Opinion ID: 163905
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: The Medical Defendants

Text: 85 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Medical Defendants on all claims. Although the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Medical Defendants was based on its order granting summary judgment in favor of the Hobbs Defendants, which we have reversed in part, we affirm the district court's decision with respect to the Medical Defendants on other grounds. 86 Mr. Marshall's initial and amended complaints failed to specify which claims were directed at the Medical Defendants, as opposed to those directed at the Hobbs Defendants exclusively. The district court reasoned that since the Medical Defendants were only involved in the blood test, their potential liability is necessarily limited to that procedure. Adopting this assumption, we interpret Mr. Marshall's complaint as asserting that the seizure of his blood violated his Equal Protection and Fourth Amendment rights, and that this act constituted battery and negligence per se under New Mexico law. 87 To sustain a claim under the Equal Protection Clause, a plaintiff must provide evidence that he was treated differently from others who are similarly situated to him, and that the acts forming the basis of the plaintiff's claim were motivated by a discriminatory purpose. See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272-74, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979); Village of Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264-66, 97 S.Ct. 555. Mr. Marshall admits that there are no facts showing disparate treatment or racially motivated discrimination by the Medical Defendants. Thus, we uphold the district court's dismissal of the equal protection claim against the Medical Defendants. 88 As to the Fourth Amendment, the evidence in the record, interpreted in the manner most favorable to Mr. Marshall, does not support liability on the part of the Medical Defendants. The record shows that Iris Goad, the nurse on duty at Columbia Lea Regional Hospital, administered the blood test at the behest of police officers Porter and Roye, who signed the consent form. She knew that Mr. Marshall verbally refused to consent but did not otherwise resist the taking of his blood. Neither she nor any other employee of the Hospital was otherwise involved, or had any further knowledge about the circumstances. 89 We are not aware of any decisions of the Supreme Court or of this court regarding the liability of medical personnel for performing a warrantless and coerced blood test at the instruction of a police officer, but other cases provide a close and persuasive analogy. First, nurses have been permitted to rely on the representations of other nurses that parental consent has been obtained for the medical examinations of children. Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1217 & n. 15. If it is reasonable for nurses to rely on other nurses regarding consent, we see no reason to doubt it is reasonable for nurses to rely on police officers regarding probable cause and exigent circumstances. 90 Similarly, courts have held that police officers may ordinarily rely on determinations made by other officers regarding the constitutional legitimacy of police procedures. In Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971), the Supreme Court noted that police officers called upon to aid other officers in executing arrest warrants are entitled to assume that the officers requesting aid [had properly determined the existence of] probable cause. See also Baptiste v. J.C. Penney Co., 147 F.3d 1252, 1260 (10th Cir.1998) (for qualified immunity purposes, female officer called in by another officer to conduct pat-down search of female suspect is entitled to rely on first officer's determination of probable cause); Ramirez v. Butte-Silver Bow County, 298 F.3d 1022, 1027-28 (9th Cir.2002), cert. granted on other grounds sub nom. Groh v. Ramirez, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 1354, 155 L.Ed.2d 195 (2003) (in the qualified immunity context, distinguishing between officers who lead the search and are responsible for ensuring that they have lawful authority for their actions, and line officers who may accept the word of their superiors that they have a warrant and that it is valid); Caldarola v. Calabrese, 298 F.3d 156, 166-67 (2d Cir.2002) (reversing denial of qualified immunity because an officer is entitled to rely on factual accuracy of information supplied by his superiors). 91 The same is true of private persons assisting the police. In Warner v. Grand County, 57 F.3d 962, 965 (10th Cir.1995), this Court held that a private party who assisted in a search could not be sued under § 1983 when she followed the ostensibly legitimate orders of a state official for the mere purpose of assisting the state with its investigatory powers. See also Rodriques v. Furtado, 950 F.2d 805, 815 (1st Cir.1991) (holding that a doctor could not be sued for performing a body cavity search pursuant to an allegedly defective search warrant). 92 Many of these decisions arose in the context of a claim of qualified immunity, rather than on the merits of the constitutional claim. Here, the Medical Defendants do not assert qualified immunity, but argue that performing a search at the behest of the ostensibly legal order of a police officer is not unreasonable and hence not a violation of the Fourth Amendment. We agree. The qualified immunity cases which we have cited did not rest on the lack of clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), but rather on the theory that private parties or police officers relying on the orders or determinations of other law enforcement officials are entitled to qualified immunity because such reliance is objectively reasonable. See, e.g., Baptiste, 147 F.3d at 1260 (actor entitled to qualified immunity if actions are objectively reasonable). Since the Supreme Court has long held that the `touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness,' Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 39, 117 S.Ct. 417, 136 L.Ed.2d 347 (1996) (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S.Ct. 1801, 114 L.Ed.2d 297 (1991)), this rationale goes to the merits of the § 1983 claim, not just to the availability of qualified immunity. See Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1217 n. 15. 93 Nurses and other medical personnel have neither the training nor the information that would be necessary to second-guess police determinations regarding probable cause, exigent circumstances, and the like. If police officers, trained in Fourth Amendment law and specifically charged to conduct their activities in conformance with the Constitution, are entitled to rely on legal or factual determinations made by other officers, then nurses should be able to do the same. To hold medical personnel liable would impose a greater constitutional duty on medical professionals than on law enforcement, an outcome having no basis in either logic or precedent. See Rodriques, 950 F.2d at 815, cited approvingly in Warner, 57 F.3d at 965; Ruppel v. Ramseyer, 33 F.Supp.2d 720, 729 (C.D.Ill.1999) (under state law, medical personnel are not liable for damages for police-ordered blood tests). 94 While not conclusive on the federal question of liability under § 1983, it is noteworthy that New Mexico, like many other states, has enacted a statute requiring that medical personnel, rather than police, administer blood tests to DUI suspects, and immunizing them from liability when acting pursuant to police requests: 95 Only a physician, licensed professional or practical nurse or laboratory technician or technologist employed by a hospital or physician shall withdraw blood from any person in the performance of a blood-alcohol test. No such physician, nurse, technician or technologist who withdraws blood from any person in the performance of a blood-alcohol test that has been directed by any police officer... shall be held liable in any civil or criminal action for assault, battery, false imprisonment or any conduct of any police officer, except for negligence.... 96 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-103. Subject to minor variations, similar laws have been passed by most states in this circuit. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 32-1132(c); Okla. Stat. tit. 47 § 752(A)-(B); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.10(5); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-106. This suggests a strong legislative consensus consistent with our legal conclusion here. 97 We therefore conclude that the district court correctly granted the Medical Defendants' motion for summary judgment.