Opinion ID: 3014361
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Basis for Remand

Text: Prior to 1990, the INA conferred on district courts exclusive jurisdiction to naturalize aliens. INA § 310, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a). These courts were, however, statutorily precluded from granting the naturalization applications of aliens when removal proceedings against them were underway in connection with a warrant of arrest. The prior version of 8 U.S.C. § 1429 read: “No person shall be naturalized against whom there is outstanding a final finding of deportability pursuant to a warrant of arrest . . . ; and no application for naturalization shall be finally heard by a deportation court if there is pending against the petitioner a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest.” Consequently, district courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction to entertain an application for naturalization filed by an alien against whom a removal proceeding was pending. See, 5 We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 5 e.g., Petition of Terzich, 256 F.2d 197, 200 (3d Cir. 1958); United States v. Ali, 757 F. Supp. 710, 713-14 (W.D. Va. 1991). The Immigration Act of 1990 transferred jurisdiction to consider naturalization applications from district courts to the Attorney General. Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 401, 104 Stat. 4978. While the Attorney General now has the sole authority to naturalize aliens, 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a), he or she (like district courts under the prior law) may not consider an application for naturalization if there is pending against the applicant a removal proceeding pursuant to a warrant of arrest. 8 U.S.C. § 1429. But no mention is made of what district courts may do in § 1429. They may review denials of naturalization petitions, without regard to the basis for the denial. 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c). Thus it is an open question whether a district court has jurisdiction under § 1421(c) to review the Attorney General’s denial of a naturalization petition based on § 1429. Adding additional complexity to this area is that, since the 1990 amendment, the Attorney General has entertained petitions for naturalization and ruled on their merits—rather than dismissing them for lack of jurisdiction due to pending removal proceedings—in at least four cases in addition to Apokarina’s. See Zayed v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 2d 813 (N.D. Ohio 2002); Tellez v. INS, 91 F. Supp. 2d 1356 (C.D. Cal. 2000); Gatcliffe v. Reno, 23 F. Supp. 2d 581 (D.V.I. 1998); Mosleh v. Strapp, 992 F. Supp. 874 (N.D. Tex. 1998). The only possible authority that we find for the Attorney General to do this is the 6 1975 decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals entitled Matter of Cruz, 15 I. & N. Dec. 236 (1975). There the BIA held that, if an alien can establish prima facie eligibility for naturalization, he can move to have removal proceedings terminated under 8 C.F.R. § 242.7.6 But Cruz was decided prior to the 1990 statutory amendments, and the BIA based its conclusion on the fact that “neither we nor immigration judges have authority with respect to the naturalization of aliens.” 15 I. & N. Dec. at 237. But with the Attorney General having sole authority to naturalize aliens since 1990 under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(a), is Cruz still viable?7 All of this spawns many questions. (1) Does the Attorney General view Cruz as continuing authority for considering the merits of naturalization petitions in the face of pending removal proceedings? If not, does it have any other authority to do so? (2) If the Attorney General derives no authority from Cruz or elsewhere for considering the merits of naturalization petitioners in the face of pending removal proceedings, why does it continue to consider those petitions on the merits? (3) Did the Attorney General consider the merits of Apokarina’s naturalization application as part of the discretionary administrative process enabling termination of 6 Until last year upon regulatory repeal, this procedure was codified in the INS regulations at 8 C.F.R. § 239.2(f). 68 Fed. Reg. 35276 (June 13, 2003). 7 While we requested and received post-argument briefing from the parties on the status of Cruz, this resulted in raising more questions than answers. 7 removal proceedings under Cruz? (If the Attorney General is considering the merits of his application notwithstanding limits on his jurisdiction imposed by 8 U.S.C. § 1429, then the case for the District Court’s jurisdiction to review the Attorney General’s decision is stronger.) (4) What is the effect, if any, of the repeal of 8 C.F.R. § 329.2(f), on the Attorney General’s policy regarding Cruz? (5) Were removal proceedings against Apokarina in fact pending at the time he filed his naturalization application?