Opinion ID: 2344370
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparagement of defense counsel.

Text: Defendant alleges that, at several points during the evidentiary stage of the penalty phase trial, the State accused the defense of discovery violations. According to defendant, those accusations constituted disparagement of defense counsel of the type condemned in State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 461, 803 A. 2d 1 (2002). Defendant complains of four separate instances when defendant claims his counsel was disparaged by the State, each of which deals exclusively with cross-examination questions regarding the timing of required discovery disclosures from defendant to the State. The State responds that none of the questions accused defendant or his counsel of discovery violations and that the prosecution never accused defendant or defense counsel of collusion in the presentation of defendant's witnesses. In respect of the first instance claimed as error by defendantwhen the State cross-examined defendant's traumatic brain injury expert concerning a computer printout that the State received last weekthe State notes that defendant's focus on the timing of the disclosure is belied by the trial court's conclusion that I don't see the time of receipt of significance in the question posed to the witness. In respect of the second instance of error claimed by defendantwhen the prosecutor noted in his cross-examination of defendant's brother that the basis of his cross-examination was that he received today another detailed statementthe State explains that defendant specifically requested that the trial court instruct the jury that the comments of the Prosecutor with respect to suggesting that [the defense] had done something improper with this material is inappropriate and should be disregarded. Abiding by that request, the trial court instructed the jury that when we broke for recess the Court was dealing with a legal issue, which essentially centers around discovery obligations. Essentially, under our practice within limits each side is obliged to turn all their information over to the other side, and I made a determination that there was no delay or no impropriety in [the defense] turning over the information with respect to the supplemental report. Accordingly, you should disregard [the prosecutor's] comments with regard to it. Defendant neither objected to, nor requested any addition or modification to, this curative instruction. The third instance involved the State's cross-examination of defendant's expert in clinical neuropsychology. Highlighting a discrepancy between the raw data supporting that expert's report and the language in the report itself, the State sought to determine that the discrepancy only became clear when the State subpoenaed the expert's raw data. Defendant objected, but the trial court deemed the prosecution's questioning proper, ruling that: What this witness may have chosen to withhold may be relevant on the issue of credibility and meet the credibility relevance, so I will allow cross-examination as to whether he was initially willing to turn it over if that's where the Prosecutor wants to go and whether it took a subpoena to get it. And then counsel are free to make the arguments that counsel chooses to make from there. With regard to the mistrial, in light of what I have said, I would deny the application for a mistrial. I will invite an instruction with respect to the purpose of this, what it is for and what it is not, on the issue of credibility. I'll tell the jury something to that effect when they get back in, but if there's anything further, counsel, that will be addressed. Upon the jury's return to the courtroom, the trial court issued the following curative instruction: An issue has arisen, and I'll give you some instructions with respect to it. The comments with regard to discovery being provided or information being provided[,] I'll instruct you that there has been no discovery violation on behalf of defense counsel or the defendant[,] that there has been no violation of any duty they owed to either the Court or to opposing counsel. Having said that, you will perhaps and you have heard some information and may hear further cross-examination as to when and the circumstances under which the so-called raw data were supplied. That would be before you for a limited purpose and a limited purpose only, and that would be for your purpose in assessing any credibility issues or any credibility determinations that you would make concerning the testimony of this witness. Again, defendant did not object to or request any addition to or modification of this curative instruction. Defendant's final instance of counsel disparagement arises in the context of the direct examination of defendant's capital mitigation specialist. During that examination, defendant's capital mitigation specialist described conversations she had had with defendant's mother. The State objected, noting that it had not been provided any information in respect of those conversations. The trial court explained to defendant that he had a continuing obligation to provide witness statements and, in the absence of statements, witness summaries. As a result, the trial court issued an additional curative instruction: Yesterday, at the close of business, issues arose with respect to a continuing discovery obligation. And out of your presence the Court dealt with some further matters with respect to it; after that I am satisfied that no attorney in this case endeavored to mislead or consciously fail[ed] to follow what they thought was the appropriate obligation of counsel. Rather, we have as you know a hotly contested matter where each side is advocating from their position. Accordingly, whatever happened should not prejudice any side on that. I have taken the responsibility, as is my responsibility, to make sure that the discovery obligations are clear. I think they are clearly understood at this point in time and we're ready to proceed. That instruction, which also was accepted by defendant without objection, marks the end of defendant's objections to the State's questions concerning when and under what circumstances these defense witnesses defendant's traumatic brain injury expert, brother, clinical neuropsychology expert, and capital mitigation specialistdisclosed to the prosecution matters properly subject to discovery obligations. An overarching principle guides any inquiry into whether a prosecutor may disparage defense counsel: [P]rosecutors are prohibited from casting unjustified aspersions on the defense or defense counsel. State v. Nelson, 173 N.J. 417, 461, 803 A. 2d 1 (2002) (citing State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 86, 727 A. 2d 1 (1999)). As with each of defendant's earlier claims of prosecutorial misconduct or error, however, the issue for resolution is two-fold: whether the prosecutor committed misconduct, and, if so, whether the prosecutor's conduct constitutes grounds for a new trial. State v. Smith, 167 N.J. 158, 181, 770 A. 2d 255 (2001). We have explained that, in order to meet the second part of that test, the misconduct must have been `so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.' Ibid. (citations omitted). Stated differently, [t]o warrant a new trial the prosecutor's conduct must have been clearly and unmistakably improper, and must have substantially prejudiced defendant's fundamental right to have a jury fairly evaluate the merits of his defense. Id. at 181-82, 770 A. 2d 255 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We do not read those three cross-examination questions or one objection posed by the State as an assault on defense counsel. On the contrary, in each instance, the prosecution properly sought to question a witness in respect of materials either recently disclosed or not disclosed at all to the State. Therefore, to the extent that line of questioning or objection raises credibility issues concerning recent fabrication or bias, interest or prejudice, see generally N.J.R.E. 607 ([A]ny party including the party calling the witness may examine the witness and introduce extrinsic evidence relevant to the issue of credibility . . . .), the questions and objection are proper. See, e.g., State v. Silva, 131 N.J. 438, 442, 621 A. 2d 17 (1993) (holding that if a witness appears to know of the charges and would naturally be expected to have come forward with the alibi testimony, the witness may be cross-examined about those circumstances of non-disclosure); State v. Josephs, 174 N.J. 44, 127, 803 A. 2d 1074 (2002) (In assessing the worth of the defense's case, the jury is entitled to `consider whether it was receiving a full picture, as interest and bias are always relevant.' (quoting State v. Timmendequas (I), 161 N.J. 515, 594, 737 A. 2d 55 (1999), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 858, 122 S.Ct. 136, 151 L.Ed. 2d 89 (2001))). Furthermore, even if we were to credit defendant's allegations and condemn the State for implying that the defense was derelict in its discovery obligations, we nevertheless conclude that the State's conduct in posing the complained-of questions and objection does not rise to the level where it can be considered so egregious that it deprived the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 83, 727 A. 2d 1 (1999); see also State v. Pennington, 119 N.J. 547, 566, 575 A. 2d 816 (1990) ([T]he test by which we shall evaluate the prosecutor's misconduct is whether it was so egregious as to deny defendant a fair trial.); State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 322, 524 A. 2d 188 (1987) (same). Therefore, we reject defendant's claim that the State disparaged defense counsel or that, even if so construed, that the State's actions warrant a new death penalty phase trial.