Opinion ID: 782341
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Right of Publicity Claim

Text: 58 ETW claims that Jireh's publication and marketing of prints of Rush's painting violates Woods's right of publicity. The right of publicity is an intellectual property right of recent origin which has been defined as the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identity. See McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1:3. The right of publicity is a creature of state law 13 and its violation gives rise to a cause of action for the commercial tort of unfair competition. Id. 59 The right of publicity is, somewhat paradoxically, an outgrowth of the right of privacy. See McCARTHY ON PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY, § 1:4. A cause of action for violation of the right was first recognized in Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2nd Cir. 1953), where the Second Circuit held that New York's common law protected a baseball player's right in the publicity value of his photograph, and in the process coined the phrase right of publicity as the name of this right. 60 The Ohio Supreme Court 14 recognized the right of publicity in 1976 in Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St.2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976). 15 In Zacchini, which involved the videotaping and subsequent rebroadcast on a television news program of plaintiff's human cannonball act, the Ohio Supreme Court held that Zacchini's right of publicity was trumped by the First Amendment. On appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed, holding that the First Amendment did not insulate defendant from liability for violating Zacchini's state law right of publicity where defendant published the plaintiff's entire act. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965 (1977). Zacchini is the only United States Supreme Court decision on the right of publicity. 61 There are few Ohio decisions defining the contours of the right of publicity in the aftermath of Zacchini. In Vinci v. American Can Co., 9 Ohio St.3d 98, 459 N.E.2d 507 (1984), the Ohio Supreme Court merely reaffirmed its recognition of the right and devoted the remainder of its opinion to the issue of class action certification. Vinci was an Olympic gold medal weight lifter who brought a class action on behalf of himself and other Olympic athletes whose names and likenesses were used on a series of disposable drinking cups promoted by a partnership between the Minute Maid Corporation and the United States Olympic Committee. The Supreme Court of Ohio held that the action could be maintained as a class action. After remanding the case to the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals, that court, with one judge dissenting, upheld the grant of summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the mention of the athletes' names within the context of accurate, historical information was incidental to the promotion of the Dixie Cups by the partnership and that the reference to the athletes and their accomplishments was purely informational[.] Vinci v. American Can Co., 69 Ohio App.3d 727, 729, 591 N.E.2d 793, 794 (1990). 62 In Bajpayee v. Rothermich, 53 Ohio App.2d 117, 372 N.E.2d 817 (1977), the Ohio Court of Appeals for Franklin County held that the plaintiff's right of publicity was violated where the defendant presented plaintiff's pharmacological research paper as his own before the American Society of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics. 63 Finally, in Parma International, Inc. v. Bartos, 1990 WL 11716, No. 89CA004573, 1990 Ohio App. LEXIS 508 (Feb. 7, 1990), the Ohio Court of Appeals for Lorain County reversed a trial court's grant of summary judgment for the defendant where the defendant had continued to use the plaintiff's name and likeness on the packaging of its product and in its advertising literature after the plaintiff ceased his employment with the defendant. The issue in Parma International was whether the plaintiff had consented to the continued use of his name and likeness. 64 When the Ohio Supreme Court recognized the right of publicity, it relied heavily on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652. See Zacchini, 47 Ohio St.2d at 230, 351 N.E.2d 454. The court quoted the entire text of § 652(C) of the RESTATEMENT, as well as comments a., b., c. and d. Id. 65 The RESTATEMENT originally treated the right of publicity as a branch of the right of privacy and included it in a chapter entitled Invasion of Privacy. In 1995, the American Law Institute transferred its exposition of the right of publicity to the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, Chapter 4, § 46, in a chapter entitled Appropriation of Trade Values. The current version of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION defines the right of publicity as follows: 66 Appropriation of the Commercial Value of a Person's Identity: The Right of Publicity 67 One who appropriates the commercial value of a person's identity by using without consent the person's name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules stated in §§ 48 and 49. 68 Id. 69 In § 46, Comment c, Rationale for Protection, the authors of the RESTATEMENT suggest that courts may justifiably be reluctant to adopt a broad construction of the right. 70 The rationales underlying recognition of a right of publicity are generally less compelling than those that justify rights in trademarks or trade secrets. The commercial value of a person's identity often results from success in endeavors such as entertainment or sports that offer their own substantial rewards. Any additional incentive attributable to the right of publicity may have only marginal significance. In other cases the commercial value acquired by a person's identity is largely fortuitous or otherwise unrelated to any investment made by the individual, thus diminishing the weight of the property and unjust enrichment rationales for protection. In addition, the public interest in avoiding false suggestions of endorsement or sponsorship can be pursued through the cause of action for deceptive marketing. Thus, courts may be properly reluctant to adopt a broad construction of the publicity right. See § 47. 71 In § 47, Comment c, the authors of the RESTATEMENT note, The right of publicity as recognized by statute and common law is fundamentally constrained by the public and constitutional interest in freedom of expression. In the same comment, the authors state that [t]he use of a person's identity primarily for the purpose of communicating information or expressing ideas is not generally actionable as a violation of the person's right of publicity. Various examples are given, including the use of the person's name or likeness in news reporting in newspapers and magazines. The RESTATEMENT recognizes that this limitation on the right is not confined to news reporting but extends to use in entertainment and other creative works, including both fiction and non-fiction. Id. The authors list examples of protected uses of a celebrity's identity, likeness or image, including unauthorized print or broadcast biographies and novels, plays or motion pictures. Id. According to the RESTATEMENT, such uses are not protected, however, if the name or likeness is used solely to attract attention to a work that is not related to the identified person, and the privilege may be lost if the work contains substantial falsifications. Id. 72 We believe the courts of Ohio would follow the principles of the RESTATEMENT in defining the limits of the right of publicity. The Ohio Supreme Court's decision in Zacchini suggests that Ohio is inclined to give substantial weight to the public interest in freedom of expression when balancing it against the personal and proprietary interests recognized by the right of publicity. This suggestion is reenforced by the decision in Vinci. 73 This court first encountered the right of publicity in Memphis Development Foundation v. Factors Etc., Inc., 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir.1980), where the issue presented was whether the heirs of Elvis Presley retained his right of publicity after his death. We concluded that they did not. We held that under Tennessee law, [t]he famous have an exclusive legal right during life to control and profit from the commercial use of their name and personality. Id. at 957. Noting that the Tennessee courts had not addressed the issue, we decided the case in the light of practical and policy considerations, the treatment of other similar rights in our legal system, the relative weight of the conflicting interests of the parties, and certain moral presuppositions concerning death, privacy, inheritability and economic opportunity. Id. at 958. 74 In Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir.1983), a majority of this court, with Judge Kennedy dissenting, held that television comedian and talk show host Johnny Carson's right of publicity was invaded when defendant used the phrase with which Carson was commonly introduced on his television program. In Carson, we held that a celebrity has a protected pecuniary interest in the commercial exploitation of his identity. Id. at 835. 75 In Landham, 227 F.3d at 625-26, this court held that Landham, a fringe actor who played supporting roles in several motion pictures, had failed to show a violation of his right of publicity when defendant marketed an action figure of a character he had played but which did not bear a personal resemblance to him. This court found that Landham had failed to show that his persona had significant value or that the toy invoked his persona as distinct from that of the fictional character he played. 76 There is an inherent tension between the right of publicity and the right of freedom of expression under the First Amendment. This tension becomes particularly acute when the person seeking to enforce the right is a famous actor, athlete, politician, or otherwise famous person whose exploits, activities, accomplishments, and personal life are subject to constant scrutiny and comment in the public media. In Memphis Development Foundation, 616 F.2d at 959, this court discussed the problems of judicial line drawing that would arise if it should recognize the inheritability of publicity rights, including the question [a]t what point does the right collide with the right of free expression guaranteed by the First Amendment? In Carson, after noting that the First Amendment protects commercial speech, Judge Kennedy opined in her dissent that public policy requires that the public's interest in free enterprise and free expression take precedence over any interest Johnny Carson may have in a phrase associated with his person. Carson, 698 F.2d at 841. In Landham, we noted the careful balance that courts have gradually constructed between the right of publicity and the First Amendment[.] 227 F.3d at 626. 77 In a series of recent cases, other circuits have been called upon to establish the boundaries between the right of publicity and the First Amendment. In Rogers, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on Rogers' right of publicity claim, noting that commentators have advocated limits on the right of publicity to accommodate First Amendment concerns. 875 F.2d at 1004 n. 11. That court also cited three cases 16 in which state courts refused to extend the right of publicity to bar the use of a celebrity's name in the title and text of a fictional or semi-fictional book or movie. Id. at 1004. 78 In White, television celebrity Vanna White, brought suit against Samsung Electronics, alleging that its television advertisement which featured a female-shaped robot wearing a long gown, blonde wig, large jewelry, and turning letters in what appeared to be the Wheel of Fortune game show set, violated her California common law right of publicity and her rights under the Lanham Act. The Ninth Circuit, with Judge Alarcon dissenting in part, reversed the grant of summary judgment to defendant, holding that White had produced sufficient evidence that defendant's advertisement appropriated her identity in violation of her right of publicity, and that the issue of confusion about White's endorsement of defendant's product created a jury issue which precluded summary judgment on her Lanham Act claim. In so holding, the court rejected the defendant's parody defense which posited that the advertisement was a parody of White's television act and was protected speech. 79 A suggestion for rehearing en banc failed. Three judges dissented from the order rejecting the suggestion for a rehearing en banc. See White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir.1993). Judge Kozinski, writing the dissenting opinion, observed, Something very dangerous is going on here.... Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativity is impossible without a rich public domain. 989 F.2d at 1513. Later, he commented: 80 Intellectual property rights aren't free: They're imposed at the expense of future creators and of the public at large.... This is why intellectual property law is full of careful balances between what's set aside for the owner and what's left in the public domain for the rest of us[.] 81