Opinion ID: 1354899
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: pardons.

Text: We begin with the proposition that, in a republic, the power to pardon is not an inherent power of the executive. The power is in the people who delegate it to the executive by way of constitutional provision and who may attach conditions to its exercise. Moore v. City of Newport, 198 Ky. 118, 248 S.W. 837, 838 (1923). See also Laird v. Sims, 16 Ariz. 521, 147 P. 738, 738 (1915); State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, 23 (1857); Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 228 P. 82, 87 (1924). Article II, section 2, clause 1, of the United States Constitution, dealing with the powers and duties of the President, closes with these words: [A]nd he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States, except in cases of impeachment. Thus, there are no stated conditions or restrictions on the president's pardoning power except that the power may not be used to prevent an impeachment. The genesis of this exception was the case of the Earl of Danby, Treasurer of England, who was impeached in 1678 for offering neutrality to France in exchange for substantial payment in direct contravention of Parliament's desire to raise funds for a war against France. During the course of the impeachment proceedings, Charles II pardoned Danby for the offense, thus precluding the impeachment (and the introduction of any evidence that the King may have been complicit in Danby's act). Nida & Spiro, supra note 14, at 203-04; Hugh C. Macgill, The Nixon Pardon: Limits on Benign Prerogative, 7 Conn. L.Rev. 56, 61 (1974) ([T]he genesis of the exception was the Danby problem, the use of a pardon to block legislative investigation of executive misconduct by means of impeachment.). Resultantly, Parliament provided in the Act of Settlement, 12 & 13 Will. III, ch. 2, § 3 (1700), that a royal pardon could not be pleaded in bar of impeachment. Macgill, supra, at 58 & n. 14. In light of the facts of this case, it is pertinent to note Justice Story's explanation for the impeachment exception: The power of impeachment will generally be applied to persons holding high offices under the government; and it is of great consequence that the President should not have the power of preventing a thorough investigation of their conduct, or of securing them against the disgrace of a public conviction by impeachment, if they should deserve it. The Constitution has, therefore, wisely interposed this check upon his power, so that he cannot, by any corrupt coalition with favourites, or dependents in high offices, screen them from punishment. 3 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 1495 (1833). Indeed, the chief objection to conferring the pardoning power on the president was the fear that the president might use that authority to shield the president's confederates in treason. The Federalist No. 74, at 408-09 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed. 1898); W.H. Humbert, The Pardoning Power of Presidents 18 (1941). Some foreign governments, even some that could hardly be described as republican in nature, have adopted constitutions that specifically preclude the head of state from pardoning his own ministers. Constitution of the Kingdom of Belgium, art. 73 (1831) ([The King] shall have the right to remit or to reduce the sentences pronounced by the judges, save those who are decreed regarding the ministers.); Constitution of the Kingdom of Prussia, art. 49 (1850) (The King shall have power to pardon, and to mitigate punishment. But in favor of a minister condemned for his official acts, this right can only be exercised on the motion of that Chamber whence his impeachment emanated. Only in virtue of a special law can the King suppress inquiries already instituted.); Constitution of the United States of Brazil, art. 48, § 6 (1889) (to pardon and commute penalties in cases of crimes subject to federal jurisdiction, except cases of impeachment and crimes committed by ministers of state). As we learned from President George H.W. Bush's pardons of the Iran-Contra indictees, supra note 3, the fears of the critics of the pardoning power were ultimately realized. In fact, some commentators have speculated that the real motive for the Iran-Contra pardons was, as in Danby's case, to cover up the president's own complicity. Peter M. Shane, Presidents, Pardons, and Prosecutors: Legal Accountability and the Separation of Powers, 11 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 361, 403-04 (1993) (suggesting that the Bush pardons involved an attempt by the President to cover up his own questionable activities); Harold Hongju Koh, [18] Begging Bush's Pardon, 29 Hous. L.Rev. 889, 889-90 (1992) (Thus, for Bush, like the defendants he pardoned, the issue was . . . whether he had himself partaken in the manifest abuse of constitutional authority that this affair represented.); James N. Jorgensen, Note, Federal Executive Clemency Power: The President's Prerogative to Escape Accountability, 27 U. Rich. L.Rev. 345, 346 (1993) (For perhaps the first time in United States history, an executive pardon may have been motivated by the self-interest of a president who halted criminal proceedings in order to suppress information concerning his own conduct.). The United States Supreme Court first interpreted the pardoning power granted by Article II in United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 8 L.Ed. 640 (1833). In that opinion, Chief Justice Marshall established four principles with respect to the operation and effect of a presidential pardon: (1) a pardon exempts the person upon whom it is bestowed from punishment for the crime pardoned; (2) a pardon is of no effect unless it is accepted by the person pardoned and (3) brought to the attention of the court in which it is sought to be enforced; and (4) a pardon is subject to judicial review and interpretation. A pardon is an act of grace, proceeding from the power intrusted [sic] with the execution of the laws, which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed; it is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the court. It is a constituent part of the judicial system, that the judge sees only with judicial eyes, and knows nothing respecting any particular case of which he is not informed judicially; a private deed, not communicated to him, whatever may be its character, whether a pardon or release, is totally unknown, and cannot be acted upon. . . . ... A pardon is a deed to the validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance; it may then be rejected by the person to whom it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in a court to force it to him. It may be supposed, that no being condemned to death would reject a pardon; but the rule must be the same in capital case and in misdemeanors.... [The pardon] may be absolute or conditional; it may be controverted by the prosecutor, and must be expounded by the court. These circumstances combine to show, that this, like any other deed, ought to be brought judicially before the court, by plea, motion or otherwise. Id. at 160-61 (emphasis added) (footnotes and quotations omitted). [19]
Poena tolli potest, culpa perennis erit (The punishment can be removed, but the crime remains). United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 960 (3d Cir.1990). The Governor's primary assertion, and one that the majority of this Court erroneously adopts, is that the grand jury cannot issue indictments because the pardoned conduct no longer constitutes a criminal offense, Appellant's brief, at 18, i.e., it has been obliterated. See Governor's requested instruction to the special grand jury No. 4, supra. The Governor grounds this position on dictum in Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 18 L.Ed. 366 (1866), that when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never committed the offence. Id. at 380, 18 L.Ed. 366. However, the blots out statement was directly contradicted by a later statement in Burdick v. United States, 236 U.S. 79, 35 S.Ct. 267, 59 L.Ed. 476 (1915), that a pardon carries the imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it. Id. at 94, 35 S.Ct. at 270. See Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 128 n. 2 (7th Cir.1975) (noting Burdick 's departure from the Garland dictum). In fact, the holding in Garland was that refusal to permit the pardoned attorney to practice law before the Supreme Court (the only issue in Garland ) would impermissibly punish him for the pardoned offense (joining the Confederacy), not that the offense had been blotted out. In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1437 (D.C.Cir.1994). Garland decided only that: The effect of this pardon is to relieve the petitioner from all penalties and disabilities attached to the offence of treason, committed by his participation in the Rebellion. So far as that offence is concerned, he is thus placed beyond the reach of punishment of any kind. Garland, 71 U.S. at 381, 18 L.Ed. 366 (emphasis added). See also Noonan, 906 F.2d at 958 (characterizing Garland 's blots out statement as dictum rejected by Burdick ). Other courts have characterized the blots out statement as mere metaphor. In re Abrams, 689 A.2d 6, 19 (D.C.1997) ([B]ut metaphors cannot appropriately be used to justify a conclusion which would follow logically only if the metaphor were not a figure of speech but an accurate description.); People ex rel. Prisament v. Brophy, 287 N.Y. 132, 38 N.E.2d 468, 470 (1941) (same). A law review article authored by Professor Williston put the Garland dictum to rest, concluding: Thus, the fact of conviction after a pardon cannot be taken into account in subsequent proceedings. However, the fact of the commission of the crime may be considered. Therefore, although the effects of the commission of the offense linger after a pardon, the effects of the conviction are all but wiped out. Samuel Williston, Does a Pardon Blot Out Guilt?, 28 Harv. L.Rev. 648, 653 (1915) (emphasis added). The fundamental distinction suggested by Professor Williston has been generally accepted and followed by the courts since the date of his article. Damiano v. Burge, 481 S.W.2d 562, 565 (Mo.Ct.App.1972). The parties have not cited, and our research has not disclosed, a single decision by any federal, state, or other court ... which has rejected Professor Williston's reasoning. Abrams, 689 A.2d at 11. Until today. In Noonan, the Third Circuit canvassed cases from the British Commonwealth (the origin of the pardoning power in United States jurisprudence) and determined that English law also holds that a pardon does not blot out guilt. 906 F.2d at 959-60. See, e.g., R. v. Foster, (1985) 1 QB 115, 129 ([The effect of the pardon] was to remove the criminal element of the offense named in the pardon, but not to create any factual fiction, or to raise the inference that the person pardoned had not in fact committed the crime for which the pardon was granted.). A pardon neither takes away the guilt [n]or washes out the moral stain. Anglea v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. (10 Gratt.) 696, 1853 WL 3250, at  (1853). It secures against the consequences of one's acts, and not against the acts themselves; it involves forgiveness, not forgetfulness. United States v. Swift, 186 F. 1002, 1017 (N.D.Ill.1911). For the same reasons, a pardon does not blot out the existence of an indictment. North, 62 F.3d at 1437. Our own cases are in accord. But it cannot wipe out the act that he did, which was adjudged an offense. It was done, and will remain a fact for all time. Notwithstanding the extensive language used in Ex parte Garland, supra , and In re Deming, supra, [10 Johns. 232] and that which we have used, there are limits to the effect of such a pardon. Nelson v. Commonwealth, 128 Ky. 779, 109 S.W. 337, 338 (1909) (quotation omitted). Thus, while a pardoned offense may not be punished, such does not preclude an accusation that the offense was committed and the admission of guilt that flows from the acceptance and assertion of the pardon. See also Parson v. Commonwealth, 112 S.W. 617, 617 (Ky.1908) (The pardon of the Governor did not restore the character of the witness in so far as it was besmirched by the commission of the felony of which he was convicted.).
In upholding the validity of a conditional pardon, it was said in Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307, 15 L.Ed. 421 (1855): [I]f the condition upon which alone the pardon was granted be void, the pardon must also be void. If the condition were lawful, but the prisoner did not assent to it, . . . he cannot have the benefit of the pardon. . . . Id. at 312, 15 L.Ed. 421. In Burdick v. United States , the United States Supreme Court again reaffirmed the requirement of acceptance, explaining that since a pardon carries the imputation of guilt; acceptance a confession of it, 236 U.S. at 94, 35 S.Ct. at 270, one to whom a pardon is offered may prefer to maintain his innocence and reject the escape by confession of guilt implied in the acceptance of a pardon. Id. at 90-91, 35 S.Ct. at 269. [20] See also State v. Jacobson, 348 Mo. 258, 152 S.W.2d 1061, 1063 (1941) ([A]s the very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of penalty, a pardon implies guilt. (Citations and quotations omitted.)); Cook v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 26 N.J.L. 326, at  (N.J.1857) (Pardon implies guilt. If there be no guilt there is no ground for forgiveness. It is an appeal to executive clemency. It is asked as a matter of favor to the guilty. It is granted not of right but of grace. A party is acquitted on the ground of innocence; he is pardoned through favor.). It is this admission of guilt and its attendant opprobrium that underlies the requirement of acceptance and belies the holding of JUSTICE JOHNSTONE's opinion that acceptance is presumed from the absence of rejection. [21] An unsolicited pardon or amnesty issued by the executive does not become effective automatically. It must be accepted by the one to whom it is issued before it can operate as a waiver of his right to contest his guilt. Marino v. I.N.S., 537 F.2d 686, 692 (2d Cir.1976). Another reason for requiring acceptance is that it estops the person pardoned from later asserting that a condition attached to the pardon is invalid. Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256, 267, 95 S.Ct. 379, 385, 42 L.Ed.2d 430 (1974) (It would be a curious logic to allow a convicted person who petitions for mercy to retain the full benefit of a lesser punishment with conditions, yet escape burdens readily assumed in accepting the commutation which he sought.). Historically, acceptance has been found in one of three ways in this country. The first is by the government seeking and obtaining an explicit acceptance. This is the most prevalent practice and was followed in the case of President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon. Secondly, a pardon or commutation may prescribe a condition precedent to be performed by the individual. The Civil War pardons required the taking of an oath of allegiance as a condition to the operation of the pardon. There is a third, somewhat murky area of acceptance: if other rights are dependent upon the pardon or commutation and are asserted. The best examples of this are the Civil War cases in which persons claimed property seized by the government as the result of the offenses for which they had been pardoned and relied upon the pardons to reclaim their property. Leonard B. Boudin, The Presidential Pardons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M. Nixon: Have the Limitations of the Pardon Power Been Exceeded?, 48 U. Col. L.Rev. 1, 32-33 (1976) (footnotes and quotations omitted). Prior to pardoning former president Nixon, President Ford, specifically relying on Burdick , sent a secret emissary to Nixon to ensure that the latter would accept an offered pardon in terms that admitted guilt. Nixon agreed and issued an acceptance that included the language: I made errors of judgment and mistakes that violated criminal statutes and resulted in criminal prosecutions. Benton Becker, [22] The History of the Nixon Pardon, 30 Cumb. L.Rev. 31, 41 (1999-2000). Acceptance is also an essential requisite to effect an executive pardon in Kentucky. Adkins v. Commonwealth, 232 Ky. 312, 23 S.W.2d 277, 280-81 (1929) (A pardon is a deed to the validity of which delivery and acceptance are essential. (citing Wilson )). [23] I have found no authority for the proposition that acceptance is presumed from a failure to reject. [24] In State ex rel. Barnes v. Garrett, 135 Tenn. 617, 188 S.W. 58 (1916), the Supreme Court of Tennessee noted that the court can neither know of the grant of a pardon nor presume its acceptance unless the facts are brought before it by motion, plea, or otherwise. Id. at 60 (emphasis added). See also In re Fredericks, 211 Or. 312, 315 P.2d 1010, 1015 (1957) (en banc) (It is true that the Governor may pardon an offender by virtue of his constitutional power in that behalf, but even that is not effective, unless it is accepted by the prisoner to whom the pardon is offered.) (quoting Carpenter v. Lord, 88 Or. 128, 171 P. 577, 580 (1918)); cf. In re Victor, 31 Ohio St. 206 (Ohio 1877) (holding that acceptance of commutation by insane prisoner not required because a commutation is not a pardon).
Although courts are bound to take judicial notice of proclamations of general amnesty, which have the force of public law, Jenkins v. Collard, 145 U.S. 546, 560-61, 12 S.Ct. 868, 873, 36 L.Ed. 812 (1892), they do not take judicial notice of executive pardons. Wilson, 32 U.S. at 160-61, 8 L.Ed. 640; Eighmy v. People, 78 N.Y. 330, 333 (1879) (citing Wilson ); Garrett, 188 S.W. at 60. The same rule was applied under English common law. People v. Corning, 2 N.Y. 9, 9 (1848) (At common law it was held that the courts were not bound to take judicial notice of a pardon procured by the king's letters patent, but that it was otherwise in the case of a pardon by act of parliament.). A person relying on the king's pardon was required to specially plead it, and if he failed to do so and allowed himself to be put on trial under a plea of not guilty, he was deemed to have waived the pardon. 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England . The correct rule, gathered from the authorities, may be thus stated: The court does not take judicial notice of individual pardons. When one relies upon a pardon issued to him individually to relieve him from prison or for any other purpose he must in some way and in some proceeding call it to the attention of the court. The manner and the nature of the proceeding in which it is called to the attention of the court are not material. When the court's attention is called to the pardon it will not inquire into the motives which prompted the pardoning official to issue the pardon, for to do so would be to usurp the pardoning power; but the court will inquire into the authority of the pardoning official to issue the particular pardon in question, will inquire as to whether fraud was practiced upon the pardoning official, if that be suggested, though on that point much care must be exercised, and there is some division of authority on how that question may be raised, will examine the pardon to see that it is valid upon its face, and if it is conditional will inquire as to whether or not the conditions have been complied with. Jamison v. Flanner, 116 Kan. 624, 228 P. 82, 85 (1924) (citations omitted). A pardon has been described as a `plea in bar,' comparable to the statute of limitations. Abrams, 689 A.2d at 10. In Kentucky, a formal plea is unnecessary; the pardon need only be called to the attention of the court. Jackson v. Rose, 223 Ky. 285, 3 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1928); Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735, 737 (1901). However, implicit in the holding in United States v. Wilson is that only the individual affected may bring the pardon to the attention of the court. Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributiyists, and the United States Constitution, 41 Brandeis L.J. 85, 110 (2002). It is apparent from these authorities that a pardon takes effect only after a particular person is formally accused of a particular offense and calls the court's attention to the pardon as a defense to prosecution or, if after conviction, punishment. Thus, the Franklin Circuit Court should not have dismissed any of the indictments sua sponte. As will be discussed further, infra, a pardon issued prior to a formal accusation that initiates legal proceedings is invalid.
As stated in Jamison v. Flanner , quoted above, a court, upon being presented with a purported pardon, has authority to examine the pardon to see that it is valid upon its face. Jamison, 228 P. at 85. A commutation of sentence may be effected by the Governor only by his acting in formal compliance with terms of section 4 of Article IV of the [New York] Constitution and the implementing statutes. There is no showing of formal compliance here. People ex rel. Reynolds v. Martin, 3 N.Y.2d 217, 165 N.Y.S.2d 26, 144 N.E.2d 20, 23 (1957). The following are some examples of why pardons have been declared invalid:  Failure to comply with the requirement that either (1) notice be given prior to its issuance in the county where the crime was committed, or (2) include in the pardon a statement that such notice was not given. Horton v. Gillespie, 170 Ark. 107, 279 S.W. 1020, 1024-25 (1926).  Failure of the person seeking remission of forfeiture to forward to the Governor with his application the opinion of a majority of the officers of the county where the forfeiture occurred attesting to the propriety of doing so. State v. Dunning, 9 Ind. 20, at -4 (1857).  Failure of the person seeking the pardon to give notice of the application for pardon to the district judge or county attorney where the offense occurred, or by formal publication. Jamison, 228 P. at 99.  Failure to obtain the recommendation of the Board of Pardons. Rich v. Chamberlain, 104 Mich. 436, 62 N.W. 584, 586 (1895). Historically, Kentucky courts have also examined the validity of executive pardons. The most famous instance arose out of the contested gubernatorial election of 1899. The three candidates for governor were William S. Taylor, William Goebel, and John Young Brown. On the face of the returns, the board of elections certified the Republican, Taylor, and his lieutenant governor candidate, John Marshall, the winners, and they were sworn into office. The Democrat, Goebel, and his lieutenant governor candidate, J.C.W. Beckham, filed an election contest before the Democrat-controlled legislature. On January 30, 1900, Goebel was mortally wounded on the capitol grounds by a gunshot fired from the Secretary of State's office. On February 2, 1900, the legislature declared Goebel and Beckham to have been the winners of the election. Goebel was sworn in as governor before he died on February 3, 1900. Beckham was sworn in as Governor after Goebel's death. However, in defiance of the legislative declaration, Taylor retained possession of the executive building, archives, and records, and continued to act as governor. Taylor v. Beckham, 108 Ky. 278, 56 S.W. 177, 177-78 (1900). Ultimately, our predecessor court held that the legislative determination that Goebel and Beckham had won the election was conclusive of the controversy. Id., 56 S.W. at 184. Meanwhile, Taylor, Secretary of State Caleb Powers, and others were indicted for conspiracy to the murder of Goebel. Powers was brought to trial in March 1900. John Young Brown (the third gubernatorial candidate in the 1899 election) served as one of his defense attorneys. On March 10, 1900, during the course of the trial, Taylor purported to issue an executive pardon of Powers. The trial court refused to recognize it. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that Taylor was not the de jure governor of Kentucky on March 10, 1900, thus the pardon was invalid. Powers v. Commonwealth, 110 Ky. 386, 61 S.W. 735, 737-38 (1901). In Adkins v. Commonwealth , our predecessor court declared a pardon invalid because it had been procured by fraud. Adkins, 23 S.W.2d at 280. (Even the former governor who issued the pardon joined the action as a party plaintiff.) It is not the right of the Governor to issue the pardon that is in question, nor is there an interference or usurpation by the courts with his constitutional powers in that regard. To declare the pardon invalid is in effect but to deny the accused of all legal right thereunder and to prevent him from taking advantage of the wrong which he has practiced on the commonwealth. Id. Finally, it is elementary that a person cannot be pardoned for conduct that has not yet occurred or of which the chief executive is unaware. And if it is improperand constitutionally impermissibleto pardon an offense which has not yet been committed, it is no more proper to pardon an offense which is not yet known to have been committed .... Knowledge of the commission of the offense must exist before the specific intent to pardon it can be formed; it is on that intent that the validity of a pardon depends. Macgill, supra, at 84 (footnote omitted). And that, of course, is one reason why a pardon issued before formal accusation is invalid. Even prior to Kentucky's 1890 Constitutional Convention, discussed at length infra, our predecessor court held that, while a pardon could issue prior to conviction, it could not issue until after the pardoned person had been formally charged with the offense to be pardoned. A fine or forfeiture cannot be remitted until it has either been adjudged or the offense shall have been so charged and defined, in some judicial procedure for enforcing its legal penalty, as to identify it, and make the remission effectual as a bar to any other prosecution for the same act. And the power of pardon is certainly as comprehensive as that of remission, and may be more so. But, in all cases alike, the exercise of the executive prerogative of remission or pardon relieves from the offense, and discharges the accused from its legal penalty; and this may be done as well and effectually before as after formal conviction. Commonwealth v. Bush, 63 Ky. (2 Duv.) 264, 265 (1865) (emphasis added). President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon prior to indictment provides no precedent to the contrary; the only court challenges to the validity of that pardon were dismissed for lack of standing to challeng[e] the pardon on behalf of the public. McCord v. Ford, 398 F.Supp. 750, 754-55 (D.D.C.1975); Koffler v. Ford, Civil No. 74-1406, slip op. (D.D.C. Sept. 25, 1974) (discussed in McCord ). [25] The Nixon pardon has been accurately characterized as an anomaly. Macgill, supra, at 72. Nor can Adkins be cited as authority for the proposition that a pre-indictment pardon is valid. While the attempted pardon in Adkins was, as here, issued prior to indictment (presumably because the governor was leaving office the next day), 23 S.W.2d at 277, the pardon was, in fact, issued after formal charge and a preliminary hearing finding probable cause. Id., 23 S.W.2d at 278. See discussion in Part v. of this opinion, infra, of when criminal proceedings are instituted so as to trigger the right to exercise the pardoning power. Regardless, our predecessor court did not address that aspect of the pardon's validity but declared the pardon invalid because it had been procured by fraud. Id., 23 S.W.2d at 280. [26] As pointed out in the passage quoted supra from Commonwealth v. Bush, another reason there can be no pre-indictment general pardon is that, otherwise, the pardoned person could not plead the pardon as a bar to double jeopardy. Other reasons include (1) to assure that the pardon will be given effect only with respect to the offense intended to be pardoned, and (2) to protect the citizenry against executive irresponsibility. For these reasons, there has always existed the requirement of specificity. General words have also a very imperfect effect in pardons. A pardon of all felonies will not pardon a conviction or attainder of felony; (for it is presumed the king knew not of those proceedings) but the conviction or attainder must be particularly mentioned. . . . 4 Blackstone, supra, at . The Framers of the U.S. Constitution considered three restrictions on the pardoning power, in addition to the impeachment restriction, and rejected all three, indicating an intent to give the president the same pardoning prerogatives that had been afforded the kings of England. Macgill, supra, at 82-83. [T]hey conferred upon the President such powers as the King of England had enjoyed, but no more. Specificity in the language of pardons, sufficient to apprise all concerned of the offenses intended to be pardoned, and evidencing the grantor's knowledge of such offenses, was a due process limitation upon a power subject to no substantive restriction. The very character of the limitation was consistent with the tenor of the Convention's work, to secure and confirm the protections from executive irresponsibility their parliamentary predecessors had won in the preceding century. No modification was suggested at the Convention; the limitation [of specificity] can be presumed to have been imported into the presidential pardoning power of Article II. Id. at 83. If a completely general pardon may be granted, it might lead to extensive abuses. For instance, such a pardon might be framed for any and all crimes committed by persons later found to have authorized a certain grievous act. Boudin, supra, at 35. Compare the pardon language of Governor Fletcher's Executive Order 2005-924, viz: any and all persons who have committed or may be accused of committing, any offense up to and including the date hereof, relating in any way to the current merit system investigation being conducted by the special grand jury .... Obviously, Executive Order 2005-924 does not satisfy the requirement of specificity or even indicate knowledge of the specific offenses being pardoned. In that respect, the attempted pardon is invalid. Under Kentucky law, an attempted pardon that is invalid in part is invalid in toto. Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 458 S.W.2d 166, 166 (Ky. 1970).