Opinion ID: 769887
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Admission Into Evidence of Ledger, Address Books and Pocket Pal6

Text: 31 Kelly argues that the district court erred in unconditionally admitting into evidence a number of exhibits, including a ledger, address books, and a pocket pal, prior to making required foundational findings. We reject Kelly's contention. 32 We review a district court's evidentiary decisions for abuse of discretion and will reverse only if an error substantially prejudiced the outcome. See United States v. Roach, 164 F.3d 403, 408 (8th Cir. 1998). Under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E), a statement is not hearsay if made by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. It is well-established that to admit such a statement the government must demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, (1) that a conspiracy existed; (2) that the defendant and the declarant were members of the conspiracy; and (3) that the declaration was made during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1978). 7 See also United States v. Guerra, 113 F.3d 809, 813 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Escobar, 50 F.3d 1414, 1423 (8th Cir. 1995). A district court's determination that these specific conditions have been met is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See United States v. Oseby, 148 F.3d 1016, 1023 (8th Cir. 1998). When determining whether a conspiracy existed, a court may consider the co-conspirator's statement itself. See Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987). 33 On direct examination, Chaffee, the government's first witness, testified that the ledger, a small, spiral notebook, was used by Mitchell to keep track of money owed and paid on methamphetamine sales. She further testified that she had seen him buy the ledger and write in it, she recognized his handwriting, and she wrote in the ledger on occasion at his direction. The writing in the ledger consisted solely of initials, nicknames, and numbers, which Chaffee testified she could decipher. Additionally, Chaffee identified two address books which she testified she had purchased for Mitchell and that he used to keep track of contacts. She testified similarly regarding the pocket pal. The government offered these exhibits into evidence and Kelly's counsel objected on grounds of hearsay, improper foundation, lack of due process, and a violation of the Confrontation Clause. The district court admitted the exhibits without making any foundational findings on the record. Chaffee then continued to testify, indicating that, according to the notations in the ledger, Kelly owed Mitchell $1,500 for methamphetamine purchased. It was only after this testimony that the district court held a sidebar and found: 1) a conspiracy existed; 2) defendants and declarant were arguably a party thereto; and 3) the declarations as to the sale of drugs in the ledger were in furtherance of the conspiracy. 34 Kelly argues that at the time of this admission, the government had established, at most, the existence of a conspiracy, but not his membership therein. Further, Kelly contends that the ledger itself did not establish his membership by a preponderance of the evidence, because the mere existence of TK and Tom next to numbers was insufficient evidence. Thus, Kelly argues that the district court erred when it admitted the evidence. We disagree. 35 The evidence presented to the district court at the time it made its preliminary finding of admissibility demonstrated: Chaffee and Mitchell were engaged in a conspiracy to sell methamphetamine; the ledger itself contained reference, albeit cryptic, to Kelly; the purpose of the ledger was bookkeeping, thus demonstrating that the statements therein were in furtherance of the conspiracy; and Kelly had knowingly 0received methamphetamine from Mitchell. This evidence is sufficient to satisfy the requisite findings. 36 Even if this court were to find the evidence insufficient at the time of admission, any error from premature admission of the exhibits was harmless. We note that the district court eventually made specific findings on the foundational elements, stating: The evidence is clear in this case that a conspiracy did exist, that the defendants and the declarant were part of that conspiracy, and that the statements which were admissible were made in furtherance of the conspiracy. In light of the fact that the evidence would eventually have been admissible 8 and the lack of a showing that the arguably premature admission carried any prejudice, we find any error harmless.