Opinion ID: 1441114
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Romansky I

Text: In its first Report, the Board found that the respondent's conduct in the Siepser and SHC matters constituted dishonesty under Rule 8.4(c). The Board adopted the Hearing Committee's conclusion that the respondent deliberately increased the hours billed in order to charge a premium that he was not entitled to, and that this alone was sufficient to constitute dishonesty. In Romansky I, we rejected this conclusion. We noted that the respondent, while conceding that he premium billed his clients, contends that he did not know that it was wrongful as unauthorized under the actual client billing agreement, [and] thus any violation was merely negligent[.] 825 A.2d at 317. In light of the respondent's position, we held that the Board had relied too heavily on In re Schneider, 553 A.2d 206 (D.C.1989), in which an attorney falsified travel receipts in order to expedite reimbursement for extra travel expenses that he had incurred on behalf of a client. Romansky I, supra, 825 A.2d at 317-18. In contrast to Schneider, where the attorney knew that the act of falsifying the receipts was dishonest, Romansky I concluded that this might be a `situation where the attorney is unaware that he has even committed the act which is the basis of the disciplinary action.' Id. at 317 (quoting Schneider, supra, 553 A.2d at 210). [5] Because the Board had reached no conclusions regarding the respondent's state of mind, we remanded the case with respect to the Siepser and SHC matters so that the Board could consider [i]f Romansky violated the fee agreements knowingly, or if he did so recklessly  i.e., consciously disregarding the risk that the agreements did not permit premium billing  [and thus] was dishonest and did violate Rule 8.4(c). Id. As noted above, neither Bar Counsel nor the respondent elected to pursue further fact-finding on remand. The Board, based upon the same record that existed at the time of the first appeal, concluded that the respondent had not acted knowingly or recklessly in charging the premiums. [6] Whether that finding is based upon substantial evidence is the issue now before us. In addition to remanding the Siepser and SHC issues for further consideration, Romansky I also affirmed the Board's finding that the respondent violated Rule 8.4(c) when he authored, backdated and used, without the client's approval, a purported letter from the client in a misguided attempt to furnish evidence in his defense during his firm's internal investigation of his billing conduct (hereinafter referred to as the FASA matter). Id. at 312. It also concluded that the respondent acted dishonestly when he assigned an associate to work on a matter for his father and then instructed her to bill the time to another client's account (hereinafter referred to as the OOSS matter). [7] Because the court was remanding the case to the Board for specific findings consistent with [that] opinion, it concluded that it would be premature to address the issues of sanctions for those violations. See id. at 318. Thus, we must resolve the issue of the appropriate sanctions for those violations in this second appeal.