Opinion ID: 727068
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Duplicitous Indictment

Text: 16 Robinson next asserts that Count Two of the indictment was duplicitous (or duplicative), because it charged both a drug conspiracy and a money-laundering conspiracy. This argument is also without merit. It is true that a duplicitous charge gives rise to the danger of a non-unanimous verdict, as some jurors might be persuaded to convict based on only one of two offenses in a charge, and some other jurors might convict based on the other offense. See United States v. Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1108 n. 4 (6th Cir.1988). However, it cannot be said that the charge here was duplicitous in any respect. 17 Count Two of the indictment stated, in relevant part: 18 That from approximately 1987 until May 1993, in the Eastern District of Michigan and elsewhere, OLEE WONZO ROBINSON, a/k/a Olee Wonzo, a/k/a Wonzo Robinson, MICHELLE WEST, CYNTHIA HORRY, and SHAWN EUGENE WIMBERLY, defendants herein, did knowingly, intentionally and wilfully conspire, combine, confederate and agree with each other and other persons to distribute cocaine, a Schedule II controlled substance. 19 In furtherance of this conspiracy, OLEE WONZO ROBINSON and MICHELLE WEST organized the distribution of hundreds of kilograms of cocaine in the Eastern District of Michigan and elsewhere. OLEE WONZO ROBINSON and MICHELLE WEST created or used companies to give the appearance of legitimacy to their organization.... CYNTHIA HORRY and SHAWN EUGENE WIMBERLY assisted in the acquisition of cocaine for distribution by members of the conspiracy. 20 In furtherance of the conspiracy, various financial institutions and other organizations were provided with false statements, including false employment, earnings, and identifying information, from the purported companies created or used by members of the conspiracy, partially listed above. These false statements were provided by and for members of the conspiracy and other narcotics traffickers to acquire expensive motor vehicles, homes and other items on credit, thereby concealing the illegal source of these trafficers' income. 21 J.A. at 85-86, 216-17. As should be apparent from the foregoing language, Count Two charged a drug conspiracy, not a money-laundering conspiracy, even though it alluded to money laundering and drug distribution as acts [i]n furtherance of the conspiracy. According to Robinson, the count was confusing to the jury, because it allowed the crime to be proved by evidence of an agreement to distribute controlled substances, or evidence of false documentation and money laundering, or evidence of a conspiratorial agreement to produce false documents or launder proceeds. Robinson's Br. at 19 (emphasis added). This is incorrect. There was nothing in the language of Count Two to lead the jury to believe that an affirmative finding of money laundering would be sufficient, by itself, to convict on the charge of conspiracy to distribute cocaine. Acts of money laundering were merely presented as a part of the conspiracy, as evidence of conduct [i]n furtherance of the conspiracy. As recognized by this court in United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 406 (6th Cir.1990), Money-laundering is an act integrally related to the success of a conspiracy to distribute drugs. Yet, evidence of money-laundering alone is not sufficient to link a person who launders money with a conspiracy to violate narcotics laws. Id. 22 To forestall any possibility of juror confusion, the district court specifically instructed the jury with respect to Count Two as follows: 23 The indictment charges that the defendants were all members of one conspiracy to commit the crime of distributing controlled substances. And that it was part of that conspiracy to provide false documentation from false companies to make purchases and to conceal the income derived from the conspiracy. 24 Some of the defendants may well take the position that there was not one conspiracy, but that there were two or more separate conspiracies. [To] Convict any one of the defendants of the conspiracy charged, the Government must convince you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. 25 Proof that a defendant was a member of some other conspiracy is not enough to convict. But proof that a defendant was a member of some other conspiracy would not prevent you from returning a guilty verdict if the Government also proved that he was a member of the conspiracy charged in the indictment. 26 J.A. at 1606-07 (emphasis added). As a result, even if Count Two had been duplicitous, there still would not be reversible error, because the district court's instruction re-emphasized that the relevant offense on which the jury needed to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt was conspiracy to commit the crime of distributing controlled substances, and money laundering simply constituted a part of that conspiracy. Sixth Circuit case law establishes that the remedy for a duplicitous indictment is a curative instruction, see United States v. Robinson, 651 F.2d 1188, 1194 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 875 (1981); Duncan, 850 F.2d at 1108 n. 4, and here the district court did give such an instruction. In sum, regardless of whether the indictment itself was duplicitous, reversal is not warranted on this issue. 27