Opinion ID: 1990508
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Statutory Time Limit

Text: [¶ 8] Questions of law are reviewed de novo. Murphy v. Maddaus, 2002 ME 24, ¶ 8, 789 A.2d 1281, 1283. Generally, statutory interpretation is such a question. See, e.g., FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC v. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 2007 ME 97, ¶ 11, 926 A.2d 1197, 1201. In interpreting a statute or ordinance, reviewing courts look first to the plain language of the provisions to be interpreted. Gensheimer v. Town of Phippsburg, 2005 ME 22, ¶ 22, 868 A.2d 161, 167 (citation omitted). If there is ambiguity in the plain language of the statute, a court may then look to the legislative history. FPL Energy Me. Hydro LLC, 2007 ME 97, ¶ 12, 926 A.2d at 1201. [¶ 9] Title 30-A M.R.S. § 2691 (2007) permits municipalities to establish boards of appeals. Such boards may be given the power to hear any appeal by any person . . . from any decision, order, regulation or failure to act. . . . [3] 30-A M.R.S. § 2691(4). Most relevant here is section 2691(3)(F), which states, in part: The board may reconsider any decision reached under this section within 45 days of its prior decision. A request to the board to reconsider a decision must be filed within 10 days of the decision that is to be reconsidered. A vote to reconsider and the action taken on that reconsideration must occur and be completed within 45 days of the date of the vote on the original decision. [¶ 10] There is no apparent ambiguity in the statute. As the ten-day restriction is not present in the first sentence, a board is not subject to it. If the Legislature had intended to limit the time within which a board could start the reconsideration process, it could have easily done so by explicitly imposing such a limit. As there is no ambiguity in the plain language of the statute, its ordinary meaning governs here: reconsideration by a board is subject to the forty-five-day limit, not the ten-day time limit.