Opinion ID: 2674842
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Counterarguments

Text: Tandon and Doohan raise several counterarguments, none of which we find persuasive. First, they claim that the “type of incident” involved should include the actions leading up to the fistfight—including their alleged negligence in piloting the Up and Over in hot pursuit of the water taxi. That argument confuses the first and second parts of the connection test. The first part of the connection test looks to the nature of the incident that immediately caused the underlying injury; the second part, by contrast, looks to the nature of the broader activity giving rise to that incident. To take a few concrete examples: the type of incident at issue in Executive Jet was an airplane crash in navigable water, while the nature of the activity giving rise to that incident was air travel generally. See Sisson, 497 U.S. at 363–64 (describing Executive Jet). The type of incident at issue in to claims by seamen against their employers even for injuries on land. See O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 42–43 (1943); see also Schoenbaum, supra, § 3‐7, at 160–62 & n.3. 29 Foremost was a collision between two boats on navigable water, while the nature of the activity giving rise to that incident was the navigation of vessels generally. Id. (describing Foremost). The type of incident at issue in Sisson was a fire on a vessel docked at a marina on navigable waters, while the activity giving rise to that incident was the storage and maintenance of a vessel at a marina on navigable waters. Id. at 363–65. In each case, the first part of the connection test looked more narrowly at the event that directly caused the injury at issue; the second part of the connection test looked more broadly at the proximate causes of that event. Cf. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 541 (asking, in applying the second part of the connection test, “whether one of the arguably proximate causes of the incident originated in the maritime activity of a tortfeasor”). Here, the event that immediately caused Genna’s injuries was the physical altercation on and around the South Dock. It is that “incident” to which we look in determining the “type of incident” at issue and its potential effect on maritime commerce. Tandon and Doohan next emphasize that the fight took place not only on the dock itself, but also in the water beside the dock. We agree that in considering the type of incident involved, the location of the incident may be relevant. And we agree that on the facts found by the district court, it appears some harm was 30 done in the water as well as on the dock. That is why we characterize the type of incident at issue as a physical altercation on and around a permanent dock surrounded by navigable water. But we are not convinced by the conclusion Tandon and Doohan seek to draw: that because the incident involved some harm suffered on navigable water, it necessarily had a potential effect on maritime commerce. Not all torts that happen on or over navigable water have the potential to disrupt commercial shipping. Otherwise, there would be no need for the potential effect test at all; we could simply apply the location test in its place. Cf. Foremost, 457 U.S. at 675 n.5 (noting that the substantial relationship test is necessary because “[n]ot every accident in navigable waters that might disrupt maritime commerce will support federal admiralty jurisdiction”). Tandon and Doohan speculate that when a fight occurs partly in navigable water, the struggling bodies could themselves pose a navigational hazard. Because the class of incidents we are considering is limited to fights on and around permanent docks, however, we do not worry that the combatants might present an obstacle to commercial navigation in open sea lanes. Unlike the “collision between two pleasure boats in navigable waters” considered in 31 Foremost, the type of incident described here could not disrupt commerce by occurring at the mouth of the St. Lawrence Seaway, because there are no permanent docks stationed in the middle of that major shipping route. (If there were, it would be the docks themselves rather than the altercation that would threaten commercial navigation.) We thus think that the scenario Tandon and Doohan pose presents only a fanciful risk to commercial shipping. See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 539. At worst, an incident of this sort might temporarily prevent commercial vessels from mooring at the permanent dock around which the fight occurred. Cf. Sisson, 497 U.S. at 362 (noting that a fire on a boat at a marina can “make the marina inaccessible to [commercial] vessels”). But the potential impact of such a temporary disruption is simply too meager to support jurisdiction. The fire considered in Sisson might have damaged a marina enough to close it for days or weeks, or even permanently; a fistfight presents no similar danger. At worst, it might prevent commercial ships from using part of a dock for a few hours. We do not think that this slight possibility of a temporary inconvenience is the “potentially disruptive impact on maritime commerce” envisioned by the Supreme Court’s test. Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538. 32 Alternatively, Tandon and Doohan suggest that a fight on a dock surrounded by navigable water may require emergency responders to come to the dock by boat and leave by boat, potentially snarling naval traffic in nearby waters. We recognize that other courts have found the potentially disruptive impact of a maritime emergency response enough to satisfy the first part of the connection test in some cases. See, e.g., In re Mission Bay Jet Sports, LLC, 570 F.3d 1124, 1129 (9th Cir. 2009); Ayers v. United States, 277 F.3d 821, 827–28 (6th Cir. 2002); Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 602 (3d Cir. 1991). Those cases, however, have generally dealt with incidents occurring either aboard a vessel or else in open water. See, e.g., Mission Bay, 570 F.3d at 1129 (considering “harm by a vessel in navigable waters to a passenger”); Ayers, 277 F.3d at 827 (considering “a drowning which occurred a short distance downstream from a lock on navigable waters”). Where such an incident takes place on a vessel or in open water far from the shore, the potential danger to commercial shipping posed by a maritime emergency response may be more significant. Cf. Roane v. Greenwich Swim Comm., 330 F. Supp. 2d 306, 315 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]hose on board a boat . . . giving their full attention to the saving of the life of a swimmer in difficulty may well be 33 distracted from hazards posed by the approach of other boats unaware of the rescue in progress, or coming at speed in an effort to assist.”). But the type of incident at issue in this case is a fight on and around a permanent dock, not a fight on a vessel or in open water. The risks to maritime commerce posed by a rescue operation at a dock are substantially lower than the risks to maritime commerce posed by a rescue operation at sea. Emergency responders may have to travel by boat to reach persons injured near a permanent dock, but they will never have to travel far. And once the emergency responders arrive at the scene, they can moor their vessel at the permanent dock, rather than having to focus simultaneously on navigating their vessel and rescuing the injured. An emergency response to an incident on and around a floating dock is consequently much less likely to “ensnarl maritime traffic,” Mission Bay, 570 F.3d at 1129, than an emergency response to an incident on a vessel or an incident in open water.8 8 Tandon and Doohan also cite a number of specific facts about this incident that they claim increased the risk of disruption to maritime commerce. Those facts include, for instance, that the incident occurred on Memorial Day weekend, and that the Up and Over allegedly left the South Dock after the incident at a high rate of speed. To the extent their argument rests on specific aspects of the incident that actually occurred, it clearly fails, because our analysis looks only to the general type of incident at issue rather than particular facts about that incident. See Grubart, 513 U.S. at 538. To the extent they simply raise these facts to show that this type of incident has a potential disruptive 34 Indeed, accepting the argument that Tandon and Doohan advance would effectively eviscerate the first part of the connection test. If the possibility of a maritime emergency response is alone enough to show a potential impact on maritime commerce, then almost any tort occurring anywhere on or near navigable water would satisfy this requirement.9 We do not think this part of the connection test is so easily evaded. Because the type of incident at issue in this case poses only “a fanciful risk to commercial shipping,” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 539, it is outside the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction extended by 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1).10 The district court was therefore correct to dismiss the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. effect on maritime commerce, we remain unconvinced that the potential risk is anything more than fanciful. 9 Perhaps the requirement might still rule out, for example, a defamation claim, see Wells v. Liddy, 186 F.3d 505, 523–27 & n.16 (4th Cir. 1999), or a claim for tortious interference with contract, see Wiedemann & Fransen, A.P.L.C. v. Hollywood Marine, Inc., 811 F.2d 864, 865–66 & n.1 (5th Cir. 1987) (per curiam). We need not consider such questions here. 10 As this incident does not satisfy the first part of the connection test, we do not reach the second part, and thus need not decide whether the “activity giving rise to the incident shows a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.” Grubart, 513 U.S. at 534 (internal quotation marks omitted). 35