Opinion ID: 789142
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the first amendment contentions

Text: 130 While conceding that ensuring the well-being of children is a compelling governmental interest, Hobbs contends principally that § VI, ¶ 2, of Executive Order 3-2003 is a content-based prior restraint that violates the First Amendment on the grounds (a) that it is not the least restrictive means necessary to achieve its goal (Hobbs reply brief on appeal at 7) because it applies to every person who has been convicted of a sexual offense involving a minor, without any individual analysis of the speaker ( id. at 6), (b) that it lacks efficacy (Hobbs brief on appeal at 31) because it does not bar his presence at Playland or any other County park, and (c) that it is, on its face, overly broad both as to the speech it prohibits and as to the persons restrained. Defendants, while arguing that the district court did not err in ruling that ¶ 2 met the strict-scrutiny test that is applicable to content-based restrictions, also contend that only an intermediate level of scrutiny was required because the Prohibition is content-neutral. We conclude that ¶ 2 is content-neutral and survives intermediate scrutiny.
131 The pertinent Clause of the First Amendment, which applies to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 60 S.Ct. 736, 84 L.Ed. 1093 (1940), provides that Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech.... U.S. Const. amend. I. [S]peech may include expressive conduct, see, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404-06, 109 S.Ct. 2533, 105 L.Ed.2d 342 (1989); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065, 82 L.Ed.2d 221 (1984), and certain principles governing the application of this First Amendment prohibition are well established. 132 The government's authority to regulate speech or expressive conduct on property that has traditionally been open to the public for such activity, such as public streets and parks, is sharply circumscribed. See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, 120 L.Ed.2d 101 (1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726, 110 S.Ct. 3115, 111 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990) (plurality opinion); Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). A prior restraint[] on speech, i.e., any regulation that g[i]ve[s] public officials the power to deny use of a forum in advance of actual expression, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 552-53, 95 S.Ct. 1239, 43 L.Ed.2d 448 (1975), such as a requirement that a permit be obtained in advance of the proposed speech or conduct, see, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130, 112 S.Ct. 2395, is not unconstitutional per se,  but it bear[s] a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity, Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. at 558, 95 S.Ct. 1239 (internal quotation marks omitted). 133 Restraints on speech on the basis of its content, except in a few limited categories such as obscenity, defamation, and fighting words, are generally disallowed. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382-83, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 115, 112 S.Ct. 501, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991); Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309-11, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). [T]he fundamental principle that underlies our concern about `content-based' speech regulations, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48, 106 S.Ct. 925, 89 L.Ed.2d 29 (1986), is that the government is not permitted to `grant the use of a forum to people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to express less favored or more controversial views,' id. at 48-49, 106 S.Ct. 925 (quoting Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96, 92 S.Ct. 2286). The concern is that if the government were able to impose content-based burdens on speech, it could effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. at 116, 112 S.Ct. 501; see, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 448-49, 111 S.Ct. 1438, 113 L.Ed.2d 494 (1991). Further, [t]he First Amendment's hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire topic. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 530, 537, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462 n. 6, 100 S.Ct. 2286, 65 L.Ed.2d 263 (1980). In short, regulations of speech based on its content are presumptively invalid. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 382, 112 S.Ct. 2538. 134 However, this presumption of invalidity can be overcome if the restriction passes a strict test. See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988) (majority opinion) (content-based restrictions on political speech must be subjected to the most exacting scrutiny). Under the strict-scrutiny test, a content-based restriction may be upheld if the restriction serves a compelling governmental interest, is necessary to serve the asserted [compelling] interest, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. at 395, 112 S.Ct. 2538 (emphasis and brackets in R.A.V. ) (internal quotation marks omitted), is precisely tailored to serve that interest, and is the least restrictive means readily available for that purpose, see, e.g., Ashcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 2791, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321, 329, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (majority opinion). 135 In contrast, a less stringent test — applying intermediate scrutiny — is applicable to regulations of expressive activity that are not based on content. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 440, 122 S.Ct. 1728, 152 L.Ed.2d 670 (2002) (plurality opinion); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798 n. 6, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). Content-neutral regulations may limit the time, place, or manner of expression — whether oral, written, or symbolized by conduct — even in a public forum, so long as the restrictions are reasonable, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065; see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746; City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 47, 106 S.Ct. 925. Although a restriction that is content-neutral must be narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest, it need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 798, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see, e.g., id. n. 6 (While time, place, or manner regulations must ... be `narrowly tailored' in order to survive First Amendment challenge, we have never applied strict scrutiny in this context. As a result, the same degree of tailoring is not required of these regulations, and least-restrictive-alternative analysis is wholly out of place.). The narrow tailoring requirement is satisfied so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation. Id. at 799, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (internal quotation marks omitted). 136 In the analysis of whether a regulation is content-based or content-neutral, the principal inquiry ..., in speech cases generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys. Id. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. at 116; Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. at 448, 111 S.Ct. 1438; FCC v. League of Women Voters of California, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984). Government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is `justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. at 293, 104 S.Ct. 3065); see, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 48, 106 S.Ct. 925. 137 A regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746; see, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 47-48, 106 S.Ct. 925. Thus, a regulation that targets only potentially harmful secondary effects of speech, rather than the contents of the speech itself or the listener's agreement or disagreement with those contents, is deemed content-neutral. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., TDBA Kandyland, 529 U.S. 277, 291, 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382, 146 L.Ed.2d 265 (2000) (plurality opinion); id. at 291, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (ordinance prohibiting public nudity and thus nude dancing was not [an] attempt to regulate the primary effects of the expression, i.e., the effect on the audience of watching nude erotic dancing, but rather [targeted] the secondary effects, such as the impacts on public health, safety, and welfare.  is content-neutral (emphasis added)); id. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (Erie's asserted interest in combating the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments like Kandyland is unrelated to the suppression of the erotic message conveyed by nude dancing.). A restriction designed to serve a governmental need to protect the security of the audience targets the speech's secondary, rather than its primary, effect. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. at 321, 108 S.Ct. 1157 (plurality opinion). 138 Finally, a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment freedoms to the prior restraint of a license must also provide narrow, objective, and definite standards to guide the licensing authority in acting on the permit application. Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51, 89 S.Ct. 935, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); see, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. at 130-31, 112 S.Ct. 2395; Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271-72, 71 S.Ct. 328, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951). 139 Application of these principles in the present case leads us to the conclusion that Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003 survives constitutional scrutiny because the County has the requisite interest in the welfare of children, the permit requirement is content-neutral, and this content-neutral requirement serves the governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest. And, as discussed in Part II.C. below, the Executive Order provides County officials with sufficient guidance to prevent arbitrary denials of permit applications. 140 First, it is indisputable and undisputed that a significant and substantial governmental interest is at stake. The government has a compelling interest in protecting the physical and psychological well-being of minors, Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989) (emphasis added), indeed, an interest of surpassing importance, in preventing the sexual exploitation of children, New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113 (1982). ( See Hobbs brief on appeal at 15 (there is no dispute that ensuring the well-being of children is a compelling governmental interest; id. at 25 (same).)) 141 Second, the Executive Order, whose pertinent provisions are set out in Part I.F. above, is content-neutral. Although it deals with speech or expressive conduct to the extent that the activity constitutes solicit[ation], perform[ance], demonstrat[ion] or other similar conduct, e.g., Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003, §§ I, II, VI-activity that we will refer to collectively as presentations — the Executive Order does not impose the permit requirement on any person or group of persons on the basis of any particular viewpoint or any particular topic. Without discriminating on the basis of content, the Executive Order focuses first — and potentially only — on the means by which the speaker's message is to be delivered. The  Application  section states that [t]his policy shall apply to all individuals seeking to obtain a permit to solicit, perform, demonstrate, or engage in similar conduct utilizing props and/or equipment on public property owned by the County that is considered to be a public forum. Id. § II (emphasis added); see also id. § I (similarly referring to the use of props and/or equipment in connection with the description of the  Purpose  of the permit requirement). There is no indication in the Executive Order that a permit is required of any person who does not use props and/or equipment. Accordingly, in the district court, the County repeatedly noted the props and/or equipment limitation on the applicability of its permit requirement. For example, in an April 2003 memorandum, the County stated that [t]he language of the [Executive] Order is limited and specific; it applies ... only to a `solicitation, performance or demonstration ... utilizing props and/or equipment' (and not, for example to hand billing or hand billing and advocating verbally) .... (Defendants' Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law dated April 17, 2003, at 8 (emphases added).) In a June 2003 memorandum, the County stated that Executive Order 3-2003 applies only to individuals who seek to engage in a very limited class of expressive activities (to wit, persons who seek to `solicit, perform, demonstrate, or engage in similar conduct ...') and even then, only when those activities involve the use of `props and/or equipment'.  (Defendants' Memorandum of Law Regarding Issues Raised at the June 2, 2003 Hearing, dated June 16, 2003, at 2 (emphasis added).) And at a later hearing on Hobbs's challenges to the Executive Order, when the court asked for confirmation that, if the speaker just dressed as a clown and did a funny act[,]... made funny faces, [and] mimed, attracting people to congregate, but used no props, that is not prohibited, the County responded, That is correct. (Hearing Transcript, June 20, 2003, at 18.) 142 Although the phrase props and/or equipment does not appear in § VI of the Executive Order, and the district court analyzed the Prohibition as if it were applicable irrespective of whether a speaker sought to use props or other equipment, see Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at  n. 8, we think it more appropriate to view the Executive Order as setting forth an integrated permit scheme. Both § II, i.e., the  Application  section that describes the broad class of individuals to whom [t]his policy shall apply, and § VI, i.e., the  Prohibition section that describes how the policy is to be applied to one category of applicants, appear in the Part headed WESTCHESTER COUNTY PERMIT POLICY, and we regard § II as an integral part of the Prohibition stated in § VI. The Executive Order does not by its terms extend to a person who wishes to convey his or her message, whatever that message may be, without the use of physical articles or equipment as theatrical aids. As we read the Executive Order, therefore, and as it is expressly interpreted by the County itself, a person not seeking to use props and/or equipment need not apply for a permit. 143 Hobbs, according to his complaint, seeks to deliver to the public various messages [that] often have political value, and or social value. (Complaint at 6.) His political messages comment[] on government inefficiency. He is criticizing the Government. He is criticizing the daffiness of some civil servant controlled governmental processes. His message is political and critical of the government. ( Id. at 12 (emphasis in original).) He apparently illustrates his point by, inter alia, referring to government inefficiency in responding to requests by General George Washington during the Revolutionary War. ( See id. at 13-14.) Hobbs also seeks to remind the public of the plight of the homeless, including homeless veterans of the military. ( See id. ) And he promotes good will and honesty and obedience to parents, promotes diversity and universal acceptance of others, and discourages prejudice and pride. ( Id. at 23.) 144 Nothing in the Executive Order prevents Hobbs from communicating his criticisms of the government and his other social commentary — or from providing entertainment — in words or expressive action. As just discussed, the Executive Order affects only the manner of presentation through the use of props and/or equipment. Although Hobbs alleges that [t]he balloon is a tool through which he conveys his message (Complaint at 13), plainly such a prop is not integral to political or social-conscience messages, and nothing prevents Hobbs from delivering his messages or entertaining without that prop. 145 Further, the goal of the Executive Order's Prohibition plainly is to protect the safety and welfare of children using public property. At the outset, the Executive Order notes the use of such areas by children, see, e.g., Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003, WHEREAS clauses 1 & 3; the  Application  section states generally that the restrictions are being imposed for the safety of the public, id. § II; and the  Prohibition  section states expressly that its ban on the issuance of permits to persons known to have been convicted of sex offenses against minors, where the presentation would entice children to congregate around such known sex offenders, is meant to prevent unreasonable risk[s] to the safety and welfare of children, id. § VI. 146 In providing that no permit will be granted where the applicant is  known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor ... if the [presentation] would entice a child to congregate around that person,  id. (emphases added), the Prohibition is not concerned with the content of the message, or the audience's agreement or disagreement with the message, or the audience's enjoyment of the presentation. By focusing on prop-assisted presentations that would entice a child to congregate around a person known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, the Prohibition looks beyond primary effects such as mere enjoyment of the presentation. Rather, it focuses on the safety of children and aims to limit the opportunity for such a convicted sexual offender to attract children with whom he might later engage in child molestation. The Prohibition thus targets effects that are secondary. 147 To be sure, the content of the applicant's proposed presentation can be examined — along with the proposed props and/or other equipment — to determine whether the presentation is likely to attract a crowd of children. But the specific content of the speech — whether the speaker is talking about animals, fairy tales, government inefficiency, or the plight of homeless veterans — is irrelevant to the governmental goal that a person with a criminal record of sexual offenses against minors not be permitted to use artifices to entice children to gather around him, developing rapport with the children and gaining new opportunities for child molestation. We conclude that the Executive Order constitutes a restriction only on the manner of speech and is designed to prevent harmful secondary effects unrelated to its content. 148 We are unpersuaded by Hobbs's contentions that the Prohibition is neither necessary nor narrowly tailored for the achievement of its purpose. As to necessity, it cannot reasonably be disputed that there exists a need for concern for the welfare of children in the presence of persons who have committed sexual offenses against minors. The Supreme Court in Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 123 S.Ct. 1140, 155 L.Ed.2d 164 (2003), for example, which was decided a few days before the issuance of Executive Order 3-2003, discussed the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders and their dangerousness as a class, 538 U.S. at 103, 123 S.Ct. 1140, and quoted a 1997 United States Department of Justice report which noted that [w]hen convicted sex offenders reenter society, they are much more likely than any other type of offender to be rearrested for a new rape or sexual assault, id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, before issuing the Executive Order, the County had sought the advice of Dr. Pogge, whose report discussed the relatively high recidivism rate of sexual offenders in general and the even higher rate for persons whose offenses were either homosexual or pedophilic (Pogge Report at 4). It is permissible for a municipality to conclude that secondary-effects-oriented regulations are necessary based on evidence such as this, which is reasonably believed to be relevant to the secondary effects that they seek to address. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. at 442, 122 S.Ct. 1728 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted); see, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., TDBA Kandyland, 529 U.S. at 296, 120 S.Ct. 1382 (plurality opinion) (in terms of demonstrating that such secondary effects pose a threat, the city need not `conduct new studies' ... `so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses') (quoting City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. at 51-52, 106 S.Ct. 925). 149 Finally, the Prohibition is narrowly tailored to further its purpose. It applies only to certain persons known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, and the Executive Order expressly requires County officials to work closely with law enforcement agencies in order to determine whether a given applicant is such a person, see Westchester County Executive Order No. 3-2003, § VIII. Given the high rate of recidivism by convicted child molesters and the facts, inter alia, that (a) the permit requirement does not apply to persons whose presentations would not use props and/or equipment, and (b) the Prohibition (i) does not apply to a person who is merely suspected or who has been accused but not convicted of being a sexual offender against a minor, and (ii) does not apply, even as to a person known to have been convicted of a sex offense against a minor, if the planned presentation, even with props and/or equipment, would not entice a child to congregate around that person, we conclude that the Prohibition is a manner-of-presentation restriction that is narrowly tailored to further the County's compelling interest in the safety and welfare of children.
150 We see no constitutional impediment to the application of the Executive Order's Prohibition to Hobbs. Notwithstanding his complaint's description of the contents of his messages as political and social-issue oriented, his performances are expressly directed toward children. Several photographs introduced at a hearing in the district court show Hobbs on the Playland boardwalk, seated in a chair with various equipment at his side and a sign reading, in part, A theater experience for 3 and 4 year olds. ( See Hearing Transcript, April 3, 2003, at 21, 37; Defendants' Exhibit 3.) In one of the pictures, Hobbs is performing and displaying balloon sculptures. In his complaint, Hobbs alleges, inter alia, that [t]he balloon is a tool through which he conveys his message and helps attract his audience (Complaint at 13); that, although adults are repelled, his performance is particularly attractive to children, who try to help him understand how to inflate a balloon ( see id. at 12-15); that his performance is interactive ( id. at 8); that the balloon creates a tie between [himself and] those watching him ( id. at 13); and that he hands balloons to children ( see id. ). Further, the complaint indicates that the desire of the children to congregate around Hobbs is long-lasting, as, after seeing Hobbs's act once, they repeatedly ask when they can go to see Hobbs again. ( See id. at 14-15.) It is undisputed that Hobbs had twice been convicted of child molestation offenses, and his own descriptions of his act compel the conclusion that his act, using props, would entice children to congregate around him. 151 Finally, we reject Hobbs's contention that the Prohibition should be invalidated on the ground that it lacks efficacy (Hobbs brief on appeal at 31) because it does not bar his presence at Playland or any other County park. His presence indeed is not barred, nor is the mere expression of his views. See, e.g., Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at  ([E]ven a convicted pedophile is free to go to Playland Park, or any other Westchester County park, to distribute leaflets or speak publicly regarding matters of personal or public concern, provided his activities and speech are oriented toward adults and are not of a nature that would be likely to `entice a child to congregate around' him.). But Hobbs and other persons convicted of sexual offenses against minors need not be banned from public property entirely in order for the Prohibition to achieve at least some of the desired effect. The efficacy of the Prohibition lies in its limitation on Hobbs's ability to entice children to come near him through the use of equipment such as the balloons he seeks to hand them — accoutrements seemingly necessary to enhance the attraction, given that the contents of the messages Hobbs alleges he delivers ( e.g., tolerance, the plight of the homeless, government inefficiency) seem unlikely to hold the attention of a child. The governmental goal of limiting opportunities for child molestation by one previously convicted of a sexual offense against a minor would be achieved less effectively absent the Prohibition. Hobbs's efficacy challenge is thus meritless and instead simply confirms that there are other means by which Hobbs can deliver his messages. 152 We conclude that the Executive Order is content-neutral, aimed only at promoting the safety and well-being of children; it imposes a reasonable limitation on the manner of expression, without reference to content; and it is narrowly tailored to, and does, address the concededly compelling governmental interest. As applied to Hobbs, it does not violate the First Amendment.
153 Hobbs also contends that the Prohibition is facially unconstitutional because it is substantially overbroad in that it prevents an entire class of people from engaging in public speech under any and all circumstances and throughout all public areas in Westchester County. (Hobbs brief on appeal at 34-35.) He argues that the Prohibition is invalid because (a) it automatically disqualifies all persons convicted of a sexual offense against a minor without any individual assessment as to their risk of recidivism in general or specifically with respect to minors who would see and listen to their performances, demonstrations or similar activities ( id. at 35); (b) almost any performance or demonstration in a public area, regardless of its substance or whom it is directed at, would likely `entice a child to congregate around' ... the speaker ( id. at 40); and (c) ¶ 2 thus gives unbridled discretion to a County employee to discriminate against a permit applicant on the basis of viewpoint ( id. at 41). We disagree. 154 It is established that the courts may, as an exception to ordinary standing requirements, New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11, 108 S.Ct. 2225, 101 L.Ed.2d 1 (1988), entertain a claim that a law, even if constitutional as applied to the claimant, is so broad that it may inhibit the constitutionally protected speech of third parties, Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 798, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). However, that exception is narrow. Invalidating any rule on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not before the Court is `strong medicine' to be applied `sparingly and only as a last resort.' FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 743, 98 S.Ct. 3026, 57 L.Ed.2d 1073 (1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973)). Invalidation of Executive Order 3-2003 on the ground of overbreadth is not warranted here. 155 As discussed in Part II.A. above, the Prohibition in § VI, ¶ 2, is narrowly tailored to the County's compelling interest in protecting children from sexual predation. Contrary to Hobbs's assertion, the Prohibition does not prevent [] an entire class of people from engaging in public speech under any and all circumstances (Hobbs brief on appeal at 34-35). The circumstances encompassed by the Prohibition are, as discussed above, narrowly circumscribed. Hobbs's contention that a fully rehabilitated person who had been convicted 20 years ago of a misdemeanor sexual offense would not be permitted to give a public speech on the dangers of pedophilia ( id. at 38) simply ignores the scope of the Executive Order. We would agree that if Hobbs were to give such a speech in conjunction with his self-styled theater experience for 3 and 4 year olds (Defendants' Exhibit 3), accompanied by the balloon sculptures that his complaint alleges attract children to him, his presentation would be within the scope of ¶ 2. But if given without props and/or equipment, such a speech-or any speech on any topic from any viewpoint — is beyond the scope of the Executive Order, and no permit is required. 156 Nor does the Prohibition apply to an entire class of people (Hobbs brief on appeal at 34). Rather, it applies only to members of a group that generally has a high rate of recidivism and poses a threat to the safety and welfare of children, i.e., persons known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, and it does not apply to all such persons. Within the class of persons known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor, the Executive Order itself does not apply if the person will not use props or other such equipment in his presentation; and the Prohibition in the Executive Order does not apply if the presentation is not likely to entice children to gather around him. 157 The framing of the Prohibition in terms of the category of persons whom the County has ascertained have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor is not unreasonable. We reject Hobbs's suggestion that the County must instead undertake an individual assessment of the likelihood of recidivism by each such permit applicant ( id. at 35). The imposition of that additional requirement, thereby necessitating substantial expenditures of time and resources for, inter alia, face-to-face psychiatric evaluation sessions by professionals, would not be reasonable. Cf. United States v. American Library Ass'n, 539 U.S. 194, 208, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 156 L.Ed.2d 221 (2003) (plurality opinion) (libraries may permissibly employ internet filtering software to exclude certain categories of [potentially inappropriate] content, without making individualized judgments). 158 Finally, we are not persuaded that the Executive Order gives the County's licensing officials unbridled discretion to deny a permit application. First, the permit requirement does not apply unless props and/or equipment would be used. Second, if such aids would be used, the  Prohibition  section itself describes the factors that require denial of a permit. It does not authorize denial of the application unless the applicant is known to have been convicted of a sex offense against a minor. Thus, denial of a permit is not authorized on the basis of mere suspicions or unproven allegations of child molestation. Section VIII of the Executive Order requires County officials to coordinate with law enforcement agencies in order to learn whether an applicant has been so convicted. Further, the Prohibition requires the licensing official to determine whether the proposed presentation would entice a child to congregate around the applicant, a phrase that squarely focuses the official's attention on whether the proposed presentation is child-oriented. We reject Hobbs's contention that almost any presentation would likely `entice a child to congregate around' the presenter (Hobbs brief on appeal at 40), although we agree that whether children are so enticed may well be unrelated to the presentation's substance ( id. ). For example, the mere contents of the messages that Hobbs states he is conveying ( e.g., the plight of the homeless, government inefficiency) would hardly be likely to entice children to congregate. His presentation of those messages with props and/or equipment such as balloons, however, is plainly child-oriented; and, as his complaint asserts, children are attracted by the manner of his presentation. If an applicant sought to deliver a speech simply using, for example, placards of text, such a presentation would seem not to be one that would entice children to congregate. ( See, e.g., Defendants' Post-Hearing Memorandum of Law dated April 17, 2003, at 8 (hand billing and[/or] advocating verbally does not require a permit).) 159 We conclude that the Executive Order's statement in § II as to the scope of the County's permit policy, expressly limiting the policy's applicability to presentations using props and/or equipment, and the criteria set forth in § VI, ¶ 2, specifying that a permit is to be denied if (a) the applicant is a person known to have been convicted of a sexual offense against a minor and (b) the presentation would entice a child to congregate, provide sufficient guidance to County officials and do not allow them discretion to deny a permit on the basis of content or viewpoint. To the extent that a given applicant might in fact be denied a permit in connection with the planned use of props or equipment in a non-child-oriented type of presentation, that applicant would be free, as the district court concluded in Hobbs II, 2003 WL 21919882, at , to seek judicial review in an Article 78 proceeding, see N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1994), challenging ¶ 2 on the ground that it was unconstitutionally applied to him or her. 160 In sum, we conclude that Executive Order 3-2003 is not facially overbroad.