Opinion ID: 1196295
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Defense Counsel's Conflict of Interest

Text: During the in camera hearing, defendant's attorney indicated, [T]his does not constitute a conflict because any attorney representing Mr. Cox would be privy to this information. [¶] In our investigation of the case there  we think that there is some possibility that there may be an escape attempt in this case. (12a) Defendant asserts the court should have pursued this revelation to assure he was represented by conflict free counsel or obtained his express waiver of such representation. (13) Included in the right to effective assistance of counsel is `a correlative right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest.' [Citations.] ( People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 834 [250 Cal. Rptr. 687, 758 P.2d 1217].) As a general proposition, such conflicts embrace all situations in which an attorney's loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client or a third person or by his own interests. [Citation.] ( Id., at p. 835.) In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment, a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance. ( Cuyler v. Sullivan (1980) 446 U.S. 335, 348 [64 L.Ed.2d 333, 346-347, 100 S.Ct. 1708], fn. omitted.) To meet this burden, Sullivan mandates a defendant show[] that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests; the possibility of conflict is insufficient to impugn a criminal conviction. ( Id., at p. 350 [64 L.Ed.2d at pp. 347-348], italics added.) Under our state Constitution, [w]e have applied a somewhat more rigorous standard of review. ( People v. Mroczko (1983) 35 Cal.3d 86, 104 [197 Cal. Rptr. 52, 672 P.2d 835].) Regardless of an objection, even a potential conflict may require reversal if the record supports `an informed speculation' that appellant's right to effective representation was prejudicially affected. Proof of an `actual conflict' is not required. ( Id., at p. 105.) Defendant relies on cases in which potential or actual conflict resulted from the defense attorney's simultaneous representation of a codefendant or witness whose position relative to the charges was adverse to the defendant's interests. (See People v. Easley (1988) 46 Cal.3d 712, 720-724 [250 Cal. Rptr. 855, 759 P.2d 490] [defense counsel also represented owner of property destroyed by fire who testified for prosecution regarding defendant's participation in arson alleged as violent-crime special circumstance]; People v. Mroczko, supra, 35 Cal.3d at pp. 103-108 [same attorney represented defendant and codefendant who had antagonistic defenses because of differing degrees of culpability]; see also Wheat v. United States (1988) 486 U.S. 153, 155-158 [100 L.Ed.2d 140, 146-148, 108 S.Ct. 1692] [same attorney represented defendant and prosecution witness whom attorney would be precluded from effectively cross-examining; defendant not permitted to waive conflict]; Cuyler v. Sullivan, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 350 [64 L.Ed.2d at p. 348] [defense attorneys rested defendant's case to avoid exposing witnesses who might later testify for codefendants they also represented; remanded for determination of actual conflict and absence of tactical decision].) (12b) We find nothing in defendant's situation comparable to the facts of these cases. Whatever conflict trial counsel was referring to does not appear of record and was never alluded to again. It clearly did not involve dual representation; defendant fails to suggest any other reason, actual or potential, that might cause his attorney to compromise his defense. Under such circumstances, we find no basis for requiring the trial court to inquire further or secure a waiver of conflict. (See Wood v. Georgia (1981) 450 U.S. 261, 272-273 [67 L.Ed.2d 220, 231, 101 S.Ct. 1097].) Parenthetically, we also observe that the American Bar Association Code of Professional Responsibility permits an attorney to reveal [t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the crime. (DR 4-101(C)(3); see also ABA Model Rules Prof. Conduct, rule 1.6(b)(1) [attorney may reveal confidential information to prevent the client from committing a criminal act ... likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm]; cf. Evid. Code, § 956 [no attorney-client privilege if the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit a crime]; see generally Matter of Shay (1911) 160 Cal. 399, 406 [117 P. 442]; Falloon v. Superior Court (1926) 79 Cal. App. 149, 157-158 [248 P. 1057].) The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also admonish against knowingly fail[ing] to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client.... (ABA Model Code Prof. Conduct, rule 3.3(a)(2).) Under most circumstances, this obligation would include alerting the court to matters that might threaten the security of the proceedings.