Opinion ID: 2746389
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Waiver by Guilty Plea

Text: A “defendant who knowingly and voluntarily enters a guilty plea waives all non‐jurisdictional defects in the prior proceedings.” United States v. Garcia, 339 F.3d 116, 117 (2d Cir. 2003); accord United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1996). A defect qualifies as jurisdictional only if it alleges that “the face of the [defendant’s] indictment discloses that the count . . . to which he pleaded guilty failed to charge a federal offense,” such that the district court “lacked the power to entertain the prosecution.” United States v. Kumar, 617 F.3d 612, 620 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the language of the rule makes clear, a waiver by guilty plea extinguishes the defendant’s rights to challenge only defects in a “prior stage of the proceedings against him.” United States ex rel. Glenn v. McMann, 349 F.2d 1018, 1019 (2d Cir. 1965); see also Garcia, 339 F.3d at 117. It does not preclude him from challenging defects in the guilty plea itself, which, as the rule demands, must be “knowing and voluntary” to have preclusive effect. Coffin, 76 F.3d at 496. Before we consider a defendant’s non‐jurisdictional objections waived, 7 therefore, we must conclude that the defendant “entered a valid plea” under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. United States v. Calderon, 243 F.3d 587, 589 (2d Cir. 2001). Because Bastian was neither advised of nor waived his rights to a superseding indictment on Count Three, Bastian’s claim that the substitution of the .32 caliber revolver as the basis of his § 924(c)(1) conviction constructively amended the grand jury’s indictment directly challenges the validity of his ensuing guilty plea. As this Court has noted, absent a valid indictment charging a defendant with criminal conduct, a “waiver of indictment” is “a necessary prerequisite . . . for entering a guilty plea” for a felony charge. United States v. Grandia, 18 F.3d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1994). The government suggests that Bastian’s guilty plea itself served as an implicit waiver of his rights to a grand jury. Yet we have repeatedly held that “a guilty plea . . . cannot serve as a waiver of indictment.” United States v. Cordoba‐Murgas, 422 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Tran, 234 F.3d 798, 806 (2d Cir. 2000), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Thomas, 274 F.3d 655 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[P]leading guilty does not waive a defendant’s right to indictment by a grand jury.”); United States v. Macklin, 523 F.2d 193, 196 (2d Cir. 1975) (“While prosecution by indictment can be waived, the only waiver that could conceivably be found here 8 is the plea of guilty.”) (citation omitted). As we have emphasized, the waiver of indictment is an act “deliberately clothed in formal procedure.” Macklin, 523 F.2d at 196. At the very least, it “must be made in open court,” after defendants have been “informed of the nature of and the cause for the accusation” and the court is “satisfied that [they] waive their rights knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.” United States v. Ferguson, 758 F.2d 843, 850‐51 (2d Cir. 1985); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b). While a panel of this Court once recognized an implicit waiver of the right to indictment where the defendants specifically requested the court to amend their charges and “displayed a lively cognition of their rights,” Ferguson, 758 F.2d at 851‐52, the mere fact of a guilty plea does not obviate Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(b)’s procedural requirements. Because Bastian’s constructive amendment claim challenges the validity of his guilty plea, the plea does not preclude us from considering his appeal.