Opinion ID: 776696
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Representation of Conflicting Interests

Text: 19 In the present case, it is clear McGlennen concurrently represented two clients. Representation of Caban is undisputed. As for Clemons, it appears from the record that McGlennen was actively representing Clemons before the ethics board at the time of the trial. The defense offered evidence that McGlennen was corresponding with the board on Clemons' behalf. This would be consistent with the most recent Minnesota disciplinary decisions regarding Clemons, which put him on probation subject to supervision by a practicing attorney. See In re Disciplinary Action Against Clemons, 530 N.W.2d 537 (Minn.1995); In re Disciplinary Action Against Clemons, 549 N.W.2d 93 (Minn. 1996). That attorney was directed to file quarterly reports on Clemons' progress. From the record, it appears that McGlennen was that attorney. 4 20 It also is apparent that these two clients' interests conflicted. We note the trial court tentatively found no conflict existed. However, this finding is contradicted by McGlennen's testimony in the § 2255 proceeding, apparently given against his self-interest, that he was conflicted because of his past representation of, and friendship with, Clemons. Certainly, the trial court as finder of fact need not credit all testimony equally, and generally we will defer to trial courts' findings as to credibility of witnesses. See United States v. Reed, 179 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir.1999). However, the unique circumstances of this case necessitate a further inquiry on our part. 21 In this case there was a conflict in two respects. First, there was the conflict between Caban and Clemons. If McGlennen put Clemons on the stand to testify to the bill of sale on Caban's behalf, the prosecutor stated that he would be obliged to turn the matter over to the ethics board on his information that the bill of sale was phony. Assuming the bill to be disputed evidence, 5 the conflict is clear. McGlennen knew it was against Clemons' interests to testify and be subject to embarrassing cross-examination and, possibly, referral to the ethics board. 22 There also was the conflict between Caban and McGlennen arising from McGlennen's personal feelings and self-interest in protecting Clemons. McGlennen clearly had a close personal relationship with Clemons. He testified under oath and to his own potential detriment that he did not want to subject his friend to an embarrassing cross-examination. Even if this was not the typical conflict situation, i.e. a single lawyer representing multiple defendants in a mutual prosecution, the division of loyalties is apparent. 23 This conflict satisfies Cuyler 's first requirement. 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S.Ct. 1708. We also believe it satisfies Strickland 's requirement that the defendant show deficient performance, 466 U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. 2052; it requires no complex analysis to recognize that an attorney who functions under a conflict of interest generally acts unreasonably. Divided loyalties violate both Sixth Amendment requirements, see Dawan v. Lockhart, 31 F.3d at 720-21, and well accepted rules of professional responsibility. See ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.7(b) (A lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation of that client may be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client or to a third person, or by the lawyer's own interests, unless: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation will not be adversely affected; and (2) the client consents after consultation....); Minnesota Rule of Professional Responsibility 1.7, cmt. (Loyalty to a client is also impaired when a lawyer cannot consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for the client because of the lawyer's other responsibilities or interests.). To the extent Caban can show McGlennen engaged in a conflict of interest without his consent, he satisfies Strickland 's deficient performance prong.