Opinion ID: 2526939
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Prior Holding in Krupp

Text: We previously examined RIPRA in Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District, 19 P.3d 687, 695-97 (Colo.2001). [15] In that case, we considered whether a local government authority, the Breckenridge Sanitation District (the District), effected an unconstitutional taking when it granted a building permit to a pair of Summit County developers on the condition that they first pay a water plant investment fee. Id. at 689. We held that neither the fee nor the District's method of collecting it was subject to the Nollan/Dolan test. Id. The District instituted the water plant investment fee so that the cost of expanding the existing wastewater treatment facilities could be apportioned among the developers responsible for increasing the overall amount of wastewater produced. Id. at 690-91. The District's regular practice was to collect the fee before issuing a building permit. Id. at 691. The amount of the fee was calculated according to a standard fee schedule established by the legislature and made available to the public. Id. at 690-91. Under the legislative scheme, property owners were charged a lower fee for year-round residences, including single-family homes and duplexes, and a higher fee for short-term rentals, including apartments and condominiums. Id. at 691. The legislature did not specifically assign triplexes to either category. Id. The developers, Marshall and Renate Krupp (the Krupps), constructed a residential complex consisting of twenty-five units, themselves partitioned into three triplexes and eight duplexes. Id. Per usual, the District collected water plant investment fees from the Krupps when the building permit issued. Id. The District charged the Krupps the lower, residential rate for the eight duplexes. Id. Lacking an express legislative designation for triplexes, the District independently determined that the three triplexes were more likely to be used as short-term rentals and applied the higher rental rate. Id. Citing Nollan and Dolan, the Krupps argued that the District's decision to charge the higher rate for the triplexes constituted an unconstitutional taking. Id. at 691-92. Our decision in Krupp examined the exception for legislatively formulated fees set forth in RIPRA. We determined that the exception was reasonable because legislatively formulated fees largely avoided the kind of regulatory pitfalls discussed in Nollan and Dolan. First, legislatively formulated fees would insure that administrative action will be rational and consistent, and that subsequent judicial review of the action, if necessary, will be available and effective. Krupp, 19 P.3d at 694. Second, the risk of leveraging or extortion was virtually nonexistent in a fee system because a generally applicable, legislatively based development fee [provides that] all similarly situated landowners are subject to the same fee schedule, and a specific landowner cannot be singled out for extraordinary concessions as a condition of development. Id. at 696. With this in mind, we held that the District's water plant investment fee fell outside the narrow class of cases where the Nollan/Dolan test applied. Id. at 695 (defining the class as that where a permitting authority, through a specific, discretionary adjudicative determination, conditions continued development on the exaction of private property for public use.). As further evidence that the fee did not constitute a discretionary adjudicative determination, we found that the fee was authorized by the General Assembly, was assessed according to a publicly promulgated fee schedule, and was applied to all new development governed by the District. Id. at 696. Therefore, [n]either the promulgation of the [fee] schedule, nor the calculation of the Krupps' [water plant investment fee] by the assigned administrative official, constituted a discretionary adjudicative activity. Id.