Opinion ID: 217428
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Compliance Hearing

Text: Although the district court held what it described as a compliance hearing in September 2006 to determine whether the defendants were in compliance with the consent decrees, the court clearly considered the operative issue to be whether the Defendants were in contempt of the consent decrees. Thus, at the outset of the bench trial, the district court stated: I want to take a minute and make sure that we're all on the same page as far as the standard which the Court must apply here, because I think that is very critical. This casewell, first of all, let me indicate that civil contempt, which I think is really the only remedy that the court can consider here. I don't know that I can award damages per se. But civil contempt consists of a party's disobedience to a specific and definite court order by failure to take all reasonable steps within the party's power to comply. The party should not be held in contempt if its actions appear to be based on a good faith and reasonable interpretation of the Court's order, and the party alleging civil contempt must demonstrate that the alleged contemnor violated the Court's order by clear and convincing evidence. . . . Thus, as discussed above, the only issues are, has the plaintiff's [sic] shown by clear and convincing evidence that the defendants have not substantially complied with their obligations under the consent decree. In its Findings and Conclusions, the district court further explained: In determining whether a party has complied with a consent decree, the Court must consider what enforcement mechanisms are available. Obviously, the only real sanction available to the Court is to find that a party is in contempt for failing to comply with the consent decree. [5] The district court then resolved to evaluate the evidence presented to determine whether the defendants violated the Action Items using the civil contempt standard. It is clear from the above statements of the district court that all of its findings with regard to the Action Items were subject to the evidentiary burden and standard of proof for establishing civil contempt. Rather than requiring the Defendants to demonstrate substantial compliance by a preponderance of the evidence, the court required the Plaintiffs to show by clear and convincing evidence that, first, the Defendants had violated the Action Items beyond substantial compliance and, second, that the violation was not based on good faith and reasonable interpretation of the judgment. That standard was reiterated many times by the district court in its findings. The district court never stated that the Defendants bore or had sustained the burden of showing substantial compliance. Thus, whether the district court's findings were phrased as failures of the Plaintiffs to sustain their burden of proof, or as statements that the Defendants had substantially complied, the findings were all the products of the civil contempt burden and standard of proof. The district court's allocation of the burden and standard of proof would have been appropriate if the only issue had been whether the Defendants should be held in contempt. [6] But that framework was not appropriate for determining whether the Defendants had sufficiently complied with the consent decrees so that they were entitled to have the decrees vacated. The adherence of the district court to the burden and standard of proof for civil contempt is illustrated by the fact that, with regard to Action Items Nos. 12B, 13A, 21C, 23B, 27F, 29G, 31F, and 31L, the only finding was that the Plaintiffs had failed to sustain their clear and convincing burden of proof. With regard to Action Items 2B, 18C, 26D, 26G, 28B, 28F, 29K, 32D, and 32E, the court referred to evidence in the record, but ruled only that the Plaintiffs had failed to meet their burden of proof, without a finding that the Defendants had substantially complied. Yet the effect of these rulings was to consider the Defendants to have substantially complied with all of those Action Items for the purposes of determining whether the consent decrees should be vacated. Some of these findings that the Plaintiffs had not sustained their burden of proof were based on the court's requirement, understandable enough for purposes of determining whether some of the Defendants were in contempt, that the Action Item place a burden of action on an individual Defendant. The result was that if an Action Item required something to occur but failed to specify the individual responsible for initiating or following through on the action, the district court typically held that the plaintiffs did not identify any specific and definite requirements with which the individual defendants failed to comply. Again, that approach may be appropriate for a finding that no one is in contempt, but it does not answer the question whether an action item that contemplated a step to be taken collectively by the Defendants had been substantially performed. With regard to the above-listed Action Items, that question simply has not been answered. This deficiency is particularly apparent when the Action Item contemplates activity by the Idaho Children's Council on Mental Health (ICCMH), a coordinating council that was established by the Governor in accordance with a recommendation of the independent Needs Assessment. The membership of the ICCMH included the Governor and representatives from several state agencies, including the DHW and the DJC. The district court stated at the outset of its February 7, 2007, Findings and Conclusions: [W]hen determining whether a defendant is in compliance with an Action Item that requires action on the part of ICCMH, the Court will consider whether, and to what extent, Plaintiffs have shown by clear and convincing evidence that an individual defendant has a specific duty to act. If a defendant failed to do its part as a member of the ICCMH, the Court will hold that defendant in contempt. However, a general assertion that the ICCMH failed to fulfill an Action Item is not sufficient to find an individual defendant in contempt. Again, this approach is quite appropriate for ruling which individuals, if any, are in contempt. But it does not address the issue whether, when the ICCMH has failed to act as required by an Action Item, the Defendants (i.e., the Governor or the DHW or, to a more limited extent, the DJC) have failed to achieve the agreed action required by the consent decrees before those decrees may be vacated. For example, the court set out Action Item 30G and its finding as follows: 30G: The ICCMH will use this information [day treatment data and standards] to develop recommendations for the Governor's consideration in developing his budget decisions. DHW tracks the utilization of the day treatment which is included in the Community Report. (Tr., p. 1629). Plaintiffs failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the defendants failed to comply with any specific and definite requirements of the defendants related to this Action Item, and therefore Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof. Moreover, to the extent DHW had requirements under the Action Item, DHW substantially complied with those requirements. It is noteworthy that this finding does not indicate that ICCMH or anyone else used the day treatment data and standards to develop recommendations for the Governor's consideration in developing his budget decisions, or that the Governor considered any such recommendations. Yet the parties to these consent decrees agreed that carefully developed recommendations for the Governor were needed to accomplish the purposes of the decrees. It may be that DHW's responsibility for any failures on the part of ICCMH was insufficiently spelled out to permit holding individuals or DHW in contempt. But the Item is set forth with sufficient specificity to indicate that data-based recommendations concerning day treatment are a requirement for substantial compliance with the decree. It is true that the Action Items were sometimes vague in setting out exactly who was to do what. An example is Action Item 4M, which was treated as follows in the district court's 2007 Findings and Conclusions: 4M: Clarification of the Role of Regional and Local councils to provide information to their communities. ICCMH approved a communication strategy and DHW developed a social marketing plan and numerous multimedia methods to use as outreach tools. (Tr., p. 1484). However, this does not necessarily clarify the role of the Regional and Local councils. Plaintiffs failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the defendants failed to comply with any specific and definite requirements of the defendants related to this Action Item, and therefore Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof. Moreover, to the extent DHW had requirements under the Action Item, DHW substantially complied with those requirements. Here again, it is important to differentiate between the question whether anyone is to be held in contempt and the question whether there has been substantial compliance with the consent decrees. The Action Item well may be too vague in imposing duties to permit contempt sanctions to be imposed on individuals. See Balla v. Idaho State Bd. of Corrections, 869 F.2d 461, 465 (9th Cir.1989). But the parties to the consent decrees agreed to the clarification called for by the Action Item. In reaching such an agreement, the parties clearly contemplated action by some person or entity. It is most reasonable to conclude that the burden is on the state Defendants; it certainly could not be upon the Plaintiffs, who are not part of the Idaho government. The court's finding wholly absolves DHW of any responsibility for achieving the result commanded by Action Item 4M, and results in a finding of substantial compliance when the action required by the Action Item has not come to pass (at least so far as any finding shows). The Plaintiffs have made extended arguments that several of the district court's findings were clearly erroneous, particularly those dealing with funding of community-based services. We decline to review these findings because they were made under an incorrect burden and standard of proof, as we have already explained. We have no way of determining whether and how these findings would change when the evidence is assessed by the district court with the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence placed on the Defendants to show substantial compliance with the Action Items. As explained in the next section, the status of funding, when found by the district court under the proper burden and standard of proof, will enter the determination whether the purposes of the consent decrees have been satisfied to the degree that permits vacatur of the decrees. In sum, then, we conclude that the employment of the contempt burden and standard of proof was improper for a determination of substantial compliance that permits the consent decrees to be vacated, and that it had sufficiently prejudicial effects on the findings and conclusions of the district court so that its order vacating the decrees must be reversed.