Opinion ID: 1927948
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Secondary Assumption of the Risk

Text: Next, defendants' contend that even if the firefighter's rule is inapplicable, summary judgment is nonetheless appropriate because, by accepting employment as an inspector of fire-alarm and sprinkler systems, plaintiff assumed the risk of injury from defects in such systems. In posing such an argument at the summary-judgment stage, defendants refer to secondary assumption of the risk as opposed to primary assumption of the risk. Secondary assumption of the risk, like primary assumption of the risk, may be invoked as a defense by a tortfeasor to escape or to diminish liability. See Drew v. Wall, 495 A.2d 229, 231 (R.I. 1985); Rickey v. Roden, 421 A.2d 539, 543 (R.I.1980). Generally, whether a plaintiff assumed a risk of harm and thereby absolved a defendant from creating an unreasonable risk of injury is an issue for a trier of fact to resolve. Drew, 495 A.2d at 231. Only if the record suggests but one inference, however, is this issue one to be decided by the trial justice on a summary-judgment motion. Id. Here, the record is not so clear as to justify removing the issue from the jury's consideration. To establish this defense, a defendant must prove that a plaintiff knew of the existence of a danger, appreciated its unreasonable character, and then voluntarily exposed himself to it. Id. The standard is a subjective one requiring us to review the evidence to determine what this particular plaintiff actually saw, knew, understood, and appreciated at the time of his injury. Id. at 231-32; see also Filosa v. Courtois Sand and Gravel Co., 590 A.2d 100, 103 (R.I.1991). Here, plaintiff alleges that the various defendants manufactured, assembled, and/or installed the subject sprinkler system in a negligent manner. Further, he contends that defendants' failure to pretest the system exposed him to an unreasonable risk of harm from defects that were otherwise detectable. The issue to be resolved, therefore, is whether during his inspection of the sprinkler system plaintiff perceived and appreciated the risk of an exploding water-line valve that could be due to defendants' negligence. Because we believe a rational trier of fact could find that plaintiff did not fully appreciate the risk of injury from this cause, the trial justice erred in granting summary judgments for defendants. For example, there is no suggestion that the failed sprinkler system had any visible defects that would have caused plaintiff to take special precautions to guard against the risk of a potential rupture during the inspection process. Moreover, defendants had informed plaintiff that their sprinkler system was ready for certification. In depositions, both plaintiff and his superior, Chief James Smith, stated that they believed a standard pretest of the sprinkler system had been conducted. Both men further testified that had they known of defendants' failure to perform such a test, the inspection would not have taken place. In these circumstances plaintiff had no prior warning of the system's instability, and neither his general familiarity with sprinkler systems nor his experience as a fire-alarm inspector would have caused him to realize that this system posed any imminent danger to him. Thus, unlike typical situations involving the doctrine of assumption of the risk, there is no inferable evidence that plaintiff here voluntarily encountered an obvious risk of injury when he undertook this inspection. Cf. Filosa, 590 A.2d at 103-04 (decedent and owner of dilapidated building, who was repeatedly warned not to go into the building because of the danger of a wall collapsing, assumed the risk of injury by working behind it); Drew, 495 A.2d at 232 (decedent who was aware of danger posed by running internal-combustion engine in enclosed space assumed the risk of asphyxiation by restarting engine after becoming dizzy and after reentering pit); Rickey, 421 A.2d at 544 (woman assumed risk of injury when in response to several options, she chose to ascend narrow stairway with no handrail). Rather, any risk involved here appeared to plaintiff to be remote and extremely unlikely to occur. In moving for summary judgment, the defendants failed to provide any evidence supporting their contention that the plaintiff could have discovered the system's defects, realized the danger, and avoided the risk of injury posed by a ruptured water-line valve. Therefore, we believe there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding to what extent, if at all, the plaintiff assumed the risk of the injuries he suffered. Consequently a trial on the merits is warranted, and the trial justice erred in granting the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Conclusion For these reasons the plaintiffs appeal is sustained, the summary judgments are vacated, and the papers in the case are remanded to the Superior Court for trial.