Opinion ID: 1980638
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: exclusion of evidence of alcoholism.

Text: The state introduced evidence from a number of witnesses who saw or came in close contact with the defendant during and immediately after the commission of the crimes; that, in their opinions, he was not intoxicated. The cab driver, Larsen, testified that the defendant didn't seem to be real drunk. Gaylord Palm, Superior police officer, one of the officers who apprehended defendant, testified that based on [h]is breath, on his speech, on the looks of his eyes, his walking and his turning ability, he did not believe that the defendant was intoxicated. James Cronin, Superior police officer, who was also present at the apprehension of the defendant, testified that the defendant was not in an intoxicated condition at that time. Robert Bennett, Detective Lieutenant Superior police, who interviewed defendant shortly after his arrest, testified that in his opinion defendant was not drunk enough so that he did not understand what he was doing or talking about, and that the defendant was not intoxicated. The defendant, twenty-four years of age, testified that he drank nine quarts of beer on the day in question, plus the cans of beer consumed during the taxicab ride. Defense counsel attempted to establish chronic alcoholism by questioning the defendant himself. Prior to the objection of the district attorney, the defendant had testified extensively as to his general drinking habits and problems. The jury heard that as a young child he was given alcoholic beverages by his parents; that by the time he was twelve he began drinking on his own at least three or four times a week; that between the ages of twelve and twenty he regularly drank alcoholic beverages and missed some high school classes; that between the age of twenty and the time of trial he drank 65 or 70 percent of his waking hours; that while working on his last job he missed one day of work; and that he quit his  job and left town because of embarrassment over an incident in which he had gotten drunk and was later told that he had almost killed his mother's boy friend, had struck his mother and had thrown furniture around. The trial court sustained the objection of the district attorney to further questioning of this nature. The trial court did not err in sustaining the objection. Section 939.42, Stats., concerns the subject of intoxication as a defense to criminal liability. Its focus is on the state of intoxication of the perpetrator at the time of the commission of the crime. It provides:  939.42 Intoxication. An intoxicated or a drugged condition of the actor is a defense only if such condition: ( 1 ) Is involuntarily produced and renders the actor incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in regard to the alleged criminal act at the time the act is committed; or  (2) Negatives the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime. [1, 2] Sec. 939.42 (1), Stats., specifically concerns involuntary intoxication. Sec. 939.42 (2) has been consistently interpreted to pertain to voluntary intoxication as well. State v. Mills (1974), 62 Wis.2d 186, 214 N.W.2d 456, and. Gibson v. State (1972), 55 Wis. 2d 110, 197 N.W.2d 813. Alcoholism, in itself, is not now and never has been a separate defense to criminal liability in this state. State v. Nemoir (1974), 62 Wis.2d 206, 214 N.W. 2d 297; Roberts v. State (1969), 41 Wis.2d 537, 164 N.W.2d 525. This court has, however, recognized that proof of alcoholism may be relevant to the defense of involuntary intoxication raised under sec. 939.42 (1). This court, in Roberts v. State, supra , stated at pp. 545, 546: Roberts argues he has a defense under sec. 939.42 (1), Stats. If Roberts had been intoxicated to the point that he could not distinguish between right and wrong in respect to the shooting of Mrs. Howe when he shot her . . . and such intoxication was involuntary because he  suffered from a type of chronic alcoholism which compels involuntary drinking to satisfy a psychological or physiological dependency thereon, Roberts would have a defense. But the evidence does not prove such involuntariness or drunkenness. [3, 4] Whether or not a person is an alcoholic is a matter to be established by expert medical opinion and proper medical proof, and not by the defendant, himself. State, v. Freiberg (1967), 35 Wis. 2d 480, 151 N.W.2d 1. Even then . . . Not every person commonly called a `chronic alcoholic' is addicted to the point where he has a physiological or psychological dependency upon alcohol and his drinking is so involuntary and compulsive that one might argue he is irresponsible for his acts. . . Roberts v. State, supra, p. 543. [5] Whether or not the defendant was a chronic alcoholic such that his condition compelled . . . involuntary drinking to satisfy a psychological or physiological dependency. . . was a matter to be proved by expert medical testimony and proper medical proof. Defense counsel expressed no intent to provide such proof. Any further statements by the defendant as to his drinking habits would be merely cumulative of the nature of the evidence already admitted when the trial court sustained the objection of the district attorney. [6] A further reason exists for holding that the trial Court's exclusion of further testimony of the defendant as to that subject was not prejudicial error. Under the affirmative defense of involuntary intoxication set forth in sec. 939.42 (1), Stats., the defendant has the burden of establishing both that his intoxication was involuntary and that he was intoxicated to the point where he was . . . incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong in regard to the alleged criminal act. . . Proof of alcoholism would go to prove involuntariness. If the required degree of intoxication is not proved, then  the defense fails anyway, and any error made with regard to the first element would be harmless. Not only did the defendant fail to prove intoxication to the state of being incapable of distinguishing between right and wrong (No evidence whatever was introduced on this point), the defendant also failed to prove that he was intoxicated to the lesser degree of intoxication required to trigger a sec. 939.42 (2), Stats., defense. [7] The defense of voluntary intoxication offered by sec. 939.42 (2), Stats., is applicable when the degree of intoxication [n]egatives the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime. This court has several times passed on the degree of intoxication which is necessary to render one incapable of forming or entertaining a mens rea under sec. 939.42 (2). Smith v. State (1946), 248 Wis. 399, 21 N.W.2d 662; Lasecki v. State (1926), 190 Wis. 274, 208 N.W. 868; and State v. Christiansen (1936), 222 Wis. 132, 267 N.W. 6. The court in State v. Guiden (1970), 46 Wis.2d 328, 331, 174 N.W.2d 488, expressed the degree of intoxication required as follows: . . . The `intoxicated or drugged condition' to which the statute refers is not the condition of alcohol-induced incandescence or being well-lit that lowers the threshold of inhibitions or stirs the impulse to criminal adventures. It is that degree of complete drunkenness which makes a person incapable of forming intent to perform an act or commit a crime. . . . To be relieved of responsibility for criminal acts, it is not enough for a defendant to establish that he was under the influence of intoxicating beverages. He must establish that degree of intoxication that means he was utterly incapable of forming the intent requisite to the commission of the crime charged. State v. Guiden, supra, p. 331; Garcia v. State (1976), 73 Wis.2d 174, 184, 242 N.W. 2d 919. His intent is a state of mind existing at the time of the commission of the offense and his state of  mind may be determined from his acts, his conduct, his own self description of his state of sobriety, and from inferences fairly drawn from the circumstances. State v. Guiden, supra, p. 332; Strait v. State (1969), 41 Wis. 2d 552, 559, 164 N.W.2d 505. [8] The question as to whether the defendant was or was not intoxicated to such a degree as [n]egatives the existence of a state of mind essential to the crime, as required by sec. 939.42 (2), Stats., was for the jury to determine. State v. Nemoir, supra . Based upon the credible evidence presented in the instant case, the jury could and did find the defendant not to be so intoxicated. The defendant argues that his own credibility as to his own statements that he was so intoxicated, would have been enhanced had the evidence of his past history of inebriacy been admitted. The defendant's own statements are but one way for the jury to determine the degree of intoxication as it affected his state of mind. The jury may still consider his acts, his conduct and inferences fairly drawn from the circumstances of the commission of the crime. [9] The overwhelming weight of the evidence in this case fairly points to the conclusion that the defendant was not so intoxicated so as to negative the existence of intent in the commission of the charged crimes. In addition to the testimony of the witnesses, the inference that can be fairly drawn from the facts and circumstances surrounding the commission of the crimes do support a finding that the defendant was not so intoxicated as to negative the existence of intent. The contention of the defendant must be that he was sober enough to enter the taxicab carrying a blanket concealing the several weapons; to tell Larsen they were going 60-70 miles to Danbury while holding a gun at Larsen's head; to give the driver turn-by-turn instructions to get out of Superior to highway #35; to climb into the front seat while the cab was in motion and hold the gun on Larsen; to take  over the driving of the cab after going 25 or 30 miles; to elude one roadblock and continue to drive two or three miles before being forced into the ditch; and at the same time to be too drunk to form an intent to commit the crimes. We do not find such a contention persuasive. Under the circumstances of this case, further testimony from the defendant to show that he was an alcoholic was immaterial to the defense of either involuntary or voluntary intoxication and, therefore, properly refused by the trial court.