Opinion ID: 182334
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Worthington's Cross-Appeal

Text: Worthington first cross-appeals the district court's rejection of his argument that trial counsel performed ineffectively by failing to conduct an adequate investigation and present further mitigating evidence through additional witnesses. In particular, Worthington asserts that his parentsPatricia Washburn (Patricia) and Richard Worthington (Richard) would have testified about his troubled upbringing. The Missouri Supreme Court held that counsel reasonably decided not to present Patricia's testimony because, when contacted, she had downplayed Worthington's traumatic childhood and endeavored to portray herself as a good mother. Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 578. The court also noted that counsel believed that Patricia was under the influence of cocaine on the day she would have testified at trial. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, [i]t was not unreasonable for counsel to make the strategic choice that it was better to use records of Mr. Worthington's history of abuse from Illinois than to call his mother at the trial. Id. Turning to Worthington's father, the court determined that, even though counsel had not spoken with Richard, their decision not to present his testimony was also reasonable. According to the court, Worthington's father was difficult to locate and did not have much of a relationship with Worthington. Id. In any event, the court observed that Carol TegardWorthington's auntwas able to testify to much of the same evidence that Mr. Worthington's parents would have offered. Id. Moreover, the sentencing court reviewed numerous records detailing Worthington's abusive background. Id. For these reasons, the Missouri Supreme Court concluded, offering additional evidence of . . . abuse by calling Mr. Worthington's parents was not necessary nor was its absence prejudicial. Id. Applying AEDPA review, [10] the district court upheld the state court conclusion that counsel's decision not to call Patricia was reasonable under Strickland. Worthington, 619 F.Supp.2d at 679. And while the district court disagreed with the Missouri Supreme Court's factual findings that Richard was difficult to locate and had only a sporadic relationship with his son, it nevertheless determined that [i]t was not unreasonable for the Missouri Supreme Court to have concluded that Richard Worthington's testimony would have been cumulative, and petitioner was not prejudiced. Id. With regard to his mother's testimony, Worthington challenges the Missouri Supreme Court's determination that counsel reasonably decided against calling Patricia as a witness. Worthington contends that the postconviction trial court did not make an explicit factual finding that counsel had a tactical basis for not calling [Patricia] because her testimony might harm the defense. Thus, asserts Worthington, the Missouri Supreme Court's conclusion that counsel made a reasonable strategic decision was an unreasonable determination of the facts because it was based upon a non-existent factual finding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). As an initial matter, we note that the postconviction trial court did, in fact, find that counsel's decision not to call Patricia was a reasonable decision based on her cocaine habit and her statements downplaying Worthington's abusive childhood. See Worthington, No. 00-12558, slip op. at 11. Even had the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on findings of fact independent from those of the postconviction trial court, however, we could not grant Worthington's habeas petition absent a showing that those findings were unreasonable. Section 2254(e)(1)'s presumption of correctness applies to factual determinations made by state courts, whether the court be a trial court or an appellate court. Perry v. Kemna, 356 F.3d 880, 883 (8th Cir.2004) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 546-47, 101 S.Ct. 764, 66 L.Ed.2d 722 (1981). The Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on the same factual findings noted by the postconviction trial court, see Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 578, and Worthington has made no showing that those findings do not enjoy the support of the record. With regard to the testimony of his father, Worthington argues that the district court erred in upholding as reasonable the Missouri Supreme Court's decision that Worthington was not prejudiced by the absence of Richard's testimony. Had Richard testified, Worthington contends, the sentencing court would have gained a better understanding of Worthington's abusive background. We agree with the district court, however, that the Missouri Supreme Court reasonably concluded that Worthington suffered no prejudice, because Richard's testimony would have been cumulative of evidence already before the sentencing court. Worthington, 619 F.Supp.2d at 679. At the penalty phase, the sentencing court heard the testimony of Carol Tegard, who described Worthington's tormented childhood and youth. She testified about the widespread drug and alcohol abuse that surrounded Worthington during his early years, as well as his mother's prostitution. Worthington and Patricia were constantly moving, at one point living out of a car until Patricia sold it for drug money. Tegard also testified that Patricia attempted suicide numerous times in Worthington's presence. Richard was a drug user and dealer who had minimal contact with the family until Worthington's adolescent years. When he did reenter Worthington's life, Tegard testified, Richard taught his son how to burglarize. According to Tegard, Worthington underwent psychiatric treatment and checked into a drug rehabilitation program, but his family members refused to be supportive. In addition to Tegard's testimony, numerous records before the sentencing court described the severe neglect and abuse that Worthington suffered as a child. For example, a 1989 psychological evaluation report described Worthington as having grown up in a dysfunctional chaotic family made up of his chronic alcoholic mother and a heroin addicted father. The report also noted chronic neglect and emotional, physical, and sexual abuse over the years. Records from the Methodist Medical Center of Illinois and the White Oaks Rehabilitation Center further described Worthington's chaotic upbringing, including his parents' drug addiction and physical abuse inflicted by a babysitter. Finally, the PSR provided numerous examples of Worthington's dysfunctional childhood, as well as detailing instances of physical and sexual abuse. Worthington discounts the value of the evidence before the sentencing court for two reasons, neither of which is persuasive. First, he argues that Richard's testimony is not cumulative because the evidence before the sentencing court was generic and skeletal. As described above, though, the state court's decision to the contrary is supported by the record. Tegard's testimony, the documentary evidence, and the PSR supplied a graphic and comprehensive account of Worthington's background. This stands in stark contrast to the evidence in the cases on which Worthington relies. See Outten v. Kearney, 464 F.3d 401, 421 (3d Cir.2006) (observing that trial counsel failed to present any evidence of defendant's sexual abuse, possible neurological damage, or learning disabilities); Ainsworth v. Woodford, 268 F.3d 868, 874 (9th Cir.2001) (determining that counsel adduced no substantive evidence in mitigation); Lewis v. Johnson, 2000 WL 1568168, at  (5th Cir. Sept.13, 2000) (noting that single mitigation witness testified little more than that defendant had a generally unhappy childhood), vacated in part, 2000 WL 35549205 (5th Cir. Dec.21, 2000); Collier v. Turpin, 177 F.3d 1184, 1201 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that counsel elicited only that defendant was a hard worker and had a reputation for truthfulness). Second, Worthington dismisses the records before the sentencing court because there is no evidence that the . . . court thoroughly reviewed any of these records before issuing its sentencing verdict. The penalty phase record belies Worthington's assertion, however. The sentence issued by the court was expressly [b]ased on the evidence presented to this Court. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([T]he assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.). Indeed, based on the mitigating evidence before it, the sentencing court found as non-statutory mitigating circumstances that Worthington had a dysfunctional family, was abused and neglected as a child, and was a long-term drug abuser. Thus, Worthington's assertion that the sentencing court failed to review the record is meritless. In light of Tegard's testimony, the extensive documentary evidence, and the PSR, we agree with the district court that the Missouri Supreme Court's decision that Worthington suffered no prejudice in the absence of his father's testimony did not unreasonably apply clearly established federal law. Nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceedings. The additional testimony did not cover any new subject matter and was not substantially more persuasive than that actually presented, Eley v. Bagley, 604 F.3d 958, 969 (6th Cir.2010), and would barely have altered the sentencing profile presented during the penalty phase, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Ultimately, much of what Worthington now claims should have been presented during the penalty phase was, in fact, considered by sentencing court. Thus, because the Missouri Supreme Court reasonably concluded that counsel's decision not to present the testimony of Worthington's parents was not constitutionally ineffective, [11] we affirm the denial of habeas relief on that claim. [12] Worthington also cross-appeals the district court's denial of his claim that trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to investigate the background of State witness Charlotte Peroti and object to her testimony on the grounds that the State had failed to disclose her correct name and the substance of her testimony. Peroti testified at the penalty phase that Worthington had broken into her house shortly before he murdered Griffin and that he had attempted to sexually assault her. In addition, Peroti testified that Worthington stole her car. Although the State had endorsed Peroti as a witness more than two years before the commencement of the penalty phase hearing, the State had not given the defense notice of the subject matter of her testimony. As a result, on direct appeal the Missouri Supreme Court determined that the State's failure to notify the defense violated State v. Debler, 856 S.W.2d 641 (Mo. banc 1993), which held that evidence of uncharged misconduct is admissible during the penalty phase only if the State provides advance notice to the defendant. Id. at 657; see also Worthington, 8 S.W.3d at 90. However, because counsel had not objected to Peroti's testimony, the Missouri Supreme Court applied plain error review and denied relief, determining that manifest injustice had not resulted from the error. 8 S.W.3d at 90. Worthington had not been prejudiced by the Debler violation, the court maintained, because the dangers against which Debler sought to guard were absent in Worthington's case. Id. at 90-91. In crafting its notice requirement, the court in Debler highlighted the risk that the average juror would fail to differentiate between evidence of prior convictions and significantly less reliable evidence of uncharged criminal activity. 856 S.W.2d at 657. In the present case, the fact that a judge rather than a juryhad determined Worthington's sentence obviated the danger identified in Debler that an average juror would give undue weight to Peroti's testimony regarding the uncharged sexual assault, burglary, and theft. Worthington, 8 S.W.3d at 90-91 & n. 5. The Missouri Supreme Court also found that, despite the Debler violation, [d]efense counsel was prepared to cross-examine [Peroti] on the details of her failure to report the burglary and assault to police. Id. at 91. The Missouri Supreme Court likewise denied relief at the post-conviction stage, holding that Worthington had not been prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to Peroti's testimony and seek a continuance to investigate her allegations. Worthington, 166 S.W.3d at 580. The court found that counsel knew all about the events to which [Peroti] testified and cross-examined her effectively about them. Id. at 581. Worthington also pointed to evidence that Peroti had been convicted of passing bad checks and that she had exaggerated her role as a police informant, arguing that had trial counsel known of this evidence they could have impeached her more effectively. The court acknowledged that counsel had been unaware of these facts but determined that they nevertheless had forcefully challenged Peroti's allegations by eliciting her strong antipathy towards Worthington. Thus, the court concluded, [t]here is no reasonable probability that the minor additional impeachment value of showing that she had a prior bad check conviction and that she may have exaggerated her role as a police informant affected the outcome of the case. Id. Reviewing the Missouri Supreme Court decision under AEDPA, the district court found the state court's conclusion that counsel knew all about Peroti's allegations to be an unreasonable determination of the facts. Worthington, 619 F.Supp.2d at 692-93. However, the district court concluded that the state court's decision was not based on this mistaken factual determination. Because counsel effectively impeached Peroti's testimony and established her bias during cross-examination, the state court found that Worthington suffered no prejudice. Id. at 695 (There is no reasonable probability that had the sentencing judge stricken her testimony or allowed counsel additional time to investigate the alleged prior bad acts, the outcome of the case would have been affected.). Worthington urges us to reverse the district court for two reasons. First, he contends that the Missouri Supreme Court based its decision on an unreasonable determination of the facts, which led to its conclusion that he suffered no prejudice from counsel's failure to object to the lack of adequate notice of Peroti's testimony and to seek a continuance to investigate her background. Specifically, Worthington challenges the state court's factual finding that defense counsel had effectively cross-examined Peroti. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). [A] state court decision involves `an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in state court proceedings' only if it is shown that the state court's presumptively correct factual findings do not enjoy support in the record. Jones v. Luebbers, 359 F.3d 1005, 1011 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ([A petitioner] shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.). Like the district court, we hold that the state court's determination is reasonable and supported by the record. Worthington argues that had counsel sufficiently prepared to examine Peroti, they would have been able to impeach her with evidence regarding her bad check conviction and the fact that she allegedly had exaggerated her work as an undercover drug informant. However, the state court found that counsel effectively cross-examined Peroti without pursuing those avenues for impeachment, and we cannot say that its finding is unreasonable under AEDPA. Even without prior knowledge of the substance of Peroti's testimony, counsel succeeded in establishing her bias against Worthington. On cross-examination, Peroti acknowledged that she had volunteered to work with the police to try to get Michael Worthington arrested for drugs. Moreover, counsel elicited that Peroti wanted to make sure [Worthington] got out of [her] area because he had supplied her son and other children with drugs and alcohol. Peroti also admitted that she had never reported the alleged sexual assault to the police and that she had continued to interact with Worthington after the assault. Likewise, the PSR before the sentencing court detailed a police report that documented the incident only as Burglary 1st and Stealing Over $150, further calling into question Peroti's testimony regarding the alleged sexual assault. Accordingly, we hold that there is sufficient record evidence to support the state court finding that counsel effectively cross-examined Peroti and that the court's determination of fact is thus not unreasonable in light of the evidence before it. We may not, therefore, upset the state court's determination that Worthington suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to investigate Peroti's background. Second, Worthington proffers an alternative ground for overturning the Missouri Supreme Court's decision that he was not prejudiced by counsel's failure to object to Peroti's testimony under Debler. Had counsel objected, Worthington contends, Peroti's testimony likely would have been excluded in its entirety, thus giving rise to a reasonable probability that the sentencing court would not have imposed the death penalty. As an initial matter, the Missouri Supreme Court has consistently maintained that Debler's notice requirement only slightly circumscribe[s] the wide latitude that both the State and the defense enjoy at the penalty phase to introduce any evidence regarding the defendant's character that assists the jury in determining the appropriate punishment. State v. Smith, 32 S.W.3d 532, 554 (Mo. 2000) (citation omitted); see also State v. Thompson, 985 S.W.2d 779, 792 (Mo. banc 1999); State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 132 (Mo.1998). Against this default principle that the decision-maker is entitled to any evidence that assists in the penalty determination, Debler, 856 S.W.2d at 656, we think it likely that, especially in the absence of a jury, the sentencing court would have simply granted a brief continuance to allow counsel to investigate Peroti, rather than exclude her testimony entirely. See State v. Parker, 886 S.W.2d 908, 917 (Mo. banc 1994) (observing, in the context of the State's alleged failure to timely disclose evidence under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 25.03, that the proper remedy was continuance); State v. Brass, 781 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Mo.Ct.App.1989) (Once surprise has occurred, the proper remedy is to request a continuance or postponement.). Moreover, because we earlier upheld the state court's determination that further investigation of Peroti's allegations would not have altered the result of the penalty phase, we reiterate that counsel's failure to secure a continuance did not prejudice Worthington. Nevertheless, even considering the unlikely possibility that the trial court would have ordered the wholesale exclusion of Peroti's testimony, we agree with the district court that there was no reasonable probability that the sentencing court would have imposed a sentence of life imprisonment. See Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 534, 123 S.Ct. 2527. Despite Worthington's assertion to the contrary, Peroti's testimony does not appear to be the most damaging aggravating evidence presented at the penalty phase. As we discussed above, Missouri courts have repeatedly acknowledged that evidence of uncharged criminal misconduct is potentially unreliable. Debler, 856 S.W.2d at 657 (Because no jury or judge has previously determined a defendant's guilt for uncharged criminal activity, such evidence is significantly less reliable than evidence related to prior convictions.); Smith, 32 S.W.3d at 554; Thompson, 985 S.W.2d at 792; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ([T]he assessment of prejudice should proceed on the assumption that the decisionmaker is reasonably, conscientiously, and impartially applying the standards that govern the decision.). Indeed, the sentencing court made no mention of the alleged sexual assault when it issued the penalty. Rather the court pointed to only two statutory aggravating factors, neither of which implicated Peroti's testimony. The sentencing court subsequently filed a Report of the Trial Judge listing three nonstatutory aggravating circumstances, none of which included Peroti's allegations of uncharged sexual assault, burglary, and theft. Accordingly, the strictures of AEDPA review do not permit us to disturb the state court decision that Worthington suffered no prejudice as a result of counsel's failure to object to the lack of adequate notice of Peroti's testimony. [13] We affirm the denial of habeas relief on this ground.