Opinion ID: 2814288
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Ms. McIntosh

Text: Susan McIntosh, a correctional officer, worked at Mr. Kuhne’s facility. On January 28, 2009, Mr. Kuhne filed an inmate request: I’ve had written you yesterday about my D.R. [Disciplinary Record] gain time. I was told that you may be able to help me receive my 85% date and [might] be able to help me resolve my D.R. I do have medical proof for my illness if that helps. Since June, I’ve been having problems with my eyes, slowly getting worse. Medical has informed me, that I didn’t have enough time to see a specialist. I have gone Blind in left eye & half blind in right. I have a Eye doctor in Tallahassee upon release to see me to review my problem. Please Help – my sight is getting worse.52 Ms. McIntosh, who apparently had no interaction with Mr. Kuhne before receiving that notice, responded: I don’t really understand what I can help you with. The only DR showing was in August 2008. If you are asking for the gain time you were unable to earn due to the DR, there is nothing I can do about that. As far as your eyesight, this is a medical issue, therefore I would be unable to assist you in that area either.53 51 See ECF No. 53-26, at  (“It is my opinion that even if Dr. Lagares had approved a retinal specialty consult on February 4, 2009, there would not have been any difference in outcome from that which [Mr. Kuhne] received subsequently from Dr. Brooks.”). 52 ECF No. 62-8, at . 53 Id. 16 Case: 14-13845 Date Filed: 07/02/2015 Page: 17 of 22 Under our circuit’s precedent, when a lay person is accused of deliberate indifference, the plaintiff must “present[] evidence that her situation was so obviously dire that two lay [officers] must have known that a medical professional had grossly misjudged [the plaintiff’s] condition.”54 In addition, the plaintiff must provide some evidence of the normal elements of deliberate indifference: “(1) subjective knowledge of a risk of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than gross negligence.” 55 The summary judgment record does not support the conclusion that Ms. McIntosh’s conduct satisfies this standard. The inmate request was framed in terms of getting information on Mr. Kuhne’s release date, and Ms. McIntosh replied in kind. The note referred to his deteriorating eyesight, but also stated that Mr. Kuhne had a doctor to see him “upon his release.” In that context, we conclude that a reasonable jury could not find that Ms. McIntosh knew that a medical professional had “grossly misjudged” Mr. Kuhne’s condition. Moreover, there is no evidence in the record that Ms. McIntosh had a subjective knowledge 54 Townsend v. Jefferson Cnty., 601 F.3d 1152, 1159 (11th Cir. 2010). Townsend favorably cited Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 236 (3d Cir. 2004), which held that “absent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official . . . will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” 55 Easley v. Dep’t of Corr., 590 F. App’x 860, 868 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Townsend, 601 F.3d at 1158) (brackets omitted). 17 Case: 14-13845 Date Filed: 07/02/2015 Page: 18 of 22 that there was a risk of serious harm, or that she “actually dr[ew] that inference.” 56 Nor is there evidence that Ms. McIntosh’s conduct was “more than gross negligence,” indeed, Mr. Kuhne only alleges that it “was inappropriate.” 57 Without more, we affirm that summary judgment in favor of Ms. McIntosh was proper.