Opinion ID: 3011243
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: State Personal Injury Claims

Text: Elizabeth's state claims run the gamut of personal injury claims common to medical malpractice suits, alleging (1) civil battery, (2) negligence by Elizabeth's par ents, the doctors, and the hospital, (3) lack of infor med consent, and (4) outrageous conduct by her parents, the doctors and the hospital. The District Court, adopting the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, dismissed them all as time barred by Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury suits. See 42 Pa. C.S. S 5524 (West 1999).4 The statute of limitations begins to run fr om the time the cause of action accrued, which we have pr eviously interpreted to mean when the first significant event necessary to make the claim suable occurs. Ross v. JohnsMansville Corp., 766 F.2d 823, 826 (3d Cir. 1985); see generally 42 Pa. C.S. S 5502(a) (W est 1999). Thus, Elizabeth's claim under state law accrued in 1977, when she was sterilized. Although theoretically Elizabeth could have brought her claim in 1977, she contends that as a practical matter she could not have done so because she was 16 years old and mentally retarded. If a claim were to have been brought on her behalf at that time, it would have been brought by her guardians, her father and step-mother, see, e.g., Walker v. Mummert , 146 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1958), but it was the guardians who in fact arranged for the sterilization to be performed. _________________________________________________________________ 4. The statutory language reads in pertinent part: The following actions and proceedings must be commenced within two years: . . . (2) An action to recover damages for injuries to the person or for the death of an individual caused by the wr ongful act or neglect or unlawful violence or negligence of another. . . . 42 Pa. C.S. 5524 (West 1999). 7 Under the two-year limitations period, Elizabeth's cause of action expired in 1979, two years after her operation. At the time of Elizabeth's sterilization, the statute of limitations did not toll for either minority or incompetence. See Walter v. Ditzler, 227 A.2d 833 (Pa. 1967). Although the statute was later amended in 1984 to toll for minors until they reached age 18, that amendment was not r etroactive. See Maycock v. Gravely Corp., 508 A.2d 330 (Pa. 1986). Even if it were retroactive, however , Elizabeth's claim would have expired in 1986, making her 1993 claims still untimely. Moreover, the statute of limitations was never amended to include incompetency as grounds for tolling. See 42 Pa. C.S. S 5533 (West 1999). 5 Thus, Elizabeth's mental retardation is not a basis for pr eserving her claim under Pennsylvania's tolling statute.6 Pennsylvania common law does, however, allow some breathing room, as the Magistrate Judge's report recognized, in that it recognizes the discovery rule, which tolls the statute of limitations until a plaintif f actually discovers the harm caused by an earlier inflicted but latent _________________________________________________________________ 5. The statutory language reads: (a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided by statute, insanity or imprisonment does not extend the time limited by this subchapter for the commencement of a matter. (b) Infancy.--If an individual entitled to bring a civil action is an unemancipated minor at the time the cause of action accrues, the period of minority shall not be deemed a portion of the time period within which the action must be commenced. Such person shall have the same time for commencing an action after attaining majority as is allowed to others by the provisions of this subchapter. As used in this subsection the term minor shall mean any individual who has not yet attained the age of 18. 42 Pa. C.S. S 5533 (West 1999). 6. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court justified its strict construction of the personal injury statute of limitations in regar d to the mentally incompetent in its opinion in Walker v. Mummert, 146 A.2d 289, 291 (Pa. 1958), in which the court emphasized that the practice of appointing a guardian, who can bring suit on behalf of the incompetent, would mitigate against any harsh consequences from a strict construction of the statute of limitations against the incompetent. 8 injury. See Ayers v. Morgan, 154 A.2d 788 (Pa. 1959) (permitting statute of limitations to toll for plaintiff's injuries that later developed from doctor leaving a sponge in his abdomen during surgery). Nevertheless, the discovery rule does not af fect Elizabeth's state claims because the circumstances under which it can be invoked depend on the nature of the injury rather than any specific characteristics unique to the plaintiff that might otherwise prevent her from recognizing her injury as a cause of action; such unique characteristics include one's mental state. See, e.g. , Dalrymple v. Brown, 701 A.2d 164 (Pa. 1997) (denying discovery rule for repressed memory syndrome); Molineux v. Reed, 532 A.2d 792 (Pa. 1987) (permitting defendants to assert limitations defense because plaintiff had no evidence of fraudulent concealment). This objective standard pr events Elizabeth from pursuing her claim. Her injury was not latent; therefore, it was not the latent natur e of the injury that prevented her from knowing of it. It was her mental retardation and her illiteracy that wer e the causes for her failing to discover her injury. These characteristics are particular to Elizabeth and do not depend on the type of injury she suffered. The Lakes now argue, however, that it might be possible for Elizabeth to meet the discovery rule's r easonableness standard, regardless of her mental r etardation and illiteracy. However, the Lakes have alleged in this action that Elizabeth could not understand the natur e and scope of the operation. In light of this repr esentation of her inability to appreciate the nature and scope of sterilization surgery as a reasonable person would, we must conclude that Elizabeth could not meet the reasonableness standard. Moreover, because Pennsylvania law r equires a plaintiff to exercise a reasonable amount of diligence and vigilance when pursuing a claim, see Redenz v. Rosenber g, 520 A.2d 883, 886 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987), Elizabeth's invocation of the discovery rule is further undermined by the fact that she took no steps to inquire into the natur e of her operation until almost two decades after it was perfor med. In addition, in determining diligence, we would again evaluate the adequacy of the inquiry by the reasonable person 9 standard, not by the standard of the mentally retarded and illiterate. There is one other circumstance under which a plaintiff can escape the rigors of Pennsylvania's statute of 949 limitations: when the defendants have intentionally misinformed the plaintiff or concealed information from her so that they are estopped from invoking the statute of limitations. See Walters v. Ditzler, 227 A.2d 833 (Pa. 1967). As we noted above, however, the Lakes do not allege that the defendants intentionally misinformed Elizabeth about her sterilization. Finally, we are unwilling to accept the Lakes' argument that we should distinguish existing Pennsylvania pr ecedent that prohibits relying on subjective mental characteristics to invoke the discovery rule on the permanent or biological nature of Elizabeth's mental state. As the defendants correctly point out, these ar e medical rather than legal distinctions. As such, they cannot serve as a basis for reinterpreting what seems to be clearly stated Pennsylvania law: mental incompetency does not toll the personal injury statute of limitations. In sum, under the Pennsylvania statute of limitations, Elizabeth had two years from the date of her operation to bring her state law personal injury claims. Neither the state statutory tolling provisions, which do not authorize tolling for mental incompetency, nor the state discovery rule, which applies an objective standard for deter mining when an individual should discover a latent injury, af ford Elizabeth any relief from the conclusion that her state claims are time-barred by Pennsylvania's two-year statute of limitations. While this conclusion appears harsh, under principles of federalism and comity between state and federal courts, we must respect the state's decision to determine the appropriate policies, including the statute of limitations and their related tolling pr ovisions, for its own judicial procedures. 2. Federal Causes of Action Under Sections 1983 and 1985 The Lakes also assert that the defendants' r ole in permanently sterilizing Elizabeth gives rise to two federal 10 causes of action for violating her substantive due process right to procreate. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). Because neither S 1983 nor S 1985(3) contains a statute of limitations, we must rely on 42 U.S.C. S 1988, which guides our selection of the appropriate time period to fill the gap. Section 1988 requires us to use the statute of limitations for the state where the federal court sits unless its application would conflict with the Constitution or with federal law.7 In determining which state limitations period to use in federal civil rights cases, we look to the general, residual statute of limitations for personal injury actions. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80 (1985). W e must also incorporate any relevant state tolling rules. See Hardin v. Straub, 490 U.S. 536, 543-44 (1989). Thus, forS 1983 and S 1985 actions originating in Pennsylvania, we look to 42 Pa. C.S. SS 5524 and 5533. See Rose v. Bartle, 871 F.2d 331, 347 (3d Cir. 1989) (S 1983); Bougher v. University of Pittsburgh, 882 F.2d 74, 79 (3d Cir . 1989) (S 1985). As we recognized in analyzing Elizabeth's state claims in Part III.B.1, Pennsylvania's statute of limitations requires all personal injury claims to be brought within a two-year time period and is not tolled for mental incompetence. Because Elizabeth's sterilization occurred well outside this _________________________________________________________________ 7. Title 42 U.S.C. S 1988 provides, in relevant part: The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts by the provisions of this T itle, and of Title CIVIL RIGHTS, and of Title CRIMES, for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in confor mity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to fur nish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal causes is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause. (emphasis added). 11 time frame, any injury she suffered would appear to be barred as untimely. This conclusion, however , is premature. We must first determine whether the state's tolling provisions themselves conflict with federal law and policy, a question that is not squarely governed by Wilson and Hardin. Wilson principally involves the second step in the process [of applying S 1988]: the selection of `the most appropriate' or `the most analogous' state statute of limitations to apply to S 1983 claims. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268. The policies that motivated Wilson, i.e., uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation, do not frame our analysis because we are instead concerned with S 1988's third pr ong: whether the state limitations statute conflicts with federal law and policy. See Hardin, 490 U.S. at 544 n.14 (concluding that Wilson's policies are more pertinent to deter mine which state laws are appropriate than whether application of those laws fosters the policies of S 1983.). Similarly, although Hardin analyzed whether tolling statutes in general conflicted with S 1983's policies of compensation and deterr ence, it did not hold that courts should ignore whether a state's particular tolling provision itself conflicts with federal law and policy. We must still, then, decide whether Pennsylvania's tolling rule satisfies this inquiry. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 486 (1980) (requiring deter mination of whether the New York tolling rule contradicted federal law). As a policy matter, SS 1983 and 1985(3) are designed to compensate victims whose federal constitutional or statutory civil rights have been violated and to pr event future abuses of state power. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 53 (1984). As such, these remedial statutes strive to give victims the opportunity to sue for r elief. See id. at 55. In contrast, state statutes of limitations ar e not crafted to promote federal remedial policies. See Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977) (noting that [s]tate legislatures do not devise their limitations period with national interests in mind). This disconnect means that, occasionally, the state statute of limitations must be modified to promote the federal inter ests at bar. 12 With this background in mind, let us look carefully at the federal claims that Elizabeth is asserting. W e held in Lake I that the mentally retarded, as a class, are entitled to protection under civil rights laws such asS 1985(3) because [t]he fact that a person bears no responsibility for a handicap, combined with the pervasive discrimination practiced against the mentally retarded and the emerging rejection of this discrimination as incompatible with our ideals of equality convinces us that whatever the outer boundaries of the concept, an animus directed against the mentally retar ded includes the elements of a class-based invidiously discriminatory motivation. 112 F.3d at 688 (quoting Novotny v. Gr eat Am. Fed. Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1243 (3d Cir. 1978)) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). As we also pointed out, involuntary sterilization is one manifestation of this discrimination against the mentally incompetent. See id. at 688 (citing law review articles). Elizabeth's federal claims are based on the violation of her constitutional right to procreate. Consequently, her claims ar e the type that S 1985(3) and S 1983 are designed to protect. Moreover, under the federal policy that the mentally retarded are a protected class, Elizabeth should not be denied her right to sue solely because of her mental retardation. In Elizabeth's case, her mental incompetency was the reason her guardians, who ought to have protected her, sought to sterilize her and the r eason that the hospital performed the operation. Not allowing any tolling, even in an extraordinary situation such as this one, puts Pennsylvania's statute of limitations at odds with the objectives that S 1983 and S 1985(3) foster by barring an individual, especially a member of a protected class, who was deprived, as in this case, of her ability to bring a claim through her guardians, from seeking compensation and deterrence.8 Consequently, the rigidity of the Pennsylvania _________________________________________________________________ 8. In Elizabeth's case, deterrence is of less concern because Pennsylvania now requires a court proceeding befor e guardians can consent to their ward's sterilization. See 20 Pa. C.S. A. S 5221(d)(1). See also In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376 (Pa. Super . Ct. 1982) (holding sterilization by guardian's consent requires court or der). 13 statute of limitations in regard to mental incompetence, absent a guardian who will protect rather than jeopardize those rights, directly conflicts with Elizabeth's right as a mentally retarded person to remedy a violation of her constitutionally protected rights. We ar e thus not obligated to apply that state rule. When the state tolling rules contradict federal law or policy, in certain limited circumstances we can turn to federal tolling doctrine. See Heck v. Humphr ey, 997 F.2d 355, 358 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing equitable tolling applicable to S 1983 actions where state limitations provision conflicts with federal policy); Boos v. Runyon, 201 F.3d 178, 184 (2d Cir. 1999) (r ecognizing that tolling for a person's mental disability is highly case-specific but declining to apply in instant case); Grant v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 163 F.3d 1136, 1138 (9th Cir. 1998) (permitting federal equitable tolling of a state limitations period for federal claims in exceptional cir cumstances but finding none present); Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 4-5 (1st Cir. 1993) (remanding for factual determination as to whether alleged mental illness justified equitable tolling). Federal courts may toll statutes of limitations for federal laws where the plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from asserting his or her rights. Robinson v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1022 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Ber man, 38 F.3d 1380, 1387 (3d Cir. 1994)); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 480 (1986) (authorizing equitable tolling where consistent with congressional intent).9 The doctrine prevents a party from profiting from its own wrongdoing. See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1388. Equitable tolling stops the statute of limitations from running when the date on which the claim accrued has _________________________________________________________________ 9. Equitable tolling is appropriate in thr ee general scenarios: (1) where a defendant actively misleads a plaintiff with r espect to her cause of action; (2) where the plaintiff has been prevented from asserting her claim as a result of other extraordinary circumstances; or (3) where the plaintiff asserts her claims in a timely manner but has done so in the wrong forum. See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1387. We are concerned in this case with only the second scenario, where extraordinary circumstances prevent a plaintiff from timelyfiling. 14 already passed. See id. Equitable tolling can be applied to suits brought under the federal civil rights statutes when the state statute of limitations would otherwise frustrate federal policy, see, e.g., Heck , 997 F.2d at 358, because as Wilson recognized, the adopted state rule operates as a federal rule responsive to the need whenever a federal right is impaired. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269. When a plaintiff requests federal equitable tolling but the facts underlying that request are disputed or unclear , a court may remand the case to determine if the facts actually support tolling. See Nunnally, 996 F.2d at 5-7. If Elizabeth's allegations prove on remand to be true, we conclude that in this situation, where a guardian conspir es to deprive a mentally incompetent person of her constitutional and civil rights, equitable tolling might be appropriate. Elizabeth would then be entitled to revive the two-year period that the Pennsylvania law provides for her to bring her claim. See Oshiver, 38 F.3d at 1389. We are not, in remanding this case to the District Court, holding that a mentally incompetent plaintif f would never be bound by state statute of limitations provisions in federal civil rights actions or, alter natively, that she would be evaluated by a more lenient subjective test. Cf. Robinson, 107 F.3d at 1022-23 (recognizing that a liberal interpretation of equitable tolling exception would swallow the rule). In fact, we have previously held that mental incompetence is not per se a reason to toll the statute of limitations in federal actions. See e.g., Barr en by Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987 (3d Cir . 1988) (rejecting mental incompetence as reason to toll statute of limitations under Federal Tort Claims Act). Where we have permitted equitable tolling for mental disability in the past, the plaintiff's mental incompetence motivated, to some degree, the injury that he sought to remedy. See Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D. Pa 1977) (deciding to equitably toll the Pennsylvania statute of limitations for a mentally incompetent plaintiff who was involuntarily committed for entire limitations period).10 _________________________________________________________________ 10. The Eubanks court concluded that it was unreasonable to expect a mental ward inmate to pursue his claims and thus, denying him his 15 The unique facts of Elizabeth's claim distinguish her case from others where a plaintiff has ar gued for tolling based on mental incapacity. Generally, under a state law where there is no equitable tolling for mental incapacity, the guardian is expected to protect the war d's interests. Pennsylvania does not permit tolling for mental incompetency for this very reason: [T]he established procedures for the appointment of guardians afford sufficient pr otection to individuals who are non compos mentis that their claims will be instituted within the permissible period and thereby diminishes the risk that the rights of incompetents will be impaired by our holding that their disability does not toll the running of the statute of limitations applicable to actions for personal injury. Walker, 146 A.2d at 291. The unusual aspect of this case, then, is that the guardians themselves, who should have been protecting Elizabeth's interests, in fact caused the injury to her. Thus, her case differs from the more typical one where a third party injures a mentally incompetent person and the guardian fails to bring the claim in a timely fashion. In the latter case, tolling would be inappr opriate because the guardian had failed to exer cise diligence. We must reiterate, however, that this is not a case based on state law for breach of fiduciary trust to r emedy a ward's injury caused by a guardian. This is a federal civil rights case seeking a remedy to a member of a pr otected class who is prevented by state law fr om tolling the statute of limitations because her guardian failed to pr otect her precisely because she was mentally retar ded. _________________________________________________________________ S 1983 action would contradict federal policy by insulating those who had denied his rights. Eubanks, 434 F . Supp. at 1032-33. Similarly, while we recognize that Elizabeth's situation is not so extreme, it nonetheless presents similar concerns because the absence of a guardian who could advocate Elizabeth's rights made it practically impossible for her to protect her rights. Thus, failing to equitably toll the statute of limitations for Elizabeth would imper missibly allow the defendants to avoid responsibility for their actions simply through the passage of time. 16 Because of her mental incapacity, Elizabeth claims to have been unable to appreciate the injury that was done to her when she was sterilized. (We of course will remand to determine if that allegation is justified.) Apparently, she has not been lax in bringing suit because she could not recognize that there was cause to do so. In fact, she brought her suit within two years of lear ning from her gynecologist that she had been sterilized. Absent her request for a more searching physical examination, she would not necessarily have had a reason to suspect that she had been sterilized until a doctor so infor med her because the effects of a sterilization ar e not always physically observable.11 Thus, it would appear that she has acted diligently, at least on the facts she alleges. Permitting the tolling provisions of the state statute of limitations to bar her cause of action would frustrate the federal civil rights laws by barring a remedy to a pr otected person because the guardian, who under state law should have sought to vindicate that person, harmed her instead. In sum, we are not equitably tolling Pennsylvania's statute of limitations solely because Elizabeth's mental incompetence prevented her from recognizing her injury when she was sterilized. Instead, as in Eubanks , we are tolling it due to the failure of the guar dian system. The persons, who should have protected Elizabeth because of her retardation, instead harmed her by having her sterilized so that she could not procreate. If her allegations prove true on remand, Elizabeth's claims should pr oceed.12 In this _________________________________________________________________ 11. Tubal ligations do not necessarily af fect a woman's menstrual cycle or other aspects of her femininity. See L. Elizabeth Bowles, The Disenfranchisement of Fertile Women in Clinical Trials: The Legal Ramifications of and Solutions for Rectifying the Knowledge Gap, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 877, 909 (1992) (discussing consequences of tubal ligation); Estate of C.W., 640 A.2d 427, 432 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (approving tubal ligation because, among other reasons, it would not affect C.W.'s menstrual cycle or feelings of femininity). 12. The defendants argue that Elizabeth had enough time after she left the custody of her father and stepmother to bring her case. We are not persuaded that, absent a guardian or other r epresentative of her interests, Elizabeth could be expected to advocate her own interests or even evaluate what course of action would be in her best interest. Thus, the fact that she left her parents' home does not, alone, preclude our application of federal tolling principles. 17 instance, equitable tolling would promote Congr ess's intent in enacting SS 1983 and 1985. It would give Elizabeth the opportunity she was denied when she was sterilized-- adequate representation of her inter ests -- and give her a chance to seek a remedy for her injury. We hold, therefore, that the Pennsylvania statute of limitations for personal injury claims could, on these alleged facts, be equitably tolled until the time, perhaps the gynecologist visit in December 1993, when Elizabeth and her husband Justin learned, or should have become aware, that Elizabeth's sterilization procedur e left her permanently unable to bear children.13 W e will remand this case to the District Court to determine whether equitable tolling is appropriate under the standard we set out above.