Opinion ID: 62137
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: challenges to his convictions

Text: Torres argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain his convictions. Torres moved for a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of evidence and renewed it prior to jury instructions. We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo. United States v. Medina, 161 F.3d 867, 872 (5th Cir. 1998). 5 No. 07-50286 When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we view all evidence, whether circumstantial or direct, in the light most favorable to the government with all reasonable inferences and credibility choices to be made in support of the jury’s verdict. United States v. Salazar, 958 F.2d 1285, 1290-91 (5th Cir. 1992). The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. The evidence need not exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence or be completely inconsistent with every conclusion except guilt, so long as a reasonable trier of fact could find that the evidence established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Faulkner, 17 F.3d 745, 768 (5th Cir. 1994). To demonstrate the existence of a drug conspiracy in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846, the government must prove: 1) an agreement existed to violate drug laws; 2) the appellants knew of the agreement; and 3) the appellants voluntarily participated in it. United States v. Morgan, 117 F.3d 849, 853 (5th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). To uphold a conviction for aiding and abetting under 18 U.S.C. § 2, the government must prove that the defendant associated with a criminal venture, purposefully participated in the criminal activity, and sought by his actions to make the venture successful. United States v. Polk, 56 F.3d 613, 620 (5th Cir. 1995) (citations omitted). A defendant associates with the criminal venture if he shares in the criminal intent of the principal. United States v. Jaramillo, 42 F.3d 920, 923 (5th Cir. 1995). A defendant participates in the criminal activity if he has “acted in some affirmative manner designed to aid the venture.” Id. Torres contends that the entirety of the government’s evidence against him consisted of a money transfer payable to Armendarez and a homemade syringe found in his shared cell more than a year before the instant offense. It is undisputed that Armendarez and Rodriguez were involved in a drug trafficking conspiracy. It is undisputed that pursuant to Torres’s instructions, 6 No. 07-50286 his girlfriend sent $300 to Armendarez. The crux of the matter is whether Torres intended the money to be used to purchase drugs or to pay off his gambling debt. The government responds that the jury could infer from the timing of the money transfer, the specific $300 amount, and the named payee (Armendarez) that Torres was an active and knowing participant in the conspiracy and aided and abetted in the possession with intent to distribute. The government also points to the recorded phone conversations in which Rodriguez mentions talking with “that other dude” and twice speaks in the plural when talking about sending the money. As previously stated, the only contested issue is whether Torres intended the $300 to be used to purchase drugs or to pay off his gambling debt. Torres’s former girlfriend testified that the amount of money she had previously sent to other inmates ranged from $50 to $200 and that $50 was the amount most often sent. Her testimony indicates that the wire transfer at issue was exceptional in that it was the highest amount ($300) Torres had her transfer to other inmates. With respect to defense witness Rodriguez’s testimony that the $300 was to pay a gambling debt, the jury was free to reject it. Further, the jury could consider the homemade syringe previously found in Torres’s cell in determining whether he had the intent to purchase the drugs. Finally, the government solicited testimony that Torres “shoots up” heroin. In sum, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we find it sufficient to prove Torres intended the $300 be used by Armendarez to purchase drugs.
Torres next contends that the district court erred in allowing the admission of evidence showing that a homemade syringe was found in his shared cell in an Arizona prison on March 23, 2003. The district court found that the 2003 seizure was not too remote in time from the instant offenses committed in 7 No. 07-50286 November 2004. The court also found that the probative value of the evidence outweighed any prejudicial effect. Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that: Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident . . . . The district court’s admission of extrinsic acts evidence may be reversed only upon a clear showing of an abuse of discretion. United States v. McCarty, 36 F.3d 1349, 1353 (5th Cir. 1994). In assessing violations of Rule 404(b), we engage in a two-part test: (1) whether the evidence is relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character; and (2) whether the evidence possesses probative value that is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice and is otherwise admissible under Rule 403. United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898, 911 (5th Cir. 1978). Beechum teaches that for extrinsic conduct to be relevant, the government must first demonstrate the defendant committed the act. 582 F.2d at 912-13. “The standard for the admissibility of extrinsic offense evidence is that of rule 104(b): ‘the preliminary fact can be decided by the judge against the proponent only where the jury could not reasonably find the preliminary fact to exist.’” Id. at 913 (quoting 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5054, at 269 (1977)). Here, the evidence established that the syringe was found on Torres’s shelf in his cell. Thus, a jury could reasonably find that Torres possessed it. Torres does not dispute that the extrinsic evidence is relevant to an issue other than his character. We agree. United States v. Parziale, 947 F.2d 123, 129 (5th Cir. 1991) (explaining that mere entry of a not guilty plea in a conspiracy case raises the issue of intent to justify admission of extrinsic evidence). The 8 No. 07-50286 first prong of Beechum is thus satisfied. Next, it must be determined whether the requirements of Rule 403 are satisfied. Torres also does not dispute that the syringe was probative of his intent with respect to the charged offense. Instead, he simply asserts that the probative value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. He contends that there was no evidence he used heroin, such as a positive drug test or needle marks on his arms. He argues that in light of the lack of evidence of his guilt, the syringe in all probability led to his wrongful conviction. Torres incorrectly contends that there was no other evidence that he injected drugs. During Sergeant Ramos’s testimony, he briefly mentioned that Rodriguez admitted to him that Torres “shoots up” heroin. In any event, the premise of Torres’s argument is faulty. Beechum provides that “if the Government has a strong case on the intent issue, the extrinsic offense may add little and consequently will be excluded more readily.” 582 F.2d at 914. Therefore, because the evidence of Torres’s intent was not particularly strong, the syringe had significant probative value. Finally, any danger of unfair prejudice was diminished by the limiting instruction to the jury.2 See United States v. Saucedo-Munoz, 307 F.3d 344, 350 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining that any prejudicial effect may be minimized with a proper limiting instruction). Under these circumstances, the probative value of 2 The district court instructed the jury as follows: You must not consider this evidence in deciding if Mr. Torres committed the acts charged in the indictment; however you may consider this evidence for other, very limited, purposes. If you find beyond a reasonable doubt from other evidence in this case that the Defendant did commit the acts charged in the indictment, then you may consider this evidence of the syringe found in his cell in Arizona in 2003 to determine whether or not the Defendant had the state of mind, intent, knowledge, or motive to commit the acts for which he is charged in the indictment. 9 No. 07-50286 the syringe was not outweighed by any unfair prejudice, and we thus affirm the district court’s evidentiary ruling.
Torres next contends that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury his proposed instruction on personal use. More specifically, Torres’s proposed instruction provided that a jury could infer intent to distribute from the quantity of drugs: The intent to distribute controlled substances may be inferred solely from the possession amount of a controlled substance if too large to be used by the possessor alone, but a quantity that is consistent with personal use does not raise such an inference in absence of other evidence. This Court reviews the district court’s refusal to give a requested jury instruction for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Pennington, 20 F.3d 593, 600 (5th Cir. 1994). “The refusal to give a jury instruction constitutes error only if the instruction (1) was substantially correct, (2) was not substantially covered in the charge delivered to the jury, and (3) concerned an important issue so that the failure to give it seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to present a given defense.” Id. (citation omitted). In the instant case, during the charge conference, the district court ruled that Torres was not entitled to a personal use instruction because he never possessed the drugs and the evidence shows the drugs had been distributed or transferred among the parties. In other words, the district court ruled that the undisputed evidence was that the drugs had been distributed or transferred (Armendarez to Zaragoza), and thus the evidence did not support the personal use instruction. We need not determine whether the district court’s reasoning is correct because the district court’s instructions substantially covered the proposed charge. In United States v. Galvan, the appellant argued that the district court erred in refusing to give an instruction that the quantity of drugs 10 No. 07-50286 involved could be consistent with personal use and did not give rise to an inference of intent to distribute. 133 F. App’x 154, 156 (5th Cir. 2005). This Court rejected the argument “because the substance of the requested jury instruction was in fact included in the court’s charge, which instructed the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of the lesser included offense of mere possession.” Id. Likewise, in the instant case, the charge instructed the jury that it could convict Torres of the lesser included offenses of aiding and abetting the possession of heroin and conspiracy to possess heroin. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing the jury instruction.