Opinion ID: 161852
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Application of Allen Precedents to this Case

Text: 45 Allen instructions are often challenged on the grounds that: (1) the instruction should not have been given in the first place; and (2) the instruction was coercive. See Powell v. United States, 297 F.2d 318, 322 (5th Cir. 1962) (Whether in any case the Allen charge should be given rests initially in the sound discretion of the trial judge. But the correctness of the charge must be determined by the consideration of the facts of each case and the exact words used by the trial court.). Here, Mr. McElhiney does not question the district court's decision to give an Allen charge, and we thus proceed to the second inquiry. 46 With respect to the coerciveness of the charge actually given, this circuit has adopted a case-by-case approach, see Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883, considering such factors as (1) [t]he language of the instruction, (2) its incorporation with other instructions; and (3) the timing of the instruction. United States v. Porter, 881 F.2d 878, 888 (10th Cir. 1989). The colloquy between the judge and the jury foreman, [the] circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction, and consideration of the American Bar Association Standards on Criminal Justice Relating to Trial by Jury may also be relevant. United States v. Dyba, 554 F.2d 417, 421 (10th Cir. 1977). The ultimate question, however, is whether the Allen instruction was impermissibly coercive in a way that undermined the integrity of the deliberation process. 10 Porter, 881 F.2d at 889; see also 75B Am. Jur. 2d 1581, at 343 ([T]he test effectively turns on a consideration of whether the court's instruction imposed such confusion or pressure on the jury to reach a verdict that the accuracy and integrity of the verdict returned becomes uncertain.); Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy & the Hung Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 Va. L. Rev. 123, 136 (1967) (Traditional analysis of the Allen-type instruction has adopted the language of prejudicial error.). 11 47 As a preliminary matter, we address the government's contention that we should reject Mr. McElhiney's Allen charge argument outright because the district court's comments were simply observations and not an instruction. Aple's Br. at 43. This contention seems calculated so as to sidestep any Allen charge analysis, and we find it unconvincing. 48 First, the district court did not simply provide observations as the government asserts; in making its comments, the district court directed the jury to deliberate further, thus providing an instruction. Second, the instruction given by the district court was Allen in nature: though not like any Allen charge which we have faced before, it serve[d] the same purpose (i.e., to encourage a unanimous verdict), was given in an Allen situation (i.e., a deadlocked jury), and was fraught with the same . . . potential for coercion. United States v. Bass, 490 F.2d 846, 854 (5th Cir. 1974) (rejecting the government's argument that the following was not an Allen charge: If you have reached a verdict as to some Counts of the indictment, but not as to others, you may return a verdict as to those Counts. On any count as to which you are not yet in unanimous agreement, I will ask you to return to the jury room and continue your deliberations.), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Lyon, 731 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1984). Finally, even if the district court's comments did not constitute an instruction (Allen or otherwise), its remarks still had the potential to coerce the jury, and, as coercion is the primary concern with the giving of an Allen instruction, the overall Allen analysis would still be applicable. In other words, the district court's comments would be examined under all the circumstances to determine whether the verdict reached by the jury was a product of impermissible coercion. See 75B Am. Jur. 1580, at 342 (The propriety of particular remarks made by a judge to a jury after retirement for deliberation must be measured by the language employed, . . . and from the language used, a fair and reasonable conclusion must be deduced as to the tendency to interfere with the exercise of the free and unbiased judgment of the jurors.) (emphasis added). 49 To summarize, the fact that district court's comments constituted a departure from the typical Allen charge does not mean that they are subject to no critical inquiry whatsoever. In our view, the Fifth Circuit took the proper approach in United States v. Cheramie, 520 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1975), explaining that: 50 [i]t might be argued that the terse charge objected to here is so lacking in the elements composing either the . . . approved version or the original Allen cases that this Court should not subsume its analysis under the banner of the traditional Allen cases . . . . While this view presents an interesting definitional question, the denomination of the charge is of only tangential importance. Instead, we look to the language employed, and that language's impact, under the circumstances, on the finders of fact. 51 Id. at 330 n.3 (emphasis added). 52 We proceed then to the heart of the matter--whether the Allen instruction given by the district court was, as Mr. McElhiney argues, impermissibly coercive. For purposes of clarity, we note that technically two Allen instructions were provided to the jury: the first was given as part of the original jury instructions, see Rec. vol. II, doc. 312 (Instruction No. 36), 12 the second as a supplemental charge after the jury had reached an impasse. On appeal, Mr. McElhiney only challenges the latter instruction. We conclude that, although the first instruction was proper, the supplemental Allen charge, which neither incorporated the language of the first instruction nor referred to it, was impermissibly coercive in a way that undermined the integrity of the deliberation process. Porter, 881 F.2d at 889. 53
54 In order to temper the potential coercive effect of an Allen charge, this court has recommended that the instruction be incorporated with the other jury instructions in other words, that it be given as part of the original jury instructions. See Smith, 857 F.2d at 684 (The Tenth Circuit law permits the Allen charge in toto to be given, though with caution, and preferably . . . before the jury has reached an impasse or deadlock.); Potter, 691 F.2d at 1277 (We have cautioned that the Allen instruction is preferred as part of the regular jury instruction before deadlock has occurred.). In this position, the Allen instruction is less likely to be coercive because (1) it does not stand out or receive particular emphasis and (2) it is given before the jury has reached a deadlock. 55 In Mr. McElhiney's case, the Allen charge at issue was not incorporated with the other jury instructions, having been issued as a supplemental charge after the jury reached an impasse. Consequently, the possibility of coercion becomes more likely. We hasten to note that this positioning of the instruction does not by itself establish coercion. See United States v. McKinney, 822 F.2d 946, 951 (10th Cir. 1987) ([A]lthough it is a preferred rule of procedure that an Allen instruction be given the jury at the same time as other instructions, it is not a per se rule.). But when this positioning is taken in conjunction with the flawed language of the instruction, as discussed below, we conclude that there was impermissible coercion.
56 This court has emphasized that the language of a pure Allen charge approaches the ultimate permissible limits of a [trial court's] prerogative to guide and direct a jury toward a righteous verdict. Benscoter v. United States, 376 F.2d 49, 50 (10th Cir. 1967) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the instant case, we do not have a pure instruction but rather a substantial deviation from it, an instruction that varies from the pure not only in terms of omission but also in terms of embellishment. That the instruction here is a dramatic departure from the pure charge causes us much concern. As noted by the First Circuit, a proper Allen instruction should include all those elements of the original charge designed to ameliorate its coercive effect and avoid language which might heighten it. Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883 (emphasis added); see also Potter, 691 F.3d at 1277 (same). 57
58 We turn first to the omissions. Notably, the Allen instruction in the supplemental charge lacked any of the cautionary language employed in the pure charge: that no juror should surrender his or her conscientiously held convictions and that the burden of proof belonged to the government, not the defendant. While we are troubled by the omission of the latter, we recognize that this court has, in at least one prior case, approved of an Allen instruction that did not include a reminder as to the burden of proof. See Winn, 411 F.2d at 417 (noting the trial court's failure to remind the jury that the defendants were presumptively innocent and the Government had the burden of proving them guilty beyond a reasonable doubt but concluding, upon reviewing the instruction as a whole, that [w]e cannot say the words used were reversibly coercive). The same, however, cannot be said with respect to the other cautionary language employed in a pure Allen charge. 59 This court has never, at least not to our knowledge nor in any of the cases supplied by the government, approved of an Allen charge that failed to incorporate an admonition regarding the juror's conscientiously held convictions. 13 A review of Tenth Circuit case law explains why. Repeatedly, this court has stated that its approval of the Allen charge's use was predicated on the inclusion of that admonition. As Chief Judge Murrah stated in Elbel v. United States, 364 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1966): We have cautiously approved the so-called Allen instruction even when made to an apparently deadlocked jury, provided the jury is made to understand that [it is] free to follow [its] conscientiously held convictions. Id. at 135-36 (emphasis added). 60 Notably, this court's most recent Allen charge cases have adhered to Chief Judge Murrah's words upholding the Allen instructions given largely because they contained the proper cautionary language. See United States v. Arney, 248 F.3d 984, 988 (10th Cir. 2001) (Although the district court emphasized that a verdict was 'very desirable' and expressed an opinion that the case could not be tried better by either side, the remainder of the instruction properly and clearly emphasized that no 'juror should surrender his or her conscientious convictions' and that each juror should consider his or her opinion 'with a proper regard and deference to the opinion of [the others].'); Rodriguez-Mejia, 20 F.3d at 1092 ([T]he court emphasized in this case that the jurors should not surrender their honest convictions.); Porter, 881 F.2d at 889 (Here, although the judge did state his opinion that the case could not have been 'tried better or more exhaustively than it has been on either side,' the remainder of the instruction properly and clearly emphasized that no 'juror should surrender his or her conscientious convictions' . . . .). 61 This court is not alone in finding the admonition on conscientiously held convictions to be of great import. See Due Process, 53 Va. L. Rev. at 28 (Almost without exception the courts have required that the charge contain the statement that 'no juror should yield his conscientious conviction' or words to that effect.). According to the Second Circuit, [A] necessary component of any Allen-type charge requires the trial judge to admonish the jurors not to surrender their own conscientiously held beliefs. Smalls v. Batista, 191 F.3d 272, 279 (2d Cir. 1999). Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has commented that an Allen instruction stripped of its complementary reminder that jurors were not to acquiesce in the views of the majority or to surrender their well-founded convictions conscientiously held . . . might readily be construed by the minority of the jurors as coercive, Rogers, 289 F.2d at 435; the Sixth Circuit has said that the admonition is one of the most important parts of the Allen charge, Scott, 547 F.2d at 337; and the Ninth Circuit has stated that [i]t is essential in almost all cases to remind jurors of their duty and obligation not to surrender conscientiously held beliefs simply to secure a verdict for either party. United States v. Mason, 658 F.2d 1263, 1268 (9th Cir. 1981). 62 Given the significance of the admonition on conscientiously held convictions, its omission cannot be condoned. See Rogers, 289 F.2d at 436 (noting that, if slight additions can convert a proper charge into a prejudicial and erroneous one, how much more objectionable it is if the reminder that makes the Allen charge tolerable in the first place is omitted altogether). Because of the omission in this case, the coercive effect of the Allen instruction was substantially heightened. 63
64 Were we confronted by the omission of cautionary language only, we would have before us a closer case. But here the instruction was not only problematic because of its omissions but also because of its embellishments. There are two embellishments deserving of special attention in the case at hand. 65 First, the district court repeatedly emphasized the desirability of a verdict and the court's desire to have a verdict reached. It noted at various points that we'd like to have a verdict in this case, that's the situation, Tr. at 2-3; [w]e may be doing this again and that's the reason I'd be very happy to have a verdict one way or the other, id. at 5; and [w]ell I--frankly, the Court would certainly like to have you try to reach a verdict in this case. Id. at 6 (emphasis added). 66 These statements by the district court that it wanted a verdict might all too easily have led the jury to think it more important to achieve unanimity to please the district court rather to remain true to its honest beliefs--especially in the absence of the admonition on conscientiously held convictions. That the district court did not express a desire for a particular verdict does not affect our analysis. Simply because the district court did not favor one verdict over another does not mean the jury was not pressured, even if only inadvertently, into reaching a verdict instead of remaining deadlocked. 67 The district court's second embellishment--its statement about expense and danger--is also troubling. As noted above, the district court stated to the jury, I have received a note from the jury here that is very distressing to me because this has been one of the greatest major efforts made in time and attention and money that I have noted in my 24 years as being a judge. Tr. at 2. Subsequently, it pointed out to the jury, [T]he time and attention and the danger of this case has been, you know, a problem. We've had security here that was just I said to somebody we could have fought the Russian Army head on with what we've had here in this case. Id. at 6. 68 While this court has in prior cases approved of Allen instructions that discuss expense, see Rodriguez-Mejia, 20 F.3d at 1091 (holding that an Allen charge, which included the statement that [t]he trial has been expensive in time, effort[,] and money to both the defense and the prosecution, was not coercive), we do not accept the proposition that a comment on expense is always noncoercive. Instead, we agree with the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the addition of a comment on expense does not necessarily make a charge more coercive but that it can. Mason, 658 F.2d at 1267 (emphasis added); see also id. (This court has long recognized that injection of fiscal concerns into jury deliberations has potential for abuse.). In Mr. McElhiney's case, we note that the district court did not make a simple reference to the expense of another trial (as, for example, in Rodriguez-Mejia); rather, the issue of expense was underscored, the district court stating, [T]his has been one of the greatest major efforts ever made in time and attention and money that I have noted in my 24 years as being a judge. Tr. at 2. Furthermore, the district court characterized this situation as being very distressing to me. Id.; see also Harris, 391 F.2d at 354 (noting that the judge's statement in regard to the expense and burden of conducting a trial is a questionable extension of the Allen charge, especially where this factor is unduly emphasized). 69 The district court's elaboration on expense, however, was not as problematic as its comment on danger. While a comment on expense has at least the potential to be innocuous, the same cannot be said of a comment on danger. Danger, unlike expense, is a loaded term, one more likely to catch a jury's attention and one more likely to prod the jury to action (i.e., unanimous agreement). 70 In denying Mr. McElhiney's motion for a new trial, the district court discounted the effect of its remark by noting that the danger was obvious to the jury: 71 [T]hese facts were well-known to the jury . . . . There were nineteen inmate witnesses. Every inmate witness . . . wore ankle chains in court. These were inmates who had served or were serving time in maximum or super-maximum security institutions. The serious criminal histories of some of these inmates were discussed. A violent prison murder . . . was a matter frequently discussed. Fear and retribution were common topics. Several times there was a tense atmosphere in the courtroom during cross-examination of adverse witnesses. There were numerous security personnel inside and outside the courtroom. None of this could have gone unnoticed by the jury. 72 Order at 10. In all likelihood, the district court was correct in stating that the danger could not have gone unnoticed by the jury. However, it is one thing for a jury to be cognizant of a fact and another for a court to draw attention to that fact, especially when the subject matter is so sensitive and the characterization so negative.
73 Because of the failure to incorporate the Allen charge with the other jury instructions and the flawed language employed in the instruction (the omission plus the embellishments), our confidence in the integrity of the deliberation process has been substantially undermined. In spite of these considerations, the government still argues that the jury's verdict was not a product of coercion because of the timing of the instruction, that is, the length of deliberations after the Allen charge was issued. We cannot agree. 74 As a preliminary matter, we note that the record does not support the government's contention that the jury deliberated for six hours after having received the supplemental Allen charge. All that is known is the following: (1) The jury first informed the district court of the deadlock at approximately 10:30 a.m.; (2) at some point, the jury was called into the courtroom during which the district court asked it to deliberate until noon; (3) at 12:17 p.m., the jury sent a second note to the district court, asking to review some evidence; (4) the jury shortly thereafter had its lunch break; (5) at 1:50 p.m., the jury sent yet another note to the district court, again asking to reconsider more evidence (i.e., a readback of Mr. Hawley's testimony); (6) the readback did not take place for another two hours; (7) the readback lasted for an hour; and (8) ten minutes after the readback i.e., at 5:00 p.m. a verdict was returned. 75 The record does not reveal such facts as (1) precisely when the jury began its deliberations after receiving the Allen charge; (2) how long the lunch break lasted; and (3) whether the jury deliberated during the time the readback was being prepared for their reconsideration (i.e., from 1:50 p.m. to 3:50 p.m.). Given these missing facts, we estimate that, in the very best case scenario itself unlikely the jurors could only have deliberated for four hours (from 10:30 a.m. to 12:17 p.m., from 1:50 p.m. to 3:50 p.m., and from 4:50 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.), and, in the worst case, for one-and-a-half hours (from 10:30 a.m. to 12:17 p.m. and from 4:50 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.). 76 The government points out, however, that in prior cases this court has approved Allen charges in which the timing was as short as an hour and twenty minutes. See, e.g., McKinney, 822 F.2d at 950 (noting that the district court gave the jury a full-fledged Allen instruction after which [t]he jury again resumed its deliberation, and an hour and twenty minutes later returned a unanimous verdict); see also United States v. Butler, 904 F.2d 1482, 1488 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that two hours after the Allen charge was given the jury returned a verdict of guilty). But see Due Process, 53 Va. L. Rev. at 133 (noting that there are no consistent standards when it comes to timing i.e., some courts have affirmed a verdict in instances in which the jury deliberated for only a short time after receiving an Allen instruction while other courts have reversed). 77 The government is correct in noting the timing of these cases. But what the government fails to recognize is that, in these cases, the trial court did not employ any faulty language, certainly none comparable to the case at hand. Most importantly, in these cases, the trial court did not omit the all-important cautionary language that the jurors should not yield any convictions conscientiously held simply to reach a verdict. See McKinney, 822 F.2d at 950 (noting that the Allen charge admonished the jurors not to yield any conscientious convictions they may have as to the weight or the effect of the evidence; also stating that the charge contained cautionary language remind[ing] the jurors that they must acquit the defendant if the evidence failed to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); Butler, 904 F.2d at 1488 (noting that Allen charge instructed jury that no juror is expected to yield a conscientious conviction he or she may have as to the weight or effect of the evidence and that it is your duty to agree on a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your conscientious conviction; also noting that instruction contained cautionary language reminding jury of the burden of proof). 78 Given this distinction, we cannot place much stock in the cases on which the government relies. Instead, we look to cases such as Smalls and Mason. In both of these decisions, the timing of the instruction did not overcome the coerciveness arising from the flawed language of the charge. See Smalls, 191 F.3d at 281 ([T]he jury charge . . . lacked any such cautionary language and failed to inform the jurors of the possibility that they could remain deadlocked rather than surrender their conscientiously held beliefs. The length of deliberations in this case did not diminish the coerciveness of the supplemental jury charge.); Mason, 658 F.2d at 1265 (noting that the jury did not return a verdict until an hour and a half after the Allen instruction but ultimately concluding that the instruction was impermissibly coercive). 79 Finally, we are not convinced by the government's argument that, because the jury deliberated beyond noon in response to the district court's suggestion of an additional deliberation period until noon, the Allen charge had no coercive effect. We agree with the government to the extent that, if the jury had rendered its verdict by noon in these circumstances, there would be a strong argument that the jury was coerced. 80 In fact, cases such as Burroughs v. United States, 365 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1966), and Goff v. United States, 446 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1971), suggest that setting a time deadline exacerbated the coercive effect of the Allen charge. We point to this court's comments in Burroughs: 81 [I]t is one thing to recall the jury to beseech them to reason together, and it is quite another to entreat them to strive toward a verdict by a certain time. When these admonitions are considered in their context, they are subject to the clear inference that the judge was unduly anxious to conclude the lawsuit, and we think it entirely reasonable to infer that the jury was aware of his anxiety. This type of verdict-urging on the part of the court tends to undermine the proper function of the common law jury system . . . . 82 365 F.2d at 434. To put the matter more succinctly, [a] court's attempt to secure [a] quick verdict prevents fair and thoughtful deliberation by [a] jury. 75B Am. Jur. 2d 1601, at 367-68; see also Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883 (criticizing the trial court for suggesting to the jury that it was more important to be quick than to be thoughtful); Goff, 446 F.2d at 626 (concluding that [i]t was impermissibly suggestive and coercive for the Court to place a time fuse [i.e., a deadline] on the period of jury deliberation).
83 These factors indicate that the Allen instruction in the instant case was impermissibly coercive. A few final considerations support that conclusion. First, this court has endorsed the ABA version of the Allen charge, see note 8, supra, and suggested that, in determining the coercive effect of a particular instruction, we compare that instruction to the ABA version. See Dyba, 554 F.2d at 421. A comparison with the ABA version highlights that the charge in the instant case was plagued by problematic language not only the omission of all cautionary language, particularly that dealing with conscientiously held convictions, but also embellishments on expense and danger. 84 Second, at least one circuit court has noted that the fact of a prior hung jury may under certain circumstances strengthen the inference of coercion. See Bailey, 468 F.2d at 665 (observing that [t]he special concurrence in Thaggard v. United States[,] [354 F.2d at 735,] thought it 'significant that there had already been one hung jury in a previous trial'). We agree. The fact that the jury in Mr. McElhiney's first trial could not reach a verdict contributes to the coercion calculus. 85 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we take note of the colloquy between the foreperson and the district court. As the Appendix reflects, the foreperson repeatedly told the district court at least three times that the jury was at an impasse, see, e.g., Tr. at 3 ([W]e have exhausted all possibilities that would help us reach a verdict.), and all the jurors, when individually polled, agreed. Deliberations resumed only after strong pressing by the district court, with the foreperson finally acquiescing by saying, I would be willing to try [more deliberations] if that is your wish. Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 86 All this is not to say that the evidence of coercion is entirely clear-cut in this case. Indeed, there is one fact that does give us some pause: that, before reaching a verdict, the jury reconsidered two pieces of evidence. The government argues that this fact demonstrates that the verdict was not a product of coercion but rather a result of the jury's reexamination of evidence. See United States v. Ajiboye, 961 F.2d 892, 894 (9th Cir. 1992) (Indeed, the jury asked for some of the trial testimony to be re-read before reaching its verdict another pretty good indication that the Allen charge did not coerce the guilty verdicts.). While we believe that this fact does weigh in the favor of the government, we cannot say that, given all of the factors above, we do not have substantial doubts as to the integrity of the deliberation process, see Porter, 881 F.2d at 889 (asking whether the Allen charge was impermissibly coercive in a way that undermined the integrity of the deliberation process); Thomas, 449 F.2d at 1184 (asking if there was a substantial probability of prejudice to the accused), especially since the foreperson insisted during the colloquy with the district court that added work and read backs would not assist the jury in reaching a verdict. Tr. at 3; see also Smalls, 191 F.3d at 281-82 (noting that the jury reexamined evidence before reaching a verdict but ultimately concluding that the Allen charge was still impermissibly coercive). Taking into account the totality of the circumstances, and, cognizant of this circuit's guideline that even a pure charge borders on the impermissible a corollary of which is that a substantial deviation is highly questionable we cannot but say that the instruction given in the instant case managed to cross that boundary. 87 To conclude, we hold that Mr. McElhiney's conviction must be reversed because, given the specific facts confronting us, and in particular, the faulty language employed, the Allen instruction provided was impermissibly coercive. We emphasize that our holding here is dictated by the unique circumstances in the case at hand. Cf. Mason, 658 F.2d at 1266 (stating that we must give close scrutiny to the actual charge and the circumstances in which it was given, particularly because an Allen error calls into question the validity of a jury's verdict, upon which substantial appellate presumptions rely). 88 Undoubtedly, this was a difficult case, made more so by the problem of a pro se defense. It may be that, because of these difficulties, the district court did not realize that it was in an Allen situation. Further, we are not without sympathy for the concerns of the district court, namely, the possibility of a third trial involving considerable expense. However, we must caution that exhorting a deadlocked jury to further deliberation--the classic Allen scenario--must be undertaken with great care. See Rodriguez-Mejia, 20 F.3d at 1091 (stating that [w]e have traditionally urged caution in the use of the Allen instruction) (citing Butler, 904 F.2d at 1488); Smith, 857 F.2d at 684 (noting that the Allen charge must be given with caution); see also Flannery, 451 F.2d at 883 (Like dynamite, [the Allen instruction] should be used with great caution, and only when absolutely necessary.). When a district court issues an instruction encouraging a unanimous verdict, the following cautionary language should be incorporated to balance the potential coercive effect of the charge: (1) that no juror should relinquish his or her conscientiously held convictions simply to secure a verdict and (2) that every individual juror should reconsider his or her views, whether in the majority or in the minority. Cf. United States v. Munroe, 424 F.2d 243, 246 (10th Cir. 1970) ([W]e believe that . . . the [ABA] Jury Trial Standards discussed above [see note 8, supra] provide proper safeguards against the possible taint of coercion from the giving of supplemental jury instructions.). As a final note, and recognizing that we have upheld an Allen instruction not containing the burden of proof, Winn, 411 F.2d at 417, this cautionary language should be supplemented with a reminder to the jury of the burden of proof, once again to avoid the possibility of coercion. See Burrup, 371 F.2d at 558 (Chief Judge Murrah stating that the judge cannot be too careful to remind the jury of these prerequisites to full and fair consideration of the guilt or innocence of an accused, including the requirement that guilt must be established beyond a reasonable doubt) (internal quotation marks omitted).