Opinion ID: 783058
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Whether We Should Apply A Different Test

Text: 41 Rouse argues that the significance and magnitude of the potentially barred claim is a primary justification for equitable tolling, (Appellant's Br. at 32), and the fact that he faces a death sentence is an important part of the equitable tolling equation, (Appellant's Br. at 31). It is undisputed that neither the nature of Rouse's claims nor his sentence was a factor beyond his control during the limitations period or was a factor that affected his ability to meet the statutory deadline, and thus, these factors do not entitle Rouse to equitable tolling under our existing extraordinary circumstances test because that test requires the petitioner to present (1) extraordinary circumstances, (2) beyond his control or external to his own conduct, (3) that prevented him from filing on time. Harris, 209 F.3d at 330. Thus, Rouse is essentially arguing that we should apply a different equitable tolling test to his case. For the reasons set forth below, we decline to adopt an equitable tolling test that would consider a petitioner's underlying claim or sentence. 42 First, we see no reason why the decision as to whether a court considers the claims in an untimely petition should depend on the nature of the claims in the petition. Allowing consideration of the merits of time-barred claims to creep into the equitable tolling analysis lets petitioners effectively circumvent the statute of limitations because the merits of their claims will always be considered. This would enable petitioners who were in no way prevented from complying with the statute of limitations to create delay and undermine finality — two of the reasons that precipitated enactment of the AEDPA statute of limitations. As discussed below, we reject Rouse's invitation to apply equitable tolling based on a factor that had nothing to do with his failure to file on time. 43 Rouse claims that Justice Stevens's concurrence in Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 182, 121 S.Ct. 2120, 150 L.Ed.2d 251 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring), suggests that the seriousness of a potential constitutional violation would be a sound basis for equitable tolling. The concurrence, however, does not make any such suggestion. The concurrence notes that when a petition containing unexhausted claims is filed within the limitations period, there is no reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim and stay further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state remedies. Duncan, 533 U.S. at 182-83, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (Stevens, J., concurring). The concurrence also observes that the Duncan majority did not preclude[] a federal court from deeming the limitations period tolled [when a petition containing unexhausted claims is filed within the 1-year limitations period] as a matter of equity. Id. at 183, 121 S.Ct. 2120 (internal citations omitted). In other words, the concurrence suggests that equitable tolling might be appropriate based on the filing of a petition, albeit an improper petition containing unexhausted claims, within the time period, not that the nature of the claims is a sound basis for equitable tolling. Rouse did not file any federal habeas petition within the limitations period, let alone one containing exhausted and unexhausted claims, so the situation contemplated by the Duncan concurrence is not before us. 44 Rouse also relies on Baskin v. United States, 998 F.Supp. 188, 189-90 (D.Conn. 1998), but it does not provide any more support than does the Duncan concurrence. In Baskin, the petitioner alleged that his federal habeas petition was late because his trial counsel never informed him that the United States Supreme Court denied his petition for certiorari. The court held that [i]t would be grossly inequitable to bar petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claim on the basis that counsel's error permitted the statute of limitations to run. Id. at 190. This is not a suggestion that the merits of the underlying claim is a reason to grant equitable tolling. Instead, the court recognized that, as we discussed above, if trial counsel's error constituted constitutional ineffective assistance of counsel, then counsel's error is not attributable to the petitioner pursuant to Coleman and Carrier. For the reasons discussed in Section B.2, however, Rouse's former habeas counsel's error is attributable to Rouse. 45 Finally, my dissenting colleagues rely on Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 320, 116 S.Ct. 1293, 134 L.Ed.2d 440 (1996), to contend that the strength of the claims in a habeas petition must inform a court's decision to exercise its equitable power to toll limitations. 15 Post at 33. But Lonchar, a pre-AEDPA case, has nothing at all to do with equitable tolling, and it certainly does not hold that we should consider the strength of the claims in a habeas petition when deciding whether equitable tolling is appropriate. 16 To the extent that Lonchar informs the analysis, however, it reinforces our belief that we should follow our equitable tolling decisions that restrict equitable tolling to narrow circumstances not present in this case. See Cantu-Tzin v. Johnson, 162 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir.1998) ([C]onfirmation that a statutory limitations period should be enforced appears in the Supreme Court's ... decision in Lonchar v. Thomas ....). 46 At issue in Lonchar was whether the Court of Appeals properly dismiss[ed][a] first habeas petition for special ad hoc `equitable' reasons not encompassed within the framework of [Habeas Corpus] Rule 9. Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 322, 116 S.Ct. 1293. In concluding that the court of appeals had erred, the Supreme Court stressed that Congress and the framers of the Rule undertook a balancing of interests,  which courts may not undermine through the exercise of background equitable powers.  Id. at 327, 116 S.Ct. 1293 (emphasis added); see Cantu-Tzin, 162 F.3d at 298 (The tenor of the majority discussion in Lonchar is that federal courts should not intervene to create equitable reasons for denying stays of execution when federal law and the habeas rules have prescribed principles applicable to the complex mix of equities in capital cases.). Here, no less, by enacting the AEDPA, Congress has balanced the competing interests — a balance embodied in section 2244(d), which provides a 1-year limitation period and explicitly specifies conditions under which that period should be tolled. We may not amend that statute through ... ad hoc judicial exception. Lonchar, 517 U.S. at 328, 116 S.Ct. 1293. While we have already held that equitable tolling applies to the AEDPA when extraordinary circumstances beyond the petitioner's control prevent him from filing a timely petition, see Harris, 209 F.3d at 329-30, we must refrain from ad hoc alteration of the statutory command. The doctrine of equitable tolling is not a license to suspend enactments of Congress whenever we happen to believe that enforcement of a limitations period would create a hardship. See id. (cautioning that any invocation of equity to relieve the strict application of a statute of limitations must be guarded and infrequent, lest circumstances of individualized hardship supplant the rules of clearly drafted statutes). 17 47 My dissenting colleagues correctly point out that Rouse's petition was filed only one day late and argue that the most minor procedural default imaginable should not bar federal habeas review in light of what they consider to be his facially strong constitutional claim. Post at 261. We recognize that [a]t the margins, all statutes of limitations and filing deadlines appear arbitrary. Lookingbill v. Cockrell, 293 F.3d 256, 264-65 (5th Cir. 2002) (declining to equitably toll when the petition was only four days late); cf. Spencer, 239 F.3d at 631 (declining to equitably toll when the petition was only five days late). Failure to adhere to the AEDPA's precise filing deadlines, however, even by only a few days, would make navigating [the] AEDPA's timetable impossible. Such laxity would reduce predictability and would prevent us from treating the similarly situated equally. Lookingbill, 293 F.3d at 265. Accordingly, we look not to the length of the delay, but to the reasons for delay in determining whether equitable tolling is appropriate. 48 Turning to the argument that the nature of Rouse's sentence should affect the equitable tolling analysis, both Rouse and the dissent argue that we should follow the Third Circuit's decision in Fahy v. Horn, 240 F.3d 239 (3d Cir.2001), and allow `less than extraordinary circumstances to trigger equitable tolling' in capital cases because death is different. (Appellant's Br. at 31 (quoting Fahy, 240 F.3d at 245)); post at 264-265. Neither Supreme Court precedent nor precedent from this court supports applying a different test to capital cases on collateral review. 49 Although Rouse's underlying claims pertain to his trial, we deal here only with the application of the AEDPA limitations period. While it is undeniable that the Supreme Court has treated death differently, any distinctions between the procedures required in capital and noncapital cases are primarily relevant to trial, and the Supreme Court has generally rejected attempts to expand any [such] distinctions further. 18 Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 281, 118 S.Ct. 1244, 140 L.Ed.2d 387 (1998) (plurality opinion); see, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-10, 109 S.Ct. 2765, 106 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989) (plurality opinion); Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256-58, 108 S.Ct. 1792, 100 L.Ed.2d 284 (1988); Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538-39, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986). The Court has, for example, refused to create a special death penalty exception to the traditional harmless error standard of appellate review set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). See Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 256-58, 108 S.Ct. 1792. Satterwhite illustrates that even though capital defendants might be entitled to heightened procedural safeguards at trial, the standard of appellate review does not change solely because a capital sentence has been imposed. While recognizing that capital defendants have a constitutional right to consult with counsel prior to submitting to a psychiatric examination that would determine future dangerousness, see id. at 254, 108 S.Ct. 1792, when addressing a violation of this constitutional right, the Court held that traditional harmless error analysis applied even in the capital context. See id. at 258, 108 S.Ct. 1792. That is, death made a difference in terms of what procedures the state had to employ at trial but not in the appellate standard of review. 50 In addition, the Supreme Court has repeatedly declined to treat death differently in the post-conviction context. In Smith v. Murray, a capital case, the Court specifically rejected the claim that the principles governing procedural default apply differently depending on the nature of the penalty a State imposes for the violation of its criminal laws. Smith, 477 U.S. at 538, 106 S.Ct. 2661. Similarly, in Giarratano, the Court concluded that the rule of Pennsylvania v. Finley [that there is no constitutional right to counsel in state post-conviction proceedings] should apply no differently in capital cases than in noncapital cases. Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 10, 109 S.Ct. 2765 (plurality opinion); see also Herrera, 506 U.S. at 405, 113 S.Ct. 853 (holding that claims of actual innocence are not grounds for habeas relief even in a capital case and noting that we have `refused to hold that the fact that a death sentence has been imposed requires a different standard of review on federal habeas corpus' (quoting Giarratano, 492 U.S. at 9, 109 S.Ct. 2765 (plurality opinion))); cf. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991) (applying, in a capital case, the general requirement of cause and prejudice to overcome a state procedural bar). 51 The cases cited by my dissenting colleagues are not to the contrary. For example, quoting California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99, 103 S.Ct. 3446, 77 L.Ed.2d 1171 (1983), the dissent states that the Supreme Court has emphasized [that] `the qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing determination,' that is, `the procedure by which the State imposes the death sentence,' to `ensur[e] that the death penalty is not meted out arbitrarily or capriciously.' Post at 36. As this quotation reveals, the Court's principal concern has been more with the procedure by which the State imposes the sentence. Ramos, 463 U.S. at 999, 103 S.Ct. 3446. This fits nicely with the decisions quoted above, which acknowledge that heightened procedural safeguards may be necessary at trial. 52 Moreover, those cases cited by the dissent that discuss appellate decision-making do not support the dissent's position that, in capital cases, the doctrine of equitable tolling allows courts to rewrite the AEDPA statute of limitations. For example, my dissenting colleagues contend that the Supreme Court itself has, `in the interests of justice,' been willing to overlook requirements that it would ordinarily impose in non-capital cases. Post at 263 (citing Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 117, 102 S.Ct. 869, 71 L.Ed.2d 1 n.  (1982) (O'Connor, J., concurring)). Justice O'Connor's discussion, however, as the dissent notes, pertained to the question of whether an argument had been waived below, not the far more serious matter of whether to apply a narrow equitable exception to a statutory limitations period enacted by Congress and absolute by its terms. 19 53 The dissent also quotes Justice Scalia's concurrence in Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 360, 113 S.Ct. 835, 122 L.Ed.2d 103 (1993): I am willing to make an exception from that [previously stated `general' internal] rule in capital cases — but only where there is a realistic likelihood that the `technical error' affected the conviction or the sentence.  Post at 262-263 (emphasis and alterations supplied by dissent). The previously stated `general' internal rule to which the quoted passage refers, however, is simply the Court's internal presumption against granting certiorari in cases that have little importance beyond the parties involved; Justice Scalia certainly did not say that exceptions should be made to the equitable tolling analysis on habeas review of capital cases. 54 In fact, relaxing the statute of limitations in capital cases would contradict one of the main purposes of the AEDPA which was to reduce delays in the execution of state and federal criminal sentences, particularly capital cases.  Woodford v. Garceau, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. at 1401 (emphasis added); see also Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 226, 122 S.Ct. 2134, 153 L.Ed.2d 260 (2002) (noting the AEDPA's statutory purpose of encouraging prompt filings in federal court in order to protect the federal system from being forced to hear stale claims). An equitable tolling analysis that encouraged judicial subversion of Congress's limitation on federal habeas and devolved into a wide ranging inquiry into the proceedings of the state trial court and habeas court would undermine the principles of comity, finality, and federalism that animate the AEDPA. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436, 120 S.Ct. 1479, 146 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000). 55 Because we deal today with the district court's decision on habeas review not to toll the AEDPA limitations period, rather than with state capital procedures at trial or sentencing, we hold that Rouse's death sentence does not change the test we apply to determine if equitable tolling is warranted. 20