Opinion ID: 1118941
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: federal constitution: due process

Text: Defendant asserts that production of the letter by his lawyer is protected by the Fifth Amendment as applicable to the states by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the trial court, defendant relied on Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), and Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85, 94 S.Ct. 2179, 40 L.Ed.2d 678 (1974). In this court he also contended that Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 96 S.Ct. 1569, 48 L.Ed.2d 39 (1976), and United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 104 S.Ct. 1237, 79 L.Ed.2d 552 (1984), supported his claim of protection from an order for his lawyer to produce the letter. It is arguable that Boyd could be so read, but the Court has made it quite clear in Fisher that in this respect Boyd has no continuing vitality. Fisher v. United States, supra, 425 U.S. at 405-14, 96 S.Ct. at 1578-83. Bellis is not in point, for it concerned only the question whether a former partner could successfully resist a subpoena for the production of records of the former partnership in his possession under the privilege against self-incrimination afforded by the Fifth Amendment. The Court held that he could not, although there is some dictum that would be of comfort to this defendant. In Fisher the Internal Revenue Service issued a summons to the taxpayer's attorney for the production of work papers for tax returns that the taxpayer's independent accountant had prepared for the taxpayer. The taxpayer had retrieved the papers from the accountant and turned them over to the attorney for the purpose of having the attorney assist the taxpayer in resisting the claims of the Service. The decision is well summarized in 61 J. Tax'n 66 (1984): The Court held that the attorney's production of the tax return materials did not violate his client's Fifth Amendment privilege because the latter was entitled to this protection only when `compelled to make a testimonial communication that is incriminating.' (Emphasis in original.) The Court reasoned that since the Fifth Amendment protected an individual only against compelled testimonial communications, it was not violated by a demand that the individual produce papers already in existence which an independent accountant (not he) had prepared. At the same time, however, the Court realized that the disclosure of the contents of the papers was not the only method of self-incrimination; a person may incriminate himself merely through the act of producing the documents. The Court, therefore, created a two-part test to determine whether compliance with a document demand, whether by summons or subpoena, would result in taxpayer's production of `incriminating testimony': (1) if the existence and location of the requested papers are unknown to the Government, the taxpayer's compelled production of those documents `tacitly concedes the existence of the papers demanded and their possession or control by the taxpayer,' and (2) where the taxpayer's production of documents `implicitly authenticates' the documents, the production provides a link in the chain of incrimination. If the facts fulfill the requirements of these tests, (under the `act of production' analysis), then the taxpayer could assert a valid Fifth Amendment claim to avoid compliance with the summons or subpoena. The Court found that the Fifth Amendment privilege was not implicated in Fisher for two reasons: the existence of the accountant's workpapers was a `foregone conclusion' and the Government could not use the taxpayer to authenticate the documents. The Court, therefore, held that the summons served upon taxpayer's attorney was properly enforced. (Footnotes omitted.) The Court itself expressed its holding as follows: Our above holding is that compelled production of documents from an attorney does not implicate whatever Fifth Amendment privilege the taxpayer might have enjoyed from being compelled to produce them himself. 425 U.S. at 402, 96 S.Ct. at 1576. The Court then explored whether the production was protected by the attorney-client privilege, but that holding and that discussion is of no interest to us because that privilege is codified in this state, and we have already held in Part I of this opinion that it is not applicable to this case. In United States v. Doe, supra , a grand jury sought business records prepared by the owner of the businesses. When he refused to produce them voluntarily, the grand jury issued subpoenas for production. The owner moved to quash the subpoenas, asserting the Fifth Amendment privilege. The District Court and Court of Appeals sided with the owner. On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States held that the contents of the documents were not privileged because the Fifth Amendment protects only against compelled self-incrimination, and the documents were not prepared under any compulsion; in fact, the preparation was concededly voluntary. The Court further held, however, that the act of producing the documents in response to the subpoena would be privileged because it would be testimonial in the sense that the District Court had found as fact that production would concede the existence of the documents and the owner's belief that the documents were those described in the subpoenas. Doe might be of some support to defendant in the instant case if the letter had been in his possession. We believe, however, that the Supreme Court of the United States would hold otherwise on the facts at hand, for the document was in the hands of his lawyer (as in Fisher ), and the existence of the document and its general content were known to the police by reason of defendant's own communication to his sister and Thomas and by reason of Bundy's communication to the police. In those circumstances, compelled production of the document was not necessary to proof of its existence, nor was it any indication of defendant's belief that the letter was the document described in the state's motion and the court's order. Because of our conclusion that neither the state nor the federal constitution affords defendant the protection he seeks, we need not address his argument that he had to be granted transactional immunity in return for the production of the letter. The decision of the Court of Appeals and the judgment of the trial court are affirmed.