Opinion ID: 2407465
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prejudicial error in the admission of evidence of prior race?

Text: After erroneously sustaining defendant Judkins' motion for a directed verdict, the court announced Defendant Watkins Motor Lines, Inc. is still in the case and may now proceed with its evidence. In its case defendant Watkins' first witness, James D. Jackson, a traffic study engineer employed by the Missouri Highway Department testified about certain measurements. Defendant Watkins next called Calvin Calhoun to the witness stand. Among other matters Calhoun testified, over timely objection by plaintiff, that about one-half hour before the fatal collision at issue he had a race with James Albert Judkins north along the same stretch of Highway 71 and that, although Calvin Calhoun attained a speed of 110 miles per hour, he lost the race to decedent James Albert Judkins. The court later sustained plaintiff's motion to strike such evidence and orally instructed the jury to disregard all evidence concerning this alleged race, but the trial court refused to grant plaintiff's motion for a mistrial. In her brief plaintiff makes a point that the court erred in allowing testimony of Calvin Calhoun on the subject of a prior race between himself and Jim Judkins   . Plaintiff then proceeded to argue that the court's later action in telling the jury to disregard the testimony was insufficient. To quote from plaintiff's brief This attempt to unring the bell came far too late. That part of Calhoun's testimony pertaining to the race was that about 7 o'clock on the evening of the collision (which as indicated occurred about 8:20 p. m.) he saw James Albert Judkins at the Townsend service station; that Judkins then had a white 1958 Chevrolet identified by Calhoun from the photographs of the wreck as the car involved in the collision at issue; that such Chevrolet had a special engine built up for racingthe whole inside had been worked over;    It was built for racing and is not on a car that comes from the factory. It had been worked over. And that Jim Judkins drove into Townsend's service station in that white Chevrolet. Thereafter, the following occurred during the direct examination by Mr. Brown, counsel for defendant Watkins: Q Did you have a race with Jim Judkins on this evening? A Yes. MR. HALE: We will object to this as being immaterial. Ask the witness to wait until I make by objection. (sic) THE COURT: Overruled. MR. HALE: Your Honor, may I make my objection? THE COURT: I thought you had. Go ahead. MR. HALE: I would like to object to this question of asking Mr. Calhoun if he had a race with Jim Judkins in this case as being immaterial, incompetent and irrelevant, bringing up information about what Mr. Calhoun did with a Mr. Jim Judkins. It has no bearing on this case whatsoever. THE COURT: Overruled. Q Where did you race from? A Sharp's Trailer Court up to the intersection of Interstate 29. Q And what? A 71 Highway. Calhoun then testified that the northbound race took place on that part of northbound 71, so crucial to the issues in this case, viz. the last quarter mile south of its intersection with I-29. In answer to further questions by Watkins' counsel Calhoun testified: Q How fast did you go? A Approximately 110 miles an hour. MR. HALE: We will object to further inquiry about all of this, about some race, unless it is connected up some way with this accident that we are trying. THE COURT: Overruled. A We got to approximately one hundred ten. Q Did you win the race? A No, he did. Q Then what did you do? A We turned around at the intersection and raced back. Q To where? A About half way to Sharp's, my transmission went out. Q What did you do? A I limped on back to the station the best way I could get there. Later on cross-examination of Calhoun, it was developed that Raymond Hughes was not in the car at the time of the alleged race. Plaintiff's counsel thereafter, out of the hearing of the jury, orally moved that the testimony regarding that race in which Calvin Calhoun was involved at some other time, be stricken from the record, that the jury be instructed to disregard that testimony and that the jury be discharged and a mistrial declared. After some discussion, out of the hearing of the jury, the trial court stated to counsel as to the evidence concerning the race, I think it was clearly inadmissible. It was too far removed in time from the time of the collision, and the motion to strike, for that reason, will be sustained. However, the request to discharge the jury will be denied. Thereafter the trial court told the jury: A motion to strike the testimony of witness Calvin Calhoun concerning a race which he had with James Albert Judkins sometime on the evening of January 8, 1965, was sustained, and all of that testimony is ordered stricken from the record and you are instructed to disregard all evidence concerning this alleged race. That has no bearing and is irrelevant and immaterial to the issues of the case. Counsel for defendant Watkins, in their brief argument contend that the trial court's exclusion of the erroneously admitted evidence leaves no ground for reversing this judgment because this Court should assume the jurors considered only legal evidence, and were not unmindful of their duty to obey the Trial Court's direction. Thus we have presented the question of whether the evidence with reference to the race (conceded in defendant's brief to be erroneously admitted in evidence and found by the trial court to be clearly inadmissible, and too far removed in time from the time of collision and irrelevant and immaterial to the issues of the case) was so prejudicial as to warrant reversal of the judgment entered in favor of defendant Watkins. In the case of Harter v. King (Mo.App.) 259 S.W.2d 94, 96, the court had occasion to pass upon somewhat similar evidence of a race occurring several hours before the collision at issue and said:    Assuming that it was proper cross-examination, which we do not decide, it was a collateral matter whether two hours before the collision at a point five miles removed from it, plaintiff failed to stop at a stop sign or raced his car with the witness at 35 or 40 miles an hour.    Defendant should not have been permitted to introduce this highly inflammatory evidence under the pretext of impeaching Mr. Wengler. Reversed and remanded. After carefully reviewing all of the facts of this case we are of the considered opinion that the erroneous evidence of the race on an occasion prior to the trip during which the instant collision occurred was so inflammatory and prejudicial that a new trial as to defendant Watkins should be granted to plaintiff. Plaintiff also complained of the court's action in permitting Calhoun to relate certain statements allegedly made by deceased Hughes or in his presence concerning the purpose of the trip toward Savannah. One of the complaints was that Calhoun was permitted to relate some conversation by the boys without full identification of the person quoted by Calhoun. Care should be exercised in order to make certain that improper hearsay evidence is not admitted over timely objections. However, in view of the result reached, we will not discuss this further since it is doubtful that the same identical wording of the questions and answers will be used on retrial.