Opinion ID: 1891354
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Barbara also avers the termination proceedings from which these appeals are taken were fatally deficient because of failure by the State to allege a cause of action.

Text: Any detailed analysis of that assignment will only serve to needlessly extend this opinion. Cross-appellant (Barbara) foundations the presently claimed deficiency upon her aforesaid facial invalidity of § 232.41 assertion. It therefore follows the instant contention affords her no basis for appellate relief. Additionally, Barbara's claim to the effect the court below erred in failing to return Jay and Dawn to the parental home is without substance. In summary, every issue raised by Barbara on cross-appeal has been considered and, as herein delineated, found to be without merit even though not specifically discussed. V. Next entertained is the State's lone contention that the juvenile court erred in finding there was insufficient evidence upon which to terminate parental rights and thereupon dismissing the proceedings from which these appeals are taken. In the first place, it is to be understood, on this de novo review, we like the court below apply the clear and convincing proof standard. See Long v. Long and In Interest of Hochmuth, both supra. At this point a resume of evidence adduced in course of hearings below, heretofore set forth at some length, will suffice for purpose of the moment. It reveals: The Ponx household was characterized by filth and improper food. The children had been disciplined by being locked in their rooms and one had been handcuffed to a bed. They were frequently left alone in the house and two of them had been observed with bruises or marks which appeared to be cigarette burns. The girl had once been observed with indications of sexual molestation. Both Jay and Dawn had speech problems and gave evidence of being slow learners. There were indications some medical problems had been long ignored and the children had not always received proper nourishment. Both Barbara and Robert had drinking problems. They appeared to have trouble maintaining employment. Their marriage disintegrated and was about to be dissolved. The father had at one point lived with another woman and was admittedly the father of a child the other woman was carrying. He announced, but later retracted, a plan to marry his paramour. None of the presently involved children have been in the Ponx home since May 22, 1975. Since then they have been in custody of Polk County Department of Social Services, which had placed them in various foster homes. Jay and Dawn have been kept together in a succession of foster homes and there repeatedly manifested multiple behavioral problems, some clearly exhibiting loose and demoralizing sex-related conduct or language in the Ponx home. That factual backdrop prompts reference to this statement in the case of Long v. Long, 255 N.W.2d at 143: That which has taken place and is likely to occur in the future because of present conditions must be considered. In other words, we are required to determine the long-range as well as immediate interests of the child. In the same vein, this court has observed, parent-child termination proceedings are not like a tort action where injury must be proved before damages may be recovered. Our termination statute is preventive as well as remedial. It mandates action to prevent probable harm to children and does not require delay until after harm has been done. (Citation). Under extant conditions it might be argued respondents have at least been minimally responsive to corrective efforts, therefore termination of parental rights should await another day. But this flies in the face of reality. Barbara and Robert Ponx have now had multiple chances to prove their ability to effectively assume parental responsibilities but have clearly failed to satisfactorily respond. Surely Jay and Dawn should not be indefinitely left in a parentless limbo to await the speculative maturity of those who have not, over a period of three or more years, given actual assurance of ever achieving the desired result. By reason of such state of precarious uncertainty this court is persuaded it should not gamble with the future of these two involved minors and that their destiny should not be again indefinitely deferred. See In Interest of Kester, 228 N.W.2d at 110-111. In other words, the State has exhibited the threshold harm necessary to give it a compelling interest, and further adequately established a factual basis for immediate termination of the presently involved parent-child relationship. Unlike the juvenile court we are satisfied the record before us reveals, by clear and convincing evidence, the parental rights vested in Barbara and Robert Ponx, as to Jay Allen Lewis and Dawn Marie Ponx have been forfeited and under the provisions of Code § 232.41(2)(e) should be and are terminated. To this extent we reverse and remand on both appeals for further appropriate proceedings. VI. This does not serve, however, to dispose of the appeals regarding Robert Dean Ponx, Jr., the third and youngest child, because he was never prefatorily adjudged dependent. More precisely, the factors which served to make § 232.41(2)(e) constitutional, both facially and as applied with regard to Jay and Dawn, are not instantly applicable. Additionally, as aforesaid, we take note of the fact subsections (2)(b) and (d) were held to be unconstitutionally vague in Alsager v. District Court of Polk Cty., Iowa, 406 F.Supp. at 17-21, and that the court of appeals 545 F.2d at 1138, said the Alsager vagueness and overbreadth attacks upon these provisions are serious ones. Under these circumstances, but not without some misgivings as to the welfare of Robert Ponx, Jr. we have no choice but to affirm, on other grounds, the Polk County Juvenile Court in dismissing the State's petition with regard to this child alone. It is to be understood, however, such affirmance is without prejudice to the State's right to initiate anew any proceeding or proceedings deemed appropriate regarding custodial right as to Robert Dean Ponx, Jr., under any law presently existing or as hereafter amended. In event such new proceeding be not commenced within 90 days from issuance of procedendo upon the present appeals, then and thereupon custody of said minor shall be restored to his parents or such one of them as may be found lawfully entitled thereto. In the interim said minor shall remain under the custodial supervision of Polk County Social Services Department. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded on both appeals.