Opinion ID: 468750
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: plaintiff's fugitive status and a new trial

Text: 22 Because we have vacated the finding of liability against defendants, we need not reach the interesting question posed by Ali's appeal with respect to damages. Cf. Watts v. Laurent, 774 F.2d 168 (7th Cir.1985) (court resolved similar ambiguity of jury verdict by giving plaintiff option of accepting the damages award or taking a new trial on damages and risking a lower award). Since, in the ordinary course, we would remand the matter for a new trial, we must consider whether Ali's fugitive status (which is not in dispute) precludes him from seeking a new trial on the issue of liability. 23 In Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 90 S.Ct. 498, 24 L.Ed.2d 586 (1970), the Supreme Court dismissed a defendant's appeal from a criminal conviction because, following his conviction, he had fled. The court reasoned that his fugitive status disentitles [him] to call upon the resources of the court for determination of his claims. Id. at 366, 90 S.Ct. at 499. This court has had occasion to follow the Molinaro doctrine, Government of the Virgin Islands v. James, 621 F.2d 588 (3d Cir.1980), and has extended it to dismiss the appeal from a deportation order of an individual who had fled. Arana v. United States Immigration & Naturalization, 673 F.2d 75 (3d Cir.1982). Several other courts have extended Molinaro to dismiss suits arising in a slightly different context: cases in which convicts who had brought civil actions related to their criminal convictions had fled. Conforte v. Commissioner, 692 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.1982) (individual convicted of tax evasion appealed tax court's assessment; suit dismissed because he had fled following his conviction); Doyle v. United States Department of Justice, 668 F.2d 1365 (D.C.Cir.1981) (fugitive's suit seeking documents under the Freedom of Information Act related to his conviction dismissed because of his fugitive status), cert. denied 455 U.S. 1002, 102 S.Ct. 1636, 71 L.Ed.2d 870 (1982); Broadway v. City of Montgomery, Alabama, 530 F.2d 657 (5th Cir.1976) (fugitive's suit alleging illegal wiretap that led to his arrest dismissed). 24 In addition, one court has extended this doctrine to a situation in which the fugitive fled not after a criminal conviction but after court-martial charges were preferred against him. Brin v. Marsh, 596 F.Supp. 1007 (D.D.C.1984) (fugitive's suit for retirement benefits and discharge from army dismissed). See also Johnson v. Laird, 432 F.2d 77 (9th Cir.1970) (a pre-Molinaro case in which a habeas corpus petitioner, a service man seeking release from the Army as a conscientious objector, appealed the dismissal of his complaint but fled and departed the country after oral argument on appeal; Court of Appeals ruled that it would dismiss the appeal unless he surrendered himself within 30 days). 25 In the case at bar we must decide whether to apply the rationale of Molinaro to preclude a new civil trial when the plaintiff fled immediately after the first trial. As noted, the articulated basis of Molinaro is that the fugitive from justice has demonstrated such disrespect for the legal processes that he has no right to call upon the court to adjudicate his claim. Practical concerns are congruent with this consideration. Particularly in this age of overcrowded dockets and court backlogs, it is unreasonable to expect a court to expend its scarce resources on one who has blatantly disregarded the court's procedures. In Arana we noted that nothing in the Supreme Court's opinion suggests that the Molinaro rule is limited to the criminal context. 26 We recognize that Molinaro itself and some of its progeny may be explained as holding that the courts will not entertain the cause of one who will respond to a judgment only if it is favorable. See United States v. Swigart, 490 F.2d 914, 915 (10th Cir.1973) (any court has the inherent discretion to refuse to hear the claim of a litigant who is willing to comply with the court's decree only if it is favorable); Arana, 673 F.2d at 77 (quoting Swigart). A plaintiff, of course, is not called upon to respond to a court's judgment. However, several of the cases following Molinaro were akin to this case, in that the fugitive was a plaintiff in the suit which was dismissed on account of his fugitive status. See, e.g., Doyle, supra. At all events, the principles of Molinaro intersect with the principles underlying Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 & 41, which render a party's misconduct a basis for the dismissal of his case. See supra pp. 957-958. Indeed, the cases involving dismissals under the Federal Rules generally entail conduct far less egregious than a flight from justice. Thus, the jurisprudence upholding such sanctions as necessary and proper in an era of court backlogs dovetails with the Molinaro doctrine. Cf. Eash v. Riggins Trucking, Inc., 757 F.2d 557 (3d Cir.1985) (in banc ) (it is within the inherent powers of the court to take such actions as are necessary for the effective administration of the judicial system). 27 In sum, the concerns that animate Molinaro as well as the principles that undergird Rule 37 and Rule 41 sanctions, dictate that Ali, whose contempt for justice was manifest in the egregious act of skyjacking a plane and endangering innocent lives in a flight from justice, not be awarded a new trial.IV. CONCLUSION 28 For the reasons set forth above, Ali's appeal at No. 85-3143 will be dismissed and the judgment of the district court which the Government of the Virgin Islands challenged on appeal at No. 85-3073 will be vacated and the case remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss Ali's action with prejudice. This mandate shall issue forthwith.