Opinion ID: 852325
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether the Legislature Intended to Impose Punishment

Text: Whether the legislature intended the residency restriction statute to be civil or criminal is primarily a matter of statutory construction. And as we observed in Wallace for the overall Sex Offender Registration Act, it is difficult to determine legislative intent since there is no available legislative history and the Act does not contain a purpose statement. Id. at 383 (quoting Spencer v. O'Connor, 707 N.E.2d 1039, 1043 (Ind.Ct.App.1999)). As with the overall Act, the residency restriction statute does not contain a purpose statement. However, unlike the overall Act where some components are contained in the civil code and others in the criminal code, see Jensen v. State, 905 N.E.2d 384, 390 (Ind.2009), the residency statute is located solely within the criminal code, see, e.g., Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 361, 117 S.Ct. 2072, 138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997) (noting the fact that the Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act was placed in the probate code rather than the criminal code evinced a legislative intent to create a civil proceeding). Further, the statute contains no exception or Grandfather Clause exempting sex offenders who were convicted before its enactment or who owned their homes before the statute's effective date; nor is there any exemption for sex offenders who established their residences before a school, youth program center, or public park moved within 1,000 feet of them. In essence with a single exception, [4] the residency restriction statute does not appear to include a civil or regulatory component. We do acknowledge however, that the [overall] Act advances a legitimate regulatory purpose, namely, public safety. Wallace, 905 N.E.2d at 383. It could thus be argued that as a part of the Act, the residency restriction statute is subsumed into this larger purpose. For this reason we conclude there is ambiguity as to whether the legislature intended to impose punishment by enacting the statute. Therefore, assuming without deciding that the legislature's intent was to create a civil, non-punitive, regulatory scheme we examine whether the statute is so punitive in effect as to negate that intent.