Opinion ID: 2616871
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Power of City

Text: Oil Co. asserts that: The Charter of the City of Englewood does not confer upon the city council the powers which it purported to exercise with relation to nonconforming uses as set forth in Section 22.6-8. In support of this contention the petitioner-appellee argues, in effect, that if the City has the power to act to terminate nonconforming uses it must find it in C.R.S. 1963, 139-60-1, et seq. As we understand the argument it is based on the fact that there are several references in the Charter to the statutes of the State of Colorado and to general law. We do not regard this as a valid argument and will demonstrate its fallacy. Article XX, Section 6, Constitution of Colorado, grants home rule cities every power possessed by the General Assembly as to local and municipal matters, unless restricted by the terms of its Charter. Fishel v. Denver, 106 Colo. 576, 108 P.2d 236. See also Vela v. People, 174 Colo. 465, 484 P.2d 1204. We have held that zoning is a matter of local and municipal concern. Roosevelt v. City of Englewood, Colo., 492 P.2d 65. In Article I of the Charter of the City of Englewood, the City vested its legislative power in the Council (Section 2) and in Section 3 gave it . . . all powers, functions, rights and privileges in the operation of the municipality, except those . . . expressly forbidden to Home Rule municipal corporations and cities by the constitution or the statutes of the State of Colorado.  (Emphasis added.) Oil Co. argues that Section 3, above, is superfluous, because it basically repeats the thrust of Section 6, Article XX. It is further contended that Article III, Section 30 of the Charter prevails over the general and all-inclusive statement contained in Section 3 of Article I, for the reason that the issue herein is the validity of a legislative act. Section 3, as underscored, denies the City only powers expressly forbidden by the statutes, and this, of course, would only apply to situations where the legislation was of statewide concern. Vela v. People, supra . Article III deals specifically with the Legislative Body. It creates the council, provides for the organization, staffing and procedures of the Council and grants certain powers. Section 30: PowersCouncil shall have all municipal legislative powers as conferred by general law, except as provided by this Charter and except those which may be exercised by the people through direct legislation. The Council shall have the power and authority, within constitutional limitations, to delegate by ordinance to Boards and Commissions such functions, powers or authority herein conferred upon the City as the Council shall deem proper and advisable within its discretion. In its brief the Oil Co. argues specifically that C.R.S. 139-60-1, et seq., does not grant the power to the City which appears in Section 22.6-8: Thus, the Englewood City Council is granted such power in the conduct of the legislative affairs of the City as are conferred by general law. The general law of the State of Colorado as it relates to the extent of municipal power in the exercise of the zoning function is set forth in Article 60 of Chapter 139, Colorado Revised Statutes, 1963. Comparison of the language of C.R.S.1963, Sections 139-60-1 through 3, demonstrates that it is virtually identical with the language contained in Sections 1 through 3 of the Charter of the City and County of Denver cited and reviewed by the Court in Denver Buick, supra . (See pages 136 and 137 of the Court's Opinion). . . . From comparison of the statutory language with the language of the Denver City Charter at issue in Denver Buick, supra, it is readily apparent that the City of Englewood can claim no further or additional powers in the area of restriction and regulation of nonconforming uses than that claimed by the City of Denver in 1959. If we were to accept Oil Co.'s arguments and adhere to Denver Buick, it would make no difference whether the power to zone emanated from the Charter or from the statute. In either event the product of the exercise of that power would be unconstitutional. So far as the question of whether the statute or the Charter prevails, that issue was disposed of in Roosevelt v. City of Englewood, supra, when it was recognized that zoning was a local and municipal matter and that Article XX, Section 6, confers on home rule cities every power possessed by the general assembly in granting charters generally. See also Vela v. People, supra . The General Assembly has power to legislate zoning regulations applicable to statutory cities. Where, however, the Charter of a home rule city exercises the power delegated to it by Article XX, Section 6, as to matters of purely local concern, the legislature has no power. This being true, the only remaining argument relates to the question of reasonableness.