Opinion ID: 465003
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: jurisdiction to review the board's good cause determination

Text: 13 The issue whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to review the Board's determination on good cause is a question of law subject to de novo review. Broudy v. United States, 722 F.2d 566, 567 (9th Cir.1983). Section 1395oo(f)(1) provides a right to obtain judicial review of any final decision of the Board. 2 The Secretary does not dispute, and other circuits have held, see Athens Community Hospital, Inc. v. Schweiker, 686 F.2d 989, 993-94 (D.C.Cir.1982); Cleveland Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Califano, 594 F.2d 993 (4th Cir.1979), that a decision by the Board that it will not exercise jurisdiction is a final decision within the meaning of section 1395oo(f)(1). 14 Under section 1395oo(f), review of Board decisions is governed exclusively by the applicable provisions of chapter seven of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. Secs. 701-706 (1982). Thus the question is whether any provision of the APA prohibits the federal courts from reviewing the Board's determination. The Supreme Court has interpreted the APA to require a presumption of reviewability of agency action. See Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1511, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967). Section 701(a)(2) of the APA does, however, contain an exception for agency action ... committed to agency discretion by law. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 701(a)(2). 15 The Supreme Court in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), stated that the committed to agency discretion provision is a very narrow exception.... The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.'  401 U.S. at 410 (footnote omitted) (citing S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 (1945)); see also City of Santa Clara v. Andrus, 572 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.) (judicial reviewability is the rule), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859, 99 S.Ct. 176, 177, 58 L.Ed.2d 167 (1978). We conclude that the Board's determination whether to extend the time limit for appeals does not fit within that narrow exception. This precise issue appears to be one of first impression in a circuit court. 3 16 While there is no statute requiring the Board to grant a hearing after the expiration of the time limit, 42 C.F.R. Sec. 405.1841(b) provides: 17 (b) Extension of time limit for good cause. A request for a Board hearing filed after the time limit [expires] shall be dismissed by the Board, except that for good cause shown, the time limit may be extended. 18 No law specifically commits Board action to its discretion. This standard of good cause is not so broad that there is no law to apply, and courts have experience in interpreting the term, good cause. See, e.g., Strickland v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 748 F.2d 681 (Fed.Cir.1984) (reviewing under abuse of discretion standard refusal of M.S.P.B. to find good cause under 5 C.F.R. Sec. 1201.113(d), which allows M.S.P.B. to extend time limit for appeal for good cause shown); Sheeran v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 746 F.2d 806 (Fed.Cir.1984) (same). 19 While we have jurisdiction to review the Board's decision, our scope of review is narrow. The decision whether good cause has been shown is committed to the Board's discretion. See 42 C.F.R. Sec. 405.1841(b). Only if the Board has abused its discretion by acting arbitrarily and capriciously will we reverse its determination. See 5 U.S.C. Sec. 706(2).