Opinion ID: 783938
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The First Action as a source of subject matter jurisdiction

Text: 34 Cello argues that the district court lacked jurisdiction because [t]he only jurisdictional nexus ... presented on the face of Storey's complaint ... stems solely from the First Action. Cf. Rivet v. Regions Bank of Louisiana, 522 U.S. 470, 478, 118 S.Ct. 921, 139 L.Ed.2d 912 (1998) (holding that claim preclusion by reasons of a prior federal judgment is a defensive plea that provides no basis for removal or federal subject matter jurisdiction under the well-pleaded complaint rule); Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349, 355, 116 S.Ct. 862, 133 L.Ed.2d 817 (1996) ([C]laims alleged to be factually interdependent with and, hence, ancillary to claims brought in an earlier federal lawsuit will not support federal jurisdiction over a subsequent lawsuit.). While we do not take issue with this general principle, Cello's argument is meritless because Storey's complaint is premised on his federal right to bring a cause of action under 15 U.S.C. § 1114(2)(D)(v), which expressly provides: A domain name registrant whose domain name has been suspended, disabled, or transferred ... may ... file a civil action to establish that the registration or use of the domain name by such registrant is not unlawful under this Act. Storey's complaint thus has its own, independent basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 35