Opinion ID: 2337399
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Legality of the Council's Action

Text: A proper understanding of plaintiffs' charge in this regard must be based on the following chronological sequence of events. On or about March 3, 1967, the petition for an amendment of the zoning ordinance was filed with the town clerk. Notice of the pendency of the petition was duly given in accordance with the law then in effect. On April 3, 1967 a hearing was held. The plaintiffs appeared before the council and registered their objections to the grant of the petition. The council took the entire matter under advisement and on August 1, 1967, the ordinance was amended. Earlier, however, on May 26, 1967, P.L. 1967, chap. 173, became the law. Section 2 of this statute provides in effect that no specific change in a zoning map shall be made unless written notice of the time and place of hearing on the proposed change shall be given by registered or certified mail to all owners of real property located within a 200-foot perimeter of the subject property. The plaintiffs now contend that the council, having failed to comply with the notice provision of chap. 173, has acted in excess of its jurisdiction and its action thus is of no consequence. While it is true as plaintiffs point out that this court in R.I. Home Builders, Inc. v. Budlong Rose Company, 77 R.I. 147, 74 A.2d 237, held that a local municipal council's failure to give proper notice of a hearing would vitiate its legislative function, this case is inapposite here. It is unquestioned that when the council held its April hearing on Consolidated's petition, notice thereof had been duly given pursuant to the then pertinent statutory provisions. At that time, notice of a hearing on a petition to amend a zoning ordinance was required to be advertised in a newspaper having general circulation in the town at least once a week for three successive weeks prior to the date scheduled for the hearing. This was done in the instant case. What plaintiffs seek is a retroactive application of the 1967 act which specifically states that it will take effect upon its passage. In our opinion the statute is prospective in operation and applies only to hearings held after its effective date. We can find nothing in the new statute which discloses that the legislature intended that this statute operate retroactively. See Langdeau v. Narragansett Ins. Co., 96 R.I. 276, 191 A.2d 28. Therefore the provisions of chap. 173 are no help to the plaintiffs.