Opinion ID: 2602228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Violent Felony

Text: [¶ 26] Kearns finally argues that he was not convicted of a violent felony pursuant to Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-10-201(a) and that he, therefore, should not have been sentenced as an habitual criminal. The State insists that the judge misspoke during the sentencing proceeding, calling Kearns' conviction one for attempted aggravated robbery rather than for aggravated robbery and that this error was harmless. During the sentencing proceeding, the judge stated that Kearns had been convicted of attempted aggravated robbery, and this erroneous choice of words was carried over to, and memorialized in, the judgment and sentence. This description of the offense with which Kearns was convicted as attempted aggravated robbery was obviously a mistake because the third amended information charged Kearns with aggravated robbery, the jury instructions instructed the jury on the crime of aggravated robbery, and the jury convicted Kearns of aggravated robbery. [¶ 27] W.R.Cr.P. 36 applies to clerical errors, and it provides: Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors in the record arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time and after such notice, if any, as the court orders. We must, therefore, determine whether the judge's error constituted a clerical error or a judicial error, the latter of which does not fall within the remedial provisions of W.R.Cr.P. 36. Eddy v. First Wyoming Bank N.A.-Lander, 713 P.2d 228, 233 (Wyo.1986). This court has previously distinguished the two types of errors by explaining that all errors, mistakes, or omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial function may be called clerical errors, while a judicial error is one that is the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination. Matter of Kimball's Estate, 583 P.2d 1274, 1277-78 (Wyo.1978) (quoting Holmes v. Holmes, 66 Wyo. 317, 211 P.2d 946, 953 (Wyo.1949)). [1] [¶ 28] In Holmes, we made the following attempt to distinguish the two types of errors: It is said in 30 Am.Jurisprudence 876: The authority of the court in this connection does not extend beyond the power to make the journal entry speak the truth, and may be exercised only to supply omissions in the exercise of functions which are clerical merely. It is, however, often difficult to distinguish between clerical and judicial errors. The distinction between a clerical error and a judicial one is not dependent upon its source. Clerical errors may include mistakes in papers evidencing the judgment of the court made by the court itself. In 126 A.L.R. 977, it is stated: Clerical errors in judgments, orders, or decrees are not, by the majority rule, limited to mistakes of the clerk, but include also errors made by the judge where of a clerical or ministerial nature. In 126 A.L.R. 978, it is stated: Although an error in a judgment, order, or decree was originally made by an attorney when preparing the same for the signature of the judge or clerk, it may none the less be a `clerical' error. In Sec. 146, Freeman on Judgments, 5th Ed., the author states: But `clerical' is employed in a broad sense as contradistinguished from `judicial' error and covers all errors, mistakes, or omissions which are not the result of the exercise of the judicial function. In other words, the distinction does not depend so much upon the person making the error as upon whether it was the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination, regardless of whether it was made by the clerk, by counsel or by the judge. Mistakes of the court are not necessarily judicial error. Thus if the judgment or some provision in it was the result of inadvertence, as where the court was laboring under a mistake or misapprehension as to the state of the record or as to some extrinsic fact, but for which a different judgment would have been rendered, the judgment may be vacated or may be corrected to correspond with what it would have been but for the inadvertence or mistake. Holmes, 211 P.2d at 953. [¶ 29] We hold that the error in this case was a clerical one. It is clear from the record that the judge's use of the word attempted to describe the aggravated robbery conviction was not the deliberate result of judicial reasoning and determination. Indeed, the judge could not have applied any judicial reasoning or made any judicial determination when he described the crime that Kearns had been convicted of as attempted aggravated robbery because he did not have the authority to decide of what crimes Kearns was guilty. The judge's use of the word attempted was, instead, a clerical error which may be corrected by virtue of W.R.Cr.P. 36 to accurately reflect the offense of which Kearns was convicted. [¶ 30] Before a defendant can be sentenced as an habitual criminal, the crime for which he is currently being sentenced must qualify as a violent felony. Because this court has recognized aggravated robbery as a violent felony for purposes of the habitual criminal statute, we hold that the trial court properly sentenced Kearns as an habitual criminal. Oakley v. State, 715 P.2d 1374, 1380 (Wyo.1986). [¶ 31] Affirmed with instructions to the trial court to enter a corrected judgment and sentence pursuant to W.R.Cr.P. 36.