Opinion ID: 2625838
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: intentional infliction of emotional distress claims

Text: ¶ 107 Once again, on this issue State Farm failed in its brief to adequately marshal the evidence, and its challenge is subject to rejection on that ground alone. Furthermore, it must be rejected on its merits. ¶ 108 To sustain a cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress, a party must show that (i) the conduct complained of was outrageous and intolerable in that it offended against the generally accepted standards of decency and morality; (ii) [the defendant] intended to cause, or acted in reckless disregard of the likelihood of causing, emotional distress; (iii) [the plaintiff] suffered severe emotional distress; and (iv) [the defendant's] conduct proximately caused [the] emotional distress. Retherford v. AT & T Comm. of the Mountain States, Inc., 844 P.2d 949, 970-71 (Utah 1992). ¶ 109 First, State Farm challenges the jury's finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress claiming that the evidence was exceedingly weak and that the Campbells failed to establish that they suffered severe emotional distress. When considering such challenges, we view the evidence in the light most supportive of the verdict, and assume that the jury believed those aspects of the evidence which sustain its findings and judgment. Billings v. Union Bankers Ins. Co., 918 P.2d 461, 467 (Utah 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). If the evidence taken in the light most favorable to the verdict supports the verdict, we will affirm. Steenblik v. Lichfield, 906 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995). ¶ 110 In discussing when the statute of limitations begins to run for the claim of the intentional infliction of emotional distress, this court stated: [T]he element of emotional distress is specific to the plaintiff in each case. Because the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress requires actual emotional distress, see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965), this element is to be gauged subjectively. A particularly hardy or calloused plaintiff may never accrue a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, even though he or she is subjected to outrageous conduct that no reasonable person could be expected to bear. Consequently, our task is to determine when ... [plaintiff] experienced severe emotional distress, not when an ordinarily sensitive person would have experienced such suffering. Retherford, 844 P.2d at 975-76 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). Thus, the Campbells must only show that they subjectively experienced severe emotional distress regarding the situation they found themselves in, not that an ordinary reasonable person would have experienced it that way. State Farm's citation to cases involving the negligent infliction of emotional distress for the proposition that objective proof is required to show that mental or physical consequences have occurred is inapposite. See Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 70-72 (Utah 1998); Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., 858 P.2d 970, 973-75 (Utah 1993). ¶ 111 Second, State Farm argues that the general damages award for each of the Campbells was excessive. For an award of compensatory damages regarding the intentional infliction of emotional distress, the standard of review confronting State Farm is quite high. This court has stated: While it is true ... that soft compensatory damages, i.e., for pain and suffering, must be awarded with caution, when the determination of the jury has been submitted to the scrutiny and judgment of the trial judge, his [or her] action thereon should be regarded as giving further solidarity to the judgment. Elkington v. Foust, 618 P.2d 37, 41 (Utah 1980). Or, as we said in Geary v. Cain, 255 P. at 423, 69 Utah at 358, In case of doubt, the deliberate action of the trial court should prevail. Otherwise, this court will sooner or later find itself usurping the functions of both the jury and the trial court. Id. These statements in Elkington and Geary are consistent with our statement of the appropriate appellate standard of review today. Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 806. Despite the court noting in Crookston I that the trial judge's statements could have been more specific, it found them adequate to support its decision to uphold the compensatory damage award, and therefore to support its denial of a new trial on the issue of compensatory damages. Id. ¶ 112 There is ample evidence in this record from which a jury could infer that each of the Campbells suffered severe emotional distress. These include: the financial ruin that they believed they faced after the jury in the underlying action rendered its verdict for more than five times the State Farm policy limit; being told by their lawyer that they could start dealing with their exposure by putting a For Sale sign on their house; State Farm's refusal to post a supersedeas bond to protect their home and other assets during the pendency of the appeal; and the numerous personal issues that made the Campbells, who had each experienced other traumatic events in their lives, particularly vulnerable to the stress created by State Farm's actions. [18] ¶ 113 Furthermore, with respect to the amount of the award, we note that the trial court did remit the amount of compensatory damages from $1,400,000 for Curtis Campbell and $1,200,000 for Inez Campbell to $600,000 and $400,000, respectively. It might be argued, given the subjective standard enunciated by this court, that the trial court should not have so drastically reduced the jury's initial awards. The Campbells, however, do not raise this issue on appeal. As pointed out above, the deferential nature of our review requires us to uphold a jury's verdict that has been scrutinized by a trial court unless there is a clear abuse of discretion. Our review of the trial court's post-trial ruling on this issue reveals no such abuse. Therefore, we find that the award was not excessive, and note that it provides an independent basis for sustaining all of Mrs. Campbell's damages. See Part V, supra, and Crookston I, 817 P.2d at 798 ([A]ll damages awarded by the jury can be sustained upon the finding of fraud.); see also Osbourne, 667 A.2d at 1328 (holding that plaintiff may recover emotional damages that are natural and proximate result of defendant's intentional misrepresentation).