Opinion ID: 853166
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Appointment of the Judge Pro Tempore

Text: The State argues that the Court of Appeals erroneously overruled Judge Pratt's finding that Judge Murphy was validly appointed judge pro tempore, and that in any case Ringham waived the issue because he objected to Judge Murphy on the basis of bias, not because of any flaw in Murphy's appointment. We do not agree that the issued was waived. The State is correct that failure to object at trial to a judge pro tempore's authority to preside over the proceedings generally waives the issue for appellate review. Coleman v. State, 694 N.E.2d 269, 277 (Ind.1998); Floyd v. State, 650 N.E.2d 28, 32 (Ind. 1994). It is also true that a litigant may not raise one ground for objection at trial and a different ground for objection on appeal. Lehman v. State, 730 N.E.2d 701, 703 (Ind.2000). However, in this case Judge Murphy stated that he was acting as a commissioner, rather than judge pro tempore, and at the time of his objection Ringham had no means of knowing that Judge Murphy was sitting as judge pro tempore. An issue cannot be waived before it is presented on the record. See Smith v. Convenience Store Distrib. Co., 583 N.E.2d 735, 739 (Ind.1992) (error arising from trial judge's ex parte communication with jury not waived by plaintiff's failure to object prior to verdict where record did not show that plaintiff had knowledge of communication prior to verdict). Indiana Code section 33-5.1-2-27(d) provides: A party to a superior court proceeding that has been assigned to a magistrate ... may request that an elected judge ... preside over the proceeding instead of the magistrate.... Upon a request made ... by either party, the magistrate... shall transfer the proceeding back to the superior court judge. Ringham contends that, if Judge Murphy was sitting as a commissioner, this section required him to transfer the proceedings back to Judge Pratt when Ringham objected to his presiding. We need not resolve this claim because we do not agree that Judge Murphy was sitting as a commissioner. In the hearing on remand Judge Pratt entered findings of fact, including a finding that Appointment of Attorney as Judge Pro Tempore papers were executed and placed, [a]s done in the regular course of business, in the Marion County Clerk's order book. The court concluded as a matter of law that although the deputy clerk failed to include these papers in Ringham's record of proceedings, file stamp them, and record them in the trial court's CCS on April 17, the papers were nevertheless properly executed and were intended to be in defendant's record of proceedings, and that accordingly Judge Murphy was validly appointed. The trial court transmitted its findings of fact and conclusion of law, along with the appointment papers, to the Court of Appeals, which added them to the Record on Appeal. The Court of Appeals concluded that because Judge Murphy stated he was sitting as commissioner rather than as judge pro tempore, and because the papers appointing him were not notarized, file stamped and recorded in the trial court's CCS for April 17, on that date Judge Murphy was presiding not as a properly appointed judge pro tempore, but in the capacity of Master Commissioner. Ringham, 753 N.E.2d at 34. Trial Rule 63(E), which governs the appointment of a judge pro tempore, states in pertinent part that [a] judge who is unable to attend and preside at his court for any cause may appoint in writing a judge pro tempore to conduct the business of this court during his absence. The written appointment shall be entered in the records of the court. Although we agree that notarizing, file stamping, and contemporaneously noting appointment papers in the CCS is desirable and would minimize the risk of the type of confusion that arose in this case, we do not believe reversible error occurred by reason of these irregularities. Although Rule 63(E) requires the written appointment to be entered of record, there is no explicit requirement as to the timing of that entry. Judge Pratt found that the appointment was in fact made on April 17, and that finding is not clearly erroneous. Indeed, it seems clearly correct. Here, the propriety of Judge Murphy's appointment did not become an issue until Ringham's initial appeal. When the Court of Appeals realized that the Record on Appeal was incomplete, it remanded to the trial court for findings. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing, then transmitted its findings of fact and conclusion of law, along with the appointment papers, to the Court of Appeals, which added them to the Record on Appeal. This is exactly what Indiana Appellate Rule 32 requires. [2] Under these circumstances, supplementing the record pursuant to Appellate Rule 32 was sufficient to establish compliance with Trial Rule 63(E). Finally, although Judge Murphy referred to himself as commissioner when he explained Judge Pratt's absence to the parties, a judge's status is determined by an examination of the record, not the judge's self-description. Dearman v. State, 632 N.E.2d 1156, 1159 (Ind.Ct.App.1994), trans. denied. As explained above, the trial court record, as supplemented, shows that Judge Murphy was validly appointed judge pro tempore.