Opinion ID: 2590549
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Testimony of gang experts

Text: Defendant contends the trial court erroneously permitted the testimony of two gang experts, Compton Police Commander Hourie Taylor and Deputy Sheriff Joe Holmes. Initially, defendant contends the prosecutor impermissibly used fact-specific hypothetical questions to elicit testimony from these experts that a gang member going into rival gang territory  like defendant  would do so as a challenge and would protect himself with a weapon. According to defendant, the specificity of the hypothetical questions converted the answers by the experts into improper opinions on his state of mind and intent at the time of the shooting. As such, the experts were not merely explaining gang practices or methods generally but opining that defendant premeditated the crimes. Defendant, however, misconstrues the substance of the testimony. The experts did not render an impermissible opinion as to defendant's actual intent; rather, they properly testified as to defendant's motivations for his actions. In People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713, this court recognized that [t]he subject matter of the culture and habits of criminal street gangs ... meets [the] criterion [of Evidence Code section 801 defining the admissibility of expert testimony]. [Citations.] As in Gardeley, that matter is of particular relevance here ( Gardeley, at p. 617, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713) considering the circumstances leading to the shooting of Adkins and Shy. Nevertheless, defendant argues that expert testimony as to his being armed with the intention of shooting anyone who issued any form of gang challenge did more than embrace an ultimate issue in the case; it allowed the prosecutor to solicit the experts' opinions as to his mental state through impermissible hypothetical questions. Generally, an expert may render opinion testimony on the basis of facts given `in a hypothetical question that asks the expert to assume their truth.' [Citation.] Such a hypothetical question must be rooted in facts shown by the evidence, however. [Citations.] ( Id. at p. 618, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713.) Defendant relies on People v. Killebrew (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 644, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876, in support of his contention the hypothetical questions in this case exceeded permissible limits. In Killebrew, the defendant was convicted of conspiracy to possess a handgun after police found a handgun in one of three vehicles occupied by seven gang members and another handgun in the dumpster of a taco stand where the members had stopped. Killebrew was seen in the area of one of the vehicles, and two unidentified men were seen walking away from his location. ( Id. at p. 648, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876.) The prosecution theorized that the threat of [rival gang] retaliation compelled the occupants of the three vehicles to conspire to possess the handgun[s].... ( Id. at p. 649, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876.) The prosecution attempted to establish that the defendant had been a passenger in one of the vehicles. [A] police officer testified as an expert on gangs to establish not only Killebrew's membership in a criminal street gang, but his subjective knowledge and intent to possess [a] handgun. ( Id. at p. 647, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876.) On appeal, the defendant challenged the admissibility of the expert's testimony that when one gang member in a car possesses a gun, every other gang member in the car knows of the gun and will constructively possess the gun, arguing that these opinions on the subjective knowledge and intent of each occupant in the car were improperly admitted. ( People v. Killebrew, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th at p. 652, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876, fn. omitted.) The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the testimony is not the type of culture and habit testimony found in the reported cases. Gardeley addressed testimony about the primary purpose of the gang, and whether the attack was gang-related activity. ( Id. at p. 654, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876.) On this basis, the court distinguished cases such as People v. McDaniels (1980) 107 Cal.App.3d 898, 166 Cal.Rptr. 12, in which the expert testified that a person who lived in a gang's territory was automatically associated with that gang by rival gangs, fistfights between gangs normally occur at neutral sites, if a gang traveled to another gang's territory, normally more than a fistfight would occur, and it was unusual for various Crip factions to band together when taking retaliatory action. ( Killebrew, at p. 656, 126 Cal.Rptr.2d 876; see also, e.g., People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1367, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596.) We conclude that the expert opinions in this case fall within the gang culture and habit evidence approved in People v. Gardeley, supra, 14 Cal.4th at page 617, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713. The substance of the experts' testimony, as given through their responses to hypothetical questions, related to defendant's motivation for entering rival gang territory and his likely reaction to language or actions he perceived as gang challenges. (See People v. Zepeda (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1183, 1208-1209, 105 Cal.Rptr.2d 187; see also Gardeley, at p. 619, 59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713; People v. Valdez (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 494, 508-509, 68 Cal.Rptr.2d 135; People v. Olguin, supra, 31 Cal.App.4th at p. 1371, 37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596.) This testimony was not tantamount to expressing an opinion as to defendant's guilt. (See People v. Torres (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 37, 47-48, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 103.) Accordingly, we find no abuse of the trial court's discretion in admitting it. Defendant further contends the prosecutor improperly used expert testimony to enhance witness credibility. Even assuming such testimony is impermissible after Proposition 8 (see People v. Padilla (1995) 11 Cal.4th 891, 946-947, 47 Cal.Rptr.2d 426, 906 P.2d 388 [questioning whether such rules for crimes committed after the June 1982 effective date of Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (d), known as Prop. 8's Truth-in-Evidence provision, were still in effect], overruled on another ground by People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th 800, 823, fn. 1, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 656, 952 P.2d 673), we find nothing in the record supporting his assertion that Taylor testified Donald Jacobs was credible or truthful. Taylor was never questioned about Jacobs and never mentioned him. In arguing for the admissibility of the expert testimony, the prosecutor stated he was trying to bolster the credibility of Donald Jacobs in terms of the truthfulness of his statement as to why he would feel fear in not making the identification.... Defendant now contends this was not the proper subject of expert testimony because the prosecutor failed to identify any misconceptions the jurors might have in this regard that the testimony would dispel. (Cf. People v. McAlpin (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1289, 1300-1302, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563.) Since he failed to object on this basis, the prosecutor had no chance to respond, and the trial court had no chance to consider whether the evidence should have been excluded for that reason. Accordingly, the claim is forfeited. (See People v. Wash (1993) 6 Cal.4th 215, 244, 24 Cal.Rptr.2d 421, 861 P.2d 1107.) In any event, it is meritless because under the circumstances the trial court would not have abused its discretion in overruling such an objection. Initially, Jacobs had not identified defendant as the shooter when questioned by law enforcement, explaining he was concerned for his safety since he lived in gang territory and his cousin had recently been killed walking home from football practice. Taylor testified that witnesses, even those from rival gangs, are often reluctant to identify or testify against gang members out of fear for their safety. This court has frequently permitted the use of expert testimony to explain to lay jurors conduct that may appear counterintuitive in the absence of such insight. (See People v. Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 904-908, 16 Cal.Rptr.3d 447, 94 P.3d 574; People v. McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at pp. 1300-1302, 283 Cal.Rptr. 382, 812 P.2d 563; People v. Bledsoe (1984) 36 Cal.3d 236, 247-248, 203 Cal.Rptr. 450, 681 P.2d 291.) Invariably, the point of such an explanation is to support another witness's credibility. Assuming a proper foundation for the expert's qualifications, we see no reason to exclude such testimony as it relates to gang activities. A juror unfamiliar with the particulars of gang intimidation may well consider it abnormal for a witness not to want to testify against an individual who committed a violent crime against himself or a family member or friend. If an expert can shed light on such reluctance, the testimony is admissible. Defendant also raises constitutional objections to the testimony. Assuming the objections were properly preserved for appeal (see People v. Yeoman (2003) 31 Cal.4th 93, 117, 133, 2 Cal.Rptr.3d 186, 72 P.3d 1166), they are without merit for the same reasons.