Opinion ID: 541744
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Schaumburg Trilogy

Text: 41 On this appeal the plaintiffs also argue that there is no meaningful distinction between begging and other types of charitable solicitation. The contention is an echo of the district court's finding that a meaningful distinction cannot be drawn for First Amendment purposes between solicitations for charity and begging. The district court based its finding on three Supreme Court cases: Schaumburg, supra; Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., Inc., 467 U.S. 947, 104 S.Ct. 2839, 81 L.Ed.2d 786 (1984); and Riley v. National Federation of The Blind of North Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 108 S.Ct. 2667, 101 L.Ed.2d 669 (1988). In these cases the Supreme Court considered laws regulating solicitations by organized charities, and held that such solicitation constituted a type of speech protected by the First Amendment. At a loss to detect a distinction between such solicitation and begging, the district court reasoned that begging must also enjoy constitutional protection. The district court apparently assumed that the outcome of the three Supreme Court cases would have been the same if, instead of involving door-to-door solicitation by organized charities, they had involved begging and panhandling in the subway. We think that the district court misconstrued the line of reasoning that underpins the trilogy. 42 The Supreme Court's holding in Schaumburg rested on the reasoning that appeals by organized charities involve a variety of speech interests including communication of information, the dissemination and propagation of views and ideas, and the advocacy of causes. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 632, 100 S.Ct. at 833. The Court continued that such solicitation is characteristically intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social issues. Id. Absent solicitation by organized charities, the Court expressed its concern that the flow of such information and advocacy would likely cease. Id. As a result, the Court concluded that [c]anvassers in such contexts are necessarily more than solicitors for money and do more than inform private economic decisions. Id. 43 Upon revisiting the charitable solicitation field in Munson, the Supreme Court quoted all of the above Schaumburg language as the basis for concluding that charitable solicitations are so intertwined with speech that they are entitled to the protections of the First Amendment. Munson, 467 U.S. at 959, 104 S.Ct. at 2848. In Riley, the Court reiterated that limitations preventing charitable organizations from raising contributions were unconstitutional under the force of Schaumburg. Riley, 108 S.Ct. at 2673. 44 The facts in Munson demonstrate the significance of the nexus between solicitation and traditional First Amendment activities. Munson was a professional fundraiser who challenged a Maryland statute that prohibited charitable organizations from paying any more than twenty-five percent of the amount raised by fund-raising activity to such professional fund-raisers. The Supreme Court struck down the statute on the ground that charities often ... combin[e] solicitation with dissemination of information, discussion, and advocacy of public issues, an activity clearly protected by the First Amendment, and not upon the fundraiser's right to retain the funds he solicited on behalf of the charity. Munson, 467 U.S. at 961, 104 S.Ct. at 2849. See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 799, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3447, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (the nexus between solicitation and the communication of information and advocacy of causes.... implicates interests protected by the First Amendment); cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n., 436 U.S. 447, 457-58, 98 S.Ct. 1912, 1919-20, 56 L.Ed.2d 444 (1978) (lawyer's unsolicited legal advice did not implicate First Amendment since it actually may disserve the individual and societal interest ... in facilitating 'informed and reliable decisionmaking' ) (citation and footnote omitted). Thus, neither Schaumburg nor its progeny stand for the proposition that begging and panhandling are protected speech under the First Amendment. Rather, these cases hold that there is a sufficient nexus between solicitation by organized charities and a variety of speech interests to invoke protection under the First Amendment. 45 Consistent with the Schaumburg reasoning, the TA amended 21 N.Y.C.R.R. Sec. 1050.6 to allow for solicitation by organized charities in certain areas of the subway system, while totally prohibiting begging and panhandling. Despite the district court's inability to draw a distinction between begging and solicitation by organized charities, the amended regulation reflects the TA's ability to do so. Before the district court was evidence that subway passengers experience begging as intimidating, harassing and threatening. Moreover, the passengers perceive that beggars and panhandlers pervade the system. Indeed, such conduct has been reported in virtually every part of the system. Nowhere in the record is there any indication that passengers felt intimidated by organized charities. In amending the regulation based on its experience, the TA drew a distinction between the harmful effects caused by individual begging and the First Amendment interests associated with solicitation by organized charities. Further, the TA obviously made a judgment that while solicitation by organized charities could be contained to certain areas of the system, the problems posed by begging and panhandling could be addressed by nothing less than the enforcement of a total ban. We think that the amendment of the regulation reflects the TA's concerns to respect the First Amendment in accordance with Schaumburg and at the same time to protect its patrons from being accosted. We find no reason to quarrel with these legitimate concerns. 46 Both the reasoning of Schaumburg and the experience of the TA point to the difference between begging and solicitation by organized charities. In the instant case, the difference must be examined not from the imaginary heights of Mount Olympus but from the very real context of the New York City subway. While organized charities serve community interests by enhancing communication and disseminating ideas, the conduct of begging and panhandling in the subway amounts to nothing less than a menace to the common good. See Members of the City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2128, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984) (The government may protect its citizens from unwanted exposure to certain methods of expression which may legitimately be deemed a public nuisance.). The lone dissent in Schaumburg recognized this difference stating: [N]othing in the United States Constitution should prevent residents of a community from making the collective judgment that certain worthy charities may solicit ... while at the same time insulating themselves against panhandlers, profiteers, and peddlers. Schaumburg, 444 U.S. at 644, 100 S.Ct. at 840 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 47 The district court attempted to discredit this difference by suggesting that historically begging has not been considered a malum in se. Similarly, the plaintiffs warn that the prohibition of begging is a stark departure ... from our Judeo-Christian tradition. We are not unaware that the giving of alms has long been considered virtuous in our Western tradition. In antiquity the humanist and jurist, Cicero, said of Caesar: Of all thy virtues none is more marvelous and graceful than charity. Some centuries later the Christian thinker, Augustine of Hippo, observed that it is essential to the virtue that charity obeys reason, so that charity is vouchsafed in such a way that justice is safeguarded, when we give to the needy. In Medieval times the Jewish philosopher, Moses Maimonides, espoused a charity such that no contribution should be made without the donor feeling confident that the administration is honest, prudent and capable of management. The district court itself stated that [i]n early English common law, begging by those able to work was prohibited, but beggars who were unable to work were licensed and restricted to specific areas. Thus, while there can be no doubt that giving alms is virtuous, in the Western tradition there is also no doubt that the virtue is best served when it reflects an ordered charity. It does not seem to us that the TA's regulation of solicitation and ban on begging are inconsistent with the concept. Although this discussion is certainly not determinative of the legal issues now before us, we mention it here only because both the plaintiffs and the district court have attributed a fair amount of weight to it. We take this opportunity, therefore, to suggest that it is not the role of this court to resolve all the problems of the homeless, as sympathetic as we may be. We must fulfill the more modest task of determining whether the TA may properly ban conduct that it finds to be inherently harmful in the subway system.