Opinion ID: 1209026
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: 4a THE COMPLAINT FAILS TO STATE A CAUSE OF ACTION FOR INVASION OF PRIVACY.

Text: Forsher's third cause of action, which incorporates by reference much of the first cause of action, is an attempt to allege invasion of privacy. The essential allegations concerning the alleged invasion of privacy may be summarized as follows: [The] publication of Plaintiff's identity in connection with the events surrounding the disappearance of Ronald Hughes was of little or no informational or social value. At no time relevant herein was Plaintiff's identity newsworthy; at no time relevant herein was there any substantial reason or justification for focusing public attention on Plaintiff as an individual or any legitimate public interest in ascertaining Plaintiff's identity.... [¶] At no time relevant herein did Plaintiff seek or in any way encourage the publication of his name ... in connection with the disappearance of Ronald Hughes. At no time ... did plaintiff attempt ... to solicit publicity.... At no time ... was Plaintiff regarded as a public figure or did plaintiff hold such a position in the community [that] plaintiff's ... involvement in the Hughes disappearance was a matter of general, legitimate or substantial public interest. Forsher further alleges that defendants published his identity with reckless disregard of the fact that the publication would be offensive to him, that the publication was offensive to him and that the publication was intentional, fraudulent, malicious and oppressive. The right of privacy is a rather recent development of the common law. The celebrated article by Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy (1890) 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193, attempted to trace the right and to provide a theoretical base for the recognition of privacy as an interest especially entitled to protection. Justice Peters, writing for this court, observed in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc. (1971) 4 Cal.3d 529 at page 533 [93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 483 P.2d 34, 57 A.L.R.3d 1]: ... Warren and Brandeis perceived that it was mass exposure to public gaze, as opposed to backyard gossip, which threatened to deprive men of the right of `scratching wherever one itches.' [Citation.] Succinctly stated, the right is to be left alone. (See 4 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Torts, § 334, p. 2599; Rest. 2d Torts, § 652A, com. a.) Our courts have dealt with four distinct factual settings under the heading of invasion of privacy. As identified by the late Dean Prosser, those four types of cases are: (1) intrusion upon one's physical solitude or seclusion; (2) public disclosure of private facts; (3) false light in the public eye; and (4) appropriation. ( Kapellas v. Kofman (1969) 1 Cal.3d 20, 35, fn. 16 [81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 459 P.2d 912]; Prosser, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1971) § 117, p. 804 et seq. Plaintiff claims through his allegations that private embarrassing facts about him were revealed and that his personal character was thereby injured. The allegations of the complaint might involve either the public disclosure of private facts branch or the false light branch of the tort. On appeal, plaintiff, while not labeling which branch of the tort he contends was committed, most clearly contends that there has been public disclosure of private facts. In particular, plaintiff complains of the use of his true name and identity in connection with the admittedly newsworthy publication of the facts surrounding Hughes' disappearance and death. (5) Three required elements of the cause of action for public disclosure of private facts may be discerned from decisions of our courts. First, the disclosure of private facts must be a public disclosure. ( Porten v. University of San Francisco (1976) 64 Cal. App.3d 825, 828 [134 Cal. Rptr. 839]; Timperley v. Chase Collection Service (1969) 272 Cal. App.2d 697, 700 [77 Cal. Rptr. 782] (quoting Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) § 112, p. 835).) Second, the facts disclosed must be private facts, and not public ones. ( Kapellas v. Kofman, supra, 1 Cal.3d 20, 35; Coverstone v. Davies (1952) 38 Cal.2d 315, 323 [239 P.2d 876]; Melvin v. Reid (1931) 112 Cal. App. 285, 290 [297 P. 91].) Third, the matter made public must be one which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable [person] of ordinary sensibilities. ( Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 224 [253 P.2d 441]; Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co. (N.D.Cal. 1954) 122 F. Supp. 327.) In determining whether a cause of action has been stated, we must consider certain principles relating to the First Amendment, for the right to keep information private often clashes with the First Amendment right to disseminate information to the public. Warren and Brandeis themselves noted the potential conflict between freedom of the press and the right of privacy and suggested that the right should not apply to matters of public or general interest. (Warren & Brandeis, supra, 4 Harv.L.Rev. 193, 214; see also Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d 529, 534.) The conflict between freedom of the press and the right of privacy was considered in Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d 529. In that case, Briscoe's identity as a former hijacker was revealed in a magazine article 11 years after he had committed his crime. During the intervening years Briscoe had become rehabilitated and was a respectable member of society. Briscoe filed suit against Reader's Digest claiming that it had invaded his privacy by disclosing truthful but private, embarrassing facts about his past life and that as a result, his daughter and friends had abandoned him. We concluded that Briscoe had stated a cause of action. We recognized in Briscoe that the case pitted a rehabilitated felon's right to anonymity against a magazine's right to identify him ( id., at p. 534), and proceeded to analyze the nature of these competing interests. In so doing, we acknowledged the significant public interest in true reports of recent crimes and the names of persons charged with their commission and concluded they are protected by the First Amendment: The circumstances under which crimes occur, the techniques used by those outside the law, the tragedy that may befall the victims  these are vital bits of information for people coping with the exigencies of modern life. ( Id., at p. 536.) Naming the suspect may legitimately put others on notice that the named individual is suspected of having committed a crime and may also persuade eyewitnesses and character witnesses to testify. ( Ibid. ) In Briscoe, however, we had to go further and determine whether the public interest in reports of long past crimes was of similar strength so as to fall within the First Amendment protections. We recognized that reports of the facts of past crimes may be newsworthy and may prove educational in illustrating the reasons for and methods by which crimes are committed as well as methods of apprehension. ( Id., at p. 537.) We found it a different matter, however, as to the inclusion of the actor's identification: Once legal proceedings have terminated, and a suspect or offender has been released, identification of the individual will not usually aid the administration of justice. Identification will no longer serve to bring forth witnesses or obtain succor for victims. Unless the individual has reattracted the public eye to himself in some independent fashion, the only public `interest' that would usually be served is that of curiosity. ( Ibid. ) We considered three factors drawn from our decision in Kapellas v. Kofman, supra, 1 Cal.3d 20, to determine whether the Reader's Digest story was newsworthy: the social value of the facts published, the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and the extent to which the party voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety. ( Id., at p. 36.) Applying the three Kapellas criteria to the revelation of Briscoe's identity, we determined: (1) the public had little interest 11 years after the crime was committed in knowing Briscoe's identity; (2) a jury could find that the revelation of a person's criminal past is grossly offensive; and (3) Briscoe did not voluntarily consent to the publicity accorded him. Most important to our decision, however, was the fact that the state has a compelling interest in the rehabilitative process and that a continuing threat of media disclosure of the identity of past criminals is counterproductive to this process. This additional interest, when pooled with the privacy and First Amendment interests, swung the pendulum in privacy's favor. California courts have refrained from extending the Briscoe rule to other fact situations. For example, in Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc. (1974) 43 Cal. App.3d 880 [118 Cal. Rptr. 370], the court distinguished Briscoe by pointing out that it was not dealing with a reformed criminal, but an honest citizen who had returned $240,000 in cash to Brinks after it had been mislaid. The Johnson court interpreted Briscoe as holding that where the plaintiff is a past criminal and his name is used in a publication, the mere lapse of time may provide a basis for an invasion of privacy suit. ( Id., at p. 891.) Lapse of time is not an issue, the court concluded, in a case where the plaintiff is not a past criminal. Our decision in Briscoe was an exception to the more general rule that once a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days. (Prosser, Privacy (1960) 48 Cal.L.Rev. 383, 418, quoted in Werner v. Times-Mirror Co. (1961) 193 Cal. App.2d 111, 118 [14 Cal. Rptr. 208]; see also Smith v. National Broadcasting Co. (1956) 138 Cal. App.2d 807, 814 [292 P.2d 600]; Rest.2d Torts, § 652D, com. k.) As we noted in Kappellas v. Kofman, supra, 1 Cal.3d 20, 36: If the information reported has previously become part of the `public domain' or the intrusion into an individual's private life is only slight, publication will be privileged even though the social utility of the publication may be minimal. The clash between claims of privacy and claims of a free press has also been considered in recent years by the United States Supreme Court. In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn (1975) 420 U.S. 469 [43 L.Ed.2d 328, 95 S.Ct. 1029], an action for invasion of privacy brought upon defendant's publishing the name of plaintiff, a rape victim, in violation of a state statute, the high court invalidated the statute. In so doing and while recognizing the impressive credentials for a right of privacy, the court determined (1) the commission of crime, prosecutions resulting from it and judicial proceedings arising from prosecutions are events of legitimate concern to the public and fall within the responsibility of the press to report the operations of government, and (2) the interest in privacy fades when the information involved already appears on the public record. [7] ( Id., at pp. 489-496 [43 L.Ed. at pp. 345-350].) More recently in Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co. (1979) 443 U.S. 97 [61 L.Ed.2d 399, 99 S.Ct. 2667], the high court struck down a West Virginia statute making it a crime to publish, without approval of the juvenile court the name of any youth charged as a juvenile offender. The state's interest in protecting the anonymity of the juvenile to further his rehabilitation was held to be subordinate to the reach of the First Amendment, especially in the absence of the unlawful obtaining of such information or of an issue of privacy or pretrial publicity. Since Smith did not involve an individual right of privacy claim, its holding is of narrow scope and affords little aid in analyzing the problems before us. (6) From the foregoing discussion we discern certain guidelines to be considered in determining whether a report is newsworthy and thus constitutionally protected. Among the factors to consider are the depth of the intrusion into the plaintiff's private affairs, the extent to which the plaintiff voluntarily pushed himself into a position of public notoriety, the exact nature of the state's interest in preventing the disclosure, and whether the information is a matter of public record. Additionally, we look to any continued public interest in the event so that the passage of time does not per se extinguish the privilege of the publisher; if a report made reasonably contemporaneously with the incident would have been in the public interest, the weighing process continues in light of the circumstances prevailing at the time of publication. (4b) Although plaintiff concedes that the disappearance of Hughes was newsworthy, he insists that no facts were stated in the complaint or in the book which would enable the trial court to conclude that his identity was newsworthy. He admits, however, that his name was published in connection with a description of Hughes' disappearance by two Los Angeles area newspapers in December 1970. [8] Moreover, the mention of plaintiff in the book is not offensive, for the clear import of it is to absolve plaintiff of any responsibility for Hughes' death. The depth of intrusion, if indeed there be any, is miniscule. In the book, as our prior discussion indicated, plaintiff is not treated in any great detail; his name might even escape notice in the context of the entire volume. The book clearly does not exaggerate the importance of plaintiff's role. We are convinced that the publication of the book and plaintiff's identity did not affront any significant state interest. Unlike the plaintiffs in Melvin v. Reid, supra, 112 Cal. App. 85 and Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Association, Inc., supra, 4 Cal.3d 529, no rehabilitation or other social processes have been threatened. Also, unlike Briscoe, at the time of the publication of Helter Skelter, the event (disappearance and death of Hughes) had not become a wholly closed chapter. It is possible that the book could have elicited leads which might have explained Hughes' death in a more certain manner. At the time the book was written, Manson and events connected with the murder case were still a matter of public concern, the appeal not being decided until August 1976. (See People v. Manson (1976) 61 Cal. App.3d 102 [132 Cal. Rptr. 265].) Weighing the interest of plaintiff, the state and public, as we must under the cases cited, we conclude that the attempt to plead a cause of action for invasion of privacy must fail.