Opinion ID: 992009
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kenneth Williams

Text: Kenneth contends that the district court failed to recognize its authority to depart downward on the grounds urged in his sentencing memorandum and in a psychological report prepared at the court's request. The district court made clear that it would prefer to impose a shorter sentence than called for under the guideline, but ultimately found that Kenneth's youth (he was nineteen at the time) was not a permissible ground for departure and that there were no other circum- stances which warranted departure. When a court's decision not to depart is based on a perceived lack of legal authority, its decision is reviewable. United States v. Hall, 977 F.2d 861, 863 (4th Cir. 1992). The psychologist suggested that, because of his youth, non-violent conduct, and lack of vocational skills, Kenneth would benefit from an environment which could provide structure, discipline, and guidance as well as the opportunity to learn vocational skills, and noted that he appeared motivated to make positive changes in his life. A sentence below the guideline range at the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Intensive Confinement Center was recommended; however, participants may not have a sentence of more than 12-30 months. Kenneth's guideline range was 188-235 months. At sentencing, defense counsel stressed the psychologist's finding that Kenneth was socially immature and that he desired approval from an older male. He sought to portray him as unable to resist Glenn's influence, an argument the court rejected. 7 On appeal, Kenneth concedes that youth, USSG § 5H1.1, p.s., lack of youthful guidance, USSG § 5H1.12, p.s., lack of education and vocational skills, USSG § 5H1.2, p.s., and mental and emotional con- dition, USSG § 5H1.3, p.s., are not factors which would support a departure in a usual case. However, he claims that the combination of these factors, together with the psychologist's recommendation, took the case outside the heartland of ordinary cases and gave the court a basis for departing. See United States v. Rybicki, 96 F.3d 754, 758 (4th Cir. 1996) (discouraged factors not ordinarily relevant but may be basis for departure in exceptional cases). The district court did not find that youth or any of the other factors were present to an excep- tional degree. Therefore, the court correctly held that it lacked author- ity to impose a sentence outside the guideline range. Kenneth also contends that he should have received a 2-level decrease under USSG § 2D1.1(b)(4) because he met the criteria set out in USSG § 5C1.2. The issue was whether he had fulfilled the last requirement, that he truthfully provide to the government all informa- tion and evidence he had about the offense. Detective Kennon testified at sentencing that the information Kenneth provided in two interviews after his arrest (before he decided to go to trial) was accurate but incomplete. He testified that Kenneth minimized his involvement by saying that he made only three or four deliveries of crack in the month that he lived with Glenn at Shaw's apartment, a month in which at least five kilograms of crack were sold. His statement was contradicted by Green, who said that he received crack several times from Kenneth and that Kenneth also made several deliveries to two others. Kenneth also failed to mention Angel Shaw's involvement in bringing cocaine from New Jersey, although Reynolds testified at trial that on one occasion he traveled to New Jersey with Shaw and Kenneth in a rented van which Shaw drove back to Raleigh after Glenn loaded cocaine into it. Kenneth argues that the government did not prove he knew Shaw was transporting cocaine for Glenn. However, because Kenneth's only purpose for coming to Raleigh was to help Glenn sell crack, the court was not clearly erroneous in finding, implicitly, that Kenneth knew Shaw was transporting cocaine for Glenn. Consequently, the district court also did not clearly err in finding that Kenneth had not told the police all he knew about the conspiracy. 8 Finally, we find that the district court did not clearly err when it summarily denied Kenneth's request for an acceptance of responsibil- ity reduction. The adjustment is available to a defendant who truth- fully admits all his criminal conduct, not to one who minimizes his conduct. USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.1(a)). The adjustment may be given to a defendant who goes to trial only in rare cases where the defendant intends to preserve issues unrelated to factual guilt. USSG § 3E1.1, comment. (n.2). This is not such a case. Accordingly, we grant Glenn Williams leave to file his supplemental briefs and amendments and affirm his conviction and sentence. We dismiss as moot his motion for release pending appeal. Kenneth Williams' sentence is affirmed. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materi- als before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AFFIRMED 9