Opinion ID: 2508099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Robbery Felony murder; robbery-murder special-circumstance finding

Text: Again, ignoring his two confessions, defendant claims that there was no evidence that he intended to steal before or during the killing. He claims that the total of the evidence regarding the crime of robbery consisted of the fact he possessed Janine's checkbook, a forged check, and Janine's car after the homicide and that his only motive before the killing was to obtain a ride from Janine so that he and Purcell could go camping. Thus, he argues that, because the evidence showed that the robbery was merely incidental to the murder, the robbery felony murder conviction and the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding were not supported by sufficient evidence. ( People v. Kipp (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1100, 1128, 113 Cal. Rptr.2d 27, 33 P.3d 450; People v. Morris (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1, 21, 249 Cal.Rptr. 119, 756 P.2d 843, disapproved on other grounds in In re Sassounian (1995) 9 Cal.4th 535, 543, fn. 5, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 446, 887 P.2d 527.) To the contrary, the same evidence that established defendant intentionally killed Janine with deliberation and premeditation also established that he killed her while committing a robbery. [5] (See ante, 22 Cal. Rptr.3d at pp. 85-86, 101 P.3d at pp. 1027-1028; People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 500, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754 [sufficient evidence that killing accompanied by intent to steal where the defendant stated victim had money and he was going to kill him and take it].) Further, when arrested, defendant was driving Janine's car and possessed her checkbook and one of her checks made out to himself. ( People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 357, 116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432 [sufficient evidence that the defendant harbored larcenous intent before or during use of force where the defendant stole victim's wallet and cashed one of her checks shortly after killing].) Consequently, there is sufficient evidence to support a first degree robbery felony-murder conviction and the robbery-murder special-circumstance finding. [6]
Defendant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding because he was not physically concealed in the car, and the lying-in-wait period was disrupted when the occupants briefly stepped from the car. He is wrong. `The lying-in-wait special circumstance requires an intentional murder, committed under circumstances which include (1) a concealment of purpose, (2) a substantial period of watching and waiting for an opportune time to act, and (3) immediately thereafter, a surprise attack on an unsuspecting victim from a position of advantage.... [Citations.] The element of concealment is satisfied by a showing `that a defendant's true intent and purpose were concealed by his actions or conduct. It is not required that he be literally concealed from view before he attacks the victim.' [Citation.]' ( People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 388 [63 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 935 P.2d 708].) ( People v. Hillhouse, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 500, 117 Cal.Rptr.2d 45, 40 P.3d 754.) The evidence amply supports the lying-in-wait special-circumstance finding. To carry out his plan to rob and kill Janine, defendant devised a ruse about needing a ride to a campsite in Odessa Canyon to meet a fictitious friend, John. Using this ruse, he tricked Janine into giving him a ride. As Janine drove defendant and Purcell to the desert, defendant sat in the backseat behind Janine, with both cords that he had obtained earlier, waiting for an opportune time to strangle her. When they reached the canyon, defendant saw a trailer and pretended that it belonged to John. Although they started walking towards the trailer, they returned to the car and drove to the trailer after defendant saw that a road led to it. As Janine drove to the trailer, defendant, who was again seated in the backseat behind her, removed the electrical cord from his pocket and wrapped it around his wrists. After Janine parked the car, defendant  from his position of advantage  surprised her by placing the electrical cord over her head and strangling her. Substantial evidence supports the jury's finding. [7] ( People v. Morales, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 555, 257 Cal.Rptr. 64, 770 P.2d 244 [sufficient evidence of lying in wait where the defendant sat behind victim in car, waited until car was in more deserted location, and then strangled and bludgeoned her].)
During closing argument, the prosecutor stated: I want you to focus on why [Dr.] Crinella was here. Crinella was here for a limited purpose. There's an instruction to tell you about it. That limited purpose is if because of [defendant's] mental disease, defect, etcetera, it impaired him in such a way that he couldn't form the specific intent or mental states required for these crimes, then he's not guilty, he walks. That's what we have. If, based on Dr. Crinella's testimony, you believe that he couldn't form the intent to rob somebody, he's not guilty. Focusing on the last sentence above, defendant argues that the prosecutor incorrectly told the jury that, if they believed the defense evidence as it relates to first degree felony murder, the only option would be to set him free without considering how the evidence related to other crimes. Defendant contends that this misstatement of the law constituted prosecutorial misconduct, violating his right to due process. However, defense counsel did not object to the challenged statement or request an admonition. Because an objection and admonition could have cured any harm, the contention is not cognizable on appeal. ( People v. Maury, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 418, 133 Cal. Rptr.2d 561, 68 P.3d 1.) In any event, we would not be required to reverse defendant's conviction on the alleged basis. Viewing the prosecutor's comments in the context of the argument as a whole, we do not find it reasonably likely that the jury would have construed or applied the complained-of remarks in an objectionable manner. ( People v. Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 841, 64 Cal. Rptr.2d 400, 938 P.2d 2.) First, defendant reads too much into the prosecutor's comment. Immediately before that comment, the prosecutor correctly stated that if the jury believed any mental disease or defect impaired him in such a way that he couldn't form the specific intent or mental states required for these crimes, then he's not guilty, he walks. The trial court instructed on the theories of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder with robbery as the underlying felony, and the lesser included offenses of second degree murder based on either express or implied malice. All of these offenses are specific intent crimes and, with the exception of felony murder and robbery, require malice aforethought. (See CALJIC Nos. 8.10, 8.11, 8.20, 8.21, 8.30, 8.31, 9.40.) The trial court further instructed the jury that it could consider the evidence regarding mental disease, mental defect, or mental disorder in determining whether defendant had the required mental states for both first and second degree murder (CALJIC No. 3.32). In a murder case, if this evidence is believed, the only supportable verdict would be involuntary manslaughter or an acquittal. ( People v. Saille (1991) 54 Cal.3d 1103, 1117, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 364, 820 P.2d 588.) Involuntary manslaughter was not an option in this case. Thus, the prosecutor correctly related that defendant would be entitled to an acquittal if the jury believed defendant had not formed the specific intent or mental states necessary to commit the crimes. The further comment  If, based on Dr. Crinella's testimony, you believe that he couldn't form the intent to rob somebody, he's not guilty  was not inaccurate; in that case, defendant would not have been guilty of first degree felony murder. Second, if the jury had had any doubt as to the meaning of the challenged comment, the remaining arguments clarified it. In his closing argument, defense counsel told the jury it could consider Dr. Crinella's testimony in determining whether defendant actually formed the required specific intent, premeditated, deliberated, or harbored malice aforethought. Counsel further argued: [The prosecutor] I believe was suggesting to you  and I may have misunderstood, I'll certainly yield to your understanding  that if you adopted this interpretation, [defendant] would walk right out the door. And I dispute that. No one is suggesting that in the least. And no one is suggesting that that is going to happen. But when it comes to weighing the evidence, which we don't dispute it, in weighing the history, the diagnosis, regarding [defendant's] mental defects, mental diseases, those are certainly things you should consider in determining whether this offense was of the first or of the second degree. In his rebuttal argument, the prosecutor clarified that second degree murder required that defendant form the mental state of malice aforethought and that defendant could walk if the jury found that his alleged mental illness or defect precluded him from harboring malice. Thus, the prosecutor only argued that defendant would walk if the jury concluded he did not form the mental states necessary for both first and second degree murder. Contrary to defendant's claim, there is no reasonable likelihood that the jury construed the prosecutor's remarks to mean that they had no choice but to convict [defendant] of first degree murder or else he would be `set free.'

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury sua sponte on theft as a lesser included offense of robbery. Although theft is a lesser included offense of robbery ( People v. Turner (1990) 50 Cal.3d 668, 690, 268 Cal.Rptr. 706, 789 P.2d 887), defendant was not charged with robbery. Accordingly, the trial court did not have a sua sponte duty to instruct the jury on theft as a lesser included offense, because the robbery formed the basis for the felony-murder charge and the special circumstance allegation. ( People v. Cash (2002) 28 Cal.4th 703, 737, 122 Cal.Rptr.2d 545, 50 P.3d 332; People v. Silva, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 371, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 93, 21 P.3d 769.) In any event, because there was no evidence that defendant abandoned the intent to steal and killed Janine for a reason independent of theft, the trial court would not have had to instruct sua sponte on theft even if robbery had been charged. (See People v. Sakarias (2000) 22 Cal.4th 596, 620, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 17, 995 P.2d 152 [no sua sponte duty to instruct on theft; neither the defendant's statements nor his actions showed he abandoned intent to steal].)
The trial court instructed the jury on the definitions of express and implied malice (CALJIC No. 8.11). [8] Defendant claims that the court violated his right to due process by giving the implied malice instruction because it permitted the jury to find him guilty of first degree murder based on implied malice. He is wrong. In addition to instructing on the first degree murder theories of deliberate, premeditated murder and felony murder, the trial court instructed on the lesser included offenses of second degree murder based on express and implied malice. In regard to the implied malice second degree murder offense, the court gave CALJIC No. 8.31, which stated: Murder of the second degree is also the unlawful killing of a human being when: [¶] 1. The killing resulted from an intentional act; [¶] 2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life; and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for, human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an act, it is not necessary to establish that the defendant intended that his act would result in the death of a human being. Because the definition of second degree murder, as given in CALJIC No. 8.31, included the element of implied malice, as defined in CALJIC No. 8.11, the jury was informed that the implied malice instruction applied to the offense of second degree murder. On the other hand, the trial court instructed that first degree premeditated murder required a willful, deliberate and premeditated killing with express malice. (CALJIC No. 8.20.) The instruction continued to emphasize the intent to kill requirement. The court then instructed that first degree felony murder required only a specific intent to commit the underlying felony of robbery and that the unlawful killing could be unintentional or accidental. (CALJIC No. 8.21.) Thus, the instructions as a whole clearly conveyed to the jury that implied malice did not apply to either first degree deliberate, premeditated murder or to felony murder. ( People v. Cain (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1, 36, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.) Finally, the verdicts revealed that the instructions did not mislead the jury. In finding the lying-in-wait special-circumstance allegation true, the jury found that defendant intentionally killed the victim. It thus necessarily found express, not implied, malice. In finding the robbery felony-murder special-circumstance allegation true, the jury found that defendant murdered the victim while engaged in the commission of robbery. Thus, there was no reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood the instructions as a whole. ( People v. Cain, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 36, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 481, 892 P.2d 1224.)

Defendant claims that: (1) admission of unadjudicated acts of misconduct in jail was improper factor (b) evidence (§ 190.3, factor (b)) and (2) admission of his prior juvenile adjudications for robbery was improper factor (c) evidence (§ 190.3, factor (c)). He is wrong.