Opinion ID: 479867
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Kohan's Alternative Conspiracy Defense.

Text: 25 In an attempt to establish a lack of intent to defraud Chemical Bank, Kohan testified on his own behalf as to the circumstances surrounding his involvement with Fellouris. In addition, Kohan desired to show that Ragno may have plotted with Fellouris to forge the signatures on the checks so that Brook Fuel would be reimbursed by the bank while Fellouris escaped with the cash proceeds. At a side bar conference, Kohan's counsel advised the trial court that he wanted to prove this theory by questioning the government's witnesses about whether Chemical Bank had reimbursed Brook Fuel for the loss and whether Colombos and Ragno had possibly conspired with Fellouris to defraud the bank. 26 Kohan's counsel explained, Anybody could have traced a signature on that check, including the principals. He stated further, 27 This creates the following possibility: That if he is my uncle and I want him to go abroad and avoid his problems here in the United States, all I have to do is trace my own signature on a check, give him the check, [and] have him cash it. When he is in Morocco, [I] go to the bank and say this is not my signature. My uncle has the money and I have it back too. 28    29    30 And if the company accepts less than the $148,000, the question becomes, why would they. 31 The trial court refused to permit counsel to question Ragno as to his possible involvement with Fellouris, ruling that Kohan could not put in anything which is clearly prejudicial to the government if there is no proof of that, not a scintilla of proof. 32 On the reimbursement issue, the court ruled that whether Chemical Bank had reimbursed Brook Fuel was irrelevant to anything this jury has to decide regarding [Kohan]. For that reason the trial court had also sustained objections to Kohan's questioning of Newby, Colombos, and Chemical Bank's counsel on the reimbursement issue. 33 Since district courts exercise broad discretion in making rulings on the scope of cross-examination, United States v. Bari, 750 F.2d 1169, 1178 (2d Cir.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019, 105 S.Ct. 3482, 87 L.Ed.2d 617 (1985), and determinations of relevance, see United States v. Ebner, 782 F.2d 1120, 1126 (2d Cir.1986), we do not disturb an exercise of that discretion absent a clear showing of abuse, Bari, 750 F.2d at 1178. 34 When a government witness in a criminal case is being cross-examined by the defendant, however, the trial court should allow wide latitude, United States v. Pedroza, 750 F.2d 187, 195 (2d Cir.1984), and the court's discretion  'cannot be expanded to justify a curtailment [of cross-examination that] keeps from the jury relevant and important facts bearing on the trustworthiness of crucial testimony' , id. at 196 (quoting Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414, 423, 73 S.Ct. 369, 375, 97 L.Ed. 447 (1953)). 35 The government relies on United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769 (2d Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040, 104 S.Ct. 704, 79 L.Ed.2d 169 (1984), wherein we stated, 36 Although [defense] counsel may explore certain areas of inquiry in a criminal trial without full knowledge of the answer to anticipated questions, he must, when confronted with a demand for an offer of proof, provide some good faith basis for questioning that alleges adverse facts. 37 Id. at 779. The government's reliance is misplaced, however, because Katsougrakis is readily distinguishable. There, defense counsel sought to inquire whether the government witness had mentioned in an earlier interview with a federal agent that the two arsonists hired by defendants were known as hit men. Id. at 778. The flimsy, Pedroza, 750 F.2d at 196, proffer made by defense counsel was that a private investigator hired by defendants suspected the arsonists were thugs. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d at 779. 38 Here, by contrast, Kohan's counsel based his proffer on previously admitted testimony that provided circumstantial evidence sufficient to support Kohan's conspiracy theory of defense and to allow him to present it to the jury. 39 The testimony of Kohan, Moringiello, Detective Manzello, FBI Agent Shubert, and others is replete with references to a loan Fellouris had made to Brook Fuel and to two checks that were allegedly in repayment of that loan. Moreover, Moringiello telephoned Ragno the day after the checks were cashed to inform him that Fellouris had said you fellows repaid him a loan and/or he ripped you off. Are you fellows missing a substantial sum of money?    I'm talking about $140,000. Ragno, in response, said, No way we could be missing $140,000, and took no action to check the status of the company's account at Chemical Bank. 40 When Moringiello met Fellouris at the airport later that morning and told him of the phone call to Ragno, Fellouris simply responded that the principals of Brook Fuel were stupid and would not even know the money was missing. Additionally, the missing page of Brook Fuel checks that Fellouris had stolen on February 26 went undetected until discovered by Colombos on Monday, March 4, when, after further inquiry, it was also discovered that two unauthorized checks in the amounts of $71,500 and $72,000 had been drawn on the company's account. Finally, Brook Fuel settled its claim against Chemical Bank for wrongful payment on those checks for an undisclosed amount, presumably less than full reimbursement. Kohan's counsel argues persuasively that if the settlement amount is substantially less than the claimed loss, the company's willingness to accept such an amount might be further proof of a collusive scheme between it and Fellouris. 41 We conclude, therefore, that Kohan's proposed cross-examination concerning Brook Fuel's possible involvement with Fellouris and reimbursement by Chemical Bank was not prejudicial hypothesis, but rather was relevant to the case and sufficiently supported in the record. A jury that was presented through effective cross-examination with the facts stated above might very well be left with a reasonable doubt as to whether Kohan intended to conspire with Fellouris, Acker, and Lowery to defraud Chemical Bank. Indeed, if Kohan's theory is correct, the jury might well conclude that Brook Fuel, in conspiring with Fellouris, authorized the traced signatures of Ragno appearing on the Brook Fuel checks, that the checks were, therefore, not forged, and that Chemical Bank was justified in cashing the checks. In that event, Kohan's alleged fraud would be set in a much different light, and the verdict might well be different. 42 Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge abused her discretion both in limiting the scope of Kohan's cross-examinations in this regard and in deeming the reimbursement issue irrelevant to Kohan's defense.