Opinion ID: 202706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Swearing-in of the AUSA

Text: 52 Owens argues that the swearing-in of the AUSA in the middle of the trial, combined with laudatory comments made by the judge during the swearing-in ceremony, presented the prosecution in a positive light for a reason totally unrelated to the case. 15 Accordingly, Owens argues, the jury was no longer impartial and may have favored the prosecution based on evidence unrelated to the trial. 53 The district court denied this habeas claim in a separate order by Judge Gertner, finding that viewing the ceremony as a whole, there is virtually no possibility that jurors would believe the Court favored one side over the other. 16 54 As an initial matter, we note that a judge's participation [in a trial] must be balanced; he cannot become an advocate or otherwise use his judicial powers to advantage or disadvantage a party unfairly. Logue v. Dore, 103 F.3d 1040, 1045 (1st Cir.1997). This is true even where a judge's innocently intended statements have impermissibly exceeded the limitations on his power to comment. United States v. Paiva, 892 F.2d 148, 159 (1st Cir.1989). We examine allegations of judicial bias to see if comments are improper, and whether the complaining party can show serious prejudice. United States v. Cunan, 152 F.3d 29, 37 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Logue, 103 F.3d at 1045). 55 There is little question that the decision to hold a swearing-in ceremony for an AUSA in the middle of a lengthy and high-profile criminal trial was inappropriate. Cf. United States v. Michienzi, 630 F.2d 455, 456-57 (6th Cir.1980) (While we recognize that the District Judge's greeting to his old friend [a witness in the trial] was plainly not intended to sway the jury, the episode may have lent undue weight to the testimony given by the witness involved.); United States v. Cisneros, 491 F.2d 1068, 1074 (5th Cir.1974) (A trial judge must not appear to be a partisan for the prosecution.). At oral argument, even the Government conceded that such a decision may have been unwise. We feel it necessary to reiterate that the purpose of a criminal trial is to provide a neutral forum in which the guilt or innocence of a defendant is determined based on evidence that is free of improper influence. Anything that might detract from this purpose-such as holding an elaborate ceremony for the prosecution in front of the jury in the midst of a trial—should not be considered lightly. 56 In many ways, the issue at Owens' trial raises concerns similar to those in cases in which the Government has vouched for its own credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 962 F.2d 923, 933-34 (9th Cir.1992) (reversing for plain error where the prosecutor made repeated comments aimed at establishing his own veracity and credibility as a representative of the government); see also United States v. González Vargas, 558 F.2d 631, 633 (1st Cir.1977) ([T]he representative of the government approaches the jury with the inevitable asset of tremendous credibility-but that personal credibility is one weapon he must not use.). Likewise, the jury in Owens' case was told of the background and professional experience of the prosecutor being sworn in, that a prosecutor was sworn to support and defend the Constitution of the United States, and that many defense attorneys had come to watch the AUSA be sworn in. That the judge participated in bolstering the prosecution's credibility only increases the possibility of prejudice, given the influence a judge has over the jury. See Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933) (The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight and his lightest word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove controlling. (internal quotation marks omitted)). 57 Whether Owens was prejudiced by the swearing-in ceremony presents a closer question. It is unfortunate that the trial judge's ill-advised actions have placed before us this difficult question. Prejudice is always a risk when a judge comments during a trial. United States v. Hickman, 592 F.2d 931, 933 (6th Cir.1979) ([P]otential prejudice lurks behind every intrusion into a trial made by a presiding judge.). The Government notes that the court issued some curative instructions. See, e.g., United States v. Quesada-Bonilla, 952 F.2d 597, 601 (1st Cir.1991) (finding no prejudice where the judge issued curative instructions). On the other hand, curative instructions, though important, are of limited power. Crowe v. Di Manno, 225 F.2d 652, 655 (1st Cir.1955) (At the most [curative instructions] can offset only brief and minor departures from strict judicial impartiality.); see also United States v. Filani, 74 F.3d 378, 386 (2d Cir.1996) ([T]he presiding judge cannot ... foster the notion that the judge believes one version of an event and not another. Curative instructions to the jury ... do not remove such an impression once it is created.). The Government also points out that Owens was acquitted on a number of charges. See, e.g., United States v. Dworken, 855 F.2d 12, 29 (1st Cir.1988) ([T]he jury's discerning verdict [acquitting the defendant on one count] `reflects a careful dissection of the evidence as it applied to each defendant.'). 58 On balance, we do not think that Owens has shown that he was prejudiced by the swearing-in ceremony. While we continue to think the ceremony and the judge's comments were ill-advised, the quantity of the evidence against Owens, the jury's discerning verdict, the curative instructions, the fact that the prosecutor who was sworn in was not working on Owens' trial, and the length of the trial all militate against a finding of prejudice. While we sympathize with Owens' claim, absent a showing of actual prejudice, mere bad judgment on the part of the trial court is insufficient to merit a new trial. 17