Opinion ID: 7489
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Failure to cooperate as excusing duty to defend.

Text: 31 Hartford further argues that, if it did have a duty to defend, as we have determined it did, then Lafarge's failure to cooperate with Hartford in attempting to determine if coverage existed excused Hartford from its duty to defend Lafarge. We note first that, generally, [c]ooperation clauses are intended to guarantee to insurers the right to prepare adequately their defenses on questions of substantive liability. Martin v. Travelers Indemnity Co., 450 F.2d 542, 553 (5th Cir.1971) (construing Mississippi law). Thus it is arguable that, with respect to the issue of coverage (a question of the scope of the policy), as opposed to the issue of liability (a question of whether Lafarge or Anchor Wate were ultimately guilty of negligence or some other culpable act), Hartford may not even invoke the cooperation clause here. 32 Nevertheless, even if the cooperation clause may be invoked with respect to coverage issues, we conclude that the district court did not err in determining that Lafarge did not breach that duty. In an effort to show Lafarge's lack of cooperation, Hartford directs us to a footnote in its cross-motion for summary judgment of June 13, 1991. The first of the four letters between counsel for the parties referenced in that footnote was dated February 11, 1991; Hartford filed a declaratory judgment action against Lafarge in federal court in Virginia on February 12, 1991. Although we have found no Texas cases directly on point, 13 we think it is clear that, once the insurer sues the insured and contests coverage, the insurer cannot rely on the cooperation clause to gain access to information that any other party to any other lawsuit would be required to obtain through ordinary discovery methods.