Opinion ID: 161020
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: necessary parties

Text: 16 The Citizen Potawatomi challenge Defendants' determination that the 1988 formula is static. Because the Citizen Potawatomis' action may alter the future funding for the absent tribes, the tribes can claim interests relating to the subject of the action. See Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 558 (10th Cir. 1977) (The financial and other benefits to the Tribe under the Exxon agreement give the tribe sufficient interest to satisfy the requirements of Subsection (a)(2)(i).). In Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Collier, 17 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 1994), we noted that for purposes of Rule 12(b)(7) necessary party analysis the Rule does not protect inchoate interests. Here, however, the tribes have already agreed to the use of the formulas in question. As the district court noted, Order at 6, II App. at 407, here the five tribes entered in an agreement regarding a funding formula in 1988. We feel this transforms the funding decisions from a mere expectation, which is unprotected, into an interest which is protected. 17 The Citizen Potawatomi argue, however, that they do not challenge the use of the 1988 formula as a basis for funding, but rather how the Defendants implement the formula, and that under the Ninth Circuit's decision in Makah Indian Tribe v. Verity, 910 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990), absent tribes are not necessary in such circumstances. We are not persuaded. That case presented a challenge brought by the Makah to regulations of the Secretary of Commerce governing quotas on tribal ocean fishing for various tribes. The court held that the other tribes were not necessary to the action because all of the tribes have an equal interest in an administrative process that is lawful. Id. at 559. The Citizen Potawatomi make the same argument in this action, contending that the remaining tribes do not possess a legitimate interest in continuing to receive funding allocations that are not fairly distributed. Brief For Appellant at 15-16. 18 We do not agree. Makah focused on the underlying merits of the litigation - all tribes have an interest in a lawful administrative process. As we have made clear, the underlying merits of the litigation are irrelevant under Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a): 19 Plaintiffs' narrow interpretation of the term legally protected interest inappropriately presupposes Plaintiffs' success on the merits. Under the interpretation advanced by Plaintiffs, the Tribe would have no legally protected interest in the monies used to fund Judgment Fund Programs that exclude the Estelusti Seminoles only if Plaintiffs prevail on the merits. Consequently, if this court adopted Plaintiffs' interpretation of the term legally protected interest, the district court would be required to determine the merits of Plaintiffs' Judgment Fund Award claim before ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss. Such an approach is untenable because it would render the Rule 19 analysis an adjudication on the merits. The term legally protected interest thus cannot mean what Plaintiffs would like it to mean. 20 Davis, 192 F.3d at 958. 21 We thus noted that Rule 19, by its plain language, does not require the absent party to actually possess an interest; it only requires the movant to show that the absent party `claims an interest relating to the subject of the action.' Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a)(2)). Consequently, Rule 19 excludes only those claimed interests that are `patently frivolous.' Id. at 959 (citing Shermoen v. United States, 982 F.2d 1312, 1318 (9th Cir. 1992)) (emphasis in original). Applying Davis to the instant case, we are convinced that the Citizen Potawatomi have not demonstrated that the absent tribes' defense of the current funding methods would be patently frivolous. Thus, even if the Citizen Potawatomi would otherwise prevail on the merits, the absent tribes can nevertheless validly claim an interest in the subject of the action. 22 We are likewise unpersuaded by Citizen Potawatomis' reliance on Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd. v. Babbitt, 87 F.3d 1338, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1996), for the proposition that the United States can adequately protect the absent tribes' interest and that therefore they are not necessary parties. Brief For Appellant at 16. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit did note in Ramah, 87 F.3d at 1351, that the United States may adequately represent a tribe's interests; however, it made it clear that this representation is permissible only so long as no conflict exists between the United States and the nonparty beneficiaries. Id. (emphasis added). In the instant case, however, some tribes may gain, while some tribes may lose if the Citizen Potawatomi prevail. Thus, we agree with the district court here that the United States cannot adequately represent these varied and potentially conflicting interests. Order at 10-11, II App. at 411-12. See Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding absent Tribe was indispensable and distinguishing Ramah as a case in which the government had no conflicting obligations to the nonparty tribes); see also Makah 910 F.2d at 560 ([T]he absent tribes had no proper representative because potential intertribal conflicts meant the United States could not represent all of them.). 23 In sum, Defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that the absent tribes can claim an interest in the application of the funding formulas and that Defendants cannot adequately represent their varied interests. Accordingly, we are convinced that the district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the absent tribes were necessary for purposes of the Citizen Potawatomis' claim concerning the funding formula.
24 The Citizen Potawatomi next claims that Defendants have improperly provided a shared service area for it and the Shawnee and therefore improperly awarded the Shawnee excess funds. Brief for Appellant at 11. Unquestionably the Shawnee can claim an interest in the funding that they receive for the shared service area. Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 558 (The financial and other benefits to the Tribe under the Exxon agreement give the tribe sufficient interest to satisfy the requirements of Subsection (a)(2)(i).). The Citizen Potawatomi argues, however, that we have previously ruled that the Shawnee do not share a reservation with them and that it therefore follows that they do not share a service area with them either. 25 It is true that in Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Oklahoma v. Collier, 17 F.3d 1292, 1294 (10th Cir. 1994), we held that the United States had failed to adequately demonstrate that the Shawnee and the Citizen Potawatomi share a common former reservation. We did not hold, however, that the United States could not provide that proof. Moreover, our Collier opinion did not decide whether the Shawnee and the Citizen Potawatomi share a common service area, which is the relevant question at issue here. 1 Accordingly, we conclude the Shawnee do not present a patently frivolous claim that they share the service area with the Citizen Potawatomi Nation and thus pursuant to Davis, they can claim an interest in the Citizen Potawatomis' action. 26 Nor do we believe that Defendants can adequately represent the Shawnees' interests. Unlike the claim concerning the funding factors, where potential tribal conflicts were present, on this claim, the government officers would only have to represent one tribe - the Shawnee. Nevertheless, the relevant question under Rule 19(a) is whether the United States and the tribe share the same interest. In this case, Defendants have a duty to implement national Native American policy. The Shawnee, on the other hand, have an interest in receiving the funds at issue in this case. The two interests are not necessarily the same. Manygoats, 558 F.2d at 558 (The Secretary must act in accord with the obligations imposed by NEPA.... The national interest is not necessarily coincidental with the interest of the Tribe in the benefits which the Exxon agreement provides. When there is a conflict between the interest of the United States and the interest of Indians, representation of the Indians is not adequate.). 27 In the circumstances of this case, we believe the district court did not abuse its discretion by holding that the United States could not adequately represent the Shawnees' interest. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by deciding that the Shawnee were necessary for the purposes of the shared service claim.