Opinion ID: 845581
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Trial Court's Authority to Sanction Litigants for Unethical Behavior

Text: As stated above, trial courts possess the inherent authority to sanction litigants and their counsel, including the power to dismiss an action. Banta, supra at 368, 121 N.W.2d 854. The authority to dismiss a lawsuit for litigant misconduct is a creature of the `clean hands doctrine' and, despite its origins, is applicable to both equitable and legal damages claims. Cummings v. Wayne Co., 210 Mich.App. 249, 252, 533 N.W.2d 13 (1995), citing Buchanan Home & Auto Supply Co. v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 544 F.Supp. 242, 244-245 (D.S.C., 1981). The authority is rooted in a court's fundamental interest in protecting its own integrity and that of the judicial process. Cummings, supra at 252, 533 N.W.2d 13. The `clean hands doctrine' applies not only for the protection of the parties but also for the protection of the court. Id., citing Buchanan Home, supra at 244. Moreover, the Michigan Constitution confers on the judicial department all the authority necessary to exercise its powers as a coordinate branch of government. Const. 1963, art. 3, § 2 divides the powers of government among three branches and commits to each branch exclusive exercise of the functions properly belonging to it, except as otherwise expressly provided in the Constitution. [18] In re 1976 PA 267, 400 Mich. 660, 662, 255 N.W.2d 635 (1977). Art. 6, § 1 vests the judicial power of the state exclusively in one court of justice. [19] Id. Section 4 of that article [20] vests general superintending control over all courts in the state in the Supreme Court and § 5 confers upon this Court the power to make rules to govern the practice and procedure within the courts. [21] Id. It is also well settled that under our form of government the Constitution confers on the judicial department all the authority necessary to exercise its powers as a coordinate branch of government. Id. at 662-663, 255 N.W.2d 635. The judicial powers derived from the Constitution include rulemaking, supervisory and other administrative powers as well as traditional adjudicative ones. Id. at 663, 255 N.W.2d 635. They have been exclusively entrusted to the judiciary by the Constitution and may not be diminished, exercised by, nor interfered with by the other branches of government without constitutional authorization. Id., citing Attorney General ex rel., Cook v. O'Neill, 280 Mich. 649, 274 N.W. 445 (1937). Moreover, express authority to dismiss a complaint is conferred by statute and court rule in Michigan. MCL 600.611 provides that [c]ircuit courts have jurisdiction and power to make any order proper to fully effectuate the circuit courts' jurisdiction and judgments. Additionally, MCR 2.504(B)(1) provides that [i]f the plaintiff fails to comply with [the court] rules or a court order, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or a claim against that defendant. Several of the Michigan Rules of Professional Conduct address sanctionable attorney conduct. MRPC 3.6 concerns trial publicity. It provides: A lawyer shall not make an extrajudicial statement that a reasonable person would expect to be disseminated by means of public communication if the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that it will have a substantial likelihood of materially prejudicing an adjudicative proceeding. [Emphasis added.] MRPC 3.5 addresses impartiality and decorum of the tribunal. It states: A lawyer shall not: (a) seek to influence a judge, juror, prospective juror or other official by means prohibited by law; (b) communicate ex parte with such a person concerning a pending matter except as permitted by law; or (c) engage in undignified or discourteous conduct toward the tribunal. [Emphasis added.] Finally, MRPC 8.4 deals with attorney misconduct. It provides, in relevant part: It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to: (a) violate or attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another; (b) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, or violation of the criminal law, where such conduct reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer; (c) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.