Opinion ID: 755348
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Seventh Amendment Requirement of a Jury Trial

Text: 36 Dean and Dubose claim that by providing for conversion of restitution orders into enforceable civil judgment liens, the MVRA violates the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by Jury. 8 37 Numerous circuit courts of appeal, including this one, rejected the argument that restitution orders under the VWPA--the predecessor statute of the MVRA--were subject to the Seventh Amendment. See United States v. Keith, 754 F.2d 1388, 1391-92 (9th Cir.1985); United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 910 (2d Cir.1984); United States v. Florence, 741 F.2d 1066, 1067-68 (8th Cir.1984); United States v. Satterfield, 743 F.2d 827, 839 (11th Cir.1984); United States v. Watchman, 749 F.2d 616, 617 (10th Cir.1984). They held that restitution pursuant to the VWPA did not violate the Seventh Amendment's jury trial right because the victim enforcement provision in the Act does not transform a sentencing proceeding resulting in a restitution order into an 'action at common law' within the meaning of the seventh amendment. Keith, 754 F.2d at 1392. 38 Defendants nevertheless argue, unpersuasively, that the MVRA is unconstitutional because the judge no longer has discretion in fixing the amount of restitution, which must be imposed in the full amount of actual loss. 9 39 Yet it is still true under the MVRA, as it was under the VWPA, that [t]he inclusion of this civil enforcement provision does not transform the restitution order into an action at common law. Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 839. In determining that the restitution order was not transformed into a common law suit, the courts that have addressed the issue under the VWPA pointed to several factors. One of these factors was the courts' exercise of judicial discretion in imposing the amount of restitution. See, e.g., United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 479 (3d Cir.1985) ([I]n ordering restitution, the court must consider the defendant's ability to pay, a factor that would normally be irrelevant in a civil adjudication.). Under the MVRA, however, while judges must impose the full amount of loss as restitution, they have considerable discretion to impose nominal, in-kind, and periodic payments. That courts cannot exercise discretion as to the technical amount of restitution that would theoretically be recovered is of no import. 40 More broadly, the procedures for imposing restitution differ ... from a traditional civil proceeding. Palma, 760 F.2d at 479. As under the VWPA, the [MVRA] victim is limited to recovering certain specified losses. Id. Moreover, [t]he fundamental and obvious difference ... [between a restitution order and a civil adjudication] is that restitution occurs only after an adjudication of guilt. Brown, 744 F.2d at 909. 41 Finally, civil enforcement of criminal penalties does not transform a restitution order into a common law suit. See Satterfield, 743 F.2d at 839. So long as the restitution provision is a permissible form of punishment, it is not subject to civil requirements simply because it also achieves some of the purposes of a civil judgment. Restitution undoubtedly serves traditional purposes of punishment. United States v. Brown, 744 F.2d 905, 909. 42 Accordingly, we reject defendants' argument that the MVRA violates the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury. 43 The judgments of the district courts in Nos. 96-30369 and 97-30067 (Dubose) and No. 97-30035 (Dean) are AFFIRMED.