Opinion ID: 2544661
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Failure to Instruct on Intent to Kill as Element of Felony-murder Special Circumstance

Text: Defendant contends that the judgment must be reversed as to penalty, and the special circumstance finding must be set aside, because the trial court failed to instruct the jury that intent to kill is a required element of the felony-murder special circumstance. We disagree. In 1983, this court decided Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131, 197 Cal.Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862, in which we construed the statutory provision defining the felony-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17)) as requiring an intent to kill, whether the defendant was the actual killer or an accomplice. In 1987, we overruled Carlos in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104, 240 Cal.Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306, holding that intent to kill was not a requirement for an actual killer. For crimes committed during the so-called window period between those two decisions, however, intent to kill continues to be a requirement for the felony-murder special circumstance. ( People v. Marshall, supra, 15 Cal.4th at pp. 41-42, 61 Cal. Rptr.2d 84, 931 P.2d 262.) Because the killing of Henry Michael Pedersen occurred in September 1986, during this window period, the trial court was required to instruct the jury that intent to kill was an element of the robbery-murder special circumstance. The trial court did not so instruct, and, indeed, it expressly told the jury that intent to kill was not required. This was error. Because defendants in capital cases have a right under the federal Constitution to a jury determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment ( Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584, 589, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 2432, 153 L.Ed.2d 556), we apply the harmless error test for federal constitutional error set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705. ( People v. Williams, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 689, 66 Cal.Rptr.2d 573, 941 P.2d 752; People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 45, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673.) Under that test, an appellate court may find an error harmless only if, after conducting a thorough review of the record, the court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same absent the error. ( Neder v. United States (1999) 527 U.S. 1, 7-10, 119 S.Ct. 1827,144 L.Ed.2d 35.) We have found error in failing to instruct that the felony-murder special circumstance requires intent to kill to be harmless when, because of the circumstances and manner in which the defendant killed the victim, the evidence of intent to kill was overwhelming and the jury returning the special circumstance finding could have had no reasonable doubt that the defendant had the intent to kill. ( People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 681, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 26, 919 P.2d 640; People v. Cudjo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 585, 630, 25 Cal. Rptr.2d 390, 863 P.2d 635; see also People v. Johnson, supra, 6 Cal.4th at pp. 45-47, 23 Cal.Rptr.2d 593, 859 P.2d 673 [applying same analysis for multiple-murder special circumstance].) Here, the victim died from a single stab wound to the back that penetrated the victim's lungs and spleen. The stab wound was five inches long and five to six inches deep. At the scene of the killing there were no signs of a struggle or evidence of a quarrel. In plunging the knife so deeply into such a vital area of the body of an apparently unsuspecting and defenseless victim, defendant could have had no other intent than to kill. Defendant presented no evidence that the killing was other than intentional. Under these circumstances, after thorough review of the appellate record, we are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's true finding on the special circumstance allegation would have been the same absent the trial court's instructional error.