Opinion ID: 2065493
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: The Outburst In Court

Text: Lumpkin asserts that when Evans engaged in a violent and unprovoked outburst during trial, he prejudiced the jury to such an extent that Lumpkin was denied a fair trial. He cites as error the trial court's failure to declare a mistrial or, in the alternative, to ascertain the effect that the outburst had on the jury. Initially, we differ with Lumpkin's characterization of the outburst as violent. In the midst of the prosecutor's cross-examination of Roxanne Johnson, Evans exclaimed: God damn. What you man trying to do with it. I've been going through this sitting here going through this shit for a man in my mind. I'm tired, man. The jury was immediately excused. The record does not reflect any violent behavior on the part of Evans, and the trial court assessed the jury's reaction to the outburst as one of curiosity rather than shock or fear. The trial court instructed the jury at length to disregard Evans' brief emotional display, and to reach a verdict based solely on the evidence. A motion for mistrial is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge. Hammond v. United States, D.C.App., 345 A.2d 140, 141 (1975); United States v. James, 151 U.S.App.D.C. 304, 466 F.2d 475 (1972). While we have not had occasion previously to address the issue of an appropriate remedy for an outburst by a codefendant, we seek guidance in two decisions by the Second Circuit which speak to this question. In United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179 (2d Cir. 1960), the trial court issued an instruction similar to the one given here to cure any prejudice which might have arisen from an outburst by one of several codefendants. That outburst involved an accusation that the other codefendants were convicts, some of whom were currently serving time in jail. Despite the highly prejudicial nature of those remarks, the trial court's response was held to be adequate. The Second Circuit reasoned: If such conduct by a co-defendant on trial were held to require a retrial it might never be possible to conclude a trial involving more than one defendant; it would provide an easy device for defendants to provoke mistrials whenever they might choose to do so. [ Id., at 193.] In United States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir. 1963), based on comparable reasoning a similar result was reached in considering outbursts which were both numerous and violent. While it is not necessary for us to expressly approve the holdings of Aviles or Bentvena, the approach utilized by the Second Circuit may be appropriately applied to the circumstances of this case. The disruption caused by Evans did not include any prejudicial remarks about co-defendant Lumpkin. Any adverse reaction toward Lumpkin by members of the jury which might have been triggered by Evans' brief emotional display was adequately tempered by the trial court's careful instructions. The denials of Lumpkin's requests for a mistrial or an individual voir dire were proper.