Opinion ID: 2554806
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Prescriptive Rights to the Upland of Lot J-46

Text: [¶ 77] The J-Lot owners contend that the evidence at trial supported a finding that they, as a class of persons, used the upland portion of Lot J-46 continuously for a period of twenty years. They argue that the court clearly erred in finding otherwise. [¶ 78] To establish an easement by prescription, [t]he party asserting the easement must prove (1) continuous use (2) for at least 20 years (3) under a claim of right adverse to the owner, (4) with his knowledge and acquiescence, or (5) a use so open, notorious, visible, and uninterrupted that knowledge and acquiescence will be presumed. Eaton, 2000 ME 176, ¶ 32, 760 A.2d at 244. [¶ 79] Although only a subset of the J-Lot owners claimed prescriptive rights in the upland of Lot J-46, the court treated all of the J-Lot owners as a class of persons for purposes of the prescriptive easement claim. The court properly focused on evidence of use of the upland portion of Lot J-46 by persons who were J-Lot owners at the time of the use. Viewed in the light most favorable to Muther and Woods, as the prevailing party, see Batchelder, 2007 ME 17, ¶ 3, 914 A.2d at 1118, the trial record establishes that only three J-Lot households asserted use of the upland of Lot J-46, and that only one J-Lot owner had used the upland prior to 1999. Reasoning that adverse use by one member of a class of persons was insufficient to establish continuous use by the class, the court concluded that the J-Lot owners, as a class of persons, failed to demonstrate continuous use for twenty years. [¶ 80] The statute of limitations for adverse possession makes clear that a class of persons may acquire an easement through prescriptive use: No person, class of persons or the public shall acquire a right-of-way or other easement through, in, upon or over the land of another by the adverse use and enjoyment thereof, unless it is continued uninterruptedly for 20 years. 14 M.R.S. § 812 (2010). [¶ 81] We have decided numerous cases regarding acquisition of prescriptive easements by individuals and the public. See, e.g., Lyons v. Baptist Sch. of Christian Training, 2002 ME 137, 804 A.2d 364 (discussing public prescriptive easements); Blackmer v. Williams, 437 A.2d 858 (Me.1981) (affirming an individual's easement by prescription); Town of Kennebunkport v. Forrester, 391 A.2d 831, 833 n. 2 (Me.1978) ([T]o create a public easement, . . . the adverse use must be general and not limited to a few specific individuals. . . . The test of a public use is not the frequency of the use, or the number using the way, but its use by people who are not separable from the public generally.). However, we have never discussed how a class of persons that is separate from the public can establish the prescriptive element of continuity. There is a similar dearth of cases on this issue in other jurisdictions. But see Cordrey v. Dorey, 1996 WL 633293, at , 1996 Del. Ch. LEXIS 131, at  (1996) (holding that evidence of individual plaintiffs' own personal use of a property was insufficient to support prescriptive easement rights in a class of persons). Additionally, the doctrine of tacking successive prescriptive periods together to establish continuous use does not apply to concurrent users within a class when the members are not in privity of title. See Glidden v. Belden, 684 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Me.1996); Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 2.17 cmt. 1 (The question whether periods of use by successive users can be tacked should not be confused with the question whether several people can be regarded as concurrent users whose use comprises a single continued use.). [¶ 82] The question thus presented is whether use by three householdsone for twenty years, one for ten years, and one for one year [15] is sufficient to establish a prescriptive easement for a class of nineteen households. [¶ 83] In the absence of relevant prior decisions, we seek guidance from the Restatement, which provides: A servitude should be interpreted to give effect to the intention of the parties ascertained from. . . circumstances surrounding creation of the servitude, and to carry out the purpose for which it was created. Restatement (Third) of Prop.: Servitudes § 4.1(1). When the circumstances surrounding the creation of an easement are prescriptive in nature, the adverse use that leads to creation of the servitude provides the basis for determining its terms. Id. § 4.1 cmt. a. Since the servitude created by adverse use arises from the failure of the landowner to take steps to halt the adverse use, interpretation of the prescriptive servitude focuses on the reasonable expectations of the landowner. The relevant inquiry is what a landowner in the position of the owner of the servient estate should reasonably have expected to lose by failing to interrupt the adverse use before the prescriptive period had run. Id. § 4.1 cmt. h. This approach is consistent with the idea that the open, notorious, [and] visible element of establishing a prescriptive easement is required to give notice to the owner of the servient estate that the user is asserting an easement. See Great N. Paper Co. v. Eldredge, 686 A.2d 1075, 1077 (Me. 1996). [¶ 84] Adopting this view, the objective expectations of the owner of Lot J-46 become central to determining whether, as a matter of law, the conduct by the J-Lot owners established a prescriptive easement for the J-Lot owners, as a class of persons, in the upland of Lot J-46. Those expectations rest on the actual use of the upland during the prescriptive period. In this case, the actual use was quite limited. Only three of nineteen J-Lot households made use of the upland. In addition, only one J-Lot owner used the upland between 1985 and 1999. Viewed objectively, this limited use was insufficient to provide notice to the owner of Lot J-46 that the entire neighborhood was asserting an easement. [¶ 85] We conclude that the owner of Lot J-46 could not have reasonably expected that acquiescence to such use during the prescriptive period would result in the class of J-Lot owners gaining prescriptive rights to the upland of Lot J-46. Although we rely on a different analysis, we affirm this aspect of the court's judgment. [16] See Friedman v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2008 ME 156, ¶ 1, 956 A.2d 97, 99.