Opinion ID: 901213
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Tender of Payment

Text: [¶ 7.] Since both issues I and II involve the question of when McKinnies tendered payment, they will be discussed jointly. The issue whether payment was tendered during the 30 day period under the option to purchase is no longer relevant because of our ruling in Adrian I and, therefore, not before us. Rather, the issue is whether McKinnies tendered payment prior to foreclosure. McKinnies argue that once they received the title policy, May 9, 2000, they were ready, willing, and able to pay. SDCL 20-5-10. [¶ 8.] The trial court, on remand, determined that McKinnies had not tendered payment. See SDCL 20-5 et seq. The trial court entered the following findings: (1) [t]hat despite claiming to have funds needed to purchase the property, McKinnies failed to tender payment or propose to close on the property by May 3, 2000. (FF 12). [4] (2) McKinnies never tendered payment of the appropriate amount payable under the contract before May 8, 2000. (FF 28). [5] (3) McKinnies never made a tender of payment which was unconditional. Money placed in Vander Heide's trust account was not releasable to Adrian without condition. (FF 52). (4) McKinnies never made a tender of payment for the full amount which included the sum of $122,327.38 plus pro-rated rental payments which were required to be paid under the contract. (FF 53). (5) [t]he issue of tender was fully litigated between these same parties in the first trial and was decided. (FF 54). The trial court concluded that McKinnies did not make sufficient tender, and the doctrine of the law of the case also supports that finding, and this Court finds that McKinnies never did make sufficient tender. [¶ 9.] The trial court's Findings of Fact must be supported by the evidence and Conclusions of Law must in turn be supported by the Findings of Fact. The first finding of fact listed supra is based on the 30 day time period in the Option to Purchase provision. As previously noted, whether payment was tendered under the option is no longer relevant. Therefore, the trial court's finding is clearly erroneous. The second finding is also based on the option time period and is irrelevant for the same reason as finding (1). The third finding that the tender of payment was conditional is likewise in error. The evidence reveals that the title policy was issued May 9 and that funds were available at that time. SDCL 20-5-9. The fourth finding that McKinnies never tendered the full amount owed is also erroneous. McKinnies stated that the amount they owed was the balance due according to Schedule A of their agreement with Adrian plus accrued interest until closing. McKinnies never denied they owed interest nor did they characterize the Schedule A balance as payment in full. The evidence shows that at the time McKinnies gave notice of their intent to exercise the purchase option April 3, 2000, the December 1999 payment had been made. Schedule A of the parties' agreement states: Amount of option price if exercised on the following dates: ... After 12-01-99 and before 06-01-00 $122,327.38 ... Therefore, $122,327.38 was the balance due as of the December 1, 1999 payment. Because McKinnies attempted to exercise their purchase option in April of 2000, they owed $122,327.38 plus interest at ten percent up to closing. [6] Further, McKinnies' complaint dated May 10, 2000 states that upon delivery of the warranty deed, they would pay $122,327.38 plus prorated rental payments. The parties agree that the prorated rental payments and the ten percent interest are the same. Finally, the trial court's fifth finding that the issue of tender was fully litigated in Adrian I and was the law of the case is clearly erroneous. Again, the court focused only on the option time period. On remand, the court should have analyzed whether McKinnies had tendered payment under the foreclosure action rather than under the lease/purchase action litigated in Adrian I. [¶ 10.] Based on the record, the facts show, McKinnies tendered payment prior to foreclosure. The word `tender' is generally defined as an unconditional offer of payment consisting in the actual production of a sum not less than the amount due on a specific debt or obligation. 60 AMJUR 2d Payment § 4 (2003). Correspondence between the parties' attorneys indicated McKinnies made an unconditional offer to pay the amount due.