Opinion ID: 2659078
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Exemptions 3, 7(D) and 7(E)

Text: In the alternative, the DOJ briefly invoked—and the district court even more briefly approved—withholding a portion of the requested records under Exemptions 3, 7(D) and 7(E).7 Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 83–85. The DOJ’s Declaration, however, lacks the “reasonably specific detail” required to carry its burden of establishing that each exemption applies, Larson, 565 F.3d at 862, and fails to “give the reviewing court a reasonable basis to evaluate the claim of privilege,” Judicial Watch, Inc., 449 F.3d 7 It is unclear from the district court order whether it held that the DOJ could withhold all responsive records under one of these exemptions or some combination of them, or whether each applies only to certain categories of documents. Compare Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash., 870 F. Supp. 2d at 83 (“In any event, I find that defendant can properly withhold the records pursuant to FOIA Exemptions 2, 3, 7(D), and 7(E).”), and id. at 85 (finding “the information” supplied by confidential sources exempt under Exemption 7(D) but not specifying whether “the information” includes all responsive records), with id. at 83 (only internal telephone and fax numbers exempt under Exemption 2), and id. at 84 (only “information that defendant seeks to withhold pursuant to Rule 6(e)” exempt under Exemption 3). To the extent the district court held that any of these exemptions categorically exempts all responsive documents, we think that holding was error. For the reasons discussed infra, the DOJ has not met its burden of demonstrating that the circumstances “‘characteristically support an inference’” that Exemption 3, 7(D) or 7(E) applies. Nation Magazine, 71 F.3d at 893 (quoting Landano, 508 U.S. at 177) (alteration omitted). CREW does not challenge the district court’s holding regarding the FBI’s invocation of Exemption 2, which was expressly limited to internal FBI telephone and fax numbers. 27 at 146 (quoting Gallant, 26 F.3d at 172–73). The Declaration never specifies how many responsive documents exist and makes no attempt to link each exemption to specific documents. Moreover, the explanation for the applicability of each exemption is inadequate. To aid the parties—and district court—on remand, we briefly highlight the shortcomings of the record before us. Exemption 3: FOIA exempts matters “specifically exempted from disclosure by statute,” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), including a disclosure violative of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which provides for the secrecy of grand jury proceedings. See Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Grp. Ltd. v. United States, 534 F.3d 728, 732 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Fund for Const. Gov’t, 656 F.2d at 867–68. “Rule 6(e) applies if the disclosed material would ‘tend to reveal some secret aspect of the grand jury’s investigation,’ including ‘the identities of witnesses or jurors, the substance of testimony, the strategy or direction of the investigation,’ or ‘the deliberations or questions of jurors.’” Hodge v. FBI, 703 F.3d 575, 580 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 582). The DOJ cites Exemption 3 to withhold “the names of potential grand jury witnesses and interview statements pertaining to signed proffer agreements and immunity statements, which could be used as evidence before a Federal Grand Jury.” Hardy Decl. 24; see also id. at 20 (“Exemption 3 is asserted to protect information contained in the FD-302s which identifies specific records that may be subpoenaed by a Federal Grand Jury.”). The DOJ bears the burden of “demonstrating some ‘nexus between disclosure and revelation of a protected aspect of the grand jury’s investigation.’” Lopez v. Dep’t of Justice, 393 F.3d 1345, 1350 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (quoting Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 584). But we are told only that the requested documents contain information that “could be used as evidence 28 before a Federal Grand Jury” or “may be subpoenaed by a Federal Grand Jury” and therefore that “any such disclosure would clearly violate the secrecy of the Grand Jury proceedings.” Hardy Decl. 20, 24 (emphases added). This conclusory explanation is insufficient. “[T]here is no per se rule against disclosure of any and all information which has reached the grand jury chambers,” Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1349, let alone any and all information which “could” reach the grand jury, see In re Sealed Case, 192 F.3d 995, 1001–03 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam); Wash. Post Co. v. Dep’t of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1988); see also Stolt-Nielsen Transp. Grp. Ltd., 534 F.3d at 732 (“[T]he government may not bring information into the protection of Rule 6(e) and thereby into the protection afforded by Exemption 3, simply by submitting it as a grand jury exhibit.”). Although we do not doubt that some of the requested records may fall under Exemption 3, the DOJ has not yet supplied sufficient information for a court to make that determination. Senate of Puerto Rico, 823 F.2d at 584; see Lopez, 393 F.3d at 1349–51. Exemption 7(D): FOIA also exempts records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the extent disclosure of such records “could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source” or “information furnished by a confidential source.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D). The DOJ cites this exemption to “protect the identities of, and information received from, individuals who provided information to the FBI during the course of the . . . investigation.” Hardy Decl. 21. Unlike Exemption 7(C), Exemption 7(D) does not require balancing. Roth, 642 F.3d at 1184; Davis v. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1992). It does, however, require a showing that the source is a confidential one. See Landano, 508 U.S. at 172 (“[T]he question is not whether the requested document is of the type that the agency usually treats as confidential, but whether the 29 particular source spoke with an understanding that the communication would remain confidential.”). “[I]t is not enough for the agency to claim that all sources providing information in the course of a criminal investigation do so on a confidential basis.” Roth, 642 F.3d at 1184; see Landano, 508 U.S. at 180–81. Yet that is essentially what the DOJ has done by stating, in the alternative and without specific explanation, that all of its sources “were interviewed either under express confidentiality and/or under circumstances from which an assurance of confidentiality may be implied.” Hardy Decl. 21; see also id. at 30–31 (explaining how informants provide information during the course of “an investigation,” with no tie to this investigation). Such boilerplate will not do. See Billington v. Dep’t of Justice, 233 F.3d 581, 584 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“This bald assertion that express assurances were given amounts to little more than recitation of the statutory standard, which we have held is insufficient.”); Campbell v. Dep’t of Justice, 164 F.3d 20, 34–35 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (rejecting assertion that express assurances of confidentiality were given where declarant demonstrated no basis for knowledge of alleged fact); Computer Prof’ls for Soc. Responsibility v. Secret Serv., 72 F.3d 897, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (description of “the manner in which an agency ‘routinely’ handles information is not sufficient to establish an implied assurance of confidentiality as to any particular source”). To invoke Exemption 7(D) on remand, the DOJ must either “present probative evidence that the source did in fact receive an express grant of confidentiality,” Campbell, 164 F.3d at 34 (quotation omitted), or “‘point to more narrowly defined circumstances that . . . support the inference’ of confidentiality.” Roth, 642 F.3d at 1184 (quoting Landano, 508 U.S. at 179). Exemption 7(E): FOIA also exempts records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes to the 30 extent release of such records “would disclose techniques and procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions, or would disclose guidelines for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions if such disclosure could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(E). The DOJ cites Exemption 7(E) “to protect procedures and techniques used by FBI [agents] during the investigation.” Hardy Decl. 21; accord id. at 31. This near-verbatim recitation of the statutory standard is inadequate. We are not told what procedures are at stake. (Perhaps how the FBI conducts witness interviews? Or how it investigates public corruption?) Nor are we told how disclosure of the FD-302s or investigative materials could reveal such procedures. (Are the procedures spelled out in the documents? Or would the reader be able to extrapolate what the procedures are from the information contained therein?) Although Exemption 7(E) sets a “low bar for the agency to justify withholding,” Blackwell v. FBI, 646 F.3d 37, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2011), the agency must at least provide some explanation of what procedures are involved and how they would be disclosed. See id. (FBI sought to withhold “details about procedures used during the forensic examination of a computer by an FBI forensic examiner” (quotation marks omitted)); Mayer Brown LLP v. IRS, 562 F.3d 1190, 1192 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (IRS sought to withhold information setting forth “settlement strategies and objectives, assessments of litigating hazards, and acceptable ranges of percentages for settlement” (quotation marks and alteration omitted)); Morley v. CIA, 508 F.3d 1108, 1128–29 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (CIA sought to withhold information revealing procedures for conducting security clearances and background investigations).8 8 Twice the DOJ asserted that disclosure of the requested records “could enable the targets of these techniques to avoid detection or develop countermeasures to circumvent the ability of 31