Opinion ID: 2178267
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: cmhs's appeal

Text: In the second appeal, CMHS maintains that the trial court erred in concluding that D.C.Code § 21-592 does not provide a mechanism for returning a committed outpatient to the hospital when the patient is refusing treatment. CMHS urges us to hold that the statutory language limiting the application of section 21-592 to a patient who has left the hospital without authorization or has failed to return as directed should not be interpreted literally. [5] In denying CMHS's petition, the trial court rejected a similar argument. It read the statutory language narrowly and concluded that section 21-592 applies only to those two narrow categories of patients, neither of which includes Ms. Walker. We think the trial court was right. The Ervin Act provides an explicit and expedited timetable for involuntary hospitalization procedures, In re Lomax, 386 A.2d 1185, 1188 (D.C.1978) (en banc), evinc[ing] the intention of Congress to permit emergency confinement for only short and precisely circumscribed durations. In re DeLoatch, 532 A.2d 1343, 1345 (D.C.1987). While the Act permits the often necessary emergency hospitalization of the mentally ill or those believed to be mentally ill, it also reflects a `profound congressional concern for the liberties of the mentally ill.' Id. (quoting Covington v. Harris, 136 U.S.App. D.C. 35, 41, 419 F.2d 617, 623 (1969)). This court therefore construes the Act narrowly when its application may result in the curtailment of any person's liberty. In re Reed, 571 A.2d 801, 802 (D.C.1990); see In re Lomax, 386 A.2d at 1187-1188. Contrary to CMHS's position, the fact that Ms. Walker refused to take her medication does not bring her within the reach of D.C.Code § 21-592. The plain language of that section permits a court to order the United States Marshal to return a committed patient to the hospital in only two precisely defined situations: when the patient (1) has left the hospital without authorization or (2) has failed to return as directed. The record shows that Ms. Walker was a committed outpatient, not an inpatient, and thus did not need authorization to leave the hospital. In addition, both parties agreed that Ms. Walker regularly attended the outpatient clinic, having missed only one appointment in fifteen months; thus she did not fail to return as directed. Given these undisputed facts, the trial court couldand didreasonably conclude that CMHS had not made the requisite showing for a section 21-592 order. [6] CMHS makes several policy-based arguments in support of its contention that section 21-592 should be read to encompass cases such as this one, but they all founder on the clear and unambiguous statutory language. If CMHS believes that section 21-592 should be more broadly applicable, its recourse must be to the legislature, not to the courts.