Opinion ID: 2003518
Heading Depth: 3
Heading Rank: 2

Heading: Waiver of Counsel in a Capital Case

Text: Defendant argues that his constitutional rights were violated when the trial court permitted him to waive counsel in a capital case. In Faretta v. California (1975), 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562, the Court held that a criminal defendant has a constitutional right to refuse State-provided counsel and proceed without representation if he voluntarily and intelligently elects to do so. (See Silagy v. Peters (7th Cir. 1990), 905 F.2d 986, 1007.) Defendant contends, however, that Faretta is not controlling here because it was not a capital case. Defendant argues that the death penalty has been recognized to be qualitatively different from other forms of punishment. (See Gardner v. Florida (1977), 430 U.S. 349, 357, 97 S.Ct. 1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393, 401 (plurality opinion).) The eighth amendment requires increased reliability of the process by which capital punishment may be imposed. ( Herrera v. Collins (1993), 506 U.S. 390, 406, 113 S.Ct. 853, 863, 122 L.Ed.2d 203, 219.) It is defendant's position that the demands of increased reliability in the capital setting require that the accused be represented by counsel notwithstanding his own desire to conduct his defense pro se. We disagree. In Faretta, the Court explained: Although not stated in the [Sixth] Amendment in so many words, the right to self-representationto make one's own defense personallyis    necessarily implied by the structure of the Amendment. The right to defend is given directly to the accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails. The counsel provision supplements this design. It speaks of the `assistance' of counsel, and an assistant, however expert, is still an assistant. The language and spirit of the Sixth Amendment contemplate that counsel, like the other defense tools guaranteed by the Amendment, shall be an aid to a willing defendantnot an organ of the State interposed between an unwilling defendant and his right to defend himself personally. To thrust counsel upon the accused, against his considered wish, thus violates the logic of the Amendment.    It is true that when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and present his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial strategy in many areas. [Citations.] This allocation can only be justified, however, by the defendant's consent, at the outset, to accept counsel as his representative. An unwanted counsel `represents' the defendant only through a tenuous and unacceptable legal fiction. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819-21, 95 S.Ct. at 2533-34, 45 L.Ed.2d at 572-73. This reasoning applies with no less force in a capital case than in other cases. We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that the heightened need for reliability in capital cases justifies forcing the accused to accept representation by counsel. Defendant's argument assumes that the representation by counsel is invariably beneficial to the accused. However, in Faretta the Court noted that it is conceivable that in rare instances the accused may be able to present his case more effectively by conducting his own defense than entrusting his defense to counsel. Moreover, as the Court observed, [p]ersonal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834, 95 S.Ct. at 2540, 45 L.Ed.2d at 581. In People v. Silagy (1984), 101 Ill.2d 147, 179-81, 77 Ill.Dec. 792, 461 N.E.2d 415, this court implicitly rejected a distinction between capital and noncapital cases for purposes of the right to self-representation. Reviewing the district court judgment in Federal habeas corpus proceedings related to Silagy, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly held that the right to self-representation applies in capital sentencing proceedings. ( Silagy v. Peters (7th Cir.1990), 905 F.2d 986,1007-08.) The Seventh Circuit noted that in Faretta, the Court did not impose any restrictions upon a defendant's right to refuse the assistance of counsel except to require that the right be knowingly and intelligently waived. ( Silagy, 905 F.2d at 1007.) The Silagy court further stated that it could think of no principled reason to deny a death-eligible defendant his Faretta right to proceed without the assistance of counsel. ( Silagy, 905 F.2d at 1007.) Accordingly, the trial court did not err in honoring defendant's request to conduct his own defense during portions of the original proceedings.