Opinion ID: 2022254
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Proximate Cause: Question of Law or Fact?

Text: Prior to granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on the issue of proximate cause, the circuit court ruled that the issue of proximate cause in an appellate legal malpractice action is a question of law for the court to decide and not a question of fact for a jury. The appellate court upheld this ruling. 356 Ill.App.3d at 270-72, 292 Ill.Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729. Generally, the issue of what is the proximate cause of an injury is a question of fact for a jury to determine based on its consideration of all of the evidence. Kalata v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., 144 Ill.2d 425, 436, 163 Ill.Dec. 502, 581 N.E.2d 656 (1991), quoting Davis v. Marathon Oil Co., 64 Ill.2d 380, 395, 1 Ill.Dec. 93, 356 N.E.2d 93 (1976), quoting Neering v. Illinois Central R.R. Co., 383 Ill. 366, 381, 50 N.E.2d 497 (1943). Specifically: The issue of proximate causation in a legal malpractice setting is generally considered a factual issue to be decided by the trier of fact. Renshaw v. Black, 299 Ill.App.3d 412, 417-18, 233 Ill.Dec. 703, 701 N.E.2d 553 (1998) (and cases cited therein). This court has explained that issues that could cause reasonable persons to reach different results should never be determined as questions of law. The debatable qualities of issues such as proximate cause, the fact that fair-minded persons might reach different conclusions, emphasize the appropriateness of leaving such issues to a fact-finding body, i.e., the jury. Ney v. Yellow Cab Co., 2 Ill.2d 74, 84, 117 N.E.2d 74 (1954). In the present case, plaintiffs contend that the issue of whether defendants' appellate legal malpractice proximately caused plaintiffs' injury was likewise a question of fact for a jury to determine. Plaintiffs argue that the appellate court's holding in the present case distinguishes attorneys who commit appellate malpractice from other negligent professionals, and insulates negligent appellate attorneys from a jury determination of whether their negligence caused injury. Plaintiffs go so far as to argue that this result violates the right to a jury trial as guaranteed by the Illinois Constitution. Ill. Const.1970, art. I, § 13. We cannot accept plaintiffs' contention. It is quite settled that [t]he interpretation of a statute is a matter of law for the court and appropriate for summary judgment. County of Knox ex rel. Masterson v. The Highlands, L.L.C., 188 Ill.2d 546, 551, 243 Ill.Dec. 224, 723 N.E.2d 256 (1999) (collecting cases). This principle does not usurp the fact-finding role of a jury, but rather reflects the constitutionally recognized role of the court to interpret and declare the law. The Illinois Constitution places the state's judicial power in the courts. Ill. Const.1970, art. VI, § 1. The application of principles of law is inherently a judicial function. Wright v. Central Du Page Hospital Ass'n, 63 Ill.2d 313, 322, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976); see Environmental Control Systems, 301 Ill.App.3d at 621, 234 Ill.Dec. 901, 703 N.E.2d 1001 (stating that the judicial power includes the power to determine and analyze the applicable law). In this appellate legal malpractice action, the negligence that plaintiffs alleged defendants committed was the failure to perfect the appeal to the appellate court in the underlying case. Accordingly, for plaintiffs to prevail, they must prove that, but for defendants' failure, the appellate court in the underlying case would have held that the Tort Immunity Act immunized the County from liability. In other words: If the County should not have been afforded protection from the verdict under the Tort Immunity Act, then defendants' failure to perfect the appeal was not the proximate cause of the County's damages. 356 Ill.App.3d at 272, 292 Ill.Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729. Thus, the success of plaintiffs' legal malpractice action rests upon the question of how the appellate court in the underlying case would have interpreted the Tort Immunity Act. This was a question of law for the circuit court. The circuit court's determination of the correct interpretation of the Tort Immunity Act and whether the County should be immune thereunder does not turn on questions of fact. We agree with the appellate court that whether defendants told plaintiffs prior to the appeal of the underlying traffic accident case that the appellate court was likely to reverse based upon tort immunity and whether such statement was truthful does not affect the proper application of the Tort Immunity Act. 356 Ill. App.3d at 272, 292 Ill.Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729. Although this case presents an issue of statutory interpretation, which is clearly an issue of law for the court, we do not see how the issue of proximate cause in an appellate legal malpractice action could be a question of fact for a jury. The issue of proximate cause in an appellate legal malpractice action must    be made by the trial judge as an issue of law, based on review of the transcript and record of the underlying action, the argument of counsel, and subject to the same rules of review as should have been applied to the [underlying] appeal. 3 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 30.52, at 1257 (2005). Indeed, the vast majority of courts that have addressed this issue have concluded that the issue of proximate cause in an appellate legal malpractice action presents a question of law for the court and not a question of fact for a jury. In addition to the appellate court panel in the present case, the appellate court in Environmental Control Systems, 301 Ill.App.3d at 620-22, 234 Ill.Dec. 901, 703 N.E.2d 1001, so held. Other decisions so holding include Richards v. Knuchel, 327 Mont. 249, 254-55, 115 P.3d 189, 192-93 (2005) (discussing cases), Steeves v. Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, P.C., 718 A.2d 186, 190-91 (Me. 1998) (agreeing with [n]umerous courts that have recognized rule), Sturgis v. Skokos, 335 Ark. 41, 51, 977 S.W.2d 217, 221-22 (1998) (agreeing with majority rule), Millhouse v. Wiesenthal, 775 S.W.2d 626, 627-28 (Tex.1989) (collecting cases), Daugert v. Pappas, 104 Wash.2d 254, 258, 704 P.2d 600, 603-04 (1985) (collecting cases), Tinelli v. Redl, 199 F.3d 603, 606-07 (2d Cir.1999) (collecting cases; applying New York law), and Jones v. Psimos, 882 F.2d 1277, 1281 (7th Cir.1989) (applying Indiana law). The rationale for these decisions is clear. The overall inquiry is whether the client would have been successful if the attorney had timely filed the appeal.    Underlying the broad inquiry, however, are questions bearing legal analysis. Daugert, 104 Wash.2d at 258, 704 P.2d at 604. As the court in Millhouse explained: The question of whether an appeal would have been successful depends on an analysis of the law and the procedural rules. [The malpractice plaintiff's] position that the jury should make this determination as a question of fact would require the jury to sit as appellate judges, review the trial record and briefs, and decide whether the trial court committed reversible error. A judge is clearly in a better position to make this determination. Resolving legal issues on appeal is an area exclusively within the province of judges; a court is qualified in a way a jury is not to determine the merits and probable outcome of an appeal. Thus, in cases of appellate legal malpractice, where the issue of causation hinges on the    outcome of an [underlying] appeal, the issue is to be resolved by the court as a question of law. Millhouse, 775 S.W.2d at 628. To rule otherwiseand hold that a jury should decide how an appellate court would have ruledwould misconstrue the very nature of appellate review. Appellate courts decide matters as `issue[s] of law, based upon review of the transcript and. . . the argument of counsel.' [Citations.] Tinelli, 199 F.3d at 607 (applying New York law). Plaintiffs cite Andrews v. Saylor, 134 N.M. 545, 80 P.3d 482 (App.2003), in an attempt to lighten this weight of authority. In Andrews, the New Mexico Court of Appeals held that the trial court in an appellate legal malpractice action erred in deciding whether the appeal in the underlying case would have been successful; the court held that the issue of proximate cause in an appellate legal malpractice action is a question of fact. As a learned treatise described Andrews: The court did not discuss or even reference the virtually uniform case law to the contrary. 3 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 30.52, at 1259 (2005). In the present case, the appellate court expressly limited its holding to the facts presented in this case, i.e., an appellate legal malpractice action where the success of the underlying case rests upon a question of law. 356 Ill.App.3d at 272, 292 Ill.Dec. 141, 825 N.E.2d 729. However, we agree with the circuit court, and so hold, that the issue of proximate cause in an appellate legal malpractice action is inherently a question of law for the court and not a question of fact for the jury.