Opinion ID: 470318
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Defect

Text: 18 To recover in Louisiana from a manufacturer under strict products liability theory, the plaintiff must prove: 19 (1) that the injury or damage resulted from the condition of the product; (2) that the condition made the product unreasonably dangerous to normal use; and (3) that the condition existed at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or supplier. 20 Bell v. Jet Wheel Blast, 462 So.2d 166, 168 (La.1985). 21 A product may be unreasonably dangerous because of its design for any one of three reasons: (1) A reasonable person would conclude that the danger-in-fact, whether foreseeable or not, outweighs the utility of the product. This is the same danger-utility test applied in determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous per se.... (2) Although balancing under the risk-utility test leads to the conclusion that the product is not unreasonably dangerous per se, alternative products were available to serve the same needs or desires with less risk of harm; or, (3) Although the utility of the product outweighs its danger-in-fact, there was a feasible way to design the product with less harmful consequences.... In regard to the failure to use alternative products or designs, as in the duty to warn, the standard of knowledge, skill and care is that of an expert, including the duty to test, inspect, research and experiment commensurate with the danger. 22 Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So.2d 110, 115 (La.1986). 23 The trial court held Superior strictly liable under the third means of proving a defective product: 24 We conclude that this flying saw, manufactured by Superior, was defective, i.e. unreasonably dangerous, because the clamp and saw blade were not adequately guarded by a physical barrier. The cost of such a barrier would be very small and we cannot find that there would be any production problems caused by such a barrier. We do not think that the manufacture, marketing, shipping or utility of this product will be adversely affected by the production of a flying saw with such a barrier. 25 Rec. at 380. Although the trial court undoubtedly had in mind the screen that Hunt had installed after the accident, we note that plaintiff's expert also described a panic release bar, which could be placed in front of the clamp. This device would trigger automatically when a worker's hand was drawn into it, thereby arresting the motion of the clamp. 26 Superior contends in its appeal that the holding amounts to a requirement that Superior design a saw which was fool proof to the extent that no person could be cut by the saw, only wood. This holding, it continues, is a clear error of law for no other court has required a manufacturer to design a fool proof or fail safe saw or other piece of machinery. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 6. Superior would have a point, if it had characterized the district court's holding correctly. 1 Superior has, however, misread the district court's holding. 27 The language that Superior finds particularly egregious is the following: 28 We hold that a manufacturer of dangerous machinery has a duty to protect a worker stationed near that machinery, where it is reasonably foreseeable that the worker would be placed near the machinery and where it is reasonably foreseeable that the worker would suffer injury from that machinery's operation. We find that in this particular case, that duty can only be fulfilled by designing the flying saw so that a physical barrier would prevent the worker from reaching too close to the flying saw; from being pulled into the flying saw by the conveyor; or from inadvertently sticking his hand under the path of the clamp on the flying saw. 29 Rec. at 380 (emphasis added). 30 Put simply, Superior's contention is frivolous. The court did not explicitly or implicitly require that Superior construct a barrier which would allow only wood to enter the saw and not human tissue. Defendant-Appellant's Brief at 8. Rather, the court required that, in order to avoid liability under Louisiana products liability doctrine, Superior install a barrier that would reduce significantly--not absolutely--the danger that human hands will be clamped under the saw. The adequacy of any particular barrier is a question best left to another case. 2 Given, however, that Superior's flying saw contained no barrier whatsoever between the worker and the clamp, we find the district court's conclusion that the flying saw was unreasonably dangerous in normal use eminently sound and in accord with Louisiana law.