Opinion ID: 2680029
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: DOC’s Interpretation of Section 1253(10)(B)

Text: [¶12] We next look to see whether, as the Superior Court found, the policy comports with section 1253(10)(B). Our analysis begins with a determination of whether the statute is ambiguous. See Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d 271 (“When a case concerns the interpretation of a statute that an administrative agency administers and that is within its area of expertise, our scope of review is to determine first whether the statute is ambiguous.”) Ambiguity exists when a statute “is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.” Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 23, 58 A.3d 1083 (quotation marks omitted). If the statute is not ambiguous, we do not defer to DOC’s construction but rather “interpret the statute according to its plain language.” Cobb, 2006 ME 48, ¶ 13, 896 A.2d 271. Here, we conclude that section 1253(10)(B) is not ambiguous considering its plain language and the statutory scheme of which it forms a part. See Fuhrmann, 2012 ME 135, ¶ 23, 58 A.3d 1083. [¶13] Section 1253 sets out three categories of good time credit that Roderick could potentially earn each month. The first category allows up to four days for good conduct. 17-A M.R.S. § 1253(9)(A). The second allows “up to 3 days . . . [for] fulfillment of responsibilities assigned in the person’s transition plan for work, education or rehabilitation programs during that month.” Id. § 1253(10)(A). The category at issue here, set out in section 1253(10)(B), allows 9 “[i]n addition to the days of deduction provided for in [section 1253(10)(A)] . . . up to 2 days per calendar month . . . [for] fulfillment of responsibilities assigned in the person’s transition plan for community work, education or rehabilitation programs during that month.” [¶14] The only significant difference between sections 1253(10)(A) and 1253(10)(B) for our purposes is the word “community.” Roderick argues that the word “community” only modifies “work,” and so an inmate can receive three days of good time credit for prison-based “education or rehabilitation programs” under section 1253(10)(A), or two days for the same programs under section 1253(10)(B) if, as in his case, he had already received the maximum three days’ credit under section 1253(10)(A) for working in the prison. Had he not worked in the prison at all, Roderick argues, then he would have been entitled to three days of credit for his prison-based “education or rehabilitation programs” under section 1253(10)(A), and section 1253(10)(B) would not be implicated. [¶15] We reject Roderick’s strained construction of the statutory scheme. In section 1253(10)(A), the Legislature established a maximum of “up to 3 days per calendar month” of good time credit for an inmate’s combined participation in prison-based “work, education or rehabilitation programs.” 17-A M.R.S. § 1253(10)(A) (emphasis added). It would be illogical for the Legislature to then allow for more than three days of combined credit (up to a total of five days) in the 10 following paragraph for participation in the same programs. Section 1253(10)(B) makes the flaw in Roderick’s argument clear when it begins by distinguishing section 1253(10)(A) credits from section 1253(10)(B) credits: “In addition to the days of deduction provided for in paragraph A . . . .” (Emphasis added.) [¶16] Accordingly, we conclude that the word “community” in section 1253(10)(B) modifies each of the three alternatives that immediately follow it— “work, education or rehabilitation programs.” Our reading eliminates the illogical duplication between sections 1253(10)(A) and 1253(10)(B) urged by Roderick and yields the result reached by the Superior Court—an inmate may receive up to three days of good time credit for prison-based work, education or rehabilitation programs, and up to two additional days of credit for work, education or rehabilitation programs that are community based, as described by DOC’s policy. [¶17] Roderick further argues that DOC cannot restrict participation in community-based programs to the last year of confinement because section 1253(10)(B) provides that the two-day deduction is “calculated from the date of commencement” of the sentence. The full clause, however, reads “calculated from the date of commencement of that term as specified under subsection 1 [of section 1253].” 17-A M.R.S. § 1253(10)(B). Subsection one of section 1253 establishes the point at which a DOC sentence begins to run. 17-A M.R.S. § 1253(1) (2012). The plain meaning of the clause is that any good time credit earned under section 11 1253(10)(B) is applied to the DOC sentence, not to any period of incarceration served before the sentence commences. As the trial court found: “This provision does not require DOC to allow prisoners to earn this deduction for the entire time they are in execution of sentence. Rather, when a prisoner accrues a deduction authorized by section 1253(10)(B), that deduction is calculated in the way prescribed by that statute.” [¶18] Because DOC correctly interpreted section 1253(10)(B) to grant potential good time credit only for participation in work, education or rehabilitation programs that are community based, and because its policy does no more than give effect to that construction, the court did not err in denying Roderick’s petition.5 The entry is: Judgment affirmed. 5 To the extent Roderick argues that the policy’s restrictions improperly disqualify him from future opportunities to participate in community-based programs, even if the policy did not exist prison officials would still have broad discretion to determine whether he was suitable to participate in them. See 34-A M.R.S. § 1402(1) (2012) (“The commissioner has general supervision, management and control of . . . clients of any . . . correctional program.”); Dep’t of Corr. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 2009 ME 40, ¶ 13, 968 A.2d 1047 (“The Legislature granted the Department [of Corrections] broad power and authority to establish policies and procedures to manage the prisons and the persons incarcerated within them.”). 12 On the briefs: Hunter J. Tzovarras, Esq., Bangor, for appellant Christopher J. Roderick R. Christopher Almy, District Attorney, and Susan J. Pope, Asst. Dist. Atty., Prosecutorial District V, Bangor, for appellee State of Maine William J. Schneider, Attorney General, and Diane E. Sleek, Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for amicus curiae Department of Corrections At oral argument: Hunter J. Tzovarras, Esq., for appellant Christopher J. Roderick Diane E. Sleek, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee State of Maine and amicus curiae Department of Corrections Penobscot County Superior Court docket number CR-2009-834 FOR CLERK REFERENCE ONLY