Opinion ID: 78401
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Jefferson's Juror Misconduct Claim

Text: Jefferson cross-appeals claiming that he was denied a fundamentally fair trial and reliable sentencing proceeding because jurors allegedly considered an unknown biblical passage during their deliberations in violation of the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. As an initial matter, Jefferson did not raise this claim in the state courts, and, we, therefore, must address whether Jefferson has excused his procedural default with a showing of cause and actual prejudice. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 542, 96 S.Ct. 1708, 48 L.Ed.2d 149 (1976); Mincey v. Head, 206 F.3d 1106, 1135 (11th Cir.2000) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991); McCoy v. Newsome, 953 F.2d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir.1992)); see also Turpin v. Todd, 268 Ga. 820, 828, 493 S.E.2d 900 (Ga.1997) (to overcome the procedural bar, Todd must not only demonstrate cause for failing to raise the claim on direct appeal, but also actual prejudice). Under the actual prejudice test, a defendant must show not merely that the errors at his trial created a possibility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); Hollis v. Davis, 941 F.2d 1471, 1480 (11th Cir.1991); Turpin, 268 Ga. at 828, 493 S.E.2d 900 (citing Reece v. United States, 119 F.3d 1462, 1467-68 (11th Cir.1997)). See also Booker v. Wainwright, 764 F.2d 1371, 1380 (11th Cir.1985) (finding no showing of actual prejudice where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt and the petitioner admitted on the stand that death was the only appropriate penalty, as Booker faced a difficult task in arguing that the prosecutor's description of the victim as `white' destroyed a substantial likelihood that he would receive mercy). Notably, even if the law presumes prejudice for certain errors when they are timely raised, a convicted defendant who is seeking to overcome a procedural bar does not have the benefit of that presumption of prejudice, and must instead meet the actual prejudice test set forth in Frady. See Francis, 425 U.S. at 542 n. 6, 96 S.Ct. 1708 (The presumption of prejudice which supports the existence of the [constitutional] right is not inconsistent with a holding that actual prejudice must be shown in order to obtain relief from a statutorily provided waiver for failure to assert it in a timely manner.); Hollis, 941 F.2d at 1479-80; Turpin, 268 Ga. at 828, 493 S.E.2d 900. Regardless of whether Jefferson has established cause for his failure to present the juror misconduct issue to the state courts, he has not come close to making a showing of actual prejudice. All that Jefferson has suggested, at the highest order of abstraction, is that he somehow suffered prejudice when the sentencing decision of at least one of the jurors necessary to the death sentence verdict in this case was arbitrarily based upon extrajudicial material. (Gray Br. at 13.) This claim  which does nothing more than presume prejudice based on jury exposure  does not establish actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions. Frady, 456 U.S. at 170, 102 S.Ct. 1584. On this basis alone, his claim is due to be denied. But even if we were to reach the merits of Jefferson's procedurally defaulted claim, we would reject it. To establish jury misconduct, [t]he defendant has the burden to show that the jury has been exposed to extrinsic evidence or extrinsic contacts. Once the defendant establishes that such exposure in fact occurred, prejudice is presumed and the burden shifts to the government to rebut the presumption. United States v. Ronda, 455 F.3d 1273, 1299 (11th Cir.2006); McNair v. Campbell, 416 F.3d 1291, 1307 (11th Cir.2005). The presumption of prejudice arises upon a showing of two elements: that an extraneous contact with or by a member of the jury took place and that such contact was about the matter pending before the jury. Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 229, 74 S.Ct. 450, 98 L.Ed. 654 (1954). [10] Here, after holding an evidentiary hearing, the district court rejected Jefferson's suggestion that a juror consulted a Bible verse in reaching her sentencing verdict. Specifically, the district court found as a fact that the evidence is too weak to demonstrate that juror misconduct actually occurred, or assuming that such misconduct did occur, that the misconduct prejudicially influenced the jury's sentencing deliberations. 490 F.Supp.2d at 1347-48. These findings are not clearly erroneous. As for whether the incident occurred, the record plainly shows that only one juror, Richard Berry, recalled a female juror with a Bible, despite the fact that at least four other jurors were interviewed about the alleged incident. Furthermore, while Berry testified that he was fairly certain that a juror had read from the Bible during the sentencing phase, he could not recall the name of the juror or which passage was read. The district court did not clearly err in finding the evidence too weak to establish that a juror read a Bible passage out loud during Jefferson's sentencing deliberations. Moreover, even if we were to assume that a female juror did read from the Bible  and that an individual juror's private consultation with the Bible constitutes extrinsic evidence [11]  the evidence concerning which passage was read from the Bible, and in what manner, is too innocuous and nebulous to establish that the Bible passage reading was about the matter pending before the jury. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229, 74 S.Ct. 450. On the record before us, we do not know who had the Bible, what was read, or whether the reading was considered, let alone drove her decision. Without more, Jefferson has not met his initial burden of showing that the jury has [in fact] been exposed to extrinsic evidence or extrinsic contacts. Ronda, 455 F.3d at 1299. The district court properly denied relief on this ground.