Opinion ID: 706003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Teague's Distinct Claims

Text: 48
49 During the government's direct examination of Cleveland Fire Department Arson Investigator David McAmis, McAmis testified that Teague admitted to him that he went to Lee College in Charlie Jacks' car and acted as a lookout. J.A. at 284. Counsel for Teague objected to the investigator's use of the word lookout because according to Teague's written statement, Teague said that he was told to watch out. Id. The court overruled the objection and told counsel that he could take that matter up on cross-examination. On cross-examination, counsel for Teague wanted to go beyond Teague's written statement and inquire of the witness whether Teague stated who told him to get out of the car and who told him to watch out. J.A. 305-06. Moreover, counsel for Teague wanted to question the witness regarding portions of the statement that inculpated Sherlin. J.A. at 306-07. The district court ruled that counsel for Teague could cross-examine the witness regarding Teague's statement, but the court limited the cross-examination to exclude references to Sherlin. 50 Teague claims that the court's limitation of his cross-examination of McAmis denied him his constitutionally mandated right of confrontation and was reversible error. Teague argues that the portions of his statement that he was not permitted to address on cross-examination supported his theory of defense, namely that he was just a follower and had no real knowledge of the activity that was about to take place. 51 We find that the district court correctly limited the cross-examination of McAmis to exclude references to Sherlin. As noted above, this redaction prevented potential Bruton problems. Moreover, Teague's statement is actually ambiguous as to who told him to watch out. The district court properly concluded that it was irrelevant for purposes of Teague's defense who told Teague to watch out. Finally, the portions of Teague's statement, which contained potentially inculpating statements of Sherlin, would not have been admissible if offered into evidence through McAmis because they were hearsay. Fed.R.Evid. 805. 52
53 During the cross-examination of government witness Charlie Jacks, Teague asked the court for a copy of Jacks' presentence report to further test Jacks' credibility. The government objected to the request for the report. J.A. at 218. At side bar, Teague asked the court to look at the report in camera, but the district court denied Teague's request. J.A. at 220-21. Relying on Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), Teague claims that the court committed reversible error in denying his request for access to Jacks' presentence report and in refusing to review the presentence report in camera for potential Brady material. 54 The regulation of discovery in criminal matters is committed to the discretion of the trial court. Fed.R.Crim.P. 16(d). Thus, we review for abuse of discretion. 55 Although this court has not addressed this particular issue in a published decision, 3 the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1270 (5th Cir.1977) did address the issue of whether the Supreme Court's holding in Brady required a court, for due process reasons, to provide access for a defendant to a prosecution witness' presentence report. In Brady, the Court held that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment. 373 U.S. at 87, 83 S.Ct. at 1196-97. Recognizing that Brady was directed to suppression of available evidence by the prosecution, the Fifth Circuit distinguished the application of Brady to the facts in Trevino because a presentence report is a report to the court, compiled for the court's use in the sentencing process. Trevino, 556 F.2d at 1270; see Fed.R.Crim.P. 32(b). Thus, the Fifth Circuit declined to extend Brady 's reach by holding that a discovery motion addressed in effect to a court or its probation officer, rather than the prosecution, asking production of a witness' presentence report, must be granted under Brady 's authority. 556 F.2d at 1271; see United States v. Walker, 491 F.2d 236, 238 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 990, 94 S.Ct. 2399, 40 L.Ed.2d 769 (1974). 56 We find the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in Trevino quite persuasive. Brady expressly applies to material evidence withheld from the defense by the prosecution. Neither Brady nor the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure mandate that a trial court produce a copy of a presentence report concerning a government witness, prepared for the court, to the defense upon request. Nor do they require a trial court to review such a report in camera for potential Brady material. Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Teague's request.