Opinion ID: 1818950
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the Trial Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied a Motion to Sever Counts Against the Defendant, or Alternatively, in Refusing to Allow the Defendant to Stipulate to a Prior Conviction of Armed Robbery.

Text: ¶ 31. For issues of severance, this Court applies an abuse-of-discretion standard of review. Rushing v. State, 911 So.2d 526, 532 (Miss.2005). This Court fully discussed the applicable case law in Rushing. Mississippi law allows for both multi-count indictments and multi-offense trials under certain circumstances. In trials concerning multi-count indictments, severance is unnecessary in Mississippi if the acts or transactions are connected together as part of a common scheme or plan and if the indictment was otherwise proper. Miss.Code Ann. § 99-7-2 (Rev. 2000) states in pertinent part: (1) Two (2) or more offenses which are triable in the same court may be charged in the same indictment with a separate count for each offense if: (a) the offenses are based on the same act or transaction; or (b) the offenses are based on two (2) or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan. (2) Where two (2) or more offenses are properly charged in separate counts of a single indictment, all such charges may be tried in a single proceeding. The Mississippi Uniform Rules of Circuit and County Court Practice (URCCC) likewise address multi-count indictments. The provisions of URCCC 7.07(A.) & (B.) are identical to the above statutory language. Rushing v. State, 911 So.2d 526, 532-33 (Miss.2005). ¶ 32. In the present case, Williams presented a motion to sever or in the alternative to stipulate to a prior conviction on the first day of trial, outside the presence of the jurors and prior to opening statements. Williams's indictment included three counts: (1) armed robbery, (2) kidnapping, and (3) convicted felon in possession of a firearm. Williams argued in his motion that count three should be severed because his prior conviction was one of armed robbery. Williams asserted that if the State were required to present proof beyond a reasonable doubt of this prior conviction, such would constitute prejudice so great as to affect the fair determination of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. ¶ 33. The issue was discussed at trial as follows: BY MS. GIBSON [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, the defense has two motions. The first motion is a motion to sever. . . . Michael Wayne Williams is indicted in 06-0-072 with three counts, count one armed robbery, count two kidnapping and count three possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. In order for the State to be able to prove that he has a possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, they obviously have to prove he is a convicted felon. His prior felony conviction is for armed robbery, and our contention is that to allow them to go forward with count three in the same trial as count one and two would be extremely prejudicial because he's convicted of armed robbery, and he's on trial for armed robbery in this case. We're moving under Rule 9.03 of the Uniform Circuit and Chancery Court Rules, and, as I have said previously, I do not know what the interplay is between Mississippi Code 99-7-2 and Uniform Circuit and Chancery Court Rule 7.07. Of course, those are the rules that allow for multi-count indictments. And we are not saying that this indictment is defective in any way. I don't think we even need a Corley hearing. We admit that these transactions are interwoven. I could not find a single case where our Supreme Court or Court of Appeals has made any pronouncement about how 9.03 is to interact with 99-7-2 and 7.07. But Rule 9.03 says that the Court may grant a severance of offenses when if before trial it is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the defendant's guilt or innocence of each offense. And our contention is that the jury will not be able to fairly determine whether he is guilty of armed robbery in this case when they hear that he had a prior armed robbery conviction. If the state denies our request to sever count three, we would like to go on and offer to stipulate to the fact that he has a prior felony conviction, and we have a stipulation prepared. BY THE COURT: All right. Response by the State. BY MS. MANSELL [COUNSEL FOR THE STATE]: Your Honor, as I argued previously, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have repeatedly said in Carter v. State , which was rehearing denied August 15, 2006, that when a person has been convicted of a felony and they're charged with possession of a firearm by a convicted . . . felon, it is clear when a prior conviction is an element of the crime, the State is authorized to introduce evidence of the conviction and is not limited in its method of proof in that we do not have to stipulate. We can put that prior conviction in or put testimony in to prove that he is a prior conviction felon. In Evans v. State, 802 So.2d 137, again it clearly says the statute does not limit the State to proving a single prior felony conviction or methods by which it may prove the prior conviction. The only difference is that they are asking for a limiting instruction. Obviously, we would not object to that, and case law is clear that we're entitled to prove the prior convictions as part of the elements of the crime. BY THE COURT: All right. Any reply by the defendant? BY MS. GIBSON [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, only that I certainly don't disagree with that. That is what the case law says, and that's why we're trying to sever count three. If we're not allowed to sever count three and the State will not agree to a stipulation, then I certainly agree that's how they are able to prove it, and that's when we would like to offer our limiting motion instruction to the Court if our motion is denied. BY THE COURT: All right. Well, consistent with this Court's previous ruling last week, the Court is going to deny this motion on the part of the defendant based upon the case authority cited by the State, which is very strong support of the State's position in opposing this motion. And, also, this Court under Rule 9.03 is given discretion to severance or not. The Court doesn't believe that there is any unfair prejudice under the circumstances and, also, in the interest of judicial economy, but, more importantly, the Court does not believe it's unfairly prejudicial under circumstances, and even more important than that, the case authority cited by the State is quite persuasive that the correct ruling of the Court is to deny the motion of the defendant. So a limiting order or instruction will be given if requested by the defendant. ¶ 34. The below limiting instruction was given following testimony of Williams's prior armed robbery conviction: BY THE COURT: Members of the jury, I am going to read you what is known as a limiting instruction at this time. You have heard testimony that the defendant Michael Wayne Williams has been convicted of a felony. You may only use this testimony to determine whether or not Mr. Williams is a convicted felon for purposes of count three of the indictment, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Court instructs you that this testimony must not be used as evidence of guilt as to counts one and two of the indictment, armed robbery and kidnapping. ¶ 35. In light of the fact that the counts are interwoven, a limiting instruction was given. Giving the trial court the deference it should be afforded, we find it acted within its discretion when it denied Williams's Motion to sever count three, convicted felon in possession of a firearm. ¶ 36. With regard to Williams's motion to stipulate to his prior conviction, Williams argued that introduction of his prior armed robbery to prove count three of the indictment would unfairly prejudice the jury to convict him on the current armed robbery charge, count one. Williams cited no case law before the trial court, but on appeal argues that Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 117 S.Ct. 644, 136 L.Ed.2d 574 (1997) ( Old Chief I ) is dispositive of the issue. ¶ 37. The State argued before the trial court that where a prior conviction is an element of the crime, the State is authorized to introduce evidence of the conviction and is not limited in its method of proof. The State cited Carter v. State, 941 So.2d 846, 854 (Miss.Ct.App.2006) and Evans v. State, 802 So.2d 137, 140 (Miss.Ct.App. 2001) as support for its argument. The State incorrectly argued at trial that these cases were Mississippi Supreme Court cases. On appeal, the State correctly identified the cases as having been heard by the Court of Appeals. The State did not respond in any way to the citation of Old Chief I. ¶ 38. In denying Williams's motions to sever or in the alternative to stipulate, the trial judge stated, The Court doesn't believe that there is any unfair prejudice under the circumstances and also, in the interest of judicial economy, but, more importantly, the Court does not believe it's unfairly prejudicial under the circumstances, and even more important than that, the case authority cited by the State is quite persuasive that the Court is to deny the motion of the defendant. ¶ 39. In Old Chief I, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings where a district court had allowed the State to introduce evidence of a defendant's prior conviction over the defendant's objection and where the defendant had offered to stipulate to his prior conviction. Old Chief I, 519 U.S. at 172, 117 S.Ct. 644. On remand, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals stated, Regardless of the defendant's offer to stipulate, the government is entitled to prove a prior felony offense through introduction of probative evidence. See United States v. Breitkreutz, 8 F.3d 688, 690 (9th Cir.1993). Under Ninth Circuit law, a stipulation is not proof, and, thus, it has no place in the FRE 403 balancing process. . . . Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the prosecution to introduce evidence of Old Chief's prior conviction to prove that element of the unlawful possession charge. United States v. Old Chief, 121 F.3d 448, 449 (9th Cir.1997) ( Old Chief II ) (remanded for resentencing on unrelated grounds)(internal citations omitted). ¶ 40. This Court discussed Old Chief I in Rigby v. State, 826 So.2d 694 (Miss.2002). This Court was faced therein with an offer to stipulate to prior DUI convictions in a felony DUI case. The Court affirmed the conviction and held that Prior DUI convictions are elements of a felony DUI charge and are required to be submitted to a jury. Rigby, 826 So.2d at 702. Rigby expressly distinguished Old Chief I based on the charged offense, opining that, the nature of convictions that are elements of felony DUI is important. Id. The Court stated, Old Chief is essentially the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Thus, in the very specific instance of a defendant charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, the Court found that the underlying felony, while an element of the crime, was irrelevant. In a felony DUI case, the nature of the underlying felonies is extremely relevant as only prior DUI convictions will justify the charge. Thus, Rigby's suggestion that we extend Old Chief 's reasoning to DUI cases is more like attempting to fit a size six shoe on a size ten foot. It can not be done! . . . Despite this finding, certain procedural safeguards are warranted if a defendant offers to stipulate to previous DUI convictions. The trial court should accept such stipulations, and they should be submitted to the jury with a proper limiting instruction. The instruction should explain to the jury that the prior DUI convictions should be considered for the sole purpose of determining whether the defendant is guilty of felony DUI and that such evidence should not be considered in determining whether the defendant acted in conformity with such convictions in the presently charged offense. See United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401 (5th Cir.1998). . . . [T]he impact of the evidence of prior bad acts must be lightened as much as possible. Thus, if a defendant stipulates to the prior DUI convictions, a limiting instruction accomplishes this goal. Rigby, 826 So.2d at 700-03 (emphasis in original). Where evidence of a prior conviction is a necessary element of the crime for which the defendant is on trial (i.e., possession of firearm by a convicted felon), but evidence of the specific nature of the crime for which the defendant was previously convicted (i.e., armed robbery), is not an essential element of the crime for which the defendant is on trial, as it is in DUI cases, the trial court should accept a defendant's offer to stipulate and grant a limiting instruction. ¶ 41. The count to which Williams sought to stipulate was, for all practical purposes, the same as that in Old Chief, possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Old Chief I, 519 U.S. at 174, 117 S.Ct. 644. Furthermore, Carter and Evans, the cases cited by the State and relied upon by the trial court, where handed down prior to Rigby. More importantly, in neither of those cases did the defendants offer a stipulation. In the present case, the trial court gave Williams's limiting instruction, but denied his motion to stipulate. In light of this Court's interpretation of Old Chief I in Rigby, the trial court erred when it denied Williams's offer to stipulate to his prior conviction. ¶ 42. It is especially important to allow a stipulation when a defendant is being prosecuted on multiple offenses. When a prosecutor is faced with a scenario like this one, where the underlying conviction supporting a charge of possession of a firearm by felon is the same or similar to one of the other offenses charged, then the prosecutor must articulate a reason to justify denying a defendant's offer to stipulate. The reason must illustrate why the probative value is not substantially outweighed by the potential prejudice. ¶ 43. However, [f]ew, if any, prosecutions have been perfect, and there can be errorseven errors of constitutional proportionswhich do not require reversal of a conviction. Tran, 962 So.2d at 1246. Where an error is deemed harmless, reversal is not warranted. Id. at 1247. In the present case, we find the denial of Williams's offer to stipulate to his prior armed robbery conviction to be harmless error. Williams's conviction is supported by overwhelming evidence including the victim's photo line-up identification, the victim's testimony, as well as corroborating gas station surveillance videotape, and 911 audiotape. Although the trial court erred in denying the offer to stipulate, in light of the overwhelming evidence, the error is harmless.
¶ 44. [A] motion in limine should be granted only when the trial court finds two factors are present (1) the material or evidence in question will be inadmissible at a trial under the rules of evidence; and (2) the mere offer, reference, or statements made during trial concerning the material will tend to prejudice the jury. Hersick v. State, 904 So.2d 116, 127 (Miss.2004)(internal quotations omitted). ¶ 45. Williams argued at trial that reference to the fact that the vehicle in which he was arrested was allegedly stolen was irrelevant to the charges brought by the State and should not be admitted as it was extremely prejudicial. Williams contends that any reference should have been excluded under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403 as irrelevant or under Rule 404(b) as evidence of another bad act. ¶ 46. The State responded at trial that the introduction of evidence referring to the vehicle as stolen, was admissible under an exception to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b), specifically identity; that Williams's arrest in the stolen vehicle led to the identification of his involvement with the crimes charged, and the State has a right to tell a continuous story. ¶ 47. The trial court, in denying Williams's motion in limine, stated, [I]t is the Court's opinion that this was interlinked with the identification of this running the tag on this Lexus, white Lexus, and running the tag led directly to the identification of this defendant in connection with the subject crime that he's charged with that we're in trial today. ¶ 48. The general rule is that evidence of a crime, other than the one for which the accused is being tried, is not admissible. Palmer v. State, 939 So.2d 792, 795 (Miss.2006). However, there are exceptions to this general rule as provided by Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b): Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. ¶ 49. Evidence of other crimes or bad acts also is admissible to tell the complete story so as not to confuse the jury. Palmer, 939 So.2d at 795; Ballenger v. State, 667 So.2d 1242, 1257 (Miss.1995). [T]he State has a legitimate interest in telling a rational and coherent story of what happened. Where substantially necessary to present to the jury the complete story of the crime, evidence or testimony may be given even though it may reveal or suggest other crimes. Palmer, 939 So.2d at 795 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). ¶ 50. Even where evidence of other crimes is admissible under M.R.E. 404(b), it can not be admitted unless it also passes muster under M.R.E. 403. That is, the risk of undue prejudice must not substantially outweigh its probative value. Ballenger, 667 So.2d at 1257. In the present case, evidence of Williams's arrest in a stolen vehicle was introduced to explain why he was arrested, how his picture came to be part of the photograph lineup, and how he ultimately was linked with the crimes charged. Furthermore, this evidence was essential to provide the jury with a complete story of the events that led to Williams's being identified as the person who perpetrated the crimes charged. Evidence of the stolen vehicle was admissible under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 404(b) and Mississippi case law. In addition, said evidence was probative to show Williams was involved in the armed robbery, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The probative value of this evidence was not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.