Opinion ID: 488727
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Coconspirator Denials

Text: 5 Munson's first argument concerns testimony by Drug Enforcement Administration Special Agent Michael Cunniff about statements Grenier and Pierce made when they were confronted by Cunniff upon arrival in Waterville on November 20, 1984, after they allegedly had obtained cocaine from Munson. Cunniff asked Grenier and Pierce where they had been earlier in the day and inquired about the ownership of the suitcase in their possession. Subsequent testimony demonstrated that Grenier and Pierce gave false and conflicting answers. 6 At trial Munson's counsel objected on the basis that this testimony by Cunniff was inadmissible hearsay. The district court overruled the objection, but instructed the jury to bear in mind that what this witness testified to as having been said to him by other persons is not offered for the truth of the matter that that other person asserted.  'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Fed.R.Evid. 801(c). These statements were admitted to show, through subsequent testimony, that Grenier and Pierce were lying about their activities. They were not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 7 The Supreme Court taught in Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 94 S.Ct. 2253, 41 L.Ed.2d 20 (1974), that such statements are not hearsay. That case involved a conspiracy by election officials to cast false votes. The prosecution sought to use false testimony given by two of the defendants at a prior hearing to establish that at the time the testimony was given the effort to have fraudulent votes counted was continuing. Id. at 216, 94 S.Ct. at 2258. The Court said: 8 Out-of-court statements constitute hearsay only when offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The election contest testimony of [the defendants], however, was not admitted into evidence in the ... trial to prove the truth of anything asserted therein. Quite the contrary, the point of the prosecutor's introducing those statements was simply to prove that the statements were made so as to establish a foundation for later showing, through other admissible evidence, that they were false. The rationale of the hearsay rule is inapplicable as well. The primary justification for the exclusion of hearsay is the lack of any opportunity for the adversary to cross-examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is introduced into evidence. Here, since the prosecution was not contending that anything [the defendants] said at the election contest was true, the other defendants had no interest in cross-examining them so as to put their credibility in issue. 9 Id. at 219-20, 94 S.Ct. at 2260 (footnotes omitted). The district court, therefore, was correct in ruling that Grenier's and Pierce's statements, which were admitted on the same basis as the testimony admitted in Anderson, were not hearsay. As nonhearsay they were admissible as long as they were relevant in some way to prove the conspiracy charged. Id. at 221, 94 S.Ct. at 2261. The statements showed that Grenier and Pierce were trying to conceal what they had done and, therefore, were relevant to prove the existence of the conspiracy between Grenier, Pierce, and Munson.