Opinion ID: 681368
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: United States' Cross-Appeal

Text: 13 The United States' cross-appeal asserts the district court's decision to grant a judgment of acquittal on counts one and two because they were mock transactions, claiming the district court erred in its interpretation of Sec. 841(a)(1). 14 A district court decision 'setting aside a jury verdict of guilt is entitled to no deference'  on appeal, United States v. Reicher, 983 F.2d 168, 170 (10th Cir.1992) (citation omitted), and we review that determination de novo. See United States v. Coleman, 9 F.3d 1480, 1482 (10th Cir.1993), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 1234, 127 L.Ed.2d 578 (1994). We must therefore view the direct evidence, along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the government to determine if a rational finder of fact could reasonably have found Mr. Santistevan guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See Chavez-Palacios, 30 F.3d at 1293-94 (citing, inter alia, Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 324, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2791-92, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979)). 6 15 The district court granted Mr. Santistevan's motion as to counts one and two due to what it termed the lack of any concrete involvement in the distribution of drugs. While we disagree with the district court's reliance on the concrete involvement language, we nonetheless agree with its ultimate conclusion that counts one and two must be dismissed because of a deficiency in the government's proof of an essential element of the crimes charged.
16 Pursuant to the plain language of Sec. 841(a)(1), the essential elements of a prima facie case of distribution of a controlled substance are: (1) knowing or intentional; (2) distribution; (3) of a controlled substance. In light of the unambiguous language in this statute, we have difficulty with the use of the amorphous term concrete involvement in defining what constitutes a distribution. 17 As we noted in United States v. Wigley, 627 F.2d 224, 226 (10th Cir.1980) (per curiam ), Congress specifically defined the term distribution in the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. Sec. 801 et seq., as a delivery. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 802(11). Delivery is further defined as the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 802(8). Given the clarity and specificity of Congress' definition of the term distribution, we find the concrete involvement gloss to be both unnecessary and unwarranted. 7 B. 18 Although we disagree with the district court's reliance on the concrete involvement language to dismiss counts one and two, we agree with the district court's ultimate conclusion dismissing counts one and two. In our view, there was insufficient evidence of distribution presented to the trier of fact to support the convictions on counts one and two. 19 The issue of whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt was not raised below nor was it asserted in the briefs on appeal. 8 While this ordinarily constitutes a waiver of the issue, precluding us from reviewing the merits of the claim, our case law unquestionably recognizes our inherent power to raise an issue sua sponte as plain error under circumstances strongly implying a fundamental defect or error of sufficient magnitude to undermine our confidence that justice was served. See, e.g., Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b) & adv. comm. note (discussing, inter alia, Wiborg v. United States, 163 U.S. 632, 658, 16 S.Ct. 1127, 1137, 41 L.Ed. 289 (1896) (And although this question was not properly raised, yet if a plain error was committed in a matter so absolutely vital to defendants, we feel ourselves at liberty to correct it.) (emphasis added)); United States v. Brown, 995 F.2d 1493, 1504 (10th Cir.) (noting a critical omission is one which should be noted by an appellate court sua sponte as plain error.), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 114 S.Ct. 353, 126 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); United States v. Kline, 922 F.2d 610, 613 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Greschner, 802 F.2d 373, 380 (10th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 908, 107 S.Ct. 1353, 94 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987) (recognizing the power to raise plain error sua sponte ); United States v. Zolicoffer, 869 F.2d 771, 774 (3d Cir.) (the failure to prove one of the essential elements of a crime is the type of fundamental error which may be noticed by an appellate court notwithstanding the defendant's failure to raise it in the district court) (citing Strickland v. United States, 339 F.2d 866, 868 (10th Cir.1965)), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1113, 109 S.Ct. 3172, 104 L.Ed.2d 1034 (1989). 20 In Kline, we stated courts of appeals do not search appellate records for unassigned errors, and claims not asserted on appeal are deemed waived except in the extraordinary case where necessary to prevent a manifest miscarriage of justice. Kline, 922 F.2d at 613 (citing United States v. Fagan, 821 F.2d 1002, 1015 n. 9 (5th Cir.1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1005, 108 S.Ct. 697, 98 L.Ed.2d 649 (1988)). While we strongly adhere to the principle that only the exceptional case will warrant the exercise of this extraordinary power, we believe the prosecution's failure to prove an essential element of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt in this case offends our most fundamental sense of due process. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1072-73, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). Accordingly, it is appropriate for us to exercise our power to raise the sufficiency of the evidence sua sponte as plain error. 21 As indicated above, Congress specifically defined the term distribution as the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance. 21 U.S.C. Sec. 802(8). The government's position in both its opening and supplemental briefs is that the defendant possessed cocaine in November, 1989 and in December, 1989, and physically passed the cocaine on to Mares. (Emphasis added.) In other words, the government asserts the distribution took the form of an actual transfer from Mr. Santistevan to Mr. Mares. 9 22 The plain, ordinary meaning of the words actual transfer connotes the passing of an object from one person to another, see Webster's New International Dictionary, Unabridged 2427 (3d ed. 1981), although the government correctly notes that in order to satisfy the distribution element, it need not prove a sale. See Wigley, 627 F.2d at 226. We have carefully reviewed the briefs and the record on appeal in search of any evidence supporting a finding that Mr. Santistevan passed the drugs to Mr. Mares. The record simply belies such a finding. We find no evidence to support even a reasonable inference that Mr. Santistevan transferred cocaine to Mr. Mares as charged in counts one and two. When asked about this possible deficiency in proof at oral argument, the government directed us to two excerpts of testimony. The evidence we were referred to does not, either individually or collectively, support the government's position. 23 The first excerpt we are directed to is the testimony of Mr. Santistevan's girlfriend, Edith Bridgeforth. Her testimony, however, does not address the alleged distributions forming the basis for counts one and two, which occurred in November and December of 1989, respectively. Rather, her testimony pertains to the remaining counts in the indictment alleging real drug distributions between Mr. Santistevan and Mr. Mares, the first of which happened in January of 1990. 24 On direct examination, Ms. Bridgeforth admitted meeting Mr. Santistevan in the fall of 1989. She further acknowledged Mr. Santistevan began living with her at the end of November 1989. When she began testifying as to matters pertaining to the substantive counts alleged against Mr. Santistevan, she stated the first transaction she was describing occurred in January of 1990. Before she described other incidents between Mr. Santistevan and Mr. Mares, she stated the events took place in January and February of 1990. In sum, Ms. Bridgeforth's testimony is simply not relevant to counts one and two. Her testimony as to the defendant's actions in distributing drugs to Mr. Mares began in January of 1990 and would appear to relate to counts three through seven of the indictment, as opposed to counts one and two, which occurred at the end of 1989. Therefore, this evidence cannot, and does not, support the convictions on counts one and two. 25 The second excerpt relied on by the government is the testimony of Mr. Mares. Although a portion of his testimony does in fact relate to counts one and two, we believe it is insufficient as a matter of law to support a finding of distribution. The essence of Mr. Mares' testimony relative to counts one and two is he was asked by Mr. Santistevan to help him in a fake buy. According to Mr. Mares, Mr. Santistevan asked him to pose as a buyer of drugs. Mr. Santistevan would provide the money and the drugs and Mr. Mares would make it appear as though he was buying the drugs from the defendant. 26 The relevant portions of Mr. Mares' testimony was he met Mr. Santistevan at Ms. Bridgeforth's apartment in November of 1989; he (Mr. Santistevan) left the apartment and returned with a bundle of money; the two men counted the money; he again left the apartment and returned shortly thereafter with a kilo of cocaine; he opened the cocaine and took a piece; and he then took the cocaine and left the apartment. With respect to the second count, Mr. Mares testified the sequence of events was the same. 27 We are simply at a loss to see how this testimony supports a finding that Mr. Santistevan transferred the drugs to Mr. Mares. The entire testimony is Mr. Santistevan did everything himself. While the government's position at oral argument was that the evidence of transfer was circumstantial, we believe the inference sought to be drawn crosses the admittedly imprecise line between a reasonable inference based on the evidence and impermissible speculation and conjecture. See, e.g., United States v. Galbraith, 20 F.3d 1054, 1057 (10th Cir.) (citing Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th Cir.1987) (citing Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372, 63 S.Ct. 1077, 87 L.Ed. 1458 (1943))), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 233, 130 L.Ed.2d 157 (1994). It is worth reiterating that in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not give the government the benefit of every potential inference but rather, only those inferences reasonably and logically flowing from the other evidence adduced at trial. E.g., Coleman, 9 F.3d at 1482. Therefore, we find Mr. Mares' testimony insufficient to sustain the verdicts on counts one and two. 10