Opinion ID: 1724022
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 9

Heading: Unargued Assignments of Error

Text: Defendant proffered several formal assignments of error for which he did not provide any argument beyond the assignment itself. [6] In unbriefed assignments twelve and thirteen, defendant complains of statements made by the trial court and the prosecutor during voir dire. In assignment twelve he complains that the court instructed potential jurors that they must consider aggravating factors when determining punishments. This is a wholly correct statement of the law. La.Code Crim.P. arts. 905.2, 905.3, 905.4, 905.7. In assignment thirteen, he complains that the prosecutor told potential jurors that they should not consider sympathy when determining the appropriate sentence. This is also a correct statement of the law. State v. Brogdon, 457 So.2d 616, 629 (La.1984). Assignments twelve and thirteen are without merit. In unargued assignment number eight, the defendant contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State to admit gruesome photographs of the victim. The trial court allowed the introduction of the photographs citing several reasons, including La.Code Crim.P. art. 905.2(A) which provides: The jury may consider any evidence offered at the trial on the issue of guilt. In addition to Article 905.2(A), this Court previously ruled in the first review of this case that these same photographs were relevant and probative in proving the State's case and were not so gruesome as to overwhelm the juror's reason. State v. Bourque, 622 So.2d 198, 236 (La.1993). In the instant hearing, during the defendant's attempt to exclude the photographs via stipulation, the State pointed out that in addressing the exact evidence, this Court had held that the defendant cannot deprive the State of the moral force of its case by offering to stipulate to what is shown in photographs. Bourque, 622 So.2d at 236. (citing to State v. Perry, 502 So.2d 543, 559 (La.1986) cert. denied, 484 U.S. 872, 108 S.Ct. 205, 98 L.Ed.2d 156 (1987)). As before, we find that the evidence is admissible. This assignment is without merit. In assignment number nine, the defendant asserts that the trial court erred each time it refused a jury charge offered by defendant. The defendant tendered ten proposed special jury charges. Because the charge conference took place off the record in chambers and as this is an unbriefed assignment, we have no indication as to which of the defendant's proposed charges were refused or which may have been abandoned because their substance was already contained within the general charge. Nonetheless, a review of the proposed charges reveals that most of their content was included within the general charge to the jury and much of the language contained in the proposed charges appeared verbatim in the general charge. Neither the record nor the defendant demonstrates that the trial court's refusal to accept the defendant's proposed charges was error. This assignment lacks merit. In assignment sixteen, defendant contends that the trial court erred in overruling defendant's objection to the State's introduction of the Huebner film. No such evidence was admitted. Thus, this assignment lacks merit. Assignment twenty complains that the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to review the personnel records of Duke Needham, a potential witness for the State. As Mr. Needham did not testify, this assignment is without merit. In assignment number nineteen, defendant contends that it was error for the trial court to excuse for cause jurors who stated they could not consider voting for the death penalty because of religious beliefs and scruples. This contention is in direct contradiction to the law of this state. La.Code Crim.P. art. 798 expressly provides that it is good cause for challenge that a prospective juror in a capital case could not consider voting for the death penalty because of religious beliefs and scruples. La.Code Crim.P. art. 798(2). This assignment lacks merit. Defendant, in assignment twenty-two, asserts that the trial court's denial of his motion to exclude the aggravating circumstance of aggravated burglary was reversible error. Presumably, this assignment, unbriefed, is based upon the State's filing of its motion to include this aggravator one legal day after the date set by the trial court for the filing of motions. In response to a writ filed by defendant, this Court ruled on June 17, 1994 that the State could not use aggravated kidnapping as an aggravating circumstance, State v. Bourque, 640 So.2d 1317 (La.1994), thus leaving the State with only that the defendant knowingly created a risk of death or great bodily harm to more than one person as an aggravating circumstance. The State subsequently filed its motion to amend to include aggravated burglary on August 2, 1994, fifty-five days before trial. Defendant contested on the grounds that the courtimposed deadline had passed by one day at the time the State filed its motion. The trial court heard arguments on the issue and granted the State's motion. The defendant is entitled to notice of the aggravating circumstances upon which the State will rely in sufficient time to afford a reasonable opportunity to prepare. State v. Sonnier, 379 So.2d 1336, 1356 (1980). However, defendant makes no argument nor shows any prejudice nor points to any law which would preclude the State from alleging the additional aggravator. The State had the right to allege and prove the additional aggravator after this Court decreed that it could not use aggravated kidnapping. The mere fact that the State filed its motion to amend one legal day after the court's selfimposed deadline does not show prejudice toward the defendant, nor has the defendant shown any prejudice. This assignment is without merit. In assignment twenty-six, defendant argues that the jury's determination of sentence was invalid because there was no agreement on the underlying felony to support the aggravating circumstance of aggravated burglary. [7] Initially, we note that the only possible supporting felony included in the jury instructions was simple kidnapping. Furthermore, there is no requirement that the jury agree on which felony the armed perpetrator intended when he entered even if the State had submitted several named and defined felonies. See Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 111 S.Ct. 2491, 115 L.Ed.2d 555 (1991). The claim of invalidity due to lack of juror agreement is neither factually nor legally supportable. This assignment lacks merit. Defendant states, in assignment twenty-seven, that Louisiana's death penalty scheme is unconstitutional on its face and as applied in this case. Louisiana's bifurcated capital sentencing scheme is modeled on Georgia's statute which was upheld in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976). Louisiana's scheme narrows the substantive definition of first degree murder to restrict the class of death-eligible cases and further provides for a sentencing hearing in which the jury may make a binding decision that the defendant receive a sentence of life imprisonment. Thus, it passes Eighth Amendment constitutional muster. State v. Welcome, 458 So.2d 1235, 1251-52 (La.1983). In the final unargued assignment of error, defendant asserts that the cumulative error in this case requires reversal. We have carefully reviewed each of the defendant's assignments of error and determined that none constitute reversible error. As this Court stated in State v. Copeland, 530 So.2d 526, 544-45 (La.1988), ... the combined effect of the incidences complained of, none of which amounts to reversible error, did not deprive the defendant of his right to a fair trial.