Opinion ID: 2523874
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Jury Trial

Text: ¶ 179 As discussed, the majority maintains that, in juvenile court proceedings, trial judges have no obligation to ensure that the minors who appeared before them are not unnecessarily shackled. This decision disadvantages juveniles, placing them in a worse position than an adult defendant. After so holding, the majority does an about face, denying juveniles the right to a jury trial by finding that juvenile proceedings are still very different from criminal prosecutionsprotective in nature and designed to reach the goals of correcting and rehabilitating juvenile offenders. ¶ 180 While keeping juveniles in chains is hardly protective or promotes rehabilitation, my concerns go much deeper. I am persuaded by Jonathon's argument that the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998, along with a number of other amendments to the Juvenile Court Act since 1999, have transformed the Act to such an extent that, for juveniles charged with criminal offenses, juvenile proceedings are now the equivalent of a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, I agree with Jonathon that juveniles charged with criminal offenses should have the right to a jury trial pursuant to the guarantees of the Illinois Constitution. ¶ 181 Article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution provides in pertinent part: In criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right    to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the offense is alleged to have been committed. ¶ 182 At the same time, section 5-101(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 provides, Minors shall not have the right to a jury trial unless specifically provided by this Article. 705 ILCS 405/5-101(3) (West 2006). The Act then specifically provides the right to a jury trial to juveniles in only three instances: when a juvenile is tried under the extended juvenile jurisdiction provision (705 ILCS 405/5-810 (West 2006)), when a juvenile is tried as a habitual juvenile offender (705 ILCS 405/5-815 (West 2006)), and when a juvenile is tried as a violent juvenile offender (705 ILCS 405/5-820 (West 2006)). For all others, even those who, like Jonathon, are charged with serious felony offenses and may be committed to the Department of Corrections until they reach the age of 21, a jury trial is unavailable. ¶ 183 Jonathon argues that by denying juveniles who are charged with committing a criminal offense the right to a jury trial, section 5-101(3) of the Act violates article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution. According to Jonathon, with the enactment of the Juvenile Justice Reform Provisions of 1998, [4] which became effective January 1, 1999, the juvenile justice system can no longer be viewed as the informal, confidential, nonadversarial system it was originally intended to be. He points out that the amendments explicitly changed the policy and purpose of the juvenile justice system, making the protection of citizens from juvenile crime and holding juvenile offenders accountable for their actions the primary goals of the Act. See 705 ILCS 405/5-101 (West 1999). In so doing, the amendments shifted the focus of the Act away from rehabilitation and toward punishment. See also People v. Taylor, 221 Ill.2d 157, 165, 302 Ill.Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134 (2006) (amendatory changes which became effective in 1999, radically altered the Juvenile Court Act and largely rewrote article V of the Act to provide more accountability for the criminal acts of juveniles and, from all appearances, to make the juvenile delinquency adjudicatory process look more criminal in nature). ¶ 184 Even the terminology used regarding delinquency proceedings was changed by the reforms and now more closely tracks the terminology used in criminal proceedings. For example, juvenile proceedings are no longer adjudication hearings, but trials (705 ILCS 405/5-105(17) (West 2006)), which no longer result in adjudications of delinquency, but rather, findings of guilt (705 ILCS 405/5-620 (West 2006)) which lead to a sentencing hearing wherein a minor may face the possibility of commitment in the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, for a number of years (705 ILCS 405/5-105(13), 5-620, 5-705, 5-710 (West 2006)). See also People v. Taylor, 221 Ill.2d at 166-67, 302 Ill.Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134. ¶ 185 In addition, pursuant to section 5-4-3(a)(3.5) of the Unified Code of Corrections (730 ILCS 5/5-4-3(a)(3.5) (West 2006)), every minor adjudicated guilty for the commission of any felony offenselike an adult felonmust provide a DNA sample to the Illinois Department of State Police so that genetic marker grouping analysis information may be included in state and national DNA databases. Also, the legislature amended the confidentiality rules pertaining to juveniles adjudicated guilty of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, aggravated criminal sexual assault, or criminal sexual assault, permitting access to their personal information by the general public. See 705 ILCS 405/5-901(5)(a) (West 2006). For juveniles adjudicated guilty of a criminal sexual offense, there are additional, serious collateral consequences: juveniles, like adults, are mandated to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act (SORA) (730 ILCS 150/1 et seq. (West 2006)), sometimes for life. With registration comes the potential that restrictions will be placed on the minor's movement (730 ILCS 150/7 (West 2006)), schooling (730 ILCS 152/121 (West 2006)), and housing (730 ILCS 150/8 (West 2006)), as well as other societal repercussions which could continue throughout the minor's lifetime. ¶ 186 Based on the above, Jonathon concludes that, for all juveniles charged with serious criminal offenses, amendatory changes to the Act have transformed the juvenile court system into an adversarial criminal justice system. Juveniles, like adult criminal defendants, are charged, tried, and found guilty, and can be sentenced to the Department of Corrections for significant periods of time. Accordingly, Jonathon asks that we dispense with the legal fiction that, for a juvenile charged with a criminal offense, a delinquency trial can still be characterized simply as civil in nature. See People ex rel. Daley v. Fitzgerald, 123 Ill.2d 175, 181, 121 Ill.Dec. 937, 526 N.E.2d 131 (1988); In re S.R.H., 96 Ill.2d 138, 144, 70 Ill.Dec. 255, 449 N.E.2d 129 (1983). He asks that we recognize juvenile proceedings for what they arecriminal prosecutions resulting in criminal convictions. ¶ 187 The majority rejects Jonathon's argument. Relying on case law, much of which was decided prior to the Act's amendment, the majority finds that juvenile proceedings are not criminal prosecutions. The majority also holds that, notwithstanding the recent amendments to the Act, rehabilitation remains an important purpose of the Act and that juvenile proceedings should not be deemed the equivalent of criminal proceedings simply because certain delinquent juveniles face some of the same collateral consequences as convicted criminals. In my opinion, however, the majority is missing the point. ¶ 188 The notion that juveniles should have a constitutional right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings is not new. It has been considered on numerous occasions and in a number of jurisdictions, with varying results. In In re J.W., 106 N.J.Super. 129, 254 A.2d 334 (1969), the court noted: The question of the constitutionality of juvenile proceedings without jury trials is hardly one which is free from doubt.    Juveniles are afforded a jury trial by acts of the legislatures in nearly half the states. In England all children over the age of 14 charged in the juvenile courts with what would be indictable offenses are accorded the right of trial by jury. See 46 Cornell L.Q. 387 (1961); Colo. Rev.Stat. Ann. § 22-8-2 (1953); Tex. Rev.Civ. Stat., art. 2334 (Supp.1950); Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 102 (1941). ¶ 189 In Illinois, the issue was considered by this court for the first time in In re Fucini, 44 Ill.2d 305, 255 N.E.2d 380 (1970). In Fucini, the minor claimed that the Juvenile Court Act violated the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution of the United States and article II, section 5, of the Illinois Constitution of 1870, because it made no provision for trial by jury in delinquency proceedings. The minor argued that the sixth amendment right to a trial by jury made applicable to the States through the fourteenth amendment due-process clause ( Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491; Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 88 S.Ct. 1477, 20 L.Ed.2d 522), should be extended to apply to juvenile court delinquency proceedings in light of the United States Supreme Court decision in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. See In re Fucini, 44 Ill.2d at 307, 255 N.E.2d 380. Gault had extended to juvenile proceedings many of the same procedural protections afforded adult defendants in criminal prosecutions, but did not specifically address the right to trial by jury. Accordingly, we surveyed decisions from other jurisdictions (see id. at 307-08, 255 N.E.2d 380 (and cases cited therein)), and found a split among the jurisdictions which had considered the matter. ¶ 190 Ultimately, this court concluded in Fucini that neither the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, nor the Illinois Constitution, required the right to a jury trial be extended to juvenile proceedings. The Fucini court reasoned: [U]pon careful analysis of Gault, we find that the Supreme Court recognized fundamental differences between adult and juvenile proceedings and decided, wisely we believe, that to hold the full panoply of adult rights applicable to juvenile proceedings would strip those same proceedings of the unique benefits which they were designed to obtain. (Emphasis added.) Id. at 309, 255 N.E.2d 380. ¶ 191 Shortly after Fucini was decided, the United States Supreme Court rendered its decision in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 29 L.Ed.2d 647 (1971) (plurality op.). In McKeiver, the Court reviewed decisions of the supreme courts of Pennsylvania and North Carolina which upheld the adjudications of minors who had been tried without a jury trial. The minors argued before the Court that juvenile proceedings were substantially similar to criminal trials and thus the sixth amendment, imposed on the states by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, gave them the right to a trial by jury. ¶ 192 In a plurality decision, the Court initially recognized that a juvenile's right to a jury trial, as guaranteed by the sixth and fourteenth amendments, depended on whether juvenile proceedings could be deemed the equivalent of a criminal prosecution. The Court stated: The right to an impartial jury `[i]n all criminal prosecutions' under federal law is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Through the Fourteenth Amendment that requirement has now been imposed upon the States `in all criminal cases whichwere they to be tried in a federal courtwould come within the Sixth Amendment's guarantee.'    This, of course, does not automatically provide the answer to the present jury trial issue, if for no other reason than that the juvenile court proceeding has not yet been held to be a `criminal prosecution,' within the meaning and reach of the Sixth Amendment, and also has not yet been regarded as devoid of criminal aspects merely because it usually has been given the civil label.  (Emphasis added). Id. at 540-41, 91 S.Ct. 1976. ¶ 193 Although the McKeiver plurality acknowledged that the fond and idealistic hopes of the juvenile court proponents and early reformers of three generations ago have not been realized, [5] it, nonetheless, upheld the rulings of the Pennsylvania and North Carolina courts. Id. at 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976. Employing the fundamental fairness standard to determine what process was due juveniles in juvenile court proceedings, the plurality concluded that trial by jury in the juvenile court's adjudicative stage is not a constitutional requirement. Id. One of the main reasons for so holding was the possibility    that the jury trial, if required as a matter of constitutional precept,    will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding. Id. ¶ 194 At the core of the plurality decision was the concern that the injection of the jury trial into the juvenile court system would bring with it into that system the traditional delay, the formality, and the clamor of the adversary system, remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process, put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding, and threaten, if not destroy, every aspect of fairness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that the juvenile court system contemplates. See id. at 545, 550, 91 S.Ct. 1976. ¶ 195 In contrast, Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Marshall, wrote in dissent, where a State uses its juvenile court proceedings to prosecute a juvenile for a criminal act and to order `confinement' until the child reaches 21 years of age or where the child at the threshold of the proceedings faces that prospect, then he is entitled to the same procedural protection as an adult. Id. at 559, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (Douglass, J., dissenting, joined by Black and Marshall, JJ.). ¶ 196 For the most part, states have relied on McKeiver to deny minors tried in juvenile proceedings the right to a jury trial. See B. Finberg, Right to Jury Trial in Juvenile Court Delinquency Proceedings, 100 A.L.R.2d 1241, 1242-43 (1965). [6] That is not to say, however, that in the nearly four decades following the McKeiver plurality decision, its contemporary validity has not come under fire. Courts and legal commentators, alike, have questioned whether McKeiver's factual predicatethat the sanctions that juvenile courts impose are not `punishment'has been superseded by the new reality of juvenile justice, i.e., that changes in States' juvenile codes have fostered a substantive, punitive convergence with criminal courts. See Barry C. Feld, The Constitutional Tension Between Apprendi and McKeiver: Sentence Enhancements Based on Delinquency Convictions and the Quality of Justice in Juvenile Courts, 38 Wake Forest L.Rev. 1111, 1154 (2003). ¶ 197 One commentator has noted: The strongest and most fundamental challenges [to McKeiver ] contend that changes in juvenile justice administration require a re-examination of McKeiver's factual premise that juvenile courts only treat, rather than punish, delinquents.    [V]irtually every state has revised and greatly `toughened' its juvenile codes in the decades since that decision. Whether or not the Court properly decided McKeiver in 1971, legislative amendments to states' juvenile codes have fostered a punitive convergence with criminal courts and completely eroded the rationale for less effective procedural safeguards in delinquency trials. In short, the unproved factual premise on which the Court based McKeiver simply does not exist today. Id. at 1156-57. ¶ 198 As the article above suggests, changes in state juvenile codes have prompted a new wave of constitutional challenges to state statutes that deny juveniles the right to a jury trial. See, e.g., In re Hezzie R., 219 Wis.2d 848, 580 N.W.2d 660 (1998); In re J.F., 714 A.2d 467 (Pa.Super.Ct.1998). In 2008, the Kansas Supreme Court, confronted with such a challenge, broke new ground with its decision in In re L.M., 286 Kan. 460, 186 P.3d 164 (2008). ¶ 199 In L.M., a 16-year-old minor was charged with aggravated sexual battery and possession of alcohol. He was found guilty of both charges in a bench trial and sentenced to 18 months' incarceration (the sentence was later stayed and he was then placed on probation until his twentieth birthday). L.M. was also required to complete sex offender treatment and to register as a sex offender. On appeal, L.M. challenged the constitutionality of the Kansas statute which denied him the right to a jury trial. ¶ 200 On review, the Kansas Supreme Court first acknowledged that, in Findlay v. State, 235 Kan. 462, 681 P.2d 20 (1984), it had previously held that juveniles did not have a constitutional right to a jury trial under either the federal or state constitutions. However, the court noted that Findlay reached that conclusion because the sixth amendment right applies only to criminal prosecutions and, under the Kansas juvenile code as it existed when Findlay was decided, a juvenile adjudication was not the equivalent of a criminal prosecution. The L.M. court noted that similar reasoning had been employed by the McKeiver plurality, which Findlay had adopted. ¶ 201 The L.M. court then went on to note that, subsequent to Findlay, the Kansas Juvenile Justice Code had been revised and that changes in the Code as a result of these revisions had eroded the benevolent parens patriae character that had previously distinguished the Kansas juvenile justice system from the adult criminal justice system. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 170. Specifically, the court held that, in 1982, the Juvenile Code had focused on rehabilitation and the State's parental role in providing guidance, control, and discipline ( id. at 168) but that the revised Juvenile Code now provided: The primary goals of the juvenile justice code are to promote public safety, hold juvenile offenders accountable for their behavior and improve their ability to live more productively and responsibly in the community. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 38-2301 (West 2006). According to the Kansas Supreme Court, this shift in purpose brought Kansas' revised code more in alignment with the adult criminal justice system. In re L.M., 186 P.3d at 168. The L.M. court also noted that Kansas' revised code had incorporated language similar to that used in the criminal context and had established a sentencing matrix for juveniles which emulated the Kansas Sentencing Guidelines for criminal convictions. See id. at 168-69. Finally, the court noted that some of the protections that previously had been afforded juveniles, such as confidentiality of records, had been removed. Accordingly, the court held: The United States Supreme Court relied on the juvenile justice system's characteristics of fairness, concern, sympathy, and paternal attention in concluding that juveniles were not entitled to a jury trial. McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550, 91 S.Ct. 1976. Likewise, this court relied on that parens patriae character in reaching its decision in Findlay. However, because the juvenile justice system is now patterned after the adult criminal system, we conclude that the changes have superseded the McKeiver and Findlay Courts' reasoning and those decisions are no longer binding precedent for us to follow. Based on our conclusion that the Kansas juvenile justice system has become more akin to an adult criminal prosecution, we hold that juveniles have a constitutional right to a jury trial under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 170. ¶ 202 The L.M. court also considered whether juveniles had a right to a jury trial under their state constitution. Looking to section 10 of the Kansas Constitution Bill of Rights, the court noted that it guaranteed a speedy public trial by an impartial jury to an accused [i]n any prosecutions. (Emphasis omitted.) Id. at 171 (quoting Kan. Const. Bill of Rights § 10). Because the revised juvenile code referred to its proceedings as prosecutions, the court concluded that section 10, by its plain language, applied to juvenile proceedings when the juvenile is charged with violating the criminal laws of the state. Id. at 172. As a result, the court declared that, as a new rule of procedure in Kansas, juveniles have the right to a jury trial under the sixth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, as well as section 10 of the Kansas Constitution's Bill of Rights. Id. ¶ 203 In 2009, the Louisiana Supreme Court was confronted by a similar claim in In re A.J., 2009-0477 (La.12/1/09), 27 So.3d 247. In A.J. a 14-year-old minor was charged with six counts of aggravated rape. He moved for a jury trial, arguing that McKeiver left open the possibility that the Court would extend the right [to a jury trial for juveniles] in the future if the line between delinquency proceedings and adult criminal prosecutions became sufficiently blurred. Id. at 2. A.J. then contended that, in his case, the proceedings would be sufficiently like an adult criminal proceeding and, for that reason, he should be entitled to a jury trial. A.J. also argued that, if he was found guilty, he would be subject to confinement until he reached the age of 21. He contended that proceedings which might result in confinement for more than six months are fundamentally unfair in the absence of a jury. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968) (more than six months' incarceration is the threshold upon which the right to a jury trial attaches). After hearing the arguments of counsel, the juvenile court judge ruled in A.J.'s favor and granted his motion for a jury trial, declaring that the Louisiana statute which denied juveniles a trial by jury violated both the federal and state constitutions. ¶ 204 The State appealed that judgment to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, which reversed. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that McKeiver, as well as the Louisiana case, State ex rel. D.J., 2001-2149 (La.5/14/02), 817 So.2d 26, which had relied on McKeiver, were still controlling law. In reversing, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted that the juvenile court's rationale for granting A.J.'s request for a jury trial was its concern that juvenile justice has become increasingly like criminal justice. In re A.J ., 2009-0477 at 15, 27 So.3d at 259. The court also recognized that, based on similar concerns, the Kansas Supreme Court, in In re L.M., had held that juveniles in that state had the right to a jury trial under both the federal and Kansas constitutions. However, the Louisiana Supreme Court distinguished In re L.M., stating, Louisiana, in contrast, has gone through no comparable wholesale revision [of its juvenile code]. Id. at 263. Furthermore, the court pointed out that in In re C.B., 97-2783 (La.3/4/98), 708 So.2d 391, it had held unconstitutional a statute which would have allowed transfer of adjudicated delinquents to adult correctional facilities. Its rationale for doing so was that the statute would have tilted the scales so that juvenile proceedings would no longer be civil proceedings with a focus on rehabilitation, but rather purely criminal proceedings. Also, in State v. Brown, 2003-2788 (La.7/6/04), 879 So.2d 1276, the Louisiana Supreme Court had held a juvenile adjudication was not a conviction for any crime and, therefore, could not be counted as a prior conviction for purposes of habitual offender sentencing. To do so, said the court, would subvert the civil trappings of the juvenile adjudication. ¶ 205 The A.J. court then held that, based on its rulings in In re C.B. and Brown, the boundary between juvenile delinquency proceedings and adult criminal prosecutions was returned to its status quo ante. In re A.J ., 2009-0477 at 16, 27 So.3d at 247. And since A.J. could not point to any laws which postdated its rulings in In re C.B. and Brown which made juvenile justice more criminal in nature, the A.J. court concluded that it had closely monitored the `blurred boundary' at issue and had found that boundary to be properly restored. Id. at 17. Therefore, it held the juvenile court had erred in finding the Louisiana statute unconstitutional. ¶ 206 It is clear that the situation in Illinois is much more akin to Kansas than it is to Louisiana. In Illinois, our Juvenile Court Act of 1987 was radically altered, making it much more criminal in nature. See People v. Taylor, 221 Ill.2d at 165, 302 Ill.Dec. 697, 850 N.E.2d 134. Where once the only policy and purpose of the Act was to provide each minor the care and guidance necessary to serve the minor's moral, emotional, mental, and physical welfare (705 ILCS 405/1-2 (West 1996)), our Juvenile Court Act now explicitly provides that two of the primary purposes of the juvenile justice system are the protection of the community and holding juvenile offenders accountable for their acts. See 705 ILCS 405/5-101(1)(a), (1)(b) (West 2006). Thus, in Illinois as in Kansas, the singular goal of rehabilitating minors has been replaced with punishment. ¶ 207 Further, with the enactment of the 1998 revisions, the Act imported more adversarial language with regard to juvenile proceedings: guilty plea, finding of guilt, trial and sentencing are now the proper terminology replacing admission, finding of delinquency, adjudication hearing, and dispositional hearing. Also, the 1998 revisions to the Act gave the State's Attorney discretion to prosecute a delinquency petition (705 ILCS 405/5-330 (West 1998)), and also provided that any minor over the age of eight should be issued a summons [u]pon the commencement of a delinquency prosecution (705 ILCS 405/5-525 (West 1998)). ¶ 208 In People ex rel. Devine v. Stralka, 226 Ill.2d 445, 315 Ill.Dec. 664, 877 N.E.2d 416 (2007), this court referred to delinquency proceedings as prosecutions and certain provisions of the Act use the term prosecution in reference to delinquency proceedings. In addition, SORA (730 ILCS 150/2 (West 2004)) and the Child Murderer and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act (730 ILCS 154/5 (West 2006)), specifically provide that, for the purposes of these acts, a juvenile delinquency adjudication shall have the same meaning as a conviction. And after this court decided Taylor, the legislature negated our decision by amending the felony escape statute (720 ILCS 5/31-6 (West 2008)) to provide that an adjudication for a felony offense is to be treated as a felony conviction. ¶ 209 In In re G.O., 191 Ill.2d 37, 245 Ill.Dec. 269, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (2000), which was decided shortly after the Act was revised, Justice Heiple wrote in dissent that the minor, G.O., should have had the right to a jury trial under article I, section 8, of the Illinois Constitution. In G.O., a 13-year-old minor was charged with first degree murder, aggravated battery and aggravated battery with a firearm on an accountability theory. The trial court adjudicated him delinquent and, pursuant to section 5-33.1 of the Act, ordered him committed to the Department of Corrections, Juvenile Division, until his 21st birthday, without the possibility of parole, furlough, or non-emergency authorized absence for a period of 5 years. See 705 ILCS 405/5-33(1.5) (West 1996). In re G.O., 191 Ill.2d at 40-41, 245 Ill.Dec. 269, 727 N.E.2d 1003. On appeal, the appellate court had ruled that denying G.O. a jury trial violated the equal protection clauses of our federal and state constitutions because G.O. was subject to the same mandatory determinate sentence required whenever a minor is adjudicated a habitual or violent juvenile offender, yet minors who are tried as habitual juvenile offenders or violent juvenile offenders are entitled to a jury trial. [7] In re G.O., 304 Ill.App.3d 719, 728, 237 Ill.Dec. 717, 710 N.E.2d 140 (1999). ¶ 210 A majority of this court reversed the appellate court, finding no equal protection violation because section 5-33(1.5) was enacted as part of Public Act 88-680, which had been declared unconstitutional in violation of the single subject clause of our Illinois Constitution. Thus, section 5-33(1.5) was void and not applicable to G.O. Justice Heiple dissented, reasoning: In past decisions, this court has emphasized that delinquency proceedings are not criminal in nature because the overriding concern of these proceedings is rehabilitation, not punishment. See, e.g., In re Beasley, 66 Ill.2d 385, 389, 6 Ill.Dec. 202, 362 N.E.2d 1024 (1977); In re W.C., 167 Ill.2d 307, 320 [212 Ill.Dec. 563, 657 N.E.2d 908] (1995). The prior analysis on this issue is flawed, however, because it relied on an outmoded characterization of the juvenile justice system. Much has changed in the last three decades since the United States Supreme Court refused to extend the right to a jury trial to juvenile delinquency proceedings on the grounds that the jury trial `will remake the juvenile proceeding into a fully adversary process and will put an effective end to what has been the idealistic prospect of an intimate, informal protective proceeding.' McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 91 S.Ct. 1976, 1986, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, 661 (1970). Rehabilitation no longer occupies its once preeminent status in the juvenile justice system; punishment and public safety are now the juvenile justice system's overriding concerns.       In Beasley, the court implied that recognizing a juvenile delinquency proceeding as a criminal prosecution would lead to the abandonment of the intimate, informal protective proceeding of the juvenile justice system altogether. In re Beasley, 66 Ill.2d at 390 [6 Ill.Dec. 202, 362 N.E.2d 1024]. This fear was unwarranted when Beasley was decided in 1977, and it is even more so now. The incorporation of virtually every aspect of criminal procedure (except the jury trial) into juvenile proceedings has not undermined the justification for separate adult and juvenile justice systems. Moreover, the right to a jury trial has already been incorporated into the juvenile justice system for certain specific offenses. See 705 ILCS 405/5-815(d), 5-820(d) (West 1998) (providing right to jury trial for habitual and violent juvenile offenders). The failure to provide the right to a jury trial in delinquency proceedings should not be treated as a method of shielding the juvenile defendant from the adult criminal justice system. Rather, it should be recognized that most attributes of the adult criminal justice system are already permanent features of the juvenile justice system. A juvenile, no less than an adult, is entitled to the protection of a jury trial when faced with incarceration in the Illinois Department of Corrections. The failure to provide a jury trial should be seen for what it truly is: an anachronism and a denial of equal justice for all. In re G.O., 191 Ill.2d at 60-61, 63-64, 245 Ill.Dec. 269, 727 N.E.2d 1003 (Heiple, J., dissenting).