Opinion ID: 693035
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: issues in this case

Text: 26 The Murrays argue: (1) the LRE requirement of section 1412(5)(B) includes a strong rebuttable presumption that the LRE is in the neighborhood school, with supplementary aids and services; (2) the Ninth Circuit's LRE standard is the proper standard for evaluating compliance with the IDEA's LRE requirement and under that standard, the district court's decision granting summary judgment to the District was erroneous; (3) the district court erred in not permitting the Murrays to introduce additional evidence of Tyler's progress after the due process hearing and of possible supplementary aids and services. In its cross-appeal, the District argues the district court erred in not granting its first motion for summary judgment. The Murrays seek dismissal of the cross-appeal, arguing the District lacks standing since it prevailed. We hold that a single legal issue controls the outcome of this case--whether the LRE mandate of section 1412(5)(B) includes a presumption that the LRE is in the neighborhood school with supplementary aids and services. We hold that it does not. For reasons more fully discussed below, we need not address the Murrays' other arguments. 27
28 The Murrays argue that the LRE mandate includes a presumption that the LRE is in the neighborhood school, with supplementary aids and services. They rely upon the plain meaning of the statute; the 1973-1975 legislative history of the IDEA; the wording of two regulations implementing the IDEA; and the 1982-1983 legislative history of the IDEA. We reject these arguments. The statute requires that 29 to the maximum extent appropriate, children with disabilities ... are educated with children who are not disabled, and that special classes, separate schooling or other removal of children with disabilities from the regular educational environment occurs only when the nature or severity of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily.... 30 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1412(5)(B). The Murrays argue that regular educational environment implicitly includes neighborhood schools, that special classes means non-regular classes; and that separate schooling means non-neighborhood schools. They further argue that because Congress has declared that the neighborhood is the appropriate basis for determining public school assignments, 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1701(a)(2), then the reference to removal in section 1412(5)(B) must mean removal from the neighborhood school. Thus, they argue that supplementary aids and services must be fully explored before a child is removed from both the neighborhood school and the regular classroom with nondisabled children. 31 This interpretation strains the plain meaning of the statute. The statute clearly addresses the removal of disabled children from classes or schools with nondisabled children. It simply says nothing, expressly or by implication, about removal of disabled children from neighborhood schools. In other words, while it clearly commands schools to include or mainstream disabled children as much as possible, it says nothing about where, within a school district, that inclusion shall take place. 32 The Murrays next argue that two implementing regulations make express what the statute merely implies. 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.552(a)(3) provides that [t]he educational placement of each child with a disability [shall be] as close as possible to the child's home. 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.552(c) provides that state agencies must ensure that [u]nless the IEP of a child with a disability requires some other arrangement, the child is educated in the school that he or she would attend if nondisabled. The Murrays assert that these two regulations create a presumption that the LRE is in the neighborhood school. 33 We disagree. A natural and logical reading of these two regulations is that a disabled child should be educated in the school he or she would attend if not disabled (i.e., the neighborhood school), unless the child's IEP requires placement elsewhere. If the IEP requires placement elsewhere, then, in deciding where the appropriate placement is, geographical proximity to home is relevant, and the child should be placed as close to home as possible. See Barnett v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 927 F.2d 146, 153 (4th Cir.) (the regulations require[ ] only that a school board take into account, as one factor, the geographical proximity of the placement in making these decisions), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 859, 112 S.Ct. 175, 116 L.Ed.2d 138 (1991); Devries v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 882 F.2d 876 (4th Cir.1989) (approving placement away from neighborhood school); Urban v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-1, 870 F.Supp. 1558, 1568 (D.Colo.1994) ([T]he statutory preference for placement at a neighborhood school is only that--and it does not amount to a mandate.). There is at most a preference for education in the neighborhood school. To the extent the Third Circuit has expressly held in Oberti that the IDEA encompasses a presumption of neighborhood schooling, we disagree. See Oberti, 995 F.2d at 1224 n. 31. 13 34 The Murrays next argue that the voluminous legislative history surrounding the enactment of the statute, as well as the legislative history surrounding a subsequent proposal to amend certain implementing regulations and a resulting amendment to the IDEA, support their interpretation of the statute. We disagree. 35 With respect to legislative statements surrounding the enactment of the IDEA, they all present the same problem for the Murrays as the statute: they simply do not clearly indicate that Congress, in discussing mainstreaming or inclusion and the concept of the LRE for each disabled child, meant anything more than avoiding as much as possible the segregation of disabled children from nondisabled children. They in no way express a presumption that the LRE is always or even usually in the neighborhood school. 36 The Murrays fare little better with the legislative history surrounding the proposed amendment to certain implementing regulations in 1982 and 1983. In 1982 the Secretary of Education proposed amending some regulations, including 34 C.F.R. Sec. 300.552(a)(3) requiring education as close as possible to a child's home. The regulations were ultimately not amended, but the IDEA was itself amended to include a prohibition against any regulation ... which would procedurally or substantively lessen the protections provided to children ... as embodied in regulations in effect on July 20, 1983 (particularly as such protections relate to ... least restrictive environment). 20 U.S.C. Sec. 1407(b). The Murrays cite various statements made in connection with the proposed amendments, as well as the fact of section 1407(b)'s enactment, to support their argument that the LRE concept includes a strong presumption in favor of neighborhood schools. We again reject this argument as simply insufficiently persuasive to overcome the plain meaning of the statute, and the absence therein of any reference to neighborhood schools. Accordingly, we hold that there is no presumption of neighborhood schooling, either in the IDEA or its implementing regulations. 37 The Murrays ask us to select an LRE standard from those proposed thus far by other circuit courts. We need not adopt an LRE compliance standard in order to decide this case, and we therefore choose not to do so. This is so because we have held that the LRE mandate does not include a presumption of neighborhood schooling, and a school district accordingly is not obligated to fully explore supplementary aids and services before removing a child from a neighborhood school. It is only so obligated before removing a child from a regular classroom with nondisabled children. The Murrays have never objected to the degree to which Tyler was educated outside the regular classroom; they only challenge his removal from his neighborhood school. We therefore need not decide which standard this circuit would apply to determinations of whether the LRE requirement of section 1412(5)(B) has been met. 38
39 The Murrays argue the district court erred in failing to hear additional evidence as to (1) possible supplementary aids and services which could be implemented at Olathe and (2) Tyler's educational progress since the due process hearing. 40
41 We have held, as a matter of law, that the obligation to explore supplementary aids and services prior to removing a child from a regular classroom does not apply independently to decisions to place children in non-neighborhood schools. The Murrays do not challenge Tyler's IEP insofar as it determined how much time Tyler should spend in a regular classroom, as compared with special education or resource classrooms. We therefore need not consider whether there are additional supplementary aids and services which could be implemented to comply with section 1412(5)(B)'s LRE mandate, and a remand for additional evidence on this point is unnecessary. 14 42
43 The Murrays also argue that the district court should have heard additional evidence of Tyler's educational progress since the due process hearing before ruling on the parties' motions for summary judgment. 44 There is a division between the circuits on the meaning and scope of section 1415(e)(2)'s directive that a district court in an IDEA case shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party. 15 Even under the more restrictive interpretation taken of additional evidence by the First and Ninth Circuits, arguably evidence relating to a child's educational progress subsequent to the due process hearing would be relevant to a determination of appropriate placement pursuant to an IEP. It would be evidence concerning relevant events occurring subsequent to the administrative hearing. Town of Burlington, 736 F.2d at 790. Other courts have admitted such evidence. See, e.g., Lenn, 998 F.2d at 1088; Greer, 950 F.2d at 698; Mavis, 839 F.Supp. at 980. 45 However, we need not remand this case for such additional evidence because we agree with the District's contention that any necessity for doing so has been rendered moot by the evaluation and review of Tyler's IEP conducted in November 1993, pursuant to which Tyler was placed at Olathe. 16
46 Having determined that the district court made no legal error, and that it did not err in failing to take additional evidence, we are left with determining whether any genuine issues of material fact remained which precluded the grant of summary judgment on the record before the district court. The only disputed factual issue before the ALJ and the district court was whether Tyler was making educational progress at Olathe such that placement there was appropriate under the IDEA. That issue has been rendered moot by Tyler's subsequent evaluation and IEP placing him at Olathe. It would serve no purpose to remand this case for further proceedings directed to resolving that issue, in light of his later evaluation and placement.
47 The District's cross-appeal from the district court's earlier denial of its motion for summary judgment has likewise been mooted by our affirmance of the district court's grant of summary judgment to the District. Having ruled in their favor, there is no additional relief we could provide the District. We therefore grant the Murrays' motion to dismiss the cross-appeal.