Opinion ID: 199486
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 4

Heading: Motions for Attorney's Fees and Double Costs.

Text: 42 In order to prevail on appeal against Freidel's, Interstate effectively had to show in this fact-intensive case that no rational jury could have concluded that the $50,000 portion of the deposit paid to Freidel's was non-refundable and that it was equitable for Freidel's to retain it. It was undisputed at trial that Interstate knew Freidel's took the eight color press off the market in exchange for the deposit and suffered a detriment as a result. It was also undisputed that Freidel's was not a party to the contract between Brown and Interstate and had no business relationship with Interstate. 43 Because Interstate's claims against Freidel's were in equity and unjust enrichment, Interstate had to prove that Freidel's had no right to retain the deposit, regardless of the outcome of Interstate's underlying contract dispute with Brown. See National Shawmut Bank v. Fidelity Mut. Ins. Co., 61 N.E.2d 18, 22 (Mass. 1945) (The fundamental question . . . is whether the defendant has received money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the plaintiff.); see also Flower v. Suburban Land Co., 123 N.E.2d 218, 221 (Mass. 1954) ([T]he right to recover in an action for money had and received does not depend upon privity of contract, but on the obligation to restore that which the law implies should be returned, where one is unjustly enriched at another's expense.) (internal quotation marks omitted). In light of the undisputed fact that Freidel's conferred a benefit upon Interstate and incurred a detriment as a result, restitution would have been improper. Cf. National Shawmut Bank, 61 N.E.2d at 20-21. 44 Even the authorities Interstate cites in its brief undermine its position, suggesting instead that Interstate must seek recovery of its deposit from Brown, not Freidel's, because Interstate made the deposit to Freidel's pursuant to its agreement with Brown. See Bolen v. Paragon Plastics, 747 F. Supp. 103, 107 (D. Mass. 1990) ([A] person who has conferred a benefit upon another as the performance of a contract with a third person is not entitled to restitution from the other merely because of the failure of performance by the third person.) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Restitution §§ 115)); LaChance v. Rigoli, 91 N.E.2d 204, 205 (Mass. 1950) (The contracting party must look for payment to the one . . . who was expected to pay and who in fact expected to pay or as a reasonable man should have expected to pay.). We award Freidel's its reasonable attorney's fees and double costs. See Fed. R. App. P. 38; see also Toscano v. Chandris, S.A., 934 F.2d 383, 387 (1st Cir. 1991); E.H. Ashley & Co. v. Wells Fargo Alarm Servs., 907 F.2d 1274, 1280 (1st Cir. 1990).
45 We feel differently, however, about Brown's motion for attorney's fees and double costs. While weak, Interstate's claims against Brown cannot be said to be frivolous.