Opinion ID: 2635298
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Even Though Offenses Are Properly Joined, A Trial Court Abuses Its Discretion in Failing to Sever When the Defendant Is Prejudiced at the Time the Motion Is Made

Text: {9} In its brief-in-chief, the State appears to argue that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in rejecting Gallegos's motion to sever because joinder of the offenses was proper. We agree that joinder was proper as an initial matter. However, this does not alter the fact that a trial court may abuse its discretion in failing to sever charges. The issue of joinder is not so inextricably linked with the issue of severance such that a prosecutor's proper exercise of the former means that a court never abuses its discretion when it refuses to exercise the latter. {10} Regarding joinder of offenses, our rules provide: Two or more offenses shall be joined in one complaint, indictment or information with each offense stated in a separate count, if the offenses, whether felonies or misdemeanors or both: (1) are of the same or similar character, even if not part of a single scheme or plan; or (2) are based on the same conduct or on a series of acts either connected together or constituting parts of a single scheme or plan. Rule 5-203(A) NMRA (emphasis added). It is important to recognize that Rule 5-203(A) is not a discretionary or permissive rule; it demands that the State join certain charges. At common law, whether charges should be joined in the same indictment was a matter of prudence and discretion which . . . rest[ed] with the judges to exercise. State v. Compton, 57 N.M. 227, 240-41, 257 P.2d 915, 924 (1953) (quoted authority omitted). Our rule as originally promulgated was discretionary and reflected the common law. See NMSA 1953, § 41-23-10 (1972) (providing that [t]wo . . . or more offenses may be joined); see also Fed.R.Crim.P. 8(a) (The indictment or information may charge a defendant in separate counts with 2 or more offenses. . . .). The original rule was based on the 1968 draft of the American Bar Association Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance, Section 1.1. Rule 5-203 NMRA committee commentary; see also State v. Gregory, 66 N.J. 510, 333 A.2d 257, 262 n. 4 (1975) (noting that the ABA rule does not require procedural joinder of the charges by the prosecuting attorney). The primary focus of such a discretionary rule is the promotion of judicial efficiency. See 1A Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 141, at 5 (3d ed.1999). {11} We recognized over thirty years ago, however, that requiring prosecutors to get[] their facts straight, their theories clearly in mind and trying all charges together has the salutary effect of avoiding prejudice to the defendant. State v. Tijerina, 86 N.M. 31, 36, 519 P.2d 127, 132 (1973). Around the same time as Tijerina, and based on this same concern, numerous other jurisdictions began requiring prosecutors to charge together all crimes arising from a defendant's conduct or series of acts. This was done either legislatively, through interpretation of a particular state's constitution or statute, or through a court's general supervisory power over rules of criminal procedure. Allan D. Vestal & Douglas J. Gilbert, Preclusion of Duplicative Prosecutions: A Developing Mosaic, 47 Mo. L.Rev. 1, 15-22 (1982); see also Susan R. Klein, Double Jeopardy's Demise, 88 Cal. L. Rev 1001, 1031 n. 104 (2000) (book review) (noting that [a] number of advisory groups have suggested mandatory joinder of all offenses arising from the same transaction as a legislative fix to vexatious prosecutions). {12} For instance, in 1975 the Supreme Court of New Jersey became satisfied that the time for the adoption of [compulsory joinder was] well due. Gregory, 333 A.2d at 263. The court gave three reasons: (1) fairness and reasonable expectations of the defendant; (2) justice, economy, and convenience; and (3) consistent and rational sentencing of all of a defendant's relevant conduct. Id. (quoted authority omitted). Gregory recognized that the then-current trend toward mandatory joinder in order to protect a defendant from multiple prosecutions was largely motivated by the American Law Institute's Model Penal Code. Id. at 261. {13} The Model Penal Code requires joinder of offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode when the prosecutor knows of such offenses and when a court has jurisdiction over them. Model Penal Code § 1.07(2); see also id. § 1.07 explanatory note for sections 1.07-1.11 (In prohibiting multiple trials in many situations where multiple convictions are permissible, the section thus imposes compulsory joinder.). The court in Gregory was also persuaded by Justice Brennan's concurrence in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 90 S.Ct. 1189, 25 L.Ed.2d 469 (1970), calling for the adoption of a same transaction test for purposes of double jeopardy. Gregory, 333 A.2d at 261; see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 453-54, 90 S.Ct. 1189 (Brennan, J., concurring) (In my view, the Double Jeopardy Clause requires the prosecution . . . to join at one trial all the charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction.). Thus, although the court in Gregory did not rest its decision on constitutional double jeopardy grounds, the court exercised its administrative and procedural powers to formally adopt section 1.07(2) of the Model Penal Code. Gregory, 333 A.2d at 261, 263. {14} As New Jersey did in Gregory, we exercised our supervisory powers in 1979 to change the rule regarding joinder of offenses from permissive to mandatory. Our 1979 order states: When a person is charged with more than one crime and the crimes can be incorporated in one information or indictment in separate counts, this practice shall be followed. Rule 5-203 NMRA committee commentary (emphasis added). Our order in 1979 may have resulted from our decision in State v. Tanton, 88 N.M. 333, 540 P.2d 813 (1975), where we formally rejected the same transaction test espoused by Justice Brennan in Ashe as a constitutional rule. Id. at 335-36, 540 P.2d 813, 540 P.2d at 815-16; see State v. Manzanares, 100 N.M. 621, 624, 674 P.2d 511, 514 (1983). In Tanton, however, we adopted as judicial policy our distaste for piecemeal prosecutions as described two years earlier in Tijerina. Tanton, 88 N.M. at 336, 540 P.2d at 816. Thus, in order to avoid disorderly criminal procedures that threaten the existence of our judicial system [and] risk . . . prejudice to the accused, Tijerina, 86 N.M. at 36, 519 P.2d at 132, we require the State to join those offenses as laid out in Rule 5-203(A). {15} In this case, pursuant to the requirements of Rule 5-203(A), the State appropriately and necessarily charged the offenses related to Jamie S. and those related to Ursula C. in the same indictment. In both cases, Gallegos engaged in inappropriate sexual activities with minors in his care as a guard at YDDC. At the very least, Gallegos's acts towards Jamie S. and Ursula C. were of the same or similar character regardless of whether they were part of a single scheme or plan. See Rule 5-203(A)(1) NMRA. {16} However, even though offenses are properly joined, a trial court abuses its discretion in failing to sever when there is prejudice to the accused. We emphasize that our rules provide for severance when it appears that there  is prejudice[] by a joinder. Rule 5-203(C) NMRA. Thus, by its very nature, Rule 5-203(C) does not come into play unless and until there is a proper joinder pursuant to Rule 5-203(A). See 1A Wright, supra, § 221, at 465 (stating that the federal rule for severance is applicable only if the original joinder was proper); see also, e.g., State v. Griffin, 116 N.M. 689, 693, 866 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1993) (determining first that joinder was proper before ruling on the trial court's refusal to sever); State v. McCallum, 87 N.M. 459, 461, 535 P.2d 1085, 1087 (Ct. App.1975) (same). {17} Admittedly, we have not always made this distinction clear. For example, in a case where the defendant argued that he was prejudiced when the trial court refused to sever his possession of drug paraphernalia charge from his murder trial, we stated that our review of whether charges are properly joined is narrow. State v. Duffy, 1998-NMSC-014, ¶ 42, 126 N.M. 132, 967 P.2d 807. We concluded in Duffy that, even if the joinder of charges was an abuse of discretion, [the defendant failed to show that] he was prejudiced by a lack of severance. Id. ¶ 45. The language in Duffy is misleading in that the issue there was entirely whether the trial court abused its discretion in failing to sever the offenses, not whether the offenses were properly joined. Moreover, given that our rule regarding joinder is mandatory, we believe that our review of an improper joinder-or of a failure to properly join defenses-is a question of law to be reviewed de novo. We clarify our language in Duffy and hold that simply because offenses are properly joined does not mean that a trial court never abuses its discretion for denying a motion to sever. Similarly, in State v. Ruiz, 2001-NMCA-097, ¶ 11, 131 N.M. 241, 34 P.3d 630, the Court of Appeals stated that even when Rule 5-203(A) is satisfied, charges should be joined only if joinder does not unfairly prejudice either party. Again, we clarify. Charges should be joined whenever Rule 5-203(A) is satisfied; if either party believes it is prejudiced as a result, the proper procedure is to file a motion for severance with the trial court pursuant to Rule 5-203(C). {18} Even when the trial court abuses its discretion in failing to sever charges, appellate courts will not reverse unless the error actually prejudiced the defendant. In State v. Gunthorpe, 81 N.M. 515, 521, 469 P.2d 160, 166 (Ct.App.1970), the Court of Appeals held that the mere denial of a request for severance is not a basis for reversal unless abuse of discretion and prejudice is shown. More recently, it was said that a trial court's denial of a motion to sever will not be reversed without a showing of an abuse of discretion, which resulted in prejudice to the accused. State v. Nguyen, 1997-NMCA-037, ¶ 5, 123 N.M. 290, 939 P.2d 1098. Furthermore, in a case involving the trial court's failure to sever defendants, we first held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. State v. Rondeau, 89 N.M. 408, 417, 553 P.2d 688, 697 (1976). We then went on to state that, even if the trial court had abused its discretion, we will not reverse a defendant's conviction if said error is harmless. Id. We do not see any reason to review the denial of a motion to sever offenses any differently than a motion to sever defendants.