Opinion ID: 1498296
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Improper Expressions of Belief

Text: Near the beginning of his jury speech, the prosecutor made the following observation: We have heard a lot about the rights of Alvin Joyner, and I'm a lawyer, and I took an oath and I went to law school and I abide by the laws of this land and I love them and I respect them and you, ladies and gentlemen, have borne witness to the unbelievable length our system of justice goes to protect the rights of an accused person. You have seen how many times I have been stopped during the course of the trial from bringing out things that might have been prejudicial. I have been prevented from telling you a lot of things about this case.  R. 927-28 (Emphasis added) The emphasized portions of the above statement clearly constitute an expression of the prosecuting attorney's own opinion that the system was unduly protective of accused persons. There is nothing in the record which suggests that the appellant received any more than he was entitled to by way of protection of his constitutional rights as those have been defined by the Supreme Court of the United States and by this Court. For the prosecutor to seek to convey to the jury his own disagreement with the extent of those protections was altogether improper. Implicit in the statement is a belief that such safeguards are unnecessary when the defendant is guilty. (The statement also includes, of course, the implication that there was evidence of Joyner's participation in the Cobbs Creek Park murder in addition to that which was brought out at trial). We have often condemned such expressions of personal belief by a prosecutor. See e.g. Commonwealth v. Russell, 456 Pa. 559, 322 A.2d 127 (1974); Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974); Commonwealth v. Potter, 445 Pa. 284, 285 A.2d 492 (1971); Commonwealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 185 A. 203 (1936). See also the Code of Professional Responsibility, Disciplinary Rule DR7-106(C)(4): (C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not: ........ (4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, as to the credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the evidence, for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated herein. 438 Pa. xxv, ci-cii (1970). See also American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function, § 5.8(b) (Approved Draft, 1971). Falling into this same category of unacceptable remarks are these statements: He [Alvin Joyner] is a high school graduate, and who I think, ladies and gentlemen, you can infer, was the leader of this pack of murderers because his position was at the top of the hill, and men are deployed, the shock troops are to go down the hill, and he is to take up a position of command, which he does. (R. 953). ........ Why he hater police officers, that on August the 29th, 1970, that is why he was the leader of this pack of murderers and that he hates police officers today, and he figured the best way to beat the case and fool the jury is to tell how awful the police officers treated him, how awful these police officers are. R. 956-57. (Emphasis added). We condemned just such a pejorative reference to a defendant in the case of Commonwealth v. Capalla, 322 Pa. 200, 185 A. 203 (1936). There, during his summation, the district attorney had called the defendant a cold-blooded killer. In our opinion granting a new trial we said: It is no part of the district attorney's duty and it is not his right, to stigmatize a defendant. He has a right to argue that the evidence proves the defendant guilty as charged in the indictment, but for the district attorney himself to characterize the defendant as a cold-blooded killer is something quite different. No man on trial for murder can be officially characterized as a murderer or as `a cold-blooded killer,' until he is adjudged guilty of murder or pleads guilty to that charge. 322 Pa. at 204, 185 A. at 205 (emphasis in original). See also Commonwealth v. Lipscomb, 455 Pa. 525, 317 A.2d 205 (1974) and cases cited therein. Calling the present defendant the leader of this pack of murderers, of course, is the same thing as calling him a murderer directly; and if a murderer, then guilty. Apparently not content with the above indirect expressions as to the defendant's culpability, the assistant district attorney at the conclusion of his speech made a flat declaration of guilt: It is perfectly clear that this man is guilty, if not more, being a high school graduate, custodian of the grenades, clearly guilty of murder in the first degree. (R. 961) In our recent case of Commonwealth v. Cronin, 464 Pa. 138, 346 A.2d 59 (1975) we made it clear beyond cavil that statements such as this asserting the personal belief of the prosecutor as to the guilt of the defendant will not be tolerated: such rhetoric `is emphatically condemned.' Id. at 142, 346 A.2d at 61.