Opinion ID: 184831
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of the felon-misdemeanant claim.

Text: 6 Although the felon-misdemeanant distinction was never the focus of FOP's arguments, the Order did raise it twice in this litigation: orally before the district court at the combined summary judgment/preliminary injunction hearing and in its reply brief here. After advancing FOP's principal equal protection argument--that it was irrational to focus on domestic violence misdemeanants to the exclusion of other misdemeanants--FOP's counsel said: 7 The other strangeness about it is that, if you are convicted of a felony, you are a convicted serial killer ... you can be rearmed, or if you somehow become a police officer after your conviction, you can keep your gun, because you're a convicted felon. Fine. The exemption section still obtains with respect to felonies. 8 So what's the rationality of, not only looking at one kind of misdemeanor instead of all violent misdemeanors, but leaving every felon able to be a law enforcement officer and carry a weapon in the public interest? I mean the States may regulate that, but the Federal government isn't. 9 So if you looked just at the Federal enactment, it's irrational to say that convicted felons can be police officers and carry weapons, and people convicted of one kind of misdemeanor cannot. 10 March 7, 1997 Hr'g Tr. at 50-51. Neither the government nor the district court addressed the misdemeanant-felon distinction. 11 FOP's oral argument on the felon-misdemeanant distinction was enough to satisfy the general requirement that an issue on appeal be raised in the trial court. The government complains that it lost any opportunity to make a record as to the relevant facts and legal arguments because of FOP's timing in raising the issue below. Gov't Reh'g Br. at 4. But the government did not, as it could have, seek to submit a post-argument brief or supplemental affidavits on the felon-misdemeanant question. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e) (The court may permit [summary judgment] affidavits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, or further affidavits.). Furthermore, the issue presented is essentially a legal one, and the government has not identified in its rehearing petition or briefs any type of factual evidence it would have introduced if given the opportunity. 12 In any event, the District Court for the District of Columbia regularly considers arguments raised for the first time at oral argument in deciding dispositive motions. See Joslin Co. v. Robinson Broadcasting Corp., 977 F.Supp. 491, 493 (D.D.C.1997) (motion to dismiss); Jones v. WMATA, 1997 WL 198114, at  1, n. 1, No. Civ. A. 95-2300-LFO (D.D.C. April 10, 1997) (summary judgment); Richardson v. National Rifle Ass'n, 871 F.Supp. 499, 501 (D.D.C.1994) (summary judgment). If the felon-misdemeanant issue had been properly briefed on appeal, it would have been proper for us to address it. 13 But FOP failed to raise the issue in its opening brief on appeal. Although two passages in that brief might be read in isolation as related to the felon-misdemeanant equal protection argument, context makes clear that neither one actually did so. The first vague allusion was merely ancillary to FOP's commerce clause argument, see FOP Br. at 34-35, and the second, though vague, plainly related solely to FOP's claim of irrational discrimination among misdemeanants, see FOP Br. 39-40. Unsurprisingly, the government did not address the felon-misdemeanant distinction in its brief. 14 FOP's reply brief, however, did raise it, saying, albeit in the context of its commerce clause argument, that [t]his limited elimination of a long-standing exception is irrational.... Permitting a person convicted of a felony on a domestic partner to benefit from the exception but not a person convicted of a misdemeanor on a domestic partner serves no legitimate goal. FOP Reply Br. at 16. 15 Normally, because of the likely unfairness to parties and risk of improvident decisions, we would refuse to consider an argument that an appellant failed to raise before its reply brief. See, e.g., Doolin Sec. Sav. Bank v. OTS, 156 F.3d 190, 191 (D.C.Cir.1998); McBride v. Merrell Dow & Pharms., Inc., 800 F.2d 1208, 1210-11 (D.C.Cir.1986). Here, however, the felon-misdemeanant issue was raised energetically by the court at oral argument (perhaps because, although defectively raised, it appeared comparatively straightforward), but the government, though responding on the merits, made no mention of FOP's waiver of the issue. Oral Arg. Tr. at 35-39. Accordingly, we think it was within the court's discretion to treat the government as having waived the waiver. See United States v. Hollingsworth, 27 F.3d 1196, 1203 (7th Cir.1994) (en banc); cf. Ochran v. United States, 117 F.3d 495, 503 (11th Cir.1997) (weighing prejudice to the parties and interest of justice in determining whether to treat government as having waived appellant's failure to raise argument below). 16 That of course is not to say that affirmative exercise of the discretion was wise. We have already telegraphed that with the more complete briefing we see the issue as coming out the other way. In retrospect, it may well have been imprudent to address the merits on so thin an argumentative record. 17 Now, however, both parties have weighed in on the issue in considerable detail. The court has worked through it not once but twice. So there is no special risk of reaching an improvident decision; and, as the government has had (and taken) the opportunity to respond, the most important respect in which reaching the issue might have been unfair is also absent. One might also think it unfair in a relevant sense to be faced with the risk of losing a case on the basis of an argument that one's adversary failed to raise in the time and space allotted. But that seems weak here, as the government shares some of the responsibility for our having missed the procedural objection initially. 18 Thus, there is no bar to resolving the felon-misdemeanant issue at this stage. In addition, there is an affirmative reason for doing so: judicial economy. This panel's prior opinion highlighted the felon-misdemeanant issue; it will surely be raised again soon. The costs of now going forward being modest, and the potential benefit being at least the norm for any judicial decision, it makes little sense to drop the issue. 19