Opinion ID: 2540012
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Detective Banta's Reference to Appellant's Prior Contacts with Metro Police

Text: In Appellant's final point, he claims the trial court erred when it overruled his objection to Banta's testimony, which alluded to Appellant's criminal past. Appellant argues that Banta's testimony was evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, and was inadmissible under KRE 404(b). The Commonwealth responds by contending that no error occurred as Banta did not testify about any specific prior crimes or acts. We agree with Appellant's claim: Banta's testimony was inadmissible evidence of prior bad acts; however, its admission was harmless error. On direct examination, Banta testified that he knew Appellant before their contact in connection with the current charges. Banta further testified that, on the day of the robberies, he observed Appellant acting suspiciously. Over Appellant's objection, the trial court permitted Banta to testify that while he was investigating an unrelated incident, he observed Appellant walk past his car. Banta thought Appellant recognized his car and changed course to walk in a different direction. Banta stated that being familiar with Mr. Wiley I went back to our division to kind of check for his status, maybe being wanted or anything like that. We find that the quoted part of Banta's testimony was a thinly-veiled reference to Appellant's criminal history and was not offered for another purpose. KRE 404(b)(1). While the Commonwealth is technically correct in contending that Banta did not specifically testify about Appellant's prior wrongs, the inference drawn by Banta's testimony is inescapable. Banta testified that he knew Appellant and as a result of his familiarity] with Mr. Wiley, [he] went back [the police station] to perform a status check to see if Appellant was wanted or anything like that. This testimony directs the jury's attention to the fact that Appellant had prior criminal encounters with law enforcement and thus is inadmissible prior bad acts evidence. Allowing a witness to make suggestive references to the defendant's prior crimes, wrongs, or bad acts circumvents KRE 404(b)'s prohibition of evidence of other crimes. See Matthews v. Commonwealth, 163 S.W.3d 11, 17 (Ky.2005) (finding a statement calling the jury's attention to the defendant's prior incarceration inadmissible. The witness stated, When I moved here, we didn't know [the defendant]. [Defendant] hadn't been out of prison that long.). As a result, we hold that Banta's suggestive statements violated KRE 404(b) and the trial court erred when it overruled Appellant's objection to those statements. Although we find that the trial court erred, we find such error harmless. As stated above, evidentiary errors are evaluated under the non-constitutional substantial influence standard, wherein we determine whether the error had substantial influence upon Appellant's trial such that it substantially swayed his conviction. Winstead, 283 S.W.3d at 688-689; see also RCr 9.24. With the above framework in mind, we determine that the erroneous part of Banta's testimony did not have substantial influence due to the great weight of admissible evidence identifying Appellant as the perpetrator. Hill v. Brigano, 199 F.3d 833, 847 (6th Cir.1999) (finding the erroneous admission of hearsay to be harmless error because, in light of the great weight of evidence against the defendant, the introduction of limited statements did not have any significant influence on the jury's decision-making process). We find Anderson v. Commonwealth, instructive due to the (frequent) similarities to the present case. 231 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Ky. 2007). In Anderson, the trial court allowed a deputy to testify that the defendant responded to his questions regarding his involvement in a robbery by stating, Do you think I'm stupid, I just got out of prison for the same thing. I'm not saying anything, I'm going to ride this one out. Id. at 119. We found this testimony inadmissible, as its sole purpose was to inform the jury of appellant's previous incarceration for similar criminal activity. Id. at 120. However, we found this error trivial, considering that three eyewitnesses testified against appellant as well as the Commonwealth's introduction of ample circumstantial evidence. Id. at 122 The evidence in the present case is comparable to that in Anderson: multiple witnesses identified Appellant as the bank robber and gunman. As in Anderson, when considering the vast evidence in this case, given by multiple witnesses, we cannot conclude that Banta's suggestive testimony had substantial influence upon Appellant's trial such that it substantially swayed his conviction. Consequently, we find this error harmless.