Opinion ID: 200625
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Morehead v. Atkinson-Kiewit

Text: 13 In Morehead, the en banc Court considered a dual capacity claim very similar to this case. Morehead was employed as a carpenter on a bridge construction project and a line-handler on a barge used for the project. Id. at 605. Atkinson-Kiewit (A-K), the construction contractor, was not only Morehead's employer, but, as charterer of the barge, was also the vessel owner. Id. at 606-07 (noting that under 33 U.S.C. § 902(21) bare-boat charterers such as A-K were liable as vessel owners under § 905(b)). While Morehead was handling a heavy line on the barge deck, he stepped backwards into an open hatch and was injured. The hatch had negligently been left open by a co-worker, who, like Morehead, had been hired both for carpenter and scowman duties. Id. at 614. 14 The plaintiff argued that A-K violated vessel duties owed to Morehead because at the time he was injured A-K as vessel (rather than A-K as employer) [had] `active control' over the open hatch. Id. That is, because no construction purpose (and therefore no employment purpose) was being pursued at the time of his injury, the hatch was within A-K's control in its capacity as a vessel owner, not an employer. 2 Id. 15 We rejected this argument, and found instead that both Morehead and the employee who left the hatch open had been hired both for carpenter and scowman duties. Id. We noted that both employees were expected as part of their employment duties to lend a hand with supporting maritime chores as well as to pursue their particular construction trade. Id. Consequently, we agreed that A-K's active control over the open hatch was therefore attributable to it as employer, not as vessel, since the hatch was opened ... and the line thrown in the course of harbor worker duties which both men were regularly hired to perform. Id. Since both men were acting as employees, rather than as A-K's agent in a distinct shipowner's capacity, we found that any negligence on A-K's part was committed in its capacity qua employer. Id. at 616. As a result, Morehead's suit was barred under § 905(a). Id. 16 In reaching this conclusion, we expressly rejected any dual capacity approach that would focus on the specific activities of the employee to determine whether the employee's actions were benefitting the defendant in its capacity as vessel owner or employer at the time the employee was injured. Id. at 614-15. That is, we rejected any functional approach which would lead us to question whether an accident occurred in furtherance of a `construction' objective or a `vessel' objective. Id. We stated: 17 A functional interpretation, hinging the type of liability on the nature and purpose of the duties being performed by covered employees at any given time, would increase uncertainty and the frequency of disputes over the scope of the coverage. As [the two employees involved in the accidents] employment contemplated that they would alternate frequently between construction and linehandling, a single overall classification of their duties is most appropriate for determining the types of remedies available. 18 Id. at 615. Because the functional approach increased uncertainty and contravened the Congressional intent behind the LHWCA by expanding vessel owner liability, we concluded that the dual capacity vessel could be held liable under section 905(b) only to the extent that it breached its duties of care while acting in its capacity as a vessel. Id.