Opinion ID: 2594892
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Veasley's Argument

Text: The only effect the trial court's ruling had on Veasley was to sever his penalty trial from that of Cleveland and Charan. Because his trial was first, the second penalty trial could not have affected him. Veasley argues the ruling was error. The issue is not cognizable as to Veasley because he never objected. It is settled that a defendant must request severance or object to joinder to complain on appeal of the failure to sever. ( People v. Champion (1995) 9 Cal.4th 879, 906, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) The same rationale applies to the reverse situation, i.e., the failure to object to severance. (See People v. Saunders, supra, 5 Cal.4th at pp. 589-590, 20 Cal.Rptr.2d 638, 853 P.2d 1093.) If, for some reason, Veasley had wanted to be tried with the other two defendants at the penalty phase, he should have so requested at trial. He did not, so he cannot complain on appeal of the court's action. Veasley argues that counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the severance. However, no reason appears for counsel to believe severance was against Veasley's interests. Indeed, criminal defendants usually complain of the trial court's denial, not granting, of severance. (E.g., People v. Champion, supra, 9 Cal.4th at pp. 904-906, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 547, 891 P.2d 93.) We also see no error or prejudice from Veasley's perspective. His statement to Peterson about shooting the victims was never used against him. He argues that severance was not required to protect Cleveland's and Charan's legitimate interests. But the question here is not whether the court was required to order severance, but whether it erred in doing so. We see no abuse of discretion. ( People v. Alvarez, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 189, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 385, 926 P.2d 365.) Ordering severance to permit Cleveland and Charan to present Peterson's testimony seems reasonable. Veasley also claims that the bifurcation was a surprise to the jury and caused it to return a death verdict against Veasley as a means of ensuring at least one of the defendants paid the ultimate price for the deaths of Nelson and Hunter. We disagree. At the outset of the penalty trials, the court explained to the jury what was occurring. The explanation was neither difficult to understand nor one that would particularly trouble the jury. The jury knew that the separate penalty trial as to Cleveland and Charan would follow. No reason appears to believe that the severance increased the likelihood the jury would impose the death penalty against Veasley.