Opinion ID: 628036
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: District Attorney as Municipal Policymaker

Text: 68 Nor do we agree with the district court's alternative view that Frank's official-capacity claim was dismissable because she had offered no evidence to support a claim that the alleged constitutional violation was a result of municipal policy or that defendant is a policy-making official. 1992 Decision at 9 n. 4. The district court's conclusion that there was no indication that Relin was a policymaking official within the meaning of Monell is, at best, premature. We have noted that generally, [w]here a district attorney acts as the manager of the district attorney's office, the district attorney acts as a county policymaker. Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 301 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1387, 122 L.Ed.2d 762 (1993); see also Gan v. City of New York, 996 F.2d at 536 (same). 69 Construed in her favor, the record indicates that Frank was hired by Relin's predecessor and was reappointed by Relin upon his election to district attorney. She was asked to resign by Relin after he had discussed the matter with the top administrative personnel in the district attorney's office (Feb. 13 Tr. at 5 (testimony of Sofia)). Plainly Relin undertook his actions as manager of the Monroe County District Attorney's Office. 70 Though Relin contended that he was not a policymaker because Frank's position was controlled by civil service laws and that his discretion to hire and fire was subject to review and regulation by the County Civil Service Commission, Frank denied that her position had ever been covered by civil service, and the district court declined to decide this issue. Nor has that issue, undeveloped below, been fully briefed on this appeal. We would note, however, that there is a good deal of tension between Relin's contention that Frank's position was governed by civil service and the proposition that he was permitted to fire her in the interest of improving office efficiency or morale. 71 In any event, the matter of whether Relin had final policymaking authority is a question of state law and is an issue to be decided by the court. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701, 737, 109 S.Ct. 2702, 2723, 105 L.Ed.2d 598 (1989). If Relin was not the final decisionmaker, of course, the decisionmaker cannot be held liable for Relin's actions on a theory of respondeat superior, though it can be held liable if it approved of or acquiesced in his actions. See generally id. at 736-38, 109 S.Ct. at 2722-24.