Opinion ID: 891607
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: A Mechanical Application of Section 31-9-1.6 Leads to an Absurd and Unreasonable Result

Text: {23} The State argues that Defendant must be criminally committed because Section 31-9-1.6 does not explicitly require that he be civilly committed. It contends that, in the absence of a clear statutory directive to the contrary, the previous regime, criminal commitment under the NMMIC, should remain in place. {24} However, interpreting Section 31-9-1.6 to require the criminal commitment of defendants who are dangerous, incompetent because of mental retardation, without a substantial probability of gaining competence, and accused of a crime other than those enumerated leads to an absurd and inequitable result. Namely, defendants incompetent due to mental retardation who are charged with one of the four felonies enumerated in Section 31-9-1.6(C) would automatically be civilly committed under that subsection while those who are charged with any other less serious crime would continue to be subject to criminal commitment under the NMMIC. {25} In other words, if we held that Section 31-9-1.6 did not preclude the possibility of criminal commitment under the NMMIC for all defendants incompetent due to mental retardation, we would be leaving the defendants incompetent due to mental retardation who are accused of lesser crimes, and are thus more deserving, subject to criminal commitment while those accused of greater crimes would be automatically civilly committed per the plain language of Section 31-9-1.6. While this approach may represent the most straightforward and mechanical application of the words of Section 31-9-1.6, we are doubtful whether this contradiction captures the intention of the Legislature. Rather, it is a result that is absurd, unreasonable, [and] contrary to the spirit of [Section 31-9-1.6]. See Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 10, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022. Therefore, we conclude that, in this case, the failure of Section 31-9-1.6 to explicitly require that Defendant be civilly committed is not conclusive of the Legislature's intent on the point.