Opinion ID: 589967
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: McNeil's Good Faith

Text: 57 Evidence of intentional copying by a junior user may be indicative of an intent to create a confusing similarity between the products. Charles of the Ritz Group v. Quality King Distrib., 832 F.2d 1317, 1322 (2d Cir.1987). Although this factor alone is not dispositive, it bolsters a finding of consumer confusion. Id. 58 The district court here found that McNeil intentionally copied elements of Bristol's trade dress. There is evidence in the record to support that finding. McNeil concededly was aware of Bristol's trade dress. There was evidence that the target market for Tylenol PM was the Excedrin PM user. Evidence also existed tending to show that the similarities in the trade dresses were raised by McNeil employees during the design process. There were many proposed trade dresses that did not incorporate substantial aspects of the Excedrin PM trade dress yet, as the district court noted, every choice [McNeil] made brought it closer to the EXCEDRIN PM trade dress. An internal memorandum regarding the text to be placed on the package stated that it should appear as in Excedrin PM. Based on this and other evidence in the record, the district court was not clearly erroneous in finding that McNeil had not exercised good faith in adopting its trade dress. 59 Although there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's finding with regard to McNeil's good faith, McNeil argues that the district court erred in rejecting, without receiving additional evidence, the findings of the magistrate judge, who had found that McNeil acted in good faith. District courts may designate a magistrate judge to conduct hearings and to submit to the district court proposed findings of fact and dispositions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). If a party files objections to those findings, as both parties did in this case, the district court is to 60 make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made. [The district court] may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate. The judge may also receive further evidence. 61 Id. at 636(b)(1). McNeil argues that before a district court may reject credibility findings of a magistrate judge it must recall witnesses and hear and observe them itself. We disagree. 62 McNeil's reliance on dicta from United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 681 n. 7, 100 S.Ct. 2406, 2415 n. 7, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980), is unavailing. In that case, a criminal prosecution, the Court expressed skepticism as to whether a district court could reject dispositive findings of credibility without seeing and hearing the witnesses. Arguably, the rejection of the magistrate judge's conclusion by the district court was not based on witness credibility in this case. Moreover, we have indicated that the Raddatz dicta may be inapplicable outside the criminal context, see Moore v. Ross, 687 F.2d 604, 609 n. 5 (2d Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1115, 103 S.Ct. 750, 74 L.Ed.2d 969 (1983), and where, as here, the civil party has raised no objection on those grounds before the trial court we will not reverse the district court's findings on that ground. 63