Opinion ID: 1373789
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: Error in Admission of Testimony.

Text: We consider next an assignment of error based on the admission of evidence over the objection of counsel for the defendants. Floy L. Morrill, a patrolman for the Oregon State Police, was called as a witness for the plaintiff. He testified that he arrived at the scene of the accident about 5:00 a.m., that the plaintiff was lying on the sidewalk, evidently seriously injured, and that Mr. Piasecki was there walking about. He asked Mr. Piasecki what had happened, and the latter answered that the patrol car had been going too fast, and they had hit. The record proceeds: Q Did he say anything about, or was there any more conversation? A No, I refrained from having too much conversation with him because of the circumstances, and a remark that was made about causing injury to his dog. Q Something was said about injuring his dog? A Yes, he was  (interrupted) MR. LEWELLING: If the Court please, I object to that as immaterial and irrelevant. MR. CARSON: I submit it is not, Your Honor. (The question was read.) THE COURT: If that was all it referred to, I will sustain the objection. Q (by Mr. Carson) Was that connected in any way with the rest of the conversation, about the dog? A Yes, he  (interrupted) MR. LEWELLING: If the Court please, I will object to this entire line, whatever it may be about the dog, as being immaterial and irrelevant. MR. CARSON: We don't claim anything for it about the dog, Your Honor, but it is part of the conversation at the scene immediately after the accident. THE COURT: This was part of the conversation there at the scene of the accident? A Yes. THE COURT: I will overrule the objection. Q (by Mr. Carson) Will you to the best of your memory relate what the conversation was? A He came over to where Mr. Wiebe was  (interrupted) Q Mr. Piasecki, you mean? A Yes, sir. And I was attempting to take care of Mr. Wiebe and keep him out of shock, and he made the statement  (interrupted) MR. LEWELLING: If the Court please, I will renew my objection to this as being immaterial and irrelevant. THE COURT: Overrule the objection; you may proceed. Q (by Mr. Carson) You say he made the statement  A He made the statement that the patrol car had been going too fast, and he was quite belligerent about the fact that an accident had occurred, and I was trying to take care of Mr. Wiebe  (interrupted) THE COURT: Confine it to the conversation, please. A He made the statement who was going to take care of his dog that had been injured too, what I was going to do about his dog. MR. LEWELLING: If the Court please, I object to that and move for a mistrial; it is obviously introduced into the case for the prejudicial effect  a man is hit early in the morning and shaken up and they want to introduce some statement he may have made in the heat of that event purely for prejudice, the prejudicial effect it will have. It has no bearing on the case, and the only way you can cure it now is by a mistrial. THE COURT: You are reciting this as part of the conversation at the time? A Yes, sir. THE COURT: I will overrule the objection, and deny the motion. MR. LEWELLING: And give me an exception? THE COURT: Yes. 28. The ruling was clearly erroneous and prejudicial. The testimony was completely irrelevant to any question in the case. Its obvious effect was to portray Mr. Piasecki as a man completely indifferent to the suffering of the plaintiff lying on the pavement, grievously injured, as the plaintiff claimed, by Mr. Piasecki's negligent driving. This is substantially what is said in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff, in an argument intended to show the materiality of the testimony from which we quote: Such evidence also constitutes an admission, by conduct, of Mr. Piasecki, against his interest, and properly was receivable as such; in this, that one who would, in those fearful circumstances, display such gross callousness to the plainly threatened dissolution of another human being, well might be likely to show even a greater degree of indifference toward, and hence utter disregard of, the very traffic regulations, enacted for the protection of human life, upon the violation of which his negligence is predicated in these actions. In personal injury actions it is not always possible to exclude the emotional. The evidence of the plaintiff's injuries, especially when they are serious and permanent, naturally tends to excite the sympathy of the jury and, notwithstanding instructions of the court to the contrary, sympathy may influence the verdict. This is sometimes unavoidable. But where, over objection, irrelevant evidence is admitted which tends to make the defendant appear hateful in the eyes of the jury, who are properly concerned only with questions of negligence and damages, it must be apparent to any reasonable person that the defendant's right to a fair trial is placed in serious jeopardy. We have no other course open to us than to hold that admission of the testimony here under consideration was reversible error.