Opinion ID: 222940
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Gregory Taylor

Text: Taylor first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute methamphetamine. Unlike Slagg, Taylor does not argue that a conspiracy did not exist; rather, he contends that the evidence failed to connect him to the conspiracy and established only that he engaged in discrete buyer-seller transactions with alleged co-conspirators. To prove that Taylor participated in the charged conspiracy, the Government was required to present evidence establish[ing] some degree of knowing involvement and cooperation, United States v. Cabrera, 116 F.3d 1243, 1244 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Fregoso, 60 F.3d 1314, 1323 (8th Cir.1995)), beyond a mere sales agreement with respect to contraband, United States v. West, 15 F.3d 119, 121 (8th Cir.1994). In considering what evidence is sufficiently beyond the mere sales agreement, id., we have concluded that evidence of multiple sales of resale quantities of drugs is sufficient in and of itself to make a submissible case of a conspiracy to distribute. Eneff, 79 F.3d at 105. By contrast, even numerous sales of small amounts of drugs for personal use are insufficient to support a conviction for some larger conspiracy, id., absent independent evidence tending to prove that the defendant had some knowledge of the broader conspiracy, United States v. Vinton, 429 F.3d 811, 816 (8th Cir.2005) (quoting United States v. Prieskorn, 658 F.2d 631, 635 (8th Cir.1981)). Taylor contends that the evidence is insufficient to show his participation in the conspiracy because it establishes only that he engaged in discrete transactions involving personal-use quantities of methamphetamine. We disagree with this characterization of the evidence. Shannon Krueger testified that, over the course of her three-year relationship with co-conspirator Ty Zacher ending in October 2008, Ty Zacher would visit Taylor to purchase methamphetamine once [or] twice a week. Krueger also testified that she accompanied Ty Zacher to Taylor's house on approximately twelve occasions and that Taylor sold Zacher methamphetamine in quantities ranging from [a] half ounce to an ounce. Harper testified that she accompanied Slagg to Taylor's house and Slagg provided Taylor a couple eight-balls of methamphetamine. Moreover, according to the testimony of DEA Special Agent Marc Laurie, a typical dosage amount of methamphetamine is in less than a gram quantity, and witness Bruce Fleck confirmed that a half gram of methamphetamine was a [u]ser-type quantit[y]. As a result, a reasonable jury could conclude that the half-ounce and ounce quantities supplied to Ty Zacher, at least, constituted resale quantities of methamphetamine. See United States v. Pruett, 501 F.3d 976, 985 (8th Cir.2007) (remarking that, [a]s one ounce equals approximately 28.35 grams[,] ... [i]t was reasonable for the jury to infer that the [one-ounce] quantit[ies] of drugs ... w[ere] purchased for resale and not for personal use), vacated on other grounds, 552 U.S. 1241, 128 S.Ct. 1473, 170 L.Ed.2d 294 (2008); United States v. Schindler, 77 F.3d 245, 246-47 (8th Cir.1996) (per curiam) (Expert testimony established that a half-ounce of methamphetamine was an amount associated with distribution, rather than personal use.). In any event, the Government presented additional, independent evidence tending to prove that the defendant had some knowledge of the scope of the conspiracy, Fregoso, 60 F.3d at 1323 (quoting Prieskorn, 658 F.2d at 635), from which the jury reasonably could infer Taylor's knowing involvement and cooperation, see Cabrera, 116 F.3d at 1244 (quoting Fregoso, 60 F.3d at 1323). Forrest testified that Taylor asked him what price he paid per ounce for methamphetamine and that Taylor then said he was getting them somewhere else in Minnesota ... a little cheaper than what I said and that if I was willing to meet or beat his price that he would work with me or something. Although Forrest declined Taylor's suggestion, a jury could infer from the exchange that Taylor knew that Forrest was a distributor of methamphetamine and sought to work with him directly. See United States v. Miranda-Ortiz, 926 F.2d 172, 176 (2d Cir.1991). In addition, the Government presented evidence that, after Slagg was arrested on state drug charges, Taylor, Bob Zacher, and a third man took Valinda Tyndall for a drive during which they told her that [she] should just not say anything to anybody. Tyndall characterized Taylor's demeanor as intimidating and testified that he insisted that he was sure that [Tyndall] had talked to the police. See Donnell, 596 F.3d at 921 (holding that evidence of defendant's role as enforcer buttress[ed] the conclusion that [he] was an active participant in the conspiracy). Further, Harper testified that Taylor, Bob Zacher, and Ty Zacher collected the money for Slagg's bail and that she, Heid, and Taylor discussed gathering money from people who owed Slagg money. Cf. United States v. Zerba, 21 F.3d 250, 252 (8th Cir.1994) (relying, in part, on evidence that defendant acted as drug debt collector for another in holding evidence sufficient to support conspiracy conviction). The Government also introduced a petition for remission, submitted to the DEA by Heid, which stated that Taylor gave Heid $10,000 to help bail Slagg out of jail. See Fregoso, 60 F.3d at 1325 (relying, in part, on evidence that the defendant provided the bail money when an alleged co-conspirator was arrested ... on an unrelated drug charge in holding evidence sufficient to support conspiracy conviction); see also United States v. Woodard, 88 Fed.Appx. 154, 155 (8th Cir.2004) (unpublished per curiam). Thus, granting the verdict the benefit of all reasonable inferences, we conclude the totality of the evidence against Taylor was sufficient to support the jury's verdict. Second, Taylor argues that the district court should have instructed the jury that a buyer-seller relationship alone is insufficient to create a conspiracy. We review a district court's jury instructions for abuse of discretion, United States v. Faulkner, 636 F.3d 1009, 1019 (8th Cir. 2011), and [w]e will reverse a jury verdict when the errors misled the jury or had a probable effect on the jury's verdict, id. at 1019-20 (quoting United States v. Pereyra-Gabino, 563 F.3d 322, 328 (8th Cir. 2009)). Defendants are entitled to an instruction explaining their theory of the case if the request is timely made and if the proffered instruction is supported by the evidence and correctly states the law. United States v. Adams, 401 F.3d 886, 898 (8th Cir.2005). Here, there is no question that Taylor timely requested the proposed instruction, and the Government does not appear to dispute that the proposed instruction correctly stated the law. Thus, the issue before us is whether the instruction was supported by the evidence. The proposed instruction regarding the buyer-seller relationship stated you are ... instructed that the mere fact that there may have been shown a relationship between a buyer and seller of drugs ... does not, in and of itself, establish a conspiracy. Taylor asserts that the evidence in this case proves at best that Taylor provided small quantities of drugs to a couple of friends for personal use and that he was a methamphetamine user. We agree with the district court, however, that the evidence does not support this assertion. Krueger testified that, over the course of her three-year relationship with Ty Zacher, Zacher received methamphetamine from Taylor once, twice a week, and, on the occasions Krueger accompanied Zacher to Taylor's house, Zacher would purchase between [a] half ounce to an ounce of methamphetamine. See Faulkner, 636 F.3d at 1021 (holding it was not an abuse of discretion to deny a proposed buyer-seller jury instruction where Government presented evidence that defendant sold crack cocaine well over 100 times and heroin on five or six occasions). Moreover, Taylor engaged in numerous drug transactions with Slagg, participated with Bob Zacher in an effort to dissuade Tyndall from talking to the police, helped gather money for Slagg's bail, and provided $10,000 to bail Slagg out of jail. Again, this evidence does not support Taylor's theory that he simply engaged in discrete buyer-seller transactions. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to give Taylor's proposed jury instruction. Third, Taylor contends that the district court erred in admitting an alleged mug shot photograph of Taylor. Although we do not endorse the admission of mugshots as evidence, we have not adopted a per se rule requiring reversal. Cox v. Wyrick, 642 F.2d 222, 227 (8th Cir.1981) (internal citations omitted). Taylor urges us to review his claim for plain error, noting that [t]his court reviews for plain error the admission of evidence to which the defendant did not object below. However, this is not a case where the defendant neglected to raise a timely objection; rather, Taylor objected to the admission of the photograph but later withdrew his objection. We have held that [t]he plain error standard only applies when a defendant inadvertently fails to raise an objection in the district court. United States v. Thompson, 289 F.3d 524, 526 (8th Cir.2002). The Supreme Court has distinguished between a right that is inadvertently left unasserted and one that is intentionally relinquished or abandoned, noting that the latter constitutes a waiver that extinguishes a claim altogether. United States v. Gutierrez, 130 F.3d 330, 332 (8th Cir.1997) (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733, 113 S.Ct. 1770, 123 L.Ed.2d 508 (1993)). Thus, in light of Taylor's affirmative withdrawal of his objection, we conclude that his claim is waived. Finally, Taylor argues that the district court erred in entering an order of forfeiture for the $50,000 gathered for Slagg's bail, $10,000 of which were contributed by Taylor. The superseding indictment contained a forfeiture count in which, as relevant to the present appeal, the Government sought the following: upon the conviction of Slagg of the drug conspiracy alleged in Count 1 or upon the conviction of Slagg or Taylor of the money laundering conspiracy alleged in Count 2, the Government would seek forfeiture of any and all property constituting or derived from any proceeds the defendant obtained directly or indirectly as a result of the violations and any and all property used or intended to be used in any manner or part to commit or to facilitate the commission of the violations alleged in Counts One and Two ..., including, but not limited to ... [the $50,000 posted for Slagg's bail]. As noted above, the district court granted Taylor's motion for acquittal on the money laundering conspiracy count, and the jury found Taylor guilty on the drug conspiracy count and Slagg guilty on both the drug conspiracy and the money laundering conspiracy counts. Following the return of the jury's verdict, Taylor's attorney represented to the district court that [Taylor] has agreed to waive his right to challenge the criminal forfeiture at this time. The district court later issued an order of forfeiture for the $50,000, which predicated forfeiture on the jury's finding Slagg and Taylor guilty of the crime(s) giving rise to the forfeiture of the property and noted that both Slagg and Taylor agree[d] to the forfeiture in open court. Taylor raised no objection to the order of forfeiture at any time before the district court. On appeal, he now argues that the district court erred in ordering the forfeiture against him. He contends that the indictment only provided notice that his property would be subject to forfeiture upon his conviction on the money laundering conspiracy count but that it did not state that his property would be subject to forfeiture upon his conviction on the drug-conspiracy count. Because he was acquitted of the money laundering conspiracy, Taylor argues that the district court order[ed] forfeiture on an acquitted count. The Government responds that the district court did not enter an order of forfeiture against Taylor that was predicated upon the money laundering conspiracy. Rather, the Government maintains that the district court and all the parties uniformly understood the indictment to provide notice that the Government would seek forfeiture of Taylor's property upon his conviction of either the drug conspiracy or the money laundering conspiracy. Thus, in the Government's view, the district court entered the order of forfeiture against Taylor based on the drug conspiracy count of which he was convicted, not the money laundering conspiracy count of which he was acquitted. Despite the seemingly irreconcilable premise upon which his argument on appeal is based, Taylor nonetheless concurs with the position taken by the Government, acknowledging that [t]he district court, counsel for the government and Taylor's trial counsel ... all apparently operat[ed] under the mistaken belief that the Superseding Indictment provide [sic] for forfeiture against Taylor on the basis of conviction on Count One [the drug conspiracy charge]. Accordingly, to the extent Taylor requests that we resolve the propriety of the district court's entering an order of forfeiture predicated on an acquitted count, Taylor and the Government appear to be in agreement that the district court did no such thing. [10]