Opinion ID: 848625
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: public necessity

Text: Because the majority insists on addressing the merits of this moot claim and rendering an advisory opinion that will now control the state of the law, I find it incumbent on me to respond to its analysis. The majority correctly recognizes that a trial court's realm of permissible inquiry in a condemnation case is limited to whether a taking entity's decision regarding public necessity was based on fraud, an error of law, or an abuse of discretion. M.C.L. § 213.56(2). The Court of Appeals reviews the trial court's determination regarding public necessity for clear error. City of Troy v. Barnard, 183 Mich.App. 565, 569, 455 N.W.2d 378 (1990); Nelson Drainage Dist. v. Filippis, 174 Mich.App. 400, 403, 436 N.W.2d 682 (1989). Likewise, this Court may only reverse a decision of the Court of Appeals if we find the decision clearly erroneous. MCR 7.302(B)(5). Thus, it is our task to determine whether the Court of Appeals clearly erred in affirming the trial court's decision. Although the trial court concluded its written opinion by stating that defendants met their burden of showing that Plaintiff City's actions evidence a lack of public necessity by fraud, error of law and/or abuse of discretion, the substance of its opinion demonstrates that it analyzed not public necessity, but public use. The paragraph preceding the trial court's conclusion summarized the basis for its ruling: The Court does not dispute the fact that the project proposed by the City of Novi furthers a benefit to the general public. Nonetheless, the Court is persuaded that Plaintiff City's proposed action will benefit a specific, identifiable private interest and, therefore, the Court is compelled to inspect with heightened scrutiny as outlined by the Michigan Supreme Court in Poletown Neighborhood Council v. Detroit, 410 Mich. 616 [304 N.W.2d 455] (1981). The question thus becomes whether the public interest is the predominant interest being advanced; the public benefit of which can be neither speculative nor marginal, but clear and significant. Id. at 635[, 304 N.W.2d 455]. Applying heightened scrutiny to the overwhelming evidence before this Court, the Court finds that the proposed industrial spur, A.E. Wisne Drive, is primarily for the benefit of Wisne, which benefit predominates over those to the general public. Thus, the trial court, despite erroneously citing the standard of review for a public necessity challenge, found that the city had not demonstrated that its condemnation was for a public use. Having found so, it was unnecessary for the trial court to inquire into public necessity. Likewise, the Court of Appeals focused solely on public use. Consequently, this Court is without the benefit of any lower court findings on public necessity. [5] Therefore, were this case not moot, I would first agree with the majority that the Court of Appeals holding that the taking was for a public use was clearly erroneous for the reasons the majority states. But I would then remand this case to the trial court and instruct it to address defendants' claim that the city's determination of public necessity was made on the basis of fraud, error of law, or abuse of discretion. I would not foreclose defendants' argument regarding fraud on the basis that defendants showed no reliance or injury resulting from these acts. Ante at 152 n. 8. A trial court cannot accept the taking entity's assertion of public necessity when that assertion was fraudulently made. The record shows that plaintiff submitted a grant application misrepresenting that defendants donated their property toward the project. On the basis of that misrepresentation, the state pledged the funding. When the state granted the funding, plaintiff then had no choice but to condemn defendants' land. And in pursuit of the condemnation, plaintiff claimed that the taking was necessary. But plaintiffs' assertion of necessity was not grounded in a decision that the land in question was reasonably suitable and necessary for the project and that this particular piece of property, rather than some other, was required. See State Hwy. Comm. v. Vanderkloot, 392 Mich. 159, 176-177, 220 N.W.2d 416 (1974). Its assertion was made because plaintiff had to make good on its misrepresentation. [6] Last, I wholeheartedly disagree with the amount of deference the majority affords the government in determining that the taking of a particular piece of property is necessary. As stated, the precise legal question is whether, to complete the project, the government needs all the property involved or needs one particular piece of property rather than some other property. Vanderkloot, supra at 176-177, 220 N.W.2d 416. That review encompasses variables such as whether the land in question is reasonably suitable and necessary for the `improvement' and whether there is the necessity for taking particular property rather than other property for the purposes of accomplishing the `improvement.' Id. at 177-178, 220 N.W.2d 416. Necessarily, then, there must be some factual demonstration that would allow a court to determine whether an agency abused its discretion in condemning a particular piece of property. With regard to public necessity, the majority's first analytical error is in failing to properly apply the clear error standard. City of Troy supra at 569, 455 N.W.2d 378; Nelson Drainage, supra at 403, 436 N.W.2d 682. Where the trial court did not reach the issue of necessity, it is impossible to determine whether its nonexistent findings were clearly erroneous, despite whether the parties believe that the record is sufficient for us to do so. [7] In its next analytical error, rather than actually assessing whether the facts demonstrate that the city even undertook a necessity analysis, the majority concludes that even if there were other suitable locations for the spur, the decision to take defendants' property was not outside the `principled range of outcomes.' Ante at 152, quoting People v. Babcock, 469 Mich. 247, 269, 666 N.W.2d 231 (2003). But defendants presented evidence that the city did not examine any range of outcomes, but rather fixated on this particular piece of property to the exclusion of considering other parcels or even alternatives to condemnation. [8] Thus, a conclusion that the city's outcome fell within an acceptable range is unsupportable. The majority's overly deferential viewpoint permits a city to prevail against a challenge to public necessity by simply claiming that its taking of a particular piece of property was, in fact, necessary. While deference to a taking agency's finding is certainly warranted, it cannot be said that as long as an agency claims necessity, its decision cannot be disturbed. Such an approach does not venerate the constitutional principle on which the UCPA is based: a taking can only occur on proof that the taking was both for a public purpose and that the taking of a particular piece of property was truly necessary. This is especially true here, where defendants presented evidence that, during the negotiation phase, they proffered several alternatives to taking their property. The city refused those avenues because to be eligible for the funding it sought, some portion of the ring road project had to consist of a community donation. The city decided that to fulfill the community donation portion, it would simply require defendants to unwillingly sacrifice their land. Thus, the city never answered the question whether the particular piece of property was necessary for the purposes stated in its complaint, i.e., safety and welfare. Rather, it is clear only that the taking was a necessary means to an end. The majority further states that [t]he city is not obligated to show that its plan is the best or only alternative, only that it is a reasonable one. Ante at 152. Again, a taking agency's mere claim that the choice was reasonable is not conclusive. When defendants challenged public necessity, they put forth evidence that there were alternatives to taking their particular piece of property. Other than a road project plan that incorporated defendants' property, nothing in the record demonstrates that the city chose defendants' property in lieu of other alternatives because other alternatives were inferior, or because there were no available alternatives. Thus, the city's assertion of public necessity is bare. If it is enough for the city to say that it needs a particular piece of property and that its choice is a reasonable one, judicial review of public necessity is essentially foreclosed, and an abuse of discretion could never or only rarely be found. Under the majority's rationale, a necessity hearing hardly seems meaningful. The majority accuses my dissent of reversing the burden of proof, but nothing could be further from the truth. If the city is required to do no more than sit back and assert public necessity, what, then, is the hearing's purpose? Generally, in civil matters, one party begins with the burden of proof and must present evidence in support of its position. The other party must then somehow diminish, rebut, or contest that evidence with evidence of its own. Only then can a trial court decide which party should prevail under the appropriate standard. But the majority's position allows the following scenario. A property owner disputes public necessity and requests a hearing. At that hearing, the owner puts forth evidence that, if believed, would support his claim that the taking of his particular parcel was not necessary. The taking entity rebuts the allegation not with evidence, but merely by affirming that the taking was necessary. Under the novel rule of law set forth by today's majority, the taking entity prevails, despite the fact that it produced nothing more than an unsupported assertion of public necessity. This unquestioning ceding of power is not what was contemplated by the constitutional or statutory prohibitions against the unnecessary taking of private property. Contrary to the majority's position, a reviewing court has an obligation to determine whether, in the face of evidence to the contrary, the taking entity produced evidence -not assertions-of necessity. And this is true despite the fact that the burden of disproving necessity is on the property owner. When a trial court must determine whether there was an abuse of discretion, defendants raise a compelling argument that the taking entity's failure to use any discretion at all is, in itself, an abuse of discretion. Were this case not moot, in the complete absence of trial court findings on necessity, I would remand for the trial court to determine whether the city's decision to take defendants' property was based on fraud, error of law, or an abuse of discretion.