Opinion ID: 2584046
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Interrelationship Between the Intestacy Statutes and the Adoption Statutes

Text: [¶ 10] Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 2-4-101 and 2-4-107 (LexisNexis 2003) establish the rules of intestate succession and, specifically, those that apply to persons in an adoptive family. The pertinent parts are: (a) Whenever any person having title to any real or personal property having the nature or legal character of real estate or personal estate undisposed of, and not otherwise limited by marriage settlement, dies intestate, the estate shall descend and be distributed in parcenary to his kindred, male and female, subject to the payment of his debts, in the following course and manner: .... (c) Except in cases above enumerated, the estate of any intestate shall descend and be distributed as follows: .... (ii) If there are no children, nor their descendents, then to his father, mother, brothers and sisters, and to the descendents of brothers and sisters who are dead, the descendents collectively taking the share which their parents would have taken if living, in equal parts[.] Section 2-4-101. (a) If for purposes of intestate succession, a relationship of parent and child shall be established to determine succession by, through or from a person: (i) An adopted person is the child of an adopting parent and of the natural parents for inheritance purposes only. The adoption of a child by the spouse of a natural parent has no effect on the relationship between the child and that natural parent; (ii) An adopted person shall inherit from all other relatives of an adoptive parent as though he was the natural child of the adoptive parent and the relatives shall inherit from the adoptive persons estate as if they were his relatives [.] Section 2-4-107 (emphasis added). [¶ 11] Section 2-4-107(a)(ii) explicitly establishes the adopted person inherits the same as any other member of the adoptive parent's family and provides mutuality by requiring the relatives of the adoptive parent shall inherit from the adopted person as well. In addressing the respective rights of the adopted person and the relatives of the adoptive parent, the legislature was silent on the inheritance rights of an adopted person's biological relatives. The adoption statutes, on the other hand, act to terminate the legal relationship between the biological parents and the adopted child. Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 1-22-114, 14-2-317 (LexisNexis 2003). When the legislature adopts a statute, we presume it does so with full knowledge of the existing state of the law with reference to the statute's subject matter. Fosler, 13 P.3d at 693. However, where a statute enumerates the subjects or things on which it is to operate, or the persons affected, we construe it as excluding from its effect all those subjects and things not expressly mentioned. Town of Pine Bluffs v. State Board of Equalization, 79 Wyo. 262, 333 P.2d 700 (1958). Each of these statutes is silent on the critical issue in this case. This gap in the statutory scheme was likely unintended. We are left with the difficult task of filling that gap, and, to do so, we read these statutes in pari materia. When read together, Wyoming's adoption statutes and intestacy statutes are unambiguous as to the question presented in this case. [¶ 12] Since adoption was not considered at common law, we must strictly construe adoption statutes. JK ex rel. DK v. MK, 5 P.3d 782 (Wyo.2000). Strict construction of Wyoming's adoption statutes suggests that the legislature ultimately intended for adoption to sever all rights of the biological family members. Section 1-22-114 provides that the former parent, guardian or putative father of the child shall have no right .... and [t]he adopting persons shall have all the rights.... Siblings obtain their inheritance rights as a result of their relationship with their parents. If the former parents have no such rights, it logically follows that neither do the siblings because one is only a brother and/or a sister as a result of one's relationship to one's parents. When that parental relationship is terminated as a matter of law, so are the rights of biological siblings that derived from that relationship. [¶ 13] Likewise, the intestacy statutes are to be strictly construed. Fosler, 13 P.3d at 692. Those statutes create inheritance rights in the decedent's sisters and brothers. Webster's Dictionary defines sister as a female human being having the same parents as another person. Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary 1102 (1991). Similarly, Webster's defines brother as, a male who has the same parents as another, or one parent in common with another. Id. at 182. In the case of an adoption, siblings, in the legal sense, are those within the adoptive family. Further, to determine what was intended when the legislature used the terms brother and sister in the intestacy statutes, we must first understand mother and father. The gist of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 14-2-501 (LexisNexis 2003) is this: a mother-child relationship is established by adoption of the child; similarly, a father-child relationship is also established by adoption of the child. Thus, when referring to mother and father, § 2-4-101 is plain and unambiguous in the context of adoption. Mother refers to the adoptive mother, who is given all rights by § 1-22-114. Father refers to the adoptive father, who is also given all rights by § 1-22-114. [¶ 14] The only connection statutorily preserved between the biological family and the adopted child is the express right of the adopted child to inherit from his biological parents. Section 2-4-107(a)(i). However, this statute's plain and unambiguous language provides the adoptee remains a child of the biological parents for inheritance purposes only. The statute does not say the inheritance relationship is a two-way street or the biological parents remain the father and mother for inheritance or any other purpose. To that end, the strictest interpretation of § 2-4-107 is therefore unequivocally one-sided and does not establish mutuality. [¶ 15] Carol Marafioti and Jean Lien contend in their appellees' brief a brother is a brother, and a sister is a sister, even after adoption. However, the effect of the adoption decree changes the legal relationship between the adopted child and his biological family and between the adopted child and his adoptive family. Section 1-22-114 provides: (a) Upon the entry of a final decree of adoption the former parent, guardian or putative father of the child shall have no right to the control or custody of the child. The adopting persons shall have all of the rights and obligations respecting the child as if they were natural parents. (b) Adopted persons may assume the surname of the adoptive parent. They are entitled to the same rights of person and property as children and heirs at law of the persons who adopted them. (Emphasis added). [¶ 16] The adoption decree severs the relationship between the child and his biological parents and creates a new and exclusive parent-child relationship between the child and the adoptive parents. This Court has recognized the import of the severance from the biological parents and the new unity with the adoptive parents: A decree of adoption tears asunder forever the parent-child relationship and for all legal and practical purposes, that child is the same as dead to the parent affected. The parent has lost the right to ever again see the child or even know of his whereabouts. Voss v. Ralston, 550 P.2d 481, 485 (Wyo.1976). A New York case extends this view logically: Although there is nothing in the adoption law that says that rights between the adopted child and his natural brothers and sisters have been terminated or destroyed, nevertheless, when the natural parents relinquished their rights, the foundation or substructure which joined the blood relatives with the adopted child was removed. Therefore, natural blood relatives who must trace their relationship through a natural parent may not inherit or take from the adopted [child]. In re Accounting of Fodor (Estate of Adler), 202 Misc. 1100, 117 N.Y.S.2d 331, 334 (N.Y.1952) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). When a child is given up for adoption, his natural parents have, in effect, destroyed the mythical cord which nature provided to bind them with the child, and the adoption has the effect of excluding the natural parents and all the natural kindred and blood relatives of the child from inheriting from the adopted child. Id. at 333 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). [¶ 17] The preceding cases are consistent with settled principles of Wyoming law regarding severing the legal relationship between adopted children and their biological parents. For instance, Rist v. Taylor, 955 P.2d 436 (Wyo.1998), states that a second adoption severs the child's previously existing rights of inheritance from his first adoptive parent. JS v. FV (Adoption of RDS), 787 P.2d 968, 970 (Wyo.1990) cut off the adopted child's relationship with his natural grandmother because it was violative of public policy. Although the facts of Rist and RDS differ from those in this case, the principle of an adopted child being legally severed from the biological family has remained steadfast throughout our jurisprudence. An adopted child cannot live in limbo, nor can his adoptive or biological family, after the adoption is finalized. Moreover, to say that adoption severs previously existing rights of inheritance in some members of the biological family but not others would be against public policy. Adoption severs all rights of biological family members, including their right to inherit from the adopted child. [¶ 18] We have long recognized adopted children's rights to inherit equally within their adoptive family. This Court, prior to any statute addressing the subject, found adopted children should be treated the same as biological children. Moralee v. Cadwell, 26 Wyo. 412, 186 P. 499 (1920) found that the adoptive brother and sister were at a minimum entitled to share equally with the decedent's biological sister. Cadwell quoted the Washington Supreme Court: One of the rights or privileges of a natural child is to inherit from a brother or sister, a natural son or daughter of the same parents. If the adopted child does not have the same right, then it is denied a right or privilege which the natural child has. Id. at 501 (quoting McManis v. Lloyd (Masterson's Estate), 108 Wash.307, 183 P.93, 94 (1919)). Cadwell noted that the Washington court held an adopted sister was entitled to inherit along with the biological brothers and sisters of one dying without issue, a husband, a wife, a father, or a mother. Id. The quote from McManis, however, focuses on children (adopted and biological) within the same family. Both Washington and Wyoming, in McManis and Cadwell, take special care to treat equally the children within the same family. [¶ 19] In the instant case, the children are from two different families. The Rosettis relinquished their rights as parents to the two boys and gave those rights to the Kirkpatricks. The adoption terminated the Rosettis' parent/child relationship with John and Edward Kirkpatrick. Cadwell further illuminates the definition of brother or sister. The specific language, [o]ne of the rights and privileges of a natural child is to inherit from a brother or sister, a natural son or daughter of the same parents, explains that having the same parents is an inherent part of being a brother or a sister. Cadwell, 186 P. at 501. If that parent/child relationship is terminated by adoption and established in new, adoptive parents, the right to inherit is derived from the adoptive parents and flows down the family tree to the siblings who share the same parents in the eyes of the law. [¶ 20] Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we must consider and clarify Randall, 506 P.2d 432. In that case, Mr. Randall died intestate, leaving an adoptive brother and sister and a biological sister. Id. at 432. The trial court determined that only the biological sister could inherit. This Court reversed, relying primarily on the Wyoming adoption statute then in place, which provided (as does today's statute) that adopted children have the same rights as biological children. In analyzing Randall, the district court in the instant case concluded: The distribution statute considered in Randall, although renumbered, has not been subsequently amended to a degree that would destroy the precedent established by the Wyoming Supreme Court in 1973. However, the court overlooked an important detail. The Randall court interpreted the statutes as they existed at the date of decedent's death: § 2-37, W.S.1957: ... the estate of any intestate shall descend and be distributed as follows: 2. If there be no children, nor their descendants, then to his father, mother, brothers and sisters, and to the descendants of brothers and sisters who are dead (the descendants, collectively, taking the share which their parents would have taken if living), in equal parts; and § 1-721, W.S.1957: Minor children, adopted as aforesaid, shall assume the surname of the persons by whom they are adopted, and shall be entitled to the same rights of person and property as children or heirs-at-law of the persons thus adopting them, unless the rights of property should be excepted in the agreement of adoption. Id. at 433 (footnote omitted). [¶ 21] Because rights of inheritance vest immediately on the death of intestate and devolutionary rights must be determined in relation to the date, id. at 433 n. 1, and Mr. Randall died in 1966, the Randall court was precluded from considering a 1969 amendment to § 1-721. Park County ex rel. Park County Welfare Department v. Blackburn, 394 P.2d 793, 794 (Wyo.1964). The 1969 amendment read: Provided further that adopted persons shall inherit from all other relatives of the adoptive parents as though they were the natural children of such parents and the relatives shall inherit from the adopted [persons'] estate as if they were their relatives in fact. Randall, 506 P.2d at 433 n. 2 (emphasis added). [1] This statute established inheritance mutuality within the adoptive family only. The legislature chose to say nothing about the biological family members' inheritance rights surviving adoption. Since those rights are purely statutory, the legislature's silence must be interpreted as intending to create no such rights. Had Mr. Randall died after the 1969 amendment, we believe strict construction of the statutes would have mandated a different result. [2] Also, the Randall court did not directly address the question presented in this case: Whether biological siblings outside of the adoptive family are entitled to inherit from an adopted sibling.