Opinion ID: 2250509
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: People v Sparber

Text: On January 17, 2002, defendant Sparber pleaded guilty to first degree assault in exchange for a negotiated prison term of 15 years. That same day, Supreme Court also adjudicated him a second violent felony offender, based upon a 1995 conviction for weapons possession. On April 11, defendant appeared for sentencing. As a consequence of his plea and status as a second violent felon, Penal Law § 70.00 (6) and § 70.45 (1) and (2) required defendant to serve a mandatory five-year PRS term. But at sentencing, Supreme Court did not mention the PRS term and instead pronounced a sentence of a determinate term of . . . 15 years. The part clerk's entries on a court worksheet, which the judge initialed, also failed to indicate any PRS sentence. [1] The clerk-prepared commitment sheetwhich reflects a defendant's commitment to the custody of the Department of Correctional Services (DOCS), the crime committed, Penal Law section violated and the sentence imposednoted, however, in its remarks section, that defendant was required to serve a five-year PRS term. On appeal, defendant Sparber argued that the PRS term should be stricken from his sentence and deemed a nullity because it was not part of the sentence that the court pronounced orally, in his presence in open court (34 AD3d 265, 265 [1st Dept 2006]). Defendant's arguments were predicated upon CPL 440.40 (1), which permits the People to move to correct an illegal sentence within one year of its imposition, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit's decision in Earley v Murray (451 F3d 71 [2d Cir 2006]), which held that DOCS's administrative addition of a PRS term not pronounced by Supreme Court violated federal due process guarantees ( id. at 76 n 1) and should therefore be excised from the petitioner's sentence on a motion for a writ of habeas corpus. [2] Defendant acknowledged that, under our decisions in People v Catu (4 NY3d 242 [2005]) and its progeny, the failure to inform him of the PRS term would permit vacatur of his plea. But he expressly disavowed that remedy ( see 34 AD3d at 265). [3] The Appellate Division rejected defendant's arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. It held that because the directive of Penal Law § 70.45 (1) is mandatory, the oral sentence, which was silent as to PRS, carried with it a five-year PRS term by operation of law. Relying on the United States Supreme Court's decision in Hill v United States ex rel. Wampler (298 US 460 [1936]), the Appellate Division also concluded that defendant's constitutional argument failed because the clerk's entry of the PRS term on the commitment sheet satisfied any due process requirement that a sentence be entered upon the records of the court (34 AD3d at 266). In so holding, the court deemed the imposition of a mandatory PRS term a ministerial function ( id. ). A Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal and we now modify and remit to Supreme Court for a resentencing hearing at which the PRS term will be orally pronounced.