Opinion ID: 3011342
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: conclusion

Text: Initially, the government moved the District Court to dismiss the ACLU's action insofar as the individuals and entities that it purported to represent were not in danger of prosecution under COPA and therefore lacked standing. In particular, the government asserted that the material placed on plaintiffs' Web sites was not harmful to minors and that each of the plaintiffs were not engaged in the business of posting such material for commercial purposes. See supra note 13. The District Court interpreted COPA to impose liability on those Web publishers who profited from Web sites that contained some, even though not all, material that was _________________________________________________________________ 16. We question, however, the effectiveness of actions taken by a minor's parent to supervise or block harmful material by using filtering software. We are of the view that such actions do not constitute government action, and we do not consider this to be a lesser restrictive means for the government to achieve its compelling interest. See also n.24 supra. But see United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 2000 WL 646196 (U.S. May 22, 2000). 16 harmful to minors. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 480. The court therefore concluded that the plaintiffs could reasonably fear prosecution because their Web sites contained material that is sexual in nature. Id. Having established plaintiffs' standing17 -- an analysis with which we agree -- the District Court began its First Amendment analysis by stating that insofar as COPA prohibits Web publishers from posting material that is harmful to minors, it constitutes a content-based restriction on speech that is presumptively invalid and is subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 493 (citing R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992); Sable Comm. of Calif. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,126 (1989)) See also United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 2000 WL 646196 (U.S. May 22, 2000). Pursuant to this strict scrutiny analysis, the District Court held that COPA placed too large a burden on protected expression. In particular, the court found that the high economic costs that Web publishers would incur in implementing an age verification system would cause them to cease publishing such material, and further, that the difficulty in accurately shielding harmful material from minors would lead Web publishers to censor more material than necessary. See id. at 494-95. Moreover, the District Court believed that because of the need to use age verification systems, adults would be deterred from accessing these sites, and that the resulting loss of Web traffic would affect the Web publishers' abilities to continue providing such communications in the future. The court then considered whether the government could establish that COPA was the least restrictive and most narrowly tailored means to achieve its compelling objective. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 496. The government contends that COPA meets this test because COPA does not  `ban . . . the distribution or display of material harmful to minors [but] simply requires the sellers of such material to recast their message so that they are not readily available to children.'  Appellant's Brief at 27 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 105-775 at 6 (1998)). The court concluded, however, that even if COPA were enforced, children would still be able to _________________________________________________________________ 17. See Reno III, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 479. 17 access numerous foreign Web sites containing harmful material; that some minors legitimately possess credit cards -- thus defeating the effectiveness of this affirmative defense in restricting access by minors; that COPA prohibits a sweeping category of form of content instead of limiting its coverage to pictures, images and graphic image files -- most often utilized by the adult industry as teasers Reno III 31 F. Supp. 2d at 497; and that parental blocking and filtering technology would likely be as effective as COPA while imposing fewer constitutional burdens on free speech. Therefore, the District Court concluded that COPA was not the least restrictive means for the government to achieve its compelling objective of protecting minors from harmful material. Id. at 492. As a result, the court held that the ACLU had shown a substantial likelihood of succeeding on the merits in establishing COPA's unconstitutionality. In concluding its analysis, the District Court held that losing First Amendment freedoms, even if only for a moment, constitutes irreparable harm. See id. (citing Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72-73 (3d Cir. 1989)). And, in balancing the interests at stake for issuing a preliminary injunction, the District Court concluded that the scale tipped in favor of the ACLU, as the government lacks an interest in enforcing an unconstitutional law. See id. (citing ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 849 (E.D. Pa. 1996)). Because the ACLU met its burden for a preliminary injunction, the District Court granted its petition.