Opinion ID: 2025141
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial attorney fees. The district court awarded the plaintiffs $3000 in attorney fees under this statutory authority:

Text: Upon a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a governmental body has violated any provision of this chapter, a court: .... b. Shall order the payment of all costs and reasonable attorneys fees to any party successfully establishing a violation of this chapter. Iowa Code § 21.6(3). The defendant contends there was insufficient evidence to support the district court's award of attorney fees. The only evidence concerning fees, it complains, is the self-serving testimony of the plaintiffs that the fees were about $3000. Their objection is that the plaintiffs had failed to provide fee affidavits at the trial. (The fee affidavits were furnished, after the trial but before the court's fee order was entered, showing $3380 in fees and $100 in costs.) The defendant does not contend that it was deprived of an opportunity to challenge the amount of fees before the court entered its order allowing them. We believe that the procedure for setting fees was appropriate. In fact, a fee affidavit filed after the trial would most accurately reflect the hours actually spent by the attorneys in the trial. We find no abuse of discretion in the fee award and therefore affirm on that issue. B. Appellate attorney fees. The plaintiffs request appellate attorney fees under the authority of Iowa Code section 21.6(3)(b) (court [s]hall order the payment of all costs and reasonable attorneys fees for establishing a violation). The defendant resists, claiming that chapter 21 does not allow appellate attorney fees and that we have rejected such fees in an open meeting case. See Telegraph Herald, 297 N.W.2d at 537. The plaintiffs rejoin that, since Telegraph Herald, this court has accepted the notion of appellate attorney fees in another context, even in the absence of express statutory authority. The case on which the plaintiffs rely is Lehigh Clay Products, Ltd. v. Iowa Department of Transportation, 545 N.W.2d 526 (Iowa 1996). In a five-to-four decision, we decided that appellate attorney fees could be awarded in a condemnation case. In so holding, we overruled Wilson v. Fleming, 239 Iowa 918, 32 N.W.2d 798 (1948). In overruling Wilson, we relied on language in Iowa Code section 6B.33 (1993), which stated that [t]he applicant shall ... pay all costs occasioned by the appeal, including reasonable attorney fees to be taxed by the court.... We interpreted the language occasioned by the appeal to accommodate an interpretation that would encompass the allowance of fees for any appeal that was necessary. Lehigh, 545 N.W.2d at 529. In Lehigh we also pointed to the underlying rationale of the eminent domain law, which was to make a party whole. To deny the property owner appellate attorney fees would not be consistent with that goal. Id. at 528-29. In contrast to the goal of the eminent domain statute, we believe that the underlying purpose of chapter 21 is to provide access to public meetings. The legislature has seen fit to allow reasonable attorney fees, at least at the trial court level, in order to vindicate the plaintiffs' rights. We find in chapter 21 no language comparable to the provision for appellate attorney fees occasioned by the appeal, as in the case of the eminent domain statute, and the goal of chapter 21, we believe, is not basically aimed at making a plaintiff whole. In fact, in Telegraph Herald we pointed to language in our open meetings statute that suggests just the opposite: that only trial attorney fees would be allowed. We said: Under section 28A.6(3) [predecessor to present statute], the court that orders payment of costs and reasonable attorney fees is the same court that makes the prior finding by a preponderance of the evidence that a governmental body has violated any provision of this chapter. We think both references are to the district court, and there is no statutory authority for this court to assess attorney fees for appellate services. Telegraph Herald, 297 N.W.2d at 537. We believe that the present case must be distinguished from Lehigh, and we therefore reject the plaintiffs' application for appellate attorney fees. AFFIRMED.