Opinion ID: 186705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Political Question Doctrine

Text: 9 The United States argues our decision in Schneider v. Kissinger, 412 F.3d 190 (2005), controls this case, rendering all the plaintiffs' claims nonjusticiable. Specifically, the Government argues the claims are nonjusticiable because they would require the court to pass judgment on a matter of foreign policy and national security, which subjects are textually committed to the political branches, id. at 194. Alternatively, the Government argues there are no judicially discoverable and manageable standards to apply to the claims here, thus precluding any role for the judiciary. The Government also contends our recent decision in Bancoult v. McNamara fully supports application of the political question doctrine in this case. 10 The plaintiffs distinguish Schneider as having presented a challenge to the Government's policy decision to support Pinochet's rise to power, whereas the present case challenges specific acts of torture ... committed after the military government was already in place. Because these acts could not have been committed in furtherance of any policy decision to support Pinochet's rise to power, they reason, their claims raise no political question. The plaintiffs also cite Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729, 124 S.Ct. 2739, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004), for the proposition that claims based on a narrow class of international norms, such as ... claims of torture and extrajudicial killing, should be protected [sic] and adjudicated in U.S. courts. 11 The Supreme Court has recognized a half dozen reasons for which a case may be nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine: 12 [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. 13 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). As mentioned above, the United States here argues the first and second reasons; if either obtains, the courts are without jurisdiction to proceed. See Schneider, 412 F.3d at 194. 14 Despite the plaintiffs' efforts, we fail to see how this case can be distinguished from Schneider. In each instance the plaintiffs brought claims under the common law, international law, the ATS, and the TVPA. The plaintiffs in Schneider alleged the United States and Kissinger, in conjunction with certain Chilean officials, facilitated kidnapping and torture in order to further the goals of [k]ey United States policymakers who had opposed the election of President Allende. Id. at 191-92. We held the plaintiffs' claims nonjusticiable per the political question doctrine because they challenged foreign policy decisions of the United States .... within the province of the political branches. Id. at 195. More specifically, the complaint presented questions textually committed to a coordinate branch of government, running afoul of the first reason stated in Baker v. Carr. Id. at 194. 15 The same is true here. The plaintiffs have alleged and challenged drastic measures taken by the United States and Kissinger in order to implement United States policy with respect to Chile. For the court to evaluate the legal validity of those measures would require us to delve into questions of policy textually committed to a coordinate branch of government. Id. It is of no moment that the acts alleged in this case took place after the coup. True, as the plaintiffs state, those acts could not have been committed in furtherance of any policy decision to support Pinochet's rise to power, but the difference between actions taken to place Pinochet in power and actions taken to keep him in power does not a viable distinction make: Both types of actions, if they occurred, were inextricably intertwined with the underlying foreign policy decisions constitutionally committed to the political branches. Bancoult, 445 F.3d at 436. Nor are we persuaded by the plaintiffs' purported distinction between challenging an action and challenging a policy. As we explained in Bancoult, the dichotomy is false; actions taken in furtherance of foreign relations themselves may constitute[] foreign policy decisions. Id. at 437. 16 Such is indeed the case here. Although the plaintiffs attempt to characterize Kissinger's acts as ultra vires, Compl. ¶ 2, we reiterate what we said in Schneider: Whatever Kissinger did as National Security Advisor or Secretary of State can hardly be called anything other than foreign policy. 412 F.3d at 199. 17 To be sure, we can imagine a case in which a rogue agent commits an act so removed from his official duties that it cannot fairly be said to represent the policy of the United States, but this is not such a case. The plaintiffs allege Kissinger purposefully act[ed] outside the proper channels of Congressional oversight, Compl. ¶ 43, but that does not take his conduct outside the scope of his employment; the statutory descriptions of Kissinger's positions make clear his duty was to the President, not to the Congress. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656 (Secretary of State responsible for conduct[ing] the business of the department in such manner as the President shall direct); 50 U.S.C. § 402(a)-(b) (function of National Security Council, of which National Security Advisor is a member, to advise the President with respect to the integration of ... policies relating to the national security and to perform such other functions as the President may direct). 18 We need not quarrel with the plaintiffs' assertion that certain claims for torture may be adjudicated in the federal courts as provided in the TVPA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note. We simply observe that such a claim, like any other, may not be heard if it presents a political question. So it was that, before concluding the present case is entirely nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine, we requested supplemental briefing on the justiciability of the plaintiffs' claims under the TVPA. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 230, 106 S.Ct. 2860, 92 L.Ed.2d 166 (1986) (although courts are fundamentally underequipped to formulate national policies or develop standards for matters not legal in nature .... it goes without saying that interpreting congressional legislation is a recurring and accepted task for the federal courts (internal quotation marks omitted)). As we have seen, however, the plaintiffs were unable to extricate their TVPA claims from the political question that permeates their complaint. The plaintiffs having failed to present any cognizable factual distinction of, or persuasive legal argument for departing from, our decision in Schneider, that precedent must control this case.