Opinion ID: 3049918
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: [1] Stanton’s contention that we lack jurisdiction to entertain the government’s appeal is without merit. Stanton accurately identifies the fundamental rule that “the United States cannot appeal in a criminal case without express congressional authorization.” United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 568 (1977). He also correctly points out that the governing statute, the Criminal Appeals Act, on its face authorizes the United States to appeal only from a “judgment . . . of a district court dismissing an indictment or information . . . except that no appeal shall lie where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.” 18 U.S.C. § 3731. However, his argument flowing from these two basic premises is flawed. Because express congressional authorization is required to support a government appeal in a criminal case, and because § 3731 does not on its face authorize the government to appeal from a district court order reversing a conviction entered by a magistrate, and ordering an entry of acquittal, Stanton argues that this court is stripped of jurisdiction. Although we have not yet addressed this issue, Stanton’s posiUNITED STATES v. STANTON 11155 tion is contrary to controlling Supreme Court authority, and to the jurisprudence of every other circuit that has considered the question. In United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332 (1975), the jury returned a guilty verdict that was subsequently vitiated by the trial court’s post-verdict dismissal of the indictment on speedy trial grounds. 420 U.S. at 334. The government sought to appeal, but the Third Circuit held that because the district court’s ruling was effectively an acquittal, the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented the government from constitutionally appealing the ruling. Id. at 335. Considering the present version of § 3731, which had recently undergone substantial revision, the Supreme Court first noted that the revised statute eliminated many of the prior limitations on the government’s appeal rights. Id. at 336-37. In combination with the new language, the court considered at length the legislative history underlying the revised Act and determined it was “clear that Congress intended to remove all statutory barriers to Government appeals and to allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit.” Id. at 337. Because “Congress was determined to avoid creating nonconstitutional bars to the Government’s right to appeal,” the Court turned next to a lengthy double jeopardy analysis. Id. at 339. Having surveyed the evolution of double jeopardy jurisprudence, the Court concluded that “where there is no threat of either multiple punishment or successive prosecutions, the Double Jeopardy Clause is not offended.” Id. at 344. Because the jury had rendered a guilty verdict, and because reversal of the district court’s order on appeal would do nothing more than reinstate that verdict, the appeal presented no threat of a successive prosecution or multiple punishments for the same offense. Id. at 344-45, 353. Accordingly, there was no double jeopardy violation, and the government was constitutionally free to bring the appeal under § 3731. Id. at 353. The procedural posture in Wilson — a trial court’s dismissal of an indictment — fit squarely within the terms of 11156 UNITED STATES v. STANTON § 3731, regardless of the Court’s broad interpretation of the statute. Just two years later, the Court gave a similarly broad construction to a different portion of the statute in United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1977). In that case a “hopelessly deadlocked” jury was discharged after failing to reach a verdict. 430 U.S. at 565. After the jury’s dismissal the district court granted the defendants’ motions for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, a decision from which the government sought appeal under § 3731. Id. at 566-67. Noting that the statute by its terms authorizes appeal from a “dismiss[al]” rather than “acquittal,” the Court nonetheless followed the Wilson example of construing the statute broadly, stating that unless barred by the Constitution, Rule 29 acquittals may be appealed because “the form of the ruling is not dispositive of appealability in a statutory sense.” Id. at 567 n.4; see also id. at 568. The Court then applied the Wilson constitutional analysis, beginning from the premise that since its common-law origins, double jeopardy protection has been “directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, not at Government appeals, at least where those appeals would not require a new trial.” Id. at 568-69 (quoting Wilson, 420 U.S. at 342). Because no guilty verdict was returned before the district court granted the defendants’ motions for acquittal, reversing the district court would have necessarily created the threat of a second prosecution for the same act, in violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 569-70; 575-76. Accordingly, no appellate review was available under § 3731. [2] Sitting as an appellate court reviewing the magistrate’s decision, the district court here did not style its order as a Rule 29 acquittal. Instead, the district court stated that because of “the insufficiency of the evidence to support the finding of guilt on Count I,” Stanton’s conviction on that count was ordered reversed, and a finding of not guilty was ordered to be entered. Regardless of its form, the district court’s order is clearly an acquittal in substance because it represents “a determination that the evidence was insufficient UNITED STATES v. STANTON 11157 to convict.” United States v. Ogles, 440 F.3d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc). [3] Accordingly, under Martin Linen the district court’s judgment of acquittal is appealable unless reversing the district court’s order would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Stanton makes no argument on this point, nor can he. Because reversal of the district court’s order would merely reinstate the guilty verdict entered by the magistrate, our review “does not offend the policy against multiple prosecution.” Wilson, 420 U.S. at 345. Not only does this conclusion flow naturally from Wilson and Martin Linen, but it also aligns with the jurisprudence of the other circuits that have considered the issue, each of which has determined that § 3731 authorizes a government appeal where a district court either reverses a conviction entered by a magistrate (as here), or affirms a magistrate’s judgment of acquittal after a jury verdict of guilty. See United States v. Duncan, 164 F.3d 239, 242 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v. Aslam, 936 F.2d 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Forcellati, 610 F.2d 25, 29-30 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Moore, 586 F.2d 1029, 1031-32 (4th Cir. 1978). [4] We dispose quickly of Stanton’s other jurisdictional argument — that § 3731 does not apply because he was charged under a criminal complaint, rather than an indictment or information. The various charging documents are unquestionably distinct. Compare Fed. R. Crim. P. 3, with Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(f) and Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). However, Stanton’s position cannot be reconciled with Wilson’s central holding that § 3731 should be applied to “allow appeals whenever the Constitution would permit.” Wilson, 420 U.S. at 339. Nor can it be squared with the statutory mandate that § 3731 “shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes,” which the Supreme Court has identified as “avoid[ing] creati[on] [of] nonconstitutional bars to the Government’s right to appeal.” Id. Stanton has simply shown no constitutional reason why § 3731 should not apply because he was charged under a 11158 UNITED STATES v. STANTON criminal complaint, rather than under an indictment or information. Accordingly, we join the Second and Fourth Circuits in holding that § 3731 authorizes a government appeal under the circumstances of this case. See Aslam, 936 F.2d at 754; Moore, 586 F.2d at 1031.