Opinion ID: 494679
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence Relating to the Due Process Defense

Text: 20 At the commencement of the bench trial before the district court, the trial judge advised counsel that he read the stipulated facts and the attached exhibits containing the relevant proceedings before the state trial judge regarding Tallmadge's conviction for illegal possession of a machine gun under California law. The district court then inquired of defense counsel, Charles Weedman, What is your defense? Mr. Weedman advised the court that his client would testify 21 that he believed that when the felony--the underlying felony was reduced to a misdemeanor that thereafter the judge could no longer impose a sentence greater than one year, and, therefore, for him to purchase at least a long gun would be permissible under federal law. 22 The trial judge then inquired, You are satisfied that his state of mind as you described it would be a defense, is that what you are saying. Mr. Weedman replied as follows: 23 Well, I am seeking to offer that evidence for whatever constitutional attack may be appropriate in this case. 24 I think that the form [Firearms Transaction Record] is misleading. I think it is constitutionally defective in that respect. Ignorance of the law is no excuse, and such testimony offered for that purpose, I imagine your Honor would not permit. But I think his reading of it in that fashion at least lays the foundation for a constitutional due process attack. 25 The district court then requested the government to state its position. The prosecutor replied that Tallmadge's state of mind was not a defense. 26 After the foregoing colloquy concerning Mr. Weedman's offer of proof, the government rested without calling any witnesses, relying on the facts set forth in the stipulation. 27 Tallmadge then testified that prior to purchasing any of the firearms described in the indictment he had a conversation with Lewis Ferguson. Ferguson was the president of Cole's Manchester Arms (Cole's). The firearms referred to in the indictment were purchased at Cole's. The records of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms (hereinafter ATF) show that at all relevant times in this matter Cole's was a federally licensed dealer in firearms. Ferguson signed each application for Cole's license to engage in business as a firearms dealer. Tallmadge testified that Mr. Ferguson said he had read and understood that I was in some kind of problem, and there may have been a felony conviction. And I said that was changed to a misdemeanor conviction, and there was no problem. 28 Tallmadge testified that Ferguson agreed that there was no problem owning a gun because the felony conviction had been reduced to a misdemeanor. 29 Following Tallmadge's testimony, the district court suggested that Mr. Weedman testify. Mr. Weedman agreed to do so after Tallmadge waived his attorney-client privilege. The district court conducted the direct examination of Mr. Weedman. 30 Mr. Weedman testified that he advised his client that he could not purchase a firearm during the period of probation because he stood convicted of a felony. Mr. Weedman also testified that while the machine gun possession charge was a state proceeding it was largely orchestrated by agents of the ATF. ATF agents also testified at the trial of the machinegun possession charges. 31 Mr. Weedman testified that it is his view of the applicable California statutes that upon the reduction of a felony conviction to a misdemeanor it was no longer a felony conviction. 32 During Mr. Weedman's testimony, the district court asked the government to comment on whether question 8.b. on the Firearms Transaction Record addresses the effect of the reduction of a felony to a misdemeanor. The government replied that Tallmadge was required to answer question 8.b. in the affirmative because Cal.Penal Code Sec. 1203.4 requires a person whose felony record is expunged to disclose his prior felony conviction in any application for licensure. The government again argued to the court that state of mind is not a defense to the receipt and possession charges. The court was told: 33 [T]he government's position would be that the defendant's belief that it was not a felony is irrelevant to the possession and receipt charges. He is guilty despite state of mind of possessing a gun as a prior felon and of receiving guns as a prior felon. 34 After this exchange, Mr. Weedman testified that he advised Tallmadge following the probation termination proceedings that he could legally possess long guns but not concealable weapons because the charge of possession of a machine gun had been reduced to a misdemeanor. 35 The district court found Tallmadge not guilty of each count charging him with making false statements concerning his prior conviction. The court concluded that there wasn't a requisite specific intent as regards 922(a)(6). Tallmadge was found guilty of each count charging him with receipt and possession of a firearm, however, because the court concluded that his subjective belief that he had not been convicted of a felony or a crime punishable by imprisonment for more than one year was not relevant because these crimes are complete upon proof of knowing receipt or possession of a firearm. 36 During the sentencing hearing, the district court commented that the advice given to Tallmadge by his experienced criminal lawyer after his conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor could disarm him. It further noted that this fact, coupled with his open and notorious purchase of weapons from a dealer that he knew in Santa Monica, was all consistent with a mens rea to the effect, look at, I am not doing anything wrong. In explaining its conclusion that Tallmadge's state of mind was not a defense to the charges of receipt or possession of firearms, the district court did not discuss the import of the evidence concerning the federally licensed gun dealer's statement to Tallmadge that it would not be a problem to receive or possess weapons after a state trial judge has reduced a felony conviction to a misdemeanor.