Opinion ID: 1942603
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Failure to Request Jury Instructions on Mental Health Statutory Mitigators

Text: Finally, Evans alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to request jury instructions on the mental health statutory mitigators based on evidence at trial that Evans was drinking prior to shooting Johnson and was slightly intoxicated at the time of the shooting. In particular, Evans points to three places in his trial testimony where he admits he was drinking prior to the shooting and to Sammy Hogan's testimony that he and Evans had been drinking together earlier that day. Evans argues that this evidence was sufficient to justify a jury instruction on the mental health statutory mitigators and that counsel was deficient for failing to make this request. Evans argues that he was prejudiced because had counsel requested these instructions, the jury would have been instructed on the mental health statutory mitigators, creating a reasonable probability that the jury would not have recommended the death sentence. The trial court found that counsel was not ineffective for failing to request the mental health statutory mitigators on the basis that Evans was slightly intoxicated at the time of the shooting. The trial court held that counsel could not be deemed deficient for failing to present a mitigator that was not supported by the record or would have been inconsistent with the evidence and testimony presented by the defendant. Cherry v. State, 781 So.2d 1040, 1050 (Fla.2000). Specifically, the trial court found that evidence of Evans' intoxication was refuted by Evans' trial testimony that while he was slightly intoxicated he was not drunk and had a clear recollection of what happened. Furthermore, the trial court found that these mitigators were inconsistent with the defense's theory that the shooting was an accident. Thus, the trial court found that counsel was reasonable for not requesting instructions on the mental health statutory mitigators. The trial court also found that Evans had not demonstrated how counsel's failure to request these instructions prejudiced him. The trial court's findings regarding the deficiency prong are supported by the record. As the trial court noted, Evans' trial testimony clearly refuted his current argument that he was impaired at the time of the shooting. Evans insisted that the shooting was an accident and that, in spite of having consumed some alcohol, he was focused and had a clear recollection of everything that was happening. In light of these circumstances, we agree with the trial court that counsel's decision not to request instructions on statutory mitigation for lack of grounds was reasonable. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (The reasonableness of counsel's actions may be determined or substantially influenced by the defendant's own statements or actions.); see also Brown v. State, 894 So.2d 137, 146 (Fla.2004) (same). Thus, counsel cannot be deemed deficient for failing to request an instruction on a mitigator that would have been inconsistent with the evidence and testimony presented by the defendant. Cherry, 781 So.2d at 1050. [24] In addition, Evans has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by counsel's failure to request these instructions because he has not shown that the sentencing court would have given the instructions on statutory mitigation to the jury. In Cooper v. State, 492 So.2d 1059, 1062 (Fla. 1986), we held that the trial court did not err by refusing to instruct the jury on statutory mitigation because the presentation of evidence of some alcohol and marijuana consumption, without more, does not require a jury instruction. See also Duest v. State, 855 So.2d 33, 42 (Fla. 2003) (citing Cooper for this proposition). We have recognized that evidence of [the defendant's] probable mental state at the time of the murder, [or] evidence of a pervasive mental condition that affected [the defendant] every day is required. Duest, 855 So.2d at 42 (holding that trial court did not err in refusing to give statutory mitigation instructions because, although there was evidence of defendant's long-term drug abuse and consumption of intoxicants . . . in the hours preceding the crime there was no evidence indicating that [defendant] was substantially impaired at the time of the murder or that his ability to control his behavior was reduced by drug or alcohol abuse) (citing Cooper, 492 So.2d at 1062). Based on the record, Evans has not shown that the sentencing court would have given these instructions had counsel requested them. At the guilt phase, there was no evidence presented that Evans suffered a pervasive mental condition or that he was under the influence of alcohol to the extent that he could not control his actions. The only evidence of Evans' probable mental state at the time of the murder was his trial testimony and, as in Duest, this testimony does not support an instruction on the mental health statutory mitigators. Furthermore, we recognize that the sentencing court considered the mental health statutory mitigators and found no evidence to support them. We find that Evans has not demonstrated that there is a reasonable probability that his sentence would have been different had counsel requested instructions on statutory mitigation based on Evans' use of alcohol prior to the shooting. We are confident in the outcome and therefore affirm the trial court's denial of this claim.