Opinion ID: 1723327
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: evidence of plea and sentence of state's witness

Text: During the state's questioning of Fields, it was brought out that he pleaded guilty and had been sentenced to twenty-five years for his part in this crime. In closing argument the district attorney argued that it was necessary to do this to bring the parties responsible for the officer's death to justice. The language of this Court in Buckley v. State, 223 So.2d 524 (Miss. 1969), under unusual facts has been the basis for numerous assignments of error. It is time we distinguish Buckley from the usual case. Let us take the ordinary case in which two or more people are charged with the commission of a crime, and it is necessary that one of the participants in the crime testify for the state in order to make out a case against any of them. Frequently, the state will choose the person whose participation is not as great, or whose guilt is not as reprehensible, or who has readily confessed. Generally speaking, there are good, and at times compelling reasons for the state's choice among those accused to be the witness for the state. It is not the function of the court, however, to tell the state which witness among the accused persons to select as the witness for the state. It is the right of the state to select which witnesses it deems proper to testify on its behalf. While it is the sole responsibility of the circuit judge to sentence each accused who has been convicted or pleaded guilty, it is not improper for a circuit judge to take into consideration in his sentencing that such person is cooperating with, and will be a witness for the state in the prosecution of other defendants. A co-conspirator, co-defendant or co-indictee who has been thus favored, however, is a marked man before the jury. There is a big question mark placed upon his testimony by the law, and indeed the accused on trial is entitled to an instruction that his testimony is to be viewed with caution. One of the best weapons for defense counsel to further arouse the distrust of the jury in the testimony of such witness is to ask him on cross-examination whether he has been sentenced or not for his participation, and if so, the sentence he has received. Invariably, if he has been sentenced, it will be much lighter than the sentence the man on trial can receive and, if he has not been sentenced, defense counsel can exploit even more the weakness and untrustworthiness of the testimony from such a witness. These observations are to point out that in the ordinary case, if the state did not on direct have such witness testify as to his plea of guilty and sentence, defense counsel on cross-examination most assuredly would. Indeed, defense counsel would be derelict in his duty to his client not to point this out to the jury, so as to show a very special interest the witness has in his own testimony. In closing argument, defense counsel has no better weapon to demonstrate the weaknesses of such testimony, the disparity of the sentence received by the state's witness, and the sentence which the court can inflict upon his client. Indeed, even though the state brings out on direct examination the plea of guilty, defense counsel invariably will further exacerbate the state's problem on cross-examination of such witness and hammer away at the disparity in treatment in final argument. What harm has resulted, then, by the state making this concession in its examination in chief? In the ordinary case, none. Buckley presented a special set of facts. Buckley and one Billy Roy Pitts were indicted for kidnapping. At Buckley's first trial, Pitts testified as a witness for Buckley, corroborating Buckley's testimony. This trial ended in a mistrial when the jury failed to reach a verdict. Prior to the second trial, Pitts pleaded guilty to the charge, and at Buckley's second trial testified as a witness for the state. His testimony in the second trial corroborated the testimony of the kidnap victim, and contradicted Buckley's. Over the objection of Buckley, the state was permitted to prove Pitts had pleaded guilty and then sentenced to serve five years. We found this to be reversible error there because proof of the plea of guilty over Buckley's objection had the effect of bolstering the testimony of an admitted perjurer. We stated: Appellant assigns as error the action of the trial court in overruling his objection to that part of the testimony of Pitts wherein he testified that he had been jointly indicted on the charge of Kidnapping Jack Watkins and that he had plead guilty to that charge, and as a result of his plea of guilty, had been sentenced to serve a term of five years in the state penitentiary. The overruling of this objection and admission of this testimony was reversible error. The law is well settled in this state that where two or more persons are jointly indicted for the same offense but are separately tried, a judgment of conviction against one of them is not competent evidence on the trial of the other because such plea of guilty or conviction is no evidence of the guilt of the party being tried. State v. Thornhill, 251 Miss. 718, 171 So.2d 308 (1965); Pieper v. State, 242 Miss. 49, 134 So.2d 157 (1961); Pickens v. State, 129 Miss. 191, 91 So. 906 (1922). Not only was this testimony designed to lead the jury to believe that since Pitts had plead guilty to the charge, that his co-indictee, Buckley, was also guilty, but it was also designed to bolster the testimony of Pitts. On the first trial of this case Pitts testified and his testimony in that trial corroborated Buckley's version of what happened. On this trial he testified directly contrary on the crucial issues. The state was aware that the evidence that Pitts had plead guilty to the same charge since the former trial would add weight to his testimony. It had the effect of bolstering the testimony of an admitted perjurer. [223 So.2d at 527-528] The Buckley rationale is not present in this case. Indeed, defense counsel made no objection to the state's elicitation in its direct examination of Fields that he had pleaded guilty and been sentenced for his part in the crime. Defense counsel had excellent reason not to object, this was a fact very much in Johnson's interest with which to acquaint the jury. [2] We do not overrule Buckley, but neither do we extend its holding beyond the unusual situation of that case. If defense counsel under some unusual case wishes to withhold from the jury the fact that a co-indictee testifying for the state has pleaded guilty and received a lesser sentence, he has a duty to object to the testimony offered by the state. This duty is more compelling in a case of this sort than in the usual case in which we have held that failure to object to testimony waives any assignment of error on appeal. To permit this defendant to say nothing at trial, and complain for the first time in post-trial proceedings presents a classic case of having your cake and eating it, too.