Opinion ID: 835909
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: farm bureau petitioners

Text: The issues that Farm Bureau petitioners raise on review are the result of the pipeline's proposed placement in areas zoned for exclusive farm use. In its final order, the council found that Northwest Naturalin keeping with ORS 215.275had considered reasonable alternatives to EFU locations in formulating the pipeline's route. The council then found that siting the pipeline within EFU zones nevertheless was necessary in light of the statutory factors set out in ORS 215.275(2). As set out above, 336 Or. at 100-101, 79 P.3d at 873-874, before an applicant can site an energy facility in an EFU zone, ORS 215.275(2) requires the applicant to establish that it must site the facility in that zone to provide service. To do so, that statute requires an applicant to show that as part of its planning, it considered reasonable alternatives to the use of EFU lands and that one or more statutory factors nevertheless required it to locate the facility in an EFU zone. See 336 Or. at 99 n. 5, 79 P.3d at 873 n. 5. On review, Farm Bureau petitioners' first assignment of error is that the council misconstrued ORS 215.275(2) in finding that Northwest Natural had considered reasonable alternatives before concluding that it was necessary to locate the pipeline within EFU zones. Specifically, Farm Bureau petitioners argue that, as a matter of law, the phrase reasonable alternatives means alternatives that are facially feasible or, as they state in their brief, alternatives that have some likelihood of success either initially or with modest refinement. They contend that Northwest Natural failed to meet that standard. This court interprets statutory terms under the now familiar analytical framework set out in PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or. 606, 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). Pursuant to that methodology, we first examine the text and context of the statute, giving words of common usage their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. If the legislature's intent is clear from the text and context of the statute, then further analysis is unnecessary. Id. No statutory definition exists to explain what makes an alternative reasonable under ORS 215.275(2). There is, however, a well-understood legal meaning attributed to that term: Fair, proper, just, moderate, suitable under the circumstances.    Not immoderate or excessive, being synonymous with rational, honest, equitable, fair, suitable, moderate, tolerable. Black's Law Dictionary 1265 (6th ed. 1990). That definition of reasonable contrasts considerably with the meaning that Farm Bureau petitioners would have us insert in its place, i.e., to have some likelihood of success either initially or with modest refinement. By its choice of words, the legislature used a broad brush to describe the alternatives that an applicant must consider under ORS 215.275(2). The qualification that Farm Bureau petitioners propose would narrow that broad standard significantly, effectively replacing it with one by which applicants must determine that a particular EFU alternative probably is capable of realization before they can consider it as an alternative under the statute. We reject that construction of the statute. See ORS 174.010 (in construing statutes, court cannot omit what has been inserted or insert what has been omitted). Farm Bureau petitioners next argue that, in developing the initial pipeline corridor, the council erred in failing to require Northwest Natural to evaluate siting alternatives on a property-by-property basis. Relying on a Land Use Board of Appeals' (LUBA) decision City of Albany v. Linn County, 40 Or LUBA 38 (2001), they contend that the size and complexity of the proposed pipeline requires a property-by-property analysis under ORS 215.275(2) for each discrete property segment. That position, however, is not well supported, for several reasons. First, nothing in ORS 215.275(2) suggests that the legislature intended to impose the kind of property-by-property analysis Farm Bureau petitioners posit here. The text of that statute focuses on EFU zones only as whole units, not as collections of discrete, subdivided properties: (2) To demonstrate that a utility facility is necessary, an applicant for approval under ORS 215.213(1)(d) or 215.283(1)(d) must show that reasonable alternatives have been considered and that the facility must be sited in an exclusive farm use zone due[.] (Emphasis added.) Second, assuming arguendo that LUBA's opinion in City of Albany is indeed instructive in the context of this judicial review proceeding, Farm Bureau petitioners nevertheless have misconstrued its application here. City of Albany involved siting a municipal waterworks that encompassed separate, discrete components, among them, a water treatment facility, a storage reservoir, a waste backwash facility, and finished water pipelines. The opinion in that case noted, as a general matter, that the need to locate one component of such a facility in an EFU zone would not necessarily justify siting companion components in the same zone. 40 Or LUBA at 48. The opinion then went on to observe that the justification for siting the waterworks' pipelines on farm or forest land would not, by extension, also justify placing the facility's separate water treatment and storage reservoir components in similar areas. Id. at 50. The kind of multiple-component utility that figured so prominently in City of Albany, however, is not present in this case. Here, one component comprises the facility at issue: the proposed pipeline. Unlike the waterworks in City of Albany, the pipeline contains no obvious dividing points marked by separate physical structures and therefore affords no occasion to consider whether distinct physical structures might require distinct justifications under ORS 215.275(2). As a result, we see no application for the City of Albany rationale in this case. The council did not err in refusing to require a property-by-property analysis of the pipeline under ORS 215.275(2). In their second and third assignments of error, Farm Bureau petitioners focus on the use of road and highway rights-of-way in the EFU zones as alternatives to routing the pipeline through actively farmed land. Farm Bureau petitioners assert in their second assignment of error that the council erred when it allowed Northwest Natural to site the pipeline on farmland, rather than in public road and highway rights-of-way within the EFU zones. Specifically, they argue that the council misconstrued ORS 215.275(2) and made findings that were not supported by substantial evidence in determining that safety and other concerns prevented Northwest Natural from locating the pipeline within those rights-of-way. In their third assignment of error, Farm Bureau petitioners assert that the council erred when it determined that road or highway rights of way in EFU zones do not require consideration as siting alternatives under ORS 215.275(2). Farm Bureau petitioners note that, pursuant to ORS 215.283(1)(L), an applicant may site energy facilities either overhead or in the subsurface of public roads in EFU zones without resorting to the analysis required by ORS 215.275(2). Because that analysis is unnecessary when siting energy facilities on non-EFU zoned land, Farm Bureau petitioners argue that road and highway rights-of-way in EFU zones, in effect, are like non-EFU zoned lands for the purposes of ORS 215.275(2) and should be considered accordingly. Because our analysis of the latter argument effectively disposes of both assignments of error, we address it first. ORS 215.203(1) allows areas within counties to be set aside as zones for exclusive farm use: Zoning ordinances may be adopted to zone designated areas of land within the county as exclusive farm use zones. Land within such zones shall be used exclusively for farm use except as otherwise provided in ORS 215.213, 215.283 or 215.284. Farm use zones shall be established only when such zoning is consistent with the comprehensive plan. (Emphasis added.) At the same time, however, the part of the statute highlighted above recognizes another assortment of uses that can take place in EFU zones: specific nonfarm uses otherwise provided in ORS 215.213, 215.283, or 215.284. Expressly included within that group is the construction and modification of public roads and highways within EFU zones. See, e.g., ORS 215.283(1)(L) (permitting roadway modifications that do not involve construction of additional travel lanes, removal or displacement of buildings, or creation of new land parcels); ORS 215.283(2)(q)(r) (permitting, with prior approval, construction of passing or travel lanes that require acquisition of right-of-way and road modifications that require building displacement); ORS 215.283(3) (permitting, with prior approval, construction of roads and highways not allowed under subsections (1) and (2) of statute). As a result, rather than categorically distinguishing road-related modifications and construction from the EFU zones in which they occur, ORS 215.203 anticipates inclusion of roads and highways as integral parts of EFU zones, even though they are nonfarm uses. In short, under ORS 215.203, it is incorrect to view road and highway rights-of-way within EFU zones as non-EFU anomalies that each require separate analysis under ORS 215.275(2). We do not view such rights-of-way as alternatives to EFU zones when, in fact, they are part of such zones. Farm Bureau petitioners' contrary position in their third assignment of error therefore is not well taken. We conclude that the council did not misapply ORS 215.275(2) with regard to the road and highway rights-of-way at issue here. That conclusion also disposes of Farm Bureau petitioners' second assignment of error. There, they argue that, under the alternatives analysis that ORS 215.275(2) requires, the council incorrectly rejected some road rights-of-way within EFU zones as pipeline sites based on safety concerns and other factors. Although the context of that argument differs slightly from that presented in Farm Bureau petitioners' third assignment of error, it is nevertheless premised on the same mistaken notion that we have identified above, i.e., that the statutes treat road and highway rights-of-way in EFU zones in the same manner as non-EFU zoned lands. As we have concluded, they do not. In their fourth assignment of error, Farm Bureau petitioners assert that, in those locations where the council did approve public road and highway rights-of-way as sites for the pipeline, the council nevertheless misconstrued ORS 215.283(1)(L) in doing so. That statute provides: (1) The following uses may be established in any area zoned for exclusive farm use:      (L) Reconstruction or modification of public roads and highways, including the placement of utility facilities overhead and in the subsurface of public roads and highways along the public right of way, but not including the addition of travel lanes, where no removal or displacement of buildings would occur, or no new land parcels result. (Emphasis added.) Relying on the text highlighted above, Farm Bureau petitioners argued below that locating a pipeline within the subsurface of a public road or highway road right-of-way necessitated, as a matter of law, placing it directly under the hard surface of the road. The council declined to adopt that reading of the statute, and petitioners now reiterate their argument on review. In construing ORS 215.283(1)(L) under the PGE methodology, 317 Or. at 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143, we first examine the statute's text and context. Id. at 611, 859 P.2d 1143. The statute's use of the phrase along the public right of way and the fact that it modifies the word overhead in the statute suggests that the legislature intended that a utility facility may be placed anywhere along, that is, within the confines of, the right-of-way. The context of that statutory provision, which includes related statutes, lends substantial support to that interpretation of legislative intent. The zoning statutes contained in ORS chapter 215 do not articulate the defining physical aspects of roads or highways, much less discuss in any detail their subsurfaces. However, statutes expressly devoted to the thoroughfares of this state [9] frequently define roads and highways as encompassing the entire right of way upon which the road or highway's hard surface has been built: ` Road' means the entire right of way of any public or private way that provides ingress to or egress from property by means of vehicles or other means or that provides travel between places by means of vehicles. `Road' includes, but is not limited to: (a) Ways described as streets, highways, throughways or alleys[.] ORS 368.001(6)(a) (emphasis added). ` Public road' means the entire right of way of any road over which the public has the right of use or any right of way held by the state or a political subdivision of the state for road purposes that is not open for public use. ORS 376.150(1) (emphasis added). ` State highway,' `highway' or `state highway system' means the entire width between the boundary lines of the right of way of every state highway, as defined by ORS 366.005, and the terms also include the interstate system and the federal-aid primary system. ORS 377.710(34) (emphasis added). For zoning purposes, the legislature can define roads and highways differently if it chooses, but it has not done so. In the absence of any other definition in the zoning statutes, the statutes noted above provide important contextual clues from which we discern the legislatures's intent regarding the roads and highways at issue here. We conclude that, for purposes of ORS 215.283(1)(L), the phrase public roads and highways means the entire right-of-way within which those thoroughfares are constructed, not just the hard surface upon which traffic travels. As a result, Northwest Natural could comply with ORS 215.283(1)(L) by burying a pipeline alongside a hard road surface, so long as it remained within the thoroughfare's right-of-way. Farm Bureau petitioners' contrary construction of the statute therefore is not well taken, and the council did not err in so concluding. In their final assignment of error, Farm Bureau petitioners assert that the council misconstrued and, as a result, failed to satisfy the requirements of ORS 215.275(5). ORS 215.275(5) provides: The governing body of the county or its designee shall impose clear and objective conditions on an application for utility facility siting under ORS 215.213(1)(d) or 215.283(1)(d) to mitigate and minimize the impacts of the proposed facility, if any, on surrounding lands devoted to farm use in order to prevent a significant change in accepted farm practices or a significant increase in the cost of farm practices on the surrounding farmlands. Farm Bureau petitioners note that, in the administrative rules that the council promulgated, one definition of mitigation makes avoiding impacts a priority in the hierarchy of actions that an applicant can take to lessen potentially negative effects in siting an energy facility. See OAR XXX-XXX-XXXX(29). [10] Pointing to that rule, Farm Bureau petitioners suggest that the term mitigate in ORS 215.275(5) warrants a similar construction. They argue that the statutory term compels the council to preempt farmland impacts outright by conditioning compliance with ORS 215.275(5) on avoiding incursions onto actively farmed land where possible. As a result, they argue, the council should have imposed an objective condition requiring Northwest Natural to locate the pipeline under roadways in EFU zones wherever possible or, alternatively, denied Northwest Natural's application. Farm Bureau petitioners contend that the council's failure to do so was error. [11] In construing ORS 215.275(5), we follow the PGE methodology, 317 Or. at 610-12, 859 P.2d 1143. In this instance, because the terms minimize and mitigate do not have special statutory definitions, and do not have any well-understood legal meaning in this context, we give those terms their plain, natural, and ordinary meanings. The dictionary defines, mitigate as to cause to become more gentle or less hostile;    to make less severe, violent, cruel, intense, or painful. Webster's at 1447. In the context of ORS 215.275(5), that term speaks to lessening the intensity or severity of a particular impact. Minimize in turn, means to reduce to the smallest possible number, degree, or extent[.] Webster's at 1438. It does not, however, mean eliminate. Thus, the statute assumes that some impact on EFU land is permissible. Put differently, the word connotes reducing, to the extent possible, the frequency with which an impact occurs. When we construe the terms mitigate and minimize together, they demonstrate that ORS 215.275(5) requires the general reduction in the intensity and frequency of an impact, not, as Farm Bureau petitioners suggest, the absolute avoidance or elimination. The council did not err in declining to adopt that construction of those terms in its final order. The order of the Energy Facility Siting Council is affirmed.