Opinion ID: 2968343
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Talebnejads

Text: The Talebnejads are Iranian immigrants. Farhad Talebnejad operated two money transmitting businesses—Shirazi Money Exchange, Inc., and Shirazi Arz, Inc.—out of his parents’ home in Rockville, Maryland. The businesses were not licensed under Maryland law, nor were they registered pursuant to 31 U.S.C.A. § 5330 (West 2003). In UNITED STATES v. TALEBNEJAD 7 late 1995, Talebnejad investigated the possibility of obtaining licenses, but decided not to do so because he could not afford the cost and he believed that the licensing statute did not apply to his businesses. In November 2003, the Talebnejads were charged with one count of conspiring to conduct an unlicensed money transmitting business and with two substantive counts of conducting an unlicensed money transmitting business.1 All three counts alleged that the businesses were unlicensed within the meaning of § 1960(a) because (1) the businesses were required to be licensed under Maryland law, and were not, in violation of § 1960(b)(1)(A); and (2) the businesses were required to be registered with the federal government, and were not, in violation of § 1960(b)(1)(B).2 The indictment also sought forfeiture of approximately $18 million in property traceable to the charged offenses. The Talebnejads moved to dismiss the indictment, asserting that (1) § 1960(b)(1)(A) violated the Equal Protection Clause because not all states require money transmitting businesses to be licensed; (2) § 1960(b)(1)(A) violated the Due Process Clause because it lacked a scienter requirement as to the applicability of state licensing laws; (3) § 1960(b)(1)(A) was unconstitutionally vague in several respects; and (4) the indictment failed to adequately inform the Talebnejads of the offenses charged. The district court granted the motion.3 With respect to the due process challenge to the lack of a scienter requirement in § 1960(b)(1)(A), the court recognized that Congress attempted to exclude any mens rea requirement when it amended § (b)(1)(A). 1 One other family member was also charged, but the charges against him were subsequently dismissed. 2 For purposes of this appeal, we accept the Government’s contention that § 1960 sets forth one offense—conducting an unlicensed money transmitting business—that may be committed in multiple ways. For ease of reference, however, we will refer to the definitions of unlicensed in § 1960(b)(1)(A) and (B) as independent violations of § 1960. 3 The court rejected the Talebnejads’ equal protection claim, see Talebnejad, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 350-53, a ruling they do not challenge. 8 UNITED STATES v. TALEBNEJAD Talebnejad, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 353. But, the court observed, § 1960(b)(1)(A) still refers to the operation of such a business where such operation is punishable as a misdemeanor or felony under State law. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court concluded that the plain meaning of these words is that unless the lack of a license is ‘punishable’ under state law, it is not a federal crime at all, and that the Government therefore was required to allege and prove an actual violation of state law in order to prove a violation of § 1960. Id. at 354-55. Because the indictment did not allege that Talebnejad had knowingly and willfully failed to obtain a license, Md. Code Ann., Fin. Inst. § 12-430, the court ruled it was deficient, see Talebnejad, 342 F. Supp. 2d at 355. The district court acknowledged the potential conflict between its analysis of the statute and the expressed intent of Congress to omit any scienter requirement with respect to state licensing obligations, but purported to avoid this conflict by declaring that portion of § 1960 merely inoperative in states that have identified a mens rea for violation of licensing requirements. Id. Although the Talebnejads did not challenge the constitutionality of § 1960(b)(1)(B), the district court nevertheless considered that provision as well. See id. at 355-56. Noting that Congress had not clearly expressed its intent to exclude a mens rea from a violation of § 1960(b)(1)(B), the court ruled that the Government could obtain a conviction under that provision only by alleg[ing] and prov[ing] that the Defendant acted knowing that he had an obligation to register and that he willfully failed to do so. Id. at 356.