Opinion ID: 785396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Severe or Pervasive Hostile Environment

Text: 36 In determining if an environment is so hostile as to violate Title VII, we consider whether, in light of all the circumstances, Nichols v. Aztec Rest. Enter., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir.2001), the harassment is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 106 S.Ct. 2399 (internal brackets and quotation marks removed). The Supreme Court has followed a middle path with regard to the level of hostility or abuse necessary to establish a hostile work environment. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993). Simply causing an employee offense based on an isolated comment is not sufficient to create actionable harassment under Title VII. Id. However, the harassment need not cause diagnosed psychological injury. Id. at 22, 114 S.Ct. 367. It is enough if such hostile conduct pollutes the victim's workplace, making it more difficult for her to do her job, to take pride in her work, and to desire to stay on in her position. Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1463. 37 A plaintiff must show that the work environment was both subjectively and objectively hostile. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 871-72. Subjective hostility is clearly established in the instant case through McGinest's unrebutted testimony and his complaints to supervisors and to the EEOC. Id. at 873. 38 In evaluating the objective hostility of a work environment, the factors to be considered include the frequency of discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 872 (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. at 23, 114 S.Ct. 367). The required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Considering the facts in the light most favorable to McGinest, 5 it is clear that the incidents described are sufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment. According to McGinest, he was involved in a serious automobile accident because, due to his race, both his supervisor and garage personnel were unwilling to ensure that his vehicle received necessary maintenance. He was forced to work in dangerous situations and barraged with insults and abuse by, among others, Supervisor Noson. 6 Over a two-year period, he was prevented from collecting overtime pay that he worked. 7 McGinest's ability to perform his job was directly affected by the refusal of his coworkers to work under his direction on occasion. 39 Additionally, McGinest was subjected to extreme racial insults, as well as more subtle taunts, by supervisors and coworkers. Racist graffiti such as nigger and white is right regularly appeared in the bathroom and on equipment, and on one occasion a management-level employee called McGinest stupid nigger to his face. Although it is clear that [n]ot every insult or harassing comment will constitute a hostile work environment, [r]epeated derogatory or humiliating statements ... can constitute a hostile work environment. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir.2000). 40 In evaluating the significance of the statements in question, we consider the objective hostility of the workplace from the perspective of the plaintiff. Nichols, 256 F.3d at 872; Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir.1991). In Ellison, in the context of sexual harassment, we evaluated objective hostility from the perspective of a reasonable woman. As the Supreme Court has noted, Hostile work environment claims based on racial harassment are reviewed under the same standard as those based on sexual harassment. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. at 116 n. 10, 122 S.Ct. 2061. We now state explicitly what was clear from our holding in Ellison, that allegations of a racially hostile workplace must be assessed from the perspective of a reasonable person belonging to the racial or ethnic group of the plaintiff. 8 41 In Ellison we noted that [a] complete understanding of the victim's view requires, among other things, an analysis of the different perspectives of men and women. 924 F.2d at 878. We explained: 42 because women are disproportionately victims of rape and sexual assault, women have a stronger incentive to be concerned with sexual behavior. Women who are victims of mild forms of sexual harassment may understandably worry whether a harasser's conduct is merely a prelude to violent sexual assault. Men, who are rarely victims of sexual assault, may view sexual conduct in a vacuum without a full appreciation of the social setting or the underlying threat of violence that a woman may perceive. 43 Id. at 879 (citations omitted). Our analysis of the importance of interpreting gender discrimination from the perspective of a reasonable woman reverberates powerfully in the context of racial harassment. See Stingley v. Arizona, 796 F.Supp. 424, 428-29 (D.Ariz.1992) (noting that  Ellison's reasoning may be applied seamlessly to racist environment claims, and implementing a reasonable person of the same gender and race or color standard). 44 Racially motivated comments or actions may appear innocent or only mildly offensive to one who is not a member of the targeted group, but in reality be intolerably abusive or threatening when understood from the perspective of a plaintiff who is a member of the targeted group. The omnipresence of race-based attitudes and experiences in the lives of black Americans [may cause] even nonviolent events to be interpreted as degrading, threatening, and offensive. Harris v. Int'l Paper Co., 765 F.Supp. 1509, 1516 (D.Me.1991) (noting that instances of racial violence or threatened violence which might appear to white observers as mere `pranks' are, to black observers, evidence of threatening, pervasive attitudes), vacated in part on other grounds, 765 F.Supp. 1529 (D.Me. 1991); see also id. (discussing racial jokes, comments or nonviolent conduct which white observers are ... more likely to dismiss as nonthreatening isolated incidents); Dickerson v. State of New Jersey Dep't of Human Serv., 767 F.Supp. 605, 616 (D.N.J.1991) (The mere mention of the KKK invokes a long and violent history sufficient to detrimentally affect any reasonable person of the same race as the plaintiff.) (emphasis in original). Title VII tolerates no racial discrimination, subtle or otherwise. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). By considering both the existence and the severity of discrimination from the perspective of a reasonable person of the plaintiff's race, we recognize forms of discrimination that are real and hurtful, and yet may be overlooked if considered solely from the perspective of an adjudicator belonging to a different group than the plaintiff. 45 It is beyond question that the use of the word nigger is highly offensive and demeaning, evoking a history of racial violence, brutality, and subordination. This word is perhaps the most offensive and inflammatory racial slur in English, ... a word expressive of racial hatred and bigotry. Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 817 (9th Cir.2001) (ellipsis in original) (quotation marks omitted); see also Daso v. The Grafton School, Inc., 181 F.Supp.2d 485, 493 (D.Md.2002) (The word `nigger' is more than [a] `mere offensive utterance'.... No word in the English language is as odious or loaded with as terrible a history.); NLRB v. Foundry Div. of Alcon Indus., Inc., 260 F.3d 631, 635 n. 5 (6th Cir.2001) (That the word `nigger' is a slur is not debatable.). Perhaps no single act can more quickly alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working environment than the use of an unambiguously racial epithet such as `nigger' by a supervisor in the presence of his subordinates. Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 675 (7th Cir.1993) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The direct verbal attack on McGinest and the prevalence of graffiti containing a racial slur evocative of lynchings and racial hierarchy are significant exacerbating factors in evaluating the severity of the racial hostility. 9 46 The district court observed that there was little evidence of racial animus for a number of the incidents described by McGinest, noting with approval GTE's contention that there is no necessary association between African Americans and drug dealers. However, the Third Circuit has explained persuasively that the use of `code words' can, under circumstances such as we encounter here, violate Title VII. Aman v. Cort Furniture Rental Corp., 85 F.3d 1074, 1083 (3d Cir.1996). The Third Circuit went on to note: 47 [A] reasonable jury could conclude that the intent to discriminate is implicit in these comments. There are no talismanic expressions which must be invoked as a condition-precedent to the application of laws designed to protect against discrimination. The words themselves are only relevant for what they reveal — the intent of the speaker. A reasonable jury could find that statements like the ones allegedly made in this case send a clear message and carry the distinct tone of racial motivations and implications. They could be seen as conveying the message that members of a particular race are disfavored and that members of that race are, therefore, not full and equal members of the workplace. 48 Id. (citations omitted). 10 The reference to McGinest as a drug dealer might certainly be deemed to be a code word or phrase. In fact, reported cases have recognized the racial motivations behind this and other comments and slurs experienced by McGinest. See, e.g., Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc., 937 F.2d 1264, 1273 (7th Cir.1991) (noting that employer engaged in a not-so-subtle attempt to link drugs ... with the plaintiff simply because he is black); Swinton, 270 F.3d at 799 (noting that a [r]eference to `Pontiac' as an acronym for `Poor old nigger thinks it's a Cadillac' was a racially offensive joke); Jones v. City of Overland Park, 1994 WL 583153 (D.Kan.1994) (recognizing reference to plaintiff as Aunt Jemima as one factor in hostile environment). GTE's attempt to deny the possible racial overtones of many of the comments made to McGinest or uttered in his presence indicates a willful blindness to racial stereotyping. 49 The district court discounted the insults and hostile actions directed at McGinest by both Noson and DeLeon, reasoning that because Ketchum, a white worker, was also targeted, this behavior did not constitute actionable racial harassment. The district court erred in ignoring these interactions for several reasons. First, if racial hostility pervades a workplace, a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII, even if such hostility was not directly targeted at the plaintiff. See, e.g., Woods, 925 F.2d at 1202 (holding that work environment was racially hostile where Woods was surrounded by racial hostility, and subjected directly to some of it); Stingley, 796 F.Supp. at 426, 428 (finding racial and sexual harassment based in part on use of racist nicknames and slurs about another worker in presence of plaintiff); Kishaba v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 737 F.Supp. 549, 554 (D.Haw. 1990) (Even if Plaintiff herself was never the object of racial harassment, she might nevertheless have a Title VII claim if she were forced to work in an atmosphere in which such harassment was pervasive.). McGinest testified at his deposition that DeLeon directed racially charged comments at Ketchum specifically in order to anger McGinest. If racial animus motivates a harasser to make provocative comments in the presence of an individual in order to anger and harass him, such comments are highly relevant in evaluating the creation of a hostile work environment, regardless of the identity of the person to whom the comments were superficially directed. 50 Secondly, our case law is clear that the fact that an individual consistently abused men and women alike provides no defense to an accusation of sexual harassment. Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1463; see also id. at 1464. DeLeon's use of racially charged words to goad both black and white employees makes his conduct more outrageous, not less so; as in Steiner, were the conduct sufficiently severe or pervasive it might indeed raise the possibility that Ketchum himself could raise a claim of discrimination. Id. 51 Thirdly, the district court overlooked testimony that Ketchum was harassed because of his association with black employees. Title VII has ... been held to protect against adverse employment actions taken because of the employee's close association with black friends or coworkers.... ARTHUR LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, § 51.02 (2d ed.2003); cf. Taylor v. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co., 966 F.2d 1188 (7th Cir.1992) (affirming Title VII judgment for employee subjected to discrimination because of interracial marriage); Brosmore v. City of Covington, 1993 WL 762881 (E.D.Ky.1993) (noting significance under Title VII of detriment due to interracial association). Ketchum was not harassed for being white, nor were racial slurs mocking or insulting whiteness directed at him. Instead, the evidence suggests that he was harassed for making friendships that crossed racial lines, and for his acts of solidarity. 11 Hostile conduct that attempts to sever or punish only those friendships that are interracial might certainly pollute[] the victim's workplace, Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1463, and the district court erred in failing to consider this fact. 52 For purposes of summary judgment, McGinest persuasively demonstrates that he was subjected to a hostile work environment. He has presented evidence that over the past ten to fifteen years several racial incidents occurred each year, ranging in severity from being called racially derogatory names to experiencing a potentially life-threatening accident. As even the dissent recognizes, McGinest has raised a genuine issue of material fact with regard to the existence of a racially hostile workplace.