Opinion ID: 518889
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Applicable Statute and Regulations

Text: 20 Congress has established an extensive statutory structure for the review of nuclear power facilities, beginning with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2011 et seq. (1982), and followed by the amendments in the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 5801 et seq. (1982). Under these statutes, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is delegated primary authority in regulating the safety of nuclear plants through licensing and other procedures. In fact, the D.C. Circuit has noted that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 creates a regulatory scheme which is virtually unique in the degree to which broad responsibility is reposed in the administrative agency, free of close prescription in its charter as to how it shall proceed in achieving the statutory objectives. Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commission, 400 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C.Cir.1968). 21 Consistent with its statutory mandate and a subsequent recommendation by a Presidential Commission following the Three Mile Island disaster, the NRC promulgated rules requiring each state and county located within a ten mile radius of each nuclear power facility to submit an off-site emergency preparedness plan which would ensure that in the event of a nuclear accident, information could be disseminated rapidly and the endangered populations would be evacuated or otherwise protected. 10 C.F.R. Sec. 50.47(b) & app. E (1988). The responsibility for evaluating and approving the plans is shared between the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the NRC, see Memorandum of Understanding, 45 Fed.Reg. 82,713 (1980), but final decision-making authority on a plan's adequacy rests with the NRC. 22 Detailed regulations set forth the required procedures which must be followed by both FEMA and the NRC in reviewing a plan for plants not yet licensed or in operation, see 10 C.F.R. Sec. 50.47 & app. E, and for plants already in operation at the time the regulation was promulgated, see 10 C.F.R. Sec. 50.54(s) (1988). However, since Davis-Besse was an operating plant well before the regulations were promulgated in 1981, the rules governing operating plants set forth at section 50.54(s) apply. Section 50.54(s) provides in part: 23 (2)(ii) If after April 1, 1981, the NRC finds that the state of emergency preparedness [submitted by a licensee authorized to possess and/or operate a nuclear power reactor] does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency (including findings based on requirements of Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 ) and if the deficiencies (including deficiencies based on requirements of Appendix E, Section IV.D.3 ) are not corrected within four months of that finding, the Commission will determine whether the reactor shall be shut down until such deficiencies are remedied or whether other enforcement action is appropriate. In determining whether a shutdown or other enforcement action is appropriate, the Commission shall take into account, among other factors, whether the licensee can demonstrate to the Commission's satisfaction that the deficiencies in the plan are not significant for the plant in question, or that adequate interim compensating actions have been or will be taken promptly, or that that [sic] there are other compelling reasons for continued operation. 24 (3) The NRC will base its finding on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented, and on the NRC assessment as to whether the licensee's emergency plans are adequate and capable of being implemented. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as limiting the authority of the Commission to take action under any other regulation or authority of the Commission or at any time other than that specified in this paragraph. 25 Unlike its counterpart for new unlicensed plants, see 10 C.F.R. 50.47(a) (1988), this regulation does not appear to require formal FEMA approval of a plan prior to the NRC's approval. 1 See also infra section III.B. In all other ways, the guidelines for operating plants appear identical to those for new plants. Both regulations allow the Director considerable latitude in identifying and in acting on significant deficiencies in the plan. Once the Director has determined that a significant deficiency exists, he may choose any of a number of unspecified enforcement paths, including allowing the plant to continue in operation provided he is satisfied that interim measures are sufficient. Both sections also allow the Director to determine whether a plan is adequate, but the time scale for when such adequacy must be attained is discretionary, since the regulations require that the Director need only have reasonable assurance that a plan is capable of being implemented. 10 C.F.R. Sec. 50.54(s)(3) (emphasis supplied). See Union of Concerned Scientists v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 735 F.2d 1437, 1452 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Under [section 50.47(a)(1) ], the NRC's required finding is essentially predictive in nature). 26 The NRC's implementation of its emergency plan provision can be challenged throughout the licensing process, but a hearing is only mandatory before a construction permit is issued. 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2239(a)(1) (1982 & Supp.1988). After a permit and an operating license have been issued, petitions for further proceedings to modify, suspend, or revoke a license, or for such other action as may be proper are granted at the discretion of the Director. 10 C.F.R. Sec. 2.206(a) (1988). The regulations provide no indication of the standards under which a section 2.206 request is considered, but the courts have universally interpreted the regulations to afford the Director broad discretion in his decision to deny a section 2.206 petition. See, e.g., Union of Concerned Scientists, 735 F.2d at 1444 n. 11; Rockford League of Women Voters v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 679 F.2d 1218, 1223 (7th Cir.1982) (Our job is to assure that the Commission complies with the specific statutes and regulations applicable to its regulatory activities.... Beyond that our power to review an agency's decision not to initiate a proceeding is extremely limited. We would exercise it only if we were strongly convinced that the Commission was inexcusably defaulting on its fundamental responsibility to protect the public safety from nuclear accidents.). 27 Assuming for the sake of an expedited analysis that the Director's decision to deny petitioners' request for a hearing in the present case is reviewable, the standard for review is the familiar arbitrary and capricious standard. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2)(A) (1982). A careful examination of each of petitioners' claims satisfies us that the Director's actions were within the bounds of his discretion. Each of petitioners' claims will be considered in detail below.