Opinion ID: 1540960
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Presentation of an Organizational Grievance Against the Wishes of the Allegedly Aggrieved Employee

Text: Our holding that N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3 must be interpreted to mandate the right of a majority representative to file organizational grievances in order to effectuate the constitutional right of the unit employees to have their grievances presented through their collectively chosen representative presupposes the existence of consent to the initiation of such grievances on the part of the affected employee. In the absence of such consent, however, the propriety of such action by the majority representative, no matter how highly motivated would differ. Because no involuntary grievant of the sort envisioned by the trial judge, see ante at 129, exists in this case, we need not reach the question of the lawfulness of a majority representative's non-consensual initiation of an organizational grievance. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the question of consensual initiation of any organizational grievance would not be a legitimate matter of concern for the public employer. Its obligation to accept organizational grievances is not conditioned on its verification that the affected employee has consented to the filing of the grievance. So far as it is concerned, all organizational grievances are consensual. The Board has argued before us that a public employer has a valid interest in ensuring that its employees are not being coerced by their majority representative. The short answer to that contention is that the Legislature has chosen to assign responsibility for the prevention of such possibly unlawful conduct to PERC, not to the public employer. N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.4(c). Normally, inquiry into the consent question would occur only if the involuntary grievant chose to file an unfair practice charge with PERC against the majority representative. Moreover, the aid of their employer is not necessary to protect the unit employees against possible overreaching by their majority representative. They are always capable of availing themselves of a representation proceeding under PERC's auspices to replace or oust the majority representative if they so desire. See N.J.A.C. 19:11-1.1 (a) (1), (3). The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed. CONFORD, P.J.A.D. (temporarily assigned), dissenting. I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division in this case because I believe that plaintiff's complaint for a declaratory judgment should have been dismissed as not based on an actual controversy involving a concrete contested issue. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 240 (1949); Sanders v. Cuba Railroad Co., 21 N.J. 78, 89 (1956). As the Appellate Division correctly observed, the issue of law presented to the Court here for declaration of rights is a difficult and close one of statutory interpretation. Red Bank Ed. Assn. v. Red Bank High Bd. of Ed., 151 N.J. Super. 435, 437 (1977). Yet, although the complaint seeks judicial affirmation that plaintiff [union] is entitled by statutory right to institute and process grievances in its own name and upon its own impetus, there is no allegation of the existence of an actual grievance, whether of a union member or of the union itself, or both, requiring initiation or processing. All that is sought is a raw advisory opinion as to the meaning of the statute concerning negotiation of public employment grievances, N.J.S.A. 34:13A-5.3, in relation to who may initiate the processing of a grievance when the collective labor contract specifies that a grievance    must be initiated by the teacher    and that [t]he Association may process a grievance through all levels of the grievance procedure even though the aggrieved person does not wish to do so. No actual grievance is posited here. The rights of the parties in an actual case could very well depend upon such variables as (a) the nature of the complaint of the employee; (b) whether it affects only one or more persons; (c) whether, if affecting only one person, it is of a nature indirectly affecting others: (d) whether the affected person is a member of the union; or (e) whether the aggrieved person is indifferent to the processing of the complaint but does not wish formally to initiate it, or whether, on the other hand, he affirmatively objects to its processing and has so advised the union. Only upon the presentation of a specific set of facts involving one or more of these variations, and in the context of a real dispute between the three entities, the individual employee, the union and the employer, could a court be expected to render a useful and significant adjudication of rights within the intent and purpose of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act. N.J.S.A. 2A:16-52. It is settled that the latter statute is not intended for the benefit of those who seek advisory opinions; that courts should refrain    from functioning in the abstract and should decide only concrete contested issues conclusively affecting adversary parties in interest. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons, 3 N.J. 235, 240 (1949). These principles are disregarded by the undertaking of the Court in the present case to render an abstract declaration of rights on an entirely supposititious case. In my view, the entertainment of this litigation under the attendant circumstances creates a bad precedent. Elucidation of the complex legal questions involved would better await presentation of specific controversies over actual grievances. For affirmance  Chief Justice HUGHES and Justices SULLIVAN, PASHMAN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and HANDLER  6. For reversal  Judge CONFORD  1.