Opinion ID: 2975230
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: Objective Reasonableness of the Action

Text: The final prong of the qualified-immunity test requires this Court to consider whether Srisavath offered sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Richardson’s conduct was objectively unreasonable in light of clearly established constitutional rights. See Feathers, 319 F.3d at 348. The objective-reasonableness standard requires that courts analyze claims of qualified immunity “on a fact-specific, case-by-case basis to determine whether a reasonable official in the defendants’ position could have believed that his conduct was lawful, in light of clearly established law and the information he possessed.” Pray, 49 F.3d at 1158. Officers are entitled to qualified immunity if they made a reasonable decision, even if it was mistaken. Id. Moreover, this Court has stated that “‘if officers of reasonable competence could disagree on [the] issue, immunity should be recognized.’” Id. (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 349 (1986)). Again, Feathers is instructive. Although we concluded that the Terry stop violated the plaintiff’s rights and that those rights were clearly established, we also concluded that the improper stop was not objectively unreasonable. Accordingly, we reversed the district court and held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. Feathers, 319 F.3d at 852. Crucial to this holding was the information the officers themselves had (ultimately providing a sufficient basis for reasonable suspicion) versus the information the dispatcher had (ultimately insufficient). The dispatcher informed the officers of a suspicious person who was possibly intoxicated and supposedly carrying a weapon. Id. at 851. This information, provided by an anonymous tipster, was not sufficient to create reasonable suspicion under J.L.. Id. But “[t]he officers did not know that the dispatcher’s information was from an anonymous tipster who offered no evidence of reliability.” Id. at 849 - 18 - No. 06-6067 Srisavath v. City of Brentwood (emphasis added). On the contrary, they presumed the information was accurate and reliable, and acted accordingly. Id. Based on that information, the totality of the circumstances would justify the Terry stop. Id. In sum, “although the stop violated the Fourth Amendment because the authorities’ collective information did not amount to reasonable suspicion, [the plaintiff could not] prevail in a § 1983 suit because the individual defendants had a sufficient factual basis for thinking that they were acting consistently with Terry.” Id. at 851. This is where Feathers and the present case part ways: Richardson testified that the dispatcher told him that her information was based on an anonymous call. Cf. Srisavath, 115 F. App’x at 824 (Siler, J., dissenting) (“The fact that the officers [in Feathers] had not been told by the police dispatcher that the information came from an anonymous source was very significant in granting qualified immunity). To rely on the anonymous tip, Richardson had to take steps to check the tipster’s veracity. As discussed, however, the tip at issue provided only readily observable facts and no predictions of future activity that Richardson could test. Moreover, the tip did not allege that criminal activity was ongoing. Richardson could not even identify the passengers in the car he stopped. Indeed, under these circumstances, one could fairly question whether Richardson could have stopped the car even if the informant were an identified, trustworthy source, such as another officer—the “close call” here, if any, would be whether Richardson would have reasonable suspicion of a crime even in that situation. Here, relying on the anonymous tip alone as the basis for a Terry stop was objectively unreasonable in light of established constitutional law. Accordingly, Richardson is not entitled to qualified immunity. - 19 - No. 06-6067 Srisavath v. City of Brentwood