Opinion ID: 793980
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: David LaPorte

Text: 52 At trial, David LaPorte testified for Ms. Naeem as an expert on DOT regulations governing post-accident drug testing. He testified that Ms. Naeem's failure to have Barden tested for drugs after his December 29, 1995, accident was not a violation of DOT regulations. The defendants offered no objection during Mr. LaPorte's direct examination when he was asked to give an opinion regarding whether the failure to test for drugs was a DOT violation. Tr.V at 307-08. 53 Before trial, however, the defendants filed a motion in limine to exclude the testimony of LaPorte. The defendants contended that his testimony about the applicable DOT regulations was irrelevant to the questions to be decided by the jury. They stressed that what was at issue was Mr. Montreuil's state of mind in suspending Ms. Naeem, not whether he was actually correct in believing that DOT regulations required drug testing after the Barden incident. The defendants further argued that LaPorte's testimony regarding McKesson's drug and alcohol testing policies was not needed to help the jury understand the evidence, and that such an opinion would usurp the jury's fact-finding role in their determination as to whether Mr. Montreuil acted reasonably under the McKesson policies. No additional argument was made at trial during LaPorte's testimony. The defendants did not raise their current argument, that LaPorte impermissibly provided conclusions of law, until their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law or, alternatively, for a new trial. See R.288 at 12. In that motion, they argued that the testimony of David LaPorte was admitted in error because it allowed an expert witness to provide a legal interpretation and application of a federal regulation. See id. In their view, the court should instruct the jury on the applicable law, not witnesses. 54 To preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must make a proper objection at trial that alerts the court and opposing party to the specific grounds for the objection. United States v. Wynn, 845 F.2d 1439, 1442 (7th Cir.1988). An objection is proper when a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context.... Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(1). Neither a general objection to the evidence nor a specific objection on other grounds will preserve the issue for review. Wynn, 845 F.2d at 1442; see also United States v. Laughlin, 772 F.2d 1382, 1392 (7th Cir.1985) (holding that defendant's objection to the admission of photographs on the ground of irrelevancy did not preserve objection under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)). When a defendant does not object to the admission of evidence during the trial, the objection is waived and cannot be raised for the first time in a motion for new trial or on appeal. United States v. Hack, 205 F.2d 723, 727 (7th Cir.1953). In this case, the defendants did not raise their current objection to LaPorte's testimony in either their motion in limine or during the testimony itself. The defendants therefore waived their current objection to LaPorte's testimony. 55 In any event, we previously have stated that allowing a witness to testify as to a legal conclusion may cause the jury to accord too much weight to that testimony, and may infer that the jury should look to that witness for legal guidance. See Bammerlin v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Co., 30 F.3d 898, 900 (7th Cir.1994); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 922 F.2d 357, 366 (7th Cir.1991). In Bammerlin and Harbor Insurance, the expert witnesses were offering opinions about legal issues that ... determine[d] the outcome of a case. United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 757-58 n. 1 (7th Cir.1996) (citing cases). However, in the present case, the DOT regulations at issue do not determine the outcome of Ms. Naeem's claims; rather, they are only a piece of evidence regarding whether one of the disciplinary actions against Ms. Naeem was justified. 56 Moreover, even if LaPorte did provide impermissible testimony, it would not be grounds for reversal. Mr. Montreuil admitted at trial that he knew that the truck driven by Barden was not covered by the DOT regulations at the time he disciplined Ms. Naeem for failing to order post-accident drug testing. Therefore, his testimony was consistent with the testimony of Mr. LaPorte, and, consequently, there was no plain error. See also United States v. Duvall, 272 F.3d 825, 829 (7th Cir.2001) (holding that, even if expert testimony opining that drugs were packaged for distribution was admitted in error, the error was harmless because the defendant admitted he intended to distribute the drugs in question).