Opinion ID: 2166967
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Commitment Proceeding

Text: The Act is composed of two separate, yet interrelated proceedings. The first part involves the commitment proceeding. During this proceeding, the defendant is committed to the Department and is adjudicated sexually dangerous. This proceeding is triggered when the State files a petition for commitment. A petition can be filed [w]hen any person is charged with a criminal offense and it [appears]    that such person is a sexually dangerous person, within the meaning of [the] Act. 725 ILCS 205/3 (West 1998). This petition must set forth facts tending to show that the person named is a sexually dangerous person. 725 ILCS 205/3 (West 1998). The Act specifies that either the State's Attorney or the Attorney General may seek an involuntary, indeterminate institutional commitment in lieu of criminal prosecution if the person is charged with a criminal offense and is believed to be sexually dangerous. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998). While the question of whether an individual is a sexually dangerous person is one of fact, it is one which, by its nature, cannot be answered by a court or jury without hearing the opinions of people who have a special knowledge in the field of mental disorders and sexual aberration. People v. Covey, 34 Ill.2d 195, 215 N.E.2d 220 (1966). Thus, after filing a petition alleging sexual dangerousness, the trial court must appoint two psychiatrists to make a personal examination of the person so charged and determine whether such person is sexually dangerous. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998). The Act states that [t]he psychiatrists shall file with the court a report in writing of the result of their examination, a copy of which shall be delivered to the respondent. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998). Once the psychiatrists file their report and provide the respondent with a copy, a hearing is held to determine the defendant's sexual dangerousness. 725 ILCS 205/4 (West 1998). The reports of the psychiatrists must be introduced by direct testimony. People v. Pearson, 65 Ill.App.2d 264, 212 N.E.2d 715 (1965). Nonetheless, although the statute provides that two qualified psychiatrists shall be appointed to examine the defendant, there is no requirement that both psychiatrists shall testify; testimony of one may provide a prima facie case in the absence of contradictory reports. People v. Olmstead, 32 Ill.2d 306, 205 N.E.2d 625 (1965). Once the hearing begins, section 3.01 of the Act controls. Section 3.01 specifies that the proceedings under the Act are civil. It states, The proceedings under this Act shall be civil in nature[;] however, the burden of proof required to commit a defendant to confinement as a sexually dangerous person shall be the standard of proof required in a criminal proceedings of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The provisions of the Civil Practice Law, and all existing and future amendments of that Law and modifications thereof and the Supreme Court Rules now or hereafter adopted in relation to that Law[,] shall apply to all proceedings hereunder except as otherwise provided in this Act. 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998). Section 5 of the Act mandates that the defendant is accorded certain rights: The respondent in any proceedings under this Act shall have the right to demand a trial by jury and to be represented by counsel. At the hearing on the petition it shall be competent to introduce evidence of the commission by the respondent of any number of crimes together with whatever punishments, if any, were inflicted. 725 ILCS 205/5 (West 1998). These rights are conferred upon the defendant/respondent because, although the proceedings under the Act are civil in nature, they may result in deprivation of liberty and incarceration in the penitentiary for psychiatric treatment. Therefore, a respondent under the Act must be accorded the essential protections available at a criminal trial. See Olmstead, 32 Ill.2d at 312, 205 N.E.2d 625; People v. Capoldi, 37 Ill.2d 11, 225 N.E.2d 634 (1967); People v. Nastasio, 19 Ill.2d 524, 168 N.E.2d 728 (1960). Moreover, due process under both the United States and Illinois Constitutions require that the loss of liberty which results from civil commitment under the Act be justified by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 725 ILCS 205/3.01 (West 1998); People v. Pembrock, 62 Ill.2d 317, 321, 342 N.E.2d 28 (1976). In discussing the Act, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931, 937 (7th Cir.1975), stated: We recognize that society has a substantial interest in the protection of its members from dangerous deviant sexual behavior. But when the stakes are so great for the individual facing commitment, proof of sexual dangerousness must be sufficient to produce the highest recognized degree of certitude. The Seventh Circuit further stated, and we agree, that the right to due process entitles the defendant to the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses testifying against him, the right against selfincrimination and the right to a speedy trial. Coughlin v. Stachulak, 424 U.S. 947, 96 S.Ct. 1419, 47 L.Ed.2d 354 (1976). We note that our legislature intended rigid adherence to rules of evidence and that every necessary element of the State's petition be proved by competent evidence. People v. Bruckman, 33 Ill.2d 150, 210 N.E.2d 537 (1965); People v. Pearson, 65 Ill.App.2d 264, 212 N.E.2d 715 (1965). If the State succeeds on its petition to adjudicate the respondent sexually dangerous, the respondent is committed to the custody of the Director of Corrections as guardian. Section 8 of the Act states, The Director of Corrections as guardian shall keep safely the person so committed until the person has recovered and is released as hereinafter provided. The Director of Corrections as guardian shall provide care and treatment for the person committed to him designed to effect recovery. The Director may place that ward in any facility in the Department of Corrections or portion thereof set aside for the care and treatment of sexually dangerous persons. 725 ILCS 205/8 (West 1998). The respondent is committed for an indeterminate time until the time the respondent has recovered and is released under the Act. 725 ILCS 205/9 (West 1998). We now turn to the second part of the Act, the recovery proceeding.