Opinion ID: 1919281
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Sexual Assault of a Child

Text: Davis also contends that the record lacks sufficient evidence to support his conviction for sexual assault of a child. He argues that the statute required the State to prove that the victim experienced `serious personal injury' because of the assault. [10] We disagree. Davis' argument presents an issue of statutory construction, and if the language of a statute is clear, the words of the statute are the end of our inquiry. [11] A person commits sexual assault of a child if he or she subjects another person 14 years of age or younger to sexual contact and the actor is at least 19 years of age or older. [12] Section 28-318(5) defines sexual contact to mean the intentional touching of the victim's sexual or intimate parts or the intentional touching of the victim's clothing covering the immediate area of the victim's sexual or intimate parts. Sexual contact shall also mean the touching by the victim of the actor's sexual or intimate parts or the clothing covering the immediate area of the actor's sexual or intimate parts when such touching is intentionally caused by the actor. Sexual contact shall include only such conduct which can be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification of either party. Intimate parts mean the genital area, groin, inner thighs, buttocks, or breasts. [13] Simply put, we see nothing in §§ 28-318(5) or 28-320.01(1) that shows a serious personal injury was a statutory element when Davis committed his crime. Thus, his serious personal injury argument also fails.