Opinion ID: 1120053
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: academic freedom

Text: Petitioners argue the restrictions imposed upon their team-teaching methods and the requirement that they teach in the conventional manner violate their right to academic freedom. They assert that case law recognizes the right of a teacher to select teaching methods and materials. On the other hand, the school board asserts that a teacher has no right to select or use teaching methods or course materials contrary to administrative instructions. The Supreme Court has long recognized that academic freedom at the college level is protected under the First Amendment. It only recently extended that protection to the noncollegiate level, however. In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 21 L.Ed.2d 731, 89 S.Ct. 733 (1969), the court found unconstitutional a ban on student black armbands worn to protest the Vietnam war. The court stated: First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the school-house gate. 393 U.S. at 506. Millikan and Petersen rely on a number of cases purportedly recognizing a teacher's substantive right to select teaching methods and materials. Sterzing v. Fort Bend Independent School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex. 1972), remanded for reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.1974); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D. Mass. 1971), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir.1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir.1969). All of these cases involve discharge or suspension stemming from a high school teacher either having provided materials with a controversial content or making allegedly profane or objectionable remarks to students. In each case, the court was attempting to protect both the right of the teacher, as speaker, and the right of the student to receive the communication. These cases are not in point, however. Here the students have expressly indicated they do not wish to participate in the Global Studies course. Petitioners' case is undercut because the right they assert is independent from the students' rights. Furthermore, in each of the above cited cases the court found a due process violation because the teaching method had not been proscribed before the nonretention or firing. Since these factors are not present in the instant case the value of those cases is questionable as precedent for a teacher's right to choose materials and methods. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1393 (suspension may be in order where teacher with notice uses a disapproved method not appropriate to teaching the subject). As noted above, controversial statements and methods of conveying a point underlie the cases cited by petitioners. In the case at bar, however, the content of specific communications is not actually involved. At most, the effect of the student preference registration system is to force Millikan to teach courses in a more conventional manner. He acknowledges that neither his specific course material nor his technique have been disapproved. Instead, only a broad methodology and course approach has, in effect, been forbidden. Arguably, judicial nonintervention is called for. This conflict does not directly and sharply implicate basic constitutional values. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104, 21 L.Ed.2d 228, 89 S.Ct. 266 (1968). But because of the novelty and importance of the question, we will directly confront the academic freedom issue. [1] The applicable cases take the position that a school district has authority to prescribe both course content and teaching methods. Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir.1975); Saunders v. Reorganized School Dist. 2, 520 S.W.2d 29 (Mo. 1975); Hetrick v. Martin, 480 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075, 38 L.Ed.2d 482, 94 S.Ct. 592 (1973); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir.1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972, 36 L.Ed.2d 695, 93 S.Ct. 2148 (1973). In Hetrick, a First Amendment challenge to contract nonrenewal, the school administration expected teachers to teach on a basic level, stressing fundamentals and and following conventional teaching patterns. Plaintiff's teaching, however, emphasized student responsibility, as well as freedom to organize class time and assignments in terms of student interest. In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky reasoned that while the First Amendment guaranty of academic freedom gives a teacher the right to encourage a vigorous exchange of ideas within the confines of the subject matter being taught, it does not require a University or school to tolerate any manner of teaching method the teacher may choose to employ. A University has a right to require some conformity with whatever teaching methods are acceptable to it. 480 F.2d at 707. On appeal, the teacher claimed a constitutional right to teach her students to think and argued the First Amendment protected her from termination for using teaching methods and adhering to a teaching philosophy that are well-recognized in the profession. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded plaintiff's rights had not been abridged by the refusal to rehire her because of her teaching philosophy. The court held academic freedom does not encompass the right of a nontenured teacher to have her teaching style insulated from review by her superiors ... just because her methods and philosophy are considered acceptable somewhere within the teaching profession. 480 F.2d at 709. Like the plaintiff in Hetrick, Millikan and Petersen have utilized unconventional but professionally recognized methods designed to teach the student to think. Notwithstanding this worthy objective, Hetrick indicates an educational institution may require some conformity in teaching methods. Under the reasoning in Hetrick, the respondent-defendant board's requirement that petitioners teach history classes in a conventional manner contrary to their own preferred teaching philosophy is not violative of their rights. In a similar vein, see Adams v. Campbell County School Dist., supra , in which nontenured high school teachers sued the school district following nonrenewal of their employment contracts. That court concluded that even though the teachers' methods may have had educational value, plaintiffs did not have an absolute constitutional right to use those methods in preference to more orthodox ones. See also Clark v. Holmes, supra , and Saunders v. Reorganized School Dist. 2, supra , which held the school board need not tolerate a significant deviation from prescribed course content or the course calendar. Accordingly, if Global Studies detracts from the scope of a conventional history course  because it emphasizes small groups, independent reading and writing, and inquiry-discovery techniques  petitioners may be compelled to abandon their own preferred techniques and to teach history in a more conventional manner. While teachers should have some measure of freedom in teaching techniques employed, they may not ignore or omit essential course material or disregard the course calendar. Millikan and Petersen characterize this controversy as one involving the right to choose a teaching method. Yet, Petersen's own affidavit stresses that unless the school district is enjoined there will be a tremendous loss of coverage and content. (Italics ours.) Paul G. Treckeme, supervisor of secondary social studies, states in his affidavit that Global Studies is significantly different both in subject matter content and teaching methodology from the traditional survey course. (Italics ours.) Further, a University of Washington professor familiar with Global Studies characterizes it as differing from the conventional history course as much as new math differs from traditional math. Consequently, it is clear Global Studies differs from the more conventional course of study in more than teaching method  it differs in coverage and content as well. Since significant course content differences exist and course content is manifestly a matter within the board's discretion, [2] petitioners' claims of academic freedom are not well taken. [3] Millikan and Petersen also assert the school board's actions violate their contractual right to academic freedom guaranteed by article III, section 3 of the Everett School District 1975-76 Handbook. It reads: General Statement Education can best be carried out in an atmosphere in which academic freedom for staff is encouraged and guaranteed with due consideration to the rights of the students and community in connection therewith. Suggested Procedures for Handling Complaints. The right of community involvement in matters or issues relating to academic freedom is herein recognized. It is recommended that citizen complaints relevant to academic freedom follow this procedure: In support of their secondary position petitioners cite In re Department of Educ., State of Hawaii and Hawaii State Teachers Ass'n, 66 Lab. Arb. 1221 (1976) (Tsukiyama, Arb.), a case based primarily on the need to foster and preserve the students' right to hear and learn even controversial subjects and issues. The Hawaii decision is inapposite, however. Here, students' right to hear and learn are not directly involved. The contract provision in question  which clearly contemplates complaints over books and other controversial materials  does not support the teachers' position that being assigned to teach conventional history courses violates their right to academic freedom.