Opinion ID: 2599164
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Issues Regarding Witness Lonnie Hillhouse

Text: Defendant raises a number of interrelated evidentiary and instructional issues regarding Lonnie, a key prosecution witness. He argues that Lonnie should not have been allowed to testify because the plea bargain by which he pleaded guilty to second degree murder was coercive. Defendant did not object to the testimony at trial, so the issue is not cognizable on appeal. ( People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1178-1179, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Defendant claims his attorneys were ineffective in failing to object. To establish this claim, defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and that he was prejudiced, i.e., that it is reasonably probable the result would have been more favorable had counsel acted competently. ( Id. at p. 1175, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) As in People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 1179, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969where, like here, a coparticipant and original codefendant pleaded guilty to murder and testified against the defendanthe has shown no basis on which to exclude [the witness's] testimony. When Lonnie pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of second degree murder, he signed an agreement that he would testify truthfully if subpoenaed to so testify at the trial of Danny Ray Hillhouse in this matter. The agreement said nothing else regarding the content of Lonnie's testimony. Nothing in this agreement was coercive or otherwise improper. Although an agreement compelling the witness to testify in a particular fashion would be improper, an agreement that only requires the witness to tell the truth is valid. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1179, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Defendant argues that even if the agreement purported only to compel Lonnie to tell the truth, Lonnie understood it to compel him to testify in a particular way. Even assuming that such an understanding, as distinct from the actual terms of the agreement, could invalidate the agreement, the record does not support defendant's claim. After Lonnie agreed to the plea bargain, he gave a statement to a prosecution investigator. His subsequent testimony at the preliminary hearing and at trial was consistent with this statement. Defendant claims that Lonnie understood the plea agreement to compel him to testify consistently with that statement. However, the agreement could not have compelled Lonnie to testify in accordance with the statement, for the statement came months after the agreement. Moreover, nothing in the agreement or the statement suggests the prosecution expected Lonnie to testify in any particular fashion other than truthfully. In arguing to the contrary, defendant relies largely on testimony defense counsel elicited from Lonnie on cross-examination. Defense counsel asked: [W]as it your understanding by the time you were testifying a month or so later [after making the statement], at this preliminary hearing, having accepted this plea bargain, if you changed your story from the last one you gave the investigator, the DA can say you're lying and come back and send [you to] prison for the rest of your life, that was your understanding wasn't it? Lonnie responded, I do believe it was. But Lonnie also said that his preliminary hearing testimony was consistent with the statement because it's the truth. He explained that the statement was the first time he had told the full truth: I think once that I came ... out with the full facts of the truth, then I wasn't going to change. Why would I want to change the truth. In context, Lonnie said only that he felt obligated to testify consistently with the statement because it was the truth, and he felt obligated to tell the truth. Defendant also notes that during the interview, Lonnie asked to see the police reports. This circumstance may merely show that Lonnie wanted to refresh his recollection. It does not compel the conclusion he felt obligated to testify in any particular fashion other than truthfully. In short, the jury heard the facts regarding the plea agreement, Lonnie's understanding of it, and his prior statements. In light of the actual agreement, allowing a fully informed jury to judge the witness's credibility for itself fully protected defendant's rights. ( People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pp. 1180-1181, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Defendant also argues that Lonnie's testimony was too incredible to believe. As in the similar situation in People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 1181, 96 Cal. Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969, reasons do indeed exist for the jury to have questioned Lonnie's credibility. He had an obvious motive to minimize his own involvement in the crime. He had made many prior inconsistent statements and admitted to the jury he had lied about the crime. He said he originally lied to protect himself and defendant. But Lonnie's overall testimony was credible, or so the jury could reasonably have found. Defendant argues it was contradicted in some respects by other witnesses and the physical evidence. He discusses the evidence in great detail, reiterating many points the defense made at trial in trying to discredit Lonnie. But these circumstancesknown to the jury do not provide a basis to exclude his testimony. ( Ibid. ) Defendant also notes that on a few points, such as whether the knife had a flimsy blade, Lonnie said his was a commonsense answer. He claims this shows Lonnie was unable to grasp the role of a witness in a judicial proceeding. We disagree. As a whole the record shows that Lonnie understood his duty to tell the truth. His credibility was for the jury to determine under all the circumstances. Defendant also argues that even the prosecutor questioned Lonnie's credibility. On the contrary, the prosecutor argued that Lonnie's basic testimony was credible. She did additionally argue, as a backup position, that even if the jury disbelieved him and believed that he, not defendant, had been the actual killer, then defendant was nonetheless guilty of murder on an aider and abettor theory. Such argument is entirely appropriate. Moreover, even if the prosecution had questioned Lonnie's credibility on some points, defendant would have had no basis to complain. As we explained in People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at pages 1181-1182, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969, the prosecutor was not present at the crime scene and therefore did not personally know whether or to what extent Lonnie might be lying at trial. The prosecution simply presented its evidence and allowed a fully informed jury to evaluate it. ( Id. at p. 1181, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Allowing Lonnie to testify subject to cross-examination and impeachment by available evidence, as was done here, afforded defendant a fair trial and comported with due process. ( Id. at p. 1182, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969.) Over defense objection, the trial court ruled that Lonnie's prior statements that predated his plea agreement and were consistent with his trial testimony would be admissible as prior consistent statements under Evidence Code section 791. Accordingly, it admitted part of a statement Lonnie made several months before the plea bargain. Defendant contends the court erred. We disagree. Evidence Code section 791, subdivision (b), provides that a prior consistent statement may be admitted to support a witness's credibility if [a]n express or implied charge has been made that his testimony at the hearing is recently fabricated or is influenced by bias or other improper motive, and the statement was made before the bias, motive for fabrication, or other improper motive is alleged to have arisen. Here, as the trial court noted in its rulings, defense counsel cross-examined Lonnie extensively regarding the plea agreement and at least implied that Lonnie was testifying as he did because of that agreement. Arguing to the contrary, defendant asserts, No new motive for fabrication is engendered by the plea bargain. This assertion contradicts his argument, discussed above, that the plea agreement was so coercive as to be illegal. As we have explained, the agreement was valid in the sense that it did not disqualify Lonnie from testifying. But the defense was entitled to, and did, use it at trial to try to cast doubt on Lonnie's credibility. This circumstance made the consistent statements predating the agreement admissible to support his credibility. Defendant argues that Lonnie had a motive to minimize his role in the crime even before he made the prior consistent statements. This is no doubt true, but defendant also implied at trial that the plea agreement provided an additional improper motive. A prior consistent statement logically bolsters a witness's credibility whenever it predates any motive to lie, not just when it predates all possible motives. Accordingly, under Evidence Code section 791, a prior consistent statement is admissible as long as the statement is made before the existence of any one of the motives that the opposing party expressly or impliedly suggests may have influenced the witness's testimony. ( People v. Noguera (1992) 4 Cal.4th 599, 629, 15 Cal.Rptr.2d 400, 842 P.2d 1160, italics added.) The statement admitted here comes within this rule. Defendant also argues the court misinstructed the jury regarding how to view Lonnie's testimony. The court told the jury that Lonnie was an accomplice as a matter of law and gave the then standard instructions regarding accomplice testimony, including that it must be corroborated and should be viewed with distrust. (CALJIC Nos. 3.11, 3.12, 3.18 (5th ed.1988).) The only substantive difference between the instructions the court gave and the current standard instructions is that currently, the standard instructions tell the jury to view accomplice testimony that incriminates the defendant with caution, rather than distrust. (CALJIC No. 3.18 (1999 rev.) (6th ed.1996); see People v. Guiuan (1998) 18 Cal.4th 558, 569, 76 Cal.Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928.) Thus, the actual instruction was more favorable to defendant than the current standard instruction, a circumstance about which defendant cannot complain. Instead, he argues the court erred in refusing additionally to give two special instructions he requested that elaborated on these instructions. We disagree. The actual instructions were adequate. Regarding the corroboration requirement, the court instructed: To corroborate testimony of an accomplice, there must be evidence of some fact or facts related to each crime which if believed, by itself, and without any aid, interpretation or direction from the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect the defendant with the commission of each crime charged. [¶] However, it is not necessary that the evidence of corroboration be sufficient in itself to establish every element of each crime charged or that it corroborates every fact to which the accomplice testifies. Defendant's first requested instruction would have added: It is not sufficient corroboration if the evidence merely shows an association between the accomplice and the person who committed the offense, or merely places the defendant at the scene of the crime, or merely casts a grave suspicion upon the defendant. The trial court correctly refused this instruction. The actual instructions correctly stated the law. (§ 1111; People v. Sanders (1995) 11 Cal.4th 475, 534, 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 751, 905 P.2d 420; People v. Szeto (1981) 29 Cal.3d 20, 26-27, 171 Cal.Rptr. 652, 623 P.2d 213.) Informing the jury of the standard for corroboration was sufficient; it was not necessary additionally to describe any particular type of evidence that would not be sufficient. ( People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 446, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78; People v. Williams (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 711, 718-719, 161 Cal.Rptr. 830.) Moreover, telling the jury that evidence merely casting a grave suspicion on the defendant is insufficient would have been confusing at best, incorrect at worst. Evidence that casts a grave suspicion on the defendant might well tend to connect him with the crime. As noted, the court instructed the jury to view Lonnie's testimony with distrust. Defendant asked the court to add that the testimony should be received with care, caution, and suspicion for the reason that its very source is tainted. You must not accept the words of an accomplice at face value, or with any presumption of truthfulness, or judge them by the same standards as that applied to other witnesses. [¶] An accomplice may have many self-serving motives that may influence his credibility, such as the hope or expectation of leniency in return for testimony which would help to convict another. The requested instruction was argumentative and would have been inappropriate. (See People v. Ochoa, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 446, 110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78.) Indeed, after the trial here, we even disapproved the word distrust, which the trial court used, preferring instead the word caution. ( People v. Guiuan, supra, 18 Cal.4th at p. 569, 76 Cal. Rptr.2d 239, 957 P.2d 928.) Defendant also complains of an instruction informing the jury it may reject the testimony of a witness who testified falsely unless from all the evidence you believe the probability of truth favors his or her testimony in other particulars. (See CALJIC No. 2.21.2.) He argues the phrase probability of truth impermissibly lowers the prosecution's burden of proof. We rejected a similar argument in People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at page 1200, 96 Cal.Rptr.2d 1, 998 P.2d 969. Although this instruction did not itself explain the reasonable doubt standard of proof, it did not undermine other instructions that did do so.