Opinion ID: 2356269
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Calling Beverly Coats as a Witness

Text: Flanagan argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to allow her to call Beverly Coats as a witness, thus violating her compulsory process and due process rights, including the right to present a defense and the right to a fair trial. Prior to trial, Flanagan made an oral motion that the case against Beverly Coats be disposed of prior to Flanagan's trial so that Beverly could be called as a witness for Flanagan. The circuit court denied Flanagan's motion, stating: I'm not directing that the prosecutors try Mrs. Coats's case first or set it for priority over the Flanagan case. Flanagan planned to call Beverly as a witness; however, Beverly's attorney informed the court that Beverly would exercise her right to remain silent throughout the course of the trial. Flanagan argued that there could not be a blanket Fifth, and citing Ark. R. Evid. 510, she contended that Beverly had partially waived the privilege by making statements to the police. Rule 510 provides: A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege if he or his predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged matter. This rule does not apply if the disclosure itself is privileged. The State contends that, contrary to the appellant's assertion, Ark. R. Evid. 510, by its terms, does not apply to the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination that Beverly was going to invoke. We agree. Rule 501(1) of the Arkansas Rules of Evidence provides,  Except as otherwise provided by constitution or statute or by these or other rules promulgated by the Supreme Court of this State, no person has a privilege to refuse to be a witness. (Emphasis added.) This includes the Fifth Amendment, as it is a privilege otherwise provided by constitution. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 964, 936 S.W.2d 509, 533 (1996), cert. denied, 520 U.S. 1244, 117 S.Ct. 1853, 137 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1997). [N]either the prosecution nor the defense is permitted to call a witness knowing that the witness will claim his testimonial privilege. Hamm v. State, 301 Ark. 154, 159, 782 S.W.2d 577, 580 (1990). Next, Flanagan argues that the circuit court erred in refusing to compel the State to grant Beverly the use of immunity under Ark.Code Ann. § 16-43-603 so that she could testify. We disagree. In Williams v. State, 329 Ark. 8, 19, 946 S.W.2d 678, 684 (1997), we stated: This court has said that the granting of immunity is not a constitutional right but merely one authorized by statute. Fears v. State, 262 Ark. 355, 556 S.W.2d 659 (1977). It is within the prosecutor's discretion to grant immunity when it is in the public's interest. Id. The reason for granting immunity is to aid in the prosecution of criminals by inducing witnesses to testify. Id. Williams fails to cite any criminal case law or statute in support of his argument that his constitutional rights were,infringed, and this failure to adduce apposite authority or otherwise to make a convincing argument is sufficient reason to affirm the trial court's ruling on this point. Hall v. State, 326 Ark. 318, 326 Ark. 823, 933 S.W.2d 363 (1996); Dixon v. State, 260 Ark. 857, 545 S.W.2d 606 (1977). Pursuant to our holding in Williams, it is clear that the granting of immunity is within the prosecutor's discretion; therefore, Flanagan's argument fails. Further, like the appellant in Williams, Flanagan fails to make a convincing argument that her constitutional rights were infringed. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court on this point.