Opinion ID: 369355
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Paragraph I,B.

Text: 70 Paragraph I,B prohibits representations that a user of a product can achieve any result unless the representation is, when made, substantiated by competent scientific or medical tests and studies and requires that such tests or studies, the raw data gathered, and the procedures followed, be available to the Commission for inspection for three years following the representation. Petitioners contend that Paragraph I,B improperly relieves the Commission of the burden of proving their advertising representations false and imposes on petitioners the burden of proving the truthfulness of any claims they make. The Commission defends Paragraph I,B as a fencing in provision justified by the petitioners' false representation that they had scientific evidence which formed a reasonable basis from which to conclude that substantially all X-11 users would lose significant amounts of weight. 71 Petitioners rely on Federated Nationwide Wholesalers Service v. FTC, 398 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1968), for the proposition that in no event is the Commission warranted in decreeing what in effect is clearly a shifting of the burden of proof from itself to the petitioners. 398 F.2d at 260. There the challenged order prohibited the petitioners from representing themselves as wholesalers, but provided that  'it shall be a defense in any enforcement proceeding under this order for (petitioners) to show'  that they actually operated as wholesalers, 398 F.2d at 259. The court modified the order to prohibit petitioners from representing that they are wholesalers unless they in fact operate as wholesalers. 398 F.2d at 260. Paragraph I,B of the order before us resembles the modified order in Federated Nationwide more closely than the objectionable order in that case. Essentially, Paragraph I,B prohibits petitioners from making representations unless they are true; it does not make the truthfulness of the representation an affirmative defense petitioners must prove once the Commission establishes that petitioners have made representations. The burden of proof remains entirely on the Commission. 72 The authority of the Commission to impose fencing in restrictions is stated in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., supra, 380 U.S. at 395, 85 S.Ct. at 1048: 73 We think it reasonable for the Commission to frame its order broadly enough to prevent respondents from engaging in similarly illegal practices in future advertisements. As was said in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 473 (72 S.Ct. 800, 803, 96 L.Ed. 1081): (T)he Commission is not limited to prohibiting the illegal practice in the precise form in which it is found to have existed in the past. Having been caught violating the Act, respondents must expect some fencing in. Federal Trade Comm'n v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (, 77 S.Ct. 502, 1 L.Ed.2d 438). 74 Although Paragraph I,B is as extreme a fencing in provision as we would sustain, we think it is justified in this case by the egregiousness of past misrepresentations and the propensity of the principal respondents to violate the Act. 13 75