Opinion ID: 780239
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Appointment of a Legal Representative

Text: 26 Having determined that the application of estoppel was inappropriate, we must now decide whether the District Court was nonetheless correct in dismissing Christian Gibbs's claims as time-barred according to the provision in the passenger ticket contract limiting the time to bring suit to one year.
27 The Gibbses contend that the time-bar was not triggered because Christian Gibbs's complaint was filed within the safe-harbor of 46 U.S.C. § 183b(c), which mandates the tolling of suit time-bars in passenger ticket contracts for minors who suffer injury aboard maritime carriers. This statute provides in relevant part: 28 If a person who is entitled to recover on any such claim is ... a minor ... any lawful limitation of time prescribed in such contract shall not be applicable so long as no legal representative has been appointed for such ... minor ... but shall be applicable from the date of the appointment of such legal representative: Provided, however, that such appointment be made within three years after the date of such death or injury. 29 The statute does not specify the process by which a legal representative is appointed. Carnival contends that this appointment occurred on or about March 25, 1999, when the Gibbses retained counsel and notified Carnival that Suzanne Gibbs was appointed guardian ad litem for Christian. The Gibbses respond that under New Jersey Court Rule 4:26-2(b)(2), in negligence actions a parent shall not be deemed to be appointed guardian ad litem of the child without court order until the filing of a pleading or certificate signed by an attorney. Id. Therefore, they submit that Suzanne Gibbs was not appointed legal representative of Christian Gibbs within the meaning of § 183b(c) until the Gibbses filed their complaint before the District Court. Since the complaint was filed on August 21, 2000, well before the three-year limit to appoint a legal representative specified in the statute, the Gibbses argue that the time-bar provision in the passenger ticket contract did not expire. 30 While the New Jersey Court Rule is relevant to our inquiry and will be discussed further in the next section, we do not begin our analysis with this Court Rule. Instead, we must look to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 17, which explains the capacity of a party to sue or be sued, and may therefore be used to determine how a person is appointed a legal representative within the meaning of § 183b(c). We apply the Federal Rules instead of the New Jersey Court Rules because state rules regarding the appointment of guardians ad litem are procedural and therefore do not apply, in the first instance, to cases brought in federal courts. See M.S. v. Wermers, 557 F.2d 170, 174 n. 4 (8th Cir.1977); 6A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1571, at 511-12 (1991); see generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471-72, 85 S.Ct. 1136, 14 L.Ed.2d 8 (1965) (federal courts apply on-point Federal Rules of Civil Procedure instead of state procedural practices).
31 Fed.R.Civ.P. 17 prescribes a two-part inquiry. Rule 17(b) incorporates state law practice and provides, The capacity of an individual, other than one acting in a representative capacity, to sue or be sued shall be determined by the law of the individual's domicile. Rule 17(c) refers specifically to infants: 32 Whenever an infant or incompetent person has a representative, such as a general guardian, committee, conservator, or other like fiduciary, the representative may sue or defend on behalf of the infant or incompetent person. An infant or incompetent person who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. The court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such other order as it seems proper for the protection of the infant or incompetent person. 33 Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c) (emphasis added). 34 Under this two-step process, a federal court must first determine whether the infant has a duly appointed representative who has the capacity to bring the action on behalf of the infant. McSparran v. Weist, 402 F.2d 867, 869 (3d Cir.1968). Rule 17(b) instructs the court to look at the law of the individual's domicile, in this case New Jersey, to ascertain whether a representative has been duly appointed. Hence, we apply the New Jersey Court Rules. 35 N.J. Court Rule 4:26-2(b)(2) states that the Appointment of Parent in Negligence Actions as guardian ad litem is not consummated until the filing of a pleading or certificate signed by the attorney containing certain relevant information, including a statement showing the absence of a conflict of interest between parent and child. Under the plain meaning of this rule, Suzanne Gibbs was not appointed guardian ad litem because she never filed any papers with a court. New Jersey vests sole authority of appointment in negligence actions in courts, not private actors, in order to ensure that the child's interests are protected. See Moscatello ex rel. Moscatello v. Univ. of Med. and Dentistry of N.J., 342 N.J. Super. 351, 360-61, 776 A.2d 874 (2001) (noting that a child's separate claim for tort damages cannot be prosecuted except by a guardian ad litem and that a court must authorize a guardian's settlement of a child's cause of action). Absent the filing of papers before a court, Suzanne Gibbs cannot be construed as having the capacity to sue on behalf of her son under Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(b). 36 Next we look to Rule 17(c). It explains that [a]n infant ... who does not have a duly appointed representative may sue by a next friend or by a guardian ad litem. Since Suzanne Gibbs had not been duly appointed guardian ad litem under New Jersey law, [t]he court shall appoint a guardian ad litem for an infant ... not otherwise represented in an action or shall make such order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 17(c). A district court need not look to the state law, however, in determining what factors or procedures to use when appointing the guardian ad litem. See M.S., 557 F.2d at 174 n. 4. Rather, its polestar appears to be the protection of the infant's interests. See Garrick v. Weaver, 888 F.2d 687, 693 (10th Cir.1989); Noe v. True, 507 F.2d 9, 11-12 (6th Cir.1974). This makes particular sense when appointing a legal representative within the scope of 46 U.S.C. S 183b(c), since that statute is designed to protect injured infants by ensuring that proper legal representation is appointed who will advance the best interests of the child. See Fugaro v. Royal Caribbean Cruises Ltd., 851 F.Supp. 122, 125 n. 3 (S.D.N.Y.1994). 37 In their complaint before the District Court, the Gibbses specified that Christian Gibbs is to be represented by Suzanne Gibbs as his guardian ad litem. There appears to be no conflict of interest between Suzanne Gibbs and her son, nor any other reason why she might not protect Christian's interests. Therefore, we detect no reason to suggest that the District Court should not have accepted the appointment of Suzanne Gibbs as guardian ad litem for Christian in this action. Because no legal representative for Christian Gibbs had been appointed until the Gibbses commenced the instant action before the District Court, where a legal representative was first appointed for Christian, we hold that his claims against Carnival are not time-barred under the special tolling provisions for minors in § 183b(c).