Opinion ID: 1938741
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: judith p. parker's in-court testimony

Text: UXB argued in the alternative that even if the March 13 communication was deficient for purposes of the statute of frauds, Judith P. Parker cured any deficiencies by admitting in court all the terms essential to a contract's validity. A writing that, standing alone, does not comport with § 9-1-4 can nevertheless satisfy the statute of frauds if in-court admissions of the party to be charged supply the missing elements. Peacock Realty Co. v. E. Thomas Crandall Farm, Inc., 108 R.I. 593, 600-02, 278 A.2d 405, 408-10 (1971). In fact, the absence of any writing at all does not render a contract per se unenforceable if the party to be charged admits all of the terms essential to the validity of [a] contract. Adams-Riker, Inc. v. Nightingale, 119 R.I. 862, 867, 383 A.2d 1042, 1045 (1978). Judith P. Parker's in-court testimony, however, fell far short of establishing an objective intent to be bound. See Boyd, 553 A.2d at 134. Her testimony disclosed that she had no intention of committing herself to sell to UXB prior to receipt of a cash deposit and execution of a written purchase-and-sale agreement. In fact, Judith P. Parker testified that at the March 30 meeting, she told Despres, No deposit, no deal. Judith P. Parker's in-court declarations are supported by the November 1988 letter, which specified that UXB could purchase the property by signing a purchase and sale agreement, and by the March 13 letter, which, as discussed supra, expressed the Parkers' intent to execute a formal written contract. Despres himself admitted that he fully expected to sign a purchase-and-sale agreement but never executed one because additional items, including the deposit, warranted discussion. Accordingly, because neither the March 13 correspondence nor Judith P. Parker's in-court testimony establishes an objective intent to be bound, the alleged agreement for purchase and sale of the property is unenforceable because it fails to comply with the statute of frauds. See 553 A.2d at 132-34. We conclude, therefore, that the trial justice properly granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict. [2]