Opinion ID: 675243
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Formal Policy

Text: 60 The plaintiffs have not shown a formal City policy to expel them from the City or to deprive them of their constitutional rights. The plaintiffs rely on statements made to the media by City Councilman Bill Kling that those homeless who do not work, and thus contribute to the community, should be show[n] ... the city limits. In granting the preliminary injunction, the district court concluded that Kling was the City's principal policymaker on homeless issues, and that his inflammatory statements were indicative of an unannounced, but nonetheless official, policy of the City of Huntsville to isolate homeless citizens from the established residential areas, and ultimately, to remove them from the City itself. 61 The imposition of municipal liability requires a decision by a final policymaker, not a principal one. In any event, the record in this case contains no evidence that Councilman Kling is either the City's principal policymaker or its final policymaker with respect to the homeless. The plaintiffs concede that, under Alabama law, final policymaking authority rests with the entire five-member City Council and the Mayor, yet the plaintiffs have produced no evidence to suggest that the Council and Mayor have delegated this authority to Kling. See generally Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 124, 108 S.Ct. at 924 (stating that authority to make municipal policy may be delegated). There is no evidence that the Council ever adopted Kling's statements against the homeless. Although Kling suggested a zoning change to restrict shelters to non-residential areas, the Council never made such a change. That fact, by itself, establishes that Kling is not the City's final policymaker on the issue of the homeless; if he were, the zoning change would have been made. 4 The plaintiffs may not prevail on the basis of the actions or words of a single councilmember, such as Kling. 62 The plaintiffs argue that a videotape of the June 10, 1993 City Council meeting provides clear evidence that the City has been making use of city ordinances and laws for the purpose of removing the Homeless and not otherwise addressing their problems. The Constitution does not guarantee the homeless that their problems will be addressed, nor does it protect them from enforcement of ordinances and laws unless that enforcement violates a specific constitutional right. Nothing in the videotape, or elsewhere in the record, indicates that the Council authorized or condoned any violation of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The videotape of the council meeting actually undermines the plaintiffs' case. It shows that at the meeting a number of homeowners complained about some real problems resulting from violation of City ordinances and building codes by and on behalf of the homeless. Those homeowners angrily demanded that the homeless be removed from their neighborhoods immediately, regardless of the procedural mandates of state or municipal law. In response, City Council President Chuck Saunders admonished the homeowners: Don't ask us to do something to violate the law. We didn't get elected to violate the law but to serve the law. After repeated complaints by homeowners, Saunders reiterated: Your answer to that problem is for us to violate the law; I can't accept that, I won't accept that. Councilman Jim Putnam also stated: We're doing everything that we can under the law. There is due process, [these] people have their rights to due process. These comments are hardly indicative of a municipal policy to run roughshod over the constitutional rights of the homeless. 5 Instead, the videotape shows City Council members explaining to their constituents the legal limitations on municipal action, including the need to respect the rights of the homeless. 63 The existence of a formal municipal policy to remove the homeless from the City is also belied by the testimony of City Police Officer John Hollingsworth and homeless advocate James Holland. Officer Hollingsworth, the police representative on the Mayor's Homeless Advisory Commission, testified that he was not aware of any police policy or custom to deprive homeless persons of their property. He also denied the existence of any policy of arresting homeless persons solely for being in public places. Similarly, Holland testified that after two years as a full-time advocate for the homeless in Huntsville, he was aware of only one instance of what he would call police harassment. The evidence does not support an inference that this single instance of harassment in two years constituted a constitutional violation. Even assuming that the incident was a constitutional violation, it certainly does not establish a pattern or evidence a policy. Holland characterized his working relationship with City police as very good, and testified that, at his request, City police have occasionally called him to pick up intoxicated homeless persons instead of arresting them. Given their vantage points, Hollingsworth and Holland were likely to know of any official City policy, announced or otherwise, to violate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Neither of them did. 64 The plaintiffs point to the removal of the homeless from under the bridges and overpasses in the City as evidence of a City policy to exclude the homeless from the municipality and to violate their constitutional rights. It is uncontested that the City's final policymakers knew of and supported the plan which led to eviction of the homeless from under the bridges in early June 1993. It is also clear that the City suggested the evictions to the State Highway Department, which has jurisdiction over the bridges and overpasses. However, there is no evidence that the City violated the constitutional rights of the evicted homeless persons. DeJarvis Leonard, the district engineer for the Alabama State Highway Department, testified that his department was responsible for removing the personal property and makeshift structures of the homeless from under the bridges. The State was also responsible for storing any personal items taken from under the bridges. Officer Hollingsworth, who was present during the second and third days of the three-day operation, testified that the City police's only function was to assist the state to keep peace and to protect state employees. According to DeJarvis Leonard, this peace-keeping function included mak[ing] initial contact with those individuals under the bridges prior to ... someone from the highway department giving them trespassing warrants. None of the homeless witnesses could testify with any specificity as any additional role of the City police in the bridge sweep operation. 6 65 Even if we were to impute to the City full responsibility for the removal of the homeless and their property, we would still be unable to agree that such action is indicative of a City policy to violate the rights of the homeless. The Constitution does not confer the right to trespass on public lands. Nor is there any constitutional right to store one's personal belongings on public lands. In this case, the property owner, the State of Alabama, authorized the removal of the homeless and their belongings from under the bridges and overpasses. It is irrelevant that the State made its decision at the request of the City and that City workers aided state employees in carrying out that decision. The plaintiffs allege a constitutional violation in the failure to return to the homeless any personal belongings that were removed but not destroyed, but the uncontroverted evidence at the hearing was that these items are, and have always been, in the possession of the State, not the City. 66