Opinion ID: 579465
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Bennett's Status

Text: 17 The collective bargaining agreement provides for a thirty (30) day probationary period (sixty (60) days if mutually agreeable to extend probation). Union Br.App. at 38. Employees become and remain members of the Union upon completion of the probationary period. Other benefits provided by the agreement are secured by the attainment of nonprobationary status; in particular, Article 3, Section 3 provides: The discharge of a new employee during his thirty (30) day probationary period (sixty (60) days if mutually agreeable to extend probation) shall not be a matter for grievance. Id. Thus under the agreement Union membership and nonprobationary status are triggered simultaneously. See also Record, Pleadings, Doc. 16 (Union Trial Br.), at 15; Tr. at 133-34, 150-51. 18 The parties do not question the district court's finding that Bennett initially became a nonprobationary employee on her 31st day of employment (May 15), when Slater welcomed her into the Union and told her that her probationary term was over. The Union and the Company argue, however, that they could properly extend her probation to 60 days on her 35th day of employment (May 19). They contend that the retroactive extension was consonant with the collective bargaining agreement and that the concept of vested rights is inapplicable. 19 The interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law, as is the question whether the contract is unambiguous; as legal questions, both are subject to de novo review. See In re Vitreous Steel Prods. Co., 911 F.2d 1223, 1237-38 (7th Cir.1990). These standards apply to collective bargaining agreements as they do to other contracts. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. General Electric Co., 865 F.2d 902, 905 (7th Cir.1989). The agreement between Owens-Brockway and Local Union No. 66 provides that employees shall become and remain Union members and nonprobationary employees after 30 days, or after 60 days if mutually agreeable to extend probation. This language does not explicitly require that an extension take place, if at all, during the first 30 days. Nevertheless, we think that the agreement's terms must mean that extensions can only be obtained during the initial 30-day period, because a contrary interpretation does violence to the language of the contract. If the probationary period could be extended to 60 days at some point after the first 30 days, then the stated 30-day default rule would essentially become meaningless (not just meaningless, but downright deceptive), since all new employees would risk being placed back on probation for the entire first 60 days. Thus, any new employee could have her probation extended on her 59th day of work. Counsel for the Union conceded at oral argument that its interpretation effectively amounted to a 60-day probationary period for all new employees. Rather than completely read the 30-day language out of the contract, we adopt what seems the natural and obvious construction: the word extend contemplates only prospective, not retroactive, extensions. Therefore a probationary period can be extended to 60 days only during the first 30 days of employment. 20 Not only would the defendants' interpretation ignore the 30-day language in the agreement, but it would conflict with evidence of the parties' understandings of the agreement. Although the district court did not expressly find the agreement unambiguous, we think that the relevant provisions are unambiguous. Even assuming ambiguity, however, we are convinced that the extrinsic evidence considered by the district court supports our interpretation. 3 Most important, the Union's interpretation simply cannot be reconciled with Slater's statement to Bennett on her 31st day of employment--when he denied rumors of an extension--that Williams has had thirty days to take care of that [extension of probation]. Order at 4. 4 21 The parties spend considerable energy debating the legal metaphysics of vestedness. We think the defendants have overestimated the importance of that concept to the district court's decision and to this case. It is perhaps unfortunate that the district court used the language of vested rights in concluding that an employee's probation could not be extended retroactively. There is no need to look beyond the collective bargaining agreement in this case, and surely no need to talk about absolute or interminable rights. The right to nonprobationary status here was wholly a creation of the agreement, and therefore not vested in any absolute sense. Cf. Cooper v. General Motors Corp., 651 F.2d 249, 250-51 (5th Cir.1981) (seniority rights under collective bargaining agreement not vested rights); Turner v. Local Union No. 302, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 604 F.2d 1219, 1224-26 (9th Cir.1979) (retiree benefits not vested rights). But under the clear terms of the agreement, Bennett became a nonprobationary employee on her 31st day of employment, and the agreement did not allow for her status to be altered thereafter. We suspect that the district court's reliance on the notion of vested rights was mere shorthand or analogy for an analysis of the agreement itself. In any event, the present dispute does not call for anything so ambitious as an appeal to the nature of vested rights. 22 We also reject the defendants' attempt to characterize their conduct as the product of legitimate negotiations. They cite cases upholding modifications that affect rights under collective bargaining agreements: Since parties to a labor contract are always free to amend their agreements, we do not see how an amendment through the ordinary processes of collective bargaining can be considered a breach of contract. Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 489 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 137, 27 L.Ed.2d 151, 911 (1970). The flaw in this line of argument is readily apparent when one observes that the ordinary processes of collective bargaining were not utilized here. The Union and the Company did not purport to modify or supplement the collective bargaining agreement as it applies to the entire class of employees; instead, they acted on an ad hoc basis, depriving Bennett (and a few other employees) of the nonprobationary status that the agreement had conferred upon them. Indeed, it is telling that the defendants cite numerous cases supporting the validity of modifications to collective bargaining agreements, but then assert that their actions did not modify the agreement. There is an important distinction between a negotiated modification of an agreement's terms and an unstated modification intended to apply only to selected individuals: we call the latter a breach. 23