Opinion ID: 431689
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Approximately 68 percent.

Text: 102 In arguing that that testimony established that it would have made at least 68% of RDI's sales, Stucki misconstrues not only our role as an appellate court but the evidence itself. The question presupposes Stucki would have made 100% of RDI's sales and the answer indicates that that would have resulted in a 68% increase in Stucki's sales. The cited testimony thus provides no support whatever for Stucki's assertion that the testimony indicates Stucki would have made 68% of RDI's sales, and cannot support the view that error resides in the district court's statement concerning an absence of proof in the record. 103 Stucki correctly points out that 35 U.S.C. Sec. 284 provides for damages adequate to compensate for the infringement and provides for a reasonable royalty only as the floor beneath which a damage award should not fall. Its difficulty here lies in its failure to prove actual damages, leaving the district court with no alternative but that of measuring damages by what would have been a reasonable royalty. 104 ii. Interest 105 Lastly, Stucki asserts that a 6% interest rate neither represents the value of money nor adequately compensates Stucki for its loss. 35 U.S.C. Sec. 284 provides the court shall award ... damages adequate to compensate for the infringement ... together with interest and costs as fixed by the court.... That language leaves the court some discretion in awarding prejudgment interest. General Motors Corp. v. Devex Corp., --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 2058, 2063, 76 L.Ed.2d 211 (1983); Lam, Inc. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 718 F.2d 1056, 1066, 219 USPQ 670, 676 (Fed.Cir.1983). Though the court could have selected a higher interest rate, Stucki's mere assertion that 6% is too low does not establish that an abuse of discretion occurred here. 106 Stucki tells us that in 1980 it stipulated to delay an injunction until decision on appeal, that it learned in the proceedings on damages that the two shareholders of RDI had been and were milking RDI of its assets, that it then filed a motion for an injunction on which the district court had not acted when this appeal was filed, that RDI's two stockholders received from RDI $2,200,000 and $1,000,000, all gained from RDI's infringement during the litigation, that RDI's infringing sales from just before the suit was filed were $19,000,000, with a $9,000,000 gross margin, that Stucki suffered actual damages of more than $7,000,000 over the more than five years from filing to completion of trial while it waited for a decision. The plight of the patent owner in this case may invoke sympathy; it cannot invoke a finding of abuse of discretion. 107 If Stucki waived an injunction in a mistaken expectation that RDI would remain responsible in damages, that is unfortunate. Nothing of record establishes the extent to which Stucki may have contributed to the five year delay before trial. In all events, the district court conducted a full proceeding on damages, at which Stucki was found not to have established its actual damages under 35 U.S.C. Sec. 284. No basis exists therefore for overturning the award of damages and interest made in light of those proceedings. Further Proceedings 108 Upon return of this case to the district court, and assuming Stucki's motion for an injunction has not by then been acted upon, we presume that it will be granted at an early date. In determining damages to be awarded for infringement occurring from the March 28, 1983 final judgment until the grant of the injunction, the rate of interest applicable to those damages is equal to the coupon issue yield of U.S. Treasury bills. 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961 (1982). Stucki's concern for its ability to collect the full amount finally awarded is a matter for presentation to the district court, which may, of course, modify its judgment and is not without power to enforce it. Costs 109 The limit lines of lawyering are not always clear. The zenith of zeal was approached if not exceeded by those of RDI's defenses having no true basis in fact or law. Similarly, like RDI, Stucki sought on appeal a retrial of the facts on damages and a de novo approach to misconstrued testimony in the face of the district court's express finding, supported on the record, that it had not proved its actual damages. This court is content therefore to leave the parties where it finds them and to provide herewith that each party shall pay its own costs on appeal.