Opinion ID: 2613228
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: Sua Sponte Instruction on Provocation

Text: (19a) Defendant next contends the trial court erred in failing to instruct sua sponte, based on CALJIC No. 8.73, that the jury, in deciding whether defendant could be found guilty of second degree murder of victim Castro, could consider evidence of any provocation that played a part in inducing the homicide, even if that evidence was insufficient to reduce the offense to manslaughter. The record discloses that the court instructed the jurors generally on the subject of second degree murder, telling them that such a finding would be appropriate if the killing was intentional, and was committed with malice aforethought, but was neither premeditated nor deliberate. At counsel's request, the court also instructed that provocation could reduce the offense involving victim Castro to voluntary manslaughter. (The court found no substantial evidence of provocation as to victim Holmes, and declined to so instruct as to her death.) (20) As defendant observes, a sua sponte instruction on provocation and second degree murder must be given where the evidence of provocation would justify a jury determination that the accused had formed the intent to kill as a direct response to the provocation and had acted immediately to carry it out. ( People v. Wickersham (1982) 32 Cal.3d 307, 329 [185 Cal. Rptr. 436, 650 P.2d 311].) Wickersham noted that the fact that heated words were exchanged or a physical struggle took place between the victim and the accused before the fatality may be sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to premeditation. ( Ibid. ) (19b) Defendant argues that because the trial court apparently found sufficient evidence to justify giving a provocation/manslaughter instruction, then a fortiori there must have been enough evidence to instruct on second degree murder. The problem with defendant's analysis is that there was insufficient evidence of provocation to justify any instructions on that subject. Thus, the trial court's instruction on manslaughter was inappropriate and unnecessary, though obviously not prejudicial to defendant. Defendant introduced no evidence whatever to support a defense of provocation, or to indicate he was relying on one. Instead, he attempted to mount an alibi defense, to cast suspicion on another acquaintance of Castro, and to impeach witness Fuller's incriminating testimony. A provocation defense would have been inconsistent with the foregoing denial of guilt. Under such circumstances, no sua sponte instruction was required. ( People v. Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 329; People v. Sedeno (1974) 10 Cal.3d 703, 716 [112 Cal. Rptr. 1, 518 P.2d 913].) Defendant observes, however, that at an in-chambers conference with the court at close of trial, his counsel indicated he would also rely on a provocation defense, a defense that the jury might accept despite rejecting the alibi defense. Counsel cited the testimony of interrogating officer McCarthy that, according to defendant, Castro first became intoxicated and then became emotional and upset, complaining about being mistreated by men, hollering at defendant, and knocking things over, before finally going to sleep. Significantly, nothing in the portion of defendant's statement that was summarized by the testifying officer indicated any relevant effect on defendant's state of mind resulting from Castro's words or actions. Indeed, according to his statement, defendant was not provoked into killing Castro. Thus, the foregoing evidence would have given the jury no basis whatever for concluding that defendant formed the intent to kill as a direct response to Castro's conduct as required by Wickersham, supra, 32 Cal.3d at page 329. (See also People v. Morris (1991) 53 Cal.3d 152, 211, and fn. 12 [279 Cal. Rptr. 720, 807 P.2d 949] [no evidentiary basis for believing jury might have found adequate provocation].) The trial court likewise expressed its doubt that defendant's provocation evidence was substantial enough to justify a provocation/manslaughter instruction but nonetheless indicated it would give the instruction (only as to Castro) to avoid possible reversal on appeal. The court cited a reference in prosecution witness Fuller's testimony to the effect that defendant told her he had become upset with Castro. In fact, Fuller testified that, according to defendant, Castro became intoxicated and depressed, and that defendant became sick and tired of her ... being depressed, so he hit her and knocked her out. We conclude that such meager evidence, suggesting passive conduct by Castro, and being contrary to defendant's own statement to the officers, would not be a sufficient basis for concluding that Castro actively provoked defendant into killing her. Defendant contends that because the trial court instructed on provocation/manslaughter, there must have been evidence to support a provocation/second degree murder theory. We have previously rejected similar contentions. ( People v. Payton (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1050, 1061 [13 Cal. Rptr.2d 526, 839 P.2d 1035]; People v. Pensinger (1991) 52 Cal.3d 1210, 1242 [278 Cal. Rptr. 640, 805 P.2d 899]; People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 157 [158 Cal. Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) We conclude the trial court did not err in failing to instruct sua sponte on a provocation/second degree murder defense. In light of our conclusion, we need not consider whether defendant was prejudiced by the failure to instruct. We observe, however, that the evidence overwhelmingly supports a finding that both murders were premeditated, deliberate, and unprovoked, being committed to facilitate a burglary of the victims' home, and to prevent them from identifying defendant as the burglar. (See, e.g., People v. Pride (1992) 3 Cal.4th 195, 247-248 [10 Cal. Rptr.2d 636, 833 P.2d 643] [finding evidence of premeditation based partly on victims' multiple stab wounds].)
(21) In Carlos v. Superior Court (1983) 35 Cal.3d 131 [197 Cal. Rptr. 79, 672 P.2d 862], we held that intent to kill was a necessary element of the felony-murder special circumstance, and in People v. Turner (1984) 37 Cal.3d 302 [208 Cal. Rptr. 196, 690 P.2d 669] we extended the Carlos holding to the multiple-murder special circumstance. We overruled both Carlos and Turner in People v. Anderson (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1104 [240 Cal. Rptr. 585, 742 P.2d 1306]. As to offenses committed after Carlos but before Anderson, however, due process and ex post facto principles demand that the intent-to-kill requirement apply to any felony-murder special circumstance charged in connection with such offenses. (See People v. Fierro (1991) 1 Cal.4th 173, 227 [3 Cal. Rptr.2d 426, 821 P.2d 1302]; People v. Duncan (1991) 53 Cal.3d 955, 973, fn. 4 [281 Cal. Rptr. 273, 810 P.2d 131]; In re Baert (1988) 205 Cal. App.3d 514, 516-522 [252 Cal. Rptr. 418].) The offenses involved here occurred in January 1986, during the foregoing window period between Carlos and Anderson. Presumably, the foregoing constitutional concerns would likewise apply to the multiple-murder special circumstance alleged here. The Attorney General does not contend otherwise. (22) Indeed, the People concede that Carlos error occurred here, and they contend that such error was harmless. (See People v. Harris (1989) 47 Cal.3d 1047, 1100 [255 Cal. Rptr. 352, 767 P.2d 619]; People v. Odle (1988) 45 Cal.3d 386, 414-415 [247 Cal. Rptr. 137, 754 P.2d 184].) Odle concluded that a harmless error analysis pursuant to Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at page 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pages 710-711], is appropriate and constitutionally permissible in cases involving failure to instruct on an element of a special circumstance. Odle reasoned that there is no constitutional right to a jury trial on the issue of a defendant's eligibility for the death penalty, an issue which, but for the mandate of a state statute, would be a sentencing issue. (45 Cal.3d at pp. 411-412.) Although defendant asserts that Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d 386, was incorrectly decided, we have repeatedly declined to reexamine our holding in that case. (See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1179, 1267 [275 Cal. Rptr. 729, 800 P.2d 1159]; People v. Harris, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1100; see also People v. Cummings (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1233, 1302, and fn. 45, 1313-1314 [18 Cal. Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1] [acknowledging Odle 's distinction between failure to instruct on element of an offense, and failure to instruct on element of a special circumstance allegation].) Our review of the record confirms that the court indeed failed to instruct the jury that an intent to kill was a prerequisite to finding true the multiple-murder special circumstance. Moreover, we cannot necessarily infer such a finding from the jury's verdict or findings based on the court's other instructions. (See, e.g., People v. Duncan, supra, 53 Cal.3d 955, 973-974.) Although the jurors were instructed regarding premeditated murder and its intent element, they were also instructed on felony murder. Thus, although the issue of intent was not entirely removed from the jury's consideration (cf. United States v. Gaudin (9th Cir.1993) 986 F.2d 1267), its finding of first degree murder did not necessarily include a determination that defendant intended to kill both of his victims. But as we explain, the evidence of defendant's intent to kill both victims was overwhelming, and the jury could have had no reasonable doubt on that matter. As in People v. Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d at page 416, this is a case in which the facts overwhelmingly demonstrate that the instructional error was harmless. (See also People v. Harris, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 1100 [failure to instruct on intent to kill harmless where evidence of such intent overwhelming].) The dissent herein relies on Yates v. Evatt (1991) 500 U.S. 391 [114 L.Ed.2d 432, 111 S.Ct. 1884], disapproving language in an earlier case ( Rose v. Clark (1986) 478 U.S. 570, 579 [92 L.Ed.2d 460, 471, 106 S.Ct. 3101]), relied on in part by Odle, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pages 413 through 414. But Yates 's criticism of Rose v. Clark was made in the context of determining the proper harmless error standard for rebuttable presumptions. (See 500 U.S. at pp. 402-403, fn. 8 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 448].) Yates concerned the applicable harmless error test where the jury has been improperly instructed that an element of the offense (malice) could be presumed from certain facts (intentional commission of unlawful act, or use of a deadly weapon). Thus, if an intent to kill were an element of the offenses charged herein (rather than pertaining to the special circumstance finding), and if the jurors herein had been told that the defendant's intent to kill was presumed by reason of certain facts in the case, Yates would require the following showing in order to find the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at pp. 710-711]: [T]he issue under Chapman is whether the jury actually rested its verdict on evidence establishing the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt, independently of the presumption. Since that enquiry cannot be a subjective one into the jurors' minds, a court must approach it by asking whether the force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the presumption.  (500 U.S. at pp. 404-405 [114 L.Ed.2d at p. 449, 111 S.Ct. at pp. 1893-1894], italics added; see also Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) ___ U.S. ___ [124 L.Ed.2d 182, 188-189, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2081] [ Chapman test requires finding jury's guilty verdict surely unattributable to error; faulty instructions on reasonable doubt deemed reversible per se].) In the present case, the jurors were not told to apply any improper presumptions as to the intent-to-kill issue. Accordingly, the test of Yates v. Evatt, supra , seemingly would be inapplicable here. But, as will appear, even were we to apply that test, we would conclude that the evidence before the jury was so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt the verdict would have been the same had the jury been instructed regarding the necessity of finding an intent to kill. We briefly review the evidence as it bore on the intent issue:
Defendant strangled Castro to death with a telephone wire and set her room, and probably her body, afire. The method of execution itself precludes any inference the murder was accidental or unintentional. As we have repeatedly held, this method of killing [strangulation] is indicative of at least a deliberate intent to kill. [Citations.] ( People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 349.) The jury's first degree murder finding reflected the jury's determination that Castro's murder was either (1) premeditated, (2) committed in the course of a burglary, requiring a preexisting specific intent to steal, and/or (3) committed in the course of a rape. On this record, the only reasonable conclusion one can draw from the evidence and the jury's findings is that defendant intentionally murdered Castro to facilitate his escape and preclude his apprehension after raping her and/or stealing her jewelry. Defendant, relying on an alibi defense, introduced no evidence which would have justified a finding of unintentional homicide.
As for Holmes, defendant admitted that she became aware of his presence in the house with Castro on the night of the murders. According to witness Fuller, defendant admitted hitting Holmes after she came upstairs to inquire about Castro, who was already unconscious from defendant's assault on her. The evidence shows that defendant stole Holmes's jewelry and beat her to death by kicking her 10 to 12 times in her face and head. As we have explained, there was no substantial evidence that Holmes provoked the assault. Once again, the methodical method of execution would preclude any inference the killing was accidental or unintentional. (See People v. Pride, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 247 [multiple stab wounds consistent with finding of premeditated murder]; People v. Hernandez, supra, 47 Cal.3d at p. 350 [calculated rather than random method of killing may be indicative of premeditated murder]; People v. Anderson, supra, 70 Cal.2d at p. 27 [exacting manner of killing indicative of premeditated murder].) Again, the only reasonable conclusion the jury could have drawn was that defendant, after killing Castro, then killed Holmes to facilitate his escape and preclude his apprehension. We conclude that the error in failing to instruct on intent to kill with respect to Castro and Holmes was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.