Opinion ID: 159762
Heading Depth: 4
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: mental health evaluation

Text: -8- Petitioner argues counsel failed to seek a mental health expert to evaluate her before trial. Dr. Fischer’s affidavit, presented at the state post-conviction proceedings, indicated petitioner has a full scale IQ of 76, suggesting borderline intelligence. Dr. Fischer believed that, given petitioner’s limited intellectual functioning, her submissive, dependent personality style, and her disorganized thought processes, it was “highly improbable” she was capable of creating a scheme to murder her husband. Furthermore, due to Mr. Plantz’s dominant role and his perception of petitioner as stupid and inferior, Dr. Fischer believed it was “unlikely” petitioner knew the details of Mr. Plantz’s personal business. Petitioner maintains this evidence was relevant and should have been presented at both stages of trial because it showed she lacked the ability to form the necessary intent to “mastermind” first degree murder and because it would have been mitigating evidence. The federal district court determined (1) no indicia of incompetence or mental illness were apparent prior to trial; (2) petitioner and her counsel had discussions during the trial and counsel never questioned her mental state during trial; (3) she never informed counsel of a mental impairment, and she does not suggest either counsel or the trial court should have recognized she was mentally impaired; (4) even if counsel had attempted to obtain a mental health expert, counsel could not have made the required showing for an expert; (5) petitioner -9- failed to show any likelihood the outcome of the proceedings would have been different if a mental health expert had been appointed; and (6) Dr. Fischer’s opinion was highly speculative and contrary to the weight of the evidence at trial indicating petitioner initiated the murder scheme, actively planned the murder, and hid evidence. Again, we proceed directly to prejudice. We agree with the district court that it is doubtful the trial court would have appointed a mental health expert even if counsel had requested one. Nothing in the record suggests that petitioner’s mental state or sanity at the time of the offense could have been a significant factor at either stage of trial or that her mental condition was a potentially mitigating factor. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1985); Mayes v. Gibson, 210 F.3d 1284, 1289 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Gibson, 197 F.3d 454, 463 (10th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. May 19, 2000) (No. 99-9652). The evidence showed petitioner devised most of the schemes to murder her husband. None of the schemes was complex. Nothing in the record suggests she did not know the difference between right and wrong or that she would not understand the consequences of her acts. See Jones v. State, 648 P.2d 1251, 1254 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). Rather, Dr. Fischer indicated petitioner was oriented to time, place, and date. At no time during court proceedings was her behavior inappropriate. Her in camera testimony regarding her decision not to testify or to -10- allow her children to do so was coherent and rational. Additionally, her low IQ does not outweigh evidence supporting both aggravating circumstances. See Smith, 197 F.3d at 463. Considering the totality of the evidence, there is no reasonable probability the jury would have determined petitioner was not involved in planning the murder and therefore not guilty of first degree murder. See Boyd v. Ward, 179 F.3d 904, 914 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1188 (2000). Also, in light of the strength of the State’s case, it is doubtful any mental health testimony would have changed the outcome at sentencing. See Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1098 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1025 (1999).