Opinion ID: 2326933
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Substantially Different Discipline

Text: We now consider whether respondent has overcome the rebuttable presumption that the discipline will be the same in the District of Columbia as it was in the original disciplining jurisdiction, In re Zilberberg, 612 A.2d 832, 834 (D.C. 1992), on the ground that his misconduct warrants substantially different discipline in this jurisdiction. D.C. Bar Rule XI, § 11(c)(4). We must consider (1) whether the misconduct would have resulted in the same punishment in the District; and (2) if the sanction would have been different, whether it is substantially so. In re Meaden, 902 A.2d 802, 815 (D.C. 2006) (citation omitted). There is no question that in this jurisdiction, a finding that a lawyer knowingly misappropriated client funds supports the sanction of disbarment. We have said that [i]n this jurisdiction misappropriation of funds warrants disbarment in virtually all cases. In re Larsen, 589 A.2d 400 (D.C.1991); [14] see also In re Reid, 540 A.2d 754, 759 (D.C.1988) (citing the well established rule in this jurisdiction that, with limited exceptions, the sanction for misappropriation of client funds is disbarment). While Respondent emphasizes that there has been no finding that he had the intent to steal, that is beside the point, because a showing of an intent to steal is not required to disbar an attorney for misusing client funds. See In re Harrison, 461 A.2d 1034, 1036 (D.C.1983) (defining misappropriation as any unauthorized use of client's funds entrusted to [a lawyer], including not only stealing but also unauthorized temporary use for the lawyer's own purpose, whether or not [he] derives any personal gain or benefit therefrom); see also In re Carlson, 802 A.2d 341, 348 (D.C.2002) (misappropriation occurs whenever the balance in an attorney's escrow account falls below the amount due to the client); In re Edwards, 808 A.2d 476, 484 (D.C.2002) (misappropriation revealing an unacceptable disregard for the safety and welfare of entrusted funds will warrant disbarment) (quoting In re Anderson, 778 A.2d 330, 338 (D.C.2001)). The foregoing does not end our analysis, however. We must determine (if we can on the Maryland record) whether Respondent's misconduct actually would have resulted in substantially different discipline had he engaged in misappropriation of client funds within the District of Columbia. Respondent argues that the findings of dishonesty and misappropriation of client funds would warrant substantially different discipline here because the depression from which he suffered during the relevant time period substantially affected his misconduct. Stanback, 681 A.2d at 1114-15. This means, Respondent argues, that even in the absence of utter inability to conform his conduct to the rules of professional conduct, the mitigation standard established in Kersey is met. Bar Counsel, on the other hand, urged at oral argument that our decision last year in Meaden requires us to accept the Maryland court's ruling that a mitigation of sanction is not warranted. In Meaden, the respondent had been suspended from the practice of law by the Supreme Court of New Jersey for, inter alia, lying on seven applications to purchase handguns (by failing to disclose his psychiatric history) and for using another individual's credit card information without authorization to purchase golf clubs and bags. See 902 A.2d at 805, 806. Police also found in Meaden's possession mail and credit card statements of two other individuals. Id. at 805 n. 5. In mitigation, Meaden presented to New Jersey disciplinary authorities evidence that he suffered from bipolar disorder. Id. at 806-07. The New Jersey Supreme Court upheld a finding by the state's disciplinary review board that Meaden's evidence regarding purported mitigation fell short of the standard established by In re Jacob, 95 N.J. 132, 469 A.2d 498, 501 (1984) (finding that mitigation was unavailing where the disciplinary review board correctly determined that respondent's medical presentation failed to establish any `causal connection' between [Jacobs'] condition and his financial depredations, the hearing panel and ethics committee were not persuaded that Jacobs' medical condition was an exclusive or major cause of his ethical derelictions, and there was no demonstration by competent medical proofs that [Jacobs] suffered a loss of competency, comprehension or will of a magnitude that could excuse egregious misconduct that was clearly knowing, volitional and purposeful). The New Jersey court suspended Meaden for three years with a fitness requirement. In reciprocal proceedings in our jurisdiction, Meaden argued that he would have prevailed on his claim of mitigation of sanction under the standard set forth in Kersey,  902 A.2d at 813, and that, assuming reciprocal discipline was warranted, this jurisdiction should impose nothing more than probation with conditions. Id. at 808. In rejecting Meaden's argument that reciprocal discipline was not warranted, we relied on In re Benjamin, 698 A.2d 434 (D.C.1997), quoting it for the proposition that [u]nder principles of collateral estoppel, in reciprocal discipline cases we generally accept the ruling of the original jurisdiction, even though the underlying sanction may have been based on a different rule of procedure or standard of proof. 902 A.2d at 814 (quoting Benjamin, 698 A.2d at 440 (rejecting respondent's argument that reciprocal discipline should not be imposed based on a New York disciplinary action because New York uses a lower standard of proof in attorney discipline cases than the District of Columbia uses, reasoning that the difference in evidentiary standards between New York and the District of Columbia in disciplinary cases does not, on its face, establish an infirmity of proof, id. at 439)). [15] We concluded that Meaden had provided no persuasive reasons why we should depart from general principles of collateral estoppel and reject reciprocal discipline in this case, 902 A.2d at 814, and that Meaden cannot avoid reciprocal discipline by attacking collaterally the New Jersey tribunal's . . . application of that jurisdiction's law to the facts of the case. Id. at 815. We reasoned that [a]lthough the Jacob standard differs somewhat from the Kersey standard, that distinction alone is not sufficient in itself to avoid a reciprocal discipline proceeding. Id. at 814. Thus, under Meaden, Maryland's different standard for mitigation provides no basis for us to decline to impose (some form of) reciprocal discipline on the basis of the Maryland court's findings. And, if the standard for mitigation in Maryland were merely somewhat different from our Kersey standard, Meaden would also require us to impose a sanction identical to the discipline that the Maryland court imposed, so long as that discipline falls within the range of sanctions that we would impose, in an original proceeding, for the violations in issue. See id. at 815 (the question is whether the upper range of any sanction here would be ` substantially different' from the sanction imposed in New Jersey) (emphasis added in the original) (quoting In re Garner, 576 A.2d 1356, 1357 (D.C.1990)). But we do not read Meaden or any of our other precedents as requiring us to impose such an identical sanction if  as we conclude infra  Maryland's mitigation standard is more than somewhat different from our own standard. Maryland's Vanderlinde standard requires proof of a lawyer's utter inability to conform his or her conduct to the rules of professional conduct. 773 A.2d at 485. Vanderlinde also requires a showing of nothing less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the `root cause' of the misconduct. Id. By contrast, Kersey mitigation requires Respondent to show (1) by clear and convincing evidence that [he] had a disability; (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that the disability substantially affected [his] misconduct; and (3) by clear and convincing evidence that [he] has been substantially rehabilitated. In re Verra, 932 A.2d 503, 504, 2007 D.C.App. Lexis 484,  (D.C.2007) (emphasis added), quoting In re Lopes, 770 A.2d 561, 567 (D.C. 2001). We explained in Kersey that the substantially affected test is met if an attorney shows that but for [his disabling condition], his misconduct would not have occurred. 520 A.2d at 327. We found that a mitigated sanction was warranted even while acknowledging that it is an impossible burden to prove that Kersey's alcoholism caused each and every disciplinary violation, id. at 326, meaning that we did not require a showing that each offending act was caused by his impairment; it was enough that Kersey's professional conduct was substantially affected by his alcoholism and that his alcohol abuse affected his thoughts and judgment. Id. In In re Temple, 596 A.2d 585 (D.C.1991), we explained further that the but for test does not require proof that the attorney's disability was the sole cause of the attorney's misconduct. Id. at 586. We instructed that in applying the Kersey test, the issue is whether `a sufficient nexus between [the respondent's disability] and his misconduct' had been established, id. at 589 (quoting Kersey, 520 A.2d at 327), and whether removal of the substantial contributing factor . . . would eliminate the offensive conduct, even if there are other reasons for some of the misconduct. Id. (citing Kersey, 520 A.2d at 327 n. 16); see also Temple, 596 A.2d at 590 (explaining that there must be a close nexus between the misconduct and the mitigating factor proffered, whether alcoholism, drug addiction or mental illness, and holding that this test was met even though Temple was able to manage an appearance of normalcy in his law practice). [16] We conclude that Maryland's Vanderlinde standard is substantially different (not merely somewhat different) from our Kersey standard. [17] The Maryland standard sets a substantially higher bar and will require an unmitigated sanction in some cases in which, in our jurisdiction, a mitigated sanction would be warranted. To read Meaden as requiring us to impose identical reciprocal discipline in this case even in light of this difference would enervate Rule XI, §§ 11(c)(4), which establishes an exception to reciprocal discipline where the misconduct established warrants substantially different discipline in the District of Columbia, and 11(f)(2), which provides that the Court shall impose the identical discipline unless the attorney demonstrates . . . that one or more of the grounds set forth in subsection [c] [18] of this section exists. We hold instead that if the factual findings of record establish that Respondent met the Kersey mitigation standard (albeit not the Vanderlinde standard), the presumption in favor of identical reciprocal discipline must fall away. Accordingly, before determining what sanction is appropriate, we must consider whether the Maryland court's factual findings establish that the Kersey standard was met. As noted, the Maryland court found that Respondent suffers from significant depression. 876 A.2d at 678. Because we have previously recognized that depression is a disability that may warrant Kersey mitigation, see, e.g., Peek, 565 A.2d at 631-32, the first prong of the Kersey test is met (an attorney must demonstrate (1) by clear and convincing evidence that he had a disability, Lopes, 770 A.2d at 567). The Maryland court also found that Respondent's depression did not render him utterly unable to conform his conduct in accordance with his ethical obligations, see 876 A.2d at 691, and that he abused his trust account in a determined and knowing manner. id. at 678. From this the Board concluded that [t]he Maryland Court's findings demonstrate that the record evidence failed to establish the requisite causal nexus between the disability and the violations under Kersey  that Respondent's psychological impairments `substantially caused him to engage in the misconduct.' We cannot agree. Except for a handful of findings that are not pertinent to our discussion, the Maryland court adopted Judge Thompson's findings. Judge Thompson found by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent's depression affected both his personal and professional relationships and lifestyle; that his depression interfered with Respondent's ability to think through the problems he perceived were plaguing him and to develop acceptable solutions and to implement them; and that [a]s a result, Respondent was crisis driven which caused him to abuse his trust account and utilize monies deposited therein for others for his personal use. 876 A.2d at 678. We think these conclusions amount to findings-factual findings by which we are bound [19]  that Respondent's depression substantially affected his misconduct, Lopes, 770 A.2d at 567, and substantially caused him to misappropriate the funds in his client trust accounts, Stanback, 681 A.2d at 1115; and that but for Respondent's depression, the conduct in issue would not have occurred. Kersey, 520 A.2d at 327. We must conclude, therefore, that with respect to his misappropriation of client funds, Respondent has satisfied the second prong of the Kersey test, and we must reject the Board's conclusion to the contrary. Cf. In re Appler, 669 A.2d 731, 739 (D.C.1995) (we conclude that there was no significant evidence of record that could have led the Board majority to find that respondent had not met his burden to prove that the bipolar condition substantially affected his conduct. . . . Therefore, we conclude that the Board's finding on this question is `unsupported by substantial evidence of record'). [20] What we cannot conclude on the record before us is whether Respondent satisfied the third prong of the Kersey test, i.e., that he prove by clear and convincing evidence that he now is substantially rehabilitated. Stanback, 681 A.2d at 1115. Judge Thompson made no findings regarding rehabilitation, [21] and the Maryland court, having found that Respondent was not utterly unable to control his conduct, deemed any facts pertinent to rehabilitation unavailing. See 876 A.2d at 686 n. 17. Yet, as the Maryland court's opinion notes, Respondent offered testimony that he is now taking medication for depression, has taken courses in accounting and office management, attended a Maryland Bar Association workshop for solo practitioners and small firms, hired an accountant to review his financial transactions on a weekly basis, was counseled by the Maryland State Bar Association Lawyer Assistance Program, was seeing his clinical social worker on a weekly basis, and was being monitored by a psychiatrist. See id. at 678, 686 n. 17. Respondent also testified that he was willing to submit to monitoring by a practice monitor and to mentoring on ethical issues. Id. at 678. Because the imposition of discipline is intended not to punish the attorney but to protect the public, these facts, though not necessarily pertinent to rehabilitation, are relevant to a determination of whether a sanction less than disbarment may be appropriate in this case. See Temple, 596 A.2d at 591 ([d]isciplinary sanctions are not imposed as punishment, but as a means of assuring the attorney's fitness to practice and for protecting the public from misconduct by attorneys which may cause harm) (citation omitted). On the other hand, the Board's Report states that although suspended[,] Respondent appears to have signed papers in a Superior Court case and federal bankruptcy proceedings. . . . Board Report at 16. For this reason and possibly others, whether Respondent can demonstrate that he is rehabilitated remains a serious question that is appropriately considered by the Board in the first instance. In determining whether a mitigated sanction is warranted, the Board will also need to take into account the absence of any finding by the Maryland court that Respondent's depression or other disorders caused or affected his misconduct in regard to the Patterson bankruptcy matter. While a mitigated sanction may be warranted for Respondent's misappropriation of client funds and related violations ( e.g., his dishonesty toward medical care providers who were awaiting payment from settlement proceeds), the Board will need to determine whether there is any basis for mitigation as to his dishonesty in withholding information from the bankruptcy trustee and (whether or not mitigation is warranted) what sanction is appropriate in light of that misconduct. Cf. Verra, 932 A.2d at 504, 2007 D.C.App. Lexis 484,  (holding that a stay of disbarment was warranted as to misappropriation of client funds because of Verra's depression, but that because Verra had not shown that her impairments affected her misrepresentations and other misconduct vis a vis Bar Counsel's investigation, a thirty-day suspension was warranted). [22] Before concluding our analysis, we must address the Board's suggestion that, under our case law, Kersey mitigation is not available in cases involving intentional dishonesty. See Board Report at 13 n. 7. We have never adopted such a per se rule. To the contrary, as we said in Appler, 669 A.2d at 738, we have recognized certain situations where the most egregious misconduct may qualify for mitigation; see also Reid, 540 A.2d at 759 ([t]he sanction imposed in Kersey did not necessarily turn on the egregiousness of the conduct at issue there). Notably, the mitigated sanction that we imposed in Kersey (disbarment, with a stay of execution and a five-year period of conditional probation) was for a widespread and persistent pattern of violations that included commingl[ing] client funds and [ ] us[ing] them for [Kersey's] own purposes. 520 A.2d at 324. Bar Counsel correctly notes that, in several cases involving intentional misappropriation of funds, we concluded that Kersey mitigation was not warranted. [23] However, just as often, we have applied Kersey mitigation to reduce the sanction for impaired lawyers' misappropriation of client funds. See, e.g., Verra, 932 A.2d at 503-04, 2007 D.C.App. Lexis 484, -2, 5 (D.C.2007) (during her representation of a client in connection with an automobile accident, Verra held funds belonging to the client in her personal bank account, overdrew the account before the client received her funds and eventually wrote a check to the client on insufficient funds, and failed to pay the client's medical bills arising from the accident; we stayed disbarment and placed Verra on conditional probation for misappropriation of client funds, accepting the Board's finding that Verra had demonstrated a causal relationship between her depression and her misconduct); In re Mooers, 910 A.2d 1046 (D.C.2006) (Mooers allowed the amount in his trust account to fall below the amount owed to a client's medical providers and acknowledged having used funds in the account for personal and business expenses; we accepted the Board's determination that Mooers suffered from major depression (caused by an acrimonious divorce and custody proceeding) and that his misconduct would not have occurred but for his depression, and followed the Board's recommendation that we disbar respondent but stay the disbarment and impose a three-year period of conditional probation); In re Cappell, 866 A.2d 784 (D.C.2004) (Cappell collected monies for his clients but failed to pay outstanding medical providers' bills for some months thereafter, using the funds instead for personal and business expenses; a hearing committee found that the misconduct would not have occurred but for Cappell's major depression, which was caused by the breakup of his marriage and significant health problems, and we accepted the Board's recommendation that we disbar respondent but stay the disbarment and impose a three-year period of conditional probation); Larsen, 589 A.2d at 402 (a reciprocal discipline matter in which we relied on findings by the Maryland Court of Appeals that Larsen collected a check from an insurance company in the amount of $2,050 to reimburse the physician's medical charges and instead of paying the money to the physician, . . . used the funds for his own purposes, and that Larsen's misconduct resulted from his bipolar or manic depressive disorder and that respondent could practice law responsibly and professionally with treatment and support; we disbarred Larsen but stayed the disbarment and imposed a period of conditional probation); Reid, 540 A.2d 754 (Reid settled a client's claim but deposited the proceeds in his personal checking account and then misrepresented to his client the amount of settlement and failed to pay the client's medical bills; noting that Reid's alcoholism was the proximate cause of his misconduct, we disbarred him but stayed the execution of disbarment, and we placed him on probation for a period of five years subject to conditions recommended by the Board). As these cases demonstrate, a sanction less an absolute disbarment, such as an order of disbarment stayed during a period of conditional probation, may be an appropriate sanction for Respondent's intentional misappropriation if there is clear and convincing evidence of rehabilitation. We cite these cases not to suggest a sanction, but merely to illustrate the range of discipline that has been imposed when mitigation was found to be appropriate. Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we accept the recommendation of the Board that we impose reciprocal discipline on Respondent Robert Joel Zakroff. We defer judgment on the recommendation that Respondent be disbarred and instead remand the matter to the Board for a determination of (1) whether Respondent can demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he has been substantially rehabilitated and that, for his misappropriation of client funds, a sanction lesser than immediate disbarment is appropriate (and, if so, what lesser sanction is appropriate); and (2) how Respondent's misconduct in connection with the Patterson bankruptcy matter should impact the sanction to be imposed. See Rule XI, § 11(f)(2) (If the Court determines that the identical discipline should not be imposed, it shall enter such order as it deems appropriate, including referral of the matter to the Board for its further consideration and recommendation). So ordered.