Opinion ID: 1716282
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Heading: liability under civil code article 2322.

Text: Article 2322 imposes liability upon the owner of a building to persons injured through its ruin, whether due to a vice in its original construction or through his neglect to repair it. [5] The owner's fault is founded upon the breach of his obligation to maintain or repair his building so as to avoid the creation of undue risk of injury to others. The owner is absolved from its strict liability neither by his ignorance of the condition of the building, nor by circumstances that the defect could not easily be detected. He is absolved from such liability only if the thing owned by him falls, not because of its defect, but rather because of the fault of some third person or of the person injured thereby, or because the fault is caused by an irresistible cause or force not usually foreseeable. Article 3556(14), (15), (usually, an act occasioned exclusively by violence of nature without the interference of or contribution by any human agency). See: Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1927); Thompson v. Commercial National Bank, 156 La. 479, 100 So. 688 (1924); Barnes v. Beirne, 38 La.Ann. 280 (1886); Camp v. Church Wardens, 7 La.Ann. 321 (1852); Crawford v. Wheless, 265 So.2d 661 (La.App.2d Cir., 1972); Anslem v. Travelers Insurance Company, 192 So.2d 599 (La. App.3d Cir., 1966); Green v. Southern Furniture Company, 94 So.2d 508 (La.App.1st Cir., 1957); Comment, 42 Tul.Law Rev. 178 (1967). Under the terms of Article 2322, several requirements for the imposition of liability under the article must be met: (1) There must be a building; (2) the defendant must be its owner; and (3) there must be a ruin caused by a vice in construction or a neglect to repair, which occasions the damage sought to be recovered. 1. Is Shell's Platform a Building Within the Meaning of Article 2322? The word building as used in Article 2322 has received no clear jurisprudential definition. This court itself has never spoken directly to the question whether an oil derrick or drilling platform constitutes a building within the meaning of the article. Nevertheless, some Louisiana jurisprudence indicates that an oil derrick is a building for purposes of imposing liability under the code article. Vinton Petroleum Co. v. L. Seiss Oil Syndicate, 19 La.App. 179, 139 So. 543 (1932). The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has relied on the Vinton decision, in holding that fixed offshore drilling platforms constitute buildings for such purposes. Mott v. Odeco, 577 F.2d 273 (1978); Moczygemba v. Danos & Curole Marine Contractors, 561 F.2d 1149 (1977); McIlwain v. Placid Oil Company, 472 F.2d 248 (1973) certiorari denied, 412 U.S. 923, 93 S.Ct. 2734, 37 L.Ed.2d 150 (1973). Without making specific reference to oil derricks, this court has made several observations as to what constitutes a building under the article. An inherent requirement is that there be a structure of some permanence. Mudd v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 309 So.2d 297 (La.1975). Also, the permanent structure need not be intended for habitation, for it to be considered a building. Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 232 So.2d 473 (1970). Additionally, we have held, for instance, that, for purposes of delictual responsibility under Article 2322, the word building encompasses a wharf or walkway over water which gave access and was attached to a camphouse. Cristadoro v. Von Behren's Heirs, 119 La. 1025, 44 So. 852 (1907). See also Howe v. City of New Orleans, 12 La.Ann. 481 (1857). The wording building in Article 2322 is translated from the word batiment in its corresponding article of the French Civil Code, Article 1386. Batiment is defined in Bescherelle's Dictionnaire National (1844) as a generic term designating all edifices public or private, regardless of the type material composing them, but most particularly those which serve as habitations. (The writer's translation.) Traditionally, French jurisprudence has interpreted the word batiment broadly; according to an authoritative French treatise, numerous French authors consider it to include all works of man, synonymous with the word construction (including structures both movable and immovable, whether temporary or permanent). [6] The treatise would more narrowly define the word, at least limiting it to immovables, and the tendency of modern French jurisprudence has been so to interpret the word more narrowly. [7] Louisiana Civil Code Article 464 (1870) provides that buildings or other constructions, whether they have their foundations in the soil or not, are immovable by their nature. See also Civil Code Articles 463 and 464, as re-enacted in 1978. In the context of the Louisiana Civil Code, a building is a type of permanent construction that would be classified as an immovable. Without further defining the limits of a building within the meaning of Article 2322, it is sufficient for present purposes to hold that a permanent structure, such as the fixed drilling platform owned by Shell and which has a foundation in the soil, is indeed a building for purposes of that article, whether or not intended for habitation. [8] This result is consistent with and analogous with our earlier holdings summarized above. The defendant further argues that federal law dictates that we hold Shell's drilling platform to be an island, and therefore an extension of the soil, rather than a building. [9] In support of this thesis, the defendant cites Rodrigue v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352, 89 S.Ct. 1835, 23 L.Ed.2d 360 (1969) and In Re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974). We find no merit to this argument. The cited decisions concern a choice of law question, federal maritime law versus state law. They do not touch upon nor concern the classification of a drilling platform as land or soil rather than as a building. [10] As previously noted, the federal courts have reached, correctly, the same conclusion as we do now, i. e., that a drilling platform such as the present is a building within the meaning of Article 2322: See Mott, Moczygemba, and McIlwain, cited above. 2. Is Shell the Owner, for Purposes of Article 2322 Liability, of the Defective Attachments to Its Drilling Platform? By contract between Shell and Movible, Movible retained the ownership of its drilling rig and of its living unit attached to Shell's drilling platform. (Movible's modular living unit included the defective water heater as a component part thereof.) Much of the argument of both parties is addressed to this issue of ownership. Unquestionably, as between Shell and Movible, the latter remained the owner of its drilling rig and living unit. The true issue, however, is whether by reason of this contractual circumstance, Shell is relieved of its obligation as owner of the building (i. e., the fixed drilling platform) for its strict liability under Article 2322 for injuries caused by any defect in it or its appurtenances. [11] Preliminarily, we note that necessary appurtenances to structures and movables made immovable by attachment, which are defective or have fallen into ruin, also may be included within that term `building' for purposes of the building-owner's delictual responsibility under Article 2322. Cothern v. LaRocca, 255 La. 673, 232 So.2d 473, 477 (1970). See also Dunn v. Tedesco, 235 La. 679, 105 So.2d 264 (1958) (water heater). [12] Thus, the Fifth Circuit has correctly held that the owner of a fixed drilling platform (a building) is liable for injuries resulting from a defect in an appurtenant drilling rig which (as in the present case) was welded onto the building by a drilling contractor which (as between itself and the platform owner) retained title to this appurtenant attachment. Moczygemba v. Danos and Curole Marine Contractors, 561 F.2d 1149 (CA 5, 1977). In attacking the conclusion reached in the cited Moczygemba decision, Shell argues that because its drilling contractor (Movible) owned the living unit attached so as to become part of Shell's building (the drilling platform), Shell cannot be held delictually responsible for defects in the living unit, insofar as sought to be based on the strict liability of an owner under Article 2322 for defects in its buildings or appurtenant or component parts thereof. In our view, this argument overlooks the basis for the delictual obligation of the owner of a building for damages caused by defects in its structure or appurtenances: The obligation of every property owner to answer for damages for a failure to keep his property in such condition of repair that it will not be dangerous to other persons is imposed by law, by Articles 670, 2315, 2322 of the Civil Code. Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 69, 111 So. 495 (1927). In Klein, this court held that, although the owner of the premises could by contract allow another person to use the property for any particular purpose and could thus regulate the rights as between owner and contractual occupant, the owner could not by such contract evade his obligation imposed by law to repair harm to others resulting from defects in his premises. The decisions previously cited have imposed Article 2322 liability upon the owner of a building for defects in its appurtenant structures without consideration of whether the thing attached to a building has become an immovable by nature or by destination under property law concepts, and without consideration of whether there is unity of ownership of the building and its appurtenance. In the absence of another statute providing otherwise, the strict liability under Article 2322 of the owner of a building for harm caused by defects in its structure or appurtenances imposes a non-delegable duty upon him to keep his building and appurtenances in repair and to be responsible to third persons for harm caused by any defect in the structure or its appurtenances. [13] By contractual agreement between himself and the occupant who owns the appurtenance incorporated into the structure of the building, the owner of the building may regulate their relative ownership or duties of indemnification to one another resulting from injury to third persons. The owner cannot by such contract, however, limit his law-imposed liability to third persons for injuries arising from premise defects. Klein v. Young, 163 La. 59, 111 So. 495 (1927). For the same reasons, neither can he, by contractual agreement relating to the ownership of appurtenant parts by an occupier, absolve himself from liability to third persons from injuries resulting from premise-defects in any part of his premises, including in occupier-owned appurtenant parts attached to his building so as to become a part of it. In view of this conclusion, we need not discuss Shell's additional argument that no liability attaches to it because the modular living unit attached to its building (the drilling platform) did not become an immovable by nature under Civil Code Article 467 (1870; as amended in 1912), since it was attached to the building by a person (Movible) other than the owner. Because the appurtenant living unit was part of the building for purposes of Article 2322, cf. also La.C.C. art. 508 (1870), it is immaterial whether it is technically immobilized or not under Article 467 (1972) for purposes of determining rights between Shell and Movible and their respective creditors or purchasers. [14] 3. Did the explosion of the water heater constitute a ruin of the building under Article 2322 so to impose liability upon the building's owner for damages occasioned thereby? Shell argues that the explosion of the water heater, caused by the negligent failure of the occupier Movible to install the correct valve in it, is not a ruin of the building which was the result of a neglect to repair it or a vice in its original construction, as required by Article 2322. We find no merit to this contention, for reasons stated in our previous discussion. There, we noted that Louisiana jurisprudence interpreting Article 2322 has held that the owner of a building has a non-delegable duty to keep his buildings and its appurtenances in repair so as to avoid unreasonable risk of injury to others, and that he is held strictly liable for injuries to others resulting from his failure to perform this duty imposed by law upon him. As likewise noted, the premise owner's liability under Article 2322 extends to damages resulting from defects in appurtenances such as window fans and water heaters. See footnote 12 and surrounding text. Shell's reliance upon certain language in Davis v. Royal-Globe Insurance Co., 257 La. 523, 242 So.2d 839 (1970) is misplaced. That decision held that the owner-landlord was not liable for the lead poisoning of a tenant's children who had eaten paint flakes which had fallen from the ceiling. The court felt that the intermittent peeling, flaking, and fall of paint particles to the floor did not constitute a ruin for purposes of Article 2322, since that term referred to the actual fall or collapse of a building or one of its components, 242 So.2d 841, or a situation `in which some part of the building collapses, or breaks, or gives way', 242 So.2d 842 (i. e., as compared to the intermittent falling of paint flakes from a ceiling). Whatever the merits of that particular ruling, the decision did not in terms or context intend to modify the jurisprudence previously cited that an owner is liable under Article 2322 for injuries resulting from a defective condition which causes a breaking or explosion of an appurtenant or component part of the building.