Opinion ID: 894512
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Pleading Requirements Under Recreational Use Statute

Text: Rather than dismiss the case on the merits under a summary judgment standard, I would examine the pleadings to determine whether the Mirandas alleged facts sufficient to invoke the trial court's jurisdiction. See Tex. Ass'n Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 446 (Tex.1993) (plaintiff has burden to allege facts affirmatively demonstrating that the trial court has subject matter jurisdiction). In my view, the Mirandas' pleading falls short. Just as the Department owes no duty to warn trespassers that rattlesnakes may strike, it owes no duty to advise statutory trespassers that tree limbs fall in state parks. The Mirandas did not allege that the Department had so much as an inkling that the branch in question would fall. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code § 41.001(7); see also Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 21-22 (Tex.1994) (explaining that gross negligence requires at a minimum that the defendant subjectively have actual awareness of the extreme risk created by his or her conduct). Rather, she alleges that the Department is generally aware that tree limbs fall, just as it must know of countless other natural perils in state parks. Because the Department owes no duty to warn trespassers that forces of nature may cause random harm, I would hold, contrary to the Courts conclusion, that the Mirandas pleading does not invoke the trial courts jurisdiction. The Mirandas did not allege that the Department was subjectively aware of any specific risk of injury. See id. Instead, they alleged: Defendant knew of the dangers of its falling tree branches, failed to inspect, failed to prune, failed to alleviate or remove the danger, and consciously and deliberately failed to warn Plaintiffs of the extremely dangerous condition. Plaintiffs paid a campsite rental fee and specifically asked defendant to assign them a safe campsite. Defendant knew that its property contained hidden, dangerous defect (sic) in that its tree branches which have not been inspected or pruned regularly fall. Defendant did not warn Plaintiffs of the hidden danger.    Plaintiffs would show the court that the occurrence made the basis of this suit and the resulting damages set out below were a direct and proximate result of Defendants negligence and its agents, servants, and officers, both of commission or omission, or both separately and collectively, in failing to properly maintain and inspect the campsite where Plaintiffs were injured, in failing to properly maintain the campsite in a safe condition and/or in failing to exercise ordinary care to protect Plaintiffs from the danger. The Mirandas' gross negligence allegations stated: Plaintiffs would show the court that the occurrences made the basis of this suit and the resulting injuries and damages set out below were a direct and proximate result of Defendants negligence in failing to make safe the dangerous condition of its campsite trees. Defendant's conduct was willful, wanton, or grossly negligent. Defendant failed to warn or make reasonably safe the dangerous condition of which it was aware and which Plaintiffs were unaware. We can accept as true the Mirandas' allegation that the Department knew its tree branches which have not been inspected or pruned regularly fall and did not warn them about that contingency. That pleading, however, is of neutral value in a suit against the Department, which would owe no duty to warn unless it had actual knowledge that the branch would fall yet nevertheless instructed Maria to camp beneath it. See id.; see also Lee Lewis Constr., Inc. v. Harrison, 70 S.W.3d 778, 785 (Tex.2001) (reiterating that gross negligence requires that the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the risk involved, but nevertheless proceed in conscious indifference to the rights, safety, or welfare of others.). Indeed, nowhere in their pleadings do the Mirandas assert that the Department was aware of any risk associated with either the tree or the campsite below. Instead, they simply recast allegations of simple negligence into a claim for gross negligence. We are bound, however, to analyze their claims in light of the policies underlying the recreational use statute. The statute exists to encourage landowners to allow the public to enjoy outdoor recreation on their property by limiting their liability for personal injury. City of Bellmead v. Torres, 89 S.W.3d 611, 617 (Tex.2002) (Hankinson, J. dissenting). To accomplish that objective, the Legislature has placed stringent parameters around the duty landowners owe trespassers. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 75.002. The duty implicit in the Mirandas pleading, however, would require the Department to warn all visitors of all perils commonly confronted by human interaction with nature. The scope of that proposed dutyobligating the Department to post warnings about all naturally occurring dangerswould create such an insurmountable practical and economic burden as to frustrate the legislatures intent to encourage landowners to make property available for recreational use. Without allegations that the Department was aware that the limb would fall and nevertheless instructed Maria to camp below it, the Mirandas have not pleaded facts sufficient to proceed on their claim under the recreational use statute. I do not mean to suggest that merely because the injury is alleged to have resulted from a natural condition, the trial court is thereby deprived of jurisdiction. For example, the trial courts jurisdiction would be properly invoked by a pleading that the Department told the plaintiff it was safe to dive into waters the Department knew were so shallow that the dive posed a likelihood of serious injury, and that the plaintiff was severely injured diving in reliance on that assurance. Here, by contrast, the Mirandas did not plead that the Department directed Maria to a campsite knowing that an overhanging tree branch would likely fall on her and cause serious injury. I understand fully the Courts holding that the Mirandas gave fair notice that they were pursuing a gross negligence claim. Fair-notice pleadings, however, must be viewed in this case through the prism of sovereign immunity, which deprives a court of jurisdiction unless the State has expressly waived immunity. Tex. Dep't of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.1999). The plaintiffs' pleadings against the State must affirmatively establish jurisdiction to overcome the contrary presumption. Tex. Dep't of Crim. Justice v. Miller, 51 S.W.3d 583, 587 (Tex.2001)(quoting Tex. Assn. Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446). The plaintiff must plead facts that, if true, would establish that the claims come within an express waiver of sovereign immunity before the trial court has jurisdiction to proceed. Just as mere reference to the Texas Tort Claims Act is insufficient to confer jurisdiction, Miller, 51 S.W.3d at 587, the trial court's jurisdiction is not satisfied by mere notice that the plaintiff is pursuing a gross negligence claim. The Mirandas have failed to affirmatively establish the court's jurisdiction because, even if all of the facts alleged in their pleading were true, those facts would not amount to gross negligence and therefore would not establish a waiver of sovereign immunity under the recreational use statute. When a plaintiff fails to plead facts establishing jurisdiction, the issue is ordinarily one of pleading sufficiency and the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity to amend. County of Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex.2002). A court may grant a plea to the jurisdiction without affording an opportunity to amend only when the pleadings affirmatively negate the existence of jurisdiction, a circumstance not presented here. Id. In this case, however, the trial court overruled the Departments plea to the jurisdiction, concluding implicitly that the Mirandas pleadings were sufficient to confer jurisdiction, and the court of appeals affirmed. Consequently, the Mirandas have never been placed on notice that they must cure the jurisdictional defect. It may well be that the facts will not lend themselves to a pleading that would confer jurisdiction, but we are not equipped to make that determination at this stage of the proceedings. III