Opinion ID: 726672
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Liberty Interest In Instant Case

Text: 45 The similarities between Huntley and the instant case are striking. Both discharged supervisors received strongly negative evaluations of their skills in the areas of discipline, staff relations, educational and instructional supervision, administrative responsibilities, and leadership. In each case, the statement of reasons for termination reads like a bill of indictment, methodically reciting a litany of lack of professional competence. Taken together, we think the comments in the instant case are so harsh as to be likely to persuade any other school board not to hire plaintiff as a supervisor. 46 Decisional law bolsters Donato's contention that her termination implicated a liberty interest. In Baden v. Koch, 799 F.2d 825, 827, 831 (2d Cir.1986), the Chief Medical Examiner of New York City was demoted one level to the position of Deputy amidst negative public comment concerning his ability. We held that this demotion may have implicated a weak liberty interest. Id. at 831. Here, Donato was not simply demoted--she was fired by her employer of 28 years. Although O'Neill, 23 F.3d at 693, explained that vague statements of unspecified 'incompetence'  would not harm an employee's professional reputation so as to require a hearing, the Metzendorf evaluations and the District's statement of reasons for Donato's discharge are not vague statements of incompetence. They are extensively detailed lists of her supposed professional failings. 47 Appellant also satisfies the other requirements for stating a liberty interest. Stigmatizing statements by the government about an employee upon her discharge only implicate a liberty interest when there is also public disclosure. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 2079, 48 L.Ed.2d 684 (1976); see also Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. at 1496 n. 13 (upholding dismissal of a liberty claim due to absence of publication). This requirement is satisfied where the stigmatizing charges are placed in the discharged employee's personnel file and are likely to be disclosed to prospective employers. Brandt v. Board of Coop. Educ. Servs., 820 F.2d 41, 45 (2d Cir.1987); see also Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334, 336 (2d Cir.1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 97 S.Ct. 882, 51 L.Ed.2d 92 (1977). We have recognized, in fact, that this is the very action that circulates the stigmatization. Valmonte v. Bane, 18 F.3d 992, 1000 (2d Cir.1994). Potential future employers undoubtedly will consult plaintiff's prior employer when she applies for supervisory positions. See Velger, 525 F.2d at 336 (job applicants usually required to disclose personnel files to prospective employers). Appellant also strongly disputes the accuracy of the District's comments, another showing required for a plaintiff to state a liberty claim. See Codd, 429 U.S. at 627, 97 S.Ct. at 883. 48 Defendants argue that even though the circumstances surrounding plaintiff's termination may make it more difficult for her to find employment as a supervisor, she remains free to seek another type of employment. Quite the contrary. As we made clear in Huntley, 543 F.2d at 985, a significant difference exists between a teaching and a supervisory position. It is of little consequence to our analysis that appellant is not foreclosed from finding employment in some other line of work outside the education field. Due process protects the freedom to engage in any of the common occupations of life. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399, 43 S.Ct. at 626 (emphasis supplied). 49 Defendants also contend that an employee is only deprived of a liberty interest when the government allege[s] some charge of moral turpitude. Such accusations obviously can form the basis for a liberty claim. See, e.g., Brandt, 820 F.2d at 42 (accusations that a teacher sexually abused autistic children); Velger, 525 F.2d at 336 (allegations that police officer threatened to commit suicide). Nonetheless, stigmatizing allegations also include charges going to professional competence when the charges are sufficiently serious. See O'Neill, 23 F.3d at 692-93; Quinn, 613 F.2d at 446 n. 4; Huntley, 543 F.2d at 985. Donato's dismissal is far more stigmatizing than those of other public employees whose claims have failed. See, e.g., Roth, 408 U.S. at 568, 574 & n. 13, 92 S.Ct. at 2704, 2707 & n. 13 (dismissal of employee without any statement of reasons only hypothetically affects future employment prospects); Russell, 470 F.2d at 215 n. 2, 217 (rejecting claims by employees terminated for no stated reason, due to a knee injury, or due to absenteeism and incorrect clothing respectively). 50 The presence or absence of a literal charge of incompetence is not dispositive of the question before us. Compare Huntley, 543 F.2d at 982 n. 4, 985 (specific allegations amounted to charge of incompetence and implicated liberty interest though the word incompetence not used by employer) with O'Neill, 23 F.3d at 692-93 (explicit charge of incompetence was too vague to implicate liberty interest). We look to the substance of the employer's comments when viewed as a whole rather than to any label attached to them. 51 It could be argued that because N.Y. Educ. Law § 3031 requires that school districts provide a statement of reasons for termination (upon an employee's request), our decision puts state employers in a daunting dilemma between the Due Process Clause and state law, and that the public employer might be said to be like Odysseus, trapped between the six-headed monster, Skylla, and the destructive whirlpool Charybdis. See Homer, The Odyssey 185-92 (Richmond Lattimore trans., Harper & Row 1967). We do not subscribe to that view. A law like § 3031, which requires the government to explain its reasons for termination, is beneficial to both the employee and the public alike. After all, a constitutional rule that strongly discourages the government from providing its employees with the reasons for their dismissal for fear they will be held stigmatizing might, in the long run, harm more workers than it helped. See Russell, 470 F.2d at 217. 52 In most cases a state employer's criticism will not be so stigmatizing as to foreclose the employee's freedom to seek other employment. Moreover, constitutional interpretation cannot be guided simply by what is efficacious--we must ask whether a given government action is constitutional. See Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 Harv. L.Rev. 1223, 1302 (1995). When the state makes stigmatizing allegations in the course of dismissing an employee, such action implicates the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment, and we must enforce the Constitution even when the state is perhaps thereby burdened by having to recalibrate its employment practices. 53 Here, the accusations made against Donato go to the heart of her professional competence and damage her professional reputation to such an extent as to severely impede her ability to continue in the education field in a supervisory capacity. As a consequence, the defendant District deprived plaintiff of a liberty interest.