Opinion ID: 625309
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of Stroud's Motion to Dismiss the Indictment

Text: Stroud contends that the indictment against him should have been dismissed because he was prosecuted in retaliation for filing a § 1983 action that claimed his constitutional rights were violated. We review the district court's denial of a motion to dismiss an indictment on a claim of vindictive prosecution for abuse of discretion. United States v. Scott, 610 F.3d 1009, 1017 (8th Cir.2010) (citing United States v. Hirsch, 360 F.3d 860, 863 (8th Cir.2004)). Although the government may take action to punish a defendant for committing a crime, punishing a defendant for exercising his valid legal rights is impermissible prosecutorial vindictiveness. United States v. Campbell, 410 F.3d 456, 461 (8th Cir.2005) (citing United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 102 S.Ct. 2485, 73 L.Ed.2d 74 (1982)). It is the defendant's burden to show that the prosecution was vindictive, and [t]he defendant's burden is a heavy one in light of the discretion prosecutors are given in performing their duties. United States v. Leathers, 354 F.3d 955, 961 (8th Cir.2004) (citing United States v. Kelley, 152 F.3d 881, 885-86 (8th Cir.1998)). Prosecutorial vindictiveness may be proven through objective evidence or through a presumption of vindictiveness where there exists a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness, which may arise when prosecutors increase the number or severity of charges. Campbell, 410 F.3d at 461 (citations omitted). Stroud has failed to provide any objective evidence of vindictiveness and has failed to submit any evidence that would raise a presumption of vindictiveness. In support of his claim, Stroud offers a timeline showing that the USAO, despite having an open case file, did not request a Petite waiver from the DOJ until two months after Stroud's counsel became involved in the § 1983 case. Stroud also points to the magistrate judge's comment during the hearing on his motion to dismiss the indictment that the timing is enough to maybe raise some eyebrows here. Hr'g Tr. of Aug. 20, 2009, at 7. That comment aside, we agree with the magistrate judge and the district court that the time sequence in this case is insufficient to raise a presumption of vindictiveness. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 91 F.3d 695 (5th Cir.1996). Additionally, there was no evidence that the federal prosecutors were even aware of the pending civil lawsuit at the time that the federal charges were brought. See Johnson, 91 F.3d at 699. The district court thus did not abuse its discretion in denying Stroud's motion to dismiss the indictment. Moreover, it was within the district court's discretion to deny Stroud's request for discovery on his claim of vindictive prosecution, as the magistrate judge had already held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and concluded that Stroud had not made a showing sufficient to warrant discovery. Hr'g Tr. of Aug. 20, 2009, at 10. Stroud's claim that the denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment resulted in a double jeopardy violation is without merit. Prosecution of a federal offense after the prosecution of a state offense arising out of the same acts does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See United States v. Basile, 109 F.3d 1304, 1306-07 (8th Cir.1997) (citing Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 194, 79 S.Ct. 666, 3 L.Ed.2d 729 (1959)).