Opinion ID: 2352189
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: manufacture of methamphetamine

Text: In the other identical offense sentencing issue, Snellings argues he should have been sentenced to a class A misdemeanor under K.S.A. 65-4164(a) (compounding a controlled substance containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine) and not a drug severity level 1 penalty under K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159 (manufacture of methamphetamine). The same identical offense sentencing doctrine principles discussed in the prior issue control this question. The statute under which Snellings was charged, K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(a), states it is unlawful for any person to manufacture any controlled substance. A violation of this law is a severity level 1 drug felony. K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(b). There are two components to this crime. The first is manufacture. Notably, the definition of manufacture includes compounding. K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4101(n). The second component requires that the result of the manufacturing process be any controlled substance. A controlled substance is defined by K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4150(a) as any drug, substance or immediate precursor included in any of the schedules designated in K.S.A. 65-4105, 65-4107, 65-4109, 65-4111 and 65-4113, and amendments thereto. K.S.A. 65-4105 lists Schedule I substances, K.S.A. 65-4107 lists Schedule II substances, K.S.A. 65-4109 lists Schedule III substances, K.S.A. 65-4111 lists Schedule IV substances, and K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4113 lists Schedule V substances. Methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled substance. See K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4101(e); K.S.A. 65-4107(d). The statute under which Snellings argues he should be sentenced, K.S.A. 65-4164(a), makes it is unlawful for any person to possess,... control, ... [or] compound ... any controlled substance designated in K.S.A. 65-4113. (Emphasis added.) A violation of K.S.A. 65-4164 is a class A nonperson misdemeanor unless the drug was prescribed for or administered, delivered, distributed, dispensed, sold, offered for sale or possessed with intent to sell to a child under 18 years of age. K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4113, which lists Schedule V substances, includes compounds containing any detectable quantity of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. Snellings argues this misdemeanor statute overlaps with K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(a) because compounding is the same as manufacturing and because a controlled substance is manufactured. The Court of Appeals panel rejected this argument. The panel agreed with Snellings that compounding and manufacturing were the same conduct, but the panel concluded the misdemeanor statute does not specifically apply to the manufacture of methamphetamine. The panel explained that K.S.A. 65-4164(a) only applies to any controlled substance designated in K.S.A. 65-4113.  (Emphasis added.) Methamphetamine is designated a controlled substance under K.S.A. 65-4107(d)(3), which defines Schedule II controlled substances, not K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4113, which defines Schedule V controlled substances. Hence, the Court of Appeals concluded the elements are not identical. Snellings, 2010 WL 2216900, at -2. In seeking our review, Snellings argues first that the specific controlled substance that is manufactured is irrelevant; what counts, Snellings contends, is that there is an intent to manufacture some type of a controlled substance. We disagree. Snellings was specifically charged with the manufacture of methamphetamine. Hence, that is what the State had to prove. In order for the statutes to be subject to the identical offense sentencing doctrine, both statutes must be ones under which the State could prosecute the charged crime. If one of the statutes could not be used to convict the defendant of the charged crime, it does not matter that the statutes may overlap in other respects. Rather, [w]hen two statutes contain overlapping provisions, this court must examine the facts in order to determine the area of overlap. Once it is determined which provisions of a statute apply, the only question is whether the overlapping provisions contain identical elements. State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 967, 179 P.3d 439 (2008) (citing Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 106 P.3d 1129). Because K.S.A. 65-4164(a) does not cover any controlled substances other than those listed in K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4113 and that statute does not list methamphetamine, the statute does not appear to overlap with K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(a), as it applies in this case. Snellings suggests that although the overlap is not obvious, it exists. To make this alternative argument, Snellings points out that the K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4113 list of controlled substances includes (e) [a]ny compound, mixture or preparation containing any detectable quantity of ephedrine, its salts or optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers and (f) [a]ny compound, mixture or preparation containing any detectable quantity of pseudoephedrine, its salts or optical isomers, or salts of optical isomers. (Emphasis added.) Snellings argues that ephedrine and pseudoephedrine are two ingredients commonly used to manufacture methamphetamine and, therefore, there is overlap. To support this argument, Snellings cites State v. McAdam, 277 Kan. 136, 83 P.3d 161 (2004), and Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 106 P.3d 1129. Snellings' reliance on these cases is misplaced. McAdam was convicted of conspiracy to unlawfully manufacture methamphetamine in violation of K.S.A. 21-3302(a) and K.S.A. 65-4159(a). On appeal, he argued his sentence was illegal because it was imposed under K.S.A. 65-4159(a), a severity level 1 drug felony, rather than the lesser penalty under K.S.A. 65-4161(a). At the time of the McAdam decision, K.S.A. 65-4159(a) read: Except as authorized by the uniform controlled substances act, it shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture any controlled substance or controlled substance analog. In turn, as in the present case, manufacture was statutorily defined as the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion or processing of a controlled substance.... (Emphasis added.) K.S.A. 65-4101(n). And methamphetamine was classified as a controlled substance under K.S.A. 65-4101(e) and K.S.A. 65-4107(d)(3). McAdam argued that under the identical offense sentencing doctrine, he should have been sentenced under the lesser offense defined in K.S.A. 65-4161(a), which at the time, read in part: `Except as authorized by the uniform controlled substances act, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale or have in such person's possession with intent to sell, deliver or distribute; prescribe; administer; deliver; distribute; dispense or compound any opiates, opium or narcotic drugs, or any stimulant designated in subsection (d)(1), (d)(3) or (f)(1) of K.S.A. 65-4107 and amendments thereto.' (Emphasis added.) McAdam, 277 Kan. at 142, 83 P.3d 161. The court agreed with McAdam and found that the two statutes had identical elements; both forbade the compounding of methamphetamine. Because the two statutes were identical with respect to McAdam's conduct, he could be sentenced under only the lesser penalty found in K.S.A. 65-4161(a). This court vacated McAdam's sentence and remanded for resentencing as a severity level 3 drug felony. McAdam, 277 Kan. at 146-47, 83 P.3d 161. That holding does not apply in this case, however, because the statute considered in McAdam is distinguishable from the statute Snellings wishes to have applied. More specifically, the statute at issue in McAdam, K.S.A. 65-4107(d)(3), listed methamphetamine by name. Consequently, the McAdam court did not analyze whether there would have been identical offenses if the defendant had been charged with manufacturing methamphetamine and the allegedly overlapping statute had prohibited the manufacture of a product containing a detectible quantity of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. Likewise, the second case cited by Snellings does not support his argument. In State v. Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 14-15, 106 P.3d 1129 (2005), this court applied the identical offense sentencing doctrine analysis from McAdam to conclude that possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to use it to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3) was identical to possession of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine with the intent to produce a controlled substance in violation of K.S.A. 65-7006(a). Again, both statutes overlapped to include methamphetamine as a controlled substance and the Campbell court's analysis hinged on whether ephedrine and pseudoephedrine were items of drug paraphernalia, not on whether methamphetamine was identical to a compound containing detectable quantities of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. While neither McAdam nor Campbell assist in our analysis on this point, a comparable analysis is found in Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 179 P.3d 439. The defendant in Cooper pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine under K.S.A. 65-4159(a), but he argued that the offense was identical to a less severe offense, the use of drug paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine under K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(3). This court held that the offenses were not identical because the general statute prohibiting the manufacture of methamphetamine did not require the State to prove that a defendant used paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine. Cooper, 285 Kan. at 967, 179 P.3d 439. Therefore, even though, as a factual matter, paraphernalia must have been used to manufacture methamphetamine and evidence could had been admitted to establish the use of that paraphernalia, the jury was not required to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant used paraphernalia to gain a conviction for manufacture of methamphetamine. Cooper, 285 Kan. at 967, 179 P.3d 439. The Cooper court also observed that the legislature designed the statutes to more severely punish those who manufacture methamphetamine and to less severely punish those who merely possess drug paraphernalia used to manufacture methamphetamine. Cooper, 285 Kan. at 967-68, 179 P.3d 439; see State v. Thompson, 287 Kan. 238, 260-61, 200 P.3d 22 (2009) (following Cooper ). While Cooper is not controlling, its analysis is persuasive. Just as the prosecution did not have to prove that Cooper used ephedrine or pseudoephedrine to manufacture methamphetamine, the prosecution in this case did not have to prove that Snellings manufactured a product containing detectable quantities of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine. Thus, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that manufacture of methamphetamine under K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(a) is not identical to compounding a controlled substance containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine under K.S.A. 65-4164(a). Snellings, 2010 WL 2216900, at . Accord State v. Dick, No. 98,120, ___ Kan.App.2d ___, 2009 WL 1393738, at -11 (Kan.App.2009) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 290 Kan. 1097 (2010); State v. Beal, No. 98,682, ___ Kan. App.2d ___, 2009 WL 743156, at -4 (Kan. App.) (unpublished opinion), rev. denied 289 Kan. 1280 (2009). After reaching this conclusion, the Court of Appeals panel took a detour in its analysis that seems to arise from confusion over the application of our previous cases. In explaining the reason for the detour, the panel stated that based on the analysis used in both the Cooper and [ State v. Fanning, 281 Kan. 1176, 1180, 135 P.3d 1067 (2006),] cases, this court must examine the facts of the case before reaching a definitive ruling on the similarity of the statutes for sentencing purposes. Snellings, 2010 WL 2216900, at . Instead of examining the facts for the limited purpose of determining whether the statutes overlapped, the Court of Appeals examined the factual proffer presented at the plea hearing to determine if there was a showing that Snellings had a substance which retained both the characteristics of the pseudoephedrine that it used to be and the methamphetamine that it would become. Snellings, 2010 WL 2216900, at . The Court of Appeals further noted: It would have been impossible for the State to prove that Snellings `compounded' a mixture containing pseudoephedrine under K.S.A. 65-4164(a), because there was no `compounding' occurring in the vehicle at the time of Snellings' arrest. Snellings, 2010 WL 2216900, at . On other occasions, the Court of Appeals has engaged in a similar analysis of how the facts of the particular case may fit the statute that is argued to be identical. Often these cases comment on confusion caused by some language in Fanning. See State v. Moore, 39 Kan.App.2d 568, 590, 181 P.3d 1258, rev. denied 286 Kan. 1184 (2008) (This court has sometimes struggled with the application of Fanning. However, generally, we have concluded that where the record contains evidence that the defendant actually used paraphernalia, manufacturing and possession of drug paraphernalia are identical offenses for sentencing purposes.); State v. Allen, No. 95,628, ___ Kan.App.2d ___, 2007 WL 4158070, at  (Kan.App.2007) (unpublished opinion) ([T]he outcome of Fanning would apparently have been different if the record had supported Fanning's argument that he used drug paraphernalia to attempt to manufacture methamphetamine.). In Fanning, 281 Kan. 1176, 135 P.3d 1067, this court considered whether the identical offense doctrine applied to the offenses of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine and possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. One of Fanning's arguments was that attempted manufacture was an identical offense to possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to manufacture because the term `use' in K.S.A. 65-4152(a)(2) is equivalent to the term `manufacture' in K.S.A. 65-4159. Fanning, 281 Kan. at 1183, 135 P.3d 1067 (K.S.A. 65-4152[a][2] prohibited the possession or use of drug paraphernalia to use ... or otherwise introduce into the human body a controlled substance.). After indicating that, in resolving identical offense issues, courts must consider the underlying facts in relation to the statutory elements to determine whether the offenses are identical, the Fanning court concluded the doctrine did not apply. Fanning, 281 Kan. at 1183, 135 P.3d 1067. This court stated: Although the elements are nearly identical, they are not completely identical. Attempted manufacture of methamphetamine requires an additional element not found in possession of drug paraphernalia [prevented or intercepted in actually manufacturing methamphetamine]. Consequently, the two crimes are not identical under the rules applied in both McAdam and Campbell, which required the elements proven to be exactly the same under each statute. Fanning, 281 Kan. at 1183, 135 P.3d 1067. After reaching this conclusion, the Fanning court went on to address the defendant's use argument and found the record does not support Fanning's argument that he used drug paraphernalia to attempt to manufacture methamphetamine. The evidence in this case merely establishes possession of drug paraphernalia. There are no facts to establish that Fanning actually used the paraphernalia for any reason. Fanning, 281 Kan. at 1184, 135 P.3d 1067. This appears to be a peripheral analysis of the term use that was not intended to circumvent the court's focus on the statutory elements at issue in the case. In other words, even if the record had supported Fanning's argument that he used drug paraphernalia to attempt to manufacture methamphetamine, the elements would not have been identical because there remained an additional element in the attempt crime. But it is this discussion in Fanning that appears to have caused the confusion. Despite this factual examination, the Fanning court returned its focus to the statutory elements, holding: Limiting our analysis to McAdam and Campbell and the facts as supported by the record in relation [to] the statutory elements of these crimes, we hold that the offense of attempted manufacture of methamphetamine is not identical to the offense of possession of drug paraphernalia with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Fanning, 281 Kan. at 1184, 135 P.3d 1067. Two years later in Cooper, this court cited Fanning for the concept that [o]ffenses are identical when they have the same elements and to reiterate that for sentencing purposes, an appellate court must consider the statutory elements in conjunction with the underlying facts. [Citations omitted.] Cooper, 285 Kan. at 966, 179 P.3d 439. The Cooper court then clarified that the identification of elements ultimately controls. As we have previously quoted, the Cooper court stated: When two statutes contain overlapping provisions, this court must examine the facts in order to determine the area of overlap. Once it is determined which provisions of a statute apply, the only question is whether the overlapping provisions contain identical elements. Then, in the next sentence, the court stressed:  That determination is made from the statute.  (Emphasis added.) Cooper, 285 Kan. at 967, 179 P.3d 439 (citing Campbell, 279 Kan. 1, 106 P.3d 1129). In other words, the facts of the case are only relevant to determine which provisions of a statute applya preliminary stepnot as a final step of examining the record to determine what evidence was used to prove the overlapping elements. For example, in this case, we look to the facts to tell us that Snellings was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine. Once this is established, a comparison of the elements of K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(a) and K.S.A. 65-4164(a) reveals that there is no overlap because methamphetamine is not a controlled substance to which K.S.A. 65-4164(a) applies. Consequently, the manufacture of methamphetamine under K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(a) does not overlap with and is not identical to compounding a controlled substance containing ephedrine or pseudoephedrine under K.S.A. 65-4164(a). We therefore affirm Snellings' sentence for manufacture of methamphetamine as a severity level 1 drug felony.