Opinion ID: 3047630
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: William Hernandez

Text: Hernandez’s first argument is that the District Court erred by allowing cellular-phone records into evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 401. We review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 217 (3d Cir. 1999). Evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” F ED. R. E VID. 401. Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the records because they were probative of Hernandez’s connection to and participation in the offense. Specifically, the records (1) provided evidence of Hernandez’s efforts to plan the offense and 3 (2) provided evidence of Hernandez’s presence at the offense and efforts with his codefendants to execute the offense. Hernandez next argues that this Court should reverse his Hobbs Act conviction because insufficient evidence existed to prove that the robbery had a substantial impact on interstate commerce. We exercise plenary review over challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. E.g., United States v. Taftsiou, 144 F.3d 287, 290 (3d Cir. 1998). We determine whether the trial evidence, which is viewed in the light most favorable to the government, would allow a rational trier of fact to convict. See, e.g., United States v. Hart, 273 F.3d 363, 371 (3d Cir. 2001). We have held that to satisfy the Hobbs Act’s jurisdictional requirement only a “de minimis effect on commerce is sufficient.” United States v. Clausen, 328 F.3d 708, 710 (3d Cir. 2003). The government must thus show that “the defendants’ conduct produce[d] any interference with or effect upon interstate commerce, whether slight, subtle or even potential . . ..” United States v. Haywood, 363 F.3d 200, 210 (3d Cir. 2004) (internal quotation omitted). Hernandez’s argument fails because the evidence would allow a rationale trier of fact to find the required de minimis effect on interstate commerce. Specifically, the evidence showed that the defendants used interstate channels of commerce to commit the robbery, including interstate highways (from Pennsylvania to New Jersey and back) and interstate cellular-phone networks. See United States v. Carcione, 272 F.3d 1297, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001). 4 Hernandez finally argues that, if Counts One and Two (the Hobbs Act Counts) do not give rise to federal jurisdiction, then the violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which is contained in Count Five, must be dismissed. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) penalizes carrying or brandishing a weapon during the commission of a crime of violence or drug trafficking. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). His argument fails because Counts One and Two (the Hobbs Act Counts) do give rise to federal jurisdiction. Count Five therefore has either Count One or Two as the requisite predicate.