Opinion ID: 624293
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Concern for Fair Trial Rights

Text: Central to the holding in Sell was the understanding that the side-effects associated with psychotropic medication may severely prejudice a defendant's right to receive a fair trial. Here, for example, Dr. Pietz testified that Loughner has developed a flat, emotionless aspect since resuming psychotropic medication. The district court further observed that Loughner did appear to be tired at the commitment proceeding and did appear to close his eyes from time to time today and maybe a little sleepy or nod off. This sedation-like effect may result in serious prejudice during trial proceedings if medication inhibits [Loughner's] capacity to react and respond to the proceedings and to demonstrate remorse or compassion. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 143-44, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). The tendency of psychotropic medication to flatten or deaden emotional responses could prove particularly damaging if the government seeks the death penalty, as it very well might in this case, because the jury would then be especially sensitive to [Loughner's] character and any demonstrations of remorse (or lack thereof). Weston, 206 F.3d at 20 (Tatel, J., concurring). Even the intended effects of psychotropic drugs may infringe Loughner's fair trial rights. Assuming Loughner will put on an insanity defense, manifestations in court of how his mind works may well be his own best evidence. Because psychotropic medication chemically alters the brain, it deprives the jury of the opportunity to observe the defendant in the delusional state he was in at the time of the crime. Id. at 21 (Tatel, J., concurring). The government's decision to restore Loughner's trial competency may therefore prevent him from putting on his chosen defense, by altering the material evidence for that defense. See Riggins, 504 U.S. at 139, 142, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). [10] Thus, both the intended and unintended effects of psychotropic medication can conceivably deprive a criminal defendant of his right to a fair trial. There is no point in restoring a defendant's trial competency, through commitment to a medical facility and involuntary administration of psychotropic medication, if the means necessary to effect restoration will so infringe the defendant's fair trial rights as to render the trial itself unconstitutional. That is why Sell requires a court to find, before ordering involuntary medication on trial competency grounds, that the involuntary medication to be administered is both substantially likely to render the defendant competent to stand trial and substantially unlikely to create side-effects that would render his trial unfair. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 181, 123 S.Ct. 2174 (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 142-45, 112 S.Ct. 1810 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)). Only then, the Court observed, will the medication sufficiently advance the trial-related interests put forward to justify depriving the defendant of his liberty to reject medical treatment. See id. And, although the Court did not expressly so state, the possible impact of involuntary medication on the ultimate trial explains Sell's repeated insistence on the need for a court to determine the need for involuntary medication on grounds of dangerousness where restoration of trial competency is the government's ultimate goal. See id. at 181-83, 123 S.Ct. 2174. Given the particular circumstances of this casenamely, a commitment proceeding governed by 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A)there is the same need for a judicial determination as to how the psychotropic drugs will likely impact Loughner's fair trial rights, even though dangerousness to self is the immediate reason for his involuntary medication. To commit Loughner for the purpose of restoration, the court must conclude that there is a substantial probability that he will attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward during the commitment period. See 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d)(2)(A). Thus, § 4241 requires the court to focus on whether Loughner's commitment is likely to advance the prosecution's trial-related interests. Pretrial commitment for restoration of competency will likely not permit the [trial] proceedings to go forward if Loughner can only be restored through means likely to render any resulting trial unfair. So the district court may only commit Loughner for restoration of trial competency if it concludes that the psychotropic means through which his restoration is to be accomplished are substantially unlikely to infringe his fair trial rights. [11] Of course, at the time of the § 4241(d)(2)(A) commitment hearing, there may not be sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that involuntary psychotropic medication will render the trial unfair. But that should not excuse the district court from its responsibility to evaluate the evidence that is available according to its own best lights, providing both the defendant, whose right to present a defense may be infringed by involuntary medication, and the government, whose eventual prosecution of the defendant may be foreclosed because of the infringement, with the best available pre-medication resolution of the Sixth Amendment issue. Weston, 206 F.3d at 14. If the district court concludes that there is insufficient evidence to reach a final conclusion on the impact involuntary medication will have on the defendant's fair trial rights, it could simply defer the issue until some later, pre-trial date. See id. at 21 (Tatel, J., concurring). The government would then, however, bear the risk that the court might bar criminal prosecution if it subsequently concludes that the drugs have infringed the defendant's fair trial rights. Regardless of whether the court had sufficient evidence to resolve Loughner's fair trial rights concerns at the time of the commitment hearing, however, the inquiry is not, as the majority asserts, premature and irrelevant at this stage. Majority Op. at 769.