Opinion ID: 2571500
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Motion for Enlargement of Time and W.R.C.P. 56(f) Motion

Text: [¶ 9] Mr. Jacobson contends that his Motion for Enlargement of Time and W.R.C.P. 56(f) Motion to Supplement the Record were improperly denied. He argues that he did not have adequate time to obtain an affidavit by a medical expert to oppose Dr. Cobbs' motion for summary judgment because his attorney entered his appearance one month prior to the hearing. Mr. Jacobson also points out that discovery was not yet complete and, as a result, contends that summary judgment was premature. [¶ 10] Rule 6(b), of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, governs extensions of time and provides that the court . . . for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . order the period enlarged if [the] request . . . is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed. W.R.C.P. 56(f) provides an alternative way to obtain additional time to respond to a motion for summary judgment. The rule states: Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that the party cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify the party's opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. Id. We apply an abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court's decision denying Mr. Jacobson's motions for additional time. The district court has broad discretion in granting or denying a motion for continuance, and absent a manifest abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will not disturb such ruling. To find an abuse of discretion, the refusal must be so arbitrary as to deny appellant due process, and the burden rests upon appellant to prove actual prejudice and a violation of his rights. Upon review we look at the peculiar circumstances of the case and the reasons presented to the trial judge at the time of the request. Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, ¶ 16, 101 P.3d 446, 454 (Wyo. 2004) (citing Byrd v. Mahaffey, 2003 WY 137, ¶ 7, 78 P.3d 671, 673 (Wyo.2003)). [¶ 11] The district court explained its reasons for denying the request for additional time: All of the delays and lack of bona fide action in this caseincluding the failure to answer or respond to discovery served by Defendant (even after multiple extensions), the failure to seek a scheduling order, the failure to serve discovery on the Defendant, the failure to respond to this Court's Order to Show Cause, and the failure [to] respond substantively to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment within the time prescribed under the Rules of Civil Procedureare due to the Plaintiff's own choice not to prosecute this action. We cannot disagree with the district court's assessment. [¶ 12] Mr. Jacobson acknowledges that he failed to conduct discovery or consult an expert at any time during the course of the litigation. Regardless, he contends that summary judgment cannot be granted, in any case, if the discovery process has not been completed. He relies on Abraham v. Great Western Energy, LLC, 2004 WY 145, 101 P.3d 446 (Wyo.2004), as support for his position. His reliance is misplaced. [¶ 13] In Abraham, discovery was ongoing and the parties were in the process of deposing key witnesses when the district court granted summary judgment. We reversed the district court's decision explaining that W.R.C.P. 56(c) presupposes that discovery is complete and, ordinarily, discovery on the issues which are the subject of the summary judgment motion should be allowed to be completed before a motion for summary judgment is scheduled, heard, and decided. Abraham, ¶ 19, 101 P.3d at 455 (emphasis added). We concluded that [b]y scheduling the hearing on the motions for summary judgment before the deadline for discovery had passed and, thus, not allowing the Abrahams adequate time to prepare and file any other pertinent materials prior to that hearing, they were deprived of the protections to due process afforded by the applicable rules of civil procedure. Id. [¶ 14] The permissive language used in Abraham does not lead to the conclusion that the court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Jacobson's motions in the present case. Rule 56 does not require that discovery be completed prior to entry of summary judgment. Rather, there must have been adequate time allowed for discovery to be conducted. See, e.g., Keller v. Anderson, Wyo., 554 P.2d 1253, 1262 (1976) (motion for enlargement of time denied because plaintiff had adequate time to prepare and file necessary papers to respond to motion for summary judgment). See also Hatton v. Energy Elec. Co., 2006 WY 151, ¶ 20, 148 P.3d 8, 16 (Wyo.2006) (clarifying that we did not rule a district court may never grant summary judgment before discovery has been completed, only that ordinarily, if doing so would unfairly prevent the opposing party from discovering contradictory evidence, it would be an abuse of discretion not to grant a request for a continuance to allow adequate time for such discovery). Unlike the situation in Abraham, Mr. Jacobson was not relying on any deadlines set by a scheduling order and had over ten months in which to commence discovery. Mr. Jacobson simply failed to take any action during the pendency of this matter to commence or complete discovery. We find no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of the Motion for Enlargement of Time. [¶ 15] We also do not find that the district court erred by denying Mr. Jacobson's W.R.C.P. 56(f) motion. Mr. Jacobson offered no legitimate justification for his failure to obtain expert medical testimony in support of his malpractice claim. The sole basis of his request for additional time was his assertion that [a]s discovery progresses, it is believed that defendant Kenneth F.B. Cobbs' position will be controverted by expert medical testimony and evidence. Where a party filing a Rule 56(f) motion has been dilatory, an extension of time is not required. Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency, 998 F.2d 1550, 1554 (10th Cir.1993). See also United States v. Bob Stofer Oldsmobile-Cadillac, Inc., 766 F.2d 1147, 1153 (7th Cir.1985) (A party who has been dilatory in discovery may not use Rule 56(f) to gain a continuance where he has made only vague assertions that further discovery would develop genuine issues of material fact.); Abiodun v. Martin Oil Service, Inc., 475 F.2d 142 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 866, 94 S.Ct. 57, 38 L.Ed.2d 86 (1973); Waldron v. Cities Service Co., 361 F.2d 671 (2d Cir.1966), aff'd sub nom. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 88 S.Ct. 1575, 20 L.Ed.2d 569 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 901, 89 S.Ct. 63, 21 L.Ed.2d 188 (1968). [¶ 16] Although we have recognized that certain leniency is accorded to pro se litigants, we have also reiterated that the proper administration of justice requires reasonable adherence to the same rules of evidence, procedure and requirements of the court as expected of those qualified to practice law. Stoneking v. Wheatland Rural Elec. Ass'n, 2003 WY 81, ¶ 12, 72 P.3d 272, 276 (Wyo.2003). Under the circumstances presented, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in denying Mr. Jacobson's requests for additional time.