Opinion ID: 195417
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Governing Evidentiary Principles

Text: 37 Norton contends that his 1963 firearm conviction was not admissible under Fed.R.Evid. 609, and that the court violated a number of requirements of this rule when it admitted the conviction. Rule 609, however, is not controlling in this context. Rule 609 is an impeachment rule which governs the admissibility of evidence of certain criminal convictions of a witness when offered to impeach that witness by proving character for untruthfulness. Fed.R.Evid. 609 advisory committee's notes; 28 Wright and Gold, Federal Practice and Procedure, Sec. 6133 at p. 204; see, e.g., United States v. Brown, 603 F.2d 1022, 1027-29 (1st Cir.1979); United States v. Oakes, 565 F.2d 170, 173 (1st Cir.1977). The premise behind the rule is that a witness who has previously been convicted of a felony, or a crime involving dishonesty or a false statement, is more likely to lie than is a person with a spotless past. Federal Practice, Sec. 6132 at pp. 190-94. Thus, Rule 609 evidence is admissible for the purpose of attacking credibility generally, but the rule does not address the admissibility of prior convictions when they are offered for another purpose. Id. at pp. 205-06; see United States v. Babbitt, 683 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.1982) (introduction of evidence of a prior conviction did not implicate Rule 609 where defendant denied having a police record on direct examination and prosecutor introduced conviction on cross-examination to bring to light actual facts); United States v. Lopez, 979 F.2d 1024, 1033 (5th Cir.1992) (neither Rule 608 or 609 applies in determining the admissibility of relevant evidence introduced to contradict a witness's testimony as to a material issue), cert. denied sub nom. Ramirez v. United States, --- U.S. ----, 113 S.Ct. 2349, 124 L.Ed.2d 258 (1993); cf. United States v. Barrett, 766 F.2d 609, 619 (1st Cir.) (where a defendant introduces, and makes material, specific conduct in his direct testimony, proving the falsity of such testimony is a fair target for the prosecution and Rule 608 is not implicated), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 923, 106 S.Ct. 258, 88 L.Ed.2d 264 (1985). 1 38 Instead, the general strictures of Fed.R.Evid. 402 2 and 403 3 were invoked when the government proffered the 1963 firearm conviction to contradict material false testimony injected into the trial by Norton himself. See Lopez, 979 F.2d at 1034. Prior convictions are admissible under Rules 402 and 403 to contradict specific testimony, as long as the evidence is relevant and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Lopez, 979 F.2d at 1034; cf. United States v. Beauchamp, 986 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993). Evidence which tends to disprove a witness's testimony about a material issue in the case is relevant. Lopez, 979 F.2d at 1034. 39 In the present case, Norton's possession of the firearm was the sole contested issue at trial. 4 We agree with the government that the district court could have found that the evidence of Norton's prior firearm conviction was relevant to this material issue. See Babbitt, 683 F.2d at 25; Lopez, 979 F.2d at 1034. Norton testified on direct examination that he did not have a firearm on the night in question. Norton then attempted to add credence to this claim by testifying to the effect that he had never possessed a gun in his life. If Norton had never possessed a gun prior to the night in question, it was more likely than it would be without this evidence that he did not possess a gun on the night in question. Once Norton denied that he had ever possessed a gun, he opened the door to the issue of his prior or present firearm possession. The fact that Norton had been previously convicted of carrying a firearm was highly relevant to contradict his specific misleading assertion. 5 40 As with most evidentiary questions, the court was then required to consider the unfair prejudice that would stem from admitting this prior conviction. As a primary matter, Norton introduced the issue of whether he had previously possessed a firearm into the trial. Norton cannot be heard to claim that he was unfairly prejudiced by the fact that the government then established, through the 1963 conviction, that he lied, or at the least, misled the jury, when he testified that he had never possessed a firearm. See, e.g., Oakes, 565 F.2d at 172 (an accused should not be heard to complain of any resulting prejudice created by his own actions). Moreover, the prejudice to Norton which resulted from admitting the conviction was relatively slight. While the evidence did tend to demonstrate a propensity by Norton to possess firearms, here, that effect was minimal. The conviction was 29 years old, and, as Norton pointed out on cross-examination, his transgression had occurred many years ago, when he was a very young man. The court also limited any possible prejudicial spillover of such evidence by repeatedly instructing the jury as to the limited purpose of prior conviction evidence. 6 Under these circumstances, the court properly concluded that the probative value of Norton's 1963 firearm conviction outweighed any unfair prejudice to him. 41 The district court's decision to admit Norton's prior firearm conviction was free from error. Therefore, we affirm.