Opinion ID: 3039916
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Whether consultation is required

Text: Section 7(a)(2) of the ESA states: Each Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency (hereinafter in this section referred to as an “agency action”) is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat of such species. . . 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). To support its position that the continuing operation of the project by PG&E is an agency “action” within the meaning of the statute, petitioners point to the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978). There, a project that had been approved repeatedly by Congress was required by the terms of the ESA to remain inoperative. Id. at 172. This was because, if the project became operational, it would result in the destruction of the habitat of a newly discovered, but endangered species of snail darter. Id. at 171-74. The agency was ordered not to take action to operate the dam. Id. at 195. In that case, the dam had not yet begun to operate and the contemplated government action at issue was its start up. Id. at 171. Here PG&E has been operating the DeSabla- Centerville project for more than 20 years. The question is thus whether such ongoing operations are similarly subject to the ESA. The answer requires an examination of the structure of the Act. 19360 CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING v. FERC Congress could have provided that once a species is listed as threatened or endangered under the ESA, federal agencies must consult with expert agencies like NMFS about the impact of all ongoing operations, including those carried out pursuant to licenses. This is how the petitioners ask us to interpret the ESA. Congress did not so provide, however. [4] The statute requires federal agencies to consult with NMFS or another expert agency in connection with federal agency action in order to “insure that any action . . . is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence” of threatened species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). The statute looks to the future effect of contemplated actions by the agency. The triggering mechanism for consultation is an agency action, not the listing of a species. Because the focus is on the future effect of the agency’s action, the statute requires the government to insure that an action “is not likely to” jeopardize an endangered species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). Again, the phrase “likely to” does not refer to present effects but to the future. The regulations reinforce this purpose by requiring the agency to “review its actions at the earliest possible time.” 50 C.F.R. § 402.14(a). [5] The leading Supreme Court authority is in accord. In Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, the Supreme Court looked to the action about to be taken by the agency to operate the dam. 437 U.S. at 171. The Court held that because such action would jeopardize the habitat of the endangered snail darter, the agency could not begin operating the dam. Id. at 173-74. The Court thus focused on the potential effect of the government’s contemplated action. The point was made more succinctly in the later case of Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. at 158, where the Court said an agency must engage in formal consultation “[i]f an agency determines that action it proposes to take may adversely affect a listed species.” The petitioners, nevertheless, contend that PG&E’s operation of this project constitutes ongoing agency action that can CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING v. FERC 19361 trigger a requirement for consultation with the expert agencies. They rely on our decision in Turtle Island Restoration Network v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 340 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2003). The case is instructive, but does not support petitioners here. [6] Turtle Island involved an ongoing government program to issue permits for fishing that could cause collateral damage to sea turtles and other endangered species, affecting their survival. Id. at 971. We held that once a species was listed as endangered under the ESA, the agency was required to take into account the potential effect on the species before issuing future fishing permits. Id. at 977. It is significant for purposes of this case that permits issued in the past were not affected. Id. In Turtle Island, we distinguished our decisions in Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995) and Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr. v. Simpson Timber Co., 255 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2001) on the grounds that in those cases, the relevant agency activity had been completed. Turtle Island, 340 F.3d at 97677. In Sierra Club the agency had already granted a right of way through forest land to a logging company. Sierra Club, 65 F.3d at 1505. Thus consultation for road-building by the logging company was not required. Id. at 1509. In Simpson Timber, consultation was not required because the agency had already issued an incidental take permit to a logging contractor. Simpson Timber, 255 F.3d at 1079. [7] Here, as in both Simpson Timber and Sierra Club the agency action of granting a permit is complete. The ongoing activity is that of PG&E operating pursuant to the permit. Plaintiffs in this case are not challenging an ongoing program of issuing new permits that underlay our decision in Turtle Island. [8] Even more recently, in W. Watersheds, 456 F.3d at 930, the plaintiffs challenged the agency’s failure to consult on 19362 CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING v. FERC whether the agency should regulate certain rights-of-way used by private parties to divert water. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ challenge, we explained that “Ninth Circuit cases have emphasized that section 7(a)(2) consultation stems only from ‘affirmative actions’ ” of an agency. Id. We held that because private parties, and not the government, were diverting the water, there was no agency action triggering a duty to consult. Id. at 931. [9] This case is materially the same. PG&E, a private party, operates the hydroelectric project challenged in this case. FERC, the agency, has proposed no affirmative act that would trigger the consultation requirement for current operations. The petitioners also rely on Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir. 1994), but it does not support their argument either. Pacific Rivers involved certain Land and Resource Management Plans (“LRMPs”) governing thousands of different projects in two national forests. Id. at 1052. After the Forest Service adopted the LRMPs, the Chinook was listed as a threatened species. Id. We held that the Forest Service had to initiate formal consultation on the LRMPs because they affected each future project planned in the forests. Id. at 1053. We observed that “every individual project planned in both national forests . . . is implemented according to the LRMPs.” Id. Because they continued to apply to new projects, we concluded that “the LRMPs have an ongoing and long-lasting effect even after adoption,” and represented “ongoing agency action.” Id. Unlike Pacific Rivers, this case involves no such longlasting effects on new permits. The action was concluded in 1980 when FERC issued the license to PG&E. [10] The regulations promulgated pursuant to the ESA make it clear that the operation of a project pursuant to a permit is not a federal agency action. The regulations expressly define the term “action” to include the granting of licenses CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING v. FERC 19363 and permits. The definitional regulation provides in relevant part that “action” means: (a) actions intended to conserve listed species or their habitat; (b) the promulgation of regulations; (c) the granting of licenses, contracts, leases, easements, rights-of-way, permits or grants-in-aid; or (d) actions directly or indirectly causing modifications to the land, water, or air. 50 C.F.R. § 402.02 (emphasis added). [11] Thus the granting of the license to PG&E in 1980 was a federal agency action. See W. Watersheds, 456 F.3d at 931. However, the continued operation of the project by PG&E in 1999, when the Chinook Salmon was declared threatened, is not a federal agency action. Finally, Petitioners point to 50 C.F.R. § 402.03, which provides that Section 7’s requirements apply to all actions in which there is “discretionary Federal involvement or control.” Petitioners contend that the reopener provisions, contained within Articles 15 and 37 of the license, create such discretionary federal control within the meaning of the regulation. [12] Article 37 gives FERC the discretionary authority to require changes in the operation of the project, after notice and hearing. Article 15 requires the Licensee to make such modifications as may be ordered after FERC exercises such discretion. Thus, the reopener provisions do no more than give the agency discretion to decide whether to exercise discretion, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. The reopener provisions in and of themselves are not sufficient to 19364 CALIFORNIA SPORTFISHING v. FERC constitute any discretionary agency “involvement or control” that might mandate consultation by FERC.