Opinion ID: 2799391
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether the comments were improper

Text: Improper suggestions, insinuations, or assertions that are calculated to produce a wrongful conviction by misleading the jury or appealing to the jury’s passion or prejudice are forbidden in closing arguments. United States v. Rodriguez, 765 F.2d 1546, 1559-60 (11th Cir. 1985). However, “there is no prohibition on colorful and perhaps flamboyant remarks if they relate to the evidence adduced at trial.” Bailey, 123 F.3d at 1400 (internal quotation marks omitted). Remarks can also be improper “if they attempt to bolster the credibility of a witness based on the government’s reputation or through alluding to evidence not admitted at trial.” Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1256. Improper bolstering occurs if the “jury could reasonably believe that the prosecutor was indicating a personal belief in the witness’ credibility.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). However, this prohibition does not forbid prosecutors from arguing credibility based on evidence admitted at trial. Id.; see United States v. Schmitz, 634 F.3d 1247, 1270 (11th Cir. 2011) (“We have no doubt that there are some cases where a prosecutor is justified in arguing during closing arguments that a particular witness is lying, if that is an inference supported by the evidence at trial.”). We agree with Hope that the prosecutor’s closing arguments contained some clearly improper statements. First, the prosecutor’s reference to September 11 19 Case: 14-12462 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 Page: 20 of 25 was, in context, improper and appears calculated solely to appeal to the jury’s passion or prejudice. While the reference to the number of claims HNS submitted on September 11, 2006, in and of itself, was based on the evidence presented, the prosecutor went further. In stating that “it “makes [him] sick” to think that he’ll remember September 11 for Hope’s Medicaid fraud, the prosecutor implied that the juries should also be disgusted not solely by the evidence of Hope’s actions but rather by some specious connection to an emotionally charged event. Therefore, the remark was improper because it was intended solely to inflame. Second, the prosecutor made an improper appeal to the jurors’ emotions by asking the jurors to place themselves in the position of parents whose children were “stabb[ed] with a pin” by HNS employees without medical backgrounds or training. See United States v. McGarity, 669 F.3d 1218, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012); cf. Grossman v. McDonough, 466 F.3d 1325, 1348 (11th Cir. 2006) (habeas case discussing improper “Golden Rule” arguments under Florida law). Alone, the prosecutor’s simple use of the word “stab” as opposed to “prick” would not have been improper because it related to evidence admitted at trial and emphasized the government’s position that the services HNS provided to Head Start children were fraudulent. But, in context, the remarks—particularly the invitation to the jurors to put themselves in the positions of the children’s parents—plainly were an improper appeal to the jurors’ emotions. 20 Case: 14-12462 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 Page: 21 of 25 We do not find that the other remarks challenged by Hope were improper. With respect to the statement that Garcia was “honest,” the prosecutor did not improperly vouch for a witness’s credibility. After stating that Garcia was honest, the prosecutor went on to discuss her testimony and the other evidence introduced at trial. Therefore, in context, we understand the prosecutor’s “honest” remark to be an argument in favor of finding Garcia credible based on her behavior on the stand and the evidence admitted. See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1256. Finally, the prosecutor’s reference to the Ten Commandments’ prohibition against stealing was made in response to Hope’s counsel’s reference to a Biblical passage. We have explained that “[a] prosecutor is entitled to make a fair response to defense counsel’s arguments,” even if the statement would otherwise be inadmissible. United States v. Frank, 599 F.3d 1221, 1238 (11th Cir. 2010). In any case, the prosecutor did not ask the jury to decide the case on a religious or emotional basis, and the remark served mainly to highlight the government’s position that the case was fundamentally about theft. See Bailey, 123 F.3d at 140001 (holding that two references to the Bible during closing argument were not improper). 3. Whether Hope has shown prejudice to her substantial rights Improper remarks alone will not entitle a defendant to relief. Rather, Hope must show prejudice to her substantial rights. In other words, Hope must 21 Case: 14-12462 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 Page: 22 of 25 demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for the improper remarks, the result of the trial would have been different. Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1256. She has not done so for several reasons. See id. (delineating factors to assess the prejudicial effect of a prosecutor’s conduct). We consider whether a defendant’s substantial rights were prejudiced “in the context of the entire trial, along with any curative instruction.” Id. First, the improper remarks were isolated. They were not interrelated or an extension of impermissible comments earlier in the proceeding. See, e.g., Schmitz, 634 F.3d at 1270 (finding that comments in closing argument were improper because “they were a clear continuation” of improper questions during crossexamination). Second, the district court gave curative instructions. See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1256 (stating that, where the district court takes proper curative measures, “we will reverse only if the evidence is so prejudicial as to be incurable by that measure.”). The court instructed the jurors that their decisions “must be based only on the evidence presented here in this courtroom, that “anything the lawyers say is not evidence,” and that they “must not be influenced in any way by either sympathy for or prejudice against the Defendant or the Government.” Third, and most significantly, the government convincingly established Hope’s guilt by admissible, inculpatory evidence, the vast majority of which is 22 Case: 14-12462 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 Page: 23 of 25 uncontested by Hope on appeal and unrelated to the errors raised. See id. (“When the record contains sufficient independent evidence of guilt, any error is harmless.” (quotation omitted)). At trial, the government presented extensive documentary and testimonial evidence of guilt from fraud investigators, the case agent, numerous former HNS employees, Hope’s cooperating co-conspirator, and the parents of Head Start children whose billing information was used by Hope. Hope does not argue that the evidence of her guilt was weak or insubstantial. In addition, Hope testified on her own behalf. By doing so, she ran the risk that the jury would disbelieve her and conclude that the opposite of her testimony was true. United States v. Brown, 53 F.3d 312, 314 (11th Cir. 1995). For the foregoing reasons, Hope has not met her burden of showing that the prosecutor’s improper comments prejudicially affected her substantial rights. See Lopez, 590 F.3d at 1256-58; McGarity, 669 F.3d at 1246-47. This fact, however, does not excuse the prosecutor’s clearly improper remarks, and we pause to remind the prosecutor of his special obligations in our adversary system: The [prosecutor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence 23 Case: 14-12462 Date Filed: 05/07/2015 Page: 24 of 25 suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor— indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).