Opinion ID: 1159924
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gibb's Standing to Appeal

Text: To have standing to make an administrative appeal under HRS § 91-14(a), Gibb 1) must be an aggrieved person; and 2) must have participated in the contested case before the administrative agency. [2] Jordan v. Hamada, 64 Haw. 451, 643 P.2d 73 (1982). Spiker argues Gibb is not a person but an agency who cannot appeal from the Commission's ruling. We conclude otherwise. HRS § 91-1 (1976) reads in relevant part: (1) Agency means each state or county board, commission, department, or officer authorized by law to make rules or to adjudicate contested cases, except those in the legislative or judicial branches. (2) Persons includes individuals, partnerships, corporations, associations, or public or private organizations of any character other than agencies. .... (4) Rule means each agency statement of general or particular applicability and future effect that implements, interprets, or prescribes law or policy, or describes the organization, procedure, or practice requirements of any agency. The term does not include regulations concerning only the internal management of an agency and not affecting private rights of or procedures available to the public, nor does the term include declaratory rulings issued pursuant to section 91-8 nor intra-agency memoranda. (Emphasis added). Gibb is thus an agency if he engages in rulemaking that affects private rights of or procedures available to the public. Here, there is no contention Gibb has promulgated or enforced any such rules. The decision not to rehire Spiker based on an informal, unwritten policy against hiring anyone under investigation for possible criminal wrongdoing was a purely internal management function not within the scope of HRS § 91-1(4). See Waugh v. University of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 117, 621 P.2d 957 (1981); Holdman v. Olim, 59 Haw. 346, 581 P.2d 1164 (1978); Doe v. Chang, 58 Haw. 94, 564 P.2d 1271 (1977). Gibb, therefore, was not an agency based on the definitions provided in HRS § 91-1 and possessed standing under HRS § 91-14(a) to appeal the Commission's order. Spiker argues In re Eric G., 65 Haw. 219, 649 P.2d 1140 (1982), is dispositive. Eric G. held the Department of Education was an agency, not an aggrieved person, and lacked standing to appeal an adverse administrative hearings ruling under HRS § 91-14(a) (though DOE was entitled to appeal under a separate controlling federal act). We noted there: A plain English reading of 91-1 ... HRS discloses a clear and understandable legislative directive that agencies are not `persons' with standing to appeal administrative action. Id. at 224, 649 P.2d at 1143. Eric G. is clearly distinguishable from the present case. The Department of Education is undisputedly an agency within the meaning of HRS § 91-1(4). Unlike Gibb, the Department of Education promulgates rules subject to the requirements of the Hawaii Administrative Procedure Act (HRS Chapter 91) that affect private rights of or procedures available to the public. Eric G. is not applicable to this case.