Opinion ID: 1258944
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: the constitutional right of privacy

Text: The California Constitution declares that All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights, and that among these inalienable rights are obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy. (Cal. Const., art. I, § 1.) In Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1 [26 Cal. Rptr.2d 834, 865 P.2d 633], this court held that the privacy clause of the state Constitution creates a right of action against private as well as government entities. ( Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn., supra, at p. 20.) We further held that the elements of a claim for violation of the constitutional privacy right are: (1) a legally protected privacy interest; (2) a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances; and (3) conduct by defendant constituting a serious invasion of privacy. ( Id. at pp. 39-40.) Here, both the majority and Justice Mosk conclude that plaintiff's complaint is defective as to the second element  the reasonable expectation of privacy. They note that by bringing a malpractice action against Dr. Geis, plaintiff opened her medical history to discovery as to matters put in issue by the allegations against Geis. This is all true as far as it goes, but it does not defeat plaintiff's claim for violation of privacy. Plaintiff sued Dr. Geis for professional negligence in diagnosing and treating an infection of her finger. Any medical information in the possession of Dr. Yamaguchi bearing on the issues of the existence of the alleged negligence or the extent of damages resulting from the alleged negligence would be directly relevant to the issues in the Geis litigation. As to any such information, plaintiff could have no reasonable expectation of privacy after asserting her malpractice claim. But she preserved her reasonable expectation of privacy as to any other information she imparted to Yamaguchi in confidence in the course of their doctor-patient relationship. As this court has observed, Plaintiff is not compelled, as a condition to entering the courtroom, to discard entirely her mantle of privacy. ( Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 841-842 [239 Cal. Rptr. 292, 740 P.2d 404].) Although the filing of a lawsuit may be deemed a waiver of privacy as to matters embraced by the action, we have emphasized that the scope of this waiver must be narrowly rather than expansively construed. ( Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 859 [143 Cal. Rptr. 695, 574 P.2d 766]; accord, Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 842.) Matters that would otherwise be protected by the constitutional privacy right are discoverable only if directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit. ( Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 842.) The party seeking access to constitutionally protected information has the burden of proving direct relevance. ( Davis v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal. App.4th 1008, 1017 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 331].) For example, the Court of Appeal has held that a plaintiff who seeks damages for personal injuries, including pain and suffering, does not thereby surrender the right to privacy in postinjury psychotherapeutic records. ( Davis v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal. App.4th 1008, 1017.) The court summarized its conclusion this way: By limiting her claim for emotional distress to pain and suffering associated with stated physical injuries, and by explaining that the [Cedar Women's Center] provided no treatment in connection with the injuries for which compensation was sought, petitioner established that it is not reasonably probable that the records are directly relevant to the condition she placed in issue. ( Ibid. ) This court reached essentially the same conclusion when construing the scope of the patient-litigant exception to the doctor-patient privilege (Evid. Code, § 996). As the Courts of Appeal have recognized, the doctor-patient privilege and the right of privacy are closely related protections against public disclosure of private information. ( Binder v. Superior Court (1987) 196 Cal. App.3d 893, 899 [242 Cal. Rptr. 231]; accord, Davis v. Superior Court, supra, 7 Cal. App.4th 1008, 1013.) In this state, the doctor-patient privilege protects information, including information obtained by an examination of the patient, transmitted between a patient and his physician in the course of that relationship and in confidence by a means which, so far as the patient is aware, discloses the information to no third persons other than those who are present to further the interest of the patient in the consultation or those to whom disclosure is reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose for which the physician is consulted, and includes a diagnosis made and the advice given by the physician in the course of that relationship. (Evid. Code, § 992.) Under the patient-litigant exception, there is no doctor-patient privilege as to a communication relevant to an issue concerning the patient if such issue has been tendered by the patient or any party claiming through the patient. (Evid. Code, § 996.) In Britt v. Superior Court, supra, 20 Cal.3d 844, owners and residents of homes near an airport brought suit against the owner of the airport seeking, among other things, damages for personal injuries and emotional disturbance caused by the noise, vibrations, air pollution, and smoke produced by operation of the airport. During discovery, the airport owner served the plaintiffs with interrogatories demanding a complete account of each plaintiff's lifetime medical history, including any treatment for mental or emotional disturbance. In this court, the airport owner asserted that under the patient-litigant exception, a patient waived the doctor-patient and psychotherapist-patient privileges by instituting a claim for physical or mental injury. As we had done previously (see In re Lifschutz (1970) 2 Cal.3d 415, 435 [85 Cal. Rptr. 829, 467 P.2d 557, 44 A.L.R.3d 1]), this court emphatically rejected such a broad rendition of the statutory exception. ( Britt v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 863.) We concluded that plaintiffs were entitled to retain the confidentiality of all unrelated medical or psychotherapeutic treatment they may have undergone in the past. ( Id. at p. 864.) Here, the complaint alleged, as I previously noted, that Dr. Yamaguchi disclosed to Norcal private, intimate, personal, financial, and confidential medical information and records without the consent or knowledge of [plaintiff] or her attorney. Because the case comes before us on demurrer, we must assume that the allegations of the complaint are true, and we may not look beyond those allegations to ascertain the facts. To conclude, as the majority and Justice Mosk do, that all of the confidential material Yamaguchi disclosed to Norcal was directly relevant to plaintiff's malpractice claim against Dr. Geis and essential to that claim's fair resolution is sheer speculation, and improbable speculation at that. In particular, it is difficult to conceive how financial information, disclosed in confidence in the course of the doctor-patient relationship, could have any direct relevance to plaintiff's malpractice claim against Dr. Geis. [2] The majority asserts in a footnote that any information plaintiff disclosed to Yamaguchi concerning her financial and emotional state would be unrelated to her medical condition and for this reason not protected by the constitutional privacy right. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 43, fn. 4.) As authority for this assertion the majority cites only Kizer v. Sulnick (1988) 202 Cal. App.3d 431, 439 [248 Cal. Rptr. 712], but in that case the court concluded that no doctor-patient relationship had existed. Here, it is undisputed that plaintiff was Dr. Yamaguchi's patient. Consistent with the Evidence Code's definition of confidential information provided in Evidence Code section 992 (that is, all information transmitted between patient and physician in the course of that relationship and in confidence), I would not exclude confidential information about a patient's emotional or financial condition from the reach of the constitutional privacy right merely because it may not have been strictly necessary to the task of diagnosing and treating the patient. When a patient has disclosed information to a doctor in confidence, in the course of their professional relationship, a requirement that the information be medically relevant before it will qualify for legal protection is, in my view, destructive of the confidence and trust that are essential to a healthy physician-patient relationship, and it is inconsistent with the purposes of the constitutional privacy right. This is because patients generally cannot be expected to know when information is or is not medically relevant. As one court has put it: Since the layman is unfamiliar with the road to recovery, he cannot sift the circumstances of his life and habits to determine what is information pertinent to his health. As a consequence, he must disclose all information in his consultations with his doctor  even that which is embarrassing, disgraceful or incriminating. To promote full disclosure, the medical profession extends the promise of secrecy.... ( Hammonds v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Company (N.D.Ohio 1965) 243 F. Supp. 793, 801.) Not knowing when information is medically relevant, but advised by this court that only medically relevant information is protected, patients will be inhibited in relating sensitive or potentially embarrassing information to their physicians. Because the complaint does not show on its face that all the information Dr. Yamaguchi disclosed was directly relevant to the matters at issue in plaintiff's action against Dr. Geis, I would permit plaintiff to proceed on her claim for violation of the constitutional privacy right.