Opinion ID: 2626405
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The plain meaning of the statute supports an expansive interpretation.

Text: The parties vigorously dispute the meaning of AS 34.20.070(b), which provides for cure of a defaulted deed of trust before foreclosure by the obligee. [34] That statute states, in relevant part: At any time before the sale, if the default has arisen by failure to make payments required by the trust deed, the default may be cured by payment of the sum in default other than the principal that would not then be due if no default had occurred, plus attorney fees or court costs actually incurred by the trustee due to the default. If, under the same trust deed, notice of default under this subsection has been recorded two or more times previously and the default has been cured under this subsection, the trustee may elect to refuse payment and continue the sale. Embley argues that the statute must be read as granting a right of cure only to obligors because the statute makes no mention of other persons. Young argues that the statute should be read more broadly because it uses the passive voice rather than designating the beneficiary of the right of de-acceleration. Young proposes that we interpret AS 34.20.070(b) to protect the same classes of persons who are entitled to notice of foreclosure under AS 34.20.070(c). That subsection requires the trustee to notify: (1) the grantor in the trust deed; (2) the successor in interest to the grantor whose interest appears of record or of whose interest the trustee or the beneficiary has actual notice, or who is in possession of the property; (3) any other person in possession of or occupying the property; (4) any person having a lien or interest subsequent to the interest of the trustee in the trust deed, where the lien or interest appears of record or where the trustee or the beneficiary has actual notice of the lien or interest. Young thus claims a right to cure Dang's default either as a possessor or occupant of the property or as a holder of a subsequent interest in the property. In matters of statutory interpretation, we must give effect to the intent of the legislature, with due regard to the meaning that the statutory language conveys to others. [35] If a statute is unambiguous and expresses the legislature's intent, we will not modify or extend it by judicial construction. [36] However, in cases where the plain language of the statute permits more than one plausible interpretation, we apply a sliding scale: [T]he plainer the language, the more convincing contrary legislative history must be. [37] Thus, the inquiry begins with the text of the statute, buttressing the text with legislative history if necessary. The language at issue here was adopted in 1976. [38] As the parties have argued, the language admits of two possible interpretations. The legislature may have omitted express mention of obligors because it assumed that the reference would apply only to obligors; alternatively, it may have omitted express mention because it wished to include other interested persons such as those listed in AS 34.20.070(c). From the plain text either interpretation is plausible. [39] Because the statute is written in the passive voiceit states that the default may be curedits meaning is ambiguous. In Exxon Corp. v. State, [40] we considered the terms of a contract which stated that the Prudhoe Bay oil and gas unit may be enlarged from time to time. [41] In determining whether Exxon or the state was entitled to enlarge the unit, we held that the language is ambiguous. The passive voice can be ambiguous. [42] Since, however, subsequent sections of the contract in that case laid out procedures by which the state could decide on unit expansion, we held that only the state was entitled to expand the unit. [43] Likewise, AS 34.20.070(b) is ambiguous because it uses the passive voice. And, as was the case with the contract in Exxon, the statutory context provides some guidance: AS 34.20.070(c), in establishing a broad group of persons entitled to notice of foreclosure, suggests that the right of cure extends beyond the obligor.