Opinion ID: 588908
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Possession Charges

Text: 18 Castro claims that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of the possession charges. He contends that there was insufficient evidence that he knowingly possessed cocaine, and that the substance was in fact cocaine. Again, Castro essentially complains at the lack of direct evidence against him. His argument is meritless. 19 There was ample circumstantial evidence from which the jury could conclude that Castro possessed the cocaine seized in the four tractor-trailers. He was observed driving heavily loaded vehicles into a warehouse. The tractor-trailers then were driven into the warehouse. After a period of time, Castro's vehicle would leave empty. Then the tractor-trailers would leave. The trucks would then be stopped and large amounts of cocaine discovered. It was reasonable for the jury to infer that the cocaine had come from the vehicles Castro was driving. 20 The evidence in the last seizure was even more clear. Castro drove a heavily loaded van to a parking lot and left it. The van was then picked up by another coconspirator. The van was driven to an apartment where its contents were unloaded. The apartment was then raided and large amounts of cocaine were discovered in one of the containers unloaded from the van. The clear inference is that the cocaine came from the van which had been in Castro's possession. 21 Nor can Castro seriously claim not to have known about the cocaine. Government experts testified that that amount of cocaine, valued in the millions of dollars, would have never been entrusted to an unknowing dupe. Based on that testimony the jury reasonably could have found that Castro knowingly possessed the cocaine. 22 Castro also claims that there was no evidence to prove that the substance was in fact cocaine. He claims that the lab only tested packages from one of the seizures. The record clearly reveals that the lab tested packages from each of the seizures. There was also circumstantial evidence admitted which supported the jury's conclusion that the substance was cocaine. Sgt. Rodig testified about the markings on the packages and their significance. Thus, taking this evidence in a light most favorable to the government, there was sufficient evidence to support the possession convictions. III. Application of the Sentencing Guidelines 23 Castro claims that the district court erred in applying the amended Sentencing Guidelines as the crime occurred prior to their effective date. He contends that this was a violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. The government contends that the conspiracy was an ongoing offense which continued after the effective date of the amended Guidelines and therefore, the amended Guidelines should be applied. Ex Post Facto challenges are reviewed de novo. United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342, 1346 (9th Cir.1987). This is an issue of first impression in this circuit. However, there are two closely analogous cases decided by this court which suggest that there is no Ex Post Facto problem here. 24 In United States v. Calabrese, 825 F.2d 1342 (9th Cir.1987), we addressed the issue of whether the enhanced penalties of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 could be applied to a conspiracy which continued after the effective date of the Act. The defendants contended that application of the Act would violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. We rejected that argument, finding that because the conspiracy continued after the effective date of the Act, the enhanced penalty applied. 25 In United States v. Gray, 876 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir.1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930, 110 S.Ct. 2168, 109 L.Ed.2d 497 (1990), we addressed the issue of whether the Sentencing Guidelines applied to offenses that were initiated before their effective date but were completed after that date. The defendant in that case failed to appear in court prior to the effective date. The defendant was arrested after that date. Failure to appear, like conspiracy, is a continuing offense. We found that because the crime continued after the effective date of the Guidelines, the Guidelines applied to the offense. 26 The reasoning of the above cases clearly applies in this case. Conspiracy is a continuing offense. It is presumed to continue until there is affirmative evidence of abandonment, withdrawal, disavowal or defeat of the object of the conspiracy. United States v. Bloch, 696 F.2d 1213, 1215 (9th Cir.1982). Here, the object of the conspiracy was not defeated until the final seizure of cocaine and the arrest of the coconspirators. That occurred after the effective date of the amended Guidelines. Therefore, the amended Guidelines apply to this offense. 27 Furthermore, every circuit which has addressed this issue has reached the same result. United States v. Chambers, 944 F.2d 1253, 1269-70 (6th Cir.1991), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1217, 117 L.Ed.2d 455 (1992); United States v. Moscony, 927 F.2d 742, 754-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2812, 115 L.Ed.2d 984 (1991); United States v. Wayne, 903 F.2d 1188, 1196-97 (8th Cir.1990); United States v. Terzado-Madruga, 897 F.2d 1099, 1124-25 (11th Cir.1990); United States v. Williams, 897 F.2d 1034, 1039-40 (10th Cir.1990), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2064, 114 L.Ed.2d 469 (1991); United States v. Sheffer, 896 F.2d 842, 844-45 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 432, 112 L.Ed.2d 416 (1990); United States v. Story, 891 F.2d 988, 995 (2d Cir.1989); United States v. White, 869 F.2d 822, 826 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1112, 109 S.Ct. 3172, 104 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1989). Therefore, we find that there was no Ex Post Facto violation with respect to the conspiracy count. 28 However, the amended Guidelines were also applied to the possession offenses as well, Counts IV, VI and VII. Their application to the possession offenses, which occurred prior to the effective date of the amended Guidelines, was error. We reject the government's contention that these offenses were continuing offenses. We likewise reject the government's claim that because the conspiracy lasted beyond the effective date of the amended Guidelines that all other crimes committed as part of the conspiracy should be deemed to have lasted beyond that date. These arguments are illogical. Thus, we remand the action to the district court to resentence Castro under the 1988 Guidelines on Counts IV, VI and VII. 29 IV. The District Court's Finding that Castro was a Leader in the Conspiracy was not Clearly Erroneous 30 Castro contends that there was no evidence to indicate that he had a leadership role in the conspiracy. As above, Castro essentially complains that there was no direct evidence that he was the leader of the conspiracy. A district court's finding that a defendant was a leader in the offense is reviewed for clear error. United States v. Carvajal, 905 F.2d 1292, 1295 (9th Cir.1990). 31 Sentencing Guideline § 3B1.1(a) provides for a four offense level increase if the defendant was an organizer or leader of the criminal activity. The commentary to this section indicates that the court should consider such factors as the exercise of decision-making authority, the nature of the participation in the offense, recruitment of accomplices, right to a larger share of the profits, degree of participation in planning, the nature and scope of the activity and the degree of control and authority exercised over others in determining whether the defendant was a leader. Sentencing Guidelines § 3B1.1, commentary. Analyzing these factors, it is clear that Castro was a leader of the conspiracy. 32 The circumstantial evidence suggests that Castro exercised the decision-making authority in the conspiracy. The loading of the cocaine seemed to occur at his direction. He was the only member of the conspiracy present at all the loadings of the cocaine into the tractor-trailers. Castro delivered the cocaine in four of the five seizures. Given the amount of cocaine involved, the fact that Castro appeared to control possession of it, the degree of planning which had to go into the offense and the fact that events seemed to occur at Castro's bidding, the district court could properly conclude that he was the leader of the conspiracy. The district court did not err in finding that Castro was the leader of the conspiracy. 33 Therefore, the judgment of the district court is hereby, AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part, and REMANDED for resentencing under the pre-November 1, 1989 Sentencing Guidelines on Counts IV, VI and VII.