Opinion ID: 1119018
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Search of the Tent and the Truck

Text: The State argues that Alward had no property or legitimate possessory interest in either the tent or the truck, [6] thus had no legitimate expectation of privacy in either the tent or truck, and therefore cannot challenge the lawfulness of the search and seizure. [7] The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed whether the Fourth Amendment [8] protects a person's privacy interests in a tent located on a public campground. In United States v. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir. 1993), the defendant, a camper in a public campground, was reportedly shooting at other campers. The police were summoned, and without seeking an arrest warrant, ordered Gooch out of his tent, patted him down, arrested him, and handcuffed and locked him in a patrol car. Id. The officers then ordered Gooch's companion out of the tent and searched the tent for the firearm, finding a loaded handgun under an air mattress. Id. The court concluded that Gooch had both a subjective and an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the tent, noting that camping in a public campground as opposed to on private land was of no consequence since the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places. Id. at 676-77 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967)). Further, the court stated that [t]he fact that the tent may be moved, alone, is not enough to remove the Fourth Amendment protections. As noted above, tents are protected under the Fourth Amendment like a more permanent structure. Also, a tent is more analogous to a (large) movable container than to a vehicle; the Fourth Amendment protects expectations of privacy in movable, closed containers. Id. at 677 (citations omitted). We find the reasoning in Gooch persuasive. Alward had a subjective expectation of privacy in the tent and its contents. He manifested this expectation, at the very least, by leaving the tent, tent pouches, back-pack and other containers closed. Alward had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the tent and its contents as well. Simply because appellant camped on land managed by the Bureau of Land Management does not diminish his expectation of privacy. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 99 S.Ct. 421, 430, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the Supreme Court interpreted Katz to hold that `capacity to claim the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the person who claims the protection of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of privacy in the invaded place.' Because Alward and Baxter chose to make a tent their temporary residence, as opposed to staying at a hotel, does not diminish Alward's expectation of privacy. Indeed, holding that temporary residence at a hotel ensures Fourth Amendment protections, while temporary residence in a tent does not, would limit the protections of the Fourth Amendment to those who could afford them. See Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490, 84 S.Ct. 889, 893-94, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964); Phillips v. State, 106 Nev. 763, 801 P.2d 1363 (1990). Thus, we conclude that Alward had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the tent such that the warrantless search of the tent violated the Fourth Amendment. Of course, a warrantless search of the tent would not have violated the Fourth Amendment had an exception to the warrant requirement existed. The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, section 18, of the Nevada Constitution proscribe all unreasonable searches and seizures. The principle is well established that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment  subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S.Ct. at 514 (footnotes omitted); Phillips, 106 Nev. at 765, 801 P.2d at 1365. In all cases outside the exceptions to the warrant requirement, the Fourth Amendment requires the interposition of a neutral and detached magistrate between the police and the `persons, houses, papers, and effects' of citizens. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20, 105 S.Ct. 409, 410-11, 83 L.Ed.2d 246 (1984). We review the lawfulness of a search de novo. Gooch, 6 F.3d 673, 676 (9th Cir.1993). One exception to the warrant requirement is the existence of exigent circumstances, including a medical emergency. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392-93, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 2413-14, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978). However, a warrantless search must be strictly circumscribed by the exigencies which justify its initiation. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25-26, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1882-83, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1967). In this case, the investigators may have had probable cause to search the tent  Alward initially related that Baxter had shot herself with a .22, and a .38 was found in Baxter's hand with her finger curiously lodged behind the trigger  but the investigators did not obtain a warrant to search. For such a search to be valid, it must fall within one of the narrow exceptions to the warrant requirement, as discussed in Katz. While there is no such thing as a murder scene exception to the warrant requirement, the Supreme Court has indicated that police may enter a residence without a warrant when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. Further, police may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises. Id. The police may also seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities. Id. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. Thus, the scope of this warrantless emergency entry was limited to rendering any possible assistance to Baxter and securing a possible crime scene. Once the emergency dissipated, i.e., once police established that Baxter was dead, they could not search the premises simply because they were lawfully present. See Bass v. State, 732 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987); State v. Tyler, 598 S.W.2d 798 (Tenn. Crim.App.1980). There is no dispute that the officers' presence in the tent was initially lawful because Bogdanowicz, Steuart and Horsley were all part of the police response to Alward's call for help. Any items discovered in plain view in the tent, including the .38 revolver and the red notebook, were lawfully seized. Items discovered in plain view in the truck bed, including the 9 millimeter magazine and empty .38 brass casings, were likewise lawfully seized. Therefore, the district court properly denied Alward's pre-trial motion to suppress the .38 revolver, red notebook, 9 millimeter magazine, and empty .38 brass casings. However, other items seized in the search, either that evening or the following day pursuant to the general search of the entire tent and truck, should have been suppressed. Among the items seized from the tent which were not in plain view were Alward's writings, which were located in a backpack, and 9 millimeter bullets, which were located in a matchbox. Failure to obtain a warrant before searching inside closed containers in the tent and the truck necessitates suppression of this evidence, and the district court erred in failing to do so. See United States v. Villarreal, 963 F.2d 770, 773 (5th Cir.1992) (individuals can manifest legitimate expectations of privacy in closed, opaque containers that conceal their contents from plain view). Further, the warrantless search of closed containers inside the tent was not justified by any other exigent circumstance. Only the victim's body remained in the tent  Alward did not return to the tent after the police arrived, and Alward indicated to the police that no one else was camping with them at Sand Mountain. There is no indication in the record that officers could not return to Fallon to obtain a warrant or that they could not obtain a warrant telephonically. In addition, the tent was guarded after the police left the scene for the evening. The police obtained a warrant for Alward's arrest that night, and there is no reason why they could not have obtained a search warrant at that time, or earlier, as well. While the State argues that the inclement weather created an exigent circumstance, there is no indication that snowfall would destroy evidence, especially since the exhaustive search of the tent was not conducted until the following day anyway. Because no other exigent circumstances or other exception existed to justify the warrantless search, the search violated Alward's Fourth Amendment rights. Where error of constitutional proportions has been committed, a conviction of guilty may be allowed to stand if the error is determined to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Obermeyer v. State, 97 Nev. 158, 162, 625 P.2d 95, 97 (1981). Here, we cannot say that the admission of items found in closed containers inside the tent was harmless. Bullets obtained from the matchbox led the prosecution to present the theory that Alward killed Baxter using a 9 millimeter weapon and then placed the .38 revolver in her hand. Expert testimony pertaining to the muzzle imprint on Baxter's neck supported this theory. More importantly, in closing argument, the prosecutor read some of Alward's writings that police recovered from inside the backpack, arguing that Alward's actions conformed with the ideas expressed therein. [9] The prosecutor argued that [t]he evidence in this case consists of three major sections, the defendant's writings, the scene of the crime, and the physical evidence ... found there. Thus, we conclude that admission of the illegally seized evidence cannot be viewed as harmless error and, therefore, warrants reversal of Alward's conviction.