Opinion ID: 2273152
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to call a forensic expert

Text: Appellant also claimed that although trial counsel had listed a forensic expert, Dr. Jack Daniel, as a potential witness, he was not called to testify at trial. Appellant argues that trial counsel simply failed to develop medical evidence that could have aided in [appellant's] defense... [b]y failing to impeach the government's expert or present differing medical evidence to show that the force was not as significant as asserted.... The trial court rejected this argument because appellant did not show how he was prejudiced by the trial counsel's decision not to call Dr. Daniel as a witness. See Robinson v. United States, 797 A.2d 698, 708 (D.C.2002) (In the absence of any proffer of expert testimony ..., the trial judge could properly conclude that the claim that counsel was ineffective for not calling such an expert was `vague and conclusory' and, therefore, that [petitioner] was not entitled to a hearing.). Appellant failed to show prejudice, as the trial court noted, because he did not submit with his motion a statement, declaration, or affidavit of the potential witness setting forth in detail what his testimony would have been, as required by the D.C. Court of Appeals. See Metts v. United States, 877 A.2d 113, 122-23 (D.C.2005) (affirming trial court's denial of § 23-110 petition where appellant failed to make a credible proffer from one or more these prospective witnesses); see Hairston v. United States, 905 A.2d 765, 783 (D.C.2006) (holding that trial court did not err in denying petition without a hearing where appellant presented no affidavit in support of his allegations, as we have required in other cases, and the trial court found his assertions regarding trial counsel and his ([appellant's]) statement to the police `palpably false'); Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489 (D.C.1997) (The fact that [appellant] has not provided an affidavit from any of these witnesses is itself a sufficient ground to reject without a hearing allegations of ineffectiveness premised on the failure to call them.); Ready v. United States, 620 A.2d 233, 235 (D.C.1993) (footnote omitted) (The absence of an affidavit or other credible proffer... persuades us that the trial court did not err in declining to hold a hearing.). Because there is no record of how Dr. Daniel would have testified, or an affidavit from counsel, we cannot assess whether trial counsel simply failed to follow-up with Dr. Daniel, or made a considered judgment not to call him. Counsel's initial listing of Dr. Daniel as a potential expert witness could be read as an indication that, after reviewing the forensic evidence and interviewing Dr. Daniel, counsel decided not to call him as a witness. [S]trategic choices made as a result `will seldom if ever' be found wanting. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 681, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Because advocacy is an art and not a science, and because the adversary system requires deference to counsel's informed decisions, strategic choices must be respected in these circumstances if they are based on professional judgment. Id. Without some evidence that counsel failed in his duty to investigate, we cannot surmise that counsel was ineffective in not calling Dr. Daniel. Cf. Cosio v. United States, 927 A.2d 1106, 1124-27 (D.C.2007) (en banc). In addition, we see no prejudice from trial counsel's decision not to call a medical expert. Appellant claimed that he punched Sharp in self-defense, but the prosecutor argued that appellant had reacted unreasonably to Sharp's drunken pestering and threats, punching Sharp in the eye with excessive force. [5] This argument was based on the medical examiner's testimony that the eye, which is usually very resilient, was ruptured by the blow inflicted. The medical examiner also testified that the punch had caused the neck to twist, severing Sharp's spinal cord from the brain stem, which was the fatal injury. In cross-examination, however, defense counsel was able to elicit from the medical examiner that Sharp's injuries were consistent with appellant's theory of self-defense: hitting a punch square to the eye with no object and then [Sharp] hitting a tree and falling down to the ground. [6] See Curry v. United States, 498 A.2d 534, 543 (D.C.1985) (trial counsel's deficiency in failing to obtain available medical records and secure an independent medical expert was not prejudicial when the government's medical evidence also supported defense theory of the case); Tillery v. United States, 419 A.2d 970, 974 (D.C.1980) (no prejudice unless trial counsel's incompetence blot[s] out a substantial defense). Defense counsel was also able to explore alternative causes with the medical examiner, including the possibility that Sharp's death may have been caused by the paramedics dropping him during transit or as an untoward result of the accumulated injuries that Sharp had sustained during his time as a boxer. Although D.C.Code § 23-110(c) creates a statutory presumption in favor of holding a hearing when there is an allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel, the right to a hearing is not automatic. See Hairston, 905 A.2d at 783. [N]o hearing is required where defendant's motion `consists of (1) vague and conclusory allegations, (2) palpably incredible claims, or (3) allegations that would merit no relief even if true,' Joyner, 818 A.2d at 174 (quoting Courtney v. United States, 708 A.2d 1008, 1011 (D.C.1998)), or (4) if the issues are capable of resolution on the existing record, Fields v. United States, 698 A.2d 485, 489 (D.C.1997). The court review[s] the trial judge's denial, without a hearing, ... for abuse of discretion. Alston v. United States, 838 A.2d 320, 324 (D.C.2003). Here, the trial court explained that it would not hold a hearing on the first motion claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because [t]he defendant's claims are all vague or conclusory. Appellant did not submit any affidavits or any other evidence with his motion that required an evidentiary hearing. As discussed above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying appellant's initial claim of ineffective assistance on the merits based on the existing record. See Metts, 877 A.2d at 123 (no hearing required if statements of witnesses are vague and not exculpatory); cf. Steward v. United States, 927 A.2d 1081, 1088-89 (D.C.2007) (hearing required when trial counsel failed to investigate an accomplice's sworn statement, whichif creditedwould have been exculpatory); Jones v. United States, 918 A.2d 389, 409 (D.C.2007) (hearing required when trial counsel failed to call alibi witnesses and no record indicating that it was a tactical decision or that counsel even knew of witnesses' existence); Lanton v. United States, 779 A.2d 895, 899, 904 (D.C. 2001) (hearing required when counsel did not interview exculpatory witnesses and judge discredited their letters, submitted as a kind of informal affidavit).