Opinion ID: 1906454
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: admissibility of the lawyer's logbook.

Text: A question of fact arose at trial as to when the will was signed. This was particularly important to the issue of susceptibility since Mrs. Glass' physical and mental condition changed during her hospitalization, particularly after her surgery on November 10, 1975. The will was dated November 4, 1975, in two places, above Mrs. Glass' signature and above the witnesses' signatures. The date above Mrs. Glass' signature was in the same ink and appeared to be written in by her when she signed the will. The date above the witnesses' signatures appeared to be written by the lawyer. At his deposition on February 11, 1976, Konnor, first testifying from memory, stated that Mrs. Glass had called him around November 17th and he had arranged to visit her home. He said the respondent had then called him to tell him she was in the hospital. When asked if he meant October, he repeated that it was in November. He said he first met Mrs. Glass within two weeks of her death. He said he saw her the first time several days before the will was executed. He also said he thought the respondent was the first to contact him about the will.  After he was shown the will at the deposition, Konnor said respondent called him the week of October 20th. He then said the will was prepared on November 3rd or 4th. At the trial, on March 1st, on cross-examination Konnor stated that he was first contacted about the will the week before November 3rd and 4th, and that he first met Mrs. Glass on November 3rd. Konnor explained the discrepancies between his deposition and trial testimony as due to the fact that he did not have his logbook at the time of the deposition because it had been misplaced when he moved to a new office. Konnor admitted that the logbook was subpoenaed for the deposition and said he turned it over to his lawyer as soon as he found it. The logbook admitted into evidence is similar to a lawyer's record-keeping book sometimes referred to as an appointment or day book. The logbook was admitted into evidence over appellant's lawyer's objections. The trial court said that the explanation that the book was misplaced in moving was adequate to explain his failure to produce it. The court also said the appellant waived a right to object by asking questions about the logbook. The logbook confirmed that Konnor met with Mrs. Glass on November 3rd and 4th. This was important since the other witness to the will testified that it was signed in late November after Mrs. Glass underwent surgery. After having the date on the will pointed out to her the witness said that she couldn't be sure but she thought it had been signed in late November, although she could not recollect seeing any surgical bandages on Mrs. Glass. The appellant's lawyer made an offer of proof of the testimony of Catherine Tuchowski, Mrs. Glass' niece-by-marriage, who was declared incompetent to testify because she thought she had been named in a previous will. Mrs. Tuchowski would have testified that when she visited Mrs. Glass on November 9th she said she had not  signed any papers since she had been in the hospital and begged for help to keep her from signing any papers for respondent. Konnor's associate testified from office records that the will was prepared on the 4th and the bill was sent out on November 12th. She also testified that a bill would not be sent out until after the will had been executed. The appellant contends that it was prejudicial error for the trial court to admit the logbook into evidence. The appellant cites sec. 804.12, Stats., and Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b) as authority for refusing the introduction to evidence of documents that have not been produced in response to pretrial discovery requests. Appellant also cites sec. 804.01(5)(b), requiring supplementation of answers made during a deposition. It is argued that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to impose sanctions for this discovery violation. Respondent argues that the alleged error was not prejudicial because the judge did not rely on it in making his findings. Sec. 804.01(5), Stats., reads: (5) SUPPLEMENTATION OF RESPONSES. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement the response to include information thereafter acquired, except as follows: . . . . (b) A party is under a duty seasonably to amend a prior response if the party obtains information upon the basis of which 1. the party knows that the response was incorrect when made, or 2. the party knows that the response though correct when made is no longer true and the circumstances are such that a failure to amend the response is in substance a knowing concealment. Sec. 804.12(4) reads: (4) FAILURE OF PARTY TO ATTEND AT OWN DEPOSITION OR SERVE ANSWERS TO INTERROGATORIES OR RESPOND TO REQUEST FOR INSPECTION OR SUPPLEMENT RESPONSES. If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party  or a person designated under s. 804.05(2)(e) or 804.06(1) to testify on behalf of a party fails . . . (d) seasonably to supplement or amend a response when obligated to do so under s. 804.01(5), the court in which the action is pending on motion may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others, it may take any action authorized under sub. (2)(a) 1, 2 and 3. . . . Prohibiting the introduction of certain evidence is one of the sanctions in sec. 804.12(2)(a) 2, Stats. Appellant admits that Konnor is not a party and as such had no duty to supplement his testimony with the logbook. However, Konnor did turn over the logbook to respondent's lawyer. Good reasons clearly exist for not penalizing a party for the failure of a witness to supplement deposition answers. In many cases the party will have very little control over the actions of its witnesses. Here however the party's lawyer had the logbook in his possession. There appears to be little excuse for not producing it as soon as it was available. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2) permits the court to impose a variety of sanctions upon a party who fails to comply with a discovery order. Under the federal rule a party who has not sought an order compelling discovery cannot later complain when the evidence is produced. Britt v. Corporacion Peruana De Vapores, 506 Fed.2d 927, 932 (5th Cir. 1975); GFI Computer Industries, Inc. v. Fry, 476 Fed.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1973); 4A Moore, Federal Practice, sec. 37.03[2.-4.] (2d ed. 1978). The cited federal rule lends little support to the argument of the appellant. [19, 20] Sec. 804.12(4), Stats., does not require a violation of a discovery order to justify sanctions. Failure to comply with the statutory directive is sufficient. However, the statute does not apply to a response made by a witness who is not a party. Further, the imposition of sanctions  is discretionary with the court. Excusing Konnor for not producing his misplaced logbook at the time of the deposition is not an abuse of discretion. However, holding that the appellant's lawyer had waived the right to object by asking Konner about the logbook was inappropriate. A privilege may be waived by a voluntary disclosure of privileged matter. Sec. 905.11. Where a portion of a writing or recorded statement is introduced the adverse party may have another portion introduced. Sec. 901.07. Here, the appellant's lawyer did not ask about the logbook's contents. He merely asked whether it had been subpoenaed and whether it had been produced in response to that subpoena. [21] Regardless of the trial court's ruling on appellant's right to object, the result was correct. Fairness and fairness alone would dictate that the logbook be made available to appellant's lawyer as soon as it came into the possession of respondent's lawyer. No statute compels such production. Further, appellant's lawyer did not follow up the failure to produce the logbook at the deposition with a motion to compel discovery under sec. 804.12(1), Stats. Without a violation of an order to compel discovery appellant had no legal grounds on which to object to the logbook's introduction. [22] Moreover, even if we were to hold the admission of the logbook was error, it was not prejudicial error. Sufficient credible evidence other than the logbook was introduced for the trial court to find the will was executed on November 4, 1975. Such a finding would reasonably have been made without the corrobration of the logbook. The order of the trial court is affirmed. By the Court. Order affirmed.