Opinion ID: 2513997
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Idaho Code section 16-2005 is constitutional on its face and as applied.

Text: John Doe asserts that I.C. § 16-2005(a) is unconstitutionally vague on its face as well as unconstitutional as applied. [A] statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning, and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. State v. Marek, 112 Idaho 860, 866, 736 P.2d 1314, 1320 (1987). While more often applied to criminal statutes, the void for vagueness doctrine applies equally to civil statutes. See Olsen, 117 Idaho at 716, 791 P.2d at 1295. However, greater tolerance is permitted when addressing a civil or non-criminal statute as opposed to a criminal statute under the void for vagueness doctrine. Id. at 716, 791 P.2d at 1295. If persons of reasonable intelligence can derive core meaning from a civil statute, it is not unconstitutionally vague. Id. John argues that the following section of the statute is vague: The court may grant an order terminating the relationship where it finds one (1) or more of the following conditions exist: a. The parent has abandoned the child by having willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact; failure of the parent to maintain this relationship without just cause for a period of one (1) year shall constitute prima facie evidence of abandonment under this section. I.C. § 16-2005(a) (emphasis added). John argues that the statute is not clear whether the burden is on the petitioning parent to prove the absence of just cause or whether it is on the defendant parent to prove just cause. The language of the statute establishes that the petitioning parent has the burden of proof to come forth with prima facie evidence that the defendant parent is without just cause for not maintaining a normal relationship with the child, which is what the petitioner did in this case. The defendant parent can then come forth with evidence to rebut the prima facie case that there was no just cause. The burden of persuasion remains with the petitioning parent to show, by clear and convincing evidence, willful failure to maintain a normal parental relationship. As long as the trier of fact finds clear and convincing evidence that there are no valid defenses, or just causes, then the petitioning parent has met his or her burden of persuasion. The burden on the defendant parent is the burden of production to come forth with evidence supporting defenses to any failure to maintain a normal parental relationship once a prima facie case of abandonment has been established. In support of this interpretation, this Court has held that [w]hile I.C. § 16-2005(a) does provide that failure of the parent to maintain the normal parental relationship without just cause for a period of over one year is prima facie evidence of abandonment, that section does not place the burden of persuasion upon the parent whose rights are proposed to be terminated. The burden of persuasion of abandonment remains with the petitioner who seeks to terminate the parent-child relationship. Maier v. Matthews, 97 Idaho 99, 104, 540 P.2d 284, 289 (1975). This is consistent with a plain reading of the statute. There is nothing that renders the statute unconstitutional on its face. The statute is also constitutional as applied by the trial court. John Doe argues that the magistrate judge shifted the burden of persuasion to him in violation of his constitutional rights. However, there is no evidence that the magistrate judge applied the statute in an unconstitutional manner. The magistrate judge's decision shows the reverse. The judge specifically found that the intent element was proved by clear and convincing evidence. This finding necessarily implies that Jane Doe also met her burden of persuasion as to proving no just cause. This reading of the decision is bolstered by the magistrate judge's findings which credited Jane's evidence as to why there was no just cause and discredited John's evidence purportedly illustrating just cause. When the trial court discredited the excuses provided by John, the prima facie case made by Jane Doe became sufficient to meet the burden of persuasion. See Miller v. Belknap, 75 Idaho 46, 51, 266 P.2d 662, 665 (1954) (when the plaintiff has made a prima facie case, the defendant must meet it with countervailing proof or suffer whatever judgment the prima facie proof will support).