Opinion ID: 1640607
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Jenkins's Breach-of-Contract Claim

Text: Sheriff Hale asks this Court to direct the circuit court to dismiss Jenkins's breach-of-contract claim against him on the basis of State immunity. Sheriff Hale argues that he is entitled to immunity under § 14, Ala. Const.1901, because, he says, Jenkins seeks in her breach-of-contract claim to recover money damages for those acts Sheriff Hale performed while he was working within the line and scope of his employment as a sheriff for the State of Alabama.
The writ of mandamus is an extraordinary legal remedy. Ex parte Mobile Fixture & Equip. Co., 630 So.2d 358, 360 (Ala.1993). Therefore, this Court will not grant mandamus relief unless the petitioner shows: (1) a clear legal right to the order sought; (2) an imperative duty upon the trial court to perform, accompanied by its refusal to do so; (3) the lack of another adequate remedy; and (4) the properly invoked jurisdiction of the Court. See Ex parte Wood, 852 So.2d 705, 708 (Ala.2002). Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 499. `[I]f an action is an action against the State within the meaning of § 14, such a case presents a question of subject-matter jurisdiction, which cannot be waived or conferred by consent.' Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 499 (quoting Haley v. Barbour County, 885 So.2d 783, 788 (Ala.2004), quoting in turn Patterson v. Gladwin Corp., 835 So.2d 137, 142-43 (Ala.2002)). `Therefore, a court's failure to dismiss a case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on sovereign immunity may properly be addressed by a petition for the writ of mandamus.' Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 499-500 (quoting Ex parte Alabama Dep't of Mental Health & Retardation, 837 So.2d 808, 810-11 (Ala.2002)). Moreover, this Court may address this argument even if it was not presented to the trial court. See Atkinson v. State, 986 So.2d 408, 411 (Ala.2007) (The assertion of State immunity challenges the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court; therefore, it may be raised at any time by the parties or by a court ex mero motu. ).
Sheriff Hale argues that Art. 1, § 14, Ala. Const.1901, affords him immunity in his individual capacity for actions taken in the line and scope of his employment as Sheriff. Sheriff Hale's petition at 7. He asserts that Jenkins's breach-of-contract claim seeks compensation for [the] alleged actions taken [by Sheriff Hale] during the course and scope of Sheriff Hale's employment as Sheriff of Jefferson County and, thus, that Sheriff Hale's State immunity bars Jenkins's breach of contract claim. Sheriff Hale's petition at 8. Jenkins argues that she does not seek damages from Sheriff Hale but seeks only to recover on her breach of contract claim through Sheriff Hale's official bond with Western Surety Company. Jenkins's brief at 28. Article I, § 14, Const. of Ala.1901, states that `the State of Alabama shall never be made a defendant in any court of law or equity.' `The wall of immunity erected by § 14 is nearly impregnable.' Ex parte Davis, 930 So.2d at 500 (quoting Patterson, 835 So.2d at 142). This Court has concluded that § 14, Ala. Const.1901, prohibits suits against a sheriff in his official capacity for conduct that occurred in the line and scope of the sheriff's employment. See Parker v. Amerson, 519 So.2d 442, 442-43 (Ala.1987) (A sheriff is an executive officer of the State of Alabama, who is immune from suit under Article I, § 14, Alabama Constitution of 1901, in the execution of the duties of his office....); Employees of the Montgomery County Sheriff's Dep't v. Marshall, 893 So.2d 326, 331 (Ala.2004) (State immunity immunizes the sheriff in his official capacity from liability for money damages.). On the other hand, as this Court noted in Ex parte Davis: `Section 14 does not necessarily immunize State officers and agents from individual civil liability.' Gill v. Sewell, 356 So.2d 1196, 1198 (Ala.1978). Whether immunity serves as a defense to an action against a state officer or employee sued in his individual capacity depends upon the degree to which the action involves a State interest.... When determining whether a State interest in an action against a state official or employee in his or her individual capacity is sufficient to trigger the immunity granted by § 14, our cases distinguish between the standards applied to those state agents or employees whose positions exist by virtue of legislative pronouncement and those who serve as the constitutional officers of this State. We have held that State-agent immunity may bar an action against a state agent or employee under the principles announced in Ex parte Cranman, 792 So.2d 392 (Ala.2000). See Ex parte Butts, 775 So.2d 173 (Ala.2000) (adopting, by majority, the Cranman restatement of the rule governing State-agent immunity). However, this Court has consistently held that a claim for monetary damages made against a constitutional officer in the officer's individual capacity is barred by State immunity whenever the acts that are the basis of the alleged liability were performed within the course and scope of the officer's employment.  930 So.2d at 500-01 (emphasis added). In this instance, Jenkins has asserted a breach-of-contract claim against Sheriff Hale in his individual capacity; accordingly, Sheriff Hale is not automatically entitled to immunity. See Ex parte Davis, supra. To determine whether Sheriff Hale is entitled to immunity we must determine whether Jenkins's breach-of-contract claim is, in effect, a claim against the State. Jenkins does not contest that the actions giving rise to her breach-of-contract claim were actions taken by Hale in the execution of his duties as sheriff. Jenkins argues, however, that she seeks to recover on her breach-of-contract claim only on Sheriff Hale's official bond from Western Surety Company and, thus, that her claim is not a claim against the State. Jenkins's brief at Exhibit B. We disagree. Although Jenkins alleges that she is entitled to recover from the defendant Western Surety Company for the said breach, she also demands judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for incidental and consequential damages in an amount to be determined by a struck jury.... Jenkins's brief, Exhibit B. Jenkins's second amended complaint clearly seeks a monetary award from Sheriff Hale in his individual capacity; thus, under our holding in Ex parte Davis, Sheriff Hale is entitled to State immunity on Jenkins's breach-of-contract claim. [4]