Opinion ID: 1057705
Heading Depth: 2
Heading Rank: 1

Heading: Tennessee’s Right to Jury Trial

Text: We first address the Defendant’s contention that the trial court’s charge to the jury violated his right to a jury trial under Tennessee’s constitution. Our state constitution provides that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” Tenn. Const. art. I, § 6. In Tennessee, this right dictates that all issues of fact be tried and determined by twelve jurors. Thus, it follows that a defendant has a right to a correct and complete charge of the law, so that each issue of fact raised by the evidence will be submitted to the jury on proper instructions. State v. Garrison, 40 S.W.3d 426, 432 (Tenn. 2000) (citations omitted). This Court has long recognized that the constitutional right to “a correct and complete charge of the law,” id., includes the right to jury instructions on each and every lesser-included offense embraced within the charged offense(s) and supported by the proof, see State v. Ely, 48 S.W.3d 710, 727 (Tenn. 2001); State v. Staggs, 554 S.W.2d 620, 626 (Tenn. 1977), overruled on other grounds by State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 n.7 (Tenn. 1998); Strader v. State, 362 S.W.2d 224, 230 (Tenn. 1962). This Court has not previously addressed, however, whether the order and manner in which a jury considers a charged offense and its lesser-included offenses implicates the constitutional right to trial by jury.4 A brief review of some of this Court’s recent decisions regarding lesser-included offenses is helpful to our analysis. In State v. Burns, 6 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 1999), this Court conducted a comprehensive review of Tennessee’s statutory mandate that trial courts charge juries as to the law of each offense included in an indictment. Id. at 464 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110 (1997)).5 This Court recognized the benefits of providing a jury with the option of convicting a defendant of an offense less serious than the one charged: “‘[P]roviding the jury with the “third option” of convicting on a lesser included offense ensures that the jury will accord the defendant the full benefit 4 Our Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly approved of instructions that require a jury to reach a unanimous verdict of acquittal on each greater offense before proceeding to consider the next lesser-included offense, however. See, e.g., State v. Raines, 882 S.W.2d 376, 381-82 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1994); State v. McPherson, 882 S.W .2d 365, 375-76 (Tenn. Crim. App.), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1994); State v. Rutherford, 876 S.W .2d 118, 11920 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993), perm. app. denied (Tenn. 1994). In State v. M ann, 959 S.W .2d 503 (Tenn. 1997), this Court adopted without analysis the Court of Criminal Appeals’ holding to that effect. See id. at app. 521. Tennessee’s Rules of Criminal Procedure also contemplate the use of acquittal-first instructions in cases where lesser-included offenses are charged. See Tenn. R. Crim. P. 31(d)(2). 5 This statutory provision has since been superceded. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-18-110 (2006). 6 of the reasonable-doubt standard.’” Id. (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 634 (1980)). The Court also stressed the dangers inherent in failing to provide a jury with the option of convicting of a lesser-included offense where the prosecution has established some criminal conduct beyond a reasonable doubt: “Such a scenario forces a jury into an ‘all or nothing’ decision that, unfortunately, is likely to be resolved against the defendant, who is clearly guilty of ‘something.’” Id. at 466. Accordingly, this Court held that a trial court must instruct a jury on lesser-included offenses where the trial court determines that (1) the particular lesser offense is included in the greater offense charged (using the calculus set forth in Burns6); (2) the record contains evidence that reasonable minds can accept as to the lesser-included offense; and (3) that evidence is legally sufficient to support a conviction for the lesser-included offense. Id. at 467-69. In State v. Ely, this Court recognized that “the right to lesser-included offense instructions does not derive only from statute,” 48 S.W.3d at 726, but that “the right has both a statutory and a constitutional basis,” id. at 727, specifically, the Tennessee Constitution’s guarantee that “the right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate.” We therefore held that “this constitutional right is violated when the jury is not permitted to consider all offenses supported by the evidence.” Id. It is upon this statement that the Defendant bases his claim that the trial court’s acquittal-first jury instructions in this case were unconstitutional. The Defendant asserts that acquittal-first jury instructions do not permit a jury to consider all of the offenses supported by the evidence in a given trial because the jury is not permitted to consider any lesser-included offenses until it has unanimously determined that the defendant is not guilty of the charged (greater) offense. And, once it decides to convict of a greater offense, it never considers any remaining lesser-included offenses. The Defendant asserts that prohibiting a jury from considering lesser-included offenses unless and until it unanimously acquits of all greater offenses flies in the face of our declaration in Ely. Under the Defendant’s interpretation of Ely, a jury must be permitted to consider simultaneously all of the offenses included in the charged offense, eventually arriving upon any verdict of guilt without necessarily reaching unanimous agreement as to the charged and/or any remaining included offenses. The Defendant stretches our language in Ely beyond the framework it was designed to fit. In Ely, this Court was addressing the appropriate standard of review to be applied in assessing a trial court’s error in failing to instruct the jury about lesser-included offenses called for by the indictment and proof in the case. Ely, 48 S.W.3d at 725, 727. The issue was significant because the standard of review differs depending upon whether the error is constitutional error or non-constitutional error. See State v. Rodriguez, 254 S.W.3d 361, 371 (Tenn. 2008) (recognizing structural constitutional error, non-structural constitutional error, and non-constitutional error as the three categories of error and that the category into which any alleged error falls defines the standard of appellate review). Because this Court determined that a defendant’s right to instructions on lesser-included offenses stemmed not only from statute but also from Tennessee’s Constitution, we held in Ely that “when determining whether an erroneous failure to instruct on a lesser-included offense requires reversal, we hold that the proper inquiry for an appellate court is whether the error is harmless beyond a 6 An offense may also be designated by our legislature to be a lesser-included offense. State v. Elkins, 83 S.W .3d 706, 710-11 (Tenn. 2002). 7 reasonable doubt.” 48 S.W.3d at 727 (emphasis added). That is, the Ely Court utilized the standard of review applicable to non-structural constitutional errors. Significantly, the Ely Court did not hold that a defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial was violated when the jury did not in fact consider every single lesser-included offense charged before returning a verdict of guilt on a greater charge. Indeed, in cases where the jury convicts of the indicted offense after having also been instructed on the immediate lesser-included offense (e.g. first degree murder and second degree murder), this Court has found no reversible error where the trial court erroneously failed to give an instruction on a more remote lesser-included offense. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 977 S.W.2d 101, 106 (Tenn. 1998) (where defendant was convicted of first degree murder after trial court gave instruction on lesser-included offense of second degree murder but erroneously failed to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, trial court’s error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because “by finding the defendant guilty of the highest offense to the exclusion of the immediately lesser offense, second degree murder, the jury necessarily rejected all other lesser offenses, including voluntary manslaughter”). Ely does not, therefore, stand for the proposition the Defendant advocates. Cf. State v. Sawyer, 630 A.2d 1064, 1070 (Conn. 1993) (observing that “the lesser included offense doctrine . . . does not imply that the jury should be allowed to consider the charged offense and lesser included offenses in any order and with whatever degree of dedication it chooses”). We also deem it significant to our analysis that the Tennessee Constitution’s right to trial by jury under article 1, section 6 includes the right to a unanimous jury verdict. State v. Scarbrough, 181 S.W.3d 650, 658 (Tenn. 2005); State v. Cleveland, 959 S.W.2d 548, 551 (Tenn. 1997); see also Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (“The very object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views and by arguments among the jurors themselves.”). A jury cannot convict a defendant unless and until it reaches a unanimous verdict of guilt. By the same token, a jury cannot acquit a defendant unless and until it reaches a unanimous verdict of not-guilty. Thus, the unanimity requirement works to benefit both the defendant and the prosecution.7 An acquittal-first jury instruction regarding the proper order in which the jury is to consider the charged and lesser-included offenses is consistent with this unanimity requirement. We also point out that a jury considering a greater offense, by necessity, simultaneously considers, albeit not explicitly, all applicable lesser-included offenses supported by the proof.8 See Dresnek v. State, 697 P.2d 1059, 1062 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (“[A] jury cannot consider the elements of the greater offense without simultaneously considering the elements of the lesserincluded offense.”). For instance, a jury considering first degree premeditated murder must consider whether the defendant (1) unlawfully killed the victim; (2) did so intentionally; and (3) did so with premeditation. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1) (2003). By comparison, when considering 7 Juries that are unable to reach a unanimous verdict are commonly described as “hung.” In that event, the defendant is subject to being retried. 8 This is the case at least with respect to those lesser-included offenses whose statutory elements are included within the statutory elements of the offense charged, the first of three categories of lesser-included offenses set forth in Burns. 8 second degree murder, the jury must consider whether the defendant (1) unlawfully killed the victim; and (2) did so knowingly. See id. § 39-13-210(a)(1) (2003). Of course, when the jury is considering the second element of the greater offenseSwhether the defendant killed the victim intentionallySit is necessarily and simultaneously considering whether the defendant acted knowingly: “When the law provides that . . . acting knowingly suffices to establish an element, that element is also established if a person acts intentionally.” Id. § 39-11-301(a)(2) (2003). When considering whether a defendant intentionally killed the victim, then, the jury is simultaneously considering whether the defendant knowingly killed the victim. A defendant is therefore not “cheated” out of a jury’s consideration of lesser-included offenses simply because the jury is required to deliberate, and may convict, on the greater offense, first.9 We hold, therefore, that, while a defendant is entitled by our constitution to have the jury charged on all offenses encompassed within the indictment and supported by the proof, our constitution does not go so far as to mandate the order in which those offenses are considered. Our constitution also does not prohibit the requirement that a jury first reach a unanimous verdict of acquittal with respect to a greater offense before it proceeds to consider a defendant’s guilt of a lesser-included offense. We therefore reject the Defendant’s contention that the trial court’s acquittal-first instructions in this case violated his state constitutional right to trial by jury.10