Opinion ID: 1799288
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Procedural v. Substantive

Text: Where there is a state constitutional entitlement to some due process right, the State may not enact legislation to impede that right under ex post facto analysis. Hill v. State, 659 So.2d 547, 551 (Miss. 1994) citing Johnston v. State, 618 So.2d 90, 95 (Miss. 1993) (holding ex post facto prohibitions bar retroactive applications of statutory law unless the changes are procedural and ameliorative.). In Conerly v. State , this Court analyzed criminal statutes of limitations and determined their purpose to be much like the purpose behind the right to a speedy trial, which is to avoid the bringing of stale criminal charges. Conerly v. State, 607 So.2d 1153, 1157 (Miss. 1992). In its analysis, the Court reviewed 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 196 at 240-41 (1989), and found the following: Protection from prosecution under a statute of limitations is a substantive right. Under some, but not all, authorities, the limitation so fixed is jurisdictional, and the time within which the offense is committed is a jurisdictional fact, it being necessary that the indictment or information be actually filed within the time prescribed. Under such statutes a substantive statute of limitation question is properly raised at any time. Conerly, 607 So.2d at 1157. The Court then looked at several state courts that have treated the statute of limitations in a criminal case as jurisdictional and nonwaivable. Id. (internal citations omitted). This Court determined the better rule to be that in a criminal case statutes of limitations are not jurisdictional, but an affirmative defense that may be waived. Id. The Court rejected the viewpoint that criminal statutes of limitation are jurisdictional and nonwaivable. Therefore, the reasonable conclusion is that criminal statutes of limitation do not carry with them a substantive right in Mississippi. This is inferred from the Court's analysis of Conerly. However, this Court specifically addressed this question in an earlier case as the district court noted in Morningstar v. General Motors, Corp., 847 F. Supp. 489 (S.D.Miss. 1994), aff'd, 36 F.3d 89 (5th Cir.1994): Mississippi follows the traditional rule that a statute of limitation is deemed procedural rather than substantive. Williams v. Taylor Machinery, Inc., 529 So.2d 606, 609 (Miss. 1988). However, a well-established exception exists where a particular state's limitations period is considered to be part of its substantive law because the limitations period is built in or in the same enactment as the statute which creates the right of action. See e.g., Siroonian v. Textron, Inc., 844 F.2d 289, 292 (5th Cir.1988) (holding that in a wrongful death action brought in Mississippi court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction and applying Kentucky substantive law, Kentucky's statute of limitations is considered substantive and thus governed the case). Id. at 491. The statute that creates the right of action against a defendant for touching or handling a child for lustful purposes is Miss.Code § 97-5-23. The statute that enumerates the limitations period within which the action must be brought is Miss.Code § 99-1-5. [6] These are two separate acts. This statute of limitation was procedural. It did not fit within the exception espoused by the Fifth Circuit as discussed in Morningstar, because the limitations period was not built in or in the same enactment as the statute which creates the right of action. Id. Thus, in keeping with Johnston, there is no ex post facto prohibition or bar to this retroactive application of statutory limitations period where the change is merely procedural. Johnston, 618 So.2d at 95.