Opinion ID: 2770261
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applying Lane to Flora’s Complaint

Text: Against that legal backdrop, we consider the viability of Flora’s complaint.12 If the facts alleged are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to Flora, the complaint contains sufficient factual allegations to plausibly establish that Flora’s statements were not made pursuant to responsibilities.”). Flora argues that Lane merely clarified the Garcetti holding and does not represent any shift in the law. In Dougherty, we expressly declined to resolve that question because, on those facts, we did not need to do so. 2014 WL 6600421 at . Likewise, here, we do not need to decide whether Lane represents more than a clarification of existing law. Due to the relief Flora is seeking, there is no qualified immunity determination to be made, so we can leave for another day the ramifications of deciding whether Lane constitutes new law. 12 Because this case presents a purely legal issue – the facts having to be accepted as alleged at the motion-todismiss stage – we apply Lane in the first instance rather than remanding for the District Court to do so. 21 his ordinary job responsibilities. 13 Flora’s complaint does concede some ground. It includes allegations that, as the Chief Public Defender, he was responsible for his office’s representation of its clients and that he was terminated for enforcing those clients’ rights. He also alleges that he learned about both the funding crisis and the expungement issue in the course of his job duties. But Flora also alleges that, when channeling his speech “up the chain of command” failed to produce results, he took drastic measures by filing the funding lawsuit against the County and by reporting the unfinished expungements.14 Foraker, 501 F.3d at 237-38. 13 Again, Lawton and the County have not challenged that the statements touched on a matter of public concern or that the County lacked an adequate justification for treating Flora differently than other citizens, nor did they argue that the statements were not a substantial or motivating factor in prompting his discharge. Thus, at this stage in the litigation, we need not address those issues. 14 While Flora’s institution of the funding lawsuit and reporting of the failure to finish the expungements may be construed as conduct, our precedent holds that verbal and written communications do not become conduct, rather than speech, merely because they happen to serve a certain function or serve as a vehicle for some other purpose. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 225 (3d Cir. 2014); accord Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 28 (2010). We are not asked to and we do not undertake to consider whether Flora’s lawsuit should be considered under the petition clause of the First Amendment. Cf. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. at 2494 (public employee whose speech consists of 22 He further alleges that his obligations as an attorney, rather than as the Chief Public Defender, compelled him to make the statements at issue. Finally, he describes both the funding crisis and the expungement issue as extraordinary circumstances impelling him to extraordinary speech. A straightforward application of Lane leads us to conclude that, given those allegations, Flora’s speech with respect to both the funding litigation and the expungement problems was not part of his ordinary responsibilities – it was not part of the work he was paid to perform on an ordinary basis. 134 S. Ct. at 2378-79. As claimed in his complaint, and as described in the statute creating the Public Defender, Flora’s ordinary job duties did not include the public reporting of lingering effects from government corruption or the filing of a class action suit to compel adequate funding for his office. Rather, he represented indigent clients in criminal court and in related proceedings. Lawton and the County contend that, because Flora alleges his speech was partially aimed at vindicating the rights of indigent criminal defendants, he has conceded that it was within the scope of his ordinary job duties. But, their argument sweeps too broadly. While certain statements in Flora’s complaint do suggest that the speech at issue bore some relation to his job duties and may have, indirectly, benefitted his clients, that does not bring the speech within the realm of his ordinary job duties. Cf. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (teacher who reported funding deficiency was speaking as a citizen rather than as a teacher even though additional funding would have facilitated teacher’s education of students); Dougherty, 2014 WL instituting a lawsuit may bring retaliation claim either under speech or petition clause of First Amendment). 23 6600421 at ,  (procurement director reporting superintendent’s failure to abide by procurement policies was speaking as citizen even though absence of wrongdoing would arguably facilitate procurement office operations). To view it otherwise would unduly restrict First Amendment rights, because reporting malfeasance or misfeasance will regularly benefit an employee in the execution of his job duties by, presumably, removing impediments to proper government functioning. Accordingly, we conclude that Flora’s complaint contains sufficient allegations that his ordinary job duties did not include filing the funding suit or reporting the expungement issue and the pleading should therefore have survived the motion to dismiss. Whether Flora’s ordinary job duties actually encompassed such tasks is an issue that may need to be resolved later in the case.