Opinion ID: 2829984
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Reference to Richard Allen Davis

Text: Following his conviction at the guilt phase of the trial, defendant decided to forgo his right to wear street clothes and to instead appear before the jury in jail clothes. The trial court accordingly informed the jury that it was not to consider defendant‘s dress as a factor in its deliberations. Thereafter, during the penalty phase examination of defense expert Dr. Marlin Griffith, Defense Counsel Levy asked him whether, hypothetically speaking, a criminal defendant‘s decision not to wear civilian clothes and begin appearing before the jury in jail clothes would have ―psychological implications‖ for the expert‘s assessment of the person. Dr. Griffith replied: ―Well, given the gravity of Mr. Seumanu‘s case, and given the psychological information that I have previously pulled together, yes, I am very surprised that Mr. Seumanu is dressed in the county jail uniform as opposed to civilian clothes.‖ The prosecutor briefly cross-examined the witness on this point. Later, in closing argument, the prosecutor urged the jury to disregard Dr. Griffith‘s testimony, characterizing it as ―psychobabble‖ that ―doesn‘t mean a thing.‖ Ms. Backers then said this: ―The guy — do you remember what Richard Allen Davis did to his jury after he got convicted? ―Same thing [defendant] did to you. You convicted him of first degree murder and specials. And guess what? He thumbed his nose at you, took down his hair, put his jail clothes on and said: You can‘t touch me. I am not afraid of you.‖ There was no defense objection. Defendant contends the prosecutor‘s reference to Richard Allen Davis, the notorious kidnapper and killer of a 12-year-old child in 1993 (see People v. Davis 80 (2009) 46 Cal.4th 539), constituted prosecutorial misconduct requiring reversal.18 That the issue was forfeited by the failure to object is immediately apparent (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820) and although defendant claims an objection would have been futile (id. at p. 721), no reason suggests such futility. The prosecutor did not equate defendant to Davis in terms of comparative moral fault, but raised only the side point that both defendants demonstrated contempt for their respective juries. Accordingly, even assuming the argument was improper, an admonition would likely have been sufficient to cure any harm. We thus conclude defendant forfeited the issue. Were we to address the issue, we would find no error. ―In general, prosecutors should refrain from comparing defendants to historic or fictional villains, especially where the comparisons are wholly inappropriate or unlinked to the evidence.‖ (People v. Bloom (1989) 48 Cal.3d 1194, 1213, quoted with approval in People v. Jablonski (2006) 37 Cal.4th 774, 836–837.) Although defendant‘s choice of attire was not as confrontational as Davis‘s obscene gesture to the jury,19 one could fairly argue that, in choosing to wear jail clothes, defendant demonstrated disdain for the solemnity of the proceedings. Considering 18 Defendant also initially claimed the prosecutor‘s reference to jail clothes in her closing argument was misconduct, but has since withdrawn that claim in light of the People‘s counterargument that it was based on defense counsel‘s examination of Dr. Griffith. 19 Defendant requests we take judicial notice that when the verdicts in Davis‘s case were read, he turned to the television camera and raised both hands with his middle fingers extended. The request is improper because defendant does not comply with California Rules of Court, rules 8.252 and 8.520(g), which require requests for judicial notice to be filed under separate cover. It matters little because there is no dispute as to Davis‘s actions in gesturing to the jury. (People v. Davis, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p. 563 [describing these events].) 81 the wide latitude afforded prosecutors during argument (People v. Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 371–372), the prosecutor‘s argument comprised fair comment on the evidence. 4. Alleged Improper Exploitation of Evidence of a Contract to Kill Iuli During her closing argument at the penalty phase, the prosecutor made this remark when addressing the issue of whether defendant deserved the jury‘s mercy: ―What mercy did [defendant] show to Tony [Iuli] when he put out a contract on his life, when Tony decided to come forward?‖ We previously have addressed the admissibility of testimony referencing the alleged contract on Iuli‘s life, and concluded the evidence was admissible despite the rule against hearsay because the testimony was admitted, not for its truth, but to bolster Iuli‘s credibility. (Ante, pt. I.B.1.c.) We also concluded any error was harmless. Defendant now reprises the issue, claiming the prosecutor‘s penalty phase argument exploited the improper evidence of the alleged contract by inviting the jurors to use it ―as a factor in aggravation when there was no competent evidence to support it.‖ Such argument, defendant contends, violated his constitutional right to due process and to a reliable penalty phase determination as guaranteed by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. We conclude defendant forfeited this issue by the failing to object. Although defendant contends an objection was not required, we disagree. The first time the issue of the alleged contract arose, the challenged testimony— although not competent evidence that such a contract actually existed—was at least partially admissible for the nonhearsay purpose of bolstering Iuli‘s credibility. But when the prosecutor mentioned it in her penalty phase closing argument, she spoke of the contract as if it had been proven by competent evidence. A timely and specific objection would have allowed the trial court to 82 consider whether to strike the argument as lacking a proper evidentiary basis and to admonish the jury to disregard the argument. 5. Gang Status List We have previously explained that, with the exception of his claim that exhibit 46 (the gang status list entitled ―America‘s Most Wanted Samoans‖) was not properly authenticated, defendant‘s guilt phase challenges to the admission of the exhibit and later prosecutorial argument based on it, were both meritless. (Ante, pt. I.B.1.d.) Defendant reprises these arguments, arguing the prosecutor‘s penalty phase questioning of Iuli about the list elicited inadmissible evidence, and also that her closing argument referencing the list misstated the evidence and thus constituted misconduct. We first address defendant‘s evidentiary claim. At the penalty phase, Iuli confirmed that exhibit 46 was a typewritten copy he made, while in pretrial detention at juvenile hall, of a handwritten list defendant had given him. Iuli testified the list named the ―brothers in our house‖ and to be on the list was a ―badge of honor.‖ On cross-examination by defense counsel, Iuli said the list was not intended to name those who participated in Pamintuan‘s murder, that the names on the list were people to whom defendant and Iuli were close, and that the names were in order of age, oldest to youngest. Iuli said he did not ask defendant what he meant by the phrase ―America‘s Most Wanted Samoans,‖ and merely typed up what defendant gave him. Defendant did not object to this testimony, a point he acknowledges, but argues any objection would have been futile in light of the trial court‘s admission of exhibit 46 at the guilt phase. We need not resolve the forfeiture point because defendant does not in any event identify any ground on which the trial court could have excluded Iuli‘s penalty phase testimony. Unlike Tautai‘s testimony at the 83 guilt phase, Iuli testified at the penalty phase that he had personal knowledge about the list: He typed it up from defendant‘s handwritten list, and he recognized the names and explained why they were on the list (i.e., they were ―brothers in our house‖). Defendant‘s evidentiary complaint appears to center on what Iuli did not say: He did not say the list had anything to do with Pamintuan‘s murder, or that the order of names had anything to do with criminal behavior by the Sons of Samoa street gang. Defendant complains that the prosecutor made such assertions in her closing argument, but whether or not those comments were a fair extrapolation from Iuli‘s testimony, Iuli never actually said those things and defendant thus posits no ground on which Iuli‘s penalty phase testimony could have been excluded even had an objection been made. Admission of the evidence aside, defendant contends primarily that the prosecutor committed misconduct during her closing penalty phase argument by referring to Iuli‘s testimony as evidence defendant lacked remorse for his crimes. He claims the prosecutor misstated the evidence and alluded to evidence that did not exist. In support, he cites this portion of the prosecutor‘s argument: ―Now that you know the real truth, the real evidence, the brutality of this crime, and you know how it not only destroyed a single life, not only a single human being‘s life, not only a kind, unselfish, compassionate young person‘s life, but his whole family and his bride‘s family, and it turned his wedding day into a day of unending despair. ―All of those who know and love Nolan will never wake up from this darkest nightmare. And this nightmare is the handiwork of Afatia Ropati Seumanu, for which he has named himself one of America’s most wanted Samoans, a badge of honor that he awarded to himself for blowing Nolan’s chest to pieces.‖ (Italics added.) That this claim was forfeited by failure to object is immediately apparent. 84 In contrast to the evidentiary claim, no reason appears to justify the failure to object to this argument for—if defendant is correct that Ms. Backers misstated the evidence and referred to facts not in evidence—an objection (and request the jury be admonished) would not have been rendered futile by the earlier admission of the evidence. Were we to address the issue, we would find no misconduct. ―The prosecution is given wide latitude during closing argument to make fair comment on the evidence, including reasonable inferences or deductions to be drawn from it.‖ (People v. Harris, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 345; see People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 819.) The phrase ―most wanted‖ is generally associated with the Federal Bureau of Investigation‘s list of the most dangerous criminals extant. (See People v. Parson, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 339 [U. S. Marshals placed the defendant ―on their list of ‗top 15 most-wanted fugitives‘ ‖].) By labeling himself as ―America‘s Most Wanted Samoan[],‖ it was reasonable to infer that defendant was boasting of his criminal exploits, including Pamintuan‘s murder, and that he thus lacked remorse for his crimes. 6. Darrell Churish’s Testimony Darrell Churish testified that he was driving somewhere with defendant when they spotted a large man at a bus stop wearing a Georgetown University jacket. Churish reported that defendant exited the car and physically confronted the man, who removed the coat and gave it to defendant. The prosecutor then asked Churish if defendant had ever offered to take someone‘s coat to give to him. Churish replied that one time when he was with defendant, he admired an Oakland Raiders jacket someone was wearing and defendant asked him if he wanted it. Churish told him no because he would not be able to explain the acquisition of such a garment to his mother. The prosecutor asked: ―He was going to take it off 85 that guy for you, right?‖ Churish answered: ―Probably, yeah.‖ There was no objection. Defendant contends Churish‘s assertion that defendant would have forced someone to give up his jacket for Churish‘s benefit was mere speculation and conjecture and therefore inadmissible. (See People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 599, overruled on other grounds in Price v. Superior Court, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1069, fn. 13 [― ‗ ―A finding of fact must be an inference drawn from evidence rather than . . . a mere speculation as to probabilities without evidence.‖ ‘ ‖].) Defendant further contends the prosecutor‘s question that elicited this information was improperly leading and, because she knew it called for inadmissible evidence, constituted misconduct. (See People v. Gray (2005) 37 Cal.4th 168, 216 [prosecutor commits misconduct by intentionally eliciting inadmissible evidence].) Finally, defendant claims these twin state-law errors violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution because they diminished the reliability of the jury‘s penalty verdict. All of these claims were forfeited by defendant‘s failure to object. An objection is necessary to preserve for appeal questions regarding the admissibility of evidence (Evid. Code, § 353, subd. (a); People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 977) and prosecutorial misconduct (People v. Hill, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 820). Defense counsel‘s sole objection to the witness‘s testimony came after the question asking Churish about the type of jacket he had admired, but can reasonably be assumed to have been directed at Churish‘s previous answer. That solitary objection was insufficient to alert the trial court that defendant intended to challenge the witness‘s further testimony that he believed defendant intended to take a stranger‘s property by force to satisfy Churish‘s fashion desires, and that defendant further believed the prosecutor was engaging in misconduct by 86 intentionally eliciting inadmissible evidence. Accordingly, we find the issues now raised were forfeited by the failure to object. 7. Effect of Alleged Guilt Phase Errors in the Penalty Phase Defendant contends three alleged errors occurring at the guilt phase worked synergistically to deny him a fair penalty phase trial. Citing his claim the prosecutor improperly used his postarrest silence against him (Doyle v. Ohio, supra, 426 U.S. 610) (ante, pt. I.B.4.a.), the alleged judicial misconduct flowing from the trial court‘s offhand comment, ―I know the temptation‖ (ante, pt. I.B.2.), and the prosecutor‘s alleged misconduct in questioning Tautai regarding whether the witness had sought to obtain a plea deal (ante, pt. I.B.4.d.), defendant argues the combined effect of these alleged guilt phase errors requires reversal of the penalty judgment because all involve ―[t]he circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted‖ under section 190.3, factor (a), and the errors improperly inflated the number of aggravating circumstances available for the jury‘s consideration. As we explained above, however, defendant‘s claim of Doyle error, as well as the argument based on the trial court‘s fleeting comment, were forfeited and meritless. Further, the prosecutor‘s use of the failed plea negotiations when questioning Tautai was harmless and any claim thereon forfeited. We thus reject the claim of cumulative prejudice. 8. Cumulative Prejudice from Guilt and Penalty Phase Errors Defendant contends the accumulation of the many alleged errors and acts of misconduct occurring in both the guilt and penalty phases of trial worked together to deny him a fair penalty trial. We have previously discussed each allegation individually and found most claims were forfeited for appeal, many are substantively meritless, and all were nonprejudicial. In particular, the prosecutor‘s two possible missteps (asking the jury to view the crime through the eyes of the 87 victim, and referring to Pamintuan as her ―client‖) were, as explained, not prejudicial in light of the strong evidence of guilt and the instruction informing the jury that the arguments of counsel are not evidence. (Ante, pt. I.B.4.c.) Defendant argues that balanced against these errors was a ―substantial case in mitigation‖ but even if true, the argument ignores the very substantial case in aggravation. On balance we find no cumulative prejudice requiring reversal. 9. Admission of Victim Impact Evidence Defendant contends the admission of victim impact evidence, in the form of the testimony from the victim‘s intended bride, Rowena Panelo, his brother Paul Pamintuan, and his mother, Dr. Clementina Manio, although permissible under the Eighth Amendment (Payne v. Tennessee, supra, 501 U.S. 808), violated Penal Code section 190.3, factor (a) because the victim‘s positive qualities do not fairly constitute the ―circumstances of the crime.‖ Although defendant admits we have held otherwise (see, e.g., People v. Edwards, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 835 [―factor (a) of section 190.3 allows evidence and argument on the specific harm caused by the defendant, including the impact on the family of the victim‖]; id. at p. 836), he contends none of our decisions has considered the actual meaning of the statutory phrase ―circumstances of the crime‖ as informed by this court‘s interpretation of the same phrase in People v. Love (1960) 53 Cal.2d 843 (disapproved on another ground in People v. Williams (1981) 29 Cal.3d 392). Defendant would thus have us distinguish a long line of precedent (e.g., People v. Edwards, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 755; People v. Tully (2012) 54 Cal.4th 952, 1031; People v. Boyette (2002) 29 Cal.4th 381, 444; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 832),20 on the 20 Because we agree an objection to the victim impact evidence would have been futile in light of the long line of cases permitting the admission of such (footnote continued on next page) 88 ground that these prior cases did not specifically address the argument he now raises (see People v. Brown (2012) 54 Cal.4th 314, 330 [―cases are not authority for propositions not considered‖]). We thus turn to a consideration of defendant‘s claim. The centerpiece of defendant‘s claim is People v. Love, supra, 53 Cal.2d 843. In that case, the defendant, charged with murdering his wife, objected at his capital trial to the admission, during the penalty phase, of a ―a photograph showing a front view of the deceased lying on a hospital table‖ (id. at p. 854) and an audio recording allowing the jury to ―hear the failing voice and the groans of the [victim] as she was dying‖ (id. at pp. 854–855). The case, which arose in 1958, was governed by the death penalty law enacted in 1957, and the admissibility of evidence under that law. That law provided in pertinent part that after finding the defendant guilty of murder ―there shall thereupon be further proceedings on the issue of penalty, and the trier of fact shall fix the penalty. Evidence may be presented at the further proceedings on the issue of penalty, of the circumstances surrounding the crime, of the defendant‘s background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty.‖ (Former § 190.1; added by Stats. 1957, ch. 1968, § 2, pp. 3509–3510, italics added.)21 This court found the admission of the photograph and recording was reversible error. ―The determination of penalty . . . must be a rational decision. (footnote continued from previous page) evidence, we find the issue is properly before us despite the absence of an objection. 21 Former section 190.1 was, for other reasons, declared unconstitutional under the California Constitution in People v. Anderson (1972) 6 Cal.3d 628, 656657. 89 Evidence that serves primarily to inflame the passions of the jurors must therefore be excluded, and to insure that it is, the probative value and the inflammatory effect of proffered evidence must be carefully weighed.‖ (People v. Love, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 856.) Regarding the photograph and the recording, we found the evidence to have ―no significant probative value‖ (ibid.) absent some evidence that the victim‘s pain was ―intentionally inflicted‖ (ibid.). ―[E]ven if relevant and material, [the victim‘s] pain was more than adequately described by the doctor. There was no need to show the jurors the expression of her face in death or to fill the courtroom with her groans. Both the photograph and the tape recording served primarily to inflame the passions of the jurors and both should have been excluded.‖ (Id. at pp. 856–857.) Defendant contends the 1957 law‘s use of the phrase ―the circumstances surrounding the crime‖ substantially mirrors language used in current section 190.3, factor (a)—―The circumstances of the crime of which the defendant was convicted‖—such that both phrases must be given the same construction. He thus seeks to invoke the rule of statutory construction that ―[w]here . . . legislation has been judicially construed and a subsequent statute on the same or an analogous subject uses identical or substantially similar language, we may presume that the Legislature intended the same construction, unless a contrary intent clearly appears.‖ (Estate of Griswold (2001) 25 Cal.4th 904, 915–916.) But even were we to assume People v. Love concerned victim impact evidence, defendant‘s reasoning has a fatal flaw: Love did not purport to interpret the meaning of the statutory phrase in question to reach its decision. To be sure, the Love court found the evidence had ―no significant probative value‖ unless it could be proved that the defendant ―intentionally inflicted‖ the victim‘s pain. (People v. Love, supra, 53 Cal.2d at p. 856.) But the Love court also reasoned there were ―less inflammatory methods of imparting to the jury the same or substantially the same 90 information‖ (ibid.), and that the key problem with the evidence was that there were other ways to give the jury the same information. There was also a sense the challenged evidence was improperly cumulative, as the victim‘s pain had already been described by the doctor. (Id. at pp. 756–857.) In short, Love explains, there was no particular need to present this information anew to the jury in the form of overly emotional evidence. ―Both the photograph and the tape recording served primarily to inflame the passions of the jurors and both should have been excluded.‖ (Id. at p. 857.) We conclude Love did not purport to give the phrase ―the circumstances surrounding the crime‖ a narrow interpretation so as to preclude evidence of the crime‘s impact on surviving family and friends. Even assuming for argument that Love has not been overtaken by subsequent judicial decisions concerning the admissibility of victim impact evidence in capital trials, it has no bearing on the meaning of section 190.3, factor (a) as presently written. 10. The Impact of Delay on the Constitutionality of the California Death Penalty Law While the appeal in this case was pending, the United States District Court for the Central District of California issued its opinion in Jones v. Chappell, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050 (Jones), a case in which a California capital defendant challenged his sentence of death in a federal habeas corpus petition. Jones concluded that systemic delays in implementing the death penalty under California law have rendered execution of the penalty so arbitrary that its imposition would violate the prisoner‘s rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The state has appealed that decision to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and, as of this writing, that appeal is pending. (Jones v. Chappell (9th Cir., Aug. 21, 2014, No. 14-56373).) Following the district court‘s decision, defendant Seumanu filed a supplemental opening brief in this court, raising the same Eighth Amendment/delay issue and relying heavily on the federal court‘s 91 reasoning. As we explain, although we do not in this case pass on the viability or legitimacy of what we will here call a ―Jones claim,‖ i.e., a claim that systemic delay in resolving postconviction challenges to death penalty judgments has led to a constitutionally intolerable level of arbitrariness in the implementation of the penalty, we conclude that—assuming such a claim exists—it has not been proved here. The Eighth Amendment provides that ―[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.‖ Although this key provision of the Bill of Rights applies to the states (Glossip v. Gross (2015) ___ U.S. ___ [2015 WL 2473454, p. 9]; Robinson v. California (1962) 370 U.S. 660, 666–667; In re Anderson (1968) 69 Cal.2d 613, 629, fn. 6),22 we have, in the past, rejected the claim that delay in deciding postconviction challenges in capital cases constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. As we explained in People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, ―delay inherent in the automatic appeal process is not a basis for concluding that either the death penalty itself, or the process leading to its execution, is cruel and unusual punishment.‖ (Id., at p. 606, citing People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 574, and People v. Hill (1992) 3 Cal.4th 959, 1016.) ―[T]he automatic appeal process following judgments of death is a constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional defect [citations], because it assures careful review of the 22 Although the state Constitution has its own prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment (Cal. Const., art. I, § 17), a different section in article I provides in part that the ―death penalty . . . shall not be deemed to be, or to constitute, the infliction of cruel or unusual punishments within the meaning of Article I, Section 6 nor shall such punishment . . . be deemed to contravene any other provision of this constitution‖ (id., art. I, § 27). Our discussion is thus limited to the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, which is in any event the only legal authority defendant invokes. 92 defendant‘s conviction and sentence [citation]. Moreover, an argument that one under judgment of death suffers cruel and unusual punishment by the inherent delays in resolving his appeal is untenable. If the appeal results in reversal of the death judgment, he has suffered no conceivable prejudice, while if the judgment is affirmed, the delay has prolonged his life.‖ (People v. Anderson, supra, at p. 606.) We have cited Anderson for this proposition many times since it was decided. (See People v. McDowell (2012) 54 Cal.4th 395, 412; People v. Demetrulias (2006) 39 Cal.4th 1, 45; People v. Dunkle (2005) 36 Cal.4th 861, 942; People v. Jones (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1229, 1267; see also People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 630 [generally rejecting 8th Amend. delay claim]; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 500 [same].) But although we have consistently, and recently, rejected the Eighth Amendment/delay claim, doctrine can evolve. This is especially true when interpreting the Eighth Amendment, which was ratified in 1791. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the notion of cruel and unusual punishment is not a concept carved in 18th-century stone, instead explaining that although ―the words of the [Eighth] Amendment are not precise, . . . their scope is not static. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.‖ (Trop v. Dulles (1958) 356 U.S. 86, 100–101, fn. omitted; see People v. Trinh (2014) 59 Cal.4th 216, 237 [holding the California law permitting penalty phase retrials, although rare when compared to the statutory schemes of other states, does not violate the Trop standard].) ―The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.‖ (Trop v. Dulles, supra, at p. 100.) 93 Accordingly, although this court has consistently rejected the Eighth Amendment/delay argument, defendant‘s reliance on the recently decided Jones, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, provides an opportunity to reconsider whether our prior position on this issue remains valid and supportable. ―As with many rules of law, multiple repetitions over time may tend to obscure the original purpose of the rule.‖ (In re Harris (1993) 5 Cal.4th 813, 826; Hyde v. United States (1912) 225 U.S. 347, 391, dis. opn. of Holmes, J. [―It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis.‖].) Our examination of defendant‘s claim reveals it to be subtly different from the Eighth Amendment claim rejected by People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th 543, and its progeny, rendering that line of authority a less than perfect refutation of the claim now before the court. Anderson and later cases addressed what is known as a ―Lackey claim,‖ which takes its name from a memorandum opinion on denial of certiorari by Justice John Paul Stevens in Lackey v. Texas (1995) 514 U.S. 1045. (See Muhammad v. Florida (2014) ___ U.S. ___ [134 S. Ct. 894] (Breyer, J., mem. opn. on denial of cert.) [same]; Johnson v. Bredesen, Governor of Tennessee, et al. (2009) 558 U.S. 1067 (Stevens, J., with Breyer, J., mem. opn. on denial of cert.) [same].) Such a claim argues that a lengthy period of incarceration on death row awaiting execution is impermissibly cruel and unusual because the long delay robs the ultimate penalty of any legitimate retributive value, diminishes to the vanishing point any deterrence value to an execution, and is psychologically damaging to the condemned inmate to an unjustifiable degree. (See Glossip v. Gross, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [2015 WL 2473454, p. 43] (dis. opn. of Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.) [―lengthy delays both aggravate the cruelty of the death penalty and undermine its jurisprudential rationale‖].) 94 Lackey claims are usually denied in the lower federal courts, sometimes on the merits (see, e.g., Smith v. Mahoney (9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 978, 998; Thompson v. Secretary for Dept. of Corrections (11th Cir. 2008) 517 F.3d 1279, 1284), and sometimes on procedural grounds (e.g., Ibarra v. Thaler (5th Cir. 2012) 687 F.3d 222, 224–225 & fn. 1), although not all federal judges are in agreement (see Ceja v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1998) 134 F.3d 1368, 1376 (dis. opn. of Fletcher, J. from summary refusal to stay execution) [noting the claim ―that having a death sentence hanging over one‘s head subjects one to extraordinary psychological duress, as well as the extreme physical and social restrictions that inhere in life on death row, and that it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment to impose such conditions of stress upon a death row inmate for a period of decades‖ and concluding the issue is ―of the highest importance‖]; Gretzler v. Stewart (9th Cir. 1998) 146 F.3d 675, 676 (dis. opn. of Pregerson, J.) [opining that he would grant a stay and remand to allow the lower court to consider a Lackey claim on the merits]; see also McKenzie v. Day (9th Cir. 1995) 57 F.3d 1461, 1488 (dis. opn. of Norris, J.) [Lackey claim ―is substantial, important, and deserving of careful and thoughtful adjudication‖]). Although the United States Supreme Court has yet to definitively embrace or reject a Lackey claim in a full opinion, two justices recently suggested they find the claim potentially meritorious. (Glossip v. Gross, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [2015 WL 2473454, p. 43] (dis opn. of Breyer, J., joined by Ginsburg, J.).) Although also based on a long postconviction delay, defendant‘s claim is different from a Lackey claim. Relying on Jones, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, he claims the systemic delays in implementing the death penalty in California render its implementation arbitrary, thus violating the Eighth Amendment‘s prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments. According to Jones, ―California‘s death penalty system is so plagued by inordinate and unpredictable delay that the death 95 sentence is actually carried out against only a trivial few of those sentenced to death.‖ (Jones, supra, at p. 1062.) Of those few selected to be executed, ―their selection for execution will not depend on whether their crime was one of passion or of premeditation, on whether they killed one person or ten, or on any other proxy for the relative penological value that will be achieved by executing that inmate over any other. Nor will it even depend on the perhaps neutral criterion of executing inmates in the order in which they arrived on Death Row. Rather, it will depend upon a factor largely outside an inmate‘s control, and wholly divorced from the penological purposes the State sought to achieve by sentencing him to death in the first instance: how quickly the inmate proceeds through the State‘s dysfunctional post-conviction review process.‖ (Ibid.) Although the concern over the continuing ability of the death penalty to serve the state‘s legitimate interest in retribution and deterrence is also relevant to a Lackey claim, the kernel of a Jones claim is not the delay per se, but the arbitrariness that such delay injects into the system. According to Jones, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d at page 1063, for a defendant ―to be executed in such a system, where so many are sentenced to death but only a random few are actually executed, would offend the most fundamental of constitutional protections—that the government shall not be permitted to arbitrarily inflict the ultimate punishment of death. See Furman [v. Georgia (1972)] 408 U.S. [238, 293] (Brennan, J., concurring) (‗When the punishment of death is inflicted in a trivial number of the cases in which it is legally available, the conclusion is virtually inescapable that it is being inflicted arbitrarily. Indeed, it smacks of little more than a lottery system.‘).‖ Although Furman addressed arbitrariness as it affected the selection of offenders eligible for the death 96 penalty,23 and not—as here—which among those already sentenced to death would actually be executed, Jones concluded that ―[t]he Eighth Amendment simply cannot be read to proscribe a state from randomly selecting which few members of its criminal population it will sentence to death, but to allow that same state to randomly select which trivial few of those condemned it will actually execute. Arbitrariness in execution is still arbitrary, regardless of when in the process the arbitrariness arises.‖ (Jones, supra, at p. 1063.) In sum, although both Lackey and Jones claims stem from a concern over how a long postconviction delay in carrying out the death penalty may be squared with the Eighth Amendment‘s constitutional limitations, they are distinct. A Lackey claim examines how a long postconviction delay affects the state‘s interest in retribution and deterrence, as well as the allegedly psychologically brutalizing effect on the condemned inmate; a Jones claim, by contrast, examines whether a long postconviction delay leads to the infliction of a criminal sanction in a manner that is so arbitrary that its imposition can be characterized as cruel and unusual. We now turn to this latter issue. Assuming for argument we were to agree with the federal judge in Jones, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, that long and systemic delays in postconviction review of death penalty verdicts could render the capital case system in this state impermissibly arbitrary in violation of the Eighth Amendment, an initial obstacle to reaching such a conclusion in this case is the inadequate state of the record. The issue comes to us on direct appeal and review is limited to facts in the 23 Furman ―has been authoritatively interpreted as holding that the death penalty cannot ‗be imposed under sentencing procedures that created a substantial risk that it would be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.‘ ‖ (People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 173.) 97 appellate record. By contrast, in Jones, the federal court confronted the issue on habeas corpus, where the petitioner could produce supporting facts and evidence from outside the appellate record. To the extent the petitioner in Jones alleged facts by citing the Final Report of the California Commission on the Fair Administration of Justice (2008),24 sites maintained by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation25 and the Office of the Attorney General,26 and articles by legal writers and scholars,27 we can take judicial notice of the same facts. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (h) [court can take judicial notice of ―(h) Facts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.‖].) But the petitioner in Jones also presented key facts to the federal court in the form of two declarations by the Director of the Habeas Corpus Resource Center, neither of which is in the record before us or properly subject to judicial notice. 24 (as of August 24, 2015). 25 For example: [as of August 24, 2015]. 26 For example: [as of August 24, 2015]. 27 For example, Jones v. Chappell, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, cites Uelmen, Death Penalty Appeals and Habeas Proceedings: The California Experience (2009) 93 Marq. L.Rev. 495; Alarcón & Mitchell, Executing the Will of the Voters?: A Roadmap to Mend or End the California Legislature’s Multi-BillionDollar Death Penalty Debacle (2011) 44 Loy. L.A. L.Rev. S41, S61; and Alarcón, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock (2007) 80 S.Cal. L.Rev. 697, 734. 98 For example, citing the latter declarations, the federal court found the following assertions factually true: (1) ―[A]s of June 2014, 352 inmates—nearly half of Death Row—were without habeas corpus counsel.‖ (Jones, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d at p. 1058.) (2) ―Currently, of the 352 inmates without habeas counsel, 159 have been awaiting appointment of such counsel for more than ten years.‖ (Ibid.) (3) ―[T]here are 76 inmates whose direct appeals have been fully denied by the California Supreme Court but still lack habeas counsel.‖ (Ibid.) (4) Such inmates ―have already waited an average of 15.8 years after the imposition of their death sentence for habeas counsel to be appointed, and are still waiting.‖ (Ibid.). Given that the People do not contest the accuracy of these alleged facts, however, we will assume for purposes of argument that the facts before the Jones court are accurate. We will further assume for purposes of argument that Furman v. Georgia, supra, 408 U.S. 238, and its progeny are not limited to the earlier selection process from among the class of all murderers, but prohibit as well arbitrariness in the selection for execution from among those already adjudged guilty and deserving of the death penalty.28 (But see, Glossip v. Gross, supra, ___ U.S. at p. ___ [2015 WL 2473454, p. 23] (conc. opn. of Thomas, J., joined by 28 ―As long as a state‘s capital sentencing scheme ‗narrows the class of deatheligible murderers‘ and then during sentence selection permits the exercise of discretion and does not limit consideration of evidence in mitigation, the United States Supreme Court has stated that the Eighth Amendment ‗requires no more.‘ (Lowenfield v. Phelps [(1988)] 484 U.S. [231] at p. 246; accord, California v. Brown (1987) 479 U.S. 538, 541.) Indeed, the high court found no constitutional defect in a capital sentencing scheme that in the sentence selection process afforded the sentencer ‗unbridled discretion‘ in deciding what sentence to impose on a defendant within the narrowed class of persons eligible for the death penalty. (Zant v. Stephens [(1983)] 462 U.S. [862] at p. 875.)‖ (People v. Bacigalupo (1993) 6 Cal.4th 457, 466–467.) 99 Scalia, J.) [describing the rule against arbitrariness in imposing the death penalty ―an imaginary constitutional rule‖].) Even operating under these twin assumptions, we conclude defendant has not, on this record, demonstrated that systemic delays have produced arbitrariness that is violative of the Eighth Amendment. Our conclusion would be different were the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation to ask all capital inmates who have exhausted their appeals to draw straws or roll dice to determine who would be the first in line for execution. But the record in this case does not demonstrate such arbitrariness. Unquestionably, some delay occurs while this court locates and appoints qualified appellate counsel, permits those appointed attorneys to prepare detailed briefs, allows the Attorney General to respond, and then carefully evaluates the arguments raised, holds oral argument, and prepares a written opinion. Further delays occur when this court locates and appoints qualified counsel for habeas corpus, allows ample time for counsel to prepare a petition, and then evaluates the resulting petition and successive petitions. But such delays are the product of ―a constitutional safeguard, not a constitutional defect [citations], because [they] assure[] careful review of the defendant‘s conviction and sentence.‖ (People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 606.) Although the Jones court found that systemic delays cause the state to apply an arbitrary and irrational standard for deciding whom to execute (see Jones, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d at p. 1062 [choosing whom to execute depends on factors ―wholly divorced‖ from any valid ―penological purposes‖]), the facts before that court did not explain why the death penalty review process takes as long as it does at certain points, nor do they shed light on the reasons behind the variability in the time it takes for cases to progress through the review process. That some inmates will exhaust their appeals and collateral attacks sooner than others, that some will obtain relief on appeal or on habeas corpus and others not, is inevitable given the 100 complexity of the judicial review process. These differences are not necessarily attributable to arbitrariness in the process of review under state law, but may instead represent the legitimate variances present in each individual case. Such differences may include variances in the nature of the underlying facts, the length of record, the quality of the briefing, and the complexity and number of issues raised by the parties. For some defendants the appointed attorneys will need more time to prepare and file an opening brief or habeas corpus petition due to the relative complexity of the issues involved, and the Attorney General will for the same reasons in some cases need additional time to respond. In some cases the trial record will take longer to certify as correct due to length or legitimate accuracy concerns. That capital case appeals and habeas corpus petitions are not decided in a purely chronological first in, first out manner may simply reflect the variation in the cases and this court‘s individual consideration of each case, and thus not demonstrate any intrinsic arbitrariness within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment. Nor is it clear from the record before us (even assuming we may consider the facts before the Jones court) how the process may be labeled ―arbitrary,‖ given the innumerable variables in play that affect the overall delay in this court in resolving capital appeals and habeas corpus petitions. To characterize the system of reviewing death penalty judgments as arbitrary as a result of long postconviction delays suggests randomness or a lack of rationality. But allowing each case the necessary time, based on its individual facts and circumstances, to permit this court‘s careful examination of the claims raised is the opposite of a system of random and arbitrary review. As one federal appellate court has stated: ―The essential point for our purposes, of course, is whether or not the Eighth Amendment is being violated. We believe that delay in capital cases is too long. But delay, in large part, is a function of the desire of our courts, state and federal, 101 to get it right, to explore exhaustively, or at least sufficiently, any argument that might save someone‘s life.‖ (Chambers v. Bowersox (8th Cir. 1998) 157 F.3d 560, 570, fn. omitted.; see Zant v. Stephens (1983) 462 U.S. 862, 885 [―although not every imperfection in the deliberative process is sufficient, even in a capital case, to set aside a state court judgment, the severity of the sentence mandates careful scrutiny in the review of any colorable claim of error.‖].) Without concrete evidence of the reasons why cases take as long as they do and why some cases take so much longer than others, we cannot conclude that postconviction delays affecting the imposition of a death sentence are arbitrary, let alone so arbitrary as to violate the Eighth Amendment. In sum, assuming for argument the facts before the court in Jones v. Chappell, supra, 31 F.Supp.3d 1050, were before this court, and further assuming that evidence of systemic delay could implicate a capital defendant‘s rights under the Eighth Amendment (i.e., a Jones claim), we conclude defendant has not on this record demonstrated that delays in implementing the death penalty under California law have rendered that penalty impermissibly arbitrary. We thus reject his Jones claim for purposes of this appeal. Any such claim is more appropriately presented in a petition for habeas corpus, where a defendant can present necessary evidence outside the appellate record. 11. Constitutional Challenges to California’s Death Penalty Statute Defendant contends several features of California‘s death penalty law, as interpreted by this court, violate the United States Constitution. He concedes ―most of these features [of the law] have been rejected by this Court‖ and so ―presents these arguments here in an abbreviated fashion,‖ presumably in order to preserve his rights in federal court. We address and reject them in a similarly brief manner: 102 1. ―California‘s special circumstances (see § 190.2) adequately narrow the class of murderers eligible for the death penalty.‖ (People v. Duff, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 568.) 2. ―Section 190.3, factor (a), which permits the jury to consider the circumstances of the crime in deciding whether to impose the death penalty, does not license the arbitrary and capricious imposition of the death penalty.‖ (People v. Duff, supra, 59 Cal.4th at p. 569.) 3. Neither the state nor federal Constitution requires the prosecution bear the burden of proof or persuasion at the penalty phase of a capital trial, or requires the jury find beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the aggravating factors have been proved, (2) the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors, or (3) death is the appropriate sentence. Moreover, none of the United States Supreme Court‘s recent decisions interpreting the Sixth Amendment‘s jury trial guarantee (Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270; United States v. Booker (2005) 543 U.S. 220; Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296; Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584; Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466) require a different result (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at pp. 979–980). 4. Neither ―the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment require[s] written findings or other specific findings by the jury regarding the aggravating factors.‖ (People v. Bunyard (2009) 45 Cal.4th 836, 861.) 5. ―The federal constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment (U.S. Const., 6th, 8th, & 14th Amends.), do not require intercase proportionality review on appeal.‖ (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1057.) 6. ―Admitting evidence of prior unadjudicated crimes in aggravation does not violate the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendment guarantees of fair 103 trial, trial by an impartial jury . . . and reliability. . . .‖ (People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1297.) 7. ―The Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments are not violated by the use of the adjectives ‗extreme‘ and ‗substantial‘ in connection with section 190.3, factors (g) and (d).‖ (People v. Bunyard, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 861.) 8. ―The trial court was not constitutionally required to inform the jury that certain sentencing factors are relevant only in mitigation, and the statutory instruction to the jury to consider ‗whether or not‘ certain mitigating factors were present did not unconstitutionally suggest that the absence of such factors amounted to aggravation.‖ (People v. Whisenhunt (2008) 44 Cal.4th 174, 228.) 9. California‘s use of the death penalty law does not violate international norms of humanity and decency. (People v. Jones, supra, 57 Cal.4th at p. 981.) 104