Opinion ID: 1195082
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: This court struck portion of defendant's brief

Text: On July 20, 1995, this court granted the state's motion to strike several sections of defendant's opening brief, on the basis that they attacked the validity of his convictions rather than his sentence. Defendant argues that this was error because: (1) on his previous appeal he was represented by counsel who failed to raise all the issues he thought were meritorious; (2) the court sometimes considers issues for the first time on appeal and should do so in a capital case; and (3) the underlying conviction-stage evidence was relied on to establish aggravation and mitigation and is therefore related to the sentence. We decline to revisit our ruling for several reasons. First, the stricken arguments relate to pretrial and guilt-phase issues that clearly could have been raised in the first appeal. See Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 504-05, 844 P.2d at 1154-55 (With even greater force, preclusion should occur on remand after direct appellate review has been exhausted .... the `efficient and orderly administration [of justice] requires some point in time at which it is too late to raise new issues on appeal.' ); cf. State v. Rossi, 171 Ariz. 276, 281, 830 P.2d 797, 802 (1992) (new claim arising after defendant's previous appeal was considered although not raised in brief). At that time, we searched the record for fundamental error and found none. Schackart, 175 Ariz. at 503, 858 P.2d at 648. Finally, any claim that counsel improperly failed to develop certain issues on appeal should be addressed in a post-conviction relief proceeding. See Ariz.R.Crim.P. 32.1.

Defendant complains that the judge did not consider imposing a life sentence without possibility of release, yet argues that it would be inappropriate for this court to reduce his sentence to natural life. We are unable to see the logic in this position. In any event, at the time of this murder, A.R.S. § 13-703(A) did not provide for the possibility of a natural life sentence. Therefore, that penalty is not available here. See A.R.S.§ 1-246; State v. Vineyard, 96 Ariz. 76, 80, 392 P.2d 30, 33 (1964). Alternatively, defendant asks this court to consider the natural life option as a mitigating factor in its independent review. We have previously held, however, that the availability of a real life sentence is not appropriate mitigation. See State v. Soto-Fong, 187 Ariz. 186, 211, 928 P.2d 610, 635 (1996).
Defendant argues that executing him after he has spent many years on death row would constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, § 15 of the Arizona Constitution. In Lackey v. Texas, the Supreme Court declined to review the same issue, although Justice Stevens filed a memorandum noting his belief that this concern should be further explored. 514 U.S. 1045, 115 S.Ct. 1421, 131 L.Ed.2d 304 (1995), petition for reh'g denied, ___ U.S. ___, 117 S.Ct. 1465, 137 L.Ed.2d 568 (1997). Since then, so-called Lackey claims have found little support in the courts that have addressed them. See McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir.1995) (delay in carrying out executions benefits inmates, allowing them to extend their lives and perhaps obtain commutations, reversals, or, rarely, complete exoneration); State v. Smith, 280 Mont. 158, 931 P.2d 1272, 1288 (1996) (If an Eighth Amendment challenge based on delay were to prevail, then the procedures designed to promote fair adjudication in death penalty cases would in themselves be used to ultimately defeat their own purpose.); Janecka v. State, 937 S.W.2d 456, 476 (1996) (no factual basis to prove psychological torment and law does not recognize present claim). We perceive no constitutional violation. There is no evidence that Arizona has set up a scheme prolonging incarceration in order to torture inmates prior to their execution. See McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466. Moreover, defendant's claim that the state is solely responsible for the delays in this case is inaccurate. Those were in large part caused by the unlikely circumstance of a court reporter failing to prepare an adequate record and the subsequent painstaking process of reconstructing one. Additionally, defendant has requested and received numerous continuances. See Smith, 931 P.2d at 1288; McKenzie, 57 F.3d at 1466-67.
Defendant asserts that it would be cruel and unusual to execute him after he has served out his consecutive prison terms (totaling 70.5 years) for the non-capital offenses. We disagree, however, with his premise that Arizona law requires sentences to be served in the order in which they were imposed. See A.R.S. §§ 13-706(A), 13-703.
Defendant complains about a statement that the former governor allegedly made concerning a plan to devise a hard labor program for our death row inmates, to help them pass the time while the courts process those endless appeals. He has not cited the time or place of this statement, nor has he provided details of any hard labor program to which he has been subjected so that we may examine its legality as applied. See A.R.S. §§ 31-251 through -254 (authorizing, among other things, the director of the Department of Corrections to classify prisoners as eligible for hard labor programs).
In a brief paragraph, defendant states that by holding a joint sentencing hearing on his capital and non-capital charges, the court heard inadmissible and prejudicial information. He does not specify what was improper and fails to provide legal authorities for us to consider. See State v. Bolton, 182 Ariz. 290, 298, 896 P.2d 830, 838 (1995). Moreover, the procedure in question was permissible. See State v. Greenawalt, 128 Ariz. 150, 170, 624 P.2d 828, 848 (1981).
Defendant alleges that the prosecutor made misleading statements during trial about evidence found at the crime scene. These claims were not raised in the trial court or on his first appeal, and are therefore waived. See Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 297, 316, 896 P.2d at 837, 856; Youngblood, 173 Ariz. at 505, 844 P.2d at 1155. Further, the majority of statements were made at a hearing before the judge alone, and all appear to have been reasonably supported by the evidence. We fail to see how they could have unfairly influenced the verdict. See Bolton, 182 Ariz. at 307, 896 P.2d at 847.
Defendant raises numerous constitutional challenges to Arizona's death penalty, which have been dispositively addressed in previous cases, as follows: 1. Imposed arbitrarily and irrationally, see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3057, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 777, 110 S.Ct. 3092, 3100, 111 L.Ed.2d 606 (1990); McKenzie v. Day, 57 F.3d 1461, 1466-67 (9th Cir.1995). 2. Lethal gas or injection cruel and unusual punishment, see State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 507, 892 P.2d 838, 843 (1995); State v. Hinchey, 181 Ariz. 307, 315, 890 P.2d 602, 610 (1995). 3. Death unconstitutionally required if one aggravating factor found, see Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 651-52, 110 S.Ct. 3047, 3056-57, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990). 4. No right to death qualify sentencing judge, see State v. Atwood, 171 Ariz. 576, 645-46 n. 21(3), 832 P.2d 593, 662-63 n. 21(3)(1992). 5. No statutory standards for weighing, see id. at n. 21(4). 6. Defendant must prove mitigating factors, see id. at n. 21(11). 7. Death-eligible class not sufficiently narrowed, see State v. West, 176 Ariz. 432, 449, 862 P.2d 192, 209 (1993) (citing Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 244, 108 S.Ct. 546, 559, 98 L.Ed.2d 568 (1988)). 8. State does not separately prove death is appropriate, see State v. White, 168 Ariz. 500, 515, 815 P.2d 869, 884 (1991). 9. Consideration of mitigation evidence too restricted, see id. at 514-15, 815 P.2d 869; Walton, 497 U.S. at 651-52, 110 S.Ct. at 3056-57; State v. Gonzales, 181 Ariz. 502, 513, 892 P.2d 838, 849 (1995). 10. No meaningful distinction between capital and non-capital cases, see State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 411, 844 P.2d 566, 578 (1992). 11. Discriminates against poor, young, male defendants as applied, see Jeffers v. Lewis, 38 F.3d 411, 419 (9th Cir.1994). 12. Judge alone makes aggravation and mitigation findings, see id. at 419. 13. No proportionality review, see Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 50-51, 104 S.Ct. 871, 879, 79 L.Ed.2d 29 (1984); State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. at 416-417, 844 P.2d at 583-84 (1992).
We have determined that the trial court properly found the (F)(6) aggravating circumstance based on cruelty. This court has previously affirmed death sentences where only one prong of the (F)(6) factor is found in aggravation and some mitigation, albeit minimal, has been presented. See State v. Hinchey, 181 Ariz. 307, 314-15, 890 P.2d 602, 609-10 (1995); State v. Villafuerte, 142 Ariz. 323, 332, 690 P.2d 42, 51 (1984); State v. Smith, 138 Ariz. 79, 86, 673 P.2d 17, 24 (1983). That is precisely the situation here. Having reweighed the evidence, we find that the mitigation is not sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. The sentence is affirmed. JONES, V.C.J., and FELDMAN, MOELLER and MARTONE, JJ., concur.