Opinion ID: 380476
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: summers' standing to assert a charge of racial discrimination

Text: 12 The district court concluded that the EEOC's subpoena enforcement action did not involve any question of racial discrimination by the College. EEOC v. Mississippi College, 451 F.Supp. at 565. The EEOC argues that this conclusion was erroneous because Summers included in her amended charge allegations that the College discriminated against blacks in the recruitment and hiring of faculty members. The EEOC asserts that Summers, a white female, has standing to charge the College with discrimination against others that affected her working environment. 13 A. Can a Person Charge Discrimination Against a Group of Which he is not a Member? 14 Section 703 of Title VII proscribes those employment practices utilized by an employer that discriminate against any individual because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Section 706(b) of Title VII permits a person claiming to be aggrieved, or . . . a member of the Commission to file with the EEOC a charge alleging an unlawful employment practice under Title VII. See id. § 2000e-5(b). 15 In Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957, 92 S.Ct. 2058, 32 L.Ed.2d 343 (1972), Judge Goldberg, without the concurrence of either of the two other panel members, concluded that an employee could charge her employer under § 703 with discrimination that, although not directed towards her, had the effect of creating a working environment heavily charged with discrimination. 6 Judge Goldberg observed that § 703(a)(1) of Title VII prohibits discrimination with respect with compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment and reasoned that Congress intended to encompass within Title VII subtle discriminatory practices that, while not directed toward the charging employee, affected the employee by creating a working environment polluted with discrimination. Id. at 237-39. 16 The College relies on Stroud v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 544 F.2d 892 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 844, 98 S.Ct. 146, 54 L.Ed.2d 110 (1977). In Stroud, a panel of this court, after noting in dictum that Delta Air Line's policy of hiring only female flight attendants violated § 703, stated that the plaintiff (a female former stewardess) is not a person who may assert the rights of prospective male flight attendants who would complain of this illegality. Id. at 893. We interpret Stroud to hold that a Title VII plaintiff may assert only his own right to be free from discrimination that has an effect upon him and may not assert the rights of others to be free from discrimination. 17 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 409 U.S. 205, 93 S.Ct. 364, 34 L.Ed.2d 415 (1972), will not permit the language in Stroud to bar every charge of discriminatory employment practices directed against a group of which the charging party is not a member. In Trafficante, the Supreme Court construed the meaning of the term person aggrieved contained in § 810(a) of the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a). The Court reasoned that by defining aggrieved person in § 810(a) to include (a)ny person who claims to have been injured by a discriminatory housing practice, Congress demonstrated an intent to confer standing to the fullest extent permitted by Article III of the United States Constitution. Because the black and white tenants of an apartment complex alleged to have discriminated against nonwhites met the requirement of Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 92 S.Ct. 1361, 31 L.Ed.2d 636 (1972), by alleging injury in fact in the form of the loss of important benefits from interracial associations, the Court found that they had standing to challenge the alleged discrimination against nonwhites by filing complaints under § 810 of the Fair Housing Act. 409 U.S. at 210, 93 S.Ct. at 367, 34 L.Ed.2d at 415. 18 We agree with other circuits that have held that the strong similarities between the language, design, and purposes of Title VII and the Fair Housing Act require that the phrase a person claiming to be aggrieved in § 706 of Title VII must be construed in the same manner that Trafficante construed the term aggrieved person in § 810 of the Fair Housing Act. See, EEOC v. Bailey Co., 563 F.2d 439, 450-54 (6th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 915, 98 S.Ct. 1468, 55 L.Ed.2d 506 (1978); Waters v. Heublein, 547 F.2d 466, 469-70 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 915, 97 S.Ct. 2988, 53 L.Ed.2d 1100 (1977). 7 19 We conclude that § 706 of Title VII permits Summers to file a charge asserting that Mississippi College discriminates against blacks on the basis of race in recruitment and hiring. 8 Our decision today does not allow Summers to assert the rights of others. We hold no more than that, provided she meets the standing requirements imposed by Article III, Summers may charge a violation of her own personal right to work in an environment unaffected by racial discrimination. B. Sufficiency of Summers' Charge 20 Two problems inhere in Summers' attempt to charge racial discrimination by the College. First, her charge does not identify how she has been injured by the alleged racial discrimination. Second, her charge of racial discrimination may not have been timely filed. 21 In her amended charge, Summers asserted that the College has discriminated on the basis of race by failing to recruit and hire Black faculty members. As a general rule, charges filed with the EEOC must be liberally construed because charging parties usually are unfamiliar with the technicalities of formal pleadings and are not assisted by an attorney. See Tillman v. City of Boaz, 548 F.2d 592, 596 (5th Cir. 1977); Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1970). Section 706(b) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), requires that charges be filed in writing under oath and that they contain such information and be in such form as the Commission requires. The EEOC's regulations establish very minimal requirements for the sufficiency of charges and allow technical defects or omissions to be cured by amendment: 22 a charge is sufficient when the Commission receives from the person making the charge a written statement sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of. A charge may be amended to cure technical defects or omissions, including failure to verify the charge, or to clarify and amplify allegations made therein. Such amendments and amendments alleging additional acts which constitute unlawful employment practices related to or growing out of the subject matter of the original charge will relate back to the date the charge was first received. . . . 23 29 C.F.R. § 1601.12(b) (1979). We conclude that, by identifying in a general fashion the parties involved and the action or practices complained of, Summers' amended charge sufficiently stated a charge of racial discrimination. Although Summers' amended charge fails to disclose the specific injury that she suffered because of the College's alleged racially discriminatory practices, we accept the argument of the EEOC that Summers could claim that the discrimination deprived her of the benefits arising from association with racial minorities in a working environment unaffected by discrimination. 24 The record before us on this appeal prevents us from determining whether Summers' charge of racial discrimination was timely. Summers' original charge filed with the EEOC alleged only that the College had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex in denying her a full-time faculty position. The issue of racial discrimination did not arise until Summers filed the amended charge on November 30, 1976. Because her allegations of racial discrimination do not relate to or grow out of the allegations of sex discrimination advanced in the original charge, that aspect of the amended charge does not relate back to the time of filing of her original charge. The charge of racial discrimination is therefore time barred unless it could have been timely filed on November 30, 1976, as a separate charge. 25 While the record does not establish the date on which her employment with the College terminated, it suggests that she left the College's employ following the 1975-76 school year. Thus the charge of racial discrimination by the College may be barred, if it was not filed within 180 days of the termination of her employment with the College. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 9 26 Summers' amended charge characterizes the discrimination as continuing. However, under the construction of her charge of racial discrimination urged by the EEOC and adopted by us on appeal, the unlawful practice ceased with respect to Summers once she left the working environment. See United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 558, 97 S.Ct. 1885, 1889, 52 L.Ed.2d 571 (1977). We leave the determination of the timeliness of her charge of racial discrimination to be determined by the district court on remand.