Opinion ID: 1368768
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Validity of Bill 1379

Text: Petitioners argue that we should not consider the question of the validity of Bill 1379 because respondents did not timely raise in the Court of Appeal their claim that the bill violates the single subject provision of the Constitution (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 28(a)), and that respondents have no standing to raise the issue. We disagree on both counts. (5) The alleged violation of the single subject rule was raised by respondents in the Court of Appeal in their answer to the amicus curiae brief filed by the California Legislature, and again in response to the alternative writ of mandate issued by the Court of Appeal following our remand to that court. (6) As to the issue of standing, petitioners assert that the Governor may not claim that section 45.5 is invalid on single subject grounds because he does not have the power to veto legislation based on his opinion that it is unconstitutional. [17] The rules relating to standing refer to a plaintiff's ability to challenge the constitutionality of a statute if he is not injured by its operation. (5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) § 44, p. 3282.) The Governor is not a plaintiff in this proceeding but a respondent and his assertion that section 45.5 violates the single subject rule is employed as a matter of defense to petitioner's claim that the measure is valid and his veto ineffective. The issue raised by respondents is of great public importance, the matter has been fully briefed by the parties, and petitioners have cited no authority which requires us to postpone consideration of the matter until, as they suggest, a taxpayer challenges the constitutionality of Bill 1379 on the ground that it violates the single subject rule. (7a) We come, then, to the merits of the question whether Bill 1379 violates article IV, section 9 of the Constitution. It provides, as we have seen, that a statute shall embrace but one subject, which shall be expressed in its title. This provision has its origin in the Constitution of 1849. (Art. IV, § 25.) [18] Petitioners' argument that Bill 1379 does not violate the single subject rule is based on a simple premise: they deny that the provision sets forth an independent requirement that a bill must be confined to one subject and assert that a statute complies with the Constitution even if it includes numerous unrelated subjects so long as they are all germane to the title of the act. The problem with this claim is that it reads the single subject provision out of the Constitution and substitutes for it a provision that a statute with multiple subjects complies with section 9 so long as those subjects are included within the title. (8) Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the two aspects of section 9 relating to the subject of an act and its title are independent provisions which serve separate purposes. A statute must comply with both the requirement that it be confined to one subject and with the command that this one subject be expressed in its title. (See 1A Sutherland, Statutory Construction (1985 rev. ed.) § 17.01, p. 1; Ruud at p. 391.) The single subject clause has as its primary and universally recognized purpose the prevention of log-rolling by the Legislature, i.e., combining several proposals in a single bill so that legislators, by combining their votes, obtain a majority for a measure which would not have been approved if divided into separate bills. ( Ruud at p. 391.) As of 1982, the constitutions of 41 states included a single subject requirement. (1A Sutherland, op. cit., supra, at pp. 1-2.) The purpose of the requirement that the single subject of a bill shall be expressed in its title is to prevent misleading or inaccurate titles so that legislators and the public are afforded reasonable notice of the contents of a statute. (See e.g., Ex parte Liddell (1892) 93 Cal. 633, 635-656 [29 P. 251]; Abeel v. Clark (1890) 84 Cal. 226, 228 [24 P. 383].) The authorities cited by petitioners for the proposition that compliance with the title requirement satisfies section 9 do not support their claim. They call for a liberal construction of section 9 so that it does not become a loophole of escape from, or a means for the destruction of legitimate legislation ( Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507, 510 [289 P. 160]), but they do not suggest that an accurate title alone will comply with the single subject rule. For the most part, the cases they cite involve a challenge only to the appropriateness of the title of a statute (e.g., Heron v. Riley, supra, 209 Cal. 507, 512-514; Ex parte Hallawell (1909) 155 Cal. 112, 113-114 [99 P. 490]; Estate of McPhee (1908) 154 Cal. 385, 389 [97 P. 878]; Ex parte Liddell, supra, 93 Cal. 633, 635; Abeel v. Clark, supra, 86 Cal. 226, 228), although a few relate also to the single subject rule, and these evaluate the merits of both the single subject and title requirements (e.g., Robinson v. Kerrigan (1907) 151 Cal. 40, 50-51 [90 P. 129]). A few cases have held statutes unconstitutional on the basis that they violated the single subject rule in addition to the title requirement. (E.g., In re Werner (1900) 129 Cal. 567, 572-575 [62 P. 97]; People v. Parks (1881) 58 Cal. 624, 638-640; see Hill v. Board of Supervisors (1917) 176 Cal. 84, 87 [167 P. 514] [overruled on other grounds in Simpson v. Hite (1950) 36 Cal.2d 125, 131 (222 P.2d 225)]; cf. Planned Parenthood Affiliates v. Swoap (1985) 173 Cal. App.3d 1187, 1196-1201 [219 Cal. Rptr. 664].) (7b) Bill 1379 amends, repeals, or adds approximately 150 sections contained in more than 20 codes and legislative acts. Its title describes the measure as relating to fiscal affairs, making an appropriation therefor, and declaring the urgency thereof to take effect immediately. (Stats. 1984, ch. 268, p. 1302.) Respondents characterize the measure as a trailer bill which trails the budget bill and is closely related to it. Both bills follow the same legislative path, and are reviewed by the same legislative committees on the same time schedule. Section 71 of the bill provides that it is an urgency measure to take effect immediately and that it provides necessary statutory adjustments to implement the Budget Act of 1984. ( Id. at p. 1408.) Many cases which discuss the single subject rule combine its expression with the requirement that the single subject of the enactment must be stated in its title even though, as we note above, each aspect of the constitutional provision declares a separate requirement with an independent purpose. This combination is natural in view of the fact that both requirements appear in a single sentence and are related to one another. Here, however, respondents' main concern is that the text of Bill 1379 contains more than one subject. Evans v. Superior Court (1932) 215 Cal. 58 [8 P.2d 467], although decided more than half a century ago, remains the leading authority on the construction of section 9 of article IV of the Constitution. In that case, the Legislature adopted the entire Probate Code in one enactment with a title declaring that it was an act to revise and consolidate the law relating to probate ... to repeal certain provisions of law therein revised and consolidated and therein specified; and to establish a Probate Code. This court held that the act contained only one subject, and that that subject was expressed in its title. (9) The opinion, like those before and after it, confirms the liberal construction to be accorded the single subject rule. It states the following principles as the basis of its holding: Numerous provisions, having one general object, if fairly indicated in the title, may be united in one act. Provisions governing projects so related and interdependent as to constitute a single scheme may be properly included within a single act. [Citation.] The legislature may insert in a single act all legislation germane to the general subject as expressed in its title and within the field of legislation suggested thereby. [Citation.] Provisions which are logically germane to the title of the act and are included within its scope may be united. The general purpose of a statute being declared, the details provided for its accomplishment will be regarded as necessary incidents. [Citations.] ... A provision which conduces to the act, or which is auxiliary to and promotive of its main purpose, or has a necessary and natural connection with such purpose is germane within the rule. (215 Cal. at pp. 62-63.) [19] In analyzing petitioners' contentions, it is helpful to consider decisions of this court which have applied the single subject rule in a context independent of the title requirement. In 1948, California adopted a single subject constitutional provision applicable to initiatives. It states that an initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect (Cal. Const., art. II, § 8, subd. (d)), and it does not incorporate in the same sentence the requirement that the subject must be expressed in the title; nor does it contain a provision for severance in the event more than one subject is included in the measure. [20] Shortly after the adoption of this provision, it was held that the same principles apply to the single subject rule relating to initiatives as to legislative enactments. ( Perry v. Jordan (1949) 34 Cal.2d 87, 92-93 [207 P.2d 47].) The single subject rule as applied to the initiative has the dual purpose of avoiding logrolling and voter confusion. ( Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization (1978) 22 Cal.3d 208, 231 [149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 583 P.2d 1281].) In three recent cases, we have relied on the rules laid down in Evans, supra, 215 Cal. 58, to uphold initiative measures challenged on the ground that they embraced more than one subject. ( Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, 22 Cal.3d 208, 229-232; Fair Political Practices Com. v. Superior Court (1979) 25 Cal.3d 33, 37-43 [157 Cal. Rptr. 855, 599 P.2d 46]; hereinafter FPPC; Brosnahan v. Brown (1982) 32 Cal.3d 236, 245-253 [186 Cal. Rptr. 30, 651 P.2d 274].) In each of these decisions, we held that the measures involved complied with Evans in that their provisions were reasonably germane to the object of the act. As additional support for its conclusion, Amador held that the constitutional initiative involved there contained provisions which were `functionally related in furtherance of ... a common underlying purpose.' (22 Cal.3d at p. 230.) [21] The initiative changed the previous system of real property taxation and imposed limitations on the assessment and taxing power of local and state government. The following year, we were faced with another single subject challenge in FPPC. The measure in that case concerned elections and different methods for preventing corruption and undue influence in political campaigns and governmental activities. (25 Cal.3d at p. 37.) Again, we upheld the initiative concluding that its provisions were reasonably germane to the subject of political practices. In the last of these cases, Brosnahan, a majority of this court rejected the claim that the single subject rule requires that a measure meet both the reasonably germane and functionally related tests, and held that either standard would satisfy the constitutional requirement. The initiative measure in that case had as its aim the accomplishment of changes in the criminal justice system for the purpose of protecting the rights of victims of crime. The majority concluded that it did not violate the rule because [e]ach of its several facets bears a common concern, `general object' or `general subject,' promoting the rights of actual or potential crime victims. (32 Cal.3d at p. 247.) In a statement which is important to the resolution of the issue before us, the majority observed that proponents of initiative measures do not have blank checks to draft measures containing unduly diverse or extensive provisions bearing no reasonable relationship to each other or to the general object which is sought to be promoted. The single subject rule indeed is a constitutional safeguard adopted to protect against multifaceted measures of undue scope. For example, the rule obviously forbids joining disparate provisions which appear germane only to topics of excessive generality such as `government' or `public welfare.' However, we concluded that the initiative sustained fairly disclosed a reasonable and common sense relationship among their various components in furtherance of a common purpose. (32 Cal.3d at p. 253.) The decision commanded a bare four-to-three majority (dis. opn. by Bird, C.J.; Mosk, J., filed a separate dis. opn. joined by Broussard, J.), but all seven justices agreed that subjects of excessive generality would violate the purpose and intent of the single subject rule. [22] (7c) In sum, these cases hold that a measure complies with the rule if its provisions are either functionally related to one another or are reasonably germane to one another or the objects of the enactment. Bill 1379 complies with none of these standards. Petitioners do not claim that the provisions of the bill are either functionally related or germane to one another, and examination reveals that there is no apparent relationship among its various sections. A few examples will suffice: section 0.2 amends a provision of the Business and Professions Code to require that before transmitting a fiscal impact report to the Legislature, agencies within the Department of Consumer Affairs must submit it to the director of the department (Stats. 1984, ch. 268, p. 1306). Section 0.4 amends the same code to provide that the Contractors' State License Board may disclose to the public general information regarding complaints filed against licensees ( ibid. ); section 28.4 amends the Military and Veterans Code to provide that a veterans' home may be appointed guardian of the estate of a veteran ( id. at p. 1352); section 66.7 permits concession contracts for state parks to exceed 20 years ( id. at p. 1405). Our second inquiry is whether the provisions of Bill 1379 can be fairly characterized as reasonably germane to the objects of the measure. Petitioners suggest that the subject of Bill 1379 is fiscal affairs, as stated in its title, and that its object is to make statutory adjustments which relate to the ongoing allocation of state funds appropriated annually in the budget bill, within the state programs so funded. Section 45.5 comes within this object because it affects the cost of the state's AFDC program. We understand this somewhat cryptic analysis to mean that the goal of Bill 1379 is to reflect matters encompassed in the budget bill, and that since the cost of the program mandated by section 45.5 affects the amounts appropriated in the budget, its provisions are conducive to that goal and therefore in compliance with the single subject rule. Our unanimous determination in Brosnahan, supra, 32 Cal.3d 236, that a bill which encompasses matters of excessive generality violates the purpose and intent of the single subject rule is applicable to this assertion. Fiscal affairs as the subject of Bill 1379 and statutory adjustments to the budget as its object suffer from the same defect. They are too broad in scope if, as petitioners appear to claim, they encompass any substantive measure which has an effect on the budget. The number and scope of topics germane to fiscal affairs in this sense is virtually unlimited. If petitioners' position were accepted, a substantial portion of the many thousand statutes adopted during each legislative session could be included in a single measure even though their provisions had no relationship to one another or to any single object except that they would have some effect on the state's expenditures as reflected in the budget bill. This would effectively read the single subject rule out of the Constitution. We hold, therefore, that Bill 1379 is invalid as a violation of article IV, section 9 of the California Constitution. [23]