Opinion ID: 3019701
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Lodestar Amounts and Adjustments

Text: With these reductions in mind, we calculate the lodestar amounts as follows: Approved Hourly Approved Hours 10 Lodestar Rate Amount11 Mr. Sugarman $500.00 248.00 (reduced by $124,000.00 8.5 hours) Mr. Yale $350.00 245.00 (reduced by $85,750.00 2.5 hours) Mr. Lowenthal $175.00 400.00 (no $70,000.00 reduction) Mr. Shapiro $281.61 99.75 (reduced by $28,091.00 3.5 hours) Mr. Lewin $550.00 118.25 (no $65,038.00 reduction) Ms. Lewin $315.00 31.25 (no $9,844.00 reduction) 10 Times are rounded to the nearest quarter hour. 11 Amounts are rounded to the nearest dollar. 15 We now consider whether these amounts should be adjusted based on any of the factors mentioned in footnote 2 above. Appellees contend that an adjustment is appropriate because the issues involved in this case were not novel or complicated and many of appellants’ arguments were not persuasive on appeal. We have already rejected the latter objection in Part II.B.1 above. We reiterate that when a party’s claims are connected such that it would be “difficult to divide the hours expended on a claim-byclaim basis,” Hensley, 461 U.S. at 435, it is appropriate to award compensation for work on all claims rather than only those claims that were successful. That is the case here. Just as we deemed it inadvisable to consider appellants’ claims in isolation from each other when determining the lodestar amounts, we will not do so when considering whether to adjust those amounts. We also reject appellees’ contention that this case was not novel or complicated. To the contrary, as we have already stated, the case presented complicated and important questions of constitutional law. Though we relied on existing precedents in deciding the case, this does not mean the case was easy or the result obvious. We do not, therefore, believe it appropriate to decrease the lodestar amounts on that basis. Thus, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we presume the lodestar amounts are reasonable, see, e.g., Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 897 (1984), and adopt those amounts as the reasonable fees appellants’ counsel are owed. 16