Opinion ID: 2602478
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: Scope of Probable Cause Hearing

Text: We first resolve the issue, raised by the Court of Appeal and disputed by the parties, of the proper scope of this hearing. The outcome of the probable cause hearing determines whether or not an offender must proceed to a trial in which he or she might be civilly committed as a sexually violent predator. (§ 6602, subd. (a).) As previously noted, section 6602, subdivision (a), describes the determination to be made at the probable cause hearing as to whether there is probable cause to believe that the individual ... is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release. Section 6604, which describes the determination to be made at trial, requires that a court or jury find beyond a reasonable doubt, the person is a sexually violent predator. (Italics added.) A sexually violent predator is defined in section 6600, subdivision (a)(1), as a person who has been convicted of a sexually violent offense against two or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. In addition, as previously noted, we recently held that the predatory nature of criminal acts is an additional element required to be proven at trial in order to commit an SVP. ( Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1186, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116.) [9] The Legislature used different language to describe the ultimate determinations to be made at trial and at the probable cause hearing. Section 6604 describes the determination to be made at trial as whether the person is a sexually violent predator, whereas subdivision (a) of section 6602 describes the determination as whether the person is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release. The Court of Appeal apparently relied on this difference in the statutory language to conclude that the only finding the court has to make at the probable cause hearing is whether there is probable cause to believe that the sexual predator is likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior upon release. The Court of Appeal went on to state that [t]he court is not required to make any findings on any of the other criteria of the Sexually Violent Predators Act at the probable cause hearing. The district attorney adopts the Court of Appeal position here. Marentez, on the other hand, argues that the scope of a probable cause finding encompasses all four of the elements contained in the definition of an SVP. He argues that this interpretation is implicit in the language contained in section 6602, subdivision (a), because only individuals with an identified sexual criminal history who have a mental disorder are statutorily defined as being likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior. (§ 6602, subd. (a).) Contrary to the position taken by the Court of Appeal and adopted by the district attorney, we do not believe that the difference in language used in section 6602, subdivision (a) and section 6604 signifies an intention by the Legislature that the scope of the probable cause hearing should be more limited than the scope of the trial. Under the SVPA, an individual can only proceed to a trial if the judge determines there is probable cause, and the petition is dismissed if there is not probable cause. (§ 6602, subd. (a).) The probable cause hearing, therefore, is only a preliminary determination that cannot form the basis of a civil commitment; the ultimate determination of whether an individual can be committed as an SVP is made only at trial. (§ 6604.) For this reason, based on the structure of the SVPA, a section 6602 hearing is analogous to a preliminary hearing in a criminal case; both serve to `weed out groundless or unsupported charges ... and to relieve the accused of the degradation and expense of a ... trial.' ( Nienhouse v. Superior Court (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 83, 91, 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 573.) Like a criminal preliminary hearing, the only purpose of the probable cause hearing is to test the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the SVPA petition. ( Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1186, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116.) Given this purpose, we can discern no reason why the superior court at the probable cause hearing would test the sufficiency of only one of the elements required for civil commitment as an SVP at trial. We do not believe that the Legislature intended such a result. Rather, we interpret section 6602, subdivision (a) in light of the language used and the purpose of the probable cause hearing within the structure of the SVPA, to require that the probable cause hearing encompass all four of the elements also required for the ultimate determination at trial. We proceed by examining the language contained in section 6602, subdivision (a). { Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988) 45 Cal.3d 727, 735, 248 Cal.Rptr. 115, 755 P.2d 299.) Pursuant to this section, the superior court must determine at the probable cause hearing whether the offender is likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release. (§ 6602, subd. (a), italics added.) Viewing this language in isolation, it is not clear how the Legislature intended that the superior court make this determination. For purposes of the determination to be made at trial, however, an SVP is an individual with a qualifying sexual offense and a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. (§ 6600, subd. (a), italics added.) We can infer from the use of this similar language that the Legislature intended the determination of dangerousness at the probable cause hearing to be the same as at the subsequent trial. In fact, the district attorney does not suggest otherwise. The district attorney suggests, instead, that the probable cause hearing is limited solely to a determination of the likely element. The district attorney's position relies on the fact that the existence of a mental condition and dangerousness, manifested in the likelihood of sexual criminal behavior, are different elements contained in the definition of an SVP that must be proved at trial. (§§ 6600, subd. (a), 6604.) The district attorney suggests, therefore, that these elements can be separated, and that the probable cause hearing is limited solely to a determination of dangerousness. This argument ignores the fact that in the definition of an SVP contained in section 6600, subdivision (a), a finding of likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior is expressly dependent on the existence of a statutorily defined mental disorder: a diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior. (ibid, italics added.) Based on the statutory definition of an SVP, therefore, at trial, the finder of fact can only find that an offender is likely to engage in sexually violent criminal behavior if the offender suffers from a mental disorder. Applying the rule of statutory construction that `provisions relating to the same subject matter must be harmonized to the extent possible' ( Lakin v. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 659, 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 109, 863 P.2d 179), we find that a finding of the existence of a mental disorder is, therefore, also implicit in the determination of dangerousness to be made at the probable cause hearing. We can conclude, therefore, that the probable cause hearing necessarily encompasses at least two of the elements required at trial: a finding by the superior court of a statutorily defined diagnosed mental disorder and a finding of future dangerousness whether a person is likely to commit sexually violent predatory behavior upon release. [10] We rely on the plain language of section 6602, subdivision (a) to conclude that the superior court must also determine whether there is probable cause to believe it likely that future acts of sexual violence will be predatory. This subdivision specifically refers to sexually violent predatory criminal behavior. (Ibid, italics added.) Furthermore, as previously noted, the term predatory is expressly defined in section 6600, subdivision (e). To ignore the term, therefore, would violate the maxim of statutory construction that `[c]ourts should give meaning to every word of a statute if possible, and should avoid a construction making any word surplusage.' [Citation.] ( Reno v. Baird (1998) 18 Cal.4th 640, 658, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 499, 957 P.2d 1333.) Our conclusion reiterates our previous interpretation of the plain meaning of the language of the SVPA probable cause hearing provision. (See People v. Torres (2001) 25 Cal.4th 680, 686, 106 Cal.Rptr.2d 824, 22 P.3d 871 [language [of section 6602, subdivision (a) ] requires the court at a probable cause hearing to decide whether the defendant is `likely to engage in sexually violent predatory criminal behavior upon his or her release' (italics added) ]; Hurtado, supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 1183, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d 186, 52 P.3d 116.) We further conclude that the fourth element of an SVP determinationwhether the offender has been convicted of at least one qualifying offense (§ 6600, subd. (a)) falls within the scope of the probable cause hearing. In reaching our conclusion, we recognize that the language of section 6602, subdivision (a) contains no express reference to the offender's qualifying conviction. Given that the purpose of the probable cause hearing is to test the sufficiency of evidence for civil commitment, however, we can discern no reason why the superior court at the probable cause hearing would test the sufficiency of all the elements except the existence of a qualifying conviction when an individual cannot be found to be an SVP at trial without this element. We note that the statute expressly provides that the existence of a qualifying offense can be proved by documentary evidence, so that proof of this element is unlikely to be a subject of dispute. (§ 6600, subd. (a)(3).) The probable cause determination, however, is the first judicial hearing at which the offender can point out any error related to this documentary evidence. In light of the fact that this element can be easily verified, excluding this determination from the scope of the probable cause hearing would lead to the absurd result that an individual could potentially be kept in custody pending an eventual trial, even though he or she did not meet this basic requirement for civil commitment. (§ 6602, subd. (a).) Therefore, based on the purpose of section 6602, subdivision (a), within the structure of the SVPA, we conclude that the probable cause hearing must also encompass a judicial verification of the existence of at least one qualifying offense as defined in section 6600, subdivision (a). In sum, we hold that the probable cause determination, like the ultimate determination to be made at trial, encompasses all four of the elements contained in the definition of an SVP.