Opinion ID: 2455414
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Whether a writ is appropriate to prohibit any agreement to transfer portions of I-90 for light rail use.

Text: ¶ 28 Petitioners argue that article II, section 40 prohibits DOT from entering into any agreement with Sound Transit for use of the two center lanes of I-90 for light rail. Petitioners assert that the transfer is essentially already final, as evidenced by the Term Sheet between DOT and Sound Transit. Petitioners argue that article II, section 40 creates a mandatory duty to expend motor vehicle funds only for highway purposes. Since the center lanes were constructed, in part, using motor vehicle fund moneys, petitioners reason that any transfer of the lanes for light rail transit would essentially be an unlawful diversion of motor vehicle fund moneys in violation of article II, section 40. ¶ 29 In response, DOT argues that article II, section 40 does not bar the state from transferring highway property. As an intervening party, Sound Transit similarly argues that article II, section 40 only applies to restrict certain expenditures from the motor vehicle fund. Sound Transit argues that nothing in article II, section 40 prevents the transfer of highway lands if the motor vehicle fund is properly reimbursed. ¶ 30 We need not reach the arguments presented by DOT and Sound Transit. At the onset, petitioners' request for mandamus to ensure that article II, section 40 funds will be used exclusively for highway purposes is too general to command issuance of the writ. Walker, 124 Wash.2d at 408, 879 P.2d 920 (`Mandamus will not lie to compel a general course of official conduct, as it is impossible for a court to oversee the performance of such duties.' (quoting State ex rel. Pac. Am. Fisheries v. Darwin, 81 Wash. 1, 12, 142 P. 441 (1914))). And petitioners fail to identify a present constitutional violation remediable by writ. Instead, petitioners seek a writ broadly prohibiting DOT from taking or authorizing any future action with respect to the transfer or occupancy of I-90 for light rail. We have consistently held that we will not issue writs generally ordering state officers to adhere to the constitution because we presume that they already do so without our direction. Walker, 124 Wash.2d at 409, 879 P.2d 920. ¶ 31 Secondly, the remedy of mandamus contemplates the necessity of indicating the precise thing to be done, but petitioners' request fails to identify what the petitioners actually seek to restrain. Because petitioners broadly move this court to prevent the governor or DOT from taking or authorizing any action with respect to the transfer of the center lanes of I-90, petitioners are, in essence, asking this court to manage DOT's potential discretionary decisions. However, the jurisdiction granted this court under article IV, section 4 does not authorize this court to assume general control or direction of official acts. Walker, 124 Wash.2d at 407, 879 P.2d 920 (citing State ex rel. Taylor v. Lawler, 2 Wash.2d 488, 490, 98 P.2d 658 (1940)). DOT has statutory authority to discretionarily manage highway property. Furthermore, as explained above, DOT has no immediate duty to transfer the center lanes of I-90 to Sound Transit and no such transfer has yet occurred. Since this court is not empowered to command the discretionary decisions of state officials in advance, we cannot direct or prohibit DOT's future management of highway property. While petitioners point to the Term Sheet as evidence of DOT's commitment to lease the center lanes to Sound Transit, the Term Sheet expressly indicates that the agreement is subject to the execution and delivery of a number of future agreements and instruments. ASF, Ex. K, at Term 9. Although petitioners argue that the eventual transfer of the center lanes will violate article II, section 40, this court will not issue a writ in anticipation of a failure to discharge a duty. The duty must exist at the time the writ is sought. Since petitioners have failed to identify a present duty to transfer the center lanes for light rail use, the petition for a writ is premature. Walker, 124 Wash.2d at 409, 879 P.2d 920. ¶ 32 Taking into account the language of the Term Sheet requiring future actions by DOT and Sound Transit, the petitioners are, essentially, asking this court to grant a declaratory judgment that DOT may not sell or lease any portion of I-90 to Sound Transit for light rail use. But such a request is beyond this court's original jurisdiction. This court's authority in original jurisdiction is derived from the constitution, which does not include original jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action. Walker, 124 Wash.2d at 411, 879 P.2d 920. Even if we were to consider DOT's proposed lease agreement with Sound Transit, we note that DOT is statutorily authorized to sell, transfer or lease highway lands within certain statutory restrictions. Whether this potential lease specifically complies with these statutory provisions is not before us at this time and, in any event, the statutory provisions authorizing transfers of highway land do not generally violate article II, section 40. ¶ 33 In sum, petitioners ask for a writ prohibiting DOT from entering into any agreement that places light rail on the center lanes of I-90. We will not issue such a writ.