Opinion ID: 2103477
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Delaware Definition Lesser-Included Offense

Text: Lilly argues that the Superior Court erred when it ruled that Vehicular Homicide in the First Degree (11 Del.C. § 630A(a)) was not a lesser-included offense to the charge of Murder in the Second Degree (11 Del.C. § 635(1)). Lilly's indictment alleged he recklessly and under circumstances manifesti[n]g a cruel, wicked, and depraved indifference to human life cause[d] the death of Patricia A. Motter, by driving while under the influence of alcohol and at a high rate of speed and as a result he lost control of his automobile and collided headon [sic] with the automobile driven by Patricia A. Motter. According to Lilly, the offense of Vehicular Homicide was a lesser-included offense because the allegations in the indictment and the evidence presented at trial provided a rational basis for acquitting him of the charged offense and convicting him of Vehicular Homicide. The Superior Court denied Lilly's request to instruct the jury concerning the crime of Vehicular Homicide. It held that, under Delaware law, an included offense is determined exclusively by a statutory elements analysis. Such an analysis does not examine the allegations in the indictment or the evidence presented, but focuses solely upon the elements in the statutory definitions of the charged offense and the alleged lesser-included offense. In Delaware, lesser-included offenses are defined by statute: (b) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in the indictment or information. An offense is so included when: (1) It is established by the proof of the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or (2) It consists of an attempt to commit the offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included therein; or (3) It involves the same result but differs from the offense charged only in the respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person, property, or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability suffices to establish its commission. 11 Del.C. § 206. The official commentary to the Delaware Criminal Code states that Subsection [b][1] provides the standard statutory elements definition of included offenses. Delaware Criminal Code with Commentary, 15 (1973) ( Code Commentary ). This Court has recognized the propriety of using the statutory elements test to determine lesser-included offenses. See Ward v. State, Del.Supr., 575 A.2d 1156, 1158-59 (1990). This Court's holding in Ward, however, can most accurately be characterized as deciding that one proper focus under 11 Del.C. § 206(b) is on the statutory elements of the offenses, i.e., Section 206(b)(1). Unlike its federal corollary, the Delaware statute prescribing included offenses is not limited exclusively to the standard statutory elements definition. See 11 Del.C. § 206; Cf. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 715-21, 109 S.Ct. 1443, 1450-53, 103 L.Ed.2d 734 (1989) (Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c) adopts statutory elements approach). [3] In fact, the official commentary to the Delaware Criminal Code states that subsection 3 of the Delaware definition of included offenses expressly contemplates that there may be some dissimilarity in the elements necessary to prove the [included] offense. Code Commentary at 16. With regard to subsection 3, the Code Commentary provides: [Subsection 3] differs from [Subsection 1] in that, although the included offense must produce the same result as the inclusive offense, there may be some dissimilarity in the elements necessary to prove the offense. Therefore, [1] would not strictly apply and [3] is needed to fill the gap. For example, criminally negligent homicide would probably not be included in murder under [1], because negligence is different in quality from intention. It would obviously be included under [3], because the result is the same and only the required degree of culpability changes. (emphasis added). Code Commentary at 16. The same rationale that concludes, under appropriate factual circumstances, that Criminally Negligent Homicide is an included offense of Murder would also determine Vehicular Homicide to be an included offense of Murder in the Second Degree. In this appeal, the State candidly acknowledged the propriety of instructing the jury on an included offense often depends on particular fact situations. See Code Commentary, Appendix B, at 501. In Ward, this Court held that even under a statutory elements approach, the trial court is not obligated to charge the jury with an included offense unless there is a rational basis for such an instruction in the evidence. Ward v. State, 575 A.2d at 1159. Conversely, under appropriate factual circumstances, Delaware's expanded definition of included offenses in Section 206(b)(2) and (3) obligates the trial court to instruct the jury on an offense that has rational evidentiary support in the record, notwithstanding a dissimilarity in the elements necessary to prove [that] offense and the charged offense. Code Commentary at 16. In Lilly's case, the jury was instructed about the charged offense of Murder in the Second Degree. That instruction required the jury to find Lilly acted with reckless culpability and depraved indifference towards the risk of causing death. The jurors were next instructed on the crime of Manslaughter. 11 Del.C. § 632(1). Finally, the jury was instructed on the offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide. 11 Del.C. § 631. Unlike the charged offense of Murder in the Second Degree, the crime of Criminally Negligent Homicide required the jury to find Lilly acted with negligent culpability, unaware of the risk of death he was creating. The record reflects that, under the facts of Lilly's case, the Superior Court properly decided to instruct the jurors regarding Criminally Negligent Homicide, notwithstanding its erroneous conclusion that in Delaware included offenses are determined exclusively by a statutory elements analysis. Those same facts, however, provided rational evidentiary support for and obligated the Superior Court to instruct the jury regarding the crime of Vehicular Homicide. See 11 Del.C. § 206(b)(3) and (c). Accord Ex Parte Jordan, Ala.Supr., 486 So.2d 485, 486-89 (1986). Consequently, this Court must now consider the nature of that error. The failure to properly instruct the jury regarding a lesser offense is not reversible error per se. Ross v. State, Del.Supr., 482 A.2d 727, 736 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1194, 105 S.Ct. 973, 83 L.Ed.2d 976 (1985). This Court and other courts have found such an error harmless when the jury was presented with, but rejected, lesser offenses than the one for which the defendant was convicted. Id.; Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 646-47, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 2504-05, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991); Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d 877, 882-87 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 113 S.Ct. 472, 121 L.Ed.2d 379 (1992). In Geschwendt, the Third Circuit held: Schad, of course, did not announce a new principle of law, for it was and is consistent with the great weight of state authority. See State v. Mendez, 252 N.J.Super. 155, 165-55, 599 A.2d 565, 570-71 (App.Div.1991) (collecting cases). Schad teaches us that, in cases involving offenses on a ladder, if the trial court wrongfully refuses to charge the offense at the bottom rung, that error is harmless provided the jury return a guilty verdict for an offense higher up rather than for an intermediate offense which was also charged. There is simply no escape here from the principle underlying Schad. In Schad, the trial court refused to give an instruction, supported by the evidence, that would have permitted the jury to return a verdict for a lesser included offense. But the Supreme Court held that the first degree murder verdict was reliable because the jury had not returned a verdict for the intermediate offense of second degree murder. Geschwendt v. Ryan, 967 F.2d at 884. Furthermore, some courts have noted that the failure to instruct the jury on a lesser-included offense supported by the record is clearly harmless when the jury was presented with and rejected the opportunity to convict the defendant of a lesser offense that was consistent with the defendant's theory of the case. Ex Parte Jordan, 486 So.2d 485. See also People v. Beach, 429 Mich. 450, 418 N.W.2d 861, 879 (1988). Such a situation is reflected in the record of Lilly's case. In his closing remarks to the jury, Lilly's attorney argued: And I am not coming in here asking you to find him not guilty of anything. I told you that the first day I got here. I said he did something wrong. He made a mistake and you are going to now tell us what it was. But we're talking about a pretty significant offense in criminally negligent homicide.... Reckless is defined as he is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk of death, and criminally negligent is that he failed to perceive the risk of death, but the risk was so great that a reasonable person should have been able to perceive it.... [Lilly] couldn't have consciously disregarded a substantial risk of the death of Patricia Motter. He couldn't even see she was there. He fits into a category of a reasonable person that should have assumed that there could have been a risk, and that makes him criminally negligent.... If the jury was persuaded by the foregoing argument that Lilly acted negligently and did not perceive the risk of death he created, it had the opportunity to convict him of the included offense of Criminally Negligent Homicide. The jury's verdict reflects its factual determination that Lilly perceived the risk of death and acted with a reckless, depraved indifference to that risk. The jury's decision to convict Lilly, as charged, of Murder in the Second Degree and to reject the option of finding Lilly guilty of Criminally Negligent Homicide leads this Court to conclude that the Superior Court's erroneous decision not to instruct the jury regarding Vehicular Homicide was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Ross v. State, 482 A.2d at 736; Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. at 646-47, 111 S.Ct. at 2504-05. Accord Ex parte Jordan, 486 So.2d at 486-89. See also People v. Beach, 418 N.W.2d at 879.