Opinion ID: 6328261
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Downward Adjustment

Text: At sentencing, the district court denied Casanova’s request for a downward adjustment under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1. That section provides for a two-level reduction to a defendant’s offense level “[i]f the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” Id. § 3E1.1(a). Casanova contends he was entitled to the reduction because he never denied his factual guilt for his offenses. “Whether a defendant is entitled to a reduction in offense level under § 3E1.1(a) is a question of fact that we review for clear error.” United States v. Collins, 511 F.3d 1276, 1279 (10th Cir. 2008). It is Casanova’s burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that he was entitled to the reduction. See id. The commentary to § 3E1.1 states: This adjustment is not intended to apply to a defendant who puts the government to its burden of proof at trial by denying the essential factual elements of guilt, is convicted, and only then admits guilt and expresses remorse. Conviction by trial, however, does not automatically preclude a defendant from consideration for such a reduction. In rare situations a defendant may clearly demonstrate an acceptance of responsibility for his criminal conduct even though he exercises his constitutional right to a trial. This may occur, for example, where a defendant goes to trial to assert and preserve issues that do not relate to factual guilt (e.g., to make . . . a challenge to the applicability of a statute to his conduct). In each such instance, however, a determination that a defendant has accepted responsibility will be based primarily upon pre-trial statements and conduct. U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, cmt. n.2. 19 Appellate Case: 20-2159 Document: 010110664531 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 20 Casanova contends his is a “rare” case because he went to trial to assert an entrapment defense, not deny guilt. He contends that his pre-trial participation in drug treatment, coupled with his trial testimony admitting his conduct, clearly demonstrates that he accepted responsibility. Casanova is partly correct. “[A] sentencing court may apply an acceptance-of-responsibility reduction to a defendant who asserts the entrapment defense.” United States v. Garcia, 182 F.3d 1165, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999). However, “that does not mean that the simple assertion of the entrapment defense coupled with acknowledgement of the underlying criminal activity automatically entitles a defendant to a two-point acceptance[-]of[-]responsibility reduction.” Id. “A defendant will [still] need to evidence acceptance of responsibility, primarily through pre-trial statements and conduct, before an acceptance[-]of[-]responsibility reduction would be warranted.” Id. at 1174. When evaluating the propriety of a reduction, courts may consider such factors as a defendant’s “voluntary termination or withdrawal from criminal conduct,” “voluntary surrender to authorities promptly after commission of the offense,” “voluntary assistance to authorities in the recovery of the fruits or instrumentalities of the offense,” “post-offense rehabilitative efforts,” and “the timeliness of the defendant’s conduct in manifesting the acceptance of responsibility.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.1. Casanova’s participation in drug treatment weighs in favor of granting the reduction. But the balance of his conduct does not. There is no evidence he sought to withdraw from the drug and firearm transaction underlying this case; rather, after 20 Appellate Case: 20-2159 Document: 010110664531 Date Filed: 03/30/2022 Page: 21 selling the rifle and less than one full ounce of methamphetamine to the lead ATF agent, Casanova said he would make up the difference on a later transaction. That same night he called the lead ATF agent and said he had obtained a second ounce of methamphetamine. Casanova also did not voluntarily surrender to the authorities; rather, he was arrested by local police on additional drug charges. And when the ATF attempted to interview him to learn the identity of his methamphetamine supplier, he did not assist authorities by identifying Bowker; rather, he waited until trial to disclose Bowker’s identity to authorities. Thus, while Casanova contends that he accepted responsibility for his criminality, his pre-trial conduct suggests otherwise. On this record, we cannot say the district court clearly erred in denying the two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.