Opinion ID: 523609
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: I am Vice President-Finance and Administration for the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME).

Text: 30 2. During late 1982 through early 1983, Brad Wilkus as Telecommunications Manager, reported to me. 31 3. Sometime in late 1982 or early 1983, Wilkus came to me and explained that he had located alternate suppliers of the telephone handsets and confidencers the CME was seeking to purchase in connection with its move to its new facilities at 30 South Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois. He further stated that purchasing from these alternate suppliers would effect significant savings off the price then being quoted to us by Interconnect Planning Corporation for the handsets and confidencers. 32 4. Wilkus stated that the purchase from the alternate suppliers had to be done through a local distributor and asked whether the CME could set up a subsidiary corporation to act as such a distributor. I said it could not. 33 5. At no time up until the time of Wilkus' discharge was I aware that he had set up his own company to buy the handsets and confidencers from the alternate suppliers and, in turn, resell them to the CME at a substantial profit to himself. (Def.Ex. 3 quoted in part in Def.Br. 18-19). 34 Old stated that the affidavit did not refresh his memory and that it was apparently prepared by CME's outside counsel. Because he was then suffering from a disabling back ailment and had been out of his office for six weeks, Old could not remember anybody coming to his home in October 1985 and asking him to sign the affidavit. He also said that because of medication administered for treatment of his herniated disk, his faculties were impaired for an extended period of time, diminishing his ability to read, comprehend and understand documents. He could not recollect anything about the affidavit prior to seeing it two days before trial and could not recall how his signature appeared on the affidavit. 35 In ruling the affidavit inadmissible, the district judge found that there was insufficient evidence to show its accuracy and there was no circumstantial evidence of trustworthiness. He also ruled that the affidavit was not more probative than any other evidence which the proponent could procure, that the notice requirements of Federal Rules of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(5) were not fulfilled, and that justice would not be served by its admission. Defendant has not convinced us that any of the exceptions contained in Rules 803 and 804 of the Federal Rules of Evidence are applicable. 36 In ruling the affidavit inadmissible as a statement against interest, the district judge found that it was clear that Old was not an owner of CME nor had a direct financial interest in CME. However, he permitted Wilkus to testify to the subject matter of the conversation with Old as disclosed in the affidavit. Wilkus testified that he had a conversation with Old in his office during which Wilkus inquired as to the possibility of CME's becoming a direct distributor of the telephone equipment in question. Old responded in the negative since CME was a not-for-profit corporation. Wilkus then suggested to Old that CME develop a subsidiary to get the best possible price for the equipment but Old replied that this could not be done. Thus the vital parts of the Old affidavit were before the jury through Wilkus rather than Old. 37
38 In seeking reversal of the failure to admit the Old affidavit as corroborating his testimony, Wilkus relies on various provisions of Federal Rules of Evidence 803 and 804 including Rule 804(b)(3) which permits as a hearsay exception statements against interest. It provides in pertinent part as follows: 39 Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by the declarant against another, that a reasonable person in the declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true. 40 As the district court noted, Old had no pertinent pecuniary or proprietary interest, nor was the statement intended to subject him to civil or criminal liability. Since CME was not a party to the case, the affidavit was not against its interest nor, paraphrasing the rule, was the statement shown to be such that a reasonable person in Old's position would not have made it unless he believed it to be true. Judge Nordberg also thought that it was unlikely that Old had ever read the affidavit. Wilkus was simply unable to show that the affidavit was a statement against interest within the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3).
41 The district court also refused to admit the affidavit under the catch-all exceptions to the hearsay rule contained in Rule 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which provides as follows: 42 (24) Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant. 43 Rule 804(b)(5), applicable when the declarant is unavailable, is identically worded. The conditions of neither have been satisfied. 44 As demonstrated by evidence of Robert Old's physical and mental conditions at the time the affidavit was apparently executed, the district court concluded that there was an insufficient showing of its accuracy. As noted previously, he was bedridden with a herniated disk, under medication and suffering a diminished ability to read and comprehend documents. He also had no recollection of the affidavit or of his signature on it. Because of this lack of mental capacity, the affidavit was properly excluded as inherently untrustworthy. 45 In addition to trustworthiness, these catch-all provisions also require that the statement be offered as evidence of a material fact, that it be more probative on the point than any other evidence, that it serve the interests of justice, and advance notice to the adverse party. These catchall conditions were also not satisfied. 46 The affidavit does not constitute evidence of a material fact even though Wilkus may have discussed with Old savings to CME through buying the handsets and confidencers from alternate suppliers instead of IPC. This does not excuse defendant's setting himself up as an alternate supplier through ITS and then purchasing the equipment from Walker Equipment and Roanwell at the lowest possible prices and reselling the equipment to CME at much higher prices. CME would not have had to pay such high prices if defendant had disclosed the true facts. The conversation is not material since the proof at trial showed that CME could have purchased the equipment directly at lower prices without having to go through a distributor. 47 Likewise the affidavit is not more probative than any other evidence because the defendant testified along the same lines as the affidavit without any rebuttal testimony being tendered by the prosecutor. The evidence did not show how the affidavit was prepared or any remembrances of Old about it so that it cannot be said that the affidavit would be more probative than Old's testimony that was received. 48 Defendant contends that the admission of the affidavit would serve the interests of justice within the meaning of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5). Because the affidavit was unreliable in view of Old's mental and physical state at the time it was executed, the interests of justice would certainly not be served by its admission. 49 Finally under both Rule 803(24) and Rule 804(b)(5) a statement may not be admitted as a catch-all hearsay exception unless the proponent advises the adverse party in advance of trial of its intention to offer the statement and also provides its particulars. Here the government received no such notice. When the affidavit was shown to the government on the first day of trial, defense counsel did not inform the government that he intended to introduce the document, nor did the government ever agree to its being introduced. Therefore the district court correctly found that the notice requirement was also not satisfied. 50 The affidavit was properly excluded as inadmissible hearsay. Its reliability is certainly doubtful, Wilkus was able to testify as to its substance, and other evidence convincingly showed the falsity of the parts of the affidavit favorable to Wilkus. 51 The conviction is affirmed.