Opinion ID: 6107541
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: The Reinitiation of Questioning

Text: As noted, defendant asserted his right to counsel at the end of the San Quentin interview and the officers promptly stopped their questioning. Defendant contends the officers violated his rights under Edwards , supra , 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , when, 10 days later, they resumed questioning on the car trip to the station despite his earlier invocation of Miranda rights. We reject his claim. Defendant reinitiated further communications with the officers when they arrived at San Quentin to take custody of him, thus allowing for further questioning under Edwards . ( Edwards , supra , 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880 .) [W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation .... [There is to be no] further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police. ( Edwards , supra , 451 U.S. at pp. 484-485, 101 S.Ct. 1880 ; accord, People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347 , 384, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771 , 227 P.3d 342 .)  Edwards set forth a 'bright-line rule' that all questioning must cease after an accused requests counsel. [Citation.] In the absence of such a bright-line prohibition, the authorities through '[badgering]' or 'overreaching'  - explicit or subtle, deliberate or unintentional - might otherwise wear down the accused and persuade him to incriminate himself notwithstanding his earlier request for counsel's assistance. ( Smith v. Illinois (1984) 469 U.S. 91 , 98, 105 S.Ct. 490 , 83 L.Ed.2d 488 .) [I]t is presumed that any subsequent waiver that has come at the authorities' behest, and not at the suspect's own instigation, is itself the product of ... 'inherently compelling pressures' and not the purely voluntary choice of the suspect. ( Arizona v. Roberson (1988) 486 U.S. 675 , 681, 108 S.Ct. 2093 , 100 L.Ed.2d 704 ; Gamache , at p. 385, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771 , 227 P.3d 342 .) Thus, the People must show both that the defendant reinitiated discussions and that he knowingly and intelligently waived the right he had invoked. ( Gamache , at p. 385, 106 Cal.Rptr.3d 771 , 227 P.3d 342 .)  The Edwards presumption of involuntariness ensures that police will not take advantage of the mounting coercive pressures of 'prolonged police custody,' [citation] by repeatedly attempting to question a suspect who previously requested counsel until the suspect is 'badgered into submission.' [citation.] ( Shatzer , supra , 559 U.S. at p. 105, 130 S.Ct. 1213 .) In Shatzer , the high court considered the temporal reach of the Edwards presumption, noting that without a time limit, every Edwards prohibition of custodial interrogation of a particular suspect would be eternal. The prohibition applies, of course, when the subsequent interrogation pertains to a different crime, [citation], when it is conducted by a different law enforcement authority, [citation], and even when the suspect has met with an attorney after the first interrogation. ( Id . at pp. 108-09, 130 S.Ct. 1213 .) 10 In the course of its discussion,  the Shatzer court examined the underpinnings of the Edwards rule. The court identified the benefits of the rule:  Edwards ' presumption of involuntariness has the incidental effect of 'conserv[ing] judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult determinations of voluntariness.' [Citation.] Its fundamental purpose, however, is to '[p]reserv[e] the integrity of an accused's choice to communicate with police only through counsel,' [citation], by 'prevent[ing] police from badgering a defendant into waiving his previously asserted Miranda rights,' [citation]. ( Shatzer , supra , 559 U.S. at p. 106, 130 S.Ct. 1213 .) These benefits are typically realized in the paradigm Edwards case. That is a case in which the suspect has been arrested for a particular crime and is held in uninterrupted pretrial custody while that crime is being actively investigated. After the initial interrogation, and up to and including the second one, he remains cut off from his normal life and companions, 'thrust into' and isolated in an 'unfamiliar,' 'police-dominated atmosphere,' [citation], where his captors 'appear to control [his] fate.' [citation] ( Ibid . ) When, however, a suspect has been released from his pretrial custody and has returned to his normal life for some time before the later attempted interrogation, there is little reason to think that his change of heart regarding interrogation without counsel has been coerced. He has no longer been isolated. He has likely been able to seek advice from an attorney, family members, and friends. And he knows from his earlier experience that he need only demand counsel to bring  the interrogation to a halt; and that investigative custody does not last indefinitely. In these circumstances, it is farfetched to think that a police officer's asking the suspect whether he would like to waive his Miranda rights will any more 'wear down the accused,' [citation] than did the first such request at the original attempted interrogation - which  is of course not deemed coercive. ... Uncritical extension of Edwards to this situation would not significantly increase the number of genuinely coerced confessions excluded. ( Shatzer , supra , 559 U.S. at pp. 107-108, 130 S.Ct. 1213 , fn. omitted.) The court considered how long of a break in custody would be sufficient to dissipate its coercive effects. ( Id . at p. 109, 130 S.Ct. 1213 .) It determined that 14 days was the appropriate period. That provides plenty of time for the suspect to get reacclimated to his normal life, to consult with friends and counsel, and to shake off any residual coercive effects of his prior custody. ( Id . at p. 110, 130 S.Ct. 1213 .) Here, defendant was questioned again 10 days after his initial interview, within the Shatzer window period. During the intervening 10 days, defendant did not entirely return[ ] to his normal life while in prison. ( Shatzer , supra , 559 U.S. at p. 107, 130 S.Ct. 1213 .) When the interview ended, the officers took blood and buccal swab samples, dental casts, and defendant's shoes. They told prison staff that defendant was a suspect, and he was subject to an enhanced level of prison security as a result. When defendant next saw the officers, they arrested him. Instead of anticipating a release from custody, as he had been at the time of the first interview, he faced a new prosecution on a very serious charge. Thus, he was under the mounting coercive pressures of 'prolonged police custody,'  identified by the Shatzer court as the rationale for the Edwards presumption of involuntariness. ( Shatzer , at p. 105, 130 S.Ct. 1213 .) If further conversations [were] initiated by the police ... defendant's statements are presumed involuntary and inadmissible as substantive evidence at trial. This [would be] true even [if] defendant again waive[d] his Miranda rights and his statements [were] voluntary under traditional standards. ( People v. Thomas (2012) 54 Cal.4th 908 , 926, 144 Cal.Rptr.3d 366 , 281 P.3d 361 .) An accused 'initiates'  further communication, when his words or conduct can be 'fairly said to represent a desire' on his part 'to open up a more generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.'  ( People v. Mickey (1991) 54 Cal.3d 612 , 648, 286 Cal.Rptr. 801 , 818 P.2d 84 , quoting  Oregon v. Bradshaw (1983) 462 U.S. 1039 , 1045, 103 S.Ct. 2830 , 77 L.Ed.2d 405 ( Bradshaw ) (plur. opn. of Rehnquist, J.); see People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614 , 641-642, 21 Cal.Rptr.3d 612 , 101 P.3d 509 .) The trial court found that defendant initiated conversation with the officers in unrecorded statements he made before the car trip began. Chicoine testified that they had contacted prison staff to coordinate defendant's transfer to Alameda County custody. Defendant was in a receiving area when they arrived. Without prompting, he told them he had been meaning to call us, that he had already talked to a counselor. He said [h]e knew we'd be coming back and he wanted to talk to us. Chicoine understood these remarks as a continuation of what defendant had said at the end of his first interview, which was that he wanted to talk to them after  he had a chance to talk to a counselor. 11 Chicoine  told defendant to wait, and we would get an opportunity to talk to him later. Chicoine also testified that while in the receiving area they told defendant he was under arrest for McKenna's murder. He could not remember whether this advisement came before or after defendant said he wanted to talk. On appeal, defendant challenges Chicoine's veracity. He points out that the initiation of contact in the receiving area was not noted in Chicoine's police reports. He argues that the tape of the conversation in the car reflects no readiness to talk on defendant's part, and no understanding on the officers' part that he had reinitiated the conversation. When the facts are disputed, we must accept the trial court's resolution of disputed facts and inferences, and its evaluations of credibility, if they are substantially supported. ( Bradford , supra , 15 Cal.4th at p. 1311, 65 Cal.Rptr.2d 145 , 939 P.2d 259 .) A trial court's credibility finding will be sustained so long as the account is plausible. ( Ibid . ; People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690 , 731-732, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396 , 996 P.2d 46 ; cf. People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334 , 384, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272 , 28 P.3d 34 .) Chicoine's version of events is both plausible and corroborated by defendant's own later recorded statements. When defendant first invoked his right to counsel during the March 21 interview, the officers honored that request, stopped the interview, and told defendant that if he wanted to talk to them again, You have to initiate the contact. When the officers returned to San Quentin on March 27, they did so to execute the arrest warrant. According to Chicoine, defendant volunteered that he had spoken to his counselor and was ready to talk. The 10-day break between the first interview and the officers' return on March 31 would have given defendant ample time to seek advice. Indeed, he does not dispute that he did so. Despite defendant's repeated statements about his willingness to talk, the officers did not interview him immediately. Instead, they repeatedly told him to wait until he was re- Mirandized at the station. They explained that at the station they would take him to an interview room and read him his rights again. They explicitly told him: [A]t that time, you know, you can say hey, let me talk to my PD and I'll talk to you again, but, you know, that's entirely up to you. Back on tape at the station, Dudek clarified, You approached us, is the only thing I'm getting to, is that correct? Defendant replied, Uh-huh. In a  subsequent interview, Deputy District Attorney Andy Sweet also explored defendant's reinitiation of contact in detail. Defendant acknowledged that he had previously invoked his Miranda rights. When asked, What changed from before to now? defendant said, I just ... I'm ... I'm tired. Sweet said, It was your decision to start talking. Defendant agreed, saying, It was my decision. I'm tired now, and, In my mind, they didn't press the issue, understand me? Sweet sought further clarification, asking, When they came to pick you up today, some place between San Quentin and here, the Sheriff's Department in Alameda County, you started talking to the officers about your case and about what was going on. Isn't that true? Defendant said, That's correct. He  reaffirmed that he changed his mind because he was tired and I just want closure, and that it was [m]y decision. He said the officers had not said or done anything that  made him think he had to talk to them, adding, I asked them on the way here if I would be able to talk to a DA. Sweet then asked, Would it be a fair statement to say that you reinitiated kind of the discussion about the case? Defendant answered, Ok. I, it, that would be fair because I asked like if I will be straight up with you both like I was with them, right. I understand ok, I don't have the money for a public defender, blah blah blah. Right. But I understand my public defender said well, look you shouldn't do this you shouldn't do that because they're not here. Ok. I know what I did. All right. And I just want to get it over with. He agreed with Sweet's statement that [t]hey didn't ask you any questions, you were the one asking them questions to start the conversation going again. Correct? He volunteered, They made me no promises or anything. My only, my main concern was that you [the DA] were to come down here. This record amply supports the trial court's factual finding that defendant reinitiated conversation with the officers at San Quentin before the car trip began. Accordingly, under Edwards , the officers were permitted to resume their questioning of defendant about the McKenna homicide. ( Edwards , supra , 451 U.S. 477 at pp. 484-85, 101 S.Ct. 1880 .)