Opinion ID: 2975005
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: lawfulness of search

Text: On April 1, 2001, Cherokee’s board terminated the lease of the Colony Park premises between itself and the defendants. On April 12, the court-appointed receiver for Cherokee’s assets visited the Colony Park property. On April 17, with the receiver’s free consent, an FBI agent investigating the activities of the defendants examined the contents of 2771 Colony Park Drive. Later that day, the FBI Agent served the receiver with a subpoena from the Grand Jury, which required the receiver to turn over certain records at the Colony Park office. Mrs. Madison contends on appeal that the search of Cherokee’s office space at 2771 Colony Park, Memphis, Tennessee, was unlawful and that all evidence obtained as a result of that search should have been suppressed by the district court.4 “In reviewing a denial of a motion to suppress, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact for clear error.” United States v. Morgan, 435 F.3d 660, 663 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1999)). Police may lawfully search a location if they receive valid consent. United States v. Morgan, 435 F.3d 660, 663 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973)). This consent may be given by any person “‘who possesse[s] common authority over or other 4 Contrary to the government’s argument, whether Mrs. Madison has “standing” to contest the seizure of documents at Colony Park is not the proper inquiry for this court. Rather, “in determining whether a defendant is able to show the violation of his (and not someone else’s) Fourth Amendment rights, the ‘definition of those rights is more properly placed within the purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing.’” Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1998) (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978)). -6- Nos. 05-5622, 05-5625, 05-5825, 05-5826 United States v. Madison sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974)). Common authority is mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes, so that it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others have assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched. United States v. Waller, 426 F.3d 838, 845 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7). Common authority is not a function of actual ownership rights in the premises. Id. (quoting Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n.7). In fact, an actual owner does not have authority to give consent if the premises searched are occupied by his tenant.5 Wilhelm v. Boggs, 290 F.3d 822, 826 (6th Cir. 2002). The district court reasonably found based on the evidence that “at least one employee, Mrs. Weathers, continued to work for Cherokee Children from the Colony Park location after April 1.” Report and Recommendation on Motion to Suppress (“R.R.”) at 8. Despite the termination of the lease on April 1, when the receiver took control of 2771 Colony Park Drive on April 12, Cherokee was still engaging in “use of the property” and had “common authority over” the premises. Thus, Cherokee itself had authority to consent to the search. The appointing court here ordered the receiver to “[t]ake exclusive custody, control and possession of all . . . effects, books and records of account and other papers and property or interests owned or held by the [Cherokee Corporations] . . . with full power to . . . receive and take possession of such receivership properties.” R.R. at 9. Thus, the 5 Nor need an occupant be a party to a lease agreement in order to have authority to consent. See, e.g., United States v. Clutter, 914 F.2d 775, 778 (6th Cir. 1990) (a twelve- and a fourteen-year-old boy had common authority to consent to a search of their parents’ home where they were “routinely left in exclusive control of the house” and their parents’ “possession of large quantities of marijuana was . . . open and patently non-exclusive”). T hus, the fact that Cherokee’s board terminated the lease on April 1 and the search and subsequent seizure occurred on April 17 is not dispositive of whether Cherokee had authority to consent to the search. -7- Nos. 05-5622, 05-5625, 05-5825, 05-5826 United States v. Madison receiver exercised Cherokee’s own authority, and had the authority to consent to the FBI agent’s search of 2771 Colony Park Drive.6 See Javitch v. First Union Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 626 (6th Cir. 2003). Mrs. Madison additionally argues that the seizure was invalid because the Grand Jury subpoena was facially defective. However, it is not necessary for the panel to decide this question, because the receiver voluntarily consented to the FBI agent’s seizure of the materials. The district court found that the receiver “did not ask for a subpoena; he only asked that [the FBI agent] provide him with an inventory of the documents taken,” and that the receiver said, prior to being served with a subpoena, that the FBI agent “was free to look around the building and to collect whatever files he needed.” R.R. at 26-27. Consent to a search may be voluntary even if the person giving the consent has already been served with a subpoena for the items to be seized, to say nothing of the case here, where the receiver consented when he had not yet been served with a subpoena. See United States v. Susskind, 965 F.2d 80, 87 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that the defendant’s consent to search was voluntary although he had been served with a subpoena), vacated, 975 F.2d 1206 (6th Cir. 1992), analysis adopted, 4 F.3d 1400, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993) (en banc)); see also United States v. 6 The FBI agent also seized files in a locked closet at 2771 Colony Park Drive. Because the receiver stood in the shoes of Cherokee, he could consent to the search of a locked closet to which Cherokee had access. The fact that Cherokee as an entity had access to the closet is demonstrated by the fact that Cherokee employees other than M rs. Madison had keys to the closet. Moreover, a Cherokee employee testified that Mrs. Madison had come to 2771 Colony Park and removed her personal possessions before April 17. Mrs. Madison also argues that even if the receiver had authority to consent to a search of the Colony Park premises, he did not have authority to consent to a search of her office, which she sometimes, but not always, kept locked. However, she never so much as alleges what, if any, incriminating documents were seized from her office, nor contends that she was prejudiced by the admission of any particular document. See Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 53 (1970) (holding that the admission of evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search and seizure is subject to a harmless-error analysis). -8- Nos. 05-5622, 05-5625, 05-5825, 05-5826 United States v. Madison Iglesias, 991 F.2d 1519, 1522 (9th Cir. 1989) (the fact that an officer threatened the “issuance of a grand jury subpoena” held not “sufficient to render . . . consent [to search] involuntary”). The district court did not clearly err in finding the consent to be voluntary. Because a person lawfully in control of the premises consented to the search and to the removal of documents, Mrs. Madison’s motion to suppress was properly denied.