Opinion ID: 814980
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sufficiency of the Evidence for Castro’s

Text: Conviction for False Statements Before addressing either of Castro‟s first two contentions, we must first determine whether his appellate 14 waiver bars us from even considering them. As part of his plea agreement, Castro generally agreed that he would neither appeal nor present any collateral challenge to his conviction or sentence. In pertinent part, the appellate waiver provides that, “[i]n exchange for the undertakings made by the government in entering this plea agreement, the defendant voluntarily and expressly waives all rights to appeal or collaterally attack the defendant‟s conviction, sentence, or any other matter relating to this prosecution[.]” (App. at 127.) The waiver does, however, contain two exceptions that are relevant to this appeal: first, the waiver does not “bar the assertion of constitutional claims that the relevant case law holds cannot be waived” (App. at 127); and, second, the waiver allows appeal for “claims that … the sentencing judge, exercising the Court‟s discretion pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), imposed an unreasonable sentence above the final Sentencing Guideline range determined by the Court.” (App. at 128.) “We exercise plenary review in deciding whether an issue raised by a defendant falls within the scope of an appellate waiver in his plea agreement.” United States v. Goodson, 544 F.3d 529, 537 n.6 (3d Cir. 2008). When “the government invokes an appellate-waiver provision … , we must determine as a threshold matter whether … [that] waiver prevents us from exercising our jurisdiction to review the merits of the defendant‟s appeal.” United States v. Corso, 549 F.3d 921, 926 (3d Cir. 2008) (citations omitted). “We decline to exercise jurisdiction over the appeal where [1] the issues on appeal fall within the scope of the waiver and [2] the defendant knowingly and voluntarily agreed to the waiver, unless [3] „enforcing the waiver would work a miscarriage of justice.‟” United States v. Saferstein, 673 F.3d 237, 242 (3d 15 Cir. 2012) (quoting Corso, 549 F.3d at 927); accord United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315, 1325 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). Under the first prong, we evaluate the language of the appellate waiver to determine if the disputed appeal falls within its scope. We follow the “well-established principle that plea agreements, although arising in the criminal context, are analyzed under contract law standards.” Goodson, 544 F.3d at 535 n.3 (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]n light of those standards, the language of an appellate waiver, like the language of a contract, matters greatly to our analysis[.] [S]uch waivers must be strictly construed.” Corso, 549 F.3d at 927 (citation, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted); cf. United States v. Williams, 510 F.3d 416, 422 (3d Cir. 2007) (“In view of the government‟s tremendous bargaining power courts will strictly construe the text [of a plea agreement] against the government when it has drafted the agreement.” (alterations omitted)). “But we are also mindful that under contract principles, a plea agreement necessarily works both ways. Not only must the government comply with its terms and conditions, but so must the defendant.” Corso, 549 U.S. at 927 (citations, alteration, and internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, a defendant cannot “get the benefits of his plea bargain, while evading the costs because contract law would not support such a result.” Id. (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). The second step in reviewing an appellate waiver is to determine whether the waiver is knowing and voluntary. “[T]he role of the sentencing judge is critical” in that regard, United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 563 (3d Cir. 2001), 16 because rule 11(b)(1)(N) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that Before accepting a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, … the court must address the defendant personally in open court. During this address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the defendant understands the following: … the terms of any plea- agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1)(N). We have held that “a statement made by the sentencing court during the [plea] colloquy can create ambiguity where none exists in the plain text of the plea agreement,” Saferstein, 673 F.3d at 243, and such ambiguity may result in a narrow construction of an appellate waiver, “to protect the defendant as the weaker bargaining party,” id. The third and last step is to determine whether enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. When a waiver encompasses the issue on appeal and was entered knowingly and voluntarily, it must be enforced except in the “unusual circumstance” of “an error amounting to a miscarriage of justice.” Khattak, 273 F.3d 562. Certain factors weigh in the determination of whether a given error meets that standard: [T]he clarity of the error, its gravity, its character (e.g., whether it concerns a fact issue, a sentencing guideline, or a statutory 17 maximum), the impact of the error on the defendant, the impact of correcting the error on the government, and the extent to which the defendant acquiesced in the result. Id. at 563 (internal quotation marks omitted). Courts apply the “miscarriage of justice” exception “sparingly and without undue generosity,” United States v. Wilson, 429 F.3d 455, 458 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted), but with the aim of avoiding “manifest injustice,” United States v. Gwinnett, 483 F.3d 200, 206 (3d Cir. 2007).6 6 It is not enough that an issue be meritorious: [B]y waiving the right to appeal, a defendant necessarily waives the opportunity to challenge the sentence imposed, regardless of the merits. … A waiver of the right to appeal includes a waiver of the right to appeal difficult or debatable legal issues – indeed, it includes a waiver of the right to appeal blatant error. Waiver would be nearly meaningless if it included only those appeals that border on the frivolous. … While it may appear unjust to allow criminal defendants to bargain away meritorious appeals, such is the necessary consequence of a system in which the right to appeal may be freely traded. Khattak, 273 F.3d at 561-62 (internal quotation marks omitted). 18
This case presents a procedural anomaly. Ordinarily, plea agreements are entered before any trial in a case, but Castro entered his plea agreement in anticipation of a second trial, after he had been tried once and convicted on one of ten counts. Our first task in determining whether Castro‟s appellate waiver should be enforced to prevent him from challenging his conviction for the crime charged in Count Three is to determine whether the waiver even encompasses that conviction. Castro asserts that the language of the appellate waiver does not clearly apply to his conviction at trial. Because plea agreements are to be “strictly construed” against the government, Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562, he says that his appellate waiver should not apply to his conviction on Count Three. He cannot, however, wish away the words of the waiver. The plea agreement provides that Castro “voluntarily and expressly waives all rights to appeal or collaterally attack [his] conviction, sentence, or any other matter relating to this prosecution.” (App. at 127.) The breadth of the phrase “any other matter relating to this prosecution” surely encompasses Castro‟s earlier conviction on Count Three, and Castro‟s attempt to argue otherwise is unavailing.
But understanding the linguistic scope of the waiver is only the first step in determining whether the waiver applies. Castro claims that, during the Rule 11 colloquy, the District Court did not mention his earlier conviction, and that he was therefore under the impression that the waiver did not apply 19 to that conviction. Instead, says Castro, the Court consistently emphasized that he was giving up his right to a second trial and the right to appeal his sentence. Thus, Castro argues, “it is at least reasonable to conclude that the plea agreement did not concern the count on which there had already been a full trial.” (Appellant‟s Reply Br. at 5.) Although he does not say so explicitly, Castro appears to be seeking shelter in our precedent that a judge‟s affirmative statements during a plea colloquy can sometimes overcome the otherwise plain terms of a plea agreement.7 Such judge-created “ambiguity” must be construed “against the government,” Saferstein, 673 F.3d at 243, because, “[i]f it is reasonable to rely upon the court‟s words for clarification, then we cannot expect a defendant to distinguish and disregard those statements of the court that deviate from the language of a particular provision in a lengthy plea agreement,” United States v. Wilken, 498 F.3d 1160, 1168 (10th Cir. 2007). Castro‟s argument is an elaboration on that precedent. He argues in essence that, by talking at length about the rights he would give up by foregoing a second trial, the District Court left him thinking that the waiver applied only prospectively and not as to the already fixed history of the case. He suggests, in other words, that it is not only a district court‟s affirmative statements that can change the scope of a 7 As noted, we have held that, even when the written terms of an appellate waiver are clear, “a statement made by the sentencing court during the colloquy can create ambiguity where none exists in the plain text of the plea agreement.” Saferstein, 673 F.3d at 243. 20 plea agreement; a district court‟s emphases and omissions during a plea colloquy may also alter the defendant‟s understanding of the plain terms of the plea agreement. We have never so held and we will not do so now. Indeed, even if we were to accept Castro‟s assertion that the District Court injected some confusion into the scope of the appellate waiver through emphasis and omission during the plea colloquy, we cannot accept that the colloquy overcame the import that the plea agreement‟s terms must have had for Castro, a man with years of law enforcement experience and two post-graduate degrees. A deficient plea colloquy will not overcome the plain terms of an appellate waiver when the defendant is highly educated and should accordingly be held to his informed understanding of the text of the waiver. See Goodson, 544 F.3d at 540-41 (defendant who was “college educated” and who had “successfully perpetrated wire fraud and the uttering of counterfeit checks” was held to his informed understanding of the plain terms of the plea agreement). Castro affirmed under oath that he understood the plea agreement, and nothing in the record undermines that affirmation. Given the plain terms of the plea agreement in this case, and given Castro‟s education and professional background, we conclude that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his “conviction … or any other matter relating to this prosecution.” (App. at 127.)
Castro‟s knowing and voluntary waiver forecloses his appeal of the conviction on Count Three, unless the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. Castro says it would, because the record is devoid of evidence that he made a false 21 statement when he stated that he received no money from Encarnacion in repayment of his $90,000 investment. We are compelled to agree. We have not previously evaluated a challenge to an appellate waiver that is grounded on a claim of insufficiency of evidence amounting to a miscarriage of justice. We have, however, evaluated claims of insufficiency of evidence in the plain error context and have explained that plain error warranting reversal exists when the insufficiency “resulted in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” United States v. Barel, 939 F.2d 26, 37 (3d Cir. 1991). To determine if that exacting standard is met, “we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government and will sustain the verdict unless a rational juror could not have found that the Government proved” one or more elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Williams, 299 F.3d 250, 253-54 (3d Cir. 2002). The prosecution‟s failure to prove an essential element of the charged offense does constitute plain error, United States v. Wolfe, 245 F.3d 257, 260-61 (3d Cir. 2001), and so can be understood as a miscarriage of justice, see United States v. Jones, 471 F.3d 478, 480 (3d Cir. 2006) (“[A]ffirming a conviction where the government has failed to prove each essential element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt affect[s] substantial rights, and seriously impugns the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). It bears emphasis, however, that a “manifest miscarriage of justice” warranting reversal on plain error review occurs only where the record is “devoid of evidence pointing to guilt” – a “stricter than usual standard.” United 22 States v. Green, 293 F.3d 886, 895 (5th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. Vasquez, 560 F.3d 461, 469 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Because [defendant] failed to move for a judgment of acquittal at either the close of the government‟s case or the close of his case, we will reverse his conviction only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, such that a manifest miscarriage of justice occurred.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Irby, 558 F.3d 651, 653 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[R]eversal is warranted only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, or if the evidence on a key element was so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Spinner, 152 F.3d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“[A] miscarriage [of justice] would exist only if the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt, or because the evidence on a key element of the offense was so tenuous that a conviction would be shocking.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). These insights from the plain error context are applicable to the “miscarriage of justice” argument before us now. Cf. Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (holding that for an error to result in a miscarriage of justice that overcomes an appellate waiver “„the error [must] seriously affect[] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings‟” (quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (alterations in original)). Castro is therefore required to show that, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, the record is entirely devoid of evidence that he committed each element of a § 1001 offense – specifically, that he made a false statement to government officials when he insisted that he had not received money from Encarnacion in repayment of his $90,000 loan – so that allowing his 23 conviction to stand would “seriously impugn[] the fairness, integrity and public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Jones, 471 F.3d at 480 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 1001 calls for punishment of anyone who “knowingly and willfully … makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation” in any matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2). To establish a violation of § 1001, the government [is] required to prove each of the following five elements: (1) that [the accused] made a statement or representation; (2) that the statement or representation was false; (3) that the false statement was made knowingly and willfully; (4) that the statement or representation was material; and (5) that the statement or representation was made in a matter within the jurisdiction of the federal government. United States v. Moyer, 674 F.3d 192, 213 (3d Cir. 2012). It is uncontroverted that all three payments that Castro received, ostensibly in repayment of Encarnacion‟s “debt,” were in fact not from Encarnacion but rather from the FBI through Moshe. None of the money in question actually came from Encarnacion, either directly or indirectly, nor had Castro collected any other money from Encarnacion in repayment for the supposed debt. Castro‟s statement that he had not received money from Encarnacion, though intended to be a lie, was therefore entirely true, and the government cannot prove the second element of the offense. 24 That fact is crucial because, to properly convict Castro of violating § 1001, the government must be able to show that he made a statement to government agents that was untrue, and the government cannot satisfy that burden by showing that the defendant intended to deceive, if in fact he told the literal truth. In Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352, 362 (1973), the Supreme Court held that a conviction under the federal perjury statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1621, cannot rest on testimony that is unresponsive to the interrogation, even if intentionally deceptive, so long as the answer in question is literally true and the questioner is free to ask further clarifying questions. We applied Bronston in United States v. Serafini, 167 F.3d 812, 822-24 (3d Cir. 1999), affirming the dismissal of a charge under the “false material declarations” statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1623, as applied to grand jury questioning. In Serafini, we also stated that § 1001 is “[a] close kin” to §§ 1621 and 1623. 167 F.3d at 813 n.2. Thus, the same interpretive principles apply to § 1001 prosecutions as were applied in Bronston and Serafini. See also United States v. Milton, 8 F.3d 39, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“The defense of literal truth applies to section 1001 prosecutions … .”). Accordingly, when a statement is literally true, it is, by definition, not false and cannot be treated as such under a perjury-type statute, no matter what the defendant‟s subjective state of mind might have been. Cf. Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 284-85 (1982) (a bad check, even when knowingly used to defraud, cannot be a “false statement” within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1014, because as a matter of negotiable instruments law a check makes no assertion about the truth of any matter stated thereon). 25 Viewing the record as required by Bronston, it is devoid of evidence that Castro made a false statement when he told government agents that he had not received money from Encarnacion. On the contrary, that statement was completely, if unintentionally, accurate. Thus, allowing his conviction on Count Three to stand would be to allow a conviction when there has been a complete failure of proof on an essential element of the charged crime, and that would seriously impugn the fairness, integrity, and public reputation of our courts. In short, such a conviction constitutes a miscarriage of justice. The government nevertheless argues that, given Castro‟s belief that he was lying to FBI agents, there is nothing unfair in his conviction. (See Appellee‟s Br. at 37 (“Castro does not contend that he was unjustly charged with or convicted of this offense, but argues only that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction.”).) In the broadest sense, it is surely so that Castro was morally wrong even if not legally guilty, but our legal system does not convict people of being bad. If they are to be convicted, it is for specific crimes, and the government here undertook the burden of proving that Castro had committed each element of the specific crime set forth in § 1001. It failed to do that. The government tries to work its way around this failure-of-proof problem by arguing for a “sting operation exception” in § 1001 prosecutions. As the government sees it, whether Castro‟s statements were literally true is irrelevant, as long as he subjectively believed he was lying to the FBI when he made them. A contrary position, the government argues, “would pervert the very purpose of the literal truth defense, which is to protect people from 26 prosecution for literally true responses to the precise question asked, and surely was not intended to protect those who knowingly and willfully lie about their actions solely because they unknowingly acted in collusion with a government agent instead of a true criminal cohort.” (Appellee‟s Br. at 47.) The ready and dispositive response to that argument is that, even if a “sting exception” to the strictures of § 1001 is a good idea, it is simply not in the statute. Congress knows how to pass laws that penalize statements made to law enforcement officers by a defendant who incorrectly believes the statements to be false. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1) (“knowing” laundering of funds “which in fact involves the proceeds” of a crime), with id. § 1956(a)(3) (intentional laundering of funds “represented to be” proceeds of a crime). But it did not do so when it enacted § 1001, and we are not free to amend the law. Under analogous circumstances, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed as plain error a conviction for “knowing possession” of stolen government property because the property was not actually “stolen” but was rather sold to the defendant by agents in a sting operation. United States v. Golomb, 811 F.2d 787, 792-93 (2d Cir. 1987). “Knowledge and belief are very different mental states,” the court held, and although the defendant “may very well have believed the checks were stolen, … [the statute] cannot be interpreted to support a conviction when the property at issue was not stolen.” Id. at 792. The government nevertheless insists that a jury could conclude, based on the evidence, “that the money Castro received came „from‟ Encarnacion.” (Appellee‟s Br. at 41.) According to the government, “[t]he FBI paid $21,000 in real 27 cash to Castro, through its agent, Moshe, and represented through Moshe that the payments were on behalf of Encarnacion. A jury could thus readily determine that Castro received money „from‟ Encarnacion, and lied about it to the agents when asked.” (Id. at 41.) It is not clear how the quotation marks around the word “from” in that sentence help the argument. The money was not “from” Encarnacion in any sense, and we are frankly at a loss to understand the government‟s assertion that Castro “not only believed that his answer was false … , but it was in fact false.” (Appellee‟s Br. at 50.) There is, quite literally, no evidence whatsoever that even a penny of the money that Moshe handed over to Castro came from Encarnacion. To say, as the government does, that “[t]he FBI actually gave Castro $21,000 on Encarnacion‟s behalf” (Appellee‟s Br. at 52), is an invention, since nothing shows that Encarnacion owed Castro anything, much less that he authorized the government to pay Castro on his behalf. Castro is therefore not guilty on Count Three, because the statement set forth in that count simply was not false.8 8 The District Court‟s jury instructions were correct in highlighting that “[a] false … statement … is an assertion which is untrue when made.” (D.I. 92:150-51 (Tr. 4/18/11) (emphasis added).) The subjective belief of the person making the statement is an entirely separate element of the offense. The false statement must be “known by the person making it or using it to be untrue.” (Id.) In this regard, we note our disagreement with the government‟s assertion that “the fact that Castro was not charged with attempting to make a false statement is of no consequence.” (Appellee‟s Br. at 52.) What is charged is of enormous consequence, and had 28 The complete failure of proof on the “actual falsity” element of the offense charged in Count Three requires reversal of Castro‟s conviction on that count, as the conviction is infected with plain error and constitutes a miscarriage of justice.