Opinion ID: 662299
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: the search of tilmon's car

Text: 10 Tilmon also argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress the cocaine seized from his car. Although we are certainly not impressed with Officer Rothans' decision to forcibly enter Tilmon's car without a warrant and without involving other officers, we nonetheless conclude that the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.
11 Tilmon first argues that the warrantless search of his car was unreasonable because his car was locked and parked and therefor no exigent circumstances justified searching without a warrant. He contends that the automobile exception to the warrant requirement should apply only to moving cars, lawfully stopped by police, and not to parked cars or non-moving vehicles. While this might be a plausible restriction on police discretion, it is not a restriction courts have adopted. See United States v. Hatley, 999 F.2d 392, 394-95 (9th Cir.1993) (vehicle exception applies to inoperable vehicle); United States v. Hamilton, 792 F.2d 837, 843 (9th Cir.1986) (vehicle exception applies to car parked in private driveway). 5 Since cases have consistently concluded that the vehicle exception applies to inherently mobile vehicles, even if they are not moving when searched, we must conclude that the exception applies to Tilmon's parked car. Thus, if supported by probable cause, Rothans's search is legal.
12 Tilmon also contends that Rothans did not have probable cause. In support of this claim, he argues primarily that Rothans's story of seeing the cocaine in plain view, yet not informing other officers of his find, not waiting for other officers to confirm his find and photographing the evidence after the fact, is not plausible. However, although we review a finding of probable cause to conduct a warrantless vehicle search de novo, Hatley, 999 F.2d at 394, we may not substitute our judgment of credibility for that of the district court. United States v. Vigil, 989 F.2d 337, 340 (9th Cir.), cert. denied S.Ct. 205 (1993). We must adopt the district court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous, United States v. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1239, 1241 (9th Cir.1993), and give deference to its credibility determinations. United States v. Williams, 978 F.2d 1133, 1135 (9th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 1606 (1993). 13 In Tilmon's case, although the court expressed concerns about the credibility of some government witnesses, 6 it apparently believed Rothans's testimony about looking in the Buick window and seeing the plastic baggy of cocaine. 7 This finding is not clearly erroneous, and establishes probable cause. 14 Looking through the window of a parked car is not a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Head, 783 F.2d 1422, 1426-28 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1171 (1986). Whether or not the officers' previous observations supplied probable cause, Rothans had probable cause to search once he saw the baggy in plain view. Cf. Nohara, 3 F.3d 1242 (seeing methamphetamine pipe in plain view established probable cause to arrest). Moreover, since Rothans had seen Tilmon remove the baggy from the trunk, he had probable cause to search the trunk and open any containers he found inside. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 809 (1982); United States v. Spires, 3 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir.1993) (confidential informant's tip and discovery of drugs in one part of a car established probable cause to search rest of car).