Opinion ID: 2544661
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Adequacy of Trial Court's General Voir Dire

Text: Defendant contends that the trial court did not conduct an adequate general voir dire of the prospective jurors, resulting in a denial of a right under the federal Constitution's Eighth Amendment to reliable verdicts in a capital case, of a right under the federal Constitution's Sixth Amendmentand the corresponding provision of the California Constitution (Cal. Const, art. I, § 16)to trial by an impartial jury, and of a right under the federal Constitution's Fourteenth Amendment to due process of law. We reject the contention. Before explaining why we reject defendant's claim on the merits, we consider and reject respondent's argument that the defense did not preserve this claim for appellate review because the defense did not use all of its peremptory challenges. When voir dire is inadequate, the defense is denied information upon which to intelligently exercise both its challenges for cause and its peremptory challenges. Because the exercise of peremptory challenges cannot remedy the harm caused by inadequate voir dire, we have never required, and do not now require, that counsel use all peremptory challenges to preserve for appeal issues regarding the adequacy of voir dire. Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored. Without an adequate voir dire the trial judge's responsibility to remove prospective jurors who will not be able impartially to follow the court's instructions and evaluate the evidence cannot be fulfilled. ( Rosales-Lopez v. United States (1981) 451 U.S. 182, 188, 101 S.Ct. 1629, 68 L.Ed.2d 22.) Here, the trial court posed questions to the prospective jurors on general voir dire and then permitted counsel for both sides to pose additional questions. In this situation, reversal of the judgment is required only if the voir dire was so inadequate that the reviewing court can say that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair. People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 661, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Applying this standard, we find no basis for reversal here. We have advised trial judges to closely follow the language and formulae for voir dire recommended by the Judicial Council in the [California Standards of Judicial Administration (Standards) ] to ensure that all appropriate areas of inquiry are covered in an appropriate manner. ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 661, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Here, the trial court asked most of the questions recommended in the Standards and did not prohibit the parties from asking any of the remaining questions. In addition, the questionnaires that all prospective jurors completed inquired into many of the same areas covered in the Standards' recommended voir dire questions. Defendant complains, first, that the trial court failed to ask the 18 prospective jurors seated in the jury box whether any of them had any prior knowledge of defendant, of the alleged victim, or of the facts or events of the case. Although the court did not ask this precise question, it did inquire whether any prospective juror had previously had any contact with or dealings with Clifford Bolden, the defendant in this case. The jury questionnaire, moreover, asked whether the prospective jurors had read newspaper accounts, seen television broadcasts, or heard radio reports about the killing of Michael Pedersen on September 9, 1986. Finally, the court asked each prospective juror whether he or she could give both sides a fair trial in this case. Although the wording of these questions could have been improved in the manner defendant now suggests, they were adequate, particularly when the trial court permitted defense counsel to ask additional questions. Defendant complains, next, that the trial court failed to require prospective jurors who entered the jury box after the original 18 to answer the questions asked of the original panel members about prior acquaintance with defendant, counsel, or prospective witnesses. We find this criticism to be unfounded. At the outset of general voir dire, the trial court asked the prospective jurors not seated in the jury box to pay attention to the questions and to make a little mental or written note if any of the questions applied to them so that if they were called into the jury box they could then direct the court's attention to any question that applied to them. This was sufficient to alert the prospective jurors not originally seated in the jury box of their obligation to disclose any information about prior acquaintance with counsel, prospective witnesses, or defendant. Defendant observes that under questioning by defense counsel, Prospective Juror A.N. said that the judge had told him that defendant was caught with some of the victim's belongings. Because the appellate record fails to indicate when, if ever, the trial court disclosed this information, defendant faults both the trial court and defense counsel for failing to ask follow-up questions to determine how Prospective Juror A.N. acquired knowledge of these facts and whether he was aware of other potentially prejudicial information about the circumstances of the crime. We decline defendant's invitation to speculate about the source of the prospective juror's information and about what additional information A.N. may have known. Defense counsel adequately questioned Prospective Juror A.N. to determine whether knowledge of defendant's possession of the victim's belongings affected A.N.'s ability to be impartial, and defense counsel could have, but chose not to, exercise a peremptory challenge against A.N. We conclude that this incident does not demonstrate that the general voir dire was so inadequate that the resulting trial was fundamentally unfair. Finally, defendant complains that the trial court should have disclosed that the victim was White and, because defendant is Black, should have asked whether the prospective jurors held any views or biases on the subject of race that would interfere with their ability to be fair in this case. (See Turner v. Murray (1986) 476 U.S. 28, 36, 106 S.Ct. 1683, 90 L.Ed.2d 27.) In a case involving an interracial killing, such as this one, a trial court during general voir dire is required to question prospective jurors about racial bias on request. (Id. at pp. 36-37, 106 S.Ct. 1683 [a defendant cannot complain of a judge's failure to question the venire on racial prejudice unless the defendant has specifically requested such an inquiry].) Here, there was no such request, and the trial court need not make the inquiry on its own initiative. (See People v. Kelly (1992) 1 Cal.4th 495, 518, 3 Cal. Rptr.2d 677, 822 P.2d 385.)