Opinion ID: 1178403
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: right to plead guilty in juvenile court

Text: Appellants assign error to the juvenile court's refusal to accept their offers to plead guilty to the charges filed against them in juvenile court. They contend that by virtue of RCW 10.40.060 and language in State v. Martin, 94 Wn.2d 1, 614 P.2d 164 (1980), they were entitled to enter pleas of guilty 1 day after arraignment in juvenile court despite the prosecutor's motion to have the juvenile court decline jurisdiction. The rules of procedure for juvenile courts are set out in the Juvenile Court Rules. JuCR 1.4(b) provides that: The Superior Court Criminal Rules shall apply in juvenile offense proceedings when not inconsistent with these rules and applicable statutes. (Italics ours.) JuCR 7.6(a) states that [t]he arraignment of an alleged juvenile offender is governed by CrR 4.1. JuCR 7.6(b) provides that [t]he taking of a plea of an alleged juvenile offender is governed by CrR 4.2. CrR 4.1(a) clearly states that promptly after an information is filed, the defendant should be arraigned. The arraignment procedure essentially consists of ascertaining the defendant's name, advising the defendant of certain rights including the right to counsel, and informing the defendant of the charges that have been filed. CrR 4.1(b)(e). Appellants argue, and we agree, that they were arraigned before Juvenile Court Judge Hamilton on August 12, 1981, on the amended informations charging each of them with conspiracy to commit first degree robbery, first degree robbery, and first degree felony murder. Appellants contend that regardless of the prosecutor's notification of his intent to seek a decline of juvenile court jurisdiction, upon arraignment they were immediately afforded the statutory right to enter pleas of guilty. Appellants find this right in RCW 10.40.060, which reads: In answer to the arraignment, the defendant may move to set aside the indictment or information, or he may demur or plead to it, and is entitled to one day after arraignment in which to answer thereto if he demand it. (Italics ours.) Appellants interpret this statute to give them the ability to demand to enter pleas of guilty to the juvenile court charges within 1 day of their arraignments. They then argue that since they are entitled to enter pleas of guilty, the juvenile court must accept those guilty pleas under the Martin reasoning. In Martin, this court addressed the question of a defendant's ability to plead guilty to first degree murder and thereby avoid the possibility of the death penalty. Although we recognized that there is no constitutional right to plead guilty to a criminal charge, United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 20 L.Ed.2d 138, 88 S.Ct. 1209 (1968), we noted that it is well established that the State may confer such a right by statute or by other means. North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n. 11, 27 L.Ed.2d 162, 91 S.Ct. 160 (1970). Martin, at 4. We found such a right in CrR 4.2(a), and went on to hold: Although the State appears to argue to the contrary, we have been informed of no statute or rule of court which grants a trial court authority to decline a plea of guilty made competently, knowingly, voluntarily, unconditionally, unequivocally and on advice of counsel. Moreover, unlike the law in some states, our rules and statutes nowhere suggest that prosecutorial approval is required before a defendant may plead guilty. Accordingly, we hold that in this state, a criminal defendant has the right to plead guilty unhampered by a prosecuting attorney's opinions or desires. Martin, at 5. Appellants insist the above language from Martin is equally applicable to juvenile court guilty pleas made competently, knowingly, voluntarily, unconditionally, unequivocally, and on advice of counsel. They point out that CrR 4.2, as well as the holding in Martin itself, is made applicable to the juvenile courts through JuCR 7.6(b). Therefore, appellants argue they were entitled to plead guilty to the juvenile court charges and avoid adult criminal prosecution. We disagree. [1] The critical distinction between Martin and the cases now before us is that here, the juvenile court was required to conduct a decline hearing under RCW 13.40.110(1)(a). That provision reads, in pertinent part: Unless waived by the court, the parties, and their counsel, a decline hearing shall be held where: (a) The respondent is sixteen or seventeen years of age and the information alleges a class A felony or an attempt to commit a class A felony; ... (Italics ours.) RCW 13.40.110(1)(a). The above provision was applicable to appellants Frazier and Spencer because at the time of their arraignments, appellants were 16 and 17 years of age, respectively, and both were charged with class A felonies. The prosecution specifically requested that decline hearings be held under the statute, so no question is presented as to a waiver of those hearings. Therefore, the juvenile court was bound by the statute to hold decline hearings to decide whether or not to transfer appellants Frazier and Spencer for adult criminal prosecution. We think the mandatory language of RCW 13.40.110(1)(a) requires the issue of jurisdiction over the juvenile to be resolved as a prerequisite to any further proceedings on the merits of the case, either in juvenile or superior court. Thus, a motion to decline jurisdiction under RCW 13.40.110(1)(a) stays further action on the merits of the case until a decline hearing is held in accordance with the guidelines of Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 566-67, 16 L.Ed.2d 84, 86 S.Ct. 1045 (1966). See also State v. Holland, 98 Wn.2d 507, 515 n. 2, 656 P.2d 1056 (1983). Put another way, the juvenile court is without authority to resolve the case on the merits, such as by acceptance of a guilty plea, as long as a motion to decline juvenile court jurisdiction under RCW 13.40.110(1)(a) is pending. Our construction of RCW 13.40.110(1)(a) prevents the juvenile court only from accepting a guilty plea prior to the resolution of a decline hearing. The juvenile court can, of course, continue to require juvenile defendants to enter pleas of guilty or not guilty under RCW 13.40.130(1). In all other respects, the juvenile court retains plenary powers to perform any procedural requirements necessary to the efficient processing of the case. As previously pointed out, the Superior Court Criminal Rules apply to juvenile offense proceedings  when not inconsistent with these rules and applicable statutes.  (Italics ours.) JuCR 1.4(b). It seems clear to us that recognition of a juvenile's right to force acceptance of a juvenile court guilty plea under CrR 4.2 and Martin would be entirely inconsistent with the mandatory decline hearing requirements of RCW 13.40.110(1)(a). Thus, we hold Martin to be inapplicable to juvenile offense proceedings where, as here, a pending motion for decline of juvenile court jurisdiction is required under RCW 13.40.110(1)(a). The juvenile court below properly refused to accept the proffered guilty pleas of appellants Frazier and Spencer prior to resolution of their decline hearings. We find no error.