Opinion ID: 2149364
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Admission of Briefcase and Contents

Text: At trial, the State introduced a briefcase recovered from the trunk of the stolen vehicle and several documents bearing defendant's name which were inside. Ashley sought to exclude this evidence through a motion in limine, which the trial court overruled, and again objected to its admission at trial. Over these objections, the briefcase and its contents were admitted and exhibited to the jury. Appellant now alleges that this evidence is irrelevant and insufficiently connected to him or to the commission of the crime, that it is too remote, that the documents are inadmissible hearsay and are not properly authenticated, and that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The State, in its brief, answers that the evidence is relevant. In this contention, the State is correct. Evidence is relevant if it tends to prove or disprove an issue material to the case. White v. State (1981), Ind., 425 N.E.2d 95, 97. The presence of the briefcase and documents in the stolen vehicle suggests that Ashley was in possession of the vehicle during the time it was absent from the rightful owner's possession. The evidence was relevant. Ashley further argues that the state established an insufficient foundation for the admission of this physical evidence, which requires two showings: 1) that the item be connected to the defendant and the commission of the crime, and 2) that the item be like the item associated with the crime. Springer v. State (1984), Ind., 463 N.E.2d 243, 245. Ashley first alleges that the connection between the briefcase and the defendant and commission of the crime is insufficient. However, it is not necessary to establish that the evidence was in the possession of the accused for the item to be admissible. It is sufficient that the evidence constitutes a small but legitimate link in the chain of evidence connecting defendant with the crime. Mallott v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 879, 884; Martin v. State (1986), Ind., 490 N.E.2d 309, 314. In this case, Ashley was never seen in possession of the brief case. However, he was seen leaving the car lot with the car and the keys for the trunk and ignition. When the car was recovered nine days later the keys were missing, but the trunk lid showed no signs of tampering. When the owners gained access to the trunk by rewiring the trunk release, they discovered the brief case and documents, which had not been present in the car before it was removed from the lot. Certainly, one inference to be drawn is that Ashley was the owner of the brief case and left it in the car during the commission of the theft. This inference is sufficient to connect the evidence to Ashley and the theft. The tenuous nature of the connection or the possibility that other inferences might be drawn goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. Id. Appellant also contends that a proper foundation required testimony that the brief case was like the one associated with the crime. Establishing this simile was not necessary, however. The brief case which was admitted was in fact the very brief case which had been found in the car. It was identified by the owner and his employees who discovered it, and the chain of custody was established by the police officers who handled the evidence. Both requirements for establishing a foundation for the admission of this evidence were met. Appellant also argues that the brief case found nine days after the crime ... was too remote for admissibility. However, exclusion of evidence as remote is within the discretion of the trial court. That discretion will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse. Shaw v. Shaw (1973), 159 Ind. App. 33, 41, 304 N.E.2d 536, 540. Here, the evidence was discovered immediately upon the return of the stolen property; a more timely recovery of this evidence was not possible. We find no abuse of discretion in its admission. Turning specifically to the documents contained in the brief case, appellant maintains that they are inadmissible hearsay. Hearsay is defined as an out of court statement offered for the truth of the matter contained therein. Mulligan v. State (1986), Ind., 487 N.E.2d 1309, 1313. Appellant asserts that these documents were offered to prove the truth of the matters contained. This assertion is not supported by the record, which reveals that the documents included a certificate of graduation in Ashley's name from a barber school, an envelope addressed to Ashley from a utility company, and an appointment calendar containing Ashley's identification information. These documents were not offered to prove that Ashley was a certified barber, that he corresponded with a utility company, or that he had a busy appointment calendar. These documents were clearly not offered for the proof of the matter contained therein, and therefore are not hearsay. Ashley also argues that the documents were inadmissible because they were not properly authenticated. Generally, proof of authentication is required before documents may be admitted. Blevins v. State (1973), 259 Ind. 618, 627, 291 N.E.2d 84, 89. The admissibility of documents requiring authentication is within the discretion of the trial court, and will be reversed only on a clear showing of error. Wolfe v. State (1981), Ind., 426 N.E.2d 647, 655. We usually consider the question of authentication of documents when their legal significance pertains to their execution, authorship, or content. [1] In this case, we find it unnecessary to address the adequacy of the authentication; the purpose of the evidence did not require that the documents be authenticated. The authorship or execution of the documents is not in issue, nor is the content of the documents central to the case. The purpose of offering the documents was merely to show their own existence, and, more particularly, their existence in the stolen vehicle. When the execution of a document is not in issue, but only ... the fact of the existence of a document of such tenor, no authentication is necessary. 4 Wigmore on Evidence § 2132, at 714. The unauthenticated documents were properly admitted. Finally, Ashley argues that the probative value of this evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. No particular prejudice to Ashley is asserted; we presume he refers to the prejudice inherent in all evidence which tends to show the defendant's guilt. If such prejudice were sufficient to preclude admission, very few offers on behalf of the State would succeed. The balancing of the probative value of evidence against its prejudicial effect is once again a task within the wide discretion of the trial court. We see no evidence that this discretion was abused.