Opinion ID: 3164768
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Applicability of the Presumption of Vindictiveness

Text: Â¶24Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Neither the Supreme Court nor this court has dictated a particular method for determining whether a defendantâs subsequent sentence is objectively more severe than the original sentence for purposes of applying the presumption of vindictiveness. Other jurisdictions have taken three different approaches to determining this threshold issue. First, the âaggregate approachâ compares the new aggregate sentence to the original aggregate sentence to determine whether there was an increase. Second, the âremainder aggregate approachâ compares the new aggregate sentence only to the aggregate of the original sentences for the convictions that remained after appeal. Third, the âcount-by-count approachâ isolates each conviction and deems a defendantâs sentence increased if any of the individual sentences increased, regardless of the aggregate effect. Before adopting one of these approaches, it is useful to discuss their relative merits and their application in other jurisdictions. Â¶25Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â First, a majority of courts that have considered the issue apply an aggregate approach to determine whether a new sentence is more or less severe than an original sentence. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell, 106 F.3d 64, 68 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 370, 374â75 (10th Cir. 1992); People v. Savala, 195 Cal. Rptr. 193, 196â97 (Ct. App. 1983), overruled on other grounds by People v. Foley, 216 Cal. Rptr. 865 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Hudson, 748 S.E.2d 910, 911â14 (Ga. 2013). 2 Under this approach, where changes to the defendantâs sentence on remand cause the aggregate total sentence to increase as compared to the original aggregate sentence, the presumption of vindictiveness applies. Â¶26Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The rationale that supports the aggregate approach is that judges imposing sentences in multi-count cases âtypically craft sentences on the various counts as part of an overall sentencing scheme,â but when that scheme âunravels,â a judge should have discretion to reevaluate the underlying facts and the sentences on the remaining convictions to âreflect[] the gravity of the crimes for which the defendant is being resentenced.â Hudson, 748 S.E.2d at 913. The aggregate approach thus recognizes the fact-intensive analysis in which the trial court must engage when sentencing a defendant on multiple interrelated convictions, and acknowledges the need for the same level of discretion at resentencing as at the original sentencing proceeding; however, by presuming vindictiveness when the total aggregate sentence increases, the aggregate approach still protects defendants from the fear of actual vindictiveness. See Campbell, 106 F.3d at 68 (âWhen an appellate court subsequently reverses a conviction (or convictions) that was part of the original sentence, the district courtâs job on remand is to reconsider the entirety of the (now-changed) circumstances and fashion a sentence that fits the crime and the criminal. . . . The aggregate approachâs inherent flexibility best comports with this important goal.â (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)). Â¶27Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â The logic of the aggregate approach is apparent, as demonstrated in a recent court of appeals opinion, People v. Woellhaf, 199 P.3d 27, 31 (Colo. App. 2007). In Woellhaf, a jury originally found the defendant guilty of nine separate counts stemming from a sexual assault of a child. Id. at 28. The trial court sentenced the defendant to an aggregate of forty-eight years in prison. Id. After the court of appeals affirmed the trial court in pertinent part, this court granted certiorari and reversed, holding that certain counts violated double jeopardy and instructing the trial court to merge certain convictions and then resentence. Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209, 220 (Colo. 2005). On remand, the trial court merged the counts and then sentenced the defendant to twenty-four years on a single count of sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, and to a concurrent sentence of twelve years for a single count of sexual assault on a child. Woellhaf, 199 P.3d at 29. Â¶28Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â On appeal a second time to the court of appeals, the defendant argued, among other things, that the new sentences violated his due process rights. Id. The court of appeals disagreed, holding that the presumption of vindictiveness did not arise because the aggregate period of incarceration did not increase from the original sentence to the new sentence on remand. Id. at 31â32. In so holding, the court of appeals noted that the aggregate approach deters actual vindictiveness and protects a defendantâs due process rightsâthe two goals of the presumption of vindictivenessâbut also balances the sentencing courtâs broad discretion and obligation to consider all relevant factors atÂ resentencing. 3 Id. at 32 (âIf . . . the trial court had been limited to imposing the length of incarceration originally imposed for one of [the four merged] convictions, it would have [sic] effectively have been prevented from considering all relevant and material facts relating to defendantâs conduct for purposes of resentencing.â). As the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has similarly observed, âthe aggregate approach best reflects the realities faced by district court judges who sentence a defendant on related counts of an indictment. Sentencing is a fact-sensitive exercise that requires district judges to consider a wide array of factors when putting together a âsentencing package.ââ Campbell, 106 F.3d at 68. Â¶29Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Turning to the second approach, two federal circuits have adopted a âremainder aggregateâ approach, which compares the new aggregate sentence on remand with the original aggregate sentence only of the counts that remained following the defendantâs successful appeal. United States v. Monaco, 702 F.2d 860, 884â85, 884 n.47 (11th Cir. 1983); United States v. Markus, 603 F.2d 409, 413 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Campbell, 106 F.3d at 68 (describing the remainder aggregate approach). As the court in Monaco observed, the distinctive feature of the remainder aggregate approach is that it accounts for the fact that the defendantâs original appeal succeeded in getting certain convictions and sentences dismissed, and therefore disregards those sentences when determining whether the presumption of vindictiveness applies. 702 F.2d at 885. Thus, theÂ remainder aggregate approach does not affect a trial judgeâs discretion to impose a new sentence that is less than or equal to the âvalidâ aggregate sentence from the original sentencing proceeding, but it does give rise to the presumption of vindictiveness if the sentence exceeds that âvalidâ original sentence. See id. Â¶30Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Finally, a small minority of jurisdictions have adopted the âcount-by-countâ approach, which compares the trial courtâs original sentence on an individual conviction against the trial courtâs sentence on that same conviction after appeal and remand, applying the presumption of vindictiveness if there is an increase. See, e.g., People v. Moore, 686 N.E.2d 587, 595 (Ill. 1997); see also Anthony v. Hopper, 219 S.E.2d 413, 415 (Ga. 1975), overruled by Hudson, 748 S.E.2d at 914. The remainder aggregate approach and the count-by-count approach share certain characteristics and display similar benefits and drawbacks; therefore, we will discuss the merits of the two approaches in tandem in further detail below. Â¶31Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In comparison to the aggregate approach, the remainder aggregate and count-by-count approaches give rise to the presumption of vindictiveness in more factual scenarios. The remainder aggregate approach does so because it chooses a different reference pointâthe original aggregate sentence only of the remaining countsâand applies the presumption of vindictiveness if the new sentence exceeds that reference point, even if the new sentence does not exceed the aggregate sentence on all original counts. The count-by-count approach does so because it focuses the analysis on each individual count and gives rise to the presumption of vindictiveness for an increase on any one count, regardless of aggregate effect. Consequently, these twoÂ approaches provide substantial protection to defendants and recognize that the potential for vindictive sentencing presents a real danger of chilling a defendantâs right of appeal. Focusing on the principle that vindictiveness âmust play no part in the sentenceâ a defendant receives after a successful appeal, Pearce, 395 U.S. at 725, the remainder aggregate approach and the count-by-count approach both opt to apply the presumption of vindictiveness more often than the aggregate approach in order to thoroughly deter vindictive sentencing and minimize any possibility, however remote, of creating a chilling effect on defendantsâ right of appeal. These two approaches thus prefer to presume vindictiveness in a potentially over-inclusive set of factual circumstances in an attempt to ensure that all actually vindictive sentencing decisions fall within their presumption. If, however, vindictiveness is truly absent in a case in which the presumption arises under either of these approaches, the prosecution has the ability to rebut the presumption and prove that there is no reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness by identifying objective reasons in the record for an increased sentence. Â¶32The protection these two approaches afford defendants deserves recognition, but allowing the application of the presumption of vindictiveness in a broader universe of cases could unduly restrain trial court sentencing discretion even where there may be a legitimate reason, under the sentencing statute and the facts of the case, to increase an individual countâs sentence on remand while preserving or decreasing the aggregate sentence. Restraining sentencing discretion in this way could result in harsher sentences for defendants because rather than sentencing each count separately and independently of one another to avoid any possibility of punishing a defendant doubleÂ for a certain offense, judges might impose a harsher sentence on each count in order to protect against a claim of vindictiveness after a future resentencing. A recent Georgia Supreme Court case, State v. Hudson, helps to illustrate this effect and its possible repercussions. 748 S.E.2d at 911. Â¶33Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In Hudson, the defendant was originally sentenced to an aggregate of twenty-five years in prison and life on probation based upon concurrent sentences on one count of sexual battery and one count of child molestation. Id. Pertinent here, the child molestation component of that original sentence was ten years in prison and twenty years on probation. Id. After the defendant successfully appealed his convictions, on remand the trial court followed the court of appealsâ instructions and merged the two convictions. Id. It subsequently resentenced Hudson on the single remaining count, child molestation, to twenty-five years in prison and five years on probation. Id. Thus, the aggregate sentence decreased from twenty-five years in prison and life on probation to twenty-five years in prison and five years on probation. Id. Â However, the child molestation count, when considered in isolation, increased from ten years in prison and twenty years on probation to twenty-five years in prison and five years on probation. Id. at 912. In light of the increased child molestation sentence and Georgiaâs adoption in 1975 of the count-by-count approach, the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the new sentence by presuming vindictiveness and concluding that the trial court violated the defendantâs due process rights. Id.; see also Anthony, 219 S.E.2d at 415. On appeal, the prosecution urged the Georgia Supreme Court to abandon the count-by-count approach in favor of the aggregate approach, relying in part on thatÂ courtâs recent three-justice plurality recommending that course of action. Hudson, 748 S.E.2d at 912; see also Adams v. State, 696 S.E.2d 676, 679â81 (Ga. 2010). The court agreed that there was sufficient reason to part with its precedent and therefore overruled Anthony and adopted the aggregate approach. Hudson, 748 S.E.2d at 914. Â¶34Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In explaining its decision, the court provided several reasons to part with the count-by-count approach. Id. at 913. First, the court noted that the presumption of vindictiveness seeks to prevent vindictiveness, not any âmere imposition of an enhanced sentence on retrial or remand.â Id. The court therefore found it necessary to tailor the applicability of the presumption of vindictiveness and try to ensure that it applied only in cases in which that goal is âmost efficaciously served.â Id. (quoting Smith, 490 U.S. at 799). After observing that the Supreme Court itself has âcircumscribedâ the applicability of the presumption of vindictiveness in numerous cases since Pearce, id. (citing Smith, 490 U.S. at 801; McCullough, 475 U.S. at 139â40; Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17, 18 (1973)), the Georgia court concluded that the count-by-count approach was not satisfactorily precise in determining when the presumption should apply, and therefore adopted the aggregate approach in its place: [T]he Pearce presumption [of vindictiveness] is a blunt instrument for ascertaining trial court vindictiveness. For the same reasons the Supreme Court has seen fit to limit the factual circumstances in which the Pearce Â presumption is triggered, we see fit to adopt the aggregate approach, as the more precise of the two methods [the other being the count-by-count approach] in identifying actual trial court vindictiveness. Id. Â¶35Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Providing a second reason, the Georgia Supreme Court noted that the count-by-count approach is not as âadept [as the aggregate approach] at accommodating the discretion trial courts need in fashioning just and proper sentences.â Id. Especially when faced with a multi-count sentence, a trial court may have legitimate reasons to increase certain counts or the aggregate of the remaining counts, but even where such a new sentence is less than the original aggregate, the remainder aggregate and count-by-count approaches would presume vindictiveness under those circumstances. See id. As a result, the Georgia court concluded that a ârule presuming vindictiveness only where the subsequent sentence is more severe in the aggregate affords the judge the appropriate level of discretion in resentencing . . . .â Id. Â¶36Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â In sum, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the count-by-count approach does not strike as careful a balance as the aggregate approach, in large part because of âits relative imprecision in identifying actual trial court vindictiveness and failure to recognize the âbig pictureâ in a trial judgeâs sentencing decisions.â Id. at 914. The same could be said of the remainder aggregate approach: A trial court may have legitimate reasons to increase the aggregate sentence on the remaining counts after an appellate court invalidates the conviction for some other count, but under the remainder aggregate approach the trial courtâs discretion to impose such an increase is constrained by the specter of the presumption of vindictiveness, regardless of whether there was any ârealistic motive for vindictive sentencing.â McCullough, 475 U.S. at 139. In part because of these concerns, both federal circuits that have adopted the remainder aggregate approach have strayed from that approach under certain circumstances,Â although neither has expressly overruled it. See United States v. Fowler, 749 F.3d 1010, 1022 (11th Cir. 2014) (limiting the application of Monacoâs remainder aggregate approach in light of changes to federal sentencing law); United States v. Mata, 133 F.3d 200, 201â02 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that the presumption of vindictiveness did not arise, despite the fact that the remainder aggregate approach would have triggered it, because the facts did not show any âhint of vindictivenessâ). Â¶37Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â With all of these approaches in mind, we conclude that the aggregate approach taken by a majority of courts is the appropriate framework for applying the presumption of vindictiveness. The aggregate approach best effectuates the Supreme Courtâs instruction to apply the presumption only where its objectivesâto deter actual vindictiveness and avoid a chilling effect on defendants exercising their right to appealâare âmost efficaciously served.â Smith, 490 U.S. at 799 (quoting McCullough, 475 U.S. at 138). When a new sentence is less than the original aggregate sentence, the defendant necessarily benefits from his appeal and the presumption of vindictiveness need not apply in order to avoid a chilling effect on defendants exercising their constitutional rights. Moreover, under the aggregate approach, sentencing judges retain their broad discretion in sentencing a defendant both before and after remand, taking into account the panoply of factors relevant to those determinations. A reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness does not necessarily arise, and therefore vindictiveness should not be presumed, when a sentencing judge increases a sentence on one conviction but the aggregate time of incarceration does not exceed the aggregate original sentence; the increase on the individual count may simply reflect the fact thatÂ the trial court was faced with a different situation, in which the defendant was subject to a different combination of charges for the same criminal episode. In this way, the aggregate approach strikes the desired balance between protecting a defendantâs right to appeal, on the one hand, and ensuring that trial courts retain their broad discretion in sentencing, on the other. Â¶38Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Having adopted the aggregate approach, we now determine whether the presumption of vindictiveness applies to Johnsonâs new possession of a controlled substance sentence.