Opinion ID: 1060523
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 26

Heading: Competency of Witness Nakeita Shaw

Text: Carruthers next claims that the trial court erred by not ordering a competency evaluation of Nakeita Shaw. Prior to trial, counsel representing Carruthers at the time requested an evaluation of Shaw and any records of a history of mental treatment. The state indicated that it had no record of treatment. The trial court denied the request. During the first jury selection, the state asked for a trial continuance because Shaw had checked herself into a hospital for depression and could not appear in court. The court granted the continuance. Carruthers claims, however, that this fact should have been a compelling enough reason for the trial court to exercise its inherent power to order a competency evaluation. In support of his claim, Carruthers relies upon State v. Garland, 617 S.W.2d 176 (Tenn.Crim.App.1981). Carruthers' reliance is misplaced. In Garland , this Court specifically held [t]here is no statutory or case law in Tennessee authorizing a court to compel a prospective witness, not a party interested in the case and present only by compulsion of a subpoena, to submit to a psychiatric examination. Id. at 185. The Court further held that the ruling in Forbes v. State, 559 S.W.2d 318 (Tenn.1977), that the trial court has the inherent power to compel a psychiatric or psychological examination of the victim, was restricted to complaining victims in sex cases. The Court refused to broaden this holding, and neither of the parties in the case before us have cited to any authority which has done so. The case cited by the appellant involves the physical examination of a complainant in a sex case. State v. Barone, 852 S.W.2d 216 (Tenn.1993). It clearly appears that the court ordered examination of witnesses has been limited to complainants in sex cases, and we do not intend to broaden the holding in Forbes any further. Tenn.R.Evid. 601 provides that every person is presumed competent to be a witness. The Advisory Commission Comments to this rule state that [v]irtually all witnesses may be permitted to testify: children, mentally incompetent persons, convicted felons. (Emphasis added). Accordingly, any prospective witness may testify as long as they have personal knowledge of the matter about which they are testifying, Rule 602, and swear they will testify truthfully, Rule 603. The trial judge has the discretion to determine whether a witness is competent to testify. State v. Caughron, 855 S.W.2d 526, 538 (Tenn.1993). This determination will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Howard, 926 S.W.2d 579, 584 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996) (overruled on other grounds). In Garland , this Court held: A lunatic or a person adjudged insane is competent as a witness if, at the time he is offered as a witness, he has sufficient understanding to comprehend the obligation of an oath and capable of giving a correct account of the matters which he has seen or heard in reference to the questions at issue. 617 S.W.2d at 184. Despite the above-cited authority, the state claims Carruthers has waived this issue 1) by not renewing his request for a mental examination of Shaw before she took the witness stand and 2) by failing to question her on cross-examination about her hospitalization. See T.R.A.P. 36(a). We agree. Since the trial court did not have the authority to order a mental evaluation of Shaw, and because Carruthers failed to preserve the issue, this matter has been waived. Regardless, even if Shaw had been found to be mentally incompetent, she could have testified as long as she was able to understand the obligation of an oath and had personal knowledge of the matter to which she testified. See Caughron, 855 S.W.2d at 538. The trial judge apparently determined that she was competent according to the law to testify, and there is nothing in the record to suggest he abused his discretion. This issue is without merit.