Opinion ID: 71523
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Williams's Procedurally Defaulted and Unexhausted IAC at Sentencing Claim

Text: In its denial of Williams's habeas petition, the district court held that Williams had failed to exhaust and procedurally defaulted his IAC at sentencing claim. In his Rule 59(e) motion, Williams asserted several arguments for why the district court should either excuse his procedural default and hear his IAC claim, or grant a stay and abeyance to allow Williams to exhaust his claims in Texas state court. The district court held that Williams had neither demonstrated cause for excusing his procedural default nor had he demonstrated grounds for granting a stay and abeyance, and refused to grant a COA on these claims. In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court held that when a post-judgment motion attacks, not the substance of the federal court's resolution of a claim on the merits, but some defect in the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings, the motion does not assert a claim that would force a court to construe it as a second or successive habeas petition. 545 U.S. at 532, 125 S.Ct. 2641. More specifically, a petitioner does not make a habeas corpus claim when he merely asserts that a previous ruling which precluded a merits determination was in errorfor example, a denial for such reasons as failure to exhaust, procedural default, or statute-of-limitations bar. Id. at 532 n. 4, 125 S.Ct. 2641. We thus hold that we have jurisdiction to consider Williams's request for a COA on the district court's refusal to excuse his procedural default or to grant a stay and abeyance.
Before reaching Williams's arguments for cause to overcome his procedural default, we note that the district court did not err when it described Williams's unexhausted IAC at sentencing claim as procedurally defaulted. `Procedural default . . . occurs when a prisoner fails to exhaust available state remedies and the court to which the petitioner would be required to present his claims in order to meet the exhaustion requirement would now find the claims procedurally barred.' Bagwell v. Dretke, 372 F.3d 748, 755 (5th Cir.2004) (quoting Nobles v. Johnson, 127 F.3d 409, 420 (5th Cir.1997)) (alteration in original). Williams has already filed two petitions in Texas state court for post-conviction relief. Texas courts may not consider the merits of any subsequent application for post-conviction relief unless: (1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application filed under this article or Article 11.07 because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application; (2) by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; or (3) by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the state's favor one or more of the special issues that were submitted to the jury in the applicant's trial under Article 37.071, 37.0711, or 37.072. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 11.071 § 5(a)(1)-(3) (Vernon 2007). [A] factual basis of a claim is unavailable on or before a date described by Subsection (a)(1) if the factual basis was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before that date. Id. § 5(e). The TCCA has grafted an additional requirement on the first prong of 11.071 § 5(a): to satisfy Art. 11.071, § 5(a), 1) the factual or legal basis for an applicant's current claims must have been unavailable as to all of his previous applications; and 2) the specific facts alleged, if established, would constitute a constitutional violation that would likely require relief from either the conviction or sentence. Ex parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App.2007) (internal footnotes omitted). If Williams brought his actual innocence claim in a third application for state post-conviction relief, we find that a Texas court would not likely permit consideration of the merits. Although Brown's call and the accompanying Jenkins story did not surface until the federal district court denied Williams relief on his § 2254 petition, Williams has known all along whether he shot Blando. The prior non-existence of Brown's statement implicating Jenkins in the shooting did not prevent Williams from asserting his innocence earlier. Article 11.071 § 5(a)(1) requires that the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously, and Williams certainly could have proclaimed his innocence prior to filing his first application for post-conviction relief. [11] Additionally, Williams has made no argument that the factual basis of his actual innocence claim was not ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence. TEX.CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art 11.071 § 5(e). Even if Williams had demonstrated that Brown's late correspondence and the accompanying Jenkins story prevented him from asserting his actual innocence claim earlier, he has failed to assert a prima facie constitutional violation that would require relief from his conviction. See Ex Parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d at 421. Although Texas is one of the few jurisdictions to recognize freestanding claims of actual innocence, see Graham v. Texas Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 913 S.W.2d 745, 749 (Tex.App.Austin, 1996, writ dism'd w.o.j.), Texas courts have held that in order to overcome the Article 11.071 § 5(a)(1) bar, an applicant must allege sufficient specific facts that, if proven, establish a federal constitutional violation sufficiently serious as to likely require relief from his conviction or sentence. Ex Parte Campbell, 226 S.W.3d at 422 (emphasis added). Because the United States Supreme Court has yet to recognize a freestanding claim of actual innocence, we find that Williams has not demonstrated that a Texas court would hear the merits of his third application for post-conviction relief on the grounds of unavailability of the factual basis of his claim. See House, 547 U.S. at 554-55, 126 S.Ct. 2064 (declining the opportunity to recognize a freestanding innocence claim). Additionally, Williams cannot demonstrate that a Texas court would reach the merits of his actual innocence claim based on either of the other two grounds enumerated in Article 11.071 § 5(a). As discussed at greater length below in the context of the federal miscarriage of justice standard, [12] Williams's new evidence does not persuade us that but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found [him] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. § 5(a)(2). [13]
Williams argues that because new evidence tending to exonerate him from Blando's murder has come to light, the district court should review his procedurally defaulted IAC at sentencing claim. Federal habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims is barred `unless the prisoner can demonstrate cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.' Hughes v. Quarterman, 530 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir.2008) (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991)). The miscarriage of justice exception applies where a petitioner is actually innocent of either the offense giving rise to his conviction or actually innocent of the death penalty. See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 326-27, 115 S.Ct. 851, 130 L.Ed.2d 808 (1995); Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992). Thus, to excuse procedural default, Williams must show that `a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent,' Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 340, 112 S.Ct. 2514 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496, 106 S.Ct. 2639, 91 L.Ed.2d 397 (1986)), or, in other words, he must demonstrate that more likely than not, in light of the new evidence, no reasonable juror would find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064. Williams states that a week after the district court entered judgment in his habeas petition, his counsel received a phone message from David Brown, a drug treatment sponsor in Houston, Texas, who sponsored an individual named Jervette Jenkins. Williams's counsel reported that, as part of Jenkins's rehabilitation, Jenkins told Brown that he had killed a police officer in 1999, and that he knew someone named Jeffrey was sentenced to death for the murder. Brown, in a handwritten affidavit, stated that he had no reason to lie, that he thought Jenkins had told him the truth, and that he would help the police in any way he could. Brown does not know Williams, and to this day, no one has been able to locate Jenkins. Brown and Williams both concede that Jenkins's purported confession contains several factual inaccuracies, such as the location of the motel where Blando was shot and the circumstances under which Blando's murder occurred, which tends to discredit Jenkins's claim of guilt. [14] In contrast, the State introduced overwhelming evidence of Williams's guilt at trial, including (1) the testimony of two eyewitnesses who stated that they observed Williams shoot Blando; (2) evidence that when police apprehended Williams, he still wore Blando's handcuffs and possessed a gun that matched the bullet extracted from Blando's body; (3) Williams's two separate confessions; and (4) evidence of Williams's fingerprints on both the stolen Lexus and Blando's unmarked Jeep Cherokee. Most tellingly, at no point has Williams himself ever described a different shooter. The Supreme Court has sought to ensure that the fundamental miscarriage of justice exception would remain `rare' and would only be applied in the `extraordinary case.' Schlup, 513 U.S. at 321, 115 S.Ct. 851; see also House, 547 U.S. at 538, 126 S.Ct. 2064 ([I]t bears repeating that the Schlup standard is demanding and permits review only in the `extraordinary' case.) (quotation omitted). Williams has not met that exacting burden. Because Williams failed to demonstrate that reasonable jurists would debate whether executing Williams would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, we deny Williams's request for a COA on this issue.
Williams also argues that we should excuse his procedural default because his appointed state post-conviction counsel labored under an impermissible conflict of interest. According to Williams, the attorney whom the state trial judge appointed to prepare Williams's state habeas application was married to an attorney in the Harris County District Attorney's Office. Williams cites Texas Disciplinary Rule of Professional Conduct 1.06(b) for his argument that a lawyer shall not represent a person when such a conflict exists, and argues that this conflict should serve as cause for overcoming the procedural default barring federal consideration of Williams's IAC at sentencing claim. Because [a] state prisoner has no constitutional right to an attorney in state post-conviction proceedings, [w]e have repeatedly held that ineffective assistance of state habeas or post-conviction counsel cannot serve as cause for a procedural default. Matchett v. Dretke, 380 F.3d 844, 849 (5th Cir.2004). [15] Despite Williams's allegations of an ethical violation on the part of his state habeas counsel, Williams cannot overcome his procedural default on this ground. Because reasonable jurists would not debate this conclusion, we deny Williams's request for a COA on this issue.