Opinion ID: 2648789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: analysis

Text: Craig asserts that the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the circuit court’s rulings on his motions to strike because, under its interpretation, mere employment as a teacher when a minor attends school establishes the relationship necessary for conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1(A). We disagree. A motion to strike challenges whether the evidence is sufficient to submit the 4 case to the jury. What the elements of the offense are is a question of law that we review de novo. Whether the evidence adduced is sufficient to prove each of those elements is a factual finding, which will not be set aside on appeal unless it is plainly wrong. In reviewing that factual finding, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. After so viewing the evidence, the question is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In sum, if there is evidence to support the conviction, the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its judgment, even if its view of the evidence might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 285 Va. 187, 223-24, 738 S.E.2d 847, 868, cert. denied ___ U.S. ___, 134 S. Ct. 427 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Code § 18.2-370.1(A) provides that “[a]ny person 18 years of age or older who, except as provided in § 18.2-370, maintains a custodial or supervisory relationship over a child under the age of 18 and is not legally married to such child and such child is not emancipated who, with lascivious intent, knowingly and intentionally” engages in certain proscribed acts “shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony.” The purpose of the statute “is to protect minors from adults who might exploit certain types of relationships.” Sadler v. Commonwealth, 276 5 Va. 762, 765, 667 S.E.2d 783, 785 (2008). The key question in determining whether a given relationship falls within the statute is whether the defendant “had the responsibility for and control of the [child’s] safety and well-being.” Krampen v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 163, 168, 510 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1999); see also Guda v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 453, 459-60, 592 S.E.2d 748, 750-51 (2004) (rejecting the argument that the child must be specifically entrusted to the defendant’s care through explicit parental delegation of responsibility). As a general rule, primary and secondary school administrators and teachers meet this criterion. We have held that school administrators have a responsibility “to supervise and ensure that students could have an education in an atmosphere conducive to learning, free of disruption, and threat to person.” Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 671, 727 S.E.2d 634, 643 (2012) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). They have “a duty to supervise and care for” all students who are on school premises or engaged in school activities. 2 Id. This responsibility extends to those to whom 2 The vast majority of primary and secondary school students are minors. In Commonwealth v. Peterson, 286 Va. 349, 357, 749 S.E.2d 307, 311 (2013), we assumed without deciding that a similar responsibility existed at post-secondary educational institutions, where many students are adults. Thus, the question in that case was not whether the responsibility existed but whether the institution had a 6 administrators assign it within the scope of the assignment, even those who are not teachers and have no students. 3 When an administrator assigns this responsibility to a teacher in addition to the teacher’s classroom duties, it encompasses students not enrolled in the teacher’s classes. The evidence established that Craig was assigned responsibility for student safety and supervision in the cafeteria one day each week and on the sidewalk before, after, and between classes each day. This assignment was beyond the scope of his regular classroom duties and encompassed students not enrolled in his classes. He therefore had the relationship required by the statute with respect to A.G. even though she was not his student. However, Code § 18.2-370.1(A) also requires that the acts proscribed by the statute occur while the defendant “maintains” the required relationship. The proscribed acts in this case did not occur on school premises or during any school activity. Accordingly, Craig’s mere status as a teacher is insufficient specific duty to warn students about the potential for injury arising from the criminal acts of a third party. Id. 3 For example, in Guda, the defendant was a school security officer and assistant football coach and the victim was 15year-old female tenth grader. The defendant encountered the victim in the hall during class. The victim asked the defendant for a hall pass and he directed her to his office in the boy’s locker room, where he assaulted her. 42 Va. App. at 455-56, 592 S.E.2d at 749. 7 to warrant conviction. Conversely, the facts that the proscribed acts occurred at his home and were unrelated to any school activity are insufficient by themselves to warrant acquittal. In Sadler, we considered the case of a softball coach convicted of molesting a minor female on his team. Ten days after a team fundraiser and three days before a softball tournament, the defendant visited the victim at her home, where he kissed her and rubbed her buttocks. He also showed her the team’s new uniforms. 276 Va. at 764, 667 S.E.2d at 784. On appeal, the defendant argued that he was not acting in his capacity as a coach during the visit and that the conduct therefore did not occur in the context of the relationship required for conviction under Code § 18.2-370.1(A). Id. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 784. We rejected that argument, holding that a defendant may maintain the required relationship even when the proscribed acts occur outside the context giving rise to it. We concluded that “[w]hether such a relationship exists at the time of the offending conduct is a matter of fact to be determined on a case by case basis.” Id. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 785. That is the rule to be applied here. Although the acts occurred at Craig’s home outside school hours and during the winter recess, school was due to resume in a few weeks and he 8 and A.G. would again see each other there on a daily basis as he performed assigned administrative duties. These facts are materially indistinguishable from those in Sadler. There, the proscribed acts took place at the victim’s home. The required relationship existed several days before (during the team fundraiser) and several days after (during the softball tournament). While the required relationship may have been abeyant in the interstice, it did not cease to exist. Rather, it continued, with a known past and an expected, imminent future. See id. at 765-66, 667 S.E.2d at 785. Moreover, A.G. testified that when she went back to school in January, Craig lay in wait for her and pursued her as she went to class: He was waiting on the inside of the building. It was very close to the bell being rung, so it was weird; he would only be outside. . . . I saw every other girl walk past him and he didn’t say a word to them, so I knew he was waiting for me to come. . . . . I kept walking and I could see his reflection in the glass door coming after me. . . . . He said, “That was the best night I ever had, and I hope you come over again.” This testimony establishes that Craig renewed his advances at school, where the relationship required by the statute 9 undoubtedly existed. The jury could reasonably infer from Craig's conduct that his relationship with A.G. was the same whether they were on or off school grounds, and whether school was in or out of session. Moreover, he chose to initiate predatory contact at school, where he held a position of authority and where A.G. was a captive audience, unable to resist or avoid contact with him. This is precisely the type of exploitation the General Assembly enacted the statute to deter. Sadler, 276 Va. at 765, 667 S.E.2d at 785. Accordingly, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the proscribed acts occurred while Craig “maintain[ed] a custodial or supervisory relationship” for the purposes of Code § 18.2- 370.1(A).
1. THE COMMONWEALTH’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS The Commonwealth proposed four contested jury instructions that were given to the jury by the circuit court. The first stated, “A custodial relationship arises when the supervising adult exercises care and control over the child, with the care including the responsibility for and control of the child’s safety and well being.” The second stated, “The term ‘custody’ is not limited to legal custody. It can include those standing in loco parentis such as teachers or babysitters who may have 10 temporary custody of children.” The third stated, “One may become a person ‘responsible for the care of a child’ by a voluntary course of conduct and without explicit parental delegation of supervisory responsibility or court order.” The fourth stated, the “[o]ffense of taking indecent liberties with a minor does not require proof of a direct nexus of any type between the custodial or supervisory relationship and the defendant’s wrongful conduct.” In his appeal to the Court of Appeals, Craig asserted that these proposed jury instructions were incorrect statements of the law. We focus initially on the first three proposed jury instructions. The Court of Appeals ruled that only Angela objected to them and therefore Craig failed to preserve his argument for appeal under Rule 5A:18. Craig asserts that the Court of Appeals erred because the circuit court understood the joint nature of the defense, and therefore Angela’s objections should be imputed to Craig even though he did not expressly join them. He also argues that the purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to ensure that the circuit court has an opportunity to rule on the argument before it is submitted to the appellate court as ground for error. He contends Angela’s objection was sufficient to fulfill this purpose. According to him, the question is whether the circuit 11 court had an opportunity to rule on the issue, not who raised it. We disagree. We review interpretations of the Rules of this Court de novo. LaCava v. Commonwealth, 283 Va. 465, 469-71, 722 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2012). Although we have never before considered whether an objection raised by one party may be attributed to another party who does not expressly join it, courts that have considered that question have answered in the negative. E.g., Barnes v. State, 310 S.E.2d 777, 778 (Ga. App. 1983) (“If several parties are entitled to make an objection, and it is made by any number less than all, it does not inure to the advantage of the party or parties not joining in it. Thus, where a defendant does not expressly adopt the objection of a co-defendant, he thereby waives that objection and may not utilize it to gain review.”); accord Daniels v. Yancey, 175 S.W.3d 889, 892 (Tex. App. 2005); Cook Assocs. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983); Thomas v. Bank of Springfield, 631 S.W.2d 346, 351 (Mo. App. 1982); Roskoten v. Odom, 87 P.2d 338, 340 (Okla. 1939). We adopt the general rule articulated in these cases and hold that one party may not rely on the objection of another party to preserve an argument for appeal without expressly joining in the objection. Craig also argues that the circuit court understood that the two defendants were presenting a joint defense. His 12 argument is contradicted by the record. Tellingly, Craig expressly noted his separate objection to the Commonwealth’s fourth proposed jury instruction, stating through counsel “Judge, I’d like to note an objection to the fourth one offered by the Commonwealth,” while remaining silent as to the preceding three. Further, the record reflects at least six additional occasions where one of the defendants expressly joined in the other’s objections to preserve an argument for appeal. We therefore reject Craig’s argument that this case calls for an exception to the general rule we adopt today. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that Craig did not preserve for appeal any objection to these three proposed instructions. We now turn to the fourth proposed jury instruction. Although Craig did object, the Court of Appeals again declined to consider his argument, determining that it was not preserved under Rule 5A:18 because he failed to state a basis for his objection at trial. Craig asserts that the Court of Appeals erred because this proposed jury instruction directly relates to whether the Commonwealth was required to prove a direct nexus between the required relationship and the proscribed acts. He notes that he and the Commonwealth vigorously contested that question in their arguments on his motion to strike, which preceded the circuit court’s consideration of the 13 proposed jury instructions. He asserts the circuit court therefore was fully apprised of the argument relevant to this proposed jury instruction and intelligently ruled on it. We agree. Craig argued on his first motion to strike that the Commonwealth was required to demonstrate a nexus between any relationship with A.G. at school and the proscribed acts. The Commonwealth responded that, under Sadler, no such nexus was required. The circuit court rejected Craig’s argument and denied the motion. Accordingly, this argument was adequately presented to the circuit court to provide it “an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue[].” Scialdone v. Commonwealth, 279 Va. 422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Craig’s motion and argument were made before he presented his case, he renewed them at the conclusion of all the evidence. The circuit court again rejected the argument and denied the motion. It then proceeded immediately to consider jury instructions: The motions to strike are overruled. Your objections are noted for the record. All prior motions are incorporated and the rulings are the same. We’re now ready to discuss instructions. 14 Both Rule 5A:18 and Rule 5:25 require an objection to be timely and Craig’s objection was. The basis of the objection was encompassed by his argument on the motions to strike, which the circuit court had recently considered and rejected. We conclude that this was sufficient to satisfy the Rules. The Court of Appeals therefore erred in determining under Rule 5A:18 that Craig failed to state a basis for his objection to the fourth proposed jury instruction. Nevertheless, the error was harmless because Craig’s argument on appeal is not the one he made to the circuit court. 4 On appeal, Craig argues that the instruction was misleading because the word “nexus” encompasses the temporal association suggested by the word “maintain[]” as used in Code § 18.2- 370.1(A). As noted above, the required relationship must exist at the time of the proscribed acts. Craig argues that the instruction that no proof of a nexus “of any type” was necessary for conviction therefore had a tendency to mislead the jury that the relationship and the proscribed acts need not coincide as the statute requires. 4 “Under the doctrine of harmless error, we will affirm [a lower] court's judgment when we can conclude that the error at issue could not have affected the court's result.” Dorr v. Clarke, 284 Va. 514, 526, 733 S.E.2d 235, 242 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). 15 Craig did not make this argument below. His argument on the motion to strike was limited solely to the issue we considered in Sadler and his attempt to distinguish that case from this one on their facts. 5 He therefore did not preserve this argument for appeal and we will not consider it. Rule 5:25; see also Online Res. Corp. v. Lawlor, 285 Va. 40, 57, 736 S.E.2d 886, 895 (2013); Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r v. Target Corp., 274 Va. 341, 351-52, 650 S.E.2d 92, 97-98 (2007). Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ erroneous determination that Craig failed to state any basis for his objection to the instruction is harmless. 2. CRAIG’S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS Craig proposed two jury instructions. The first stated, “One who is a guest is one who decides on her own to leave the home, and where the host has no personal authority to direct or punish the guest.” The second stated, “Only those persons who maintain a custodial relationship with their victim can be convicted of Indecent Liberties.” The circuit court refused both and the Court of Appeals affirmed its rulings. 5 Although Craig referred to the winter break in his argument on the motion to strike, he did not suggest that the break terminated the custodial or supervisory relationship. To the contrary, he argued that the fact of the break, together with his limited contact with A.G. at school and the lack of parental entrustment or knowledge with respect to her presence at his house, was evidence that the relationship was not custodial or supervisory. 16 Craig argues that the first proposed jury instruction was necessary “to explain the ‘hostess and guest relationship’ referenced in” another of his proposed jury instructions, which the circuit court gave to the jury. 6 However, he did not make this argument in support of the refused jury instruction to circuit court. We therefore will not consider it on appeal. Rule 5:25; see also Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 274 Va. at 351-52, 650 S.E.2d at 97-98. 7 Craig argues that the second proposed jury instruction was necessary to correct other instructions proposed by the Commonwealth and given to the jury by the circuit court. According to those instructions, he argues, the Commonwealth need only prove that Craig “maintained a custodial or supervisory relationship over A.G.” (Emphasis added.) He concludes that the use of the preterite verb form “maintained” indicated that the required relationship need not exist at the time of the proscribed acts. Again, he made no such argument to the circuit court. Furthermore, he did not object to the 6 That instruction stated, “For a custodial or supervisory relationship to exist, the custodian or supervisor must hold some form of legal or actual authority over the child. Those who maintain [a] hostess and guest relationship do not maintain a custodial or supervisory relationship.” 7 Although the record reveals that Angela argued in favor of the “hostess-and-guest relationship” instruction, neither she nor Craig offered any argument in support of this refused instruction he now contends was necessary to explain it. 17 proposed jury instructions containing the preterite verb form. We therefore will not consider his argument on appeal. Rule 5:25; see also Online Resources, 285 Va. at 60-61, 736 S.E.2d at 897; Commonwealth Transp. Comm'r, 274 Va. at 351-52, 650 S.E.2d at 97-98.