Opinion ID: 2264795
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: analysis

Text: ¶ 25 The majority today fumbles several relevant rules of statutory construction. Chiefly, it bypasses the following tenet: In interpreting a statute, this court looks first to its plain language. If the plain language of the statute is unambiguous, then this court's inquiry is at an end. The statute is to be enforced in accordance with its plain meaning. State v. Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). The majority similarly ignores the rule that obliges us to derive legislative intent from the plain language of the statute. When statutory language is unambiguous, we look only to that language to determine the legislative intent without considering outside sources. State v. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d 723, 727, 63 P.3d 792 (2003) (emphasis added); see also Tingey v. Haisch, 159 Wash.2d 652, 657, 152 P.3d 1020 (2007) (when a `statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative intent' (quoting State v. Jacobs, 154 Wash.2d 596, 600, 115 P.3d 281 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted))). We review statutory construction de novo. City of Spokane v. County of Spokane, 158 Wash.2d 661, 672-73, 146 P.3d 893 (2006). ¶ 26 Former RCW 26.50.110(1) provides: Whenever an order is granted under this chapter, chapter 10.99, 26.09, 26.10, 26.26, or 74.34 RCW, or there is a valid foreign protection order as defined in RCW 26.52.020, and the respondent or person to be restrained knows of the order, a violation of the restraint provisions, or of a provision excluding the person from a residence, workplace, school or day care, or of a provision prohibiting a person from knowingly coming within, or knowingly remaining within, a specified distance of a location, or of a provision of a foreign protection order specifically indicating that a violation will be a crime, for which an arrest is required under RCW 10.31.100(2)(a) or (b), is a gross misdemeanor except as provided in subsections (4) and (5) of this section. (Emphasis added.) ¶ 27 While this statute is inelegant, its plain language is also unambiguous. When the irrelevant portions are removed, the statute reads, [A] violation of the restraint provisions..., for which an arrest is required under RCW 10.31.100(2)(a) or (b), is a gross misdemeanor.... Former RCW 26.50.110(1). ¶ 28 Despite the majority's claim to the contrary, there is no reason the last antecedent rule's corollary should not apply here. Majority at 490-91. The majority's primary reason for dismissing this rule of grammar (i.e., that a subsequent statutory provision contains the word also) makes little sense. Majority at 491. Aside from being loose justification for such an important aspect of the case, the logic falters. The also in former RCW 26.50.110(3) refers to the gross misdemeanor of violating a no-contact order for which an arrest is required under RCW 10.31.100(2)(a) or (b). Subsection (3)'s contempt of court penalty is properly in addition to some other punishment when that punishment is warranted. Majority at 491. The majority's logic should not discharge the rule of grammar here. ¶ 29 Moreover, the majority's contention that the corollary to the last antecedent rule, if applied, would lead to absurd results does not ring true. See id. at 490-91, 491, 491-92. That the legislature would characterize as gross misdemeanors only violations that carry the requirement of arrest under RCW 10.31.100instead of all violations generallyis not absurd. It might not mesh with the majority's preferences, but it is not absurd. ¶ 30 Accordingly I would hold the qualifying phrase for which an arrest is required under RCW 10.31.100(2)(a) or (b) applies to all antecedents, not merely the immediately preceding one. Former RCW 26.50.110(1). The statute unambiguously limits gross misdemeanors to only those violations of no-contact orders for which an arrest is required. It does not criminalize all violations of no-contact orders. ¶ 31 The statute's plain language ends our inquiry. See Armendariz, 160 Wash.2d at 110, 156 P.3d 201. Yet the majority nonetheless delves into external sources, including amendments passed after the violations. [1] Majority at 492. Our rules of statutory construction require us to derive legislative intent from the plain language of this unambiguous statute. Delgado, 148 Wash.2d at 727, 63 P.3d 792; Tingey, 159 Wash.2d at 657, 152 P.3d 1020. [2] ¶ 32 Here, police found Leo Bunker in the willing company of Lillian Hiatt after Bunker was stopped for speeding. Hiatt, who had a restraining order against Bunker, was a passenger in the truck. The same theme applies to Rachel Vincent, whom police discovered in a car with a man who held a no-contact order against her. Donald Williams violated a no-contact order by yelling profanities at Linda Poole, grabbing Poole's wrist, trying to take her keys, and threatening to trash her house, steal her truck, and kidnap her dog. He also appeared on Poole's front porch late at night and rattled the doorknob in an attempt to enter her home. ¶ 33 For a conviction to stand the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt every essential element of a crime charged. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). The State charged the defendants with violations of former RCW 26.50.110(1). While each of the incidents here violated the provisions of the respective no-contact orders, the State did not allege nor prove at trialthat arrest pursuant to RCW 10.31.100(2)(a) or (b) [3] was an essential element of the crimes. The State merely charged violations of each no-contact order. ¶ 34 Accordingly I would hold the State improperly charged the defendants under former RCW 26.50.110(1). The charging documents and jury instructions omit essential elements of the crimes. For Bunker and Vincent, it is not even clear they committed a crime under former RCW 26.50.110(1) because there was no act or threat of violence and no presence in prohibited places requiring arrest. The Stateand this courtmust live with the version of former RCW 26.50.110(1) in effect when the defendants violated the no-contact orders.