Opinion ID: 853042
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Opportunity to Present a Defense

Text: Contending that the time of death of all three victims was critical to his defense, Kubsch complains that the State never established the time of death and that the trial court barred him from presenting evidence that the time of death could have been proven within a definite period. Br. of Appellant at 35. According to Kubsch, the trial court's action denied him a meaningful opportunity to present a defense. To support his claim, Kubsch directs our attention to the testimony of Dr. Robert Tomec, the pathologist who conducted the autopsies, and the testimony of Officer Thomas Mammon, a crime scene investigator. Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process or Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants `a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.' Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690, 106 S.Ct. 2142, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986) (citations omitted) (quotation omitted). As the Supreme Court has also observed: The right to offer the testimony of witnesses, and to compel their attendance, if necessary, is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right to present the defendant's version of the facts as well as the prosecution's to the jury so it may decide where the truth lies. Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution's witnesses for the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process of law. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). A. Examination of the pathologist During cross-examination, the pathologist affirmed that he did not attempt to establish a time of death for the victims. The following exchange then occurred: Q. [Defense Counsel] What would be the things that you would look at to determine time of death? A. [Pathologist] There are a number of factors that can be examined to try to determine a range cause of death I'm sorry, a time of death, and those include lividity and rigidity that we already discussed as well as other factors like the temperature of the body.    Q. [Defense Counsel] Did you at all make an attempt to look at or determine time of death? A. [Pathologist] I recorded certain findings of rigor and lividity, but other than that, I do not try to determinea time of death at the time of the autopsy. Q. [Defense Counsel] If you yourself were not present at the scene, what information would be useful to you to determine time of death? R. at 4038. At that point the State objected. After a side-bar conference the trial court sustained the objection on grounds of materiality. Specifically, the trial court declared: I mean you're asking him to answer a question [in] an ideal world, if he had had this, and this, could he have made a determination. And probably he could tell you what he could know if he had temperature, if he had opacity of eyes... In an ideal world could he have determined, yes, but so? No, there's nothing in this evidence that we can go on, you know, there's nothing. It's a non-question. It's immaterial. Okay? R. at 4041. Relevant evidence is, evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence. Evid. R. 401. The two components of relevant evidence are materiality and probative value. If the evidence is offered to help prove a proposition that is not a matter in issue, the evidence is immaterial. 1 McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 637 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.1999). In the form posed by the defense, the question to the pathologist did not appear to be probative of anything at all. The pathologist had already testified that he had not made a time of death determination. In fact during further cross-examination, the pathologist was even more explicit: I was not at the scene. That's correct. And I do nothave never gone to the scene of a homicide so that I'm not in the practice of doing that type of work [taking measurements needed to determine time of death]. R. at 4041-42. Only in the context of the argument Kubsch now makes on appeal, is it plausible that the contested testimony of the pathologist may have been both relevant and material. In this appeal, Kubsch essentially advances the argument that he wanted to demonstrate that the police were deficient in gathering the necessary time of death evidence from the crime scene. If the police had done so, the argument continues, then they could have provided that information to the pathologist. In turn, it was necessary to examine the pathologist on exactly what type of evidence could have been gathered and thus may have assisted the pathologist in making a time of death determination. However Kubsch made no such argument before the trial court. Rather, he merely commented, [w]ell, time of death is an important question, Judge. R. at 4040. Because the question is important, does not necessarily mean that it is relevant or material. In any event, limiting the cross-examination of the pathologist was not a ban on Kubsch presenting evidence that the time of death could have been proven within a definite period. Br. of Appellant at 35. [8] Trial judges retain wide latitude to impose reasonable limits on the cross-examination of witnesses based on concerns about, among others things, interrogation that is only marginally relevant. Smith v. State, 721 N.E.2d 213, 219 (Ind.1999). As we have indicated, the question asked of the pathologist was not just marginally relevant. As posed, it did not appear to be relevant at all. Lacking relevance, the question thus lacked materiality. The trial court's ruling on this issue was correct. B. Examination of the crime scene investigator During the direct examination of Thomas Mammon, a crime scene investigator, the State established that when the officer arrived at the scene at about 6:00 p.m. on September 18, 1998, he and other officers were waiting on a search warrant for the home. R. at 3586. A warrant arrived around 9:00 p.m. at which time Mammon and the other officers began processing the scene. Defense counsel followed-up on this testimony during cross-examination. At one point counsel asked the officer, you're aware that you could have gotten the consent from a homeowner to search the house? R. at 3600. The State objected and after a side-bar conference the trial court sustained the objection and admonished the jury as follows: [A]s stated, the question would call for a conclusion from this witness that would be simply conjecture, that if a homeowner were present and if he were asked, that he might have consented to such a search. There's nothing in this evidence to suggest that this witness knew that the homeowner was there. He said he didn't. And even if he did, there is no evidence thus far to suggest that he was asked or that he would have consented or would not have consented if he were asked. And therefore to ask this witness that question is an improper question. It calls for speculation. R. at 3604. On appeal Kubsch does not contest the underlying bases for the trial court's ruling. Rather, contending that the response from the officer was an important component of the defense's time of death claim, Kubsch insists that by sustaining the State's objection the trial court denied him the right to present a meaningful defense. To demonstrate the significance of Officer Mammon's testimony on this issue, Kubsch essentially makes the following argument. At the time police officers first arrived at the crime scene relevant evidence existed that could have assisted the pathologist in determining the time of death. The argument continues that because the officers waited for a search warrant, rather than taking steps immediately to obtain a consent to search, valuable information was lost. See generally Br. of Appellant at 37-40. Regardless of Kubsch's theory of defense, evidence to support the theory must comply with applicable evidentiary rules. An answer to a question of a witness that calls for speculation and conjecture is not admissible. Because it is axiomatic that a ruling or a verdict should not be based upon evidence which is conjectural, Lindsey v. State, 485 N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind.1985), [t]o require a witness to answer hypothetical questions based upon facts not established would invite speculation. Id. at 106-07. As such, an objection to such a question would be properly sustained. See id. at 107. The trial court correctly ruled that as posed Kubsch's question to the officer was improper. Contrary to Kubsch's claim on appeal, he was not denied the right to advance his theory of defense. Rather, he simply could not ask an improper question in doing so. We find no error here.