Opinion ID: 1465501
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Although the district court erred in applying the marital communications privilege, the error was harmless.

Text: Over Banks's objection that the testimony was protected by the marital communications privilege, the district court allowed Banks's wife to testify to statements made by Banks during the course of their marriage concerning why Banks created the video. The marital communications privilege protects from disclosure private communications between spouses, Griffin, 440 F.3d at 1143-44 (citations omitted), and may be invoked by the non-testifying spouse. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 729. The privilege exists to protect the integrity of marriages and ensure that spouses freely communicate with one another. Griffin, 440 F.3d at 1143 (citation, alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). However, because the marital communications privilege obstructs the truth seeking process, its use in criminal proceedings requires a particularly narrow construction because of society's strong interest in the administration of justice. United States v. White, 974 F.2d 1135, 1138 (9th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). While balancing the public's interest in the full and fair administration of justice and the need to protect the integrity of marriage and ensure that spouses freely communicate, we have created two exceptions to the privilege. First, the marital communications privilege does not apply to statements made in furtherance of joint criminal activity. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 731. Second, the marital communications privilege should not apply to statements relating to a crime where a spouse or a spouse's children are the victims. White, 974 F.2d at 1138. It is the extent of this second exception that we now consider. In White, we agreed with the balancing test set forth by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362, 1366-67 (8th Cir.1975), which concluded that an exception to the marital privilege was needed to protect the children of either spouse from abuse by the other spouse. Id. at 1367. The district court's ruling in this case demonstrates its belief that the White exception should extend to those individuals considered the functional equivalent of the children protected in White. In determining whether the functional equivalent of a child/parent relationship should support an exception to the marital communications privilege, the rationale of Allery is instructive. In Allery, the court extended the exception to allow testimony when a crime has been committed against the child of either spouse, recognizing that in light of today's society, the policy behind the privilege requires expansion of its exceptions. 526 F.2d at 1366. The court noted that a serious crime against a child is an offense against that family['s] harmony and to society as well. Id. The court also discussed that a vast majority of child abuse cases involve a parent or parent substitute as the perpetrator. Id. Given that the bond between marital partners and the functional equivalent of their children would be nearly identical to that between marital partners and their birth or step-children, the harm to family harmony and society would be the equivalent of that noted in Allery. See id. Indeed, of the nine states within the Ninth Circuit, seven recognize a marital communications privilege exception including the functional equivalent of birth children or a somewhat broader concept. [2] Considering the comparable familial ties, we conclude that violence against the functional equivalent of a child should be afforded the same protections as violence against the birth or step-child of a married couple. [3] The question remains, however, whether the district court correctly concluded that the minor child in this case was the functional equivalent of a birth or step-child. The district court's conclusion was based on the following findings: that JB, the alleged victim, was the grandchild of both the witness, Mrs. Banks, and the defendant, Mr. Banks; that the witness and the defendant were married and co-habitating at the time of the communication; that JB was in the care, joint care of Mrs. Banks and the defendant at the time of the alleged molestation; that JB was specifically being cared for by the defendant at the time of the alleged molestation; that at least during the two-month period prior to the alleged molestation that JB had been left in the joint care of the defendant and Mrs. Banks for two weekends beginning on Friday evening and ending Saturday afternoon; that the parents, i.e., Mr. and Mrs. Banks' son and their daughter-in-law, were not present during those times when JB was in the care of the defendant and his wife. Further, during the approximate two years of JB's life preceding that time, for the first six months he had lived with Mr. and Mrs. Banks. And during that time, the parents also lived with Mr. and Mrs. Banks, but Mrs. Banks on occasion would feed, bathe, clothe, and change the diapers of JB on many occasions. After that three-month-or after that six-month period, the times in which JB was in Mr. and Mrs. Banks's care was very infrequent until April of 2005. But the parents started leaving JB in the care of Mr. and Mrs. Banks from the time he was about one and one half years old but not usually overnight until April of 2005. Although these facts demonstrate a strong bond between the victim and his grandparents, they do not show the type of relationship that would be considered the functional equivalent of a birth or step-child's relationship with his parents. Infrequent overnight visits are common to a large portion of grandparent/grandchild relationships, as are frequent visits with or even regular day-care services provided by the grandparents. This type of care, while admirable and important, does not carry the same indicia of guardianship and responsibility that a parent/child relationship carries. Further, while the district court noted that JB had resided with the Banks for the first six months of his life, it is an important qualifier that his parents had also resided in the home and that this living situation had ended well over a year before the alleged molestation. This is not a case in which a child was raised by grand-parents and, therefore, could be said to share a parent/child relationship with those caretakers. Rather, this situation demonstrates a strong grandparent/grandchild relationship. Although such a relationship is important to building strong extended families and improving society, it is not the type that creates the same overriding policy concerns that led us to limit the marital communications privilege to protect children of the marriage. Accordingly, the district court's admission of Mrs. Banks's testimony was an abuse of discretion because the district court's finding that JB was the functional equivalent of a birth child to Banks and his wife was clearly erroneous under these facts. See Shafer, 518 F.3d at 1070 (A district court abuses its discretion if it `bases its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.' (citation and alteration omitted)). Our dissenting colleague accuses the majority of neglect[ing] its duty pursuant to Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence... Dissenting Opinion, p. 981. To the contrary, it is the dissenting opinion that strays from the dictates of Rule 501 by incorporating wholesale state law statutory privileges into its analysis. Rule 501 provides in pertinent part: [T]he privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States ... Fed. R. of Evid. 501 (emphasis added). In keeping with Rule 501's emphasis on federal common law, the court in Allery recognized that [f]ederal courts may ... look to the privileges created by state courts and applicable state statutes if the court finds them appropriate. Allery, 526 F.2d at 1365 (emphases added). No deference to state law is mentioned or implied. More importantly, the court in Allery noted that proposed rules of privilege adopted by the United States Supreme Court and sent to Congress for approval.. . [were] abandoned by Congress and [were] replaced by Rule 501. Id. at 1366 (footnote reference omitted). In Allery, the court explained that [a] careful review of the legislative history behind the rejection of the changes proposed in Article V and the passage of Rule 501 does not indicate that Congress disapproved of the expansion of this exception but rather that any substantive changes should be done on a case-by-case basis. Id. (citation omitted). Rather than resolving this case on these facts, the dissent seeks to make a sweeping ruling that the marital privilege is waived for all grandparents for all time for all circumstances, whenever a charge of sexual abuse of a minor is involved. Although the majority recognizes the abhorrent nature of child sexual abuse, we must nevertheless faithfully apply our precedent. Our governing precedent on this issue is our opinion in White, which cited Allery with approval. See White, 974 F.2d at 1138. In White, we concluded that the common law marital communications privilege should not apply to statements relating to a crime where a spouse or spouse's children are the victims. The dissent seeks to extend this holding virtually without limitation. See Dissenting Opinion, pp. 986-87. In doing so, the dissent goes far beyond the approach taken by the district court. It is apparent from the district court's factual findings that its ruling was predicated upon a determination that the grandparents in this case were the functional equivalents of parents. Indeed, the district court expressly reasoned that this case was not even a small step from what the court ruled in White. It is almost exactly the same. In this particular case, under these particular facts, we disagree. Perhaps our holding would be different if the grandparents were the primary care-givers. But such was not the case. Rather, the grandparents were occasional caregivers. As discussed above, and as Rule 501 contemplates, a case-by-case application of the marital communications privilege as interpreted by our court, leads the majority to conclude that the exception did not apply in this case. [4] Nevertheless, evidence improperly admitted under the marital communications privilege warrants reversal only if it affected the defendant's substantial rights. Marashi, 913 F.2d at 729. The error here was harmless as it related to the issue of Banks's identity. In fact, the district court's finding that Banks created the video made no mention of Banks's confession to his wife. Rather, the court focused on the multitude of evidence supporting the conclusion that Banks made the video. This evidence included the recognition of Banks's watch and ring on the adult in the video; the recognition of a couch in the video that was owned by Banks and kept in his garage; testimony that Banks had been found in his locked garage, alone with the victim, and had admitted to changing the child's diaper; and testimony that Banks had been left alone with the child. This evidence demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt that the video was made in Banks's garage and that Banks had been involved in the making of the video. We are persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the district court would have found that Banks made the video, even without the improperly admitted statement. Any error was also harmless as it related to the district court's finding that the video constituted sexually explicit conduct. Although the district court did discuss the competing motives for making the video that were adduced at trial, the finding that the video constituted sexually explicit conduct was based on the actions taken in the video and Banks's later transmission of that video to a known pedophile with comments suggesting that the video was intended to show the child's erection. See United States v. Freeman, 498 F.3d 893, 901 (9th Cir.2007) (holding error harmless when it is more probable than not that the error did not materially affect the verdict) (citation omitted). Banks argues that admission of the testimony constituted reversible error because he was required to change his trial strategy to explain his prior criminal history. However, there is no indication in the record that the district court relied at all on Banks's prior criminal history in reaching its guilty verdict, rendering any error harmless. See id. In sum, although the district court abused its discretion in admitting the contested testimony, such error was harmless and does not warrant reversal.