Opinion ID: 2394524
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: The Court of Special Appeals' Denial of Petitioners' Motion to Dismiss

Text: Petitioners first contend that the Court of Special Appeals erred when it failed to grant their motion to dismiss. In their motion before the intermediate appellate court, Petitioners argued that the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to hear the City's appeal because, under Maryland Code (1974, 2006 Repl.Vol.), § 12-302 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, an aggrieved party may not seek appellate review of a circuit court's decision when that decision was made in the exercise of the circuit court's appellate jurisdiction. Petitioners contended that the Circuit Court undertook an appellate review of the Civil Service Board's decision because Section 3.36.150F explicitly provides for judicial review of a Civil Service Board decision. Petitioners then asserted that the City is not permitted to seek appellate relief in the Court of Special Appeals because the City Code does not provide such a right to an aggrieved party. In rejecting Petitioners' argument and denying their motion, the Court of Special Appeals held that the City could appeal the Circuit Court's judgment because the Circuit Court's review of the Civil Service Board was by way of a writ of mandamus filed by Petitioners. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 532-34, 920 A.2d at 60-62. The court first dismissed Petitioners' argument that Section 3.16.150F, which permits an appeal to the Circuit Court, applies to the instant case. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 532, 920 A.2d at 60. The court held that the plain language of Section 3.16.150 discloses that it only applies to permanent status employees and their right to contest adverse disciplinary actions first before the City's Civil Service Board and then before the [Circuit Court for] Anne Arundel. Id. The intermediate appellate court stated: [N]either [Section] 3.16.150 nor any of its subsections, including [Section] 3.16.150F, have any bearing whatsoever on police or fire retirees or their pension benefit claims. Id. The court then explained that the [C]ircuit [C]ourt has the authority to review the Board's decision pursuant to a complaint for a writ of mandamus, which it found to be the essence of Petitioners' complaint. Id. Petitioners argue, in this Court, that the Court of Special Appeals' denial was in error because an appellate right is entirely statutory in origin, [so that] no appeal may be prosecuted unless the right is conferred by statute. Petitioners further assert that because Section 3.16.150F expressly authorizes only a circuit court's review of the decision of the Civil Service Board, the Court of Special Appeals did not have jurisdiction to review the instant case. The City asserts that the Court of Special Appeals was correct in denying the motion to dismiss because the Circuit Court was not exercising appellate jurisdiction when it reviewed the Civil Service Board's decision. Rather than a petition for judicial review, the City contends that the complaint filed by Petitioners was substantively a common law writ of mandamus, which is subject to appellate review. The City maintains that the complaint could not have been a petition for judicial review because the City Code does not provide a statutory right to appeal to the Circuit Court for retired employees who have been aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board. The City takes issue with Petitioners' view that Section 3.16.150F provides a right to appeal, arguing that the express words of Section 3.16.150A limit the applicability of the appeal provisions of Section 3.16.150, including Subsection F, to permanent status civil service employees, which Petitioners are not. The City contends that because the appeal provisions of Section 3.16.150 do not apply to retired employees, and because there are no other applicable City Code sections pertaining to appeals before the Civil Service Board, there [could have been] no statutory authorization for an appeal to the circuit court for judicial review of the Civil Service Board's decision. Therefore, the City asserts, [t]he only basis for circuit court jurisdiction was the `inherent power to review and correct actions by an administrative agency which are arbitrary, illegal, capricious, or unreasonable,' which is undertaken by the circuit court through a writ of mandamus filed by the aggrieved party. We hold that the Court of Specials Appeals did not err in denying Petitioners' motion to dismiss. While we reach the same end result, we disagree with the Court of Special Appeals' labeling of Petitioners' complaint as a common law writ of mandamus. Petitioners' complaint clearly and explicitly requests both declaratory and injunctive relief from the Circuit Court. We explain. Section 3.16.150 of the City Code states: A. A permanent status civil service employee may appeal to the Civil Service Board a disciplinary action consisting of a suspension without pay of any length, demotion or dismissal. Intolerable working conditions, administrative leave without pay pursuant to Section 3.16.120(E) and other complaints enumerated in the civil service rules may also be appealed to the Civil Service Board by permanent status employees. B. An aggrieved employee shall file an appeal with the Civil Service Board not later than five working days after the date of notice of the disciplinary action under Section 3.16.120(D). If the employee files a timely request for an informal hearing under Section 3.16.120(F), the appeal with the Civil Service Board shall be filed not later than five working days after the date of the appointing authority's reply under that section. The employee's right to an appeal to the Civil Service Board shall be waived if not timely filed. If the employee files a timely request for a Civil Service Board hearing pursuant to this section, the imposition of discipline shall be suspended pending the decision of the board. Leave pursuant to Section 3.16.120(E) shall not be suspended pending the decision of the board. C. The Civil Service Board shall schedule a hearing within a reasonable time not exceeding forty-five days following the date the appeal was filed. The hearing shall be open to the general public. The employee may be represented by counsel, present witnesses in the employee's behalf and examine and cross-examine all witnesses. During the course of any investigation or hearing the Civil Service Board may request any employee of the City to give testimony. Notwithstanding any provision of the Charter or this code authorizing the City Attorney to serve as legal counsel to the Civil Service Board, in contested cases before the board, the City Attorney shall represent the interest of the City and the appointing authority and shall not render legal advice to the board. D. The Civil Service Board shall issue a written decision within forty-five days after the conclusion of the hearing. If the Civil Service Board finds that the action of the appointing authority was in error, contrary to the personnel provisions of this code, or that the appointing authority failed to follow the proper procedure, the Civil Service Board may reverse or modify the action and, if appropriate, may order reinstatement of the employee with or without loss of pay. Decisions of the Civil Service Board on all appeals shall be in writing, shall contain the reasons for the decision, and are final. E. A failure by the appointing authority or the Civil Service Board to timely conduct a hearing or to timely issue a determination following a hearing shall not constitute a basis to reverse or modify any disciplinary action taken pursuant to this chapter. F. A party aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board made pursuant to this section may appeal that decision to the circuit court for Anne Arundel County pursuant to Maryland Rule Title 7, Chapter 200 or its successor. For purposes of this subsection, an employee shall be considered aggrieved by a decision of the Civil Service Board if and only if the decision is to suspend the employee for thirty or more consecutive days, to demote or to dismiss the employee. An appeal under this section must be taken within thirty days of the date of the decision appealed and shall be the exclusive remedy of the aggrieved party from that decision. It is clear from the plain language of the City Code that the provisions of Section 3.16.150 do not apply to the instant case. [7] The plain language of Section 3.16.150A limits the applicability of these appeal provisions, including the right to seek judicial review of the Civil Service Board's decision in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County, solely to permanent status civil service employees. A prior section of the Code, Section 3.04.010, defines employee, as the person employed to perform the work of a position. This section also defines permanent status as the status given to a civil service employee who has successfully completed the probation period. There is no dispute that Petitioners are non-active, retired persons. As such, they are no longer employed by the City to perform the work of any position; therefore, Petitioners cannot be considered permanent status employees and Section 3.16.150F cannot apply to Petitioners' claims. In addition, Chapter 3.36, entitled Police and Fire Retirement, provides no authorization for retired members to seek a direct review of the Civil Service Board's decision in the Court of Special Appeals or even the Circuit Court. In the absence of a statutory authorization for judicial review of this administrative proceeding, the Circuit Court could have only acted on Petitioners' complaint to review the Civil Service Board's actions by way of a common law or equity writ (e.g., mandamus, injunction, certiorari, or declaratory judgment). Harvey v. Marshall, 389 Md. 243, 296, 884 A.2d 1171, 1203 (2005); Criminal Injuries Compensation Bd. v. Gould, 273 Md. 486, 500-01, 331 A.2d 55, 65 (1975). In the case sub judice, the Court of Special Appeals held that the complaint was in essence an action for a writ of mandamus, explaining that the complaint specifically requested that the court direct [the City] to pay [Petitioners] all prospective and retroactive increases in their pension payments that they believed were due to them pursuant to [Section] 3.36.150A1. Bowen, 173 Md.App. at 534-35, 920 A.2d at 61. Assuming, arguendo, that Petitioner's complaint was in the nature of a writ of mandamus, the complaint, nonetheless, specifically sought other relief. Indeed, the complaint is titled Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Retroactive and Prospective Increases in Annuity Payments and clearly and explicitly requests both declaratory and injunctive relief from the Circuit Court. The difference in the labeling of the subject matter of the complaint, whether as a writ of mandamus or a declaratory judgment or a request for injunctive relief, results in no change to the outcome of Court of Special Appeals' decision. The Court of Special Appeals was correct in holding that it had the jurisdiction to review the Circuit Court judgment as, under our jurisprudence, actions for declaratory and injunctive relief filed in the Circuit Court are reviewable on appeal. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219, 932 A.2d 571 (2007); Baltimore Imp. Car Serv. & Storage, Inc. v. Maryland Port Auth., 258 Md. 335, 265 A.2d 866 (1970). Therefore, the Court of Special Appeals' denial of Petitioners' motion to dismiss was proper.