Opinion ID: 1613998
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Whether there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning Laughter's testamentary capacity when he executed the May will.

Text: ¶ 18. The burden of proving testamentary capacity is on the proponents of the will, who can present a prima facie case simply by offering into evidence the will and the record of probate. In re Last Will and Testament and Estate of Smith, 722 So.2d 606, 610-11 (Miss.1998) (citing In re Estate of Edwards, 520 So.2d 1370, 1372-73 (Miss.1988)). Once a prima facie case has been established, the burden of going forward shifts to the contestants to overcome the prima facie case. Id. at 611. ¶ 19. Since the May will has been properly admitted to probate, Williams has presented such a prima facie case. Therefore, the burden shifts to Foster to show that Laughter lacked testamentary capacity at the time of the will. ¶ 20. Testamentary capacity is determined based on three factors: (1) whether the testator had the ability at the time of the will to understand and appreciate the effects of his act; (2) whether the testator had the ability at the time of the will to understand the natural objects or persons to receive his bounty and their relation to him; and (3) whether the testator was capable of determining at the time of the will what disposition he desired to make of his property. In re Estate of Holmes, 961 So.2d 674, 679 (Miss.2007) (citing Smith, 722 So.2d at 610). However, evidence need not fall squarely under any one of these factors in order to be pertinent. See, e.g., Smith, 722 So.2d at 611. ¶ 21. Excluding allegations based on the videotapes, Foster has raised three arguments to rebut the presumption that Laughter possessed testamentary capacity. First, Foster asserts that the letter sent on behalf of Williams by her attorney, Garner, dated March 28, 2005, admitted Laughter's lack of capacity. The Garner letter described Laughter as extremely ill and unable to handle his affairs, and it stated that Laughter was unable to remember deeding his home to Foster, as a joint tenant with himself only three weeks earlier. [5] ¶ 22. The mere fact that someone is too ill to handle his affairs does not in and of itself render him mentally incompetent or void of testamentary capacity. See Lee v. Lee, 337 So.2d 713, 715 (Miss.1976) (citing Thomas v. Hamlin, 56 Tenn.App. 13, 404 S.W.2d 569 (1964)). However, Laughter's alleged inability to remember deeding joint ownership of his home to Foster only three weeks earlier is evidence of a potential lack of capacity. The Garner letter's implication that Laughter had signed the deed only because he was extremely ill and unable to handle his affairs apparently was made to show that the deed of March 4, 2005, was invalid because of Laughter's incapacity. ¶ 23. Second, Foster points out that the May will completely changed the distribution of Laughter's assets from the March will. This Court has held that a prior will, if made at a time when the testator possessed testamentary capacity, may be admitted into evidence to show a lack of testamentary capacity at the time of a subsequent will. Perry v. Aldrich, 196 So.2d 521, 525 (Miss.1967). Prior statements by the testator may be similarly relevant. Moore v. Parks, 122 Miss. 301, 332, 84 So. 230, 237 (1920). ¶ 24. Here, Williams has not formally challenged Laughter's competency at the time he executed the March will. However, the March will was executed on the same day, March 4, as the deed of Laughter's home to Foster. As discussed above, the Garner letter implies that the deed is invalid because of Laughter's poor health at that time. Thus, it is possible that Williams impliedly challenges the validity of the March will because it was executed on the same day as the deed. ¶ 25. Any such challenge, however, would be disingenuous. Williams does not challenge Laughter's capacity to execute the quitclaim deed to Williams, done only one day before, on March 3. Presumably, any alleged inability of Laughter to appreciate the effects of his March 4 will also would invalidate the March 3 quitclaim deed to Williams. ¶ 26. Laughter's March will was entirely different from his May will. The March will devised nearly all of Laughter's property to Foster, whereas the May will, drafted only two months later, devised nearly all of Laughter's property to Williams. These changes were made even though Jack Nazary recounted that when he visited Laughter in the hospital in April of 2005, Laughter stated that nothing had changed with his relationship with Foster. ¶ 27. The differences between the March and May wills raise questions regarding Laughter's capacity. The dramatic extent of the changes to his will may indicate that Laughter did not remember the prior will or understand how the proposed changes would affect it legally. Thus, the March will, as well as other evidence of Laughter's intent, such as the Nazary affidavit and the amendment to the promissory note, create a question of material fact as to Laughter's testamentary capacity at the time he executed the May will. ¶ 28. Foster additionally argues that Laughter did not have the ability to appreciate the effects of his May will because he devised several items that she claims he did not own. Whether an attempted devise of unowned property is enough to call into question a testator's testamentary capacity is apparently an issue of first impression in Mississippi. [6] Because Foster has presented other evidence sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact, however, we need not decide this issue at this time. ¶ 29. Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to Foster, as we must, we find that the evidence presented is enough to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding Laughter's testamentary capacity at the time of the May will. The chancellor's grant of summary judgment therefore was erroneous.