Opinion ID: 2570496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: sufficiency of the evidence

Text: [¶ 36] The appellant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that he signed the credit card receipts with the intent to defraud, or that Dorr did not authorize the appellant to sign the receipts. According to the appellant, Burton told the appellant that they had Dorr's permission to use Dorr's credit card, and the appellant had no reason to believe that he did not have that authority when he executed the credit card receipts at issuethe appellant executed the receipts because Burton told him that he could do so and because he was male and Burton wanted to avoid having to call Dorr to come and personally sign the receipts. The appellant adds that there was no question that Dorr had also granted Burton (and by extension, the appellant) the authority to use his credit cards in the recent past. [¶ 37] Our standard of review on this issue is as follows: When reviewing an appeal based on sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence, and any applicable inferences based on the evidence, in a light most favorable to the State. Nixon v. State, 994 P.2d 324, 329 (Wyo.1999); and see Pool v. State, 2001 WY 8, 17 P.3d 1285 (Wyo.2001). In conducting such a review, we do not substitute our judgment for that of the jury; rather, we determine whether a quorum of reasonable and rational individuals would, or even could, have found the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. McFarlane v. State, 2001 WY 10, ¶ 4, 17 P.3d 31, 32 (Wyo.2001). [¶ 38] The district court separately instructed the jury on the elements of forgery for each of the four counts alleged in the charging document. For example, the district court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows with respect to Count I: