Opinion ID: 2345025
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Sufficiency of Evidence to Support Requisite Mental State

Text: Barnes also argues on appeal that the district judge erred by disregarding uncontested expert medical evidence and substituting her own judgment on the question of Barnes' mental capacity to form the requisite intent. In his view, as a matter of law, the State cannot overcome a mental disease or defect defense supported by expert testimony unless it sponsors contrary expert testimony. This argument, at base, raises a sufficiency of evidence question. The standard of review when sufficiency of the evidence is challenged following conviction in a criminal case is whether, after reviewing all the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the prosecution, we are convinced a rational factfinder could have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1003, 236 P.3d 481 (2010) (citing State v. Gant, 288 Kan. 76, 83, 201 P.3d 673 [2009]); see State v. Makthepharak, 276 Kan. 563, 569-70, 78 P.3d 412 (2003). This court does not weigh the evidence or reassess witness credibility. State v. Trussell, 289 Kan. 499, 503, 213 P.3d 1052 (2009). Under K.S.A. 22-3220, [i]t is a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result of mental disease or defect, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense charged. See State v. Pennington, 281 Kan. 426, 434-35, 132 P.3d 902 (2006) (mental disease or defect negates intent element of crime). The statute does not require any particular form of proof to support or combat the defense. And Barnes has not directed us to any other authority. Our own search has not revealed any authority for Barnes' argument that a factfinder must inevitably give more weight to after-the-fact psychological expert opinion on a defendant's mental state than to lay eyewitness testimony about the defendant's behavior at the time of the crime. This court has stated: Kansas courts recognize intent is very difficult to establish. See State v. Lassley, 218 Kan. 758, 762, 545 P.2d 383 (1976) (It is very `difficult, if not impossible, to show [intent] by definite and substantive proof.').... But intent may be inferred from `acts, circumstances, and inferences reasonably deducible therefrom.' State v. Salcido-Corral, 262 Kan. 392, 398, 940 P.2d 11 (1997) (citing State v. William, 248 Kan. 389, 402, 807 P.2d 1292, cert. denied 502 U.S. 837 [112 S.Ct. 120, 116 L.Ed.2d 89] [1991]). State v. Martinez, 290 Kan. 992, 1004, 236 P.3d 481 (2010). This case is similar to State v. Pratt, 255 Kan. 767, 769, 876 P.2d 1390 (1994), in which the defendant similarly argued that the testimony of his expert witness established his inability to form the requisite intent necessary for conviction. There the factfinder weighed the expert testimony against the other evidence presented and found the defendant guilty. We found that there was sufficient evidence from which the fact-finder could conclude that the State met its burden of proof on the intent element. Pratt, 255 Kan. at 770-71, 876 P.2d 1390. Thus we affirmed the conviction. When sitting as the trier of fact, a judge has the right to observe the conduct of a witness in the courtroom and to consider that in weighing the testimony. State v. Anderson, 243 Kan. 677, 679, 763 P.2d 597 (1988); see State v. Graham, 273 Kan. 844, 853, 46 P.3d 1177 (2002). It is not the task of an appellate court to reweigh the evidence before the district court. Graham, 273 Kan. at 853, 46 P.3d 1177. In this case, the district judge did not ignore Wisner's report. In fact, she explicitly described the consideration that she gave it. She merely regarded it as less persuasive than evidence coming from multiple eyewitnesses at the scene of the shooting and from the detective who took Barnes' statement immediately after his arrest. The testimony of these witnesses painted Barnes as calm. According to them, there was no external, observable evidence that Barnes was hearing voices or was compelled to commit the crimes by those voices. The district judge was entitled to base her verdict on this admissible evidence, which was sufficient to support a finding that Barnes possessed the necessary mental state to commit the crimes.