Opinion ID: 1180819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Resulting Injury

Text: This court has rejected the theory that providers have not proximately caused injuries caused by those provided with alcohol. [T]he court's analysis of proximate cause changed from `the drinking of the liquor is the proximate cause of the injury' to `the furnishing of the liquor is the proximate cause of the injury.' Dickinson, at 461. In the hypothetical, the host has thus proximately caused the pedestrian's injuries. I choose not to discuss the issue of allocation of damages between hosts and guests in the absence of that issue in this case. It requires no extension of existing tort principles to impose liability on social hosts who have put their guests in no position to drive. If the actor does an act, and subsequently realizes or should realize that it has created an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to another, he is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from taking effect. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 321(1), at 132 (1965). In Robertson v. LeMaster, ___ W. Va. ___, 301 S.E.2d 563 (1983), the West Virginia Supreme Court found an employer liable under this common law principle for encouraging an employee to work unreasonably long hours and then sending him out on the highway in an exhausted condition. As one commentator noted in comparing Robertson with the social host situation: In both instances, the driver's condition is a natural and foreseeable result of the host's or employer's actions, which the host or employer should realize have created a dangerous situation. Although a tired or intoxicated driver always has the option not to drive, in many cases her condition may be such that she does not recognize that option. The Robertson court did not suggest that the employer should have prevented the employee from driving; it did suggest, however, that the employer should have provided the employee with an alternative. Comment, Social Hosts and Drunken Drivers: A Duty To Intervene?, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 867, 890 (1985). Because all the elements of a negligence cause of action are present in the social host hypothetical presented above, the majority's denial of compensation to victims injured as a proximate result of the host's unreasonable actions must rest on some sort of immunity. The courts and Legislature in this state are very reluctant to grant immunity for tortious conduct, absent very compelling public interests. Some traditional common law immunities have been abolished in the interest of providing just remedies. Thus the interest of preserving peace and tranquility of the home was found insufficient justification to perpetuate inter-spousal immunity in Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wn.2d 183, 187, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). The need of financial encouragement and protection of charitable institutions was found insufficient justification to perpetuate charitable immunity in Friend v. Cove Methodist Church, Inc., 65 Wn.2d 174, 176, 396 P.2d 546 (1964). Sovereign immunity was statutorily abolished. RCW 4.96.010. Where the Legislature has enacted statutory immunities, it is generally in response to a compelling social need. Thus, providers of emergency care are immune from ordinary negligence suits under RCW 4.24.300. Reporters of child abuse are immune from suit under RCW 26.44.060. This court grants immunity to parties and counsel for allegedly libelous statements made in the course of judicial proceedings based on a public policy of granting them utmost freedom to secure justice. McNeal v. Allen, 95 Wn.2d 265, 267, 621 P.2d 1285 (1980). The majority cites no compelling public policy, even in its dicta, for granting immunity to social hosts. The only justification the majority offers for granting immunity to social hosts where commercial providers have no such immunity is that the latter are only a narrow slice of our population, [whereas] social host liability would touch most adults in the state on a frequent basis. Majority, at 387. This is not a proper basis for granting tort immunity. The entire population of this state is liable for the foreseeable consequences of unreasonable behavior. Commercial hosts are liable to parties injured as a result of their serving alcohol to obviously intoxicated patrons. E.g., Dickinson. There is no logical reason to deny recovery to victims injured as a proximate result of equally unreasonable actions by social hosts. Indeed, I must now agree with Justice Durham's statement in her dissent in Dickinson, [T]he inevitable extension of the majority rationale dictates a finding of liability for a social host. Dickinson, at 489. The consequences to the victims are the same, whether the driver's host was commercial or social. And there is no convincing reason to see the host's responsibility to the victim any differently based on whether he or she benefits commercially from serving alcohol. See Comment, Social Hosts and Drunken Drivers: A Duty To Intervene?, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 867, 869 (1985). The majority seems concerned that hosts will worry they will be held liable for serving guests that are not obviously intoxicated. The majority thus poses a fretful list of inquiries that hosts presumably would make if confronted with liability. Can the host determine if a guest is drinking on an empty stomach? ... Is it necessary to gauge a guest's weight and height in order to determine allowable amounts of alcohol? ... Before guests depart, should the host ... [ask] them to recite the alphabet or walk a straight line? ... Majority, at 384-85. This list, while entertaining, is irrelevant. There is no issue of liability of social hosts that serve alcohol to guests who cleverly hide their intoxication. As with the existing liability of commercial hosts, social host liability is not asserted to attach except where the guest is obviously [7] intoxicated. See, e.g., Dickinson. That some hosts may have a groundless worry about whether they will be found liable when their guests are not in fact obviously intoxicated is trivial. The justice in compensating victims injured or killed as a proximate result of hosts serving truly obviously intoxicated guests alcohol and then failing to deter their driving on public roads is compelling. Although, by definition, it will be obvious to social hosts when their guests are obviously intoxicated, it will not always be clear to the hosts what steps to take in response to such guests intending to drive away from the social event. I recognize that it is not uncommon for intoxicated persons to be very assertive of their desire to drive, and some might become intimidating to their hosts. We have all heard of belligerent drunks. Kelly, at 567 (Garibaldi, J., dissenting). On the other end of the spectrum, it might be merely embarrassing to the host to point out to a guest that the guest would be better to temporarily refrain from driving. I propose the following standards to determine if a host has acted reasonably: 1. Liability attaches only where the social host has provided an obviously intoxicated guest with alcohol. The host has no liability if the guest has consumed the alcohol before arriving, or has imbibed his or her own alcohol while on the host's premises without the host's knowledge. 2. Liability attaches only where the host knows or has reason to know the guest intends to drive a motor vehicle away from the host's premises. 3. Hosts should verbally express to obviously intoxicated guests that the host does not wish the guest to drive while in that condition. Hosts should present reasonable alternatives to such guests: e.g., letting the guest stay until no longer impaired, providing alternative means of transportation, or lending money for taxi fare. 4. In no case is a host liable for failing to perform acts that might endanger his or her physical well being. See Comment, Recognizing the Liability of Social Hosts Who Knowingly Allow Intoxicated Guests To Drive: Limits to Socially Acceptable Behavior, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 389, 403 (1985). 5. Social embarrassment alone is not an excuse for failing to take reasonable steps to deter the guest from driving. Comment, 60 Wash. L. Rev., at 403. These standards give hosts a choice. They can either refrain from providing alcohol to guests that are obviously intoxicated, or they can take reasonable steps to prevent such guests from driving. The standards certainly do not impose an onerous burden on hosts. I believe responsible hosts follow these or higher standards already.