Opinion ID: 6496707
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 5

Heading: Motion to Dismiss Charges

Text: Jackson argues that the circuit court erred in denying his claim that trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to dismiss the murder charge on the basis of prosecutorial delay. In denying this claim, the circuit court ruled that a motion to dismiss for pretrial delay would have been meritless. We agree that Jackson is not entitled to relief. In so deciding, we reconsider our case law on the due process standard for preindictment delay. In Rogers v. State, 511 So. 2d 526, 531 (Fla. 1987), we adopted, without significant discussion, a balancing test to determine if preindictment delay violated due process. That test traced back to the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Townley, 665 F.2d 579 (5th Cir.1982)). We described the Townley test as follows: When a defendant asserts a due process violation based on preindictment delay, he bears the initial burden of showing actual prejudice. . . . If the defendant meets this initial burden, the court then must balance the demonstrable reasons for delay against the gravity of the particular prejudice on a case-by-case basis. The outcome turns on whether the delay violates the fundamental conception of justice, decency[,] and fair play embodied in the Bill of Rights and fourteenth amendment. - 22 - Rogers, 511 So. 2d at 531 (citing Townley, 665 F.2d at 581-82). Since we decided Rogers, the Fifth Circuit has receded from the Townley balancing test. United States v. Crouch, 84 F.3d 1497 (5th Cir. 1996). In doing so, the Fifth Circuit cogently explained the flaws in the Townley balancing test, reasoning: The Townley test purports to weigh or balance the extent or degree of the actual prejudice against the extent to which the government’s “good faith reasons” for the delay deviate from what the court believes to be appropriate. However, what this test seeks to do is to compare the incomparable. The items to be placed on either side of the balance (imprecise in themselves) are wholly different from each other and have no possible common denominator that would allow determination of which “weighs” the most. Not only is there no scale or conversion table to tell us whether eighty percent of minimally adequate prosecutorial and investigative staffing is outweighed by a low-medium amount of actual prejudice, there are no recognized general standards or principles to aid us in making that determination and virtually no body of precedent or historic practice to look to for guidance. Inevitably, then, a “length of the Chancellor’s foot” sort of resolution will ensue and judges will necessarily define due process in each such weighing by their own “ ‘personal and private notions’ of fairness,” contrary to the admonition of [United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977)]. Apart from the above difficulty, grounding a due process violation on the basis of good faith but inadequate, ineffective, or insufficient governmental personnel or management leading to preindictment delay runs counter to two basic constitutional principles. In the first place, “[h]istorically, this guarantee of due - 23 - process has been applied to deliberate decisions of government officials to deprive a person of life, liberty, or property,” Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986), and hence “the Due Process Clause . . . is not implicated by the lack of due care of an official causing unintended injury to life, liberty or property.” Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986). Contrary to these principles, however, the Townley test would find a due process violation where the government acted in good faith and did not deliberately seek to prejudice the party ultimately accused. Finally, serious separation of powers concerns are implicated. Here, for example, the panel concluded that the reasons for the delay—“lack of manpower and the low priority which this investigation was assigned”—were “insufficient to outweigh the actual prejudice to Crouch and Frye.” [United States v. Crouch, 51 F.3d 480, 483 (5th Cir. 1995) (vacated panel decision)]. Finding these reasons “insufficient” is in substance determining that greater manpower should generally have been allocated to investigation and prosecution in that jurisdiction, and that a higher priority should have been assigned to this particular investigation. Yet those decisions are ones essentially committed to the legislative and executive branches, and the case for judicial second guessing is particularly weak where it is directed at preindictment conduct and is supported not by any specific constitutional guaranty or by any long-established tradition of judicial oversight, but only by the general contours of the due process clause. Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1512-13 (footnotes omitted) (some citations omitted). For additional support, the Fifth Circuit looked to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. - 24 - 51, 58 (1988) (holding in related context of destruction of evidence that due process is not violated unless loss of evidence resulted from bad faith on part of police). Crouch, 84 F.3d at 1511, 1513 n.17. The Fifth Circuit further observed that its disapproval of Townley was consistent with the majority rule in the federal circuit courts. Id. at 1511. Based on these persuasive justifications, we conclude that the Rogers balancing test is clearly erroneous. Having so concluded, we now consider whether there is any reason for us not to recede from it. See Poole, 297 So. 3d at 507 (providing stare decisis framework).7 Jackson has not made that showing. He does not claim to have relied on the Rogers balancing test at all. See id. (“The critical consideration ordinarily will be reliance.”); cf. State v. MaisonetMaldonado, 308 So. 3d 63, 69-70 (Fla. 2020) (noting that defendant did not claim to have relied on rule of criminal liability from which Court was receding). Instead, Jackson claims that the Rogers balancing test has been workable for decades. Even if that were so, 7. We summarily reject Jackson’s argument that the Poole stare decisis framework does not apply. - 25 - we conclude that this reason alone is insufficient for retaining the clearly erroneous balancing test. Thus, based on the analysis above, we recede from the Rogers balancing test. We now align ourselves with the majority of federal circuit courts and hold that a due process claim for preindictment delay requires a showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant and bad faith on the part of the State. E.g., United States v. Stokes, 124 F.3d 39, 47 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v. Stierwalt, 16 F.3d 282, 285 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. Foxman, 87 F.3d 1220, 1223 (11th Cir. 1996). Application of this standard here supports the circuit court’s denial of Jackson’s claim. There is simply no evidence in the record that the length of time from the murder to the indictment was the product of bad faith on the part of the State. And Jackson does not claim otherwise. Accordingly, without evidence of bad faith, Jackson cannot establish a due process violation for preindictment delay; and, as a consequence, he cannot establish the prejudice - 26 - necessary to succeed on an ineffectiveness claim. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369-72 (1993).8