Opinion ID: 2163333
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Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Michigan's Mechanics' Lien Law Pre-1958

Text: The term commencement of a building had a well-established meaning in most states when Michigan incorporated that term into its own mechanics' lien law. As illustrative of this meaning, and in order not to belabor the point, we quote from one such case, while citing the reader to others which preceded or were contemporaneous with Michigan's statute: The commencement of a building is the doing of some act upon the ground upon which the building is to be erected, and in pursuance of a design to erect, the result of which act should make known to a person viewing the premises, from observation alone, that the erection of a building upon that lot or tract of land has been commenced. James v Van Horn, 39 NJL 353, 363 (1877). (Emphasis supplied.) Accord, Brooks v Lester, 36 Md 65 (1872); Kansas Mortgage Co v Weyerhaeuser, 48 Kan 335; 29 P 153 (1892); Fitzgerald v Walsh, 107 Wis 92; 82 NW 717 (1900); Conrad & Ewinger v Starr, 50 Iowa 470 (1879). Likewise, early Michigan case law espoused this same idea of keying the concept of commencement in its priority section to some actual, visible work on the land such that it was apparent to all that a building was being erected or improvements were being made. In Kay v Towsley, 113 Mich 281, 283; 71 NW 490 (1897), this Court, in ruling that two materialmen's liens were prior to that of a mortgagee who had recorded his mortgage prior to the furnishing of the materials but subsequent to the erection of the foundation wall, stated: This provision [the priority provision in the Mechanics' Lien Law] has been passed upon frequently by the courts, and it has been uniformly held that the lien has priority over a mortgage executed upon the land or premises after the actual commencement of the building, though no part of the labor performed or materials furnished for which the lien is claimed was done or performed until after the execution and recording of the mortgage. (Emphasis supplied.) See, also, Stevens v Garland, 198 Mich 24, 32; 164 NW 516 (1917); Peninsular Stove Co v Crane, 226 Mich 130, 137-138; 197 NW 693 (1924). One early commentator summarized the meaning of commencement of said building in Michigan thus: In determining priorities, liens attach as of the date of the actual commencement of the building or improvement, regardless of the time when, or person by whom, particular work is done or materials furnished, for which lien is claimed. The building is begun when the first permanent work is done on the land. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted.) Wykes, The Michigan Laws of Mechanics' Liens (2d ed), pp 167-168, fn 2. Commencement, then, as defined by early case law and commentary, required an act of such a character that it was notice to all of the existence of mechanics' liens. As Professor Thompson wrote: The `commencement of a building', within the meaning of these statutes, is the first labor done on the ground which is made the foundation of the building, and forms part of the work suitable and necessary for its construction. It is some work or labor on the ground, such as beginning to dig the foundation, which everyone can see and recognize as the commencement of a building; and the work, moreover, must be done with the intention thus formed of continuing it to completion. (Footnotes omitted.) 8A Thompson, Commentaries on the Modern Law of Real Property (1963 Supp), § 4427, p 228. Accord, Anno, 1 ALR3d 822, § 2, p 824. In such fashion, commencement of a building gave constructive notice to prospective lenders or purchasers of the possible existence of liens. See Phillips on Mechanics' Liens (3d ed), § 218, 385-388; Flick, Abstract & Title Practice, § 734, pp 716-717. This visible notice was especially important since under Michigan's mechanics' lien act, as well as those of other states, commencement fixed the date to which all mechanics' liens related back, even if other contractors started their work weeks or months later. MCL 570.9 (first); MSA 26.289 (first). [7] It was in keeping with this interpretation that this Court early held, in response to a mechanic lienor's contention, analogous to that made in the present case, that the commencement of a building occurred when the architect began drawing the plans and specifications for the building, that [i]t is, we think, clear, that the drawing of plans for a building is not `the commencement of said building or buildings.' Stevens v Garland, 198 Mich 24, 32; 164 NW 516 (1917).