Opinion ID: 2252960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Evidence Concerning Dugan's Other Crimes

Text: According to defendant, evidence concerning Dugan's five admitted crimes and the circumstances of his confessions to those crimes was admissible under several theories: (1) the evidence was relevant to show Dugan's modus operandi; (2) it corroborated the truth and accuracy of Dugan's Nicarico statements; (3) it rebutted the State's proposition that defendant committed this murder with Dugan; and (4) it demonstrated that he possessed the requisite motive (pedophilia) to have assaulted the child victim here. Although at trial defendant argued only that evidence of Dugan's other crimes was admissible on the basis of modus operandi, on appeal the parties fully briefed these several theories supporting the admission of the evidence. Under such circumstances, we may consider the admissibility of the evidence based on these theories as well. See People ex rel. Daley v. Datacom Systems Corp. (1991), 146 Ill.2d 1, 27, 165 Ill.Dec. 655, 585 N.E.2d 51 (exception to the general waiver rule exists if question is one of law and is fully briefed and argued by the parties). The basic rule is that all relevant evidence is admissible unless otherwise provided by law. (See People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey (1957), 10 Ill.2d 288, 139 N.E.2d 780.) In addition to specific laws that may require exclusion, a court may generally exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is outweighed by such dangers as unfair prejudice, jury confusion, or delay. As an outgrowth of this principle, a general rule has developed that evidence of offenses other than those for which a defendant is being tried is inadmissible. ( People v. McDonald (1975), 62 Ill.2d 448, 455, 343 N.E.2d 489.) The underlying rationale is that such evidence `is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value, but because it has too much.` ( People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 330, 5 Ill.Dec. 817, 362 N.E.2d 288, quoting People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342, 125 N.E.2d 506; see also People v. Hendricks (1990), 137 Ill.2d 31, 52, 148 Ill.Dec. 213, 560 N.E.2d 611.) The law distrusts the inference that because a man has committed other crimes he is more likely to have committed the current crime. And so, as a matter of policy, where the testimony has no value beyond that inference, it is excluded. People v. Lehman (1955), 5 Ill.2d 337, 342, 125 N.E.2d 506. This court has repeatedly held that evidence of other crimes is admissible if it is relevant for any purpose other than to show the propensity to commit crimes. (Emphasis added.) People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill.2d 499, 520, 131 Ill.Dec. 125, 538 N.E.2d 500; see People v. Evans (1988), 125 Ill.2d 50, 125 Ill.Dec. 790, 530 N.E.2d 1360; see also E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 448 (2d ed. 1972) (range of permissible uses of other-crimes evidence is almost infinite). Where other-crimes evidence is offered, it is admissible only where the other crime bears some threshold similarity to the crime charged. (See Illgen, 145 Ill.2d at 372, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515, quoting People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill.2d 294, 310, 74 Ill.Dec. 557, 456 N.E.2d 59.) This threshold requirement serves to increase the relevancy of the evidence and ensures that the evidence is not being used solely to establish a defendant's criminal propensities. (See People v. Bartall (1983), 98 Ill.2d 294, 310, 74 Ill.Dec. 557, 456 N.E.2d 59.) In cases where evidence of other crimes is offered, however, to establish modus operandi or a common design or plan, a high degree of identity between the facts of the crime charged and the other offense has been required. ( Illgen, 145 Ill.2d at 373, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515; see also People v. Tate (1981), 87 Ill.2d 134, 141, 57 Ill.Dec. 572, 429 N.E.2d 470 (other-crimes evidence is found to be relevant and admissible as proof of modus operandi only upon a strong and persuasive showing of similarity).) This high degree of identity between the other offense and the charged crime is necessary because modus operandi refers to a pattern of criminal behavior so distinctive that separate crimes are recognized as the handiwork of the same wrongdoer. (See M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 404.5 (5th ed. 1990).) This court has also recognized that even where such evidence is offered to prove modus operandi some dissimilarity will always exist between independent crimes. People v. Taylor (1984), 101 Ill.2d 508, 521, 79 Ill.Dec. 151, 463 N.E.2d 705; see also People v. Phillips (1989), 127 Ill.2d 499, 520-521, 131 Ill.Dec. 125, 538 N.E.2d 500 (test is not one of exact, rigorous identity). That same degree of identity between the two offenses is not necessary when evidence of the other crime is offered for some purpose other than modus operandi. ( Illgen, 145 Ill.2d at 373, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515; People v. McKibbins (1983), 96 Ill.2d 176, 185-86, 70 Ill.Dec. 474, 449 N.E.2d 821.) Thus, where a defendant's involvement in another offense was offered to prove the absence of an innocent frame of mind or the presence of criminal intent, mere general areas of similarity have sufficed. Illgen, 145 Ill.2d at 373, 164 Ill.Dec. 599, 583 N.E.2d 515; McKibbins, 96 Ill.2d at 185-86, 70 Ill.Dec. 474, 449 N.E.2d 821; see also People v. King (1986), 109 Ill.2d 514, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949 (evidence of defendant's other crime relevant and admitted to establish accuracy of confession without analysis concerning degree of identity between two crimes); People v. Baptist (1979), 76 Ill.2d 19, 27, 27 Ill.Dec. 792, 389 N.E.2d 1200 (no analysis concerning degree of identity between two crimes when evidence offered to show consciousness of guilt). In this case, defendant sought to introduce exculpatory evidence concerning a nontestifying, third party's crimes and the circumstances of his confessions to those crimes. We agree with defendant that in cases where a defendant seeks to introduce other-crimes evidence to exculpate himself, there is usually no need for the trial court to be concerned with balancing probative value against prejudicial effect. (See 1 S. Gard, Illinois Evidence Manual 48 (Supp.1990) (reasons for exclusionary rule when applied to the defendant in a criminal action do not exist in the case of other persons).) Thus, as this court recognized in Tate, the most recent case dealing with other-crimes evidence offered by a defendant, such evidence is admitted where the evidence contains significant probative value to the defense without any reference to the element of prejudice. Tate, 87 Ill.2d at 143, 57 Ill.Dec. 572, 429 N.E.2d 470. See also M. Graham, Cleary & Graham's Handbook of Illinois Evidence § 405.5, at 196 (5th ed. 1990). Other courts have also recognized that there is a distinction between the limits imposed on a defendant's use of other-crimes evidence to exculpate himself and the State's use of such evidence to prosecute him. See United States v. Cohen (11th Cir.1989), 888 F.2d 770, 777; United States v. Aboumoussallem (2d Cir.1984), 726 F.2d 906, 911; United States v. Stamper (W.D.N.C.1991), 766 F.Supp. 1396, 1406; State v. Garfole (1978), 76 N.J. 445, 452-53, 388 A.2d 587, 591. Defendant contends that the evidence concerning Dugan's other crimes was admissible under a modus operandi theory to show that he spoke truthfully when he admitted to having killed Jeanine Nicarico in the manner that he did. We disagree with defendant's assertion that Tate allows for a relaxed degree of identity between the crimes compared when other-crimes evidence is offered by a defendant. While Tate dispenses with the consideration of prejudice when such evidence is offered by a defendant, Tate requires that, for such evidence to have significant probative value under modus operandi, there must be a substantial and meaningful link between the offenses being compared, regardless of which party offers the evidence. Tate, 87 Ill.2d at 143, 57 Ill.Dec. 572, 429 N.E.2d 470. In the present case, evidence of Melissa Ackerman's murder only was admissible under a theory of modus operandi. In both of Dugan's accounts of the Ackerman and Nicarico murders, he was aimlessly driving around alone in his auto, smoking marijuana, before he encountered the female, Caucasian child-victim. In neither instance was the crime apparently premeditated or planned. In both accounts, Dugan recklessly abducted the victim during daylight hours, in full view, by perhaps placing the victim in the front, passenger-side area of his auto. In both accounts, Dugan attempted to hide or cover the victim with some type of bedding (sleeping bag or sheet). Both accounts also involved anal sex and the tying of the victim's hands. We find that a substantial and meaningful linkage was established between the compared offenses such that Dugan's confession to the Ackerman murder was probative of the truth of his account of the Nicarico murder. The facts and Dugan's account of his remaining other crimes were also similar in significant respect to his account of the Nicarico murder. While there was not a sufficient linkage among these crimes to support admission of them all under a theory of modus operandi, there was a sufficient degree of similarity to support their entire admission for purposes other than to show modus operandi. In each murder, Dugan tied the victim's hands at some point. In all of the murders, Dugan availed himself of whatever physical material (water, tire iron, tree branch) was immediately at hand for use as a murder weapon. Several of the crimes, like the Nicarico murder, involved sexual assaults in an auto, blindfolding, tire irons, blows to the head, and the use of bedding materials. Two of the three murders involved blunt trauma, and two of the three involved drowning. Every crime involved the use of an auto to abduct the victim, and every crime involved the abduction of a young, Caucasian female. Although each crime does not bear the same similar feature, various similar features are repeated. The greatest similarity between these crimes, however, lies not in discrete and observable facts, but in the character of the assaults as a whole. ( Tate, 87 Ill.2d at 143, 57 Ill.Dec. 572, 429 N.E.2d 470.) The crimes appear unpremeditated, highly spontaneous, and reckless in their regard to possible apprehension. The requisite degree of similarity having been established, this evidence of Dugan's other crimes was admissible to corroborate his statements about the Nicarico murder. In People v. King (1986), 109 Ill.2d 514, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949, this court found that [t]he evidence of the other crime tended to corroborate the defendant's statements in his confession concerning the two offenses. ( King, 109 Ill.2d at 531, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949.) King held that [e]vidence regarding the    robbery was relevant to establish the accuracy of the confession to the charged crime. King, 109 Ill.2d at 531, 94 Ill.Dec. 702, 488 N.E.2d 949. See also People v. Kokoraleis (1989), 132 Ill.2d 235, 258, 138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202 (evidence of defendant's other crimes tended to support the reliability and accuracy of the defendant's confession to the charged murder). The State, however, cites to People v. Romero (1977), 66 Ill.2d 325, 5 Ill.Dec. 817, 362 N.E.2d 288, and People v. Thingvold (1991), 145 Ill.2d 441, 452, 164 Ill.Dec. 877, 584 N.E.2d 89, for the proposition that othercrimes evidence may not be introduced to bolster a witness' credibility. The correct statement of the law in Thingvold is that evidence of other crimes is not admissible to bolster the credibility of a prosecution witness. ( Thingvold, 145 Ill.2d at 459, 164 Ill. Dec. 877, 584 N.E.2d 89, citing Romero, 66 Ill.2d 325, 5 Ill.Dec. 817, 362 N.E.2d 288.) The Thingvold court did not reach any consideration of this rule under the facts of the case, finding, as a threshold matter, that the evidence was not admissible as traditional other-crimes evidence because there was nothing connecting the defendant to the other crime. In Romero, the court rejected the State's proffered reason for using the othercrimes evidence, to enhance the credibility of its witness, as not being supported by authority. Although Romero does not expressly state, the State had failed to demonstrate that the other-crimes evidence was used for anything other than showing the defendant's propensity to commit crime. Unlike the case at bar, Romero was concerned with possible prejudice to the defendant. In this case, if the other-crimes evidence contained significant probative value to the defense, it was admissible. In the instant case, the State attacked the reliability and accuracy of Dugan's Nicarico statements. In rebuttal, defendant attempted to corroborate the accuracy of Dugan's Nicarico statements by showing that they were given within the context of his apparently accurate and acceptable formal confessions to five other similar crimes. As in King and Kokoraleis, we believe this other-crimes evidence was probative of the accuracy of certain key evidentiary statements. The fact that Dugan formally confessed to the kidnappings, rapes and murder of a female child and young women contemporaneous to his statements that he committed similar acts against the Nicarico child speaks to the accuracy of his statements. Evidence is considered relevant if it has any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of an action more or less probable that it would be without the evidence. ( People v. Stewart (1984), 105 Ill.2d 22, 54, 85 Ill.Dec. 241, 473 N.E.2d 840.) We conclude that evidence of Dugan's other crimes and the circumstances of his confessions to those crimes was probative of whether Dugan's Nicarico statements were accurate and reliable. The other-crimes evidence, in its entirety, was therefore relevant and admissible on this basis. As part of a dual strategy to combat Dugan's Nicarico statements, the State also attempted to undercut the statements in another way. Accepting that Dugan's Nicarico statements might be accurate regarding the general details of the crime itself, the State presented evidence to show defendant and Dugan's joint participation. Thus, the State presented evidence or argued that different shoeprints were found outside the Nicarico home, that bloodhounds followed different trails during the police investigation, and that Dugan accompanied defendant at Rodriguez's home around the time of the murder. In rebuttal, defendant attempted to demonstrate the implausibility of this theory by introducing Dugan's other crimes, revealing that Dugan invariably acted alone in committing similar crimes. The State argues that this claimed basis for admitting the evidence is only a form of modus operandi. We disagree under the circumstances presented here. (But see Kokoraleis, 132 Ill.2d at 257, 138 Ill.Dec. 233, 547 N.E.2d 202 (fact of defendant's presence during other crimes admissible under modus operandi to prove his participation in charged crime).) Defendant sought to introduce all of the facts of Dugan's other crimes to show that Dugan was truthful in his statements that he killed the victim. Defendant sought to introduce the fact that Dugan acted alone in every one of these admitted crimes to show that Dugan did not act with defendant as postulated by the State. The probative value of this evidence depends not on any heightened degree of identity between the crimes compared, as is the case in modus operandi, but on the consistency of Dugan's solitary conduct in similar situations. We find that evidence that Dugan always acted alone in all his other similar crimes was probative of whether Dugan committed this crime with defendant. Under the circumstances of this case, we believe that the evidence of Dugan's other crimes and the circumstances of his confessions to those crimes was relevant and admissible. The Dugan-Cruz linkage was an essential element of the State's case. Defendant was thus entitled to rebut the evidence of that linkage with nonprejudicial and relevant evidence. The exclusion of the Dugan other-crimes evidence was, accordingly, an abuse of discretion.