Opinion ID: 1140735
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether the punitive damage award violates due process.

Text: ¶ 42. Fitch concedes that [u]nder the current state of jurisprudence in Mississippi, the state has a legitimate interest in protecting the institution of marriage and the love that forms its foundation. Nonetheless, he argues that such interest ends when one is punished for engaging in action protected by the Constitution that incidentally may also cause the transfer of affections to one outside the marriage. Therefore, he maintains that the penal component of the award below . . . offends substantive due process insofar as it sanctions punishment for constitutionally permissive conduct. ¶ 43. In reply, Valentine first argues that Fitch waived this argument by only generally objecting to punitive damages at trial [21] and not seeking remittance of the punitive damage award in post-trial motions. Notwithstanding the procedural bar, Valentine notes that this Court has recognized punitive damages as proper relief in alienation of affection cases since Brister v. Dunaway, 149 Miss. 5, 115 So. 36 (1928). . . . Moreover, he asserts that because adultery constitutes malice, see Walter, 228 So.2d at 598 (on the issue of adultery with the wife of another . . . malice is presumed.), then Miss.Code Ann. Section 11-1-65(1)(a) [22] is satisfied and [t]he necessary elements were present for the jury to determine whether or not to grant punitive damages in this case. In total, Valentine maintains that: [t]his malicious act of adultery was . . . admitted on the stand. Further, other aggravating circumstances also existed in the case sub judice: i.e., by the continuing acts of adultery occurring two to three times a week during work and occasionally at night over an extended period of time; by a child fathered by [Fitch] during Sandra's marriage to [Valentine]; and by the exorbitant and lavish sums of money, gifts, and benefits which [Fitch] gave to Sandra, his employee, during her marriage to [Valentine]. ¶ 44. As an initial matter, this Court finds that this issue is procedurally barred as no due process challenge to the punitive damage award was raised before the circuit court. See Johnson, 929 So.2d at 407. Procedural bar notwithstanding, this Court has consistently recognized punitive damages as a legitimate form of relief in alienation of affections cases. See Brister, 115 So. at 36. Moreover, the punitive damages awarded in the case sub judice were only a fraction of compensatory damages awarded, [23] hardly rising to the level of gross excess. In total, this issue is without merit.