Opinion ID: 2612550
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: was the defense properly pleaded?

Text: Second, plaintiff contends that the insured's misrepresentation that he had never been treated for excessive use of alcohol should not have been submitted to the jury because that affirmative defense was not properly pleaded under Utah R.Civ.P. 8(c), and was therefore waived under Rule 12(h). Pratt v. Board of Education, Utah, 564 P.2d 294, 298 (1977). This issue turns on how specifically a defendant must plead an affirmative defense under U.C.A., 1953, § 31-19-8. That statute, on which the insurer relies, provides that all statements in any application for an insurance policy shall be deemed to be representations, and that omissions, incorrect statements, or misrepresentations shall not prevent a recovery under the policy unless they are (a) fraudulent, or (b) material either to the acceptance of the risk or to the hazard insured, or (c) the insurer would not have issued the policy if it had known the true facts. The insurer's answer contained the following paragraph, whose adequacy is at issue here: As a separate affirmative defense, defendant alleges that on or about September 14, 1977, Charles Miller Williams completed a written application for said life insurance policy in part as follows: 10. Have you ever received treatment or joined an organization for alcoholism or drug habit? yes no x ___ ___ Defendant further alleges that said answer was fraudulent or material to acceptance of the risk or to the hazard assumed by defendant, or defendant in good faith either would not have issued the policy or would not have issued it at the same premium rate . .. if the true facts had been made known as required by the application. Plaintiff contends that this affirmative defense is insufficient in three respects: (1) it refers only to fraudulent answers, whereas the jury found no fraud; (2) it refers only to treatment... for alcoholism, whereas the jury found no omission, incorrect statement, or misrepresentation in the insured's answer respecting alcoholism; and (3) it refers to an alleged false answer on question 10 on the application, but it makes no reference to question 2.1. on the Medical History. Plaintiff's arguments raise serious questions about the adequacy of defendant's pleadings. Before we address these questions, it will be helpful to review our rules and decisions governing the pleading of affirmative defenses. Rule 8(a)(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1950, requires that a pleading set forth a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.... Defenses must be stated in short and plain terms... . Rule 8(b). Each averment of a pleading shall be simple, concise and direct. Rule 8(e)(1). Rule 8(c) specifies that [i]n pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... fraud ... and any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense. Finally, Rule 9(b) states that [i]n all averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with particularity. Our decisions have construed these requirements. Burr v. Childs, 1 Utah 2d 199, 204, 265 P.2d 383, 387 (1953), unanimously approved a pleading the Court characterized as a crisp statement of ultimate facts. That opinion quotes with approval the following passage from Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-01, 67 S.Ct. 385, 388-389, 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947), concerning the Federal Rules, from which our Rules had been taken: Under the prior federal practice, the pre-trial functions of notice-giving, issue-formulation and fact-revelation were performed primarily and inadequately by the pleadings. Inquiry into the issues and the facts before trial was narrowly confined and was often cumbersome in method. The new rules, however, restrict the pleadings to the task of general notice-giving and invest the deposition-discovery process with a vital role in the preparation for trial. Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 160, 280 P.2d 453, 455 (1955), quoted this same language and also referred approvingly to other authorities, as follows: Thus, it can very often be found stated in these cases that a complaint is required only to    give the opposing party fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. The leading statement of these pleading principles in the context of an affirmative defense is Justice Crockett's much-cited opinion for the Court in Cheney v. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205, 211, 381 P.2d 86, 91 (1963), which held admissible a supplementary agreement reducing the compensation fixed in a real estate contract notwithstanding it had not been specifically pleaded as an affirmative defense. After explaining that the purpose of the Rule 8(c) requirement that affirmative defenses be pleaded was to have the issues to be tried clearly framed, the Court added that this was only one of the Rules: They must all be looked to in the light of their even more fundamental purpose of liberalizing both pleading and procedure to the end that the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What they are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules provide for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the other party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so requests. [Emphasis added.] The foregoing passage was quoted with approval by a unanimous Court in Eie v. St. Benedict's Hospital, Utah, 638 P.2d 1190, 1193-94 (1981) (answer referring generally to fraudulent inducement, estoppel, and breach by plaintiffs held sufficient pleading to raise issue that parties' agreement not integrated and therefore subject to modification by contemporaneous oral communications). It is evident from these statements that the fundamental purpose of our liberalized pleading rules is to afford parties the privilege of presenting whatever legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute, Cheney v. Rucker, supra , subject only to the requirement that their adversary have fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim and a general indication of the type of litigation involved. Blackham v. Snelgrove, supra . The functions of issue-formulation and fact-revelation are appropriately left to the deposition-discovery process. The rules allow examination into and settlement of all issues bearing upon the controversy, Cheney v. Rucker, supra , with latitude for proof that extends beyond the pleadings, where appropriate. Rule 15(b). It also appears from the cited decisions that these principles are applied with great liberality in sustaining the sufficiency of allegations stating a cause of action or an affirmative defense. The application of these principles to specific pleadings is also instructive. An allegation of certain derogatory and libelous statements is insufficient; a complaint for defamation must set forth the language complained of ... in words or words to that effect... . Dennett v. Smith, 21 Utah 2d 368, 369, 445 P.2d 983, 984 (1968). An allegation that the defendant conspired to annoy, threaten and intimidate the plaintiff is insufficient when it does not state the nature or substance of the acts allegedly committed by defendants... . Utah Steel & Iron Co. v. Bosch, 25 Utah 2d 85, 86, 87, 475 P.2d 1019, 1020 (1970). Allegations which contained merely broad and general statements that a false affidavit and false pleadings were filed but which contained no allegation whatever of the contents, nature or substance of any such false statements are insufficient. Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 2d 60, 62, 377 P.2d 189, 190 (1962). It appears from these precedents that when the pleader complains of conduct described by such general terms as libel, intimidation, or false statements, the allegation of the conclusion is not sufficient; the pleading must describe the nature or substance of the acts or words complained of. The same is true of fraud. Rule 9(b) specifies that the circumstances constituting fraud ... shall be stated with particularity. In Heathman v. Hatch, 13 Utah 2d 266, 267-68, 372 P.2d 990, 991 (1962), a complaint charging a lawyer with fraud, conspiracy, and negligence was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. In affirming unanimously, this Court stated: It is to be noted that the terms fraud, conspiracy and negligence are but general accusations in the nature of conclusions of the pleader. They will not stand up against a motion to dismiss on that ground. The basic facts must be set forth with sufficient particularity to show what facts are claimed to constitute such charges. [Emphasis added.] Similarly, in Shayne v. Stanley & Sons, Inc., Utah, 605 P.2d 775, 776 (1980), the Court affirmed the granting of summary judgment for defendants on a complaint charging fraud where plaintiff admitted in answering defendant's interrogatories that he could not designate any specific fraud on the part of defendants, but had brought his action to determine what acts were instigated by defendants ... to deceive plaintiff. Against the background of the foregoing principles, we now examine plaintiff's arguments on the insufficiency of defendant's pleading of its affirmative defense.