Opinion ID: 1436710
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: The Mayor's Exercise of Discretion.

Text: The Sierra Club contends, as an alternative ground for affirmance, that even if the Mayor is vested with authority under the OBSEA to determine the extent to which funds are available for recycling from DPW's solid waste management budget, he acted unlawfully in this case. According to the Sierra Club, the District did not and could not show that funds were unavailable for recycling, for it would be more expensive for the District to cancel the recycling program than to continue it. We have held in Part III. of this opinion that the District's suspension of the curbside collection program was subject to judicial review. The initial question presented was whether the DCRL required the Mayor to continue the recycling program. That question, we concluded, was not committed to the Mayor's absolute discretion, nor did the DCRL clearly preclude judicial review. The question we are now addressing is quite different. The court having ruled that the OBSEA did not deprive the Mayor of his discretionary authority to allocate the expenditures of the DPW as between recycling and other activities, including garbage collection and alley cleaning, we are dealing here with an alternative or fall-back argument in which the Sierra Club is effectively seeking to challenge the Mayor's exercise of discretion in the expenditure of public funds. Essentially, the Sierra Club is asking the court to second-guess the Mayor as to whether the recycling program is cost-effective, and to order him to continue residential curbside collection notwithstanding the Mayor's determination that no funds are available to pay for it without unacceptable risks to public health. For all practical purposes, the Sierra Club is demanding that the court assume responsibility for managing at least a part of the District's budget. The various parts of a budget are interdependent, however, and enforcement of such an order would potentially entangle the court even further in concerns which are not the province of the judicial branch. The doctrine of separation of powers restrains courts from inappropriate interference in the business of the other branches of Government. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 394, 110 S.Ct. 1964, 1970, 109 L.Ed.2d 384 (1990). Whether for lack of judicial power or for prudential reasons, a court will stay its hand where, inter alia, it would be impossible to undertak[e] independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 82 S.Ct. 691, 710, 7 L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). The occasion for restraint is surely at its apogee when the court is asked to dictate the Mayor's spending priorities. We decline, under these circumstances, to weigh the elaborate arguments which the parties have presented to us as to whether or not the recycling program pays for itself. [13] That is a determination for the elected branches of the government, and as we read the DCRL as amended by the OBSEA, it has been confided to the discretion of the Mayor under the circumstances of this case.