Opinion ID: 4521869
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Defendant’s Right to Confrontation

Text: On May 11, 2011, with one remaining witness left to testify at the guilt phase, the prosecution informed the trial court that they would not be calling Smith to the stand. The trial court permitted the prosecution to lay the foundation for the recorded conversation between Smith and defendant through Detective Abdul’s testimony. Detective Abdul testified 20 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. that he placed a recording device on Smith’s person. After defense counsel recounted Smith’s criminal history, Detective Abdul replied he did not know “how extensive his criminal history was.” Detective Abdul denied offering Smith any advantage or reward for cooperating with authorities and also denied counseling Smith on what to say to defendant. However, the detective admitted he knew that at the time of the recorded conversation, Smith was awaiting sentencing and “facing a fairly substantial federal prison term” after pleading guilty to selling cocaine to an undercover agent. After Detective Abdul testified, the jury heard (and later received a transcript of) the entirety of the recorded conversation. In admitting the transcript and tape of the recorded conversation into evidence, the trial court concluded Smith’s statements were not being offered for the truth of the matter asserted and were, therefore, admissible as nonhearsay. As to defendant’s recorded statements, the trial court found that while the statements constituted hearsay, they were admissible under the exception for an admission against penal interest. Outside the presence of the jury, defense counsel raised a “standing objection”—i.e., referring to previously raised objections based on the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution—to the admission of the recorded conversation between Smith and defendant. Defense counsel also specifically raised a hearsay objection based on Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. 36 and requested that the court give a clarifying instruction on the jury’s permitted use of Smith’s statements. The trial court told defense counsel to draft an appropriate instruction, which the court said it would take up later. 21 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. On appeal, defendant focuses on Smith’s statements, the admission of which he claims violated his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and the restrictions against testimonial statements. (Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59; U.S. Const., 6th Amend. [“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him”]; see Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7, 14 & 15.) Claiming prejudice, defendant asserts Smith’s statements were the “force majeure” of the prosecution’s case, without which there would be little evidence against defendant. Generally speaking, a declarant’s hearsay statement is testimonial if made “with a primary purpose of creating an outof-court substitute for trial testimony.” (Michigan v. Bryant (2011) 562 U.S. 344, 358.) Notwithstanding the lack of a comprehensive definition of “testimonial” (Ohio v. Clark (2015) __ U.S. __, __ [135 S.Ct. 2173, 2179]), the high court has nonetheless emphasized that only hearsay statements that are “testimonial” are subject to the confrontation clause. (Davis v. Washington (2006) 547 U.S. 813, 821; Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 53 [“even if the Sixth Amendment is not solely concerned with testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object”].) “It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon hearsay evidence, is not subject to the Confrontation Clause.” (Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 821; see People v. Cage (2007) 40 Cal.4th 965, 984.) The admission of nonhearsay statements, it follows, “raises no Confrontation Clause concerns.” (Tennessee v. Street (1985) 471 U.S. 409, 414; see Crawford, supra, 541 U.S. at p. 59, fn. 9; People v. Cage, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 975, fn. 6; Evid. Code, § 1200.) 22 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. With this legal backdrop, we have set out a two-step inquiry to determine the admissibility of out-of-court statements in criminal cases: “The first step is a traditional hearsay inquiry: Is the statement one made out of court; is it offered to prove the truth of the facts it asserts; and does it fall under a hearsay exception? If a hearsay statement is being offered by the prosecution in a criminal case, and the Crawford limitations of unavailability, as well as cross-examination or forfeiture, are not satisfied, a second analytical step is required. Admission of such a statement violates the right to confrontation if the statement is testimonial hearsay, as the high court defines that term.” (People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, 680; see People v. Blacksher (2011) 52 Cal.4th 769, 811 (Blacksher).) In the context of an interrogation, as used in the colloquial and not legal sense, “ ‘it is in the final analysis the declarant’s statements, not the interrogator’s questions, that the Confrontation Clause requires us to evaluate.’ . . . An interrogator’s questions, unlike a declarant’s answers, do not assert the truth of any matter.” (Michigan v. Bryant, supra, 562 U.S. at p. 367, fn. 11, quoting Davis v. Washington, supra, 547 U.S. at p. 822, fn. 1.) In that regard, the high court has also noted that statements made unknowingly to an informant or statements between fellow prisoners are “clearly nontestimonial.” (Davis v. Washington, at p. 825, citing Bourjaily v. United States (1987) 483 U.S. 171, 181-184, Dutton v. Evans (1970) 400 U.S. 74, 87-89 (plur. opn. of Stewart, J).) In this case, the prosecution maintained that statements by Smith, an undercover informant who befriended defendant in federal detention and prompted him to confess to Pamela’s murder, were not hearsay in the first place because Smith’s statements were not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. 23 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. For example, in response to defense counsel’s argument that it was Smith who “leads and cons, and . . . directs” defendant to confess, the prosecution relied on Smith’s statements to show that Smith did not threaten or intimidate defendant into making incriminating statements. Smith’s statements were nonhearsay and admissible to put defendant’s “admissions on the tapes into context, making the admissions intelligible for the jury. Statements providing context for other admissible statements are not hearsay because they are not offered for their truth.” (U.S. v. Tolliver (7th Cir. 2006) 454 F.3d 660, 666, fn. omitted.) Though conceding that the statements were originally admitted for this nonhearsay purpose, defendant claims that the prosecution “repeatedly used Smith’s statements for the truth of the matter by arguing that the jury should find Smith’s taped statements to be credible.” We reject this claim. Contrary to defendant’s contention, by telling the jury, “[I]s there anything that makes you suspect that Shawn Smith is not being truthful? No because you can hear every syllable that comes out of his mouth,” the prosecution was not vouching for Smith’s credibility. Impermissible vouching “ ‘ “involves an attempt to bolster a witness by reference to facts outside the record.” ’ ” (People v. Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206, italics added.) Here, the prosecution urged the jury to focus on the admissible evidence: “I am not asking you to take Shawn Smith’s word for anything. I am not saying, yeah, Shawn Smith says that James Fayed said this. You can hear for yourself on the DVD, on the tape.” Moreover, the issue was not the truth or falsity of Smith’s statements—for instance, whether Smith actually knew a hitman named “Tony” who would kill Moya if defendant wanted—but whether Smith had made the 24 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J. statements. Out-of-court statements are inadmissible hearsay “only when they are offered for the same purpose as testimony of a witness on the stand and therefore depend for probative value on the credibility of the declarant.” (1 Witkin, Cal. Evidence (5th ed. 2012) Hearsay, § 5, p. 788, italics added.) In the strictest sense, Smith’s credibility was not at issue because his out-of-court statements were not offered for their truth. It bears emphasis that both sides thoroughly discussed Smith’s credibility (or lack thereof) at trial. When crossexamining Detective Abdul, defense counsel underscored Smith’s “extensive criminal history,” and recounted each of Smith’s convictions. In closing argument, defense counsel called Smith: “Drug addict. Convicted. Felon in possession of firearms. Drunk driver. Hit and run driver.” In conclusion, defense counsel submitted: “[T]his man is no good. This man is evil. And no good comes from evil.” For its part, the prosecution was not “hiding” the fact that Smith was a convicted drug dealer. Far from vouching for Smith’s credibility, the prosecution conceded that Smith was not a trustworthy individual but was instead, in the prosecution’s words, “a crook and a criminal.” Nevertheless, as the prosecution emphasized, the recorded conversation spoke for itself: “It wouldn’t matter who was in the cell next to [defendant]. Mr. Fayed, it is his words that are being used against him.” Moreover, regarding any motive for Smith to lie, the jury heard that while Detective Abdul denied that he offered Smith any benefit in exchange for recording his conversation with defendant, Detective Abdul admitted he was aware that Smith was released early after cooperating with authorities. 25 PEOPLE v. FAYED Opinion of the Court by Chin, J.