Opinion ID: 1839071
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: catholic charities owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in investigating the health of geoffrey foster and in advising his prospective adoptive parents of any health problems.

Text: Since Foster raises a claim of negligence, it is obvious that he must prove by a preponderance of the evidence: duty, breach of duty, proximate cause and damages. Palmer v. Biloxi Regional Medical Center, Inc., 564 So.2d 1346, 1354 (Miss. 1990); Phillips v. Hull, 516 So.2d 488, 491-92 (Miss. 1987); see also, Beck v. Thompson, 818 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir.1987). [6] Recovery must be denied where a plaintiff fails to prove any one of these elements. Only when the first two items are shown is it possible to proceed to a consideration of proximate cause since a duty and breach of that duty are essential to a finding of negligence under the traditional and accepted formula. Ward, supra . One major contention between the parties is whether Catholic Charities breached that duty. In particular, Foster argues that a duty in fact existed because under the common law of Mississippi a person or entity which undertakes to perform an act must exercise reasonable care in performing that act. What is duty? [I]n order to recover for an injury to a person or property, by reason of negligence or want of due care, there must be shown to exist some obligation or duty toward the plaintiff which the defendant has left undischarged or unfulfilled. This is the basis on which the cause of action rests. Gulf M & N Railroad Co. v. Sparkman, 180 Miss. 456, 466, 177 So. 760, 762 (1938). Stated another way, this Court also has explained that negligence is the result of the failure to perform a duty; therefore, actionable negligence cannot exist in the absence of a legal duty to an injured plaintiff. Stanley v. Morgan & Lindsey, Inc., 203 So.2d 473, 475 (Miss. 1967). Accord, Robinson v. Estate of Williams, 721 F. Supp. 806 (S.D.Miss. 1989). The existence vel non of a duty of care is a question of law to be decided by the Court. Ward, 450 F.2d at 1181 n. 15; Morgan & Lindsey at 473; Faulkner Concrete Pipe Co. v. Fox, 248 Miss. 50, 157 So.2d 804 (1963); see also, W. Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts, 236 (5th Ed. 1984) (the existence of a duty is entirely a question of law and it must be determined only by the court. A decision by the court that there is no duty must necessarily result in judgment for the defendant.). [7] Foster relies on three cases to establish that Catholic Charities, in fact, violated its duty to them. In his first case, Chadwick v. Bush, 174 Miss. 75, 163 So. 823 (1935), Foster relies on the following language: Long before there were any statutes in this state, it was the established law of the land, applicable to every member of the civil community, that each shall so use his own or otherwise so guide his conduct as not unreasonably to injure another; and that an actionable wrong has been committed when a responsible person has neglected to use a reasonable degree of care and diligence for the protection of another person from such injury as under the existing circumstances should reasonably have been foreseen as a natural and proximate consequence of that negligence. It requires no statute to give force and validity to the principles of the law of negligence  no more than as to any other portion of the great field of the common law ... Id. at 80-1, 163 So. at 824. In that case, however, the facts indicate that the decedent was killed in an automobile accident on a public highway when his car collided with the defendant's truck. Id. 163 So. at 823-24. The major issues before the jury concerned two things: whether it was reasonable for the defendant to drive, after midnight, a seven foot four-inch wide truck without a light on the left side; and did defendant's failure to have a left light contribute to and proximately cause the accident. Id. at 824. On appeal the issues before this Court, however, concerned whether the trial court should have submitted jury instructions requested by the defendants. One jury instruction informed the jury that Mississippi had no statutes requiring defendants to keep a light or sign on the left side of their vehicles. The second instruction indicated that the width of defendant's truck was not in violation of any Mississippi statute. It is in this context that this Court made the above statement and concluded that it was reversible error to grant [the instructions] ... since we cannot say with dependable confidence that the jury was not misled thereby into supposing that since no statute had been enacted validating the instruction, the law [announced in the first instruction] was not fully obligatory upon them. Id. at 81, 163 So. at 824. Without doubt, the defendants had a duty to use the public roads in a reasonably safe manner. The second case that Foster cites for approval is Brunt v. Chicago Mill & Lumber Co., 243 Miss. 607, 139 So.2d 380 (1962). That case involved a suit for property damages caused by the negligent operation of an airplane. Id. 139 So.2d at 381. The simple question before the jury was whether a pilot could be held liable for a cattle stampede when, as he ascended for landing, he flew over and near the cattle with the motor [at full throttle]. In reversing the lower court, this Court made the following statement: The probability of injury by one to the legally protected interests of another is the basis for the law's creation of a duty to avoid such injury. Every person is under duty to exercise his senses and intelligence in his actions in order to avoid injury to others, and where a situation suggests investigation and inspection in order that its dangers may fully appear, the duty to make such investigation and inspection is imposed by law. It is no excuse that one who has created a peril did not intend or expect any injury to result therefrom; every person is held to a knowledge of the natural and probable consequences of his acts. 243 Miss. at 615, 139 So.2d at 384 (emphasis added). What Foster fails to point out is that on appeal the plaintiff/appellant emphasized the following points: that the pilot was licensed and experienced; that he knew the rules of aviation; that he should have known at least a hundred cattle were grazing in the pasture; therefore he should have known and reasonably foreseen, if he exercised ordinary care, that taking off at full throttle would cause the cattle to stampede. Id. 139 So.2d at 383-84. Surely, Foster cannot say that Catholic Charities created his peril. Finally, Foster points to Dr. Pepper Bottling Co. v. Bruner, 245 Miss. 276, 148 So.2d 199 (1962). The facts of that case are pretty simple. After delivering drinks to a local drug store, one of Dr. Pepper's employees pushed a cart loaded with drinks into the plaintiff's leg. Id. 148 So.2d at 200. On appeal Dr. Pepper insisted that it was entitled to a peremptory instruction. As Foster points out in his brief, however, this Court affirmed the lower court and gave this discussion of duty: As a general rule, it is the natural inherent duty owed by one person to his fellowmen, in his intercourse with them, to protect life and limb against peril, when it is in his power to reasonably do so. The law imposes upon every person who undertakes the performance of an act which, it is apparent, if not done carefully, will be dangerous to other persons, or the property of other persons  the duty to exercise his senses and intelligence to avoid injury, and he may be held accountable at law for an injury to person or property which is directly attributable to a breach of such duty ... Stated broadly, one who undertakes to do an act or discharge a duty by which conduct of others may be properly regulated and governed is under a duty to shape his conduct in such manner that those rightfully led to act on the faith of his performance shall not suffer loss or injury through his negligence. 245 Miss. at 282, 148 So.2d at 201 (emphasis added). Catholic Charities, on the other hand, relies on other cases. For example, it cites Illinois Central RR Co. v. Bloodworth, 166 Miss. 602, 145 So. 333 (1933). In that case, the decedent was killed while walking across an elevated railroad bridge. The driver of the car was involved in a race when it struck an iron water main with such force that the main burst, and also the tire of the car; the car plunged from the south side of the bridge to the north side, back across the driveway and the south walk to the guard rail, loosening some of the upright pieces thereof, and hurled [the decedent] who was in its path, to the ground below. Id. 145 So. at 334. The plaintiffs sued alleging, inter alia, that the bridge was negligently constructed and maintained. This Court responded: Precaution is a duty only so far as there is reason for apprehension. Ordinary care of a reasonably prudent man does not demand that a person should prevision or anticipate an unusual, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence, though such happening is within the range of possibilities. Care or foresight as to the probable effect of an act is not to be weighed on jewelers' scales, nor calculated by the expert mind of the philosopher, from cause to effect, in all situations. Probability arises in the law of negligence when viewed from the standpoint of the judgment of a reasonably prudent man, as a reasonable thing to be expected. Remote possibilities do not constitute negligence from the judicial standpoint. Id. 145 So. at 336; see also, Capitol Tobacco & Specialty Co. v. Runnels, 221 So.2d 703, 705 (Miss. 1969); Burnside v. Gulf Refining Co., 166 Miss. 460, 470, 148 So. 219, 221 (quoting Bloodworth, supra ). This same point is expressed in Jarbon v. State, 172 Miss. 135, 139-40, 159 So. 406, 407 (1937), where this Court stated the following: [I]t is elemental that, in order that a wrongdoer may be held liable ... for negligence, it is necessary to show that the injury complained of was the natural and probable result of the negligence ... `Actionable fault on the part of a defendant must be predicated on action or nonaction accompanied by knowledge actual or implied of the facts which make the result of his conduct not only a probable result but a result also which he should, in view of these facts, have reasonably anticipated.' That a particular result was possible result does not establish a case... . (citations omitted). The Fifth Circuit has provided this discussion of negligence law in Mississippi: For actionable negligence to exist, the defendant must owe the plaintiff a legal duty. We noted Mississippi's adoption of this universal principle in Ward v. Hobart Mfg. Co. A duty does not exist, `[i]f the defendant could not reasonably foresee any injury as the result of his acts, or if his conduct was reasonable in the light of what he could anticipate' ... The rationale behind this foreseeability requirement is that no one is expected to guard against events which are not reasonably to be anticipated or that are so unlikely that the risks would be commonly disregarded. Karpovs v. State, 663 F.2d 640, 649 (5th Cir.1981) (citations omitted).