Opinion ID: 1770772
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 12

Heading: whether the trial court made erroneous evidentiary findings and improperly instructed the jury.

Text: ¶ 42. Additionally, Patton-Tully contends the circuit court erred in making numerous erroneous evidentiary rulings and gave a jury instruction which incorrectly stated applicable law. The jury instruction in question stated: A vessel operator, such as the defendant, should exercise reasonable care before the plaintiff begins his work on a vessel, the MV John Morris. This means the defendant must use reasonable care to have the vessel and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced iron worker, such as the plaintiff, would be able, by the exercise of reasonable care, to carry on his work on the vessel with reasonable safety to persons and property. This means that the defendant must warn the plaintiff of a hazard on the ship, or a hazard with respect to the ship's equipment, if: the defendant knew about the hazard, or should have discovered it in the exercise of reasonable care, and the hazard was one which was likely to be encountered by the plaintiff in the course of his work in connection with the defendant's vessel, and the hazard was one which the plaintiff did not know about which would not be obvious to anticipated by a reasonably competent iron worker in the performance of his work. Even if the hazard was one about which the plaintiff knew, or which, would be obvious or anticipated by a reasonably competent iron worker, the defendant must exercise reasonable care to avoid the harm to plaintiff if the hazard was one which defendant knew or should have known the plaintiff would not or could not correct and the plaintiff could not or would not avoid. Therefore, if you believe by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was negligent in failing to provide a reasonably safe place to work, in that it failed to provide sufficient manpower and equipment to remove the steel plates when the deck was slippery with oil and water ... (emphasis added). ¶ 43. Patton-Tully asserts that this jury instruction not only improperly instructed on 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) negligence but also that the instruction lacked evidentiary basis in that no evidence was introduced which tended to show the decks were slippery with oil and water or that its manpower or equipment was insufficient. It is contended this jury instruction constituted a finding of fact by the trial court with respect to a factual issue that was disputed. Patton-Tully contends that if there were hazards that existed, they played no part in the injury and Patton-Tully had no duty to warn Douglas of so called hazards that he was aware existed. ¶ 44. Here, the extent of a vessel's duty to longshoremen under 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) must be determined. The longshoreman's right to recover for negligence was preserved by section 905(b), but the section did not specify what acts or omissions would constitute actionable negligence. Pluyer v. Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd., 664 F.2d 1243, 1246 (5th Cir.1982). Neither can it be said that the legislative history, which has been analyzed and re-analyzed in the course of these cases, furnishes sure guidance for construing § 905(b). Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. 156, 165, 101 S.Ct. 1614, 1621, 68 L.Ed.2d 1 (1981). However, in Scindia Steam Navigation Co., the Court mandated use of a `reasonable care under the circumstances of each case' test and then went on the discuss the various inquiries essential to proper resolution of a longshoreman's negligence action against a vessel. McCullough v. S/S Coppename, 648 F.2d 1036, 1038 (5th Cir.1981). The Court held: the vessel owes to the stevedore and his longshoremen employees the duty of exercising due care under the circumstances. This duty extends at least to exercising ordinary care under the circumstances to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that an expert and experienced stevedore will be able by the exercise of reasonable care to carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety to persons and property, and to warning the stevedore of any hazards on the ship or with respect to its equipment that are known to the vessel or should be known to it in the exercise of reasonable care, that would likely be encountered by the stevedore in the course of his cargo operations and that are not known by the stevedore and would not be obvious to or anticipated by him if reasonably competent in the performance of his work. The shipowner thus has a duty with respect to the condition of the ship's gear, equipment, tools, and work space to be used in the stevedoring operations; and if he fails at least to warn the stevedore of hidden danger which would have been known to him in the exercise of reasonable care, he has breached his duty and is liable if his negligence causes injury to a longshoreman. Scindia Steam Navigation Co. v. Santos, 451 U.S. at 165, 101 S.Ct. 1614. ¶ 45. As a general matter, the shipowner may rely on the stevedore to avoid exposing the longshoremen to unreasonable hazards. Id. at 169, 101 S.Ct. 1614. ¶ 46. Section 41 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 941, requires the stevedore to provide a reasonably safe place to work and to take such safeguards with respect to equipment and working conditions as the Secretary of Labor may determine to be necessary to avoid injury to longshoremen. [1] Id. ¶ 47. It is error to grant a jury instruction that misstates the law applicable to a case. Munford, Inc. v. Fleming, 597 So.2d 1282, 1286 (Miss.1992). Further, when this Court reviews the propriety of a jury instructions, it will view the questioned instruction in light of all other instructions which were given to determine whether the jury was correctly instructed. Id. at 1286. ¶ 48. In the case sub judice, the circuit court also gave instructions which stated: You are instructed that a vessel owner is not negligent simply because a worker, working aboard such vessel, is accidentally injured. Patton-Tully was not obligated to furnish an accident-free vessel to Jamey Douglas. Patton-Tully's only duty was to furnish a vessel that was reasonably safe for competent, careful workers to work aboard her. If you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the M/V John Morris, together with Patton-Tully's workers who worked with Jamey Douglas, were reasonably safe, then Patton-Tully was not negligent and this is true even though you may also find that Jamey Douglas got hurt while working on that vessel. ¶ 49. Therefore, in viewing all of the instructions given, we find the circuit court adequately informed the jury as to the law applicable to the case sub judice. ¶ 50. Patton-Tully had a duty to have the ship and its equipment in such condition that the stevedore, Buddy Turner, may carry on its cargo operations with reasonable safety and the stevedore's duties is to provide a safe workplace and to use safeguards with respect to the ship's gear. ¶ 51. Patton-Tully's assertion that the trial court made a finding of fact in regard to the deck being slippery with oil and water is totally out of context. Douglas testified that the back of the boat was wet with rain and hydraulic oil. We were stepping over all this stuff in that hydraulic oil. The floor was pretty wet and we were having to get down here and put that decking up on that barge. Further, McKnight stated, It was raining off and on. And it was kind of wet and slick. It was oily and slick. All the steering inside the steering was oil and where we step in side and out on the wall it was just slick. Therefore, evidence was introduced to support the instruction going to the jury on finding such issues by a preponderance of the evidence.