Opinion ID: 2190926
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's post-arrest silence

Text: Szabo took the stand at the sentencing hearing in an effort to show that mitigating circumstances existed. In relating his version of the course of events on January 26 to 27, 1979, Szabo admitted that he had shot John Rajca, but his testimony differed from Leatherman's account of what happened. He asserted that Leatherman did the planning, announced the stickup, and handed him the gun, and that it was Leatherman who stabbed Chris Rajca to death. Szabo went on to answer defense counsel's questions about how he now felt about what he did: Q. How do you feel about what you did, John? A. Bad. Q. How badly do you feel about it, John? A. Can't stop thinking about it. It bothers me inside. The State contends that this testimony of John Szabo expressing his feelings of remorse about his participation in the murders of the Rajca brothers invited the following cross-examination by the State's Attorney: Q. So you  that you are feeling bad did not extend to the point that you wanted to tell the police about your participation in this incident, is that correct? A. Put it this way. I'm not a stool pigeon. Q. You are not a stool pigeon? A. No. Q. You didn't tell them (the police) about how bad you felt about the Rajca brothers being killed, did you? A. No. Q. You didn't tell them it was Robert Leatherman's idea to start to shoot and start to rob and start to kill them? A. No, sir. Q. But now you say that it was his idea, is that correct? A. Yes, sir. Q. All of these details that you have testified to were fairly fresh in your mind one week after the incident, weren't they? A. Yes, sir. Q. You never bothered to tell them about it, did you? A. No. The State attempted to use Szabo's silence in an effort to impeach his account of the murders and his expressions of contrition made in response to defense counsel's questions. In closing argument the State's Attorney highlighted the fact that Szabo did not offer an explanation following his arrest but chose to remain silent: On February 3 [the day that the defendant was interviewed by police officers at the Laraway police station] he wasn't feeling that bad that he couldn't get it off his chest. This thing was really bothering him at the time.    [If] the facts occur[red] as he said they occurred[,] on February 3rd, 1979 [h]e would have been chomping at the bit to say, `Hey, look, please. You know, I've had some of my problems in the past, but you have got to know something here and now[,] I was there, but Leatherman went nuts. He was absolutely crazy. Stabbing and shooting and my God, I never seen anything like it.' But what does he tell you in court? He says he's not a stoolie. Had the cross-examination of John Szabo and subsequent closing remarks of the prosecutor occurred at trial, they would constitute error. There is no question that such remarks are fundamentally unfair and amount to a deprivation of due process in allowing an arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. People v. Green (1979), 74 Ill.2d 444, 449, 386 N.E.2d 272, 274; Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 617-18, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 97-98, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 2244-45. The State suggests that because the defendant signed a waiver of his Miranda rights before he indicated that he did not want to talk and wanted to see his lawyer, Doyle v. Ohio (1976), 426 U.S. 610, 49 L.Ed.2d 91, 96 S.Ct. 2240, does not apply. The State argues that Szabo spoke freely, when in fact his response to the officers' questions when being interviewed was that he was tired of the police hassling him. He then invoked his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. Szabo could not properly have been impeached at trial with what he did not say to the police officers on February 3. ( People v. Green (1979), 74 Ill.2d 444 (nothing that the defendant said at the time of arrest permits cross-examination on his failure to tell an exculpatory story, or justifies comments by the State's Attorney during closing argument).) A prosecutor's remarks on the defendant's silence following his arrest cannot be used to impeach exculpatory testimony of a defendant at trial. People v. Beller (1979), 74 Ill.2d 514. We reiterate that because the decision to invoke the death penalty is such a serious one, the State remains obliged at the sentencing hearing to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees. ( Estelle v. Smith (1981), 451 U.S. 454, 462, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 368, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1872.) Those guarantees include the fifth amendment guarantee of the right to remain silent, and the defendant cannot be penalized for exercising that right. (See Malloy v. Hogan (1964), 378 U.S. 1, 8, 12 L.Ed.2d 653, 659, 84 S.Ct. 1489, 1493-94.) This is true whether it be at trial or at the sentencing hearing. In Estelle v. Smith (1981), 451 U.S. 454, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 101 S.Ct. 1866, the United States Supreme Court examined testimony of a doctor who had conducted a pretrial psychiatric examination of the defendant and subsequently testified for the State at the penalty phase of the trial to the effect that the defendant would be a danger to society. In holding that such testimony violated the defendant's privilege against compelled self-incrimination, the court said: The Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, commands that `[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' The essence of this basic constitutional principle is `the requirement that the State which proposes to convict and punish an individual produce the evidence against him by the independent labor of its officers, not by the simple, cruel expedient of forcing it from his own lips.' Culombe v. Connecticut [(1961), 367 U.S. 568, 581-82, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1046, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1867] (opinion announcing the judgment) (emphasis added). See also Murphy v. Waterfront [ Com. (1964), 378 U.S. 52, 55, 12 L.Ed.2d 678, 681, 84 S.Ct. 1594, 1596-97]; E. Griswold, The Fifth Amendment Today 7 (1955). The Court has held that `the availability of the [Fifth Amendment] privilege does not turn upon the type of proceeding in which its protection is invoked, but upon the nature of the statement or admission and the exposure which it invites.' In re Gault [(1967), 387 U.S. 1, 49, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 558, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1455]. In this case the ultimate penalty of death was a potential consequence of what respondent told the examining psychiatrist. Just as the Fifth Amendment prevents a criminal defendant from being made `the deluded instrument of his own conviction,' Culombe v. Connecticut [(1961), 367 U.S. 568, 581, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1045-46, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1867] quoting 2 Hawkins, Pleas of the Crown 595 (8th ed. 1824), it protects him as well from being made the `deluded instrument' of his own execution. We can discern no basis to distinguish between the guilt and penalty phases of respondent's capital murder trial so far as the protection of the Fifth Amendment privilege is concerned. Given the gravity of the decision to be made at the penalty phase, the State is not relieved of the obligation to observe fundamental constitutional guarantees. See Green v. Georgia [(1979), 442 U.S. 95, 97, 60 L.Ed.2d 738, 741, 99 S.Ct. 2150, 2151]; Presnell v. Georgia [(1978), 439 U.S. 14, 16, 58 L.Ed.2d 207, 211, 99 S.Ct. 235, 236-37]; Gardner v. Florida [(1977), 430 U.S. 349, 357-58, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 402, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204] (plurality opinion). Estelle v. Smith (1981), 451 U.S. 454, 462-63, 68 L.Ed.2d 359, 368-69, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 1872-73. It would have been fundamentally unfair to impeach Szabo at trial in the manner in which he was impeached at the sentencing hearing, and we believe it was equally unfair to cross-examine him at the sentencing hearing about his failure to make an exculpatory statement or a statement of contrition to the police officers following his arrest. While the rules governing the admission of evidence at the sentencing hearing are not the same as those that govern the admission of evidence at criminal trials (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 38, par. 9-1(e)), fundamental constitutional guarantees cannot be abrogated. The defendant's right to remain silent is one of those guarantees. The State's cross-examination and closing remarks about the defendant's silence were improper and constituted plain error at the sentencing hearing, as defects that, although not properly preserved by specific objection, clearly affected substantial rights of the defendant (see 73 Ill.2d R. 615(a); People v. Precup (1978), 73 Ill.2d 7).