Opinion ID: 1894449
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Judicial Role

Text: Eichelberger's second assignment of error asserts the trial court abandoned a neutral and unbiased status and role in order to testify and otherwise adduce evidence during the trial. The record reveals that the trial judge questioned no witnesses before the jury and therefore cannot be said to have adduce[d] evidence in connection with the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. The record also demonstrates that the trial judge made no statement at all to the jury which may be characterized as testimony, nor even any comment on the evidence. The sole comment to the jury to which Eichelberger's assigned error may by some leap of imagination be taken to refer is the court's accurate notation for the record, following Eichelberger's erroneous assertion to the contrary, that [t]he record reflects that the defendant did waive or indicated to the court that he did want to represent himself.... The record should further reflect that Mr. Gooch is here as standby counsel. It is, of course, axiomatic that a court should refrain from commenting on the evidence or making remarks prejudicial to a litigant or calculated to influence the minds of the jury. State v. Bideaux, 219 Neb. 718, 365 N.W.2d 830 (1985). See, also, Pitt v. Checker Cab Co., 217 Neb. 600, 350 N.W.2d 507 (1984). In this case, however, it is clear that no such remarks were made. The comments the judge made outside the presence of the jury dealt with matters concerning the progress of the case and were made necessary by Eichelberger's obvious attempt to manipulate and thwart the judicial process. As noted in U.S. v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952 (10th Cir. 1987), speaking in the context of a request for a substitution of counsel, when a court suspects manipulation on the part of a criminal defendant, it must balance the need for the efficient administration of the criminal justice system against the defendant's rights. The trial judge in this case correctly struck that balance. To the extent Eichelberger may be understood to complain that the trial judge took judicial notice of the record in this case, it is a well-established principle that in a criminal case a court may take judicial notice of its own records in the case under consideration. State v. Coffen, 184 Neb. 254, 166 N.W.2d 593 (1969). Eichelberger's hyperbolic characterization of the trial judge's statements as abandonment of proper judicial demeanor borders dangerously on misrepresentation of the record.