Opinion ID: 2451452
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: contract for sale of land

Text: Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment construing the alleged oral contract between Melvin and Mrs. Smith for the sale of the 240 acre tract. The trial court concluded that the evidence supported the claim that Mrs. Smith had sold the 240 acre farm known as the Home Place to Melvin for a principal amount of $120,000 to be paid over a 20-year period at the rate of $6,000 per year with no interest. The trial court rejected Melvin's contention that the balance of the debt was cancelled or forgiven upon Smith's death. Melvin contends the trial court erred in ordering him to pay the estate the balance due of $72,000 plus interest because plaintiffs relied principally on his testimony to establish the contract and its terms. He argues that they are bound by his testimony that the debt was to cancel on Mrs. Smith's death because they offered no evidence to the contrary. Ramsden v. State of Illinois, 695 S.W.2d 457, 458-9, n. 1 (Mo. banc 1985); Manchester Bank of St. Louis v. Harrington, 199 S.W. 242, 249 (Mo.1917); Bowers v. Columbia Terminals Co., 213 S.W.2d 663, 671 (Mo.App.1948); Mississippi Valley Trust Co. v. Francis, 186 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Mo.App.1945). The difficulty in Melvin's argument is that contrary evidence existed and, although he consistently and repeatedly testified that his obligation to his mother was to terminate upon her death, the trial court was free to believe all, part or none of the testimony of a witness even though such testimony is uncontradicted. Feinstein v. Cobur Corp., 721 S.W.2d 763, 765 (Mo.App. 1986). Due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to have judged the credibility of witnesses. Rule 73.01(c)(2). Darrell Haer testified that at the reading of his mother's will Melvin indicated there was a piece of paper excusing him from the payment of the balance of the money on the farm. On cross-examination Melvin denied that such a document existed. He further denied he told Darrell that such a document existed. Further, Melvin and his wife had made a loan application which stated that his mother held a mortgage on the property and that payments of $6,000 were due annually for 20 years, and it did not provide that the obligation was to cease upon his mother's death. [2] The trial court reviewed all the documentary evidence and found that no documentation supported the contention that any remaining balance was to be forgiven upon Mrs. Smith's death. It also heard Melvin's testimony but chose to disbelieve it. Giving due regard to the trial court's judgment of the credibility of the witness, its finding that Melvin's obligations under the contract were to continue after his mother's death is affirmed generally. The trial court ordered, however: That there was $72,000 owed decedent by Personal Representative as a result of an installment sale ... and that judgment is entered in said amount in favor of the estate with interest accruing at the statutory rate of 9% per annum commencing June 12, 1983 [the date of Mrs. Smith's death], and that said asset be inventoried and included in the estate. This order is ambiguous because (1) there was no evidence that the contract was to accelerate upon Mrs. Smith's death, and (2) it purports to enter a money judgment against Melvin rather than to declare the rights of the estate in the balance due, the relief requested in the petition. First, absent an express provision that the contract was to be accelerated upon Mrs. Smith's death the trial court erred in ordering the entire amount due at that time. McDown v. Wilson, 426 S.W.2d 112 (Mo.App.1968). Second, [i]n order to obtain a binding judgment against a defendant in his individual capacity ... he must be sued in his individual capacity. Kaplan v. Centerre Trust Co. of St. Louis, 740 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Mo.App.1987); Barnett v. Schumacher, 453 S.W.2d 934, 937 (Mo.1970). Melvin is a party to this action only in his capacity as personal representative of Mrs. Smith's estate. Further, the plaintiffs' petition sought declarations that a principal balance of $72,000 plus accrued interest at the statutory rate existed on a contract between Melvin and Mrs. Smith, and that the principal balance and accrued interest be declared assets of the estate. The judgment of the trial court regarding the contract for sale of land is modified to comport with the evidence and to make the trial court's findings consistent with the declaratory relief prayed. The annual payments were due the first of March. [3] The payments for the years 1975 through 1982 were made. The estate is entitled to $36,000 for the payments due for the years 1983 through 1988 and interest accruing at the rate of 9 percent per annum from the date each payment was due. Stewart v. Johnson, 398 S.W.2d 850, 854 (Mo.1966); § 408.020, RSMo 1986. This Court thus declares that a contract for the sale of land existed between Melvin and Mrs. Smith which has a remaining balance of $72,000. This Court further declares as a result of this contract Mrs. Smith's estate includes the following assets: (1) $6,000 for the payment due March 1, 1983, plus interest accruing at the statutory rate of 9 percent per annum until paid; (2) $6,000 for the payment due March 1, 1984, plus interest accruing at the statutory rate of 9 percent per annum until paid; (3) $6,000 for the payment due March 1, 1985, plus interest accruing at the statutory rate of 9 percent per annum until paid; (4) $6,000 for the payment due March 1, 1986, plus interest accruing at the statutory rate of 9 percent per annum until paid; (5) $6,000 for the payment due March 1, 1987, plus interest accruing at the statutory rate of 9 percent per annum until paid; (6) $6,000 for the payment due March 1, 1988, plus interest accruing at the statutory rate of 9 percent per annum until paid; and, (7) $36,000 remaining balance on the contract to be paid $6,000 a year on the first of March beginning March 1, 1989, and ending March 1, 1994.