Opinion ID: 1173567
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: denial of counsel during jury deliberations

Text: (7) Appellant contends that he was denied the right to counsel when the trial judge, without notifying counsel, responded to jury requests to see various trial exhibits during deliberations. On February 26, 1979, the jury sent four different notes requesting exhibits. The judge sent all the requested exhibits into the jury room. [14] The conduct of the trial court in sending in the exhibits without notifying counsel was serious error. Indeed, it has long been the rule that the trial court should not entertain communications from the jury except in open court, with prior notification to counsel. [A]ll communications should be made in open court.... Ordinary procedure would require that the trial judge afford the parties an opportunity to be apprised of any such communication and to have the opportunity to make timely objection to any action by the court or jury which might be deemed irregular. ( People v. Alcalde (1944) 24 Cal.2d 177, 189 [148 P.2d 627]; quoted with approval in Paulson v. Superior Court (1962) 58 Cal.2d 1, 7 [22 Cal. Rptr. 649, 372 P.2d 641]; accord, People v. Weatherford (1945) 27 Cal.2d 401, 418-420 [164 P.2d 753].) Failure to notify counsel of the jury's requests for exhibits also violated section 1138. [15] Section 1138 requires jury requests for information to be made in open court after notice to counsel. A jury request for exhibits during deliberation is a critical stage of the prosecution during which the right to counsel applies. (Cf. People v. Dagnino (1978) 80 Cal. App.3d 981, 985-988 [146 Cal. Rptr. 129] [court's sending of written instructions to jury during deliberation is critical stage].) Exhibits, like testimony, are evidence. The trial court's decision to provide evidence to the jury during deliberations, whether through the rereading of testimony or the provision of exhibits, requires the opportunity for counsel to assist his client. As was held recently in People v. Knighten (1980) 105 Cal. App.3d 128, 132 [164 Cal. Rptr. 96]: It is obviously critically important that a defendant and his attorney be permitted to participate in decisions as to what testimony is to be reread to the jury; the essence of the error in this action is its tendency to deprive the defendant of his fundamental constitutional right to the assistance of counsel at this critical stage of the proceedings. [Citations.] The question remains whether the denial of assistance of counsel here was prejudicial error requiring reversal. As held by People v. Knighten, supra , and People v. Dagnino, supra, 80 Cal. App.3d 981, if the denial of the right to counsel during jury deliberations may have affected substantial rights of a defendant, prejudice is presumed and [o]nly the most compelling showing to the contrary will overcome the presumption. ( People v. Knighten, supra, 105 Cal. App.3d at p. 133.) The reason for the strong presumption of prejudice when the assistance of counsel has been denied is both the fundamental nature of the right and its relation to a fair trial and the difficulty of a meaningful assessment of prejudice on the record. ( People v. Coffey (1967) 67 Cal.2d 204, 219 [60 Cal. Rptr. 457, 430 P.2d 15], italics omitted; People v. Dagnino, supra, 80 Cal. App.3d at p. 988.) When faced with a record of a proceeding conducted without counsel, a reviewing court assessing possible prejudice is compelled to speculate as to what might have occurred had counsel been present. The uncertain nature of such a determination requires the strong presumption of prejudice the above-cited cases have applied. In the present case, this court need not look far to determine that the presumption has not been rebutted. Once the trial judge informed counsel that he had given the jury the May 16th jailhouse tape, defense counsel quickly informed the trial judge about the inadmissible portion of the tape. Had counsel been properly notified of the jury's requests before the exhibits were sent into the jury room, it is virtually certain that the inadmissible and highly prejudicial material concerning appellant's reluctance to take a lie detector test would never have reached the jury. In these circumstances, the compelling showing necessary to overcome the presumption of prejudice has not been made. The error is of federal constitutional dimension and cannot be deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. ( Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 [17 L.Ed.2d at p. 711].) [16]