Opinion ID: 2243559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Texas Conviction as an Aggravating Circumstance

Text: Lockhart argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the second allegation of the death penalty count. Count II of the amended information contained the State's request for the death penalty, and charged the following as an aggravating circumstance supporting the death penalty: On or about October 4, 1988, Michael Lee Lockhart was convicted of murder in the 186th District Court of Bexar County, Texas, Cause 88-CR-3197. (Record at 18A). Under Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(a) (West Supp. 1992), the State is entitled to seek a death sentence for murder by alleging at least one of the twelve aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (b). Under subsection (b)(7), the State establishes an aggravating circumstance if it proves beyond a reasonable doubt that [t]he defendant has been convicted of another murder. Appellant argues that the Texas conviction was not available as a (b)(7) aggravator because that conviction was not a final conviction under Texas law. For purposes of Texas evidence rules, a conviction becomes final when it is affirmed on appeal. E.g., Taylor v. State, 755 S.W.2d 548, 552 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988). Non-final convictions are inadmissible hearsay, Texas Rules of Criminal Evidence 803(22), in TEXAS RULES OF COURT  STATE AND FEDERAL (West 1992), and are thus not available as evidence in Texas sentence enhancement proceedings. Taylor, 755 S.W.2d at 552. Lockhart argues that because Texas courts would not recognize his Texas conviction for penalty enhancement purposes, Indiana courts should not consider the non-final Texas conviction for such purposes. The trial court denied Lockhart's motion to dismiss because the Texas proceeding did in fact result in a conviction for murder and thus falls within the aggravating circumstance enumerated in (b)(7). The trial court concluded: [A] sentence makes a Texas charge a Final Judgment whether appealed or not. (Record at 265A). The court determined that Texas's admissibility requirement that a conviction be affirmed on appeal is merely a rule of evidence that is peculiar to Texas. ( Id. ). Texas courts recognize that a judgment entered on a jury's verdict and assessment of punishment is indeed a conviction. Cf. Morgan v. State, 515 S.W.2d 278, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). In incorporating a finality requirement for admission of convictions in court proceedings, Texas lawmakers apparently made a judgment that judicial economy and the integrity of penalty enhancement proceedings are furthered by prohibiting the admission of prior convictions until the validity of such convictions is affirmed on appeal. Indiana lawmakers, however, have not chosen to impose such a requirement on the admission of convictions in penalty enhancement or death penalty proceedings. The fact that Lockhart's Texas conviction could not be used as evidence in a Texas penalty enhancement proceeding has no effect on the availability of the Texas conviction as an aggravating circumstance under the Indiana death penalty statute. Indiana has not chosen to require a conviction to be final for admission in subsequent proceedings. In using Lockhart's Texas murder conviction as an aggravating circumstance supporting a death sentence Indiana courts rely on the Texas proceeding's determination of the facts and the defendant's guilt or innocence. Indiana courts do not, however, rely on another state's laws to determine the admissibility of the other state's convictions in Indiana proceedings or to determine the effect of such convictions under Indiana law. We apply this principle in the context of habitual offender proceedings, see, e.g., Galmore v. State (1984), Ind., 467 N.E.2d 1173 and it is just as applicable to death penalty proceedings. In habitual offender cases we have held that the interpretation of a prior conviction from another jurisdiction is determined by Indiana law. [U]nder Indiana law the classification of crimes as felonies or misdemeanors in other states is not relevant for purposes of establishing a prior felony conviction in determining habitual criminal status in Indiana. Galmore, 467 N.E.2d at 1177; see also Collins v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 86, 97, 415 N.E.2d 46, 54-55, cert. denied, 451 U.S. 991, 101 S.Ct. 2331, 68 L.Ed.2d 851 (Arizona's classification of burglary not relevant for purposes of establishing prior felony conviction in Indiana habitual criminal proceeding). Therefore, we look to Indiana law to determine whether Lockhart's Texas murder conviction qualifies as evidence that [t]he defendant has been convicted of another murder. Ind. Code Ann. § 35-50-2-9(b)(7) (West Supp. 1992). In cases interpreting our death penalty statute, we have stated that a conviction under (b)(7) means the entry by the trial court of a judgment of conviction. Hough v. State (1990), Ind., 560 N.E.2d 511, 519, corrected on reh'g; accord Thompson v. State (1986), Ind., 492 N.E.2d 264. It is also instructive to note that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals itself holds that there need not be a final conviction for prior criminal conduct to be admissible in the penalty phase of a capital trial. See, e.g., Hammett v. State, 578 S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). The evidence demonstrates that the State did prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Lockhart was indeed convicted of another murder in the Texas proceeding. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Lockhart's motion to dismiss the second allegation of the death penalty count. The record in this case demonstrates that the trial court was warranted under Indiana law in entering the conviction and the penalty. We affirm the judgment of the trial court. GIVAN, DICKSON and KRAHULIK, JJ., concur. DeBRULER, J., concurs and dissents with separate opinion.