Opinion ID: 3054349
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Mihalev v. Ashcroft.

Text: [1] Mihalev is of no help to Donchev. Aside from their common nationality (Bulgarian), what is striking is how different these two petitioners are. Mihalev was Roma, Donchev is not. Mihalev was jailed, beaten, and otherwise abused for ten days after his first arrest (for a noisy party), two weeks after his second arrest (for walking around without his identification papers), and five days (until he escaped after being sexually assaulted by a prison guard) after the third arrest. Donchev was jailed for less than one day and detained only once for two hours. Our holding in Mihalev that there is “no question that Gypsies are an identifiable ethnic group and that being a Gypsy is a protected ground” (ethnicity) is of no help to Donchev, because he is not a Gypsy. 13 Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 2008). 14 Ghaly v. INS, 58 F.3d 1425, 1431 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Al-Saher v. INS, 268 F.3d 1143, 1146 (9th Cir. 2001). 15 Lolong, 484 F.3d at 1178. 16 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (2007); Ghaly, 58 F.3d at 1431. 17 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 18 388 F.3d 722 (9th Cir. 2004). DONCHEV v. MUKASEY 663 [2] Mihalev claimed that he suffered a well-founded fear of persecution based on three arrests by the Bulgarian police.19 The first time, police jailed Mihalev on charges of instigating Roma gatherings after arresting him at a Roma birthday party where the police beat the other Roma guests, called them names, and said “Gypsies did not deserve to live.” The second arrest occurred when the police demanded Mihalev’s documents as he was walking on a street at night and Mihalev did not have them. Mihalev was arrested a third time at his “periodic check-in” at the police station. We held that substantial evidence did support the IJ’s finding that the second and third arrests were not “on account of” a protected ground, and that being a Gypsy “played no role in the police mistreatment.”20 This holding is analogous to the IJ’s finding in the case at bar — that being a friend of Gypsies played no role in Donchev’s arrests. The IJ found that Donchev encountered police when they were investigating crimes or maintaining the peace. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s finding that any escalation during these encounters were caused by Donchev’s friends challenging police authority. [3] In Mihalev we also held that the record “compels the conclusion that the first arrest was ‘on account of’ [Mihalev’s Roma] ethnicity.”21 Specifically, “[t]he police officers’ contemporaneous declarations that Gypsies did not deserve to live and that Petitioner was being held because he had been organizing Gypsy gatherings”22 compelled a conclusion that Mihalev’s Gypsy ethnicity played some role. There were no analogous, contemporary declarations by the police or the skinheads in Donchev’s case. The police never arrested or jailed Donchev on charges of organizing Gypsy gatherings, although Donchev organized and participated in his New 19 Id. at 725-26. 20 Id. at 727 (emphasis in original). 21 Id. 22 Id. 664 DONCHEV v. MUKASEY Year’s Eve party, and participated in pro-Roma demonstrations (which did not result in arrest). Although the skinheads assaulted, beat, and robbed Donchev after he left a Friends of the Roma meeting, the IJ found that there was no evidence that it was “on account of” his friendships with the Roma or membership in Friends of the Roma. The skinheads who took Donchev’s watch and money were not policemen. These facts support the IJ’s finding that this was crime, not persecution. The location (outside the Roma organization’s meeting) and timing alone do not compel the conclusion that Donchev was attacked because of a protected ground.23 2. Particular Social Group. In Mihalev, it was undisputed that the petitioner was part of an “identifiable ethnic group” that qualified as a protected ground.24 The same is not true of Donchev.25 Donchev does not claim that he was persecuted because of Roma ethnicity (his ethnicity is not Roma, but Bulgarian). Nor does he claim that he was persecuted on account of political opinion. Rather, Donchev claims that he was persecuted because he was in the 23 In concluding that Donchev’s arrests and mistreatment “were at least partially motivated by Donchev’s affiliation with the Roma,” the dissent fails to give proper deference to the IJ. See Dissent at 678. The question is not whether the evidence would allow us to reach a different conclusion, but whether the evidence compels us to. Lolong, 484 F.3d at 1178. 24 Mihalev, 388 F.3d at 726. 25 The IJ decided this case on the ground that Donchev had not proved persecution “on account of” his membership in a particular social group. The dissent focuses on whether Donchev was persecuted, a different question from why he was persecuted. Assuming without deciding that he was persecuted, that would still not entitle him to asylum under the statute unless his persecution was “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). The argument in the dissent that the evidence would support a conclusion that Donchev was persecuted because of his friendship with the Roma does not compel that conclusion, nor does it compel the conclusion that friends of the Roma are a “particular social group” within the meaning of the statute. DONCHEV v. MUKASEY 665 “particular social group” of friends of Roma individuals, or friends of the Roma people. [4] To determine whether Donchev has a cognizable claim, we must determine what it means to be a “refugee.” We begin by looking at the text of the statute. The statutory phrase is “well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.”26 Although the other four protected grounds are denoted with a fair degree of clarity, except perhaps around the edges, “particular social group” needs interpretation to be understood. On its face, the term “particular social group” is ambiguous.27 We have previously defined “particular social group” to mean a group “united by 1) a voluntary association which imparts some common characteristic that is fundamental to the members’ identities, or 2) an innate characteristic which is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that they either cannot or should not be required to change it.”28 To determine whether a claimed group is a “particular social group,” we consider “whether a group’s shared characteristics gives members social visibility and whether the group can be defined with sufficient particularity to delimit its membership.”29 This attempt at a general definition is instructive, but very abstract. When we are talking about membership in something other than a tribe or clan, this definition is not very helpful to deciding cases because the abstractness allows most disputes to be decided either way. 26 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 27 See Elien v. Ashcroft, 364 F.3d 392, 396 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the term “particular social group” is not free from ambiguity); Lwin v. INS 144 F.3d 505, 510 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing the meaning of “social group” as remaining “elusive”). 28 Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 744 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Arteaga v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007)). 29 Id. (citing Arteaga, 511 F.3d at 944-45). 666 DONCHEV v. MUKASEY What is “fundamental” or “innate” to one person may be a passing fancy to another. In interpreting the statute, we follow the procedure set forth in Chevron.30 We first apply the normal rules of statutory construction. We are required, when faced with an ambiguous statutory term, to defer to the construction given it by the agency charged with the statute’s administration, provided the interpretation is a permissible construction of the statute.31 To determine whether an agency’s construction is permissible, we look to the text and structure of the statute being construed.32 We look to the BIA’s decisional law to assist us in this inquiry.33 Under INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre,34 we must give deference, as our sister circuits have,35 to BIA law defining “particular social group.”36 In re Acosta37 was the BIA’s first effort to develop the characteristics for what may constitute a “particular social group.” The BIA focused on the characteristics of individuals claim30 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984); see also Chowdhury v. INS, 249 F.3d 970, 972 (9th Cir. 2001). 31 See INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 424-25 (1999). 32 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 448-49 (1987). 33 See, e.g., In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008); In re A-M- E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69 (B.I.A. 2007); In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (B.I.A. 2006); In re V-T-S-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792 (B.I.A. 1997); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.I.A. 1996) (en banc); In re TobosoAlfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec. 658 (B.I.A. 1988); In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). 34 526 U.S. at 424. 35 See, e.g., Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007); Castillo-Arias v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187 (10th Cir. 2005); Elien, 364 F.3d at 392; Lukwago v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2003); Lwin, 144 F.3d 505. 36 Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. at 424. 37 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (B.I.A. 1985). DONCHEV v. MUKASEY 667 ing membership in the group, while recognizing that whether a particular kind of group characteristic would qualify “remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis.”38 The BIA explained: The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this construction remains to be determined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, it must be one that the members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences. Only when this is the case does the mere fact of group membership become something com- parable to the other four grounds of persecution under the Act, namely, something that either is beyond the power of an individual to change or that is so fundamental to his identity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.39 The BIA has stated that the “essence” of the particularity requirement “is whether the proposed group can accurately be described in a manner sufficiently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society in question, as a discrete class of persons. While the size of the proposed group may be an important factor in determining whether the group can be so recognized, the key question is whether the proposed description is sufficiently ‘particular,’ or is ‘too amorphous . . . to create a benchmark for determining group membership.”40 38 Id. at 233. 39 Id. at 233-34. 40 In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (B.I.A. 2008). 668 DONCHEV v. MUKASEY [5] The BIA has subsequently reaffirmed that “members of a ‘particular social group’ must share a common, immutable characteristic,” one that the person “cannot change, or should not be required to change.”41 The immutable characteristic is a sine qua non for status as a member of a “particular social group,” though it is not by itself sufficient. As the BIA itself has recognized,42 the immutability requirement may be inapplicable in some circumstances. Wealth, even a trivial amount of it, targeted many “kulaks” and “landlords” for persecution in the Soviet Union and Communist China. According to the State Department’s Profile on Bulgaria and other evidence in the record, people in Bulgaria who have Roma friends are not targeted for persecution as the kulaks and landlords were. The record does not suggest that Donchev, or friends of Roma individuals generally, are analogous to white freedom riders during the sixties, who were targeted because of their political activity on behalf of blacks. Donchev’s police contacts did not arise out of any pro-Roma activities and several preceded his membership in Future for the Roma. Overexpansion of refugee status to include amorphous social groups is unfair to other immigrants, because asylum jumps people to the head of the line of those seeking permission to live in the United States. [6] Just as we refuse to infer persecution on account of a political opinion “merely from acts of random violence by members of a village or political subdivision against their neighbors who may or may not have divergent . . . political views,”43 we do not infer that people who are associated with a protected group automatically comprise a “particular social 41 In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73-74 (B.I.A. 2007) (citing Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233). 42 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233-34. 43 Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 865 (9th Cir. 2001). DONCHEV v. MUKASEY 669 group” for the purposes of asylum. The BIA applies “particular social group” to groups of people who are “unable by their own actions” to avoid persecution.44 [7] Some “particular social groups” recognized as such by the BIA include traditional clans or tribes. The BIA held in In re V-T-S- that persecution on account of a particular social group “refers to persecution that is directed toward an individual who is a member of a group that share common immutable characteristics . . . characteristics that members of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change, because such characteristics are fundamental to their individual identities.”45 For example, the “characteristics of being a Filipino of mixed Filipino-Chinese ancestry cannot be changed and are therefore immutable.”46 The BIA relied upon the State Department’s Country Profile, which reported that 1.5 percent of the Philippine population had “identifiable Chinese background” and reports that the Philippine government also recognized these individuals as a group. The Country Profile also stated that the police and government officials were colluding to make wealthy businessmen of Chinese ethnicity a target of extortion schemes and kidnappings-forransom.47 Similarly, in In re Kasinga the BIA held that young women of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu tribe of Northern Togo who do not undergo and oppose their tribe’s practice of female genital mutilation were a particular social group.48 The BIA explained that being a member of the Tchamba-Kunsuntu Tribe “cannot be changed,” and the “characteristic of having intact genitalia 44 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 935. 45 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (B.I.A. 1997). 46 Id. 47 Id. at 795. 48 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365 (B.I.A. 1996). 670 DONCHEV v. MUKASEY is one that is so fundamental to the individual identity of a young woman that she should not be required to change it.”49 The BIA held in In re H- that members of the Marehan subclan of Somalia was a particular social group, because it was “an entity which is identifiable by kinship ties and vocal inflection or accent.”50 The Marehan subclan was also economically identifiable as the ruling class in Somalia (the place of persecution), and as a minority “constitut[ing] less than 1 percent of the population of Somalia.”51 Relying on Country Reports for Somalia, the BIA held that in Somalia “clan membership is a highly recognizable, immutable characteristic that is acquired at birth and is inextricably linked to family ties” and that it was possible to discern “distinct and recognizable clans and subclans in Somalia.”52 In In re Toboso-Alfonso the BIA held that persons identified as homosexuals by the Cuban government were a particular social group.53 “[B]ecause of [Toboso-Alfonso’s] status as a homosexual he was advised by his government to leave the country or face incarceration for a period of 4 years.”54 He was required to register with the Cuban government as a homosexual, and the Cuban government was known to detain, jail, and beat Cuban homosexuals.55 Noting that the government’s penalty for failure to leave Cuba was imprisonment, the BIA explained that Toboso-Alfonso’s plight was “not simply a case involving the enforcement of laws against particu49 Id. at 365-66. 50 In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 340, 342-43 (B.I.A. 1996). 51 Id. at 340. 52 Id. at 342-43. 53 20 I. & N. Dec. 819 (B.I.A. 1990). 54 Id. at 823. 55 Id. at 821. DONCHEV v. MUKASEY 671 lar homosexual acts, nor is this simply a case of assertion of ‘gay rights.’ ”56 [8] Friends of Roma individuals or of the Roma people do not resemble those groups. Donchev was not born a friend of the Roma, like members of the Marehan subclan in In re H- , Filipinos of Chinese ancestry in In re V-T-S-, or the young women of the Tchamba-Kunsunti tribe in In re Kasinga. Nor is he a member of a highly recognizable economic or social minority. As a Bulgarian Christian, he is most identifiable with the ethnic, religious, and cultural majority in his country. A comparison of the treatment of Donchev to the treatment of Roma during World War II, when Bulgaria was an ally of Germany, underscores the difference.57 During the war, Bulgaria passed laws denying the Roma access to central parts of Sofia, forbidding their use of public transportation, and giving them smaller food rations than other Bulgarians. In some places, the government forced the Roma to convert to Christianity and outlawed marriages between Bulgarians and Roma. Donchev has not claimed any restrictions on his freedom to work, to marry, or to eat. The experience of other members of Donchev’s own family shows that friends of Roma are not viewed or treated in a uniform way by the Bulgarian government or Bulgarian society. The Roma were not only neighbors of Donchev, but also of his mother. Donchev testified that the Roma were his mother’s friends after Donchev’s father passed away, and that the Roma supported their family. Yet Donchev’s mother remains in Bulgaria, and Donchev never claimed or testified that she was arrested or even harassed, although she also has visible friendships with the Roma.58 56 Id. 57 See Ctr. for Documentation & Info. on Minorities in Europe — Southeast Europe, Roma of Bulgaria 5. 58 Cf. Aruta v. INS, 80 F.3d 1389, 1395 (9th Cir. 1996) (approving the use of “family evidence and the inferences drawn from it” to support the agency’s decision); Chavez v. INS, 723 F.2d 1431, 1434 (9th Cir. 1984) (noting that the family had remained in the country and not been harassed). 672 DONCHEV v. MUKASEY The BIA has stressed the importance of social visibility as a factor in defining a particular social group. It has found that no “particular social group” exists for individuals merely claiming to be “affluent Guatemalans,”59 former noncriminal informants working against a drug cartel,60 and Salvadoran youths who had rejected gang recruitment efforts.61 We said in Ochoa v. Gonzales, consistent with the BIA’s construction, that the “[k]ey to establishing a ‘particular social group’ is ensuring that the group is narrowly defined.”62 We held in Ochoa that “business persons” who rejected the demands of narco-traffickers were “too broad to qualify as a particularized social group.”63 There is no principled distinction that allows rejection of refugee status for persecuted business persons who resisted narco-traffickers but grants it to persecuted friends of Roma individuals or the Roma people.64 In Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, we held that young urban males who had not served in the military were not the “type of cohesive, homogeneous group” embraced by the statutory term “particular social group.”65 We held in Santos-Lemos v. Mukasey,66 which applied Ochoa and Sanchez-Trujillo, that the group of young Salvadorans who had refused to accede to gang recruitment was “too broad and diverse” and lacked the 59 In re A-M-E & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 75-76 (B.I.A. 2007). 60 In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957-58 (B.I.A. 2006). 61 In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579 (B.I.A. 2008). 62 Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 2005). 63 Id. at 1171. 64 Nor has the dissent suggested that they are distinguishable. Instead, the dissent simply assumes that any “supporters” of an ethnic, political, or religious group are themselves a “particular social group.” This assumption is unwarranted under Santos-Lemos and Ochoa. Supporters must make the same showing as other individuals claiming to be part of a “particular social group.” 65 801 F.2d 1571, 1577 (9th Cir. 1986). 66 542 F.3d 738 (9th Cir. 2008). DONCHEV v. MUKASEY 673 requisite “social visibility” to qualify as a “particular social group.”67 It is impossible to define “particular social group” with precision for all contexts, and dangerous to those who may be persecuted for group membership that we cannot anticipate, because the potential range of persecution of some people by others cannot be fully embraced by the imagination. Various factors, such as immutability, cohesiveness, homogeneity, and visibility, are helpful in various contexts, but they are not exhaustive. The traditional common law approach, looking at hypothetical cases and commonalities in cases that go one way or the other, is more prudent. When the Hutus in Rwanda murdered as many Tutsis as they could, the persecution was not on account of “race, religion, nationality, . . . , or political opinion.”68 But ethnicity, being Tutsi, fits well into the “particular social group” category. Likewise, the persecution of the Roma in Bulgaria during World War II was of a “particular social group.” [9] Persons who have declined to join gangs, who have not served in the military, and who have declined to pay money to drug dealers differ in obvious ways from the Tutsis in Rwanda, most obviously in that they have chosen a course of conduct that led others to harm them, whereas the Tutsis did not. Donchev’s claim arises out of the choices he made in his friends. We cannot say that “any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude”69 that Donchev’s friendship with Roma individuals and the Roma people made him part of a “particular social group.” [10] Because a reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to conclude that friends of Roma individuals or of the 67 Id. at 745-46. 68 See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A). 69 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2006); see Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). 674 DONCHEV v. MUKASEY Roma generally are a “particular social group,” the remaining issues raised in this case do not require adjudication. Accordingly, we need not decide whether what happened to Donchev was “past persecution,” or whether his friendship with the Roma caused the mistreatment he suffered. We thus do not reach the question of whether the government overcame the presumption of a well-founded fear that would arise from past persecution. PETITION DENIED.