Opinion ID: 1668496
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: prior contradictory statements

Text: CR 43.08, which covers the use of prior contradictory statements, is the present codification for Kentucky of the rule in Queen Caroline's Case, stating as follows: Before other evidence can be offered of the witness having made at another time a different statement, he must be inquired of concerning it, with the circumstances of time, place, and persons present, as correctly as the examining party can present them; . . . The rule is offered as a method of impeachment. However, Kentucky has extended the rule to permit prior inconsistent testimony, when admissible, to be considered as substantive evidence as well as impeachment under the so-called Jett doctrine. Jett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 436 S.W.2d 788 (1969). It may be used as substantive evidence in civil cases as well as criminal cases. Tri-City Van & Storage, Inc. v. Slone, Ky., 437 S.W.2d 211 (1969). It may be used when the witness has been confronted with the prior contradictory statement at deposition as well as when this confrontation takes place at trial. But [t]he rule of Jett may not be applied without compliance with its plainly stated prerequisites, which means compliance with the requirements for laying a foundation in CR 43.08. Norton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 471 S.W.2d 302, 306 (1971). In Hall v. Hamlin, Ky., 484 S.W.2d 853 (1972), wherein the witness was confronted with a prior contradictory statement at a deposition which was later used in evidence, this foundation requirement was fully complied with  [the witness] was cross-examined. . . regarding certain statements, inconsistent with his deposition, allegedly made by [the witness] shortly after the accident . . . [and] categorically denied any such inconsistent statements. Id., at 854. Grisanti argues that it was enough to have the witness acknowledge that a statement was taken, and unnecessary to confront him with the substance of the statement, i.e., what he said in the statement that is supposedly contradictory to his present testimony. This position is flatly contradicted by the language of CR 43.08 which requires that the witness be inquired of concerning it, referring back to the different statement previously made. As stated in McCormick, supra, § 37, Impeachment: . . . the cross-examiner will ask the witness whether the witness made the alleged statement, giving its substance, and naming the time, the place, and the person to whom made. . . . If the witness denies the making of the statement, or fails to admit it, but says `I don't know' or `I don't remember' then the requirement of `laying the foundation' is satisfied and the cross-examiner, at the next stage of giving evidence, may prove the making of the alleged statement. White v. Piles, Ky.App., 589 S.W.2d 220 (1979) is a Kentucky case squarely in point. The Court of Appeals reversed because the party offering a prior contradictory statement from a pre-trial deposition had not confronted the witness with the substance of his statement when counsel had the opportunity during his trial testimony. The court stated: . . . where a witness has made a prior sworn statement which is arguably contradictory, he is especially entitled to have that fact pointed out to him and to be afforded an opportunity to explain the inconsistency. 589 S.W.2d at 223. The second sentence of CR 43.08 provides for limited circumstances in which the court may relax the foundation requirement when it is impossible to comply with this Rule . . . and when the court finds that the impeaching party has acted in good faith. Bertelsman & Philips, Ky. Practice, supra at 115, explains: The Rule contains an important exception. A party may be permitted to introduce impeaching evidence when a foundation can not be laid for contradiction because of the absence of the witness. The purpose of this provision is to avoid undue hardship in the event the witness has been examined by deposition and prior contradictory statements made by him may not have been known at the time of the taking. This language in the second sentence of CR 43.08 is the Kentucky equivalent of the so-called interests of justice clause in F.R.E. 613(b), the Federal rule for impeachment of witnesses by proof of a prior inconsistent statement. It is explained in 3 Weinstein's Evidence, p. 613-9, as follows: The `interests of justice' clause permits the admission of statements which under the orthodox rule were completely barred if the party did not learn of the prior inconsistent statement until after the witness ceased being amenable to the court's jurisdiction since the foundational questions could not then be asked. The interests of justice exception to the foundation requirement of the Rule in Queen Caroline's Case appears to have been sponsored by Wigmore and McCormick, who favor permitting the judge, in his discretion, to dispense with the foundation requirement where the putting of the question has become impossible and the impeaching party has acted in good faith. 3A Wigmore on Evidence, § 1027, pp. 1022-23 (Chadbourne rev. 1970). McCormick, supra at § 37, makes it clear that this interests of justice exception to the foundation requirement should not be utilized except where there is proof of good faith and lack of knowledge of the inconsistent statement on the part of the impeacher when [the witness was] cross-examined. This textbook discussion of the interests of justice exception to the foundation requirement in CR 43.08 does not support the use of Duckworth's allegedly prior inconsistent statement in the present case. On the contrary, it negates it. Grisanti's counsel had full knowledge of the prior audiotaped statement with which he intended to contradict Duckworth at the time when Duckworth's deposition was taken. Indeed, he alluded to the fact that he had such a statement while concealing its substance and its contradictory nature. In these circumstances Grisanti's counsel is not in a position to request that the foundation requirement in CR 43.08 should be waived in his case. Therefore, because of trial error in the admission of key evidence which should have been excluded the within case is reversed and remanded for a new trial on all issues. STEPHENS, C.J., and LAMBERT and VANCE, JJ., concur. WINTERSHEIMER, J., files a dissenting opinion in which GANT and STEPHENSON, JJ., join.