Opinion ID: 2148470
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Waiver of Fourth Amendment Protection

Text: We address a final fourth amendment issue raised by the State. The State asserts that Bircher's acceptance of the conditions of her probation constituted prospective consent that waived fourth amendment protection. This issue was expressly left open by the Court in Knights. Knights, 534 U.S. at 118, 122 S.Ct. at 591, 151 L.Ed.2d at 504-05. None of the probation conditions explicitly express a waiver of fourth amendment rights. Bircher's probation order stated, That Defendant shall submit to a search    as directed by her Probation Officer. Two members of the appellate panel interpreted this language as requiring Bircher's presence during a probation search, while one of the two justices concluded that the condition could also be satisfied if Bircher had prior notice of the search. Each of the 20 conditions of Bircher's probation, including the search condition, begin with the phrase That the Defendant shall do or refrain from doing certain things. The inclusion of this phrase is significant because it shows that compliance by Bircher is dependent on her conduct. In other words, the search condition did not directly empower her probation officer to conduct searches to verify compliance; it required action by Bircher, that she shall submit to a search. The term shall is often the focus of scrutiny during statutory interpretation. See, e.g., People v. Richardson, 104 Ill.2d 8, 15, 83 Ill.Dec. 604, 470 N.E.2d 1024 (1984). We note the primary definition of shall is, [h]as a duty to; more broadly, is required to. Black's Law Dictionary 1379 (7th ed. 1999). In other words, by accepting the probation order, Bircher accepted a duty to submit to a probation search when directed to do so by her probation officer. Creating such a duty implies a requirement of further action by Bircher rather than a prospective consent toward possible future, unspecified searches. We are informed about the meaning of submit by examining the usage of this term elsewhere in the probation order. See McMahan v. Industrial Comm'n, 183 Ill.2d 499, 513, 234 Ill.Dec. 205, 702 N.E.2d 545 (1998), citing People v. Talbot, 322 Ill. 416, 422, 153 N.E. 693 (1926). The term submit appears only in one other condition, 20. That the Defendant shall submit herself to and successfully complete Mental Health evaluation and treatment as deemed reasonably necessary by her Probation Officer. The purpose of such a condition was not merely to obtain prospective consent to attend future treatment. Instead, this condition clearly required future action by Bircher, specifically that she actually attend mental-health appointments when told to do so by her probation officer or risk revocation of her probation. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that submit was used similarly in the search condition, that upon the request of the probation officer she would either have to agree to permit the search or face possible probation revocation. These probation conditions were mandatory limits upon the liberty of Bircher. See Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874, 107 S.Ct. at 3169, 97 L.Ed.2d at 718, quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480, 92 S.Ct. at 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d at 494. However, their mandatory nature did not remove the element of choice from Bircher's life. During the period of her probation, Bircher repeatedly was faced with the decision of whether to comply with these conditions or whether to face revocation of her probation and possible incarceration, just as all citizens are subject to the requirements and proscriptions of civil and criminal laws and regulations. We find that the plain language of this probation search condition affirmatively required Bircher's probation officer to ask her to consentor submitto a particular search prior to conducting it; agreeing to the probation order did not constitute a prospective consent to all probation searches that waived fourth amendment protection. See, e.g., State v. Hindman, 125 Or.App. 434, 439, 866 P.2d 481, 483 (1993); contra State v. Martinez, 811 P.2d 205, 209 (Utah App.1991); see also 4 W. LaFave, Search & Seizure, § 10.10(b), at 764-66 (3d ed. 1996).