Opinion ID: 495206
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Herring and Harasek

Text: 64 We turn first to the claims asserted by both plaintiffs against Chief Herring, and by Stevens against Officer Harasek. Plaintiffs fail to present even the barest factual support for their claims of constitutional violations by either Herring or Harasek, and we therefore order the district court to dismiss these claims. Stevens' common law tort claim against Harasek, while cognizable on its face under District of Columbia law, cannot survive Harasek's responding motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity.
65 Martin and Stevens asserted essentially identical claims against Chief Herring: 66 On information and belief, persons other than Plaintiff have been arrested by and assaulted by U.S. Park Police officers, when they had violated no law and are afterward charged with the offense of Disorderly Conduct and Disobeying the Order of a Police officer. Most, if not all, of these charges are dismissed before being brought to trial.... 67 On information and belief, ... Defendants have either affirmatively permitted this practice of arrest of persons without probable cause or have failed to establish systems and procedures adequate to provide reasonable assurances that persons are not improperly arrested and assaulted.... 42 68 Chief Herring moved for immediate judgment dismissing these claims in both actions; he asserted that plaintiffs had not set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial 43 regarding the existence of the alleged unconstitutional arrest policy. The district court denied Herring's motions without prejudice. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs' allegations are unsupported and conclusory, 44 but found Herring's summary judgment motions premature: Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 when faced with a motion for summary judgment a party is entitled to discovery sufficient to enable him to oppose the motion. 45 Plaintiffs, the district court ruled, had not had an opportunity to pursue sufficient discovery, and Herring's motions were therefore denied. 69 Application of pre-trial procedural rules to actions for damages against public officers is a perplexing, still developing area of the law. We set forth below our understanding of the current state of the governing precedent, and we explain why we hold that immediate judgment must be entered in Chief Herring's favor. 70 Herring's appeal presents two discrete questions. First, did the evidence indicate a genuine issue, within the meaning of Rule 56, as to Herring's responsibility for, or participation in, the alleged practice of arrest of persons without probable cause? This question is readily resolved, for we find no factual support for plaintiffs' claims that a pattern of arrests without cause pervades U.S. Park Police practices. Each plaintiff points to a single instance--his or her own arrest--as illustrative of the alleged unlawful pattern; beyond these personal encounters, plaintiffs tender only the conclusory allegations to which the district court referred. 46 71 Our opinion in Carter v. District of Columbia, 795 F.2d 116 (D.C.Cir.1986), highlights the deficiencies in plaintiffs' presentations. In Carter, plaintiffs alleged a similar policy or established custom of deliberate indifference to police misconduct, id. at 122, on the part of the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department and the Chief of Police. We upheld the entry of directed verdicts in both defendants' favor; 47 while plaintiffs came forward with evidence of assorted actual instances of misconduct, 48 id. at 124, their catalog of disquieting events [was] not sufficient to demonstrate a pervasive pattern of police officer indulgence in the use of excessive force, persisting in the District because of the MPD's tacit approval. Id. at 123. The incidents cited by the Carter plaintiffs were scattered, id., and did not support an inference that the instances would not [have] occur[red] but for municipal tolerance of the practice in question. Id. at 124. 72 As the basis for inferring a general practice in their cases, Martin and Stevens urge instances of alleged police misconduct not merely scattered but wholly isolated. One instance, however egregious, does not a pattern or practice make. As the Supreme Court has recently observed, a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to establish that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at trial--an apt description of Martin and Stevens here--cannot withstand an opponent's motion for summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). 73 We thus can answer the first question (did the evidence cited by plaintiffs indicate a genuine issue) by straightforward application of familiar principles governing resolution of motions under FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c); we need take no special cognizance of the defendant's immunity claims in reaching our conclusion. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 807 F.2d 180, 188-89 (D.C.Cir.1986) (Harlow's reformulation of the qualified immunity defense did not ... alter the burden that rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure places on the movant to demonstrate, as a condition of summary judgment, that the objective inquiry raises 'no genuine issue as to any material fact....' ); 49 see also Briggs v. Goodwin, 698 F.2d 486, 489 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.) (the rules governing summary judgment in cases involving officials claiming a qualified immunity do not differ from those applicable in other contexts), vacated on other grounds, 712 F.2d 1444 (D.C.Cir.1983). 74 This brings us to the second question Herring's appeal raises: did the district court err in deferring final disposition of Herring's motions in order to give plaintiffs an opportunity to uncover, through discovery, specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial? See FED.R.CIV.P. 56(e). We hold, in light of the special nature of the immunity defense, that dispositive rulings on Herring's motions should not have been deferred. 75 While [a] plaintiff's hope that further evidence may develop prior to trial is an 'insufficient basis upon which to justify the denial of [defendant's summary judgment] motion,'  Martin, 812 F.2d at 1430 (emphasis added), quoting Contemporary Missions, Inc. v. United States Postal Service, 648 F.2d 97, 107 (2d Cir.1981), a district judge may defer a final ruling on that motion, pending further discovery, where the nonmovant avers that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(f). Indeed, a reasonable opportunity to complete discovery before grappling with a summary judgment motion is the norm. See Celotex, 106 S.Ct. at 2554-55 (any potential problem with ... premature [summary judgment] motions can be adequately dealt with under Rule 56(f), which allows [deferral of] a summary judgment motion ... if the nonmoving party has not had an opportunity to make full discovery); see also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787-88 (D.C.Cir.1971) (Rule 56[ (f) ] clearly contemplates that the parties shall have opportunity for deposition in order to establish the existence of a material issue); Sames v. Cable, 732 F.2d 49, 51-52 (3d Cir.1984) (reversing district court's entry of summary judgment for defendants where pertinent discovery requests were outstanding). See generally 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Sec. 2741 at 541-48 (2d ed. 1983) (One of the most common reasons offered under Rule 56(f) for being unable to present specific facts in opposition to a summary judgment motion is insufficient time or opportunity to engage in discovery.). 76 Where public official defendants invoking an immunity from suit are involved, however, a case is no longer ordinary in this regard, for [d]iscovery is itself one of the burdens from which defendants are sheltered by the immunity doctrine. Martin, 812 F.2d at 1430; see also Anderson, --- U.S. at ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3042 n. 6 (One of the purposes of the Harlow qualified immunity standard is to protect public officials from the 'broad-ranging discovery' that can be 'peculiarly disruptive of effective government'.), quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817, 102 S.Ct. at 2737-38; Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2815, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1986) (the essence of official immunity is its possessor's entitlement not to have to ... stand trial or face the other burdens of litigation ) (emphasis added); Smith, 807 F.2d at 200-201 (Harlow directed against the primary evil of  'broad-ranging discovery and the deposing of numerous persons' ), quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-17, 102 S.Ct. at 2736-37. 77 Two lines of authority are thus opposed, one tending towards deferral of a ruling on Herring's summary judgment motions, the other towards immediate final disposition. Our precedent attempts to reconcile this conflict by applying the above-mentioned heightened pleading standard, see supra p. 253, to damage actions against government officials, requiring plaintiffs normally to come forward with nonconclusory allegations of evidence [if they are] to proceed to discovery on the claim. Hobson, 737 F.2d at 29. This standard would not serve its intended function--protecting public officials from becoming unduly enmesh[ed] in protracted discovery, Hobson, 737 F.2d at 30--unless it were read to restrict the otherwise applicable authority of a trial judge to permit discovery to proceed so that plaintiffs can uncover facts essential to justify [their] opposition to a motion for summary judgment. FED.R.CIV.P. 56(f). 78 The heightened pleading standard will thus operate, in practice, much like Rule 9(b)'s requirement that the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated [in the complaint] with particularity. FED.R.CIV.P. 9(b) (emphasis added). Because conclusory allegations of unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct will not withstand a public official's dispositive pre-trial motion, and because plaintiffs cannot expect the court's assistance in obtaining the necessary factual support, plaintiffs bringing suit against public officials generally must put forward, in their complaints or other supporting materials, greater factual specificity and particularity than is usually required. 79 We emphasize that this heightened standard restricts, but does not eliminate, the trial court's Rule 56(f) discretion. See Martin, 812 F.2d at 1436-38 (a blanket restriction on all discovery prior to the resolution of the qualified immunity issue could in some circumstances unfairly penalize plaintiffs seeking  'crucial facts ... in the control of the opposing party' ), quoting Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1278 (D.C.Cir.1981). Difficult cases will no doubt arise calling for fine judgments as to the sufficiency of a plaintiff's showing. Martin and Stevens, however, do not tender such a case. We have no warrant to subject Park Police officials to a fishing expedition in government waters, Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 807 F.2d 204, 208 (D.C.Cir.1986), on the basis of wholly unsubstantiated charges. The broadsides against Herring levelled by Martin and Stevens fail to make out a prima facie case that Herring affirmatively permitted repeated illegal activity on the part of his subordinates; indeed, the allegations do not support even the most tenuous of inferences that such activity routinely took place. Accordingly, we remand this portion of the proceedings with instructions that judgment be entered in Herring's favor on all claims against him.
80 Stevens brought two claims against Officer Harasek, one for conspir[ing] to violate her constitutional rights [in violation of] 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985, 50 the other for negligently breach[ing] [his] affirmative duty to intervene and prevent Defendant Stover from unlawfully arresting and assaulting Plaintiff. 51 In support of her constitutional claim, Stevens alleged that Harasek made untrue statements [s]imilar 52 to those made by Officer McKinstry--i.e., that Stevens was honking her horn while in traffic and that she drove away from [McKinstry] when he attempted to obtain her license and registration 53 --statements subsequently used in an effort to obtain an indictment against Plaintiff. 54 As to her common law claim, Stevens asserted that Harasek [stood] there with his hands in his pocket while she was being forcibly and brutally handcuffed and pressed against the rear of her vehicle[.] 55 81
82 As the district court observed, to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1985, Stevens must allege: 83 (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, ... and (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either injured in her person or property or deprived of any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States. 84 Hobson, 737 F.2d at 14; see Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-103 (1971). The statute does not apply to all conspiratorial tortious interferences with the rights of others, but only those motivated by some class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus. Hobson, 737 F.2d at 14. 85 The district court denied Harasek's motion for dismissal of this claim, or in the alternative for summary judgment, with this observation: 86 To make out her prima facie case plaintiff relies on Metropolitan Police Department documents showing that defendants Stover and Harasek conferred before officer McKinistry testified before the grand jury. The requisite discriminatory animus is found in the reference to the plaintiff by one officer as a black bitch. This is adequate to survive a motion to dismiss. 56 87 We disagree. [U]nsupported factual allegations which fail to specify in detail the factual basis necessary to enable [defendants] to intelligently prepare their defense, will not suffice to sustain a claim of governmental conspiracy to deprive [plaintiff] of [her] constitutional rights. Hobson, 737 F.2d at 30, quoting Ostrer v. Aronwald, 567 F.2d 551, 553 (2d Cir.1977); see also id. at 30 n. 87 (citing cases requiring particularity in pleading civil rights complaints). Here again, measuring Stevens' claim against the indicated heightened pleading standard must result in its dismissal. The record shows only that Harasek conferred with Officer Stover prior to Officer McKinstry's grand jury testimony, and that Harasek's allegedly false statements helped to secure Stevens' indictment. Even accepting these two factual allegations as true, the inference Stevens is apparently asking us to draw--that the three officers agreed to testify falsely and thereby obtain Stevens' indictment--is a most tenuous one, hardly an adequate foundation on which to base a complaint of this kind. 57 88
89 Stevens next maintains that Harasek's failure to intervene on her behalf while Officer Stover was assaulting her constitutes an actionable breach of Harasek's duty to protect her from harm. This claim is met, first, by Harasek's assertion that he owed Stevens no such duty and that, as a result, no cognizable negligence claim has been stated. 58 90 As far as we can determine, this precise question--whether a law enforcement officer is answerable in damages for standing by and failing to protect a member of the public from an assault allegedly perpetrated by a fellow officer--has never been squarely addressed by the District of Columbia courts. We are satisfied, nonetheless, that Stevens' complaint, at the threshold, stated a cognizable claim under principles reflected in case law governing negligence actions against law enforcement officers in the District of Columbia. 91 In two recent cases, the D.C. Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, has considered a question bearing upon the one presented here: in what circumstances is a police officers' general duty to protect the public from harm a sufficient base on which to premise liability for a failure to protect an individual from harm caused by a third party? Morgan v. District of Columbia, 468 A.2d 1306 (D.C.1983) (en banc); Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.1981) (en banc). As these cases make clear, only where the police and the individual are in a special relationship different from that existing between police and citizens generally, Warren, 444 A.2d at 5, can a sufficiently particularized duty to protect arise rendering the officer potentially liable for a failure to act. See also Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1312-15. 59 Absent any such special relationship, the officer's duty is a public duty, for neglect of which the officer is answerable to the public and punishable by indictment only. Id. at 1311, quoting South v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 396, 403, 15 L.Ed. 433 (1856). 92 In determining whether the necessary special relationship exists in a given situation, the District of Columbia courts look to see whether the police have beg[un] to act in behalf of a particular citizen in such a way as to raise significantly the quotient of risk over and above the risks assumed by every other member of the community. Id. at 1312. Requiring some affirmative undertaking to protect a particular individual, id. at 1314, before a specific duty to the plaintiff will be recognized avoids conflict with the primary policy supporting the no-duty rule: the practical realization that individuals, juries and courts are ill-equipped to judge 'considered legislative-executive decision[s]' as to how particular community resources should be or should have been allocated to protect individual members of the public. Id. at 1311, quoting Riss v. City of New York, 22 N.Y.2d 579, 579, 293 N.Y.S.2d 897, 240 N.E.2d 860 (1968). Once the police have exercised [their] discretion and chosen to act, imposing a duty to proceed with reasonable care to protect people whom they have particularly placed in peril  does not interpose the judgment of a jury for the discretion of the police. Morgan, 468 A.2d at 1313 (emphasis added). 93 We think Officer Stover's affirmative undertakings--forcibly removing Stevens from her car, handcuffing her and placing her in police custody--sufficient to establish a special relationship between Stevens and the police. Once Stevens was denied, by Stover's actions, the most basic means of self-protection, the quotient of risk to which she was exposed rose significantly; the officers thus incurred an obligation to take reasonable steps to insure that the physical harm to which Stevens was vulnerable did not materialize. 94 We express no opinion as to the extent of that obligation or the steps a reasonable officer in Harasek's position must take in order to satisfy it. We hold only that Stevens' allegations set forth a cognizable negligence claim which, if proved, and not met by a dispositive defense, could subject Harasek to liability. 95 This does not end our inquiry, however, for Harasek has asserted that, even assuming the threshold validity of Stevens' negligence claim, her entire case against him must be dismissed on the basis of an immunity from suit. Under the qualified immunity standard we have declared applicable to this claim, see supra pp. 251-254, we find Harasek's showing of the objective reasonableness of his actions sufficient to warrant entry of judgment in his favor. 96 Harasek's action, in failing to intervene on Stevens' behalf, must be placed in the context of the transpiring events and the information Harasek possessed. According to Stevens' own account, shortly after Officer Stover approached her vehicle, Stover began hysterically screaming to [Officer] Harasek[:] 'She's got a gun'. 60 At this stage of the encounter, again according to Stevens, while Stover was forcibly and brutally handcuff[ing] and press[ing] [Stevens] against the rear of her vehicle, Harasek [stood] there with his hands in his pockets. 61 97 Shortly thereafter, once more in Stevens' words, she was drag[ged] to [Stover's] unmarked police cruiser ... some 500 feet [away from Stevens'] car. 62 Once she was inside the cruiser, Stover allegedly intensified his attack on her. 63 Stevens does not claim that Harasek was involved in, or could even see, the alleged attack inside the cruiser. 64 According to Harasek's uncontradicted account, 65 after Stover took Stevens to the cruiser, Harasek radioed a request for assistance on his portable radio; he then went back and retrieved [Stevens'] pocketbook[,] which was lying in the street. 66 Harasek recalls looking through the pocketbook for the weapon to which Stover had referred, and finding nothing but Stevens' police ID badge and other non-incriminating material. 67 98 Given these facts, we are satisfied that the alleged unlawfulness of Harasek's failure to intervene on Stevens' behalf would not have been apparent, Anderson, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. at 3039, to a reasonable officer in Harasek's shoes. Harasek had a fully rational basis for anticipating that Stevens had a gun, possibly on her person, at the time Stover pulled her from her vehicle. Stover's attempts to subdue and handcuff Stevens could therefore have been viewed by Harasek as justified by the threat he could reasonably have thought she posed to the officers' safety. When Stover began his allegedly brutal and unprovoked attack on a handcuffed and defenseless suspect, he and Stevens were inside a police cruiser some 500 feet away from Harasek. We find no basis for inferring, even assuming the truth of Stevens' allegations, that Harasek could have seen that attack clearly enough to render his failure to come to Stevens' aid unreasonable. Our view on this matter is reinforced by the apparent failure of Stevens' passengers--who surely must have been at least as concerned with Stevens' treatment inside the cruiser as was Harasek--to see the alleged beating. 68 99 For these reasons, we hold that Harasek is immune from suit on Stevens' negligence charge, and we direct the district court to dismiss that last remaining claim against him. 100