Opinion ID: 1712397
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: whether the parties agreed to a specific provision contained within the settlement agreement.

Text: ¶ 27. Chantey argues that the ninth provision included in Zachary's letter memorializing the terms of the parties' settlement agreement should not be recognized as part of what was negotiated at mediation. [4] In direct contradiction of a prior argument, Chantey now asserts here that the signed mediation agreement speaks for itself and that parol evidence of an additional provision should not be considered. ¶ 28. Chantey presents this argument for the first time on appeal to this Court. In Southern v. Mississippi State Hosp., 853 So.2d 1212 (Miss.2003), we reiterated the important procedural tenet that [a] trial judge cannot be put in error on a matter not presented to him. Id. at 1214-15 ( see Mills v. Nichols, 467 So.2d 924, 931 (Miss.1985)). Precedent mandates that this Court not entertain arguments made for the first time on appeal as the case must be decided on the facts contained in the record and not on assertions in the briefs. Parker v. Miss. Game & Fish Comm'n, 555 So.2d 725, 730 (Miss. 1989) (citing Britt v. State, 520 So.2d 1377, 1379 (Miss.1988); Shelton v. Kindred, 279 So.2d 642, 644 (Miss.1973)). Stated clearly, [i]t is an elementary and familiar rule that we sit to review actions of the lower courts, and we will not undertake to consider matters which do not appear of record in the lower court, absent unusual circumstances. Cossitt v. Federated Guar. Mut. Ins. Co., 541 So.2d 436, 446 (Miss.1989) (citing Educational Placement Servs. v. Wilson, 487 So.2d 1316, 1320 (Miss.1986)). ¶ 29. The record clearly evidences the fact that Chantey did not present this argument in its motion to set aside mediation and did not present the argument at the motions hearing. Inasmuch as Judge Kidd has been denied the opportunity to decide this issue, we find this issue is not properly before this Court and thus decline to consider it. ¶ 30. Although, Chantey, as a corporate plaintiff, has not assigned as error the trial judge's denial of its request to permit Kazery's pro se representation of the corporation at trial, Chantey does mention several times in its brief that it was prejudiced by the trial court's disallowing Chantey, through Kazery, to cross-examine Malaco's witnesses, and to call and interrogate witnesses in Chantey's case-in-chief. Thus, Chantey makes an alternative argument that, at the very least, this Court should remand this case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing where both parties can actively participate and all evidence that pertains to this issue can be heard. However, in making this assertion, Chantey has not cited any authority in support of his contention that he is entitled to a new evidentiary hearing because of the trial judge's invocation of URCCC 1.06. Therefore, we are under no obligation to consider this proposition. Ferrell v. River City Roofing, Inc., 912 So.2d 448, 456 (Miss.2005) (citing Williams v. State, 708 So.2d 1358, 1362-63 (Miss. 1998)); Hoops v. State, 681 So.2d 521, 535 (Miss.1996). See also M.R.A.P. 28(a)(6).