Opinion ID: 2011334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Introduction: Discrimination and Equal Protection of the Laws

Text: The fact that same-sex marriage is not a fundamental right, entitled to due process protection, see supra Part V., does not end the constitutional inquiry; equal protection analysis is available to determine whether the classification at issue, unrelated adult homosexual couples, [31] can serve as a legitimate basis for excluding persons from a state benefitin this case the right to marry which is available virtually without limitation to unrelated adult heterosexual couples. The Supreme Court has explained that certain state-imposed limitations or exclusions can violate the equal protection guarantee either (1) by restricting the exercise of a fundamental right, see Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541, 62 S.Ct. at 1113not the case here [32] or (2) by discriminating, without sufficient justification, against members of a constitutionally protected class. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2394-95; Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 312, 96 S.Ct. at 2566. This case concerns the latter, discrimination category. It is important to say at the outset of this discussion what will become clearer as I proceed: the question I am addressingwhether homosexuals, see supra note 31, comprise a constitutionally protected classmust be answered for equal protection purposes generally, not just for a marriage case. That is to say, the answer to this classification question will be the same whether the issue in a particular case is alleged discrimination against homosexuals in employment, or in housing, or under the marriage statute; homosexuals either will, or will not, comprise a class entitled to special constitutional scrutiny of alleged discrimination against them. What will not be the same from case to case, however, is the ultimate outcome resulting from that classification. Suppose, for example, this court were to conclude here, or in another case, that homosexuals comprise a constitutionally protected class. This would do no more than shift to the government in a particular case the burden of proving that the alleged discrimination against homosexuals served a compelling, or at least an important, governmental interest. See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2394-95. Thus, classification of homosexuals as a constitutionally protected class would not grant them the right to marry one another. It is theoretically possible that the government would fail to carry its burden in a housing or employment, discrimination case but might succeed, nonetheless, in demonstrating why, in the public interest, only heterosexuals should be allowed to marry. The point is: in the ensuing discussion of whether homosexuals comprise a constitutionally protected classjust as racial minorities and women are specially protected classesI shall be dealing with a threshold inquiry that does not necessarily dictate the result of the case. Basically, I shall be dealing with the question (1) whether the plaintiffs-appellants should have the burden of showing why there is no rational basis for disallowing homosexuals to marry one another, or (2) whether instead the District should have the burden of showing a compelling, or at least substantial, governmental interest in preventing homosexuals from marrying one another. It also is important to be clear from the beginning that, even though the state does not withhold a right deemed fundamental for constitutional purposes, a legislative classification that withholds other significant rights and benefits from a protected class of persons, while making those benefits available to others, can just as surely violate the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Plyler, 457 U.S. at 216-18, 102 S.Ct. at 2394-95 (Texas statute withholding from local school districts state funds for educating children who were not legally admitted violates equal protection clause). Thus, even though only heterosexual couples have a fundamental right to marry, the aspect of marriage that elevates it to a fundamental right under the due process clausethe capacity to have children togetherdoes not gainsay the fact that marriage has other important attributes which, as the Supreme Court itself has recognized, can be significant enough on occasion to outweigh various interests the state may have in withholding the right to marry from one group or another.