Opinion ID: 2265487
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Due-Process/Equal-Protection Considerations

Text: Lastly, the husband attacks the constitutionality of § 15-5-24, as amended by P.L. 1981, ch. 421, § 1, commonly referred to as the wage-assignment statute. The language in effect at the time of this hearing provided that [e]ach judgment containing support provisions and each order for support issued by the family court of this state shall include an order directing the obligor to assign such salary currently due obligor to be due in the future from the obligor's employer or successor employers to the clerk of the court where the judgment is granted or the order issued, in such amount as will be sufficient to meet the support payments imposed by the court. This wage assignment shall take effect upon application of the person receiving payments or any person or public agency designated to receive such payments, when the requirements of this section have been met. The statute further provides for a hearing upon request within ten days concerning whether the wage assignment should take effect. As a result of the husband's refusal to sign a DR-20 wage-assignment form at the conclusion of the hearings in Family Court, the trial justice entered the following order: Until such time as the Defendant signs the DR-20, the Defendant is restrained and enjoined from dealing with in any way the funds in the Keogh Plan and the value or the negotiability of the Cotton Exchange seat. He is enjoined and restrained from negotiating, selling or in any way dealing with the seat as a right or chose in action, he is not restrained from working under it, but he is restrained from dealing with it, selling it or otherwise cashing in on it. At such time as he signs the DR-20 and delivers it to the Clerk, that order will be vacated. On appeal, the husband argues, without cited authority, that this ruling constitutes an improper taking of the husband's property, an anticipatory penalty, and a prospective imposition of contempt sanctions without due process of law. He contends further that the statute violates the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States. The husband's equal-protection challenge requires little discussion since it assumes that only males fall under the classification of obligors. Section 15-5-24 is not restricted in its operation to males or females. The objective of the statute is to protect the well-being of those persons to whom support is owed pursuant to a court order. The statutory term obligor makes no distinction between the sexes that would necessitate enhanced judicial scrutiny by this court. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50 L.Ed.2d 397 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 S.Ct. 251, 30 L.Ed.2d 225 (1971). Moreover, [u]nless there is a showing that the sexually neutral legislative scheme is a mere pretext designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other, the statute will not be considered as violating the [F]ourteenth [A]mendment's guarantee of equal protection. Harwood v. Harwood, 120 R.I. 145, 148, 385 A.2d 1055, 1057 (1978) (citing Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 94 S.Ct. 2485, 41 L.Ed.2d 256 (1974)). Therefore, we shall move on to the husband's due-process argument, which, like his equal-protection challenge, is unfounded. It is fundamental that the Fourteenth Amendment requires notice and an opportunity to be heard before one is deprived of his property or liberty. Here, the husband argues that the court's order restraining him from dealing with the funds in his Keogh Plan or his seat on the Cotton Exchange until such time as he executed the income-attachment form constituted an improper deprivation of his property without due process. In light of the constitutional safeguard contained in § 15-5-24(b) providing for a hearing upon request on whether the wage assignment should take effect, it is difficult to perceive the due-process violation of which the husband complains. Furthermore, it is evident from the record that the trial justice gave an extensive explanation of the ramifications for failure to comply with the court's order of support, including a discourse on the conditional nature of the wage-assignment provision, that is, that its effect is postponed until such time as there is a violation of the support order and an application by the person entitled to receive such support. This being the case, the husband's argument of a due-process violation is hardly plausible. The case is remanded to the Family Court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion, the husband's appeal is denied and dismissed in all other particulars, and the judgment appealed from is affirmed.