Opinion ID: 2996898
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Clean Water Act Statutory Scheme

Text: The CWA makes the “discharge of any pollutant” into 12 13 navigable waters, by any person unlawful, absent compliance with specific provisions of the Act. See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(7), 1362(12). Two of those provisions are § 1342 (§ 402) and § 1344 (§ 404), which create permitting systems for the discharge of pollutants. Generally, in order to avoid liability under the CWA, a defendant who wishes to discharge a pollutant must first obtain a permit either under § 1344 (a § 404 permit) for the discharge of dredged or fill material or under § 1342 (a § 402 permit) for other pollutants. Because the plaintiffs allege that the defendants discharged dredged materials into the Fawn River, the question of whether a permit is required is answered by 14 reference to § 404. 12 “Navigable waters,” is defined as the “waters of the United States,” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7). The parties do not dispute that the Fawn River, an interstate river, falls within “waters of the United States.” See Appellants’ Br. at 21 n.14. 13 “Person” is defined to include a “State, municipality, commission, or political subdivision of a state.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5). 14 The district court and the parties discussed CWA liability on the part of the defendants in terms of both § 402 and § 404. However, § 404 is the permitting scheme that regulates discharges of dredge and fill material, which is the category of dis- (continued...) 18 No. 02-1863 (...continued) charge at issue here, and thus is the permitting scheme relevant to this case. If a defendant falls within an exception to the permitting requirements of § 404 under § 1344(f)(1), as argued here, then the defendant is not liable under § 1311 for having “discharged a pollutant” or subject to the § 1342 (§ 402) permitting requirements. See 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1) (explaining that the exemptions for obtaining a § 404 permit for the discharge of dredge and fill material also exempt the discharge from regulation under §§ 1311 or 1342). As explained in the amicus brief of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Army Corps of Engineers (collectively “amici”), [t]he discharge of pollutants other than dredged or fill material are generally regulated under section 402, which creates the EPA-administered National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System [“NPDES”] permitting program. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342. Discharges of dredged or fill material are generally regulated under section 404, which creates the Corps-administered dredge-and-fill permitting program. 33 U.S.C. § 1344. The discharges in this case fall within the purview of the section 404 program. . . . Amicus Br. at 4-5. This distinction is also made clear in the regulations implementing § 1342. See 40 C.F.R. § 122.1(a)(1). (“The regulatory provisions contained in this part and parts 123, and 124 of this chapter implement the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program under section 318, 402, and 405 of the Clean Water Act . . . .”). According to the regulations, “[t]he following discharges do not require NPDES permits: . . . (b) Discharges of dredged or fill material into waters of the United States which are regulated under section 404 of the CWA.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(b). We note in passing that the regulations implementing § 404 set forth certain exceptions to the definition of “discharge of (continued...) No. 02-1863 19 (...continued) dredged material” including “[d]ischarges of pollutants into waters of the United States resulting from the onshore subsequent processing of dredged material that is extracted for any commercial use (other than fill).” 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d)(3)(i). “These discharges,” the regulations explain, “are subject to section 402 of the Clean Water Act even though the extraction and deposit of such material may require a permit from the Corps or applicable state Section 404 program.” Id. However, such materials are not at issue in the present case, and § 404 is the only permitting process applicable here. Consequently, we affirm that portion of the district court’s judgment holding that the defendants were not required to obtain a § 402 permit for their actions on May 18, 1998, but on the ground set forth above. Nevertheless, we note our disagreement with the district court’s conclusion that the defendants’ purpose and intent were relevant in determining whether § 402 had been violated. See R.131 at 29 (stating that the defendants were not liable under § 402 because they “had no purpose of excavating and redepositing soil downstream”). Liability for discharging a pollutant without a § 402 permit and absent an exemption is strict; a defendant’s intent or purpose is irrelevant. See Kelly v. EPA, 203 F.3d 519, 522 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing cases). 20 No. 02-1863
The CWA generally prohibits “the discharge of any pollutant by any person” absent compliance with one of the permitting schemes set forth in the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). The Act defines “discharge of pollutant[s]” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). Under the CWA, pollutant includes “dredged spoil, solid waste, . . . biological materials, . . . rock, sand . . . .” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(6). Here, the plaintiffs maintain that the DNR employees made an 15 addition of “dredged spoil,” namely the materials emptied from the supply pond, into the Fawn River from a point 16 source, the Orland Dam. 15 In the district court, the parties disputed whether “dredged” materials included materials that had been hydraulically dredged or “sluiced”; however, the defendants do not urge any such distinction in this court. 16 The CWA defines a point source as any discernable, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be discharged. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). We noted in Froebel v. Meyer, 217 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2000), that several other circuits had addressed the issue whether a dam could be considered a point source and that “all have concluded that, at least under some circumstances, a dam can meet the statutory definition of point source.” Id. at 937. Although we were not required to resolve the issue in Froebel (continued...) No. 02-1863 21 The defendants argue on appeal that there was no “addition” of dredged spoil to the Fawn River because the supply pond and the Fawn River constitute the same body of water. In support of their position, they point to National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156, 174-75 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988), which hold that the discharge of pollutants from one body of water to a contiguous one is not an “addition” because it does not add a pollutant from the outside world. More recent cases, however, have undercut severely the holdings of Gorsuch and Consumers Power. For example, the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Deaton, 209 F.3d 331 (4th Cir. 2000), held that “sidecasting” (digging dirt from a ditch and casting it onto the contiguous wetland) was still an “addition” of a pollutant even though nothing was “added” from the outside world. The court stated: Once it was removed, that material became “dredged (...continued) (because the dam largely had been removed), we stated that “the CWA’s definition of ‘point source’ . . . connotes the terminal end of an artificial system for moving water, waste, or other materials.” Id. at 938. We also noted that “[t]he broad reach of ‘navigable waters’ pushes the natural reading of ‘point source’ back to the point at which an artificial mechanism introduces a pollutant.” Id. Here, the artificial mechanism of the dam was used to convey pollutants into the Fawn River, a navigable waterway. Consequently, we believe that the dam constitutes a “point source.” See Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unltd., Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 493 (2d Cir. 2001) (noting that “point source” refers to “the proximate source from which the pollutant is directly introduced to the destination water body,” giving the example of a pipe). 22 No. 02-1863 spoil,” a statutory pollutant and a type of material that up until then was not present on the Deaton property. It is of no consequence that what is now dredged spoil was previously present on the same property in the less threatening form of dirt and vegetation in an undisturbed state. What is important is that once that material was excavated from the wetland, its redeposit in that same wetland added a pollutant where none had been before. Id. at 335; see also Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715 F.2d 897, 923-24 & n.43 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that term “addition” may reasonably be understood to include “redeposit,” that “ ‘dredged’ material is by definition material that comes from the water itself,” and that “[a] requirement that all pollutants must come from outside sources would effectively remove the dredge-and-fill provision from the statute”); Borden Ranch P’ship v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 261 F.3d 810, 814 (9th Cir. 2001). The rationale for limiting the holdings of Gorsuch and Consumers Power to the very circumscribed facts upon which they were based and to employ a broader definition of addition was well stated by the Second Circuit in Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481, 489-94 (2d Cir. 2001). The Second Circuit noted that the decisions of the courts in Gorsuch and Consumers Power were based on deference to the EPA’s interpretation of “addition.” The Second Circuit continued: If the EPA’s position had been adopted in a rulemaking or other formal proceeding, deference of the sort applied by the Gorsuch and Consumers Power courts might be appropriate. Instead, the EPA’s position is based on a series of informal policy statements made and consistent litigation positions taken by the EPA over the years, primarily in the 1970s and 1980s. Recent Supreme Court No. 02-1863 23 cases emphasize that such agency statements do not deserve broad deference of the sort accorded by the Gorsuch and Consumers Power courts. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000). Id. at 490 (parallel citations omitted). The court then held that the narrow definition of addition simply could not be applied to the facts before it: The present case, however, strains past the breaking point the assumption of “sameness” made by the Gorsuch and Consumers Power courts. Here, water is artificially diverted from its natural course and travels several miles from the Reservoir through Sandaken Tunnel to Esopus Creek, a body of water utterly unrelated in any relevant sense to the Schoharie Reservoir and its watershed. . . . When the water and the sus- pended sediment therein passes from the Tunnel into the Creek, an “addition” of a “pollutant” from a “point source” has been made to a “navigable water,” and terms of the statute are satisfied. Id. at 492. Unlike the position espoused by the EPA in Gorsuch and Consumers Power, here the EPA, participating at the court’s invitation as an amicus curiae, has urged upon this court the broader definition of “addition” employed by the courts in the more recent § 404 cases. See Amicus Br. at 5 (stating that “the courts of appeals have consistently recognized that materials that have been scooped up and then redeposited in the same waterbody can result in a discharge of a pollutant” and citing, inter alia, Avoyelles Sportsmen’s League and Borden Ranch). The EPA’s position, which follows the holdings of recent circuit cases, is persuasive for several reasons. First, such a reading is compatible with the 24 No. 02-1863 purpose of the CWA to “restore and maintain the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.” 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). Second, it is logical to believe that soil and vegetation removed from one part of a wetland or waterway and deposited in another could disturb the ecological balance of the affected areas—both the area from which the material was removed and the area on which the material was deposited. Finally, we agree with our colleagues on the Fifth Circuit that excluding such dredged materials from the concept of “addition” “would effectively remove the dredge-and-fill provision from the statute.” Avoyelles, 715 F.2d at 924 n.43. We therefore follow the interpretation of the amici and of our sister circuits and hold that the discharge of dredged material, such as that removed from the supply pond, into a contiguous body of water or wetland, here the Fawn River, constitutes an “addition” of dredged 17 spoil under the statute. The defendants’ actions of May 18, 1998, therefore, constituted an addition of dredged spoil into the Fawn River and were subject to the permit requirement of § 404. In order to escape liability under the CWA, the defendants therefore must establish that their actions fall into one of the narrow exemptions to the permit requirements.
17 The amici note that the situation in National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), and National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1988), concerned normal dam operations that resulted in changes to water quality. Here, by contrast, the sediment had settled out of the navigable waters, and the DNR’s opening of the flow structure control gates dredged those materials from their resting place and added them to the navigable downstream waters. No. 02-1863 25 Section 1344(f)(1) provides an exemption to the federal permit requirements “for narrowly defined activities specifically identified in paragraphs A-F that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively.” Envtl. Policy Div. of the Cong. Research Serv. for the Senate Comm. on Envtl. and Pub. Works, 95th Cong., 3 A Legislative History of the Clean Water Act of 1977, 420 (Comm. Print 1978) (hereinafter “Legislative History”). For these specified activities, a discharge of dredged or fill material “is not prohibited by or otherwise subject to regulation under this section or section 1311(a) or 1342 of this title [except 1317 of the CWA].” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1). In order to be exempt from the § 404 permit requirement, however, a party must show not only that it is exempt under one of the provisions in § 1344(f)(1), it also must show that its activities do not fall within the “recapture” provision, § 1344(f)(2). “Read together the two parts of Section 404(f) provide a narrow exemption for . . . activities that have little or no adverse effect on the waters of the U.S.” United States v. Brace, 41 F.3d 117, 124 (3d Cir. 1994). The defendants bear the burden of establishing both that they qualify for one of the exemptions of § 1344(f)(1) and that 18 their actions are not recaptured by § 1344(f)(2). Turning first to the exemptions, the defendants maintain that their actions fall within the maintenance exemption set forth at § 1344(f)(1)(B). Paragraph (B) of § 1344(f)(1) exempts the discharge of dredged or fill material “for the purpose of maintenance, including emergency reconstruc- 18 Amici construe the recapture provision as containing two distinct elements: that the activity (1) has “ ‘as its purpose bringing an area of the navigable waters into a use to which it was not previously subject,’ and (2) has the consequence of impairing the flow or circulation of navigable waters or reducing the reach of such waters.” Amicus Br. at 8. 26 No. 02-1863 tion of recently damaged parts, of currently serviceable structures such as dikes, dams, levees, groins, riprap, breakwaters, causeways, and bridge abutments or approaches, and transportation structures.” 33 U.S.C. § 1344(f)(1)(B). The regulations provide that “[m]aintenance does not include any modification that changes the character, scope, or size of the original fill design.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(2). We have construed § 1344(f)(1) narrowly because “Congress intended that Section 1344(f)(1) exempt from the permit process only ‘narrowly defined activities . . . that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively [and which do not] convert more extensive areas of water into dry land or impede circulation or reduce the reach and size of the water body.’ ” United States v. Huebner, 752 F.2d 1235, 1240-41 (7th Cir. 1985) (quoting 3 Legislative History 420). The plaintiffs contend that the defendants do not fall within the exemption under § 1344(f)(1) for the following reasons: (1) There is a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the defendant’s actual purpose in draining the supply pond was “maintenance” or merely a pretext for dredging the pond without a permit; (2) The exemption does not include dredging that was not reasonably necessary or at least proportional to the maintenance performed; and (3) The dredging of the pond was not maintenance because it impermissibly modified “the character, scope, or size of the original fill design.” 33 C.F.R. § 323.4(a)(2). We consider each of these in turn.
The plaintiffs first argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to the defendants because there is a genuine issue of material fact with respect to whether the defendants actually raised the gate to perform No. 02-1863 27 maintenance on the dam or whether the “maintenance” was just a pretext to dredge the pond without a permit. In determining the “purpose” of the defendants’ actions, “reviewing courts have consistently looked beyond the stated or subjective intentions and determined the effect or ‘objective’ purpose of the activity conducted.” United States v. Sargent County Water Res., 876 F. Supp. 1090, 1101 (D.N.D. 1994) (“Sargent County II”) (reviewing cases and noting that in those cases “[a]lthough each of the defendants stated a purpose facially worthy of an exemption, it was clear by their actions that the only ‘purpose’ each had was to circumvent the Act”). In Sargent County II, for example, the county’s stated purpose was to remove accumulated silt from an existing ditch. In evaluating whether that stated purpose was the county’s true purpose, the court observed: “Rather than approach the project haphazardly, it hired an engineer to determine the original depth, and it hired and directed a reputable contractor to perform clean-out maintenance work only. . . . The court has previously noted that the stated purpose [of maintenance] was confirmed by the actions of those who performed work on the drain.” Id. (emphasis added). The court found that the defendants’ activities of removing silt from a ditch fell within the § 1344(f)(1) exemption for “maintenance of drainage ditches,” noting that the defendants’ actions “were consistent with the stated intention of maintaining the drain.” Id. at 1099. Based on the record before us, we cannot reach the same conclusion with respect to the defendants’ actions. The defendants were slow to repair, performed quite “haphazardly,” and let the supply pond drain substantially farther (and for much longer) than was needed to do the repairs. By 11:00 a.m. on May 18, 1998, the supply pond was drained to a level where the pump was exposed and the lower gate was open such that the defendants could inspect the gate. 28 No. 02-1863 However, the defendants allowed the gate to remain open for four more hours; during this time, the defendants had lunch, purchased supplies and examined other areas of the hatchery. At the end of the day, the defendants had not repaired, or even attempted to repair, the pump. The defendants also have not brought forth evidence explaining the importance or necessity of a test draw-down to the subsequent repair of the gates. Finally, the plaintiffs submitted evidence that the DNR had expressed an interest in dredging the supply pond in the years prior to the drawdown and had been informed that obtaining a permit for this action would be difficult. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, and primarily noting the length of time during which the bottom gate was open and the pump was exposed without any attempt at making repairs, we hold that the plaintiffs have brought forth sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material fact with respect to the defendants’ purpose in drawing down the water in the supply pond. On the basis of the record before us, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the purpose of drawing down the water in the supply pond was not to perform maintenance on either the pump or the dam, but rather was to dredge the supply pond without a permit.
The plaintiffs argue that, in order for a dredging activity to fall within the maintenance exception, the dredging also must be reasonably necessary to the proposed maintenance. The EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers, as well, construe the maintenance exemption to carry a requirement of reasonable necessity. They state that the DNR’s activities are exempt as maintenance if the “draw-down and discharge of sediment was necessary to perform those maintenance functions.” Amicus Br. at 7. For the following reasons, we No. 02-1863 29 believe that the amici’s position—that the maintenance exemption carries with it a requirement that discharge of dredged material be reasonably necessary to the maintenance—is persuasive. We note initially that a requirement of reasonable necessity or proportionality comports with the legislative history of the statute. Throughout the legislative history, Congress repeatedly stressed that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions were intended to cover only a very narrow class of exemptions for activities “that cause little or no adverse effects either 19 individually or cumulatively.” 3 Legislative History 420. 19 See also 3 Legislative History 283 (“These specified activities should have no serious adverse impact on water quality if performed in a manner which will not impair the flow and circulation patterns and the chemical and biological characteristics of the affected waterbody and which will not reduce the reach of the affected waterbody.” (H.R. Rep. No. 95-830, at 99 (1977)); id. at 421 (“A case-by-case permit review would not be required for narrowly defined activities that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively, including those activities narrowly defined in 404(f)(1)(A-F).”); id. at 474 (“Federal permits will not be required for those narrowly defined activities that cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively” even though “it is understood that some of these activities may necessarily result in incidental filling and minor harm to aquatic resources . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 529 (noting that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions “exclude[] from permit requirements, discharges of dredged or fill material in conjunction with the following activities that will cause little or no adverse effects either individually or cumulatively”); 4 Legislative History 870 (recognizing that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions were intended “to free from the threat of regulation those kinds of manmade activities which are sufficiently de minimus as to merit general attention at State and local level and little or no attention at the national (continued...) 30 No. 02-1863 Certainly there would be no guarantee against more than de minimus adverse effects on the environment if the discharge of dredged material was not required to be reasonably necessary or otherwise proportional to the maintenance performed. Additionally, several courts have spoken of § 1344(f)(1) exemptions as containing a reasonableness requirement. In Sargent County II, 876 F. Supp. at 1098, the district court determined that the defendants’ activities of removing silt from a ditch fell within the § 1344(f)(1) exemption for “maintenance of drainage ditches,” particularly where “the individuals involved in the clean-out of Drain 11 were competent and acted responsibly in carrying out their assigned tasks.” Id. (emphasis added). Additionally, in United States v. Zanger, 767 F. Supp. 1030, 1035 (N.D. Cal. 1991), the court found that defendants who graded, filled and changed the bottom elevation of a stream could not be exempt under the maintenance exemption because the exemption “is limited to ‘maintenance’ of certain ‘structures,’ ” and there were no structures involved. The court further explained that “even if there had been [structures], defendants’ filling goes far beyond any reasonable definition of maintenance or 20 repair.” Id. (emphasis added). (...continued) level” (emphasis added)); id. at 912 (stating that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions “should have only a minor impact on water quality if performed in a manner that will not impair the flow and circulation patterns and the chemical and biological characteristics of the affected waterbody, and that will not reduce the reach of the affected waterbody”). 20 The regulations also imply a requirement of reasonableness for the maintenance provision at least in the circumstance of (continued...) No. 02-1863 31 Accordingly, we agree with the plaintiffs and amici that, in light of the legislative history, existing case law and the rule that the § 1344(f)(1) exemptions must be narrowly construed, see Huebner, 752 F.2d at 1240-41, the maintenance exemption should be construed so that only dredging that is reasonably necessary to the proposed maintenance is exempt from the permit requirement. Applying this standard to the case at hand, we believe that the plaintiffs have brought forth sufficient evidence to permit the trier of fact to conclude that the dredging of the pond was not reasonably necessary to either the maintenance of the pump or the alleged inspection of the gates. DNR engineers explained that the repairs could have been performed without a rapid draw-down, and in fact, both of the alleged repairs were later performed without any drawdown of the pond. Moreover, even if the repairs warranted a rapid draw-down and dredging of the pond, the pond was drained sufficiently to expose the plumbing by 11:00 a.m., and the bottom gate was fully open for inspection by the same time. However, the defendants kept the gates open, allowed the pond to continue “dredging” until 3:00 p.m. and never commenced the necessary repairs. Looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, we cannot say that the dredging of the pond—particularly from 11:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.—was, as a matter of law, reasonably necessary to the proposed maintenance. (...continued) emergency reconstruction of recently damaged parts. The regulations only exempt emergency reconstruction that “occur[s] within a reasonable period of time after damage occurs.” 33