Opinion ID: 2621310
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 10

Heading: Other challenges to Nevada's three-judge panels

Text: Johnson has challenged the validity of Nevada's three-judge panels on a number of other grounds. We conclude that none has merit. Johnson contends that three-judge panels are not authorized by the Nevada Constitution and interfere with each district judge's jurisdiction. We have rejected similar arguments before and see no reason to reconsider our position. [38] Johnson contends that the district judges on panels impermissibly act in a nonjudicial capacity in violation of Nevada's separation of powers. Article 3, Section 1 of the Nevada Constitution divides the government into three departmentsthe legislative, executive, and judicialand provides that no persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to one of these departments shall exercise any functions, appertaining to either of the others, except in the cases expressly directed or permitted in this constitution. A judge does not impermissibly engage in a nonjudicial activity just because he or she is part of a collegial body. The district judges on a panel are participating in a traditional judicial activity, sentencing a convicted criminal; therefore, the separation of powers is not offended. Johnson asserts that the system of three-judge panels is unconstitutional because it does not permit voir dire and peremptory challenges for selecting and qualifying impartial panel members. He also complains that the process of selecting the panel members is secretive and produces panels prone to return death sentences. Again, we have rejected these arguments before and will not reconsider them now. [39] Johnson did not challenge any member of his panel and does not offer any evidence that any member was biased or acted inappropriately during the sentencing process. Johnson is not entitled to any relief on this basis. Johnson also claims that three-judge panels are improper because two of the panel judges are not from the judicial district in which the crime was committed and therefore cannot impose a sentence that expresses the conscience of the community. Citing Witherspoon v. Illinois, [40] Johnson claims that this deficiency violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. In Witherspoon, the United States Supreme Court addressed a very narrow issue: whether a court can properly exclude jurors who indicated that they ha[ve] conscientious scruples against inflicting capital punishment. [41] The Supreme Court determined that a court cannot. A jury must express the conscience of the community on the ultimate question of life or death. [42] Because a large portion of society has doubts about the wisdom of the death penalty, the court concluded that a jury in which that portion has been excluded cannot speak for the community. [43] Johnson contends that his situation is similar to that in Witherspoon because two of the judges on his panel were not from his county. Johnson asserts that they, like the limited Witherspoon jury, did not possess the same values as people in his county. Witherspoon does not support this argument: Johnson's definition of community is much narrower than Witherspoon 's. Witherspoon referred to the views and morals of the nation, not a specific county or city. [44] Johnson fails to demonstrate that judges from different areas of this state are unable to speak for the community under Witherspoon. Finally, amicus curiae, Nevada Attorneys for Criminal Justice, argues that Nevada's scheme of three-judge sentencing panels is unconstitutional because it violates the Equal Protection Clause. We believe that our foregoing decision that NRS 175.556(1) is unconstitutional renders this argument moot. To the extent that the argument may not be moot, we conclude that it is meritless.