Opinion ID: 1223783
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: The Existing Law

Text: 1. The following propositions are significant to the resolution of this case: (a) Causation, or cause in fact, is the determination that the defendant's acts caused a claimed injury. Causation is of necessity a factual inquiry. (b) Causation differs from that which we have called proximate cause, foreseeability and remoteness. In practical terms, these words form the basis for a policy determination relative to the permissibility of recovery. [3] [A] holding that a defendant's conduct is not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury does not constitute a determination that the defendant's conduct is not a cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury, but rather is in the nature of a policy decision by the court that, for a variety of reasons, e.g., intervening act, the defendant's conduct and the plaintiff's injury are too remote for the law to countenance a recovery. As pointed out by Professor Prosser in his treatise, the proximate-cause rubric has been used as another way of saying, among other things, that the defendant was under no duty to protect the plaintiff from the injury which in fact occurred. [Cit.] [ McAuley, supra at 7.] (c) Under the present rule, proximate cause must be determined by a jury except in plain and undisputed cases. [4]