Opinion ID: 2371971
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: NRS 11.340 violates separation of powers Separation of powers

Text: The separation of powers doctrine is the most important foundation for preserving and protecting liberty by preventing the accumulation of power in any one branch of government. Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature, 120 Nev. 456, 466, 93 P.3d 746, 753 (2004). Nevada's separation of powers provision, contained in Article 3, Section 1(1) of the Nevada Constitution, provides that [t]he powers of the Government of the State of Nevada shall be divided into three separate departments,the Legislative, the Executive and the Judicial; and no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution. The Constitution further embodies this concept of limited government by specifically delineating the powers granted to the three distinct and coequal branches of government, as set forth in Article 4 (legislative), Article 5 (executive), and Article 6 (judicial). Commission on Ethics v. Hardy, 125 Nev. ___, ___, 212 P.3d 1098, 1103 (2009). As coequal branches, each of the three governmental departments has inherent power to administer its own affairs and perform its duties, so as not to become a subordinate branch of government. Halverson v. Hardcastle, 123 Nev. 245, 261, 163 P.3d 428, 439 (2007) (internal quotations omitted); accord Blackjack Bonding v. Las Vegas Mun. Ct., 116 Nev. 1213, 1218, 14 P.3d 1275, 1279 (2000). We have been especially prudent to keep the powers of the judiciary separate from those of either the legislative or the executive branches. See, e.g., Galloway v. Truesdell, 83 Nev. 13, 19, 422 P.2d 237, 242 (1967). This separation is fundamentally necessary because `[w]ere the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would be the legislator: Were it joined to the executive power the judge might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.' Id. at 19, 422 P.2d at 242 (quoting the French Enlightenment thinker Charles de Secondat, baron de Montesquieu, whose views had a significant following within the Revolutionary generation); The Federalist No. 47 (James Madison) (stating that [t]he oracle who is always consulted and cited on [separation of powers] is the celebrated Montesquieu). Here, the conflict is between an act of the LegislatureNRS 11.340and the inherent ability of the judiciary to manage litigation and finally resolve cases. Regarding such discord between the legislative and judicial branches of government, it is well settled that the judiciary retains the authority to `hear and determine justiciable controversies' as a coequal power to the Legislature's broad authority to enact, amend, and repeal legislation. Halverson, 123 Nev. at 260, 163 P.3d at 439 (quoting Galloway, 83 Nev. at 20, 422 P.2d at 242). And as one commentator aptly explained this distinction, [t]o declare what the law is or has been is judicial power; to declare what the law shall be is legislative. 1 Thomas M. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 191 (8th ed.1927). In keeping with this theory, `[t]he judiciary ... has the inherent power to govern its own procedures.' State v. Dist Ct. [ Marshall ], 116 Nev. 953, 959, 11 P.3d 1209, 1212 (2000) (quoting Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 26, 752 P.2d 210, 211 (1988)); see also NRS 2.120(2) (legislative recognition that this court regulates civil practice in order to promote the speedy determination of litigation upon its merits). The judiciary is entrusted with `rule-making and other incidental powers reasonable and necessary to carry out the duties required for the administration of justice' and to economically and fairly manage litigation. Borger v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 1021, 1029, 102 P.3d 600, 606 (2004) (quoting Goldberg v. District Court, 93 Nev. 614, 616, 572 P.2d 521, 522 (1977)); see also Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (stating that `[t]here are regulating ... powers of the Judicial Department that are within the province of the judicial function, i.e., ... promulgating and prescribing any and all rules necessary or desirable to handle the business of the courts or their judicial functions' (second and third alterations in original) (quoting Galloway, 83 Nev. at 23, 422 P.2d at 244)). Thus, `the legislature may not enact a procedural statute that conflicts with a pre-existing procedural rule, without violating the doctrine of separation of powers, and ... such a statute is of no effect.' Marshall, 116 Nev. at 959, 11 P.3d at 1213 (quoting State v. Connery, 99 Nev. 342, 345, 661 P.2d 1298, 1300 (1983)); see also Secretary of State, 120 Nev. at 465, 93 P.3d at 752 (explaining that the Legislature cannot restrict, substantially impair, or defeat the exercise of this court's constitutional powers); Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 26, 752 P.2d at 211 (concluding that a particular statute did not encroach on judicial authority because it did not disrupt or abrogate a court rule); but see Connery, 99 Nev. at 345, 661 P.2d at 1300 (noting that any court-created procedural rules may not conflict with the state constitution or abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right (internal quotations omitted)). In addition to the constitutionally mandated bases for keeping separate those inherent powers of the judiciary, leaving control of court rules and the administration of justice to the judiciary, and thereby placing the responsibility for the system's continued effectiveness with those most familiar with the latest issues and the experience and flexibility to more quickly bring into effect workable solutions and amendments, makes good sense. Goldberg, 93 Nev. at 617-18, 572 P.2d at 523.