Opinion ID: 2444991
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: sister state decisions

Text: A significant majority of the states that have considered the issue apply the Schneckloth totality of the circumstances test in assessing whether consent was voluntary for purposes of their state constitutions, and do not require an express advisement of the right to withhold consent. E.g., Henry v. State, 621 P.2d 1, 4 and n. 9 (Alaska 1980); State v. Knaubert, 27 Ariz. App. 53, 56-57, 550 P.2d 1095 (1976), overruled on other grounds by State v. Grilz, 136 Ariz. 450, 666 P.2d 1059 (1983); People v. Hayhurst, 194 Colo. 292, 295-96, 571 P.2d 721 (1977); State v. Thompson, 284 Kan. 763, 779-81, 166 P.3d 1015 (2007); Scott v. State, 366 Md. 121, 145, 782 A.2d 862 (2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 940, 122 S.Ct. 1324, 152 L.Ed.2d 231 (2002); Reese v. State, 95 Nev. 419, 421, 596 P.2d 212 (1979); State v. Osborne, 119 N.H. 427, 433, 402 A.2d 493 (1979); State v. Robinette, 80 Ohio St.3d 234, 245, 685 N.E.2d 762 (1997); State v. Flores, 280 Or. 273, 279-82, 570 P.2d 965 (1977); Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 558 Pa. 517, 527, 738 A.2d 427 (1999); State v. Cox, 171 S.W.3d 174, 181-84 (Tenn.2005); State v. Contrel, 886 P.2d 107, 111-12 (Utah App.1994), cert. denied, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995); State v. Zaccaro, 154 Vt. 83, 88-91, 574 A.2d 1256 (1990); State v. McCrorey, 70 Wash.App. 103, 110-11, 851 P.2d 1234, review denied, 122 Wash.2d 1013, 863 P.2d 73 (1993); State v. Rodgers, 119 Wis.2d 102, 114-15, 349 N.W.2d 453 (1984). For many of the reasons set forth in part I of this opinion, however, I believe that the cases that have rejected Schneckloth are better reasoned and, therefore, more persuasive with respect to the determination of whether consent voluntarily was granted in the inherently coercive context of a routine traffic stop. For example, in State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 353-54, 346 A.2d 66 (1975), the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected Schneckloth in construing the New Jersey constitution [11] and imposed a knowledge requirement for consent searches. [12] The court in Johnson observed that [m]any persons, perhaps most, would view the request of a police officer to make a search as having the force of law. Unless it is shown by the [s]tate that the person involved knew that he had the right to refuse to accede to such a request, his assenting to the search is not meaningful. One cannot be held to have waived a right if he was unaware of its existence. Id., at 354, 346 A.2d 66. The court therefore concluded that when the [s]tate seeks to justify a search on the basis of consent it has the burden of showing that the consent was voluntary, an essential element of which is knowledge of the right to refuse consent. Id., at 353-54, 346 A.2d 66. Although the court declined to impose a strict warning requirement in noncustodial settings, under the New Jersey constitution, the state must demonstrate that the defendant knew that he or she had the right to refuse to give consent. [13] Id. Justice Morris Pashman dissented. Although he agreed with the majority in rejecting Schneckloth for purposes of the New Jersey constitution, he concluded that the standard that the majority adopted fell short of what [was] necessary to protect the privacy rights of the consenting individual. Id., at 359, 346 A.2d 66 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Recognizing that a person confronted with a request by the police for consent to search is likely to feel an element of compulsion due to the nature of the encounter, Justice Pashman concluded that the state should be obligated to establish that that person was aware of his right to withhold consent and that the police would respect his decision to withhold consent if he chose to do so. Id., at 366, 346 A.2d 66 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Justice Pashman explained: I find it inconceivable and incomprehensible to suppose that an individual can be said to have relinquished privileges as fundamental as those embodied in our constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures unless it clearly and unmistakably appears that the subject of the search knew that he did not have to submit to the official request. Schneckloth ... cannot withstand close scrutiny when it treats that knowledge as merely one factor to be considered in determining the validity of a consent search. Id., at 367-68, 346 A.2d 66 (Pashman, J., dissenting). Similarly, in Penick v. State, 440 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss.1983), the Mississippi Supreme Court concluded, contrary to the holding of Schneckloth, that a knowing waiver is necessary before consent may be deemed valid under the Mississippi constitution. Subsequently, the Mississippi Supreme Court clarified that the state is not required to prove that the defendant had knowledge of his or her right to refuse consent; instead, the defendant must show impaired consent or some diminished capacity. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Graves v. State, 708 So.2d 858, 863 (Miss.1997). Thus, [i]f the defendant claims that his waiver was not knowledgeable, the burden is on him to raise the issue of lack of knowledgeable waiver. Knowledgeable waiver is defined as consent [when] the defendant knows that he or she has a right to refuse, being cognizant of his or her rights in the premises. Id., at 864. Although this standard is not crystal clear, most courts have interpreted it as requiring a knowledgeable waiver for all consent searches. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cleckley, supra, 558 Pa. at 526, 738 A.2d 427. In a context analogous to the temporary detention of the subject of a routine traffic stop, that is, a consensual investigative encounter, [14] the Hawaii Supreme Court has concluded that, under the Hawaii constitution, an investigating officer must inform the subject of a suspicionless encounter of his or her right to terminate the encounter. [15] See State v. Kearns, 75 Haw. 558, 570-72, 867 P.2d 903 (1994). In particular, the court concluded that an investigative encounter can ... be deemed `consensual' [only] if (1) prior to the start of questioning, the person encountered was informed that he or she had the right to decline to participate in the encounter and could leave at any time, and (2) the person thereafter voluntarily participated in the encounter. [16] Id., at 571, 867 P.2d 903. In reaching its conclusion, the court observed that [i]t is appropriate to require police officers who wish to question individuals without even a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to ensure that the individuals are aware of their rights, because `no system of criminal justice can, or should, survive if it comes to depend for its continued effectiveness on the citizens' abdication through unawareness of their constitutional rights.' Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490 [84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977] (1964).... Moreover, `if the exercise of constitutional rights will thwart the effectiveness of a system of law enforcement, then there is something very wrong with that system.' Id. State v. Kearns, supra, 75 Haw. at 571, 867 P.2d 903. Indeed, in a subsequent case, State v. Trainor, 83 Hawai`i 250, 925 P.2d 818 (1996), the Hawaii Supreme Court explained that, [i]n the context of walk and talk investigations [17] ... [c]onsent ... can hardly be viewed as either voluntary or intelligent if it is obtained through such material nondisclosures as an officer's failure to advise the consenting individual ... that the individual is free to go at any time. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 260, 925 P.2d 818. Moreover, at least two state courts expressly have declined to apply Schneckloth in the context of a knock and talk search, which has been described as a fashionable... alternative to obtaining a search warrant when police officers do not have sufficient probable cause to obtain a search warrant. What generally occurs is that several law enforcement officers accost a home dweller on the doorstep of his or her home and request consent to search that home. If an oral consent is given, the search proceeds. What is found by police officers may then form the basis for probable cause to obtain a search warrant and result in the subsequent seizure of contraband. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brown, 356 Ark. 460, 466, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004). Thus, in State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103, 115, 118-19, 960 P.2d 927 (1998), and State v. Brown, supra, at 472-74, 903 A.2d 169, the Supreme Court of Washington and the Supreme Court of Arkansas, respectively, held that the use of the knock and talk investigative technique is unconstitutional when the police fail to inform the subject of his or her right to refuse consent. In Ferrier, the Supreme Court of Washington concluded that, under article I, § 7, of the Washington constitution, [18] as a prerequisite for a valid knock and talk search, the resident must be advised, prior to giving her consent to the search of her home, that she could refuse to consent. State v. Ferrier, supra, 136 Wash.2d at 115, 960 P.2d 927. The court observed: [A]ny knock and talk is inherently coercive to some degree.... [T]he great majority of home dwellers confronted by police officers on their doorstep or in their home would not question the absence of a search warrant because they either (1) would not know that a warrant is required; (2) would feel inhibited from requesting its production, even if they knew of the warrant requirement; or (3) would simply be too stunned by the circumstances to make a reasoned decision about whether or not to consent to a warrantless search. Id. To mitigate the coercive effects of the knock and talk, the court concluded that officers who conduct the procedure [must] warn home dwellers of their right to refuse consent to a warrantless search. This would provide greater protection for privacy rights that are protected by the state constitution and would also accord with the state's [f]ourth [a]mendment burden of demonstrating, by clear and convincing evidence, that consent to a search was voluntarily given. Id., at 116, 960 P.2d 927. The court further observed that the only sure way to give [the right to refuse consent] substance is to require a warning of its existence. If we were to reach any other conclusion, we would not be satisfied that a home dweller who consents to a warrantless search possessed the knowledge necessary to make an informed decision. That being the case, the [s]tate would be unable to meet its burden of proving that a knowing and voluntary waiver occurred. Id., at 116-17, 960 P.2d 927; see State v. Brown, supra, 356 Ark. at 470-72, 156 S.W.3d 722 (adopting Ferrier, among other cases, for purposes of article two, § 15, [19] of Arkansas constitution); [20] see also State v. Brown, supra, at 466, 903 A.2d 169 ([i]t is the intimidation effect of multiple police officers appearing on a home dweller's doorstep, sometimes in uniform and armed, and requesting consent to search without advising the home dweller of his or her right to refuse consent that presents the constitutional problem). Although it is axiomatic that the physical entry of the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the [f]ourth [a]mendment is directed; United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313, 92 S.Ct. 2125, 32 L.Ed.2d 752 (1972); the analysis of the coercive effect of the knock and talk investigative procedure involved in the foregoing cases also is applicable to a request by the police for consent to search following a routine traffic stop because of the inherently coercive nature of the latter type of encounter. Indeed, the Wyoming Supreme Court has observed that the atmosphere surrounding a traffic stop is more coercive than that attendant to the knock and talk encounter, stating that the standards [that have been] ... applied in [cases involving] premises searcheswhere the individual is on his or her own premises and likely feels freer to turn law enforcement away[are] even more applicable in the context of roadside vehicle searches where the traveler has been stopped for a traffic offense and is not free to leave. O'Boyle v. State, 117 P.3d 401, 412 (Wyo. 2005). As in O'Boyle, several courts have taken notice of the coercion inherent in the routine traffic stop in crafting rules applicable to that factual scenario. For example, in State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, 790 A.2d 903, modified, 174 N.J. 351, 806 A.2d 798 (2002), the court observed that, [i]n the context of motor vehicle stops, [in which] the individual is at the side of the road and confronted by a uniformed officer seeking to search his or her vehicle, it is not a stretch of the imagination to assume that the individual feels compelled to consent. Id., at 644, 790 A.2d 903. Indeed, after analyzing scholarly articles and empirical data, the court observed that (1) detained motorists give consent approximately 95 percent of the time it is sought even though, in New Jersey, following the decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 349, 346 A.2d 66, police in New Jersey are required to inform motorists of their right to withhold consent, and (2) the vast majority of motorists subjected to consent searches following routine traffic stops are not charged with any wrongdoing. State v. Carty, supra, at 645, 790 A.2d 903. As a result, the court in Carty concluded that, despite its holding in Johnson, consent searches following valid motor vehicle stops are either not voluntary because people feel compelled to consent for various reasons, or are not reasonable because of the detention associated with obtaining and executing the consent search. [21] Id., at 646, 790 A.2d 903. Although other courts have not expressly adopted the rule articulated in Carty, they nevertheless have identified the coercive effects of a request for consent to search following a routine traffic stop. For example, in Brown v. State, supra, 182 P.3d at 624, the Alaska Court of Appeals observed that motorists who have been stopped for traffic infractions do not act from a position of psychological independence when they decide how to respond to a police officer's request for a search. Because of the psychological pressures inherent in the stop, and often because of the motorist's ignorance of [his or her] rights, large numbers of motorists guilty and innocent alikeaccede to these requests. Id., at 626. The court in Brown further observed that, [i]n all but exceptional cases ... consent searches [following routine traffic stops] are held to be valid under the [f]ourth [a]mendment. The federal law in this area is premised on the assumption that, all things being equal, a motorist who does not wish to be subjected to a search will refuse consent when the officer seeks permission to conduct a search. But experience has shown that this assumption is wrong. Id., at 630. The court concluded: Motorists are giving consent in such large numbers that it is no longer reasonable to believe that they are making the kind of independent decision that lawyers and judges typically have in mind when they use the phrase `consent search'. Id., at 631; see also Commonwealth v. Strickler, 563 Pa. 47, 73, 757 A.2d 884 (2000) ([the] element of coercion [inherent in all interactions between a uniformed police officer and a citizen] is obviously enhanced when police actually detain a citizen, albeit lawfully, for some period of time, by means of a traffic or similar stop); Commonwealth v. Strickler, supra, at 74, 757 A.2d 884 (in determining whether encounter following conclusion of routine traffic stop is consensual, courts cannot discount the fact that there remains at work some pertinent psychological dynamic based [on] the relative positions of authority as between the officer and a citizen-subject, and an immediately-preceding exercise of the officer's authority). Finally, although many state courts have adopted the Schneckloth standard under their respective state constitutions, I am more persuaded by the thoughtful dissenting opinions that have been issued in many of those cases. For example, in Commonwealth v. Cleckley, supra, 558 Pa. at 517, 738 A.2d 427, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania concluded that article I, § 8, of the Pennsylvania constitution does not require the subject of a consent search to be informed of his or her right to refuse to consent. See id., at 527, 738 A.2d 427. The court, relying on (1) the fact that most states apply Schneckloth for purposes of their own constitutions, and (2) the lack of local policy issues indicating that a departure from the federal standard is needed; id., at 526-27, 738 A.2d 427; concluded that the federal voluntariness standard as enunciated in Schneckloth adequately protects the privacy rights obtained under [a]rticle I, [§] 8 of [the Pennsylvania] constitution. Id., at 527, 738 A.2d 427. In his dissent, Justice Russell M. Nigro concluded that when police seek consent to perform an otherwise unconstitutional search, they should be required under ... the Pennsylvania constitution to expressly advise the subject of the search that he or she has the right to refuse to give consent and that any refusal will be respected. Id., at 528, 738 A.2d 427 (Nigro, J., dissenting). In reaching this conclusion, Justice Nigro stated that the majority ... ignore[d] the practical impact that a police officer's request for consent to search has on the average citizen. Id., at 530, 738 A.2d 427 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Relying on both State v. Johnson, supra, 68 N.J. at 349, 346 A.2d 66, and Justice Marshall's dissent in Schneckloth, Justice Nigro concluded that, [i]f a person believes [that] he has no choice but to consent upon an officer's request, then that person's consent cannot be said to have been given voluntarily, much less knowingly and intelligently. The safeguard advocated by [the] [a]ppellanta simple statement by the police that the subject of the search has the lawful right to withhold consent to searchwould serve to protect not only those who are unaware of their rights, but also those who, although perhaps aware of their rights, become too intimidated to refuse what can readily be perceived as an official demand. Commonwealth v. Cleckley, supra, 558 Pa. at 530-31, 738 A.2d 427 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Lastly, Justice Nigro rejected the majority's assertion that the commonwealth of Pennsylvania would be prejudiced if it was required to inform suspects of their rights before seeking consent to search: There is ... little reason to believe, as the Schneckloth [c]ourt apparently did, that the requirement of informed consent would reduce the number of consent searches obtained by the police. It has not occurred with the [f]ifth [a]mendment waiver even in the wake of Miranda, and there is no reason to expect [that] it will occur in the face of the requirement to inform of the right to refuse a consent to search. Many cases hinge on confessions, despite the Miranda warning requirement. Although somewhat different considerations are often present in a confession situation, such as the prior arrest of the defendant, and thus more than mere suspicion exists at that point, there is little cause to believe that warnings of the right to refuse to consent to search will, in any great degree, cause a vast reduction in the number of consent searches. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 531, 738 A.2d 427 (Nigro, J., dissenting). Likewise, in State v. Flores, supra, 280 Or. at 273, 570 P.2d 965, the Supreme Court of Oregon concluded that the Oregon constitution provides no greater protection than the federal constitution for purposes of consent searches. [22] See id., at 282, 570 P.2d 965. That case, in which the court implicitly overruled a prior Oregon Supreme Court decision that predated Schneckloth and required the police to inform the subject of the encounter of his or her right to withhold consent; see id., at 276-77, 281, 570 P.2d 965; was predicated on (1) the reasoning of United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976); [23] see State v. Flores, supra, at 281, 570 P.2d 965; (2) the absence of any unique local conditions, such as widespread police misconduct infringing suspects' rights against unreasonable searches and seizures, that would require a different rule under the state constitution; id.; and (3) the perceived need for a uniform standard, particularly when state and law enforcement agencies collaborate.... [24] Id. In his dissent, Justice Hans A. Linde noted the then existing criticism of Schneckloth and explained that the reasoning of Schneckloth was rejected... by the experts who prepared the [M]odel Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure for the American Law Institute, and by the [American Law Institute] in approving that code. The [American Law] [I]nstitute adopted the position that before undertaking a search on the basis of consent, an officer must inform the individual whose consent is sought that he need not consent and that anything found may be used as evidence.... [I]n short, the [American Law] [I]nstitute would treat [the] waiver of the protection of a search warrant the same as [the] waiver of the right to remain silent. [25] Id., at 285-86, 570 P.2d 965 (Linde, J., dissenting). Justice Linde also observed that, as the drafters of the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure explained in its accompanying commentary, there is a greater need for warnings in the context of a consent search than in the context of a custodial interrogation because, by the consent search the officer is seeking to short-circuit another means available to himthe use of a warrantto obtain evidence. No such alternative exists with respect to information sought by interrogation. It seems far less justifiable to omit the protection of the warning when, by the very act of seeking consent, the officer is depriving the person from whom it is sought of the protective screening of judicial involvement in the issuance of the warrant. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., at 286, 570 P.2d 965 (Linde, J., dissenting). Declining to adopt fully the American Law Institute's position, Justice Linde was persuaded by the approach that the New Jersey Supreme Court had taken in Johnson and concluded that warnings are not constitutionally required as long as the state could show that consent was given with the knowledge that it could be withheld. Id., at 287-88, 570 P.2d 965 (Linde, J., dissenting). Dissenting justices of other state courts also have recognized the inherently coercive nature of the encounter between a police officer and motorist subject to a traffic stop. See, e.g., Salmeron v. State, 280 Ga. 735, 739, 632 S.E.2d 645 (2006) (Sears, C.J., dissenting) (disagreeing with decision of majority not to impose reasonable suspicion requirement for consent searches and noting that [t]raffic stops are inherently time-consuming and coercive events providing ample opportunity for interrogations and that [m]ost citizens naturally feel compelled to submit to any request from a police officer who has already seized them for some other legal violation); State v. Akuba, 686 N.W.2d 406, 426 (S.D.2004) (Sabers, J., dissenting) (An honest appraisal of the typical traffic stop must [lead] to the conclusion that it is an inherently coercive situation in which very few citizens understand their constitutional protections.... A citizen pulled over to the side of the road and brought to a trooper's car would not feel free to terminate the encounter and carry on with their business.... Therefore, the encounter is inherently coercive and an officer should be required to meet a threshold evidentiary standard before requesting such consent. [Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.]). Ultimately, I am not convinced by the reasoning of those courts that have adopted Schneckloth as the governing standard for purposes of their state constitutions. Indeed, those courts generally have not engaged in any substantive analysis of the rationale underlying the court's holding in Schneckloth. Moreover, they simply do not address the pervasive criticism that has been directed at Schneckloth. [26] As Justice Linde observed in his dissenting opinion in Flores, the extent of the protections of our constitution is not answered by the [decision] in Schneckloth .... It cannot be answered by the Supreme Court of the United States but only by [the Supreme Court of Oregon]. Obviously, if [this] case had arisen before Schneckloth .... this court would have had to form its own judgment. It does not escape that responsibility after Schneckloth.  (Citations omitted.) State v. Flores, supra, 280 Or. at 285, 570 P.2d 965 (Linde, J., dissenting). For this reason, I am persuaded by the dissenting opinions in those cases because I believe that they properly account for the coercion inherent in routine traffic stops that was overlooked by the majority in Schneckloth.