Opinion ID: 150603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Merits of the Prejudicial Spillover Argument

Text: The government contends that Lee's prejudicial spillover argument fails for two reasons. First, the government says that the District Court did not err when it denied Lee's motion for judgment of acquittal as to the pistol charge because there was sufficient evidence to allow that charge to go to the jury. Second, the argument continues, even assuming that the Court erred in denying Lee's motion, the rifle conviction can stand because there was no prejudicial spillover of evidence from the pistol charge. The government's insistence that there was sufficient evidence to support the pistol charge is not its most persuasive argument. Indeed, it might have been the better part of wisdom not to have pressed for that charge to go to the jury. The pistol was never recovered, and the testimony about its make and, in turn, about whether it had traveled in interstate commerce, turned out to be a bit equivocal. [8] However, we need not address whether it was error to send the pistol charge to the jury because, even assuming it was, the government is correct that no prejudicial taint from that charge spilled over into the jury's consideration of the rifle charge. An analysis of whether there was prejudicial spillover involves two inquiries. See United States v. Cross, 308 F.3d 308, 318 (3d Cir.2002). First, if the evidence to prove the overturned count would have been admissible to prove the remaining valid count, the defendant was not prejudiced, and there is no need to consider whether the evidence influenced the outcome. Id. In other words, if, in creating a hypothetical trial as to the valid count only, the evidence of the invalidated count would have been admissible anyway, the analysis ends there. Id. If the evidence would not have been admissible, then we must consider whether the verdict on the remaining count was affected adversely by the evidence that would have been inadmissible at a trial limited to that count. Id. Generally, invalidation of the convictions under one count does not lead to automatic reversal of the convictions on other counts. United States v. Gambone, 314 F.3d 163, 180-81 (3d Cir.2003) (citing Pelullo, 14 F.3d at 897). As to whether evidence regarding the pistol charge would have been admissible in a trial only about Lee's possession of the rifle, Lee asserts that, had the District Court properly granted him a judgment of acquittal on the pistol charge, evidence relating to the pistol would have been stricken. According to Lee, the only reason for allowing evidence of Kraus's belief that he saw a pistol would be to demonstrate Lee's propensity to carry firearms... i.e., a person who carries a pistol on his lap is the type of person who also transports a rifle in his back seat. (Appellant's Op. Br. at 31.) Admission of such propensity evidence, Lee argues, is precisely what Rule 404(b) is intended to prevent. [9] Id. However, even if we assume that evidence regarding the pistol would not have been admissible during a trial on the rifle charge alone, [10] Lee has failed to show that there was any prejudicial spillover. In Pelullo, we established a four-part test to evaluate a spillover claim. We ask (1) whether the charges were intertwined with each other ... so as to create substantial confusion on the part of the jury; ... (2) whether the evidence for the different counts was sufficiently distinct to support the verdict on other separate counts; ... (3) whether substantially all the evidence introduced to support the invalid conviction would have been admissible to prove other counts, and whether the elimination of the count on which the defendant was invalidly convicted would have significantly changed the strategy of the trial; ... (4) [whether] the charges, the language that the government used, and the evidence introduced during the trial ... are of the sort to arouse a jury ... [and] whether the defendant was branded with some terms with decidedly pejorative connotation ... so that the prejudicial spillover effect is palpable. 14 F.3d at 898-99 (internal citations omitted). The first Pelullo factor asks whether the charges were sufficiently intertwined to create confusion on the part of the jury. Id. at 898. Lee argues that the charges did create confusion because a single-count indictment charged him with possessing both the rifle and pistol on the same date, and a single officer described the entire episode. While it is true that the pistol charge and the rifle charge were set forth together in the single-count indictment, and that both allegations arose out of the events of a single day, there was, on this record, no meaningful risk that the jury was confused when asked to consider the two charges. The proof of the jury's comprehension is that it found Lee guilty of possessing the rifle but not guilty of possessing the pistol. Clearly, it was able to separate the issues and the charges, and it did so, in keeping with the District Court's instructions. The Court said, In order to find the defendant guilty, you must unanimously determine that the defendant specifically possessed the rifle, or the pistol, or both. For example, it is not sufficient for six jurors to agree that the defendant possessed the rifle and the other six to agree he possessed the pistol. Rather, the verdict slip indicates that all jurors must agree on which weapons, if any, the defendant possessed. (App. at 601-02.) Questions about the pistol and the rifle were also set forth separately in the special interrogatories attached to the verdict form. In addition, in closing argument, the prosecutor emphasized that the jury needed to consider the pistol charge and the rifle charge separately, saying, [Y]ou have to find that the defendant possessed the rifle or possessed the pistol or possessed both. That means all of you as a whole. As the Judge told you, six of you can't say, we believe that he possessed the rifle, and the other six say, we believe he possessed the pistol. That's not enough. All twelve final jurors have to determine that the defendant possessed the rifle or possessed the pistol or possessed both. ( Id. at 615.) In short, by argument, instruction, and the verdict form, the jury was told to keep the rifle and pistol charges separate, and their verdict proves that they did. The second Pelullo factor asks whether the evidence relating to each charge was sufficiently distinct that a verdict as to one could be supported without reference to evidence regarding the other. 14 F.3d at 898. Put differently, we must ask whether there was enough independent evidence concerning Lee's possession of the rifle to support that charge. Lee argues that the government mixed together the pistol and rifle evidence by telling the jury that Kraus had already seen a long slender object concealed on the back seat of Lee's Jeep, and then by asking the jury to infer that what Kraus saw in Lee's lap was a firearm. Lee points to the prosecutor's closing argument, where he asked the jury, [h]ow about the fact that there was a gun in the back seat? Does that lend any more credence to the fact that what was on [Lee's] lap was a gun and not a squirt gun? (App. at 615.) Leaving aside the fact that Lee's logic here is that the rifle evidence was prejudicially spilling over to support the pistol charge, which is the opposite of the point he is trying to make, his argument fails because there was sufficient evidence of his rifle possession that was distinct from any pistol evidence. Shortly after Lee abandoned his Jeep, the same distinctive black coat that Kraus had seen in the Jeep covering the long, slender object on the backseat was located along a fence near the Jeep, and that coat was covering a rifle. That very potent evidence stands independent of the allegation that Lee possessed a pistol, as does the evidence of the bloodhound's tracking his scent from the Jeep along a path where the rifle was found. The third Pelullo factor asks us to look at whether the absence of the pistol charge would have affected the defense's strategy in a trial on the rifle charge only. 14 F.3d at 898-99. Lee argues that the error affected his trial strategy because the District Court allowed the jury to base a finding of guilt on probabilities or propensity. In other words, because Lee was accused of having two firearms, the jury was permitted to assume that he probably had at least one. Lee argues that this necessarily influenced his trial strategy, because, if only possession of the rifle been charged and had the judgment of acquittal been granted as to the pistol, the jury would not have needed any instruction about unanimity as to either the rifle or the pistol or both. Instead, the defense would have been a straightforward plea for a weighing of the evidence.... Had evidence supporting the improper handgun charge never been presented or been stricken, the jury would not have been authorized to reach a compromise verdict or rely on propensities but would instead have been forced to weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations. (Appellant's Op. Br. at 37-38.) This argument has a crucial factual flaw in its assertion that the jury was authorized to reach a compromise verdict. The jury was repeatedly and explicitly told that they were not permitted to do any such thing, as should be clear from the very instruction that Lee cites. [11] Lee does not identify any additional arguments he would have made or any witness he would have calledor not calledif the trial had been solely on the rifle charge, nor does he describe how his questioning of any witness would have been materially different. In fact, Lee's strategy seems to have been exactly what he says it ought to have been, namely, asking the jury to weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations, focusing on uncertainty in Kraus's testimony, and arguing the paucity of physical evidence. It appears that the jury did not rely on propensities as Lee suggests they did, but instead was able to weigh the evidence and make credibility determinations, because they ultimately acquitted him of the pistol charge. The final Pelullo factor asks whether the pistol charge and its accompanying evidence was pejorative or inflammatory. 14 F.3d at 899. Lee does not offer an argument on this factor, probably because the evidence plainly was neither pejorative nor inflammatory. The evidence was not that Lee threatened Kraus with the pistol, but simply that Kraus saw what he believed to be a pistol on Lee's lap. Thus, whether or not the District Court erred in denying Lee's motion for judgment of acquittal, all of the Pelullo factors indicate that there was no prejudicial spillover from the pistol charge to the rifle charge. Accordingly, Lee is not entitled to a new trial on the rifle charge.