Opinion ID: 2633651
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 17

Heading: Asserted error in the consideration of the automatic motion to modify the verdict

Text: Defendant contends the trial court deprived him of meaningful review of his automatic motion to modify the verdict under section 190.4, subdivision (e), in violation of his rights to a reliable penalty determination and to due process of law under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Subdivision (e) of section 190.4 provides in pertinent part: In every case in which the trier of fact has returned a verdict or finding imposing the death penalty, the defendant shall be deemed to have made an application for modification of such verdict. . . . In ruling on the application, the judge shall review the evidence, consider, take into account, and be guided by the aggravating and mitigating circumstances referred to in Section 190.3, and shall make a determination as to whether the jury's findings and verdicts that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances are contrary to law or to the evidence presented. We have emphasized that in ruling on the modification application, `the trial court must independently reweigh the evidence of aggravating and mitigating factors presented at trial and determine whether, in its independent judgment, the evidence supports the death verdict. The court must state the reasons for its ruling on the record. On appeal, we independently review the trial court's ruling after reviewing the record, but we do not determine the penalty de novo.' ( People v. Steele (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1230, 1267, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 432, 47 P.3d 225.) ( People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 766-767, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 236, 86 P.3d 302.) Defendant first contends the trial court impermissibly considered the following two items of evidence before ruling on the motion to modify: (1) a probation and sentencing report; and (2) the statement of Benintende's father, Fredrick Fredrek, which the prosecutor offered pursuant to section 1191.1. [37] We first note that defendant did not object to the court considering either the probation report or Fredrek's statement. These claims of error therefore are forfeited. ( People v. Ramos (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1133, 1183, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 551, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035.) Even were we to reach the merits, we would find no error. In ruling on an automatic motion to modify, it is improper for a trial court to consider matters that were not before the jury. ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 694, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1331, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1; People v. Frank (1990) 51 Cal.3d 718, 742, 274 Cal.Rptr. 372, 798 P.2d 1215; People v. Lewis (1990) 50 Cal.3d 262, 287, 266 Cal. Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) Thus, we recognize the better practice is for the court to rule on the motion to modify before reading any applicable probation reports (§ 1203, subds. (b), (g)) or hearing victim statements pursuant to section 1191.1. ( People v. Navarette (2003) 30 Cal.4th 458, 526, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182; People v. Lewis, supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 287, 266 Cal.Rptr. 834, 786 P.2d 892.) The failure to do so is not error, however, where nothing in the record suggests the court relied on any impermissible material in ruling on the motion to modify. ( People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 526, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182; People v. Dennis, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 551, 71 Cal.Rptr.2d 680, 950 P.2d 1035; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 694, 63 Cal. Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Here, we find no indication in the record that the court relied on either the report or Fredrek's statement in ruling on the motion to modify. Rather, after reviewing the aggravating and mitigating factors set out in section 190.3, the court denied the motion to modify, stating: And when you take into consideration the circumstances of these crimes charged in this case and the circumstances of other crimes that came out, I think that the penalty of death is not unreasonable, and the court will impose it. In discussing the factors that had informed its decision to deny the motion, the court made no mention of matters contained in the probation report or in Fredrek's statement. Moreover, the court's explanation of its ruling demonstrates that it independently considered whether the aggravating and mitigating circumstances existed, and independently weighed them before denying the motion. ( People v. Navarette, supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 526, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 89, 66 P.3d 1182; People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1184, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 694, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213; People v. Cummings, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 1331, 18 Cal.Rptr.2d 796, 850 P.2d 1.) Defendant asserts the trial court's consideration of Fredrek's statement in ruling on the motion to modify violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition on the sentencing authority's consideration of characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant, and the appropriate sentence of a victim's family member. ( Payne v. Tennessee (1991) 501 U.S. 808, 830, fn. 2, 111 S.Ct. 2597, 115 L.Ed.2d 720.) As we have explained, however, nothing in the record suggests the trial court relied on Fredrek's statement in ruling on the motion to modify. Moreover, as a general matter, this aspect of the United States Supreme Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence does not apply to automatic motions to modify a death verdict. ( People v. Ramos, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 1184, 64 Cal.Rptr.2d 892, 938 P.2d 950; People v. Benson, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 812, 276 Cal.Rptr. 827, 802 P.2d 330.) Defendant next contends the trial court erred by counting the circumstances of the Benintende and Clark murders under multiple factors. He asserts the trial court improperly considered the two homicide counts under section 190.3, factor (b) (other criminal activity involving force or violence), when it stated: [G]oing to the second part of 190.3, the presence or absence of criminal activity by the defendant which involved the use or attempted use of force or violence. [¶] Well, of course, both of these murders involve the use of force or violence. Counting the Clark and Benintende murders under factor (b) was improper, because that factor is limited to criminal activity other than crimes of which the defendant was convicted in the capital proceeding. ( People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 938, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.) Here, however, there is no indication the court believed that this criminal activity weighed more heavily on the aggravating side of the balance simply because it was considered under both factor (a) and factor (b) of section 190.3. ( People v. Holt, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 695, 63 Cal.Rptr.2d 782, 937 P.2d 213.) Any error therefore was harmless. Defendant further argues the trial court improperly counted the Benintende homicide twice under section 190.3, factor (a) (the circumstances of the crime) by counting that homicide both as a special circumstance (multiple murder) and as a circumstance[] of the crime. (See People v. Ashmus (1991) 54 Cal.3d 932, 997, 2 Cal.Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214 [improper to count the same conduct under both the circumstances of the crime and the existence of any special circumstances under section 190.3, factor (a)].) He contends only the circumstances of the capital crime  that is, the Clark homicide  could be considered as circumstances of the crime under factor (a). Defendant is mistaken on both counts. The trial court explained: The first thing the jury was asked to look at in determining the fate of Mr. Rogers were the circumstances of the crime of which he was convicted and the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. [¶] And of course, they did find special circumstances to be true. [¶] They found the defendant in this proceeding had been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. Then, after reviewing all of the other factors, the court stated: And when you take into consideration the circumstances of these crimes charged in this case and the circumstances of other crimes that came out, I think the penalty of death is not unreasonable, and the court will impose it. Accordingly, it is apparent that the trial court first properly considered simply the existence of the multiple-murder special circumstance under the existence of any special circumstances found to be true. (See People v. Ashmus, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 997, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d 112, 820 P.2d 214 [under the heading of `the existence of any special circumstances found to be true,' [factor (a)] reaches merely the presence of any such special circumstances].) Second, the trial court properly considered the conduct underlying the Benintende homicide as a circumstance[] of the crime of which the defendant was convicted in the present proceeding. As we have explained, we have assumed that factor (a), though it speaks in the singular of the `crime' of which the defendant was currently convicted, covers the `circumstances' of all offenses, singular or plural, that were adjudicated in the capital proceeding. ( People v. Montiel, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 938, fn. 33, 21 Cal.Rptr.2d 705, 855 P.2d 1277.) No error appears. Defendant next asserts the trial court improperly considered whether defendant in the future would pose a danger to prostitutes. In discussing section 190.3, factor (b) (other criminal activity involving force or violence), the trial court stated: But I think that his actions with Tambri Butler shocked me almost more than any other case I have ever heard. [¶] The use of a cattle prod or the taser or whatever you call it, and the firing of the shot across the bridge of her nose, and requiring her to engage in all of these various and sundry sexual activities, that probably influenced the jury, in my view, and this court more than any other because not only has it happened once with Janine Benintende, twice with Tracie Johann Clark; we know it happened with [Ellen] Martinez; we know it happened with Tambri Butler. [¶] How many more times did it happen? But even more importantly, how many more times in the future might it happen? Then, at the conclusion of its summary of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the trial court stated: And so, the court weighing all of them has determined that this man is a danger to a certain segment of society, and maybe all of society. We believe the trial court's comments, read in context, properly were addressed to the circumstances of the crime and defendant's criminal history. Defendant argues that the trial court erred because it focused on his dangerousness to prostitutes, an irrelevant consideration in view of the circumstance that life in prison without possibility of parole, or the death penalty, were the only possible penalties. Even if the court erred to the extent it focused on the danger defendant would pose to prostitutes, defendant was not prejudiced. The trial court mentioned only briefly defendant's dangerousness to prostitutes. The court did not place undue emphasis on this factor. We do not believe there is a reasonable possibility the trial court would have ruled differently had it not considered defendant's future dangerousness. Defendant contends the trial court improperly relied upon the Martinez incident as an aggravating factor. He contends that incident was not properly before the jury under section 190.3, factor (b), because it did not constitute a crime and there was no evidence of force, violence, or the threat to use force or violence. The Attorney General asserts defendant's conduct came within the prohibition of several criminal statutes, including false imprisonment (§§ 236, 237), false arrest under color of authority (§ 146), and committing a lewd act in public (§ 647, subd. (a)), and that defendant's statement to Martinez that he was going to take her downtown was a threatened arrest and thus a threatened use of force. In the alternative, the Attorney General argues Martinez's testimony was relevant to section 190.3, factor (a), the circumstances of the capital crime, because it was the brief termination of defendant's employment resulting from Martinez's complaint that provided defendant with the motive to murder Clark. We need not resolve this dispute. Even if the Martinez incident was not properly before the trial court in the context of its ruling on the automatic motion to modify the verdict, any error was harmless. The trial court mentioned that incident only once, and then only briefly, after recounting the facts of the Butler incident. It is evident the trial court based its ruling primarily upon the circumstances of the Clark murder, the Butler incident, and the lack of substantial evidence in mitigation. There is no reasonable possibility any error affected the trial court's ruling on the motion. Defendant next asserts the trial court improperly considered a pattern of violence. He contends this is not a proper factor in aggravation, because it does not fit any of the statutory criteria and also was not supported by the evidence. We disagree. The trial court mentioned the so-called pattern of violence only after it had denied the motion to modify, when it was discussing the sentencing considerations outlined in the probation report. No error appears. Defendant finally contends the trial court disregarded or forgot the bulk of the mitigating evidence. In discussing such evidence, the trial court stated: This man has no criminal record and that is a factor in mitigation. Defendant would have us believe that he committed these acts while under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, and I don't believe it, and neither did the jury. The court then reviewed the other mitigating factors mentioned in section 190.3, including whether the victim was a participant, whether defendant believed the killing was morally justified, whether defendant acted under duress or the domination of another person, whether defendant had the capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct, defendant's age, and whether defendant was an accomplice, finding that these circumstances did not mitigate the crimes committed by defendant. The court then stated: And I couldn't think of any other extenuating circumstance in this case. Defendant contends the trial court disregarded the evidence of his record of service as a deputy sheriff, the love defendant's family felt for him, and his remorse for the Clark killing. But a trial court is not required to mention every item of evidence it reviewed in ruling on the automatic motion to modify. ( People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 752, 280 Cal.Rptr. 440, 808 P.2d 1197.) Here, as in Frierson, we find no indication in the record that the court ignored or overlooked defendant's mitigating evidence. Rather, the court simply found that the mitigating evidence presented by defendant did not amount to an extenuating circumstance and thus did not outweigh the aggravating evidence. No error occurred. In sum, there is no reasonable possibility that any errors or assumed errors, singularly or in combination, affected the trial court's ruling on the motion to modify. Thus, any related claimed federal constitutional error would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.