Opinion ID: 2384186
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Direct Attack

Text: Cases involving direct attack involve a different standard. On direct attack, statutory provisions involving the adoption of minors are to be strictly construed and applied. In the case of In re Adoption of Parsons, 302 Ark. 427, 432, 791 S.W.2d 681, 683-84 (1990), we wrote: We reaffirmed our position of giving careful protection to a natural parent's rights in In The Matter of the Adoption of Glover, 288 Ark. 59, 702 S.W.2d 12 (1986) (citing Woodson v. Lee, 221 Ark. 517, 254 S.W.2d 326 (1953) (quoting In re Cordy, 169 Cal. 150, 146 P. 532 (1914))): ... the power of the court in adoption proceedings to deprive a parent of her child, being in derogation of her natural right to it, and being a special power conferred by the statute, such statute should be strictly construed; that `the law is solicitous toward maintaining the integrity of the natural relation of parent and child; and in adversary proceedings in adoption, where the absolute severance of that relation is sought, without the consent and against the protest of the parent, the inclination of the courts, as the law contemplates it should be, is in favor of maintaining the natural relation.... Every intendment should have been [in] favor of the claim of the mother under the evidence, and if the statute was open to construction and interpretation it should be construed in support of the right of the natural parent.' We have frequently written that there must be strict compliance with the statutory requirements for the petition, but we have not been unreasonable in finding that compliance. In A & B v. C & D, 239 Ark. 406, 390 S.W.2d 116, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 926, 86 S.Ct. 314, 15 L.Ed.2d 340 (1965), we used the words substantial compliance in discussing a direct attack, but, in reality, we held there was full compliance with the statute. The applicable paragraph is as follows: Finally, it is urged that the consent to adoption was not properly executed. Appellants point out that the adoption statute requires a written consent, verified by affidavit, and they assert that Mrs. Ward only witnessed and acknowledged B's signature. It is true that the evidence does not reflect that B held up her hand while Mrs. Ward recited a formal oath, but we think there was substantial compliance with the statutory requirement. Mrs. Ward was present in the room; Mrs. Ward did see B sign the consent; Mrs. Ward did hear the explanation given B by the attorney representing C and D, and it is obvious that this appellant executed the instrument with the full intent to do that which is required by the statute. Ark.Stat.Ann. § 28-206 (Repl. 1962) provides: Every affidavit shall be subscribed by the affiant, and the certificate of the officer before whom it is made shall be written separately, following the signature of the affiant. Id. at 413-14, 390 S.W.2d at 120. Likewise, in Taylor v. Collins, 172 Ark. 541, 289 S.W. 466 (1927), we said compliance with the statute was mandatory and that there was substantial compliance with it. The court of appeals, in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Couch, 38 Ark. App. 165, 832 S.W.2d 265 (1992), adopted our language from Taylor v. Collins . However, we have never intended to vary our requirement that on direct appeal there be strict compliance because, as we have often written, adoption statutes are in derogation of the common law and must be strictly construed. See Swaffar v. Swaffar, 309 Ark. 73, 827 S.W.2d 140 (1992) and cases cited therein. This is a case of the direct appeal of an adoption decree.