Opinion ID: 1426237
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: President Springer Violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment Rights

Text: A. Scope of First Amendment Rights for Student Media Outlets, and the Student Journalists who Produce Them, at Public Universities Courts have long recognized that student media outlets at public universities, and the student journalists who produce those outlets, are entitled to strong First Amendment protection. These rights stem from courts' recognition that such student media outlets generally operate as limited public fora, within which schools may not disfavor speech on the basis of viewpoint. A limited public forum is is created when the State `opens a non-public forum but limits the expressive activity to certain kinds of speakers or to the discussion of certain subjects.' . . . In limited public fora, the government may make reasonable, viewpoint-neutral rules governing the content of speech allowed. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 626 (2d Cir.2005) (emphasis and internal citations omitted). Once the state has created a limited public forum, however, it must respect the boundaries that it has set. It may not exclude speech where its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of its viewpoint. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). The forum itself can take many forms, yet the analysis of the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on speech made in the forum remains the same. See id. at 830, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (The [student activity fund] is a forum more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.). For over three decades, courts have acknowledged that a public university's establishment of a student media outlet typically involves the creation of a limited public forum, which means that the ability of school administrators to interfere with the speech made through such an outlet is generally strictly curtailed. [11] The Fourth Circuit, for instance, recognized the strong First Amendment rights of student journalists at public colleges in Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d 456 (4th Cir.1973). There, the president of North Carolina Central University withdrew the University's support for the Echo, a student newspaper, because of his objections to the newspaper's content. The court held that the college president's actions violated the First Amendment rights of the students who produced the college newspaper. Id. at 462. It explained that [i]t may well be that a college need not establish a campus newspaper, or, if a paper has been established, the college may permanently discontinue publication for reasons wholly unrelated to the First Amendment. But if a college has a student newspaper, its publication cannot be suppressed because college officials dislike its editorial comment. Id. at 460. The Fifth Circuit adopted a similar view in Bazaar v. Fortune, 476 F.2d 570 (5th Cir.1973). In Bazaar, officials at the University of Mississippi attempted to prevent publication and distribution of a student literary magazine because it used language that they considered to be inappropriate and in bad taste. The Fifth Circuit rejected the University's argument that the school had the same powers as a private publisher to restrict whatever content it saw fit. The court stated, once a public school makes an activity available to its students, faculty, or even the general public, it must operate the activity in accord with First Amendment principles . . . [A] state university [cannot] support a campus newspaper and then try to restrict arbitrarily what it may publish, even if only to require that material be submitted to a faculty board to determine whether it complies with `responsible freedom of the press.' Id. at 574 (quoting ACLU of Virginia v. Radford College, 315 F.Supp. 893, 896-97 (W.D.Va.1970)). The court further explained that [w]e are well beyond the belief that any manner of state regulation is permissible simply because it involves an activity which is part of the university structure and is financed with funds controlled by the administration. The state is not necessarily the unrestrained master of what it creates and fosters. Id. at 575 (citing Antonelli v. Hammond, 308 F.Supp. 1329, 1337 (D.Mass.1970)). As a result, in cases concerning school-supported publications or the use of school facilities, the courts have refused to recognize as permissible any regulations infringing free speech when not shown to be necessarily related to the maintenance of order and discipline within the educational process. Id. In light of the First Amendment rights enjoyed by student publications, the court found that the University could not restrict the distribution of the student magazine in the absence of special circumstances such as that the speech used was obscene or would prompt a violent disruption. Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit upheld the district court's determination that the University's interference with the publication and distribution of the student magazine violated the First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the strong First Amendment protections enjoyed by student media outlets at public colleges in Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975). There, the president of Atlantic University removed three editors of the student newspaper allegedly because of the newspaper's poor quality under their leadership. The University argued that, because the editors were state employees, their free speech rights could be restricted by the University if those rights were outweighed by a more significant government interest, which it identified as the university's interest in a publication which maintained high standards of grammar and literary value so as to project a proper view of the university and its student body. Id. at 260. The court resoundingly rejected this argument. It held that the right of free speech embodied in the publication of a college student newspaper cannot be controlled except under special circumstances. Id. The Fifth Circuit explained those special circumstances were limited to situations where the restrictions were necessary to maintain order and discipline within the educational process. The circumstances relied on by the University  poor grammar, spelling, and language expression  were clearly not the sort which could lead to significant disruption on the university campus or within its educational processes. Id. at 261. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's finding that the University's actions had violated the student journalists' First Amendment rights. Relying on these cases, the Eighth Circuit adopted a similar understanding of the First Amendment protections afforded college newspapers in Stanley v. Magrath, 719 F.2d 279 (8th Cir.1983). In Stanley, the Minnesota Daily, the student newspaper of the Twin Cities campuses of the University of Minnesota, published an especially controversial humor issue. In response, the University's Board of Regents changed the method by which it funded the newspaper and other student publications. Whereas student publications in the past had been funded by a mandatory student fee, the Board voted to allow students to obtain a refund of this fee if they so desired. Former editors of the Daily, the Daily itself, and the Board of Student Publication brought suit. They claimed that the Regents instituted the refundable fee system in response to the content of the humor issue and, as a result, violated the First Amendment. The Eighth Circuit agreed. In support of its holding, the court explained, [a] public university may not constitutionally take adverse action against a student newspaper, such as withdrawing or reducing the paper's funding, because it disapproves of the content of the paper. Id. at 282 (citing, inter alia, Joyner, 477 F.2d at 460). As a result, to prevail on their First Amendment claim, the plaintiffs must show that the Regents' decision was adverse and that the decision was substantially motivated by the content of the newspaper. Id. As the plaintiffs demonstrated both that the decision was adverse, in that it created a chilling effect, and that it was substantially motivated by the content of the humor issue, the court held that the Regents' actions violated the First Amendment. Id. at 283-84. The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits, therefore, have adopted the position that the establishment of a student media outlet, in essence, necessarily involves the creation of a limited public forum where the only restraint is on the speakers who can participate (i.e., students) and where there can be no restrictions on the content of the outlet except with respect to content that threatens the maintenance of order at the university. Two other circuits, while also recognizing that student media outlets often enjoy First Amendment protection from interference by school administrators, have taken a less expansive view. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits agree that the establishment of a student media outlet can create a limited public forum but have concluded that the scope of that forum can be restricted by the school. In other words, these courts do not consider the creation of a student media outlet as categorically involving the creation of a limited public forum within which students may speak on essentially any subject without fear of reprisal, but rather look to the context of the public university's treatment of a student media outlet, including its intent in creating the outlet and practices with respect to the outlet, in order to determine what First Amendment protection the outlet, and those that participate in it, receive. See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 735-36 (7th Cir.2005) (en banc); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 347 (6th Cir.2001) (en banc). [12] Nevertheless, although the treatment of forum analysis with respect to student media outlets at public universities has differed in some respects in the various circuits, all the circuits that have considered the issue have determined that, at the very least, when a public university creates or subsidizes a student newspaper and imposes no ex ante restrictions on the content that the newspaper may contain, neither the school nor its officials may interfere with the viewpoints expressed in the publication without running afoul of the First Amendment. We agree that, at a minimum, when a public university establishes a student media outlet and requires no initial restrictions on content, it may not censor, retaliate, or otherwise chill that outlet's speech, or the speech of the student journalists who produce it, on the basis of content or viewpoints expressed through that outlet. This holding is fully consistent with and, indeed, substantially follows from, our decisions, and those of the Supreme Court, in other cases addressing limited public fora. See Peck, 426 F.3d at 626; Hotel Emples. & Rest. Emples. Union, Local 100 v. City of N.Y. Dep't of Parks & Rec., 311 F.3d 534, 545 (2d Cir.2002); see also Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. Given our conclusion, we need not decide in this case which of the two approaches embraced by other circuits governs evaluations of the First Amendment protections afforded student media outlets at public colleges. Because CUNY had a policy in which it expressly placed no limits on the contents of student publications, under even the less protective contextual approach of the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, it is clear that the College Voice was a limited public forum in which there were no restrictions on the subjects that could be addressed. [13] B. Springer's Actions Violated Plaintiffs' First Amendment Rights
Under even the less protective approach for evaluating the scope of the First Amendment rights afforded student media outlets and the students journalists who work on them, it is clear that the College Voice was a limited public forum in which (subject always to the existence of a compelling state interest such as the maintenance of public order) the only permissible restriction was on the speakers who could participate. CSI, through the student government, chartered the College Voice and provided the newspaper with most of its funding through the allocation of student activity fees. The defendants agree that neither CUNY nor CSI had placed any restrictions on the subjects that could be covered in the College Voice or other student publications. Indeed, in earlier litigation before this court, CUNY expressly disclaim[ed] any right of the institution to control student publications, such as those financed through student activity fees. Leeds, 85 F.3d at 54. Accordingly, the policy and practice of CSI demonstrate that the school intended to open the pages of the College Voice to indiscriminate use by the students who serve as its contributors and editors, and that it thereby created a public forum in which the only limit involved the nature of permissible speakers. See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators ' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 47, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983). Because the College Voice operated as such a forum, CSI and its officials could not, under the First Amendment, take adverse action against the student newspaper, including engaging in conduct designed to chill the speech contained in future editions, on the basis of the views expressed in the publication unless such action served a compelling government interest. See Hotel Emples. & Rest. Emples. Union, 311 F.3d at 545. The defendants have offered no arguments that the nullification of the May 1997 election advanced any such interest, and we can conceive of no interest of sufficient import to justify President Springer's actions given the First Amendment concerns involved. See infra note 14. ii. President Springer Canceled the Spring 1997 Election Because of the Viewpoint Expressed in the May 1997 Issue of the College Voice In its May 1997 issue, the College Voice clearly sought to express a viewpoint on the Spring 1997 election. This viewpoint was reflected both in the election-related content contained in the issue and in the manner in which that content was presented. The substance of the College Voice 's election-related material made clear the newspaper's support for the positions taken by the Student Union and its belief that the candidates on that slate should be elected. In order to emphasize the strength of its view that the student body should elect candidates who supported running CSI in the manner advocated by the Student Union, the College Voice devoted almost its entire front cover and its complete back cover to promoting the election of candidates running on that slate, and included in the May 1997 issue the slate's platform statement as well as various exhortations urging the slate's election. Remarks and testimony made by President Springer reveal that it was the College Voice 's viewpoint on the election  expressed in both the substance of its content and in the manner in which that content was presented  that led her to nullify the election. First, in announcing her decision, Springer noted the aspects of the May 1997 issue of the College Voice that caused her to nullify the initial Spring 1997 election included its cover [that] boldly encourage[ed] a vote for a particular slate of candidates and her assessment that much of the issue was devoted to supporting an endorsed slate of candidates. President Springer's testimony also shows that she nullified the election because of the viewpoint expressed by the College Voice. The following exchange occurred during President Springer's deposition: Q: Is it your opinion that the College Voice has an obligation to present both sides of an issue? A: Not any issue. Certainly they have a right to their opinion on issues, but as far as student elections is concerned, yes. Q: Could you be very specific . . . I don't . . . want to mischaracterize your testimony. Are you saying that the College Voice is required to have a balanced coverage of student elections? A: Yes. Q: Okay. Could you describe what is your understanding of balanced? A: Presenting both slates. Q: When you say presenting both slates, could the College Voice favor one slate over the other and say so in writing? Could they publish that? A: It depends on whether it was a small statement in an editorial or whether it was part of their whole issue. Q: So, is it your testimony then that the College Voice could appropriately endorse candidates if it was done in appropriate context? A: Yes. If the candidates were fairly presented on both sides of the slate. If it were a one-piece campaign literature, then no. Q: So, you're saying one of your requirements . . . for fairness in coverage is to present both sides; is that correct? A: If  yes, and honestly. Q: . . . [Y]ou also said . . . there would be some differences as to how prominently the College Voice voiced its opinion. Is that a fair characterization of your testimony? A: It could well be, yes. . . . Q: . . . Is the decision to publish an opinion on the front page with a big headline as opposed to on a back  on page 10 with a small headline, is that decision fundamentally reflecting an opinion about how important the story is? A: I think in journalist practices it would be in that sense. But is it the editor's right to do that under these particular situations where we have regulations governing the campaign literature, no. This exchange shows that President Springer's nullification of the election due to the May 1997 issue of the College Voice was premised on two types of viewpoint discrimination relating to the subject of student elections. First, Springer's action was driven by her belief that only one perspective was acceptable for speech on student elections in a student newspaper  a viewpoint that reflected a balanced view of the candidates  and that contrary views  including that certain candidates should be elected  were inappropriate. Second, Springer's testimony reveals that her nullification of the initial election was premised on her belief that the College Voice 's view as to the importance of electing the Student Union slate, as reflected in the presentation of the content promoting those candidates, was improper and should be excluded from the limited public forum of the student newspaper. That the views on the student election, expressed through the substance and presentation of the content in the May 1997 issue, led to Springer's conduct is further supported by comments made by a CUNY associate general counsel during the preliminary injunction hearing before the magistrate judge. There, the CUNY attorney stated, I think if this happened again in . . . the April 2000 elections and this identical issue came out, something [looking] like this and a student appealed, I think the Court should have a reasonable expectation the same thing would happen. The election results would be voided. The CUNY attorney further told the magistrate judge that one way the College Voice could avoid such retaliation against its speech in the future would be to submit its content to the SERC for pre-publication review. Such viewpoint discrimination is clearly impermissible in a limited public forum open to unrestricted speech on campaigns, candidates, and issues affecting CUNY. Indeed, as the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly emphasized, once a state institution opens a limited forum to speech on a particular topic, it may not act against a speaker in that forum on the basis of views they express on that topic. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510 (finding that the state may not exercis[e] viewpoint discrimination, even when the limited public forum is one of its own creation and noting that viewpoint discrimination . . . is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations); see also Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07, 121 S.Ct. 2093; Peck, 426 F.3d at 626; Hotel Emples. & Rest. Emples. Union, 311 F.3d at 545. Yet, that is exactly what happened here: the College Voice was a limited public forum open to speech related to the Spring 1997 election and to which candidates should be elected, the College Voice expressed views on those subjects in its May 1997 issue, and Springer, by canceling the election, engaged in adverse action because of the views the newspaper offered. [14] iii. The Defendants' Arguments For Why President Springer's Actions Did Not Violate the First Amendment Are Unavailing a. The Nullification of the Election Created a Chilling Effect and Thus Violated the First Amendment Defendants assert that any harm the plaintiffs may have suffered as a result of the nullification of the election does not rise to the level of cognizable constitutional injury. This argument is entirely without merit. When a state university official takes retaliatory action against a newspaper for publishing certain content in an effort to force the newspaper to refrain from publishing that or similar content in the future, the official's action creates a chilling effect which gives rise to a First Amendment injury. See Stanley, 719 F.2d at 283. Here, the record establishes that Springer's nullification of the election created just such a chilling effect. As the district court explained, there was a concrete action taken in nullifying a student election because of a publication supportive of a particular slate of candidates which won the election. The threat or chill that plaintiffs assert they felt regarding future issues of the newspapers is not merely subjective, but has already been experienced. In the wake of President Springer's actions in Spring 1997, the College Voice scaled back its coverage of elections and reduced the prominence and extent of its candidate endorsements in an effort to avoid provoking another election nullification. Accordingly, although Springer's actions did not entail impoundment of the May 1997 issue, the denial of funding, or the express prohibition of election coverage, her conduct nevertheless violated the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights as a result of the chill on student speech that it created. See Zieper v. Metzinger, 474 F.3d 60, 65 (2d Cir.2007) (It is well-established that First Amendment rights may be violated by the chilling effect of governmental action that falls short of a direct prohibition against speech. (internal quotation marks omitted)). b. The May 1997 Issue Did Not Constitute Candidate Speech Nor Did Its Content Violate Applicable Election Rules The defendants contend, however, that the front and back covers of the May 1997 issue of the College Voice, as well as the candidate position statements included in the inside of the issue, did not constitute the newspaper's speech, but rather was the speech of the candidates themselves. The defendants argue that President Springer nullified the election because of this method of candidate speech, which, they assert, violated the governing election rules by essentially creating 5,000 flyers for the Student Union candidates. This claim is unconvincing. First, as the defendants concede, the College Voice was entitled to endorse candidates in the May 1997 student government elections. They further concede that there were no prohibitions against candidates also serving as editors or staffers on the College Voice or against such candidates endorsing themselves. As a result, it cannot be that the newspaper's endorsement of candidates who were also members of its staff converted those endorsements from newspaper speech to candidate speech. Furthermore, the record in this case reflects that the College Voice editors who chose (1) what election-related content to include in the May 1997 issue, (2) which, if any, candidates to endorse, and (3) how to lay out the election-related content in that issue were not running in the election. In other words, the choice to speak in the way challenged by the defendants was not made by any of the candidates. Alternatively, in making this argument, the defendants may be asserting that content such as platform statements, slogans, and exhortations to vote for candidates is necessarily candidate speech, even if technically selected for inclusion in a publication by non-candidates. This position seems premised on an improperly narrow view  in light of the nature of the forum at issue  of what speech is encompassed in media coverage of an election. Moreover, it appears to stem from an impoverished understanding of the different types of media outlets that cover an election or politics, and the nature of content inherent in those outlets: In addition to outlets that offer balanced coverage, there are those that adopt a specific point of view and that  throughout the publication (i.e., not just on the editorial page)  provide content urging readers to embrace that view. To take national media outlets as examples, in addition to USA Today, which describes itself as offering the type of balanced views of an election that President Springer evidently favors, there are partisan media organizations, such as the Nation and the Weekly Standard, which regularly aggressively endorse their chosen candidates, parties, and ideas, and demonstrate their endorsements by, inter alia, reprinting that party's platform or putting a candidate's picture on the cover and urging readers to vote for him or her. These various news organizations all offer different perspectives, or views, on an election, but the latter's coverage is no more candidate speech than the former's. In other words, the fact that a news outlet adopts and zealously promotes the views of the candidates or party it supports and aggressively urges the election of those candidates, or the fact that such speech, unsurprisingly, would tend to benefit those candidates, does not transform the media outlet's speech into candidate speech. In any event, the College Voice 's publication of the election-related content in the May 1997 issue did not violate any germane election rules. The two rules that the defendants assert justified President Springer's actions are Elections Rules 2 and 5. Rule 2 provided: The campus newspaper may not be used as posters on walls, bulletin boards, etc. and may not be used as a means to distribute campaign flyers. Rule 5 stated: The Student Government will be glad to make you 30 copies of your stamped and approved poster or flyer. All candidates must remove their election materials from the designated areas after the election is over. As the district court clearly and correctly explained, neither of these rules precluded the College Voice from publishing the election-related content in its May 1997 issue. We cannot do better than to restate that court's discussion: The only Rules that President Springer relied on and that defendants say are relevant, Election Rules 2 and 5, define the responsibility of the individual student candidates, not the scope of the content of the college newspapers. . . . The Rules do not, explicitly or even implicitly, preclude campus newspapers from endorsing candidates or running platform statements. There is nothing in the rules concerning balanced coverage, the context of editorials, or the placement of headlines or platform statements. Indeed, implicit in Rule 2's requirement that candidates should not use the newspapers as posters is the acknowledgment that the papers may contain favorable opinions and support for a candidate that he or she would want to post on a bulletin board. That Rule 5 provides that the student government will print and pay for 30 posters or flyers imposes no restriction on the number of issues of the school newspaper which may contain an endorsement. There are simply no written guidelines to establish that what was printed in the May 1997 issue of the College Voice was prohibited. (second emphasis added). We agree entirely with the district court's reading of the rules and therefore reject defendants' arguments that Springer's actions were no more than the content-neutral enforcement of the election regulations adopted by the SERC. c. President Springer's Actions Cannot Be Justified as Necessary to Ensure Viewpoint Neutrality in the Administration CSI's Student Activity Fees Fund The defendants further argue that President Springer's actions were justified by her duty to address[ ] the potential First Amendment violation arising from the use of the mandatory Student Activity Fee to favor the viewpoint of the candidate Plaintiffs over that of other candidates. This argument misapprehends how viewpoint neutrality requirements apply to mandatory student activity fees. The defendants are correct that when a state college implements a mandatory student activity fee, its procedure for allocating the funds that fee generates must be viewpoint neutral. This is totally different from, and in no way means, that the college has a duty to ensure that the positions expressed by the recipients of the fees reflect a balance of viewpoints. Far from it; as long as the availability of the funds to student groups is not restricted based on their viewpoint, the college's administration of a mandatory student activity fee complies with the neutrality requirement demanded by the First Amendment. See Board of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 232-33, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000) (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 841, 115 S.Ct. 2510). Here, the fact that the College Voice expressed a particular viewpoint did not create a First Amendment concern relating to viewpoint neutrality with respect to CSI's administration of the student activity fee funds. No one disputes that the CSI student activity fee funds were distributed based on viewpoint-neutral criteria. Nor does any party dispute that the candidates on the rival slate, SFS, could have founded a newspaper that promoted their views and received student activity fee funds for it. (Indeed, the other campus newspaper at CSI, which also received student activity fee funds, was created by students who objected to the viewpoints espoused by the College Voice. ) The fact that the supporters or candidates of the rival slate did not seek a student-activity-fee-supported media outlet of their own in no way means that the College Voice 's use of the student activity fee funds to express its views gave rise to a viewpoint neutrality issue regarding CSI's administration of the student activity fee fund. No one has here suggested any violations of the requirement that the student activity fee fund be administered in a viewpoint neutral manner. As a result, there was no abuse for President Springer to correct. Rather, far from remedying a (non-existent) viewpoint neutrality problem, President Springer's actions created (a very real) one.