Opinion ID: 866146
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Admission of the Lindley Files

Text: Ralph contends that the district court erred in admitting the files of Lindley, who served as the closing attorney on the real estate transactions. Although Ralph frames this contention under the heading of due process, his brief neither explains why his due process rights were violated by the documents' admission, nor identifies with any precision the particular documents to which this argument is addressed. Ralph's vague allusion to due process notwithstanding, his argument primarily addresses the documents' admissibility under the Federal Rules of Evidence and we therefore treat it as such. When the defendant has preserved his objections, the district court's evidentiary rulings are reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Jiménez, 419 F.3d 34, 43 (1st Cir. 2005). The government contends that Ralph forfeited this claim below, thereby rendering it subject to plain error review. See 4 Ralph contends that the government did not prove the existence of an agreement between Levine and Ralph, but it is a well-settled proposition that each coconspirator need not know of or have contact with all other members, nor must they know all of the details of the conspiracy or participate in every act in furtherance of it. United States v. Martínez–Medina, 279 F.3d 105, 113 (1st Cir. 2002); see also Pérez-González, 445 F.3d at 49. -15- United States v. Chaney, 647 F.3d 401, 406 n.6 (1st Cir. 2011) (observing that failure to raise an argument or right due to inattention or neglect constitutes forfeiture and issue is reviewed for plain error). We need not resolve this question, however, since the district court's admission of these documents was not an abuse of discretion. Ralph's first challenge goes to the authenticity of the Lindley files. To introduce a piece of evidence, the proponent must demonstrate that the item is what the proponent claims it is. Fed. R. Evid. 901(a). This relatively undemanding rule requires the trial court to determine if there is a reasonable probability that the evidence is what it is purported to be. United States v. Carlos Cruz, 352 F.3d 499, 506 (1st Cir. 2003) (quoting United States v. Neal, 36 F.3d 1190, 1210 (1st Cir. 1994)) (quotation marks omitted). The proponent need not rule out all possibilities inconsistent with authenticity in order to meet this burden. Asociación De Periodistas De P.R. v. Mueller, 680 F.3d 70, 79 (1st Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Alicea-Cardoza, 132 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 1997)) (quotation marks omitted). Evidence can be authenticated in numerous ways, including through the testimony of a witness with knowledge that an item is what it is claimed to be. Fed. R. Evid. 901(b)(1). The record shows that the government laid a sufficient foundation for the admission of the Lindley files. On the second -16- day of trial, before testimony began, the parties had a colloquy with the district court regarding the files. When the government sought to have them admitted provisionally before their authentication, Ralph objected to the use of documents that are not testified to by anybody and . . . the authenticity of which is in dispute, at least from coming in without a witness. The government responded that MacPhee, one of its witnesses and Lindley's former employee, could serve as such a witness. In light of this representation, the district court gave the government permission to use them, but with the caveat that they would not be formally in evidence until they're qualified for admission. MacPhee later gave the promised testimony. She stated that she was responsible for the filing system at Lindley's office, and kept files for real estate matters. She also discussed her role in updating and maintaining the records, and identified the files when they were presented to her. After the government moved to admit the files into evidence, the court concluded during a brief sidebar that there's an adequate foundation for the admission, but clarified that the files would not be admitted for the truth of their contents.5 As someone who maintained, reviewed and worked with the files, MacPhee was well-positioned to recognize 5 The court gave a limiting instruction after the sidebar concluded, and another instruction at the close of evidence. Ralph's counsel asserted no further objections to the admissibility of the files, suggesting that he did indeed forfeit this argument. -17- and verify the documents in question. Her testimony was more than sufficient to establish a reasonable probability that the Lindley files were what they purported to be. Ralph also suggests that the Lindley files are inadmissible hearsay because, despite the court's statement to the contrary, they were admitted for their truth and do not fall under any exception to the hearsay rule. Fed. R. Evid. 801. This objection misapprehends the files' probative significance. The files in question contained numerous records, including correspondence with lenders and other participants in the transactions, copies of the loan applications, and documents related to the transactions' closings. These files were not introduced for the purpose of establishing the truth of the assertions contained therein, but rather, as instrumentalities of the crimes in question. To the extent that the government relied on any representations contained within these documents, the representations' probative value was not for their truth. Indeed, the government sought to admit them for a wholly different purpose -- to prove that the statements were made, and to later demonstrate through other admissible evidence[] that [the statements] were false. United States v. Munson, 819 F.2d 337, 340 (1st Cir. 1987) (citation omitted) (quotation marks omitted). Consequently, they are not hearsay. -18- For these reasons, the district court did not err in admitting the Lindley files into evidence.