Opinion ID: 2631854
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: The EMT's Testimony

Text: Diggs argues that the district court erred by allowing Cathy States, an EMT volunteer, to testify concerning how long Brian had been dead when she arrived at the scene. She asserts that such an opinion was beyond States' training and qualifications. Whether an expert or lay witness is qualified to testify as to his or her opinion lies within the discretion of the district court. State v. Canaan, 265 Kan. 835, 848, 964 P.2d 681 (1998). States was a volunteer EMT for Phillips County and responded to Diggs' 911 call. At the preliminary hearing, the prosecutor asked her, [I]n your impression, did you feel that you arrived on a scene that had just happened, or did you arrive on a scene that had been there a while? Baumgartner objected, saying, She's giving a lay opinion about something that's in the realm of professionals, Your Honor. The court sustained the objection. Diggs subsequently filed a motion in limine, in which she urged the court to limit the testimony of the EMTs at the scene of the crime. She argued that none of the EMTs who responded to the call had the qualifications to address issues such as rigor mortis, livor mortis, or the coagulation time of blood. The district court reserved judgment on the motion until it could hear the witnesses' testimony. At trial, States testified that she was trained to deal with trauma and illness. She had learned to look for signs and symptoms showing that an injured person had been gone too long to resuscitate. States testified that to make such a determination, she looked for lividity (pooling of blood) and rigor mortis (stiffness of joints). Baumgartner objected to States' talking about rigidity, lividity, and rigor mortis. The objection was overruled. Later in States' direct examination, Baumgartner's objection as to lividity was sustained. The district court ruled that States could indicate what she observed, but she was not to use the medical term lividity. When asked whether, based upon her training, rigor mortis was present, she testified that she thought it was. She also testified that the victim's blood appeared to be starting to dry and maybe clotting, looked like it had been there and had dried up somewhat more than [she] expected to see. She said, It's very obvious that [the act] has just happened [when] the blood is still very wet and bright colored. The prosecutor then continued to establish a foundation for States to testify on lividity. The opinion testimony objected to on appeal developed through further prosecution inquiry. After States testified that she determined that lividity was present in the victim, she concluded that the victim had been there more than 15 to 20 minutes. A. As I understood it, [lividity] it was present. Q. Which indicated to you what? A. That he had been there more than 15 to 20 minutes. MR. BAUMGARTNER: I'm sorry, I didn't hear her answer. THE WITNESS: That he had been there more than 15 to 20 minutes. No objection was made at this point. A timely and specific objection to the admission of evidence is necessary to preserve an issue for appeal. State v. Jamison, 269 Kan. 564, 569-70, 7 P.3d 1204 (2000). On cross-examination, States admitted that this was the first time that she had observed what she believed to be lividity and rigor mortis in a victim. She, did not know what effect the presence of brain matter would have on the timing of the coagulation of the blood. She did not know how long it takes blood to coagulate, nor did she know if the fact that the victim was laying on a waterbed would affect the timing of the coagulation of the blood. We have found that to be competent as an expert, a witness must be skilled or experienced in the profession to which the subject relates. State v. Willis, 256 Kan. 837, 839, 888 P.2d 839 (1995). An expert witness `must be qualified to impart to the jury knowledge within the scope of his special skill and experience that is otherwise unavailable to the jury from other sources.' 256 Kan. at 839. Diggs relies on Willis, 256 Kan. 837, and State v. Bressman, 236 Kan. 296, 689 P.2d 901 (1984), to support her contention that States should not have been permitted to draw such a conclusion. In Willis, we concluded that the district court erred in allowing a social worker to testify as an expert in the psychiatric field of posttraumatic stress disorder and rape trauma syndrome. 256 Kan. at 847. In Bressman, the emergency medicine physician who examined the victim at the hospital testified that, in her opinion, the victim had been raped. We noted that expert testimony that the victim had been raped of necessity had to pass upon the credibility of the victim's story. Thus, we concluded that the district court erred in admitting the physician's expert opinion. 236 Kan. at 303-04; cf. State v. Hayes, 239 Kan. 443, 447, 720 P.2d 1049 (1986) (finding that in a rape case, testimony of an attorney/rape counselor was limited to her actual physical observations and could not be extended to the area of expert opinion evidence on the medical probability of trauma). In looking at States' testimony, it appears that she testified as to her personal observations, basing her observations on her experience as an EMT. When she moved the victim's fingers, the joints were stiff, suggesting to her that rigor mortis had begun. She noticed that the blood found at the scene was darker and dryer than she expected to see. She explained that she was trained to recognize lividity, or pooling of the blood, in victims in order to make a determination on whether to attempt resuscitation. She observed that lividity was present in the victim's body. Based on her observations, she concluded that she and the other EMTs should not attempt resuscitation. However, States also testified that lividity indicated to her that the victim had been there more than 15 to 20 minutes. Although determining the time of death was not within the scope of the special knowledge, skill, experience or training of States, the observations of an EMT regarding rigor mortis and lividity appear to be permitted in other jurisdictions. See Nicholson v. State, 319 Ark. 566, 573, 892 S.W.2d 507 (1995) (finding no prejudice where an EMT testified that when she arrived at the scene, [s]he found a cold body with blood pooling which indicated [the victim] had been dead `quite a while' and more than the ten minutes or so which would have been consistent with [the defendant's] testimony); Mayes v. State, 887 P.2d 1288, 1303-04 (Okla. Crim. 1994) (finding no fundamental error where an EMT testified that [w]hen he loaded the body between 9:30 and 10 p.m., rigor had begun; and the body exhibited substantially more lividity, and was colder than it had been six hours earlier). States was not qualified to testify about the length of time Brian had been dead. Although no specific objection was made to the length of time question, Diggs' counsel earlier had filed a motion in limine and had objected to the line of questioning during States' testimony. While Diggs' contention presents a close question, we conclude that any error was harmless because of other medical testimony. Dr. Pojman, a forensic pathologist and deputy coroner, testified that the effect of brain matter in the blood causes the blood to begin clotting almost immediately. Blood on sheets or clothing would begin to clot within 5 to 10 seconds. He agreed that it would not have been uncommon to have seen dry blood on the victim's back within 10 to 15 minutes of death. By 20 minutes later, most of the small spots of blood would be completely dry. Dr. Pojman also testified that the victim's waterbed temperature was set between 85 and 90 degrees. According to Dr. Pojman, a heated waterbed would decrease the clotting and drying time. He also agreed that rigor mortis generally begins 2 to 4 hours after death. Dr. Pojman's opinion was consistent with the States' observation that the victim had been there more than 15 or 20 minutes. Diggs was not prejudiced by States' testimony. Note-taking Instruction Diggs contends that the district court erred in failing to instruct the jury regarding note taking. This contention lacks merit. Diggs admits that she did not request such an instruction at trial. We review this issue under a clearly erroneous standard. See K.S.A. 2000 Supp. 22-3414(3). Failure to give an instruction is clearly erroneous only if an appellate court reaches a firm conviction that there is a real possibility that the jury would have returned a different verdict if the instruction had been given. State v. Coleman, 271 Kan. 733, 739, 26 P.3d 613 (2001). The failure to give a formal note-taking instruction was not clearly erroneous. Cumulative Error Finally, we find no basis in the record to support Diggs' contention of cumulative trial errors warranting reversal. Affirmed.