Opinion ID: 2600070
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of sexual assaults against Jason L.

Text: Over trial counsel's renewed objection, the prosecutor called 20-year-old Jason L. to testify about being sexually assaulted by defendant as a youth. Jason testified that while home one day after school when he was eight years old and defendant was 12 or 13, defendant threatened him with a steak knife, forced him to orally copulate defendant, and then sodomized him. (33) As defendant acknowledges, we have long held that although the fact of a juvenile adjudication is inadmissible as a factor in aggravation, juvenile criminal activity involving force or violence is admissible as aggravating evidence under factor (b). ( People v. Lewis (2001) 26 Cal.4th 334, 378 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 28 P.3d 34]; People v. Lucky (1988) 45 Cal.3d 259, 295 [247 Cal.Rptr. 1, 753 P.2d 1052].) Defendant urges us to reconsider this holding, arguing that because a juvenile court adjudication affords more procedural safeguards than does the factor (b) admission processwhich demands neither juror unanimity nor instruction on the elements of the unadjudicated crimeit is inherently illogic[al] to allow the prosecutor to present the underlying facts of criminal activity but not the fact of the activity's adjudication. Contrary to defendant's assertion, there is no illogic in the rule prohibiting admission of the fact of a juvenile adjudication while permitting evidence of violent juvenile criminal activity. Juvenile adjudications are inadmissible as evidence in aggravation, not because of their evidentiary weight or reliability, but because they are not prior felony convictions within the meaning of section 190.3, factor (c). ( People v. Burton (1989) 48 Cal.3d 843, 861-862 [258 Cal.Rptr. 184, 771 P.2d 1270]; see also Welf. & Inst. Code, § 203 [order adjudging minor a ward of the court shall not be deemed a conviction of a crime for any purpose].) Factor (b), on the other hand, involves evidence of violent conduct other than the capital crimes, regardless of when the misconduct occurred or whether it led to a criminal conviction. ( People v. Lewis and Oliver, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) Such evidence is permitted because it  `enable[s] the jury to make an individualized assessment of the character and history of the defendant to determine the nature of the punishment to be imposed.' [Citation.] ( People v. Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 544 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119].) Thus, although the fact of the juvenile adjudication is inadmissible, the conduct underlying the adjudication is relevant to the jury's penalty determination and admissible as violent criminal activity under factor (b). ( People v. Lucky, supra, 45 Cal.3d at pp. 295-296, fn. 24 [It is not the adjudication, but the conduct itself, which is relevant.].) Defendant's claim of an internal inconsistency fails. [24] Defendant argues that the high court's decision in Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551 [161 L.Ed.2d 1, 125 S.Ct. 1183], precludes admission of his juvenile criminal activity. As we recently explained, however, Roper does not compel exclusion of such evidence. ( People v. Bramit (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1221, 1239 [96 Cal.Rptr.3d 574, 210 P.3d 1171] [ Roper 's holding that the 8th Amend. prohibits the execution of a condemned prisoner younger than 18 years old at the time of the capital offense says nothing about the propriety of permitting a capital sentencing jury to consider the defendant's violent conduct as a juvenile].) Defendant asserts finally that in instructing the jury regarding the Jason L. incident, the trial court erred by not setting forth the elements of the crimes of forcible sodomy and oral copulation. We have repeatedly held, however, that absent a request, a trial court has no duty to instruct on the elements of unadjudicated crimes admitted under factor (b). ( People v. Guerra (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1067, 1147 [40 Cal.Rptr.3d 118, 129 P.3d 321]; People v. Anderson (2001) 25 Cal.4th 543, 588 [106 Cal.Rptr.2d 575, 22 P.3d 347] [rule recognizes the defense concern that such instructions may lead the jury to place undue emphasis on unadjudicated crimes, rather than on the question of penalty].) We also have rejected defendant's further argument that recent high court decisions on the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial call that rule into question. Apprendi, supra, 530 U.S. at page 490, holds that a fact, other than a prior conviction, that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. As we have explained, however, because death is no more than the statutory maximum once a special circumstance allegation is found true, the penalty determination in a capital case falls outside of Apprendi 's rule. ( People v. Anderson, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 589, fn. 14.)