Opinion ID: 860588
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Otha Lee Hoskins

Text: 2. killed Wayne Harrison by shooting the said Wayne Harrison with a gun, 3. without any design to effect the death of Wayne Harrison, and 4. at the time of the alleged killing, Otha Lee Hoskins, was engaged in the commission of a felony, to-wit: robbery, attempted robbery, sale of a controlled substance or conspiracy to sell a controlled substance, . . . . then the jury was to find Hoskins guilty of murder. This instruction requires the jury to find that Hoskins shot his victim without a design to kill him, but while committing one of the named felonies, while indictment charged Hoskins with an intentional killing without any reference to other felonies. The issue quite simply is whether a killing that occurs during the commission of certain named felonies, is an offense that is raised by an indictment for a wilful killing. Hoskins argues that a constructive amendment of the indictment was made. A constructive amendment of an indictment occurs when the proof and instructions broaden the elements of the offense charged so that the defendant may have been convicted on a ground not alleged by the grand jury in its indictment. U.S. v. Miller, 471 U.S. 130, 142-45 (1985). Hoskins objected at trial to this instruction. He did not label the problem an impermissible amendment, but the issue was raised using equivalent words. Mississippi's murder statute is a long, multi-part creation that addresses different categories of murder. Subsection (1) defines deliberate design murder, depraved heart murder, and felony murder,  i.e., a killing that occurs without design, but while committing any felony except for those especially heinous and violent felonies that would cause the crime to be punishable as capital murder. Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-3-19(1) (Rev. 1994). Subsection (2) defines the acts that constitute capital murder, i.e., murder for which death is a statutorily available punishment. Miss. Code Ann. Section 97-3-19(2) (Rev. 1994). The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that an indictment for a willful murder was sufficient to support jury instructions and a conviction for felony murder. Sessums v. State, 221 So. 2d 368, (Miss. 1969). The reason for this conclusion is straightforward: a statute requires it. In an indictment for homicide it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which or the means by which the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient to charge in an indictment for murder, that the defendant did feloniously, willfully, and of his malice aforethought, kill and murder the deceased. [A similar rule is then described for manslaughter.] Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-37 (Rev. 1994). The rationale of the statute was articulated in Sessums. Regardless of the various ways in which murder can be committed there is still but one crime. The crime is the killing of another human being. An indictment for a premeditated killing allows the court to grant jury instructions and for felony murder. Sessums, 221 So. 2d at 370. It would also allow a conviction for a lesser-included offense such as manslaughter. It would not have allowed a conviction that would have exposed Hoskins to the possibility of a death sentence, since he was not put on notice by the indictment that he had potentially committed a capital crime. Under Sessums, however, a killing that occurred during the commission of certain particularly violent crimes for which capital punishment could have been sought, is included within an indictment for simple murder so long as the death penalty is not being requested. The nature of the accusation is still murder. This statute explaining the proper means to indict for murder put Hoskins on notice that even though he was charged with willfully, unlawfully and feloniously . . . [killing Wayne Harrison] with deliberate design to effect the death of Wayne Harrison, proof of any manner in which or the means by which the death of the deceased was caused could be introduced. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-7-37 (Rev. 1994). Sessums allowed a conviction under a simple murder indictment for a killing that occurred during the commission of an arson. There is no additional burden on the defendant in requiring him instead to defend against a different enumeration of felonies. In both situations there are crimes contemporaneous with the killing and not mentioned in the indictment, the proof of which will support a murder conviction. More recently, the supreme court has held that subsections (1)(a) for a willful killing and (1)(b) for depraved heart murder have coalesced, such that an indictment for a willful killing allows proof and conviction of a depraved heart killing. Catchings v. State, 684 So. 2d 591, 599 (Miss. 1996). A distinction was drawn in Catchings between this approach and the supreme court's determination regarding similar issues arising under the aggravated assault statute. The court has held that if an indictment charges a purposeful and willful assault, instructions cannot be given nor a conviction had for a reckless assault under conditions manifesting an extreme indifference to human life. Quick v. State, 569 So. 2d 1197, 1200 (Miss. 1990). The murder indictment statute, Section 99-7-37, was not mentioned in Catchings, but that would be an additional reason permitting the result. Even if depraved heart murder and simple murder had not coalesced, this statute is notice to defendants as surely as if the indictment itself covered the other alternative methods of committing murder. Hoskins was indicted, tried, and convicted under Section 97-3-19(1) of the Mississippi Code. The instruction did not permit the jury to convict Hoskins on any ground outside the indictment, and the instruction did not amend the indictment. There was no error in giving this instruction.