Opinion ID: 849062
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: respondent's due process claim

Text: Respondent further claims that the JTC's simultaneous role as a prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory body is violative of her due process rights. In particular, Judge Chrzanowski asserts that the JTC's failure to defer to the factual findings of the master demonstrates that it could not separate itself from the fact-finding function, and therefore, that it could not, and did not impartially recommend discipline. We conclude that, while the JTC accepted the pertinent findings of fact of the master, it nonetheless based its recommendation upon a different characterization of the facts, to wit, that respondent's statements to the officers were false, rather than merely inaccurate. On the basis of our review of the record, we do not disagree with this conclusion, and, for the reasons set forth below, we hold that the JTC afforded respondent due process. It is uncontroverted that judges, like all other citizens, have protected due process interests under the Michigan Constitution, Const. 1963, art. 1, § 17, and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. The scope and meaning of due process protections in circumstances where there is some commingling of prosecutorial, investigatory, and adjudicatory roles has been discussed by the United States Supreme Court in a circumstance similar to the present case. In Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 95 S.Ct. 1456, 43 L.Ed.2d 712 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held that there is no broad prohibition against members of an administrative agency investigating facts, instituting proceedings, and then making the necessary adjudication. The Withrow case arose in Wisconsin where the Wisconsin Medical Examining Board commenced an investigation to determine whether a doctor had committed certain illegal acts. The board subsequently decided to hold a hearing to determine whether the doctor had committed the alleged acts and whether to suspend the doctor's license temporarily. Id. at 39-41, 95 S.Ct. 1456. The Court held that the board could adjudicate the same charges it had investigated and decided to prosecute without violating the doctor's due process rights. Id. at 47-55, 95 S.Ct. 1456. The Court stated: The contention that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative adjudication has a much more difficult burden of persuasion to carry. It must overcome a presumption of honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and human weakness, conferring investigative and adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due process is to be adequately implemented. [ Id. at 47, 95 S.Ct. 1456]; see also McIntyre v. Santa Barbara Co[unty] Emp[loyees'] Ret. System, 91 Cal.App.4th 730, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 565, 569 (2001) the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation); Marshall v. Cuomo, 192 F.3d 473, 484-485 (C.A.4,1999) (due process rights are not violated simply by the combination of the investigatory, prosecutorial, and adjudicatory functions in one agency, but rather by actual bias or the high probability of bias); Matter of Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 265 Ga. 843, 462 S.E.2d 728 (1995) (the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, per se, violate the requirements of due process). Notably, the Court further observed that, while the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions is not, without more, a due process violation, this does not, of course, preclude a court from determining from the special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that the risk of unfairness is intolerably high. Withrow, supra at 58, 95 S.Ct. 1456. However, the Court found no such special facts and circumstances with regard to the professional discipline board in Withrow. This Court also has had occasion to address this due process issue especially in reference to the JTC and has adopted the Withrow standards. [15] In In re Del Rio, 400 Mich. 665, 690, 256 N.W.2d 727 (1977), we noted that the authority is legion in support of the proposition that combining the investigative and adjudicative roles in a single agency does not necessarily violate due process in administrative adjudications such as judicial fitness hearings. Id., see also In re Moore, 464 Mich. 98, 128-131, 626 N.W.2d 374 (2001). Further, we held in In re Mikesell, 396 Mich. 517, 530, 243 N.W.2d 86 (1976), that the combination of investigative and adjudicative functions does not, without more, constitute a due process violation.... Quoting from Withrow, supra at 58, 95 S.Ct. 1456. Thus, in accordance with Withrow, this Court held that a court should examine the matter to see if there are special facts and circumstances present in the case before it that present an intolerably high risk of unfairness. Id. We find, in reliance upon Withrow and the Michigan authorities, that the procedures followed by the JTC in reaching its decision conformed to the constitution and the court rules, and afforded respondent sufficient due process protections. We further conclude that there were no special facts or circumstances which would suggest that the risk of unfairness here, if indeed there was any, was intolerably high. Mikesell, supra at 531, 243 N.W.2d 86. As to the procedures, first, pursuant to MCR 9.207(B)(3), the JTC conducted a preliminary investigation to determine whether respondent's alleged conduct warranted further action. Second, after determining that sufficient evidence of misconduct existed, the JTC filed a formal complaint pursuant to MCR 9.208. Third, a master was appointed, [16] notice was given, and a hearing was then afforded respondent under MCR 9.210(A) and MCR 9.211, with the JTC's executive director serving as prosecutor-examiner under MCR 9.201(6). Fourth, after the hearing, when objections were lodged against the master's findings, the examiner under MCR 9.216 issued such objections in writing, with a supporting brief. MCR 9.216. Finally, the JTC's conclusion that Judge Chrzanowski should be disciplined was ultimately just a recommendation to this Court that we are charged to review de novo pursuant to deciding what discipline, if any, is appropriate. As in Withrow, the JTC's investigative and adjudicative procedures are functionally separate; additionally, as distinct from Withrow, in which the investigation and the decision were undertaken by the same Medical Examining Board, here the master, the examiner, and the JTC panel are separate entities. If the board in Withrow did not violate due process rights by investigating, and then adjudicating claims, it can hardly be argued that the JTC's procedures violated due process. Further, a majority of the members of the JTC are judges, and all the members who ultimately recommend discipline are assumed to be fair and impartial. We conclude then that there was no actual bias in the JTC's decision. It had authority to review the master's findings de novo, and reasonably determined, by a preponderance of the evidence, that respondent had in fact made false statements. We find these procedures adequately separated the JTC's investigative and adjudicative functions. [17]