Opinion ID: 1430936
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Judgment for the County

Text: The county properly relies upon City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal.2d 127 [330 P.2d 802], to support its judgment against both corporations. [1] Rock as the property owner which constructed the track across the highway for the benefit of its property was under a common-law duty to maintain the crossing in a safe condition for travel ( City & County of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, supra, 51 Cal.2d, p. 129) and the county is entitled to recover over against Rock by way of indemnity for the amount it was out of pocket by reason of Rock's negligent failure to properly maintain the crossing ( Id., 51 Cal.2d at p. 138). [2] Rock argues that under its contract with the county it was only bound to place the road back in its former condition and was under no duty thereafter to maintain it. However cases in other jurisdictions have construed similar provisions to impose a continuing duty of maintaining the crossing so long as it remains in the highway, and not to limit the duty to a single restoration. ( City of Iola v. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co., 97 Kan. 242 [155 P. 45, 46-47]; Southern Ry. Co. v. Morris, 143 Ala. 628 [42 So. 17, 18]; Chesapeake, O. & S.W.R. Co. v. Dyer County, 87 Tenn. 712 [11 S.W. 943, 944]; Town of Clarendon v. Rutland R. Co., 75 Vt. 6 [52 A. 1057, 1059-1060]; Village of Wayzata v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 50 Minn. 438 [52 N.W. 913, 914]; Maltby v. Chicago & W.M.R. Co., 52 Mich. 108 [17 N.W. 717].) [3] While Ho Sing dealt only with the duty of an adjoining property owner placing an artificial structure in the thoroughfare for the benefit of his property, the principle extends to any person or corporation placing or maintaining a structure in the highway for his own purposes. [4] So the common-law duty is cast upon a railroad company to safely maintain the crossing over its tracks where they occupy a portion of the highway. ( Bullock v. Yakima Valley Transp. Co., 108 Wash. 413 [184 P. 641, 647-648, 187 P. 410]; Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Taylor, 79 Okla. 349 [192 P. 349, 352]; Patterson v. Thompson (Mo. App.), 277 S.W.2d 314, 317; State v. Minnesota Transfer Ry. Co., 80 Minn. 108 [83 N.W. 32, 34]; Omaha & R.V. Ry. Co. v. Brady, 39 Neb. 27 [57 N.W. 767, 768]; People ex rel. City of Bloomington v. Chicago & A.R.R. Co., 67 Ill. 118.) This duty rests not only on the corporation which originally constructed the tracks but likewise attaches to whatever railroad company thereafter exercises the franchise. ( Wichita Valley Ry. Co. v. Meyers (Tex. Civ. App.), 248 S.W. 444, 446-447; Attwill v. Boston & A.R. Co., 246 Mass. 292 [140 N.E. 928, 929]; Wasmer v. Delaware, Lacka. & West'n. R.R. Co. (N.Y.), 80 N.Y. 212, 216 [36 Am. Rep. 608]; Allen v. Buffalo, R. & P. Ry. Co., 151 N.Y. 434 [45 N.E. 845, 847]; People ex rel. City of Bloomington v. Chicago & A.R.R. Co., supra, 67 Ill. 118, 120; cf. Alton R. Co. v. Illinois Commerce Comm'n., 305 U.S. 548, 553 [59 S.Ct. 340, 83 L.Ed. 344] et seq.; Snyder v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 44 Cal.2d 793, 799 [285 P.2d 912].) [5] Southern Pacific, having by its contract with Rock obtained the right to operate said track ... under (its) full control and having regularly operated its trains thereafter under said contract, cannot escape this liability of maintenance which the law casts upon it. Since it was under this legal responsibility for maintenance, the county is likewise entitled to indemnity against it. ( Washington Gaslight Co. v. District of Columbia, 161 U.S. 316 [16 S.Ct. 564, 40 L.Ed. 712]; Lowell v. Boston & Lowell Railroad, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 24 [34 Am.Dec. 33]; Town of Waterbury v. Waterbury Traction Co., 74 Conn. 152 [50 A. 3]; Baltimore & O.R. Co. v. Howard County Com'rs., 111 Md. 176 [73 A. 656, 40 L.R.A.N.S. 1172], id. on second appeal, 113 Md. 404 [77 A. 930]; City of Astoria v. Astoria & C.R.R. Co., 67 Ore. 538 [136 P. 645, 49 L.R.A.N.S. 404]; City of Raleigh v. North Carolina R. Co., 129 N.C. 265 [40 S.E. 2]; Portland v. Atlantic & St. Lawrence Railroad Co., 66 Me. 485; City of Bloomington v. Chicago, I. & L.R. Co., 52 Ind. 510 [98 N.E. 188].) [6] The court found that both corporate defendants negligently failed to maintain said crossing in a safe condition and as a proximate result thereof, ruts, holes and depressions were caused to exist at said crossing and immediately adjacent to the rails thereof, and that as a result thereof the Cali truck was caused to be thrown out of control and damaged. These findings sufficiently support the judgment for the county. There is some uncertainty in the findings as to whether these ruts were within 2 or 4 feet of the rails. There was testimony that it was the customary practice for railroads to maintain the highway for 2 feet on either side of the rails and the testimony of the Cali driver was that the break in the pavement which threw his truck out of control was adjacent to the track. [7] Findings are to be liberally construed whenever possible to support the judgment ( Richter v. Walker, 36 Cal.2d 634, 639 [226 P.2d 593]; Menghetti v. Dillon, 10 Cal.2d 470, 472 [75 P.2d 596]), and it seems clear from the record that the break in question was within 2 feet of the rails. The fact that Cali recovered judgment against Southern Pacific in the original action lends further support to this conclusion. The corporate defendants cite Restatement, Restitution, section 95: Where a person has become liable with another for harm caused to a third person because of his negligent failure to make safe a dangerous condition of land or chattels, which was created by the misconduct of the other or which, as between the two, it was the other's duty to make safe, he is entitled to restitution from the other for expenditures properly made in the discharge of such liability, unless after discovery of the danger, he acquiesced in the continuation of the condition. (Emphasis added.) [8] The defense that the county acquiesced in the condition was not urged in the trial court and under settled principles of appellate practice it is too late to present this defense for the first time on appeal ( Damiani v. Albert, 48 Cal.2d 15, 18 [306 P.2d 780]; Los Angeles Inv. Co. v. Home Sav. Bank, 180 Cal. 601, 615 [182 P. 293, 5 A.L.R. 1193]), assuming, without deciding, that such defense is available against a governmental subdivision. [1] Since the principles herein stated sufficiently support the county's judgment, other theories advanced by the county for recovery need not be discussed.