Opinion ID: 2974639
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Trial Procedure Issues

Text: Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial based on a prospective juror’s comments during voir dire. We review the denial of the motion for a mistrial for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Knipp, 963 F.2d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 1992). During voir dire, the following colloquy took place between defendant’s counsel and a prospective juror: Defense counsel: The fact that you know Zoro [a potential witness], would that influence– Prospective Juror: I wouldn’t believe the man if he laid his hands on a stack of bibles. Defense counsel: You wouldn’t? Prospective Juror: I’ve had dealings with Zoro before. JA at p. 132. After the prospective juror’s remark, defendant’s counsel moved for a mistrial at side bar. The district court determined that before ruling on the motion, it would ask some follow-up questions of the entire panel and would excuse the prospective juror for cause, but not until others are excused for cause, in order to not call undue attention to the remarks. The district court then asked some questions to the entire panel as to whether they could be fair and impartial 13 and cautioned the panel “to not give any particular witness any more credibility or less credibility based upon the voir dire” and also asked whether anyone would give more or less credibility to a witness that might testify based on responses from other panel members. The district court then asked both counsel if they had any additional follow up questions; defendant’s counsel replied she did not. In denying defendant’s motion, the district court found that based on the circumstances surrounding the prospective juror’s statement and the follow-up questions, the panel was not unduly prejudiced. We agree. In Knipp, supra, we held that the district court properly denied a motion for mistrial after a prospective juror expressed a general opinion as to a witness’s credibility. The prospective juror stated “I have known [the witness] all my life. I believe everything he tells me. He always tells me when his corn is ready.” Id. at 845. The prospective juror was then excused for cause and the district court gave a curative instruction to the jury. As in Knipp, the prospective juror’s comment was a general opinion as to a witness’s credibility and the district court asked follow-up questions in order to ensure the panel had not been adversely affected by the comment. No juror expressed reluctance as to whether they could be fair and impartial. Additionally, the witnesses’s testimony was not pivotal to the case. He testified that he had never seen defendant with a gun and that Lila Howard had a reputation for untruthfulness but had never lied to him. Overall, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial.
Defendant argues that the district court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal. We review the decision de novo. United States v. Keeton, 101 F.3d 48, 52 (6th Cir. 14 1996). “In reviewing the denial of a motion for acquittal, ‘the relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1083 (6th Cir. 2001)(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) provides in pertinent part: It shall be unlawful for any person-who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year; ... to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported in interstate or foreign commerce. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The essential elements of the crime of being a felon in possession of a firearm or ammunition are: (1) that the defendant had a previous felony conviction, (2) that the defendant possessed a firearm or ammunition, and (3) that the firearm or ammunition traveled in or affected interstate commerce. See United States v. Walker, 160 F.3d 1078, 1087 (6th Cir. 1998). Here, defendant admitted that the firearm and ammunition traveled in interstate commerce and that he had previously been convicted of a felony. Contrary to defendant’s argument, the fact that the firearms and ammunition were found in his home was not the only evidence of possession. The government also presented testimony from Lila Howard that she and defendant fired the rifle on September 5, 2001. Although defendant argues that Lila Howard was not credible, it is not for us to assess credibility. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, it was sufficient to establish possession.