Opinion ID: 4013709
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ponte

Text: “A district court commits procedural error where it makes a mistake in its Guidelines calculation, does not consider the § 3553(a) factors, or rests its sentence on a clearly erroneous finding of fact.” United States v. Hsu, 669 F.3d 112, 120 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We review the district court’s legal determinations in applying the Guidelines de novo. See Hsu, 669 F.3d at 120. 37 Ponte’s total offense level was thirty‐seven, consisting of: a base offense level of seven, see U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(a)(1), a twenty‐two level enhancement based on loss amount, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(L), a four‐level adjustment for the number of victims, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) (as of 2013),9 a two‐level adjustment for the use of sophisticated means, see id. § 2B1.1(b)(10)(c), and a two‐level adjustment for abuse of position of trust, see id. § 3B1.3. Ponte’s challenges the application of all of those enhancements, and also argues that the district court erred in not applying a minor‐role or acceptance‐of‐responsibility reduction. He further argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable.

“Loss for purposes of the fraud guideline . . . is defined as ‘the greater of actual loss or intended loss.’” United States v. Certified Envtl. Servs., Inc., 753 F.3d 72, 103 (2d Cir. 2014), quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A). A district court is not required to calculate loss with “absolute precision,” but need only by a preponderance of the evidence “make ‘a reasonable estimate of the loss’ given the 9 As discussed in note 8, the Sentencing Commission amended § 2B1.1(b)(2)(B) after Ponte’s sentencing. The amendment does not apply on direct review. 38 available information.” See United States v. Coppola, 671 F.3d 220, 250 (2d Cir. 2012), quoting U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). “Nevertheless, a court of appeals must determine whether the trial court’s method of calculating the amount of loss was legally acceptable.” United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 178 (2d. Cir. 2007) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted). Ponte argues that the district court erred in finding that the government had proven by a preponderance of the evidence that the loan applications for each of the 104 properties purchased through Cut Above Ventures contained a material misrepresentation. In order to reach this conclusion, the district court held a loss amount hearing. At the hearing, the government introduced (1) the testimony of Rivernider’s co‐conspirator, Tosha Wade, who testified that the incentive program was not disclosed to lenders and also described the common steps taken to commit mortgage fraud; (2) an email between Wade and a buyer in which Wade explained that the lender should not be told about the incentive program; (3) documents from Rivernider’s computer listing all 104 properties with the general notation “Property List”; and (4) testimony from FBI Special Agent Stephen West. West testified that (1) all of the documents relating to the 104 properties were found in one place; (2) he had not seen any document that 39 would suggest that any of the 104 mortgages were not obtained through the Cut Above Ventures incentive program; (3) he had not found any documents disclosing the incentive plan to lenders; and (4) the properties on the spreadsheet matched the properties the government identified as fraudulent. On cross‐examination, West conceded that he did not know which specific misrepresentations were made with respect to individual loans, and that he did not have access to internal communications between lenders that could potentially show lenders’ awareness of the incentive program. West also admitted that he had not looked specifically at the loan documentation for all 104 properties, and, when questioned about two specific transactions, was unable to provide any details without checking the underlying documentation. He clarified that it was his belief that if he checked the documentation for each loan, he would find that each transaction was tainted. Following the hearing, the government filed a supplemental submission describing the two real estate transactions that West had been questioned about, and identifying the misrepresentations contained in those loan documents. The district court did not commit clear error in determining that the foregoing evidence was sufficient to establish, by a preponderance of the 40 evidence, that all 104 properties purchased through Cut Above Ventures were tainted by fraud. Although the government did not identify which misrepresentations were made with respect to each individual loan, the testimony of West – which the district court found credible – combined with Wade’s testimony and other documentary evidence, are sufficient to establish that it was more likely than not that all of the 104 loan applications processed by Cut Above Ventures contained material misrepresentations.
Ponte also challenges the district court’s application of enhancements for abuse of a position of trust, use of sophisticated means, and number of victims, as well as the court’s denial of acceptance‐of‐responsibility and minor role reductions. Ponte’s arguments largely revolve around the characterization of his role in the fraud as that of a minor player who lacked knowledge of the overarching scheme; therefore, he argues, enhancements for Rivernider’s use of sophisticated means, number of victims, and abuse of a position of trust were inappropriate. As Ponte largely does not challenge the application of these enhancements to the schemes as a whole, only the application to himself based on his role in the 41 offense, we address here only the district court’s factual finding that Ponte was “more a partner than a pawn,” G.A. 880, in both schemes. The district court did not err in rejecting Ponte’s self‐serving description of his role in the offense. In his statement of offense conduct, Ponte admitted to soliciting money for the NMB program using material misrepresentations and omissions. With respect to the real estate scheme, Ponte admitted to participating in a real estate conspiracy that deceived lenders and personally making material misrepresentations and omissions to borrowers. Moreover, as the district court observed, emails between Ponte and Rivernider showed that Ponte acted as Rivernider’s partner, regardless of the formal business arrangement. Based on Ponte’s own admission of offense conduct, and other documentary evidence, the district court did not err in rejecting Ponte’s characterization of himself as a mere salesperson who lacked knowledge of the overall scheme. Ponte additionally argues that the abuse‐of‐trust enhancement was in error because he had no managerial or professional discretion with respect to the clients’ funds. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 provides for a two‐level enhancement “[i]f the defendant abused a position of public or private trust, . . . in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of the offense.” The term 42 “public or private trust” refers to a position characterized by “professional or managerial discretion (i.e., substantial discretionary judgment that is ordinarily given considerable deference)” and is consequently subject to reduced supervision. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3, cmt. n.1. “Whether a position is one of ‘trust’ within the meaning of § 3B1.3 is to be viewed from the perspective of the offense victims . . . .” United States v. Wright, 160 F.3d 905, 910 (2d Cir. 1998). Ponte’s argument the he lacked discretionary authority in either scheme fails. As the district court found, Ponte functioned essentially as an investment advisor for a number of victims. For example, Ponte convinced some victims to take out home equity loans to increase investments in the NMB program, and recruited investors for the real estate scheme from his NMB clients with whom he had already established a relationship. Ponte was not directly supervised by Rivernider; rather, he exercised significant discretion in recruiting victims. In light of the foregoing evidence, the district court did not err in finding that, from the perspective of the victims, Ponte occupied a position of trust. Ponte also argues that the district court erred in failing to grant an acceptance‐of‐responsibility reduction. “Whether a defendant has carried his burden to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility is a factual question on which 43 we defer to the district court unless its refusal to accord such consideration is without foundation.” United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 284 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). As Ponte did not plead guilty until several weeks into the trial, and contradicted his statement of offense conduct at sentencing, there was a more than adequate foundation for denying an acceptance of responsibility reduction.
Ponte argues that his sentence was substantively unreasonable because the district court imposed a sentence greater than necessary to achieve the goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). That argument is premised on the district court’s consultation of a draft of an American Bar Association report, which set forth proposed alternative guidelines for economic crimes, and would have yielded a guidelines range below 90 months had they actually been in effect. See American Bar Association, A Report on Behalf of the American Bar Association Criminal Justice Section Task Force on The Reform of Federal Sentencing for Economic Crimes (2014), www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/uncategorized/criminal_justice/ economic_crimes.authcheckdam.pdf. 44 Ponte’s argument lacks any basis in law. The district court considered – among other factors – the rationale of the ABA report in concluding that the Guidelines loss amount calculation overstated the seriousness of Ponte’s offense. However, such consideration does not require the court to follow the recommendations set forth in that report. The district court was (to understate the case) no more bound by a hypothetical set of guidelines issued by proponents of changes in the law than it was by the actual Guidelines promulgated by the Sentencing Commission. Accordingly, Ponte’s below‐Guidelines sentence is easily “located within the range of permissible decisions.” Cavera, 550 F.3d at 189 (internal quotation marks omitted).