Opinion ID: 2519714
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Utah Caselaw

Text: ¶ 26 In considering whether a special relationship existed between the District and the student, the majority focuses only on the question of whether the school had custody over the child at the time of the injury. The majority takes this approach primarily from the comments to the Restatement (Second) of Torts and New York case law. This rigid inquiry, however, is contrary to the approach we have taken in the past when considering whether a special relationship exists. In Higgins, we reiterated the rule: [U]nlike the Restatement writers, we do not attempt in our duty analysis to rigorously maintain the artificial categorization that differentiates between cases based on whether the actor owes the duty to the victim or to the victimizer, ... nor do we apply the Restatement's precise formulation uncritically. Instead, we have taken a policy-based approach in determining whether a special relation should be said to exist and consequently whether a duty is owed. Higgins v. Salt Lake County, 855 P.2d 231, 236-37 (Utah 1993); see also Wilson v. Valley Mental Health, 969 P.2d 416, 419 (Utah 1998); Rollins v. Petersen, 813 P.2d 1156, 1161-62 (Utah 1991); Ferree v. State, 784 P.2d 149, 151-52 (Utah 1989); Beach v. Univ. of Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 418 (Utah 1986). The policy approach, we noted, is more realistic than that which would result from a broad reading of the Restatement, especially when one considers the fact that at bottom, the issue is one of negligencea lack of reasonable care. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237. A consideration of policy factors is necessary to a fair evaluation of tort duties: It is meaningless to speak of special relationships and duties in the abstract. These terms are only labels which the legal system applies to defined situations to indicate that certain rights and obligations flow from them; they are an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that a particular plaintiff is entitled to protection. Beach, 726 P.2d at 418 (quoting William Prosser, Law of Torts 333 (3d ed.1964)). Thus, in Higgins and its predecessors we abandoned the mechanistic relational models of the Restatement and based our analysis on careful consideration of the consequences of imposing that duty for the parties and for society. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237; see also Beach, 726 P.2d at 418. ¶ 27 In considering whether a special relationship exists, we have weighed a number of factors, including: (1) the foreseeability of the harm, see Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419-20; Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162; Beach, 726 P.2d at 416-17; (2) the relationship between the parties, see Gilger v. Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, ¶¶ 15 & 18, 997 P.2d 305; Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419; Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237; Beach, 726 P.2d at 415-16 & 418; and (3) the ease with which the defendant could have fulfilled the duty, see Gilger, 2000 UT 23 at ¶ 17, 997 P.2d 305; Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419; Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237; Beach, 726 P.2d at 418. Our sister states have considered a similar range of factors when determining whether a special relationship exists. California and Idaho, for example, weigh the following factors: The foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved. Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995) (quoting Isaacs v. Huntington Mem'l Hosp., 38 Cal.3d 112, 211 Cal.Rptr. 356, 695 P.2d 653, 658 (1985) (citations omitted)). ¶ 28 A consideration of these factors, with particular emphasis on the factors that we have found determinative in the past, leads to the conclusion that a special relationship existed here. First, the court should look to the foreseeability of the harm under the circumstances of the case. We have stated that we will find a special relationship and consequent duty when a defendant knew of the likely danger to an individual or distinct group of individuals or when a defendant should have known of such danger. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 240; see also Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419-20; Rollins, 813 P.2d at 1162; Beach, 726 P.2d at 416-17. Foreseeability is necessarily a flexible concept: Where the degree of result or harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where the threatened injury is minor but the burden of preventing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability may be required. Rife, 908 P.2d at 148-49 (quoting Sharp v. W.H. Moore, 118 Idaho 297, 796 P.2d 506, 509-10 (1990)). In this case, the risk of harm was great, as it is any time young children are compelled to cross busy streets. The burden of prevention, by contrast, was very low. The danger could have been avoided by a phone call. The District was required only to report the dangerous crosswalk and the need for a crossing guard to the city. The circumstances of this case extend well beyond the low degree of foreseeability required to find a special relationship. The District had every reason to know of the danger: the dangerous condition was adjacent to the school; parents had reported concerns about the crosswalk to the school; and the District itself scheduled the conference for a time when a crossing guard was not scheduled to be at the intersection. That a child could be seriously injured on the way to the conference was, therefore, quite foreseeable. ¶ 29 A second factor worthy of consideration is the underlying relationship between the parties. We have stated that [t]he essence of a special relationship is dependence by one party upon the other or mutual dependence between the parties. Beach, 726 P.2d at 415-16; see also Gilger, 2000 UT 23 at ¶¶ 15 & 18, 997 P.2d 305. On the other hand, [w]e are loath to recognize a duty that is ... fundamentally at odds with the nature of the parties' relationship. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237; see also Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419; Beach, 726 P.2d at 418. The majority embraces the concept that the school has a custodial relationship with its students while the students are within the charge of the school. The majority, however, applies this concept rigidly, presuming that once a child steps beyond the schoolhouse gates the school relinquishes all responsibility for the child and fully transfers custody to the parents. Such a rule misapprehends the relationship between schools, parents, and students. The custodial relationship of the school and the parents over the child must properly be viewed as overlapping. The school's responsibility should be commensurate with its awareness of the danger, its ability to control the condition, and the degree to which parents reasonably rely upon the school to provide safety precautions. Here, it was the District that scheduled the conference for a time when no crossing guard would be at the intersection, the District that made attendance at the conference mandatory for children, the District that had been warned of the dangerous conditions, and the District that chose inaction by failing either to warn parents or remedy the situation. It is only natural that parents would rely upon the Districtthe entity that scheduled, ran, and required attendance at the conference to ensure that the same safety precautions would be taken at night as were taken during the day. This dependence of the parents and children upon the District, in addition to the school's control over the circumstances, makes the special relationship between the parties quite clear. ¶ 30 A third factor to consider is the burden that such a duty would place upon the defendant. We have refused to find a special relationship if by doing so the defendant in question would be unable to perform the duty without either radically changing its character or drastically circumscribing the function it was charged with performing. Higgins, 855 P.2d at 237; see also Gilger, 2000 UT 23 at ¶ 17, 997 P.2d 305; Wilson, 969 P.2d at 419; Beach, 726 P.2d at 418. In this case, the burden such a duty would place upon the District is quite minimal and fits squarely within the character and function of the school's other duties. I would hold that the school only has a duty to report the dangerous conditions to the proper authority where the danger is contiguous to the school property and threatens an important pathway to the school. [1] Placing the duty to report upon the school fits within the school's typical responsibilities, including ensuring safety of arriving children during class hours. Indeed, as the entity that schedules school activities, the school is in a better position than any other person or entity to report such a problem to the city. Surely, the duty to make a phone call is not burdensome. ¶ 31 Finally, it is worth considering the overarching policy of preventing future harm. The majority states that while the District had no duty to report the danger, it would be salutary for the District to assist the city in maintaining safe streets. Where the lives of children are at stake, I find it inadequate to describe the District's duty as merely salutary. It would be unrealistic to expect that the city could independently remain aware of all potentially dangerous conditions adjacent to school property and the intricate schedules of various schools. If the District has no duty to inform the city of dangers and the need for a crossing guard after hours, there is little hope that accidents such as this will be prevented.