Opinion ID: 1355273
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Excused Prospective Juror

Text: We first review the defendant's argument that the trial court erred in excusing a prospective juror, Gary Pannell, based on his views regarding the death penalty. The State maintains that the trial court properly excused Pannell based on his statements and views about imposing a death sentence. To place this issue into context, we will include the portions of the voir dire with respect to this prospective juror. First, the exchange between the assistant district attorney general and the prospective juror: Q. Mr. Pannell, same question to you, if the State of Tennessee proves the aggravating circumstances, beyond a reasonable doubt, and proves that they weigh more than the mitigators, again, beyond a reasonable doubt, can you sentence one or both of the defendants to death? A. I really don't think so. .... A. I had a hard time dealing with it last night, soul searching and everything. Q. All right. A. And there have been articles in the paper recently about planted evidence and stuff like that, that it makes it hard for me to say that I would agree to a death sentence on something I didn't witness myself. Q. That's fine. A. Or to hear the person charged with the crime to personally admit to it himself. Q. All right. So you couldn't follow the law in the State of Tennessee if what I have told you would be the law that you would have to follow according to [Judge] Dailey's instructions? A. Well, you know you have to listen to witnesses. Q. Yes, sir. A. Okay. And that's where I would have a problem, is taking what they are saying, and saying, Okay, what they are saying is true, which I don't know  Q. All right. A. And to me, death is  it's a permanent thing. Q. Yes, sir. Thank you. A. You don't come back with it. Q. Thank you. After the prosecution moved to excuse the prospective juror for cause, counsel for the defendant asked the following questions: Q. Sir, let me ask you this: Are there circumstances where you feel you could give the death penalty? You mentioned you wouldn't feel comfortable doing it unless you actually saw it or unless you heard someone admit to it. Are there circumstances where you could give that punishment? A. That's the only two that I can thin[k] of right now. Q. So there are some circumstances where you could give that punishment if it actually showed; is that correct? A. That's right. Q. I have no further questions, Your Honor. Finally, the trial court had the following exchange with the prospective juror: Q. So you're not foreclosing the possibility of giving the death penalty. Is that correct, Mr. Pannell? A. That's correct. Q. You're just stating that you would have to see sufficient proof to satisfy you that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. A. Sufficient proof in my eyes would be what I witnessed myself or what the person charged with the crime  if they said that they did it, yes, I could go along with it. Q. Let me ask you this: If you felt that the state had proven the aggravating circumstance that they allege  you're satisfied that they have proven that and that it outweighed the mitigation  the mitigating circumstances  but neither of these criteria that you set forth existed, are you saying, then, that even though you felt that the state had proven their aggravating circumstances, you still could not follow the law and impose the death penalty? A. (No audible response) Q. Do you follow what I'm saying? A. (No audible response) Q. You set up two criteria that you say are the only two by which you could consider voting for the death penalty, and I'm saying what happens if, in your mind, if you determine that the state has proven, beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of the aggravating circumstance they allege, and you further find, in your mind, that that aggravating circumstance does, indeed, outweigh, beyond a reasonable doubt, any mitigating circumstances that have been presented  if you find that the law had been satisfied in that regard as it's set up by the legislature, but you find that these two circumstances that you set forth aren't part of this process  don't exist in this process, are you saying that because of that, you could not go forward an[d] impose the death penalty? A. I would have a hard time taking what I would hear coming from witnesses' accounts and everything because, just like I said, just last week in the paper about some incidents down in Florida  Q. Well, we wouldn't want to get into what was in the paper because we don't try cases in the paper or on TV. A. Okay. It's planted evidence  Q. Well  A.  people can say anything  Q. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Pannell.... After the State renewed its challenge to the prospective juror for cause, the trial court heard arguments from the parties. The trial court then excused the prospective juror for cause after concluding: I think that his responses, in their totality  he, at best, has given some sort of qualified statement that he could, under his own perceived limited circumstances follow the law; and under the law, that's not good enough. He conceded that if the state proved what they were required to prove under the statute but it didn't meet his self-appointed criteria, then he couldn't go forward and follow the law. And I don't think that's what our system requires of a juror. AndI  that's just the way he feels, and that's fine; but I'll note your exception. I'm going to go ahead and excuse him. The principles governing a trial court's decision to excuse a prospective juror challenged for cause are set out as follows. Under Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985), prospective jurors may be excused for cause only if their views about the death penalty would prevent or substantially impair the performance of their duties as a juror in accordance with their instructions and their oath. See also State v. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tenn.1994). However, a juror's bias need not be proven with unmistakable clarity to justify a challenge for cause. Id. A trial court must have the definite impression that a prospective juror could not follow the law. Hutchison, 898 S.W.2d at 167; see Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 425-26, 105 S.Ct. 844. A trial court's findings are accorded a presumption of correctness, and the [defendant] must establish by convincing evidence that the trial court's determination was erroneous before an appellate court will overturn that decision. State v. Austin, 87 S.W.3d 447, 473 (Tenn.2002); see also State v. Alley, 776 S.W.2d 506, 518 (Tenn.1989); State v. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d 63, 71 (Tenn.1985). A review of these principles as applied illustrates the broad discretion afforded to the trial court. In Wainwright, for instance, the Supreme Court concluded that a prospective juror was properly excused where she was afraid or thought that her views against the death penalty may interfere with her ability to determine the defendant's guilt. 469 U.S. at 426, 105 S.Ct. 844. In Austin, this Court agreed that the trial court had properly excused several prospective jurors who indicated that they would not consider or did not believe in imposing the death penalty. 87 S.W.3d at 473. In Duncan, a case very similar to the present case, this Court held that a prospective juror was properly excused where she believed that she could not impose the death penalty unless she saw the crime committed, and where she stated that she did not want to judge another human being on the basis of what one says against what another person says. 698 S.W.2d at 71; see also Alley, 776 S.W.2d at 517-18 (prospective juror excused where he was not sure he could consider the death penalty). In our view, the defendant has not met the burden of establishing by convincing evidence that the trial court erred in excusing prospective juror Pannell for cause. The prosecutor extensively questioned Pannell as to whether he could apply the law to the evidence and consider all forms of punishment in this case. Pannell consistently indicated that it would be hard for [him] to say that he would impose the death penalty for a crime he did not witness or for a crime to which the defendant had not confessed. Cf. Duncan, 698 S.W.2d at 71. In response to additional questioning by defense counsel, Pannell reiterated that he could impose the death penalty only in those circumstances where he had witnessed the crime or heard a defendant's confession. Finally, Pannell answered the trial court's questions by saying that he could not follow the law as to aggravating and mitigating circumstances unless his own criteria were satisfied. In sum, the prospective juror was questioned extensively by both parties and the trial court. The trial court gave defense counsel ample opportunity to rehabilitate the prospective juror and gave full consideration to the arguments of the parties. The trial court asked its own questions to further explore the prospective juror's views. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in excusing prospective juror Pannell.