Opinion ID: 2049222
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Alleged Inconsistency Between the Finding of Negligent Supervision by the District and the Verdict in Favor of Officer McKoy

Text: The District next contends that because the jury absolved Officer McKoy of false arrest (and of any other tortious conduct), it could not logically find the District liable for negligently supervising her. The two verdicts, according to the District, are intrinsically inconsistent. In essence, the District's argument is that Officer McKoy's superiors could not have negligently failed to prevent her from committing a tort if she did not commit that tort. We disagree with the District's framing of the issue, and therefore with its conclusion. We begin by summarizing the law pertaining to allegedly inconsistent verdicts. In criminal cases, inconsistent verdicts, while not favored, Whitaker v. United States, 617 A.2d 499, 503 (D.C. 1992), [11] are generally allowed to stand. Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390, 393, 52 S.Ct. 189, 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); see also United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65, 105 S.Ct. 471, 83 L.Ed.2d 461 (1984). In civil cases, on the other hand, irreconcilable verdicts are taboo, for in a case in which such a verdict has been returned, the jurors either mistakenly or arbitrarily failed to perform their duty. Both verdicts cannot be right, and in such circumstances courts have set aside both verdicts and awarded a new trial. Lansburgh & Bro. Inc. v. Clark, 75 U.S.App. D.C. 339, 341, 127 F.2d 331, 333 (1942); see also Super. Ct. Civ. R. 49(b) ([w]hen the answers [to written interrogatories] are inconsistent with each other and one or more is likewise inconsistent with the general verdict, judgment shall not be entered; but the [c]ourt shall return the jury for further consideration of its answers or verdict or shall order a new trial); Estate of Underwood v. National Credit Union Admin., 665 A.2d 621, 645 (D.C.1995); Bowler v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 563 A.2d 344, 348 (D.C.1989). A corollary to the proscription of inconsistent verdicts in civil litigation is that [w]here there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers to special interrogatories consistent, they must be resolved [in] that way. Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores, Inc. v. Ellerman Lines, Ltd., 369 U.S. 355, 364, 82 S.Ct. 780, 7 L.Ed.2d 798 (1962) (emphasis added); accord, Bowler, 563 A.2d at 348 (quoting 76 AM. JUR. 2d Trial, § 1196, at 158 (1975) (quoting Atlantic & Gulf Stevedores )). [12] The court's duty to harmonize the answers, if it is reasonably possible to do so, arises from the Seventh Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial. Id. ; see also Gallick v. Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co., 372 U.S. 108, 119, 83 S.Ct. 659, 9 L.Ed.2d 618 (1963) ([i]t is fundamental that every attempt must be made to harmonize a jury's verdict.... We therefore must attempt to reconcile the jury's findings, by exegesis, if necessary ... before we are free to disregard the jury's verdict and remand the case for a new trial.) (emphasis added, citations omitted). The applicable principles have been effectively summarized at 75 B. AM.JUR. 2d Trial, § 1586, at 378-80 (2007)a later edition of the authority cited by this court in Bowler and we quote from that treatise at some length: A court may harmonize inconsistent responses in a special verdict by exercising its own powers of interpretation. Only where verdicts are so logically and legally inconsistent that they cannot be reconciled will they be set aside. To justify setting aside an otherwise valid jury verdict, special verdict answers must be ineluctably inconsistent. The presumption on appeal is that jurors do not intend to return conflicting answers, but rather the contrary. As a general rule, a reviewing court indulges every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of the verdicts. Where special verdict answers appear to be inconsistent but there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers consistent, they must be resolved that way. If the answers to special verdict questions can be reconciled on any theory, the verdict will not be disturbed. The trial court possesses broad discretion in attempting to harmonize inconsistent answers. The applicable standard is whether the answers can be reconciled in any reasonable manner consistent with its fair inferences. If it is impossible to harmonize such answers, then they cancel one another out and should be disregarded by the court. A court may not strike down conflicting jury answers if there is any reasonable basis upon which they may be reconciled. The reviewing court, upon reviewing the jury's answers, must not determine whether the findings may be viewed as conflicting, but rather, must ascertain if there is any reasonable basis upon which the answers may be reconciled. (Footnotes containing extensive authorities from numerous jurisdictions omitted.) In light of the strong constitutionally-based policy in favor of harmonizing, where reasonably possible, apparently inconsistent verdicts (or a jury's arguably inconsistent answers to interrogatories), some courts have held that a jury's facially inconsistent verdict does not require a new trial if the inconsistency can fairly be attributed to the jury's misunderstanding of the court's instructions. Keehr v. Consolidated Freightways of Delaware, Inc., 825 F.2d 133, 138 n. 7 (7th Cir.1987); Silverberg v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 710 F.2d 678, 685 n. 10 (11th Cir. 1983). In Keehr, the court, indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption in favor of the legality of jury verdicts, affirmed a judgment based on ostensibly inconsistent verdictsfor the plaintiff as to invasion of privacy but against her as to defamation on the ground, inter alia, that the jury may have misunderstood a key instruction: Cynthia testified that she was not aware of any damage to her reputation resulting from Nisun's statement. Under the court's instructions on slander, Cynthia's testimony should not have precluded the jury from returning a verdict in her favor on the defamation claim. Her testimony went only to the question of damages. The jury, however, might have thought that, without any evidence of damage to her reputation, it could not find for Cynthia on this claim. 825 F.2d at 138 n. 7. In Silverberg, the court found it to be manifestly clear that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the new trial motion because a jury verdict inconsistent on its face does not require a new trial if the inconsistency may reasonably be attributed to the jury's misunderstanding of the jury instructions. 710 F.2d at 685 n. 10. [13] In light of these principles, we conclude that the trial judge did not abuse her broad discretion, see, e.g., Strauss v. Waseca Vill. Bowl, 378 N.W.2d 131, 133 (Minn. Ct.App.1985) and authorities there cited, in concluding that the jury's verdict in favor of Officer McKoy with respect to the tort claims against her was not irreconcilable with its finding of liability against the District for negligent supervision. The judge had instructed the jury that it was a valid defense to unlawful arrest if the officer reasonably believed in good faith that her conduct towards the plaintiff was lawful. Further, the judge added that in determining whether the arrest was made in good faith, you must consider the evidence from the defendant's perspective, not from the plaintiff's perspective. Given Detective Rauf's pointed question whether that's an automatic lock-up and the apparent view of Sergeants McLean and Jackson that Mr. Tulin should be arrested, the jury could reasonably find that Officer McKoythe lowest police person on the totem pole or, in the words of Mr. Tulin's counsel, the puppet rather than the puppeteer [14] believed in good faith that she had the legal right and obligation to make the arrest. For the reasons set forth in Part III of this opinion, however, the jury could further fairly conclude that regardless of Officer McKoy's bona fide but mistaken belief to the contrary, the sergeants at the scene should have recognized that the investigation was inadequate and that the arrest was unlawful, but that they nevertheless failed to prevent Officer McKoy from making it. Accordingly, the jury could reasonably find that the District, through Sergeants McLean and Jackson, was negligent in its duty to supervise Officer McKoy and to protect Mr. Tulin from a wrongful arrest. Such a finding was not ineluctably inconsistent [15] (or indeed, inconsistent at all) with the jury's determination that Officer McKoy was not personally liable for false arrest. [16] For the foregoing reasons, we discern no error in the award against the District for negligent supervision.