Opinion ID: 2570071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: NRCP 25(a)(1)'s 90-day period is triggered

Text: Dr. Moseley contends that the district court had a duty to dismiss Richard's loss of consortium claim once the Sinickis failed to move for substitution within NRCP 25's 90-day limitation period. Under NRCP 25(a)(1), when a party dies during a pending proceeding, a substitution generally may be allowed when the motion for substitution is made not later than 90 days after the death is suggested upon the record by service of a statement of the fact of the death as provided herein for the service of the motion, [otherwise] the action shall be dismissed as to the deceased party. In other words, generally, once a suggestion of death has been filed in the district court, a motion for substitution must be made within 90 days of the date the death was suggested on the record. The Sinickis assert that NRCP 25's 90-day limitation period was not triggered because Richard's successor was not named in any of the suggestions of death filed in the district court. [7] To support their contention, the Sinickis rely on this court's 1985 decision in Barto v. Weishaar. [8] In Barto, the defendant died while the district court action was proceeding. The deceased defendant's counsel filed a suggestion of death upon the record but did not identify a successor or personal representative who could be substituted for the deceased defendant. [9] After the 90-day period to file a motion for substitution had passed, the deceased defendant's counsel filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint on the basis that a motion to substitute a proper party for the deceased defendant had not occurred within NRCP 25's 90-day limitation period. [10] The district court denied the motion to dismiss and allowed the plaintiff additional time to locate a successor or personal representative for the deceased defendant. After plaintiff failed to locate a proper party for substitution, the district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint. [11] On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the deceased defendant's suggestion of death was insufficient to trigger NRCP 25's 90-day period because it did not identify a successor for the deceased defendant. This court agreed and concluded that the 90-day period in which to seek substitution was not triggered because allowing the 90-day period to run when a suggestion of death emanating from the deceased party fails to identify a successor or personal representative would create a tactical maneuver that would burden the plaintiff with the duty of locating a representative for the deceased defendant's estate or have an otherwise meritorious action dismissed. [12] The year following Barto's issuance, this court distinguished it in Bennett v. Topping. [13] In Bennett, a plaintiff died, rather than a defendant, while the case was pending. The defendant filed a suggestion of death that did not name the deceased plaintiff's successor and a motion to substitute a successor was not filed on behalf of the deceased plaintiff within NRCP 25's 90-day limitation period. The district court dismissed the action. [14] In affirming the dismissal of the deceased plaintiffs cause of action, the Bennett court distinguished Barto on the basis that requiring a defendant to speculatively identify a successor or personal representative for a deceased plaintiff incorrectly shifts the burden of locating a successor or personal representative to the defending party. [15] Thus, under Barto, requiring the plaintiff to name the deceased defendant's successor improperly placed the burden on the plaintiff to discover the deceased defendant's successor's identity. Whereas, under Bennett, the surviving plaintiff was properly charged with locating the deceased plaintiff's successor because it is more likely that the deceased plaintiff's wife was, or knew who would be, the successor or personal representative to represent the deceased's estate in the pending litigation. Here, reliance on the decision in Bennett is proper because the facts in this writ petition are similar to the facts in Bennett and distinguishable from what occurred in Barto. Specifically, Richard Sinicki, a plaintiff, died during the underlying proceeding's pendency. Dr. Moseley, a defendant, suggested Richard's death upon the record and served the suggestion of death on the surviving plaintiffs in the district court action. Accordingly, applying the Bennett reasoning to the facts in this case demonstrates that NRCP 25's 90-day limitation period was triggered by Dr. Moseley's service and filing of the suggestion of Richard's death. Thus, Bennett, not Barto, controls, [16] and Dr. Moseley's suggestion of death, along with service on the surviving plaintiffs, properly triggered the 90-day period because Dr. Moseley was not required to identify a successor for deceased plaintiff Richard Sinicki.