Opinion ID: 3166086
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Our “Clear Indication” Test

Text: Not counting the case now before us, we have decided nine Arizona capital cases in which petitioners have alleged that the Arizona Supreme Court, as a matter of law, treated would-be mitigation evidence as legally irrelevant in violation of Eddings. In two of these cases, we held that the Arizona Supreme Court committed Eddings error. See Williams v. Ryan, 623 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2010); Styers v. Schriro, 547 F.3d 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (per curiam). In the other seven, we held that the Arizona Court had not committed Eddings error. In six of these, we applied a test first articulated in Schad v. Ryan, 581 F.3d 1019, 1037 (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (unamended opinion), under which we could not find Eddings error unless there was a “clear indication in the record” that the Arizona Court had refused, as a matter of law, to treat nonstatutory mitigation evidence as relevant unless it had some effect on the petitioner’s criminal behavior. See Hedlund v. Ryan, 750 F.3d 793, 818 (9th Cir. 2014); Murray v. Schriro, 746 F.3d 418, 455 (9th Cir. 2014); Clabourne v. Ryan, 745 F.3d 362, 373 (9th Cir. 2014) (petition for panel rehearing and for rehearing en banc MCKINNEY V. RYAN 39 pending); Poyson v. Ryan, 743 F.3d 1185, 1188 (9th Cir. 2013); Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011); Schad v. Ryan, 671 F.3d 708, 724 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (amended opinion). In the seventh, we did not apply the “clear indication” test. See Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2012). In none of the cases in which we held that there had been no Eddings error did we hold that the Arizona Supreme Court had renounced its causal nexus test. Rather, we held only that petitioners had not shown that the Court had applied the test in such a way as to treat nonstatutory mitigation evidence irrelevant as a matter of law. In our amended opinion in Schad, we stated the “clear indication” test as follows: Absent a clear indication in the record that the state court applied the wrong standard, we cannot assume the courts violated Edding’s constitutional mandates. See Bell v. Cone, [543 U.S. 447, 455] (2005) (“Federal courts are not free to presume that a state court did not comply with constitutional dictates on the basis of nothing more than a lack of citation.”). Schad, 671 F.3d at 724 (emphasis added). The language from Bell, quoted in Schad in support of its “clear indication” rule, states only that we may not presume that a state court failed to follow federal constitutional law based on “nothing more than a lack of citation.” But in Schad we broadened the language from Bell and transformed it into a prohibition against an “assumption” of unconstitutionality in the absence of a “clear indication” to the contrary. 40 MCKINNEY V. RYAN When used in Bell, the quoted language stated a rule that is applicable in a narrow circumstance: a federal habeas court should not presume, merely because a state court has failed to cite a federal case, that the state court was unaware of or failed to follow the rule established in that case. The Bell rule is eminently sensible. A presumption of ignorance or disregard of federal law based merely on a failure of citation by a busy state court is both unrealistic and disrespectful. But the Bell rule, as stated by the Supreme Court, has a relatively narrow application. It is not a broad rule requiring federal habeas courts to assume in all circumstances, including Eddings cases, that absent a “clear indication” to the contrary, a state understood and properly applied federal law. Congress knows how to limit federal collateral review by requiring deference to state court decisions, and it has done so in AEDPA. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), federal courts shall not issue writs of habeas corpus on any claim adjudicated in state court unless the adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or “that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Section 2254(d) is already a form of a clear statement or a clear indication rule, which all federal courts are required to follow. The “clear indication” rule stated by our circuit for the first time in Schad, and applicable in our circuit only in Eddings cases, is an inappropriate and unnecessary gloss on the deference already required under § 2254(d). We therefore overrule Schad, and the cases that have followed it, with respect to the “clear indication” test. MCKINNEY V. RYAN 41 C. Application of the Causal Nexus Test in This Case For the reasons that follow, we conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court applied its unconstitutional causal nexus test to McKinney’s PTSD, refusing, as a matter of law, to treat it as a relevant nonstatutory mitigating factor. This was contrary to clearly established federal law as established in Eddings. We review the decision of the highest state court to have provided a reasoned decision. Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 797, 804–06 (1991). The Arizona Supreme Court reviews capital sentences de novo, making its own determination of what constitute legally relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and then weighing those factors independently. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-755. The Arizona Supreme Court “conducts a thorough and independent review of the record and of the aggravating and mitigating evidence to determine whether the sentence is justified.” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1225. The Court “considers the quality and strength, not simply the number, of aggravating or mitigating factors.” Id. In reviewing the de novo sentencing decision of the Arizona Supreme Court, we look only to the decision of that Court. We look to the decision of the sentencing judge only to the degree it was adopted or substantially incorporated by the Arizona Supreme Court. See Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1903 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that when “the last reasoned decision adopted or substantially incorporated the reasoning from a previous decision,” it is “reasonable for the reviewing court to look at both decisions to fully ascertain the reasoning of the last decision”). The sentencing judge accepted the factual accuracy of Dr. McMahon’s diagnosis of PTSD, saying that he was “certainly not trying to dispute him 42 MCKINNEY V. RYAN as an expert on what all that meant.” The judge then went on to say that “Dr. McMahon did not at any time suggest in his testimony nor did I find any credible evidence to suggest that, even if the diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome were accurate in Mr. McKinney’s case, that it in any way significantly impaired Mr. McKinney’s conduct.” (Emphasis added.) He further stated: [I]t appeared to me that based upon all these circumstances that there simply was no substantial reason to believe that even if the trauma that Mr. McKinney had suffered in childhood had contributed to an appropriate diagnosis of Post-traumatic Stress Syndrome that it in any way affected his conduct in this case. (Emphasis added.) The italicized language echoes the language of Arizona’s statutory mitigator under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-703(G)(1). It also echoes the language used by the Arizona Supreme Court to articulate the unconstitutional causal nexus test applied to nonstatutory mitigation. See, e.g., Wallace, 773 P.2d at 986 (“A difficult family background is a relevant mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that something in that back ground had an effect or impact on his behavior that was beyond his control.”) (emphasis added). The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed McKinney’s death sentence in 1996, roughly in the middle of the fifteen-yearplus period during which it insisted on its unconstitutional nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. The Court reviewed in its opinion the death sentences of both Hedlund and McKinney. The Court first affirmed Hedlund’s death sentence, writing, “A difficult family background, including MCKINNEY V. RYAN 43 childhood abuse, does not necessarily have substantial mitigating weight absent a showing that it significantly affected or impacted a defendant’s ability to perceive, to comprehend, or to control his actions. See State v. Ross, . . . 886 P.2d 1354, 1363 (1994).” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1226. As we pointed out above, the pin citation to Ross is a citation to the precise page on which the Arizona Supreme Court had two years earlier articulated its unconstitutional “causal nexus” test for non-statutory mitigation. When the Arizona Supreme Court reviewed McKinney’s death sentence, it again relied on Ross. The Court wrote that the sentencing judge had given “full consideration” to McKinney’s childhood and resulting PTSD, using the word “consideration” in the sense of considering whether the evidence was, or was not mitigating. See Djerf, 959 P.2d at 1289 (“This court has held that Lockett and Eddings require only that the sentencer consider evidence proffered for mitigation. The sentencer, however, is entitled to give it the weight it deserves. Arizona law states that a difficult family background is not relevant unless the defendant can establish that his family experience is linked to his criminal behavior.”) (emphasis added). Reviewing McKinney’s sentence de novo, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed “the effects of [McKinney’s] childhood, specifically the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1234. The Court accepted the conclusion of the sentencing judge that, as a factual matter, McKinney had not shown that his PTSD had causally contributed to the murders of Mertens and McClain. Indeed, the Arizona Supreme Court went further, pointing out that McKinney’s PTSD, if anything, would have had the opposite effect, influencing him not to have committed the 44 MCKINNEY V. RYAN murders. Because the Court concluded that McKinney’s PTSD was not causally connected to his crimes, it refused, as a matter of law, to treat his PTSD as a mitigating factor. After describing McKinney’s PTSD evidence and assessing de novo the effect of his PTSD on his behavior, the Court recited its causal nexus test. The Court concluded with a pin citation to the precise page in Ross on which, two years earlier, it had articulated the causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. We quote in full the relevant paragraph: Here again, the record shows that the judge gave full consideration to McKinney’s childhood and the expert testimony regarding the effects of that childhood, specifically the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Assuming the diagnoses were correct, the judge found that none of the experts testified to, and none of the evidence showed, that such conditions in any way impaired McKinney’s ability to conform his conduct to the law. The judge noted that McKinney was competent enough to have engaged in extensive and detailed preplanning of the crimes. McKinney’s expert testified that persons with PTSD tended to avoid engaging in stressful situations, such as these burglaries and murders, which are likely to trigger symptoms of the syndrome. The judge observed that McKinney’s conduct in engaging in the crimes was counter to the behavior McKinney’s expert described as expected for people with PTSD. As we noted MCKINNEY V. RYAN 45 in discussing Hedlund’s claim on this same issue, a difficult family background, including childhood abuse, does not necessarily have substantial mitigating weight absent a showing that it significantly affected or impacted the defendant’s ability to perceive, comprehend, or control his actions. See State v. Ross, . . . 886 P.2d 1354, 1363 (1994)[.] Id. at 1234 (emphasis added). Based on (1) the factual conclusion by the sentencing judge, which the Arizona Supreme Court accepted, that McKinney’s PTSD did not “in any way affect[] his conduct in this case,” (2) the Arizona Supreme Court’s additional factual conclusion that, if anything, McKinney’s PTSD would have influenced him not to commit the crimes, and (3) the Arizona Supreme Court’s recital of the causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation and its pin citation to the precise page in Ross where it had previously articulated that test, we conclude that the Arizona Supreme Court held, as a matter of law, that McKinney’s PTSD was not a nonstatutory mitigating factor, and that it therefore gave it no weight. This holding was contrary to Eddings. We therefore hold that the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court applied a rule that was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). D. Structural or Harmless Error We have not heretofore decided whether an Eddings error is structural error. We do so now and conclude that it is not. 46 MCKINNEY V. RYAN The Supreme Court has consistently characterized structural errors as “structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 629 (1993). Because such errors go to the framework within which judicial proceedings are conducted, they “infect the entire trial process” and accordingly require “automatic reversal of the conviction.” Id. at 629–30; see also Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 310 (1991) (noting that structural errors “affect[] the framework within which the trial proceeds”). Some structural errors produce a fundamentally flawed record, so “any inquiry into [their] effect[s] on the outcome of the case would be purely speculative.” Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 256 (1988); see also Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 579 & n.7 (1986) (holding that harmless-error analysis was appropriate because “[u]nlike errors such as judicial bias or denial of counsel, the error in this case did not affect the composition of the record. Evaluation of whether the error prejudiced respondent thus does not require any difficult inquiries concerning matters that might have been, but were not, placed in evidence”). By contrast, harmless-error analysis applies to trial errors, “which may . . . be quantitatively assessed in the context of other evidence presented in order to determine whether its admission was harmless.” Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 307–08. Because “the error occurs at trial and its scope is readily identifiable[,] . . . the reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury.” Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 490 (1978). For example, in Satterwhite, the Court applied harmless-error analysis to a Sixth Amendment error resulting in the improper admission of testimony from a psychiatrist who had examined Satterwhite without notifying his attorney. MCKINNEY V. RYAN 47 486 U.S. at 258. The Court noted that “the evaluation of the consequences of an error in the sentencing phase of a capital case may be more difficult because of the discretion that is given to the sentencer.” Id. However, it held that the error at issue was subject to harmless-error analysis because the admission of testimony was an error of limited scope that was ready identifiable and whose impact could be assessed by a reviewing court. Id. at 257–58. E. Harmless Error The harmless-error standard on habeas review provides that “relief must be granted” if the error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.’” Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). “Under this standard, habeas petitioners may obtain plenary review of their constitutional claims, but they are not entitled to habeas relief based on trial error unless they can establish that it resulted in actual prejudice.” Id. at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted). But, as with the stricter Chapman standard, the “risk of doubt” is placed “on the State.” O’Neal v. McAninich, 513 U.S. 432, 439 (1995). On federal habeas, in the absence of structural error that requires automatic reversal, “relief is appropriate only if the prosecutor cannot demonstrate harmless error.” Ayala v. Davis, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 (2015). The Court explained in Kotteakos, [I]f one cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the 48 MCKINNEY V. RYAN error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected. The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand. 328 U.S. at 765. Accordingly, “[w]hen a federal judge in a habeas proceeding is in grave doubt about whether a trial error of federal law had ‘substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict,’ that error is not harmless. And, the petitioner must win.” O’Neal, 513 U.S. at 436. We hold that the Eddings error committed by the Arizona Supreme Court in this case had a “substantial and injurious effect” on McKinney’s sentence within the meaning of Brecht. McKinney presented evidence of severe, prolonged childhood abuse that, in the words of the sentencing judge, was “beyond the comprehension and understanding of most people.” Dr. McMahon diagnosed McKinney as suffering from PTSD as a result of his horrific childhood. McKinney’s PTSD was important mitigating evidence, central to his plea for leniency, but the Arizona Supreme Court, as a matter of law, gave it no weight. See Coleman v. Calderon, 210 F.3d 1047, 1051 (9th Cir. 2000) (constitutionally infirm jury instruction was not harmless because “it undermined the very core of Coleman’s plea for life”). We hold here, as we did in Styers, that PTSD is mitigating evidence under Eddings. Styers, 547 F.3d at 1035–36 (granting the writ based on Eddings error by the Arizona Supreme Court in treating PTSD mitigation evidence irrelevant as a matter of law). We MCKINNEY V. RYAN 49 hold, further, as we also did in Styers, that the Arizona Supreme Court’s refusal, as matter of law, to give weight to petitioner’s PTSD, requires resentencing. Id. “[I]n capital cases the fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment . . . requires consideration of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976); see also Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 (“Given that the imposition of death by public authority is so profoundly different from all other penalties, we cannot avoid the conclusion that an individualized decision is essential in capital cases.”). When a defendant’s life is at stake, the Supreme Court has consistently emphasized the importance of a properly informed, individualized sentencing determination. See, e.g., Abdul-Kabir v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 233, 264 (2007) (noting that Lockett and its progeny “have made clear that when the jury is not permitted to give meaningful effect or a ‘reasoned moral response’ to a defendant’s mitigating evidence . . . the sentencing process is fatally flawed”); Satterwhite, 486 U.S. at 258 (“It is important to avoid error in capital sentencing proceedings.”); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 304; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604 (“We are satisfied that this qualitative difference between death and other penalties calls for a greater degree of reliability when the death sentence is imposed.”). We recognize that there were important aggravating factors in this case. Although the jury had not found that McKinney had himself killed either Ms. Mertens or Mr. McClain, the sentencing judge concluded, based on substantial evidence, that McKinney had killed Ms. Mertens, 50 MCKINNEY V. RYAN though not Mr. McClain. Further, McKinney had been involved, as either the actual killer or as an accessory, in two murders; the murders had been done for pecuniary gain; and there had been cruelty to Mertens in the struggle preceding her death. We do not give “short shrift” to, or minimize the importance of, these aggravating factors. Bobby v. Van Hook, 558 U.S. 4, 13 (2009) (per curiam). But we conclude that McKinney’s evidence of PTSD resulting from sustained, severe childhood abuse would have had a substantial impact on a capital sentencer who was permitted to evaluate and give appropriate weight to it as a nonstatutory mitigating factor. We conclude in this case that the Arizona Supreme Court’s application of its causal nexus test to exclude, as a matter or law, evidence of McKinney’s PTSD was “contrary to . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” and that its application of the test had a “substantial and injurious effect or influence” on its decision to sentence McKinney to death. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation marks omitted). VIII. Response to Dissent The foregoing opinion speaks for itself, but we add a few words to respond directly to two contentions in the dissent with which we particularly disagree. A. Consistent Articulation and Application of the Causal Nexus Test First, the dissent contends that during the relevant period the Arizona Supreme Court was inconsistent in its articulation and application of its unconstitutional causal nexus test for nonstatutory mitigation. We disagree. As we discuss in the body of our opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court, during a MCKINNEY V. RYAN 51 period of just over fifteen years, consistently insisted upon and applied its causal nexus test to nonstatutory mitigation. In no case during this period did the Court give any indication that the causal nexus test was not the law in Arizona, or any indication that it had the slightest doubt about the constitutionality of the test. The dissent particularly relies on four Arizona Supreme Court cases. Dissent at 89–96. Those cases are State v. Towery, 920 P.2d 290 (Ariz. 1996), State v. Thornton, 929 P.2d 676 (Ariz. 1996), State v. Gonzales, 892 P.2d 838 (Ariz. 1995), and State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869 (Ariz. 1997). None of the four cases even remotely supports the dissent’s contention. Of the four cases, the dissent emphasizes Towery. Dissent at 89–90. In Towery, however, the Arizona Supreme Court clearly articulated and applied its causal nexus test. The defendant in Towery had introduced, as a would-be mitigating factor, evidence of his difficult family background. The sentencing judge “rejected the evidence as a mitigating factor because [Towery] failed to establish a nexus between his family background and his crime.” Towery, 920 P.2d at 310. The Arizona Supreme Court, on de novo review, affirmed the death sentence. It wrote: We have held that a difficult family background is not always entitled to great weight as a mitigating circumstance. State v. Wallace, . . . 773 P.2d 983, 985–86 (1989) (“A difficult family background is a relevant mitigating circumstance if a defendant can show that something in that background had an effect or impact on his behavior that was 52 MCKINNEY V. RYAN beyond the defendant’s control.”)[.] We have since reaffirmed that family background may be a substantial mitigating circumstance when it is shown to have some connection with the defendant’s offense-related conduct. White, . . . 815 P.2d at 881–82. Defendant has failed to connect his family background to his criminal conduct. Id. at 311 (citations shortened). The Court in Towery could hardly have been clearer. It both articulated and applied its unconstitutional causal nexus test to treat as irrelevant, as a matter of law, nonstatutory mitigation evidence of the defendant’s family background because he had “failed to connect his family background to his criminal conduct.” Our three-judge panel decision, reviewing Towery’s conviction and sentence on federal habeas, held to the contrary, but it was mistaken in so holding. See Towery v. Ryan, 673 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2012). The other three cases are of no greater help to the dissent. In Thornton, the sentencing judge had given mitigating weight to defendant’s “traumatic childhood, dysfunctional family, and antisocial personality disorder,” as it was permitted to do under Arizona law provided there was a causal nexus to the crime. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the judge on this point. It did not recite whether the judge had found a causal nexus; it simply affirmed without comment. The defendant contended that the sentencing judge should also have given weight to four other nonstatutory mitigating factors — mental illness, remorse, cooperation, and character. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the contention that any of these factors were mitigating. It MCKINNEY V. RYAN 53 rejected three of them on the ground that they did not exist as a factual matter. It rejected the fourth with a citation to the precise page in Ross in which it had articulated its unconstitutional causal nexus test. In Gonzales, defendant contended his good character should have been given mitigating weight. The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the contention, holding as a factual matter that Gonzales did not have good character. In Trostle, the Arizona Supreme Court gave mitigating weight to the defendant’s mental impairment because the causal nexus test was satisfied. The Court wrote, [W]eight to be given to mental impairment should be proportional to a defendant’s ability to conform or appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. The defendant here established . . . that he was affected in no small measure by an impaired ability to conform his conduct to the law’s requirements. . . . The trial court, therefore, should have given serious consideration to this evidence, either as statutory or nonstatutory mitigation. 951 P.2d at 886. The dissent also relies on two cases cited in Lopez v. Ryan, 630 F.3d 1198, 1204 n.4 (9th Cir. 2011) — State v. Mann, 934 P.2d 784 (Ariz. 1997); and State v. Medrano, 914 P.2d 225 (Ariz. 1996). Neither case supports the dissent’s contention. In State v. Mann, the defendant had advanced four proposed nonstatutory mitigators: (1) the possibility of 54 MCKINNEY V. RYAN consecutive life sentences rather than the death penalty; (2) defendant’s relationship to his children; (3) a change in defendant’s “lifestyle” after he committed the murders; and (4) defendant’s difficult family background. 934 P.2d at 795. The Arizona Supreme Court held as a matter of law that the possibility of consecutive life sentences was “a sentencing option” rather than a mitigating factor. Id. With respect to defendant’s relationship with his children and his change in lifestyle, the Court held that the defendant had not “established mitigation of sufficient weight to call for leniency.” Id. Finally, the Court held that defendant’s difficult family background was irrelevant as a matter of law. It recited its causal nexus test, citing the precise page in its Wallace opinion on which it had articulated and applied the test. The Court then wrote, “Defendant did not show any connection.” Id. In State v. Medrano, the defendant contended that his cocaine intoxication was both a statutory and nonstatutory mitigating factor. The sentencing judge had found as a factual matter that defendant’s cocaine intoxication had not affected his behavior in committing the crime. The Arizona Supreme Court applied the causal nexus test, writing that the sentencing judge had found that the defendant had “not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, either as a statutory or nonstatutory mitigating factor, that cocaine intoxication had contributed to his conduct on the night of the murder.” 914 P.2d at 227. The Arizona Supreme Court accepted the factual finding of the sentencing judge that there had been no causal nexus. The Court wrote that defendant’s evidence was “unpersuasive” and that his cocaine use therefore “fail[ed] as a non-statutory mitigating circumstance.” Id. at 229. MCKINNEY V. RYAN 55 As we noted at the beginning of our opinion, the Arizona Supreme Court has a strong view of stare decisis. The Court wrote in White v. Bateman, 358 P.2d 712, 714 (Ariz. 1961), for example, that its prior case law “should be adhered to unless the reasons of the prior decisions have ceased to exist or the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong.” See also Young v. Beck, 251 P.3d 380, 385 (Ariz. 2011) (“[S]tare decisis commands that ‘precedents of the court should not be lightly overruled,’ and mere disagreement with those who preceded us is not enough.” (quoting State v. Salazar, 173 Ariz. 399, 416 . . . (1992))); State ex re. Woods v. Cohen, 844 P.2d 1147, 1148 (Ariz. 1993) (referring to “a healthy respect for stare decisis”); State v. Williker, 491 P.2d 465, 468 (Ariz. 1971) (referring to “a proper respect for the theory of stare decisis”). Consistent with its view of stare decisis, the Arizona Supreme Court applied its unconstitutional causal nexus test consistently throughout during the relevant period. We would hardly expect the Court have done otherwise, given its view of stare decisis and the causal nexus test. The test was, of course, premised on a mistaken understanding of Eddings. The Court corrected its mistake, consistent with its view of stare decisis under Bateman (“the prior decision was clearly erroneous or manifestly wrong”), after the United States Supreme Court emphatically reiterated the Eddings rule in 2004 in Tennard v. Dretke. See State v. Anderson, 111 P.3d 369 (Ariz. 2005). But a mistake is only a mistake. All courts, even very good courts, make mistakes. A good court, however, does not apply an established rule erratically, enforcing it arbitrarily in some cases but not in others. We have great respect for the Supreme Court of Arizona, whose institutional integrity is demonstrated, inter alia, by the 56 MCKINNEY V. RYAN consistent application of the causal nexus test during the fifteen-year period it was in effect. B. Appellate Review and “Unreasonable Determination of Fact” Second, the dissent contends that the critical question before us is whether the Arizona Supreme Court properly concluded that the sentencing judge “fully considered McKinney’s PTSD.” Dissent at 82. It further contends that we must review whether the Court properly so concluded under the “unreasonable determination of fact” standard of AEDPA. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). According to the dissent, the Arizona Supreme Court did not unreasonably make the factual determination that the sentencing judge had “fully considered McKinney’s PTSD.” Therefore, according to the dissent, we must uphold the sentencing decision of the Arizona Supreme Court. The dissent misunderstands both the significance of the Arizona Supreme Court’s de novo review in capital cases, and the “unreasonable determination of fact” standard of review under AEDPA. Contrary to the view of the dissent, the Arizona Supreme Court in reviewing capital sentences does not base its decision on whether the sentencing judge fully considered aggravating and mitigating factors. Rather, as we indicated above, the Arizona Supreme Court reviews capital sentences de novo, making its own independent determination of what constitute legally relevant aggravating and mitigating factors, and then performing an independent weighing of those factors. In its own words, the Arizona Supreme Court “conducts a thorough and independent review of the record and of the aggravating and mitigating evidence to determine whether the sentence is justified, . . . consider[ing] the quality MCKINNEY V. RYAN 57 and strength, not simply the number, of aggravating or mitigating factors.” McKinney, 917 P.2d at 1225. Further, and also contrary to the view of the dissent, the question whether the sentencing judge “fully considered McKinney’s PTSD” is not a question of “fact” under § 2254(d)(2). A “fact” under § 2254(d)(2) is an evidentiary fact, such as whether a defendant had PTSD or whether a defendant’s PTSD had a causal nexus to the crime. See, e.g., Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 850 (2010) (analyzing evidentiary facts under § 2254(d)(2)). Whether a sentencing judge fully considered an evidentiary fact is not a “fact” within the meaning of § 2254(d)(2).