Opinion ID: 2366364
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Allowing An Inspection Of Whittle's Property

Text: Under Alaska Civil Rule 34(a) [a]ny party may serve on any other party a request . . . to permit entry upon designated land or other property in the possession or control of the party upon whom the request is served for the purpose of inspection and measuring, surveying, photographing, testing, or sampling the property or any designated object or operation thereon. . . . Any request made pursuant to Civil Rule 34 must set forth, either by individual item or by category, the items to be inspected, and describe each with reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time, place, and manner of making the inspection and performing the related acts. [9] We have explained that [i]n general, the civil rules are committed to a system of liberal pretrial discovery. [10] A court may, however, limit discovery under certain circumstances. Whittle argues that the superior court's order permitting Weber to conduct an inspection of Whittle's property violated his constitutional rights. [11] We consider whether the right to privacy might offer Whittle any protection from the discovery order. We have considered at least one challenge to a discovery order on right-to-privacy grounds. In Jones v. Jennings , involving a lawsuit filed against two police officers, we affirmed a discovery order requiring production of one of the officer's personnel records and records of citizen complaints filed against him. [12] On the officer's behalf, the Municipality of Anchorage argued that this discovery request was unnecessarily intrusive into the privacy of the officers involved. [13] Noting that the Alaska Constitution expressly protects Alaskans' right to privacy but that [t]he right to privacy is not absolute, we applied the following three-part inquiry, adopted from a Colorado Supreme Court case, to determine whether the discovery order was appropriate: (1) does the party seeking to come within the protection of the right to confidentiality have a legitimate expectation that the materials or information will not be disclosed? (2) is disclosure nonetheless required to serve a compelling state interest? (3) if so, will the necessary disclosure occur in that manner which is least intrusive with respect to the right to confidentiality?[ [14] ] We concluded that the officer did have a legitimate expectation that the information would not be disclosed but then emphasized that disclosure served the compelling interest of preserving democratic values and fostering the public's trust in those charged with enforcing the law. [15] We also noted that the trial court made the inspection as minimally invasive as possible by protecting the officer's financial information and family's name and address and by conducting an in camera inspection of the requested documents. [16] Thus, we affirmed the trial court's order. Other jurisdictions have used similar balancing tests and considered similar factors when reviewing discovery requests for entry onto private property. Overall, to determine whether an inspection is appropriate, courts must balance the respective interests by weighing the degree to which the proposed inspection will aid in the search for truth against the burdens and dangers created by the inspection. [17] Most courts focus on the second Jones factor: the compelling interest element. To determine whether a compelling interest exists, courts scrutinize the relevance of the proposed inspection to the issue in the legal action. The Kentucky Supreme Court, looking to federal courts' practices, observed that [i]n each case, the place to be inspected is somehow `at issue' in the underlying law suit. [18] Thus, other jurisdictions have concluded that the property or item to be inspected must be directly connected with the main issue of the legal action; some have determined that this nexus must appear on the face of the discovery order. [19] Besides focusing on the nexus between the location and the legal cause of action, courts may also consider additional factors that connect the inspection to the lawsuit; for example, whether a legal action has begun, [20] or whether the inspection is necessary ( i.e., the information cannot be obtained through other avenues). [21] Based on our decision in Jones v. Jennings and the approaches of other jurisdictions to this question, we conclude that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Whittle to allow a limited inspection of his property as part of discovery. First, legal action had begun in this case, and that action directly concerned the property to be inspected pursuant to the superior court's discovery order. Second, we note that, in line with Civil Rule 34's requirements, Weber's request was specific about what information he seeks: he wants to know whether hazardous substances or substances of any other nature exist[] that could present a threat to the neighbors surrounding [Whittle's] property and/or the ground water beneath their property. Moreover, the superior court endeavored to protect the privacy of Whittle's home by explicitly excluding any residence from the inspection order. [22]