Opinion ID: 2276467
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Opened Door Doctrine

Text: Although we hold that the invited response doctrine is inapplicable, because defense counsel did not make an improper argument and no impermissible missing witness inference was made, our analysis does not end here. The State contends that several federal court cases and cases from other jurisdictions support its position that the invited response doctrine applies and that Mitchell's convictions ought to be affirmed. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 145 F.3d 1433, 1439 (11th Cir.1998) (holding that it is not improper for a prosecutor to comment on a defendant's subpoena power, `particularly when done in response to a defendant's argument about the prosecutor's failure to call a specific witness' (quoting United States v. Blackman, 66 F.3d 1572, 1578 n. 7 (11th Cir.1995))); United States v. Molovinsky, 688 F.2d 243, 247 (4th Cir.1982) (holding that prosecutor's remarks regarding the defendant's subpoena power were a justified defensive response); accord People v. Kliner, 185 Ill.2d 81, 235 Ill.Dec. 667, 705 N.E.2d 850, 886 (1998); Doby v. State, 557 So.2d 533, 539-40 (Miss.1990). None of those cases, however, mention the invited response doctrine as we have defined it; thus, the State's reliance is misplaced. Instead, the cases cited support another one of the State's assertions, that is, that fundamental principles of fairness permitted the prosecutor to call attention to Mitchell's subpoena power. We agree with that assertion, which we also find supported by our own cases, and hold that defense counsel's closing argument opened the door to the prosecutor's remarks about Mitchell's subpoena power. We, therefore, consider the prosecutor's remarks to be fair comment. The opened door doctrine is based on principles of fairness and permits a party to introduce evidence that otherwise might not be admissible in order to respond to certain evidence put forth by opposing counsel. Conyers v. State, 345 Md. 525, 545, 693 A.2d 781, 790 (1997). `[O]pening the door' is simply a way of saying: `My opponent has injected an issue into the case, and I ought to be able to introduce evidence on that issue.' Clark v. State, 332 Md. 77, 85, 629 A.2d 1239,1243 (1993); see also McLain, Maryland Evidence, § 103:13(c)(i) (If one party has introduced irrelevant evidence, over objection, or, indeed, even `admissible evidence which generates an issue,' the trial court may rule that the first party has `opened the door' to evidence offered by the opposing party that previously would have been irrelevant, but has become relevant.). We have held that the opened door doctrine applies in the context of opening statements, see Terry v. State, 332 Md. 329, 337, 631 A.2d 424, 428 (1993) (noting that, although the opening statement is not evidence, the general principles involved in allowing a party to `meet fire with fire' are applicable), and we see no reason why it should not apply in the context of closing arguments as well. [8] Here, as we have noted, defense counsel, in closing argument, permissibly drew the jury's attention to the absences of Wali Henderson, Antonio Corprew, Lewis Man-Man Cochran, and others. By saying Let's bring Wal[i] Henderson, Corprew, and Man-Man into the courthouse, however, defense counsel argued the relevancy of their absences and the weakness in the State's case. This maneuver opened the door for the prosecutor to offer an explanation as to why those witnesses were not present. See Degren, 352 Md. at 433, 722 A.2d at 903 ([P]rosecutors may address during rebuttal issues raised by the defense in its closing argument.). Moreover, defense counsel's choice of language in stating Let's bring Wal[i] Henderson, Corprew, and Man-Man into the courthouse for inspection associated the jurors with the defense, as if the jurors were entitled to see these witnesses and somehow were prevented from doing so by the State. In light of such language, a response by the prosecutor calling attention to Mitchell's subpoena power was fair comment. Accordingly, our holding in regard to the State's rebuttal argument is a narrow one. The prosecutor's remarks calling attention to the defendant's subpoena power were a tailored response to defense counsel's assertion that all the potential witnesses should have been brought into the courtroom given what defense counsel identified as a weakness in the State's case. Indeed, in response to defense counsel's assertion that Mitchell faced a case of misidentification, the prosecutor responded as follows: The defense made mention a couple of times about what the State didn't present to you all. We never saw Cochran, never saw Corprew, never saw Turner, never saw Wal[i] Henderson....     As far as dealing with certain people that weren't here, the defense made a specific point. He said you all should have had a chance to look at them and see what they looked like....     If [defense counsel] thought that them being here would have shown that something we presented was so contradictory to something about them, he could have brought them in as well. The defense has subpoena power just like the State does. You can't say why didn't the State present a witness, when they had an equal opportunity to present it to you, and then try to say, well, it wasn't presented. They had an equal right to present it if they thought it would contradict something we presented. Cases from other courts that the State has called to our attention support our conclusion that a prosecutor may comment on the defendant's subpoena power after defense counsel has opened the door. In Hernandez, supra, defense counsel first brought up the defendant's subpoena power. 145 F.3d at 1436. Defense counsel argued in closing, Now I will suspect the government will say ... [the defendant] has the subpoena power. Id. During rebuttal, the prosecutor stated: It is much easier to raise questions than it is to answer [them], folks, isn't it? It is much easier to raise questions. [Defense counsel] starts first with where is the confidential informant? Well, where was the confidential informant? Remember Special Agent Greene told you the informant was not too confidential to Ms. Short [defense counsel] because she met the informant before. Hernandez, 145 F.3d at 1437. On appeal, Hernandez argued that the prosecutor's rebuttal argument shifted the burden of proof to the defense. See Hernandez, 145 F.3d at 1438 (Hernandez contends that the prosecutor, in his rebuttal argument, created a non-existent relationship between the confidential informant and defense counsel which left the jury with the impression that defense counsel had an equal if not elevated duty to use its subpoena power to produce the informant at trial.). The court rejected this argument, stating that it is not improper for a prosecutor to note that the defendant has the same subpoena powers as the government, `particularly when done in response to a defendant's argument about the prosecution's failure to call a specific witness.' Hernandez, 145 F.3d at 1439 (quoting Blackman, 66 F.3d at 1578 n. 7). In Molovinsky, supra, one of the defendant's alleged co-conspirators, Ed Sparrow, was present in the courthouse throughout the trial. 688 F.2d at 247. The government never called Sparrow to testify, and defense counsel commented in closing argument as follows: [I]t is clear from the evidence that Sparrow was as heavily involved, subsequently, in trying to find a way of counterfeiting as the defendant was. He is not here; he did not testify. He is not on trial. He is not charged. He did not testify. You cannot speculate on what his testimony might have been, but you can note his absence and ask yourself whether or not, given all the factors in this case  whether or not the Government has really proven to your satisfaction, beyond a reasonable doubt, given that they do not call the co-conspirator in, that there was an agreement to counterfeit.... Molovinsky, 688 F.2d at 247-48 (alterations in original). The prosecutor then replied in rebuttal argument: Now where was Ed Sparrow? I have a sneaking suspicion that Gale Molovinsky knows his address and phone number. The law provides him subpoena power. Do you think it is possible that Mr. Molovinsky might not have wanted you to hear Mr. Sparrow's version of what went on? Ladies and gentlemen, he [Sparrow] was at least as available to the defense as he was to the Government. Molovinsky, 688 F.2d at 247 (alteration in original). The court held that the prosecutor's response was proper in light of the argument made by defense counsel. Molovinsky, 688 F.2d at 247-48. In Doby, supra, defense counsel cross-examined an officer about the whereabouts of a confidential informant. 557 So.2d at 538. During closing argument, the prosecutor rekindled the discussion, stating that [t]he State has the power of subpoena. So does defense counsel. You didn't see anybody subpoena him, did you? Id. In holding that the prosecutor's statements were not improper, the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated: [W]here opposing counsel opens the door, the prosecution may enter and develop a matter in greater detail....     Moreover, a fair reading of th[e] cross-examination does indeed find the defense suggesting that the prosecution was up to something in its failure to have the confidential informant present. We may not in fairness hold the prosecution unable to answer. Doby, 557 So.2d at 539-40 (emphasis added).