Opinion ID: 795417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Orders of Voluntary Departure as Final Orders of Removal

Text: 35 While the parties vigorously argue about the provisions we have just discussed, neither party has raised what we observe to be an additional jurisdictional question: whether a BIA order granting voluntary departure, and ordering removal only in the alternative should the applicant overstay the grant of voluntary departure, is a final order of removal subject to judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We consider this question because of our independent obligation to assure ourselves of our own jurisdiction. See Arnold v. Lucks, 392 F.3d 512, 517 (2d Cir.2004); Henrietta D. v. Giuliani, 246 F.3d 176, 179 (2d Cir. 2001). We conclude that an order of voluntary departure that includes an alternate order of removal is a final order subject to judicial review under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 once the BIA has affirmed it, as the Third Circuit has persuasively explained. See Obale, 453 F.3d at 157-60. 36 The provision of the INA that describes final orders of removal defines such orders as those that conclud[e] that the alien is deportable or order[ ] deportation. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(A). 3 Such orders 37 shall become final upon the earlier of — 38 (i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals affirming such order; or 39 (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by the Board of Immigration Appeals. 40 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B). Because the IJ's order granting voluntary departure and ordering removal in the alternative has the effect of concluding that the alien is removable and contains a contingent order of removal, courts — including the Supreme Court — have long held that [t]he granting of voluntary departure relief does not result in the alien's not being subject to an outstanding final order of deportation. Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 220 n. 1, 84 S.Ct. 306, 11 L.Ed.2d 281 (1963); see also Hadera v. INS, 136 F.3d 1338, 1340-41 (D.C.Cir.1998); Karimian-Kaklaki v. INS, 997 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir.1993). This reading was consistent with INS regulations that were in place for over 35 years, providing that an order of deportation, including an alternate order of deportation coupled with an order of voluntary departure, . . . shall become final upon dismissal of an appeal by the Board of Immigration Appeals . . . ; or, . . . it shall be final as of the date of the Board's decision. See Obale, 453 F.3d at 158-59 (citing former 8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1997)). 41 New regulations put in place by the Department of Homeland Security in 2005 purported to change the rules of finality. The relevant provision states that 42 If an immigration judge issues an alternate order of removal in connection with a grant of voluntary departure, [an order of removal becomes final] upon overstay of the voluntary departure period except where the respondent has filed a timely appeal with the Board. In such a case, the order shall become final upon an order of removal by the Board or the Attorney General, or upon overstay of any voluntary departure period granted or reinstated by the Board or the Attorney General. 43 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1(f) (2005). This new regulation would seem to indicate that unless and until an alien overstays the period of voluntary departure, there is no final order from which to appeal. However, we agree with the Third Circuit that this interpretation of the regulation is inconsistent with the statutory definition of a final order of removal if applied to determine finality for purposes of judicial review, because, under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B), the statutory definition of an order of removal encompasses not only orders actually ordering removal but also orders in which an IJ merely determines that an alien is removable and issues a contingent order of removal. Obale, 453 F.3d at 160. We also agree that the new regulation seems to conflict with Congress's intent in the IIRIRA to allow aliens to pursue petitions for review from abroad: If an alien complied with an order of voluntary departure and left the country within the allotted time, no final order of removal would ever come into existence under the new regulation, and thus the alien would be prohibited from appealing. See id. at 160 n. 9. We cannot uphold a regulation that is inconsistent with both the plain meaning and purpose of the statute. See, e.g., Fowlkes v. Adamec, 432 F.3d 90, 97 (2d Cir.2005). Accordingly, like the Third Circuit, we decline to enforce § 1241.1(f). See Obale, 453 F.3d at 160 and n. 9 (positing additionally that § 1241.1 may have been intended solely to specify when an order of removal may be executed, as opposed to when an order of removal is final for purposes of [judicial] review); cf. Kanacevic v. INS, 448 F.3d 129, 134-35 (2d Cir.2006) (declining to elevate form over substance in the interpretation of what constitutes a final order of removal and therefore treating a denial of asylum in an asylum-only proceeding as the functional equivalent of a removal order). 44 Because orders of voluntary departure are final orders of removal for the purposes of judicial review, and because the provisions in the INA governing voluntary departure do not strip us of our traditional authority to stay agency orders pending consideration of petitions for review on the merits, we hold that stays of voluntary departure orders are available to those aliens who can meet the standard for a stay. 45