Opinion ID: 40551
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ella Jones

Text: O’Brien contends this court should grant a COA because reasonable jurists could debate that counsel’s failure to call his mother, Ella Jones, to testify on his behalf did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. Ms. Jones submitted statements to the state habeas court and federal 3 The petitioner also indicates that although counsel investigated O’Brien’s mental health, the investigation was not conducted in a timely fashion. However, the record shows that the mental health evaluations and reports were completed prior to the commencement of O’Brien’s trial. In addition, counsel conferred with the mental health experts who expressed opinions that counsel deemed detrimental to O’Brien. 15 district court,4 expressing concern that she was not given the opportunity to speak on her son’s behalf or say anything to contradict the other witnesses. In her statements, Ms. Jones explains that her son had experienced some difficulties in school as a result of alleged sexual advances by a male teacher. She describes her son as a young man headed in a positive direction. However, the record reveals that counsel spoke with Ms. Jones and made a strategic decision not to call her as a witness. During Ms. Jones’s interview with counsel, Ms. Jones stated: she had attempted to take O’Brien to counseling, but that he wouldn’t attend faithfully; she was not surprised that the incidents leading up to O’Brien’s prosecution had occurred; and she had warned O’Brien on numerous occasions about his conduct and the people with whom he was associating. In addition, O’Brien told his counsel that he did not want his mother to testify because he did not want to subject her to cross-examination and other harassment by the prosecution. “[S]trategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually unchallengeable.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-91. Further, “in evaluating strategic choices of trial counsel, we must give great deference to choices which are made 4 With respect to Ms. Jones’ affidavits, we only consider the factual allegations that were presented to the state habeas court. See Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 745-46 (5th Cir. 2000). 16 under the explicit direction of the client.” U.S. v. Masat, 896 F.2d 88, 92 (5th Cir. 1990). The state habeas court found counsel’s explanation as to why counsel did not call Ms. Jones to testify credible. State court findings of fact are presumed to be correct, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 947-48 (5th Cir. 2001); see also Pondexter v. Dretke, 346 F.3d 142, 149 (5th Cir. 2003). Consequently, the district court agreed with the state habeas court: counsel made a professional judgment that Ms. Jones would not be a favorable witness. The district court explained that “[w]hile hindsight might suggest that counsel should have called [Ms.] Jones, the tactic was not so ill chosen that it permeated the entire trial with obvious unfairness.” O’Brien v. Dretke, No. H-02-1865, slip op. at 13 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 14, 2005)(internal quotations omitted). Reasonable jurists would not find this debatable.