Opinion ID: 1613388
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Heading: The Order to Report to Jail.

Text: Jackson also contends that she is not subject to the provisions of section 811.2(8) because she did not fail to appear before a court or magistrate. Failure to report to the Black Hawk County Jail cannot be construed to be failure to appear before the court or magistrate. This is especially so, she argues, in view of the general rule that criminal statutes must be narrowly construed. The federal bail jumping statute now deals specifically with this problem. It provides that a person commits an offense if the person fails to appear before a court or knowingly fails to surrender for service of sentence pursuant to a court order. 18 U.S.C. § 3146. Prior to the time the provision was added regarding failure to surrender for service of sentence, however, the federal statute was very similar to Iowa's. It provided: Whoever, having been released pursuant to this chapter, willfully fails to appear before any court or judicial officer as required, shall, ... incur a forfeiture of any security which was given or pledged for his release, and [shall be deemed guilty of a criminal offense]. 18 U.S.C. § 3150. Despite the limited language of § 3150, the federal circuits have uniformly held that failure to appear for commencement of sentence, usually by failing to appear before the United States Marshal, constituted a violation of § 3150. In United States v. Burleson, 638 F.2d 237, 238-39 (10th Cir.1980), the defendant failed to surrender to the United States Marshal to begin service of her sentence. She argued that a marshal is not a judicial officer within the meaning of § 3150 and that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. The court of appeals agreed with both these contentions, but nevertheless affirmed her conviction of a violation of § 3150. The court noted that, while it was an issue of first impression in the tenth circuit, other circuits had considered whether a sentenced defendant who disobeys a court order directing him or her to report to a United States marshal violates § 3150: These cases hold that although the Marshal is not himself a judicial officer for purposes of a section 3150 violation, it is appropriate to view the Marshal as a designated agent of the court for the limited purpose of taking a defendant into custody. We agree. Here, Burleson had already been sentenced and no discretionary action by the Marshal was involved. Requiring a defendant to appear before the courts solely to be turned over to the custody of the Marshal is an unnecessary waste of judicial time. Burleson, 638 F.2d at 238 (emphasis added). Burleson also argued that the court's reasoning was in conflict with the principle that criminal statutes must be strictly construed. The court responded that general rules of construction cannot be used to ignore the statute's manifest purpose. The obvious intent of Congress under 18 U.S.C. § 3150 was to provide sanctions against bail jumping. One released on bail under the Bail Reform Act is under the continuing jurisdiction of the district court. The court clearly has the power to designate the time and place for the defendant to report, and to designate the United States Marshal as the agent of the court for the limited purpose of taking the defendant into custody.... The mere fact that the court directs the defendant to appear before its designated agent, the United States Marshal, rather than before the judicial officer making the order, does not obviate sanctions under the Act. Id. at 238-39 (quoting United States v. Harris, 544 F.2d 947, 949-50 (8th Cir. 1976)). Similar holdings are found in United States v. Wells, 766 F.2d 12, 20 (1st Cir.1985); United States v. Black, 543 F.2d 35, 37 n. 3 (7th Cir.1976); United States v. Bright, 541 F.2d 471, 475 (5th Cir.1976); United States v. Logan, 505 F.2d 35, 37-39 (5th Cir.1974); United States v. West, 477 F.2d 1056, 1058 (4th Cir.1973); and United States v. Cardillo, 473 F.2d 325, 327-28 (4th Cir.1973). In a South Dakota case, Foster v. State, 372 N.W.2d 468 (S.D.1985), a statute virtually identical to Iowa's section 811.2(8) was involved. In that case, the defendant was ordered to report to the sheriff to begin service of his sentence, but the defendant failed to appear. The court rejected the argument that the sheriff was not a court or judicial officer within the meaning of South Dakota's equivalent to section 811.2(8). The court relied on federal cases, noting that the bail statute in South Dakota, as in Iowa, is very similar to the federal Bail Reform Act. Foster, 372 N.W.2d at 469. The court cited several federal circuit cases, which held that failure to appear before a magistrate constituted a violation of the Bail Reform Act. Based on the reasoning of the federal cases and the similarity of the federal statute involved, we conclude that the Black Hawk County Jail, or the sheriff, are the proper designees of the district court and the failure to appear at the jail violated the court's order and subjected Jackson to criminal liability under section 811.2(8). It would make little sense to require her to appear in the courtroom personally before the judge simply to be transported to the jail.