Opinion ID: 1521098
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: A Majority of the Members Elected to the Senate

Text: This Court has announced clear guidelines to aid in the interpretation of constitutional provisions. In Commonwealth ex rel. Paulinski v. Isaac, 483 Pa. 467, 397 A.2d 760 (1979), we stated: Constitutional provisions are not to be read in a strained or technical manner. Rather, they must be given the ordinary, natural interpretation the ratifying voter would give them. Commonwealth v. Harmon, 469 Pa. 490, 366 A.2d 895 (1976); Berardocco v. Colden, 469 Pa. 452, 366 A.2d 574 (1976). . . . . Where, as here, we must decide between two interpretations of a constitutional provision, we must favor a natural reading which avoids contradictions and difficulties in implementation, which completely conforms to the intent of the framers and which reflects the views of the ratifying voter. Id., 483 Pa. at 475, 477, 397 A.2d at 765, 766. We believe the reading petitioners would impose upon Article IV, section 8(a) enjoys none of the characteristics of such an interpretation. Petitioners contend that the phrase a majority of the members elected to the Senate means a majority computed on the basis of the total number of senators elected at a given time, whether or not such senators are, in the words of Senate Rule XXII-8, living, sworn [or] seated. Hence, in the instant action, they would have us rule that Respondent Daniels was put into office by less than a constitutional majority, and should be ousted, because 50 senators were elected, and her nomination received only 25 affirmative votes. Petitioners appear to be relying on the common or natural meaning of the word elected and the meaning of member as it is used elsewhere in the Constitution to arrive at this interpretation, disregarding the phrase as a whole and in the context of Article IV, section 8. In our view, to compute a majority based on a number greater than the total voting group, even where, as here, the potential for ambiguity may exist, would be irrational. The purpose of Article IV, section 8(a) in requiring a majority of members elected would appear to be to ensure that the entire body of the Senate participates in the executive appointment confirmation process, rather than just a quorum. Thus, if in the instant situation the two persons not in office at the time of the vote on Respondent Daniels' nomination were instead merely absent, petitioners' method of computing a majority would have been correct. To include among the number of individuals charged with the responsibility of reviewing the qualifications of the Governor's nominees, senators-elect or former senators, neither entitled to vote in the Senate, would in no way enhance the ability of the Senate to advise and consent. What it would do, however, is cause Article IV, section 8(a) to require greater than a majority vote whenever there was a vacancy in the Senate. [7] This would place a proportionately greater burden on the executive branch when a vacancy or vacancies exist in the Senate, which could in turn encourage needless delay in filling appointive positions. Additionally, under petitioners' interpretation, the number of members elected could be greater than the total number of senators provided for in the Constitution. [8] For example, both defeated incumbents and the successful candidates who have not yet replaced them in office would be members elected. The same would presumably be true of senators who die or resign and those elected to fill their seats. Both petitioners and respondents posit doomsday hypotheticals in which 25 of 50 senators are killed in a disaster. While under respondents' interpretation of the phrase in question, a lesser number of senators could override the Governor's veto than were originally required to pass the vetoed bill, under the same circumstances, the Senate would be incapable of taking any action requiring the vote of a majority of all members if petitioners' interpretation of Article IV, § 8(a) were followed. The latter consequence is by far the less desirable. Petitioners' only support in Pennsylvania case law for their position appears to be the Marshall Impeachment Case, 363 Pa. 326, 69 A.2d 619 (1949), wherein petitioners find language of this Court they assert is controlling in the instant action. In Marshall, President Judge Brown of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, on whose opinion we affirmed the trial court decision per curiam, stated: Rule 4 of the Rules of Council, Manual of the City of Philadelphia for 1949, page 14, provides: `A quorum shall consist of a majority of the members elected to council. ' This number is twelve, and it governs even where variance exists in the Council membership of twenty-two. It also constitutes a majority of such membership. Therefore it seems that twelve councilmen must concur in finding the accused guilty . . . . Id., 363 Pa. at 345, 69 A.2d at 629. (emphasis added). We do not consider that decision relevant to the instant action. First, the language quoted was entirely unnecessary to the determination of the case, and, in fact, all 22 councilmen were seated at the time the opinion was written. Secondly, and most importantly, a Rule of Philadelphia City Council, not the Pennsylvania Constitution, is discussed. Finally, it is impossible to determine from the reported opinion whether this rule is being construed or whether, as is just as likely, the actual practice of the City Council is merely being described. Petitioners find additional support in several decisions of the courts of other states, most notably, an advisory opinion of the Delaware Supreme Court, Opinion of the Justices, 251 A.2d 827 (Del.Sup. 1969). There the court was asked to determine whether a constitutional provision stating that a majority of all the members elected to each House shall constitute a quorum to do business (emphasis added), meant the majority as prescribed by law, regardless of whether vacancies have occurred. Id. Answering in affirmative, the court used language which indicates that the Delaware Constitution has been interpreted along the lines urged upon us by petitioners. In light of the above discussion, however, we decline to follow such an interpretation. Moreover, on the whole respondents' interpretation of the phrase majority of the members elected finds considerable support in the published decisions of American courts construing that phrase or portions thereof. See e. g., State ex rel. Pickrell v. Myers, 89 Ariz. 167, 359 P.2d 757 (1961); State v. Penta, 127 N.J.Super. 201, 316 A.2d 733 (1974); Bailey v. Greer, 63 Tenn.App. 13, 468 S.W.2d 327, 336 (1971); Osburn v. Staley, 5 W.Va. 85, 13 Am.Rep. 640 (1871); State Bank of Drummond v. Nuesse, 108 N.W.2d 283, 285, 13 Wis.2d 74 (1961). But see Satterlee v. San Francisco, 23 Cal. 315 (1863); Smiley v. Commonwealth ex rel. Kerr, 116 Va. 979, 83 S.E. 406 (1914). We therefore adopt the interpretation of Article IV, section 8(a) placed upon it by the Senate in its Rule XXII-8, and hold that a majority of the members elected to the Senate as employed in that subsection means a majority of the members elected, living, sworn, and seated. Accordingly, the appointments of Respondent Daniels and of the other nominees confirmed by a vote of 25 senators are upheld as valid under the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. The relief requested by petitioners is denied and their Petition for Review dismissed.