Opinion ID: 2077155
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Prosecutor's Release of Stevenson from Subpoena

Text: We first consider whether the prosecutor's actions regarding the release of Stevenson from the subpoena constituted prosecutorial impropriety. The defendant relies on the venerable rule of State v. Guilfoyle, 109 Conn. 124, 145 A. 761 (1929), and State v. Mitchell, 169 Conn. 161, 362 A.2d 808 (1975), overruled in part on other grounds by State v. Graham, 200 Conn. 9, 509 A.2d 493 (1986), and contends that the prosecutor shirked her responsibility to bring forth every relevant witness before the trial court, and also intentionally and overtly prevented [the defendant] from, himself, placing the truth before the jury. [40] Notwithstanding the lack of evidence of bad faith on the part of the prosecutor; see part II of this opinion; we agree, however, with the state that subsequent case law has made clear that the Guilfoyle rule is one of disclosure, akin to that of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), and that there was no Guilfoyle violation because the defendant was aware of Stevenson and the potential substance of his testimony, and could have taken action to procure his testimony. See State v. Mitchell, supra, at 165, 362 A.2d 808; see also State v. Johnson, 57 Conn.App. 156, 161-62, 748 A.2d 334 (prosecutor complied with rule by disclosing information that victim had given defendant permission to visit her room after sexual assault, and did not have a further duty to present that information to the trier of fact when the defendant failed to offer the evidence to the jury), cert. denied, 253 Conn. 912, 754 A.2d 162 (2000); State v. Jurgensen, 42 Conn.App. 751, 762, 681 A.2d 981 (the state is not under an obligation to call every competent witness to testify), cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931, 683 A.2d 398 (1996). Accordingly, we conclude that the state had no obligation to call Stevenson to the stand under Guilfoyle, and that the state satisfied its disclosure obligation, as there is no dispute that the defendant was fully aware of the potential substance of Stevenson's anticipated testimony and, indeed, was able to make comprehensive offers of proof about it, and then ultimately determine that it had been covered by the testimony of the other police officers. [41] See footnotes 23 and 24 of this opinion and the accompanying text.