Opinion ID: 107545
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the words as they existed.

Text: In the first phase of this case, the problem was which, if any, of the five Gulf States had boundaries that were cognizable for purposes of the Submerged Lands Act grant. Congress had limited boundaries so cognizable to boundaries as they existed at admission or as heretofore approved by Congress. The Court's decision at that time therefore turned entirely on the meaning of those two terms, which were consequently subjected to exacting analysis. We at that time rejected a contention made on behalf of the States, but apparently now adopted by the Court, that the words as they existed referred simply to the location of state boundaries at the time of admission; [15] we held, quite to the contrary, that the purpose of these words was not to affect the location of present state boundaries but to single out those boundary claims that had at one time or another been approved by Congress as the only ones cognizable under the Act. We reasoned as follows: The earlier `quitclaim' bills defined the grant in terms of presently existing boundaries, since such boundaries would have circumscribed the lands owned by the States under an application of Pollard to the marginal sea. . . . Some suggestions were made, however, that States might by their own action have effectively extended, or be able to extend, their boundaries subsequent to admission. To exclude the possibility that States might be able to establish present boundaries based on extravagant unilateral extensions, . . . subsequent drafts of the bill introduced the twofold test of the present Actâ boundaries which existed at the time of admission and boundaries heretofore approved by Congress. It is apparent that the purpose of the change was not to alter the basic theory of the grant, but to assure that the determination of boundaries would be made in accordance with that theoryâ that the States should be `restored' to the ownership of submerged lands within their present boundaries, determined, however, by the historic action taken with respect to them jointly by Congress and the State.  [16] (Emphasis added.) It was on this theory that we held that the words as they existed should properly be read to refer to the moment of admission rather than to preadmission claims, because Congress' purpose had been to allow only claims that it had approved. [17] Having defined the term as they existed to mean as acknowledged by Congress at the moment of admission, the Court in the prior litigation went on to hold that the Resolution of Annexation of 1845 [18] had, indirectly, been a congressional acknowledgment of the boundary established by the Republic of Texas Boundary Act of 1836, and that this act therefore defines Texas' present boundary. [19] The Act reads, in relevant part, as follows: beginning at the mouth of the Sabine river, and running west along the Gulf of Mexico three leagues from land, to the mouth of the Rio Grande . . . . 1 Laws, Republic of Texas 133. (Emphasis in the Court's prior opinion. [20] ) The problem before us hereâ where the boundary of Texas isâ must be answered by determining where three leagues from land now is, for Texas has no historic boundary claim at all unless it is to three leagues from land. The question is one that the Court does not even reach: should the words from land be taken, today, to refer to the shoreline in 1836, or 1845, or to the present shoreline, and, if to the last of these, should land include artificial accretions built upon the land? It is to that question that I now turn.