Opinion ID: 3007117
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), (d)

Text: Foy’s attempt to assert jurisdiction based on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) or (d) fails for similar reasons. Rule 60(b) authorizes a party to move for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding based on various specified grounds, including, as Foy contends is applicable here, because “applying the [the judgment] prospectively is no longer equitable” or for “any other reason that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(5), (6). Rule 60(d) is a savings clause, clarifying that Rule 60 does not limit a court’s power, among other things, to “entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order, or proceeding.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(1); see Jackson v. Danberg, 656 F.3d 157, 166 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Rule 60(d) permits a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a 12 judgment in order to ‘prevent a grave miscarriage of justice.’” (quoting United States v. Beggerly, 524 U.S. 38, 47, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 1868 (1998))).4 Nevertheless, Rule 60 by itself does not vest a district court with jurisdiction to consider such a motion or independent action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 82 (“These rules do not extend or limit the jurisdiction of the district courts or the venue of actions in those courts.”); Palkow v. CSX Transp., Inc., 431 F.3d 543, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (stating that district court required “an independent statutory basis” to exercise jurisdiction over claim framed as Rule 60 motion or independent action). Ordinarily, it would be clear that a district court would have jurisdiction over a Rule 60 motion or an independent action seeking relief from a judgment because the court will have ancillary jurisdiction to consider a challenge to its own judgment or order. See Beggerly, 524 U.S. at 46, 118 S.Ct. at 1867 (citing Pac. R.R. of Mo. v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 111 U.S. 505, 522, 4 S.Ct. 583, 592 (1884)) (“The Government is . . . wrong to suggest that an independent action brought in the same court as the original lawsuit requires an independent basis for jurisdiction.”); Budget Blinds, Inc. v. White, 536 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The power of a court to invoke Rule 60(b) to vacate its own earlier judgment is unquestioned.”). Foy attempts to rely on this basis for jurisdiction, pointing to the initiation of commitment proceedings under 18 U.S.C. § 4246 in the Eastern District Court and its September 19, 2005 order committing him for a reassessment of his dangerousness. As discussed above, however, the commitment order under which 4 Foy’s pro se motion cited Rule 60(d)(3), which preserves a court’s power to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court,” but his brief frames his motion as attempting to assert an independent action as authorized by Rule 60(d)(1). 13 Foy was confined when he filed his November 18, 2010 motion, and therefore the order from which he sought relief in asking for his immediate release, had been issued in the Western District of Missouri, not by the Eastern District Court. We emphasize that the Eastern District Court’s earlier order of temporary commitment did not provide it with jurisdiction to revisit a distinct order of commitment entered by a different court. See Baker, 807 F.2d at 1325. Though we recognize that there may be circumstances in which a district court has jurisdiction over a Rule 60 motion or an independent action seeking relief from a judgment entered by another court, such as where a party to initial proceedings registers a judgment obtained in another court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1963, see Budget Blinds, 536 F.3d at 251-54, 254 n.12, Foy does not point to such an independent ground for jurisdiction here.5 5 Of course, the Eastern District Court would have had jurisdiction over a challenge to its September 19, 2005 order of temporary commitment, but such jurisdiction would not have authorized it to order Foy’s release from his current commitment, the identified aim of his pro se motion. Though we do not reach a conclusion on the point as we have no need to do so, we recognize that arguably the Eastern District Court lacked authority to initiate the preliminary § 4246 commitment proceedings because it was not “the court for the district in which [Foy was] confined” when the Court entered the order as he was confined in FMC Butner at that time. 18 U.S.C. § 4246(a); see, e.g., United States v. Charters, 863 F.2d 302, 314 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc); Baker, 807 F.2d at 1324; United States v. Steil, 753 F. Supp. 806, 808-09 (D. Minn. 1989). But see United States v. Godinez-Ortiz, 563 F.3d 1022, 1032 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that district court in Southern District of 14