Opinion ID: 796898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: jurisdiction

Text: 42 An order denying summary judgment is not ordinarily a final, appealable decision. Hoover v. Radabaugh, 307 F.3d 460, 465 (6th Cir.2002). The collateral order doctrine, however, provides that a district court's denial of qualified immunity is an appealable final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 `to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.' Bradley v. City of Ferndale, 148 Fed.Appx. 499, 504 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985)). In the context of a diversity case or a federal-question action involving pendent state-law claims, the question of whether an interlocutory order denying immunity under state law is appealable turns on the nature of the immunity at issue. Id. at 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806 (citing Mitchell, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 and Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938)). An order denying statutory immunity is immediately appealable only if the state law provides immunity from suit, as opposed to immunity simply from liability. See Estate of Owensby v. City of Cincinnati, 414 F.3d 596, 605 (6th Cir.2005). 43 Prior to 2003, Ohio's immunity statutes, codified in Chapter 2744 of the Ohio Revised Code, provided immunity from liability only. An interim order denying immunity under that section was thus not immediately appealable. See, e.g., id. (holding that a district court's denial of immunity under § 2744.03 regarding claims that accrued in 2000 did not support jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal because the statute provided immunity from liability only). 44 Ohio amended § 2744.02 in 2003, however, to provide that [a]n order that denies . . . the benefit of an alleged immunity from liability as provided in this chapter or any other provision of the law is a final order. Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2744.02(C). Because Ohio Rev.Code Ann. § 2505.03(A) provides that every final order may be appealed, Ohio now clearly allows for an immediate appeal from the denial of immunity under Chapter 2744. This effectively provides political officials and subdivisions with immunity from suit, and thus warrants interlocutory appellate jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine. See Bradley, 148 Fed.Appx. at 512 (determining that an analogous change in Michigan law making a denial of statutory immunity a final, appealable order created jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the collateral order doctrine). 45 Ohio courts have determined, however, that the amendment making a denial of immunity immediately appealable applies only prospectively to claims accruing after the effective date of the amendment. See Jackson v. Columbus, 156 Ohio App.3d 114, 804 N.E.2d 1016, 1019-1020 (2004). The amendment became effective on April 9, 2003. Our jurisdiction thus turns on whether the claims to which the denial of immunity applied accrued on or after that date. See id. 46
47 Chesher asserts that her claims must have arisen prior to April 9, 2003 because the latest amended complaint in this action was filed in 2002. She therefore argues that this court lacks jurisdiction over the present interlocutory appeals. Causes of action for emotional distress, however, accrue not when the underlying activity occurs, but rather when the plaintiff suffers emotionally by learning of it. See, e.g., Biro v. Hartman Funeral Home, 107 Ohio App.3d 508, 669 N.E.2d 65, 68 (1995) (holding that an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress accrues at the time the injury is incurred and the emotional impact is felt). Class plaintiffs in this case include not only those families whose deceased relatives were photographed by Condon (Subclass One), but also all families whose relatives were housed in the Morgue during the time the offending photographs were taken and whose bodies thus may have been accessed, viewed, or manipulated by Condon (Subclass Two). According to their deposition testimony, many, if not all of the members of Subclass Two did not discover their injury until contacted by Chesher's counsel in 2004. 48 Chesher argues that, although the claims of some class members did not accrue until after April 9, 2003, the class representatives' claims accrued before that date. To hold that the claims accrued after that date, Chesher contends, would let the tail wag the dog. But the defendants point out that even the chosen representatives of Subclass Two did not learn of their claims until after the effective date, and that the vast majority of that class is similarly situated. This would mean that we have jurisdiction over the majority of the class's claims. 49 Our sister circuits have recognized the problems inherent in ascertaining when claims accrue on a class-wide basis. See, e.g., Thorn v. Jefferson-Pilot Life Ins. Co., 445 F.3d 311 (4th Cir.2006) (upholding the denial of class certification where a statute-of-limitations defense required an individualized examination of each plaintiff's knowledge to determine when their claims accrued). The present case, however, does not involve a statute-of-limitations defense as in Thorn. Because we have interlocutory jurisdiction over the majority of the class's emotional-distress claims and because all plaintiffs are similarly situated for purposes of resolving the immunity issues presented, we can properly take up the question presented. Cf. Tucker v. City of Richmond, 388 F.3d 216, 224 (6th Cir. 2004) (addressing, in the context of an interlocutory qualified-immunity appeal, related but unappealable issues that were inextricably intertwined with the appealable issues). 50
51 Chesher's argument that we lack jurisdiction over the appeal with respect to her conspiracy claim belies her own expansive allegations regarding the misconduct at issue. Chesher successfully argued before the district court that the employee defendants had engaged in a continuing civil conspiracy (1) with one another and Condon in 2000 and 2001 to permit Condon to undertake his art project, and (2) with the County Prosecutor's Office to cover up their misconduct from 2001 until at least July of 2003. 52 Chesher attempts to distance herself from these arguments on appeal by shifting her factual allegations. She omits on appeal any reference to the overt acts allegedly committed in 2003. In addition, in the context of her jurisdictional argument, Chesher asserts that the alleged conspiracy relates only to the offending photographs, with no reference to the continuing cover-up. Chesher now questions where in the record is there evidence that [the defendants] engaged in cover-up activities after April 9, 2003? 53 The answer to her question lies in her successful opposition to the defendants' motions for summary judgment on the conspiracy claim, where she alleged that Tobias and others in the Coroner's Office engaged in a cover-up with the County prosecutors that extended beyond April 9, 2003. In Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 83 Ohio St.3d 464, 700 N.E.2d 859, 868 (1998), the Ohio Supreme Court cited with approval Am.Jur.2d, Conspiracy, §§ 50-73 in defining Ohio civil conspiracy law. Section 65 provides, with regard to the accrual of civil conspiracy claims, as follows: 54 In determining when the period of limitations begins to run, the statute does not begin from the date of the conspiratorial agreement, but from the occurrence of damage pursuant to the conspiracy. However, under various decisions, the limitations period may run from the date of the last overt act done in furtherance of the conspiracy, or from the last overt act causing damage to the plaintiff, or from the date of each overt act causing damage. 55 16 Am Jur.2d, Conspiracy § 65 (2006) (footnotes omitted); cf. State v. Tolliver, 146 Ohio App.3d 186, 765 N.E.2d 894, 899-900 (2001) (holding in the context of a criminal conspiracy that the statute of limitations begins to run with the last overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy). 56 Using any of the above measuring points, Chesher's conspiracy claim alleging acts in May, June, and July of 2003 accrued after April 9, 2003. Ohio law also establishes that acts of coconspirators are attributable to one another. Williams, 700 N.E.2d at 868. We therefore conclude that Chesher's allegations of conspiratorial acts that allegedly took place between May and July of 2003 acted as a de facto amendment to her complaint and establish our jurisdiction over the employee-defendants' interlocutory appeals. 57 Chesher's argument that her conspiracy claim accrued prior to April 9, 2003 is also untenable in light of our determination of when her infliction-of-emotional-distress claim accrued. Ohio does not recognize conspiracy as an independent tort. See Orbit Elecs., Inc. v. Helm Instrument Co., 167 Ohio App.3d 301, 855 N.E.2d 91, 100 (2006) (An action for civil conspiracy cannot be maintained unless an underlying unlawful act is committed.); Putka v. First Catholic Slovak Union, 75 Ohio App.3d 741, 600 N.E.2d 797, 803 (1991) (noting that an independent claim of conspiracy is not a recognized tort under Ohio law) (quotation marks omitted). Here, where the underlying infliction of emotional distress did not accrue until after April 9, 2003, it would be incongruous to hold that the conspiracy claim premised on those tortious acts accrued earlier.