Opinion ID: 626941
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: When did Rosetta Stone's marks become famous?

Text: Under the FTDA, the owner of a famous mark may obtain injunctive relief against any person who, at any time after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a mark . . . in commerce that is likely to cause dilution. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). A threshold issue, therefore, is whether the plaintiff's mark became famous, if at all, before the defendant began using the mark in commerce. Although the district court held that Rosetta Stone's mark had become famous before Google began using it, we are not limited to evaluation of the grounds offered by the district court to support its decision . . . [and] may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record. Pitt Cnty. v. Hotels.com, L.P., 553 F.3d 308, 311 (4th Cir.2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we consider Google's argument that Rosetta Stone's marks were not famous in 2004 when Google allegedly began using the mark in commerce. Under the statute, a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). This is not an easy standard to achieve. [C]ourts agree that a mark must be truly prominent and renowned to be granted the extraordinary scope of exclusive rights created by the Federal Antidilution Act. 4 McCarthy § 24:104. Because protection from dilution comes close to being a `right in gross,'. . . the FTDA extends dilution protection only to those whose mark is a `household name.' Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1011 (9th Cir. 2004). Additionally, for § 1125(c)(1) to apply, the defendant must have commence[d] a diluting use of the plaintiff's mark after the point at which the mark became famous. The policy basis for this rule reflects the fair and equitable principle that one should not be liable for dilution by the use of a mark which was legal when first used. 4 McCarthy § 24:103. Professor McCarthy explains as follows: [I]f at the time of first use, Zeta's mark did not dilute Alpha's mark because Alpha's mark was not then famous, Zeta's use will not at some future time become diluting and illegal solely because Alpha's mark later became famous. That is, Alpha will not at some future time have a federal dilution claim against Zeta's mark. Thus, the junior user must be proven to have first used its mark after the time that plaintiff's mark achieved fame. . . . This rule is modeled after that applied in traditional confusion cases where the plaintiff must prove secondary meaning. In those cases, the senior user must prove that secondary meaning in its mark was established prior to the junior user's first use. . . . 4 McCarthy § 24:103 (footnote omitted). Stated differently, the defendant's first diluting use of a famous mark fixes the time by which famousness is to be measured for purposes of the FTDA. Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1013. The district court concluded that Rosetta Stone Marks are famous and have been since at least 2009, when Rosetta Stone's brand awareness reached 75%. Rosetta Stone, 730 F.Supp.2d at 550. The court explained that [t]he Marks need not have been famous when Google revised its trademark policy in 2004. Instead, Rosetta Stone must only show that at any time after its Marks became famous, Google began using a mark or trade name in commerce that was likely to cause dilution of the Rosetta Stone Marks. Id. According to Google, however, even if ROSETTA STONE had become a famous brand by 2009, it was not famous when Google began its alleged facilitation of the use of ROSETTA STONE in 2004. Indeed, Rosetta Stone alleges in its Complaint that the use of ROSETTA STONE and other trademarks as keywords in Google's AdWords program lessen[ed] the capacity of Rosetta Stone's famous and distinctive. . . Marks to distinguish Rosetta Stone's products and services from those of others, and has diluted the distinctive quality of the marks. J.A. 56. The use of Rosetta Stone's mark as a keyword trigger began at least as early as 2004. Google points to survey evidence reflecting that, in 2005, two percent of the general population of Internet users recognized ROSETTA STONE without being prompted while 13 percent recognized ROSETTA STONE with prompting. In response, Rosetta Stone argues that Google first began permitting the use of Rosetta Stone's mark in sponsored ad text in 2009, by which time it had become famous. Thus, Rosetta Stone's position is that the phrase commences use in § 1125(c)(1) refers to any diluting use in commerce, not merely the first. This argument, of course, undercuts Rosetta Stone's own Complaint, which clearly asserts that Google diluted Rosetta Stone's mark beginning in 2004 by permitting the use of trademarks such as ROSETTA STONE as keyword triggers. Rosetta Stone asks us to ignore this alleged diluting use for purposes of § 1125(c)(1). The statute does not permit the owner of a famous mark to pick and choose which diluting use counts for purposes of § 1125(c)(1). See Nissan Motor Co., 378 F.3d at 1013 (If . . . first use for purposes of § 1125(c) turned on whatever use the mark's owner finds particularly objectionable, owners of famous marks would have the authority to decide when an allegedly diluting use was objectionable, regardless of when the party accused of diluting first began to use the mark.). The fame of Rosetta Stone's mark, therefore, should be measured from 2004, when Rosetta Stone alleges Google's diluting use of its mark began. Alternatively, Rosetta Stone suggests that it produced evidence showing that its mark was famous in 2004. It is, however, unclear from the voluminous record precisely which evidence reflects ROSETTA STONE's fame in 2004, and we think the better course is for the district court to handle this fact-intensive question of when Rosetta Stone's mark became famous in the first instance, particularly since other facets of the dilution claim will be reconsidered on remand. Thus, on remand, the district court should reconsider whether ROSETTA STONE was a famous mark for purposes of its dilution claim against Google. That will require the court first to determine when Google made its first ostensibly diluting use of the mark. Second, the court must decide whether Rosetta Stone's mark was famous at that point. In making the latter determination, the district court should assess fame in light of the relevant statutory factors, see 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A), as well as the strong showing required to establish fame under this statute, see, e.g., I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 46 (1st Cir.1998) (explaining that to satisfy the famousness requirement, a mark had to be truly prominent and renowned (internal quotation marks omitted)).