Opinion ID: 472139
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Cram-down Provisions--Sec. 1129.

Text: 90 We have seen that Judge Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding Co., 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir.1935), held in the context of a proposed confirmation of a plan of reorganization, proposed by a debtor over the dissent of a secured creditor (one form of cram-down), that the dissenting secured creditor was entitled to the present value of its secured claim in cash or a substitute of the most indubitable equivalence. Id. at 942. Judge Hand noted that the usual way the equivalent of a claim is provided in a plan of reorganization that contemplates a deferred payout of the claim is by paying a creditor interest on the amount of its claim. In 1978, Congress did codify the holding of Murel, as distinguished from its rhetoric, in the cram-down provisions of the Code. 91 In Sec. 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), Congress clearly set forth the requirement of Murel that a secured creditor receive over time the present value of its allowed secured claim in order for a proposed plan of reorganization to gain court approval: 41 92 (2) For the purpose of this subsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitable with respect to a class includes the following requirements: 93 [ (A)(i) ] (II) That each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property. 94 When the right of a creditor to payment of its allowed secured claim is delayed in the cram-down situation, Congress expressly ordered compensation for delay, in accordance with the holding in Murel; it failed to use similar language in Sec. 362(d)(1) or in Sec. 361. This supports a conclusion that Congress knew what it was doing when it expressly ordered that secured creditors receive interest payments for the deferral of their repayments in the cram-down situation, but failed to include language to the same effect in the automatic stay provisions.  'Where Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.'  United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (5th Cir.1972), quoted with approval in Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23, 104 S.Ct. 296, 301, 78 L.Ed.2d 17 (1983). The cram-down provisions, therefore, strongly suggest that subsection (3) of Sec. 361 was not intended to authorize present value payments to undersecured creditors to compensate for delay during the pendency of the reorganization proceeding. 95