Opinion ID: 210959
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Vertex® Model

Text: 20 DePuy argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment of non-infringement on the Vertex® model because a genuine issue of material fact exists on both literal infringement and infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. With respect to the doctrine of equivalents, DePuy argues that the court erred in applying both the all elements rule and the function-way-result test. 21 Medtronic counters that the receiver member of the Vertex® device has a conically-shaped hollow portion, rather than a spherically-shaped portion, and therefore does not literally infringe. Medtronic also counters that the court properly applied the relevant law in examining infringement by equivalents. Alternatively, Medtronic counters that even if a spherically-shaped equivalent is present in the Vertex® model, the Vertex® model does not meet the pressed against limitation because the screw head rests against an edge of the equivalent and not against the actual spherically-shaped portion equivalent. We will begin our analysis with Medtronic's alternative argument. 22
23 Claim 1 recites that the screw head is pressed against the hollow spherically-shaped portion. The court construed spherically-shaped to mean approximately spherical, such as a globe or a basketball. The parties do not dispute this construction on appeal. The parties dispute, however, whether the pressed against limitation requires that the screw head engage the entire spherically-shaped portion or whether it is enough that the head engage just the edge of the spherically-shaped portion. 24 In determining the meaning of the disputed claim limitation, we look principally to the intrinsic evidence of record, examining the claim language itself, the written description, and the prosecution history, if in evidence. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1312-17. First, the claim language does not indicate that hollow spherically-shaped portion must be limited so as not to include the edge of that portion, nor does it indicate how much of the hollow spherically-shaped portion must be pressed against the screw head. Claim 4, which depends from claim 1, requires that the radii of the hollow spherically-shaped portions (9, 19) and of the spherically-shaped screw head (4)[be] substantially equal. '678 patent, col. 4, ll. 37-40. That implies that independent claim 1 must be broad enough to read on a device with components of unequal radii that nonetheless are pressed against each other. If the screw head has a smaller radius than the hollow spherically-shaped portion, the only part of the spherically-shaped portion against which the screw head would be pressed would be the edge of the hollow spherically-shaped portion. 25 Second, the specification does not indicate that the hollow spherically-shaped portion must be limited to exclude the edge of that portion or that pressed against requires a certain amount of contact between the spherically-shaped portion and the screw head. In the absence of a stated reason to exclude the edge, it would ordinarily and customarily be understood that the referenced portion includes any and all parts of the structure. Similarly, in the absence of a stated reason to require a certain amount of contact, it would ordinarily and customarily be understood that the referenced portion is pressed against a screw head when any amount of that portion presses against the screw head. Figures 1 and 2 of the '678 patent depict hollow spherically-shaped portion 9 in crosshatching that appears to include the edge of the portion. The corresponding description of that portion does not exclude the edge, noting that [a] portion 9 in the form of a hollow spherical segment is provided in the interior immediately adjacent to the bore. '678 patent, col. 2, ll. 21-23. That description indicates that the relevant portion extends all the way to the bore, which necessarily implies that it includes the edge. Further, the description does not indicate how much of the spherically-shaped portion presses against the screw head; rather, it notes only that there is contact between the components. Id., col. 2, ll. 33-34. The prosecution history provides no further guidance. 26 For the foregoing reasons, we find Medtronic's argument unpersuasive, and we conclude that hollow spherically-shaped portion includes the edge of that portion and that the screw head is pressed against the hollow spherically-shaped portion if it presses against all or any part of that portion—including the edge.
27 The district court found that there was not a genuine issue of material fact as to literal infringement because the shape of the inner hollow space in the Vertex® model is conical, with angular rather than spherical walls. Vertex Order, slip op. at 2-3. The court also found that even if a portion of the shape is spherical, that spherically-shaped portion does not contact the head of the screw. Id., slip op. at 3. 28 On appeal, DePuy points to two comparisons as evincing a question of fact regarding a spherically-shaped portion in the Vertex® model. First, DePuy points to pictures of a basketball and a selected portion of the basketball, which DePuy submitted as exhibits before the district court. DePuy argues that the picture of the selected portion demonstrates that a thin slice of a sphere creates a profile that appears conical. Depictions of those exhibits are shown below: 29 NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE 30 Second, DePuy points to a comparison of a cross section of the Vertex® model and Figure 3 of the '678 patent. That comparison is shown in the following figures, with arrows added to indicate the relevant conical and spherical walls: 31 NOTE: OPINION CONTAINING TABLE OR OTHER DATA THAT IS NOT VIEWABLE DePuy argues that, like the selected portion of the basketball, the Vertex® model could be viewed as possessing a spherically-shaped portion that appears conical in profile. 32 Although these comparisons do highlight that at varying degrees of magnification or abstraction a curved surface can appear angular, they do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Vertex® model possesses the spherically-shaped limitation. DePuy points to no evidence that specifically identifies a region in the Vertex® model as spherical. Indeed, DePuy's expert acknowledged that the engineering drawing of the Vertex® model shows a conically-shaped hollow portion, and that a photomicrograph of the Vertex® receiver shows a ledge—not a sphere—even if it contains some rounding at the edges. At best, these declarations identify a conical or ledge structure; they do not constitute evidence of a portion that meets the literal terms approximately spherical, such as a globe or a basketball. Therefore, the district court did not err in concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to literal infringement.
33 The district court determined that it cannot find that the cylindrical-conical shape of [the Vertex® model's] receiver member is equivalent to the spherically-shaped portion disclosed in the '678 patent. Vertex Order, slip op. at 4. The court first applied the all elements rule and concluded that, as in Tronzo, treating a conical shape as the equivalent of a spherical shape would vitiate the spherically-shaped limitation. Id. The court also applied the function-way-result test and determined that, because the screw head in the Vertex® model is merely pressed against an edge or lip on the receiver member, the Vertex® model does not do substantially the same thing as the device in the '678 patent. Id., slip op. at 5. 34 Under the doctrine of equivalents, a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is `equivalence' between the elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented invention. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 117 S.Ct. 1040, 137 L.Ed.2d 146 (1997) (citing Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 70 S.Ct. 854, 94 L.Ed. 1097 (1950)). The doctrine recognizes that 35 [t]he language in the patent claims may not capture every nuance of the invention or describe with complete precision the range of its novelty. If patents were always interpreted by their literal terms, their value would be greatly diminished. Unimportant and insubstantial substitutes for certain elements could defeat the patent, and its value to inventors could be destroyed by simple acts of copying. 36 Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731, 122 S.Ct. 1831, 152 L.Ed.2d 944 (2002); Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 605, 70 S.Ct. 854 ([T]o permit imitation of a patented invention which does not copy every literal detail would be to convert the protection of the patent grant into a hollow and useless thing.). 37 One limit on the doctrine of equivalents is the all elements rule. The all elements rule attempts to balance the doctrine of equivalents with the basic patent law principle that claim language defines the scope of an invention and every limitation is material. 38 Each element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the patented invention, and thus the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to individual elements of the claim, not to the invention as a whole. It is important to ensure that the application of the doctrine, even as to an individual element, is not allowed such broad play as to effectively eliminate that element in its entirety. 39 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 117 S.Ct. 1040. Thus, as a practical matter, the all elements rule informs a doctrine of equivalents analysis by requiring that equivalence be assessed on a limitation-by-limitation basis, rather than from the perspective of the invention as a whole, and that no limitation be read completely out of the claim. Freedman Seating Co. v. Am. Seating Co., 420 F.3d 1350, 1358 (Fed. Cir.2005). 40 In Warner-Jenkinson, the Supreme Court provided guidance for determining when resort to the doctrine of equivalents is precluded as a matter of law. First, the Court noted that [w]here the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could determine two elements to be equivalent, district courts are obliged to grant partial or complete summary judgment. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n. 8, 117 S.Ct. 1040 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). Second, the Court noted that under the particular facts of a case, . . . if a theory of equivalence would entirely vitiate a particular claim element, partial or complete judgment should be rendered by the court. Id. at 39 n. 8, 117 S.Ct. 1040. 41 Informed by this guidance, we have held that in certain instances, the all elements rule forecloses resort to the doctrine of equivalents because, on the facts or theories presented in a case, a limitation would be read completely out of the claim— i.e., the limitation would be effectively removed or vitiated. For instance, we have concluded that in some cases, the evidence was such that no reasonable jury could determine a proffered equivalent to be insubstantially different from the claimed limitation. See, e.g., Freedman Seating, 420 F.3d at 1361 (holding that a limitation was vitiated in part because the structural difference in the accused device is not a `subtle difference in degree,' but rather `a clear, substantial difference or difference in kind' (internal citation omitted)); Ethicon, 149 F.3d 1309, 1319 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that the all elements rule barred application of the doctrine of equivalents because, on the facts presented, no reasonable jury could find the differences to be insubstantial). We have also concluded that in some cases, the patentee's theory of equivalence was legally insufficient because, rather than demonstrate an insubstantial difference between a limitation and an element in the accused device, the theory effectively eliminated a limitation in its entirety. See, e.g., Tronzo, 156 F.3d at 1160 (holding that the patentee's theory of equivalence—that  any shape would be equivalent to the conical limitation—would write such a limitation out of the claims (emphasis in original)); Forest Labs., Inc. v. Abbott Labs., 239 F.3d 1305, 1313 (Fed.Cir.2001) (holding that the patentee's theory of equivalence—that a limitation on the percentages of water in a composition was irrelevant when compared to the accused composition—vitiated such a limitation). Thus, the all elements rule generally is not met—and therefore a claim limitation can be said to be vitiated—if the theory or evidence of equivalence is legally incapable of establishing that the differences between the limitation in the claim and the accused device are insubstantial; i.e., if the theory or evidence is so legally insufficient as to warrant a holding of non-infringement as a matter of law. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n. 8, 117 S.Ct. 1040; Metro. R.R. Co. v. Moore, 121 U.S. 558, 569, 7 S.Ct. 1334, 30 L.Ed. 1022 (1887) (Strictly speaking, evidence is said to be insufficient in law only in those cases where there is a total absence of such proof, either as to its quantity or kind, as in the particular case some rule of law requires as essential to the establishment of the fact.); see also Sage Prods., Inc. v. Devon Indus., Inc., 126 F.3d 1420, 1425-26, 1429-30 (Fed.Cir.1997). 42 Our decision in Sage Products, decided shortly after Warner-Jenkinson, illustrates the genesis of such an analysis. For one invention in that case, we held that resort to the doctrine of equivalents was foreclosed because no reasonable jury could find that the differences in the accused device were insubstantial. Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1423-26. In considering equivalence, we noted the simplicity of the structure, the specificity and narrowness of the claim, and the foreseeability of variations at the time the claim was filed. Id. at 1425 (No subtlety of language or complexity of the technology, nor any subsequent change in the state of the art, such as later-developed technology, obfuscated the significance of this limitation at the time of its incorporation.). Because under these particular facts, no reasonable jury could find that the differences in the accused device were insubstantial, we concluded that a finding of infringement by equivalents would effectively remove the relevant limitations from the claim and affirmed the district court's summary judgment of non-infringement. Id. at 1425-26. 43 For a second invention at issue in Sage Products, we held that the doctrine of equivalents was foreclosed because the patentee's theory of infringement was improper. Id. at 1429-30. In considering equivalence for a means-plus-function limitation, we noted that the claimed function included the ability to control access by moving between open and closed positions. Id. at 1428-29. The accused product used a permanently locking lid that could not move back to an open position. Id. at 1427. We noted that the patentee's theory of equivalence—that a permanently locking lid is equivalent to an openable lid—was unsustainable in that it did not offer a function equivalent to that expressly recited in the claimed element. Id. at 1429. Because that theory could not support a conclusion of equivalence regardless of the evidence, we concluded that the theory was legally insufficient, declined to apply the doctrine of equivalents, and affirmed the court's summary judgment of non-infringement. Id. at 1429-30. 44 It is important to note that when we have held that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied to an accused device because it vitiates a claim limitation, it was not to hold that the doctrine is always foreclosed whenever a claim limitation does not literally read on an element of an accused device; such an interpretation of the all elements rule would swallow the doctrine of equivalents entirely. See Ethicon, 149 F.3d at 1316-17 (holding that a similar interpretation would force the All Elements rule to swallow the doctrine of equivalents, reducing the application of the doctrine to nothing more than a repeated analysis of literal infringement (footnote omitted)). [A]ny analysis of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents necessarily deals with subject matter that is `beyond,' `ignored' by, and not included in the literal scope of a claim. Id. at 1317 (emphasis in original). A holding that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied to an accused device because it vitiates a claim limitation is nothing more than a conclusion that the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that an element of an accused device is equivalent to an element called for in the claim, or that the theory of equivalence to support the conclusion of infringement otherwise lacks legal sufficiency. 45 Here, in applying the all elements rule, the district court relied solely on Tronzo and concluded that the cylindrical-conical shape of the [Vertex® model] cannot infringe the '678 patent without reading out of the claim the express requirement that the screw head be `pressed against the hollow, spherically-shaped portion.' Vertex Order, slip op. at 4 (emphasis added). The court also noted that permitting the cylindrical-conical shape of the [Vertex® model] to be considered equivalent to the spherical shape required by the '678 patent vitiates the '678 patent requirement that the spherically-shaped head ... be pressed against an inner, hollow, spherically-shaped portion of the receiver member. Id., slip op. at 4 n. 3 (emphasis added). The district court also determined that this conclusion was supported by the function-way-result test because the conically-shaped portion of the Vertex® model and the spherically-shaped limitation of the claim do not do `substantially the same thing.' Id., slip op. at 5. 46 We find no support in the present case for the district court's conclusion that applying the doctrine of equivalents would vitiate or read out the spherically-shaped limitation. Our decision in Tronzo is factually distinguishable. 1 In Tronzo, the invention related to artificial hip sockets and the patent at issue was a continuation-in-part. 156 F.3d at 1156-57. The independent claims that were added in the continuation covered a prosthesis socket with no specific shape. Id. at 1157-58. Because the written description only disclosed a conical shape for the prosthesis and characterized other shapes as prior art and inferior to a conical shape, we held that the independent claims were unsupported by the written description, not entitled to the parent's filing date, and thus invalid in view of intervening prior art. See id. at 1158-60. The only valid claims at issue in Tronzo were dependent claims that limited the prosthesis body to having a generally conical outer surface. The patentee attempted to prove infringement of an accused product with a hemispherical outer surface under the doctrine of equivalents because, [a]ccording to the expert testimony, any shape would be equivalent to the conical limitation. Id. at 1160 (emphasis in original). The theory of equivalence, therefore, did not identify a specific element of the accused product as an equivalent to the generally conical limitation; rather, the patentee argued that any shape would be equivalent to a conical shape, despite clear indications in the written description to the contrary. We concluded that such a theory was insufficient as a matter of law and thus would write the `generally conical outer surface' limitation out the claims. Id. (citing Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 39 n. 8, 117 S.Ct. 1040). Accordingly, we reversed the finding of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents. Id. 47 Here, unlike the patentee in Tronzo, DePuy did not propose that any shape would meet the spherically-shaped limitation. Rather, DePuy's expert presented particularized declarations demonstrating its theory that a specific element of the accused device—the hollow conically-shaped portion of the receiver member—was insubstantially different from the corresponding spherically-shaped limitation because it supported the screw head, allowed for flexible movement, and—when the compression member is engaged—creates a rigid lock between the screw head and the receiver. Indeed, the expert expressly identified certain shapes that were different from the accused device but would not be capable of supporting the screw head, allowing flexible movement, and creating a rigid lock when the compression member is engaged. Also, unlike the patent at issue in Tronzo, the written description in the '678 patent does not label other shapes as prior art and inferior. Thus, unlike the theory presented in Tronzo, DePuy's theory of equivalence was not improper. 48 The district court also erred in concluding that no reasonable jury could find the conically-shaped portion to be an equivalent to the spherically-shaped limitation because it does not do substantially the same thing. The district court's conclusion rested solely on the fact that the screw head in the Vertex® model contacts an edge of the hollow portion as opposed to pressing against a much larger area. Vertex Order, slip op. at 5. As discussed above, properly construed, the hollow spherically-shaped portion includes the edge of that portion. Because the screw head in the Vertex® model presses against an edge of a hollow conically-shaped portion argued to be an equivalent of the spherically-shaped limitation, a question of fact exists as to whether the difference in the equivalent is substantial. 49 Because DePuy's theory of equivalence is not legally insufficient, and because we find that a question of fact exists as to whether the difference between the spherically-shaped limitation and the alleged equivalent is substantial, we hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine of equivalents for the Vertex® model.