Opinion ID: 1930832
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: First Amendment ClaimsAssociation and Political Activity

Text: Appellants argue that even assuming the effectiveness of section 152 to convert them to at-will employees and thereby eliminate their property interest in continued employment under the CMPA, they still have a justiciable claim based on infringement of their rights under the First Amendment. They contend that they were fired for improper personal and political reasons. They argue that the allegations in their complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action on each of these theories, and therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for failure to state a cause of action under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 12(b)(6). In reviewing an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we apply the same standard as the trial court. Schiff v. American Ass'n of Ret. Persons, 697 A.2d 1193, 1196 (D.C.1997). Dismissal is warranted only if, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and assuming the factual allegations to be true for purposes of the motion, it appears, beyond doubt, that the plaintiff can prove no facts which would support the claim. Id. (citing Cauman v. George Washington Univ., 630 A.2d 1104, 1105 (D.C.1993) and Aronoff v. Lenkin Co., 618 A.2d 669, 684 (D.C.1992)). Applying these principles to appellants' complaint, we examine these two claims. Appellants' wrongful termination claim is based on allegations that the firings were motivated by personal bias, whim, caprice, and/or political expediency, and/or for other unlawful reasons. They contend that these bare allegations were sufficient to state a claim under the First Amendment. Specifically, they contend that these allegations were sufficient to proceed on the theory that, in contravention of the First Amendment, the District terminated them because they criticized openly the handling of budgetary matters and associated with the administration of the Mayor of the District of Columbia and others who had different ideas about how to handle the District's fiscal crisis. Generally, the government may not discharge an employee because of his or her exercise of First Amendment rights to freedom of speech or association. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 358-60, 96 S.Ct. 2673, 49 L.Ed.2d 547 (1976) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597, 92 S.Ct. 2694, 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972)). [7] Thus, it has been held that an at-will employee cannot be dismissed for exercising First Amendment rights. See Orange, supra, 313 U.S.App. D.C. at 284, 59 F.3d at 1272 (citing Hall, supra, 272 U.S.App. D.C. at 305, 856 F.2d at 259). A public employee's cause of action for retaliation in violation of the First Amendment requires proof of four elements: (1) that the public employee was speaking on a matter of public concern; (2) that the employee's First Amendment interest is not out-weighed by the governmental interest of promoting the efficiency of the public service performed through its employees; (3) that the employee's speech was a substantial or motivating factor for the denial of a right or benefit; and (4) that the government would not have reached the same decision absent the protected conduct in which the employee engaged. O'Donnell v. Barry, 331 U.S.App. D.C. 272, 279, 148 F.3d 1126, 1133 (1998) (citations omitted); Tao v. Freeh, 307 U.S.App. D.C. 185, 188-89, 27 F.3d 635, 638-39 (1994). Appellants argue that the allegation of dismissal for improper political reasons is sufficient to show that they are making a claim under the First Amendment. They contend that they were entitled to offer proof at trial that they were terminated because of their open criticisms of the handling of budgetary matters within their offices; for their associations with those who had different ideas of how to manage the financial crisis; for any allegiance to or association with the administration of the District's Mayor; and for any other reasons clearly implicating their First Amendment Rights. We disagree. Under Super. Ct. Civ. R. 8(a) and (e), a complaint is sufficient so long as it fairly puts the defendant on notice of the claim against him. Scott v. District of Columbia, 493 A.2d 319, 323 (D.C.1985) (other citation omitted); see also Nelson v. Covington, 519 A.2d 177, 178-79 (D.C.1986). Nevertheless, even under our liberal rules of pleading, the allegations in the amended complaint fail to alert the defense to the nature of claim as one for retaliatory discharge for the appellants' exercise of their right to free speech under the First Amendment. There are no allegations in the complaint that appellants engaged in any protected activity. There are no allegations related to the elements of the action that appellants spoke out on a matter of public concern or that the District fired them wholly or partially because of it, let alone the other two elements of the cause of action. See O'Donnell, supra, 331 U.S.App. D.C. at 279, 148 F.3d at 1133. Appellants' failure to allege that the retaliatory action was related to speech of public concern is fatal to pleading this cause of action. See id. (citing Tao, supra, 307 U.S.App. D.C. at 188, 27 F.3d at 638-39) (citation omitted) (If the speech is not of public concern, it is unnecessary to scrutinize the basis for the adverse action absent the most unusual circumstances.). Further, appellants failed to allege any facts from which it even may be inferred reasonably that they were fired because they engaged in speech of public concern. The purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the formal sufficiency of a statement of the claim for relief . . . . Fraser v. Gottfried, 636 A.2d 430, 432 (D.C.1994) (citation omitted). In the trial court, appellants did not provide sufficient facts for the court to make that determination. Appellants seem to recognize the insufficiency of their allegations to support a First Amendment claim. They suggest, therefore, that an amendment could have cured the defect in the complaint. However, appellants do not assert, and we find no indication in the record, that they sought to amend the complaint further to assert a First Amendment claim. Indeed, we find nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court was ever made aware that appellants claimed that they were fired because they exercised their rights to free speech and association. The general conclusory statements which appellants made in their complaint ( i.e., that the firings were motivated by personal bias, whim caprice, and/or political expediency, and/or for other unlawful reasons) are simply inadequate to state a cause of action for exercising their First Amendment rights, particularly given the very specific nature of the action. There is a split among the Federal circuits concerning whether the public concern requirement applies to claims of improper discharge based on associational claims. Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1212-13 (7th Cir.1991) (citations omitted) (making public concern threshold requirement to such claims). Cf. Boddie v. City of Columbus, Miss., 989 F.2d 745, 747 (5th Cir.1993) (citations omitted) (Holding a public employee's claim of improper discharge for political affiliation not subject to the threshold public concern requirement). This court has not addressed the issue, and we need not do so here because, even absent the public concern requirement, appellants' vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a claim. They have made no factual allegations that they engaged in any particular political activity or had other affiliations which motivated the District to fire them. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not err in dismissing appellants' claims under the First Amendment. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the decision of the trial court on appellants' defamation-based claim and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In all other respects, we affirm. So ordered.