Opinion ID: 2056377
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Direct Appellate Jurisdiction Under CP Section 8-201(j)(6)

Text: The State contends that Thompson does not have available to him a direct appeal arising under CP Section 8-201(j)(6) because this provision, at the time of Thompson's postconviction proceeding, only provided for direct appeal when the postconviction court either (1) does not order DNA testing; (2) does not open or reopen a postconviction proceeding; or (3) orders destruction of evidence over the defendant's objection. The State argues that because these provisions do not encompass Thompson's challenge to the postconviction court's denial of his motion for new trial, his appeal is precluded from review by this Court. At the time of Thompson's appeal in 2007, CP Section 8-201(j)(6) provided: [a]n appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an order entered under subsection (c), (h)(2), or (j)(4) of this section. [4] Subsection (c) provides a postconviction petitioner a direct appeal to this Court if the postconviction court does not order DNA testing, but DNA testing was ordered here. Subsection (h)(2) provides petitioners with a method of direct review when the Circuit Court does not open or reopen a postconviction proceeding pursuant to Sections 7-102 and 104 of the Criminal Procedure Article. Here, however, the postconviction court did reopen Thompson's petition. [5] Because Thompson did not meet any of the prerequisites for appeal provided by the 2007 version of CP Section 8-201(j)(6), he has no avenue for appeal under that iteration of the statute. CP Section 8-201 was revised in 2008 to provide, inter alia, broader appeal rights and more liberal standards for the granting of new trials. The General Assembly, in Chapter 337 of the Acts of 2008, effective January 1, 2009, modified the appeal provisions of CP Section 8-201 to read as follows: [a]n appeal to the court of appeals may be taken from an order entered under this section. CP § 8-201(k)(6). CP Section 8-201 was also modified to add a new subsection (c) providing: New trial. A petitioner may move for a new trial under this section on the grounds that the conviction was based on unreliable scientific identification evidence and a substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted without the evidence. The revised statute also added a new subsection (i)(2), which contains the following new trial provision: (2) If the results of the postconviction DNA testing are favorable to the petitioner, the court shall: (i) if no postconviction proceeding has been previously initiated by the petitioner under § 7-102 of this article, open a postconviction proceeding under § 7-102 of this article; (ii) if a postconviction proceeding has been previously initiated by the petitioner under § 7-102 of this article, reopen a postconviction proceeding under § 7-104 of this article; or (iii) on a finding that a substantial possibility exists that the petitioner would not have been convicted if the DNA testing results had been known or introduced at trial, order a new trial. (3) If the court finds that a substantial possibility does not exist under paragraph (2)(iii) of this subsection, the court may order a new trial if the court determines that the action is in the interest of justice. (Emphasis added.) Thompson contends that we should apply both the new trial and appeal modifications retroactively and allow this appeal.