Opinion ID: 2519810
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Pennsylvania v. Ritchie

Text: The majority further seeks to support its Brady/Pitchess interpretation by pointing to the high court decision in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie (1987) 480 U.S. 39, 107 S.Ct. 989, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 ( Ritchie) as authorizing trial court review of information that (like police officer personnel records) enjoys a `qualified statutory confidentiality' to determine whether it includes material exculpatory evidence subject to disclosure under Brady. ... (Maj. opn., ante, 124 Cal.Rptr.2d at p. 212, 52 P.3d at p. 137.) The Ritchie framework, however, is inapplicable to Pitchess documents that are over five years old. Specifically, Ritchie held that an in-chambers review of Children and Youth Services (CYS) privileged documents for Brady material was appropriate because the high court correctly assumed that CYS could provide the file for such an in-chambers review. ( Ritchie, supra, 480 U.S. at pp. 57-60, 107 S.Ct. 989.) In this manner, the Ritchie review procedure is similar to the Pitchess review scheme as it relates to documents under five years old. (See Evid.Code, § 915.) Ritchie, however, did not address the situation present here, where police agencies can destroy any relevant and material Pitchess document older than five years. And as such documents are systematically destroyed, the Ritchie scheme is effectively nullified because there is no method by which an in-chambers review can be conducted. The majority thus leaves the prosecutor in a classic Catch 22 situation: he is obligated to turn over documents that no longer exist. This constitutes a violation of Brady, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses and the right to due process. [6]