Opinion ID: 1182126
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Existence of Attorney/Client Relationship.

Text: [2] Determining whether an attorney/client relationship exists necessarily involves questions of fact. See 48 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts 2d, Existence of Attorney-Client Relationship 525 (1987); 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith, Legal Malpractice § 11.2 n. 12 (3d ed. 1989). Summary judgment is proper on a factual issue only if reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion on it. Steinbach, at 437. [3] The essence of the attorney/client relationship is whether the attorney's advice or assistance is sought and received on legal matters. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith § 11.2 n. 18; 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorneys at Law § 118 (1980). The relationship need not be formalized in a written contract, but rather may be implied from the parties' conduct. In re McGlothlen, 99 Wn.2d 515, 522, 663 P.2d 1330 (1983). Whether a fee is paid is not dispositive. McGlothlen, at 522. The existence of the relationship turns largely on the client's subjective belief that it exists. McGlothlen, at 522. The client's subjective belief, however, does not control the issue unless it is reasonably formed based on the attending circumstances, including the attorney's words or actions. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith § 8.2 n. 12; Fox v. Pollack, 181 Cal. App.3d 954, 959, 226 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1986); In re Petrie, 154 Ariz. 295, 299-300, 742 P.2d 796 (1987). Cody told Lucille Bohn at the outset of their very first meeting that he could not act as her attorney in this matter, as he was already representing the Folletts. Lucille Bohn has not challenged this statement. Moreover, Cody reemphasized this point when he told Lucille Bohn later in the conversation that he would prepare the necessary documentation only upon obtaining the Folletts' approval. [4, 5] Lucille Bohn maintains that despite these clear disclaimers she still believed that Cody was acting as her attorney. She argues that her belief was reasonably held because Cody gave her legal advice and performed legal services for her. First, she contends that he answered (though not fully) her questions concerning the effect of the assignment of the right to receive the fulfillment deed. An attorney/client relationship is not created, however, merely because an attorney discusses the subject matter of a transaction with a nonclient. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith § 11.2 n. 19. Second, she points out that Cody prepared the assignment paperwork. Yet an attorney for one party to a transaction does not become the other party's attorney merely because he prepared the documents formalizing the transaction. See 1 R. Mallen & J. Smith § 8.2 n. 22. Lucille Bohn also relies on the letter Cody wrote seeking reissuance of the fulfillment deed to the Bohns. This letter, however, was written approximately 4 weeks after the conversations were held that form the basis for the Bohns' action. The important consideration here is the reasonableness of Lucille Bohn's belief at the time of the allegedly tortious acts. The occurrence of subsequent events has no bearing on this issue, for we are not concerned with whether Cody was acting as her attorney at a later time, and the letter gives no indication that he was acting as the Bohn's attorney at any prior time. In light of Cody's disclaimers of any attorney/client relationship and in light of the Bohns' inability to show that Cody acted inconsistently with these statements, we conclude that Lucille Bohn's subjective belief was not reasonably based on the attending circumstances, and no attorney/client relationship was formed. Reasonable finders of fact could reach no other conclusion on the record here presented.