Opinion ID: 1974418
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 7

Heading: the decision of this court

Text: As we see it, the SOPD gave no real significance to the ALJ's report. She did not adequately take into account in considering the evidence before the ALJ whatever in the record detracted from the substantiality of that evidence, as, for example the disagreement between the ALJ and the SOPD as to the disposition of Anderson. We do not agree with the appellees' assertion that there is really no issue of credibility on the genuine issues of this case. We think that the credibility of the witnesses was of the utmost importance in the circumstances here; it played a dominant role; it was pivotal. But there is no indication that the SOPD gave any deference to the ALJ's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses before him. And she gave no strong reasons for rejecting the ALJ's assessments of credibility. It seems that the SOPD made her own findings of fact, as suggested by the representative of the Penitentiary, and it appears that she did not take into account in making them the factual findings of the ALJ. Therefore, we believe that the Circuit Court for Baltimore City was wrong when it found that there was substantial evidence to support the order of the SOPD, because the SOPD did not appreciate the proper relationship between her and the ALJ. The SOPD must reconsider her order in the light of what we have found to be the interrelation between her function and the function of the ALJ. We vacate the judgment of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and remand the case to it with direction to remand the case to the DOP for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion. We note that the SOPD found that Anderson's removal was mandated by DCR 50-54.VI. Presumably, she saw her discretion to decide on a less drastic sanction destroyed by Paragraph A of that DOC regulation. As we have noted, the regulation declares: Excessive or unnecessary force used against an inmate, or any other action by an employee which results in serious bodily harm, death or a serious breach of the security of the institution, its staff, inmates, or the general public, or which has the potential for such results, shall result in the filing of Charges for Removal from State service. (Emphasis added). This belief was probably why she did not address the issue of mitigation raised by Anderson. In any event, she read too much into the provision. DCR 50-54.VI.A does not mandate dismissal; all it does is require the filing of Charges for Removal from State service. That much, obviously, had been accomplished and was the basis for the hearing. In fact, written charges are required to set the hearing process in motion. See Art. 64A, § 33(b)(2)(i); COMAR 06.01.01.48. The issue before the ALJ and the SOP was whether Anderson should, in fact, be removed from State service in light of the charges already filed. The DCR regulation in no way binds the Department of Personnel to a preordained result in a given case; for its decision, the DOP has its own regulations to guide it. The relevant DOP regulation says that a classified employee  may be permanently removed from his position only for cause.... COMAR 06.01.01.47 (emphasis added). The regulation then sets forth several specific transgressions that shall be sufficient cause of removal, though removal may be for causes other than those enumerated. Id. COMAR 06.01.01.61, which is headed Appeal of Charges for Removal of a Classified Employee, discusses the options open to the SOP when she resolves an employment matter such as the one at issue in this case. It says that the SOP or her designee may decide to: (1) Restore the employee to his position without loss of pay; (2) Suspend the employee without pay for a specified period of time; (3) Demote the employee; (4) Remove the employee from the position and the classified service; (5) Require that other action be taken as indicated by the findings in the case. COMAR 06.01.01.61H (emphasis added). The plain meaning of COMAR language applicable to the Department of Personnel is that removal is not mandated when an employee fails to abide by the requirements of a Division of Correction regulation. The representative of the DOP acknowledged as much at the hearing in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. She told the court: I do agree with [Anderson's attorney] that if the [SOP] had thought that a lesser sanction was appropriate she didn't have to remove him because the regulation [DCR 50-54.VI.A] just says [charges] shall be filed.[ [3] ] JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR BALTIMORE CITY VACATED; CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTION TO REMAND THE CASE TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PERSONNEL WITH DIRECTION TO VACATE ITS ORDER REMOVING WILLIAM HENRY ANDERSON, JR. FROM STATE SERVICE AND TO CONDUCT FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLEES.