Opinion ID: 4561573
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Disparity based on individuals’ different

Text: disabilities First, we reject MHA’s and the dissent’s assertion that excluding Reilly’s IHSS payments from annual income under 24 Code of Federal Regulations part 5.609(c)(16) (2020) would create an unfair disparity by extending the exclusion to families with a developmentally disabled member but not to families with a medically disabled member. To the extent there is any disparity, it is inherent in the federal regulation itself, which specifically limits the exclusion to payments made to families caring for a “developmentally disabled family member.” (24 C.F.R. § 5.609(c)(16) (2020).) Put another way, even assuming MHA’s position is correct that the exclusion is limited to payments made to third party providers, it would still treat developmental disabilities more favorably than physical disabilities because whatever its scope, the exclusion by its 19 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. terms applies only to “[a]mounts paid by a State agency to a family with a member who has a developmental disability.” (Ibid., italics added.) The regulation, moreover, does not require that an individual meet a particular definition of “developmentally disabled” for the income exclusion to apply. As previously discussed (see ante, at p. 15), HUD has not defined “developmental disability” in the regulation, but instead left it up to states to determine its meaning. Specifically, if a state program authorizes a family to receive in-home care for a family member, in HUD’s view that family member “meets the criteria of the definition” of developmentally disabled, and the PHA “should consider the family eligible for the exclusion.” (61 Fed.Reg. 54492, 54497 (Oct. 18, 1996), italics added.) This expansive view in favor of applying the exclusion is consistent with HUD’s expressed concern that families of developmentally disabled members in particular would receive unfair treatment if this income exclusion were not made available to them. HUD added the relevant exclusion for families with a developmentally disabled member “[s]ince families that strive to avoid institutionalization should be encouraged, and not punished.” (60 Fed.Reg. 17388, 17389 (Apr. 5, 1995), italics added.) The dissent, however, asserts that precluding Reilly from utilizing this income exclusion would not amount to punishment because no other group, besides foster parents, enjoys the benefit of the income exclusion. (See dis. opn., post, at p. 34, fn. 18.) This critically misapprehends the nature of the penalty involved. The punishment here is not merely withholding a benefit to a family that is not otherwise given to similarly situated families; in other words, the dilemma a family faces is not choosing between enjoying or forgoing a “preferential 20 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. benefit,” as the dissent seems to suggest. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 23.) Rather, if a family cannot utilize the income exclusion to exclude compensation for a parent’s in-home care, this may cause the family to lose its Section 8 housing altogether because it is unable to pay an increased portion of rent. Without such housing, a family may face having to institutionalize a developmentally disabled member, a result the exclusion seeks to prevent in the first place. Further, despite no expressed preference for family providers per se, “[r]ecipients needing 24-hour protective supervision — and other services — are more likely to receive better continuous care from relatives living with them whose care is more than contractual.” (Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 870.) This continuity of care is particularly salient here because of the nature of need-based tasks under the IHSS program. Because an IHSS recipient may only receive specific services based on an assessed need — i.e., where “[p]erformance of the service by the recipient would constitute such a threat to his/her health/safety that he/she would be unable to remain in his/her own home” (MPP, § 30.761.14) — not all time that a provider spends with a recipient would be compensable. (See § 12300, subd. (a); MPP, § 30.761.12.) Many tasks are discrete and not clustered together throughout the day (such as feeding, dressing, bowel and bladder care), and a provider may not be compensated for time spent waiting in between those tasks. It would no doubt prove challenging to find many providers — other than family members — willing to work that intermittently during the day. Family members may also make particularly good providers because IHSS services “involve a most intimate and personal aspect of an individual’s life” and family providers 21 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. often “insure the least intrusion upon the recipient’s privacy.” (Miller v. Woods, supra, 148 Cal.App.3d at p. 878; see § 12304.1 [“preference shall be given to any qualified individual provider who is chosen by any recipient”].) Also recognizing that familyprovided care is often the best type of care for individuals with disabilities, Congress has included it as one of the “goals of the Nation” to provide families of children with disabilities the services necessary to “enable families of children with disabilities to nurture and enjoy their children at home”; and “support family caregivers of adults with disabilities.” (42 U.S.C. § 15091(a)(6)(B), (D) [congressional findings of Families of Children with Disabilities Support Act of 2000]; id., § 15091(a)(1) [“It is in the best interest of our Nation to preserve, strengthen, and maintain the family”].) Congress further emphasized the important cost savings when family members are themselves providers for their disabled children: “Families of children with disabilities provide support, care, and training to their children that can save States millions of dollars. Without the efforts of family caregivers, many persons with disabilities would receive care through State-supported out-ofhome placements.” (Id., § 15091(a)(2); see 60 Fed.Reg. 17388, 17389 (Apr. 5, 1995).) These expressed goals fully align with HUD’s objective to have developmentally disabled individuals avoid institutionalization and instead live with their families at home.3 3 Contrary to the dissent’s suggestion, nothing in our opinion should be construed as implying that third party caregivers as a whole will provide “substandard” care compared to family members. (Dis. opn., post, at p. 31.) We merely confirm what Congress has expressly recognized about the benefits of having family caregivers. 22 REILLY v. MARIN HOUSING AUTHORITY Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. This leads us to the inescapable conclusion that parents who keep their disabled child at home instead of in an institution — while also providing care as their child’s IHSS provider — are different from other caregivers. That difference, however, cuts in favor of allowing a parent’s IHSS compensation under the exclusion. Unlike third party caregivers whose job it is to take care of someone on an hourly basis, for these parent providers, caring for their child “is not a day job; it is their life.” (In re Hite (Bankr. W.D.Va. 2016) 557 B.R. 451, 458 [holding parents’ in-home care payments excluded from monthly income and consequently not deemed disposable income subject to creditors].) If in-home care payments are not excluded from her income, the benefits Reilly receives — the in-home care for her disabled daughter K.R. and the Section 8 housing assistance — would be at cross-purposes. A family should not be forced to make an impossible choice between these two critical benefits. We perceive no plausible reason why Reilly should not realize the full benefit of what each program has to offer her family.4