Opinion ID: 184099
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Louisiana's Offense of Unauthorized Entry of an Inhabited Dwelling Is a Crime of Violence under the Guidelines

Text: The Guidelines assign a base offense level of 24 to a defendant who has previously been convicted of at least two felony offenses that are crimes of violence. [4] Guidelines § 4B1.2(a) defines a crime of violence as an offense punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that either: (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another, or (2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. [5] Louisiana defines the crime of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling as the intentional entry by a person without authorization into any inhabited dwelling or other structure belonging to another and used in whole or in part as a home or place of abode by a person. [6] It is undisputed that, even though the offense of unauthorized entry of an inhabited dwelling is punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, it does not qualify as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1) because it does not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another. The government nevertheless asserts that unauthorized entry does present a serious potential risk of physical injury to another per § 4B1.2(a)(2) and cites our holding in United States v. Claiborne for support. In Claiborne, we held that Louisiana's offense of unauthorized entry qualified as a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(2). [7] We likened the offense to burglary despite the fact that unauthorized entry does not require the intent to commit a felony or any theft therein [8] as is required for the Louisiana offense of simple burglary. [9] Nevertheless, we concluded that a home invader's nonfelonious mindset [does not] eliminate[] the risk of physical injury to his victims, based on the reasoning that [a] homeowner's surprise confrontation with an intruder is laced with the potential for violence, regardless of whether the intruder is a burglar or merely an unauthorized entrant. [10] O'Connor challenges our Claiborne holding, however, asserting that our conclusion is undermined by the Supreme Court's subsequent analysis in Begay v. United States , as relied on by the district court. In Begay, the Supreme Court did not address the crime of unauthorized entry but did provide guidance for interpreting the Guidelines' provision defining crimes of violence. The Court explained that the Guidelines' inclusion of offenses that present a serious potential risk of physical injury in § 4B1.2(a)(2) is not all-encompassing because if Congress meant [§ 4B1.2(a)(2)] to include all risky crimes, why would it have included [§ 4B1.2(a)(1)]? [11] The Court specifically instructed that we should read the examples [of burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives] as limiting the crimes that [§ 4B1.2(a)(2)] covers to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves. [12] Applying this understanding of the relevant Guidelines provision, the Court concluded that the defendant's crime of driving under the influence of alcohol was not a violent crime: [C]rimes involving intentional or purposeful conduct (as in burglary and arson) are different than DUI, a strict liability crime. In both instances, the offender's prior crimes reveal a degree of callousness toward risk, but in the former instance they also show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger. [13] This assessment of the Guidelines, if anything, only bolsters our conclusion in Claiborne. The Louisiana crime of unauthorized entry is expressly defined as the  intentional entry by a person without authorization. [14] Even though a defendant convicted of unauthorized entry need not possess an intent to commit a felony once he enters the residence, he still must act intentionally and purposefully to enter it, and his actions still are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to burglary. O'Connor also relies on Chambers v. United States, [15] in which the Supreme Court addressed whether the crime of failure to report to a penal institution constituted a crime of violence under the Guidelines. The Court held that it did not because [c]onceptually speaking, the crime [of failure to report] amounts to a form of inaction.... While an offender who fails to report must of course be doing something at the relevant time, there is no reason to believe that the something poses a serious potential risk of physical injury. [16] Here, the crime of unauthorized entry is undoubtedly an active crime, so the Chambers holding does not undermine our conclusion. The Chambers Court reiterated that [t]he question is whether such an offender is significantly more likely than others to attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a `serious potential risk of physical injury.' [17] Again, because unauthorized entry requires the intentional act of entering the home of anotherwhere [a] homeowner's surprise confrontation with an intruder is laced with the potential for violence [18]  unauthorized entry comes within this category of violent crimes. Finally, O'Connor points to our decision in United States v. Armendariz-Moreno, [19] in which we held that the Texas crime of unauthorized use of a vehicle was not a violent crime under the Guidelines. Specifically, we explained: [The Supreme Court opinions in Begay and Chambers ] hold that the generic crime of violence or aggravated felony must itself involve purposeful, violent and aggressive conduct. The risk of physical force may exist where the defendant commits the offense of unauthorized use of a vehicle, but the crime itself has no essential element of violent and aggressive conduct. [20] Even though unauthorized use of a vehicle must be intentional, [21] like the crime of unauthorized entry, it does not by its nature involve the same threat of violence. Simply put, entering an inhabited dwelling that is used at least in part as a home by another person presents a much more serious risk of a violent conflict than does the use of another person's vehicle without permission. In that way, unauthorized entry is akin to burglarya listed § 4B1.2(a)(2) crimewhereas unauthorized use of a vehicle is not. Consequently, both Claiborne and Armendariz-Moreno are consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis in Begay and Chambers. We hold that Claiborne remains good law and that the district court erred in its application of the Guidelines by not treating O'Connor's Louisiana conviction of unauthorized entry as a crime of violence.