Opinion ID: 198029
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Loss of Money or Property

Text: 38 ADL had the burden of showing not only that the acts were unfair or deceptive, but also that it suffered a loss of money or property under Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 93A, § 11.  '[M]oney' means money, not time, and ... 'property' means the kind of property that is purchased or leased, not such intangibles as a right to a sense of security, to peace of mind, or to personal liberty. Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 369 Mass. 33, 337 N.E.2d 701, 709 (1975). And that loss of money or property must stem from Dooyang's misrepresentations regarding payment. See Lyle Richards Int'l, Ltd. v. Ashworth, 132 F.3d 111, 114-15 (1st Cir.1997) (loss of money or property required under § 11 must stem from deceptive act). It is the misrepresentations about payment which must have caused the loss because those misrepresentations, not the formation of the contract extension itself, took place in Massachusetts and so are subject to Chapter 93A. [W]hether the requisite causal connection has been proven is one of fact that will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. DiMarzo v. American Mut. Ins. Co., 389 Mass. 85, 449 N.E.2d 1189, 1199 (1983) (citation omitted). 39 This requirement is satisfied by the combination of ADL's loss of the use of the money owed by Dooyang together with ADL's expenses incurred attempting to collect Dooyang's debt. While we have found no § 11 cases directly on point, a number of cases under § 9 are helpful in the analysis. The closest § 11 case is Community Builders, in which false promises to pay and delay caused a loss of use of money, attendant expenses, and caused plaintiff to continue to do work. Here plaintiff did not continue to do work and so the Appeals Court did not face the precise issue that we face. 40 Massachusetts courts have held in § 9 cases against insurers under Chapter 93A and Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 176D that the loss of the use of money owed to a plaintiff, once liability is reasonably clear, is a form of damage compensable by Chapter 93A. See Clegg v. Butler, 424 Mass. 413, 676 N.E.2d 1134, 1139 (1997) (stating that when an insurer wrongfully withholds funds from a claimant, it is depriving the claimant of the use of those funds and so constitutes injury cognizable under Chapter 93A though the insurer eventually pays). Clegg reiterated the rule announced in Schwartz v. Rose, 418 Mass. 41, 634 N.E.2d 105, 109 (1994), that the loss of the use of money is precisely the type of damage we have described as appropriately being subject to multiplication ... under c. 93A. Schwartz was not a claim against an insurer under Chapter 176D, and so we take it that the Schwartz rule has general application, at least under § 9. 41 In 1979 the Massachusetts legislature amended Chapter 93A to eliminate the requirement of pleading a loss of money or property under § 9. See Smith v. Caggiano, 12 Mass.App.Ct. 41, 421 N.E.2d 473, 475 (1981). Now, under § 9, a plaintiff must prove that he or she has been injured by the defendant's unfair or deceptive practices. Mass Gen. Laws. ch. 93A, § 9. One question is whether the cases under § 9, which requires only a showing that plaintiff has been injured, provide guidance on what is meant by loss of money or property under § 11. The two phrases are not coextensive. Injury is a broader term, and includes, for example, emotional distress. See Leardi v. Brown, 394 Mass. 151, 474 N.E.2d 1094, 1101 (1985) (interpreting injury under § 9 to include an invasion of a legally protected interest, but no harm for which actual damages can be awarded). But loss of money or property is certainly one form of injury. 42 We think the § 9 cases provide guidance. In these § 9 cases, the court rejected arguments that the plaintiff suffered no injury because he suffered only a delay in payment rather than an absolute loss. Certainly, the loss of use of money, along with attendant collection and other expenses would seem to be both an injury under § 9 and a loss of money or property under § 11. Cf. Caggiano, 421 N.E.2d at 476 ( 'Money' means ... 'money,' but its loss may occur short of physical transfer of legal tender.). 43 In addition to the loss of the use of the money, Dooyang's unfair withholding of payment caused ADL to make expenditures to recover the money owed: long-distance phone calls and faxes to South Korea, and meetings with Dooyang executives. Such expenditures have been found to satisfy the loss of money or property requirement. See Alcan Aluminum Corp. v. Carlton Aluminum of New England, 35 Mass.App.Ct. 161, 617 N.E.2d 1005, 1013 (1993) (Carlton did suffer an actual loss of money or property--by responding to customer complaints and lawsuits about the defective siding....); Bump v. Robbins, 24 Mass.App.Ct. 296, 509 N.E.2d 12, 22 (1987) (There is evidence of out-of-pocket expenditures for travel and long-distance telephone calls, time spent at meetings and in other related activities, and the usual charges Bump made for his time.); see also Baldassari, 337 N.E.2d at 709 (when plaintiffs suffered only emotional distress, no loss of money or property, but a different question would have been presented had plaintiffs suffered expenses). 11 This combination of expenses and loss of use of money meant that ADL suffered a loss of money or property caused by Dooyang's second act of deception. 44 A question remains about the proper measure of damages in this case. The district court doubled the breach of contract damages, but also ruled that Dooyang's initial act of deception was not covered by Chapter 93A. This theoretically could raise the issue of whether damages should be limited to only those damages caused by the second act of deception or whether § 11 precludes such a measure of damages. Dooyang does not argue in its brief that the court's doubling of the entire amount of the underlying contract damages was error, but maintains only that there was no loss of money or property caused by the second deceptive act as required by § 11. Dooyang's brief perfunctorily challenges the district court's decision to award double damages, but does not address the proper amount to be doubled. Dooyang has thus conceded the issue of the amount to be doubled, and we do not reach the theoretical issue. See King v. Town of Hanover, 116 F.3d 965, 970 (1st Cir.1997) (claims not argued on appeal are deemed waived). 45 The district court awarded ADL double damages on the ground that Dooyang's misconduct was willful and knowing. The district court clearly articulated its reasons for levying multiple damages, and we agree. See ADL II, 979 F.Supp. at 926-28. For the reasons stated in the opinion of the district court, we do not find the award of double damages based on Dooyang's willful deceptive acts to be excessive in this case. 46 The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Costs are awarded to ADL.