Opinion ID: 1243098
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Return of the Bond

Text: Despite our holding that the principal surrendering or being surrendered constitutes good cause under HRS § 804-51, appellee maintains that the judgment of forfeiture should not be vacated and the bond returned to the surety because it was the police who arrested and surrendered Camara, not the surety. In other words, appellee's position is that, unless the principal is actually surrendered by the surety, the surety is not entitled to recover any portion of the bond. We disagree for three principal reasons. First, as previously stated, [w]hen construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language of the statute itself. Housing Fin. & Dev. Corp., 79 Hawai`i at 77, 898 P.2d at 589. HRS § 804-51 provides that, if the principal surrenders or is surrendered pursuant to Section 804-14 [12] or Section 804-41 [13]  the court shall return the bond to the surety, less costs. Under our reading of the statute, one of two alternative conditions must be met in order for the surety to recover its bond, less costs: either (1) the principal surrenders, which, in our view, includes both voluntary and involuntary surrender by the principal to law enforcement officials; or (2) the principal is surrendered by the surety to the appropriate authorities. Second, returning the bond to the surety, less costs, is consistent with the general principle that the primary purpose of bail is not to punish the defendant or surety, see Seybert, 753 P.2d at 326, but to secure the presence of the defendant to answer the charges against him or her. See Diaz, 811 F.2d at 1415. Whether the principal personally surrenders, voluntarily or otherwise, on the one hand, or is surrendered by the surety, on the other, is of no consequence. In our view, if the State regains custody of the defendant prior to the expiration of the thirty-day search period and the surety receives partial return of its bond, the primary purpose of bail would be met. To hold otherwise would result in punishment of the surety and possibly of the defendant. Finally, to hold that the surety may not secure relief from the judgment of forfeiture because the principal was apprehended by law enforcement officials, and not the surety, would discourage bondspersons from cooperating with law enforcement officials in their pursuit of a defendant. If we were to hold as appellee urges, sureties, in an effort to protect their interests, would effectively be encouraged to engage in conduct that could jeopardize public safety in an attempt to gain custody of a principal without assistance from law enforcement officials. Encouraging bondspersons to cooperate with the appropriate authorities by providing information of a defendant's whereabouts, so that such authorities may take the necessary precautions when apprehending the defendant, would promote both public safety and the safety of the bondspersons and the defendant. Accordingly, we hold that Aloha is entitled to the return of its bond, less costs.