Opinion ID: 76812
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Congress Properly Exercised Its Spending Power.

Text: 18 The Constitution empowers Congress to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. It is well-settled that [i]ncident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206, 107 S.Ct. 2793, 2795-96, 97 L.Ed.2d 171 (1987). This power can be exercised to achieve goals not within the other enumerated powers of Congress in Article I, id. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 2796, but this power is also limited. 19 The Supreme Court has identified four restrictions on the spending power of Congress. First, conditions attached by Congress on the expenditure of federal funds must promote the general welfare, and not be in the service of narrow and private interests. Id. Second, conditions on the state receipt of federal funds must be unambiguous, and enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their participation. Id. Third, the Supreme Court has suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs. Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Fourth, no condition attached to receipt of federal funds may violate other provisions of the Constitution. Id. at 208, 107 S.Ct. at 2796. Georgia does not dispute that RLUIPA serves the general welfare, so we limit our discussion to the three remaining issues. 20
21 Congress may condition the expenditures of federal funds on the furtherance of federal objectives, but when the recipient of those funds is a state the conditions imposed by Congress must be unambiguous: 22 [L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the contract. There can, of course, be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it. Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously. 23 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17, 101 S.Ct. 1531, 1540, 67 L.Ed.2d 694 (1981) (internal citations omitted). 24 Georgia argues that the conditions of RLUIPA are ambiguous, contrary to Pennhurst, in four ways: (1) RLUIPA does not put states on clear notice that, by accepting federal funds, they waive immunity to suits brought under the act; (2) RLUIPA does not clearly inform states that they have an option whether to accept or reject federal funds; (3) federal grants do not mention the requirements that RLUIPA will impose on states accepting the grants; and (4) the standard of least restrictive means is too ambiguous to allow a state an informed choice. These arguments fail. 25 Congress unambiguously required states to waive their sovereign immunity from suits filed by prisoners to enforce RLUIPA. Section 2000cc-2(a) provides that [a] person may assert a violation of this chapter as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(a). The statutory definition of government specifically includes states and state agencies. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(4)(A). Georgia was on clear notice that by accepting federal funds for its prisons, Georgia waived its immunity from suit under RLUIPA. Where Congress has unambiguously conditioned the receipt of federal funds on a waiver of immunity, [our decisions do] not leave open the possibility that a state can continue to accept federal funds without knowingly waiving its immunity. Garrett v. Univ. of Ala. at Birmingham Bd. of Trs., 344 F.3d 1288, 1293 (11th Cir.2003). 26 Congress need not inform the states of their self-evident ability to decline federal funds nor include within each federal grant a list of all accompanying conditions. It is sufficient for the text of RLUIPA to link unambiguously its conditions to the receipt of federal funds and define those conditions clearly enough for the states to make an informed choice. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 25, 101 S.Ct. at 1544. RLUIPA applies in any case in which the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b)(1). 27 The standard of least restrictive means is far from ambiguous in informing states of their responsibilities when they receive federal funds. RLUIPA forbids the states from imposing substantial burdens on religious exercise absent a compelling government interest accomplished by the least restrictive means necessary to serve that interest. This standard is not new to Georgia or any state. In Midrash, we observed that RLUIPA reanimates the strict scrutiny long applied to the states in disputes regarding the free exercise of religion both before and after Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). Midrash, 366 F.3d at 1236-37. RLUIPA gives states wide latitude in applying its provisions, but this flexibility does not make the conditions of RLUIPA opaque. [O]nce Congress clearly signals its intent to attach federal conditions to Spending Clause legislation, it need not specifically identify and proscribe in advance every conceivable state action that would be improper. Sandoval v. Hagan, 197 F.3d 484, 495 (11th Cir.1999), overruled on other grounds, Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 121 S.Ct. 1511, 149 L.Ed.2d 517 (2001). 28 The Supreme Court has explained that so long as a spending condition has a clear and actionable prohibition of discrimination, it does not matter that the manner of that discrimination can vary widely. In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, for example, the Court upheld the prohibition of sexual harassment in schools that receive federal funds, under Title IX, and its corresponding right of action, even though the level of actionable `harassment' ... `depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships,'... including but not limited to, the ages of the harasser and the victim and the number of individuals involved.... 526 U.S. 629, 651, 119 S.Ct. 1661, 1675, 143 L.Ed.2d 839 (1999) ( quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 82, 118 S.Ct. 998, 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 201 (1998)). The clear prohibition of discrimination in Title IX provided adequate notice to the recipients of federal funds that severe student-on-student harassment was actionable. Id. 29 Georgia erroneously relies on Pennhurst to support its argument that RLUIPA is ambiguous. In Pennhurst, a federal suit failed when the plaintiffs argued that a federal law that declared a right to appropriate treatment for certain patients provided in the setting that is least restrictive of the [patient's] individual liberty created a substantive right against the states. Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 14, 101 S.Ct. at 1538. The Court reasoned, It is difficult to know what is meant by providing `appropriate treatment' in the `least restrictive' setting, and it is unlikely that a State would have accepted federal funds had it known it would be bound to provide such treatment. Id. at 24-25, 101 S.Ct. at 1543-44. Congress fell well short of providing clear notice to the States that they, by accepting funds under the Act, would indeed be obligated to comply with [the treatment standards]. Id. The federal law in Pennhurst was unclear as to whether the states incurred any obligations at all by accepting federal funds, but RLUIPA is clear that states incur an obligation when they accept federal funds, even if the method for compliance is left to the states. Pennhurst does not require more. 30 Our sister circuits that have considered this question reached the same conclusion. In Mayweathers, the Ninth Circuit stated, Congress is not required to list every factual instance in which a state will fail to comply with a condition. Such specificity would prove too onerous, and, perhaps, impossible. Congress must, however, make the existence of the condition itself — in exchange for the receipt of federal funds — explicitly obvious. 314 F.3d at 1067. The Seventh Circuit explained, Congress permissibly conditioned the receipt of federal money in such a way that each State is made aware of the condition and is simultaneously given the freedom to tailor compliance according to its particular penological interests and circumstances. Charles, 348 F.3d at 608. No federal appellate court has held to the contrary, and we decline to be the first. 31
32 Georgia erroneously argues that the federal grants for its prisons are unrelated to the objectives of RLUIPA. Georgia relies on the statement in Dole that the Court has suggested (without significant elaboration) that conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated to the federal interest in particular national projects or programs. 483 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 2796 (internal citations omitted). The problem with this argument is that the United States has a substantial interest in ensuring that state prisons that receive federal funds protect the federal civil rights of prisoners. 33 Congress has every right to ensure that the state prisons that accept federal funds respect the religious freedom of prisoners and promote their rehabilitation: 34 Congress has a strong interest in making certain that federal funds do not subsidize conduct that infringes individual liberties, such as the free practice of one's religion. The federal government also has a strong interest in monitoring the treatment of federal inmates housed in state prisons and in contributing to their rehabilitation. Congress may allocate federal funds freely, then, to protect the free exercise of religion and to promote rehabilitation. If the Supreme Court has in fact imposed a low-threshold relatedness test, RLUIPA satisfies it. 35 Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1067; see also Charles, 348 F.3d at 608-09. 36 The warning in Dole that Spending Clause legislation might be illegitimate if it is unrelated to the purpose of the federal spending program, 483 U.S. at 207, 107 S.Ct. at 2796, and the guidance in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2423, 120 L.Ed.2d 120 (1992), that Spending Clause legislation should bear some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending, establish a minimal standard of rationality. RLUIPA easily satisfies this standard. Both the protection of the religious exercise of prisoners and their rehabilitation are rational goals of Congress, and those goals are related to the use of federal funds for state prisons. 37 Georgia fails in its argument that highway safety, the federal interest in Dole, was tied more closely to the funding condition that states raise their legal drinking age to 21 than the funding of prisons is tied to the objectives of RLUIPA. The connection between raising the drinking age and highway funds is no more related than the connection between accommodating the religious exercise of prisoners and correctional funds. Mayweathers, 314 F.3d at 1067; Charles, 348 F.3d at 608-09. If anything, the protection of the free exercise of religion, a civil right guaranteed by the First Amendment, is a more substantial federal interest than highway safety. 38 Georgia also wrongly argues that the extensive conditions imposed by RLUIPA are not in proportion to the small amount of federal funds dedicated to state correctional systems. Georgia relies on Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 111 S.Ct. 1759, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1990), and FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 104 S.Ct. 3106, 82 L.Ed.2d 278 (1984), in support of this argument. Although both of those decisions briefly discussed the Spending Clause, the holdings of the Court turned on statutory conditions that violated the free speech rights of individual citizens. Neither decision involved conditions imposed on the receipt of federal funds by states. As the Seventh Circuit stated in Charles, both Rust and League of Women Voters are inapposite; they do not even concern the Spending Clause. Charles, 348 F.3d at 601. 39 The Seventh Circuit also correctly explained in Charles that there is no standard of proportionality for spending legislation: 40 Nothing within Spending Clause jurisprudence, or RLUIPA for that matter, suggests that States are bound by the conditional grant of federal money only if the State receives or derives a certain percentage ... of its budget from federal funds. If a State wishes to receive any federal funding, it must accept the related, unambiguous conditions in their entirety. 41 Id. Likewise, Georgia cannot accept federal funds and then attempt to avoid their accompanying conditions by arguing that the conditions are disproportionate in scope.