Opinion ID: 3047827
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Review of Environmental Impacts

Text: Citizens alleges the following deficiencies in the FEIS: inadequate review of alternatives, failure to take a “hard look” at direct effects, and insufficient consideration of cumulative and indirect impacts. First, Citizens asserts that Appellees failed to complete a detailed analysis of all alternatives because it relied upon conclusions of local planning documents to reject some alternatives prior to the preparation of the FEIS. As explained above, the reliance on local planning documents was appropriate. Regarding 12 Citizens’s contention that too few alternatives were considered in the FEIS, NEPA’s requirement that alternatives be considered is “bounded by some notion of feasibility.” Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 713 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Agencies only have to consider “reasonable alternatives,” and we evaluate their choices against a “rule of reason.” Id. NEPA does not impose any minimum number of alternatives that must be evaluated. See N. Buckhead Civic Ass’n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1541–43 (11th Cir. 1990) (finding that an EIS with only two alternatives studied in detail was sufficient); Tongass Conservation Soc’y v. Cheney, 924 F.2d 1137, 1140–42 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that agency complied with NEPA when thirteen of fourteen alternatives were eliminated as unreasonable and only one alternative was discussed in detail in the EIS). Here, Appellees considered three alternatives in the FEIS—the Indian Street Bridge Alternative, the No-Build Alternative, and the Traffic System Management Alternative—and also analyzed Citizens’s Alternative in depth. Reviewing Appellees’ choice and analysis of alternatives presented in the EIS under a rule of reason, we find Appellees’ consideration of alternatives to be “sufficient to permit a reasoned choice.” N. Buckhead Civic Ass’n, 903 F.2d at 1541. When alternatives are rejected from consideration in an EIS, there is no duty to perform in-depth analyses of these alternatives. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a) (stating 13 that agencies shall “[r]igorously explore and objectively evaluate all reasonable alternatives,” but when alternatives have been rejected from consideration, agencies need only “briefly discuss the reasons for their having been eliminated” (emphasis added)). Because Appellees’ choice to exclude the alternatives that it did was appropriate, Appellees had no duty to conduct an in-depth analysis of those rejected alternatives in the FEIS. Appellees, by discussing in the FEIS their analysis of the expected environmental effects of the corridors and the relative impact of the various alternatives on cost, traffic service, engineering, environmental, and socio-economic factors, more than fulfilled NEPA’s requirement to “briefly discuss” the rejected alternatives. Second, Citizens alleges that Appellees failed to take a “hard look” at the direct environmental effects of the proposed action, as required by 40 C.F.R. § 1502.16(a). Citizens argues that one arbitrary and capricious act of Appellees regarding their study of direct impacts was the choice to continue with environmental studies after the EIS was completed. In making this argument, Citizens urges us to conclude from the fact that studies are ongoing that they could not have been developed to an appropriate extent when the EIS was created.3 3 Citizens also argues that Appellees violated the requirement that the “draft EIS shall also summarize the studies, reviews, consultations, and coordination required by environmental laws or Executive Orders to the extent appropriate at this stage in the environmental process.” 23 14 However, a commitment to ongoing studies alone is not necessarily indicative of an insufficient EIS. See City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 123 F.3d 1142, 1167 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that an agency with only a “conceptual” mitigation plan that intended to continue compliance efforts had satisfied Executive Order 11990 because it had complied “to date”). Because we do not find the scheduling choice alone to be arbitrary or capricious, we turn to examine the alleged substantive deficiencies of the EIS. Citizens points to specific studies to illustrate its claim that Appellees failed to adequately evaluate direct environmental impacts of the proposed action. Under the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1996 (“MSFCMA”), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1883, federal agencies are required to prepare an Essential Fish Habitat Assessment and consult with the National Marine Fisheries Service prior to taking an action that would adversely impact an essential fish habitat, 50 C.F.R. § 600.920. Appellees did so, but Citizens alleges that the study area selected to review cumulative effects—the drainage basin of the South Fork of the St. Lucie River—was too narrow, and thus the assessment was C.F.R. § 771.123(c). Citizens’s argument glosses over the “to the extent appropriate” caveat of that regulation and fails to acknowledge the instructions of 23 C.F.R. § 771.133: “If full compliance [with other environmental regulations] is not possible by the time the final EIS . . . is prepared, the final EIS . . . should reflect consultation with the appropriate agencies and provide reasonable assurance that the requirements will be met.” A commitment to continue with ongoing environmental reviews would embody exactly this kind of assurance. 15 insufficient. Appellees respond that the basin area selected for review of cumulative impacts was the only basin into which another bridge also drained, and thus the only area where cumulative impacts could potentially occur. This rationale is hardly indicative of arbitrary and capricious decision making.4 Citizens also asserts that Appellees did not comply with Executive Orders 11988 and 11990 because Appellees’ analyses lacked detail and were overly conclusory. Executive Order 11988, entitled “Floodplain Management,” requires federal agencies taking action in or affecting a floodplain to think twice. The agency must consider the project’s effects on the floodplains and possible alternatives, and may proceed only if it finds that the only practicable alternative requires sitting in the floodplain. In designing its plan the agency must take steps to minimize potential damage to the floodplain. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea, 123 F.3d at 1166 (quotation marks and footnote omitted). Executive Order 11990, entitled “Protection of Wetlands,” provides “similar protection” regarding wetlands. Sierra Club v. Hassell, 636 F.2d 1095, 1100 (5th Cir. Unit B Feb. 1981). Section Four of the FEIS contains a detailed discussion of floodplains and wetlands. Both the floodplains and wetlands 4 Citizens also contends that Appellees acted in error by failing to consider alternatives to the action, but an analysis of alternatives is not mandatory under the Act. See 50 C.F.R. § 600.920(e)(3) (listing mandatory contents of assessment); 50 C.F.R. § 600.920(e)(4) (listing additional information—including an analysis of alternatives—to be included “[i]f appropriate”). 16 subparts of Section Four discuss harm-minimization plans. The floodplains subpart concludes that because the area along the river is prone to flooding, there is no practicable alternative to locating the bridge in a floodplain. The wetlands subsection explains that due to the nature of bridge construction and the terrain around the St. Lucie River, there are no practicable alternatives to impacting wetlands. Overall, we find this analysis, as well as the discussions of other direct impacts, satisfactorily thorough and neither arbitrary nor capricious. Third, Citizens contends that Appellees’ review of cumulative and indirect impacts was insufficient. Indirect impacts are reasonably foreseeable long-term effects of the proposed action. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b). “Cumulative impact is the impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions.” Id. § 1508.7 (quotation marks omitted). Appellees discuss both types of impacts in the subsection of the FEIS entitled “Indirect and Cumulative Impacts.” That subsection discusses the cumulative impacts on current and existing growth, emergency response and evacuation, wildlife, essential fish habitats, and water quality, as well as proposed transportation projects. The FEIS also noted that no other major construction projects pending in the area had 17 obtained permit applications. The FEIS discussion of these matters, therefore, was sufficient. Citizens alleges that Appellees’ indirect impacts assessment is faulty because it fails to consider the change that would result from the project’s stimulation of commercial interests in a previously residential area. However, in their review of indirect impacts of the project, Appellees found that other commercial uses in the study area were already being planned or developed. Therefore, Appellees concluded that any induced commercial growth would not constitute a change to the area. Citizens also objects to the area selected for the study of induced growth but fails to explain why Appellees’ choice was erroneous. Determining the geographic extent of an analysis area is the kind of task “assigned to the special competency of the appropriate agencies,” and such a determination can only be overturned by a showing of arbitrariness or capriciousness in the decision making. See Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 414, 96 S. Ct. 2718, 2732 (1976). Furthermore, the FEIS recognized that commercial uses were in development or in the planning stages for development along the project’s corridor. Appellants cannot demand a more detailed response to their challenge without identifying precise geographic areas or instances of induced growth, 18 considering that the project is already underway. Here, the FEIS’s finding that no land use change is expected to occur adequately addresses Appellants’ concerns. In their study of cumulative effects, Appellees found that because no other construction projects were listed on the Martin County Five-Year Capital Improvements Plan as pending in the project area, no cumulative impacts could be expected. Citizens argues that referencing to the Five-Year Plan was an error and that Appellees should have consulted the Martin County Long-Range Plan instead. However, Appellees determined that because the projects on the Long-Range Plan were listed far before their actual development, any analysis of the cumulative impacts of the Long-Range Plan projects would be mostly speculative.5 We have held that agencies cannot be “forced to analyze the environmental impact of a project, the parameters and specifics of which would be a mere guess.” City of Oxford v. FAA, 428 F.3d 1346, 1356 (11th Cir. 2005). Ultimately, Citizens argues that Appellees should have used different and better methodologies for reviewing environmental impacts of the project. However, we do not review an agency’s compliance with NEPA by asking whether it made the optimal choices; NEPA does not require perfection. See 5 See 23 U.S.C. § 135(f) (“Each State shall develop a long-range statewide transportation plan, with a minimum 20-year forecast period . . . .”) (emphasis added). 19 Druid Hills, 772 F.2d at 708–09. Appellees’ compliance with NEPA may not have been perfect, but it was sufficient. D. Need for a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement The Indian Street Bridge has four phases that were originally planned to be completed contemporaneously, but FDOT announced on May 1, 2009 that one phase will commence prior to the others. Citizens now attempts to argue that Appellees erred by not completing a Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (“SEIS”) investigating the impacts of phasing.6 However, Citizens did not raise this issue in its Amended Complaint.7 Instead, Citizens alleged in its Amended Complaint that an SEIS was necessary because Citizens had submitted its Alternative, which included information and proposals about traffic modeling systems. Citizens’s argument on appeal—that the decision to utilize phasing must be examined further in an SEIS—is substantially different than that alleged in its Complaint, and we will not consider a claim not detailed in the plaintiff’s pleadings. See Maniccia v. Brown, 171 F.3d 1364, 1367 n.1 (11th Cir. 1999). 6 A SEIS is required when the agency “makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are relevant to environmental concerns; or [t]here are significant new circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c)(1). 7 Citizens filed a motion to amend its Complaint to include the argument it now raises; Appellees opposed the motion as untimely. The district court denied the motion as moot when it entered its May 3, 2010 summary judgment order. 20