Opinion ID: 2625630
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Asserted error in responding to a question by the jury concerning section 190.3, factor (k) and the absence of remorse

Text: Defendant contends that the court erred in responding to a question posed by the jury during deliberations. According to defendant, the court's response directed that remorse not be considered as a factor in mitigation, and indeed that absence of remorse should be considered in aggravation. He claims the court's asserted error violated his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution by elevating absence of remorse into a circumstance in aggravation. Defendant's claim is based upon the following circumstances. On the fifth day of deliberations, the jury delivered the following note to the court: We the jury ... request the following, the second paragraph on page 45 [of the written jury instructions] ... states that we, as jurors, shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Are we to assume that these circumstances are A through K as stated on pages 25 through 27, or can we look at all the circumstances, regardless of being on A through K ..., or not? The court responded that the factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances are stated in jury instruction 8.85, factors A through K .... [¶] However, I need to ask you a question as to the meaning of the last ... paragraph of the note .... [¶] The last question, the one I'm inquiring about is, `or can we look at all circumstances, regardless of being an A through K factor or not?' At defense counsel's request the court inquired: My question is, is there any particular evidence or testimony that is the subject of your inquiry here? The jury foreperson initially requested to consult with the jury as a whole, but then responded: I would think it would be in regard to the circumstances in regard to information at the trialall the information. The foreperson repeated: I would think it would be in regard to the circumstances related to the trials, the testimony, and it would be in general. The court responded as follows: Then I will give you what is ... a partial response, but I still think I need to have you focus with a little more specificity ... as to what it is you're asking about or what it is you're thinking about in terms of that last question. The court continued: When jury instruction 8.88 ... states `after having heard all of the evidence and after having heard and considered the arguments of counsel, you shall consider, take into account and be guided by the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances upon which you have been instructed' ... the applicable factors of aggravating and mitigating circumstances are defined in jury instruction 8.85 ... and they are ... found within items that are labeled parenthesis A through parenthesis K. [¶] Now, my question is, is there any particular testimony or evidence that you are inquiring about with respect to where it fits or could fit in that framework of factors that are listed A through K? The jury responded with two additional notes to the court. The notes read as follows: Can we, as jurors, consider, take into account and be guided by anything other than the evidence which was received during both phases of the trial, as they pertain to factors A through K? Can we look at factors other than A through K, such as the remorse or lack of remorse exhibited by the defendant? The second note read as follows: Under K are we allowed to consider the pleas by both the victim's family and defendant's family? The court excused the jury for the day and discussed the notes with counsel. The matter was discussed in chambers again the following morning. Ultimately, the court responded to the two notes in comments and instructions that span six pages of transcript. Defense counsel agreed that the court's statements represented the appropriate response to the jury's questions. Concerning remorse, the court responded to the jury's question as follows: You may properly consider evidence tending to show remorse or the lack of remorse exhibited by the defendant, as you determine the evidence to be. [¶] To the extent such evidence tends to show the defendant's lack of remorse regarding the crimes of which he has been convicted, if you determine such to be the case, such evidence may not be considered by you as a factor or circumstance in aggravation. [¶] Lack of remorse, if such is the case, is not a factor in aggravation and cannot be considered as such by you. [¶] However, you may consider such evidence as tending to establish the absence or lack of remorse as a mitigating factor, in other words, as tending to show that remorse, an appropriate factor in mitigation in any case, under factor K, in instruction 8.85, is absent in this case. [¶] Whether the evidence does, in fact, show the presence or absence of remorse as a mitigating factor under factor K, and the weight and significance, if any, which should be given such facts are exclusively matters for your determination. (Italics added.) The court proceeded to discuss victim-impact evidence and the question whether the jury might consider factors other than those enumerated in the statute. The factors set forth in jury instruction 8.85, paragraphs A through K, is the exclusive list of those factors which you shall consider, take into account and be guided by, if applicable. In other words, the only factors you shall consider, take into account and be guided by are those factors defined in paragraphs A through K in this instruction. [¶] However, I remind you of another principle ... that you must consider the instructions as a whole .... The court then reread pattern instructions CALJIC Nos. 8.85 and 8.88 to the jury. As defense counsel at trial himself agreed, the court's instruction properly informed the jury in what respects remorse or absence of remorse were pertinent to section 190.3, factor (k), explaining plainly and repeatedly that absence of remorse may not be considered as a circumstance in aggravation, but that absence of remorse may be considered as `relevant to the question of whether remorse is present as a mitigating circumstance ....' ( People v. Bonilla (2007) 41 Cal.4th 313, 356 [60 Cal.Rptr.3d 209, 160 P.3d 84].) (23) Defendant concedes that this court has concluded that a prosecutor may urge the jury to consider absence of remorse for the purpose of demonstrating the absence of a mitigating circumstance. Defendant claims, however, that although such argument is permissible, an instruction from the trial court directing the jury to consider lack of remorse under [section 190.3,] factor (k) presents a reasonable likelihood of transforming lack of remorse into a factor in aggravation. This claim lacks merit, in view of the circumstances that the instruction was necessary because the jury requested guidance on this specific point (see § 1138), that the court gave an answer (consistent with the law) stressing evidence of absence of remorse could not be considered in aggravation, and that the answer to the jury's question was approved by defense counsel. (See People v. Marks (2003) 31 Cal.4th 197, 237 [2 Cal.Rptr.3d 252, 72 P.3d 1222] [a response that is generally consistent with the law cannot be challenged for the first time on appeal in the absence of a request for modification or clarification]; see also People v. Roldan (2005) 35 Cal.4th 646, 729 [27 Cal.Rptr.3d 360, 110 P.3d 289] [if a party fails to object to a court's response to a question posed by the jury during deliberations, any claim on appeal based upon the court's response ordinarily is forfeited], disapproved on another ground in People v. Doolin, supra, 45 Cal.4th at p. 421, fn. 22; People v. Benavides, supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 114 [same]; People v. Martinez (2003) 31 Cal.4th 673, 698 [3 Cal.Rptr.3d 648, 74 P.3d 748] [same]; People v. Boyette, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 430 [failure to object deemed a tacit approval]; and see People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 402 [116 Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432] [trial counsel's agreement with court's response forfeits a claim of error on appeal].) We do not find any merit in defendant's claims that the court's response was argumentative, favored the prosecution, or suggested that evidence in mitigation could not be considered or was absent.