Opinion ID: 628266
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Amending a Complaint After Judgment

Text: 14 Southern asserts as its second ground for reversal that the district court abused its discretion when it denied Southern's motion to vacate, alter, or amend its judgement under Rule 59(e). Southern's announced reason for this motion was to be able to file an amended complaint under Rule 15 so as to add quasi-contract claims. 15 Denial of a motion to vacate, alter, or amend a judgment so as to permit the filing of an amended pleading draws the interest in finality of judgments into tension with the federal policy of allowing liberal amendments under the rules. A threshold question is whether we are reviewing the denial under the standards applicable to Rule 59(e)--which favor the denial of motions to alter or amend a judgment 16 --or under Rule 15--which favor granting leave to amend. 17 Under either rule we review the district court's decision only to determine whether it was an abuse of discretion. 18 16 While we have held that the Rule 15 standards apply when a party seeks to amend a judgment that has been entered based on the pleadings, 19 we seriously doubt whether these liberal standards would apply to amendment of a judgment after trial or, as here, after completion of arbitration. 20 We need not resolve this issue today, however, as we conclude that the district court's decision to deny Southern's motion was not an abuse of discretion even under the more liberal standards applicable to Rule 15. 17 In construing Rule 15 we have concluded that a district court's discretion is limited because Rule 15 evinces a bias in favor of granting leave to amend. 21 In Dussouy we stated:The policy of the federal rules is to permit liberal amendment to facilitate determination of claims on the merits and to prevent litigation from becoming a technical exercise in the fine points of pleading. Thus, unless there is a substantial reason to deny leave to amend, the discretion of the district court is not broad enough to permit denial. 22 18 We have also stated, however, that leave to amend under Rule 15 is by no means automatic, 23 and we have affirmed denials when the moving party engaged in undue delay 24 or attempted to present theories of recovery seriatim to the district court. 25 19 Southern's attempt to amend its complaint was nothing more than an attempt to try its theories of recovery seriatim. After conditioning all of its theories of recovery on the existence of a contract--and losing conclusively on this issue at arbitration--Southern wished to amend its complaint to try a different tack by claiming that it was entitled to recovery under quasi-contract. 26 The fact that the first theory was tried at an arbitration proceeding, while the second would be tried in a court of law, fails to provide a justifiable distinction for ignoring the policy against allowing litigants to assert their claims in series. By applying this anti-seriatim policy to the arbitration award in the instant case, we protect the efficacy of that award 27 while we avoid adding to the already burgeoning dockets of the district courts. As we concluded in an earlier case, 28 a district court need not subject itself to the presentation of theories seriatim: We perceive no justification for not applying that rule to the instant case. III