Opinion ID: 1372315
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Did SEPA require preparation of an EIS prior to a variance decision in the instant case?

Text: RCW 43.21C.030, which lies at the heart of this issue, provides: The legislature authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: ... (2) all branches of government of this state, including state agencies, municipal and public corporations, and counties shall: ... (c) Include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major actions significantly affecting the quality of the environment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on: (i) the environmental impact of the proposed action[.] (Italics ours.) [4] The PCHB correctly concluded that PSAPCA's decision to grant a variance through resolution 359 constituted, in effect, a determination that the granting of a variance without an EIS was consistent with the public's right to a healthful environment and with the policies of SEPA. This amounted to a negative threshold determination that an EIS was not mandated by RCW 43.21C.030. As we said in Leschi Improvement Council v. State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wn.2d 271, 285, 525 P.2d 774 (1974): [U]nder SEPA an agency's decision to approve a project impliedly, if not expressly, determines that the project is consistent with the citizen's fundamental right to a healthful environment and with the legislatively mandated policy that an agency action allow to citizens the widest practicable range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation. The standard for review of a negative threshold determination is whether the agency's decision is clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in the act of the legislature authorizing the decision or order. RCW 34.04.130(6)(e); Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wn.2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977); Norway Hill Preservation & Protection Ass'n v. King County Council, 87 Wn.2d 267, 552 P.2d 674 (1976). The reason for this broad scope of review is clear. The policy of the act, which is simply to insure via a detailed statement the full disclosure of environmental information so that environmental matters can be given proper consideration during decision making, is thwarted whenever an incorrect threshold determination is made. The determination that an action is not a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment means that the detailed impact statement of SEPA is not required before the action is taken or the decision is made. (Italics ours.) Norway Hill, 87 Wn.2d at 273. See Sisley v. San Juan County, supra at 84. The purpose of the broad scope of review is to ensure that an agency, in considering the need for an EIS, does not yield to the temptation of expediency thus short-circuiting the thoughtful decision-making process contemplated by SEPA. [5] The procedural mandate of SEPA requiring preparation of an EIS is triggered by a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment. RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c). An action is major, within the meaning of RCW 43.21C.030, if it involves a discretionary, nonduplicative decision by the agency. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 475, 488, 513 P.2d 36, 76 A.L.R.3d 360 (1973). As we said in Loveless v. Yantis, 82 Wn.2d 754, 764, 513 P.2d 1023 (1973) in discussing major action: In Eastlake ... we set forth the elements necessary to establish a major action. We therein indicated that if the governmental action involved a discretionary nonduplicative stage of the government's approval, SEPA would apply where the considered project significantly affects the environment. PSAPCA had authority to either grant or deny ASARCO's request for a variance. Clearly the decision to grant it was a discretionary act within the purview of Loveless. The next question, then, is whether the action of PSAPCA was also nonduplicative so as to be characterized as major. We hold that, although an earlier variance sought by ASARCO was granted by PSAPCA in 1972, the decision on the second or renewed variance was nonduplicative. No EIS was prepared and the record does not indicate that the environmental costs of the earlier variance were fully considered at the time. Thus, there is no conflict with the dictate of Loveless v. Yantis, supra at 764-65 wherein we said: [I]f environmental issues have previously been considered or no new information or developments have intervened since the last major action, a new or revised impact statement is not necessary. SEPA does not mandate bureaucratic redundancy but only that the heretofore ignored environmental considerations become part of normal decision making on major actions. (Italics ours.) PSAPCA's decision here was nonduplicative and thus must be characterized as a major action under RCW 43.21C.030(2)(c). [6] Our next inquiry is whether the action taken by PSAPCA, at ASARCO's request, significantly affected the quality of the environment. A significant impact is established whenever more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment is a reasonable probability. (Italics ours.) Norway Hill, 87 Wn.2d at 278; Swift v. Island County, 87 Wn.2d 348, 358, 552 P.2d 175 (1976). Where an agency finding of no significant environmental impact has been challenged, the scope of review is broad and the search for factors indicating more than a moderate effect on the environment must be considered in light of the public policy of SEPA. Sisley v. San Juan County, supra at 84. ASARCO's plant, for which the variance is sought, is located in Tacoma. It is a custom smelter of arsenic-laden copper ores. The smelting process produces approximately 11,000 tons of arsenic trioxide each year as a by-product. In 1975, the year in which ASARCO sought the variance at issue here, the Tacoma plant annually emitted into the surrounding atmosphere 238 tons of arsenic trioxide, 1,286 tons of total particulate matter and 89,000 tons of SO[2]. The plant is located within the jurisdiction of PSAPCA and, therefore, is subject to that agency's regulations. PSAPCA was established pursuant to the Washington Clean Air Act, RCW 70.94, and pursuant to that act, PSAPCA promulgated Regulation I in 1968. The policy motivating the adoption of the regulation was: to secure and maintain such levels of air quality as will protect human health and safety and, to the greatest degree practicable, prevent injury to plant and animal life and to property, foster the comfort and convenience of its inhabitants, seek public participation in policy planning and implementation, promote the economic and social development of the Puget Sound area and facilitate the enjoyment of the Puget Sound area. Article 7 of Regulation I outlines PSAPCA's authority to consider variances from the emission levels established by it. For the most part the article reiterates the language of RCW 70.94.181. ASARCO sought the instant variance pursuant to section 7.01 of Regulation I. Under the terms of the requested variance, emissions from the plant's main stack would be permitted to continue in violation of PSAPCA's standards for 24 months. ASARCO predicted that during this period approximately one-half ton of suspended particulate would be emitted from the main stack per day. Phrased another way, by ASARCO's admission, the average opacity of the main stack would be 30 percent while section 9.03(b) of Regulation I requires no greater than 20 percent opacity. At the end of the 24-month period, ASARCO's main stack was to be in full compliance with section 9.03(b). The variance application further requested that the anode furnaces be exempt from section 9.03(b) for 32 months. During those months the furnaces would emit four-tenths ton of suspended particulate per day. At the end of the 32-month period, ASARCO planned to be in full compliance with section 9.03(b). The variance application also requested a 5-year exemption from regulations limiting particulate emissions from low-level sources. During this 5-year period, such emissions would decrease from 1.89 to 1.25 tons per day. At the end of that period ASARCO predicted it would still be unable to comply with section 9.03(b) but the incidence of noncompliance would be reduced. Finally, the variance would allow exemption from the limitations on SO[2] emission (section 9.07(a)) for 5 years. During this period, 244 tons of SO[2] per day would be emitted. At the end of the period, ASARCO still would not comply with section 9.07. Section 7.01 requires PSAPCA to make two findings before granting a variance request. (1) The emissions occurring or proposed to occur do not endanger public health and safety; and (2) compliance with the rules or regulations from which the variance is sought would produce serious hardship without equal or greater benefits to the public. PSAPCA made both findings before granting the variance. After reviewing the testimony and evidence before PSAPCA, the PCHB concluded PSAPCA's decision not to prepare an EIS was clearly erroneous in view of the entire record and the public policy of SEPA. The PCHB stated: These emissions to the ambient air pose possible adverse effects of unknown dimensions over a large geographic area which affect air, land and water . .. The variance granted would allow the emissions to continue above and in excess of that allowed by regulation for up to five years. We believe that there is a reasonable probability, on its face, that the variance granted would have more than a moderate effect on the quality of the environment. (Italics ours.) PCHB Order, at 15-16. The decision of the PCHB was later reversed by the trial court. [7] We reverse the trial court and uphold the PCHB's determination that there is a reasonable probability PSAPCA's variance would have a significant adverse impact on the quality of the environment. PSAPCA promulgated the emission levels in a statutorily mandated effort to protect the health of plant, animal and human life as well as the quality of the environment. A variance request seeking to considerably exceed such limits for up to 5 years, in itself suggests a reasonable probability that the quality of the environment will be at least moderately affected. In addition, during a lengthy public hearing, medical testimony was presented to PSAPCA on the potential for serious health problems caused by the pollutants among residents in the area, particularly children attending schools in the vicinity of the plant. PSAPCA heard testimony that high concentrations of SO[2] in the air are linked to an increase in the rate of illness and death among those breathing it over an extended period of time. Most vulnerable are the young, the elderly, and those already ill with lung or heart disease. Other medical testimony suggested that actual damage to health from the emissions could not be proven conclusively. But, nearly all scientists who testified stated they lacked sufficient factual data to evaluate thoroughly the effect of granting the variance. Finally, ASARCO does not appear to seriously contend the emissions allowed by the variance will not significantly affect the environment. Rather, testimony presented by ASARCO at the PSAPCA hearing emphasizes the adverse economic impact the denial of a variance would have on ASARCO and the Tacoma community and the adverse impact it would have on proposed improvements in pollution control that could be accomplished during the variance period. While such considerations are important in evaluating the variance request, they do not diminish the potential environmental effects of continued emissions in excess of those permitted by PSAPCA's regulations. Considering the testimony presented before PSAPCA, in light of the public policy of SEPA, we hold that there is a reasonable probability of a moderate effect on the quality of the environment as a result of granting the variance. Thus, the effect must be said to be significant. [8] ASARCO contends the granting of a variance cannot properly be characterized as a major action significantly affecting the environment under RCW 43.21C.030 because granting the variance simply maintained the status quo. In support of this contention, respondent cites Narrowsview Preserv. Ass'n v. Tacoma, 84 Wn.2d 416, 526 P.2d 897 (1974) and Marino Prop. Co. v. Port of Seattle, 88 Wn.2d 822, 567 P.2d 1125 (1977). In Narrowsview we stated at page 423: the term significantly has been defined to include the examination of at least two relevant factors: (1) the extent to which the action will cause adverse environmental effects in excess of those created by existing uses in the area, and (2) the absolute quantitative adverse environmental effects of the action itself, including the cumulative harm that results from its contribution to existing adverse conditions or uses in the affected area. (Italics ours.) Narrowsview involved a proposed rezoning of certain property in Tacoma from single-family dwelling to planned residential development. We recognized in Narrowsview, at page 424, that, in certain cases including the challenged rezone, it might be entirely proper for a governmental agency to determine that [the act of making] a change in the zoning would not have a substantial impact on the environment, based upon the information available, when examined in relation to those uses already allowed by existing zoning and yet to require an environmental impact statement at such [later] time as a preliminary plat or building permit was issued for a specific project when details of the specific structure and use of the property are more clearly defined. Marino involved the reacquisition of certain property and the taking over of an existing use of certain piers by the Port of Seattle. We held that a mere change in the ownership of property, where the use of the property remained unchanged, would not have an effect on the quality of the environment and thus is not a major action which mandated preparation of an EIS. Marino v. Port of Seattle, supra at 831. The factual settings of both Narrowsview and Marino distinguish them from this case and compel a different legal result. The proposed action in those cases changed neither the actual current uses to which the land was put nor the impact of continued use on the surrounding environment. Such is not the case here. ASARCO asserts the granting of the variance would not change the emission levels in effect prior to the variance requested and thus would maintain the status quo. However, ASARCO's contention obscures the fact that the existing levels were themselves in violation of PSAPCA's Regulation I. The requested variance, far from maintaining the environmental status quo as envisioned by either Regulation I or SEPA, would maintain the status quo of an admitted violation. It would permit the continued impact of high levels of emissions which, cumulatively, would be much greater than that ever authorized by PSAPCA's Regulation I. Rather than maintaining the status quo, the granting of the variance potentially would increase the pace of environmental degradation. This is precisely the danger sought to be avoided by the legislature in enacting SEPA. Our conclusion is consistent with the purpose underlying SEPA which aims not only to prevent further environmental degradation but to reverse, where possible, ecological damage already done. The continuing policy and responsibility of the state is not only to maintain and enhance our environment, but to also prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and restore it. Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assocs., Inc., 82 Wn.2d 475, 490, 513 P.2d 36, 76 A.L.R.3d 360 (1973). We hold that PSAPCA's issuance of a 5-year variance was a major action significantly affecting the quality of the environment. As such it triggered the EIS requirements of SEPA. We hold further that PSAPCA's issuance of the variance was clearly erroneous in view of the entire record as submitted and the public policy contained in SEPA. Consequently, the trial court's judgment affirming PSAPCA's action is in error.