Opinion ID: 2656174
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Denial of LTD Benefits

Text: Judge Mauskopf reviewed the R&R de novo and adopted its disposition, denying Liberty’s motion for summary judgment and sua sponte granting summary judgment for Donachie,3 on the basis that the denial of LTD benefits had been arbitrary and capricious.4 We review the District Court’s order entering summary judgment de novo. Pagan v. NYNEX Pension Plan, 52 F.3d 438, 441 (2d Cir. 1995); cf. Celardo v. GNY Auto. Dealers Health & Welfare Trust, 318 F.3d 142, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[D]etermination that the Trustees’ decision was 2 The District Court awarded plaintiff “own occupation” LTD benefits, but held that “it would be premature to grant plaintiff the ‘any occupation’ benefits,” and remanded to Liberty to determine eligibility for these additional benefits. The parties do not address on appeal the additional LTD benefits requested. 3 A sua sponte grant of summary judgment against the moving party is permissible only if “the facts before the district court were fully developed so that the moving party suffered no procedural prejudice” and “[the] court is absolutely sure that no issue of material fact exists.” Bridgeway Corp. v. Citibank, 201 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). Liberty does not contend that it was denied the opportunity to place all relevant evidence in the record. Accordingly, the District Court’s grant of summary judgment was not procedurally deficient. 4 In an ERISA action, the discretionary decision by an ERISA‐plan administrator to deny benefits is subject to arbitrary and capricious review. Durakovic v. Bldg. Serv. 32 BJ Pension Fund, 609 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2010). 7 Nos. 12‐2996‐cv (L), 12‐3031‐cv (XAP) arbitrary and capricious is a legal conclusion, . . . review[ed] . . . de novo.”). Upon review of the record, we conclude that Liberty’s denial of LTD benefits was indeed arbitrary and capricious, substantially for the reasons stated in the R&R and in the District Court’s opinion―namely, that Liberty ignored substantial evidence from Donachie’s treating physicians that he was incapable of performing his current occupation, while failing to offer any reliable evidence to the contrary.5 See Black & Decker Disability Plan v. Nord, 538 U.S. 822, 834 (2003) (holding that plan administrators may “credit reliable evidence that conflicts with a treating physician’s evaluation,” but “may not arbitrarily refuse to credit a claimant’s reliable evidence, including the opinions of a treating physician.”). Accordingly, we affirm the District Court’s judgment insofar as it entered summary judgment for Donachie on his ERISA claim for LTD benefits.