Opinion ID: 789821
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Dismissal of Central's contract and promissory-estoppel claims

Text: 45 As noted by the district court, the Acquisition Sharing Agreement allegedly entered into at Scotts's facility in Marysville, Ohio would have been governed by Ohio law. See Bamerilease Capital Corp. v. Nearburg, 958 F.2d 150, 152 (6th Cir.1992) (holding that Ohio law requires that contracts be interpreted according to the law of the place of the contract's making). An enforceable contract in Ohio arises from a meeting of the minds, and must ... be specific as to its essential terms, such as the identity of the parties to be bound, the subject matter of the contract, consideration, a quantity term, and a price term. Alligood v. Procter & Gamble Co., 72 Ohio App.3d 309, 594 N.E.2d 668, 669 (Ohio Ct.App.1991). 46 The district court explained in detail that the alleged oral contract between Scotts and Central, with tentative terms vaguely sketched out on pieces of easel paper that were never introduced into evidence, lacks specificity as to essential contract terms. For example, the percentages of ownership interest in RoundUp and Ortho products are meaningless because the term ownership interest ... is not ... defined with sufficient specificity to allow the Court to enforce a contract without, in effect, making the agreement for the parties. The alleged agreement not only failed to define the very interest that it purported to allocate, but also made no reference ... to a myriad of basic financial issues. Even if the district court's observation that the oral agreement would have violated Ohio's Statute of Frauds were not correct, an agreement lacking terms specific enough to be enforced falls short of the Ohio standard for a valid contract. Alligood, 594 N.E.2d at 669. 47 Likewise, a promise to abide by vague provisions like those contained in the alleged Acquisition Sharing Agreement could neither be clear and unambiguous in its terms nor induce reasonable and foreseeable reliance, two of the three requirements for promissory estoppel in Ohio. See Cohen & Co. v. Messina, 24 Ohio App.3d 22, 492 N.E.2d 867, 872 (Ohio Ct.App.1985) (listing the elements of a claim for promissory estoppel). We therefore affirm the dismissal of Central's contract and promissory-estoppel claims for the reasons stated by the district court at pages 8-12 and 14 of its January 11, 2002 opinion. 48