Opinion ID: 629224
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: 9
10 [I]f the indictment charges jointly tried defendants with participation in a single conspiracy, but the evidence reveals multiple, discrete conspiracies, such a variance of proof may be so prejudicial as to require reversal. United States v. Kenny, 645 F.2d 1323, 1334 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 920, 101 S.Ct. 3059, 69 L.Ed.2d 425 (1981). The question of whether a single conspiracy has been proved, rather than multiple conspiracies, is a recurring one, which is essentially a question of the sufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Bibbero, 749 F.2d 581, 586 (9th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1103, 105 S.Ct. 2330, 85 L.Ed.2d 847 (1985). Therefore, the critical issue is  'whether after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.'  United States v. Bishop, 959 F.2d 820, 829 (9th Cir.1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). 11 To prove a conspiracy exists the government must prove three elements: (1) an agreement to commit an illegal act; (2) an overt act in furtherance of the illegal objective; and (3) a requisite intent to commit the underlying offense. United States v. Penagos, 823 F.2d 346, 348 (9th Cir.1987). The evidence clearly indicates that Martin conspired with Jackson but the indictment did not charge Martin for that conspiracy. Instead, the indictment charged Martin, Jackson, Allen, Romero, and Cullinan for one overall conspiracy. 12 The charged conspiracy takes the form of a wheel with Jackson being the hub and Martin, Allen, Romero, and Cullinan being the spokes. To establish the overall conspiracy, the government must supply proof that the spokes are bound by a rim. Kenny, 645 F.2d at 1335 (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, the evidence must show that there was one overall agreement among the various parties to perform various functions in order to carry out the objectives of the conspiracy. United States v. Kearney, 560 F.2d 1358, 1362 (9th Cir.) (quotation omitted), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 971, 98 S.Ct. 522, 54 L.Ed.2d 460 (1977). It is sufficient to show that each defendant knew or had reason to know of the scope of the conspiracy and that each defendant had reason to believe that their own benefits were dependent upon the success of the entire venture. Kenny, 645 F.2d at 1335 (quotation omitted). 13 Based on the evidence here, a jury could reasonably have found that the overall conspiracy as charged in the indictment existed. However, that does not end our inquiry. The next question is whether the evidence connects Martin to that overall conspiracy. See United States v. Brown, 912 F.2d 1040, 1044 (9th Cir.1990) (after concluding that an overall conspiracy existed, the court found it necessary to determine whether the defendant was part of that conspiracy). In determining whether the necessary link exists, there must be evidence to show Martin's knowledge of and dependency on the overall conspiracy. See id. at 1044 (While only slight evidence is needed to convict a person of knowing participation, we have emphasized the fact that there must be knowledge and dependency.). 14 The government argues that the evidence links Martin to the single overall conspiracy because Martin introduced Jackson to Agent Scott, and Jackson, in turn, involved Allen, Romero, and Cullinan in the transaction. We disagree. Martin was double-crossed by Jackson and had no idea that Jackson and others were dealing separately with Agent Scott. Martin's initial plan to obtain and supply Agent Scott with methamphetamine was not dependent on Jackson's double-dealing, and Martin did not benefit from the separate actions of Jackson, Allen, Romero, and Cullinan. 15 The evidence does not in any meaningful way connect Martin to the overall conspiracy, and therefore, we reverse Martin's conspiracy conviction as charged in the indictment on the ground of insufficient evidence.
16 Martin also argues that the evidence does not support his possession conviction because he never possessed the methamphetamine seized during the arrests of Jackson, Allen, Romero, and Cullinan. Although Martin did not actually possess the methamphetamine, he may nevertheless be convicted for the substantive offense under two liability theories: (1) aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2, and (2) coconspirator liability. See United States v. Aichele, 941 F.2d 761, 764 (9th Cir.1991) (conspirator is liable for all foreseeable substantive offenses committed in furtherance of the conspiracy). 17 To convict Martin of possession under an aiding and abetting theory of liability, the evidence must show that Martin associated himself with the venture, that 'he participate[d] in it as something he wish[ed] to bring about' ... [and that] 'he [sought] by his action to make [the venture] succeed.'  United States v. Smith, 832 F.2d 1167, 1171 (9th Cir.1987) (quoting Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 619, 69 S.Ct. 766, 770, 93 L.Ed. 919 (1949)). 18 The government has not put forth any evidence supporting Martin's possession conviction on an aiding and abetting theory. There is no evidence indicating that Martin intended or assisted Jackson, Allen, Romero, and Cullinan to possess methamphetamine. The government argues that Martin intentionally counseled, induced, and procured Jackson to obtain and provide five pounds of methamphetamine to undercover DEA agents. This argument is misplaced. Although Martin introduced Jackson to the DEA agents, Martin obviously did not intend or assist Jackson in double-crossing him by obtaining the methamphetamine with others behind his back. 19 Because the district court instructed the jury on coconspirator liability the government argues that we may affirm Martin's possession conviction under Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946). Under Pinkerton, each conspirator is liable for the criminal acts of his coconspirators as long as the following conditions are met: (1) the substantive offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy; (2) the offense fell within the scope of the unlawful project; and (3) the offense could reasonably have been foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement. United States v. Douglass, 780 F.2d 1472, 1475-76 (9th Cir.1986) (citations omitted). 20 The government argues that, under Pinkerton, Martin is liable for possession because Jackson, his coconspirator, committed the substantive offense. We disagree. The substantive offense committed by Jackson, Allen, Romero, and Cullinan was not committed in furtherance of the conspiracy between Martin and Jackson. The actions of Jackson, Allen, Romero, and Cullinan also were not reasonably foreseeable. Martin could not have reasonably foreseen that Jackson would double-cross him by carrying out the illegal venture with others behind Martin's back. The evidence thus does not support Martin's conviction for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine.