Opinion ID: 78396
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Limitation on Cross of E.M.

Text: Notwithstanding the federal rape-shield law, Sarras contends that the district court erred in refusing to permit Sarras to ask E.M. questions about a post-abuse sexual relationship with her boyfriend. Federal Rule of Evidence 412 provides that, subject to narrow exceptions, [e]vidence offered to prove that any alleged victim engaged in other sexual behavior or to prove any alleged victim's sexual predisposition is not admissible in any criminal proceeding involving alleged sexual misconduct. [25] Rule 412(b)(1) allows such evidence to be admitted when its exclusion . . . would violate the constitutional rights of the defendant. At trial, Sarras contended that E.M.'s testimony that she was traumatized by the sexual abuse opened the door to questions about her sexual history. [26] Sarras claims broadly that the district court's limitation left the jury with the false impression that E.M. was traumatized by the sexual activity and had not been photographed nude, although E.M. admitted to police that she engaged in explicit sexual activities with her boyfriend. [27] Again, we conclude the district court did not err. First, as the district court aptly recognized, victims of sexual abuse can be traumatized whether or not they have had other sexual relations. Second, we reject Sarras's argument that E.M.'s sexual relationship with her boyfriend shows that Sarras did not abuse her. The laptop photos show sexual abuse of E.M. The only issue is the identity of the male in the photos. That E.M. had a sexual relationship with her boyfriend is irrelevant to the identity of the adult male in these photos. It is equally irrelevant to whether Sarras knowingly possessed the materials found on his laptop computer. Third, the district court afforded Sarras a constitutionally adequate opportunity to attempt to impeach E.M. Sarras questioned E.M. about her possible motives for framing him; her access to the camera; his house and computers; her knowledge of computers; her anger over Sarras's restrictions against her dating and watching MTV; and the inconsistencies between her interview with Officer Ortiz and the facts developed at both trials. Simply put, Sarras has not met his burden of demonstrating that the district court's application of Rule 412 violated a constitutional guarantee. See Frazier, 387 F.3d at 1271 (While the Constitution unquestionably provides a defendant with the right to be heard, this right is not unbounded. Thus, `[t]he accused does not have an unfettered right to offer testimony that is incompetent, privileged, or otherwise inadmissible under standard rules of evidence.' (alteration in original) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 410, 108 S.Ct. 646, 653, 98 L.Ed.2d 798 (1988))).