Opinion ID: 1754868
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Whether the Chancellor Erred in Allowing Mask's Testimony from the Conservatorship Hearing to be Read and Introduced into Evidence.

Text: ¶ 31. At the trial below, the chancellor allowed Mask's testimony from his conservatorship termination hearing to be read and introduced into evidence. In his testimony, Mask showed some signs of mental confusion, and at one point could not remember what year he was born. This evidence was introduced by the contestants to show that Mask was in a debilitated mental state at the hearing, and that therefore, the evidence had probative value for the issue of whether he had testamentary capacity nine months later. While evidence of lack of lucidity at a prior time is not dispositive of the issue of testamentary capacity at the time of execution of a will, it is certainly relevant to the decision to be made and sufficiently probative to allow a jury to draw inferences therefrom. ¶ 32. Unlike references to what the prior chancellor did or did not find with respect to the evidence before him, the testimony of Mask at the prior hearing was not hearsay, as the proponents argued in their brief. Hearsay is a statement, other than one by declarant while testifying in trial, offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Miss. R. Evid. Rule 801(c). If the significance of the statement is simply that it was made and there is no issue about the truth of the matter asserted, then the statement is not hearsay. Miss. R. Evid. 801 cmt.; Eselin-Bullock & Assoc. Ins. Agency, Inc. v. National General Ins. Co., 604 So.2d 236, 242 (Miss. 1992). ¶ 33. At Mask's conservatorship hearing, he was asked such questions as what his name was, when he was born, what the purpose of the hearing was, and what he would do with his money if he were given control of it. These questions were not designed to elicit answers to the actual questions asked of Mask, but to determine his mental and physical competence to handle his business affairs. The reading of this testimony was offered at the proceeding below for similar reasons, namely, to persuade the jury that Mask was mentally debilitated on the day the hearing took place and was therefore probably not capable of executing a will nine months later. Thus, the statements were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Moreover, they were relevant, since the jury could draw reasonable inferences based on the transcript's reflection of Mask's mental condition nine months before he executed his will. ¶ 34. The determination of relevancy is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, whose determination will not be reversed in the absence of clear abuse. Bredemeier, 689 So.2d at 773; Watts v. State, 635 So.2d 1364, 1367 (Miss. 1994). The chancellor made no error in allowing Mask's testimony to be read into the record.