Opinion ID: 2425406
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Exhaustion by Appellants

Text: Having held that the relation-back theory applies, we now address whether any of the individual plaintiffs have properly exhausted internal prison remedies. Of the thirteen appellants, nine made internal complaints, investigated by the IG, that sought redress only for the alleged actions of the particular officer and did not seek a change in policies or procedures. [9] These nine have, therefore, not exhausted their internal remedies with regard to the complaint in the present action. Another appellant, Stacie Calloway, complained about a sexual assault. However, her affidavit also states that she informed the IG that sexual abuse was a problem affecting other inmates and that no one kept track of what the officers were doing. We believe that this complaint sufficiently raises systemic issues relating to policies and procedures regarding the prevention of sexual abuse. To be sure, she did not ask for the precise relief sought in this action, but she adequately alerted the authorities as to her claim of systemic issues. However, Calloway did not appeal to CORC, which is the final step in the grievance procedure for raising issues regarding DOCS polices. The issue, then, is whether her failure to exhaust should be excused. In Hemphill v. New York, we established a three-part inquiry to guide the analysis of whether a plaintiff has met the requirements of Section 1997e(a) of the PLRA. 380 F.3d at 686. The first part, which is not an issue here, is a determination that administrative remedies were in fact available to the prisoner. Id. at 686-88. The second part considers whether defendants forfeited the affirmative defense of non-exhaustion by failing to raise or preserve it, or whether defendants' own actions inhibiting the inmate's exhaustion of remedies estops one or more of the defendants from raising the exhaustion defense. Id. at 686, 688-89. The third part requires consideration of whether, if the requirements of step two were not met, special circumstances excuse the plaintiff's failure to pursue or exhaust administrative remedies. Id. at 686, 689-91. If any of the three parts is satisfied, the prisoner is deemed to have exhausted internal procedures for purposes of the PLRA. Subsequent decisions have questioned the continued viability of this framework following the Supreme Court's decision in Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006). In Woodford the Court addressed whether a prisoner can satisfy the [PLRA's] exhaustion requirement by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective administrative grievance or appeal. Id. at 83-84, 126 S.Ct. 2378. The Court resolved the question in the negative, explaining that PLRA requires proper exhaustion, that is using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits). Id. at 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378 (emphasis omitted). We have questioned whether, in light of Woodford, the doctrines of estoppel and special circumstances survived. See Macias v. Zenk, 495 F.3d 37, 43 n. 1 (2d Cir.2007) ([W]e need not decide what effect Woodford has on Hemphill 's holding where administrative procedures are confusing a reasonable interpretation of prison grievance regulations may justify an inmate's failure to follow procedural rules to the letter.) (internal quotations omitted); Ruggiero v. County of Orange, 467 F.3d 170, 176 (2d Cir.2006) (noting that [w]e need not determine what effect Woodford has on our case law in this area because the prisoner's estoppel and special circumstances arguments nonetheless failed). We too decline to reach the issue, concluding that, even under pre- Woodford caselaw, Calloway has failed to establish that defendants are estopped from raising exhaustion as a defense or that special circumstances excuse her failure to exhaust. A prisoner may invoke the doctrine of estoppel when defendants took affirmative action to prevent him from availing himself of grievance procedures. Ruggiero, 467 F.3d at 178. Prior cases have held that verbal and physical threats of retaliation, physical assault, denial of grievance forms or writing implements, and transfers constitute such affirmative action. See, e.g., Hemphill, 380 F.3d at 688; Ziemba v. Wezner, 366 F.3d 161, 162 (2d Cir.2004). No such conduct prevented Calloway from appealing to CORC. Nor were there special circumstances relieving Calloway of the obligation to exhaust the IGP procedures. It is clear that challenges to DOCS policies or lack thereof, the subject matter of this lawsuit  where coupled with a claim of sexual abuse  must be pursued through the CORC level. While this is a somewhat complex scheme, it hardly constitutes special circumstances. Calloway's grievance was thus not exhausted. Two other appellants, whose complaints were dismissed as moot but to which we have applied the relation-back doctrine, Shantelle Smith and Shenyell Smith, alleged both assaults and a failure to protect and completed the grievance procedure. Shenyell Smith wrote a letter addressed To Whom It May Concern that was logged as a grievance on January 3, 2002. The letter alleged that she had been harassed for a period of three months, retaliated against, and sexually assaulted by an officer. With respect to the relief sought, she stated, This officer is still working on this unit and its not right. I feel that [the officer] should seek counseling [and be] removed ..., fired and any other [precaution] that is there. The superintendent responded that [a] significant portion of this complaint has to do with issues turned over to the Inspector General's Office for investigation in accordance with Departmental procedures. Grievance denied in that no basis was found for your allegations. She appealed the grievance. On February 20, 2002, CORC denied it, stating, Upon full hearing of the facts and circumstances in the instant case, the action requested herein is hereby denied. CORC upholds the determination of the Superintendent for the reasons stated. Shantelle Smith filed a grievance with the IGRC on July 10, 2003, alleging a sexual assault by an officer. With respect to corrective action, she stated, I am seeking monetary damages for the reason that the State had a duty to protect me and failed to do so, thus rendering their misactions as a `Failure to Protect', a most serious dereliction of their duty to provide for my care, custody and control. On July 11, 2003, the superintendent responded, neither granting nor denying the grievance, stating only, Your grievance has been forwarded to the Inspector General's office for further investigation. Shantelle appealed, and on September 10, 2003, CORC denied the grievance, stating, CORC upholds the determination of the Superintendent for the reasons stated. CORC notes that the grievant's allegation of sexual misconduct ... has been forwarded to the appropriate Central Office personnel for investigation. Any action deemed necessary and appropriate will be taken as a result of that investigation. That disposition states that any final action would be taken by the IG. No favorable action was taken by the IG, and we deem the grievance procedure exhausted. [10] Each of these inmates completed the IGP procedure. The issue is whether a claim of a failure to protect is sufficient exhaustion with regard to litigation seeking systemic relief. The issue, in our view, is whether a reasonable corrections official would recognize a complaint alleging a failure to protect a female inmate from a sexual assault by a male officer as raising issues regarding DOCS policies and procedures. We believe that it would. To be sure, a grievance may not be so vague as to preclude prison officials from taking appropriate measures to resolve the complaint internally. Brownell, 446 F.3d at 310. However, a failure to protect involves conduct by officials superior to the officer accused of the misconduct and suggests the need for policy and procedural reform. While the complaint asks for a result  protection  rather than specifying the means used to reach that result, the need for the result is clearly articulated and the appropriate means are far more within the expertise of DOCS than the individual prisoner. A fourth appellant, Stephanie Dawson, clearly alleged an act of sexual misconduct, clearly sought systemic reform along the lines of the class action complaint, and clearly exhausted the IGP procedure. Her claim was dismissed as moot by the district court but is now revived by application of the relation-back doctrine. Dawson filed her grievance with the IGRC on February 25, 2003. She alleged that she was raped by an officer at the prison where she was incarcerated. In describing her grievance, she stated, Taconic didn't provide protection from Correctional Officer sexual assault on me. Dawson requested various relief including: (i) For DOCS to train and assign and supervise staff so that [she would] not again [be] subjected to this kind of abuse; (ii) For DOCS to conduct a full and complete investigation; (iii) That [the officer] should be disciplined; and (iv) That [she] continue to receive mental health counseling. In response, the superintendent concluded that an investigation by the DOCS Inspector General's Office is in progress. When Dawson sought to appeal, she was advised that an appeal would be redundant. Dawson nonetheless pressed her appeal, and CORC upheld the superintendent's decision. CORC noted that the complaint has been forwarded to the appropriate Department personnel for investigation. Any action deemed necessary will be taken as a result of the investigation. The parties agree that Dawson's grievance was both procedurally and substantively exhausted. Because Dawson's role as plaintiff is not mooted by her release for reasons stated supra, she is entitled to pursue a role as class representative. Our conclusion that the district court erred when it failed to relate those claims it deemed moot back to the filing of the complaint does not automatically establish that the three appellants affected, Stephanie Dawson, Shantelle Smith, and Shenyell Smith, are entitled to litigate the interests of the class they seek to represent. See Sosna, 419 U.S. at 403, 95 S.Ct. 553 (This conclusion does not automatically establish that appellant is entitled to litigate the interests of the class she seeks to represent, but it does shift the focus of examination from the elements of justiciability to the ability of the named representative to `fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.' (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a))). In a separate proceeding, a previous panel of this court denied appellants' application for leave to appeal the denial of class certification by the district court. Accordingly, the propriety of class certification is not before us.