Opinion ID: 2218958
Heading Depth: 1
Heading Rank: 3

Heading: tribal judicial jurisdiction

Text: Before a tribal court may adjudicate a matter, Professor Frank Pommersheim notes: First, the tribal court has to determine whether it possesses judicial jurisdiction over the suit. And second, the court must resolve whether the tribe has the legislative authority to regulate the conduct of non-Indians engaged in the activities at issue. F. Pommersheim, The Crucible of Sovereignty: Analyzing Issues of Tribal Jurisdiction, 31 Ariz. L.Rev. 329, 335 (1989) (hereinafter Pommersheim) (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 12, 107 S.Ct. 971, 974, 94 L.Ed.2d 10, 17 (1987)). See National Farmers Union Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S.Ct. 2447, 85 L.Ed.2d 818 (1985). We agree with Professor Pommersheim's general thesis that tribal judicial jurisdiction depends on whether the tribal court has proper subject matter, personal, and territorial jurisdiction.... Pommersheim, supra at 336. These issues are resolved by determining whether federal law limits the tribal court's authority and whether tribal law has empowered the tribal court to hear the case. Id. at 334. Unless the determination has been made that the tribal court has judicial jurisdiction, we need not resolve whether the tribe has legislative authority to regulate Hettich's conduct pursuant to Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981). Both must be found before SDCL 1-1-25(1)(a) is satisfied, for without legislative authority to regulate Hettich's conduct, the tribal court will have no case which it can adjudicate. [4] SDCL 1-1-25, requires us to analyze jurisdictional issues through its traditional components of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. This is not unreasonable in light of the fact that we engage in such an analysis before recognizing other foreign judgments, Baldwin v. Heinold Commodities, Inc., 363 N.W.2d 191, 194 (S.D.1985); Bahr v. Bahr, 85 S.D. 240, 244, 180 N.W.2d 465, 467 (1970); see also SDCL 15-16A-1 to 10 (Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act), as do federal courts. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421, 99 S.Ct. 1182, 1188, 59 L.Ed.2d 416, 425 (1979); Kulko v. California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84, 96, 98 S.Ct. 1690, 1702, 56 L.Ed.2d 132, 143 (1978). However, a review of the cases of the United States Supreme Court reveals that the analysis of jurisdictional issues between Indian and federal or state governments is rarely broken down into the traditional facets of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. Rather, the United States Supreme Court refers to criminal or civil jurisdiction. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 98 S.Ct. 1011, 55 L.Ed.2d 209 (1978); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 79 S.Ct. 269, 3 L.Ed.2d 251 (1959). Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493, and cases decided since, refer to regulatory jurisdiction. But is this a facet of subject matter jurisdiction? Of personal jurisdiction? It is unclear. It appears from our reading of the cases, that it is neither and both. While recognizing Indian tribes occupy a unique position in the United States, we also recognize that this failure to analyze questions of tribal jurisdiction through jurisdiction's traditional component parts does not promote clarity of jurisdictional analysis. We take the opportunity presented by this case to begin to clarify our method of jurisdictional analysis for the recognition of tribal court judgments. SDCL 1-1-25 does not directly address a criminal/civil breakdown of jurisdiction. Nor does it directly address a territorial or a legislative breakdown of jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we must make the initial determination of whether the action is civil or criminal. Once that determination is made, we look to territorial jurisdiction which is implicit in jurisdictional analysis. We then engage in our statute's traditional subject matter and personal jurisdiction analysis. We conclude with Montana's legislative analysis which will confirm or negate subject matter and personal jurisdiction, without actually being a facet of either. The method we engage in today will help to better mesh South Dakota's comity statute and its traditional subject matter/personal jurisdictional analytic requirements, with the United States Supreme Court's civil/criminal/legislative jurisdictional analytic requirements. [5]
Having previously determined that this is a civil action, we now look to whether the territorial jurisdiction component of tribal judicial jurisdiction is satisfied. Although territorial jurisdiction is not directly addressed by the statute, it is a necessary predicate to the determination of subject matter and personal jurisdiction. This civil action arose out of an incident which occurred within the boundaries of the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation [6] on State Highway 63. The landowners adjacent to this highway, who owned their land in fee, had previously granted easements to the state for its construction. Nevertheless, this incident occurred within the boundaries of the reservation and is in Indian country. [7] We conclude therefore, that the territorial jurisdiction component of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court's judicial jurisdiction has been met.
Subject matter jurisdiction relates to the power of a court to hear and determine a general class of cases to which a particular proceeding belongs. Leon v. Numkena, 142 Ariz. 307, 689 P.2d 566, 568 (1984) (citations omitted). See also Harris v. Young, 473 N.W.2d 141, 143-44 (S.D.1991); In re Guardianship of Flyinghorse, 456 N.W.2d 567, 568 (S.D. 1990); Redwing, 429 N.W.2d at 51. A court's jurisdiction of the subject matter... exists when a constitution or statute specifically confers upon the court such jurisdiction. Timmerman v. Timmerman, 163 Neb. 704, 81 N.W.2d 135 (1957). This power is likewise conferred upon Indian courts by their constitutions or tribal codes. See generally Cohen, Federal Indian Law, p. 428 (1958). Leon, 689 P.2d at 568. The circuit court concluded the tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction over this cause of action. Despite the circuit court's invitation to do so, Hettich did not formally appeal by way of notice of review. Normally, when an appellee fails to file a notice of review pursuant to SDCL 15-26A-22 (1992 Supp), the trial court's conclusion of law becomes the law of the case and there is nothing for this court to review. See Rude Transp. Co. v. P.U.C., 431 N.W.2d 160, 162 (S.D.1988); State v. Howell, 354 N.W.2d 196, 198 (S.D.1984); In re Application of Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 326 N.W.2d 100, 104 (S.D.1982); Gridley v. Engelhart, 322 N.W.2d 3, 5-6 (S.D.1982). Nevertheless, both parties (and State, who filed an amicus brief) set out extensive arguments in their briefs regarding subject matter jurisdiction. In addition, Red Fox included in the docketing statement the issue of whether the tribal court judgment is entitled to comity. This issue necessarily includes the issue of subject matter jurisdiction. See SDCL 1-1-25. Further, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction in this case is of utmost importance to the state and the tribes. Thus, we will address it. See State Hwy. Comm'n v. Beets, 88 S.D. 536, 539-40, 224 N.W.2d 567, 568-69 (1974). We first determine whether any federal statutes, decisional law or treaties control. [8] Pommersheim, supra at 336. Interestingly enough, there are no federal statutes or decisions that categorically bar tribal court jurisdiction over certain civil matters. Because of the general absence of federal statutes that deal with the allocation of civil jurisdiction, few civil cases will be disposed of at this stage of analysis. Id. at 337. Similarly, we find no federal statutes, decisional law, or treaties which categorically limit this tribal court's civil judicial jurisdiction through limits on subject matter, personal or territorial jurisdiction. Nor do we find any federal statutes or treaties which categorically grant this tribal court civil judicial jurisdiction. Absent specific treaty provisions or federal statutes which categorically bar or grant the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court civil judicial jurisdiction, [c]ivil jurisdiction over [activities of non-Indians on reservation lands] presumptively lies in the tribal courts[.] Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 18, 107 S.Ct. at 977, 94 L.Ed.2d at 21; Sage v. Sicangu Oyate Ho, Inc., 473 N.W.2d 480, 482 (S.D.1991); Defender, 435 N.W.2d at 722. We now look to determine whether Red Fox has clearly and convincingly established that the tribal court has civil subject matter jurisdiction as a matter of tribal law. Tribal law includes treaties, the tribal constitution, code, decisional law and custom. Pommersheim, supra at 337. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code provides: 1-107. Civil jurisdiction of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under the Tribal Constitution, the customs or the laws of the Tribe, and to any case in which the Tribe, a member of the Tribe, an Indian residing on the Reservation or a corporation or entity owned in whole or insubstantial part by any Indian shall be a party. The tribal code clearly allows civil subject matter jurisdiction, as Red Fox, an enrolled member of the tribe, is a party to this civil action.
Tribal judicial jurisdiction also depends on whether the tribal court has personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code does not appear to limit jurisdiction to any great extent and clearly grants the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court personal jurisdiction over Red Fox. It is, however, silent on whether the tribal court has personal jurisdiction over a non-Indian defendant who resides within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. Some tribal codes contain long-arm statutes similar to those found in state and federal law to obtain personal jurisdiction over non-tribal members. See, Law and Order Code of the Shoshone and Arapaho Tribes of the Wind River Indian Reservation, Wyoming Tit. I, § 1-2-3; Law and Order Code for the Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation, Utah ch. 2, § 1-2-3. The Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code, however, contains no long-arm provision. Nevertheless, we agree with Professor Pommersheim's suggestion that absent a tribal code provision, a tribal court could apply traditional federal long-arm jurisdictional analysis. Pommersheim, supra at 341. See, e.g., Rosebud Hous. Auth. v. LaCreek Elec. Coop., 13 Indian L.Rep. 6030 (Rosebud Sx.Tr.Ct.1986). Therefore, applying traditional long-arm analysis, before the tribal court can assert jurisdiction over a non-Indian, he must receive notice and have minimum contacts with the tribe. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). We have previously said that the same due process standards which govern state court assertions of jurisdiction over nonresident defendants apply to tribal courts. Defender, 435 N.W.2d at 720 n. 2. Hettich was served notice of the tribal court proceeding via certified mail. This type of service is permitted by the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Code, 2-102(4)(b)(4) and under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(c)(2)(C)(ii) & (D). Cf. Wells, 451 N.W.2d at 403-04. Hettich acknowledged in his answer that he received notice of the claim. We conclude the reasonable notice requirement was met. We next look to determine whether Red Fox has clearly and convincingly established that Hettich has the requisite minimum contacts with the Standing Rock Sioux Indian Reservation to enable this tribal court to assert jurisdiction over Hettich. More in the way of minimum contacts is required for a tribal court to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over a non-Indian than would be sufficient for the citizen of one state to assert personal jurisdiction over the citizen of another state. Babbitt Ford, Inc. v. Navajo Indian Tribe, 519 F.Supp. 418, 431 (Ariz.1981) aff'd in part, rev. in part on different grounds, 710 F.2d 587 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 926, 104 S.Ct. 1707, 80 L.Ed.2d 180 (1984); Swift Transp., Inc. v. John, 546 F.Supp. 1185, 1193 (Ariz.1982), vacated as moot, 574 F.Supp. 710 (Ariz.1983). See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Hettich owns land, fee in nature, within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. He also owns and operates a grocery store within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. He engages in commercial transactions with tribal members. He has utilized the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court system to sue tribal members. Hettich had sufficient minimum contacts with the tribe to justify the tribal court's assumption of personal jurisdiction over him. Accordingly, we conclude the Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Court had judicial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, mere presence within reservation boundaries is not enough to confer adjudicatory power on a tribal court. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493; Babbitt, 710 F.2d at 598. Unless the tribe has the authority to regulate the conduct of non-Indians on state highways, the tribal court will not have the authority to adjudicate this action. Iowa Mutual, 480 U.S. at 12, 107 S.Ct. at 974, 94 L.Ed.2d at 17; Pommersheim, supra at 334. If mere physical presence within reservation boundaries is enough to confer tribal court jurisdiction, then the distinctions between reservation lands owned by Indians and those owned by non-Indians, as set forth in Montana and Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 109 S.Ct. 2994, 106 L.Ed.2d 343 (1989), are meaningless. Therefore, a determination of whether there is tribal authority over non-Indians and their property is the other facet of a tribal court's civil jurisdiction in Indian country. Pommersheim, supra at 334. We now look to determine whether Red Fox has clearly and convincingly established that the tribal court has the authority to adjudicate this matter as a result of the tribe's authority to regulate the claimed conduct of Hettich.