Opinion ID: 447979
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Conditions of detention giving rise to Sec. 1983 action against the defendants.

Text: 31 A proper liberal reading of the plaintiffs' complaint demonstrates that it alleges violations of the Fourteenth Amendment 16 from the denial of the plaintiffs' request to call and meet with an attorney during their period of confinement pursuant to Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, Sec. 103-3; from the unnecessary delay in processing the plaintiffs' appearance in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 38, Sec. 109-1; from a failure to segregate inmates by sex in violation of Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 75, Sec. 11; 17 and from the failure of the sheriffs to prevent the verbal abuse inflicted by another detainee upon the plaintiffs. 32 In determining the validity of these claims, this court once again notes that an alleged violation of a state statute does not give rise to a corresponding Sec. 1983 violation, unless the right encompassed in the state statute is guaranteed under the United States Constitution. Moore v. Kusper, 465 F.2d 256, 258 (7th Cir.1972); Street v. Surdyka, 492 F.2d 368, 372-73 (4th Cir.1974). Addressing the plaintiffs' claims individually, initially we hold that although the plaintiffs have the right to call and consult with an attorney under the Fourteenth Amendment, 18 they have failed to state a claim since the evidence establishes that in fact they never did request the use of a telephone to call an attorney. 19 33 Further, failure to segregate detainees by sex in the jail's holding cell, by itself, does not lead to a constitutional deprivation. This failure to separate by sex, however, led to the alleged abuse inflicted upon the plaintiffs by the burly drunk which, the women plaintiffs stated, led them to fear for their safety. The plaintiff cites Stokes v. Delcambre, 710 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir.1983) to support its position that this abuse establishes deprivation within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Stokes, the plaintiff, who was charged with a misdemeanor, was left in a large cell area for days with persons who faced serious felony charges. During this time, he was savagely beaten by several inmates. The attention paid to the plaintiff's welfare by guards at the institution was, at best, negligible. 34 In the instant case, the evidence shows that the plaintiffs, including the females, were placed in a holding cell with a burly drunk who allegedly intermittently swore at the officers and, at times, glared and muttered at the plaintiffs. The women plaintiffs alleged in their depositions that they were frightened for their safety. We agree with the plaintiffs that a prisoner or, in this case, a detainee has the right to be reasonably protected from the constant threat of violence and physical assault .... Stokes, 710 F.2d at 1125. 20 However, we do not agree that under the facts of this case having to endure threatening or angry looks, mutterings and screamed profanities arises to the level of a constitutional deprivation under Stokes. See also Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1981); Collins v. Cundy, 603 F.2d 825, 827 (10th Cir.1979). 35 There does exist, however, a question as to the length of time that the plaintiffs were detained in the holding cell. The plaintiffs claim that they were detained for a period of approximately four hours or more. In Duran v. Elrod, 542 F.2d 998, 999 (7th Cir.1976), we stated that the sole permissible interest of the state in detaining a person after arrest is to ensure their presence at trial. Id. Therefore, we held that pre-trial detainees are to suffer no more restrictions than are reasonably necessary to ensure their presence at trial. Id. This standard was subsequently modified in Jordan v. Wolke, 615 F.2d 749 (7th Cir.1980), in light of the United States Supreme Court's opinion in Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). Quoting from Bell, the Jordan court noted that the question in determining if a claim exists is whether the disability is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose. Jordan, 615 F.2d at 752 quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 537, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. The answer to this question  'generally will turn on whether an alternate purpose to which [the restriction] may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternate purposes assigned [to it].'  Jordan, 615 F.2d at 752 quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 538, 99 S.Ct. at 1873. 21 Although these cases concern the conditions of confinement, such as visitation rights and overcrowding, and not the fact of confinement itself, the underlying principle that the purpose of detention is to ensure the defendant's presence at trial applies equally to the time of detention. The principle is clear--detention must be justified, especially where, as in this case, there has been no independent appraisal of probable cause to arrest prior to the detention; if detention is not justified, it amounts to punishment prior to conviction. 36 Here, the plaintiffs were arrested for, at best, a minor misdemeanor. If they had been convicted, their punishment, given the small amount of money involved, would probably have been only a small fine. As far as we can discern, the only condition which needed to be satisfied in order to ensure plaintiffs' presence at trial was the posting of a small bond. There is no evidence in the district court opinion or the parties' affidavits and/or briefs in support of summary judgment justifying the length of detention. One could surmise that it took several hours to book the defendants or that the jail was extremely busy that night; however, we are not willing to make these assumptions since there is no evidence in the record warranting any conclusion justifying the four or more hour time period spent by the plaintiffs in the jail. 22 Because the district court did not address this issue and the record is silent on this point, we remand this issue back to the district court for determination. 23 37 We also note that the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Fisher v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority, 690 F.2d 1133 (4th Cir.1982) recently addressed the issue of whether there are constitutional limits on the duration of time between the warrantless arrest and the pre-hearing detention of the arrested person. 24 In analyzing the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1974), the Fisher Court stated: 38 From this we must conclude that the Court considers the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment does carryover past arrests to place limits of permissible duration upon this particular period of detention. The standard of reasonableness can only be that implied in the Court's observation that it is to be 'brief' and, more specifically, that it is to be only that required 'to take the administrative steps incident to the arrest.'  39 Fisher, 690 F.2d at 1140 quoting, Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 113-14, 95 S.Ct. at 862-63. The Fisher decision concluded that the relevant time period must be determined on a case-by-case basis. Applying this approach to the instant case Ill.Rev.Stat. ch. 38, Sec. 109-1, which requires processing of arrestees without unnecessary delay, is not, as the plaintiff argues in its brief, controlling when evaluating the constitutionality of the detention. Rather, under the Fisher and Gerstein approach, the question is whether the detainee was held for a brief period of detention to take the administrative steps incident to the arrest. Fisher, 690 F.2d at 1141. The Fisher Court held that there was no constitutional violation since the evidence demonstrated that the officer who arrested the plaintiff and who was the subject of the 1983 action did not unreasonably detain the arrestee. However, as stated previously, the record as developed at this point does not reveal any comparable demonstration of timeliness. Thus, we remand this issue back to the district court for further investigation. If no reasonable excuse is presented, or that excuse is legitimately disputed, the question of liability is to be decided by the jury. 25 40