Opinion ID: 3173359
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Requests for Downward Departure & Variance

Text: Young requested that the District Court depart downward because his criminal‐history category overrepresented the seriousness of his criminal past, see 2013 U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1), and that the Court vary from the Guidelines range based on a number of factors relevant under § 3553(a). He contends that the District Court erred by not formally ruling on his requests and failing to discuss his arguments during sentencing. We disagree. A district court’s decision not to depart downward is “within the court’s broad discretion and rarely reviewed on appeal.” United States v. Scott, 387 F.3d 139, 143 (2d Cir. 2004). “A district court is not obliged to give reasons for refusing to depart,” and, where a defendant has not shown a violation of law or misapplication of the Guidelines, refusal to depart warrants vacatur only if the defendant “point[s] to clear evidence of a substantial risk that the judge misapprehended the scope of his departure authority.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “A district court’s silence concerning its refusal to depart downward, generally, does not support an inference that the district court misapprehended its scope of authority.” Id. In this case, Young offers no reason why we should suppose that the District Court misunderstood its authority to depart, and we do not think it did. The Court was merely silent on the point. Nor need a district judge imposing a sentence recite every § 3553(a) argument advanced by a defendant. Rather, we presume 12 that the judge properly considered the sentencing factors even in the absence of protracted discussion pertaining to each of the factors and all of the defendant’s contentions. United States v. Brown, 514 F.3d 256, 264 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007). Here, Young identifies nothing in the record suggesting that Judge Geraci failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors or his arguments in support of a variance, and indeed the record shows that Judge Geraci appropriately discharged his obligations under § 3553(a). See, e.g., App. 374 (discussing the factors enumerated in § 3553(a)). We accordingly reject this argument. II. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (Other Felony Offense Enhancement) Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four‐point enhancement if the defendant “[u]sed or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” 2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Young challenges the application of this enhancement on three separate grounds. He argues, first, that the District Court clearly erred in crediting Davis’s testimony that Young gave him a gun to deliver to Young’s cousin, a drug dealer named Reggie; second, that even if that testimony were credited, the evidence adduced at the hearing did not support a reasonable inference that Young had reason to believe the firearms he distributed would be used in connection with 13 other felonies; and third, that applying the enhancement constituted impermissible “double‐counting.” Young’s first argument is easily dispatched. The District Court’s decision to credit Davis’s testimony, even in the face of contrary testimony from Bullock, is “entitled to substantial deference.” United States v. Norman, 776 F.3d 67, 78 (2d Cir. 2015). It was reasonable not to believe the testimony from Bullock, who had cause to lie about having received guns from Young. Indeed, Young himself suggests elsewhere in his brief that Bullock’s testimony was not credible. We have no reason to disturb the District Court’s credibility determination.6 Young’s second argument is no more convincing than his first. The District Court specifically found that Young unlawfully sold a large number of unusually dangerous weapons—AK‐47s and TEC‐ 9s—to people he knew to be drug dealers. That is sufficient to support an inference that he had reason to believe the guns would be used in connection with other felonies. See United States v. Martin, 78 F.3d 808, 811–12 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming application of enhancement based on defendant’s sale of a large number of easily concealable handguns in “unusual circumstances”). 6 Young raises the same clear‐error argument in connection with his challenges to application of the obstruction enhancement and non‐application of the acceptance‐of‐responsibility adjustment. Because the District Court’s rulings concerning those adjustments turned on the same credibility determinations discussed above, we also reject Young’s clear‐error argument in those contexts. 14 Young’s final argument, however, has merit. He contends that applying the other‐felony‐offense enhancement constituted impermissible “double‐counting” because the District Court also applied a four‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5) for “trafficking” in firearms. He is correct.7 7 Our concurring colleague suggests that an “obstacle” stands in the way of our reviewing Young’s double‐counting argument: “Young never advanced this analysis on appeal or before the District Court, and the Government has had no opportunity to rebut it.” Concurring Op. 3. We think that Young has adequately presented his double‐counting argument on appeal. See, e.g., Defendant’s Br. 32 (arguing that application of both §§ 2K2.1(b)(5) and 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on defendant’s transfer of “several guns to individuals who he had reason to believe would use them unlawfully . . . . amounts to impermissible double counting”); Defendant’s Reply Br. 7 (relying on United States v. Johns, 732 F.3d 736 (7th Cir. 2013), in which the Seventh Circuit interpreted Application Note 13(D) to § 2K2.1 to hold that application of both enhancements constituted improper double‐counting). We can agree with the concurrence that this argument might have been advanced somewhat more cogently; just the same, we are not at liberty to ignore it. As for our concurring colleague’s observation that Young does not appear to have advanced this analysis below, we do not disagree. We have found nothing in the record indicating that Young argued double‐counting before the District Court. The government, for its part, does not say whether he did or did not, because the government does not respond to Young’s double‐ counting argument at all. Accordingly, even if Young did not present this argument below, the government has “waived waiver.” See United States v. Quiroz, 22 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, this is an imperfect state of affairs: neither party (it appears) argued this issue before the District Court, and only one of them has argued it here. We benefit greatly when, as typically occurs, questions are passed on below and fully aired on appeal. But the government’s failure to brief either forfeiture or double‐counting, though it makes our task more difficult, does not relieve us of our duty to perform it. 15 Simple “double‐counting”—applying more than one Guidelines enhancement based on the same conduct—is unobjectionable, and indeed commonplace. United States v. Maloney, 406 F.3d 149, 152–53 (2d Cir. 2005). But double‐counting is impermissible if the Guidelines instruct against it. Id.; see United States v. Morris, 350 F.3d 32, 37 (2d Cir. 2003) (rejecting double‐ counting argument because the defendant “offered nothing in the Sentencing Guidelines or relevant statutes reflecting an intent to preclude the double counting the District Court employed”). We conclude that the relevant Guidelines provisions and Application Notes indicate that the Sentencing Commission intended to preclude application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement in the circumstances of this case. When a defendant receives a sentencing enhancement for “trafficking” in firearms under § 2K2.1(b)(5), Application Note 13(D) to § 2K2.1 prohibits imposition of an enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) based on the defendant’s transfer of a firearm with reason to believe it will be used in another felony offense. We begin with the text of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The other‐felony‐ offense enhancement applies if a defendant “used or possessed any firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense.” 2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The provision thus consists of two clauses, each of which describes a different set of circumstances. The first clause— 16 the in‐connection‐with clause—concerns defendants who use or possess firearms in connection with another felony offense. The second—the reason‐to‐believe clause—concerns defendants who possess firearms, or transfer them to others, with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that they will be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense. The District Court concluded that this second clause applied to Young’s conduct: it found that he had knowledge, intent, and reason to believe that the weapons he transferred would be used in connection with other felonies (i.e., drug trafficking). Young also received a four‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), which applies if “the defendant engaged in the trafficking of firearms.” 2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Application Note 13(A) to § 2K2.1 describes what is meant by “trafficking of firearms,” explaining that the enhancement applies if a defendant: (i) transported, transferred, or otherwise disposed of two or more firearms to another individual, or received two or more firearms with the intent to transport, transfer, or otherwise dispose of firearms to another individual; and (ii) knew or had reason to believe that such conduct would result in the transport, transfer, or disposal of a firearm to an individual— (I) whose possession or receipt of the firearm would be unlawful; or (II) who intended to use or dispose of the firearm unlawfully. 17 Application Note 13(D) describes the interaction of the “trafficking” enhancement with the other‐felony‐offense enhancement. It states that if the “trafficking” enhancement applies, the other‐felony‐offense enhancement also applies “[i]f the defendant used or transferred one of such firearms in connection with another felony offense (i.e., an offense other than a firearms possession or trafficking offense).” 2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, Application Note 13(D) (emphasis supplied). These provisions, read together, preclude application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement to Young. The District Court found that Young had knowledge, intent, and reason to believe that the guns he transferred would be used in connection with other felonies. In the normal run of things, that is a valid reason to apply the other‐felony‐offense enhancement. But when the “trafficking” enhancement also applies, as it does in this case, Application Note 13(D) limits the application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement to those situations in which “the defendant used or transferred one of such firearms in connection with another felony offense,” incorporating language from the in‐connection‐with clause set forth in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (emphasis supplied). See note 2, ante. No mention is made of situations—like this one—in which the defendant transferred a firearm not in connection with another felony offense, but with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe it would later be used in connection with another felony offense, which would have incorporated language from the reason‐to‐believe clause set forth in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). 18 The omission of such an application compels the conclusion that the application of the other‐felony‐offense enhancement is limited to the situations specifically addressed in Application Note 13(D). Put another way, by expressly mentioning one application of the enhancement and conspicuously leaving out the other, the Sentencing Commission said clearly—by negative implication, to be sure, but clearly—that when the “trafficking” enhancement applies, a sentence may be enhanced under the in‐connection‐with clause but not under the reason‐to‐believe clause. See VKK Corp. v. Nat’l Football League, 244 F.3d 114, 130 & n.12 (2d Cir. 2001) (“To express or include one thing implies the exclusion of the other . . . .” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Ortega, 94 F.3d 764, 770‐71 (2d Cir. 1996) (relying in part on the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius to hold that a Guidelines provision stating that “[p]rior sentences . . . are to be counted in the criminal history score, including uncounseled misdemeanor sentences where imprisonment was not imposed” implicitly excluded from the criminal‐history computation uncounseled misdemeanor sentences where imprisonment was imposed (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Application Note’s text is, in our view, very much the equivalent of that which the concurrence concedes would prohibit double‐counting here: an “express[ ] provi[sion] [stating] that an additional enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(6) is permissible ‘only’ when trafficking occurs . . . in connection with a felony.” Concurring Op. 4. Accordingly, we conclude that transferring a firearm with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe it will be used in connection with another felony 19 cannot support an enhancement in a case where the “trafficking” enhancement also applies. As is clear from the analysis above, however, transferring a firearm in connection with another felony offense can support a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) enhancement in “trafficking” cases. One might argue (particularly in view of the broad definition of “in connection with” set out in Application Note 14(A)) that transferring a firearm with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe it will be used in connection with another felony, without more, can be characterized as transferring a firearm in connection with that other felony. But it is not plausible to read § 2K1.1 in that fashion. If the phrase “in connection with another felony offense” in Application Note 13(D) includes the concept of transferring a firearm with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe it will be used in connection with another felony offense, the phrase presumably embraces the same concept where it is used in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 260 (1993) (identical language appearing in two places in the same statute should be given the same meaning in each instance); United States v. Potes‐Castillo, 638 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2011) (ordinary principles of statutory construction apply to Guidelines provisions and their explanatory commentary). But if that is so, the second, reason‐to‐believe clause in § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) does no work at all. The Sentencing Commission could have reached the same substantive result by stopping after the first, in‐ connection‐with clause. We accordingly reject this reading of the provision. See United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 81 (2d Cir. 20 2012) (“[A] statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”). Our construction of § 2K2.1 yields a sensible result in light of the Sentencing Commission’s apparent concern (in this particular instance) with double‐counting. The “trafficking” enhancement applies in situations (among others) in which a defendant transfers two or more firearms to another person with reason to believe that that person intends to use the firearms unlawfully. 2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, Application Note 13(A). But for Application Note 13(D), such conduct would also support application of the other‐felony‐ offense enhancement pursuant to the reason‐to‐believe clause, provided the transferee intended to use the firearms not just unlawfully but in connection with another felony. Thus, Application Note 13(D) avoids the simultaneous application of two provisions likely in many circumstances to punish the same behavior.8 8 We acknowledge, as the concurrence emphasizes, that Application Note 13(D) is not perfectly tailored to address all double‐counting concerns that might arise through application of the provisions in question. Plainly, the “trafficking” enhancement and § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)’s reason‐to‐believe clause are not coextensive in the conduct to which they apply; the latter applies when a person “possesse[s] or transfer[s] any firearm . . . with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it [will] be used or possessed in connection with another felony offense,” 2013 U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (emphasis supplied), whereas the former can be triggered by transfer of a firearm with reason to believe it will be possessed, used or disposed of merely unlawfully. And Application Note 13(D) appears to permit imposition of a “trafficking” enhancement in cases where the defendant also 21 In sum, we conclude that application of the other‐felony‐ offense enhancement to Young constituted impermissible double‐ counting. Accordingly, the District Court erred in imposing the enhancement, and we must vacate and remand for resentencing.9 III. U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 (Obstruction of Justice Enhancement) Young next argues that the District Court erred in applying an enhancement for obstruction of justice under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. We agree. Section 3C1.1 provides for a two‐level enhancement if “(1) the defendant willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect to the . . . sentencing of the instant offense of conviction, and (2) the obstructive conduct related to (A) the defendant’s offense of conviction and any relevant conduct; or (B) a closely related receives an enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A)—which provides for a four‐level increase if the defendant “possesse[s] or transfer[s] any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it [will] be transported out of the United States”—even though conduct supporting a § 2K2.1(b)(6)(A) enhancement might often support a “trafficking” enhancement as well. But even if imperfectly tailored, Application Note 13(D) appears reasonably calculated to address a legitimate concern about double‐counting and produces a sensible result in furtherance of that end. This buttresses our reading of the Guidelines’ text. 9 Though it is not clear to us that the record would support application of the enhancement on the ground that Young “used or possessed a[ ] firearm . . . in connection with another felony,” we do not foreclose the possibility that on remand the District Court could make such a finding. 22 offense.” 2013 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Covered conduct includes “providing materially false information to a probation officer in respect to a presentence . . . investigation.” 2013 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 4(H). It is “essential” that a court applying this enhancement make “a finding that the defendant had the specific intent to obstruct justice, i.e., that the defendant consciously acted with the purpose of obstructing justice.” United States v. Brown, 321 F.3d 347, 351 (2d Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is not sufficient merely to find that the defendant made materially false statements concerning his offense conduct. United States v. Bradbury, 189 F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 1999). Here, the District Court found that Young made two materially false statements to the probation officer: that he did not know he was selling guns to drug dealers, and that he did not traffic in guns before meeting Davis. On this basis it imposed the enhancement. The government specifically requested that the Court enter a finding that in making those false statements, Young “had the intent to obstruct justice.” App. 358. Judge Geraci replied that there was no need to “articulate [Young’s] motivation” in speaking falsely—only to find that the statements “were materially false.” App. 359. But there was such a need: material falsity is not enough to support application of the enhancement. Bradbury, 189 F.3d at 205. The government argues that a finding of specific intent to obstruct justice is not necessary when a “defendant has clearly lied in a statement made under oath.” United States v. Lincecum, 220 F.3d 23 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the clearly false statement was made under oath, the court need only “point to the obvious lie and find that the defendant knowingly made a false statement on a material matter.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). But here, the false statements the District Court identified were not made under oath. They were made during an interview with a probation officer. App. 356 (“[T]his Court finds that there’s sufficient evidence that the defendant obstructed the administration of justice by providing false statements to the probation officer.”). Accordingly, the rule of Lincecum does not apply. We do not mean to imply, of course, that the District Court could not have found on this record that Young specifically intended to obstruct justice, or that the District Court could not have imposed the enhancement based on Young’s sworn testimony without making such a finding. But those determinations are for the District Court in the first instance. We leave them for its consideration on remand. IV. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 (Acceptance of Responsibility Enhancement) Even without making a finding that Young specifically intended to obstruct justice, the District Court could reasonably have concluded that he was not entitled to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. But in refusing to apply the adjustment, the Court seems to have relied significantly, perhaps exclusively, on Application Note 4 to § 3E1.1, which reads: “Conduct 24 resulting in an enhancement under § 3C1.1 (Obstructing or Impeding the Administration of Justice) ordinarily indicates that the defendant has not accepted responsibility for his criminal conduct. There may, however, be extraordinary cases in which adjustments under both [provisions] may apply.” 2013 U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, Application Note 4; see App. 356 (“Based upon the Court’s finding that [Young] provided material[ly] false statement[s] to the probation officer who was conducting the presentence investigation, this is conduct that’s inconsistent with the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility, and . . . the Court finds that there are no extraordinary circumstances that would justify the defendant receiving a three step reduction . . . .”). Thus, it appears that the District Court, having imposed the obstruction enhancement, declined to adjust downward for acceptance of responsibility because no “extraordinary” circumstances justified the application of both adjustments. In other words, the Court’s ruling on the acceptance‐of‐responsibility adjustment was premised on its ruling on the obstruction enhancement. The latter having been made in error, the former must fall with it, and application of the acceptance‐of‐responsibility adjustment considered on remand.