Opinion ID: 1043883
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Principles of Preemption Law

Text: The legal basis for the doctrine of preemption is the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which mandates that the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2. Pursuant to the Supremacy -9- Clause, a law enacted by Congress may preempt an otherwise valid state law, rendering it without effect. Leggett, 308 S.W.3d at 853. Consistent with this principle, a federal regulation promulgated by an agency pursuant to its congressionally delegated authority may preempt a state tort suit. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 886 (2000); MCI Sales & Serv., Inc. v. Hinton, 329 S.W.3d 475, 482 (Tex. 2010) (citing City of N.Y. v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63-64 (1988)). The United States Supreme Court has identified two fundamental principles that must guide any preemption analysis. First, no matter what type of preemption is at issue, “the purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.” Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009) (quoting Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996)). Second, in conducting any preemption inquiry, courts must “start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by [federal law] unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress”—particularly when the federal law in question pertains to “a field which the States have traditionally occupied.” Id. (quoting Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 485) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Leggett, 308 S.W.3d at 854; Morgan v. Ford Motor Co., 680 S.E.2d 77, 83 (W. Va. 2009) (“Preemption of topics traditionally regulated by states—like health and safety—is greatly disfavored in the absence of convincing evidence that Congress intended for a federal law to displace a state law.”). Courts recognize both express preemption, which occurs when Congress explicitly dictates that a federal law supplants contrary state law, and implied preemption, which typically falls into one of three categories: (1) field preemption, (2) direct conflict preemption, or (3) “purposes and objectives” conflict preemption.7 Leggett, 308 S.W.3d at 853. “Field preemption occurs when federal regulation of a field is ‘so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement it.’” Id. at 854 (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)). Direct conflict preemption arises from “an inescapable contradiction between state and federal law—for example, ‘where it is impossible for a private party to comply with both state and federal law.’” Id. at 853 (quoting Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-73 (2000)). Purposes and objectives conflict preemption—the only category of preemption at issue in this appeal—occurs when a state law “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of a federal law.” Williamson, 131 S. Ct. at 1136 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)). 7 Courts interchangeably refer to this latter type of preemption as “purposes and objectives” preemption, “frustration-of-purpose” preemption, and “obstacle” preemption. See, e.g., Geier, 529 U.S. at 873-74; id. at 908 n.22 (Stevens, J., dissenting). -10- In order to determine whether a state law impermissibly conflicts with the purposes and objectives of a federal regulation, courts must look to the regulation’s “history, the promulgating agency’s contemporaneous explanation of its objectives, and the agency’s current views of the regulation’s pre-emptive effect.” Id. As the United States Supreme Court has cautioned, courts must remain mindful “that it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts state law”; in keeping with this principle, courts must guard against implied preemption analysis devolving into a “freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute is in tension with federal objectives.” Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968, 1985 (2011) (quoting Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 111 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 604 (Thomas, J., concurring in judgment only) (concluding that “broad evaluations of the ‘purposes and objectives’ embodied within federal law” result in “the illegitimate—and thus, unconstitutional—invalidation of state laws”).