Opinion ID: 2640351
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Expert Testimony on the Subject of White Supremacy

Text: Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion and denied him a fair trial by permitting Huntington Beach Police Department Sergeant Ronald Miller to testify as an expert on the subject of White supremacy and to opine that defendant was a White supremacist. Defendant asserts violations of his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and the presumption of innocence absent proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt ( In re Winship (1970) 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068]) as well as the Eighth Amendment right to a reliable adjudication in a capital case ( Caldwell v. Mississippi (1985) 472 U.S. 320 [86 L.Ed.2d 231, 105 S.Ct. 2633]).
Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court conducted an Evidence Code section 402 hearing to determine the admissibility of Sergeant Miller's testimony as expert testimony on the subject of White supremacy. The prosecutor intended to call the expert to (1) identify letters written by defendant and other material found in his possession as containing references to White supremacist groups and espousing White supremacist beliefs, (2) identify White supremacist groups and describe their beliefs, and (3) identify defendant as a White supremacist. Counsel for defendant objected to the proposed testimony on the grounds that the subject of White supremacy was within the jurors' common knowledge, the writings and symbols depicted in defendant's letters and other materials in his possession required no interpretation, and the testimony's prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value (Evid. Code, § 352). Sergeant Miller testified at the section 402 hearing that, for over 10 years, he had been involved with White supremacists and one of their subgroups, skinheads, as a police officer assigned to the Huntington Beach Police Department Beach Detail and Gang Unit. He had developed expertise on the subject of White supremacy through his contacts and interviews with self-proclaimed White supremacists and skinheads and his review of numerous publications on the White supremacist movement. During the course of this work, he became acquainted with numerous White supremacist groups that believed the White race is supreme over others. Sergeant Miller had testified in court five times on the subject of White supremacy. The trial court overruled defendant's objections and found Miller qualified as an expert on the subject of White supremacist groups and their teachings and thinking. Sergeant Miller then testified before the jury that a White supremacist is a racist who is oriented toward the superiority of the White race, believing that it is above all others. They tend to view minorities as ... sub-humans. [¶] They are also quite often Antisemitic, even to the point that they label the Holocaust as a Jewish trick to garner support and sympathy for the Jews throughout the world. [¶] Those are the two major tenets of the White supremacist. Miller testified that he had reviewed the handwritten notations on the last several pages of the Bible recovered from defendant's apartment. He recognized the name of a White supremacy group, Church of Jesus Christ Christian, also known as the Aryan Nations. This group is based in Hayden Lake, Idaho, and is led by Richard Butler, who appeals to a broad spectrum within the white supremacist movement, including skinheads, Ku Klux Klan members. Members of the Aryan Nations subscribe to the Identity Christian belief, described by Miller as a pseudo religion that uses biblical passages to prove that White people are God's chosen, [and that] all others are what they would call mud people or sub human. This group believes all Jews are descendants of Satan. Miller recognized a reference to Brig. Gen. Jack Mohr, whom he identified as Brigadier General Jack Mohr, who had served as a colonel in the United States Army during World War II and had been a prisoner of war. Miller knew Mohr had been involved with preaching Christian Identity beliefs about White supremacy to prisoners. Miller believed Mohr would probably have no problem with violence against minorities under the right circumstances. Miller recognized a notation for The Talon, a newsletter of the White supremacist organization Euro-American Alliance, which is based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin. This group advocated that the White race should be kept pure from any inbreeding, inter-mixing between, for example, Asians and White American[s] or black[s] and White Americans. Sergeant Miller examined the inside of the box seized from defendant's apartment and observed it was covered with multicolored personal graffiti, including the Nazi swastika (two) and the Nazi SS lightning bolts. He explained the SS lightning bolts symbol identified members of the Stamp Shuffel [ sic : Schutzstaffel]. The SS referred to the elite Nazi organization assigned by Hitler with such missions as the extermination of the Jews, minorities, gypsies, homosexuals, communists and others during the holocaust of World War II. Miller examined a letter defendant had written to Jeremie Overstreet while he was in custody in this case and identified among its contents the Nazi SS lightning bolts symbol and the phrase, Stay White, a reference to the belief that the White race should be kept pure. Miller next identified a piece of paper found in defendant's Bible with the heading Pro White Organizations as comprising a list of White supremacist organizations, including (1) the Aryan Research Fellowship, based in Coquille, Oregon, and identified by the United States Department of Justice as a White supremacist organization; (2) the N.A.A.W.P., or National Association for the Advancement of White People, based in New Orleans, Louisiana, and formed by former Ku Klux Klan (KKK) imperial wizard David Duke to protect White people's rights; (3) the New Order, based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and successor to the American Nazi Party; this group views Adolf Hitler as the Messiah for the Aryan or White race and formerly was known as the National Socialist White People's Party; (4) The Klansman, a group associated with the KKK; (5) the White Aryan Resistance, based in Fallbrook, California, and led by White supremacist Tom Metzger, whom Miller described as oriented toward violence; (6) the White Knights, a KKK-oriented organization, based in Birmingham, Alabama; and (7) the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, a larger faction of the KKK, led by Thom Robb, whom Miller described as a White supremacist and Christian Identity preacher. Miller elaborated that, with the exception of skinheads, he had the most contact with Metzger and the White Aryan Resistance, an organization very violent in [its] orientation. The White Aryan Resistance published a newsletter that regularly feature[d] both articles [and] illustrations backing up [Metzger's] White supremacist views. One such featured illustration depicted a White man with a double-barrel shotgun blasting a minority with a couple of rounds with a caption stating, If it isn't White, waste it. As for this organization's leader, Metzger advocated White supremacy over Blacks, Asians, Hispanics, and all minorities. He maintained a Web site, and previously a computer bulletin board, that promoted his and the organization's hate views. Earlier, Metzger had produced a cable access television program called Race and Reason that provided a forum for White supremacists to appear as guests and discuss their common beliefs about White supremacy. After Metzger began recruiting skinheads, the latter produced their own cable access program called Skinhead Race and Reason. Sergeant Miller then examined portions of three letters defendant had written to Robert Dulaney over a year before the murder in this case. In a letter dated March 10, 1993, when defendant was incarcerated in Missouri, he wrote, I run the W.A.R. group in here. White Arian resistance is a action groupwere a branch of NVAPNational Vastal Arian Party they dictate we react in other words they talkwe back them with violence. (Errors in original.) Miller explained that the phrase W.A.R. group referred to the White Aryan Resistance and interpreted defendant's written statement as meaning that when the NVAP talks, defendant's White Aryan Resistance group backs them up with violence. In a letter postmarked October 12, 1993, defendant wrote, Don't worry dog, I love to play in the WaR zone.... Miller understood WaR as referring to the White Aryan Resistance supremacist organization. In another letter postmarked February 14, 1994, defendant wrote the word Kill in large block letters near the closing. The letter K resembled a Nazi swastika. Below this, defendant repeated the word kill seven times in lowercase letters. Sergeant Miller examined a photograph of the helmet and plastic skull found in defendant's bedroom and identified the helmet as a World War II Nazi military helmet or a replica. A Nazi swastika symbol appeared on the front of the helmet. Based on defendant's own words in his letters, the groups with whom defendant associated, and his use of the symbols associated with the Nazi White supremacist types of beliefs, including the Nazi swastika and SS lightning bolts symbols, Miller believed defendant was a White supremacist. Among the letters Miller considered were two letters written by defendant while in custody awaiting trial in this case. One was addressed to Kelly Dresen, in which defendant stated, I am 100 percent against black. In another letter addressed to Jeremie Overstreet, defendant drew two lightning bolts next to the phrase, stay White, and wrote on a separate page, No better not them hong kong fuee's might not like you! (Errors in originals.)
On appeal, defendant first claims the trial court erred by allowing Sergeant Miller to testify that written and printed material found in defendant's bedroom, including letters written by defendant before and after Ly's murder, referred to White supremacist organizations and espoused White supremacist beliefs. Defendant asserts that Miller's testimony should have been restricted to identifying the organizations listed in defendant's Bible or on the Pro White Organizations list, and that jurors were capable of recognizing and understanding any White supremacist references or overtones in the writings and printed material. A trial court's decision to admit expert testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Prince (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1179, 1222 [57 Cal.Rptr.3d 543, 156 P.3d 1015].) We conclude for the reasons discussed below that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting this testimony. (11) First, although expert testimony is generally inadmissible on topics so common that jurors of ordinary knowledge and education could reach a conclusion as intelligently as the expert, an expert may testify on a subject about which jurors are not completely ignorant. ( People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1222, citing People v. McDonald (1984) 37 Cal.3d 351, 367 [208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709], overruled on another ground in People v. Mendoza (2000) 23 Cal.4th 896, 914 [98 Cal.Rptr.2d 431, 4 P.3d 265].) In determining the admissibility of expert testimony, the pertinent question is whether, even if jurors have some knowledge of the subject matter, expert opinion testimony would assist the jury. ( People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1222; see Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a).) Here, the challenged evidence was relevant to establish defendant's state of mind at the time he killed Ly and whether defendant killed Ly because of his race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(16).) Although some jurors may have possessed general knowledge of the subject of White supremacy, Miller's testimony nonetheless explained in some detail that a White supremacist is a racist who believes the White race is superior to all other races and is anti-Semitic, label[ing] the Holocaust as a Jewish trick to garner support and sympathy for the Jews throughout the world. Without the benefit of the expert's testimony, the jurors might not have understood that symbols often associated with Nazis that adorned some of the items found in defendant's bedroom (e.g., the Nazi swastikas and the SS lightning bolts on defendant's box) and phrases that were contained in defendant's letters and other written material (e.g., Pure White Organizations, Stay White, I run the W.A.R.) were used by White supremacists to advocate their beliefs. Nor would the jurors likely have recognized the names of the White supremacist leaders (e.g., Brigadier General Jack Mohr) and organizations (Church of Jesus Christ Christian, also known as the Aryan Nations) noted in the materials seized. Sergeant Miller's testimony could assist jurors by providing them with a basis of information about White supremacist beliefs and tenets from which they could determine, based on the material seized from defendant's bedroom, that defendant subscribed to White supremacist beliefs and tenets. Ultimately, this evidence could assist the jury in determining defendant's motive for killing Ly. Thus, the expert's testimony demonstrated more than defendant's abstract beliefs about White supremacy and was relevant to the jury's determination of whether the prosecution proved the hate-murder special circumstance. (Cf. Dawson v. Delaware (1992) 503 U.S. 159, 164-165 [117 L.Ed.2d 309, 112 S.Ct. 1093] [evidence of the defendant's membership in Aryan Brotherhood that was not linked to the crime committed and revealed only the defendant's abstract beliefs was irrelevant to his capital sentencing hearing].) Under these circumstances, we cannot conclude Sergeant Miller's testimony was of no assistance to the jurors (Evid. Code, § 801, subd. (a)), or would contribute nothing to the jury's common fund of information. ( People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th 107, 163 [121 Cal.Rptr.2d 106, 47 P.3d 988].) A second basis for upholding the trial court's decision admitting Miller's testimony on White supremacy culture and beliefs is that we have admitted expert testimony in analogous circumstances. (See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932, 944-949 [44 Cal.Rptr.3d 237, 135 P.3d 649] [approving the admission of expert testimony regarding gang culture and witness intimidation by gang members]; People v. Ochoa (2001) 26 Cal.4th 398, 438 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 324, 28 P.3d 78] [approving the admission of expert testimony to explain the significance of the defendant's gang-related tattoos]; People v. Gardeley (1996) 14 Cal.4th 605, 617 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 356, 927 P.2d 713] [recognizing that [t]he subject matter of the culture and habits of criminal street gangs satisfies the criterion of admissible expert testimony under Evid. Code, § 801]; People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 922 [39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93] [approving admission of juvenile gang expert's testimony on defendants' gang membership as relevant to establish their identities as perpetrators of the charged offenses]; see also People v. Olguin (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 1355, 1370 [37 Cal.Rptr.2d 596] [The use of expert testimony in the area of gang sociology and psychology is well established.].) Numerous decisions in federal and other state cases also have upheld the admission of expert testimony to explain the culture and beliefs of White supremacy groups and gangs and to interpret tattoos, symbols, and graffiti associated with these groups when such evidence was relevant to the issues at trial. (See U.S. v. Sparks (8th Cir. 1991) 949 F.2d 1023, 1025-1026 [expert testimony explaining the meaning of gang graffiti and hand signs depicted in the photographs seized from house in which the defendant was arrested was properly admitted and relevant to establish the defendant's gang affiliation and for impeachment]; U.S. v. Skillman (9th Cir. 1990) 922 F.2d 1370, 1374 & fn. 4 [expert testimony describing skinheads as `a neo-Nazi type of group ... [that] espouse[s] racial purity and White power, and ... tend[s] to be violent' was properly admitted because it tended to establish the defendant's racial animus, an element of the charged offense, intimidating or interfering with a person's housing rights because of race or color]; United States v. Mills (11th Cir. 1983) 704 F.2d 1553, 1559-1560 [the trial court properly admitted the testimony of a quasi expert on the organization, history, and activities of the Aryan Brotherhood, a White supremacist prison gang, as relevant to the defendant's motive and the circumstances of the alleged Aryan Brotherhood contract killing]; People v. Skinner (Colo.Ct.App. 2002) 53 P.3d 720, 722, 724 [the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting expert testimony to explain that the defendant's tattoo could be viewed as a symbol of White supremacy beliefs]; People v. Wagner (N.Y.App.Div. 2006) 27 A.D.3d 671, 672 [811 N.Y.S.2d 125, 126-127] [the trial court properly permitted an expert on hate crimes and the meaning of tattoos to testify with respect to the defendant's White supremacist tattoos; the tattoos were relevant to the defendant's motive and intent to commit second degree aggravated harassment]; Mason v. State (Tex.Crim.App. 1995) 905 S.W.2d 570, 577 [a prison gang expert's testimony that the Aryan Brotherhood is a White supremacist organization that, among other things, recruits White inmates and engages in contract killings and assaultive behavior was properly admitted as relevant to the issue of the defendant's future dangerousness]; State v. Campbell (Wn.Ct.App. 1995) 78 Wn.App. 813, 823 [901 P.2d 1050, 1055-1056] [the trial court properly admitted the expert gang testimony to explain gang terminology, gang symbols, and the organizational structure and history of gangs as relevant to show the defendant's premeditation, intent, and motive to commit the murders].) (12) In addition, the United States Supreme Court has held that evidence of racial intolerance and subversive advocacy may properly be considered in a capital sentencing proceeding when such evidence is relevant to the issues involved. ( Dawson v. Delaware, supra, 503 U.S. at p. 164.) The high court suggested that such evidence properly could be adduced by expert testimony. ( Id. at pp. 165, 168.) Defendant claims that Sergeant Miller's testimony that White supremacists are also quite often Antisemitic, even to the point that they label the Holocaust as a Jewish trick to garner support and sympathy for the Jews throughout the world was irrelevant and inadmissible because, he asserts, Ly was not Jewish. As a preliminary matter, we agree with respondent that defendant forfeited this claim because, although defendant objected to the admission of the expert's testimony as a whole, he failed to object specifically on the ground he now advances and thereby deprived the trial court an opportunity to make a fully informed ruling on the issue. (Evid. Code, § 353; see, e.g., People v. Geier (2007) 41 Cal.4th 555, 609-611 [61 Cal.Rptr.3d 580, 161 P.3d 104] [the defendant's broad pretrial objection to the admissibility of DNA evidence did not preserve for appeal his specific claim that the trial court erroneously permitted the DNA expert to testify to the frequency of the genetic profile among only a single racial group rather than for two additional major racial and ethnic groups for which DNA databases existed].) In any event, defendant's contention is without merit. Sergeant Miller described the White supremacists' two tenets as their belief in the superiority of the White race above all other races and their particular hatred of Jews, who they believe fabricated the Holocaust to garner worldwide sympathy and support. The expert's comments regarding the White supremacists' hatred towards Jews were relevant to explain these tenets and their origins and to provide the jurors with a basis of information for understanding certain symbols found in defendant's bedroom (e.g., the SS lightning bolts) and determining whether defendant's murder of Ly was motivated by racial hatred. Whether or not Ly was Jewish, these comments were relevant on the general subject of White supremacy. Defendant's complaint concerns the weight of this portion of Miller's testimony, not its admissibility. Defendant also claims that Sergeant Miller's testimony regarding Tom Metzger, whom Miller identified as the leader of the White Aryan Resistance, was irrelevant because Metzger was not on trial. According to Miller, however, the Pro White Organizations list found in defendant's Bible contained the name White Aryan Resistance, the very violent organization led by Metzger. Defendant also referred to the White Aryan Resistance in letters he had written to Dulaney over one year before he killed Ly. In any event, the expert's remarks concerning Metzger gave the jurors an overview of White supremacy culture and beliefs in order to place in context the White supremacist references found in the seized material. This concern, too, affects the weight of this evidence, not its admissibility. Next, defendant claims the trial court erred in permitting Sergeant Miller to give his opinion that defendant was a White supremacist, an issue properly reserved to the trier of fact. He asserts the expert was less informed than the jurors on this point because they could also consider additional relevant evidence on this point, including the testimony of other witnesses. (13) Evidence Code section 805 provides that [t]estimony in the form of an opinion that is otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces the ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact. (See People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 1226-1227 [an expert on crime scene analysis and signature crimes testified that all six murders were committed by the same person].) We cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in finding Sergeant Miller's opinion that defendant was a White supremacist would be of assistance to the jury in evaluating the evidence and determining whether the prosecution had proved the charged offenses and the truth of special circumstance allegations. The expert stated no opinion as to defendant's guilt or the truth of the special circumstances. His opinion that defendant was a White supremacist did not bind the jurors on this point or preclude them from considering other relevant evidence. The trial court instructed the jurors that they were the sole judges of the credibility of a witness (CALJIC No. 2.20), that they should consider all the evidence on which the proof of any fact depends (CALJIC No. 2.27), and that they were free to determine the weight, if any, to accord an expert's opinion upon considering the basis for the opinion (CALJIC No. 2.80). Defendant additionally contends that the probative value of Sergeant Miller's testimony was outweighed by its prejudicial effect (Evid. Code., § 352) and that its admission rendered his trial unfair in violation of his right to due process. He asserts the expert's opinion that he was a White supremacist unfairly poisoned the jury against him because it depicted him as an anti-Semite who wanted to exterminate Jews, minorities, homosexuals, and gypsies. This opinion, he claims, also equated him with Adolph Hitler and the worst excesses of the Nazi regime. Defendant further complains that the expert's description of a photograph of a White man with a double-barrel shotgun blasting a minority with a couple of rounds in a White Aryan Resistance publication was prejudicial. (14) Evidence Code section 352 permits a trial court in its discretion to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission would create a substantial danger of undue prejudice. We review a trial court's decision whether to exclude evidence pursuant to Evidence Code section 352 for abuse of discretion. ( People v. Cox (2003) 30 Cal.4th 916, 959 [135 Cal.Rptr.2d 272, 70 P.3d 277].) For this purpose, `prejudicial' means uniquely inflammatory without regard to relevance. ( People v. Zambrano (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1082, 1138 [63 Cal.Rptr.3d 297, 163 P.3d 4].) Evidence is substantially more prejudicial than probative [citation] if ... it poses an intolerable `risk to the fairness of the proceedings or the reliability of the outcome' [citation]. ( People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 724 [94 Cal.Rptr.2d 396, 996 P.2d 46].) Here, the admission of Sergeant Miller's testimony was probative of defendant's motive and intent in committing the murder and, thus, was directly relevant to the jury's determination of the murder charge and hate-murder special-circumstance allegation. We do not view as prejudicial either the expert's general overview of the subject of White supremacy or his specific testimony that White supremacists harbor a particular hatred of Jews, associate with Nazis and use Nazi-related symbols (e.g., SS lightning bolts and swastika) to promote their racist beliefs, and regularly feature racist illustrations in their publications (e.g., the depiction of a White man blasting a minority with a double-barrel shotgun). As defendant has argued, many of the items found in defendant's bedroom and the letters confiscated while he was in jail awaiting trial themselves clearly conveyed messages of racial hatred and anti-Semitism. For example, jurors reasonably could find defendant harbored a hatred of Blacks and Jews based on evidence he displayed in his bedroom the racist Martin Luther King poster, possessed an actual or replica of a Nazi helmet with a swastika symbol across the front, and penned a letter to Dulaney before Ly's death that contained a swastika above the words kill-kill-kill-kill-kill-kill-kill followed by Them all! Evidence is not unduly prejudicial merely because it strongly implicates a defendant and casts him or her in a bad light. ( People v. Robinson (2005) 37 Cal.4th 592, 632 [36 Cal.Rptr.3d 760, 124 P.3d 363].) The trial court properly instructed the jury not to be influenced by passion, sympathy, or prejudice and to conscientiously consider and weigh the evidence in applying the law. Under these circumstances, where other, properly admitted evidence plainly communicated to the jury defendant's odious attitudes, the trial court properly found the probative value of the expert's testimony was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Finally, assuming without deciding that defendant's additional constitutional claims were preserved (see People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th 428, 433-434 [35 Cal.Rptr.3d 644, 122 P.3d 765]), they are without merit for the same reasons we have rejected defendant's state law claims. (See People v. Prince, supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1229; People v. Kraft, supra, 23 Cal.4th at p. 1035.)