Opinion ID: 1788655
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Amendment 68, Section 1 per se violation analysis.

Text: We next consider the Committee's contention that the performance of abortions at UAMS is a per se violation of Amendment 68. The Committee agrees with the trial court's finding that [t]he term `public funds' as used in Amendment 68, Section 1 of the Constitution does not refer to tax revenues, but rather to any public monies belonging to the State. Such a construction of public funds is consistent with our prior cases. See Sebastian County Chapter v. Weatherford, 311 Ark. 656, 846 S.W.2d 641 (1993) (giving term public funds as used in FOIA its plain and ordinary meaningmoneys belonging to government.). The Committee nonetheless argues that the chancellor's order and injunctionpermitting abortions where the individual pays in advance or furnishes guarantee of payment by a third-party provideris an erroneous interpretation of Amendment 68's prohibition of the use of public funds to pay for any abortion except to save the mother's life. In examining the language contained in Amendment 68, Section 1, we have stated as follows: Section 1 of Amendment 68 proscribes the use of public funds to pay for any abortion. In construing the meaning of this provision we apply the same rules governing the construction of legislative statutes. Gazaway v. Greene County Equalization Board, 314 Ark. 569, 864 S.W.2d 233 (1993); Faubus v. Kinney, 239 Ark. 443, 389 S.W.2d 887 (1965). The fundamental rule is that the words of the constitution or statute should ordinarily be given their obvious and natural meaning. Gipson v. Maner, 225 Ark. 976, 287 S.W.2d 467 (1956). If the language used in a constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, the court should not seek other aides of interpretation in determining the intent of the framers and voters. Ellison v. Oliver, 147 Ark. 252, 227 S.W. 586 (1921). Knowlton v. Ward, 318 Ark. 867, 889 S.W.2d 721 (1994). In Knowlton, supra , this court further explained that [i]t hardly seems possible that any other language could be used to explain more plainly or unambiguously the purpose or meaning of the phrase, `to pay for any abortion.' Accordingly, for any entity to be in violation of Amendment 68, Section 1, the challenging party must provide the following proof: 1. That abortions were performed at the entity that were paid for with public funds; or 2. That the entity paid for, with public funds, abortions that were performed elsewhere. Knowlton, supra . Knowlton provides an illustration of how this standard works. As stated above, Knowlton was actually a companion case to the present case. Knowlton initially sued both UAMS and the Arkansas Genetics Program, which was a part of UAMS. Knowlton specifically alleged that AGP provided abortions in violation of Amendment 68. UAMS moved for partial summary judgment and to dismiss AGP as a party, which the chancellor granted. The dismissal of AGP occurred prior to the consolidation of Knowlton's case with that of the Committee and Forbes. The evidence revealed that AGP did not actually perform abortions, but that it provided medical care in support of individuals affected with various genetic disorders and birth defects, and that it informed families who have, or might have, pregnancies that are at risk of an adverse outcome. Knowlton argued that Amendment 68 not only prohibited the use of public funds to pay for the performance of abortions, but that it also prohibits the use of public funds to pay for any activity that might further or advance the performance of abortions. Knowlton, supra (emphasis in original). This court concluded that Section 1 was plain and unambiguous, and that Knowlton had simply failed to offer proof to support her case under the section. We stated that [t]he plain and unambiguous meaning of [Section 1] does not prohibit the `testing, diagnosis, and counseling to families during the preconceptional, prenatal and postnatal periods' that is performed by AGP. Knowlton, supra . Similarly, in Juvenile H. v. Crabtree, 310 Ark. 208, 833 S.W.2d 766 (1992) (per curiam), the petitioner was involved in a juvenile proceeding where she was placed in the custody of DHS because she was in substantial risk of serious harm. The trial court ruled that the juvenile could not terminate her pregnancy without an order of the court relying in part on Amendment 68: Amendment 68 also prohibits the use of public funds for an abortion. The State of Arkansas has already, and will continue expending public funds for the care of the minor during pregnancy and would indirectly or directly expend funds for the care of the minor child while in custody of the state after termination of the pregnancy in violation of Amendment 68. Id. On petition for writ of certiorari to this court, we vacated the portion of the juvenile judge's order enjoining the juvenile or her attending physicians from terminating her pregnancy. In doing so, we dismissed the trial court's reliance on Amendment 68 as irrelevant, because the juvenile had failed to request public funds. As is apparent from Knowlton, supra , and Crabtree, supra , Amendment 68, Section 1 does not prohibit the use of public funds to pay for any activity that might further or advance the performance of abortions. Instead, it prohibits the use of public funds to pay for abortions, except where necessary to save the life of the mother. Black's Law Dictionary, 6th ed. (1990), defines the verb pay in part as [t]o compensate for goods, services or labor. Webster 's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1991), defines pay as to make due return to for services rendered, or to give in return for goods or service. Thus, the phrase pay for plainly implicates an exchange in return for services. Under the Committee's theory, the salaries of UAMS employees, the public funds used to construct and maintain UAMS buildings, and the monies used to purchase medical supplies are all being used to pay for abortions when abortions are allowed to take place at UAMS. This broad construction of Section 1 is far beyond the scope of the plain meaning of the word pay. We have already held that Amendment 68 does not prohibit the use of public funds to pay for any activity that might further or advance the performance of abortions. See Knowlton, supra ; Crabtree, supra . The Committee's assertion that Amendment 68 generally prohibits the use of public buildings or the use of publicly paid employees to perform abortions ignores the plain language of Amendment 68. The use of public funds must go to pay for an abortion in order for the prohibition to apply. Amendment 68 does not prohibit the use of things paid for by public funds, but it does plainly prohibit payment for abortions with public funds. This conclusion is supported by an examination of laws in other jurisdictions that have expressly prohibited not only the use of public funds to pay for abortions, but also the use of public buildings or public employees to perform abortions. For example, UAMS cites Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 106 L.Ed.2d 410 (1989), where the United States Supreme Court upheld Missouri statutes limiting public resources that could be used to perform abortions. The Missouri statutes upheld in Webster expressly prohibited a public employee from performing or assisting with an abortion, except to save the mother's life. Similarly, the law expressly prohibited the use of a public building to perform an abortion, and the use of public funds, employees, or facilities for the purpose of `encouraging or counseling' a woman to have an abortion except to save her life. The Court ultimately reasoned that: Having held that the State's refusal to fund abortions does not violate Roe v. Wade, it strains logic to reach a contrary result for the use of public facilities and employees. If the State may make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and ... implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds, (citation omitted), surely it may do so through the allocation of other public resources, such as hospitals and medical staff. Id. (emphasis added.) Thus, the Webster Court recognized how the Missouri statutes encompassed different public resources. Not only did they permissibly prohibit public funding, but they also prohibited the use of public facilities and public employees. By its plain language, the Missouri prohibition considered in Webster appears broader than the one found in Amendment 68. Similarly, other states have seen fit to place broad limits on the amount of public resources that may be expended with regard to abortions. For example, La.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.34.5 (enjoined from enforcement insofar as it conflicts with Hyde Amendment to Title XIX, Hope Medical Group v. Edwards, 860 F.Supp. 1149 (E.D.La.1994)), provides in part that: [N]o public funds, made available to any institution, board, commission, department, agency, official, or employee of the state of Louisiana ... whether such funds are made available by [any government subdivision], or from any other public source shall be used in any way for, to assist in, or to provide facilities for an abortion, except when the abortion is medically necessary to save the mother's life. (Emphasis added.) The prohibition found in Amendment 68, Section 1 appears more narrow than the one contained in the Louisiana statute. Compare Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 311.715 (no public funds shall be used for the purpose of obtaining an abortion) and N.D. Cent.Code § 14-02.3-01 (no funds of this state ... may be used to pay for the performance, or for promoting the performance, of an abortion) with Ky.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 311.800(1) (no publicly owned hospital... shall perform or permit the performance of abortions) and N.D. Cent.Code § 14-02.3-04 (no person may authorize or perform an abortion in a hospital owned, maintained, or operated within the state by the state); see also Ariz.Rev.Stat. Stat. Ann. § 35-196.02 (no public funds ... may be expended for payment to any person or entity for the performance of any abortion....); Colo. Const. Art. V., § 50 (No public funds shall be used ... to pay or otherwise reimburse, either directly or indirectly, any person, agency or facility for the performance of... [an] abortion); Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 5101.55(C) (public funds shall not be used to subsidize an abortion); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 62, § 453 (no [public] funds ... shall be expended by any State or local government agency for the performance of abortion.); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 28-6-4.5 (No funds of the state ... shall be authorized or paid to or on behalf of any person or entity for or in connection with any abortion....). Giving the phrase pay for its plain and ordinary meaningcompensation for a servicewe reject the Committee's argument that Amendment 68 erects a per se bar to abortions performed at UAMS other than those to save the life of the mother, where patients pay for the cost in advance or furnish guarantee of payment by a third-party provider. Simply put, if a patient or third-party provider pays for the cost of an abortion per the chancellor's order and permanent injunction, it cannot then be said that public funds are being used to pay for that abortion. Thus, there is no per se Amendment 68 violation when such an abortion is performed in a public hospital or by a public employee. Therefore, we affirm the chancellor's ruling that Amendment 68 does not prohibit the performance of abortions at public facilities and by public employees, and does not prohibit UAMS from performing abortions for patients who either paid for their abortions or secured payment from a third-party provider.