Opinion ID: 2777593
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Definition of “Personal Information”

Text: The DPPA proscribes knowingly obtaining or disclosing “personal information” from motor vehicle records. 18 U.S.C. § 2722(a). Sun-Times contends that the details it acquired from the Officers’ driving records—i.e., each Officer’s birth date, height, weight, hair color, and eye color—fall outside the statutory definition of “personal information” and that, therefore, Sun-Times’s acquisition and publication of the Officers’ information did not violate the Act. However, we conclude, based on the plain meaning of the DPPA’s text, the underlying purpose of the Act, and language from prior decisions of this court and others, that the DPPA’s definition of “personal information” encompasses the information at issue here. “As in any case of statutory construction, our analysis begins with the language of the statute. … Interpretation of a word or phrase depends upon reading the whole statutory text, considering the purpose and context of the statute.” Senne v. Vill. of Palatine, Ill., 695 F.3d 597, 601 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The DPPA’s definition of “personal information” expressly “includ[es] an individual’s photograph, social security number, driver identification number, name, address (but not the No. 14-2295 9 5-digit zip code), telephone number, and medical or disability information.” 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) (emphasis added). SunTimes emphasizes that none of the information at issue here is explicitly included in this definition, and argues that any category not specifically listed must therefore lie beyond the Act’s reach. In so arguing, Sun-Times advocates the application of the interpretive canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius, or “the expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others.” Exelon Generation Co. v. Local 15, Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, AFL-CIO, 676 F.3d 566, 571 (7th Cir. 2012). However, the Supreme Court has explained that the term “including”—which introduces the itemized list of characteristics that constitute “personal information” under the DPPA, see § 2725(3)—is typically “illustrative and not limitative.” Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994); see also Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 177, 189 (1941) (“To attribute such a [limitative] function to the participial phrase introduced by ‘including’ is to shrivel a versatile principle to an illustrative application. … The word ‘including’ does not lend itself to such destructive significance.”). This court has also noted the disfavored status of the expressio unius doctrine. See, e.g., Exelon Generation Co., 676 F.3d at 571 (referring to “the much-derided maxim of expressio unius est exclusio alterius”). On its face, the DPPA’s language appears broad: “‘personal information’ means information that identifies an individual,” § 2725(3), and there is no indication that Congress intended the enumerated list of examples to be exhaustive. The Supreme Court, albeit in dicta, has also signaled that “personal information” may well include categories of information beyond those specifically identified in the statute: in Reno v. Condon, the Court noted that “[t]he DPPA defines 10 No. 14-2295 ‘personal information’ as any information ‘that identifies an individual.’” 528 U.S. 141, 144 (2000) (emphasis added). Reno dealt not with the issue of statutory interpretation, but rather with whether Congress’s enactment of the DPPA violated either the Commerce Clause or the principles of federalism contained in the Tenth Amendment. See id. at 148–51. While it is possible that the Court unconsciously read the modifier “any” into the statutory text, it is equally plausible that the Court was subtly advocating an expansive reading of the term “personal information.” Each category of published information at issue here (age, height, weight, hair color, eye color) relates to the Officers’ physical appearance and, therefore, indisputably aids in “identif[ying]” them. Yet Sun-Times insists that this information is merely descriptive and cannot be said to “identif[y] an individual” because it does not uniquely single out a particular person as does, for example, a Social Security number. However, the categories of “personal information” explicitly included in § 2725(3) directly undermine SunTimes’s theory. Although many of the itemized categories (e.g., driver identification number) do uniquely identify the individual with whom they are associated, others (e.g., medical and disability information) do not. In fact, even though medical and disability information do not uniquely pertain to a single individual, they are included in a subcategory of “highly restricted personal information,” which receives even greater protection under the DPPA. See 18 U.S.C. § 2725(4). The express inclusion of these categories of information in § 2725(3) clearly demonstrates that Congress intended “personal information” to encompass a broader range of personal details than Sun-Times’s proposed reading would allow. No. 14-2295 11 The underlying purpose of the DPPA also supports reading “personal information” to extend to the personal details at issue here. The DPPA was enacted as a public safety measure, designed to prevent stalkers and criminals from utilizing motor vehicle records to acquire information about their victims. Prior to the law’s enactment, anyone could contact the department of motor vehicles in most states and, simply by providing a license plate number and paying a nominal fee, obtain the corresponding driver’s address and other pertinent biographical information—no questions asked. 140 Cong. Rec. H2526 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994) (statement of Rep. Porter Goss). At congressional hearings on the proposed legislation, numerous witnesses testified about the risks posed by unfettered public access to motor vehicle records. 5 The most highly publicized impetus for the Act’s passage was the 1989 murder of television actress Rebecca Schaeffer by an obsessed fan who obtained her unlisted 5 Law enforcement officers were among those to testify. Police sergeant Donald L. Cahill, who spoke on behalf of the Fraternal Order of Police, commented on the concerns of officers who were targeted for retribution: [N]umerous law enforcement officers over the years [have] had concerns about the ability of defendants, that they had helped prosecute; to surveil them at their place of employment and get their license plate number, and in turn trace that number through the state division of motor vehicles to get their home addresses. These officers feared for the safety of their families mostly as most of their time was spent away on the job. The Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1993: Hearing on H.R. 3365 Before the Subcomm. on Civil & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1994 WL 212833 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Donald L. Cahill, Legislative Chairman, Fraternal Order of Police). 12 No. 14-2295 home address from the California Department of Motor Vehicles. Maracich v. Spears, 133 S. Ct. 2191, 2213 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The DPPA’s legislative history reveals that “[t]he intent of [the Act] is simple—to protect the personal privacy and safety of all American licensed drivers.” 140 Cong. Rec. H2526. Although a potential stalker would likely require information beyond hair and eye color to positively identify his victim, details regarding any pertinent physical feature would make such identification easier. Interpreting the DPPA’s definition of “personal information” to include the identifying information at issue here would therefore advance the Act’s important public safety goals. A secondary purpose of the DPPA is similarly relevant to the challenged categories of information. The Supreme Court noted in Maracich v. Spears that Congress also enacted the DPPA to protect against “the States’ common practice of selling personal information to businesses engaged in direct marketing and solicitation.” 133 S. Ct. at 2198 (majority opinion). Much of the information at issue here, particularly details regarding an individual’s age, height, and weight, could conceivably be of great interest to businesses (e.g., Weight Watchers) seeking to market their products or services to targeted audiences. While protection against commercial solicitation may not be as fundamental as the Act’s public safety objectives, excluding these categories of information from the DPPA’s definition of “personal information” would likely contravene legislative intent. An expansive reading of “personal information” is further supported by the language of several cases, including a recent decision from our own court. Although the definition of “personal information” under 18 U.S.C. § 2725(3) was not No. 14-2295 13 specifically at issue in these cases, they nevertheless provide helpful guidance as to the term’s appropriate interpretation. In our 2012 en banc decision, Senne v. Village of Palatine, Illinois, where we dealt with the DPPA’s “permissible use” exceptions, we noted that “[t]he otherwise protected information actually disclosed here included [plaintiff’s] full name, address, driver’s license number, date of birth, sex, height, and weight.” 695 F.3d at 608 (emphases added). Other courts have also understood the DPPA’s definition of “personal information” to encompass these personal characteristics. See, e.g., Johnson v. W. Publ’g Corp., 801 F. Supp. 2d 862, 877 (W.D. Mo. 2011) (noting that “[a] potential stalker cannot walk into a Missouri DMV to obtain every Missouri driver’s name, address, height, weight, eye color, driver’s license number, and social security number without a specific permissible use under the DPPA” (emphasis added)), rev’d on other grounds, 504 F. App’x 531 (8th Cir. 2013); Manso v. Santamarina & Assocs., No. 04 Civ. 10276, 2005 WL 975854, at –3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2005) (explaining that plaintiff’s “name, address, date of birth, height, gender, eye color, New York State Motor Vehicle Identification Number, restrictive lens status, license class, license status and license expiration date” “does qualify as ‘personal information’ under the DPPA” (emphases added)). Although these decisions are not dispositive, they indicate that the great weight of the case law supports interpreting the statute’s coverage to extend to the information at issue here. 6 6 The lone authority that Sun-Times invokes in support of its position is Camara v. Metro-North Railroad Co., 596 F. Supp. 2d 517, a 2009 opinion from the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut. The 14 No. 14-2295 Based on the foregoing analysis, we conclude that each Officer’s approximate date of birth, height, weight, hair color, and eye color fall within the range of “personal information” to which the DPPA’s protections apply. Sun-Times therefore violated the Act when it knowingly obtained the Officers’ personal details from the Illinois Secretary of State and proceeded to publish them. Sun-Times objects that this reading of “personal information” renders the DPPA void for vagueness because it incorporates categories of information not explicitly enumerated in the statute, which will allegedly force “men of common intelligence … to guess at the meaning of the criminal law.” 7 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974) (citation and Camara court, “[a]pplying the interpretive doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius,” concluded in a footnote that an individual’s birth date does not fall within the DPPA’s definition of “personal information.” Id. at 523 n.9. As we explain above, we do not believe that the doctrine of expressio unius is applicable here, and Camara offers no persuasive reason—indeed, no reason at all—to prompt us to reconsider our position. 7 Sun-Times protests that the Officers “cannot explain how the Secretary of State’s office, let alone lay reporters, could intuit that the contours of the DPPA definition for ‘personal information’ were broader than expressly stated.” But at least one prominent organization dedicated solely to providing free legal assistance to reporters has interpreted “personal information” to include the published information at issue here. The Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press (“RCFP”), a nonprofit organization that has provided legal advice, resources, and advocacy to journalists for more than forty years—see About Us, Reporters Committee for the Freedom of the Press, www.rcfp.org/about—issued a 2010 guide, which explains the rights of journalists under various federal privacy protection laws, including the DPPA. That guide describes the DPPA’s scope as follows: No. 14-2295 15 internal quotation marks omitted). However, the reading of § 2725(3) that we adopt today does not strain the DPPA’s plain meaning, directly advances its underlying legislative goals, and has been implicitly adopted by several courts. Information including age, hair color, eye color, weight, and height falls squarely within the universe of information that “identifies” an individual and, therefore, our interpretation is “clear and precise enough to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice about what is required of him.” Wis. Right to Life, Inc. v. Barland, 751 F.3d 804, 835 (7th Cir. 2014).