Opinion ID: 1673978
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Sub-Issue: Whether Ivy's References to Liability Insurance Were Prejudicial and Reversible Errors?

Text: Through the second of the two sub-issues, GMAC contends that it did not receive a fair trial by an impartial jury because Ivy (Ivy's counsel) twice uttered the I word. In other words, Ivy made comments from which the jurors could deduce that the defendant was covered by liability insurance. The first instance occurred during voir dire when Ivy asked a juror whether the insurance company which employed her had ever been represented by GMAC's law firm: Ivy: Having heard the names of those lawyers, have any of you ever heard of any of those lawyers before today? Juror: I have through my work. Ivy: Let me see, do you have some type of business? Juror: I work for an insurance company and I don't deal with lawyers myself, but I have heard of the firm. Ivy: All right. You have heard of that firm? Juror: Seems like. Ivy: All right. And to your knowledge, that firm does not represent the insurance company you work for? Juror: I'm not sure. What is the name of the firm? I mean, I  Ivy: It's Markow, Walker, Reeves and Anderson. Juror: I don't believe so. Liberty Mutual, they don't represent us. Ivy: All right. And the fact that you've heard of them, would that have any affect one way or the other upon your verdict? Juror: No, sir. Rec.Vol. II, at 1-S. The second instance occurred during cross-examination of James Freeman, owner of American Lenders and brother of Dax Freeman, who repossessed the van: Ivy: You've got here [on this repossession invoice] Insurance deduct. What does this mean? It's $35.00. Freeman: That's the insurance charge on a repossession. And when it says deduct, that's our home office. We don't write the insurance; American Lenders writes the insurance. And when we pay royalties on our franchise we don't pay it on the insurance because that's a direct cost to us. Id. at 81; see also Rec.Exh. P-6 (repossession invoice). Ivy counters that these references were neither direct nor by innuendo and could not have been construed by the jury to mean that GMAC had liability insurance.
Particularly relevant to the disposition of this issue is West Cash & Carry Bldg. Materials v. Palumbo, 371 So.2d 873, 876 (Miss. 1979). In Palumbo, Justice Patterson noted: The general rule that insurance should not be mentioned before a jury has long been adhered to by this Court because it was thought to prejudice a defendant. West Cash & Carry Bldg. Materials v. Palumbo, 371 So.2d 873, 876 (Miss. 1979) (citing Herrin v. Daly, 80 Miss. 340, 31 So. 790 (1902)). However, [t]he likelihood of the [defendant] being prejudiced by the mention of insurance has been diminished in recent years because most jurors, and other citizens, ... share the common knowledge [regarding coverage of] liability insurance. Id. Such awareness has meant that the mere mentioning of insurance in a trial is not cause for mistrial in all cases. See, e.g., Anchor Coatings v. Marine Industrial Residential, Inc., 490 So.2d 1210, 1219 (Miss. 1986) (Defendant asked expert witness who was paying him to testify. Witness responded: The insurance company. Held: Trial judge did not abuse discretion in denying motion for mistrial.) (citing cases). The trial judge is in the most advantageous position to correctly rule whether prejudice, or the lack of it, has emanated from the comment of a witness. Palumbo, 371 So.2d at 876. Therefore, a large discretion has been [vested in] the trial [judge] in ruling upon comments concerning insurance arising during a trial. Id. (citing Copiah Dairies, Inc. v. Addkison, 247 Miss. 327, 153 So.2d 689 (1963)). Of utmost importance, a judge can only make a determination of prejudice if the defendant makes a timely objection and motion for a mistrial. Strictly speaking, timeliness means the objection and motion must be made contemporaneously with the allegedly improper utterance. This is well-known as the contemporaneous objection rule. Id. at 875-76. Contemporaneousness is critical because it allows the judge to avert a mistrial, if possible, by admonishing the jury to disregard the utterance. Id. at 876.
In the case sub judice, GMAC voiced its objection to Ivy's repeated references to insurance. In the first instance  at the conclusion of voir dire  GMAC moved to quash the entire [prospective juror] panel. GMAC contended that the exchange between Ivy and the juror who works for an insurance company tainted the entire [prospective juror] panel with the clear implication [that] the Defendants ... were represented by a firm for an insurance company. The trial judge denied the motion without explanation. GMAC also moved for a mistrial after Ivy asked James Freeman to explain the phrase  Insurance deduct  which was written on the repossession invoice. The trial judge again denied the motion without explanation.
Applying the law to the facts, this Court cannot conclude that Ivy's utterances constituted reversible errors. See Palumbo, 371 So.2d at 876. This Court, therefore, affirms on this issue.