Opinion ID: 1983550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: braxton's other contentions

Text: In a related argument, Braxton claims that since the government failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that he had constructive possession of the pistol, the evidence was also insufficient to prove the armed with or having readily available element of D.C.Code § 22-3202. [14] Relying on Thomas v. United States, 602 A.2d 647 (D.C.1992), Braxton urges us to hold that the phrase readily available in section 22-3202 requires the government to show that he had a closer connection to the pistol than is required to prove constructive possession under D.C.Code § 22-3204(b). In Thomas this court said: Proof that one had possession of a firearm does not necessarily establish that the firearm was readily available.... In short, possession is a broader concept than armed with/readily available. Thus, 3202 requires proof of a fact not required of 3204(b).... Id. at 654 (citations omitted). We also stated that [s]ection 3202 requires proof that the perpetrator exercised a degree of dominion and control not required for a conviction under 3204(b). Id. at 655. Braxton maintains that the government failed to establish that he had this higher degree of control and that the trial court therefore erred in permitting the while armed charges (see notes 1 and 2, supra ) to go to the jury. This court has not yet defined the term readily available, but we have held that it includes an operable pistol lying on top of a television set within [the defendant's] immediate reach. Morton v. United States, 620 A.2d 1338, 1340 (D.C.1993). Although the language in Thomas cited by appellant suggests that constructive possession and readily available are different concepts, they also overlap to some extent because, in order to have a weapon readily available, one must at a minimum have constructive possession of it. We need not now explore the possible distinctions between the two concepts, since Morton compels us to hold that an operable pistol in a dresser drawer, just a few feet away from both appellants as they jointly engaged in a series of drug transactions, meets the definition of readily available. We leave to a future case any attempt to set the outer limits of that definition.
Braxton also claims that he cannot be convicted of any armed offense as an aider and abettor of Guishard because the evidence was insufficient under Thomas to sustain Guishard's conviction as a principal. He argues in the alternative that even if the evidence was sufficient to prove Guishard's guilt of an armed offense as a principal, it was insufficient to show that Braxton could foresee that Guishard would be distributing the cocaine with a gun readily available. It is firmly established in the District of Columbia that [o]ne who aids and abets the principal in committing the crime is charged as a principal. Tyler v. United States, 495 A.2d 1180, 1182 (D.C.1985) (citing inter alia D.C.Code § 22-105). [15] However, in order to convict an aider and abettor of an armed offense which was committed only by the principal, the evidence must be sufficient to support an inference that the aider and abettor could reasonably foresee that the principal was armed or that a dangerous weapon was readily available. Hordge v. United States, 545 A.2d 1249, 1256 (D.C. 1988) (it is sufficient if there is evidence to support a reasonable inference that the accomplice was aware the crime would be committed `while armed'); see Ingram v. United States, 592 A.2d 992, 1002-1003 (D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1017, 112 S.Ct. 667, 116 L.Ed.2d 757 (1991). We need not decide whether the evidence against Braxton as an aider and abettor meets this test, because the evidence was sufficient independently to establish Braxton's guilt as a principal under D.C.Code § 22-3202. In part III-A of this opinion we have already held that Braxton's reliance on Thomas is misplaced and that the gun found in the dresser drawer was readily available to both Braxton and Guishard. Thus we hold that the evidence was sufficient to establish that both Braxton and Guishard were acting as principals, and we need not reach the issue of whether, as an aider and abettor, Braxton could foresee that the gun was readily available.
We next address Braxton's argument that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on foreseeability in the context of aiding and abetting and in failing to define the while armed component of D.C.Code § 22-3202. Although the government concedes that the trial court erred in omitting a foreseeability instruction, it argues that the omission does not require reversal because the evidence was sufficient to convict Braxton as a principal. We agree. In Ingram this court recognized that in order to receive the enhanced penalties applicable to a [crime] `when armed,' D.C.Code § 22-3202, the defendant is entitled to a `reasonably foreseeable' weapon instruction.... 592 A.2d at 1004. We also held in Ingram, however, that there was no plain error because the instructions actually given were sufficiently complete and were coupled with a record that supported a finding of aiding and abetting under Hordge. Id. We reach a similar conclusion here. We hold that there was no plain error [16] because the instructions were sufficiently complete and because, in any event, the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury reasonably to find that both Braxton and Guishard were acting as principals. See Butler v. United States, 614 A.2d 875, 886-887 (D.C.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1009, 113 S.Ct. 625, 121 L.Ed.2d 558 (1992) (instruction applicable only to aiders and abettors need not be given when evidence shows that defendant was a principal). Braxton's claim that the trial court erred in failing to define readily available is also without merit. A trial court is under no obligation to define particular terms in its jury instructions, nor does it have a general duty to instruct the jury sua sponte.  Allen v. United States, 495 A.2d 1145, 1150 (D.C.1985) (en banc); see also, e.g., Curington v. United States, 621 A.2d 819, 821-822 (D.C.1993) (no plain error in court's failure to instruct the jury on statutory definition of an element of the offense). Braxton's trial counsel submitted to the court several proposed jury instructions based on the standard red book [17] and on the language of the statute. Later the instructions to be given were discussed at length by all concerned, and the court asked counsel whether they wished to offer any corrections or additions. Braxton's counsel never requested a definition of armed with or having readily available, although he had ample opportunity to do so. Since Braxton failed to preserve this issue for appeal, we review his claim only for plain error, see Allen, supra, 495 A.2d at 1151-1152, and hold that he has failed to show that omission of the instruction rose to the level of a miscarriage of justice. Watts v. United States, supra note 16, 362 A.2d at 709; see also Carter v. United States, 591 A.2d 233, 234 (D.C.1991) (a statute should be construed according to the ordinary meaning of the words (citation omitted)).
Braxton maintains that the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence which he claims unfairly prejudiced his case. The government, on cross-examination of Guishard, was allowed to elicit evidence of his relationship with Braxton and their connection to New York. Braxton now claims that this testimony portrayed him as an incorrigible, dangerous and long-time New York drug dealer. He also contends that the court erred in denying his request for a mistrial after the government elicited information about his prior incarceration. On direct examination Guishard testified that he was from New York and that he had traveled to Washington with his girl friend, his infant son, and Braxton. Counsel for Braxton opposed the admission of any evidence that would connect his client to New York, claiming that it was irrelevant and prejudicial. The court overruled his objection, ruling that the probative value of such evidence outweighed its potential for prejudice. Thereafter Guishard testified on cross-examination that he knew Braxton from New York and that they had traveled several times to Washington together. The prosecutor then asked a series of questions which implied that the two men were bringing drugs to Washington from New York and selling them out of a rented room. [18] We reject Braxton's argument that the testimony about his travels between New York and Washington was prejudicial because it portrayed him as a drug dealer. We find nothing in the record which would lead the jury to conclude that appellants were drug dealers simply because they came from New York. As the government persuasively argues, the same questions could have been posed had appellants been traveling back and forth between Washington and Pittsburgh. We agree with the government that it was reasonable to question why Guishard was shuttling back and forth between New York and Washington, and why he was not staying with his girl friend at 1205 Harvard Street but merely used that address for his mail, staying in another apartment only two blocks away, at 1012 Harvard Street, that contained an abundance of drugs, a weapon, and ammunition. Moreover, the prosecutor had a factual basis for asking the questions, since there was conflicting testimony about whether Braxton lived at 1012 Harvard Street, and the prosecutor's questions sought to explore the connection between Guishard and Braxton. See Carter v. United States, 614 A.2d 913, 918 (D.C.1992) (stating general rule that a cross-examiner must have some sort of factual predicate for a potentially prejudicial question). Braxton and Guishard both testified that Braxton did not live in the apartment; Mosley, however, testified that both men did live there. Thus it was not unreasonable for the prosecutor to ask Guishard about his travels with Braxton between New York and Washington. [19] Furthermore, the prosecutor was entitled to frame questions by drawing inferences from earlier testimony that would support his theory of the case. See Scott v. United States, 619 A.2d 917, 924 (D.C.1993). Since there was already evidence before the jury that Braxton and Guishard were selling drugs together and that they had traveled several times together between New York and Washington, it was not improper for the prosecutor to draw the inference that they had brought the drugs from New York to sell in Washington. Braxton also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to pursue a line of questioning during his cross-examination of co-defendant Smith in which it was revealed that Braxton had previously been incarcerated. When the prosecutor asked Smith if he had ever seen the officers in the neighborhood before, Smith replied: [The officer] ... asked where [was] the fellow with the scar on [his] face. And I thought about it.... I said, he's not in the house, you all know you got him in jail. Since Braxton was the fellow with the scar on his face, his counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial. The court denied the motion, but instructed the jury that the defendants were on trial only for what occurred on May 15, 1991. Although the prosecutor's question gave rise to an apparently spontaneous comment about Braxton's previous incarceration, the record satisfies us that the question was asked in good faith and that the prosecutor had no idea that the witness would answer in the way he did. Moreover, the comment was not substantially prejudicial, since there was already evidence that Braxton was involved in selling drugs, and the court gave a curative instruction to minimize any potential prejudice. See Scott v. United States, supra, 619 A.2d at 925-927 (reversal not warranted when court gave prompt curative instruction and defendant was not substantially prejudiced by the questioning). We conclude that neither this comment nor the prosecutor's questions connecting appellants to New York were sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a mistrial. See Rambert v. United States, 602 A.2d 1117, 1120 (D.C.1992) (denial of motion for mistrial will be disturbed only in extreme situations threatening a miscarriage of justice).
Finally, Braxton argues that the trial court erred by not disclosing the identity of an informant whose information served as the basis for the search warrant. Braxton asserts that the informant's testimony was essential to show that he was merely a visitor, not a resident of the apartment, and that the trial court should have held an in camera hearing to determine what the informant's testimony would be. Although in general the government is privileged to withhold the identity of an informant who gives information to law enforcement officers about violations of the law, this privilege must occasionally give way when the identification of an informant is essential to a fair trial. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 59-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 627-28, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957). Nevertheless, we will overturn a trial court's denial of a request for disclosure of an informant only for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Lyons, 448 A.2d 872, 875 n. 6 (D.C.1982) (citing cases). Relying on Roviaro, Braxton claims that there was such an abuse in this case because the informant's testimony was material to his defense. This claim is without merit. There is no indication in the record that revealing the identity of the informant was essential to a fair trial for either appellant. In Roviaro, unlike this case, the informant was the sole participant in the transaction and, aside from the police officers, was the only witness. By contrast, in the instant case, the informant was neither a participant nor a witness to the undercover sales but merely a person who had purchased drugs at 1012 Harvard Street approximately three days earlier. Mere speculation that the informer might possibly be of some assistance is not sufficient to overcome the public interest in the protection of the informer. Lannom v. United States, 381 F.2d 858, 861 (9th Cir.1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1041, 88 S.Ct. 784, 19 L.Ed.2d 833 (1968). The burden is on the person seeking disclosure to demonstrate that the informer is not merely an informer but rather a participant, an eyewitness, or someone who could give direct testimony on the events at issue. United States v. Lyons, supra, 448 A.2d at 874. We hold that Braxton did not meet that burden, see Hamilton v. United States, 395 A.2d 24, 27 (D.C.1978), and thus that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to disclose the identity of the informant.