Opinion ID: 3012412
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Relevant Anti-Retaliation Provisions

Text: Greg alleges that his termination violated the antiretaliation provisions of the ADA, the ADEA, and the PHRA. The ADA's anti-retaliation provision states: No person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter. 42 U.S.C. S 12203(a). The ADEA and PHRA contain nearly identical anti-retaliation provisions, which we quote in the margin.4 Because the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA and ADEA are nearly identical, as is the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, we have held that precedent interpreting any one of these statutes is equally relevant to interpretation of the others. See Krouse v. American Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997). The language of the PHRA is also substantially similar to these anti-retaliation provisions, and we have held that the PHRA is to be interpreted as identical to federal anti- discrimination laws except where there is something _________________________________________________________________ 4. The anti-retaliation provision of the ADEA provides: It shall be unlawful for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because such individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or litigation under this chapter. 29 U.S.C. S 623(d). Similarly, the PHRA states: It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or any . . . employer to discriminate in any manner against any individual because such individual has opposed any practice forbidden by this act, or because such individual has made a charge, testified or assisted, in any manner, in any investigation, proceeding or hearing under this act. 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. S 955(d). 8 specifically different in its language requiring that it be treated differently. See Dici v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542, 552 (3d Cir. 1996). There is no argument made by either party that the PHRA should be interpreted any differently from federal law in this case. For purposes of this appeal, therefore, we will interpret the anti-retaliation provisions of the ADA, ADEA, and PHRA cited above as applying identically in this case and governed by the same set of precedents. In addition to the anti-retaliation provision cited above, the ADA has a further anti-retaliation provision not found in the ADEA and the PHRA. That provision reads: It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of his or her having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of his or her having aided or encouraged any other individual in the exercise or enjoyment of, any right granted or protected by this chapter. 42 USC S 12203(b). As will appear, this provision, in light of its similarity to language in the NLRA, see 29 U.S.C. S 158(a)(1), is critical to the outcome of this case. Before analyzing each of Greg's theories of illegal discrimination, we note that in order to establish a prima facie case of illegal retaliation under the anti-discrimination statutes, a plaintiff must show: (1) protected employee activity; (2) adverse action by the employer either after or contemporaneous with the employee's protected activity; and (3) a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's adverse action. Krouse, 126 F.3d at 500. Because the District Court concluded that Greg failed to satisfy the first prong with respect to his theories of relief, it never addressed the adverse employment action and causation prongs of his retaliation claims. Consequently, we do not address those issues here on appeal in the first instance. Rather, we consider only the District Court's treatment of the protected activity prongs of Greg's anti-discrimination claims. 9