Opinion ID: 2285907
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Constitutionality of the State's exercise of its police power under this Act.

Text: In enacting the Site Location Law, the 104th Legislature presented the State with a means of minimizing, through the exercise of its police power, the irreparable damage being done to the environment. But the mere urgency of the action taken cannot override the necessity that the device which the Legislature has chosen for the public protection is one which is constitutionally permitted. It is Lakesites' contention that the Legislature has not chosen such a device here. In our consideration of the validity of the Legislature's choice of legislation to accomplish its purpose we have in mind that all Acts of the Legislature are presumed to be constitutional, that this is a presumption of great strength and that the burden is on him who claims that the Act is unconstitutional to show its unconstitutionality. State v. Fantastic Fair, 158 Me. 450, 186 A.2d 352 (1961). The State is permitted, of course, to exercise the police power for the protection of the public welfare, safety, order, morals and health. Prudential Insurance Company of America v. Insurance Commissioner, Me., 293 A.2d 529 (1972); York Harbor Village Corporation v. Libby, 126 Me. 537, 140 A. 382 (1928). It seems self-evident in these times of increased awareness of the relationship of the environment to human health and welfare that the state may actif it acts properlyto conserve the quality of air, soil and water. To do so the State may justifiably limit the use which some owners may make of their property. Our law has long recognized that a landowner holds his property subject to the limitation that he may not use it to the serious disadvantage of the public. As early as 1835 the legislative body of the City of Bangor determined that the public safety demanded that wooden buildings should not be built in certain sections of the City and enacted an ordinance forbidding owners of land in these areas from erecting wooden buildings on their property. This Court upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance saying: Police regulations may forbid such a use, and such modifications, of private property, as would prove injurious to the citizens generally. This is one of the benefits which men derive from associating in communities. It may sometimes occasion an inconvenience to an individual; but he has a compensation, in participating in the general advantage. Laws of this character are unquestionably within the scope of the legislative power, without impairing any constitutional provision. It does not appropriate private property to public uses; but merely regulates its enjoyment.. . .  Wadleigh v. Gilman, 12 Me. 403, 405 (1835). In 1907 the very philosophy contained in the statement of purpose of the present Act was expressed by the Justices of this Court in an Opinion in which they responded to a question from the Maine Senate. The Senate inquired whether In order to promote the common welfare of the people of Maine by preventing or diminishing injurious droughts and freshets, and by protecting, preserving, and maintaining the natural water supply of the springs, streams, ponds, and lakes and of the land, and by preventing or diminishing injurious erosion of the land and the filling up of the rivers, ponds, and lakes, . . .  Questions and Answers, 103 Me. 506, 507, 69 A. 627 (1907). the Legislature had power under the Constitution to pass legislation which would prohibit the owners of wildland from unnecessary cutting or destruction of small trees to preserve or enhance the value of such lands and trees thereon and protect and promote the interests of such owners and the common welfare of the people. While the Opinion of the Justices is not precedent, we find that the reasoning which led to their conclusions is most impressive. The Justices found that the proposed legislation would not offend the constitutionally guaranteed right of acquiring, possessing and defending property or the provision that private property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation. Constitution of Maine, Art. 1, §§ 1, 21. Six of the Justices answered, [10] quoting with approval the language of Chief Justice Shaw in Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (1851): `We think it a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community. All property in this commonwealth, as well that in the interior as that bordering on tide waters, is derived directly or indirectly from the government and held subject to those general regulations which are necessary for the common good and general welfare. Rights of property like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the Legislature, under the governing and controlling power vested in them by the Constitution, may think necessary and expedient.. . . ' Questions and Answers, supra, 103 Me. at 510, 69 A. at 628-629. The Maine Justices also quoted and relied upon the language of the Maryland Court in Windsor v. State, 103 Md. 611, 64 A. 288 (1906): `Property of every kind is held subject to those regulations which are necessary for the common good and general welfare. And the Legislature has the power to define the mode and manner in which one may use his property.' Questions and Answers, supra, 103 Me. at 513, 69 A. at 630.