Opinion ID: 208083
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Deference to Commerce's Interpretation of Governing Statutes

Text: Because Congress's intent as to the interaction of § 1677b(c)(1) and § 1677e(a) is clear from the plain language of these statutes, the court need not determine whether Commerce's interpretation warrants Chevron deference. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43, 104 S.Ct. 2778; Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1359. In the interest of completeness, however, the court will address the Chevron analysis. If ambiguity existed, Chevron obligates the court to defer to Commerce's reasonable interpretations of its governing statutes, such as § 1677b and § 1677e. See SKF USA, 537 F.3d at 1379. It is well established that `statutory interpretations articulated by Commerce during its antidumping proceedings are entitled to judicial deference under Chevron. ' Agro Dutch, 508 F.3d at 1029 n. 4 (quoting Pesquera Mares Australes Ltda. v. United States, 266 F.3d 1372, 1382 (Fed. Cir.2001)); Thai Pineapple Canning Indus. Corp. v. United States, 273 F.3d 1077, 1083 (Fed.Cir.2001). Although not in an identical case, Commerce has invoked its § 1677e(a) facts available authority in other NME cases. See, e.g., Polyethylene Retail Carrier Bag Comm. v. United States, 232 Fed.Appx. 965, 968-69 (Fed. Cir.2007) (non precedential); Shandong Huarong Gen. Group Corp. v. United States, 27 C.I.T. 1568, 1596 (2003) (Commerce has exercised this ability [to apply partial adverse facts available] in the context of NME investigations.). These cases, as well as its position in this case, confirm that Commerce interprets 19 U.S.C. § 1677e(a) to apply, where appropriate, to NME investigations. Further, this court gives Commerce's interpretation of antidumping laws significant deference because of its special expertise in administering antidumping duty law. Wheatland Tube, 495 F.3d at 1361. Indeed, `[d]eference to an agency's interpretation is at its peak in the case of a court's review of Commerce's interpretation of the antidumping laws.' SKF USA, 537 F.3d at 1379 (quoting Koyo Seiko Co. v. United States, 36 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir.1994)). The court's conclusion that facts available can apply when valuing factors of production in NME cases is further strengthened by the considerable deference due to Commerce's interpretation of the antidumping statutes. See Micron Tech., Inc. v. United States, 243 F.3d 1301, 1312 (Fed.Cir.2001); cf. Chen v. Mukasey, 524 F.3d 1028, 1032 (9th Cir. 2008) (Because the statute is silent on the interaction between the two provisions at issue, we must defer to the agency as long as its interpretation is reasonable.). In order to affirm Commerce's determination here, however, it is not enough that the law permits Commerce to apply facts available in valuing factors of production. Commerce's decision to do so also must be supported by substantial evidence. In addition, substantial evidence must support Commerce's color-specific PET flake valuations.