Opinion ID: 5128872
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Scholz I 1

Text: In line with the FTCA’s administrative exhaustion requirements, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), Scholz first submitted a form SF95 claim for damage, injury, or death to the Milwaukee VA on September 9, 2013. Her 2013 administrative claim focused on her breast reduction surgery and resultant “severe physical 1The district court took judicial notice of the Scholz I record. See Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp. v. Lease Resol. Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080-81 (7th Cir. 1997); Doherty v. City of Chicago, 75 F.3d 318, 324 n.4 (7th Cir. 1996). 4 No. 20-2163 disfigurement and permanent physical, mental and emotional disabilities.” In this initial step of administrative review, she alleged that her physician team at the Zablocki VAMC “failed to obtain proper informed consent prior to [her breast reduction] surgery and this failure was a cause of injury as [she] would not have undergone the surgery had she been properly informed.” She alleged this initial negligent action resulted in “on-going treatment and additional … painful surgeries … which have impacted her physical, mental and emotional health.” Scholz’s September 2013 administrative claims were denied on April 2, 2014. Relevant to this appeal, the denial letter apprised dissatisfied claimants of available paths for reconsideration, including the option to file a federal lawsuit within six months of the denial, but qualified this guidance with the following caveat: Please note that FTCA claims are governed by a combination of Federal and state laws. Some state laws may limit or bar a claim or law suit. VA attorneys handling FTCA claims work for the Federal government, and cannot provide advice regarding the impact of state laws or state filing requirements. On September 26, 2014, Scholz filed a request for reconsideration with the VA General Counsel. In its October 14, 2014, acknowledgment of receipt of Scholz’s request for reconsideration, the VA once again warned Scholz about the combination of state and federal law governing FTCA claims, providing the same caveat listed above that appeared in the April 2, 2014, denial. No. 20-2163 5 Scholz filed another form SF-95 on March 7, 2015, adding allegations of negligent mental health treatment at the Tomah VAMC “[c]ommencing on or about January 1, 2011, and continuing thereafter for years” claiming “[s]he was placed in a dangerous situation through improper prescriptions of medications” and “was unable to properly care for herself resulting in permanent mental, emotional and physical injury.” In denying this request on September 8, 2015, regional counsel included information about filing a request for reconsideration with the VA General Counsel and the option for filing suit in federal district court, but it did not include the twicereceived disclaimer regarding the impact of state laws and state filing requirements on filing a suit in federal court. On October 3, 2015, Scholz filed a request for reconsideration with the VA General Counsel. In its October 15, 2015, acknowledgment of receipt of request for reconsideration, the VA again mirrored the previous disclaimer that “[s]ome state laws may limit or bar a claim or law suit” relating to FTCA claims and “VA attorneys handling FTCA claims work for the Federal government, and cannot provide advice regarding the impact of state laws or state filing requirements.” On February 18, 2016, the VA issued a final decision upon reconsideration, denying both Scholz’s 2013 claim relating to her breast reduction surgery and her 2015 claim relating to her mental health treatment in a joint decision. This denial stated: This denial is the last action we will take on this tort claim. If your client wishes to pursue this claim further, she may file suit in Federal dis- trict court within 6 months from the date at the top of this letter. 6 No. 20-2163 … Please note that FTCA claims are governed by a combination of Federal and state laws. Some state laws may limit or bar a claim or law suit. VA attorneys handling FTCA claims work for the Federal government, and cannot provide advice regarding the impact of state laws or state filing requirements. Thereafter, Scholz filed Scholz I—a two-count complaint based on her 2013 and 2015 administrative claims—in federal district court on August 8, 2016. The complaint implicated concerns about both Scholz’s mental health treatment and her breast reduction surgery. Scholz’s complaint alleged that after her tour of service, she was treated for various mental health issues at the Tomah VAMC in 2011 and 2012 and had been prescribed as many as sixteen active medications during that time. As detailed in the complaint, on January 6, 2012, around the time of Scholz’s Tomah VAMC treatment, a medical team at Zablocki VAMC performed a bilateral breast reduction surgery on Scholz. With respect to that procedure, Scholz alleged the operating surgeons failed to obtain informed consent, despite her “diminished mental status.” After the surgery, several distressing post-operative complications arose, which required four additional corrective surgeries over two years. Of note, the Zablocki VAMC surgeons flagged “self mutilation” as a contributing factor. At a high level, the two counts asserted claims of “negligence and professional malpractice in connection with medical care provided to Plaintiff Scholz by the Department of Veteran Affairs at the Tomah Veterans Affairs Medical Center, the Zablocki Veterans Affairs Medical Center, and outpatient No. 20-2163 7 programs.” Framed by Scholz as part of her medical negligence claim, the complaint also briefly alleged that the VA was negligent in failing to timely provide her records from the Tomah VAMC, despite her formal requests for them. 2 The district court began by dismissing Scholz’s claim of negligent hiring, supervision, or retention because she had failed to exhaust administrative remedies for any such claim, which the FTCA requires. 28 U.S.C. § 2675. Separately, the district court found Scholz was not alleging a standalone tort based on an alleged duty to provide medical records, but instead “offer[ed] these details only in support of her medical malpractice claim.” Next, the district court denied as untimely Scholz’s motion to amend her complaint to increase her requested damages from $2.5 million to $4 million because Scholz had not provided good cause for the delay. After the close of discovery, both parties then filed motions for summary judgment. As relevant to this appeal, the United States moved for partial summary judgment on Scholz’s claim of medical malpractice involving the 2011 treatment she received from providers at the Tomah VAMC, arguing the claim was time-barred. Scholz countered that her 2 The Scholz I complaint states that the defendant “had a duty to provide patient treatment records and notice of deficiencies in patient care at the Tomah VAMC to all other treatment facilities and to patients” and “breached its duty by negligently failing to ensure that patient treatment records and deficiencies in care were timely communicated to all VAMC health care providers and to [Scholz].” When pressed on this, Scholz clarified the “claim is that her medical records and unstable mental condition [were] not provided to other VA healthcare providers and VA facilities that were treating her and resulted in injury. This lack of continuity of care is part of [Scholz’s] medical negligence claim.” 8 No. 20-2163 claims encompassed her ongoing outpatient treatment, as well. Scholz’s response relied on a “continuous treatment doctrine”—essentially, Scholz argued defendant’s wrongful conduct was ongoing—to support her claim the statute of limitations had not run. To support her continuous treatment theory, Scholz offered declarations from her two proffered experts, Dr. Lawrence Amsel and Dr. Jill Johnson. Dr. Amsel explained his opinion that “[d]uring the years 2011 through 2018 [Scholz’s psychiatrist] Dr. Dy continued prescribing medications that had been negligently prescribed at the Tomah VAMC” and “Dr. Dy admitted that on 25 different occasions during the years 2011 to 2018 he received pharmacy warnings about the unsafe medication combinations he was prescribing but continuously ignored the warnings and ordered them for” Scholz. Summarizing the “entire record in this case,” Dr. Amsel saw “evidence of on-going continuous negligent mental health treatment practices affecting the Plaintiff’s treatment during the years 2011 through the present at the Tomah VAMC, Zablocki VAMC, and VA outpatient clinics.” Dr. Johnson similarly opined that “the pharmaceutical treatment rendered to the Plaintiff by the Department of Veterans Affairs commencing during Plaintiff’s treatment at the Tomah VAMC, and continuing in the Zablocki VAMC and outpatient clinics during the years 2011 through 2017 … failed to meet the required standard of care of reasonable health care providers and was a cause of injury to” Scholz. In short, Scholz’s experts made the case that the government’s tortious conduct continued well past 2011 and into 2017 or 2018. Separate from the government’s motion, Scholz filed a motion for summary judgment of her own for, among other No. 20-2163 9 claims, her claim that she “was deprived of her basic right to informed consent for her mental health treatment.” Echoing the declarations of Dr. Amsel and Dr. Johnson, she again contended in this motion that there were “years of continuing mental health treatment at the VA” and that the government’s wrongdoing occurred both during her time at the Tomah VAMC and Zablocki VAMC but also “in her subsequent outpatient treatment.” Considering these motions, as well as the expert witness proffers, the district court granted the government’s motion, denied Scholz’s motion, and largely prohibited Scholz from introducing her expert’s declarations and testimony because their opinions were not timely disclosed. The court held that Scholz’s claims of negligent mental health treatment at the Tomah VAMC were barred by Wisconsin’s statute of limitations and statute of repose, rejecting as insufficiently supported Scholz’s argument about a course of continuing negligent treatment. The court also denied Scholz’s motion for summary judgment. Reflecting later, the court said “[t]his phase did not go well for the plaintiff, largely because of errors made by her attorney.” The district court denied Scholz’s subsequent motion for reconsideration, underscoring the impropriety of introducing new evidence, rehashing previously rejected arguments, or developing arguments for the first time at this stage of litigation. The district court rejected any attempt by Scholz to assert an estoppel argument at this stage as forfeited for failure to present in her initial response to the government’s motion for summary judgment. The district court also denied Scholz’s motions throughout litigation for sanctions against the 10 No. 20-2163 government for violating discovery rules, engaging in misconduct, and spoliation of evidence. After much of this pre-trial litigation, the district court judge recused himself. Scholz’s remaining claims were tried at a bench trial in March 2021. At trial, the court considered evidence concerning Scholz’s mental health treatment provided by the VA, including the testimony of Dr. Amsel, Dr. Johnson, and the pharmacy records over those years. The court commented that “plaintiff’s counsel pa[id] some attention to all aspects of Scholz’s treatment, but [did] not pay[] meaningful attention to … the more meritorious components of her complaint,” which “resulted in an evidentiary shortfall regarding meaningful aspects of Scholz’s claims.” Nevertheless, the court found negligence causing injury in a narrow aspect of Scholz’s VA treatment—the failure to coordinate mental health care at and after the time she underwent a procedure to address a traumatic post-operative complication. Finding that Scholz only met her burden of proof to this limited extent, the court awarded $200,000 for pain, suffering, and mental anguish. Final judgment in this matter is pending for review of Scholz’s request for all applicable costs and fees pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d).