Opinion ID: 2801047
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Evidence of Record

Text: As previously discussed, the relevant public’s perception is the primary consideration in determining whether a term is generic. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“It is basic to the inquiry to determine whether members of the relevant public primarily use or understand the term to refer to the genus of goods or services.”). And, as noted, evidence of the public’s perception may be obtained from “any competent source, such as consumer surveys, dictionaries, newspapers and other publications.” Northland Aluminum, 777 F.2d at 1559. One of our sister circuits has indicated that “direct consumer evidence, e.g., consumer surveys and testimony is preferable to indirect forms of evidence.” Berner Int’l Corp. v. Mars Sales, Co., 987 F.2d 975, 982-83 (3d Cir. 1993) (“Consumer surveys have become almost de rigueur in litigation over genericness.”) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). We likewise have recognized that “consumer surveys may be a preferred method of proving genericness.” BellSouth Corp. v. DataNational Corp., 60 F.3d 1565, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“While consumer surveys may be a preferred method of proving genericness under the proper test of purchaser underPRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. 17 FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. standing, we are satisfied that on the facts of this case genericness has been established under that test.”). On appeal, Princeton Vanguard argues that the Board cherry-picked the media references in the record and chose only those references that supported genericness. According to Princeton Vanguard, the Board failed to consider evidence that, “since the launch of PRETZEL CRISPS pretzel crackers, 86% of unsolicited media references clearly use the term PRETZEL CRISPS” as a brand name. Appellant Br. 23. Next, Princeton Vanguard argues that the Board failed to consider the declarations it presented from four independent participants in the snack food industry who testified that they use and understand the term PRETZEL CRISPS exclusively to refer to Snack Factory’s PRETZEL CRISPS products. 5 Instead, the Board cited “two instances in which a snack food company used the term PRETZEL CRISPS in an arguably generic fashion.” Id. at 27. Finally, Princeton Vanguard argues that the Board erred in disregarding the results of Dr. Jay’s survey without any explanation. In response, Frito-Lay argues that, “even if the Board somehow ‘cherry picked’ generic uses of ‘pretzel crisps’ by the media (which it did not), there is ample other evidence supporting its genericness finding, including dictionary definitions; generic use by Princeton, competitors, and consumers; and survey evidence.” Appellee Br. 43-44. Frito-Lay maintains that the Board’s findings are reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Given our conclusion that the Board applied the incorrect standard for genericness and our decision to remand for application of the correct legal test, we need 5 Princeton Vanguard explains that it “has granted Snack Factory an exclusive license to use the PRETZEL CRISPS mark.” Appellant Br. 4 n.2. 18 PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. not analyze the parties’ specific arguments with respect to the evidence of record. We reiterate, however, that substantial evidence review “requires an examination of the record as a whole, taking into account both the evidence that justifies and detracts from an agency’s opinion.” Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2006). Our review under that standard “can only take place when the agency explains its decisions with sufficient precision, including the underlying factfindings and the agency’s rationale.” Packard Press, Inc. v. HewlettPackard Co., 227 F.3d 1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2000). The record here contains significant evidence in the form of declarations, survey evidence, and evidence of use of PRETZEL CRISPS in the snack food industry and by the media and Frito-Lay does not dispute Princeton Vanguard’s description of much of it. Though the Board is not required to discuss every piece of evidence, it cannot focus primarily on evidence of the word “crisps” in isolation, select a few pieces of evidence involving the combined term “pretzel crisps,” and conclude that the trademark is generic. Nor can it disregard the results of survey evidence without explanation. Just as it may not short-cut its legal analysis, the Board may not short-cut its consideration of the factual record before it. As previously noted, the Board expressly agreed with Dr. Jay’s criticisms of Dr. Simonson’s survey and gave his findings “little probative weight.” Board Decision, 109 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1958. In particular, the Board concluded that the two “don’t know” and “not sure” answers “potentially were confusing to survey participants, and may have le[d] those who understood the survey question to elect to indicate they did not.” Id. As to Dr. Jay’s survey, which found that 55% of respondents thought that PRETZEL CRISPS was a brand name, the Board merely noted Dr. Simonson’s criticism, which was that “less than 65% of the initial group ‘of qualified respondents’ was entered into the survey due to the underinclusive nature PRINCETON VANGUARD, LLC v. 19 FRITO-LAY NORTH AMERICA, INC. of the questions.” Id. at 1958. The Board did not agree with this critique, however. Id. Nor did the Board call into question Dr. Jay’s conclusion that “the primary significance of the name ‘PRETZEL CRISPS’ to past and prospective purchasers of salty snacks is as a brand name.” Id. Nevertheless, in finding the mark generic, the Board indicated that it considered the evidence of record “including the surveys (which in any event arrive at different conclusions),” but gave controlling weight to dictionary definitions, evidence of use by the public, and evidence of use by Princeton Vanguard. Id. at 1960. The Board seems to have treated the surveys as though they cancelled each other out, but failed to offer any explanation for doing so. The Board thus overlooked or disregarded a genericness survey as to which it apparently found no flaw. On remand, the Board will have the opportunity to make the relevant factual findings based on all of the evidence of record, and must give appropriate consideration to the proffered survey evidence.