Opinion ID: 735450
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Testimony of David Holden

Text: 4 At trial, the Partnership presented testimony from David Holden, a claims manager for one of the subscribing underwriters on the policy. He testified that, in his opinion, the claim was a legitimate loss and that he was very upset about the denial of coverage. Insurer argues that this testimony: constituted improper lay opinion; lacked relevance; and was unduly prejudicial. 1
5 Lay opinion is admissible only if it is (1) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (2) helpful to a clear understanding of the testimony or a fact in issue. Fed.R.Evid. 701. Insurer has failed to show that Holden's testimony was not based on his own perception. There is no evidence that he relied on a report from the Insurers. 2 Even if he did, his recollection that he believed the loss was legitimate was his own perception. Presumably an underwriter develops an opinion about whether a loss should be paid based on all the evidence before him, including legal advice or other insurers' reports. Further, the court instructed him not to give an opinion based on what he learned from someone else. Insurer does not show that Holden disregarded this instruction. 6 Insurer also fails to show that Holden's opinion was not helpful. Lay opinion is appropriate when a witness cannot explain through factual testimony the combination of circumstances that led him to formulate that opinion. United States v. Skeet, 665 F.2d 983, 985 (9th Cir.1982) (lay opinion may be admitted when it is difficult to reproduce the data observed by the witnesses, or the facts are difficult of explanation, or complex, or are of a combination of circumstances ... which cannot be adequately described and presented with the force and clearness as they appeared to the witness); see also United States v. Yazzie, 976 F.2d 1252, 1255 (9th Cir.1992) (court should have permitted witnesses to give opinions as to how old statutory rape victim looked); United States v. Young Buffalo, 591 F.2d 506, 513 (9th Cir.) (witnesses could testify that photo of robbery suspect looked like defendant, even though jury could have made this comparison), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 950, 99 S.Ct. 2178, 60 L.Ed.2d 1055 (1979). 7 Holden's testimony meets this standard. His reasons for treating the Partnership's claim as he did may well have been based on factors too numerous and complex to develop in trial testimony. In arguing that the opinion was not helpful, Insurer relies primarily on cases dealing with expert witnesses, which apply a different standard.
8 Holden's opinion tended to make more probable the Partnership's allegation that Insurer denied its claim too hastily. It therefore was relevant under Rule 401. Rule 403 permits a court to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. District courts enjoy wide latitude in applying this rule. United States v. Joetzki, 952 F.2d 1090, 1094 (9th Cir.1991). 9 That Holden's testimony embraced the ultimate issues of coverage and bad faith does not make it unduly prejudicial. Kostelecky v. NL Acme Tool/NL Indus., Inc., 837 F.2d 828, 830 (8th Cir.1988). 3 Holden did not say that the policy provided coverage or that Insurer acted in bad faith. In fact, he refrained from using the term bad faith when invited to do so. And, the court instructed the jury: The fact that any of the insurers on this risk paid their portion of the Policy is not to be considered by you as evidence on the issue of coverage. Insurer offers no evidence that the jury did not follow this instruction. Finally, Insurer cross-examined Holden about other reasons he might have had for paying the Partnership's claim, thus reducing the possibility of prejudice.