Opinion ID: 1499082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Lease Sued on.

Text: In addition to what has been said, other considerations against the judgment have been urged for the government which appear meritorious. Inspection of the terms of the written lease to the Association on which the plaintiff has sued shows that Ashley Homestead Association, Inc., was separate and distinct from Farm Security or the United States, and that the United States did not undertake to lease the land or assume the lessee's obligations. Thus in the document of lease the association is designated Lessee; the Lessors hereby lease to the Lessee and the Lessee hires from the Lessors the following described real estate located in Ashley County, Arkansas, viz.; the lease mentions the United States in only a few places. The first is in the enumeration of the parties to the lease, and there it is specifically stated that the lease and option to purchase was being made between Mrs. Gordie M. Herren, a widow whose address is Portland, Arkansas, and the Southwest Joint Stock Land Bank of Little Rock, Arkansas (hereinafter called the `Lessors'), and Ashley Homestead Association, Inc., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Arkansas (hereinafter called the `Lessee'), and The United States of America, acting by and through the Secretary of Agriculture (hereinafter called the `Government'). This description of the parties to the lease points out clearly that Ashley Homestead Association, Inc., the Lessee, was separate and distinct from the United States. The other places in the lease mentioning the United States demonstrate the separateness of the United States and Ashley. The United States is again mentioned in Paragraph 5; subparagraph (a) of that paragraph provides that the Government or the lessees    shall have an exclusive and irrevocable option, at any time prior to December 31, 1941, to purchase said property upon the following terms and conditions,   , whereas subparagraph (b) vests in the United States in case it exercises the option, the right to terminate this lease as to the end of any calendar year by giving written notice of such termination to the Lessee at least ninety (90) days before the end of such year   . Further mention of the United States appears in Paragraph 10, subparagraph (a) of which permits the Lessee to sublet all the property to any tenant upon first receiving the written consent of the Government thereto, and subparagraph (b) permits the Lessee to sublet any part of the property without first receiving consent of the Government. Paragraph 11(b) obligated the Lessors to furnish the Lessee with evidence of title in it satisfactory to the Government, whereas Paragraph 12 provided All rights, privileges, benefits, options and powers conferred herein on the Government may be exercised on its behalf by the Secretary of Agriculture, or by the head of any other agency of the Federal Government that may from time to time be vested with authority over the subject matter of this lease, or by the duly authorized representative of either of them. If Ashley Homestead Association, Inc., were a contractual designation, or an agent, for the United States and if the Government had intended to assume the obligations of the lease, there would have been no purpose in preparing the lease in the form in which it was executed and in distinguishing so carefully between the United States and Ashley; for each time the United States is mentioned in the lease, it is in order to give it rights which were separate and distinct from those of Ashley's. For instance, there would have been no purpose in reserving two separate options to purchase the property, one for the United States and one in favor of Ashley, nor would there have been any purpose in making Ashley's right to exercise its option dependent on the approval of the Government, since if it were intended that Ashley be a contractual designation, or agent, for the United States, a reservation of a single unconditional option in favor of the lessee would have been sufficient. In addition, there would not have been any purpose in reserving the right to the United States, once it has exercised its option, to terminate the lease on 90 days' notice, for if Ashley were its contractual designation, and the United States and Ashley were one and the same, the purchase of the property by the United States would have merged the lease with the title. There would then have been no lease separate from the title  nothing which the United States could terminate by exercise of this reserved right. Furthermore, there would have been no need to condition the subletting of all the property upon the written consent of the United States nor to permit the leasing of any part thereof with the consent of the United States. Accordingly, it is clear from the face of the lease that the United States did not intend to bind itself thereon as the lessee, but was interested only in securing an option to purchase the property, and to assure that Mrs. Herren had a proper title to the property. And it is a well-established principle of contract law that those who are parties to a contract and are bound by it are to be ascertained by an inspection of the document and its provisions are controlling in the absence of some positive rule of law or provision of statute requiring them to be disregarded. United States v. Algoma Lumber Co., 305 U.S. 415, 59 S.Ct. 267, 83 L.Ed. 260, involved the question whether certain contracts for the sale of timber on land of the Klamath Indian Reservation, executed by the Superintendent of the Klamath Indian School, by authority of an Act of Congress, are contracts of the United States upon which the United States was suable. In holding that the action could not be maintained against the United States, the Supreme Court said (305 U.S. 421, 422, 59 S.Ct. 271, 83 L.Ed. 260): Neither the United States nor any officer purporting to act on its behalf is named a party to the contract. By its terms the contract is declared to be entered into `between the Superintendent of the Klamath Indian School, for and on behalf of the Klamath Indians, party of the first part' and the Lumber Company, `party of the second part.'    In this, as in any other case of a written contract, those who are parties to and bound by it are to be ascertained by an inspection of the document, and its provisions are controlling in the absence of some positive rule of law or provision of statute requiring them to be disregarded. See also, Waterman Steamship Co. v. Land, 80 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 151 F.2d 292, 296, reversed on other grounds sub nominee Macauley v. Waterman Steamship Co., 327 U.S. 540, 66 S.Ct. 712, 90 L.Ed. 839; Anson on Contracts (Corbin's 3rd Ed.1919) § 275 et seq.; cf. Hodgson v. Dexter, 1 Cranch 345, 2 L.Ed 130. A further consideration which precludes any recovery by Mrs. Herren against the United States is that no employee of Farm Security Regional Office VI was authorized to lease her property on behalf of the United States either in its name or in the name of Ashley Homestead Association. There is no question that by Executive Orders the President of the United States had, pursuant to the authority vested in him by various Emergency Relief Appropriation Acts, empowered the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States, to lease land in the name of the United States for the purpose of rural rehabilitation. But that authority was vested in the Secretary of Agriculture; he retained that authority in himself and did not delegate it generally to the Administrator of the Farm Security Administration, the agent ultimately charged with the administration of that program, or to its Regional Directors. This is clear from Memorandum 715 of the Secretary of Agriculture which stated: Pursuant to authority delegated to me in Executive Order No. 7530 of December 31, 1936, as amended, it is hereby ordered that  1. All authorization, delegations of authority, and procedures heretofore issued or approved by the Administrator of the Resettlement Administration are hereby confirmed with the exception of the following functions: