Opinion ID: 1936088
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 14

Heading: Overall Balancing

Text: As stated in Barker, the four factors have no magic qualities, and all must be weighed in a sensitive balancing process. Barker, 407 U.S. at 533, 92 S.Ct. at 2193, 33 L.Ed.2d at 118. The sole remedy for the denial of a defendant's right to a speedy trial is dismissal of the charges against him. Smith, 550 So.2d at 409; Perry v. State, 419 So.2d 194, 197 (Miss. 1982). Considering the reasons for the delays, plea bargaining, three continuances, Taylor's switching attorneys twice, motion for a change of venue, and requests for additional discovery and trial preparation, Taylor was not denied a speedy trial.
Taylor was indicted under the statute that provides that [t]he killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be capital murder in the ... case... [of] [m]urder which is perpetrated by a person who is under sentence of life imprisonment[.] Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(2)(b) (Supp. 1991). He moved, prior to trial, to prohibit evidence of his prior life sentence from going to the jury and for a Rule 6.04 hearing. He argued at the pre-trial hearing that the jury should not be told during the guilt phase that he had a prior conviction, but should be instructed on capital murder without that element, that is, that the court should determine whether there was a prior life sentence which elevated the killing of Mildred Spires to capital murder. The State countered that the life sentence being served by Taylor was an element of the crime of capital murder which the State was required to prove to the jury, that is, that the conditions which elevate murder to capital murder are issues of fact for the jury. The trial court, expressing concern that admission of Taylor's prior murder conviction might be so prejudicial as to create a problem, deferred ruling on Taylor's motion to exclude the prior conviction. The court later overruled the motion to exclude evidence of the prior murder conviction. Taylor contends on appeal that the admission of evidence of his prior conviction requires reversal on four grounds. He alleges that: (1) the evidence was insufficient to prove the prior conviction; (2) the prejudicial nature of the evidence denied him a fundamentally fair trial; (3) he was not serving a life sentence as required by the statute; and (4) the trial court improperly denied the jury instruction regarding proof of the conviction. To prove that Taylor was under a sentence of life at the time of the murder for which he was charged, the State offered a certified copy of the order of the prior conviction and life sentence and the testimony of Dick Bowie, Mississippi Department of Corrections Supervisor of Probation and Parole Services in Hinds County, testified that Taylor was on parole from a life sentence on July 11, 1987. That evidence was sufficient to prove that Taylor was under a life sentence at the time of the murder of Mildred Spires. Taylor contends that the trial court erred in denying defense counsel's motion to exclude evidence of the prior life sentence and for a Rule 6.04 hearing. [2] Taylor argues that the admission of evidence of a prior life sentence was so prejudicial as to deny him a fair trial and that the trial court should have held a separate hearing to determine the validity of the prior conviction. The United States Supreme Court has declined to find a violation of due process rights when prejudicial evidence of prior crimes has been adduced at trial for purposes of sentence enhancement. Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 87 S.Ct. 648, 17 L.Ed.2d 606 (1967). We hold that when, as here, the evidence of a prior crime is a necessary element of the State's case, introduction of such evidence will not require reversal. Once the trial court ruled the evidence admissible, no limiting instruction was sought and none was given. In the future, the very least the trial court should do to limit the prejudicial effect of such evidence is to admonish the jury that such evidence may not be considered as evidence of the defendant's guilt of the charge for which he is being tried. An even better procedure would be that adopted by statute in Oregon which provides that the defendant may, prior to trial, stipulate with the prosecution to the prior conviction and sentence. Or. Rev. Stat. § 163.103 (1993). If the defendant does so stipulate, the court is required to accept the stipulation whether the prosecution agrees or not and the stipulation is made a part of the record, but does not go before the jury. The defendant has a clear choice of stipulating to the existence of his prior conviction or of having evidence of that conviction admitted into evidence. State v. Earp, 69 Or. App. 365, 368-70, 686 P.2d 437, 439-40 (1984). We suggest the use of this procedure when the State seeks a capital murder conviction based on the fact that the murder was committed by one under a sentence of life imprisonment. Taylor contends that he was not serving a life sentence when he allegedly committed the murder of Mildred Spires and that he was therefore not under life sentence as contemplated by the statute. Neither Taylor nor the State cites any authority for an interpretation of § 97-3-19(2)(b). The State, however, argues persuasively that this Court's interpretation of essentially the same language in another portion of the death penalty statutory scheme is applicable here. In Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d 1317 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2858, 101 L.Ed.2d 895 (1988), the defendant argued that a person on probation was not under sentence of imprisonment as contemplated by the statute setting forth aggravating circumstances in capital cases. The Court held that a person whose sentence has been suspended or who is on probation is deemed to remain under the sentence. Lockett v. State, 517 So.2d at 1337, citing, Evans v. State, 422 So.2d 737, 742 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 939, 103 S.Ct. 2111, 77 L.Ed.2d 314 (1983). Since parole, like probation, is a matter of grace, Grantham v. Mississippi Department of Corrections, 522 So.2d 219, 226 (Miss. 1988), and can be revoked upon violation of the conditions of parole, Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-27 (Supp. 1991), and since the legislature in § 97-3-19(2)(b) did not specify that the defendant must be serving a life term, we read the language of § 97-3-19(2)(b) to apply not only to persons serving a life term but also to those who are on parole from a life term. In Taylor's final challenge concerning evidence of his prior crime, he contends that the trial court improperly denied his requested instruction D-18, which would have required the State to prove that his prior conviction was valid. The language of § 97-3-19(2)(b) requires only proof that Taylor was under a sentence of life. The evidence of Taylor's conviction and sentence was properly admitted without this instruction.
First, Taylor claims that the circuit clerk improperly exercised authority to excuse fifty-eight (58) potential jurors from the original two-hundred fifty (250) person special venire. We find no merit in this argument. Potential jurors were excused for such reasons as age, medical conditions, financial hardships and prepaid vacations. In each case, the trial judge was informed of the circumstances and he told the clerk to excuse the person from jury service. Next, Taylor claims that the prosecutor was allowed to extract a commitment from potential jurors to convict Taylor and to impose the death penalty. In West v. State, 553 So.2d 8 (Miss. 1989), this Court held that prosecutors can probe the prejudices of the prospective jurors to the end that all will understand the jurors' thoughts on the matters directly related to the issues to be tried. Id. at 22. The line between a proper and improper question is not always easily drawn; it is manifestly a process in which the trial judge must be given considerable discretion. Harris v. State, 532 So.2d 602, 606 (Miss. 1988); Murphy v. State, 246 So.2d 920, 922 (Miss. 1971). Although many of the prosecutor's questions were pointed, his questions included the word consider. In fact, the prosecutor told the potential jurors that he was not trying to pin them down, stating: I am just asking you to look into a crystal ball. I'm not trying to get you to tell me how you're going to vote, believe me, I'm not. I'm just asking if you can conceive that sort of thing. [on imposing the death penalty without an eyewitness] (emphasis added) These questions did not appear to extract any kind of commitment from the potential jurors, but merely probed into their prejudices in order to get some insight into their thoughts. See West, 553 So.2d at 22. Taylor argues that it was impermissible for the prosecution to ask the venire whether they could impose the death penalty when there were no eyewitnesses or fingerprints linking the defendant to the crime. Four potential jurors stated that they probably could not, and that they would need a lot stronger proof to change their position, almost to the point of an admission. Because a juror's bias against the death penalty does not have to be proven with unmistaken clarity, the decision of whether or not to excuse the juror is left to the trial judge's discretion. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 943 (Miss. 1986). Further, a juror need not expressly state that he absolutely refuses to consider the death penalty; an equivalent response made in any reasonable manner indicating the juror's firm position will suffice. Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 673 (Miss. 1991); Williamson, 512 So.2d 868, 881 (Miss. 1987). Since the trial judge was present during the voir dire process, he was in a better position to evaluate the prospective jurors' responses. Williamson, 512 So.2d at 881. We therefore defer to his judgment on this matter. Taylor further claims that four potential jurors were improperly excused on Witherspoon grounds. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). Prospective jurors in capital cases may only be excluded for cause based upon their views on capital punishment when those views would `prevent or substantially impair the performance [their] [sic] duties as juror[s] in accordance with [their] instructions and oath.' Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 880-81 (Miss. 1987) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841, 851-52 (1985); Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 658, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 2051-52, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987)). As a juror's bias against the death penalty does not have to be proven with unmistaken clarity, the decision of whether or not to excuse the juror is left to the trial judge's discretion. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 943 (Miss. 1986). The juror need not expressly state that he absolutely refuses to consider the death penalty; an equivalent response made in any reasonable manner indicating the juror's firm position will suffice. Willie, 585 So.2d at 673; Williamson, 512 So.2d at 881. Due to the trial judge's presence during the voir dire process, he is in a better position to evaluate the prospective juror's responses. Williamson, 512 So.2d at 881. Finally, the determination of whether a juror is fair and impartial is a judicial question, and will not be set aside unless such determination is clearly wrong. Carr v. State, 555 So.2d 59, 60 (Miss. 1989); King v. State, 421 So.2d 1009, 1016 (Miss. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 919, 103 S.Ct. 1903, 77 L.Ed.2d 290 (1983). The cases of Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980) and Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 105 S.Ct. 844, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985) spurned the development of the Adams-Witt standard which was adopted by this Court in Balfour v. State, 598 So.2d 731, 755 (Miss. 1992) and Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114, 128 (Miss. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 921, 112 S.Ct. 1970, 118 L.Ed.2d 570 (1992). In both Balfour and Hansen, this Court considered the holding of Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968). The Witherspoon line of cases establishes the general proposition that a juror may not be challenged for cause based on his views about capital punishment unless those views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and his oath. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45, 100 S.Ct. 2521, 2526, 65 L.Ed.2d 581 (1980) (reaffirmed in Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 424, 105 S.Ct. 844, 852, 83 L.Ed.2d 841 (1985)). Stated another way, a prospective juror merely stating general objections or expressing conscientious or religious scruples against inflicting the death penalty is not enough for that juror to be excused for cause. Willie v. State, 585 So.2d 660, 672 (Miss. 1991) (citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522, 88 S.Ct. 1770, 1777, 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968)). If a juror who is opposed to the death penalty indicates that, if convinced of a defendant's guilt, he could return a verdict of guilty which might result in the death penalty, then the juror cannot be struck from the jury. Willie, 585 So.2d at 672-73. However, if a prospective juror is irrevocably committed to vote against the death penalty regardless of the facts and circumstances, then the prospective juror can be struck from the jury. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n. 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1777 n. 21; Williamson v. State, 512 So.2d 868, 881 (Miss. 1987). This Court recognizes that it is often difficult for a juror to express in precise terms his or her feelings about, understanding of, and willingness to impose the death penalty. This difficulty of verbally expressing such views, of course, makes the interpretation of the juror's voir dire extremely difficult. We therefore look to not only the ruling but the setting and time devoted to the questions, and the opportunity of sequestered voir dire. Finally, we also examine and consider the overall care and concern given to developing the issues to be determined by the voir dire. Simon v. State, No. 91-DP-00353, slip op. at 16-17, ___ So.2d ___, ___-___ [1995 WL 49560] (decided February 9, 1995). In the present case, the four potential jurors were properly excused only after they stated their inability to impose the death penalty. Finally, Taylor claims that he was denied due process and a fair cross section of the community when three potential jurors, namely one doctor and two attorneys, were excused by the trial judge. The trial judge stated in the record that he does not automatically exclude doctors or lawyers from jury service, but he allows them, as well as teachers and heads of government agencies, the opportunity to supply valid reasons why they can not serve on a jury. In this case, the doctor in question was an emergency room physician, who had just come from working the night shift and was to continue working that shift in the future. A reading of the record shows that the judge excused the attorneys not because they were attorneys, but because they operated small businesses which could not afford to be closed. Since the trial judge excused several other potential jurors who would experience hardships because they operated small businesses, it does not appear that the judge showed any bias toward the three professionals.

During cross-examination, witness Josephine Magee, an acquaintance of Taylor, and the defense attorney had the following exchange: Question: But he came all the way over to your house, ever how far it is, and we don't know, but he came all the way over there in his sister's truck and told you what you said. Answer: Well, there C.W. is. Ask him didn't he tell me this. Question: I'm asking you, ma'am. Answer: Well, I just want you to know that I don't have to lie up on the witness stand. In closing arguments, the prosecutor made the following reference to Magee's testimony: As Josephine sat right up there and said, `He's just like my brother, but let me tell you this: If he didn't tell me that, you ask him, because I'm sitting right here and I'm looking him in the eye and I'm telling you he told me he killed that girl, and if you don't believe it, ask him. The prosecution is prohibited from making a direct comment, or reference by innuendo or insinuation to a defendant's failure to testify on his own behalf. U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 5, Ladner v. State, 584 So.2d 743 (Miss. 1991). As stated in Ladner, the question is whether the comment of the prosecutor can reasonably be construed as a comment on a failure to take the stand. Statements made by the prosecution must also be considered in light of this Court's observation that counsel should be given wide latitude in their arguments to a jury ... Courts should be very careful in limiting the free play of ideas, imagery and the personalities of counsel in their argument to a jury. Johnson v. State, 477 So.2d 196, 209 (Miss. 1985). However, counsel is clearly limited to arguing facts introduced in evidence, deductions and conclusions he or she may reasonably draw therefrom, and the application of the law to the facts. Ivy v. State, 589 So.2d 1263 (Miss. 1991). It is within these guidelines that the prosecutor's reference to Magee's testimony must be considered. Although this issue presents a close question, there is authority to support a decision that there was no reversible error. This Court has stated that although a direct reference to the defendant's failure to testify is strictly prohibited, all other statements must necessarily be looked at on a case by case basis. Jimpson v. State, 532 So.2d 985, 991 (Miss. 1988). In Butler v. State, 608 So.2d 314 (Miss. 1992), the defendant did not take the stand but had made more than one statement to the authorities which were admitted into evidence. In closing arguments, the prosecutor stated: Ladies and Gentlemen, that is an admission of guilt, but I submit to you she hasn't told you the whole truth yet. ... . Ladies and Gentlemen, those bruises were not inflicted by the same wound that created the massive internal injuries that subsequently killed this child. It could not have happened. So, Ladies and Gentlemen, she has not yet told you the whole truth of the torment she subjected her son to. You still don't know the whole story. Incredible, unbelievable evasion from start to finish... . Id. at 318. (emphasis added). This Court concluded: The prosecution could hardly have made the point plainer if it had simply come out and said, There is a lot more to tell, but Butler has not seen fit to get on the witness stand and tell you. These comments were reversible error, so egregious in fact that even if there had been no objection at trial, we would nevertheless have been obligated to reverse. Id. at 319. First, it must be recalled that it was during cross-examination by the defense counsel that Magee's unelicited comments were made. It is suggested that by taking no affirmative steps to correct what would later become a valid part of the evidence, the defense counsel erred. Instead of objecting to the witness' answer as being unresponsive and requesting the court to instruct the jury to disregard Magee's statements, defense counsel simply continued asking questions. Second, the prosecutor's statements involved in the case at bar are not comparable to the egregious, and direct comments easily found to constitute reversible error in Butler. The prosecutor is allowed, as the Butler Court noted, to properly evaluate the weight and worth of what was in evidence, while at the same time he must refrain from impermissibly referring to the defendant's failure to testify. Butler, 608 So.2d at 318. (emphasis in original). In this case, the prosecutor was clearly referring to the testimony of Magee, in evidence. As such, the prosecutor's remarks could more easily be characterized as a summary of Magee's testimony rather than a reference of his own to the defendant's failure to testify. In Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), extensive comments by the prosecutor and instructions by the trial judge allowed the jury to draw adverse inferences from the petitioners' failure to testify. The United States Supreme Court reversed the convictions, finding petitioners are entitled to a trial free from the pressure of unconstitutional inferences. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. The significance of the case, however, was in the Court's approval and use of a harmless error analysis to determine whether reversible error results from reference to a defendant's failure to testify. First noting that every state has a harmless error rule or statute, the Court stated: All of these rules, state or federal, serve a very useful purpose insofar as they block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial. We conclude that there may be some constitutional errors which in the setting of a particular case are so unimportant and insignificant that they may, consistent with the Federal Constitution, be deemed harmless, not requiring the automatic reversal of the conviction. The Supreme Court went on to hold, that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. In reversing, the Court noted that the machine-gun repetition of a denial of constitutional rights, designed and calculated to make petitioners' version of the events worthless, could not be considered harmless. The record indicated that direct comments on the petitioners' failure to testify occurred no less than thirty (30) times throughout the trial. The Court concluded: And though the case in which this occurred presented a reasonably strong `circumstantial web of evidence' against petitioners, ... it was also a case in which, absent the constitutionally forbidden comments, honest, fair-minded jurors might very well have brought in not-guilty verdicts. Under these circumstances, it is completely impossible for us to say that the State has demonstrated, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the trial judge's instruction did not contribute to petitioners' convictions. Id. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. This Court, in the recent case of Hansen v. State, 592 So.2d 114 (Miss. 1991), utilized the authority recognized in Chapman to hold offenses to certain of an accused's constitutional rights do not per se require reversal. Id. at 135. The Court in Hansen stated the reviewing court must first objectively examine the instructions and evidence considered by the jurors in reaching their verdict. The final analysis is whether: the force of the evidence presumably considered by the jury in accordance with the instructions is so overwhelming as to leave it beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict resting on that evidence would have been the same in the absence of the ... [rights violation]... . Hansen, 592 So.2d at 136, citing Yates v. Evatt, 500 U.S. 391, 405, 111 S.Ct. 1884, 1893, 114 L.Ed.2d 432, 449 (1991), disapproved on other grounds by, Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 73 n. 4, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482 n. 4, 116 L.Ed.2d 385, 399 n. 4 (1991). The jury in the instant case was instructed that in order to convict Taylor for capital murder it must find, beyond a reasonable doubt that: 1) Taylor was under sentence of life imprisonment, and 2) Taylor without authority of law and not in reasonable self-defense, murdered Mildred Spires. The jury in this case had sufficient evidence to support its finding of Taylor's guilt, and that the verdict was not against the overwhelming weight of the evidence. Looking at the evidence before the jury, we find:
(b) On July 11, 1987, Taylor had two heated confrontations, one in person with his ex-wife, Edith Taylor, and within an hour of the last confrontation, Taylor had telephoned Edith's daughter, Mildred, the victim in this case. (c) Taylor could not establish an alibi for his whereabouts from 5:00 p.m. until 7:00 p.m. on July 11, the date Mildred was last seen alive. (d) Taylor gave several conflicting explanations for fresh claw marks appearing on his face and body noted by Detective Knowles on July 12, the day following Taylor's conversation with Mildred and her disappearance. None of the explanations could be verified. (e) Taylor requested that his girlfriend, Fairy Warren, lie to the police and tell them she had scratched him in an argument. (f) Taylor asked a friend to find a prostitute whom he could pay $50 to say she had scratched him. (g) During questioning, Detective Knowles pointed out that if Taylor was responsible for Mildred's disappearance, his fingerprints would be found on her car. When recovered, the steering wheel, dashboard, doors and door handles of Mildred's car had been spray painted white. (h) Most significantly, Taylor confessed to a close personal friend that he had killed Mildred Spires. The evidence, coupled with the proper instructions issued the jury, allowed it to clearly find Taylor guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, which it did. Having overcome the first step, this Court is then left to evaluate the persuasive force of the prosecutor's impermissible references to Taylor's failure to testify, that is, the effect of his reference to witness Magee's testimony. Hansen, 592 So.2d at 137. Here, the prosecutor, in a trial transcript of some twelve hundred pages, was said to have impermissibly commented on one occasion, albeit indirectly, on Taylor's failure to take the stand. It seems beyond question that the probability of this one reference to Magee's testimony, when balanced against the evidence permissibly before the jury, having had any persuasive force in this verdict is next to none. The prosecutor's error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Nearly twenty years after Chapman, in United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 76 L.Ed.2d 96, (1983) the Court stated: Since Chapman, the Court has consistently made clear that it is the duty of a reviewing court to consider the trial record as a whole and to ignore errors that are harmless, including most constitutional violations. Id. In finding that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the convictions based on a finding that the prosecutor's statements improperly commented on the defendants' failure to testify, the Supreme Court noted: Here, the Court of Appeals, while making passing references to the harmless-error doctrine, did not apply it. Its analysis failed to strike the balance between disciplining the prosecutor on the one hand, and the interest in the prompt administration of justice and the interest of the victims on the other. Id. Looking at the entire record in the case at bar, the prosecutor's summary of Magee's testimony is not at all comparable to the situations presented in cases like Butler or Chapman, where the prosecutor's statements certainly prejudiced the defendants. Here, the one possible, indirect reference to Taylor's failure to testify was indeed harmless. The comment was isolated, indirect and merely a paraphrasing of a witness' earlier testimony. Further, the failure of the defense to have witness Magee's comments stricken from the record should be considered. Without such action, the testimony remained a valid part of the evidence and could be summarized or commented upon by the State. The error presented is clearly not of the magnitude to constitute reversible error.
Taylor complains about the following remarks made during the State's closing argument: MR. DELAUGHTER: And it was said to you that these admissions that he committed this crime were not made to any law enforcement officer, no policeman to come up here and tell you we have a signed confession of this defendant. He talked to who he trusted. And I want to tell you right now, if we had put on a police officer or detective that said, I've got a confession from this guy, they would have been up there telling you that the police beat it out of him. You can't win. MR. KITCHENS: Your Honor, we object. That's improper argument. There's no such thing to support a statement like that. THE COURT: Let's don't argue outside the record. MR. DELAUGHTER: (CONTINUING) I can tell you this much, there's no way you can ever satisfy defense lawyers. If you have it one way, they will get up here and say, scream to you it should have been another. You just can't get it done  MR. KITCHENS: Your Honor, we continue to object. This is improper argument, and move for a mistrial. THE COURT: It will be overruled. Taylor contends the prosecutor was allowed to make highly derogatory comments about defense counsel, comments which also improperly deflected the jury's attention from the issues at hand. First, it must be noted that the defense counsel during opening arguments challenged Taylor's alleged admissions based on the fact that they were not made to persons in authority. Defense counsel concluded, I think you will find it exceedingly unlikely that these witnesses are being completely truthful with you. In closing argument, the State was obviously attempting to rebut the defense's inferences that the State's witnesses were not reliable or truthful because they were not law enforcement officers; the State argued no witness would be good enough in the defense's view. It could certainly be found, as the lower court did in Clemons v. State, 320 So.2d 368 (Miss. 1975), in overruling the defense's objection to such argument, that counsel for the defendants initially interjected that subject into the trial. Id. In United States v. Jennings, 724 F.2d 436 (5th Cir.1984), defense counsel suggested the government's female witnesses had engaged in various illegal acts and intimate relationships with a government investigator and also complained that the witnesses would not answer questions before the trial. During closing arguments, the prosecutor rebutted the charges by commenting: [Y]ou observed the way they treated those ladies here in this courtroom. I mean the gall that they had to ask them the questions they did and treat them the way they did right here in front of ya'll, can you imagine  can you imagine what these gentlemen would have done if those ladies had dared talk to them out on the street. Id. at 444. The Court declined to find reversible error in the prosecutor's remarks, stating: In light of these attacks upon the credibility of the government witnesses, the prosecutor was `not obliged to sit quietly while character assaults [were] made on his witnesses; he [was] entitled to argue fairly their credibility.' Id. at 443; United States v. Bright, 630 F.2d 804 (5th Cir.1980). The Jennings Court concluded, Moreover, even if the prosecutor's remarks are construed as an attack upon defendant's counsel, we do not find ... error ... sufficiently prejudicial to warrant reversal. 724 F.2d at 443-44. This Court in Monk v. State, 532 So.2d 592 (Miss. 1988), discussed the wide range within which counsel may properly argue: The right of argument contemplates liberal freedom of speech and range of discussion confined only to bounds of logic and reason; and if counsel's argument is within the limits of proper debate it is immaterial whether it is sound or unsound, or whether he employs wit, invective and illustration therein. Moreover, figurative speech is legitimate if there is evidence on which it may be founded. Exaggerated statements and hasty observations are often made in the heat of debate, which, although not legitimate, are generally disregarded by the court, because in its opinion they are harmless. Id. at 601. (emphasis in original). In the above-emphasized language in Monk, the Court was specifically contemplating the kind of situation which occurred in the case at bar. Counsel's remark that defense lawyers are never satisfied with the evidence presented was obviously directed toward defense lawyers in general, and it would be difficult to construe this as a highly derogatory remark toward Taylor's counsel in particular. The trial court considered the objections, instructed counsel to stay within the record and overruled motions for a mistrial. Implicit in the trial court's ruling was a finding that any problem with the prosecutor's statements was harmless, and not of the level to support a motion for mistrial. Examples of cases in which this Court has held clearly improper arguments were made are distinguishable from those of the present case: Bridgeforth v. State, 498 So.2d 796 (Miss. 1986) (defendant referred to as scum); Ellis v. State, 254 So.2d 902 (Miss. 1971) (defendant termed professional criminal). In Dunaway v. State, 551 So.2d 162 (Miss. 1989), this Court further noted: As set forth in Craft v. State, 226 Miss. 426, 84 So.2d 531 (1956), the test to determine if an improper argument by a prosecutor requires reversal is whether the natural and probable effect of the prosecuting attorney's improper argument created unjust prejudice against the accused resulting in a decision influenced by prejudice. Id. at 163. Under this test, it does not appear there was reversible error in the case sub judice. Although finding the prosecutor's comments did contain some cause for complaint, this Court stated in Dozier v. State, 257 So.2d 857, 860 (Miss. 1972): This is regrettable and is by no means approved by this Court. However, in the context of the whole record, we are unable to say that any or all of these things were of such a character or of such substance as to have been capable of prejudicing the right of appellant to a fair trial. Further, we note that the prosecutor was not perfect and made comments that were unfortunate, but the comments did not amount to reversible error. Appellate courts often recognize society as imperfect while at the same time attempting to hold prosecutors to absolute perfection. We affirm on this issue.
Circumstantial evidence instructions which have been approved by this Court instruct the jury that it must not only find the accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, but it must also find the accused guilty to the exclusion of every reasonable hypothesis other than guilt. Stringfellow v. State, 595 So.2d 1320, 1322 (Miss. 1992). The Court in Stringfellow declined to abolish the requirement of the language of the circumstantial evidence instruction although recognizing that the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is no less stringent. Taylor claims the trial court committed reversible error when it denied two circumstantial evidence instructions, citing Simpson v. State, 553 So.2d 37 (Miss. 1989). Simpson held that circumstantial evidence instructions are required when the prosecution is without a confession and without eyewitnesses to the gravamen of the offense charged. Id. at 39. In the present case, Taylor confessed to Josephine Magee that he killed his stepdaughter. That confession takes the case out of a circumstantial context. In Mack v. State, 481 So.2d 793 (Miss. 1985), this Court held that an admission by a defendant to his girlfriend of an alleged burglary was a confession, and constituted direct evidence of the crime such that giving a circumstantial evidence instruction was not required. Id. at 795. See also Anderson v. State, 246 Miss. 821, 828, 152 So.2d 702 (1963). Taylor's alleged confession to Josephine Magee makes a circumstantial evidence instruction inapplicable.
The photographs that were objected to were color photographs taken from relatively close range, showing the position of the body on the rear floorboard with the victim's left leg stretched on top of the back seat. As a general rule, the admissibility of photographs rests within the sound discretion of the trial judge. Unless abuse of discretion is shown, the trial judge's decision will be upheld on appeal. Ladner, 584 So.2d at 753-54; Mackbee v. State, 575 So.2d 16, 31 (Miss. 1990). Photographs of bodies may be admitted into evidence where they are not so gruesome as to be overly prejudicial and inflammatory. Stringer v. State, 500 So.2d 928, 934 (Miss. 1986). This Court has held photographs to be so gruesome and inflammatory as to be inadmissible in only one circumstance, a close-up photograph of a partly decomposed, maggot-infested skull. See McNeal v. State, 551 So.2d 151 (Miss. 1989). The photographs in the present case, although not pleasant, do not rise to the level of those found in McNeal.
Taylor contends that the State improperly failed to preserve the victim's car and the x-rays taken prior to the victim's autopsy. He argues that these pieces of evidence could have been exculpatory in nature as well as being vital in shedding more light into Mildred Spires' cause of death. The landmark case concerning the preservation of evidence is California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), which held that due process does not require that law enforcement officers preserve breath samples in order to introduce breath analysis tests at trial. Id. at 491, 104 S.Ct. at 2535, 81 L.Ed.2d at 423. In reaching this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court held that the State's duty to preserve evidence is limited to evidence that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense. Id. at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2534, 81 L.Ed.2d at 422. Significant role means that the exculpatory nature and value of the evidence must have been: (1) apparent before the evidence was destroyed; and (2) of such a nature that the defendant could not obtain comparable evidence by other reasonable means. Id. at 489, 104 S.Ct. at 2534, 81 L.Ed.2d at 422. This Court adopted the Trombetta standard when it decided Tolbert v. State, 511 So.2d 1368 (Miss. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1016, 108 S.Ct. 723, 98 L.Ed.2d 672 (1988). In Tolbert, the Court held that the State's failure to preserve a particle of skin clipped from an abrasion on the defendant's finger which he claimed would exonerate him did not require a dismissal of his indictment. The mere possibility the evidence might aid the defense does not satisfy the constitutional materiality standard. Tolbert, 511 So.2d at 1372 (citing United States v. Binker, 795 F.2d 1218, 1230 (5th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1085, 107 S.Ct. 1287, 94 L.Ed.2d 144 (1987)). Finally, the destruction of the evidence must not have been done in bad faith. Tolbert, 511 So.2d at 1372 (citing United States v. Webster, 750 F.2d 307, 333 (5th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1106, 105 S.Ct. 2340, 85 L.Ed.2d 855 (1985)). If the destruction of evidence was done as a matter of routine and with no fraudulent intent, there is no inference of bad faith. Washington v. State, 478 So.2d 1028, 1032 (Miss. 1985). There was no showing of bad faith on the part of the State in the present case. There were photographs of the car which showed the location and condition of the vehicle. In accordance with usual police procedure, the car remained in police custody for approximately a month and a half before it was released to the victim's family. In viewing the photographs, no exculpatory evidence appears to be present. The x-rays, on the other hand, were taken prior to the autopsy in order to search for foreign objects as well as broken bones. When the x-rays did not reveal either foreign objects or broken bones, they were thrown away. Finally, the mere possibility that the car or the x-rays would show some exculpatory evidence is not enough to meet the Trombetta standard.
Taylor contends that it was error for the trial court to deny his motion for a directed verdict because the prosecution introduced inculpatory statements which he had made to Beatrice Young before the prosecution had proved corpus delicti. Taylor cites Burkhalter v. State, 302 So.2d 503, 504-05 (Miss. 1974), for the general rule that the prosecution should first submit evidence tending to prove the corpus delicti before introducing into evidence the confession made by an accused person. That case goes on to say, however, that the rule is not without some flexibility as to the order of proof in conjunction with confessions and independent proof of corpus delicti.  Id. The Court in Burkhalter found no error in admitting the defendant's confession prior to admitting a stipulation on cause of death. Id. at 505. The Court emphasized not the order of proof but the rule that the state must establish corpus delicti aliunde an out of court confession of the crime with which the accused is charged and must present sufficient evidence to establish that a real and not an imaginary crime has been confessed. Id. at 505, citing Brooks v. State, 178 Miss. 575, 173 So. 409 (1937). See also Miskelley v. State, 480 So.2d 1104, 1107-08 (Miss. 1985); Poole v. State, 246 Miss. 442, 150 So.2d 429 (1963). In these cases it is not the order of proof which is crucial but the rule that a confession may not be treated as sufficient to establish the corpus delicti. The corpus delicti in a capital murder case consists of (1) the death of the victim, and (2) the existence of criminal agency as the cause of death. Shell v. State, 554 So.2d 887, 901 (Miss. 1989), cert. granted and rev'd in part, 498 U.S. 1, 111 S.Ct. 313, 112 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990), on remand, 595 So.2d 1323 (Miss. 1992). Medical evidence is not required to prove either element of corpus delicti. Miskelley, 480 So.2d at 1107; King v. State, 251 Miss. 161, 176, 168 So.2d 637, 643 (1964). The admissions of which Taylor complains here are statements which he made to Beatrice Young. The statements made to Young were inculpatory but did not constitute an admission of guilt; in fact, Young testified that Taylor denied having killed Mildred. At the time that Young's testimony was elicited, the State, through the testimony of Melissa Spires and Edith Taylor, had shown that Mildred Spires had left home under unusual circumstances, that Mildred was dead, and that the family had identified the clothing and objects found on the body as the same items which Mildred was wearing when she disappeared. There was no error in admitting Taylor's statements to Beatrice Young.