Opinion ID: 1879070
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge erred in denying austin's motion for a new trial?

Text: ¶ 39. In his final assignment of error, Austin contends that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a new trial on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The standard of review on this issue is well settled. As distinguished from a motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, a motion for new trial asks that the jury's guilty verdict be vacated on grounds related to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence presented at trial. May v. State, 460 So.2d 778, 781 (Miss.1984). This Court will not order a new trial unless convinced that the verdict is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that, to allow it to stand, would be to sanction an unconscionable injustice. Groseclose v. State, 440 So.2d 297, 300 (Miss. 1983). The Court will reverse the lower court's denial of a motion for a new trial only if, by denying, the court abused its discretion. Gleeton v. State, 716 So.2d 1083, 1089 (Miss.1998). Furthermore, we are to consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, accepting all credible evidence consistent with the verdict as true. Ashford v. State, 583 So.2d 1279, 1281 (Miss.1991). We must also accept all reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence that are consistent with the verdict. Id. Ashford held: [O]nce the jury has returned a verdict of guilty in a criminal case, we are not at liberty to direct that the defendant be discharged short of a conclusion on our part that given the evidence, taken in the light most favorable to the verdict, no reasonable, hypothetical juror could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty. Id. Matters regarding the weight and credibility of evidence must be resolved by the jury. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d 203, 212 (Miss.1985). ¶ 40. Austin's argument is that conflicting testimony of eyewitnesses resulted in flaws so serious that they need to be re-examined in a new trial. First, Austin cites the failure of three witnesses to identify Austin at trial. One of those witnesses, Morganti, was crouched behind the counter of the Payment Center at the time Moore was shot. Also, there were various witnesses who did positively identify Austin at trial. ¶ 41. Second, Austin questions the fact that there was inconsistent testimony regarding the color and description of the clothing worn by the gunman. Many witnesses testified in the case at bar, including young children. Therefore, it is not surprising that minor discrepancies emerged regarding certain details. The aforementioned discrepancies did not call into question the main points of the crime, however. ¶ 42. Third, Austin calls into question the credibility of Michael Matthews, who positively identified Austin. Austin claims that several others who purportedly identified Austin suffered from credibility problems. Issues of fact and of weight and credibility for the jury to resolve. Fisher v. State, 481 So.2d at 212. Although there are some inconsistencies in the testimony presented in this case, the State provided ample evidence to support the jury's verdict. It was possible and reasonable for the jury, upon the evidence at trial, ultimately to conclude that Austin had robbed the Payment Center and shot Moore. To allow this verdict to stand does not sanction an unconscionable injustice, as the record reflects evidence to support the jury's findings. See Robinson v. State, 749 So.2d 1054, 1059 (Miss.1999); Eakes v. State, 665 So.2d 852, 872 (Miss. 1995). Accordingly, this issue is without merit.