Opinion ID: 474058
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Internal Union Charges and Report to WDILHR

Text: 8 Shortly after Evans' resignation in 1977, the Shaw administration embarked on an effort to quiet Evans by thwarting his efforts to express publicly his disapproval of the Shaw administration. In August of 1982, Shaw initiated internal union charges against Evans alleging that Evans had violated union bylaws and the international union constitution by slandering union officers, creating dissension among the members, and disclosing the business transactions of Local 139 to persons outside the local. Shaw admits that he filed the charges because of information Evans had published in the Ethical Engineer. The union membership found Evans guilty as charged. Although the International Union had told Shaw that Local 139 could not fine Evans for the conduct with which Evans was charged, Shaw convinced the union members that Evans' dissension had required Local 139 to spend thousands of dollars defending itself against Evans' charges and that an appropriate penalty would be to require Evans to pay a token reimbursement of $5,000, with $3,000 to be returned to Evans on the condition that he attend the next twelve meetings. Evans was then required to travel to Washington, D.C. at his own expense, to appeal the conviction. The International Union reversed both the conviction and the penalty. 9 In another effort to harass Evans, Local 139 referred a job to him knowing that it would conflict with the date of the NLRB hearing in this matter and then reported him to the Wisconsin Department of Industry, Labor and Human Relations (WDILHR) for refusing to accept the job referral. Consequently, the WDILHR terminated Evans' unemployment compensation benefits. Prior to this incident, Evans had not received a job referral from the union in three years. Shaw testified that prior to reporting Evans to the WDILHR the union had consistently adhered to a policy of refusing to release referral information to any union member or governmental agency without a court order. The NLRB found that by charging, trying, and fining Evans on internal union charges and by reporting him to the WDILHR, Local 139 violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA by restraining him in the exercise of protected activity within Sec. 7 of the NLRA. Operating Engineers, Local 139, 273 N.L.R.B. No. 126 (1984). 10 On petition for enforcement of an NLRB order, this court upholds findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole. NLRB v. Denver Building and Construction Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 691-692, 71 S.Ct. 943, 952-53, 95 L.Ed. 1284 (1951); NLRB v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters, Warehousemen & Helpers, 773 F.2d 921, 923 (7th Cir.1985). Moreover, we substantially defer to the NLRB's interpretation and application of the NLRA because of its special competence in the field of labor relations. Pattern Makers' League of North America, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3064, 3068, 87 L.Ed.2d 68 (1985). 11 The NLRB found that Evans' publication of the Ethical Engineer qualified as concerted activity within the protection of Sec. 7 and that the union's motive in bringing internal union charges against Evans and in reporting him to the WDILHR was to retaliate against Evans for publishing the Ethical Engineer. Local 139 argues that Evans' complaints about union leadership were not concerted activities. 12 Section 7 of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 157, guarantees employees the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain, collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and the right to refrain from such activities. Section 8(b)(1)(A) makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents to restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed by Sec. 7. 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158; Local 1384, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, v. N.L.R.B., 756 F.2d 482, 487 (7th Cir.1985). 13 The NLRB found two alternative grounds for deciding that Evans' publication of the Ethical Engineer was protected by Sec. 7 activity. First, it adopted the Administrative Law Judge's finding that the activity was concerted activity because Russell Retzack, a fellow union member of Evans, assisted Evans in publishing the Ethical Engineer and in exposing what they believed to be corrupt practices of the union administration. Second, the NLRB adopted the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that even if Retzack had not assisted Evans, Sec. 7 rights include the right to participate fully and freely in internal union affairs by questioning the wisdom of union representatives or taking action to align the union membership with one's own position. 14 To fall within the scope of concerted activity, an employee's action must be taken for the purpose of inducing or preparing for group action to correct a grievance or complaint. United States Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772, 775 (7th Cir.1983); NLRB v. Town & Country L.P. Gas Service Co., 687 F.2d 187, 191 (7th Cir.1982). In United States Steel Corp. v. N.L.R.B., we found that an employee had engaged in concerted activity protected by Sec. 7 in honoring another union's picket line and distributing, to his fellow employees, leaflets in support of the picket line. Although he had written, typed, printed, and distributed his leaflets alone, his distribution of the leaflets was concerted activity because it was an attempt to induce group action on the part of his fellow employees. 711 F.2d at 775. 15 In N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country L.P. Gas Service Co., an employee's individual act of filing a grievance concerning his own discharge was concerted because resolution of the grievance sufficiently related to collective union objectives as the grievance was essentially a challenge to the company's disparate treatment of employees. 687 F.2d at 191. 16 In the present case, we agree with the NLRB that Evans' conduct in publishing the Ethical Engineer falls within the definition of concerted activity. The NLRB found that Evans acted with another union member to publish the Ethical Engineer and that their purpose was to incite action against Shaw and his union practices. This is a clear example of concerted activity by employees for mutual aid and protection. We also would sustain the NLRB's alternative finding that an individual employee engages in concerted activity by taking action to align the union membership with his own position against the union representatives. 17 Next we must consider whether disciplining Evans and reporting him to the WDILHR in retaliation for Sec. 7 concerted activity is an unfair labor practice proscribed by Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). Section 8(b)(1) makes it an unfair labor practice to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in [Sec. 7]: Provided, That this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition and retention of membership therein ... 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(1). 18 As explained above, when employee members of a union undertake to inform fellow members of what they believe to be corruption of union officials, they are engaging in concerted activity. Therefore, imposing fines on these employees for their dissident activities restrains the exercise of their Sec. 7 rights. However, the terms restrain or coerce in Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) are not interpreted so literally as to make it an unfair labor practice for a union to enforce compliance with union rules and policies. Pattern Makers' League v. N.L.R.B., --- U.S. ----, 105 S.Ct. 3064, 3068, 87 L.Ed.2d 68, 74 (1985). Section 8(b)(1)(A) was not intended to give the NLRB power to regulate internal union affairs, including union disciplinary charges and fines against members. N.L.R.B. v. The Boeing Company, 412 U.S. 67, 71, 93 S.Ct. 1952, 1955, 36 L.Ed.2d 752 (1973); Scofield v. N.L.R.B., 394 U.S. 423, 428, 89 S.Ct. 1154, 1157, 22 L.Ed.2d 385 (1969); N.L.R.B. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 195, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 2014, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967). Although any disciplinary charge or fine is coercive to some degree, the provisions of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) were not intended by Congress to apply to the imposition by the union of fines not affecting the employer-employee relationship. The Board has authority to pass on union rules affecting an individual's employment status but not rules affecting only his union membership status. N.L.R.B. v. The Boeing Company, 412 U.S. 67, 74, 93 S.Ct. 1952, 1956-57, 36 L.Ed.2d 752 (1973) (citing Scofield, 394 U.S. 428-430, 89 S.Ct. at 1157-58). Congress has not empowered the NLRB to pass judgment on the penalties a union may impose so long as the penalty does not impair the member's status as an employee. 19 In Allis-Chalmers, the court held that imposing fines against current union members does not restrain or coerce the workers in the exercise of their Sec. 7 rights. 388 U.S. at 187, 87 S.Ct. at 2010. The court reasoned that since membership in the union is purely voluntary, it is not unlawful for a union to punish a member by fine, suspension or expulsion for an infraction of the union rules. The relationship between a member and his union is contractual and a member is free to resign to escape union discipline. Pattern Makers, --- U.S. at ----, 105 S.Ct. at 3068, 87 L.Ed.2d at 75. 20 The Supreme Court, this court, and the NLRB itself have in other cases cincluded that Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) has nothing to say about the reasonableness of union fines. Boeing, 412 U.S. at 74, 93 S.Ct. at 1956-57; Norplex v. N.L.R.B., 445 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir.1971); Booster Lodge No. 405, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 383 n. 16, 75 LRRM 1004, 1007 n. 16 (1970). Likewise, the Supreme Court has concluded that questions such as the union's motivation for imposing a fine delv(e) into internal affairs in a manner ... Congress did not intend. Boeing, 412 U.S. at 74, 93 S.Ct. at 1956 (citing Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 296, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1923, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971)). The NLRA does not undertake to protect union members in their rights as members from arbitrary conduct by unions and union officials. International Association of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620, 78 S.Ct. 923, 925, 2 L.Ed.2d 1018 (1958). 21 We recognize that by conferring on the NLRB the authority to implement and interpret the NLRA, Congress has narrowed our review of NLRB decisions. N.L.R.B. v. Insurance Agents International, 361 U.S. 477, 499, 80 S.Ct. 419, 432, 4 L.Ed.2d 454 (1960). We must sustain the NLRB's position so long as its explication of a rule is not inadequate, irrational, or arbitrary, N.L.R.B. v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236, 83 S.Ct. 1139, 1149, 10 L.Ed.2d 308 (1963), but we must not make our review so deferential as to become a mere rubber stamp of the NLRB's decisions. N.L.R.B. v. Harvstone Mfg. Co., 785 F.2d 570, 574 (7th Cir.1986). 22 The Administrative Law Judge found that the union's conduct of filing union charges against Evans and reporting him to the Wisconsin unemployment compensation authorities was restraint and coercion ... not privileged by the Section 8(b)(1)(A) proviso and therefore ... a violation of that Section of the NLRA. Joint Appellate Appendix, p. 18. The NLRB affirmed the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge without commenting on the issue of whether the union's imposition of fines and report to the WDILHR were purely internal union affairs outside the reach of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). The NLRB has interpreted Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) to prohibit the union discipline and the report to the WDILHR in this case but has offered no explanation for its deviation from established precedent holding that internal union fines or discipline that restrain Sec. 7 rights are not violations of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). The NLRB made no finding as to whether the union discipline and report to the WDILHR were matters affecting employment. 23 The record shows that the disciplinary charges, union trial and fine against Evans and the report to the WDILHR were unrelated to his status as an employee. There is no evidence that Local 139 sought to enforce the disciplinary fine by interfering with Evans' relationship with employers who used union labor. Even though Local 139's discipline of Evans was motivated by its desire to quiet Evans in his expression of dissident views, it did not extend its efforts beyond the use of internal union mechanisms to achieve this end. Because the union's action in charging and fining Evans did not touch the employer-employee relationship, the union did not commit an unfair labor practice in violation of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) by charging and fining Evans. See Boeing, 412 U.S. at 74, 93 S.Ct. at 1956-57. 24 Likewise, the union's report to the WDILHR was an internal union affair beyond the scope of Sec. 8(b)(1)(A). Local 139 referred a job to Evans knowing that he could not accept the job because he was scheduled to appear before the NLRB on the same day. When Evans informed Local 139 that he could not take the job, Local 139 sent a letter to the WDILHR to report that Evans had refused a job referral. The NLRB found that (b)y charging, trying, and fining Evans and reporting him to the State of Wisconsin's Department of Industry, Labor, and Human Relations on 7 June 1983 because Evans published the Ethical Engineer, the Respondent (Local 139) violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act. The Administrative Law Judge recommended ordering Local 139 to inform the WDILHR that its June 7, 1983 letter was an error because Evans did not refuse a job offer. Rejecting this recommendation, the NLRB instead ordered Local 139 to send to the WDILHR a copy of the NLRB's decision and thus allow the WDILHR to decide whether Evans did or did not refuse a job referral. 25 The NLRB's conclusion that Local 139 violated Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) by reporting Evans to the WDILHR does not rest on a finding that the letter to the WDILHR interfered with Evans' right to attend the NLRB hearing on his unfair labor practice allegations against Local 139. We know that sending the letter was contrary to the regular policy of Local 139 and that the letter was sent in retaliation for Evans' publication of the Ethical Engineer. We do not know whether Evans did or did not refuse a job according to the Wisconsin unemployment compensation rules and thus we do not know whether Local 139's letter, reporting that Evans had refused a job, was false or misleading. If the WDILHR does not consider attendance at an NLRB hearing to excuse an unemployed worker's refusal to accept a job, then Local 139 was accurate in its report that Evans had refused a job referral. 26 Accurate or inaccurate, the letter to the WDILHR neither had nor was intended to have any impact on an employer or Evans' relationship with an employer. The letter to the WDILHR did not interfere with Evans' existing or prospective employment relations. If Local 139 implicitly or explicitly agreed with its members not to make such information available to outside agencies, then perhaps the union would be liable in a state court action for breach of its membership arrangement with union employees. See Motor Coach Employers v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 295-296, 91 S.Ct. 1909, 1922-23, 29 L.Ed.2d 473 (1971). Whether a union is free to report a member's conduct to an outside governmental agency is a matter between the union and its members so long as it does not impact on the member's relations with his employer. U.O.P. Norplex, Division of Universal Oil Products Company v. NLRB, 445 F.2d 155, 157 (7th Cir.1971) cited in Boeing, 412 U.S. at 74, 93 S.Ct. at 1956-57. We hold that the NLRB erred in concluding that the union breached Sec. 8(b)(1)(A) by charging, trying, and fining Evans and reporting him to the WDILHR. This conduct had no impact on Evans' status as an employee or his relations with any employer and thus, were never intended to be prohibited by Sec. 8(b)(1)(A).