Opinion ID: 2356749
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Government appeal in criminal cases.

Text: In 1892, the Supreme Court held that the federal government could not appeal an adverse decision in a criminal case without express statutory authorization. United States v. Sanges, 144 U.S. 310, 12 S.Ct. 609, 36 L.Ed. 445 (1892). Fifteen years later, Congress enacted the Criminal Appeals Act, which conferred jurisdiction on the Supreme Court to consider criminal appeals by the government in limited circumstances. [26] In 1970, Congress enacted a new Criminal Appeals Act, [27] which was intended to broaden the government's authorization to appeal to the constitutional limit imposed by the double jeopardy clause. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 337, 95 S. Ct. at 1019. See generally Comment, Double Jeopardy Limitations on Appeals by the Government in Criminal Cases, 80 Dick.L.Rev. 525 (1976). The new Criminal Appeals Act led the Supreme Court to take a closer look at the policies underlying the Clause in order to determine more precisely the boundaries of the Government's appeal rights in criminal cases. United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. at 339, 95 S.Ct. at 1020. In Wilson, the Court concluded that [t]he development of the Double Jeopardy Clause from its common-law origins . . . suggests that it was directed at the threat of multiple prosecutions, not at Government appeals, at least where those appeals would not require a new trial. 420 U.S. at 342, 95 S.Ct. at 1021. Finding no threat of multiple prosecution or multiple punishment in Wilson, the Court held that the government could appeal from a post-verdict ruling of law by a trial judge in favor of a defendant without violating the double jeopardy clause. [28] In United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 365, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 1011, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975), the Court explained its holding in Wilson as follows: When a case has been tried to a jury, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not prohibit an appeal by the Government providing that a retrial would not be required in the event the Government is successful in its appeal. The Court stated that the same principle would apply to a bench trial. In Jenkins, the trial court dismissed the indictment and discharged the defendant after a bench trial, apparently on an issue of law rather than from a factual finding that the government had failed to prove its case. However, the Supreme Court could not discern a clear resolution of the factual issues against the defendant. Since resolution of the government's appeal in its favor would require further proceedings of some sort, devoted to the resolution of factual issues going to the elements of the offense charged, 421 U.S. at 370, 95 S.Ct. at 1013, the Court held that permitting the government to appeal would violate the double jeopardy clause. Like the cases involving other contexts, the recent cases on government appeals clearly reflect the principle that the fundamental policy behind the double jeopardy clause is that the defendant should be spared a second trial once jeopardy attaches a first time. The decisions prohibit retrial even if the defendant's discharge resulted from what may have been reversible legal error.