Opinion ID: 894934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Erroneous Definition of Manufacturing Defect Is Reversible Error

Text: Having determined that the court's charge was erroneous, there remains the question of whether this charge error is reversible error. Ledesma contends that Ford did not preserve error on this complaint. Generally, [a] party objecting to a charge must point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds of the objection. [25] Preservation of error generally depends on whether the party made the trial court aware of the complaint, timely and plainly, and obtained a ruling. [26] Failure to submit a definition or instruction shall not be deemed a ground for reversal of the judgment unless a substantially correct definition or instruction has been requested in writing and tendered by the party complaining of the judgment. [27] In this case, Ford objected to the definition of manufacturing defect on grounds that it did not accurately reflect the law, and submitted in writing a proposed question that included an alternative definition of a manufacturing defect. The alternative definition provided that a manufacturing defect is a physical departure from the product's intended design that renders it unreasonably dangerous. The trial court refused Ford's alternative charge. The proposed definition addresses the essential omission in the court's charge described above, namely, the omission of a requirement that the product deviate from its intended design. The proposed definition is consistent with the Restatement definition of a manufacturing defect, discussed above, that includes the requirement that the product departs from its intended design, as well as our own case-law. In support of its proposed definition, Ford also provided the trial court with quotations from Grinnell and Torrington Co. v. Stutzman , giving their definitions of a manufacturing defect that include the requirement of a deviation from specifications or planned output. [28] The objection, proposed question and instruction, and supporting authorities provided the trial court with a plain objection identifying the error in the charge that we recognize today, with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint. [29] Since Ford preserved error, we turn to whether the charge error is reversible. We hold that it is. It is fundamental to our system of justice that parties have the right to be judged by a jury properly instructed in the law. [30] There can be no question that it was [the plaintiff's] burden to obtain affirmative answers to jury questions as to the necessary elements of his cause of action. [31] The jury was not asked to decide an essential element of a manufacturing defect claim, namely whether the u-bolt deviated from Ford's specifications or planned output. If a cause of action consists of more than one element, and an element is omitted from the charge without request or objection, the missing element can be found by the trial court or deemed found if certain requirements are met. [32] But where, as here, a proper objection is made about the omission of an essential element, the failure to include it is reversible error. [33] Ford argues that we should reverse and render judgment in its favor because of its objected-to charge error, as we did in State Department of Highways, & Public Transportation v. Payne, [34] but we disagree. In Spencer v. Eagle Star Insurance Co. of America, [35] we distinguished Payne and explained that where, as in the pending case, the theory of recovery was defectively submitted, as opposed to a situation where the plaintiff refused to submit a theory of liability after defendant's objection, the proper remedy is to remand for a new trial. [36] Spencer distinguished cases that reversed and rendered where the plaintiff failed to submit any jury question on a controlling issue. [37] We further explained, in Spencer and in Stutzman, that if the plaintiff submits a jury question on his claim that is merely defective, as opposed to immaterial, the appropriate remedy is to remand for a new trial rather than to render judgment. [38] In the pending case, Ledesma proffered a question on his manufacturing defect claim based on the PJC for this cause of action. He attempted to submit a controlling issue [39] on his sole cause of action, and the question submitted was the heart of [Ledesma's] case, [40] so the question cannot be characterized as immaterial, and we cannot say that Ledesma failed to submit a jury question on a controlling issue. Further, we may, in the interest of justice, remand the case to the trial court even if a rendition of judgment is otherwise appropriate. [41] [W]e have remanded in the interest of justice when our decisions have altered or clarified the way in which a claim should be submitted to the jury. [42] In the pending case, the trial court followed the PJC. On one occasion we not only approved a PJC issue and instruction for design defect cases, we expressly disapproved of the use of any other instructions in such cases, [43] prompting one court of appeals to remark that [o]ur highest court has made it abundantly clear that to deviate from the pattern jury charges in products liability cases is a perilous journey. [44] Given that our trial courts routinely rely on the Pattern Jury Charges in submitting cases to juries, [45] and we rarely disapprove of these charges, we conclude that the interests of justice would not be served by reversing and rendering judgment in favor of Ford. The more appropriate remedy is to reverse and remand for a new trial.