Opinion ID: 1613613
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: We recently reiterated the test by which proof of an attorney-client relationship is measured:

Text: An attorney-client relationship is generally established by contract. The contract may be express, or implied from the conduct of the parties. The party attempting to establish the relationship must prove the following elements: (1) a person sought advice or assistance from an attorney, (2) the advice or assistance sought pertained to matters within the attorney's professional competence, and (3) the attorney expressly or impliedly agreed to give or actually gave the desired advice or assistance. Wunschel, 461 N.W.2d at 845 (citations omitted). Based on the facts sketched above, the committee has not cross-appealed the commission's finding that no professional relationship existed between Mollman and Johnson at the time their conversation was recorded. The committee seems to concede a failure of proof on elements (1) and (3) because it was Mollman, not Johnson, who initiated the conversation and Mollman repeatedly cautioned Johnson to retain independent counsel. The record supports this conclusion. That is not to say, however, that Mollman shed his ethical responsibility as a lawyer in these circumstances. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Williams, 473 N.W.2d 203, 206 (Iowa 1991); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Hall, 463 N.W.2d 30, 35 (Iowa 1990); Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Millen, 357 N.W.2d 313, 315 (Iowa 1984). Moreover, it appears that Mollman was able to draw incriminating statements out of Johnson precisely because their conversation centered on the legal implications of the way they had pooled their resources to purchase and share drugs in the past. The tape clearly reveals that Johnson looked to Mollman for guidance, if not legal advice, on these matters and, in doing so, made the admissions federal agents wanted. The fact that Mollman secured these admissions by deceit and misrepresentation is simply irrebuttable under this record. That the trickery occurred outside the strict bounds of an attorney-client relationship is, we think, of only passing significance. See Millen, 357 N.W.2d at 315 (lawyer sanctioned for dishonest and deceitful conduct in personal divorce proceedings); People v. Smith, 778 P.2d 685, 686-87 (Colo.1989) (though formal lawyer-client relationship had ended, trust inspired by that relationship betrayed by use of inherently deceptive recording device). We do not mean by this opinion to suggest that there is not a zone of privacy in which a lawyer's honesty in purely personal matters remains free from scrutiny by committee or court. But any reasonable drawing of that line would find Mollman beyond it. To save his own skin, he used artifice to lure Johnson into a trap set by federal law enforcement officials. This was not a purely personal matter. Fundamental honesty is the base line and mandatory requirement to serve in the legal profession. Wenger, 469 N.W.2d at 678 (quoting Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct v. Bauerle, 460 N.W.2d 452, 453 (Iowa 1990)). Mollman shunned this requirement when it suited his purpose. In doing so, he violated DR 1-102(A)(4), EC 9-2, and EC 9-6. II. Beyond this proof of deceitful conduct, the committee sought to prove that Mollman violated formal opinion 83-16. As noted earlier, the opinion outlaws any surreptitious recording of conversations by lawyers. It is premised on the view that such conduct is inherently deceptive and thereby violates the aspirational goals of EC 1-5, EC 4-4, EC 4-5, EC 7-1, EC 9-2, and EC 9-6 as well as DR 1-102(A)(4). See Formal Op. 83-16. Not all recordings, however, are necessarily banned: There may be extraordinary circumstances in which the Attorney General of the United States or the principal prosecuting attorney of state or local government or law enforcement attorneys or officers acting under the direction of the Attorney General or such principal prosecuting attorneys might ethically make and use secret recordings if acting within strict statutory limitations conforming to constitutional requirements. Id. We have not previously considered formal opinion 83-16 in a disciplinary case. Although advisory only, a committee's formal opinion is effective unless modified by decision of this court or superseded by the code of professional responsibility or another advisory opinion. Committee on Professional Ethics & Conduct Rule 6.1. Thus the question before us is whether we should adopt the committee's opinion and, if adopted, whether Mollman should benefit from its limited exception. At least three jurisdictions recognize and apply the formal opinion across the board to conversations between attorneys and members of the public or legal profession. National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Miller, 484 So.2d 329, 338 (Miss.1985); Matter of Anonymous Member of South Carolina Bar, 304 S.C. 342, 343-44, 404 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1991); Cleckner v. Dale, 719 S.W.2d 535, 537 n. 1 (Tenn.App.1986). Others have expressed an inclination to do so in the proper case. See Gunter v. Virginia State Bar, 238 Va. 617, 621, 385 S.E.2d 597, 600 (1988) (surreptitious recordation authorized by lawyer an underhand practice violating DR 1-102(A)(4) but application of ABA formal opinion requires lawyer to be party to conversation); People v. Holman, 78 Misc.2d 613, 614-16, 356 N.Y.S.2d 958, 960-61 (Sup.Ct.1974) (noting similar New York bar opinion applies only to lawyers in private practice). Mollman does not contest the wisdom or spirit of formal opinion 83-16 on appeal. He merely claims that because he acted under the direction of federal prosecutors, he should benefit from the rule's exception. The commission was not so convinced, and neither are we. First, the plain language of the rule limits its exception to law enforcement attorneys or officers. Formal Op. 83-16. It makes no room for private citizens acting as government agents, as Mollman describes himself. Nor do we think Mollman, as a private attorney, could qualify for this status. In that connection, we echo the sentiment of the Colorado Supreme Court in a very similar case: The respondent, however, was a private attorney, not a prosecuting attorney. We do not agree that the [policy considerations underlying the prosecutorial exception] permit private counsel to deal dishonestly and deceitfully with clients, former clients and others. To hold otherwise would fatally undermine the foundation of trust and confidentiality that is essential to the attorney-client relationship in the context of civil as well as criminal proceedings. People v. Smith, 778 P.2d at 687. Second, the rule itself declines to make the exception automatic. It states: This opinion does not address such exceptions which would necessarily require examination on a case by case basis. It should be stressed, however, that the mere fact that secret recordation in a particular instance is not illegal will not necessarily render the conduct of a public law enforcement officer in making such a recording ethical. Formal Op. 83-16. Examining the exception in light of the present case, we are unable to justify its application. Mollman argues that he was a mere citizen acting for the benefit of the community. But the record makes plain that his motives were far from altruistic. It would depreciate the role of true citizen-informants and government agents to cast Mollman in the same light. In short, if formal opinion 83-16 were the only basis for disciplinary action against Mollman, he could not rely on the opinion's prosecutorial exception to excuse his conduct. As the case stands, however, Mollman is clearly guilty of violating the disciplinary rule underlying the formal opinion, DR 1-102(A)(4). Because the language of the advisory opinion exceeds the scope of the rule by applying to any recording of conversations, whether or not intended by a lawyer to be deceptive or misleading, we reserve our decision about its blanket adoption.