Opinion ID: 1060924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: absent juror

Text: The trial court's action in first discharging an original absent juror and replacing him with an alternate juror, and then reversing course when the original juror appeared, followed no recognized procedural course and resulted in the original juror missing a part of the trial. The State agrees this is error, but contends it is harmless because no prejudice to the defendant has been shown. In order to determine whether the error is subject to harmless error analysis, we first review the scope of the right to trial by jury. The right to trial by jury is a fundamental right preserved by article I, § 6 of the Tennessee Constitution and has special resonance in criminal matters. Ricketts v. Carter, 918 S.W.2d 419, 424 (Tenn. 1996). It includes the right to have a unanimous jury verdict. State v. Shelton, 851 S.W.2d 134, 137 (Tenn. 1993). It also includes the right to have every fact tried and determined by twelve jurors and to have all issues of fact submitted to the same jury at the same time. State v. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tenn. 1991); Willard v. State, 174 Tenn. 642, 130 S.W.2d 99 (1939). Closing argument assists the jury in determining the facts. The purpose of summation is to allow each side to assist the jury in analyzing, evaluating, and applying the evidence and it includes counsel's right to state his contention as to the conclusion that the jury should draw from the evidence. United States v. Garza, 608 F.2d 659 (5th Cir.1979); Tenn.R.Crim.P. 29.1; see also Sonsteng and Haydock, Trialbook, § 3.02 (purposes include summarizing factual theories, significance of evidence, reasonable inferences, and legal theories). Courts have recognized that closing argument is a valuable privilege afforded to the State and the defense and have afforded wide latitude to counsel in arguing their cases to the jury. State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797, 809 (Tenn. 1994). Once a jury is impaneled, jurors may be discharged from further service prior to deliberations only if found by the trial court to be unable or disqualified to perform their duties. Tenn.R.Crim.P. 24(e); see Tenn. Code Ann. § 22-2-312 (1994). Although the decision to discharge a juror and to select an alternate juror is left to the discretion of the trial judge, State v. Millbrooks, 819 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991), there is no recognized procedure, statutory or otherwise, for discharging a juror, selecting an alternate, and then reinstating the original discharged juror who has missed a portion of the trial, as occurred in this case. Accordingly, the judge's action was error. The primary question we must answer is whether the error is subject to harmless error analysis. In State v. Bobo , we said that the trial court's error in replacing a member of the jury with an alternate juror after the jury had begun deliberating in violation of Tenn.R.Crim.P. 24(e), reache[d] past the statutory and procedural framework of our criminal justice system and encroache[d] upon certain basic constitutional guarantees under article I, § 6 of our Constitution. We compared a violation of the right to a trial by jury to a violation of the right to counsel or the right to an impartial judge, that is, a defect[] in the structure of the trial mechanism which prejudices the judicial process. We held, therefore, that such an error def[ies] harmless error analysis and requires automatic reversal. Id. at 357-58. The State argues that, unlike Bobo , the error here occurred before the jury deliberated, and that the defendant, who did not object to the juror's absence at trial, failed to show actual prejudice because the juror heard all of the evidence and missed only a portion of closing argument. [3] The State contends this case is controlled by State v. Chestnut, 643 S.W.2d 343 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982), in which the Court of Criminal Appeals held that there was no indication that the defendant had been prejudiced when a sleeping juror missed five minutes of testimony. In our view the error so fundamentally prejudices the judicial process that we do not reach the question of whether the error was harmless and whether there was actual prejudice. By first discharging and then reinstating the original juror, the jury included a member who missed a portion of the proceedings. The right to trial by a jury of twelve members must be preserved inviolate. Bobo, 814 S.W.2d at 357. The right, therefore, requires that every effort must be made to maintain the integrity of the jury's deliberations. For example, the trial judge could easily have prevented the error in this case by waiting for the absent juror to show up or by discharging the absent juror and proceeding with an alternate. In dissent, Justice Drowota, while acknowledging the presence of error, contends that the error was harmless because the defendant failed to show prejudice from the juror's absence during a short portion of the prosecution's closing argument. Requiring such a showing, however, would amount to an all but impossible burden for a defendant to meet in most cases and require sheer speculation as to the effect of a juror's absence. Moreover, the dissent misses the fundamental point that each juror in a jury of twelve must be present for every stage of the proceedings to preserve inviolate the constitutional right to a jury trial. Instead, the dissent's view merely endorses the presence of a fundamental error without a principled harmless error analysis or a practical remedy. We conclude that the error in this case implicated the fundamental right to trial by jury under article I, § 6 of the Tennessee Constitution and constituted a defect in the trial mechanism that defies harmless error analysis. Moreover, the error is one that not only affects the substantial rights of the accused but also results in prejudice to the judicial process as a whole. State v. Onidas, 635 S.W.2d 516 (Tenn. 1982); see also Tenn. R.App.P. 36(b); Tenn.R.Crim.P. 52(b). We therefore agree with the Court of Criminal Appeals' conclusion that the trial judge's action was plain error which violated the defendant's constitutional right to trial by jury and was, therefore, not subject to harmless error analysis. The only remedy was a new trial.