Opinion ID: 196811
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Appellant's Motion for Mistrial

Text: 30 Appellant also appeals the denial of his motion for a mistrial on the grounds that improper testimony was prejudicial. We review the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. United States v. Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d 993, 998 (1st Cir.1995) (The trial judge is best situated to make a battlefield assessment of the impact that a particular piece of improper information may have on a jury.); United States v. Sepulveda, 15 F.3d 1161, 1184 (1st Cir.1993) (Granting or denying a motion for mistrial is a matter committed to the trial court's discretion.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 2714, 129 L.Ed.2d 840 (1994). 31 Appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a mistrial which he made after Schaller testified that Appellant owned a gay night club. The trial transcript shows that Schaller testified on direct as follows: 32 Q: Now, in the beginning of the restaurant when it first opened, how often did you speak with the defendant about the Galleria II Restaurant? 33 A: On a daily basis. 34 Q: When you say daily basis, was that on the phone or in person? 35 A: Usually in person. 36 Q: Where was that? 37 A: At the club that he owns in Providence, Gerardo's. 38 Q: What type of club is that? 39 A: A gay night club. 40 (Transcript, Vol. 4 at 98-99). At this point, Appellant objected to the comment and moved for a mistrial on the grounds that the comment was completely gratuitous ... [a]nd it was designed specifically to, solely to[,] inflame the passions and prejudice of this jury. (Transcript, Vol. 4 at 99). 41 Although the court seemed to agree with the government that the information was offered as strictly background information, the court was nonetheless concerned about the possibility that some jurors may have a view that someone who runs a gay bar may not be an upstanding citizen. (Transcript, Vol. 4 at 99-100). The court decided to speak with the jurors individually to ascertain (i) whether the juror was affected by the testimony in any way; (ii) whether the juror would remain impartial; and (iii) whether the juror would be able to render a verdict based on the evidence and the law as instructed by the court, without regard to the fact that Appellant operated a gay night club. After every juror responded that he or she would not be affected by the testimony in rendering his or her verdict, (Transcript, Vol. 4 at 101-12), the court concluded, All right. I'm satisfied. (Transcript, Vol. 4 at 113). At this point, and without further comment by counsel, testimony resumed. At the end of trial, Appellant did not request any additional questions be asked of the jurors or that any additional instructions be given. 42 Based on the record, and under the guiding principle that a district court may declare a mistrial only as a last resort, Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1184, we find that the district court's decision was well within the broad range of its discretion. Rivera-Gomez, 67 F.3d at 999. The district court properly weighed the claim of impropriety and determined that it was unfounded based on his voir dire of the jurors. United States v. Hahn, 17 F.3d 502, 508 (1st Cir.1994) (A mistrial need not be allowed absent a clear showing of prejudice.). Moreover, the district court acted swiftly by polling the jurors immediately after the improper testimony. 10 Sepulveda, 15 F.3d at 1185 (Swiftness in judicial response is an important element in alleviating prejudice once the jury has been exposed to improper testimony.). The government argues that this polling effectively provided a curative instruction that the jurors were not to consider evidence that Appellant operated a gay night club in determining guilt or innocence. Given the questions asked and the responses received, we agree that the district court efficaciously dispelled any prejudicial effect of Schaller's statement by its immediate and thorough response. See United States v. Bello-Perez, 977 F.2d 664, 672 (1st Cir.1992) (affirming denial of motion for mistrial where [a]ny prejudicial effect of the remark was efficaciously dispelled). Finally, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt presented during the trial, the challenged testimony was innocuous. Bello-Perez, 977 F.2d at 672 (denying mistrial where evidence of guilt was overwhelming). 43