Opinion ID: 165332
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Counter-arguments

Text: 58
59 The Secretary insists that the joint employment provision is valid because the agency, as directed by the legislative history, patterned the definition of worksite after the definition of single site of employment in the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification (WARN) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2101 et seq. 60 The Secretary correctly points out that the House and Senate Committee Reports both indicate that the term worksite is to be construed consistent with the term single site of employment under the WARN Act and regulations under that Act: 61 The term worksite is intended to be construed in the same manner as the term single site of employment under the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act (WARN), 29 U.S.C. 2101(a)(3)(B), and regulations under that Act (20 CFR Part 639). Where employees have no fixed worksite, as is the case for many construction workers, transportation workers, and salespersons, such employees'worksite should be construed to mean the single site of employment to which they are assigned as their home base, from which their work is assigned, or to which they report. 62 S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 23 (1993); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 35 (1993) (substantially the same). 63 The WARN Act requires covered employers to provide written notice to affected employees sixty days before a mass layoff. 29 U.S.C. § 2102(a); see also Frymire v. Ampex Corp., 61 F.3d 757, 761 (10th Cir.1995). Congress defined mass layoff as a reduction in force which ... results in an employment loss at the single site of employment during any 30-day period for ... at least 50 employees[.] 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(3) (emphasis added). The WARN Act itself does not define single site of employment. 64 The Secretary of Labor has promulgated a regulation defining the term single site of employment for purposes of the WARN Act. 3 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i); see also 29 U.S.C. § 2107. The focus of the regulation is in explaining when two or more different employment sites can be counted together as a single site for the purpose of aggregating employees to reach the 50-employee minimum. See 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i). The regulation also recognizes that the employment sites of certain groups of employees will be difficult to identify. Accordingly, it provides: 65 For workers whose primary duties require travel from point to point, who are outstationed, or whose primary duties involve work outside any of the employer's regular employment sites (e.g., railroad workers, bus drivers, salespersons), the single site of employment to which they are assigned as their home base, from which their work is assigned, or to which they report will be the single site in which they are covered for WARN purposes. 66 Id. § 639.3(i)(6). 67 The Secretary argues that its FMLA joint employment regulation, 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3), is consistent with this WARN regulation defining single site of employment for purposes of the WARN Act. Specifically, the Secretary argues that jointly-employed employees are essentially outstationed workers and are properly treated in the joint employment provision of the FMLA in the same manner that outstationed workers are treated under this WARN Act regulation. For several reasons, we disagree. 68 First, we believe that this provision of the WARN Act governs only employees without a fixed place of work, not employees who, like Plaintiff, do have a fixed place of work. All three examples listed in the parenthetical in the WARN Act regulation are employees who do not have a fixed place of work. See 20 C.F.R. 639.3(i)(6) (listing railroad workers, bus drivers, and salespersons). Furthermore, the agency, in enacting the WARN Act regulation, referred to § 639.3(i)(6) as that part of the regulation relating to mobile workers[.] 54 Fed.Reg. 16042, 16051 (1989). 4 Finally, for employees who do have a fixed place of work, there is no reason to believe the agency for purposes of the WARN Act would have named any different place as the employee's employment site. Accordingly, we conclude that the applicable WARN Act regulation, 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(6), applies only to employees without a fixed place of work and is not relevant to employees who, like Plaintiff, do have a fixed place of work. 69 Further, even if the term outstationed in the WARN Act regulation could reasonably be interpreted more broadly to encompass employees who do have a fixed place of work, the definition of single site of employment for outstationed employees under the WARN Act is ambiguous. Under the WARN Act regulation, there are three potentially different locations that could be the single site of employment of an outstationed employee — namely, the site ... to which they are assigned as their home base, from which their work is assigned, or to which they report. 20 C.F.R. § 639.3(i)(6). Accordingly, even if Plaintiff, who does have a fixed place of work, could be considered outstationed under the WARN Act regulation, it is entirely unclear from the regulation whether her single site of employment would be Brush (the site to which she is assigned) or Golden (the place to which she reports and from which she is assigned). As such, the WARN Act regulation provides little, if any, guidance to the agency with respect to the proper definition of worksite for an employee who, although arguably outstationed, does have a fixed place of work. 70 Absent guidance from Congress, such ambiguity might militate in favor of deference to the agency's construction of the statute. As discussed above, however, the plain meaning of the term worksite in the FMLA, the congressional purpose underlying the 50/75 provision in the FMLA, and the arbitrary distinction the regulation creates between sole and joint employers under the FMLA are all factors that militate strongly against deference to the agency's construction of that statute. We therefore find no merit in the Secretary's argument that an ambiguous regulation implementing the WARN Act renders the agency's construction of the FMLA reasonable. 71 b. Congressional recognition that the worksite of some employees may not be their regular workplace 72 The Secretary also argues that because the legislative history suggests that the worksite of some employees may be some place other than their regular place of work, it was permissible for the agency to define the worksite of jointly-employed employees as some other location. We disagree. 73 The House and Senate Committee Reports both provide a definition of worksite for employees with no fixed worksite. Specifically: 74 Where employees have no fixed worksite, as is the case for many construction workers, transportation workers, and salespersons, such employees'worksite should be construed to mean the single site of employment to which they are assigned as their home base, from which their work is assigned, or to which they report. 75 S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 23 (1993); see also H.R. Rep. No. 103-8(I), at 35 (1993) (substantially the same). As such, both Committee Reports recognized that all employees, even those without a fixed worksite, must have a definable worksite so that their eligibility under the Act can be determined. For employees without a fixed worksite, it was necessary to identify some fixed location that could serve as a worksite for purposes of the Act. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 103-3, at 23. That location could not be the employee's regular workplace, because the employee has no regular workplace. Accordingly, we do not question the validity of the agency's regulation pertaining to employees with no fixed worksite. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(2). 76 Furthermore, we do not question the validity of the joint employment provision, id. § 825.111(a)(3), insofar as it applies to employees of temporary help agencies. An employee of a temporary help agency does not have a permanent, fixed worksite. It is therefore appropriate that the joint employment provision defines the worksite of a temporary employee as the temporary help office, rather than the various changing locations at which the temporary employee performs his or her work. See 60 Fed.Reg. 2180, 2187 (1995) (explaining that under joint employment provision, worksite of temporary employee is temporary help office). 77 On the contrary, if an employee does have a fixed worksite, there is no similar need to identify a constructive worksite for purposes of the FMLA. The Secretary's argument that an employee with a fixed worksite should be treated comparably to an employee without a fixed worksite is therefore without merit. 78 In sum, we find the counter-arguments offered by Plaintiff and the Secretary unavailing, and we conclude that 29 C.F.R. § 825.111(a)(3), as applied to an employee like Plaintiff with a fixed worksite yet subject to joint employers, is arbitrary, capricious, and manifestly contrary to the FMLA. 5