Opinion ID: 3038569
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Forest Service reserved the right to “sus-

Text: pend, revoke, or terminate” the easement pursu- ant to the Rules of Practice Governing Formal Adjudicatory Administrative Proceedings instituted by the Secretary of Agriculture.4 3 Fitzgerald v. United States, 932 F. Supp. 1195 (D. Ariz. 1996), vacated as moot No. CIV-94-0518-PCT-PRG (D. Ariz. July 19, 1999). 4 7 C.F.R. § 1.130-1.151. These rules provide for the filing and adjudication of an administrative complaint when, inter alia, an administrative order is violated. 10468 THE FITZGERALD LIVING TRUST v. UNITED STATES The Fitzgeralds did not accept this easement and instead filed suit under the Quiet Title Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2409a, and the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701706. In their complaint, the Fitzgeralds alleged, inter alia, the following: (1) they have an easement by necessity, an implied easement under the Homestead Act, and an express easement over FDR 56B; and (2) the Forest Service’s issuance of the FLPMA easement is arbitrary and capricious because it restricts their common law rights of access and it deprives them of their statutory right of access under the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3210(a) (“ANILCA”),5 and their right to a permanent easement under the National Forest Roads and Trails Act (“NFRTA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 532-538. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Forest Service, holding that the Forest Service has the statutory authority under FLPMA and ANILCA to impose restrictions on a private landowner’s ingress and egress over national forest land and that the unrestricted use of FDR 56B for many years did not trump this authority. The district court concluded that the easement’s restrictions were reasonable, and that the Forest Service did not abuse its discretion by offering the Fitzgeralds an easement under FLPMA and not pursuant to NFRTA. While the district court held that any common law rights to an easement were preempted by statute, citing to Adams v. United States (Adams II), 255 F.3d 787, 794 (9th Cir. 2001) 5 ANILCA, passed in 1980, directs the Secretary of Agriculture to provide access to private property within the boundaries of the National Forest System “as the Secretary deems adequate to secure to the owner the reasonable use and enjoyment thereof” and provided that the “owner comply with rules and regulations applicable to ingress and egress” over the federal land. 16 U.S.C. § 3210. In this respect, ANILCA is not limited to national forest land located in the state of Alaska, but rather applies nationwide. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981). THE FITZGERALD LIVING TRUST v. UNITED STATES 10469 (holding that “common law [easement] claims are preempted by ANILCA and FLPMA where . . . the United States owns the servient estate for the benefit of the public”), it also reached the merits of the Fitzgeralds’ common law claims. The court concluded that an easement by necessity did not exist because FLPMA and ANILCA grant the Fitzgeralds access to their property, obviating the necessity requirement for such an easement. Moreover, it held that an implied easement did not exist because the Fitzgeralds’ right of access was clearly expressed in those statutes, and, assuming arguendo that an express easement was granted based on the 1920 patent language, it would still be subject to Forest Service regulation. The Fitzgeralds appealed.6 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we affirm.