Opinion ID: 1770580
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Spooner's Argument

Text: Spooner argues the state was constitutionally required to establish beyond a reasonable doubt each ground for the forfeiture. Specifically, Spooner complains the state's proof with respect to the $1,400 rested entirely on the statute's rebuttable presumption that all monies seized incident to a valid arrest and in close proximity to contraband, paraphernalia or records pertaining thereto, was itself contraband. La.R.S. 32:1500(A)(7)(c). La.R.S. 32:1550 [1] defines the procedure and legal proof necessary for the seizure and forfeiture of contraband, including conveyances or moveable property used to facilitate the transportation of controlled dangerous substances. The state sought forfeiture of Mr. Spooner's automobile and the $1,400.00 found in his pocket pursuant to the following language in the statute: § 1550. Forfeitures A. The following are contraband and shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture, and all property rights in the following are forfeited:       (3) All cash which is used, or intended for use, to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, production, manufacture, compounding, dispensation, concealment, importing, or exporting of [controlled dangerous substances or equipment used in the manufacturing and processing, etc. of controlled dangerous substances].       (5) All conveyances or moveable property, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to transport or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, manufacture, compounding, dispensation, or concealment of [controlled dangerous substances or equipment used in the manufacturing and processing, etc. of controlled dangerous substances]. The statute also provides the state must prove the value of the contraband was in excess of five hundred dollars or that the contraband was intended for commercial sale. La.R.S. 32:1550(C)(3). Once this burden is satisfied, forfeiture of Spooner's automobile falls easily within La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(5) since Spooner was carrying controlled dangerous substances in the automobile. Proving the $1,400.00 falls under La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(3) was made easier for the state under La.R.S. 32:1550(A)(7)(c) which provides: There shall be a rebuttable presumption that all moneys, coin, and currency seized incident to a valid arrest and found in close proximity to contraband controlled dangerous substances or contraband manufacturing or distributing paraphernalia or records of the illegal importation, manufacture, or distribution of controlled dangerous substances, are contraband as defined herein. The burden of proof shall be upon claimants of such property to rebut this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Spooner's arguments that the state must prove each ground for forfeiture beyond a reasonable doubt rely on In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970); State v. Manuel, 426 So.2d 140 (La.1983), and State v. Searle, 339 So.2d 1194 (La.1976). In re Winship is cited for the proposition that due process requires the prosecution to prove each element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Id., 397 U.S. at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73. Searle is cited for the proposition that the use of mandatory presumptions in criminal cases will be sustained only if the prosecution can demonstrate that the presumed fact flows, beyond a reasonable doubt, from the proven fact on which it is made to depend. 339 So.2d at 1205. Both are correct statements of the law. See, State v. Lindsey, 491 So.2d 371, 374 (La.1986); State v. Jones, 481 So.2d 598 (La.1986); Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 315-18, 105 S.Ct. 1965, 1972-73, 85 L.Ed.2d 344 (1985); County Court of Ulster County v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 157-58, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224-26, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979). However correct and well-settled these principles are, they have applicability only in the context of criminal cases. Consequently, in order to give his arguments any vitality, Spooner must show that the forfeiture statute, found among the Motor Vehicle and Traffic Regulations in the Revised Statutes, is governable by criminal law principles and jurisprudence. To accomplish this and show the necessary connexity, Spooner relies on State v. Manuel, supra . In Manuel, writs were granted to consider the correctness of a district court's ruling which upheld the constitutionality of La.R.S. 32:1550 in the face of the defendant's motion for the release of two cars seized in connection with his arrest on three counts of drug distribution. After a thorough analysis and full written treatment, this Court affirmed. Id. at 148 (Marcus and Watson, JJ., concurring). Manuel classified forfeitures as quasi-criminal and suggested the proceedings were valid only so long as the taking of property ... [is] subject to the same preconditions required for a seizure of criminal evidence. Id. at 143, 146. Manuel also suggested that federal due process analysis might be insufficient because federal review, under the 5th and 14th Amendments, is in some respects less exacting than Louisiana constitutional inspection.... Id. at 146. Accordingly, and pertinent here, Manuel read La.R.S. 32:1550 as requiring: the district attorney to prove beyond a reasonable doubt in a hearing instituted by him that: (1) valid grounds exist for forfeiture of the property under the statute which do not conflict with the constitution; (2) the seizure was in conformity with the constitution and the law or was made upon reasonable grounds to believe that it so conformed; (3) the owner of the conveyance was knowingly and intentionally a consenting party or privy to a violation of the controlled dangerous substances statute; (4) the value of the contraband was in excess of five hundred dollars or the contraband was intended for commercial sale. Id. at 147. Manuel was decided January 10, 1983, or some eight months before the amendment which added (A)(7) and its disputed presumption to La.R.S. 32:1550. (Acts 1983, No. 150, § 1, effective August 30, 1983). At issue is whether (A)(7)(c)'s presumption passes constitutional muster under Searle and progeny.