Opinion ID: 310291
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Evidence and Trial Court Action

Text: 2 Appellant has a history of psychological instability. In 1969 a military doctor recommended that he be released from the Army in part because of an observed propensity toward psychiatric illness. In 1970, after undergoing an operation, appellant was confined to the psychiatric ward of a Veterans Administration hospital because of violent, irrational outbursts. He was diagnosed as having an anti-social personality and being a borderline schizophrenic. On one occasion following his discharge from the VA hospital police had to be called to subdue appellant who was acting in an irrational manner. He was immediately taken to the psychiatric ward of the D. C. General Hospital where he spent 16 days; appellant's admission was based upon a conclusion that he was mentally ill. Following his discharge appellant allegedly experimented with various drugs, including LSD. On 5 January 1971, four months after being released from the psychiatric ward of D. C. General, appellant committed the acts which led to his arrest. 3 In April 1971 appellant's counsel moved to have appellant examined pursuant to 24 D.C.Code Sec. 301 to determine his competency to stand trial and his mental condition as of the date of the charged offenses. The motion was granted and appellant spent 15 days being examined in St. Elizabeths, a Government-operated psychiatric hospital. The St. Elizabeths report stated that appellant was competent to stand trial and was not suffering from a mental disease or defect on the date of the offense. In November 1971 appellant's attorney moved for a second examination in order to verify the initial findings of the first court-ordered examination, and to permit the defense to determine if grounds existed to assert a defense of insanity. The motion was granted and appellant was referred to Legal Psychiatric Services, an agency of the Government. Appellant was examined for about 50 minutes by Dr. Maguigad of LPS, who reported that, while appellant was presently competent to stand trial, he had been suffering from Schizophrenia Undifferentiated Type which substantially imparied [sic] his behavior at the time of alleged offense.. . . 4 Following this report appellant's attorney wrote a letter ex parte to the trial judge, moving to have Maguigad appointed to serve as a defense witness under the provisions of 18 U.S.C. Sec. 3006A, which provides for the allocation of money to pay for expert witnesses for indigent defendants. 2 This request apparently was made because defense counsel felt that additional examinations by Dr. Maguigad would be necessary for him to serve as an effective witness, and that consultation between the doctor and defense counsel would be necessary in order to prepare an effective presentation to the jury. 5 The trial judge took no action on the motion until a March 1972 calendar call, at which time appellant's attorney in open court and before the prosecutor inquired as to the disposition of his request. Upon hearing that appellant had requested expert assistance, the prosecutor vigorously opposed the motion as being unnecessary and a waste of money in light of the psychiatric examinations already undertaken. The court ruled that Dr. Maguigad could not be appointed under Sec. 3006A, ostensibly because there might be an apparent conflict of interest between his role as a court-appointed independent expert and his acting as a defense witness under Sec. 3006A. Appellant immediately applied alternatively for another expert to be appointed; the Government opposed this as well. The court declined to appoint another doctor, saying: 6 We are not going to continually appoint more and more psychiatrists. This is it. He has been examined by two psychiatrists . . . . Your motion is denied. 3 7 The stated basis for appellant's desire to receive more examinations from either Dr. Maguigad or another doctor was that counsel believed that Dr. Maguigad's 50-minute examination would have little weight in the jury's mind when countered by the 15 days of examinations conducted by St. Elizabeths, the results of which supported the Government's position. 4 8 Indeed, appellant's fears were borne out at trial. The Government seriously impeached Dr. Maguigad, both on his qualifications as an expert and his familiarity with the case. 5 At the conclusion of the cross-examination of Dr. Maguigad, appellant's attorney moved for a mistrial on the ground that appellant had been unlawfully denied psychiatric assistance sufficient to prepare an adequate defense. The trial court denied the motion. The jury subsequently found appellant guilty on all counts and appellant was sentenced to a jail term.