Opinion ID: 2164332
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The FGCA's Petition for Review.

Text: The FGCA assails the BZA's decision approving the proposed construction of the new law school at site 4 on a number of different grounds. The fundamental premise of most or all of its contentions, however, is that the BZA permitted the University to focus on matters which the FGCA views as irrelevant (the University's interests) and ignored or minimized the interests of the residents of neighboring communities. We do not agree with this premise. The BZA's findings and the testimony in the record demonstrate that this is not a case in which the University thumbed its nose at the neighbors and induced an inappropriately compliant BZA to submit to its will at the neighbors' expense. Rather, in conformity with the Board's 1988 directive, the University went out of its way to make peace with its erstwhile adversaries and made significant concessions which would cost it substantial sums of money but which would minimize any unfavorable impact on the surrounding communities. As the BZA stated in its 94th and final Finding of Fact, [t]he Board is extremely impressed with the process initiated by the University and undertaken by it and the surrounding neighbors and neighborhood groups. The University and its professional consultants, as well as the many neighbors who participated in this effort, are to be commended for the work involved and the resultant Campus Plan. In particular the Board notes the existence of the Agreement which is exhaustive in detail and evidences strong commitments from all parties. The Board will look to this Agreement and the process undertaken in this Campus Plan as a guide in future Campus Plan cases. (Emphasis added). The president of the NLC, the organization which had been formed three years earlier largely to resist the 1987 Campus Plan, testified enthusiastically in favor of the application (except for its treatment of Parcel B). We are satisfied that, in general, and especially with respect to the law school, no one ran roughshod over the rights of anybody else. As we note below, the BZA's compliance in this case with some of the requirements of the Regulations and the case law has sometimes been less than meticulous. Not all i's were dotted, and not all t's were crossed. At least one of the Board's errors was serious; its handling of the petitioners' requests to cross-examine the University's rebuttal witnesses was indefensible. Nevertheless, the FGCA's objections must be assessed with the basic posture of the case in mind.
The FGCA contends that the BZA's decision granting the special exceptions was based on incorrect legal criteria. It argues that the Board focused almost exclusively on the University's needs, rather than on the community's. The Board erred, according to the FGCA, both when it failed to consider a suggestion that the law school be constructed off campus and when it declined to require the University to show that there was no alternative site on the campus which would have been less objectionable to the neighbors. We are not persuaded by any of these contentions. The BZA found that the siting, massing and design of the law school building are appropriate and that the proposed plan is thoroughly responsive to the reasonable concerns of the neighbors. (FF ¶ 51). The evidence discussed in Part I A, supra, fully supports this finding. The Zoning Regulations do not require that the Board treat the University's needs as irrelevant. Contrary to the FGCA's approach, a universityeven a law schoolis not to be presumed, for purposes of the Zoning Regulations, to be the land use equivalent of the bubonic plague. [5] In general, uses of land for educational purposes are highly favored, 2 ROBERT M. ANDERSON, AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING, § 12.09, at 508 (1986), and it has long been recognized that universities serve the public welfare and morals in important ways. Cornell University v. Bagnardi, 68 N.Y.2d 583, 593, 503 N.E.2d 509, 514, 510 N.Y.S.2d 861, 866 (1986); see also 2 ANDERSON, supra, § 12.15, at 526. We are dealing here with special exceptions contemplated by the Zoning Regulations, see Stewart, supra, 305 A.2d at 518, and the Board's function on these facts is surely to determine whether a reasonable accommodation has been made between the University and the neighbors which does not interfere with the legitimate interests of the latter. Cornell University, supra, 68 N.Y.2d at 589, 503 N.E.2d at 511, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 861. The Regulations require only that the applicant demonstrate that it is not likely that the proposed site will become objectionable to neighboring properties. See 11 DCMR § 210.2 (1987). The BZA may grant a special exception for university uses in residential and special purpose districts where in the judgment of the Board, those special exceptions will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the Zoning Regulations and Maps and will not tend to affect adversely the use of neighboring property ... Levy, supra, 570 A.2d at 742 (quoting DCMR § 3108.1); see Rose Lees Hardy Home and School Association v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 324 A.2d 701, 706 (D.C.1974). [T]he applicant is not charged with considering every option that any party in opposition might conceptualize. Don't Tear it Down, Inc. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Hous. and Community Dev., 428 A.2d 369, 379 (D.C.1981). The Board found, on the basis of substantial evidence in the record, that the 1989 plan accommodated the reasonable concerns of the residents and otherwise met the requirements for a special exception. Many or most of the erstwhile adversaries agreed. The standard applied by the Board was reasonable and legally correct.
The FGCA also maintains that the BZA failed to make a finding that the proposed location of the law school would not result in unreasonable campus expansion into low-density districts, as required by 11 DCMR § 210.3. While the Board did not use this precise phraseology, that is not conclusive. We are satisfied that the findings and conclusions which the Board did make demonstrate that it carried out the intent of this Regulation. We reach this conclusion, inter alia, on the basis of the following Findings of Fact: 26. In December, 1988, the University agreed to a major change.... [t]he law school was down-sized approximately 20,000 square feet. 51. The Board finds that the siting, massing and design of the law school building are appropriate and that the proposed plan is thoroughly responsive to the reasonable concerns of the neighbors. 62. The Board finds that the University thoroughly analyzed all available sites for the location of the law school ... and that the program and design [of the law school] will be compatible with the site and the adjacent neighborhood. 74. [T]he consultant later testified and confirmed that he reviewed the plans for the law school, and in his opinion, because of the geometry of the site [and] the topography and relationship of the site to Massachusetts Avenue, the University's proposal for the Cassell site is reasonable. See also FF ¶¶ 10B, 43, 45 through 48, 56, 58, 59 and 65. The Board then concluded as a matter of law that: Regarding the size of the proposed structure and the proximity of the building to the neighborhood, the Board has found that the siting and size of the building are appropriate. See also the discussion in Part I B, supra, and note 10, infra. The only rational conclusion which flows logically from the Board's findings is that there will be no unreasonable expansion of the campus into low-density residential areas, and that the siting and size of the building are appropriate. While it is true that the [Board's] analysis did not track or even mention [the specific criteria set forth in the Regulation], we conclude that [its] inquiry adequately addressed the critical factors there identified. In re D.R.M., 570 A.2d 796, 803 (D.C.1990). It would have been better if the Board had explicitly incorporated into its decision the language of the Regulation, so that no one could have doubted the Board's meaning. Its failure to do so, however, does not require reversal of its decision [6] by this court.
Although the new law school itself is to be constructed on site 4, the 1989 Campus Plan also calls for the regrading, landscaping and screening of a part of site 3 to convert a largely wooded and undeveloped tract of land into a parking lot. The BZA did not make any findings, evaluations or conclusions which referred to site 3 by name or number. The FGCA contends that the Board thus failed to address a significant contested issue in the case. If the agency makes no finding of fact on a material contested issue, this court on review may not fill the gap by making its own determinations from the record, but must remand the case. Levy, supra, 570 A.2d at 746 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The FGCA has contested this issue before this court, but it did not do so before the Board. This petitioner filed a proposed order with the BZA in which it included thirty-four proposed Findings of Fact, as well as almost a page and a half of single spaced Conclusions of Law and Opinion. Site 4 was mentioned at least sixteen times. Site 3 was not mentioned at all. Neither OP nor ANC 3-E made any allusion whatever to site 3. [7] In the absence of exceptional circumstances, this court will not entertain contentions not raised before the agency. Rafferty v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 583 A.2d 169, 178 (D.C.1990). The circumstances of the present case do not warrant our consideration of the FGCA's complaint about the treatment of site 3 when no such concern was presented to the BZA.
Relying on Draude v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 527 A.2d 1242 (D.C.1987) ( Draude I ), the FGCA contends that the Board inadequately explained its standard for determining whether the proposed development is likely to have objectionable consequences for the community. The FGCA objects to the Board's failure to make a comparison between the effects on neighboring residential areas of the University's proposed construction of a law school and the consequences of the kind of use of the property which would be authorized without a special exception. Draude I mentions such a standard, id. at 1253, but does not mandate it; neither do we. See also Draude v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 582 A.2d 949, 959-60 (D.C.1990) ( Draude II ). In this case, the Board did apply, in substance, the other test articulated in Draude I, namely whether the proposed use would significantly increase objectionable qualities over their current levels in the area. Id. [8] This standard is consistent with the Zoning Regulations. See generally 3 R. ANDERSON, supra, § 21.09, at 652-54 (3d ed. 1986) (discussing the adequacy of various standards). The University presented evidence, including the testimony of a planner, an architect, and a traffic expert, which was sufficient to support the BZA's conclusion that this standard was met. Indeed, we agree with the following paragraphs in the University's submission: The University did more than demonstrate that the proposed use would be an improvement over previous use or present use. As required, the record shows and the BZA found that the use would not be objectionable based on the criteria of 11 DCMR § [210]. While the significant improvement over existing conditions at the Cassell site was found to be responsive to concerns of the neighbors, particularly Fort Gaines neighbors, this was not the standard applied by the BZA in reaching its ultimate determination. The warning in Draude [I] is meant to guard against inconsistent application of standards in special exception determinations. Petitioners' reliance on this point [is incompatible with] the BZA's actual findings, which are amply supported by the record.
The Zoning Regulations provide that [b]efore taking final action on an application for use as a college or university, the Board shall submit the application to the District of Columbia Office of Planning... for review and written reports. 11 DCMR § 210.6 (1987). The University complied with this requirement and, as we have noted, OP expressed reservations regarding the placement of the new law school at the Cassell Center site. Although no statute or regulation expressly so provides, the FGCA argues, and we agree, that the Board is required to demonstrate in its findings that it considered OP's views, and must provide a reasoned basis for any disagreement with them. See, e.g., Committee for Washington's Riverfront Parks v. Thompson, 451 A.2d 1177, 1193-94 (D.C.1982). The BZA is also required to give great weight to the concerns of Advisory Neighborhood Commissions. Levy, supra, 570 A.2d at 746; see D.C.Code § 1-261(d) (1987); 11 DCMR § 3307.2 (1987). As we explained in Kopff v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 381 A.2d 1372, 1384 (D.C.1977), An agency must elaborate, with precision, its response to the ANC issues and concerns.... [T]he agency must articulate why the particular ANC itself, given its vantage point, doesor does not offer persuasive advice under the circumstances.... [W]e believe that great weight implies explicit reference to each ANC issue and concern as such, as well as specific findings and conclusions with respect to each. (Emphasis in original). ANC 3-E objected to the use of the Cassell Center as the proposed site for the law school and urged the Board to consider and adopt the arguments submitted by OP. [9] The FGCA maintains that the Board failed to give ANC 3-E's recommendation the requisite great weight. In its findings, the Board failed to make any mention of the fact that OP opposed the selection of site 4 for the new law school. The University presents only a perfunctory defense of this omission, claiming that the OP position can best be described as equivocal. The sequence of events described in Part I D., supra, establishes to our satisfaction that OP continued to adhere, throughout the course of the case, to its initial opposition to the proposed site. The BZA should have explicitly acknowledged and addressed OP's reservations. The Board did, however, discuss in some detail the concerns of ANC 3-E regarding the proposed site for the law school. [10] The Board specifically stated that it had accorded great weight to the views of ANC 3-E and of ANC 3-D and, while the assertion that this has occurred may not necessarily make it so in every case, we have no reason to question the Board's assurance here. The FGCA also contends that the BZA violated the great weight requirement by not responding to ANC 3-E's suggestion that the law school be constructed on site 5, the Nebraska Avenue parking lot. We conclude that the Board dealt adequately with this suggestion. The Board found that site 5 was initially considered a viable location for the law school, and that an analysis was prepared for this site (and others) to determine whether it would be suitable. (FF ¶ 25). When the site evaluation criteria were applied to each of the apparently feasible locations, it was determined that site 4 was the only one that could accommodate both the needs of the University and the interests of the community (FF ¶ 27). The topography of Site 5 would create a taller building facing the Westover Place and Embassy Row townhouses, [and] forty of the residents who now face an open parking area would face a building where none has existed. ( Id. ) Moreover, testimony during the hearings revealed that Westover Place and Embassy Row residents were opposed to construction on site 5 ( Id. ). The Board thus not only responded to the ANC's views, but also indicated why the ANC's suggestion was unsound. See Bakers Local Union No. 118 v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 437 A.2d 176, 180 (D.C.1981). Since the Board sufficiently addressed ANC 3-E's concerns, and since ANC 3-E largely adopted OP's objections, the Board's failure to make any explicit allusion to OP's position was harmless. We recognize that where both OP and the ANC have objected to a proposal, their combined opposition may merit greater weight in the decision-making calculus than the opposition of only one of these organizations standing alone. In this case, however, the Board has sufficiently responded to the substance of the objections, and reversal would not be appropriate.
The FGCA, joined with respect to this issue by Common Cause/DC as amicus curiae, contends that the BZA violated the DCEPA, D.C.Code §§ 6-981 to -990 (1990 Supp.), by failing to conduct an environmental assessment to determine whether the University's Campus Plan was the kind of project which was likely to have an adverse impact on the environment, and whether an environmental impact statement was required under the Act. See §§ 6-981, -982(a), -983(a) and (c). The University contends, among other things, that the issue was not adequately raised before the Board. Under the rather unusual circumstances of this case, we agree with the University. The DCEPA, which became effective on October 18, 1989, contains a grandfather clause which exempts from its requirements any action for which ... entitlement or permission to act by a District government agency has been approved before December 31, 1989. D.C.Code § 6-986(a)(8) (1990 Supp.). In the present case, the BZA voted at a public meeting held on December 6, 1989 to approve the special exceptions. The Board did not issue its formal written decision until February 21, 1990. In a Memorandum in Lieu of Brief which he filed to address only the question of coverage under the DCEPA, the Corporation Counsel argues that [i]n these circumstances, the Board should be held to have approved the applications, within the meaning of § 6-986(a)(8), on December 6, 1989 and thus to have acted correctly in not commencing a new round of inquiries, determinations and proceedings under the DCEPA. The Corporation Counsel maintains that the BZA's deliberations had been concluded prior to the effective date of the Act and that the Board's written order simply effectuated what had been decided earlier. The purpose of § 6-986(a)(8), according to the Corporation Counsel, was clearly to permit agencies which had concluded their deliberations and come to a conclusion with respect to a project to avoid reopening the matter. The purpose is served by holding [that] the Board had approved the proposed actions here when it voted to approve them on December 6, 1989. We have no occasion to decide whether this court would adopt on its own initiative the construction of the DCEPA proposed to us by the District's chief legal officer. [11] We conclude, however, that the BZA was not obliged to adopt a different interpretation, in the absence of a contention by FGCA or by some other aggrieved party that this interpretation was not correct. [12] Neither the FGCA nor anyone else identified this problem to the Board or asked for a ruling on it. The BZA did not receive any submission relating to the DCEPA between January 1, 1990, when the Act became effective, and February 21, 1990, when the Board issued its written decision, nor did anyone anticipate the issue during 1989. In fact, the only reference by the FGCA to environmental issues in its proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was proposed Finding No. 33, in which the FGCA requested the Board to find that there has been no analysis of the environmental impact of the law school on site 4 conducted by an impartial expert and filed with the application. The FGCA proposed no Conclusion of Law on the subject, made no mention of the DCEPA, and never discussed the applicability of the grandfather clause. Essentially, the FGCA claims that the BZA erred by failing to hold, on its own initiative, and without any party having so contended in the proceedings before the agency, that although the DCEPA was not applicable when the BZA granted the special exceptions, it became applicable when 1990 dawned and the written decision had not yet been issued. According to the FGCA, the Board erred when it failed, sua sponte, to reopen a case which it had orally decided and which nobody had asked it to reopen. We do not agree with this position. As we have explained in an analogous judicial (rather than administrative) context, [q]uestions not properly raised and preserved during the proceedings under examination, and points not asserted with sufficient precision to indicate distinctly the party's thesis, will normally be spurned on appeal. D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 48 (D.C.1988) (emphasis added) (quoting Miller v. Avirom, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 367, 369-70, 384 F.2d 319, 321-22 (1967)). Environmental concerns are important, and we would be more reluctant to treat the point as having been waived if there were any appreciable danger that such a holding would contribute to the abdication of environmental values or to the pollution of the air or water or quality of life for the citizens of Fort Gaines or of the District. But there is no realistic threat of such baleful consequences in this case. Under proposed regulations promulgated on November 30, 1990 by the Mayor pursuant to the DCEPA, the Department of Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (DCRA) is the lead agency responsible for overseeing the preparation of an environmental impact statement whenever a building permit is required. See 37 DCR 7588, 7593 (Nov. 30, 1990), to be codified in 20 DCMR § 7203.1(a). Moreover, we have been advised in a supplemental submission by the University, which the FGCA has not contradicted, that the DCRA has given the University a clean [environmental] bill of health in connection with the proposed site for the law school. [13] We are therefore confident that no injustice will flow from our invocation here of the general rule that arguments not presented to the agency will not be entertained by the court. [14]
Proceeding in an unorthodox manner which we deem altogether unacceptable, the Board permitted the University to recall two witnesses to testify in rebuttal, but denied petitioners the right to cross-examine them regarding their rebuttal testimony. This is not the first time that a District agency deciding zoning issues has proceeded in this manner. See Citizens' Coalition Against the Proposed Brookings Office Bldg. v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 516 A.2d 506, 512-13 (D.C. 1986) (court assumed, arguendo, that the practice was improper but found the error harmless). We hope it will be the last. The following exchange occurred at the conclusion of the examination by counsel for the University of the first of its rebuttal witnesses: CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: All right. Thank you very much, Mr. Brown. MR. NETTLER: Excuse me. I just have some cross-examination on just two points that he has raised CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: Are you kidding? MR. NETTLER: I am entitled to cross-examine him on his rebuttal testimony. CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: No, you are not. MR. NETTLER: I certainly am. Excuse me but I am certainly entitled to cross-examine a witness who provides rebuttal testimony; and the Board has permitted me to do so in the past and has permitted other counsel to do so. CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: We have not, Mr. Nettler; and there wasn't anything new about what Mr. Brown testified to. MR. NETTLER: Yes, he did.... After counsel attempted to explain the reasons for his view that the witness had given testimony on rebuttal which went beyond his testimony in the case-in-chief, the colloquy concluded as follows: CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: Mr. Nettler, we are not having cross-examination. MR. NETTLER: I reserve my right to object to the fact that that has not been provided us. CHAIRPERSON THORNHILL: Very well. After the second rebuttal witness testified, counsel for the University, playing under the unconventional ground rules announced by the presiding officer, eschewed the time-honored words your witness, which are frequently used by attorneys to tender the witness to opposing counsel for cross-examination, and asked instead: Madam Chairperson, are there questions of Mr. Arminster from the Board? (Emphasis added). Chairperson Thornhill said No, and reiterated her ruling that no cross-examination would be permitted. Counsel for the University stated that just to protect the record, he wanted to be certain that opposing counsel could file something for the record. The attorneys for petitioners were ultimately permitted to submit questions which they would have asked and the answers they expected to elicit, but no cross-examination was allowed. The proceeding before the Board was a contested case. Rose Lees Hardy Home and School Ass'n v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 324 A.2d 701, 707 (D.C.1974). A contested case is one in which a trial-type hearing is implicitly required, either by the organic act or constitutional right. Lamont v. Rogers, 479 A.2d 1274, 1278 (D.C.1984). The rebuttal witnesses were testifying about contested facts. Each party therefore had the right to conduct such cross-examination as may be required for a full and true disclosure of the facts. D.C.Code 1-1509(b) (1987). Accordingly, the cross-examination which petitioners were entitled to conduct was that which is available at a trial-type hearing. In almost every setting where important decisions turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 269, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 1021, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970). In Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 79 S.Ct. 1400, 3 L.Ed.2d 1377 (1959), the Supreme Court stated that the requirements of confrontation and cross-examination ... have ancient roots.... This Court has been zealous to protect these rights from erosion. It has spoken out not only in criminal cases... but also in all types of cases where administrative and regulatory actions were under scrutiny. [Citations and footnotes omitted]. Id. at 496-97, 79 S.Ct. at 1413-14. An administrative agency may neither refuse to permit any cross-examination nor unduly limit it. Giant Food, Inc. v. F.T.C., 116 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 234, 322 F.2d 977, 984 (1963), cert. dismissed, 376 U.S. 967, 84 S.Ct. 1121, 12 L.Ed.2d 82 (1964). In all adjudicative proceedings, cross-examination and confrontation are the handmaidens of trustworthiness in the face of factual dispute. National Trailer Convoy, Inc. v. United States, 293 F.Supp. 634, 636 (N.D.Okla.1968) (three-judge court). Although we have only a paper record before us, the presiding officer's choice of words ( e.g., are you kidding?) appears to have been intended to ridicule counsel's perceived effrontery in requesting the right to cross-examine his adversary's rebuttal witnesses. But a request to conduct perfectly conventional cross-examination is not ridiculous, and the reasons given by the Chairperson for not permitting it were spurious. Where, as here, a witness has been recalled on rebuttal, there is no doubt that he may not only be examined on direct, but [also] cross-examined and re-examined. EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 4 at 7 (3d ed. 1984). The DCAPA gives every party the right to submit rebuttal evidence. Hilton Hotels Corp. v. District of Columbia Dep't of Employment Serv., 531 A.2d 999, 1000 (D.C.1987) (per curiam). Logically, at a trial type hearing, the statute must likewise give the adversary the right to cross-examine the witnesses who provide such evidence. If the witness had in fact said nothing new, then his testimony would not have been genuine rebuttal testimony in the first place. See 6 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 1873, at 672-73 (James H. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1976); Throckmorton v. Holt, 12 App.D.C. 552, 583-85 (1898). But once the University had been permitted to present the same evidence for a second time, petitioners had the corresponding right to cross-examine for a second time. [15] If the Chairperson intended to intimate that cross-examination of rebuttal witnesses was not permitted in this case because it is not permitted in any caseand that seems to be implicit in the words are you kidding? [16] then such a practice is impermissible no matter how uniformly the Board may have followed it. The Board undoubtedly has broad discretion with respect to the nature, scope and duration of cross-examination. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Greensboro Coca Cola Bottling Co., 180 F.2d 840, 846 (4th Cir.1950). But that discretion must be exercised reasonably. The Board may, for example, restrict cross-examination if further interrogation on a particular subject would be more prejudicial than probative, Goldman v. United States, 473 A.2d 852, 856 (D.C.1984), or if the evidence sought to be elicited would be cumulative. Hilton v. United States, 435 A.2d 383, 388 (D.C. 1981). [17] The Board may not, however, prohibit cross-examination altogether, Washington v. United States, 461 A.2d 1037, 1038 (D.C.1983), and must permit such cross-examination to proceed at a stage of the case when its effect is not unreasonably diluted. See People v. Becker, 210 N.Y. 274, 299-300, 104 N.E. 396, 405-406 (1914); Town of Somerset v. Montgomery County Bd. of Appeals, 245 Md. 52, 66-67, 225 A.2d 294, 303 (1966). Any restrictions which the Board may impose must be rationally related to some legitimate purpose. Whether testimony has been presented in a party's direct case or on rebuttal has no rational relationship to the opponent's need to conduct cross-examination. The Board's apparent bright line rule of practice on the subject is therefore unacceptable. Indeed, the University's only real argument in support of the Board's approach is that any error was harmless. The FGCA has been unable to point to any prejudice. It claims in the most general terms to have been denied the opportunity at the public hearings to cross-examine University witnesses on important issues such as the site selection process' failure to incorporate neighborhood concerns and the limited usefulness of steps the University planned to take to mitigate objectionable impacts. But the witnesses in question had been cross-examined at length on these subjects in connection with their initial testimony, and the BZA's findings were adequately supported without consideration of their rebuttal testimony. The University's case with respect to the selection of a site for the law school was a strong one, especially in light of the support which its decision drew from the adversaries of the 1987 Campus Plan. The Board's procedural error was a serious one, but we are satisfied that it did not result in substantial prejudice to the FGCA. See Citizens' Coalition Against the Proposed Brookings Office Bldg. v. District of Columbia Zoning Comm'n, 516 A.2d 506, 512-13 (D.C.1986).