Opinion ID: 2198338
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 13

Heading: Constitutionality of Indiana Death Penalty

Text: The defendant contends that the Indiana capital sentencing procedure, as applied in this case, violates the Indiana and federal constitutions on several grounds. He argues that our statutory formulation (wherein the jury serves only to recommend and the trial court makes the final determination), combined with remarks in the State's jury voir dire, opening statement, and closing argument, further emphasized by the trial court's jury instructions, violate the standards of reliability required by the Eighth Amendment, citing Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985), 472 U.S. 320, 105 S.Ct. 2633, 86 L.Ed.2d 231. In Caldwell, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a capital sentence is not valid when a sentencing jury is misled regarding its actual responsibility for determining the appropriateness of a death sentence. However, to establish a Caldwell violation, a defendant necessarily must show that the remarks to the jury improperly described the role assigned to the jury by local law. Dugger v. Adams (1989), 489 U.S. 401, 407, 109 S.Ct. 1211, 1215, 103 L.Ed.2d 435, 443. Unlike the Caldwell jury, which under Mississippi law made the sentencing decision, Indiana penalty phase juries serve a recommending function with the trial judge having final sentencing responsibility. See Burris v. State (1990), Ind., 558 N.E.2d 1067. We have rejected Caldwell claims in several cases. See Evans v. State (1990), Ind., 563 N.E.2d 1251; Burris, 558 N.E.2d 1067; Wallace v. State (1990), Ind., 553 N.E.2d 456; Huffman v. State (1989), Ind., 543 N.E.2d 360, cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3257, 111 L.Ed.2d 767. In the present case the jury instructions properly informed the jury of the court's responsibility to make the final determination of the sentence after considering the jury's recommendation. The remarks by the State during voir dire, opening statement and final argument likewise accurately described this procedure and even emphasized that the jury recommendation would be weighed very heavily and seriously by the trial judge. Record at 2088, 4597, 4643. We find no merit in the defendant's Caldwell claim. The defendant next argues the Indiana statute violated his federal and state rights to due process for the reason that the burglary designated by the State as an aggravating circumstance was not separately charged as a substantive offense and thus, he was deprived of full procedural safeguards including the presumption of innocence and the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element. Citing State v. McCormick (1979), 272 Ind. 272, 397 N.E.2d 276, he asserts that it is unconstitutional to find an aggravating circumstance based on another crime for which his guilt had not been determined with full constitutional protections. We disagree because the charged aggravator was not unrelated to the principal murder charge, and the aggravating conduct involved burglary instead of murder. In McCormick the charged aggravator was that the accused committed another unrelated murder. Our concern was that the defendant would, in effect, be tried for the aggravator murder to a jury undeniably prejudiced by having convicted him of an unrelated murder. Id., at 278, 397 N.E.2d at 280. Where the charged aggravating circumstance was related to the principal murder, we noted that evidence of the aggravator would very likely already have come before the jury during the guilt phase trial, and that the prejudicial impact resulting from the introduction of this evidence at the subsequent sentencing hearing is virtually non-existent. Id. The McCormick decision was expressly limited to cases in which the murder alleged as an aggravating circumstance is not related to the principal murder charge. Id., at 280, 397 N.E.2d at 281. McCormick does not apply to the present case because the charged aggravator is not an unrelated murder. The defendant also claims constitutional error because, as to the burglary aggravator, the jury was not instructed in the penalty phase to apply the presumption of innocence and to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crime of burglary. At the conclusion of evidence in the penalty phase, the jury was told five separate times that the burden rests upon the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of the alleged aggravating circumstance. Record at 465, 466, 474, 475. The trial court read to the jury the formal information seeking the death penalty. Charging as the aggravating circumstance an intentional killing while committing the crime of burglary, the information separately asserted the specific facts constituting the elements of the alleged burglary. Other instructions listed and explained the separate elements of the offense of burglary. Record at 468-71. The jury recommendation verdict included a special finding that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstance alleged does exist. Record at 497. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects an accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. Cage v. Louisiana (1990), 498 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct. 328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339; In re Winship (1970), 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368. Likewise, this clause has been held to require a trial court to give an accused's requested instruction on the presumption of innocence. Taylor v. Kentucky (1978), 436 U.S. 478, 98 S.Ct. 1930, 56 L.Ed.2d 468. While the sentencing process must generally satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause, Gardner v. Florida (1977), 430 U.S. 349, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, it is within the power of individual states to regulate sentencing procedures, including the burden of proof, so long as it does not offend a fundamental principle of justice. Patterson v. New York (1977), 432 U.S. 197, 97 S.Ct. 2319, 53 L.Ed.2d 281. This view has recently been refined and restated by the U.S. Supreme Court. Every person has a fundamental right to liberty in the sense that the Government may not punish him unless and until it proves his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at a criminal trial conducted in accordance with the relevant constitutional guarantees. But a person who has been so convicted is eligible for, and the court may impose, whatever punishment is authorized by statute for his offense, so long as that penalty is not cruel and unusual, and so long as the penalty is not based on an arbitrary distinction that would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Chapman v. United States (1991), 500 U.S. ___, ___, 111 S.Ct. 1919, 1927, 114 L.Ed.2d 524, 538 (emphasis in original, citations omitted). The capital sentencing procedures enacted by our General Assembly are a matter of legislative choice. The statutory provisions designate the specific aggravating circumstances which may support a death sentence and require the State to prove the existence of any charged aggravators beyond a reasonable doubt. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(a), (e), (f). With respect to the aggravator consisting of intentional killing while committing or attempting to commit certain enumerated criminal offenses, Ind. Code § 35-50-2-9(b)(1), the legislature has not chosen to require either that the penalty phase jury be instructed that such burden of proof applies to each element of such aggravating offenses or that the defendant is presumed innocent as to such crimes. We find that the absence of these instructions in the penalty phase does not run afoul of the Due Process Clause. The defendant's arguments conclude by asserting, for purpose of preservation of error, several claims that the Indiana death penalty statute and its general operation violate the federal constitution. These alleged infirmities include: failure to adopt meaningful rules of review; failure to adopt meaningful rules of review for proportionality; failure to charge only by grand jury indictment; and total discretion of prosecution attorney in deciding whether to seek the death penalty. The defendant concedes that each of these contentions have been clearly rejected to date. We decline his invitation to reconsider these decisions.