Opinion ID: 316137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: basic principles of equal protection

Text: 122 Even without any federal convictions before it, the court was required to consider whether the D.C. burden of proof statute could apply to U.S.Code offenses. Appellant argued first that the statute in plain terms applies to 'any criminal proceeding in the District Court,' which obviously includes the trial of federal offenses; on this point, the government agreed. Second, he claimed that such a legislative classification is either underinclusive because it does not apply to federal crimes tried in other jurisdictions, or overinclusive because it does not apply exclusively to D.C.Code offenses, and that for either reason, it is a denial of equal protection. 123 In the face of this challenge, the court's decision to 'put to one side' the applicability of the D.C. burden of proof statute to federal offenses evidences a misunderstanding of basic equal protection analysis. By claiming that the D.C. burden of proof statute is overinclusive because it applies to federal offenses tried in the District of Columbia, appellant acknowledges that Congress might well be able to enact a burden of proof statute limited to local offenses, 61 unless of course it would be a violation of due process. 62 Congress, however, has chosen to pass a different statute. And by failing to consider the overinclusive aspect of that statute, this court has decided to 'make a new law, not to enforce an old one'; and 'this,' the Supreme Court has held, 'is no part of our duty.' 63 Obviously, every equal protection challenge could be rejected if a court is willing to ignore the existing statutory classification. 64 124 By failing to address the equal protection issue, the court forces us to choose between two unacceptable alternatives. Either we can read the D.C. burden of proof statute to apply only to local offenses, or we can hold that its application to federal offenses is not a denial of equal protection. Limiting the statute to local offenses is not only contrary to its language 65 and legislative history, 66 but also leads to the imposition of two different burdens of proof on ths issue of sanity 67 when federal and local offenses are joined in federal district court. 68 125 On the other hand, holding that the statute may apply to U.S.Code offenses tried in this jurisdiction requires us to find that the 'justification offered' by Congress for limiting its application to federal offenses tried in the District is 'actually convincing.' 69 Thompson, supra, 452 F.2d at 1341. The justification offered 70 was our decision in Bolton v. Harris, 130 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 395 F.2d 642 (1968), where we held that the government could not automatically commit for long term treatment those found not guilty by reason of insanity; first, it had to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they were mentally ill and dangerous at the time of commitment. 71 Congress feared that Bolton would allow 'dangerous criminals, particularly psychopaths to win acquittals of serious criminal charges on grounds of insanity by raising a mrer reasonable doubt as to their sanity and then to escape hospital commitment because the government is unable to prove their insanity following acquittal by a preponderance of the evidence.' 72 This reasoning rests on a misapprehension about how the insanity defense has been administered in this jurisdiction. 73 Even if it were a reasonable concern, however, it is inadequate as a justification for a classification distinguishing between D.C. and other jurisdictions. In D.C. there is a statutory procedure, applicable to both local and federal offenses, that permits post-trial confinement of those found not guilty by reason of insanity. 74 No such statute applies to federal offenses tried in other jurisdictions, where an accused found not guilty by reason of insanity is released. 75 He may, of course, be committed pursuant to a state civil commitment statute, 76 but no state permits long term civil commitment unless the state establishes mental illness by at least a preponderance of the evidence. 77 Therefore, there is no justification, let alone a convincing one, for singling out the District of Columbia, and applying a different burden of proof on federal offenses. 126 Thus, the court in the present case-- by failing to consider the equal protection issue raised by the D.C. burden of proof statute-- has forced us to choose in subsequent cases between two wholly unacceptable choices.