Opinion ID: 1316227
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Ironi's Prior Crimes

Text: We review the admission of evidence of prior bad acts for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Edelmann, 458 F.3d 791, 809 (8th Cir.2006). Evidence of prior bad acts is not admissible under [Federal] Rule [of Evidence] 404(b) solely to prove the defendant's criminal disposition, but is admissible to show proof of . . . intent . . . [or] knowledge. . . . Bad acts evidence is admissible if (1) it is relevant to a material issue; (2) it is similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged; (3) it is supported by sufficient evidence; and (4) its potential prejudice does not substantially outweigh its probative value. United States v. Jackson, 278 F.3d 769, 771 (8th Cir.2002) (internal quotations omitted). When prior bad acts are admitted to show intent, the prior acts need not be duplicates, but must be sufficiently similar to support an inference of criminal intent. Edelmann, 458 F.3d at 809. Ironi argues that the admission of his two cocaine possession crimes from 1995 and 1997 was improper under Rule 404(b). We disagree. First, the prior crimes are relevant to the issue of whether Ironi had the intent and knowledge necessary to convict him of the aiding and abetting charges. Ironi argues that he did not know Ennen was storing or selling drugs at his house. As we have previously held, a prior conviction for distributing drugs, and even the possession of user-quantities of a controlled substance, are relevant under Rule 404(b) to show knowledge and intent to commit a current charge of conspiracy to distribute drugs. United States v. Frazier, 280 F.3d 835, 847 (8th Cir.2002); see also United States v. Cook, 454 F.3d 938, 941 (8th Cir.2006) (stating that we have frequently upheld the admission of prior drug convictions to show intent when a defendant denies committing a drug offense); United States v. Gipson, 446 F.3d 828, 831 (8th Cir.2006) (Evidence of prior possession of drugs, even in an amount consistent only with personal use, is admissible to show such things as knowledge and intent of a defendant charged with a crime in which intent to distribute drugs is an element.) (quotation and alteration omitted). Second, the prior crimes are similar in kind and not overly remote in time to the crime charged. The prior crimes of possession of cocaine are similar to the aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine charge. See Gipson, 446 F.3d at 831. The two crimes occurred eight and ten years before the November 17, 2005 search and are not too remote in that they are within the bounds of admission. Frazier, 280 F.3d at 847; see also United States v. Foster, 344 F.3d 799, 802 (8th Cir.2003) (finding that a nine-year-old prior crime was not too remote); United States v. Green, 151 F.3d 1111, 1114 (8th Cir. 1998) (listing cases where prior acts from twelve and thirteen years ago were admissible). Third, the prior crimes are supported by sufficient evidence, as Ironi does not dispute the two convictions. Fourth, any potential unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value of this evidence. The prior crimes had probative value because Ironi argued that he did not have knowledge of Ennen's drug possession or drug dealings at his house and did not have the intent to participate in them. However, the prior possession convictions are relevant to establishing that Ironi had the intent and knowledge necessary for a jury to convict him of aiding and abetting possession with intent to distribute cocaine and methamphetamine. His prior convictions rebut his argument that he lacks intent to participate in the cocaine dealings and demonstrate that he had knowledge about cocaine and the types of materials and objects typically found in the presence of cocaine, such as scales, drug packaging materials and cocaine cutting agents. Furthermore, any prejudicial effect of admitting the prior crimes was reduced by the district court's limiting instruction to the jury that it could only consider the prior crimes to determine Ironi's intent. See Frazier, 280 F.3d at 848. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Ironi's prior drug crimes. [2]