Opinion ID: 1113445
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Computation of Petitioner's Age

Text: (20a) It is undisputed that petitioner committed the charged offenses on October 20, 1984, the day before his 16th birthday. Because the juvenile court retains exclusive jurisdiction over minors less than 16 years old ( In re Gladys R., supra, 1 Cal.3d at p. 862), we thus must determine whether petitioner turned 16 years old on the day preceding his 16th birthday. Were this not a legal question, it would be easily answered, for the common, everyday method of age calculation holds that a person attains a certain age on his or her corresponding birthday. Nevertheless, the common law rule for calculating a person's age has always been that one reaches a given age at the earliest moment of the day before their anniversary of birth. (32 Cal.Jur.3d, Family Law, § 6, pp. 36-37; 42 Am.Jur.2d, Infants, § 6, pp. 13-14; Annot. (1949) 5 A.L.R.2d 1142; 1 Blackstone's Commentaries 463.) The rationale is that `[a] person is in existence on the day of his birth. On the first anniversary he or she has lived one year and one day.' ( State v. Alley (Tenn. 1980) 594 S.W.2d 381, 382, quoted in Johnson, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at p. 1095.) The subject is controlled in California by Civil Code section 26, enacted in 1872, which states: The periods specified in the preceding section must be calculated from the first minute of the day on which persons are born to the same minute of the corresponding day completing the period of minority. (21) Our primary duty, of course, is to construe the statute to effectuate the Legislature's intent. `In construing ... statutory provisions, ... the intent of the enacting body is the paramount consideration. [Citations.] We are mindful that the goal of statutory construction is ascertainment of legislative intent so that the purpose of the law may be effectuated.' ( In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 889 [210 Cal. Rptr. 631, 194 P.2d 744].) ( Yoshisato v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 978, 989 [9 Cal. Rptr.2d 102, 831 P.2d 327]; Taxpayers to Limit Campaign Spending v. Fair Pol. Practices Com. (1990) 51 Cal.3d 744, 764 [274 Cal Rptr. 787, 799 P.2d 1220].) The failure of Civil Code section 26 to clearly and expressly embrace or reject the common law rule prompts the present dispute. (20b) The statutory language of Civil Code section 26, though far from lucid, indicates the Legislature intended to adopt the birthday rule. It states the appropriate period must be calculated from the first minute of the day on which persons are born to the same minute of the corresponding day completing the period of minority. ( Ibid. ) Because the common law rule regarding time in general held a day has no fractions (see Annot., supra, 5 A.L.R.2d at p. 1145), the common law deemed a person born at any time on a particular day to have been born on the first minute of that day. This suggests the first clause of Civil Code section 26 was not constructed to adopt the common law rule. In reality, 18 years from the first minute of life would expire  that is, the 19th year would begin  at that same minute on a person's 18th birthday, i.e., the day corresponding to the day of birth. Because a person is deemed to have been born on the first minute of the day, the period of minority ends on that same minute 18 years later. In other words, the period of minority terminates on the first minute of one's 18th birthday. Because the plain meaning of Civil Code section 26 indicates the Legislature intended to adopt the birthday rule, we conclude section 26 abrogates the common law rule regarding age calculation. This interpretation is bolstered by the notation following Civil Code section 26 in the original 1872 annotated code. Apparently written by the code's drafters, the note states: NOTE.  The first second of the preceding day is the common law rule.  Shars. Bl. Comm., I., p. 463, and note 11. (See Code Commrs. note foll. 1 Ann. Civ. Code, § 26 (1st ed. 1872, Haymond & Burch, commrs.-annotators p. 3, italics in original.) [14] This provides persuasive evidence that the drafters of Civil Code section 26 were aware of the common law rule. Moreover, by emphasizing the word preceding in their note, but not using that term in the code section itself, it is reasonable to infer that the drafters of Civil Code section 26 meant to alter the common law rule. Further evidence is provided by the Legislature's short-lived amendment to the code 29 years later. Around the turn of the century, Civil Code section 26 was amended to clarify the code commissioners' intent. (Stats. 1901, ch. 157, § 7, p. 333.) That amendment read: Thus, if a male is born at any time during the first day of January, nineteen hundred, he attains his majority at the first minute of the first day of January, nineteen hundred and twenty-one. According to the code commissioners, this sentence was added to illustrate the meaning and make the section less obscure. (Rep. of Comm. for Revision and Reform of the Law, Civil Code (1900) p. 9, quoted in Note (1943) 17 So.Cal.L.Rev. 73 & fn. 8.) Although this amendment, along with several others, was declared unconstitutional because the revised law was not reenacted and published at length as revised ( Lewis v. Dunne (1901) 134 Cal. 291 [66 P. 478]), it strongly suggests the code commissioners intended to abrogate, and not reenact, the common law rule. Although the legislative history of Civil Code section 26 suggests the Legislature intended to abrogate the common law rule, judicial interpretation of Civil Code section 26 has been less than consistent. In Ganahl v. Soher (1884) 2 Cal. Unrep. 415 [5 P. 80], the question arose in this court whether the plaintiff had filed his action within the allowable five-year statute of limitations, which began running when he attained majority. The plaintiff's 21st birthday fell on April 11, 1876, and he did not file his suit until April 11, 1881. The court ruled that the filing period had elapsed by one day, reasoning that the plaintiff attained the age of majority on his birthday. In computing the period of five years we must include the eleventh day of April, 1876, because, as the plaintiff in question attained his majority the first minute of that day, he had the whole of the day in which to sue; and computing that as the first day of the five years, the whole period of five years expired with the tenth day of April, 1881, and the action not having been commenced until the 11th of April, 1881, was barred by the provisions of the statute. ( Id. at p. 416, italics added.) No mention was made of the common law rule. The issue reappeared 23 years later in Ex parte Wood (1907) 5 Cal. App. 471 [90 P. 961]. In Wood, a complaint was filed in superior court on March 16, 1907, to confine applicant Julia Wood to a state reform school due to her alleged incorrigibility. The school in question was authorized to admit girls between the ages of eight and eighteen. Wood argued she was ineligible for commitment to the school because she had already turned 18, her 18th birthday being March 17, 1907, the day after the complaint was filed. The Court of Appeal agreed. Citing Civil Code section 26, the court explained that It thus conclusively appears that ... Wood completed the period of her minority at the commencement of the sixteenth day of March, 1907, and that at the time of said adjudication and commitment she was of full adult age. ( Ex parte Wood, supra, 5 Cal. App. at pp. 472-473.) [15] The court thus held Wood turned 18 on the day before her 18th birthday. As with Ganahl v. Soher, supra , the Wood court did not compare the common law rule with the language of Civil Code section 26. Additional light was shed on the matter in People v. Dudley (1942) 53 Cal. App.2d 181 [127 P.2d 569]. In that case, the defendant was charged with violating section 288, lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor under 14 years old. Because the sexual assault occurred on the day before the victim's 14th birthday, the issue was whether the defendant's alleged acts violated the specified statute. The Court of Appeal recognized the common law rule prevails in many jurisdictions ( People v. Dudley, supra, 53 Cal. App.2d at p. 183), and that the issue was whether Civil Code section 26 reenacted or abrogated the common law rule. The Dudley court discussed Ganahl v. Soher, supra, 2 Cal. Unrep. 415, [16] as well as Ex parte Wood, supra, 5 Cal. App.471, and concluded: We are of the opinion that section 26 of the Civil Code is merely a reenactment of the rule of the common law. The prosecutrix was born on November 4, 1927. The cycle of fourteen years was completed at the end of November 3, 1941. That day was, therefore, `the corresponding day completing the period ...' of fourteen years.... On November 4, 1941, she started her fifteenth year so her fourteenth year was completed on November 3, 1941, and under the provisions of the section she was fourteen years old on that day and defendant cannot be convicted under the clear provisions of section 288 of the Penal Code. ( People v. Dudley, supra, 53 Cal. App.2d at p. 185, italics in original.) More recently, the Court of Appeal confronted the question of age calculation on facts very similar to those in the present case. In People v. Valladares (1984) 162 Cal. App.3d 312 [208 Cal. Rptr. 604], the defendant contended on appeal that the superior court lacked jurisdiction to try him for the charged felony offenses because the crimes were allegedly committed the day before his 18th birthday, and thus when he was only 17. The appellate court rejected the claim, relying on People v. Dudley, supra, 53 Cal. App.2d 181, to hold that the common law rule prevailed. Although the defendant contended Dudley had been wrongly decided, the Valladares court rejected the claim. The final decision to speak on the issue was in Johnson, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d 1093. In that case, the petitioner was charged with an offense allegedly committed on August 12, 1988. When it was discovered that the petitioner's 18th birthday was August 13, 1988, he was transferred to juvenile court but was ultimately transferred back to adult court on the ground that he was not a minor when the offense was committed. The petitioner then sought a writ from the Court of Appeal. That court granted relief, holding that the petitioner did not attain majority until the day of his 18th birthday. In choosing to follow the Supreme Court's interpretation of [Civil Code] section 26 in Ganahl v. Soher, supra, 2 Cal. Unrep. 415, the Johnson court acknowledged that the court in People v. Dudley, supra, 53 Cal. App.2d 181, believed Ganahl's reasoning was dictum. ( Johnson, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d at p. 1097.) The Johnson court, however, disagreed with that characterization. It reasoned that If plaintiff [in Ganahl ] had reached his majority on April 10th [the day before his birthday], there would not have been any issue to consider. The action would obviously have been barred on April 11, 1881. The statement that the 11th [the plaintiff's birthday] was the date on which plaintiff attained his majority is a statement of the law necessary to the decision, and therefore binding precedent. ( Ibid. ) As the history of this issue in California courts makes clear, although there is strong support for the birthday rule, there is also support for the common law rule of calculating age. A survey of our sister states finds a similar split, although a majority of states follow the common law rule. (For cases following the common law rule, see Thomas v. Couch (1930) 171 Ga. 602 [156 S.E. 206]; Erwin v. Benton (1905) 120 Ky. 536 [87 S.W. 291]; Gouldsboro v. Sullivan (1934) 132 Me. 342 [170 A. 900]; Nelson v. Sandkamp (1948) 227 Minn. 177 [34 N.W.2d 640, 5 A.L.R.2d 1136]; Totton v. Murdock (Mo. 1972) 482 S.W.2d 65; In re Edward (R.I. 1982) 441 A.2d 543; Pate v. Thompson (Tex.Civ.App. 1944) 179 S.W.2d 355; see generally, Annot., supra, 5 A.L.R.2d at p. 1147.) The modern trend, however, is to reject the common law rule in favor of the more commonsense rule that the controlling day is one's birthday. ( Patterson v. Monmouth Regional High School Bd. of Education (1987) 222 N.J. Super. 448 [537 A.2d 696]; State v. Alley, supra, 594 S.W.2d 381; United States v. Tucker (D.C.App. 1979) 407 A.2d 1067; People v. Stevenson (1966) 17 N.Y.2d 682 [269 N.Y.S.2d 458]; Bynum v. Moore (1923) 101 Okla. 128 [223 P. 687].) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court recently joined this group. ( Com. v. Iafrate (Pa. 1991) 594 A.2d 293, overruling Firing v. Kephart (1976) 466 Pa. 560 [353 A.2d 833].) In arguing for a contrary result, the Attorney General begins with his apparent concession of the issue in Johnson, supra, 208 Cal. App.3d 1093. In an informal opposition filed in that case (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 60), he agreed that Civil Code section 26 meant that a person attains a certain age on his or her birthday. ( Johnson, supra, at p. 1096.) He now argues that concession must be viewed in the context of that case. Thus, he claims Johnson concerned the attainment of majority only, and not the calculation of age in general. By contrast, the question here concerns when a minor turns 16 and is thus subject to a finding of unfitness under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. The Legislature, however, is free to exercise its judgment in fixing the age limits of minority for particular purposes. ( In re Herrera (1943) 23 Cal.2d 206, 213 [143 P.2d 345], disapproved on other grounds, People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 257 [131 Cal. Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375].) [17] Although the Attorney General thus argues his concession in Johnson, supra, concerned only attainment of the age of 18 because that is the only true age of majority, his argument fails. It is clear that calculation of age is a question that cuts across the laws of California, affecting myriad statutes and regulations. (See, e.g., Civ. Code, §§ 25.5 [consent to blood donation; 17 years], 25.9 [consent to furnishing of outpatient services; 12 years], 4101 [consent to marry; 18 years]; Ed. Code, § 48200 [subject to compulsory education; ages 6 to 16]; Elec. Code, § 17 [elector means a citizen 18 years or older]; §§ 266 [enticing female under 18 for purposes of prostitution], 271 [willful desertion of child under 14], 272 [contributing to delinquency of minor under 18], 273b [prohibiting confining child under 16 with adult prisoners], 288 [lewd conduct with child under 14], 288a, subds. (b), (c) [age-based sentence enhancements for oral copulation]; Veh. Code, § 12507 [licenses for those aged 16 to 18]; Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 733 [no ward under 8 years old may be committed to the Youth Authority], 208.5 [minor detained in county institution prior to turning 18 may stay until age 19].) It would seem absurd to calculate each of these ages in a different manner, resulting in a mosaic of various age calculation methods. The law demands more certainty. Accordingly, absent an expression of a contrary legislative intent, we hold Civil Code section 26 generally applies to all statutory calculations of age, including when a minor turns 16 under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707. We therefore reject the distinction urged by the People. (22) The Attorney General also relies on the reasoning of People v. Valladares, supra, 162 Cal. App.3d 312, that right or wrong, the decision in [ Dudley, supra, 53 Cal. App.2d 181] was binding on the trial court. ( Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455 [20 Cal. Rptr. 321, 369 P.2d 937].) ( Valladares, supra, at p. 318.) This reasoning, however, fails to recognize that Ganahl was a California Supreme Court case. [18] Thus, the Valladares court's conclusion that Dudley was binding on the trial court is inaccurate. The existence of Ganahl also undermines the Attorney General's further argument that we may infer Dudley accurately interpreted legislative intent because the Legislature has not acted to amend Civil Code section 26. (20c) Accordingly, we conclude that the Legislature  by enacting Civil Code section 26  intended to abrogate the common law rule regarding age calculation, and to instead adopt the birthday rule.