Opinion ID: 3214358
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Purpose and History of the 2011 Decree

Text: Our case law instructs district courts deciding a motion to vacate a consent decree to first consider “the more general goals of the decree.” Otter, 643 F.3d at 288 (quoting Youngblood v. Dalzell, 925 F.2d 954, 960 (6th Cir. 1991)). Then the court should examine defendants’ entire “record of compliance.” Id. (quoting Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 491 (1992)). We have reversed a district court’s termination of a consent decree for failing to explicitly consider the “goals of the decree[]” and only evaluating compliance with individual action items. Id. at 289. The district court overlooked the teachings of Otter. Nowhere in its terse minute order did it mention the defendants’ record of compliance—either with the 2011 Decree or its predecessor—“which over the course of the litigation has been far from exemplary.” Id. at 288. Nor did it analyze whether the purposes of the 2011 Decree had been “adequately served” by defendants. Id. at 289. The dissent claims that the district court identified the purpose of the decree by explaining that Rouser initially brought suit for, and entered into a settlement that governs, his “right to practice his religion, Wicca.” See Diss. at 38. But these passing observations don’t satisfy Otter’s requirement that a district court give “[e]xplicit consideration [to] the goals of the decree[].” 643 F.3d at 289. Nor do they comply with Otter’s requirement that the district court find 10 ROUSER V. WHITE that “those goals have been adequately served” before vacating the decree. Id. This alone provides sufficient grounds for reversing the order vacating the decree. Id. But there’s much more. Because the case must be returned to the district court, we note numerous other errors so that they will not be repeated on remand.