Opinion ID: 1170931
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Death Threats.

Text: (25a), (26a), (27a), (28a) Defendant contends that evidence of the D.A. and Danny death threats was inadmissible on three grounds: (1) the prosecution failed to give adequate notice of its intent to introduce such evidence in aggravation; (2) the police had a duty to preserve a tape recording of the monitored conversation in which defendant made the Danny threat; and (3) neither threat constituted a violation of a penal statute  a prerequisite for admissibility under section 190.3, factor (b). (See People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72 [222 Cal. Rptr. 127, 711 P.2d 423].) (27b), (28b) Only the last claim has merit, and then only with respect to the Danny threat. Moreover, the erroneous admission of evidence of the Danny threat was nonprejudicial.
(25b) Defendant contends that the prosecutor failed to give him proper notice of his intent to offer evidence of the death threats in aggravation at the penalty phase. Section 190.3 provides in relevant part: Except for evidence in proof of the offense or special circumstances which subject a defendant to the death penalty, no evidence may be presented by the prosecution in aggravation unless notice of the evidence to be introduced has been given to the defendant within a reasonable period of time as determined by the court, prior to trial. (29) The purpose of the statutory notice is to advise the accused of the evidence against him so that he may have a reasonable opportunity to prepare a defense for the penalty phase of trial. (See People v. Miranda (1987) 44 Cal.3d 57, 96 [241 Cal. Rptr. 594, 744 P.2d 1127].) (25c) We are satisfied that there was substantial compliance with section 190.3. The record discloses that the prosecutor told defense counsel even before the case arrived in superior court that defendant had threatened a deputy district attorney and a police officer. In addition, a written notice of the intention to introduce such evidence in aggravation was filed a full week before commencement of the penalty phase. The trial judge conducted a hearing in chambers on the evidence to be admitted at the penalty phase. He personally recalled that from the time he was assigned the case the matter of the prior threats had been discussed in connection with courtroom security concerns. Moreover, defendant cannot be heard to complain that the notice of the October 30, 1979, courtroom threat against the deputy district attorney was lacking in specificity; the record reflects defense counsel was representing defendant at the preliminary hearing and was himself present in the courtroom when defendant uttered the threat. Finally, the record reveals counsel was fully aware of his right to seek a continuance to investigate and respond to any evidence of which he had not been afforded adequate notice. (See People v. Howard (1988) 44 Cal.3d 375, 419-425 [243 Cal. Rptr. 842, 749 P.2d 279].) A continuance was never sought. The trial court was satisfied that defense counsel had been afforded adequate notice of the prosecutor's intent to introduce evidence of the threats. We see no reason to reach a contrary conclusion.
(26b) Shortly after selling the gun to undercover Officer MacIvor (Danny), defendant and his cousin were detained at the police station on suspicion of burglary. Officer Nichols testified the two were placed in a room and their conversation secretly monitored. Defendant was overheard to tell his cousin he would have to get the gun back from Danny, and that Danny should be offed. Nichols testified off was a street term for kill. At the start of the penalty phase, the district attorney for the first time learned that the conversation at the police station had been tape-recorded as well as monitored. Officer Nichols testified that the threats were audible on the tape, but its quality was very poor because defendant and his cousin had been whispering. A copy of the tape was forwarded to homicide detectives whose attempts to enhance it electronically proved unsuccessful. The homicide detectives thereafter informed Officer Nichols that the tape was of no value to them. He kept the original for five or six months and ultimately reused it, making no special effort to preserve it for trial. Neither the original tape nor the copy were ever made available to the defense or prosecution during trial. Defendant contends that under People v. Hitch (1974) 12 Cal.3d 641, 652-653 [117 Cal. Rptr. 9, 527 P.2d 361], the officers' negligent destruction of the tape should have precluded admission of evidence of the Danny threats at the penalty phase. (30) The United States Supreme Court has recently formulated its own duty-to-preserve-evidence test in California v. Trombetta (1984) 467 U.S. 479 [81 L.Ed.2d 413, 104 S.Ct. 2528]. Under Trombetta, the duty to preserve extends only to evidence which both possess[es] an exculpatory value that was apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably available means. (467 U.S. at p. 489 [81 L.Ed.2d at p. 422].) (26c) Here it appears neither prong of the Trombetta test was met; defendant made no showing that the tape recording possessed any apparent exculpatory value, nor did he show why his opportunity to cross-examine Officer Nichols, who directly monitored the taped conversation, was inadequate to protect his rights. [9] In any event, as next shown, this claim is effectively mooted by our conclusion that evidence of the Danny threats was inadmissible for a more fundamental reason.
(27c), (28c) Five years after trial in this case, this court held that [i]nsofar as section 190.3 contemplates consideration of defendant's criminal history (see [factors] (b), (c)), such evidence `must be limited to ... conduct that demonstrates the commission of an actual crime, specifically, the violation of a penal statute....' ( People v. Phillips (1985) 41 Cal.3d 29, 72; see also Boyd, [ People v. Boyd (1985)] 38 Cal.3d [762,] at pp. 776-778 [215 Cal. Rptr. 1, 700 P.2d 782].) ( People v. Belmontes (1988) 45 Cal.3d 744, 808 [248 Cal. Rptr. 126, 755 P.2d 310].) (27d) Defendant and amicus curiae contend that the courtroom threat, the hell with getting a cop, I'll get me a D.A., was not a crime in violation of a penal statute. Respondent asserts it was a violation of sections 69 or 71 (threatening an executive or public officer with intent to deter performance of his duties). We conclude that evidence of the courtroom threat would support a finding of a violation of section 69. Although defendant voiced the threat in a low voice, he turned to face the deputy district attorney when he communicated it. The deputy had just completed conducting a preliminary hearing in which defendant was held to answer, had argued against his release on bail, and was able to hear at least a portion of the threat. Given the murder and assault charges which defendant faced, it could reasonably be perceived that he had the apparent ability to carry out the threat. The evidence thus supports an inference that defendant intended to thwart or deter further prosecution of his case by threatening the deputy district attorney, and each requisite element of a violation of section 69 was shown on these facts. (See People v. Hopkins (1983) 149 Cal. App.3d 36, 40-44 [196 Cal. Rptr. 609].) Furthermore, the jury was instructed that the threats had to be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to qualify as factors in aggravation. ( People v. Robertson (1982) 33 Cal.3d 21, 55 [188 Cal. Rptr. 77, 655 P.2d 279].) (28d) We agree with defendant that evidence of the Danny threat was inadmissible under the rule of Phillips and Boyd. Respondent contends that defendant's statement constitutes solicitation of his cousin Lawrence Martin to assist in a plan to murder Officer MacIvor, a violation of section 653f. But Officer Nichols's testimony concerning this threat does not bear out the claim; the words used by defendant are at best ambiguous and equally supportive of an inference that he was merely relating to Martin how he (defendant) would have to get the gun back and off Danny. [10] We conclude, however, that admission of evidence of the Danny threat was nonprejudicial. (Cf. People v. Belmontes, supra, 45 Cal.3d at p. 809.) This case was tried well before Phillips or Boyd were decided. The properly admitted aggravating evidence in this case  in particular, the circumstances of the crime (§ 190.3, factor (a))  was simply overwhelming. From that evidence the jury found defendant guilty in one incident of murdering one person and assaulting two others in execution-style shootings of unarmed and unresisting victims, two of whom were teenagers. One month later defendant viciously pistol-whipped a young woman and shot her twice in the head in order to facilitate his escape with her $11 and her car. The evidence of defendant's threats was dwarfed in comparison to the seriousness and excessive violence of the charged offenses. Nor did the prosecutor place heavy emphasis on the threats in his closing argument. He maintained that they constituted examples of other criminal activity involving a threat of violence and should thus be considered in aggravation, but he also cautioned the jury on three separate occasions to ignore the evidence unless they first found beyond a reasonable doubt that the alleged criminal activity had actually occurred. He suggested the threats evidenced a callous and casual attitude toward the value of others' lives, but clearly communicated his belief that this attitude was established primarily by defendant's conduct in the charged offenses and his courtroom demeanor. Finally, the jury knew from the guilt phase that defendant twice met with undercover Officer MacIvor after communicating the Danny threat to his cousin and being released from custody. There was no evidence defendant ever attempted to make good on his threat. On these facts it would be sheer speculation for us to conclude that evidence of the threat affected the penalty verdict.