Opinion ID: 3038438
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: by its terms explicitly prohibits the

Text: use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury; . . . to ship or transport in interstate or foreign com- merce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce.11 1 At Young’s trial in federal district court, Judge Van Sickle instructed the jury on the elements of “actual notice” and “opportunity to participate.” The jury instructions, tracking the statutory text, stated that the statute required the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that, “at the time the defendant possessed the firearm, the defendant was subject to a court order dated December 8, 2004, that: (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to participate.” The district court further instructed the jury: It can be legal for a court to issue a no-contact order against an individual in emergency circumstances, before allowing the individual notice and an opportunity to participate. However, the federal criminal law at issue in this case only applies to those no- contact orders that have been issued after the indi11 Young also stipulated that he knowingly possessed a firearm which had been shipped in interstate commerce. UNITED STATES v. YOUNG 9795 vidual who is subject to the order has been provided notice and an opportunity to participate. 2 The jury found Young guilty of violating § 922(g)(8), but the district court overturned the jury verdict based on Young’s Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29 motion, concluding that the prosecution had presented insufficient evidence that Young’s December 8 DVNC order met the terms of § 922(g)(8)(A). The district court explained that “advance notice is an important component of due process.” (Citing Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)). The district court reasoned that “[w]ithout advance notice, a party is unable to consult an attorney, evaluate allegations or marshal evidence. In view of these considerations, it is reasonable to conclude that § 922(g)(8) requires advance notice of a judge’s intention to extend a no-contact order.” Because the government presented no evidence that Young was actually aware that the December 6 DVNC order would be extended at the December 8 arraignment, the district court concluded that Young lacked sufficient notice of the proceedings. Similarly, the district court reasoned that an “opportunity to respond” requires “ ‘the opportunity to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed action should not be taken.’ ” (Quoting United States v. Wilson, 159 F.3d 280, 290 (7th Cir. 1998)). The district court explained that: The judge who presided over Mr. Young’s arraign- ment did not allow him to consult with his attorney before issuing the no-contact order. The judge did not ask Mr. Young whether he wanted to review the report upon which the judge relied to find probable cause. The judge did not advise Mr. Young he was entitled to challenge the contents of the report. The judge did not ask Mr. Young whether he objected to 9796 UNITED STATES v. YOUNG the entry of a no-contact order. . . . [H]aving examined the record as a whole, the Court concludes that the judge who presided over Mr. Young’s arraign- ment did not provide him with a meaningful oppor- tunity to participate in the decision-making process. (internal notes and citations omitted). The district court concluded that “the jury lacked evidence from which it could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Young received either actual notice of, or an opportunity to participate in, the hearing that led to the issuance of the no-contact order,” and it entered a judgment of acquittal. Ruling in the alternative, the district court granted Young’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33(a). The court concluded that “the jury should have been instructed that actual notice means advance notice.” Further, “the jury should have been instructed more clearly concerning the factors it needed to consider in determining whether Mr. Young received a meaningful opportunity to participate.” The United States timely appeals from both the grant of the Rule 29 judgment of acquittal and the alternative grant of the Rule 33 motion for a new trial.12