Opinion ID: 2601655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Former chapter 69.51A RCW (1999) (the Act)

Text: ¶ 13 By passing Initiative 692 (I-692), the people of Washington intended that [q]ualifying patients with terminal or debilitating illnesses who, in the judgment of their physicians, would benefit from the medical use of marijuana, shall not be found guilty of a crime under state law for their possession and limited use of marijuana. Former RCW 69.51A.005 (1999). Additionally, [ i ]f charged with a violation of state law relating to marijuana, any qualifying patient who is engaged in the medical use of marijuana, or any designated primary caregiver who assists a qualifying patient in the medical use of marijuana, will be deemed to have established an affirmative defense to such charges by proof of his or her compliance with the requirements provided in this chapter. Any person meeting the requirements appropriate to his or her status under this chapter shall be considered to have engaged in activities permitted by this chapter and shall not be penalized in any manner, or denied any right or privilege, for such actions. Former RCW 69.51A.040(1) (emphasis added). Based on I-692 and the derivative statute, we have recognized that Washington voters created a compassionate use defense against marijuana charges. See State v. Tracy, 158 Wash.2d 683, 691, 147 P.3d 559 (2006). An affirmative defense admits the defendant committed a criminal act but pleads an excuse for doing so. State v. Votava, 149 Wash.2d 178, 187-88, 66 P.3d 1050 (2003) (citing State v. Riker, 123 Wash.2d 351, 367-68, 869 P.2d 43 (1994)). The defendant must prove an affirmative defense by a preponderance of the evidence. State v. Frost, 160 Wash.2d 765, 773, 161 P.3d 361 (2007). An affirmative defense does not negate any elements of the charged crime. Id. ¶ 14 Possession of marijuana, even in small amounts, is still a crime in the state of Washington. See RCW 69.50.4014. A police officer would have probable cause to believe Fry committed a crime when the officer smelled marijuana emanating from the Frys' residence. Fry presented the officer with documentation purporting to authorize his use of marijuana. Nevertheless, the authorization only created a potential affirmative defense that would excuse the criminal act. The authorization does not, however, result in making the act of possessing and using marijuana noncriminal or negate any elements of the charged offense. Therefore, based on the information of a marijuana growing operation and the strong odor of marijuana when the officers approached the Frys' home, a reasonable inference was established that criminal activity was taking place in the Frys' residence. Therefore, the officers had probable cause and the search warrant was properly obtained. ¶ 15 This conclusion is supported by McBride v. Walla Walla County, 95 Wash. App. 33, 975 P.2d 1029, 990 P.2d 967 (1999). In McBride, a police officer arrested McBride for hitting his son. The officer had substantial facts and information to indicate McBride acted in self-defense. Nevertheless, the officer arrested McBride as mandated by the domestic violence section in former RCW 10.31.100(2)(b) (1996). ¶ 16 Like the compassionate use defense, self-defense is an affirmative defense. See City of Kennewick v. Day, 142 Wash.2d 1, 10, 11 P.3d 304 (2000). McBride argued it was the officer's duty to evaluate the self-defense claim and determine whether it negated the existence of probable cause to arrest him. McBride, 95 Wash.App. at 39, 975 P.2d 1029. The court concluded, [t]he officer is not judge or jury; he does not decide if the legal standard for self-defense is met. Id. at 40, 975 P.2d 1029. The court determined the affirmative defense did not vitiate probable cause. Id. ¶ 17 Fry attempts to distinguish McBride. He notes that the officers in that case were required to arrest an individual involved in a domestic violence dispute. There was no statutory requirement compelling the officers to search Fry's residence and seize the marijuana. However, probable cause is not created or negated by statutory mandate to search or arrest (or lack thereof). In most cases, including the one before us, officers have discretion as to whether they will conduct a search or make an arrest once they have probable cause. However, this discretion has no impact on whether probable cause exists. ¶ 18 Under the Act, a person charged with a violation of state law relating to marijuana. . . will be deemed to have established an affirmative defense to such charges by proof of his or her compliance with the requirements provided in this chapter. Former RCW 69.51A.040(1). One of the requirements is that a qualifying patient [p]resent his or her valid documentation to any law enforcement official who questions the patient regarding his or her medical use of marijuana (presentment requirement). Former RCW 69.51A.040(2)(c). ¶ 19 An amici brief [4] calls our attention to the presentment requirement in the Act. It is argued that if the presentment requirement is to have meaning, presentation of a patient's authorization must establish lawful possession of marijuana, and thereby the absence of criminal activity that would provide probable cause for a search or seizure. Amici Br. at 7-8. ¶ 20 The presentment requirement must be read in context. It is only triggered when someone is charged with a violation. Former RCW 69.51A.040(1). A person who meets the presentment requirement (and all other requirements) will be deemed to have established an affirmative defense. Id. Additionally, the requirements, taken together, do not indicate that the Act created more than an affirmative defense. One of the other requirements mandates that the charged individual [p]ossess no more marijuana than is necessary for the patient's personal, medical use, not exceeding the amount necessary for a sixty-day supply. Former RCW 69.51A.040(2)(b). It would be impossible to ascertain whether an individual possesses an excessive amount of marijuana without a search. ¶ 21 Instead, the presentment requirement facilitates an officer's decision of whether to use his or her discretion and seize the marijuana and/or arrest the possessor. Once the officer has searched the individual and established that the individual is possessing marijuana in compliance with the Act (i.e., appropriate documentation, limited supply, etc.) the officer would then have sufficient facts to determine whether an arrest is warranted. This view is supported by the 2007 amendment to RCW 69.51A.040. The current version reads, [i]f a law enforcement officer determines that marijuana is being possessed lawfully under the medical marijuana law, the officer may document the amount of marijuana, take a representative sample that is large enough to test, but not seize the marijuana. RCW 69.51A.040(1). It is difficult to imagine how a law enforcement officer, having been presented with a medical marijuana authorization, would be able to determine that the marijuana is otherwise being lawfully possessed (and take a sample) without some kind of search. ¶ 22 I-692 did not legalize marijuana, but rather provided an authorized user with an affirmative defense if the user shows compliance with the requirements for medical marijuana possession. See former RCW 69.51A.005, .040. As an affirmative defense, the compassionate use defense does not eliminate probable cause where a trained officer detects the odor of marijuana. A doctor's authorization does not indicate that the presenter is totally complying with the Act; e.g., the amounts may be excessive. An affirmative defense does not per se legalize an activity and does not negate probable cause that a crime has been committed. We therefore affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue.