Opinion ID: 812350
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Grounds for Habeas Relief

Text: Mr. Kinkead first argues that his criminal prosecution was barred by the statute of limitations. Aplt. Br. 8. He claims that his Judgment and Sentence provides that the crime charged was committed on or about June 9, 1995, but the Information was not filed until February 7, 2003, which is beyond the five-year statute of limitations period for the offense. The OCCA rejected this claim, finding that the Information charged criminal conduct between June 9, 1995 and July 2, 1998, and therefore, was timely filed on February 7, 2003. On appeal, Mr. Kinkead argues that the OCCA decision is not on the merits, and thus not entitled to AEDPA deference, because the OCCA did not consider the Judgment and Sentence in reaching its decision. Id. at 12. We disagree. As an initial matter, Mr. Kinkead raises a question of state law. As a federal habeas court, we do not review violations of state law. We are limited to determining whether a conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treatises of the United States. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). We also find that the OCCA adjudicated this claim on the merits, even without the Judgment and Sentence, because it relied on the Information in finding that the charge was timely filed. R. 34. Moreover, Mr. Kinkead has not established that the OCCA’s decision was -6- unreasonable “in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). We find that reasonable jurists could not fairly debate this conclusion.
Mr. Kinkead next argues that Oklahoma is applying his sentence in violation of the Constitution by denying him earned credits. Aplt. Br. 2, 15–17. We note that this is a slight variation of the claim Mr. Kinkead raised in his habeas petition, where he alleged that he was wrongly subject to Oklahoma’s 85% Rule. Mr. Kinkead now contends that his sentence, “life imprisonment with all but the first ten years suspended,” is not life sentence, and therefore, Okla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138(A), which prevents those inmates serving life sentences from earning credits, does not apply to him. Id. As the district court found, Mr. Kinkead is serving a sentence of life imprisonment, even though all but the first ten years were deferred. Kinkead, 2012 WL 2995667, at . We do not believe that reasonable jurists could fairly debate this conclusion.
Mr. Kinkead’s third ground for relief is that his imprisonment is a double jeopardy violation. The district court denied this claim as procedurally barred, finding neither “cause and prejudice” nor a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” to excuse the default. Id. at –8. As an initial matter, it is not clear whether Mr. Kinkead seeks a COA on this ground. Mr. Kinkead only refers to this point in the -7- opening paragraph of his brief when he states that he appeals the “judgment denying on ‘procedural grounds’ any federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254.” Aplt. Br. 1. However, construing this pro se pleading liberally, see Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007), we will assume that he seeks a COA on this basis as well. Nonetheless, we find that a COA is not warranted because Mr. Kinkead has failed to demonstrate that it is reasonably debatable whether the court’s procedural ruling is correct. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484. The district court found that Mr. Kinkead’s double jeopardy claim was procedurally barred because he failed to raise this claim on direct appeal. The court rejected Mr. Kinkead’s argument that he had in fact raised this claim, finding that Mr. Kinkead asserted a different double jeopardy argument on direct appeal. Kinkead, 2012 WL 2995667, at  n.6. On direct appeal, Mr. Kinkead argued that the acceleration of his sentence subjected him to double jeopardy because it was based on violations for which his probation officer had already punished him. However, in his habeas petition, Mr. Kinkead argued that the double jeopardy violation was his current imprisonment after serving two years of a deferred sentence. Id. We do not believe that reasonable jurists could debate the court’s conclusion that these are different claims, and that Mr. Kinkead’s current double jeopardy claim is procedurally barred. Nor do we find that “cause and prejudice” exists for the default or that a “fundamental miscarriage of justice” will result if Mr. Kinkead’s claim is not -8- considered. We note that Mr. Kinkead does not address this point on appeal, and like the district court, we find that Mr. Kinkead has failed to show any reason to excuse the default.