Opinion ID: 3066667
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Constitutionally Adequate Process

Text: A state must release a person who is involuntarily committed if the grounds for his commitment cease to exist. See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 574–75, 95 S. Ct. 2486, 2493 (1975); cf. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738, 92 9 Case: 12-14212 Date Filed: 10/15/2015 Page: 10 of 22 S. Ct. 1845, 1858 (1972) (“[D]ue process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed.”). But that requirement—release the committed when they deserve to be let out—is toothless if a state does not periodically review whether the grounds for commitment are met. That is, a state could get around the timelyrelease requirement by simply refusing to ever consider the continued propriety of commitment. To effectuate that requirement, then, the state must undertake some form of periodic review. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 607, 99 S. Ct. 2493, 2506 (1979).11 But what form of review is constitutionally adequate? To answer that question, courts turn to the balancing test from Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976), which requires consideration of several factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. 11 Accord, e.g., Doe v. Austin, 848 F.2d 1386, 1396 (6th Cir. 1988) (explaining that “due process requires that some periodic review take place during” a continued involuntary commitment); Clark v. Cohen, 794 F.2d 79, 86 (3d Cir. 1986) (explaining that a plaintiff “was entitled to periodic review of her commitment”); cf. Williams v. Wallis, 734 F.2d 1434, 1438 (11th Cir. 1984) (upholding a scheme that provided periodic review of continued commitment and remarking that “[t]he frequency of the evaluations also reduces the risk that the patient will be confined any longer than necessary”); Hickey v. Morris, 722 F.2d 543, 549 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that a statute adequately protected a plaintiff’s liberty because it required “regular review of his continued confinement”). 10 Case: 12-14212 Date Filed: 10/15/2015 Page: 11 of 22 Id. at 335, 96 S. Ct. at 903. The Mathews test is stated at a high level of generality. It does not provide much guidance for this (or any) specific context. And constitutionally adequate process, the Supreme Court has said, is a flexible concept that “cannot be divorced from the nature of the ultimate decision that is being made.” Parham, 442 U.S. at 608, 99 S. Ct. at 2507.