Opinion ID: 1871258
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: continued detention

Text: Voichahoske argues that Reilly improperly detained Roan and her passengers. Resolving this issue hinges on whether Reilly had reasonable suspicion to believe that criminal activity was occurring. Reilly stopped Roan because she was speeding; a traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle. State v. Verling, supra ; State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663, 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003). Once stopped, a law enforcement officer may conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the traffic stop. See id. The investigation may include asking the driver for an operator's license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver about the purpose and destination of his or her travel. See id. Also, the officer may run a computer check to determine whether the vehicle involved in the stop has been stolen and whether there are outstanding warrants for any of its occupants. Id. The officer may engage in similar routine questioning of passengers in the vehicle to verify information provided by the driver. State v. Verling, supra . Here, the original purpose of the traffic stop was completed when Reilly issued the warning citation to Roan. See, State v. Verling, supra ; State v. Lee, supra . In order to expand the scope of a traffic stop and continue to detain the person for additional investigation, an officer must have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person is involved in criminal activity beyond that which initially justified the interference. Id. Reasonable suspicion entails some minimal level of objective justification for detention, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized hunch, but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause. See State v. Verling, supra . Whether a police officer has a reasonable suspicion based on sufficient articulable facts depends on the totality of the circumstances. See id. Reasonable suspicion must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Id. When a determination is made to detain a person during a traffic stop, even where each factor considered independently is consistent with innocent activities, those same factors may amount to reasonable suspicion when considered collectively. Id. Before issuing the citation, Reilly had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. Several factors contribute to that suspicion; some might be insufficient standing alone, but collectively establish reasonable suspicion. First, Roan pulled into the farmyard after Reilly began following her, but before he turned on his lights; this made Reilly suspect that she sought to evade the stop. Also, when Reilly investigated the stop, Roan provided no proof of identification. See U.S. v. Green, 52 F.3d 194 (8th Cir. 1995) (determining that lack of identification does not automatically create reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, but that it can contribute). Roan and her passengers also gave inconsistent explanations for pulling into the farmyard and inconsistent descriptions of their travel plans. See State v. Lee, 265 Neb. 663, 658 N.W.2d 669 (2003) (determining that individual's inconsistent explanation of reason for being at particular location can contribute to reasonable suspicion). See, also, U.S. v. Johnson, 58 F.3d 356 (8th Cir.1995) (determining that inconsistencies between driver's and passenger's explanations of trip's purpose can contribute to reasonable suspicion). Reilly also testified that he was suspicious because they were not taking the most direct route to their stated destination. In addition, Reilly testified that Roan's passengers constantly moved around while he spoke with Roan in his patrol car; at one point, he saw Young lean forward and put something under the seat. See State v. Gutierrez, 9 Neb.App. 325, 611 N.W.2d 853 (2000) (determining that observing stopped passenger bend over and hide something can contribute to reasonable suspicion). He also noted that Young continuously rubbed her vaginal area while he questioned her and that she said she needed to use a restroom because she had just started her menstrual cycle. He opined that based on his experience and training, he believed her behavior indicated that she was on a narcotic and that she might be hiding contraband. Reilly also stated that the Nebraska State Patrol's intelligence officer informed him Roan and Voichahoske were suspected of using illegal narcotics. But Reilly provided vague information and could not explain what facts premised the suspicion. Moreover, Reilly did not realize Roan had given him a false name until after he detained her. Nonetheless, the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that Reilly had reasonable suspicion Roan was involved in illegal activity beyond that which justified the initial stop, and thus, he could detain her and the passengers while awaiting the drug dog. Having determined that reasonable suspicion exists supporting continued detention, we consider whether the detention was reasonable in the context of an investigative stop. See State v. Lee, supra . We consider both the length of the continued detention and the investigative methods employed. See, State v. Verling, 269 Neb. 610, 694 N.W.2d 632 (2005); State v. Lee, supra . Reilly testified that the drug dog arrived about 15 minutes after ticketing Roan. Reilly called for the Nebraska State Patrol canine unit, but when it was not available, he had to wait for the Nance County canine unit, which he believed was both reliable and available. The record fails to show a lack of diligence on Reilly's part, or any unreasonable delay. And because a canine sniff is not a search under the Fourth Amendment, using the drug dog during the lawful detention did not violate any constitutionally protected right. See, State v. Verling, supra ; State v. Lee, supra . Thus, the length and method of detention were reasonable.