Opinion ID: 2211690
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Court's Role in This Case

Text: We conclude that by calling and questioning the probation officer in this situation the trial judge did not abandon his role as neutral fact finder. [4] The questions the judge asked were very straight forward and clearly intended to develop the truth and ascertain the facts. The questions were designed simply to determine whether Isaac showed up for his regularly scheduled appointments [5] , an issue within the personal knowledge of the probation officer. Although there may have been some awkwardness when defense counsel objected to the questioning, there was nothing in the questioning to indicate the judge was anything but impartial. A trial judge is not transformed into a prosecutor by calling and asking questions of the court's own probation officer to determine whether the court's probation order has been violated. Isaac argues the language of Ind. Code § 35-38-2-3(d) (West 1986), The state must prove the violation ..., means that only the prosecutor can present evidence of the alleged violation. A probation revocation hearing is not, however, to be equated with an adversarial criminal proceeding. Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 789, 93 S.Ct. at 1763. [6] It is a narrow inquiry, and its procedures are to be more flexible. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489, 92 S.Ct. at 2604. At a probation revocation hearing the court is only trying to determine whether its probation order has been violated. The prosecutor usually assists by presenting evidence of a violation of the terms of the probation. It cannot be said that if the prosecutor refuses to present the evidence, however, the court is helpless to enforce its probation order. To deny a court power to enforce obedience to its lawful orders is to nullify its effectiveness as an independent branch of government. State ex rel. Brubaker v. Pritchard (1956), 236 Ind. 222, 138 N.E.2d 233. The power of a court to enforce compliance with its orders duly entered is inherent. Id. The language of the statute (The state must prove) is consistent with the ordinary situation in which the prosecutor presents the evidence of the probation violation. We believe that the import of the statutory language, however, is to ensure the defendant that before his probation can be revoked, any violation must be found by a preponderance of the evidence. This is not to say that any informal evidentiary hearing would be permissible. This case is not like Dalton v. State (1990), Ind. App., 560 N.E.2d 558, and Weatherly v. State (1990), Ind. App., 564 N.E.2d 350, where no witnesses were sworn to testify and the probationers were not afforded the opportunity to cross-examine or present their own evidence. Here the probation officer was under oath and was subject to cross-examination. Isaac was given an opportunity to present any evidence in his own defense. We think that when the issue of violation is the subject of complex proof involving multiple witnesses and assessments of credibility, the trial court should appoint a special prosecutor to present the evidence of violation. Here, the evidence was the simplest in nature, essentially like a hearing on direct contempt. There really was no contention that Isaac had complied with the order to report to a court officer. The court's conduct in this case did not offend due process. Therefore, the trial court's judgment is affirmed. GIVAN, DICKSON and KRAHULIK, JJ., concur. DeBRULER, J., concurs in result.