Opinion ID: 1254437
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Workers' Compensation Immunity Question

Text: The first certified question we address is: Does W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986] grant immunity to political subdivisions in a wrongful death case where the claim is covered by workers' compensation, but where not all of the beneficiaries of the decedent's estate are eligible for workers' compensation benefits? The statute referenced by the circuit court in this question, W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986], states in pertinent part: A political subdivision is immune from liability if a loss or claim results from ... [a]ny claim covered by any workers' compensation law or any employer's liability law[.] [4] This Court has previously addressed the scope of the immunity conferred upon political subdivisions by W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986]. In Marlin v. Bill Rich Const., Inc., 198 W.Va. 635, 482 S.E.2d 620 (1996), we held that whether W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986] provides a political subdivision with immunity for a claim initially depends upon determining whether the claim is covered by a worker's compensation law or other employer's liability law. [5] We determined in Marlin that because fear of cancer is not a cognizable claim under our workers' compensation law, the claims in that case, based upon fear of cancer from asbestos exposure, were not subject to political subdivision immunity. We held in Marlin in Syllabus Point 3 that: If the claims asserted by appellants would result in no benefits under any workers' compensation law or any employer's liability law, that is to say, if there is no recovery of benefits under such laws in lieu of damages recoverable in a civil action, then, notwithstanding W.Va.Code Sec. 29-12A-5(a)(11), such claims are not covered within the meaning of the immunity statute and may be asserted in the courts of this State against a political subdivision which is not their employer, and such recovery had as may be proved under a recognized cause of action. We went on to state in Marlin that a political subdivision is immune from suit as to all elements of damage arising under a `covered' claim, 198 W.Va. at 643, 482 S.E.2d at 628. We further stated: ... if appellants' assertion is correctif their claims are cognizable at law, and if the damages they claim are not ... merely damages for which workers' compensation provides an alternate form of recovery they will have no remedy for their present claims of the fear of contracting the disease and have no claim under workers' compensation until and unless their respective conditions develop to the point where benefits would be provided. In other words, if no benefits of any sort would be provided to appellants under workers' compensation by reason of their conditions, we cannot conclude that the conditions are covered. 198 W.Va. at 644, 482 S.E.2d at 629. We have also held that the mere fact that there is a difference between the workers' compensation and civil action remedies for an injury or loss does not dictate the conclusion that a civil action claim is not covered by workers' compensation law, for purposes of W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986] immunity. In O'Dell v. Town of Gauley Bridge, 188 W.Va. 596, 425 S.E.2d 551 (1992), we held that injured people who had been compensated for their injuries by workers' compensation were barred by W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986] from maintaining a civil suit against a political subdivision for damages from those injurieseven though the damages available in a civil suit were broader or different than those available under the workers' compensation system. In O'Dell, we rejected the argument that the failure of the workers' compensation system to provide compensation for elements of damages, such as pain and suffering, total lost wages, and mental anguish meant that a claim was not covered by workers' compensation. 188 W.Va. at 610, 425 S.E.2d at 565. In the instant case, as in O'Dell, the mere fact that there is a difference between the remedies available under workers' compensation and those available in a wrongful death action does not require the conclusion that there has been no recovery of benefits ... in lieu of damages recoverable in a civil action. On the contrary, in the instant case there clearly has been a recovery of benefits in lieu of damages available in a civil action. Syllabus Point 3, in part, Marlin, supra . Because Mr. Brooks is deceased, any wrongful death civil action damages or workers' compensation benefits that flow from his death must go to his survivors. Some of these survivors, who may have a right to collect damages in a wrongful death action, are not entitled to benefits under the workers' compensation system. Do these survivors then have their own independent claims that are not covered by workers' compensation? We addressed a similar issue in Marlin, where we briefly discussed claims made in that case by the workers' spouses and children. We stated: ... [the] derivative claims [of the spouses and children] for loss of love, society, comfort, companionship and services ... would not survive immunity under W.Va.Code Sec. 29-12A-5(a)(11), if the Board could establish such immunity [for the workers' claims;] ... the derivative claims for loss of love, society, comfort, companionship, and services stand or fall with [the workers'] claims[.] (Emphasis added.) 198 W.Va. at 655-56, 482 S.E.2d at 640-41. Thus, we reasoned in Marlin that derivative children's and spouses' claims were subject to immunity under W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986], if the workers' claims from which the children's and spouses' claims derived,were covered claims under workers' compensation law. [6] In Davis v. Foley, 193 W.Va. 595, 457 S.E.2d 532 (1995), we stated at Syllabus Point 4 (in part) that damages in a wrongful death action arise out of the death of the decedent thereby making a wrongful death action a derivative claim. We further stated in Davis that: The damages provided for in [the] wrongful death statute are not unlike the damages recoverable in a loss of consortium claim: both arise out of the death or injury of another person. As one court stated, in the wrongful death action [t]he estate and the survivors suffered loss, not directly from the collision, but from the loss of the deceased who was killed in the accident. All their claims are derivative from the deceased as was the husband's consortium claim[.] ... [T]he basic premise appears fairly well-settled in other jurisdictions: the beneficiaries' claims in a wrongful death action arise out of the death of the deceased[.] (Citations omitted.) 193 W.Va. at 599, 457 S.E.2d at 536.[ [7] ] In the instant case, we apply the principles established in Marlin and O'Dell. We conclude that the claims of Mr. Brooks' survivors are derivative of his claim, and that the workers' compensation remedies available as a result of his death provide an alternative remedy which compensates for his loss. The wrongful death civil claim in the instant case should therefore be treated as a covered claim under workers' compensation law. As such, it is subject to immunity pursuant to W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986]. [8] Therefore, we agree with the circuit court's answer to certified question number 1, and we hold that W.Va.Code, 29-12A-5(a)(11) [1986] grants immunity to political subdivisions in a wrongful death case where the decedent's claim is covered by any workers' compensation law or employer's liability law, even though not all of the beneficiaries of the decedent's estate are eligible for benefits under the workers' compensation law or employer's liability law. B.