Opinion ID: 1388145
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Mitigating Circumstance and Enmund Charge

Text: Johnson contends that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury on the statutory mitigating circumstance that he was an accomplice in the murder committed by another and his participation was relatively minor pursuant to S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C)(b)(4)(1976). We disagree. The trial judge has a duty to review the statutory mitigating circumstances and submit any which may be supported by the evidence. S.C. Code Ann. § 16-3-20(C). In determining which statutory mitigating circumstances are supported, the judge is concerned only with the existence of the evidence and not its weight. State v. Bellamy , 293 S.C. 103, 359 S.E. (2d) 63 (1987). Johnson introduced a statement made by Hess, that Harbert rather than Johnson had killed Trooper Smalls. Johnson contends that the trial court erred in failing to give an Enmund instruction as requested by defense counsel. Enmund v. Florida , 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed. (2d) 1140 (1982) forbids the imposition of the death penalty upon an individual who did not personally take life or intend that life be taken. In State v. Peterson , 287 S.C. 244, 335 S.E. (2d) 800 (1985), this Court held that such a charge should be given in a case that involves conspiracy liability. However, this case did not involve conspiracy or accomplice liability. At the guilt phase, Johnson was found guilty of the murder, not of conspiracy or accomplice liability. Hence, the jury need not consider any evidence regarding conspiracy or accomplice liability at the sentencing phase. Those are not the crimes for which the defendant was being sentenced. Johnson argues in the alternative that a mere presence charge should have been given. His theory is that if the evidence shows that either Johnson was guilty or innocent, then the jury should have been instructed that mere presence at the scene is not sufficient evidence to convict. We find this assertion to be without merit and conclude that any error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the admission of guilt Johnson made in his statements during the closing argument to the jury.