Opinion ID: 2517324
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Exclusion of Evidence of James's Probation Performance

Text: Defense counsel sought to impeach Robert James with testimony from his probation officer to the effect that James was dishonest. The court held a hearing under Evidence Code section 402 to determine what the probation officer would say. The parties agreed that because James was a juvenile, the officer could not go into specific matters reflected on his record. Harry Ridley testified that he was James's probation officer and had been for nearly a year. He considered James irresponsible. James had been evasive, did not comply with the conditions of his probation, and failed to keep Ridley informed of his whereabouts. Ridley recalled one particular lie James told, which he did not specify, but generally he based his opinion on James's failure to follow instructions. The court heard extended argument from counsel, during which the prosecutor stated that if Ridley's testimony were admitted, she would be entitled to rehabilitate James by examining the reasons for his behavior. Ultimately, the court concluded that while the evidence of James's performance on probation was relevant to show his lax character and general lack of credibility, its probative value was insufficient to outweigh the consumption of time it would take to explore the matter, including collateral issues pertaining to his failure to comply with probation conditions. Accordingly, the court excluded the evidence of his probation performance under Evidence Code section 352. Regarding specific instances of untruthfulness, the prosecutor acknowledged that Ridley remembered one time when James had lied to him. However, the court agreed with her argument that James's failure to keep promises made to his probation officer did not amount to lies. After conferring with Ridley, defense counsel told the court there were no additional grounds to go into. Counsel had interpreted Ridley's account of James's failure to do what he said he would do as instances of lying. Ridley did not testify before the jury. (7) Defendant contends the court abused its discretion under Evidence Code section 352. We disagree. `[T]he latitude section 352 allows for exclusion of impeachment evidence in individual cases is broad. The statute empowers courts to prevent criminal trials from degenerating into nitpicking wars of attrition over collateral credibility issues.' [Citation.] ( People v. Ayala (2000) 23 Cal.4th 225, 301 [96 Cal.Rptr.2d 682, 1 P.3d 3]; accord, People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 374-375 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34].) Here, James's failures on probation were evidently numerous, and the prospect of prolonged nitpicking was a real one. Defendant claims the court's ruling deprived him of his fundamental rights to confrontation and to present a defense, under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution. However, we have repeatedly held that `not every restriction on a defendant's desired method of cross-examination is a constitutional violation. Within the confines of the confrontation clause, the trial court retains wide latitude in restricting cross-examination that is repetitive, prejudicial, confusing of the issues, or of marginal relevance.' [Citation.] ( Ayala, at p. 301; see also Lewis, at p. 375.) Defense counsel had ample opportunity to question James regarding the discrepancies between his taped statement and his trial testimony. James himself testified that he had not been completely truthful during the police interview, when he incriminated defendant. Moreover, after it was shown that he had been threatened in advance of his original trial testimony, James denied the threat had affected him, but also confirmed the accuracy of the taped statements that he could not remember in his original testimony. Thus, James's truthfulness was already seriously compromised. Evidence of his performance on probation would have introduced a variety of collateral credibility issues, and would not have produced `a significantly different impression of [the witness's] credibility.' ( People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 25, 959 P.2d 183], quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 [89 L.Ed.2d 674, 106 S.Ct. 1431]; see also People v. Smith (2007) 40 Cal.4th 483, 513 [54 Cal.Rptr.3d 245, 150 P.3d 1224].) [5]