Opinion ID: 1645742
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Howard Johnson's Action

Text: In the first venture, Prime Motor Inns, Inc., through its wholly-owned subsidiary, Prime Management, entered into a joint venture with Waltman and Cohen, doing business as W & C Associates. They created Southern Joint Venture, owned one-half by Prime Management and one-half by W & C Associates, which was granted by Prime Motor Inns a lease of certain Howard Johnson's motels, containing a provision of first refusal to purchase. Subsequently, Prime Motor Inns sold the leased Howard Johnson's properties and then reacquired them from the purchaser in a transaction that W & C Associates contested. The partnership alleged that the purchase of the three Howard Johnson's motels by Prime Motor Inns was a breach of fiduciary duty and that the purchase price paid by Prime Motor Inns for the property in the repurchase transaction was below the fair market value. W & C Associates also alleged bad faith and claimed damages in the amount of one-half the difference between the market value of the three motels and the amount actually paid by Prime Motor Inns. The jury returned a verdict for the respondents in the amount of $500,000. In post-trial motions, the trial court denied petitioners' motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for directed verdict and denied a motion for new trial as to liability, but, without specifying its reasons, granted a motion for new trial as to damages because the amount of damages awarded by the jury was excessive and contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. [2] In its decision, the district court stated that the new trial order failed to state reasons supporting the court's conclusions, and that it was unable to discern reasons justifying the trial court's decision to grant a new trial, 446 So.2d at 186, and concluded that the order granting the new trial should be vacated and the jury verdict of $500,000 reinstated. The trial court's order clearly failed to specify the specific grounds for granting a new trial when the verdict is determined to be contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence, as required by rule 1.530(f), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, and explained by Wackenhut Corp. v. Canty, 359 So.2d 430 (Fla. 1978), and Baptist Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Bell, 384 So.2d 145 (Fla. 1980). The district court, however, also failed to comply with that part of rule 1.530(f), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, which states: If such an order is appealed and does not state the specific grounds, the appellate court shall relinquish its jurisdiction to the trial court for entry of an order specifying the grounds for granting the new trial. (Emphasis added.) This provision ensures that an appellate court knows the reasons for the trial court's action before determining whether the trial judge has abused his or her discretion in granting a new trial. To allow appellate courts to make an independent determination of whether a jury of reasonable persons could have returned the verdict without knowing the reasons of the trial judge or applying the appropriate test to determine whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion allows appellate courts to substitute arbitrarily their judgment for that of the trial court and to ignore the second sentence of rule 1.530(f). We hold that the district court was mandated to relinquish its jurisdiction to the trial court for an order specifying the grounds for granting the new trial and, thereafter, to consider those reasons in determining whether the trial judge had abused his discretion in entering the new trial order in accordance with the dictates of this Court in Baptist Memorial Hospital; Castlewood International Corp. v. LaFleur, 322 So.2d 520 (Fla. 1975); and Cloud v. Fallis, 110 So.2d 669 (Fla. 1959).