Opinion ID: 4527706
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Parties’ Arguments to this Court

Text: The issue before this Court requires that we first determine when a foreign police officer qualifies as an “agent” of a Pennsylvania police force. In offering her view on the topic, Appellant does not discuss Brown, supra, or any other legal authority that is directly on point. Instead, Appellant supports her position primarily by invoking this [J-40-2019] - 9 Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. Dembo, 301 A.2d 689 (Pa. 1973) (holding that a warrantless, exploratory search of mail by a postal employee at the direction of the Pennsylvania State Police constituted a government search in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution), and Commonwealth v. Eshelman, 383 A.2d 838 (Pa. 1978) (concluding that, although an auxiliary officer was off-duty when he conducted a warrantless search of a vehicle, the record nonetheless established that the off-duty officer was acting as a police officer when he removed packages from that vehicle and turned them over to police). In short, Appellant believes that these cases suggest that in determining whether the California law enforcement officers were acting as agents of the Pennsylvania State Police, this Court should focus “on the coordination between Pennsylvania law enforcement and California law enforcement.” Appellant’s Brief at 16. Applying this rationale to the facts of the case, Appellant points out that the California detectives would not have interviewed her but for the Pennsylvania State Police’s request that they do so. Appellant further highlights that Detective Cahow informed Pennsylvania State Police Corporal McAndrew that he would be interviewing Appellant in her home and that he would be recording that interview; yet, Corporal McAndrew continued to use Detective Cahow’s assistance in this matter. Appellant concludes, “The continued use of Detective Cahow knowing that the residence would be entered and the conversations recorded makes Detective Cahow an agent under Dembo and Eshelman.” Id. The Commonwealth’s argument is of limited help as it does not squarely address Appellant’s agency argument. Rather, the Commonwealth primarily contends that a conflict-of-law analysis, like that performed by the trial court, applies to and permits the secret recording of the statements that Appellant made in her California [J-40-2019] - 10 home. Commonwealth’s Brief at 10-16. Later in its brief, the Commonwealth suggests that, if the Court concludes that the trial court erred by permitting the jury to hear the recordings of Appellant in her home, any such error was harmless. Id. at 20-22.