Opinion ID: 2230892
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: modification of prior opinion

Text: We continue to reject Petitioners' claims that the Legislature merely codified the case law when it passed Ind. Code 34-4-16.5-3(7). The language of the statute as amended is clear. [1] The State of Indiana and its employees are not liable for losses resulting from the enforcement of or failure to enforce a law, unless such enforcement constitutes false arrest or false imprisonment. It does not follow, however, that the statute necessarily grants immunity for all acts of law enforcement officers committed while engaged in the enforcement of the law. If the injury in question resulted from the enforcement of a law, immunity is granted to both the governmental entity and to the employee, notwithstanding that the enforcement resulted in a loss that would not have occurred but for the negligent manner in which the duty was performed. However, an employee's acts, although committed while engaged in the performance of his duty, might be so outrageous as to be incompatible with the performance of the duty undertaken. In such a case, it cannot be said that an injury resulting therefrom resulted from the performance of the duty. Such acts, whether intentional or willful and wanton, are simply beyond the scope of the employment. [2] Plaintiffs characterize our determination, that the statute is not ambiguous and must be given its plain meaning, as being prejudicial to the public interest in that it immunizes governmental entities and its employees from all liability for all losses that result from any act which can possibly be characterized as enforcement of the law. We cannot agree. Our interpretation does result in the grant of such immunity for losses that result from any act which can properly be characterized as enforcement of the law, but we do not regard this as being against the public interest, and it is clearly a matter that the Legislature may determine. With regard to those acts that are so incompatible with the performance of duty as to be outside the scope of the employment, there is no statutory grant of immunity either to the employee or to the governmental entity, which has no need for it, inasmuch as there is no basis for liability in it. The issue which the trial court faced and which we face in review of Defendant's motion for summary judgment is whether a jury could have found from the facts construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs that the losses sued for resulted from acts of Trooper Richey for which Defendant, the State of Indiana, was liable. It is clear that even if the accident resulted from the negligence of the trooper for which the defendant would otherwise be liable, it was, nevertheless, immune under the express terms of the statute. We now turn to a consideration of the previously omitted issues: