Opinion ID: 413469
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Lynette's Appeal

Text: 18 Lynette raises several arguments on appeal. First, she contends that at the time she was stopped by Officer Williamson he lacked founded suspicion to detain her and, accordingly, the evidence subsequently seized from her purse was inadmissible as the fruit of an unlawful detention. Second, Lynette contends that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the purse she was carrying at the time of her arrest and that, accordingly, the District Court's denial of her motion to suppress based on a contrary conclusion was error. Third, Lynette contends that the District Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that she could not be convicted of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery unless she was aware that Michael was armed. We address these contentions in sequence. 19 Lynette's contention that her initial detention by Officer Williamson was unlawful is clearly without merit. It is well settled that, under certain limited circumstances, law enforcement officers may briefly detain a suspect for investigative purposes. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). Such a detention is permissible when based on an officer's founded or reasonable suspicion that criminal activity may be afoot. Id. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Founded suspicion 16 exists when an officer is aware of specific articulable facts, together with the rational inferences drawn therefrom, that reasonably warrant suspicion that the person to be detained may have committed or is about to commit a crime. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 880, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 2579, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United States v. Huberts, 637 F.2d 630, 634-35 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Collom, 614 F.2d 624, 628 (9th Cir.1979). 20 In the present case, the Tucson police officers 17 clearly had founded suspicion to detain Lynette. The police were aware that approximately one hour earlier the Savings & Loan had been robbed by an armed black male. They were aware that the robber had fled in a white over blue Buick containing at least one other black person and bearing Nevada license plate number TFG 162. The getaway car was found at the Tucson Inn. Two black females, Lynette and Theresa, were near the car. Lynette was wiping or brushing the driver's door and Theresa was apparently removing the rear license plate. The police officers could reasonably infer that Lynette was somehow connected with the car and was, with the aid of Theresa, attempting to destroy evidence connecting her with the car. Upon seeing Sgt. Hallums, the two women went to Room 123 of the Inn. Shortly thereafter a black male, matching the description of the robber, emerged from Room 123 and ran into an alleyway. Theresa and Lynette then separated with Theresa returning to the car and Lynette attempting to leave the motel complex. Given the knowledge and observations of the police officers, we believe that founded suspicion existed to briefly detain and question Lynette regarding her possible involvement in the robbery of the Savings & Loan. 21 Lynette next contends that the District Court erred in ruling that she lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the purse she was carrying at the time of her arrest and therefore could not challenge the legality of its search and seizure. The court based its decision on its finding that Lynette had abandoned the purse. 22 It is firmly established that warrantless searches of abandoned property do not violate the Fourth Amendment. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 240-41, 80 S.Ct. 683, 697-98, 4 L.Ed.2d 668 (1960); United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d 199, 200 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 941, 102 S.Ct. 1434, 71 L.Ed.2d 652 (1981); United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d 731, 735 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 970, 102 S.Ct. 516, 70 L.Ed.2d 387 (1981). One who has voluntarily abandoned property has no right to complain of its search or seizure. United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d at 200. The intention to retain a reasonable expectation of privacy is determinative of abandonment. Id. See United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d 407, 409 (9th Cir.1976). Thus, if the person alleged to have abandoned property intends to retain his or her privacy interest in the allegedly abandoned property, there has been no abandonment. Whether a person intends to retain a privacy interest in the property is determined by objective standards. United States v. Kendall, 655 F.2d at 201. In making this determination, we look to the party's words, acts, and other objective facts. United States v. Jackson, 544 F.2d at 409 (citation omitted). The District Court, relying principally on Lynette's statement that she had just found the purse, concluded that Lynette had evidenced an intention to abandon the purse. We must uphold this finding unless we find it clearly erroneous. 18 United States v. Diggs, 649 F.2d at 735; United States v. Humphrey, 549 F.2d 650, 652 (9th Cir.1977). Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the District Court clearly erred in finding that Lynette had abandoned her privacy interest in the purse. 23 Although Lynette initially disclaimed ownership of the purse, her subsequent conduct during the confrontation with Officer Williamson strongly indicated her intent to retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the purse. At one point during the confrontation, Lynette referred to the purse as my purse. Much more compelling, however, was Lynette's behavior while trying to comply with Officer Williamson's request for photographic identification. While trying to retrieve her wallet, Lynette took all possible precautions to retain her privacy in the contents of the purse. She stood and placed her body between Officer Williamson and the purse. She did not completely open the purse but instead merely opened it partially and reached in to extract her wallet. Moreover, at no time did Lynette indicate a desire to relinquish physical possession of the purse. Rather, she continued to hold the purse until it was physically removed from her possession by Officer Williamson. 19 Under these circumstances, we conclude that Lynette intended to retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the purse and the District Court's finding of abandonment was clearly erroneous. 20 24 Although we hold that the District Court erred in ruling that Lynette abandoned the purse, we conclude that the evidence seized from the purse was nevertheless properly admitted at trial. We may affirm the District Court on any basis fairly presented by record that, as a matter of law, sustains the judgment. Dessar v. Bank of America National Trust & Savings Ass'n, 353 F.2d 468, 470 (9th Cir.1965). Our review of the record in the present case leads us to conclude that Lynette's purse was properly seized and searched incident to a lawful arrest. 25 At the time he initially stopped Lynette, Officer Williamson had founded suspicion that she was somehow involved in the robbery of the Savings & Loan. During the course of their discussion, this founded suspicion ripened into probable cause to arrest. When hailed by Officer Williamson, Lynette immediately replied in a highly inappropriate manner that she had just found the purse she was carrying. She appeared reluctant to furnish the photographic identification requested by Officer Williamson. Her furtive conduct convinced Officer Williamson that she was about to flee. At this point, Officer Williamson placed Lynette under arrest and renewed his request for identification. When Lynette attempted to obstruct his view as she withdrew a small black object from the purse, Officer Williamson quite properly seized the purse. The purse was then handed to Officer Strickland whose brief search of the purse disclosed a large amount of cash. A subsequent search of the purse at the police station revealed additional evidence. 21 26 It is settled Fourth Amendment doctrine that a police officer may, incident to a lawful arrest, conduct a contemporaneous warrantless search of the arrestee's person and of the area into which the arrestee might reach to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). Containers found within that area may also be searched contemporaneously with the arrest. Id. Where such a container is not searched immediately, however, but is instead taken to the police station and searched later, a warrant is required. United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981). In the present case, Lynette's purse was searched immediately upon her arrest in a somewhat cursory fashion and later subjected to a more thorough search at the police station. During the search at the police station, additional evidence apparently not discovered in the initial search was found. 22 We must determine a question of apparent first impression: whether the warrantless search at the police station was valid given the initial lawful search incident to Lynette's arrest. 27 We believe that the warrantless search at the police station was valid and that the evidence obtained from that search was properly admitted at trial. The Fourth Amendment protects only reasonable expectations of privacy. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978). In United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800, 94 S.Ct. 1234, 39 L.Ed.2d 771 (1974), the Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of an arrestee's clothing conducted at the police station approximately ten hours after the arrest. The Court grounded its holding on the necessarily reduced expectation of privacy one holds in his person after being placed under arrest. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977); United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d at 1290. In the present case, Lynette had been arrested and her purse lawfully searched incident to that arrest. The contents of the purse had been fully exposed to the police and, consequently, her expectation of privacy in the purse was necessarily reduced by a significant degree. Because Lynette's expectation of privacy in the purse had been significantly reduced by the initial search, we believe the subsequent warrantless search at the police station was valid. Accordingly, we hold that once an item in an individual's possession has been lawfully seized and searched, subsequent searches of that item, so long as it remains in the legitimate uninterrupted possession of the police, may be conducted without a warrant. 23 28 We believe our decision here is fully consistent with our prior decisions and with the policies underlying the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 24 Requiring police to procure a warrant for subsequent searches of an item already lawfully searched would in no way provide additional protection for an individual's legitimate privacy interests. 25 The contents of an item previously searched are simply no longer private. 29 We also believe our holding here is fully consistent with our decision in United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir.1981). In Monclavo-Cruz the defendant was carrying a purse at the time of her arrest. Although the purse could have been lawfully searched at the time of arrest, see New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768, it was not. Subsequently, at the police station, the police conducted a warrantless search of the purse. In holding the search to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment, we relied principally upon the strong expectation of privacy one holds in the contents of luggage, purses, and similar containers. Because the search was not conducted at the time of arrest, the defendant's expectation of privacy in the purse survived the exigencies justifying a warrantless search. Accordingly, the subsequent warrantless search conducted at the station house intruded upon the defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy and therefore violated the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d at 1290. The present case is markedly different. Lynette's purse was lawfully searched at the time of her arrest and her expectation of privacy in the purse was thereby significantly reduced, if not destroyed. The subsequent search at the station simply did not violate any reasonable expectation of privacy. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387. 30 Finally, Lynette contends that the District Court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that she could not be convicted of aiding and abetting armed robbery absent proof beyond reasonable doubt that she knew Michael was armed. This contention has merit and, accordingly, we reverse Lynette's conviction and remand for further proceedings. 31 Knowledge that the principal has and intends to use a gun is an essential element of the offense of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery. United States v. Jones, 592 F.2d 1038, 1042 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 951, 99 S.Ct. 2179, 60 L.Ed.2d 1056 (1979). Failure to give a requested jury instruction to that effect constitutes reversible error. United States v. Short, 493 F.2d 1170 (9th Cir.), on rehearing, 500 F.2d 676, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1000, 95 S.Ct. 317, 42 L.Ed.2d 275 (1974). 32 At trial, Lynette requested an instruction that she could not be found guilty of aiding and abetting armed bank robbery absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew Michael was armed. The District Court refused to give the requested instruction and Lynette made a timely objection. Accordingly, under United States v. Short, supra, Lynette's conviction must be reversed as to the armed portion of the offense and the case remanded. The Government may elect to retry Lynette for aiding and abetting armed bank robbery. 26 Alternatively, the Government may decide not to retry. In that event, the District Court may, on remand, resentence Lynette under the charge of aiding and abetting unarmed bank robbery. 27 United States v. Short, supra.