Opinion ID: 2843011
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: the cda immunizes backpage from liability

Text: With this background about subsection 230(c)(1)'s language, context, and policy choices in mind, I turn to J.S. 's claims. A. The Complaint's Factual Allegations Treat Backpage as a Publisher, Not a Content Creator The first prerequisite to subsection 230( c)(1) immunity is that the defendant is an interactive service provider. The parties do not dispute Backpage is such an interactive service provider. The parties are correct. 7 The second prerequisite to CDA immunity is that the interactive serv1ce provider (here, Backpage) is acting as a publisher or speaker. The parties do not dispute that J. S. 's claims treat Backpage as a publisher or speaker of information satisfying this second prerequisite to CDA immunity, also. Again, the parties are correct: J.S. seeks to impose liability on Backpage for failing to prevent or to remove certain advertisements. CP at 12 (Backpage.com continues to display prostitution ads that include minors without any meaningful safeguards or protections for the 7 See generally Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1162 n.6; see also MA. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1048 (E.D. Mo. 2011) (holding that Backpage is an interactive computer service); Schneider v. Amazon. com, Inc., 108 Wn. App. 454, 460-61, 31 P.3d 37 (2001) (Internet service providers are interactive computer services). 15 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) children.). This constitutes publication. See, e.g., Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1103 ([R]emoving content is something publishers do, and to impose liability on the basis of such conduct necessarily involves treating the liable party as a publisher of the content it failed to remove.); Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1170-71 ([A]ny activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under section 230.); Chi. Lawyers' Comm. for Civil Rights under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,671 (7th Cir. 2008) (ruling that defendant was immune because only in a capacity as publisher could [the defendant] be liable under [42 U.S.C. § 3604( c)]); Green v. Am. Online, 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) ([D]ecisions relating to the monitoring, screening, and deletion of content are actions quintessentially related to a publisher's role.). J.S. and the majority, however, argue that Backpage flunks the third prerequisite to CDA immunity because it could also be an information content provider. As discussed above, J.S. argues, Backpage engages in three distinct activities, each of which independently excludes CDA immunity. First, Backpage creates, at least some, unlawful content with respect to advertising the minor Plaintiffs for sex. Second, Backpage develops unlawful content by making online sex advertisements of the minor Plaintiffs usable and available. Third, Backpage encourages unlawful content, including postings offering the minor Plaintiffs for sex. CP at 89. Similarly, the majority holds, Backpage's advertisement posting rules were not simply neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain content but were 16 J.S., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings eta!., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) instead 'specifically designed ... so that pimps can continue to use Backpage.com to traffic in sex.' Majority at 8 (quoting CP at 12). Because we are reviewing a CR 12(b)( 6) motion, the assertion that Backpage constitutes a content provider must stand or fall on J. S. 's factual allegations, not on these legal arguments. First, J.S. alleges, The Backpage.com defendants were well aware that their website was being used in this way because they developed and required content to ensure that young girls, like the Plaintiffs, would continue to be advertised in this manner. CP at 2. The allegation about required content or content rules is not a basis for liability, as discussed below, at Part B. The allegation about awareness of illegal content is irrelevant, as discussed below, at Part D. And the allegation about the meaning of develop is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation. We do not consider such legal conclusions. Haberman, 109 Wn.2d at 120. J.S. also alleges that Backpage owns, operates, designs and controls the website Backpage.com, including its content, CP at 3, and that Backpage.com develops the content of the prostitution advertisements on its website through the use of the foregoing content requirements. CP at 10. This is a claim that equates content rules with content development. This is a legal assertion, and, as discussed below in Part B, it is one that Congress rejected when it enacted the CDA. 17 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) The complaint further alleges, [Backpage's] content requirements are specifically designed to control the nature and context of those advertisements so that pimps can continue to use Backpage.com to traffic in sex, including the trafficking of children, and so Backpage.com can continue to profit from those advertisements. CP at 12. Once again, content requirements-even content requirements that promote sex trafficking-do not constitute content d,evelopment under the CDA. The complaint similarly alleges, Backpage.com does not impose [a licensing] requirement for its website because it believes it is immune from liability, regardless of its substantial role in creating the content and context of the advertisements on its website. CP at 13. The allegation of creating the content, as J.S. presents it here, is a legal conclusion. Addressing the specific advertisements at issue, J.S. alleges, As a result of Backpage.com's relationship and agreement with [alleged pimp] Hopson, J.S. engaged in sexual activities with adults, including sexual intercourse with multiple adult customers per day for several months. CP at 17. J.S. also alleges that pimps dressed S.L. in lingerie and took photographs of her to create advertisements for the Backpage.com escort website .... The wordings of the advertisements were sexually suggestive and obvious invitations for commercial sex acts with the underage S.L., and from the appearance of her photographs it was obvious S.L. was 18 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) underage. CP at 17-18. J. S. further alleges, The wordings of the advertisements were sexually suggestive and obvious invitations for commercial sex acts with the underage L.C. and from the appearance of her photographs it was obvious L.C. was underage. The advertisements were for prostitution services and included contact information that allowed customers to access L.C. CP at 20. These allegations, while repulsive, do not demonstrate that Backpage created the content of these advertisements and hence do not form a basis for rejecting the application of CDA immunity here. I fear that the majority has accepted J.S.'s legal conclusions while failing to recognize the lack of supporting facts. But when we depart from J.S.'s legal argument and look only at factual allegations-as we must when reviewing a CR 12(b )(6) motion-we find allegations that pimps wrote and uploaded illegal content and that Backpage intentionally published it, knowing that it would lead to child sex trafficking. As discussed in the sections below, Congress has said that that is not content development, but publication. B. Under the CDA's Definitions, Backpage Did Not Develop Content by Maintaining Neutral Content Requirements J.S. argues that Backpage developed content by maintaining content requirements for advertisements posted on its website: [T]he backpage defendants developed the content of the escort advertisements themselves by providing phoney posting rules and 19 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) content requirements to instruct sex traffickers not to use certain words and graphics in order to avoid growing scrutiny by the public and law enforcement, all with the goal of allowing the backpage defendants to continue profiting from their illegal marketplace for sex. Br. ofResp'ts at 21. This allegation-that Backpage designed its posting rules to induce sex trafficking-might prove true. Indeed, we presume it is true when evaluating the sufficiency of J. S. 's complaint. But adopting such posting rules still does not make Backpage a content provider within the meaning of the CDA, even under the Ninth Circuit case upon which J.S., the majority, and the concurrence place principal reliance. Majority at 7-8; concurrence at 12-13. In that case, Roommates, the court held, [A] website helps to develop unlawful content, and thus falls within the exception to section 230, if it contributes materially to the alleged illegality of the conduct. 521 F.3d at 1168. 8 In fact, courts have consistently rejected the contention that defendants develop content by maintaining neutral policies prohibiting or limiting certain 8 J.S. asserts that the court in Roommates approved of several definitions of the term 'develop' and several methods by which a provider can become a 'developer, including making 'usable or available' and by 'researching, writing, gathering, organizing and editing information for publication on websites.' Br. ofResp'ts at 17-18 (quoting Roommates, 421 F.3d at 1168-69). J.S. misreads this case. The court in Roommates stated, [T]o read the term so broadly would defeat the purposes of section 230 by swallowing up every bit of the immunity that the section otherwise provides. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1167. And contrary to J.S.'s assertion, Br. ofResp'ts at 19, the Tenth Circuit in Fed. Trade Comm 'n v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1200 (lOth Cir. 2009), applied the Ninth Circuit's definition stated in Roommates. 20 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) content. For example, inDartv. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961,969 (N.D. Ill. 2009), which the majority cites at 7, the plaintiff claimed that even though Craigslist, an Internet classifieds service, prohibited illegal content on its website, users frequently posted ads promising sex for money. 665 F. Supp. 2d at 962. Consequently, the p1aintiff asserted that Craigslist ma[de] it easier for prostitutes, pimps, and patrons to conduct business. I d. at 963. A federal court in Illinois dismissed the claims on a Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion, explaining, Plaintiffs argument that Craigslist causes or induces illegal content is further undercut by the fact that Craigslist repeatedly warns users not to post such content. While we accept as true for the purposes of this motion plaintiffs allegation that users routinely flout Craigslist's guidelines, it is not because.Craigslist has caused them to do so. Or if it has, it is only 'in the sense that no one could post [unlawful content] if craigslist did not offer a forum.' Id. at 969 (quoting Chi. Lawyers', 519 F.3d at 671); see also Chi. Lawyers', 519 F .3d at 671 (Nothing in the service craigslist offers induces anyone to post any particular listing.); Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1171 (To be sure, the website provided neutral tools, which the anonymous dastard used to publish the libel, but the website did absolutely nothing to encourage the posting of defamatory content-indeed, the defamatory posting was contrary to the website's express policies. (citing Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1124)); Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193, 1198 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (rejecting plaintiffs claim relating to third21 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) party ads where the ads were 'contrary to [Google's] express polic[y]' (alterations in original) (quoting Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1171). The facts in Dart are analogous to the facts here. J.S. alleges that pimps-not Backpage-created and uploaded the ads at issue. CP at 2 (adult pimps ... posted advertisements for the girls), 17 (adult pimps ... create[ d] ... and then uploaded [the] advertisements of S.L. onto . . . Backpage.com). Nothing in Backpage's policies obligated users to flout Backpage' s express content requirements or to post unlawful content. J. S. 's allegations indicate that the pimps chose the content ultimately used in the advertisements. CP at 2, 12, 16, 17-18, 20-21. The actual information at issue consisted of the particular wording and photos that the pimps provided. CP at 16-21. Thus, holding Backpage liable would punish it for publishing third party content, and the CDA prohibits such liability. See also Jane Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) (dismissing claims brought on behalf of a minor sexually assaulted after meeting a man through the defendant's website: [Plaintiffs'] claims are barred by [section 230], notwithstanding their assertion that they only seek to hold MySpace liable for its failure to implement measures that would have prevented [the abuse]. Their allegations are merely another way of claiming that MySpace was liable for ... third-party-generated content.); Julie Doe v. MySpace Inc., 175 Cal. App. 4th 561, 573, 96 Cal. Rptr. 3d 148 (2009) 22 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings eta!., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) ([Plaintiffs] want MySpace to ensure that sexual predators do not gain access to (i.e., communicate with) minors on its Web site. That type of activity-to restrict or make available certain material-is expressly covered by section 230.); John Doe v. SexSearch.com, 502 F. Supp. 2d 719, 727-28 (N.D. Ohio 2007) (At the end of the day ... Plaintiff is seeking to hold SexSearch liable for its publication of thirdparty content and harms flowing from the dissemination of that content. . . . Section 230 specifically proscribes liability in such circumstances.), aff'd on other grounds, 551 F.3d 412 (6th Cir. 2008). J.S. and the majority then rely on Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1168, to suggest that Backpage lost immunity because it' contribute[d] materially to the illegality of the alleged conduct.' Majority at 8. They misread Roommates. In Roommates, the Ninth Circuit did hold that Roommates.com was an information content provider and was not entitled to immunity from liability for violating housing discrimination laws under the CDA. 521 F.3d at 1164. But as a condition for using its website, which is designed to help individuals find suitable roommates, Roommates.com required users to create a profile describing the user's desired roommate and mandated that users disclose his sex, sexual orientation and whether he would bring children to a household. Id. at 1161. Notably, the website also encouraged users to provide separate comments in an open-ended essay describing themselves and their desired roommate .. I d. The 23 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) Ninth Circuit ruled that while the website's users were information content providers because they ultimately provided the information for their profiles, this ''does not preclude Roommate[s.com] from also being an information content provider by helping 'develop' at least 'in part' the information in the [mandatory dropdown menu] profiles through its required questionnaire. Id. at 1165. The Ninth Circuit therefore concluded that Roommates.com lacked immunity for the discriminatory content that it mandated users provide with that drop-down menu and required discriminatory fields: Roommate[s.com] does not merely provide a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes; rather, Roommate[s.com]'s work in developing the discriminatory questions, discriminatory answers and discriminatory search mechanism is directly related to the alleged illegality of the site ... Roommate[s.com] is directly involved with developing and enforcing a system that subjects subscribers to allegedly discriminatory housing practices. Id. at 1172. Critically, however, Roommates also held that the defendant was immune from liability for the open-ended comments users posted, which the website neither required nor shaped through its questionnaire: Roommate[s.com] publishes these comments as written. It does not provide any specific guidance as to what the essay should contain, nor does it urge subscribers to input discriminatory preferences. Roommate[s.com] is not responsible, in whole or in part, for the development of this content, which comes entirely from subscribers and is passively displayed by Roommate[s.com]. Without reviewing every essay, Roommate[s.com] would have no way to distinguish unlawful 24 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) discriminatory preferences from perfectly legitimate statements. Nor can there be any doubt that this information was tendered to Roommate[ s.com] for publication online. !d. at 1173-74. Thus, the defendant in Roommates was immune from liability for claims based on nonmandatory content even if this content showed roommate selection on a discriminatory basis. But it was not immune for alleged violations of housing discrimination laws based on the comments that Roommates.com elicited with mandatory illegal questions about race, sex, or sexual preferences. Here, J.S. alleges that Backpage maintains policies prohibiting solicitation for illegal services exchanging sexual favors for money or other valuable consideration, prohibiting material that exploits minors, and prohibiting material that in any way constitutes or assists in human trafficking. CP at 9-10. J.S. also acknowledges-and even alleges-that Backpage prohibits the use of sexually explicit language; naked images; images using transparent clothing, graphic box, or pixelization to cover bare breasts or genitalia; certain code words; suggesting an exchange of sex acts for money; and advertising an illegal service. CP at 8. If users post advertisements that do not comply with these guidelines, ·it is not because Backpage caused them to do so with mandatory questions or in any other way. Thus, contrary to the majority's and the concurrence's arguments, majority at 8; concurrence at 11-12, unlike the website in Roommates, Backpage.does not tell users 25 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) that they should or must include certain information as a condition of using the website. And J.S. does not allege that Backpage induces users to post particular advertisements or express a preference for soliciting minors for sex. See Chi. Lawyers', 519 F.3d at 671-72. Backpage instead provide[s] a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes. Roommates, 521 F.3d at 1172. Based on these factual allegations, Backpage's rules did not cause or induce anyone to create, post, or search for illegal content. See Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 969. Therefore, even under Roommates, J.S. fails to allege facts that would establish Backpage created content through its posting requirements. C. Under the CDA, There Is No For-Profit Exemption J.S. also claims that CDA immunity does not apply because Backpage derives the vast majority of its income from sex trafficking. Br. of Resp'ts at 24. Backpage allegedly provid[es] commissions to pimps who refer other pimp customers, accepts pre-paid credit card payments for the advertisements of more than one girl from the same source, and charge[s] their users a higher fee to post in their 'escort' section than they do for any other section on their website. !d. But under the CDA, ' [t]he fact that a website elicits online content for profit is immaterial; the only relevant inquiry is whether the interactive service provider creates or develops that content.' MA. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041, 1050 (B.D. Mo 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting Goddard v. 26 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) - Google, Inc., No. C 08-2738JF(PVT), 2008 WL 5245490, at  (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2008) (court order)). Barring subsection 230(c) immunity because Backpage structured its website to increase its profits would be to create a for-profit exception to§ 230's broad grant of immunity. This the Court may not do. !d. Based on the allegations in this complaint, Backpage did not materially contribute to the development or creation of the content at issue no matter how much it benefited financially from the pimps' use of its website. D. Under the CDA, Backpage's Escort Category Does Not Defeat Immunity J.S. also claims that Backpage contributes materially to the unlawful content of the advertisements on its website because Backpage chose the term 'escorts' as its heading because it means 'prostitutes' in the world of sex trafficking, and thus would most effectively identify the internet location of illicit sex ads to johns. Br. ofResp'ts at 30. J.S. asserts that Backpage placed its own logo and the word escort on the individual ads in the escort section. !d. 9 J.S. further argues that Backpage encourages illegal content because selling sex online is backpage's business 9 Backpage contends that the website automatically generates the labels on the ads identifying the category in which the ad appears. Appellants' Reply Br. at 18 n.l5. Other courts have rejected similar claims that this defeats CDA immunity. See Seldon v. Magedson, No. CV-13-00072-PHX-DGC, 2014 WL 1456316, at ,  (D. Ariz. Apr. 15, 2014) (court order) (software that automatically published and filed a third-party's statements as philip-seldon I Ripoff Report I Complaints Reviews Scams Lawsuits Frauds Reported does not undercut Xcentric's claim to immunity under the CDA). 27 JS., S.L., and L. C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings eta!., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) model and because its website contains an 'escorts' section. I d. at 25, 27-28. J.S. continues that Backpage's knowledge about the illicit ads in its 'escorts' section shows that it is well aware that the services offered on its website are (1) illegal and (2) not the same as any of the lawful services regulated by state or municipal law. Id. at 28. J.S. cites First Global Communications, Inc., v. Bond, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (W.D. Wash. 2006), and states that the case recognize[ed] 'escort was a euphemism for prostitution services.' Br. of Resp 'ts at 28. This is incorrect. In fact, Bond involved websites that admittedly provided information about prostitution services in the United States and abroad. 413 F. Supp. 2d at 1151-52. The court made no findings about the term escort and did not seek to define this term. Rather, in describing the website, the court noted, Plaintiffs counsel acknowledged at oral argument that 'escort services' is essentially a euphemism for prostitution services. I d. at 1152. Therefore, we reject J.S. 's argument. See also City of Yakima v. Emmons, 25 Wn. App. 798, 802, 609 P.2d 973 (1980) (recognizing the existence of legitimate escort service[s]). Even ifescort were a euphemism for prostitute, subsection 230(c) would still provide immunity. In MA., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1049, the court stated, [T]he creation by Backpage of an 'adult' category does not impose liability on Backpage for ads posted in that category. The court in MA. cited Dart in rejecting the 28 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings eta!., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) plaintiffs claim that Backpage lacked immunity because it created an escort category: 'Craigslist created the categories, but its users create the contents of the ads and select which categories their ads will appear in.' !d. (quoting Dart, 665 F. Supp. at 962). 10 Similarly, in Prickett v. InfoUSA, Inc., 561 F. Supp. 2d 646, 651 (E.D. Tex. 2006), the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that because the anonymous third party was prompted to select subcategories through the Defendant's database gathering system, the Defendant directed the third party's selections. The fact that some of the content was formulated in response to the Defendant's prompts does not alter the Defendant's status [as a publisher]. Roommates simi~arly held that by 10 J.S. contends that MA. is distinguishable because while MA. involved similar facts (i.e. a minor trafficked on backpage.com), it was pled much differently than the child victims' case and the Missouri court was thereby limited in its analysis. Br. ofResp'ts at 32-33. Specifically, J.S. argues that MA. involved no allegations that Backpage was responsible for developing the ad content at issue or for encouraging the development of the content's offensive nature and that the court mistakenly seemed to regard backpage.com as an innocent classified ads website, instead of a deliberate purveyor of prostitution. ld. at 33. J.S. is partially correct. The MA. plaintiff alleged that Backpage '[w]as responsible in part for the development and/or creation of information provided through the internet or other internet computer service,' MA., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1044 (alteration in original), but also stated later that she was not suing Backpage for the ad content. I d. at 1046. In this case, in contrast, J.S. is suing Backpage for the ad content. But J.S.'s arguments still conflict with the allegations that pimps, not Backpage, uploaded advertisements with sexually suggestive wording and photographs. CP at 16, 17, 20. And the complaint here still alleges no facts showing that Backpage actually selected the wording or photos that the ads at issue contained. 29 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) creating a neutral category escort, a legal service in Washington, Backpage provided a tool but that the pimps were the ones who used it to develop the unlawful content. 521 F.3d at 1172. Accordingly, the creation of this category does not establish that Backpage contributed materially to unlawful content of the ads (within the meaning of the CDA). In fact, other federal courts have held that the First Amendment to the United States Constitution protects escort ads and that the CDA preempts state measures imposing liability for publishing escort ads. In Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1268 (W.D. Wash. 2012), for example, the court struck down as unconstitutionally vague a Washington statute that targeted Backpage by creating a criminal offense for 'advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor.' (Quoting S.B. 6251, at 2, 62d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012).) 11 The court found it unlikely that Defendants would be able to prove that all online advertisements for escort services are ads for prostitution. Id. at 1282. The court expressed concern that a website that contains a section for postings for escort services that chooses to either shut down that section or require age verification will likely chill protected speech 11 The court in McKenna stated, Washington legislators have openly stated that the challenged statute is aimed at Backpage.com and that they seek to eliminate escort ads and similar Internet postings. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1270. 30 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) in the course of doing so. Jd.; 12 see also Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 823 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (CDA preempted a Tennessee statute similar to Washington's, which impose[ d) liability on websites such as Backpage.com for selling or offering to sell advertisements, activity inherent in their role as publishers.); Dart, 665 F. Supp. 2d at 968 (Plaintiff is simply wrong when he insists that [the 'erotic services' category and subcategories] are all synonyms for illegal sexual services.). These cases demonstrate that a category for escort services on Backpage' s website is another neutral, legal tool that users misuse to commit unlawful acts. Therefore, J.S. cannot use this as a basis to defeat immunity. E. Under the CDA, Backpage's Alleged Knowledge Does Not Defeat Immunity We are thus left with J.S.'s theory that Backpage is liable for knowingly encouraging unlawful content promoting sex trafficking of children. But courts have consistently held that an allegation that a defendant encourages unlawful content is insufficient to defeat CDA immunity. See, e.g., Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 219 N.C. App. 227, 727 S.E.2d 550, 560 (2012) (the fact that a website acted in such a manner as to encourage the publication of unlawful material does not preclude a finding of 12 The court in McKenna also reasoned that numerous states license, tax and otherwise regulate escort services as legitimate businesses. !d. at 1282. See, e.g., RCW 82.04.050(3)(g) (escort services subject to state business and occupation tax); see also Appellants' Opening Br. at 30-31 n.13 (listing state and municipal provisions recognizing and regulating escort services). 31 J.S., S.L., and L. C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) immunity pursuant to [section] 230);Ascentive, LLCv. Opinion Corp., 842 F. Supp. 2d 450, 476 (E.D.N.Y. 2011) ([T]here is simply 'no authority for the proposition that [encouraging the publication of defamatory content] makes the website operator responsible, in whole or in part, for the 'creation or development' of every post on the site. (second alteration in original) (quoting Global Royalties, Ltd. v. Xcentric Ventures, LLC, 544 F. Supp. 2d 929, 933 (D. Ariz. 2008) (holding that the ripoffreport.com website was not an information content provider even though it allegedly encouraged defamatory reviews by others for its financial benefit)). As the First Circuit explained, It is, by now, well established that notice of the unlawful nature of the information provided is not enough to make it the service provider's own speech. Lycos, 478 F.3d at 420. Section 230 immunity applies even after notice of the potentially unlawful nature of the third-party content. Jd.; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 ([I]f computer service providers were subject to distributor liability, they would face potential liability each time they receive notice of a potentially defamatory statement-from any party, concerning any message, and such notice-based liability would deter service providers from regulating the dissemination of offensive material over their own services by confronting them with ceaseless choices of suppressing controversial speech or sustaining prohibitive liability, which is contrary to section 230's statutory purposes). Thus, despite Backpage's alleged knowledge that its users post illegal content, its 'failure to 32 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) intervene is immunized.' MA., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (quoting Goddard, 2008 WL 5245490, at ). To be sure, intentionally promoting child sex trafficking is a serious crime in our state. But encouraging users to use a website-even with the intent to promote sex trafficking of minors-does not convert a defendant into a content provider within the meaning of the CDA. F. Subsection 230(c)(l) Contains No Good Faith Requirement J.S. further claims that Backpage lacks immunity because backpage's 'posting rules' and 'content requirements' are not developed or enforced in a good faith effort to restrict offensive content, but rather in a surreptitious effort to evade law enforcement, skirt legal liability, and maintain the profitability of its escort website. Br. ofResp'ts at 31. The concurrence echoes this argument. Concurrence at 5, 9 n.4. J.S. and the concurrence cite 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2), which contains a good faith prerequisite to subsection 230( c)(2) immunity, to support this position. But Backpage moved to dismiss based on subsection 230(c)(1), a provision separate from subsection 230( c)(2). Subsection 230( c)(1) contains no intent-based exception to the immunity that it provides. See Levitt v. Yelp! Inc., No. C-10-1321EMC, 2011 WL 5079526, at  (N.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2011) (court order) ([subsection 230](c)(1)'s immunity applies regardless of whether the publisher acts in good faith), aff'd, 765 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1105 33 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) (Subsection [230]( c)(1 ), by itself, shields from liability all publication decisions, whether to edit, to remove, or to post, with respect to content generated entirely by third parties. Subsection [230]( c)(2), for its part, provides an additional shield from liability . . . not merely [for] those whom subsection [subsection] (c)( 1) already protects, but [for] any provider of an interactive computer service.). For that reason, courts have found that defendants are immune under subsection 230(c)(l) even ifthey act in bad faith. See, e.g., Zeran, 129 F.3d at 33133 (interactive service provider immune from defamation liability even when it has actual knowledge of statement's falsity); Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, No. CV 10-01360 SVW (PJWx), 2011 WL 2469822, at  (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (court order) (holding that defendant's deliberate manipulation ofHTML (hypertext markup language) computer code for paying customers to make certain reviews more visible in online search results was immune under section 230 and that [a]bsent a changing of the disputed reports' substantive content that is visible to consumers, liability cannot be found.); Blumenthal, 992 F. Supp. at 52. The concurrence seeks to avoid this conclusion by arguing that subsection 23 0( c)(2) basically eviscerates subsection 23 0( c)( 1). It does this by arguing that subsection 23 0( c)(2) provides the defendant with the defense, . while subsection 230(c)(1) essentially provides the defendant with nothing. Concurrence at 5-6. But we cannot ignore the plain language of a federal statute, or treat it as a superfluous, 34 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) any more than we can do that with a state statute. As the Seventh Circuit ruled, in rejecting the same argument, [S]ubsection [230]( c)(2) does not deal with the liability of speakers and publishers, the subject of subsection [230](c)(l). We read each to do exactly what it says. Chi. Lawyers', 519 F.3d at 671 (affirming grant of summary judgment). G. The Cases That J.S. Cites Do Not Support Their Legal Arguments J.S. compares this case to Anthony v. Yahoo!, Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257 (N.D. Cal. 2006), NPS LLC v. StubHub, Inc., No. 06-4874-BLS1, 2009 WL 995483, at 1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Jan. 26, 2009) (court order), Jones v. Dirty World Ent'mt Recordings, LLC, 965 F. Supp. 2d 818 (E.D. Kent. 2013) (Jones II), rev'd and vacated, Jones III, 755 F.3d 398, and Jane Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 767 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2014). Br. ofResp'ts at 32-37; Resp'ts Notice ofSuppl. Auth. Ex. A. In Anthony, the court rejected Yahoo's claim of immunity from liability where the plaintiff alleged that Yahoo created false dating profiles posted on its website and sent them to users for the purpose of luring them into renewing their subscriptions. 421 F. Supp. 2d at 1262. The court held that Yahoo was a content provider and was not immune from tort liability because it created the false profiles. Id. at 1263. But in contrast to the plaintiff in Anthony, J.S. does not allege that 35 JS., S.L., and L. C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) Backpage actually chose the content of the ads or otherwise created the actual challenged content. Thus, J.S. cannot rely on this case. In NPS, a Massachusetts state trial court applied the CDA and denied a website operator's motion for summary judgment with respect to a claim by a football team and stadium owner of intentional interference with the team's advantageous relationship with its season tickets holders. NPS, 2009 WL 995483, at . The court ruled that evidence in the record showed that the website materially contributed to its sellers' illegal 'ticket scalping' and, thus, CDA immunity did not apply. I d. at 13. Specifically, the website's pricing structure meant that it profited from violations of antiscalping laws; the website did not require a seller to disclose the face value of a ticket, so a buyer was unaware of whether the ticket price was above the legal threshold; and the website affirmatively encouraged underpriced ticket[] sales by waiving its fees for a certain class of sellers. I d. at  11. The court said that the absence of information about the face value of a ticket precluded a buyer from knowing if a ticket price was above the price threshold set by law and prevented any policing of the website to prohibit scalping. I d. Arguably, Backpage similarly engaged in willful blindness and maintained a pricing structure that encouraged pimps to misuse its website. But NPS conflicts with the cases discussed above that rejected similar arguments about a website's notice of the illegal content and its pricing structure. Notably, later cases have 36 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) rejected NPS. See, e.g., Milgram v. Orbitz Worldwide, Inc., 419 N.J. Super. 305, 16 A.3d 1113, 1126 (2010) (finding online ticket marketplace immune; dismissingNPS as inconsistent with other cases, and noting that it was quite fntnkly, unclear ... which facts the court used in reaching the conclusion that§ 230 did not apply); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 563 (declin[ing] to follow NPS as inconsistent with the decisions concluding that knowledge of unlawful content does not strip a website of [section 230] immunity). Although it is arguable that Backpage, like StubHub, contributed to the illegality here, NPS is an outlier. Internet Brands does not support J.S. 's claims, either. In Internet Brands, the Ninth Circuit held that the CDA did not apply to a model's claim against the operator of a social networking site for models for its negligent failure to warn that rapists were using the website to lure models to fake auditions where they would be drugged and sexually assaulted. 767 F.3d at 895. The court determined that the model's claim did not seek to hold the defendant liable for its failure to remove content that others created; rather, the claim sought to hold the defendant liable for its own failure to provide information that it allegedly possessed about the rapists. I d. at 897. The court explained, Any obligation to warn could have been satisfied without changes to the content posted by the website's users. Internet Brands would simply have been required to give a warning to Model Mayhem users, perhaps by posting a notice on the website or by informing users by e-mail the information it had about the 37 J.S., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) rapists' activities. Id. Because the plaintiff allegedly failed to generate its own warning to users, CDA immunity did not apply. Id. at 898. Here, J.S. alleges no similar failure to warn claim. J.S. seeks to hold Backpage liable as a publisher of content that third parties created. Finally, J.S. cites to Jones. In Jones, users could anonymously upload comments, photographs, and videos to a website called www.TheDirty.com, which the website's operator would select and publish along with his own editorial comments. Jones v. Dirty World Entm't Recordings, LLC, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1009 (E.D. Ky. 2012) (Jones I). After the plaintiff became the unwelcome subject of several posts, the district court denied immunity from her state tort claims. Jones II, 965 F. Supp. 2d at 823. The court found that the defendant invited and encouraged the postings through its name and by inciting the site's viewers to form 'the Dirty Army,' which [the defendant] urged to have 'a war mentality' against anyone who dared to object to having their character assassinated. Id. at 822-23. The defendant's comments about the plaintiff added to the posts at issue effectively ratified and adopted the defamatory third-party post. Id. at 823. After J.S. filed its brief, however, the Sixth Circuit reversed. Jones III, 755 F.3d at 402. Applying the material contribution test defined in Roommates and rejecting the district court's encouragement test, the Sixth Circuit held, 38 JS., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) Dirty World and Richie did not author the statements at issue; however, they did select the statements for publication. But Richie and Dirty World cannot be found to have materially contributed to the defamatory content of the statements posted on October 27 and December 7, 2009, simply because those posts were selected for publication. Nor can they be found to have materially contributed to the defamatory content through the decision not to remove the posts. Unlike in Roommates, the website that Richie operated did not require users to post illegal or actionable content as a condition of use. Nor does the name of the website, www.TheDirty.com, suggest that only illegal or actionable content will be published. Unlike in [Federal Trade Commission v. ]Accusearch[ Inc., 570 FJd 1187 (lOth Cir. 2009)], Richie or Dirty World did not compensate users for the submission of unlawful content. The website's content submission form simply instructs users to [t]ell us what's happening. Remember to tell us who, what, when, where, why. The form additionally provides labels by which to categorize the submission. These tools, neutral (both in orientation and design) as to what third parties submit, do not constitute a material contribution to any defamatory speech that is uploaded. Id. at 415-16 (fourth alteration in original). IV. No RELEVANT DIFFERENCE EXISTS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL PLEADING STANDARDS HERE Backpage also claims that the trial court applied CR 12(b)(6) improperly because it went beyond just accepting Plaintiffs' factual allegations and credited J.S. 's legal contentions that Backpage could be held liable for 'assist[ing] in developing' content. Appellants' Opening Br. at 43. Backpage also alleges, To the extent the Superior Court felt constrained to reject federal case law because of 39 JS., S.L., and L. C. v. Village Voice Media Holdings et al., No. 90510-0 (Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent) Washington's more lenient CR 12(b)(6) pleading standards, it erred for the separate reason that state procedural rules cannot trump federal substantive rights. Id. at 44. While I agree that it appears the trial court's order erroneously credited J. S. 's legal conclusions, rather than just J.S.'s factual allegations, federal and state law do not differ about crediting legal conclusions in a plaintiffs complaint on a CR or Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion. Haberman, 109 Wn.2d at 120 ([t]he court need not accept legal conclusions as correct); Papas an v. Allain, 4 78 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S. Ct. 2932, 92 L. Ed. 2d 209 (1986) (on a motion to dismiss, courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation). Washington's more relaxed pleading standards did not play any role in this case.