Opinion ID: 1277687
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 19

Heading: Defendant's Absence from Trial

Text: As recounted above, defendant frequently disrupted the trial proceedings. As a result, he was removed on a number of occasions from the courtroom. At other times he requested or demanded to absent himself from the courtroom. He claims now that his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses, his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment and his right to be personally present with counsel in a criminal cause under article I, section 15, of the California Constitution all were violated thereby. As we have concluded, `as a matter of both federal and state constitutional law, ... a capital defendant may validly waive presence at critical stages of the trial.' ( People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1210, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) Moreover, a defendant may waive his right to be present at his trial by being disruptive at the trial, and appellate courts must give considerable deference to the trial court's judgment as to when disruption has occurred or may reasonably be anticipated. (See Illinois v. Allen (1970) 397 U.S. 337, 343, 90 S.Ct. 1057, 25 L.Ed.2d 353; People v. Jackson, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 1211, 56 Cal.Rptr.2d 49, 920 P.2d 1254.) We find no constitutional error arising from defendant's removal or absence at various points during the trial. Defendant also contends that his statutory rights were violated under section 977, subdivision (b), which provides in pertinent part that in felony cases the accused shall be present at the arraignment, at the time of plea, during the preliminary hearing, during those portions of the trial when evidence is taken before the trier of fact, and at the time of the imposition of sentence. The accused shall be personally present at all other proceedings unless he shall, with leave of court, execute in open court, a written waiver.... Furthermore, section 1043, subdivision (a), recites in part that [e]xcept as otherwise provided in this section, the defendant in a felony case shall be personally present at the trial. The cases which have interpreted the foregoing sections uniformly have held that the accused is not entitled to be personally present either in chambers or at bench discussions which occur outside of the jury's presence on questions of law or other matters in which defendant's presence does not bear a `reasonably substantial relation to the fullness of his opportunity to defend against the charge.' ( People v. Jackson (1980) 28 Cal.3d 264, 309, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603, 618 P.2d 149.) Moreover, the right to be present found in section 977 is subject to qualification under section 1043, subdivision (b)(1), which permits a felony trial in a defendant's absence in [a]ny case in which the defendant, after he has been warned by the judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive behavior, nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that the trial cannot be carried on with him in the courtroom. As stated above, appellate courts accord trial courts considerable discretion in determining when disruption has occurred. Our review of the record reveals quite plainly a defendant who was persistently disruptive. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion by either ordering defendant's removal or consenting to his absence for the sake of maintaining order in the courtroom.