Opinion ID: 1956820
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: American Casualty

Text: The issues to be determined with respect to appellee, American Casualty, are: (1) whether American Casualty was contractually obligated to reimburse Widener for defense costs incurred in connection with the four Avins lawsuits; and (2) whether American Casualty is estopped from refusing to reimburse Widener's defense costs. The resolution to the first issue requires a determination as to whether the American Casualty insurance policy provided only excess coverage in this case. Our review of the record reveals that there is no genuine issue of material fact to be tried in this instance; therefore, we proceed to a discussion of whether American Casualty is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. American Casualty supplied Widener with a board of education liability policy which provided insurance for the directors, officers and trustees of Widener for claims made against them for any breach or neglect in the discharge of their duty or any actual or alleged errors or misstatement or misleading statement or act or omission or neglect or breach of duty by the Assureds in the discharge of their duties, individually or collectively, or any matter claimed against them solely by reason of their being or having been Assureds during [the] policy period. American Casualty policy, paragraph III(c). This coverage of wrongful acts as defined above extended to: any amount which [Widener is] legally obligated to pay. . . for a claim or claims made against [Widener] for a Wrongful Act and shall include but not be limited to damages, judgments, settlements and costs, cost of investigation and defense of legal actions . . . claims or proceedings and appeals therefrom . . . American Casualty policy, paragraph III, as modified in Liberalization Endorsement (emphasis added). In addition, the policy obligated Widener to select and retain legal counsel of its own choosing. Further, the American Casualty policy, under an endorsement which amended paragraph IV(b)(1) of the policy, expressly excluded the following: (b) The insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for loss in connection with any claim against the Assureds, and/or the School District (1) which is insured by another policy or policies except in respect of any excess over and above the amount or amounts of such other policy or policies . . . (Emphasis added.). Commercial Union, INA and Reliance issued general liability policies which provided occurrence coverage [4] for personal injury. The definition of personal injury included defamation. [5] The general liability policies provided that the insurers shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the insured on account of such personal injury. American Casualty contends that its policy was in excess of policies issued by Reliance, INA and Commercial Union and that American Casualty had no defense obligations to Widener until exhaustion of coverage under the `primary' coverage of Reliance, INA and Commercial Union Policies. Widener, in challenging the trial court's finding that American Casualty was an excess insurer, asserts that other or double insurance exists only where there are two or more insurance policies covering the same interest, same subject matter and against the same risk. Blue Anchor Overall Co., Inc. v. Pennsylvania Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co., 385 Pa. 394, 398, 123 A.2d 413, 415 (1956). Widener asserts that the coverage provided by the American Casualty policy is fundamentally different from the general liability policies. A careful review of Blue Anchor reveals that it does not compel the conclusion that American Casualty was not an excess insurer. Blue Anchor dealt with a situation where the defendant's insurance policy was the only one which insured against the risk of loss at issue in that case. In the case at hand, it is undisputed that each of the four underlying suits contained one or more allegations that fell potentially within the scope of coverage afforded by the duty-to-defend policies issued by Commercial Union, Reliance and/or INA. In Pennsylvania, an insurer with a duty to defend must provide a complete defense on behalf of its insured so long as even one allegation of the complaint falls potentially within the scope of the coverage of the insured's policy. Cadwallader v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 396 Pa. 582, 152 A.2d 484 (1959); Brugnoli v. United National Insurance Co., 284 Pa.Super. 511, 426 A.2d 164 (1981), clarified 284 Pa.Super. 520, 434 A.2d 105 (1981). Therefore, the loss for which Widener is seeking reimbursement from American Casualty, its defense costs, is also covered by the general liability policies and Widener's express provision excluding payment for a loss which is insured by another policy, must be given effect. Widener argues alternatively that, in the event we find American Casualty to be an excess insurer, the other insurance clause constitutes an escape clause and, therefore, cannot be given effect. See Insurance Company of North America v. Continental Casualty Co., 575 F.2d 1070 (3rd Cir. 1978) (escape clauses generally in disfavor with the courts). Widener's argument is premised on its contention that American Casualty has a duty to defend. Pacific Indemnity Co. v. Linn, et al., 590 F.Supp. 643 (E.D.Pa. 1984), aff'd 766 F.2d 754 (3rd Cir. 1985) (the duty to defend is unaffected by other insurance clause). Widener's argument is fallacious. American Casualty has no duty to defend in this case. See King Aluminum Corp. v. William Hyndman III Insurance Agency, Inc., 370 F.Supp. 621 (E.D.Pa. 1974) (no duty to defend where policy does not state one). Furthermore, American Casualty's excess clause cannot be construed as an escape clause. See Insurance Company of North America v. Continental Casualty Co., supra (escape clause provides that the company invoking it is relieved from any obligation to the insured if other coverage is available). See also Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 579 F.Supp. 140 (W.D.Pa. 1984) (escape clause held to exist where policy provided it afforded no coverage in the event the insured has other insurance). As the language in American Casualty's policy provides simply that American Casualty is liable for amounts in excess of that covered by other policies, we conclude that American Casualty's excess provision should not be struck down as an escape clause, but must be given its intended effect. We now turn to the issue of whether American Casualty is estopped from refusing to reimburse Widener's defense costs. To seek relief under the doctrine of promissory estoppel, plaintiffs must plead all facts necessary to support such a claim in their complaint. See DiSante v. Russ Financial Co., 251 Pa.Super. 184, 380 A.2d 439 (1977); Lakenau Hospital v. Madway, 410 Pa. 268, 189 A.2d 592 (1963). We have reviewed appellant's complaint in this matter and have found that the necessary facts have not been pleaded. Therefore, this claim is not properly before this Court and we will not undertake a review of it.