Opinion ID: 363559
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: six month statute of limitations

Text: 46 It is provided in 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) that: 47 . . . no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board 48 The charge was filed December 30, 1975. The complaint alleged unfair labor practices occurring during the six month period beginning July 1, 1975. Only one subcontract was let during this period and that was while the union was on strike. The next most recent contract was let in May of 1975, which was also while the union was on strike. As previously detailed, the Administrative Law Judge's decision allowed amendment of the complaint to allege that unfair labor practices occurred during the period beginning July 1, 1974, which was a full year beyond the statute of limitations. This was also the time period when the bulk of the subcontracting occurred. 49 AMCAR contests the validity of this amendment. 6 The Administrative Law Judge allowed the amendment of the complaint: 50 . . . because Respondent concealed, and the Union had no notice of, the hitch components and parts subcontracting by Respondent, or no actual or constructive knowledge of any part of it until the end of September 1975 . . .. 51 Several circuits, including this one, have recognized that the six month statute of limitations does not start to run until the injured party knows or should have known that his statutory rights were violated. Metromedia, Inc. v. NLRB, 586 F.2d 1182 (8th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Allied Products Corp., Richard Bros. Div., 548 F.2d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 1977); Wisconsin River Valley Dist. Council v. NLRB, 532 F.2d 47, 53 (7th Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Shawnee Industries, Inc., 333 F.2d 221, 224 (10th Cir. 1964). 52 The NLRB specifically agreed with the Administrative Law Judge's determination in this case that the 10(b) statute was tolled, stating in a footnote: 53 The Employer is estopped from asserting a 10(b) defense, because its fraudulent concealment of vital information from the Union caused the latter to sleep while its opportunity to seek a legal remedy was slipping away. We cannot permit the Employer to benefit from the specific unfair labor practice which the Act explicitly empowers us to remedy. Don Burgess Construction Corporation d/b/a Burgess Construction, 227 NLRB No. 119 (1977); Avila Group, Inc., 218 NLRB 633, 639 (1975). 54 In Don Burgess the company shifted work from union to nonunion employees while assuring the union that it did not intend to employ any carpenters. The NLRB held that in such a case both the charge and the remedy extended beyond the six month statute of limitations period. Similarly, the doctrine of fraudulent concealment was adopted in International Ladies Garment Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 150 U.S.App.D.C. 71, 463 F.2d 907 (1972), where the company told the union it was going out of business but in fact was moving the business to another state. Judge J. Skelly Wright, writing for the court, found there was no lack of diligence on the part of the union in discovering the fraud despite the fact that a considerable time period had elapsed. Not only was the statute tolled as to the filing of the charges, but back pay was allowed by the Circuit Court of Appeals to the date when the violation first occurred. 55 We believe the amendment of the complaint was appropriate in this case. There is substantial support for the finding that the union did not learn about the subcontracting until the end of September. When a union agent was apprised of the subcontracting, he took immediate action. The charge was filed well within six months of the union's learning of the subcontracting. In light of the facts, we do not believe the union exhibited any lack of diligence in discovering the subcontracting. The union was misled and deceived by the company. The company's negotiation chairman stated during the course of bargaining negotiations for the 1972-75 contract that no side letter concerning subcontracting would be necessary since the company had a statutory duty to bargain about subcontracting. We have in Section I found such a duty. The union, relying on this statement and the company's past history of notifying the union prior to subcontracting maintenance work, was undoubtedly lulled into a false sense of security. It is not surprising it did not discover the subcontracted work earlier even though deliveries were made by subcontractors to a building next to the hitch area. When the union began experiencing heavy lay-offs in December of 1974 and March of 1975, the union agent inquired as to the reason and was told by the hitch department superintendent that hitch sales were down. The superintendent claimed not to have any knowledge of the subcontracting until a later date. If he was not aware of the subcontracting of work from his own department, it is hard to see how the union should have been aware of the same. The statements of this company official gave the union no reason to investigate further or to send members to other buildings looking for evidence of subcontracted work. If the statute is not held to be tolled under these facts, the company will be allowed to benefit from its own unfair practices. 56