Opinion ID: 1153162
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: the chancellor awarded a divorce to appellant wife from a 29 year marriage but refused to make an equitable distribution. does appellant wife's post separation adultery estop appellant wife from an equitable distribution of marital assets?

Text: Within this assignment of error, Jean contends that the chancellor erred in failing to order an equitable distribution of the couple's property, specifically the two pieces of commercial property and the collection of Corvettes. The standard of review that this Court employs on appeals from chancery courts is limited. A chancellor's decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial credible evidence. Hammett v. Woods, 602 So.2d 825, 827 (Miss. 1992) (citing Clark v. Myrick, 523 So.2d 79, 80 (Miss. 1988)). Also, This Court will not disturb the findings of a Chancellor unless the Chancellor was manifestly wrong, clearly erroneous or an erroneous legal standard was applied. Bell v. Parker, 563 So.2d 594, 596-97 (Miss. 1990). In the instant case the chancellor placed an undue emphasis on Jean's adulterous activities in making his ruling. Jean's affairs occurred during periods in which she was separated from Jimmie, and the chancellor did not make a finding of what effect the affairs had to with the deterioration of this marriage, if anything. In his opinion, the chancellor stated: The Plaintiff admitted that she had an adulterous relationship with a man after the May, 1989, separation and that she did not tell Defendant about same prior to or during the attempted reconciliation. She also admitted two other such relationships which occurred after the November, 1990, separation. The Plaintiff presented sufficient proof regarding the Defendant's conduct prior to the May, 1989 separation to be granted a divorce on the grounds of Habitual Cruel and Inhuman Treatement (sic). The adulterous conduct of the Plaintiff immediately after May, 1989, was not condoned by the Defendant. That fact, along with similar conduct after the November, 1990 separation prevents her from being granted any relief other than hereinafter stated. (Emphasis added). The relief the chancellor referred to was that Jean was given title to the Forts Lake house (the home Jimmie quitclaim deeded to her in 1990) clear of the indebtedness that she had promised to pay Jimmie of $22,000.00. Also, the chancellor ordered that Jimmie pay Jean $5,000.00 for the furniture and fixtures that Jean had purchased for her lounge. This Court has held that adultery should not per se preclude a spouse from receiving alimony, saying, adultery should not stand as an absolute bar to alimony, especially, we believe, when denial of alimony would render the wife destitute. Hammonds v. Hammonds, 597 So.2d 653, 655 (Miss. 1992). In addition, in considering an award of alimony, fault or misconduct of one of the parties is only one of several factors to be taken into account. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So.2d 1278, 1280 (Miss. 1993). See Hammonds, 597 So.2d at 655. This Court recently expanded this concept to the division of marital property in Chamblee v. Chamblee, 637 So.2d 850 (Miss. 1994). In Chamblee, this Court said: In recent years, this Court has been moving away from using divorce proceedings as a means of punishing the party adjudged to be at fault toward creating a more fair and equitable jurisprudence of divorce law. This trend can be seen in the area of child custody in the many non-fault based factors listed in Albright. Furthermore, Moak v. Moak, 631 So.2d 196, 1992 Miss.Lexis 842 (Miss. 1994), states specifically that child custody decisions are to be made in the best interests of the children, rather than as punishment. Id., 631 So.2d at 200, at 5. Alimony is likewise not to be used as a punishment. Tilley v. Tilley, 610 So.2d 348, 354 (Miss. 1992). In view of the recent case law, it seems likely that this Court must use a similar attitude of equity and non-punishment towards the division of marital property. Chamblee, 637 So.2d at 863 (emphasis added). It is difficult to adjust conventional values of morality when weighing marital misconduct for purposes of a just division of marital property. However, marital misconduct is a viable factor entitled to be given weight by the chancellor when the misconduct places a burden on the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationship. See Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So.2d 921, 927 (Miss. 1994). Thus, the chancellor erred in holding that Jean's adulterous conduct precluded her from being entitled to any form of equitable distribution of the property upon divorce. In addition, this case must also be considered in light of this Court's recent case of Ferguson, which deals with the issue of equitable distribution and also provides guidelines for the division of marital property, as well as, Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So.2d 909, 915 (Miss. 1994), which defines marital assets as any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. Jean testified that during their marriage, she was responsible for paying nearly all of the family's household type expenses. These expenses included: the electric bill, telephone bill, gas bill, groceries, doctor's expenses, medication, household supplies, clothing for all three members of the family, swimming pool supplies, day care, car payments, car tags, car insurance, car maintenance, and presents. In addition, Jean testified that she bought all of the household furnishings with the exception of two bedroom suites and a refrigerator. Jean said the more money that she made, the more she had to spend on expenses. Jimmie also admitted that Jean paid for most of these types of expenses. Jean stated that she feels that through her paying all of these expenses she thereby allowed Jimmie to use more of his money for investments. Jimmie testified that he paid for the house note and the house insurance. Jimmie also said that he thought he paid for Vickie's school tuition. However, in addition to paying for the above items, Jean performed many domestic type services for the family. She did the grocery shopping, the housework, washed the family's clothes, mowed the yard, and cleaned the swimming pool and hot tub. Among the major items that Jean argues should be equitably distributed are the two pieces of commercial property purchased by Jimmie. In her amended complaint for divorce, Jean prayed for a legal and equitable interest in all real property owned by the parties at time of separation. Jimmie bought the property on Martin Street in 1980 and purchased the property located on Market Street in 1983. [3] Jean's name was not on any of the deeds to these two pieces of commercial property. Jean did not pay any of the mortgage payments, taxes, or insurance on these properties. These were paid by Jimmie. Jimmie opened up automotive parts stores at these two locations. Jean worked in the parts store on and off for approximately six months, but received no compensation for her efforts. However, Jimmie was similarly uncompensated for working in Jean's lounge. Jimmie now receives $525.00 per month in rent on the Martin Street property, but pays a light bill of about $100.00 per month for security purposes. He also receives $800.00 per month in rent from the Market Street property. The Martin Street property was appraised in 1988 to have a value of $130,000.00. Jimmie currently still owes $85,000.00 on this property. Jimmie's Market Street property was appraised in 1983. This appraisal placed the property's value at $132,000.00. Jimmie stills owes $15,000.00 on this piece of property. However, Jimmie testified that he has tried to sell these properties at prices below their appraised values and no one has purchased them. The other major item that Jean contends should have been equitably distributed by the chancellor below was the collection of Corvette automobiles. In her amended complaint for divorce, Jean asked that she be awarded a one-half interest in all Corvettes, parts and accessories. Jean basis her argument on the fact that she paid the majority of the household bills and expenses. She contends that, by paying these expenses, she allowed Jimmie to use his money to invest in these Corvettes. By doing this, she said she feels as if she put money into the Corvettes just as Jimmie did. It is not disputed by either party that at the time of their separation, Jimmie had quite a collection of Corvettes. [4] Jimmie purchased his first Corvette in 1972. At one time Jimmie owned 46 Corvettes, but has dealt with between 70 and 100 in his tradings. All of the Corvettes are in Jimmie's name except for two which are in Jean's name. Jimmie said that he initially started buying Corvettes as a hobby, but as the prices of these cars started going up, he determined that they might be a good investment for their retirement. Jean testified that even though the Corvettes were in Jimmie's name, she trusted him because he told her the purpose of owning these cars was to build income for their retirement. Jean said that she was involved in about fifty percent (50%) of the Corvette purchases. She also said that she had worked on the Corvettes, sanding and fiberglassing some of them. Jimmie acknowledged that Jean helped with the Corvettes, but stated that she did very little. Jimmie valued his entire Corvette collection at $396,000.00. However, this appraisal was prepared by Jimmie for a possible buyer and he said that these are inflated values. In Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 929, this Court emphasized that after classifying property as marital, separate, (or fixed) assets a valuation of assets would be necessary in order for the trial court to adequately arrive at a fair division of marital properties. [5] Again, Jean considered these Corvettes to be an investment in their retirement and contends that she contributed to this investment by paying the vast majority of the family's household expenses. Finally, their daughter Vickie testified that Jimmie stated that the Corvettes were for his and Jean's retirement. In Ferguson and in Hemsley, this Court reiterated the fact that chancery courts of this state have the authority and power to equitably divide a couple's marital assets upon divorce. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 927. See Hemsley, 639 So.2d at 914; Draper v. Draper, 627 So.2d 302, 305 (Miss. 1993); Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 690 (Miss. 1990); Jones v. Jones, 532 So.2d 574, 580-81 (Miss. 1988). In Johnson v. Johnson, 550 So.2d 416, 420 (Miss. 1989), this Court stated, the Chancery Court certainly has the authority to order an equitable division of jointly accumulated property and in doing so to look behind the formal state of title. Johnson, 550 So.2d at 420. See Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 927; Hemsley, 639 So.2d at 913. This principle was expanded in the recent decision of Draper v. Draper in which this Court held that the chancellor has the power to divest title to real property from one spouse and vest it in the other. Draper, 627 So.2d at 305. As Ferguson notes, fairness is the prevailing guideline in marital division. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 929. This Court later stated: We define marital property for the purpose of divorce as being any and all property acquired or accumulated during the marriage. Assets so acquired or accumulated during the course of the marriage are marital assets and are subject to an equitable distribution by the chancellor. We assume for divorce purposes that the contributions and efforts of the marital partners whether economic, domestic or otherwise are of equal value. Hemsley, 639 So.2d at 915. Ferguson also noted that unfairness and unjust property distributions may result upon divorce [i]n a family where both spouses worked, but the husband's resources were devoted to investments while the wife's earnings were devoted to family expenses or vice versa. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 926. This appears to be such a situation where Jean appears to have paid most, if not all, of the family's household type expenses, including purchasing the vast majority of their home's furnishings. She also did a great deal of domestic work in the home. Thus, by Jean's working in the home and by her paying a great deal of the family's expenses, she thereby allowed Jimmie to utilize more of his money for the purchase of investments (i.e. the Corvettes and the commercial property). However, this does not mean that Jean is entitled to one-half of the parties' property. It is well-established by this Court that the chancery court has the authority to order an equitable division of property that was accumulated through the joint efforts and contributions of the parties. Brown v. Brown, 574 So.2d 688, 690 (Miss. 1990). However, there is no automatic right to an equal division of jointly-accumulated property, but rather, the division is left to the discretion of the court. Id. at 691. Draper, 627 So.2d at 305 (emphasis added). This would seem to be especially true with regard to the Corvettes. Evidence was also presented that some of the Corvettes may have been purchased by Jimmie with money from his father's estate and with inherited money borrowed from his mother. Property originally acquired by inheritance, devise, or descent is usually treated as separate property. Fields v. Fields, 643 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Mo. App. 1982). While Jean did do some of the work on these cars, it appears that Jimmie did the vast majority of the work on them. Also, it appears that much of the value of these Corvettes came not solely from the purchase of these cars, but from the work and improvements made upon them after they were purchased. Appreciation of the value of any non-marital asset may be taken into account to arrive at a fair division to the extent that the nontitled spouse had made a contribution toward that appreciation of value. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 111 N.C. App. 460, 433 S.E.2d 196, 204 (1993). Therefore, Jean should not be automatically entitled to a one-half share, but it does appear that she should be entitled to some portion of the couple's appreciated value of the separate property where the appreciation resulted from the joined efforts, skills or funds of both spouses. In analyzing the equitable distribution of a divorcing couple's property, this Court, in Ferguson, set forth eight factors which should be utilized by a chancellor as guidelines in making a determination. The chancellor may weigh several factors under Mississippi law, applying them to the facts of this case in reaching a fair distribution of marital property, to be decided by the proper weighing and balancing of all the applicable factors together to arrive at a just division. These factor are: 1. Substantial contribution to the accumulation of the property. Factors to be considered in determining contribution are as follows: a. Direct or indirect economic contribution to the acquisition of the property; b. Contribution to the stability and harmony of the marital and family relationships as measured by quality, quantity of time spent on family duties and duration of the marriage; and c. Contribution to the education, training or other accomplishment bearing on the earning power of the spouse accumulating the assets. 2. The degree to which each spouse has expended, withdrawn or otherwise disposed of marital assets and any prior distribution of such assets by agreement, decree or otherwise. 3. The market value and the emotional value of the assets subject to distribution. 4. The value of assets not ordinarily, absent equitable factors to the contrary, subject to such distribution, such as property brought to the marriage by the parties and property acquired by inheritance or inter vivos gift by or to an individual spouse; 5. Tax and other economic consequences, and contractual or legal consequences to third parties, of the proposed distribution; 6. The extent to which property division may, with equity to both parties, be utilized to eliminate periodic payments and other potential sources of future friction between the parties; 7. The needs of the parties for financial security with due regard to the combination of assets, income and earning capacity; and, 8. Any other factor which in equity should be considered. Ferguson, 639 So.2d at 928-929.