Opinion ID: 1665317
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: teacher tenure act

Text: Van Hooser finally asserts that the manner in which her suspension from teaching was handled violated the Teacher Tenure Act, and she therefore seeks to be awarded back pay for the period of her suspension at the end of the 1982-83 school year. Van Hooser was suspended on March 24, 1983, pending the investigation of the events of the day before. Testimony at trial indicates that this investigation was completed no later than the beginning of April 1983, but there is no mention of Marilyn Van Hooser's name in any of the board's minutes for the rest of the school year. In fact, Van Hooser was re-employed and transferred to another position for the 1983-84 school year without any mention of the suspension or approval of the transfer in the school board's minutes. Van Hooser asserts that she is entitled to back pay for the period of her suspension because of the delay in taking action after the termination of the investigation. T.C.A. § 49-5-511, in pertinent part provides: Dismissal or suspension of teachers in general.  (a)(1) No teacher shall be dismissed or suspended except as provided in this part. (2) The causes for which a teacher may be dismissed are as follows: Incompetence, inefficiency, neglect of duty, unprofessional conduct, and insubordination, as defined in § 49-5-501. (3) A superintendent may suspend a teacher at any time that may seem necessary, pending investigation or final disposition of a case before the board or an appeal, provided that if the teacher is vindicated or reinstated, he shall be paid the full salary for the period during which he was suspended. Although reinstatement and vindication are not defined in the statute, we hold that the events in this case can not possibly be construed as constituting either of these events. All of the proceedings to this point have terminated in decisions against Van Hooser. Obviously, she has not been vindicated of the charges underlying her suspension. However, if on remand, the chancellor determines that her dismissal was improper, then back pay for the period of her suspension would be appropriate. Likewise, at this point, Van Hooser can not be said to have been reinstated. Reinstatement implies restoration to a position from which a person has been removed. Van Hooser was not restored to a position teaching third-graders. In fact, she was moved to a position where she had less student contact and less opportunity to engage in the type of conduct for which she was suspended. Although she was temporarily reemployed in the Warren County School System, then-superintendent Knight testified that this action was taken because negotiations were continuing with her attorney to settle the matter. He could have continued the suspension until the final disposition of the matter on appeal. T.C.A. § 49-5-511(a)(3). Hence, we cannot construe Van Hooser's reemployment to be reinstatement such as to allow her to recover back pay for the period of her suspension, when that suspension resulted from charges for which she was ultimately dismissed. Van Hooser also seeks to be reinstated to her former position as a classroom teacher because of various acts of the school board, which she asserts violate the Teacher Tenure Act, T.C.A. §§ 49-5-501 et seq. She insists that the later acts of the board preceding and including the May 1985 hearing cannot cure the board's earlier violations of the Act. The procedures to be followed in considering the potential dismissal of a teacher are set forth at T.C.A. § 49-5-511(a), which, in pertinent part, provides: (4) When charges are made to the board of education against a teacher, charging the teacher with offenses which would justify dismissal of the teacher under the terms of this part, the charges shall be made in writing, specifically stating the offenses which are charged, and shall be signed by the party or parties making the charges. (5) If in the opinion of the board, charges are of such nature as to warrant the dismissal of the teacher, the superintendent shall give the teacher a written notice of this decision, together with a copy of the charges against him, and a copy of a form which shall be provided by the state commissioner of education advising the teacher as to his legal duties, rights, and recourse under the terms of this part. After receiving notice of charges under the above statute, a teacher may seek a hearing before the school board pursuant to T.C.A. § 49-5-512. The teacher must notify the superintendent within 30 days of receipt of the notice of the teacher's intention to seek this hearing. The teacher may be represented by an attorney and may present witnesses, evidence, and argument to support his or her contentions. The school board must make a decision within 10 days and immediately give the teacher notice. We hold that Van Hooser was afforded the appropriate procedures as set forth in the Teacher Tenure Act. The school board's minutes of the March 28 meeting reflect that Galligan addressed the board, explained the case to them, and read the charges against Van Hooser. The board voted to give Van Hooser notice of the charges against her because they were serious enough to warrant dismissal, suspension or probation. Written notice, dated March 29, 1985, was provided to Van Hooser. On May 28-30, 1985, Van Hooser was afforded the hearing provided by statute, and, by letter dated June 7, 1985, the board informed her that she was dismissed, based on the board's determination that she had committed the acts with which she was charged. We are not unsympathetic to Van Hooser's concerns that the school board had predetermined her case before any formal charges were ever filed against her. These are valid concerns in a school system where, in the course of their daily duties, school board members are privy to information about cases that may ultimately reach them in an official proceeding to seek the dismissal of a teacher. These concerns, however, do not justify Van Hooser's reinstatement. To hold otherwise would mean that the school board could never initiate dismissal proceedings against her, regardless of how meritorious the charges might be, because of prior ill-conceived actions. We addressed this same concern in Cooper . There, we quoted Potts v. Gibson, 225 Tenn 321, 323, 469 S.W.2d 130, 135 (1971), in which the Court noted: It is inevitable that members of a school board should form an opinion, good or bad, of teachers and especially school principals within the system. And by reason of their official duties the members may possess valuable information either for or against individual members of the teaching and executive staff and consequently can offer valuable testimony at a disciplinary hearing before the board. Yet, the law makes no provision for a hearing before another tribunal. Much of the mischief which could result from the system is obviated by the right to a trial de novo conferred by [this statute]. As we held in Cooper , any danger of arbitrariness, capriciousness, or bias is cured when, in the hearing de novo, the trial court readjudicates the matter in a neutral forum. Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for further clarification and, if necessary, review of the record as previously described. Costs of appeal are assessed equally. DROWOTA, C.J., and FONES, COOPER and O'BRIEN, JJ., concur.