Opinion ID: 1111331
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: was the chancellor manifestly in error in failing to modify the decree to curtail the father's visitation schedule?

Text: In his opinion the chancellor found in part: It is very obvious to me that you are using the child to fight with each other... . I am not impressed with the testimony I hear from either one of you here today... . As long as you want to keep fighting over your child, your child will have to continue seeing psychiatrists and doctors. My first inclination ... is to put restrictions on it so bad that you could hardly live with it, because this is ridiculous testimony today, coming from two grown people with a child seven or eight years old. But... for me to put restrictions on it is just going to make life more miserable for that child. All it will do is hurt the child... . Based on the testimony before the Court, I don't find any reason whatsoever in this testimony for the mother to have denied the visitation set forth in the agreement . .. I'm going to leave the visitation as it is... . You previously agreed on it. In cases where the terms of visitation are at issue, our familiar change in circumstances rule has no application. Cox v. Moulds, 490 So.2d 866, 869 (Miss. 1986). This is true because the court is not being asked to change the permanent custody of the child. Cox, 490 So.2d at 869; Sistrunk v. McKenzie, 455 So.2d 768, 770 (Miss. 1984). In Cox, this Court stated: All that need be shown is that there is a prior decree providing for reasonable visitation rights which isn't working and that it is in the best interest of the children as fostering a positive and harmonious relationship between them and their divorced parents to have custody provisions made specific rather than flexible and attendantly vague. Cox, 490 So.2d at 869. Applying this rule to this case, the opposite is also true, to-wit: all that need be shown is that there is a prior decree providing for reasonable visitation rights which is working and which is in the best interest of the child. On visitation issues, as with other issues concerning children, the chancery court enjoys a large amount of discretion in making its determination of what is in the best interest of the child. Harrell v. Harrell, 231 So.2d 793, 797 (Miss. 1970). The specification of times for visitation rights is committed to the broad discretion of the chancellor. Cheek v. Ricker, 431 So.2d 1139, 1146 (Miss. 1983); Buntyn v. Smallwood, 412 So.2d 236, 238 (Miss. 1982). The chancellor did not expressly find that Laura's best interest would be served by leaving the 1983 agreed decree visitation provisions in effect. He found simply that there was no evidence introduced at the hearing to warrant any change in those earlier visitation provisions. Assuming as we are required to do that the chancellor resolved all fact issues in favor of the appellee, it appears that there was ample credible evidence to support this determination by the chancellor. There was uncontradicted testimony that Laura's displays of displeasure over visitation disappeared within two hours after her arriving at her father's or paternal grandparents' home. There was no evidence, either that Laura was diabetic, or that Myrick and his family were doing anything to promote diabetes. Under our familiar guidelines of review this assignment of error is also without merit. We are of the opinion that the chancellor was not manifestly wrong in his finding of fact nor did he abuse his discretion and for that reason, the judgment of the lower court is affirmed. AFFIRMED. ROY NOBLE LEE, C.J., HAWKINS and DAN M. LEE, P.JJ., and ANDERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. ROBERTSON, PRATHER and ZUCCARO, JJ., dissent.