivera, 900 F.2d at 1470). In death penalty cases, we review whether the errors so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process, or rendered the sentencing fundamentally unfair in light of the heightened degree of reliability demanded in a capital case. Thornburg, 422 F.3d at 1137 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The OCCA found that none of the errors, considered cumulatively, required reversal. Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 472-73; Wilson III, 2006 WL 2289777, at . We must defer to this ruling unless it is an unreasonable application of the cumulative-error doctrine. This was far from a perfect trial, and we have found several errors, as did the OCCA. At the guilt phase, we found three examples of prosecutorial misconduct: (1) the prosecutor misstated facts about the money found in Mr. Wilson's car; (2) the prosecutor argued that the jury should convict as the great equalizer; (3) and the prosecutor disparaged defense counsel. We found no additional errors. As we have already stated, the prosecution's evidence at the guilt phase was quite strong. There was the videotape, the confession, the eyewitnesses, and the evidence left for the police by Mr. Wilson's mother. Despite the impermissible prosecutorial comments, it was not unreasonable for the OCCA to conclude that the jury had substantial evidence to convict Mr. Wilson of first-degree felony murder and that the errors did not result in a denial of due process. See Bland, 459 F.3d at 1029. We found several errors at the sentencing phase, including: (1) ridiculing Mr. Wilson as an animal who needed to be put ... down to sleep and unadulterated evil; (2) encouraging the jury to sentence Mr. Wilson to death out of sympathy for the victim and the victim's family; (3) introduction of the post-autopsy photo; and (4) introduction of unduly prejudicial victim impact evidence. These are the same errors found by the OCCA. For the purposes of cumulative error analysis, we will also assume, arguendo, that it was error to admit the photographs of Yost's bloody face. We do not consider Mr. Wilson's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim here, as, depending on the outcome of the proceedings below, it will either require reversal of Mr. Wilson's sentence anyway or, if the government offers strong rebuttal evidence against the affidavits drawing into doubt their credibility and requiring an evidentiary hearing, there may not be error at all. This might be a closer case had defense counsel put on stronger mitigation evidence at sentencing. However, given the lack of mitigating evidence, and the strength of the evidence supporting the aggravators, discussed earlier, we must determine that the OCCA reasonably applied clearly established federal law in finding that there was not cumulative error. Id. at 1029. Habeas relief on this ground is therefore denied. We think, however, that it is worth noting what the OCCA stated in its opinion. In assessing the cumulative error claim, the OCCA commented that we are confounded by the fact that experienced prosecutors jeopardize cases, in which the evidence is overwhelming, with questionable argument.... Wilson I, 983 P.2d at 471. We too are puzzled as to why prosecutors are willing to take such risks. We encourage those who take this gamble to reconsider.