Opinion ID: 4357626
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Alleged Brady Violations and Sanctions

Text: Logan and Watson both contend that the government committed Brady violations by failing to disclose certain evidence ahead of trial. 6 Specifically, they argue that the government failed to timely disclose that Mr. Bolden’s bank card had been used in the days after the murder, and that, at some point thereafter, the prosecution lost an unexamined CD-ROM containing video that the police had obtained from a BP gas station, one of the locations where the card was allegedly fraudulently used. 7 6 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”); see also Andrews v. United States, 179 A.3d 279, 286 (D.C. 2018) (“The government’s obligation to disclose material evidence favorable to the accused arises from the Due Process Clause’s purpose of preventing miscarriages of justice.” (citing Brady, 373 U.S. at 87)). 7 Logan and Watson make two additional claims unrelated to the bank card. Logan asserts that the MPD failed to disclose that two men had been stopped near the location where the body was found in southeast D.C., following a report of shots fired. However, Logan offers no details or argument as to how this prejudiced the defense, and it is unclear which men Logan’s brief is referencing. In any event, this information was insignificant at best, since the body was found (continued…) 12 Following the murder, the decedent’s family informed Detective Anthony Greene that Mr. Bolden’s debit card “appeared to have been used on December 30th and after.” On January 14, 2010, Detective Greene obtained transaction records from Chevy Chase Bank, which revealed that there were four debit card transactions on January 1, 2010, followed by five additional transactions on January 12 at a Wal-Mart, a convenience store, and a Chinese buffet in Sanford and Cameron, North Carolina. One of the January 1 transactions was $72.15 charged to “New York BP Washington DC” at approximately 7:28 p.m. Detective Greene identified the likely location as the BP Gas Station at 1231 New York Avenue, N.E., Washington, D.C., because there was “no other” BP gas station on (…continued) several hours after the murder took place. While two men were also stopped near the scene of the shooting in the northwest quadrant of the District, this information was likewise of minimal value because the men did not match the description of the shooter and they were stopped sometime after the incident. Watson contends that the trial court improperly denied his request to exclude certain identification testimony following the government’s untimely disclosure of out-of-court identification procedures. While Watson correctly notes that the court admonished the government for failing to disclose earlier its plans for in-court identification, the court allowed the government’s witnesses to identify appellants because continuances had already been granted in favor of the defense and because the prosecution proffered that the witnesses clearly knew Watson. Thus, there was no issue. Furthermore, Watson did not contemporaneously object when Norlin Washington, one of the government’s witnesses, identified him in court. 13 New York Avenue at the time. He met with the owner, who could not find a receipt for a $72.15 transaction inside the store, which indicated that the transaction may have taken place outside at the pumps. There was no outside surveillance footage available, but Detective Greene requested and viewed the instore surveillance footage for the time period around the transaction while he was at the gas station. Detective Greene testified at trial that he did not see “anything . . . deemed to be probative” on the footage, but still obtained a copy on a disk, which he brought back to his office. He also stated that, while he was unsure, he believed that, when he tried to look at it again at the police station, the disk did not work on the computers. He apparently lost track of it after that. At the time of his testimony, he had “no idea” where the disk could be found, and had not seen it for “maybe three and a half years.” Detective Greene could not recall if or when he told any of the prosecutors assigned to the case about the missing disk. He also did not believe that he had ever tried to obtain a second copy. Detective Greene also failed to realize that the bank statement showed a charge at another gas station (“Casey’s BP”) until months before the trial, so he did not investigate the possibility of surveillance footage at that location. 14 None of this information was disclosed to the defendants until December of 2012 (just over six months before trial, which began in July of 2013), at which point the defendants moved for sanctions for Brady violations. In March of 2013, after one of the prosecutors on the case told Detective Greene that the prosecution had disclosed the information about the bank records to the defense, Detective Greene began – for the first time – investigating the North Carolina charges on the debit card. Following that investigation, it was discovered that a Ronald Smith had made at least some of the charges on Mr. Bolden’s bank card, including the charges at the Walmart in North Carolina. Mr. Smith was called to testify at trial and admitted during his testimony that he had picked up Mr. Bolden’s debit card after finding it on 11th Street, N.W. He testified to using the card to purchase gas for other patrons of nearby gas stations, after which he would collect half the cost from the patron and pocket the money. Mr. Smith also recalled going to North Carolina in early January and using the bank card when he arrived, including at a Chinese buffet and a Walmart. In May of 2013, the case was before Judge Russell F. Canan, who presided over a pre-trial hearing on the defendants’ motions to dismiss or for other sanctions as a result of the prosecution’s late disclosure of the debit card information. Judge 15 Canan found that the failure to disclose this information was a Brady violation and “constitute[d] negligence to a gross degree” on the part of the government. At that time, however, Judge Canan found that a dismissal would be too harsh a sanction for the “gross negligence” of the government, particularly because he found that it was not “willful misconduct or bad faith or even done for tactical advantage.” Judge Canan also reserved judgment on further sanctions until it became clear how the disclosures “affected the fairness” of the trial. Judge Canan ultimately passed on the discussion of further sanctions to Judge Herbert B. Dixon, who took over the case. In July of 2013, Judge Dixon heard arguments on sanctions. The government insisted that hefty sanctions from the court were unnecessary because the government had voluntarily provided the defense with “full and complete” discovery on the records and resulting investigation into the missing debit card, and subpoenaed Mr. Smith, whom the government “otherwise probably would not call.” The government argued that this assistance offered to the defense, which might not have been necessary if the disclosures had been timely, together with the continuance already granted, were sufficient to remedy any prejudice that might have resulted from the government’s delay in disclosing the evidence. 16 The trial judge agreed that the subpoenaing of witnesses and the continuances had “ameliorated the impact on the defense,” but also held that “it probably [had not] really made them whole.” Therefore, the court also ordered the government to produce Detective Greene’s grand jury material, Washington Area Criminal Intelligence Information Systems (“WACISS”) reports, and notes. The government was able to redact information unrelated to the case, including all identifying information, such as names, addresses, relationships, and locations, of witnesses that were not being called in the case. If the government was “very concerned” about releasing additional information for other security reasons, it was permitted to temporarily redact it, pending an official request to do so. The trial judge cautioned the prosecution against unnecessary redactions, saying that if it had “an inkling that the witness might be helpful [to the defense,]” then it should disclose it. On appeal, Logan and Watson argue that the late disclosure hindered their ability to mount an effective defense at trial. The failure to disclose constitutes a constitutional violation that justifies reversal if “the nondisclosure was so serious that there is a reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a different verdict.” Strickler v. 17 Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999). Here, the disclosure of the debit card information, while late, was done early enough to allow for further investigation. This investigation revealed that Ronald Smith had used the stolen debit card, and allowed Mr. Smith to be brought to testify at trial. The only evidence that may have been difficult to obtain at that late stage would have been the videos from the locations where the cards were used, if any videos indeed existed, but the probative value of such videos would have been quite limited, given Mr. Smith’s testimony. Logan and Watson were able to make full use of all of this information in their closing statements, making note of the defense’s inability to discover Mr. Smith’s involvement until later in the case, and linking the use of the debit card to Mr. Smith’s involvement in the drug trade. Therefore, there is little reason to believe that an earlier disclosure would have produced a different result for appellants. The trial judge also found, and appellants do not appear to contest, that the failure to disclose was not in bad faith.8 This failure was grossly negligent, but not on its own a due process violation. Rule 16 of the Superior Court Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the “range of available sanctions is extremely 8 Cf. Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988) (“unless a criminal defendant can show bad faith on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not constitute a denial of due process of law”). 18 broad, [with] the only real limitation being that a sanction must be ‘just under the circumstances.’” Koonce v. District of Columbia, 111 A.3d 1009, 1020 (D.C. 2015) (quoting Gethers v. United States, 684 A.2d 1266, 1272 (D.C. 1996)); see Super. Ct. Crim. R. 16. The sanctions offered by the judge here were just and appropriately addressed the violation. Appellants were able to use Greene’s notes, which were turned over pursuant to the judge’s order, to attack Detective Greene’s investigatory process and conclusions. The court also granted continuances, which allowed the time to discover the necessary information about the debit cards that appellants went on to use at trial. Furthermore, they were able to present Mr. Smith as an alternative perpetrator – a Winfield defense9 – and use his possession of the cards as a source of reasonable doubt. Logan and Watson specifically take issue with Judge Dixon’s denial of a missing evidence instruction, which they requested to ameliorate the effects of the government’s Brady violation regarding the bank records and related 9 See Winfield v. United States, 676 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1996) (setting forth the “standards governing the admissibility of evidence proffered by a criminal defendant that another person or persons committed the crime alleged”). See section II.D.i, infra. 19 information.10 As noted, the court allowed the defense to make a Winfield argument relating to Mr. Smith, who had used Mr. Bolden’s bank card, during closing, but it did not give a missing evidence instruction to the jury. Watson submitted a detailed request to instruct the jury on the government’s failure to timely investigate the bank card use, asserting an “impermissible burden” on his ability to mount a defense by way of investigating the bank card use. We see no reason for reversal based on the denial of the missing evidence instruction. A party seeking an instruction to the jury regarding missing evidence must show that the evidence is “likely to elucidate the transaction at issue” and “peculiarly available to the party against whom the adverse inference is sought to be drawn.” Tyer v. United States, 912 A.2d 1150, 1164 (D.C. 2006) (citations and 10 The government construes Watson’s argument on appeal as taking issue not with the trial court’s refusal to issue a missing evidence instruction, but rather with the trial court’s refusal to issue a Shelton instruction, which resembles an adverse inference instruction, i.e., an instruction to the jury to draw an inference that the government thought its case was weak. See Shelton v. United States, 983 A.2d 363, 369 (D.C. 2009), opinion amended on reh’g, 26 A.3d 216, 26 A.3d 233 (D.C. 2011). Appellants did request such an instruction at trial. The government opposed this instruction, but was willing to allow a Winfield argument, see section II.D.i, infra, regarding Mr. Thomas. Prior to closing, the trial court stated that there was no justification for a Shelton instruction, noting that the failure to disclose “demonstrate[d] the government’s view of its case [in regards to] weakness.” Because appellants do not take issue with the denial of the Shelton instruction on appeal, the question of whether the trial court erroneously denied a Shelton instruction is not before us. 20 internal quotation marks omitted). We have “recognized several dangers inherent in the use of a missing [evidence] instruction,” as it “represents a radical departure from the principle that the jury should decide the case by evaluating the evidence before it.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore “review the denial of a request for a missing evidence instruction for abuse of discretion,” id. (citation omitted), bearing in mind that “the trial court retains considerable latitude to refuse to give a missing evidence instruction, where it determines from all of the circumstances that the inference of unfavorable evidentiary value is not a natural or reasonable one.” Id. at 1166 (citation, internal quotation marks, and brackets omitted). On this record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the missing evidence instruction offered by appellants. The remedies employed by the court, described above, were significant and sufficient. 21