Opinion ID: 612156
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Nine Kilos Under Negotiation

Text: 6 Cedano first argues that the district court erroneously calculated his base offense level by including the nine kilograms over which Rios and Cedano were negotiating at the time of the arrest. 1 Cedano contends that only the one kilogram he possessed should be used in calculating his offense level because he did not have the intent or ability to complete the nine kilogram transaction. Any offhand statements he made regarding his ability to move cocaine, Cedano suggests, were simple braggadocio. 7 Section 1B1.3 of the Guidelines directs courts to consider relevant conduct when calculating a defendant's base offense level. Subsection 1B1.3(a)(1) provides that all acts and omissions committed or aided and abetted by the defendant, or for which the defendant would be otherwise accountable, that occurred during the commission of the offense of conviction should be considered in fixing a base offense level. Subsection 1B1.3(a)(2) likewise states that solely with respect to offenses of a character for which § 3D1.2(d) would require grouping of multiple counts, all such acts and omissions that were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of conviction should be considered by the sentencing court. 2 The quantity of drugs used for calculating the defendant's offense level is a question of fact, which we review for clear error. United States v. Mahoney, 972 F.2d 139, 141 (7th Cir.1992). 8 Application Note 1 of § 2D1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines 3 provides that 9 [i]f the defendant is convicted of an offense involving negotiation to traffic in a controlled substance, the weight under negotiation in an uncompleted distribution shall be used to calculate the applicable amount. However, where the court finds that the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing the negotiated amount, the court shall exclude from the guideline calculation the amount that it finds the defendant did not intend to produce and was not reasonably capable of producing. 4 10 This note makes clear that Cedano's base offense level should reflect the nine kilograms over which Cedano and Rios were negotiating if Cedano intended to buy the cocaine and he was reasonably capable of completing the transaction. See United States v. Ruiz, 932 F.2d 1174, 1183-84 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 151, 116 L.Ed.2d 116 (1991). Of course, the government bears the burden of proving both of these elements by a preponderance of the evidence and the district court's findings will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Id. 11 There is sufficient evidence that Cedano intended to buy the additional nine kilos. When Rios told Cedano that he was holding the nine kilos for him, Cedano stated, Save them, save them, and instructed Rios, Don't give them away. The evidence also indicates that Cedano could complete the transaction. During one of their conversations prior to the April 19 transaction, Cedano told Rios that he could move 10 kilos over a two day period. Although Cedano submits that this was mere braggadocio, there is a sufficient basis to lend credibility to the statement. Rios testified that he previously sold 40 kilos to Cedano. Further, Cedano's ability to complete the transaction was enhanced by the fact that the cocaine, as in the other transactions to which Rios testified, was fronted to Cedano. Hence, Cedano was not required to pay for the nine kilos at the outset but could pay Rios when he had distributed the cocaine to his buyers. See Mahoney, 972 F.2d at 142 (noting that issue of ability to complete the transaction not applicable with respect to middlemen). 12 Cedano relies on United States v. Foley, 906 F.2d at 1264, and United States v. Richardson, 939 F.2d 135 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 112 S.Ct. 942, 117 L.Ed.2d 112 (1992), to argue that his statements were not sufficient to hold him accountable for the nine kilos. The evidence of the defendant's intent here, however, is much more persuasive than in the circumstances of those two cases. In Foley, the issue was whether the defendant was accountable for two ounces, rather than for one ounce, of cocaine. The only evidence of an intent to buy two ounces, however, was that, when asked whether there was a discount for buying two ounces of cocaine, the defendant simply informed the government agent that the price for two ounces would be the same as for one ounce. In Richardson, moreover, the defendant, who accepted money from the government agent pursuant to an alleged cocaine deal, was merely trying to defraud the would-be buyer and had no intention or ability of supplying the agent with cocaine. Thus, these cases are of little help to Cedano, and we conclude that the inclusion of the nine kilos was not clearly erroneous. 13