Opinion ID: 2639110
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Did the Delay Between Mays' Arrest and Preliminary Hearing Violate His Right to a Speedy Trial?

Text: Mays was arrested on January 27, 2000. The hearing to authorize his prosecution as an adult was held on March 9, 2000. The preliminary hearing at which Mays was bound over for trial began on April 10, 2000. Mays argues that the delay between his arrest and preliminary hearing violated his right to a speedy trial, as provided in K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-2902. K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-2902 provides in relevant part: (1) Every person arrested on a warrant charging a felony or served with a summons charging a felony shall have a right to a preliminary examination before a magistrate, unless such warrant has been issued as a result of an indictment by a grand jury. (2) The preliminary examination shall be held before a magistrate of a county in which venue for the prosecution lies within 10 days after the arrest or personal appearance of the defendant. Continuances may be granted only for good cause shown. The State accurately points out that this court has interpreted the 10-day time limitation of K.S.A. 2003 Supp. 22-2902(2) to be directory rather than mandatory: Unlike K.S.A. 22-3402, which requires the discharge of a person not promptly brought to trial, K.S.A. 22-2902(2) does not require the dismissal of the charge and the discharge of the defendant if a preliminary hearing is not provided within 10 days. State v. Fink, 217 Kan. 671, Syl. ¶ 3, 538 P.2d 1390 (1975). This time limitation is directory. Inconsequential delay beyond the 10 days will not require dismissal of the charges. State v. McClain, 258 Kan. 176, 185, 899 P.2d 993 (1995). The McClain court further held that the timeliness of a preliminary hearing may be challenged only by a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3208 and no later than 20 days after arraignment. The failure to challenge the timeliness of the preliminary hearing by such a motion constitutes a waiver and precludes review on appeal. 258 Kan. at 185. Because McClain failed to file a motion to dismiss, he waived the issue. Similarly, in this case the record does not reflect that Mays ever filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3208; therefore, under the holding of McClain, Mays has waived the issue of the timeliness of the preliminary hearing.