Opinion ID: 1229876
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Application of the Public Use Exception

Text: Having decided to adopt § 359 as a general matter, we turn to the question whether it applies under the facts of this case. Campbell Estate argues that it cannot be held liable under § 359 because Sean was injured in an area of HRP  the motocross track  that was not open to the general public, but was accessible to only a select few, such as racers and race officials. It points to comment f to § 359, which states: The lessor's liability is limited to those parts of the premises which, under the express or implied terms of the lease, are to be thrown open for the admission of the public. Thus the lessor has no liability under this Section to a customer in a leased restaurant who is injured when he wanders into the kitchen. The Haos appear to concede that liability under § 359 is limited to those areas thrown open for the admission of the public. They simply argue that whether such a limitation applies in this case  i.e. whether the motocross track was an area open to the public  is a question of fact that should be left to the jury to decide. However, the relevant facts are not in dispute. There is no question that Sean was injured on the motocross track. There is also no question that the motocross track was intended to be, and was, an area of limited access. That is, spectators who came to watch the races at HRP were not free to wander onto the track; only a limited group of persons, such as racers and officials, could traverse the track. Thus, because there are no factual matters for a jury to resolve, the question whether the motocross track was an area open to the public within the meaning of comment f is one of law and not, as the Haos contend, of fact. We conclude, as a matter of law, that, because the motocross track was off-limits to members of the general public who had come to watch the race, it was not an area thrown open for the admission of the public. Under comment f, an area open to the public means an area open to the public generally. It does not mean an area to which only a select few have access. The example given in comment f  that a restaurant's kitchen is not an area thrown open to the public  makes that plain. So does the illustration offered in Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 17.2, which, as noted, is substantively identical to § 359: L leases a building to T to be operated as a grocery store. At the time of the lease, there is an unprotected stairwell in the storage room, an area not normally open to the public. A, a patron of the store, asks to see the manager and is directed to pass through the storage room to find the office. While walking through the storage room A falls down the unprotected stairwell and is injured. L is not liable to A under the rule in this section. Restatement (Second) of Property, Landlord & Tenant § 17.2 comment f, illustration 6. See also Strade v. Ryan, 97 A.D.2d 880, 470 N.Y.S.2d 707 (1983) (no liability under New York's public use exception where injury occurred in an area of a restaurant that was not open to the public but was used only by employees of [the owner/lessor].). We see no principled basis for distinguishing a motocross track that is open only to a few from a storage room or restaurant kitchen that is similarly off-limits to the general public. Were we to conclude otherwise  that is, were we to reject the limitation described in comment f, as the Haos implicitly ask us to do  we would read the public out of the public use exception. Public connotes non-exclusivity. Black's Law Dictionary, for instance, defines public (when used as an adjective) as meaning, inter alia, [c]ommon to all or many; general; open to common use. Black's Law Dictionary 1227 (6th ed. 1990). Under that definition, the motocross track was not a public area, because it was not open to common use. More importantly, by ignoring the limitation described in comment f, we would be expanding § 359 far beyond its intended purpose, which is, after all, to protect the public at large. That purpose is not advanced by exposing non-possessory lessors to liability for injuries occurring in restricted areas of an otherwise public premises. We are not willing, under the rubric of a public use exception, to impose a duty on lessors to take measures to protect against injuries occurring in areas not intended to be open to the public simply because another part of a leased premises happens to be open to the public. We note that the Washington Supreme Court has reached the same conclusion on facts closely analogous to those of the present case. In Regan v. City of Seattle, 76 Wash.2d 501, 458 P.2d 12 (1969), the court rejected a claim that the public use exception applied when a boy was injured when he lost control of his go-cart during a race at the Seattle Center Coliseum. 76 Wash.2d at 503, 458 P.2d at 14. The boy and his father sued, among others, the City of Seattle as the lessor of the coliseum, claiming the public use exception as one basis for liability. Id. at 504-05, 458 P.2d at 14-15. The City of Seattle moved for summary judgment in the trial court and its motion was granted. Id. at 503, 458 P.2d at 14. The Washington Supreme Court held that the public use exception did not apply: [11] [L]iability under [the public use] exception only extends to injuries suffered by members of the public and which occur in that portion of the premises intended to be open to the public. We hold that this exception does not apply to a participant in a race who was injured on the race course and not in any area thrown open to members of the public. Id. at 505, 458 P.2d at 14-15 (citations omitted). [12] Because Sean was injured in an area of HRP not thrown open for the admission of the public, we hold that § 359 cannot be a basis for Campbell Estate's liability to Sean or his parents.