Opinion ID: 835638
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: defendant's request for appointment of new counsel

Text: Defendant next argues that the trial court erred in denying his various requests for appointment of new counsel. He cites to various relevant portions of the transcript, but is otherwise unspecific about what motions were made, which rulings were objectionable, and which facts support his claim. We assume that defendant's challenge is directed at two rulings: (1) the trial court's May 4, 2001, refusal to accept defendant's pro se motion for substitute counsel and its comment, after hearing defendant's complaints, that, [b]ased on what I've heard there, I wouldn't remove [counsel]; and (2) the trial court's failure to act on an affidavit that defendant filed on July 23, 2001, asking the court to replace defendant's lawyers or instruct them to follow [his] legitimate requests. [20] In his argument to this court, defendant does not rely on or even advert to any particular inadequacies of trial counsel. Instead, he focuses on the broader proposition that the trial court erred by failing to make a sufficient inquiry into his complaints. He notes that, under State v. Langley, 314 Or. 247, 257, 839 P.2d 692 (1992), adh'd to on recons., 318 Or. 28, 861 P.2d 1012 (1993), a defendant's request for new counsel requires a factual assessment of whether the complaint is `legitimate.' Defendant acknowledges that a trial court's denial of a request for substitute counsel is reviewed for abuse of discretion, id. at 258, 861 P.2d 1012, but he contends that, in his case, the trial court erred by exercising its discretion without inquiring adequately into the legitimacy of his complaints. This court recently considered a similar claim in State v. Smith, 339 Or. 515, 123 P.3d 261 (2005). There, the defendant indicated to the trial court, on the day of trial, that he was dissatisfied with his trial lawyer. The trial court listened to the defendant's complaints and ultimately concluded that trial counsel was adequate. Upon his conviction, the defendant appealed and argued, inter alia, that the trial court had erred by not holding a hearing or otherwise inquiring into the basis of the defendant's dissatisfaction with his lawyer. The Court of Appeals agreed with that argument, State v. Smith, 190 Or.App. 576, 80 P.3d 145 (2003), and remanded the defendant's case for a hearing about defendant's complaints. On review, we held that, contrary to the Court of Appeals decision, there is no rule of law requiring a trial court to conduct an inquiry into, and make a factual assessment of, a defendant's complaints about appointed counsel. Smith, 339 Or. at 530, 123 P.3d 261. We also held that a trial court's failure to inquire into the facts underpinning a complaint about counsel does not violate a defendant's constitutional right to assistance of counsel, because post-conviction procedures provide a constitutionally sufficient mechanism for obtaining relief when trial counsel has been inadequate. Id. at 530, 123 P.3d 261. Finally, we held that, where the defendant had expressed general concerns about fair representation and had suggested that defense counsel had not investigated his case sufficiently, the trial court had not abused its discretion in denying the motion on the ground that the defendant had not advanced any legitimate reasons for appointing substitute counsel. Id. at 531, 123 P.3d 261. Our decision in Smith resolves much of defendant's assignment of error. Specifically, it disposes of his claim that the trial court erred in failing to hold an inquiry into defendant's complaints and to make a factual assessment based on that inquiry. That leaves us to consider whether, on the record that was before it, the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's requests for substitute counsel. Defendant's claim is directed at two specific decisions by the trial court denying such requests. We turn to those decisions. On May 4, 2001, the trial court indicated that defendant must make any request for substitute counsel through his lawyers, but also allowed defendant at that time to describe his concerns orally. Defendant indicated that trial counsel had refused to file motions that defendant wished them to file, on the ground that such filings would be a waste of time. Defendant also indicated that he had asked his lawyers to research various issues and implied that they had declined to do so. The trial court suggested that the lawyers had been right about certain of defendant's requests being a waste of time. It also explained that most of defendant's complaints were about strategic decisions that were for the lawyers, and not defendant, to make. Ultimately, the court told defendant that the two lawyers were the best that I can give you and that he would not remove them based on what he had heard. In sum, the trial court considered defendant's complaints andon this record, at leastreasonably concluded that those complaints did not present a legitimate reason for appointing new counsel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's May 4, 2001, request for substitute counsel. On July 23, 2001in the midst of voir dire defendant again asked the court to appoint new counsel or instruct them to follow my legitimate requests. Trial counsel explained, at that time, that defendant was unhappy about counsel's inability or refusal to carry out a wide variety of legal tasks that he has asked us to do that he feels are appropriate. The trial court reiterated its earlier positionthat defendant was complaining about legal and strategic decisions that were not his to make. The trial court then invited defendant to compile and file a list of complaints, which it would consider and then seal for purposes of appeal. In response to that invitation, defendant presented the court with a large folder on August 9, 2001, which purportedly contained a list of items relating to his complaints about trial counsel. Apparently, the trial court found nothing in the material that defendant presented to suggest a legitimate reason for granting defendant's request for new counsel. The court did not grant defendant's request. We have reviewed the material that defendant presented to the trial court and find it to be more of the same i.e., complaints that trial counsel failed to file motions that defendant wished to file, failed to pursue issues and strategies that defendant wished to pursue, and generally failed to follow defendant's instructions. Neither the materials, nor defendant's similar oral complaints to the trial court, constitute a basis for concluding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's request for new counsel.