Opinion ID: 19777
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: A Brady Violation?

Text: 21 Under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), a prosecutor has a duty to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant when that evidence is material to either guilt or punishment. See 373 U.S. at 87. The Supreme Court has not as yet ruled on whether a prosecutor's failure to disclose material exculpatory information prior to entry of a guilty plea 9 violates the U.S. Constitution. A review of the Court's Brady v. Maryland line of cases, however, tends to counter, rather than support, the proposition Matthew would need to establish in order to prevail. 22 The prosecutor's duty to disclose material exculpatory information is based in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and exists to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, i.e., that an impartial party's assessment of the defendant's guilt is based on all the available evidence. See Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935) (describing the due process requirement as a requirement that cannot be deemed to be satisfied . . . if a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by the presentation of testimony known to be perjured). As the Brady Court noted, [t]he principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the accused. . . . A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce the penalty helps shape a trial that bears heavily on defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87-88, 83 S.Ct 1194. 23 The subsequent inclusion of impeachment evidence under the Brady rule, see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), was also based on the potential effect of undisclosed information on a jury's determination of guilt. See id. (citing in support Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959)(The jury's estimate of the truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or innocence . . . .)). Thus, as was the case in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87-88, the Court's concern focused on ensuring that jury or judge determinations of guilt beyonda reasonable doubt were not contrived through a prosecutor's withholding of material information favorable to the defendant. 24 The Court's definition of material information also reflects the Brady rule's purpose of ensuring a fair trial. The state's obligation to disclose favorable information extends only to information that is material. See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 674-75. [T]he prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would deprive the defendant of a fair trial . . . . Id. at 675 (footnote omitted). 10 An earlier argument that the materiality test should be defined in terms of the defendant's ability to prepare for trial (rather than in terms of factfinders' assessments of guilt) was explicitly rejected by the Court in United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). As the Court explained, to base the materiality requirement on the effect of the undisclosed information on the defendant's ability to prepare for trial would be unacceptable in part because such a standard would necessarily encompass incriminating evidence as well as exculpatory evidence, since knowledge of the prosecutor's entire case would always be useful in planning the defense. Id. at 112 n.20. 11 Because the state's duty extended only to exculpatory information, defining the materiality requirement in terms of defense strategies would be at odds with the scope and purpose of the Brady rule. 25 The Brady rule's focus on protecting the integrity of trials suggests that where no trial is to occur, there may be no constitutional violation. While describing the purpose of the Brady rule and of the rule's materiality requirement, the Bagley Court noted that 26 unless the omission deprived the defendant of a fair trial, there was no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's constitutional duty to disclose. . . . 27 . . . But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. 28 Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675-76 (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976)); see also id. at 678 ([S]uppression of evidence amounts to a constitutional violation only if it deprives the defendant of a fair trial.). 12 Becausea Brady violation is defined in terms of the potential effects of undisclosed information on a judge's or jury's assessment of guilt, it follows that the failure of a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory information to an individual waiving his right to trial is not a constitutional violation. 13 In waiving his or her right to trial, the defendant eliminates the opportunity for a prosecutor to contrive[] a conviction through the pretense of a trial which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury . . . . Mooney, 294 U.S. at 112. Instead, conviction is supported by the defendant's plea. 29 In light of the Court's Brady v. Maryland line of cases, it is apparent to us that, at a minimum, a state court would not have felt compelled to hold that the prosecutor's failure to supply Matthew with the CPS documents prior to entry of his plea constituted a Brady violation. Matthew, in order to establish that a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information prior to entry of a guilty plea is a Brady violation, would require adoption of a new rule - one that seeks to protect a defendant's own decision making regarding the costs and benefits of pleading and of going to trial. 30 Our conclusion that Matthew seeks a new rule is not at odds with cases he cites in support of his arguments. By October 1994, a number of court opinions had suggested that pleas could be collaterally attacked on grounds that the state failed to disclose material exculpatory information. See, e.g., Tate v. Wood, 963 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1992); White v. United States, 858 F.2d 416 (8th Cir. 1988); Miller v. Angliker, 848 F.2d 1312 (2d Cir. 1988); Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314 (6th Cir. 1985); Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590 (W.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 565 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1977). The Sixth Circuit assumed for purposesof its opinion that a Brady violation had occurred, see Campbell, 769 F.2d at 315, but subsequently noted that there is no authority within our knowledge holding that suppression of Brady material prior to trial amounts to a deprivation of due process. Id. at 322. The Eighth Circuit followed Campbell's approach. See White, 858 F.2d at 422. Thus, neither court found that a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information prior to entry of a plea was a violation of the U.S. Constitution. 31 The Second Circuit's approach in Miller and Tate links directly nondisclosure and the Due Process Clause. However, in light of the Court's holdings, the Second Circuit's approach would appear to adopt a new rule. The Miller court adapted the Supreme Court's materiality test in order for it to be applicable to the plea context. See 848 F.2d at 1322. Under Miller's objective test, information is material if there is a reasonable probability that but for the withholding of the information the accused would not have entered [counsel's] recommended plea but would have insisted on going to full trial. Id. The emphasis in this test is not on the influence the undisclosed information possibly would have had on the fairness of a trial - the focus of Brady rule's materiality test - but instead on the accused's decision making process. 14 The Miller court's test, in defining material information in a manner separated from both trial outcomes and counsel's recommendation, arguably creates a due process right where none previously existed. 32 State courts' decisions, see Caspari, 510 U.S. at 395 ([I]n the Teague analysis the reasonable views of state courts are entitled to consideration along with those of federal courts.), were also not such that a state court reviewing Matthew's claim would have felt compelled to decide that the rule he seeks is required by the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., State v. Simons, 731 P.2d 797 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (finding failure to disclose material exculpatory information could render counsel ineffective); Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding, based on the absence of contrary law, that failure to disclose material exculpatory information entitled defendant to a withdrawal of his plea); Ex parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (holding that a prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable information extends to defendants pleading guilty). But see Schmidt v. State, 647 P.2d 796 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982) (holding defendant who pleads guilty waives his right to disclosure of evidence by the prosecutor). For example, although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals' 2-1 decision in Lewis would appearto dictate at least a portion of the result that Matthew seeks, it is not clear from the opinion whether the duty-to-disclose holding was based in the U.S. Constitution, or in Article 2.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Article 2.01 sets forth the duties of district attorneys. The last sentence of the article, added in 1965, states that [t]hey shall not suppress facts or secrete witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused. The absence in Lewis of any materiality-based limitation on the duty to disclose suggests that the U.S. Constitution was not the basis for the opinion. 33 On the basis of our review of the legal landscape existing in October 1994, we cannot conclude that a state court would have felt compelled to decide that a prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory information prior to entry of a guilty or nolo contendere plea was a Brady violation, or otherwise a violation of the Due Process Clause. We turn next to a consideration of whether a state court would have seen the nondisclosure of which Matthew complains as rendering his plea invalid. 15 34