Opinion ID: 580694
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the first appeal (peter beane)

Text: 6 We divide our discussion of the first appeal into three subparts. We begin by capsulizing the jurisprudence of Fed.R.Civ.P. 56. We thereafter offer an overview of civil in rem forfeiture proceedings under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). At that point, we turn to Peter Beane's asseverational array. 7
8 Summary judgment's role is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial. Garside, 895 F.2d at 50 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56 advisory committee's note). Thus, summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). 9 By invoking Rule 56, the moving party in effect declares that the evidence is insufficient to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It then falls to the opposing party to limn a genuine disagreement as to some material fact. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Medina-Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 8 (1st Cir.1990). In this context, genuine means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party, Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; material means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Id. On issues where the nonmovant bears the burden of proof, he must present definite, competent evidence to rebut the motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256-57, 106 S.Ct. at 2514-15; see also Garside, 895 F.2d at 49 (a mere promise to produce admissible evidence at trial does not suffice to thwart the summary judgment ax). 10 In the precincts patrolled by Rule 56, appellate review is plenary. Garside, 895 F.2d at 48. We, like the district court, must view the entire record in the light most hospitable to the party opposing summary judgment, indulging all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Griggs- Ryan v. Smith, 904 F.2d 112, 115 (1st Cir.1990). Nonetheless, the court of appeals is not tied to the district court's reasoning but may affirm the entry of summary judgment on any independently sufficient ground made manifest by the record. See United States v. One Lot of United States Currency ($68,000), 927 F.2d 30, 31 (1st Cir.1991); Garside, 895 F.2d at 48-49. 11
12 The framework for civil forfeiture proceedings brought pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) is borrowed from customs law. See United States v. Parcels of Real Property, Etc. (1933 Commonwealth Ave.), 913 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1990); see also 21 U.S.C. § 881(d) (1982 & Supp.1988) (mandating cross-reference); 19 U.S.C. § 1615 (1988) (codifying customs law forfeiture provisions). Under these rules, the government must initially demonstrate probable cause to believe that the property had the required nexus to a specified illegal purpose. $68,000, 927 F.2d at 32; see also United States v. Parcel of Land, Etc. (28 Emery St.), 914 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1990); United States v. $250,000 in United States Currency, 808 F.2d 895, 897 (1st Cir.1987). In this setting, probable cause means a 'reasonable ground for belief ... supported by less than prima facie proof but more than mere suspicion' that the property is subject to forfeiture. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d at 3 (quoting $250,000, 808 F.2d at 897). Once probable cause is shown, the burden shifts to those individuals wishing to assert claims to the property. To prevail, such claimants must prove by a preponderance of the evidence either that the property was not used in violation of the statute or that it was so used without the owners' knowledge or consent. 28 Emery St., 914 F.2d at 3. 13
14 Peter Beane contends that the district court erred in granting summary judgment for three reasons: (1) section 881(a)(7) does not allow the forfeiture of property used to grow marijuana for personal use; (2) a title dispute regarding ownership of the estate foreclosed summary judgment because a trial was necessary to resolve the dispute and adjudicate Peter Beane's actual ownership status; and (3) the forfeiture violated constitutional strictures prohibiting disproportionate punishment. We turn, then, to these contentions. 15 1. Personal Use. Peter Beane's first asseveration is that section 881(a)(7) does not authorize a forfeiture of property based on the cultivation of marijuana exclusively for personal use; and that, since a dispute existed as to why he grew marijuana--he asserts that it was for his own, admittedly copious, consumption--summary judgment was premature. We think this claim is more smoke than substance. 16 The statutory scheme is precise to the point of pedantry. By its express terms, section 881(a)(7) sanctions forfeiture of real property used to commit ... a violation of this subchapter punishable by more than one year's imprisonment. The subchapter in question makes it unlawful to manufacture ... a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1982). As employed in the statute, the term manufacture includes production, 21 U.S.C. § 802(15) (Supp.1988), and the term production includes the planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance. Id. at § 802(22). The pertinent authority also designates marijuana as a controlled substance. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (1982). 17 Given the clear and unambiguous nature of the legislative mandate, the appellant's speculation about lessened congressional concerns in respect to marijuana and/or in respect to the personal use of drugs (as opposed to trafficking in them) seems feckless. We hold unhesitatingly, joining other courts that have formed the same conclusion, that marijuana grown for personal use is within the reach of section 841(a). See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 870 F.2d 1067, 1071 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Klein, 850 F.2d 404, 405 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867, 109 S.Ct. 173, 102 L.Ed.2d 143 (1988); United States v. Roberts, 747 F.2d 537, 547 (9th Cir.1984). Moreover, since violations of section 841(a) are felonies punishable by more than one year in prison, see 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (Supp.1988), we also hold that growing marijuana, whether or not for personal use, is an activity sufficient to subject the property on which cultivation occurs to civil forfeiture under section 881(a)(7). Accord United States v. Premises & Real Property at 250 Kreag Road, 739 F.Supp. 120, 124 (W.D.N.Y.1990) (proof of cultivation [of marijuana] for personal use will suffice as a predicate illegal act under section 881(a)(7)). It follows inexorably that any disagreement over the purpose for which Peter Beane grew marijuana is not material in the Rule 56 sense. 18 2. The Title Dispute. Peter Beane endeavors to persuade us that brevis disposition was improper because an unrelated party, Everett Edwards, claimed title to a portion of the subject property. Edwards's claim barred forfeiture, this thesis runs, since the marijuana crop may have sprouted on land belonging to Edwards, thereby blunting section 881(a)(7)'s impact on the untainted remainder of the Beane homestead. We are not convinced. 19 This argument ignores--or at least misapprehends--the allocation of burdens of proof in forfeiture cases. In such cases, the government carries a relatively light burden of showing probable cause to believe that the subject property was used in a way that triggered the forfeiture laws. See, e.g., United States v. One 1986 Chevrolet Van, 927 F.2d 39, 42 (1st Cir.1991); 1933 Commonwealth Ave., 913 F.2d at 2-3; $250,000, 808 F.2d at 897; see also supra Part II(B) and cases cited therein. The forfeiture statute places no restriction on how the government must define the limits of the property to be seized--a lacuna that has troubled some tribunals. See, e.g., United States v. Premises & Real Property, Etc. (4492 S. Livonia Rd.), 889 F.2d 1258, 1270 (2d Cir.1989). Whatever safeguards courts may ultimately impose upon the government's powers of delineation, we believe that the government may treat as unitary, for purposes of an initial seizure warrant, any tract over which an owner or group of owners exercises dominion and treats as his/her/their own. Furthermore, we think it is beyond serious question that, for purposes of showing probable cause, the government is justified in describing a seized tract in the usual and customary manner reflected in the local land records. See, e.g., United States v. Santoro, 866 F.2d 1538, 1543 (4th Cir.1989) (land to be seized may be described by the duly recorded instruments and documents filed in the county offices where the defendant property is located). 20 These principles are dispositive here. The government described the tract in the same way as the deed into the Beane family described it. The lower court determined, supportably, that the government satisfied its burden of elucidating probable cause. 2 In the face of this showing, Peter Beane failed to adduce any evidence sufficient either to negate the subject property's connection with proscribed activities or to bring himself within the statute's innocent owner exception. 3 In a forfeiture case where the government carries its initial burden and the claimant offers no exculpatory evidence, summary judgment is appropriate. See United States v. Parcel of Land, Etc. (18 Oakwood St.), 958 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir.1992); $68,000, 927 F.2d at 32. 21 3. Proportionality. In a last-ditch effort to salvage his property interest, Peter Beane argues that the Eighth Amendment blocks disproportionate forfeitures. 4 The judgment below, he tells us, suffers from this infirmity. We demur. 22 The Eighth Amendment provides that [e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. U.S. Const. amend. VIII. Having consistently recognized that section 881 forfeitures are civil in nature, see, e.g., United States v. Parcel of Land, Etc. (40 Moon Hill Road), 884 F.2d 41, 43 (1st Cir.1989); $250,000, 808 F.2d at 900, we begin our analysis by noting that such proportionality protections as the Eighth Amendment contains have generally been considered inapplicable to civil actions initiated by the United States. See Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 262-63, 109 S.Ct. 2909, 2913-14, 106 L.Ed.2d 219 (1989); United States v. Certain Real Property, Etc. (6250 Ledge Road), 943 F.2d 721, 727 (7th Cir.1991). 23 Notwithstanding this phalanx of authority, the appellant insists that he discerns a trend toward applying proportionality protections in civil cases where the balance between the disapproved conduct and the sanctions received is severely lopsided. Drawing somewhat strained analogies to cases such as United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 109 S.Ct. 1892, 104 L.Ed.2d 487 (1989) and Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 113 L.Ed.2d 1 (1991), the appellant invites us to extend the Constitution's prohibition against excessive punishment to allegedly disproportionate sanctions imposed in the course of civil forfeiture proceedings. 5 24 We need not venture too deeply into this thicket. Although the Second Circuit, virtually simultaneous with oral argument herein, decided that section 881(a)(7) forfeitures are subject to proportionality analysis, see United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises, Etc. (38 Whalers Cove Drive), 954 F.2d 29, 33-39 (2d Cir.1992), this court has ruled the other way, taking the unequivocal position that proportionality analysis is inappropriate in civil forfeiture cases brought under section 881(a)(7). See 40 Moon Hill Rd., 884 F.2d at 43-45. That ends the matter. We have held, with a regularity bordering on the monotonous, that in a multi-panel circuit, newly constituted panels are, by and large, bound by prior panel decisions closely in point. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 945 F.2d 10, 12 (1st Cir.1991) (collecting cases), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 1290, 117 L.Ed.2d 514 (1992). The exceptions to this rule are few, see id., and they are narrowly construed. See id. at 12-13. No such exception is applicable here. 6 Inasmuch as 40 Moon Hill Rd. is the law of this circuit, Peter Beane's argument must fail. 25 Even assuming, arguendo, that we felt free to deviate from our prior precedent, it would not profit this appellant. On the merits, the Whalers Cove court determined that the forfeiture of a $68,000 interest in a condominium was not unconstitutionally disproportionate vis-a-vis the claimant's sale of $250 worth of cocaine on the premises. Whalers Cove, 954 F.2d at 39. Given that ruling, the tenor of recent criminal cases, see, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, --- U.S. ----, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991) (upholding, against a proportionality challenge, a life sentence without possibility of parole in respect to a defendant convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (upholding a 40-year sentence for possession of nine ounces of marijuana with intent to distribute), and the facts of 40 Moon Hill Rd. (which involved the forfeiture of roughly 18 acres of land and a home based on the cultivation of approximately 130 marijuana plants), it is clear beyond peradventure that the forfeiture of Peter Beane's one-third interest in the homestead, though valuable, was not unconstitutionally harsh when balanced against the nature of his crime and the prodigious extent of his unlawful agricultural activities. In fine, the instant forfeiture cannot successfully be challenged on proportionality grounds. 7 26