Opinion ID: 2708545
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Payment Provision of Conditions 1, 3 & 8

Text: Conditions 1, 3, and 8 of the written judgment require Baker to pay for the costs or services of the particular condition “as directed” by “the probation office,” “the probation officer,” and “the U.S. Probation Office,” respectively. 2 The conditions do not specify what will happen if Baker bears the burden of paying and is unable to do so. Siegel, 2014 WL 2210762, at  (“Nothing is said about what happens if he can’t pay the entire cost. Will his supervised release be revoked because he won’t be complying with the conditions in question in their entirety? Or will the government pay for them? It must mean the latter … .”). This is problematic because conditions of supervised release must make clear what conduct is prohibited, see United States v. Preacely, 702 F.3d 2 Any argument that the payment conditions should be vacated because the written judgment, explicitly stating the entity or official who can direct Baker to pay, is inconsistent with the oral pronouncement, which only says “as directed” without specifying by whom, is unavailing. The specifications in the written judgment clarify the oral pronouncement; they are not inconsistent with an unambiguous provision. See United States v. Bonanno, 146 F.3d 502, 511–12 (7th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Zepeda, 329 Fed. Appx. 647, 649 (7th Cir. 2009) (stating that “an oral pronouncement of sentence, if unambiguous, controls over a conflicting written one”). No. 13-1641 23 373, 376 (7th Cir. 2012), as well as the scope of the provisions. See Siegel, 2014 WL 2210762, at  (vacating a special condition because the sentencing did not make clear that the behavior therapy program it required the defendant to complete would not necessarily have to continue for the entire supervised release term); see also United States v. Monteiro, 270 F.3d 465, 473 (7th Cir. 2001) (vacating a “vague and overbroad” special condition so the sentencing judge could “craft more precisely” its terms). A defendant may not be recommitted to prison “for mere inability to pay,” Siegel, 2014 WL 2210762, at , and the conditions should account for the possibility of Baker failing to satisfy any payment requirement imposed. This deficiency is an error that the judge must address on remand. 3 It is unnecessary for us to address Baker’s alternative arguments.