Opinion ID: 181573
Heading Depth: 5
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Fabregas' Adoption of Monica

Text: A state official's duty to provide adequate care to a foster child generally terminates once the foster child is officially adopted. See Griffith v. Johnston, 899 F.2d 1427, 1440 (5th Cir.1990). [9] This principle is consistent with the concept that the state functions as the de facto parent of a child in foster care. See Taylor ex rel. Walker v. Ledbetter, 818 F.2d 791, 795 (11th Cir.1987) (en banc) (The state's action in assuming the responsibility of finding and keeping the[foster] child in a safe environment placed an obligation on the state to insure the continuing safety of that environment.). Once the foster child is adopted, the adoptive parent assumes the role of caregiver previously occupied by the state. It becomes the adoptive parent's responsibility to provide for the well-being of the adopted child, see Griffith, 899 F.2d at 1440, with no further need for the state to oversee the welfare of the former foster child. However, state actors may nevertheless incur liability under § 1983 if state officials affirmatively created a danger that the adopted child would not have otherwise faced. See L.W. v. Grubbs, 974 F.2d 119, 121 (9th Cir.1992). In Grubbs, we held that the danger creation exception applied where state correctional officers knowingly created an opportunity for a convicted sex offender to assault the custodial institution's nurse. See id. The officers in Grubbs affirmatively created the dangerous situation, id. at 122, because they assigned the sex offender to work with the nurse despite knowing: (1) that the sex offender had an extraordinary history of unrepentant violence against women and girls; (2) that the sex offender would likely assault a female if left alone with her; (3) that the nurse would be alone with [the sex offender]; and (4) that the nurse would not be prepared to defend[herself] because she was not informed ... that she would be left alone with violent offenders. Id. at 121. Similarly, prior to Fabregas' adoption of Monica, various Appellants affirmatively created the particular danger that exposed Monica to harm. Despite referrals reporting Fabregas' physical and sexual abuse, Kleinhen, Loeffler and Drake approved Fabregas' foster-care licenses, paving the way for Fabregas to continue abusing Monica after her adoption. The state's approval of Monica's foster care and adoption by Fabregas created a danger of molestation that Monica would not have faced had the state adequately protected her as a result of the referrals. Appellants cite DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 192, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) in support of their argument for immunity. In DeShaney, the state briefly took custody of a child from his birth father to investigate alleged abuse. See id. The Court concluded that the State had no constitutional duty to protect [the child] against his father's violence because the State does not become the permanent guarantor of an individual's safety by having once offered him shelter. Id. at 201, 202, 109 S.Ct. 998. By contrast, Monica, as a foster child, was in the custody of the state for three years prior to her adoption. Unlike the facts in DeShaney, where the victim was in no worse a position than that in which he would have been had [the state] not acted at all, DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201, 109 S.Ct. 998, Monica was placed in a worse situation by the actions and inactions of the various Appellants. Therefore, we conclude that Monica's liberty interest continued after her adoption under the danger-creation exception to the general rule that state actors are not liable for failure to protect members of the public.