Opinion ID: 1119842
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 16

Heading: Admission of Juvenile Conviction

Text: Lord contends that he was denied due process and equal protection by the admission of his California juvenile conviction for second degree murder. To the extent that we can distill specific arguments from what is essentially a philosophical discussion, Lord appears to be making two arguments. First, allowing the sentencing jury to consider a juvenile conviction violates Const. art. 1, § 21 [24] and the Sixth Amendment [25] because juveniles do not have the right to a jury trial. Second, the underlying conviction may be defective if the California court did not require that each of its elements be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. [35] Lord cites no authority for his first claim. Juveniles do not have a constitutional right to a jury trial under either article 1, section 21 or the Sixth Amendment. State v. Schaaf, 109 Wn.2d 1, 16, 743 P.2d 240 (1987); State v. Lawley, 91 Wn.2d 654, 658-59, 591 P.2d 772 (1979) (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545, 29 L.Ed.2d 647, 91 S.Ct. 1976 (1971)). Nor does due process require that juveniles have the right to a jury trial. Lawley, at 659. As to his second argument, Lord contends that equal protection concerns arise if he was convicted under a lesser standard of proof than other defendants. However, the trial court specifically addressed this issue and, after reviewing the relevant documents and applicable law, concluded that the standard of proof utilized by the California court was guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Lord does not challenge this conclusion. He cannot support an equal protection challenge on this basis. The sentencing jury may consider [w]hether the defendant has or does not have a significant history, either as a juvenile or an adult, of prior criminal activity, RCW 10.95.070(1), in determining if there are not sufficient mitigating circumstances to merit leniency. Lord's constitutional claims are without merit. His juvenile conviction was properly admitted pursuant to RCW 10.95.070(1).