Opinion ID: 2902089
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Butler’s Batson Claim

Text: Butler also claims that the trial judge in his capital trial erred by providing an inadequate remedy for a Batson violation, and that the TCCA’s decision upholding that remedy on appeal was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established” Supreme Court precedent. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); see also Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 215. Batson held that a party may not exercise a peremptory challenge on the basis of a juror’s race. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Butler protests that, after the trial court found the prosecution’s peremptory challenge violated Batson, it implemented a remedy that was not mentioned by the Supreme Court in Batson and which contravenes the spirit of Batson by effectively rewarding the 20 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 21 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 prosecution for its impermissible peremptory strike. In Batson, the Supreme Court acknowledged two acceptable methods of ameliorating the harm from an unlawful challenge—reinstating the improperly stricken juror or discharging the venire and selecting a new jury from an entirely new panel. Id. at 99 n.24. Yet, the Court left trial courts the discretion to fashion an appropriate remedy: We decline . . . to formulate particular procedures to be followed upon a defendant’s timely objection to a prosecutor’s challenges. .... In light of the variety of jury selection practices followed in our state and federal trial courts, we make no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement our holding today. For the same reason, we express no view on whether it is more appropriate in a particular case, upon a finding of discrimination against black jurors, for the trial court to discharge the venire and select a new jury from a panel not previously associated with the case, or to disallow the discriminatory challenges and resume selection with the improperly challenged jurors reinstated on the venire . . . . Id. at 99 & n.24 (citations omitted). During jury selection for Butler’s capital trial, the trial court divided all prospective jurors into smaller groups. See Butler, 872 S.W.2d at 231, 233. The Batson issue arose during the voir dire of the fourth group. Id. at 231. One member of the group was selected (Jimmie Lewis), but the prosecution exercised a peremptory challenge on an African-American member of the panel, Delores Hadnott. Id. at 231–33. Butler’s counsel objected that this strike by the prosecution was exercised in a racially discriminatory manner. Id. at 231–32. The trial court sustained the objection. After much back and forth during which Butler’s attorney argued that the entire “array” of prospective jurors (all summoned jurors, not just this small group) should be excused or that Hadnott should be seated, the trial judge dismissed the entire small group (not all summoned prospective jurors), unseating Lewis and also 21 Case: 09-70003 Document: 00513185744 Page: 22 Date Filed: 09/09/2015 Nos. 09-70003, 14-70018 excusing Hadnott. Id. at 232–33. Three jurors selected from previous small groups, or mini panels, remained on the jury. Id. The judge also returned the used peremptory strike to the State. Id. On direct appeal the TCCA found the trial court’s remedy constitutionally sufficient under Batson, on the merits. See id. at 233. The district court likewise found that “[w]hile the remedy chosen by the trial court may not have been ideal, the trial court’s Batson remedy was not ‘so patently incorrect as to be unreasonable.’” Butler, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 831 (quoting Gardner v. Johnson, 247 F.3d 551, 560 (5th Cir. 2001)). Under AEDPA, we cannot address this issue de novo; instead, we ask whether the trial court’s chosen remedy and the TCCA’s affirmance of that remedy directly conflict with a prior decision of the Supreme Court or reach a different conclusion than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts. See Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 215. They do not. Accordingly, we leave the larger question of Batson remedies to another day and AFFIRM the district court on this point. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Matamoros, 783 F.3d at 215.