Opinion ID: 1872830
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 6

Heading: district court's analysis

Text: According to the district court, the issue it needed to decide was whether the . . . Authorization or the Referral . . . Letter is binding. In making that decision, the court considered whether the individual documents complied with ethics rules. The court determined that the applicable ethics provisions were Canon 2, DR. 2-107, of the Nebraska Code of Professional Responsibility; Neb. Ct. R. of Prof. Cond. § 3-501.5(e); and rule 2-200 of the California Rules of Professional Conduct. The court concluded that when read together, these provisions required five elements for an enforceable fee-division agreement: 1. Full disclosure in writing to the client including the terms of the division. 2. The client's written consent to any fee division. 3. The fee division is in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer or each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation. 4. The total fee is not unreasonable or unconscionable. 5. The total fee is not increased solely by reason of the division. The court decided that only the first two elements were at issue for the summary judgment determination. According to the district court, McCord, Piuze, and Shipler created a contract to divide attorney fees when they signed the Authorization. The court then found that the Authorization was the only document that disclosed the division of fees to Shipler and the only division of fees to which she consented. The court further stated, To the extent Piuze's Referral . . . Letter conflicts with the terms of the . . . Authorization, it is an agreement to divide a fee that is neither disclosed to the client in writing, nor consented to by the client. The court therefore concluded that the Referral Letter was an unenforceable fee division and that the Authorization was the only binding fee-division agreement. The district court then considered whether the fee-division agreement in the Authorization pertained to fees for appellate work. The court concluded that the agreement included appellate fees, so Piuze owed McCord a portion of those fees.