Opinion ID: 159197
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Boughton Trial

Text: 7 In 1989, some five hundred residents and property owners living in Lincoln Park, Brookside, a community east of the Mill, and Canon City (collectively, Lincoln Park) filed suit in federal court. In an amended complaint, Lincoln Park plaintiffs requested statutory relief under CERCLA and sought damages exceeding $350 million for Cotter's negligence, strict liability, nuisance, willful and wanton conduct, outrageous conduct, trespass, and absolute liability. In addition, plaintiffs requested damages and injunctive relief for medical monitoring. Although plaintiffs sought class certification, the district court held the action was not maintainable under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) because individual issues predominated over common issues of law or fact. The parties then agreed to the selection of eight bellwether plaintiffs (Boughton plaintiffs) for the first trial. 8 The Boughton plaintiffs did not allege any physical illnesses or injuries. Instead, they claimed they and their property were exposed to hazardous substances from the Cotter Mill and sought damages for trespass to real estate; damages for nuisance; and medical monitoring based on negligence. 9 At the close of the evidence after a twenty-three day trial, the court framed the issues for the jury to decide with the parties' claims and defenses. It instructed the jury, in part, The plaintiffs claim that they and their properties have been exposed to radioactive and hazardous contamination as a result of Cotter's milling operation. They assert that this contamination has significantly increased their risk of health problems, and that they are therefore entitled to medical monitoring. Although the Boughton plaintiffs did not claim their exposure to hazardous substances caused physical injuries, they contended medical monitoring of the possible adverse effects of the exposures was required. For Cotter's theory of defense, the court told the jury, 10 Cotter admits that its operations have caused some ground water contamination by radioactive and molybdenum materials in certain limited areas, but Cotter states that the contamination has been and is now being cleaned up pursuant to a government-supervised Remedial Action Plan. Cotter claims that it did not engage in any conduct nor breach any legal standard for which it would be liable to plaintiffs. 11 The court then instructed the jury on negligence tracking the language of the Colorado Civil Jury Instructions. Instruction 25 provided: 12 The plaintiffs claim that Cotter was negligent, and therefore plaintiffs are entitled to medical monitoring. 13 Negligence means a failure to do an act which a reasonably careful person or company would do, or the doing of an act which a reasonably careful person or company would not do, under the same or similar circumstances to protect others from bodily injury or property damage. 14 Even if statutes, ordinances or regulations govern the actions of a person or corporation, that person or corporation must use reasonable care under the particular circumstances and conditions prevailing. 15 Reasonable care is that degree of care which a reasonably careful person or company would use under the same or similar circumstances. 16 The degree of care that constitutes reasonable care increases in proportion to the degree of risk associated with the particular activity. 17 Instruction 26 set forth each of the elements the jury had to find for the Boughton plaintiffs to succeed on the claim of negligence for medical monitoring. It stated: 18 In order for any particular plaintiff to recover from Cotter on his or her negligence claims for medical monitoring, you must find that all of the following have been proved as to that particular plaintiff: 19 1. that the particular plaintiff was significantly exposed to a proven hazardous substance; 20 2. that Cotter was negligent; 21 3. that Cotter's negligence was a cause of that plaintiff's exposure; 22 4. that as a result of that exposure, the particular plaintiff suffers a significantly increased risk of contracting a serious latent disease; 23 5. that the significantly increased risk makes periodic diagnostic medical examinations reasonably necessary; and 24 6. that monitoring and testing procedures exist which make the early detection and treatment of the disease possible and beneficial. 25 The determination of which of the plaintiffs, if any, are entitled to medical monitoring must be made independently for each plaintiff. 26 If you find that a particular plaintiff has proved all six of these propositions by a preponderance of the evidence, then your verdict must be for that plaintiff on that plaintiff's negligence claim for medical monitoring. 27 After five days of deliberation, the jury returned separate special verdict forms 4 for each plaintiff making a claim of negligence for medical monitoring, trespass, and nuisance. There was no separate verdict form on which the jury found Cotter was negligent under Instruction 25. However, on each of the plaintiffs' Negligence claim for medical monitoring Special Verdict Form, the jury was asked whether Cotter was negligent and found Cotter negligent. For each Boughton plaintiff the jury also found there was no exposure to hazardous substances making reasonably necessary future medical monitoring or testing. 5 After the verdicts were read, the jury asked the court, [C]ould you explain about the other 500 plaintiffs? We promise we never considered them during deliberation. The court told them because it was impossible to try such a large case, it was hoped that an initial bellwether trial might provide some indication helpful to resolve the remaining plaintiffs' cases. The Boughton plaintiffs' appeal of the denial of class certification and other issues was later rejected. Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 828 (10th Cir. 1995). Cotter did not cross appeal.