Opinion ID: 2634775
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Did Munson invoke his right to silence?

Text: Munson next claims he invoked his right to silence during his interview with Detective Hoffbeck and therefore, any post-invocation statements should be suppressed. In the interview, Munson discussed the events leading up to the homicide but became hesitant when the topic moved to Camanga's involvement with the guns. Hoffbeck: Who brought [the guns] over? Munson: Sam [Camanga]. Hoffbeck: Sam brought `em over? How many did he bring over that time? Munson: What? Hoffbeck: Guns ... Munson: I saw one ... Hoffbeck: What uh ... what was that? Munson: Think it was the 9 mm ... or 45, I don't know. Hoffbeck: Well, both of these type show up there so ... which one is the first one, do you remember? Munson: I think it was the .45. Hoffbeck: .45? Munson: Uhhuh. What's gonna happen? Is Sam gonna know I'm saying this? Hoffbeck: Maybe Sam's already talked to me. Munson: No, but ... Hoffbeck: Eventually Sam is going to know, yes ... the answer to that is yes. Everybody ... everybody involved is going to know eventually ... yes they will. Munson: Well, I'm done talkin' then. Hoffbeck: Before you make a final decision on that there ... play that tape there for him ... Munson: You know what'll happen to me? Hoffbeck: Listen to this here ... The officers then played a tape recording of a conversation seized under a Glass warrant [38] in which Munson admitted watching Camanga shoot Gorsche in the head. Hoffbeck pointed out that the tape recording showed Munson already had admitted that he witnessed the murder and that Camanga was the shooter. He also reassured Munson that Camanga would not retaliate. The interview continued, and Munson continued to describe his involvement in the homicide. In the superior court, Munson raised a two-pronged claim that he had invoked his right to silence. First, he argued that he clearly invoked his right to silence and that anything he said after that statement had to be suppressed. In the alternative, he argued that if his invocation of his right to silence was ambiguous or equivocal, then the officers were obliged to clarify the ambiguity before proceeding with the interview. The State argued that Munson had not clearly invoked his right to silence but that his comment about silence was equivocal because it expressed Munson's concern that Camanga would learn that he had talked to police. The State also argued that when a defendant makes an equivocal reference to the right to silence, a police officer has no obligation to clarify the reference. However, the State claimed that Detective Hoffbeck clarified Munson's statement. At the evidentiary hearing, Detective Hoffbeck testified he did not believe Munson was exercising a Miranda right to silence when he said, Well, I'm done talkin' then. Instead, Hoffbeck thought Munson was expressing a concern that Camanga would learn what he was telling the police and retaliate against him. Judge Wolverton found Detective Hoffbeck's testimony on the issue was honest and candid. But Judge Wolverton held that Hoffbeck was required to clarify what Munson meant by his statement Well, I'm done talkin' then by either reaffirming Munson's waiver or by readvising him of the Miranda warnings before continuing. Implicit in Judge Wolverton's analysis is his rejection of Munson's claim that he had made an unequivocal assertion of his right to silence. If Munson had made such an unequivocal assertion, then no clarification would have been needed; the interview should simply have ended. [39] Judge Wolverton concluded that Detective Hoffbeck mistakenly believed there was a distinction between a defendant's invocation of the right to silence and a request for counsel. Judge Wolverton agreed with Munson's position that the law recognizes no distinction between a defendant's assertion of either right. Alaska law does require the police to clarify an equivocal or ambiguous request for counsel. In Hampel v. State , [40] we noted that the case law divided into two generally recognized approaches when a defendant made an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel: Some courts, interpreting literally the language in Miranda that the right to counsel may be invoked in any manner, have held that all questioning must cease upon any reference to counsel, however ambiguous or equivocal. The second approach is to permit a limited inquiry for the purpose of clarification after an accused makes a statement that arguably might be construed as a request for counsel. In Giacomazzi v. State, 633 P.2d 218, 222 (Alaska 1981), the Alaska Supreme Court implicitly rejected the first approach, while approving of the second. In noting the difficulty for a police officer in determining whether a suspect indeed intends to invoke his right to have an attorney present, the court stated: For this reason, the officer may seek clarification of the suspect's desires. Permitting clarification of an accused's request is necessary to protect his rights without unduly interfering with reasonable police questioning. This approach avoids the rigid rule of prohibiting further questioning upon any vague reference to an attorney, while providing police and the courts with a standard which protects the rights of those who desire the presence of counsel at questioning but whose requests fail to meet an arbitrary threshold of clarity. We therefore follow the second, more pragmatic, approach. In keeping with Giacomazzi, we hold that when the accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel during a custodial interrogation, the officer need not immediately terminate the interrogation. Further questioning, however, must be limited to clarifying the reference. Thus, any questioning on the subject matter of the investigation must be suspended until the intent of the accused is clarified. [41] The United States Supreme Court has since adopted a new standard when an accused makes an ambiguous or equivocal reference to counsel. In Davis v. United States , [42] a closely divided Court reasoned that if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning. [43] The majority stated: If the suspect's statement is not an unambiguous or unequivocal request for counsel, the officers have no obligation to stop questioning him. [44] Since this decision, courts have extended Davis to cases where a suspect has made an ambiguous or equivocal reference to the right to silence. [45] Furthermore, in Hampel v. State , we noted that the right to counsel is more rigidly observed than the right to silence and that situations where a defendant made an ambiguous or equivocal reference to his right to silence were distinguishable from situations where a defendant made an equivocal reference to the right to counsel. [46] Several Alaska cases supported that distinction. For example, in Vail v. State , [47] the supreme court upheld continued police questioning of one co-defendant who had waived his Miranda rights but said that he did not want to talk about his co-defendant. [48] The supreme court concluded that this remark was an ambiguous remark that was not intended to cut off questioning entirely. [49] In Pierce v. State, [50] we rejected a claim that the State had not shown that Pierce had waived his rights. [51] Pierce told the police that he was not sure that he wished to waive his rights but continued to answer questions. [52] In Nashoalook v. State , [53] we concluded that a fair and common sense reading of the totality of Nashoalook's interview with the police did not reflect an intent on Nashoalook's part to cut off questioning entirely. [54] Instead, we concluded that Nashoalook was concerned that the interview was being tape recorded and that others in his community would find out what he told the police. [55] Because the circumstances around Nashoalook's refusal to answer questions were ambiguous, we concluded that further questioning was not prohibited. [56] Detective Hoffbeck testified that he concluded from Munson's statement, Well, I'm done talkin' then, that Munson was afraid Camanga would retaliate against him if he talked to the police. Detective Hoffbeck stated he did not believe that Munson was exercising his right to remain silent. Therefore, he continued to talk with Munson to allay his concerns about retaliation. Judge Wolverton accepted Detective Hoffbeck's testimony, finding it to be candid and honest. Furthermore, an objective reading of the transcript of Detective Hoffbeck's interview with Munson supports the conclusion that Munson was expressing fear of retaliation rather than exercising his right to remain silent. Under these circumstances, we conclude that Detective Hoffbeck did not violate Munson's constitutional right to remain silent when he continued to interview Munson after Munson made the statement Well, I'm done talkin' then.