Opinion ID: 1610587
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 27

Heading: Was the Prior Conviction Facially Invalid?

Text: Here the Court is asked to render guidelines for determining the admissibility of prior felony records to establish aggravating circumstances under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-101(5)(b) (Supp. 1986). This Court has announced the following procedure in Phillips v. State, 421 So.2d 476 (Miss. 1982). In Phillips, the prosecution sought to use a prior Kentucky conviction to enhance the defendant's punishment under Miss. Code Ann. § 99-19-81, as amended. The defendant objected to the use of the Kentucky conviction alleging that the conviction was invalid because he had not knowingly and voluntarily pled guilty. In response to Phillips' argument, this Court held that the trial judge is not required to go beyond the face of the prior convictions sought to be used in establishing a defendant's status as an habitual offender. If, on its face, the conviction makes a proper showing that a defendant's prior plea of guilty was both knowing and voluntary, that conviction may be used for the enhancement of the defendant's punishment under the Mississippi Habitual Offender Act. Phillips, 421 So.2d at 481. See also, Moore v. State, 508 So.2d 666 (Miss. 1987). In the instant case the record reflects that: John B. Nixon in open court, in person, pleaded guilty to the charge contained in the indictment, thereupon the said Defendant was admonished by the Court of the consequences of said plea, and the said Defendant persisted in pleading guilty; and it plainly appearing to the Court that the said Defendant is sane, and that he is uninfluenced in making said plea by any consideration of fear, or by any persuasion, or delusive hope of pardon prompting him to confess his guilt, the said plea of guilty is by the Court received and here now entered of record upon the minutes of the Court as the plea herein of said Defendant.
If the Court had found that the introduction of Nixon's prior rape conviction as an aggravating circumstance was improper, Nixon contends his death sentence must be reversed. This Court has rejected that argument. Even if this Court did so determine, reversal would not necessarily follow. Relying on Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S.Ct. 2733, 77 L.Ed.2d 235 (1983), this Court has held numerous times that where a death penalty is supported by several aggravating circumstances, the invalidity of one of those circumstances will not constitutionally impair the sentence. See e.g., Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 945 (Miss. 1986); Irving v. State, 498 So.2d 305, 314 (Miss. 1986). In the instant case, the jury found two other aggravating circumstances  (1) the capital offense was committed for pecuniary gain and (2) the capital offense was especially heinous, atrocious and cruel. For those reasons, the Court holds the introduction of Nixon's prior rape conviction was not reversible error.