Opinion ID: 2966290
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Maine Tort Claims Act

Text: The MTCA contains several provisions that speak to the amount of damages available to a plaintiff who brings a successful claim against a governmental entity or its employees. The provision at the core of this case, § 8104-D, is titled Personal liability of employees of a governmental entity, and it limits the out-of-pocket exposure of a government employee to $10,000 for any claims arising out of a single occurrence. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8104-D; see supra note 2. Another provision of the Act, titled Limitation on damages, sets a $400,000 cap on the award of damages that may be obtained against either a governmental entity or its employees, or both . . . for any and all claims arising out of a single occurrence. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8105(1). The § 8105 limit is explicitly superseded in certain instances, however, when a governmental entity procures liability insurance: If the insurance provides protection in excess of the limit of liability imposed by section 8105, then the limits provided in the insurance policy shall replace the limit imposed by section 8105. Id. § 8116.4 4 The substitution of the policy limits for the statutory limit applies to claims for which immunity is waived by the MTCA or under any other law. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8116. If the policy covers actions for which the government would otherwise be immune from liability, the governmental entity shall be liable . . . but only to the limits of the insurance coverage. Id. -7-
Appellee Titcomb argues that this case is easily resolved by reference to the terms of § 8104-D, which he reads to impose a $10,000 ceiling whenever damages are awarded against a government employee in his personal capacity. He argues that § 8105, which allows damages up to $400,000 against a governmental entity or an employee, must apply only to employees in their official capacity because that provision otherwise would be inconsistent with § 8104-D's much lower cap. He points out that official-capacity suits are, in essence, suits against the employing governmental entities. Hence, narrowly construing the word employee in § 8105 retains the distinction between the government's liability – capped at $400,000 under § 8105 – and the individual's liability – capped at $10,000 under § 8104-D. No Maine cases address the relationship between §§ 8104-D and 8105, and Titcomb's depiction of the statutory scheme presents one plausible interpretation of the MTCA. Section 8104-D explicitly caps the recovery of damages from individual employees at $10,000, and that clear limitation would be inconsistent with § 8105 if the latter provision were construed to allow up to $400,000 in damages against such individuals. Arguably, then, the reference in § 8105 to employees cannot refer to the category of employees covered by § 8104-D, i.e., those sued in their personal capacity. -8- That construction is reinforced by the language of § 8116, which allows governmental bodies to procure insurance coverage against liability for any claim against it or its employees for which immunity is waived. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8116. Section 8116 makes no reference to § 8104-D. Rather, it states: If the insurance provides protection in excess of the limit of liability imposed by section 8105, then the limits provided in the insurance policy shall replace the limit imposed by section 8105. A fair reading of § 8116, in the context of §§ 8104-D and 8105, could lead to the conclusion that § 8104-D is a stand-alone provision that applies to personal-capacity claims against governmental employees, while §§ 8105 and 8116 apply to all other types of claims involving governments and their employees. Under that construction of the MTCA, the district court would have properly reduced Fortin's award to the $10,000 limit set by § 8104-D. Titcomb's construction has some support in the Maine Law Court's requirement to strictly construe the MTCA. Darling v. Augusta Mental Health Inst., 535 A.2d 421, 424 (Me. 1987); see also Mueller v. Penobscot Valley Hosp., 538 A.2d 294, 297-98 (Me. 1988) (rejecting a broad reading of the Act). The Law Court appears to be particularly strict in construing the provisions of the MTCA that govern suits against government employees. In Darling, for example, the court explained that the Tort Claims Act, both by the limits it places on personal liability of employees and by the -9- discretionary authority it grants an immune entity to defend and indemnify a nonimmune employee, articulates the significant state interest in regulating the conditions under which suit can be prosecuted against government employees. See Darling, 535 A.2d at 429. As one example of that interest, the court emphasized that the Act limits to $10,000 the amount that a plaintiff can recover in a personal suit against a nonimmune employee. Id. at 430 (emphasis added). Although this statement is dicta, and does not consider the possible impact of insurance coverage on the § 8104-D cap, it reflects an assumption by the Law Court that a plaintiff's recovery in a personal suit against a government employee is limited to $10,000. Similarly, in Moore v. City of Lewiston, 596 A.2d 612 (Me. 1991), the Law Court concluded that § 8116 operates differently as to government entities than as to government employees sued in their personal capacity. In Moore, the court noted that, under § 8116, the City of Lewiston could have waived its statutory immunities in its liability insurance policy; it thus held that summary judgment on the basis of those immunities, without a copy of the City's liability insurance policy in evidence, was premature. See id. at 615. The court went on to hold, however, that the City could not override the personal immunity of its employees by purchasing insurance, contrasting the -10- explicit waiver in § 8116 of governmental immunity with the absence of any such explicit waiver for individual employees. See id. (concluding that regardless of whether the City's insurance coverage extended to the defense or indemnity of the police officers, their personal immunity from liability could not have been waived by the City's purchase of insurance). Although Moore addressed the issue of immunity rather than damages, Titcomb argues that its reasoning applies to him. Moore, he says, recognizes that § 8116 gives different effect to the availability of insurance for an employee sued in his personal capacity than for a government entity or an employee sued in his official capacity. He claims that it follows from Moore's discussion of employee immunity that an employee's liability also is unaffected by insurance coverage and, hence, remains subject to the $10,000 limit established by § 8104-D. Titcomb's construction is not, however, the only plausible reading of the statutory scheme. As an initial matter, § 8105 refers to employees without qualification. Reading the statute to contain an official-capacity restriction would be a significant departure from its plain language – and thus an approach at odds with basic principles of statutory interpretation under Maine law. See Anastos v. Town of Brunswick, 15 A.3d 1279, 1283 (Me. 2011) (In interpreting a statute, we first consider the plain language and will consider other indicia of legislative -11- intent if the language is silent or ambiguous.); Jusseaume v. Ducatt, 15 A.3d 714, 719 (Me. 2011) (In interpreting a statute, we look first to the plain meaning expressed in the statute's language to discern the Legislature's intent.). Indeed, the Law Court has previously construed the term employee in another section of the MTCA to include a government employee in his or her personal capacity. See Mueller, 538 A.2d at 297 (rejecting plaintiff's argument that the notice requirement of Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8107(4), referring to a governmental entity or employee, does not apply to claims against employee as an individual). It may also be significant that §§ 8104-D and 8105 by their terms address different matters: the former relates to personal liability, while the latter imposes a limit on damages. Hence, there arguably would be no consistency problem if a plaintiff were awarded more than $10,000 in damages against a government employee in his individual capacity, so long as the employee's personal exposure is capped at $10,000. In fact, the possibility of a damages judgment beyond the employee cap appears to be contemplated by the language of § 8104-D, which implicitly recognizes that the award may include an amount in excess of th[e] limit. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8104-D. Thus, it is possible to conclude that, under the terms of §§ 8105 and 8104-D, a plaintiff may obtain an award of damages against a government -12- employee in his individual capacity up to $400,000 – but any amount over $10,000 is not recoverable from the employee himself. The question would then be what alternative source of funding exists for the balance of such an award. One possible answer, again requiring our attention to § 8116, is that the Maine legislature contemplated the availability of insurance coverage for that purpose.5 As noted above, § 8116 states that, where a governmental entity procures liability insurance, the policy limits will replace the $400,000 statutory cap if the insurance provides coverage in excess of the limit of liability imposed by section 8105. Id. § 8116. Although we gave significance above to the absence of any reference in § 8116 to the § 8104-D cap, that omission does not necessarily reflect a legislative intent to strictly limit recoveries in personal-capacity claims to $10,000. It also is plausible to conclude that § 8116 does not reference § 8104-D simply because an employee's personal liability would be unaffected by insurance coverage. Rather, in allowing a government to procure insurance for any claim against it or its employees, § 8116 may have been 5 The MTCA also contains an indemnification provision that allows a governmental entity, with the employee's consent, to indemnify [the] employee against a claim which arises out of an act or omission occurring within the course and scope of employment and for which the governmental entity is not liable. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8112(1). Indemnification has not been raised by either party, and we therefore have no occasion to consider how, or if, it would affect Fortin's recovery here. -13- designed at least in part with the victims of government actors in mind – i.e., to provide a source of funds for payment of damages that could not be satisfied against the offending actor because the total award was in excess of the § 8104-D cap. Because the insurance coverage would not override the limit of personal liability set by § 8104-D, there would be no reason to refer to that cap. The pertinent limit on damages would instead be the $400,000 ceiling imposed by § 8105 for damages against governments and their employees. Hence, § 8116 could have been intended to apply to personal-capacity claims as it would to any other tort claim against a government or governmental employee: where insurance coverage provides protection in excess of the limit of liability imposed by section 8105, see id. § 8116, a plaintiff may recover up to the policy limit. The legislative history of the MTCA's damages-related provisions could be read to support the view that § 8104-D does not remove personal-capacity claims from the scope of §§ 8105 and 8116. When first enacted in 1977, the MTCA contained no statutory cap on damages against employees other than in § 8105, which at that time imposed a $300,000 limitation for damages against a governmental entity and its employees. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8105(1) (1977). Early on, however, the MTCA was amended to include a $10,000 limit on the personal liability of state – though not municipal – employees in instances in which the State is immune. -14- Id. § 8103(3); see Me. Pub. Laws 1977, chap. 578, § 1. In the same amending legislation, the language of § 8116 was modified so that it closely tracked the current version allowing governmental entities to purchase insurance for claim[s] against it or its employees and providing that the policy limit would replace the limit of liability imposed by section 8105. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 14, § 8116 (1977); see Me. Pub. Laws 1977, chap. 578, § 5. Not until 1986 was the $10,000 personal liability cap extended to all government employees, Me. Pub. Laws 1985, ch. 599, § 2, and the next year it was broadened to cover claims without regard to the employing entity's immunity. See Pub. Laws 1987, ch. 110. Later, the personal liability provision was recodified and became § 8104-D. See Me. Pub. Laws 1987, ch. 740, § 4. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the MTCA always reflected legislative intent to permit successful plaintiffs to obtain compensatory damage awards up to $300,000 (later, $400,000) based on the harmful actions of governmental employees performed as part of their employment. Over time, the legislature also demonstrated its concern that employees at all levels of government be protected from personally bearing the burden of such large judgments. Both of these concerns arguably are addressed by the combined effect of §§ 8104-D, 8105, and 8116: no individual employee will be saddled with responsibility beyond $10,000, but the plaintiff will be entitled to a more complete recovery – up to -15- the statutory or policy limits – when the offending employee's liability is covered by insurance. Reading § 8104-D to supersede the § 8105 liability limit in every instance, without regard to the availability of insurance, would defeat the balance the legislature may have intended to establish between remedying injuries caused by government employees and protecting those employees from financial ruin. The Law Court's existing precedent on the MTCA does not provide guidance on the issue we face here. Most of the cases address the relationship between insurance coverage and immunity, without discussing the interaction of the various statutory limitations on damages. One such example is Moore, described above, in which the court held that access to employer-provided insurance does not waive the personal immunity of employees, as it does under § 8116 for insured governmental entities. See Moore, 596 A.2d at 616; see also Grossman v. Richards, 722 A.2d 371, 376 (Me. 1999) (Section 8116 only affects the liability of governmental entities, and does not waive the immunity of the individual insured employees.); cf. Doucette v. City of Lewiston, 697 A.2d 1292, 1294-95 (Me. 1997) (holding that both police dispatcher and city possessed immunity, and that city's immunity was not waived under the terms of its insurance policy). Here, however, immunity is not the issue. The jury found that Titcomb was not entitled to immunity, which paved the way for -16- an award of damages against him. The sole question is whether the damages ceiling is set by § 8104-D or – because there is insurance coverage – by §§ 8105 and 8116. Appellee invokes Rodriguez v. Town of Moose River, 922 A.2d 484 (Me. 2007), where the court held that § 8104-D limited the damages recoverable in an action against a government employee in her personal capacity. Id. at 491-92. In Rodriguez, however, there was no insurance policy available to supplement the $10,000 prescribed by the statute. Id. at 488. The two competing constructions of the MTCA that we have described each have policy rationales to justify them. The Act effects a limited waiver of the government's sovereign immunity, and even explicit waivers are construed narrowly. Knowlton v. Att'y Gen., 976 A.2d 973, 977 (Me. 2009); see also Reid v. Town of Mount Vernon, 932 A.2d 539, 545 (Me. 2007) (Statutory exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed.); Sanford v. Town of Shapleigh, 850 A.2d 325, 329 (Me. 2004) ([S]overeign immunity is the rule, and liability for governmental entities [is] the statutorily created, narrowly construed exception. (quoting Clockedile v. Me. Dep't of Transp., 437 A.2d 187, 189 (Me. 1981) (alterations in original))). Hence, we could not lightly conclude that the Maine Legislature intended to permit recoveries beyond the limit of § 8104-D via governmental insurance policies. Even if government coffers would not be -17- directly affected by payment of the additional amount,6 the possible indirect cost of higher insurance premiums is enough to give us pause. Indeed, the MTCA's legislative history indicates particular concern for local fiscs and the cost of insurance: the areas open[ed] to liability were those where it appeared likely that an insurance program could be arranged within the reach of the pocketbooks of Maine communities and the State. Rodriguez, 922 A.2d at 493 n.4 (quoting 2 Legis. Rec. 1644 (1977) (remarks of Sen. Collins)). At the same time, however, the MTCA itself is a policy statement that, in certain circumstances, the governmental immunity from suit should give way to the objective of compensating individuals who have been harmed by government actors.7 The Legislature's apparent assumption was that governmental entities would acquire insurance to cover liability for claims outside immunity protection, id., and § 8116 explicitly authorizes 6 We see no basis under the MTCA for directly imposing Titcomb's excess damages obligation on the Town. 7 The Law Court has stated that [t]he central purpose of the MTCA was to restore the common law sovereign immunity that had been abrogated by this Court in Davies v. City of Bath, 364 A.2d 1269 (Me. 1976). Beaulieu v. Aube Corp., 796 A.2d 683, 689 n.9 (Me. 2002). The court also has noted, however, that [t]he MTCA applies a policy of broad liability to governmental employees, subject to the exceptions enumerated in [its] immunity provisions. Carroll v. City of Portland, 736 A.2d 279, 282 (Me. 1999); see also id. at n.3 (Although, under the MTCA, liability is the rule and immunity the exception for governmental employees, immunity is the rule and liability the exception for governmental entities.). -18- governments to obtain such coverage for employees, as well as for the entities themselves. With $400,000 designated by § 8105 as the appropriate cap on recoveries against either a governmental entity or its employees, or both, the Legislature's purpose to compensate victims of government-caused injury arguably would be suitably met by allowing insurance coverage for the amount in excess of § 8104-D's cap. We deem the choice between these two paths a matter of state policy best left to the state's courts. See In re Hundley, 603 F.3d 95, 98 (1st Cir. 2010) (noting that resolution of a certified question may require policy judgments about the applicability of [state] law that the SJC is in the best position to make); Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 187 F.3d 88, 103 (1st Cir. 1999) (noting that certified question in that case was quintessentially a policy judgment appropriately made for the state by its own courts); see also Real Estate Bar Ass'n, 608 F.3d at 119 (noting strong federalism interests that are furthered by providing the state courts with the opportunity to decide on underlying unsettled questions of state law). Moreover, the statutory construction could easily matter in future cases not involving these parties. Boston Gas. Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 529 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2008). We therefore will certify the following question to the Law Court: Where an insurance policy procured by a governmental entity is available to cover a judgment -19- against a government employee sued in his personal capacity, is the applicable limit on the award of damages set by § 8104-D (i.e., $10,000) or by the combination of §§ 8105(1) and 8116 (i.e., $400,000 or the policy limit)?