Opinion ID: 1453510
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: communication with ill juror in defendant's absence.

Text: Appellant relies on State v. Wilson, 109 N.M. 541, 787 P.2d 821 (1990); Hovey v. State, 104 N.M. 667, 726 P.2d 344 (1986), and State v. McDuffie, 106 N.M. 120, 739 P.2d 989 (Ct.App. 1987), to argue that due process requires reversal because a juror, ill with chicken pox, called the court and asked to be excused. It is not clear from the record whether the court actually spoke with the juror; the record shows only that the juror informed someone at the court of her illness. [13] The record also shows that the court did not excuse the juror until it discussed the matter with counsel, who agreed with dismissal. Appellant, however, was not present at the latter meeting and now asserts error because counsel cannot waive her right to be present. See Hovey, 104 N.M. at 671, 726 P.2d at 348. [I]t is improper for the trial court to have any communication with the jury concerning the subject matter of the court proceedings except in open court and in the presence of the accused and his counsel. Hovey, 104 N.M. at 669, 726 P.2d at 346 (emphasis added). A presumption of prejudice arises whenever such an improper communication occurs, and the State bears the burden of rebutting that presumption by making an affirmative showing on the record that the communication did not affect the jury's verdict. Id. at 670, 726 P.2d at 347 (emphasis added). Wilson added a somewhat unclear gloss to the law articulated in Hovey. In Wilson, this court determined that cumulative error, including prosecutorial misconduct, a failure of proof, alteration of a uniform jury instruction, and the court's failure to make a record of its conversation with a juror and to offer the defendant an opportunity to be present during that conversation, deprived the defendant of a fair trial. This court emphasized the constitutional dimension of a defendant's right to participate in every phase of the trial, while noting that the rule does not cover every situation in which a trial judge communicates with jurors about a matter that is not at issue in the trial. 109 N.M. at 546, 787 P.2d at 826. In Wilson, this court equated with the reversible error in Hovey two communications between the court and the juror, where the court had three previous warnings of the need to meet with the juror; it sua sponte decided to dismiss the juror; it failed to allow counsel or defendant to be present at the meeting; and it neglected to make a record. Analysis of Hovey clarifies that there are two prongs to the analysis: (1) determination of error, and (2) if there is error, analysis of whether the state has rebutted the presumption of prejudice. The first prong is not met unless an improper communication occurs. That prong has not been met in the instant case, where the communication concerned a housekeeping matter, and where, unlike Wilson, the court had no notice prior to the communication. A judge does not risk error every time he answers a phone. As in this case, if a juror calls to say she is ill and the court cannot take steps to prevent the communication, there is not error without more. The court did not act to dismiss the juror without consulting counsel, and the court acted with prudence when it made a record. Furthermore, the court took steps to determine that defendant had been apprised of the communication through her attorney and had been given and waived the opportunity to be present. Defendant's counsel was asked whether the matter had been discussed with the defendant and he answered affirmatively. Neither Hovey nor Wilson requires more. It is not clear from the record whether defense counsel had apprised appellant of the problem with the juror who was dismissed, or only that of another juror. This does not affect our conclusion. The dispositive consideration is that the question before the court  whether the juror should be excused because of her illness  did not concern an issue in the case. Wilson does not require us to find reversible error in every communication between the court and a juror when the communication is not relevant to substance of the case. We do not repudiate the dictum in Wilson to the effect that the better practice is to inform defense counsel and defendant as soon as practicable of the substance of the communication. See 109 N.M. at 546, 787 P.2d at 825. This appears to have been done. We emphasize, furthermore, that Wilson did not in any way limit the presumption of prejudice analysis articulated in Hovey, 104 N.M. at 670, 726 P.2d at 347, to be applied when error is present. [14]