Opinion ID: 772486
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Balwant Murder Threat

Text: 163 Dhinsa next challenges his conviction on count 11 for threatening to commit murder in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1959(a)(4). Specifically, that count alleged that Dhinsa knowingly and intentionally threatened to murder Balwant in violation of N.Y. Penal Law §135.65, Coercion in the first degree. 164 The threat against Balwant arose out of Dhinsa's efforts to locate Sarvjeet, who he suspected was cooperating with the police. During Satinderjit's funeral service, Parmar, an associate of Dhinsa's, approached Balwant to request his assistance in locating Sarvjeet. Balwant apparently was a friend of Sarvjeet, and Dhinsa solicited his aid in arranging a meeting with Sarvjeet. After Balwant refused to help Dhinsa, Parmar told Balwant that Dhinsa would have him killed. Balwant again refused Dhinsa's request to locate Sarvjeet. 165 The gravamen of Dhinsa's challenge is that, because Balwant never gave in to Dhinsa's demand that he help locate Sarvjeet, the government failed to meet its burden of establishing that Balwant was compelled or induced to engage in conduct which he had a legal right to abstain from engaging in. See N.Y. Penal Law §135.60. We agree. Dhinsa further argues that this Court may not affirm his conviction on count 11 based on the lesser offense of attempted coercion in the first degree because the jury was not asked to consider that offense. In response, the government argues that, assuming the elements of coercion in the first degree are not satisfied, Dhinsa may be properly convicted of an attempt of that offense; to wit, attempted coercion in the first degree, which it contends is sufficient to sustain a conviction under section 1959(a). See Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c). Thus, the question before us is whether we may affirm Dhinsa's conviction on count 11 based on the lesser offense of attempted coercion in the first degree where there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on the lesser offense, but where the district court failed to charge the jury on that offense. 13 We answer that question in the negative and, accordingly, vacate the judgment of conviction and sentence as to count 11. 166 Both parties cite the decision of the Third Appellate Department of New York in People v. Wager, 199 A.D.2d 642, 604 N.Y.S.2d 1008 (3d Dep't 1993), appeal denied, 83 N.Y.2d 811, 611 N.Y.S.2d 147, 633 N.E.2d 502 (1994) (table), as support for their respective positions. In Wager, the defendant grabbed the victim and ordered that she get into her car. See id. at 642, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 1009. As the parties began to struggle, a second car pulled into the parking lot near the defendant and the victim, causing the defendant to release the victim. See id. The defendant was charged with, and convicted of, inter alia, coercion in the first degree. See id. In overturning that conviction, the Third Department held that the victim's failure to get into the defendant's car negated a finding that she was compelled to engage in conduct which she had a right to abstain from engaging in as required under the statute. See id. at 642-43, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 1009. The Third Department held, however, that the defendant's conduct met the statutory requirements of attempted coercion in the first degree and, thus, modified the judgment accordingly and remanded the matter for resentencing. See id. at 643, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 1009 (citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §470.15(2)(a) (Upon a determination that the trial evidence adduced in support of a verdict is not legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt of an offense of which he was convicted but is legally sufficient to establish his guilt of a lesser included offense, the court may modify the judgment by changing it to one of conviction for the lesser offense.)). 167 Because Dhinsa's challenge involves an interpretation of New York state criminal law, the decision in Wager interpreting N.Y. Penal Law §135.65 is controlling on our resolution of Dhinsa's challenge to his conviction on count 11. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 636 (1991); Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 167 (1977); Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 1999) (We are bound, as was the district court, to apply the law as interpreted by New York's intermediate appellate courts... unless we find persuasive evidence that the New York Court of Appeals, which has not ruled on this issue, would reach a different conclusion.). The government acknowledges that Balwant never yielded to Dhinsa's demand that he arrange a meeting between Dhinsa and Sarvjeet. Accordingly, to the extent Dhinsa's conviction under section 1959(a) for threatening to kill Balwant is based on a violation of N.Y. Penal Law §135.65, that conviction cannot stand. See Wager, 199 A.D.2d at 642-43, 604 N.Y.S.2d at 1009. 168 Recognizing the possible infirmity in the jury's conviction for coercion in the first degree, the government argues that, under Wager, there is sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for attempted coercion in the first degree, which it contends is a crime of violence under New York state law sufficient to sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. §1959(a). The government further argues that, under Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c) and established Second Circuit precedent, we may find Dhinsa guilty of the lesser offense of attempted coercion in the first degree and, thus, affirm Dhinsa's conviction under section 1959(a) based on that offense. See 18 U.S.C. §1959(a) (Whoever... threatens to commit a crime of violence... in violation of the laws of any State... or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be punished.). We find the government's arguments unpersuasive. 169 Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c), [t]he defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense charged or an offense necessarily included therein if the attempt is an offense. In practice, Rule 31(c) permits the defendant to request a lesser included offense instruction if, based on the evidence at trial, a jury could rationally find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense, yet acquit him of the greater. Schmuck v. United States, 489 U.S. 705, 716 n.8 (1989) (adopting the elements approach to determine when a lesser included offense instruction is permitted under Rule 31); see also Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 349-50 (1965); cf. United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486, 489 n.5 (8th Cir. 1977) (describing the decision to request a lesser included offense instruction as a tactical one). Although the rule generally is invoked by the defendant, it may work to either the prosecutor's or the defendant's benefit: to aid the prosecution when it has failed to prove all of the elements of the offense charged in the indictment or provide[] the jury with an alternative which may permit mitigation of punishment for the greater offense. United States v. Giampino, 680 F.2d 898, 900 n.1 (2d Cir. 1982) (internal quotation marks omitted). The indictment need not charge the defendant with the lesser offense in order for the trial court to submit that offense to the jury. See United States v. Martel, 792 F.2d 630, 638 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. LoRusso, 695 F.2d 45, 52 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982). 170 If the jury finds the defendant guilty of the greater offense, the trial court may enter a judgment of conviction on a lesser included offense when it finds that an element exclusive to the greater offense is not supported by evidence sufficient to sustain the jury's finding of guilt on the greater offense. Government of the Virgin Islands v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1108 (3d Cir. 1981); see also LoRusso, 695 F.2d at 52. Similarly, a reviewing court may vacate the conviction and sentence for the greater offense and enter a judgment of conviction on the lesser offense (or, in the alternative, remand the matter to the trial court with instructions to enter a judgment of conviction on the lesser offense) [w]hen the evidence is insufficient to support the greater offense, but sufficient to support a conviction on the lesser included offense. Josiah, 641 F.2d at 1108; see also Rutledge v. United States, 517 U.S. 292, 306 (1996); United States v. Dickinson, 706 F.2d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v. Lamartina, 584 F.2d 764, 767 (6th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United States v. Swiderski, 548 F.2d 445, 452 (2d Cir. 1977). A reviewing court may exercise its authority in this manner when it is convinced that the defendant will not be prejudiced as a result. See Swiderski, 548 F.2d at 452; see also Rutledge, 517 U.S. at 306 (citing Morris v. Mathews, 475 U.S. 237, 246 47 (1986)); Allison v. United States, 409 F.2d 445, 450-51 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (per curiam). We apply these standards to Dhinsa's challenge to his conviction on count 11 for threatening to kill Balwant. 171 We begin with the principle that, [u]nder Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c), a defendant may be found guilty of an attempt to commit a substantive offense, whether or not the attempt was charged in the indictment, provided an attempt is punishable. United States v. Marin, 513 F.2d 974, 976 (2d Cir. 1975); see also United States v. Remigio, 767 F.2d 730, 733 (10th Cir. 1985) (The crime of attempt is a lesser included offense of the substantive crime.). In cases where we vacated a conviction on the greater offense and instructed the trial court to enter a judgment of conviction on the lesser offense, we noted that the jury was instructed on the lesser offense and that there existed sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction on the lesser offense. See, e.g., United States v. Boissoneault, 926 F.2d 230, 235 (2d Cir. 1991); Dickinson, 706 F.2d at 92-93 (jury was properly charged on the lesser predicate offense). In cases where other circuits have similarly directed the entry of a judgment of conviction on a lesser offense, the lesser offense was previously considered by the jury. See, e.g., United States v. Silvers, 90 F.3d 95, 99 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Dinkane, 17 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 1994) (requiring, inter alia, that the jury [was] explicitly instructed that it could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense and [was] properly instructed on the elements of that offense.) (quotation marks omitted); United States v. Plenty Arrows, 946 F.2d 62, 66 n.2 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Figueroa, 666 F.2d 1375, 1377 (11th Cir. 1982); Josiah, 641 F.2d at 1107; Cobb, 558 F.2d at 488; cf. Morris, 475 U.S. at 241-43 (jury instructed on greater and lesser included offense and conviction reduced to lesser offense); Keeble v. United States, 412 U.S. 205, 212 (1973) ([I]f the prosecution has not established beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the offense charged, and if no lesser offense instruction is offered, the jury must, as a theoretical matter, return a verdict of acquittal.); LoRusso, 695 F.2d at 52-53 (holding that trial court's decision to charge the jury on a lesser offense was well within the court's authority and was properly designed to ensure the just determination of the charges brought against these defendants.); United States v. Pino, 608 F.2d 1001, 1003 (4th Cir. 1979) ([H]ad the government lacked evidence with which to convict Pino of distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), while it did not seek to have the district judge do so, it would have been entitled to have the matter submitted to the jury on an attempt theory.). 172 Here, however, the district court never instructed the jury on the lesser crime of attempted coercion in the first degree. The government does not dispute that point. Indeed, the government does not directly address Dhinsa's contention that the jury must be instructed on the lesser offense as a prerequisite to any modification in a defendant's conviction and sentence. Thus, consistent with precedent, and the decisions of our sister circuits that have addressed the issue under similar (although not exact) circumstances, we cannot affirm Dhinsa's conviction on count 11 based on the lesser offense of attempted coercion in the first degree because the jury was not instructed on that offense. 173 The government's reliance on Wager to support its position that we may affirm Dhinsa's conviction based on the lesser offense of attempted coercion in the first degree is misplaced. In Wager, the Third Department of the Appellate Division reduced the defendant's conviction to attempted coercion in the first degree pursuant to the unique factual review power available to the New York state appellate courts. People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 494, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 762, 508 N.E.2d 672, 674 (1987); see also Preiser, Practice Commentaries, N.Y. C.P.L. §470.15(2)(a), at 529 (describing the scope of intermediate appellate review under section 470.15 as broad and unique). Notably, this review power is provided for in the statutory section titled Proceedings After Judgment, indicating that the intermediate appellate court's authority to modify a judgment of conviction arises after the jury has rendered its verdict and the trial court has entered a judgment of conviction. In contrast, Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c) applies to the jury instruction and verdict phase of the trial. Specifically, Rule 31(c) is invoked when a trial court must decide whether or not a lesser-included offense charge should be given in a particular case. Sansone, 380 U.S. at 349; see also Boissoneault, 926 F.2d at 235; LoRusso, 695 F.2d at 52. The fact that Rule 31 is titled Verdict reinforces the conclusion that it applies to the jury's -- rather than a reviewing court's -- finding of guilt on a lesser-included offense. 174 The government's argument that section 1959(a) covers criminal attempts and, therefore, provides a basis for affirming Dhinsa's conviction on count 11 fares no better. To the extent that section 1959(a) encompasses attempted violations of state law, that is only relevant to whether attempted coercion in the first degree -- if proven beyond a reasonable doubt -- constitutes a crime of violence under that section. However, because we find that the district court failed to instruct the jury that it could find Dhinsa guilty of the lesser offense of attempted coercion in the first degree (and properly instruct them on the elements of that offense), we do not reach the issue of whether the evidence presented at trial supported a conviction on that offense. 175 Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of conviction and the sentence on count 11. Because we vacate Dhinsa's conviction on count 11 based on the district court's failure to instruct the jury on the lesser predicate offense of attempted coercion in the first degree, we express no view on the issue of whether that offense constitutes a crime of violence against [an] individual under the VICAR statute. 18 U.S.C. §1959(a).