Opinion ID: 844248
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Constitutional Challenges to Death Penalty Law

Text: Defendant raises numerous challenges to the death penalty law under the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution, and to the manner in which it was applied to him. He mainly seeks to preserve and litigate such issues later. (See People v. Schmeck (2005) 37 Cal.4th 240, 303-304 [33 Cal.Rptr.3d 397, 118 P.3d 451].) As defendant concedes, we have rejected all such claims before. We do so again here, as follows: Section 190.3, factor (a), allowing consideration of the circumstances of the capital crime, does not license the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty. ( People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347, 406 [106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771, 227 P.3d 342], and cases cited.) The death penalty law, and standard instructions based thereon, are not flawed insofar as they fail to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to whether (1) aggravating factors were present, (2) the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, (3) the aggravating factors were so substantial as to warrant a death sentence, or (4) death is the appropriate penalty. Nor were written findings or unanimity as to aggravating factors required. High court decisions, such as Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 [159 L.Ed.2d 403, 124 S.Ct. 2531], Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 [153 L.Ed.2d 556, 122 S.Ct. 2428], and Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 [147 L.Ed.2d 435, 120 S.Ct. 2348], do not undermine these conclusions. ( People v. Bell, supra, 40 Cal.4th 582, 620, and cases cited; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 589 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347], and cases cited.) There is no constitutional requirement to instruct either on any burden of persuasion regarding the penalty determination, or on any presumption that life without the possibility of parole is the favored or appropriate penalty. ( People v. Taylor, supra, 48 Cal.4th 574, 662, and cases cited.) Standard instructions are not flawed insofar as they allow a death verdict if aggravation is so substantial compared with mitigation, such that death is warranted. ( People v. Russell (2010) 50 Cal.4th 1228, 1273 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 615, 242 P.3d 68].) A jury so advised need not also be told that life without parole is (1) mandatory if mitigation outweighs aggravation, or (2) permissible even if aggravation outweighs mitigation. ( People v. Tate, supra, 49 Cal.4th 635, 712, and cases cited.) Under the relevant law and instructions, the trial court did not err insofar as it failed to (1) delete assertedly inapplicable sentencing factors, (2) instruct as to which sentencing factors are aggravating and which are mitigating, or (3) instruct that the absence of mitigation in certain statutory categories was not aggravating. ( People v. Stitely, supra, 35 Cal.4th 514, 574, and cases cited.) Use of the terms extreme and substantial to describe certain mitigating factors is not impermissible. ( People v. DePriest, supra, 42 Cal.4th 1, 60, and cases cited.) California's automatic appeals process is constitutional even though it affords no intercase proportionality review. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, 602.) Equal protection does not require that capital defendants be afforded the same sentence review as other felons to whom the determinate sentencing law applies. ( People v. Brady, supra, 50 Cal.4th 547, 590.) Elimination of capital punishment in California is not required under international law or norms. ( People v. Solomon, supra, 49 Cal.4th 792, 844, and cases cited.)