Opinion ID: 2449819
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: suppression of evidence because of surveillance privilege

Text: As mentioned supra, Detective Huber testified that the transaction was tape recorded, but the recording was determined to be inaudible. On cross-examination, defense counsel sought to obtain information as to the type of recording device that was used. Huber refused to furnish this information and counsel moved the court to compel the witness to respond. The motion was overruled. Appellant argues that a thorough cross-examination concerning the tape recorder, whether its volume and off/on controls could be manipulated by Payne, or whether Payne could muffle the recorder or otherwise affect the audibility of the recording, was essential to his defense that the alleged drug transaction never occurred and that Payne fabricated the entire event in order to receive his $50.00 snitch payment from Huber. The trial judge sustained the objection to this inquiry on the basis of the so-called police surveillance privilege recognized by the Court of Appeals in Jett v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 862 S.W.2d 908, 910 (1993). Prior to Jett , the surveillance privilege had never been recognized by our courts; nor is it found in Article V of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence. KRE 501 provides in pertinent part as follows: Except as otherwise provided by Constitution or statute or by these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of Kentucky, no person has a privilege to: . . . (2) Refuse to disclose any matter. The proper procedure for amending or adding to the Kentucky Rules of Evidence is established in KRE 1102 and 1103. These procedures do not include amendments or additions created unilaterally by either the General Assembly or the Supreme Court (although we are aware that the General Assembly has enacted post-1992 statutes which purport to create new privileges, e.g., KRS 325.431, KRS 224.01-040). More specifically the rules do not permit the amendment or addition of any new rules of evidence by any court of this Commonwealth except the Supreme Court. Thus, the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it purported to adopt a police surveillance privilege. We overrule Jett v. Commonwealth in that respect. We are aware that the Federal courts recognize a surveillance privilege with respect to the types of devices used by police in surveillance operations in order to prevent criminal elements from learning information which would help them evade future surveillance. E.g., United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1508 (11th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 854, 107 S.Ct. 190 (1986). However, the Federal Rules of Evidence contain no codified rules recognizing specific privileges, but rather permit common law development in criminal cases and require conformance with state law in civil cases. If a police surveillance privilege is to be adopted in this Commonwealth, it must be adopted in accordance with the procedures established in KRE 1102 and 1103. We are unable to perceive how the identification of the type of tape recorder used in this transaction would permit criminal elements from learning information that would help them evade future surveillance. Nevertheless, Detective Huber admitted that the nature of this device was such that Payne could have intentionally affected its operation so as to prevent it from producing an audible recording of the transaction. Since that is the information Appellant sought to prove, any error in suppressing evidence which would further identify the type of recording device used was harmless.