Opinion ID: 1373552
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: the maloy matter

Text: Mr. Maloy testified that in January 1972, he retained petitioner for $150 to dissolve his marriage, to negotiage with his creditors and to file a chapter 13 proceeding in the federal bankruptcy court. Petitioner subsequently agreed to pursue the divorce, setting a fee of $325. At a third meeting a month later, petitioner sought to excuse his failure to prepare the papers by saying his secretary had been away. Thereafter, petitioner failed to communicate with Mr. Maloy even though Mr. Maloy called petitioner's office on at least 15 occasions. During this time Mr. Maloy was advised that the phone was disconnected, petitioner was not in, or the office was locked during normal business hours. Petitioner did not proceed with the divorce action or with the insolvency matter. Mr. Maloy wrote to petitioner discharging him from the insolvency and dissolution matters and requesting refund of the $150. The $150 was never refunded. Petitioner did not appear at the local committee hearing on the Maloy matter. Two notices of hearing date were sent to petitioner's address. A State Bar investigator who went to petitioner's home was advised by his wife on the day before the hearing that petitioner had left for New York City more than a month earlier and had not been heard from since. Petitioner's mail had not been forwarded. He first asserts that the local committee hearing was improperly continued more than 30 days after the hearing on the other matters. Rule 34 of the State Bar Rules of Procedure permits continuances of more than 30 days with approval of a member of the Board of Governors who resides in the district in which the proceeding is pending. Such approval was obtained. Petitioner states that if permitted to present a defense he would show that the initial payment of $150 was to investigate the matters, that he did so, and subsequently agreed to represent Maloy at the rate of $50 per hour for the creditor matter and $325 for the divorce, but that no such payment was made and that he was therefore not obligated to represent Maloy. (1) Not having appeared before the local committee at the time properly set for the matter, petitioner may not now demand that this court consider evidence which should have been presented to the committee. ( Glover v. State Bar (1939) 13 Cal.2d 229, 232 [88 P.2d 922]; Shaeffer v. State Bar (1934) 220 Cal. 681, 687 [32 P.2d 140]; cf. Alkow v. State Bar (1971) 3 Cal.3d 924, 933-934 [92 Cal. Rptr. 278, 479 P.2d 638].) (2) Petitioner's counsel contends in the reply brief that petitioner should not have been permitted to represent himself. Petitioner represented himself at the hearing before the local administrative committee on the first three matters and was represented by other counsel before the Disciplinary Board of the State Bar. [1] He never indicated to the local committee that he wished to have counsel represent him, and may not now claim lack of representation. ( Oliver v. State Bar (1974) 12 Cal.3d 318, 321, fn. 2 [115 Cal. Rptr. 639, 525 P.2d 79]; Yokozeki v. State Bar, supra, 11 Cal.3d 436, 447; Hyland v. State Bar (1963) 59 Cal.2d 765, 773 [31 Cal. Rptr. 329, 382 P.2d 369].) (3) Petitioner further contends that the board's recommendation for suspension is not warranted by the evidence. Petitioner's pattern of abdicating his duties owed to his clients constitutes moral turpitude and violates the oath petitioner took upon admission to practice  to discharge faithfully the duties of an attorney to the best of his knowledge and ability. ( Schullman v. State Bar (1973) 10 Cal.3d 526, 528, fn. 1 [111 Cal. Rptr. 161, 516 P.2d 865]; Ridley v. State Bar (1972) 6 Cal.3d 551, 560 [99 Cal. Rptr. 873, 493 P.2d 105].) Moreover, Misappropriation of a client's property is a gross violation of general morality likely to undermine public confidence in the legal profession and therefore merits severe punishment. ( Yokozeki v. State Bar, supra, 11 Cal.3d 436, 450.) Accepting the recommendation of the board ( Schullman v. State Bar, supra, 10 Cal.3d 526, 540), we order that commencing 30 days after filing of this opinion, petitioner be suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months, and until he has made restitution totalling $733.34 to his clients in the four separate matters.