Opinion ID: 761575
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: probable cause to forfeit the dolorosa street property

Text: 15 Hopkins and the Lowndeses contend that the district court erred when it found probable cause. That ruling implicates three issues: (1) Did the Lowndeses have Fourth Amendment standing to suppress evidence seized from the property? (2) Did the district court err in suppressing all the documentary evidence seized by the officers? (3) If the evidence was properly suppressed, did the court err in finding probable cause? 16 A. Did the Lowndeses Have Fourth Amendment Standing to Suppress Evidence Seized from the Property? 17 The government contends that the Lowndeses lacked an expectation of privacy in the property and, therefore, have no standing to have the seized evidence suppressed. The government argues that, while it did not raise the issue below, Fourth Amendment standing is not a waivable issue and may be raised for the first time on appeal. 18 While it is true that the government can first raise the issue on appeal when the defendant appeals, see United States v. Taketa, 923 F.2d 665, 670 (9th Cir.1991), it cannot do so when the government itself appeals from the granting of a motion to suppress, see United States v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 962-63 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Sherwin, 539 F.2d 1, 5 n. 4 (9th Cir.1976) (en banc). Were the government's argument accepted, the claimant would be prejudiced by being deprived of an opportunity to present evidence to counter the government's contention first raised on appeal that he had no expectation of privacy. Having failed to raise it below, the government has waived the Fourth Amendment standing issue. 19 B. Did the District Court Err in Suppressing All the Documentary Evidence? 20 The government contends that the court committed clear error when it suppressed the documentary evidence on the ground that the government was unable to prove clearly which documents came from the car, rather than from the property. It is for the district court to determine which items seized were obtained as the result of an illegal search and which were obtained lawfully. See United States v. Van Damme, 48 F.3d 461, 467 (9th Cir.1995); United States v. Carneiro, 861 F.2d 1171, 1183 (9th Cir.1988). We review that determination for clear error, see United States v. VonWillie, 59 F.3d 922, 925 (9th Cir.1995), and find none. 21 At the probable cause hearing, the government offered the box labeled Item No. 23 seized from the car which contained Hopkins's 1984, 1987, and 1988 income tax returns; back up documents for his 1989, 1990, 1991, and 1992 returns; bank statements and checks from Independence Bank and Sanwa Bank; fifty to sixty receipts relating to Reels of Sound (Hopkins's recording studio business); escrow papers relating to the real property; and invoices relating to the remodeling of the property. An officer testified that the box had been kept in the locked property room, but no officer was able to testify from personal knowledge that the records then contained in the box had been in the box when it was taken from the car and did not come from the property. The property records, prepared on the day the box was seized from the car, state only that Item No. 23 contained miscellaneous pictures, trophies, and papers. The box offered at the hearing contained no trophies or pictures. The property records listing documents seized from the residence, on the other hand, list opened and unopened mail, mortgage statements, receipts, an IRS statement, a loan application, tax records, miscellaneous paperwork, and miscellaneous escrow papers. Hopkins denied having placed any of those documents in the car and he and the Lowndeses argued that they were taken from the property. On this record, the district court did not clearly err in finding that it could not separate the documents lawfully taken from the car from those illegally seized from the residence. 22 The government argues, citing United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 71 F.3d 754, 768 (9th Cir.1995), that the court erred in suppressing the evidence because there was ample evidence that Item 23 was in substantially the same condition as when it was seized and there was a reasonable probability [it] ha[d] not been changed in important respects. The argument is inapposite since the government produced no evidence from which it could reasonably be inferred that the documents found in Item 23 at the hearing were in the box when it was taken from the car rather than having come from the residence. In any event, the issue here is not whether the evidence is sufficiently reliable to be submitted to a jury, as in Matta-Ballesteros, but whether the court's finding that the government had failed to show which documents had not been unlawfully seized was clearly erroneous. 23 C. If the Evidence Was Properly Suppressed, Did the Court Err in Finding Probable Cause? 24 We review de novo the district court's probable cause determination in a forfeiture proceeding. See United States v.1982 Yukon Delta Houseboat, 774 F.2d 1432, 1434 (9th Cir.1985). The burden of establishing probable cause is on the government. See 19 U.S.C. § 1615. To establish probable cause and pass the point of mere suspicion, the government must demonstrate by some credible evidence the probability that the [seized asset] was in fact connected to drugs. United States v. U.S. Currency, $30,060.00, 39 F.3d 1039, 1041 (9th Cir.1994); see also United States v. $405,089.23 U.S. Currency, 122 F.3d 1285, 1290-91 (9th Cir.1997) (finding no probable cause absent a sufficient connection between the detailed narcotics activity and the particular assets targeted by the Government's forfeiture proceeding). The government cannot rely on suppressed evidence to establish probable cause. See $191,910.00, 16 F.3d at 1063-64; United States v. $277,000.00 U.S. Currency, 941 F.2d 898, 902 (9th Cir.1991). 25 The district court found probable cause on the ground that there is some evidence that Mr. Hopkins' funds that were in banks ... were used, that there was some tracing. The record shows that the court arrived at its finding after hearing the testimony of an officer, which was based on documents seized from the residence: checking records, mortgage payments, tax records, and records of expenditures for remodeling. Those records, however, were suppressed, and without them there was no substantial evidence that money was funnelled, or traced, from Hopkins's bank accounts to the house. Accordingly, the finding was clearly erroneous. 26 The government contends that there is nonetheless sufficient evidence of probable cause, independent of the documents, to support the forfeiture judgment. That evidence tends to show that Hopkins was a large-scale drug dealer who possessed large amounts of cash and other expensive assets, which he tried to conceal, and that he lacked a legitimate source of income. That evidence, however, is insufficient to establish the requisite connection between Hopkins's drug activity and the property. See $405,089.23, 122 F.3d at 1290. The government must show that Hopkins used the proceeds from drug transactions to purchase or improve the property. Here, there is no admissible evidence that Hopkins invested any money in the property, let alone drug money. In the absence of evidence of a link between the property and illegal drug transactions, the evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause. 27 The judgment is REVERSED.