Opinion ID: 1430146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Fraud by Reams.

Text: The superior court decided that Reams' deed to J.J. Lown constituted an effort to hinder or defraud the creditor in whose favor Reams had made the deed of trust just eight days earlier. Therefore, the court concluded, the deed was void. Robin Lown argues that his father was nevertheless protected under AS 34.40.100, which states that fraud by a grantor does not impair the title of a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of the fraud. I think there were genuine issues of material fact both as to Reams' intent to defraud and as to J.J. Lown's knowledge or lack thereof of any fraud. According to J.J. Lown's deposition, Reams told him that the land he had deeded to Lown was unencumbered, and that the deed of trust covered the rest of the Swanson Harbor lots. This was clearly not the case; [4] however, it does at the very least highlight an issue of fact as to J.J. Lown's knowledge of any fraud on the part of Reams, and as to whether Reams' state of mind involved an intent to defraud or an honest misunderstanding as to the specific portion of land included in the deed of trust. In order to resolve this issue of fact in favor of Nichols, I would be forced to draw an inference in its favor. Since, on a summary judgment motion, all inferences are to be drawn against the movant, Clabaugh v. Bottcher, 545 P.2d 172, 175 n. 5 (Alaska 1976), summary judgment cannot be based upon this premise.