Opinion ID: 1650090
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 8

Heading: The Killing Was Cold

Text: First, Turner challenges the finding of the trial court that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage. The trial court found: The evidence presented at trial establishes that the defendant spent at least a day lurking around the Comfort Inn hotel. He knew where the truckthe victim's truck was parked and in which room she was staying. The defendant did not enter the victim's room until her teenage son and daughter were gone. The evidence suggests the defendant, who had seen the victim loading her truck, waited for the opportune moment when the victim and Ms. Raybon were alone with small children to initiate the attack. The evidence indicates the defendant chose his victims carefully as he watched them go back and forth from the hotel room to the truck. He entered the room, knife drawn, prepared to kill. And, as a further indication that the defendant's acts were the product of cool and calm reflection, after committing the murder, the defendant took the victim's keys and immediately left in her truck. Stacia Raybon did not give the defendant the keys, nor did she tell him where the victim's truck was parked. Furthermore, no one testified that the defendant was frantically searching the parking lot for the car that matched the keys in his hand. To the contrary, the evidence suggests the defendant went right to the very vehicle he had previously planned to take. Turner challenges this finding by claiming that it is inconsistent with the trial court's finding of two statutory mitigating factors: (1) he was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance; and (2) his capacity to appreciate criminality or conform his conduct was substantially impaired. Specifically, Turner relies on this Court's previous decisions in Santos v. State, 591 So.2d 160 (Fla.1991), and White v. State, 616 So.2d 21 (Fla.1993). Turner's reliance on Santos is misplaced. In Santos, the defendant murdered his former girlfriend and their infant daughter after numerous domestic disturbances between the parents. See 591 So.2d at 160. This Court held that the fact that the killing arose from a domestic dispute tended to negate cold, calculated premeditation. Id. at 162. Here, Turner essentially claims that the news of his wife's infidelity initiated a chain of events, including his cocaine use, which ultimately resulted in his murderous conduct. Even if he was emotionally disturbed, Turner provides no logical basis to support a finding that the murder of Renee Howard arose from a domestic disturbance. Unlike in Santos, Turner did not murder his wife or the man he thought she was cheating with; he murdered a woman with whom he had absolutely no connection prior to this violent encounter. Santos cannot be read so broadly as to shield any defendant who is emotionally distraught due to a domestic conflict, regardless of whom that defendant murders. Further, this Santos interpretation is undermined by Lynch v. State, 841 So.2d 362 (Fla.2003). Twelve years after the Santos decision, this Court made it clear in Lynch that it does not recognize a domestic dispute exception in connection with death penalty analysis. Id. at 377. Therefore, even if Howard's murder did, in fact, arise from a domestic disturbance, such a defense would not preclude a finding of CCP. Turner's reliance on White is also misguided. Turner relies on White to support his contention that CCP cannot be established beyond a reasonable doubt because his behavior was affected by cocaine. In White, the trial court found: The capital crime for which the Defendant is to be sentenced was committed while he was high on cocaine and while he (questionably) was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance. White, 616 So.2d at 24. Based on the trial court's specific finding in White, this Court held that the evidence of White's excessive drug use and the trial judge's express finding that White committed this offense `while he was high on cocaine ' precluded application of the CCP aggravating factor. Id. at 25 (emphasis supplied). A critical distinction between White and the facts of the present case is that here, the trial court did not make an express finding that Turner committed the murder while he was high on cocaine. Here the trial judge recognized that the defendant began using crack cocaine at some point after September 22, 2005, which is not in dispute. However, whether the abuse of cocaine was chronic and truly mitigating in this case is another issue. The trial court carefully analyzed the testimony of numerous experts with regard to the effects of Turner's cocaine use and did not reach the conclusion that he was high on cocaine at the time he murdered Howard. Even if the trial court had found that Turner was addicted to crack cocaine, such a finding would not necessarily preclude the CCP aggravator from being found. This Court has explained that a chronic drug abuser can still act in accordance with a deliberate plan where the evidence indicates that the person was fully cognizant of his actions on the night of the murder. Guardado v. State, 965 So.2d 108, 117 (Fla.2007) (quoting Robinson v. State, 761 So.2d 269, 278 (Fla.1999)). Here, Turner was fully cognizant of his actions the morning of the murder. Prior to entering the hotel room, Turner exchanged pleasantries with a housekeeper and asked for a towel. After attacking Howard and Rabon, Turner was able to locate the keys to the victim's truck, proceed directly to the truck, and drive away. Later, after initially pulling over to the side of the road, Turner made the conscious decision to ram the police vehicle and attempt to elude capture. All of these actions are consistent with someone who was fully cognizant of his actions. Neither of the cases upon which Turner relies negates the trial court's finding that the killing was the product of cool and calm reflection and not prompted by emotional frenzy, panic, or a fit of rage. To the contrary, the trial court's finding is supported by competent, substantial evidence. We therefore hold that the cold factor of the CCP aggravating circumstance was properly found by the trial court.