Opinion ID: 2335427
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prior statement of witness, kre 613.

Text: Steve Ethington, C.M.'s stepfather, was a witness for the defense. The following was elicited during his testimony: Q. Did [C.M.] ever tell you that the alleged touching by Mr. Noel did not happen? A. Yes. The trial judge sustained the Commonwealth's objection to this testimony and admonished the jury to disregard both the question and the answer, reasoning that C.M. had not been asked on cross-examination if she had told her stepfather that the alleged touching by Appellant did not happen. KRE 613(a) provides in pertinent part: Before other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at another time a different statement, he must be inquired of concerning it, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining party can present them.... Most, but not all, of the Kentucky Rules of Evidence are identical to the corresponding Federal Rules of Evidence, and, in fact, the version of KRE 613 proposed by the drafters of the Kentucky Rules was identical to FRE 613. See proposed KRE 613, Evidence Rules Study Committee (Final Draft 1989). The Kentucky Supreme Court, however, decided not to adopt the more liberal federal rule but to retain the language contained in Civil Rule (CR) 43.08 which, in turn, had retained the language of section 598 of the old Kentucky Code of Civil Practice (CCP). The same rule had been followed in criminal cases as a matter of common law since at least 1883. Craft v. Commonwealth, 81 Ky. (4 J.Rodm.) 250 (1883). CCP § 598, CR 43.08, and now KRE 613(a) are codifications of a common law rule first enunciated in Queen Caroline's Case, 129 Eng. Rep. 976 (1820). See Fisher v. Duckworth, Ky., 738 S.W.2d 810, 815 (1987). Perhaps the best explanation of the rationale behind the rule was expressed in Cole v. State, 65 Tenn. 239 (1873). Where it is intended to impeach the witness by proving that he made statements out of court contrary to what he has testified in court, the witness should be asked whether he said or declared that which it is proposed to prove by the impeaching witness, that he did say or declare, and the time and place and person to whom the declaration was made should be stated in the question. The object of the question is to contradict him, and it is but fair to the witness to refresh his recollection as to the declaration or words used and proposed to be proved, and also by stating time, place and other circumstances calculated to refresh his memory. If the time, place and person to whom the declaration was made is stated, and also the words or their substance, or the declaration is stated in the question, and the witness answers that he does not recollect, evidence may be given on the other side to prove that the witness did say what is imputed to him, otherwise you could never contradict a witness who said he could not remember. Id. at 241 (citations omitted). Even our more modern cases have consistently required strict compliance with the foundation requirements of CR 43.08 and KRE 613(a). Foley v. Commonwealth, Ky., 953 S.W.2d 924, 935-36 (1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1053, 118 S.Ct. 1375, 140 L.Ed.2d 522 (1998); Drumm v. Commonwealth, Ky., 783 S.W.2d 380, 383 (1990), overruled on other grounds, Garrett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 48 S.W.3d 6 (2001); Fisher v. Duckworth, supra, at 815-17; McQueen v. Commonwealth, Ky., 721 S.W.2d 694, 701 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1059, 107 S.Ct. 2203, 95 L.Ed.2d 858 (1987). The rule was slightly relaxed in Kinser v. Commonwealth, Ky., 741 S.W.2d 648 (1987), which held that failure to inquire as to the date and time of the statement was not fatal where the witness admitted having the conversation but denied making the statement in question during that conversation. Of course, that exception does not apply here. Appellant asserts that the rule should be further relaxed in this case because of C.M.'s tender years and the alleged difficulty in cross-examining her. We note that, although the opinion in Drumm, supra , did not state the age of the witness/victim at the time of his testimony, it did state that he was six years old at the time the sexual offense was perpetrated against him. Id. at 380. And while it is sometimes difficult to elicit desired responses during cross-examination of a child of tender years, the fact remains that, here, the question was never asked. Thus, the trial judge correctly admonished the jury to disregard the impeachment evidence elicited from Steve Ethington.