Opinion ID: 1969802
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 36

Heading: 7-8, h.11, h.16)

Text: Defendant raises three claims relating to the trial court's charge to the jury. The PCR court dismissed these claims under Rule 3:22-4. We reach the substance of the claims and find that, to the extent that the arguments presented have not been addressed previously by this Court, each is without merit. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in charging the jury that in many cases, circumstantial evidence can be more certain, satisfying, and persuasive than direct evidence. Defendant claims that the trial court inadvertently implied that it had presided over trials in which circumstantial evidence was more persuasive than direct evidence, and that, because the State's case relied primarily on circumstantial evidence, the court also revealed a bias in favor of the prosecution. We perceive nothing in the quoted language that could have deprived defendant of a fair trial. We note, moreover, that the same language appears in the Model Jury Charge on Circumstantial Evidence. We reject defendant's claim that the charge revealed a bias in favor of the prosecution or diluted its burden of persuasion, and note that both the State and defendant relied on circumstantial evidence at trial. Defendant objects to the trial court's charge to the jury that the use of a .45 caliber pistol in and of itself permits the jury to draw the inference that the person using it had the purpose to take life. Defendant claims that the court should have instructed the jury that it was free to reject that inference. We approved a similar instruction in State v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 272, 619 A. 2d 1208 (1993) ( Martini I ), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 203, 133 L.Ed. 2d 137 (1995). The charge clearly does not mandate the inference of an intent to kill. In any event, the intent of the shooter was never at issue in the case; the question for the jury was whether defendant had procured the death of his wife through the payment of money. Defendant claims that the trial court erred in charging the jury that its function was to determine the truth, thus diluting the State's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant also claims that the jury should have been charged that it could reject the death penalty based on any mitigating evidence, notwithstanding the outcome of the weighing process. We rejected both of those claims in Marshall I, supra, 123 N.J. at 134-36, 150-51, 586 A. 2d 85. Defendant asserts that he was precluded from fully presenting these arguments by the two hundred page limit this Court imposed on briefs in the direct appeal. However, this Court has reviewed the original direct appeal briefs, submitted before the two hundred page limit was imposed, and we have found nothing that would change our original disposition of the issues raised. On this appeal, defendant has not revealed what substantive arguments he was unable to make due to the page limit, contenting himself with objecting to the PCR court's application of the procedural bar. We are satisfied that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the two-hundred page limit on direct appeal briefs. Both of the claims are relatively simple. The trial court's reference to finding truth did not dilute the prosecution's burden when read in context with the jury charge as a whole. There is no legal foundation for defendant's claim that he was entitled to a charge that the jury could disregard the statutorily mandated balancing process and reject the death penalty on the basis of any mitigating evidence. We are satisfied that our original disposition of the issues was correct, and that defendant was not precluded from raising any dispositive argument. Therefore, we find those claims to be without merit.