Opinion ID: 2747891
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Rational basis analysis

Text: Mr. Titley has not met his burden to show Congress lacked a rational basis for § 924(e)(2)(A). See Heller, 509 U.S. at 319. He argues that, because state legislatures have not enacted identical drug offense laws, criminal conduct that may qualify as a “serious drug offense” in one state may not qualify in another. In other words, Mr. Titley contends § 924(e)(2)(A) violates equal protection because it does not apply uniformly to similarly situated defendants previously convicted of drug offenses in different states. He defines “violent felony” as “any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” The Lender court said Congress intended this provision to incorporate state law in determining whether offenses committed while the defendant was a juvenile are to be considered predicate offenses under the Act. See 985 F.2d 151, 156 n.. In McKissick, 204 F.3d at 1301, we quoted Lender: “It is not irrational for Congress to defer to state law with regard to the characteristics of a prior offense, and doing so is no more intentionally arbitrary than our system of federalism itself.” Lender, 985 F.2d at 156 n.. 8 Other circuits have rejected similar equal protection challenges to federal sentencing provisions that depend at least in part on state criminal law to determine a defendant’s sentence in a federal case. E.g., United States v. Fink, 499 F.3d 81, 87 (1st Cir. 2007) (challenge to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)); United States v. Inglesi, 988 F.2d 500, 502-03 (4th Cir. 1993) (U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(d)); United States v. Fair, 194 F. App’x 148, 151-52 (4th Cir. 2006) (U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1); United States v. Stokes, 351 F. App’x 115, 116-17 (7th Cir. 2009) (21 U.S.C.§ 841(b)(1)(A)). -8- points out his ACCA sentence rests on two state drug convictions that would not qualify had the offenses been committed in 19 other states or the District of Columbia. This disparity, he argues, shows § 924(e)(2)(A) lacks a rational basis. But rational basis review does not require uniformity. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976); Schanzenbach v. Town of Opal, Wyo., 706 F.3d 1269, 1276 (10th Cir. 2013) (“[T]here need not be a perfect fit between purpose and achievement for a law to pass constitutional muster.”). Although states can and do vary as to whether certain drug manufacturing or distribution activity is a crime carrying a maximum sentence of at least ten years, Congress needs only a rational basis to rely on state convictions for a federal sentence enhancement. If state lawmakers prescribe a sentence of at least a ten-year maximum for a manufacturing or distribution drug offense, it is rational for Congress to include such a prior offense as one that qualifies for an ACCA sentence. Doing so contributes to the purpose of incapacitating repeat offenders who violate § 922(g) and deterring others from conduct that could lead to an ACCA sentence.9 9 Mr. Titley’s reliance on Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990), is misplaced. In Taylor, the Supreme Court addressed when a state law burglary offense may be used to support an ACCA sentence. The Court held Congress intended a “uniform definition” for burglary “independent of the labels employed by the various States’ criminal codes.” Id. at 592. Mr. Titley argues this holding supports his equal protection argument for a uniform definition of “serious drug offense” to avoid disparities among state laws. We disagree. First, Taylor concerned 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), which, unlike § 924(e)(2)(A), specified burglary as a predicate offense in only general terms. Second, Mr. Taylor did not allege an equal protection violation, and the Court did not consider one. Third, the Taylor Court said, apart from burglary, the ACCA -9-