Opinion ID: 780799
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Order of the Steps in Claims 1 and 8.

Text: 38 The district court held that, even though the claims did not recite a specific order, the setting step must occur after the testing automatically step and before the booting normally step. The district court so concluded because the specification consistently indicates that the `setting' step must precede the `booting normally' step. Altiris, 160 F.Supp.2d at 1282-83. Altiris argues that the setting step can occur before, after, simultaneously with, or between any of the other steps, because the plain meaning of the language of the claims imposes no order. Essentially, Altiris argues the district court ran afoul of our prohibition against importing a limitation from the specification into the claims — here the order of steps used by the sole, preferred embodiment. We agree. 39 The district court's conclusion was based, in part, on its understanding of our decision in Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc., 256 F.3d 1323, 59 USPQ2d 1401 (Fed.Cir.2001). In Interactive Gift we stated: Unless the steps of a method actually recite an order, the steps are not ordinarily construed to require one. However, such a result can ensue when the method steps implicitly require that they be performed in the order written. In this case, nothing in the claim or the specification directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction. Id. at 1342-43, 256 F.3d 1323, 59 USPQ2d at 1416 (citations omitted). This is the proper standard to apply, but as with much of our case law on claim construction, careless application of so ambivalent a standard can be a recipe for error. The proper application here of that standard becomes clear only upon a close look at our related precedent. 40 Interactive Gift recites a two-part test for determining if the steps of a method claim that do not otherwise recite an order, must nonetheless be performed in the order in which they are written. Id. First, we look to the claim language to determine if, as a matter of logic or grammar, they must be performed in the order written. Id. at 1343, 256 F.3d 1323, 59 USPQ2d at 1416. For example, in Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Electronics Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1321, 50 USPQ2d 1865, 1870 (Fed. Cir.1999), we held that the claim language itself indicated that the steps had to be performed in their written order because the second step required the alignment of a second structure with a first structure formed by the prior step. See also Mantech Envtl. Corp. v. Hudson Envtl. Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1368, 1375-76, 47 USPQ2d 1732, 1739 (Fed.Cir.1998) (holding that the steps of a method claim had to be performed in their written order because each subsequent step referenced something logically indicating the prior step had been performed). If not, we next look to the rest of the specification to determine whether it directly or implicitly requires such a narrow construction. Interactive Gift, 256 F.3d at 1343, 59 USPQ2d at 1416. If not, the sequence in which such steps are written is not a requirement. 41 The appropriate use of the rest of the specification in claim construction has not always been clear. Several recent cases, however, have clarified the subject. In Texas Digital, we noted that the specification may be useful in determining a claim term's ordinary meaning where a dictionary has been consulted but it becomes necessary to choose between multiple definitions. 308 F.3d at 1203, 64 USPQ2d at 1819. In CCS Fitness, we discussed, more generally the use of the specification to rebut the presumption that a claim term carries its ordinary meaning: 42 First, the claim term will not receive its ordinary meaning if the patentee acted as his own lexicographer and clearly set forth a definition of the disputed claim term in either the specification or prosecution history. Second, a claim term will not carry its ordinary meaning if the intrinsic evidence shows that the patentee distinguished that term from prior art on the basis of a particular embodiment, expressly disclaimed subject matter, or described a particular embodiment as important to the invention. Third ... a claim term also will not have its ordinary meaning if the term chosen by the patentee so deprives the claim of clarity as to require resort to the other intrinsic evidence for a definite meaning. Last, as a matter of statutory authority, a claim term will cover nothing more than the corresponding structure or step disclosed in the specification, as well as equivalents thereto, if the patentee phrased the claim in step-or means-plus-function format. 43 288 F.3d at 1366-67, 62 USPQ2d at 1662-63 (citations omitted). Essentially then, claim terms take on their ordinary and accustomed meanings unless the patentee demonstrated an intent to deviate from [that meaning]. Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosa N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1327, 63 USPQ2d 1374, 1382 (Fed.Cir.2002). It follows from that proposition that the number of embodiments disclosed in the specification is not determinative of the meaning of disputed claim terms. Id. Nor are claims ordinarily limited in scope to the preferred embodiment. These principles apply with equal force where, as is the case here, the limitation to be imported from the specification is an order of method steps, rather than a limitation on a specific claim term. 44 In the case before us, nothing in the intrinsic evidence indicates that the setting step must be performed before the booting normally step. Beginning with the claim language, it neither grammatically nor logically indicates that the setting step must occur in a particular order compared to the other steps. The only order mandated by the claim language is the conditional language in several of the steps, indicating that they must be performed after the testing step. 45 Looking next to the written description, it clearly only discusses a single preferred embodiment in which the setting step occurs after the testing step and before the booting normally step. Nowhere, however, is there any statement that this order is important, any disclaimer of any other order of steps, or any prosecution history indicating a surrender of any other order of steps. Symantec makes much of the specification's multiple statements regarding the invention gaining control before the computer boots normally. For example, in the Object of the Invention section, the patent states: It is a further object of this invention to provide a method gaining control of a networked computer prior to the `normal' boot procedure. '593 patent, col. 3, lines 20-22. While this is true, it is clear from the expert testimony at the Markman hearing that one of ordinary skill in the art would understand that the stated purpose could be achieved without performing the setting step prior to the booting normally step. Both experts indeed testified that it was technologically possible to achieve the invention's purpose by performing the setting step before, during, or after the booting normally step. In this regard, the expert testimony serves the permissible purposes of aiding our understanding of the technology and in helping us view the patent through the eyes of the skilled artisan. See Pitney Bowes, 182 F.3d at 1309, 51 USPQ2d at 1168. 46 For all the reasons stated above, we conclude that the court erred in construing the method claims as requiring the setting step to occur prior to the booting normally step. Instead, we construe the claims as allowing the setting step to occur at any time. 47