Opinion ID: 1356581
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The NSA's Invocation of Glomar Pursuant to FOIA Exemptions in the Instant Case

Text: Plaintiffs contend that even if the Glomar doctrine may be invoked in the context of a TSP-related FOIA request, the records plaintiffs seek here are not exempt from public disclosure under FOIA. Accordingly, plaintiffs argue, confirming or denying the existence of these records is not exempt from public disclosure. We agree with the District Court that, in order to invoke the Glomar response to a FOIA request, an agency must tether its refusal, Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at , to one of the nine FOIA exemptions. In other words, a government agency may ... refuse to confirm or deny the existence of certain records ... if the FOIA exemption would itself preclude the acknowledgment of such documents. Minier, 88 F.3d at 800. We adopt the District Court's careful and well-reasoned analysis, and affirm its judgment, including the holding that NSA's Glomar response was properly tethered to FOIA Exemption 3, under section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959. The NSA tied its Glomar response to FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3. Exemption 1 permits the nondisclosure of records that are (A) specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and (B) are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1). In invoking Exemption 1, the NSA specifically relies on Executive Order 12,958, 60 Fed.Reg. 19,825 (Apr. 17, 1995), as amended by Executive Order 13,292, 68 Fed.Reg. 15,315 (Mar. 25, 2003), which provides that an agency may classify records relating to, inter alia, intelligence activities (including special activities), intelligence sources or methods, or cryptology, and vulnerabilities or capabilities of systems, installations, infrastructures, projects, plans, or protection services relating to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism. 68 Fed.Reg. at 15,317. Under Executive Order 12,958, as amended, an agency may classify information when it determines that the unauthorized disclosure of the information reasonably could be expected to result in damage to the national security, which includes defense against transnational terrorism, and the original classification authority is able to identify or describe the damage. Id. at 15,315. As the District Court noted, the Executive Order specifically countenances the Glomar Response, permitting a classifying agency to `refuse to confirm or deny the existence or nonexistence of requested records whenever the fact of their existence or nonexistence is itself classified under this order or its predecessors.' Id. at 15324. Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at . FOIA Exemption 3 applies to records specifically exempted from disclosure by statute, provided that the statute requires that the matters be withheld from the public in such a manner as to leave no discretion on the issue. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). In invoking Exemption 3, the NSA relies on three statutes that preclude disclosure of the documents plaintiffs seek. First, the NSA argues that the documents are exempt under section 6 of the National Security Agency Act of 1959 (NSAA), Pub.L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 63, 64 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 note), which provides that: [N]othing in this Act or any other law... shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization or any function of the National Security Agency, of any information with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles, salaries, or number of persons employed by such agency. Second, the NSA relies on section 102(A)(i)(1) of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub.L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 403-l(i)(1)), which requires the Director of National Intelligence to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Third, the NSA invokes section 798 of Title 18 of the U.S.Code, which criminalizes disclosure of information concerning, inter alia, the communication intelligence activities of the United States. Because defendants need only proffer one legitimate basis for invoking the Glomar response and FOIA Exemptions 1 and 3 are separate and independent grounds in support of a Glomar response, we consider only the applicability of FOIA Exemption 3. See Larson, 565 F.3d at 862-63, ([A]gencies may invoke the exemptions independently and courts may uphold agency action under one exemption without considering the applicability of the other.). The District Court held that the NSA's affidavits provide the requisite detailed explanations for withholding the documents requested in FOIA Request No. 1 under FOIA Exemption 3. Specifically, defendants have demonstrated that acknowledging the existence or nonexistence of the information entailed in FOIA Request No. 1 would reveal the NSA's organization, functions, and activities, in contravention of Section 6 of the NSAA. Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at . We agree with the District Court's holding with respect to FOIA Exemption 3, and we adopt its thorough analysis, which for convenience we set forth in full below: In CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 1881, 85 L.Ed.2d 173 (1985), the Supreme Court adopted a two-pronged approach to evaluating an agency's invocation of FOIA Exemption 3: First, the court must consider whether the statute identified by the agency is a statute of exemption as contemplated by Exemption 3. Second, the court must consider whether the withheld material satisfies the criteria of the exemption statute. Id. at 167 [105 S.Ct. 1881]; see Fitzgibbon v. C.I.A., 911 F.2d 755, 761 (D.C.Cir. 1990). As the D.C. Circuit has observed, [e]xemption 3 presents considerations distinct and apart from the other eight exemptions inscribed in FOIA. Ass'n of Retired R.R. Workers v. U.S. R.R. Retirement Bd., 830 F.2d 331, 336 (D.C.Cir.1987): Exemption 3 differs from other FOIA exemptions in that its applicability depends less on the detailed factual contents of specific documents; the sole issue for decision is the existence of a relevant statute and the inclusion of withheld material within the statute's coverage. Id. Defendants argue, and plaintiffs do not dispute, that Section 6 of the NSAA qualifies as an exemption statute under Exemption 3. The D.C. Circuitthe only circuit court to have considered this questionconcurs. See Founding Church of Scientology, Inc. v. NSA, 610 F.2d 824, 828 (D.C.Cir.1979); Hayden v. NSA, 608 F.2d 1381, 1389 (D.C.Cir. 1979). Indeed, the language of Section 6 makes quite clear that it falls within the scope of Exemption 3. Section 6 states that no law ... shall be construed to require the disclosure ... of any information with respect to the activities of the NSA. Pub.L. No. 86-36, § 6, 73 Stat. 63, 64, codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402. Section 6 thus specifically exempt[s] certain information from disclosure. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3). Wilner, 2008 WL 2567765, at  (alterations in original).