Opinion ID: 2512331
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: other criticisms of the tort of malicious defense

Text: As Justice Thayer also recognized, a tort of malicious defense may threaten the rule that an attorney at law is absolutely privileged to publish defamatory matter concerning another in communications preliminary to a proposed judicial proceeding, or in the institution of, or during the course and as a part of, a judicial proceeding in which he participates as counsel, if it has some relation to the proceeding. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1032 (Thayer, J., dissenting); McCarthy v. Yempuku, 5 Haw.App. 45, 48-49, 678 P.2d 11, 14 (1984) (quoting Restatement  586). [T]he protection is complete irrespective of the motive prompting the use of the words or writings, but the privilege does not extend to matters having no materiality or pertinency to the question involved in the suit. Ferry v. Carlsmith, 23 Haw. 589, 591 (Terr.1917) (emphasis added). See also Restatement  586 comment a ([The absolute privilege] protects the attorney from liability in an action for defamation irrespective of his purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, his belief in its truth, or even his knowledge of its falsity.). In Kahala Royal Corp., 113 Hawai`i at 268, 151 P.3d at 749, this court observed the following policies associated with the litigation privilege: (1) promoting the candid, objective, and undistorted disclosure of evidence; (2) placing the burden of testing the evidence upon the litigants during trial; (3) avoiding the chilling effect resulting from the threat of subsequent litigation; (4) reinforcing the finality of judgments; (5) limiting collateral attacks upon judgments; (6) promoting zealous advocacy; (7) discouraging abusive litigation practices; and (8) encouraging settlement. (Quoting Matsuura v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 102 Hawai`i 149, 155, 73 P.3d 687, 693 (2003)) (some citations, brackets, and internal quotation marks omitted). Where the alleged misconduct consists in part of false statements made in the underlying proceedings, as in the instant case, allowing an action for malicious defense may counteract our stated polic[ies]. Aranson, 671 A.2d at 1032 (Thayer, J., dissenting). Additionally, recognizing the tort of malicious defense may result in plaintiffs seeking damages when (1) they are dissatisfied with an award in the underlying suit or (2) the defendant in the underlying action is judgment-proof and they attempt to extend liability to attorneys, their firms, and possibly, third parties. Id. The California appeals court also expressed concerned that the tort of malicious defense would invite never-ending litigation: [14] The policy of the rule is obvious. If the wrongful conduct of a defendant causing the plaintiff to sue him would give rise to an independent tort and a separate cause of action, there would be no end to the litigation, for immediately upon the entry of judgment the plaintiff would start another action.... Under our jurisprudence the defendant may present any defense... that he may have or that he may deem expedient, and in so doing he will not be subjecting himself to a second suit by the plaintiff based on the wrongful conduct of the defendant in causing the plaintiff to sue him or in defending the action. The rule is the same even though the wrongful conduct of the defendant is willful, intentional, malicious or fraudulent. California Physicians' Service, 9 Cal.App.4th at 1325 n. 2, 12 Cal.Rptr.2d at 97 n. 2 (quoting Ritter, 46 N.E.2d at 44). In our view, it is simply unnecessary to risk the foregoing consequences that may arise from recognizing the tort of malicious defense when viable alternatives exist.