Opinion ID: 1968057
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Third-party defendant's appeal:

Text: In his appeal as third-party defendant, Shea contends the trial court's finding for Miller as third-party plaintiff was error. Since the finding was general we must of course accept the evidence most favorable to Miller's case, [10] and as tending to establish the following facts. Miller was given permission by Shea's former resident manager to store certain furnishings in a locker provided for such purposes in the basement storage room of the apartment house. Pursuant to this permission she did in fact store certain items in the locker, retaining a key to the particular locker she used, and when she moved from the apartment, the locker was empty. At this juncture in the case it is clear that under the rules set out above, Miller's evidence was sufficient to establish a prima facie case against Shea and the burden of proceeding with the evidence shifted to him to explain or justify the loss, or to introduce evidence showing an exercise of that degree of care which the bailment called for. [11] Under the circumstances of this case, by virtue of the provisions of the lease, Shea's liability was limited to acts of gross negligence, willful conduct, or fraud. [12] Thus, the burden was Shea's to produce evidence of his exercise of some care or diligence in regard to the bailed property, or to otherwise justify or explain its loss. The substance of defendant Shea's evidence is found in the testimony of his janitor who testified that the storage lockers or bins were in a separate room in the basement of the apartment and that each locker was separated by wire and each had a door with a lock. He testified that he and two others had keys to the storage room door which was always kept locked, but although he had keys to some of the individual locker doors he did not have one to Miller's. The failure to exercise even slight care is to be grossly negligent; to say that Shea failed to exercise even slight care over the property bailed to him is to say that he was grossly negligent in its supervision, and, in this jurisdiction, negligence to be gross must be such negligence as would `shock fair-minded men', [13] or,    negligence of such magnitude as to be gross in character. [14] We do not think that Shea's conduct was of such a nature. Although the evidence is not as explanatory as it might be, it is clear that the property delivered to him as bailee was stored in an individual locker or bin with its own door and lock and that the locker itself was located within the confines of a locked room. While the janitor testified that two others besides himself had keys to the storage room, it would be difficult to say that this in itself was sufficient to constitute a failure to exercise even slight care in the supervision of the property, or that because of that fact Shea was grossly negligent. Accordingly, we must rule as a matter of law that Miller failed in her over-all burden of proving by a preponderance that Shea was grossly negligent, or guilty of willful conduct, or fraud; [15] and in addition thereto, we hold that Miller offered no testimony of the value of the articles she stored in the locker. The judgment against Shea in No. 1759 is reversed; the judgment against Miller in No. 1760 is affirmed.