Opinion ID: 694663
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Propriety of Award of Attorney Fees

Text: 34 FFA cross-appeals the district court's award of RTC's attorneys' fees after a finding that the RTC was the prevailing party given FFA's voluntary dismissal of Franklin I under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 and we generally review attorneys' fees awards for an abuse of discretion. Holland v. Roeser, 37 F.3d 501, 503 (9th Cir.1994). However, any elements of legal analysis and statutory interpretation which figure in the district court's decisions are reviewed de novo. Id. (Citations and quotations omitted). 35 Both FFA and the RTC make claims for attorneys' fees pursuant to Article XXVII of the Lease and Or.Rev.Stat. Sec. 20.096. Article XXVII of the Lease provides: 36 If suit or action is commenced to enforce compliance with any term, covenant or condition of this instrument, the party not prevailing shall pay to the prevailing party a sum which the trial judge determines is reasonable as attorneys' fees to be allowed in the suit or action, and if appeal is taken from any judgment or decree in the suit or action, the party not prevailing on the appeal shall pay to the prevailing party such further sum as the appellate court shall adjudge reasonable as attorneys' fees on appeal. 37 The Oregon statute states that if a contract provides for the payment of attorneys' fees and costs, then the prevailing party is entitled to reasonable attorneys' fees. 38 We apply Oregon law in interpreting the attorneys' provision of the Lease. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Midwest Fed. Savings Bank of Minot, 36 F.3d 785, 800 (9th Cir.1993) (applying California law in interpreting attorneys' fees provision in a contract involving FDIC). We must apply state law in this situation unless (1) the claim for fees arose under some federal statute, or (2) the litigated issues involve not basic contractual enforcement question [sic], but issues peculiar to [federal law]. Midwest Fed. Savings, 36 F.3d at 800 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 39 The next inquiry, applying Oregon law, is whether a voluntary dismissal under Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(i) by FFA makes the RTC a prevailing party. In All Am. Distrib. Co. v. Miller Brewing Co., 736 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.1984), we determined that an Arizona statute did allow for a finding that a defendant was a prevailing party following a voluntary dismissal of claims by the plaintiff. Here, too, we do not find that the district court abused its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees in favor of the RTC. Nor can we say that the district court erred in its computation of the attorneys' fees. Finally, article XXVII of the Lease allows the prevailing party to recover attorneys' fees incurred on appeal. We remand to the district court for a determination of attorneys' fees in accordance with our holding. 40 AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part and REMANDED.