Opinion ID: 797934
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Trial Counsel's Alleged Failure to Communicate Jimmy Ray's Desire to Accept a Plea

Text: 31 Jimmy Ray claims that he learned in February or March 1999 that the government had offered him a ten-year plea arrangement, but his trial counsel advised him there was no rush to accept because he believed the government would make a better offer later in the proceedings. According to Jimmy Ray, however, the government made no additional offers, and he repeatedly told his trial counsel that he would like to accept the government's ten-year offer. Trial counsel ignored Jimmy Ray's wishes, he alleges, and took the case to trial in January 2000, where Jimmy Ray was convicted and sentenced to 292 months. 32 The government disputes Jimmy Ray's factual allegations, contending (1) that it never offered Jimmy Ray a ten-year plea agreement, and (2) that Jimmy Ray made his own decisions about his trial. The government points to a colloquy at Jimmy Ray's sentencing hearing in which defense counsel made the following representations to the district court: 33 And he would have taken a deal, Your Honor, he would have taken a deal in a second had the Government chose to give him a crime that he felt he was guilty of instead of something he wasn't. He adamantly maintained from day one, I did not do this. I am no leader. I did not move millions of dollars worth of crack cocaine. I don't have millions of dollars. I don't even have thousands of dollars. I didn't do this. That's what he told me time and time again. 34 He is not a stupid man, but he is not a brilliant man, but he understands what I told him, You go to trial and lose, it is life. I told him that. He will tell you that. He said, I don't care, I didn't do what they say I did. 35 According to the government, this statement establishes that the government never offered a ten-year plea agreement to Jimmy Ray and that Jimmy Ray was not kept in the dark on anything and freely made his own decision to go to trial. The government observes that Jimmy Ray maintained his innocence during his sentencing hearing, apparently implying that he would not have accepted any plea, had one been offered. Moreover, the government points out that Jimmy Ray had ten months in which to complain about his lawyer's alleged dereliction, but he made no complaints during pretrial proceedings, at trial, or at his sentencing hearing. 36 Jimmy Ray disputes the government's characterization of his counsel's statements at the sentencing hearing and contends that they illustrate his trial counsel's dishonesty. Jimmy Ray argues that his attorney's statement that his client would have taken a deal `had the Government chose[n] to give him a crime that he felt he was guilty of instead of something that he wasn't' can be interpreted as an attempt by his attorney to conceal his failure to communicate Mr. Valentine's acceptance of the ten-year plea offer. Jimmy Ray also accuses the government of dissembling in its interpretation of his attorney's statement and his own statement at the sentencing hearing, which he maintains should be interpreted in the context of disputing the Government's leadership charge, rather than as general claims of innocence.
37 Jimmy Ray highlighted his claim in his § 2255 motion, but the district court denied him an evidentiary hearing on the matter. We need only determine whether Jimmy Ray is entitled to an evidentiary hearing to resolve whether the government offered him a plea that his lawyer essentially prevented him from accepting. If Jimmy Ray's trial counsel prevented him from accepting a plea, his assistance was clearly ineffective and, because the alleged plea agreement offered Jimmy Ray substantially less prison time (120 months rather than his 292-month sentence), he could show sufficient prejudice to satisfy Strickland 's second prong. The district court denied Jimmy Ray's claim, finding that the [d]efendant has not presented specific, credible evidence supporting his claim [on this ground.] This court reviews that determination for abuse of discretion. Arredondo v. United States, 178 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir.1999). 38 In reviewing a § 2255 motion in which a factual dispute arises, the habeas court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the truth of the petitioner's claims. Turner v. United States, 183 F.3d 474, 477 (6th Cir.1999). [T]he burden on the petitioner in a habeas case for establishing an entitlement to an evidentiary hearing is relatively light. Id. More is required, however, than mere assertions of innocence. See id. ([I]t would be nonsensical to conclude that the petitioner could meet that burden simply by proclaiming his innocence.). Nevertheless, [a]n evidentiary hearing is required unless the record conclusively shows that the petitioner is entitled to no relief. Arredondo, 178 F.3d at 782 (internal quotations omitted). Stated another way, no hearing is required if the petitioner's allegations cannot be accepted as true because they are contradicted by the record, inherently incredible, or conclusions rather than statements of fact. Id. (internal quotations omitted). 39 We conclude, for several reasons, that Jimmy Ray met his burden, and the district court erred in declining to hold a hearing. First, although the government implies that Jimmy Ray's protestations of innocence discredit his argument that he was willing to accept a plea, this circuit has rejected this reasoning in the past. See Griffin v. United States, 330 F.3d 733, 738 (6th Cir.2003) (citing North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 33, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970)) (Griffin's repeated declarations of innocence do not prove, as the government claims, that he would not have accepted a guilty plea.). This court has also explained that [p]rotestations of innocence throughout trial are properly a factor in the trial court's analysis, however they do not, by themselves, justify summary denial of relief without an evidentiary hearing. Smith v. United States, 348 F.3d 545, 552 (6th Cir.2003). 40 Second, the authority relied on by the district court, Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445 (6th Cir.2003), does not support its conclusion that a defendant's affidavit alone could not present sufficient evidence supporting his request for a hearing. The Moss district court reached its conclusion only after an extensive three-day hearing on the evidence surrounding the defendant's ineffective-assistance and other claims. Id. at 453. 41 Third, the conclusions the government draws from Jimmy Ray's counsel's statement at his sentencing hearing are unsupported by the record. From the statement, he would have taken a deal . . . had the Government chosen to give him a crime that he felt he was guilty of, the government draws the conclusion that the Government never offered a ten-year plea agreement to the Defendant. But the government's reasoning is flawed. Taking the statement at face value, it proves only that Jimmy Ray was never offered a plea to a crime that he felt he was guilty of, not that he was never offered a plea at all. The government's assertion may be correct, but it does not follow from the colloquy it quotes. Furthermore, it is strange that the government claims it never offered Jimmy Ray a plea, but then relies on an ambiguous statement by Jimmy Ray's counsel to prove this claim in its brief, rather than an affidavit from Jimmy Ray's trial counsel or its own trial attorneys who litigated the matter. 42 The defendant's burden to show his right to a hearing is significantly lower than his burden to show he is entitled to § 2255 relief. See Turner, 183 F.3d at 477. Here, Jimmy Ray offers more than a mere assertion of his innocence; he presents a factual narrative of the events that is neither contradicted by the record nor inherently incredible. His claim may prove false at the evidentiary hearing, but it is impossible to assess its veracity based on this record alone. The purpose of the hearing, however, is to allow the court to make these factual determinations based on more than a defendant's affidavit and the contrary representations of the government. Therefore, we reverse the district court's judgment on this issue and remand for an evidentiary hearing on this claim. 43