Opinion ID: 379272
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: School Desegregation Context

Text: 32 Many of Sanchez's complaints charging the District Court with failing to properly accommodate his objections to the school closures are grounded on a fundamental misunderstanding of the purpose of the plan hearing (August 8th and 9th) and the status of the school closure question following the August 11th order approving the desegregation plan. Sanchez's complaints that the school closure issue was not properly considered in the procedures surrounding the settlement hearing assume the continuing vitality of this issue after the August 11th order. What was and was not decided by the August 11th order, and what remained to be considered in the settlement proceedings, are determined by the law governing school desegregation remedies in the federal courts. 33 When a federal court finds that a public school system operates in a manner infringing upon some students' federal constitutional rights, the Court is empowered to prescribe a suitable remedy. Keyes v. School District No. 1, Denver Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 93 S.Ct. 2686, 37 L.Ed.2d 548 (1973); Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 92 S.Ct. 2196, 33 L.Ed.2d 51 (1972); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 28 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971). In the first instance, however, the Court must give the local school officials an opportunity to devise changes sufficient to bring the schools' operations within the constitutional standards. Swann at 16, 91 S.Ct. at 1276. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S.Ct. 753, 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955). If the school officials present a plan which will correct the violations found, and it does not infringe upon other rights in the process, the District Court must approve that remedy even if the Court does not believe it was the most desirable plan which could have been selected. 5 See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 97 S.Ct. 2766, 53 L.Ed.2d 851 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 94 S.Ct. 3112, 41 L.Ed.2d 1069 (1974). 34 In the present case, the District Court in its June 5th decision found continuing constitutional violations at nine Tucson schools, and it ordered the School District to prepare a remedial plan. On July 17, 1978, following public hearings, the District filed with the Court several plans to correct the violations, designating the options it preferred. The Court held hearings on this plan August 8 and 9. On August 11, the Court issued an order finding the options acceptable remedies for implementation in September, 1978. This plan included involuntary busing of some students and the closing of three of the nine designated schools. 35 The hearing on August 8 and 9 was specifically and solely directed to the question of whether the District's desegregation plan remedied the constitutional violations found in the June 5th order, and whether it did so in a constitutional manner. The District Court's understanding of its role was consistent with the limited remedial jurisdiction of the federal courts in school desegregation cases. As the Court noted in its August 11th order:The remedy which this Court has authority to order must work, it must work now, and it must not inflict additional burden on plaintiffs and the classes they represent, nor inflict further racial or ethnic segregation or discrimination on such plaintiffs. This Court's jurisdiction or power does not extend any further than that. Concerning all other interests, parents and others must look to their elected officials. 36 At present, the Court must rule only on the issue of whether the defendants' proposed plans for the upcoming school year sufficiently remedy the violations heretofore found to exist with respect to nine schools. 37 The District Court went on to observe that the closing of the three schools was not required by its June 5th order, but that those closures were compatible with it. The Court's careful examination of the school closures determined that they would not place an undue burden on minority students. Finally, the District Court concluded that the proposed plans were acceptable remedies for the constitutional violations heretofore found. 38 We believe the District Court properly perceived its role in reviewing the desegregation plan. The August 11th approval of the District's desegregation plan was an independent judgment of the District Court conclusively deciding the permissibility of the plan, including the school closures, for the 1978-79 school year. With this understanding of the status of the school closure issue as of August 11, we can proceed to examine the specific issues raised by Sanchez.