Opinion ID: 612846
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Error Was Plain

Text: We next consider whether the error is plain  that is, whether it is clear under current law. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993). An error is clear where the Supreme Court or this court [] [has] addressed the issue or where the district court's interpretation was clearly erroneous. United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d 1181, 1187 (10th Cir.2003) (quotation omitted). The government notes the district court's error was not plain or obvious at the time of sentencing; there was no Supreme Court precedent on point, and the only relevant Tenth Circuit cases were both unpublished and potentially misleading. See Story, 635 F.3d at 1248. In addition, the question had created a circuit split. Nonetheless, the government concedes this prong based on the recent publication of Story and Tapia, citing our en banc case addressing sentencing error in the wake of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 125 S.Ct. 738, 160 L.Ed.2d 621 (2005), for the proposition that an error is `plain' if it is clear or obvious at the time of appeal.  Aple. Supp. Br. at 10 (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 744-45 (10th Cir.2005) (emphasis added)). It is true that a number of our cases have repeated this standard, although none has done so in any analytical depth. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 558 F.3d 1193, 1200 n. 7 (10th Cir.2009) (This court decided Hays after [the plaintiff's] sentencing had occurred, but while his direct appeal remained pending. Even so, an error will be plain if it is clear or obvious at the time of the appeal.  (quotation omitted) (relying on Gonzalez-Huerta )); United States v. Meacham, 567 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir.2009) (finding an error plain because the law was clear or obvious at the time of the appeal, even though the clarifying case was published after the district court's contested decision); United States v. Mendoza, 543 F.3d 1186, 1192 (10th Cir.2008) ([The plain error] standard applies to the law in place at the time of review rather than at the time of sentencing.). It is worth noting, however, that the question of whether an error must be plain at the time of trial or merely at the time of appeal has divided the circuits. In Olano, while clarifying the application of plain error review, the Supreme Court held only that [a]t a minimum, a court of appeals cannot correct an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law. 507 U.S. at 734, 113 S.Ct. 1770. The Court chose not to address the special case where the error was unclear at the time of trial but becomes clear on appeal because the applicable law has been clarified. Id. The Court subsequently offered a further refinement: where the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal [] it is enough that an error be `plain' at the time of appellate consideration. Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 468, 117 S.Ct. 1544, 137 L.Ed.2d 718 (1997). But Johnson brings no clarity to cases such as the one at hand, where the law at the time of the contested decision was unsettled, but clarified while the appeal was pending. The Ninth and D.C. Circuits have concluded that Johnson articulates a narrow exception to an otherwise broad rule that an error is plain only if it was clear at the time of the district court's decision. See United States v. Mouling, 557 F.3d 658, 663-64 (D.C.Cir.2009); United States v. Turman, 122 F.3d 1167, 1170 (9th Cir. 1997). In Turman, the Ninth Circuit explained we expect district judges to be knowledgeable, not clairvoyant. When the law is such that an experienced district judge cannot be expected to detect the error on his own, that is precisely when it is most important for the parties to object. 122 F.3d at 1170. Only in the circumstances of Johnson, the court asserted, where the law is well settled at the time of trial but later reversed, are objections pointless. Id. In that case, [m]easuring error at the time of trial would result in counsel's inevitably making a long and virtually useless laundry list of objections to rulings that were plainly supported by existing precedent. Id. (quotation omitted). Other circuits, however, observe a blanket rule that plain error is measured at the time of appeal. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 402 F.3d 1303, 1315 n. 7 (11th Cir.2005) vacated on other grounds by 545 U.S. 1125, 125 S.Ct. 2938, 162 L.Ed.2d 863 (2005); United States v. Ross, 77 F.3d 1525, 1539-40 (7th Cir.1996). The Eleventh Circuit has explained that this approach has the advantage of avoiding the necessity of distinguishing between cases in which `the law at the time of trial was settled and clearly contrary to the law at the time of appeal' on the one hand and cases in which it was merely `unsettled' on the other. Smith, 402 F.3d at 1315. The Seventh Circuit has also contended that this practice better comports with the purpose of plain error review, which it described as an exception to the rule of forfeiture where the error is undebatable and significant, and not merely where the district court was at fault. Ross, 77 F.3d at 1539-40. It is the law of this circuit that we side with the latter view. We therefore accept the government's concession, and find the district court's error was plain.