Opinion ID: 547646
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Prosecution's Challenge of Tellez

Text: 36 De Gross also argues that the district court erred in allowing the prosecution's peremptory challenge of Tellez, the only Hispanic on the venire. Based on this single challenge, the district court found that De Gross established a prima facie case of race discrimination. The government takes issue with this finding, arguing that the exclusion of one venireperson cannot establish the pattern of challenges against a cognizable group necessary to give rise to an inference of discrimination. Cf. United States v. Vaccaro, 816 F.2d 443, 457 (9th Cir.) (striking just two [black] jurors does not constitute such a pattern indicating a systematic exclusion of blacks), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 914, 108 S.Ct. 262, 98 L.Ed.2d 220 (1987). 37 Although showing a pattern of systematic exclusion is one way of giving rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the only way. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97, 106 S.Ct. at 1723 (while a 'pattern' of strikes against black jurors included in the particular venire might give rise to an inference of discrimination.... These examples are merely illustrative). There is no magic number of challenged jurors which automatically establishes a prima facie case of discrimination. United States v. Chinchilla, 874 F.2d 695, 698 (9th Cir.1989). Batson clearly directs that the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances  in determining whether a defendant has raised an inference of discrimination. 476 U.S. at 96-97, 106 S.Ct. at 1722-23 (emphasis added); see also Chinchilla, 874 F.2d at 698 (the combination of circumstances taken as a whole must be considered). 38 Here, the jury was charged with deciding whether De Gross, a Hispanic woman, illegally aided and abetted the transportation of undocumented Mexican aliens into the United States, an offense that arguably has racial and ethnic overtones. The prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge against the only Hispanic on the jury. The combination of these relevant circumstances convinces us that De Gross established a prima facie case of racial discrimination. Cf. id. at 698 (in a Mexican drug smuggling case, Hispanic defendants established a prime facie case because the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges against the only Hispanic in the jury pool and the only Hispanic in the alternate pool). 39 After De Gross established a prima facie case of discrimination, the district court properly required the prosecutor to justify his challenge of Tellez on nondiscriminatory grounds. The prosecutor stated that he sought to exclude Tellez primarily because she is a woman and he desired more men on the jury. 11 That statement constituted an admission of purposeful gender discrimination which, under our holding in Section I, violated Tellez's equal protection rights, and also violated De Gross' equal protection rights. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 86-87, 106 S.Ct. at 1717-18 (a prosecutor's discriminatory peremptory challenge violates the defendant's right to equal protection of the laws because the defendant is entitled to be tried by a jury chosen pursuant to nondiscriminatory criteria). The district court, therefore, erred in finding that the prosecutor exercised his peremptory challenge on nondiscriminatory grounds. 12