Opinion ID: 2508855
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 21

Heading: Double Jeopardy Bar After Automatic Appeal

Text: Defendant contends that because his prior appeal, upon which this court reversed the judgment because of juror misconduct ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1103, 269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327), was taken automatically under section 1239, subdivision (b), the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy precluded his retrial. [18] He reasons that while a criminal appellant ordinarily is deemed to have waived double jeopardy protection by taking the appeal, no such waiver can be imputed when the appeal is taken automatically, by operation of law. We disagree. We previously rejected such a claim in People v. Quicke (1969) 71 Cal.2d 502, 524, 78 Cal.Rptr. 683, 455 P.2d 787, albeit with minimal discussion of the issue. The claim has also been persuasively rejected by the California Court of Appeal ( People v. Powell (1974) 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 142-144, 115 Cal.Rptr. 109) and by the federal court of appeals ( Massie v. Hennessey (9th Cir.1989) 875 F.2d 1386, 1388-1389). In People v. Quicke, supra, 71 Cal.2d 502, 78 Cal.Rptr. 683, 455 P.2d 787, a capital defendant was given a new penalty trial after reversal of his death penalty on automatic appeal (see People v. Quicke (1964) 61 Cal.2d 155, 37 Cal.Rptr. 617, 390 P.2d 393) and was again sentenced to death. On his second automatic appeal, he maintained double jeopardy protections had barred his penalty retrial. We held that the contention cannot stand; we set aside the judgment in the first penalty trial at the request of defendant. ( People v. Quicke, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 524, 78 Cal.Rptr. 683, 455 P.2d 787.) The same is true in defendant's case. Though defendant and his attorneys were, like Quicke and his attorneys, relieved by section 1239 of the burden of filing a notice of appeal or otherwise initiating the first automatic appeal, defendant, through appellate counsel, pursued that appeal, seeking and obtaining reversal of the judgment from this court. In his first appeal, [d]efendant contend[ed] that jury misconduct during the guilt phase of the trial requires reversal of the judgment. ( People v. Holloway, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 1106, 269 Cal.Rptr. 530, 790 P.2d 1327.) [19] This court agreed and reversed for that reason. Thus, as in People v. Quicke, we set aside the judgment in the first . . . trial at the request of defendant. ( People v. Quicke, supra, 71 Cal.2d at p. 524, 78 Cal.Rptr. 683, 455 P.2d 787.) Though the first appeal was automatic, reversal was not. As the original conviction has, at the defendant's behest, been wholly nullified and the slate wiped clean ( North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) 395 U.S. 711, 721, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, italics added), the state was free to retry defendant on the charges. The appeal is fairly characterized as [the appellant's] even though it is mandatory, and his waiver of any defense of double jeopardy must be implied by operation of law. ( Massie v. Hennessey, supra, 875 F.2d at p. 1389.) The rationale for permitting retrial after a successful automatic appeal, as after an appeal initiated by the defendant, was further explained in People v. Powell, supra, 40 Cal.App.3d 107, 115 Cal.Rptr. 109. The defendants there claimed that because their prior reversals came in automatic appeals under section 1239, the appeals could not be considered waivers of double jeopardy rights. The appellate court agreed the automatic appeal is mandatory, but observed the appeal is certainly not detrimental to the defendant. On the contrary, a substantial benefit is afforded by this procedure, both to the accused and to society, when the most severe of all penalties has been imposed. It is not logical that its provisions should operate to the benefit of the accused and to the detriment of society. ( People v. Powell, supra, at p. 143, 115 Cal.Rptr. 109.) Similarly, in Massie v. Hennessey , the Ninth Circuit emphasized that California's automatic appeal procedure serves the vital goal, one mandated by the federal Constitution, of ensuring against arbitrariness and caprice in a murder conviction and imposition of the death sentence. This most important concern must override any double jeopardy objection Massie may have. ( Massie v. Hennessey, supra, 875 F.2d at p. 1388.) As the United States Supreme Court has explained in upholding retrial after a defendant's successful appeal, `It would be a high price indeed for society to pay were every accused granted immunity from punishment because of any defect sufficient to constitute reversible error in the proceedings leading to conviction.' ( North Carolina v. Pearce, supra, 395 U.S. at p. 721, 89 S.Ct. 2072, fn. 18, quoting United States v. Tateo (1964) 377 U.S. 463, 466, 84 S.Ct. 1587, 12 L.Ed.2d 448.) That price would be truly exorbitant were California forced to choose between abandoning the automatic appeal procedure, thereby increasing the likelihood that errors in capital proceedings would go uncorrected and unremedied, and immunizing from retrial, because of errors not going to the sufficiency of the evidence of guilt, defendants charged with the most heinous crimes. The existing general rule of automatic appeal with the possibility of retrial after reversal serves both the accused's right to be given a fair trial and `the societal interest in punishing one whose guilt is clear after he has obtained such a trial.' ( Ibid. ) Defendant does not persuade us the rule violates double jeopardy principles.