Opinion ID: 597516
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Knight's Claims

Text: 46 Knight asserted claims premised upon the Back Pay Act and the Equal Access to Justice Act. These claims are for an affirmative award of attorney's fees, above and beyond any back pay recovered by Knight. Any claim under either statute belongs to Knight, not Foster Pepper. FDL Technologies v. United States, 967 F.2d 1578, 1580 (Fed.Cir.1992). 12 The Back Pay Act claim was for fees incurred by Knight in connection with Foster Pepper's advocacy before Interior, OPM, and the Office of Special Counsel. The EAJA claim is now limited to attorney fees for Foster Pepper's advocacy before the district court in this fee litigation.
47 Knight asserts error in the district court's denial of fees under the Back Pay Act for his attorney's administrative advocacy. This Act provides in pertinent part: 48 An employee of an agency who ... is found by appropriate authority under applicable law, rule, regulation, or collective bargaining agreement, to have been affected by an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action which has resulted in the withdrawal or reduction of all or part of the pay, allowances, or differentials of the employee-- 49 (A) is entitled, on correction of the personnel action, to receive for the period for which the personnel action was in effect-- ... 50 (ii) reasonable attorney fees related to the personnel action which, with respect to any decision relating to an unfair labor practice or a grievance processed under a procedure negotiated in accordance with Chapter 71 of this title, or under Chapter 11 of Title I of the Foreign Service Act of 1980, shall be awarded in accordance with standards established under section 7701(g) of this title.... 51 5 U.S.C. § 5596(b)(1) (1988). The referenced provision of 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g) states that: 52 ... the Board, or an administrative law judge or other employee of the Board designated to hear a case, may require payment by the agency involved of reasonable attorney fees incurred by an employee or applicant for employment if the employee or applicant is the prevailing party and the Board, administrative law judge, or other employee (as the case may be) determines that payment by the agency is warranted in the interest of justice ... 53 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) (1988). We have held the interest of justice standard generally applicable to fee claims under the Back Pay Act. Sims v. Department of Army, 711 F.2d 1578, 1578 (Fed.Cir.1983); Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 785 F.2d 1568, 1576 (Fed.Cir.1986) (in banc). Various factors may be considered in determining whether an award is warranted in the interest of justice, including agency bad faith, action which is clearly without merit or wholly unfounded, gross procedural error, and whether the agency knew or should have known ab initio that it would not prevail on the merits. Sims, 711 F.2d at 1581. 54 Interior denied Knight's administrative request for fees under the Back Pay Act, concluding inter alia that an award of attorney fees is not warranted in the interest of justice. 13 In support of this conclusion, Interior cited its reasonable reliance upon a common procedure sanctioned by OPM. The district court reviewed Interior's denial of fees under the deferential standard afforded administrative actions, finding that it was not an abuse of discretion, contrary to law, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 55 Although the parties contest the degree of deference that must be afforded Interior in this matter, we decline to address this question. Even were we to determine de novo whether a fee award would be in the interest of justice, we would agree with Interior and the district court. Interior merely followed established policy; the question of statutory interpretation was not at all clear; and it acted promptly when this policy was challenged. 14 The district court's denial of fees on this claim is affirmed.
56 Finally, Knight asserts error in the denial of attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act for work before the district court on the suit for attorney fees. The part of the EAJA relevant here, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1988), provides for an award of fees incurred by a prevailing party in a civil action brought against the United States. 15 57 Foster Pepper argues principally that the government acted in bad faith and that this suit would have been unnecessary if the United States had withheld the fees it demanded. This argument borders on the frivolous. Only Knight can assert an EAJA claim, not his attorneys. FDL Technologies, 967 F.2d at 1581. 58 Here, Knight has incurred no attorney fees for the district court litigation. Foster Pepper was retained on a contingent fee basis, the amount of which accrued and was fixed before the suit. Although the administrative attorney fees sought as the object of the district court litigation are included within the Claim subject to Foster Pepper's 25 percent charge, our disposition of the case leaves no basis upon which such fees may be awarded. Thus the fees incurred by Knight in connection with the district court litigation are twenty-five percent of nothing--in other words, nothing. See Phillips v. General Serv. Admin., 924 F.2d 1577, 1583 (Fed.Cir.1991) (In this sense, Phillips incurs the attorney fees that may be awarded her. On the other hand, if no fee award is made to her, she does not have any obligation to pay any further fees to her attorney from her own resources.). 59 Respecting costs, Knight may have some obligation to pay the costs for litigation on his fee claims. However, this suit was primarily directed to Foster Pepper's own claims, not Knight's personal claims for costs and attorney fees. Even with respect to Knight's claims, Foster Pepper's lien claims, for which they must assume costs, have been inextricably intertwined into the Back Pay and EAJA issues, that is, into Knight's claims. No argument is made based on parsing out costs attributable to Knight's claims. Indeed, plaintiffs failed to present a separate issue respecting Knight's recovery of his costs--at best a de minimis amount--and we decline to give separate consideration sua sponte to this aspect of Knight's EAJA claim. 60 The denial of attorney fees and costs under the EAJA is affirmed.