Opinion ID: 2119163
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: application of sec. 298.09, stats., to a motion to confirm an award.

Text: The collective bargaining agreement between the parties specifically incorporated secs. 298.08 through 298.15, Stats. Sec. 298.09, 298.10, 298.11 and 298.13 provides: 298.09 Court confirmation award, time limit. At any time within one year after the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court in and for the county within which such award was made for an order confirming the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in the next two sections. Notice in writing of the application shall be served upon the adverse party or his attorney 5 days before the hearing thereof. 298.10 Vacation of award, rehearing by arbitrators. (1) In either of the following cases the court in and for the county wherein the award was made must make an order vacating the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration: (a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means; (b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption on the part of the arbitrators, or either of them; (c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; (d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made. (2) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired, the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators. 298.11 Modification of award. (1) In either of the following cases the court in and for the county wherein the award was made must make an order modifying or correcting the award upon the application of any party to the arbitration: (a) Where there was an evident material miscalculation of figures or an evident material mistake in the description of any person, thing or property referred to in the award; (b) Where the arbitrators have awarded upon a matter not submitted to them unless it is a matter not affecting the merits of the decision upon the matters submitted; (c) Where the award is imperfect in matter of form not affecting the merits of the controversy. (2) The order must modify and correct the award, so as to effect the intent thereof and promote justice between the parties. 298.13 Notice of motion to change award. Notice of a motion to vacate, modify or correct an award must be served upon the adverse party or his attorney within three months after the award is filed or delivered, as prescribed by law for service of notice of a motion in an action. For the purposes of the motion any judge who might make an order to stay the proceedings in an action brought in the same court may make an order, to be served with the notice of motion, staying the proceedings of the adverse party to enforce the award. In the case before us the city appellant and adverse party did not move to vacate, modify or correct the award within three months after the award as provided in sec. 298.13, Stats. Rather, the respondent Stabbe moved to confirm the arbitration award after the expiration of three months but within one year from the date of the award. The appellant responded to the motion to confirm by moving to have the award dismissed. One of the reasons advanced for the motion of the appellant was that the arbitrator exceeded his authority. Sec. 298.10(1) (d). For the purposes of this opinion we consider the motion to dismiss tantamount to a motion to vacate. The respondent contends that because the appellant did not bring a motion to vacate within three months of the date of the award as provided in sec. 298.13, it is foreclosed from responding to the respondent's timely motion to confirm. Thus, argues the respondent, the circuit court is left with no alternative but to confirm the award regardless of the merits of the position of the adverse party. The appellant on the other hand argues that regardless of the three-month limitation in sec. 298.13, Stats., if a party chooses to timely move for confirmation of an award under sec. 298.09, the adverse party can respond by moving to vacate the award upon grounds set forth in sec. 298.10 or modify or correct the award upon grounds set forth in sec. 298.11. The appellant contends that any contrary application of the statutes would result, on occasion, in the circuit court being required to enter judgment confirming an award patently made contrary to the provisions of secs. 298.10 or 298.11. This issue has not heretofore been presented for resolution in this state. However, we find that secs. 298.09, 298.10, 298.11 and 298.13, Stats., and 9 U.S.C. secs. 9, 10, 11 and 12, are substantially identical. These provisions of the federal code have been interpreted and applied by the federal courts. In Riko Enterprises, Inc. v. Seattle Supersonics Corp., 357 F. Supp. 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), like the case at bar, the conditions of the award had not been met, three months had expired and the petitioner moved the court for an order confirming the arbitration award pursuant to 9 U.S.C. sec. 9. In response to that motion, respondent moved to vacate the award. The petitioner objected to the motion of the respondent on the ground that it was barred by 9 U.S.C. sec. 12, because more than three months had elapsed since the arbitrator had made the award. The court held that if respondent's motion were an independent motion to vacate, then the court would agree the motion was barred by sec. 12. However, the court held that by filing the application for confirmation, petitioner provided respondent with a means by which it could raise objections under secs. 10 and 11. The Riko court quoted from The Hartbridge, 57 F.2d 672, 673 (2nd Cir. 1932), cert. denied, Munson Steamship Line v. North England Steamship Co., 288 U.S. 601 (1933), wherein that court stated: . . . Upon a motion to confirm the party opposing confirmation may apparently object upon any ground which constitutes a sufficient cause under the statute to vacate, modify, or correct, although no such formal motion has been made. . . . . . . Although more than three months have elapsed since the award was filed, the appellant may still assert objections to confirmation of the award. There is authority for the proposition that even after the statutory period for moving to vacate an award has expired, a party may use the statutory grounds for vacation in defense of a motion to confirm. . . . In Paul Allison, Inc. v. Minikin Storage of Omaha, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 573 (D. Neb. 1978), the court held that the three-month requirement in 9 U.S.C. sec. 12, is inapplicable when the party who prevails at the arbitration moves to confirm the award and the defendant desires to raise objections in response to that motion. See also: Catz American Co. v. Pearl Grange Fruit Exchange, Inc., 292 F. Supp. 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). [2] We find the holdings of the federal authorities persuasive. We also believe the language used by the legislature in the enactment of sec. 298.09, Stats., is significant. This section states in part that the trial court shall grant the application for an order confirming an award unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in the next two sections. [secs. 298.10 and 298.11] (Emphasis supplied.) Sec. 298.09 does not say the order for confirmation shall be granted unless the award has been vacated, modified or corrected as provided in sec. 298.13, Stats. Obviously, if an award of an arbitrator has been vacated, modified or corrected under sec. 298.13, the arbitrator's award could not be confirmed. Also, the language in sec. 298.09, unless the award is vacated, modified or corrected as prescribed in the next two sections, would be superfluous if the arbitrator's award could not be challenged on those statutory grounds at the time of the application for confirmation. [12] We, therefore, hold that the time strictures of sec. 298.13, Stats., are inapplicable when a party who prevails at an arbitration decides to move to confirm the award and the adverse party desires to raise objections by responding with a motion to vacate, modify or correct the award as prescribed in secs. 298.10 and 298.11. By the Court. Judgment reversed. SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. (dissenting). I would affirm the circuit court's order confirming the arbitration award, because the City of Milwaukee did not serve its motion to vacate, modify or correct the award within three months after the award was filed or delivered as required by sec. 298.13, Stats. [1] I believe the majority incorrectly interprets secs. 298.09, 298.10, 298.11 and 298.13 to give a party a choice of when to assert a defense to an arbitration award. The majority says the party may move to vacate, modify or correct the award either within the statutory three month period or when an application to confirm the award is made. As a practical matter the majority renders sec. 298.13 meaningless. The party opposing an award need not promptly object to the award. He may simply ignore the award. The successful party must then seek an order confirming the award, at which time objection to the award can be raised. Chapter 298 must be construed as a whole and each section must be given effect. Reading secs. 298.09, 298.10, 298.11 and 298.13 together, I conclude that the legislative intent was to place the burden on the objector to move to vacate, modify or correct the award within the statutory three-month period and that, if the objector fails to do so, the proponent of the award still has nine months in which to ask the court to confirm the award. Limiting the time to challenge the award furthers the purposes of arbitration and the goal of the arbitration statutes, namely to obtain a prompt and conclusive answer to issues submitted to arbitration. Courts interpreting state statutes similar to Wisconsin's have construed the arbitration statutes in the manner I urge here. [2] The majority opinion, instead of following these state court cases, follows the holdings of several federal district courts to the contrary. I do not find the cases cited by the majority persuasive. The key case upon which the majority opinion and the federal district courts rely, without discussion or analysis, is The Hartbridge Case. [3] That case did not decide the issue presented here. In The Hartbridge a party to an award brought an action to confirm the award within three months of the date of service of the award. The opposing party challenged the court's jurisdiction to confirm the award prior to the expiration of the statutory three-month period and stated that it intended to move to vacate the award within the statutory three-month period. The district court granted the motion to confirm the award apparently believing it need not hear the objections in a proceeding to confirm. The court of appeals reversed the district court's confirmation of the award and held that objections must be made in the confirmation proceeding if the confirmation proceeding is brought prior to a motion to vacate. The court of appeals was then faced with the problem that as a result of the appeal proceedings more than three-months had expired since the award was made, and the opposing party had not yet moved to vacate the award. The court concluded that the appeal tolled the three-month statutory period and that the opposing party could assert objections to the confirmation of the award when the matter was remanded. The court of appeals carefully stated that it was not deciding the broader question of an opposing party's right to move to vacate after the statutory three-month period expired. The majority opinion's brief quotation from The Hartbridge is misleading if it is read to mean that the court of appeals held that in all applications to confirm, the opposing party may, outside the three-month statutory time limit, move to vacate. I quote the entire portion of The Hartbridge opinion dealing with this issue in the margin. [4] The legislative history of the Wisconsin arbitration act supports my contention that the legislature intended to allow a longer time for confirming an award than for vacating, modifying or correcting it. Chapter 298 of the Wisconsin Statutes was adopted in 1931. [5] As the majority opinion notes, the Wisconsin statute is nearly identical to the Pennsylvania arbitration statute. The Wisconsin and Pennsylvania arbitration statutes are modeled after the Uniform Arbitration Act of 1925. [6] Sections 15, [7] 16, [8] 17, [9] and 18 [10] of the Uniform Arbitration Act (1925) are nearly identical to secs. 298.09, 298.10, 298.11 and 298.13 of the Wisconsin Arbitration Act. The only significant difference between these sections of the two Acts relate to the time for making an application for an order to confirm and the time for giving notice of motion to change award. The Uniform Act limited the time for both motions to three months and allowed the parties to extend the time for an application for confirmation; there was no express provision in the Act for extending the time to move to vacate. The Wisconsin statutes allowed one year for applying for court confirmation of the award and allowed only three months to move to vacate, modify or correct. The 1925 Uniform Arbitration Act was superseded by the 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act. The 1955 Act imposes no time limit on applying for a confirmation order [11] and limits the time for vacating, [12] modifying or correcting [13] the award to ninety days after the delivery of a copy of the award to the applicant. The 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act has, as far as I can determine, been consistently interpreted to prohibit a party from moving to vacate the award in a confirmation proceeding, if that confirmation proceeding is brought after the ninety-day period has run. [14] It is clear from a comparison of these sections of the 1925 Uniform Arbitration Act and the Wisconsin Arbitration Act that the Wisconsin legislature intended that the time for vacating, modifying or correcting the award be shorter than the time for confirming it. The draftsmen of the 1955 Uniform Arbitration Act deliberately chose to limit the time for vacating the award (and not for confirming the award), because they believed that the short time limit for a motion to vacate promotes the purpose of the arbitration act. I would affirm the circuit court's order confirming the award because the very language of the statutory provisions in issue, the interpretations of similar statutes by courts of other jurisdictions, the legislative history of the Wisconsin Arbitration Act, and public policy all lead to the conclusion that Chapter 298 limits the time to move to vacate, modify or correct the award to three months after the award is filed or delivered.