Opinion ID: 453021
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement

Text: 17 In rendering his decision in this dispute, the arbitrator made reference to the disciplinary regulations 6 under which Otero purportedly was dismissed. The Company asserted that Otero was dismissed for a violation of rule nine, prohibiting conduct which offends the morals or any offense involving moral depravation during working hours or within company premises. The arbitrator, however, considered Otero to have been dismissed under rule ten, which provides for suspension or dismissal of an employee found guilty of a felony offense or one that involves moral depravation. The arbitrator further concluded that footnote a to rule ten limited the rule's applicability to casino employees. The rule was, therefore, inapplicable to the present controversy and did not require the arbitrator to find that, because of Otero's criminal conviction, the Company was justified in dismissing him. The arbitrator further determined that rule nine, like rule ten, was confined to casino employees and inapplicable to Otero. Having previously determined that the evidence produced by the Company could be accorded no weight, the arbitrator found that the Company had failed to prove that Otero's dismissal was justified on any other ground. 18 The district court found that the arbitrator's analysis of the disciplinary rules manifested an infidelity to the plain and unambiguous terms of the contract between the parties. According to the clear language of the disciplinary rules, rule nine provided for suspension or dismissal for conduct offending the morals during working hours or on company grounds. It contained no requirement that the dismissed employee be convicted of criminal charges and was in no way confined to casino employees. Rule ten, as limited by footnote a, provided for suspension or dismissal of an employee convicted of a felony offense involving moral depravation. The district court concluded that the arbitrator had improperly interpreted the text of footnote a as restricting the applicability of rules nine and ten to casino employees; moreover, the court found the arbitrator to have disregarded the plain language of the contract in applying footnote a to rule nine, which contained no reference to footnote a. The court therefore found the arbitrator's determination that Otero's dismissal was not justified to be based on the arbitrator's misconstruction and alteration of the collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator had, therefore, exceeded his authority as interpreter of the collective bargaining agreement in issuing his award. Accordingly, the court vacated the arbitration award. 19 Absent exceptional circumstances, an arbitrator's interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement is final and binding on the parties because it is this interpretation that is bargained for by the parties. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corporation, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S.Ct. at 1361; Westinghouse Elevators of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. S.I.U. de Puerto Rico, 583 F.2d 1184, 1186 (1st Cir.1978). The arbitrator has great latitude in construing ambiguous language in the contract, and a court must not vacate an arbitration award simply because the court disagrees with the arbitrator's construction of the contract. E.g., Westinghouse Elevators, 583 F.2d at 1186. The arbitrator is, however, confined to the interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement, and although he may construe ambiguous contract language, he is without authority to disregard or modify plain and unambiguous provisions. Detroit Coil Company v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Lodge No. 82, 594 F.2d 575, 579 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840, 100 S.Ct. 79, 62 L.Ed.2d 52 (1979) (citations omitted); see also, e.g., Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen, Helpers and Food Processors, Local Union 657 v. Stanley Structures, Inc., 735 F.2d 903, 905 (5th Cir.1984). 20 We agree with the district court that the arbitrator in the instant case ignored the clear language of the contract in determining that footnote a applied to rule nine and limited that rule's applicability to casino employees. We decline to review the arbitrator's interpretation of the ambiguous language of footnote a itself. The arbitrator acted within his authority in construing this language. Whatever its meaning, however, the footnote is clearly inapplicable to rule nine and can in no case, therefore, be construed as limiting the application of rule nine to casino employees. Accordingly, the arbitrator abused his discretion in failing to consider whether the Company was justified in dismissing Otero under rule nine of the disciplinary rules appended to the collective bargaining agreement. 7 This failure, coupled with the arbitrator's refusal to give any weight to the evidence presented at the arbitration hearing, resulted in conduct so improper as to warrant judicial review and to mandate vacatur of the arbitration award.