Opinion ID: 1560801
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Jailhouse Recordings

Text: While incarcerated in South Carolina, Jackson made a telephone call from the Charleston County Jail to his grandmother which was recorded. At the inception of the telephone call, an automated voice informed Jackson and his grandmother that the call would be monitored or recorded. This warning was repeated later in the conversation. South Carolina law enforcement provided a recording of the conversation to the JSO without requiring the JSO to obtain a warrant or certification that a warrant was unnecessary. Based on the deposition of a South Carolina detective who stated that Charleston County Jail policy generally required a warrant to obtain a recording of a telephone call made from the jail, Jackson filed a motion to suppress the recorded statements. However, Jackson did not present the testimony of the detective during the suppression hearing and relied solely on the statements in the deposition. Jackson also asserted that a South Carolina statute required a warrant but was unable to locate the statute even after the trial court provided additional time for counsel to conduct research before the recording was presented to the jury. Thus, the trial court denied the motion because under Florida jail procedures, inmates receive notice that all phone conversations are recorded. Where, as in this case, the law of a foreign forum is claimed to be dispositional, but is not pleaded to the trial court, the matter is to be determined by the law of this state and a presumption arises that the foreign law is the same as ours. Mills v. Barker, 664 So.2d 1054, 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995) (citing Columbian Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Lanigan, 154 Fla. 760, 19 So.2d 67, 70 (1944)). Both the Florida and South Carolina Constitutions protect the privacy rights of citizens from the unreasonable interception of communications and the protections afforded to wire, electronic, or oral communications are codified in each state's wiretapping act. See ch. 934, Fla. Stat. (2005); S.C.Code Ann. § 17-30-10 (Supp.2007). In State v. Smith, 641 So.2d 849 (Fla.1994), this Court analyzed the application of the Florida Security of Communications Act, chapter 934, Florida Statutes, which is essentially identical to the provisions of the South Carolina wiretapping act at issue here. We held that (1) there was no expectation of privacy in a police vehicle, and (2) the Florida wiretapping act does not protect a communication under these circumstances. In so holding, we stated: The Fourth Amendment right to privacy is measured by a two-part test: 1) the person must have a subjective expectation of privacy; and 2) that expectation must be one that society recognizes as reasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360[, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576] (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).... A prisoner's right of privacy fails both prongs of the Katz test. First, a prisoner's privacy interest is severely limited by the status of being a prisoner and by being in an area of confinement that shares none of the attributes of privacy of a home, an automobile, an office, or a hotel room. Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139, 143[, 82 S.Ct. 1218, 8 L.Ed.2d 384] (1962). Second, society would insist that the prisoner's expectation of privacy always yield to what must be considered the paramount interest in institutional security. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 528[, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393] (1984). Thus, the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches does not apply within the confines of the prison cell. Id. at 526[, 104 S.Ct. 3194]. Smith, 641 So.2d at 851 (parallel citations omitted). This Court further stated that the wiretapping act did not afford protection to conversations that occurred in the back of a police vehicle because the act required an oral communication to be uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation.  Smith, 641 So.2d at 852 (some emphasis added) (quoting § 943.02(2), Fla. Stat. (1991)). The South Carolina law essentially employs the same definition. See S.C.Code Ann. § 17-30-15(2) (2005); cf. § 934.02(2), Fla. Stat. (2005). Under both the Fourth Amendment and the Florida wiretapping act, a speaker must have an actual subjective expectation of privacy and our society must recognize that the expectation is reasonable for the oral conversation to be protected. See Smith, 641 So.2d at 852. Thus, there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in a police vehicle or in a telephone communication from jail during which warnings are issued; therefore, any interception of conversations that occur there would not be prohibited by chapter 943. See id. Under the circumstances of this case, Jackson was aware through repeated, automated warnings that the jail would record and monitor his communication. Thus, Jackson implicitly consented to the interception. Moreover, Jackson did not have a right to privacy in the recorded statements because (1) Jackson did not have a legitimate, reasonable expectation of privacy in a recorded phone call that was placed while incarcerated after receiving warning that the call was being recorded; and (2) the interest in institutional security allows jailhouse conversations to be monitored. Cf. Mosley v. State, 34 Fla. L. Weekly S468, ___ So.3d ___, 2009 WL 2045387 (Fla. July 16, 2009) (holding that defendant waived the spousal privilege because he did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone conversation placed while incarcerated after receiving multiple warnings that the call would be monitored and recorded). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's denial of the motion to suppress because, under these circumstances, the wiretapping statute does not afford Jackson protection from interception and his Fourth Amendment privacy rights were not violated.