Opinion ID: 767610
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Sowards's First Amendment Retaliation Claim

Text: 8 A district court's decision to grant summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See General Elec. Co. v. G. Siempelkamp GmbH & Co., 29 F.3d 1095, 1097 (6th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is proper only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We must look beyond the pleadings and assess the proof to determine whether there is a genuine need for trial. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The proper inquiry is whether the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1476-80 (6th Cir. 1989). We view inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See General Elec. Co., 29 F.3d at 1097-98. 9 Sowards claims that she was terminated from her position as a jailer at the LCSD for exercising her First Amendment rights of political and intimate association in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In order to establish retaliation for engaging in constitutionally protected activity, a plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection between elements one and two - that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's protected conduct. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). In brief, this analysis focuses on whether the adverse employment action was motivated in substantial part by the plaintiff's constitutionally protected activity. See Mattox v. City of Forest Park, 183 F.3d 515, 520-21 (6th Cir. 1999). If the plaintiff meets her burden, the burden then shifts to the defendants to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the employment decision would have been the same absent the protected conduct. See Kreuzer v. Brown, 128 F.3d 359, 363 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 1802 (1998); see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977). 1
10 To prove the first element of retaliation, Sowards argues that she was exercising her rights of both political and intimate association protected by the First Amendment. The right of political association is a well established right under the First Amendment for 'political belief and association constitute the core of those activities protected by the First Amendment.' Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois, 497 U.S. 62, 69 (1990) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976)). Support of a political candidate falls within the scope of the right of political association. See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 356-57. Therefore, Sowards was exercising her constitutionally protected right of political association by supporting her husband's campaign for the office of Sheriff of Loudon County. 11 Sowards also claims that she was retaliated against because of her exercise of her First Amendment right of intimate association with her husband. In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18 (1984), the Supreme Court stated that one type of constitutionally protected freedom of association is the right to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships [which] must be secured against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such relationships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to our constitutional scheme. The Supreme Court reasoned that the formation and preservation of certain types of highly personal relationships is necessary to secure individual liberty and suggested that marriage is such a relationship that must be protected from unwarranted state interference. See id. at 618-19. Although the Supreme Court did not explain whether this right stems from the freedom of association under the First Amendment or the fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we have analyzed the right of intimate association under the First Amendment. See Adkins v. Board of Educ., 982 F.2d 952, 955-56 (6th Cir. 1993). 12 In Adkins, a high school secretary claimed that the superintendent of the school board refused to recommend continuing her employment in retaliation forher association with her husband, who was the principal of the high school. We concluded that the plaintiff secretary had made a prima facie case of a constitutional violation because evidence showed that her freedom to form 'certain intimate human relationships' was implicated in the superintendent's decision not to recommend rehiring her. See 982 F.2d at 956 (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617). We explained, it is not necessary that the governmental act require the abandonment or dissolution of a marriage relationship as the price for retaining public employment. The right of association is violated if the action constitutes an undue intrusion by the state into the marriage relationship. Id. (quotation omitted). 2 Accordingly, Sowards has the right to associate intimately with her husband, and her marriage relationship is protected from undue intrusion by the state. Sowards claims that she lost her job because of her protected marital relationship, and that this constitutes undue intrusion by the state in that relationship. See Adkins, 982 F.2d at 956. 13 Defendants respond with several arguments. First, they mistakenly assert that Sowards's right to marry was not violated because she is still married to her husband and that she does not have a fundamental right to marry a specific person. With respect to the First Amendment's right of intimate association, the state action need not cause abandonment or dissolution of the marriage to constitute an undue intrusion. See Adkins, 982 F.2d at 956. In addition, defendants' citations to cases involving the fundamental right to marry under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are not applicable to Sowards's right of intimate association claim under the First Amendment. Defendants also argue that Guider's actions need only satisfy a rational basis test. However, it is not necessary to engage in such an analysis at the summary judgment stage if the plaintiff alleges that she was terminated on the basis of a protected relationship. See Montgomery v. Carr, 101 F.3d 1117, 1127-28 (6th Cir. 1996). Sowards claims that Guider dismissed her because of her protected relationship with her husband, which could constitute an undue interference in that relationship under Adkins. Therefore, we conclude that Sowards has met her burden at this juncture of establishing that she was engaged in the protected conduct of intimate association under the First Amendment.
14 Sowards then must prove that she suffered an adverse action by Loudon County and Guider that caused her to suffer an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in her constitutionally protected conduct. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Sowards was dismissed from her position as a jailer at the LCSD. A dismissal qualifies as an adverse employment action for the purposes of a retaliation claim. See id. at 396 (pointing to discharge, demotions, refusal to hire, nonrenewal of contracts, and failure to promote as examples of adverse actions in the employment context).
15 Finally, Sowards has the burden of proving that her termination was substantially motivated by the exercise of herconstitutional rights. See Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Sowards worked as a jailer at the LCSD for several years and never had any problems until her husband announced that he was running for the position of Loudon County Sheriff. She then noticed an abrupt change in her work environment. She asserts that her supervisors ostracized her, changed her day shift to a split shift, disciplined her more harshly than her co-workers, told her she was being watched by the sheriff's office, and reduced her overtime opportunities. On July 19, 1995, Guider terminated Sowards from her position as a jailer allegedly in response to an incident that occurred on June 28, 1995, in which Sowards failed to serve an outstanding warrant for burglary on a person who had been brought to jail on a DUI charge. In Sowards's dismissal letter, Guider explained that he was following Chief Jailer Bridges's recommendation to terminate her employment because it was her responsibility to check for outstanding warrants and because of the serious nature of the burglary charge which had been outstanding for over a year. In his deposition, Guider denied that he took into account the fact that Sowards was married to William Sowards when terminating her. However, when asked [i]f Wanda Sowards had been one of [his] staunchest supporters in the last election would [he] have looked into the basis for Sergeant Bridges' recommendation of termination rather than just more or less accepting it, Guider replied, I might have. J.A. at 140. 16 Sowards has presented sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable juror could conclude that Guider's decision to terminate her employment was substantially motivated by her protected First Amendment associational rights. Guider admitted that he might have treated her termination case differently if she had been one of his political supporters. Although defendants respond that Guider also asserted that he did not take Sowards's association with her husband or his political campaign into account in deciding to terminate her employment, Guider made conflicting statements regarding his treatment of Sowards's case. Thus, a genuine issue of material fact exists regarding his true motivation for terminating her employment. 17 Moreover, other evidence also supports Sowards's claim that Guider's decision to terminate her was substantially motivated by her protected conduct. Prior to her termination, Sowards had never been disciplined for missing a warrant. Guider admitted that Sowards had been a dependable employee and had never been involved in any serious disciplinary action. Bridges acknowledged that her job performance over the years was a positive factor on her behalf. However, Bridges stated that he decided to recommend termination because the warrant Sowards missed had been outstanding for a long time and involved a serious crime. Even though Sowards explained that she had looked for the wrong name, Bridges stated that she could have looked up the records to find the correct name, and he did not treat her mistake more leniently because a misunderstanding was involved. Bridges also admitted that other LCSD officers had missed mittimuses, 3 but had never been fired for that omission despite their obligation to check for both outstanding warrants and mittimuses, which are located in the same box. Because there is evidence that she was treated differently than other officers who had made similar mistakes and that she was terminated based on only one mistake, Sowards has provided sufficient evidence that her association with her husband substantially motivated Guider to terminate her. 18 Defendants have not presented sufficient evidence that Guider would have terminated Sowards on the basis of this one mistake in the absence of her protected association. They argue that Guider did not know that Sowards had supported her husband in his political campaign for sheriff and thus could not have made any decisions on this basis. See Hall v. Tollett, 128 F.3d 418, 426-27 (6th Cir. 1997) (dismissing plaintiffs' political retaliation claims because of lack of evidence that a newly elected sheriff had any knowledge of which candidate plaintiffs had actually supported in the election). Guider claims that Sowards told him she was planning on supporting his candidacy rather than her husband's. Sowards denies making this statement. Furthermore, Guider admitted [b]ut in my mind, you know, I felt confident that she would support her husband. J.A. at 146. Unlike the sheriff in Hall, Guider actually spoke with Sowards and felt confident that she would support her husband's campaign. Defendants also argue that Guider could not have known of Sowards's political affiliation because Sowards admitted she was not politically active at work and had not given money to any campaigns. A rational juror could conclude, however, that Guider knew Sowards had supported her husband on the basis of Guider's deposition statement describing his conversation with her and his conclusion that she would support her husband. 19 Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Sowards, we conclude that a genuine issue of material fact exists whether Sowards's termination was substantially motivated by her protected associational freedoms. Therefore, the district court erred in granting defendants' motion for summary judgment.