Opinion ID: 2556735
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Specificity of the Preliminary Injunction

Text: Finally, defendants contend that the preliminary injunction appealed from is unenforceable and should be quashed on the grounds that it is directed against unknown and undescribed John Does and Jane Does   . The plaintiff counters that defendants waived any objections to defects in service and sufficiency of process in the proceedings below and that their argument before this Court is nothing but an effort to circumvent those waivers. [10] Rule 65(d) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure says: Every order granting an injunction and every restraining order shall be specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail the act or acts sought to be restrained; and is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participation with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise. The defendants cite no case law as foundation for their core proposition that the specific in terms requirement of Rule 65(d) means that the exact names of individuals must be identified by the injunction in order to be enforceable. The defendants do, however, cite us to State v. Eckert, 120 R.I. 560, 389 A.2d 1234 (1978) (affirming an order denying the plaintiffs motion to adjudge the defendant in contempt for allegedly violating the terms of a preliminary injunction), which states the general rule that to be enforceable by a contempt proceeding, an injunction must be clear and certain, and its terms must be sufficiently detailed to enable one reading the injunctive order to understand therefrom what he may not do thereunder. Id. at 567, 389 A.2d at 1238 (citing School Committee v. Pawtucket Teachers' Alliance, Local No. 930, 117 R.I. 203, 365 A.2d 499 (1976); Sunbeam Corp. v. Ross-Simons, Inc., 86 R.I. 189, 134 A.2d 160 (1957)). [11] The injunction appealed from here says, [the] [d]efendants are enjoined from camping, living, occupying, using or otherwise trespassing upon city property and more specifically, the property commonly referred to as Pleasant Valley Parkway. We have no hesitation in concluding that the terms of the order issued by the hearing justice speak for themselves and are quite specific so as to enable one reading the injunctive order to understand therefrom what he [or she] may not do thereunder. See Eckert, 120 R.I. at 567, 389 A.2d at 1238.