Opinion ID: 2752120
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The ALJ’s Step-Three Analysis

Text: Forrest also challenges the ALJ’s finding at step three of the Social Security Administration’s five-step inquiry for adjudicating disability claims that Forrest’s impairments did not meet or medically equal the severity of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. In support of that finding, the ALJ stated only that “[t]he record does not contain any clinical findings or diagnostic laboratory evidence of an impairment or combination of impairments that would meet the requirements for any listed physical impairment.” (R. 7-3, ALJ Decision 4.) Forrest did not argue before the ALJ that his impairments met or medically equaled in severity a specific listing. Forrest contends that the ALJ’s sparse step-three analysis requires us to remand, either because the ALJ failed to follow agency regulations, denying Forrest an important procedural right, or because the ALJ’s failure to explain his findings precludes substantial-evidence review. We reject both arguments. -8- Case No. 14-5421 Forrest v. Commissioner of Social Security 1. Sufficiency in Light of Social Security Regulations Forrest first contends that we must remand because, in his view, the ALJ failed to follow Social Security Administration regulations by providing scant reasons for his step-three findings. But he relies on an inapposite case, Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, which holds that a reviewing court must reverse and remand if an ALJ fails to provide “good reasons” under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d) for rejecting all or part of a treating physician’s opinion. 378 F.3d 541, 544–48 (6th Cir. 2004). Wilson distinguished between agency rules that create an “important procedural safeguard for claimants” and rules “adopted for the orderly transaction of business,” placing the “good reasons” requirement squarely within the first category. Id. at 547 (quoting Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538–39 (1970)). Thus, this court rejected the Commissioner’s argument that the ALJ’s explanatory failures were harmless, explaining that: A court cannot excuse the denial of a mandatory procedural protection simply because, as the Commissioner urges, there is sufficient evidence in the record for the ALJ to discount the treating source’s opinion and, thus, a different outcome on remand is unlikely. . . . To hold otherwise, and to recognize substantial evidence as a defense to non-compliance with § 1527(d)(2), would afford the Commissioner the ability to violate the regulation with impunity and render the protections promised therein illusory. Id. at 546. In subsequent cases, we declined to apply “Wilson’s circumscribed form of harmless error review . . . outside the context of the reasons-giving requirement of § 404.1527(d)(2).” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 655–57 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that rule requiring Social Security Administration to record in a “standard document” how it applied a “special technique” for evaluating mental impairments,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(e), creates no procedural safeguard for claimants); see also Bowie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 539 F.3d 395, 399– -9- Case No. 14-5421 Forrest v. Commissioner of Social Security 401 (6th Cir. 2008) (holding that regulation stating that ALJ will not apply age categories mechanically, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1563(b), imposes no “procedural explanatory requirement”). And we decline Forrest’s invitation to extend Wilson to require remand when the ALJ provides minimal reasoning at step three of the five-step inquiry, especially where Forrest did not argue at the hearing that he met a particular listing. Importantly, the regulations governing the five-step inquiry require only that the ALJ “consider all evidence in [the claimant’s] case record,” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(3), and, at step three, “consider the medical severity of [the claimant’s] impairment(s),” id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). See Bowie, 539 F.3d at 400 (distinguishing requirement that ALJ “consider” from requirement that he give “good reasons”). 2. Sufficiency in Light of Substantial-Evidence Standard Finding Wilson inapplicable does not end our inquiry, because Forrest also argues that the ALJ’s sparse analysis precludes meaningful judicial review of his step-three findings. He grounds his argument on a Fifth Circuit opinion finding another ALJ’s sparse step-three analysis “beyond meaningful judicial review.” Audler v. Astrue, 501 F.3d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 2007) (explaining that 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) “explicit[ly]” required the ALJ to explain why she found the claimant not disabled at step three). Forrest urges us to find the ALJ’s decision similarly wanting and remand for additional findings. In response, the Commissioner urges us to uphold the ALJ’s step-three findings, either because they are supported by substantial evidence in the record, or because we can infer the ALJ’s reasoning from factual findings made elsewhere in the opinion. In support of her first argument, she cites a recent non-precedential opinion in which this court located substantial evidence in the record that supported an ALJ’s unexplained step-three findings. See Malone v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 507 F. App’x 470, 472 (6th Cir. 2012) (per curiam). - 10 - Case No. 14-5421 Forrest v. Commissioner of Social Security Regardless of Malone’s deferential “substantial evidence” standard, here the ALJ made sufficient factual findings elsewhere in his decision to support his conclusion at step three. See Bledsoe v. Barnhart, 165 F. App’x 408, 411 (6th Cir. 2006) (looking to findings elsewhere in the ALJ’s decision to affirm a step-three medical equivalency determination, and finding no need to require the ALJ to “spell out every fact a second time”); see also Burbridge v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F. App’x 412, 417 (6th Cir. 2014) (Moore, Circuit J., dissenting) (acknowledging that an ALJ’s step-three analysis was “cursory” but suggesting that, under our precedent, it is enough for the ALJ to support his findings by citing an exhibit where the exhibit contained substantial evidence to support his conclusion). Forrest posits that his hip impairment meets Listing 1.02, “Major dysfunction of a joint[],” and Listing 1.03, “Reconstructive surgery or surgical arthrodesis of a major weightbearing joint.” 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1, §§ 1.02, 1.03. Both listings include as an element the “inability to ambulate effectively,” which the regulations define, in relevant part, as “an extreme limitation of the ability to walk.” Id. § 1.00B2b(1). An individual cannot ambulate effectively if, for example, he is unable to walk “without the use of a walker, two crutches[,] or two canes” or “carry out routine ambulatory activities, such as shopping and banking.” Id. § 1.00B2b(2). To meet either listing, Forrest must also show that his inability to ambulate lasted or can be expected to last for at least twelve months. Id. § 1.00B2a. Here, the ALJ’s factual findings support the conclusion that Forrest could “ambulate effectively” for most of the relevant period. For instance, the ALJ found that Forrest (1) fell while lifting his daughter in Wal-Mart in April 2007, (2) could walk without a cane in November 2009, and (3) moved furniture down stairs in July 2011. - 11 - Case No. 14-5421 Forrest v. Commissioner of Social Security And even if these reasons failed to support the ALJ’s step-three findings, the error is harmless, because Forrest has not shown that his impairments met or medically equaled in severity any listed impairment between October 2006 and July 2011. See Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 416 (6th Cir. 2011) (finding that an ALJ erred by providing no reasons to support his finding that a specific listing was not met, and holding that the error was not harmless because it was possible that the claimant had put forward sufficient evidence to meet the listing); cf. Audler, 501 F.3d at 448–49 (declining to find lack of step-three explanation harmless where claimant carried her burden of showing that she met a listing). The record shows that Forrest used one cane at most, often went without, and could otherwise ambulate effectively during the relevant period. We reject Forrest’s argument that the record necessarily shows that his impairments met or equaled Listing 1.02 and Listing 1.03.